Case Title: State v. Rashaad A. Imani

Citation: 2010 WI 66

Docket Number: 2008AP001521-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1521-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Rashaad A. Imani, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 98 
Reported at: 320 Wis. 2d 505, 771 N.W.2d 379 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 9, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
CROOKS, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by 
Basil M. Loeb and Schmidlkofer, Toth & Loeb, LLC, Wauwatosa, and 
oral argument by Basil M. Loeb. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1521-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CF677) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Rashaad A. Imani, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals decision1 that reversed a judgment 
entered on a jury verdict by the Waukesha County Circuit Court, 
J. Mac Davis, Judge.  Rashaad A. Imani (Imani) was convicted of 
one count each of armed robbery, as party to a crime, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2) (2007-08)2 and possession of 
                                                 
1 State v. Imani, 2009 WI App 98, 320 Wis. 2d 505, 771 
N.W.2d 379. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.32, "Robbery," provides:  
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
2 
 
a firearm by a felon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2),3 
both as a repeater pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c).4  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Whoever, with intent to steal, takes property 
from the person or presence of the owner by either of 
the following means is guilty of a Class E felony:  
(a) By using force against the person of the 
owner with intent thereby to overcome his or her 
physical resistance or physical power of resistance to 
the taking or carrying away of the property; or  
(b) By threatening the imminent use of force 
against the person of the owner or of another who is 
present with intent thereby to compel the owner to 
acquiesce in the taking or carrying away of the 
property.  
(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) by use or threat of 
use of a dangerous weapon, a device or container 
described under s. 941.26(4)(a) or any article used or 
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to 
believe that it is a dangerous weapon or such a device 
or container is guilty of a Class C felony. 
3 The 
relevant 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.29, 
"Possession of a firearm," are as follows:  
(1) A person is subject to the requirements and 
penalties of this section if he or she has been:  
(a) Convicted of a felony in this state.  
 . . . . 
(2) A person specified in sub. (1) is guilty of a 
Class G felony if he or she possesses a firearm under 
any of the following circumstances:  
(a) The person possesses a firearm subsequent to 
the conviction for the felony or other crime, as 
specified in sub. (1)(a) or (b). 
4 The relevant provisions of Wis. Stat. § 939.62, "Increased 
penalty for habitual criminality," state:  
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
3 
 
court of appeals concluded that the evidence was more than 
sufficient for the jury to convict Imani; nevertheless, the 
court remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the circuit 
court denied Imani's pretrial motion to represent himself 
without engaging him in the colloquy required by State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  The State 
petitioned this court for review, and we accepted.  We now 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and uphold Imani's 
conviction. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is 
defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for 
any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, 
except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to 
report 
under 
s. 946.425, 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be 
increased as follows:  
 . . . . 
(c) A maximum term of imprisonment of more than 
10 years may be increased by not more than 2 years if 
the prior convictions were for misdemeanors and by not 
more than 6 years if the prior conviction was for a 
felony.  
(2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was 
convicted of a felony during the 5-year period 
immediately preceding the commission of the crime for 
which the actor presently is being sentenced, or if 
the actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate 
occasions during that same period, which convictions 
remain of record and unreversed.  It is immaterial 
that sentence was stayed, withheld or suspended, or 
that the actor was pardoned, unless such pardon was 
granted on the ground of innocence.  In computing the 
preceding 5-year period, time which the actor spent in 
actual confinement serving a criminal sentence shall 
be excluded. 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
4 
 
¶2 
The issue in this case is whether the circuit court 
committed 
reversible 
error 
by 
denying 
Imani's 
motion 
to 
represent himself after finding that Imani did not validly waive 
his right to counsel under two of the four lines of inquiry 
prescribed in Klessig and was not competent to proceed pro se. 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court properly denied 
Imani's motion to represent himself.  First, we determine that 
Imani did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 
the right to counsel.  The circuit court engaged Imani in two of 
the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and properly 
determined that Imani (1) did not make a deliberate choice to 
proceed without counsel, and (2) was unaware of the difficulties 
and disadvantages of self-representation.  If any one of the 
four conditions prescribed in Klessig is not met, the circuit 
court is required to conclude that the defendant did not validly 
waive the right to counsel.  Second, we conclude that the 
circuit court's determination that Imani was not competent to 
proceed pro se is supported by the facts in the record.  Because 
Imani did not validly waive his right to counsel and was not 
competent to proceed pro se, the circuit court was required to 
prevent him from representing himself.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The facts giving rise to Imani's conviction are 
convoluted and largely irrelevant to this appeal.  For our 
purposes, the evidence at trial demonstrated that on March 1, 
2006, Imani and his cousin, Raziga Imani, masked and carrying 
firearms, entered the Guaranty Bank inside the Pick 'n Save 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
5 
 
grocery store on Appleton Avenue in Menomonee Falls.  The Imanis 
demanded money from the bank employees and left with a metal 
bank box containing in excess of $100,000.  With Imani driving, 
they fled from the scene in a stolen vehicle and were subject to 
a high-speed pursuit by a Menomonee Falls police officer.  Imani 
eventually lost control of the vehicle and crashed on Hampton 
Avenue.  The Imanis escaped from the vehicle on foot and 
separated.5   
¶5 
Still 
carrying 
his 
firearm, 
Imani 
entered 
the 
Milwaukee Washing Machine, Inc. store on Appleton Avenue and 
demanded a ride from the driver of the Buick Riviera parked 
outside.  He told the driver, James Dukes (Dukes), that he had 
just robbed a bank in Menomonee Falls.  Dukes drove Imani to a 
location about four or five minutes away.  A fingerprint lifted 
from the Buick's passenger's side door handle was later 
identified as Imani's, and when presented by the police with a 
range of photographs, Dukes selected Imani as the individual who 
carjacked him. 
¶6 
On June 20, 2006, Imani was charged with one count of 
armed robbery, as party to a crime, and one count of possession 
of a firearm by a felon, both as a repeater.  At the preliminary 
hearing, Dukes again identified Imani as the individual who 
carjacked him.  On July 27, 2007, Imani moved to suppress Dukes' 
in-court identification of him on the grounds that media 
                                                 
5 Raziga Imani was apprehended by police that day and 
admitted his role in the robbery.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
he testified against Imani at Imani's trial. 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
6 
 
coverage of the robbery may have tainted the identification.  
The circuit court denied Imani's motion at a pretrial hearing on 
July 31, 2007. 
¶7 
That hearing is at the center of this appeal.  After 
the circuit court denied Imani's motion, Imani informed the 
court that he would like to represent himself at trial.  At that 
time, he was represented by Attorney Joseph Schubert, who by 
then was the third state public defender appointed to Imani.6 
¶8 
Imani reasoned that he did not feel as though his 
counsel "spoke up enough for [him]" during the motion hearing 
and that he was "very dissatisfied."  In particular, he was 
upset that his counsel did not play a news broadcast at the 
hearing in an attempt to jog Dukes' memory, and he argued that 
his counsel had not yet fully investigated the circumstances 
surrounding the fingerprint analysis.  "[H]aving been through 
this with about three lawyers," Imani felt as though he could 
best represent himself at trial: 
So, when it comes to trial I know, like I said 
before, ain't nobody going to represent myself better 
than me.  I've been dealing with this case for over a 
year now and I'm pretty sure that I got a fuller 
defense prepared that I've been preparing myself, you 
know, with the help of my lawyers, you know. . . . 
¶9 
The circuit court asked Imani how he is going to 
convince the court that he is competent to represent himself.  
Imani responded that he had been "working on" his case for 13 
                                                 
