Case Title: Holly Lornson v. Nadeem Siddiqui, M.D.

Citation: 2007 WI 92

Docket Number: 2005AP002315

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2315 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Holly Lornson, Individually, and as Successor 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Janice M. 
Sanders, and as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Joseph D. Sanders, and Kim Hoertsch, 
Individually, and as Successor Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Janice M. 
Sanders, and as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Joseph D. Sanders, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Tommy Thompson Secretary, Department of Health & 
Human Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Nadeem Siddiqui, M.D., Paul McAvoy, M.D., 
Matthew Williams, M.D., James E. Haine, M.D., 
John E. Almquist, M.D., Frederick W. Knoch, 
M.D., Affinity Medical Group/Affinity Health 
System, St. Elizabeth Hospital, Inc., The 
Medical Protective Company, Preferred 
Professional Insurance Company, and Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 11, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Hawley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
CROOKS, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
 
2 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Lynn R. 
Laufenberg and Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Michael 
P. Russart and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Milwaukee; David Colwin 
and Sager, Colwin, Samuelsen & Associates, S.C., Fond du Lac; 
Terri L. Weber and Nash, Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken, LLP, 
Manitowoc; Peter J. Hickey and Everson, Whitney, Everson & 
Brehm, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by Michael P. Russart. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Guy DuBeau and Axley 
Brynelson, LLP, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Hospital 
Association, Inc. and the Wisconsin Medical Society, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee; D. James 
Weis and Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Rhinelander, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2007 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2315   
(L.C. No. 
2003CV1094) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Holly Lornson, Individually, and as Successor 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Janice 
M. Sanders, and as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Joseph D. Sanders, and Kim 
Hoertsch, Individually, and as Successor 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Janice 
M. Sanders, and as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Joseph D. Sanders, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Tommy Thompson Secretary, Department of Health 
& Human Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Nadeem Siddiqui, M.D., Paul McAvoy, M.D., 
Matthew Williams, M.D., James E. Haine, M.D., 
John E. Almquist, M.D., Frederick W. Knoch, 
M.D., Affinity Medical Group/Affinity Health 
System, St. Elizabeth Hospital, Inc., The 
Medical Protective Company, Preferred 
Professional Insurance Company, and Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2315 
2 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Robert A. Hawley, Judge.  Affirmed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06).1  Holly Lornson (Lornson) and Kim 
Hoertsch (Hoertsch) seek review of a circuit court order 
dismissing their wrongful death claims against Nadeem Siddiqui, 
M.D.; Paul McAvoy, M.D.; Matthew Williams, M.D.; James E. Haine, 
M.D.; John E. Almquist, M.D.; Frederick W. Knoch, M.D.; Affinity 
Medical Group/Affinity Health System; St. Elizabeth Hospital 
Inc.; 
The 
Medical 
Protective 
Company; 
and 
the 
Preferred 
Professional Insurance Company (collectively, defendants).2 
¶2 
Lornson and Hoertsch are the adult daughters of Janice 
and Joseph Sanders, both deceased.  They appear in this 
litigation in several capacities, but appear in this appeal as 
(1) personal representatives of their father's estate; and (2) 
individual claimants as adult children of their late mother. 
¶3 
During his lifetime, Joseph Sanders filed a wrongful 
death claim against the defendants for medical negligence in the 
death of his wife Janice.  He died before his case could go to 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted.   
2 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
the 
Wisconsin 
Patients 
Compensation Fund's motion for summary judgment on the basis 
that the overall damages claimed by Lornson and Hoertsch would 
not exceed $1 million.  Lornson and Hoertsch do not seek review 
of this order. 
No.  2005AP2315 
3 
 
trial.  His daughters, Lornson and Hoertsch, were appointed 
personal representatives for their father's estate, and, in that 
capacity, 
they 
pursued 
his 
wrongful 
death 
claim, 
citing 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o). 
 
At 
the 
same 
time, 
in 
the 
alternative, they made their own individual claims for the 
wrongful death of their mother, citing Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). 
¶4 
The circuit court dismissed these wrongful death 
claims on grounds that Lornson and Hoertsch lacked standing 
under the applicable statutes to maintain medical malpractice 
wrongful death claims.  Lornson and Hoertsch appealed.  The 
court of appeals certified the case to this court.  After 
carefully reviewing the governing statutes and case law, we 
affirm.  We hold that in wrongful death actions, an eligible 
claimant's cause of action does not survive the death of the 
claimant.  Thus, Joseph Sanders' wrongful death claim does not 
survive.  In a non-medical malpractice wrongful death case, 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), a new cause of action is available 
to the next claimant in the statutory hierarchy.  In a medical 
malpractice wrongful death case, eligible claimants under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 are not subject to a statutory hierarchy 
like claimants under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  However, in a 
medical malpractice wrongful death case, adult children of the 
deceased (like Lornson and Hoertsch) are not listed as eligible 
claimants and are therefore not eligible because of the 
exclusivity of Wis. Stat. § 655.007, as interpreted in Czapinski 
v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2000 WI 80, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 
N.W.2d 120.   
No.  2005AP2315 
4 
 
¶5 
In addition, we hold that our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
in 
conjunction 
with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 895.04(2) does not deprive Joseph 
Sanders or his estate of a vested property right without due 
process or violate equal protection of the law.  We remand the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings on the 
separate claim of the estate of Janice M. Sanders. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice 
wrongful death/survival action.  On November 11, 2002, Janice 
Sanders died from complications of a large paraesophageal hiatal 
hernia.  On October 22, 2003, Joseph Sanders filed a complaint 
against the defendants on behalf of himself individually and as 
special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife.  In 
his complaint, Joseph Sanders alleged that defendants acted 
negligently by failing to timely diagnose and treat Janice 
Sanders' paraesophageal hernia.  He alleged that the defendants' 
negligence led to Mrs. Sanders' excessive vomiting, aspiration, 
cardiopulmonary arrest, resuscitation, coma, and eventual death. 
¶7 
Joseph Sanders sought compensatory damages on behalf 
of his wife's estate for Mrs. Sanders' conscious pain and 
suffering before her death.  He also sought compensatory damages 
on behalf of himself for the loss of society, companionship, and 
consortium of his wife; pecuniary loss of his wife's services; 
and medical, funeral, and burial expenses. 
¶8 
After initial discovery but before trial, Joseph 
Sanders died.  On April 26, 2005, Joseph Sanders' counsel filed 
No.  2005AP2315 
5 
 
a motion for substitution of plaintiffs and for leave to file a 
supplemental complaint.  The motion asked the court for three 
things: (1) an order substituting Lornson and Hoertsch for 
Joseph Sanders as successor special administrators of the estate 
of Janice Sanders; (2) an order appointing Lornson and Hoertsch 
as personal representatives of the estate of Joseph Sanders; and 
(3) 
an 
order 
allowing 
Lornson 
and 
Hoertsch 
to 
file 
a 
supplemental complaint.  The court issued two orders, one that 
appointed Lornson and Hoertsch as personal representatives of 
their father's estate and one that appointed Lornson and 
Hoertsch as successor administrators of their mother's estate.  
By consent of the parties, a supplemental complaint was filed on 
May 3, 2005.  
¶9 
Lornson and Hoertsch sought compensatory damages under 
three theories of recovery: (1) on behalf of the estate of 
Janice Sanders in their capacities as special administrators; 
(2) on behalf of the estate of Joseph Sanders in their 
capacities as personal representatives; and (3) alternative to 
the second theory, on behalf of themselves in their individual 
capacities as the surviving daughters and lineal heirs of Janice 
Sanders. 
¶10 All defendants joined in a motion to dismiss the 
wrongful death claim asserted on behalf of Joseph Sanders' 
estate, and in the alternative, on behalf of Lornson and 
Hoertsch individually.  The defendants asserted Lornson and 
Hoertsch lacked standing to bring a wrongful death claim in 
their capacities as personal representatives of their father's 
No.  2005AP2315 
6 
 
