Case Title: State ex rel. Devore Roofing & Painting v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-23

Docket Number: 20020148

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Devore Roofing & Painting v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 66, 2004-
Ohio-23.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DEVORE ROOFING & PAINTING, APPELLEE, V. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Devore Roofing & Painting v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio 
St.3d 66, 2004-Ohio-23.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application for an additional award based on 
violation of a specific safety requirement — Applicability of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) to scaffolds — Industrial Commission did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that employer failed to comply with 
requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E). 
(No. 2002-0148—Submitted November 4, 2003—Decided January 21, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-69. 
_______________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
The relevant facts in this case are straightforward and undisputed.  
On June 29, 1998, claimant-appellant, Dennis R. Walden, received a multitude of 
massive injuries in the course of and arising from his employment as a roofer with 
appellee, Devore Roofing & Painting (“Devore”).  Walden was electrocuted when 
a piece of aluminum downspout that he was maneuvering for installation on a 
building contacted an overhead electric power line.  The force of the shock 
propelled Walden over a guarded side of the scaffold upon which he was working, 
and he fell at least 25 feet to the ground below. 
{¶2} 
Following the allowance of his workers’ compensation claim, 
Walden filed an application for an additional award based on the violation of a 
specific safety requirement (“VSSR”), alleging that Devore had failed to comply 
with several provisions of Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-3.  As relevant here, a 
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staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, found 
(1) that Devore was in compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1), 
which requires the employer to provide lifelines and safety belts when the 
employee is exposed to hazards of falling more than six feet, (2) that Devore had 
violated Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-10(C)(4)(b), requiring guardrails on scaffolds, 
but that Walden had failed to prove that this violation was a proximate cause of 
his injuries, and (3) that Devore had violated Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E), 
which pertains to the operation of cranes, derricks, hoists, and other construction 
equipment in proximity to overhead electrical conductors.  Based on the latter 
finding, the SHO granted an award of 40 percent of the maximum weekly rate, 
and the commission subsequently denied Devore’s motion for a rehearing. 
{¶3} 
Devore sought a writ of mandamus in the Tenth Appellate District 
to vacate the SHO’s order as it pertains to application of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
3-07(E).  Walden also sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals on the 
basis that the commission had abused its discretion in finding that there was no 
violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J), but this request was conditioned 
upon the court’s granting of Devore’s writ. 
{¶4} 
The cause was assigned to a magistrate, who found that the 
commission did not abuse its discretion with respect to either code provision and 
recommended that both writs be denied.  However, the court of appeals sustained 
Devore’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, denied Walden’s conditional 
request for a writ, and ordered the commission to vacate its award.  With regard to 
the applicability of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E), the court of appeals found as 
follows: 
{¶5} 
“The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that a 
VSSR regulation must be strictly construed as being in the nature of penalty 
provisions.  The determination of the commission to apply the provisions of a 
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3 
regulation titled ‘Cranes, Hoists, and Derricks’ to a scaffold violates the 
requirement that before an employer can be found to have committed a violation 
of a safety regulation, that regulation must prescribe, ‘specific and definite 
requirements or standards of conduct which are of a character plainly to apprise an 
employer of his legal obligation toward his employees.’  The plain language of the 
regulation in question, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) was insufficient to put the 
employer on notice that its use of scaffolding was subject to the requirements of 
the regulatory section addressing the operation of cranes, hoists, and derricks.”  
(Citations omitted.) 
{¶6} 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right. 
{¶7} 
The primary issue in this case is whether the commission abused 
its discretion in finding that Devore had failed to comply with the requirements of 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E).  A second issue, which is conditioned upon an 
affirmative finding on the first, is whether the commission abused its discretion in 
finding that Devore did comply with the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
3-03(J). 
{¶8} 
Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-3 governs specific safety 
requirements relating to construction.  “The purpose of this chapter of the 
Administrative Code is to provide safety for life, limb and health of employees 
engaged in construction activity.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(A).  To this end, 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07, entitled “Cranes, hoists and derricks,” provides: 
{¶9} 
“(E) Proximity to overhead electric conductors. 
