Case Title: Kidwell v. State

Citation: 295 N.E.2d 362

Docket Number: 972S122

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
295 N.E.2d 362 (1973)
James Larry KIDWELL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 972S122.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 3, 1973.
Rehearing Denied June 22, 1973.
Forrest Bowman, Jr., Martz, Bowman & Kammen, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Harry L. Sauce, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment denying relief on a petition for post-conviction relief filed by the appellant. Appellant had been convicted in 1964 for the crime of the commission of a felony while armed. The appellant perfected an appeal to this Court from that conviction. This Court affirmed appellant's conviction. See Kidwell v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 430, 230 N.E.2d 590, 11 Ind.Dec. 641.
On October 18, 1971, appellant filed his petition for post-conviction relief. Hearing was held on this petition on March 17, 1972. Following hearing the trial court *363 entered special findings of fact and conclusions of law which read as follows:
Following the overruling of a motion to correct errors, appellant appealed to this Court. We have fully examined the *364 transcript filed in this appeal and have also examined the transcript of record which was filed in the original appeal. This original transcript was introduced in evidence as an exhibit at the hearing on the post-conviction remedy petition. These records entirely support the special findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge Kitchen.
The Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies provide, in part, as follows:
Rule P.C. 1(A)(2) reads as follows:
And Rule P.C. 1(H) reads as follows:
In his petition for post-conviction relief, appellant attempts to raise numerous questions concerning the voluntary nature of a confession made by him, the introduction of physical evidence acquired as a result of a so-called coerced confession and prejudicial publicity surrounding appellant's original trial. These matters obviously were well known to trial counsel at the time of the original trial. The question thus first arises as to whether or not trial counsel did, in fact, diligently pursue these matters in the representation of his client. An examination of the original transcript discloses that counsel did, in fact, make pertinent and proper objections where indicated concerning these matters and did, in fact, following appellant's conviction, file a very comprehensive and well prepared motion for new trial which contained thirty-five specifications of error, including all matters which appellant now seeks to raise in his petition for post-conviction relief.
As observed by this Court in the original appeal, appellant's counsel on the original appeal, who was not the same counsel as the one who represented appellant at the trial, chose not to pursue all thirty-five stated grounds in the motion for new trial.
The next question is, therefore, did counsel for appellant on his original appeal fail to properly represent the appellant when he waived some of the error alleged in the motion for new trial. Included in this record is an Exhibit A filed in the post-conviction hearing, which exhibit is a scrapbook containing numerous newspaper articles beginning with an article which appeared in an afternoon paper after the appellant's initial arrest that morning and continuing through numerous articles which appeared from time to time throughout the course of the jury trial, including articles which appeared concerning the progress and result of appellant's appeal. An examination of this material and the additional fact that trial counsel for the appellant, *365 although raising the question of adverse publicity, did not seek a change of venue from Marion County to remove the appellant from the area in which the adverse publicity had occurred leads us to the conclusion that appellant's counsel on his original appeal correctly concluded that these questions were of no merit on appeal and would avail the appellant nothing.
On the other hand, we cannot say that trial counsel was guilty of any neglect of duty toward his client in failing to request a change of venue from Marion County. The publicity received in this case was not unusual, nor does there appear to be any misrepresentation of facts in the newspaper accounts as sometimes occurs in cases.
The transcript of evidence which was submitted to the jury through witnesses and exhibits closely parallels the facts as recited in the newspaper accounts.
Some of the publicity in this case was beneficial to appellant in that appellant, through his counsel, sought and received a television interview during his trial wherein he sought to obtain maximum coverage as to his version of the case. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that trial counsel's judgment to remain in Marion County was necessarily bad. Counsel was faced with a difficult case. He diligently pursued that line of strategy which then appeared to him to be in the best interests of appellant. The fact that appellant was subsequently convicted does not justify a second-guessing of counsel's strategy to the point of stating that he did not properly represent his client. Quite to the contrary, it appears that the appellant was well represented both at the trial and appellate level. He now comes before this Court seeking to do that which the above quoted rule specifically prohibits, i.e., he now seeks what in fact amounts to a second appeal from his original conviction again raising those questions which were raised or could have been raised in his original appeal.
We, therefore, hold that the trial judge was correct in his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the appellant is not entitled to prevail in his petition for post-conviction relief.
The trial court is, therefore, affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion
DeBRULER, Justice (dissenting).
The majority misreads the record in this case. No objection or motion to suppress was directed by defense counsel during the original trial to the admission of the items of evidence which appellant claims were constitutionally inadmissible in this, his first post-conviction petition. Appellant's oral admission of guilt appears in the testimony of Officer Line at the original trial as follows:
No objection was made to this testimony of Officer Line. The only motion to suppress made by defense counsel was directed to State's exhibit # 15, a written confession given at the sheriff's office at a later time. The motion for new trial, while as lengthy as described by the majority contains no reference whatsoever to any error having been committed by the trial court in receiving the items of evidence complained of by appellant here. Indeed, in the absence of an in-trial objection or a motion to suppress, there would be none. The failure to object at trial constitutes a waiver on appeal attributable to the appellant. It is therefore obvious to me that the trial court erred in making the following conclusion of law:
There was no failure here to pursue any remedy through the normal appellate routes. I would therefore reverse the trial court denial of the petition on this ground and order a new hearing.
In addition, I will not examine the entire transcript of the original trial to determine whether or not defense counsel at trial engaged in an acceptable strategy as contemplated by Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U.S. 443, 85 S. Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed. 2d 408, in not objecting to these items of evidence, or in not taking a change of venue from Marion County, as that issue has not been raised in the post conviction petition nor litigated in the hearing upon the petition.