estate or as individuals.  The defendants argued that the 
wrongful death claim did not survive the death of Joseph Sanders 
and that Lornson and Hoertsch, in their individual capacities, 
were not eligible to make a medical malpractice wrongful death 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 655.007.  The defendants conceded that 
the survival claim by the special administrators on behalf of 
Janice Sanders' estate was unaffected by Joseph Sanders' death. 
¶11 The parties submitted their briefs, and on July 21, 
2005, the Honorable Robert A. Hawley, judge of the Winnebago 
County Circuit Court, heard oral argument.  The circuit court 
granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the wrongful death 
claims.  The court reasoned that Wis. Stat. § 655.007 provided 
the exclusive list of claimants eligible to bring a medical 
malpractice action.  It concluded that because the list in 
§ 655.007 
did 
not 
include 
adult 
children 
or 
a 
spouse's 
representative, the legislature did not intend for adult 
children or the spouse's representative to bring a wrongful 
death claim.  The court also refused to apply the general 
provisions 
of 
the 
wrongful 
death 
statute 
in 
a 
medical 
malpractice case because those general provisions were not 
incorporated by reference into Chapter 655. 
¶12 Lornson and Hoertsch filed a notice of appeal of the 
wrongful death dismissal, and the parties agreed to adjourn the 
trial of the estate's survival claim pending the resolution of 
this appeal.  On May 17, 2006, the court of appeals certified 
the case to this court, asking us to address the issue of 
whether "a surviving spouse's wrongful death claim in a medical 
No.  2005AP2315 
7 
 
malpractice action survive[s] his or her own death such that his 
or her personal representatives have standing to pursue that 
claim."  This court accepted certification on June 14, 2006.  We 
also address the individual wrongful death claims of Mrs. 
Sanders' adult children.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 This case comes to us on review of a motion to 
dismiss.  We address whether Lornson and Hoertsch (hereinafter 
Lornson) assert claims upon which relief can be granted.  See 
Brew City Redevelopment Group, LLC v. Ferchill Group, 2006 WI 
128, ¶15, 297 Wis. 2d 606, 724 N.W.2d 879.  This presents a 
question of law that we review de novo, benefiting from the 
certification memorandum and the circuit court's analysis.  
Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶6, 262 
Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.  We take as true the allegations in 
the 
complaint 
and 
all 
reasonable 
inferences 
from 
those 
allegations.  Id., ¶5. 
¶14 To determine whether Lornson has asserted claims upon 
which relief can be granted, we must interpret and apply several 
statutes, 
including 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.006 
and 
655.007 
and 
provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 895.  Statutory interpretation 
presents questions of law that we review de novo.  Vill. of 
Cross Plains v. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, ¶9, 288 Wis. 2d 551, 709 
N.W.2d 447; Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 664, 456 
N.W.2d 336 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Chang v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 566, 514 N.W.2d 399 
(1994).   
No.  2005AP2315 
8 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶15 Defendants challenge the standing of Lornson to bring 
wrongful death claims under Wisconsin Statutes.  To determine 
whether adult children of a deceased parent or the personal 
representatives of a surviving but now deceased spouse are 
eligible to bring a medical malpractice wrongful death claim, we 
look to the language of Wis. Stat. §§ 655.006 and 655.007.   
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.006 provides in part: "Remedy. 
(1)(a) On and after July 24, 1975, every patient [and] every 
patient's representative . . . shall be conclusively presumed to 
have accepted to be bound by this chapter." 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.007 provides: "Patients' Claims.  
On and after July 24, 1975, any patient or the patient's 
representative having a claim or any spouse, parent, minor 
sibling or child of the patient having a derivative claim for 
injury or death on account of malpractice is subject to this 
chapter." 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.007 creates two kinds of claims: 
direct claims for injury or death on account of medical 
malpractice, and derivative claims for injury or death on 
account of medical malpractice.  A patient has a direct claim 
for the patient's injury.  The patient's representative has a 
direct claim for the patient's injury or death.  There is no 
dispute that Lornson has a direct claim as successor special 
administrator of her mother's estate because all parties concede 
that the estate's claim survives.   
No.  2005AP2315 
9 
 
¶19 There would be no dispute that Lornson also has a 
derivative claim under Wis. Stat. § 655.007 for her mother's 
death if the phrase "child of the patient" includes an adult 
child.  However, this court held in Czapinski that adult 
children are not included in the § 655.007 list of claimants.  
In Czapinski, the court stated:  
[T]he 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) 
makes 
applicable to medical malpractice death cases only the 
limit on damages, and does not incorporate the 
wrongful death classification of claimants entitled to 
bring such an action.  The classification of claimants 
entitled to bring a wrongful death suit for medical 
malpractice 
is 
limited 
to 
those 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007.  Legislative history shows that 
adult children were not intended to be included within 
this classification. 
 
. . . . 
 
We hold that an adult child lacks standing to 
recover for loss of society and companionship in a 
wrongful death case involving medical malpractice. 
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶¶2, 33. 
¶20 Only minor children and minor siblings, plus the 
spouse and parents of the patient, have derivative claims under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007.  As we elaborate in section III.B. infra, 
this settles the issue of Lornson's individual claim.3   
                                                 
3 In Pierce v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2007 WI 
App __, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, the court of appeals 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) to include adult children as 
eligible claimants under the wrongful death statute.  However, 
the Pierce case was not a wrongful death case involving medical 
malpractice, and the court distinguished the case from Czapinski 
v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2000 WI 80, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 
N.W.2d 120, on that basis.  Pierce, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶10 n.3.   
No.  2005AP2315 
10 
 
¶21 In addition, there is no dispute that Joseph Sanders 
had a derivative wrongful death claim before his death, for he 
was a "spouse . . . of the patient."  The certified question in 
this appeal is whether this derivative claim survived Joseph 
Sanders' death, inasmuch as the personal representative of any 
"spouse, parent, minor sibling or child of the patient"——like an 
adult child——is not included in the Wis. Stat. § 655.007 list. 
¶22 Wisconsin has a separate statute on "[w]hat actions 
survive."  Wis. Stat. § 895.01.  Because of the existence of 
this statute, we must examine whether the language and history 
of Chapter 655 absolutely limit the potential claimants to the 
list enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 655.007, or whether the list of 
claimants may also include potential claimants allowed under the 
wrongful 
death 
statute. 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) 
and 
895.04(2). 
A. 
Exclusivity of Wisconsin Statute Chapter 655 
¶23 Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin Statutes was enacted in 
1975 "in response to a perceived economic and social crisis."  
State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 499, 509, 
261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).  It established an exclusive procedure 
for the prosecution of malpractice claims against a health care 
provider. 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.006, 
655.007; 
Strykowski, 
81 
Wis. 2d at 
499. 
 
