Case Title: New Jersey v. Mosley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                     State v. Noah Mosley (A-24-16) (078369)

Argued November 29, 2017 -- Decided March 6, 2018

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court.

         In this appeal, the Court considers whether defendant Noah Mosley’s due process rights were violated
because the State relied on hearsay evidence to prove the violation of probation (VOP) charge filed against him.

         Defendant was serving a five-year term of probation when he was arrested in September 2014. Based on
the circumstances underlying that arrest, the State charged him with a VOP and several new criminal offenses.
Before any proceedings on the new criminal charges had taken place, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
defendant’s VOP. Detective Michael Carullo of the Edison Police Department was the only witness to testify at the
hearing. Although he was not present during the events that provide the basis for defendant’s charges, Detective
Carullo assisted with the investigation after the events had occurred. He testified based on information that the on-
scene officer, Officer Zundel, relayed in police reports about the incident. In addition to Zundel’s reports, Carullo
relied on a report that he had prepared concerning the investigation and conversations with other officers.

          According to Detective Carullo’s testimony, at about noon on September 7, 2014, Officer Zundel of the
Edison Police Department parked his unmarked police car in a local store’s parking lot. Sometime later, Zundel
observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand exchange of narcotics between a minivan driver and a Mercedes
driver. When each vehicle attempted to leave the parking lot, Zundel ordered them to stop. The minivan driver
complied, but the Mercedes driver did not. Zundel was unable to stop the Mercedes from speeding out of the
parking lot. A consent search of the minivan yielded approximately twenty bags of heroin. The driver of the
minivan and a bystander to the episode in the parking lot provided descriptions of the Mercedes driver. Carullo
testified that he joined Zundel in working on the case and eventually uncovered evidence that pointed to defendant
as the driver of the Mercedes. Zundel was asked to view a photograph of defendant, and based on the photo, Zundel
identified defendant as the Mercedes driver that he observed.

         During the VOP hearing, Detective Carullo was unable to provide details of the encounter between Zundel
and defendant that led to defendant’s arrest. Several times during his testimony, Carullo’s recollection had to be
refreshed. He read from Zundel’s report. He also refreshed his recollection by reviewing his own report containing
information secured from other third parties. At the close of the evidence, defense counsel objected to the State’s
use of hearsay and argued that the State had not carried its burden of proof on defendant’s probation violation
charge. The State declined to produce more evidence, arguing that hearsay is admissible in VOP hearings and that
the standard of proof is lower in such hearings than in a typical criminal trial. The court agreed.

         Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied due process by the admission and use of hearsay in the
VOP hearing. The Appellate Division rejected the argument and affirmed. The panel reasoned that a trial court may
rely on hearsay evidence so long as it is “demonstrably reliable.” The panel determined that Carullo’s testimony
met that standard because he had “actively investigated defendant’s actions” and had extensive experience
“interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence against those being investigated.”

         The Court granted certification “limited to the issue of the trial court’s acceptance of hearsay testimony as
proof that defendant committed a new offense in violation of probation.” 
228 N.J. 433 (2016).

HELD: Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing. When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to
satisfy its proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s due process rights, a court fundamentally should
consider the State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the reliability of the evidence for its proposed
purpose. In this matter, the State failed to provide any justification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidence
was not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose of substantiating the new criminal charges against defendant.

                                                           1
1. “The court, if satisfied that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement
imposed as a condition of the order or if he has been convicted of another offense, may revoke the . . . probation and
sentence or resentence the defendant, as provided in this section.” 
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4) (emphasis added). The
State bears the burden of proving the charges by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. 126, 137 (App. Div. 1986). At the VOP hearing, a defendant has the specific rights “to hear and controvert the
evidence against him, to offer evidence in his defense, and to be represented by counsel.” 
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4. A
probationer in a VOP proceeding has the overlay of the protections of due process. For VOP hearings, the minimal
process required must include “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) . In
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973), the Court spoke approvingly of the conventional use, where
appropriate, of substitutes for live testimony in VOP hearings but added the reminder that “in some cases there is
simply no adequate alternative to live testimony.” (pp. 14-19)

2. Similar to federal law on the issue, New Jersey courts have viewed VOP hearings as “a part of the corrections
process” rather than an element of a criminal prosecution. Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 134. In Reyes, the Appellate
Division explored the State’s use of hearsay evidence to prove a VOP. Id. at 139. The Appellate Division declared
“[t]he admission and consideration of reliable hearsay evidence in probation violation proceedings [to be] both fair
and practical.” Ibid. The panel recognized that it was unproductive and perhaps unnecessary to insist that the State
could not proceed initially with hearsay evidence, and it instructed that the State could supplement its proofs as
necessary when the probationer contests the State’s proofs. Ibid. The panel explained its accommodation as a “fair
balance of the probationer’s rights with the interest of the public.” Ibid. Reyes allows for flexibility for the State
but is ever mindful of the need for sufficient reliable evidence to prove the factual underpinnings to a charged
violation. With respect to state courts that consider the question, the overwhelming majority allow the admission of
hearsay so long as the hearsay is determined to be reliable. In the federal sphere, a form of balancing test is utilized
for determining the admission of hearsay evidence in VOP proceedings. (pp. 19-28)

3. The Court adheres to the use of hearsay at VOP hearings but endorses a balancing approach that includes
assessment of the reasons for the government’s proceeding through the use of hearsay in addition to testing the
evidence’s reliability. The evidence to support the VOP charge must be reliable to meet due process concerns, and
the reason for relying on hearsay informs the decision on the evidence’s overall reliability. The Court adopts the
factors set forth in United States v. Walker, 
117 F.3d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1997)—(1) the importance of the evidence
to the court’s finding; (2) the probationer’s opportunity to refute the evidence; (3) the consequences for the
probationer of the court’s finding; (4) the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses; and (5) the traditional
indicia of reliability borne by the evidence—which each can assist the trial court in analyzing the reliability of the
hearsay being offered by the State and the fairness of its use. And the court should explain its reasons for
determining that the hearsay evidence is reliable for its stated purposes. (pp. 28-29)

4. The State charged defendant with violating probation by committing another criminal offense. While normally
that type of VOP charge is demonstrated through the submission of proof of a criminal conviction, the State here
opted to proceed first with the VOP charge. It was incumbent on the State then to prove the new criminal charge.
See Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 138. Defendant’s ability to defend against the new criminal charges, which were the
premise for the VOP charge, was undermined because the State deprived defendant of the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine Zundel, or anyone else, who saw the events transpire. The hearsay evidence that the court
accepted from Carullo was not reliable to prove the underlying new criminal charges that were the basis for
defendant’s VOP charge. Defendant was denied a hearing that met due process requirements. (pp. 29-31)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.

