Case Title: Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-134

Docket Number: 19940137

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Vance, Appellant, v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, Appellee.                    
[Cite as Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1995),       Ohio                          
St.3d      .]                                                                    
Employment relations -- Recovery of damages from Consolidated                    
     Rail Corporation under Federal Employers' Liability Act                     
     for infliction of emotional distress suffered during                        
     employment permitted, when.                                                 
     (No. 94-137 -- Submitted April 5, 1995 -- Decided August                    
16, 1995.)                                                                       
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.                   
63806.                                                                           
     On January 26, 1990, plaintiff-appellant Larry D. Vance                     
filed suit against his former employer, defendant-appellee                       
Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail"), seeking to recover                    
damages from Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act                  
("FELA"), Section 51 et seq., Title 45, U.S.Code, for                            
infliction of emotional distress he claimed to have suffered                     
during his employment.                                                           
     Plaintiff began his employment with Conrail in 1976, when                   
the corporation was formed by the merger of seven separate                       
bankrupt railroads into one unit.  Plaintiff had been an                         
employee of one of the railroads involved in the merger, the                     
Erie Lackawanna Railroad ("Erie"), since 1968.  He went on sick                  
leave from Conrail in 1987, and remained on sick leave until                     
1988, when he was medically disqualified from work.  In his                      
complaint, plaintiff claimed he was incapacitated from working                   
due to emotional distress brought about by an abusive work                       
environment which Conrail negligently failed to correct.  The                    
basis of plaintiff's claim is set forth in paragraphs one and                    
five of his complaint:                                                           
     "1.  This suit is brought under the Federal Employers'                      
Liability Act (45 U.S.C., Sec. 51, et seq.).  The action arises                  
out of the failure of Defendant Railroad, Consolidated Rail                      
Corporation, to provide Plaintiff, Larry Vance, with a safe                      
place to work.  Defendant Railroad negligently caused and                        
inflicted upon Plaintiff severe emotional distress, anxiety,                     
and depression.  This caused disabling psychological harm, and                   
accompanying physical harm.                                                      
     "* * *                                                                      
     "5.  The severe emotional distress and resulting injury                     
were directly and proximately caused by Defendant Railroad.  It                  
negligently supervised and condoned the known conduct of                         
Plaintiff's superiors and fellow employees who in the process                    
of making work assignments and in other work related                             
associations, subjected Plaintiff to torment, embarrassment,                     
humiliation, frustration, harassment, inequity, ridicule, and                    
other severe emotional distress, because he was a former                         
employee of Erie Lackawanna Railroad.  This outrageous conduct                   
throughout Plaintiff's employment relationship ultimately                        
caused Plaintiff's said emotional breakdown and                                  
disqualification from his job, all of which was reasonably                       
foreseeable by Defendant Railroad."                                              
     At trial, plaintiff testified that the former employees of                  
Penn Central ("PC"), another railroad involved in the merger                     
which formed Conrail, hated the less numerous former Erie                        
employees.  Plaintiff testified that he and other former Erie                    
workers were subjected to name-calling, harassment and                           
torment.  Plaintiff recounted the following instances which he                   
claimed were primarily inflicted by former PC employees.                         
Specifically, he testified as to the following matters:                          
     He was called a scab and other scurrilous names by former                   
PC employees of Conrail, and derogatory remarks about former                     
Erie employees were written on locker room walls and elsewhere                   
at the workplace.                                                                
     He found a dead bloody rat on top of his sandwich in his                    
lunch box.  Whoever put the rat into the lunch box had pried                     
open the locked door of his truck cap.                                           
     Not being assigned a locker at some work locations forced                   
him to change clothes in parking lots.                                           
Sugar was put in the gas tank of his wife's car while it was                     
parked at a railyard when he drove it to work one day.                           
His supervisors would override his decision to pull railcars                     
out of service for defects and would put the cars back in                        
service.                                                                         
     He was not allowed to schedule his vacations when he                        
wanted them, even though he had more seniority than those who                    
got their chosen dates.                                                          
He was nearly run over by another employee in a truck who                        
wanted to "put a scare" into him.                                                
     He was not furnished needed safety equipment and had to                     
buy his own lantern and batteries when the company failed to                     
provide them.  He was not furnished a key to control the blue                    
signal lights that indicated the presence of a worker on the                     
tracks.                                                                          
In the presence of a supervisor, he was threatened by a fellow                   
employee with a chipping hammer (a sharp-pointed hammer with a                   
four-or five-inch handle used for removing scale from welds),                    
which caused great emotional distress.                                           
     He was taunted about his sex life after he confided in a                    
fellow employee about impotency problems and the other workers                   
learned of the problem.                                                          
     He was not properly oriented as to track layout by                          
supervisors when he traveled to different railyards to work.                     
The words "Erie scab" were scraped into the side of his own                      
truck, apparently with a key.                                                    
     While working at a railyard, he received an anonymous                       
phone call threatening that "you won't know what's going to hit                  
you."                                                                            
     Plaintiff testified to a generally antagonistic work                        
relationship between the former PC employees and the former                      
Erie employees at Conrail and indicated that he believed                         
Conrail did very little to regulate the conduct of former PC                     
employees toward former Erie employees.  Plaintiff testified                     
that he complained of several of the abusive incidents                           
recounted above to supervisors, and also that supervisors                        
witnessed some of the incidents, but that no attempt to                          
ameliorate the abuse was undertaken by Conrail.  Plaintiff                       
testified that it would have done no good for him to complain                    
about the mistreatment through the union grievance process                       
because the union was dominated by former PC employees who had                   
no interest in stopping it.                                                      
     Other witnesses, called both by plaintiff and by Conrail,                   
also testified to animosity between the two groups of                            
employees, although there was disagreement as to the extent of                   
abuse.  Conrail called some of the employees who allegedly had                   
harassed plaintiff, and they denied that the events detailed by                  
plaintiff had occurred.  Conrail also called past supervisors                    
of plaintiff, who testified that they did not remember that he                   
had ever complained of harassment to them.                                       
     One of the chief points of contention between former Erie                   
workers and Conrail was that many former Erie employees lost                     
seniority when the merger forming Conrail occurred.  Plaintiff                   
had participated in an unsuccessful lawsuit with other former                    
Erie employees against Conrail and the union in an attempt to                    
regain seniority.  Conrail contended that any anxiety caused to                  
plaintiff by the seniority dispute was irrelevant to                             
plaintiff's FELA case, and had nothing to do with whether                        
Conrail failed to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe workplace.                 
     Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. James Fry,                           
testified that he began to treat plaintiff in 1985, at which                     
time plaintiff told Dr. Fry of his difficulties and unhappiness                  
with his employment since the merger forming Conrail.  Dr. Fry                   
diagnosed plaintiff as severely depressed.  In 1987, Dr. Fry                     
declared that plaintiff was medically disabled from work due to                  
the depression, which Dr. Fry opined was caused by plaintiff's                   
worrying about his job.  Dr. Fry recommended electric shock                      
therapy in 1988.  Plaintiff received ten treatments.  At the                     
time of trial, plaintiff was receiving fairly large doses of a                   
tranquilizer and an antidepressant.  Dr. Fry testified that                      
plaintiff did not speak of  specific incidents of harassment on                  
the job until 1988, after plaintiff was disabled from work.                      
