Case Title: Sazima v. Chalko

Citation: 1999-Ohio-92

Docket Number: 19981510

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SAZIMA, APPELLANT, v. CHALKO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Sazima v. Chalko (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 151.] 
Civil procedure — Trial court abuses its discretion in dismissing an action with 
prejudice for party’s unexplained failure to timely comply with an order for 
a more definite statement, when. 
(No. 98-1510 — Submitted May 4, 1999 — Decided July 28, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 72769 and 73138. 
 
On April 3, 1995, appellant, Susan Sazima, filed a complaint for legal 
malpractice against appellee, Paul P. Chalko.1  On May 15, 1995, appellee filed a 
motion for definite statement pursuant to Civ.R. 12(E).2  On June 16, 1995, the 
trial court ordered:  “Motion of defendant, Paul Chalko, for a definite statement 
pursuant to Civ. Rule 12(E), filed 5-15-95, is granted without opposition.  Same to 
be provided within 30 days or case will be dismissed.”  On July 12, 1995, appellant 
filed a definite statement.3  On July 27, 1995, appellee filed a stipulation for leave 
to respond to the definite statement by September 24, 1995, which the trial court 
granted on August 8, 1995.  On September 20, 1995, appellant filed a notice of 
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A), and on October 17, 1995, the trial 
court dismissed the case without prejudice. 
 
On September 17, 1996, appellant refiled her complaint.4  On October 28, 
1996, appellee again moved the court to order a definite statement.  In his motion, 
appellee argued that “it was improper for plaintiff to refile the same vague original 
complaint,” and moved the court “to sanction plaintiff and her counsel in this 
matter.”  Appellee claimed he was “entitled to an award of fees associated with 
straightening out this matter as well as any other sanction which this court deems 
to be appropriate.” 
 
On March 5, 1997, the trial court entered its order stating, “Motion for a 
more definite statement, filed 10-28-96, is granted.  Pltf. to file more definite 
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statement by 3-14-97.” 
 
On April 25, 1997, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint 
as a sanction for failing to comply with the court’s order requiring appellant to file 
a more definite statement, along with a motion to compel appellant to respond to 
certain outstanding discovery requests. 
 
On May 9, 1997, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to compel 
discovery, informing appellant that “[s]anctions, including dismissal, may be 
imposed for failure to comply within two weeks of the date of this order.”5  On 
May 27, 1997, appellant responded to appellee’s discovery requests and filed a 
definite statement.6 
 
On May 30, 1997, the trial court journalized its order dated May 28, 1997, 
stating that “[d]efendant Paul Chalko’s motion to dismiss, filed 4/25/97, is granted.  
Per court’s order filed [March 5, 1997] [plaintiff] to file more definite statement by 
3/14/97, and sanctions were to be imposed for failure to comply.  [Plaintiff] has not 
offered an explaination [sic] for failure to timely comply.” 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action.  In so 
doing, the court found that appellant “had implied notice that her case was subject 
to dismissal with prejudice for failure to timely comply with the order of the trial 
court that a more definite statement be filed by March 14, 1997.”  The court also 
found that because “[p]laintiff-appellant repeatedly ignored orders of the trial court 
with little or no justification presented, * * * [t]he trial court was left with little 
alternative at that point but to dismiss the action based on plaintiff-appellant’s 
unexplained failure to comply with the court’s order in a timely manner.”  In 
addition, the court of appeals found that although appellant eventually responded 
to the orders compelling discovery and for a definite statement, “each [pleading] 
was clearly out of rule and therefore not in compliance with the orders of the trial 
court.  * * * Clearly, plaintiff-appellant’s eleventh hour attempt at perfunctory 
3 
compliance with the court’s orders with no showing of good cause for the undue 
delay does not constitute actual compliance.” 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Ellen M. McCarthy, 
David M. Paris and Kathleen J. St. John, for appellant. 
 
Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Timothy T. Brick and Timothy P. 
Whitford, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The sole issue presented is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice for appellant’s 
unexplained failure to timely comply with its March 5, 1997 order for a more 
definite statement.  For the following reasons, we hold that the trial court abused 
its discretion. 
 
Civ.R. 12(E) provides: 
 
“If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or 
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive 
pleading, he may move for a definite statement before interposing his responsive 
pleading.  The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired.  If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 
fourteen days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may 
fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make 
such order as it deems just.” 
 
