Case Title: 37 GAMBLING DEVICES (CHEYENNE ELKS CLUB AND CHEYENNE MUSIC AND VENDING, INC.) v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
37 GAMBLING DEVICES (CHEYENNE ELKS CLUB AND CHEYENNE MUSIC AND VENDING, INC.) v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 16694 P.2d 711Case Number: 83-199Decided: 01/30/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
37 GAMBLING DEVICES 
(CHEYENNE ELKS CLUB AND CHEYENNE MUSIC AND 
VENDING, INC.), APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Rehearing Denied March 4, 
1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
Douglas J. 
Moench, Jr., Cole & Moench, Cheyenne, for appellants.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, 
C.J.*, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and 
RAPER, J., Retired.**

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** ROONEY, C.J. at the time of oral 
argument, having recused himself, RAPER, 
J., Retired, was assigned pursuant to order of the court entered June 13, 
1983.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The key issue which we 
address in this case is a claim of exemption from the Wyoming statutes 
prohibiting gambling, which is premised on the ground that the accused 
activities consisted of "raffles or bingo conducted by charitable or nonprofit 
organizations." The appellants also argue at length a claim that the trial court 
erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the claimed fact that the Elk's 
Lodge is a nonprofit organization. The district court ruled that certain accused 
machines, devices and paraphernalia were either gambling devices per se or used 
for gambling, and it ordered their destruction. The district court refused to 
take judicial notice of the status of the Elk's Lodge as a nonprofit 
organization. As we analyze the ruling of the district court, even if the status 
of the Elk's Lodge as a nonprofit organization were established, the judge still 
did not perceive the machines, devices and paraphernalia as "raffles or bingo." 
We find no error in the rulings of the district court, and its judgment is 
affirmed.

"* * * In clear violation 
of Rule 5.01(2), W.R.A.P., appellants have failed to provide `[a] statement of 
the issues presented for review." * * *." Cline v. Safeco Insurance Companies, 
Wyo., 614 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1980).

As we noted in 
Cline v. Safeco Insurance Companies, 
supra, Rule 1.02, W.R.A.P., would justify our refusing to consider the 
contentions of the appellants. Because the apparent issues are of some import in 
Wyoming, and because we believe we have 
accurately gleaned the contentions of the appellants from their brief, we shall 
consider the issues as we have identified them with some support from the brief 
of the State of Wyoming. We reiterate to the Bar, however, the 
concerns expressed in Cline v. Safeco 
Insurance Companies, supra, and post a firm admonition that we will not 
always tolerate such glaring failures to comply with the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

[¶2.]     There is included in 
the Brief of Appellants a summary of the argument which does furnish some 
guidance as to the apparent issues addressed by the brief. That summary 
is:

"I. AN ARBITRARY DECISION 
BASED UPON THE TAKING OF JUDICIAL NOTICE OF CHARITABLE, NON-PROFIT STATUS AS TO 
ONE POSSESSOR OF DEFENDANTS, AND NOT TAKING SUCH NOTICE AS TO ANOTHER IS 
CAPRICIOUS AND ERRONEOUS IN LAW.

"II. AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION OCCURS WHERE AB INITIO, THE TRIAL COURT FAILS TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
OF A FACT COMMONLY KNOWN WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT, 
IS NOT SUBJECT TO REASONABLE DISPUTE, AND IS CAPABLE OF ACCURATE AND READY 
DETERMINATION. PROTECTION OF THE OPPOSING PARTY CAN BE IMPLEMENTED BY PROVIDING 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
HEARD.

"III. JUDICIAL NOTICE MAY 
BE TAKEN AT ANY STAGE OF A PROCEEDING AND IS MANDATORY WHEN A REQUEST IS 
ACCOMPANIED WITH CORRESPONDING INFORMATION. AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL, SUCH ACTION 
IS PROPER WHERE PLAIN ERROR APPEARS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.

"IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A 
EVIDENTIARY, ADJUDICATIVE FACT ESTABLISHES THAT FACT AND LEADS TO A 
QUALIFICATION OF THE PARTY AS EXCEPTED FROM THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN A 
STATUTE. SUCH EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE CONSISTENTLY APPLIED.

