Case Title: State v. Simonsen

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43487

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: August 12, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

THE STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent,

	v.

DAVID LYNN SIMONSEN,

Appellant.

(CC 88CR-1816; SC S43487)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Coos County Circuit Court.

	Richard L. Barron, Judge.

	Argued and submitted May 8, 1998.

	Laura Graser, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief
and additional authorities for appellant.

	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General,
and Holly A. Vance, Assistant Attorney General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.*

	CARSON, C.J.

	The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.

	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

		CARSON, C.J.

		This criminal case is before us on automatic review of
defendant's conviction for aggravated murder and a sentence of
death.  Defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to
allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas and also challenges the
death sentence that the court entered in his third 
sentencing-phase proceeding.  We affirm the judgment of conviction and the
sentence of death.

I.  FACTS

		On September 3, 1988, the bodies of two women were
found in a remote area near Coquille.  Both women, who had been
dead for two or three days, were nude from the waist down.  They
had been tied together at the wrists and shot in the head from
close range with a shotgun.  Police found a great deal of
physical evidence at the scene, including tire tracks from a
small automobile.

		Investigators eventually determined that the victims
were from West Germany.  A week after the bodies were discovered,
two witnesses separately came forward to report that defendant
had said that he and a man named Jeff Williams had been involved
in shooting two women with a sawed-off shotgun.  On September 11,
1988, police arrested defendant.  After being advised of his
rights, defendant gave two statements confessing that he and
Williams had abducted, raped, and murdered the women.  As a
result of defendant's confessions, investigators eventually
recovered significant evidence implicating defendant, including
the suspect automobile and the murder weapon.  

		After being charged with two counts of aggravated
murder, defendant pleaded guilty.  The trial court conducted a
penalty-phase proceeding.  The jury answered the penalty-phase
questions put to it in the affirmative, and the trial court
sentenced defendant to death.

		On October 4, 1990, on automatic review, this court
affirmed defendant's convictions, but vacated the sentence of
death, because the jury was not presented with the "fourth
question" under ORS 163.150 (1989).  State v. Simonsen, 310 Or
412, 798 P2d 241 (1990) (Simonsen I); see generally State v.
Wagner, 309 Or 5, 14-20, 786 P2d 93 (1990) (setting out reasons
that "fourth question" must be given).

		On remand, defendant again was sentenced to death.  
However, on automatic review of that sentence, this court held
that the state had obtained evidence against defendant in
violation of his right against self-incrimination under Article
I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.  State v. Simonsen,
319 Or 510, 514, 878 P2d 409 (1994) (Simonsen II).  Accordingly,
this court again vacated the sentence and remanded the case for a
third penalty-phase proceeding.  Id. at 519.  At the close of
that proceeding, the jury again answered the penalty-phase
questions in the affirmative and the trial court sentenced
defendant to death.  This automatic review followed.  

II.  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

		We have considered each of defendant's assignments of
error.  Several of those assignments were not preserved for
appeal or are precluded by the doctrine of the law of the case. 
See Koch v. So. Pac. Transp. Co., 274 Or 499, 512, 547 P2d 589
(1976) (discussing doctrine).  Other assignments of error present
questions that do not warrant discussion in this opinion because
they have been resolved in other decisions by this court.  The
remaining issues are discussed below.  

A.	The Trial Court's Refusal to Allow Defendant to Withdraw his
1988 Guilty Pleas

		In 1995, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas,
which had been entered more than six years earlier.  The trial
court denied the motion.  Defendant argues that the trial court
should have allowed him to withdraw his pleas because "the
circumstances were so different when he pleaded."  According to
defendant, that was so because, when he pleaded guilty, the
"fourth question" had not yet been added to ORS 163.150 (1989)
and also because defendant mistakenly had believed that a
videotaped re-enactment of the crime could be used against him in
court.

