Case Title: State Ex Rel. Hausner v. Blackman

Citation: 233 Kan. 223, 662 P.2d 1183

Docket Number: 52,771

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
233 Kan. 223 (1983)
662 P.2d 1183
STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. SHEILA HAUSNER, and SIMON HAUSNER, by and through his mother and next friend, SHEILA HAUSNER, Appellees,
v.
PAUL BLACKMAN, Appellant.
No. 52,771

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 29, 1983.
Louis S. Wexler, of Wexler, Wingfield and Zemites, of Shawnee Mission, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
David R. Gilman, of Overland Park, argued the cause for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
This is a paternity case, filed pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1101 et seq., by the State of Kansas ex rel. Sheila Hausner against defendant Paul Blackman for a determination of paternity and for child support. A jury trial resulted in a verdict and judgment that defendant is the father of the minor child, Simon Hausner; support was ordered. Defendant appealed; the Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, reversed. State ex rel. Hausner v. Blackman, 7 Kan. App.2d 693, 648 P.2d 249 (1982). We granted review.
The issues are: Is blood test evidence admissible to prove paternity and, if so, did the trial court commit prejudicial error in admitting the particular blood test evidence in this case? Is *224 K.S.A. 23-131 constitutional? And is the verdict and judgment in this case supported by substantial competent evidence? The Court of Appeals held that expert testimony, resulting from certain sophisticated and recently-developed blood test examinations, is admissible to show the probability of paternity, but that the trial court erred in admitting the specific blood test evidence offered in this case; that K.S.A. 23-131 is constitutional; and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We agree.
Expert opinion, based upon the results of blood tests, has been received in paternity cases for perhaps the last fifty or sixty years, but until recent years that evidence has been admissible only for the purpose of showing that the putative father could not be the father of the child; as a general rule, it was admissible only to show nonpaternity. The following summary of the development of blood tests and the value of blood test evidence is given in the following quotation from Chief Justice Burger's unanimous opinion in the case of Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 68 L. Ed. 2d 627, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981):
Little v. Streater dealt with the claim of an indigent defendant, named as the father of an illegitimate child in a paternity action filed in Connecticut, of the denial of his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by application of a Connecticut statute which denied him access to blood tests for which he could not pay. The Supreme Court held that the cost requirement of the state statute did in fact effect a denial of the appellant's constitutional rights. While the issue here differs from that in Streater, the opinion of the court demonstrates the importance of blood test evidence to establish non-paternity, *226 and the quoted portion of the opinion is illuminating.
In 10 Am.Jur.2d, Bastards §§ 32 and 118, we find the following discourse on blood test evidence:
The rule with respect to the receipt in evidence of blood test results in bastardy proceedings is stated in 10 C.J.S., Bastards § 82 (Supp. 1982), as follows:
In 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 165a (3rd ed. 1940), we find the following comment:
In Annotation on Blood Grouping Tests, found in 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 et seq., we find the general rule stated in § 16: "Evidence of the results of blood grouping tests which fail to establish nonpaternity is generally held inadmissible in disputed paternity proceedings." p. 1036.
Most of the authority quoted above is based upon cases decided prior to 1970, and upon the state of accepted medical and scientific knowledge and practice at the time the cases were decided. The general rule was clear: Blood test results, when performed by and presented during the testimony of a qualified expert in the field, were admissible to prove nonpaternity, and *227 inadmissible to establish paternity because scientific expertise at that time was unable to provide an acceptable and accurate estimate or probability of paternity.
In recent years, however, a method of blood testing with a much higher exclusion rate, the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) test, has increasingly been utilized in paternity actions. The HLA test involves a method of tissue typing which detects antigens in white blood cells. Antigens are produced under genetic control by genes. The HLA test alone has an exclusion rate of 78 to 80 percent, and when used in addition to the six other basic blood group systems tests, ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy and Kidd, produces an exclusion rate of 91 to 95 percent. See Forrest, The Legal Implications of HLA Testing for Paternity, 16 J. Fam. L. 543 (1977-1978); Terasaki, Resolution of HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. Fam. L. 543 (1977-1978); and for recent cases where HLA tests were admitted in paternity actions see Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); J.H. v. M.H., 177 N.J. Super. 436, 426 A.2d 1073 (1980); Mtr Edward K. v. Marcy R., 106 Misc.2d 506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1980); and Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App.2d 509, 644 P.2d 490 (1982).
Judge Rees's well-reasoned and well-documented discussion in the Court of Appeals opinion in this case bears repeating:
