Case Title: Kruger v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0133

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
KRUGER v. STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 2Case Number: S-11-0133Decided: 01/05/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
STEVEN 
R. KRUGER,Appellant (Defendant),
v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Steven R. Kruger 
was charged with: (1) felony child abuse in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-503(a) (LexisNexis 2011); and (2) a misdemeanor count of endangering 
children in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-403(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 
2011).  After a mental evaluation 
found him competent, Kruger entered a plea of guilty to felony child abuse.  Although Kruger entered a guilty plea to 
the misdemeanor charge at the same time, it was later dismissed pursuant to a 
plea agreement.  Also, a criminal 
citation relating to being under the influence of a controlled substance 
involving the same series of events was dismissed as part of the plea 
agreement.  At the scheduled 
sentencing Kruger sought to withdraw the guilty plea.  The district court denied the 
motion.  We affirm the district 
court’s denial of Kruger’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony child 
abuse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Kruger raises one 
issue:
 
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [Kruger’s] motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea?
 
The 
State raises two issues:
 
Did 
the district court arbitrarily apply the “assertion of innocence” factor of the 
seven-factor Frame test, in deciding 
that Kruger could not withdraw his guilty plea, and was that decision otherwise 
reasonable?
 
Did 
the district court, by its actions and oral pronouncements, accept Kruger’s 
guilty plea and defer only its acceptance of the plea agreement, so that Kruger 
was entitled to withdraw his plea only upon a showing of just 
cause?
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶3]      In Winsted v. State, 2010 WY 139, ¶ 6, 
241 P.3d 497, 499 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998)), this Court stated that the standard of review for the denial of a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea is abuse of discretion.  In applying this standard we focus on 
the “reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court.”  If the decision below is based upon sound 
judgment under the circumstances and the trial court could reasonably conclude 
as it did, we will not disturb the decision absent a showing that some facet of 
the ruling is arbitrary or capricious.  
Rolle v. State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 
9, 236 P.3d 259, 264 (Wyo. 2010).
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      An affidavit of 
probable cause is attached as Exhibit A to the Information and incorporated 
therein by reference and details the events that form the factual basis for the 
guilty plea:
 
I 
have been advised that on July 21, 2010 Wendy Kruger reported that her thirteen 
(13) year old daughter and two friends had gone missing while left in STEVEN R. 
KRUGER’S care.  Officer Pitchford 
and Officer King of the Sheridan Police Department travelled to 19 North 
Sheridan Avenue, in Sheridan County, to make contact with KRUGER.  When officers arrived on scene they 
heard loud music coming from inside the residence and tried to make contact with 
KRUGER.  Officers could see KRUGER 
sitting cross legged on the living room floor moving violently to the heavy 
metal music.  The officers made 
several attempts to speak with KRUGER, but KRUGER avoided the officers by 
locking the door and yelling for them to get off the property.  KRUGER then strung up blankets over the 
windows so the officers could not see inside.  Through a back window officers were able 
to notice that the residence had been totally ransacked.  KRUGER eventually opened a window to 
speak with the officers and told them he had chased Wendy’s daughter and her two 
friends out of the house and down the street.
 
Wendy 
arrived on [the] scene a short time later and told officer[s] that her daughter, 
BM, and two friends, CF and TM, were left in KRUGER’S care while Wendy sought 
medical attention for her aching back.  Wendy Kruger advised that the residence 
was tidy and in order when she left, but upon returning the residence was in 
complete disarray and the children were missing.  Wendy then advised that she received a 
telephone call shortly after contacting law enforcement informing her that the 
children were in the lobby of the Best Western Motel.
 
