Case Title: Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-53

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.1995 WY 26891 P.2d 57Case Number: 94-53, 94-72, 94-79Decided: 03/03/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

CARGILL, INCORPORATED, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY, Appellee (Plaintiff), and 
Salt Creek Welding, Appellee (Third-Party Plaintiff).

 

SALT CREEK WELDING, a sole proprietorship, Appellant 
(Third-Party Plaintiff),

v. 

CARGILL, INCORPORATED, Appellee (Third-Party 
Defendant).

 

MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

SALT CREEK WELDING; and Cargill Incorporated, 
Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Albany County, Larry Lehman, J.

Alan B. Minier, Brent R. 
Cohen, and Justin D. Cumming of Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson, 
Cheyenne, for Cargill, 
Inc.

David R. Nicholas, Philip A. 
Nicholas, Stephen N. Goodrich, and Jeff Anthony of Nicholas Law Office, Laramie, 
for Mountain Cement 
Co.

James Richard McCarty and 
Keith P. Tyler, Casper, for Salt Creek 
Welding.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and TAYLOR, 
JJ., and KAUTZ, D.J.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, we are asked to address theories of express and implied 
warranties arising out a jury verdict in favor of Mountain Cement Company and 
Salt Creek Welding and against Cargill Incorporated. The district court reduced 
the jury verdict by the amount Mountain Cement Company and Salt Creek Welding 
recovered from other defendants who settled prior to trial. These appeals 
require us to apply Wyoming's Uniform Commercial Code; review jury instructions, 
both given and refused; consider the denial of a request for further discovery; 
and consider the damages awarded.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      In Appeal No. 
94-53, Cargill Incorporated states the issues in the following 
manner:

   
A..    Did the trial 
court err by failing to order summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law 
against Mountain Cement Company and Salt Creek Welding on their warranty claims 
because, under the definitions found in the Uniform Commercial Code, Cargill was 
not a seller of the defective 5/8 inch steel plates?

   
B.     Did the trial 
court err by failing to order summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law 
against Mountain Cement Company and Salt Creek Welding because the alleged 
contract was unenforceable against Cargill under the Statute of 
Frauds?

   
C.     Did the trial 
court err when it gave Mountain Cement Company and Salt Creek Welding, two 
parties with common interests, four peremptory challenges each, for a total of 
eight, while Cargill was only given four?

   
D.     Did the trial 
court err when it instructed the jury. Specifically:

   
1.      Did the 
trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on intervening 
causation?

   
2.      Did the 
trial court err by instructing the jury on delegation of performance under the 
Uniform Commercial Code?

   
E.     Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion by denying Cargill an opportunity for further 
discovery when Mountain Cement shifted its damage case after the discovery 
cutoff and again during trial?

[¶3]      In Appeal No. 
94-53, Mountain Cement Company states the issues:

A.        Is there 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that Cargill, 
Incorporated sold 5/8 inch steel plate to Salt Creek and breached an express 
warranty and/or implied warranty for the sale of the steel 
plate?

B.        Is there 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that Cargill, 
Incorporated failed to establish its affirmative defense that an express 
warranty and/or implied warranty could not be enforced because of the statute of 
frauds?

C.        Did the 
Trial Court abuse its discretion by granting Cargill, Incorporated, Mountain 
Cement Company, and Salt Creek Welding each 3 peremptory challenges and an 
additional peremptory challenge to each for the alternate jurors? And, if it did 
abuse its discretion, was it reversible error?

D.        Was the 
jury confused or misled with respect to the applicable law by the Trial Court's 
refusal to grant appellant's instruction on intervening causation and its 
granting [of] Salt Creek Welding's instruction on delegation under the Uniform 
Commercial Code?

E.        Did the 
Trial Court abuse its discretion by (1) denying Cargill, Incorporated an 
opportunity to take the deposition of Mountain Cement Company's damage witnesses 
for a second time, or (2) allowing Mountain Cement Company's damage experts to 
testify at trial?

[¶4]      Salt Creek 
Welding agrees with the issues presented by Cargill Incorporated in Appeal No. 
94-53.

[¶5]      In Appeal No. 
94-79, Mountain Cement Company presents the following 
issues:

A.        Did the 
Trial Court err by refusing to grant Mountain Cement Company interest on its 
property damage claims against defendants Salt Creek Welding and Cargill 
Incorporated?