         JUSTICE ALBIN, CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT, disagrees as to the evidential standard to be
applied going forward. According to Justice Albin, the default position should be the application of the Rules of
Evidence. If the State seeks relaxation of the evidence rules for good cause, then the balancing test set forth in
Walker would be useful for deciding whether hearsay should be allowed in a probation revocation hearing.

        CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON,
AND TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment.

                                                           2
                                     SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       A-
24 September Term 2016
                                                078369

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

         v.

NOAH MOSLEY, a/k/a NUBEE
OUTUUQCIO, NUBEE
BUCKUOUTUUQCIO, and NOAH
MOSELEY,

    Defendant-Appellant.

         Argued November 29, 2017 – March 6, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public
         Defender, argued the cause for appellant
         (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
         attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on
         the briefs).

         David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor,
         argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C.
         Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
         attorney; David M. Liston, of counsel and on
         the briefs, and Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant
         Prosecutor, on the briefs).

         Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for
         amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
         of New Jersey Foundation (Edward L. Barocas,
         Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R.
         Shalom, Rebecca J. Livengood, Edward L.
         Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the
         briefs).

                               1
            Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney
            General, argued the cause for amicus curiae
            Attorney General of New Jersey
            (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
            attorney; Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney
            General, of counsel and on the brief).

    JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion for the Court.

    In this appeal, we consider whether defendant Noah Mosley’s

due process rights were violated because the State relied on

hearsay evidence to prove the violation of probation (VOP)

charge filed against him.

    Defendant’s VOP hearing was atypical.    He was charged with

violating probation because new criminal charges were filed

against him; however, the new criminal charges had not yet been

adjudicated when the State requested that the court proceed and

sentence defendant on the VOP.    At the VOP hearing, the State

advanced hearsay evidence to substantiate the new criminal

charges.    The State did not produce the officer who had

witnessed the alleged new criminal acts for which defendant was

later identified and charged as the perpetrator.    Nor did the

State provide justification for that failure, relying on the

proposition that hearsay is admissible in probation violation

hearings.

    Although we have yet to address the use of hearsay evidence

in VOP hearings, several decades ago the Appellate Division

determined it “fair and practical” for a court to admit

                                  2
“reliable hearsay evidence” in such hearings.       State v. Reyes,

207 N.J. Super. 126, 139 (App. Div. 1986).      Reyes established

two important principles for VOP hearings.       First, while there

is no bar to the admission and use “of demonstrably reliable

hearsay evidence . . . [a] violation may not be bottomed on

unreliable evidence.”     Id. at 138.   Second, the nature of VOP

hearings calls for flexibility.       Id. at 139.   In respect of the

latter, the Reyes panel emphasized that when a defendant is

charged with “inexcusably fail[ing] to comply with a substantial

requirement imposed as a condition of” probation, see 
N.J.S.A.

2C:45-3(a)(4), the State usually does not know whether, or what,

factual aspect of a probation violation charge a defendant will

contest at a VOP hearing, Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 139 (noting

differences between proof of failure to comply and proof of

legitimate excuse for that failure).       The decision in Reyes

elaborates on ways in which the State may initially produce

evidence of a violation and then meet its ultimate burden of

proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.          Id.

at 137, 139.

    Reyes’s approach to the use of hearsay in probation

violation hearings is both practical and protective of the due

process rights of a probationer charged with a violation of

probation.     Building on the sound legal foundation of Reyes, we

hold that hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing.

                                  3
When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to satisfy

its proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s due

process rights, a court fundamentally should consider the

State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the

reliability of the evidence for its proposed purpose.    We

identify factors for a court to consider when called on to

balance the respective interests of the parties concerning the

State’s use of hearsay in a VOP hearing.

    In this matter, the State failed to provide any

justification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidence

was not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose of

substantiating the new criminal charges against defendant.     In

fact, the hearsay was pivotal to defendant’s ability to confront

and test the adequacy of the evidence to support a conclusion

that he committed a VOP by engaging in new criminal conduct.

The sole witness at the VOP hearing was an officer who became

involved in the investigation of the alleged criminal incident

after it had occurred, and that witness could not attest to

personal knowledge of the events that provided the basis for

defendant’s new criminal charges.

    In the unusual circumstances of this case, the hearsay

presented through his testimony was insufficient to prove the

new underlying substantive offense that was the premise for

defendant’s probation violation and sentence.   We are

                                4
constrained to reverse the Appellate Division judgment that

upheld defendant’s probation violation.

                                  I.

                                  A.

    Defendant was serving a five-year term of probation when he

was arrested in September 2014.       Based on the circumstances

underlying that arrest, the State charged him with a VOP and

several new criminal offenses.    The new criminal charges

included third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous

substance, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), third-degree possession of a

controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3), third-degree possession of a controlled

dangerous substance with intent to distribute near a school

zone, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, second-degree distribution of a

controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of public

housing, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, and second-degree eluding a police

officer, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b).

