Case Title: Julia Cole v. Yvonne L. Hubanks

Citation: 2004 WI 74

Docket Number: 2002AP001416

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 74 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1416 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Julia Cole,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
City of Milwaukee,  
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Yvonne L. Hubanks, Aubrey Hubanks, and  
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 11, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William J. Haese   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Jonathan 
Cermele, Laurie Eggert, Rachel L. Schneider and Eggert & 
Cermele, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jonathan Cermele. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Janet 
E. Cain and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Janet E. Cain. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John F. Fuchs, 
Catherine 
A. 
Goodman 
and 
Fuchs 
DeStefanis 
Boyle, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of The Milwaukee Police Association and 
Police Officers Defense Fund, and there was oral argument by 
John F. Fuchs. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael T. Leibig, and  
Zwerdling, Paul, Leibig, Kahn & Wolly, P.C., Alexandria, VA, and 
Richard A. Frederick, Milwaukee, on behalf of International 
Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, and National Association 
of Police Organizations. 
 
 
2004 WI 74 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1416  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 7770) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julia Cole,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
City of Milwaukee,  
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Yvonne L. Hubanks, Aubrey Hubanks, and  
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, William J. Haese, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   Police Officer Julia Cole 
appeals a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judgment that granted 
Aubrey and Yvonne Hubanks and their insurer, American Family 
Mutual Insurance Company, summary judgment, dismissing her 
personal injury claims against the Hubanks.  This case is before 
us on certification of the following question: 
No. 
02-1416   
 
2 
 
Whether Wisconsin's "firefighters rule,"1 that is based 
on public policy limitations on liability, should be 
extended to police officers to bar an officer from 
suing dog owners for injuries the officer received 
while capturing the dog. 
¶2 
We conclude that public policy reasons do not support 
extending the firefighters rule to police officers.  Therefore, 
Cole may sue for injuries she received allegedly because of the 
Hubanks' dog's attack that occurred during the course of Cole's 
duties as a police officer.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment and remand for further proceedings.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Police Officer Julia Cole was on patrol in the City of 
Milwaukee when she came upon a large dog wandering in the 
street.  The dog still had a chain attached to its collar.  Cole 
grasped the loose end of the chain and began calling the dog 
toward her.  She knelt down as the dog, an Akita estimated to 
weigh between 85 and 90 pounds, approached her.  Without any 
prior indication of viciousness, the dog lunged at her, knocked 
her over and bit her on the face and neck.  She was able to 
wrest the dog off of her, but 30 stitches were required to close 
her wounds. 
¶4 
Cole brought suit against Aubrey and Yvonne Hubanks, 
the owners of the dog, and their insurance company, American 
Family, alleging that the Hubanks:  (1) negligently cared for 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin first employed what has become known as the 
"firefighters rule" in Hass v. Chicago & North Western Railway 
Company, 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).  Hass precluded 
liability to firefighters in very limited circumstances.  Id. at 
327. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
3 
 
and restrained the dog; (2) harbored a dangerous animal; (3) 
failed to warn the public of the dangerous nature of the dog; 
and (4) violated Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (2001-02),2 all causing her 
injury.  The Hubanks moved for summary judgment, contending that 
the firefighters rule precluded liability.  The circuit court 
agreed and dismissed Cole's claims.  Cole appealed, and we 
accepted certification.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶5 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
Hubanks because it concluded they could not be liable to Cole, 
as a matter of law.  We review summary judgments de novo, using 
the same method as the circuit court.  Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 
Wis. 2d 124, 135, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999).  In dismissing Cole's 
claims, the circuit court relied on Hass v. Chicago & North 
Western Railway Company, 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970), 
that held that public policy factors preclude liability to a 
firefighter in limited circumstances.  Whether public policy 
factors are a limitation on liability is a question of law, on 
which we owe no deference to the circuit court.  Beacon Bowl, 
Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 761, 501 
N.W.2d 788 (1993).  And finally, whether a statute that provides 
for strict liability is also subject to public policy factors is 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
4 
 