{¶10} “When it is necessary to move or operate cranes, derricks, or any 
other type of hoisting apparatus or construction equipment within ten feet of an 
electrical conductor carrying one hundred ten volts or more, the employer shall: 
{¶11} “(1) Arrange with the owner of the conductor, or the owner's 
authorized representative, to deenergize the conductor, or 
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{¶12} “(2) Arrange with the owner of the conductor, or the owner's 
authorized representative, to move the conductor, or 
{¶13} “(3) Arrange with the owner of the conductor, or the owner's 
authorized representative, to guard the conductor from accidental contact and the 
employer shall designate an employee to act as signalman to direct the operator in 
the movement of derricks, cranes, or any other type of hoisting apparatus or 
construction equipment, or 
{¶14} “(4) Install an insulated type guard about the boom or arm of the 
equipment and a dielectric insulator link between the load and the block and the 
employer shall designate an employee to act as a signalman to direct the operator 
in the movement of derricks, cranes, or any other type of hoisting apparatus or 
construction equipment.” 
{¶15} It is undisputed that the overhead power lines in this case carried 
more than 110 volts of electricity (7,200 volts to be exact), that the scaffold upon 
which Walden was working was erected by Devore within 10 feet of the power 
lines, and that Devore took none of the precautionary measures listed in Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E).  The sole dispute here concerns the applicability of 
this safety requirement in the first instance to stationary scaffolding. 
{¶16} Devore’s overall contention is that “the [staff] hearing officer’s 
determination that the scaffold was covered by this rule and was being ‘operated’ 
was clearly erroneous.”  According to Devore, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) 
was “not intended to cover the scaffolding involved in the instant claim.”  There 
are actually three overlapping components to Devore’s assertion.  We will analyze 
each separately. 
{¶17} First, Devore argues that by its express terms, Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-3-07(E) is inapplicable to scaffolds.  In particular, Devore points out that 
the rule requires the employer to take one of four precautionary measures when it 
January Term, 2004 
5 
is necessary to “move or operate” cranes, derricks, hoists, or other construction 
equipment within ten feet of an electrical conductor.  Directing the court’s 
attention to the fourth precautionary option, which allows the employer to install 
“an insulated type guard about the boom or arm of the equipment,” Devore states 
that this option suggests that “the regulation is geared toward cranes, hoists, 
derricks and other moving machinery, not an inanimate object such as a scaffold.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Thus, a scaffold, which is defined as a “platform” under Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-10(B)(30), is “not ‘moved’ or ‘operated’ within the meaning 
of 4121:1-3-07(E).” 
{¶18} Devore takes particular aim at the SHO’s finding that Walden was 
“operating” the scaffold at the time of his injury.  Referring to this finding as a 
“tortured interpretation of the term ‘operated,’ ” Devore argues that “[s]uch 
reasoning is not the stuff that narrow construction [of a specific safety 
requirement] is made of” and that “[u]nder equivalent logic, one would be 
‘operating’ the sidewalk upon which he or she was standing.” 
{¶19} With regard to the express terms of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
07(E), it happens that just the opposite is true, that is, by its express terms Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) does apply to scaffolds.  As Devore points out, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-10(B)(30) defines “scaffold” as “any temporary elevated 
platform and its supporting structure used for supporting employees, materials, or 
equipment.”  But 4121:1-3-07(E) does not purport to be limited to cranes, 
derricks, and hoists, and it does not contain any restrictive language such as other 
“moving machinery,” as Devore suggests.  Instead, it applies to cranes, derricks, 
hoists, and “any other type of * * * construction equipment.”  The critical 
question, therefore, is whether “construction equipment” means or includes 
scaffolds or platforms. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶20} To answer this question, we need not engage in a strict or narrow 
interpretation of “construction equipment.”  In fact, it would be entirely 
inappropriate for this court to construe that term at all.  This is because the 
regulation contains its own definition of construction equipment.  Under Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(B), which applies throughout Chapter 4121:1-3, 
“equipment” “means and includes all * * * scaffolds [and] platforms * * * used in 
connection with construction operations.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(B)(5).  
Thus, when read in conjunction with that definition, 4121:1-3-07(E) actually 
provides that the employer shall take certain steps “[w]hen it is necessary to move 
or operate any cranes, derricks, or any [scaffold or platform] within ten feet of an 
electrical conductor carrying one hundred ten volts or more.”  To hold otherwise 
would not result from a legitimate “strict construction” of a specific safety 
requirement, but would instead constitute an impermissible judicial excision of 
the “construction equipment” language under the guise of strict construction.  We 
can no more adopt an interpretation that essentially deletes language from the text 
of a safety rule than we can accept an “interpretation [that] implicitly adds 
language to the text of the rule.”  State ex rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co. (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 661 N.E.2d 724. 
{¶21} Moreover, we see no logical reason to presume that the code’s 
drafters inserted such an expansive phrase as “move or operate” in order to denote 
some sort of fundamental distinction between bodies in motion and bodies at rest.  
