Case Title: Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88227

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88227-Agenda 15-March 2000.
MARK VOYKIN, Appellee, v. ESTATE OF GORDON
 DeBOER, Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal presents the question of whether a defendant must
present medical or other competent evidence of a causal or
relevancy connection between a plaintiff's prior injury, prior
accident, or preexisting condition and the injury at issue.
BACKGROUND
	This action arose from an automobile accident between
plaintiff, Mark Voykin, and decedent, Gordon DeBoer. The
evidence at trial established that, on January 31, 1996, decedent's
car collided with the rear of plaintiff's car. Although plaintiff did
not seek medical attention on the evening of the accident, the next
morning, at his wife's suggestion, he sought treatment from Dr.
Chinyung See for neck and back pain. Subsequently, in the circuit
court of Lake County, plaintiff sued decedent for injuries suffered
in the accident. After suit had been filed, but before trial, decedent
died, and his estate was substituted as defendant.
	During the trial, plaintiff sought to bar and defendant sought
to introduce evidence that, in April 1991, approximately five years
before the accident, plaintiff had suffered an injury to his lower
back. Plaintiff argued that such evidence was not admissible unless
defendant presented expert testimony demonstrating that the prior
and present injuries were causally related. Defendant contended
that expert testimony was not necessary because the injuries were
to the same part of the body and continuity existed between the
injuries. The trial court allowed defendant to question plaintiff and
Dr. See about this prior injury and to introduce evidence relating
to the treatment of plaintiff's prior injuries. The trial court also
allowed defendant to introduce evidence that plaintiff had
previously suffered "neck problems" and had been treated for
carpel tunnel syndrome.
	After defendant rested, the trial court granted plaintiff's
motion for a directed verdict as to defendant's negligence. The
court specifically stated, however, that it was not ruling on the
questions of causation or injury. The jury returned a verdict in
defendant's favor, and the trial court entered judgment on the
verdict. In his post-trial motion, plaintiff argued that he should
receive a new trial because defendant should not have been
permitted to introduce evidence of plaintiff's prior injury without
providing expert testimony to demonstrate a causal connection
between the past and present injuries. The trial court denied
plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff timely appealed.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The court examined recent decisions from other districts of the
appellate court and concluded that evidence of prior injuries should
not be admitted unless the defendant presents "evidence of
causation between prior and present injuries." 306 Ill. App. 3d 689,
695. The court further explained that expert testimony would
normally be necessary if the injuries were "complex." 306 Ill. App.
3d at 696. Thereafter, this court granted defendant's petition for
leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We also granted the motions
of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and the Illinois
Trial Lawyers Association to file briefs as amici curiae.
ANALYSIS
History of the Same Part of the Body Rule
	The "same part of the body rule," a doctrine developed in the
appellate court, permits a defendant to introduce evidence that the
plaintiff has previously suffered injuries similar to those at issue.
Brown v. Baker, 284 Ill. App. 3d 401, 404 (1996). Under the same
part of the body rule, evidence of a prior injury is admissible
without any showing that it is causally related to the present injury
as long as both the past and present injuries affected the same part
of the body. Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 404. If the injury is not to
the same part of the body, the defendant must demonstrate a causal
connection between the current injury and the prior injury. Bailey
v. Wilson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303 (1998); see also Elliott v.
Koch, 200 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14 (1990).
	Although this court has never addressed the applicability of the
same part of the body rule, the appellate court universally applied
the rule until 1996. At that time, the Appellate Court, Fifth District,
reconsidered the rule. The court noted that, under the rule as it was
currently being applied, a childhood knee injury could arguably be
admissible in an action involving a later knee injury, "without any
further showing of relevance or causation, even if the prior injury
had completely healed and been symptom free for decades."
Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 404-05. The court concluded that such
a rule of evidence invited the jury to speculate on the nexus
between the prior and current injuries. Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at
405. The court concluded that, if the prior injury has "long since
healed and has shown no recurring symptoms, a defendant should
not be permitted to introduce evidence of the prior injury without
establishing causation." Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 405.
