Case Title: In re M.M.

Citation: 2013-Ohio-1495

Docket Number: 2012-0250

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re M.M., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1495.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1495 
IN RE M.M. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as In re M.M., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1495.] 
Appellate procedure—State’s right to appeal after acquittal—R.C. 2945.67(A)—
Juvenile cases—State may not pursue discretionary appeal when it fails to 
take an appeal as of right in accordance with applicable rules of 
procedure. 
(No. 2012-0250—Submitted February 5, 2013—Decided April 17, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 96776, 2011-Ohio-6758. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In juvenile cases, the state is not authorized to pursue a discretionary appeal when 
it fails to take an appeal as of right in accordance with the applicable rules 
of procedure. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal presents an important issue of public interest, that is, 
the scope of the state’s right to appeal in juvenile cases.  For the reasons 
explained, we hold that in juvenile cases, the state is not authorized to pursue a 
discretionary appeal when it fails to take an appeal as of right in accordance with 
the applicable rules of procedure. 
{¶ 2} The Eighth District reached the correct result in this case, but it did 
so by relying on a dissent in State v. Arnett, 22 Ohio St.3d 186, 489 N.E.2d 284 
(1986).  In contrast, appellant, the state of Ohio, relies on our majority opinion in 
Arnett, as well as our later decision in State v. Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 
N.E.2d 644 (1990), which cited Arnett with approval.  Id. at 159. This opinion 
will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, limit Arnett to its facts, and 
explain the scope of Bistricky, thereby providing clarity to a somewhat confusing 
area. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The charges 
{¶ 3} On September 29, 2009, the state filed seven complaints against 
appellee, M.M., a juvenile, alleging that he was delinquent for engaging in 
conduct that, if he had been an adult, would have constituted rape and gross 
sexual imposition.  The alleged victims were siblings, M.J., A.R., K.R., and C.R.  
The complaints each charged that the conduct had occurred between October 
2008 and January 2009, when M.M. was 12 years old and the alleged victims 
were 8, 6, 4, and 2, respectively. 
Pretrial proceedings 
{¶ 4} On April 22, 2010, the state filed a notice of its intention to 
introduce statements that M.J. and A.R. made to Lauren Krol, a social worker for 
the Cleveland Police Department Sex Crimes and Child Abuse Unit.  The state 
January Term, 2013 
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argued that the statements are admissible under Evid.R. 807,1 which permits 
admission of certain hearsay statements made by child victims about physical or 
sexual abuse.  Id. 
{¶ 5} On October 28, 2010, a magistrate held an evidentiary hearing on a 
motion in limine filed by M.M., which sought exclusion of all out-of-court 
statements made by any of the alleged victims. 
                                                 
1 Evid.R. 807(A) provides:  
 
An out-of-court statement made by a child who is under twelve years of 
age at the time of trial or hearing describing any sexual act performed by, with, 
or on the child or describing any act of physical violence directed against the 
child is not excluded as hearsay under Evid.R. 802 if all of the following apply: 
 
(1) The court finds that the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement provides particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness that make the statement at least as reliable as statements 
admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 803 and 804. The circumstances must establish that 
the child was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was 
made and that the test of cross-examination would add little to the reliability of 
the statement. In making its determination of the reliability of the statement, the 
court shall consider all of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement, including but not limited to spontaneity, the internal consistency of 
the statement, the mental state of the child, the child's motive or lack of motive 
to fabricate, the child's use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, 
the means by which the statement was elicited, and the lapse of time between 
the act and the statement. In making this determination, the court shall not 
consider whether there is independent proof of the sexual act or act of physical 
violence. 
 
(2) The child's testimony is not reasonably obtainable by the proponent 
of the statement. 
 
(3) There is independent proof of the sexual act or act of physical 
violence. 
 
