Case Title: Hitchens v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 468, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAMIAN HITCHENS,  
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 468, 2006      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0210009956 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 27 , 2007 
 
 
Decided:     July 26, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 26th day of July 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Damian Hitchens (“Hitchens”), the defendant-below appellant, 
contends that the Superior Court erroneously refused to vacate his probation 
violation sentences because:  (i) his counsel at sentencing had a per se conflict of 
interest; and (ii) the sentence on his burglary conviction exceeded the balance of 
the Level V time remaining on that sentence.  We find that appellant’s first claim 
has no merit and, therefore, affirm.  As for appellant’s second claim, because the 
Superior Court erred in imposing the sentence for Hitchens’ 2004 probation 
violation, we reverse and remand for resentencing.    
 
2
 
2. 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  In November 2002, Hitchens was 
arrested and charged with, among other things, second degree burglary and first 
degree robbery.  On April 28, 2003, Hitchens pled guilty to second degree burglary 
and aggravated menacing (a lesser included offense of first degree robbery).  On 
the burglary conviction, the Superior Court sentenced Hitchens to five years at 
Level V imprisonment with credit for 157 days previously served, suspended upon 
successful completion of Level V Boot Camp program for three years of probation.  
On the aggravated menacing conviction, Hitchens was sentenced to another three 
years of Level V imprisonment, suspended for 2 years Level II probation.  
Hitchens completed the Boot Camp program in April 2004. 
 
3. 
Thereafter, Hitchens violated his probation on three separate occasions.  
Hitchens first violated his probation in June 2004.  For violating his probation on 
the burglary charge, the Superior Court sentenced Hitchens to four years, six 
months of Level V imprisonment, suspended for four months at Level IV home 
confinement and decreasing levels of probation.  On the aggravated menacing 
probation violation (“VOP”), the Superior Court sentenced Hitchens to three years 
of Level V imprisonment, suspended for two years at Level III supervision. 
 
4. 
In December 2004, Hitchens violated the terms of his probation a 
second time.  As a result, on the burglary VOP, the Superior Court sentenced 
Hitchens to four years, six months at Level V imprisonment, with credit for 21 
 
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days previously served, suspended for six months home confinement, followed by 
18 months at Level III supervision.  On the menacing VOP, Hitchens was 
sentenced to three years at Level V imprisonment, suspended for two years at 
Level III supervision. 
5. 
In November 2005, Hitchens violated his probation a third time, and 
was charged with violating seven conditions of his Level III probation.  During his 
July 28, 2006 VOP hearing, Hitchens admitted violating his probation curfew and 
not reporting for mandatory office appointments after absconding from probation.  
At that hearing, Hitchens was represented by Assistant Public Defender Carole 
Dunn.  In order to decide a remaining disputed issue, the Superior Court conducted 
a further VOP hearing, on August 3, 2006, at which Hitchens was represented by 
the Assistant Public Defender Stephanie Tsantes (“Tsantes”).  Tsantes had 
previously been a Deputy Attorney General.  Moreover, she was involved in 
prosecuting Hitchens on the original criminal charges, and had signed the charging 
documents and plea agreements securing Hitchens’ convictions.  
6. 
Following the August 2006 VOP hearing, the Superior Court found that 
Hitchens had violated five conditions of his Level III probation. On the burglary 
charge violation, the court sentenced him to four years, five months imprisonment, 
followed by one year of work release and two years of probation for the aggravated 
menacing charge.   
 
4
7. 
On appeal, Hitchens contends that his probation violation sentences 
should be vacated for two reasons:  First, his attorney at sentencing (Tsantes) had a 
per se conflict of interest.  Second, his sentence on the burglary VOP charge 
exceeded the balance of the Level V time remaining on that sentence.  We address 
the issues generated by those two contentions. 
 8. Hitchens first claims that his sentences should be reversed, because 
Tsantes’ substantial participation in the same case in which she had earlier been 
involved as a prosecutor created a per se conflict of interest.   Because it presents a 
question of law, we review Hitchens’ claim de novo.1  
9. 
To be entitled to relief in a conflict of interest dispute, the defendant 
must:  (1) “prove by clear and convincing evidence there is a conflict of interest in 
the first place;”2 and (2) “demonstrate how the conflict will prejudice the fairness 
of the proceeding.”3  Having reviewed the briefs and the record, we conclude that 
Hitchens’ conflict of interest claim lacks merit. 
 10. Hitchens claims that “[t]he existence of a conflict in the present case 
cannot reasonably be debated.”  Because Tsantes had personally prosecuted him in 
his original criminal proceeding (Hitchens claims), solely for that reason she could 
                                                 
1 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998). 
 