Civ.R. 41(B)(1) provides: 
 
“Where the plaintiff fails to prosecute, or comply with these rules or any 
court order, the court upon motion of a defendant or on its own motion may, after 
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notice to the plaintiff’s counsel, dismiss an action or claim.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In Ohio Furniture Co. v. Mindala (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 99, 101, 22 OBR 
133, 135, 488 N.E.2d 881, 883, we held that “the notice requirement of Civ.R. 
41(B)(1) applies to all dismissals with prejudice.  * * * A dismissal on the merits is 
a harsh remedy that calls for the due process guarantee of prior notice.”  (Emphasis 
sic.) 
 
The purpose of notice is to give the party who is in jeopardy of having his or 
her action or claim dismissed one last chance to comply with the order or to 
explain the default.  Id., 22 Ohio St.3d at 101, 22 OBR at 135, 488 N.E.2d at 883 
(“Notice of intention to dismiss with prejudice gives the non-complaining party 
one last chance to obey the court order in full.”); Logsdon v. Nichols (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 124, 128, 647 N.E.2d 1361, 1365, quoting McCormac, Ohio Civil 
Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 357, Section 13.07 (“The purpose of notice is to 
‘provide the party in default an opportunity to explain the default or to correct it, or 
to explain why the case should not be dismissed with prejudice.’ ”); Moore v. 
Emmanuel Family Training Ctr., Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 64, 69, 18 OBR 96, 
101, 479 N.E.2d 879, 885 (“The purpose of this notice requirement is to give a 
party an opportunity to obey the order.”). 
 
In Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 46, 684 
N.E.2d 319, at the syllabus, the court held that the notice requirement of Civ.R. 
41(B)(1) is satisfied “when counsel has been informed that dismissal is a 
possibility and has had a reasonable opportunity to defend against dismissal.”  The 
gist of this holding is that “the notice required by Civ.R. 41[B][1] need not be 
actual but may be implied when reasonable under the circumstances.”  80 Ohio 
St.3d at 49, 684 N.E.2d at 322.  As relevant here, the court found that the fact that 
the defendant had filed a motion requesting the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claim 
with prejudice constituted sufficient implied notice for purposes of Civ.R. 
5 
41(B)(1).  80 Ohio St.3d at 48-49, 684 N.E.2d at 322. 
 
As pointed out by the dissenting opinions in that case, the majority’s 
decision in Quonset represents a rejection of the proposition that Civ.R. 41(B)(1) 
requires the trial court to expressly and unambiguously give actual notice of its 
intention to dismiss with prejudice.  80 Ohio St.3d at 50, 684 N.E.2d at 323 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); 80 Ohio St.3d at 51-52, 684 N.E.2d at 324 (Resnick, J., 
dissenting).  Nevertheless, the one inexorable principle that continues to be 
recognized in Quonset is that “the very purpose of notice is to provide a party with 
an opportunity to explain its default and/or correct it.”  80 Ohio St.3d at 49, 684 
N.E.2d at 322.  Thus, the majority in Quonset was quite careful in pointing out that 
at the time the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, neither the 
plaintiff nor its counsel had taken any action to comply with the outstanding order, 
and there was no reason for the court to expect that one more warning would have 
prompted them to do so.  Id. 
 
In the present case, the trial court never gave actual or express notice to 
appellant’s counsel that the cause would be dismissed with prejudice for failure to 
timely comply with its order of March 5, 1997.  It is true, as appellee points out, 
that “[i]n the original action the trial court expressly warned appellant of the 
possibility of dismissal for failing to file a more definite statement.”  However, 
such express language is conspicuously omitted from the trial court’s March 5, 
1997 order entered in the refiled action, and appellant in fact complied with the 
court’s original order of June 16, 1995.  This omission becomes even more 
glaringly obvious when we consider that the trial court’s order of May 9, 1997, 
granting appellee’s motion to compel discovery, contained explicit notice that 
“[s]anctions, including dismissal, may be imposed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Indeed, 
given the fact that appellant had once complied with an order for a definite 
statement, and that the trial court’s order of March 5, 1997, unlike its other orders, 
6 
provided no notice of its intent to dismiss, one could reasonably conclude that the 
trial court had no intention of dismissing the action if appellant failed to provide a 
definite statement by March 14, 1997. 
 
However, pursuant to Quonset, we must find that appellee’s April 25, 1997 
motion to dismiss was sufficient to put appellant’s counsel on implied notice that 
the case would be dismissed if appellant did not file a definite statement.7  Thus, 
appellant’s counsel received notice under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) at the time he became 
aware that appellee had filed his motion requesting the court to dismiss appellant’s 
claim with prejudice. 
 
