Case Title: Sheppard v. State

Citation: 344 Md. 143

Docket Number: 10/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Frances Diana Sheppard v. State of Maryland - No. 10, 1996 Term
CRIMINAL LAW - PROBATION -- Trial judge abused his discretion by
requiring, as a condition of probation, that a defendant convicted
of driving under the influence of alcohol not operate a motor
vehicle for the full three-year term of probation, even if the
Motor Vehicle Administration restores her driver's license.
Circuit Court for Worcester County
Criminal No. 17285
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 10
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
FRANCES DIANA SHEPPARD
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  December 12, 1996    
             
     All sections infra, unless otherwise indicated, refer to
1
Maryland Code (1977, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), Transportation
Article.
The issue in the instant case is whether the trial judge
abused his discretion by requiring, as a condition of probation,
that a defendant convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol not operate a motor vehicle for the full three-year term of
probation, even if the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) restores
her driver's license.
I.
The facts in the instant case are not in dispute.  The
appellant, Frances Diana Sheppard, was convicted pursuant to
Maryland Code (1977, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article, §
21-902(b)  of two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol.
1
One offense occurred on August 23, 1994 and the other on March 6,
1995.  A sentencing hearing was held, and Sheppard's attorney
proffered that Sheppard had recently undergone triple-bypass, open-
heart surgery, that she was suffering from anxiety and stress as
the result of the recent murder of her son by an unidentified drug
dealer, and that she was now in a counseling and alcohol treatment
program.  In allocution Sheppard stated:
"I'm not working now.  I have no driver's
license.  And I live in Ocean Pines.  I just
don't have access to public transportation.
And I've been under so much stress that I've
tried to get my life together.  I want to go
back to work [as a registered nurse] more than
anything."
-2-
The trial judge was also informed that Sheppard had two prior
offenses, each of which occurred over ten years before the two
instant offenses.  Those prior offenses resulted in a probation
before judgment for driving under the influence in 1982 and a
conviction for driving under the influence in 1983.
For each of her new driving under the influence convictions,
the court imposed a one-year-concurrent sentence, with all but 60
days suspended and a five-hundred-dollar fine.  The court also
placed Sheppard on supervised probation for three years.  In
addition, the court imposed several conditions including "alcohol
counselling as may be directed by her probation officer, ...
mandatory attendance at AA at least four times weekly," random
urinalysis, and the requirement that she "not ... possess or
consume any alcoholic beverages."  As an additional condition of
probation, the court stated:  "I'm going to order her to not
operate a motor vehicle while on probation. *** Even if the [M]otor
[V]ehicle [A]dministration gives you back your license, you cannot
drive, because my order says you can't."
Sheppard appealed her sentence to the Court of Special Appeals
raising the single issue:  "May a trial judge lawfully order a
defendant, in a driving under the influence case, as a condition of
probation, to abstain from driving a motor vehicle for the three
year term of probation?"  This Court, on its own motion, issued a
writ of certiorari to review the case prior to decision by the
Court of Special Appeals.  We hold that, under the circumstances of
-3-
the instant case, the trial judge abused his discretion in
ordering, as a condition of probation, that Sheppard not operate a
motor vehicle even if the MVA returns her driver's license.
II.
A judge has very broad discretion when imposing conditions of
probation "and may make such orders and impose such terms as to ...
conduct ... as may be deemed proper...."  Md. Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 639(a).  A judge, however, does not have
unlimited discretion in fashioning conditions of probation.  A
condition of probation may be found to be unduly restrictive and
unreasonable.  For example, the suspension of a sentence on the
condition that the defendant, who had been found guilty of assault
with intent to murder, return to Puerto Rico and remain there for
at least a ten-year period has been held to be an abuse of
discretion and void.  Bird v. State, 231 Md. 432, 190 A.2d 804
(1963).
Courts are divided on whether a judge may, as a condition of
probation, prohibit a licensed driver from operating a motor
vehicle during the period of probation.  Some states have upheld
such conditions of probation.  For example, in City of Detroit v.
