Case Title: Dorsey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 76, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
PRISCILLA DORSEY,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 76, 2007 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. No. 0511005415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  October 10, 2007 
Decided:  November 6, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
This 6th day of November 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Priscilla Dorsey, Defendant-Appellant, appeals a Superior Court 
judge’s summary dismissal of her motion for postconviction relief under Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(4).  Dorsey argues that the trial judge abused his 
discretion when he denied her postconviction motion because the dismissal 
effectively prevented her from creating a necessary record for adequate appellate 
review.  Because Dorsey merely asserts conclusory allegations in her motion that 
conflict with her statements made during her plea colloquy and in her Truth In 
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, the trial judge properly summarily dismissed 
Dorsey’s motion.  Therefore, we AFFIRM. 
 
2
(2) 
In November 2005, the State indicted Dorsey on counts of first degree 
murder, second degree murder, third degree arson, and two counts of first degree 
reckless endangering.  Dorsey pleaded guilty but mentally ill to first degree murder 
in exchange for the State not pursuing the death penalty and entering nolle 
prosequis on the remaining charges.   In September 2006, the trial judge sentenced 
Dorsey to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
(3) 
In December 2006, Dorsey filed a pro se motion for postconviction 
relief in Superior Court.   She asserted the following grounds as basis for relief: 
1.  I was cocreed [sic] to make the plea he Mr. Goff kept telling me 
that they where [sic] going to kill me if I didn’t take the plea. 
 
2.  I was under meds at the time I took the plea it was 300 mg 
Thorzine [sic] 3 times a day. 
 
3. 
I have been under psychiatric care sence [sic] I was 14 yrs old 
and my Doctor (Dr. Bill) was never no infortion [sic] never exceded 
[sic] from him.  He planey [sic] stated that it was my criminal record.  
 
The trial judge first decided that Rule 61 did not procedurally bar Dorsey’s motion.  
Next, the trial judge considered the merits of her motion.  He summarily dismissed 
the motion, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(4), after he determined that 
her claims were conclusory and wholly unsubstantiated.1   Dorsey now appeals that 
dismissal. 
                                                 
1  
State v. Dorsey, Cr. A. No. IN05-11-0688, 2007 WL 544507 (Del. Super.). 
 
 
3
(4) 
Dorsey argues that the Superior Court judge erred by summarily 
dismissing her motion for postconviction relief instead of holding an evidentiary 
hearing allowing her to raise factual questions regarding the reasonableness of her 
attorney’s representation.  This Court reviews the Superior Court judge’s decision 
on a motion for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.2  
(5) 
“Rule 61 allows prisoners to attack their sentences collaterally in the 
court where they were originally tried.”3  To establish a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Rule 61, a defendant must set forth a “sufficient factual 
and legal basis” to support the collateral attack on the conviction.4   Specifically, 
the defendant must demonstrate that his “counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would 
have been different.”5  “If it plainly appears from the motion . . . that the movant is 
                                                 
2  
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
 
3  
Luby v. State, 1998 WL 665054, at *1 (Del.). 
 
4  
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).  On appeal, this Court must first consider whether the 
procedural filters of Rule 61 are satisfied before addressing any substantive issues.  Stone v. 
State, 690 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1996).  Here, as the trial judge noted, Dorsey procedurally 
complied with the requirements set forth in Rule 61. 
 
5  
Bialach v. State, 773 A.2d 383, 387 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
694 (1984)). 
 
 
4
not entitled to relief, the [trial] judge may enter an order for its summary 
dismissal.”6    
(6) 
Dorsey’s first two assertions supporting her motion can be 
characterized as contentions that her plea was coerced and involuntary because (a) 
she was threatened; and, (b) her medication prevented her from understanding the 
proceedings.  However, these conclusory assertions, without any factual support, 
cannot support postconviction relief.  “In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, [a defendant] is bound by his [or her] answers on the 
Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea form and by his [or her] sworn testimony prior to 
the acceptance of the guilty plea.”7  Dorsey’s first and second assertions, and the 
inferences she would have us draw from them, directly contradict her statements 
made at the plea colloquy and in her Truth In Sentencing Form.  First, in her Truth 
In Sentencing Form, Dorsey attested that “she freely and voluntarily decided to 
plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement; she had not been promised 
anything not stated in the written plea agreement; and that neither her attorney, the 
State, nor anyone else had threatened or forced her to enter this plea.”8   Second, 
the trial judge questioned Dorsey about her medication and her state of mind.  
                                                 
6  
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4). 
 
7  
Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
8   
Dorsey, Cr. A. No. IN05-0688, Order, at 8 (Feb. 15, 2007). 
 
 
5
Dorsey indicated (a) that she took medication on the day of the guilty plea, (b) that 
the medication helped her understand the proceedings, (c) that she could think 
clearly allowing her to make the important decision of pleading guilty, (d) that the 
medication did not impair her in any way, and (e) that she was confident that she 
could make the important decision of pleading guilty.   
(7) 
In her motion for postconviction relief, Dorsey provides no additional 
facts or assertions that contradict her earlier statements or that would support the 
conclusion someone coerced her guilty plea.  Without any clear and convincing 
evidence beyond her conclusory assertions, Dorsey is bound by her statements 
made at trial.9  Accordingly, Dorsey’s first two allegations are factually and legally 
insufficient to attack her guilty plea.   
(8) 
The Superior Court judge dismissed Dorsey’s third allegation of 
ineffective assistance of counsel because he could not discern any factual or legal 
argument.  Neither can we. 
(9) 
Dorsey’s claim on appeal that her Rule 61 motion should be remanded 
to Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing has no merit.  Rule 61(h)(1) vests 
discretion in the trial judge to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is 
necessary.10  The trial judge may, in his discretion, appoint counsel for an indigent 
                                                 
9  
See Sommerville, 703 A.2d at 632.   
 
10  
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h)(1); Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996). 
 
6
movant or direct expansion of the record.11  But because the trial judge determined 
that Dorsey’s claims were entirely conclusory, unsubstantiated, and contradicted 
her plea colloquy and her Truth In Sentencing Form, he did not abuse his 
discretion when he declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, appoint counsel, or 
expand the record.  He properly ordered the summary dismissal of Dorsey’s 
postconviction motion.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11  
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1), (g), (h).  See Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 974-75 (Del. 
2005); Franklin v. State, 2006 WL 1374675 (Del. Supr.).