6 The record reflects that Imani requested new appointment 
of counsel at least twice. 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
7 
 
months, had completed the tenth grade, could read and write 
English, and reads at a college level.  Imani also stated that 
he had appeared in court at least five times before in other 
cases, though admittedly always with counsel: 
The Court: And what experience do you have with 
the legal system?  Have you ever appeared in court 
besides this case? 
Imani: Of course. 
The Court: For what kind of matters, criminal 
matters, or? 
Imani: Criminal matters. 
The Court: How many times do you think? 
Imani: At least maybe, five. 
The Court: Have you ever represented yourself in 
court before? 
Imani: No. 
The Court: You have always had a lawyer? 
Imani: Yes. 
¶10 Despite 
those 
representations, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied Imani's motion to represent himself and offered the 
following explanation: 
While it is not the last minute on the clock 
we're getting close to a jury trial that requires 
substantial and extensive preparation.  And I'm——
because it is a two defendant trial it makes it 
particularly difficult to get that preparation on 
track.  We not only have to have the State and 
Defendant, we have two defendants. 
And everybody has to be prepared and ready to 
start the same day at the same time, and keep the case 
organized together.  That means that any potential 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
8 
 
threat to keeping the schedule is an even bigger issue 
than it otherwise would be. 
 . . . . 
I also have in mind that Mr. Rashaad Imani has 
had several lawyers.  And while he certainly is 
entitled to some degree to have the lawyer of his 
choice and to switch lawyers, that is not an unlimited 
right. 
 
It 
has 
to 
be 
balanced 
against 
proper 
preparation and conducting of a trial. 
The reasons he gives they seem to be episodic 
driven, he comes to court today on a motion, he 
doesn't win the motion and now he is disgruntled.  
That's in and of itself not a sufficiently rational 
basis to justify such a decision. 
 . . . . 
I don't know that much about his capability, but 
he has only got a 10th grade education, he said he 
reads at a college level, that's the only information 
I have on the subject of his education and background.   
He says he has been to court, but apparently 
those didn't involve trials, and he didn't represent 
himself. 
 
So 
while 
he 
has 
some 
observational 
experience with the criminal court system, it hasn't 
been presented to me that he has any experience 
actually conducting proceedings like a criminal court 
trial. 
So in order to preserve the trial date, maintain 
the opportunity to be prepared and go forward, and to 
not make a flippant short term or immature decision go 
into effect, I'm going to deny it at this point. 
¶11 The circuit court indicated that it would be willing 
to hear Imani's motion again.  Moreover, with advance notice, 
the court would consider the possibility of Imani participating 
in the opening statement, closing argument, and questioning of 
the witnesses, with Attorney Schubert acting as standby counsel.   
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
9 
 
¶12 Imani never again moved for self-representation, and 
he proceeded to trial with Attorney Schubert as his counsel.  
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and the 
circuit court entered the judgment of conviction on October 29, 
2007. 
¶13 Imani appealed his conviction on two grounds: the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdicts, 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
wrongfully 
deprived 
him 
of 
his 
constitutional 
right 
to 
self-representation 
because 
he 
established a valid waiver of counsel and was competent to 
represent himself. 
¶14 On June 3, 2009, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction and remanded for a new 
trial.  State v. Imani, 2009 WI App 98, ¶1, 320 Wis. 2d 505, 771 
N.W.2d 379.  Despite concluding that the evidence "amply 
supports the verdicts," id., ¶21, the court determined that 
Imani was entitled to a new trial because the circuit court 
failed to conduct the waiver-of-counsel colloquy required by 
Klessig, id., ¶13.  The court disagreed with Imani's assertion 
that he established a valid waiver of counsel, concluding 
instead that Imani "could not have established a valid waiver 
because the trial court failed to engage him in the colloquy 
Klessig requires."  Id., ¶13. 
¶15 The court of appeals properly recognized that when a 
defendant seeks to exercise his or her constitutional right to 
self-representation, the circuit court must establish that the 
defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
10 
 
right to counsel and is competent to proceed pro se.  Id., ¶14 
(citing Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203).  If the circuit court 
finds that the defendant met both of those conditions, the 
court's denial of the defendant's right of self-representation 
is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.  Id. 
(citing State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189). 
¶16 The court of appeals concluded that in this case, the 
circuit court "did not even touch on" the colloquy required in 
Klessig for the purpose of establishing whether Imani's waiver 
of counsel was knowing and voluntary.  Id., ¶15.  Moreover, as 
to competence, the circuit court failed to identify a "specific 
problem or disability which might significantly affect [Imani's] 
ability to communicate a meaningful defense."  Id., ¶17.  
Instead, the circuit court sacrificed Imani's right to self-
representation for an illegitimate concern of preserving the 
court's schedule.  Id., ¶18.  On those grounds, the court of 
appeals concluded that Imani was entitled to a new trial. 
¶17 The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that 
pursuant to Klessig, the proper remedy for a circuit court's 
failure to conduct the required colloquy is a post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing, not a new trial.  On June 15, 2009, the 
court of appeals denied the State's motion, reasoning that 
"[a]lthough a new trial is granted, it is not known if [Imani] 
will elect self-representation at the new trial and if so, the 
trial court will have the opportunity to make a proper record on 
the issue." 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 24, 2009.  We now reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and uphold Imani's conviction. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 Whether 
a 
defendant 
was 
denied 
his 
or 
her 
constitutional right to self-representation presents a question 
of 
constitutional 
fact, 
which 
this 
court 
determines 
independently.  See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 204; State v. Woods, 
117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).  In order to 
determine whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived the right to counsel, we apply constitutional 
principles to the facts of the case.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 
204.  We review those facts independent of the circuit court.  
Id.  However, a circuit court's determination that a defendant 
is incompetent to proceed pro se "will be upheld unless totally 
unsupported by the facts."  Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 
569-70, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), overruled on other grounds by 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206, 212 (expressly "affirm[ing] the 
holding in Pickens as still controlling on the issue of 
competency"); see also State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, ¶21, 286 
Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878 (quoting State v. Garfoot, 207 
Wis. 2d 214, 224, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997)) ("We review a circuit 
court determination of whether a defendant is competent to 
proceed pro se under what is 'essentially a clearly erroneous 
standard of review.'"). 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
12 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶20 Every criminal defendant has a fundamental right to 
the assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both Article I, Section 
7 of the Wisconsin Constitution7 and the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.8  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 201-02.  
Equally, a defendant has a constitutional right to represent 
himself.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) 
                                                 
7 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
8 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
342 (1963); State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 202, 564 
N.W.2d 716 (1997). 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
13 
 
(holding that the right to self-representation is "necessarily 
implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment"); McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984); Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203 
(recognizing that Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution explicitly establishes a defendant's right to 
conduct his own defense).  "Just as the right to the assistance 
of counsel is identical under the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions, the right to represent oneself also does not 
differ."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203. 
¶21 We, along with the United States Supreme Court, have 
often 
recognized 
the 
apparent 
tension 
between 
these 
two 
constitutional rights.  See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832; Klessig, 
211 Wis. 2d at 203; Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 556.  One cannot 
"blink[] the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his 
own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's 
decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused 
can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the 
right to the assistance of counsel."  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832.  
The right to counsel is regarded as one of the most significant 
elements of due process.  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 555.  Save for 
"some rare instances," "[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal 
prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's 
guidance than by their own unskilled efforts."  Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 834.  Accordingly, as a prerequisite to a defendant's 
self-representation, the circuit court must ensure that the 
defendant (1) has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
14 
 
waived the right to counsel, and (2) is competent to proceed 
pro se. 
 
