Case Title: Patel v. Shah

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180012

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: September 30, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2019
____________________
1180012
____________________
Dahyalal H. Patel
v.
Ashish Shah, individually and in his capacity as president,
treasurer, director, and controlling shareholder of Subway
No. 43092, Inc.; Ramesh Shah, individually and in his
capacity as secretary of Subway No. 43092, Inc.; and Subway
No. 43092, Inc.
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-12-901307)
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Dahyalal H. Patel filed an action seeking to enforce his
ownership rights as a shareholder in Subway No. 43092, Inc.
1180012
("the 
corporation"), 
against 
shareholder 
Ashish 
Shah 
("Shah");
Shah's father, Ramesh Shah ("Ramesh"); and the corporation
(hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively 
as 
"the 
Shah
defendants").  The Madison Circuit Court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the Shah defendants.  Patel appeals.  We
affirm in part and reverse in part.  
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 2007, Shah, the owner of eight Subway restaurants in
and around Madison County, prepared to open a ninth Subway
restaurant in Huntsville ("the restaurant").  In July 2008,
Shah formed the corporation for the purposes of owning and
operating the restaurant.  Shah owned 90 percent of the stock
of the corporation and Ramesh owned 10 percent.
In 2008, Patel met with Shah about Shah's plan to open
the restaurant.  At some point, Patel and Shah orally agreed
that Patel would purchase a 25 percent ownership interest in
the corporation.  Because Shah estimated that start-up costs
for the restaurant would be $240,000, Patel agreed to purchase
a 25 percent interest in the corporation for $60,000, payable
in monthly installments.1  After the restaurant opened in
1The record does not indicate on what date the parties
agreed that Patel's monthly payments would begin.
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December 2008, Shah began making periodic distributions of
profits to Patel.
In April 2009, Shah orally agreed to sell Patel an
additional five percent interest for $12,000, which Patel paid
that month.  In December 2009, Patel began making the monthly
payments on the purchase price for his original 25 percent
interest, and he eventually paid the $60,000.  Accordingly,
Patel owned a 30 percent interest in the corporation, and he
continued to receive distributions of profits of the
restaurant.
In September 2012, Patel sued the Shah defendants,
alleging that Shah had misrepresented the start-up costs for
the restaurant in calculating the price of Patel's 25 percent
interest.  Patel alleged that the actual start-up costs were
$140,000 rather than $240,000, as Shah had represented. 
Accordingly, Patel alleged that he either overpaid for his
interest or acquired more than a 50 percent interest in the
corporation.  Patel further alleged that the  distributions of
profits he received were not proportional to his interest,
even assuming that his interest was 30 percent.  In addition,
he claimed that Shah had withheld Patel's share of franchise-
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sales commissions that the corporation received from its
franchisor, Doctor's Associates, Inc.  Finally, Patel alleged
that Shah had engaged in illegal business practices such as
hiring illegal immigrants and filing false tax returns. 
Patel's complaint asserted claims of breach of contract and
unjust enrichment.  Patel also asserted several tort claims,
including claims of shareholder oppression, civil conspiracy,
breach 
of 
fiduciary 
duties, 
fraudulent 
suppression,
misrepresentation, conversion, waste, statutory violations,2
and fraud.  
The Shah defendants asserted several counterclaims
against Patel.  The circuit court consolidated Patel's case
with cases filed by other persons against Shah relating to the
ownership and operation of other restaurants.  The restaurant
was subsequently sold to a third party in 2016, and the
proceeds were placed in escrow pending final resolution of
Patel's action.
The Shah defendants moved for a summary judgment in
Patel's case based on their affirmative defense that Patel's
breach-of-contract claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds,
2Patel made no argument in his brief regarding his tort
claim based on alleged statutory violations.  Accordingly,
that claim is deemed abandoned on appeal.  Tucker v. Cullman-
Jefferson Ctys. Gas Dist., 864 So. 2d 317, 319 (Ala. 2003).
