Case Title: P. v. Reynoza

Citation: 

Docket Number: S273797

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RAYMOND GREGORY REYNOZA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S273797 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H047594 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
C1775222 
 
 
April 22, 2024 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
S273797 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
We granted review in this case to interpret a witness 
dissuasion statute.  Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) 
makes it a crime to attempt to dissuade a victim or witness from 
“[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted, and 
assisting in the prosecution thereof.”1  (Italics added.)  A jury 
found defendant Raymond Gregory Reynoza guilty of violating 
this statute based on actions that occurred entirely after the 
complaint in the underlying criminal case had been filed.   
The question before us is whether section 136.1(b)(2) 
supports this disjunctive interpretation — in which the statute 
independently applies where a defendant dissuades a witness 
from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case after the charging 
document has already been filed — or whether a conjunctive 
interpretation precludes a conviction under such circumstances.  
On the one hand, the word “and,” which joins the subject clauses 
of section 136.1(b)(2), is ordinarily used as a conjunction (In re 
C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 101).  On the other hand, the word 
“and” also “is sometimes, in a fair and rational construction of a 
statute, to be read as if it were or, and taken disjunctively” 
(People v. Pool (1865) 27 Cal. 572, 581 (Pool)), which would lead 
us to apply section 136.1(b)(2) to situations where a defendant 
 
1  
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code.  We refer to section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) as 
section 136.1(b)(2). 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
dissuades a witness from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case 
only after a charging document has already been filed.   
After considering the text, statutory context, legislative 
history, and the experiences of other jurisdictions when faced 
with similar statutory language, we conclude that section 
136.1(b)(2) is equally susceptible to both the conjunctive and 
disjunctive constructions.  Accordingly, the rule of lenity 
counsels in favor of adopting the “interpretation more favorable 
to the defendant.”  (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57 
(Avery).)  Here, that is the conjunctive construction, which does 
not permit a conviction to be based solely on proof of dissuasion 
from “assisting in the prosecution” of an already-filed charging 
document.   
Because there is no dispute that defendant’s conduct 
amounted to, at most, dissuasion after a complaint was filed, we 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing his 
conviction. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant and two others (Guillermo Cervantes and 
Cesar Chavez) were charged with murder (§ 187) and 
dissuading a witness (§ 136.1(b)(2))2 with allegations that the 
dissuasion was “accompanied by force” (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) and 
done “in furtherance of a conspiracy” (id., subd. (c)(2)).  The 
prosecution’s theory was that defendant was trying to dissuade 
 
2  
The parties stipulated, and the jury was instructed that 
“[t]he phrases ‘Witness Intimidation,’ ‘Intimidating a Witness,’ 
and ‘Witness Dissuasion’ have the same meaning.”  We use 
variations of these terms interchangeably.  And for convenience 
we occasionally use the term “witness” rather than “witness or 
victim,” although the statute includes both terms.   
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
a witness, Rafael Cornejo, in a criminal case against defendant’s 
brother, Francisco Rosales.  We briefly summarize the 
underlying criminal case involving defendant’s brother, and the 
instant case of witness dissuasion.   
In February 2017, Gilroy police arrested Rosales, Cornejo, 
and Benjamin Valladares after finding an unregistered firearm 
in their vehicle.  In April, Rosales, Cornejo, and Valladares were 
charged with misdemeanor possession of a firearm.  Valladares 
was also charged with one felony count of assault with a firearm 
and one misdemeanor count of causing a firearm to be carried in 
a vehicle.  Between April and June, these three defendants 
made several appearances at the Morgan Hill courthouse — 
including on June 15, when one of the defendants in this witness 
dissuasion case (Cesar Chavez) and his brother (Gilbert Chavez) 
attended despite not having any business before the court.   
The charged witness dissuasion in this case occurred one 
week later outside a bar in San Jose.  Cornejo and Valladares 
were drinking in the bar when the manager warned Valladares 
that a group of men were outside.  The manager gave this 
warning because there had been an incident at the bar a few 
weeks earlier involving Valladares and one of the men outside.  
When Valladares went outside to see if everything was all right, 
someone asked him, “Where’s your bitch-ass uncle at?”  
(Valladares considered Cornejo to be his uncle.)  Valladares 
went back inside and told Cornejo not to go outside but Cornejo 
disregarded the warning. 
The group outside — which included defendant, Chavez 
(who had gone to the Morgan Hill courthouse the week before), 
and Cervantes — approached Cornejo in the parking lot.  A 
bouncer at the bar who had approached the men heard someone 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
say “[d]rop the charges” and “it will be all good” or “[y]ou have 
nothing to worry about.”  Valladares then heard a member of 
defendant’s group say, “[W]e don’t fuck with snitches.”  
Cervantes then punched Cornejo once in the head.  Cornejo fell 
to the ground, struck his head on the pavement, and died hours 
later from blunt force trauma to the head and acute alcohol 
intoxication.   
The jury found defendant not guilty of murder and guilty 
of witness dissuasion, found the dissuasion in furtherance of a 
conspiracy 
allegation 
true, 
and 
found 
the 
dissuasion 
accompanied by force allegation not true.  The trial court 
sentenced defendant to two years in prison, which the court 
deemed satisfied by defendant’s presentence custody credits, 
and placed him on parole for three years.   
Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his conviction and the jury’s true finding on 
the conspiracy allegation.  He argued that section 136.1(b)(2) 
“includes two elements, first, that the witness is being dissuaded 
from ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted’ and 
second, ‘assisting in the prosecution thereof.’ ”  (Boldface 
omitted.)  He maintained the evidence was insufficient to 
support either ostensible element.  As to the first ostensible 
element, defendant argued “[t]here was no substantial evidence 
supporting the theory that Cornejo was going to ‘cause’ any 
criminal actions to be sought in [the Morgan Hill] case” because 
“charges were already brought in that case, and several court 
appearances had already taken place” by the time of the incident 
leading to Cornejo’s death.  Thus, according to defendant, there 
was an “impossibility of meeting the first element.”  (Boldface 
omitted.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
The Court of Appeal agreed that section 136.1(b)(2) 
requires proof that the defendant attempted to prevent or 
dissuade another person from causing an accusatory pleading to 
be filed.  (People v. Reynoza (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 181, 189 
(Reynoza).)3  The court explained that “section 136.1(b)(2) 
requires proof that, among other things, the defendant 
attempted to prevent or dissuade another person from causing 
a complaint, indictment, information, probation or parole 
violation to be filed.  If the defendant was aware the relevant 
charging document had already been filed, and the defendant 
did not attempt to prevent or dissuade the filing of any amended 
or subsequent charging document, the defendant has not 
violated section 136.1(b)(2).”  (Reynoza, at p. 189.)  The court 
further explained that “[o]ther statutory provisions prohibit 
attempts to dissuade victims or witnesses where charges have 
already been filed.”  (Ibid., citing §§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1) & (2) 
[dissuasion of a witness from testifying or attending trial], 137, 
subd. (c) [attempting to influence testimony or information 
given to law enforcement].) 
In so holding, the Reynoza court expressly disagreed with 
People v. Velazquez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 219 (Velazquez), 
which stated that section 136.1(b)(2) “clearly encompasses more 
than prearrest efforts to dissuade, inasmuch as it includes 
attempts to dissuade a victim from causing a complaint . . . to be 
 
3  
Because the Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence 
on the first ostensible element of section 136.1(b)(2), the court 
did not reach defendant’s argument that the evidence was also 
insufficient to establish the second ostensible element or the 
conspiracy finding.  (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 185, 
fn. 2.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
prosecuted or assisting in that prosecution.”  (Velazquez, at 
p. 233, italics added.) 
We 
granted 
review 
to 
determine 
whether 
section 136.1(b)(2) requires proof of an attempt to dissuade a 
witness from causing a charging document to be sought and 
prosecuted — as the court below held — or whether the statute 
also independently applies where a defendant dissuades a 
witness only from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case after 
the charging document has already been filed.   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
The Attorney General contends the Court of Appeal erred 
in reversing defendant’s conviction on the basis of insufficient 
evidence.  Although we ordinarily review such challenges under 
the deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. 
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357), because the Court of 
Appeal’s 
ruling 
is 
based 
on 
the 
interpretation 
of 
section 136.1(b)(2), we review that legal determination de novo 
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961).  “ ‘When we 
interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine 
the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.  We 
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and 
commonsense meaning. . . .  If the language is clear, courts must 
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation 
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not 
intend.  If the statutory language permits more than one 
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such 
as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”  
[Citation.]  “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in 
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of 
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative 
purpose.” ’ ”  (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
608, 616–617 (City of San Jose).) 
A.  
The Text and Statutory Context of Section 
136.1(b)(2) Support Both a Conjunctive and a 
Disjunctive Construction 
Section 136.1, subdivision (b) states in relevant part:  
“[E]very person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another 
person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a 
crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not 
more than one year or in the state prison:  [¶] . . . [¶]  (2)  
Causing a complaint, indictment, information, probation or 
parole violation to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in 
the prosecution thereof.”4  The crux of the issue before us is 
whether the connecting “and” should be read conjunctively, as 
defendant contends, or whether it should be read disjunctively, 
as the Attorney General contends.  Under the latter disjunctive 
interpretation, it is not necessary to establish that any 
dissuasion occurred before the filing of a charging document.  
Dissuasion could be shown through evidence that the defendant 
attempted to dissuade a victim or witness from either causing a 
charging document to be sought and prosecuted, or solely based 
on assisting in the prosecution of an already-filed charging 
document.   
 
