Case Title: Pyron v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Collin A. PYRON v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-499                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 2, 1997


1.   Constitutional law -- double jeopardy -- remedial civil
     sanctions may be imposed without subjecting person to double
     jeopardy. -- Both the United States and Arkansas Constitutions
     provide that no person shall be subjected to two punishments
     based on the same offense; however, remedial civil sanctions
     may be properly imposed without placing the person in
     jeopardy; remedial sanctions may be of varying types, one
     which is characteristically free of the punitive criminal
     element is revocation of a privilege temporarily granted.

2.   Constitutional law -- double jeopardy -- standard for
     determining whether civil forfeiture is punishment for double
     jeopardy purposes applies to administrative suspension of
     driver's license. -- The standard for determining whether a
     civil forfeiture is "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes
     pertains to the provision providing for administrative
     suspension of a driver's license; the test first asks whether
     the legislature intended for the statute to be a remedial
     civil sanction or a criminal penalty; secondly, it asks
     whether the administrative proceedings are so punitive in
     nature as to establish that they may not legitimately be
     viewed as civil in nature, despite any legislative intent to
     establish a civil remedial mechanism.
3.   Statutes -- administrative license suspension --
     administrative intent clearly to provide remedial-civil
     sanctions. -- Where Arkansas Code Annotated  5-65-104 (Supp.
     1995) provides that the administrative suspension of a
     driver's license is supplementary to the suspensions of
     driver's licenses as ordered by a court of competent
     jurisdiction, the standard for administrative license
     suspension established by section 5-65-104(a)(8) is based on
     the civil standard of proof by a preponderance of the
     evidence, the purpose for the sanctions is to prevent drunk
     driving, and the proceedings for imposition of the sanctions
     are conducted by the executive branch of government, and not
     the judiciary, it was clear that the legislative intent was to
     provide remedial civil sanctions.

4.   Statutes -- penalty under statute not so divorced from any
     remedial goal that it constitutes punishment under double
     jeopardy analysis -- punishment imposed is rationally related
     to statute's purpose of protecting public from drunk drivers.
     -- The supreme court, upon consideration of the language and
     application of Arkansas Code Annotated  5-65-
     104(a)(4)(A)(iii)(Supp. 1995), determined that the penalty
     imposed was not so divorced from any remedial goal that it
     constituted punishment under double jeopardy analysis; the
     temporary revocation of the privilege of driving for refusal
     to submit to a chemical analysis was found to be rationally
     related to the purpose of the statute, which was to protect
     the public from intoxicated drivers and to reduce alcohol-
     related accidents.      

5.   Statutes -- provisions made for restricted driving permit --
     legislative intent clearly to establish remedial civil
     sanction to protect public from drunk drivers while allowing
     driver to maintain his livelihood. -- In order to relieve any
     extraordinary hardship that might occur by an administrative
     license suspension, the legislature enacted Arkansas Code
     Annotated  5-65-120 (Supp. 1995), to allow those with no
     alternate means of commuting to and from work to apply for a
     restricted driving permit; this provision rebuts any argument
     concerning the punitive effect of the sanction upon a person
     whose license has been suspended, as a result of which his
     ability to maintain his means of livelihood is impaired; it 
     further reflects the legislature's intent to establish a
     remedial-civil sanction for the purpose of protecting the
     public from intoxicated drivers and to reduce alcohol-related
     accidents while softening the sanctions in order to allow the
     person to continue to operate a vehicle for appropriate
     purposes.


     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; William Storey, Judge;
affirmed.
     Mashburn & Taylor, by:  Scott E. Smith, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     Collin Andrew Pyron, appellant, was arrested by the
Fayetteville Police Department on July 19, 1996, and charged with
driving while intoxicated and refusal to submit to a chemical
analysis.  On August 20, his driver's license was suspended by the
Office of Driver Services for 120 days on the basis of his arrest
for the DWI and for 180 days for his refusal to submit to chemical
analysis.  He was convicted in Fayetteville Municipal Court for
both offenses on October 2, 1996, and appealed to Washington County
Circuit Court.
     In circuit court, he filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
the prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution.  He argued that the length of the
administrative suspension of his license for 180 days, "rises to
the level of punishment due to its retributive and deterrent
effect."  The trial court found that because the suspension was
that of a privilege, not a right, to operate a motor vehicle, the
Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated by his trial and subsequent
conviction on criminal charges.  We agree.
     Both the United States and Arkansas Constitutions provide that
no person shall be subjected to two punishments based on the same
offense.  However, remedial civil sanctions may be properly imposed
without placing the person in jeopardy.  As the Supreme Court
stated long ago in Helvering v. Mitchell,