Officer 
Pitchford travelled to the Best Western Motel to spoke [sic] individually with 
BM, CF and TM.  BM advised that 
KRUGER was drinking wine in the residence and offered it to the three of them. 
 BM advised that they all took a 
small sip but when KRUGER offered them more, they declined.  KRUGER started yelling and calling the 
children profane names because they refused to drink more wine.  KRUGER forcefully pressured BM, CF and 
TM until they agreed to drink more of the wine.  KRUGER then said he was going to leave 
the residence to get some “weed.”  
He returned approximately twenty (20) minutes later and started smoking 
the Marijuana.  KRUGER offered the 
Marijuana to BM, CF and TM, but they all declined.  Their declination angered KRUGER so he 
again started to call them names, yell, and pressure them until they gave in to 
smoking the Marijuana with him.  BM 
estimates they took three (3) to four (4) puffs of the Marijuana cigarette. 
KRUGER then finished drinking a second bottle of wine and started to drink 
mouthwash.  KRUGER offered the 
mouthwash to CF, but CF refused to drink it.  KRUGER became enraged, and struck CF on 
the left side of his head.  KRUGER 
then pushed CF into the wall and grabbed TM by the throat and held TM against 
the couch.  TM managed to get loose 
and run out of the house with BM. KRUGER chased after them, but they were able 
to escape and run down North Sheridan Avenue to Brundage 
Street.
 
Officer 
Pitchford spoke with TM and CF individually who confirmed BM’s story.  Officer Pitchford felt CF’s head and 
found a two inch diameter bump above CF’s ear consistent with having been struck 
by KRUGER.
 
Course 
of the Proceedings
 
[¶5]      A criminal 
warrant was issued on July 22, 2010.  
A public defender was assigned.  
The initial appearance was set for July 22, 2010, at 2:00 
p.m.
 
[¶6]      A motion to 
suspend proceedings and for a mental evaluation was filed on August 17, 
2010.  An order for evaluation was 
entered on August 24, 2010.  A 
request for an extension of time to do the evaluation was extended to October 
12, 2010.  Kruger was found 
competent to proceed.
 
[¶7]      At the 
arraignment, held on October 21, 2010, the district court advised Kruger of the 
charges and of his rights.  The 
court placed Kruger under oath and determined that Kruger was alert and 
competent to proceed.  The court 
then read the charges and determined that Kruger had reviewed the charges with 
his attorney.  The court then 
determined that Kruger had seen and reviewed the affidavit of probable cause 
with his attorney.  The court asked 
if Kruger wanted to go through the affidavit in detail, at which time Kruger 
indicated that it was not necessary.  
The court then informed Kruger of his rights, including the right to an 
attorney, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy trial, the right to 
a public trial, the right to cross-examine witnesses, the right to submit 
evidence, the right to subpoena witnesses, and the right to 
appeal.
 
[¶8]      At no time during 
the proceeding did Kruger or his attorney raise any concern regarding a lack of 
understanding on the part of Kruger.  
At the appropriate time in the proceeding, Kruger was advised by the 
court of the four possible pleas available to him: (1) not guilty; (2) guilty; 
(3) no contest; or (4) not guilty by reason of mental impairment or 
deficiency.
 
[¶9]      The court then 
asked Kruger, “Please stand.  As to 
the charge of felony child abuse, how do you plead?”  Kruger answered, “Guilty, Your 
Honor.”  The court then asked, “As 
to the charge of misdemeanor endangering children, how do you plead?” Kruger 
answered, “Guilty, Your Honor.”  Immediately, the prosecutor explained to 
the court “that in exchange for his guilty plea to the felony, the State would 
agree to dismiss the misdemeanor.”
 
[¶10]   After explaining the rights Kruger 
was waiving by pleading guilty and that sentencing would be in the discretion of 
the court, the court then asked, “Is this guilty plea being entered as part of a 
plea agreement?”  Kruger answered, 
“Yes, it is, Your Honor.”  The 
prosecutor was asked to recite the terms of the plea agreement.  She explained that in exchange for the 
dismissal of the misdemeanor in the district court and the dismissal of the 
citation in the circuit court that Kruger agreed to enter a guilty plea on the 
felony child abuse.  She also 
explained that the plea agreement did not include a term of 
years.
 
[¶11]   The court then asked defense 
counsel if the terms of the plea agreement were accurate, to which defense 
counsel responded:
 
Your 
Honor, there was one other side matter, and that’s the matter of laying a 
factual basis, that may be difficult for Mr. Kruger to do, and so whether this 
is treated as an Alford plea, a no 
contest or whatever, we would ask that unless it is absolutely necessary, that 
Mr. Kruger not be called upon to lay the factual basis for this 
plea.
 