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§ 8-9-2, Ala. Code 1975.  The Shah defendants also argued that
Patel's tort claims were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations and that, if they were not time-barred, there were
no genuine issues of material fact as to those claims.  The
circuit court granted the motion for a summary judgment.  The
circuit 
court 
later 
dismissed 
the 
Shah 
defendants'
counterclaims on August 20, 2018.  Patel filed his notice of
appeal on October 1, 2018.  The other consolidated cases
remain pending in the circuit court.
II. Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment de novo.  McClendon v.
Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 601 So. 2d 957, 958
(Ala. 1992).
"'A summary judgment is proper when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the
moving party to make a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  In
determining whether the movant has carried that
burden, the court is to view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and to draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. To
defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion,
the nonmoving party must present "substantial
evidence" creating a genuine issue of material fact
-- "evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
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judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved."'"
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935
(Ala. 2006) (quoting Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough-
Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994)).
III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
Before addressing the merits of Patel's appeal, we first
address this Court's jurisdiction to consider the appeal while
the other consolidated cases remain pending below.  By
granting the Shah defendants' summary-judgment motion and
dismissing the Shah defendants' counterclaims against Patel,
the circuit court resolved all the claims and disposed of all
the parties in Patel's case.  At that time, Patel could not
immediately appeal the judgment in his case without an order
from the circuit court certifying the judgment as final under
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  See Hanner v. Metro Bank &
Protective Life Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 1056, 1061 (Ala. 2006)
(holding that "a trial court must certify a judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., before a judgment on
fewer than all the claims in a consolidated action can be
appealed"). 
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However, 11 days after the circuit court dismissed the
counterclaims, after having earlier entered the summary
judgment, in Patel's case, this Court overruled Hanner in
Nettles v. Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.C., [Ms. 1170162,
August 31, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2018).  We held that,
"[o]nce a final judgment has been entered in a case, it is
immediately 
appealable, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
it 
is
consolidated with another still pending case."  Nettles, ___
So. 3d at ___.  After Nettles was released, Patel filed his
notice of appeal in his case.  Hence, this case presents the
question whether Patel was entitled to appeal under Nettles or
was required to wait under Hanner for the disposition of the
other cases that had been consolidated with his.
In overruling Hanner, we noted that "we are overruling
clear precedent on which other litigants may have relied -- in
determining, for example, if and when a notice of appeal is
due.  In such a case, we think a prospective-only application
of today's decision is appropriate."  Nettles, ___ So. 3d at
___ n.1 (emphasis added).  In light of our reliance-based
declaration that Nettles would be prospective only, Nettles
applies only to cases in which (a) the judgment was entered
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after Nettles was released or (b) the appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal under Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P., after Nettles
was released.  Here, Patel did the latter; he did not rely on
Hanner.  Therefore, Nettles applies to Patel's appeal, which
was properly filed without waiting until the circuit court
resolved the other consolidated cases.  Accordingly, this
Court has jurisdiction over Patel's case.
B. Analysis
In support of the motion for a summary judgment, the Shah
defendants asserted that Patel's breach-of-contract claim was
barred by the Statute of Frauds because the claim was based on
oral agreements to purchase stock.  The Shah defendants also
argued that Patel's tort claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations and that, if they were not time-
barred, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
those claims.  Patel contends that his claims were not barred
by the Statute of Frauds or by a statute of limitations and
that there were genuine issues of material fact as to his tort
claims. 
1. Statute of Frauds
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Patel's breach-of-contract claim was based on his status
as a shareholder in the corporation.  Thus, his claim hinges
on the enforceability of his two oral stock-purchase
agreements with Shah.
Regarding stock-purchase agreements, the Statute of
Frauds provides:
"In 
the 
following cases, every agreement is 
void
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum
thereof expressing the consideration is in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith
or some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized in writing:
"....
"(8) ... [E]very agreement for the
sale or purchase of securities other than
through the facilities of a national stock
exchange 
or 
of 
the 
over-the-counter
securities market."
§ 8-9-2(8), Ala. Code 1975.
The Shah defendants contend that, because the stock-
purchase agreements between Patel and Shah were oral
agreements for the sale of securities outside an organized
securities market, they are unenforceable under § 8-9-2(8). 