    On December 23, 2014, before any proceedings on the new

criminal charges had taken place, the court conducted an

evidentiary hearing on defendant’s VOP.       Defendant had admitted

that he had been arrested on the new criminal charges and he was

being held in custody for that arrest.       See 
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-

3(a)(3).   However, the State wanted the court to sentence

defendant on the VOP charge.     Accordingly, to move forward on

                                  5
the State’s request, the court required an evidentiary hearing

on the State’s proofs to substantiate the unadjudicated new

criminal charges that were the premise for the VOP charge.

      Detective Michael Carullo of the Edison Police Department

was the only witness to testify at the VOP hearing.   Although he

was not present during the events that provide the basis for

defendant’s charges, Detective Carullo assisted with the

investigation after the events had occurred.   Detective Carullo

testified based on information that the on-scene officer,

Officer Zundel,1 relayed in police reports about the incident.

In addition to relying on Zundel’s reports, Carullo relied on a

police report that he had prepared concerning the investigation

and conversations he stated that he had with other officers.

                                B.

      According to Detective Carullo’s testimony, at about noon

on September 7, 2014, Officer Zundel of the Edison Police

Department parked his unmarked police car in a local store’s

parking lot.   Sometime later, a blue Mercedes parked about two

spaces away from his car.   The windows of the Mercedes were

rolled halfway down, and Zundel observed in the vehicle a black

male driver and a white male passenger.   Shortly thereafter, a

minivan entered the lot and parked next to the Mercedes.    The

1   The record does not disclose Officer Zundel’s first name.

                                 6
minivan’s driver, a white male, got out of the minivan and

entered the rear passenger side of the Mercedes.      Zundel then

observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand exchange of

narcotics between the minivan driver and the Mercedes driver.

       When the minivan driver exited the Mercedes and returned to

the minivan, Zundel maneuvered his unmarked police vehicle to

block in the Mercedes and the minivan to prevent both from

leaving.   When each vehicle nevertheless attempted to leave the

parking lot, Zundel ordered them to stop.       The minivan driver

complied, but the Mercedes driver did not.      Zundel drew his

weapon and grabbed the Mercedes’s side door handle, but he was

unable to stop the Mercedes from speeding out of the parking

lot.

       After securing the scene, Zundel talked with the minivan’s

driver, Anthony Thornton.   A consent search of the minivan

yielded approximately twenty bags of heroin.      Thornton later

gave a statement to police revealing that the person whom he met

in the parking lot was known as “Black” and that Thornton had

been purchasing heroin from him for over a year.      Thornton also

provided a physical description of the person who sold him the

drugs that day.

       The police also obtained a statement from a bystander to

the episode in the parking lot.       Jimmy An provided an account of

what he saw, along with a description of the Mercedes driver.

                                  7
    Carullo testified that he joined Zundel in working on the

case and eventually uncovered evidence that pointed to defendant

as the driver of the Mercedes when Zundel encountered it in the

parking lot.   Zundel was asked to view a photograph of

defendant, and based on the photo, Zundel identified defendant

as the Mercedes driver that he observed.

                                  C.

    During the VOP hearing, Detective Carullo was unable to

provide details of the encounter between Zundel and defendant

that led to defendant’s arrest.       Carullo was unable to answer

questions designed to test Zundel’s ability to observe what his

report stated he had witnessed.       Carullo admitted that he was

“going by [Zundel’s] version of events.”       Several times during

his testimony, Carullo’s recollection had to be refreshed.       He

read from Zundel’s report.   He also refreshed his recollection

by reviewing his own report containing information secured from

other third parties.   Specifically, Carullo could not remember

the name of the minivan driver; used Zundel’s police report to

refresh his recollection concerning the description Thornton had

provided of his drug seller; used his own report to refresh his

recollection as to the name of witness Jimmy An; could not

remember whether the Mercedes windows were tinted; and could not

remember what Zundel observed before the minivan arrived.

                                  8
    At the close of the evidence, defense counsel objected to

the State’s use of hearsay, maintaining that the only witness to

testify -- Carullo -- had not been present during the alleged

drug transaction and ensuing events in question.     Counsel stated

that he was denied the opportunity to confront and question “the

person who was actually trying to effect the arrest” about the

events that led to defendant’s new criminal charges.     He argued

that the State had not produced sufficient evidence to carry its

burden of proof on the substantive aspects of defendant’s

probation violation charge.

    Following an adjournment, the State declined to produce

more evidence, arguing that hearsay is admissible in VOP

hearings and that the standard of proof is lower in such

hearings than in a typical criminal trial.     The court agreed.

Although noting that it “appreciate[d] the desire defense might

have to have the actual witness present,” the court stated that

it was not required to follow the rules of evidence in a VOP

hearing.     The court determined that the record contained

sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant violated

probation.    For that violation of probation, the court sentenced

defendant to five years in prison with a two-and-a-half-year

parole disqualifier.

    Defendant appealed, arguing in relevant part that he was

denied due process by the admission and use of hearsay in the

                                   9
VOP hearing.   The Appellate Division rejected the argument and

affirmed in an unpublished opinion.   Stating that a defendant’s

right to confrontation is not absolute, the panel reasoned that

a VOP hearing is not a criminal prosecution and that a trial

court may rely on hearsay evidence so long as it is

“demonstrably reliable.”   The panel determined that Carullo’s

testimony met that standard because he had “actively

investigated defendant’s actions” and had extensive experience

“interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence against those

being investigated.”

    We granted defendant’s petition for certification, “limited

to the issue of the trial court’s acceptance of hearsay

testimony as proof that defendant committed a new offense in

violation of probation.”   
228 N.J. 433 (2016).   We also granted

the motions of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey

(ACLU-NJ) and the Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae.

                                II.

                                A.

