Case Title: Jonathan Lisowski v. Hastings Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 2009 WI 11

Docket Number: 2006AP002662

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2662 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jonathan Lisowski, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Hastings Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Reported at: 308 Wis. 2d 394, 746 N.W.2d 604 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 28, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Buffalo   
 
JUDGE: 
James J. Duvall   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissent (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Joel W. Brodd and Brodd Law Firm, L.L.C., Hudson, and oral 
argument by Joel W. Brodd. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Lee J. 
Fehr and Fehr Law Office, Onalaska, and oral argument by Lee J. 
Fehr. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Linda S. Schmidt, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, and oral argument by James 
A. Friedman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy A. Barber and 
Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 11
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2662  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV78) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jonathan Lisowski, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Hastings Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 28, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals per curiam opinion1 that affirmed a 
circuit court decision dismissing a claim by Jonathan Lisowski 
against Hastings Mutual Insurance Company for underinsured 
motorists coverage under Lisowski's father's business auto 
policy. 
¶2 
The "for a covered auto" language on which this case 
turns is substantive language that appears in several places in 
the policy, including the endorsement page.  When the provisions 
                                                 
1 Lisowski v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co., unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008). 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
2 
 
of the policy are read together, the language is not ambiguous.  
We agree with the reasoning of Crandall v. Society Insurance, 
2004 WI App 34, 269 Wis. 2d 765, 676 N.W.2d 174, and we believe 
it controls here.  Like Crandall, this case concerns an 
underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement to a business auto 
policy; also, like Crandall, it involves an injured party who is 
not the named insured, a driver who is not an insured under the 
policy, and a vehicle not listed in the policy.  Even if the 
covered auto language is characterized as an exclusion in the 
UIM endorsement, it is valid when the conditions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j)(2005-06)2 are satisfied, as they are here.  We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
This case involves a family with multiple personal and 
business vehicles insured under policies purchased from three 
companies.  Dennis Lisowski, a farmer, owned a Chevy Lumina, a 
Chevy pickup, a Dodge Avenger, and a Mack semi tractor.  He 
bought insurance policies for the Lumina and the pickup from 
First Community Insurance Company but allowed the policies to 
lapse.  He had purchased the Avenger for his son, Jonathan 
Lisowski,3 who bought insurance for the car from Northern 
                                                 
2 As 
explained 
more 
fully 
below, 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) 
permits insurers to exclude coverage under 
certain circumstances.  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
3 Dennis Lisowski testified that he considered Jonathan the 
owner of the Avenger and had intended to transfer the title to 
him but had not gotten around to doing so before the accident.  
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
3 
 
Progressive Insurance Company but bought no UIM coverage with 
that policy.  The Mack semi tractor, which Dennis Lisowski used 
exclusively for farming, was covered by a business auto policy 
issued by Hastings Mutual Insurance Company (Hastings Mutual), 
which included a UIM endorsement. 
¶4 
That business auto policy is the policy against which 
the claim was made.  The car accident involving the Avenger, and 
giving rise to this claim, occurred January 18, 2004.  Jonathan 
Lisowski was a passenger, and a friend of his was driving at the 
time of the accident.  
¶5 
Jonathan 
Lisowski 
sued 
Hastings 
Mutual, 
claiming 
coverage under the UIM endorsement to the business auto policy 
on his father's semi tractor.  He claimed coverage on the 
grounds that, as a family member of the named insured, he was 
entitled to coverage for any injury caused by an underinsured 
motorist.  Hastings Mutual denied coverage on the grounds that 
the UIM policy applied to covered autos only.   
¶6 
Following a hearing, the Buffalo County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable James Duvall presiding, dismissed the complaint.  
The circuit court found that:  (1) Dennis Lisowski was the owner 
of the Avenger; (2) Jonathan Lisowski was a passenger in the 
Avenger when he was injured; (3) Jonathan Lisowski was an 
insured under the UIM endorsement of the Hastings Mutual policy; 
(4) the Avenger was an underinsured motor vehicle under the 
terms of the UIM endorsement; and (5) the Avenger was not a 
covered auto in the Hastings Mutual policy.  Relying on 
Crandall, the circuit court concluded that "the introductory 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
4 
 