(4) At least ten days before the trial or hearing, a proponent of the 
statement has notified all other parties in writing of the content of the statement, 
the time and place at which the statement was made, the identity of the witness 
who is to testify about the statement, and the circumstances surrounding the 
statement that are claimed to indicate its trustworthiness. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 6} The magistrate determined that M.J., A.R., and K.R. were 
competent to testify at trial but that C.R., who was two years old at the time of the 
alleged conduct, was not competent to testify.  The magistrate further concluded 
that, because M.J. and A.R. were competent to testify at trial, Evid.R. 807 does 
not permit admission of their statements, as the rule excludes such statements as 
hearsay when the child’s testimony is reasonably obtainable.  See Evid.R. 
807(A)(2).  For that reason, the magistrate determined that the state was precluded 
from introducing at trial “any statements by the alleged victims.” 
{¶ 7} The state did not move to set aside the magistrate’s decision even 
though it had the right to do so no later than ten days after the adverse order was 
issued.  Juv.R. 40(D)(2)(b). The state also failed to perfect an interlocutory appeal 
as of right to the Eighth District, pursuant to Juv.R. 22(F).  Instead, the case 
proceeded to trial.   
The trial 
{¶ 8} At trial, the state’s primary witnesses were M.J., A.R., K.R., their 
mother, S.H.,2 and the social worker, Krol. 
{¶ 9} S.H. testified that she was dating M.M.’s older brother, and from 
October 2008 to January 2009, she and her children lived with M.M., M.M.’s 
older brother, and their mother.  In January 2009, S.H., who was pregnant, 
developed a kidney infection.  S.H. testified that while she was lying sick on the 
kitchen floor in need of medical assistance, M.M.’s mother accused her of 
fabricating the pregnancy and illness and “literally walked over [her] body.”  As a 
result, S.H. realized that she was not welcome at the house and that she and her 
children needed to move out.  S.H. left the house by ambulance; however, her 
children remained.  After she was released from the hospital, she went back to the 
home only to collect her children and her belongings. 
                                                 
2 S.H. is an adult, but we use her initials in order to protect the identity of her children.  
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 10} S.H. testified that thereafter, the children disclosed to an adult 
cousin that M.M. had sexually abused them.  The cousin told S.H. and she, in 
turn, reported the abuse to the police.  As a result, in March 2009, Krol contacted 
S.H. and arranged to interview the children about the allegations. 
{¶ 11} Krol is an intake sex-abuse social worker who investigates 
referrals from the child-abuse hotline, 696-KIDS.  She testified that in her 
professional capacity, she investigates allegations of sexual abuse, makes 
referrals, ensures the safety of children, and provides services to the children’s 
families.  In response to a defense objection to a question about what the children 
said in the interview, the prosecuting attorney argued that Evid.R. 803(4),3 which 
provides for admission of statements made for the purpose of medical treatment, 
justified the admission of Krol’s testimony about statements that M.J. and A.R. 
made to her. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence 
under Evid.R. 803(4), but in doing so, ruled that the statements were admissible 
only to explain Krol’s subsequent actions on behalf of the children.  The trial 
court did not consider the children’s out-of-court statements as substantive 
evidence of M.M.’s alleged conduct, thereby adhering to the pretrial ruling with 
regard to admissibility of the statements under Evid.R. 807.  Thus, the state’s only 
direct evidence of M.M.’s alleged conduct came from the testimony of the alleged 
victims at trial. 
                                                 
