Case Title: JAG v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES; STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-01-4

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAG v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES; STATE OF WYOMING2002 WY 15856 P.3d 1016Case Number: C-01-4Decided: 10/21/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
   

JAG,

Appellant(Respondent/Obligor) ,

 

v.

 

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC

ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES;

STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., MB, minor child,

Appellees(Petitioners),

 

and

                                                                                                

                                                                       
WLC, n/k/a WLB,

                                                           
Appellee(Respondent/Obligee) .

 

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona 
County

The Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 

Representing Appellant:

Pro Se

 

Representing Appellee State of Wyoming:

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, 
Deputy Attorney General; and Sue Chatfield, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Representing Appellee WLC n/k/a WLB:

            
Pro Se

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

 

HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant JAG1 seeks review of the district court's Judgment 
and Order which established his paternity of a child (the Child), awarded 
judgment for past child support to the date of the Child's birth, ordered future 
child support, and provided for visitation.  The other parties to this appeal are WLC 
(a/k/a WLB and WLS), who we will refer to as Mother, and the State of Wyoming 
acting through the Department of Family Services, Child Support Enforcement, 
which we shall refer to as the State.  JAG is appearing pro se.  Mother did not 
participate in the appeal.

 

[¶2]      We will affirm in 
part and reverse in part and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The district court's order establishing JAG 
to be father of the Child and awarding future support will be affirmed.  That portion of the 
order directing the payment of retroactive support will be reversed.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      JAG sets out these 
issues in his brief:

A.  Did the court deny JAG his right to due 
process, by not excepting the applicable laws that should bar WLB, appellee, 
from attempting to recover arrearages by equitable estoppel and laches?

B.  To preclude enforcement of some or all 
arrearages, the obligor must present evidence establishing full or part 
defense.  Did 
the district court err by not allowing JAG the special rule of evidence to 
present 1987 court orders?

C.  Did the court err in calculating the amount 
of child support due?  
Shouldn't the court consider all minor children who are in need of 
support?

D.  Change of circumstances, requiring 
modification.

The State abbreviates the issues to these two matters:

I.          
Did the district court correctly determine paternity and order 
retroactive and future child support in the appropriate amount?

II.          
Does the doctrine of laches prohibit Child Support Enforcement's petition 
for paternity and child support in this case?

 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW

 

[¶4]      From the limited 
record available we are able to discern at least some of the factual background 
of this case.  
The Child who is the subject of these proceedings was born May 5, 
1985.  The 
Child is now over seventeen years of age.  The Child was conceived in the state of Ohio 
in 1984.  
Mother moved to Wyoming not knowing she was pregnant.  JAG has never 
resided in Wyoming and does not appear to have had any contact with the State of 
Wyoming other than his limited appearance in this lawsuit.  In the years since 
1985, JAG married and is the father of three young children.

 

[¶5]      The State initiated 
its first attempt to establish JAG's paternity on August 25, 1986.  That action was 
initiated under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
20-4-101 138 (Michie 1977 and Cum. Supp. 1986).  In the record of that case, there appears a 
document denominated as "Testimony," wherein Mother indicated that JAG gave her 
a gift of $50.00 in June of 1986.  In addition, Mother indicated that JAG's 
mother sent the Child a birthday card.  The information contained in this "Testimony" 
further indicated that JAG was aware that he was the father of the Child.  Notice of that 
action was served on JAG, and all parties had JAG's address in Ohio.  On September 4, 
1987, an assistant district attorney in Natrona County filed a motion to dismiss 
the action, stating:  
"[T]he initiating party, Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, has terminated their case and requests dismissal of this action, and 
the matter is therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Court."  The action was 
dismissed by the Wyoming district court on September 4, 1987.  The matter was also 
dismissed by the Ohio Common Pleas Court on August 1, 1988, because "there has 
been no action on this matter by the State of Wyoming."

 

[¶6]      On March 10, 1993, a 
virtually identical action was reinitiated by the State, although this second 
suit was filed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-6-101 401 (Michie 1987 and Cum. 
Supp. 1992) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-101 319 (Michie 1986 and Supp. 
1992).  By 
order entered on January 13, 1994, that action was dismissed for the asserted 
reason that the State was unable to secure service on JAG.  JAG asserts in his 
brief that he was still residing in the same community and the failure of a 
process server to find him could not be attributed to him.