4  
For brevity and convenience, we refer to (1) the clause that 
begins with “[c]ausing a complaint” as the “causing clause,” 
(2) the clause that begins with “assisting in the prosecution” as 
the “assisting clause,” and (3) the word “and” that appears 
between the causing and assisting clauses as “the connecting 
‘and.’ ” 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
For reasons discussed below, section 136.1(b)(2) is 
reasonably susceptible to both proffered interpretations and, 
thus, is ambiguous.  (See People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 
1106 [a statute is ambiguous if its “ ‘language supports more 
than one reasonable construction’ ”].)   
On its face, section 136.1(b)(2) is reasonably susceptible to 
the conjunctive reading, which rests largely on the presence of 
the connecting “and.”  “The ordinary and usual usage of ‘and’ is 
as a conjunctive, meaning ‘ “an additional thing,” ’ ‘also’ or 
‘plus.’ ”  (In re C.H., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 101; see Dr. Leevil, 
LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 479 
[“the use of the conjunctive word ‘and’ to connect the three 
conditions can only mean that all three conditions must be 
satisfied”].)  By contrast, “ ‘[U]se of the word “or” in a statute 
indicates an intention to use it disjunctively so as to designate 
alternative or separate categories.’ ”  (People ex rel. Green v. 
Grewal (2015) 61 Cal.4th 544, 561.)  Thus, according to the 
Court of Appeal and defendant, had the Legislature intended for 
the connecting “and” to be read disjunctively, the Legislature 
would instead have used the word “or.”  (See Reynoza, supra, 
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [stating that a disjunctive reading 
“pass[es] over the drafters’ use of the conjunctive [‘and’] rather 
than the disjunctive [‘or’]”].)  As defendant observes, this 
argument is bolstered by the Legislature’s use of the word “or” 
in other parts of section 136.1 that were clearly intended to be 
read disjunctively.  Specifically, section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) 
and (3) exclusively use “or” to convey a disjunctive meaning and 
section 136.1(b)(2) uses “or” earlier in its first clause to convey a 
disjunctive meaning when listing the different charging 
documents.  With this context, the Legislature’s use of “and” 
twice in section 136.1(b)(2) stands out, thus suggesting the 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
Legislature understood the difference between the typically 
conjunctive “and” and the typically disjunctive “or.”  Overall, the 
Legislature’s use of the connecting “and” more firmly supports 
the conjunctive construction of section 136.1(b)(2). 
“But the word and is not always to be taken conjunctively.  
It is sometimes, in a fair and rational construction of a statute, 
to be read as if it were or, and taken disjunctively . . . .”  (Pool, 
supra, 27 Cal. at p. 581; see People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 
731, 755 [“the word ‘and’ is often carelessly used when ‘or’ is 
intended”]; 1A Singer & Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction (7th ed. 2022) § 21:14 [“There has been . . . such 
laxity in the use of these terms [‘and’ and ‘or’] that courts have 
generally said the words are interchangeable and that one may 
be substituted for the other, if consistent with legislative 
intent”].)  Nevertheless, while “[i]t is true that courts will 
sometimes substitute ‘or’ for ‘and,’ and vice versa, when 
necessary to accomplish the evident intent of the statute, . . . 
doing so is an exceptional rule of construction.”  (In re C.H., 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 102–103.)  For example, we might do so 
to correct a “drafting error” where “it appears clear that a word 
has been erroneously used, and a judicial correction will best 
carry out the intent of the adopting body.”  (People v. Skinner 
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775.)  The Attorney General argues that 
another consideration — the canon against surplusage — 
suggests that this is a circumstance when the word “and” should 
be given a disjunctive meaning.  Under this canon of 
construction, “we generally must ‘accord[] significance, if 
possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the 
legislative purpose,’ and have warned that ‘[a] construction 
making some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ ”  (People v. 
Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
We agree with the Attorney General that certain aspects 
of the canon against surplusage support the disjunctive 
construction of section 136.1(b)(2).  The Attorney General 
reasons that dissuasion done to prevent a witness from causing 
a charging document “to be sought” also is an attempt to prevent 
the witness from “assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  
(§ 136.1(b)(2).)  In other words, causing a complaint to be sought 
is one form of assisting in the prosecution of a complaint — such 
that dissuasion from doing the former will also always 
constitute dissuasion from doing the latter — and thus will 
constitute a violation of section 136.1(b)(2).  In this context, the 
Attorney General posits that the conjunctive reading overlooks 
the other ways in which a victim or witness can assist in the 
prosecution of a case after it has been filed, and would 
potentially immunize attempts to dissuade such conduct if the 
defendant had not also attempted to dissuade the victim or 
witness from causing the case to be sought and prosecuted in the 
first place.  This approach would effectively render the assisting 
clause surplusage.5 
The Attorney General also reasons that if we were to 
accept defendant’s characterization of the causing and assisting 
clauses as stating separate elements of a unified offense, we 
could “avoid superfluity” under a conjunctive reading only by 
“requir[ing] two acts of dissuasion at different times:  the 
defendant would first have to unsuccessfully attempt to 
 
5  
This approach does not require us to view the assisting 
clause as some broad “catch-all” that covers all postcharging 
dissuasion.  Indeed, doing so would create surplusage problems 
of its own.  As we explain further below (see pt. II.C., post), while 
we conclude the assisting clause must be narrowly construed, 
we have no occasion here to define its particular contours. 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
dissuade the witness from causing a complaint to be sought and 
prosecuted, and then would have to attempt to dissuade that 
witness from assisting in the prosecution of the filed complaint.  
That is, section 136.1(b)(2) could be violated only when the first 
dissuasion attempt was unsuccessful.”   
The Attorney General argues that the Legislature did not 
intend to establish an offense that effectively requires separate 
acts at separate times — the first of which must have been 
unsuccessful — to constitute a violation.  First, as the Attorney 
General observes, construing section 136.1(b)(2) this way would 
ignore the Legislature’s clarification that attempts at dissuasion 
are prohibited just the same as accomplished dissuasion.  (See 
§ 136.1, subd. (d).)6   
Second, the Attorney General contends that this 
construction ignores the context of the statutory scheme of 
which section 136.1(b)(2) is a part by adopting a construction 
that would require us to conclude that the Legislature intended 
for section 136.1(b)(2) to operate in a significantly different 
manner than analogous subdivisions and statutes.  The 
Attorney General argues that it would be anomalous for us to 
conclude that the Legislature intended for section 136.1(b)(2) to 
require the commission of separate acts at separate stages of a 
potential 
criminal 
prosecution — before 
and 
during 
a 
prosecution — while enacting at the same time analogous 
subdivisions that require the commission of only a single act at 
 
6  
Section 136.1, subdivision (d) provides:  “Every person 
attempting the commission of any act described in subdivisions 
(a), (b), and (c) is guilty of the offense attempted without regard 
to success or failure of the attempt.  The fact that no person was 
injured physically, or in fact intimidated, shall be no defense 
against any prosecution under this section.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
a single stage of a potential criminal prosecution.  For example, 
similar to the precharging stage of a case addressed by the 
causing clause, subdivision (b)(1) of section 136.1 prohibits 
attempting to dissuade a person from “[m]aking any report 
of . . . victimization to a[] . . . prosecuting agency.”7  No 
additional conduct is required at another time.  Similarly, 
somewhat analogously to the ongoing stages of a prosecution 
that appear to be addressed by the assisting clause, 
section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1) prohibits dissuading a person 
from “attending or giving testimony at any trial,”8 and 
section 137, subdivision (c) prohibits “induc[ing] . . . false 
testimony.”9  Neither provision requires further conduct at 
another stage of the criminal proceeding.  It seems questionable 
that the Legislature intended for only section 136.1(b)(2) to 
 
