Case Title: State v. Bradley J. Vorburger

Citation: 2002 WI 105

Docket Number: 2000AP000971-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 105 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0971-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Bradley J. Vorburger,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 43 
Reported at:  241 Wis. 2d 481, 624 N.W.2d 398 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven D. Ebert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, JJ., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by David D. Cook, Monroe. 
 
 
2002 WI 105 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-0971-CR   
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 1307) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Bradley J. Vorburger,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals that reversed the conviction of 
Bradley J. Vorburger on a charge of possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver, and directed the circuit court to grant 
Vorburger's motion to suppress evidence.1  Vorburger and a co-
defendant, Amerie Becker, were stopped and detained in a motel 
by police conducting a drug investigation.  During questioning 
by police, Vorburger consented to a search of his car and Becker 
                                                 
1 State v. Vorburger, 2001 WI App 43, 241 Wis. 2d 481, 624 
N.W.2d 398. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
2 
 
consented to a search of the apartment in which she and 
Vorburger resided. 
¶2 
Vorburger moved to suppress the evidence discovered by 
police in the car and in the apartment.  He claimed that he and 
Becker were illegally seized and arrested and that their 
consents to the searches were both involuntary and the fruit of 
illegal seizures. 
¶3 
Vorburger's motion to suppress was denied by the 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Dane 
County, 
Steven 
D. 
Ebert, 
Judge.  
Vorburger then pled no contest to one count of possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver as party to the crime, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)2 and 939.05 (1995-96).2  He 
appealed his conviction, alleging that the circuit court erred 
in denying his suppression motion.  The court of appeals 
reversed, determining that Vorburger and Becker were unlawfully 
arrested.  The court concluded that Vorburger's consent to 
search his car and Becker's consent to search their apartment 
were given as a result of unlawful arrests and, therefore, were 
invalid. 
¶4 
The State petitioned this court for review of the 
court of appeals decision as it relates to Becker's detention 
and consent to search.  We now determine that Becker was 
properly and lawfully stopped and detained as part of a law 
enforcement investigation and that her detention did not 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
3 
 
constitute an unlawful arrest.  We further determine that Becker 
voluntarily 
consented 
to 
the 
search 
of 
her 
apartment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The facts of this case are gleaned from testimony at a 
motion hearing held on April 2 and 3, 1998, and from documents 
in the record.  The salient events occurred during the afternoon 
and evening of July 2, 1997, and the early hours of July 3.  
Between 4:00 and 4:30 in the afternoon of July 2, the manager of 
a Motel 6 east of Madison near Interstate 90 was inspecting 
rooms to ensure that they had been properly cleaned.  As he 
entered room 230, the manager detected a strong smell that he 
suspected was marijuana.  He also noted an unzipped bag about 
the size of a diaper bag on the floor next to the air 
conditioning unit.  He picked up a sample of the substance he 
saw in the bag, placed it in a plastic bag, took the plastic bag 
to the motel office, and called the police.3 
¶6 
Dane County Deputy Sheriffs Jeffrey Thiel and Robert 
Lurquin were dispatched to the motel, and arrived separately at 
approximately 4:30.  Deputy Thiel met with the manager and 
examined the substance that had been removed from room 230.  The 
substance appeared to be marijuana.  The manager showed Deputy 
Thiel a check-in slip.  It revealed that room 230 had been 
rented to Corin Cramer and listed the driver's license number 
                                                 
3 The manager testified at the motion hearing that he could 
not recall whether he personally called the police or whether he 
had an employee call them. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
4 
 
and license plate number (RZY-670) that Cramer gave when he 
checked in.  Deputy Thiel checked the license plate number and 
learned that the plates were registered to Peter Kokoros and 
were associated with a four-door Buick. 
¶7 
Deputies Lurquin and Thiel contacted their supervisor, 
Sergeant David Ritter, who contacted Sergeant Randall Gaber,4 a 
supervisor with the Dane County Narcotics and Gangs Task Force 
(Task Force).  Sergeant Gaber then contacted Detective Alix 
Olson of the Madison Police Department and instructed her to 
begin to prepare a search warrant affidavit. 
¶8 
Deputies Thiel and Lurquin then positioned themselves 
outside room 230 to wait for a warrant to search the room.  From 
their vantage point, the officers could see the motel parking 
lot through a window.  At approximately 5:45, a four-door 
vehicle with license plate number RZY-670 entered the parking 
lot.  The driver parked the car and entered the motel.  When the 
driver approached the door to room 230 and attempted to insert a 
key into the lock, he was approached by Deputy Thiel. 
¶9 
The driver identified himself as Peter Kokoros and 
acknowledged that room 230 was registered to Cory Cramer.  
Kokoros stated that Cramer had been in Kokoros' car that day and 
had left the motel room key in the car.  Kokoros claimed that he 
found the key and stopped at the motel to use the bathroom. 
                                                 
4 By the time of the motion hearing, Sergeant Gaber had been 
promoted to Lieutenant.  This opinion refers to Gaber by his 
rank at the time of the incident. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
5 
 
¶10 At about 5:45 or 6:00, a number of other officers from 
the Task Force arrived at the motel.  After leaving Kokoros with 
Officer Michael Montie, Deputy Thiel field-tested the contents 
of the plastic bag given to him by the motel manager.  The 
substance tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinols (THC), the 
active ingredient in marijuana. 
¶11 Officer Montie told Kokoros that he was not under 
arrest but was being detained.  He asked him to go outside for 
questioning.  Kokoros told Officer Montie that he had traveled 
to Madison from La Crosse the previous day and had stayed in 
room 215 of the motel that night.  He said that he had checked 
out at around 10:00 a.m. and had met with Cory Cramer and 
another friend.  Kokoros told Officer Montie that he was on his 
way back to La Crosse when he noticed the motel key in his car 
and remembered Cramer saying that he was staying in room 230.  
Kokoros claimed that he intended to drop off the key at the 
residence of Cramer's girlfriend, but first went to the motel to 
use the bathroom.  Detective Olson subsequently checked Kokoros 
for warrants and learned that he was on probation for a drug 
offense. 
¶12 Meanwhile, Officer Kevin Linsmeier learned from the 
front desk clerk that room 215 had not been rented since Kokoros 
had checked out, so he got a key for the room.  When he entered 
room 215, he smelled marijuana and observed particles of 
marijuana, 
marijuana seeds, 
and other 
marijuana 
remnants.  
Officer Montie learned from a motel employee that Cory Cramer 
had arrived at the motel at approximately 2:30 that afternoon in 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
6 
 
a car with license plate number RZY-670, and had checked into 
room 230.  Officer Montie continued to question Kokoros5 who told 
him that Cramer was likely driving a Grand Prix owned by 
Cramer's girlfriend.  Officer Montie called the State Patrol and 
learned that the car registered to Cramer's girlfriend was a 
Grand Prix, and that Cramer had a Madison address. 
¶13 While Officer Montie was questioning Kokoros, Deputy 
Thiel, 
Sergeant 
Gaber, 
and 
Officers 
Linsmeier, 
Christian 
Paulson, and Linda Kosovac entered room 229 to wait for the 
warrant. 
¶14 At around 9:20, Officer Montie was informed that two 
vehicles, one a Grand Prix, had arrived in the motel parking 
lot.  Officer Montie drove his squad car into the parking lot 
and Kokoros identified one of the vehicles as the Grand Prix 
that Cramer had been driving.  Kokoros also identified Cramer as 
he exited the Grand Prix.  Cramer entered the motel office, told 
the front desk clerk that he had left his key in the room, and 
was given a new key. 
¶15 A few minutes later, just after 9:20, the officers in 
room 229 observed three people, later identified as Cramer, 
Vorburger, and Becker, approach room 230.  When they saw Cramer 
begin to insert a key into the lock, the officers exited room 
229 and identified themselves as police officers.  Sergeant 
                                                 
5 Officer Montie drove his squad car in which he was 
questioning Kokoros across the street to act as an "early 
observation" vehicle and perhaps a "stop" vehicle depending on 
what transpired in the motel parking lot. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
7 
 