Marquardt, 
286 
Wis. 2d 204, 
¶56; 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d at 203; Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 568-69.  If the circuit 
court finds that both conditions are met, the court must permit 
the defendant to represent himself or herself.  Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d at 203-04.  An improper denial of a defendant's 
constitutional right to self-representation is a structural 
error subject to automatic reversal.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶37 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (citing 
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8.)).  On the other hand, if the 
circuit court finds that either of the two conditions is not 
satisfied, "the circuit court must prevent the defendant from 
representing himself or deprive him of his constitutional right 
to the assistance of counsel."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203-04.  
We now examine each of the conditions in turn. 
A. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver 
of the Right to Counsel 
¶22 "So important is the right to attorney representation 
in a criminal proceeding that nonwaiver is presumed."  Pickens, 
96 Wis. 2d at 555; see also Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 204.  The 
presumption of nonwaiver is overcome only upon an affirmative 
showing 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
waived 
the 
right 
to 
counsel. 
 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d at 204.  In Klessig, this court mandated the circuit 
court's use of a colloquy in order to prove the defendant's 
valid waiver.  Id. at 206.  Such an examination on the record 
assists 
the 
circuit 
court 
in 
"establish[ing] 
that 
'[the 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
15 
 
defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open.'"  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
¶23 Accordingly, to prove a valid waiver of counsel, the 
circuit court must conduct a colloquy designed to ensure the 
following:  
[T]he defendant: (1) made a deliberate choice to 
proceed 
without 
counsel, 
(2) 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, 
(3) was aware of the seriousness of the charge or 
charges against him, and (4) was aware of the general 
range of penalties that could have been imposed on 
him. . . . 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.  "If the circuit court fails to 
conduct such a colloquy, a reviewing court may not find, based 
on the record, that there was a valid waiver of counsel."  Id.  
Stated differently, a reviewing court may conclude that a 
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the 
right to counsel only if the circuit court engaged in, and found 
that the defendant met, the four lines of inquiry prescribed in 
Klessig. 
¶24 In Klessig, the circuit court permitted Klessig to 
represent himself at trial without first engaging him in a 
waiver-of-counsel colloquy or inquiring into his competency to 
proceed pro se.  Id. at 199.  The jury found Klessig guilty of 
one count of burglary as party to a crime, and he was sentenced 
to 58 months in prison.  Id. at 201.  Klessig appealed the 
judgment of conviction, arguing that the circuit court erred by 
failing to conduct a hearing on whether he validly waived his 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
16 
 
right to counsel and was competent to proceed pro se.  Id.  In 
other words, Klessig claimed that the circuit court should not 
have permitted him to represent himself at trial.  On review, 
this court mandated the use of the above-stated colloquy as the 
"clearest and most efficient means of insuring that the 
defendant has validly waived his right to the assistance of 
counsel, and of preserving and documenting that valid waiver for 
purposes of appeal and postconviction motions."  Id. at 206.  We 
do not depart from Klessig today. 
¶25 The case before us, however, is the converse scenario 
of Klessig.  Unlike Klessig, Imani did not proceed to trial 
without counsel.  The circuit court found that Imani did not 
meet the four conditions required by Klessig in order to validly 
waive his right to counsel.  The circuit court denied Imani's 
motion to represent himself, he proceeded to a jury trial with 
counsel and was found guilty, and he is now appealing the 
judgment of conviction on the grounds that the circuit court 
deprived him of his constitutional right to self-representation 
by not engaging him in the colloquy required by Klessig.   
¶26 We disagree.  We conclude that Imani was not deprived 
of his constitutional right to self-representation because the 
circuit court properly determined that Imani did not validly 
waive his right to counsel under Klessig.  We are cognizant of 
the fact that the circuit court did not engage Imani in the full 
colloquy prescribed in Klessig and did not utilize the exact 
language or "magic words" of Klessig when conducting its 
colloquy.  The circuit court's inquiry could have been better.  
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
17 
 
Nevertheless, it is evident from the record that the circuit 
court engaged Imani in two of the four lines of inquiry 
prescribed in Klessig: whether Imani made a deliberate choice to 
proceed without counsel and whether Imani was aware of the 
difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation.9  Because 
we answer both in the negative, it necessarily follows that 
Imani did not validly waive his right to counsel.  Even had the 
circuit court engaged him further, the answer would have been 
the same.  Under Klessig, as long as the circuit court finds 
that one of the four conditions is not met, the court cannot 
permit the defendant to represent himself.  We do not impose on 
circuit courts the requirement of placing form over substance 
and using "magic words" when the reality of the circumstances 
dictate the answer. 
1. Whether Imani made a deliberate choice 
to proceed without counsel 
¶27 The circuit court's explanation for denying Imani's 
motion to represent himself makes apparent that the court could 
not find that Imani deliberately chose to proceed without 
counsel.  According to the circuit court, Imani's decision to 
represent himself was "flippant," "short term," and "immature."  
The reasons he gave did not reflect a deliberate choice but 
instead were "episodic driven."  Specifically, the circuit court 
                                                 
9 In its petition for review, the State did not challenge 
the court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court failed 
to engage Imani in the colloquy required by Klessig.  However, 
we need not accept a party's concession of law.  Bergmann v. 
McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997). 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
18 
 
found that Imani was "disgruntled" about losing his motion to 
suppress Dukes' in-court identification of him, and that "in and 
of itself [was] not a sufficiently rational basis to justify" 
his decision to represent himself.  We agree. 
¶28 The record reflects that Imani did not make a 
deliberate choice to proceed without counsel.  Rather, he made a 
hasty request on the heels of an unsuccessful motion hearing.  
Imani's immediate reason for wanting to represent himself was 
his belief that his counsel did not "sp[eak] up enough for [him] 
during [that] proceeding."  He was particularly upset that his 
counsel did not play a news broadcast at the hearing, and he 
"wasn't satisfied with the questions that [his counsel] asked 
Mr. Dukes."  Imani stated, "If [my counsel], you know, doing 
this type of job here then I know at trial I don't——I don't feel 
as though he is going to represent me well enough."  It is clear 
that Imani did not make a deliberate choice to represent 
himself.  Instead, he impulsively moved for self-representation 
as a result of his aggravation towards counsel and the fact that 
he did not prevail on the motion to suppress. 
¶29 Moreover, 
the record indicates that despite the 
circuit court's invitation, Imani never before and never again 
expressed a desire to represent himself.  To the contrary, in 
this case alone, he was assisted at various times by four 
different attorneys, and he twice expressly requested new 
appointment of counsel.  He never took the circuit court up on 
its offer to hear his motion for self-representation again or to 
permit him to participate at trial with standby counsel.  In 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
19 
 
fact, Imani's decision to represent himself at trial was 
evidently conditioned upon the assistance of counsel, and thus, 
he may not have truly sought to waive counsel in the first 
instance.10  Specifically, in his "heat of the moment" argument, 
he informed the circuit court that he "[did not] have any 
problem with" the trial being scheduled for the next month "as 
long as [his] lawyer will make a full investigation into the 
fingerprint."   
¶30 We therefore agree with the circuit court's finding 
that Imani's choice to proceed without counsel, if it even was 
that, was not deliberate but instead was "episodic driven."  The 
record reflects that he made a hasty request on the heels of an 
unsuccessful motion hearing and never again expressed a sincere 
desire to be without the assistance of counsel——until he was 
convicted. 
2. Whether Imani was aware of the difficulties  
  and disadvantages of self-representation 
¶31 Without using the "magic words," the circuit court 
also engaged Imani in a colloquy concerning the difficulties and 
disadvantages of self-representation.  The court twice mentioned 
the added difficulty in preparing for and conducting a two-
defendant jury trial.  The court also noted the "complicated and 
messy" nature of self-representation and how it "is almost 
always the wrong tactical move" because "it is confusing as to 
                                                 
10 "[A] defendant has no constitutional right to be actively 
represented in the courtroom both by counsel and by himself."  
Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 300, 265 N.W.2d 540 (1978). 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
20 
 
when you're speaking as yourself and when you're speaking on 
behalf of yourself." 
¶32 Based upon our review of the record, the circuit court 
correctly determined that Imani was unaware of the difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-representation. 
 