Every 
patient 
and 
every 
patient's 
representative shall be "conclusively presumed to be bound by 
the provisions of the chapter regardless of injury or death."  
Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 665.  Over the years, courts have 
grappled with the impact of the "exclusivity" of Chapter 655 and 
No.  2005AP2315 
11 
 
whether statutory provisions not referenced by or incorporated 
into Chapter 655 may be applied to medical malpractice actions.   
¶24 One line of cases supports the proposition that 
Chapter 
655 
"precludes 
from 
application 
those 
statutory 
provisions not expressly referred to in that chapter."  Dziadosz 
v. Zirneski, 177 Wis. 2d 59, 63, 501 N.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 666-67 ("We do not believe that 
the legislature would have taken pains to specifically refer to 
particular statutes . . . if it intended to incorporate without 
mention other miscellaneous general provisions, such as sec. 
895.04(4).")); see also Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 512 N.W.2d 764 (1994), superseded by 
statute, 
1995 
Wis. 
Act 
10, 
§ 10 
(codified 
at 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), 
as 
recognized 
in 
Czapinski, 
236 
Wis. 2d 316, ¶16).  This interpretation of "exclusivity" would 
not only limit medical malpractice claimants to the list in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 but also prevent any incorporation of 
general statutory provisions not referenced in Chapter 655.  It 
would bar Lornson's claim as personal representative of her 
father's estate because Chapter 655 does not contain its own 
survival provisions or incorporate survival provisions from 
Chapter 895.  It would also bar any claim she had as an adult 
child of Janice Sanders because Chapter 655 does not include an 
adult child as an eligible claimant and does not incorporate the 
eligible claimants provision of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  
¶25 There is, however, another line of cases that supports 
the proposition that Chapter 655 is not totally self-contained 
No.  2005AP2315 
12 
 
and that statutory provisions may be applied in medical 
malpractice cases if they do not conflict with Chapter 655.  See 
Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶33-35, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 
665 N.W.2d 353; Hoffman v. Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, 196 
Wis. 2d 505, 513-14, 538 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1995).  In Storm, 
the court stated that: "Numerous statutes, including civil 
procedure and discovery statutes, that are not located in 
Chapter 
655 
apply 
to 
claims 
brought 
for 
medical 
malpractice. . . . Rineck stands for the proposition that if 
general statutory provisions conflict with Chapter 655, the 
latter will trump the general statute."  Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 
¶¶34-35 (internal citations omitted).  "If we accept the view 
that ch. 655, Stats., is self-contained, subject to no outside 
rules of practice and procedure, there would be no discovery, 
summary 
judgment, 
or 
amendment 
of 
pleadings 
in 
medical 
malpractice cases because ch. 655 does not mention those 
procedures."  Hoffman, 196 Wis. 2d at 514.  This second line of 
cases permits consideration of statutory provisions that do not 
conflict with the specific provisions or general purposes of 
Chapter 655. 
¶26 As we interpret statutes, we are mindful of our 
obligation, first, to apply the plain language of a statute so 
long as it does not produce a plainly absurd result, and, 
second, when the statute is ambiguous, to seek out and 
faithfully apply legislative intent.  Teschendorf v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  We 
do not discern the language of Chapter 655 to prohibit the 
No.  2005AP2315 
13 
 
applicability of general statutes if these statutes complement 
and do not conflict with Chapter 655.  Against this background, 
we turn to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) to determine whether the 
statute complements or conflicts with Chapter 655. 
B. 
Eligible 
Claimants 
in 
Wrongful 
Death 
Actions 
Under 
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 
 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(1) reads as follows: "(1) An 
action for wrongful death may be brought by the personal 
representative of the deceased person or by the person to whom 
the amount recovered belongs." 
 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) reads in part as follows: 
If the deceased leaves surviving a spouse, and 
minor children under 18 years of age with whose 
support the deceased was legally charged, the court 
before whom the action is pending, or if no action is 
pending any court of record, in recognition of the 
duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor 
children, shall determine the amount, if any, to be 
set aside for the protection of such children . . . .  
If there are no such surviving minor children, the 
amount recovered shall belong and be paid to the 
spouse of the deceased; if no spouse survives, to the 
deceased's lineal heirs as determined by s. 852.01; if 
no lineal heirs survive, to the deceased's brothers 
and sisters.  If any such relative dies before 
judgment in the action, the relative next in order 
shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful death. 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) provides a hierarchical 
list of wrongful death claimants.  Lineal heirs of the deceased 
are included on the list.  Lineal heirs become eligible when "no 
spouse [of the deceased] survives."  Lineal heirs include adult 
children.  Thus, the wrongful death statute makes Lornson 
eligible to assert a wrongful death claim for her mother's 
No.  2005AP2315 
14 
 
death.  However, her eligibility under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) is 
in 
direct 
conflict 
with 
her 
ineligibility 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 and would contradict the decisions in 
Czapinski 
and 
Dziadosz. 
 
Consequently, 
in 
view 
of 
the 
unquestioned primacy of Chapter 655 in medical malpractice 
cases, Lornson's individual claim in her capacity as an adult 
child is barred under Wis. Stat. § 655.007.   
C. 
Survival of Wrongful Death Claim Upon Death of the Claimant 
 
¶30 Lornson's 
claim 
as 
Joseph 
Sanders' 
personal 
representative 
is 
more 
difficult 
to 
assess 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 clearly allows a spouse to bring a wrongful 
death claim, and the chapter is silent as to what happens to 
that claim when the spouse dies before judgment.  If Chapter 655 
spoke to the survival of an eligible claimant's claim, this 
court would have its marching orders.  The chapter's silence 
requires interpretation. 
¶31 Because Chapter 655 is silent regarding the survival 
of a spouse's medical malpractice wrongful death claim, we refer 
to the general wrongful death provisions in Chapter 895 to 
determine whether the spouse's claim survives.  We rely on 
statutory provisions, rather than common law, to determine 
survivability because a wrongful death action is a purely 
statutory 
creation 
unknown 
to 
common 
law, 
and 
thus 
its 
survivability depends solely on a statutory provision.  Kranz v. 
Wis. Trust Co., 155 Wis. 40, 42, 143 N.W. 1049 (1913); Brown v. 
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140, 77 N.W. 48 (1899). 
No.  2005AP2315 
15 
 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.01(1) is the general survival 
statute, and paragraph (o) addresses the survival of a wrongful 
death claim.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) provides: 
(1) In addition to the causes of action that 
survive at common law, all of the following also 
survive: 
. . . .  
(o) Causes of action for wrongful death, which 
shall survive the death of the wrongdoer whether or 
not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or 
after the death of the injured person. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o). 
¶33 Lornson 
argues 
that 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) is unambiguous.  She argues that 
paragraph (o) assures that causes of action for wrongful death 
survive the death of the claimant as well as the death of the 
wrongdoer.  She describes the clause beginning with "which" as a 
nonrestrictive, relative pronoun clause, meaning that this  
language about the death of the wrongdoer simply provides 
additional, but not essential, information about the phrase that 
it modifies.   
¶34 Though 
arguing 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) 
is 
unambiguous, Lornson fails to explain why the legislature would 
include additional information about the death of the wrongdoer 
if such information were not essential to the meaning of the 
statute.  Courts are to construe statutes so as to avoid 
rendering any of the statutory language superfluous.  Robin K. 
v. Lamanda M., 2006 WI 68, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 718 N.W.2d 38.   
No.  2005AP2315 
16 
 
¶35 If the legislature intended for the wrongful death 
cause of action to survive the death of both the claimant and 
the wrongdoer, why did it include specific language about the 
death of the wrongdoer but not include language about the death 
of the claimant?  If the legislature intended for the wrongful 
death cause of action to survive the death of both the claimant 
and the wrongdoer, why did the legislature not write paragraph 
(o) consistent with the other paragraphs in the survival statute 
by stopping after the words "wrongful death"?  In all the other 
paragraphs 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), 
the 
legislature 
provides simply that a particular cause of action survives, and 
does not add any non-restrictive, relative pronoun clauses about 
the death of the wrongdoer.4   
¶36 Lornson's interpretation, while a strict adherence to 
the rules of grammar, is not the only possible interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o).  Another reasonable interpretation of 
the statute is that, by specifically including the language 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(a), (b), (c), and (d): 
(1) In addition to the causes of action that survive 
at common law, all of the following also survive: 
 
(a) Causes of action to determine paternity. 
 
