Case Title: Pachl v. Officer

Citation: 54 N.W.2d 883

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1952-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
54 N.W.2d 883 (1952) PACHL v. OFFICER et al. No. 7314. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 26, 1952. Rehearing Denied October 13, 1952. *884 Lyche & Lyche, Grand Forks, for appellant. Degnan, Hager & McElroy, Grand Forks, for respondents. GRIMSON, Judge. This is a suit for damages resulting from an automobile accident. On the evening of Sept. 9, 1949, James Pachl, a single man, 22 years of age, together with his friend, Donald Voiss, a young man 21 years old, left Grand Forks in Pachl's dark colored, Ford car to go to a dance at Ardoch. Before they left the city they bought six pints of beer, drank one each at the time and one after leaving town. When they had gone about eight or nine miles west on Highway No. 2 they had a flat tire. They drew to the north side of the road, almost if not, entirely off the pavement. There they left the car without lights or flares. The time was about 7:45 P.M. It was a clear night just turning dark. They found the tire was ruined and that the spare tire was flat. They drank a third can of beer each and decided to take off the spare and to stop a car for a ride into the city to have it repaired. Voiss began taking off the tire. Pachl was standing at his right. Voiss describes it this way: The car that thus hit James Pachl was a 1948 Chevrolet, Tudor automobile, which had been driven between nine and ten thousand miles. It was in good condition, with four wheel, hydraulic brakes. At the time of the accident it was being driven by George Officer. The two Officers with their wives and one additional passenger, Inez Olness, had left Ryder, North Dakota, that morning and were on their way to Grand Forks on business. From there they had intended to go to Detroit Lakes. At the time of the accident George Officer claims to have been driving 45 miles an hour. Regarding the accident he testified: Dorothy Officer, the wife of George was sitting on the right-hand side on the front seat. She describes the accident as follows: * * * No. Inez Olness who was sitting with I. E. Officer in the back seat testified as follows: A photograph of the car taken after the accident was admitted without objection. It shows the right, front light bashed in and the hood on the right side, almost straight below the front edge of the visor, was dented. The evidence shows that James Pachl was injured on his left side. The left side of his face was injured. There was a compound fracture of his left leg, the bones sticking out through his trousers. His skull was fractured, The evidence in the case indicates that the highway crossed a hollow and a low ridge west of the place where the accident occurred. The defendants admit that they did not see the Pachl Ford car at all. Defendants claim to have been driving not to exceed fifty miles an hour. A very distinct skid mark, variously estimated at from fifty to sixty-five feet long was found back of the Chevrolet in the south lane about two feet from the edge of the pavement. One witness testified that that skid mark began east of the Pachl car and ended about 15 feet west of where the Chevrolet stopped, still in the south lane. Plaintiff tried to testify as to another skid mark about ten feet long coming in diagonally off the gravelled shoulder but that testimony is not very clear. The Chevrolet was stopped from 35 to 50 feet east of the body. The plaintiff as the surviving father of James Pachl, in behalf of himself and his wife and Pachl's brother and sisters brings this action for damages on account of the *888 death of James. He claims the defendants were driving at a "high, unlawful, reckless speed and at said time and place failed to keep the proper lookout and to keep said automobile under control". The defendants made a joint denial, except admitting the accident, and plead contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, James. At the close of the plaintiff's case defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case. That motion was resisted and denied. Again, at the end of the evidence defendants made a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendants on the same grounds and on the further ground "that the decedent, James Pachl, was himself, guilty of contributory negligence at the time of the accident and that the same was the direct and proximate cause of the accident." Again objection was made and the motion denied. The whole matter was submitted to the jury who brought in a verdict for the defendant. No further motions were made and the plaintiff appeals from the judgment. He alleges errors in the proceedings of the trial and the admission of testimony and alleges the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict and that it is against the law. The decisive question here is whether under the evidence the verdict is in accordance with law. This action is based on negligence. Negligence and contributory negligence are always questions of fact for the jury unless the evidence is such that but one conclusion can be deduced from the evidence by reasonable minds. Williams v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co., 57 N.D. 279, 221 N.W. 42; Bagg v. Otter Tail Power Co., 70 N.D. 704, 297 N.W. 774; Leonard v. North Dakota Cooperative Wool Marketing Ass'n, 72 N.D. 310, 6 N.W.2d 576; Logan v. Schjeldahl, 66 N.D. 152, 262 N.W. 463; Skramstad v. Miller, N.D., 49 N.W.2d 652; Rokusek v. Berthsch, N.D., 50 N.W.2d 657; Lostegaard v. Bauer, N.D., 51 N.W.2d 761. There is evidence on behalf of the plaintiff to warrant the submission of his case to the jury. Defendants admit they did not see the Pachl car, indicating that there might be a question about the lookout the driver was keeping. The driver claims he applied the brakes as soon as he saw the decedent come in view of his lights, some 15 feet ahead of him. The 50 to 65 foot long skid mark is somewhat contradictory of the distance the decedent was away from the oncoming car when first seen. The skid mark may also indicate that the Chevrolet was being driven at more than fifty miles an hour so could not stop in shorter space. So would the description of how Pachl was hit and thrown and the battered condition of his body. Then there is some evidence that the skid mark coming in from the gravelled shoulder of the highway might be construed as indicating loss of