Case Title: B-T LIMITED, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; E.B. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF B-T LIMITED; AND TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AND D.E. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. KENNETH BLAKEMAN AND FERN BLAKEMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ROBERT V. CORDINGLY AND GARY LEE CORDINGLY, JUDITH C. CORDINGLY, VIRGIL R. CORDINGLY, AND LOWELLA M. CORDINGLY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-229

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
B-T LIMITED, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; E.B. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF B-T LIMITED; AND TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AND D.E. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. KENNETH BLAKEMAN AND FERN BLAKEMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ROBERT V. CORDINGLY AND GARY LEE CORDINGLY, JUDITH C. CORDINGLY, VIRGIL R. CORDINGLY, AND LOWELLA M. CORDINGLY1985 WY 103705 P.2d 307Case Number: 84-229, 84-230Decided: 08/07/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
B-T LIMITED, A WYOMING 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; E.B. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF B-T LIMITED; AND TRIPLE R 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AND D.E. TATMAN, A GENERAL 
PARTNER OF TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

KENNETH BLAKEMAN AND FERN 
BLAKEMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

ROBERT V. CORDINGLY AND 
GARY LEE CORDINGLY, JUDITH C. CORDINGLY, VIRGIL R. CORDINGLY, AND LOWELLA M. 
CORDINGLY, (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS). 

ROBERT V. CORDINGLY AND 
GARY LEE CORDINGLY, JUDITH C. CORDINGLY, VIRGIL R. CORDINGLY, AND LOWELLA M. 
CORDINGLY, APPELLANTS (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

KENNETH BLAKEMAN AND FERN 
BLAKEMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS), 
v. B-T LIMITED, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; E.B. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF 
B-T LIMITED; AND TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
AND D.E. TATMAN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF TRIPLE R LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
(PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellants B-T Limited, 
Triple R Limited Partnership, E.B. Tatman, and D.E. 
Tatman.

Thomas S. Smith 
of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for appellants Robert V. Cordingly, 
Gary Lee Cordingly, Judith C. Cordingly, Virgil R. Cordingly and Lowella M. 
Cordingly.

Timothy J. 
Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, Buffalo, for appellees Kenneth Blakeman and 
Fern Blakeman.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In a three party 
transaction involving the exchange of ranches, Kenneth and Fern Blakeman 
received title to a ranch known as the Upton Ranch. They made a $48,000 down 
payment and gave a promissory note and mortgage to Tatmans to secure the balance 
owed on the purchase price. The Blakemans did not make the first payment due on 
the note, so the Tatmans foreclosed the mortgage and the property was sold at a 
foreclosure sale for less than the amount due on the note.

[¶2.]     The Tatmans sued the 
Blakemans for a deficiency. The Blakemans defended, contending that they gave a 
deed back to the Tatmans in satisfaction of the amount due on the note. The 
Blakemans cross-claimed against Cordinglys, third-party defendants, demanding 
reimbursement of the $48,000 down payment that they gave Tatmans, contending 
that they (Blakemans) were only agents of Cordinglys. A jury decided in favor of 
the Blakemans on both the Tatmans' deficiency complaint and their 
cross-complaint against Cordinglys.

[¶3.]     The Tatmans appeal the 
adverse verdict and judgment on their complaint and raise the following 
issues:

I

"A. Where the Defendants 
claimed that Plaintiffs accepted a deed for mortgaged property in full 
satisfaction of a promissory note made by the Defendants, was it error to refuse 
to instruct the jury regarding the principles of law applicable to the delivery 
and acceptance of deeds of conveyance?

"B. Were the Plaintiffs 
entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the balance due on the 
promissory note, where the makers admitted execution and delivery of the note 
but claimed that Plaintiffs accepted a deed to satisfy the obligation, although 
Plaintiffs notified Defendants that they did not accept the deed, foreclosed and 
brought an action for the deficiency after foreclosure?"