language 'for a covered auto' in the UIM endorsement required 
Jonathan Lisowski to be an occupant of a covered auto in order 
to trigger UIM coverage" under the Hastings Mutual policy.  
Because the Avenger was not a covered auto under the policy, the 
court ordered the case dismissed.   
¶7 
Jonathan Lisowski appealed.  On August 23, 2007, the 
court of appeals certified the appeal to this court, but we did 
not grant the certification.  In an unpublished per curiam 
opinion, the court of appeals then affirmed the circuit court's 
decision, on the same grounds:  that Crandall required the "for 
a covered auto" language to be given effect, and the Hastings 
Mutual policy therefore did not provide UIM coverage.  Lisowski 
v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co., unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jan. 31, 2008). 
¶8 
Jonathan Lisowski filed a petition for review, and on 
May 13, 2008, review was granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
Interpretation of an insurance policy presents a 
question of law that we review independently.  Smith v. Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 808, 810, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990).  If 
words or phrases in a policy are susceptible to more than one 
reasonable construction, they are ambiguous.  Id. at 811.  In 
such a case, we construe the policy as it would be interpreted 
by a reasonable insured.  Holsum Foods v. Home Ins. Co., 162 
Wis. 2d 563, 568-69, 469 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1991).  If the 
policy is not ambiguous, we will not rewrite it by construction 
to impose liability for a risk the insurer did not contemplate.  
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
5 
 
Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 134, 
628 N.W.2d 916.  "Applying the canons of interpretation for 
insurance contracts . . . we interpret the policy based on what 
a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have 
understood the words to mean."  Mau v. North Dakota Ins. Reserve 
Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶17, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45.  Where 
it is necessary to apply a statute, the review is de novo.  
State v. T.J. Int'l, Inc., 2001 WI 76, ¶20, 244 Wis. 2d 481, 628 
N.W.2d 774. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶10 There is no dispute that the vehicle involved in the 
accident was not a covered vehicle under the Hastings Mutual 
business auto policy.  Nor is there any dispute that Jonathan 
Lisowski was an insured as a family member of the named insured, 
Dennis Lisowski.  What the parties dispute is whether Jonathan 
Lisowski was entitled to coverage as an insured regardless of 
where he was at the time he was injured by the underinsured 
motorist.  Jonathan Lisowski contends that even if Hastings 
Mutual could have excluded coverage for him under these 
circumstances without running afoul of Wisconsin law, the policy 
was not written in such a way that it actually and unambiguously 
did so.  He points to a statement describing UIM coverage as 
"all sums the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover as 
compensatory 
damages 
from 
the 
owner 
or 
driver 
of 
an 
'underinsured motor vehicle.'"  Jonathan Lisowski also points to 
the UIM endorsement's language identifying insureds.  Where the 
named insured is an individual, the endorsement states, insureds 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
6 
 
are "[t]he Named Insured and any 'family members'" and "[a]nyone 
else 'occupying' a covered 'auto'. . . ."  Because the family 
member provision contains no mention of a covered auto, he 
contends, there is no requirement that a family member of the 
named insured be in a covered auto in order for coverage to 
apply.  He also notes that none of the endorsement's exclusions 
applies. 
¶11 Hastings Mutual points to the sentence at the top of 
the UIM endorsement that begins, "For a covered 'auto'. . . ."  
It contends that this language mirrors the "covered auto" 
language in the main body of the policy and limits UIM coverage 
accordingly.  As for the exclusions, Hastings Mutual argues that 
they operate only to limit coverage, not create it, and that the 
exclusions are relevant only after coverage is established. 
A. 
The key language 
¶12 The language on which this case turns is found in the 
policy's declarations page and in the endorsement for UIM 
coverage.  On the declarations page, Item One lists Dennis 
Lisowski as the named insured. Item Two, the Schedule of 
Coverages and Covered Autos, says, "Each of these coverages will 
apply only to those 'autos' shown as covered 'autos'.  'Autos' 
are shown as covered 'autos' for a particular coverage by the 
entry of one or more of the symbols from the covered auto 
section of the business auto coverage form next to the name of 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
7 
 
the coverage."4  The symbol from the business auto coverage form 
that appears next to the UIM coverage on the list of coverages 
under Item Two is "07."  The business auto coverage form 
indicates 
that 
where 
"07" 
is 
used, 
"any 
auto" 
means 
"Specifically Described 'Autos'."  That is further described as  
"[o]nly 
those 
'autos' 
described 
in 
Item 
Three 
of 
the 
Declarations for which a premium charge is shown . . . ."  In 
Item Three, the "Schedule of Covered Autos You Own" lists one 
vehicle: 
the 
1985 
Mack semi tractor.  The premium for 
underinsured motorist coverage for that vehicle is $30. 
¶13 Turning to the endorsement page, one finds the words, 
"For a covered 'auto' licensed or principally garaged . . . in[] 
Wisconsin, this endorsement modifies insurance provided under 
the following:  Business Auto Coverage Form."  On the same page, 
in section A.1., the policy reads, "We will pay all sums the 
'insured' is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages 
from the owner or driver of the 'underinsured motor vehicle.'"  
In section B.1., the endorsement states that where the named 
insured is an individual, which is the case here, insureds are 
"[1]a. The Named Insured and any 'family members'" and "[1]b. 
Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 'auto'. . . ."  
¶14 There is no dispute that Jonathan Lisowski, as a 
family member, is an insured under his father's business auto 
                                                 
