Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 368 Md. 320

Docket Number: 80/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Martinez R. Brown v. State of Maryland
No. 80, September Term, 2001
Headnote:
Petitioner was convicted of various offenses after a jury trial in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.  At trial, the trial judge had refused petitioner’s
request to call a witness to impeach the credibility of the State’s witnesses
because the trial judge had found petitioner’s witness not to be credible during
a hearing outside of the presence of the jury.  We hold that defendants are
entitled to present their complete defense and that issues of witness credibility
are to be determined by the trier of fact, in this case a jury.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case # 199336014
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 80
September Term, 2001
MARTINEZ R. BROWN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   March 7, 2002
Martinez R. Brown, petitioner, was convicted, after a jury trial in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, of second degree assault, wearing and carrying a handgun, and being a felon
in possession of a handgun.  He was sentenced to various concurrent and consecutive periods
of incarceration.  His convictions were affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.  We granted
his Petition for Writ of Certiorari on October 12, 2001.  Brown v. State, 366 Md. 246, 783
A.2d 221 (2001).
Petitioner presents one question for our review:
“Is it error for a trial judge to refuse to allow the defense, during its case
in chief, to call a witness whom the court deems to lack credibility based on
testimony given by that witness during a hearing out of the jury’s presence?”
We will hold that under the facts of this case, it was error, and we will reverse.
I. Facts
a. The Arrest
Police officers in Baltimore City received dispatches that there were “armed persons,
people armed with guns” in the 2300 block of Biddle Street in the early morning hours of
November 6, 1999.  They were also furnished with descriptions of two persons who allegedly
had the guns.  Two officers responded to the location.  There they observed four individuals;
two matched the descriptions that had been furnished to the officers.  Petitioner was not one
of the individuals who matched the descriptions.
All of the individuals were ordered to show their hands and to get on the ground.
Petitioner ran, instead of complying with the officers’ commands.  He was chased by several
officers (additional officers had arrived on the scene).  One officer caught petitioner and
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pulled him to the ground where the two scuffled.  Petitioner retrieved a gun from his
waistband and there was a struggle for the gun, with the officer knocking the gun from
petitioner’s hand.  Other officers then helped subdue petitioner.
b. The Sequestration Hearing 
During a pre-trial suppression hearing, the witnesses had been sequestered.  After the
suppression hearing, Ms. Mazahn, petitioner’s mother, informed petitioner’s counsel that
during a recess in the suppression hearing she had overheard several officers discussing their
testimony.  At a hearing in regards to whether the sequestration order had been violated,
which was held after the trial had started, but out of the presence of the jury, Ms. Mazahn
stated that after Officer Clinedinst had testified in the suppression hearing, she overheard him
and Officer Boyd talking in the hallway.  One of them, according to Ms. Mazahn, stated:
“‘Man, you got to say I said he was arrested right here, “A,” not at “B,” . . . .’” Ms. Mazahn
said that the other officer responded: “‘Well, okay, man.  No problem.  No problem’ . . . .”
Although the record is not completely clear, Ms. Mazahn also apparently stated that the
exchange between the officers included one telling the other “‘[m]an, you can’t say that
because I said Mr. Brown was arrested right here.’”  According to the witness, the officer then
began to write on a piece of paper to illustrate what “right here” meant.
In the hearing as to whether the sequestration order had been violated, the State
proffered that the officers would deny that the conversation had taken place.  Petitioner’s
counsel stipulated that the officers would so testify.  At the conclusion of the hearing on the
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alleged violation of the sequestration order, the trial judge found that the sequestration order
had not been violated, stating: “[H]er testimony made absolutely no sense.  The Court so
holds, no violation of the sequestration rule, and that’s that.” 
c. The Issue of Credibility
During closing argument, the State said to the jury, in relevant part:
“[State]:  . . . The testimony of Officers Clinedinst, Guizzotti, Young,
and Boyd.  Those four people’s testimony are evidence that you have to
evaluate. . . . 
.     .     .            
 
“. . . And in the rigorous cross-examination that each one of those
officers was exposed to . . . , they were asked all kinds of details and you’ve
got to figure out whether they’re lying or they’re telling the truth.
.     .     . 
“. . . [S]ee, that corroborates what every one of those cops told you
about the radio call because they all said the same thing. . . . 
.     .     .
“Young and Boyd tell you the same story. They take off. . . .  This is
Boyd’s drawing. . . .
.     .     .
“And this evidence supports everything that those police officers told
you. 
.     .     .
 
“All of this evidence corroborates itself. Each officer corroborates the
other.” [Emphasis added.]
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In petitioner’s closing argument, his counsel took the primary position that it was the
inconsistencies in the evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt, saying,
in part:
“[The State’s Attorney] seems to feel that the inconsistencies just mean they’re
little mistakes.  Those inconsistencies add up. . . .  Every little hole you find in
this case leads to a bigger hole. . . . 
“Just one inconsistency? Oh, big deal. . . . [W]hen you have
inconsistency after inconsistency, you have a problem with the case. 
“. . .  I’m not saying the officers are lying. . . .  The State is coming in
here with a very serious accusation and they want you to convict on proof that
is not standing up, that’s not meshing together.