B.        Did the 
Trial Court err by granting defendant Cargill, Incorporated a setoff against the 
jury verdict for settlement payments paid by USX Corporation and Leeco Steel 
Products, Inc.?

C.        If Cargill, 
Incorporated was entitled to a setoff, did the Trial Court err by deducting the 
entire amount of the settlement payments against the entire amount of the jury's 
verdict, when the settling parties did not pay damages for Mountain Cement 
Company's property damage or prejudgment interest on its property 
damage?

[¶6]      Cargill 
Incorporated presents the following issues in Appeal No. 
94-79:

A.        Did the 
trial court properly refuse to grant Mountain Cement prejudgment interest on its 
property damage claim against Cargill?

B.        Following a 
case tried only on breach of warranty, did the trial court properly reduce the 
judgment by $4,930,000 in settlement proceeds previously received by Mountain 
Cement?

[¶7]      In Appeal No. 
94-72, Salt Creek Welding presents the following issue:

Whether the trial court erred in awarding Cargill a 
set-off in the amount of $70,000 representing monies paid prior to trial by USX 
to Salt Creek for mental anguish.

[¶8]      Cargill 
Incorporated, states the issue in Appeal No. 93-72 as:

A.        Following a 
case tried only on breach of warranty theories, did the trial court properly 
reduce the judgment by $70,000 in settlement proceeds previously received by 
Salt Creek Welding?

II. 
FACTS

[¶9]      Salt Creek 
Welding (Salt Creek) contracted to build a steel silo for Mountain Cement 
Company (Mountain Cement). The silo walls were to be built from A36 steel plate. 
A36 steel is an industrial grade material often used to build steel 
silos.

[¶10]   Salt Creek contacted Charlie Mandry 
(Mandry), a salesman for Cargill, Incorporated (Cargill), and ordered A36 steel 
plate for use in constructing the Mountain Cement silo. Cargill did not have the 
steel in stock and Mandry arranged to have the steel delivered by a Tulsa, 
Oklahoma supplier, Steel Deck. Several plates of steel were non-conforming 
carbon .33 max. alloy plates. The non-conforming plates were supplied by Leeco 
and manufactured by USX. When carbon .33 max. alloy plates are welded in the 
same way A36 steel plates are welded, the alloy becomes very brittle. One of the 
brittle alloy plates in the Mountain Cement silo cracked and the silo 
collapsed.

[¶11]   Mountain Cement sued Salt Creek, 
Cargill, USX, Leeco, and Steel Deck. (Steel Deck and USX were identified as 
Does). Salt Creek filed a cross claim against Cargill, USX, and Leeco. Steel 
Deck defaulted. Prior to trial, Mountain Cement and Salt Creek settled with USX 
and Leeco and both were dismissed with prejudice. Salt Creek confessed judgment 
to Mountain Cement.

[¶12]   The matter was tried before a jury 
on breach of warranty theories. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mountain 
Cement and Salt Creek and against Cargill. The district court set off the 
settlement proceeds against the jury awards. Cargill appeals the jury verdict 
and several rulings by the district court. Mountain Cement and Salt Creek appeal 
the decision to set off the settlement proceeds against their jury 
awards.

III. 
DISCUSSION

APPEAL NO. 
94-53

[¶13]   Cargill argues that it is entitled 
to summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Cargill argues 
it is not a seller for purposes of Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-103(a)(iv) (1991) and 
that the statute of frauds bars enforcement of any verbal contract between 
Cargill and Salt Creek. Cargill also challenges the district court's decision to 
allow Mountain Cement and Salt Creek to exercise separate peremptory challenges 
during jury selection; the jury instruction regarding delegation; the district 
court's refusal to give an instruction on intervening cause; and an order by the 
district court limiting discovery.

A. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶14]   Whether the denial of a motion for 
summary judgment may be reviewed on appeal, following a trial on the merits, is 
an issue of first impression to this court. Before granting summary judgment, a 
court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Roemer Oil Co. v. Aztec Gas & Oil Corp., 886 P.2d 259, 262 
(Wyo. 1994). This two-pronged analysis is inapplicable if a motion for summary 
judgment is denied and the case is heard on its merits. The first prong of 
summary judgment analysis is rendered moot when the trier of fact accepts a 
particular set of facts at trial.

