Case Title: DAVID A. BASDEN V. CARLA J. COLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-45

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVID A. BASDEN V. CARLA J. COLE2005 WY 151123 P.3d 566Case Number: 05-45Decided: 11/28/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
DAVID A. 
BASDEN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
CARLA J. 
COLE,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
C.M. 
Aron of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Richard 
W. Beckwith of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich, Stith & Cannon, P.C., 
Rock Springs, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, David 
A. Basden (Father), challenges an order of the district court which modified the 
custody of his Daughter so that Appellee, Carla J. Cole (Mother), is now the 
primary custodian, with Father having liberal visitation.  Father contends that Mother failed to 
prove a material change in circumstances which warranted the modification of 
custody, and that the district court erred in relying on evidence from the 
guardian ad litem (GAL) that was not admitted at trial.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Father raises 
these issues:

 
 
            
1.  Can a 14-year-old's unchanged preference to live with the 
noncustodial parent satisfy the statutory requirement for a material change of 
circumstances?

 
 
            
2.  Is it reversible error for the trial court to rely on a GAL 
report that includes opinions that are, in effect, expert testimony, and relies 
on evidence outside the hearing?

 
 
Mother 
rephrases the issues in these terms:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court properly considered the child's preference as 
one of many factors in making its decision to modify 
custody.

 
 
II.          
Whether the district court committed reversible error when it accepted 
closing arguments from the parties, including the guardian ad litem, in the form 
of written findings of fact and conclusions of law, following a trial on the 
merits.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
divorced by decree entered on May 12, 1998.  The parties had three children:  A son born September 17, 1986; a son 
born September 5, 1988; and a daughter born June 7, 1990.  In the divorce decree, Father was 
awarded "sole legal custody" of the children, with Mother to have reasonable 
visitation.

 
 
[¶4]      On August 6, 
2003, acting pro se, Mother filed a 
petition to modify custody with respect to Daughter.  The basis for that petition was 
this:

 
 
            
6.  That since the most recent order/decree was entered there 
has been a significant and material change of circumstances to 
wit:

 
 
[Daughter], 
now the age of 13, has specified a preference to live with her mother, Carla J. 
(Basden) Cole for over a year.  Last 
year [Daughter] wrote letters to the Department of Family Services and the Court 
requesting a change in the custody order as she did not feel safe in the custody 
of her father (who at the time had  a drinking/driving incident during which 
time he drove off the road with the children, including [Daughter], in the 
vehicle).  Since that incident, 
[Daughter] reports a lack of supervision by her father including a recent event 
at the beginning of July 2003, of [Daughter] leaving the house late in the 
evening with a girlfriend while her father who had been drinking alcohol and 
watching television was sleeping very soundly on the couch.  [Daughter] and the girlfriend were 
picked up about 12:30am that night by the Kemmerer police and returned to her 
father who told them "it's 9:30pm, you girls should be in bed."  Additionally, [Daughter] lacks an adult 
female role model and confidant with whom she feels able to discuss menstrual 
cycles, changes inherent to puberty, dating questions, and other predominantly 
female issues.  Her retired 
grandmother lives in Kemmerer, but [Daughter] and she do not share a close 
personal relationship, per [Daughter's] report.  As to significant and material changes 
of circumstance in the mother, Carla J. (Basden) Cole, there have been many 
since the divorce judgment and decree dated May 12, 1998.  Carla has a full-time job with Nocor in 
Pinedale, Wyoming where she has worked eleven 
months.  She has lived in a nice 
home in a quiet residential neighborhood in Marbleton, Wyoming nearly four years.  Carla married Bill Cole nearly two years 
ago.  He has accepted all three of 
Carla's children as his own (he does not have children of his own) and has 
developed a comfortable relationship with them in which he is a respected 
parental figure and enjoys recreation activities with them including bicycling, 
basketball, volleyball, traveling, and barbeques.  Additionally, Bill is employed full-time 
where he has worked for the past 30 years.