.     .     .
 
“But if you’re looking at this and every time you think you have – you
know, you know what is going on, another inconsistency pops up, something
that doesn’t make sense pops up, then the State has not proven its case and you
have to find Mr. Brown not guilty.” [Emphasis added.]
The State in its final closing argument, responded, in relevant part:
“You saw the cops testifying.  They don’t remember all the details. . . .
They’re not machines, but in this case, fortunately, they were professionals that
restrained themselves and nobody is dead, thank God.
.     .     .
“Common sense. If you follow what [defense counsel] is asking you to
do with common sense, the holes in the nylons and the ponds that are growing
from the drops of water and all that business, what she wants you to believe is
that these police officers are conspiring against him.  Why?  Don’t they have
enough to do? . . .
“Do you think, based on the way you saw these police officers handle
themselves, that they’re interested in conspiring to get him . . .?” [Emphasis
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added.]
It is clear from the arguments of both parties that the credibility of the various officers
was a key element in petitioner’s attempts to defend himself.  It is also clear that the State
understood issues of credibility to be a key element of the defense.
d. Rulings
Near the end of the hearing on the alleged violation of the sequestration order,
petitioner’s counsel attempted to get permission to call Ms. Mazahn as a witness before the
jury in the trial in chief in respect to the officers’ credibility, to testify as to what she alleged
she had overheard the officers saying in the hallway during the suppression hearing.  Once
it became obvious that the trial court was not going to strike the testimony of the police
officers, petitioner’s counsel stated to the court: “The only other suggestion I have, Your
Honor, is to allow me to call Ms. Mazahn as a defense, you know, call her as a defense
witness regarding the fact, you know, to that one statement, to that one statement she heard.”
The complete exchange was as follows: 
“THE COURT: Before the jury?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Before the jury.
“THE COURT: How in the world could that possibly be relevant – 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think it’s relevant because it goes to their
credibility.
“THE COURT: Well, if you take her testimony, the rambling nature
thereof, it’s hard to believe and it doesn’t really make any sense that they
would be trying to coordinate an irrelevant point.
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.     .     .
“THE COURT: Based upon that, the Court holds there was no violation
of the sequestration rule, period . . . .  [H]er [Ms. Mazahn’s] testimony made
absolutely no sense.  The Court so hold[s], no violation of the sequestration
rule, and that’s that.” 
It is clear that the trial judge, in his ruling at this point, did not realize that the question
then before him was whether Ms. Mazahn was going to be permitted to testify before a jury
as to what she alleged she had heard, not whether the officer’s testimony would be stricken
for a violation of the sequestration order.  Later, after the State rested and the motion for
judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case was denied, petitioner’s counsel again
addressed the court attempting to get permission to call Ms. Mazahn in the defendant’s case:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . Actually, Your Honor, let me just say
this point. Based on the hearing we had yesterday on the violation of the
sequestration order, I would want to put Ms. Loretta Mazahn on to show that
there was a – not to show that for the truth of the matter that the officers –
there was a violation of the sequestration order – well, the credibility of the –
let me put it this way.  I would want to put her on to show the credibility of the
officers is at stake.  Based on what she testified to, it is clear that at least
Officer Clinedinst was discussing the testimony with some other person.
“THE COURT: The Court does not find that to be true and does not
find that to be in any way credible and does not find a violation of the
sequestration rule, and your motion is denied.” 
At this point, the only request before the court was that defense counsel wanted to
present Ms. Mazahn in the trial itself to challenge the credibility of the officers, not to
challenge whether the officers had violated the sequestration order.  The trial court’s denial
of what he called her “motion’ was a denial of her right to present Ms. Mazahn as a witness
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to impeach the credibility of the officers who had already testified.  Additionally, it is also
clear that her request was denied because the trial judge did not find the testimony of Ms.
Mazahn to be “in any way credible.”  The jury, not the trial judge, was the fact-finder in this
case.  
II. Discussion
Whether Ms. Mazahn’s testimony is credible in an impeachment context at trial is for
the fact-finder, in this case a jury, to determine, unlike the issue of her credibility at a hearing
on whether State witnesses have violated a sequestration order, where normally, if not always,
a judge is the fact-finder, and thus assesses credibility.  In the case sub judice, in the context
of trial credibility issues, the trial judge’s ultimate ruling was beyond his power.  He was not
the proper trier of fact and assessor of credibility of witnesses at the trial of the case-in-chief.
He failed to realize that he was no longer in a hearing on whether a sequestration order had
been violated. 
We have reiterated, time and again, that defendants are, generally, entitled to present
their complete defense.  We have said for a hundred years and more that issues of the
credibility of witnesses at trial, normally, are for the finders of fact to resolve.  We said in
Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 313-14, 730 A.2d 181, 195 (1999), that:
“In a jury trial, judging the credibility of witnesses is entrusted solely to
the jury, the trier of fact; only the jury determines whether to believe any
witnesses, and which witnesses to believe.  See also Dykes v. State, 319 Md.
206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990) (requiring the court to ‘instruct the jury
that it is the sole judge of the facts, the weight of the evidence, and the
credibility of the witnesses’) . . . .” [Some citations omitted.]