[¶15]   When the "issue of material fact" 
prong of summary judgment analysis is removed, the only question that remains is 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The proper 
procedural mechanism for challenging an adverse judgment, following a trial on 
the merits, is a motion for judgment as a matter of law. We hold that it is 
improper to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment following a trial 
on the merits. Bigney v. Blanchard, 430 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Me. 1981). We will not 
consider Cargill's argument that it is entitled to summary judgment. The proper 
focus of our analysis is on Cargill's motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.

B. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶16]   A motion for judgment as a matter 
of law under W.R.C.P. 50, as amended in 1992, is procedurally identical to a 
motion for directed verdict under the former W.R.C.P. 50. Accordingly, our 
standard of review is identical. If the jury acted unreasonably, that is 
returned a verdict contrary to the one conclusion a reasonable jury could have 
reached, the district court may grant judgment as a matter of law. Rhoades v. 
K-Mart Corp., 863 P.2d 626, 629 (Wyo. 1993). If, however, there is more than one 
conclusion that reasonable jurors could reach, judgment as a matter of law is 
inappropriate. Id.

[¶17]   The decision to grant a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo and we will accord no deference 
to the district court's decision. Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Wyo. 
1983). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that the jury may have drawn 
from that evidence will be respected. Rhoades, 863 P.2d  at 629. Finally, we note 
that judgment as a matter of law should be granted cautiously and sparingly. Id. 
This standard will be applied to Cargill's legal claims.

C. UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE

[¶18]   Cargill insists it is not a seller 
under Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-103(a)(iv) because it never held title to the 
defective steel plate. Cargill argues that if it is not a seller, it is not 
liable for any breach of express or implied warranties under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC). This argument is flawed because the question of whether 
Cargill held title to the defective steel plate becomes irrelevant if Mandry 
acted as Cargill's agent in arranging the sale of the defective plate to Salt 
Creek. See, Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Wyo. 1964) 
(parties' rights under UCC not dependent on title).

[¶19]   The proper analysis focuses on 
whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude that Mandry acted 
as Cargill's agent. Rhoades, 863 P.2d  at 629. This issue is controlled by 
well-settled legal principles. A brief review of agency law will facilitate our 
analysis of this issue.

[¶20]   Whether an agency relationship 
exists and the scope of the agent's authority are questions of fact to be 
determined by the jury following proper instruction. Henderson v. Coleman, 19 
Wyo. 183, 211-12, 115 P. 439, 445-46 (1911); First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. 
Government of Antigua & Barbuda-Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 193 (2nd 
Cir. 1989). An agent may possess actual or apparent authority and either may 
serve to bind the principal. Ulen v. Knecttle, 50 Wyo. 94, 103-04, 58 P.2d 446, 
449 (1936).

[¶21]   Actual authority may be express or 
implied. Id. An agent has express actual authority to bind the principal when 
the principal, orally or in writing, specifically grants the agent the power to 
bind the principal. Id.; United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1560 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005, 112 S. Ct. 640, 116 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1991). 
Implied actual authority is established by the course of dealings between the 
parties and the circumstances surrounding the case. Ulen, 58 P.2d  at 
449.

[¶22]   Apparent authority is created when 
the principal holds the agent out as possessing the authority to bind the 
principal or when the principal allows the agent to claim such authority. Id. To 
bind the principal under a theory of apparent authority, a third party must 
establish personal knowledge of, and reliance on, the apparent authority of the 
agent. Id. In Herbert Const. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 989, 993-94 
(2nd Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated that 
test:

To recover on this theory [apparent authority] the 
third party must establish two facts: (1) the principal "was responsible for the 
appearance of authority in the agent to conduct the transaction in question," 
Ford, [v. Unity Hospital,] 32 N.Y.2d [464,] at 473, 346 N.Y.S.2d [238] at 244, 
299 N.E.2d [659] at 664 [(1973)] (citation omitted), and (2) the third party 
reasonably relied on the representations of the agent, Hallock, [v. State,] 64 
N.Y.2d [224,] at 231, 485 N.Y.S.2d [510,] at 513, 474 N.E.2d [1178,] at 1181 
[(1984)].

This statement essentially 
modernizes our holding in Ulen. Apparent authority in agency cases will be 
determined according to this two-prong test.

