Case Title: BARTON v. BARTON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-363

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
#25965-r-GAS  
 
2012 S.D. 44 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF THE 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
JEANNINE ANN BARTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
DONALD L. BARTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE JOHN J. DELANEY 
Retired Circuit Judge 
 
* * * * 
PATRICIA A. MEYERS  
Rapid City, South Dakota 
Attorney for plaintiff 
 
and appellee. 
 
BARTON R. BANKS of 
Banks, Johnson, Colbath, 
  Kappelman & Becker, PLLC 
Rapid City, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for defendant 
and appellant. 
 
 
* * * * 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 
ON MARCH 20, 2012  
 
 
OPINION FILED 06/06/12 
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SEVERSON, Justice 
[¶1.]  
Jeannine Barton and Donald Barton divorced and the circuit court 
awarded Jeannine permanent alimony, a monetary judgment, and attorney fees.  
After Donald filed for bankruptcy, the court issued an order clarifying the nature of 
the monetary judgment.  After an appeal of this order, Jeannine and Donald 
entered into a settlement agreement regarding the judgment.  The agreement, 
which was not incorporated into the divorce decree, resolved a dispute regarding the 
judgment and released all present and future claims between the parties.  Nine 
years later, Jeannine moved to modify alimony.  The circuit court granted 
Jeannine’s motion, increasing Jeannine’s monthly alimony award.  The court also 
extended Donald’s alimony obligation beyond Donald’s death.  Donald appeals.  We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
[¶2.]   
 Jeannine and Donald divorced in 1993.  The circuit court awarded 
Jeannine: (1) $700 per month in permanent alimony until her remarriage or death 
or until Donald’s death; (2) a judgment against Donald for $150,000 as an 
equalizing property distribution; and (3) attorney fees.  
[¶3.]   
Later in 1993, Donald filed for relief in federal bankruptcy court.  
Jeannine moved for an order to show cause in South Dakota circuit court as to why 
the $150,000 judgment and all attorney fees should not be considered alimony or 
support and thus, non-dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings.  In February 1994, 
the circuit court clarified its order and ruled that $40,000 of the $150,000 award 
and all of the attorney fees were in the nature of maintenance and support.  Donald 
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appealed the court’s decision to this Court.  This Court affirmed.  Barton v. Barton, 
534 N.W.2d 48, 52 (S.D. 1995).   
[¶4.]   
 Following the appeal, Jeannine and Donald entered into a “post-
appeal settlement agreement” (Agreement).  The Agreement was not incorporated 
into the divorce decree.  The Agreement’s purpose was to “settle all questions, 
including dischargeability, as to their respective rights and obligations under the 
terms of [the $150,000 judgment].”  Under the Agreement, Donald would pay 
Jeannine just over $66,000 by certain dates.  Donald would also pay Jeannine’s 
attorney $13,991.20 in attorney fees.  Donald waived “any and all legal defenses to 
the payments required within [the Agreement] including the protection that may be 
available to him pursuant to U.S.C. Title 11[.]”  The Agreement also provided that 
Donald’s “obligation to pay [Jeannine] permanent alimony in the sum of . . . $700 
per month, until her remarriage or death, or the death of [Donald], shall remain 
undisturbed.” 
[¶5.]   
In exchange, Jeannine released Donald from “any and all other claims, 
demands, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, which have 
resulted in the past or may in the future develop as a result of the contacts, 
transactions and dealings by and between [Jeannine] and [Donald] in connection 
with the marriage of [Jeannine] and [Donald].”  The Agreement also provided that 
“[s]o long as [Donald] is in full compliance with the alimony payments and the two 
remaining agreed upon property payments on the [$150,000] Judgment, [Jeannine] 
agrees not to proceed with any collection efforts.”  Jeannine was represented by 
counsel when negotiating this Agreement. 
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[¶6.]   
Donald made all required payments for the $66,000 and Jeannine 
recorded a satisfaction of judgment.  Donald has also timely made all monthly 
alimony payments to Jeannine.  Since the divorce, Jeannine obtained her teaching 
degree, secured fulltime employment, purchased a home, a car, and established a 
$140,000 retirement savings. 
[¶7.]   
In October 2009, Jeannine moved to modify alimony.  Jeannine 
claimed that she was forced to leave her employment to care for her aging parents.  
Jeannine also claimed that her health was failing and that Donald’s financial 
position had steadily improved since the divorce.  Donald stipulated to his ability to 
pay.  In March 2011, the court concluded that Jeannine demonstrated a change in 
circumstances and granted Jeannine’s motion.  The court ordered Donald to pay 
$1,500 per month in alimony.  The court also ordered that the alimony terminate 
only upon Jeannine’s death or remarriage.  Thus, the alimony obligation would 
continue beyond Donald’s death.  
[¶8.]   
Donald appeals, arguing that: (1) Jeannine waived the right to claim 
additional alimony and should be estopped from doing so because of her release of 
claims under the Agreement; (2) Jeannine failed to demonstrate a change in 
circumstances for a modification of alimony; and (3) the court erred in extending 
Donald’s alimony obligation beyond his death. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[¶9.]  
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo.”  State 
ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Clark, 2011 S.D. 20, ¶ 5, 798 N.W.2d 160, 162.  We review 
a circuit court’s modification of an alimony award under the abuse of discretion 
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standard.  Moore v. Moore, 2009 S.D. 16, ¶ 10, 763 N.W.2d 536, 539.  “An abuse of 
discretion is a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly 
against, reason and evidence.”  Id.  “We review the circuit court’s findings of fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard and conclusions of law de novo.”  Id.   
DISCUSSION 
[¶10.] 
1.  
Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to modify 
Jeannine’s alimony award.  
 