	Subsequently, the First District relied upon Brown and
concluded that, "absent competent and relevant evidence of a
causal connection between the preexisting condition and the injury
complained of, evidence of the preexisting condition is
inadmissible." Cancio v. White, 297 Ill. App. 3d 422, 430 (1998);
see also Lagestee v. Days Inn Management Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d
935, 946-47 (1999) (holding that "the defendant is required to
present medical or other competent evidence of a causal or
relevancy connection between plaintiff's prior injury, prior
accident, or preexisting condition and the injury at issue as a
prerequisite of admissibility").
	After Cancio was decided, the Fourth District reconsidered
and reaffirmed the same part of the body rule. Bailey, 299 Ill. App.
3d at 304. In so doing, the court held that "[a]s long as there is
some evidence of the nature, extent, duration, or treatment of the
previous injury, an independent showing of causation is
unnecessary." Bailey, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 304.
	Plaintiff asks us to follow the reasoning of Brown, Cancio, and
Lagestee and to discard the same part of the body rule. Defendant
requests that we adopt the same part of the body rule.
Shifting the Burden of Proof
	Defendant's chief argument in favor of the same part of the
body rule is that requiring a defendant to present evidence of
causation impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to defendant.
The problem with defendant's argument is that this court rejected
it in 1962.
	In Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390 (1962), the plaintiff
recovered $20,000 for injuries sustained in a car accident. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in striking
evidence of the plaintiff's prior and subsequent accidents. This
court, in rejecting that claim, noted that the issue "was fully and
correctly resolved by the Appellate Court and we adopt its views
in such regard." Caley, 24 Ill. 2d  at 395.
	In Caley, the defendant sought to question the plaintiff
regarding accidents occurring before and after the accident at issue.
The defendant's theory was that these other accidents were the
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant contended that,
because the plaintiff always bears the burden of proving proximate
cause, the defendant did not need to demonstrate a connection
between the other accidents and the plaintiff's injuries.
	The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument. It
explained that, although the burden of proof never shifts between
the parties, the "burden of going forward with the evidence may
shift from party to party." Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323,
327 (1961). The court further reasoned that, although the
defendant bore the burden of demonstrating the connection
between the other accidents and the plaintiff's injuries, that did not
mean that the burden of proof shifted to the defendant. Caley, 29
Ill. App. 2d at 327. The court explained:
			"Proximate cause was a part of plaintiff's case. It was as
indispensable as the elements of defendant's negligence,
plaintiff's freedom therefrom, and damage. Without it,
plaintiff's action would have failed. But when he has borne
the burden of proof and established the material elements
necessary to make out a case, it is then the defendant's
right, but certainly not his duty-to put on his defense. This
is not shifting the burden of proof. One cannot be said to
have a burden if one may pick it up or not as he pleases.
Obviously if there is evidence negative of causation, a
defendant should show it, but the law in according him the
privilege of going forward in no wise shifts to him the
burden of proof as the law knows that phrase." (Emphasis
added.) Caley, 29 Ill. App. 2d at 328-29.
	The court then explained that, although other causes of the
injury may be a relevant area of inquiry, "the evidence elicited on
this cross-examination does not establish even remotely, a possible
'cause' or 'causes' of plaintiff's injuries." Caley, 29 Ill. App. 2d at
329-30. The court emphasized that whether evidence of the other
accidents was admissible was nothing more than a question of
relevancy:
		"To elevate testimony that sometime before the rear-end
accident in question plaintiff had been bumped, bending a
trunk handle, and that after the accident and before the
onset of a more serious lower-back complaint, his front
head-light was struck, to the status of contributing or
intervening causes, suitable for submission to triers of the
fact, is to misread standard of relevancy required as pre-conditions of admissibility. That this requirement devolves
on the defendant to the same extent as on plaintiff initially
in presenting his case, which it does, does not shift the
burden of proof, or indeed have anything to do with it. It
is a question of relevancy, pure and simple." (Emphasis
added.) Caley, 29 Ill. App. 2d at 330.