[¶23]   We begin by noting that the jury in 
the appeals before us was properly instructed. Specifically, Jury Instruction 
No. 9 and Jury Instruction Nos. 16 through 21 fairly and accurately apprised the 
jury of the law that controlled their decision regarding the nature and extent 
of any agency relationship between Mandry and Cargill. Since the jury was 
properly instructed, our review is limited. We must determine whether there was 
only one conclusion that a reasonable jury could have reached and, more 
specifically, whether the jury in this case unreasonably failed to reach that 
conclusion. Rhoades, 863 P.2d  at 629.

[¶24]   Mandry was hired by Cargill to work 
as an outside sales representative. Cargill authorized Mandry, in writing, to 
sell Cargill's products to Cargill's customers. To facilitate the sale of its 
products, Cargill provided Mandry with an office, a telephone and an expense 
account. Mandry was authorized by Cargill to take telephone orders for 
steel.

[¶25]   Salt Creek consistently placed 
verbal orders for steel with Cargill. Salt Creek bought steel from Cargill in 
this manner for years and many of these verbal orders were placed with Mandry. 
Cargill typically sold steel to customers by telephone and Mandry was authorized 
to do so as well.

[¶26]   Both the "actual authority" 
analysis and the "apparent authority" analysis make it clear that Mandry was 
Cargill's agent. It was perfectly reasonable, on these facts, for the jury to 
conclude that Mandry was Cargill's agent. Mandry was authorized, in writing, to 
sell Cargill's steel products. Further, the course of dealings between Mandry 
and Salt Creek established that both Mandry and Salt Creek believed that Cargill 
was bound by Mandry's agreement with Salt Creek. Under the express actual 
authority theory, or the implied actual authority theory, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that Mandry was Cargill's agent.

[¶27]   The same is true under an apparent 
authority theory. Cargill provided Mandry with a telephone, an expense account 
and office space. These facts indicate that Cargill intended to hold Mandry out 
as an agent who possessed the authority to bind Cargill. Further, Salt Creek 
reasonably relied on that apparent authority when it ordered steel from Cargill. 
Thus, both prongs of the apparent authority test are satisfied. Ulen, 58 P.2d  at 
449; Herbert Const. Co., 931 F.2d  at 993-94. Because a jury could, under either 
theory of agency, reasonably conclude that Mandry was Cargill's agent, Cargill 
was a seller under the UCC. As a merchant of goods of that kind under the UCC, 
Cargill is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the warranty claims. 
See, Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-314(a) (1991).

D. STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS

[¶28]   Cargill argues that judgment as a 
matter of law must also be granted because the agreement between Mandry and Salt 
Creek was not reduced to writing, and therefore, violates the statute of frauds. 
Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-201 (1991). This argument lacks merit because the 
transaction falls within the scope of a statutory exception. Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-2-201 provides, in pertinent part:

(a)       Except as 
otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the 
price of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more is not enforceable by way of 
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent * * 
*.

*           
*           
*           *           
*           
*

(c)        A contract 
which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) but which is valid in 
other respects is enforceable:

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(iii) With respect to goods for which payment has 
been made and accepted or which have 
been received and accepted * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶29]   Salt Creek received the steel plate 
from Steel Deck and paid Steel Deck for the steel plate. Cargill argues that the 
full performance exception to the UCC, Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-201(c)(iii), is 
inapplicable because a third party, Steel Deck, accepted payment for the steel 
plate. Cargill argues that because it never received payment for the steel from 
Salt Creek, there was no "acceptance" by Cargill, as required under Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-2-201(c)(iii), and that the verbal agreement between Mandry and Salt Creek 
is unenforceable.

[¶30]   This argument ignores the fact that 
Mandry, acting as Cargill's agent, arranged the sale and instructed Salt Creek 
to pay Steel Deck. Since Mandry was acting within the scope of his authority, 
the express authority to sell steel, Cargill is bound by Mandry's actions 
despite the fact that Mandry may have violated private instructions he received 
from Cargill. Koon v. Sampson, 61 Wyo. 498, 506, 159 P.2d 366, 369 (1945). 
Cargill is, therefore, bound by the contract Mandry executed with Salt Creek. 
Since Cargill's agent issued the directive, Cargill is bound by the result, the 
acceptance of payment by Steel Deck. The goods were received and payment was 
accepted. The full performance exception to the UCC is satisfied and there is no 
violation of the statute of frauds.