Dr. Fry further testified that plaintiff may not have related                    
the incidents until that time due to embarrassment and shame.                    
Dr. Fry also testified that, if the incidents of harassment did                  
occur, they certainly would have contributed to plaintiff's                      
depression.                                                                      
     After the trial court overruled Conrail's motion for a                      
directed verdict, the jury returned a general verdict for                        
plaintiff for $500,000 in damages.  The trial court denied                       
Conrail's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and                   
for a new trial.                                                                 
     Conrail appealed to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga                       
County, raising seven assignments of error.  The court of                        
appeals, in a split decision which resolved only Conrail's                       
first two assignments of error, vacated the jury verdict and                     
entered judgment for Conrail, holding that Conrail's motions                     
for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the                      
verdict should have been granted.  The court of appeals                          
majority held that "plaintiff has not proven a cause of action                   
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, even if one                      
were available under the FELA."  The majority determined that                    
plaintiff had not proved that Conrail was negligent, in part                     
because he did not show that he was subjected to                                 
"unconscionable abuse," and also because he "failed to show                      
that Conrail should have reasonably foreseen his extreme                         
reaction to railroad yard harassment."  Based upon its finding                   
of no negligence, the court of appeals majority found it                         
unnecessary to decide whether a claim for negligent infliction                   
of purely emotional distress is cognizable under the FELA.1                      
     The dissenting judge at the court of appeals concluded                      
that a cause of action for emotional distress is available                       
under the FELA, and believed that plaintiff presented                            
sufficient evidence to create a jury question on the issue of                    
Conrail's negligence.  The dissenter would have overruled                        
Conrail's first two assignments of error, and would have                         
proceeded to address the remaining ones.                                         
     The cause is now before this court pursuant to the                          
allowance of a motion to certify the record.                                     
                                                                                 
     Wallace R. Steffen, for appellant.                                          
     Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman and Sheila A. McKeon,                     
for appellee.                                                                    
                                                                                 
     Alice Robie Resnick, J.  The court of appeals'                              
consideration of this case occurred before the United States                     
Supreme Court announced its decision in Consol. Rail Corp. v.                    
Gottshall (1994), 512 U.S.    , 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d                      
427, which resolved some issues pertinent to this appeal.  In                    
light of Gottshall, this case presents two issues for our                        
review:  (1) Does plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of                   
emotional distress place him within the class of plaintiffs who                  
may recover under the FELA?  (2) If issue one is resolved in                     
plaintiff's favor, did plaintiff sufficiently demonstrate that                   
Conrail's negligence caused his injuries so as to create a jury                  
question on Conrail's duty, breach of duty, foreseeability, and                  
causation?                                                                       
     At this juncture, we clarify that, while plaintiff's claim                  
may appear to be based upon the intentional actions of fellow                    
employees, the essence of his FELA claim against Conrail is                      
that his employer negligently failed in its duty to provide him                  
with a safe workplace.  Therefore, his claim sounds in terms of                  
negligent infliction of emotional distress, going to Conrail's                   
negligence in allowing a hostile workplace environment to                        
flourish.                                                                        
                                                                                 
                                                                                 
                               I                                                 
                               A                                                 
                Federal Employers' Liability Act                                 
     Section 1 of the FELA, Section 51, Title 45 U.S.Code,                       
provides that "[e]very common carrier by railroad * * * shall                    
be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is                  
employed by such carrier * * * for such injury * * * resulting                   
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,                  
agents, or employees of such carrier."                                           
     "In 1906, Congress enacted the FELA to provide a federal                    
remedy for railroad workers who suffer personal injuries as a                    
result of the negligence of their employer or their fellow                       
employees.  A primary purpose of the Act was to eliminate a                      
number of traditional defenses to tort liability and to                          
facilitate recovery in meritorious cases.  * * * The coverage                    
of the statute is defined in broad language, which has been                      
construed even more broadly."  (Footnotes omitted.)  Atchison,                   
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell (1987), 480 U.S. 557,                         
561-562, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1413, 94 L.Ed.2d 563, 570-571.  The                     
FELA is to be liberally construed to further its remedial                        
goal.  Gottshall, 512 U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2404, 129                        
L.Ed.2d at 440.                                                                  
     What constitutes negligence for purposes of the FELA is a                   
federal question, which does not vary under different                            
conceptions of negligence under non-FELA state and local laws.                   
"Federal decisional law formulating and applying the concept                     
governs."  Urie v. Thompson (1949), 337 U.S. 163, 174, 69 S.Ct.                  
1018, 1027, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 1295.  Generally, "FELA cases                         
adjudicated in state courts are subject to state procedural                      
rules, but the substantive law governing them is federal."  St.                  
Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson (1985), 470 U.S. 409,                    
411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 1348, 84 L.Ed.2d 303, 306.  Thus, past                      
decisions of the courts of this state setting the parameters of                  
negligence law in Ohio are largely irrelevant to a negligence                    
inquiry under the FELA.  As a state court, we are as capable of                  
interpreting the FELA as a federal court would be, but we apply                  
the same federal law as the federal courts, without regard to                    
Ohio's negligence law.  Since we are bound to apply the unique                   
body of federal decisional law interpreting the FELA, our                        
discussion in this case is of virtually no precedential value                    
to any non-FELA negligence issues that arise under Ohio law.                     
                               B                                                 
            Gottshall and the "Zone of Danger" Test                              
     In Gottshall, supra, the United States Supreme Court                        
granted certiorari to determine "the threshold standard that                     
must be met by plaintiffs bringing claims for negligent                          
infliction of emotional distress under FELA."  512 U.S. at    ,                  
114 S.Ct. at 2403, 129 L.Ed.2d at 438.  The Gottshall court                      
determined that "claims for damages for negligent infliction of                  
emotional distress are cognizable under FELA."  Id. at    , 114                  
S.Ct. at 2407, 129 L.Ed.2d at 444.  The court went on to hold                    
that "a railroad has a duty under FELA to avoid subjecting its                   
workers to negligently inflicted emotional injury."  Id. at                      
, 114 S.Ct. at 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d at 444.                                         
     The liability faced by a railroad for inflicting emotional                  
distress is not, however, unlimited.  Even though the FELA                       
requires a liberal interpretation, it is not a workers'                          
compensation statute.  Liability is based on the employer's                      
negligence.  Id. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2404, 129 L.Ed.2d at                       
440.  The Gottshall court, noting that common-law principles                     
play a significant role in the development of the FELA                           
negligence law, evaluated the various common-law tests which                     
have developed to determine which claims of negligent                            
infliction of emotional distress may go forward, based on the                    
policy considerations underlying recognition of the tort.  The                   
court chose the "zone of danger" test as the proper test to be                   
applied in determining whether, as a threshold matter, a                         
plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under the FELA.  512                     
U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2410, 129 L.Ed.2d at 447.                              