    Defendant argues that his state and federal due process

rights were violated by the State’s use of hearsay evidence at

his VOP hearing.   While acknowledging that such hearings are

technically not criminal in nature and do not require the same

procedural demands as a criminal trial, defendant contends that

such hearings still place probationers at risk of incarceration

                                10
and thus require careful procedural protections.     Defendant

contends that those procedural protections have not been

adequately elucidated.   Defendant maintains that Reyes’s

“demonstrably reliable” standard for the use of hearsay evidence

in VOP hearings is vague, unclear, and subject to inconsistent

application.   Defendant asks that we adopt a new test,

incorporating a variety of factors for determining the

admissibility of hearsay evidence in VOP hearings.     In

defendant’s view, any such test should assess the reliability of

the hearsay evidence and, where necessary, critically analyze

the State’s reasons for calling a witness without personal

knowledge of the events in question.

    Further, defendant contends that the hearsay adduced here

is inadmissible under any standard.     Defendant notes that the

prosecutor provided no reason for failing to call Zundel as a

witness.   Defendant asserts that Carullo’s testimony was

unreliable because his recollection had to be refreshed numerous

times and because his testimony was based, in part, on police

reports that he did not prepare.     Defendant thus maintains that

the hearsay relied upon at his VOP hearing was not reliable and

should not have been admitted to substantiate that he committed

the new criminal offenses.

                                B.

                                11
    The State contends that the trial court followed

“longstanding principles of due process” in allowing Carullo’s

hearsay testimony.   The State claims widespread support for the

proposition that hearsay evidence is permissible in VOP hearings

and that such hearings do not afford defendants the same

procedural safeguards as a criminal trial.   Moreover, the State

argues that the evidence adduced here was “sufficiently

reliable,” as required by Reyes, and that the demands of due

process were satisfied.   The State maintains that to hold

otherwise would be inconsistent with both state and federal case

law and would place a heavy and unwarranted burden on the State

to either produce witnesses at VOP hearings or at the very least

explain their absence.

                                C.

    Amicus ACLU-NJ argues that defendants subject to VOP

hearings should receive the protections of the confrontation

clause because such hearings are criminal in nature and thus

entitle defendants to certain procedural safeguards.   ACLU-NJ

emphasizes the grave importance of ensuring that probationers

are not imprisoned erroneously and posits that any burden

imposed upon the State by such additional safeguards is

warranted by the fact that those safeguards will aid in the

truth-seeking process.

                                12
     Alternatively, ACLU-NJ maintains that even under the law as

it currently stands the prosecution must show good cause for

failing to allow a defendant to confront witnesses.     In so

arguing, ACLU-NJ states that we should not allow Reyes’s vague

standard to “eviscerate” a probationer’s right to witness

confrontation.   Turning to the facts at issue here, ACLU-NJ

argues that the State could not provide a sufficient reason to

explain Officer Zundel’s absence.2

                                D.

     The Attorney General, appearing as amicus, argues that VOP

hearings are intended to be flexible and informal proceedings

that provide trial courts with sufficient discretion to

determine the reliability of hearsay evidence.    Like the State,

the Attorney General argues that VOP hearings are not a stage of

criminal prosecution and thus do not provide the same

protections as a criminal trial.     Therefore, the Attorney

General maintains, the current reliability standard does not

violate defendant’s due process rights and there is no reason to

2  ACLU-NJ also argues that the VOP hearing here resulted in
defendant receiving a penalty for the original offense above the
statutory maximum, and in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), because defendant was not entitled under
our law to receive jail credit for time spent serving his
probationary sentence. That argument has not been raised by the
parties. We decline to consider an argument raised for the
first time by an amicus curiae in an appeal. State v. J.R., 
227 N.J. 393, 421 (2017).

                                13
abandon the current rule in favor of a new standard that would

turn VOP proceedings into “mini-trials” and imbue the process

with unnecessary complications and uncertainty.

                                  III.

                                  A.

    We start with some basic concepts governing probation,

which is an authorized sentence under the New Jersey Criminal

Code.   
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2).

    When imposing a sentence of probation, the sentencing court

is empowered to incorporate, among other things, “such

reasonable conditions . . . as [the court] deems necessary to

insure that [the defendant] will lead a law-abiding life or is

likely to assist him to do so.”     
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(a).    An

acknowledged “standard condition” of probation is that the

probationer not commit another offense.       State v. Wilkins, 
230 N.J. Super. 261, 263 (App. Div. 1989) (recognizing that

condition as inherent part of any probationary sentence

authorized under Criminal Code).       Defendant was subject to that

standard condition.   A probationer’s commission of a new offense

can support a finding of “failure 'to comply with a substantial

requirement imposed as a condition of probation’” and provide

grounds for the revocation of probation.       Ibid. (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4)); cf. State v. Wasserman, 
75 N.J. Super.
 480, 484-85 (App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 
39 N.J. 516 (1963)

                                  14
(recognizing, pre-Code, that proof of commission of new offense

is basis for revocation of probation).

    Provisions governing probation violation proceedings are

set forth in the Criminal Code.    
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3 addresses the

summons or arrest of a defendant who is serving a period of

probation, a defendant’s commitment to custody pending a

violation hearing, and the revocation of probation and

resentencing of a defendant.   More specifically, the statute

provides that

         [a]t any time before the discharge of the
         defendant or the termination of the period of
         . . . probation:

         . . . .

            (2) A probation officer or peace officer,
            upon request of the chief probation officer
            or otherwise having probable cause to
            believe that the defendant has failed to
            comply with a requirement imposed as a
            condition of the order or that he has
            committed another offense, may arrest him
            without a warrant.

         [N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(2).]

When a probationer has been apprehended, the court conducts a

preliminary hearing.   
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(3).   If the court

finds “probable cause to believe that the defendant has

committed another offense or if he has been held to answer

therefor,” the court may hold the defendant “without bail

                                  15
pending a determination of the charge by the court having

jurisdiction thereof.”   Ibid.

