Case Title: Flonnory v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 513, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
AHKEE FLONNORY,
)
)  No. 513, 2000
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below – Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware
v.
)  in and for New Castle County
)  ID No. 9706016844
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)
)
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  October 24, 2001
Decided:  November 5, 2001
Before, WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and
REMANDED.
Kevin J. O’Connell, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellee.
STEELE, Justice:
2
A Superior Court jury convicted Appellant, Defendant-below, Ahkee
Flonnory of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine and Conspiracy in the
Second Degree.  In this appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Superior
Court because it erred in denying defense counsel’s Motion to Suppress
evidence that the police invalidly seized from Defendant’s car in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.  We conclude that agents of the
State may stop and detain an individual only when they have a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  Because we find that the
police failed to demonstrate a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity when they detained Appellant, any evidence then or later
seized by the police from his car and resulting from the invalid detention and
search was inadmissible.
I.
On the morning of June 23, 1997, the Wilmington Police Department
received a tip from an anonymous caller alleging that an occupant of a gray
automobile at the corner of 23rd and Lamotte Streets in Wilmington
possessed an “illegal substance.”  The caller described not only the vehicle,
but also gave the police the license tag number.  When the police arrived
they identified the vehicle described by the caller as a gray Oldsmobile
3
Cutlass with a license number matching that given in the tip.  The police
observed Appellant Flonnory and Neimon T. Barbour “scrunched low,” as
the caller had described, in the front seat of the vehicle.  The three
Wilmington police officers at the scene approached the automobile.  The
officers testified at the suppression hearing that two of the officers
positioned themselves at the driver and passenger doors of the vehicle
respectively, while the third stood at the rear.  One of the officers tapped on
the driver’s window and asked Flonnory and Barbour what they were doing.
The two occupants of the car replied that they had just “woken up.”  When
the officers continued to question them and asked whether they had any
weapons or other contraband, Flonnory and Barbour stated that they did not.
The police removed Flonnory and Barbour from the automobile and frisked
them for weapons.  At some point during this encounter, the police asked
Flonnory and Barbour for identification.  When none was produced, the
officers asked for the vehicle registration and proof of insurance, neither of
which the Appellant possessed.1  They then searched the passenger
compartment of the car.  The officers discovered no weapons.  However,
during what the officers described as “a Terry search of the vehicle,” one of
                                                
1 The record is unclear about whether the officers asked for Appellant’s identification,
vehicle registration, and proof of insurance before or after they removed Flonnory and
4
the officers discovered several plastic packets that were later revealed to
contain cocaine.  Flonnory and Barbour were taken into custody and driven
to the Wilmington Police Department.
The State charged Appellant Flonnory and his co-defendant, Barbour,
with Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Conspiracy, Maintaining a
Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, and several motor vehicle
offenses.  In July 1999, counsel for Flonnory filed a Motion to Suppress.
The judge presiding over the suppression hearing2 denied the motion, stating
that the police officers’ confirmation of the anonymous caller’s description
of the vehicle provided probable cause for the officers to seize Flonnory and
Barbour and conduct the inquiry and search that led to the discovery of the
cocaine on the floor of the car.
At trial, the court dismissed the charge of Maintaining a Vehicle for
Keeping Controlled Substances.  In addition, the State entered a nolle
prosequi on the motor vehicle charges.  After a trial, a jury convicted
Flonnory of the remaining two charges.  This is the appeal from that
conviction.
                                                                                                                                                
Barbour from the car and searched them.  However, the exact chronology of these events
is irrelevant to our holding in this case.
2 In this instance, a different Superior Court Judge than that assigned for trial presided
over the suppression hearing.
5
II.
 The United States Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio3 that a police
officer may seize an individual for an investigatory purpose of limited scope
and duration only when that detention is supported by “a reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”4  A trial court’s determination of
whether the State possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion before
detaining an individual is an issue of both law and fact.5  In this case, there
are no significant disputes over the issues of fact.  Therefore, we review de
novo the decision of the Superior Court for error in the formulation and
application of the law.6
The right of individuals to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures is secured in Delaware by both the guarantee of an individual’s
right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be
“secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures”7 and the nearly identical language of Article I,
Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.8  We have held that the Delaware
Constitution provides a greater protection for the individual than the United
                                                