     Under the zone of danger test, recovery for emotional                       
injury is limited "to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical                    
impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, or who                    
are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that                            
conduct."  Id. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2406, 129 L.Ed.2d at 443.                    
"Under this test, a worker within the zone of danger of                          
physical impact will be able to recover for emotional injury                     
caused by fear of physical injury to himself, whereas a worker                   
outside the zone will not.  Railroad employees thus will be                      
able to recover for injuries -- physical and emotional --                        
caused by the negligent conduct of their employers that                          
threatens them imminently with physical impact."  Id. at    ,                    
114 S.Ct. at 2410-2411, 129 L.Ed.2d at 448.                                      
                               C                                                 
              Was Plaintiff in the Zone of Danger?                               
     Consistent with the principles espoused in Gottshall, we                    
must determine if plaintiff's claim meets the requirements of                    
the zone of danger test, which it must in order for him to be                    
placed in the class of plaintiffs who may potentially recover                    
under the FELA for the negligent infliction of emotional                         
distress.                                                                        
     The United States Supreme Court opinion in Gottshall                        
actually involved the appeals of two separate cases which were                   
consolidated for review.  The plaintiff in one of the cases,                     
James Gottshall, sought to recover against his employer,                         
Conrail, for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  His                    
claim was based on witnessing the death of a longtime friend                     
and fellow employee.  The  cause of death was a heart attack                     
which was allegedly precipitated by Conrail's forcing                            
employees, including the deceased friend and also plaintiff, to                  
do overly strenuous work on a hot, humid day.  See 512 U.S.                      
at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2400-2401, 129 L.Ed.2d at 435-436.                          
Plaintiff Gottshall thus appeared to present primarily a theory                  
of bystander recovery which involved to some extent witnessing                   
an injury to another person as the event that brought about his                  
distress.  After holding that the zone of danger test must be                    
satisfied for recovery for emotional distress under the FELA,                    
the court declined to decide whether Gottshall was in the zone                   
of danger, but remanded to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals                    
to consider the issue.  Id. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2411, 129                       
L.Ed.2d at 449.  Since the Gottshall court made no comments on                   
whether plaintiff Gottshall was in the zone of danger, we can                    
discern no guiding principles emerging from the Supreme Court                    
on that particular plaintiff's situation to aid us in our                        
inquiry in the case before us.                                                   
     The other case considered on appeal by the Supreme Court                    
in Gottshall involved plaintiff Alan Carlisle.  Carlisle                         
claimed his employer, Conrail, caused him emotional distress,                    
and a nervous breakdown, by subjecting him to a great deal of                    
stress on his job, brought about by excessive work                               
responsibilities and working overly long hours.  See 512 U.S.                    
at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2402, 129 L.Ed.2d at 437-438.  Plaintiff                    
Carlisle thus based his claim against Conrail on emotional                       
distress he suffered due to Conrail's alleged failure to                         
provide a safe workplace.  After enunciating the zone of danger                  
test, the Gottshall court found as a matter of law that                          
Carlisle was not in the zone of danger, refusing to "take the                    
radical step of reading FELA as compensating for stress arising                  
in the ordinary course of employment."  512 U.S. at    , 114                     
S.Ct. at 2412, 129 L.Ed.2d at 449.                                               
     In Buell, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated                     
that "whether one can recover for emotional injury might rest                    
on a variety of subtle and intricate distinctions related to                     
the nature of the injury and the character of the tortious                       
activity."  480 U.S. at 568, 107 S.Ct. at 1417, 94 L.Ed.2d at                    
575.  While Gottshall establishes the general rule that a                        
plaintiff must be in the zone of danger to recover for                           
emotional distress under the FELA, the case did not attempt to                   
define which plaintiffs are in the zone of danger under                          
situations factually distinguishable from those before the                       
court.  In such distinguishable situations, a case-by-case                       
analysis must be undertaken.                                                     
     We find, through the evidence he presented at trial, that                   
plaintiff was placed in immediate risk of physical impact by                     
Conrail's negligence, so that the zone of danger test was                        
satisfied.  In particular, plaintiff testified that important                    
safety devices were denied to him, that a fellow employee came                   
at him with a chipping hammer, and also that a fellow employee                   
attempted to run him over.  These instances of abuse to which                    
plaintiff testified at trial indicating plaintiff's fear for                     
his physical safety due to the acts of fellow employees are                      
sufficient to place him in the zone of danger, pending a                         
resolution by the jury of the relevant issues of fact.                           
Plaintiff alleged that Conrail was negligent in failing to                       
provide him with a safe place to work.  While much of                            
plaintiff's evidence went to Conrail's failure to provide an                     
emotionally safe place to work, some of the evidence also went                   
to Conrail's failure to provide a physically safe place to                       
work, so that plaintiff was in the zone of danger, as that                       
requirement is defined in Gottshall.                                             
     We are struck by the differences between plaintiff's                        
emotional-distress claim resulting from effects of his                           
workplace environment and the emotional-distress claim of                        
plaintiff Carlisle in Gottshall.  Plaintiff here is claiming                     
damages for injuries different in kind from those which arise                    
in the ordinary course of employment.  Plaintiff in this case                    
claims that his injuries were caused by a hostile work                           
environment, not merely by a stressful work environment.                         
     Since plaintiff was in the zone of danger based on an                       
immediate risk of physical impact, we need not determine                         
whether there would be some threshold level of hostility,                        
accompanied by no threat of physical impact, that a plaintiff                    
in a FELA action could demonstrate when the employer is                          
allegedly negligent for allowing the atmosphere of abuse to                      
flourish and that could allow the plaintiff's claim to proceed                   
despite Gottshall.  In that situation, the plaintiff's claim                     
may be a square peg that does not appear to fit in Gottshall's                   
round hole.                                                                      
                               II                                                
     That plaintiff was in the zone of danger, and so satisfies                  
the threshold Gottshall test placing him within the class of                     
plaintiffs who may recover for negligent infliction of                           
emotional distress under the FELA, answers only one of the                       
issues in this case.  "To prevail on a FELA claim, a plaintiff                   
must 'prove the traditional common law elements of negligence:                   
duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation.'"  Adams v. CSX                     
Transp., Inc. (C.A.6, 1990), 899 F.2d 536, 539, quoting Robert                   
v. Consol. Rail Corp. (C.A.1, 1987), 832 F.2d 3, 6.  The court                   
of appeals majority in this case found that plaintiff failed to                  
prove that Conrail was negligent.  We, therefore, must examine                   
the elements of plaintiff's claim.                                               
     As this case comes to us, the court of appeals majority                     
reversed the trial court's denial of Conrail's motions for a                     
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.                   