 

[¶7]      On April 22, 1998, a 
third petition to establish paternity and child support was filed in the 
district court.  
This petition relied on the same statutory grounds as the 1993 
petition.  On 
December 16, 1998, an untitled document mailed to the district court by JAG was 
filed.  It 
contained this information:

 

At this time, I [JAG], am denying that I am the paternal 
father to "minor child".  I am requesting a genetic blood test.  A  DNA laboratory in 
the State of Ohio has been contacted regarding this matter.

I am requesting for the convenience of the "Mother"  
"minor child"  alleged "paternal father" , that the DNA testing take place 
through this laboratory. The number is 1-800-611-5728.

JAG filed no other papers in the form of an answer to the 
petition.

 

[¶8]      On May 10, 2001, an 
informal paternity hearing was held but it was not reported.  It appears to be 
uncontroverted that JAG participated in that hearing by telephone and without 
the assistance of counsel.  In an order entered on May 16, 2001, the 
district court:  
Denied JAG's oral motion for continuance, determined that based upon 
paternity testing JAG was the father of Child, awarded custody of Child to 
Mother, ordered JAG to pay temporary child support of $169.00 a month, ordered 
reasonable visitation in JAG, ordered the parties to submit financial affidavits 
within 30 days, and entered judgment in favor of the State in the amount of 
$239.00 for filing and service fees and costs of genetic testing.  On September 5, 
2001, a final order was entered, and it contained the following provisions:  JAG is the father 
of the Child, Mother awarded unassigned retroactive presumptive child support of 
$30,152.60, and the State awarded assigned retroactive presumptive child support 
of $2,705.40, as well as expenses of $207.06, genetic testing costs of $174.00, 
and service and filing fees of $65.00, and JAG was ordered to pay future 
support.  An 
income withholding order was issued by the clerk of district court requiring 
JAG's employer to withhold $200.00 for support per month, and $200.00 in arrears 
per month.  
There is no order of the district court setting the arrears payment at 
$200.00 per month nor is there any indication in the record of how that $200.00 
is to be divided between the unassigned and assigned arrearages.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

[¶9]      We include a brief 
introduction so as to clarify two matters.  First, JAG does not contest the jurisdiction 
of the district court over his person in this appeal, and he did not do so 
below.  
However, because the district court's in 
personam jurisdiction over JAG appears to be in question, we find it prudent 
to resolve that issue both for clarity in this case, as well as for future cases 
which may have to tackle this same sort of circumstance.

 

[¶10]   Second, we want to note that JAG does 
not challenge the finding of paternity or his obligation to pay child support 
until his son reaches the age of majority or is otherwise emancipated.  (There is no 
evidence in the record that the Child is impaired and, therefore, eligible for 
support beyond his minority.)  JAG only challenges the district court's 
decision to require him to pay the arrearages.

 

JURISDICTION

 

[¶11]   The question of jurisdiction arises 
because JAG was not served in Wyoming nor did he have any contacts with 
Wyoming.  The 
Child was not conceived in Wyoming.  There was no basis for jurisdiction in 
Wyoming unless JAG agreed to it or blundered into it.  As we shall 
conclude at the end of this section, he did blunder into it, but we think it 
prudent to discuss the matter in some detail because the question is a very 
close one, given:  
(1)  The 
very limited "appearances" JAG made in the district court; (2) the fact that he 
was not represented by counsel; (3) that no record was made of the hearings; and 
(4) that Wyoming statutes contemplate that cases such as this one be prosecuted 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-4-139 194 (LexisNexis 2001) (Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act which supplanted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act which was the basis for the initial proceedings in this 
case).

[¶12]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-142 (LexisNexis 
2001) provides:

 

§ 20-4-142. Basis for jurisdiction over nonresident.

            
(a)  In a proceeding to establish, 
enforce, or modify a support order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this 
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the 
individual's guardian or conservator if:

(i)  The individual is personally served with 
notice within the state;

(ii)  The individual 
submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering a general 
appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any 
contest to personal jurisdiction;

(iii)  The individual resided with the child in 
this state;

(iv)  The individual resided in this state and 
provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;

(v)  The child resides in this state as a result 
of the act or directives of the individual;

(vi)  The individual engaged in sexual 
intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of 
intercourse;

(vii)  The individual asserted parentage in this 
state pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120;

(viii)  There is any other basis consistent with 
the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction.

