Case Title: Rashidi v. Moser

Citation: 

Docket Number: S214430

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/15/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
HAMID RASHIDI, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S214430 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B237476 
FRANKLIN MOSER, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC392082 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In professional negligence actions against health care providers, recovery of 
noneconomic damages is capped at $250,000.  (Civ. Code, § 3333.2, enacted as 
part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA).)1  In any 
action, liability for noneconomic damages is several only, so that defendants pay 
in proportion to their share of fault.  (§ 1431.2, part of the Fair Responsibility Act 
of 1986, enacted by passage of Proposition 51.)2 
Here we consider whether a jury‟s award of noneconomic damages, 
reduced by the court to $250,000 under MICRA, may be further diminished by 
                                              
1  
Further statutory references are to the Civil Code, unless otherwise 
specified. 
2  
Noneconomic damages compensate the plaintiff for “pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary 
damage.” (§ 3333.2, subd. (a).)  Section 1431.2, subdivision (b)(2) similarly 
defines noneconomic damages as “subjective, non-monetary losses including, but 
not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, 
loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and 
humiliation.” 
 
2 
setting off the amount of a pretrial settlement attributable to noneconomic losses, 
even when the defendant who went to trial failed to establish the comparative fault 
of the settling defendant.  The Court of Appeal held that such a further reduction is 
required by the MICRA cap. 
We disagree.  It would be anomalous to allow a defendant to obtain a setoff 
against damages for which he is solely liable.  Neither the text nor the history of 
section 3333.2 reflects such an intent.  Rather, the Legislature sought to address 
the problem of unpredictable jury awards.  The limitation on noneconomic 
damages restrains settlements indirectly, by providing a firm ceiling on potential 
liability as a basis for negotiation.  Only noneconomic damages awarded in court 
are actually capped. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Trial Court Proceedings 
According to the complaint, 26-year-old Hamid Rashidi went to the 
emergency room at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars-Sinai) in April 2007 
with a severe nosebleed.  He was treated and discharged, but returned the next 
month with the same symptom.  Dr. Franklin Moser examined him and 
recommended surgery.  In an operation performed the same day, Moser ran a 
catheter through an artery in Rashidi‟s leg up into his nose.  Tiny particles were 
injected through the catheter to irreversibly block certain blood vessels.  The 
particles were manufactured by Biosphere Medical, Inc. (Biosphere Medical).  
When Rashidi awoke after surgery, he was permanently blind in one eye. 
Rashidi sued Moser and Cedars-Sinai for medical malpractice and medical 
battery.  He sued Biosphere Medical for product liability, failure to warn, 
negligence per se, breach of express and implied warranty, and misrepresentation.  
The theory of liability against Biosphere Medical was that its particles were able 
to travel through very small blood vessels and collateral veins, causing a 
 
3 
significant risk they would migrate to places other than the intended sites.  They 
did so here, causing Rashidi‟s blindness.  Rashidi claimed Biosphere Medical had 
failed to disclose this risk, or the fact that the particles were irregular in size.  
Instead it marketed them as being uniform, allowing particular arteries to be 
accurately targeted. 
Rashidi settled with Biosphere Medical for $2 million and with Cedars-
Sinai for $350,000.  The case went to trial against Moser alone.  Moser presented 
no evidence of Cedars-Sinai‟s fault, and the court ruled that the evidence was 
insufficient to support instructions on Biosphere Medical‟s degree of fault.  The 
jury found that Moser‟s negligence caused Rashidi‟s injury.  It awarded $125,000 
for future medical care, $331,250 for past noneconomic damages, and $993,750 
for future noneconomic damages.  The court reduced the noneconomic damages to 
$250,000, conforming to the MICRA cap. 
Moser sought offsets against the judgment for the pretrial settlements with 
Cedars-Sinai and Biosphere Medical.  The court rejected this claim, finding no 
basis for allocating the settlement sums between economic and noneconomic 
losses, and noting that the jury made no finding as to the settling defendants‟ 
proportionate fault.  Moser appealed, contending he was entitled to offsets against 
both the economic and noneconomic damage awards.  He did not dispute the 
ruling that he had made an insufficient showing of comparative fault on the part of 
Cedars-Sinai or Biosphere Medical.  Rashidi cross-appealed, challenging the 
constitutionality of MICRA.  
 