In FELA cases Ohio law applies where matters of procedure,                       
rather than of substantive federal FELA law, are involved, so                    
that both motions must be evaluated under Ohio's Civ.R. 50.  In                  
so doing the evidence must be construed most strongly in favor                   
of the party opposing the motion.  To grant either motion, a                     
trial court must find that reasonable minds could come to but                    
one conclusion and that conclusion must be adverse to the party                  
opposing the motion.  Civ.R. 50(A)(4); White v. Ohio Dept. of                    
Transp. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 39, 45, 564 N.E.2d 462, 468 (if                    
reasonable minds can come to more than one conclusion the issue                  
should go to the jury).  See McNees v. Cincinnati Street Ry.                     
Co. (1949), 152 Ohio St. 269, 272-273, 40 O.O. 318, 320, 89                      
N.E.2d 138, 141 (standards for granting motion for judgment                      
notwithstanding the verdict and for granting motion for                          
directed verdict are the same).                                                  
     As a preliminary matter, we agree with the observation                      
made by the court of appeals majority that "there was                            
sufficient medical evidence to establish that plaintiff was                      
suffering from chronic and disabling depression."  Conrail does                  
not dispute that plaintiff has suffered emotional injury.                        
Conrail does dispute, however, that the injury is attributable                   
to its negligence.                                                               
                               A                                                 
                              Duty                                               
     There is no doubt that an employer has a responsibility                     
under the FELA to provide a safe place to work.  Furthermore,                    
"as part of its 'duty to use reasonable care in furnishing its                   
employees with a safe place to work,' Buell, 480 U.S. [557], at                  
558 [94 L.Ed.2d 563, 568, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1412], a railroad has                  
a duty under FELA to avoid subjecting its workers to                             
negligently inflicted emotional injury."  Gottshall, 512 U.S.                    
at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d at 444.  The zone of                      
danger test outlines Conrail's duty pertaining to negligent                      
infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at    , 114 S.Ct. at                      
2410, 129 L.Ed.2d at 447.  Conrail clearly had a duty to                         
provide plaintiff, an employee in the zone of danger, with a                     
reasonably safe workplace.                                                       
                               B                                                 
                         Breach of Duty                                          
     Plaintiff testified that the atmosphere of abuse endured                    
by former Erie employees was pervasive throughout the company.                   
It does not require a great leap of reasoning to conclude that                   
if the jury gave credence to plaintiff's allegations, then                       
Conrail had to be aware of the abusive environment, or at the                    
very least, should have been aware of it.  Plaintiff alleged                     
that foremen witnessed some of the incidents of abuse, and that                  
nothing was ever done by Conrail to deal with the problems in                    
plaintiff's work environment.  Conrail countered at trial by                     
presenting evidence that plaintiff never sufficiently                            
complained of the abuse, and also that much of the abuse did                     
not actually occur, or if it did occur that plaintiff                            
exaggerated the significance of the events.  If the jury                         
accepted plaintiff's view of the facts, it could easily have                     
determined that Conrail, acting through its "officers, agents,                   
or employees" (Section 51, Title 45, U.S.Code) at the very                       
least should have been aware that plaintiff was in an unsafe                     
work environment.  We find that plaintiff presented sufficient                   
evidence to create a jury question on whether Conrail breached                   
its duty to provide a safe workplace.                                            
     In Adams, supra, 899 F.2d at 539-540, the United States                     
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the FELA                        
requires a plaintiff claiming emotional injury to show                           
"unconscionable abuse" before an employer can be found to have                   
breached its duty to provide a safe workplace.                                   
     The court of appeals in this case reversed the jury                         
verdict in part because it determined that plaintiff failed to                   
show unconscionable abuse.  However, the trial judge instructed                  
the jury that plaintiff had to show that "Conrail's actions                      
amounted to unconscionable abuse" before it would be                             
established that a breach of the duty to provide a safe                          
workplace occurred.  Since the jury returned a general verdict                   
for plaintiff that was unclarified by interrogatories, we must                   
assume that the jury followed the trial court's instruction in                   
this regard and that the jury found that plaintiff did suffer                    
unconscionable abuse, as required by Adams.  We do not comment                   
on the ambiguities of requiring unconscionable abuse (a concept                  
that seems more appropriate in an inquiry regarding a claim for                  
intentional infliction of emotional distress) in a negligence                    
action brought under the FELA.  Furthermore, we need not                         
determine whether the Adams unconscionable-abuse test is                         
consistent with the general contours of the Supreme Court's                      
opinion in Gottshall, because we find that plaintiff met the                     
heightened burden of showing unconscionable abuse.                               
                               C                                                 
                         Foreseeability                                          
     The court of appeals majority in this case reversed the                     
jury verdict for plaintiff in part because it found that                         
plaintiff failed to show Conrail should have foreseen his                        
"extreme reaction" to the claimed workplace abuse.  However,                     
the foreseeability of plaintiff's reaction is directly                           
dependent on the degree of abuse he endured.  As discussed                       
above, we must assume that the jury found that Conrail at the                    
least should have been aware of the hostile work environment                     
surrounding plaintiff; we must also assume that the                              
mistreatment plaintiff endured amounted to unconscionable                        
abuse.  We cannot say that a plaintiff who endures                               
unconscionable abuse is not to be expected to display strong                     
reactions or emotions.  We are not prepared, as the court of                     
appeals majority was, to characterize plaintiff's response to                    
his situation as an "extreme reaction," which Conrail could not                  
have foreseen as a matter of law.  Instead, we find that                         
plaintiff created a jury question as to foreseeability.  Since                   
the jury's general verdict was unclarified by interrogatories,                   
we accept the jury's decision that plaintiff's reaction was not                  
excessive given the circumstances, a decision the jury                           
necessarily had to make to arrive at its ultimate conclusion                     
that Conrail was negligent.                                                      
                               D                                                 
                           Causation                                             
     As part of the liberal construction accorded to the FELA,                   
a "relaxed standard of causation applies" to a negligence claim                  
under the act.  Gottshall, 512 U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2404,                   
129 L.Ed.2d at 440.  "Under this statute the test of a jury                      
case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the                        
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the                    
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages                    
are sought."  Rogers v. Missouri Pacific RR.  Co. (1957), 352                    
U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, 499.  We see                    
no reason to apply a more stringent standard of causation for                    
emotional injury under the FELA than for physical injury,                        
recognizing like the Supreme Court in Gottshall that "'severe                    
emotional injuries can be just as debilitating as physical                       
injuries,'" 512 U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d at                   
444 (quoting Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp. [1993], 988 F.2d                    
355, 361).  We therefore find that in the process of                             
establishing the other elements of Conrail's negligence to the                   
satisfaction of the jury, plaintiff easily met his burden of                     
proving that Conrail's negligence played at least a slight part                  
in producing his injury.                                                         
                              III                                                
     In summary, based on Part I of our discussion, plaintiff                    
was in the zone of danger under the standards set forth by the                   
Supreme Court in Gottshall for recovery for emotional injury                     
under the FELA.  In addition, based on Part II of our                            
discussion, we agree with the conclusion of the dissenting                       
judge below that plaintiff raised a jury question as to                          
Conrail's negligence.  Construing the evidence most strongly in                  
favor of plaintiff, we defer to the decision of the jury, since                  
reasonable minds could come to different conclusions regarding                   
Conrail's negligence.  We adopt the position of the dissenting                   
judge below, who would have resolved Conrail's first two                         
assignments of error in that court by concluding that Conrail's                  
"motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the                   
verdict were correctly overruled by the trial court."                            
