Case Title: Kansas v. Novotny

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102891

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,891 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN S. NOVOTNY, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When a district court provides alternative bases to support its ultimate ruling on an 
issue and an appellant fails to challenge the validity of each alternative basis on appeal, 
an appellate court may decline to address the appellant's challenge to the district court's 
ultimate ruling.  
  
2. 
 
When an eyewitness is acquainted with the defendant, the normal concerns about 
eyewitness reliability are not present. In such cases, the likelihood that a suggestive 
identification procedure led to misidentification is lessened, and the jury is the 
appropriate body to consider the weight to be given to the eyewitness identification 
evidence.  
 
3. 
 
An instruction on aiding or abetting is appropriate if, from the totality of the 
evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant aided and abetted another 
in the commission of the crime. 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's response to a jury question for an abuse 
of discretion. 
 
5. 
 
When the answer to a jury's question is adequately covered by the original 
instructions, the trial court may decline to answer the question and direct the jury to 
reread the instructions already given. 
 
6. 
 
Appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involving improper 
comments to the jury requires a two-step analysis. First, the appellate court decides 
whether the comments were outside the wide latitude allowed the prosecutor in 
discussing the evidence. Second, if misconduct is found, the appellate court determines 
whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the 
defendant a fair trial. 
 
7. 
 
In closing argument, a prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence but may not comment on facts outside the evidence. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOSEPH BRIBIESCA, judge. Opinion filed September 13, 
2013. Affirmed. 
 
Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Theresa L. Barr, 
of the same office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
3 
 
 
 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
MORITZ, J.:  Steven S. Novotny directly appeals his jury convictions of first-
degree felony murder and aggravated battery. Novotny argues the district court erred in 
(1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his house; (2) 
denying his motion to suppress one victim's identification of him as the shooter; and (3) 
improperly instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. Novotny further argues the 
prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during closing arguments and the 
cumulative effect of trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. Finally, he argues the district 
court violated his constitutional rights at sentencing. We affirm Novotny's convictions 
and sentences. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On April 25, 2007, as Xavier Worley and Desmond Adams stood on the front 
porch of Worley's apartment, two men came around the corner of the building and 
walked past Worley and Adams, only to turn around and walk back. One of the two men 
said, "What's up." After Worley replied, "What's up," one of the men opened fire, 
shooting Worley three times and fatally striking LaQuishia Starr, Worley's girlfriend, 
who was inside the apartment.  
 
Officer Joshua Lewis of the Wichita Police Department accompanied Worley on 
his ambulance ride to the hospital. Worley told Lewis he did not know who shot him, but 
that he had seen the shooter earlier that day in the neighborhood. Worley described the 
shooter as a 5'9" tall light-skinned black man with cornrow braids.  
 
4 
 
 
 
Starr's sister, Trashell Gasper, arrived at the hospital sometime after Worley 
emerged from surgery and asked Worley who shot him. Worley could not speak 
following his surgery, but he wrote the word "Loco" on a piece of paper and indicated 
that his cousin, Lori Worley, knew Loco. On the same piece of paper, Gasper wrote a 
description Worley provided of Loco through nonverbal responses to Gasper's questions 
about Loco's appearance—Mexican, black hair, 5'8" to 5'10" tall and skinny, with long 
hair and braids. Gasper gave the written information to Detective Thomas Fatkin.   
 
The next day, Detective Thomas Fatkin visited Worley in his hospital room. 
Worley was still unable to speak, but he communicated with Fatkin through nonverbal 
gestures and in writing. Worley described the shooter to Fatkin as a 5'7" tall, "mixed-
male" man, weighing approximately 175 pounds with brown and black hair. Worley 
indicated the shooter's name was Loco and that Worley's cousin, Lori Worley, previously 
dated a friend of Loco's and had a child with that friend. Finally, Worley informed Fatkin 
that he had seen Loco in Worley's neighborhood earlier on the day of the shooting.  
 
