Case Title: In Re Cogan

Citation: 401 A.2d 1142, 485 Pa. 273

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1979-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
485 Pa. 273 (1979) 401 A.2d 1142 In re Dennis J. COGAN, Contemnor. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 27, 1979. Decided May 31, 1979. *274 Mark E. Kogan, Norris E. Gelman, Philadelphia, for appellant. Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. ROBERTS, Justice. Appellant Dennis J. Cogan, Esq. entered an appearance as defense counsel on behalf of a client charged with murder of the first degree. On December 15, 1976, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Sabo, J., conducted a suppression *275 hearing. Over the course of the hearing, there were several exchanges between counsel and the court. At the end of one exchange appellant was summarily convicted of criminal contempt of court and fined $100. On appeal, we are asked only to review whether the record supports the conviction. We reverse. At the suppression hearing, the defendant disputed that his arrest was based on probable cause. The defendant had been arrested on the basis of statements obtained during the interrogation of another suspect. A police officer was called by the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing to describe the suspect's interrogation. The officer's cross-examination was interrupted by an exchange between appellant and the court. To properly evaluate the consequences of appellant's conduct on the orderly progress of the suppression hearing, we must refer to the relevant portions of the record. The dispute concerning probable cause arose again later. BY MR. COGAN: BY MR. COGAN: BY MR. COGAN: BY MR. COGAN: BY MR. COGAN: The court cited the above exchanges as the basis for sustaining the criminal contempt conviction. Courts have the power summarily to convict those before them of criminal contempt of court. Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23, 17 P.S. § 2041, reenacted as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131; see also ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft 1972). This Court has previously construed the criminal contempt statute, In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 359 A.2d 739 (1976) and we note that immediately after our decision in Johnson, supra, the Legislature reenacted the Act of 1836 contempt statute using identical language.[1] Each subsection of the statute is intended to penalize a different class of contemnor. In re Johnson, 467 Pa. at 556-57, 359 A.2d at 741-42. Subsection I permits the court to compel proper performance of a ministerial duty by a Commonwealth official. Subsection II provides a means of punishing those who negligently or *281 wilfully fail to comply with lawfully issued orders, decrees and process. Finally, subsection III grants the court power to punish one who interferes with the administration of justice, including failure to meet the standard of conduct necessary to effect a just and efficient resolution of matters before a court. Johnson, supra. Although the suppression court did not expressly specify the subsection under which it held appellant in contempt, "[t]he court found that Mr. Cogan's acts disrupted the dignity, order and decorum of the courtroom." Appellant's conviction, therefore, must be based on the court's authority under subsection III. Criminal contempt of court is a criminal offense and thus every element of the offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson, supra, 467 Pa. at 557, 359 A.2d at 742. "To prove criminal contempt of court which may be acted upon under authority of subsection III of the Act of June 16, 1836, the Commonwealth must prove an improper intent, an action and an obstruction of the administration of justice." Johnson, supra, id. Courteous, considerate and decorous conduct in the courtroom is not only in harmony with the American sense of fair play, it makes good sense and is also an essential ingredient of effective advocacy. Counsel could well model courtroom conduct on the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge, supra, § 6.4: See also, Commonwealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 308 A.2d 90 (1973). A controlled and well-mannered demeanor is mandated of advocates as well by the Code of Professional Responsibility: D.R. 7-106(C)(6), adopted as Pa.R.D.E., id. (1974). Appropriate decorum in the courtroom creates an impartial and judicious proceeding which assures the orderly and effective administration of justice. See ABA Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Court, supra, § 6.4, Comment. We must conclude, however, that appellant's inappropriate and ill-mannered conduct over the course of the suppression hearing did not obstruct or delay the hearing and therefore falls short of that misbehavior which may be punished under subsection III of the Act of 1836. While there is no doubt that counsel was impolite, the exchanges to which the suppression court referred in its opinion were at most momentary and appellant's attempts to place his objections on the record appear not to have impeded the progress of the hearing. The record reveals that appellant's intent was not to obstruct justice, but to be, in his view, an effective advocate for a client charged with first degree murder. The intensity with which appellant attempted to place some of his objections on the record may have been unwise and exaggerated. Nonetheless, appellant could have reasonably misunderstood the hearing court's remark, "We are wasting a lot of time over nothing. Go ahead . . .," to constitute a decision against the defendant on one of the questions in controversy at the hearing. In these circumstances, appellant's attempt to place his objection on the record does not provide the requisite intent to support a conviction for contempt. See Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 386 A.2d 971 (1978) (plurality opinion); United States v. Mathis, 175 U.S.App. D.C. 341, 535 F.2d 1303 (1976); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); ABA Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge, supra, § 5.7.[2] Finally, we note that the *283 record indicates that appellant was given notice that he would be held in contempt if he failed to take his seat, but does not reflect whether appellant complied with the court's directive. We hold that on this record, appellant's conduct did not and was not intended to delay or obstruct justice and that, therefore, there is insufficient evidence upon which to affirm the conviction of criminal contempt of court. Order of the court of common pleas reversed, and appellant discharged. LARSEN, Justice, dissenting. I dissent and in support thereof, cite the trial judge's (The Honorable Albert F. Sabo) opinion as follows: NIX, Justice, dissenting. I vigorously dissent from today's majority opinion. The majority of this Court believes that attorney Cogan's "misconduct cannot be condoned" and that it contravenes Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(6) of our Code of Professional Responsibility. It further characterizes appellant's conduct as "impolite," "unwise, unseemly and exaggerated," as well as "discourteous," "inappropriate and ill-mannered." These characterizations correspond with those made by the trial judge in his opinion. There it is stated that appellant *285 "spoke in a manner demeaning to the Court in both tone and facial expressions," appellant was "arrogant and disrespectful" and at one point he "lashed out, screaming at the Court." The trial court found that appellant's misconduct had disrupted the dignity, order and decorum of his courtroom and found appellant in contempt, citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 443 Pa. 433, 275 A.2d 312 (1971). In that case Chief Justice Bell wrote the following for a unanimous Court: I agree with the trial judge that appellant's conduct was contumacious. I disagree with today's majority opinion that *286 In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 359 A.2d 739 (1976), changes the law set forth in Snyder. I therefore dissent. [1] The Act of 1976 became effective in 1978. This appeal is controlled by the Act of 1836, which provides: "Classification of penal contempts The power of the several courts of this commonwealth to issue attachments and to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases, [to-wit]: I. To the official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively; II. To disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court; III. To the misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice." (Brackets added.) The bracketed phrase was deleted in the Act of 1976. [2] Section 5.7 provides: "Duty of judge on counsel's objections and requests for rulings: The trial judge should respect the obligation of counsel to present objections to procedures and to admissibility of evidence, to request rulings on motions, to make offers of proof, and to have the record show adverse rulings and reflect conduct of the judge which counsel considers prejudicial. Counsel should be permitted to state succinctly the grounds of his objections or requests; but the judge should nevertheless control the length and manner of argument."