Case Title: Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Sachse

Citation: 345 Md. 578

Docket Number: 5m/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)  
No. 5
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
DOUGLAS T. SACHSE
___________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
___________________________________
Filed:  May 9, 1997
      By order dated June 5, 1996, effective January 1, 1997, this Court
1
renumbered this Rule and the other Rules governing attorney discipline proceedings.
They are now found in Chapter 700, Maryland Rules 16-701 through 16-718.  In this
opinion, all reference to the Maryland Rules will be to the former Md. Rules, BV1
through BV18, which were in effect at the time these proceedings were commenced.
The Review Board of the Attorney Grievance Commission directed
Bar Counsel to file charges against Douglas T. Sachse for violating
several Rules of Professional Conduct stemming from his actions as
trustee of a testamentary trust.  Specifically, the Petition for
Disciplinary Action alleged that, in approving the issuance and
negotiation of five checks drawn upon the corpus of the trust,
Sachse had failed to provide competent representation, Rule 1.1 of
the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, had represented
interests in conflict with those owed to the trust, Rule 1.7(b),
and had engaged in professional misconduct, Rule 8.4(a) and (c).
The Petition further alleged that Sachse had made a false statement
of material fact, Rule 8.1(a), and had violated Maryland Code
(1989, 1995 Repl. Vol.), § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article (BP), which provides:  "A lawyer may not use
trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the
trust money is entrusted to the lawyer."
Pursuant to Maryland Rule BV9,  we transmitted the case to
1
Judge John O. Hennegan of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Judge Hennegan found
that Sachse had violated Rule 1.1 and BP § 10-306, but had not
violated Rules 1.7, 8.1, or 8.4.  Bar Counsel excepted solely to
the hearing judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law in
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respect to Rule 1.7(b), and recommended that Sachse be indefinitely
suspended, with the right to apply for reinstatement after one
year.  As conditions upon that reinstatement, Bar Counsel asks that
we order restitution of the principal of the trust and that Sachse
submit to monitoring by Richard B. Vincent, Director of Lawyer
Counseling for the Maryland State Bar Association, for a period of
two years.
For the reasons recited below, we shall sustain Bar Counsel's
exception.
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Hennegan made the
following findings of fact:
"Mr. Douglas T. Sachse was admitted to
the Maryland Bar on November 9, 1979.  He
maintains an office for the practice of law
with the firm of Turnbull, Mix and Farmer in
Towson, Maryland.  Shirley Stemler is the
daughter of the late Dorothy J. Thompson.
Whitney Stemler Riley and Erin Stemler Drew
are the daughters of Shirley Stemler.  On or
about March 19, 1978, Dorothy J. Thompson
executed 
a 
Last 
Will 
and 
Testament
(hereinafter 
"the 
Thompson 
Will") 
that
provided, inter alia, for the creation of a
trust upon Mrs. Thompson's death to hold one-
half of her net estate for the benefit of her
daughter, Shirley Stemler, and Mrs. Stemler's
descendants.  The Thompson Will specified that
Shirley Stemler was to receive net income from
the trust in at least quarterly installments
during Mrs. Stemler's lifetime, with the
principal and undistributed income to be
distributed to Mrs. Stemler's then living
descendants, per stirpes, upon Mrs. Stemler's
death.  Mrs. Thompson died on May 13, 1985,
and the Thompson Will thereafter was probated
in Harford County.  Pursuant to the terms of
the Thompson Will, a trust (hereinafter "the
-3-
Stemler Trust") was established, with County
Banking and Trust Company appointed to serve
as trustee.  The original corpus of the
Stemler Trust was approximately $50,000.00, of
which approximately $45,000.00 was invested in
blue-chip stocks and $4,500.00 was placed in a
certificate of deposit at County Banking and
Trust Company.  Mr. Sachse had a professional
and social relationship with Shirley Stemler
dating back to approximately 1980.  Sometime
in the spring of 1987, Shirley Stemler hired
Mr. Sachse to seek removal of County Banking
and Trust Company as trustee of the Stemler
Trust based on Mrs. Stemler's dissatisfaction
with its investment of the trust assets and
the income she was receiving.  With the
consent of Mrs. Stemler's two daughters,
Whitney Stemler (now Riley) and Erin Stemler
(now Drew), who were the only then living
residual beneficiaries of the Stemler Trust,
the Circuit Court for Harford County approved
a Consent Order on May 6, 1987, by which Mr.