(b) Causes 
of 
action 
for 
the 
recovery 
of 
personal property or the unlawful withholding or 
conversion of personal property. 
 
(c) Causes of action for the recovery of the 
possession of real estate and for the unlawful 
withholding of the possession of real estate.  
 
(d) Causes of action for assault and battery. 
No.  2005AP2315 
17 
 
about the death of the wrongdoer in paragraph (o), the 
legislature intended that the wrongful death cause of action 
survive only the death of the wrongdoer, and not the claimant.   
¶37 Thus, Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) is ambiguous because 
it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.  See 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶47, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  This ambiguity is 
fortified after reading Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) in the context 
of Chapter 895.  As we stated in Kalal,  
Context is important to meaning.  So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative 
language appears.  Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results. 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46. 
 
When 
we 
read 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) in the context of surrounding or 
closely 
related 
statutes 
in 
the 
chapter, 
we 
conclude 
that § 895.01(1)(o) 
conflicts 
with 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  Ambiguity may be created by the 
interaction of two conflicting statutes.  Morrissette v. 
DeZonia, 63 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 217 N.W.2d 377 (1974).   
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) provides a hierarchy of 
eligible claimants in a general wrongful death action.  As we 
noted above, under the statute, the spouse and minor children 
are first in line to make a wrongful death claim; if there are 
no minor children, the claim belongs to the spouse; if no spouse 
No.  2005AP2315 
18 
 
survives, the claim belongs to the lineal heirs (as determined 
by Wis. Stat. § 852.01); if no lineal heirs survive, the claim 
belongs 
to 
the 
deceased's 
brothers 
and 
sisters. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). 
¶39 This statute specifically provides that "[i]f any such 
relative dies before judgment in the action, the relative next 
in order shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful death."  
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) (emphasis added).  It is implicit in this 
provision that a claimant's cause of action does not survive the 
claimant's death before judgment; rather, a new cause of action 
is available to the next relative in line.  This was the 
interpretation given by this court in Eleason v. Western 
Casualty & Surety Co., 254 Wis. 134, 139, 35 N.W.2d 301 (1948), 
and it has never been changed.  To interpret a wrongful death 
claim as surviving the death of the claimant would render this 
provision in § 895.04(2) meaningless and superfluous because no 
causes of action would pass to the next relative in line but 
would be assumed by the claimant's personal representative.  
Statutory construction requires that a law be construed so that 
no word or clause is surplusage.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46.   
¶40 Therefore, 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) 
is 
inconsistent in its drafting with the other paragraphs in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), contains superfluous language if the 
language about the death of the wrongdoer is stripped of all 
significance, 
and 
directly 
conflicts 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), 
we 
conclude 
that 
No.  2005AP2315 
19 
 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) is ambiguous.  We therefore refer to 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) 
and 
895.04(2) to discern their meaning.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶¶50-51.   
¶41 We begin with historical context.  Actions for 
wrongful death are created by statute and did not survive at 
common law.  Thus, "[u]nless some statute can be found providing 
for survival, the action abates."  Kranz, 155 Wis. at 42.  This 
principle has been part of Wisconsin law since statehood.   
¶42 The first case to discuss this principle was Woodward 
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 23 Wis. 400 (June Term, 
1868).  Julia Woodward was allegedly killed by negligence.  A 
complaint was filed by her husband, claiming special damages.  
Before judgment, the husband died and the defendant claimed that 
the wrongful death cause of action had abated.  Id. at 400.  The 
court said: 
 
In this case, the deceased, who was a married 
woman, left a husband, who survived until some time 
after this action was commenced.  Upon her death, 
therefore, the right of action, by the statute, vested 
solely and exclusively for the benefit of her husband.  
He alone was entitled to the amount to be recovered, 
and could hold and dispose of the same at pleasure.  
The lineal descendants and ancestors of the deceased 
had no interest whatever in the action . . . . 
 
The question then arises as to the effect of the 
death of the husband: Did the action abate thereby, or 
does it survive, so that it may still be prosecuted 
for the benefit of the infant child . . . ? 
 
[Being] an action of tort, and the sole party in 
interest having died, the next inquiry is, whether it 
falls within the general rule of the common law, that 
No.  2005AP2315 
20 
 
such an action does not survive the death of the party 
in whose favor it existed.  It is very clear to our 
minds 
that 
it 
is 
not 
distinguishable 
in 
this 
particular from other actions of tort, and that the 
common law must govern, unless it has been taken out 
of the operation of that rule by some express 
provision of statute.  We know of no such provision. 
 
. . . .  
. . . It appears that the person so entitled 
died, and that the right of action expired with 
him . . . . 
Id. at 404-06. 
 
¶43 The principle that a wrongful death claim does not 
survive the death of the claimant was affirmed in Schmidt v. 
Menasha Woodenware Co., 99 Wis. 300, 303, 74 N.W. 797 (1898).  
It was reaffirmed in 1948 in Eleason.  However, the Eleason 
court noted that the legislature changed and ameliorated the law 
in 1931, ch. 263, Laws of 1931, adding the following sentence to 
Wis. Stat. § 331.04 (the forerunner of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2)): 
"If any of the foregoing relatives shall die at any time after 
such cause of action shall have accrued, the relative or 
relatives next in order named above shall be entitled to recover 
for the wrongful death of the deceased."5  The court explained: 
"By that clause, when the widow [of the deceased] died, a cause 
of action for the wrongful death [of the deceased] vested in the 
deceased's lineal descendants.  It was not her cause of action, 
but a new one given the lineal descendants by the statute."  
                                                 
5 The contemporary equivalent of the above-quoted language 
is contained in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2): "If any such relative 
dies before judgment in the action, the relative next in order 
shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful death." 
No.  2005AP2315 
21 
 
Eleason, 254 Wis. at 139; see also Herro v. Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 
68, 37 N.W.2d 874 (1949); Arendt v. Kratz, 258 Wis. 437, 441, 46 
N.W.2d 219 (1951); Murray v. Dewar, 6 Wis. 2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 
(1959); Collins v. Gee, 82 Wis. 2d 376, 382-83, 263 N.W.2d 158 
(1978) ("[I]t is clearly the law of Wisconsin that a cause of 
action of a particular beneficiary under the wrongful death 
statute terminates upon the death of the beneficiary where no 
judgment has been entered.").6 
 
¶44 To sum up, the legislature has historically used the 
wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.04, to delineate the 
eligibility 
and 
priority 
of 
claimants. 
 
The 
statute 
is 
hierarchical.  Thus, a claimant's personal claim does not 
survive his death; it is succeeded by a new claim for someone 
lower in the hierarchy. 
 