This fact, however, does not determine the issue presented in this case.  As 
Quonset continued to recognize, “the very purpose of notice is to provide a party 
with an opportunity to explain its default and/or correct it.”  (Emphasis added.)  80 
Ohio St.3d at 49, 684 N.E.2d at 322.  In other words, the implied notice furnished 
by appellee’s motion of April 25, 1997, gave appellant “one last chance to obey the 
court order in full.”  Mindala, 22 Ohio St.3d at 101, 22 OBR at 135, 488 N.E.2d at 
883.  Appellant availed herself of this opportunity when she filed her definite 
statement on May 27, 1997, in which she cured the defects complained of and 
provided the details desired.  See fn. 6.  Unlike the plaintiff in Quonset, appellant 
and her counsel took action to comply with the outstanding order three days prior 
to the trial court’s order of dismissal.  Stated differently, the trial court in this case 
dismissed the action with prejudice three days after appellant’s counsel had 
complied with the outstanding order. 
 
The situation in this case, therefore, is entirely different from that in 
Quonset, where “[t]here was no reason for the trial court to expect that one more 
warning would have prompted” plaintiff to comply with the outstanding order.  80 
Ohio St.3d at 49, 684 N.E.2d at 322.  To the contrary, the initial implied warning 
did in fact prompt appellant to comply with the court’s outstanding order, and this 
7 
action took place before the court’s determination to dismiss for noncompliance.  If 
a trial court were permitted to dismiss an action for plaintiff’s failure to comply 
with an outstanding order after notice to the plaintiff’s counsel resulted in 
compliance, the entire purpose of providing notice in the first place would be 
defeated. 
 
This does not mean, as appellee suggests, that “such a lax rule” would give 
plaintiffs “a free pass to comply with [court] orders at some undefined future time 
and would allow the plaintiff to ignore deadlines which are contained within the 
trial court’s order.”  It simply means that a trial court is required to give effect to 
the purpose behind Civ.R. 41(B)(1)’s requirement for notice.  If dismissal is 
otherwise warranted under the circumstances, nothing in this opinion precludes a 
trial court from dismissing an action for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court 
order after notice is given to plaintiff’s counsel and a reasonable time to comply 
has elapsed.  However, once plaintiff’s counsel has responded to the notice given 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) by complying with the trial court’s outstanding order, 
the trial court may not thereafter dismiss the action or claim on the basis of 
noncompliance with that order. 
 
What appellee really objects to is the fact that Civ.R. 41(B)(1) gives the 
plaintiff another opportunity to comply with a court order after the deadline 
specified for compliance has run.  This is not, however, the time or the place to 
consider amending the rule. 
 
The court of appeals also found that dismissal of appellant’s action was 
warranted because “appellant repeatedly ignored orders of the trial court with little 
or no justification presented.”  We disagree.  In the first place, the trial court’s 
decision to dismiss the action was based solely on appellant’s failure to timely file 
a definite statement as ordered.  The trial court made no finding that any other 
conduct or noncompliance on appellant’s part warranted a dismissal with 
8 
prejudice. 
 
Second, the record does not support the conclusion that “appellant 
repeatedly ignored orders of the trial court.”  The record reveals that appellant 
failed to comply with two orders issued by the trial court:  (1) the trial court’s order 
of March 5, 1997 for a definite statement, and (2) the trial court’s order of May 9, 
1997, granting appellee’s motion to compel and ordering appellant to comply 
within two weeks.  Noncompliance with this second order is tempered by the fact 
that appellant filed her response within seven days of receiving notice of the order.  
See fn. 5. 
 