a question of law we decide de novo.  See State v. Stoehr, 134 
Wis. 2d 66, 76, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986).  
B. 
Firefighters Rule 
¶6 
The firefighters rule developed in Illinois more than 
100 years ago, in the landmark case of Gibson v. Leonard, 32 
N.E. 182 (Ill. 1892).  Gibson was based on premises liability, 
wherein a firefighter was classified as a licensee to whom the 
property owner owed no duty other than to "refrain from willful 
or affirmative acts which are injurious."  Id. at 183.  Many 
other jurisdictions have adopted the firefighters rule, some 
based on assumption of risk3 or public policy concerns,4 as well 
as on premises liability.5  
¶7 
We first adopted the firefighters rule in 1970 in 
Hass.  Our rule was based solely on public policy grounds and 
was very narrowly drawn.  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 326-27.  When we 
employ public policy factors to preclude a claim for relief, we 
assume there is negligence and that the negligence was a cause 
of the injury, but for reasons of public policy, we prevent the 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Hack v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Ohio 
1996); Sobanski v. Donahue, 792 A.2d 57, 59-60 (R.I. 2002); 
Martin v. Gaither, 466 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ga. App. 1995); 
Carpenter v. O'Day, 562 A.2d 595, 600 (Del. Super. 1988). 
4 See, e.g., Winn v. Frasher, 777 P.2d 722, 725 (Idaho 
1989); Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa 1984); 
Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. P'ship, 520 A.2d 361, 368 
(Md. 1987); Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 415 
N.W.2d 178, 186 (Mich. 1987). 
5 See, e.g., Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182, 183-84 (Ill. 
1892); Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 548 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1989). 
No. 
02-1416   
 
5 
 
claim from proceeding.  See Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 198 Wis. 2d 450, 460, 543 N.W.2d 282 (1996). 
¶8 
We have identified six public policy considerations 
that the courts of Wisconsin use to limit liability:   
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or 
(2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm; or 
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tortfeasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance for recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 141 Wis. 2d 804, 817-
18, 
416 
N.W.2d 
906 
(Ct. 
App. 
1987) 
(citing 
Morgan 
v. 
Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660 
(1979)).  A determination that any one of the factors applies to 
the case at hand is sufficient to preclude liability.  Flint v. 
O'Connell, 2002 WI App 112, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 772, 648 N.W.2d 7.  
Generally, the application of public policy factors proceeds on 
a case-by-case basis because claim-specific facts are often 
relevant to the analysis.  Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
183 Wis. 2d 627, 660, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).   
¶9 
In Hass, where we precluded a firefighter's claims 
against a person who negligently started a fire for injuries 
Hass sustained in fighting the fire, we employed the fourth6 and 
                                                 
6 Recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the 
negligent tortfeasor. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
6 
 
sixth7 public policy factors.  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 327.  We 
explained that nearly all fires are started by negligence.  
However, to subject a landowner or occupier to liability for 
such negligence would "place too great a burden" on landowners 
and 
occupiers, 
who 
should 
summon 
the 
help 
necessary 
to 
extinguish the blaze and prevent its spread to neighboring 
buildings and property.  Id.  Our concern focused on a greater 
good to be protected:  promoting conduct that would lead to 
extinguishing a fire before it could spread.  However, our 
relief from liability was very narrowly drawn.  We explained 
that while we were precluding liability for one who negligently 
starts a fire and the fire causes injury to a firefighter from 
fighting the fire, we were not "hold[ing] a landowner under no 
circumstances must respond in damages for his negligence which 
caused injury to a firefighter upon the premises."  Id.  We 
cautioned that, "We do not by this decision venture into other 
areas of negligence where liability is based upon something more 
than the negligent starting of a fire."  Id.  Liability based 
upon "something more" became the issue in the next firefighter's 
case. 
¶10 In Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis. 2d 292, 249 N.W.2d 567 
(1977), Clark, a fireman, was injured fighting a fire when he 
became trapped in Corby's basement bedroom, built contrary to 
building code.  Id. at 299.  He sued, alleging negligence in 
                                                 