B.  The Court of Appeal Decision 
The Court of Appeal held that offsets were required.  Code of Civil 
Procedure section 877 allows a nonsettling tortfeasor to set off the amount of a 
jointly liable tortfeasor‟s settlement against damages awarded at trial.  However, 
tortfeasors are jointly liable for only economic damages.  Civil Code section 
 
4 
1431.2 imposes “a rule of strict proportionate liability” on noneconomic damages.  
(DaFonte v. Up-right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 600.)  “[E]ach defendant is liable 
for only that portion of the plaintiff‟s noneconomic damages which is 
commensurate with that defendant‟s degree of fault for the injury.”  (Evangelatos 
v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1198.) 3  Accordingly, as the Court of 
Appeal recognized, when a pretrial settlement does not differentiate between 
economic and noneconomic losses, a postverdict allocation is required because 
“only the amount attributable to the joint responsibility for economic damages 
may be used as an offset.”  (Ehret v. Congoleum Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 
1308, 1320.) 
A widely accepted method for making such a postverdict allocation was 
provided in Espinoza v. Machonga (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 268, 276–277 
(Espinoza).  The percentage of the jury‟s award attributable to economic damages 
is calculated and applied to the settlement, yielding the amount that the nonsettling 
defendant is entitled to offset.  (Espinoza, at p. 277; see Jones v. John Crane, Inc. 
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 990, 1006; Ehret v. Congoleum Corp, supra, 73 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1320; Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Brothers Construction Corp. 
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838-1839.)  Following this formula, the Court of 
Appeal determined that the percentage of Rashidi‟s award attributable to economic 
damages was 8.62 percent ($125,000 in economic damages divided by the total 
award of $1,450,000).  Applying that percentage to the $2 million settlement with 
Biosphere Medical, the court concluded that $172,400 of the settlement was for 
                                              
3  
“In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, 
based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-
economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint.  Each defendant 
shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that 
defendant in direct proportion to that defendant‟s percentage of fault, and a 
separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.”  
(§ 1431.2, subd. (a).) 
 
5 
economic losses, completely offsetting the jury‟s $125,000 economic damages 
award.  Rashidi does not challenge this aspect of the judgment. 
The court performed a different calculation for the Cedars-Sinai settlement.  
Cedars-Sinai, like Moser and unlike Biosphere Medical, is a health care provider 
protected by MICRA.  Therefore, the court first reduced the jury‟s award of 
noneconomic damages to $250,000 under section 3333.2.  It added the economic 
damages of $125,000 to that amount, and determined that economic damages were 
33.33 percent of the reduced total award.  Applying that ratio to the $350,000 
Cedars-Sinai settlement, the court allocated $116,655 of the settlement to 
economic losses and the remaining $233,345 to noneconomic losses. 
The court then considered the intersection of the MICRA cap on 
noneconomic damages with the rule of section 1431.2 that liability for 
noneconomic damages is not joint, but several.  It acknowledged that ordinarily 
each health care provider would pay a share of the noneconomic damages based 
on its own comparative fault.  (Gilman v. Beverly California Corp. (1991) 231 
Cal.App.3d 121, 128–130.)  The court also noted that “ „[a] defendant bears the 
burden of proving affirmative defenses and indemnity cross-claims.  
Apportionment of noneconomic damages is a form of equitable indemnity in 
which a defendant may reduce his or her damages by establishing others are also 
at fault for the plaintiff‟s injuries. . . .‟  (Wilson v. Ritto (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 
361, 369.)”4 
Here, Moser failed to establish that any other defendant was at fault.  Thus, 
section 1431.2 would require him to pay the entire amount of the $250,000 
                                              
4  
See Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 
8 Cal.4th 100, 118 (indemnity plaintiff bears burden of proving indemnitor‟s 
fault); Conrad v. Ball Corp. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 (defendant seeking 
offset under § 1431.2 must prove each fact essential to recovery). 
 