3 Evid.R. 803 provides:   
 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
 
* * *  
 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the 
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.   
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 12} But the state’s efforts to elicit coherent testimony from the children 
about the alleged abuse by M.M. were unavailing.  The children’s answers on the 
stand were confused and unfocused. 
{¶ 13} M.J. testified that M.M. did “inappropriate things” to his sisters 
and to him but he could not remember what those things were.  A.R. testified that 
M.M. had requested that she do something that she did not want to do, but she 
also testified that she did not know how to describe what M.M. had requested that 
she do.  A.R. further testified that she saw M.M. “laying on” M.J., but she was 
unable to describe what M.M. was doing to him.  When asked if she saw anything 
happen to her sister C.R. while they were living with M.M., K.R. testified that she 
had, but she was not asked any further questions. 
{¶ 14} At the close of the state’s case, the prosecuting attorney renewed 
her argument that the children’s out-of-court statements were admissible under 
Evid.R. 807, contending that even though they were competent to testify, their 
failure to provide answers in court made their testimony “not reasonably 
obtainable” within the meaning of the rule.  The trial court was not persuaded and 
did not allow the out-of-court statements into evidence.  At that point, the defense 
moved for dismissal pursuant to Juv.R. 29.  The court granted the motion, 
dismissing all counts. 
The appeal 
{¶ 15} The state sought leave to file a discretionary appeal, pursuant to 
R.C. 2945.67(A).  In doing so, it argued that appellate review of the trial court’s 
exclusion of evidence was permissible under our decision in State v. Bistricky, 51 
Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644.  Although leave to appeal was initially granted, 
after briefing and oral argument, the court of appeals determined that leave to 
appeal had been improvidently granted and therefore dismissed the appeal.  In re 
M.M., 8th Dist. No. 96776, 2011-Ohio-6758. 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 16} In so holding, the Eighth District explained that Bistricky permits 
courts of appeals in cases of acquittal to address substantive issues that are 
capable of repetition yet evading review.  Id. at ¶ 9.  But because an adequate 
interlocutory remedy provided the state with “the means to correct any perceived 
error before the adjudicatory hearing,” the court of appeals concluded that the 
evidentiary issues will not escape future review.  Id., citing State v. Arnett, 22 
Ohio St.3d at 188-191, 489 N.E.2d 284 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 17} We accepted review of the state’s discretionary appeal.  In re 
M.M., 131 Ohio St.3d 1539, 2012-Ohio-2025, 966 N.E.2d 893. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
{¶ 18} The sole proposition of law before us asserts:  
 
The right to file an appeal pursuant to State v. Bistricky, 51 
Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644 (1990), is not waived if the state 
does not pursue an interlocutory remedy under Crim.R. 12(K)4 and 
Juv.R. 22(F).  The existence of interlocutory remedies does not 
preclude the state from appealing substantive legal issues involving 
the suppression or exclusion of evidence pursuant to Bistricky. 
 
{¶ 19} We reject the state’s proposition because it both lacks statutory 
support and ignores a governing rule of procedure. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 20} As a threshold issue, we must explain that the state’s proposition 
contains a red herring.  Contrary to the state’s framing of the issue, Bistricky 
cannot and does not answer the question before us because only a statute, not a 
                                                 
4 Although Crim.R. 12(K) is similar to Juv.R. 22(F), it differs in some respects.  Because Juv.R. 
22(F) is the only rule that applies in this case, we disregard the state’s reference to Crim.R. 12(K) 
because any discussion of it would be advisory.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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decision of this court, can imbue the state with a substantive right to appeal.  We 
will fully explain the proper place for Bistricky, but first we turn our attention to a 
discussion of the controlling law. 
R.C. 2945.67(A) 
{¶ 21} The Ohio Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the courts of 
appeals to “review and affirm, modify, or reverse” a lower court’s judgment or 
final order. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); Cincinnati Polyclinic 
v. Balch, 92 Ohio St. 415, 111 N.E. 159 (1915), paragraph one of the syllabus.  
But the General Assembly—and the General Assembly alone—has the authority 
to provide by law the method of exercising that jurisdiction.  Id. 
{¶ 22} In an exercise of that authority, the General Assembly enacted 
R.C. 2945.67, which grants the state limited rights to appeal in criminal and 
juvenile cases.  State v. Davidson, 17 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 477 N.E.2d 1141 
(1985); In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 30.  
Absent R.C. 2945.67, the state has no substantive right to appeal trial court 
decisions in criminal cases.5  See Davidson, id. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2945.67 provides: 
 
(A) A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of 
right any decision of a trial court in a criminal case, or any decision 
of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which decision grants 
* * * a motion to suppress evidence * * * and may appeal by leave 
of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except 
the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case or of the 
juvenile court in a delinquency case. 
                                                 
5 We recognize that R.C. 2953.08(B) authorizes the state to appeal felony sentences under limited 
circumstances and that R.C. 2953.14 authorizes the state to appeal adverse decisions from the 
courts of appeals and from this court.  Neither of those statutes, however, is implicated here.   
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
 