Because of tips from Worley's family that Novotny shot Starr, Fatkin showed 
Worley a single photo of Novotny, who police knew by the alias "Loco." Fatkin asked 
Worley if the person in the photo was the same "Loco" who shot him. Worley wrote "not 
the same" on Novotny's photo. Later that day, Fatkin returned to the hospital and showed 
Worley six more individual photos that did not include Novotny's photo. Worley 
identified a man in one photo as Lesly Pruitt, the man he previously referred to as Loco's 
friend and Lori Worley's ex-boyfriend. But Worley informed Fatkin that none of the 
individuals in the photos was involved in the shooting.  
 
A few days later, Worley regained his ability to speak and told Detective Robert 
Shea that one of the men involved in the shooting was light skinned and the other was 
dark skinned, but Worley did not know which man shot him. Shea showed Worley 
5 
 
 
 
another photo lineup. This lineup included a photo of Desmond Adams, who earlier had 
told police he was with Worley during the shooting. After Worley denied recognizing 
anyone in the lineup, Shea informed Worley he had already spoken with Adams. Worley 
then changed his story and admitted Adams was with him on the front porch immediately 
before the shooting.  
 
After Shea asked Worley whether tips received by police identifying Loco as the 
shooter were true, Worley admitted Loco shot him. Shea then showed Worley a single 
photo of Novotny and asked Worley, "Is this Loco?" Worley said the photo "[It] looks 
like him." Shea asked, "So that's the guy that was there?" Worley replied, "Yes." Even 
though Worley verified that he knew the man in the photo as Loco, he refused to sign the 
photo identifying Novotny as the shooter, citing fears of retaliation.  
 
At trial, Worley testified he did not initially admit to police that Novotny shot him 
because "they could have came back after me or something like that" and he "wasn't 
feeling comfortable with snitching on somebody." Worley explained that for his family's 
sake, he finally admitted Loco shot him. Further, Worley identified Novotny at trial as 
the man he knew as Loco.  
 
Worley testified that on the night of the shooting, he and Desmond Adams were 
standing on Worley's porch. Worley saw two men come around the corner and walk past 
before turning around and walking toward the porch. The man Worley knew as Loco and 
a second man approached Worley and Adams, and Loco said, "What's up." After Worley 
replied, "What's up," Loco shot him three times. Worley testified he knew Loco because 
his cousin, Lori Worley, had dated Loco's friend several years ago. At trial, Worley could 
not recall whether he identified Loco's friend as Lesly Pruitt when he spoke with 
Detective Fatkin, but he did recall identifying Loco as Lori Worley's "baby daddy's 
friend." Worley further testified he had seen Loco at an apartment across the street on the 
6 
 
 
 
day of the shooting. However, Worley said he could not identify the other man involved 
in the shooting because he wore a hooded sweatshirt. 
 
Adams testified at trial that he saw two black males—one lighter skinned and one 
darker skinned—approach Worley before the shooting. Adams could not see either of the 
men's faces, but he identified the darker-skinned black male, who was wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt, as the shooter. Adams also identified Novotny as the man he knew as Loco, 
but he testified that Novotny was not the light-skinned black man involved in the 
shooting.  
 
Brandi Williams lived across the street from Worley. Brandi testified that several 
people were visiting her home on the night of the shooting, including Novotny, whom she 
knew as Loco, and Brandi's friend, Shannon Williams. At some point, Brandi and 
Shannon went to a local restaurant and, as they were leaving, Brandi saw Worley outside 
his apartment near some cars. When Brandi and Shannon returned several hours later 
there were police everywhere.  
 
Shannon Williams testified that on the night of the shooting, Novotny, whom she 
knew as Loco, and several other men were sitting around a table at Brandi's home, 
"drinking and getting high." Shannon saw guns on the table and saw a few men holding 
guns, but she could not recall if Novotny was holding a gun. Shannon heard Novotny say 
he was upset because "his sister's house got hit up by a drive-by." According to Shannon, 
Novotny said "he wanted to do something about it" and "get back at" those responsible 
for the drive-by, but he did not specifically refer to the men across the street. Shannon 
also testified that "[Novotny] and a couple other people were talking about doing 
something," and several of the men, including Novotny, were "getting hyped up" about 
the situation.  
 
