Case Title: Reynolds v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84/17

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Clement Reynolds v. State of Maryland, No. 84, September Term 2017.  Opinion by Hotten, 
J.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SILENCE – The Court of Appeals 
held that an individual’s post-Miranda silence is generally inadmissible as substantive 
evidence.  A suspect’s post-arrest silence is more prejudicial than probative, and generally 
should not be admitted.  Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 230, 854 A.2d 1259, 1267 (2004). 
Constitutional safeguards protect an individual’s desire to remain silent from being 
introduced as evidence of guilt.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – IMPEACHMENT – The Court of 
Appeals held that inconsistent statements made to law enforcement officers after invoking 
Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment purposes.  See Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643 (1971). 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – IMPEACHMENT – Where 
statements made to law enforcement officers are not omissions, or selective silence, those 
may be used for impeachment purposes if the evidence is probative.  If “the impeaching 
material would provide valuable aid to the jury in assessing the defendant’s credibility; 
again, ‘the benefits of this process should not be lost.’”  Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 
722, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1221 (1975).  Here, Reynolds’s affirmative statements were of 
probative impeachment value because Reynolds told arresting officers critical facts about 
his alibi that were directly inconsistent with his trial testimony.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 125040C 
Argued: May 8, 2018 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 84 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
__________________________________ 
 
CLEMENT REYNOLDS  
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: August 27, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-01-07 
09:45-05:00
 
On May 29, 2014, Petitioner Clement Reynolds (“Reynolds”) was indicted by the 
Grand Jury for Montgomery County on charges of first degree murder, conspiracy to 
commit first degree murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, 
stemming from the killing of Wesley King on November 18, 2002.  On October 20, 2014, 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County held a hearing to address Reynolds’s Motion to 
Suppress Custodial Statements, which was granted in part and denied in part.  Following a 
seven-day jury trial commencing on January 5, 2015, Reynolds was convicted of all counts.  
On March 31, 2015, Reynolds was sentenced to concurrent life sentences for each of the 
first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder counts, and twenty years 
imprisonment for the use of a handgun in commission of a crime of violence, to be served 
consecutively.   The first five years of his sentence for the use of a handgun charge was 
without parole, pursuant to Criminal Law (“Crim. Law”) Article § 4-2041 of the Maryland 
Code.   
 
Thereafter, Reynolds noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an unreported opinion on November 8, 2017.  
Reynolds v. State, No. 0182, Sept. Term, 2015, 2017 WL 5171593 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
Nov. 8, 2017), cert. granted, 457 Md. 399, 178 A.3d 1242 (2018).  Reynolds now seeks 
this Court’s review regarding whether he was “denied due process when the trial court 
permitted the prosecutor to question [him] about ‘what he did not tell the police about his 
                                              
 
1 See Crim. Law § 4-204(c)(1)(i) requiring that a person guilty of using a firearm in 
a commission of a crime “shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 5 years and 
not exceeding 20 years.”  
 
 
 
2 
alibi defense, even though the omissions were a result of Reynolds[’s] post-arrest, post-
Miranda[2]  invocation of silence and were not inconsistencies with his trial testimony.”  
We answer this question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals.   
BACKGROUND 
 
On April 14, 2014, Reynolds was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport 
in New York.  An open warrant was issued on March 25, 2003 for “Kevin Reynolds” 
regarding the November 18, 2002 murder of Wesley King (“King”) in Montgomery 
County, Maryland.  King was shot and killed outside of his apartment in Silver Spring, 
Maryland.  A warrant for Kevin Reynolds remained unserved until 2014, when it was 
discovered that Kevin Reynolds was using the name of Dennis Graham.  Upon his arrest 
in New York, Reynolds was carrying a United States passport, a Connecticut driver’s 
license, and other documents bearing the name of Dennis Graham.  Although officers took 
Reynolds’s fingerprints to ascertain whether he was the subject of the warrant, the analysis 
was not completed for several days.  Reynolds was taken to a New York City precinct, 
where he was detained until Montgomery County Detectives Sean Riley and Frank Colbert 
arrived to interview him.  
                                              
 
2 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the Supreme Court 
held, inter alia, that an individual has a right to remain silent during a custodial 
interrogation. 
 
 
 
3 
 
The detectives informed Reynolds that they wanted to interview him about a murder 
from 2002.  Prior to advising Reynolds of his Miranda rights, Detective Colbert asked 
Reynolds his name, and he replied “Dennis Graham.”  Detective Colbert asked Reynolds 
for his date of birth, whether he was in good physical condition, whether he was sober, how 
far he went in high school, and whether he spoke languages other than English.  The 
detectives told Reynolds they believed he was using an alias, which the fingerprints would 
soon confirm.  
 
Detective Colbert read Reynolds his Miranda rights at 2:17 a.m.  Reynolds refused 
to sign an Advice of Rights form, but Reynolds answered affirmatively that he understood 
his rights.  Detective Colbert asked Reynolds whether he had ever been to Maryland, to 
which Reynolds replied, “I’ve been through Maryland.”  When asked whether he had heard 
of Montgomery County, Maryland or of a cold case homicide from 2002, Reynolds replied 
that he knew of the County, but not the homicide.  Eventually, the detectives asked 
Reynolds directly whether he was Kevin Reynolds, to which he replied no.  Detective 
Colbert then told Reynolds that “[t]here’s overwhelming evidence that you murdered 
somebody back in November of 2012 [sic]” and that this was Reynolds’s “opportunity to 
talk this out.”  Reynolds replied, “[t]here’s nothing I have to say.” 
 