In considering dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(1), a trial court may properly 
take into account the entire history of the litigation, including plaintiff’s dilatory 
conduct in a previously filed, and voluntarily dismissed, action.  See Jones v. 
Hartranft (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 368, 372, 678 N.E.2d 530, 534; Indus. Risk 
Insurers v. Lorenz Equip. Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 576, 635 N.E.2d 14, at the 
syllabus.  However, “[t]he extremely harsh sanction of dismissal should be 
reserved for cases when an attorney’s conduct falls substantially below what is 
reasonable under the circumstances evidencing a complete disregard for the 
judicial system or the rights of the opposing party.”  Moore, 18 Ohio St.3d at 70, 
18 OBR at 102, 479 N.E.2d at 885.  In other words, dismissal is reserved for those 
cases in which “ ‘ “the conduct of a party is so negligent, irresponsible, 
contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for a dismissal with 
prejudice for a failure to prosecute or obey a court order.” ’ ”  Quonset, 80 Ohio 
St.3d at 48, 684 N.E.2d at 321, quoting Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemn. 
Co. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 632, 605 N.E.2d 936, 944.  Absent such extreme 
circumstances, a court should first consider lesser sanctions before dismissing a 
case with prejudice.  Jones, 78 Ohio St.3d at 371-372, 678 N.E.2d at 534.  See, 
also, 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1995) 340, Section 2369; 
9 
5A Wright & Miller (1990), supra, at 640-641, Section 1379.  It is “a basic tenet of 
Ohio jurisprudence that cases should be decided on their merits.”  Perotti v. 
Ferguson (1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 7 OBR 256, 257, 454 N.E.2d 951, 952.  “Thus, 
although reviewing courts espouse an ordinary ‘abuse of discretion’ standard of 
review for dismissals with prejudice, that standard is actually heightened when 
reviewing decisions that forever deny a plaintiff a review of a claim’s merits.”  
Jones, 78 Ohio St.3d at 372, 678 N.E.2d at 534.  See, also, Quonset, 80 Ohio St.3d 
at 48, 684 N.E.2d at 321. 
 
Even if the trial court had considered appellant’s conduct in failing to 
comply with its order of May 9, 1997, in addition to that of March 5, 1997, which 
it did not, these instances of noncompliance, either alone or together, hardly rise to 
the level of extreme circumstances that would justify a dismissal with prejudice 
without first resorting to the imposition of lesser sanctions. 
 
Accordingly, we hold  that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing 
appellant’s action with prejudice.  In light of our holding, we reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the common pleas court for further 
proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Aside from its prayer for relief, the complaint reads, in its entirety: 
 
“Now comes the Plaintiff, Susan Sazima, and for her Cause of Action 
against Defendant, says that: 
 
“1.  Defendant Paul P. Chalko is a lawyer authorized to practice law within 
the State of Ohio and holds himself out as competent to practice before the courts 
10 
of the State of Ohio; 
 
“2.  Plaintiff retained the services of Defendant in an attorney/client 
relationship in 1994; 
 
“3.  as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of this Defendant in 
such representation and his deviation from recognized standards of practice, this 
Plaintiff has sustained severe financial damage in addition to her reputation and to 
her career.” 
2. 
In his motion, appellee requested the trial court to “order plaintiff to provide 
a definite statement indicating when the attorney-client relationship existed and 
specifying the acts committed by Chalko which plaintiff claims constitute his 
deviation from the recognized standards of care.” 
3. 
In her statement, appellant set forth the following as amendments of the 
paragraphs specified in her complaint: 
 
“2.  The attorney/client relationship was created between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant on or about December, 1993 or January, 1994. 
 
“3.  Defendant breached those confidences made to him during this 
attorney/client relationship with the Plaintiff while testifying in the unrelated case 
of John R. Masters, et al. v. Paul Chalko, et al., Cuyahoga County Common Pleas 
Case No. 2722373.” 
4. 
The refiled complaint is essentially identical to the complaint as originally 
filed. 
5. 
It appears that the notice regarding the trial court’s May 9, 1997 order 
compelling discovery was not mailed until May 19, 1997, and was not received by 
appellant’s counsel before May 20, 1997. 
6. 
The statement amends the complaint as follows: 
 
“4.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct when 
he failed to advise Plaintiff that if he represented her on a matter adverse to Dr. 
11 
Master, he would be in a conflict of interest; 
 
“5.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct when 
he failed to advise Plaintiff that without medical evidence of the incompetency of 
Dr. Master, any Guardianship Application would be unsuccessful; 
 
“6.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct when 
he failed to advise Plaintiff that she would be unable to obtain medical information 
about Dr. Master without Master’s authorization; 
 
“7.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct when 
he accepted the filing fee for a Guardianship Application while knowing that such 
Application would be unsuccessful; 
 
“8.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct when 
he failed to advise Plaintiff prior to the Hearing on her Application that he was 
unprepared to go forward and neglected the legal matter she had entrusted to him; 
 
“9.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standard of conduct when 
he failed to inform Plaintiff about the truth of what took place before the Referee at 
the hearing on the Application and the Conservatorship; 
 