7 
 
 
 
Law enforcement officers eventually searched Novotny's residence pursuant to a 
search warrant. During the search, officers retrieved a number of items, including a 9-
millimeter live cartridge. Gary Miller, a firearm and tool mark examiner, testified for the 
State that the two cartridge casings found at the crime scene had both been fired from the 
same firearm. Miller compared the two cartridge casings from the crime scene with the 
live cartridge found at Novotny's house and opined that all three "had at one time been 
chambered and extracted from the same firearm." Miller also compared three 9-
millimeter bullets found at the crime scene with each other and determined the bullets 
were all fired from the same firearm, but Miller could not determine whether the two 
cartridge casings and the three bullets were all fired from the same firearm.  
 
John Cayton, a private forensic firearm and tool mark examiner, testified for the 
defense. Cayton agreed that the two cartridge casings found at the crime scene were fired 
from the same firearm, but he could not conclude the live cartridge found at Novotny's 
residence had been chambered or extracted from the same gun as the two cartridge 
casings. 
 
A jury found Novotny guilty of the aggravated battery of Worley and the first-
degree felony murder of Starr. The court sentenced Novotny to life in prison with a 
mandatory minimum of 20 years on the first-degree murder conviction and a consecutive 
term of 48 months' imprisonment on the aggravated battery conviction. We have 
jurisdiction over Novotny's direct appeal under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (life sentence; off-
grid crime).  
 
8 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We decline to address Novotny's challenge to the validity of the search warrant in light of 
Novotny's failure to challenge both grounds cited by the district court to support its 
suppression ruling.  
 
Before trial, Novotny moved to suppress evidence seized during the search of his 
residence, arguing the search warrant affidavit failed to establish a nexus between his 
alleged criminal activity and the place to be searched. The court denied Novotny's 
motion, finding that although the evidence supporting probable cause may not have been 
overwhelming, it was sufficient. Alternatively, the district court found that even if the 
affidavit lacked probable cause, the good-faith exception delineated in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, reh. denied 468 U.S. 1250 (1984), 
applied, permitting the evidence to be used at trial. 
 
On appeal, Novotny argues the search warrant affidavit was not supported by 
probable cause. But we decline to address this argument because Novotny challenges 
only the district court's probable cause determination. Novotny candidly admitted at oral 
argument before this court that he failed to brief any argument challenging the district 
court's alternative holding that even if the warrant was not supported by probable cause, 
the evidence seized was admissible under the Leon good-faith exception.  
 
We conclude Novotny abandoned his challenge to the district court's alternative 
ruling on the Leon exception by failing to brief any argument related to that ruling. See 
State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 709, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (issue not briefed or argued 
deemed waived and abandoned). Consequently, even if we were to reverse the district 
court's probable cause finding, the district court's unchallenged, alternative ruling would 
stand. Therefore, we decline to address Novotny's challenge to the district court's 
probable cause determination.  
9 
 
 
 
 
The district court correctly admitted eyewitness identification evidence.  
 
Novotny also filed a pretrial motion to suppress Worley's eyewitness identification 
of him as the shooter, arguing the identification was the unreliable product of an 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. After a hearing, the district court 
agreed the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. Ultimately, however, 
the district court concluded Worley's identification was reliable and admissible at trial. 
Novotny requested and received a continuing objection at trial to any testimony relative 
to identification. On appeal, Novotny argues the suggestive procedure rendered the 
identification unreliable and the district court erred in failing to suppress Worley's 
eyewitness identification.  
 
Standard of Review 
 
When reviewing the factual underpinnings of a district court's decision to admit or 
suppress eyewitness identification evidence, we apply a substantial competent evidence 
standard. We review the ultimate legal decision drawn from those facts de novo. State v. 
Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 304, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006). 
 
