Case Title: Walker v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH WALKER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 87, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 9810002187 
§  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 1, 2007 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: October 11, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of October 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Joseph Walker, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first petition for postconviction relief.  The 
State of Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of Walker’s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in 2000, a Superior Court jury 
acquitted Walker of second degree rape, two counts of third degree rape, and 
 
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first degree reckless endangering but convicted him of one count of 
attempted second degree rape.  The Superior Court sentenced him as an 
habitual offender to life in prison.  This Court affirmed his conviction and 
sentence on direct appeal but indicated that Walker’s claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct, which was based upon the prosecutor’s criticisms of defense 
counsel’s cross-examination of the victim, should be considered in the first 
instance by the Superior Court in the context of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.1   
(3) 
Walker filed his first petition for postconviction relief in 
December 2003, advancing twenty-one claims.  The Superior Court referred 
the motion to a Commissioner. The Commissioner recommended that the 
petition be denied.  On January 31, 2007, the Superior Court adopted the 
Commissioner’s findings and recommendations and denied Walker’s motion 
for postconviction relief.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Walker raises five claims, three 
of which were raised in his postconviction petition below.2  Walker asserts: 
(i) the Commissioner abused her discretion in denying his motion for 
appointment of counsel as well as his request for an evidentiary hearing; (ii) 
                                                 
1 Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Del. 2002). 
2 To the extent Walker has failed to brief the other eighteen issues he raised in the 
Superior Court, those claims are deemed to be waived on appeal. Somerville v. State, 703 
A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). 
 
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the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to strike the Commissioner’s 
report; (iii) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for a 
judgment of acquittal on Count I of the indictment, which was second degree 
rape; (iv) the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument and rebuttal 
summation were improper and prejudicial, and defense counsel’s failure to 
object constituted ineffective assistance; and (v) the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on the offense of attempted second degree rape, and 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction.  
(5) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief 
under Rule 61 for abuse of discretion.3  With respect to Walker’s first claim 
that the Commissioner abused her discretion in denying his motion for the 
appointment of counsel, we note that there is no constitutional right to 
counsel in a collateral proceeding.4  The Superior Court may appoint counsel 
for an indigent defendant in a postconviction proceeding but only in the 
exercise of its discretion and for good cause shown.5  We find no good cause 
to justify the appointment of counsel in Walker’s case.  Furthermore, the 
record reflects that the Commissioner held a hearing limited to the issue of 
why defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument and 
                                                 
3 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998). 
4 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 
5 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1). 
 
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rebuttal summation.  To the extent that the Commissioner did not deem a 
hearing on any other issue to be necessary, we find no abuse of the 
Commissioner’s discretion in refusing to hold an expanded hearing on all 
twenty-one of Walker’s postconviction claims.6 
 
(6) 
Walker next argues that the Superior Court judge abused his 
discretion in denying Walker’s motion to strike the Commissioner’s report.  
In responding to Walker’s motion, the trial judge noted that the 
Commissioner’s report was filed on August 15, 2006 and that Walker’s 
objections to the report were due on or before August 29, 2006.7  Walker, 
however, did not file his motion to strike the Commissioner’s report until 
September 18, 2006.  Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of the trial 
judge’s discretion in refusing to consider Walker’s untimely response to the 
Commissioner’s report. 
 
(7) 
Walker’s three remaining claims assert that his trial counsel 
was ineffective.  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
petitioner must establish: (a) that his defense counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) that, but for his 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the 
                                                 
6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(4)(ii).  
 
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outcome of the case would have been different.8  There is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.9  
Walker’s claims of ineffective assistance fail on both prongs.   
(8) 
First, Walker’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on Count I of the indictment, 
which was second degree rape, fails because the jury acquitted him of 
second degree rape.  Accordingly Walker cannot establish either cause or 
prejudice from his counsel’s failure to move for a judgment of acquittal on a 
charge for which Walker was acquitted.   
(9) 
Second, with respect to Walker’s claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the State’s 
closing argument, the record of the postconviction hearing reflects that 
defense counsel made a conscious strategic decision not to object during the 
prosecutor’s argument but instead to address the prosecutor’s remarks in 
defense counsel’s own closing.  We do not find that strategy objectively 
unreasonable.  Moreover, to the extent that the jury acquitted Walker of 
several indicted offenses, we find no prejudice in counsel’s strategy.   
                                                 
8 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d at 551-52 (citing the standard set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
9 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
 
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(10) Finally, Walker’s contention that defense counsel should have 
objected to the jury instruction on attempted second degree rape is without 
merit because there was no basis for defense counsel to object.10  The 
testimony at trial, which included the testimony of a witness who walked in 
while Walker was on top of the victim, was sufficient to support the jury 
instruction and the jury’s ultimate conviction of Walker on the charge of 
attempted second degree rape.11 Accordingly, we find that the Superior 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
10 See 11 Del. C. § 206(b)(2). 
11 Drake v. State, 929 A.2d 768, 772 (Del. 2007).