¶45 Wrongful death claims also abated at common law upon 
the death of the wrongdoer.  See Kranz, 155 Wis. 40; Layton v. 
Rowland, 197 Wis. 535, 222 N.W. 811 (1929). 
¶46 In Kranz, the court held that based on the survival 
statute at the time, a widow's claim for wrongful death of her 
husband did not survive the death of the wrongdoer.  Kranz, 155 
Wis. at 43.  In that case, the wrongdoer died after the husband 
died but before the widow of the deceased obtained judgment in 
the action.  Id. at 41.  The court noted that if the legislature 
                                                 
6 At least one other jurisdiction has cited Wisconsin as a 
jurisdiction that holds that the wrongful death claim abates 
upon the death of the claimant.  See Johnson 	

	
  
   	 !" 		 Schmidt v. Menasha Woodenware 
Co., 99 Wis. 300, 74 N.W. 797 (1898)) 
No.  2005AP2315 
22 
 
intended a different rule, it could easily provide one.  Id. at 
44.   
¶47 Sixteen years later, the Layton court upheld Kranz, 
noting that the legislature had taken no action in response to 
Kranz, and therefore the court did "not deem it proper to 
reconsider the matter."  Layton, 197 Wis. at 537.   
¶48 In 1933 the legislature responded to the court's 
suggestions that the survival statute, Wis. Stat. § 331.01, be 
changed.  It added this sentence: "Actions for wrongful death 
shall survive the death of the wrongdoer."7 
¶49 A problem surfaced almost immediately.  In Hegel v. 
George, 218 Wis. 327, 259 N.W. 862 (1935), the court concluded 
that the cause of action for wrongful death did not survive the 
                                                 
7 The complete survival statute, as amended by § 1, ch. 53, 
Laws of 1933, read as follows: 
In addition to the actions which survive at 
common law the following shall also survive: Actions 
for the recovery of personal property or the unlawful 
withholding or conversion thereof, for the recovery of 
the possession of real estate and for the unlawful 
withholding of the possession thereof, for assault and 
battery, false imprisonment or other damage to the 
person, for all damage done to the property rights or 
interests of another, for goods taken and carried 
away, for damages done to real or personal estate, 
equitable actions to set aside conveyances of real 
estate, to compel a reconveyance thereof, or to quiet 
the title thereto, and for a specific performance of 
contracts relating to real estate; provided this act 
shall have no application to pending litigation.  
Actions for wrongful death shall survive the death of 
the wrongdoer. 
Wis. Stat. § 331.01 (1933-34) (emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP2315 
23 
 
death of the wrongdoer when the wrongdoer died prior to the 
death of the injured person.  Id. at 329.  The court said that 
where the wrongdoer died before the injured person, the cause of 
action for wrongful death——which is a separate and distinct 
action from any personal injury action——had not arisen or 
accrued when the wrongdoer died.  Id. at 330.  Hence, the court 
found 
that 
the 
1933 
amendment 
to 
the 
survival 
statute 
"operate[d] only upon causes of action which ha[d] come into 
existence during the lifetime of the [wrongdoer]."  Id. at 329. 
¶50 In response to Hegel, the legislature amended the 
survival statute in 1937 and added the following underlined 
language: "Actions for wrongful death shall survive the death of 
the wrongdoer whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred 
before or after the death of the injured person."  § 1, ch. 189, 
Laws of 1937; see also drafting records, § 1, ch. 189, Laws of 
1937 (located at the Legislative Reference Bureau in Madison, 
Wisconsin). 
¶51 Although the survival statute was amended several 
times thereafter,8 the pertinent language concerning the survival 
of a wrongful death claim upon the death of the wrongdoer 
remained unchanged until 1999 when the legislature amended the 
statute again.  See 1999 Wis. Act 85, § 171.  In 1999 the 
legislature reorganized Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), outlining all 
the causes of action that survive in individual lettered 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., § 3, ch. 176, Laws of 1977; 1987 Wis. Act 399, 
§ 472zkbb; 1993 Wis. Act 481, § 192. 
No.  2005AP2315 
24 
 
paragraphs.  The provision on wrongful death was placed in 
paragraph (o) and changed as indicated by the strikethrough and 
underline:  
(1) In addition to the causes of action that 
survive at common law, all of the following shall also 
survive: causes 
. . . . 
(o) Causes of action for wrongful death, which 
shall survive the death of the wrongdoer whether or 
not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or 
after the death of the injured person. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o). 
¶52 The 1999 amendment made ambiguous the wrongful death 
survival provision.  As described earlier, the addition of the 
comma and the "which" created a nonrestrictive clause, making 
all 
language 
about 
the 
death 
of 
the 
wrongdoer 
arguably 
nonessential and superfluous.  Where the survival statute once 
provided that a wrongful death claim survived only the death of 
the wrongdoer, the 1999 amendment to the survival statute made 
ambiguous whether a wrongful death claim survived both the death 
of the wrongdoer and the claimant. 
¶53 Before the 1999 legislation, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1) 
and 
895.04(2) 
did 
not conflict.  The first dealt with 
wrongdoers; the second dealt with claimants.  After the 1999 
amendment, it became unclear whether the legislature intended to 
substantively change Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) by extending its 
scope to a new class of wrongful death cases, beyond its 
historical limit. 
No.  2005AP2315 
25 
 
¶54 After 
analyzing 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), we conclude that the legislature did not 
intend to make any substantive change when it amended the law in 
1999.  Five pieces of evidence lead us to this conclusion.   
¶55 The first piece of evidence that the legislature 
intended merely to reorganize the statute with no substantive 
change is the fact that the assembly bill that led to 1999 Wis. 
Act 85 (codified in part at Wis. Stat. § 895.01) is a Revisor's 
Correction Bill.  1999 A.B. 925.  This fact is significant 
because 
the 
Revisor's 
duties 
are 
mainly 
ministerial 
and 
editorial; the Revisor rarely proposes any substantive changes 
in the law, and if it does, the changes are very minor.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(j).  Wisconsin Stat. § 13.93(2) spells out 
the duties of the Revisor of Statutes.  It provides in part: 
The revisor of statutes shall: 
. . . . 
(j) In 
cooperation 
with 
the 
law 
revision 
committee, systematically examine and identify for 
revision by the legislature the statutes and session 
laws to eliminate defects, anachronisms, conflicts, 
ambiguities, 
and 
unconstitutional 
or 
obsolete 
provisions.  The revisor shall prepare and, at each 
session of the legislature, present to the law 
revision committee bills that eliminate identified 
defects, anachronisms, conflicts, ambiguities, and 
unconstitutional or obsolete provisions.  These bills 
may include minor substantive changes in the statutes 
and session laws necessary to accomplish the purposes 
of this paragraph. 
Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(j). 
 
¶56 The second piece of evidence that the legislature 
intended no substantive change in the section is the "relating 
No.  2005AP2315 
26 
 
clause," which provides that 1999 Wis. Act 85 is an act 
"relating to: repealing, consolidating, renumbering, amending 
and revising various provisions of the statutes for the purpose 
of 
correcting 
errors, supplying omissions, correcting and 
clarifying 
references, 
eliminating 
defects, 
anachronisms, 
conflicts, ambiguities and obsolete provisions, reconciling 
conflicts and repelling unintended repeals."  This descriptive 
language, 
which 
mirrors 
the 
Revisor's 
duties 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 13.93, reflects the legislature's lack of intent to 
make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01.   
 
