Case Title: State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons

Citation: 

Docket Number: S53149

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 14, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of
Ashley Jean Woodman,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DANA JO SIMMONS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 4769J; CA A124081; SC S53149)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 20, 2006.
Wes Williams, La Grande, argued the cause for petitioner on
review.  Anne Morrison, La Grande, filed the petition. 
Anna M. Joyce, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
*Appeal from Baker County Circuit Court, Gregory Baxter, Judge. 203 Or App 279, 125 P3d 66 (2005).
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Walters, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this termination of parental rights proceeding, the
issue is whether the state has shown, by clear and convincing
evidence, that, at the time of the termination proceeding, mother
was unfit and unable to be a minimally adequate parent to her
daughter.  On de novo review, the Court of Appeals concluded that
mother was unfit because she has a mental illness and an
addiction to controlled substances that, together, are seriously
detrimental to her child.  The Court of Appeals therefore
affirmed the trial court's order terminating mother's parental
rights.  State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons, 203 Or
App 279, 125 P3d 66 (2005) (Simmons III). (1)  For the reasons
that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals in a
parental rights termination case, this court may review de novo
or it may limit its review to issues of law.  ORS 19.415(4);
State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 138, 36 P3d 490
(2001).  Because we conclude that neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals correctly considered the evidence in the record
concerning mother's condition and its effect on child at the time
of the termination trial, we elect to view the record de novo.  
At the time of the trial in this case, mother was 38
years old.  Since the age of nine, mother has suffered from a
chronic, painful, autoimmune disease.  In addition, in adulthood,
mother suffered other debilitating illnesses, including
pancreatitis, hepatitis C, and sleep apnea.  Because of her
health conditions, mother had not worked and had been receiving
disability benefits since 1992.  Over the years, various doctors
prescribed pain management medications for mother, including the
opiate OxyContin, which is an oral, time-release form of the drug
Oxycodone. 
In around 1985, mother became involved with Keith
Woodman, child's father.  Woodman was addicted to heroin and
physically abused mother.  In 1995, mother gave birth to child. 
Four months later, she left Woodman.  Woodman never paid child
support and has had little contact with child. (2) 
Because of mother's health problems, she required the
assistance of a caregiver after leaving Woodman.  Mother and
child moved in with mother's sister, Cynthia Barton, in Everett,
Washington, so that Barton could help mother with her daily
needs.  By June 2000, Barton no longer was able to care for
mother, and mother and child moved to an apartment in Baker City,
Oregon, near the home of mother's other sister, Crystal Dahlem. 
Dahlem then became mother's paid caregiver.  She provided daily
assistance, dispensing mother's medications and cooking and
cleaning for her.  Mother's and Dahlem's relationship quickly
began to deteriorate, however, and they argued loudly and
frequently, often in front of child.  It also became apparent
during that time that mother was abusing her pain medications. 
Soon thereafter, mother and child moved into the home
of another woman whom mother paid to help her with her daily
household needs.  In December 2000, that person called the police
to report mother's drug use.  Police responded and found evidence
that mother had been crushing OxyContin tablets to defeat the
time-release mechanism, then "cooking" the resulting powder to a
liquid, loading it into a syringe, and then injecting herself
with it.  Mother also appeared to be using OxyContin at a rate
far exceeding the prescribed dosage.  The police called DHS and
DHS temporarily placed child with Dahlem.  
Mother then entered an inpatient drug treatment
program, taking child with her.  Mother was unsuccessful in that
program.  Among other things, mother would not admit that she had
a drug problem; on her intake assessment form, mother reported
that she had last abused OxyContin four years earlier.  In
addition, counselors observed that mother inappropriately relied
on child, then six years old, to assume the role of caretaker. 
After three weeks, mother was discharged from the program for
noncompliance with program requirements, for denying her
addiction, and for engaging in drug-seeking behaviors.  
Mother and child returned home to mother's apartment
and mother hired yet another paid caregiver, Lorrie Moss, to
assist her.  Moss dispensed mother's medications, cleaned her
house, did the laundry, did the grocery shopping, and took mother
to appointments.  She worked for mother eight hours a day, five
to seven days per week.  During that time, mother was extremely
sleepy and occasionally felt too unwell even to get out of bed. 
On those days, Moss picked child up from school.  From time to
time, mother failed to pick child up from school without making
other arrangements and Moss would receive an urgent call from the
school.  
In June 2001, Moss found syringes wrapped in paper
towels in a drawer, although mother had not been prescribed any
medicines that required mother to use syringes.  Moss disposed of
them in a dumpster outside mother's house, but the next day they
were back in the bathroom; mother had retrieved them from the
garbage.  Mother then repeatedly lied, to Moss and others, about
how she came to possess the needles.  Around that time, child,
who then was six years old, saw mother inject herself with drugs
and, on more than one occasion, found mother asleep on the sofa
and was unable to rouse her.  Child became frightened that mother
would die.  She began to sleep over at a neighbor's house.  Moss
called DHS to report mother's drug abuse.  Moss also reported
that she had witnessed volatile arguments between mother and
Dahlem over money and care of child.  DHS removed child at the
end of June 2001, placing her in a neutral foster home in Baker
City.  
Mother then began another outpatient drug treatment
program, again with little success.  Mother continued to deny her
addiction and missed appointments and group meetings.  She still
was abusing OxyContin during the months after child was removed
from mother's home and, during that time, mother was arrested for
possessing a small bindle of methamphetamine. (3) 
In August 2001, mother met with Dr. David Sweet, a
psychologist whom the state had hired to evaluate her.  During
the interview, mother was trembling and had difficulty focusing
on and answering Sweet's questions.  Mother minimized her abuse
of OxyContin and denied any other drug use or abuse.  Sweet
administered various tests, which mother took an extraordinarily
long time to complete.  The results of mother's personality test
were of dubious validity but did show mother to be extremely
defensive and obsessive, and desirous of presenting herself in a
positive light.  Mother admitted to Sweet that she was depressed. 