Sachse became substitute trustee of the
Stemler Trust.  Upon his appointment as
trustee, Mr. Sachse arranged to have the
Stemler Trust's stock portfolio transferred
into an investment account at Alex. Brown &
Sons, Inc. (hereinafter "Alex. Brown").  Alex.
Brown 
received 
the 
transferred 
stock
certificates on or about September 18, 1987.
Mr. Sachse also received $5,000.00 from
redemption of the County Banking and Trust
certificate of deposit at the end of December
1987.  Out of those funds, Mr. Sachse took
$750.00 
as 
a 
fee 
for 
petitioning 
for
appointment of a substitute trustee and for
his services as trustee to that point.  The
remaining $4,250.00 was forwarded to Alex.
Brown for investment on behalf of the Stemler
Trust.  In August 1987, Mr. Sachse, at the
request of Mrs. Stemler, filed a petition to
have the Stemler Trust terminated and to allow
distribution 
of 
the 
principal 
to 
Mrs.
Stemler's 
two 
daughters 
prior 
to 
Mrs.
Stemler's death.  The Circuit Court for
Harford County denied that petition on August
16, 1990.  As of the time that the petition to
terminate the trust was denied, the total
market value of the stocks held in the Alex.
-4-
      Although Sachse has no independent recollection of authorizing the sale of
2
stock to support the distributions, he admitted before the circuit court that he
signed the checks over to Shirley Stemler with the understanding that, except as to
the first distribution, the funds were in furtherance of an investment in Autel
Corporation, a company operated by Mrs. Stemler.  In the case of the April 30, 1991
check, Sachse categorically denied having endorsed the check and stated that he
later learned that Karl Keffer, with whom Mrs. Stemler approached him about
investment in Autel, had been the one to do so.  Upon becoming aware of Mr. Keffer's
unlawful negotiation of the check, Sachse ratified the disbursement of the funds.
      Apparently, Autel Corporation, purportedly a producer of defense computer
3
technology, was operated by Shirley Stemler and her husband, Walter, out of the
basement of the Stemler home; Mr. Stemler handled the research and development end
Brown investment account was in excess of
$70,000.00.  From September 1987 through
August 1990, Shirley Stemler received periodic
distributions of dividend and interest income
by transfer from the Stemler Trust investment
account into a separate account held at Alex.
Brown 
in 
the 
name 
of 
Mrs. 
Stemler
individually.  Beginning in September 1990 and
continuing 
through 
August 
1991, 
several
distributions were made from the Alex. Brown
investment account by way of checks made
payable to Mr. Sachse as follows:
  
Date  
Check No.
Amount
(I)   September 7, 1990
2022318
$19,472.98
(ii)  February 20, 1991
2174207
$18,758.78
(iii) April 30, 1991
2175800
$16,255.89
(iv)  July 29, 1991 
2176459
$ 2,000.00
(v)   August 5, 1991
6480069
$15,272.70
      Total
$71,760.35
The distributions from the Alex. Brown account
depleted the principal to the Stemler Trust,
leaving a balance of only eight cents ($0.08)
in the account as of August 30, 1991.  With
the exception of Check No. 2174207, drawn on
February 20, 1991, and Check No. 2175800,
drawn 
on 
April 
30, 
1991,
 
Mr. 
Sachse
[2]
acknowledges that he authorized the above
listed distributions and endorsed the checks
over to Shirley Stemler with knowledge that
she planned to invest the funds in a company
known as Autel Corporation.
  Mr. Sachse
[3]
-5-
of the business, while Shirley Stemler managed its business aspects.
prepared Articles of Incorporation for Autel
Corporation in 1987.  Mr. Sachse had no
further active involvement in the operations
and activities of Autel Corporation from the
time of its incorporation in 1987 through
September 1990, when he began releasing
Stemler Trust funds to Shirley Stemler for
investment in the corporation.  Mr. Sachse
obtained 
no 
financial 
data 
about 
Autel
Corporation before releasing Trust funds to
Shirley 
Stemler 
for 
investment 
in 
the
corporation.  Mr. Sachse did not obtain any
formal security from Shirley Stemler or anyone
else 
to 
protect 
the 
Stemler 
Trust's
"investment" in Autel Corporation.  After he
began releasing Trust funds to Shirley Stemler
for investment in Autel Corporation, Mr.
Sachse 
never 
requested 
or 
received 
an
accounting of those funds.  Shirley Stemler
took the position that the Trust funds were
for 
her 
personal 
use 
as 
she 
deemed
appropriate.
