Case Title: Darin Daniel and Dana Honeycutt-Daniel, on Behalf of Themselves and the Citizens, Residents, Taxpayers and Inhabitants of White County, Arkansas v. The Honorable Glen Jones, County Judge of White County, Arkansas et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Darin DANIEL and Dana Honeycutt-Daniel, On
Behalf of Themselves and the Citizens,
Residents, Taxpayers, and Inhabitants of
White County, Arkansas v. The Honorable Glen
JONES, County Judge of White County,
Arkansas, et al.

97-634                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 9, 1998


1.   Motions -- motion to dismiss -- trial court's duty. -- When considering
     an Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court
     must treat the facts as true and view them in the light most
     favorable to the party who filed the complaint; the trial
     court must not look beyond the complaint unless it is treating
     the motion as one for summary judgment; the trial court must
     not lend consideration to any factual conclusions reached
     through the arguments of counsel and exhibits and may not base
     its decision on allegations contained in the briefs and
     exhibits.

2.   Motions -- motion to dismiss -- treated as such by chancellor -- supreme
     court's duty on review. -- Where there were no questions of fact
     to be determined, the parties to the action having agreed upon
     and stipulated to the relevant facts and exhibits, thereby
     acknowledging the truth of the facts, the chancellor clearly
     treated appellees' motion as one to dismiss for failure to
     state facts upon which relief could be granted; thus, upon
     review, the supreme court was required to construe the
     complaint liberally, accepting the facts alleged as true and
     viewing them in a light most favorable to appellants.
3.   Constitutional law -- interpretation of Arkansas Constitution. -- When
     the language of a provision of the Arkansas Constitution is
     plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its plain,
     obvious, and common meaning; neither rules of construction nor
     rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and
     certain meaning of a constitutional provision. 

4.   Taxation -- intent of Ark. Const. art. 16,  11. -- The express intent
     of Article 16, section 11, of the Arkansas Constitution is for
     the object to be stated so that the tax revenues cannot be
     shifted to a use different from that authorized. 

5.   Taxation -- illegal exaction -- use of funds for different purpose
     constitutes. -- It is the use of tax funds for a different
     purpose that constitutes an illegal exaction; where a primary
     purpose of a tax cannot be accomplished, but the collection of
     the tax continues, an illegal exaction has occurred; when a
     tax is enacted by the General Assembly or approved by a vote
     of the people without the statement of a purpose, the
     resulting revenues may be used for general purposes; it is
     only when a diversion of tax revenues occurs from a specific
     purpose that has been authorized to an unauthorized purpose
     that an illegal exaction occurs; whether the governmental
     entity levying and collecting the tax intended to put the
     revenues to "good use" is of no consequence, so long as the
     funds are being spent on any purpose other than those
     specified on the ballot.

6.   Taxation -- court looks to levying ordinance to determine whether revenue
     expenditures whether authorized. -- For purposes of construing Ark.
     Const. art. 16,  11, the "law imposing the tax" is the
     levying ordinance; accordingly, the supreme court looks to the
     levying ordinance rather than the enabling legislation in
     determining whether expenditures of tax revenues were
     authorized.

7.   Elections -- ballot title -- source of information for voters. -- It is
     to the title of the ordinance and the ballot title that the
     electors have the right to look to ascertain what they are
     asked to approve; the ballot title is the final word of
     information and warning to which the electors have the right
     to look as to just what authority they are asked to confer.

8.   Elections -- ballot title -- purpose of. -- It has long been regarded
     as axiomatic that the majority of voters, when called upon to
     vote for or against a proposed measure at a general election,
     will derive their information about its contents from an
     inspection of the ballot title immediately before exercising
     the right of suffrage; this, indeed, is the purpose of the
     ballot title.
9.   Elections -- ballot title -- plain-language standard. -- Citizens are
     entitled to be informed by plain language about what they are
     voting, and the supreme court has long insisted on that
     standard. 

10.  Elections -- ballot title -- references to acts of legislature
     insufficient. -- Mere references to acts of the legislature in a
     ballot title are insufficient to inform voters about what it
     was they were voting because the voters do not have ready
     access to the acts of the legislature, and it cannot be
     presumed they know what repealing effects a later act may have
     on a former act.

11.  Elections -- voters' right to be fully informed is paramount. --
     Overruling its decision in City of Little Rock v. Waters, 303
     Ark. 363,