Case Title: In re Cameron Z.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 162

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 162 
Docket: 
Yor-16-99 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
September 29, 2016 
Decided: 
November 8, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CAMERON Z. et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  The mother and father of Cameron Z., Calvin Z., Cole Z., and 
Lawrence Z. appeal from a judgment of the District Court (Biddeford, Foster, 
J.) terminating their parental rights to the children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B) (2015).1  Both parents contend that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, 
of at least one ground of unfitness as to each parent, and that termination of 
their parental rights was in the children’s best interest.  See id.  The father 
additionally contends that the court erred in admitting hearsay statements 
made by one of the children, and that the trial judge should have granted his 
motion to recuse.2  We affirm the judgment. 
                                         
1  The mother consented to a termination of her parental rights to Lawrence; she does not 
challenge that part of the court’s judgment. 
 
2  We have fully considered the father’s arguments on those issues.  We discern no error, and we 
conclude that they do not warrant further discussion. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Procedural History 
 
[¶2]  On February 6, 2014, the Department of Health and Human 
Services filed a petition for a child protection order and a request for a 
preliminary order concerning Lawrence, who was at that point unnamed and 
still in the hospital after being born drug-affected on January 21.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§§ 4032, 4034(1) (2015).3  The Department alleged that the baby had 
effectively been abandoned at the hospital by the parents, and that the father’s 
six-year-old son from another relationship, D.G., who lived in the parents’ 
home, had recently received unexplained inflicted injuries.  The court granted 
a preliminary order the same day giving custody of Lawrence to the 
Department.  The parents later failed to appear for the summary preliminary 
hearing.  Also on February 6, the Department petitioned for a child protection 
order concerning Cameron, Calvin, and Cole; it did not request a preliminary 
order and the children remained in their home pursuant to a safety plan 
developed by the Department. 
[¶3]  On May 15, the court entered a jeopardy order as to the mother by 
agreement concerning all four children; the father did not appear for the 
                                         
3  Title 22 M.R.S. § 4034(1) has since been amended, but not in any way that affects this appeal.  
P.L. 2015, ch. 501, § 9 (effective July 29, 2016).  
 
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hearing.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2015).  The court found jeopardy based on the 
mother’s substance abuse issues, her inadequate supervision of the children, 
and her failure to appreciate the risk posed to them by the father.  Cameron, 
Calvin, and Cole were placed in the mother’s custody subject to several 
conditions, one of which was that she “not permit, tolerate or facilitate contact 
between the father . . . and any or all of the children without the written 
approval of the Department.”  Lawrence remained in the Department’s 
custody at his foster home. 
[¶4]  Based on the father’s representation that he was returning to 
Maine from Florida to contest a jeopardy finding, the court reset his jeopardy 
hearing for May 30.  On that date the father again did not appear; 
unbeknownst to the court, he had been arrested a few hours before the 
scheduled hearing and was in the Cumberland County Jail.  The court held a 
testimonial hearing in his absence at which he was represented by counsel, 
following which it made detailed findings and entered a jeopardy order 
against the father as to all of the children, finding that he (1) failed to protect 
D.G. from assault in the home in that, “at a minimum he was aware of the 
physical violence, did nothing to protect the child, and took active steps to 
conceal it from others”; (2) failed to protect Lawrence from the mother’s drug 
 
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use during her pregnancy, resulting in the baby being born drug-affected; and 
(3) abandoned the children by leaving the state, having no contact with them, 
and “providing no assistance, financial or otherwise.”  We affirmed the 
jeopardy order when the father appealed.  In re D.G., Mem 15-36 
(June 9, 2015). 
[¶5]  On the day of the father’s rescheduled jeopardy hearing, the 
Department filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights to Lawrence.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2015).  The mother consented to the termination of her 
parental rights; the father did not. 
[¶6]  On October 10, the Department requested a preliminary 
protection order concerning Cameron, Calvin, and Cole based, in part, on an 
allegation that the father had been having unsupervised contact with the 
children in violation of the jeopardy order that the mother agreed to.  The 
court issued a preliminary order granting custody of the children to the 
Department.  The parents appeared at the summary preliminary hearing and 
contested the preliminary order.  The court heard evidence that two Assistant 
Attorneys General had seen the father in a car with Cameron, Calvin, and Cole.  
The court made a finding that it had “no confidence in the parents’ 
 
