Case Title: Cunningham v. Testa

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2744

Docket Number: 2014-0532

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cunningham v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2744.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2744 
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., APPELLEES, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cunningham v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2744.] 
Taxation—Income—Domicile—R.C. 5747.24—Taxpayer’s claim under R.C. 
5747.24(B)(1) to be domiciled outside Ohio is not binding on tax 
commissioner when other statements support an Ohio domicile—
Common-law principles for determining domicile still apply—Taxpayer’s 
statement verifying non-Ohio domicile can be false if it is not supported by 
common law of domicile. 
(No. 2014-0532—Submitted March 10, 2015—Decided July 8, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2011-4641. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether a taxpayer’s explicit claim under 
R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) to be domiciled outside Ohio binds the tax commissioner 
without regard to other statements and actions by the taxpayer that indicate a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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domicile inside Ohio.  We conclude that a taxpayer’s statement does not bind the 
tax commissioner and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellee Kent Cunningham filed an “Affidavit of Non-Ohio 
Domicile” for tax year 2008 in March 2009, using the form prescribed by the tax 
commissioner.  Cunningham filled in his name, social security number, and 
Cincinnati address.  Cunningham declared under penalties of perjury that he “was 
not domiciled in Ohio at any time during taxable year 2008” and that he was 
domiciled in Tennessee.  Cunningham did not identify his out-of-state abode.  He 
stated that he would not be filing an Ohio individual income tax return for 2008 
and affirmed that he “had fewer than 183 contact periods in Ohio during the 
taxable year.”  Under former R.C. 5747.24(B)(1), a person is presumed not to be 
domiciled in Ohio if, among other things, he has had no more than 182 “contact 
periods” in this state during a taxable year.  151 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9444, 9463.  
Cunningham signed and dated the form.  Appellee Sue Cunningham (Kent’s wife) 
did not file such an affidavit for tax year 2008. 
{¶ 3} Neither of the Cunninghams filed an Ohio income tax return for 
2008.  They jointly filed a federal tax return using Form 1040, which listed their 
Cincinnati address as their home address. 
{¶ 4} The tax commissioner issued first a notice, then an assessment, 
based upon the nonfiling and nonpayment of Ohio income tax.  The tax 
commissioner assessed tax owed ($6,597.75), preassessment interest ($318.85), 
and a penalty ($2,309.21), for a total assessment of $9,225.81. 
{¶ 5} The Cunninghams filed a petition for reassessment.  After additional 
correspondence, the tax commissioner issued his final determination, in which he 
discussed R.C. 5747.24 and common-law domicile.  The commissioner found that 
“the petitioners owned residential property in Tennessee for the entire year in 
question.”  The commissioner noted the January 24, 2008 filing of an Ohio 
January Term, 2015 
 