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶13]   In order for a court to acquire 
jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must be properly served or must 
"voluntarily" appear.  A judgment entered without the court having 
jurisdiction is null and void.  A defendant may waive his right to challenge 
a court's jurisdiction.  Such a challenge should be made at the 
defendant's soonest opportunity.  Failure to timely broach the issue with the 
court may result in waiver of that defense.  Most importantly for this case, where a 
defendant appears voluntarily, without questioning the court's personal 
jurisdiction, that appearance is the equivalent of proper service of 
process.  Matter of Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo. 
1998); and see Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 943 (Wyo. 
1998) (consent to court's jurisdiction for one purpose may result in court's 
jurisdiction for any related purpose).  We have held that a party will be deemed to 
have appeared in an action, even though no formal pleadings have been entered, 
when contacts between the parties clearly demonstrate an intent to defend.  Sanford v. Arjay Oil Company, 686 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo. 
1984); also see Hochhalter v. Great Western 
Enterprises, 706 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶14]   Very recently we provided this further 
summary of our review responsibilities under circumstances such as 
these:

Our standard of review for jurisdictional issues, including 
sufficiency of process, should be familiar to every litigant.  The Wyoming Supreme 
Court "has the inherent power, and the duty, to address jurisdictional defects 
on appeal even though they have not been called to our attention by a 
litigant."  Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380, 1384 
(Wyo.1990).  
"The first and fundamental question on every appeal is that of 
jurisdiction; this question cannot be waived;  it is open for consideration by the reviewing 
court whenever it is raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of 
its own motion."  
Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598, 599 
(Wyo.1962).  
When a lower court acts without jurisdiction, this court will notice the 
defect and have jurisdiction on appeal, not on the merits, but merely for the 
purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in maintaining the suit.  United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440, 56 S. Ct. 829, 832, 80 L. Ed. 1263, reh'g denied 298 U.S. 692, 56 S. Ct. 951, 80 L. Ed. 1410 (1936).

Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo.1992).  Service of process must strictly comply with 
the requirements set forth in W.R.C.P. 4.  MN v. CS, 908 P.2d 414, 415 (Wyo.1995).  Proper service of process is a necessary 
condition precedent to the acquisition of personal jurisdiction under the 
Wyoming and federal Constitutions.   Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6;  U.S. Const. 
amend.  XIV, § 
1;  Gookin, 826 P.2d  at 232.

 

CRB v. State, Department. of Family 
Services, 974 P.2d 931, 934 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶15]   In this case, JAG was served with 
process in Ohio.  
He filed a written response denying paternity.  He was given notice 
of the hearing and he appeared, albeit by telephone.  On this basis, we 
conclude that the district court did have jurisdiction to decide all issues 
relevant to the paternity proceedings, including all issues regarding child 
support and arrearages.

 

ARREARAGES

 

[¶16]   We have had occasion to visit a very 
similar issue recently.  In Whitt v. State ex 
rel. Wright, 2001 WY 
128, ¶¶ 10-15, 36 P.2d 617, ¶¶ 10-15 (Wyo. 2001), we held:

            
[¶10]  
This Court has consistently held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(d) does 
not refer to expenses actually incurred, but rather is much broader.  The State brought 
this case in the name of the children.  Thus, the focus is not on the amount assigned 
to the State, but rather on the amount the appellant owes to his children.  In Holtz v. State ex rel. Houston, 847 P.2d 972, 977 
(Wyo.1993), we stated:

      It seems reasonably 
clear that the statutes contemplate provisions in the judgment for more than 
recovery of "expenses incurred."  (In this case, AFDC funds.) ... Likewise, 
there is not a provision that limits the state (if it is the petitioner) to 
expenses incurred.

Further, in Thomas v. Thomas, 
983 P.2d 717, 720 
(Wyo.1999), this Court stated:

The language of the statute leads to the clear inference 
that the legislature intended and recognized that child support would be 
collected retroactively in cases where a parent has abandoned a child and 
refused to participate in the support of the child.

Thus, the appellant owes his children reasonable support 
from the date of their birth.  This brings us to the key issue in this 
case.