By 
his 
own 
contention, his success at trial was conditioned upon the 
assistance of counsel.  As he indicated to the circuit court, he 
was "pretty sure" that he had a "fuller defense prepared that 
[he had] been preparing [him]self, you know, with the help of 
[his] lawyers."  In addition, as previously mentioned, he told 
the court that he would be ready to represent himself at trial 
"as long as [his] lawyer will make a full investigation into the 
fingerprint."  Relying as he did on the assistance of counsel, 
we cannot conclude that Imani appreciated the difficulties and 
disadvantages of self-representation, even if we presume that he 
truly meant to waive his right to counsel. 
¶33 In summary, we conclude that even though the circuit 
court could have engaged in a more thorough colloquy, it 
correctly determined that Imani did not validly waive his right 
to counsel under Klessig.  The circuit court engaged Imani in 
two of the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and 
properly determined that Imani (1) did not make a deliberate 
choice to proceed without counsel, and (2) was unaware of the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-representation.  
Regardless of how Imani may have answered the other two lines of 
inquiry, the circuit court could not have accepted his waiver of 
counsel as valid.  Under Klessig, if any one of the four 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
21 
 
conditions is not met, the circuit court is required to conclude 
that the defendant did not validly waive the right to counsel.   
¶34 Today we uphold Klessig as the controlling authority 
for determining whether a defendant validly waived the right to 
counsel and the preferred method for a circuit court to engage 
in such a colloquy.  The use of the Klessig colloquy is mandated 
"in every case where a defendant seeks to proceed pro se to 
prove knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel."  
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206 (emphasis added).  If the circuit 
court fails to engage a defendant in the four lines of inquiry 
as prescribed in Klessig, "a reviewing court may not find, based 
on the record, that there was a valid waiver of counsel."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  In a case such as this one, however, where 
the circuit court determined that two of the four lines of 
inquiry were not satisfied, the circuit court did not commit 
automatic error requiring a new trial because the defendant 
could not have validly waived his right to counsel.  It makes 
little practical sense to fault the circuit court for not 
engaging Imani in the full colloquy; if any one of the four 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
22 
 
conditions was not met, the circuit court was required to 
conclude that Imani did not validly waive his right to counsel.11 
                                                 
11 The concurrence/dissent accuses the court of "effectively 
overrul[ing]" Klessig, warning that under our reasoning, circuit 
courts are "no longer required to engage a defendant seeking to 
proceed pro se in a full and complete Klessig colloquy."  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶48.  We reject the concurrence/dissent's 
mischaracterization of our holding.  We uphold Klessig as the 
controlling authority for proving a defendant's knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.  This case, however, 
is 
the 
converse 
scenario 
of 
Klessig——a 
fact 
that 
the 
concurrence/dissent declines to acknowledge.  In this case, the 
circuit court determined that Imani did not validly waive the 
right to counsel.  Logic commands that when a series of elements 
is stated in the conjunctive, as is the case in Klessig, see 211 
Wis. 2d at 206, thereby requiring a finding of each element in 
order to prove the conclusion, disproving the conclusion 
requires only one element to fail.  The Wisconsin Jury 
Instructions, cited by the concurrence/dissent at ¶55 n.7, make 
this point clear:  
Denial of a waiver of counsel must be supported 
by one of the following findings: (1) that the 
defendant does not understandingly and voluntarily 
waive counsel; (2) that the defendant does not 
understand the disadvantages of self-representation; 
or (3) that the defendant lacks the minimal competence 
necessary to try to represent himself or herself. 
Wis JI——Criminal SM-30 at 6 (emphasis added).  Thus, if the 
circuit court makes any one of the following findings, the court 
is required to deny the defendant's waiver of counsel: 
-the defendant does not understand the seriousness of 
the charge and the maximum possible penalties; or 
-the defendant does not understand that a lawyer may 
be of assistance and that a lawyer may be appointed if 
the defendant is indigent; or 
-the defendant does not understand the disadvantages 
of self-representation; or 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
23 
 
¶35 Nevertheless, we strongly caution circuit courts that 
the preferred practice is to engage every defendant who seeks to 
proceed pro se in the full colloquy prescribed in Klessig, even 
if the court determines that a defendant did not validly waive 
the right to counsel.  Even in those cases, a complete 
examination on the record is the "clearest and most efficient 
means" of ensuring that the defendant did not validly waive the 
right to counsel and of "preserving and documenting" that 
invalid waiver for purposes of appeal.  See id. 
B. Competence to Proceed Pro Se 
¶36 In 
addition 
to 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily waiving the right to counsel, a defendant who seeks 
to represent himself or herself must be competent to proceed 
pro se.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203; Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 
567.  Determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed 
pro se is a higher standard than determining whether a defendant 
is competent to stand trial.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 212.  
"Surely a defendant who, while mentally competent to be tried, 
is simply incapable of effective communication or, because of 
less than average intellectual powers, is unable to attain the 
minimal understanding necessary to present a defense, is not to 
be allowed 'to go to jail under his own banner.'"  Pickens, 96 
                                                                                                                                                             
-the defendant does not possess the minimal competence 
necessary 
to 
try 
to 
represent 
himself 
or 
herself . . . . 
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  Again, we decline to place form over 
substance when logic commands the answer. 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
24 
 
Wis. 2d at 568 (quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v. 
Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
¶37 Whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se is 
"uniquely a question for the trial court to determine."  
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 568.  "It is the trial judge who is in 
the best position to observe the defendant, his conduct and his 
demeanor and to evaluate his ability to present at least a 
meaningful defense."  Id.  In determining whether a defendant is 
competent to proceed pro se, the circuit court may consider the 
defendant's education, literacy, language fluency, and any 
physical or psychological disability which may significantly 
affect his ability to present a defense.  Id. at 569.  A 
defendant of average ability and intelligence may still be 
adjudged competent for self-representation, and accordingly, a 
defendant's "timely and proper request" should be denied only 
where the circuit court can identify a specific problem or 
disability that may prevent the defendant from providing a 
meaningful defense.  Id.  While the determination of competency 
rests significantly upon the circuit court's judgment and 
experience, the determination must appear in the record.  
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 212.  Our review is limited to whether 
the circuit court's determination is "totally unsupported by the 
facts apparent in the record."  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 569-70. 
¶38 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court's 
determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se is 
also supported by the facts in the record.  The circuit court 
inquired into Imani's level of education, his ability to read 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
25 
 
and write, and his experience with the legal system.  Imani 
possessed only a tenth grade education and asserted, without 
more, that he read at a college level.  As the circuit court 
correctly observed, Imani's experience with the criminal court 
system was "observational," as his court appearances always 
included the assistance of counsel.  Considering all those 
factors, the circuit court determined that Imani did not possess 
the minimal competence necessary to conduct his own defense.  We 
cannot conclude that the circuit court's determination is 
"totally unsupported" by the record.  Id.   
¶39 Moreover, 
contrary 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
conclusion, it was not error for the circuit court to take into 
consideration the trial schedule when determining whether Imani 
was competent to proceed pro se.  See Imani, 320 Wis. 2d 505, 
¶18.  In Pickens, which we regard as the controlling authority 
on 
competency, 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d at 
212, 
this 
court 
recognized that a "timely and proper request" to proceed pro se 
should be denied only where the circuit court can identify a 
specific problem or disability that may prevent the defendant 
from providing a meaningful defense.  Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 569 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, the circuit court was justified 
in taking into consideration the timing of Imani's motion to 
represent himself and the fact that it was first presented to 
the court less than one month before a two-defendant jury trial 
that required "substantial and extensive preparation." 
No. 
2008AP1521-CR   
 
