Case Title: State v. McRae

Citation: 172 S.E.2d 37, 276 N.C. 308

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1970-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
172 S.E.2d 37 (1970)
276 N.C. 308
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Billie Clem McRAE.
No. 27.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
February 11, 1970.
*38 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Dale Shepherd, Staff Atty., for the State.
Benny S. Sharpe, Rockingham, for defendant.
BRANCH, Justice.
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred by admitting into evidence inculpatory statements alleged to have been made by him to police officers while in police custody.
When defendant interposed his objection to evidence concerning custodial statements made by him to police officers, the trial judge, in accordance with procedure approved by this Court and the United States Supreme Court, excused the jury and in its absence conducted a voir dire hearing to determine the voluntariness of the alleged statements. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908; State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1; State v. Catrett, N.C, 171 S.E.2d 398 (No. 52, Fall Term, 1969, filed January 6, 1970). This procedure is vital because of the unquestioned rule in North Carolina that an extra-judicial confession of guilt by a defendant is admissible against him only when it is made voluntarily and understandingly. State v. Vickers, 274 N.C. 311, 163 S.E.2d 481; State v. Gray, supra; State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259.
On voir dire, Everette L. Norton, an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation, and defendant Billie Clem McRae testified. Agent Norton, in substance, testified that he talked with defendant while he was in custody on a charge of first degree murder; that at the times he talked with defendant he appeared to be in a normal, rational condition; that defendant was in no way coerced or offered any reward to make *39 a statement; he was warned verbally and in writing of his "constitutional rights," and, prior to making the statement, he stated orally and in writing that he understood his rights. The written document signed by defendant consisted of two parts, entitled "Your Rights" and "Waiver of Rights," respectively. Under the section entitled "Your Rights" appears the following:
The section entitled "Waiver of Rights" states:
According to Agent Norton, defendant signed said waiver before any questioning took place and it was witnessed by the Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court.
On cross-examination, Agent Norton indicated that he had not discussed with defendant the charges against him before the incriminating statement was made, but that Chief Deputy Earl Dunn (of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office) had explained the charges to defendant sometime prior to defendant's signing the waiver and making the statement in question.
Defendant testified, in substance, that he was arrested on the morning of 14 November 1968. He stated that the warrant (charging him with murder) was read to him, but that he did not understand the charge of murder against him and that no one explained the doctrine of "felony-murder" to him. He further testified that, though he read the statement of his rights, he did not really know what he was signing when he signed the statement. Asked if he read the statement, he said, "Well, I read whatsome words, I couldn't make them out. Didn't know the word."
On cross-examination, defendant again stated that he did not understand what his rights were. He said, however, "I told them I was willing to make a statement and answer questions." When asked whether he understood the part of the waiver which indicated that he did not want a lawyer before he made the statement, defendant responded, "Well, I didn't think I needed one at the time." Defendant stated:
Upon completion of the evidence for the State and defendant on voir dire, the trial judge made full findings of fact. He found that defendant was fully apprised of his constitutional rights and read the paper writing quoted above entitled "Your Rights" and "Waiver of Rights," and thereupon stated to the officers that he was willing to make a statement and answer *40 questions; that he did not want a lawyer at that time and understood and knew what he was doing. The court further found:
Based upon his findings of fact, the trial judge concluded that the challenged statement was "freely, knowingly and understandingly by the defendant, after having been fully forewarned of his constitutional rights, and after having freely, knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily waived same." Thereupon the court ordered that the statement be admitted into evidence before the jury.
Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily, understandingly and intelligently make incriminatory statements or knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, because he was unaware of the rule of law which could make him guilty of murder in the first degree although he did not actually commit the act which ended Quick's life. He relies upon the familiar cases of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. In Escobedo a young Mexican boy was taken to police headquarters for interrogation on a murder charge and, after prolonged questioning, made inculpatory statements. He was not advised of his right to remain silent and, although he made several requests to see his lawyer, and although his lawyer, who was in the building, made persistent efforts to see his client, he was denied the right to have his counsel present. His custodial statement was used at his trial and Escobedo was convicted of murder. The United States Supreme Court, reversing the trial court, stated:
In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Court held that, unless other fully effective means are adopted to assure a person of his rights, certain procedural safeguards are essential. These, in effect, require that a suspect be warned: (1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that any statement he does make may be used *41 as evidence against him in court, (3) that he has the right to counsel, either appointed or retained, prior to and during the interrogation, and (4) that if he is indigent, counsel will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, if he so desires.
It is pertinent to our decision of instant case to note that immediately following the pronouncement of these required safeguards, the Court then stated:
"The very cases upon which defendant relies recognize the rule that a person may intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to legal counsel. This principle is firmly established in North Carolina. State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581; State v. Gray, supra; State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511. We do not interpret the authorities state or federalto hold that a defendant must be familiar with the rules of law in order to intelligently waive his right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. In the case before us for decision there was plenary competent evidence to support the findings by the trial judge that defendant's statement "was freely, knowingly, and understandingly given by defendant, after having been fully forewarned of his constitutional rights, and after having freely, knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily waived same."
When the trial judge's findings are based on competent evidence in the record, they are conclusive, and the reviewing court cannot properly set aside or modify such findings. State v. Wright, supra; State v. Gray, supra. We therefore hold that the trial judge properly admitted into evidence the custodial statements made by defendant to police officers.
Defendant also contends that since he was charged with a capital felony, he could not waive his right to counsel at any time after his arrest. We will consider some of the more recent decisions on this question, including some of those cited by defendant in support of his contention.
In the case of State v. Wright, supra, defendant was charged with the capital crime of rape. Upon trial, the trial judge admitted inculpatory statements made by defendant to police officers while he was in custody, no counsel being present at the time to represent him. The Court, holding the statements were properly admitted, stated:
The defendant in the case of State v. Thorpe, 274 N.C. 457, 164 S.E.2d 171, was charged with the capital felony of first degree burglary. The evidence tended to show that defendant was a retarded, uneducated youth, and that he was questioned by officers who failed to advise him of his right to counsel during the in-custody interrogation. *42 Defendant Thorpe's inculpatory statement was admitted into evidence over objection. Holding that the statement was erroneously admitted, the Court stated:
The case of Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70, presented the question of waiver of counsel where defendant was charged with a serious non-capital crime. The United States Supreme Court there said:
This quotation was approved in Miranda, v. Arizona, supra.
These recent and well documented cases clearly stand for the rule that even in capital offenses a defendant may intelligently and understandingly waive counsel during an in-custody interrogation.
In the instant case there is plenary evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the trial judge that defendant McRae intelligently and understandingly waived counsel.
In the trial below we find
No error.