Case Title: Bendekgey v. Bendekgey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 88-552
 
 
Allen Bendekgey                              Supreme Court
 
                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court
 
Martha A. Bendekgey                          November Term, 1989
 
 
James L. Morse, J.
 
Bauer, Gravel & Watson, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant
 
Priscilla B. Dube, Burlington, for defendant-appellee
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ., and Barney, C.J.
          (Ret.), Specially Assigned
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff husband appeals from a superior court divorce
decree which disposed of the parties' real property in accordance with their
pretrial agreement.  We affirm.
     The parties were married in July, 1983.  They had no children together,
but defendant had two children, and plaintiff one, from previous marriages.
They bought a house in Colchester in September, 1984 for $72,900, with a
down payment of $24,000 supplied by plaintiff.  After he refinanced the
house in 1986 to pay some personal debts, plaintiff's equity in the house
was reduced to about $8,000.  Under the parties' own arrangements, defendant
paid thirty percent of the mortgage, taxes, and insurance, and plaintiff the
balance.
     The parties separated in January, 1987, at which time they both signed
a hand-written agreement, which is the center of the present dispute.  The
agreement set a value for the house at $85,860, and, after calculating the
amount due on that date under the mortgage, established the parties' total
net equity at $21,260.  The agreement further provided that defendant would
keep the house and would pay plaintiff half of the equity amount, plus an
additional $2,630, if she sold the house.  Between the date of the
separation and the  divorce hearing, defendant spent $6,000 of her own funds
to convert a portion of the residence into a rental property.
     The divorce action commenced in June, 1987, and was heard in August,
1988.  Plaintiff testified that he appraised the value of the house at the
time of hearing at $135,000.  He asked for fifty percent of the total net
equity, a total which he estimated to be about $70,000, instead of the
$21,260 total net equity figure recited in the 1987 agreement.
     On cross-examination of plaintiff, defendant introduced the 1987
agreement without objection.  Defendant's counsel asked plaintiff about the
valuation figure in the 1987 agreement:

	Q:  And did you believe at the time that was pretty
	close to the value of the house?
	 
	A:  I remember arguing about the value of the house, and
	I didn't believe that was fair, but I settled for DD
	 
	Q:  Now, you said you were under considerable stress
	during that time?
	 
	A:  Yes.
	 
	Q:  It was a difficult time, is that DD
	 
	A:  Well, it was difficult in a few areas.  One of them
	was being there.  We didn't have a place to stay.  We
	finally had a place we couldn't move in, had to stay in
	a motel. . . .
 
     When plaintiff rested, the court announced that although it would view
the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, it had no choice but to enforce
the 1987 agreement.  The court stated:
	There hasn't been any showing that this agreement was
	obtained by fraud, by duress, by DD there's nothing
	about the agreement that's unconscionable.  Therefore I
	don't, even viewing every word the Plaintiff has uttered
	as absolute truth, there isn't anything that we can do
	to this agreement, this contract otherwise.  So if
	that's the only issue in this divorce, then I don't
	think we need to have any more testimony.
 
Plaintiff's counsel then asked to recall his client "to perhaps elucidate
the Court with respect to the circumstances of signing this contract,
alleged contract."  The court acknowledged plaintiff's testimony that he was
"under pressure" and that it had been "an emotional time," and asked
plaintiff's counsel for an offer of proof.  Counsel stated:
	Well, your Honor, the offer would be Mr. Bendekgey was
	under severe pressure at the time, his moving out of the
	premises, the document was tendered to him, that he
	didn't fully appreciate the import of each term in the
	proposed document and basically was incompetent to sign
	it at the time.  Upon reflection he thinks that it's
	unfair.
 
Counsel indicated that plaintiff did not plan to present expert testimony on
the question of his competency, and the court declined to allow any
additional testimony.  There were no requests for findings, and judgment was
entered on the basis of the January 1987 agreement. The present appeal
followed.
     Plaintiff makes three arguments on appeal:  (1) the trial court abused
its discretion in distributing the real property based solely on the
agreement between the parties; (2) the written agreement was insufficient to
effect a distribution of the real property; and (3) the trial court did not
make sufficient findings to distribute the real property.  We take these
arguments in order.
     The discretion accorded to the trial court to distribute marital
property is very broad.  The court's decision will stand on appeal unless
that discretion is "'erroneously exercised, or was exercised upon unfounded
considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable in light of the
evidence.'"  Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. 573, 578,