26 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶40 We conclude that the circuit court properly denied 
Imani's motion to represent himself.  First, we determine that 
Imani did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 
the right to counsel.  The circuit court engaged Imani in two of 
the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and properly 
determined that Imani (1) did not make a deliberate choice to 
proceed without counsel, and (2) was unaware of the difficulties 
and disadvantages of self-representation.  If any one of the 
four conditions prescribed in Klessig is not met, the circuit 
court is required to conclude that the defendant did not validly 
waive the right to counsel.  Second, we conclude that the 
circuit court's determination that Imani was not competent to 
proceed pro se is supported by the facts in the record.  Because 
Imani did not validly waive his right to counsel and was not 
competent to proceed pro se, the circuit court was required to 
prevent him from representing himself.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶41 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  When this court accepted review of this 
case, the issue that the parties presented was straightforward:  
When a defendant seeks to waive the assistance of counsel, and 
the circuit court fails to engage him or her in the colloquy 
mandated by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997), is the proper remedy a new trial or a retrospective 
evidentiary hearing?  Rather than answer that question, the 
majority rewrites the issue and, as a result, effectively 
dismantles Klessig's useful and clear bright-line rule.   
¶42 There is no dispute that the circuit court's handling 
of Rashaad Imani's request to waive counsel was somewhat flawed.  
All of the justices of this court,1 the panel of the court of 
appeals,2 and the parties3 recognize that the circuit court did 
not engage in the full, mandated Klessig colloquy needed to 
ensure protection of Imani's right to counsel and right to 
represent himself under the Wisconsin and the United States 
constitutions. 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶26 ("We are cognizant of the fact that 
the circuit court did not engage Imani in the full colloquy 
prescribed in Klessig . . . .  The circuit court's inquiry could 
have been better."); ¶33 ("[T]he circuit court could have 
engaged in a more thorough colloquy[.]"). 
2 See State v. Imani, 2009 WI App 98, ¶15, 320 Wis. 2d 505, 
771 N.W.2d 379 (stating that the circuit court "did not even 
touch on" the questions mandated by Klessig). 
3 See infra ¶¶45-47 (describing the parties' statements of 
the issue as presented to this court and their acknowledgement 
that the circuit court's Klessig colloquy was deficient). 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
¶43 What is at issue here is the correct remedy for the 
circuit court's defective colloquy.  In my view, the correct 
remedy is not a new trial, as the court of appeals held and as 
Imani argues.  Nor is the correct remedy for four justices of 
this court, in effect, to overrule sua sponte what has been a 
clear, useful, bright-line rule in Klessig.  Rather, in response 
to the only question that the parties asked us to answer, 
Klessig 
counsels 
that 
the 
proper 
remedy 
under 
these 
circumstances 
is 
a 
retrospective 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
determine whether Imani's waiver of counsel was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207 
(concluding that, where the circuit court failed to conduct a 
colloquy 
to 
determine 
knowing 
and 
intelligent 
waiver 
of 
assistance of counsel, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is 
the appropriate remedy).   
¶44 Because I believe that the court of appeals erred when 
it determined that the proper remedy for a defective Klessig 
colloquy is a new trial, I concur with the majority's holding to 
the extent that it reverses the court of appeals' remand for a 
new trial.  However, I strongly disagree with the majority's 
failure to remand for a retrospective evidentiary hearing.  
Instead, I would reverse the court of appeals, and remand to the 
circuit court for the required retrospective evidentiary hearing 
in accord with Klessig. 
¶45 A brief review of how this case came to this court is 
helpful. 
 
After 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
Imani's 
convictions and remanded for a new trial, the State sought 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
reconsideration by the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
denied reconsideration and the State petitioned this court for 
review.  Significantly, it asked: 
Did the court of appeals impose the wrong remedy, 
contrary to this Court's decision in [Klessig], when 
it ordered this case remanded for a new trial instead 
of a retrospective evidentiary hearing after finding 
that the circuit court failed to conduct the colloquy 
concerning self-representation required by Klessig? 
(Emphasis added.)  Imani's response to the petition for review 
did not challenge that statement of the issue.  Moreover, when 
we granted review, our order did not seek briefing or arguments 
relating to any other issues connected with the case. 
¶46 Accordingly, in its opening brief to this court, the 
State restated the issue virtually identically to the issue it 
presented in its petition for review.4  In response, Imani stated 
that he agreed "with the State that the issue presented for 
review is whether the court of appeals imposed the wrong remedy, 
contrary to State v. Klessig, when it ordered the case remanded 
for a new trial." 
¶47 Simply put, the parties agreed——as did we, when we 
accepted this petition for review——that the issue concerned what 
the proper remedy is when a circuit court fails to engage in a 
proper Klessig colloquy.  Given that, the majority's statement 
of the issue is surprising: 
                                                 
4 The only difference was that the State, in its opening 
brief, described the remedy as a "retrospective hearing" rather 
than as a "retrospective evidentiary hearing" as it did in its 
petition for review. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
The issue in this case is whether the circuit court 
committed reversible error by denying Imani's motion 
to represent himself after finding that Imani did not 
validly waive his right to counsel under two of the 
four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and was 
not competent to proceed pro se.   
Majority op., ¶2. 
¶48 In other words, the majority ignores the remedy issue, 
and reaches out to create and decide a new issue:  Whether the 
circuit court got it "close enough" in its very limited inquiry.  
The parties did not present that issue to us in their briefs or 
oral arguments.5  Worse, the majority's reformulation effectively 
overrules 
the 
clear, 
useful 
bright-line 
rule 
in 
Klessig 
requiring circuit courts to conduct a full and complete colloquy 
with all defendants seeking to waive assistance of counsel.  The 
majority states, "Today we uphold Klessig as the controlling 
authority for determining whether a defendant validly waived the 
right to counsel and the preferred method for a circuit court to 
engage in such a colloquy."  Majority op., ¶34.  How can that 
statement possibly be accurate, given the majority's reasoning 
and approach?  Unfortunately, the majority's reasoning leads to 
but one conclusion:  A circuit court is no longer required to 
engage a defendant seeking to proceed pro se in a full and 
complete Klessig colloquy. 
                                                 
