Case Title: Ian Clark v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 43S00-0810-CR-575

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
J. Brad Voelz 
Warsaw, Indiana 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
J.T. Whitehead 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 43S00-0810-CR-575 
IAN J. CLARK, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the Kosciusko Circuit Court, No. 43C01-0705-FA-127 
The Honorable Rex L. Reed, Judge 
On Direct Appeal 
October 15, 2009 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
A jury found appellant Ian J. Clark guilty of murdering a two-year-old left in his care, 
and it recommended life in prison without parole, which the trial court imposed.  Many of the 
grounds he urges as reasons for reversal were not preserved at trial.  One of his trial objections 
does pose a novel question:  should the trial court have permitted the State to offer into evidence 
Clark’s entry from the social networking website MySpace?  We hold that this electronic 
evidence was admissible, and we affirm Clark’s conviction and sentence. 
 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Oct 15 2009, 9:23 am
 
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Facts and Procedural History 
 
In May 2007 Ian J. Clark was living in Pierceton with his fiancée Matara Muchowicz and 
her daughter Samantha.  Samantha typically stayed with a friend while Clark and Matara were at 
work, but Clark had been laid off at some point during the month and in an effort to save money 
Matara began leaving Samantha with Clark for the day.   
 
When Matara arrived home on May 25th, around 2 p.m., she found Clark lying on the 
couch with Samantha on his chest, naked and blue.  Matara approached the couch and noticed 
blood on the blanket that was covering up Clark.  After being questioned about the blood, Clark 
sat up and then fell and stumbled into the coffee table, dropping Samantha on the ground.  Clark 
told Matara that Samantha was breathing.  Matara tried to wake Samantha, but she was cold.  
Samantha’s head was thrown back and she was gurgling.  Matara took Samantha and went to call 
911.  Clark told Matara to put the phone down and that Samantha was ―brain dead‖ and then lit a 
cigarette and turned on the television.   
 
Matara dialed 911, but Clark grabbed the phone out of her hand.  Clark told Matara there 
was nothing wrong with Samantha and that she was breathing.  He kept telling Matara that 
Samantha was fine.  Matara told Clark they needed to call an ambulance.  Clark continued to try 
to prevent Matara from calling 911.  Clark took the phone from Matara and tried to drag her 
away from the phone.  When Matara managed to dial 911 and ask the operator for help, Clark 
struck Matara in the back of the head with his fist.  
 
Matara managed to make a second call to 911.  Matara wanted to learn CPR because 
Samantha was not breathing.  The 911 operators could hear Clark interrupt and disconnect the 
attempted calls.  After completing the 911 call, Matara put a diaper on Samantha and went 
outside where she met a police officer.  
 
The Kosciusko County sheriff’s deputy who had arrived on scene tried to revive 
Samantha until paramedics arrived.  The deputy noticed Samantha suffered a split lip, was limp, 
her jaw was crushed, and she had bruises all over her body.  Paramedics were unable to revive 
 
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her.  They observed that Samantha had bruises all over her body, her right jaw was swollen, 
black and blue, and she had blood around her mouth, and bruises on her chest area that 
resembled fingerprints.  Later analysis put Samantha’s time of death at 11 a.m to 12 noon.  
 
The officers arrested Clark and transported him to the hospital with blood on his shirt. 
While waiting in an exam room with police, Clark told a detective that ―I will f. . .ing kick your 
ass.  I will send the Hell’s Angels to kill you. F. . . it.  It’s only a C felony. I can beat this.‖ (Tr. at 
90.)  
 
Police discovered diapers, tissues, a blanket, a shelf on the coffee table, a pillow and 
pajamas all stained red in the home.  Police also discovered blood spatters near the sink and red 
spots near the door in the bathroom.  They observed a hole in the bathroom wall, sixty-five 
inches from the floor, with bloodstains and brown hair embedded in it. (Tr. at 254–55, 258–259.)  
The blood and hair found in the hole was Samantha’s. (Tr. at 258, 262.) The blood on Clark’s 
shirt was Samantha’s.     
 