E. 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

[¶31]   Next, relying on Wardell v. 
McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1061 (Wyo. 1992), Cargill argues that the district 
court improperly allocated peremptory challenges during jury selection. Wardell 
involved the interpretation and application of Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-202 (1988), 
which states that "[i]n a trial of civil cases in the district courts of this 
state, each side is allowed three (3) peremptory challenges."1

[¶32]   In Wardell, this court held that 
when allocating peremptory challenges, a district court must determine whether, 
under the relevant circumstances, a good-faith controversy exists between 
multi-party defendants regarding factual issues that will be determined by the 
jury. Wardell, 844 P.2d  at 1061. Cargill argues that there was not a good faith 
controversy between Mountain Cement and Salt Creek when this case went to trial 
and that the two should have been required to share one set of peremptory 
challenges.

[¶33]   Although Wardell provides some 
guidance, we must also look to W.R.C.P. 47(e), which 
provides:

(e)       Peremptory 
challenges. - Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. 
Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for 
the making of challenges or the court may allow additional peremptory 
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or 
jointly.

(Amended November 30, 1992, 
effective February 25, 1993.) (Emphasis added.)

[¶34]   W.R.C.P. 47(e) is identical to its 
federal counterpart, F.R.C.P. 47(b) (28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988)). In Fedorchick v. 
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 577 F.2d 856, 858 (3rd Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1870, held that the allocation of 
peremptory challenges among multiple parties is discretionary. Fedorchick is 
persuasive authority. Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1107 (Wyo. 1993). The 
permissive phrases in W.R.C.P. 47(e), "may be considered" and "may allow," 
support the conclusion that the application of the second sentence of the rule 
is discretionary. We hold that the standard of review applicable to the 
allocation of peremptory challenges under W.R.C.P. 47(e) is an abuse of 
discretion standard. 

[¶35]   Cargill's reliance upon Wardell is 
not entirely misplaced. Allocation of peremptory challenges, although resting 
within the sound discretion of the district court, still requires the district 
court to determine that a good faith controversy exists between multi-party 
litigants, be they plaintiffs or defendants, before peremptory challenges are 
awarded. This rule is intended to prevent multi-party litigants, on the same 
side, from stockpiling peremptory challenges if their interests are not 
antagonistic.

[¶36]   However, we need not determine 
whether the district court erred in the application of this rule. Cargill failed 
to indicate which jurors, if any, it would have opposed had the peremptory 
challenges been allocated differently, and thereby, failed to properly preserve 
the issue for appeal. Wardell, 844 P.2d  at 1059; Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852, 105 S. Ct. 172, 83 L. Ed. 2d 107 
(1984). In Goldstein, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that a jury 
verdict will not be reversed, due to improper allocation of peremptory 
challenges, unless the challenging party can "point to some convincing 
indication in the record that if a further peremptory challenge had been 
allowed, [the party] meant to challenge one or more jurors." Id. at 38. 
Goldstein, like Fedorchick, is persuasive authority. Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1107.

[¶37]   The record in this case fails to 
reveal which jurors were excluded by Salt Creek or Mountain Cement but desired 
by Cargill. The record also fails to disclose which jurors, if any, Cargill 
would have challenged had it been allotted additional peremptory challenges. We 
hold that a jury verdict cannot be attacked on the basis of improper allocation 
of peremptory challenges absent some indication, on the record, of which jurors 
the challenging party opposed.

F. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶38]   Cargill challenges Jury Instruction 
No. 5, which stated:

A 
party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless 
the other party has a substantial interest in having his original promisor 
perform or control the acts required by the contract. No delegation of 
performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to perform or any 
liability for breach.

[¶39]   An instruction to the jury is 
proper if there is "evidence before a jury to which they may apply the rule of 
law given by the court in the instruction." Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific, 859 P.2d 85, 88 (Wyo. 1993). When reviewing jury instructions, "this Court considers 
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately and clearly advise the 
jury of the applicable law." Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & 
Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 1992). The record 
must establish that substantial rights were affected by an improper instruction before this 
court will find reversible error. Id. at 1182.

[¶40]   There is evidence in the record 
from which the jury could conclude that Cargill, through its agent Mandry, 
delegated to Steel Deck the responsibility of delivering conforming steel plates 
to Salt Creek. We have already held that Mandry, acting as Cargill's agent, 
contracted to supply Salt Creek with the steel plate for the silo. Cargill did 
not have the steel plate required and, rather than lose the sale, Mandry asked 
Steel Deck to supply the steel. Steel Deck agreed to deliver conforming steel 
plate to Salt Creek. Mandry then called Salt Creek and informed Salt Creek that 
"we can deliver it * * * via a friend in Tulsa, Steel 
Deck."

