Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Dunietz

Citation: 368 Md. 419

Docket Number: 12ag/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jerry Sam Dunietz
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG), No. 12, September Term, 2001
HEADNOTES:
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE—DISCIPLINARY ACTION—RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT—COMPETENCE—DILIGENCE—COMMUNICATION WITH CLIENTS—
DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION. 
Disbarment is appropriate where an attorney violated the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d), in connection
with his representation of a client in two separate, but related, legal matters.  The attorney
received two prior sanctions from this Court in other cases involving many of the same rules,
thus indicating a recurring pattern of misbehavior with respect to his representation of his
clients’ interests.  Moreover, the attorney also demonstrated a continuing disregard of the
attorney grievance process in the present case and in the prior disciplinary matters as
evidenced by his failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries.     
In the present case, in the first matter, the attorney failed to file timely a complaint in
his representation of his client as a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, resulting in his
client’s debt being discharged in bankruptcy.  The attorney failed to advise his client that he
had missed the deadline to file the complaint, and when his client inquired of the status of
the matter, he deceived his client by telling him not to worry, that he would take care of it.
Moreover, the attorney did not make any attempts to re-open the bankruptcy or advise the
attorney that was handling the non-bankruptcy aspects of his client’s claim against the
debtors that such action might be possible. 
In the second matter, the attorney failed to file a motion to lift an automatic stay in the
bankruptcy of another debtor so that his client could pursue recovery through the debtor’s
malpractice insurance carrier.  The attorney failed to respond to his replacement counsel
hired by his client to pursue the matter, as well as the client’s other counsel engaged in the
non-bankruptcy aspects of the client’s claim. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No.  12
September Term, 2001
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
      COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
JERRY SAM DUNIETZ
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed: April 8, 2002
1 Rule 16-709(a) states that “[c]harges against an attorney shall be filed by the Bar
Counsel acting at the direction of the Review Board.”  This case arose and was processed
under the attorney grievance rules in effect prior to 1 July 2001.  Thus, we refer to those
relevant rules as they existed prior to that date.  
2 Rule 16-709(b) states that the “Court of Appeals by order may direct that the
charges be transmitted to and heard in any court and shall designate the judge or judges to
hear the charges and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record in the proceeding.”
3 Rule 16-711(a) states that “[a] written statement of the findings of facts and
conclusions of law shall be filed in the record of the proceedings and copies sent to all
parties.”
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a),1 Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney
Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), and at the direction of the Review Board, filed a
petition with this Court initiating disciplinary proceedings against Jerry Sam Dunietz, Esquire
(“Respondent”), a member of the Maryland Bar since December 1981.  In this petition, Bar
Counsel asserted one complaint in connection with Respondent’s representation of Jimmy
Park in two separate, but related, legal matters, alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence in representation); 1.4(a) and
(b) (communication with clients); 1.16(a)(2) and (d) (declining or terminating
representation); 8.1(b) (disciplinary matters); and 8.4(c) and (d) (misconduct).  This Court
referred the matter to Judge Michael D. Mason of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Md. Rules 16-709(b)2 and 16-711(a). 3  On 25 June 2001, Respondent was
served with the Petition for Disciplinary Action, Order and Writ of Summons consistent with
4 Rule 16-709(d) states that “[t]he Court of Appeals shall direct in each case the
manner of service of a copy of the charges which shall be served together with the order
of the Court of Appeals designating the court and judge or judges to hear the charges.”
5 Rule 16-709(e)(2) provides that “[t]he attorney responding to the charges shall
file his initial pleading in the court designated to hear the charges within fifteen days after
the date of service of the charges upon him . . . .”
6 At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner presented evidence in the form of Request
for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents, and the transcript from the
Inquiry Panel hearing.  The Inquiry Panel hearing was held on 8 November 2000 in
accordance with Rules 16-706(c) (concerning Inquiry Panel selection) and 16-706(d)
(concerning Inquiry Panel proceedings).  Respondent was present and represented at the
Inquiry Panel proceeding.    
2
Md. Rule 16-709(d).4  Respondent, however, failed to file a timely answer to the petition as
required by Md. Rule 16-709(e)(2).5  Further, the Respondent did not respond to Petitioner’s
interrogatories, request for production of documents, and request for admission of facts and
genuineness of documents.  An Order of Default was entered on 27 July 2001, and an
evidentiary hearing was scheduled for 6 September 2001.  Respondent did not move to
vacate the Order of Default.