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representations or promises,” and ordered that the preliminary order remain 
in effect. 
[¶7]  On April 10, 2015, the Department filed a petition to terminate the 
parents’ rights to Cameron, Calvin, and Cole.  A hearing held over three days in 
November 2015 resulted in the court issuing a detailed twenty-page order 
terminating both parents’ rights to Cameron, Calvin, Cole, and Lawrence.  The 
father left the courtroom on the afternoon of the first day of the hearing and, 
without explanation, never returned; he continued to be represented by 
counsel throughout.  Both parents appealed. 
B. 
Facts Found in the Termination Order 
 
[¶8]  The court found the following facts by clear and convincing 
evidence in its order terminating parental rights; the findings are supported 
by evidence in the record.  See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶¶ 9, 11, 118 A.3d 812. 
1.  Father 
 
[¶9]  In 2009, five years before this case began, the court (Douglas, J.) 
issued a jeopardy order as to the father concerning Cameron4 in which the 
court found, reminiscent of the jeopardy order in this case, that the father had 
failed to protect Cameron from the mother’s substance abuse, resulting in the 
                                         
4  The jeopardy order notes that, as in the present case, the father initially appeared for the 
hearing and then left. 
 
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child being born drug-affected.  The court also found that the father had 
inflicted domestic violence on the mother, and noted his “lengthy history of 
criminal conduct, including domestic violence against his former wife, as well 
as convictions for theft, burglary, and [] disorderly conduct.  [He] has spent a 
good part of his adult life on probation or in jail.”  When reunification efforts 
with the mother were successful, the child protection case was dismissed and 
replaced with a parental rights and responsibilities order barring the father 
from having unsupervised contact with Cameron. 
[¶10]  In January 2014, the current child protection case began when 
six-year-old D.G. came to school with unexplained bruises.  Dr. Lawrence Ricci, 
co-director of the Spurwink Child Abuse Program, opined that the injuries 
were inflicted.  The mother was then pregnant with Lawrence, who, like his 
brother, was born drug-affected; the father did not visit Lawrence at the 
hospital.  In January 2015, the Department scheduled a supervised visit with 
Lawrence for the father; he confirmed the date and time with the visit 
supervisor but did not attend.  The father also did not follow through with the 
opportunity for approved visits with the other children after last seeing them 
in September 2014. 
 
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[¶11]  The court further found that throughout the child protection case 
the father maintained a relationship with the mother, although he knew that 
his actions affected the likelihood of the mother keeping custody of the 
children.  The children were aware of domestic violence that he perpetrated 
occurring in the home.  In February 2015 there was a heroin “drug bust” at the 
mother’s apartment where the father was present; the father’s brother-in-law 
was arrested.  The court summarized the factors on which it based its finding 
of the father’s parental unfitness: 
There is no evidence that he has engaged in any services designed 
to address the jeopardy identified by this Court in its order of 
June 5, 2014.  He actually left the trial in this matter midway 
through and did not return.  His actions continue to constitute 
abandonment of his children.  His continued refusal to separate 
from [the mother] and provide her the space and opportunity to 
address her own issues has seriously impeded her ability to 
alleviate jeopardy and regain custody of her sons.  There is no 
evidence that any of the children has a firm, positive connection to 
their father. 
 
2.  Mother 
 
[¶12]  The mother has a long-standing substance abuse problem, which 
she acknowledged in the 2009 and 2014 jeopardy orders, that she has made 
some progress in addressing.  The court found that “[i]t is likely that she will 
continue to have some success if she can remain in opiate replacement 
therapy.” 
 