The 
court responded:
 
All 
right.  You understand that this 
Court is not bound by any plea agreement, and although this is not the type of 
one that the court would reject, it’s within the discretion of the prosecutor to 
dismiss the case.  Ordinarily if the 
court rejects it I would not allow you to withdraw your plea; do you understand 
that?
 
Kruger’s 
response was, “Yes, I do Your Honor.”
 
[¶12]   The court then asked the prosecutor 
to set forth the factual basis to support this guilty plea.  The factual foundation given generally 
followed the affidavit of probable cause.  The court had already determined on the 
record that Kruger had seen the affidavit and reviewed it with his 
attorney.  Furthermore, when the 
court offered to go over the affidavit in detail with Kruger, Kruger declined 
the court’s invitation.  Kruger was 
then asked by the court if he disputed any of the allegations the State set 
forth in the factual basis set forth by the prosecutor and Kruger answered, “No. 
 Your Honor.”
 
[¶13]   The court then 
stated:
 
All 
right.  The Court finds there are sufficient facts 
and basis for this Court to accept the guilty plea; that he has benefitted 
from competent legal counsel; he is competent to enter such a plea; he 
understands the charge, penalties, plea options, and rights waived, that it has 
been entered freely and voluntarily.  
The Court hereby enters the 
guilty plea for Count I.  The 
Court further orders a pre-sentence investigation to be completed.  (Emphasis added.)
 
Sentencing 
was then scheduled for December 7th at 9:00 
a.m.
 
[¶14]   An “Order After Arraignment” was 
filed November 3, 2010.  Part VIII 
of the order states, “That [Kruger] pled guilty to Count I, Felony Child Abuse, 
a violation of W.S. § 6-2-503(a) as alleged in the Information, and that such plea of guilty is 
voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly entered[.]”  (Emphasis added.)  Part IX of the order provides:  “That a factual basis exists in support of 
[Kruger’s] plea of guilty to the Court, and the Court should defer acceptance of 
the plea pending receipt of the pre-sentence report.” (Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶15]   On December 7, 2010, Kruger 
informed the court that he wished to withdraw his plea of guilty.  The court then deferred further 
proceedings and appointed substitute counsel to file a motion to withdraw the 
plea.  The entry of appearance for a 
substitute public defender was filed on December 10, 2010.
 
[¶16]   A motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea was filed on December 20, 2010.  In the written motion Kruger stated the 
facts relating to the guilty plea and admitted “[t]he Court then formally accepted Mr. 
Kruger’s guilty plea, ordered a pre-sentence investigation, and set 
Sentencing for December 7 at 9:00 a.m.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Defense 
counsel continued:
 
In 
the present matter, Mr. Kruger does not challenge the sufficiency of the Court’s 
Rule 11 allocation [sic].  Rather, 
Mr. Kruger submits that the hasty manner in which he entered his guilty plea, 
coupled with new potentially exculpatory information that has come to his light 
since he entered his guilty plea, establishes a fair and just reason for 
withdrawing his plea before sentence is imposed.
 
[¶17]   With regard to the “potentially 
exculpatory information,” Exhibit C attached to the motion is a letter from 
Kruger’s father that noted, inter alia, that: “I talked to Steve’s wife who is 
the mother of one of the alleged victims and she told me that the kids lied 
about what happened, she is going to be at the sentencing hearing and will tell 
the court the same thing.”  The 
presentence report, which was Exhibit D, was also attached to the motion which 
contained hearsay that one of the victims had recanted.
 
[¶18]   A written objection to Kruger’s 
motion was filed on January 4, 2011, by the prosecutor.  A hearing on the motion was set for 
January 13, 2011.  The State filed a 
motion to continue the hearing in order to give the State the opportunity to 
subpoena the defense counsel that represented Kruger at the arraignment.  The court granted the 
motion.
 