Analysis 
 
Our caselaw has long recognized that "eyewitness identifications can be unreliable 
and result in wrongful convictions." State v. Mitchell, 294 Kan. 469, 474, 275 P.3d 905 
(2012) (citing State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 390-92, 635 P.2d 1236 [1981]). But it is 
equally well established that 
 
 
"[a]n identification infected by improper police influence . . . is not automatically 
excluded. Instead, the trial judge must screen the evidence for reliability pretrial. If there 
10 
 
 
 
is 'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,' Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968), the judge must 
disallow presentation of the evidence at trial. But if the indicia of reliability are strong 
enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive 
circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will 
ultimately determine its worth." Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 716, 
720, 181 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2012). 
 
Further, we have recognized that several procedural safeguards are built into the 
justice system to protect criminal defendants from wrongful convictions based on 
questionable eyewitness identification evidence. Those safeguards include, but are not 
limited to, the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him or 
her; the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel "'who can 
expose the flaws in the eyewitness' testimony during cross-examination and focus the 
jury's attention on the fallibility of such testimony during opening and closing 
arguments'"; eyewitness-specific jury instructions that "'warn the jury to take care in 
appraising identification evidence'"; and the constitutional requirement that the State 
prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 
850, 868-69, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012) (quoting Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728-29). 
  
Here, the district court found the law enforcement officers' repeated use of a one-
photo lineup to be unnecessarily suggestive. The State argues, as it did below, that the 
identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive and urges us to affirm the 
district court's suppression ruling as right for the wrong reason. But we decline to address 
this argument because the State failed to cross-appeal the district court's ruling finding 
the identification unnecessarily suggestive. See K.S.A. 60-2103(h) (to obtain appellate 
review of adverse rulings, appellee must file notice of cross-appeal); Cooke v. Gillespie, 
285 Kan. 748, 754-55, 176 P.3d 144 (2008). 
 
11 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, we affirm the district court's suppression ruling because the record 
supports the district court's conclusion that the identification procedure used did not lead 
to a substantial likelihood of misidentification under the facts of this case. The court 
specifically noted that this was not a "pure stranger" case and suggested the 
inconsistencies in Worley's identification of the shooter implicated Worley's credibility 
rather than the reliability of his identification. We agree.  
 
The factors courts ordinarily consider in reviewing the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification are similar, though not identical, to the factors listed in PIK Crim. 3d 52.20, 
the eyewitness identification jury instruction. See Mitchell, 294 Kan. at 478 (discussing 
eight factors trial courts use to assess reliability in considering whether to suppress 
eyewitness identification). And, as this court has previously held, the factors set out in 
that instruction "contemplate an eyewitness who does not know the defendant personally. 
Where the witness personally knows the individual being identified, the cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction is not necessary. The accuracy of the identification 
can be sufficiently challenged through cross-examination." State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. 193, 
Syl. ¶ 9, 105 P.3d 710 (2005).  
 
Similarly, in Mitchell we stated that "the normal concerns about eyewitness 
reliability, as discussed in the caselaw and scientific literature, are not present" when the 
eyewitness is acquainted with the defendant. 294 Kan. at 482. 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law 
§ 1101 states: 
 
 
"A pretrial identification obtained from suggestive procedures may be introduced 
into evidence if found to be reliable and based solely upon the witness' independent 
recollection at the time of the crime, uninfluenced by the intervening illegal 
confrontation. For example, where the witnesses knew the defendant, improper 
identification procedures do not taint the witnesses' identification testimony." 
 
12 
 
 
 
In short, consistent with our statements in Mitchell and Calvin, if Worley knew Novotny 
before the shooting and before he was exposed to any unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedure, the normal concerns about the reliability of his identification of 
Novotny as the shooter are not present.  
 
Here, the record demonstrates that Worley knew Novotny before the shooting. 
Worley testified he knew Novotny as Loco and that his cousin, Lori Worley, had a 
relationship and a child with Loco's friend several years before the shooting. Worley also 
testified he had seen Loco in his neighborhood a few days before the shooting. Detective 
Fatkin testified that Worley also reported seeing Loco on the day of the shooting. Yet, the 
record also demonstrates that Worley did not immediately identify Novotny as the 
shooter, and, at one point, Worley noted on Novotny's photo that Novotny was "not the 
same" person who shot him. 
 