7  
More fully, section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) prohibits 
attempting to dissuade a victim or witness from “[m]aking any 
report of that victimization to any peace officer or state or local 
law enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional 
officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge.” 
8  
Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides in full:  “Except 
as provided in subdivision (c), any person who does any of the 
following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in 
the state prison:  [¶]  (1)  Knowingly and maliciously prevents or 
dissuades any witness or victim from attending or giving 
testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by 
law.”   
9  
Section 137, subdivision (c) provides in full:  “Every person 
who knowingly induces another person to give false testimony 
or withhold true testimony not privileged by law or to give false 
material information pertaining to a crime to, or to withhold 
true material information pertaining to a crime from, a law 
enforcement official is guilty of a misdemeanor.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
require two different acts of misconduct at different stages of a 
criminal proceeding.   
The two exceptions to the conjunctive reading of section 
136.1(b)(2) articulated by the Court of Appeal — that the 
defendant was unaware that a charging document had been 
filed, or attempted to dissuade the filing of an amended charging 
document (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 189) — do not 
fully solve the conjunctive construction’s surplusage problem.  
This is because both exceptions pertain to the causing clause — 
they have little bearing on the assisting clause, which remains 
effectively read out of the statute under the conjunctive reading.   
However, “ ‘the canon against surplusage is [merely] a 
guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably 
controlling.’ ”  (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals 
Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 21.)  Indeed, the Attorney General’s 
proposed interpretation also raises serious questions.  The word 
“prosecute” appears in close proximity in both the causing clause 
and the assisting clause — “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be 
sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  
(§ 136.1(b)(2), italics added.)  We understand the term “[c]ausing 
a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted” (§ 136.1(b)(2)) in 
the causing clause to refer to the filing of initial charging 
documents or the initial pursuit of an action.  But under the 
Attorney General’s view, the term “assisting in the prosecution 
thereof” in the assisting clause would refer to postcharging 
conduct that includes the continuation of legal action on charges 
that have already been filed.  Under this view, the word 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
“prosecute” would curiously have different meanings, even 
though the terms are used just a few words apart.10 
On balance, we conclude the parties each offer equally 
plausible interpretations of the statute — defendant relying on 
the ordinarily conjunctive meaning of “and,” and the Attorney 
General relying on the canon against surplusage.  While the 
parties offer additional textual arguments in support of their 
respective proffered interpretations, none of them disturbs the 
relative equipoise in which the parties’ primary arguments 
stand. 
For his part, defendant argues his proposed conjunctive 
reading is further supported by the presence of the word 
“thereof” at the end of the assisting clause — “assisting in the 
prosecution thereof” (§ 136.1(b)(2), italics added) — which he 
posits “refers back to the complaint . . . which is to be sought” 
under the causing clause.  Even assuming that is the case, 
however, the reference does no more than indicate that the 
assisting clause relates to the prosecution of the same list of 
charging documents and violations identified in the causing 
clause — namely, “a complaint, indictment, information, 
probation or parole violation.”  (§ 136.1(b)(2).)  Using the word 
“thereof” as shorthand simply spared the Legislature from 
repeating the same list at the end of the assisting clause.  
Moreover, even if the Legislature intended the word “thereof” to 
be a term of specific reference that suggests that the assisting 
clause refers not just to any complaint, but specifically to the 
 
10  
Yet we also note the causing clause itself plainly lists two 
acts — “sought and prosecuted” — thus adding to any 
uncertainty about whether the Legislature meant dissuasion 
under section 136.1(b)(2) to require multiple acts. 
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complaint referred to in the first clause — that is, the one sought 
by the victim or witness — this would still suggest only that the 
causing and assisting clauses are tied together in some way; the 
relationship does not necessarily compel a conjunctive reading. 
Meanwhile, 
the 
Attorney 
General 
relies 
on 
the 
interpretive principle that “[t]he wording of the lead-in” to a 
statute “may be crucial to the meaning” of the word “and.”  
(Scalia & Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts (2012) p. 122 (hereinafter Scalia & Garner).)  For example, 
“If the introductory phrase is any one or more of the following, 
then the satisfaction of any one element . . . will suffice.”  (Ibid.)  
That is, the word “and” may be read disjunctively as the word 
“or” where, as the Attorney General emphasizes here, the 
relevant introductory language of the dissuasion statute 
prohibits a defendant from engaging in “any of the following” 
acts, including those specified in the causing clause and the 
assisting clause.  (§ 136.1, subd. (b), italics added.) 
Focusing on this aspect of section 136.1(b)(2)’s text and 
statutory context, the Attorney General observes that 
subdivision (b)(2) is bookended by the word “any,” which he 
maintains supports a disjunctive reading of the connecting 
“and.”  The first significant “any” appears in the introductory 
paragraph of subdivision (b), which makes it a crime to “do[] any 
of the following.”  (§ 136.1, subd. (b), italics added; see Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at p. 122 [“If the introductory phrase is any one 
or more of the following, then the satisfaction of any one 
element . . . will suffice”].)  The Attorney General notes this 
introductory phrase is then followed by “a variety of present 
participles that introduce a gerund phrase:  ‘(1)  Making any 
report of that victimization . . . .  [¶]  (2)  Causing a complaint, 
indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be 
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16 
sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.  
[¶]  (3)  Arresting or causing or seeking the arrest of any person 
in connection with that victimization.’ ”  Thus, the Attorney 
General reasons, the phrase “any of the following” in the 
introductory paragraph of subdivision (b) criminalizes any type 
of conduct described in each of the gerund phrases found in 
subdivision (b)’s subparts — “[m]aking any report” (§ 136.1, 
subd. (b)(1)), “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and 
prosecuted” (§ 136.1(b)(2)), “assisting in the prosecution thereof” 
(ibid.), and “arresting . . . any person” (id., subd. (b)(3)). 
The second “any” cited by the Attorney General appears in 
subdivision (d) of section 136.1, which provides that “[e]very 
person attempting the commission of any act described in 
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) is guilty of the offense attempted 
without regard to success or failure of the attempt.”  (Italics 
added.)11  The acts described in subdivision (b) include each of 
the gerund phrases found in that subdivision.  Thus, for section 
136.1(b)(2), it includes “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought 
and prosecuted” as well as “assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  
The Attorney General maintains that the combination of the 
Legislature’s use of the word “any” together with the gerund 
phrases in subdivision (b) of section 136.1 suggests that the 
Legislature may have intended the connecting “and” to be read 
disjunctively when viewed in connection with the gerund 
assisting clause.  (See Scalia & Garner, supra, at p. 122.) 
 