Del Rio, 157 N.W.2d 324 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), the Court of Appeals
of Michigan upheld a no-driving condition of probation and rejected
the argument that the Michigan vehicle code provides the exclusive
-4-
procedure for revocation and suspension of licenses.  The court
noted that the vehicle code did not specifically state that it
would be the exclusive procedure for revocation and suspension of
drivers' licenses and that, in any event, the purposes of the
vehicle code were not intended to be identical to those of the
criminal code.  Del Rio, 157 N.W.2d at 326.  The court explained
that the purpose of suspension or revocation of licenses under the
vehicle code is traffic safety.  Id.  The purposes of the criminal
law, by contrast, "may coincide with the public aim of traffic
safety," but there are other purposes as well.  Id.  Thus, the
court rejected the argument that the vehicle code preempts a
court's power to prohibit the operation of a motor vehicle as a
condition of probation.  Id.; accord Brock v. State, 299 S.E.2d 71,
72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)(finding that statute giving Department of
Public Safety authority to revoke or suspend drivers' licenses did
"not purport to deprive a court ... of the authority to suspend a
driver's license as a condition of probation"); see also Fearn v.
Director, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 314, 316 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992)(adopting view that administrative suspension of
licenses, civil in nature, and licensure restriction pursuant to
probation, criminal in nature, operate independently of each
other).
The issue before this Court implicates both preemption and
separation of powers.  Did the legislature, although establishing
-5-
detailed 
MVA 
administrative 
hearing 
procedures, 
detailed
administrative license suspension and revocation penalties, and a
detailed procedure for restoration of driving privileges, intend
that the courts also have virtually unrestricted authority over the
driving privileges of those people on probation?  Some states have
upheld a condition of probation that a defendant not drive a motor
vehicle by finding express legislative delegation of authority to
a sentencing judge to restrict driving privileges.  Clearly, if the
legislature believed it was warranted, it could have empowered the
trial courts to impose, as a condition of probation, suspension of
driving privileges in cases involving motor vehicle violations.
Cf. State v. Seaman, 237 Neb. 916, 468 N.W.2d 121, 122
(1991)(statute requires, as a condition of probation for third-
offense of driving while intoxicated, that the court order a
defendant not to drive for at least a period of one year); Blair v.
State, 554 So.2d 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(Florida statute
authorizes the sentencing court to direct the Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles to revoke for a period of up to two years
a driver's license of an individual convicted of possession of
cocaine); but see People v. Goldberg, 45 Cal. App.3d 601, 119 Cal
Rptr. 616, 617 (1975)(Under the Vehicle Code, "a court cannot, even
as a condition of probation, restrict a defendant's right to drive
a motor vehicle for more than the period prescribed by the
applicable sections of the ... Code.").
-6-
In Towers v. State, 92 Md. App. 183, 607 A.2d 105 (1992), a
pharmacist who pled guilty to distributing Dilaudid was placed on
probation with the special condition that the defendant not work in
a pharmacy without the court's permission, even if the defendant's
suspended pharmacy license was reinstated by the State Board of
Pharmacy.  The issue before the Court of Special Appeals was the
validity of that condition of probation.  Judge Wilner, writing for
the court, identified the issue as follows:
"The issue here is essentially one of
separation 
of 
powers 
-- 
whether, 
in
particular, the commitment of a specific area
of regulation by the [l]egislature to an
Executive Branch agency serves as an implied,
but nonetheless effective, circumscription on
an otherwise extensive Judicial power.  We are
dealing with overlapping circles of authority
that 
are 
statutorily 
based, 
and 
it 
is
therefore to the respective statutes that we
must first turn.
Md. Code [A]rt. 27, § 641A(a) provides
that, upon entering a judgment of conviction,
the court may suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence `and place the defendant
on probation upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper.'  This authority, as
so expressed, is obviously very broad, but it
is not unlimited.  As we indicated in Watson
v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 274, 301 A.2d 26[,
31-32] 
(1973), 
`[w]hatever 
latitude 
the
statutes repose in the trial judge, it
remains, 
of 
course, 
fundamental 
that
conditions of probation must be reasonable and
have a rational basis.'  See also Bird v.