     For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court                    
of appeals on the issues addressed in its opinion is                             
reversed.2  We remand this cause to the court of appeals for                     
further proceedings, to allow that court to rule on those                        
assignments of error raised by Conrail that have not yet been                    
addressed.                                                                       
                                  Judgment reversed                              
                                  and cause remanded.                            
     Moyer, C.J., Douglas, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ.,                        
concur.                                                                          
     Wright, J., concurs separately.                                             
     Cook, J., dissents.                                                         
                                                                                 
FOOTNOTES:                                                                       
1In holding as it did, the court of appeals majority resolved                    
only Assignments of Error I and II of Conrail's appeal, and                      
found Assignments of Error III through VII moot, citing App.R.                   
12(A)(1)(c).  Following are Conrail's seven assignments of                       
error:                                                                           
"I.The trial court erred in denying Conrail's motion for                         
directed verdict/motion jnov on plaintiff's claim for negligent                  
infliction of emotional distress.                                                
"II.The trial court erred in denying Conrail's motion for                        
directed verdict/motion jnov on the issue of negligence.                         
"III.The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for                     
directed verdict on the basis that plaintiff failed to plead a                   
specific amount of monetary damages in his complaint.                            
"IV.The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a                    
directed verdict/motion jnov on the statute of limitations.                      
"V.The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of                         
irrelevant and prejudicial testimony from plaintiff's fellow                     
employees.                                                                       
"VI.The trial court committed reversible error in failing to                     
charge the jury that any award to plaintiff is not subject to                    
income tax.                                                                      
"VII.    The trial court erred in permitting evidence of                         
plaintiff's future lost wages."                                                  
2 In addition to arguments relative to the FELA, plaintiff                       
argues that the court of appeals actually reversed the jury                      
verdict by a two-to-one vote on the weight of the evidence,                      
thereby violating the prohibition contained in Section 3(B)(3),                  
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution that "[n]o judgment                          
resulting from a trial by jury shall be reversed on the weight                   
of the evidence except by the concurrence of all three judges                    
hearing the cause."  We find that the court of appeals majority                  
did not reverse on the weight of the evidence, but reversed                      
based on its resolution of a question of law, so that a                          
violation of the Ohio Constitution did not occur.  See Ruta v.                   
Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 23 O.O.3d 115,                   
430 N.E.2d 935.                                                                  
     Wright, J., concurring.  I write separately because I                       
believe that the majority applies an imperfect analysis to the                   
case at hand.  In so doing, the majority opinion distorts the                    
otherwise clear distinction between intentionally and                            
negligently inflicted emotional distress and, as a result, also                  
distorts the scope of an employer's liability under the FELA                     
for intentional injuries inflicted upon an employee by another                   
employee.                                                                        
     The majority construes Vance's FELA claim against Conrail                   
as a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.                       
Although Vance obviously suffers from emotional distress, that                   
distress was not negligently inflicted.  More accurately,                        
Vance's fellow employees intentionally caused his emotional                      
distress.  Properly construed, Vance's claim against Conrail is                  
not that Conrail negligently inflicted emotional distress on                     
him, but rather that Conrail negligently supervised its                          
employees, thereby allowing the intentional acts of abuse to                     
occur.  In fact, this is the theory advanced in Vance's                          
complaint:                                                                       
     "5.  The severe emotional distress and resulting injury                     
were directly and proximately caused by Defendant Railroad.  It                  
negligently supervised and condoned the known conduct of                         
Plaintiff's superiors and fellow employees who *** subjected                     
the Plaintiff to torment, embarrassment, humiliation,                            
frustration, harassment, inequity, ridicule, and other severe                    
emotional distress, because he was a former employee of Erie                     
Lackawanna Railroad." (Emphasis added.)                                          
     The majority follows the United States Supreme Court's                      
analysis in Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (1994), 512 U.S.                     
, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427, to reach the conclusion that                  
Conrail is liable for negligent infliction of emotional                          
distress.  In Gottshall, Gottshall's supervisor made                             
Gottshall's crew work without appropriate breaks in hot and                      
humid conditions.  Gottshall suffered emotional distress after                   
the harsh conditions caused the death of his friend and the                      
supervisor ordered the crew to continue to work within sight of                  
the body.  The case did not involve allegations that the                         
supervisor acted with the intent of causing Gottshall, or any                    
other employee, emotional distress.  Instead, it seems that the                  
supervisor ordered the crew to work without scheduled breaks                     
and to continue to work after the death of Gottshall's friend                    
for the simple reason that the track had to be repaired as                       
quickly as possible.  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2400-2401, 129                   
L.Ed.2d at 435-436.                                                              
     The issue that the Gottshall court faced was whether a                      
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is                          
cognizable under the FELA.  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2403, 129                  
L.Ed.2d at 439.  The court addressed this issue by considering                   
whether a negligently inflicted emotional injury may constitute                  
a compensable "injury" under the FELA.  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct.                   
at 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d at 444.  After noting that "'severe                         
emotional injuries can be just as debilitating as physical                       
injuries,'" the court found that a negligently inflicted                         
emotional injury is a compensable injury under the FELA.  Id.,                   
quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (C.A.3, 1993), 988 F.2d                  
355, 361.  Of the three common-law tests for validly asserted                    
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court                  
adopted the "zone of danger" test, finding that it best                          
reconciled the competing concerns of providing a realistic                       
limit to liability and the remedial nature of the FELA.  Id.                     
at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2410, 129 L.Ed.2d at 447.                                  
     The case at hand, which involves an intentionally                           
inflicted injury, is clearly distinguishable from Gottshall.                     
The question presented in Gottshall was whether a negligently                    
inflicted emotional injury is compensable under the FELA.  The                   
court specifically refused to answer the question of whether an                  
intentionally inflicted emotional injury is compensable.  Id.                    
at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2403, 129 L.Ed.2d at 439, fn. 2.                           
     In this case, the employees' conduct that caused Vance's                    
emotional distress may only be characterized as intentional;                     
through their acts they intended to harass Vance and cause him                   
severe emotional distress.  The intent to harass Vance is                        
obvious from the behavior at issue, which included attacking                     
Vance with a chipping hammer, attempting to run him over with a                  
truck, taunting him about his sexual dysfunction, placing sugar                  
in his wife's gas tank, scratching "Erie scab" on the side of                    
his truck, and placing a dead, bloody rat in his lunch box.                      
This type of conduct does not qualify as negligent infliction                    
of emotional distress because the employees did not                              
"unintentionally cause[] emotional distress to another."  2                      
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 313.  Instead,                  
this conduct is properly characterized as intentional                            
infliction of emotional distress:  "One who by extreme and                       
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe                     
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such                   
emotional distress ***."  Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6                     
Ohio St.3d 369, 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E.2d 666, syllabus; 1                           
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 46.                             