		Under ORS 135.365, a trial court "may at any time
before judgment, upon a plea of guilty or no contest, permit [a
plea of guilty] to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
substituted therefor."  (Emphasis added.)  As discussed, at the
time of defendant's motion, the trial court already had entered
judgment.  Although this court later vacated and remanded
defendant's sentence in Simonsen I, this court affirmed the trial
court's judgment with regard to defendant's guilt.  Thus, under
ORS 135.365, defendant was not entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea, because judgment already had been entered with regard to
his guilt at the time of his motion.

B. 	Denial of Defendant's Motion to Exclude Certain Prospective Jurors

		Defendant next challenges the trial court's denial of
his motion to dismiss the prospective jurors who had heard about
his previous death sentences.  During voir dire, after 10 jurors
had been selected, the trial court began questioning another
potential juror, Denton, who stated that he had heard about
defendant's case on the radio "back when they had just overturned
* * * the death sentence."  Defendant objected to that statement
and moved to "excuse the entire jury panel and the rest of the
room for cause," because they had heard excludable information. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion, reasoning that a
cautionary jury instruction would be a sufficient remedy.  Before
excusing the jury for the day, the trial court gave the following
instruction: 

		"We've had to excuse different people -- some for
cause it's called, where they stated they've had a
specific opinion or feeling, and others on the
preemptory [sic].  What those people say, of course, we
wanted to hear because that's why we're asking for
information.

		"But, I want to make sure everybody knows that
what anybody says has got to be disregarded by the
jury.  You can't consider what any juror has said when
they have been excused, or why they've been excused. 
All of that is irrelevant, and not for consideration. 
It's not for you to take into your mind and remember. 
You're to disregard what any other juror has basically
said."  

		Defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to
dismiss all the potential jurors who were present when Denton
referred to defendant's earlier death sentences, arguing that
their knowledge of those sentences made the jurors unable to try
the case impartially.  Thus, in essence, defendant argues that
the jury's knowledge of his prior death sentences made them
biased.

		A trial court's determination whether a juror in a
criminal trial must be excluded for actual bias is governed by
ORCP 57 D(1)(g).  ORS 136.210(1).  "Actual bias" on the part of a
juror in a criminal trial is defined by ORCP 57 D(1)(g) as "the
existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror that
satisfies the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that
the juror cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice
to the substantial rights of the party challenging the juror."   

		We review trial court determinations regarding the
presence or absence of actual bias under ORCP 57 D(1)(g) for
abuse of discretion.  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 575, 789 P2d
1352 (1990) (Montez I).  In Montez I, this court noted that the
trial court "has the advantage, which we lack, of seeing the
challenged prospective juror and observing the juror's demeanor,
apparent intelligence and candor."  Ibid.  The court also noted
that "[t]he trial court's judgment as to a prospective juror's
ultimate qualifications is entitled to great weight."  Ibid.  

		This court has not addressed the question whether an
inadvertent and passing reference to a defendant's earlier death
sentence during voir dire would require the dismissal of a jury
panel.  However, as the state correctly points out, several of
this court's decisions arising from the denial of a motion for
mistrial suggest the answer.  That is so because the central
issue in a motion for mistrial -- whether the juror's knowledge
will prejudice the defendant -- is substantially similar to the
pivotal question under ORCP 57 D(1)(g), that is, whether the
juror can try the issue "impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging the juror."  

		In State v. Pratt, 316 Or 561, 583, 853 P2d 827 (1993), 
this court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying a motion for mistrial after a witness had referred to
the defendant's presence on death row.  This court noted that the
statement at issue was "isolated and made in passing" and that
the state "did not capitalize on the disclosure in any way." 
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Farrar, 309 Or 132, 164, 786 P2d 161 (1990) (mistrial not
required where improper statement made in passing and where state
did not capitalize on disclosure).