State, 231 Md. 432, 190 A.2d 804 (1963)...."
Towers, 92 Md. App. at 189-90, 607 A.2d at 108.  In finding that
the condition of probation violated the separation of powers, the
-7-
Court of Special Appeals quoted from U.S. v. Sterber, 846 F.2d 842
(2d Cir. 1988):
"`[B]ecause New York [law] sets forth well-
defined 
procedures 
to 
determine 
whether
revocation of Sterber's [] license is an
appropriate sanction and provides Sterber with
a meaningful opportunity to contest the
imposition of such a sanction, we hold that
the 
special 
condition 
of 
probation 
was
improper....'"
Towers, 92 Md. App. at 193, 607 A.2d at 110 (quoting Sterber, 846
F.2d at 842-43).  Because the licensing and regulation of
pharmacists is committed to the State Board of Pharmacy, see Md.
Code (1981, 1994 Repl. Vol.), Health Occupations Art., §§ 12-205,
12-301(a), the Court of Special Appeals held in Towers that "the
[l]egislature has left [the decision to restore Towers' pharmacy
license] to the State Pharmacy Board, not [to] the Circuit Court
for Caroline County."  Towers, 92 Md. App. at 194, 607 A.2d at 110.
By analogy, in the instant case, the legislature has left the
decision to suspend one's driving privileges to the MVA and not to
the Circuit Court for Worcester County.
The Transportation Article provides a comprehensive set of
statutes regulating motor vehicles and persons who drive motor
vehicles in the state of Maryland.  Section 12-104(b)(1) of that
Article authorizes the MVA to "adopt rules and regulations to carry
out ... [t]hose provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law that relate
to or are administered and enforced by the [MVA]...."  The
Transportation Article includes statutes delineating when a person
-8-
can receive a license, see §§ 16-102 through 16-114.1, and when
that license can be suspended, cancelled, or revoked, see §§ 16-201
through 16-208.1.  The Article also sets forth the various
penalties for certain driving offenses as well as time limitations
on the suspension of a license.  §§ 27-101 through 27-109; 16-205,
16-205.1, 16-206, 16-208.  Under the specific terms of the
Transportation Article, "[w]hen issued and signed, a driver's
license authorizes the licensee to drive any vehicle of the type or
class specified on it, subject to any restrictions endorsed on the
license."  § 16-111(d)(2).
The legislature has also established a very detailed statutory
scheme governing driver's license suspension, revocation and
reinstatement.  In addition to conferring upon the MVA the power to
impose such sanctions, the legislature has limited the duration of
license suspensions, as well as established detailed procedures for
the reinstatement of revoked licenses.  
Section 16-208(a) provides that "the Administration may not
suspend a license or privilege to drive for a period of more than
1 year."  The exceptions to this one-year limitation are set forth
with particularity in such provisions as §§ 16-208(a)(2), which
permits the MVA to "suspend for an indefinite period the license or
privilege of any individual who cannot drive safely because of his
physical or mental condition;" and 16-404(c)(2), which authorizes
various periods of suspension for the accumulation of points based
-9-
on repeated convictions for violations of drinking and driving
laws.  Section 16-404(c)(2) is particularly significant in that it
authorizes the MVA to suspend the license of a driver against whom
a designated number of points has been assessed for violations of
§§ 21-902(b) or (c) (driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs).  The legislature has restricted the duration of such
suspensions as follows:   
"(i) For a first conviction, not more
than 6 months;
(ii) For a second conviction at least 5
years after the date of the first conviction,
not more than 9 months;
(iii) For a second conviction less than 5
years after the date of the first conviction
or for a third conviction, not more than 12
months; and
(iv) 
For 
a 
fourth 
or 
subsequent
conviction, not more than 24 months."