Nonetheless, as noted by the district court, Worley's failure to immediately 
identify Novotny as the shooter and his inconsistent statements regarding the identity of 
the shooter called Worley's credibility into question but did not render his identification 
unreliable. See Calvin, 279 Kan. at 206 (noting distinction between reliability of 
eyewitness identification and credibility of eyewitness). Simply stated, the jury was 
appropriately situated to weigh Worley's testimony and prior inconsistent statements. See 
Corbett, 281 Kan. at 305 (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S. Ct. 
2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 [1977]) ("'We are content to rely upon the good sense and 
judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is 
customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure 
intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.'").  
 
Further, there were other procedural safeguards in place to protect Novotny from a 
wrongful conviction based on eyewitness identification evidence. Defense counsel 
13 
 
 
 
extensively cross-examined Worley about his familiarity with Novotny, his ability to 
identify Novotny as the shooter given the circumstances surrounding the shooting, and 
his prior inconsistent statements regarding the identity of the shooter. Additionally, the 
district court issued a cautionary eyewitness identification jury instruction to "'warn the 
jury to take care in appraising identification evidence.'" See Marshall, 294 Kan. at 869 
(quoting Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728-29). 
 
We conclude the district court properly admitted the eyewitness identification 
evidence, allowing the jury to determine the weight, if any, to give that evidence.  
 
 
 
The district court appropriately instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and did not err 
in answering a jury question. 
 
At trial, the district court, over Novotny's objection, provided the jury with an 
aiding and abetting instruction labeled as Instruction No. 10: 
 
 
"A person who either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, abets, 
advises, hires, counsels, [or] procures another to commit a crime with intent to promote 
or assist in its commission is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of 
the extent of the defendant's participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime." 
 
Later, during its deliberations, the jury asked:  "If Mr. Novotny was involved [sic] 
counseling or planning the shooting, does instruction No. 10 apply?" In discussing how to 
answer the question, Novotny urged the trial court to distinguish evidence that he made 
nonspecific statements about revenge prior to the shooting with evidence that he was one 
of the two men who approached Worley. Novotny ultimately asked the court to advise 
the jurors that Instruction No. 10 "does not apply, unless they find that Mr. Novotny was 
one of the two individuals that confronted Mr. Worley." Ultimately, the court instructed 
the jury to reread Instruction No. 10.  
14 
 
 
 
 
On appeal, Novotny asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury on 
aiding and abetting. Specifically, he argues that the evidence presented in this case 
impermissibly permitted the jury to find him guilty as an aider and abettor "based upon 
his mere association with an individual who actually committed the crime." The State 
argues the district court properly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting based on 
Shannon Williams' trial testimony and the evidence that ammunition found during the 
search of Novotny's house had been chambered and extracted from the same firearm as 
two spent cartridges found at the crime scene. 
 
"[T]he aiding or abetting instruction is appropriate if, from the totality of the 
evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant aided and abetted another 
in the commission of the crime." State v. Holt, 285 Kan. 760, 773, 175 P.3d 239 (2008); 
see State v. Pennington, 254 Kan. 757, 764, 869 P.2d 624 (1994). 
 
 
"'To be convicted as an aider and abettor, "the law requires that the person 
knowingly associates with the unlawful venture and participates in a way which indicates 
that such person is furthering the success of the venture." State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 
138, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). Mere association with the principals who actually commit the 
crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime is itself insufficient to establish guilt 
as an aider and abettor; however, when a person knowingly associates with the unlawful 
venture and participates in a way which indicates he or she willfully is furthering the 
success of the venture, such evidence of guilt is sufficient to go to the jury. [Citation 
omitted.]' State v. Kaiser, 260 Kan. 235, 242, 918 P.2d 629 (1996), disapproved on other 
grounds State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 145 P.3d 18 (2006)." State v. Simmons, 282 Kan. 
728, 738, 148 P.3d 525 (2006). 
 
Focusing almost solely on one portion of Shannon Williams' testimony, Novotny 
points out that Shannon claimed only that she heard Novotny generally discuss getting 
back at someone for shooting at his sister's house. But Novotny contends the State 
15 
 
 
 
presented no evidence that he "suggested, encouraged, or directed anyone to go to 
Worley's house to commit any crime." Further, Novotny contends the State presented no 
evidence that he "knowingly associated in an unlawful venture or participated in a way to 
indicate that he furthered the success of an unlawful venture." 
 