[¶11.]   
 “Where a divorce is granted, the court may compel one party to make 
such suitable allowance to the other party for support during the life of that other 
party or for a shorter period, as the court may deem just, having regard to the 
circumstances of the parties represented; and the court may from time to time 
modify its orders in these respects.”  SDCL 25-4-41 (emphasis added).  “This Court 
has been very clear about a trial court’s ability to modify an alimony award.”  Oman 
v. Oman, 2005 S.D. 88, ¶ 9, 702 N.W.2d 11, 14.  “[O]nce a court approves an alimony 
award, it can modify it.”  Id.  Thus, circuit courts have continuing jurisdiction to 
modify a permanent alimony award.  SDCL 25-4-41; Moore, 2009 S.D. 16, ¶ 12, 763 
N.W.2d at 539-40.   
[¶12.]   
Here, the circuit court granted Jeannine permanent alimony as part of 
a divorce proceeding.  Therefore, despite the Agreement, the court was authorized 
under SDCL 25-4-41 to modify the alimony award.   
[¶13.] 
2.  
Whether Jeannine demonstrated a change in 
circumstances warranting modification of alimony.  
 
[¶14.]   
A party seeking modification of an alimony award must establish a 
change in circumstances.  Moore, 2009 S.D. 16, ¶ 13, 763 N.W.2d at 540.   
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When the trial court considers evidence as to a change in 
circumstances, it must be careful to confine its review to changes 
occurring since the time of the divorce.  The court is not to reflect 
on whether the decree was “equitable” when entered, but only 
whether the economic circumstances of the parties have changed 
since the award such that the original award is now either 
insufficient or excessive.  The role of trial courts in modification 
proceedings is not to relieve a party of his or her bad bargain.  
The original decree is res judicata except in cases of changed 
circumstances subsequently arising, and proceedings for 
modification cannot be used to review the equities of the original 
decree. 
 
Id. ¶ 12.  “Although the change need not be substantial, mere proof of a change is 
insufficient to mandate modification.”  Id. ¶ 13.   
[¶15.]   
“The change in circumstances refers to a change in the necessities of 
the recipient and the financial ability of the obligor.”  Id.  “[B]oth income and 
expenses of the parties must be considered.”  Id. ¶ 14.  Courts may evaluate the 
following factors: “the intentional reduction of gross income; an inquiry into earning 
potential when a party is under- or unemployed; the intentional inflation of 
expenses; and the offsetting effect of cohabitation on expenses.”  Id.  “Just as courts 
must be wary of an alimony obligor’s efforts to minimize his or her ability to pay 
through under- or unemployment, courts must also consider conduct by the alimony 
recipient to maximize his or her unmet needs through speculative expenses and the 
minimization of support provided by their live-in cohabitants.”  Id. ¶ 15. 
[¶16.]   
Here, the health concerns asserted by Jeannine are primarily the same 
health concerns discussed at the time of the divorce.  A court must consider only 
changes in Jeannine’s health conditions since the time of the divorce.  In addition, 
Jeannine admitted she voluntarily retired in 2005 to care for her parents and that 
she did not suffer from any health issues that prevented her from working.  The 
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record demonstrates that Jeannine voluntarily left employment, declined other 
employment, and acquired many assets since the divorce.  We also note that while 
Jeannine identified many home improvement and repair projects when requesting 
alimony modification, Jeannine later testified that the projects are either completed 
and paid for in full, or merely anticipatory in nature.   
[¶17.]   
In addition, regarding Jeannine’s monthly income, the court found that 
Jeannine “relies on her retirement from SDRS of $608, $700 in alimony and what 
she earns from substitute teaching to meet her monthly expenses.  In 2009 she 
earned $15,000 substitute teaching and had gross income of $30,839.”  The court 
concluded that Jeannine “has current financial needs of $2,602 per month and 
current income of $608 from SDRS, $700 from alimony and various amounts earned 
by substitute teaching.  Her average net income is less than $2,000.”  The court’s 
findings relating to Jeannine’s monthly income are erroneous for several reasons.  
First, the court failed to include the $881 per month that Jeannine receives in social 
security.  The court also used the $608 figure for retirement income, when Jeannine 
testified that she was now getting $675 per month in retirement benefits.  
Furthermore, the court summarily concludes that Jeannine’s net monthly income is 
less than $2,000.  However, using Jeannine’s 2009 earnings for substitute teaching 
($15,000) as a guide, Jeannine’s monthly income would be approximately: $675 
(retirement) plus $881 (social security) plus $700 (alimony) plus $1,250 (substitute 
teaching), equaling just over $3,500.  The circuit court did not delineate how it 
calculated the net earnings and the record does not support the court’s findings 
regarding Jeannine’s monthly income. 
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[¶18.]   
Finally, we find Jeannine’s argument that she did not receive the 
entire $150,000 judgment unpersuasive.  Jeannine voluntarily settled with Donald 
to receive less than the full judgment and was represented by counsel when doing 
so.  We also agree with Donald that the circuit court considered the change in 
property division when it clarified the $150,000 judgment in 1994 and ordered that 
$40,000 of the $150,000 award was in the nature of alimony.  Upon this record, we 
conclude that the court abused its discretion in modifying Jeannine’s alimony 
award.   
[¶19.] 
3.  
Whether the circuit court erred in extending Donald’s 
alimony obligation beyond his death.  
 