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homestead-exemption application, with its declarations under penalty of perjury 
that the Cincinnati house was their principal place of residence and that the 
Tennessee house was a second or vacation home.  The commissioner found that 
“[t]his document suggests that the petitioners were residents for at least some 
portion of 2008 and that the petitioners did not intend to abandon their Ohio 
domicile.”  The commissioner considered the Tennessee utility bills submitted by 
the Cunninghams, but noted that they were sent to the Cincinnati address.  This 
fact was found to be further evidence that the Cunninghams did not intend to 
remain in Tennessee or abandon their Ohio abode. 
{¶ 6} Thereafter, the commissioner considered the Affidavit of Non-Ohio 
Domicile, which was filed after the homestead-exemption application, and found 
that “[t]his sworn statement contradicts the petitioners’ prior sworn statement that 
they occupied, as their principal place of residence, their home in Cincinnati, and 
that the Tennessee home was either a second home or a vacation home.”  Because 
of “contradictory statements made by the petitioners, the Tax Commissioner 
necessarily concludes that the petitioners’ Affidavit of Non-Ohio Domicile 
contains a false statement as described in R.C. 5747.24(B)(1).” 
{¶ 7} The commissioner’s determination stated that “the petitioners 
provided no evidence of their contact periods with Ohio, other than as sworn on 
the statement.”  As a consequence of these findings, the commissioner concluded 
that “the petitioners are not irrebuttably presumed under R.C. 5747.24(B) to be 
domiciled outside of Ohio.”  The consequence is that the “the petitioners are 
presumed to be domiciled in Ohio for the entire taxable year under R.C. 
5747.24(C).”  See R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) (if “the individual fails to file the statement 
as required or makes a false statement, the individual is presumed under division 
(C) of this section to have been domiciled in this state the entire taxable year”).  
The commissioner concluded that the Cunninghams failed to rebut the 
presumption of Ohio domicile. 
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{¶ 8} The Cunninghams appealed to the BTA.  The BTA found that Kent 
had filed the domicile affidavit under R.C. 5747.24(B).  The BTA also found that 
because Sue had not filed a domicile affidavit, she was unable to claim the 
irrebuttable presumption and that regardless of the number of contact periods, the 
totality of the evidence established that she had an Ohio domicile under common-
law principles.  BTA No. 2011-4641, 2014 WL 1155688, *3-4 (Mar. 6, 2014).  
The BTA held that because “ ‘domicile’ is a legal concept defined for individual 
income tax purposes by R.C. 5747.24,” a “taxpayer may lose the irrebuttable 
presumption of non-Ohio domicile only if making a false statement regarding (1) 
contact periods, or (2) having an abode outside Ohio.”  Id. at *3.  According to the 
BTA, Kent Cunningham had “complied with the requirements of R.C. 
5747.24(B)(1)” and was, therefore, “irrebuttably presumed to be not domiciled in 
Ohio for Ohio individual income tax purposes.”  Id.  The BTA reversed the 
commissioner’s determination with regard to Kent Cunningham, and the tax 
commissioner has appealed. 
ANALYSIS 
Income tax and domicile 
{¶ 9} Ohio’s income tax is levied “on every individual * * * residing in or 
earning or receiving income in this state.”  R.C. 5747.02(A).  “Resident” is 
defined as an “individual who is domiciled in this state, subject to section 5747.24 
of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 5747.01(I)(1).  “Nonresident” is defined as “an 
individual * * * that is not a resident.”  R.C. 5747.01(J). 
{¶ 10} Residents generally pay tax on all of their Ohio adjusted gross 
income, R.C. 5747.02(A), subject to reduction by a “resident credit” designed to 
prevent double taxation when an Ohioan has been subject to tax on the same 
income in another state.  R.C. 5747.05(B); see Brachman v. Limbach, 52 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2, 556 N.E.2d 146 (1990).  A nonresident pays tax only on the portion of 
his income that is earned or received in Ohio.  See R.C. 5747.01(A) (income tax 
January Term, 2015 
 