{¶ 24} The state’s right to appeal certain decisions as of right originates in 
the first clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  Davidson at 134; see also State v. Wallace, 
43 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 330 N.E.2d 697 (1975).  The state’s right to appeal “any other 
decision” by leave of court originates in the second. 
{¶ 25} Notably, the right to appeal by leave of court is defined by 
reference to the right to appeal as a matter of right.  First, the General Assembly 
defined the class of rulings of which the state may, without leave of court, obtain 
appellate review.  This class includes a decision that grants a motion to suppress, 
as here. 
{¶ 26} In the same sentence, the General Assembly provided for 
discretionary appeals of “any other decision.”  Thus, R.C. 2945.67(A) makes clear 
that the state’s right to a discretionary appeal is exclusive of any absolute right to 
appeal. 
{¶ 27} We reject the state’s unsound position, which would result in the 
state having an option to seek leave to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) 
regarding a suppression ruling either immediately upon the ruling or later after the 
delinquency adjudication.  Such a position ignores the General Assembly’s use of 
the word “other” in the statute.  State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 114 Ohio St.3d 76, 
2007-Ohio-2882, 868 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 23 (in construing a statute, a court may not 
delete or add words).  Indeed, the proposition implicitly asserts that the state has 
the right to seek leave to appeal “any decision,” including a decision regarding the 
suppression of evidence that is clearly referenced in the first clause of the statute 
as a decision that is appealable by the state “as a matter of right.”  Given the 
limited nature of the state’s appellate rights, that assertion cannot be true.  The 
plain language of R.C. 2945.67(A) refutes the state’s position that it has the right 
to seek leave to appeal “any decision,” including one that it already has a right to 
appeal without seeking leave. An attempt to fuse the two renders the words of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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statute meaningless.  We also reject any argument that “other” modifies the 
phrase “except the final verdict” because that construction renders the word 
“other” superfluous. 
{¶ 28} So, there is no statutory authority—and therefore, no authority 
whatsoever—for a discretionary appeal when the state has the right to appeal 
without regard to the discretion of the appellate court.  Having explained the 
state’s substantive rights to an appeal without seeking leave, we turn our attention 
to the procedure that the state must follow in exercising that right. 
Juv.R. 22(F) 
{¶ 29} In order to exercise its substantive right to appeal, the state must 
comply with the relevant rules of procedure.  Wallace, 43 Ohio St.2d at 2-3, 330 
N.E.2d 697. 
{¶ 30} In Wallace, the state filed a criminal complaint against the 
defendant, charging him with failure to plug unproductive wells in violation of 
R.C. 1509.12.  Wallace successfully sought dismissal on the ground that R.C. 
1509.12 was unconstitutional.  The state filed a notice of appeal pursuant to 
App.R. 4(B), but failed to comply with the requirement contained in R.C. 2945.67 
to obtain leave to appeal.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because the 
state’s failure to comply with the statute deprived it of jurisdiction.  We affirmed. 
{¶ 31} In so doing, we explained that the state’s substantive right to 
appeal originates only in a legislative grant of authority.  Id. at 2.  And “the grant 
apparent in R.C. 2945.67 * * * was dependent upon an application for leave to 
appeal being allowed by the appellate court.”  Id.  Therefore, the statutory 
requirement of obtaining leave, rather than governing procedure, constituted a 
condition precedent necessary to trigger a substantive right.  Id. 
{¶ 32} Because the state failed to comply with the statutory requirement 
to seek leave to appeal in Wallace, we held that the court of appeals correctly 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  But we also explained that “[i]n all 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
other respects” the procedures outlined by the statute are superseded by the 
requirements of the Appellate Rules.  Id. at 2-3. 
{¶ 33} Here too, the state must comply with the controlling procedural 
rule. 
{¶ 34} Juv.R. 22(F) provides:  
 
In delinquency proceedings the state may take an appeal as 
of right from the granting of a motion to suppress evidence if, in 
addition to filing a notice of appeal, the prosecuting attorney 
certifies that (1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay 
and (2) the granting of the motion has rendered proof available to 
the state so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of 
proving the complaint's allegations has been destroyed. 
Such appeal shall not be allowed unless the notice of appeal 
and the certification by the prosecuting attorney are filed with the 
clerk of the juvenile court within seven days after the date of the 
entry of the judgment or order granting the motion. Any appeal 
which may be taken under this rule shall be diligently prosecuted. 
 