		Likewise, in the present case, Denton's statement was
brief and inadvertent, so much so that the trial court had to
refer to the transcript to confirm its contents.  Also, the
prosecutor did not attempt to capitalize on the disclosure.  The
trial court, having heard the statement in context, concluded
that it did not require dismissing the jury panel.  We find no
abuse of discretion in that ruling.(1)

C.	Service by a Juror Who Had Been Dismissed from Prior	Service Within Two Years

		During voir dire, the trial court questioned a
prospective juror, Johnson, who stated that, in September 1994 --
21 months earlier -- she had been called to serve as a juror in
an unrelated case.  During questioning by defense counsel,
Johnson stated that she had been a member of a jury panel "two
years ago," but had not been selected to serve at trial.  Defense
counsel did not challenge Johnson for cause.

		Defendant now argues that the trial court erred by
allowing Johnson to serve because she was ineligible under

ORS 10.030(4) (1993), which provided:

		"No person is eligible to act as a juror in any
circuit or district court of this state within 24
months after being discharged from jury service in a
federal court in this state or circuit or district
court of this state unless that person's service as a
juror is required because of a need for additional
jurors."

However, defendant's failure to object to Johnson's eligibility
during voir dire precludes us from considering his argument. 
This court has held that the failure to object to the eligibility
of a juror during voir dire waives a defendant's right to appeal
based upon the juror's service.  State v. Benson, 235 Or 291,
293-94, 384 P2d 208 (1963).  In State v. Powers, 10 Or 145, 151,
45 Am Rep 138 (1882), this court explained:

	"Were a defendant allowed to take his challenge to the
jurors after the trial, he never would do it before,
but would always rather depend upon moving it to the
court after the trial -- for if he should be acquitted
he would say nothing about the disqualification of the
juror, and if convicted, he could avoid judgment by
offering his objection.  This in fact would be placing
him in a situation totally exempt from danger and from
punishment, so long as he could get a juror sworn
against whom he could offer any legal objection, and
would give him the additional advantage of several
chances for his acquittal."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

		Defendant concedes that the foregoing preservation rule
prevents him from challenging Johnson's presence in his own
behalf.  However, he asserts that his case is distinguishable
because he raises the issue in behalf of Johnson, who suffered
the "subtle" damage of infringement on her "right to be required
to serve only once every two years."(2)

		However, even were we to decide that defendant could
raise this issue in behalf of a juror -- a determination we do
not make here -- the risk of improper manipulation of the trial
court remains the same.  Thus, to preserve the issue for review,
a defendant must object to the eligibility of a juror during voir
dire, regardless of whether the juror's presence is challenged in
the defendant's or the juror's behalf.  Purporting to raise the
issue in behalf of a juror will not allow defendant to circumvent
the requirements of preservation.  Defendant's argument is not
preserved.  Accordingly, we do not consider this assignment of
error.	

D.	The Trial Court's Refusal to Allow Evidence or Instruct the Jury that Life Sentences "Would" be			Consecutive	

		Before the third sentencing proceeding, defendant
submitted an "omnibus motion" that included the following:

		"Defendant moves that the court allow evidence, or
otherwise instruct the jury, on the full nature of the
potential sentences which defendant could receive as an
alternative to death; including the fact that the court
would be required to impose life sentences with 30-year
minimums on each count, with possible parole
consideration under very limited circumstances after 20
or 40 years; and that the sentences could, and would,
be consecutive."

(Emphasis in original.)  Significantly, the trial court neither
allowed nor denied defendant's motion; rather, it took the motion
under advisement after the state requested additional time to
conduct research on the issue.

		Defendant now assigns error to the trial court's
refusal to allow him to present evidence that, if he were given
life sentences, they would be served consecutively, as well as to
the trial court's refusal to provide jury instructions to the
same effect.  Although defendant bases many of his arguments
before this court upon the state and federal constitutions, he
made no constitutional arguments to the trial court.  Thus, those
arguments were not preserved for appeal.  To the extent that
defendant's non-constitutional arguments are preserved, we
consider them in turn.

