Case Title: State v. Caenen

Citation: 235 Kan. 451, 681 P.2d 639

Docket Number: 55,833

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1984-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
235 Kan. 451 (1984)
681 P.2d 639
STATE OF KANSAS, Petitioner,
v.
THOMAS J. CAENEN, Respondent.
No. 55,833

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 27, 1984.
Roger N. Walter, disciplinary counsel, argued the cause and was on the brief for petitioner.
Larry E. Benson, of Weeks, Thomas & Lysaught, Chartered, of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the brief for respondent.
Per Curiam:
This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the Board for Discipline of Attorneys (the Board) by Arno Windscheffel, Disciplinary Administrator, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 212 (232 Kan. clxvii). A panel of the Board, after a hearing, determined that respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him and had violated DR 2-103 (A) and (B) (232 Kan. clxxix) and DR 9-102 (B) (232 Kan. cxcii), and had failed to cooperate with the Disciplinary Administrator in violation of Rule 207 (232 Kan. clxiv), and recommended the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Respondent filed exceptions to the report of the disciplinary panel (panel).
*452 In November, 1981, the respondent, Thomas J. Caenen, had a collection agency. Caenen employed an individual by the name of Evans. Evans was hired to visit the officers of certain professions and solicit their delinquent accounts for the respondent to attempt collection. Caenen paid Mr. Evans $100.00 per week plus a 20% commission on the gross amount of receipts generated on new collection accounts above his $100.00 a week draw.
About November 11, 1981, Evans and Lisa Smith, nonlawyer employees of Caenen, contacted the office of Eugene McGill, D.D.S., a dentist practicing in the Kansas City area. Neither McGill nor any member of his staff had had prior contact with the respondent or anyone affiliated with him.
Either Smith or Evans, or both, represented themselves to be "account service representatives" for Caenen. They presented the respondent's business card with their own names and the title "Account Service Repr." handwritten on the card. They spoke with Dr. McGill's office manager in an attempt to secure the referral of collection accounts to Caenen's office. Smith and Evans represented that the respondent's fee for the services contemplated would be 40% of any amount collected within one year and 50% of any amount collected after one year. These terms were written on the back of the business card provided Dr. McGill's office.
Dr. McGill's office manager agreed to refer one account to respondent for collection. The account was that of Terry Eason who owed an outstanding balance of $228.00 to Dr. McGill. By a letter dated November 16, 1981, Caenen acknowledged his employment and confirmed the terms as previously represented.
On December 2, 1981, Dr. McGill's receptionist phoned Evans at respondent's office to inquire as to the status of the collection account. Evans informed the receptionist that Eason had promised to be in that Friday with a $50.00 check. On January 5, 1982, the receptionist again contacted Mr. Evans. Mr. Evans informed her that a $50.00 payment had been received.
The only record apparently kept by respondent, and the only record produced by the respondent at the evidentiary hearing on this complaint, was a balance sheet reflecting Mr. Eason's name and the amount of the outstanding balance ($228.00) referred for collection. That sheet contains a handwritten note "12-5 Pd. *453 50.00." Caenen admitted on cross-examination that the records he maintained reflected that there was a payment of $50.00, and that he acknowledged to Dr. McGill or his office staff that he had a record of payment.
No money was forthcoming from the respondent. Thereafter Dr. McGill's office repeatedly contacted the respondent's office by phone making inquiry as to the funds collected. On a number of occasions Caenen could not be reached. Messages were left but Caenen did not return the calls. Dr. McGill's office manager spoke to Caenen personally on March 9, 1982, and March 23, 1982. On both occasions he assured her that the amount due would be mailed immediately. The funds were not remitted.
On April 23, 1982, Dr. McGill spoke personally with Caenen by phone. During this conversation, Caenen told McGill his records regarding Mr. Eason's account indicated that he had received one payment of $50.00. Caenen acknowledged that the payment was overdue and said he would remit the amount immediately.
The payment was not remitted as respondent promised. Consequently, Dr. McGill complained to the office of the Disciplinary Administrator by letter dated May 7, 1982.