[¶19]   At the hearing on the motion, held 
February 8, 2011, there were no witnesses nor testimony represented by either 
Kruger or the State.  Kruger did 
present argument to the court.  An 
order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed February 11, 
2011.
 
[¶20]   On March 29, 2011, the State 
dismissed Count II of the Information, Endangering Children, as well as the 
Citation No. 037909E, Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance, both 
without prejudice.  Kruger was 
sentenced to not less than three years and not more than five years with credit 
of 246 days for presentence confinement.  
The timely “Notice of Appeal” was filed on May 10, 
2011.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶21]   Kruger acknowledges that the court 
“formally accepted Mr. Kruger’s guilty plea[.]”  The record is clear that the court 
accepted Kruger’s guilty plea to felony child abuse.  It is equally clear that although 
Kruger’s entry of a guilty plea on the misdemeanor may have been unnecessary 
pursuant to the plea agreement, nevertheless, Kruger entered a plea of guilty on 
the misdemeanor in Count II.  Kruger 
when asked to plead to the misdemeanor, quickly answered, “Guilty, Your 
Honor.”  The prosecutor then advised 
the court of the plea agreement.
 
[¶22]   The record shows that the trial 
court was not aware of the plea agreement until after Kruger’s plea of guilty to 
both the felony and the misdemeanor.  
Although the court did not accept the guilty plea on the misdemeanor, the 
record clearly shows that the court did, in fact, accept the guilty plea on only 
the felony charge.  Until the State 
thereafter dismissed the misdemeanor, Kruger had admitted in open court and 
under oath that he was guilty of the misdemeanor, as well as the felony.  Generally, “[a] plea of guilty is an 
admission or a confession of guilt, and as conclusive as a verdict of a 
jury.”  21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§ 668 (2008).
 
[¶23]   We hold that the trial court’s 
statement that “[t]he Court hereby enters the guilty plea for Count I” 
effectively accepted the guilty plea as to Count I.  The totality of the circumstances of the 
guilty plea clearly shows that the court accepted the guilty plea as to Count I, 
Felony Child Abuse.
 
[¶24]   Nevertheless the district court’s 
subsequent order after arraignment provides that “the Court should defer 
acceptance of the plea.”  We 
conclude that the trial court was referring to the “plea agreement” as the court 
had already accepted the plea on the felony child abuse charge.  The court properly deferred the 
acceptance of the plea agreement until after the dismissal of the misdemeanor in 
accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.  The court in the hearing explained to 
Kruger:
 
All 
right.  You understand that this 
court is not bound by any plea agreement, and although this is not the type of 
one that the Court would reject, it’s within the discretion of the prosecutor to 
dismiss this case.  Ordinarily if 
the Court rejects it I would not allow you to withdraw your plea; do you 
understand that?
 
Kruger 
responded, “Yes, I do, Your Honor.”  
The court then asked Kruger, “I remind you that you’re under oath and 
subject to prosecution for perjury if you do not tell the truth.  Are you entering this plea freely and 
voluntarily?” Kruger answered, “Yes, I am, Your Honor.”
 
[¶25]   Under Rule 32(d) of the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure if the motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made 
before sentencing, the standard is “any fair and just reason.”  We review a district court’s decision on 
such a motion on an abuse of discretion basis.  A defendant has no absolute right to 
withdraw a plea of guilty before a sentence is imposed, and where the strictures 
of W.R.Cr.P. 11 are met, and Kruger intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily 
entered a plea of guilty, the district court’s decision denying such a motion is 
within its sound discretion.  Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 
(Wyo. 1999).
[¶26]   On review we must determine whether 
the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  
Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 
102, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Wyo. 2004).  We have also stated that the district 
court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion made prior to sentencing 
to withdraw a guilty plea if the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 are complied with 
at the time the plea is accepted.  
In addition, we will not disturb the district court’s decision so long as 
it could have reasonably concluded as it did.  Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 8, 
55 P.3d 29, 32 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting from Stout v. State, 2001 WY 114, ¶ 15, 
35 P.3d 1198, 1205 (Wyo. 2001)).
 