Section 16-205(c) further provides that the MVA may:
"suspend for not more than 120 days the
license of any person who, within a 3-year
period, is convicted under § 21-902(b) or (c)
of this article of driving or attempting to
drive 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
under 
the
influence of alcohol or while so far under the
influence of any drug, any combination of
drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs
and alcohol that the person cannot drive a
motor vehicle safely and who was previously
convicted of a violation under [§ 21-902(a), §
21-902(b), § 21-902(c), or § 21-902(d)]."
The Transportation Article thus sets forth in detail the
circumstances under which license suspensions are warranted, as
well 
as 
the 
permissible 
duration 
of 
such 
suspensions.
-10-
Significantly, the suspension periods prescribed by the legislature
under this detailed statutory scheme are substantially shorter than
the suspension imposed by the judge in this case.
Additionally, the legislature has established procedures for
reinstating the license of a person whose driving privileges have
been revoked, including those licenses revoked for alcohol- related
driving incidents.  § 16-208(b).  Upon revocation, the driver's
license must be surrendered to the MVA.  § 16-210(a).  An
individual whose license has been revoked for the first time may
apply for reinstatement at any time after the MVA receives the
revoked license.  § 16-208(b)(2)(i).  The MVA may not grant
reinstatement, however, until six months after it has received the
revoked license.  § 16-208(b)(2)(ii).  For a second revocation, the
individual may apply for reinstatement at any time after one year
from the date of surrender and receipt of the license, and in the
case of a third revocation, application for reinstatement may be
filed at any time after eighteen months from the date of surrender
and receipt of the license.  § 16-208(b)(3)(i),(4)(i).  For
revocations resulting from certain serious violations, including
"three or more ... alcohol-related or drug-related driving
incidents," the MVA may grant an application for reinstatement
"only if, after an investigation of an individual's habits and
driving ability, the [MVA] is satisfied it will be safe to
reinstate the license or privilege...."  § 16-208(b)(6)(ii)(3).
The Transportation Article thus establishes specific procedural
-11-
safeguards in an administrative license revocation that are denied
the individual whose license is revoked through a probation order.
Furthermore, if Ms. Sheppard had her license revoked by the MVA for
three or more alcohol related incidents, she would be subject to
periods of suspension and revocation substantially shorter than
that imposed by the judge, but she would only be eligible for
reinstatement if there was an investigation and MVA determined that
it was safe to reinstate her license.  
The legislature expressly has given courts limited authority
to order the MVA to initiate a period of suspension in connection
with the disposition of specified juvenile cases.  Maryland Code
(1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Art., § 3-820(d)(1)(i) provides that a juvenile court
may order the MVA to suspend a child's driving privileges "for a
specified period of not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days."
Section 16-206(b) of the Transportation Article in turn authorizes
the MVA "to suspend the driving privileges of a child for the
[amount of] time specified by [a] court" in a juvenile court order
issued pursuant to Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.),
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-820(d).  Similar
authority is not vested in the courts in other contexts, such as
where the court is fashioning conditions of probation.  
There is not a great deal of difference between the violation
of the separation of powers doctrine that occurred in the instant
-12-
case and that which took place in Smith v. State, 80 Md. App. 371,
563 A.2d 1129 (1989).  In Smith, after the defendant had entered a
guilty plea to the charge of child abuse, the court sentenced Smith
and imposed as a condition of probation "that Smith not seek
custody of her children unless she first obtained permission from
the judge."  Smith, 80 Md. App. at 373, 563 A.2d at 1130.  In
vacating this condition of Smith's probation, the Court of Special
Appeals held:
"Jurisdiction over the children rests with the
Juvenile 
Court 
of 
Baltimore 
City. 
 
In
accordance with the statutory procedures, the
children were placed under the care of DSS,
who then placed the children with relatives.
The authority to determine whether and under
what circumstances Smith's child or children
will be returned to her rests in the Juvenile
Court.  Since the trial judge was without
jurisdiction to decide custody directly, he is
seeking to do indirectly that which he cannot
do 
directly, 
i.e., 
nevertheless 
control
custody of the children insofar as their
mother, Kim Smith, is concerned."  (Footnote
omitted).