On May 11, 1982, the Disciplinary Administrator, Arno Windscheffel, sent a letter to Caenen enclosing a copy of the letter of complaint and requesting respondent's explanation. The letter was addressed to 10938 W. 64th Terrace, Shawnee Mission, Kansas. Receiving no reply to his first letter, Mr. Windscheffel sent a second letter dated July 20, 1982, again requesting Caenen's explanation regarding the complaint. This letter was mailed to the same address as the first letter.
Caenen testified that at the time this complaint was initiated, his office was located at 10938 W. 74th Terrace, Shawnee Mission, Kansas. Sometime in May of 1982, he moved his office location to 10281 Santa Fe Drive, Overland Park, Kansas. Caenen stated that he notified the Clerk of the Appellate Courts and the postal service of his change of address.
It appears the letters sent by the Disciplinary Administrator were improperly addressed. Notwithstanding, Caenen testified that he received the first letter dated May 11, 1982, sometime in July of 1982. Thereafter Caenen notified the Disciplinary Administrator's office of his new address. The second letter dated *454 July 20, 1982, was returned to the office of the Disciplinary Administrator by the postal authorities.
On August 2, 1982, Mr. Windscheffel sent respondent a third letter, enclosed a copy of Dr. McGill's complaint, and requested respondent's reply. This letter was properly addressed to his new address. Caenen did not reply to the letter. On August 31, 1982, Mr. Windscheffel sent Caenen a fourth letter, referencing his third letter of August 2, 1982, and again requesting some acknowledgement. Respondent did not reply.
Caenen communicated with Dr. McGill after the complaint was filed. On August 5, 1982, Dr. McGill received a phone call from a person representing herself to be Caenen's office manager. McGill explained the situation and the person calling promised payment would be forthcoming in the mail. Payment was not received. On August 25, 1982, Dr. McGill spoke personally with Caenen by phone. During the conversation, respondent implied that his records were not in order and that he would get back to McGill the next day. Caenen did not call Dr. McGill as promised. On September 1, 1982, Dr. McGill again spoke to Caenen. Caenen again attempted to put Dr. McGill off saying his records were not in order. An argument ensued when Caenen implied that the $50.00 payment must have been paid directly to Dr. McGill's office, therefore Dr. McGill owed Caenen $20.00. McGill had no further contact with Caenen.
Mr. Windscheffel testified that Caenen never answered or in any manner responded to the allegations in Dr. McGill's letter of complaint. Consequently, on January 26, 1983, the complaint was referred for consideration to a review committee pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 210(c) (232 Kan. clxvi). Caenen failed to reply to the committee. The committee referred the complaint for formal prosecution. The formal complaint against the respondent was filed on February 14, 1983.
On February 23, 1983, Dr. McGill was contacted by Stephen McAllister, an employee of Caenen. McAllister asked McGill if there was anything that could be done to get the complaint dropped. McGill replied all that he ever wanted from the beginning was payment of the amount owed, which Caenen had acknowledged receiving. The following afternoon a money order was left at McGill's office in the amount of $30.00, fourteen months after the money had been received by Caenen.
*455 Due to the fact that the respondent has practiced law for a number of years and the number and nature of the violations, the panel recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.
In State v. Pringle, 233 Kan. 726, 732, 667 P.2d 283 (1983), the court reviewed what weight should be accorded the findings of a hearing panel in a disciplinary proceeding:
The respondent challenges the panel's determination that he violated Disciplinary Rule 9-102 (B) (1), (3) and (4) (232 Kan. cxcii), which provides:
"(B) A lawyer shall:
....
Caenen argues the person responsible for his collections, Mr. Evans, did not keep accurate records, and that the respondent had trouble substantiating that a $50.00 payment was made by Eason to the respondent's office. In State v. Barrett, 207 Kan. 178, 184, 483 P.2d 1106 (1971), the court stated:
See 7A C.J.S., Attorney & Client § 148, p. 203.
Evans' records showed a $50.00 payment had been made by Eason. Caenen admitted his office records indicated the payment was received. Respondent must take responsibility for Evans' records. The hearing panel's conclusion that DR 9-102 (B) (1), (3) and (4) were violated is supported by the evidence.
The respondent contends he did not violate DR 2-103 (A) and (C) (232 Kan. clxxix), which provide:
....