{¶ 35} Juv.R. 22(F) plainly requires the state to file an interlocutory 
appeal if it wishes to seek review of an adverse decision that suppresses evidence.  
And it must do so, if at all, within seven days of the adverse decision.  It further 
requires the prosecutor to certify that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay 
and that the exclusion of the evidence seriously jeopardizes the state’s case.  The 
importance of the certification requirement is obvious, as the  proceedings are to 
be halted until the issues of admissibility of evidence are decided on appeal.  The 
existence of an interlocutory appeal is necessary to ensure a fair trial for both the 
defendant and the state.  It also serves judicial economy.  We need not quibble 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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over “waiver” or “forfeiture.”  We simply hold that the state failed to follow the 
mandatory procedure set forth in the Juv.R. 22(F), and it therefore failed to 
exercise its substantive right to appeal. 
Bistricky is inapposite 
{¶ 36} The state makes a colorable (but meritless) argument that Bistricky 
recognizes an alternative right to appeal.  There is undeniable confusion that 
stems from our decisions in Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644; State v. 
Keeton, 18 Ohio St.3d 379, 481 N.E.2d 629 (1985); and State v. Arnett, 22 Ohio 
St.3d 186, 489 N.E.2d 284.   
{¶ 37} In Bistricky, the state charged five police officers with drug 
trafficking.  After the state’s case in chief, the trial court entered a verdict in favor 
of the officers on the basis that they were exempt from prosecution under R.C. 
3719.14(B) (police officer is exempt from drug laws when offer to sell is 
necessary for performance of job-related duty).  The state sought leave to appeal 
the exemption determination.  In doing so, it expressly conceded that double-
jeopardy principles prohibited the retrial of defendants, but asserted that the court 
of appeals could grant leave to appeal the legal basis of the ruling granting 
acquittal.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  We 
accepted the state’s discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 38} We construed R.C. 2945.67(A)’s language “any other decision, 
except the final verdict.”  Id. at 159.  In doing so, we held that this second clause 
of R.C. 2945.67(A) authorizes a court of appeals to review substantive legal 
rulings when such rulings result in a judgment of acquittal, as long as the state 
does not appeal the verdict.  Id. at 160.  Accordingly, we remanded the case for 
the court of appeals to exercise its discretion to decide whether it would accept the 
state’s appeal.  Id. 
{¶ 39} Bistricky simply reaffirmed what we had already held, that “even 
in a case resulting in a judgment of acquittal, the prosecution may appeal from 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
evidentiary rulings, such as admissibility of evidence * * *.”  Id. at 159, citing 
Keeton and Arnett.  And we emphasized that Keeton and Arnett expressly 
permitted discretionary appeals of evidentiary rulings on the authority of the “any 
other decision” clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  Bistricky at 159. 
{¶ 40} Because we could discern no distinction between evidentiary 
rulings and rulings on substantive issues of law, we extended Keeton and Arnett 
and held that the state also had the right to seek discretionary review of 
nonevidentiary, substantive rulings under the authority of the “any other decision” 
clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  Bistricky at 159-160. 
{¶ 41} But as we will explain, a salient point of Keeton has been lost. 
{¶ 42} In Keeton, three defendants were indicted for robbery in 
connection with their alleged attempt to lure a truck driver into a gambling 
scheme.  When the truck driver refused to participate, the defendants allegedly 
stole his money and fled.  Police pursued, detained, and searched the three men.  
As a result, an officer removed a roll of four $20 bills from Keeton’s pocket.  
After the defendants were transported to the police department, the officer 
removed additional sums of money from the defendants’ pockets. 
{¶ 43} Because the officer’s trial testimony concerning his custody of the 
money conflicted with his testimony at a preliminary hearing, the trial court 
excluded the money from evidence.  As a result, the trial court directed a 
judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Crim.R. 29.  The state sought leave to appeal 
but the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction.  We reversed. 
{¶ 44} We held that the appeal was reviewable under the “any other 