5
“is hereby levied on every individual * * * residing in or earning or receiving 
income in this state”). 
{¶ 11} During the many years that the Cunninghams earned their income 
in Ohio from business and employment activities before their retirement, that 
income would have been taxable by Ohio regardless of their state of domicile.  
But by 2008 both had retired, and their income no longer consisted of wages or 
business income but was derived from sources such as pensions, interest, 
dividends, and IRA distributions, the allocation of which depends solely on where 
they are domiciled.  See R.C. 5747.20(B)(2)(c) (income from disposition of 
intangible property “allocable to this state if the taxpayer’s domicile was in this 
state at the time of such sale or other transfer”); 5747.20(B)(6) (any item of 
income or deduction included in the computation of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income that is not otherwise specifically allocated, including interest, dividends, 
and distributions, and IRA income, “shall not be allocated to this state unless the 
taxpayer’s domicile was in this state at the time such income was paid or 
accrued”).  Thus, the issues of domicile and residence are dispositive with respect 
to whether Kent Cunningham’s 2008 income should be taxed by Ohio. 
Common-law domicile 
{¶ 12} We recently stated that “domicile is ‘the technically pre-eminent 
headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights 
and duties that have been attached to it by the law may be determined.’ ” Schill v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 141 Ohio St.3d 382, 2014-Ohio-4527, 24 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 24, 
quoting Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625, 34 S.Ct. 442, 58 L.Ed. 758 
(1914).  In the tax context, the BTA has observed that although “the terms 
‘resident’ and ‘domicile’ are frequently used interchangeably, * * * they in fact 
are distinctly different, albeit related, concepts.”  Davis v. Limbach, BTA No. 89-
C-267, 1992 WL 275694, *4 (Sept. 25, 1992).  Domicile “is generally defined as 
a legal relationship between a person and a particular place which contemplates 
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6
two factors:  first, residence, at least for some period of time and, second, the 
intent to reside in that place permanently or at least indefinitely.”  Id.; accord 
Schill, ¶ 25.  At common law, “the issue of domicile is one of intent determined 
by the facts of the individual case,” including “the acts and declarations of the 
person” and the totality of “accompanying circumstances.”  Davis at *4, citing 
State ex rel. Kaplan v. Kuhn, 8 Ohio N.P. 197, 202, 11 Ohio Dec. 321 (1901).  See 
Cleveland v. Surella, 61 Ohio App.3d 302, 305-306, 572 N.E.2d 763 (8th 
Dist.1989) (“[e]videntiary factors” include “filing federal income tax returns, 
voting, automobile registration or location of spouse and children”). 
{¶ 13} We have held that “for a change in domicile to be established, the 
person must have a physical presence in the new residence and intend to stay 
there.”  Schill, ¶ 26,  quoting Williamson, 232 U.S. at 624, 34 S.Ct. 442, 58 L.Ed. 
758.  Moreover, “ ‘[t]he essential fact that raises a change of abode to a change of 
domicile is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere * * *.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Williamson, 232 U.S. at 624, 34 S.Ct. 442, 58 L.Ed. 758.  See E. Cleveland v. 
Landingham, 97 Ohio App.3d 385, 390, 646 N.E.2d 897 (8th Dist.1994) (“no one 
loses his old domicile until a new one is acquired”). 
{¶ 14} The Cunninghams state in their brief that they were both “common 
law domiciliaries of Ohio during the 2008 tax year.”  This concession is supported 
by various facts, including that Kent and Sue were both born, raised, and educated 
in Ohio; that they were married in Ohio; that they have lived in Ohio throughout  
their entire marriage up to the time of the BTA hearing in 2012 (except for several 
years in the 1970s); that their mail was generally delivered to their Cincinnati 
home and not forwarded to the Tennessee address; that they have lived in the 
Cincinnati area and raised a family there in three houses, including the home that 
they currently own in Indian Hill; and that they held Ohio driver’s licenses and 
voted in Ohio in 2008, the tax year at issue.  See generally In re Hutson’s Estate, 
165 Ohio St. 115, 133 N.E.2d 347 (1956). 
January Term, 2015 
 