11  
The word “any” also appears in section 136.1, subdivision 
(c), which increases the penalty when the commission of “any of 
the acts described in subdivision (a) or (b)” is accompanied by 
certain aggravating factors. 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
The Attorney General’s reading is plausible.  But an 
equally — if not more — plausible alternative reading is that 
the word “any,” as it appears in subdivision (b) of section 136.1, 
refers to each enumerated part of subdivision (b) as a whole and 
not to each part’s constituent elements.  Specifically, subdivision 
(b) prohibits a person from doing “any of the following” and then 
lists three enumerated subparts.  “[A]ny of the following” can 
simply be in reference to each of the three subparts that follow, 
as opposed to a suggestion that the three subparts should be 
broken down further into their constituent elements. 
Because we conclude from the text and statutory context 
of section 136.1(b)(2) that the statute is equally susceptible to 
the parties’ competing constructions, we turn to other 
interpretive aids. 
B.  
The Legislative History of Section 136.1(b)(2) 
and Other Jurisdictions’ Experiences 
Implementing Similar Statutory Language Do 
Not Resolve the Statute’s Ambiguity 
The legislative history of section 136.1(b)(2) and other 
jurisdictions’ experiences implementing similar statutory 
language are likewise inconclusive on the question of whether 
to read the statute conjunctively or disjunctively.  (See City of 
San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 616–617 [“ ‘ “If the statutory 
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, 
courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, 
legislative history, and public policy” ’ ”].)  
1. Legislative History of Section 136.1(b)(2) 
a. Prior law 
Before the Legislature enacted section 136.1, witness 
dissuasion was prohibited by former section 136.  (See People v. 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
Newton (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 187, 189; former § 136.)  As 
originally enacted in 1872, former section 136 prohibited 
“willfully prevent[ing] or dissuad[ing] . . . a witness . . . from 
attending upon any trial.”  (Former § 136; see Newton, at 
p. 190.)   
By 1979, the Legislature had amended former section 136 
by subdividing it into misdemeanor and felony offenses for 
nonforcible and forcible witness dissuasion, respectively.  (Stats. 
1979, ch. 944, § 1, p. 3252; see Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 
192 Cal.App.4th 948, 956, fn. 6 (Babalola).)  Thus, former 
section 136, subdivision (a) made it a misdemeanor to “willfully 
and unlawfully prevent[] or dissuade[] . . . a witness . . . from 
attending upon any trial.”  (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 1, p. 3252.)  
And former section 136, subdivision (b) made it a felony to do so 
“by means of force or threats of unlawful injury to person or 
damage to the property of another.”  (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 1, 
p. 3252.) 
b. The ABA model statute 
In 1979, an American Bar Association (ABA) committee 
issued a report that found “[e]xisting state statutes . . . largely 
inadequate to deal with intimidation.”  (ABA Section of Criminal 
Justice, Committee on Victims, Reducing Victim/Witness 
Intimidation:  A Package (1979) p. 1 (hereinafter ABA Report); 
see Babalola, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)  The ABA 
Report contained a model statute intended “to broaden 
substantially the coverage of many state laws.”  (ABA Rep. at 
p. 8; see Babalola, at p. 956.)  One area identified for potential 
broadening was protection against dissuasion for victims who 
were not also witnesses.  (ABA Rep. at p. 8 [“The addition of 
language proscribing the act of threatening someone not to 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
report their victimization is an important advance, and is not 
clearly covered by existing statutes”].)  The ABA’s “House of 
Delegates approved the recommendations in the report in 
August 1980.”  (Babalola, at p. 956, fn. 5.) 
Section 1 of the ABA model statute provided definitions 
for various statutory terms.  (ABA Rep., supra, at pp. 6–7.) 
Section 2 of the model statute — which would serve as the 
basis for Penal Code section 136.1, subdivisions (a) and (b) — 
established a misdemeanor offense for “knowingly and 
maliciously prevent[ing] or dissuad[ing] or attempt[ing] to so 
prevent or dissuade any witness or victim from attending or 
giving testimony at any trial . . . or . . . attempt[ing] to prevent 
or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime 
or who is a witness to a crime or a person acting on behalf of the 
victim of a crime from (a) making any report of such 
victimization to any peace officer or state or local or federal law 
enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional officer 
or prosecuting agency or to any judge; (b) causing a complaint, 
indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be 
sought and prosecuted and assisting in the prosecution thereof; 
(c) arresting or causing or seeking the arrest of any person in 
connection with such victimization . . . .”  (ABA Rep., supra, at 
pp. 7–8, italics added.) 
Section 3 of the model statute made the conduct described 
in section 2 a felony if the conduct was accompanied by certain 
aggravating factors.  (ABA Rep., supra, at pp. 8–9.)  Section 4 
addressed attempted dissuasion.  (Id. at p. 9.)  Sections 5 and 6 
addressed protective orders.  (Id. at pp. 9–11.)  And Section 7 
addressed pretrial release.  (Id. at p. 12.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
c. The Legislature adopts the ABA model statute 
In 1980, Assembly Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) 
(Assembly Bill No. 2909) was introduced in the Legislature “to 
pattern the California witness intimidation statute” after the 
ABA model statute.  (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as introduced 
Mar. 6, 1980, p. 2; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 9, 
1980, pp. 1–2 [Assem. Bill No. 2909 “would enact a new 
intimidation of witnesses and victims law patterned after the 
Model Statute drafted by the ABA Section on Criminal Justice”]; 
People v. Wahidi (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 807–808 (Wahidi); 
Babalola, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)  The ABA Report 
was referenced in Assembly and Senate committee analyses, 
and relevant portions were attached to an Assembly analysis.  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, 
supra, at pp. 1–2; Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, at pp. 2, 5–10.)  As with the ABA 
Report, the Legislature observed that existing California law 
made no provision “for the intimidation of victims unless they 
are also witnesses or potential witnesses.”  (Assem. Off. of 
Research, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–
1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 16, 1980, p. 1.) 
As initially introduced, Assembly Bill No. 2909 proposed 
to repeal former section 136 and replace it with a new section 
136 implementing sections 1 through 4 of the ABA model statute 
nearly verbatim.  (Compare Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as 
introduced Mar. 6, 1980, with ABA Rep., supra, at pp. 6–9.)  The 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest that prefaced Assembly Bill 
No. 2909 when introduced characterized the portion of the bill 
that would eventually become section 136.1, subdivision (b) as 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
prohibiting the dissuasion of a victim or witness “from 
performing specified acts relating to assisting law enforcement 
or prosecution activities.”12  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 
No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 6, 1980, 
p. 1.)   
After the Assembly passed Assembly Bill No. 2909, the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary observed in its analysis of 
the bill — under the heading “Redrafting necessary” — that 
because the bill was based on the ABA’s “draft model 
intimidation statute[,] . . . it has numerous rough edges and the 
quality of language is far worse than that produced by our 
Legislative Counsel.  [¶]  The syntax is cumbersome and the 
sentences extremely lengthy.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 
1980, p. 5.)  As an example, the committee analysis cited the fact 
that Assembly Bill No. 2909’s implementation of section 2 of the 
model statute “contains a single sentence of 17 lines and 150 
words.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, at p. 5.)  The analysis 
suggested, “At some point the bill should be cleaned-up and 
rewritten in order to smooth out such rough spots.”  (Id. at p. 6.) 
The Senate amended Assembly Bill No. 2909 by, among 
other things, keeping the definitions (section 1 of the model 
 
12  
“ ‘The Legislative Counsel’s Digest is printed as a preface 
to every bill considered by the Legislature.’  [Citation.]  The 
Legislative Counsel’s summaries ‘are prepared to assist the 
Legislature in its consideration of pending legislation.’  
[Citation.]  Although the Legislative Counsel’s summaries are 
not binding [citation], they are entitled to great weight.  
[Citation.]  ‘It is reasonable to presume that the Legislature 
[acted] with the intent and meaning expressed in the Legislative 
Counsel’s digest.’ ”  (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169–1170.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
statute) in section 136, and moving the misdemeanor, felony, 
and attempt provisions (sections 2, 3, and 4 of the model statute, 
respectively) to a new section 136.1.  (Sen. Amend. to Assem. 
Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) June 18, 1980; Sen. 
Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) July 1, 
1980.)  During this process, and without explanation, the Senate 
also inserted a comma immediately before the connecting “and.”  
(Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, June 18, 1980.) 
Assembly Bill No. 2909 was enacted as so amended.  
(Stats. 1980, ch. 686, § 2.1, p. 2076.)  The Legislative Counsel’s 
Digests that prefaced each iteration of the bill as it progressed 
through 
the 
Legislature 
consistently 
characterized 
section 136.1, subdivision (b) as prohibiting the dissuasion of a 
victim or witness “from performing specified acts relating to 
assisting law enforcement or prosecution activities.”  (Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as introduced 
Mar. 6, 1980, p. 1; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909 
(1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 16, 1980, pp. 1–2 
[same]; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 
Reg. Sess.), as amended June 18, 1980, pp. 1–2 [same]; Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), as 
amended July 1, 1980, pp. 1–2 [same]; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., 
Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), 2 Stats. 1980, 
Summary Dig., p. 188 [same].)13 
 
13  
An early analysis in each house of the Legislature initially 
characterized Assembly Bill No. 2909 as prohibiting dissuasion 
from “[c]ausing an accusatory pleading to be filed.”  (Assem. 
Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, 
as introduced Mar. 6, 1980, p. 1; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 
 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
As enacted, section 136.1(b)(2) read:  “Except as provided 
in subdivision (c), every person who attempts to prevent or 
dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or 
who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is 
guilty of a misdemeanor:  [¶] . . . [¶]  (2) Causing a complaint, 
indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be 
sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution 
thereof.”  (Stats. 1980, ch. 686, § 2.1, p. 2076.)14 
2. Other Jurisdictions’ Implementations of the ABA 
Model Statute  
At least eight other jurisdictions have enacted witness 
dissuasion statutes premised on the ABA model statute. 
Delaware’s version makes it a felony to dissuade a victim 
or witness from “[c]ausing a complaint, indictment, information, 
probation or parole violation to be sought or prosecuted, or from 
assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 3532(2), italics added; see State v. Stovall (Del.Super.Ct., 
Sept. 30, 1996, No. IN94-06-1461) 1996 Del. Super. Lexis 438, 
 