3 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
4 Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868.
5 Jones v. State, Del. Supr., 745 A.2d 856, 860 (1999).
6 Id.
7 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
8 Del. Const. Art. I, § 6.
6
States Constitution in the determination of whether a seizure by the State has
occurred.9  In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that a seizure
occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty” of an individual.10  That Court
clarified this standard in Michigan v. Chestnut11 when it declared that a
seizure occurs whenever the conduct of a police officer would
“communicate to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business.”12  Although the United States
Supreme Court carved a significant exception to Chestnut in California v.
Hodari D.,13 we determined in Jones v. State that Article I, Section 6 of
Delaware Constitution offered greater protection than the Fourth
                                                
9 Jones, 745 A.2d at 863-64.
10 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868.
11 486 U.S. 567, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed.2d 565 (1988).
12 Id. at 569, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554,
100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
13 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 133 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991).  In Hodari D., the Supreme
Court held that a show of authority by itself, even where a reasonable person would
believe that he or she was not free to leave, does not give rise to a seizure of a person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Although the police officers in that case
lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain the suspect in that case, even after
Hodari D. fled at the officers’ approach, the Court found that the resulting pursuit was not
sufficient to communicate to the suspected individuals that they were not free to leave.
The police did not seize the individuals for Fourth Amendment purposes until the officers
used physical restraint.  Thus, evidence discarded during the chase was not discovered as
the result of an illegal search and the trial judge properly admitted it.
7
Amendment, requiring the Delaware courts to continue to apply a standard
similar to that set forth in Chestnut.14
Thus, our focus must be on whether, and at what point, a reasonable
person would have believed that he or she was not free to ignore a police
presence.15  In the case before us, there is uncontested evidence that three
police officers approached the Oldsmobile in which Flonnory was sitting
and that they took up positions on three sides of the vehicle.  A reasonable
person in Flonnory and Barbour’s situation could only have believed that the
conduct of the officers communicated to them that they were not at liberty to
go about their business.16  Thus, at the moment that the officers approached
in this manner, they had detained the individuals in the car, which
constituted a seizure of the occupants’ persons under Article I, Section 6 of
the Delaware Constitution.
III.
Having established that the actions of the police constituted a seizure
of Appellant’s person, this Court must next determine whether or not the
police possessed the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to
conduct an investigatory stop under both the Fourth Amendment of the
                                                
14 745 A.2d at 867.
15 Id. at 869; Quarles v. State, Del. Supr. 696 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1997).
8
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware
Constitution.17  To determine whether a reasonable suspicion exists, we must
“examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation ‘as
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or
similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer’s
subjective interpretation of those facts.’”18  In this instance, the totality of the
circumstances fails to suggest the presence of the reasonable and articulable
suspicion required for a police intrusion.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the judge presiding over
the proceeding noted the existence of a “legion of cases” in which courts
have found that an anonymous tip standing alone does not give rise to the
reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop.19  Nevertheless, the judge
went on to decide that the police were not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment or Article I, Section 6 because the circumstances provided the
reasonable suspicion necessary for a seizure.  Specifically, the judge cited
                                                                                                                                                
16 See Quarles, 696 A.2d at 1337.  In Quarles, the police seized the defendant when three
officers positioned themselves on both sides of the suspect.  This Court held that Quarles
remained at the scene as “an act of submission to a show of authority by the police.”
17 Appellant also contends that the State violated 11 Del. C. § 1902(a) which authorizes
the police to conduct a stop if an officer has “reasonable ground” to suspect that an
individual has committed or will commit a crime.  We have held that “reasonable
ground” has the same meaning as reasonable and articulable suspicion and is thus subject
to the same analysis as Del. Const. art. I, § 6.   Jones, 745 A.2d at 1861.
18 Woody v. State, Del. Supr., 765 A.2d 1257, 1263 (2001) (quoting Jones, 745 A.2d at
861).
9
the fact that the officers were able to confirm the anonymous caller’s
description of the vehicle and its occupants.  He found that this confirmation
supported the conclusion that the caller’s allegation of illegal activity was
somehow more reliable and thus gave the police the reasonable suspicion
necessary to detain Flonnory and Barbour.  However, the simple
confirmation of readily observable facts does not enhance the reliability of
an anonymous tip to the level required for a finding of reasonable suspicion.
In a decision handed down after the judge made his ruling at the suppression
hearing, the United States Supreme Court held in J.L. v. Florida20 that an
anonymous tip that provides the police with no predictive information that
they may use to assess the reliability and knowledge of an informant is
insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion.21
In J.L. the police received an anonymous tip that a black male
wearing a plaid shirt, standing at a particular bus stop, was engaged in the
illegal activity of carrying a handgun.22  Police officers responding to the
call observed three black males at the named bus stop, one of whom was
wearing a plaid shirt.23  The officers did not see a firearm or observe any
                                                                                                                                                