     In terms of next steps, when a probationer is charged with

committing a new criminal offense, he can be held pending a

disposition on the new criminal charge and thereafter be subject

to a probation violation hearing after a conviction.    See

N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(3) and (4).    Or, the State may proceed with

a probation violation hearing based on failure to comply with

the condition requiring that the probationer lead a law-abiding

life, notwithstanding that a conviction on the new criminal

charge has not yet occurred.     Wilkins, 
230 N.J. Super. at 264.

The recognized “'preferable’ procedure” is to delay substantive

action on the probation violation until after the criminal

conviction is secured.   Ibid. (quoting 2 The New Jersey Penal

Code:   Commentary 347 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971).

     Ultimately, the court has the ability to revoke probation.

          The court, if satisfied that the defendant has
          inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial
          requirement imposed as a condition of the order
          or if he has been convicted of another offense,
          may revoke the . . . probation and sentence or
          resentence the defendant, as provided in this
          section.

          [
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4) (emphasis added).]

If the court revokes probation, “it may impose on the defendant

any sentence that might have been imposed originally for the

offense of which he was convicted.”     
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(b).   In

                                  16
addition, the court may add to or modify the conditions of

probation, even when not revoking probation.     
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4.

    In respect of process, the Code requires that a defendant

receive notice of the nature of the VOP charges and the

opportunity for a hearing.   Ibid. (requiring, for probation

revocation or modification, “a hearing upon written notice to

the defendant of the grounds on which such action is proposed”).

The State bears the burden of proving the charges by a

preponderance of the evidence.   Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 137.

Importantly, at the VOP hearing, a defendant has the specific

rights “to hear and controvert the evidence against him, to

offer evidence in his defense, and to be represented by

counsel.”   
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4.

                                 B.

                                 1.

    In addition to the statutory procedural protections

conferred by the Code, a probationer in a VOP proceeding has the

overlay of the protections of due process.     The United States

Supreme Court firmly established those protections in Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973).   Although the Court noted

in Gagnon that the revocation of probation occurs after

sentencing is completed and is not “part of the criminal

prosecution,” it recognized that the potential for the loss of

                                 17
liberty represents “a serious deprivation” for the probationer,

requiring due process of law.   Id. at 781-82.

    The Supreme Court determined that, for VOP hearings,

federal due process concerns are satisfied by informal

proceedings that meet basic conditions previously prescribed for

parole violation hearings.   Id. at 782 (“[A] probationer . . .

is entitled to a . . . hearing, under the conditions specified

in Morrissey v. Brewer” for parole violations); Morrissey v.

Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (“What is needed is an informal

hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole

violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise

of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the

parolee’s behavior.”).   Under the Morrissey construct, the

minimal process required must include

         (a) written notice of the claimed violations
         of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of
         evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be
         heard in person and to present witnesses and
         documentary evidence; (d) the right to
         confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
         (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
         good cause for not allowing confrontation);
         (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such
         as a traditional parole board, members of
         which need not be judicial officers or
         lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
         factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
         reasons for revoking parole.

         [Morrissey, 
408 U.S.  at 489 (emphasis added).]

                                18
    Despite listing requirements, Morrissey also allows room

for accommodation in the proceedings, stating that “the process

should be flexible enough to consider evidence including

letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be

admissible in an adversary criminal trial.”     Ibid.   Similarly,

in Gagnon, the Court spoke approvingly of the conventional use,

where appropriate, of substitutes for live testimony in VOP

hearings, due to prosecutorial concerns were government to be

burdened with an obligation to proceed only through live

witnesses.   
411 U.S.  at 782 n.5.    The Court nevertheless

insisted on reliable evidence, as due process requires, to prove

a charge, adding the reminder that “in some cases there is

simply no adequate alternative to live testimony.”      Ibid.

                                2.

    Similar to federal law on the issue, New Jersey courts have

viewed VOP hearings as “a part of the corrections process”

rather than an element of a criminal prosecution.       Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 134.   Our approach has generally been to follow

federal constitutional due process requirements in this area.

Id. at 134-35 (noting that stricter state constitutional demands

have not been imposed by our courts, except that New Jersey’s

probation statute, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4, incorporates additional

right to representation by counsel).

                                19
       In Reyes, the Appellate Division explored the State’s use

of hearsay evidence to prove a VOP.       Id. at 139.   The defendant

had been sentenced to a probationary term with the condition

that he complete an eighteen-month residential drug program;

however, he was discharged after four months and then failed to

report to his probation officer.       Id. at 132.   At the VOP

hearing, the State presented the testimony of a probation

officer, who was not the defendant’s probation officer, because

defendant’s probation officer was on sick leave at the time of

the VOP hearing.    Id. at 133.

       The Appellate Division declared “[t]he admission and

consideration of reliable hearsay evidence in probation

violation proceedings [to be] both fair and practical.”           Id. at

139.    The panel reached that conclusion for the sensible reason

that “[t]he production of witnesses to geographically remote but

material events which may not be contested would be inconvenient

and wastefully expensive.”    Ibid.    Thus, the panel recognized

that it was unproductive and perhaps unnecessary to insist that

the State could not proceed initially with hearsay evidence, and

it instructed that the State could supplement its proofs as

necessary when the probationer contests the State’s proofs.

Ibid.   The panel explained its accommodation as a “fair balance

of the probationer’s rights with the interest of the public.”

Ibid.

                                  20
    Substantively, the panel found the State’s evidence in

Reyes to be reliable in part because the defendant essentially

offered no evidence to dispute the State’s proofs that he had

violated the terms of probation.     Id. at 140.   Reyes did not

raise a factual dispute as to the claim that he had left the

residential drug program prematurely, and the panel refused to

impose on the State the burden of “negativing excusability.”