Gaber handcuffed Cramer, and Deputy Thiel and Officer Kosovac 
handcuffed Vorburger.  Officer Linsmeier handcuffed Becker, 
telling her that it was for officer safety and for her safety.  
Officers performed pat-down searches on Cramer, Vorburger, and 
Becker but found no weapons. 
¶16 Vorburger, Cramer, and Becker were detained in the 
motel hallway, each separated from the others.  Vorburger and 
Cramer were seated in chairs.  Becker declined to sit. 
¶17 Officer Linsmeier told Becker she was being detained 
and was not free to leave while the officers conducted an 
investigation, but she was not under arrest.  Becker cried and 
appeared to be upset.  She identified herself and told Officer 
Linsmeier that Vorburger was her boyfriend.  She explained that 
she was going to room 230 to use the bathroom. 
¶18 At around 9:40, about 15 minutes after officers first 
detained her, Becker asked to use the bathroom.  Officer 
Linsmeier asked a female officer, Linda Kosovac, for assistance.  
Officer Kosovac told Becker that she would accompany her to the 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
8 
 
bathroom, and that she could use it, so long as Officer Kosovac 
was present.  Becker chose not to use the bathroom.6 
¶19 Detective Olson completed the search warrant affidavit 
at approximately 8:45 and drove it to the home of Dane County 
Circuit Judge Angela Bartell, who reviewed the affidavit and 
signed a warrant at 9:34.  Detective Olson brought the signed 
warrant directly to the motel, arriving at around 10:05.  At 
10:17, Detective Olson, Sergeant Gaber, and three other officers 
entered room 230 to execute the warrant. 
¶20 Inside room 230, the officers found the bag that the 
motel manager had described.  It contained about 14 pounds of 
marijuana and a digital scale.  The officers also found a box 
containing plastic bags. 
¶21 Just after 10:30, Detective Olson and Sergeant Gaber 
directed Officer Kosovac to question Becker.  Officer Kosovac 
took 
Becker 
into 
room 
229 
and 
removed 
her 
handcuffs.  
Approximately 70 minutes had passed since Becker was initially 
detained.  According to Becker, "It felt like hours, but I think 
it was about an hour and a half, two hours."  Officer Kosovac 
                                                 
6 Becker and Officer Kosovac differed about Becker's request 
to use the bathroom.  Becker acknowledged that Officer Kosovac 
offered to let her use the bathroom, but claimed that Officer 
Kosovac told her that her handcuffs could not be removed to 
facilitate using the bathroom.  Becker asserted that she told 
Office Kosovac that she had recently undergone a personal 
medical procedure and did not want anyone to help lower her 
pants.  Officer Kosovac testified that Becker never told her 
about her surgical procedure, that she never told Becker that 
her handcuffs could not be removed, and that handcuffs are 
routinely removed from females to allow them to use the 
bathroom. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
9 
 
told Becker that she could use the bathroom with the door 
slightly ajar.  Becker used the bathroom and got a drink of 
water. 
¶22 At 10:39, Officer Kosovac read the Miranda7 warnings to 
Becker.  She then told Becker that the investigation was a 
"drug" investigation, and that officers had found a large 
quantity of marijuana in room 230.  Officer Kosovac asked Becker 
if she smoked marijuana.  Becker replied that she and Vorburger 
both were occasional marijuana smokers and had shared a "blunt"8 
that afternoon at their apartment.  Officer Kosovac asked 
whether Becker had any drugs or drug paraphernalia in her purse, 
and if she would consent to a search of her purse.  Becker 
agreed and after warning Officer Kosovac that she was a diabetic 
and had a needle in her purse, allowed Officer Kosovac to dump 
the contents of her purse onto the bed.  Officer Kosovac found 
nothing illegal.  Officer Kosovac then asked Becker if she had 
any drugs at her apartment.  Becker stated that there might be a 
small quantity of marijuana and some rolling papers.9 
¶23 Officer Kosovac asked Becker if she could remove the 
marijuana and rolling papers from Becker's apartment.  Becker 
                                                 
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
8 A "blunt" is a hollowed-out cigar filled with marijuana.  
See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶8, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621. 
9 Becker testified that Officer Kosovac told her that 
Vorburger had informed an officer that marijuana stems and seeds 
were likely present in the apartment. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
10 
 
agreed.  Officer Kosovac testified that she asked Becker if 
officers would find anything more than the small quantity of 
marijuana if they searched the apartment and Becker replied that 
they would not.  She then asked Becker if officers could go to 
the apartment, confiscate the small amount of marijuana and 
paraphernalia, and search the apartment for other items of drugs 
or drug paraphernalia.  Officer Kosovac testified that Becker 
replied with words to the effect of "Sure, no problem."10 
¶24 Officer Kosovac testified that around 11:15 she told 
Sergeant Gaber and Detective Olson that Becker had given consent 
to search the apartment.  Officer Kosovac again asked Becker if 
she consented to a search, and Becker responded that she did.  
Two uniformed officers then transported Becker to her apartment, 
while Officer Kosovac followed in her squad car.  When they 
arrived, the two uniformed officers waited, at Becker's request, 
for Becker to let them in the back door so that neighbors would 
be unaware that police officers were in the apartment.  Officer 
Kosovac testified that before the officers began to search the 
                                                 
10 Becker's testimony differed significantly from that of 
Officer Kosovac's.  She claimed that Officer Kosovac asked only 
if officers could remove the small quantity of marijuana,  but 
did not ask if they could search the entire apartment.  She 
further claimed that Officer Kosovac implied that if Becker did 
not consent to the search, she would get a search warrant to 
remove the marijuana.  Becker testified that she agreed to allow 
Officer Kosovac to remove the marijuana from the apartment 
because she did not want her apartment to be "trashed" in a 
search pursuant to a warrant. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
11 
 
apartment, she again asked Becker for consent to search, and 
that Becker said the officers could look wherever they wanted.11 
¶25 In their search of the apartment, officers found 
marijuana, powder cocaine, hallucinogenic mushrooms, a small 
postal scale, a pager, and the remains of smoked marijuana, as 
well as lease and rental agreements in the names of Becker and 
Vorburger.  They also found $1968 in cash in the pocket of a 
shirt hanging in the bedroom closet.  The officers found two 
baggies of powder cocaine in a jewelry holder that belonged to 
Becker.  Officer Kosovac testified that she asked Becker if the 
cocaine was hers, and Becker replied that it was not.  Officer 
Kosovac further testified that she found a receipt with the name 
"Brad Vorburger" on it in the same place as the officer found 
the cocaine.  When the officers completed the search and 
confiscated the drugs and drug paraphernalia, they left, 
allowing Becker to remain at her apartment. 
¶26 Vorburger and Becker were each charged with possession 
of 15 to 40 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, within 1000 
feet 
of 
a 
school 
zone, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 961.41(1m)(cm)3, and 302.11; knowingly maintaining a place 
used 
for 
keeping 
controlled 
substances, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.42; knowingly possessing psilocin, contrary to 
                                                 
11 Becker testified that after Officer Kosovac saw the 
marijuana that Becker had told her she would find, Officer 
Kosovac wanted to search the rest of the apartment.  Becker 
asserted that she did not hear Officer Kosovac ask for consent 
to search the entire apartment and that she did not give consent 
to such a search. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(d); 
and 
two 
counts 
of 
knowingly 
possessing THC, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).12 
¶27 Vorburger moved to suppress "all evidence obtained 
directly or indirectly as a result of the stop, detention and 
arrest . . . on or about July 2-3, 1997 . . . ."  He claimed 
that he and Becker were both stopped, detained, and arrested 
without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion that he or 
she had committed or were about to commit a crime.  He further 
claimed that the consent he gave to the search of his car and 
the consent that Becker gave to the search of their apartment 
were the result of unlawful arrests and, therefore, invalid. 
¶28 After a hearing, the circuit court denied Vorburger's 
motion, finding that the detentions of Becker and Vorburger were 
not unlawful.  It determined that the tactics used by police in 
gaining 
consent 
to 
search 
Vorburger's 
car 
and 
the 
Becker/Vorburger apartment were not "coercive, improper, or 
designed to overcome the defendant's resistance."  The court 
concluded that the voluntariness of Becker's consent was proven 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
¶29 Before trial, Vorburger agreed to plead to one count 
of possession of more than 5 but not more than 15 grams of 
cocaine, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)2, and 939.05, 
in exchange for a reduction in the cocaine charge from 
possession of more than 15 but not more than 40 grams to 
                                                 