Smith, 80 Md. App. at 374, 563 A.2d at 1130.  The Court of Special
Appeals concluded that the judge had "inject[ed] himself into a
matter that the [l]egislature has decided best rests in the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court."  Smith, 80 Md. App. at 376,
563 A.2d at 1131.
In In Re David K., 48 Md. App. 714, 429 A.2d 313 (1981), the
defendant, a juvenile, was found delinquent for driving while
intoxicated.  As a part of its disposition, the juvenile court
-13-
suspended David's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.  Addressing
the defendant's challenge to the juvenile court's authority to
suspend David's driving privileges, Judge Wilner, writing for the
court, stated:
"In accordance with statutory criteria (§§ 16-
103, 16-103.1), MVA is empowered to issue
learners' 
permits 
(§ 
16-105), 
accept
applications for licenses (§§ 16-106, 16-107),
examine applicants (§§ 16-110, 16-111), and
issue the appropriate licenses (§§ 16-111, 16-
113, 16-114).  Section 16-111(d)[2] expressly
provides that `[w]hen issued and signed, a
driver's license authorizes the licensee to
drive any vehicle of the type or class
specified on it, subject to any restrictions
endorsed 
on 
the 
license.' 
 
(Emphasis
supplied).
What MVA giveth, MVA may taketh away; but
only for specific statutorily prescribed
reasons 
and 
only 
in 
accordance 
with
statutorily 
prescribed 
procedures 
and
limitations.
* * *
The action of the juvenile court in this
case was quite obviously not in harmony with
the 
statutory 
scheme. 
 
It 
suspended
appellant's 
driving 
privileges 
without
purporting to suspend his license, which is
inconsistent with § 16-111(d), supra.  It
ordered an indefinite suspension, which is
inconsistent with the specific time limits on
suspensions 
set 
by 
§ 
16-208(a) 
of
Transportation 
Article. 
 
And, 
equally
important, it has placed appellant in a status
of which MVA is completely unaware.  If a
juvenile 
court 
had 
that 
authority 
(and
exercised it in the manner done here), the
integrity of MVA's records would soon be
placed in serious jeopardy.  It could never be
entirely certain of the actual driving status
of its licensees under twenty-one years of
-14-
     To the extent that language in Kursch v. State, 55 Md. App.
2
103, 460 A.2d 639 (1983) is inconsistent with our holding today,
that dicta is expressly disapproved.
age.
Given the clear thrust of the overall
statutory scheme of regulation, we conclude
that a juvenile court has no present authority
directly 
to 
suspend 
a 
child's 
driving
privileges upon a finding of delinquency.
That 
is 
a 
power 
committed 
by 
statute
exclusively to MVA."  (Footnote omitted).
In Re David K., 48 Md. App. at 723-25, 429 A.2d at 318-19.  The
Court of Special Appeals did, however, note in dicta that "[w]e
have no doubt that such restraint could have been directly effected
as part of a probation order -- a voluntary agreement by appellant
to surrender for a time his privilege to drive as a condition of
probation."  In Re David K., 48 Md. App. 721-22, 429 A.2d 317
(emphasis in original).  We need not decide if the condition
imposed in the instant case could be valid if freely and
voluntarily consented to by Sheppard because there was no consent,
and a timely appeal of the condition of probation was noted.2
The Transportation Article clearly and specifically sets the
MVA administrative hearing procedures, suspension and revocation
penalties, as well as manner of restoration of driving privileges
for those convicted of driving under the influence.  This specific
statutory scheme of regulation delegated to the executive branch
controls over the general statute authorizing a court to impose
conditions of probation. 
-15-
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED 
IN 
PART. 
 
CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 
WORCESTER 
COUNTY 
WITH
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
VACATE 
THE
CONDITION OF PROBATION WHICH
PROHIBITS THE PETITIONER FROM
DRIVING FOR A PERIOD OF THREE
YEARS.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
WORCESTER COUNTY.