7 Recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just 
stopping point. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
7 
 
starting the fire, negligence in failing to warn of hidden 
hazards and negligence in building a basement bedroom that did 
not conform to the building code.  Id. at 293-94.  We concluded 
that Hass controlled on Clark's claim of negligence in starting 
the fire; however, we also concluded that the landowner had a 
duty to warn firefighters when:  (1) there is a hidden hazard 
(that we defined as "a concealed danger that foreseeably created 
an unreasonable risk to others"); (2) the hidden hazard or 
danger is known to the landowner, but (3) is not known to or 
observable by the firefighter; and (4) there is a "clear 
opportunity" for the landowner to provide a warning.  Id. at 
298.  We noted that public policy concerns did not preclude 
liability for the failure to warn of hidden hazards because a 
warning would prevent exposure of firefighters to unnecessary 
risks.  Id.  We also explained that Corby's violation of the 
building code may subject him to liability if Clark can show at 
trial that firefighters are within the class of persons the 
ordinance was created to protect.  Id. at 300. 
¶11 The next firefighter's case distinguished Clark and 
limited it to its facts by explaining that the duty of a 
landowner is not solely to warn of hidden hazards, but also to 
warn of any hazard of which the landowner is aware.  Wright v. 
Coleman, 148 Wis. 2d 897, 909, 436 N.W.2d 864 (1989).  In 
Wright, the firefighter was injured on a patch of ice on the 
homeowner's driveway caused by the homeowner's son washing a 
car.  Id. at 900.  We concluded that Coleman had a duty of 
ordinary care "under the circumstances" and that duty included 
No. 
02-1416   
 
8 
 
warning of the ice on the driveway.  Id. at 898.  And, although 
we noted that at times public policy factors preclude liability, 
we concluded, without discussion, that none were relevant to 
Wright's claims.  Id. at 908.   
¶12 We next limited the class of persons who could raise 
the public policy shield underlying the firefighters rule when 
we concluded that a manufacturer of a defective product could 
not employ it to obviate liability for the explosion of a 
defective product that injured a firefighter.  Hauboldt v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 160 Wis. 2d 662, 467 N.W.2d 508 (1991).  We 
reasoned that the policies underlying the firefighters rule 
would not be furthered by limiting liability for manufacturers 
of defective products.  Id. at 675.  For example, the burden on 
the manufacturer would not be increased by permitting liability 
for personal injuries that resulted from the explosion of a 
defective product, over the burden a manufacturer already has 
for injuries caused by its defective products.  Id. at 675-76.  
We explained that "public policy demands that responsibility be 
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to 
life and health inherent in defective products that reach the 
market."  Id. at 677 (citations omitted).  We concluded that 
Union Carbide was in a better position than a firefighter to 
effect changes that would benefit society.  Id.     
¶13 We recently examined whether public policy precludes 
liability to an emergency medical technician (EMT) who injured 
his back as a result of an awkward position he maintained in 
order to safely extract an injured passenger from one of the 
No. 
02-1416   
 
9 
 
autos involved in an accident.  Pinter v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2000 WI 75, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 137, 613 N.W.2d 110.  
Pinter sued the drivers for their negligence in bringing about 
the accident.  Id., ¶9.  Although Pinter directed our attention 
to contrary decisions from other jurisdictions,8 id., ¶34, we 
affirmed the public policy underpinnings that supported Hass and 
denied liability.  Id., ¶47.  We reasoned that, as in Hass, 
permitting an EMT to sue for injuries he received when aiding a 
person injured in a car accident would place too unreasonable a 
burden on drivers who negligently cause accidents.  Id.  
Underlying our decision was the concern that burdening the 
negligent party with liability could deter him from summoning 
necessary aid and that could have a detrimental effect on all 
who use Wisconsin's highways.  We also reasoned that allowing 
Pinter to proceed for his injuries based on the negligence that 
                                                 
