Case Title: Ex parte Cynthia Davis and Suzann Isaacs. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: The estate of Natasha Lee, by and through its personal representative David N. Cutchen v. Jefferson Metropolitan Healthcare Authority et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060734

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 11/21/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1060734
____________________
Ex parte Cynthia Davis and Suzann Isaacs
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: The estate of Natasha Lee, by and through its
personal representative David N. Cutchen
v.
Jefferson Metropolitan Healthcare Authority et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-06-2508)
PARKER, Justice.
The petitioners, Cynthia Davis and Suzann Isaacs, are
Jefferson County sheriff's deputies who claim sovereign
immunity in a wrongful-death action brought against them and
1060734
Other named defendants sued by the estate, but not at
1
issue in this petition, included the Jefferson Metropolitan
Healthcare Authority, Prison Health Services, 3 doctors, and
at least 10 nurses. 
2
others  by the estate of Natasha Lee ("the estate"), by and
1
through its personal representative David N. Cutchen. On
October 23, 2006, the trial court granted Davis and Isaacs's
motion to dismiss the complaint against them based on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and gave the estate 21 days to
file an amended complaint. The estate filed an amended
complaint on November 13, 2006, which included a wrongful-
death claim and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging deliberate
indifference to Lee's serious medical needs.  Davis and Isaacs
again moved for a dismissal, arguing that the amended
complaint, filed more than two years after Lee's death, is
time-barred and could not relate back to the initial
complaint, which had been dismissed as to Davis and Isaacs on
the basis of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a
jurisdictional bar and, Davis and Isaacs argue, the trial
court had no authority to do anything with the initial
complaint other than to dismiss it, i.e., it had no authority
to allow the estate 21 days to file an amended complaint. The
trial court denied their motion to dismiss, and Davis and
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3
Isaacs petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus ordering
the trial court to dismiss the wrongful-death action and the
§ 1983 claim asserted against them in the amended complaint.
This Court ordered answer and briefs, and after examining the
answer and briefs, we now grant the petition and issue the
writ of mandamus.
I. Background
Lee, a 32-year-old female, was placed in the Jefferson
County jail on March 19, 2004, where she was being held
pending the hearing of federal charges against her in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama.  The estate alleges that Lee's medical records, the
information provided during the intake and screening, and
other documentation in her medical file contain multiple
references to the fact that Lee suffered from Graves' disease
and other disorders and that she required medication for these
conditions. The medications she had been taking include
propylthiouracil ("PTU"), atenolol, Inderal, Prozac, and
trazadone.
Lee's prescription for PTU,which she was to take orally
three times daily for seven days, ran out on or about April 9,
1060734
4
2004, and was not reordered, refilled, re-prescribed, or
administered to Lee after that date.  Lee was released from
the jail on April 22, 2004. She was admitted to the University
of Alabama at Birmingham hospital on April 26, 2004, after
complaining of chest pain and becoming unresponsive; she died
at the hospital on that same date. The autopsy findings of the
Jefferson County medical examiner's office state that the
cause of death was a "thyroid storm" due to Graves' disease.
Blood taken upon Lee's admission to the University of Alabama
at Birmingham hospital reflects that Lee had no PTU in her
blood at the time of her death.
The estate claims that Davis, Isaacs, and the other
defendants were responsible for Lee's physical care because
they had incarcerated her and prevented her from obtaining
medical treatment on her own, that they were aware of Lee's
medical condition, that they provided no medical care for Lee
and did not allow her to obtain medical care, and that their
failure to provide medical care or allow her to obtain medical
care constitutes willful and wanton misconduct and violation
of a duty imposed upon sheriffs and jailers by Ala. Code 1975,
§ 14-6-19.  The estate alleges that on March 20, 2004, the day
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5
after Lee's admission to the jail, Davis entered the D Block
on Level 5 of the jail to perform a head count, that she found
Lee lying on the floor, that she asked Lee what was wrong, and
that Lee told Davis that she did not feel well, that she had
Graves' disease, and that she needed her medication.  Davis
then transferred Lee to the medical block and informed someone
on the medical staff that Lee had told her she had Graves'
disease and needed her medication.
Davis and Isaacs claim that they are immune from this
action under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.  They
deny that they were negligent in any respect as to Lee's
custody and her treatment while in custody.  They admit that
Lee told them that she suffered from Graves' disease, but they
assert that they had no further knowledge of Lee's medical
condition, that they had no knowledge about Graves' disease or
about any medications used to treat Graves' disease, that they
have no medical training except basic first aid and CPR, and
that they are prohibited by regulations applicable to the jail
(Corrections Division Manual of General Orders §§ 4-1, 4-9,
and 4-11) and by state law (Ala. Code 1975, §§ 34-24-51, 34-
24-50, and 34-23-50) and federal law (the Health Insurance
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6
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191) from accessing prisoners' medical records or giving
medications to prisoners.
