Case Title: RANARD v O NEIL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12683 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1975 JERRY RANARD, a minor, by and through h i s Guardian, Carl M. Ranard, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - K A T H Y O'NEIL, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Patrick F. Hooks argued, Townsend, Montana Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana Charles A. Smith 111, appeared, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald F. Waterman argued, Helena, Montana Filed : Submitted : Janua ry 16, 19 7 5 Decided: FEB 1 0 1975 Clerk M r . ~ u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a summary judgment granted defendant i n a personal injury action i n the d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County. The d i s t r i c t court held: "* * * the defendant, Kathy O'Neil, i s en- t i t l e d t o summary judgment, a s a matter of law, finding t h a t p l a i n t i f f , Jerry Ranard, was g u i l t y of contributory negligence a s a matter of 12w and defendant Kathy OrNeil had no ' l a s t c l e a r chance' a s a matter of law". The summary judgment was granted on t h e pleadings, answers t o interrogatories by both p a r t i e s , and a deposition of p l a i n t i f f . These documents disclose t h a t , on December 7 , 1972, p l a i n t i f f was struck and injured by an automobile driven by defendant. The indi- dent occurred on a Helena c i t y s t r e e t a t approximately 9:00 p.m. The s t r e e t was snow packed and icy; it was illuminated by s t r e e t l i g h t s . P l a i n t i f f , whose eighth birthday was on the day following the accident, was on h i s way home from a boxing lesson. H i s i n s t r u c t o r had driven p l a i n t i f f and h i s brother t o the s t r e e t i n front of t h e i r home, double-parking across from t h e i r home. The brother, who was a year older than p l a i n t i f f , ran across the s t r e e t , followed almost immediately by the younger boy. A s p l a i n t i f f reached the middle of the s t r e e t , he saw defendant's headlights, stopped, and then ran i n an attempt t o avoid being struck. Defendant, upon seeing the boy, applied her brakes but was unable t o avoid h i t t i n g him. P l a i n t i f f was hospitalized f o r several weeks and continued t o wear a c a s t on h i s broken r i g h t leg f o r some time thereafter. P l a i n t i f f , i n a deposition taken some eight and one half months a f t e r the accident, admitted t h a t he had not looked before he ran i n t o the path of defendant's vehicle. Although he admitted t h a t he knew he should check f o r t r a f f i c , he said t h a t he had j u s t forgotten. Although the d e t a i l s a r e not c l e a r , p l a i n t i f f did admit t o having received some instruction on pedestrian safety, including the t r a d i t i o n a l stop, look and l i s t e n . He could not r e c a l l where he had received i t , o r precisely when i t was taught. The complaint alleged t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s were prox- imately caused by defendant's negligent operation of her automobile. The answer denied t h a t allegation and affirmatively alleged t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s own negligence was the proximate cause of h i s injury. It a l s o alleged t h a t p l a i n t i f f had knowingly assumed the r i s k of injury and, i n a l a t e r amendment, t h a t defendant had been con- fronted with a sudden emergency. Following discovery, the d i s t r i c t court granted defendant's motion f o r summary judgment, on the grounds s t a t e d i n the order quoted a t the beginning of t h i s opinion. P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h a t judgment, alleging the d i s t r i c t court erred i n granting the motion. The r u l e governing summary judgments i s Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., which provides i n pertinent p a r t : "(c) * * * The judgment sought s h a l l be rendered forthwith i f the pleadings, depositions, answers t o interrogatories, and admissions on f i l e show t h a t there i s no genuine issue a s t o any material f a c t and t h a t the moving party i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of law. I I Defendant, the moving party, has t h e burden of establishing the absence of any issues of material f a c t and t h a t she i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. See, e.g. Meech v. Cure, - M o n t . , 525 P.2d 546, 31 St.Rep. 637; Beierle v. Taylor, - M o n t . , 524 P.2d 783, 31 St.Rep. 554. With these considerations i n mind, we turn t o the p a r t i c u l a r questions raised by t h i s appeal. They are: (1) Did the p l a i n t i f f have the capacity t o be contributorily negligent ? (2) I f so, was p l a i n t i f f contributorily negligent under the f a c t s here? (3) Was the p l a i n t i f f contributorily negligent a s a matter of law because of violation of s t a t u t o r y requirements governing pedestrian conduct ? A t the outset, we observe t h a t the d i s t r i c t court had nothing but the cold record upon which t o base i t s decision--the same record which i s before us f o r review. In p a r t i c u l a r , the d i s t r i c t court was not aided i n i t s assessment of p l a i n t i f f ' s capacity by an opportunity t o view h i s demeanor i n court, since he did not appear. Our treatment of the f i r s t two issues i s guided by two Montana cases: Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372, 383, 43 P.2d 896; and Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 277, 435 P.2d 263. Both deal with alleged contributory negligence by boys between eight and nine years old. In Lesage the p l a i n t i f f , a boy aged eight years and nine months, was struck by an automobile a s he played football i n a c i t y s t r e e t . The p l a i n t i f f admitted t h a t he had not seen the car t h a t struck him, but could have i f he had looked. There was testimony t h a t p l a i n t i f f ran i n front of the c a r when i t was a t a distance of only ten o r twelve f e e t . The jury returned a verdict i n favor of the p l a i n t i f f and defendant appealed claiming t h a t the d i s t r i c t court should e i t h e r have nonsuited the p l a i n t i f f o r directed a verdict t h a t p l a i n t i f f was contributorily negligent a s a matter of law. This Court affirmed, finding evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a verdict f o r the p l a i n t i f f . The