The list of injuries was appalling.  Before Samantha’s death she suffered multiple 
contusions, lacerations, abrasions and or deformities to her mouth, ear, chin, forehead, eyes, 
neck, jaw, shoulders, cheeks, arms, ribs, chest, back, scapula, kidney areas, areas over vital 
organs, abdomen, arm pits, nipples, temple, nose, lips, wrists, hands, orbits, buttocks, and thigh; 
her ulna was broken, her wrist was broken, her lung was bruised, her jaw was broken or 
dislocated; she had a subdural hematoma, intra-abdominal wounds, including a torn colon, an 
atlanto-occipital dislocation (her head was ―ripped off her neck,‖—the ligaments were disrupted 
from the spinal column so that only ―tissue and skin‖ held it to the body), and cerebral 
contusions or bruising of her brain. (Tr. at 160, 279–84, 287, 298, 300, 310, 313, 318–36, 342–
44, 356.)   
 
Samantha suffered at least twenty separate injuries, more than one of which would be 
lethal, and she was still alive when she sustained many of them.  An emergency room doctor 
described Samantha’s ―fresh‖ injuries as the worst he had observed in twenty years. (Tr. at 285, 
287.)  Neither one fall, nor multiple falls, nor multiple household accidents, could possibly have 
 
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caused Samantha’s injuries.  The official cause of death was by multiple blunt force injuries and 
the official manner of death was ruled a homicide.  
 
 
The State charged Clark with murder.  Clark withdrew his voluntary intoxication defense 
just before trial and withdrew his insanity defense during trial.  After the jury found him guilty of 
murder, the State and Clark stipulated to the single charged aggravator: that the victim was less 
than twelve years of age.  The jury recommended life without the possibility of parole, and the 
court sentenced Clark accordingly.  
 
We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal under Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a) because 
a sentence of life without possibility of parole has been imposed under Ind. Code § 35–50–2–9 
(2008).  
 
 
  The MySpace Page 
 
 
It seems that Matara had helped Clark create his own personal entry on MySpace, the 
social networking website.  Clark testified in his own defense, and the prosecutor read to Clark, 
over defense counsel’s objection, his own description of himself: 
 
Society labels me as an outlaw and criminal and sees more and more everyday 
how many of the people, while growing up, and those who judge me, are 
dishonest and dishonorable.  Note, in one aspect I’m glad to say I have helped you 
people in my past who have done something and achieved on the other hand, I’m 
sad to see so many people who have nowhere.  To those people I say, if I can do it 
and get away.  B. . . sh. . . .  And with all my obstacles, why the f. . . can’t you.   
 
(Tr. at 466–68.) 
 
Clark contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of his 
MySpace posting. (Appellant’s Br. at 20–24.)  Clark claims this was inadmissible character 
evidence, citing Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides in relevant part: 
 
 
 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  
 
(Appellant’s Br. at 20–24.)  Evidence is excluded under Rule 404(b) when it is introduced to 
prove the ―forbidden inference‖ of demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit the 
charged crime. Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 2009).     
 
Otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted where the defendant opens the door to 
questioning on that evidence.  Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. 2000).  The door may be 
opened when the trier of fact has been left with a false or misleading impression of the facts.  
 
We conclude that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of Clark’s MySpace page.  
Clark’s posting contained only statements about himself and in reference to himself. (Tr. at 465–
469.)  Thus, the State is right to observe that this is solely evidence of his own statements, not of 
prior criminal acts.  It was Clark’s words and not his deeds that were at issue, so Rule 404(b) 
does not apply.  
 
It is only slightly more difficult to consider whether the MySpace entry was actually 
probative of any issue at trial.  Clark testified that at most Samantha died because he was drunk 
and he was ―reckless.‖ (Tr. at 431–32.)  Clark made his character a central issue, a reasonable 
defense strategy presumably aimed at obtaining a jury verdict on the lesser-included offense of 
reckless homicide.  He testified on a number of occasions about his state of mind, suggesting his 
intent could only have been ―reckless‖ and not criminal: 
 
Clark: I was negligent.  I was reckless.  I was irresponsible.  I was an a. . . hole.  
Sorry but for a lack of a better word, but, yeah.  That’s what I am, but I’m 
not an intentional killer.  I mean, I don’t even know how to explain this, 
but there’s a lot better ways to kill somebody that [sic] doing it like that.  
You know, there’s no attempt to hide the crime.  I didn’t clean up 
anything.  I didn’t change clothes, mens rea.  People do certain things 
when they kill somebody.  They try to hide a crime.  There’s no evidence.  
No evidence whatsoever that I tried to hide anything.  And the cops, they 
know that.  They know that. 
 