     Because Vance's injury is the result of intentional acts                    
by coworkers acting outside the scope of their employment,                       
Conrail cannot be liable for his emotional injury under the                      
theory of respondeat superior.  See Annotation (1966), 8                         
A.L.R.3d 442.  Although Conrail cannot be vicariously liable                     
for Vance's injury, it may still be liable to the extent it was                  
negligent in allowing its employees to intentionally harass                      
Vance.  This theory, which has a long history under the FELA,                    
provides that an employer may be liable for injuries received                    
by an employee as a result of an intentional tort of a                           
coemployee if the employer was negligent in hiring,                              
supervising, or failing to fire the employee who caused the                      
injury.  See Harrison v. Missouri Pacific RR. Co. (1963), 372                    
U.S. 248, 83 S.Ct. 690, 9 L.Ed.2d 711; Taylor v. Burlington N.                   
RR. Co. (C.A.9, 1986), 787 F.2d 1309; Lancaster v. Norfolk & W.                  
Ry. Co. (C.A.7, 1985), 773 F.2d 807, 818, certiorari denied                      
(1987), 480 U.S. 945, 107 S.Ct. 1602, 94 L.Ed.2d 788; Green v.                   
River Terminal Ry. Co. (C.A.6, 1985), 763 F.2d 805; Annotation                   
(1966), 8 A.L.R.3d 442, 446.  See, also, 2 Restatement of the                    
Law 2d, Agency (1965), Section 219; 2 Restatement of the Law                     
2d, Torts (1965), Section 317.                                                   
     Before determining whether Conrail breached a duty it owed                  
to Vance by failing to adequately supervise the employees who                    
harassed him, it must first be determined whether an                             
intentionally inflicted emotional injury is a compensable                        
injury under the FELA. Gottshall, supra, 512 U.S. at     , 114                   
S.Ct. at 2410-2411, 129 L.Ed.2d at 447-448.                                      
     Significantly, the United States Court of Appeals for the                   
Sixth Circuit has held that an intentionally inflicted, purely                   
emotional injury is not compensable under the FELA.  Adkins v.                   
Seaboard Sys. RR. (1987), 821 F.2d 340.  Specifically, the                       
Adkins court held that a claim by an employee that he suffered                   
emotional distress as a result of being threatened with                          
discharge was not compensable.  The court based its decision on                  
three grounds.  First, the court reasoned that the FELA has not                  
been held to provide compensation for purely emotional                           
injuries.  Id. at 342.  Second, the court reasoned that the                      
FELA "has not been applied to any intentional torts lacking any                  
physical dimension."  Id. at 341.  Third, the court reasoned                     
that the FELA provides a remedy for negligently inflicted                        
injuries and the plaintiff had not alleged that the railroad                     
was negligent.  Id.                                                              
     The broad pronouncement by the court in Adkins that an                      
emotional injury caused by intentionally inflicted emotional                     
distress is not cognizable under the FELA has become suspect in                  
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in                           
Gottshall, supra.  Specifically, the Gottshall court expressly                   
decided that purely emotional injuries are compensable under                     
the FELA.  And although the Gottshall court required some                        
physical dimension to the injury, manifested in the "zone of                     
danger" test, actual physical contact is now not a requirement                   
for a claim to be cognizable under the FELA.  Of course, the                     
Sixth Circuit's decision remains correct as to the facts of                      
Adkins, because the court in Gottshall declined to "take the                     
radical step of reading FELA as compensating for stress arising                  
in the ordinary course of employment."  Gottshall, supra, 512                    
U.S. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2412, 129 L.Ed.2d at 449.                             
     Even though the Gottshall court decided that an emotional                   
injury caused by negligent infliction of emotional distress is                   
a compensable injury under the FELA, it did not decide whether                   
an intentionally inflicted emotional injury may also be                          
compensable.  In order to decide this question, it is necessary                  
to consider the nature of the cause of action in light of the                    
history and policies of the FELA to ensure their                                 
compatibility.  In reviewing the history of the tort of                          
intentional infliction of emotional distress, it becomes                         
evident that, like negligent infliction of emotional distress,                   
this tort existed at the time the FELA was adopted in 1908.                      
See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of                     
Torts (1936), 49 Harv. L.Rev. 1033, 1052; Prosser & Keeton, Law                  
of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 60.  As the tort has developed, several                     
elements have surfaced as being necessary to a valid claim.                      
First, the conduct which brings about the distress must be                       
extreme and outrageous.  Magruder, supra, at 1053; 1                             
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 46, Comment d                   
("Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so                    
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go                      
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as                     
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized                                
community.").  Second, the plaintiff must have suffered severe                   
emotional distress.  Prosser, supra, at 63; 1 Restatement of                     
the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 46, Comment j ("Complete                       
emotional tranquillity is seldom attainable in this world, and                   
some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a                     
part of the price of living among people.  The law intervenes                    
only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no                           
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.").                                
     The court in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. Buell                     
(1987), 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 94 L.Ed.2d 563, noted                      
that the common law of intentional infliction of emotional                       
distress, like the common law of negligent infliction of                         
emotional distress, is not uniform, and that jurisdictions have                  
adopted different forms of the tort in three significant                         
respects.  Id. at 568-569, 107 S.Ct. at 1417, 94 L.Ed.2d at                      
575.  Specifically, the court noted that some jurisdictions                      
allow recovery for recklessly inflicted, as well as                              
intentionally inflicted, emotional injuries, that some                           
jurisdictions require physical manifestation of the emotional                    
injury, and that some jurisdictions consider the relationship                    
of the parties and place special emphasis on the workplace.                      
Id.  In noting these differences, the court in Buell seemed                      
concerned with whether the more relaxed versions of this tort                    
were consistent with the FELA's underlying policies.  This was                   
the concern raised by the court in Gottshall when it reviewed                    
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.                          
Specifically, that court noted that the FELA is not a "workers'                  
compensation statute," that railroads are not "the insurers of                   
the emotional well-being and mental health of their employees,"                  
and that the FELA does not provide a remedy for "stress arising                  
in the ordinary course of employment."  Gottshall, supra, 512                    
U.S. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2404, 2409, 2412, 129 L.Ed.2d at                      
440, 446, 449.  In other words, in order for an intentionally                    
inflicted injury to be a compensable injury under the FELA, the                  
scope of the compensable injury must be subject to reasonable                    
limits.                                                                          
     I believe that the traditional elements of the common-law                   
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress go a long                   
way towards satisfying the court's concern of placing                            
reasonable limits on the types of emotional injuries that are                    
compensable.  First, because this case involves intentionally                    
inflicted emotional injuries, it is not necessary to determine                   
whether recklessly inflicted emotional injuries are compensable                  
under the FELA.  Second, the requirement that the emotional                      
injury be severe significantly limits the potential class of                     
plaintiffs.  Third, the fact that the abusive behavior must                      
qualify as "extreme or outrageous" or "unconscionable abuse"                     
also limits the class of plaintiffs to those who have been                       
subjected to only the most outrageous behavior.  See Buell,                      
supra, 408 U.S. at 567, 107 S.Ct. 1416, 94 L.Ed.2d at 574, fn.                   