4 For each type of coverage (liability, auto medical 
payments, uninsured motorists, underinsured motorist, physical 
damage, and comprehensive), the Schedule of Coverages and 
Covered Autos also lists the policy limits and the premium.  
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
8 
 
policy and under the UIM endorsement.  The Declarations page 
designates 
Dennis 
Lisowski 
as 
an 
individual, 
and 
the 
Endorsement, in section B.1.a., says the named insured and any 
"family members" are insureds when the named insured is 
designated in the Declarations as an individual. 
B. 
Discussion 
¶15 Jonathan Lisowski advances a half-dozen reasons the 
business auto policy his father held on the 1985 Mack semi 
tractor should provide coverage for the injuries he sustained as 
a passenger in the Avenger, even though it is not a covered 
vehicle:  
(1) the 
"for 
a 
covered 
auto" 
language 
in 
the 
UIM 
endorsement is not part of the policy; it is nothing 
more than introductory language and should not be 
given effect;  
(2) the 
UIM 
endorsement 
changed 
the 
"covered 
auto" 
requirement in the declarations page and trumps any 
conflicting language elsewhere in the policy;  
(3) Hastings Mutual is wrongly seeking to have the court 
either add words to the policy or write into the 
policy a 
permissible exclusion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) that Hastings Mutual itself omitted; 
(4) the "for a covered auto" language should be treated as 
an exclusion and construed narrowly against the 
insurer;  
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
9 
 
(5) the introductory language is contextually ambiguous 
and thus must be construed in Jonathan Lisowski's 
favor; and, finally,  
(6) Crandall should not apply here because it is factually 
distinguishable and its holding is overbroad. 
¶16 Hastings Mutual responds that the "for a covered auto" 
language is part of the policy, and, if characterized as an 
exclusion, is a proper one; that there is no ambiguity; and that 
Crandall is both rightly decided and applicable.   
¶17 Jonathan Lisowski first contends that the "for a 
covered auto" language is not actually a part of the policy 
because it is merely "introductory language."  He contends that 
this court's decision in Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, rests on the 
premise that prefatory headings do not determine coverage.5  
¶18 Mau concerned a German tourist, Wolfgang Mau, who had 
purchased an underinsured motorist insurance policy for a rental 
car.  While traveling, he was involved in a minor accident on an 
icy road, and a deputy stopped to assist him.  At the deputy's 
request, Mau sat in the squad car while towing arrangements were 
made for the disabled vehicle.  As Mau waited, a passing driver 
lost control and crashed into the squad car; Mau sustained 
serious injury.  
                                                 
5 Jonathan Lisowski also proffered an affidavit from an 
editor of an insurance industry trade publication in support of 
his position that the introductory language cannot modify the 
coverage terms.  For the reasons stated herein, we do not find 
the editor's affidavit persuasive. 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
10 
 
¶19 To determine whether there was coverage under the 
policy Mau had purchased for the rental car, we first determined 
that "Mau [was] a named insured under the [UIM] policy."  We 
then determined that the occupancy requirement in the UIM 
endorsement was not valid under Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (1995-96) 
because the statute prohibits an exclusion for a named insured.  
Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, ¶1. 
¶20 Mau is inapposite here; the footnote to which Jonathan 
Lisowski cites says merely, "[R]ather than relying on the 
heading to determine who is a named insured, we look to the 
substance of Endorsement #1, the definitions, to define the 
named insured."  Id., ¶14 n.4 (emphasis added).  The first 
question in Mau was whether the person seeking coverage was a 
named insured, and we were presented with a policy that was 
ambiguous in defining a named insured.  There, where the 
declarations page referred to the endorsement for the named 
insured ("Named Insured: See Endorsement #1" (Id., ¶10)), we did 
nothing more than read all of "Endorsement #1" to find the 
answer.  Nothing in that approach requires us to ignore language 
in the Hastings Mutual policy.  Unlike in Mau, the language we 
look to here is substantive language, not a heading.6  
¶21 Jonathan Lisowski's argument that the endorsement 
changes the policy and trumps any language to the contrary in 
                                                 