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(Id.) 
 
State: You say, your conduct is reckless? 
Clark: Most definitely.  That’s what your evidence shows. 
 
(Tr. at 469.) 
 
State: Well, why didn’t you pick up the phone and call 911? 
Clark: Once again, I was incoherent.  It’s an issue of coherency.  You asked me a 
question.  Can I answer it? 
State: Sure, go ahead. 
Clark: Thank you sir.  I mean, it’s more or less common sense for the Jury.  Let 
them figure it out, but the bottom line is your officers, oh, he’s not drunk, 
he’s not drunk, and your own tests say I am drunk.  It’s one of those issues 
where you guys are trying to make an issue out of something that simply is 
not an issue.  You’re making a murder charge out of a reckless homicide 
charge.  I’ve told your office that over and over.  I would plead guilty to 
reckless homicide.  You’re making an issue of it.  You’re attacking every 
little thing and you’re looking pitiful in front of this Jury. 
State: Why would you plead guilty to reckless homicide if you didn’t do 
anything? 
Clark: A reckless act that ends in the death of a human being is termed reckless 
homicide.  I believe, through the evidence, and common sense, Mr. Hearn, 
that I am guilty of reckless homicide.  I am not guilty of an intentional 
crime.  And the evidence, one hundred percent, shows that. 
State: Well, reckless homicide is that you knowingly and intentionally 
committed an act and you’re saying you’re willing to admit to that? 
Clark: I’m guilty.  I will answer this for you one more time, and then I won’t 
answer your question if you pose it another way.  So, get this straight.  I’m 
guilty of a reckless act.  Period. 
 
 (Tr. at 471–472.)  Once Clark took the stand to testify along these lines, it was proper to permit 
the prosecution to confront Clark with his own seemingly prideful declarations that rebutted his 
defense.  Clark’s MySpace declarations shared much with his boast to the police after he killed 
Samantha:  ―It’s only a C Felony.  I can beat this.‖  (Tr. at 90.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Hells Angels  
 
 
Clark asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in the course of the following 
exchange that occurred while Clark was on the stand: 
 
 
 
 
 
State:   
You have some familiarity with the Hells Angels, don’t you? 
Clark: 
Absolutely. Absolutely. We could talk about that. I’m not scared of 
that at all. 
State: 
Alright. You’re familiar with the Hells Angels code about hurting 
a baby? 
 
(Tr. at 473.)  Clark’s lawyer objected, arguing the question was irrelevant and that the prosecutor 
was badgering the witness.  The trial court sustained the objection on relevance grounds, and 
sustained the objection as it related to Clark’s response (―No. No. No.‖) (Tr. at 473–474.) After 
the court sustained the objection, Clark declared, ―Let’s go. I’ll answer it.‖ (Tr. at 474.) The 
judge reminded Clark he had no questions before him and the State indicated it had no further 
questions. (Id.)  
 
 
Clark put his character at issue during his direct testimony, and a detective had earlier 
testified that Clark had threatened the Hells Angels would do him harm. (Tr. at 174.)  It was not 
unfair, therefore, to ask Clark about any familiarity he might have with the gang.  
 
 
Furthermore, Clark’s response when asked about his familiarity with the Hells Angels 
(―We could talk about that. I’m not scared of that at all.‖) led rather naturally to the State’s 
follow-up question about the gang’s code on hurting children.  Even after the trial court sustained 
an objection by defense counsel, Clark insisted that he wanted to answer the question. (Tr. at 
473–474.)  A defendant may not take advantage of an invited error. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 
904, 907 (Ind. 2005).  
 
 
Inasmuch as Clark seemed eager to discuss the subject and the court took such action as 
defense counsel requested, we see no error.  
 
   
 
8 
Claims of Fundamental Error 
 
Because the best way to assure a fair trial is to resolve potential errors while the trial is 
under way, we generally hold that a claim of error must be raised during trial in order to be 
available as an issue on appeal.  We nevertheless sometimes entertain such claims under the ru-
bric of ―fundamental error.‖  Fundamental error is an error that makes a fair trial impossible or 
constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting 
an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 
2002).  Fundamental error applies only when the actual or potential harm ―cannot be denied.‖ Id. 
at 756.  An appellate court receiving contentions of fundamental error need only expound upon 
those it thinks warrant relief.  It is otherwise adequate to note that the claim has not been pre-
served. Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 2001).  There are five such claims here. 
 