Fred 
Eisenbrandt 
handled 
the 
trust
account for the [Stemler] Trust.  He recalls
the distribution of the funds.  He states that
the sale of the stock could not have occurred
without authorization from the Respondent.  It
was standard procedure at Alex. Brown for
sales of stock to occur only at the request of
the account holder.
Mr. Sachse began drinking on a regular
basis at the law firm when they developed a
habit of taking off Friday afternoons and
drinking at lunch into the late afternoon.
This continued and eventually extended into
other days of the week, i.e. Thursday.  He
eventually had an affair with his current wife
while married to his first wife that produced
a child with cerebral palsy and a hearing
impairment. 
 
Obviously, 
this 
led 
to
difficulties with the marriage and increased
drinking.  The marriage ultimately broke down,
a separation resulted and the Respondent's
drinking became more severe in an effort to
-6-
      Rule 1.1, Competence, mandates:
4
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to
a client.  Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."
sleep and deal with his emotional problems and
dilemma[s].  His social worker feared he was
suicidal and it was clear he had no judgment
or ability to make sound decisions.  As a
result, he was admitted to Sheppard Pratt's
substance abuse program.  Subsequently, he was
released, got control of his substance abuse
and emotional problems, and has been sober
since his discharge from Sheppard Pratt
Hospital.
Upon his release he attempted to obtain
an executed note from Shirley Stemler and Karl
Keffer 
[with 
whom 
Shirley 
Stemler 
had
approached Mr. Sachse about investing in Autel
Corporation].  He purchased life insurance
policies and executed an indemnity deed of
trust to protect the trust corpus.  
Respondent admits that he would not
invest any of his personal assets in the Autel
Corporation."
Based upon these findings, Judge Hennegan concluded that
Sachse had "failed to use the knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the protection of the Trust or
its beneficiaries" in violation of Rule 1.1  and BP § 10-306.
4
Sachse's admission that he allowed the corpus to be depleted in
furtherance of Mrs. Stemler's investment in Autel, without
obtaining security therefor or ascertaining the precise nature of
the transaction, provided clear and convincing evidence that Sachse
had failed to provide competent representation to the Stemler Trust
and its beneficiaries, and his attempts to correct his "errors in
-7-
      Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest:  General Rule, provides, in pertinent part:
5
"(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation."
      Rule 8.4, Misconduct, reads, in relevant part:
6
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
[or]
. . . .
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
judgment" were "too late to avoid the responsibilities required" by
the Rule.  The hearing judge then rejected Bar Counsel's assertion
that the fact of Sachse's interest in Autel in conjunction with his
representation of Mrs. Stemler constituted a per se conflict of
interest under Rule 1.7.   Given evidence indicating that Sachse
5
had possibly relinquished his interest, if any, in Autel in 1987
and the fact that the disbursements at issue took place in 1990 and
1991, the court was not persuaded by clear and convincing evidence
that the Rule had been violated.  Judge Hennegan also rejected Bar
Counsel's claim that Sachse had "knowingly assisted or induced
another to violate the rules of professional conduct or engage in
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" in violation of
Rule 8.4.   Although the court found that Sachse's bouts with
6
depression and alcoholism had clouded his judgment and that he was
subject to "extreme pressure" from Mrs. Stemler and her demands for
-8-
money, the court was not persuaded that Sachse had engaged in
professional misconduct within the meaning of Rule 8.4(a) or (c).
Judge Hennegan further determined that Sachse had not
knowingly made a false statement of material fact in denying that
he authorized the sale of the stock in the trust.  Specifically,
the court found that Sachse's acknowledgment of his ultimate
responsibility for the investment of trust assets in Autel could
not be reconciled with violation of Rule 8.1.  "It is hard to
believe," the judge stated, "that [Sachse] would knowingly make a
false statement when he accepts full responsibility for the
ultimate event.  The sale of the stock may be a material [f]act in
the distribution of the Trust funds but the denial of it may not be
a material fact since there is no denial that the distribution of
the funds to Shirley Stemler could easily have been averted by
[Sachse] after the sale of the stock."  
As we have stated, Bar Counsel has excepted solely to the
hearing judge's failure to find a violation of Rule 1.7(b).  Bar
Counsel asserts that Sachse's representation of the Stemler Trust
was compromised by his relationship with Shirley Stemler when he
authorized the release of trust funds to Mrs. Stemler.  Bar Counsel
adds that the severity of Sachse's misconduct was "compound[ed]" by
his failure to arrest further depletion of the trust assets when he
ratified an unauthorized distribution from Alex. Brown on April 30,
1991.  "At that point," Bar Counsel argues, Sachse's "conduct
transcended what might be characterized as simply poor judgment and
-9-
rose to the level of affirmative participation in Shirley Stemler's
systematic use of trust monies to fund the operations of Autel
Corporation."  Bar Counsel further disputes that Sachse's
alcoholism may mitigate the egregiousness of his conduct, arguing
that "he understood the nature of Shirley Stemler's conduct yet
chose to ratify it rather than taking appropriate remedial
measures."