5 In fact, when asked at oral argument whether Klessig 
should be overruled so as to no longer require a colloquy, the 
assistant attorney general appearing for the State remarked that 
he had not "really delved into it," and was not prepared to 
discuss the question in detail.  He also noted that, if this 
court were to consider overruling Klessig, the State would want 
to weigh in on the issue. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
¶49 To understand why Klessig's requirement of a full 
colloquy is important, a discussion of that case and similar 
cases is necessary and instructive.  In Klessig, this court 
explained that when a defendant in a criminal case requests 
self-representation, that request implicates two important, yet 
competing constitutional rights, each guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution:  the right to the assistance 
of counsel and the right to self-representation.  See Klessig, 
211 Wis. 2d at 201-04. 
¶50 We discussed those competing rights in a case that 
predated 
Klessig, 
Pickens 
v. 
State, 
96 
Wis. 2d 549, 
292 
N.W.2d 601 (1980), overruled in part by Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 
206.  In Pickens, we explained, "So important is the right to 
attorney representation in a criminal proceeding that nonwaiver 
is presumed and waiver must be affirmatively shown to be knowing 
and voluntary in order for it to be valid."  96 Wis. 2d at 555 
(citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948); Keller 
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 502, 508-09, 249 N.W.2d 773 (1977)).  Yet, 
in light of the constitutional right to self-representation, 
"the trial court must also be cognizant and respectful of the 
defendant's right to conduct his own defense without the benefit 
of an attorney."  Id. at 556 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806 (1975)).  Accordingly, the court in Pickens, after 
reviewing cases dealing with the waiver of counsel, held that 
when a defendant wishes to proceed pro se, the circuit court 
must ensure two things:  first, that the defendant has 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to 
counsel, and second, that the defendant is competent to proceed 
pro se.  96 Wis. 2d at 568-69. 
¶51 As to the first part of that inquiry, for waiver to be 
valid, the court must be satisfied that the following four 
factors are present:  (1) the defendant made a deliberate choice 
to proceed without counsel, (2) the defendant is aware of the 
disadvantages and difficulties of self-representation, (3) the 
defendant is aware of the seriousness of the charges that he or 
she is facing, and (4) the defendant is aware of the general 
range of penalties that could be imposed if he or she is found 
guilty.  Id. at 563.  However, in Pickens we did not require 
expressly that a circuit court engage in a colloquy to determine 
whether those four factors were present.  Rather, we permitted 
the record to "reflect" the four factors and a reviewing court 
to determine that a waiver was valid or not based on a review of 
the record.  See id. at 564. 
¶52 In Klessig, we upheld Pickens to the extent that a 
circuit court must determine that the four Pickens factors are 
present in order to uphold a determination that there was a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.  However, we 
overruled Pickens to the extent that it permitted the colloquy 
to be optional.  Instead, as we wrote, "[W]e mandate the use of 
a colloquy in every case where a defendant seeks to proceed pro 
se to prove knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206. 
¶53 We further explained the benefits of that approach: 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
Conducting such an examination of the defendant is the 
clearest and most efficient means of insuring that the 
defendant 
has 
validly 
waived 
his 
right 
to 
the 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
and 
of 
preserving 
and 
documenting that valid waiver for purposes of appeal 
and 
postconviction 
motions. 
 
Thus, 
a 
properly 
conducted 
colloquy 
serves 
the 
dual 
purposes 
of 
ensuring that a defendant is not deprived of his 
constitutional rights and of efficiently guarding our 
scarce judicial resources.   
Id. (emphasis added).  In other words, requiring a colloquy is 
beneficial in several ways.   
¶54 First, it protects a defendant's constitutional right 
to 
the 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
and 
the 
right 
to 
self-
representation 
by 
ensuring and clarifying the defendant's 
understanding of the request to waive his or her right to the 
assistance of counsel.  See id.  Similar to other situations 
where the circuit court must conduct a colloquy to ensure a 
defendant's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a 
right,6 the purpose of engaging a defendant in a discussion 
touching upon the four interrelated Pickens factors enables the 
defendant to be aware of his or her rights, to understand the 
gravity of the offense, and to recognize the advantages and 
disadvantages 
of self-representation.  The Wisconsin Jury 
                                                 
6 Cf., e.g.,  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶¶40-43, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485 (holding that, consistent with 
Anderson and Klessig, a colloquy is required where a defendant 
waives the right to testify); State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶23, 
249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301 (mandating a colloquy where a 
defendant seeks waiver of a jury trial because it "is the 
clearest means of determining that the defendant is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to a jury 
trial"); 
State 
v. 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d 246, 
260-61, 
389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986) (requiring a colloquy "to assist the trial 
court in making the constitutionally required determination that 
a defendant's plea is voluntary").   
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
Instructions——Criminal 
Special 
Materials 
30 
supports 
that 
understanding that the colloquy is as much for the defendant's 
benefit as it is for the benefit of the circuit court.  Those 
instructions in the special materials provide a detailed series 
of suggested inquiries to engage in with the defendant, and then 
instruct the circuit court to ask the defendant if, after having 
engaged in the full colloquy, he or she continues to seek waiver 
of counsel.  Wis JI——Criminal SM-30 at 5.  In other words, along 
with allowing the circuit court to discern whether the defendant 
is making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice, engaging 
in the full colloquy allows the defendant to understand the full 
import and ramifications of his or her choice. 
¶55 Second, it encourages judicial efficiency in two 
primary ways.  As an initial matter, it provides a clear 
practice for a circuit court to follow when confronted with a 
request to waive counsel and proceed pro se.  That practice, as 
set forth in the Wisconsin Jury Instructions,7 enables circuit 
                                                 
7 Based in part on Klessig, the Wisconsin Jury Instructions—
—Criminal SM-30 set forth the recommended practice.  The 
instructions explain that: 
[w]hen a defendant affirmatively wishes to waive 
counsel, an inquiry must be conducted to determine 
whether the defendant's waiver is voluntarily and 
understandingly made.  This includes assuring that the 
defendant 
understands 
the 
benefits 
of 
being 
represented by 
counsel and the disadvantages of 
proceeding without counsel.   
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
courts to give requests to waive counsel the attention warranted 
in an efficient, streamlined manner.   
¶56 Additionally, 
the 
full 
and 
complete 
colloquy 
encourages appellate judicial efficiency.  See Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d at 206; see also State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶50, 283 
Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92 (Wilcox, J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part).  If the circuit court conducts the full and 
complete colloquy, the circuit court has developed the record 
easily for an appellate or post-conviction court to review the 
circuit court's decision quickly and efficiently.  On the other 
hand, if the circuit court fails to conduct a full and complete 
colloquy, the case is remanded for a retrospective evidentiary 
hearing that develops the record for further review.  In any 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis JI——Criminal SM-30 at 2.  The instructions then provide a 
suggested inquiry that delves into all four Pickens factors.  
If, after engaging in that colloquy, the defendant changes his 
or 
her 
mind 
and 
desires 
representation 
by 
counsel, 
the 
instructions indicate that the circuit court should either allow 
the defendant to seek private counsel or refer the case to the 
public defender's office.  Id. at 5.  However, if after 
receiving the full colloquy, the defendant still wishes to waive 
counsel, the instructions prompt the court to then conduct the 
competence inquiry.  Id. 
The instructions go on to explain, consistently with 
Klessig, that a circuit court's decision to deny waiver of 
counsel must be supported by at least one of the following 
findings: 
(1) That the defendant does not understandingly and 
voluntarily waive counsel; (2) that the defendant does 
not 
understand 
the 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation; or (3) that the defendant lacks the 
minimal competence necessary to try to represent 
himself or herself. 
Id. at 6. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
event, requiring the full and complete colloquy at the circuit 
court level promotes efficient reviews at the post-conviction and 
appellate court levels. 
¶57 In summary, a full and complete colloquy serves 
multiple purposes:  (1) ensuring that the defendant understands 
and validly waives his or her right to counsel, (2) ensuring that 
the defendant's right to self-representation is protected, and 
(3) encouraging judicial efficiency by giving circuit courts 
clear direction and promoting a well-developed record for speedy 
appellate review.  
¶58 Here, the majority's view that a partial colloquy 
could be sufficient essentially overrules Klessig and fails to 
serve the purposes advanced by a full and complete colloquy.  A 
circuit court exploring only two of the four Pickens factors 
cannot be said to have reached a determination that sufficiently 
protects a defendant's dual but conflicting constitutional 
rights to the assistance of counsel or to self-representation.  
Moreover, a partial colloquy may not provide a defendant with 
enough information to make a decision that is a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary one.  See Wis JI——Criminal SM-30 at 5 
(instructing the circuit court to ask a defendant, after 
conducting the full colloquy, whether he or she continues to 
seek waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel).  
Further, a partial colloquy eliminates helpful guidance for 
circuit courts from Klessig and the Special Materials, and is 
likely to bog down post-conviction and appellate review of such 
cases. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
¶59 Along with the majority's holding, which in effect 
overrules Klessig's mandate that the circuit court conduct a 
full and complete colloquy in every case where a defendant seeks 
waiver of the assistance of counsel and self-representation, 
several other problems arise from the majority's restatement of 
the issue. 
¶60 First, to sidestep the fact that the circuit court 
failed to engage in the full and complete colloquy as mandated 
by Klessig, the majority appears, at least at times, to shift 
the 
responsibility 
to 
the 
defendant 
to 
present 
evidence 
supporting the four Pickens factors as well as showing his 
competence.  See majority op., ¶15 ("If the circuit court finds 
that the defendant met both of those conditions . . . "); ¶23 
("[A] reviewing court may conclude that a defendant knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel only 
if the circuit court engaged in, and found that the defendant 
met, the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig."); ¶25 
("The circuit court found that Imani did not meet the four 
conditions required by Klessig in order to validly waive his 
right to counsel."); ¶28 ("The record reflects that Imani did 
not make a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel.") 
(emphases added).8 
                                                 