"V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW AND OF DUE PROCESS DOES NOT TOLERATE 
A STATUTE THAT FORBIDS ACTS IN TERMS SO VAGUE THAT MEN OF COMMON INTELLIGENCE 
MUST NECESSARILY GUESS AT ITS MEANING AND DIFFER AS TO ITS 
APPLICATION."

[¶3.]     In the brief filed on 
behalf of the State of Wyoming the following issues are 
suggested:

"I. SHOULD THE DEVICES 
WHICH WERE SEIZED BE ORDERED DESTROYED PURSUANT TO SECTION 6-9-108, W.S. 
1977?

"II. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO REFUSE TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT ELKS LODGE NUMBER 660 OF 
CHEYENNE, WYOMING WAS A NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATION?

"III. IS SECTION 6-9-111, 
W.S. 1977, WHICH PROVIDES AN EXEMPTION FROM THE GENERAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST 
GAMBLING BY ALLOWING CHARITABLE OR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS TO CONDUCT RAFFLES 
OR BINGO, APPLICABLE?

"IV. SHOULD THIS COURT 
CONSIDER APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A WYOMING STATUTE, WHEN THE 
ARGUMENT IS INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING?"

[¶4.]     On June 24, 1983, 
officers of the Cheyenne Police Department seized certain machines, devices and 
paraphernalia which allegedly violated Wyoming Statutes prohibiting gambling1 from premises owned and occupied by 
Elk's Lodge Number 660. The things that were seized included two electronic 
machines identified as Shawnee games, an electronic bingo game, four blackjack 
tables, a blackjack table top, three craps tables, eight stamp-vending machines 
which had been modified to sell "pickle cards," a pickle jar with numbers 
inside, poker chips, cards, and other items including some cash. A warrant had 
been issued pursuant to § 6-9-108, W.S. 1977,2 and after the seizure the district 
attorney filed a Petition for Determination As to Gambling Devices and Their 
Destruction in accordance with the same statute. The matter was set for hearing 
on June 24, 1983, and on the date set for hearing the Elk's Lodge filed a 
Resistance to Motion to Return Property, which essentially attacked the search 
warrant as unconstitutional, the statute as unconstitutional, and asserted that 
the seized items were not designed or adapted for gambling. Following a two-day 
hearing the State moved for a directed verdict on its petition on the ground 
that the Elk's Lodge had not established that it was a charitable or nonprofit 
organization. At this juncture the following colloquy occurred between the 
district court and counsel for the Elk's Lodge:

"[COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I 
would just say that it is well known and it has been established throughout that 
Elk's Lodges in the United States cannot be Elk's Lodges if they are profit 
making.

"THE COURT: I don't know 
that it's an item that I can necessarily take Judicial knowledge 
of."

The record 
discloses no other argument or motion to take judicial notice in the court 
below.

[¶5.]     Following the hearing 
counsel submitted briefs on the issue of constitutionality of § 6-9-108, W.S. 
1977, and the district court entered its decision letter on July 26, 1983. The 
district court found that a number of the items seized were gambling devices 
which were prohibited by the laws of Wyoming and were subject to forfeiture and 
destruction as nuisances. Some of the seized items the district court held had 
not been shown by the evidence at the hearing to have been used in connection 
with gambling, and they were not ordered destroyed. Three craps tables and one 
blackjack table, which apparently were owned by the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, 
were ordered set aside until that organization could be afforded an opportunity 
to be heard on the question of whether they should be 
destroyed.

[¶6.]     The district court in 
addressing the question of the statutory exemption found in § 6-9-111, W.S. 
1977,3 upon which the Elk's Lodge relied, 
stated:

"* * * As much as the 
Court might be inclined, it is unable in this instance to find any authority for 
taking judicial knowledge of the charitable or nonprofit status of the local 
Elks Club. A trustee, Mr. Barker, did testify at the hearing that the money 
derived from such machines generally went back to the club operation, but that 
if anything was left over, it would go to charity. The failure to establish the 
charitable or nonprofit character of the organization is fatal to any claim of 
exemption from the gambling laws of this state."