[¶27]   In this case, Kruger admits that 
the trial court met the requirements of Rule 11.  Several times during the hearing on the 
motion to withdraw, defense counsel admitted that the Rule 11 requirements were 
met by the court.  Defense counsel 
stated, “[t]he defendant is not challenging the Court’s Rule 11 allocution. … 
 It’s the allocution the Court uses 
all the time, and I don’t have a problem with that allocution.  I think the allocution is fine.”  Defense counsel also noted, “Your Honor, 
I don’t think your Rule 11 allocution is insufficient.”  It is clear that Kruger conceded that the 
Rule 11 requirements were met by the district court at the 
arraignment.
 
[¶28]   Defense counsel repeated, “And I 
think that even with the Court’s Rule 11, standard Rule 11 allocution, it can be 
said with confidence that Mr. Kruger accepted the plea agreement and entered his 
plea knowingly and voluntarily.”  Kruger’s apparent admission that the plea 
was entered knowingly and voluntarily is inconsistent with the written motion, 
which stated:
 
Under 
such hasty conditions, and even in light of the Court’s Rule 11 allocation 
(sic), it cannot fairly be said with confidence that Mr. Kruger accepted the 
plea agreement and entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, and as 
such, the Court should allow him to withdraw his plea.
 
[¶29]   In Stout, ¶ 15, 35 P.3d 1204 we gave 
the defendant the “benefit of the doubt” with regard to a letter he wrote 
expressly stating that it was not his intent to withdraw his plea, and the court 
addressed the letter as if it had been a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
despite his explicit statement before the court that he had no intention of 
making such a motion.  We will give 
Kruger the same “benefit of the doubt,” and proceed with our review. 

 
[¶30]   The standard of review for 
determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea is de novo.  Van Haele v. State, 2004 WY 59, 
¶ 12, 90 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2004).  
We look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the 
voluntariness of a plea.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1108 
(Wyo. 1993).  The well-defined 
standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary is stated as 
follows:
 
[A] 
plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including 
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his 
own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. 
bribes).
 
Major 
v. State, 
2004 WY 4, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d 468, 472 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting from Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970)).  Here there was no testimony, or 
suggestion of any kind, that Kruger was induced by threats, misrepresentation, 
or improper promises made by the court, the prosecutor, or his own counsel, to 
accept the plea agreement.  Kruger 
was cooperative and fully aware of the consequences of his guilty plea.  We conclude that Kruger’s plea, from the 
totality of the circumstances, was knowing and voluntary.
 
Kruger’s 
Burden
 
[¶31]   In McCard v. State, 2003 WY 142, ¶ 11, 
78 P.3d 1040, 1043, (Wyo. 2003) we held that it is the defendant’s burden to 
show “any fair and just reason.”  
The burden only shifts to the State to demonstrate prejudice to its case, 
if the defendant first demonstrates “any fair and just reason” for the 
withdrawal of the plea.  The court 
also explained, “There is a difference between an assertion of innocence and an 
assertion that the State lacks the requisite evidence to prove the charged 
crime.” Id.
 
[¶32]   On December 7, 2010, the court 
convened the scheduled sentencing hearing.  
The court noted that Kruger was evaluated by the Wyoming State Hospital 
and found competent to proceed.  Defense counsel also noted that Kruger 
wanted to withdraw his plea on the basis that he was hurried at the arraignment 
and additional information had come to Kruger’s attention.  This additional information was “from 
his wife, who [had] spoken with the parent of one of the alleged victims in this 
matter, and the twelve- and thirteen-year-olds apparently have acknowledged that 
all or most of what they reported was fabricated.”
 
[¶33]   The court continued the sentencing 
to allow the opportunity for full briefing and the possible opportunity to 
present evidence.  The court noted 
that this “should be handled in a little bit more deliberative way.”  At the same time counsel noted that he 
was ethically obligated to ask for substitute counsel to be appointed.  The court agreed and then gave Kruger 
three weeks to file his motion.
 