At the evidentiary hearing, at which Respondent was not present, Petitioner presented
evidence6 in support of the charges.  In addition, Petitioner submitted proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the hearing judge.  Judge Mason reviewed and adopted
Petitioner’s submission, concluding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent
violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), 8.1(b), 8.4(c) and (d), relating to
his representation of Mr. Park.  Respondent has not filed with this Court any exceptions to
the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.  Petitioner filed with this Court
3
a recommendation for sanction, urging Respondent’s disbarment.  Respondent did not appear
at oral argument before the Court. 
I.
From the evidentiary record, Judge Mason made the following findings of facts
pertaining to Respondent’s conduct regarding his representation of Mr. Park.  
In September 1998, Jimmy Park obtained a judgment against
Rising Star, Inc., Hae Y. Chi and Don S. Chi in the amount of
$105,000 in compensatory damages, $7,962.50 in prejudgment
interest and $75,000 in punitive damages.  After the judgment
was entered, the Chis filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy
in October 1998.  Mr. Park retained Respondent on November
27, 1998 to pursue the collection of his judgment through the
Chis’ bankruptcy and paid Respondent a $1,500 retainer.
Respondent undertook to represent Mr. Park as a creditor in the
Chis’ bankruptcy proceeding.  The Chis’s Chapter 13
bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on or about
February 10, 1999.  Thereafter on February 16, 1999 a notice
was sent to the creditors advising that the deadline to file a
complaint to determine dischargeability of certain debts was
May 9, 1999.  Although Respondent received the February 16,
1999 notice and advised Mr. Park that he would file a complaint
to determine the non-dischargeability of his debt, he failed to do
so by the deadline of May 9, 1999.  Even though the Chis’
counsel had indicated to Respondent that she would consent to
the relief requested, Respondent did not file a complaint on
behalf of Mr. Park.  Respondent failed to advise Mr. Park that
he had not timely filed the complaint.  Furthermore, when Mr.
Park requested status of the matter, Respondent advised him not
to worry and that he would take care of it.  Respondent never
sought to re-open the matter.  Moreover Respondent never
advised Joseph F. Cunningham, Esquire, [an] attorney who
continued to represent Mr. Park regarding the non-bankruptcy
aspects of his claim against the Chis, that such action might be
possible.
4
Mr. Park, through Mr. Cunningham, filed a malpractice action
against the attorney, Intak Lee, who had represented Mr. Park in
the underlying transaction with the Chis.  Mr. Lee filed for
bankruptcy in January 1999.  Mr. Park retained Respondent to
move the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay in order to
pursue recovery through the malpractice action from Mr. Lee’s
malpractice insurance carrier.  Mr. Park paid Respondent a
retainer of $500 to handle the matter.  Respondent failed to file
a motion even though Mr. Lee’s counsel had indicated to
Respondent that he would consent to re-opening the bankruptcy
and lifting the automatic stay.  Respondent failed to respond to
requests for status from Mr. Cunningham and another
bankruptcy attorney consulted by Mr. Park.  Thereafter, on
October 18, 1999, Mr. Park made a complaint to the Attorney
Grievance Commission concerning Respondent’s inactions in
handling the two bankruptcy matters.
The Attorney Grievance Commission[,] seeking an explanation
from Respondent concerning Mr. Park’s complaint, wrote to
him on October 18, 1999, November 12, 1999, December 30,
1999 and January 19, 2000.  Respondent failed to respond to
those letters.  On February 8, 2000, Michael H. Peregoy an
Investigator for the Attorney Grievance Commission, contacted
Respondent who acknowledged receipt of those letters.
Respondent promised that he would submit a response to the
Attorney Grievance Commission by February 11, 2000.
Respondent failed to provide a response.  Thereafter Mr.
Peregoy made another visit Respondent’s office on April 7,
2000 to obtain Respondent’s response and a copy of his file.  
II.
Based upon these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Respondent had violated the MRPC through his following actions:
A.  Violation of MRPC 1.1
Rule 1.1.  Competence.