In 
summary, I, Carla J. Cole, believe I am capable financially and emotionally of 
caring for [Daughter] and believe that at this critical stage in her development 
into a young woman, I am better able to identify with her needs and the changes 
she faces than her father.

 
 
[¶5]      On August 25, 
2003, Father filed a reply and counter-petition, asking that the district court 
dismiss Mother's petition, that Mother pay additional child support, as well as 
arrears on her obligation to pay one-half of uncovered medical expenses, and 
that Mother pay his attorney's fees.  
Mother responded, indicating that she paid more in child support than was 
alleged by Father in his reply and counter-petition, that no request for her to 
pay uncovered medical expenses had ever been made of her, and that the parties 
should each bear their own respective attorney's fees.  A GAL was appointed to represent the 
best interests of Daughter.

 
 
[¶6]      A hearing was 
held on October 29, 2004, and testimony was heard from Father, Mother, Daughter, 
Mother's current spouse, and Jerry Penny, a social worker and child custody 
expert called as a witness by Father.  
Penny's testimony was not directed at this particular case, and he did 
not meet with Daughter.  His 
testimony was limited to his general expertise with respect to "adolescent and 
custody issues."  The GAL did not 
call any witnesses.  At the close of 
the hearing, the district court decided not to hear closing arguments and gave 
these directions to the GAL:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  All right.  
Let me suggest something here.  I would like your recommendation.  If you want to put it in the form of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that's fine, or you can submit your 
recommendation, but it does need to be based on the evidence produced here in 
court.

 
 
[¶7]      The parties 
agreed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the 
district court two weeks later.  The 
record reflects that all parties did submit such findings and conclusions.  On December 29, 2004, the district court 
issued its order granting Mother's petition to regain custody of Daughter.  Father's notice of appeal was filed on 
January 25, 2005.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      A decision such 
as that which is challenged here is guided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) 
(LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
(c)  A 
court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the 
modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding in 
which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, 
proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow 
visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered as 
evidence of a material change of circumstances.

 
 
[¶9]      In the process of 
considering a modification of child custody, the district court must also be 
attentive to the requirements found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 (LexisNexis 
2005):

 
 
(a)  In 
granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the 
establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-401 through 14-2-907, the court 
may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most 
expedient and in the best interests of the children.  In determining the best interests of the 
child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following 
factors:

(i) The 
quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

(ii)  The 
ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each 
period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as 
needed;

(iii)  The 
relative competency and fitness of each parent;

(iv)  Each 
parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a 
willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish 
care to the other parent at specified times;

(v)  How 
the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with 
each other;

(vi)  How 
the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such 
interaction and communication may be improved;

(vii)  The 
ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care 
without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, 
including the right to privacy;

(viii)  Geographic 
distance between the parents' residences;

(ix)  The 
current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each 
child;

(x)  Any 
other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

            
(b)  In any proceeding in which the custody of a child is at 
issue the court shall not prefer one (1) parent as a custodian solely because of 
gender.

            
(c)  The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or 
child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children.  If the court finds that family violence 
has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best 
protects the children and the abused spouse from further 
harm.

            
(d)  The court shall order custody in well defined terms to 
promote understanding and compliance by the parties.  Custody shall be crafted to promote the 
best interests of the children, and may include any combination of joint, shared 
or sole custody.

            
(e)  Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the noncustodial 
parent shall have the same right of access as the parent awarded custody to any 
records relating to the child of the parties, including school records, 
activities, teachers and teachers' conferences as well as medical and dental 
treatment providers and mental health records.

            
(f)  At any time the court may require parents to attend 
appropriate parenting classes, including but not limited to, parenting classes 
to lessen the effects of divorce on children.