2 IMG Global v. Moffett, 1998 Del. Ch. Lexis 224 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1998). 
 
3 Id. 
 
 
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not represent Hitchens in his subsequent VOP hearing, even though the facts 
underlying the VOP charges were unrelated to the facts underlying his original 
convictions.  Rule 1.11(a)(2) of the Delaware Lawyer’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“DLRPC”) explicitly prohibits a lawyer “who has formerly served as a 
public officer or employee of the government” from representing “a client in 
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially as a public officer or employee.” 4   Here, Tsantes personally 
prosecuted Hitchens in the criminal proceeding leading to his guilty plea to 
aggravated menacing and second degree burglary in April 2003.  But, Tsantes left 
the Department of Justice in April 2004.  Therefore, she was not involved as a 
prosecutor in Hitchens’ subsequent VOP proceeding in August 2006,5 wherein she 
represented Hitchens who was found to have violated his probation.    
11. Because DLRPC 1.11 prohibits a lawyer from both prosecuting and 
representing a client “in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
                                                 
4 Rule 1.11 (a) (2) of Delaware Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct states that:  
 
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served 
as a public officer or employee of the government. . . . (2) shall not otherwise 
represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated 
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the  
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, 
to the representation.   
 
DLRPC 1.11(a)(2).   
 
5 The VOP report was returned in May 2006 and a hearing was held in July 2006.  
 
 
6
substantially as a public officer or employee. . .,”6 the threshold issue is whether 
Hitchens’ 2006 VOP proceeding constituted the same “matter” as his original 
criminal proceeding.  DLRPC 1.11(e) defines “matter” to include:  (i) any judicial 
or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, 
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other 
particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and (ii) any other matter 
covered by the conflict of interests rules of the appropriate government agency.7 
12. Although Rule 1.11(e) does not resolve the issue directly, Comment 10 
to that Rule provides guidance on the question of whether the two matters were the 
same:  
[10] For purpose of paragraph (e) of this Rule, a “matter” may continue 
in another form.  In determining whether two particular matters are the 
same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters 
involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time 
lapsed.” 
 
13. Applying the Comment 10 criteria, we conclude that Hitchens’ VOP 
proceeding did not involve the same “matter” as his original criminal proceeding.  
The only element common to the original prosecution of Hitchens in 2003 and his 
VOP proceedings in 2006, is that the parties were identical.  Tsantes’ 
representation of Hitchens in 2006 was limited to his subsequent violation of 
                                                 
6 DLRPC 1.11(a) (2) (emphasis added).  
 
7 DLRPC 1.11(e).  
 
 
7
probation.   When Hitchens’ 2006 VOP hearing took place, his original criminal 
trial had been concluded and Hitchens had been convicted.  The Superior Court’s 
determination of the VOP charges was based on Hitchens’ later conduct, not his 
conduct underlying the original offense.  Moreover, the two matters were separated 
in time by more than three years.  Therefore, the factual predicate for Hitchens’ 
VOP charges was essentially unrelated to the original charges.   
14. As we held in Jenkins v. State,8 “probation revocation is not a stage of a 
criminal prosecution.”9  The distinction between an original prosecution and a 
defendant’s subsequent VOP proceeding finds further support in State v. King,10 a 
case where the prosecution attempted to disqualify defense counsel because he was 
the attorney who prosecuted the offense that later led to a violation of probation.11  
The Florida Court of Appeals held that because the “alleged violation [was] based 
upon a factual predicate entirely unrelated to his prior offense,” defense counsel 
had no “substantial involvement on behalf of the prosecution in the same action.”12  
Moreover, the Florida Court held, “it does not appear that there has been any 
                                                 
8 2004 Del. LEXIS 549, at *7 n. 12 (Del. Nov. 23, 2004). 
 