6 In this case, the heading on the endorsement page——
"Wisconsin Underinsured Motorists Coverage"——is not relevant to 
the question of whether this business policy provides coverage 
when the injured person is neither a named insured nor an 
occupant of a covered vehicle. 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
11 
 
the declarations page is easily disposed of.  It's true that the 
endorsement says, at the top of the page, "This endorsement 
changes the policy.  Please read it carefully."  It is also true 
that an endorsement is "a provision added to an insurance 
contract altering its scope or application that takes precedence 
over printed portions of the policy in conflict therewith."  
Muehlenbein v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Wis. 2d 259, 265, 
499 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1993).  The endorsement page similarly 
notes, "With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, 
the provisions of the coverage form apply unless modified by the 
endorsement."  
¶22 Because the endorsement itself contains the "for a 
covered auto" requirement, there is no conflict between the 
endorsement and the rest of the policy.  For the same reason, 
there is no way to read the endorsement as modifying the 
provisions of the Coverage Form to expunge the "covered auto" 
requirement.  As noted above, Jonathan Lisowski contends that 
because the definition in section B.1.a., which defines an 
insured as "[t]he Named Insured and any 'family members,'" 
contains no mention of a covered auto, the requirement of a 
covered auto does not apply to a family member of the named 
insured.  He notes that section B.1.b., which applies to "anyone 
else 'occupying' a covered 'auto,'" does impose the requirement.  
These two provisions, however, merely parrot the statute, which 
dictates 
what 
a 
policy 
must 
cover. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(b)1. ("No policy may exclude from the coverage 
afforded or benefits provided [] [p]ersons related by blood, 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
12 
 
marriage 
or 
adoption 
to 
the 
insured."); 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(3)(a) ("[E]very policy . . . issued to an owner shall 
provide that [] [c]overage provided to the named insured applies 
in the same manner and under the same provisions to any person 
using any motor vehicle described in the policy . . . .").  
These provisions, which are included pursuant to statute, cannot 
be read as creating UIM coverage for Jonathan Lisowski where the 
policy, read as a whole, explicitly denies it. 
¶23 Jonathan Lisowski contends that for this court to deny 
coverage here we must rewrite the policy in one of two ways, 
either (1) by adding in words such as "who is occupying a 
covered auto" to the definition of an insured; or (2) by 
inserting an exclusion permitted under Wisconsin statutes that 
the insurer failed to put into the policy explicitly enough.7  We 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) permits insurers to exclude 
coverage under certain circumstances: 
A policy may provide that any coverage under the 
policy does not apply to a loss resulting from the use 
of a motor vehicle that meets all of the following 
conditions: 
1. 
Is owned by the named insured, or is owned by the 
named insured's spouse or a relative of the named 
insured if the spouse or relative resides in the same 
household as the named insured. 
2. 
Is not described in the policy under which the 
claim is made. 
3. 
Is not covered under the terms of the policy as a 
newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle.   
Jonathan Lisowski argues, without citation to authority, 
that such an exclusion is permissible only "if [the insurer] had 
specified the three requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) in 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
13 
 
disagree.  As we explained above, the language that requires 
denying coverage is already found in the declarations page and 
in the endorsement.  First, the endorsement page begins with the 
words "For a covered 'auto,'" so there is no need to add the 
words to the endorsement.  Second, the policy, as written, 
excludes any vehicle owned by the named insured that is neither 
described in the policy nor covered as a newly acquired vehicle.  
In the policy, one finds on the Declarations page the "Schedule 
of Coverages and Covered Autos" (with "07" in the column titled 
"Covered Autos") and the "Schedule of Covered Autos You Own," 
neither of which include the Avenger.  The business auto 
coverage form is the cross-reference for the designation of 
"07," which explicitly limits the coverage to "Specifically 
Described 'Autos.'"  That was a decision made by Dennis Lisowski 
when he bought the policy; there are other levels of coverage 
available which provide coverage for any autos owned by the 
policyholder, even those the policyholder "acquire[s] ownership 
of after the policy begins."  Jonathan Lisowski urges us to 
characterize the covered auto language as an exclusion.  We 
agree with him that such an exclusion, sometimes called a "drive 
other car exclusion," can be valid only where it complies with 
the three specific requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j).  
See Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, 234 Wis. 2d 
587, 610 N.W.2d 467.  Even if the covered auto language is so 
                                                                                                                                                             
the express written exclusion clauses of the UIM endorsement." 
There is, however, no such requirement in the statute. 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
14 
 