7
The “bright-line statute,” R.C. 5747.24 
{¶ 15} In 1993, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 5747.24, which we 
will refer to as the “bright-line” statute.  145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1113, 1120-1122.  
The bright-line statute “sets forth certain presumptions regarding an individual’s 
domicile” for tax purposes.  Tyson v. Zaino, BTA No. 2001-B-1327, 2003 WL 
22294864, *4 (Oct. 3, 2003).  Those presumptions depend on two circumstances:  
having an “abode” or place of residence outside Ohio during the entire taxable 
year and having no more than a certain number of “contact periods in this state” 
during the taxable year.  R.C. 5747.24(B)(1). 
{¶ 16} Pursuant to R.C. 5747.24(A)(1), a “contact period in this state” is 
defined in terms of two elements.  The taxpayer satisfies the first element by 
being away, overnight, from an “abode” (a place of residence) of the taxpayer that 
is located outside Ohio.  The second is satisfied if the taxpayer, while away 
overnight from the non-Ohio abode, spends a portion of each of two consecutive 
days in Ohio, however minimal the portion of each day might be.  As a general 
matter, this can be characterized as an “overnight” test, where the overnight stay 
need not be in Ohio, but probably would be in most instances. 
{¶ 17} In 2006, the legislature amended the bright-line statute, creating a 
presumption of non-Ohio domicile for a taxpayer with 182 or fewer contact 
periods in Ohio.  151 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9463 (amending R.C. 5747.24(B)(1)).  
The presumption is irrebuttable unless the taxpayer fails to timely file a statement 
verifying that he was not domiciled in Ohio and he had at least one abode outside 
Ohio, both during the entire taxable year.  The statement must identify the 
abode(s).  The statement is rebuttable if it contains a “false statement.” 
{¶ 18} It is well settled that “ ‘the general assembly will not be presumed 
to have intended to abrogate a settled rule of the common law unless the language 
used in a statute clearly supports such intention.’ ”  Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 
121 Ohio St.3d 433, 2009-Ohio-1222, 905 N.E.2d 172, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
Hunt v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St. 7, 16, 82 N.E. 518 (1907).  See also Carrel v. Allied 
Prods. Corp., 78 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 677 N.E.2d 795 (1997); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. 
v. Antonelli, 29 Ohio St.3d 9, 10-11, 504 N.E.2d 717 (1987).  Although the bright-
line statute creates an irrebuttable presumption, it does not affect the substantive 
law of domicile.  See Maple v. Tracy, BTA Nos. 98-T-268 and 98-T-312, 1999 
WL 706543, *3 (Sept. 3, 1999) (“While R.C. 5747.24 has set forth certain 
presumptions and burdens with respect to domicile, it has not altered the basic 
concept of what constitutes a domicile”); Tyson, BTA No. 2001-B-1327, 2003 
WL 22294864, *6 (quoting Maple). 
{¶ 19} Moreover, by clear implication, R.C. 5747.24 incorporates the 
common law of domicile and preserves it.  A taxpayer who does not enjoy the 
irrebuttable presumption against Ohio domicile under R.C. 5747.24(B) is 
presumed to be domiciled in Ohio and bears the burden of rebutting that 
presumption.  See R.C. 5747.24(C) and (D).  To do so involves proving the 
substantive elements of domicile under the common law.  See Schill, 141 Ohio 
St.3d 382, 2014-Ohio-4527, 24 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 35-37 (outlining the facts in the 
taxpayer’s testimony that would rebut a presumption against a Florida domicile 
under R.C. 5747.24). 
{¶ 20} At the time pertinent to this appeal, R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) under the 
2006 amendment stated: 
 
 [A]n individual who during a taxable year has no more than one 
hundred eight-two contact periods in this state, which need not be 
consecutive, and who during the entire taxable year has at least one 
abode outside this state, is presumed to be not domiciled in this 
state during the taxable year if [within a prescribed time], the 
individual files with the tax commissioner, on the form prescribed 
by the commissioner, a statement from the individual verifying that 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
the individual was not domiciled in this state under this division 
during the taxable year. 
* * * 
The presumption that the individual was not domiciled in 
this state is irrebuttable unless the individual fails to timely file the 
statement as required or makes a false statement.  If the individual 
fails to file the statement as required or makes a false statement, 
the individual is presumed under division (C) of this section to 
have been domiciled in this state the entire taxable year. 
 