		As to defendant's first argument, that the trial court
denied him the opportunity to introduce evidence that consecutive
sentences would be imposed, defendant has failed to direct us to
any part of the record that demonstrates an attempt to introduce
such evidence.  The trial court did not err in denying defendant
the opportunity to introduce evidence regarding consecutive
sentences, because defendant did not attempt to introduce any
such evidence. 

		As to defendant's argument that the trial court erred
by refusing his requested jury instruction, we note that the
requested instruction was legally inaccurate.  Because 

ORS 137.123(5) gives the trial court discretion to impose
consecutive sentences, it would have been inaccurate for the
trial court to instruct the jury that defendant would receive
consecutive sentences.(3)  See State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 627-28, 912 P2d 364 (1996) (holding that trial court did not err in
preventing arguments regarding consecutive sentences because such
decision was reserved to trial court's discretion).  A trial
court commits no error by refusing to provide a jury instruction
that is not a correct statement of the law.  Simonsen I, 310 Or
at 417.  The trial court did not err by refusing defendant's
requested instruction.  

E.	Admission of Statement that Defendant Could be Managed on the "Outside"

		Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made
statements during closing argument that suggested to the jury
that, if defendant received a life sentence, he could be sent to
a lower-security facility than the Oregon State Penitentiary. 
Although defendant makes various arguments under this assignment
of error -- some of which either were not preserved for review or
have been addressed separately under other assignments of 
error -- his point appears to be that the prosecutor's closing argument
"affirmatively" misled the jury, thereby denying defendant a fair
trial.  

		The statements to which defendant assigns error
occurred during closing arguments.  Significantly, those
statements contained information that the state already had
introduced as evidence.  Thus, the jury already had heard the
evidence at issue here, the admission of which defendant does not
challenge on review.  Even if we were to agree that the
prosecutor's statements during closing argument were improper,
defendant has failed to demonstrate how those statements, which
referred to evidence already before the jury, resulted in
prejudice.  See State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 408, 963 P2d 667
(1998) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no
prejudice based upon introduction of evidence that already had
been presented to jury without objection).  We see no prejudice
in the state's closing argument.  

F.	Prosecutor's Statement that an Inmate had Testified Despite the Risk of Acquiring a "Snitch Jacket"

		During the penalty phase, the state called three
witnesses to testify about defendant's attempt to escape from the
Coos County Jail while being held pending trial in this case. 
One of those witnesses, McCall, initially had agreed to help
defendant escape, but had changed his mind at the last minute and
reported the escape attempt to prison officials.  Defendant
sought to impeach the testimony of each of the witnesses by
suggesting that they had testified in order to avoid prosecution
by the state on other charges.  During closing arguments, the
prosecutor made the following argument that the three witnesses'
testimony should be believed:

		"They make something with Mr. McCall.  You know,
we talked about him a little bit.  You've heard us
mention snitch jacket.  I think the guy that talked
about that, was an informant's jacket -- Mr. [Pinnell],
the aggravated murderer that came and testified and
said that's not a good thing.  That's not good to have
one of those.

		"McCall comes in here.  Basically he helps foil
the escape.  And yet he was an accomplice in that, but
he basically helps stop the thing.  I'm grateful, as a
District Attorney, that somebody bothered to tell us. 
Because if the jailers hadn't been alert, Mr. Simonsen
would be gone.  So, I'm grateful for that.  I'm
grateful to Mr. McCall.  His motives may not have been
the best.  He might have been scared.  But he also
comes in here and testifies under oath.

		"That was a long time ago that that happened. 
He's got a snitch jacket.  If he goes to prison, or if
Vanessa Mason goes to prison, or if Robert Brown goes
to prison, they are marked people.  And they came in
here and testified under oath.  Nobody else in the
courtroom had to do that -- to expose themselves to any
real danger.