The only logical function of this phrase is to indicate the undesirability of 
exposing unprotected workers to the dangers of an electrical current of sufficient 
magnitude to cause injury, whether directly or through the medium or agency of 
their equipment.  Otherwise, the court would have to accept the patently illogical 
result that Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) covers only the situation where 
January Term, 2004 
7 
construction equipment, but not the employee using the equipment, is brought 
within 10 feet of an electrical conductor. 
{¶22} Even if the “move or operate” language was considered to limit 
applicability, we could not interpret this phrase so strictly as to preclude its 
practical application under varying circumstances.  In State ex rel. Harris v. Indus. 
Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 152, 153, 12 OBR 223, 465 N.E.2d 1286, we 
explained that “[t]he commission has the discretion to interpret its own rules; 
however, where the application of those rules to a unique factual situation gives 
rise to a patently illogical result, common sense should prevail.”  By the same 
token, we must defer to the commission’s interpretation when it relies upon its 
own common sense to avoid an illogical result. 
{¶23} In this case, the SHO concluded that “the claimant was operating 
the scaffold at the time of his injury in the sense that he was using it to perform 
the construction activity he was required to do.”  Considering that the definition of 
“equipment” “includes all * * * scaffolds [and] platforms * * * used in connection 
with construction operations,” we find nothing unreasonable or illogical in this 
result.  Contrary to Devore’s assertion, the court did not adopt “a much narrower 
interpretation of the word ‘operating’ ” in State ex rel. Colliver v. Indus. Comm. 
(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 476, 705 N.E.2d 349.  In Colliver, we held that the 
commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that a maintenance worker was 
not operating a forklift within the meaning of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-
13(F)(1)(g) and (h), when his only purpose in moving the truck was to test its 
brakes.  In so holding, we essentially allowed an interpretation of “operate” that 
focuses on whether equipment is being used to perform the work or activity for 
which it was designed, which is precisely how the commission in this case has 
defined the term “operate” under Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E).  In both cases, 
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the commission’s interpretation of the word “operate” is tied to the employee’s 
use of the equipment consistent with its purpose. 
{¶24} For its second argument, Devore maintains that “[g]iven the rule of 
strict interpretation, Ohio courts have repeatedly stated that selected subsections 
of rules may not be applied outside the scope of the regulation” or “held that 
safety rules could only be applied to the items enumerated in the title.”  The 
problem with this argument, however, is that it finds no support in any of the three 
cases upon which Devore relies. 
{¶25} In State ex rel. Cunningham v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 
73, 30 OBR 176, 506 N.E.2d 1179, the court declined the claimant’s invitation to 
construe the term “machine” under former IC-5-03.07(A) and (B) as including an 
arc/butt strip welder, since the title and first sentence of IC-5-03.07 clearly 
specified that the rule applied only to “power transmission machinery.”  In 
Buckeye Steel Castings, Div. of Buckeye Internatl., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 
49 Ohio App.3d 91, 550 N.E.2d 486, the court of appeals rejected the 
commission’s finding that the phrase “all jib cranes” under Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-5-14(D)(2)(a) includes a pneumatic jib crane, when paragraph (D) itself is 
titled “[e]lectric jib cranes” and (D)(1) defines only electric jib cranes.  And in 
State ex rel. Davidson v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 102, 30 O.O. 309, 60 
N.E.2d 664, the court held that former Section 16 of the Code of Specific Safety 
Requirements, which was titled “Power Presses—Guarding” and addressed the 
guarding of “power presses” but which contained a reference to “every press,” did 
not impose a guarding requirement for a hydraulic press. 
{¶26} These cases do not hold, however, that the text of a safety rule may 
never exceed the scope of its title, nor do they require that safety rules must have 
all-encompassing titles.  Instead, the cases simply concluded that the text of the 
particular safety regulation at issue was not intended to extend beyond its topic, 
January Term, 2004 
9 
and this conclusion was possible only because the particular rule’s text was 
susceptible of an interpretation coincident with its title.  But this would not have 
been the case had the rule’s text expressly extended coverage beyond the items 
enumerated in the title.  For example, the court in Cunningham could not have 
refused to apply former IC-5-03.07(A) and (B) to arc/butt strip welders, even with 
that rule’s “power transmission machinery” heading, had the rule specifically 
required lock-out devices on “power transmission machinery or any other type of 
machine,” while defining “machine” to include all arc/butt strip welders.  Cases 
such as Cunningham, Buckeye Steel Castings, and Davidson, which essentially 
harmonize rule headings and concomitant safety requirements, are simply 
irrelevant where the drafters express their intent to expand the scope of a rule 
beyond the coverage reflected in its title. 