[¶4.]     The Cordinglys appeal 
from the verdict and adverse judgment against them on the Blakemans' cross-claim 
and raise the following issues:

II

"Whether the evidence 
supports the finding of the jury that the Cordinglys agreed to reimburse the 
Blakemans for the $48,000 down payment paid to Tatmans and assume and pay the 
annual installments on the promissory note?

"Whether the lower Court 
erred in refusing to give an instruction relative to the Statute of 
Frauds?

"Whether the lower Court 
erred in granting prejudgment interest to the Blakemans?

"Whether Blakemans took 
reasonable steps to mitigate their damages?"

[¶5.]     We will reverse and 
remand both the Tatman-Blakeman and the Cordingly-Blakeman 
cases.

CAST

E.B. (Ben) Tatman 
....................................... Appellant 

a general partner of B-T 
Limited 

D.E. (Dale) Tatman 
...................................... Appellant 

a general partner of 
Triple-R Limited 

Robert V. Cordingly 
..................................... Cross-Appellant 

Gary & Judith 
Cordingly .............................. Cross-Appellants 

Virgil & Lowella 
Cordingly ........................... Cross-Appellants 

Kenneth & Fern 
Blakeman .......................... Appellees 

Lowham Associates 
.................................... Sales Agents

Ben and Dale Tatman are 
brothers engaged as partners in the ranching business (hereinafter referred to 
as "Tatmans").

Lowella Cordingly is the 
wife of Virgil Cordingly. Robert Cordingly and Gary Cordingly are the sons of 
Virgil and Lowella Cordingly; Judith Cordingly is the wife of Gary Cordingly 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Cordinglys"). Fern Blakeman is the 
sister of Virgil Cordingly. (Fern Blakeman and Kenneth Blakeman, husband and 
wife, hereinafter referred to as "Blakemans").

[¶6.]     The Tatmans owned a 
large ranch northeast of Rock 
River, Wyoming, and the 
Cordinglys owned ranches in Moorcroft, Upton and Wheatland. The Tatmans and 
Cordinglys agreed to make a tax free exchange of ranches. According to their 
agreement the Tatmans conveyed their ranch to the Cordinglys. In exchange, two 
Cordingly ranches were conveyed to the Tatmans, and the Upton ranch was conveyed 
to the Blakemans. In the agreement between the Tatmans and the Cordinglys there 
was a provision that the Blakemans could purchase the Upton ranch. In this case 
we are only concerned with this latter transaction, that is, the conveyance of 
the Upton 
ranch.

[¶7.]     At the time these 
several conveyances were accomplished, the Blakemans gave Tatmans a $48,000 down 
payment and accepted a warranty deed for the Upton ranch. They also gave a promissory note 
to the Tatmans for $144,000 and executed a purchase money mortgage. All 
documents from these transactions, including the closing statement, were dated 
December 10, 1980. Both the mortgage and warranty deed on the Upton ranch were recorded in WestonCounty on December 15, 
1980.

[¶8.]     Trouble surfaced when 
the first installment of $17,165.19 on the note from the Blakemans to the 
Tatmans was about to become due. Dale Tatman contacted the Blakemans relative to 
the payment. Blakemans informed Dale Tatman in December of 1981 that they would 
be unable to make the payment. The Blakemans' position was that neither the 
Upton ranch nor 
the note and mortgage were their obligations and they had acted at the closing 
only as agents for the Cordinglys. Upon the Cordinglys' denial that the 
Blakemans had acted as their agents, and after attempts by the Blakemans to 
resell the Upton 
ranch, the Blakemans left a warranty deed with Edward Halsey, attorney for the 
Tatmans, hoping to be completely released from the obligation of the note and 
mortgage.

[¶9.]     After an attempt to 
reinstate ownership rights to grazing permits appurtenant to the Upton ranch, the Tatmans 
refused to accept the warranty deed from the Blakemans, and commenced an action 
in foreclosure with the right to pursue the collection of any deficiency. The 
ranch was sold at a foreclosure sale for $70,000, and this action was 
subsequently commenced by the Tatmans against the Blakemans for a deficiency. 
The Blakemans joined the Cordinglys as third party defendants praying for 
indemnification for any damages they might be required to pay the Tatmans, and 
seeking reimbursement of the $48,000 down payment. The matter was tried to a 
jury which entered the following verdict:

"1. Q: Did the Tatmans 
accept a warranty deed from the Blakemans in satisfaction of the promissory note 
made by the Blakemans?