Novotny's argument might be persuasive if we were to consider it in a vacuum 
rather than as part of the totality of the circumstances we are required to consider. As the 
State points out, Shannon Williams testified that on the night of the shooting, she saw 
guns on the table at Brandi Williams' home and observed several individuals holding 
guns. Shannon could not recall whether Novotny was holding a gun, but she did hear 
Novotny "talking about how he was mad, 'cause his sister's house got hit up by a drive-
by." According to Shannon, Novotny said "he wanted to do something about it." Shannon 
further testified that "[Novotny] and a couple other people were talking about doing 
something" and about getting back at the person responsible for the drive-by shooting, 
and that several of the men, including Novotny, were "getting hyped up" about the 
situation. Further, Brandi testified that at some point she and Shannon went to a local 
restaurant and, as they were leaving, she saw Worley outside his apartment. When Brandi 
and Shannon returned, police were everywhere.  
 
Contrary to Novotny's argument, Shannon's and Brandi's testimonies do more than 
support guilt by association. Further, the State offered other testimony supporting the 
aiding and abetting charge. Miller testified he compared the two cartridge casings from 
the crime scene with the live cartridge found in Novotny's home and concluded all three 
cartridges "had at one time been chambered and extracted from the same firearm." 
 
Based on our review of the totality of the evidence in this case, we conclude the 
jury could reasonably have concluded Novotny aided and abetted another in the 
16 
 
 
 
commission of the crime, and the district court did not err in instructing the jury on aiding 
and abetting. 
 
Novotny also briefly contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in responding 
to the following jury question:  "If Mr. Novotny was involved [sic] counseling or 
planning the shooting, does instruction No. 10 apply?" Essentially, it appears Novotny 
has simply restated his argument regarding the lack of evidence to support the aiding and 
abetting instruction.  
 
We review a trial court's response to a jury question for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Wade, 295 Kan. 916, 920, 287 P.3d 237 (2012).  
 
In light of our decision that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on aiding 
and abetting, we further conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in responding 
to the jury's question by referring to the original instructions. See Wade, 295 Kan. at 923 
(approving "the tack of simply directing the jury's attention back to the instructions").  
 
The prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct during closing argument. 
 
During the State's closing argument, the following dialogue occurred: 
 
 
"[Prosecutor]:  The witnesses, Xavier [Worley] especially, Shannon [Williams], 
you know, they testified they didn't want retaliation. In fact, didn't—Shannon is the one 
that testified that after this happened, she went into hiding, 'cause she doesn't want to get 
in trouble with these guys. In fact, she said she didn't want to be here testifying in front of 
the defendant. You use that— 
 
"[Defense counsel]:  Objection. She never said that, Your Honor, and I object. 
 
"THE COURT:  The jury will decide the facts. This is argument. This is not 
evidence. 
 
"Go ahead. 
17 
 
 
 
 
"[Prosecutor]:  You saw what happened in the courtroom, and you judge the 
witnesses and the way they were on the witness stand. Did they look at the defendant 
when they were in the courtroom? No. They were looking over there. They didn't want to 
look at the defendant. Was the defendant looking at them? And you saw him eye-balling 
the witnesses. 
 
"[Defense counsel]:  Objection, Your Honor. I'd ask the jury be told to disregard 
that kind of statement. 
 
"THE COURT:  No. You—no . . . . That's overruled. 
 
"Go ahead. 
 
"[Prosecutor]:  You judge what the witnesses were feeling and the weight to give 
their testimony and why they talked to the police the way they did, why they said what 
they did to the police at the time and their demeanor here in the courtroom in front of the 
defendant, in front of you." (Emphasis added.) 
 