 
The suppression court ruled that everything up to this point was admissible because 
Reynolds had not yet invoked his right to remain silent, but found that Reynolds’s last reply 
was a clear and unambiguous invocation of Reynolds’s right to remain silent. 
 
 
 
4 
 
Despite the fact, as the suppression court found, that Reynolds asserted the right to 
remain silent, the police interrogation continued.  Detective Colbert told Reynolds he had 
a “list of evidence... [a]nd it’s overwhelming... [i]t’s your time to speak up about this.”  
Reynolds repeated, “[t]here’s nothing I have to say. You’re trying to solve a homicide 
and[.]”  Detective Colbert interjected “our homicide is solved... I’d rather you just tell me 
to go to hell and get out of here.”   Detective Colbert asked Reynolds what country he was 
in during November of 2002.  Reynolds responded, “November of 2002?  I was probably 
in the Virgin Islands.”  Reynolds indicated that he had family there.  Detective Colbert then 
asked Reynolds if he thought the evidence described by the detectives was enough to 
convict someone.  Reynolds initially responded, “I don’t know.”  When Detective Colbert 
added that Reynolds left the country after the homicide, Reynolds repeated, “I don’t know.  
Nothing else to say.”  
 
Detective Colbert also engaged Reynolds in a conversation about Reynolds’s life.  
Reynolds told Detective Colbert that he came to the United States and settled in Morris 
Plains, New Jersey, where he sold cars with a man named Byron Matamora.  Reynolds told 
Detective Colbert that he resided in two other towns in New Jersey with Rose Lopez, who 
was his girlfriend at the time.  Detective Colbert again asked, “[n]othing else you want to 
talk about?” Reynolds responded, “I guess not, no.”  
 
 
 
5 
 
On April 30, 2014, the same detectives interviewed Reynolds in Montgomery 
County, Maryland.  Reynolds immediately invoked his right to counsel.  Notwithstanding 
the invocation, Detective Colbert continued to interview Reynolds.3   
The Suppression Hearing 
 
On October 20, 2014, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County held a suppression 
hearing to consider the statements Reynolds made during the April 14, 2014 and the April 
30, 2014 interviews.  Reynolds’s trial counsel argued that Reynolds repeatedly invoked his 
right to remain silent in the April 14 interview, when he indicated that he had “nothing to 
say” about the murder, and that his statements following the first invocation were 
inadmissible because they were taken in violation of Miranda.  Additionally, Reynolds 
asserted that Detective Colbert acted in bad faith by continuing to question Reynolds after 
the invocations, so the statements were inadmissible at trial for any purpose.  The State 
averred that Reynolds never unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent, and that 
Detective Colbert did not act in bad faith.  According to Detective Colbert, Reynolds “was 
trying to get me to believe his spin on the story [that he was “Graham”], and it was my job 
to try to get the facts out….”  
 
The suppression court ruled that Reynolds invoked his right to remain silent the first 
time he stated that “[t]here’s nothing I have to say[]” about the murder.  The court held that 
a majority of the April 14 interview was in violation of Miranda, and therefore inadmissible 
                                              
 
3 Reynolds’s statements from the April 30 interview were not the subject of 
impeachment at trial. 
 
 
 
6 
as substantive evidence.  However, the court also determined that the statements elicited 
during the April 14 interview were voluntary and thus, admissible under Harris4 and Hass5 
for impeachment purposes, should Reynolds elect to testify at trial.  Regarding the April 
30 interview, the State maintained that even if the statements were obtained in violation of 
Miranda, they were voluntarily made.  The court ruled that the statements in the April 30 
interview were involuntary and inadmissible, except for Reynolds’s response to pedigree 
or booking questions.  Ultimately, the suppression court precluded the State from 
introducing any statements after Reynolds’s Miranda invocation in its case-in-chief. 
Before this Court, the State asserts that because Detective Colbert did not purposely violate 
Miranda, and Reynolds’s statements were voluntary, the statements could be used for 
impeachment purposes.  
The Trial 
 
Wesley’s daughter, Nickesha King (“Nickesha”), who was eleven years old at the 
time of the murder, testified that while walking with her father outside of their apartment 
on the evening of November 18, 2002, they were approached by two men dressed in black.  
One man pulled Nickesha aside while the other man, who she identified as Reynolds, 
                                              
 
4 In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643 (1971), the Supreme Court held 
that statements procured by law enforcement in violation of Miranda could be used for 
impeachment purposes at trial.   
 
 
5 The Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215 (1975) 
that information obtained by officers after Miranda warnings is admissible for 
impeachment purposes if an individual testifies inconsistently with the inculpatory 
information.  
 
 
 
7 
pinned King down and shot him.  As King fell, the two men ran to a white van and drove 
away with the door open.  At trial, Nickesha identified Reynolds as the shooter, who she 
recognized because he stayed with her family during the summer of 2002.  Nickesha 
testified that there was no doubt in her mind that Reynolds was the man who shot and killed 
King. 
 
Detective James Drewry testified that he recovered a cell phone from the murder 
scene, and eventually traced the cell phone number to a salon located in Brooklyn, New 
York.  The salon was operated by Simone Smith (“Smith”), who was Reynolds’s wife at 
the time of the murder. 
 
Detective Scott Sube, an expert on cell mapping and network operations, also 
testified for the State.  Detective Sube presented a detailed chart that tracked which towers 
registered pings from the subject cell phone on the day of the murder.  The chart reflected 
that pings from a call at 5:18 p.m. registered to cell towers in Manhattan, New York. 
Subsequent pings from cell phone calls were registered with towers indicating that the 
phone traveled south on the I-95 corridor from New York, through New Jersey and 
Baltimore.  Another chart displayed three cell phone calls being made between 10:10 p.m. 
and 10:43 p.m.   The final call was made at 10:43 p.m., seventeen minutes before the 
murder occurred, pinged off a Silver Spring cell tower located .54 of a mile from the scene 
of the murder. 
 