5
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Judge Mason concluded that Respondent incompetently represented Mr. Park in both
the Chi and Lee bankruptcy matters in violation of Rule 1.1 “by not exhibiting the
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation by his failure to
prepare and file the complaint in the Chis’ matter by May 9, 1999 and by his failure to move
to have the automatic stay lifted in the Lee matter even though opposing counsels in those
two matters were not opposed to the relief sought.”  The hearing judge concluded that
Respondent further violated MRPC 1.1 by failing to cooperate and assist Mr. Cunningham,
Mr. Park’s attorney who continued to represent Mr. Park in the non-bankruptcy aspect of his
claims against the Chis.
B.  Violation of MRPC 1.3
Rule 1.3.  Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client. 
Finding that “Respondent’s failure to file the appropriate documents in the Chi and
Lee bankruptcy matters demonstrat[ed] a lack of diligence,” the hearing judge concluded that
Respondent was in violation of Rule 1.3.
C.  Violation of MRPC 1.4(a) and (b)
Rule 1.4.  Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
6
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) by “failing
to communicate with Mr. Park and keep him informed of the status of the two matters despite
Mr. Park’s requests for status,” and by his failure to “communicate with Mr. Park’s attorney,
Mr. Cunningham, in the Lee matter.”  Moreover, the hearing judge concluded that
Respondent further violated Rule 1.4 by “fail[ing] to respond to requests for status updates
from Mr. Cunningham and from another bankruptcy attorney consulted by Mr. Park.”
D.  Violation of MRPC 1.16(a)(2) and (d)
Rule 1.16.  Declining or terminating representation.
(a) [A] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: . . .
(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer’s ability to represent the client; . . . . 
. . . 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 
Observing that “[a]t no time during the  representation did Respondent advise Mr.
Park that he could not handle the representation or was not going to follow through with the
representation,” Judge Mason concluded that Respondent was in violation of Rule 1.16(a)(2).
Moreover, with regard to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Park in the Chi bankruptcy, he
found that after Respondent missed the deadline to file a complaint to determine the
7
dischargeability of the Chis’ debt to Mr. Park, he never sought to re-open the matter, nor did
he advise Mr. Cunningham that such action might be possible.  Similarly, the chancellor
found that Respondent failed to file a motion to lift the automatic stay so that Mr. Park could
pursue recovery in a malpractice action from Mr. Lee’s malpractice insurance carrier, and
then failed to respond to requests from Mr. Cunningham, and another bankruptcy attorney
consulted by Mr. Park, for status updates.  Judge Mason concluded that “Respondent’s
abandonment of Mr. Park in the two matters” was a violation of Rule 1.16(d).
E.  Violation of MRPC 8.1(b)
Rule 8.1.  Bar admission and disciplinary matters. 
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
. . . 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known
by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.
Finding that Respondent knowingly failed to respond to Petitioner’s repeated attempts
to ascertain from Respondent what explanation he had concerning Mr. Park’s complaint,
including four separate occasions of mailed correspondence as well as a personal visit from
Petitioner’s investigator,  the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.1 by
“his wilful failure to respond to Petitioner’s letters.” 
F.  Violation of MRPC 8.4(c) and (d)
Rule 8.4. Misconduct
8
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
. . . 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
. . . .
Judge Mason concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by “misrepresenting to
Mr. Park the status of the Chi matter,” when Respondent advised Mr. Park not to worry, that
he would take care of it, when in fact, “he had not timely filed the complaint.”  Moreover,
the hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s “utter lack of action in completing the two
matters on behalf of Mr. Park was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of
Rule 8.4(d).” 
III.
This Court has original jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary proceedings.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Snyder, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2002) (Slip
op. No. 9 at 9, 2000 Term); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 388, 784
A.2d 516, 523 (2001); see also Md. Rule 16-709(b) (stating “[c]harges against an attorney
shall be filed on behalf of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission in the Court of Appeals.”).
The hearing  judge’s findings of fact “are prima facia correct and will not be disturbed unless
clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 21, 762 A.2d
950, 960-61 (2000).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692
A.2d 465, 469 (1997); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624
A.2d 503, 505 (1993).  As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, “our consideration is
9
essentially de novo.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 322, 786 A.2d
763, 768 (2001) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 562, 745
A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000)).  After a review of the record, we hold that the findings of fact of
Judge Mason are not clearly erroneous, and the conclusions of law are supported by clear and
convincing evidence.  As noted earlier, Respondent did not file any exceptions to the hearing
judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.  We turn now to the appropriate sanction for
Respondent’s violations of the MRPC.  