following t e s t was suggested i n Lesage f o r t h e determination of contributory negligence by a minor over the age of seven: "Did he o r did he not exercise the degree of care t h a t can ordinarily be expected of children of the same age, taking i n t o consideration t h e i r experience, intelligence and c a p a b i l i t i e s ? " The t e s t was recognized a s one which ordinarily should be submitted t o the jury. In Graham, an eight and one-half year old boy was k i l l e d when struck by an automobile while riding h i s bicycle on a c i t y s t r e e t . The only eyewitness who t e s t i f i e d was the defendant, whose version of the events was found t o be so inconsistent a s t o warrant l i t t l e credence. The relevant issue was whether o r not the d i s t r i c t cnurt erred i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury the p l a i n t i f f was incapable of contri- butory negligence a s a matter of law. I n Graham, t h i s Court s e t f o r t h a f u r t h e r t e s t f o r determination of a c h i l d ' s contributory negligence. A dual inquiry i s required covering : "(1) The ca a c i t of a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d i n a given I + - case t o e contributorily negligent; and (2) the establishment i n f a c t of the p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d ' s contributory negligence under the circumstances of a given case. 11 Applying the f i r s t p a r t of the t e s t , we held t h a t reasonable men could d i f f e r a s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s capacity t o be contributorily negligent, and the d i s t r i c t court had erred i n removing t h a t consider- a t i o n from the jury. The evidence showed only the boy's age, h i s grade i n school, h i s a b i l i t y t o r i d e a bicycle, and h i s residence i n the immediate neighborhood of the accident. The r u l e s established by Lesage and Graham indicate a sub- j e c t i v e standard. Each case must be measured by its own f a c t s , and the considerations required a r e d i f f i c u l t t o summarize i n a general rule. I n t h i s context, t h e capacity of a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d i s h i s a b i l i t y t o appreciate the danger, e i t h e r t o himself o r others, of the a c t alleged t o be negligent. That capacity i s determined by h i s age, experience, i n t e l l i g e n c e and c a p a b i l i t i e s . His negligence in f a c t can only be determined by finding a f a i l u r e t o conform h i s conduct t o a standard of care which he can reasonably observe, given the limitations of h i s capacity. In the i n s t a n t case, p l a i n t i f f ' s responses t o the questions recorded i n h i s deposition a r e commonly phrased i n a single word. While t h i s might be t y p i c a l f o r a c h i l d of h i s age, when subjected t o an unfamiliar deposition process, i t says l i t t l e o r nothing about h i s intelligence. There i s evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s experience -- he attended school and was instructed i n c e r t a i n r u l e s of safety f o r pedestrians. P l a i n t i f f could not remember when the instruction was received, where i t was received, nor i t s intensity. W e are presented with , some evidence of experience, but the remainder an only be assumed / by comparison with others in his age group. Finally, there is little evidence of plaintiff's capabilities. Related to intelligence, this attribute would determine whether plaintiff was likely to forget instruction received in pedestrian safety; whether he was self-reliant or tended to rely on his older brother's judgment, e . g . in the context of relying on his older brother's decision to cross the street; what his attention span was; and many other relevant considerations, too numerous to detail here. The record contains insufficient evidence to support a finding that plaintiff had the capacity for contributory negligence as a matter of law. This precludes summary judgment. plaintiff's actions cannot be found negligent until they are measured by some standard. Plaintiff's standard of care could not be determined until his capacity for contributory negligence was found. While the evidence produced in the district court might support a jury verdict that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, it cannot support such finding as a matter of law. Reasonable men could differ on the facts presented and thus the requirements of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., governing summary judgments, are lacking. However, defendant asserts that plaintiff violated Montana statutes regulating the conduct of pedestrians, and therefore he was contributorily negligent, as a matter of law. Her argument is that section 32-2178, R.C.M. 1947, sets the standard for determining the care which must be exercised by any pedestrian. That section provides, in pertinent part: " ( a ) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an un- marked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway." That statute makes no express exceptions for anyone, and I I certainly not for children. Pedestrians are defined as any person afoot" and persons include "every natural person". Section 32-2111, R.C.M. 1947. Authorities recognize the inconsistency inherent in a standard which imposes adult guidelines on children who violate statutes, but applies a lesser-than-adult standard to a child's conduct outside statutory regulation. See Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. 5 36, n.13. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 288A, p. 32, uses this language: " ( 1 ) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not negligence. " ( 2 ) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its violation is excused when " ( a ) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity". This illustrative comment in 5 288A is particularly pertinent here: "2. A statute provides that pedestrians shall not step into the street without looking in both directions for approaching traffic. A, a boy eight years of age, dashes into the street without looking, in pursuit of a ball. A's violation of the statute may be found not to be negligence if his conduct was reasonable for a child of similar age, intelligence, and experience. 1 1 The statutory violation may thus be excused if the plaintiff lacked the capacity for compliance. The summary judgment for defendant is vacated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Justice We Concur: . ,