 
 
8 
 
Pursuant to the suppression court’s ruling, no evidence relative to the April 14 or 
April 30 interviews was offered in the State’s case-in-chief.6  
 
Reynolds elected to exercise his right to testify.  During direct examination, he 
testified regarding his personal and professional life.  He was born in Jamaica, adopted by 
a prominent family, and completed two years of college.  Reynolds was sixteen years old 
when he first met King, who was ten to twelve years his senior, while working for 
Reynolds’s family business.  Reynolds continued to stay in touch with King and his family 
after they migrated to the United States.  Reynolds met his wife, Smith, in Jamaica before 
she moved to the United States in 1998.  Reynolds followed Smith there a year later.  The 
couple had a baby born in 2000 and settled in New York.  Reynolds acquired a fake New 
York driver’s license in the name of Kevin Reynolds. 
 
Reynolds admitted that he used to deal drugs with King.  He became involved in 
selling drugs with King and his family in California.  Reynolds helped King move to an 
apartment in Maryland and bought him furniture.  Reynolds would transport marijuana 
from New York to Maryland in his minivan.  Reynolds testified that he and King enjoyed 
a positive relationship, and he held no animosity against King at the time of King’s death. 
 
Reynolds testified that on the day of King’s murder he was in Brooklyn, New York 
and picked up his daughter from daycare at 6:00 p.m.  According to Reynolds, he arrived 
                                              
 
6 During trial, Reynolds and the State jointly stipulated that after Reynolds’s arrest 
and subsequent interview on April 14, 2014, he stated that his name was Dennis Graham, 
denied that he was Kevin Reynolds, denied that he had ever been in the State of Maryland, 
and denied that he had a relationship with Simone Smith in 2002.  
 
 
 
9 
home around 6:30 p.m., where a babysitter, Karlene Gill, was present.  Smith returned 
home shortly after 8:00 p.m.  Reynolds testified that he had an appointment with Caroline 
George to conduct an estimate for repairs on her home.  He left his apartment between 9:30 
p.m. and 10:00 p.m. and arrived at George’s house around 10:30 p.m.  Reynolds left shortly 
after 11:00 p.m. and arrived home around midnight, where he saw both Smith and Gill. 
 
Reynolds testified that around 1:00 a.m., the following morning, Smith began 
receiving phone calls and Reynolds learned that King had been killed.  Following King’s 
murder, Reynolds quickly learned that he was a suspect.  Four days later, Reynolds created 
an alias, Dennis Graham, and ultimately left for Jamaica in December of 2002.  Reynolds 
returned to the United States various times over the next decade.  Upon Reynolds’s return 
to the country in April of 2014, Reynolds was apprehended for King’s murder.  
 
On cross-examination, the State addressed inconsistent statements Reynolds made 
during the April 14 police interview, which were at odds with his trial testimony.  The State 
asked Reynolds: 
[STATE]: Didn’t you tell the police, that in November of 2002, you were in 
the Virgin Islands? 
[REYNOLDS]: Yes, I did. 
[STATE]: And didn’t you also tell the police that you had never been to 
Maryland more than passing through? 
[REYNOLDS]: Yes, I did. 
[STATE]: So, you didn’t tell them what you’re telling the jury today, that 
Wesley King was your great friend and you regularly saw him and shared an 
apartment with him? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.  
 
 
 
10 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
[REYNOLDS]: No, I was uncertain the capacity [sic] of Dennis Graham at 
that time. 
[STATE]: So you were pretending to be somebody else to the police and 
hoping you could convince them of that? 
[REYNOLDS]: Right, I was hoping to preserve the identity of Dennis 
Graham.  So, I was answering those questions with that in mind. 
**** 
[STATE]: And you told the police that when you first came to the United 
States, that you worked selling cars with Byron Matamora (phonetic sp.), 
correct? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection 
THE COURT: Overruled 
[REYNOLDS]: Yes.  
[STATE]: Now Byron Dwyer? 
[REYNOLDS]: Correct. 
[STATE]: Are there two Byrons? 
[REYNOLDS]: No. 
[STATE]: So, which is his correct last name? 
[REYNOLDS]: His name is Dwyer. 
[STATE]: And you didn’t work selling cars with him, correct? 
[REYNOLDS]: I helped him when he was, when I came back to the States 
in ‘03, and I was staying with him out in Jersey.  I used to help him out, 
selling cars. 
[STATE]: And you also told the police that you were living with a girl named 
Rose, correct? 
[REYNOLDS]: Correct. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.  
THE COURT: Overruled. 
[STATE]: And when asked what Rosa’s [sic] last name was, you said Lopez, 
correct? 
 