In State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 245-46, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982), a case which involved a direct mailing by an attorney to individuals who were selling their homes, the court stated:
The opinion in State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, was filed April 3, 1982, after the activities involved in this case occurred. The direct solicitation by Caenen or his agents of Dr. McGill is proscribed by Moses and DR 2-103. See Annot., Modern Status of Law Regarding Solicitation of Business by or for Attorney, 5 A.L.R. 4th 866.
The argument that the law on the question of restricting *458 advertising by attorneys was in a state of flux was put forward by the respondent in State v. Moses. That argument did not sway the court from publicly censuring Moses for his actions. DR 2-103 provided adequate notice to respondent that his actions were improper.
The direct solicitation of a stranger by an attorney or his agent for employment for a particular legal matter violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103, and is subject to discipline as provided by the rules of this court.
The respondent argues he was deprived of due process because he was not properly notified solicitation was to be a charge against him.
Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (232 Kan. clxvi), requires the formal complaint in a disciplinary proceeding to be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the respondent of the alleged misconduct.
The seminal decision regarding the applicability of the due process clause to lawyer disciplinary proceedings is found in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, 88 S. Ct. 1222, reh. denied 391 U.S. 961 (1968). There the United States Supreme Court held that a lawyer charged with misconduct in lawyer disciplinary proceedings is entitled to procedural due process, and that due process includes fair notice of the charges sufficient to inform and provide a meaningful opportunity for explanation and defense.
Decisions subsequent to Ruffalo have refined the concept of due process as it applies to lawyer disciplinary hearings, and suggest that the notice to be provided be more in the nature of that provided in civil cases. The weight of authority appears to be that, unlike due process provided in criminal actions, there are no stringent or technical requirements in setting forth allegations or descriptions of alleged offenses. Bar Ass'n v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974). Due process requires only that the charges must be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the misconduct charged, but the State is not required to plead specific rules, since it is the factual allegations against which the attorney must defend. Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. McBurney, 282 Md. 116, 123-24, 383 A.2d 58 (1978). However, if specific rules are pled, the State is thereafter limited to such specific offenses. McBurney, 282 Md. at 124.
*459 Subsequent to the Ruffalo decision, the due process requirements in lawyer disciplinary proceedings have been given exhaustive treatment by this court. In State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (1975), 87 A.L.R.3d 337, the court summarized prior Kansas and federal precedent on the question, including Ruffalo, and held in accordance with established precedent that the State need not set forth in its complaint the specific disciplinary rules allegedly violated (State v. Nelson, 206 Kan. 154, 476 P.2d 240 [1970]), nor is it required to plead specific allegations of misconduct (State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 524 P.2d 747 [1974]). What is required was simply stated therein:
....
The court has affirmed this holding in numerous subsequent cases: State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122, cert. denied 449 U.S. 983 (1980); State v. Regier, 228 Kan. 746, 621 P.2d 431 (1980); State v. Callahan, 232 Kan. 136, 652 P.2d 708 (1982).
The due process requirements as set out in Ruffalo and the Kansas cases cited, and the requirements of Kansas Supreme Court Rule 211 (b), have been met.
The respondent challenges the panel's findings that he violated Supreme Court Rule 207 (a) (232 Kan. clxiv), which provides:
Failure to cooperate with the Disciplinary Administrator pursuant to Rule 207 (a) can be cause for discipline. See State v. Savaiano, 234 Kan. 268, 670 P.2d 1359 (1983), for a more in depth discussion of failure to cooperate by an attorney.
The respondent admitted receiving three of the four letters sent by the Disciplinary Administrator. He never sent his explanation of the matter which was requested by the Disciplinary Administrator. The evidence supports the panel's finding of noncooperation in violation of Rule 207 (a).
*460 The respondent contends the recommended punishment of suspension is too harsh. In State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 571-72, 639 P.2d 1131 (1982), the court reviewed past disciplinary cases:
....
Misconduct by the respondent has been clearly and convincingly established. We have given careful consideration as to the nature and extent of the punishment or discipline that should be imposed upon the respondent for his breach of professional responsibility. Due to the numerous violations of professional conduct in this matter and previous violations of professional *461 conduct, we accept the recommendation of the Disciplinary Panel.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Thomas J. Caenen be and he is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the State of Kansas. The costs herein are assessed to the respondent.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that respondent shall forthwith comply with Supreme Court Rule 218 (232 Kan. clxx).
This suspension becomes effective when this opinion is filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.