9 Id. at *9.  
 
10  447 So.2d 395, 396 (Fla. App. 1984).  
 
11 Id.  
 
12 Id.  
 
 
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advantage gained that would work to the disadvantage of the state.” 13   The 
reasoning in King applies equally here.  Because Hitchens’ VOP hearing was not 
the same “matter” as his original criminal proceeding, Hitchens has not satisfied 
the first requirement of his conflict of interest claim.   
15. Even assuming that Hitchens’ VOP proceeding did involve the same 
matter as his original proceeding, Hitchens has failed to satisfy the second 
requirement—to establish that his defense counsel’s deficient performance actually 
prejudiced him.  In Delaware, the fact that defense counsel had a conflict of 
interest, without more, is normally insufficient to overturn a judgment.14  That is, 
“[even if] a defendant claims that counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of 
interest, [the defendant] must still establish prejudice.”15   
16. Here, it is undisputed that Hitchens was not prejudiced by any alleged 
conflict of interest.   Hitchens admits in his own brief that “it does not appear that 
[Hitchens] suffered any prejudice from Ms. Tsantes representation,” because he 
was “represented by another Public Defender, Ms. Dunn, at the time he admitted 
                                                 
13 Id.  
 
14 Stigars v. State, 1990 Del. Lexis 120, at *2 (Del. Mar. 29, 1990), citing Burger v, Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776 (1987). 
 
15 Id. 
  
 
9
violating his probation,”16 and “it appears that Ms. Tsantes vigorously represented 
[him].”  
17. Hitchens claims that it is not necessary to show prejudice because 
Tsantes had a “per se conflict of interest” that necessitated her withdrawal, having 
previously prosecuted him as a Deputy Attorney General.  To support this 
argument, Hitchens cites Illinois case law.  In Illinois, a per se conflict of interest 
exists where “certain facts about the defense counsel’s status, by themselves . . . 
engender a disabling conflict.”  Once a “per se” conflict of interest exists, a 
defendant is not required to establish prejudice.17    
18. Delaware has not adopted that “per se conflict of interest” rule.  
Moreover, even under a “per se” rule, this case falls outside the factual parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Once a defendant admits violating his probation, he exposes himself to the prison terms the 
Superior Court had previously suspended.  See Harris v. State, 768 A.2d 469 (Del. 2001) (Order).  
 
17 People v. Miller, 771 N.E. 2d 386, 388 (Ill. 2002). 
 
 
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of the Illinois cases Hitchens cites.18  In People v. Kester,19 defense counsel had 
been previously involved as an assistant state’s attorney in the same proceeding.  
The Illinois Supreme Court determined that because a potential conflict of interest 
existed, the defendant was not required to show any actual prejudice resulting from 
defense counsel’s dual representation. 20   Kester is inapposite because there, 
defense counsel had been involved in the same proceeding, first as a prosecutor 
and thereafter as a defense attorney.  Here, however, Tsantes was no longer 
employed by the Delaware Department of Justice at the time Hitchens committed 
the act that ultimately led to the August 2006 VOP proceedings.  In addition, 
Hitchens’ alleged probation violations were based on facts entirely unrelated to the 
                                                 
18 The Illinois Supreme Court has applied the per se conflict of interest rule in several cases.  See 
People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. 1984) (defense counsel also served as part-time 
prosecutor for municipality whose police officers were called as State’s witness against 
defendant); People v. Fife, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (Ill. 1979) (appointed defense counsel also 
employed part-time by State as Special Assistant Attorney General handling only unemployment 
compensation cases and defendant not informed of affiliation, nor validly waived such 
representation); and People v. Coslet, 364 N.E.2d 67 (Ill. 1977) (appointed defense counsel also 
served in related case as attorney for administrator of victim's estate).  
 
19 361 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. 1977).  
 