12 All charges filed against Vorburger and Becker were as 
party to the crime, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.05. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
13 
 
possession of more than 5 but not more than 15 grams, and for 
dismissal of the other charges and enhancers.   Vorburger was 
sentenced to 30 months in prison on October 4, 1999.13 
¶30 Vorburger appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that Vorburger and Becker were unlawfully arrested, 
and that their consent to search resulted from the unlawful 
arrests.  State v. Vorburger, 2001 WI App 43, 241 Wis. 2d 481, 
624 N.W.2d 398.  The court cited numerous factors in determining 
that Becker and Vorburger were arrested at the motel.  It noted 
that the two were handcuffed and Mirandized, that they were not 
free to leave, and that Becker was questioned in a closed room.  
Id. at ¶¶17-18.  The court determined that Vorburger and Becker 
consented 
to 
the 
searches 
of 
the 
car 
and 
apartment, 
respectively, after arrests without probable cause, rendering 
the consents and searches invalid.  Id. at ¶¶22, 29. 
¶31 The State petitioned this court for review, solely on 
the validity of the search of the apartment,14 and we granted the 
petition.  The primary issue in this case is whether the search 
                                                 
13 Becker pled guilty to two counts of possession of THC 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e) 
and 
one 
count 
of 
possession of psilocin contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(d).  
All the remaining charges and enhancers were dismissed.  Becker 
was sentenced to 30 months probation on March 1, 1999. 
14 The 
State does not 
contest 
the court 
of appeals 
determination that the evidence of marijuana in Vorburger's car 
was obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest and was 
properly suppressed.  It contests only the reversal of the 
conviction that was based on evidence gathered during the search 
of the apartment.  Therefore, although this is Vorburger's 
appeal, our focus is on Becker's detention and her consent to 
search the apartment she shared with Vorburger. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
14 
 
of the apartment in which Becker and Vorburger resided complied 
with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  To 
decide this issue, we must determine whether Becker's detention 
at the motel constituted an unlawful arrest, and whether Becker 
voluntarily gave officers her consent to search her apartment. 
II.  THE STOP AND DETENTION 
A. Standard of Review 
¶32 The constitutional validity of a search and seizure 
raises a question of constitutional fact.  State v. Griffith, 
2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72.  When a 
defendant 
moves 
to 
suppress 
evidence, 
the 
circuit 
court 
"considers the evidence, makes findings of evidentiary or 
historical fact, and then resolves the issue by applying 
constitutional principles to those historical facts."  Id.  
(citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶¶16-17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 
604 N.W.2d 552).  We review a circuit court's denial of a motion 
to suppress in two steps.  We examine the circuit court's 
findings 
of 
historical 
fact 
under 
the 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard, 
and 
then 
review 
de 
novo 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Eason, 2001 
WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625; State v. Matejka, 
2001 WI 5, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891. 
B.  The Circuit Court's Findings and Conclusions 
¶33 The circuit court determined that Becker was not 
arrested, but was merely detained "to freeze the status quo 
while awaiting a search warrant, and to engage in Terry-style 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
15 
 
inquiries in the meanwhile."15  The court reached its conclusion 
after 
it 
made 
numerous 
findings 
of 
fact 
regarding 
the 
investigative detention of Becker.16  It found that "Becker was 
detained for approximately one hour before the search warrant 
was executed, and at least two and one-quarter hours before 
being released."  The court found that "[t]he degree of 
restraint was modest," noting that while the officers used 
handcuffs, they did not draw their guns or use any additional 
restraints.  It found that "the police repeatedly stressed to 
defendants that they were not under arrest, . . . the police 
limited their questioning (to a scope more befitting a Terry 
stop than a custodial interrogation), and the police maintained 
the detention only as long as was necessary to effectuate its 
purpose (until they received and executed the search warrant)."  
Finally, the court noted that Becker was not moved out of the 
motel, and was not questioned in a police vehicle. 
¶34 The court did not specifically note the number of 
officers present at the motel, but it determined that "the 
number of officers involved was appropriate for the number of 
defendants involved."  The court considered the totality of the 
facts and circumstances and concluded that "the police officers' 
actions and words would have reasonably communicated to the 
                                                 
15 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
16 The circuit court's order denying the suppression motions 
applied to all four people detained at the motel——Kokoros, 
Cramer, Vorburger, and Becker.  For the purposes of this 
opinion, we focus only on the findings related to Becker. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
16 
 
defendants [] that they were not free to go, but that they were 
not under arrest." 
¶35 As noted above, we review the circuit court's findings 
of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard.  Vorburger 
disputes none of the circuit court's factual findings, and our 
review of the record finds that each finding is supported by 
testimony at the preliminary hearing or motion hearing.  We 
therefore cannot conclude that any of the factual findings made 
by the circuit court was clearly erroneous. 
¶36 The circuit court determined that under these facts 
and circumstances, Becker's detention did not constitute an 
illegal arrest.  The court of appeals disagreed.  It noted that 
Becker was read Miranda warnings in a closed-off room.  Although 
her handcuffs had been removed, Becker had "little if any 
indication of how long [she] would be detained or what [she] 
might have to do before [she was] free to go."  Vorburger, 2001 
WI App 43, ¶¶17-18.  The court of appeals concluded that Becker 
was confined and interrogated, and thus, arrested.  Id. at ¶18.  
We review de novo the circuit court's determination that Becker 
was not arrested, benefiting from the analysis of the circuit 
court and the court of appeals. 
C.  Detention or Arrest 
¶37 The critical issue in this case is whether the 
detention of Amerie Becker was constitutional at the time she 
consented to the search of her apartment.  A second issue is 
whether the consent she gave was voluntary.   
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
17 
 
¶38 The 
constitutionality 
of 
Becker's 
detention 
is 
governed by the Fourth Amendment, which protects the "right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ."  
U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).  Reasonableness is the 
"ultimate standard" embodied in the Fourth Amendment.  See 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981).  It is "the 
central inquiry," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), and "the 
key principle."  Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 n.12 (quoting Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring)). 
¶39 The 
investigative 
stop 
and 
detention 
of 
Becker 
constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.  See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (concluding that a person is seized "when 
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, 
has 
in 
some 
way 
restrained 
the 
liberty 
of 
[the] 
citizen . . . .").  Consequently, the question is whether this 
seizure was reasonable under all the circumstances, or whether 
it violated the Fourth Amendment. 
¶40 Cory Cramer, Brad Vorburger, and Amerie Becker were 
detained by officers of the Dane County Narcotics and Gangs Task 
Force at 9:20 on a Wednesday evening.  Law enforcement officers 
were already in the process of obtaining a warrant to search 
room 230 of the motel.  The warrant authorized a search of "said 
premises and persons unknown within said premises."  Had Cramer, 
Vorburger, and Becker not been stopped at the door of room 230, 
they might still have been "within said premises" when the 
warrant was executed.  
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
18 
 
¶41 The police had been working on the warrant for more 
than four hours.  Detective Olson completed her part of the 
paperwork about 8:45, 35 minutes before the detention began.  
After conferring with an assistant district attorney, she drove 
the warrant and the lengthy supporting affidavit to the home of 
Circuit Judge Angela Bartell, who read it and signed the warrant 
at 9:34.  This was 14 minutes after commencement of the 
detention.  Detective Olson then left and headed directly to the 
motel.  Shortly after obtaining the warrant, she informed the 
Task Force that the warrant was on its way. 
¶42 Hence, at the time Cramer, Vorburger, and Becker were 
detained, the Task Force officers knew that a warrant was nearly 
ready.  They had probable cause to search room 230 and probable 
cause to believe that a crime had been committed, as they had 
tested the substance taken from the room.  They were already 
detaining Peter Kokoros, who had appeared unexpectedly with a 
key to the room several hours earlier.  They knew Kokoros was on 
probation for a drug offense, that he had stayed in room 215 the 
night before, and that room 215 smelled of marijuana and 
contained physical evidence of marijuana.  They knew Kokoros had 
been with Cory Cramer earlier in the day and that Cramer had 
been using Kokoros's car when he checked into the motel at 2:30 
that afternoon.  Finally, they knew that during his detention, 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
19 
 
Kokoros had given the police several explanations of his 
activities that made them wary of his truthfulness.17  
1.  The Stop and Initial Detention 
¶43 We first address the stop and initial detention.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.24 
authorizes 
"temporary 
questioning 
without arrest."  It provides: 
 
After having identified himself or herself as a law 
enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may 
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects 
that such person is committing, is about to commit or 
has committed a crime, and may demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the 
person's 
conduct. 
 