control of the car. From these circumstances reasonable minds might come to different conclusions. So clearly the evidence was sufficient to submit plaintiff's case to the jury. Let us now consider the evidence of contributory negligence and the effect thereof. In the case of Costello v. Farmers' Bank, 34 N.D. 131, 157 N.W. 982, 984, this court said: "While the question of contributory negligence is usually one of fact for the jury, yet where * * * the facts are not in dispute it becomes a pure question of law for the court." In Johnson v. Mau, 60 N.D. 757, 236 N.W. 472, 477, this court said: "* * * but it is well settled that, when it appears affirmatively from the testimony of the plaintiff that his contributory negligence is so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, but must conclude from the evidence that there was contributory negligence, then it is a question of law for the court. (Citing cases.)" In Billingsley v. McCormick Transfer Co., 58 N.D. 913, 228 N.W. 424, this court held: "Contributory negligence is a complete bar to a recovery for damages sustained in a collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of another." See also Wilson v. Oscar H. Kjorlie Co., 73 N.D. 134, 12 N.W.2d 526; Ferm v. Great Northern Railway Co., 53 N.D. 543, 207 N.W. 39; Newton v. Gretter, 60 N.D. 635, 236 N.W. 254; Stelter v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 71 N.D. *889 214, 299 N.W. 310; Chase v. Thomas, 7 Cal. App. 2d 440, 46 P.2d 200. The books are replete with cases of injuries to pedestrians crossing a street or a highway. If a pedestrian walks onto a street or attempts to cross a highway without carefully observing the traffic and consequently walks in front of an oncoming car and is injured it is generally held that he is guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover for the damages he suffers. Bosma v. Daniels, 250 Mich. 261, 230 N.W. 199; Rhoads v. Herbert, 298 Pa. 522, 148 A. 693; Hooker v. Hancock, 188 Va. 345, 49 S.E.2d 711; Tarter v. Wiggington's Adm'x, 310 Ky. 393, 220 S.W.2d 829. The case of Bratvold v. Lalum, 68 N.D. 534, 282 N.W. 514, 516, is very similar to the case at bar. In that case Albert Bratvold had been drinking. He was driving with one, John Ellingson from Devils Lake to Harlow. As they approached Harlow the automobile failed to function properly and they left it finally in the ditch. Then Bratvold and Ellingson talked about hailing a car. They met the defendant coming from the north. Ellingson walked ahead along the west edge of the highway. The court describes the accident as follows: The evidence as to the conduct of the decedent, James Pachl, in the instant case has been set out in full. That evidence is not disputed in the least. James Pachl and Donald Voiss had decided to hail a car so *890 that they could take the spare tire into Grand Forks for repairs. While Voiss was unfastening the spare tire from the back of the Pachl Ford, Pachl was standing beside him. All at once Pachl saw a light and telling Voiss to hurry he ran off, apparently to stop the car. He was a young man of experience in driving cars and in the observation of cars on the highway. As the driver of automobiles for some years he, like all drivers, must have had some sense of the speed at which cars were being driven. His eyesight and general health were good. The weather was clear. There were no atmospheric conditions to interfere with his judgment. They were on a good highway. He started away from Voiss running and when the defendants first saw him he was running south and waving his hands. He finally seemed to jump or turn. Whether he though he had reached a place of safety and turned to wave the car to a stop or whether he hadn't yet reached across to a place of safety but was trying to stop the on-coming car his action placed him in the south lane of the highway in front of the on-coming car and in a place of great danger. He did not use the precaution of the reasonably prudent man for his safety. His reckless actions overcame the presumption that a man will not act in a manner to endanger his life. He may have failed to realize the speed at which the car was coming but whether the defendants were negligent in their way of driving or not the accident would not have happened but for the actions of the decedent. Only one inference can be drawn from the facts. We have come to the unavoidable conclusion that his contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the accident which bars a recovery for his death irrespective of any negligence of the defendants. Under such circumstances the granting of a new trial is without avail. Even if some of the alleged errors claimed by the plaintiff were removed on such trial the evidence regarding the actions of the deceased would be the same. Every person involved in the accident testified except Mrs. I. E. Officer, wife of the owner of the car who was ill at the time of the trial. Plaintiff would still be barred from recovery. In Schnell v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 71 N.D. 369, 1 N.W.2d 56, 64, this court says: In Hooker v. Hancock, 188 Va. 345, 49 S.E.2d 711, numerous errors were assigned on rulings of the trial court. The court found decedent pedestrian guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and held that conclusion rendered it unnecessary to consider other assignments of error. In Ude v. Fuller, 187 Mich. 483, 153 N.W. 769, 770, the court found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence and held that: "In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions presented by the briefs." The errors assigned by plaintiff in the conduct of the trial and the introduction of evidence even if sustained would have no effect on the result. Irrespective of said alleged errors the plaintiff could not recover because of the contributory negligence of the decedent. It is, therefore, neither necessary nor proper for us to pass on those alleged errors as the result does not in any way depend thereon. The sufficiency of the evidence was challenged by a motion for a directed verdict and the record clearly shows that the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The defendants were entitled to a verdict and judgment as a matter of law. The verdict of the jury for a dismissal of the action was, therefore, correct. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. MORRIS, C. J., and GRIMSON, BURKE, SATHRE, and CHRISTIANSON, JJ., concur.