151 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9463. 
{¶ 21} The Cunninghams argue that R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) abrogated the 
common-law principles of domicile.  They argue that the General Assembly did 
not intend to permit a finding that a taxpayer filed a “false statement” merely 
because other evidence shows that the taxpayer meets the common-law criteria 
for domicile.  Rather, they claim, the statement required under R.C. 5747.24(B) is 
false only if the taxpayer does not meet the statutory requirements for the 
irrebuttable presumption of a non-Ohio domicile.  They contend that the 
description of the statement as verifying that the individual was not domiciled in 
Ohio “under this division” bolsters their conclusion.  We disagree. 
{¶ 22} The statute is not as narrow as the Cunninghams claim.  A 
statement verifying non-Ohio domicile can be false if it is not supported by the 
common law of domicile.  That the taxpayer must “verify” domicile status 
militates strongly against the argument that the underlying common-law facts of 
domicile do not matter.  In a legal context, “verify” usually means either 
presenting evidence of a provable fact or stating a matter as being fact under oath.  
See Black’s Law Dictionary 1793 (10th Ed.2014).  If the common law does not 
matter, as the Cunninghams assert and as the BTA held, then the statutory 
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requirement that the individual “verify” non-Ohio domicile would be rendered 
meaningless. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) states that when an individual satisfies the 
contact-period test and has an abode outside Ohio, the individual   
 
is presumed to be not domiciled in this state during the taxable 
year if, on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following 
the close of the taxable year [i.e., April 15 of the following year for 
calendar-year taxpayers], the individual files with the tax 
commissioner, on the form prescribed by the commissioner, a 
statement from the individual verifying that the individual was not 
domiciled in this state under this division during the taxable year. 
 
{¶ 24} There is no factual dispute concerning the two crucial elements 
under R.C. 5747.24(B)(1).  The record extensively documents that the 
Cunninghams owned a house in Tennessee throughout 2008, which would 
constitute an “abode outside this state.”  Moreover, the Cunninghams presented 
uncontroverted evidence that they had 182 or fewer contact period during 2008.  
According to the Cunninghams, this should end the matter.  They argue that the 
statute requires nothing more than verifying the separate and discrete facts of the 
number of contact periods and an abode outside Ohio.  We disagree for two 
reasons. 
{¶ 25} First, division (B) distinguishes verification of domicile from 
verification of contact periods and abode; it does not conflate them.  The domicile 
statement itself asks for a declaration not only of contact periods and an abode 
outside Ohio; it also asks, on a separate line, for a declaration that the individual 
was not domiciled in Ohio during the tax year in question and for an identification 
January Term, 2015 
 