Id. at 139-40.   Rather, the Appellate Division determined that

the State had sufficiently proved, through “reliable hearsay

evidence, defendant’s discharge from the program.”     Ibid.   The

panel explained in detail why the evidence presented was

sufficient:

         If there was a dispute whether defendant had
         really been discharged, whether defendant
         actually   behaved    as   the   program   staff
         reported, whether discharge was a reasonable
         response, or whether defendant’s conduct was
         excusable, it was up to defendant to create
         that dispute by eliciting evidence to that
         effect on cross-examination or by offering
         such evidence. His failure to do so created
         the reasonable and lawful inference that no
         such dispute existed. That inference, coupled
         with   the   reliable    hearsay   proofs,   was
         sufficient     basis     for   [the     judge’s]
         determination that a violation of probation
         had occurred.

         [Ibid.]

The panel succinctly summed up its holding, stating “[t]here is

no constitutional bar to admission and consideration of

demonstrably reliable hearsay evidence, but a finding of

                                21
violation may not be bottomed on unreliable evidence.”        Id. at

138 (citing United States v. McCallum, 
677 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th

Cir. 1982) (other citations omitted)).

    Following that comprehensive analysis of the law and

explication of its application to Reyes’s circumstances, no

other published decisions in this State have elaborated on the

use of hearsay in VOP hearings and, as noted earlier, this Court

has not spoken on the issue.

                                 IV.

                                 A.

    Defendant presently claims his due process rights under the

Federal and State Constitutions were violated by the State’s use

of hearsay in his VOP hearing.   U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J.

Const. art. I, ¶ 1.   As a broad statement of rights, it is

incorrect that the use of hearsay in VOP proceedings is a per se

violation of defendant’s due process rights.      To the extent this

Court has not expressly stated that principle, we do so now.

    Under Gagnon, federal due process rights permit flexibility

in the use of substitutes for live testimony in probation

violation hearings.   
411 U.S.  at 782 n.5.     And, as the Reyes

panel concluded in 1986, state constitutional due process

requirements had not been more strictly construed in the VOP

setting.   
207 N.J. Super. at 135.     Nor have they since.   Indeed,

the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, updated since Reyes was

                                 22
decided, are not applicable to VOP hearings.   See N.J.R.E.

101(a)(2)(C); 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment on N.J.R.E.

101 (stating that rules of evidence do not apply in probation

proceedings).

    That said, the decision in Reyes does not suggest, in its

letter or spirit, that hearsay could be used, wholesale, as

proof of a VOP under any set of circumstances.   Any such

understanding of the Reyes opinion does it injustice.   Reyes

allows for flexibility for the State but is ever mindful of the

need for sufficient reliable evidence to prove the factual

underpinnings to a charged violation.   The decision emphasizes

the obligation of a court to be fair and balanced to the rights

of the defendant to have due process, which includes the right

to be proven guilty by reliable evidence and to confront the

evidence advanced against him.   The decision also strives to

avoid placing wasteful, unnecessary obligations on the State if

it can prove its case through hearsay and other non-live

evidence, including the supplementation of the record through

cross-examination or additional witnesses on leave granted.

Also, the use of inferences can fill evidential obligations

where supported by the record, as Reyes explained.

    Overall, the framework that was established in Reyes was

and remains sound.   In the years that have ensued since Reyes

issued, appellate courts in numerous other jurisdictions have

                                 23
addressed the use of hearsay in VOP hearings.   In their own

ways, those courts have sought to offer guidance to trial courts

on when hearsay may be relied upon to support a VOP charge while

balancing the rights of the defendant in such a proceeding.    The

starting premise, however, is that hearsay generally is

admissible in VOP hearings.   The devil is in the detail of

avoiding trenching on the due process confrontation rights of a

defendant.

                                B.

    With respect to state courts that consider the question,

the overwhelming majority allow the admission of hearsay so long

as the hearsay is determined to be reliable.    See, e.g., State

v. Stotts, 
695 P.2d 1110, 1119-20 (Ariz. 1985); State v.

Giovanni P., 
110 A.3d 442, 447-48 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015); Reyes

v. State, 
868 N.E.2d 438, 441-42 (Ind. 2007); State v. Graham,

30 P.3d 310, 313 (Kan. 2001); Bailey v. State, 
612 A.2d 288,

292-93 (Md. 1992); State v. Guthrie, 
257 P.3d 904, 914-15 (N.M.

2011).   The reliability of the evidence to support the VOP

charge satisfies due process concerns in such states.

    In addition to examining for reliability, a number of

states also require a specific showing of good cause by the

prosecution to explain the failure to call a witness and instead

offer hearsay evidence.   See State v. Marrapese, 
409 A.2d 544,

548-49 (R.I. 1979) (construing State v. DeRoche, 
389 A.2d 1229

                                24
(R.I. 1978)); State v. Brown, 
600 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (W. Va.

2004).    In such circumstances, the explanation can be

incorporated into the examination for reliability when

determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the VOP

charge.

    In the federal sphere, a form of balancing test is utilized

for determining the admission of hearsay evidence in VOP

proceedings.   In the seminal case of United States v. Bell, 
785 F.2d 640, 642–43 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit established

a balancing test for reconciling a probationer’s confrontation

rights under Morrissey with the government’s reasons for not

providing an opportunity for confrontation:

           As is true of any balancing test, it is not
           possible to articulate fixed rules on what the
           government must show to establish “good cause”
           in every case.    However, there are several
           factors which should be evaluated in examining
           the basis cited by the government for
           dispensing with confrontation.

           First, the court should assess the explanation
           the government offers of why confrontation is
           undesirable or impractical. For example, the
           government might contend that live testimony
           would pose a danger of physical harm to a
           government informant, see Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1244 (2d Cir. 1972), or, as
           suggested by Gagnon, that procuring live
           witnesses would be difficult or expensive.

           A second factor that must be considered, and
           one that has been focused upon by a number of
           courts, is the reliability of the evidence
           which the government offers in place of live
           testimony.    See, e.g., United States v.