	We now reaffirm the analysis we adopted in Caley. Requiring
a defendant to demonstrate a causal relationship between a prior
and present injury in no way shifts the ultimate burden of proof.
Instead, it simply requires a defendant demonstrate that the
evidence he wishes to present is relevant to the question at issue,
viz., whether the defendant's negligence cause the plaintiff's injury.
Relevancy
	A review of the appellate court opinions reveals that the same
part of the body rule is nothing more than a bright-line relevancy
standard. Essentially, the same part of the body rule provides that,
if a plaintiff has previously suffered an injury to the same part of
the body, then that previous injury is automatically relevant to the
present injury simply because it affected the same part of the body.
With this conclusion, we cannot agree.
	Relevant evidence is evidence that has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401; see People v.
Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 322 (1977) (adopting Rule 401); see also
Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill. 2d 125, 128 (1966) (holding that
evidence is relevant if it "tends to prove a fact in controversy or
renders a matter in issue more or less probable"). Relevancy is
"tested in the light of logic, experience and accepted assumption as
to human behavior." Marut, 34 Ill. 2d  at 128. However,
" '[r]elevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of
evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence
and a matter properly provable in the case.' " Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d  at
322, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401, Advisory Committee's Note.
	For evidence of a prior injury to be admissible at trial, that
evidence must be relevant. The evidence of the prior injury must
make the existence of a fact that is of consequence either more or
less probable. In cases such as the one before this court, the
defendant seeks to introduce evidence of the prior injury for one of
three purposes: (1) to negate causation; (2) to negate or reduce
damages; or (3) as impeachment.
	With respect to causation, evidence of a previous injury is
relevant only if it tends to negate causation or injuries. It is well
settled that a defendant need not be the only cause to be held liable
for an injury; rather, it is sufficient that the defendant is a cause.
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 88 (1964).
Moreover, a defendant is not relieved of liability simply because the
only injury suffered by a plaintiff is an aggravation of a previous
injury. Balestri v. Terminal Freight Cooperative Ass'n, 76 Ill. 2d 451, 455 (1979). Thus, for a prior injury to be relevant to
causation, the injury must make it less likely that the defendant's
actions caused any of the plaintiff's injuries or an identifiable
portion thereof.
	Even if the prior injury does not negate causation, it may still
be relevant to the question of damages. For example, the prior
injury may be relevant to establish that the plaintiff had a
preexisting condition for which the defendant is not liable and that
the defendant is liable only for the portion of the damages that
aggravated or increased the plaintiff's injury.
	Additionally, a prior injury may be relevant as impeachment.
For example, a plaintiff may be examined with respect to his failure
to disclose to his physician that he has previously suffered an injury
to the same part of the body. Similarly, an expert may be examined
about whether his opinion would change if the expert was aware
of the plaintiff's prior injury. This does not mean, however, that
every undisclosed prior injury to the same part of the body is
grounds for impeachment. Just as with the substantive admission
of evidence, trial courts should not permit inquiry into this area
unless the prior injury is relevant to a fact in consequence, i.e.,
whether the prior injury negates causation or negates or reduces
the defendant's damages.
Necessity of Expert Testimony
	The question remains, however, whether expert testimony is
necessary to determine whether the prior injury is relevant to the
current injury. In a similar context, namely, medical malpractice
cases, this court has recognized that expert testimony is normally
necessary "because jurors are not skilled in the practice of medicine
and would find it difficult without the help of medical evidence to
determine any lack of necessary scientific skill on the part of the
physician." Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 Ill. 2d 249, 256 (1978).
Nevertheless, expert testimony is not required in medical
malpractice actions if "the physician's conduct is so grossly
negligent or the treatment so common that a layman could readily
appraise it." Walski, 72 Ill. 2d  at 256.
	We believe that similar considerations should govern here.