8 Moreover, the majority does not take issue with the 
approach of the circuit court, to the extent that it made 
several comments suggesting that, in its view, the burden was 
Imani's: 
THE COURT:  What do you want to say to me to convince 
me that you're competent to represent yourself? 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
¶61 The language in Klessig is consistent in stating that 
it is the circuit court's responsibility to elicit evidence and 
determine whether that evidence supports the four Pickens 
factors.  See, e.g., Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206 ("To prove such 
a valid waiver of counsel, the circuit court must conduct a 
colloquy designed to ensure that the defendant: (1) made a 
deliberate choice to proceed without counsel, (2) was aware of 
the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) 
was aware of the seriousness of the charge or charges against 
him, and (4) was aware of the general range of penalties that 
could have been imposed on him.").  Indeed, the commentary to 
the 
Wis 
JI-Criminal 
SM-30 
indicates 
"the 
trial 
court 
must . . . make the required inquiry and make proper findings," 
SM-30 at 2, and that "the burden is on the court to make a 
record," id. at 7. 
¶62 In other words, the purpose of the circuit court's 
colloquy is to develop a record on which the court bases its 
                                                                                                                                                             
IMANI:  Like I say I've been working on this for 13 
months, you know, I'm very competent. 
THE COURT:  Those are really kind of irrelevant and 
unconvincing. 
. . . . . 
THE COURT:  I don't know that much about his 
capability, 
but 
he 
has 
only 
got 
a 
10th 
grade 
education, he said he reads at a college level, that's 
the only information I have on the subject of his 
education and background. . . . [I]t hasn't been 
presented to me that he has any experience actually 
conducting proceedings like a criminal court trial. 
(Emphases added.) 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
determination that the defendant's waiver is or is not valid.  
If there is no such record, the circuit court cannot make a 
determination as to the validity of the waiver.  To the extent 
that the majority suggests it is up to the defendant to present 
a case for why his or her waiver is valid, it is wrong.  Here, 
the circuit court did not engage in the full and complete 
colloquy required, nor did that court make the required 
determinations supporting its holding that Imani's waiver of 
assistance of counsel was invalid. 
¶63 Second, the majority ignores precedent.  The United 
States Supreme Court has held that denial of self-representation 
at trial is a structural error that is not subject to harmless-
error analysis.  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 
(1984).  Many constitutional errors are subject to the harmless-
error rule.  However, as we have noted, "certain fundamental 
constitutional errors are not amenable to harmless error 
analysis," but rather require automatic reversal.  State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  These 
"structural" errors are "so intrinsically harmful as to require 
automatic reversal (i.e., 'affect substantial rights') without 
regard to their effect on the outcome."  Id. (quoting Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)).  Errors are structural 
when they "contain a 'defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself.'"  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37 (quoting 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).  As we have 
observed, the United States Supreme Court has held that denial 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
of self-representation at trial is a structural error that is 
not 
subject 
to 
harmless-error 
analysis. 
 
Harvey, 
254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶37 (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8). 
¶64 The majority correctly acknowledges that the improper 
denial of a defendant's request for self-representation "is a 
structural error subject to automatic reversal."  Majority op., 
¶15.  But it then goes on to state that it upholds "Klessig as 
the controlling authority for determining whether a defendant 
validly waived the right to counsel" and that "[t]he use of the 
Klessig colloquy is mandated 'in every case where a defendant 
seeks to proceed pro se to prove knowing and voluntary waiver of 
the right to counsel.'"  Majority op., ¶34.  Reading those 
statements together, the majority seems to be saying that the 
failure to engage in the mandated colloquy is a structural error 
prompting automatic reversal.   
¶65 However, the majority then appears to go on to assess 
the circuit court's failure to engage in the full and complete 
Klessig colloquy to prove a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel, not as a structural error 
requiring reversal or a retrospective evidentiary hearing, but 
as a harmless error.  It bases that approach on its conclusion 
that the circuit court here had garnered enough information on 
two of the four points of inquiry to deny Imani's request.  See 
majority op., ¶34.  Yet it somehow maintains that the circuit 
court would have been required to engage in the full and 
complete Klessig colloquy only if it had determined, based on 
that colloquy, that Imani's waiver of the right to counsel was 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
15 
 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See majority op., ¶34 ("If 
the circuit court fails to engage a defendant in the four lines 
of inquiry as prescribed in Klessig, 'a reviewing court may not 
find, based on the record, that there was a valid waiver of 
counsel.'").  As an initial matter, that result-driven approach 
puts the cart before the horse.  The full and complete Klessig 
colloquy is designed to allow the court to determine whether the 
defendant's waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  By 
the majority's circular reasoning, the determination of whether 
a court is required to engage in the full and complete colloquy 
is based on the result that the full and complete colloquy is 
designed to reach. 
¶66 Moreover, that approach appears to treat the improper 
denial of the right to waiver of assistance of counsel as a 
structural error, but the improper denial of the right to self-
representation as a harmless one.  For example, by the 
majority's reasoning, a defendant challenging a circuit court's 
grant of his motion to waive assistance of counsel, where the 
circuit court failed to engage him in the full and complete 
Klessig colloquy, would appear to be entitled to automatic 
reversal and remand.  In that situation, the court's error 
implicates 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional 
right 
to 
the 
assistance of counsel.  However, in a situation such as this 
one, where the circuit court fails to engage in the full and 
complete colloquy and denies the defendant's motion to waive the 
assistance of counsel, potentially implicating that defendant's 
right to self-representation, by the majority's reasoning that 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
16 
 
defendant is not automatically entitled to reversal and remand, 
or at least to a retrospective evidentiary hearing on remand. 
Rather, an appellate court may simply review the record and 
treat the circuit court's error as a harmless error.  As 
explained herein, that approach is contrary to the McKaskle 
decision holding that denial of the right to self-representation 
is a structural error not subject to the harmless error 
analysis.  465 U.S. at 177 n.8. 
¶67 Klessig makes no such distinction between the two 
competing constitutional rights, nor am I aware of any other 
case that does.  Rather, Klessig sets a bright-line rule 
requiring a full and complete colloquy touching upon the four 
Pickens factors when an accused requests self-representation.  
It does not endorse a partial or incomplete colloquy based on 
whether the circuit court denies the defendant's request to 
waive 
the 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
and 
thus 
for 
self-
representation.  
¶68 Moreover, to the extent that this court, rather than 
the circuit court at a retrospective evidentiary hearing, can 
look to the record for evidence supporting the circuit court's 
determination that Imani's waiver was invalid, I disagree with 
the majority's conclusions that the record contains evidence 
supporting a determination (1) that Imani's waiver was not 
deliberate, (2) that he was not aware of the difficulties and 
disadvantages of self-representation, or (3) that Imani was 
incompetent to represent himself. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
17 
 