"A: Yes X No 
____

"2. Q: Did the Cordinglys 
agree to reimburse the Blakemans for the $48,000 down payment paid to the 
Tatmans and assume and pay the annual installments owed on the 
note?

"A: Yes X No 
____

"If you answer question # 
2 `yes', go on to question # 3.

"3. Q: Could the 
Blakemans have taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to reduce the 
damages?

"A: Yes ____ No X 

"If you answer question # 
3 `yes', go on to question # 4.

"4. Q: What amount could 
have been saved if such reasonable steps were taken?

"A: $ 
____"

[¶10.]  The court entered judgment on the verdict 
on May 31, 1984, and ordered prejudgment interest to be paid by the Cordinglys 
to the Blakemans. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a 
new trial was filed by Tatmans and denied by the court. The Tatmans filed notice 
of appeal and the Cordinglys filed a cross appeal.

I

A

[¶11.]  Appellant Tatmans' first assignment of 
error centers around the court's failure to instruct the jury "regarding the 
principles of law applicable to the delivery and acceptance of deeds of 
conveyance." The first installment on the Blakemans' note to the Tatmans was due 
January 2, 1982. Before that time the Blakemans had taken the position either 
that they could not pay the note or that the obligation was the Cordinglys, 
which the Cordinglys dispute in their appeal.

[¶12.]  Shortly before January 2, 1982, Dale 
Tatman talked with the Blakemans about the payment that was about to become due. 
As an alternative to foreclosure they talked about a deed back from the 
Blakemans to the Tatmans. They also talked about the Blakemans trying to find a 
buyer for the ranch. There was further discussion about the Tatmans accepting a 
deed to the ranch in a conference call among Mr. Blakeman, the Tatmans and the 
latter's attorney, H.M. MacMillan. Later Mr. MacMillan referred the Tatmans to 
Edward S. Halsey, a Newcastle attorney.

[¶13.]  Before February 9, 1982, Mr. Halsey 
prepared a deed from the Blakemans to the Tatmans. This deed was prepared in 
advance because the referring lawyer, Mr. MacMillan, had suggested that perhaps 
the Tatmans and Blakemans might settle their problem by Tatmans accepting a deed 
from the Blakemans on the Upton property. On February 9, 1982, the 
Blakemans and Mr. and Mrs. Ben Tatman met in the office of Mr. Halsey. Again, 
there was discussion about the Blakemans giving a deed to the Tatmans in order 
to settle the mortgage foreclosure problem, but nothing was 
resolved.

[¶14.]  Before the Blakemans left Mr. Halsey's 
office they signed the deed and left it in the office. At trial Mr. Halsey 
testified that he explained to the parties the significance of signing and 
leaving a deed in his office:

"I explained to the 
parties that - I told the parties that there were two, two aspects of creating 
validity in a deed, one was the actual signing and acknowledging of the signing 
of the deed and the delivery of the deed, and that if the deed was going to be 
left with me it could not be considered as delivered and that at some later date 
both parties would have to authorize my delivery of the deed. I said that a 
couple of times to make sure that the parties understood 
that."

[¶15.]  The deed signed by the Blakemans remained 
in Mr. Halsey's possession until trial. There were no instructions regarding 
disposition of the deed. After the February 9 meeting between the Tatmans and 
the Blakemans, a memorandum purporting to settle the Tatman-Blakeman controversy 
was prepared by Mr. Halsey, but never signed by either party. On February 10, 
1982, Ben Tatman presented a copy of the deed to the Inyan Kara Grazing 
Association. Mr. Tatman said this was "to try to save the forest permits, the 
grazing permits." Some of the permits were saved and some were lost. Tatman paid 
grazing fees on the Upton ranch for 1982. Sometime after February 
10, 1982, Ben Tatman met with a prospective buyer in Mr. Halsey's office, but 
nothing came of this possible sale.

