Case Title: Commonwealth v. Leal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021014

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
OPINION BY 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 021014 
 
January 10, 2003 
 
JORGE MANUEL LEAL 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Defendant Jorge Manuel Leal was indicted in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Newport News for maiming by mob and causing 
bodily injury to one John Binns in violation of Code § 18.2-41.  
The statute provides that any person "composing a mob which 
shall maliciously or unlawfully . . . cut or wound any person, 
or by any means cause him bodily injury with intent to maim, 
disable, disfigure or kill him, shall be guilty of a Class 3 
felony." 
 
During a trial by jury, the circuit court refused an 
instruction tendered by the defendant which would have permitted 
the jury to find him guilty of assault or battery by mob in 
violation of Code § 18.2-42.  That statute provides that any 
person "composing a mob which shall commit a simple assault or 
battery shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged.  
Subsequently, confirming the verdict, the circuit court 
sentenced defendant to five years imprisonment. 
 
Upon review, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  Leal v. 
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 525, 559 S.E.2d 874 (2002).  The Court 
of Appeals ruled that the circuit court erred in refusing the 
foregoing instruction.  We awarded the Commonwealth this appeal. 
 
The sole question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
ruling the circuit court incorrectly refused the instruction on 
assault or battery by mob, a crime the Commonwealth agrees is a 
lesser-included offense of maiming by mob. 
 
The Commonwealth's evidence established that during the 
afternoon of March 31, 1999, Binns and a friend, Teresa Evans, 
were in the process of moving into a motel room in the city of 
Newport News.  In the motel parking lot, Evans was surrounded by 
four men, one of whom was the defendant.  One of the men yelled 
"party time" as the group "circled" her, started "shoving" her 
"back and forth," and turned her "around in circles." 
 
Binns, who was inside the motel room, heard Evans scream.  
He "ran outside" and saw Evans being "harassed" by the group, 
"pushing" her "back and forth all around" for no apparent 
reason.  He then "ran . . . into the middle of" the melee, 
"trying to get her out of it." 
 
In the ensuing fight, Binns was struck in the head by a 
piece of wood, a "two-by-four," and was held by his hair by one 
of the assailants while defendant kicked him in the face.  A 
 
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witness observed members of the gang kicking Binns "in the ribs, 
the head, the side of the arms, the feet, the legs, stomping on 
him as he was already on the ground and unconscious." 
 
As a result, Binns sustained "a broken nose and shattered 
cheekbone and swelling and bruising" to the upper body.  He bled 
from his mouth and an ear for a "couple of days," and from his 
nose for ten days. 
 
Because the issue on appeal deals with the circuit court's 
refusal of the lesser-included offense instruction on assault or 
battery by mob, and even though the Commonwealth prevailed at 
trial, we must view the evidence on this issue in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, the proponent of the instruction.  
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33, 557 S.E.2d 220, 221 
(2002); Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729, 553 S.E.2d 733, 
736 (2001). 
 
The Court of Appeals aptly summarized defendant's 
testimony, noting that defendant stated "that Binns, whom 
neither [defendant] nor his acquaintances knew beforehand, was 
injured after Binns aggressively approached [defendant], shoved 
him and again charged him, grabbing him by the waist."  Leal,  
37 Va. App. at 533, 559 S.E.2d at 878.  The Court of Appeals 
further noted that defendant testified "he grabbed Binns' hair 
in self-defense and the pair, intertwined, went around in 
circles.  As [defendant] tried to repel Binns, one of 
 
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[defendant's] acquaintances witnessed the struggle and proceeded 
to hit Binns, knocking Binns to the ground.  When the 
acquaintance and another proceeded to strike Binns while he was 
on the ground, [defendant] said he intervened and stopped 
further aggression."  Id.
 
The law applicable here is settled.  Jury instructions are 
proper only when supported by the evidence, and "more than a 
scintilla of evidence is necessary to support a lesser-included 
offense instruction requested by the defendant."  Commonwealth 
v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445, 507 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1998). 
 
When the evidence in a prosecution warrants a conviction of 
the crime charged, and there is no independent evidence 
warranting a conviction for a lesser-included offense, an 
instruction on the lesser offense should not be given.  Guss v. 
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 13, 14, 225 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1976).  In 
other words, "we have rejected the concept that a jury 
instruction on the lesser-included offense must always be 
given."  Vaughn, 263 Va. at 35, 557 S.E.2d at 222. 
 