According to Sweet, mother's pattern of moving from place to
place and changing caregivers showed her inability to provide
stability for herself or child.  Mother appeared to Sweet to be
overwhelmed by her problems and to lack insight into them, making
it likely that she would continue to make poor choices.  Sweet
diagnosed mother with polysubstance dependence and major
depression, and made what he called a "rule-out" diagnosis of
borderline or dependent personality disorder. (4)  Sweet
recommended that child remain in foster care until mother could
show for an extended period of time that she could provide
stability for child and address her substance abuse problem.  
A few days later, Sweet also evaluated child.  He based
his evaluation on background information DHS had provided him, on
his own observations and testing of child, and on an interview
with child's foster mother.  The foster mother reported that
child seemed well adjusted, all things considered; she interacted
well with others and was settling in with her peer group. 
However, child wet the bed at night and wet herself during the
day.  Sweet's interview with child herself revealed that child
frequently had seen mother inject herself with drugs, that mother
slept a lot and often was difficult to wake up, which frightened
child, and that they moved around a lot.  However, child reported
that she was happy "most of the time," and she stated that living
with mother was "fun, great, good."  
The testing showed that child scored in the average
range on most tests, but on three verbal subtests and on certain
nonverbal tests, child scored in the low-average range. 
According to Sweet, a test requiring child to tell stories about
a series of ambiguous pictures revealed that child was sad, angry
and depressed, and that she felt vulnerable and worried about her
living arrangements.  Child also appeared to be closed and
inaccessible, finding it difficult to discuss personal
information.  
Based on the foregoing, Sweet concluded that child was
very bright but that she had had serious problems resulting from
mother's condition, which interfered with her ability to learn
and gather information about her environment.  He agreed with a
social worker's impression that child was "parentified," meaning
that child believed that she had to take care of her mother. 
According to Sweet, it would be best for child to remain in
foster care until mother could provide a stable home in which
mother clearly was the parent and child clearly was the child.  
In September 2001, child began therapy with a social
worker, Karen Waln.  In play and in stories that she told, child
conveyed to Waln that child was afraid of being abandoned.  She
also told Waln that she often had heard mother arguing with her
sister, Dahlem, and that she was afraid of Dahlem.  At that time,
child occasionally had unsupervised visits with Dahlem and
Dahlem's daughter, and her bed and daytime wetting worsened after
those visits.  
Child also began to have supervised visits with mother
at DHS offices in Baker City.  The record contains the
observations of three DHS workers during that period.  All
reported seeing a consistently strong, loving, and affectionate
relationship between mother and child.  However, one observer
noted that mother occasionally talked to child in detail beyond
what a child of her age could comprehend and that mother once
teased child inappropriately about marrying a boy in her class
one day.  The second observer, a DHS social worker, stated that,
while mother would cook nutritious and appropriate dinners for
child during the visits, on one occasion, she became distracted
by cooking and did not pay the child close attention.  That
social worker also noted that mother occasionally talked to child
about child's boyfriends, even though child was only six years
old at the time, and that mother let child dress up in scanty
attire and dance to popular music.  
Finally, the third observer, also a social worker who
supervised several visits at mother's home in Baker City during
that period, found mother's behavior during the visits to be
entirely appropriate.  However, in December 2001, that social
worker observed one incident that raised a safety concern for
her: she noticed a syringe on the top of the medicine cabinet in
the bathroom.  She did not say anything at the time, but she
called authorities and, two days later, the police searched
mother's house.  Police found hypodermic needles in the bathroom
and two bindles of methamphetamine between the mattress and the
box spring of mother's bed.  Mother denied that the drugs were
hers.  Mother was arrested but the charges against her later were
dismissed.
In late December 2001, DHS moved child to a new foster
home in Lake Oswego:  that of child's paternal aunt (Woodman's
sister) and the aunt's husband, the Stubblefields.  Mother
initially agreed to that placement because she had hoped to find
a drug treatment center in Portland that could address her
medical problems in addition to her substance abuse problem.  She
was unable to find such a program, however, and she remained in
Baker City.  
After child moved to Lake Oswego, DHS arranged for her
and the Stubblefields to undergo family counseling with Dr.
Christine Portland, a psychologist.  The counseling focused
mostly on child, but Portland also met with the Stubblefields to
address issues related to the transition.  Portland diagnosed
child with post-traumatic stress disorder, based on child's
reports of having witnessed and been frightened by mother's drug
use and loud arguments between mother and Dahlem.  She also noted
child's enuresis.  In addition, Portland found child to be
delayed in her emotional development; Portland concluded that
child had a chronologic age of seven but an emotional age at
least a year-and-a-half younger.  Accordingly, Portland at first
worked with the Stubblefields to ensure that child felt safe in
her new home, and then focused her attention on helping child in
her social and emotional development.  
Based on her therapy sessions with child, Portland
concluded that child was anxious about her mother, about Dahlem,
and about Dahlem's daughter, as well as about the structure of
her daily life.  Portland concurred that the concern that child
demonstrated for her mother and others was an expression of her
parentification and that child's parentification caused her pain,
manifested as irritability, defiance, and bed-wetting.  
After child moved to Lake Oswego, mother became
depressed and, by February 2002, was suicidal.  At that point,
with the help of her sister and her lawyer, mother entered an
inpatient psychiatric hospital program in Boise, Idaho.  There,
mother participated in drug treatment and, at the same time,
doctors addressed mother's ongoing medical conditions in light of
her addiction.  Doctors adjusted mother's medications and mother
began to improve significantly both mentally and physically. 
That improvement continued to the time of the trial.  
Immediately after mother's successful completion of and
release from that program, mother began participating in
outpatient drug treatment again in Baker City, beginning in March
2002.  This time, counselors reported that mother was compliant
with program rules, attended virtually all meetings, and followed
instructions.  She underwent regular urinalysis tests; all were
negative.  Mother obtained a sponsor and completed a 12-step
program.  Mother continued the treatment through September 2002,
when she graduated from the program.  On the discharge sheet,
mother's counselor wrote that all problems had been addressed.  