Such 
detention 
and 
temporary 
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where 
the person was stopped. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 968.24. 
¶44 Vorburger does not dispute that the Task Force 
officers had reasonable suspicion that Cramer had committed a 
crime and that Vorburger and Becker were committing, were about 
to commit, or had committed a crime.  There clearly was 
reasonable suspicion that Vorburger and Becker were about to 
commit a crime——it was 9:20 on a Wednesday evening and they were 
at the door of a motel room that smelled strongly of marijuana, 
accompanying the person who had rented the motel room several 
hours earlier. 
                                                 
17 Officer Montie asked Kokoros why, if he had come to the 
motel at 5:45 specifically to use the bathroom——but was stopped 
before he could do so——he had not asked to use the bathroom by 
7:45.  Officer Montie later testified: "I did not believe that 
he had to use the bathroom at all." 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
20 
 
¶45 We conclude that the stop and initial detention were 
based on reasonable suspicion and therefore lawful.  The police 
were entitled to demand the names and addresses of the three 
persons and an explanation of their conduct.  They also were 
entitled to pat down the three suspects to assure that they were 
not armed.  See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶¶20, 32, 234 
Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795. 
2.  Detention Before and During Execution of the Warrant 
¶46 We next address the detention of Amerie Becker pending 
the arrival and during the execution of the warrant.  In 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980), the Supreme Court 
stated that "the legality of temporarily detaining a person at 
the scene of suspected drug activity to secure a search warrant 
may be an open question."  The defendant in Rawlings was a 
visitor at a house where police smelled and observed marijuana.  
The Court more or less assumed that when the police detained 
Rawlings while they obtained a search warrant, they were 
violating the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 106.  Nonetheless, the 
Court upheld Rawlings' conviction.  Id. at 111. 
¶47 In the years since 1980, there has been a clear 
evolution in the law.  In Summers, the Court reviewed the case 
of a man who was detained as he was leaving his home and then 
held while the police executed a search warrant of his house.  
Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.  Thereafter the man was arrested and 
searched.  The Court said: "[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, we 
hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable 
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
21 
 
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is 
conducted."  Id. at 705.  The Court explained that: "The 
connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer 
an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that 
suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that 
occupant."  Id. at 703-04. 
¶48 Applying Summers to this case, it seems clear that law 
enforcement officers could have validly detained Cramer, the 
person to whom the room was registered, while the search warrant 
for contraband was executed.  However, Vorburger attempts to 
distinguish the Summers case as applied to Becker.  He contends 
that Becker was neither a resident nor occupant of the room.  
The answer to this argument is found in two federal cases, 
United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990), and United 
States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 1993). 
¶49 In Pace, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied 
Summers to a situation in which officers went to a condominium 
to execute a search warrant for gambling records and money and 
found the owner and three non-residents.  Pace, 898 F.2d at 
1223.  The officers patted down all four men and detained them 
while they searched the condominium.  Id.  Two of the 
nonresidents later claimed that they had been unlawfully 
detained during the search and, therefore, were arrested.  Id. 
at 1238.  They argued that Summers did not apply because they 
were not occupants or residents of the condominium.  Id. at 
1239.  The court determined that Summers did apply because: 
 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
22 
 
While it turned out that [the two men] were not 
residents 
of 
[the] 
condominium, 
it 
is 
still 
significant that they were present in a condominium 
that a neutral magistrate had found probable cause to 
believe 
contained 
evidence 
of 
illegal 
gambling 
activities.  The police officers could not be sure 
whether or not [the two men] were involved in the 
gambling, nor could they even be sure whether or not 
[the two men] were "occupants" of the condominium.  
Thus as in Summers, the connection of [the two men] to 
the 
condominium 
gave 
the 
officers 
"an 
easily 
identifiable and certain basis" for detaining [the two 
men] during the search. 
Id. 
¶50 Similarly, in Fountain, the Sixth Circuit applied 
Summers to a situation in which law enforcement officers looking 
for drugs executed a search warrant at a house where the owner 
and three other people were present.  Fountain, 2 F.3d at 659.  
The officers gathered the four people they found in the house, 
handcuffed them, and had them lie face down on the floor.  Id.  
In executing the warrant, the officers found illegal drugs.  Id. 
at 660.  They then questioned each of the four detainees 
separately.  Id.  One of the non-resident defendants moved to 
suppress the evidence against him, claiming that the officers 
could not have detained him under Summers because he was not a 
resident of the house and was therefore not an occupant.  Id. at 
663.  The Fountain court determined that the officers acted 
reasonably in detaining the defendant because his "apparently 
voluntary connection with the home provided the agents with 'an 
easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that 
suspicion of criminal activity justifie[d] detention.'"  Id.  
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
23 
 
The court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court intended 
Summers to apply only to residents.  Id. 
¶51 We agree with the Pace and Fountain interpretations of 
Summers.  The Task Force officers acted reasonably in detaining 
Becker and Vorburger even though they were not the persons to 
whom room 230 was registered.  Becker and Vorburger voluntarily 
connected themselves to the motel room and its occupant.  
Without investigation, they could not be dismissed as innocent 
bystanders.  There was reasonable suspicion that they were 
present at the motel room for criminal activity.   
¶52 Vorburger points out that Becker was not in the room 
at the time the officers stopped her.  Under the circumstances, 
we find this distinction meaningless.  Becker was standing 
outside the room with the person to whom the room was 
registered.  The registrant was putting his key in the lock.  
Becker was seconds away from entering the room and later 
admitted that she intended to enter the room.  The fact that 
Becker and Vorburger were standing immediately outside the room 
when they were stopped does not destroy their required voluntary 
connection to the room. 
¶53 A third distinction between this case and Summers is 
that the officers in Summers already had their warrant when they 
detained the defendant.  Here, Becker was detained before the 
warrant had arrived and before it was signed. 
¶54 This concern was substantially allayed in United 
States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477 (10th Cir. 1994).  An FBI agent 
was traveling to the defendant's home with a search warrant when 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
24 
 
the defendant began to leave the premises in an automobile.  
Agents on the scene detained him for about ten minutes until the 
arrival of the warrant.  The Tenth Circuit determined that the 
agents on the scene were justified in stopping and detaining the 
defendant because they "knew that a neutral party had issued a 
search warrant for [the] premises, thus giving them reasonable 
suspicion to detain him."  Id. at 1483. 
¶55 The Supreme Court affirmed this principle on different 
facts in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).  In 
McArthur, a police officer with probable cause to believe that 
the defendant had marijuana in his trailer home, prevented him 
from entering the home unless the officers accompanied him 
inside.  Id. at 329.  In the meantime, another officer left to 
obtain a search warrant.  Id.  The Court reversed an Illinois 
court's suppression of the drug evidence found in the trailer.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer explained:   
 
When 
faced 
with 
special 
law 
enforcement 
needs, 
diminished 
expectations 
of 
privacy, 
minimal 
intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that 
certain general, or individual, circumstances may 
render 
a 
warrantless 
search 
or 
seizure 
reasonable. . . .  
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . [T]he police made reasonable efforts to 
reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands 
of personal privacy.  They neither searched the 
trailer nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a 
warrant.  Rather, they imposed a significantly less 
restrictive restraint, preventing McArthur only from 
entering the trailer unaccompanied. . . .  
 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
25 
 