characterized, however, it is valid because it complies with the 
three specific requirements of the statute:  It is owned by the 
named insured, is not described in the policy under which the 
claim is made, and is not covered as a newly acquired or 
replacement 
motor 
vehicle. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) 
(permitting insurers to make such exclusions).8  
¶24 Jonathan Lisowski asserts that Mau compels us to 
construe the "for a covered auto" language as an exclusion and 
to construe it narrowly against the insurer.  In Mau, one of the 
questions 
before 
this 
court 
was 
whether 
an 
"occupancy 
requirement," the equivalent of a "covered auto requirement," 
could 
apply 
against 
a 
named 
insured 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6).  In order to apply the statute, which addresses 
what 
a policy may not exclude, we acknowledged that a 
requirement can be the functional equivalent of an exclusion. 
Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, ¶33.  Jonathan Lisowski contends that the 
same principle applies here.  Such an approach does not change 
the outcome.  Even where we construe language narrowly, we are 
still required to give meaning to the terms.  Contrary to his 
assertion, it is not necessary to give the "for a covered auto" 
language 
an 
"overly 
broad 
interpretation" 
to 
reach 
the 
conclusion 
that 
it 
applies 
here. 
 
Even 
construing 
the 
                                                 
8 Given this statutory scheme, the dissent's focus on the 
distinctions between Class I and Class II insureds is misplaced, 
where, as here, it is clear under the language of the policy as 
well as under the circumstances presented that there is no 
coverage; 
therefore, 
we 
do 
not 
find 
that 
distinction 
significant.  
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
15 
 
requirement as an exclusion, consistent with our approach in 
Mau, we reach the same result.9  
¶25 Jonathan Lisowski asserts that a discrepancy between 
the endorsement's statements creates ambiguity——the introductory 
language mentions covered autos and the coverage definitions do 
not.  If words or phrases in a policy are susceptible to more 
than one reasonable construction, they are ambiguous.  Mau, 248 
Wis. 2d 1031, ¶13.  However, we do not read policy terms in 
isolation.  As we noted in Mau, "[W]e must give meaning to all 
provisions in the insurance policy."  Id., ¶20 n.7 (citing 2 Lee 
R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 21:19 (Dec. 
1995) ("All its words, parts, and provisions must be construed 
together as one entire contract, each part interpreted in the 
                                                 
9 Jonathan Lisowski does not claim that the policy violates 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(b)2.  Mau v. North Dakota Insurance 
Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 134, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45, and 
Ruenger v. Soodsma, 2005 WI App 79, 281 Wis. 2d 228, 695 N.W.2d 
840, addressed whether an occupancy requirement for a named 
insured violated Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(b)2., which states: 
(b) No policy may exclude from the coverage afforded 
or benefits provided: 
. . . . 
2.a. Any person who is a named insured or passenger in 
or on the insured vehicle, with respect to bodily 
injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom, to that person. 
In both cases, the answer was that an occupancy requirement 
violated the statute because both cases involved injured parties 
who were named insureds.  In this case, that statute is not 
implicated because Jonathan Lisowski is neither a "named 
insured" nor "[a] passenger in or on the insured vehicle."   
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
16 
 
light of all the other parts, in connection with the risk or 
subject matter.")).  The language in the endorsement which 
refers to "covered auto" is consistent with the language in the 
declarations page,10 which also refers to "covered autos."  The 
language links the endorsement page to the declarations page. 
Having considered the position taken by the dissent, we find it 
more persuasive to read the "for a covered auto" language as a 
key to the question of coverage.  
¶26 It is true, as Jonathan Lisowski points out, that none 
of the endorsement's exclusions applies.11  But that makes no 
difference.  An exclusion is relevant only in a context where 
coverage exists.  Crandall, 269 Wis.2d 765, ¶16 n.2 ("The 
Crandalls raise additional arguments to establish that [their 
daughter] is an insured and that none of the UIM exclusions 
applies. 
 
However, 
those 
arguments 
do 
not 
create 
coverage . . . .  Rather, coverage must first be established.  
Then, if the policy provides coverage we would, for example, 
                                                 
10 See Dowhower v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶40, 
236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557 (Bradley, J., concurring) 
("Arguably, the Declaration page is the most crucial section of 
the policy for the typical insured . . . ."). 
11 The exclusions apply, for example, when the named insured 
is occupying a vehicle he or she owns that is not a covered 
auto; when a family member is occupying a vehicle that the named 
insured's family member owns; and when a family member is 
occupying a vehicle owned by the named insured that has UIM 
coverage under another policy.  Jonathan Lisowski fit none of 
those descriptions.  He was not the named insured.  He was a 
family member occupying a car (the Avenger) owned by the named 
insured (Dennis Lisowski).  The car had no UIM coverage under 
any other policy. 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
17 
 