13.  Additionally, the context within which the abusive                          
behavior occurs has an impact on whether particular behavior is                  
sufficiently outrageous.  Prosser, supra, supplement at 18.                      
"The salon of Madame Pompadour is not to be likened to the                       
rough-and-tumble atmosphere of the American oil refinery."                       
Eddy v. Brown (Okla. 1986), 715 P.2d 74, 77.  Given that a                       
railroad yard can present a similar rough-and-tumble                             
atmosphere, acts of harassment in that context must be                           
particularly egregious to qualify as unconscionable abuse.                       
Fourth, even though actual physical manifestation of the                         
distress is not required, Gottshall, supra; Taylor supra, 787                    
F.2d 1309; Yeager, supra, 6 Ohio St.3d at 374, 6 OBR at 425,                     
453 N.E.2d at 671; Magruder, supra, 49 Harv. L.Rev. at 1058,                     
where physical manifestation of an emotional injury is not                       
present, courts require a greater showing that the conduct is                    
extreme and outrageous.  Prosser, supra, at 64.                                  
     However, in order to ensure that only those intentionally                   
inflicted emotional injuries that are consistent with the FELA                   
will be compensated, I believe it is necessary to supplement                     
the common-law elements of the tort of intentional infliction                    
of emotional distress.  Specifically, given the FELA's focus on                  
physical perils, see Lancsater, supra, 773 F.2d at 813, and the                  
Gottshall court's determination that the FELA does not provide                   
compensation for "stress arising in the ordinary course of                       
employment," Gottshall, supra, 512 U.S. at    , 114 S.Ct. at                     
2412, 129 L.Ed.2d at 449, I believe a plaintiff seeking                          
recovery under the FELA for an emotional injury caused as a                      
result of intentional infliction of emotional distress must                      
show that the injury was caused, at least in part, by                            
physically menacing behavior.  See Gottshall, supra, 512 U.S.                    
at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2412, 129 L.Ed.2d at 449.  Given the                       
addition of the above element, I believe it is clear that an                     
intentionally inflicted, severe emotional injury which was                       
caused, at least in part, by physically menacing behavior                        
constituting unconscionable abuse qualifies as a compensable                     
injury under the FELA.                                                           
     The next question is the scope of an employer's duty to                     
prevent its employees from intentionally inflicting emotional                    
distress upon other employees.  The court in Buell noted that                    
under the FELA an employer has a duty to use reasonable care in                  
furnishing its employees with a safe place to work.  Buell,                      
supra, 408 U.S. at 558, 107 S.Ct. at 1412, 94 L.Ed.2d at 568.                    
That duty includes the obligation to take reasonable                             
precautions to prevent severe emotional abuse of one employee                    
by other employees.  Halko v. New Jersey Transit Rail                            
Operations, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 677 F.Supp. 135.  "[A]                         
railroad is guilty of negligence if it fails to prevent                          
reasonably foreseeable danger to an employee from intentional                    
or criminal misconduct."  Green, supra, 763 F.2d at 808,                         
quoting Brooks v. Washington Terminal Co. (C.A.D.C. 1979), 593                   
F.2d 1285, 1288, certiorari denied (1979), 442 U.S. 910, 99                      
S.Ct. 2823, 61 L.Ed.2d 275.  Reasonable foreseeability of the                    
harm is an "essential ingredient" of an employer's liability                     
under the FELA.  Gallick v. Baltimore & O. RR. Co. (1963), 372                   
U.S. 108, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618.  "[T]he fact that 'the                    
foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct                   
is irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to make                         
reasonable provision against it.'"  Harrison, supra, 372 U.S.                    
at 249, 83 S.Ct. at 690-691, 9 L.Ed.2d at 713, qouting Lillie                    
v. Thompson (1947), 332 U.S. 459, 462, 68 S.Ct. 140, 142, 92                     
L.Ed. 73, 75.  In that vein, a railroad will not be liable for                   
the intentional harassment of one employee by another employee                   
unless it knew or had reason to know of the offending                            
employees' vicious propensities or that the work area is                         
conducive to an unreasonable risk of unconscionable abuse.  See                  
Green, supra, 763 F.2d at 808-809;  Persley v. Natl. RR.                         
Passenger Corp. (D.Md., 1993), 831 F.Supp. 464, 468-469.  With                   
respect to the types of intentionally inflicted injuries that                    
are foreseeable, it seems clear that an employer may be liable                   
for only those injuries which the employer could have                            
potentially prevented.  In other words, where an employee acts                   
outside the scope of his employment, an employer can be liable                   
only if the offending conduct occurs on the employer's premises                  
and the employer knew or had reason to know that it could                        
control the employee's conduct and knew or had reason to know                    
of the necessity and opportunity to exercise that control, and                   
failed to do so.  See 2 Restatement of Law 2d, Torts (1965)                      
125, Section 317.                                                                
     Vance presented sufficient evidence from which a jury                       
could find that  Conrail's employees intentionally caused him                    
severe emotional distress through physically menacing                            
behavior.  The jury was properly instructed that a finding of                    
"unconscionable abuse," as set forth in Buell, supra, 480 U.S.                   
at 567, 107 S.Ct. at 1416, 94 L.Ed.2d at 574, fn. 13, was a                      
prerequisite to Vance's being able to recover.  The types of                     
harassment to which he was subjected were sufficient for a jury                  
to find that they constituted "unconscionable abuse," and it is                  
obvious that a significant portion of the harassment,                            
specifically the attack with the chipping hammer and the                         
attempted hit and run with the truck, was physically menacing                    
in nature.  Vance also presented sufficient evidence from which                  
the jury could find that his emotional injury was of such                        
severity as to justify recovery even though there were no                        
physical manifestations of his injury.  As a result, Vance met                   
the burden of proof required to show that his emotional injury                   
is a compensable injury under the FELA.                                          
     Vance also met his burden of proving that Conrail failed                    
in its duty to provide him with a safe workplace.  The jury was                  
instructed that Conrail had a duty to use ordinary care to                       
protect its employees from foreseeable danger.  The jury was                     
also instructed that in order for Vance to recover, the jury                     
had to find that Conrail was negligent in allowing the                           
emotional abuse to occur.  The court instructed the jury that,                   
in order to find Conrail liable, they had to find that Vance's                   
injuries were reasonably foreseeable.  Vance presented                           
sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Conrail                  
knew of the generally abusive environment in the railyard                        
between the former employees and the particular abuse he was                     
receiving to support a determination that Conrail knew or                        
should have known that the work area was conducive to an                         
unreasonable risk of unconscionable abuse.  Additionally, Vance                  
presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that                          
Conrail's failure to properly supervise its employees was a                      
cause of his injuries.  As a result, Vance presented sufficient                  
evidence to support a finding that Conrail was liable for his                    
emotional injury because it failed to adequately supervise the                   
offending employees.                                                             
     Thus, I agree with the majority's reversal of this matter                   
but reject in part its reasoning.                                                
     Cook, J., dissenting.   I respectfully dissent.  In my                      
view, Vance did not prove he should recover for his emotional                    
injury under FELA as such claims have been delimited by the                      
United States Supreme Court in Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall                   
(1994), 512 U.S.    , 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427.                           