[¶41]   Cargill had delivered steel to Salt 
Creek through a third-party supplier in the past. Cargill sources steel through 
third-party suppliers when it did not have the steel in its inventory. Cargill 
admitted that it had the power to direct payment by a customer, in this case 
Salt Creek, to a third-party supplier. The evidence demonstrates that Cargill 
sanctioned the delivery of steel from third-party sources to its customers and 
directed its customers to pay those third-party sources for the steel. Cargill, 
through its agent Mandry, delegated the performance of the contract with Salt 
Creek to Steel Deck.

[¶42]   The challenged jury instruction was 
proper and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The jury 
instructions as a whole adequately and clearly advised the jury of the 
applicable law. Kemper Architects, P.C., 843 P.2d  at 1182. We find no reversible 
error.

[¶43]   Cargill next argues that the 
district court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury 
that Mountain Cement, not Cargill, may have caused Salt Creek's damages. 
Specifically, Cargill argues that Mountain Cement's refusal to pay Salt Creek 
for poor welding work was the cause of Salt Creek's damages, not the defective 
steel. This argument lacks merit. The verdict form and Jury Instruction Nos. 30 
through 33 properly informed the jury that damages were not to be awarded unless 
Cargill proximately caused those damages. The jury instructions, taken as a 
whole, adequately and clearly informed the jury of the applicable law. Kemper 
Architects, P.C., 843 P.2d  at 1182. We find no reversible 
error.

G. 
DISCOVERY

[¶44]   Finally, Cargill argues that the 
district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Cargill to depose 
Mountain Cement's damage expert, Arthur Zunker (Zunker), a second time. The 
standard for reviewing a district court's denial of a discovery request is 
whether the district court abused its discretion. Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680, 
685 (Wyo. 1984). "Abuse of discretion occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of 
reason or commits an error of law." Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶45]   Cargill argues that its ability to 
defend against Mountain Cement's damage claims was impaired because it was not 
allowed to depose Zunker a second time. We disagree. Suit was filed on January 
8, 1990. After almost three and one-half years of discovery, the district court 
ordered a discovery cut-off date of May 28, 1993. Zunker had been deposed 
earlier by a Texas law firm. On September 30, 1992, the district court ordered 
Mountain Cement to deliver that deposition to Cargill.

[¶46]   Armed with over three years of 
discovery materials and two complete depositions from Zunker, Cargill sought to 
depose Zunker yet again. The district court denied this request. The denial of 
the request was a proper exercise of the court's authority and was certainly 
within the bounds of reason. Therefore, there was no abuse of 
discretion.

APPEAL NO. 
94-79

[¶47]   In Appeal No. 94-79, Mountain 
Cement appeals the denial of prejudgment interest on its property damage award 
and the decision to set off, against its portion of the verdict, the settlement 
money it received from USX and Leeco. Mountain Cement argues that its property 
damage claim was liquidated and that prejudgment interest should have been 
awarded.

H. 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

[¶48]   Prejudgment interest may be 
recovered on a liquidated claim "`that is readily computable by basic 
mathematical calculation.'" Dunn v. Rescon Technology Corp., 884 P.2d 965, 968 
(Wyo. 1994) (quoting O's Gold Seed Co. v. United Agri-Products Financial 
Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 677 (Wyo. 1988)). An unliquidated claim can be 
converted into a liquidated claim if the amount claimed can be determined, inter 
alia, "without reliance on opinion or discretion." Rissler & McMurry Co. v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25, 33 (Wyo. 1977) (citing Elte, Inc. v. S.S. 
Mullen, Inc., 469 F.2d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 1972)).

[¶49]   Mountain Cement's claim for 
prejudgment interest on the property damage award must be rejected because it 
cannot be determined without reliance on opinion or discretion. Labor costs of 
$261,192.00 and vendor invoices totaling $2,127,650.00 account for $2,388,842.00 
of the $2,734,671.00 property damage claim. Labor costs and vendor invoices, 
attributed to the silo collapse, were calculated in reliance on the discretion 
of Mountain Cement's employees.