After the jury was sent to deliberate, the following discussion occurred: 
 
 
"[THE COURT]:  There was also an objection made in the course of Closing 
Argument, and I want to just say for the record, the only reason I'm saying this is because 
I called the attorneys up to the bench, and I didn't put this on the record, and I should 
have. At the time that Mr. Xavier Worley was on the stand, I called up the lawyers to the 
bench, and I informed [defense counsel] that Mr. Novotny was attempting to stare down 
Mr. Worley, and I simply asked [defense counsel] to tell his client not to do that, to stop 
it. 
 
"Now, in all fairness, [defense counsel] responded that he hadn't seen any of that 
behavior. That's all I wanted to put on the record. 
 
"[Defense counsel]:  Well— 
 
"[Prosecutor]:  The victim did tell me about it, Judge. 
 
"[Defense counsel]:  Well, in the State's statement in Closing Argument, which I 
objected to, he's staring down the witnesses, plural. Again, I think that's objectionable; 
but two, it's the prosecutor testifying. She observed something in the courtroom. 
18 
 
 
 
 
"Now, if the jury saw it, they want to put some kind of connotation to it, but [the 
prosecutor] is saying she saw something, basically, and relating that to the jury, and I 
think that's inappropriate, as well as the nature of the statement itself." 
 
Novotny argues the prosecutor inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury 
and misstated the evidence when she advised the jury that Shannon Williams did not 
want to testify in front of Novotny. He argues the prosecutor's comments "were an 
attempt to paint a picture portraying Mr. Novotny as a vindictive and dangerous person." 
In contrast, the State contends the prosecutor accurately characterized Shannon's 
testimony and did not commit misconduct. 
  
Novotny also asserts that the prosecutor's comment in closing argument that 
Novotny "eye-balled" the witnesses was "tantamount to the prosecutor providing 
testimonial evidence." The State again disagrees, citing the district court's on-the-record 
recognition that it had cautioned Novotny's counsel regarding Novotny "staring down" 
the witness. The State further suggests the prosecutor simply commented on the 
defendant's demeanor, which the jury could have observed on its own. 
 
When reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, we first consider 
whether the comments were outside the wide latitude allowed the prosecutor in 
discussing the evidence. If so, we next determine whether the improper comments 
prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. 
Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 58, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); McCaslin, 291 Kan. at 715. In this step of 
the analysis, we consider three factors:  (1) whether the misconduct was gross and 
flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) 
whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct 
would likely have had little weight in the minds of the jurors. None of these three factors 
is individually controlling. Naputi, 293 Kan. at 58. 
19 
 
 
 
 
The prosecutor's comment regarding Shannon's reluctance to testify was not improper.  
 
Novotny contends the prosecutor misstated the evidence during closing argument 
when she advised the jury that Shannon Williams did not want to testify in front of the 
defendant. "This court has repeatedly held that in closing argument, a prosecutor may 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence but may not comment upon facts outside 
the evidence. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 848, 257 P.3d 272 (2011).  
 
At trial, Shannon testified she did not call the police after the shooting to tell them 
what she had overheard that day because she "was scared that it might come back to [her] 
and they might do something to [her]." Detective Shea testified Shannon "stated shortly 
after the shooting she kind of cut off all contact with all those people involved that she 
was hanging out with, and I believe she said she kind of went into hiding, tried to 
withdraw from everybody." When asked at trial whether she wanted to be there, Shannon 
replied, "No, I don't." 
 
Given Shannon's testimony that she did not want to be present at Novotny's trial 
and her testimony that she was scared "they might do something to [her]," the prosecutor 
drew a reasonable inference from the evidence and did not state facts not in evidence 
when she told the jury in closing argument that Shannon "said she didn't want to be here 
testifying in front of the defendant." 
 
The record is insufficient to determine whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
commenting that Novotny had "eye-balled" the witnesses; assuming the statements were 
improper, we conclude they were harmless. 
 