analyze whether any exclusions apply."); Bulen v. West Bend Mut. 
Ins. Co., 125 Wis. 2d 259, 263, 371 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1985) 
("Such clauses subtract from coverage rather than grant it."). 
¶27 Jonathan Lisowski and Hastings Mutual differ as to the 
applicability of Crandall to this case.  Crandall involved a 
policyholder who had purchased a business policy for his garage 
operations.  The policy contained a UIM endorsement.  When the 
policyholder's daughter was injured in an accident, in a vehicle 
driven by a friend, the daughter sought coverage under her 
father's UIM coverage.  The endorsement language, as here, 
included 
the 
words, 
"For 
a 
covered 
'auto' 
licensed 
or 
principally 
garaged, 
or 
'garage 
operations' 
conducted 
in 
Wisconsin, 
this 
endorsement 
modifies 
insurance . . . ."  
Crandall, 269 Wis. 2d 765, ¶2. 
¶28 This case mirrors Crandall's facts in relevant ways.  
Crandall involved a businessowner's garage operations policy; 
here, the policy involved is a business auto policy.  The cover 
of the policy here notes in large bold type that it is a 
"Business Auto Policy."  In both cases, an insured, but not the 
named insured, was injured while a passenger in an underinsured 
vehicle not listed in the policy.  The relevant language in the 
policies' endorsements is identical. 
¶29 We agree with the court of appeals' reasoning in 
Crandall that: 
[T]his is a policy for Crandall's business, not for 
him as an individual. . . .  The policy is described 
in 
various 
places 
within 
the 
policy 
as 
a 
businessowner's policy and a garage policy.  It would 
No. 
2006AP2662   
 
18 
 
be unexpected for this kind of policy to cover 
Crandall and his family under circumstances wholly 
unrelated to Crandall's business. 
Id., ¶9. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶30 The "for a covered auto" language on which this case 
turns is substantive language that appears in several places in 
the policy, including the endorsement page.  When the provisions 
of the policy are read together, the language is not ambiguous.  
We agree with the reasoning of Crandall, 269 Wis. 2d 765, and we 
believe it controls here.  Like Crandall, this case concerns an 
underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement to a business auto 
policy; also, like Crandall, it involves an injured party who is 
not the named insured, a driver who is not an insured under the 
policy, and a vehicle not listed in the policy.  Even if the 
covered auto language is characterized as an exclusion in the 
UIM endorsement, it is valid when the conditions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) are satisfied, as they are here.  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
1 
 
¶31 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that the dispute here is "whether Jonathan Lisowski 
was entitled to coverage as an insured regardless of where he 
was at the time he was injured by the underinsured motorist."  
Majority op., ¶10 (emphasis added).  Based upon what I refer to 
as Rule 101 of underinsured motorist coverage (UIM), the answer 
is undoubtedly: yes. 
¶32 By Rule 101, I mean that basic to the nature of 
underinsured motorist coverage is that it is "personal and 
portable" for resident family members of the named insured.  As 
a learned treatise on Wisconsin insurance law explains: "Keep in 
mind that UIM as well as UM coverage is personal and portable 
and follows Class I insureds [resident family members of the 
named insured]."  1 Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law 
§ 4.14 (5th ed. 2004).  
¶33 What does it mean to be "personal and portable"?  
"Personal" means that the coverage follows the person and not 
the vehicle, and "portable" means that it follows the person 
regardless of where he is at the time of the accident.  Unlike 
general automobile liability policies which insure a specific 
auto, UIM policies insure the person. 
¶34 We have previously explained that coverage for Class I 
insureds follows the insured "wherever he may go, be it 'in an 
unowned vehicle, on a motorcycle, on a bicycle, whether afoot or 
on horseback or even on a pogo stick.'"  Teschendorf v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
2 
 
(quoting 
Welch 
v. 
State 
Farm 
Mut. 
Auto 
Ins. 
Co., 
122 
Wis. 2d 172, 181, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985)).1  
¶35 The majority correctly acknowledges that there is no 
dispute that, as a resident family member of the named insured, 
Jonathan is a Class I insured.  Majority op., ¶10.  Thus, I 
conclude based on Rule 101 (UIM coverage is "personal and 
portable") that Jonathan is covered under his UIM policy 
regardless of where he was at the time he was injured.  
¶36 The problem with the majority opinion is twofold: (1) 
by ignoring this basic tenet of UIM coverage, it collapses the 
distinction between Class I and Class II insureds, requiring all 
insureds to be occupants of covered autos; and (2) by concluding 
that the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, it 
contradicts a parade of cases from other courts and avoids the 
cannon of construction that ambiguity is decided in favor of the 
insured. 
I 
¶37 The majority concludes that occupancy of a covered 
auto is a requirement for UIM coverage under this policy.  In 
reaching this conclusion the majority determines that UIM 
coverage for Class I insureds is neither "personal" nor 
"portable."   
¶38 UIM 
policies 
traditionally 
cover 
three 
distinct 
classes of insureds.  Wisconsin Insurance Law, supra, § 4.11.  
                                                 