During the time after mother's release from the Boise
inpatient program, mother and child had more than 50 supervised
telephone conversations as well as supervised visits, either at a
hotel in Clackamas or at DHS offices in Baker City.  The DHS
social worker who listened in on the telephone calls reported
that both mother and child seemed to enjoy the calls, that they
were affectionate and loving toward each other, that mother
planned for the telephone calls by having books available to read
to child, and that mother complied with DHS rules for her
behavior during the calls.  
The supervised visits lasted five hours on Saturdays
and two hours on Sunday morning.  They were scheduled irregularly
at first but eventually they took place every other weekend. 
Beginning in spring 2002, DHS social worker Waln, who had
provided therapy for child immediately after she was removed from
mother's care, supervised the visits in Baker City.  Waln
observed that mother and child were loving together, that mother
brought age-appropriate activities to the visits, that mother
prepared nutritious lunches, and that she was able to play with
child appropriately.  Waln nevertheless found mother's parenting
skills lacking, because Waln did not think that mother was able
to distinguish between her own and child's emotional needs.  As
evidence of that fact, Waln referred to an instance when mother
and child were playing with sidewalk chalk and mother disregarded
child's express wish that mother not write on the sidewalk that
she loved child.  In addition, Waln pointed to child's "passive
aggressive" actions when she and mother played, and discounted
the affection that child demonstrated toward mother as
"placating" behavior stemming from her parentification.
From May through October 2002, DHS contracted the
supervision of the Clackamas visits to an outside agency, Options
Counseling Services of Oregon, Inc. (Options).  From May through
August 2002, Options counselor Velinda Sloan supervised seven
visits.  Sloan observed that mother and child were extremely
affectionate with each other, and that that affection seemed to
her to be genuine.  She reported that mother played well with
child, engaged child in appropriate discussions about child's
life, disciplined child appropriately as necessary, and refrained
from talking about her own problems.  Sloan did not report seeing
anything that alarmed her in mother's parenting.  
From August through October 2002, Options family
resource worker Veronica Roman supervised the visits.  Her
observations were consistent with Sloan's.  She reported one
negative incident, in which Roman arrived for the visit with
child and mother was asleep in her hotel room and was difficult
to rouse.  Mother apologized and explained that she must have set
her alarm incorrectly, and the matter was resolved.  
In July 2002, DHS arranged for Sweet to examine both
child and mother again.  Sweet first met with mother,
interviewing her and subjecting her to a battery of tests.  Sweet
observed that mother was cooperative and responded more
appropriately than she had the last time that he had seen her. 
Mother told Sweet that she was feeling much stronger than she had
felt before, that she was managing her own home, and that she was
riding her bicycle all over town.  When asked to explain the
problems that had led child to be taken away from her, she
admitted that she had been "shooting up" her OxyContin.  She
stated that she had stopped after child was removed, but admitted
that she had relapsed at some point thereafter.  At the time of
the interview, mother had not abused any of her medications in
about six months.  Mother also reported that DHS's current
concern was with her ability to meet child's physical and
emotional needs.  Finally, mother described her current
relationship with Dahlem as greatly improved.  She explained that
she and Dahlem had learned to talk to each other and to trust
each other, and mother was proud of the fact that Dahlem
permitted mother to babysit her own daughter in either of the
women's homes.  When Sweet asked mother to what she attributed
that improvement, mother responded that, when she had been
abusing drugs, she would pick fights with Dahlem, but now she
realized that Dahlem had only been trying to help her and now
they were both making an effort to get along.  
Mother's various psychological test results in most
instances were similar to those of the year before.  However,
mother now was able to complete the personality test in a
reasonable amount of time.  She continued to provide a very
defensive profile, although not as defensive as the year before. 
Still, the current results showed that mother was a very rigid,
over-controlled woman, and, in people like that, according to
Sweet, one sees a tendency to overreact aggressively or even
violently.  Based on those test results and on background
information provided him by Waln, Sweet diagnosed mother with a
"personality disorder, n[ot] o[therwise] s[pecified], with
characteristics of borderline, dependent and narcissistic
personality disorders," that interferes with her ability to
function and to get along with others. 
A few days later, Sweet met with child.  He observed
that child was verbal and cooperative during the session.  Sweet
administered a series of tests that showed that child is in the
high-average intelligence range and showed strength on verbal
skills tests.  Other tests revealed that child still was somewhat
depressed and worried about her situation but that she had
improved in that respect over the previous year.  Those tests
also showed that child felt hopeful about the future and that she
felt good about herself.  
In around August 2002, DHS decided to change its plan
for mother and child from reunification to achieving adoption of
child.  Sandi Baer, the DHS supervisor in Baker City, stated that
DHS based that decision on the following factors: (1) a May 2002
statement by an addiction counselor that mother "wasn't buying
into the disease concept" and therefore he did not believe that
child safely could be returned to her; (5) and (2) Sweet's
second evaluation of mother in July 2002.  Baer also referred to
the facts that mother did not begin bringing lunches to
visitations until July 2002 despite the agency's repeated demands
that she do so and that mother did not think that her parenting
sessions with Waln were profitable because she already knew the
things that Waln was telling her.  
Once DHS had made the decision to seek termination of
mother's parental rights, but before ever meeting mother for the
first time, Portland recommended that telephone visits between
mother and child cease completely and that supervised visitations
be cut back from seven hours every other weekend to one and a
half hours every other month.  
Portland supervised the first visit after the cutback,
as well as two subsequent visits.  Mother brought presents for
child to those visits and played with her for the entirety of the 
visits.  Portland testified at trial that that behavior on
mother's part was evidence of her inability adequately to parent
child, insofar as mother brought only "fun" and not practical
presents and that mother used the time to play with child rather
than to explore child's feelings.  