1980, p. 3.)  However, a subsequent analysis by the Assembly 
Office of Research performed in connection with the third 
reading of the bill in the Assembly characterized it broadly — 
consistent with the Legislative Counsel’s Digests — as 
prohibiting dissuasion from “[a]ssisting law enforcement or 
prosecution activities.”  (Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 16, 
1980, p. 1.)  Notably, these analyses were performed before 
Assembly Bill No. 2909 reached its final form, as amended by 
the Senate.   
14  
“Effective 1998, subdivisions (a) and (b) [of section 136.1] 
were revised from straight misdemeanor status to provide for 
alternative felony-misdemeanor punishment,” referred to as a 
“ ‘wobbler.’ ”  (People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 874, 
880; Stats. 1997, ch. 500, § 1, pp. 3123–3124.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
p. *8, fn. 8 [stating the law “is modeled after” the ABA model 
statute, with differences that are, “for the most part, . . . 
inconsequential”].)   
Florida’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a person 
from “[c]ausing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation 
revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or from 
assisting in such prosecution or proceeding.”  (Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 914.22(3)(d), italics added.) 
Georgia’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a person 
from “[c]ausing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation 
revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in 
such prosecution or proceeding.”  (Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-
32(b)(4), italics added.) 
Kansas’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a victim, 
witness, or person acting on a witness’s behalf from “causing a 
complaint, indictment or information to be sought and 
prosecuted or causing a violation of probation, parole or 
assignment to a community correctional services program to be 
reported and prosecuted, and assisting in its prosecution.”  
(Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5909(a)(2)(B); State v. Doyle (Kan.Ct.App. 
July 12, 2019, No. 119,174) 2019 WL 3047432, p. *6 [noting 
Kansas’s statute “stems from” the ABA model statute].)   
Missouri’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a victim or 
a person acting on the victim’s behalf from “[c]ausing a 
complaint, indictment or information to be sought and 
prosecuted or assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  (Mo. Ann. 
Stat. § 575.270(1)(2)(b), italics added.)   
As originally enacted in 1981, Wisconsin’s statute made it 
a misdemeanor to dissuade a victim from “[c]ausing a complaint, 
indictment or information to be sought and prosecuted and 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  (Wis. Stat. Ann. former 
§ 940.44(2); see State v. Freer (Wis.Ct.App. 2009) 779 N.W.2d 12, 
14 (Freer).)  As we explain further below, after a Wisconsin 
appellate court found this provision ambiguous and construed 
the connecting “and” disjunctively (Freer, at pp. 17, 18), 
Wisconsin’s Legislature amended the statute to conform to the 
court’s interpretation.  (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.44(2).)  It now 
prohibits dissuading a victim from “[c]ausing a complaint, 
indictment, or information to be sought or prosecuted, or 
assisting in the prosecution thereof.”  (Ibid., italics added.) 
The District of Columbia’s statute makes it a crime to 
dissuade a person from “[c]ausing a criminal prosecution or a 
parole or probation revocation proceeding to be sought or 
instituted, or assisting in a prosecution or other official 
proceeding.”  (D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(3)(D), italics added.)   
And federal law makes it a crime to dissuade a person 
from “causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation 
revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in 
such prosecution or proceeding.”  (18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(4), italics 
added; see Sen.Rep. No. 97-532, 2d sess. (1982), reprinted in 
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2521 [“Section 
1512 . . . draws heavily upon a model statute developed by the 
ABA Victims Committee”].)   
Each jurisdiction’s statute contains clauses that are 
substantially similar to section 136.1(b)(2)’s causing and 
assisting clauses.  And each jurisdiction has treated the clauses 
disjunctively.  Six did so legislatively by replacing the ABA 
model statute’s connecting “and” with some formulation 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
including the word “or.”15  The other two states’ legislatures 
retained the connecting “and,” which their courts have 
construed disjunctively.  (See Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 18; 
State v. Shields (Kan.Ct.App., Feb. 7, 2020, No. 119,844) 2020 
Kan.App. Unpub. Lexis 60,  pp. *1, *3, *8 [rejecting, without 
analysis, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge premised on 
dissuasive conduct that occurred after charges had been filed].) 
In Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d 12, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals thoroughly examined the causing and assisting clauses 
in the relevant portion of a statute premised on the model ABA 
statute 
and 
determined 
it 
operated 
disjunctively, 
notwithstanding that the statute — like California’s — 
connected the two clauses with the word “ ‘and.’ ”  As noted, 
Wisconsin’s Legislature originally adopted the relevant portion 
of the ABA model statute as-is, retaining the connecting “and” 
without modification.  (Wis. Stat. Ann. former § 940.44(2); see 
Freer, at p. 17.)  After the defendant in Freer was charged with 
disturbing the peace stemming from an altercation with a local 
performer, the defendant left a voicemail threatening to harm 
the performer’s reputation if the performer insisted on 
“ ‘get[ting] into a spitting contest’ ” and “ ‘denounc[ing] people in 
an unjustified way.’ ”  (Freer, at p. 13.)  It was “undisputed that 
this alleged act of intimidation did not occur in time to prevent 
or dissuade [the victim] from ‘causing a complaint to be 
 
15  
Delaware and Florida replaced the connecting “and” with 
“, or from.”  (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3532(2); Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 914.22(3)(d).)  Georgia, the United States, and the District of 
Columbia replaced the connecting “and” with “, or.”  (Ga. Code 
Ann. § 16-10-32(b)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(4); D.C. Code Ann. 
§ 22-722(a)(3)(D).)  And Missouri replaced the connecting “and” 
with “or.”  (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 575.270(1)(2)(b).)   
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
sought.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Wis. Stat. Ann. former § 940.449(2).)16  
After a jury found the defendant guilty, he argued on appeal 
that insufficient evidence supported his conviction because 
there was no evidence showing that he violated the Wisconsin 
statute’s equivalent of section 136.1(b)(2)’s causing clause.  The 
“heart of [the defendant]’s argument” was that the legislature 
“connected” the statute’s clauses “with the conjunctive ‘and,’ not 
the disjunctive ‘or.’ ”  (Freer, at p. 14.)  The Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals rejected this claim.  (Id. at pp. 14–19.) 
The Freer court found the statute ambiguous, reasoning 
that “ ‘and’ in statutes is not always interpreted as a conjunctive 
term” (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 15), and that treating it as 
such would render the assisting clause surplusage and create 
gaps in coverage with Wisconsin’s other dissuasion laws 
depending on when in the legal process a person committed an 
act of dissuasion (id. at pp. 16–17).  In consulting the statute’s 
legislative history, the court observed that Wisconsin’s 
legislative analyst consistently summarized the relevant 
portion of the statute as relating to dissuasion from “assisting 
the prosecution.”  (Id. at p. 17.)  The court reasoned from this 
that “the legislature intended ‘causing a complaint . . . to be 
sought and prosecuted’ to be an example of the broader category 
of . . . ‘assisting in the prosecution.’ ”  (Id. at p. 18, quoting Wis. 
Stat. Ann. former § 940.449(2).)  By contrast, the court observed 
that the legislative analyst did “not even mention language . . . 
about ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted,’ 
 
16  
The state did not dispute the defendant’s contention that 
the victim had “caused a complaint to be sought against him 
when [the victim] reported the incident to the police . . . and the 
police issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct.”  
(Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 14, fn. 2.)   
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
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28 
much less state that the purpose of this language is to limit the 
reach of the statute to acts of intimidation occurring before a 
complaint is sought.”  (Freer, at p. 18.)  Accordingly, the Freer 
court read the connecting “ ‘and’ ” in the Wisconsin statute “in 
the disjunctive,” thus concluding the statute did not require that 
a defendant dissuade a person from both causing a complaint to 
be sought and prosecuted and assisting in that prosecution.  
(Ibid.) 
The Wisconsin Legislature later amended Wisconsin’s 
counterpart to section 136.1(b)(2) to replace the connecting 
“and” with “or” so it would “comply with the interpretation set 
forth in the Freer case.”  (2015 Wis. Assem. Bill No. 5, 2015 Wis. 
Sess. Laws 14; see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.44(2).) 
3. Analysis 
As with the statutory text and context of section 
136.1(b)(2), we conclude that the legislative history and other 
jurisdictions’ 
experiences 
implementing 
the 
same 
or 
substantially similar provisions are likewise inconclusive as to 
whether 
to 
read 
section 
136.1(b)(2) 
conjunctively 
or 
disjunctively. 
The Legislature expressly modeled section 136.1(b)(2) 
after the ABA model statute.  It referenced the ABA Report in 
legislative committee analyses, and attached pages from the 
report to the analyses.  The ABA Report stated that the model 
statute was intended “to broaden substantially the coverage of 
many state laws” regarding witness dissuasion.  (ABA Rep. at 
p. 8; see Babalola, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)  We find it 
reasonable to infer from the references to, and presence of, the 
ABA Report within the committee materials that the 
Legislature was aware of — and joined in — the stated intent to 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
substantially broaden the coverage of California’s witness 
dissuasion laws.  Indeed, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
analysis explained that the bill “adapts in large part the 
provisions of the draft proposal [i.e., the ABA model statute]” 
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, 
supra, as amended Apr. 9, 1980, p. 2) and that “[t]he purpose of 
the bill is to expand the coverage of the law prohibiting the 
intimidation 
of 
witnesses” 
(ibid.; 
see 
Wahidi, 
supra, 
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 808 [courts may consider committee 
materials when determining legislative intent]).   
However, even a conjunctive (and thus, narrower) reading 
of section 136.1(b)(2) would still provide broader coverage than 
that afforded by former section 136 as it existed when the 
Legislature replaced it with section 136.1.17  And both the ABA 
Report and Assembly committee materials specifically identify 
the need to broaden the coverage of existing laws to protect 
against dissuasion of victims who are not also witnesses.  (ABA 
Rep. at p. 8; Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 16, 1980, p. 1.)  
Thus, the stated legislative intent to substantially broaden the 
prohibition 
on 
dissuasion 
supports 
resolving 
statutory 
ambiguities in favor of a broader reading — the disjunctive one 
that prohibits more, rather than less, dissuasive conduct.  Yet, 
this intent is also consistent with a narrower, conjunctive 
construction 
because 
such 
a 
construction 
would 
also 
 