In the management of a trust, a trustee is charged with
exercising "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an ordinary
prudent [person] engaged in similar business affairs and with
objectives similar to those of the trust in question."  Maryland
Nat'l Bank v. Cummins, 322 Md. 570, 580, 588 A.2d 1205, 1210
(1991).  "All trustees are subject to common law duties and
equitable rules or principles."  George G. Bogert, The Law of
Trusts and Trustees § 541 (2d ed. rev. 1993).  "Perhaps the most
fundamental duty of a trustee is that he must display throughout
the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests
of the beneficiar[ies] and must exclude all selfish interest and
all consideration of the interests of third persons."  Id. § 543;
see also Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 109,
562 A.2d 720, 738 (1989) ("[T]he general duty of loyalty is well-
established in Maryland law."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.
Ct. 1167, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (1990).  "[A] trustee is charged by
law with representing the beneficiaries' interests," Board of
-10-
Trustees, 317 Md. at 90, 562 A.2d at 728, and is liable for acting
to their detriment when the conduct causing the loss "failed to
conform to the standard of care and skill applicable to trustees in
the administration of the trusts," Bogert, supra § 541.  "It is
clear that the trustee's duty of loyalty extends beyond a
prohibition against self-dealing and conflict of interest . . . .
Even if the trustee has no personal stake in a transaction, the
duty of loyalty bars him from acting in the interest of third
parties at the expense of the beneficiaries."  Board of Trustees,
317 Md. at 109, 562 A.2d at 738.  Conflicts of interest impair the
trustee's ability to act on behalf of the beneficiaries with
independent and disinterested judgment in the administration of the
trust, the rationale being that it is generally not possible for
the same person to act fairly in two capacities and on behalf of
two interests in the same transaction.  Bogert, supra § 543.
Whether or not a conflict exists must be determined by the facts of
each individual case.  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kent, 337 Md.
361, 379, 653 A.2d 909, 918 (1995).
"In reviewing the multiple findings made by the hearing judge,
we accept findings of fact made by the hearing judge if they are
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and are not clearly
erroneous."  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Boyd, 333 Md. 298, 303,
635 A.2d 382, 384 (1994) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287-88, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992); Attorney
-11-
Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 402, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091
(1991)).  To this end, hearing judges may pick and choose the
evidence upon which they will rely.  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 684, 480 A.2d 807, 816 (1984).  We shall,
however, make "an independent, detailed review of the complete
record with particular reference to . . . evidence relating to [a]
disputed factual finding."  Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510,
516, 307 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973).
Judge Hennegan concluded that no conflict of interest existed
by virtue of Sachse's ownership, if at all, of a one percent
interest in Autel.  "His representation of Shirley Stemler in part
and while trustee," Judge Hennegan added, "was . . . clearly known
to all parties in interest and there is no evidence of any
objections raised by any beneficiaries."  Bar Counsel excepts to
this conclusion, charging that Sachse "violated Rule 1.7(b) by
virtue of the conflict between his obligation to preserve the
principal of the Stemler Trust and the interest of Shirley Stemler
individually in pursuing the Autel `investment.'"  "When [Sachse]
succumbed to Shirley Stemler's requests for the distribution of
trust monies to be used for her own misguided funding of Autel
Corporation," Bar Counsel argues, "he pursued Mrs. Stemler's
interests at the expense of the trust's [interests]."  
As a threshold matter, Sachse challenges Bar Counsel's ability
to except to Judge Hennegan's findings of fact and conclusions of
-12-
      Specifically, in closing, Bar Counsel argued:
7
"I would like to point out to the Court with respect to
the 1.7(b) issue, even absent the ownership interest in
the Autel Corporation, I think there is still an issue for
the Court to evaluate . . . that being whether . . . in
connection with his responsibilities to the trust, whether
those were materially limited by his responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, that being Shirley
Stemler.