 
 
[¶10]   In JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, ¶¶10-11, 90 P.3d 718, 723 (Wyo. 2004), we provided this guidance:

 
 
            
In custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children must be given 
paramount consideration.  That which 
is in the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of fact, and 
we will not overturn the decision of a trial court unless we are persuaded that 
an abuse of discretion is present or that there has been a violation of some 
legal principle.  Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 
(Wyo.1998).  When we are asked to 
review the action of a district court, in the context of the abuse of discretion 
standard, the core of the inquiry we must make is the question of the 
reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things.  Among these are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  
It means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  We must ask whether or not the district 
court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling 
was arbitrary or capricious.  Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo.2000) 
(quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo.1999)).  The party 
seeking to modify established child custody provisions of a divorce decree has 
the burden of showing that a material change in circumstances that affects the 
child's welfare occurred subsequent to the entry of the initial decree, that the 
change warrants modification of the decree, and that the modification will be in 
the best interests of the affected child.  
Cobb, 2 P.3d  at 579-80 
(quoting Sorensen v. May, 944 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo.1997)).

 
 
            
A child's preference as to custody may be considered by the trial 
court:

 
 
      In determining 
the weight to be given a child's preference several factors should be 
considered:  the age of the 
child;  the reason for the 
preference;  the relative fitness of 
the preferred and non-preferred parent;  
the hostility, if any, of the child to the non-preferred parent;  the preference of other siblings;  and whether the child's preference has 
been tainted or influenced by one parent against the 
other.

      Although 
custodial preference is not conclusive, the court here was entitled to give more 
consideration to a fifteen-year old girl's preference than say, the preference 
of a six-year old child.

 
 

Yates v. 
Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wyo.1985).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Material 
Change in Circumstances

 
 
[¶11]   The focus of Father's first issue 
is that Mother asserted as the centerpiece of her petition that Daughter had 
expressed a preference for living in the primary custody of her Mother.  Father's contention is that that 
circumstance cannot be viewed as a material change because from the outset of 
the divorce proceedings in 1998, Daughter had expressed a preference for living 
with Mother  i.e., it was nothing new.  
Mother's response to that contention is that, although Daughter had 
always expressed a preference to live with her, it had changed in intensity (was 
ever stronger) and it had changed in nature (from wishing to be with her 
traditional at-home parent, to needing the guidance and counsel of her mother as 
she entered puberty).  Father 
further contends that the district court essentially skipped over the threshold 
question of whether there was a material change in circumstances and went 
directly to the question of what was in the best interests of the child, and it 
did so in the face of a total lack of objective evidence that would support a 
conclusion of law that a material change in circumstances was 
present.

 
 
[¶12]   A secondary argument in this regard 
is that the district court mistakenly relied on improvements in Mother's 
abilities to parent and provide for Daughter, i.e., she had mended her ways, was 
gainfully employed, had the means to support Daughter, had remarried, was living 
in a nice home, etc.  Father 
contends that merely because Mother had improved, whereas Father had a steady 
and consistent record as being a responsible parent, that cannot serve as the 
basis for a conclusion that a material change in circumstances warranted his 
loss of custody of Daughter.

 
 
[¶13]   The conclusion of this argument was 
articulated like this in Father's brief:  
"In simple terms, it is an abuse of discretion to find a change in 
material circumstances when nothing has happened except that a bad parent 
started acting like a normal parent and a child continued to express the same 
preference."

 
 
[¶14]   However, we are compelled to 
conclude that Father's argument skips several steps in the applicable reasoning 
process and our professed analytic method.  
We begin by noting that, according to the testimony of the child, her 
professed preference to be in her Mother's custody was the end result of many 
factors, and that preference had grown more urgent over the passage of 
time.  Daughter's need for Mother in 
her day-to-day life had increased as she matured into her teenage years.  She was increasingly uncomfortable 
living in a household with three males, in particular sharing a single bathroom 
with them.  She was not close to her 
brothers (although the eldest was about to leave home for college), and she was 
skeptical of Father's parenting abilities because of his tendency toward anger, 
his consumption of alcohol, and his verbal abuse of her. 