 
 
11 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.  
THE COURT: Overruled.  
[REYNOLDS]: Correct. 
[STATE]: Is Rose Lopez a real person? 
[REYNOLDS]: Yes, she is. 
[STATE]: Who is Rose Lopez? 
[REYNOLDS]: She was a neighbor of Byron Dwyer that I used to see back 
then. 
[STATE]: And is it someone you’ve had a relationship with, or was that a 
lie, too? 
[REYNOLDS]: I, we had relationships, yes. 
[STATE]: So, instead of telling the police about Caroline George, or Karlene 
Gill, who could truly alibi you, you started naming Rose Lopez and Byron 
Matamora, who isn’t even a real person? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.  
THE COURT: Overruled. 
[REYNOLDS]: Yes. 
[STATE]: And just so we’re clear, you never said anything about Caroline 
George or Karlene Gill? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
[REYNOLDS]: Like I said, at that time, I was preserving my identity as 
Dennis Graham.   So, I was answering in the capacity of Dennis Graham. 
[STATE]: Because you were hoping the Dennis Graham cover would work 
first, correct? 
[REYNOLDS]: Correct. 
[STATE]: And when the Dennis Graham cover fell through, and we realized 
that you aren’t Dennis Graham, now you create the second cover, which is 
the alibi, correct? 
[REYNOLDS]: I did not create the second cover. 
[STATE]: But you agree, you’ve never mentioned the alibi to the police? 
 
 
 
12 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.  May we approach. 
At the bench, Reynolds’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State impermissibly 
cross-examined Reynolds regarding details he did not disclose to the detectives, even 
though Reynolds asserted his right to remain silent during the interview.  The trial court 
denied the motion, but gave an instruction to the jury limiting prior witness statements to 
be considered only to aid the jury in determining the credibility of witness testimony.   
 
On January 13, 2015, a jury convicted Reynolds on all counts and the trial court 
sentenced him on March 31, 2015.  Thereafter, Reynolds noted a timely appeal to the Court 
of Special Appeals. 
The Court of Special Appeals 
 
Before the Court of Special Appeals, Reynolds challenged, inter alia, the trial 
court’s decision to admit portions of his post-arrest statements and the denial of his motion 
for mistrial.  See Reynolds, 2017 WL 5171593, at *1 (querying “[d]id the trial court err in 
permitting any portion of either custodial statement to be used at trial and in denying 
Reynolds’s motion for a mistrial as a result of such use?”).  Reynolds argued that his 
request for a mistrial should have been granted, because the State cross-examined him 
regarding his failure to disclose the identity of certain alibi witnesses during the April 14 
interview.  Id.  at 11.  Reynolds asserted that such questions constituted the use of silence 
against him, and thus were violations of Miranda.  Id.  The State countered that it was not 
using his silence against him, but rather, was impeaching him regarding the conflict 
between his statements during the April 14 interview and his alibi testimony at trial.  Id.   
 
 
 
13 
 
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the State that the questions asked at trial 
were “classic impeachment, relating to what [Reynolds] said during the April 14 interview 
and how it differed from his trial testimony.”  Id.  (Emphasis in original).  The Court of 
Special Appeals noted that during Reynolds’s initial interview, he “claimed to be Dennis 
Graham; denied knowing the victim; claimed to be in the Virgin Islands at the time of the 
murder; claimed to have only ‘been through’ Maryland in the past; said he worked with 
Byron Matamora; and stated that he was in a relationship with Rose Lopez at the time of 
the murder.”  Id.  To the contrary, during Reynolds’s direct examination, he admitted that 
he was Clement Reynolds; that he was married to Simone Smith at that time; that he was 
actually in New York at the time of the murder; and that he never mentioned Caroline 
George or Karlene Gill as part of his alibi.  Id.  The Court assessed that the State was 
pointing out these discrepancies to contradict his in-court testimony, not to use his silence 
against him.  Id.  Finding that the State’s use of Reynolds’s inconsistent testimony was not 
error, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction.  Reynolds filed a timely 
petition for certiorari, asking us to consider whether his right to due process was violated 
when the trial court allowed the State to cross-examine him regarding statements related to 
his alibi defense that were elicited after he invoked Miranda.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“Subject to supervening constitutional mandates and the established rules of 
evidence, evidentiary rulings on the scope of witness testimony at trial are largely within 
the dominion of the trial judge[.]” Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102, 1106 
 
 
 
14 
(2001).  “Generally, appellate courts review the denial of a motion for a mistrial under the 
abuse of discretion standard[.]”  Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445, 454, 3 A.3d 403, 408 (2010).  
We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling “unless there has been an abuse of discretion of 
a character likely to have injured the complaining party.”  Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 
175, 243, 670 A.2d 398, 432 (1995).  “[T]rial judges have wide discretion to admit or 
exclude items of evidence....”  Gauvin v. State, 411 Md. 698, 710, 985 A.2d 513, 520 
(2009).  Where the evidentiary ruling is a discretionary one, “a trial court’s ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence is reviewed pursuant to the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.”  
Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 583, 976 A.2d 300, 310–11 (2009).  However, 
“[w]here a party complains that the trial judge’s action abridged a constitutional right,” this 
Court’s review is de novo.  Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 157, 166 A.3d 183, 194 (2017).   
Although Reynolds alleges a due process violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, the alleged violation occurred as a result of the trial judge’s discretionary decision 
to allow impeachment questions.  We will conduct our own appraisal of Reynolds’s 
constitutional arguments and review the trial judge’s admissibility determinations for an 
abuse of discretion.   
DISCUSSION 
 
Although Reynolds’s claim rests upon constitutional rights as discussed in Miranda 
and its progeny, we address the rights afforded by the Federal constitution, the Maryland 
constitution, and Maryland common law.  Reynolds claims that the trial court denied him 
due process by permitting the State to question him about his failure to disclose an alibi 
 
 
 