[¶20.]   
Here, Donald argues that alimony is a personal obligation that cannot 
be extended beyond the obligor’s death.  Donald alternatively argues that even if 
this Court affirms the circuit court’s decision to extend Donald’s alimony obligation 
beyond his death, Jeannine has not demonstrated a change in circumstances and 
thus, the alimony modification was an abuse of discretion.  Jeannine responds that 
her needs will not terminate upon Donald’s death. 
[¶21.]   
In Lodde v. Lodde, 420 N.W.2d 20, 21 (S.D. 1988), this Court 
acknowledged that “[g]enerally, in the absence of an agreement between the 
spouses, the obligation to pay alimony ceases on the death of the obligor spouse.”  
However, we need not determine whether a court may, under any factual 
circumstances, extend an alimony obligation beyond the obligor’s death.   
[¶22.]   
Jeannine’s request that Donald’s alimony obligation extend beyond his 
death was a request for a modification of alimony award as the original Divorce 
Judgment provided for alimony to be paid until “the death of the Defendant 
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[Donald].”  Thus, under our case law, Jeannine carried the burden of demonstrating 
a change in circumstances since the time of the divorce to warrant the modification.  
Moore, 2009 S.D. 16, ¶ 13, 763 N.W.2d at 540.  The circuit court found that “without 
the continued alimony, [Jeannine] would be unable to adequately support herself in 
her old age.”  The court also found that Donald’s assets would allow for a continued 
alimony obligation beyond his death.  The court then concluded as a matter of law 
that Jeannine’s need for support will not diminish as she ages and ordered that the 
alimony award will terminate only upon Jeannine’s death.  However, these findings 
and conclusions are not supported by the record.  Jeannine did not show how her 
need for support beyond Donald’s death is a change in circumstance since the time 
of the divorce.  
[¶23.]   
 “The change in circumstances refers to a change in the necessities of 
the recipient and the financial ability of the obligor” and that “both income and 
expenses of the parties must be considered.”  Id. ¶¶ 13-14.  In addition, the record 
demonstrates that Donald was significantly more financially stable than he was at 
the time of the divorce.  However, the record does not support the circuit court’s 
findings regarding Jeannine’s need for support beyond Donald’s death and thus, the 
court abused its discretion in extending the alimony award beyond Donald’s death. 
[¶24.] 
4.  
Whether either party is entitled to appellate attorney 
fees.  
 
[¶25.]   
Both parties moved for appellate attorney fees and submitted itemized 
statements of legal services.  We may award appellate attorney fees in cases 
involving alimony.  SDCL 15-26A-87.3 and 15-17-38.  “To determine whether 
attorney fees are proper in domestic relation cases, we consider the property owned 
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by each party, the relative incomes, the liquidity of the assets and whether either 
party unreasonably increased the time spent on the case.”  Larson v. Larson, 2007 
S.D. 47, ¶ 22, 733 N.W.2d 272, 278.  We deny both Jeannine’s and Donald’s request 
for appellate attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
[¶26.]   
Mere proof that a change has occurred does not mandate a 
modification of alimony.  Moore, 2009 S.D. 16, ¶ 13, 763 N.W.2d at 540.  Clearly 
Donald’s financial situation has changed.  However, the amount of alimony 
established in the original divorce decree was not predicated solely on Donald’s 
ability to pay.  The divorce court also originally considered Jeannine’s need.  Based 
on the record presently before this Court, the circuit court’s findings when it 
considered modification do not support a change in circumstances justifying a 
modification of alimony.  Thus the circuit court is reversed.  However, under SDCL 
25-4-41, the circuit court retains jurisdiction to modify its order regarding alimony 
upon sufficient proof establishing a change in circumstances since the time of 
divorce, considering a change in the necessities of the recipient and the financial 
ability of the obligor.  
[¶27.]   
Reversed. 
[¶28.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER and WILBUR, Justices, 
and GERING, Circuit Court Judge, concur. 
[¶29.]  
GERING, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for KONENKAMP, Justice, 
disqualified.