Accordingly, the Shah defendants contend that Patel has no
enforceable ownership rights in the corporation.
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Patel, however, contends that the Statute of Frauds does
not apply here because he has fully performed under the
agreements.  In Alabama, 
"there is a historic common law principle that a
party to a parol contract, which would ordinarily
fall within the statute of frauds, who has so far
performed the contract as to render it a fraud for
the other party to repudiate the agreement, is not
prevented by the statute from recovering damages for
its breach.  Stated differently, the oral contract
is not within the statute of frauds to the extent
that it has been performed."
Jenelle Mims Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages § 17:11 (6th ed.
2012) (footnotes omitted).  Further, "[a] contract is
executed, and not voided by the Statute of Frauds, if the
plaintiff has fully performed his obligation to the defendant
and sues the defendant to obtain the defendant's performance
or the completion of the defendant's performance."  Ramsay v.
State, 829 So. 2d 146, 155 (Ala. 2002).
Patel contends that he fully paid the amounts agreed to
in the oral stock-purchase agreements.  Accordingly, he
contends that the full-performance exception removes those
agreements from the Statute of Frauds.
Patel relies on Ingram v. Omelet Shoppe, Inc., 388 So. 2d
190 (Ala. 1980), a case in which this Court applied the full-
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performance exception to enforce an oral stock-purchase
agreement.  Ingram was decided before the repeal in 1997 of
Alabama's former Statute of Frauds relating to the purchase of
stock, § 7-8-319, Ala. Code 1975.  That statute provided:
"'A contract for the sale of securities is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless:
"'(a) There is some writing signed by
the party against whom enforcement is
sought ...; or
"'(b) Delivery of the security has
been accepted or payment has been made but
the contract is enforceable under this
provision only to the extent of such
delivery or payment ....'"
388 So. 2d at 195 (emphasis added).  
The Legislature repealed § 7-8-319, effective January 1,
1997.  Act No. 96-742, Ala. Acts 1996.  At the same time,
however, the Legislature amended § 8-9-2, by 
adding subsection
(8), 
imposing the 
previously 
quoted 
requirement 
that
agreements "for the sale or purchase of securities other than
through the facilities of a national stock exchange or of the
over-the-counter 
securities 
market" 
be 
in 
writing. 
Accordingly, although the Legislature eliminated the writing
requirement for certain kinds of organized-market securities,
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it retained the requirement for stock-purchase agreements
generally.3
The Shah defendants contend that, when the Legislature
added subsection (8) to § 8-9-2, it chose not to adopt the
exceptions that had been included in § 7-8-319, including the
full-performance exception.  Accordingly, the Shah defendants
argue that the full-performance exception to the writing
requirement no longer exists in the context of stock
purchases.
Patel, on the other hand, contends that the full-
performance exception is not 
merely a statutory exception that
was abolished by the repeal of § 7-8-319 but, rather, is a
3In Act No. 96-742, the Legislature also added § 7-8-113,
Ala. Code 1975, which eliminated the writing requirement for
stock-purchase agreements generally.  See Act No. 96-742, § 1,
adding § 7-8-113; see also § 7-8-102(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975
(defining "security"), and § 7-8-103(a), Ala Code 1975
(further defining "security").  Section 8-9-2(8), however,
provides that a writing is required for non-organized-market
securities "[n]otwithstanding Section 7-8-113."  Thus, as to
such securities, § 8-9-2(8) expressly prevails over § 
7-8-113. 
See 
§ 
7-8-113, 
Alabama 
Comment 
("[Section 
8-9-2(8)] 
explicitly
applies notwithstanding [§ 7-8-113].  Thus, an agreement by a
shareholder of a closely held corporation to sell all or part
of his shares continues to be subject to the statute of
frauds, notwithstanding the elimination of a statute of frauds
requirement as to transactions in the organized securities
market.").
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common-law exception that applies to all provisions of § 8-9-
2, the Statute of Frauds.  See Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages
§ 17:11 (referring to full-performance exception as a
"historic common law principle").