8 There has been movement in other jurisdictions, both at 
the time of Pinter v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
2000 WI 75, 236 Wis. 2d 137, 613 N.W.2d 110, and since, to 
abolish or significantly limit the firefighters rule.  See id., 
¶34 ns. 7, 8.  See also Holmes v. Adams Marine Ctr., 2000 Me. 
Super. Lexis 162 at *7 (stating that adopting the firefighters 
rule would not be logical and that "formulation of such a broad 
exclusion to a common-law cause of action" should be left to the 
legislature); Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 790 N.E.2d 772, 775 
(N.Y. 2003) (stating that previous cases that have applied the 
rule have been superceded as "the legislative response has been 
clear, consistent and undoubtedly in the direction of doing away 
with the firefighter's rule"); Minnich v. Med-Waste, Inc., 564 
S.E.2d 
98 
(S.C. 
2002) 
(finding 
the 
rule 
"riddled 
with 
exceptions," often criticized, and not part of that state's 
common law); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-21 (West 2003) (effective 
1994, granting right of recovery even for negligent conduct); 
Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-226 (requiring an ordinary duty of care).   
No. 
02-1416   
 
10 
 
caused the accident to occur would enter a field with no 
sensible or just stopping point and that his injury was too 
remote from the negligence that caused the accident.  Id.  And 
finally, we emphasized "the only negligence Pinter complains of 
is the same negligence that caused the initial emergency and 
resulted in rescue personnel being called to the scene."  Id., 
¶50.  
C. 
The Certified Question 
¶14 Cole sued the Hubanks under theories of common law 
negligence 
and 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
dog 
owner's 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02, all based on dog bites she sustained from 
the Hubanks' dog that was running at large.  She argues that we 
have repeatedly limited the firefighters rule, applying it to 
Pinter as an EMT to further the public good of promptly 
reporting accidents.  She also argues that both firefighters and 
EMTs 
have 
specialized 
training 
and 
experience 
in 
rescue 
operations, whereas police officers do not.  She contends that 
extending the rule to police officers could have the unintended 
consequence of extending it to a variety of public and private 
sector employees who are trained to provide aid and to confront 
danger.   
¶15 Conversely, the Hubanks argue that the same public 
policy arguments that supported the original application of the 
rule support its extension to police officers.  They rely on 
language in Pinter that says the rule "is an expression of 
public 
policy 
because 
it 
prohibits 
a 
firefighter 
from 
complaining about the negligence that creates the very need for 
No. 
02-1416   
 
11 
 
his or her employment."  Pinter, 236 Wis. 2d 137, ¶39 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  They contend that the "need" 
for Cole's employment was capturing the stray dog and it was 
that act that brought about her injuries. 
¶16 As with any review wherein we are asked to limit 
liability based on public policy factors, we begin by examining 
the circumstances of the case.  Cole's claims for dog-bite 
injuries are grounded in common law negligence and in a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  The defense to her claims is 
grounded in public policy that according to our case law 
examines both who the plaintiff is and what claims the plaintiff 
makes.  See, e.g., Pinter,9 236 Wis. 2d 137, ¶50, Hauboldt,10 160 
Wis. 2d at 677, and Hass,11 48 Wis. 2d at 327.  We begin with 
plaintiff Cole, who was acting as a police officer when she was 
injured. 
                                                 
9 "We emphasize that our public policy analysis is based on 
the fact that the only negligence Pinter complains of is the 
same negligence that caused the initial emergency and resulted 
in rescue personnel being called to the scene."  Pinter, 236 
Wis. 2d 137, ¶50.  
10 "The purpose of strict products liability is to ensure 
that the costs of injuries resulting from the use of a defective 
product are borne by the manufacturer who placed the defective 
product on the market, rather than by the injured person."  
Hauboldt v. Union Carbide Corp., 160 Wis. 2d 662, 677, 467 
N.W.2d 508 (1991). 
11 "We do not hold a landowner under no circumstances must 
respond in damages for his negligence which caused injury to a 
firefighter  . . . ."  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 327. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
12 
 