[¶7.]     On August 1, 1983, a 
motion to intervene in the proceeding was filed on behalf of Cheyenne Music and 
Vending Company, Inc., which is the owner of the electronic machines. The 
district court held a hearing on that motion but entered its Order Denying 
Motion to Intervene on August 22, 1983. On that day the final written Order for 
Destruction of Gambling Devices was entered, which formalized the findings set 
forth in the court's decision letter. It is from that order that this appeal is 
taken. After the Notice of Appeal was filed the district court entered an 
appropriate Order for Stay of Execution on Order of Destruction pending the 
appeal.

[¶8.]     As in the district 
court, the appellants vigorously argue the availability of the statutory 
exception found in § 6-9-111, W.S. 1977:

"* * * But nothing in 
this section shall be construed as applying to games of chance known as raffles 
or bingo conducted by charitable or nonprofit organizations and the tickets of 
such raffles or bingo shall be sold only in this state."

The initial 
argument with respect to the availability of this exception focuses upon the 
claimed error on the part of the district court in refusing to take judicial 
notice of the nonprofit character of Elk's Lodge Number 660. This issue now is 
governed by Rule 201, W.R.E., which provides:

"(a) Scope of rule. - This rule governs only 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

"(b) Kinds of facts. - A judicially noticed 
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.

"(c) When discretionary. - A court may take 
judicial notice, whether requested or not.

"(d) When mandatory. - A court shall take 
judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information.

"(e) Opportunity to be heard. - A party is entitled upon 
timely requested to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking 
judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior 
notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 

"(f) Time of taking notice. - Judicial notice 
may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.

"(g) Instructing jury. - In a civil action or 
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact 
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that 
it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed."

[¶9.]     The appellants claim 
that the district court was supplied with the style of necessary information 
with respect to the nonprofit status of Elk's Lodge Number 660 which causes 
judicial notice to be mandatory under Rule 201(d), W.R.E. They point 
specifically to testimony from the secretary of the lodge that it had sought to 
ascertain whether the so-called "pickles game" was prohibited by the Wyoming 
Statutes. This testimony by the secretary of the lodge does not furnish the 
court with any information as to the nonprofit status of Elk's Lodge Number 660, 
and is not sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 201(d), 
W.R.E.

[¶10.]  The propriety of judicial notice is then 
vested in the sound discretion of the district court in accordance with Rule 
201(c), W.R.E. Blas v. Talabera, 318 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1963); United States 
v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1982); Herrera v. Nakata, Colo. App., 478 P.2d 706 (1970); 1 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 58, p. 445 (1977); and 
21 Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5107, p. 506 (1977). To 
obtain a reversal of such a ruling on appeal the appellant is required to 
demonstrate not only an abuse of discretion by the trial court but also that the 
error was prejudicial. Blas v. 
Talabera, supra; Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. In this instance the appellants fail to 
demonstrate either an abuse of discretion or prejudice.

[¶11.]  The appellants have persisted in their 
pursuit of judicial notice of the nonprofit status of Elk's Lodge Number 660 by 
supplying to this court an affidavit of the secretary of the lodge and a copy of 
its 1982 federal income tax return. We recognize that judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceedings, including the appeal. Rule 201(f), 
W.R.E.; Kemlon Products & Development 
Company v. United States, 646 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 863, 102 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1981); United States 
v. Camp, 723 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1984); Mills v. Denver Tramway Corporation, 155 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946); Prestige 
Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, Colo., 658 P.2d 850 (1983); People ex rel. Adams v. Kite, 48 Ill. 
App.3d 828, 6 Ill.Dec. 653, 363 N.E.2d 182 (1977); Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation District, 
91 N.M. 398, 575 P.2d 88 (1977); 1 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 59, 
p. 482 (1977); 1 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 28[06], p. 201-47 (1982); and 21 Wright 
and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5110, p. 521 (1977). Judicial 
notice upon appeal should not, however, be invoked to relieve parties of their 
duty to present adequate evidence at the trial except in the most extreme cases 
in which the failure to take judicial notice would be akin to plain error. Mills v. Denver Tramway, supra; 1 
Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 59, pp. 482-487; 1 Weinstein, supra, ¶ 201[04], 
pp. 201-38 and 201-39; and 21 Wright and Graham, supra, § 5110, pp. 524-527. See 
also Schwartz, A Suggestion for the Demise of Judicial Notice of Judicial Facts, 
45 Tex.L.Rev. 1212 (1967). If Rule 201(d), W.R.E., is read literally it requires 
the taking of judicial notice upon appeal when the request is made and the 
necessary information is supplied. That construction of the rule would infringe 
upon basic principles which underly the appellate process and which require the 
timely presentation of objections and offers of proof to a trial court in order 
to preserve errors on rulings on evidentiary matters for review. These 
principles are summarized in Rule 103, W.R.E., which apply in the absence of 
plain error.4 We will not adopt such an 
interpretation. We construe our Rule 201(d) to require, in the absence of plain 
error, the taking of judicial notice on appeal only when timely request has been 
made to the trial court and the necessary information made a part of the record 
on appeal. See 1 Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 59, pp. 482-483; and 21 Wright 
and Miller, supra, § 5110, pp. 525-527. Judicial restraint requires that we 
reject the request to take judicial notice in this court in an instance such as 
this in which the critical evidentiary material upon which the request is based 
was not presented to the district court.