15 
defense after he invoked Miranda.  Reynolds asserts that a reading of Miranda dictates that 
an individual has a right to remain silent during a custodial interrogation.  During the April 
14 interview, when Reynolds told police officers “[t]here’s nothing I have to say[,]” he 
avers that the State’s cross-examination regarding what he did not tell the police following 
an invocation of his right to remain silence, constituted reversible legal error.  The State 
counters that even statements taken in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach a 
witness’s prior inconsistent statement.  Reynolds’s claim requires us to interpret and apply 
Miranda and its progeny.  As explained infra, an invocation of Miranda does not preclude 
the State from impeaching a witness concerning prior inconsistent statements, even after a 
suspect invokes his right to remain silent.  
Constitutional Considerations  
 
The Federal and State constitutions unequivocally protect the right to remain silent 
in the face of custodial interrogation by law enforcement.  An individual’s due process 
rights are the tenets of two foundational constitutional provisions: the Fourteenth and the 
Fifth Amendments.  The Due Process Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a 
corollary to the federal Due Process Clause, similarly provides that “[t]hat no man ought 
to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, 
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by 
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”  Md. Const., Declaration of Rights,  
 
 
 
16 
Art. 24.   “The due process clause of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the [United States Constitution] have the same meaning; and 
we have said that Supreme Court interpretations of the federal provision are authority for 
the interpretation of Article 24.”  Dep’t of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 415–16, 474 
A.2d 191, 203 (1984).  
 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person 
shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The 
Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (1964).  Similarly, Article 22 of the Maryland 
Constitution provides “no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in 
a criminal case.”  Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. 22.  Article 22, with its federal 
counterpart, the Fifth Amendment, provides a privilege against being compelled to be a 
witness against oneself.  Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382–83, 51 A. 26, 28 (1902); Bass v. 
State, 182 Md. 496, 500–01, 35 A.2d 155, 157 (1943); Adams v. State, 202 Md. 455, 460–
63, 97 A.2d 281, 283 (1953), rev’d on other grounds, 347 U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442, (1954); 
Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 292, 196 A.2d 614, 615 (1964); State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 
699, 707, 253 A.2d 877, 881 (1969); Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 597, 655 A.2d 370, 378 
(1995).  
 
The Supreme Court held in Miranda that statements obtained from defendants 
during custodial interrogation or conditions that created similar circumstances, without the 
 
 
 
17 
full warning of constitutional rights, and waiver of those rights, were inadmissible as 
having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  384 U.S. at 478–79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.  For Miranda warnings to be required, 
the defendant must be both in custody and subject to interrogation.  Within the scope 
of Miranda, “interrogation” applies “not only to express questioning, but also to any words 
or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect.”  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 
1689–90 (1980) (internal footnotes omitted).  These well-known Miranda warnings require 
an individual to be informed that “he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, 
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.  The warnings 
act as procedural safeguards against compelled self-incrimination.  Once an individual is 
apprised of these warnings, the individual has the right to invoke the constitutional 
safeguards or waive them and engage with law enforcement.  An invocation of the right to 
remain silent must be unequivocal and unambiguous for the police to terminate the 
interrogation.  Williams v. State, 445 Md. 452, 470, 128 A.3d 30, 40 (2015).  However, 
“[a]ny and all requests by the person being questioned to exercise his or her Miranda right 
to silence must be ‘scrupulously honored’ by police, and have the effect of ‘cut[ting] off 
questioning.’”  Williams v. State, 219 Md. App. 295, 316, 100 A.3d 1208, 1220 (2014), 
aff’d, 445 Md. 452, 128 A.3d 30 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103, 
 
 
 
18 
96 S.Ct. 321, 326 (1975)).  See also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59, 114 
S.Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (holding that where an individual unambiguously invokes the right 
to remain silent, there must be immediate cessation of all questioning).  If an individual 
invokes the right to remain silent, all questioning must cease.  Crosby, 366 Md. at 528–29, 
784 A.2d at 1108. 
 
 In the event that officers continue to question an individual, any evidence flowing 
therefrom is illegally obtained and thus subject to exclusion as fruit of the unlawful 
conduct.  Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 521, 781 A.2d 787, 806 (2001).  “The rule is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair[]” an erosion of constitutional rights by precluding the 
State from using illegally obtained evidence.  Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599–600, 95 
S.Ct. 2254, 2260 (1975).  “[T]he exclusionary rule is perhaps the most effective and 
practical means of curbing lawless police[.]”  Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 419, 825 
A.2d 1078, 1086 (2003) (internal citations omitted).  The caveat to generally excluding 
statements in violation of Miranda allows the evidence to be used for impeachment 
purposes.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629.  See Harris, 401 U.S. at 226, 91 S. 
Ct. at 646 (holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach 
Harris’s inconsistent trial testimony); Hass, 420 U.S. at 722, 95 S.Ct. at 1221 (allowing 
information obtained after Miranda warnings were given to be used for impeachment 
purposes).  Allowing statements elicited in violation of Miranda for impeachment 
purposes, but not as substantive evidence, strikes a “pragmatic balance between two 
competing public policies—the exclusionary rule precluding the use of confessions 
 
 
 
19 
obtained in violation of Miranda, on the one hand, and not giving defendants a free ride to 
commit perjury[.]”   Wright v. State, 349 Md. 334, 348, 708 A.2d 316, 323 (1998).  
 
However,  the Supreme Court has made clear that statements elicited during police 
custody and interrogation are inadmissible if there is coercive police action similar to that 
in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986) or Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991).  In Connelly, the Supreme Court determined that 
where the defendant confessed to a murder, but it was later revealed that he “was following 
‘the voice of God[,]’” the confession was involuntary.  479 U.S. at 161, 107 S.Ct. at 518. 
Likewise, the Court held in Fulminante, where the defendant confessed to an undercover 
agent in prison under the guise of receiving protection from prison violence, the confession 
was also coerced.  499 U.S. at 287, 111 S.Ct. at 1252.  Supreme Court precedent clearly 
dictates that statements taken in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach an 
individual’s trial testimony, so long as the statements were elicited voluntarily.  
 