6 
noneconomic damage award, unless MICRA demanded a different result.  The 
court noted that nothing in section 3333.2 addresses the proportionate share each 
health care provider must pay for noneconomic damages.  The statute sets an 
absolute limit on the total amount of damages for noneconomic loss an injured 
plaintiff may recover from all defendant health care providers in a single action.  
The court observed, “This serves the purpose of MICRA:  „to reduce the cost of 
medical malpractice litigation, and thereby restrain the increase in medical 
malpractice insurance premiums.‟  (Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 
Cal.3d 137, 159.)”  
Rashidi relied on Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 48 
(Hoch).  The Hoch plaintiffs sought only noneconomic damages at trial after 
settling with several defendants for a total of $382,500.  The jury returned a 
damages award of $500,000, and the court entered judgment against the 
nonsettling defendant for $175,000, consistent with the jury‟s finding that it was 
35 percent at fault.  The trial court refused to set off the settlements against the 
judgment.  (Id. at p. 62.)  On appeal, the nonsettling defendant contended the 
plaintiffs had obtained a windfall because their total recovery ($557,500, including 
the settlements), exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury.  (Id. at p. 
66.) 
The Hoch court disagreed.  It reasoned in part that comparing the total 
recovery with the jury‟s award was inappropriate, because “ „settlement dollars are 
not the same as damages.  Settlement dollars represent a contractual estimate of 
the value of the settling tortfeasor‟s liability and may be more or less than the 
proportionate share of the plaintiff[‟]s damages.  The settlement includes not only 
damages, but also the value of avoiding the risk, expense, and adverse public 
exposure that accompany going to trial.  There is no conceptual inconsistency in 
allowing a plaintiff to recover more from a settlement or partial settlement than he 
 
7 
could receive as damages.‟ ”  (Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 67-68, quoting 
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (Tex. 1984) 665 S.W.2d 414, 431–432.) 
The Court of Appeal here was not persuaded.  Noting that neither Hoch nor 
Duncan involved a cap on damages like MICRA‟s, the court said, “MICRA does 
not distinguish between settlement dollars and judgments; it addresses a plaintiff‟s 
total recovery for noneconomic losses.”  The court concluded that MICRA, as the 
more specific statute, must be read as an exception to section 1431.2‟s more 
general limitation on liability for noneconomic damages according to 
proportionate fault.  It modified the judgment to reflect a deduction of $233,345 
for the part of the Cedars-Sinai settlement attributable to noneconomic losses, 
resulting in a total award to Rashidi of $16,655.  The court rejected Rashidi‟s 
constitutional challenge to MICRA. 
We granted Rashidi‟s petition for review, limiting the question to the 
propriety of the setoff against noneconomic damages granted by the Court of 
Appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The relevant MICRA provisions are these: 
“(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on 
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover 
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage. 
“(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses 
exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).”  (§ 3333.2.) 
Rashidi argues that the plain terms of section 3333.2 distinguish between 
“losses” and “damages.”  He contends he was entitled to recover his 
“noneconomic losses” without limitation by way of settlement under subdivision 
(a), while his recovery of “damages for noneconomic losses” at trial was limited 
 