[¶50]   On January 21, 1988, Mountain 
Cement circulated a memorandum regarding "[a]ll charges associated with the 
blend silo collapse/explosion * * *." The memorandum asked management to advise 
employees "to be [specific] on time cards when doing any work related to the 
job. This will include all associated labor, (clean-up, guarding, repair)." 
(Emphasis in original.) Each employee decided how much time he or she would 
allocate to the silo collapse on a given day. Employees were required to 
differentiate between their regular work duties and any work they believed 
should be attributed to the silo collapse. The opinions and discretion of 
Mountain Cement's employees determined labor costs.

[¶51]   The cost of vendor invoices 
attributable to the silo collapse was determined by Mountain Cement's accounting 
expert, Alan Wells (Wells). When asked whether he simply compiled those 
invoices, Wells responded:

I 
don't know if that's true. We didn't do a thorough test of each vendor in 
determining what each vendor did, but we did go through a list of vendors to see 
if it made sense to us or not. [To 
include the invoice in the property damage claim.]

There was [sic] some items from Mountain Cement that 
we didn't think * * * should be in the property claim, and we eliminated 
those.

In addition, there was [sic] some invoices we found 
that looked like maybe they should have 
been included, and we asked about those, whether they should have been 
included.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶52]   Wells exercised discretion in 
deciding which invoices to attribute to the silo collapse. Mountain Cement's 
work force exercised its discretion in determining labor costs that were related 
to the collapse. A major portion of Mountain Cement's property damage costs were 
generated in a discretionary fashion. We hold that Mountain Cement's property 
damage claim is not liquidated and that prejudgment interest on the claim was 
properly denied. Rissler & McMurry Co., 559 P.2d  at 
33.

APPEAL NO. 
94-72

[¶53]   In Appeal No. 94-79, Mountain 
Cement argues that the district court erred when it set off settlement proceeds 
from USX and Leeco against Mountain Cement's jury award. In Appeal No. 94-72, 
Salt Creek Welding challenges the reduction of its portion of the verdict. 
Because we resolve this issue on a different analytical basis, we will not 
consider the arguments presented by Mountain Cement and Salt 
Creek.

[¶54]   This issue is controlled by 
principles of equity and the fact that a party cannot recover more than full 
performance for breach of contract. See, Hurd v. Nelson, 714 P.2d 767, 771 (Wyo. 
1986). Possessing equitable jurisdiction, the district court has the inherent 
power to allow or compel an equitable set-off. In re First Nat. Bank of Arthur, 
Ill., 23 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.Ill. 1938). The decision to allow or compel a 
set off rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Reisman v. 
Independence Realty Corp., 195 Misc. 260, 89 N.Y.S.2d 763, 766 (1949), aff'd, 
277 A.D. 1020, 100 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1950).

[¶55]   Counsel for Mountain Cement, 
referring to the settlement received from USX and Leeco, said "[t]here's 
probably a responsibility on the part of the Court to apply that amount 
[settlement proceeds] to any Judgment that we would receive against Cargill in 
this case." Counsel went on to say that placing the set-off issue before the 
jury would be "unobjectionable." Accordingly, the district court informed the 
jury that any award would be reduced by the amount already received in 
settlement. Neither Salt Creek nor Mountain Cement 
objected.

[¶56]   Equity will not allow a party to 
switch horses in mid-stream. Salt Creek and Mountain Cement cannot endorse the 
set-off plan at trial and then challenge the reduction on appeal. We hold that 
Salt Creek and Mountain Cement are estopped from challenging on appeal the plan 
they endorsed at trial. See, Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1224 
(Wyo. 1994) and Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976). We further hold 
that the district court properly set off the jury awards against the settlement 
proceeds. Salt Creek and Mountain Cement pursued breach of contract remedies at 
trial and are not entitled to the windfall they would receive if their jury 
awards were not set off against proceeds from the settlement. See, Hurd, 714 P.2d  at 771. 

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶57]   The decision of the district court 
and the jury verdict are affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTE

1 In addition to the three peremptory 
challenges allowed under Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-202 and W.R.C.P. 47(e), each party is 
entitled to an additional peremptory challenge if one or two alternate jurors 
are empaneled. See, W.R.C.P. 47(d) (amended November 30, 1992, effective 
February 25, 1993). The district court empaneled additional jurors in this case 
and awarded each party an additional peremptory challenge for use against those 
jurors. Thus, Mountain Cement and Salt Creek were each awarded four peremptory 
challenges for a total of eight and Cargill was awarded 
four.