[¶34]   On February 8, 2011, a hearing on 
the motion to withdraw was held.  
Defense counsel was asked by the court if he anticipated calling 
witnesses.  Defense counsel 
responded that he did not intend to call any witnesses.  Thereafter, oral argument was presented 
to the court.  Defense counsel noted 
during the argument that he was not making an ineffective assistance of counsel 
argument.
 
[¶35]   Kruger’s argument focused on his 
alleged misunderstanding of the implications of changing his plea.  Kruger argued that there was a fair and 
just reason why he could not provide a factual basis.  The reason given by his attorney was 
that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident.  Kruger contended that he did not 
understand the impact of the guilty plea and that, since he entered the plea, 
the children had retracted their reports.  
Kruger claimed that he entered the plea on the basis of the children’s 
reports to police.
 
[¶36]   As explained in Major, ¶ 24, 83 P.3d  at 479 (citing 
Triplett v. State, 802 P.2d 162, 165 
(Wyo. 1990)):
 
We 
review the court’s decision on the motion for an abuse of discretion.  Even if a 'plausible’ or a 'just and 
fair’ reason for withdrawal is presented, an abuse of discretion is not 
demonstrated if the requirements of Rule 11 have been met and the record clearly 
shows that the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered the 
plea.
 
[¶37]   In Major, we also emphasized that the 
factors in Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, 29 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2001) were “a guide to the considerations 
that may be relevant in determining a motion to withdraw and consideration on 
the record of each specific factor by the court is not mandatory.”  We also explained that “[n]o single 
factor is dispositive, and the ultimate determination on the motion is based 
upon whether the defendant has carried his burden of establishing a fair and 
just reason for withdrawal.”  Major, ¶ 14, 83 P.3d  at 
473.
 
The 
Frame Factors
 
[¶38]   In Frame, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d  at 89, this 
Court adopted the seven-factor review process.  These factors are: (1) whether the 
defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government will suffer 
prejudice; (3) whether the defendant has delayed the filing of the motion; (4) 
whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether 
close assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether the original plea was 
knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial 
resources.  The district court 
analyzed Kruger’s motion under the seven factors set forth in Frame.
 
[¶39]   The trial court’s order denying 
Kruger’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on February 11, 2011.  The court provided an analysis of the 
factors set forth in the Frame 
case.  With regard to factor one, 
the court noted that Kruger did not claim innocence at the time of the plea at 
the arraignment and no evidence was presented.  With regard to the prejudice the State 
would suffer, the court noted: “This factor weighs very slightly in favor of not 
allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea.  
It is not dispositive of the issue.”  The court found only a slight impact on 
factor two, non-dispositive weight.  
The court found that as to factor three that Kruger was delayed in filing 
his motion: “This factor does not present persuasive weight for either party.” 
 As to the inconvenience to the 
court, the court found inconvenience but did not rely on the fourth Frame factor and “finds it neutral in 
the decision.”  As to factor five, 
the court indicated that: “[Kruger] is not claiming an ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Therefore this factor 
weighs in favor of the State.”  As 
to the sixth factor, the court noted: “[Kruger] does not contend that this 
Court’s W.R.Cr.P 11 allocation [sic] was erroneous.  Kruger was alert and knowingly and 
voluntarily entered the plea based on the facts before the court and what took 
place at the Change of Plea hearing.”  
As to the seventh factor, the court noted: “While there could conceivably 
be a waste of judicial resources, as with factor four, the court does not weigh 
this into consideration in this decision.”
 
[¶40]   Thereafter, the court denied the 
motion and concluded that it “does not find a fair and just reason for allowing 
withdrawal of the plea.”  The court 
also found that Kruger was properly informed under W.R.Cr.P. 11 and was properly 
represented at the hearing.  
Previously, we have explained that we give deference to the trial court’s 
findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  McCard, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d 1043.
 