¶69 As an initial matter, the majority seems to give no 
weight to Imani's statements that (1) he had been "working on" 
his case for 13 months, (2) he was dissatisfied with counsel's 
failure to challenge particular evidence or to complete tasks 
that he allegedly told Imani that he would complete, and (3) 
because of those perceived inadequacies, Imani felt that he 
could represent himself better at that point in the proceedings.  
Instead, it emphasizes the circuit court's language opining, 
without the full and complete colloquy, that Imani's decision to 
represent himself was not deliberate because his decision was 
"immature," "flippant," and "episodic driven." 
¶70 Without the colloquy, as required by Klessig, such 
statements are not sufficient to support the denial of a waiver 
of counsel.  As the Special Materials state, "Denial of a waiver 
of counsel must be supported by one of the following findings:  
(1) that the defendant does not understandingly and voluntarily 
waive counsel; (2) that the defendant does not understand the 
disadvantages of self-representation; or (3) that the defendant 
lacks the minimal competence necessary to try to represent 
himself or herself."  Wis JI——Criminal SM-30 at 6.  Here, even 
if Imani's request was "flippant" or "episodic-driven," it is 
not necessarily a non-deliberate choice.  Rather, the language 
cited reflects the circuit court's opinion that Imani was making 
a foolish choice by waiving counsel.  Many courts, when 
confronted with a criminal defendant's request to waive counsel, 
might believe that that defendant is making a poor choice.  
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
18 
 
However, such a belief, by itself, is not sufficient to support 
a finding that a defendant's decision is not deliberate. 
¶71 Next, the majority concludes that Imani, by his own 
admission, did not understand the difficulties and disadvantages 
of self-representation, based on comments that Imani made when 
he acknowledged that counsel had assisted him to some degree and 
that he recognized that there were parts of his defense on which 
it would be helpful to have counsel.  Such statements could 
reasonably be read to support the conclusion that Imani 
appreciates 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation. 
¶72 Finally, 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
information presented to the circuit court supports the circuit 
court's conclusion that Imani was not competent to represent 
himself is inconsistent with Pickens and Faretta and the factors 
discussed in those cases.  Although the majority correctly 
states the standard of review, as set forth in Pickens, that a 
court's determination that a defendant is or is not competent to 
represent himself "will be upheld unless totally unsupported by 
the facts apparent in the record," 96 Wis. 2d at 569-70, it 
ignores the framework within which the circuit court is to apply 
those facts in the record.  As we stated in Pickens, a court 
evaluating a defendant's request to waive counsel must inquire 
into factors including education, English-language fluency, 
literacy, "and any physical or psychological disability which 
may significantly affect his ability to communicate a possible 
defense to the jury."  Id. at 569.  We went on to state:   
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
19 
 
However, since Faretta indicates that persons of 
average ability and intelligence are entitled to 
represent themselves, a timely and proper request 
should be denied only where a specific problem or 
disability can be identified which may prevent a 
meaningful defense from being offered, should one 
exist.   
Id. (emphasis added).   
¶73 Here, there was no specific determination by the 
circuit court that Imani had a disability or problem that would 
prevent him from presenting a meaningful defense, nor is there 
evidence in the record that could support such a determination.  
Accordingly, the majority's conclusion is at odds with the 
factors discussed in Pickens, which the circuit court should 
consider 
in 
order 
"to 
determine 
whether 
[the 
defendant] 
possesses the minimal competence necessary to conduct his own 
defense."  96 Wis. 2d at 569.  The majority invokes the 
following facts as support for its conclusion that Imani is not 
competent to represent himself:  he has a tenth-grade education, 
he reads at a college level, he has command of written and 
spoken 
English, 
and 
he 
has 
participated 
in 
five 
other 
proceedings as a defendant.  Again, we emphasized in Pickens 
that persons of average intelligence and ability are entitled to 
represent themselves.  Here, Imani's education, reading level, 
fluency, and courtroom experience9 seem to offer support for the 
conclusion that he is competent to represent himself rather than 
support for the majority's view that he is not competent.  
                                                 
9 In 
fact, Imani's participation in five trials may 
constitute 
more 
trial 
exposure 
and 
experience 
than 
many 
practicing lawyers could claim, especially those lawyers who do 
not regularly appear in court. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
20 
 
Indeed, the majority appears to be basing its decision on an 
amorphous standard of competence.  If tenth-grade schooling is 
not sufficient, what is?  How is a college reading level 
evidence of incompetence?  How many trials must a defendant have 
participated in to be competent to represent himself?  If a 
competent defendant must have represented himself in previous 
proceedings, how can he or she ever first represent himself pro 
se? 
¶74 Moreover, 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
make 
a 
determination as to Rashaad Imani's competence.  The majority's 
determination 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
had 
made 
such 
a 
determination based on the above facts is speculative at best, 
especially considering that early in these proceedings, the 
circuit court evaluated Raziga Imani, Rashaad Imani's co-
defendant, for Raziga Imani's competence to proceed pro se.  
Interestingly, after conducting the full Klessig colloquy and 
competence inquiry with Raziga Imani, the same circuit court 
found that he was competent to proceed pro se based on 
credentials similar to those of Rashaad Imani, the defendant in 
the case before us:  (1) Raziga Imani has a high-school 
education, (2) he went to technical college for two semesters, 
(3) he was literate and spoke English, and (4) he had been 
involved in three non-trial court proceedings while being 
represented by attorneys.   
¶75 Simply put, the circuit court here did not engage in 
the full and complete colloquy mandated by Klessig.  The record 
does not support the circuit court's denial of Imani's request 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
21 
 
to waive counsel and to represent himself.  Because of that, the 
circuit 
court 
committed 
structural 
error, 
which 
requires 
reversal. 
¶76 Because I believe that the court of appeals erred when 
it determined that the proper remedy for a defective Klessig 
colloquy is a new trial, I concur with the majority's holding to 
the extent that it reverses the court of appeals' remand for a 
new trial.  However, I strongly disagree with the majority's 
failure to order a remand for a retrospective evidentiary 
hearing.  Instead, I would reverse the court of appeals, and 
remand to the circuit court for the required retrospective 
evidentiary hearing in accord with Klessig.10 
¶77 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
¶78 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this 
concurrence/dissent. 
                                                 
10 In concurrence to the majority opinion in Klessig, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson 
raised concerns about the difficulties 
involved with a retrospective determination of competency.  See 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 222 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  
Regardless of those concerns, however, I recognize, as do Chief 
Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley, that in this case we are 
bound by the Klessig precedent and the principle of stare 
decisis. 
No.  2008AP1521-CR.npc 
 
1