Case Title: LEE VINCENT MILLER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-161

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEE VINCENT MILLER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 217784 P.2d 209Case Number: 88-161Decided: 12/14/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEE VINCENT MILLER, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Bill Rice (argued), Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Howard Strand (argued), Legal Intern, for appellee. 

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Lee Vincent 
Miller, seeks reversal of his conviction for aggravated assault and battery, 
contending that the district court erroneously admitted evidence concerning a 
1983 felony conviction in Los 
Angeles for possession of PCP with intent to sell. Miller 
contends that admission of this evidence violated W.R.E. 609(a). Appellee argues 
that the evidence was admissible under the same rule.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Miller and his victim 
had been drinking whiskey and beer at a party when they began to argue. The 
victim verbally threatened Miller, punctuating his threats with racial epithets. 
Apparently, Miller had gained some knowledge of his victim's physical prowess by 
witnessing him beat up three cowboys in one night and by engaging in a public 
fist fight with him a few months before. Fearing a beating and concerned that 
his recently injured leg would prevent him from adequately defending himself, 
Miller stabbed his victim in the abdomen with a knife, inflicting a potentially 
life-threatening injury.

[¶4.]     During the trial, the 
prosecutor sought to admit into evidence a variety of appellant's prior criminal 
convictions, primarily to contradict intimations from Miller's testimony that he 
was a peaceable man. The district court did not view that testimony as having 
placed in issue his character as a peaceable man, and it refused to admit those 
prior convictions. The record then becomes somewhat obscure. After defense 
objections to admission of the prior convictions were sustained, the prosecutor 
asked:

"MR. BLONIGEN: I will 
still be allowed to go into the other?

"MR. RAYMOND [defense 
counsel]: I guess while we are here, what is the extent the Court will allow him 
to inquire, as I understand it, have you been convicted of 
it.

"MR. BLONIGEN: And 
when.

"THE COURT: 
Okay."

The following 
cross-examination of Miller then took place, without an objection by the 
defense:

"Q. Mr. Miller, you 
previously discussed why people may have referred to you and about the name 
Ragsdale. Do you remember that testimony?

"A. Yes, 
sir.

"Q. It is also true you 
used the name of John Ragsdale, isn't it?

"A. I used it 
once.

"Q. And one of the 
reasons you used that name in 1983 in Los Angeles you were convicted of a felony, 
isn't that right?

"A. I don't recall what 
felony that was or what the charge was.

"Q. The charge, was it 
not, possession of PCP with intent to sell, was it not?

"A. Well, that was 
possession when they busted me, it was possession of and sales both, but it 
wasn't, they dropped from possession of to sell to 
possession.

"Q. You were subsequently 
convicted of the felony of selling in that?

"A. I don't know if it 
was a felony.

"Q. You received 36 
months probation?

"A. Well, let me think, 
it was a little more than that, five years, but at the time I got probation I 
did 2 and a half years and it was becoming monotonous as far as interfering with 
my job, and I would have to take off my job two or three times a week and go 
check, and my boss was kind of getting upset, so I went to my probation officer 
and asked him any way I could go back to court and ask them to just give me the 
six months, because I couldn't do no more time myself any more time on the job, 
so we took it back to court and they gave me six months. I didn't have no more 
probation, and still had my job when I got out, but I don't know if it was a 
misdemeanor or a felony or not."

[¶5.]     Appellant now asserts 
that the admission of this testimony violated W.R.E. 609(a), which provides in 
pertinent part:

"For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one (1) year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant * * 
*."

His argument in 
this regard is two-fold. First, he argues that the district court erred in 
failing to make the requisite preliminary findings that the prior conviction was 
for a felony and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial potential. Second, he contends it was error to admit the testimony 
because its prejudicial effect far exceeded its negligible probative 
value.

[¶6.]     We note that 
appellant's failure to make a timely objection to the introduction of this 
testimony requires us to affirm his conviction, absent a finding that the 
admission of such evidence rises to the level of plain 
error.