 

BACK CHILD SUPPORT

 

            
[¶11] The appellant's primary contention is that the State did not meet 
its burden of proof that he owed back child support in the amount of 
$18,322.65.  
Again, the appellant acknowledges his parental obligations and that they 
relate back to the date of birth of his children.  He argues, however, that the back child 
support amount of $18,322.65 is unsupported by the evidence.

            
[¶12] While the findings of a trial judge concerning conclusions of law 
and disposition of the issues are presumptively correct, the appellate court may 
examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record.  Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 899 
(Wyo.1979).  
Because this Court does not weigh the evidence de novo, findings may not 
be set aside because we would have reached a different result.  Id. On appeal, findings of fact are not set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id. " 'A finding 
is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.' "  Cross v. Berg Lumber 
Co., 7 P.3d 922, 928 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538-39 (Wyo.1993)).  The appellant bears 
the burden of persuading the appellate court that a finding is erroneous.  Cross, 7 P.3d  at 928 (quoting 
Hopper, 861 P.2d at 538-39).

 

            
[¶13] At the end of the June 8, 2000, hearing, the DFS attorney informed 
the district court that he could at that time provide to the appellant's 
attorney "an AFDH which shows the AFDC, what we used to call Aid for Dependent 
Children, paid to the mother."   He was ordered to do so and 
complied.  The 
district court then ordered counsel to prepare and submit their income and child 
support calculations, and a final hearing was scheduled.  DFS's calculations 
with attachments and appellant's calculations and exhibits are both in the 
record.

 

            
[¶14] In establishing the amount of back child support owed, the State 
attempted to determine the income of both parents for previous years and then 
applied the current child support guidelines to establish the amount of support 
owed.  Neither 
parent could give complete and accurate information regarding income for the 
previous years for which child support was owed.  The State imputed income to the parents for 
the time periods for which they could not supply accurate and complete 
information.

 

            
[¶15] Unfortunately, the record does not disclose any factual basis for 
the amount of income imputed by the State.  For instance, while a hearing was held, no 
questions were asked of Wright regarding her prior employment history.  Certain periods of 
imputed income for Wright seem to represent minimum wage for a forty-hour work 
week.  There 
simply is no factual basis to support that such imputed income was reasonable 
for Wright over the time periods at issue.  Thus, we are compelled to remand this case to 
the district court for an evidentiary hearing so the State can establish a 
factual basis for its computations.

 

[¶17]   In this case we have even less 
information than was available in the Whitt 
case.  Wyoming 
statutes require that an evidentiary record be made in the course of 
establishing child support:

 

§ 20-2-308.  Financial affidavits required; 
financial reporting.

            
(a) No order establishing or modifying a child support obligation shall 
be entered unless financial affidavits on a form approved by the Wyoming supreme 
court which fully discloses the financial status of the parties have been filed, 
or the court has held a hearing and testimony has been received.

            
(b) Financial affidavits of the parties shall be supported with 
documentation of both current and past earnings.  Suitable documentation of current earnings 
includes but is not limited to pay stubs, employer statements, or receipts and 
expenses if self-employed.  Documentation of current earnings shall be 
supplemented with copies of the most recent tax return to provide verification 
of earnings over a longer period.

            
(c) The court may require, or the parents may agree, to exchange 
financial and other appropriate information once a year or less often, by 
regular mail, for the purpose of analyzing the propriety of modification of 
court ordered child support.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308 (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶18]   In so holding, we deem it prudent to 
note that JAG had some responsibility to provide information to the district 
court so that the child support issues could be resolved.  However, the 
district court must ensure that proceedings to establish paternity are reported, 
so that a transcript of those proceedings will be available in the event of an 
appeal.  This 
is so whether or not the noncustodial parent is represented by counsel, but a fortiori where counsel does not represent the 
noncustodial parent.  
We are not faced with a situation where a noncustodial parent refused to 
cooperate in the child support calculation process, thus making the development 
of a coherent record impossible.  Rather, we view these proceedings as a 
failure of the district court and the State to be attentive to the need for a 
record suitable for the purpose of meaningful review on appeal.  Thus, we are 
compelled to remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing 
so that an adequate factual record can be made with respect to arrearages.2

 

LACHES, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, ETC.