{¶27} In the present case, there is no justification for interpreting the 
heading of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07 in order to ascertain the meaning of 
“construction equipment,” since that term is not ambiguous and, therefore, may 
not be interpreted.  Unlike former IC-5-03.07(A) and (B), Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-5-14(D), and former Section 16 of the Code of Specific Safety 
Requirements, the text of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) expressly exceeds the 
parameters of its title by imposing requirements not only on cranes, hoists, and 
derricks, but additionally on any type of construction equipment, including 
specifically all scaffolds and platforms used in connection with construction 
operations. 
{¶28} However, while the three cases Devore cites do not advance its 
position, the question remains as to whether a safety rule should be required to 
have headings that reflect the full scope and applicability of its text.  Thus, 
Devore’s final argument tracks the reasoning of the court of appeals, which is that 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07 fails to provide the employer with adequate notice 
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of a scaffolding requirement.  In other words, even if Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
07(E) does purport to regulate the use of scaffolds, it does not plainly apprise the 
employer of its legal obligations because of its cryptic placement among a set of 
rules that few employers would expect to contain a scaffolding requirement. 
{¶29} Accordingly, Devore points out that the requirements for 
scaffolding are “covered at length in a separate rule, [Ohio Adm.Code] 4121:1-3-
10,” and maintains that “[n]owhere in those 44 pages of regulations [governing 
scaffolding] is there a companion regulation concerning working off a scaffold in 
proximity to a power source.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Devore facetiously wonders, 
therefore, whether it “should also have looked under the ‘Helicopters’ (4121:1-3-
23) and ‘Diving Operations’ (4121:1-3-21) regulations, which are also contained 
in the Construction Code.”  We are not persuaded. 
{¶30} Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) plainly and unequivocally 
apprises the employer that it has certain legal obligations to its employees when it 
is necessary to move or operate any type of construction equipment, including 
scaffolds, within ten feet of an electrical conductor carrying at least 110 volts of 
electricity.  Thus, on its face, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) is unambiguous 
and satisfies the constitutional mandate for specificity in a safety requirement.  
Yet, despite its express applicability to scaffolds, Devore would have us decline to 
apply Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) because the code’s drafters could have 
made it easier to find, for example, by placing it elsewhere in the construction 
code or inserting an equivalent provision among the scaffolding regulations under 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-10.  However, neither Devore nor the court of appeals 
has cited any decision in which this court has gone so far as to question, let alone 
override, the drafters’ judgment with regard to the proper location of a specific 
safety requirement.  This kind of oversight would cross the boundary between 
January Term, 2004 
11 
judicial and legislative activity, as it enables courts to micromanage the 
organization of a regulatory code. 
{¶31} We have held on several occasions that the applicability of a 
specific safety requirement was limited to the particular industry addressed by the 
Administrative Code chapter in which it was contained.  For example, we found 
that certain safety requirements under Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5 
(Workshops and Factories) or Chapter 4121:1-19 (Electrical Supply Lines), were 
inapplicable to an employer in a different industry, such as construction or tree 
trimming.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Double v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
13, 599 N.E.2d 259; State ex rel. Sorrells v. Mosier Tree Serv. (1982), 69 Ohio 
St.2d 341, 23 O.O.3d 312, 432 N.E.2d 197; State ex rel. Miller Plumbing Co. v. 
Indus. Comm. (1948), 149 Ohio St. 493, 37 O.O. 197, 79 N.E.2d 553.  Yet, we 
have reached the opposite result when the specific requirement at issue was 
expressly made applicable to employers in a different industry.  See State ex rel. 
Parks v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 22, 706 N.E.2d 774.  It stands to 
reason that if the drafters of a safety requirement located in a chapter devoted to a 
particular industry can expressly extend it to another industry, a requirement that 
is located in a rule devoted to certain equipment can expressly be extended to 
other equipment. 
{¶32} Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that the commission did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that Devore was in violation of Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-3-07(E).  Having found the commission’s order sustainable on this basis, 
it is unnecessary for us to consider Walden’s conditional claim that the 
commission abused its discretion in finding that Devore complied with Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J). 
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{¶33} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the order of the Industrial Commission awarding additional compensation based 
on Devore’s violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-07(E) is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed 
and order reinstated. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
_______________ 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, George B. Wilkinson and Brian P. Perry, for appellee. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant Industrial Commission. 
 
Casper & Casper and Patrick W. Allen; Kircher, Robinson & Welch and 
Greg J. Claycomb, for appellant Dennis Walden. 
_______________________________