 . . . [T]he police imposed the restraint for a 
limited period of time, namely, two hours. . . .  As 
far as the record reveals, this time period was no 
longer than reasonably necessary for the police, 
acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. 
Id. at 330-32. 
¶56 The rationale for detentions involving search warrants 
is fully explained in the Summers opinion.  The Court noted the 
difference between the detention of Summers and the detention of 
a suspect on the street, à la Terry: 
 
A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable 
cause to believe that the law was being violated in 
that house and had authorized a substantial invasion 
of the privacy of the persons who resided there.  The 
detention of one of the residents while the premises 
were 
searched, 
although 
admittedly 
a 
significant 
restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive 
than the search itself. 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 701. 
¶57 The involvement of a neutral and detached magistrate 
also impressed Justice Souter in the McArthur case.  Justice 
Souter wrote that "the legitimacy of the decision to impound 
[McArthur's] dwelling follows from the law's strong preference 
for warrants . . . .  The law can hardly raise incentives to 
obtain a warrant without giving the police a fair chance to take 
their probable cause to a magistrate and get one."  McArthur, 
531 U.S. at 338 (Souter, J., concurring). 
¶58 The 
Summers court 
evaluated 
the 
law 
enforcement 
interests in the detention of Summers and found significant: (1) 
the law enforcement interest in "preventing flight in the event 
that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) the law enforcement 
interest in "minimizing the risk of harm to the officers"; and 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
26 
 
(3) the law enforcement interest in "the orderly completion of 
the search."  Id. at 702-03. 
¶59 The Court expanded on the second point, stating: "Less 
obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in 
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. . . . [T]he 
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of 
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic 
efforts to conceal or destroy evidence."  Id. at 702. 
¶60 The 
Summers decision 
provides 
the 
framework for 
evaluating Becker's detention pending the arrival and during the 
execution of the warrant for contraband. 
¶61 Becker was detained at approximately 9:20.  She and 
her companions were told that the officers were conducting an 
investigation, that the three were being detained and were not 
free to leave, but that they were not under arrest.  The three 
were patted down, handcuffed, and held in the second floor 
corridor of a motel.  All three were offered chairs.  Becker 
declined to sit down.  At one point she asked to go to the 
bathroom.  There is a dispute about what she said and what 
Officer Kosovac said, but Becker did not go to the bathroom 
until the search warrant was executed.  Her purse was not 
searched until later, with her consent. 
¶62 Vorburger complains that several elements of the 
detention during this period were unreasonable and transformed 
the detention into an arrest.  He argues that Becker's detention 
lasted for a period exceeding two hours, that she was handcuffed 
with her hands behind her back and directed to sit in the 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
27 
 
hallway with one or more police officers continually present, 
and that she was not allowed to use the bathroom privately. 
¶63 The circuit court found that Becker "was detained for 
approximately one hour before the search warrant was executed."  
According to the record, her detention began at 9:20; the 
warrant arrived at 10:05; the warrant was read to Cramer at 
10:15; and the warrant was executed at 10:17.  Shortly after 
10:30, Becker was taken into room 229.  Thus, the period of 
detention related to the procurement and execution of the search 
warrant was roughly one hour and ten minutes.  This period of 
detention was not unreasonable given the time of day and the 
distance separating police headquarters, the judge's residence, 
and the motel, which is located in the Town of Blooming Grove, 
east of Monona.  In Justice Breyer's words, "this time period 
was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting 
with diligence, to obtain [and execute] the warrant."  McArthur, 
531 U.S. at 332. 
¶64 The officers handcuffed the three detainees.  In 
analyzing this fact, the circuit court quoted State v. Swanson, 
164 Wis. 2d 437, 448, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991): "Many jurisdictions 
have recognized that the use of handcuffs does not necessarily 
transform an investigative stop into an arrest."  Many federal 
courts have made similar pronouncements.  See e.g., United 
States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (citing Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 685 (9th 
Cir. 1998); Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 
1320 (9th Cir. 1995)); Fountain, 2 F.3d 656; United States v. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
28 
 
Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983). 
¶65 The Supreme Court stated in Summers that a warrant to 
search 
a 
premises 
for 
drugs 
"may 
give 
rise 
to 
sudden 
violence . . . .  The risk of harm to both the police and the 
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation."  Summers, 452 U.S. at 
702-03 (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9 
(1978)). 
¶66 In this case, the officers' concern for their safety 
and the safety of others is well grounded in the record.  There 
were three detainees at the motel.  They were stopped in a 
second floor corridor.  Cory Cramer, then 22, was 5 feet 10 
inches tall and weighed 195 pounds.  Police did not know then 
but later discovered in Cramer's car an electric weapon, which 
Cramer's girlfriend described as "Cory's stun gun."  Vorburger, 
also 22, was 6 feet 10 inches tall, 265 pounds.  One of the 
officers at the motel recognized him as having worked as a 
bouncer at a local nightclub.  We conclude that the officers did 
not act unreasonably in their efforts to protect themselves, 
secure the site, and "preserve the status quo."  See Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984).   
¶67 We also conclude that there is no merit to Vorburger's 
complaint about Becker's use of the bathroom.  The testimony on 
this issue was disputed, and the circuit court did not find that 
the police had acted unreasonably.  We agree. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
29 
 
¶68 We recognize that in Swanson, this court stated that 
we use an objective test, assessing the totality of the 
circumstances, to determine whether a seizure has escalated into 
an arrest: 
 
The standard generally used to determine the 
moment of arrest in a constitutional sense is whether 
a reasonable person in the defendant's position would 
have considered himself or herself to be "in custody," 
given the degree of restraint under the circumstances.  
The circumstances of the situation including what has 
been communicated by the police officers, either by 
their words or actions, shall be controlling under the 
objective test. 
Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d at 446-47 (citations omitted).18  The court 
of appeals utilized the Swanson language as the basis for its 
decision.  Vorburger, 2001 WI App. 43, ¶¶14, 18. 
¶69 We find it difficult to reconcile this Swanson 
language with the clear precedent in Summers, McArthur, Pace, 
Fountain, and Ritchie.  The critical factor in this case——the 
factor that distinguishes it from Swanson——is the presence of a 
valid search warrant for contraband.  The search warrant is 
central to this case and to our analysis because it injects an 
objective justification, based upon the determination of a 
detached magistrate, into the totality of the circumstances.  In 
Summers, the Supreme Court, in effect, recognized the concept of 
detention incident to the execution of a valid search warrant.  
                                                 
18 The "reasonable person" contemplated by the test is a 
reasonable innocent person in the defendant's position.  See 
United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 
1988); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(a) 
(3d ed. 1996).  
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
30 
 
This limited detention is based upon the same factors——concern 
for the safety of officers and the possible destruction of 
evidence——that underlie searches incident to arrest.  See 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763 (1969).  We think such a concept applies to this case from 
the moment of initial detention to the completion of the search, 
because a search warrant was in the works and its execution was 
imminent, and because the police had articulable, reasonable 
suspicion for each of the people they detained.  Becker and 
Vorburger cannot claim that their propinquity to room 230 was 
the result of pure coincidence. 
3.  Continued Detention After Execution of the Warrant 
¶70 After 10:30, the "status quo" that the Task Force 
sought to preserve, changed.  Amerie Becker was taken into room 
229.  Her handcuffs were removed and she used the bathroom.  
When she indicated she was thirsty, she was given a plastic cup 
of water.  Several times throughout the evening, Becker was 
advised that she was not under arrest.  She testified that the 
officer told her "over and over again that I was being detained, 
but I was not under arrest."  Objectively, she never was 
"arrested" in the sense that she was taken to the police station 
or the jail, and she never was charged with any offense 
involving Cory Cramer or room 230. 
¶71 After the warrant had been executed, Becker was given 
Miranda warnings and asked if she would answer questions.  She 
was told that police were present at the motel on a drug 
investigation and that they had found drugs.  Becker agreed to 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
31 
 
answer questions about the day's activities, which included 
sharing a "blunt" with Vorburger, and she spoke about their 
occasional drug use at the apartment.  During this discussion, 
Becker consented to a search of her purse.  After police advised 
Becker that Vorburger had told them there were marijuana stems 
and buds at the apartment, she consented to a search of the 
apartment.  Becker calculated whether consent to a search would 
be preferable to a search warrant, which police probably could 
have obtained based upon her own admissions, and she made a 
choice. 
¶72 Becker never refused to answer questions, never asked 
for an attorney, never withdrew her consent.  When she was 
driven to her home in Fitchburg by officers, she instructed them 
what door to enter so as not to attract the attention of 
neighbors. 
¶73 The record indicates that Becker gave her consent to 
search the apartment within 40 minutes of being taken into room 
229 and within 20 to 30 minutes after the onset of questioning. 
¶74 A police officer can stop and briefly detain a person 
for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 
"may be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable cause.  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989).   
¶75 The length of an investigative detention is one of the 
factors to weigh in determining whether a lawful detention has 
escalated into an arrest.  In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
32 
 