 

[¶19]   JAG contends that the district court 
erred in not denying Mother's and State's claims for child support arrearages on 
the basis of laches and equitable estoppel, as well as other related 
theories.  
JAG's argument is that although Mother filed suit in 1986 seeking a 
declaration of his paternity, the dismissal of that action should relieve him of 
the "notice" of paternity it might otherwise have implied.  In addition, the 
action was not finally seen through to a finish until September 5, 2001.  The State defends 
against this assertion by noting that JAG did not raise it below and contending 
that it cannot be considered on appeal.  The State also contends that our precedents 
establish that child support is not subject to any form of waiver.

 

[¶20]   Because this case must be remanded for 
further proceedings to make a record, and because the dilatoriness of the State 
and Mother is a factor in the child support equation in this case, we will 
respond briefly to this issue.  The State contends that the delay was caused 
because the State was unable to locate JAG.  JAG contends that he was always at a location 
known to Mother and State, and that the failure to obtain service cannot be 
attributed to him, and the record bears out JAG's position.  JAG contends that 
the real reason for the dismissals is that Mother married on two occasions and 
asked that the earlier petitions be dismissed so as not to "stress" those 
relationships with the paternity action.  We have held that laches does not apply to an 
action to recover adjudicated child support arrearages.  Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 201-3 (Wyo. 
2000); Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1106-8 
(Wyo. 1997); also see Whitt, 36 P.3d  at 622-23 
(collecting cases).  
We have held that laches cannot bar a separate paternity action by a 
child.  Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1220-25 
(Wyo. 1994).  
In this case, paternity and child support were not adjudicated until 
September of 2001, when the Child was sixteen years of age.  In a case with 
somewhat similar facts we held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a 
district court to award $50.00 a month in back child support retroactive to the 
date of the child's birth.  Ellison v. Walter ex 
rel. Walter, 834 P.2d 680, 683-85 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶21]   This subject is exhaustively annotated 
at:  Jeffery W. 
Santema, Liability of Father for Retroactive Child 
Support on Judicial Determination of Paternity, 87 A.L.R.5th 361 (2001).  Our case law to 
date has not dealt with the many variables that may occur in paternity actions 
with respect to retroactive support.  With the information provided by the cited 
annotation, and the cases cited therein, district courts and parties will be 
guided in the resolution of such questions as they arise.  Also see In re Paternity of IC, 971 P.2d 603, 608 (Wyo. 
1999) (within district court's discretion to limit retroactive support where 
legitimate basis exists to do so); Hasty v. Hasty, 
828 P.2d 94, 98-100 (Wyo. 
1992) (children born afterward must at least be considered by district court3).  On remand, the district court should address 
the issue to the extent that a party raises it.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶22]   The order of the district court is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  That portion of the district court's order 
establishing JAG to be the father of the Child is affirmed, as is the 
determination of future support.  The district court's order with respect to 
retroactive support is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1Proceedings in paternity matters are confidential.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-117 (LexisNexis 2001).  The foremost purpose of confidentiality is to 
protect the minor children involved from the stigma of public disclosure.  The parents are 
afforded confidentiality also so as to safeguard the confidentiality intended 
most directly for the protection of the child.

   2In this 
regard we also direct the parties', as well as the district court's, attention 
to this statute:

§ 14-2-116.  Free transcript for appeal.

(a)     Repealed by Laws 1993, 
ch. 198, § 2.

(b)     If a party is financially 
unable to pay the cost of a transcript, the court shall furnish on request a 
transcript for purposes of appeal.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-116 (LexisNexis 2001).

     Although JAG did not ask that 
a court reporter be present for proceedings in this paternity case, this statute 
requires that such proceedings be reported.  If the proceedings are not reported, then it 
becomes an impossibility for "a party" to make such a request for the appeal, if 
there is one.  
Clearly, this statute is a legislative decision that paternity 
proceedings are too important to be decided on anything less than a complete 
record.  Our 
decisions have also demonstrated a strong preference for complete records in 
cases such as this.  
In a proceeding to establish paternity, the proceedings with respect to 
child support are to be conducted pursuant to Title 20.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-113(d) (LexisNexis 2001).

   3The 
materials available for this appeal indicate that the district court may have 
considered the children born afterward, but the record does not reflect 
that.