[¶16.]  On appeal, the issues set out by the 
Tatmans revolve around the legal significance of the Blakemans leaving a deed to 
the Upton ranch 
in the office of the Tatmans' attorney.

[¶17.]  The trial court set out the issues 
between the Tatmans and the Blakemans in Instruction No. 
2:

"The Blakemans admit the 
signing and delivering of the note but claim that the Tatmans accepted a deed 
for the mortgaged property in full satisfaction of the note and that the 
Blakemans do not owe the Tatmans any sum."

[¶18.]  In Instruction Number 4 the court 
stated:

"An accord and 
satisfaction is a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations 
created by a previous contract.

"There can be no accord 
and satisfaction unless both parties understood or should have understood as 
reasonable persons that, by accepting the terms of the new contract, their 
rights and obligations under the previous contract would be 
cancelled."

[¶19.]  The Tatmans offered the following 
instruction, which was refused by the court:

"Instruction No. 
H

"For a deed to be 
operative as a transfer of the ownership of land it must be delivered. It is 
delivery that gives the instrument force and effect.

"Delivery of a deed 
requires that there be a manifestation of the unequivocal intention of the 
person who signed the deed to give up all control over the deed to have it 
become effective as a transfer of title to the land so as to deprive him of all 
authority over it or the right of recalling it. An acceptance on the part of the 
grantee is essential to complete the delivery of a deed.

"A deed cannot operate to 
release the grantor from a debt due to the grantee unless and until the grantee 
accepts the deed.

"The requirements for 
acceptance are (1) knowledge that the instrument is tendered for delivery; (2) 
an intention to take the legal title to the property which the deed purports to 
convey, and (3) the manifestation of such intention by some act, conduct or 
statement."

[¶20.]  In Instruction No. 2 the court identified 
an issue between the Tatmans and the Blakemans, that is, did the Tatmans accept 
a deed for the mortgaged property? However, the court failed to instruct on this 
issue. Instruction No. 4, accord and satisfaction, alludes to the issue between 
the Tatmans and Blakemans, but accord and satisfaction or a new agreement were 
not specified as issues. This instruction would not help the jury resolve the 
issue and may, in fact, have been confusing.

[¶21.]  We hold that the jury should have been 
instructed on the elements of delivery and acceptance, or that these terms 
should have been defined. In real property law "delivery and acceptance" are 
words of art and have a meaning different than that ordinarily understood by 
those not trained in the law of conveyances. Rothney v. Rothney, 41 Cal. App. 2d 566, 
107 P.2d 294 (1940). Absent a definition of delivery and acceptance the jury was 
free to consider these terms according to their own understanding, which was 
likely to be far different than the meaning of delivery and acceptance in the 
law of conveyances.

[¶22.]  In a conveyance of real property the 
unilateral action of the grantor manually giving the deed to the grantee or his 
agent is insufficient. There are two essential elements to a legally binding 
delivery: 1) transferring possession of the deed by the grantor, and 2) 
acceptance of the deed by the grantee.

[¶23.]  Transferring, giving, or surrendering the 
deed by the grantor to the grantee contemplates parting with possession of the 
deed with the intent that the deed is to become presently operative as a 
conveyance and pass title. Larsen v. 
Morrison, S.D., 293 N.W.2d 468 (1980); Jones v. Young, 
Tex.Civ.App., 539 S.W.2d 901 (1976); 23 Am.Jur.2d, Deeds § 123 
(1983).

"* * * The requisites of 
acceptance are the grantee's knowledge of delivery or tender of the deed, an 
intention to take the legal title to the property which the deed purports to 
convey, and the manifestation of such intention by some act, conduct, or 
declaration. * * *

"Acceptance is primarily 
a matter of the grantee's intention; hence the significant inquiry is as to his 
intention as manifested by his words and acts. Express words and positive acts 
are not necessary; intention to accept may be inferred from such conduct as 
retaining possession of the deed, conveying or mortgaging the property, 
recording the deed, or otherwise exercising the rights of an owner * * *." 23 
Am.Jur.2d, Deeds § 175, p. 196 (1983).

