Case Title: People v. Graves

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94633

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 94633-Agenda 4-May 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES 
							P. GRAVES, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 18, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue presented is whether the penalty for unauthorized theft
of $20,000 from a victim over the age of 60 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1),
(b)(5) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii), 5-8-2(b)(4) (West
2000)) is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the penalty for theft
by deception of $20,000 from a victim over the age of 60 (720 ILCS
5/16-1(a)(2), (b)(7) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West
2000)). We hold that it is not.

BACKGROUND
	While working as an investment representative at Edward Jones,
defendant, James P. Graves, misappropriated a $20,000 check
entrusted to him by a 71-year-old man and his 93-year-old mother.
Defendant later pleaded guilty to unauthorized theft of more than
$10,000 but not more than $100,000, an offense that ordinarily is a
Class 2 felony carrying a sentence of 3 to 7 years in prison. 720 ILCS
5/16-1(a)(1), (b)(5) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West
2000). However, because the victims in this case were 60 years of age
or older, defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence of 7 to
14 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii), 5-8-2(b)(4) (West
2000). The circuit court of Bureau County imposed an extended-term
sentence of 12 years and ordered defendant to pay the victims
$20,000 in restitution.
	Before the appellate court, defendant first argued that his
extended-term sentence was unconstitutional under the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In support, defendant
noted that the statutory aggravating factor in this case-i.e., the age of
the victims-was neither charged in the indictment nor proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Citing this court's decision in People v. Jackson,
199 Ill. 2d 286 (2002), the appellate court held that defendant's guilty
plea waived any Apprendi-based challenges to his sentence. 332 Ill.
App. 3d 685, 688.
	In the alternative, defendant argued that his 12-year sentence
violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). In support, defendant argued that,
although the offense of unauthorized theft of $20,000 from a victim
over the age of 60 is identical to that of theft by deception of $20,000
from a victim over the age of 60, the former offense carries a prison
term of 7 to 14 years while the latter offense carries a prison term of
only 3 to 7 years. The appellate court agreed with defendant,
explaining that "[s]ince the two offenses require the same elements
[citations], yet carry significantly different penalties, we find that the
penalties are unconstitutionally disproportionate." 332 Ill. App. 3d at
690. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated defendant's extended-term sentence and remanded the cause "for proper sentencing." 332
Ill. App. 3d at 691.
	Finally, defendant argued that the $20,000 restitution payment
should be redirected from the victims to Edward Jones. According to
defendant, Edward Jones has already reimbursed the victims for their
$20,000 loss, and thus the payment of an additional $20,000 to the
victims would constitute an unjustified windfall. The appellate court
did not reach the merits of this argument, instead remanding the cause
for further fact finding. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 691.
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).

ANALYSIS
	A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging
the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. In re K.C.,
186 Ill. 2d 542, 550 (1999). This court has a duty to construe a statute
in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it
reasonably can be done. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418
(2000). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we
review de novo. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 418.
	In evaluating statutory challenges brought under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, this court
has employed three distinct tests. First, a penalty violates the
proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense
of the community. People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 236 (1995),
quoting People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962), quoting
People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 421-22 (1894). Second, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties
clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates
a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more
severely. People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997). Third, the
proportionate penalties clause is violated "where offenses with
identical elements are given different sentences." People v. Moss, No.
91012, slip op. at 16 (June 19, 2003); see also Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at
503; People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 181 (1990).
	Here, we are concerned only with the last of these tests, the
identical elements test. This test formed the sole basis for the
appellate court's ruling, and it is the sole basis upon which defendant
defends that ruling before this court. Under this test, the elements of
the respective offenses must be identical before the proportionate
penalties clause will be implicated. See Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 503;
Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181. In Christy, for example, this court
observed that the commission of kidnapping while armed with a knife
with a blade of at least three inches in length constitutes both
aggravated kidnapping and armed violence with a category I weapon.
Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181. The court then noted that, "[s]ince the
elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence
are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate
that their penalties be identical." (Emphasis added.) Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181. Nevertheless, aggravated kidnapping was a Class 1 felony
punishable by 4 to 15 years in prison, while armed violence
predicated upon kidnapping with a category I weapon was a Class X
felony punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. Accordingly, the court
held that the penalties for aggravated kidnapping and armed violence
were unconstitutionally disproportionate. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181.
	Unlike the offenses in Christy, and contrary to the appellate
court's holding below, the offenses at issue in this case do not share
identical elements. A person commits unauthorized theft when he or
she knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property
of the owner. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1) (West 2002). Thus, to secure a
conviction under the unauthorized theft statute, the State must prove
that (1) the defendant obtained or exerted control over another's
property, and (2) the control was unauthorized. By contrast, a person
commits theft by deception when he or she knowingly obtains by
deception control over property of the owner. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)
(West 2002). Thus, to secure a conviction under the theft by
deception statute, the State must prove that (1) the defendant obtained
control over the property of another, and (2) he did so through
deception. The distinction between these two offenses is plain.
Although both offenses require proof of control over another's
property, the former requires proof that the control was unauthorized
while the latter requires proof that the control was obtained by
deception. These are not identical elements. To illustrate, if the State
proves that a defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control over
the victim's property, but does not prove that he did so by deception,
then that defendant could be convicted of unauthorized theft under
section 16-1(a)(1) but could not be convicted of theft by deception
under section 16-1(a)(2). These two sections target distinct conduct,
and they contain distinct elements.
	In support of the opposite assertion-that "the two offenses
require the same elements"-the appellate court below cited People v.
Fowler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 491, 494 (1979), which in turn cites this
court's decision in People v. Marino, 44 Ill. 2d 562 (1970). The
appellate court's reliance upon these decisions is misplaced. In
Marino, the defendants were charged with unauthorized theft under
what is now section 16-1(a)(1). On appeal, the defendants argued that
the indictment was invalid because they should have been charged
with receiving stolen property under what is now section 16-1(a)(4).
In rejecting the defendants' argument, this court explained that the
conduct proscribed in section 16-1(a)(4) is not separate from, but
rather to is included within, the conduct proscribed in section
16-1(a)(1). Marino, 44 Ill. 2d  at 576. The Fowler court then correctly
construed Marino as holding that "the several subsections of section
16-1 do not undertake to create a series of separate offenses, but
rather to create a single offense of theft which may be performed in
a number of ways." Fowler, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 494-95. Of course,
setting forth identical offenses is not synonymous with setting forth
identical elements, as the preceding paragraph demonstrates.
Significantly, Fowler itself recognizes this distinction when it states
that "the several subsections of section 16-1 *** create a single
offense of theft which may be performed in a number of ways."
(Emphasis added.) Fowler, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 494-95. That the single
offense of theft may be performed in a number of ways necessarily
requires that the single offense of theft be defined in a number of
ways. Otherwise, theft could be committed in only one way, which is
plainly not the case.(1)

CONCLUSION
	Under the identical elements test, the proportionate penalties
clause is violated "where offenses with identical elements are given
different sentences." Moss, slip op. at 16. Here, the offenses at issue
do not share identical elements. Consequently, the sentences for those
offenses do not violate the proportionate penalties clause, and the
appellate court erred in so holding. We therefore reverse that portion
of the appellate court's decision vacating defendant's extended-term
sentence and remand this cause to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.



Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
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