An individual’s post-arrest silence is also protected by Miranda and generally 
cannot be admitted as substantive evidence at trial.  The Supreme Court articulated this 
concept in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244–45 (1976), opining 
that following receipt of Miranda warnings, “post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous 
because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.”  In Doyle, the Supreme 
Court explored the obstacles that post-arrest silence can pose.  Primarily, when an 
individual is silent following an arrest, it is ambiguous to the finder of fact whether the 
silence is a result of acquiescence or disagreement to questioning.  “Failure to contest an 
 
 
 
20 
assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been 
natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question.”  United States v. 
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136 (1975).  Notwithstanding an accusation or 
assertion, in the face of contemporaneous statements, Miranda warnings carry an implicit 
assurance that silence will not be penalized.  Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245.  
Otherwise, the introduction of an individual’s invocation of the constitutional right to 
silence, “would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the 
arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at 
trial.”  Id.  However, “Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into 
prior inconsistent statements.  Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence because a 
defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced 
to remain silent.”  Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 2182 (1980) 
(per curiam). 
 
Supreme Court precedent on post-Miranda silence “does not force any state court 
to allow impeachment[.]  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2130 
(1980).  The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court should be regarded as the 
minimum of constitutionally afforded protections, where each State may expand 
Miranda’s constitutional rights as it deems fit.  With the tenets of Miranda and its progeny, 
we now assess whether Reynolds’s statements after invoking Miranda should be subject 
to the exclusionary rule.   
 
 
 
21 
Post-Arrest Silence: Permissible Uses of Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment 
Purposes 
 
Case law developed in Maryland and in the United States Supreme Court following 
Miranda requires us to address the timeline of the statements elicited by detectives when 
Reynolds invoked the right to remain silent.  Undisputedly, the April 14 interview 
constituted a custodial interrogation by the detectives, thus prompting the need for Miranda 
warnings.  At issue is whether Reynolds’s indication that he desired to remain silent was 
sufficient to invoke Miranda’s protections.  Although disputed by the State, the suppression 
court found that statements elicited after Reynolds indicated that there was “nothing I have 
to say[,]” were taken in violation of Miranda.  The Court of Special Appeals concurred 
that although Reynolds’s statements were made voluntarily, the continued questioning 
violated Miranda.  Reynolds, 2017 WL 5171593, at *8.  The detectives violated Miranda 
by continuing to question Reynolds after multiple indications that he desired to cease the 
interrogation.  The detectives elicited statements related to his location on the night of 
King’s murder and the identity of persons who could have potentially verified his 
whereabouts.  Detective Colbert asked Reynolds which country he was in during 
November of 2002, to which Reynolds responded that he was in the Virgin Islands.  
Reynolds also told detectives about two individuals, Byron Matamora and Rose Lopez, 
who were affiliated with Reynolds at the time.  Where the suppression court rendered a 
reasonable factual determination that Reynolds’s declarative statement was sufficient to 
invoke his right to remain silent, we decline to disturb that finding. 
 
 
 
22 
 
At trial, Reynolds testified on direct examination that he was actually in New York 
on the night of King’s murder and that two witnesses, Caroline George and Karlene Gill, 
could serve as his alibi.   On cross-examination, the State inquired “[s]o, instead of telling 
the police about Caroline George, or Karlene Gill, who could truly alibi you, you started 
naming Rose Lopez and Byron Matamora, who isn’t even a real person?”  Reynolds’s 
objection to this question was overruled.  The State continued, “just so we’re clear, you 
never said anything about Caroline George or Karlene Gill?”  Reynolds’s counsel again 
objected, approached the bench, and moved for a mistrial, which was ultimately denied.  
Reynolds asserts that he omitted information about his alibi from police officers because 
he was exercising his right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda, and that the trial court’s 
admission of his post-Miranda silence, was an impermissible infringement of Reynolds’s 
right to due process.   
 
Reynolds argues that Maryland liberally construes the right to be free from 
compulsory self-incrimination, and thus, this Court should evaluate Reynolds’s claim 
through the lens of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.  At issue is whether Reynolds’s 
failure to apprise officers of the alibi he introduced during trial constituted silence.  We 
have examined silence introduced against a criminal defendant on multiple occasions.  
Before this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, Reynolds relied on our decision in 
Grier, where we concluded that “[e]vidence of post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings 
are given, is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment.”  Grier v. State, 351 
Md. 241, 258, 718 A.2d 211, 219 (1998) (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245 
 
 
 
23 
(1976)).  The petitioner in Grier was arrested for forcibly stealing another’s backpack and 
was charged with attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, in violation of Article 27, § 
488 of the Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.); statutory maiming, in 
violation of Article 27, § 3851 of the Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.); and other 
related offenses.  Grier, 351 Md. at 245, 718 A.2d at 213.   During the direct examination 
of the arresting officer, the State inquired about whether Grier offered any explanation for 
the crime prior to the arrest, to which the arresting officer indicated that Grier did not.   Id. 
at 248, 718 A.2d at 215.  We rejected the State’s proposition that a defendant’s failure to 
come forward and tell the police his version of events was admissible as substantive 
evidence of guilt on the grounds that such silence was not probative.   Id. at 255, 718 A.2d 
at 218.  The Court rationalized that failure to speak up in the presence of police could be a 
result of numerous factors, thus, the evidence of post-arrest silence is more prejudicial than 
probative and generally should not be admitted.  Id. at 254–55, 718 A.2d at 218.  
 