1 While Teschendorf dealt with an uninsured motorist (UM) 
policy, its analysis applies to UIM policies as well.  See 1 
Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 4.14 (5th ed. 
2004). 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
3 
 
The named insured and any relatives who reside in the named 
insured's household are Class I insureds.  Id.  Class II 
insureds, or "occupant insureds," include anyone else while 
occupying a covered auto.  Id.  Finally, anyone who is entitled 
to a derivative claim is a Class III insured.  Id.  In Wisconsin 
as well as nationally, UIM coverage is personal and portable for 
Class I insureds.2 
¶39 The provisions of Jonathan's father's UIM policy 
correspond with this understanding of UIM insurance.  The 
initial grant of coverage states that Hastings will "pay all 
sums 
the 
'insured' 
is 
legally 
entitled 
to 
recover 
as 
compensatory 
damages 
from 
the 
owner 
or 
driver 
of 
an 
'underinsured motor vehicle.'"  The policy further defines three 
distinct classes of insureds: 
I. 
The Named Insured and any [resident] "family members." 
II. 
Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or temporary 
substitute for a "covered auto". . . .  
III. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover 
because of "bodily injury" sustained by another 
"insured." 
¶40 The definition of Class I insureds contains no 
occupancy requirement.  The only insureds who must occupy a 
covered auto to be afforded coverage are Class II insureds.  
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Insurance Law, supra, § 4.14; see also Alan I. 
Widiss & Jeffrey E. Thomas, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Insurance 
§ 33.2 
(3d 
ed. 
2005) 
("Most 
significantly, 
clause/class (1) insureds do not have to be an occupant of an 
insured vehicle when an injury occurs in order to be covered."). 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
4 
 
Under the majority's analysis, however, there is no distinction 
between Class I and Class II insureds——both must be occupants of 
a covered vehicle in order to receive coverage.  
¶41 An established principle of policy interpretation is 
that courts should read a policy to give meaning to every 
provision, avoiding constructions that render portions of the 
policy meaningless.  Isermann v. MBL Life Assur. Corp., 231 
Wis. 2d 136, ¶25, 605 N.W.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1999).  If the 
language is given the effect advanced by the majority, the 
definition of Class I insureds is rendered meaningless here.  
Why would the policy differentiate between Class I insureds and 
Class II insureds if there is no distinction? 
¶42 Reading 
this 
policy 
to 
give 
meaning 
to 
every 
provision, I conclude that there is a distinction between Class 
I and Class II insureds——Class I insureds need not occupy a 
covered auto in order to be covered under the UIM endorsement.  
As a Class I insured, Jonathan's UIM coverage is personal and 
portable and he is entitled to coverage wherever he may go. 
II 
¶43 After eschewing this basic principle of UIM coverage, 
the majority embarks upon a determination of whether the 
language of the policy is ambiguous or unambiguous.  The 
lynchpin of the majority's analysis is that the language of the 
policy is clear and unambiguous.  If, however, the majority 
concluded that the language was ambiguous, it would have to 
decide the case in favor of coverage for Jonathan.  Ambiguity in 
an insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage.  
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
5 
 
Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶13, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 
N.W.2d 857.   
¶44 The problem with the majority opinion is that it 
remains steadfast to its conclusion that the language is clear 
and unambiguous, disregarding the conclusions of court after 
court examining the same language.  Indeed, a parade of courts 
has examined identical language and reached a conclusion 
opposite to the majority.   
¶45 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals found 
Jonathan's argument that the language was ambiguous to be 
persuasive.  Nonetheless, both courts were bound to follow the 
holding of Crandall ex rel. Johnson v. Society Insurance,3 in 
which the court of appeals determined that similar language 
unambiguously restricted UIM coverage to occupants of covered 
autos.  Both courts struggled to reconcile the obvious ambiguity 
in this UIM endorsement with the unequivocal holding in Crandall 
that it was unambiguous. 
¶46 To begin, the circuit court stated that Jonathan's 
legal arguments and secondary authorities were persuasive: "I 
would be tempted to be sympathetic to the language——to a finding 
that it does create ambiguity."  Nonetheless, the court 
concluded——as it must——that it was constrained to follow 
Crandall.   
¶47 Initially, the court of appeals certified the question 
to this court, noting that "[t]he introductory provision 
Crandall relied on is plainly inconsistent with the provisions 
                                                 