Whether you identify her as a client or a third
person, Mr. Sachse obviously had some sort of ongoing
relationship, business and social, with her and he allowed
himself to be persuaded, I would submit to the Court, by
that relationship, into releasing funds that he had an
obligation to the other client, the trust, to protect.
law on Rule 1.7(b).  He contends that Bar Counsel did not argue
alternative bases of conflict, relying solely upon the fact of his
one percent ownership interest in Autel in charging him with a
conflict of interest.  Therefore, he continues, Bar Counsel may not
argue at this juncture that his simultaneous representation of
Shirley Stemler and the Trust was the basis for its allegation of
conflict.  Sachse also disagrees that the facts support the
substance of Bar Counsel's exception.  He contends that his belief
that Mrs. Stemler and her daughters had a very close relationship,
and that Mrs. Stemler was providing them with candid information
regarding the Trust, was not unreasonable and demonstrates that
"his decision making process was based on his belief that he was
seeking the interest of all the beneficiaries of the Stemler
Trust."
Our independent review of the record reveals that Bar Counsel
did in fact raise alternative theories of conflict before the
circuit court  and, therefore, may pursue its exception before this
7
-13-
So I think that there can still be a finding of a
Rule [1.7](b)(1) violation, even in finding that he had a
1 percent interest in Autel Corporation.  Those are two
alternative theories." 
Court.  Thus, we shall proceed to determine whether Sachse's
actions relative to the trust were improper.  Sachse maintains that
his impression of the closeness of Mrs. Stemler and her daughters,
coupled with his belief that the Autel investment could net
millions to the benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries,
warrants this Court's acceptance of Judge Hennegan's Finding of
Fact and Conclusion of Law.  Although superficially attractive,
upon closer examination, Sachse's contentions are without merit.
In his testimony before the circuit court, Sachse stated that he
knew that he, as trustee, had to give Alex. Brown authorization
before the sale of stock in the Stemler Trust could be effected,
and admitted that, although he did not recall authorizing the sale
of the constituent stock or the distribution of the checks, he
either signed the checks over to Mrs. Stemler or, in the case of
the April 30, 1991 check, he ratified its issuance.   He also
described Mrs. Stemler as "assertive, [and] strong," and admitted
that he "let [him]self give in to her relentlessness."  He added
that, except for the first disbursement, he understood that the
money was in furtherance of investment in Autel.  Yet, he did not
obtain any information about the security of the investment prior
to the periodic outlay of sums totaling $71,760.35 to Mrs. Stemler
based upon her word alone.  
-14-
      Indeed, looking to each disbursement, we discern a pattern of behavior in
8
which Sachse (admittedly) compromised the integrity of the Trust in response to
pressure from Mrs. Stemler.  At the hearing before Judge Hennegan, Sachse testified
that, although he believed the September 7, 1990 disbursement of $19,472.98 to be
an interest payment under the terms of the Stemler Trust, he did ask that Mrs.
Stemler obtain her daughters' written concession that the money was in fact a
payment of interest.  He received nothing from them and did not pursue the matter
further.  Although he had no independent recollection of the circumstances
surrounding the February 20, 1991 distribution of $18,758.78, in response to a
letter from Alex. Brown confirming the sale of shares to support the issue, Sachse
wrote Alex. Brown, stating that he did not grant permission for the sale but that
he expected any proceeds therefrom to be forwarded to him.  He received the funds
and, apparently, endorsed them over to Shirley Stemler.  Sachse adamantly denied
that he had authorized the sale of stock necessary to support the issuance of the
$16,255.89 check on April 30, 1991.  He further testified that he had not signed the
check; he later learned that Karl Keffer had negotiated it in his name, to which
Sachse "said it was ok."  In July of 1991, Sachse recalled that Mrs. Stemler went
Furthermore, his testimony that he had no reason to believe
that the relationship extant between Mrs. Stemler and her daughters
did not remain close and that she was advising them of her actions
is unpersuasive.  An honest but misguided assessment of the facts
does not relieve a trustee of the responsibility to act solely in
the interest of the trust.  "`Fiduciaries in general, and attorneys
in particular, must remember that the entrustment to them of the
money and property of others involves a responsibility of the
highest order.  They must carefully administer and account for
those funds.'"  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kramer, 325 Md. 39,
51, 599 A.2d 100, 107 (1991) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 345, 587 A.2d 511, 516 (1991)).  Sachse had
a duty to ascertain whether the alleged investment in Autel was one
properly pursued by the Trust.  He did not conduct any such
investigation, permitting, instead, Mrs. Stemler to dictate the
ultimate disposition of the funds.  In so doing, he breached his
duty of loyalty to the Trust.   Sachse admittedly knew of his
8
-15-
so far as to jump out of her car in traffic to ask him to endorse the $2,000.00
check issued on July 29, because she needed more funding for Autel.  He further
testified that he could not recall the circumstances respecting the distribution of
$15,272.70 on August 5, 1991.