We reiterated the principle again in reference to post-Miranda silence in Kosh v. 
State, 382 Md. 218, 227, 854 A.2d 1259, 1265 (2004) (explaining “silence is evidence of 
dubious value that is usually inadmissible under either Maryland Rule 5-402 or 5-403[]”) 
(footnote omitted); Lupfer v. State, 420 Md. 111, 132, 21 A.3d 1080, 1092 (2011) 
(reasoning “[e]vidence of post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings are given, is 
inadmissible[]”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Coleman v. State, 434 Md. 
320, 346, 75 A.3d 916, 931 (2013) (reversing a criminal conviction when trial counsel 
failed to object because “Coleman’s post-Miranda silence ‘so upset the adversarial balance 
 
 
 
24 
between defense and prosecution that the trial was unfair and the verdict rendered 
suspect.’”).  Cf. Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 244, 322 A.2d 211, 217 (1974) (concluding 
“[s]ilence in the context of a custodial inquisition is presumed to be an exercise of the 
privilege against self-incrimination from which no legal penalty can flow[.]”). The 
Supreme Court and our precedent is clear, evidence of a criminal defendant’s post-Miranda 
silence cannot be introduced at trial.  
 
However, Reynolds asserts that making statements to the police, invoking the right 
to remain silent, testifying at trial, and having his silence used against him for impeachment 
purposes, is a matter of first impression for this Court.  Reynolds argues that this scenario 
is factually distinguishable from our other decisions analyzing post-arrest, post-Miranda 
silence, and encourages this Court to follow the analysis in United States v. Caruto, 532 
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).  In Caruto, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that cross-examination on the discrepancies between post-Miranda  omissions 
and in-trial testimony is impermissible because it engenders meaning from constitutionally 
protected silence.  Id. at 831.  Caruto was arrested with seventy-five pounds of cocaine in 
her vehicle.  Id. at 824.  Caruto was advised of her Miranda rights and agreed to make a 
statement.  Id.  However, five to seven minutes into the interview, she invoked her right to 
counsel, thereby cutting her statement short.  Id. at 824.  All questioning ceased, and Caruto 
made no other statements.  Id.  Portions of her statement were memorialized as handwritten 
notes taken by one of the interrogating officers.  Id. 
 
 
 
25 
 
 At trial, the interrogating officer was asked, “[w]hat did she tell you about the 
truck?”  Id.  The officer explained that Caruto lent the vehicle to her friends in Mexico 
three to four weeks prior, and the vehicle was returned on the same day she drove to Los 
Angeles.  Id.  Caruto testified inconsistently with the officers’ testimony that her friend, 
Jimenez, was interested in purchasing the truck, and asked to take it to a mechanic to “try 
it[,]” and upon returning from the mechanic Jimenez offered to buy it.  Id. at 825.  Jimenez 
was to pay her $1,000 immediately and $1,000 once Caruto drove the truck to Los Angeles.  
Id.  During closing arguments the prosecutor argued that Caruto did not tell the agents that 
she lent the truck to Jimenez, did not tell the agents that Jimenez gave her the truck, did 
not provide the agents with Jimenez’s phone number, and did not tell the agents she was 
selling the truck.  Id. at 826.  Relying on Doyle, the Caruto Court held that where “it is a 
defendant’s invocation of her Miranda rights that results in the omitted facts that create the 
difference between the two descriptions, cross-examination based on those omissions 
draws meaning from the defendant’s protected silence in a manner not permitted by 
Doyle.”  Id. at 831.  Factually distinguishable from Caruto, inter alia, is that the 
prosecution argued that Caruto failed to give officers pertinent information, unlike here 
where Reynolds told the officers facts that were inconsistent with his trial testimony.  
Missing from Reynolds’s reliance on Caruto is a recognition of the distinction between 
silence and using affirmative inconsistent statements for impeachment.   
 
The Caruto Court also considered the Supreme Court’s rationale in Anderson v. 
Charles, 447 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180.  Charles, the defendant, was arrested while 
 
 
 
26 
driving a stolen car, and charged with murdering the vehicle’s owner.  Id.  Charles was 
given Miranda warnings and then asked about the stolen vehicle.  Id. at 405, 100 S.Ct. 
2180. Charles told the police that he stole the car in Ann Arbor, Michigan, two miles from 
a bus station.  Id.  At trial, the arresting officer testified to the same facts Charles conveyed 
during the interrogation.  Id.  Later, Charles took the stand and testified that he took the 
vehicle from a parking lot next to the bus station, inconsistent with his statement that he 
took it from two miles away from the bus station.  Id.  On cross-examination, the State 
asked Charles, “[d]on't you think it’s rather odd that if it were the truth that you didn’t come 
forward and tell anybody at the time you were arrested, where you got that car?”  Id. at 
406, 100 S.Ct. 2181.  In light of Doyle, the Court reasoned that the State’s cross-
examination was proper because “[s]uch questioning makes no unfair use of silence 
because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been 
induced to remain silent.  As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not 
remained silent at all.”  In the case at bar, Reynolds similarly testified inconsistently about 
the underlying subject of whom he saw on the night of King’s murder.  Like the questions 
posed towards Charles “were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an 
explanation for a prior inconsistent statement[,]” the questions regarding Reynolds’s alibi 
were not pointed at highlighting his omissions from law enforcement.  Id. at 409, 100 S.Ct. 
at 2182.  Rather, the State’s questions referred to Reynolds’s prior inconsistent statements. 
 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s determination in Harris and Hass, a 
defendant’s voluntary and trustworthy statements obtained in violation of Miranda that are 
 
 
 
27 
inconsistent with the defendant’s direct examination testimony, can be used for 
impeachment.  Reynolds argues that Miranda invoked silence cannot be used against a 
defendant even for impeachment purposes.  In contrast, the State avers that Reynolds did 
not simply omit his alibi testimony by opting to remain silent.  Rather, his statements to 
detectives and testimony at trial were inconsistent, and accordingly, could be used by the 
State to impeach his credibility.  In support of its argument, the State relies on United States 
Supreme Court precedent including Harris, 401 U.S. at 222, 91 S.Ct. at 643 and Hass, 420 
U.S. at 714, 95 S.Ct. at 1215.  Both Hass and Harris certainly stand for the proposition that 
an individual’s post-Miranda statements can be used at trial for impeachment purposes.   
 