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to $250,000 under subdivision (b).  If the statute is read this way, the conflict 
discerned by the Court of Appeal between sections 1431.2 and 3333.2 does not 
exist.  With no cap on settlement recoveries, Rashidi would be entitled to the full 
amounts of both the noneconomic portion of the Cedars-Sinai settlement, under 
the Espinoza formula, and the capped award of noneconomic damages at trial, for 
which Moser was solely liable under section 1431.2 because he failed to establish 
fault on the part of any other defendant. 
Moser argues that subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 3333.2 are both 
concerned with a plaintiff‟s total recovery in the entire “action.”  He claims the 
Legislature used the terms “losses” and “damages” interchangeably.  Moser 
contends that recovery should not vary depending on the number of health care 
provider defendants, and that permitting a plaintiff to recover more than $250,000 
in noneconomic losses by settling with one defendant and going to trial with 
another would subvert MICRA‟s purpose.  
Rashidi‟s reading of section 3333.2 is the more reasonable.  “Ordinarily, 
where the Legislature uses a different word or phrase in one part of a statute than it 
does in other sections or in a similar statute concerning a related subject, it must be 
presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning.  (Committee of Seven 
Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 507.)”  (Campbell v. Zolin 
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 489, 497.)  The distinction between “damages,” which are 
capped under subdivision (b) of section 3333.2, and “losses,” which are addressed 
in subdivision (a), is well understood.  “Loss” is the generic term, which includes 
“damage” as a subset.  (Nordahl v. Department of Real Estate (1975) 48 
Cal.App.3d 657, 664.) 
“[T]he term „damages‟ . . . , both in its legal and commonly understood or 
„ “ordinary and popular sense,” ‟ is limited to „money ordered by a court‟ . . . .”  
(County of San Diego v. Ace Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 406, 
 
9 
417, quoting Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 
24 Cal.4th 945, 969; see 24 Cal.4th at p. 962 [“ „[d]amages‟ exist traditionally 
inside of court”].)  Noneconomic damages, in particular, are ascertainable only at 
trial.  “They are inherently nonpecuniary, unliquidated and not readily subject to 
precise calculation.  The amount of such damages is necessarily left to the 
subjective discretion of the trier of fact.”  (Greater Westchester Homeowners 
Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103; see Walnut Creek Manor v. 
Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 263 [noneconomic 
damages “defy a fixed rule of quantification” and are traditionally left to the trier 
of fact].)  Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms indicates that 
the noneconomic “damages” identified in section 3333.2, subdivision (b) are 
limited to amounts awarded by a court.  
It is clear that the Legislature knew how to include settlement dollars when 
it designed limits for purposes of medical malpractice litigation reform.  Business 
and Professions Code section 6146, subdivision (a), a MICRA provision capping 
the contingency fees of plaintiffs‟ counsel, specifies that its fee limitations “shall 
apply regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, or 
judgment . . . .”  (See Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 923-
924.)  No similar provision appears in section 3333.2.  “ „Where a statute, with 
reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision 
from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a 
different intention existed.‟ ”  (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard (1959) 52 
Cal.2d 385, 395; accord, Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, supra, 
45 Cal.3d 491, 507.) 
Neither the parties nor amici curiae direct us to anything in the legislative 
history of section 3333.2 that indicates an intent to include settlement recoveries in 
the cap on noneconomic damages.  To the contrary, we have noted that the 
 