In April 2003, the state petitioned to terminate
mother's parental rights under ORS 419B.504.  The state alleged
that mother is unfit due to (1) addictive or habitual use of
controlled substances to the extent that her parenting ability is
substantially impaired; (2) lack of effort or failure to maintain
a suitable or stable living situation; (3) failure to present a
viable plan for return of the child to her care; (4) an emotional
or mental illness or deficiency of such nature and duration as to
render her incapable of providing care of the child for an
extended period of time; (5) physical and emotional neglect of
child; (6) lack of effort to adjust circumstances, conduct, or
conditions to make return of the child possible; (7) failure to
effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available
social services have been made; and (8) multiple medical needs
that, coupled with mother's mental health and drug abuse
problems, substantially impair mother's ability to care for the
child.  
The case went to trial in October 2003.  A large part
of the state's case was devoted to establishing the severity of
mother's drug abuse problem before child was removed from her
care in June 2001 (and the effect of that problem on child) and
mother's early failures in acknowledging and addressing that
problem.  In addition, the state presented several witnesses who
testified about mother's mental state, her behavior during visits
with child, and her compliance with DHS service agreements.  The
state's case began with testimony from Waln, who had last seen
mother in October 2002, a year before the trial.  Waln testified
that mother did not have the ability to separate her own
emotional needs from those of child as evidenced by, among other
things, the fact that mother sometimes broke the agency's rule
against talking about her "adult decisions" with child and that
she failed to acknowledge that child was afraid of Dahlem.  Waln
also reported that child seemed not to talk about her own
emotions with mother and inferred from that fact that child did
not feel safe expressing those feelings to mother.  Waln
concluded that, in her opinion, mother did not have the parenting
skills necessary to be an adequate parent and that returning
child to her care would be detrimental to child's welfare.  
The psychologist, Sweet, also testified for DHS.  Like
Waln, Sweet had not seen mother in some time.  Based on his last
evaluation of mother in July 2002 (the last time Sweet saw
mother), Sweet testified that mother suffers from a personality
disorder that would make it difficult for mother to get along
with others or to place child's needs above her own, and that
personality disorders are resistent to treatment.  Based on
information about mother that Sweet had been provided before his
evaluation, Sweet concluded that mother "didn't have a clue"
about how her behavior had affected child.  
Portland, child's therapist, testified at trial about
her early impressions of child and those that she had formed from
three meetings with child in the weeks immediately before the
trial.  Portland observed that child had improved academically in
her time in foster care and that her enuresis was under control. 
Portland also saw improvement in child's emotional development: 
child seemed to be happy, there was a sparkle in her eyes, she
had friends, and she was able to talk about her feelings, both
negative and positive.  Portland reported that child was
beginning to be inattentive and disorganized at school, but
admitted that that behavior likely was due to uncertainty brought
about by the impending termination proceeding.  
Portland also testified at length about why she
believed that child needed to be protected from mother.  She
stated that mother was controlling and rigid and not able to
empathize with child's feelings or put child's needs over her
own, as evidenced by the following facts: (1) child wanted to
have her hair cut but mother wanted child to keep it long and
believed that parents have the right to make decisions about
their children's hair; (2) that mother named a puppy that she
bought for child "Casey" when child expressed her wish to name it
"Max"; and (3) mother made the visits that Portland supervised
"fun and games" by bringing presents and playing with child the
entire time and did not "come in with herself and be with
[child], and talk to [child] about who she is now, and talk about
the mess that the family's in, and to be empathetic with
[child's] pain."  Other examples of mother's inappropriate and
insensitive behavior, according to Portland, were that mother
once gave child an Easter card that was intended for an intimate
adult couple and not for a mother and child, and that she once
made an inappropriate joke about "thongs," when child was talking
about sandals.  Finally, Portland told a story about an occasion
on which child and mother were playing "store" in a dollhouse and
child asked mother to go inside.  When mother did so, child
closed the doors and pulled up a gate.  According to Portland,
child was showing through her play that she needed to be
protected from mother.  
Portland reported that, in interactions with mother
outside child's presence, mother did acknowledge all Portland's
concerns about her parenting, but Portland characterized mother's
reaction as "pretty superficial."  Portland also testified that
child initially felt responsible for the problems in the family. 
However, child had had therapy with mother to address that
problem and, during that therapy, mother accepted responsibility
for all the problems and child now understood that she was not to
blame and that mother loved her.  
Portland concluded that mother is not capable of
providing child with things she needs: a stable home,
consistency, structure, and an emotionally mature parent. 
Portland stated that mother's deficiencies presently affected
child by making her happy and sad in extremes, impairing her
ability to trust others, and telling people what she thinks they
want to hear.  However, the main problem, according to Portland,
is the risks to which child will be exposed in the future, during
her adolescence, from mother's poor parenting:  she may feel that
she is not listened to, she may have poor self-esteem, and she
may have a hard time trusting others.  And, according to
Portland, if child continues to be parentified, she is at a high
risk in adolescence for depression and anxiety, drug use, and
even for acquiring HIV and AIDS. 
For her part, mother presented evidence of the dramatic
improvements that she had made in her life since her low point in
February 2002.  She presented evidence that she had been
maintaining a clean, well-kept, and suitable two-bedroom home in
Baker City since June 2002.  She had completed four stages of
drug treatment by September 2002, in which she had not missed a
meeting between March and September 2002.  Although mother
stopped attending AA and NA meetings after she completed her last
drug treatment program, mother continued counseling after that
until the time of the trial in Baker City with a family
therapist, Michael Cross. (6)  Cross testified that he
subjected mother to regular urinalysis tests for illicit
substances and that all such tests came back negative, and that
he saw mother continue to grow stronger both mentally and
physically in the time that he had been seeing her.  As of the
time of the trial, Cross had no concerns about mother's ability
to parent child.  
Mother also presented evidence that, in December 2002,
mother began attending twice-weekly services at a local church. 