11
of where the individual claims to have been domiciled during that year.  It follows 
that verifying domicile is not the same as verifying the two statutory criteria. 
{¶ 26} Second, division (B)(1) states that the taxpayer statement must 
verify two things:  (1) that “[d]uring the entire taxable year, the individual was not 
domiciled in this state” and (2) that “[d]uring the entire taxable year, the 
individual had at least one abode outside this state [whose location must be 
identified].”  R.C. 5747.24(B)(1)(a) and (b).  When the statute sets forth these 
precise requirements for the statement, it does not limit the concept of domicile to 
domicile “under this division.”  Because of this, we conclude that the 
Cunninghams place unwarranted emphasis on the use of the phrase elsewhere in 
the statute. 
False statement under R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) 
{¶ 27} The tax commissioner found that Kent Cunningham’s verification 
of non-Ohio domicile was false in light of a contradictory statement, which had 
been made under penalties of perjury and with the purpose of obtaining the 
property-tax benefit of the homestead exemption for his Cincinnati home.  The 
BTA disagreed, concluding, as the Cunninghams argue, that the statute permits a 
finding of falsity only for a false statement pertaining to contact periods and 
abode.  As discussed above, we disagree.  We hold that the tax commissioner 
stated a substantial basis for the false-statement finding: the contradictory 
application for the homestead exemption. 
{¶ 28} The homestead-exemption application was dated January 24, 2008.  
It claimed the tax break both for the current year 2008 and as a belated application 
for 2007.  It identified Sue Cunningham as the applicant.  She identified herself as 
a “disabled person” as the basis for claiming the exemption.  The application also 
identified Kent as the spouse of the applicant, the Cincinnati house as the home 
address, and the Tennessee home as “a second or vacation home.”  Both Sue and 
Kent signed the application, asserting, under penalty of perjury, that “I occupied 
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this property as my principal place of residence on Jan. 1 of the year(s) for which 
I am requesting the homestead exemption”; that “I currently occupy this property 
as my principal place of residence”; and that “I have examined this application, 
and to the best of my knowledge and belief, this application is true, correct and 
complete.” 
{¶ 29} As the tax commissioner found, the claim of homestead exemption 
contradicted the income tax affidavit in two respects:  it asserted that the 
Cincinnati house was the principal place of residence and that the Tennessee 
house was a second or vacation home.  For purposes of the homestead exemption, 
R.C. 323.151(A)(1) defines “homestead” as “[a] dwelling * * * owned and 
occupied as a home by an individual whose domicile is in this state.”   The tax 
commissioner found that claiming the property-tax exemption was inconsistent 
with claiming non-Ohio domicile for 2008. 
{¶ 30} We conclude that there is a substantial factual basis for rejecting 
the claim of non-Ohio domicile as a false statement.  (Our holding in this case 
should not be construed as impugning the motives of the taxpayer.  The 
Cunninghams appear to have acted on the basis of a good-faith belief that the 
statements in the two affidavits were not contradictory.) 
{¶ 31} The Cunninghams argue that the irrebuttable presumption provided 
by R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) loses all force if the commissioner can make a false-
statement finding with respect to the taxpayer’s domicile verification.  We 
conclude that when the tax commissioner has information that furnishes a 
substantial basis for rejecting the claim of non-Ohio domicile and he sets forth 
that basis in his determination, the statute does not fail of its essential purpose of 
streamlining domicile determinations.  The tax commissioner would not be 
justified in making a false-statement finding unless he could point to specific 
information that warranted the finding.  We hold that the commissioner must set 
January Term, 2015 
 
13
forth his basis for determining that the domicile statement is false and that when 
he does so, the purposes of the statute have not been frustrated. 
{¶ 32} As noted, R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) specifically states that “[i]f the 
individual * * *  makes a false statement, the individual is presumed under 
division (C) of this section to have been domiciled in this state the entire taxable 
year.”  Under division (C), a taxpayer who is not irrebuttably presumed to be 
domiciled outside Ohio may prove non-Ohio domicile by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  In this case, the tax commissioner correctly proceeded, after making 
his false-statement finding, to consider whether the evidence rebutted the 
presumption of Ohio domicile under division (C); he understandably concluded 
that it did not. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 33} The BTA erred by reversing the tax commissioner’s denial of the 
irrebuttable presumption created under R.C. 5747.24(B)(1).  Because the 
Cunninghams concede that they were Ohio domiciliaries under the common law 
for 2008, there is no call for any further determination of that issue.  We therefore 
reverse the decision of the BTA and reinstate the tax commissioner’s assessment. 
Decision reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} Kent Cunningham demonstrated that he performed the actions R.C. 
5747.24(B)(1) requires to raise an irrebuttable presumption that, for purposes of 
Ohio’s income tax, he was not domiciled in Ohio during 2008.  Those actions 
were three in number:  (1) he maintained an abode outside the state during the 
year at issue (here, the house in Tennessee qualified as such an abode), (2) he 
limited his presence in Ohio to 182 contact periods or fewer, and (3) he timely 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14
filed a statement attesting to the foregoing facts while also verifying that he was 
in fact domiciled outside Ohio during the entire year.  Because Cunningham 
satisfied these three criteria, I would hold that he was entitled to the irrebuttable 
presumption the statute prescribes.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s contrary holding. 
{¶ 35} The key issue of statutory construction lies in whether the tax 
commissioner may make a finding that the taxpayer’s verification of out-of-state 
domicile is false.  The majority holds that the commissioner may do so based on 
other information in his possession.  But this interpretation contradicts the 
irrebuttability of the presumption that arises once a taxpayer has satisfied the three 
criteria, as Cunningham has done here.  A contrary state of the facts can defeat a 
rebuttable presumption, but not an irrebuttable one.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 
957, 1377 (10th Ed.2014) (recognizing “irrebuttable presumption” as synonymous 
with “conclusive presumption,” which is “[a] presumption that cannot be 
overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as 
irrefutable proof that establishes a fact beyond dispute”). 
{¶ 36} I agree with the conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) 
that R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) permits a finding of false statement only with respect to 
out-of-state abode and number of contact periods as predicate facts.  I also concur 
with the BTA’s trenchant observation that the tax commissioner’s approach 
“essentially renders the ‘bright-line’ non-residency status established by R.C. 
5747.24(B) moot, as the commissioner could always challenge the veracity of the 
statement that the taxpayer was not domiciled in Ohio.”  BTA No. 2011-4641, 
2014 WL 1155688, *3 (Mar. 6, 2014). 
{¶ 37} Whether a taxpayer is domiciled in Ohio is a finding of ultimate 
fact that includes a legal conclusion predicated on the underlying basic facts.  In 
my view, the purpose of R.C. 5747.24(B)(1) is to premise the legal conclusion on 
selected basic facts (namely, out-of-state abode and number of contact periods) to 
January Term, 2015 
 