                                 25
         Burkhalter, 
588 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1978);
         United States v. McCallum, 
677 F.2d 1024,
         1026–27 (4th Cir. [1982]).    Thus, where the
         government demonstrates that the burden of
         producing live testimony would be inordinate
         and offers in its place hearsay evidence that
         is demonstrably reliable, it has made a strong
         showing of good cause. Where, on the other
         hand, the government neither shows that
         presenting    live    testimony    would    be
         unreasonably burdensome nor offers hearsay
         evidence that bears indicia of reliability,
         the probationer is entitled to confrontation.

         [Ibid. (footnote omitted).]

    Following Bell’s lead, other federal courts began adopting

a balancing-test approach.   United States v. Chin, 
224 F.3d 121,

124 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 
117 F.3d 417, 420

(9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Grandlund, 
71 F.3d 507, 510

(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Frazier, 
26 F.3d 110, 114

(11th Cir. 1994).

    Of particular note is the Ninth Circuit’s enunciation of

the proper balancing in Walker.    Walker instructs trial courts

to consider several factors when balancing interests in

connection with the use of hearsay at a VOP hearing:    (1) “the

importance of the evidence to the court’s finding”; (2) “the

[probationer’s] opportunity to refute the evidence”; (3) “the

consequences [for the probationer] of the court’s finding”; (4)

“the 'difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses’”; and (5)

“the 'traditional indicia of reliability borne by the

evidence.’”   117 F.3d    at 420 (quoting United States v. Martin,

                                  26

984 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1993)).     We add that Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) was amended in 2002 to impose a

balancing of interests.     Under the rule as currently

constructed, a federal defendant facing a revocation of

probation “is entitled to,” among other things, “an opportunity

to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness

unless the court determines that the interest of justice does

not require the witness to appear.”     That 2002 amendment

incorporated the balancing approach that circuit courts had

begun to follow.   See generally United States v. Jones, 
818 F.3d 1091, 1098-1100 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing development of law

and significance of Rule amendment).     Presently all circuit

courts of appeals but the Sixth Circuit have expressly adopted a

balancing-test approach.3

     Several state jurisdictions now follow a balancing approach

akin to the one initially expressed in Bell or as otherwise

updated.   See State v. Wibbens, 
243 P.3d 790, 792-93 (Or. Ct.

App. 2010) (applying balancing test adopted by Ninth Circuit);

3  See Jones, 818 F.3d    at 1099; United States v. Jordan, 
742 F.3d 276, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Doswell, 
670 F.3d 526, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lloyd, 
566 F.3d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Stanfield, 
360 F.3d 1346, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Taveras, 
380 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2004); Chin, 224 F.3d    at 124; Walker, 117 F.3d    at 420; Grandlund, 71 F.3d    at 510; Frazier, 26 F.3d    at 114.

                                  27
State v. Beck, 
619 N.W.2d 247, 250-52 (S.D. 2000); State v.

Austin, 
685 A.2d 1076, 1081 (Vt. 1996).

                                  C.

    Although we adhere to the use of hearsay at VOP hearings,

we endorse a balancing approach that includes assessment of the

reasons for the government’s proceeding through the use of

hearsay in addition to testing the evidence’s reliability.

Merely because the rules of evidence are inapplicable to VOP

hearings does not control whether due process would be violated

by the court’s acceptance and reliance on unreliable evidence to

sustain a VOP charge.    The evidence to support the VOP charge

must be reliable to meet due process concerns, and the reason

for relying on hearsay informs the decision on the evidence’s

overall reliability.    Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 139 (noting that

court’s decision as to when to admit hearsay evidence should

“represent[] a fair balance of the probationer’s rights with the

interest of the public”).

    We conclude that the Walker factors provide a helpful

refinement of the guidance already existing in New Jersey from

the Reyes decision.     See id. at 138 (noting that right to

confrontation is “one element among several to be considered and

weighed by the hearing body”).    The Walker factors that we adopt

to guide trial courts bear repeating:     (1) “the importance of

the evidence to the court’s finding”; (2) “the [probationer’s]

                                  28
opportunity to refute the evidence”; (3) “the consequences [for

the probationer] of the court’s finding”; (4) “the 'difficulty

and expense of procuring witnesses’”; and (5) “the 'traditional

indicia of reliability borne by the evidence.’”     117 F.3d    at 420

(quoting Martin, 984 F.2d at 312).     Each factor can assist the

trial court in analyzing the reliability of the hearsay being

offered by the State and the fairness of its use.     And, in the

context of what is or is not being contested by the defendant,

the court should explain its reasons for determining that the

hearsay evidence is reliable for its stated purposes.

                                 D.

    Applying those considerations to the case at hand, we

conclude that the State deprived defendant of an important due

process confrontation right at the VOP hearing.

    The State charged defendant with violating probation by

committing another criminal offense.    While normally that type

of VOP charge is demonstrated through the submission of proof of

a criminal conviction, the State here opted to proceed first

with the VOP charge.   It was incumbent on the State then to

prove the new criminal charge.   See Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at
 138 (“In violation hearings, the circumstances control the

admission and consideration of offered evidence.”).

    Defendant’s ability to defend against the new criminal

charges, which were the premise for the VOP charge, was

                                 29
undermined because the State deprived defendant of the

opportunity to confront and cross-examine Zundel, or anyone

else, who saw the events transpire.    Defendant was prevented

from questioning the key observer -- Zundel -- on what he could

or could not see, or see well, on the day of the events in the

parking lot.   See ibid. (“In some situations, there is no

adequate alternative to live testimony.”).     The State instead

proceeded with Carullo’s hearsay testimony about what Zundel

reported he observed on the day of the events in the parking lot

instead of producing Zundel himself.   A police report by Zundel,

prepared in the context of an investigation and recounting

subjective events in a narrative form, is not a document that

fits into any exception to the hearsay rule.    State v.