"Actual possession of the 
deed by the grantee is not essential to, nor does it necessarily indicate, his 
acceptance thereof, although it may be indicative of acceptance. * * *" 23 
Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 176, pp. 196-197 (1983).

[¶24.]  The "acceptance" of a deed, like that of 
its delivery, is a matter of intention, to be determined by acts and words of 
both the grantor and grantee. Fitzpatrick 
v. Layne, 291 Ky. 523, 165 S.W.2d 13, 17 (1942). The 
delivery of a deed is the act by which the grantor divests himself, and the 
acceptance of the deed is the act by which the grantee vests himself with title 
to the property.

[¶25.]  The Blakemans do not contend that the 
instruction offered by the Tatmans on delivery and acceptance was an incorrect 
statement of the law; rather, they contend that:

1) The court adequately 
instructed the jury,

2) The Tatmans did not 
make proper objection to the court's failure to give the proposed instruction, 
and

3) If it was error not to 
give the instruction, the error was harmless.

[¶26.]  In this opinion we have previously 
indicated that the jury was not adequately instructed with respect to the law of 
delivery and acceptance of a deed. Upon the trial court's refusal to give the 
Tatmans' offered instruction, counsel for the Tatmans 
said:

"The Plaintiffs object to 
the refusal of the court to give Instruction H for the reason that one of the 
issues in this case involves whether a deed was given to satisfy a promissory 
note. And the jury should be instructed on the requirements for delivery and 
acceptance of a deed. Otherwise they may be confused."

We believe 
counsel's objection was sufficient to comply with Rule 51, Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides:

"* * * No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of the objection. * * 
*"

[¶27.]  The Blakemans argue at length against 
"plain error" which they contend the Tatmans were asserting. In context we do 
not think the Tatmans were talking about plain error as discussed in Rule 7.05, 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, when counsel inadvertently used that term. 
In any event, the plain error doctrine has no application here, as we have 
determined that the Tatmans made a proper objection in the district court when 
the court refused to give an instruction on delivery and 
acceptance.

[¶28.]  Finally, we are unable to determine that 
failure to instruct on delivery and acceptance of the deed was harmless error. 
An instruction on the elements of delivery or a definition of delivery and 
acceptance was essential to the jury's understanding the key issue between the 
Tatmans and Blakemans.

B

[¶29.]  At the end of the Tatmans' case in chief, 
and again at the end of all the evidence, the Tatmans moved for a directed 
verdict. These motions were taken under advisement. After the verdict, the 
Tatmans filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was 
denied. Tatmans' second issue on appeal is the propriety of the court's denial 
of the motion for a JNOV.

[¶30.]  This court has previously set out the 
rules we must follow in determining the propriety of granting or denying a 
motion for a directed verdict or for a JNOV.

"In reviewing the grant 
of a directed verdict by a trial court, consideration must be given to all 
evidence favorable to [the] party against whom the motion is directed, as well 
as to all reasonable and legitimate inferences which might be drawn therefrom. 
[Citations.] Whether or not the evidence so viewed is sufficient to create an 
issue for the jury is solely a question of law to be answered by the trial 
court. That court must determine whether or not the evidence is such that, 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise, considering the 
weight of the evidence, there is but one conclusion as to verdict which men of 
reason could reach. * * *" Town of 
Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 
569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1977).

[¶31.]  The rule of review by this court was 
reiterated in Brasel and Sims 
Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., Wyo., 378 P.2d 501, 503 (1963), as 
follows:

"`* * * [I]t is the duty 
of this court to assume that the evidence of the successful party is true, 
leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in 
conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. * * 
*'"

[¶32.]  We have set out the evidence in detail in 
the forepart of this opinion. In summary, the evidence viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Blakemans was that the Tatmans stated they intended to become 
the owners of the Upton ranch, directed the preparation of the deed conveying 
the property to them, secured the execution and delivery of the deed, claimed 
ownership of the Upton property, tried to sell the ranch and paid the grazing 
fees. Tatmans' Motion for a JNOV was properly denied: 1) There was substantial 
evidence in support of the verdict in favor of the Blakemans; and 2) there were 
disputed material facts, which disputes were properly submitted to the 
jury.