493 (1983), two officers stopped Royer in an airport because he 
fit the profile of a drug courier.  They asked him for 
identification and his airline ticket, and when he gave them his 
driver's license and ticket, they took him into a police 
interrogation room 40 feet away for questioning.  Id. at 494.  
They retrieved his luggage without consent, then searched his 
suitcases with consent and found drugs.  Id.  Royer's detention 
lasted approximately 15 minutes.  Id. at 495. 
¶76 The Supreme Court affirmed Royer's motion to suppress 
the drug evidence, concluding that, "What had begun as a 
consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an 
investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where 
the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to 
confirm their suspicions."  Id. at 503.  The court noted that 
the officers had Royer's ticket, identification, and luggage, 
and that they never informed him he was free to leave.  Id.  It 
concluded that, "As a practical matter, Royer was under arrest."  
Id.  The Royer court summed up the law as follows: 
 
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion 
short of probable cause is that law enforcement 
interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal 
security of the suspect.  The scope of the intrusion 
permitted will vary to some extent with the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case.  This much, 
however, is clear: an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Similarly, the 
investigative methods employed should be the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 
dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of 
time. 
Id. at 500 (citations omitted). 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
33 
 
¶77 The Royer decision was followed by two other airport 
cases, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), and Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1.  Sokolow appears to have neutralized some of the 
impact of Royer's plurality opinion as to what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion.  Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
¶78 All three cases are distinguishable from the facts 
here.  First, unlike the three airport cases that involved only 
suspicion that the defendants were drug couriers, this case 
involved unquestionable evidence that someone had committed a 
felony. 
 
When 
the 
warrant 
was 
executed, 
police 
found 
approximately 14 pounds of marijuana in Cramer's room, together 
with a digital scale and plastic bags, evidence with all the 
hallmarks of major drug dealing.  Second, unlike the three 
airport cases, this case involves a search warrant.  The purpose 
of Becker's continued detention, after execution of the warrant, 
was to determine what she knew about the major felony across the 
hall.   
¶79 On the one hand, Becker could have been a party to the 
felony, present at the motel to make a major drug purchase.  On 
the other hand, she could have been a mere witness who could 
explain her presence and tell authorities what she knew about 
Cory Cramer.  Peter Kokoros may have intended to remove all 
marijuana from the room when he stopped by the motel at 5:45.  
If he had done so, Vorburger and Becker would have had no known 
connection with the drugs.  Police were entitled to try, in a 
reasonable follow-up to the search, to verify or dispel their 
suspicions 
about Becker's 
involvement. 
 Becker 
ultimately 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
34 
 
disavowed any knowledge of the marijuana in room 230 and was 
never charged with any offense in connection with that room. 
4.  Duration of the Detention 
¶80 While the Supreme Court determined in Royer that a 15-
minute detention was impermissible, and in Place that a 90-
minute detention was impermissible, it did not establish an 
absolute time limitation on investigative detentions.  See 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 494, 503; Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99.  In 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), the Supreme Court 
explained that the focus in Royer was primarily on facts other 
than the duration of the defendant's detention——particularly the 
fact that the police confined the defendant in a small airport 
room for questioning.  The court held that an investigative 
detention is not transformed into an arrest solely because of 
the length of the detention.  Id. at 686, 688.19 
¶81 The court determined that the length of the detention 
in that case (approximately 40 minutes) was not impermissible 
because it did "not involve any delay unnecessary to the 
                                                 
19 In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001), the 
Supreme Court observed that the two-hour detention of a trailer 
resident while an officer awaited a search warrant was not 
constitutionally impermissible because the detention lasted for 
only a "limited period of time." 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
35 
 
legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers."  Id. 
at 687.  We reach the same conclusion in this case.20 
¶82 Vorburger asserts that even if Becker's detention were 
permissible before the warrant was executed, her detention 
became an arrest when she was taken into room 229 and 
questioned, instead of being released.  Vorburger contends that 
the officers found nothing in room 230 linking Becker to the 
drugs in the room and consequently they no longer had reasonable 
suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity. 
¶83 We find this suggestion unpersuasive.  Contraband is 
seldom invoiced and neatly labeled for a buyer.21  We find more 
realistic the Seventh Circuit's comments in United States v. 
Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1984), that "it strikes us 
as incredible that [a drug dealer] would have a person accompany 
him to a drug deal where that person did not have [the dealer's] 
utmost trust and confidence," implying that the trust and 
confidence was most likely based on the person's involvement in 
the deal.  See Pace, 898 F.2d at 1240.  Here, Cramer was 
                                                 
20 The 
dissent 
argues 
that 
Becker's 
detention 
after 
execution of the search warrant lasted fifty minutes.  Dissent 
at ¶116.  The dissent fails to note that after Becker freshened 
up, she began answering questions immediately.  She admitted her 
own drug use within minutes of the start of questioning.  There 
is no evidence that she refused cooperation with Officer 
Kosovac. 
21 The dissent argues that execution of the search warrant 
yielded no evidence to connect Ms. Becker to the marijuana in 
the motel room.  Dissent at ¶108.  The dissent does not explain 
the kind of evidence the police would have been expected to find 
if Becker and Vorburger had come to the motel to purchase 
marijuana.   
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
36 
 
escorting Becker and Vorburger into a room containing 14 pounds 
of pungent marijuana in open view.  Police were entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from these facts. 
¶84 We agree with the State that the officers continued to 
have reasonable suspicion about Becker after the warrant had 
been executed and that it was not unreasonable to question her 
in light of their discoveries in room 230. 
¶85 Becker testified at the motion hearing that she and 
Officer Kosovac talked in room 229 for "probably ten minutes."  
She stated that Officer Kosovac asked her "about the events that 
had preceded us coming to the hotel room," and if Becker "ever 
drank or used marijuana or used any other type of drugs."  After 
Becker told Officer Kosovac about how she and Vorburger had 
smoked marijuana that day in their apartment, Officer Kosovac 
asked if officers could search the apartment. 
¶86 Vorburger correctly points out that when Becker was 
taken into room 229, Officer Kosovac did not inform her again 
that she was not under arrest.  We do not believe, however, that 
a reasonable person in Becker's position would have believed 
that she had been placed under arrest when her handcuffs had 
been removed and she was allowed to use the bathroom.  For 
Becker, 
police 
were 
deescalating 
the 
conditions 
of 
her 
detention. 
¶87 Upon thorough review of the record, we determine, as 
the circuit court did, that the officers in this case acted 
reasonably in stopping and detaining Becker for questions and 
that the detention did not escalate into an arrest. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
37 
 
III.  CONSENT TO SEARCH THE APARTMENT 
¶88 Having determined that Becker was not under arrest 
when she gave Officer Kosovac consent to search her apartment, 
we must next decide whether her consent was given voluntarily.  
Voluntariness of consent to search raises a mixed question of 
fact 
and 
law. 
 