¶57 The third piece of evidence that the legislature 
intended no substantive change in the section is the legislative 
note to the revision of Wis. Stat. § 895.01.  It provides the 
following: "Subdivides long provision in outline form to break 
up long sentence, consistent with current style."  Note, 1999 
Wis. Act 85, § 171.   
¶58 The fourth piece of evidence that the legislature did 
not intend to make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01 
is the length of the assembly bill that promulgated 1999 Wis. 
Act 85 and the lack of amendments to it.  The assembly bill is 
95 pages long with 202 sections.  1999 A.B. 925.  For a bill 
this long, one would expect at least some amendments if the bill 
were intended to make substantive changes to the law.  Instead, 
no amendments were proposed, and the bill passed with unanimous 
consent. 
 
Bulletin 
of 
the 
Proceedings 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 1999-2000 Session, Part 4, Assembly, at 292.  The 
No.  2005AP2315 
27 
 
lack of amendments to this bill illustrates the legislature's 
lack of intent to make any substantive change to § 895.01. 
¶59 The fifth piece of evidence that the legislature did 
not intend to make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01 
is that the assembly bill has no amendment or cross-reference to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  The Revisor of Statutes Bureau works to 
correct problems, not to create problems.  It would not have 
proposed a change that would have significantly altered the 
application of § 895.04(2) without addressing that subsection. 
¶60 Based on this evidence, we hold that the legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
make 
any 
substantive 
change 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01 when it amended the statute in 1999 and 
organized it into outline form.  We therefore uphold the body of 
case 
law 
that 
has 
been 
interpreting 
§ 895.01(1) 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) harmoniously and conclude that a wrongful 
death claim does not survive the death of the claimant.   
¶61 This holding applies equally to medical malpractice 
claims and non-medical malpractice claims.  We decline to 
entertain arguments that the survival rule should be applied 
more expansively to medical malpractice wrongful death actions.  
Lornson argues that because this court has held that the 
succession rule in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not apply to 
medical malpractice actions, see Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 671, 
this court should rely on its decision in City of Milwaukee v. 
Boynton Cab Co., 201 Wis. 581, 231 N.W. 597 (1930), which was 
decided before the enactment of the relevant language in 
§ 895.04(2), to find that a cause of action for wrongful death 
No.  2005AP2315 
28 
 
does not abate upon the death of the claimant in medical 
malpractice actions. 
¶62 Lornson's argument is without merit.  First, Boynton 
is not applicable because it involved a worker's compensation 
statute that specifically allowed the widow's wrongful death 
claim to be assigned.  See Boynton, 201 Wis. at 588-89.  This 
case involves no statute allowing for the assignment of Joseph 
Sanders' claim.  Second, and more important, the entire premise 
for looking outside the provisions of Chapter 655 is to apply 
general provisions of law to medical malpractice actions when 
they complement the chapter and are not in conflict with it.  To 
apply general provisions differently in medical malpractice 
actions would essentially create a whole new set of statutes 
governing medical malpractice. 
¶63 We also decline to entertain notions that the wrongful 
death claim could survive under other Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) 
provisions, such as "damage to the person," § 895.01(1)(g), or 
"damage done to the property rights or interests of another," 
§ 895.01(1)(h).  This court rejected a widow's argument in Kranz 
that her claim should survive the death of the wrongdoer under 
the "damage done to the property rights or interests of another" 
provision.  Kranz, 155 Wis. at 42.  The court held that this 
provision did not apply and responded with the following: 
"'[F]or all damage done to the property rights or interests of 
another' meant for all damage done to the property rights or 
interests of the deceased, and not to the property rights or 
No.  2005AP2315 
29 
 
interests 
of 
a 
relative 
or 
beneficiary 
named 
under 
the 
statute . . . ."  Id. at 42-43. 
¶64 The court in Schmidt held that a widow's wrongful 
death claim could not survive her death under the "or other 
damage to the person" provision.  Schmidt, 99 Wis. at 303.  The 
court stated:  
It will be observed that this action is not 
prosecuted to recover for damages to the person of the 
deceased [the husband].  As already stated, it can 
only be maintained for the recovery of such pecuniary 
loss as the widow sustained, and cannot, by the 
broadest latitude of construction, be held to fall 
under 
the 
clause 
"or 
other 
damage 
to 
the 
person . . . ." 
Id. 
¶65 In addition, the long line of cases interpreting the 
survivability of the wrongful death claim has never applied 
either of these survival provisions to preserve a wrongful death 
claim.  To apply these general provisions when a more specific 
wrongful death provision exists in paragraph (o) would be 
contrary to the canon of statutory construction that where two 
conflicting statutes apply to the same subject, the more 
specific statute controls.  State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, 
¶11, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435. 
¶66 Because Joseph Sanders' wrongful death claim does not 
survive his death, his estate's claim for damages for loss of 
society, companionship, and consortium of his wife and of her 
services of pecuniary value, together with medical, funeral, and 
burial expenses, must be dismissed.  The case must be remanded 
No.  2005AP2315 
30 
 
to the circuit court for further proceedings on the separate 
claim of the estate of Janice M. Sanders.  The circuit court is 
authorized to permit an amendment of that claim to include 
Janice Sanders' medical, funeral, and burial expenses.  See 
Schwab v. Nelson, 249 Wis. 563, 25 N.W.2d 445 (1946); Hegel, 218 
Wis. at 335. 
D. 
Lornson's Constitutional Claims 
¶67 Lornson 
contends 
that 
any 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 that denies Lornson's claim as personal 
representative of Joseph Sanders' estate would render the 
statute unconstitutional.  First, Lornson argues that Joseph 
Sanders' statutory right to recover damages for the death of his 
wife became a vested property right as of the date of his wife's 
death and, therefore, denial of Lornson's claim deprives Joseph 
Sanders and his estate of a vested property interest without due 
process of law.  Second, Lornson argues that denial of Lornson's 
claim in her capacity as personal representative of Joseph 
Sanders' estate deprives Joseph Sanders of equal protection of 
the law.   
¶68 As we address these constitutional arguments, we begin 
"with the presumption that a statute is constitutional[,] and 
[we] will continue to preserve a statute's constitutionality if 
there is a reasonable basis for the exercise of legislative 
power."  Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶27.  We uphold the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 and conclude that 
denial 
of 
Lornson's 
claim 
in 
her 
capacity 
as 
personal 
representative of Joseph Sanders' estate does not deprive Joseph 
No.  2005AP2315 
31 
 
Sanders or his estate of a vested property interest without due 
process of law.  Contrary to Lornson's argument, Joseph Sanders 
did not acquire a vested property right in a wrongful death 
cause of action as of the date of Janice Sanders' death.  A 
cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory.  No 
right of recovery was recognized at common law.  Chang, 182 
Wis. 2d at 560: 
As the right is created by statute, the right to 
recover damages for wrongful death and the terms of 
the recovery are confined to what is specified in the 
statute, and the right to recover damages is limited 
to 
members 
of 
those 
groups, 
or 
classes, 
of 
beneficiaries listed in the statute.   
Id. (internal citation omitted).  As noted previously, a 
wrongful death cause of action has always abated upon the 
claimant's death and will continue to do so unless the 
legislature provides for its survival.  See Kranz, 155 Wis. at 
42.  At the time of Janice Sanders' death, the statutory scheme 
did not allow Joseph Sanders' claim to survive his death.  Thus, 
Joseph Sanders was not deprived of a vested property right.9 
 
¶69 We also conclude that Joseph Sanders and his estate 
were not deprived of equal protection of the law.  We will 
                                                 
9 Lornson's reliance on Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 
531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), for her proposition that a claimant has a 
vested property right in a wrongful death cause of action as of 
the date of death is misplaced.  First, the Martin court did not 
involve a wrongful death cause of action or the survival statute 
(Wis. Stat. § 895.01).  Second, the Martin court explicitly 
declined to address whether the plaintiff's right to damages was 
"vested" at the time of injury.  See id. at 206 n.10. 
 