15
the exclusion of other facts that would be significant under the common-law test.  
Indeed, the essential purpose of R.C. 5747.24(B)(1)’s irrebuttable presumption is 
to avoid the wide-ranging and open-ended inquiry into a myriad of domicile facts 
that occurs under common law. 
{¶ 38} In Davis v. Limbach, BTA No. 89-C-267, 1992 WL 275694, *4 
(Sept. 25, 1992), the BTA noted that “[t]here is no bright line test stating exactly 
which factors are necessary for an individual to effectively change his domicile.” 
At the next regular legislative session, the General Assembly enacted the first 
version of R.C. 5747.24.  S.B. No. 123, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1113. In doing so, 
the General Assembly’s stated purpose included “establish[ing] income tax 
domicile tests.”  Id.; Tyson v. Zaino, BTA No. 2001-B-1327, 2003 WL 22294864, 
*4 (Oct. 3, 2003).  In other words, by enacting R.C. 5747.24, the General 
Assembly sought to create the very “bright line” that the BTA had acknowledged 
was missing.  The majority’s interpretation defeats this legislative purpose. 
{¶ 39} Also unpersuasive is the majority’s acquiescence in the view that 
the Cunninghams’ homestead-exemption application contradicts the verification 
of non-Ohio domicile under R.C. 5747.24.  Majority opinion at ¶ 29. Two 
different taxes—the state income tax and the local real estate tax—have statutory 
provisions that create two different tax breaks.  It lies well within the authority of 
the legislature to adopt different domicile standards for two completely different 
tax provisions, particularly where, as here, the legislature’s actions expand the 
scope of exemption and restrict the scope of taxation. 
{¶ 40} The General Assembly had the authority to, and in my view did, 
decide to limit the reach of the state income tax as to persons who might 
otherwise qualify as residents under the common law.  Doing so does not impair 
the General Assembly’s authority to confer a real estate tax benefit based on a 
broader common-law definition of domicile.  And if the law does indeed do what 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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I have described, there is no reason why the taxpayer cannot claim the benefit of 
both tax breaks. 
{¶ 41} For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the BTA and 
remand to the tax commissioner for a determination of the amount of 
Cunningham’s income, which must be removed from the tax assessment.  
Because the majority concludes otherwise, I dissent. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., and J. Donald Mottley, for appellees. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel W. Fausey and Melissa 
W. Baldwin, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 
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