¶17 Police officers, as with firefighters and EMTs, are 
employed to serve the public in times of trouble.  However, even 
though Cole's occupation and its role in occasioning her to come 
in harm's way are relevant to the question certified, her job 
description is not dispositive of whether she may sue the 
Hubanks.  As our opinions demonstrated in Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 
327; Clark, 75 Wis. 2d at 298-99; Wright, 148 Wis. 2d at 906-08; 
Hauboldt, 160 Wis. 2d at 675-76; and Pinter, 236 Wis. 2d 137, 
¶50, the plaintiff's occupation is only one fact to be 
considered.   
¶18 There are many differences between firefighters and 
police officers.  For example, firefighters know they are 
exposed to danger when they are called to fight a fire.  As we 
noted in Hass, "[t]he call to duty is the warning of the 
hazard."  Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 325.  By contrast, police officers 
usually are out on patrol from the start of their shift until 
its end.  Their efforts are not directed to one hazard, but 
rather they are often required to address varied circumstances, 
the responses to which may not always be apparent simply from 
the 
fact 
that 
they 
are 
police 
officers. 
 
Furthermore, 
firefighters and EMTs receive specialized training in fighting 
fires and in moving injured people at the scene of an accident, 
on a regular basis.12  While capturing stray dogs can fall within 
police officers' duties on occasion, they receive no specialized 
                                                 
12 See Wis. Stat. § 146.50(9); Wis. Admin. Code § HFS 
110.05, 110.07(3)(c); Wis. Admin. Code § COMM 30.07. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
13 
 
training to do so and it appears not to be a central focus of 
their day's activities.  And finally, focusing too heavily on 
the 
plaintiff's 
occupation 
has 
the 
danger 
of 
permitting 
assumption of risk to be an absolute defense to a negligence 
claim, without expressly saying so.13  Therefore, any limit on 
the right to sue may also evaluate relevant public policy 
concerns in light of the particular claims made.  As we have 
explained above, the public policy factors are the basis of the 
firefighters rule; therefore, they form the basis for our 
analysis here.  We now turn to Cole's claims. 
1. 
Common law claim 
¶19 Cole's claim for common law negligence is subject to 
common law defenses and proof problems.  However, in order to 
evaluate the Hubanks' public policy defense, we assume the 
Hubanks were negligent and that their negligence was a cause of 
Cole's injuries and we focus on whether public policy requires 
that we affirm its dismissal.  We conclude that the six public 
policy factors identified previously are not a limitation on 
liability for Cole's common law negligence claim.   
¶20 First, Cole's injury was not too remote from the 
alleged negligence (the failure to adequately restrain the dog).  
Dogs that run at large have the obvious opportunity to bite that 
they would not have if properly restrained.  Second, Cole's 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin no longer has assumption of risk as a bar to a 
negligence claim.  However, assumption of risk is an element of 
contributory negligence, so that it is a consideration in a 
negligence claim.  Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 
120 N.W.2d 63 (1963). 
No. 
02-1416   
 
14 
 
injury is not wholly out of proportion to the Hubanks' 
culpability.  The dog was the Hubanks' responsibility.  People 
who keep dogs must understand this and the legislature has 
enacted many provisions in ch. 174 to require dog owners to meet 
that responsibility.  Additionally, an Akita is a large dog and 
therefore was capable of inflicting serious injury.  Third, 
there is nothing "highly extraordinary" about the capability of 
an 85-pound dog running at large to cause serious harm if it 
attacks someone.  Fourth, allowing the claim to go forward will 
not place too unreasonable a burden on the Hubanks.  They are 
already required by city ordinance14 and state statute15 to 
restrain 
their 
dog 
so 
that 
it 
does 
not 
cause 
injury.  
Additionally, the Hubanks did not report their dog missing, nor 
warn law enforcement that it could be vicious.  Permitting 
Cole's claim will encourage dog owners to shoulder their 
responsibilities to the public at large, by exercising care to 
adequately restrain their dogs.  Dog owners are in a better 
position to prevent harm from their dogs.  Fifth, allowing 
Cole's claim will not open the way for fraudulent claims.  It 
will be easy enough to prove whether the Hubanks' Akita bit 
Cole.  Sixth, allowing liability will not be tantamount to 
entering a field with no sensible or just stopping point.  To 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Milwaukee Code ch. 78. 
15 See Wis. Stat. ch. 174, regarding dogs.  In addition to 
holding dog owners strictly liable for damage occasioned by 
their dogs, ch. 174 also requires dog owners to license their 
pets and keep their dogs from running at large.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 174.042, 174.07.  
No. 
02-1416   
 