No.  2005AP2315 
32 
 
"uphold a statute under an equal protection analysis [i]f a 
rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the 
statute 
impinges 
on 
a 
fundamental 
right 
or 
creates 
a 
classification based on a suspect criterion."  Czapinski, 236 
Wis. 2d 316, ¶27 (alteration in original) (internal quotations 
omitted).  We affirm the conclusion in Czapinski and Strykowski 
that Wis. Stat. ch. 655 does not deny any fundamental right.  
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶28; Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 507.   
¶70 Our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
in 
conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 895.04(2) does 
not create a classification based on a suspect criterion.  "[A] 
suspect 
class 
is 
one 
that 
involves 
'immutable 
personal 
characteristics or historical patterns of discrimination and 
political powerlessness.'"  Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶28 
(quoting Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 507).  Lornson argues that 
our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 creates two classes 
of wrongful death claimants: (1) those spouses who survived 
until the trial and entry of judgment on their causes of action 
and; (2) those who died prior to trial and entry of judgment.  
We hold that these different classes of claimants "do not have 
immutable personal characteristics and have not experienced a 
historical 
pattern 
of 
discrimination 
and 
political 
powerlessness."  See id.  Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 655.007 does 
not create a classification that would be based on a suspect 
criterion.  See id.; see also Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶65, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.  
Because Wis. Stat. § 655.007 is not based on a fundamental right 
No.  2005AP2315 
33 
 
and does not involve a suspect class, we use the rational basis 
standard of review.  Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶28. 
¶71 In applying rational basis review to equal protection 
challenges, we are "not concerned with the wisdom or correctness 
of the legislative determination."  Id., ¶29.  Rather, we 
determine whether the legislature relied on a reasonable basis 
in enacting the statute.  A statute must meet five criteria of 
reasonableness.   
(1) 
All 
classifications 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class 
really different from another. 
(2) 
The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law.  
(3) 
The 
classification 
must 
not 
be 
based 
upon 
existing circumstances only and must not be so 
constituted as to preclude addition to the 
numbers within a class.   
(4) 
To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof. 
(5) 
The characteristics of each class should be so 
far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially 
different legislation. 
Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509 n.8.   
¶72 In 
this 
case, 
Lornson 
is 
challenging 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
in 
conjunction 
with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 895.04(2), in which we conclude 
that an eligible claimant's wrongful death cause of action does 
not survive the claimant's death should the claimant die before 
judgment.  A rational basis exists for the distinction between 
No.  2005AP2315 
34 
 
claimants who die before judgment and those who do not die 
before judgment.  A wrongful death cause of action "belongs to 
the beneficiaries and is designed to compensate for the loss of 
the relational interest existing between the beneficiaries and 
the decedent."  Weiss v. Regent Props., Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 
230, 346 N.W.2d 766 (1984).  "One of the purposes of the statute 
is to compensate the survivors for the pecuniary benefits which 
they would have derived from the earning power of the decedent 
had he or she lived."  Id.  Thus, the rule that a wrongful death 
cause of action does not survive is reasonable.  It allows the 
legislature to expand the scope of potential recovery to certain 
named beneficiaries, while ensuring that only those who actually 
survive and continue to suffer loss from the wrongful death are 
compensated.  The legislature may have thought it unfair that a 
beneficiary who dies before judgment should be entitled to 
recover for wrongful death and thus limit recovery to the living 
beneficiaries. 
 
We 
acknowledge 
that 
in 
this 
case 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 eliminates Lornson, in her capacity as an 
adult child, as an eligible claimant; however, as we held in 
Czapinski, classifications distinguishing between adult and 
minor children do not violate equal protection of the law.  
Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶33.   
 
¶73 Furthermore, we note that our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 in conjunction with §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 
895.04(2) has equal effect on all claimants, including spouses, 
who die before judgment.   
No.  2005AP2315 
35 
 
¶74 We therefore find that the classifications of spouses 
who survive final judgment and spouses who do not survive final 
judgment are not arbitrary or irrational, but are based on 
reasonable criteria.  Thus, Lornson's equal protection argument 
fails.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶75 We hold that in wrongful death actions, an eligible 
claimant's cause of action does not survive the death of the 
claimant.  Thus, Joseph Sanders' wrongful death claim does not 
survive.  In a non-medical malpractice wrongful death case, 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), a new cause of action is available 
to the next claimant in the statutory hierarchy.  In a medical 
malpractice wrongful death case, eligible claimants under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 are not subject to a statutory hierarchy 
like claimants under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  However, in a 
medical malpractice wrongful death case, adult children of the 
deceased (like Lornson and Hoertsch) are not listed as eligible 
claimants and are therefore not eligible because of the 
exclusivity 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007, 
as 
interpreted 
in 
Czapinski.  We therefore affirm the decision of the circuit 
court 
that 
Lornson's 
claim 
in 
her 
capacity 
as 
personal 
representative of Joseph Sanders' estate should be dismissed 
with prejudice, and that Lornson's alternative claim in her 
capacity as adult child of Janice Sanders should also be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
¶76 In addition, we hold that our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
in 
conjunction 
with 
No.  2005AP2315 
36 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 895.04(2) does not deprive Joseph 
Sanders or his estate of a vested property right without due 
process or violate equal protection of the law.  We remand the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings on the 
separate claim of the estate of Janice M. Sanders. 
¶77 These conclusions are consistent with the statutory 
framework promulgated by the legislature.  As we stated in Hegel 
and shall state again, "Th[is] situation is one which might 
properly be directed to the attention of the legislature, but 
one in which this court is powerless to act."  Hegel, 218 Wis. 
at 333.   
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
1 
 