17  
When the Legislature replaced former section 136 with 
section 136.1, former section 136 then addressed only dissuasion 
from attending trial (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 1, p. 3252; Babalola, 
supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956, fn. 6), which is now addressed 
by section 136.1, subdivision (a).   
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
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30 
substantially broaden protections against dissuasion as 
compared to prior law. 
The Legislative Counsel’s Digests to Assembly Bill 
No. 2909 are similarly unenlightening.  As noted, they 
consistently characterized the relevant portions of the bill 
broadly as prohibiting dissuading a victim or witness “from 
performing specified acts relating to assisting law enforcement 
or prosecution activities.”  (Ante, pp. 21–22.)  While the 
reference to “assisting . . . prosecution activities” is broad 
enough to encompass “assisting in the prosecution” of a charging 
document (§ 136.1(b)(2)), we interpret the preceding phrase 
“performing specified acts” as a reference to the acts specified in 
section 136.1(b)(2).  In other words, the digests simply refer to 
the ambiguous statutory language we are construing here.  
Moreover, 
two 
early 
legislative 
committee 
analyses 
characterized an earlier version of the bill as prohibiting 
dissuasion from “[c]ausing an accusatory pleading to be filed, or 
parole or probation violation sought” (Assem. Com. on Crim. 
Justice, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as introduced 
Mar. 6, 1980, p. 1; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 1980, p. 3), which tends 
to suggest that the Legislature was focusing on the causing 
clause, which could be seen as consistent with a conjunctive 
reading that gives effect to both clauses.  (See ante, fn. 13.)  Yet, 
a subsequent Assembly committee analysis adopted the broader 
reading reflected in the Legislative Counsel’s Digests, and 
nothing in the earlier materials suggests their characterizations 
of the statutory language were intended “to limit the reach of 
the statute to acts of intimidation occurring before a complaint 
is sought.”  (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 18.) 
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31 
Nor can the Legislature’s silent insertion of the comma 
immediately before the connecting “and” reasonably be deemed 
dispositive. 
 
(See 
Roland 
v. 
Superior 
Court 
(2004) 
124 Cal.App.4th 154, 163 [“While not of controlling importance, 
punctuation is part of a statute and should be considered in its 
interpretation in attempting to give the statute the construction 
intended by the drafter”]; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 735, 747 (Renee J.) [“We agree generally that the 
presence or absence of commas is a factor to be considered in 
interpreting a statute”].)  As noted, this was the only change the 
Legislature made to the text of the causing or assisting clauses 
when implementing the ABA model statute.  A comma is 
“normally used to divide and isolate ideas” (In re S.C. (2009) 
179 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1441), thereby supporting a disjunctive 
reading.  Indeed, while it is unclear from the statutory text in 
isolation what the Legislature was intending to divide and 
isolate, when viewed against the backdrop of the stated 
legislative intent to substantially broaden the coverage of 
witness dissuasion laws, and in light of the Legislative Counsel’s 
broad characterization of the provision as prohibiting dissuasion 
from assisting in prosecution activities, we find it at least 
plausible that the Legislature intended for the comma to signify 
that the two clauses independently prohibit separate conduct. 
This interpretation is both supported and undermined by 
the experiences, discussed above, of other jurisdictions 
implementing the ABA model statute.  On the one hand, six of 
the eight jurisdictions implemented the model statute by 
replacing the connecting “and” with some formulation involving 
the word “or,” thereby expressly indicating that the causing and 
assisting clauses are to be viewed disjunctively in those 
jurisdictions.  This near-universal disjunctive treatment of the 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
clauses by other states’ legislatures suggests that our 
Legislature might also have intended for its insertion of a 
comma immediately before the connecting “and” to likewise 
convey that the clauses are to be viewed disjunctively.  That is, 
the fact that our Legislature inserted a punctuation mark that 
signifies divided or isolated ideas (see In re S.C., supra, 
179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441) precisely where other legislatures 
inserted a word that signifies independent operation, could 
suggest that our Legislature intended the comma to 
communicate the same disjunctive meaning communicated by 
the word “or.”   
But on the other hand, our Legislature’s decision to not do 
just as other jurisdictions have done, and simply replace “and” 
with “or” instead of silently inserting a comma, may well suggest 
that the Legislature had chosen to not give the clause a 
disjunctive meaning.  And it is possible that the Legislature 
intended the comma to serve some other unspecified purpose.   
In the end, while the Legislature’s insertion of the comma 
“is a factor to be considered in interpreting” section 136.1(b)(2) 
(Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 747), we decline to accord it 
dispositive weight, particularly given the opposing and 
conflicting meanings the Legislature could have ascribed to its 
unexplained insertion of a comma during the drafting process. 
Turning to the Freer court’s adoption of the disjunctive 
interpretation of Wisconsin’s implementation of the ABA model 
statute — which, like section 136.1(b)(2), retained the model 
statute’s connecting “and” — we find that the decision cuts both 
ways on the question of whether to read section 136.1(b)(2) 
conjunctively or disjunctively.  (See San Jose Crane & Rigging, 
Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1314, 1321 [“It 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
is well settled that decisions of sister state courts are 
particularly persuasive when those decisions construe similar 
statutes or a uniform act”]; see Peralta Community College Dist. 
v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 59 
[“we find persuasive the reasoning of the numerous courts in our 
sister states with statutes similar to ours”].)   
In support of the disjunctive construction, the Freer court 
noted that under Wisconsin law, “ ‘and’ in statutes is not always 
interpreted as a conjunctive term.”  (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d 
at p. 15.)  The same is true in California.  (See Pool, supra, 
27 Cal. at p. 581.)  The Freer court also found that, as the 
Attorney General argues here, the doctrine against surplusage 
supports reading the connecting “and” disjunctively so as not to 
read the assisting clause out of the statute.  (Freer, at pp. 16–
17.)   
But Freer is distinguishable in at least one material 
respect that supports the conjunctive construction.  The Freer 
court observed that the Wisconsin legislative analyst generally 
referred to the statute as addressing dissuading a victim from 
“ ‘assisting in the prosecution,’ ” without “even mention[ing] 
language in [the statute] about ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be 
sought and prosecuted.”  (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 18; see 
id. at p. 17 [Wisconsin legislative analyst’s “analysis of a bill is 
printed with and displayed on the bill when it is introduced in 
the legislature; as such, it is indicative of legislative intent”].)  
Furthermore, the Wisconsin legislative analyst specifically used 
an “ ‘or’ ” and thereby expressed a disjunctive meaning when 
referring to “ ‘assisting in the prosecution’ ” in a list of witness 
dissuasion misdemeanors that the bill would create.   (Id. at 
p. 17 [“ ‘A person who maliciously prevents or dissuades . . . a 
crime victim from making a report, assisting the prosecution or 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
seeking an arrest will be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor’ ” 
(italics added)].)  The Freer court was also clear that this 
legislative history was key to its decision.  (See id. at p. 18 [“In 
light of the LRB analysis, we conclude that the legislature 
intended the victim intimidation statute to prohibit any act of 
intimidation that seeks to prevent or dissuade a crime victim 
from assisting in the prosecution” (italics added)].) 
In this way, the Wisconsin legislative analyst was 
singularly focused on the assisting clause, which supports the 
disjunctive construction, whereas the Legislative Counsel’s 
Digests pertaining to Assembly Bill No. 2909 broadly 
encompassed both the causing and assisting clauses, which 
lends at least some support to the conjunctive construction.  
Arguably, these differing legislative histories in Wisconsin and 
California — both of which pertain to implementation of the 
same model statutory language — may reflect the fact that the 
two states’ legislatures were seeking to fill different gaps in 
their dissuasion statutes. 
At bottom, we see nothing in the legislative history of 
section 136.1(b)(2) or in other jurisdictions’ experiences 
implementing similar statutory language that suggests section 
136.1(b)(2) is more susceptible to either the conjunctive 
construction or the disjunctive construction. 
C. Overlap with Other Dissuasion Statutes 
Counsels in Favor of a Narrow Construction of 
the Assisting Clause, but Is Otherwise 
Inconclusive 
As previously observed, the Court of Appeal below also 
justified 
its 
narrow, 
conjunctive 
interpretation 
of 
section 136.1(b)(2) on the ground that other statutes “prohibit 
attempts to dissuade victims or witnesses where charges have 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
already been filed.”  (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 189, 
citing §§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1), (2) [prohibiting dissuasion or 
attempted dissuasion of a victim or witness from giving 
testimony or attending trial] and 137 [prohibiting attempts to 
influence testimony or information given to law enforcement].)18  
The Attorney General disagrees.  While we agree that a broad, 
disjunctive interpretation of the assisting clause as a “catch-all” 
for postcharging dissuasion creates overlap with other statutes, 
it does not necessarily follow that those concerns warrant a 
conjunctive construction of section 136.1(b)(2) as a whole. 
To begin with, even if a disjunctive reading of section 
136.1(b)(2) would result in some slight overlap with other 
dissuasion statutes, that fact would not be dispositive.  Although 
“[t]he Legislature has taken pains to distinguish the various 
methods 
of” 
dissuasion 
(People 
v. 
Fernandez 
(2003) 
106 Cal.App.4th 943, 950 (Fernandez)), “[i]t is axiomatic the 
Legislature may criminalize the same conduct in different ways” 
(People v. Superior Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 395; 
see § 654 [“An act . . . that is punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such 
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished 
under more than one provision”]).  Indeed, the Legislature 
contemplated that there may be overlap under certain 
circumstances of witness dissuasion.  (See, e.g., § 140, subd. (b) 
[“A person who is punished under another provision of law for 
an act described in subdivision (a) [prohibiting the use of force 
or threats because the witness, victim, or other person has 
 