 
 
[¶15]   In counterpoint, Daughter felt 
close to Mother and was more comfortable in her home.  She also felt she could talk to Mother 
about things that she could not talk about with Father.  Daughter felt bad when Father said 
Mother was not a good parent because she "would sleep with other guys."  Father also called Mother a "stupid 
woman," derided Mother's lack of education, and indicated Mother "did not know 
what she was talking about," in front of Daughter.  Daughter was also concerned that Father 
refused Mother's overture that the two parents "try to be 
friends."

 
 
[¶16]   In addition, we decline to view 
Mother's testimony that she had improved her life as irrelevant and prejudicial 
to Father because he had always been a responsible parent.  It is apparent that the district court 
viewed Father as the more fit of the two parents at the time the divorce was 
granted.  The record also reflects 
that the district court viewed the custody arrangements as a tough decision when 
it was made in 1998.  However, that 
was affected to some extent because Mother had been a stay-at-home mom, was not 
employed, had no income or assets, and had run off with another man.  We conclude these circumstances are 
relevant to a determination of a material change in circumstances.  However, the standard is not one that 
even a good parent must improve to retain custody, but rather at the time of the 
hearing on modification it was relevant that both parents were then fit and 
proper persons to have custody and, in light of that, what was in the best 
interests of Daughter.1

 
 
[¶17]   After a comprehensive consideration 
of all these facts and circumstances taken together, and in light of Daughter's 
strongly expressed preference to live with Mother, we conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a material change in 
circumstances existed and by awarding primary custody to Mother.  Moreover, it is evident from the record 
that, in making this difficult decision, the district court considered and 
weighed all of the relevant factors applicable to an award of child custody 
under § 20-2-201(a) (including the separation of siblings), as well as the 
factors applicable to the consideration of a child's preference as set out in Yates.

 
 
District 
Court's Reliance on Non-Record Evidence from GAL

 
 
[¶18]   We have held that a GAL may not be 
a fact witness in cases such as the one at bar.  In addition, we have held that attorneys 
who serve as GALs and also appear as a witness in that same matter commit an 
ethical violation.  Father contends 
that just such a situation arose here because, in her proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the GAL included facts that were not developed at trial 
or otherwise on the record.  Robbins v. Robbins, 2002 WY 80, ¶¶6-10, 
46 P.3d 880, 882-83 (Wyo. 2002); also see 
Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 1998), and Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, 22 P.3d 861 
(Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶19]   Of course, we would like to see 
errors of this sort disappear entirely from proceedings such as this, but we 
also said in Robbins, ¶¶8-10, 46 P.3d 
at 882-83:

 
 

Clark also 
stands for the proposition that such an ethical violation not instigated by the 
prevailing party would not require reversal unless it somehow resulted in a 
manifest injustice.

 
 
In 
Moore 
[v. Moore], 809 P.2d [255,] 264 [ (Wyo.1991) ], 
we held that an ethical violation, not brought about by the prevailing party, 
will be reversed only if it resulted in manifest injustice.  In many district courts, it is not 
uncommon to allow the testimony of an attorney/guardian ad litem.  Thus, in the absence of objection to the 
district court, we cannot say that the prevailing party in this case was 
responsible for the ethical violation.  
Therefore, we must determine whether the admission of the 
attorney/guardian ad litem's testimony and reports, as well as the tape 
recordings, resulted in manifest injustice under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Moore, 809 P.2d  
at 264.

 
 
      Manifest 
injustice "contemplate[s] a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party."  McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 777 
(Wyo.1997).

 
 

Id.

 
 
            
In this case, the mother cannot identify how the GAL's testimony created 
any injustice.  It was certainly 
foreseeable that the trial court might consider the GAL's recommendation 
persuasive.  That recommendation was 
already before the court in the form of the GAL's report, the admission to which 
the mother had stipulated.  The 
parties introduced other substantial evidence, including testimony by both 
parents, that supported the trial court's conclusion the father was the more 
stable parent.  At the hearing on 
the motion for a new trial, the trial court commented that the GAL's testimony 
actually convinced him in the mother's favor and dissuaded him from awarding 
full custody to the father.  Finding 
no hint of injustice, we perceive no reason to reverse the trial court's ruling 
on permanent custody.

 
 
            
An additional comment is in order.  
To the extent error occurred in this case, it is difficult to conceive of 
a more apparent example of invited error.  
These parties stipulated the GAL's report could be submitted to the trial 
court.  They were fully aware of the 
cases addressing the propriety of attorney GALs testifying.  The mother's counsel had actually argued 
in Pace, which was then pending before this court, that prior case law prevented 
the GAL from testifying.  The GAL 
herself was well informed of the limitations on her role.  Yet they all agreed to a procedure which 
allowed the GAL to testify.  Now, 
having obtained a result that was fairly predictable--the trial court followed 
the GAL's recommendation--the mother and her counsel cry foul and seek another 
time at bat.  We are decidedly 
unpersuaded.  "[I]f a party requests 
or moves the court to make a ruling which is actually erroneous and the court 
does so, that party cannot take advantage of the error on appeal or 
review."  Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 44, 28 P.3d 838, ¶ 44 (Wyo.2001).

 
 
[¶20]   Father complains that the GAL 
prefaced her findings of fact with statements that:  She spoke with several persons who did 
not appear at trial; she reviewed reports from the Department of Family Services 
relating to Father and those reports also were not in the record; Father had not 
talked with Daughter about what she could expect when she had her first period 
(the record is actually silent in this regard); it was her opinion that 
Daughter's psychological needs had changed (an unqualified opinion without 
foundation and without opportunity to cross-examine); the stepfather was not a 
danger to Daughter; and Mother considered it important that Daughter maintain a 
relationship with her brothers (Mother did not so 
testify).

 
 
[¶21]   As good a place as any to start our 
discussion of this issue is to note that all parties agreed to a simultaneous 
submission of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Lapses such as those called to our 
attention by Father are unfortunate, but understandable, when such a methodology 
is used prior to the preparation of a transcript.  We also note that Father made no post 
trial motion asking the district court to correct its oversight(s).  We note that some of the material to 
which Father objects is not "evidence," but it is reasonable to say that it 
suggests the existence of "evidence."  
However, based on the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that Father 
had not talked to Daughter about menstrual cycles or her period (Daughter 
testified she could not talk to Father about it).  Also, we think it a sound conclusion 
that the district court might have deduced that Daughter's psychological needs 
had changed based upon the expert testimony of Jerry Penny, who Father called as 
a witness.  Granted, Penny did not 
purport to speak directly about Daughter, but rather his testimony was presented 
for its general applicability to teenage girls in these circumstances.  It seems fair enough to conclude that it 
appeared to apply to Daughter, in light of all the other evidence 
presented.  The district court might 
well have concluded from all of the evidence presented (especially Mother, 
stepfather, and Daughter) that stepfather was not a "danger" to Daughter, even 
though no witness used those exact words.  
It is apparent that Mother did not say the specific words that the 
sibling relationships were important, but certainly her testimony evinced a 
continued interest in all the children being together as much as possible.  If there was error at all, it certainly 
did not arise to a manifest injustice or otherwise mandate 
reversal.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   We find no error in the proceedings 
below either with respect to the district court's conclusion that there was a 
material change in circumstances or that it was in the best interests of the 
child to be in Mother's custody.  
Any excess material contained in the GAL's submission to the district 
court and included in the final order did not constitute a manifest injustice 
under the circumstances of this case and does not require reversal.  The order of the district court is, 
therefore, affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1In 
presenting this issue, Father also places great emphasis on Mother's, new 
husband's admission that, more than 30 years ago, he sexually abused his seven 
or eight year old niece at a time when he was sixteen or seventeen years old and 
that no such incident had ever recurred since.  The district court made detailed 
findings on this matter, and we will not question the weight it assigned to that 
matter in its decision.  See Pahl v. Pahl, 2004 WY 40, ¶11, 87 P.3d 1250, 1254 (Wyo. 2004).