Consistent with Patel's argument, this Court has applied
the full-performance exception to contracts that fall within
§ 8-9-2 despite the absence of statutory language requiring
it.  Specifically, this Court has applied the exception to
contracts that, by their terms, are not to be performed within
one year (§ 8-9-2(1)), Ramsay, 829 So. 2d at 155, Scott v.
Southern Coach & Body Co., 280 Ala. 670, 673, 197 So. 2d 775,
777 (1967), Erswell v. Ford, 208 Ala. 101, 102, 94 So. 67, 68
(1922); to promises to answer for the debt of another (§ 8-9-
2(3)), Ramsay, supra; to contracts upon consideration of
marriage (§ 8-9-2(4)), Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. 400, 426
(1846); and to contracts conveying an interest in real
property (§ 8-9-2(5)), Fowler v. Oliver, 540 So. 2d 54, 55
(Ala. 1984), Talley v. Talley, 248 Ala. 84, 87-88, 26 So. 2d
586, 589 (1946).  Our precedent shows that the common-law
full-performance exception 
applies 
to 
all 
contracts within 
the
scope of § 8-9-2.  Consequently, when the Legislature in 1997
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added stock-purchase agreements to § 8-9-2, it did not need to
expressly reference the full-performance exception.  
Because the stock-purchase agreements here were fully
performed by Patel, the Statute of Frauds did not apply to
them.  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in entering a
summary judgment for 
the Shah defendants on Patel's breach-of-
contract claim based on the Statute of Frauds.4
2. Statute of limitations
In the motion for a summary judgment, the Shah defendants
argued that Patel's tort claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations.  The parties agree that those claims,
with the exception of Patel's conversion claim, are subject to
a two-year limitations period.  See § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code
1975.5  The parties differ, however, on when that two-year
period began running -- that is, when the claims accrued. 
4To the extent that the circuit court relied on the
Statute of Frauds in entering a summary judgment as to Patel's
unjust-enrichment claim, 
we 
similarly conclude 
that 
that 
claim
was not barred.
5It 
is 
undisputed that 
Patel's 
conversion claim 
is 
subject
to a six-year statute of limitations.  See § 6-2-34(3), Ala.
Code 1975.
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The Shah defendants contend that Patel's claims accrued
in 2008 or, at the latest, 2009.  The Shah defendants rely on
Patel's allegations in his complaint that the tortious acts
and omissions had been occurring "[s]ince opening the
[restaurant]" 
and 
"[s]ince 
the 
formation 
of 
[the
corporation]."  The Shah defendants point out that Shah formed
the corporation and opened the restaurant in 2008 and that
Patel first obtained an ownership interest in 2009. 
Accordingly, Shah argues that the claims accrued by 2009 at
the latest.
In contrast, Patel contends that his claims accrued in
2011, when he alleges he discovered Shah's wrongdoing.  Patel
invokes the tolling provision of § 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975:
"In actions seeking relief on the ground of
fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim
must not be considered as having accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact
constituting the fraud, after which he must have two
years within which to prosecute his action."
Patel failed, however, to present evidence to support the
application of § 6-2-3.
"[T]he burden is upon he who claims the benefit of § 6-2-
3 to show that he comes within it."  Amason v. First State
Bank of Lineville, 369 So. 2d 547, 550 (Ala. 1979).  To make
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that showing in opposition to a defendant's summary-judgment
motion, the plaintiff must submit evidence indicating (1) how
and when he discovered the facts of the claim, (2) what
prevented him from discovering those facts before the
limitations period ended, and (3) why, based on his knowledge
during the limitations period, he had no reason to conduct an
inquiry that would have led him to those facts.  See 369 So.
2d at 550. 
In Amason, the complaint on its face showed that the
limitations period had expired on at least some of the
plaintiff's claims.  369 So. 2d at 550.  However, the
plaintiff failed to show any of the above facts required for
tolling the statute of limitations under § 6-2-3, other than
when he discovered the facts of the claim.  369 So. 2d at 551.