A.  Court Comment.  Clark continually disrupted the trial with comments and interjec-
tions even when objections were sustained in his favor. (See Tr. at 274, 452, 456–59, 469–70, 
473–74.)  During the cross-examination of Clark by the prosecutor, Clark stated, ―I’m not gonna 
talk to this [p]rosecutor any more. If you want to hold me in contempt of [c]ourt, you can do 
what you’ve got to do.‖ (Tr. at 476–77.)  The court responded by saying, ―Well, I can do what 
I’ve got to do, but I think you’re doing more than I could do.‖ (Tr. at 477.)     
 
B.  Recklessness.  In final instruction number 4, the court informed the jury that if the 
State failed to prove the Defendant committed murder, the jury may consider whether Clark 
committed reckless homicide, a class C felony, and accurately defined for the jurors the crime of 
reckless homicide. See Ind. Code § 35–42–1–5(2008).  Clark contends the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by arguing to the jury that the lesser included offense of reckless homicide was more 
intended for deaths resulting from reckless driving.  
 
C.  State’s Argument on Crime.  Clark also claims the prosecutor asked the jury to 
convict him for reasons other than his guilt.  He cites this part of final argument: 
 
This case is important because the issue in this case is, do the facts and evidence 
support the inference that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally committed 
 
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murder. And as this case goes through the Court process, it will be known as Ian 
Clark versus the State of Indiana. And as attorneys in the future read the case law 
and they read the case of the State of Indiana, or Ian Clark versus the State of 
Indiana, this case will stand for the proposition that this community and this State, 
will not tolerate what happened here. It will also stand for the proposition that 
this, these facts that are sufficient to support the inference that the Defendant 
knowingly or intentionally murdered Samantha. I’m asking you to find the 
Defendant guilty of murder. Thank you.  
 
(Tr. at 534–35.)  The trial court instructed the jurors that the presumption of innocence continues 
until the State has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jurors’ decision must be 
based on the evidence, that neither sympathy nor bias should be allowed to influence the jurors’ 
decision, and that their decision should rest ―solely upon the law and the evidence, and without 
thought to the possible consequences.‖ (App. at 278–280.)   
 
D.  Arguing an Uncharged Aggravating Circumstance?  The State and Clark stipulated to 
the single charged aggravator that the victim was less than twelve years of age. See Ind. Code § 
35–50–2–9(b)(12) (2008).  The prosecutor argued in part to the jury: 
 
When you consider whether or not the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, I want you to think about this.  The Defendant had the 
responsibility to care for a two year old.  I want you to consider the brutality of 
what he did. The torture that little Samantha endured. He took the life of a two 
year old child. I think it’s ironic that at 11:30 on May 25th, 2007, Samantha lost 
her life. At 11:30 on today’s date, you found him guilty of murder. Samantha had 
her whole life ahead of her, and the Defendant snuffed it out. As I told you, in my 
prior final argument, you can’t render an injustice in this case. It’s been awful. 
But what you can do is see that the Defendant doesn’t commit it again. Keep the 
life that was all ahead for Samantha, he took it away from her. It’s only fair that 
he spends the rest of his life in jail. Thank you.  
 
(Tr. at 555.)  The State’s argument was primarily themed around the already stipulated 
aggravator of Samantha’s young age, using the word torture (which had not been charged as an 
aggravator) only once in the entire argument. 
 
E.  Voir Dire.  Clark had raised an insanity defense, so the prosecutor asked potential ju-
rors questions about insanity.  There were three instances in which the prosecutor asked some-
 
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thing like, ―Do you believe there are people in this society that are just evil,‖ (Voir Dire Tr. at 
40), and, ―[d]o you think it’s possible for somebody to be just evil and you understand there’s a 
difference between being legally insane and evil?‖  (Voir Dire Tr. at 54.)   
 
The foregoing events during trial did not constitute a ―blatant violation of basic and ele-
mentary due process‖ making a fair trial impossible, the standard for fundamental error. Benson, 
762 N.E. at 756. 
 
Conclusion 
  
We affirm the conviction and sentence for murder.  
  
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.