IV.
We most recently considered the purpose behind the attorney grievance process and
the role and appropriateness of sanctions to be imposed in that process in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Wallace, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2002) (Slip op. No. 6, 2001
Term), when we stated: 
‘It is well-settled that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is
to protect the public rather than to punish the erring attorney.’
‘The public interest is served when this Court imposes a
sanction which demonstrates to members of this legal profession
the type of conduct that will not be tolerated.’  ‘By imposing
such a sanction, this Court fulfills its responsibility to insist
upon the maintenance of the integrity of the Bar and to prevent
the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its
image into disrepute.’  ‘Therefore, the public interest is served
when sanctions designed to effect general and specific
deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates the
disciplinary rules.’  ‘Of course, what the appropriate sanction for
the particular misconduct is, in the public interest, generally
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.’  
10
Wallace, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip op. at 15-16) (internal quotations omitted)
(citations omitted).  See also Harris, 366 Md. at 405, 784 A.2d at 532-22; Zdravkovich, 362
Md. at 31-32, 762 A.2d at 966 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md.
56, 96, 753 A.2d 17, 38 (2000) (citations omitted)). 
Citing the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA
Standards) § 4.41(b) (1986 and 1992 Amendments), Bar Counsel contends here that
“[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when . . . (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform
services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; . . . .”
Petitioner argues that Respondent’s actions in the instant case warrant disbarment in light of
his  “abandonment of Mr. Park’s two legal matters and his misrepresentation to Mr. Park
concerning the status of the Chi matter.”  Petitioner notes that this matter is further
aggravated by Respondent’s failure to respond to the Attorney Grievance Commission in the
course of its investigation.
Petitioner also reminds us that Respondent has been disciplined on two prior
occasions.  In the first case, on 29 March 1996, Respondent received a private reprimand for
his violation of  MRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, and 8.1, relating to his lack of diligence; his failure to
communicate with his client; his failure to account for his client’s funds when the
representation of this client was terminated; and his failure to respond to requests of Bar
Counsel in a matter.  Less than two years latter, on 25 February 1998, Respondent received
a sixty day suspension (by consent) with regard to two unrelated complaints.  In the first
7 Rule 1.15. Safekeeping property.  
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons
that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. 
Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant
to Title 6, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.  Other property
shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. 
Complete records of such account funds and of other property
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period
of five years after termination of the representation.  
8 In re Dunietz, 756 A.2d 437 (D.C. 2000).  
11
complaint, which related to the March 1996 complaint for which Respondent received a
private reprimand, Respondent was found to have “failed to promptly remit funds which he
had collected [for] the client” in violation of MRPC 1.3 and 1.15(a),7 as well as failing to
“respond to requests for information by Bar Counsel” in violation of MRPC 8.1.  The second
complaint was a reciprocal discipline case from the District of Columbia,8 in which
Respondent was determined to be in violation of MRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a) and
(d) for “fail[ing] to act with reasonable diligence and fail[ing] to keep his client reasonably
informed,” and which said conduct resulted in his client being subjected to a “default
judgment as well as contempt proceedings.”  Respondent’s sixty day suspension was
implemented on the condition that his practice be monitored for a period of two years, and
that he continue with psychological counseling for two years.  The monitoring of
Respondent’s practice ended in February 2000. 
12
In our consideration of the appropriate sanction in an attorney disciplinary action, this
Court may consider, as a non-exclusive list, the following factors:  
‘[A]bsence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.’
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483
(1996) (citations omitted)).  
Considering all of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the appropriate
sanction to be imposed in this matter is disbarment.  Respondent’s immediate violations,
coupled with the relative currency of his prior disciplinary record for much the same or
similar misconduct, indicate a persistent pattern of behavior.  Moreover, Respondent’s
continuing disregard for the attorney grievance process, his apparent indifference to the
tenets of his chosen profession, the dereliction of his duties to his client, and his ostensible
lack of remorse for his misconduct, warrant a sanction of this severity.  Respondent offers
this Court no circumstances to mitigate or extenuate his neglect of Mr. Park’s two legal
matters.  Respondent’s misconduct is particularly troublesome in light of his client’s limited
9 Mr. Park is Korean-American, and was sufficiently deficient in his command of
the English language to require the services of a translator, Mr. Kim, his father-in-law, at
the Inquiry Panel proceedings on 8 November 2000. 