Harris was charged in “a two-count indictment with twice selling heroin to an 
undercover police officer.”  Harris, 401 U.S. at 222-23, 91 S.Ct. at 644.  Testifying in his 
own defense, Harris denied selling the undercover officer illegal drugs, and claimed that 
the substance sold to the undercover officer was baking powder.  Id.  On cross-examination, 
the State asked about statements he made immediately following his arrest that 
contradicted his direct testimony.  Id. at 223, 91 S. Ct. at 644.  Harris claimed that he could 
not remember any of his statements.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that Harris’ voluntary 
statement, although procured in violation of Miranda, was properly used to impeach him 
when he testified inconsistently with his prior statement at trial.  Id. at 226, 91 S.Ct. at 646. 
 
Similarly, in Hass, the Court confirmed that the deterrence factor provided by the 
exclusionary rule is sufficiently maintained “when the evidence in question is made 
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.”  420 U.S. at 722, 95 S.Ct. at 1221.  Hass 
 
 
 
28 
was involved in the theft of two bicycles.  Id. at 715, 95 S.Ct. at 1217.   After Hass was 
apprehended and placed under arrest, officers gave Hass the prescribed Miranda warnings.  
Id.  Hass immediately admitted to taking the bicycles, but once placed in a patrol car he 
indicated he wanted to contact his attorney.  Id.  Hass then pointed out where one of the 
stolen bicycles was hidden in a nearby bush.  Id. at 716, 95 S.Ct. at 1218.  Hass testified at 
trial that he did not know the bicycle was stolen.  Id.  As a rebuttal witness, the State called 
the arresting officer who testified that Hass told officers where the bikes were stolen.  Id. 
at 717, 95 S.Ct. at 1218.  Applying Harris, the Court reiterated that a reading of Miranda 
does not require that evidence inadmissible against Hass in the prosecution’s case-in-chief 
be barred for all purposes, always provided that “the trustworthiness of the evidence 
satisfies legal standards.”  Id. at 722, 95 S.Ct. at 1221 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  “[T]he impeaching material would provide valuable aid to the jury in assessing 
the defendant’s credibility; again, ‘the benefits of this process should not be lost[.]’”  Id.  
 
Reynolds argues that despite the lengthy precedent built around Harris and Hass, 
these principles should not apply.  Reynolds argues that Harris is distinguishable because 
Harris only considered the use of statements that the petitioner in Harris actually made to 
the police, not silence.  Indeed, silence was not at issue in Harris.  However, despite 
Reynolds’s contention, the issue before this Court is not one of custodial silence.  To the 
contrary, Reynolds provided detectives details about his personal life, which ran contrary 
to his trial testimony. These affirmative statements were then used for “classic 
impeachment” purposes.  Reynolds, 2017 WL 5171593, at *11.   For that reason, the 
 
 
 
29 
underlying application of a prior inconsistent statement in Harris is equally employable 
here.  Much like Harris who provided police officers distinctly inconsistent statements from 
his trial testimony, Reynolds told the detectives that he was in the Virgin Islands at the time 
of King’s murder.  At trial, he testified that he was in New York.  The identities of his two 
alibi witnesses who were also in New York, were necessarily related to the inconsistent 
statements about where he was on the night of the murder.  The holding from Harris, that 
prior inconsistent statements that would otherwise be Miranda violative statements can be 
used to impeach a witness’s in court testimony, is on par with the factual circumstances in 
this case.  
 
For the same reasons Reynolds’s claim that Harris is incongruous to the facts of 
this case fails, his criticisms of Hass should also fail.  Reynolds argues that Hass is 
incongruous because Hass, like Harris, was impeached by what he told the police, not by 
what he failed to tell the police.  Reynolds also asserts that Hass’s testimony directly 
contradicted testimony that he told police, and alludes that Reynolds, somehow, did not.  
As Reynolds properly identifies, the Hass Court relied directly on Harris, which we follow 
here.  Additionally, Reynolds’s statements to the detectives about his whereabouts on the 
night of King’s murder are directly inconsistent with the testimony he gave at trial.  
Miranda’s premise as reiterated in both Hass and Harris, allows prior inconsistent 
statements to be used directly for impeachment purposes.  Therefore, it was not error for 
the State to inquire on cross-examination about the inconsistent statements Reynolds made 
to police officers after he invoked Miranda. 
 
 
 
30 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We conclude that it was not error for the trial court to permit the State to inquire 
about prior inconsistent statements made to detectives after Reynolds invoked Miranda.   
The State’s use of Reynolds’s prior inconsistent statements about what he did not tell the 
State were not post-arrest silence, but rather affirmative statements about his alibi.  In 
accordance with Miranda and its progeny, it was appropriate for the State to impeach 
Reynolds about this testimony on cross-examination.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. 
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.