15 
 
the contrary, allowing liability in circumstances where police 
officers are trying to collect dogs running at large is 
supported by ordinance and statute.  Failure to comply with 
ordinances and statutes can be deterred by imposing personal 
liability on dog owners.  Otherwise, we could be "open[ing] the 
door to expansive immunity from liability."  Hauboldt, 160 
Wis. 2d at 676.  Accordingly, we conclude that none of the 
public policy factors preclude Cole's common law claim.  We next 
examine Cole's statutory claim. 
2. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02 
¶21 Cole 
also 
brings 
suit 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 174.02(1)(a),16 "Owner's liability for damage caused by a dog."  
The Hubanks ask us to apply common law public policy factors to 
bar Cole's statutory claim.  This raises two central questions:  
(1) Whether the common law public policy factors that we 
reviewed in Cole's common law claim may be applied to her 
statutory claim; and (2) if so, whether they should be applied 
here. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02 is a "strict liability" 
statute wherein the legislature has made the policy choice to 
place the burden of damage caused by a dog on the dog's owner.  
See Becker, 141 Wis. 2d at 815; Fifer v. Dix, 2000 WI App 66, 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02(1)(a) provides in relevant part: 
(1) LIABILITY FOR INJURY.  (a)  . . . Subject to s. 
895.045 and except as provided in s. 895.57(4), the 
owner of a dog is liable for the full amount of 
damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury 
to a person, domestic animal or property. 
No. 
02-1416   
 
16 
 
¶12, 234 Wis. 2d 117, 608 N.W.2d 740.  We recently have examined 
§ 174.02 in light of the six public policy factors that may be 
used to preclude liability.  Fandrey v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  In 
Fandrey, we reviewed the statutory phrase, "damages caused by 
the dog," and concluded that the statutory term, "cause," means 
a cause-in-fact of the damages sustained.  Id., ¶21.  However, 
in order for a dog owner to be liable, a sufficient legal cause, 
as well as a cause-in-fact, must be shown.  Id.  The public 
policy factors provide a means for the court to determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, whether a cause-in-fact of damages is also a 
sufficient legal cause to hold a dog owner liable.  Id., ¶¶19, 
21.  Therefore, the answer to the first question posed above is 
that the public policy factors may be applied to claims made 
against a dog owner pursuant to § 174.02. 
¶23 In regard to whether those factors should be applied 
to bar Cole's claim here, we conclude they should not be 
applied.  As we explained when we examined the six factors in 
light of Cole's negligence claim, none of the inequities that 
the factors are designed to protect against come into play under 
the facts of this case.  Accordingly, we conclude that Cole may 
proceed upon her statutory claim as well as on her common law 
claim.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶24 Because we conclude that public policy reasons do not 
support extending the firefighters rule to police officers, Cole 
may sue for injuries she received allegedly because of the 
No. 
02-1416   
 
17 
 
Hubanks' dog's attack that occurred during the course of Cole's 
duties as a police officer.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed, and the cause remanded. 
 