Recovery for negligently inflicted, purely emotional injuries,                   
according to Gottshall, is limited to "zone of danger"                           
situations.  Vance's claim, premised on a hostile work                           
environment produced by sporadic, intentional incidents of                       
harassment by various co-workers, is not cognizable for                          
negligent infliction of emotional distress.                                      
                                                                                 
                               I                                                 
     Because recognition of a cause of action for negligent                      
infliction of emotional distress holds out the very real                         
possibility of nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for                   
defendants, courts have placed substantial limitations on the                    
class of plaintiffs that may recover for emotional injuries and                  
on the injuries that may be compensable.  Id. at    , 114 S.Ct                   
at 2405, 129 L.Ed.2d at 442.   The court held in Gottshall that                  
negligent infliction of emotion distress is cognizable under                     
FELA, meaning that, as a part of its "'duty to use reasonable                    
care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work,' *                   
* * a railroad has a duty under FELA to avoid subjecting its                     
workers to negligently inflicted emotional injury." (citation                    
omitted.) Id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d at 444.                    
The court cautioned that the duty, however, is not                               
self-defining.  Id.   "[T]he common-law background of this                       
right of recovery must play a vital role in giving content to                    
the scope of an employer's duty under FELA to avoid inflicting                   
emotional injury."  Id. at     , 114 S.Ct at 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d                   
at 445.                                                                          
     Referring then to the common law of the states on the                       
subject, the court noted that "[n]o jurisdiction, however,                       
allows recovery for all emotional harms, no matter how                           
intangible or trivial, that might be causally linked to the                      
negligence of another.  Indeed, significant limitations, taking                  
the form of 'tests' or 'rules,'  are placed by the common law                    
on the right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional                      
distress, and have been since the right was first recognized                     
late in the last century." Id. at     , 114 S.Ct at 2405, 129                    
L.Ed. 2d at 441.                                                                 
     Having considered the various "tests" and "rules" used in                   
the common law  to define the class of plaintiffs who may                        
recover for negligent infliction of emotion distress, the court                  
adopted the "zone of danger" limiting test, which holds that                     
"'those within the zone of danger of physical impact can                         
recover for fright and those outside of it cannot.'"   Id.                       
at     ,  114 S.Ct. at 2406, 129 L.Ed.2d 443, quoting Pearson,                   
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional                      
Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules (1982), 34                     
U.Fla.L.Rev. 477, 489.  "The zone of danger test also is                         
consistent with FELA's central focus on physical perils."  Id.                   
at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2410, 129 L.Ed.2d 447.  The court wrote                    
that the "zone of danger" test is "based on the realization                      
that 'a near miss may be as frightening as a direct hit.'"  Id.                  
at    , 114 S.Ct. at 2406, 129 L.Ed.2d at 443, quoting Pearson                   
at 488.  The "zone of danger" test "limits recovery for                          
emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical                      
impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, or who                    
are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct,"                  
in situations involving a frightening, accidental near miss.                     
Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the "zone of danger" test is                  
"a well-established 'common-law concep[t] of negligence,' that                   
is suitable to inform our determination of the federal question                  
of what constitutes negligence for purposes of FELA."1                           
(citations omitted.) Id. at     ,  114 S.Ct. at 2410, 129                        
L.Ed.2d at 447.                                                                  
     With this as the relevant legal framework, the facts and                    
allegations proven by Vance did not support a case for                           
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  As perceived by                     
the majority, Vance demonstrated that he was subjected to a                      
"hostile workplace environment" at work.  This is not within                     
the narrow limits of a "zone of danger"  test, i.e., fright                      
caused by imminent physical peril.  The incidents such as the                    
rat in the lunch box, the scratched car, the taunting about                      
sexual matters, the sugar in the gas tank, or the failure to                     
provide safety equipment were bundled by the majority as if                      
each meets the "zone of danger" test.                                            
     The two incidents involving threats of physical peril, the                  
chipping hammer incident and the co-worker trying to run down                    
Vance with a vehicle in the yard, are intentional acts and thus                  
do not fit the  Gottshall  constraints. The railroad had a duty                  
to avoid subjecting Vance to negligently inflicted emotional                     
injury as defined by the "zone of danger" test.  Vance, of                       
course, did not allege nor did he wish to try to prove that the                  
employer intentionally inflicted emotional distress.                             
     Both the majority and concurring opinions consider the                      
applicability of a  theory of negligent supervision to this                      
case.  In my view, that theory fails for two reasons.  First,                    
such claims may be brought under FELA for intentional acts of a                  
co-employee only where there is a physical injury, not a purely                  
emotional injury.   Limitation of the purely emotional claims                    
to "zone of danger" scenarios is the upshot of the Gottshall                     
decision.  Second, even if one could recover for purely                          
emotional injuries under a negligent supervision theory, Vance                   
did not present evidence that either the chipping hammer                         
incident or the attempted rundown was committed by an employee                   
who had previously demonstrated such behavior, thereby                           
triggering  the employer's duty to discipline or discharge such                  
employee.   To the contrary, the majority opinion casts a duty                   
on railroads to regulate conduct of the general employee                         
population rather than limiting the duty to an offending                         
individual employee.  Of critical importance, in most of the                     
incidents, no culprit was even identified.  Rather, it is only                   
by evidence of a "pervasive" attitude in the company that the                    
majority holds the employer to the nebulous duty "to deal with                   
the problems" in Vance's work environment.                                       
                               II                                                
     I also differ with the majority's employing the                             
"unconscionable abuse" test from Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc.                      
(C.A.6, 1990), 899 F.2d 536, decided before Gottshall.  Because                  
Gottshall limits claims of negligent infliction of emotional                     
distress to the class of plaintiffs meeting the "zone of                         
danger" test, the  Adams "unconscionable abuse" test is no                       
longer applicable.                                                               
                           Conclusion                                            
     The majority decision merits the same criticism the                         
Supreme Court leveled at the Third Circuit's decision it                         
reviewed in Gottshall, i.e., that the "ruling would tend to                      
make railroads the insurers of the emotional well-being and                      
mental health of their employees."  512 U.S. at     , 114 S.Ct.                  
at 2409, 129 L.Ed.2d at 446.  Because the majority violates the                  
boundary imposed by Gottshall on FELA claims for purely                          
emotional injury, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of                     
the court of appeals                                                             
                                                                                 
Footnote:                                                                        
1  In Heiner v Moretuzzo (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d     ,                             
N.E.2d    , decided today, we held that in order to recover for                  
negligent infliction of emotional distress in Ohio, a plaintiff                  
has to have suffered the emotional injury from witnessing or                     
experiencing a dangerous accident or have had an appreciation                    
of actual physical peril.