Case Title: Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.

Citation: 259 S.E.2d 248, 298 N.C. 520

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1979-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
259 S.E.2d 248 (1979) 298 N.C. 520 Raymond BURGESS, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, v. JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY. No. 21. Supreme Court of North Carolina. November 6, 1979. *250 Pfefferkorn & Cooley, P. A., by William G. Pfefferkorn, J. Wilson Parker and Jim D. Cooley, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellee. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by Charles F. Vance, Jr., and W. Andrew Copenhaver, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant. HUSKINS, Justice: In Chapter 168 of the General Statutes the General Assembly has granted a number of rights to "handicapped persons." Among these rights is the right to employment. This right is granted by G.S. 168-6, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[h]andicapped persons shall be employed. . . on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated G.S. 168-6 by refusing to hire him upon discovering that plaintiff suffered from a case of simple glaucoma which did not interfere with plaintiff's job performance. Defendant had been "informed by competent medical authority" that plaintiff's glaucoma "would in no way interfere with plaintiff's job performance and that in fact plaintiff had 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses." Nonetheless, plaintiff was told by defendant that it was against company policy to hire an individual afflicted with glaucoma. In order to state a cause of action for violation of the right to employment granted in G.S. 168-6, plaintiff must establish that he is a "handicapped person" to whom such rights are granted. The central issue in this appeal is whether a person who suffers from "simple glaucoma," but has 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses, is a "handicapped person" as defined in Chapter 168. Resolution of this issue requires consideration of G.S. 168-1, which states the purpose of Chapter 168 and defines the term "handicapped person": The definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 referred to in G.S. 168-1 reads as follows: From the above summary it is evident that "[t]he definition of `handicapped persons' shall include those individuals with. . . visual disabilities." G.S. 168-1. (Emphasis added.) However, G.S. 168-1 further provides that "[f]or the purposes of [Article 1 in Chapter 168] the definition of `visually handicapped' in G.S. 111-11 shall apply." Defendant contends that the definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 limits the meaning of "visual disabilities" in G.S. 168-1. According to defendant, the only form of "visual disability" covered by G.S. 168-1 is blindness or functional blindness as defined in G.S. 111-11. Defendant points to plaintiff's allegation that he has "20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses" and concludes that plaintiff is not a "handicapped person" within the meaning of G.S. 168-1. Plaintiff contends that the sole purpose of the reference to G.S. 111-11 is to indicate that whenever the specific phrase "visually handicapped" is used in the statute, then the definition given in G.S. 111-11 shall apply. Whenever that specific phrase is not used, then the broader term "visual disabilities," unrestricted by reference to G.S. 111-11, shall apply to define a "handicapped person." Literally read, the statement in G.S. 168-1 making the definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 applicable "[f]or the purposes of this Article" can be interpreted in either the manner suggested by plaintiff or defendant. To resolve this ambiguity, we must therefore construe the statutory language in question in light of the applicable canons of statutory construction. The intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. Realty Co. v. Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979); Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979). "A construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language." State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E.2d 291 (1975). To this end, the words and phrases of a statute must be interpreted contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the other provisions of the statute and which gives effect to the reason and purpose of the statute. In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); Underwood v. Howland, Commr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968). Finally, this statute, being remedial, should be construed liberally, in a manner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals, for which it is enacted and which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1973); Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E. 800 (1912). Application of the above principles leads us to conclude that the restrictive definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 should not be applied in a manner which limits the meaning of "visual disability" in G.S. 168-1. Significantly, the opening sentence in G.S. 168-1 announces in the broadest possible terms the legislative purpose in granting certain rights to the handicapped: "The State shall encourage and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment." (Emphasis added.) In the same vein, the second sentence indicates that the term handicapped person is to be defined expansively: "The definition of `handicapped persons' shall include those individuals with physical, mental and visual disabilities." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, when we focus attention on those sections of the statute which enumerate the various rights of the handicapped, it becomes apparent that the narrowly defined term "visually handicapped," *252 which refers only to persons who are blind or functionally blind, see G.S. 111-11, is used solely in connection with those sections of the statute dealing exclusively with problems unique to the type of handicap identified by that term: On the other hand, those sections of the statute which address problems common top all handicapped citizens utilize the broadly defined term "handicapped person," which encompasses all persons "with physical, mental and visual disabilities": Thus, when we read the statute contextually, it is clear that the General Assembly did not intend the narrow definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 to control the meaning of the term "visual disabilities" in G.S. 168-1; rather, the General Assembly intended that the definition in G.S. 111-11 would apply only when the specific term "visually handicapped" was used. Such a reading of the statute harmonizes the definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 with the remaining provisions of the statute and gives full effect to the reason and purpose of the statute. See In re Hardy, supra. The broadly expressed goal of this statute is "[to] encourage and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment." G.S. 168-1. Given such a broad expression of legislative intent, exclusion from coverage of persons suffering from "visual disabilities" less severe than blindness would be contrary to the spirit of the statute. Such exclusion would fail to bring under the statute all cases falling within its intended scope. See Hicks v. Albertson, supra. We must now determine whether plaintiff has "visual disabilities" within the meaning of the statute. As used in this statute, the term "disability" refers to a present, non-correctable loss of function which substantially impairs a person's ability to function normally. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a case of simple glaucoma. However, he further alleges that he has 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses. Essentially, plaintiff has indicated in his pleadings that he has an eye disease but that his vision is functioning normally with glasses. Accordingly, we must conclude that plaintiff is not visually disabled within the meaning of the statute. Plaintiff asks us to extend the coverage of the statute to those who suffer from potentially disabling conditions, irrespective of whether those conditions have in fact resulted in "physical, mental, or visual disabilities." G.S. 168-1. Such an interpretation, if adopted, would exceed the intended scope of this statute. Fairly construed, the remedial provisions of this statute are intended to aid only those who are presently disabled. The problems of individuals, not presently disabled, who suffer from *254 conditions which may or may not disable them in the future are beyond the scope of the statute. Such individuals are not "handicapped persons" within the meaning of the statute as presently written. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to establish himself as a "handicapped person" within the meaning of G.S. 168-1. His complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under G.S. 168-6 upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Rules of Civil Procedure, was properly granted by the trial court. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court must be reinstated. To that end, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. BROCK, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.