"To determine whether the 
plain error standard has been met, we apply a three-part test. First, this court 
must be able to discern unequivocally from the record what occurred at trial 
without resort to speculation. Second, appellant must demonstrate that what 
occurred constitutes a clear and obvious violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law. Finally, that violation must have adversely affected some 
substantial right of appellant."

Schwenke v. 
State, 768 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Wyo. 1989); see 
also Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo. 1988). We will not find plain error in a 
discretionary ruling of the trial court unless the appellant demonstrates a 
clear abuse of that discretion by showing that the trial court could not have 
reasonably concluded as it did. See Schwenke, 768 P.2d at 1034-35; Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49, 56-57 (Wyo. 1985); Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 625-26 
(Wyo. 1985); Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Wyo. 
1981).

[¶7.]     With respect to 
appellant's first assignment of error, we hold that the trial court's failure to 
make the preliminary findings required by W.R.E. 609(a) did not violate a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law. As we explained in Bradley, W.R.E. 609(a) places no 
burden upon the court to make such findings to support the admission of prior 
convictions until the defendant enters a proper objection. Only at that time 
does the trial court's obligation to make those preliminary determinations 
become clear and unequivocal. The failure to object constitutes a waiver of that 
obligation. Bradley, 635 P.2d  at 1165. Appellant may not premise plain error 
upon the trial court's failure to make the Rule 609 
findings.

[¶8.]     Appellant would also 
have us find plain error in the admission of his prior conviction based on his 
contention that its prejudicial effect exceeded its probative value. However, he 
concedes that the balancing of prejudice against probative worth is ordinarily a 
discretionary matter for the trial court and that to prevail on appeal he must, 
as a threshold matter, clearly demonstrate the inflammatory nature of the 
evidence and establish that it had little probative value. Appellant has failed 
to carry this burden. His evidence concerning the prejudicial nature of his 
prior drug conviction demonstrates only the widespread public concern with, and 
media attention given to, illicit drug use. We rejected a similar showing as 
insufficient to establish the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction in 
Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027-28 (Wyo. 1981), and hold likewise in this 
case.

[¶9.]     Appellant has also 
failed to establish that the testimony elicited from him had no probative worth. 
During the prosecution's case in chief, testimony was given that appellant was 
also known as Lee Vincent Ragsdale. When appellant took the stand, he attempted 
to rebut the logical inference from that testimony that he employed an alias. He 
explained that he had been raised by a man named Ragsdale and only later in life 
discovered that his natural father was named Miller, a name he subsequently 
assumed. The prosecutor's later inquiry into appellant's use of the name John 
Ragsdale at the time of his prior conviction served to contradict that 
explanation nation and to generally impeach appellant's credibility, suggesting 
that he had resorted to the deceptive practice of assuming an alias. We, 
therefore, hold that the admission of his testimony concerning the prior 
conviction did not amount to plain error.

[¶10.]  Appellant's conviction is 
affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶11.]  This is another case where the majority 
affirms the defendant's conviction when his court-appointed counsel failed to 
object to the introduction of arguably improper evidence. That failure to object 
may have allowed Miller's prior conviction for illegal drugs to determine his 
fate at trial at least as much as did the actual evidence relevant to the charge 
against him. This is also, unfortunately, another case where the basis of the 
holding - inadequate objection and a plain error standard of review - was 
briefed by neither counsel for appellate review. I 
dissent.

[¶12.]  It appears improper for this court to 
decide according to a theory of law not briefed by the litigants, especially 
when that theory is again used to tidy up the prosecution's case. After "noting" 
the failure of Miller's counsel to make a "timely objection", the majority 
determined that the introduction of Miller's prior felony did not violate W.R.E. 
609(a) under a plain error standard. But the failure to make a "timely 
objection" was not even mentioned, much less briefed, by either the prosecution 
or Miller.1 Following the observed insufficient 
trial objection, this majority requires Miller to "demonstrate that what 
occurred constitutes a clear and obvious violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law" before this court would reverse under the plain error standard. 
This demonstration becomes the very foundation for any appellant to prevail 
under the plain error rule. Yet, here the majority applies a rule which requires 
a demonstration but provides the defendant no opportunity to make that 
demonstration absent opportunity for supplemental briefing before decision. It 
is only fair to request supplemental briefs when we suspect an issue other than 
those presented in the opposing briefs may control our holding. A request for a 
supplemental brief on an arguable issue would not be a novel request.2 "We therefore address the issues 
regarding the jurisdiction of the Campbell County District Court as presented 
pursuant to our request by the supplemental briefs of the parties." Nicholaus v. 
Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1339-40 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis 
added).

[¶13.]  Besides, in all fairness, if the plain 
error standard should control our holding, we need to permit rebriefing for the 
ineffectiveness of counsel consideration. See Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); Kallas v. State, 
776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting); and Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting).

[¶14.]  At a minimum, we should exercise care in 
deciding a case on a non-briefed issue by exercising caution to assure adequate 
presentation by the litigants before review by this court. We need not blithely 
or blindly follow the current aberration observable from the United States 
Supreme Court by copying its unfortunate pathway taken in a number of recent 
occasions to rush to redefined standards of the law. This judicial aptitude is 
particularly illustrated by dissenting comments found in a course of cases 
within only one current term. In Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., ___ 
U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724-25, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989) (footnote omitted) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting), it was indicated:

In granting certiorari in 
this case we did not, as the Court would have it, agree to review the question 
whether one may bring a suit for damages under § 1981 itself on the basis of 
governmental conduct. * * * In six years of proceedings in the lower courts, 
including a jury trial and an appeal that produced two opinions, respondent 
never once suggested that Jett's only remedy was furnished by § 1983. Petitioner 
was able to respond to this argument only in his reply brief in this Court. 
While it is true that we often affirm a judgment on a ground not relied upon by 
the court below, we ordinarily do so only when that ground at least was raised 
below. * * *

It is not only unfair to 
decide the case on this basis, it is unwise. The question is important; to 
resolve it on the basis of largely one-sided briefing, without the benefit of 
the views of the courts below, is rash. It is also unnecessary. The Court 
appears to decide today (though its precise holding is less than pellucid) that 
liability for violations by the government of § 1981 may not be predicated on a 
theory of respondeat superior. The answer to that question would dispose of 
Jett's contentions. In choosing to decide, as well, whether § 1983 furnishes the 
exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by the government, the Court makes 
many mistakes that might have been avoided by a less impetuous 
course.

In Teague v. 
Lane, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1084, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, reh'g denied ___ U.S. 
___, 109 S. Ct. 1771, 104 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), it was 
stated:

Today a plurality of this 
Court, without benefit of briefing and oral argument, adopts a novel threshold 
test for federal review of state criminal convictions on habeas corpus. It does 
so without regard for - indeed, without even mentioning - our contrary decisions 
over the past 35 years delineating the broad scope of habeas relief. The 
plurality further appears oblivious to the importance we have consistently 
accorded the principle of stare decisis in nonconstitutional cases. Out of an 
exaggerated concern for treating similarly situated habeas petitioners the same, 
the plurality would for the first time preclude the federal courts from 
considering on collateral review a vast range of important constitutional 
challenges; where those challenges have merit, it would bar the vindication of 
personal constitutional rights and deny society a check against further 
violations until the same claim is presented on direct review. In my view, the 
plurality's "blind adherence to the principle of treating like cases alike" 
amounts to "letting the tail wag the dog" when it stymies the resolution of 
substantial and unheralded constitutional questions. Griffin v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 332, 107 S. Ct. 708, 718, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Because I cannot acquiesce in this 
unprecedented curtailment of the reach of the Great Writ, particularly in the 
absence of any discussion of these momentous changes by the parties or the lower 
courts, I dissent.

[¶15.]  In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S. Ct. 205, 207, 102 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1988), Justice Marshall stated in 
dissent:

I agree with Justice 
STEVENS that the Court should not disturb the decision of the court below, and 
accordingly I join his dissent. I write separately to note my continuing belief 
that it is unfair to litigants and damaging to the integrity and accuracy of 
this Court's decisions to reverse a decision summarily without the benefit of 
full briefing on the merits of the question decided.

Justice Stevens 
then stated in dissent:

The Court explains why it 
reverses the decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in this drunk 
driving case, but it does not explain why it granted 
certiorari.

Id. 109 S. Ct.  at 207. See 
also Justice Marshall's dissents in Hildwin v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2055, 2057, 104 L. Ed. 2d 728, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 3268, 106 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1989) and Olden v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 480, 484, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1988).

[¶16.]  Although the California process may be 
more structured in written statutory criteria, the requirement and optimum goals 
for adequacy of appellate decision-making should not differ. The rule could be 
rationally stated:

"Before . . . a court of 
appeal . . . renders a decision . . . based on an issue which was not proposed 
or briefed by any party to the proceeding, the court shall afford the parties an opportunity 
to present their views on the matter through supplementary briefing. If the 
court fails to afford such an opportunity, a rehearing shall be ordered upon 
timely petition of any party."

Adoption of 
Alexander S., 44 Cal. 3d 857, 45 Cal. 3d 207A, 245 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4, 750 P.2d 778, 
782 (1988) (emphasis in original and quoting in part from a California statute). See 
a similar rebriefing process utilized in State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 770 P.2d 1165 (1989); Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 733 P.2d 1073, 
cert. denied 484 U.S. 874, 108 S. Ct. 212, 98 L. Ed. 2d 177, reh'g denied 484 U.S. 972, 108 S. Ct. 477, 98 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1987); Cole v. Delaware League for Planned 
Parenthood, Inc., 530 A.2d 1119 (Del.Super. 1987); and State v. Seward, 509 So. 2d 413 (La. 1987).

[¶17.]  The second reason for dissent is my 
continued conviction that the trier of fact should determine a defendant's fate 
only by the actual evidence of real events established by "the noble 
Anglo-American notion that we try cases rather than persons." Beaver and 
Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 
Temp.L.Q. 585, 620 (1985). Because the prosecutor tried to introduce Miller's 
prior convictions en masse3, little argument is needed to make 
good the claim that the prosecutor's purpose4 was to prejudice and inflame the 
jury to secure Miller's conviction. That the trial judge only permitted evidence 
of one prior conviction does not affect the prosecutor's purpose in seeking the 
introduction of the prior convictions en masse. If the jury might have thought 
the decision a close call after being exposed to the actual evidence of the real 
events, then Miller's past history could be available to tip the balance, 
although that history would have no relevance to his guilt or innocence to the 
crime for which he was on trial. This prosecutorial pattern is neither new nor 
fair. This follows in a course of recent developments where prejudicial 
non-relevance has become a formula for trial proof. See Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316 (Wyo. 
1989) (Urbigkit, J. dissenting).

More than a century ago, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., then a Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, wrote in a civil case:

"[W]hen it is proved that 
a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only ground for disbelieving him 
which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the 
conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone 
that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and 
thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he 
was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that 
conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character 
and unworthy of credit." Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).[5]

Green v. Bock 
Laundry Mach. Co., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1984 n. 4, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557 
(1989).

[¶18.]  It seems improper, as well as dangerous 
in the long run, to allow prior bad acts or previous convictions of the 
defendant to reduce the burdens imposed originally on government before it 
convicts and punishes citizens. That is my jurisprudential view. However, if 
this majority seeks to reduce the task imposed originally on government before 
citizens are punished, that reduction should at least be done openly in the 
light of day. The court created W.R.E. 404(b) and 609 and the court can abolish 
those rules with the stroke of a pen. When the exceptions to W.R.E. 404(b) can 
be illustrated by a lengthy footnote, Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974-76 
(Wyo. 1989), 
the rule has no meaning as a governing principle. There is enough legal fiction 
as it is.6

[¶19.]  It is difficult and probably improvident 
to appropriately consider a topic as broadly emplaced in the law as the 
impeachment of a defendant by prior conviction when we have the kind of a record 
now presented and the decision of this court is made on a plain error context by 
appellate court decision of the adequacy of trial objection. However, the power 
of dicta condemns any casual acceptance at this juncture of the broad character 
of issues raised which belie simplistic disposition. The complexity is not 
ameliorated by the current decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding 
a differentiated function of the rules of evidence for civil trials. Green, 109 S. Ct. 1981.7

[¶20.]  The first difficulty advanced in this 
case occurs with the fact that no motion in limine was made to anchor any prior 
conviction to its relevancy with the crime charged to the defendant. "Generally 
the question of which convictions will be usable to attack credibility should be 
determined prior to trial." 3 Weinstein's Evidence, United States 
Rules § 609[05] at 609-95 (1988). The second difficulty is the inability to 
pin-point whether the prior offense was considered to fall within W.R.E. 
609(a)(2) dishonesty or false statement, or W.R.E. 609(a)(1) probative value 
outweighing the prejudicial effect. If the former is used for admissibility, the 
decision was erroneous as a matter of law. 3 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 317 at 332 (1979). Conversely, if the basis is invested in the 
balanced test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, the decision was 
factually unjustified in this case and consequently, an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at § 315; Luck v. United States, 
348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). No discussion is provided for this appeal 
regarding the W.R.E. 404(b) ingredients of the obtained and introduced bad 
character evidence. See Pena, 780 P.2d 316 (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting).

[¶21.]  Clearly, the offensive foray of the 
prosecutor here did not achieve the territorial umbrella for a conviction within 
W.R.E. 609(a)(2) of crimes "involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement" by any 
majority application of that rule. Rationally constrained also is usage of the 
cross-examination impeachment where the evidence of conviction had a minimal 
probative factor related to the facts of this case compared to the prejudicial 
effect to Miller from a bad character infusion of a black man who had previously 
dealt in drugs.

[¶22.]  Miller's brief realistically assays the 
problems presented:

It is clear that the 
introduction of the prior conviction evidence was procedurally deficient. It was 
also highly prejudicial. Miller, a black, was painted as being a California drug dealer. 
One would have to be deaf and blind to the national news to be unaware of the 
great fear that our nation's population holds for the illegal drug problem and 
those who participate in its distribution network.

[¶23.]  Before this court sifts out due process 
versus bad acts evidence, a realistic research and proper briefing, not 
exacerbated by plain error intrusion, should be required. The literature and 
text analysis on the W.R.E. 609 subject is visually and factually extensive. The 
recognition of an extrinsic felony and reasoning from premise to result 
recognized by Justice Holmes is often discussed.8 The topically thoughtful analysis 
in addition to the review in Ladd, Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 166 (1940) can be included in McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal 
Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 Law & Social Order 1 (1970); Note, 
Evidence - Pennsylvania Limits Judicial Discretion on Impeachment by Prior 
Convictions - Commonwealth v. Randall, 61 Temp.L.Rev. 567 (1988); Note, Prior 
Conviction Impeachment in the District 
of Columbia: What Happened When the Courts Ran Out of 
Luck?, 35 Cath.U.L. Rev. 1157 (1986); and Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Permitting 
Impeachment of Witness by Evidence of Prior Conviction of Crime, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 
570 (1978). Cf. Note, Evidence - Diggs v. Lyons: The Use of Prior Criminal Convictions to 
Impeach Credibility in Civil Actions Under Rule 609(a), 60 Tul.L. Rev. 863 
(1986) and Note, Impeachment with Prior Convictions Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609(a)(1): A Plea for Balance, 63 Wn.U.L.Q. 469 
(1985).

[¶24.]  The California Supreme Court, in 
considering the broadening parameter of admissibility created by a 
constitutional amendment in People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 
726, 696 P.2d 111, 118 (1985), considered the admissibility decisions and 
discretional process:

What we cannot ignore, 
however, is the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which, as 
interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, demands that even 
inferences - not just presumptions - be based on a rational connection between 
the fact proved and the fact to be inferred. * * * "[C]ommon-law inferences, 
like their statutory counterparts, must satisfy due process standards in light 
of present-day experience." [Barnes v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973)] (Id. 412 U.S. at pp. 844-845, 93 S.Ct. at pp. 2362-2363.) 
Paraphrasing the question to be asked * * * we must ask with respect to any 
particular felony conviction which is offered for impeachment: "Can it be said 
with substantial assurance that the credibility of a witness is adversely 
affected by his having suffered this conviction?" If the answer is "no," 
impeachment is prohibited by due process: "An important element of a fair trial 
is that a jury consider only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the 
issue of guilt or innocence." (Bruton v. United States, (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 
131, fn. 6, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1625, fn. 6, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476.)

The court 
further reflects "that if the felony of which the witness has been convicted 
does not show a `readiness to do evil,' the fact of conviction simply will not 
support an inference of readiness to lie." Id. 211 Cal. Rptr.  at 727, 696 P.2d  at 
119.

[¶25.]  The California court further noted that by state 
law it is a felony to conspire to commit a misdemeanor and then asked "[w]hat 
moral turpitude follows from a conviction of conspiracy to tattoo a person under 
18?" Id. 211 Cal. Rptr.  at 727 n. 7, 696 P.2d  at 119 n. 7. Cf. Com. v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 528 A.2d 1326 
(1987).

[¶26.]  Witness impeachment, not the defendant, 
was involved in review by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 775 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Mont. 1989), but the recitation on the subject of conviction by 
prejudice, not by evidence, has a totality of relevance:

The record fails to 
disclose any appropriate reason for the State's inquiry as to the prior criminal 
conduct of Mr. Schoonover. Clearly it was not something inadvertent in nature, 
as the defendant's attorney objected to the question but was overruled by the 
trial court. We conclude that the intention on the part of the State was to 
discredit the witness by showing that he had been engaged in crimes of 
intimidation and assault, and that the intimidation crime involved guns. We 
further conclude that the aim on the part of the State was to improperly impugn 
the character of the defendant and thereby suggest a greater likelihood of guilt 
of the crimes with which he was charged. We will not tolerate this intentional 
and significant evasion of our rules.

We conclude that the 
prosecution's inquiry clearly was improper under Rule 609, M.R.Evid., and that 
none of the exceptions stated in Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. applied. We hold that it 
was reversible error for the District Court to allow this 
testimony.

[¶27.]  I would request supplemental briefing on 
the issues of the adequacy of objection, plain error and ineffectiveness of 
counsel, as well as a more comprehensive review procedurally and substantively 
of why this prior conviction which was presented to the jury in the 
cross-examination was admissible within the purview of W.R.E. 
609.

FOOTNOTES

1 Objection to 
introduction of the evidence of Miller's criminal record was made, but arguably 
or obviously, for whatever reason, the objection failed to include the offense 
which was then discussed by cross-examination of Miller following his testimony. 
That particular offense arguably involved drugs and a false name and when 
illuminated in trial, was most prejudicial. It set the stage for intimated 
perjury then interjected, in my opinion most improperly in rebuttal argument by 
the prosecution which had failed, and not Miller, to get the complainant to 
trial to testify. The prosecution addressed that impeachment in concluding 
contention:

And how about believing 
Mr. Miller's statement, what can we believe out of the statement? He knows his 
way around the courts, we know that, he has a prior felony conviction. He had 
two days to listen to everybody else testify and then Mr. Brummond won't be 
here, to tailor his testimony. He has had that 
opportunity.

Objection was 
taken and a mistrial requested. The objection was sustained and the mistrial 
denied.

The sequence of events 
just prior to the quotation found in the majority opinion 
included:

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: 
Your Honor, may we approach the Bench?

(The following 
proceedings were had at the Bench between Court and Counsel, out of the hearing 
of the Jury):

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: 
Your Honor, at this time I am making a request of the Court to be allowed to 
present previous convictions that occurred in '86 and '87 as well as prior 
felonies with a deadly weapon in '70. I believe the state of the evidence 
reveals the defendant has brought about the questioning of the character as 
opposed to that and ask to place the character for violence and fighting in 
question here as opposed to the victim, and I request that I be allowed to cross 
him on those matters and issues that the Court has ruled out 
previously.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your 
Honor, we oppose all three, No. 1, the rules prohibit the introduction of any 
felony older than ten years. No. 2, the batteries would not have involved the 
crime of moral turpitude, I don't believe the testimony has put peacefulness in 
issue, he has put the aggressive nature of the so-called victim into issue, that 
is law and under Rule 404 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, Rule 406 also talks 
about this kind of thing. The comment underneath that rule seems to make it 
clear that they intended that a defendant should be able to put the victim's 
aggressive nature into evidence. Mr. Miller has testified that they had a fight 
at the Holiday Inn where he did throw punches and he did fight. I think it would 
be a prejudicial thing to let those things in, and I don't bel[ie]ve that what 
he said or Mr. Miller has in any way said he was a peaceful man. I do not 
believe that rerely [sic] because you state that you acted in selfe [sic] 
defense that carries with it the obligation that you are putting your character 
for peacefulness into issue, and I would submit to the Court that it is 
prohibited by Rule 404. And additionally it would be prejudicial to the 
defendant's case.

THE COURT: I didn't 
understand him to say that he was a peaceful person.

[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: 
There is testimony that he would not have used violence except for personal 
defense, and he would not, he put his reputation in evidence both prior violence 
and Rule 404(b) is once he puts his character into issue, the evidence can be 
received.

THE COURT: It is not that 
clear to me that he said that. I will sustain the defense's 
objection.

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: I 
will still be allowed to go into the other?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I 
guess while we are here, what is the extent the Court will allow him to inquire, 
as I understand it, have you been convicted of it.

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: 
And when.

THE COURT: 
Okay.

The answers in 
cross-examination elicited by the prosecutor involved both W.R.E. 609 conviction 
evidence and W.R.E. 404(b) bad acts responses. The use of the alias in the drug 
offense was not a W.R.E. 609 inquiry. While that section clearly relates to 
conviction, variant definitions of bad acts under W.R.E. 404(b), "other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts," exist. Perhaps the most inclusive is given in 
United 
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 902 n. 1 (5th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 1244, 59 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1979), 
where the term extrinsic offense is used in categorization and then 
defined

to denote an "offense," * 
* * for which the defendant is not charged in the indictment that is the subject 
of the case sub judice. * * *

* * * * * 
*

We use the term "offense" 
to include "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," as set forth in Fed.R. Evid. 404(b). 
* * * Our analysis applies whenever the extrinsic activity reflects adversely on 
the character of the defendant, regardless whether that activity might give rise 
to criminal liability.

In this case, Miller got 
hit with a double whammy of both W.R.E. 609 and W.R.E. 404(b) in one carefully 
crafted sequence of cross-examination. By answers obtained, he was not just a 
convict - he was a dope-dealing, alias-using ex-convict.

Obviously the "victim" 
himself had some anxiety about testifying since he did not voluntarily appear 
and the State did not arrange for his involuntary attendance. Foolhardiness in 
continuing the injury-causing altercation might be a reason for that disinterest 
to later be a witness.

2 See Spitzer v. Spitzer, 
777 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1989); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989); United 
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Excise Tax Div., Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 713 P.2d 217 (Wyo. 1986); State ex rel. Mortg. Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Langdon, 671 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1983); and Brasel & Sims Const. 
Co., Inc. v. State 
Highway Com'n of Wyoming, 655 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1982).

3

[PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY]: Your honor, at this time I am making a request of the Court to be 
allowed to present previous convictions that occurred in '86 and '87 as well as 
prior felonies with a deadly weapon in '70.

4 W.R.E. 609 - Impeachment 
by evidence of conviction of crime - states:

(a) General rule. - For 
the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one (1) year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment.

(Emphasis 
added.)

5 But see, however, Note, 
Impeachment with Prior Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1): A 
Plea for Balance, 63 Wn. U.L.Q. 469, 471 (1985) (footnotes omitted and quoting 
Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884)), which 
stated:

Others argue that prior 
convictions serve as effective impeachment devices. Justice Holmes provides the 
most frequently advanced rationale for admitting prior crimes into evidence. A 
prior conviction, Justice Holmes explained, displays a "general readiness to do 
evil," from which the jury may "infer a readiness to lie in a particular case." 
Another rationale for admitting prior convictions is that the jury has the right 
to know a witness' background.

This misquotation of 
Justice Holmes as the philosophic source of conviction impeachment is not 
confined to the 1985 law journal. It should be noted that Gertz, 137 Mass. at 78 conversely 
determined that evidence of the previously convicted litigant's present 
"reputation for truth should have been admitted." Consequently, he could 
substantively disprove any intimation derived from the prejudice of 
untruthfulness derived from prior conviction. This was the ratio decidendi for 
reversal of conviction in the case.

6 In Trujillo v. State, 
750 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Wyo. 1988), this court lists a five-part test to determine 
when alleged prior bad acts can be introduced against a defendant. One part of 
that test is that the evidence alleged be "plain, clear and convincing." 
Id. at 1337. 
Yet, in Pena, 780 P.2d  at 318, this court reminds the public to keep in mind 
that "not all factors need be present to uphold a trial court's admission of 
evidence." In Pena, 780 P.2d  at 318, W.R.E. 404(b) was said to "ban the use of 
evidence of a person's character in order to establish that the person's 
behavior on a particular occasion was in conformity with his character." Then 
shortly thereafter, the majority permitted the testimony of seven police 
officers relating "a series of [prior] altercations [between Pena and the 
officers] in which Pena had exhibited great hostility toward the officers * * 
*." Id. at 
318. That testimony was permitted because it "suggested that Pena was the first 
aggressor in the altercations with the officers." Id. at 319 (emphasis 
added). Enough said about the effectiveness of rules, such as W.R.E. 404(b) and 
609, which were designed to prevent prosecutors from using innuendo and bad 
reputation to help do their job.

7 The philosophic 
infliction on justice resulting from impeachment by conviction is appropriately 
acknowledged by Justice Stevens in the majority opinion in Green, 109 S. Ct.  at 
1984 n. 4 and 1986 n. 11 as recognized by the quotation from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in Gertz, 137 Mass. 77 and Dean Ladd's article, Credibility Tests - 
Current Trends, 89 U.Pa.L.Rev. 166, 191 (1940), with accompanying 
citations.

8 Statistics are 
variegated, but it is suggested in some of the literature that at least fourteen 
percent of the adult American males have been convicted of a felonious offense. 
With one out of eight potential witnesses or participants now falling within 
that category, the astronomical increase in litigative review of the use of bad 
acts evidence and impeachment by conviction in both civil and criminal cases can 
be easily understood. If the present progression continues, it should not be 
unexpected to find that by the turn of the century, perhaps one out of four or 
one out of five of all adult Americans above the age of thirty will have been 
convicted of a felony. Within this generic conceptualization of trials pursued 
as a search for the truth, it is not quite determinable in rational belief how 
Oliver North's possible testimony is either more or less valid today than would 
have been the case one year ago. To be cruel, one could also ask what 
relationship to reliability of testimony is provided logically by an 
anticipatory or post-conviction pardon. It is still the same witness who has the 
same bad acts history, whether pardoned or not.