 
No.  02-1416.dss 
 
1 
 
¶25 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  The facts of this 
case fall well within the so-called "firefighter's rule," which 
this court first recognized as a function of Wisconsin's public 
policy limitations on tort liability in Hass v. Chicago & North 
Western Railway, 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970), and 
recently extended to emergency medical technicians in Pinter v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 75, 236 Wis. 2d 137, 613 
N.W.2d 110.  Hass held that "one who negligently starts a fire 
is not liable for that negligence when it causes injury to a 
firefighter who comes to extinguish the blaze."  Hass, 48 Wis. 
2d at 327.  The court concluded that to impose liability for the 
act 
of 
negligence 
which 
occasioned 
the 
need 
for 
the 
firefighter's services——the negligence "in starting a fire and 
failing to curtail its spread"——would impose too great a burden 
on the property owner and "would permit the law of negligence to 
'enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.'"  
Id. (quoting Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 598-99, 85 N.W.2d 
345 (1957)). 
¶26  More recently, in Pinter, this court extended the 
"firefighter's rule" of Hass to emergency medical technicians, 
precluding liability on public policy grounds against a motorist 
for negligently causing a collision to which the EMT responded 
and sustained injury while rendering emergency services at the 
accident scene.  Pinter, 236 Wis. 2d 137, ¶48.  We stated in 
Pinter that "[f]undamentally, the rule recognized in Hass is an 
expression of public policy because it prohibits a firefighter 
from complaining about the negligence that creates the very need 
No.  02-1416.dss 
 
2 
 
for his or her employment."  Id., ¶39 (citation omitted.)  We 
emphasized that "[p]ermitting firefighters to pursue actions 
like the one in Hass is . . . not consistent with the 
relationship of the fire fighting profession to the public. . . 
It would contravene public policy to permit a firefighter to 
recover damages from an individual who has already been taxed to 
provide compensation to injured firefighters."  Id. 
¶27  This court observed in Pinter that EMTs, like 
firefighters, "know that they will be expected to provide aid 
and protection to others in these hazardous circumstances" and 
"have special training and experience that prepare them to 
provide assistance under dangerous emergency conditions."  Id., 
¶43.  Noting that "an automobile collision is equivalent to a 
fire under the public policy analysis in Hass," we concluded: 
In sum, we can find no logical reason that the public 
policy analysis set forth in Hass should not extend to 
Pinter's cause of action.  Instead, we conclude that 
public policy bars Pinter's recovery.  In the same way 
that allowing a firefighter to recover in Hass would 
have placed an unreasonable burden on the railroad 
company that negligently caused the fire, permitting 
an EMT to recover under the circumstances alleged by 
Pinter would place an unreasonable burden on drivers 
who negligently cause collisions. . . . Permitting 
Pinter's action to proceed would enter a field with no 
sensible or just stopping point.     
Id., ¶¶46-47. 
¶28  We were careful to emphasize in Pinter that "our 
public policy analysis is based on the fact that the only 
negligence Pinter complains of is the same negligence that 
caused the initial emergency and resulted in rescue personnel 
being called to the scene" and that "Hass would not bar Pinter's 
No.  02-1416.dss 
 
3 
 
cause of action if Pinter sought recovery on the basis of some 
act 
or 
omission 
other 
than 
the 
initial 
negligence 
that 
necessitated emergency medical assistance," that is, on some 
"secondary or aggravating negligence."  Id., ¶¶50, 48. 
¶29  I do not disagree that the Hass rule was "narrowly 
drawn."  Majority op., ¶7.  In my view, however, Pinter's 
analysis of the "firefighter's rule" of Hass, which in essence 
is a particularized application of public policy limitations on 
tort liability, controls this case.  I do not share the court's 
view that "[t]here are many differences between firefighters and 
police officers" which distinguish this case from Hass and its 
underlying public policy rationale.  Majority op., ¶18.  Police 
officers, like firefighters and EMTs, are expected to provide 
aid and protection to the public in dangerous situations, and 
are trained and experienced emergency responders. 
¶30  To allow tort recovery for the acts of negligence 
which caused the need for a police officer's services in the 
first place——as opposed to some secondary or aggravating act of 
negligence——would place too great a burden on members of the 
public who are entitled to rely on police protection, and would 
enter a field in which there is no just stopping point.  Here, 
Officer Cole seeks to hold the dog owners liable for the risks 
associated with their dog running at large, that is, for the 
negligence 
that 
precipitated 
the 
need 
for 
the 
officer's 
assistance, rather than any collateral act of negligence.  The 
officer's duty required her to respond and attempt to remedy the 
danger.  Pursuant to Hass and Pinter, public policy therefore 
No.  02-1416.dss 
 
4 
 
precludes the officer from recovering tort damages against the 
members of the public whose negligence created the need for that 
response.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  02-1416.dss 
 
1