18  
Defendant also asserts section 137, subdivision (b), may 
be “an alternate charging option in this case.”  (Boldface 
omitted.)  We express no opinion on this question. 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
provided any assistance or information to a law enforcement 
officer or prosecutor] shall not receive an additional term of 
imprisonment under this section”].) 
We acknowledge there are differences between section 
136.1(b)(2) and other dissuasion provisions that suggest the 
Legislature intended to address a wide spectrum of dissuasive 
conduct.  For example, section 136.1(b)(2) does not contain a 
malice requirement like section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1) or (2).  
Nor does section 136.1(b)(2) establish a family member 
exemption like section 136.1, subdivision (a)(3)19 or section 137, 
subdivision (f).20  And section 136.1(b)(2) is a wobbler, whereas 
section 137, subdivision (c) is a straight misdemeanor.  But 
section 136.1(b)(2) is not the outlier in these respects — the cited 
provisions are.  None of the other general dissuasion provisions 
contains a malice requirement, family member exemption, or 
provides for straight misdemeanor treatment.  (See §§ 136.1, 
subds. (a), (b) [wobblers], 136.1, subd. (c) [felony], 137, subds. 
(a), (b) [felonies].)  The concerns implicated by these differences 
speak little to whether section 136.1(b)(2) should be read 
conjunctively or disjunctively, because the potential for overlap 
still exists under either construction. 
In addition, although it is unnecessary for us to decide the 
issue, there is some question as to whether defendant’s conduct 
 
19  
Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(3) provides:  “For purposes 
of this section, evidence that the defendant was a family 
member who interceded in an effort to protect the witness or 
victim shall create a presumption that the act was without 
malice.” 
20  
Section 137, subdivision (f) provides:  “The provisions of 
subdivision (c) shall not apply to an attorney advising a client or 
to a person advising a member of his or her family.” 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
here falls within the ambit of the statutes cited by the Court of 
Appeal.  The cited statutes relate to attending or testifying at 
trial 
(§ 136.1, 
subd. (a)) 
and 
influencing 
testimony 
or 
information provided to law enforcement (§ 137, subds. (b), (c)).  
But as the Attorney General observes, courts have reached 
different conclusions about the extent to which a request to 
“drop the charges” necessarily relates to attendance at a trial or 
testimony.21  Defendant maintains that the significance of the 
phrase “must be examined on a case-by-case basis.”  On the facts 
of this case, he maintains “ ‘drop the charges’ does not make 
sense” because “there is no evidence that [Cornejo] planned to 
separately ‘assist in the prosecution.’ ”  We decline to wade into 
this issue in the first instance because it relates to defendant’s 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
assisting clause, which the Court of Appeal found unnecessary 
to reach in light of its ruling as to the causing clause.  Because 
we ultimately conclude the Court of Appeal correctly resolved 
the case on this basis, we need not reach the issue either. 
To summarize, although the assisting clause may overlap 
with other dissuasion provisions, that circumstance does not 
 