		"You've got to give those people a little bit of
credit. * * *"

		Defendant objected to that statement and, outside the
presence of the jury, the following colloquy took place:

		"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]	* * * I thought that counsel
alluded to Mr. Simonsen's failure to testify by saying,
'No one else has been forced to come in here and
testify,' et cetera.  I move for a mistrial. 

		"* * * * * 

		"Okay.  He was talking about Ms. Mason and Mr.
McCall.  They've come in and they had to testify,
they've been subpoenaed and they had to testify under
oath.  Then he made a comment, 'No one else in the
Courtroom has been forced to come in and do that.'

		"I heard it, and it's an inadvertent, perhaps,
reference to Mr. Simonsen not taking the stand.  I move
for a mistrial on that basis.

		"[THE COURT]: 	Well, I'll deny that.  I think
that's a stretch because I think the comments were, no
one else has a snitch jacket or has something to lose,
like these people; and that was the context it was in,
not the Defendant failing to testify.

		"So, I don't think that anybody could even draw
that inference from that comment.  So I'll deny the
Motion for Mistrial."

		Defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of
his motion for mistrial.  We review the trial court's denial of a
motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Wright,
323 Or 8, 12, 913 P2d 321 (1996).  Defendant cites several cases
from this court supporting the proposition that an intentional
reference to a defendant's decision not to testify is prohibited
by both the state and federal constitutions.  That proposition is
not in dispute.  Rather, the central question here is whether the
prosecutor's statement, in fact, constituted such a reference. 
The trial court concluded that it did not.  We agree.  The
prosecutor's statement, taken in context, was designed to
rehabilitate the credibility of three witnesses who had been
impeached by the defense; it was not a comment on defendant's
silence.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for mistrial. 

		G.	Admission of Prosecutor's Allegedly Inflammatory Statements
During Closing Arguments

		Defendant also assigns error to other statements that
the prosecutor made during his closing argument.  Specifically,
defendant objects to the following statements: (1) a life
sentence would "laugh [defendant's] crime off"; (2) "[a]ll [the
prosecutor wants] in this case is justice, a punishment that fits
the crime according to the law"; (3) defendant should not "walk
away" from the crime and go to the Oregon State Penitentiary,
which "[s]ounds kind of like a racquetball club, to [the
prosecutor]"; and (4) the jurors' "duty" was to sentence
defendant to death.

		Defendant admits that he failed to object to any of
those statements before the trial court.  He argues, however,
that the prosecutor's arguments were so prejudicial that the
trial court had a duty to declare a mistrial sua sponte.  In
other words, defendant argues that the trial court legally was
obliged to declare a mistrial on its own motion.  It was not. 
Indeed, as we explain below, we hold that the trial court would
not have erred in denying such a motion, even had such a motion
been timely made.  

		We review a trial court's failure to grant an ordinary
motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.  In such cases,
"[e]ven if we find the prosecutor's remarks to be improper,
tasteless, or inappropriate, we will not find an abuse of
discretion * * * unless the effect of the prosecutor's remarks is
to deny a defendant a fair trial."  State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24,
791 P2d 836 (1990).  

		The prosecutor's remarks here did not violate that
standard.  Defendant relies on two cases as support for his
assertion that they do:  Viereck v. United States, 318 US 236, 63
S Ct 561, 87 L Ed 734 (1943), and State v. Blodgett, 50 Or 329,
92 P 820 (1907).  In Viereck, a case that occurred during World
War II, the defendants were prosecuted for failing to register as
agents of foreign principals, as was required by statute at the
time.  In his closing arguments, the prosecutor in that case made
the following statements: 

		"This is war.  It is a fight to the death.  The
American people are relying upon you ladies and
gentlemen for their protection against this sort of a
crime, just as much as they are relying upon the
protection of the men who man the guns in Bataan
Peninsula, and everywhere else.  They are relying upon
you ladies and gentlemen for their protection.  We are
at war.  You have a duty to perform here.

		"As a representative of your Government I am calling
upon every one of you to do your duty." 