¶78 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I join only that part of the majority 
opinion which concludes that Holly Lornson and Kim Hoertsch 
cannot, in their individual capacities, bring claims for their 
mother's wrongful death because, under Czapinski v. St. Francis 
Hospital, Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶2, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120, 
adult children are not included in the list of eligible 
claimants in Wis. Stat. § 655.007.  Majority op., ¶19.  I write 
separately because I strongly disagree with the majority’s 
conclusion that Holly Lornson and Kim Hoertsch, acting as 
personal representatives of the estate of Joseph Sanders, their 
father, cannot maintain the wrongful death claim that he had for 
the death of his spouse, their mother, Janice Sanders. 
¶79 Under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007, 
Joseph 
Sanders 
was 
eligible to bring a claim for Janice Sanders' wrongful death due 
to medical malpractice.  Section 655.007 states: 
On and after July 24, 1975, any patient or the 
patient’s representative having a claim or any spouse, 
parent, minor sibling or child of the patient having a 
derivative claim for injury or death on account of 
malpractice is subject to this chapter. 
Among the various statutory provisions found in Chapter 655, 
none describe what happens to a wrongful death claim for medical 
malpractice after the death of an eligible claimant.  As this 
court stated in Storm v. Legion Insurance Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶34, 
265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353: "Chapter 655 is not exclusive 
in the sense that it is a comprehensive set of procedural rules 
for medical malpractice claims."  Rather, numerous other 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
2 
statutes outside of Chapter 655 also apply, including civil 
procedure and discovery statutes.  Id.  As we stated in Stappas 
v. Kagan, 109 Wis. 2d 528, 530, 326 N.W.2d 757 (1982), "When 
Chapter 655 is silent on an issue, the law applicable to civil 
actions governs."   
¶80 It is helpful, then, to examine Chapter 877 of 
Wisconsin's Probate Code, in order to determine the authority of 
personal representatives to continue an action for the estate of 
an eligible claimant upon the death of the claimant.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 877.01 makes direct reference to Chapter 895, providing: 
If a cause of action survives under ch. 895, a 
personal representative may maintain an action on the 
cause of action against the wrongdoer in every case in 
which the decedent could, if living, maintain the 
action and, after the wrongdoer's death, against the 
wrongdoer's personal representative, except that this 
section shall not extend to actions for slander or 
libel.   
The majority opinion does not claim that § 877.01 is ambiguous, 
but disallows the personal representatives' wrongful death claim 
here chiefly because the decedent's adult children are his 
estate's personal representatives.  Majority op., ¶75.  
¶81 It 
seems 
clear 
based 
on 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) that the claim for Janice Sanders' 
wrongful death survived.  That section provides that among 
causes of action that survive are "[c]auses of action for 
wrongful death, which shall survive the death of the wrongdoer 
whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or 
after the death of the injured person." (Emphasis added.)   
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
3 
¶82 I strongly agree with the personal representatives' 
position that Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) unambiguously states 
that a cause of action for wrongful death survives the death of 
the claimant, as well as the death of the wrongdoer.  Majority 
op., ¶33.  Since the language of § 895.01(1)(o) is unambiguous, 
we should not consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such 
as legislative history.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  We give statutory language its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning," while also looking at the context and the 
structure of the statute in which the operative language 
appears.  Id., ¶¶45-46. 
¶83 The personal representatives correctly point out that, 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o), the phrase that follows the comma 
——"which shall survive the death of the wrongdoer whether or not 
the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after the death of 
the injured person"——is a nonrestrictive, relative pronoun 
clause, meaning that the phrase about the death of the wrongdoer 
provides additional, but not essential, information about the 
phrase it modifies.  Majority op., ¶33.  I wholeheartedly agree 
that in accord with § 895.01(1)(o), all causes of action for 
wrongful death survive, regardless of the death of the wrongdoer 
or the death of the claimant. 
¶84 The majority relies on five "pieces of evidence" in 
claiming that the legislature made a substantive change to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o), and did not intend to do so, when it 
amended the statutes in 1999.  Majority op., ¶54.  The majority 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
4 
opinion then concludes that a wrongful death claim does not 
survive the death of the claimant.  Majority op., ¶60.  The 
majority opinion especially emphasizes the fact that the bill 
that led to 1999 Wis. Act 85 is a Revisor's Correction Bill.  
Majority op., ¶57.  The majority states that the revisor rarely 
makes any substantive change in the law, but provides no 
authority to support such a claim.  Id.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 13.93(2)(j) states in relevant part that the revisor of 
statutes 
shall, 
"[i]n 
cooperation 
with 
the 
law 
revision 
committee, systematically examine and identify for revision by 
the legislature the statutes and session laws to eliminate 
defects, 
anachronisms, 
conflicts, 
ambiguities, 
and 
unconstitutional or obsolete provisions."  (Emphasis added.)  
The State of Wisconsin 2005-2006 Blue Book describes the 
responsibilities of the revisor of statutes bureau as follows:  
The bureau prepares revisor's corrections bills 
to correct errors or resolve conflicts arising from 
the enactment of laws.  It reviews attorney general's 
opinions, 
federal 
district 
and 
appellate 
court 
decisions, 
and 
state appellate or supreme court 
decisions that declare a Wisconsin statute or session 
law to be ambiguous, in conflict with other laws, 
anachronistic, unconstitutional, or otherwise in need 
of revision.  
State of Wisconsin 2005-2006 Blue Book 303 (Lawrence S. Barish, 
ed. 2005).  These responsibilities are significant, despite the 
majority's assertion that the revisor's duties are "mainly 
ministerial and editorial. . . ."  Majority op., ¶55.  Bills 
submitted to the legislature by the revisor of statutes and 
enacted into law "nevertheless are acts of the legislature, and 
where there is no ambiguity such acts must be applied as they 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
5 
read. . . ."  Dovi v. Dovi, 245 Wis. 50, 53, 13 N.W.2d 585 
(1944).  
¶85 The majority opinion states that the 1999 amendment to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) through 1999 Wis. Act 85, § 171 
rendered the wrongful death survival provision ambiguous and in 
conflict with other statutory sections.  I strongly disagree.  
The duty of the revisor of statutes is to eliminate conflicts 
and ambiguities, not to create them.  The insertion of a comma 
and the word "which" into § 895.01(1)(o) made it clear that 
causes of action for wrongful death survive.  It makes no 
difference whether the claimant or the wrongdoer dies; the 
wrongful death action survives such death.  
¶86 The majority opinion examines Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) 
and 
claims 
to 
find 
ambiguity 
in 
and 
conflict 
with 
§ 895.01(1)(o), because of a hierarchy of eligible claimants, 
through an examination of legislative history.  See Majority 
op., ¶¶37-42.  Under Kalal, since the plain meaning of Wis.  
Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 877.01 are evident, and since the 
daughters 
of 
Joseph 
Sanders 
are 
not 
claimants 
in 
their 
individual capacities, but as personal representatives of their 
father's estate, § 895.04(2) is not relevant here, nor is the 
supposed legislative history.  Furthermore, the majority's 
reliance on Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 254 Wis. 
134, 139, 35 N.W.2d 301 (1948) is inapposite because that case 
involved children taking over a wrongful death claim as 
individual claimants, not as the personal representatives of the 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
6 
estate of the original litigant, as in the present case.  
Majority op., ¶39. 
¶87  In Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 
2005, WI 125, ¶¶89, 91, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, we 
discussed the legislative objectives involved in the enactment 
of Chapter 655: 
 
The primary, overall legislative objective is to 
ensure the quality of health care for the people of 
Wisconsin.  The legislature obviously did not intend 
to reach this objective by shielding negligent health 
care providers from responsibility for their negligent 
actions.  After all, "[i]t is a major contradiction to 
legislate for quality health care on one hand, while 
on the other hand, in the same statute, to reward 
negligent health care providers." 
. . . . 
 
Legislative 
Objective 
#1: 
Ensure 
adequate 
compensation for victims of medical malpractice with 
meritorious injury claims.  The legislature retained 
the tort system as a means of identifying health care 
providers who are practicing below the required due 
care standards and as a means of deterring them and 
other health care providers from negligent practices.  
The 
legislature 
obviously 
considers 
noneconomic 
injuries to be real injuries for which plaintiffs 
should be compensated in appropriate cases. 
(quoting 
Farley 
v. 
Engelken, 
740 
P.2d 
1058, 
1067 
(Kan. 
1987)(footnotes omitted).  These legislative objectives are 
frustrated by the approach advocated by the majority, which 
would deny the estate of Joseph Sanders the opportunity to 
establish his claim of medical malpractice.  The result is that 
those claimed to have been negligent will be shielded from 
responsibility for any negligent actions. 
¶88 For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully concur 
in part and dissent in part. 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
7 
¶89 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON 
and 
Justice 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY 
join 
this 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2315.npc 
 
 
 
1