Kuropchak, 
221 N.J. 368, 388-89 (2015) (holding that DWI reports

containing narrative accounts by police officer are inadmissible

hearsay).   The hearsay evidence that the court accepted from

Carullo was not reliable to prove the underlying new criminal

charges that were the basis for defendant’s VOP charge.      The

consequences of the court’s determination to treat the evidence

as reliable in this context were substantial for defendant.

    The State did not even explain why Zundel was not available

on that hearing day, or on an adjourned day, as Reyes

contemplates when a factual matter, which is first presented

through the production of hearsay, is disputed by a defendant.

                                30
See Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. at 139 (noting that State may seek

adjournment to supplement its proofs where hearsay evidence is

contested).   By declining to call any witness other than

Carullo, the State prevented defendant from being able to

confront the quality of the evidence against him.     We hold that

defendant was denied a hearing that met due process

requirements.

    In this case, for the reasons expressed, we are constrained

to conclude that the use of hearsay evidence to sustain the VOP

charge against defendant was error.

                                V.

    We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division that

affirmed defendant’s VOP charge.

     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, SOLOMON, AND TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion concurring in the
judgment.

                                31
                                        SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                          A-
24 September Term 2016
                                                   078369

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

           v.

NOAH MOSLEY, a/k/a NUBEE
OUTUUQCIO, NUBEE
BUCKUOUTUUQCIO and NOAH
MOSELEY,

    Defendant-Appellant.

    JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring.

    I join the majority in concluding that the unadulterated

use of hearsay denied defendant his right to a fair probation

revocation hearing.    I also concur in its analysis that

defendant was denied the opportunity to confront the critical

witness in this case.    The State essentially tried defendant on

a newly charged criminal offense as a violation of probation --

without the burden of satisfying a higher standard of proof or

complying with the Rules of Evidence.    Defendant had a

substantial liberty interest in a fair probation revocation

hearing.   Here, the trial court, which found a probation

violation, sentenced defendant to a five-year prison term with a

two-and-a-half year parole disqualifier on the underlying

offense.

                                  1
    Unlike the majority, I believe that the Rules of Evidence

should apply in probation revocation hearings in the absence of

a good-cause showing for the relaxation of those rules.     The

Rules of Evidence are an instructional guide -- developed over

generations -- for the admission of reliable and trustworthy

evidence.   We apply those rules in garden-variety, slip-and-fall

personal injury cases in the Civil Part and in minor contractual

dispute cases tried in the Special Civil Part because the

reliability of the outcome matters to the parties.    A defendant

facing a long prison term has as great an interest in the

reliability of the fact-findings in a probation revocation

hearing.

    Procedural protections that protect the substantial liberty

interests of the accused should prevail over claims of

efficiency.   When the stakes are at their highest, our tolerance

for fact-finding errors should be at its lowest.     In those

circumstances, procedural safeguards, such as those embodied in

the Rules of Evidence, are of the utmost importance.     This Court

has not hesitated to impose additional procedural safeguards --

above the minimal requirements imposed by due process -- when a

person’s freedom hangs in the balance.   See, e.g., State v.

Delgado, 
188 N.J. 48, 63-64 & n.9 (2006) (requiring police to

maintain written records documenting out-of-court

identifications to ensure reliability of identification

                                 2
procedure); Pasqua v. Council, 
186 N.J. 127, 146 (2006) (holding

that, to ensure integrity of fact-finding hearing, right to

counsel attaches to indigent parents facing incarceration for

failure to pay child support).

    How our jurisprudence has addressed this subject in the

past should be the beginning, not the end, of the analysis.     In

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court set forth

the minimal due process requirements for conducting a probation

revocation hearing.   
411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973).   The majority

understandably turns to Gagnon for guidance.    The Supreme Court

in Gagnon, however, presumed that probation officers, not

prosecutors, would present the case against a defendant on a

probation violation charge, id. at 783-85, 789, and did not find

that the defendant had an absolute right to counsel at such

hearings, id. at 790.   Probation violation hearings are much

different today from when Gagnon was decided more than four

decades ago.

    I do not believe that we need a different set of evidence

rules for probation violation hearings.    Our judges need no

instruction on the application of our Rules of Evidence.     The

rules adopted by the majority, although an improvement, I fear

will lead to inconsistent results because those rules are more

pliable and unfamiliar to our judges.     See Pasqua, 
186 N.J. at
 139-40.

                                 3
    I would apply our evidence rules to probation violation

hearings, but I would make some common-sense accommodations

given the nature of those proceedings.    One approach is a notice

and demand procedure.    For example, if a non-critical witness is

unavailable, the prosecutor could give notice of its intent to

call a substitute witness and demand to know if the defendant

intends to challenge the substitute’s testimony.   If there is no

challenge, the issue is resolved.    See State v. Wilson, 
227 N.J.
 534, 538-39, 553-54 (2017) (authorizing notice and demand

procedure for admission of map in drug-free-zone case); State v.

Simbara, 
175 N.J. 37, 43 (2002) (noting statutory notice and

demand procedure for admission of laboratory reports in drug

cases).   In many cases, a probation officer’s records will

satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule in

the event the officer is unavailable.    See State v. Reyes, 
207 N.J. Super. 126, 138-39 (App. Div. 1986) (noting that probation

reports may be admissible as business reports (citing Prellwitz

v. Berg, 
578 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1978))).    In other

instances, on a showing of good cause by the State, I would

allow the relaxation of the Rules of Evidence “to admit relevant

and trustworthy evidence in the interest of justice.”    See

N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2).

    In short, the default position should be the application of

the Rules of Evidence.   If the State seeks relaxation of the

                                 4
evidence rules for good cause, then the balancing test set forth

in United States v. Walker, 
117 F.3d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1997),

relied on by the majority, ante at ___ (slip op. at 26-29),

would be useful for deciding whether hearsay -- otherwise

inadmissible under our Rules of Evidence -- should be allowed in

a probation revocation hearing.

    For the reasons expressed, I concur in the judgment reached

by the majority, but not in the evidential standard to be

applied going forward.

                                  5