Case Title: R.L. Manning Co. v. Millsap

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
R.L. Manning Co. v. Millsap1984 WY 100687 P.2d 252Case Number: 83-214Decided: 09/18/1984R.L. MANNING COMPANY, APPELLANT (EMPLOYER), 

v. 

WILLIAM GLENN C. MILLSAP, APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
R.L. MANNING COMPANY, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYER), 

v. 

WILLIAM GLENN C. MILLSAP, 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Thomas F. Reese 
of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellant.

William R. Fix, 
Jackson, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., 
THOMAS, ROSE and CARDINE, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.*

* BROWN, J., having 
recused himself, GUTHRIE, J., Retired, was assigned pursuant to order of the 
court entered January 2, 1979.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The only question to be 
dealt with in this case is that of the jurisdiction of the district court in a 
worker's compensation case. The case is unusual, if not unique, in that an 
ex-employee received an additional award for a job-related injury because the 
clerk of the district court became weary of entertaining complaints from the 
ex-employee about the inadequacy of his compensation for the injury. The 
Worker's Compensation Act contemplates neither such a result nor the procedure 
by which it occurred. We hold that the district court which entered the award 
did not have jurisdiction to do so, nor did the court which transferred the case 
to the acting court have jurisdiction to proceed. The award is reversed with 
directions that it be returned to the forwarding court and the proceeding 
dismissed.

[¶2.]     The employer presents a 
series of issues in its brief. While other issues present interesting questions, 
this court will deal only with the first issue, which is stated in the 
employer's brief to be:

"A. Did the District 
Court act without jurisdiction in this case since the Appellee/Employee has 
failed to move to modify or reopen consideration of the District Court's Order 
of March 19, 1979?"

[¶3.]     The employee does not 
meet the jurisdictional question, but instead characterizes it as an untimely 
attempt to invoke the statute of limitations:

"A. Is the issue as to 
whether the statute of limitations has run properly before this Court since this 
issue has been raised for the first time on appeal?"

Further the 
appellee questions the viability of this appeal:

"Is the District Court's 
Order of June 27, 1983, properly before this Court since the Appellant has 
failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure?"

[¶4.]     William Glenn Millsap 
was injured on August 5, 1977, when he was struck on the top of his head by pipe 
tongs on an oil well drilling rig in Uinta County, Wyoming. A worker's compensation proceeding 
was initiated, and the fact of injury in his employment was not contested by 
R.L. Manning Company. This proceeding culminated in an order entered on March 
20, 1979, in UintaCounty, pursuant to which 
Millsap was awarded $4,500, representing a fifteen percent permanent partial 
disability. The order recognized the potential for future surgery relating to 
the injury to the cervical spine, and provided:

"The court retains 
jurisdiction over any further temporary total award."

After that 
Millsap continued to receive medical treatment from several sources. Medical 
expenses were paid, and beginning in 1983 Millsap filed claims for loss of 
wages, asserting temporary total disability, which he made retroactive to 1981. 
The record indicates that at that juncture Millsap began to complain of problems 
with the lumbar spine.

[¶5.]     The proceeding which 
culminated in this appeal was initiated by a Petition for Hearing filed by the 
Clerk of the District Court for UintaCounty on March 9, 1983. The Petition for 
Hearing apparently was filed in response to practically continual contacts by 
Millsap with the office of the clerk of court, which apparently exhausted the 
patience of the clerk, and which were perceived by the clerk as harassment. The 
petition reports claims of prejudice on the part of the district judge and the 
clerk of court, and reports Millsap's allegation that he could not obtain 
justice in UintaCounty. He orally had asked 
that the case be transferred someplace else. No pleading ever was filed by 
Millsap. The district judge, on the same day, ordered the matter for hearing on 
March 24, 1983.