[¶12.]  We need not pursue the possibility of 
taking judicial notice under the plain error doctrine because in this instance 
we can affirm the decision of the district court upon a different ground. The 
appellants argue that possession by a nonprofit organization of the items which 
were seized in this case is permissible pursuant to the exception found in § 
6-9-111, W.S. 1977:

"* * * [N]othing in this 
section shall be construed as applying to games of chance known as raffles or bingo conducted by charitable 
or nonprofit organizations * * *." (Emphasis added.)

The appellants 
contend that some of the devices which were seized were used for "raffles or 
bingo" which may be conducted by nonprofit organizations within this exception. 
The trial court primarily relied upon the failure to establish the nonprofit 
status of the Elk's Lodge in its ruling that the statutory exception was not 
applicable. We, however, can affirm the decision of a trial court on any valid 
basis appearing in the record. Valentine 
v. Ormsbee Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 452 (1983); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); and Budd v. Bishop, 
Wyo., 543 P.2d 368 (1975).

[¶13.]  With regard to the three electronic 
machines which were seized, it is clear from the record that these machines were 
being operated as gambling devices, although unlike the standard slot machines 
there was no automatic payoff. Instead those playing the machines were paid in 
cash by the bartender with the amount of payment depending upon their success in 
playing the games. SeeState v. Branney, 62 Wyo. 40, 160 P.2d 972 
(1945). It also is established by evidence in the record that these machines 
were being operated for profit by Elk's Lodge Number 660, and the owner of the 
machines, Cheyenne Music and Vending Company, Inc. The net proceeds from the 
operation of the machines was divided between these two entities on a 
fifty-fifty basis. Cheyenne Music and Vending Company, Inc., concedes that it is 
organized and operated as a profit-making venture. That fact, as well as the 
failure of the proof relating to the nonprofit status of the Elk's Lodge, 
prevents any application of the statutory exception to these particular 
machines. As the Illinois Appellate Court has said:

"The law is not required 
to be blind to, and ineffectual against, the ceaseless efforts and ingenuity of 
persons to circumvent the Gambling Device Act. When we ascend to the bench we do 
not discard the ordinary common sense observations, experiences and intelligence 
of common men and we cannot be so naive as to conclude that the devices which 
have been demonstrated to us are games of amusement. * * *" People v. One Machine Known as "Circus 
Days", 23 Ill. App.2d 480, 163 N.E.2d 223, 228 
(1960).

[¶14.]  The other items which it is argued are 
subject to the exception are the so-called "pickle cards." These cards were 
purchased by bar patrons of the Elk's Lodge. They have tabs which when pulled by 
the purchaser reveal symbols similar to those on slot machines, and these then 
are compared with those appearing on a chart to determine whether the player has 
won. The record establishes that pickle cards are sold under a number of 
different names, each constituting a separate game containing a specific number 
of tickets which are sold for a set amount with a predetermined amount of profit 
if all the tickets are sold. The odds of any ticket winning also are 
predetermined because only a set number of the tickets display the requisite 
combination of winning symbols. These cards function in a manner very similar to 
slot machines, which are prohibited specifically by § 6-9-101, W.S. 1977. See State v. Branney, 
supra.