This 
court 
reviews 
a 
circuit 
court's 
determination as to the voluntariness of consent to search in 
two steps, examining the circuit court's findings of fact under 
the clearly erroneous standard, but applying constitutional 
standards to those facts de novo.  State v. Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, 194-95, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citing State v. 
Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987)). 
¶89 To determine whether consent was given voluntarily, a 
reviewing court must determine, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that the consent was not the result of duress or 
coercion.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197-98.  A reviewing court considers 
"the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
consent 
and 
the 
characteristics of the defendant," and determines whether the 
State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the 
consent was voluntary.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197-98. 
¶90 Vorburger raised the issue of the voluntariness of 
Becker's consent before the circuit court.  The circuit court 
summarized his argument: "[he] argue[s] that her consent was 
tainted by the coercive nature of her detention; because the 
police indicated that if she didn't consent to a search, they'd 
obtain a search warrant and search anyway; because her blood 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
38 
 
sugar was fluctuating; and because she had recently undergone a 
surgical procedural and was on Tylenol with codeine."  The 
circuit court rejected this argument, concluding: 
 
[T]he police tactic in question——explaining their 
willingness 
to 
pursue 
a 
search 
warrant, 
while 
suggesting the less-intrusive alternative of a consent 
search——is not coercive, improper, or designed to 
overcome the defendant's resistance. . . . Finally, I 
do not find Becker's health issues to be of such 
quality as to render her unduly susceptible to police 
intimidation.  Based on the testimony presented at the 
hearing, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
State 
has 
proven 
voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence.22 
¶91 Vorburger 
now asserts that 
Becker's 
consent was 
involuntary because: (1) 
the police 
knew 
she 
was 
in a 
"vulnerable physical and emotional condition" because she was a 
diabetic who had recently had surgery; (2) she was upset and 
crying while she was handcuffed; (3) she was handcuffed for the 
first time and believed she was going to be taken to jail; (4) 
she was not advised of her right to refuse consent; and (5) 
officers did not present her with a written consent form. 
¶92 We find unavailing Vorburger's assertion that Becker's 
consent was involuntary because the officers knew of her 
                                                 
22 The court of appeals did not reach the issue of 
voluntariness of consent because it concluded that Becker had 
been arrested by the time she gave her consent.  Vorburger, 2001 
WI App 43, ¶12 n.2.  The court of appeals further concluded that 
the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the arrest to 
render admissible the evidence obtained pursuant to the search.  
Id. at ¶29.  Because we determine that Becker was not arrested 
at the motel and that she voluntarily consented to the search, 
we need not reach the issue of attenuation. 
     
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
39 
 
"vulnerable physical and emotional condition."  First, the 
circuit court specifically stated: "I do not find Becker's 
health issues to be of such quality as to render her unduly 
susceptible to police 
intimidation." 
 
Second, 
Vorburger's 
assertion 
that 
Officer 
Kosovac 
knew 
of 
Becker's 
alleged 
"vulnerable physical and emotional condition" is not supported 
in the record. 
¶93 Becker gave consent to search the apartment to Officer 
Kosovac, who testified that when she interviewed Becker in the 
motel, 
Becker 
did 
not 
appear 
to 
be 
injured, 
drugged, 
intoxicated, or disoriented.  Officer Kosovac testified that she 
did not see Becker cry, that Becker did not appear to be 
emotionally distraught and that she was not visibly upset.  
Becker 
provided 
responsive, 
clear, 
chronologically-ordered 
answers to Officer Kosovac's questions.  Officer Kosovac also 
stated that while Becker told her in room 229 that she was a 
diabetic,23 she did not talk about her recent operation.  Officer 
Kosovac asserted that: "She appeared to me to be in generally 
good health, and at no time did she tell me she was not feeling 
well or was not doing well."  "Becker did not look sick or weak 
and "appeared to [be] in generally good health." 
¶94 Becker's own testimony does not contradict Officer 
Kosovac's version of events in any significant fashion.  Becker 
testified that she cried four or five times while she was 
                                                 
23 Becker told Officer Kosovac she was a diabetic so as to 
alert her to the needle she would find if she searched Becker's 
purse. 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
40 
 
detained, and that she felt thirsty and disoriented due to her 
high blood sugar level.  However, Becker's testimony at the 
suppression hearing puts to rest any implication that Officer 
Kosovac 
knew 
or 
should 
have 
known 
of 
Becker's 
alleged 
"vulnerable physical and emotional condition."  Under cross-
examination Becker acknowledged that she may not have cried 
while in room 229 with Officer Kosovac: 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  And when you testified that you 
had cried four to five times during the course of the 
evening, when were you crying other than initially 
with Officer Linsmeier and when the cocaine was found 
in the bedroom [of her apartment]? 
 
BECKER:  I guess I don't remember another time 
specifically. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: So you really could have just cried 
twice? 
 
BECKER:  Yes. 
¶95 Becker also acknowledged that she never told Officer 
Kosovac about any health problems that would affect her 
judgment:   
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  Did you tell her whether or not——
Did you tell her you needed medicine? 
 
BECKER:  No. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  Did you——Did you need any Tylenol 
III? 
 
BECKER:  I think I had just recently taken it. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  So you didn't need any painkiller, 
did you, at this time? 
 
BECKER:  I don't believe so. 
 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
41 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  Did you ever tell Office Kosovac 
anything regarding any blood sugar problems that you 
may be having?   
BECKER:  No. 
¶96 Similarly unavailing is Vorburger's argument regarding 
Becker being upset and crying while she was handcuffed and her 
belief that she was going to go to jail.  In considering the 
totality of the circumstances, we first note that Becker gave 
consent while she was being interviewed in room 229, after she 
had used the bathroom and been given a drink of water, and after 
Officer Kosovac had removed her handcuffs.  Vorburger does not 
explain how Becker's emotional state before her handcuffs were 
removed is relevant to the voluntariness of her consent after 
the handcuffs were removed.  Nor does he explain why Becker 
would have been afraid she was going to jail when she disavowed 
all knowledge of the marijuana in room 230. 
¶97 Finally, Vorburger contends that Becker's consent was 
involuntary because Officer Kosovac did not provide her with a 
written consent form or advise her that she was free to refuse 
consent.  Vorburger points to no authority providing that a law 
enforcement officer's failure to supply a consent form to a 
person who gives consent to a search renders the consent 
involuntary.  The State does not dispute that Officer Kosovac 
neither informed Becker that she could refuse to consent to the 
search of her apartment nor supplied her with a written consent 
form.  It instead asserts, "there is no basis for finding a 
consent involuntary just because the police do not offer the 
suspect a consent form." 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
42 
 
¶98 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether 
officers must inform a defendant that the defendant is "free to 
go" in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 (1996).  The court 
held that "The Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully 
seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his 
consent to search will be recognized as voluntary."  Similarly, 
in Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 203, this court stated that the 
failure of law enforcement officers to inform a defendant that 
he could refuse to consent to a search "weighs against, but is 
not fatal to, a determination of voluntary consent." 
¶99 Officer Kosovac acknowledged in her testimony that she 
"probably" did not inform Becker that she could refuse to 
consent and did not supply her with a written consent form.  
Becker's testimony made clear, however, that she understood that 
she could refuse to consent.  Becker stated that she thought she 
did not have "an appealing choice."  The implication of Becker's 
statement is that she understood that she had two choices——
consent to the search or refuse to give consent.24  There is 
nothing in the record indicating that Becker would not have 
consented to the search if Officer Kosovac had told her that she 
                                                 
24 Becker testified in the suppression motion hearing to her 
belief that had she refused to give consent, the officers would 
have sought a search warrant to search the apartment, and they 
would have "trashed" her apartment in executing the warrant.  
The circuit court concluded that "the police tactic in question—
—explaining their willingness to pursue a search warrant, while 
suggesting the less-intrusive alternative of a consent search——
is 
not 
coercive, 
improper, 
or 
designed 
to 
overcome 
the 
defendant's resistance." 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
43 
 
could refuse to give consent or supplied her with a consent 
form.  More importantly, there is nothing in the record 
indicating Becker did not actually understand that she could 
refuse to consent.  We note that Becker cooperated with Officer 
Kosovac after receiving Miranda warnings. 
¶100 While Officer Kosovac's failure to inform Becker that 
she could refuse to consent to a search "weighs against . . . a 
determination of voluntary consent," see id., we cannot conclude 
under the circumstances of this case that it renders Becker's 
consent involuntary. 
¶101 For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's 
conclusion that "the State has proven voluntariness by clear and 
convincing evidence." 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶102 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Amerie 
Becker was validly detained in the motel and was not arrested.  
She was stopped initially upon reasonable suspicion that she was 
involved in a drug deal and constitutionally detained during the 
procurement and execution of a valid search warrant for 
contraband.  After the search warrant was executed, Becker was 
detained for a reasonable time under reasonable conditions for 
questioning to verify or dispel suspicion about her involvement 
in an established felony.  We further conclude that Becker 
voluntarily consented to the search of the apartment in which 
she and Bradley Vorburger resided.  We conclude, therefore, that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
denied 
Vorburger's 
motion 
to 
No. 00-0971-CR 
 