decision” clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  18 Ohio St.3d at 381, 481 N.E.2d 629.  But 
we emphasized that “the evidentiary rulings in this case, while they do not fall 
within the provisions of R.C. 2945.67(A) granting an appeal as of right, do fall 
within the language of ‘any other decision, except the final verdict * * *’ in R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2945.67(A) which permits an appeal to the court of appeals after leave has first 
been obtained.”  Id. 
{¶ 45} Moreover, we expressly cautioned that the state must comply with 
the procedural requirements explained in Wallace.  Id.  Keeton, unlike this case, 
did not involve review of a decision listed in the first clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  
And Keeton, unlike this case, did not involve a mandatory rule of procedure.  Less 
than one year later, we glossed over that important distinction in Arnett, thereby 
creating precedent for the state’s ill-conceived proposition in this case.  And as we 
have already explained, we compounded the problem in Bistricky.   
{¶ 46} In Arnett, 22 Ohio St.3d 186, 489 N.E.2d 284, the defendant was 
charged with murder but claimed self-defense.  At trial, over the state’s objection, 
he supported his claim with the expert testimony of a psychiatrist and a 
psychologist, who testified that they had used sodium amytal and hypnosis, 
respectively, to interview Arnett about his mental state during the shooting.  Both 
testified that in their opinions, Arnett was intensely fearful. After the jury 
acquitted Arnett, the state sought leave to appeal the admission of the expert 
testimony.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal 
precluded review of the evidentiary rulings. 
{¶ 47} In a brief opinion, comprised mostly of Keeton excerpts, we 
reversed.  Arnett at 188.  The majority explained only that a “comparable situation 
was presented to this court in Keeton.”  Arnett at 187.  And we used broad 
language in our syllabus: “Pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A), a court of appeals has 
jurisdiction to grant the state leave to appeal from a decision of the trial court on 
the admissibility of evidence, notwithstanding the acquittal of the defendant.” 
{¶ 48} The decisions in Keeton, Arnett, and Bistricky have caused some 
confusion.  Keeton and Bistricky involved appeals under the “any other decision” 
clause of R.C. 2945.67(A), i.e., the state had no absolute right to pursue an 
immediate interlocutory appeal, but had to seek leave from the appellate court.  
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
Arnett did not make clear which clause of R.C. 2945.67(A) was being applied.  
Bistricky’s discussion of “substantive” versus “evidentiary” rulings and Arnett’s 
lack of clarity made it possible for the state to argue here that this court has 
granted the state a right to seek a discretionary appeal even in cases involving the 
first clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  That is not correct.  Only the legislature—not a 
court—can imbue a party with a right to appeal, discretionary or otherwise. The 
state’s reference to its “right to file an appeal pursuant to Bistricky” is mistaken, 
as is its discussion of waiver.  Whatever right to an appeal the state may have is 
limited to what is granted in the statute.  Here, that right is found in the first 
clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).  The second clause of the statute grants a discretionary 
appeal for any “other” decisions.  Both clauses cannot apply to the same decision. 
Thus, the state in this case is limited to an immediate interlocutory appeal. 
{¶ 49} Tellingly, the Eighth District in this case cites not Arnett, but its 
dissent. 
{¶ 50} That is why we seize this opportunity to limit Arnett to its facts and 
make clear that a discretionary Bistricky appeal does not exist when the state fails 
to perfect an appeal as a matter of right in accordance with the applicable rules of 
procedure.  To hold otherwise would render meaningless the importance of 
procedural compliance when invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 51} In juvenile cases, the state is not authorized to pursue a 
discretionary appeal when it fails to take an appeal as of right in accordance with 
the applicable rules of procedure.  For that reason, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the 
state’s appeal.  Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent and would dismiss the appeal as 
having been improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jason Macke, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender. 
_____________________