1 Of course, during hearings on motions relating to legal issues, such as suppression hearings
as to evidence admissibility, initial hearings as to the voluntariness of confessions, or, as in this case,
hearings on whether a sequestration order has been violated and thus whether certain testimony
should be stricken, the judge, under those circumstances, is the initial, and sometimes final, trier of
fact.  In such situations, a judge may be the appropriate assessor of a witness’ credibility.
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Over a hundred years earlier in State use of Steever v. Union Railroad Company, 70
Md. 69, 77-78, 18 A. 1032, 1034 (1889), we said:
“‘. . . [W]hen the evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences which the
jury could justifiably draw from it, is insufficient to support a verdict for the
plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, must be set aside, the court is not
bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct a verdict for the defendant.’
Schofield v. R. R. Co.[,] 114 U. S. 618[, 5 S.C. 1125, 29 L. Ed. 224]. This ruling
was not intended to declare, and cannot be fairly construed to mean, that the
court ought to assume the power of judging of the credibility of witnesses, or
of deciding on the weight of testimony in cases of discrepancy. . . .  But
whatever may be the ruling of courts elsewhere, it has been held in this State,
as an axiom of the law, ever since the institution of courts of justice, that it is
the exclusive province of the jury to decide on the credibility of witnesses, and
to determine the weight of testimony.  And by this rule we shall abide.” 
In the hundred years between State use of Steever and Robinson, there have been
numerous cases confirming that in jury trials the credibility of witnesses is a jury issue.1  In
addition to Robinson, supra, these cases include Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Company, 359 Md.
513, 754 A.2d 1030 (2000); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 729 A.2d 910 (1999); Briggs v.
State, 348 Md. 470, 704 A.2d 904 (1998); Dennard v. Green, 335 Md. 305, 643 A.2d 422
(1994); Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 281, 619 A.2d 111, 114 (1993) (“[W]e are mindful of
the respective roles of the court and the jury; it is the jury’s task, not the court’s, to measure
the weight of evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses.”); Short v. Wells, 249 Md.
491, 497, 240 A.2d 224, 228 (1968) (“[T]he court should have submitted the evidence to the
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jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses . . . .”); McKenzie v. State, 236 Md. 597, 603,
204 A.2d 678, 681 (1964) (“Such matters go to the weight of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses and these are matters for determination by the jury.”); Ferrell v. State, 234
Md. 355, 356, 199 A.2d 362, 363 (1964) (“While the versions of the victim and of the
appellant differed, the credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the jury to determine.”);
Duffin v. State, 229 Md. 434, 436, 184 A.2d 624, 625 (1962) (“The weight of the evidence
and the credibility of witnesses are always matters for the jury to determine when it is the trier
of facts.”); Davis v. State, 229 Md. 139, 141, 182 A.2d 49, 50 (1962) (“[I]t was within the
province of the jury to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses.”);
Williams v. State, 228 Md. 356, 179 A.2d 891 (1962); Meredith v. Director of Patuxent
Institution, 226 Md. 653, 172 A.2d 501 (1961); Johnson v. State, 221 Md. 177, 156 A.2d 441
(1959). 
In a recent case in which the issue was whether it was proper for a prosecutor to
comment in argument that a testifying defendant’s credibility was affected by the fact that he
had been present in the courtroom during prior testimony, the Supreme Court of the United
States reaffirmed that the fact-finder is the proper entity to assess witness credibility,
commenting:
“Indeed, in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 32 L. Ed. 2d 358, 92 S.
Ct. 1891 (1972), the Court suggested that arguing credibility to the jury – which
would include the prosecutor’s comments here – is the preferred means of
counteracting tailoring of the defendant’s testimony. . . .  The Court expressed
its awareness, however, of the danger that tailoring presented.  The antidote, it
said, was not Tennessee’s heavy-handed rule, but the more nuanced ‘adversary
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system[, which] reposes judgment of the credibility of all witnesses in the jury.’
The adversary system surely envisions – indeed, it requires – that the prosecutor
be allowed to bring to the jury’s attention the danger that the Court was aware
of.”
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 70, 120 S. Ct. 1119, 1125-26, 146 L. Ed. 2d 47, 57 (2000)
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (some citations omitted).      
Conclusion
In this case, after exercising, appropriately, his powers to assess witness credibility in
respect to matters relating to the violations of sequestration orders and motions to strike
testimony, the trial judge failed to realize that the matter of the particular witness’s testimony
had been recast as testimony challenging the credibility of the State’s witnesses in the trial in
chief, as opposed to its character during the matters relating to legal issues.  Because he failed
to realize the difference, he strayed into the province of the jury and made credibility
assessments of a witness who the defense proposed to present to challenge the credibility of
trial witnesses.  In doing so, he erred.  Considering that the officers’ credibility was the
primary contested issue in the case, and, further, that both the State’s case and the defense’s
case relied on contrary assessments of that credibility, we cannot say that the error was not
prejudicial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE
THE JUDGM ENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND
REMAND THE CASE TO THAT
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COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY THE MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL
OF BALTIMORE.