[¶6.]     After the hearing the 
district court in Uinta County entered an Order of Transfer purporting to 
transfer the case to Teton County, and providing specifically that the case was 
assigned and transferred to the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 
Teton County, Wyoming, the Honorable Robert B. Ranck, presiding. The same order 
provided that the Clerk of the District Court in TetonCounty was authorized and directed to take 
charge of the records and files in the matter and to perform all functions 
required of the clerk of court under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. It 
is interesting to note that Millsap was enjoined from in any manner contacting 
the Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Uinta County 
Wyoming, or any members of the staff. Thereafter the court in TetonCounty proceeded to deal with the matter; 
ultimately entered an award for additional temporary total disability; approved 
further medical and therapeutic treatment; and provided for application by 
Millsap for future temporary total disability. This order, which was entered on 
June 27, 1983, apparently was entered summarily without the participation of the 
employer because of the refusal or failure of the employer to comply with 
requirements of the clerk of court in TetonCounty based upon what appears to be a 
locally adopted procedure. The employer then filed a formal Protest and Request 
for Hearing, and a few days later filed a Request for Transfer of the case to 
NatronaCounty. When the Request 
for Hearing and the Request for Transfer were denied the employer appealed to 
this court.

[¶7.]     It is manifest from the 
record that no appropriate proceeding ever was initiated in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in UintaCounty in this case. There is no provision 
in the Worker's Compensation Act which justifies the appearance of the clerk of 
the district court as a party requesting a hearing. The applicable statute is § 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977, which provides a procedure for reopening and modification 
of a worker's compensation award. The pertinent language from that statute 
is:

"* * * an application may 
be made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from 
the date of the last award * * *." Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 
Wyo., 668 P.2d 649 (1983).

The problem in 
the Conn case 
was the inadequacy of the allegations and proof on the part of the injured 
employee. This case is even further removed from the reach of the corrective 
statute because in this instance no pleading has been filed which would invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court to reconsider the disability award to Millsap. 
Obviously we must disapprove the erroneous method of initiating this case which 
the District Court for UintaCounty accepted.

[¶8.]     Even the policy of 
liberal construction with respect to statutes providing for worker's 
compensation in light of their beneficent purpose (Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction 
Company, supra, and cases therein cited) does not justify the procedure 
approved by the district court in this instance. As we have held, clear 
statutory provisions cannot be ignored under the guise of liberal construction 
in order to extend the beneficent purpose of the law to injuries which do not 
reasonably fall within the ambit of the language of the statute. Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction 
Company, supra; Matter of Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 (1983); Alco of Wyoming v. 
Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982); and Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 
(1977). It would be even more anomalous to ignore statutory provisions relating 
to the proper procedure set forth in a statute which is in derogation of the 
common law in order to justify the freewheeling approach invoked in this 
instance.

[¶9.]     We hold that there was 
no proper pleading presented in this case which would invoke the jurisdiction of 
the district court in UintaCounty. The DistrictCourtofUintaCounty had no jurisdiction, because of the 
absence of any pleading sufficient to invoke the power of the court, to 
adjudicate the matter. See Dee v. 
Laramie County, Wyo., 666 P.2d 957 (1983), and Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, Wyo., 662 P.2d 410 (1983). We cannot avoid mentioning 
some other defects in this case because they manifest repetition of procedures 
which the court previously has disapproved. The procedure which the Clerk of the 
District Court of Teton County insisted be followed, apparently in vogue 
locally, is very similar to the procedure this court disapproved in 
Herring v. Welltech, Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361 (1983). In regard to 
the propriety of this appeal, as the employee has attacked it in his brief, we 
note that the employer's Petition to Reopen is subject to treatment as a motion 
brought pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., and the requisite abuse of discretion 
must be found in the failure of the District Court of Teton County to recognize 
that it had no jurisdiction to proceed in this instance. In addition to the lack 
of jurisdiction in UintaCounty, there is a total absence of any 
provision in the Worker's Compensation Act or the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure permitting the transfer of the case in the manner in which it was 
ordered in this instance. Section 27-12-601(b), W.S. 1977, provides for the 
transfer of the case to the district court of the county in which the employer's 
main office in Wyoming is located, or for transfer to the district court of the 
county in which the employee resides. We perceive those provisions as being 
exclusive with respect to transfer, and nothing is said about transferring a 
worker's compensation case to any county which the court may choose, simply to 
avoid harassment of the court staff.

[¶10.]  The case is reversed and remanded to the 
District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of the State of Wyoming in and for TetonCounty, 
with instruction to return the case and file to the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Wyoming in 
and for UintaCounty. The latter court 
shall dismiss the proceeding initiated upon the application of the Clerk of the 
District Court.