20 Id. at 572.  
 
 
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prior offense. Thus, this situation is not “too fraught with the dangers of 
prejudice”21 such as would justify the application of the per se rule.  
19. Similarly, in People v. Newberry, 22 court-appointed defense counsel 
had previously served as the head of the criminal division of the State’s Attorney’s 
Office at the time that the defendant was indicted.  The Newberry court declined to 
apply the per se rule, because there was no inherent prejudice to the defendant in 
that particular factual setting.23   Here, although Tsantes did personally serve in the 
criminal proceedings as both the prosecutor and later as defense counsel, Hitchens’ 
original criminal proceeding (in which Tsantes was a prosecutor) and his VOP 
                                                 
21 People v. Stoval, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ill. 1968), quoting United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 
253 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
 
22 302 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. 1973).  
 
23  Id. 
  
 
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proceeding (in which Tsantes was defense counsel) were essentially unrelated.  
Thus, even if there were a per se rule, that rule would not apply here.24  
20. Hitchens’ second claim is that the Superior Court erred in imposing 
sentence on the probation violation.  This Court reviews a Superior Court 
sentencing decision for abuse of discretion.25  
21. 
A revocation of probation falls within the broad discretion of the trial 
court. 26  If a violation of probation is established, the sentencing court may 
“require the probation violator to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser 
sentence, and, if imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence 
which might originally have been imposed.”27  A reviewing court will not reverse a 
sentence unless it is demonstrated that the imposed sentence was beyond the 
                                                 
24 Moreover, the Illinois per se rule is a minority rule.  In contrast, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to create a per se rule barring subsequent representation 
of a defendant by his former prosecutor, and held that:  
 
Although the possibilities for actual conflicts are very real when attorneys “switch 
sides” in a subsequent criminal case involving the same defendant, such conflicts 
do not automatically occur. Determining whether an attorney has an actual 
conflict involves a closer examination of the facts of each particular case, with a 
particular eye to whether the attorney will, in the present case, be required to 
undermine, criticize, or attack his or her own work product from the previous case. 
 
Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
25 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A. 2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006). 
 
26 Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1968), holding that “[j]ust as probation is an ‘act of 
grace,’ revocation of probation is an exercise of broad discretionary power.”  
 
27 11 Del. C. § 4334(c) (2001).  
 
 
13
maximum allowed by  law or was the result of vindictive or arbitrary action by the 
sentencing court.28 
22. In this case, the Superior Court intended to reimpose the entire 
unserved balance of Hitchens’ burglary sentence as a consequence of his violation 
of probation.  The court actually imposed a sentence of four years, five months 
imprisonment.  Hitchens’ original sentence was five years, suspended after 
completion of the Boot Camp program, with credit for one hundred fifty-seven 
days.   Hitchens claims that the sentence actually imposed exceeded the maximum 
term to which Hitchens was then subject.  The State so concedes.  As Hitchens 
correctly notes, a defendant sentenced to the Boot Camp program is entitled to 
credit for every day he spent in the program.  The boot camp program is for a 
minimum of six months.29  The State concedes that when the Superior Court 
sentenced Hitchens to four years and six months at Level V imprisonment in 
December 2004, that sentence did not reflect the one hundred fifty-seven days for 
which Hitchens was entitled to receive credit.  That omission continued through 
Hitchens’ two subsequent probation violations.  Thus, to that extent the Superior 
Court’s December 2004 sentence was invalid.  
                                                 
28  See Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839 (Del. 1992).  
 
29 11 Del. C. § 6704(d) (2001).  
 
 
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23. Hitchens further argues that he is entitled to the time he was detained in 
default of a cash bond while awaiting his 2006 VOP hearing.  He was incarcerated 
in default of the $5,000 cash bond set by the Superior Court from May 10, 2006 
until he was sentenced on August 3, 2006, but “[n]one of this time was credited 
toward [his] sentence.”  In Brown v. State,30 this Court held that a defendant is 
entitled to the credit for time he served while actually incarcerated, but the record 
here does not reflect whether Hitchens was actually incarcerated from May 10, 
2006 through August 3, 2006.  On remand this issue should be considered as well.   
NOW, THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the 
Superior Court are AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and 
REMANDED for resentencing, including the determination of any credits for time 
Hitchens was entitled.  Jurisdiction is not retained.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
30 793 A.2d 306 (Del. 2002).