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[¶13]  She has done less well, and often failed, in taking advantage of the 
many services offered to her by the Department through numerous providers 
to address a wide range of other issues affecting potential reunification.  
Those services included opportunities for supervised visitation with the 
children; case management; psychiatric treatment; medication management; 
individual counseling concerning her mental health issues; assistance with 
parenting issues; and help with the issue of domestic violence. 
[¶14]  A central concern for the court—a concern well-supported by the 
record—was the mother’s ongoing clandestine relationship with the father:  
[The mother] still does not accept that [the father] presents a risk 
of harm to her children and has not been willing or able to sever 
her ties with him. . . . It was imperative in this matter that [the 
mother] demonstrate a relatively long-term, reliable history of 
separation from [the father]. . . . In light of [the] history [of their 
relationship], as well as [the mother’s] failure to be honest on any 
number of issues, the representation that she has been separated 
from [the father] for several months, carries virtually no weight 
with the Court. 
 
3.  Children 
 
[¶15]  The court found that the children have significant difficulties 
caused, at least in part, by their parents and their parents’ relationship; 
however, Cameron, Cole, and particularly Lawrence are doing well in their 
current placements.  Although Calvin is struggling, the court found that he 
 
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cannot make progress without the chance to become established in a 
permanent home.  The children have been exposed to domestic violence when 
living with their parents.  Additionally, the children have sometimes indicated 
that they were not to tell the truth to authorities about what went on in the 
home and who was there, and have been labeled as liars by the mother when 
they have made such reports. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶16]  The termination of parental rights is governed by statute.5  When 
a court enters a judgment terminating a parent’s rights to a child, 
                                         
5  The governing statute provides: 
 
1.  Grounds.  The court may order termination of parental rights if: 
 
. . . . 
 
B.  Either: 
 
(1)  The parent consents to the termination.  Consent shall be written and 
voluntarily and knowingly executed in court before a judge. The judge shall 
explain the effects of a termination order; or 
 
(2)  The court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that: 
 
(a)  Termination is in the best interest of the child; and 
 
(b)  Either: 
 
(i)  The parent is unwilling or unable to protect the child from 
jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a 
time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs; 
 
 
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[w]e review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its 
ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child for an 
abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given 
them, through the trial court’s lens.  Evidence is sufficient to 
affirm an order terminating parental rights when a review of the 
entire record demonstrates that the trial court rationally could 
have found clear and convincing evidence in that record to 
support the necessary factual findings as to the bases for 
termination. 
 
In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶17]  Here, the court’s factual findings recited supra have support in 
the record and are not clearly erroneous.  See State v. Lowden, 2014 ME 142, ¶ 
8, 106 A.3d 1134.  As to the mother, the court found that she had the 
opportunity to utilize numerous services offered by the Department in an 
effort to reunify with the children; her cooperation with and participation in 
those services was insufficient, and she was unwilling to end her relationship 
with the father, which the court found to be a compelling factor.  As to the 
                                                                                                                                   
(ii) The parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility 
for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the 
child’s needs; 
 
(iii)  The child has been abandoned; or 
 
(iv)  The parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate 
and reunify with the child pursuant to section 4041. 
 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B) (2015). 
 
 
 
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father, the court found “no evidence he ha[d] engaged in any services 
designed to address the jeopardy identified by this Court,” and that he had 
abandoned the children, which is sufficient, standing alone, to establish 
unfitness.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iii).  The court also properly 
considered “the centrality of permanency in child protective proceedings,” In 
re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 25, 889 A.2d 297, and had in evidence the 
report and testimony of the guardian ad litem supporting the petition for 
termination. 
[¶18]  From those facts and legal authorities, the court could rationally 
find by clear and convincing evidence that both parents were unwilling or 
unable to protect the children from jeopardy or to take responsibility for 
them; that neither of those circumstances is likely to change within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; that the father abandoned 
the children; and that termination of the parents’ rights is in the children’s 
best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2).  Accordingly, the court did not err 
or abuse its discretion in entering a judgment terminating the parents’ rights. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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On the briefs: 
 
Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, 
P.A., Biddeford, for appellant mother 
 
Philip Notis, Esq., Portland, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of 
Health and Human Services 
 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2014-07 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY