Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 237 So. 2d 139

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1970-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
237 So. 2d 139 (1970)
James Clyde SMITH, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 39219.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 17, 1970.
Robert M. Lloyd, of Fee, Parker & Neill, Fort Pierce, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
DREW, Justice.
The trial court ruled in the trial of this cause that Florida Statutes, Section 317.221(1) *140 (1967), F.S.A.,[1] was constitutional, found the appellant [defendant below] guilty of the offenses charged under the statute, and imposed an appropriate sentence. It is from this judgment of conviction and sentence that this appeal has been prosecuted, raising the sole issue of the constitutionality of said statute.[2]
Appellant predicates his attack on the statute primarily on the decision of this Court in Brock v. Hardie.[3] A careful consideration of Brock, however, leaves no doubt that it is not authority for appellant. The holding of Brock, with reference to this question, is that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that anyone of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law."[4] This Court adopted that definition as its own and designated it as the test approved by the United States Supreme Court.
There are many actions of motorists in the operation of motor vehicles that may be expressly described and forbidden by the Legislature, such as speed limits in various areas and under varying conditions, parking regulations, adequate lights, brakes, and matters of that kind; but the lawmakers cannot anticipate or provide for every eventuality that might arise in the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways that might endanger life and property. For this reason the statute makes it unlawful to operate such a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards there existing. When we apply this statute to the language in Brock, it is clear that "men of common intelligence" would know of its meaning and would not be required to guess as to its application.
This conclusion is particularly true when considered in the light of the specific charges made in the sworn complaint upon which this appellant was tried below. The charges are that the appellant on a day therein named at an hour named, while operating the vehicle therein described on a public highway, at a place described, failed to use due care in violation of Section 317.221(1). Attached to this complaint is what might appropriately be termed a bill of particulars reading:
Appellant has cited authority from other states which support his contention.[5] The weight of authority, however, is that such statutes are not offensive to constitutional requirements.[6]
*141 In People v. Smith[7] the Supreme Court of California, in upholding the validity of a similar statute, said:
We approve the above observations and adopt such language as ours, so far as applicable to this statute. Moreover, our study of other authorities prompts us to say it pretty well summarizes the majority view in this area.
City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck[8] involved a disorderly conduct ordinance containing language similar to that here considered. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, appropriately observed:
We think this language appropriate in this case and that the decisions of this Court there cited clearly sustain the validity of the statute under review here.
Affirmed.
ERVIN, C.J., and ROBERTS, THORNAL, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
[1]  "No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event speed shall be controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care." Fla. Stat. § 317.221(1) (1967), F.S.A.
[2]  Fla. Const. art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A.
[3]  114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).
[4]  Id. at 678-679, 154 So. 690, 694 (1934).
[5]  Howard v. State, 151 Ga. 845, 108 S.E. 513 (1921); Empire Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 141 Ga. 413, 81 S.E. 120 (1914); and State v. Lantz, 90 W. Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766 (1922).
[6]  60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 290(2) (1969); Bush v. Southern Pacific Co., 106 Cal. App. 101, 289 P. 190, 193 (1930); George v. Smith, 105 N.H. 100, 193 A.2d 16 (1963); Gagnon v. Krikorian, 92 N.H. 344, 31 A.2d 49; Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442 (1920); People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039 (1939); People v. Banat, 39 Cal. App. 2d 765, 100 P.2d 374 (1940); Lohman v. District of Columbia, 51 A.2d 382 (Mun. Ct.App. 1947); State v. Smith, 29 R.I. 245, 69 A. 1061 (1908).
[7]  36 Cal. App. 2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039, 1042 (1939).
[8]  114 So. 2d 316, 320 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1959).