II

[¶33.]  In the Cordinglys' appeal from judgment 
in favor of the Blakemans they contend that the evidence does not support the 
jury verdict. The Blakemans produced evidence that they were reluctant to get 
involved in the purchase of the Upton ranch, but that they succumbed to the 
importunity of the Cordinglys and obligated themselves to the Tatmans only to 
accommodate their relatives, the Cordinglys. Further evidence was produced by 
the Blakemans that they made a $48,000 down payment to the Tatmans, accepted a 
deed to the Upton property, and executed a note in the sum 
of $144,000, which was secured by a mortgage on the ranch. According to the 
Blakemans, the Cordinglys orally agreed to reimburse the Blakemans for the 
$48,000, and assume and pay the annual installments on the promissory note. The 
Cordinglys were to receive a deed to the Upton ranch from the Blakemans. Apparently, the 
oral agreement described by the Blakemans did not specify precisely when the 
$48,000 was to be paid to them, nor was it specified when they would give a deed 
to the Cordinglys. The Blakemans produced some evidence from the Cordinglys and 
nonparties that could be interpreted as corroborating testimony regarding the 
alleged oral agreement.

[¶34.]  At the conclusion of the Blakemans' case 
in chief on their cross-claim against the Cordinglys, and again at the 
conclusion of the entire case, the Cordinglys made a motion for a directed 
verdict.1 Both motions were based on the 
contention of the Cordinglys that there was no writing or memorandum, and that 
if there was any agreement, it was only oral.2 The Cordinglys did not make a 
motion for a JNOV.3

[¶35.]  It appears that the agreement Blakemans 
described runs afoul of the statute of frauds. Section 1-23-105, W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp., states in part:

"(a) In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith. 

"(i) Every agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof;

"(ii) Every special 
promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another 
person;

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Every agreement or 
contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one 
(1) year."

[¶36.]  The Blakemans' evidence was deficient in 
that a valid agreement with the Cordinglys was not proved. No attempt was made 
to prove a note or memorandum; in fact, all parties agreed that the entire 
alleged agreement was oral. The Blakemans contend, however, that their agreement 
with the Cordinglys was excepted from the statute of frauds. We 
disagree.

[¶37.]  On December 10, 1980, the Blakemans 
signed a note promising to pay the Tatmans $144,000 with interest. It was never 
disputed by the Blakemans that this was a valid debt owed by the Blakemans to 
the Tatmans.4

[¶38.]  According to the Blakemans' testimony the 
Cordinglys not only agreed to reimburse them for the $48,000 down payment, but 
the Cordinglys also agreed to assume and pay the obligation they had to the 
Tatmans. According to § 1-23-105(ii), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., a promise to 
answer for the debt of another is void unless memorialized by "note or 
memorandum," in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. This 
provision of the statute of frauds was not complied with.

[¶39.]  Section 1-23-105(i) is also applicable to 
the alleged agreement between the Blakemans and the Cordinglys. Such agreement 
was not to be, and could not be, performed within one year. The promissory note 
to the Tatmans, which the Blakemans contend the Cordinglys agreed to assume and 
pay, provided:

"Makers reserve the right 
to prepay any or all of the unpaid balance at any time after three (3) years 
from date hereof."

[¶40.]  By the terms of the alleged oral 
agreement between the Blakemans and the Cordinglys, the note which the 
Cordinglys were to assume was not to be paid within a year and could not be paid 
before December 10, 1983.

[¶41.]  The Blakemans contend that their 
agreement with the Cordinglys was an agreement for reimbursement rather than an 
agreement for the sale of real estate, and therefore, § 1-23-105(v) does not 
render such agreement void. We need not address that contention because we hold 
that the agreement is void and unenforceable according to the provisions of §§ 
1-23-105(i) and (ii).