Mother eventually assumed leadership responsibilities there and
made many friends among the other church members.  The senior
pastor of that church, Gene Saunders, began to counsel mother
weekly.  Saunders testified that, in the time that he had known
mother, she had matured and was able to communicate appropriately
and respectfully and had made and maintained friends.  In
addition, mother babysat frequently for Saunder's four children
and Saunders never had any concerns for his children's safety or
well-being while they were in mother's care.  
Mother's family members, including her mother and
sister Barton, testified that mother had changed dramatically,
both mentally and physically, in the year and a half before the
trial.  They each testified that mother was more insightful,
acknowledged her problems, was better able to cope with
anxieties, and was much more physically active.  
Finally, mother presented the testimony of another 
psychologist, Dr. Steven Condon, who had interviewed mother twice
in August 2003.  Condon based his evaluation on Sweet's earlier
evaluations, on Waln's and Portland's reports, on DHS's court
report, on a report put together by the Citizen's Review Board,
on his two interviews with mother, and on the results of tests
that he had had mother take.  Condon diagnosed mother with post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from the physical and
emotional abuse mother suffered in her marriage to Woodman. 
Although Condon observed that mother had a history of major
depression, he did not think that she was then suffering from
major depression.  Condon saw the same results from the
personality tests that he had administered as were observed by
Sweet, but Condon did not think that there was sufficient
information there to enable him to conclude that mother suffers
from a personality disorder.  (According to Condon, such a
diagnosis requires a long-term pattern of inflexibility, criminal
history, or severely dysfunctional relationships that was not
present here.)  Finally, in an offer of proof, Condon testified
that, in his professional opinion, he did not believe that there
was sufficient evidence on which to conclude that mother lacked
the capacity adequately to parent her child. (7)
In January 2004, the trial court issued a memorandum
opinion terminating mother's parental rights.  In its findings of
fact, the court first outlined the extensive evidence pertaining
to mother's drug use up through the end of 2001, including the
evidence that mother used drugs in front of child.  The court
also detailed mother's repeated denials concerning her abuse of
OxyContin, including when she last had abused that drug, and her
continued denials that she ever had used methamphetamine, which
persisted up to a hearing in July 2003.  The court found that
mother's statements that she never had used methamphetamine and
that she had been clean and sober for two-and-a-half years as of
July 2003 were clearly false.  In addition, the trial court found
the following:
"Mother's abuse of OxyContin has clearly interfered
with her ability to parent [child].  Mother's inability
to be honest about the severity and the recency of her
drug abuse leaves the court with grave concerns about
her ability to presently parent the child."  
The trial court found that mother had been maintaining
suitable housing for some time and seemed to be able to take care
of the home and herself without the assistance of others.  The
court also found that mother had completed some parenting
classes, regularly attended church, and made an effort to visit
child in Portland.  Based on those factors, the court found that
mother had made an increased effort to change her circumstances
after her hospitalization in Idaho in February 2002. 
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the efforts that mother had
made would not significantly improve her ability to parent.  That
conclusion was based on the addiction counselor's May 2002
statement that mother did not understand the disease concept, on
Sweet's July 2002 evaluation of mother, and on an August 2002 DHS
report that mother did not recognize the impact of her choices
and parenting skills on child, as evidenced by her statement
that, while she might consider relinquishing her parental rights
to her sister, she would fight forever to keep child from
remaining with the Stubblefields.  
The court made additional findings concerning the
visitations, observations about mother's tendency to parentify
child and her statements to the effect that child's concern for
mother was normal and showed her compassion, and various
witness's impressions about child's progress, including Sweet's
impression that child was much improved by the time he last saw
her.  
Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that
mother is addicted to controlled substances, that she is in
denial of that fact, and that that addiction, coupled with
mother's mental illness, "has resulted in behavior that is
seriously detrimental to [child]," including causing child to act
as the parent in the relationship and thereby inflicting her with
trauma and fear.  The court stated, "Now that [child] does not
have to bear that burden she is experiencing improvement in her
mental health. * * * [T]he time to reunite [child] with her
mother is long gone."  Finally, the court concluded that mother's
condition is unlikely to change and that integration into
mother's home within a reasonable time is not possible and,
therefore, that mother's parental rights should be
terminated. (8)
Mother appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court
of Appeals.  That court affirmed without opinion.  State ex rel
Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons, 196 Or App 787, 106 P3d 699
(2004) (Simmons I).  Mother petitioned this court for review and
this court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the
case to that court for reconsideration in light of this court's
decisions in Stillman, 333 Or 135, and State ex rel Dept. of
Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 106 P3d 627 (2005).  State ex
rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons, 338 Or 374, 110 P 3d 113
(2005) (Simmons II).  On remand, the Court of Appeals again
affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating mother's
parental rights.  Simmons III, 203 Or App 279.  We discuss the
specific reasons for the Court of Appeals decision in Simmons III
and this court's holdings in Stillman and Smith below.  
Under ORS 419B.500, a court may terminate parental
rights if the court finds that it is in the child's best interest
to do so, but only if the state also establishes the existence of
one or more statutory grounds for termination of parental rights
by clear and convincing evidence.  See Smith, 338 Or at 79
(stating rule); ORS 419B.521 ("[t]he facts on the basis of which
the rights of the parents are terminated, unless admitted, must
be established by clear and convincing evidence").  As this court
stated in Smith, under that standard, the court must find that
the evidence establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is
highly probable.  Smith, 338 Or at 79.  
The specific bases for termination of parental rights
are set out in ORS 419B.502 to 419B.508 and include termination
for extreme parental misconduct, unfitness, neglect, and
abandonment.  In the present case, the state proceeded under ORS
419B.504, which provides:  
"The rights of the parent or parents may be
terminated as provided in ORS 419B.500 if the court
finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child
or ward and integration of the child or ward into the
home of the parent or parents is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change. In determining such conduct and conditions,
the court shall consider but is not limited to the
following:
"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as
to render the parent incapable of providing proper care
for the child or ward for extended periods of time.