“10.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he failed to advise Plaintiff that he had withdrawn her Application; 
 
“11.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he accepted certain audio cassettes from Plaintiff with knowledge of their 
contents and without advising Plaintiff that such distribution would and could be a 
basis for criminal and civil actions against her and the consequences of her 
possession of the same; 
 
“12.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he provided the aforementioned cassettes to an attorney representing a party 
adverse to Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s knowledge or permission when he knew or 
reasonably should have known that such actions exposed Plaintiff to potential civil 
12 
and criminal liability; 
 
“13.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he failed to protect the interest of his client, the Plaintiff; 
 
“14.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he breached those confidences made to him during this attorney/client 
relationship with the Plaintiff while testifying in the unrelated case of John R. 
Masters, et al. v. Paul Chalko, et al., Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Case No. 
272373; 
 
“15.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he disclosed confidential information [from] his client, the Plaintiff; 
 
“16.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he allowed other partie[s’] interests [to] affect his judgment in representing 
Plaintiff; 
 
“17.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he failed to act competently; 
 
“18.  That Defendant deviated from the recognized standards of conduct 
when he failed to keep and maintain files of Plaintiff’s records and papers relating 
to Defendant’s representation of Plaintiff.” 
7. 
Appellee’s October 28, 1996 motion, however, was insufficient for purposes 
of Civ.R. 41(B)(1)’s requirement for notice, even under Quonset.  In that motion, 
appellee sought “an award of fees associated with straightening out this matter as 
well as any other sanction which this court deems to be appropriate.”  While the 
term “any other sanction” may imply dismissal, we will not allow an implication to 
be piled on top of another implication for purposes of implied notice under Civ.R. 
41(B)(1). 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the court of appeals that Sazima’s  
13 
failure to comply with a court order to file a document was sufficiently 
contumacious to warrant dismissal of the case: compliance occurred more than 
thirty days from the date of notice of the possibility that dismissal could result 
from the failure to comply. 
 
Civ.R. 41(B)(1) provides that where a plaintiff fails to comply with a court 
order the action may be dismissed (1) upon motion of the defendant or the court, 
and (2) upon notice to the plaintiff.  In Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 46, 684 N.E.2d 319, we determined that the motion to 
dismiss satisfies the element of notice.  Id. at 48-49, 684 N.E.2d at 322.  We held 
that where counsel has such notice and is given a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, Civ.R. 41(B)(1) is satisfied.  Id. at syllabus. 
 
In this case, the trial court ordered Sazima to file a more definite statement 
within nine days.  Forty-two days beyond this deadline, Chalko moved to dismiss 
for Sazima’s failure to comply.  Under Quonset Hut, Chalko’s motion constituted 
the requisite notice of possible dismissal.  Thirty-two days after this notice and 
seventy-four days after the original due date, Sazima finally filed the required 
document. 
 
“The decision to dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.”  Id. at 47, 684 N.E.2d at 321.  “[T]his court will 
not hesitate to affirm the dismissal of the action when ‘ “the conduct of a party is 
so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial 
grounds for a dismissal with prejudice for a failure to prosecute or obey a court 
order.” ’ ”  Id. at 48, 684 N.E.2d at 321, quoting Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern 
Indemn. Co. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 632, 605 N.E.2d 936, 944, quoting 
Schreiner v. Karson (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 219, 223, 6 O.O.3d 237, 239, 369 
N.E.2d 800, 803. 
 
Here, Sazima disregarded the original court order to file a more definite 
14 
statement for more than two months.  Chalko’s motion provided her a “second 
chance” by putting her on notice of possible dismissal, but she disregarded this for 
yet another month.  The fact that she ultimately did comply prior to the order of 
dismissal is irrelevant to the court’s assessment of when compliance should have 
occurred. 
 
Dismissal of an action with prejudice is harsh, but “ ‘keeping this suit alive 
merely because * * * [Sazima] should not be penalized for the omissions of [her] 
own attorney would be visiting the sins of * * * [Sazima’s] lawyer upon * * * 
[Chalko].’ ”  GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio 
St.2d 146, 152, 1 O.O.3d 86, 89-90, 351 N.E.2d 113, 117, quoting Link v. Wabash 
RR. Co. (1962), 370 U.S. 626, 634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734, 740, fn. 
10.  Where dismissal results from an attorney’s negligence, “ ‘the client’s remedy 
is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice.’ ”  Id. 
 
I do not believe there is reason to find that the trial court abused its 
discretion, and I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.