10 
Legislature had jury awards in mind when it enacted the cap, and that only a 
collateral impact on settlements was contemplated.  In Fein v. Permanente 
Medical Group, supra, 38 Cal.3d 137, where the constitutionality of the cap was 
upheld, this court observed that one problem identified in the legislative hearings 
was the unpredictable size of large noneconomic damage awards, “resulting from 
the inherent difficulties in valuing such damages and the great disparity in the 
price tag which different juries placed on such losses.  The Legislature could 
reasonably have determined that an across-the-board limit would provide a more 
stable base on which to calculate insurance rates.  Furthermore, as one amicus 
suggests, the Legislature may have felt that the fixed $250,000 limit would 
promote settlements by eliminating „the unknown possibility of phenomenal 
awards for pain and suffering that can make litigation worth the gamble.‟ ”  (Id. at 
p. 163.)  
Thus, the Legislature was primarily concerned with capricious jury awards 
when it established the MICRA cap.  However, excluding settlement dollars from 
the cap does not leave settlements unaffected.  The prospect of a fixed award of 
noneconomic damages not only increases plaintiffs‟ motive to settle, as noted in 
Fein, but also restrains the size of settlements.  Settlement negotiations are based 
on liability estimates that are necessarily affected by the cap.  By placing an upper 
limit on the recovery of noneconomic damages at trial, the Legislature indirectly 
but effectively influenced the parties‟ settlement calculations. 
Allowing the proportionate liability rule of section 1431.2 to operate in 
conjunction with the cap on damages imposed by section 3333.2 enhances 
settlement prospects.  As Rashidi points out, if nonsettling defendants were 
assured of an offset against noneconomic damages regardless of their degree of 
fault, an agreement with one defendant would diminish the incentive for others to 
settle.  Conversely, if all defendants are responsible for their proportionate share of 
 
11 
noneconomic damages, settlements are encouraged.  Nonsettling defendants must 
weigh not only their exposure to liability for noneconomic damages within the 
limits imposed by section 3333.2, but also the prospect of having to prove the 
comparative fault of settling defendants in order to obtain a reduction under 
section 1431.2.  
Our reading of the statutes is confirmed by considering an alternate 
scenario, where it is clear the MICRA cap could not function effectively as a limit 
on recovery for noneconomic losses by way of settlement.  Suppose the Cedars-
Sinai and Biosphere Medical settlements in this case were interchanged, so that 
Cedars-Sinai settled for $2 million and Biosphere Medical for $350,000.  In that 
circumstance, under either of the allocation formulas applied by the Court of 
Appeal, the portion of the Cedars-Sinai settlement attributable to noneconomic 
losses would far exceed the $250,000 cap imposed by section 3333.2.  Yet no 
MICRA provision, and no other statute, authorizes a posttrial reduction in the 
amount of a settlement. 
We conclude that the cap imposed by section 3333.2, subdivision (b) 
applies only to judgments awarding noneconomic damages.  Here, the cap 
performed its role in the settlement arena by providing Cedars-Sinai with a limit 
on its exposure to liability.  Had Moser established any degree of fault on his 
codefendants‟ part at trial, he would have been entitled to a proportionate 
reduction in the capped award of noneconomic damages.  The Court of Appeal 
erred, however, in allowing Moser a setoff against damages for which he alone 
was responsible. 
 
 
 
 
 
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III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is reversed insofar as it reduced the award 
of noneconomic damages below $250,000, and affirmed in all other respects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
DETJEN, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Rashidi v. Moser 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 219 Cal.App.4th 1170 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S214430 
Date Filed: December 15, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Richard L. Fruin, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Balaban & Speilberger, Daniel Balaban, Andrew J. Speilberger; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner 
and Holly N. Boyer for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire and Benjamin I. Siminou for Michael J. Barger as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Steven B. Stevens for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Reback, McAndrews, Kjar, Warford & Stockalper, Robert C. Reback; Cole Pedroza, Curtis A. Cole, 
Kenneth R. Pedroza, Matthew S. Levinson and Cassidy C. Davenport for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Tucker Ellis, E. Todd Chayet, Rebecca A. Lefler, Lauren H. Bragin and Corena G. Larimer for California 
Medical Association, California Dental Association, California Hospital Association and American 
Medical Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips and Harry W.R. Chamberlain II for Association of Southern California Defense 
Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stuart B. Esner 
Esner, Chang & Boyer 
234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 750 
Pasadena, CA  91101 
(626) 535-9860 
 
Kenneth R. Pedroza 
Cole Pedroza 
2670 Mission Street, Suite 200 
San Marino, CA  91108 
(626) 431-2787