responsibilities as trustee of the Stemler Trust and, armed with
the knowledge that Mrs. Stemler was anxious to access the trust
principal (as evidenced by, inter alia, her 1989 campaign to have
the Trust terminated), Sachse nevertheless yielded to her
machinations and sacrificed the integrity of the Trust.  We shall,
therefore, sustain Bar Counsel's exception to Judge Hennegan's
findings and conclusion relative to Rule 1.7(b) and hold that
Sachse did entertain a conflict of interest when he permitted Mrs.
Stemler's imperiousness to override the best interests of the
Stemler Trust and its beneficiaries.  
We now turn to the matter of Sachse's sanction.  We are
mindful that the imposition of sanctions is reflective of our
responsibility "to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of
the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer
from bringing its image into disrepute."  Maryland State Bar Ass'n
v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974).  "In
determining the appropriate sanction for an offending attorney, we
have recognized that `the severity of the sanction to be imposed is
dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case' and the
Court `may consider facts in mitigation . . . .'"  Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 587, 664 A.2d 854, 858
(1995) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225,
-16-
238, 369 A.2d 61, 68 (1977)).  "[A] less severe sanction than that
ordinarily dictated may be appropriate when an attorney is able to
establish the existence of compelling extenuating circumstances."
Id. at 588, 664 A.2d at 858.
At the hearing before Judge Hennegan, the evidence revealed
that Sachse has had a long history of emotional and substance abuse
problems.  Bar Counsel maintains that, "[a]lthough some of
[Sachse]'s decisions may be partially attributable to impaired
judgment arising from his alcoholism, . . . [Sachse] had the
capacity to recognize Shirley Stemler's actions . . . as conduct
fraught with deceit."  Sachse's alcoholism notwithstanding, Bar
Counsel continues, "he understood the nature of Shirley Stemler's
conduct yet chose to ratify it rather than taking appropriate
remedial measures."  Sachse concedes that his conduct stemmed from
the exercise of poor judgment, but submits that he has "attempted
to right the wrongs he committed [and] . . . worked diligently and
faithfully to resolve the underlying problems resulting in the poor
judgment and impaired decision making ability that gave rise to
this proceeding."  He asserts that he has remained sober for five
years and asks that we accept Judge Hennegan's recommended sanction
of a published reprimand.
Although we have of late been reticent to allow alcoholism to
mitigate violations of legal and ethical rules that would
ordinarily warrant disbarment, see Kenney, supra, 339 Md. at 594,
-17-
664 A.2d at 862, we recognize that Bar Counsel has not sought
Sachse's disbarment in the instant proceeding.  Rather, Bar Counsel
asks, for the violation of a fiduciary obligation, that we
indefinitely 
suspend 
Sachse, 
with 
a 
right 
to 
apply 
for
reinstatement after one year.  Bar Counsel also asks that we
condition his reinstatement upon restitution of the principal of
the Stemler Trust and periodic monitoring by Richard B. Vincent. 
As we stated in Kenney, 339 Md. at 594-95, 664 A.2d at 862:
"Severe sanctions are necessary to protect the
public from being victimized from any further
dishonesty on the part of the attorney.  We
do, however, recognize that alcoholism is a
serious medical condition and we will be more
sympathetic to attorneys who recognize their
need for assistance and seek to rehabilitate
themselves before their transgressions are
discovered.  Nonetheless, we believe that when
violations ordinarily warranting disbarment
are found, our duty to protect the public is
strong and we cannot permit alcoholism to
alleviate an attorney's responsibility to
recognize the wrongfulness of his or her
actions and to honor his or her commitments to
his or her clients."
While Sachse has not attempted to avoid responsibility for his
actions in respect to the Stemler Trust, he is not relieved of
liability for those actions.  Therefore, for the reasons stated
above, the proper sanction for his violation of Rule 1.7(b) and BP
§ 10-306 will be indefinite suspension from the practice of law
with the right to reapply not less than one year from the date of
the filing of this opinion.  As a condition to his readmission,
Sachse is also ordered to provide or absolutely assure restitution
-18-
of the corpus of the Trust and to submit to monitoring by Richard
B. Vincent for a period of two years.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND
RULE BV15(c), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT
IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST DOUGLAS
T. SACHSE.