21  
Among other cases, the Attorney General compares People 
v. Cribas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 596, which held that a request 
that the victim “drop the charges” implies a request not to testify 
at trial only if the defendant knows “the only way she could drop 
the charges was by refusing to testify” (id. at p. 608) with 
Sullivan v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 2014) 761 S.E.2d 377, which held 
that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for 
offering a benefit “ ‘with the intent to deter [the victim] . . . from 
testifying freely, fully, and truthfully’ ” where the evidence 
showed that the defendant encouraged an intermediary “to 
contact the victim about dropping the charges” (id. at p. 383). 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
provide direct instruction on whether we should read 
section 136.1(b)(2) conjunctively or disjunctively. 
D. 1 Is Not 
Particularly Instructive 
The Attorney General argues that cases cited by the Court 
of Appeal and defendant in support of a conjunctive construction 
of section 136.1(b)(2) are not persuasive “because none 
addressed the ambiguity in section 136.1(b)(2) or applied the 
canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.”  (See 
Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 187–188, citing People v. 
Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595 (Hallock), Fernandez, supra, 
106 Cal.App.4th 943, and People v. Brown (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 
1074 (Brown).)  We agree. 
The Court of Appeal in Fernandez relied on an earlier 
court’s characterization of section 136.1, subdivision (b) as 
“punish[ing] a defendant’s pre-arrest efforts to prevent a crime 
from being reported to the authorities.”  (Fernandez, supra, 
106 Cal.App.4th at p. 950, citing Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 
at pp. 605–607.)  Neither Fernandez nor Hallock involved 
section 136.1(b)(2).   
The defendant in Fernandez attempted to induce his 
victim to testify falsely at a preliminary hearing — conduct 
covered by section 137, subdivision (c).  (Fernandez, supra, 
106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 945–946.)  But he was charged and 
convicted under section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), which pertains 
to dissuading the reporting of a crime.  (Fernandez, at p. 946.)  
Thus, although the Fernandez court broadly characterized 
section 136.1, subdivision (b) as addressing pre-arrest conduct, 
it did so in the context of contrasting “pre-arrest efforts to 
prevent a crime from being reported to the authorities” under 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
section 136.1, subdivision (b), with “effort[s] to prevent a 
witness from giving testimony after a criminal proceeding has 
been 
commenced” 
under 
section 137, 
subdivision (c).  
(Fernandez, at p. 950, citing Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 605–607.)  “There was simply no issue before the court 
concerning section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2).”  (Brown, supra, 
6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083; see People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1, 110 [“It is axiomatic that a case is not authority for an issue 
that was not considered”].) 
In Hallock, the defendant threatened his victim, “ ‘[I]f you 
tell anybody anything that happened . . . I’ll blow your house 
up.’ ”  (Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 598.)  The defendant 
was charged with violating section 136.1, subdivision (c) by 
means of violating subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(3) — dissuading a 
victim from reporting a crime or seeking an arrest, respectively.  
(Hallock, at p. 605.)  However, the trial court instructed the jury 
regarding section 136.1, subdivision (a), which prohibits 
dissuasion from attending or testifying at trial.  (Hallock, at 
p. 606.)  In comparing subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 136.1, 
the Hallock court described subdivision (b)(2) as prohibiting 
dissuasion of a victim or witness from “causing a complaint or 
similar charge to be sought.”  (Hallock, at p. 606.)  But the 
defendant was not charged under section 136.1(b)(2), nor was 
the jury instructed regarding it.  Thus, the Hallock court had no 
occasion to consider the nuances of section 136.1(b)(2); its 
characterization is therefore dicta. 
The Court of Appeal also cited Brown, in which the 
appellate court compared section 136.1(b)(2) to section 137, 
subdivision (b), but did not examine the ambiguity within 
section 136.1(b)(2).  (Brown, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1080–
1082.)  The defendant in Brown was convicted of violating 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
section 136.1, 
subdivision 
(c) 
by 
means 
of 
violating 
section 136.1(b)(2) after he threatened his victim’s life unless 
she agreed to “take back her report to the police.”  (Brown, at 
pp. 1078, 1079.)  No charging document had yet been filed.  (Id. 
at p. 1084.)  On appeal, the defendant argued he should have 
been charged, if at all, with violating section 137, subdivision 
(b), which makes it a felony — but not a serious felony, like 
section 136.1, subdivision (c) — to induce false testimony by 
force or threat.  (Brown, at p. 1080.)  The defendant reasoned 
his conduct was covered by both statutes, which required that 
he be charged with the more specific of the applicable statutes, 
which he maintained was section 137.  (Brown, at pp. 1080–
1081.)  In assessing this claim, the Brown court examined the 
elements of a section 136.1(b)(2) violation and concluded that, 
“under section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), the perpetrator must 
attempt to prevent a person from causing a charging document 
to be sought and prosecuted and from assisting in the 
prosecution.  Thus, the prevention must occur before the 
relevant charging document has been filed.”  (Brown, at 
p. 1082.)  In other words, the Brown court read section 
136.1(b)(2)’s connecting “and” conjunctively.  In doing so, 
however, the Brown court simply applied the ordinarily 
conjunctive meaning of “and” without considering the 
interpretive aids we have considered here.  Nor did the Brown 
court cite or discuss Velazquez, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 219, 
which stated that a violation of section 136.1(b)(2) may be 
premised on conduct that occurs after the relevant charging 
document has been filed.  (Velazquez, at pp. 232–233.)  Finally, 
Brown is factually distinguishable in that all the dissuasive 
conduct there occurred before any charging document had been 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
filed (Brown, at p. 1084), thus rendering the court’s analysis of 
section 136.1(b)(2)’s assisting clause dicta. 
By the same token, we acknowledge that Velazquez, supra, 
201 Cal.App.4th 219, on which the Attorney General heavily 
relies, has limited persuasive value.  The defendant in Velazquez 
was convicted of violating section 136.1(b)(2) after he told a 
victim that if she “drop[ped] all the charges” against the 
defendant’s fellow gang members “nothing would happen to 
her.”  (Velazquez, at p. 224.)  In distinguishing the basis on 
which the Fernandez court concluded that “section 136.1, 
subdivision (b) punishes a defendant’s pre-arrest efforts to 
prevent a crime from being reported to the authorities” 
(Fernandez, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 950, italics added), the 
Velazquez 
court 
held 
that 
“[s]ubdivision 
(b)(2) 
clearly 
encompasses more than prearrest efforts to dissuade, inasmuch 
as it includes attempts to dissuade a victim from causing a 
complaint or information to be prosecuted or assisting in that 
prosecution.”  (Velazquez, at p. 233, italics added.)  In reaching 
this conclusion, however, the Velazquez court uncritically read 
section 136.1(b)(2)’s connecting “and” disjunctively, without 
considering any interpretative aids.  Moreover, because the 
Velazquez court concluded the defendant’s conviction was 
supported under the causing clause alone (Velazquez, at p. 233), 
the court had no occasion to consider the interplay between the 
causing and assisting clauses, thus rendering its observations 
regarding the same dicta.   
Because none of the cases that the Court of Appeal cited 
actually addresses the ambiguity at issue here, we find they 
offer 
little 
insight 
to 
the 
proper 
interpretation 
of 
section 136.1(b)(2). 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
E. Defendant’s Remaining Arguments Are 
Unhelpful 
Defendant contends several additional considerations 
support his conjunctive reading of section 136.1(b)(2).  We 
disagree. 
First, defendant asserts that the pattern jury instruction 
corresponding to section 136.1(b)(2) — CALCRIM No. 2622 — 
supports his reading because it “clearly presents the offense as 
unified conduct.”  Specifically, the pattern instruction states 
that the prosecution must prove that the defendant dissuaded a 
victim or witness “from cooperating or providing information so 
that a . . . complaint . . . could be sought and prosecuted, and 
from helping to prosecute that action.”  (CALCRIM No. 2622, 
italics added.)  “We have cautioned,” however, “that ‘jury 
instructions . . . are not themselves the law, and are not 
authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.’ ”  (People 
v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 876, fn. 16, quoting People 
v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.)  “At most, when they 
are accurate, . . . they restate the law.”  (Morales, at p. 48, fn. 7.)  
All that CALCRIM No. 2622 does is restate section 
136.1(b)(2) — including the ambiguous connecting “and” at issue 
here. 
Second, defendant asserts that if the Legislature intended 
the assisting clause “to exist as a separate prohibited act, the 
drafters would have structured that phrase differently and 
added it as a stand-alone subsection.”  Had the Legislature been 
drafting on a blank slate, we would agree that this would have 
been a logical way to structure the statute.  But that is not what 
happened here.  Instead, the Legislature imported nearly 
verbatim the ABA model statute.  Notably, none of the other 
jurisdictions that have implemented the ABA model statute (or 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
substantially 
similar 
language) — 
including 
those 
that 
expressly created separate prohibited acts by replacing the 
model statute’s ambiguous connecting “and” with a clearly 
disjunctive “or” — set out the causing and assisting clauses in 
separate subdivisions, as defendant suggests.  (See, ante, 
pp. 23–25.)   
Additionally, although the Legislature could have 
structured the statute differently, the format it chose is not 
illogical.  The different parts of section 136.1, subdivision (b) 
refer generally to different stages of a criminal proceeding:  
subdivision (b)(1) refers to reporting crimes, subdivision (b)(2) 
refers to prosecutions, and subdivision (b)(3) refers to arrests.  
Because the causing and assisting clauses both relate to 
prosecutions, the Legislature could conclude they logically 
belong together in the same subpart. 
F. The Rule of Lenity Counsels in Favor of 
Adopting the Conjunctive Construction 
As a final argument, defendant asserts that the ambiguity 
in section 136.1(b)(2) “triggers the rule of lenity.”  “ ‘That rule 
generally requires that “ambiguity in a criminal statute should 
be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of 
every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation.  But . . . 
‘that rule applies “only if two reasonable interpretations of the 
statute stand in relative equipoise.”  [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” 
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]  ‘The rule of lenity does not apply every 
time there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a penal 
statute.  [Citation.]  Rather, the rule applies “ ‘only if the court 
can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended; 
there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify 
invoking the rule.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Nuckles (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 601, 611; accord, Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
11 Cal.5th 183, 202; see Scalia & Garner, supra, at p. 299 [“The 
criterion we favor is this:  whether, after all the legitimate tools 
of interpretation have been applied, ‘a reasonable doubt 
persists’ ”].)  “ ‘ “Application of the rule of lenity ensures that 
criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct 
rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate balance between 
the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining 
criminal liability.  [Citation.]” ’ ”  (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 57.) 
“Having consulted the usual aids to eliminating ambiguity 
in statutory construction — text, context and structure, overall 
purpose, relevant case law, legislative history — and having 
found a satisfactory answer in none of them, we conclude that 
this is one of those rare cases where the rule of lenity applies.”  
(People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972, 989 [applying the 
rule of lenity to § 136.1, subd. (b)(1)].)  That is, we can do no 
more than simply venture a guess as to whether the Legislature 
intended for section 136.1(b)(2) to operate conjunctively or 
disjunctively.  In this rare circumstance in which it is unclear 
whether the Legislature intended to accord the word “and” its 
traditionally conjunctive meaning, a disjunctive reading of the 
statute would fail to “provide fair warning concerning conduct 
rendered illegal.”  (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 57.)  The rarity, 
and egregiousness, of the ambiguity here is underscored by the 
Legislature’s unusual words in adopting the statute.  It 
recognized it was passing a criminal law despite believing from 
the very outset that “redrafting” was “necessary,” as it had too 
closely hewn to an ABA model statute with “numerous rough 
edges” and language quality “far worse” than typical.  (Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as 
amended Apr. 9, 1980, p. 5.) 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
Accordingly, we adopt the construction more favorable to 
defendants:  section 136.1(b)(2) is to be read conjunctively such 
that the language “assisting in the prosecution thereof” provides 
no independent basis for a conviction under the statute.22  
Where criminal charges have already been filed, postcharging 
dissuasion alone does not constitute an offense under 
section 136.1(b)(2). 
Because it is undisputed that all of defendant’s dissuasive 
conduct here occurred after the underlying charging document 
had been filed, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that 
substantial evidence does not support the causing-clause 
element of the charged offense.  Like the Court of Appeal, we 
therefore have no occasion to explore the assisting clause’s 
contours. 
As noted, in response to Freer, the Wisconsin Legislature 
codified the court’s clarification that the statute’s causing and 
assisting clauses are to be read disjunctively.  Likewise, our 
Legislature remains free to clarify section 136.1(b)(2), as the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary suggested it do “[a]t some 
point” to smooth out the statute’s “numerous rough edges.”  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, 
supra, as amended Apr. 9, 1980, pp. 6, 5.) 
 
22  
We 
disapprove 
of 
People 
v. 
Velazquez, 
supra, 
201 Cal.App.4th 219 to the extent it is inconsistent with this 
holding. 
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Reynoza 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 75 Cal.App.5th 181 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S273797 
Date Filed:  April 22, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Charles E. Wilson II 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Nancy Susan Brandt, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant.  
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, 
Catherine A. Rivlin, Seth K. Schalit, Bruce M. Slavin and Katie L. 
Stowe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Nancy Susan Brandt 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 6680 
Albany, CA 94706 
(510) 545-4920 
 
Katie L. Stowe 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3863