3 2004 WI App 34, 269 Wis. 2d 765, 676 N.W.2d 174. 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
6 
 
that follow it" and asked us to modify, limit, or overrule 
Crandall.  We did not accept certification, and the court of 
appeals ultimately determined that under Cook v. Cook,4 it must 
follow the conclusion of the Crandall court, even though it 
disagreed with it.  Lisowski v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co., No. 
2006AP2662, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008). 
¶48 Likewise, the court of appeals in Ruenger v. Soodsma, 
2005 WI App 79, 281 Wis. 2d 228, 695 N.W.2d 840, struggled to 
reconcile 
Crandall's 
unequivocal 
holding 
with 
plainly 
inconsistent policy language.  Ruenger, the insured, argued that 
identical introductory language as here created ambiguity when 
read in conjunction with the coverage section of the UIM 
endorsement.  Id., ¶34.  The court acknowledged that the 
coverage section of the UIM endorsement, read alone, provided 
coverage for the Class I insured while occupying an uncovered 
vehicle.  Id., ¶31.  Noting that there was merit to Ruenger's 
ambiguity argument, the court concluded that nonetheless, it was 
bound by the holding in Crandall.  Id., ¶34.   
¶49 Courts around the country have examined identical 
language and have uniformly determined that it is ambiguous.  
See Reisig v. Allstate, 645 N.W.2d 544, 550-51 (Neb. 2002) 
(finding ambiguity because the terms of the UIM endorsement 
conflicted with the introductory language "for a covered auto"); 
Bushey v. N. Assurance Co., 766 A.2d 598, 603 (Md. Ct. App. 
2001) (same); see also Stoddard v. Citizens Ins. Co., 643 
                                                 
4 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (stating that 
the court of appeals may not overrule, modify, or withdraw 
language from a prior court of appeals decision).  
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
7 
 
N.W.2d 265, 269 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (determining that a 
similar UIM endorsement unambiguously provided coverage to a 
Class I insured even though the insured did not occupy a covered 
auto).   
¶50 It should give the majority pause that in all of these 
cases, the courts have determined that identical language was, 
at the very least, contextually ambiguous.  Nonetheless, the 
majority unhesitatingly turns a blind eye to this overwhelming 
weight of authority, clings to Crandall, and concludes that the 
language of the policy is clear and unambiguous.  Wisconsin 
stands alone in this interpretation.   
¶51 The majority determines that there is no ambiguity 
because the covered auto language in the UIM endorsement is 
consistent with the declarations page of the liability policy.  
Majority op., ¶25.  It ignores, however, the obvious conflict 
between the covered auto language and the grant of coverage in 
the UIM endorsement.  In focusing on the symmetry between the 
declarations page and the "for a covered auto" language, the 
majority skirts the established principle of insurance policy 
construction that ambiguity must be construed in favor of 
coverage.   
¶52 Finally, as requested by the court of appeals in its 
certification memorandum to this court, I would take this 
opportunity to modify Crandall.  The court of appeals correctly 
explained that "[t]he introductory provision Crandall relied on 
is plainly inconsistent with the provisions that follow it."  
Our interpretation should comport with the reality observed by 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
8 
 
other courts that have examined the same language——the policy 
language is ambiguous.   
¶53 Although the majority proclaims that the language is 
clear and unambiguous, it does not necessarily make it so.  
Instead, all too often this court finds policy language 
unambiguous which then obviates the need for further meaningful 
analysis.  I am reminded of the words of a nonsense poem by 
Lewis Carroll: "I have said it thrice: What I tell you three 
times is true."5 
¶54 Just because Wisconsin courts thrice proclaim that 
this language is clear and unambiguous, it makes it no more true 
than was the proclamation in Carroll's poem.  For the above 
reasons, I would conclude that Jonathan's injuries are covered 
                                                 
5 "Just the place for a Snark!" the Bellman cried, 
As he landed his crew with care; 
Supporting each man on the top of the tide 
By the finger entwined in his hair. 
 
"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice: 
That alone should encourage the crew. 
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice: 
What I tell you three times is true." 
 
Lewis Carroll, "The Hunting of the Snark" (1876).  
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
9 
 
under 
his 
father's 
UIM 
policy. 
 
This 
interpretation 
is 
consistent with established principles of UIM coverage and of 
insurance policy interpretation.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶55 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2006AP002662.awb 
 
1