"(2) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel
or sexual nature.
"(3) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating
liquors or controlled substances to the extent that
parental ability has been substantially impaired.
"(4) Physical neglect of the child or ward.
"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the
circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to
make it possible for the child or ward to safely return
home within a reasonable time or failure of the parent
to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts
by available social agencies for such extended duration
of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting
adjustment can be effected.
"(6) Criminal conduct that impairs the parent's
ability to provide adequate care for the child or
ward."
(Emphasis added.)
As this court observed in Stillman, the foregoing
statute 
"sets out a two-part test for determining whether to
terminate parental rights, both parts of which must be
met before the court orders termination.  First, the
court must address a parent's fitness:  The court must
find that the parent is 'unfit by reason of conduct or
condition seriously detrimental to the child.'  That,
in turn, requires a two-part inquiry:  The court must
find that:  (1) the parent has engaged in some conduct
or is characterized by some condition;  and (2) the
conduct or condition is 'seriously detrimental' to the
child.  Second -- and only if the parent has met the
foregoing criteria -- the court also must find that the
'integration of the child into the home of the parent
or parents is improbable within a reasonable time due
to conduct or conditions not likely to change.' "  
333 Or at 145.  In addition, this court observed in Stillman that
the focus of both parts of the test for determining a parent's
unfitness
"is on the detrimental effect of the parent's conduct
or condition on the child, not just the seriousness of
the parent's conduct or condition in the abstract. 
Thus, the court first must identify the parent's
conduct or condition, and then measure the degree to
which that conduct or condition has had a seriously
detrimental effect on the child."  
Id. at 146.  Finally, this court in Stillman emphasized that a
parent's fitness must be measured at the time of the parental
rights termination trial.  Evidence that grounds for termination
may have existed at the time that the petition was filed, without
evidence that those grounds continued to exist at the time of the
trial, is insufficient to support the conclusion that a parent's
parental rights should be terminated.  Id. at 148-49.  
In Smith, this court elaborated on the requirement in
ORS 419B.504 that a parent's conduct be "seriously detrimental"
to the child.  That case involved a mother of low-average
intelligence whose child was removed from her care at birth
because of concerns that the mother was mentally ill.  The state
had alleged, among other things, that, in the years between
giving birth to the child and the termination proceeding, the
mother had made virtually no progress in developing parenting
skills and never learned to interact with the child in any of the
ways that DHS personnel thought necessary or appropriate.  The
state's chief complaints in that regard were that the mother
failed to make her visits with the child enjoyable for the child,
that the mother did not make proper eye contact with the child,
that the mother did not respond appropriately to the child's
cues, that the mother refused to read any of the parenting books
provided to her, and that the mother lacked "insight" into the
importance of the various skills that had been taught to her in
the many parenting classes and sessions that the agency had
provided her.  
In evaluating mother's conduct during the visits and
any detrimental effect on the child, this court agreed that
mother's behavior was not optimal.  Indeed, the court agreed that
the "mother did not interact with the child at a level that would
ensure that the child necessarily will experience maximum
emotional development."  Smith, 338 Or at 87.  Nonetheless, the
court concluded that 
"the deficiencies perceived here are not so severe as
to implicate the standard that the statute sets out for
the termination of parental rights and likely are no
worse than those of thousands of Oregonians who
ultimately succeed, without state intervention, in
raising their children safely.
"Given mother's limitations, perfection in
parenting is not attainable (if it is for anyone), but
neither is it required.  For more than two years,
despite her recognized intellectual and social skills
deficits, mother participated regularly in programs
required by DHS and religiously attended weekly visits
with the child.  The testimony of DHS workers observing
the visits confirmed that mother played with the child
with toys, although she did not offer him a variety
from among the wide assortment of educational toys
available, and that the child went to mother willingly,
laughed when mother took his picture, and clung to her
when he felt frightened.  The child never was injured
or in any danger during her visits.  And, the evidence
was undisputed that mother had provided childcare for
many children over the years with no complaints.  In
contending that, notwithstanding the foregoing, mother
is so inadequate as a parent that her condition is
seriously detrimental to the child, DHS has attempted
to impose a standard on mother that the statute does
not contemplate."
Id.
With that background in mind, we turn to the present
case.  As noted, the state alleged in its petition to terminate
mother's parental rights in this case that the following
"conditions" justified termination:  (1) addictive or habitual
use of controlled substances to the extent that her parenting
ability is substantially impaired; (2) lack of effort or failure
to maintain a suitable or stable living situation; (3) failure to
present a viable plan for return of the child to mother's care;
(4) an emotional or mental illness or deficiency of such nature
and duration as to render mother incapable of providing care of
the child for an extended period of time; (5) physical and
emotional neglect of child; (6) lack of effort to adjust
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make return of the child
possible; (7) failure to effect a lasting adjustment after
reasonable efforts by available social services have been made;
and (8) multiple medical needs that, coupled with mother's mental
health and drug abuse problems, substantially impaired mother's
ability to care for the child. 
At the outset, we observe that the fact that mother had
maintained a suitable and stable living situation for well over a
year by the time of the trial was undisputed.  In addition, the
state did not present any evidence that mother neglected the
child either emotionally or physically.  We therefore find that
the state failed to prove either of those grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence.  
The remaining allegations boil down to the following: 
that mother is unfit because her history of drug abuse, her
personality disorder, and her physical illness, either alone or
in combination, constitute a "condition" of the kind that may
justify termination of her parental rights if we find it to be
seriously detrimental to child.  