The Court of Appeals stated it agreed with defendant "that 
there was more than a scintilla of evidence on the issue of lack 
of malicious intent."  37 Va. App. at 533, 559 S.E.2d at 878.  
The court reasoned that, from defendant's testimony, "the jury 
could have found, if they believed his version of the events, 
that [defendant] and his acquaintances acted only with the 
 
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intent to do Binns bodily harm in order to deter his attack on 
[defendant], and not with the specific, malicious intent 'to 
maim, disable, disfigure or kill' him."  Id. at 534, 559 S.E.2d 
at 879. 
 
Continuing, the Court of Appeals said defendant testified 
"that the acts taken against Binns were not planned by him or 
his acquaintances, but were done only after provocation, out of 
a spontaneous intent to protect [defendant].  [Defendant's] 
testimony leaves the group's intent open to question, the answer 
to which was the province of the jury.  With more than a 
scintilla of evidence to support a finding only of intent to do 
bodily harm, [defendant] was entitled to the instruction on the 
lesser offense."  Id.  We do not agree. 
 
In order to sustain a conviction of maiming by mob under 
Code § 18.2-41, the evidence must establish that the accused was 
a member of a group composing a mob; that the mob caused the 
victim bodily injury; and that the mob acted with the malicious 
intent "to maim, disable, disfigure or kill" the victim.  In 
order to sustain a conviction of assault or battery by mob under 
Code § 18.2-42, the evidence must establish that the accused was 
a member of a mob and that the mob committed simple assault or 
battery.  See Leal, 37 Va. at 531, 559 S.E.2d at 878.  "The 
requisite intent under Code § 18.2-41 to maliciously maim, 
 
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disable, disfigure or kill is the only difference between the 
two offenses."  Id. at 532, 559 S.E.2d at 878. 
 
Here, there is no dispute that the victim sustained bodily 
injuries and that defendant was a member of a mob. Indeed, the 
instruction tendered by defendant was on assault or battery by 
mob, not merely simple assault or battery.  Therefore, because 
the evidence warranted a conviction of the crime charged, the 
pertinent inquiry becomes whether there is more than a scintilla 
of independent evidence to show that defendant was entitled to 
an instruction on the lesser offense.  There was not. 
 
We hold, contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling and the 
defendant's argument, that neither defendant's testimony nor the 
circumstances provide the necessary quantum of independent 
evidence to show he did not intend to maim, disable, disfigure, 
or kill Binns. 
 
Defendant claimed he merely was acting as a peacemaker and 
in self defense.  Yet the gravity of the victim's injuries 
inflicted by the mob, which are uncontroverted, belies any 
finding that the mob, of which defendant was a member, did not 
maliciously intend to maim the victim. Every person composing a 
mob "becomes criminally culpable even though the member may not 
have actively encouraged, aided, or countenanced the act."  
Harrell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 1, 8, 396 S.E.2d 680, 683 
(1990).  The undisputed evidence of the victim's massive 
 
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injuries is inconsistent with defendant's version of the facts 
and his claim that he only intended to act as an arbiter during 
the affray. See Vaughn, 263 Va. at 36, 557 S.E.2d at 223, a case 
which is indistinguishable from the present case. 
 
Finally, as noted, the Court of Appeals said the jury could 
have found that the mob "acted only with the intent to do Binns 
bodily harm in order to deter his attack on [defendant], and not 
with the specific, malicious intent 'to maim, disable, disfigure 
or kill' him."  However, "[t]his conclusion is not based on 
affirmative evidence, but on the jury's ability to reject 
evidence that is uncontroverted."  Vaughn, 263 Va. at 37, 557 
S.E.2d at 223. 
 
We repeatedly have ruled that "although the jury's ability 
to reject evidence will support an acquittal, the ability to 
reject evidence does not supply the affirmative evidence 
necessary to support a jury instruction."  Id. citing Donkor, 
256 Va. at 445, 507 S.E.2d at 76; LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 
Va. 564, 590, 304 S.E.2d 644, 658 (1983); and Guss, 217 Va. at 
15, 225 S.E.2d at 197. 
 
Under the facts of this case, as the circuit court 
correctly ruled, the defendant was either guilty of maiming by 
mob or no offense at all.  It follows that the Court of Appeals 
erred in determining that an instruction on the lesser crime was 
appropriate. 
 
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Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
reversed and final judgment will be entered here reinstating the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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