II. Standard of Review
     "'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that requires the showing of: (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty on the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte
McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala. 1998)."
Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 761 So. 2d 1000, 1002
(Ala. 2000).  "It is well established that mandamus will lie
to compel a dismissal of claim that is barred by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity." Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303,
305 (Ala. 2004) (citing Ex parte McWhorter, 880 So. 2d 1116,
1117 (Ala. 2003)).  "'Mandamus review is available when the
question presented is one of subject-matter jurisdiction.'" Ex
parte Richardson, 957 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Ala. 2006) (quoting
Ex parte Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 929 So. 2d 1007, 1010
(Ala. 2005)). 
III. Analysis
Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, states
simply: "[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a
1060734
7
defendant in any court of law or equity." Although counties do
not necessarily possess the same sovereign immunity as do
states and state agencies, county sheriffs are executive
officers of the State of Alabama and are therefore immune from
liability for actions taken in executing the duties of their
offices. Boshell v. Walker County Sheriff, 598 So. 2d 843, 844
(Ala. 1992).  This Court has also recognized that a "deputy
sheriff is afforded the same immunity from suit as a sheriff
in regard to claims for monetary damages stemming from
activities performed while working in the line and scope of
his or her employment."  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 796
(Ala. 1996). 
When Lee was in custody in the Jefferson County jail,
Davis and Isaacs were acting within the line and scope of
their employment while guarding the prisoners in the county
jail. They were prohibited from prescribing or dispensing
medications; 
those 
services 
were 
the 
contractual
responsibility of the medical-service providers for the jail.
Davis and Isaacs are therefore immune from liability for the
estate's wrongful-death claim because of the sovereign
immunity afforded them by § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901.
1060734
8
The 
trial 
court 
therefore appropriately dismissed 
the
wrongful-death claim against them in the original complaint.
The issue raised in this mandamus petition is whether the
trial court then erred in allowing the estate to file an
amended complaint including a new wrongful-death count and a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 count after the original complaint had been
dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity and the statute
of limitations on the claims asserted in the amended complaint
had expired. We conclude that the trial court did err in
allowing the estate to file an amended complaint.
After the original complaint was dismissed as to Davis and
Isaacs on October 23, 2006, the estate filed an amended
complaint on November 13, 2006, more than two and one-half
years after Lee's death on April 26, 2004, that stated two new
causes of action against Davis and Isaacs. The new wrongful-
death claim against Davis and Isaacs is barred by § 14,
Alabama Constitution of 1901, just like the original wrongful-
death claim that was dismissed by the trial court.
Because the original complaint purported to state a cause
of action against Davis and Isaacs in violation of § 14,
Alabama Constitution of 1901, the trial court did not acquire
1060734
9
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against the
deputies when the original complaint was filed.  Ex parte
Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 306-07 (Ala. 2004).  Thus, when
the amended complaint was filed, the newly asserted § 1983
claim against Davis and Isaacs was time-barred by the
applicable two-year statute of limitations:
"(l) All actions for any injury to the person or
rights of another not arising from contract and not
specifically enumerated in this section must be
brought within two years."
§ 6-2-38(l); Gorman v. Wood, 663 So. 2d 921,  922 (Ala.
1995)("[T]he only statute of limitations applicable to § 1983
claims in Alabama is the two-year statute of limitations in
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l).").
Therefore, Davis and Isaacs's motion to dismiss was due
to have been granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we grant the petition and
issue the writ of mandamus; the trial court is directed to
dismiss the amended complaint against Davis and Isaacs.
PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and
Bolin, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
1060734
10
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
Unlike the main opinion, I do not see a causal connection
between the fact that the trial court did not acquire subject-
matter jurisdiction over the state-law claims against Cynthia
Davis and Suzann Isaacs in the original complaint and the
disallowance of the state- and federal-law claims against
Davis and Isaacs in the amended complaint.  
Unlike the undismissed, but void, claims in the original
complaint in Cadle v. Shabani, [Ms. 1070116, Sept. 5, 2008] __
So. 2d __ (Ala. 2008), the claims in the original complaint
against Davis and Isaacs had actually been dismissed by the
trial court by the time the amended complaint was filed.
Therefore, there literally was no pre-statute-of-limitations
complaint still pending to which the amended complaint could
relate under Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  It matters not that
the claims in the original complaint were insufficient to
provide the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction.
What matters is that, with respect to the claims against Davis
and Isaacs, the original complaint had been dismissed.  Rule
15(c), therefore, was not available to save either the new
wrongful-death claim or the new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
from 
the bar of the applicable two-year statute of
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11
limitations.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l).
Accordingly, although I concur in the result reached by
the main opinion, I respectfully decline to join in the
reasoning offered by that opinion.