Novotny also complains about the prosecutor's statement to the jury:  "[Y]ou saw 
him eye-balling the witnesses." Novotny argues that because there is no evidence to 
20 
 
 
 
support this statement, it was an improper expression of personal opinion or testimonial 
evidence from the prosecutor. The State responds that directly commenting on a 
defendant's in-court demeanor does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
A prosecutor is prohibited from arguing facts not in evidence, but generally has 
wide latitude to make arguments based on reasonable inferences from the evidence 
presented at trial. State v. Peppers, 294 Kan. 377, 394, 276 P.3d 148 (2012). 
Nevertheless, the record is not sufficiently developed to permit us to address whether the 
prosecutor's comments were within the wide latitude allowed a prosecutor in discussing 
the evidence. While the district court did call counsel to the bench and advise defense 
counsel that Novotny was staring down Worley and instructed defense counsel to direct 
Novotny to discontinue this action, we cannot discern from the record whether the jury 
observed Novotny's actions. Further, the jury was not privy to the bench conference.  
 
But even if we assume that the prosecutor's comment that Novotny "eye-balled" 
the witnesses was outside the wide latitude allowed a prosecutor in discussing the 
evidence, any potential error was harmless. See State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. ___, ___ 
P.3d___, slip op. at 30-31 (August 9, 2013) (discussing harmless error in context of 
prosecutorial misconduct claim). The prosecutor's comment did not rise to the level of 
being gross or flagrant, especially given the unclear state of the law on this issue. See 
generally Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor:  The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 Minn. L. 
Rev. 573, 598-614 (2008) (discussing split among courts on how to consider 
nontestifying defendant's courtroom demeanor). We also cannot characterize the 
prosecutor's comment as gross or flagrant in light of the trial judge's purposeful creation 
of a record confirming what he had personally seen in the courtroom, his discussion with 
the prosecutor and defense counsel about Novotny's courtroom actions, and his stated 
reason for denying Novotny's objection during closing argument. The bottom line is that 
we do not know whether the jury saw what the judge saw. Under the unique 
21 
 
 
 
circumstances of this case, we cannot find the prosecutor's comment to be gross or 
flagrant. 
 
Nor do we find evidence of ill will on the part of the prosecutor. Immediately after 
the objected-to statement, the prosecutor reminded the jurors it was their responsibility to 
judge the witnesses, including "the weight to give their testimony and why they talked to 
the police the way they did, why they said what they did to the police at the time and their 
demeanor here in the courtroom in front of the defendant, in front of you." Further, the 
prosecutor made the statement only once during closing arguments.  
 
Finally, the evidence in this case, while not overwhelming, was substantial. 
Worley identified Novotny as the shooter. Shannon Williams and Brandi Williams 
testified Novotny had been at Brandi's house across the street from Worley's house on the 
day of the shooting. Shannon saw guns on the table and heard Novotny say he was angry 
that his sister's house had been shot at during a drive-by shooting and he wanted to do 
something about it. Further, the State presented testimony that the live cartridge found 
during the search of Novotny's residence had been chambered and extracted from the 
same firearm from which were fired the cartridge casings found at the scene of the 
shooting.  
 
We conclude that even if the prosecutor's statement constituted misconduct, the 
State has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. See Bridges, 297 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 
36 (stating constitutional harmless error standard).  
 
22 
 
 
 
Cumulative errors did not deprive Novotny of his right to a fair trial. 
 
Novotny argues that even if we find the above errors to be harmless when viewed 
individually, his convictions should be reversed because the cumulative effect of the 
errors substantially prejudiced him and deprived him of his right to receive a fair trial. 
 
"Cumulative error will not be found when the record fails to support the errors 
raised on appeal by the defendant. [Citations omitted.] One error is insufficient to support 
reversal under the cumulative effect rule. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Cofield, 288 Kan. 
367, 378, 203 P.3d 1261 (2009). Because we have found only one potential error, an 
assumed error regarding prosecutorial misconduct, we reject Novotny's cumulative error 
claim. 
 
The State is not required to prove Novotny's criminal history score to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Finally, Novotny argues the sentencing court's use of his prior convictions to 
enhance his sentence without proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt violated his Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution as interpreted by 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). 
We reject Novotny's claim in light of our previous decisions. See State v. Fewell, 286 
Kan. 370, 394-96, 184 P.3d 903 (2008) (reaffirming State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48, 
41 P.3d 781 [2002]). 
 
Affirmed.