[¶15.]  The appellants contend, however, that the 
pickle cards are "raffles" for purposes of applying the exception found in § 
6-9-111, W.S. 1977. On this issue we hold that these devices do not fall within 
the definition of raffles as that term was intended by our legislature. The 
language in the statute is to be examined in light of objects and purposes to be 
accomplished. State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543 (1982); and School Districts 
Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 20, in County of 
Campbell v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751 
(1967). In § 6-9-111, W.S. 1977, the legislature manifests an unmistakable 
intention that lotteries of "any kind or description" are prohibited with the 
limited exception of "raffles or bingo conducted by charitable or nonprofit 
organizations." See also § 6-9-112 and § 6-9-113, W.S. 1977. The words "lottery" 
and "raffle" are not defined in the statute, but from the manner in which these 
terms are used it is apparent that a raffle is considered a type of 
lottery.

[¶16.]  A lottery has been defined as consisting 
of three elements, which are consideration, chance and prize. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension 
Company, Inc., Wyo., 572 P.2d 412 (1977); Morrow v. State, Alaska, 511 P.2d 127 
(1973); In re Interrogatories of the 
Governor Regarding Sweepstakes Races Act, 196 Colo. 353, 585 P.2d 595 
(1978); State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 
439, 502 P.2d 841 (1972); and Albertson's, Inc. v. Hansen, Utah, 600 P.2d 982 (1979). All these elements are present in the operation of a pickle 
game. Contact, Inc. v. State, 212 Neb. 584, 324 N.W.2d 804 (1982). In Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension 
Company, Inc., supra, 572 P.2d  at 414, citing State v. Hudson, 128 W. Va. 655, 37 S.E.2d 553, 163 A.L.R. 1265 (1946), this court, in a different context, 
indicated that a "raffle" is synonymous with a "lottery." The contention of the 
appellants is that it follows if the Elk's Lodge were a nonprofit organization a 
pickle game is exempt because it is a raffle.

[¶17.]  A scrutiny of the actual language used in 
§ 6-9-111, W.S. 1977, however, convinces this court that in the prior decision 
we did not intend to justify a lottery as a raffle insofar as the statutory 
prohibition of games of chance is concerned. More properly analyzed, a raffle is 
a form of prohibited lottery in which each participant buys a ticket for 
valuable consideration in order to be eligible for a random drawing to win a 
prize or prizes. In considering what the legislature intended by using the term 
"raffle" we are reminded that words in statutes are to be given their common and 
ordinary meaning. Herring v. Welltech, 
Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361 (1983). The common and 
ordinary use of the term "raffle" would not include a game of chance such as the 
pickles game. Unlike the usual raffle conducted by a charitable or nonprofit 
organization, pickles cards are marked by symbols which when revealed and 
compared to a pre-existing chart determine whether the purchaser is a winner. In 
a raffle the probability of any individual ticket being randomly drawn to win a 
prize is equal and determined by the total number of tickets actually sold, 
whereas in the pickles game a predetermined number of cards is to be sold with a 
predetermined number of winners.

[¶18.]  We must assume that the legislature in 
structuring the exception contained in § 6-9-111, W.S. 1977, carefully chose to 
except only "raffles or bingo" conducted by the eligible organizations, and not 
all lotteries or schemes of chance, "of any kind or description, by whatever 
name, style, or title the same may be known" which might be conducted by such 
organizations. We should not assume, in construing an exception to a criminal 
statute, that the legislature intended to describe other things than those 
specifically mentioned, in this instance all lotteries, by the words "raffles or 
bingo." We conclude that even should we judicially notice the nonprofit status 
of Elk's Lodge Number 660 its conduct of the pickles game does not fall within 
the statutory exception found in § 6-9-111, W.S. 1977.