Viereck, 318 US at 247-48 n 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The defendant did not object.  Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court, after reversing on other grounds, stated in dictum
that the prosecutor's statements "prejudiced petitioner's right
to a fair trial, and * * * might well have placed the judgment of
conviction in jeopardy."  Id. at 247.  

		Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's statements in
this case were of the same inflammatory character as those in
Viereck.  We disagree.  Viereck involved a blatant appeal to the
jurors' sense of patriotism during a time of war.  The
prosecutor, in effect, equated convicting the defendants with
contributing to the war effort.  Here, we are confronted with an
entirely different situation.  The prosecutor's arguments, even
if verging on sensational, were not so prejudicial that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to declare a mistrial sua
sponte.

		Defendant's reliance on State v. Blodgett also is
misplaced.  Unlike in this case, the defendant in Blodgett
objected to the questionable statements.  50 Or at 342.  The
dispute in that case centered around the trial court's failure to
respond to the timely objection.  By contrast, defendant in this
case never raised any objection before the trial court.  For the
foregoing reasons, we reject defendant's argument under this
assignment of error. 

H.	Constitutionality of Oregon's Death Penalty Scheme

		Finally, defendant assigns error to the trial court's
denial of his omnibus motion to dismiss the penalty phase
proceeding, in which he asserted that Oregon's death penalty
scheme is unconstitutional for various reasons.  Many of the
arguments set out in the motion were addressed by this court in
Simonsen I and, thus, are the law of the case.  See Koch, 274 Or
at 512 (discussing the doctrine).  The remaining arguments either
were not preserved or have been rejected by this court in Montez
I, 309 Or 564, Wagner, 309 Or 5, State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47,
880 P2d 431 (1994), Moore, 324 Or 396, State v. Montez, 324 Or
343, 927 P2d 64 (1996) (Montez II), State ex rel Huddleston v.
Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 932 P2d 1145 (1997), State v. Moen, 309 Or
45, 786 P2d 111 (1990), or State v. Guzek, 310 Or 299, 797 P2d
1031 (1990). 

III.  CONCLUSION

		For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of
defendant's assignments of error provides a basis for reversal. 
Consequently, we affirm defendant's judgment of conviction and
sentence of death.

		The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.

1.      Defendant argues also that the trial court's
cautionary jury instruction was an insufficient remedy because it
was "so oblique it was impossible to tell that it applied to
Denton's comment."  However, the record reflects that defendant
not only failed to object to the form of the instruction but, in
fact, specifically asked that any instruction be stated generally
so as to avoid reference to any particular potential juror. 
Specifically, defendant asked that any jury instruction be given
later in the day "so that it's not so obvious that we're
referring to one particular juror."  Further, when the trial
court offered a synopsis of its preferred instruction, defense
counsel responded, "[s]omething along that would be good." 

2.      Defendant cites three United States Supreme Court
cases in support of his assertion that he has standing to act in
Johnson's behalf:  Powers v. Ohio, 499 US 400, 111 S Ct 1364, 113
L Ed 2d 411 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 US
614, 111 S Ct 2077, 114 L Ed 2d 660 (1991); and Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 US 42, 112 S Ct 2348, 120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992).  We
note that, in each of those cases, the challenge to the
prospective juror was raised during voir dire.

3. 	ORS 137.123(5) provides:

		"The court has discretion to impose consecutive
terms of imprisonment for separate convictions arising
out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct
only if the court finds:

		"(a)	That the criminal offense for which a
consecutive sentence is contemplated was not merely an
incidental violation of a separate statutory provision
in the course of the commission of a more serious crime
but rather was an indication of defendant's willingness
to commit more than one criminal offense; or

		"(b)	The criminal offense for which a consecutive
sentence is contemplated caused or created a risk of
causing greater or qualitatively different loss, injury
or harm to the victim or caused or created a risk of
causing loss, injury, or harm to a different victim
than was caused or threatened by the other offense or
offenses committed during a continuous and
uninterrupted course o[f] conduct."