A parent's history of drug abuse, if it has been
addressed successfully by the time of the termination trial, is
not a "conduct or condition" that necessarily renders a parent
unfit at the time of that trial.  Stillman, 333 Or at 148.  As
noted, at the time of the trial in this case, mother successfully
had completed four levels of drug treatment and a 12-step
program.  She had been clean and sober for 20 months; no witness
even hinted that mother might have been abusing her medications
after February 2002.   And, according to Cross, mother had been
growing ever stronger in her recovery.  On this record, there is
not clear and convincing evidence of a present drug abuse problem
that would render mother unfit at the time of the termination
trial.  
Notwithstanding mother's success in treating her drug
problem, the Court of Appeals found a "real and present risk of
relapse" based on mother's "persistent dishonesty and denial
about her addiction."  However, there is ample evidence in the
record that, by the time of trial, mother had admitted that she
was an addict, that she understood that she would always be in
recovery, and that she continued regular counseling with Cross
and her pastor to address that issue.  The fact that mother lied
about the recency of her last abuse of OxyContin and continued to
deny in court that she ever had used methamphetamine (9) does
not undercut the evidence of mother's undisputed success in the
20 months before the trial in remaining clean and sober, and it
does not, in itself, reflect on mother's fitness or ability to
care for child.  See Smith, 338 Or at 85-86 (in absence of clear
and convincing evidence that mother's tendency to lie and tell
outrageous stories is seriously detrimental to child, mother's
untruthfulness not grounds for termination).  The Court of
Appeals erred in not focusing on the pertinent time frame.  We
find that the record does not contain clear and convincing
evidence of a serious risk of relapse, such as to constitute a
"condition" that might render mother unfit.  
We also do not view mother's physical illnesses as a
condition that might justify termination.  By the time of trial,
and for at least a year before that, the undisputed evidence was
that mother was much healthier than she ever had been before. 
Indeed, the trial court found that, by the time of the trial,
mother had been able to take care of herself and her home without
the assistance of others.  
Finally, Sweet diagnosed mother with an unspecified
personality disorder with borderline, dependent and narcissistic
features, and Condon's findings, although not resulting in a
diagnosis, were not inconsistent with Sweet's.  Both
psychologists found that mother was inflexible, over-controlled,
self-centered, and overly desirous of appearing in a positive
light.  Sweet testified that that personality disorder would
interfere with mother's ability to interact with others and to
place child's needs above her own. (10)  We agree that mother's
personality disorder is a "condition" of the kind that may
justify termination under ORS 419B.504, if there is clear and
convincing evidence that that condition is seriously detrimental
to child. 
Our de novo review of the record shows the following
evidence concerning the effect of mother's "condition" on child:
Immediately after child was removed from mother's care, child was
anxious and upset and suffered post-traumatic stress over having
witnessed mother's drug abuse and having been unable on occasion
to wake mother up, leading her to worry that mother would die,
and over having witnessed repeated, loud arguments between mother
and Dahlem.  At that time, child also was irritable, angry, and
defiant.  Witnesses agreed that child was "parentified," insofar
as she was inordinately worried about her mother's welfare and
felt herself to be responsible for her mother.  She began to wet
the bed at night and wet herself occasionally during the day.  In
her play, child exhibited a fear of abandonment.  
By the time of the trial, however, child was relatively
happy and well adjusted.  She had friends and did well in school,
and her enuresis was resolved.  Portland, who had met with child
three times in the weeks before the termination trial, testified
that she had seen marked improvement in child's behavior and
outlook during the time that child was in foster care.  According
to Portland, child "is happy.  There's sparkle in her eyes.  She
has friends she cares about. * * * Emotionally, she can talk
about her feelings, negative and positive."  And, with respect to
child's "parentification," child's therapists had addressed
child's feelings of responsibility for mother together with
mother, mother has accepted responsibly for the problems, and
child now knows that mother loves her and that she is not
responsible for mother.  
Portland also testified, however, that child continues
to display an inability to trust others and a tendency to tell
others what she thinks they want to hear.  Finally, the record
reflects that, immediately before the trial in this matter, child
was beginning to be inattentive and was showing off and
disorganized at school, although Portland acknowledged that those
behaviors likely were brought on by anxiety related to the
impending proceeding.  
With respect to mother's interactions with child,
virtually all witnesses agreed that mother and child love each
other very much and that mother and child were extremely loving
and affectionate with each other during visitations. (11) 
Mothe played with child, brought age-appropriate activities to the
visits, brought and prepared nutritious meals for child, read
child books, and disciplined child appropriately as necessary.  
The state's chief criticisms of mother were that she
did not fully appreciate the harm that child had suffered from
witnessing mother's drug abuse and arguments with Dahlem and that
mother was not able to put child's needs above her own.  As to
the former point, there is evidence in the record that, soon
after child was removed from mother's care, mother minimized
child's fears and attempted to force contact with Dahlem.  The
record does not support a finding, however, that that attitude
persisted after mother stopped abusing drugs and began her
recovery in earnest in February 2002.  The evidence in support of
that latter point included the following: (1) mother believed
that child's worries for mother's well-being showed child's
compassion and were not problematic; (2) mother disregarded
child's wishes on a number of occasions, including not permitting
child to cut her hair, giving a puppy a name different from the
one child preferred, and writing a message to child in sidewalk
chalk in spite of child's request that she not do so; and (3)
mother brought presents and played with child during visits
rather than talking about the family issues.  
The foregoing evidence of detriment to the child does
not rise to the level contemplated by the legislature in ORS
419B.504 so as to provide a basis for concluding that mother is
unfit.  Child's problems, such as they continue to exist, do not
appear to us to be severe; all agree that child presently is
generally happy and well adjusted. (12)  And mother's behavior
before the termination trial, during the period of her recovery,
while not exemplary in every respect, was mainly positive and
appropriate.  During visits, mother consistently was loving and
appropriate toward child and child freely hugged and kissed
mother and told mother that she loved her.  Additionally, there
is no evidence in the record that child ever was harmed or in
danger during that period.  As this court stated in Smith, 338 Or
at 87, perfection in parenting is neither attainable nor
required.  