19 See e.g. Illinois v. Gates, 264 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
20 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).
21 Id. at 271-72, 120 S. Ct. 1375.
22 Id. at 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375.
23 Id.
10
illegal activity by the three men.24  Nevertheless, one of the officers frisked
J.L. and discovered a concealed handgun.25  The Supreme Court found that
while the tip served the limited purpose of helping the police identify the
person the caller meant to accuse, the tip did not demonstrate that the caller
had any knowledge of concealed criminal activity.26  The Court held that the
reasonable suspicion required for an investigatory stop must be based on a
reliable assertion of illegality.27  Because the tip was based only on the
readily observable location and appearance of the suspect, the police lacked
the necessary indicia of reliability that would suggest that the caller had
inside knowledge of illegal conduct sufficient to provide the police with the
reasonable suspicion required before detaining the suspect.28
As in J.L., the description of Flonnory, Barbour, and the vehicle they
occupied would have been readily observable to anyone who saw the
appellant.  The caller provided the police with only a description of the
suspects and gave no other information that would have indicated to the
                                                
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 272, 120 S. Ct. 1375.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 270-72, 120 S. Ct. 1375; cf. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412,
110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990) (a tip asserting that a woman was carrying cocaine, but
describing the suspect and predicting that she would be wearing specific clothes, leaving
her apartment at a specific time and traveling to a named motel, provided reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop once the caller’s predictions had been conformed by
11
officers that the informant possessed an inside knowledge of illegality.
Furthermore, upon arriving at the scene, the police failed to observe any
illegal activity that, standing alone, would have warranted detaining
Flonnory and Barbour.  Because the anonymous tip lacked an indicia of
reliability and was unsupported by independent police corroboration of
present or predicted future criminal activity, the police were without the
reasonable suspicion necessary to approach Flonnory’s vehicle in a manner
communicating to him that he was not at liberty to leave.
The judge also indicated at the suppression hearing that Flonnory’s
lack of identification, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance gave rise
to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the Terry search that led to
the discovery of the cocaine packets.  However, this Court has held that
“[a]n illegal stop cannot be justified by circumstances that arise following its
initiation.”29  The officers in the instant case did not discover and had no
reasonable basis to believe that they would discover that Flonnory lacked
identification, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance until after the
initial seizure had already taken place.  Therefore, it is improper for the
                                                                                                                                                
police observation because the caller’s ability to predict the appearance and movements
of the suspect provided an indication of inside knowledge of illegal activity).
29 Woody, 765 A.2d at 1263; see also Jones, 745 A.2d at 874 (where an officer attempts
to seize someone in the absence of a reasonable articulable suspicion, the suspect’s
actions stemming from the attempted seizure may not be used to manufacture the
reasonable suspicion the police initially lacked).
12
police and the courts to rely upon this information to provide the reasonable
suspicion that would justify the initial detention.
Finally, the State argues that the police were entitled to conduct a
Terry search of Flonnory, Barbour, and the passenger compartment of the
vehicle in the interest of officer safety.  While this Court has repeatedly
acknowledged that “officer safety is ‘both legitimate and weighty,’”30 an
officer needs to demonstrate an independent articulable suspicion
appropriate to the circumstances to proceed with a Terry search.31  In this
instance, Officer Kutch stated at the suppression hearing that he feared for
his safety.  However, on cross-examination, he could offer no basis for that
assertion.  Therefore, the state cannot properly assert that the need to protect
the officers met the requirements of reasonable suspicion necessary to
conduct a search of the vehicle and its occupants.
IV.
In conclusion, the record clearly demonstrates that the police officers
approached the defendant in manner that constituted a seizure of the person
under Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.  Once this seizure
occurred, the State had the duty to establish that reasonable suspicion existed
                                                
30 Jones, 745 A.2d at 872 n. 78 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 7th Cir., 170 F.3d 707,
718 (1999).
31 Jones, 745 A.2d at 872 n. 78.
13
for that detention in compliance with the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and
Title 11, Section 1902 of the Delaware Code.  The State’s reliance on an
anonymous tip that offered no indicia of reliability was insufficient to meet
that burden.  Because the State’s later discovery that Appellant lacked
identification, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance was predicated on
the initial illegal detention, the State could not then offer it as a means of
establishing reasonable suspicion.  In short, the police would not have
discovered any evidence of illegality but for the illegal seizure.  Therefore,
the Superior Court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress and ultimately
admitting the evidence of cocaine found on the floor of Appellant
Flonnory’s vehicle.  Accordingly the judgment of the Superior Court is
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.