[¶19.]  The final argument presented in the 
appellants' brief is that the statute is so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application. It is urged that it denies equal protection and due process for 
these reasons with reliance placed upon Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270 
(1977). We do follow the rule that criminal statutes must set forth with 
reasonable certainty the act or conduct required or forbidden in a manner that 
furnishes fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that certain conduct 
is proscribed by the State. Armijo v. 
State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864 (1984). The appellants' 
brief fails to identify the particular statute which is claimed to be 
unconstitutional, and it does not inform this court except by inference of those 
constitutional provisions which purportedly are violated. We do not consider 
constitutional questions in the abstract. When a party fails to demonstrate the 
manner in which his own rights are adversely affected in light of the 
circumstances before the court we will not consider the constitutional claim. Armijo v. State, supra; Alberts v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 447 
(1982). The appellants have failed in this case to meet the requirements which 
justify the consideration of their constitutional claim.

[¶20.]  The appellants also seem to argue that in 
some manner they were treated differently from the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, 
which was identified as the owner of some of the items which were seized. The 
short answer to any claims such as this, which we assume invokes the requirement 
of equal protection of the laws, is that the record establishes only that a 
hearing was required with respect to the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, and there 
is no way for us to determine from this record what the outcome of that hearing 
was. The appellants were not deprived of equal protection of the laws by the 
order of the district court affording due process to the Cystic Fibrosis 
Foundation.

[¶21.]  The district court correctly refused to 
take judicial notice of the nonprofit status of Elk's Lodge Number 660, and we 
are not required to do so in this appeal. Even if the nonprofit status of Elk's 
Lodge Number 660 had been established, the items which were ordered destroyed 
offend against the statute proscribing gambling, and they could not be saved by 
the claimed exception found in § 6-9-111, W.S. 1977. The appellants have failed 
to sustain their claim that they are denied their constitutional right of equal 
protection because of the vagueness of the statute. The Order for Destruction of 
Gambling Devices is proper and should be executed.

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

1 Sections 6-9-101 to 
6-9-113, W.S. 1977, in effect at the time of the present proceedings, have been 
replaced by §§ 6-7-101 to 6-7-103, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Repl.).

2 Section 6-9-108, W.S. 
1977, provided:

"Any gambling table, 
gambling device, or paraphernalia adopted [adapted], devised, or designed for 
the purpose of playing, conducting, or carrying on, any game of chance, 
prohibited by the laws of this state, is hereby declared to be a nuisance, and 
whenever a written complaint signed by the complainant under oath, alleging that 
he verily believes that any such gambling table, gambling device or 
paraphernalia is located at any place within this state, describing such 
gambling table, device or paraphernalia by name, and naming the place of its 
location, is presented to any district judge or justice of the peace, within 
whose jurisdiction the same is alleged to exist, it shall be his duty to 
forthwith issue his warrant, in the form prescribed by law for search warrants, 
directed to the sheriff or constable, commanding such officer to search for, 
seize, and bring before him such gambling table, device or gambling 
paraphernalia, and upon proof of its character, as such, thereupon to cause the 
same to be destroyed by burning or otherwise."

3 Section 6-9-111, W.S. 
1977:

"If any person shall in 
this state open, set on foot, carry on, or promote, make or draw publicly or 
privately, any lottery, or scheme of chance, of any kind or description, by 
whatever name, style, or title the same may be known; or if any person shall by 
such ways and means, expose or set for sale any house, or houses, mine or mining 
property, lands or real estate, or any goods or chattels, cash or written or 
printed evidence of debt, or certificates of claims, or any thing or things of 
value whatever, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and upon conviction, fined in any sum not exceeding one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00), and be imprisoned in the county jail for a period not 
exceeding three (3) months. But nothing in this section shall be construed as 
applying to games of chance known as raffles or bingo conducted by charitable or 
nonprofit organizations and the tickets of such raffles or bingo shall be sold 
only in this state."

4 Rule 103, W.R.E., 
provides:

"(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. - Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

"(1) Objection. - In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, 
stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; or

"(2) Offer of Proof. - In case the ruling is 
one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the 
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were 
asked.

"(b) Record of offer and ruling. - The court 
may add any other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question and answer 
form.

"(c) Hearing of jury. - In jury cases, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent 
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as 
making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the 
jury.

"(d) Plain error. - Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court."