10  MRPC 1.5(a) pertains to the reasonableness of a lawyer’s fee.
11 MRPC 1.15(a) and (b) pertains to safekeeping property.
12 MRPC 3.2 pertains to expediting litigation.
13
ability to speak and understand English,9 necessitating heightened reliance upon Respondent
to assist him in navigating an unfamiliar legal system.  We recognize by our action here the
need to protect the public from further victimization by a recalcitrant attorney and to
motivate other attorneys “to adopt appropriate practices in the future,” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. David, 331 Md. 317, 323-24, 628 A.2d 178, 181 (1993).  
Similar to Respondent’s misconduct in the present matter, in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Wallace, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2002) (Slip op. No. 6 at 15,
2001 Term), an attorney was determined to be in violation of the MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and
(b), 1.5(a),10 1.15(a) and (b),11 1.16(a)(2) and (d), 3.2,12 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d), in
connection with six complaints.  Even though that attorney did not have a prior disciplinary
record, this Court stated nevertheless that his “lack of diligence, his lack of preparation, his
failure to communicate with his clients, his charging of unreasonable fees, his failure to
account for and return monies, his misrepresentations,” and his repeated failure to comply
with Bar Counsel’s requests required “the most severe sanction of disbarment.” Wallace,
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip op. at 19).  
14
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manning, 318 Md. 697, 569 A.2d 1250 (1990),
disbarment was warranted where it was found that the attorney failed to diligently pursue
his clients’ interests, failed to communicate with his clients, and repeatedly failed to respond
to Bar Counsel’s requests for information in connection with four complaints.  At the time
of the hearing, the attorney was serving a suspension in connection with similar misconduct
stemming from four complaints in a prior disciplinary action.  The charges under review in
the second proceeding occurred during the same time period as the previous complaints. 
In reviewing the appropriate sanction in the second proceeding, we stated:
In recent years, . . . we have noticed too many instances when
lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in
part or in whole, only to completely neglect these same legal
problems, causing the same clients emotional distress, financial
loss, or other varying kinds of inconvenience.  More often than
not, these situations have been exacerbated by the lack of
respect and attention extended to the courts as evidenced by the
failure to file timely pleadings or to make appearances as
scheduled before the court to enable proceedings to be
conducted.  It seems to us that this kind of persistent conduct is
evidence of a lawyer’s disregard of his obligation.
Manning, 318 Md. at 704-05, 569 A.2d at 1254. 
Although we recognized that the prior sanction could not have served as a deterrent
for the misconduct charged in the second proceeding, we expressed our concern that the
“large number of similar complaints over a more than two-year span” demonstrated a
disturbing pattern.  Manning, 318 Md. at 705, 569 A.2d at 1254.  Moreover, we observed
15
that the attorney had shown the “same disregard towards both of [the disciplinary]
proceedings as he [had] shown toward his clients,” as evidenced by his failure to respond
to letters, notices, and Petitions for Disciplinary Action from Bar Counsel and his failure to
appear before the Court in the second proceeding, in spite of Bar Counsel’s recommendation
that he be disbarred.  Id.  Viewing this conduct as evidence of the attorney’s “insensitivity
to the seriousness of [the] charges,” we ordered his disbarment.  Id.
Respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), 8.1(b), and
8.4(c) and (d), had a prior disciplinary record, and displayed a continuing disregard of the
attorney grievance process.  Consistent with Wallace and Manning, we find disbarment to
be the appropriate penalty.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT; INCLUDING
THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-
715(c), FOR WHICH SUM  JUDGM ENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
G R I E V A N C E  
C O M M I S S I O N  
O F
MARYLAND 
AGAINST 
JERRY 
SAM
DUNIETZ; RESPONDENT’S DISBARMENT
SHALL 
COMMENCE 
THIRTY 
DAYS
FROM THE FILING OF THIS OPINION.