[¶41]   We conclude that the district court 
could have rationally concluded as it did – that Kruger did not present any 
“fair and just reason” to withdraw his guilty plea.  Kruger failed to meet his burden.  Kruger did not present any evidence or 
testimony to the court or argument that the plea was induced by threats, 
misrepresentation, or any promises that were improper.  The court’s denial of  the motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
was within its discretion, particularly given that it conducted a thorough and 
careful hearing in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11, wherein Kruger entered a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea.  Kruger under oath in this case admitted 
that his plea was entered “freely and voluntarily.”  See Demeulenaere v. State, 2008 WY 147, 197 P.3d 1238 (Wyo. 2008).
 
Alford 
Plea
 
[¶42]   Kruger alleges that his plea was in 
the nature of an Alford plea.  Kruger argues that the trial court’s 
determination as to the first Frame 
factor was in error.  It is 
questionable whether a true Alford 
plea was made in this case.  An Alford plea involves the court’s 
acceptance of the plea when the defendant simultaneously professes his 
innocence, North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).  In this case Kruger never professed his 
innocence but merely claimed that it may have been difficult for him to 
establish a factual basis, ostensibly because he was intoxicated.  We have reviewed the record in this 
matter and do not find any indication that Kruger asserted his innocence; 
rather, he acknowledged under oath that he had received a copy of the 
Information and discussed it with his attorney.  Furthermore, Kruger received a copy of 
the affidavit of probable cause and reviewed it with his attorney.  Kruger also told the court that it was 
not necessary to go over the affidavit in detail.
 
[¶43]   Again, Kruger did not assert his 
innocence, but did claim that the victims had changed their stories.  It was Kruger’s burden to prove that the 
victims had actually recanted.  
Kruger presented no credible or admissible evidence in this regard.  Kruger apparently relied upon the two 
exhibits attached to the motion, which were clearly hearsay statements.  The two documents include a letter from 
Kruger’s father and the presentence report.  Kruger was given the opportunity to 
present evidence and testimony. The district court stated in this regard, “What 
I intend to do is allow both parties to call whatever witnesses they want to 
call and let’s do that and move forward.”  
Kruger did not present any witnesses.  Simply put, Kruger did not present any 
evidence to the district court.
 
[¶44]   Assuming for the sake of argument 
only that Kruger’s plea could be characterized as an Alford plea due to his inability to 
admit to his participation in the acts constituting a crime, in McCard, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d  at 1043 we 
noted, “[t]here is a difference between an assertion of innocence and an 
assertion that the State lacks the requisite evidence to prove the charged 
crime.”  Here, the fact that Kruger 
was impaired at the time of the crime does not equate to a claim of innocence or 
that the State lacks the requisite evidence to prove the crime.  Furthermore, suggestion, speculation, and 
hearsay that the victims had recanted are not the type of information that a 
reasonable person would accept as the basis for the conclusion that Kruger is 
asserting his innocence.
 
[¶45]   Kruger also alleges that there was 
no definition to support the physical injury found in the statute.  Kruger admits that the issue of the 
injury was not raised in the trial court.  This Court has consistently held that an 
unconditional guilty plea waives any appellate review of non-jurisdictional 
claims.  Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 147, ¶ 8, 
55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
only claims not waived by an unconditional guilty plea are those that address 
the jurisdiction of the court or the voluntariness of the plea.  Id.
 
[¶46]   In deciding whether the district 
court abused its discretion, this Court must conclude that the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious.  Major, 83 P.3d 468.  We conclude that the district court was 
extremely patient, deliberate, careful, and reasonable in its handling and 
consideration of Kruger’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We also find that the district court 
could reasonably conclude as it did, and we conclude that the decision was not 
arbitrary or capricious.  Kruger 
also failed to carry his burden as noted above.
 
[¶47]   Wyoming has not chosen to follow 
the federal provision cited by Kruger, as Rule 11(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure is not found in the Wyoming Rules.  The Wyoming rule applies a standard of 
“any fair and just reason” to the withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, 
as opposed to the federal standard of “any reason or no reason at all.”  We have stated that a defendant has no 
absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed, and 
where the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and Kruger intelligently, 
knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court’s 
decision to deny such a motion is within its sound discretion.  Burdine, 974 P.2d 929-30.
 
[¶48]   We affirm the district court’s 
denial of Kruger’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony child 
abuse.