[¶42.]  The situation here is not merely the 
Blakemans' failure to prove a valid contract, nor the Cordinglys' failure to 
prove a defense, but rather, it is a case where the Blakemans proved a void 
contract. Nothing was done nor could be done to breathe life into a void 
agreement.

[¶43.]  Deficiency in proof is not cured by 
failure to make a motion for a JNOV. When, as here, a motion for a JNOV was not 
made, the consequences on appeal are not entirely clear. There is hardly any 
authority to reverse the case and dismiss the defendant. Of some guidance are 
federal cases which have been decided under Rule 50(b), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is similar to our Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P.5 In Johnson v. New York New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S. Ct. 125, 97 L. Ed. 77 (1952), when the 
evidence was all in, the railroad moved to dismiss the complaint and for a 
directed verdict. After the verdict the railroad made several motions but did 
not move, within ten days after the verdict, "to have judgment entered in 
accordance with his (its) motion for a directed verdict." The court in Johnson 
held:

"On several recent 
occasions we have considered Rule 50(b). We have said that in the absence of a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made in the trial court within 
ten days after reception of a verdict the rule forbids the trial judge or an 
appellate court to enter such a judgment. * * *" Id., 344 U.S. 50, 73 S. Ct. 126-127, 97 L. Ed. 81.

"Respondent made a motion 
to set aside the verdict and for new trial within the time required by Rule 
50(b). It failed to comply with permission given by 50(b) to move for judgment 
n.o.v. after the verdict. In this situation respondent is entitled only to a new 
trial, not to a judgment in its favor. * * *" Id., 344 U.S. 54, 73 S. Ct. 128, 97 L. Ed. 83.

[¶44.]  In Jackson v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad 
Company, 678 F.2d 992, 1021 (11th Cir. 1982), the court 
said:

"* * * Their failure to 
file a motion for JNOV is not fatal to their appeal. A party's failure to move 
for JNOV does not preclude appellate review of an earlier motion for a directed 
verdict. However, where a motion for JNOV has not been filed, the only relief a 
party may obtain in this court is the ordering of a new trial; we may not direct 
a district court to enter judgment for the appellant. 
[Citations.]"

See also, United States v. Valdosta-Lowndes County 
Hospital Authority, 696 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1983); Gorsalitz v. Olin Matheson Chemical 
Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921, 92 S. Ct. 2463, 32 L. Ed. 2d 807 (1972); Yorkshire 
Indemity Co. of N.Y. v. Roosth & Genecov Production Co., 252 F.2d 650 
(5th Cir. 1958).

[¶45.]  The federal cases we have cited hold that 
where no motion was made for a JNOV, as in this case, a new trial should be 
granted. Although the rationale of this federal rule is not entirely clear, we 
are inclined to follow the procedure in the federal courts since their rule is 
similar to ours.6

[¶46.]  Both the Tatmans-Blakemans case and the 
Cordinglys-Blakemans case are reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

1 Rule 50(a), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure:

"Motion for directed 
verdict; when made; effect. - A party who moves for 
a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. * * 
*"

2 Actually, in their 
motion for a directed verdict Cordinglys talked about the "statute of 
limitations." In context it is clear, however, that they were talking about the 
statute of frauds. Among other things, they cited the applicable statute of 
frauds section.

3 Rule 50(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure:

"Motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. - Whenever a motion for 
a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 
reason is not granted, the moving party may move not later than ten (10) days 
after the entry of judgment to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon 
set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a 
directed verdict. * * *"

4 The fact that a jury in 
April, 1984, found that this debt had been satisfied is of no consequence in 
this portion of the appeal.

5 Rule 50(b), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28, U.S.C.A., stated:

"Whenever a motion for a 
directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved 
for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered 
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for 
a directed verdict * * *."

6 In Garman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., 175 F.2d 24, 28 (3rd Cir. 1949), the court said:

"If the defendant after 
judgment had moved for judgment in its favor in accordance with its motion for 
directed verdict we could remand the case with directions to enter judgment for 
the defendant. Such a motion not having been made, however, the case must be 
remanded for what under the circumstances would appear to be the useless 
formality of another trial."