None of the evidence that the state presented
pertaining to mother's parenting after child was removed, and
particularly after mother began her recovery in earnest in
February 2002, shows clearly and convincingly that mother's
parenting is so inadequate as to be seriously detrimental to
child, thereby justifying termination of mother's parental
rights.  Certainly, there is no clear and convincing evidence
that such was the case at the time of trial. (13)  Again, as in
Smith, the state is attempting to impose a standard of parenting
on mother that the statute does not contemplate.  Smith, 338 Or
at 87.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the state has
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that mother is
unfit under ORS 419B.504.  It follows that the trial court order
terminating mother's parental rights was error, as was the Court
of Appeals decision affirming that order.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
1. The trial court terminated mother's parental rights in
January 2004.  Mother appealed the trial court's judgment and the
Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  State ex rel Dept. of
Human Services v. Simmons, 196 Or App 787, 106 P3d 699 (2004)
(Simmons I).  Mother petitioned this court for review and this
court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case
to that court for reconsideration in light of this court's
decisions in State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 36 P3d
490 (2001), and State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith,
338 Or 58, 106 P3d 627 (2005).  State ex rel Dept. of Human
Services v. Simmons, 338 Or 374, 110 P3d 113 (2005) (Simmons II). 
2. Woodman's parental rights are not at issue in this
case.
3. Mother consistently has denied that the methamphetamine
belonged to her.  For reasons that remain unclear after our
review of the record, that charge later was dismissed.  
4. Sweet later testified that he was reluctant to make a
firm diagnosis of personality disorder at a time when mother was
abusing drugs.  
5. The same counselor later reported that mother had
undergone an attitude change in that regard, and mother herself
admitted at trial that she was and always will be in recovery. 
6. An issue arose during the trial concerning Cross's
qualifications as a therapist, when it came to light that Cross
improperly identified himself in some letters that he had written
as holding a Ph.D., when, in fact, he held only a "doctorate in
Christian counseling" from an unaccredited correspondence
program.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals discounted
Cross's testimony in support of mother on that ground, concluding
that Cross did not have the training to evaluate mother's
recovery.  However, at the time of trial, Cross had had more than 
25 years experience as a Christian family counselor and more than 
12 years experience as a drug and alcohol counselor, and, as the
Court of Appeals recognized, Cross's counseling clearly was
beneficial to mother.  Accordingly, we think Cross's testimony
deserves to be accorded some weight in this proceeding.  
7. The state objected to mother's question to Condon about
his conclusions concerning mother's ability to parent child on
the ground that Condon had not performed the evaluation for the
purpose of determining custody but rather for the purpose of
determining mother's psychological condition.  The trial court
sustained the objection notwithstanding that it had permitted
Sweet to answer the same type of question.  The trial court
permitted Condon to answer the question in an offer of proof but
stated that it would not consider the answer in its findings and
conclusions in the case.  Given the type of evidence that the
trial court already had admitted, we disagree with the trial
court's evidentiary ruling, and we therefore consider Condon's
opinion.  
8. The trial court's judgment recites:
"THE COURT FINDS by clear and convincing evidence that:
"* * * * *
"3.  The mother is unfit by reason of conduct or
condition seriously detrimental to the child and
integration of the child into the mother's home is
improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or
condition unlikely to change, including the following:  
"(a) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating liquors
or controlled substances to the extent that parental
ability has been substantially impaired.
"(b) An emotional illness, mental illness, or mental
deficiency of such nature and duration as to render the
parent incapable of providing care for extended periods
of time.  
"(c) Failure to effect a lasting adjustment after
reasonable efforts by available social agencies for
such extended duration of time that it appears
reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be effected.
"4.  It is in the child's best interest that the
mother's parental rights be terminated and that the
child be freed for adoption."  
9. While there is evidence in the record that mother had
used methamphetamine at least once prior to February 2002 
(indeed, she has, on occasion, admitted as much), that is the
date on which everyone seems to agree that mother last abused
controlled substances.  
10. Sweet also testified that people with the type of
personality traits mother displays "tend to overreact
aggressively or even violently."  Yet the state did not present
evidence of a single instance in which mother ever "overreacted
aggressively or even violently" with child, either before or
after child was removed from her care.  We think it important to
emphasize that, for a parent's "condition" to be seriously
detrimental to the child, what a person with that condition might
do is irrelevant to our analysis.  Rather, a decision to
terminate a person's parental rights must depend on a showing of
how a parent's behavior or condition actually affects the child. 
See Simons et ux v. Smith, 229 Or 277, 280, 366 P2d 875 (1961)
(reason for terminating parental rights ought to be related to
parent's conduct as a parent).  
11. Some of the state's witnesses viewed the child's
displays of affection as "placating" and further evidence of her
parentification.  No one, however, disputed that mother's
behavior was sincere.  
12. As was true in Stillman, the fact that child has done
as well as she has is due largely to the excellent care that she
has received in the home of her foster parents, the
Stubblefields.  See Stillman, 333 Or at 152 (fact that children
had done as well as they had was due to fortuitous circumstance
of a strong extended family, who helped children avoid suffering
detriment that they otherwise might have suffered due to father's
drug abuse, criminal activity, and subsequent incarceration). 
However, the issue before us is not whether child would be better
off if she remained with the Stubblefields.  Rather, the issue,
as in Stillman, is whether the state has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that mother is unfit because her conduct or
condition was seriously detrimental to child.  On this record,
the state has failed to make that showing.  
13. In Simmons III, 203 Or App 279, the Court of Appeals in
its opinion used Smith for purposes of fact-matching, but never
acknowledged the importance of the underlying legal rule stated
in Stillman, viz., that a parent's circumstances are to be viewed
as of the time of trial.  Stillman, 333 Or at 148-49; see also
State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Rardin, 340 Or 436, 447,
134 P3d 940 (2006) (ORS 419B.504 contains legislative assumption
that parents can change their conduct and, if change is genuine
and lasting, state may not terminate parental rights on grounds
of unfitness).