The serologist who testified at the trial of this case had not performed the HLA or any comparable test; he had only performed a series of blood grouping tests. He testified that he would expect an exclusion rate of about seventy percent on the basis of those tests. He expressed no opinion as to probability of paternity, and acknowledged that all that his tests accomplished was to establish that the defendant could not be excluded as the father of the child. The trial court denied a motion in limine which sought the suppression of this evidence and stated:
There is no evidence at trial that further testing was offered to the defendant and that he refused to take such tests. The evidence admitted did not tend to establish that this defendant was the father of the child. As Judge Rees concluded:
....
We agree.
In Hurd v. State, 125 Ga. App. 353, 187 S.E.2d 545 (1972), the court held that blood grouping test results which did not establish *230 nonpaternity, but indicated only that the defendant was among forty-three percent of the male population that could have fathered the child, were inadmissible. The court noted:
This court has held evidence of blood grouping tests is relevant and admissible in criminal actions. Recent cases, however, indicate that more advanced testing has come into use, replacing the earlier Landsteiner tests. State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981), discussed by the Court of Appeals, was a case involving rape, murder and burglary charges. An analysis of the defendant's blood, the victim's blood, and blood found at the victim's apartment was conducted. The blood was analyzed for the ABO blood types, six enzyme systems, and a protein system. It was determined that the person who had intercourse with the victim was a nonsecretor and both the defendant and the victim were nonsecretors. An expert testified that only six-tenths of one percent of the population would have the defendant's combination of blood factors. We held the evidence admissible. It will be noted that the defendant in Washington was identified as being one of only six-tenths of one percent of the population having the combination of factors placing him at the scene; in the case before us the expert testified that he would expect an exclusion of seventy percent; therefore, the defendant was within thirty percent, more or less, of the population having the requisite blood factors. This evidence does not zero in upon and pinpoint the defendant, as did the evidence in Washington.
A distinction has been drawn between the admissibility of blood grouping tests in criminal cases and the use of such test results in disputed paternity proceedings. Many criminal cases have rejected the rule prevalent in paternity cases and have refused to apply it in criminal cases, holding that evidence of blood grouping tests is relevant and admissible as a corroborating fact tending to show the accused's guilt. See Annot., Admissibility, Weight, and Sufficiency of Blood-Grouping Tests in Criminal Cases, 2 A.L.R. 4th 500; Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000; and People v. Lindsey, 84 Cal. App. 3d 851, 863-64, 149 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1978). The evidence is corroborative only, and is not in itself sufficient to support the conviction of one accused of a crime.
*231 We summarize our conclusions relative to the admission of blood test evidence in paternity cases, when given by a qualified expert in the field, as follows:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the admission of Mr. Beck's testimony was error, and that it was substantially and unfairly prejudicial to the defendant and constituted reversible error.
K.S.A. 23-131 provides in pertinent part as follows:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that this statute is constitutional. It does not give a blanket endorsement to blood test evidence, nor does it make all such evidence admissible; in our view, the testimony must be considered by the court in the same light as other expert testimony. If the testimony is not reliable or if it does not constitute probative evidence as to the issues, the court need not admit the evidence. What we have heretofore said in this opinion indicates our view of the admissibility of such evidence and we think that the statute must be construed in conformity therewith.
Finally, we turn to the issue of whether the verdict and judgment is supported by substantial competent evidence. The Court of Appeals discussed this issue as follows:
We agree with the Court of Appeals rationale and with its conclusion. The plaintiff's physician testified that he performed a sonogram on Sheila Hausner. The test, regularly used and recognized in the medical world, indicates the age of the fetus and is considered fairly reliable, with perhaps a ten-day variance either way. On June 16, 1978, the test then administered indicated a fetus of from thirty-one to thirty-one and one-half weeks' gestation. Adding ten days to thirty-one and one-half weeks, or a total of thirty-three weeks, indicates that the time of conception was November 8, 1977. Plaintiff was uncertain as to the date intercourse occurred, but she was positive that it occurred on the night the parties attended a movie entitled "Fire Sale." There was positive and uncontradicted testimony that the last showing of that film at the theater which the parties attended occurred on August 30, 1977. The child was born on July 8, 1978; the physician testified that he did not feel that the child was overdue, and that it could have been from one to two weeks premature. The plaintiff testified that the child was a full-term baby, *233 and that it was not premature. There was no testimony to indicate that the child was six or more weeks overdue, as would certainly have been the case if the child had been conceived in August 1977.
We conclude that the verdict and judgment in this case are not supported by substantial competent evidence.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the judgment of the district court is reversed.