Like the complaint in Amason, Patel's complaint, on its
face, showed that the two-year limitations period had expired
on his tort claims.  Thus, in opposition to the Shah
defendants' motion for a summary judgment, it was incumbent on
Patel to submit evidence that the tolling provision of § 6-3-2
rescued his claims from the running of the statute of
limitations.  Yet Patel did not submit any evidence to meet
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the above requirements for tolling.  Instead, he merely
alleged in his response to the motion for a summary judgment
that his "claims based in fraud –- fraudulent suppression,
misrepresentation, and fraud -- did not accrue until [he]
discovered the fraud" and that his breach-of-fiduciary-duty
claim "did not begin to run until [he] discovered damage from
the breach."6
Because Patel failed to submit to the circuit court any
evidence of how or when he discovered the Shah defendants'
actions giving rise to his tort claims, of what prevented
Patel from discovering those actions before the expiration of
the statute of limitations, and of why he had no reason to
previously conduct an inquiry that would have led him to
discover those actions, he cannot invoke the tolling provision
of § 6-2-3.  Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment on
those claims.
3. Genuine issues of material fact as to conversion claim
6In his response to the Shah defendants' motion for a
summary judgment, Patel argued that his oppression and waste
claims were continuing wrongs and, thus, were not barred by
the statute of limitations.  However, Patel abandoned those
claims on appeal because he has not argued that they were not
barred by the statute of limitations.  Tucker v. Cullman-
Jefferson Ctys. Gas Dist., 864 So. 2d 317, 319 (Ala. 2003).
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In their summary-judgment motion, the Shah defendants
argued that Patel's conversion claim, based on Shah's
allegedly keeping Patel's share of profits, was not legally
viable.  Specifically, the Shah defendants argued that non-
specific money cannot be converted.
"'"[G]enerally, an action will not lie for the
conversion of money"' unless '"the money at issue is
capable of identification."'  Only when money is
earmarked 
or 
otherwise 
identifiable, 
such 
as
enclosed in a container like a bag or chest, does an
action lie for conversion of money."
Hensley v. Poole, 910 So. 2d 96, 101 (Ala. 2005) (citations
omitted).
In response, Patel contends that the converted money was
identifiable because, he says, the proceeds from the sale of
the restaurant were segregated in a designated account.  This
argument fails because the account Patel relies on contained
the proceeds from the sale of the restaurant, not the
allegedly converted profits and 
commissions from the income of
the restaurant.  Therefore, Patel fails to show error in the
summary judgment as to conversion of profits and commissions.
Alternatively, Patel contends that he alleged conversion
not of money, but of his ownership interest in the
corporation.  This argument fails because Patel did not allege
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conversion of his ownership interest in his complaint. Rather,
Patel merely alleged that the Shah defendants failed to pay
him his fair share of the profits, failed to convey to him an
ownership interest equal to that for which he paid, and
converted profits, revenues, bonuses, assets, and property of
the corporation.  Patel cannot now expand the scope of his
allegations to defeat the summary judgment.  Gilmour v. Gates,
McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) ("A
plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a
brief 
opposing 
summary 
judgment.").  
Consequently, 
Patel 
fails
to show error in the summary judgment as to conversion of his
ownership interest in the corporation.
However, Patel also argues that he alleged conversion of
the corporation's personal property.  In his complaint, Patel
alleged that the Shah defendants "wrongfully and maliciously
converted ... the ... property of the Corporation."  The Shah
defendants ignored this aspect of Patel's conversion claim in
their summary-judgment motion.  Thus, conversion of corporate
property was outside the scope of the motion.  Therefore, the
circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment on the
issue of conversion of the corporation's property.  See Henson
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v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 646 So. 2d 559, 562 (Ala. 1994)
("[T]he trial court could not properly enter the summary
judgment as to all of [the plaintiff's] claims.  Counts one
and two of the complaint ... were not before the trial court
on the [defendant's] motion.").  Accordingly, we affirm the
summary judgment on Patel's conversion claim insofar as it
relates to profits, commissions, and Patel's ownership
interest in the corporation, and we reverse the summary
judgment insofar as it relates to the conversion of corporate
property.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's
summary judgment in favor of the Shah defendants on Patel's
tort claims, other than conversion, and on Patel's conversion
claim insofar as Patel alleged conversion of profits,
commissions, and his ownership interest in the corporation. 