44 
 
suppress.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court's order. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  00-0971-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶103 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
The issue in the present case is whether Ms. Becker's detention 
following the execution of the search warrant was an unlawful 
seizure.  I conclude it was.  Therefore, Ms. Becker's consent to 
search the apartment she and Vorburger shared, given during her 
detention, was invalid.   
¶104 This case does not involve, as the majority opinion 
would have you believe, the legality of Ms. Becker's detention 
while waiting for the search warrant and its execution.  The 
majority opinion emphasizes at length the period of detention 
that occurred before execution of the search warrant.  It buries 
within the depths of the opinion the whole body of law that 
governs unlawful detentions that are not connected with the 
execution of a search warrant. 
¶105 Ms. Becker's treatment before the search warrant was 
executed does color whether Ms. Becker's detention after the 
search warrant was executed became an unlawful arrest.  But Ms. 
Becker's detention before and her detention after the search 
warrant was executed are, as the majority opinion reluctantly 
recognizes, two separate events for the purposes of our 
analysis.  See majority op. at ¶¶70-72, 84-87.  
¶106 Let me agree for the purposes of this dissent that the 
initial stop of Ms. Becker at 9:20 p.m. was based on reasonable 
suspicion and lawful, although the State concedes that no 
probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Becker.   
¶107 The majority opinion relies on Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692 (1981), to hold that Ms. Becker could be lawfully 
No.  00-0971-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
detained while the search warrant for contraband was executed.  
For purposes of this dissent, I am willing to agree with this 
conclusion.25  Once the search warrant was executed, however, 
Summers and its progeny26 become irrelevant, because Summers 
applies to a detention only until a search warrant is executed.27  
See majority op. at ¶¶47-60, 69. 
¶108 The execution of the search warrant yielded no 
evidence to connect Ms. Becker to the marijuana in the motel 
room.28  Any reasonable suspicion that Ms. Becker was more 
closely linked to the motel room and its contents other than her 
presence at the door was dispelled at that time.  Nevertheless, 
the police continued to detain Ms. Becker after the search 
warrant had been executed.   
¶109 As the majority opinion explains, the status quo 
changed after the warrant was executed.29  At this time the law 
enforcement 
officers 
began 
"a 
second 
detention," 
an 
investigative detention.  One of the officers moved Ms. Becker 
into a different motel room and began interrogating her. 
                                                 
25 Majority op. at ¶¶45-69. 
26 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); United States 
v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pace, 
898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990). 
27 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). 
28 See Officer Gaber's testimony at suppression hearing, 
Record at 59:62; Officer Olsen at suppression hearing, Record at 
59:73. 
29 Majority op. at ¶70. 
No.  00-0971-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶110 An investigative detention must be based on reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity supported by articulable facts.30  
On review of the record, I could not find that any of the police 
officers articulated any reason for detaining or questioning Ms. 
Becker.  The majority opinion claims that Ms. Becker was 
detained for questioning as a potential witness.31  However, 
there is no support for this claim in the record. 
¶111 "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop."32  The detention should be no longer than necessary to 
dispel or verify the officer's suspicion, that is, no longer 
than necessary to determine whether Ms. Becker had any knowledge 
about, or connection with, the drugs in the motel room.33  Unless 
a person who is detained and questioned provides answers that 
give the police probable cause to arrest that person, she must 
be released.34  The State concedes it never had probable cause to 
arrest Ms. Becker either before or after executing the search 
warrant. 
                                                 
30 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  
31 Majority op. at ¶79. 
32 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).  See also 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); Illinois v. McArthur, 
531 U.S. 326, 330-32 (2001). 
33 The police knew there was marijuana in the motel room at 
the time of Becker's initial detention. 
34 United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1993) 
(citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).   
No.  00-0971-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶112 I now apply the following legal standard that the 
majority opinion at ¶86 and the State use to determine whether 
the facts in the present case constitute a lawful detention or 
an illegal seizure or arrest after the search warrant was 
executed:  "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
only 
if, 
in 
view 
of 
all 
of 
the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave."35 
¶113 In the present case, a reasonable person in Ms. 
Becker's position would have considered herself arrested after 
the search warrant was executed.  Ms. Becker arrived at the 
motel room at 9:20 p.m., at which time she and her companions 
were intercepted by at least seven police officers, were placed 
in handcuffs, patted down for the presence of weapons or 
contraband, and separated from each other.  While waiting for a 
search warrant to arrive and to be executed, Ms. Becker was not 
permitted to use the bathroom without supervision by a police 
officer and remained handcuffed for about an hour.  Ms. Becker 
was told repeatedly before the search warrant was executed that 
she was not under arrest, but merely being detained. 
¶114 After the execution of the warrant, a police officer 
escorted Ms. Becker into a different motel room for the purpose 
of interrogating her.  After the search warrant was executed the 
police officer no longer told Ms. Becker that she was not under 
                                                 
35 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), 
quoted with approval and applied in State v. Williams, 2002 WI 
94, ¶23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  See also State v. 
Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 446-47, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991). 
No.  00-0971-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
arrest.  Indeed, shortly after being escorted into the motel 
room for interrogation, a police officer read Ms. Becker the 
Miranda warnings.  We can assume that a reasonable person has at 
least a casual familiarity with television crime programs (a 
critical aspect of our national culture) and would conclude from 
the Miranda warnings that he or she was under arrest.36 
¶115 Immediately upon questioning, Ms. Becker denied any 
knowledge about the drugs.  She was not then or at any time 
charged with any offense in connection with the marijuana in the 
motel.  After denying any involvement in the crime being 
investigated, the police officer did not release her, but 
broadened the scope of the interrogation to include subjects 
other than the marijuana in the hotel. 
¶116 The detention after the execution of the search 
warrant lasted fifty minutes.  The length of the investigative 
detention is one factor to weigh in determining whether a lawful 
detention has escalated into arrest.  For example, in Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a fifteen-minute investigative detention at an airport was 
impermissible. 
¶117 In addition to the length of the investigation, we 
must examine how Ms. Becker was treated.  Ms. Becker clearly was 
treated as if she were in police custody.  Before the search 
                                                 
36 "A classic example of the law bite in operation are 
reports of motorists arrested by Canadian police who repeatedly 
insisted that the Miranda rights be read to them."  J.M. Balkin, 
What Is a Post Modern Constitutionalism?, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1966, 
1981 (1992).  
No.  00-0971-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
warrant was executed, Ms. Becker was kept in handcuffs but was 
repeatedly told she was not under arrest.  Shortly after 
execution of the search warrant, the police officer removed her 
handcuffs, but did not tell her she was not under arrest.  After 
execution of the search warrant, the police officer allowed Ms. 
Becker to use the bathroom without an officer present, but the 
officer required that the bathroom door be left slightly ajar.  
The officer did not tell Ms. Becker that she was free to leave.  
The officer apparently believed Ms. Becker was in custody after 
the search warrant was executed because the officer gave Ms. 
Becker Miranda warnings. 
¶118 It is only by using a legal fiction that anyone can 
say with a straight face that a reasonable person under the 
circumstances of this case would not have thought she was under 
arrest.37 
¶119 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶120 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
                                                 
37 See 
State 
v. 
Williams, 
2002 
WI 
94 
¶¶41-44, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No. 00-0971-CR  
 
 
 
1