We reverse the summary judgment on Patel's breach-of-contract
and unjust-enrichment claims and on his conversion claim
insofar as Patel alleged the 
conversion of corporate property. 
This case is remanded for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
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Wise, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur in the
result.
Sellers, J., dissents.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).
In this case, which is one of four consolidated cases,
the trial court's summary judgment is deemed final and an
immediate appeal is available under the authority of Nettles
v. Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.C., [Ms. 1170162, Aug. 31,
2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2018).  I dissented in Nettles, and
this appeal, in my opinion, illustrates why that case was
incorrectly decided.
In the trial court, this case was consolidated with three
other actions against one of the defendants below, Ashish
Shah.  Those other actions, which are still pending in the
trial court, appear to contain multiple issues of law and fact
that are common with those in the instant case. 
This Court's decision in Hanner v. Metro Bank &
Protective Life Insurance Co., 952 So. 2d 1056, 1061 (Ala.
2006), held that "a trial court must certify a judgment as
final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., before a
judgment on fewer than all the claims in a consolidated action
can be appealed."  I have previously discussed the rationale
of Hanner:  
"Rule 54(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] acts as a gateway
preventing both appellate review in a piecemeal
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fashion and the risk of inconsistent results arising
from a later ruling in the still pending matters.
Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d
354, 363 (Ala. 2004), and Clarke-Mobile Ctys. Gas
Dist. v. Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala.
2002). Further, the need for an immediate appeal
might be mooted by future developments or rulings in
the remaining claims pending in the trial court.
Lighting Fair, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 63 So. 3d 1256,
1265 (Ala. 2010). The trial court is thus afforded
discretion to determine whether there is a just
reason--or not--for an immediate appeal. Ragland v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 So. 3d 641, 644
(Ala. 2017).
"This was the rationale for adopting the rule in
Hanner:
"'"In our view, the best approach is to
permit the appeal only when there is a
final judgment that resolves all of the
consolidated 
actions 
unless 
a 
54(b)
certification is entered by the district
court. This leaves the discretion with the
court which is best able to evaluate the
[e]ffect of an interim appeal on the
parties and on the expeditious resolution
of the entire action."'
"Hanner, 952 So. 2d at 1061 (quoting Huene v. United
States, 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1984))."
Nettles, ___ So. 3d at ____ (Shaw, J., dissenting).
This Court's decision in Nettles, however, overruled
Hanner and held that "[o]nce a final judgment has been entered
in a case, it is immediately appealable, regardless of whether
it is consolidated with another still pending case."  Nettles,
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___ So. 3d at ___.  Thus, under Nettles, the trial court's
summary judgment in the instant case in favor of the Shah
defendants was immediately appealable.  
In my dissent in Nettles, I stated: 
"Under the new rule adopted in the main opinion,
an appeal of a judgment in a case that is part of a
consolidated action might be so intertwined with the
still pending matters that all the concerns that
require 
the 
denial 
of 
a 
Rule 
54(b)
certification--the danger of inconsistent results,
piecemeal appellate review, and the potential for
the judgment to be mooted--could exist."
Nettles, ___ So. 3d at ____ (Shaw, J., dissenting).  This is
what has occurred in this case.  This case on appeal and the
actions still pending below with which it was consolidated are
so closely intertwined that separate appellate adjudication
poses 
an 
unreasonable 
risk 
of 
inconsistent 
results.7 
Therefore, a decision in the appeal before us, at least to the
extent we affirm the summary judgment, presents the danger of
inconsistent results if the similar claims still pending in
the trial court are ultimately decided differently.  Despite
7Thus, any Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification
entered by the trial court, which would have been required for
this appeal if Hanner still applied, would be inappropriate. 
 
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that fact, Nettles provides that the appeal can proceed; I
therefore concur in the result.
Stewart, J., concurs.
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