Without question, the human body is complex. A prior foot injury
could be causally related to a current back injury, yet a prior injury
to the same part of the back may not affect a current back injury.
In most cases, the connection between the parts of the body and
past and current injuries is a subject that is beyond the ken of the
average layperson. Because of this complexity, we do not believe
that, in normal circumstances, a lay juror can effectively or
accurately assess the relationship between a prior injury and a
current injury without expert assistance. Consequently, we
conclude that, if a defendant wishes to introduce evidence that the
plaintiff has suffered a prior injury, whether to the "same part of
the body" or not, the defendant must introduce expert evidence
demonstrating why the prior injury is relevant to causation,
damages, or some other issue of consequence. This rule applies
unless the trial court, in its discretion, determines that the natures
of the prior and current injuries are such that a lay person can
readily appraise the relationship, if any, between those injuries
without expert assistance.
	We now to apply these principles to the action before us. To
do so, we need not examine every piece of evidence introduced by
defendant. Our review reveals that the trial court erred in allowing
defendant to introduce evidence of plaintiff's prior "neck
problems" and that this alone denied plaintiff a fair trial.
	At trial, both plaintiff and Dr. See testified that the day after
the accident plaintiff complained of pain in his back and his neck.
During defendant's case in chief, defendant introduced medical
records revealing that, when plaintiff was treated for carpal tunnel
syndrome, he told his physical therapist that he had "neck
problems" that were "secondary to playing hockey since he was 6."
Defendant elicited this same information from plaintiff on cross-examination. During closing argument, defendant argued that the
jury should find in favor of defendant in part because of plaintiff's
previous complaints of neck pain.
	Even a cursory review of this evidence reveals that it should
have been excluded. This evidence does not come close to
demonstrating what plaintiff's "neck problems" were, when he
suffered them, or when he last suffered from symptoms. Nothing
about the evidence presented by defendant has any tendency to
make it less likely that defendant caused plaintiff's neck injury or
that defendant caused plaintiff to suffer damages. Without expert
testimony establishing both the nature of plaintiff's prior "neck
problems" as well as the relationship between those prior problems
and plaintiff's current claim, an average juror could not readily
appraise the effect of the prior problems upon plaintiff's current
claim. Consequently, this evidence should have been excluded.
	Because the plaintiff's claim of an injury to his neck was a
significant portion of his claim and because the defense introduced
no other evidence countering plaintiff's claim of a neck injury, we
conclude that this erroneous introduction of evidence prejudiced
plaintiff. Because this conclusion requires a new trial, we need not
address the question of whether the trial court erred in allowing the
introduction of evidence of plaintiff's prior back injury or his
treatment for carpal tunnel syndrome. Instead, we believe that the
trial court on remand is in the best position to address the
admissibility of this evidence under the new standard enunciated
here.
CONCLUSION
	Because the trial court erroneously allowed the admission of
plaintiff's "neck problems," we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded
this cause for a new trial.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
	In this lawsuit, plaintiff alleges that he suffered neck and back
pain which resulted from a car accident with defendant. At trial,
defendant introduced evidence that plaintiff had received treatment
for neck and back pain prior to his current accident. The jury
awarded plaintiff no damages. The majority holds that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff's prior neck and back
pain without foundation testimony first being laid to link the earlier
injuries to those plaintiff allegedly suffered in the current accident.
	By today's decision, the majority rejects the long-established
rule that, without presenting expert medical foundation evidence,
a defendant may introduce evidence of plaintiff's prior injury so
long as that injury is to the same part of plaintiff's body. See Bailey
v. Wilson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 297, 304 (1998); Elliott v. Koch, 200
Ill. App. 3d 1, 15-16 (1990); Elberts v. Nussbaum Trucking, Inc.,
97 Ill. App. 3d 381, 384 (1981); Palsir v. McCorkle, 70 Ill. App.
2d 425, 431 (1966). This is an evidentiary rule of reason and
convenience. The plaintiff, of course, is free to present evidence to
rebut any linkage to the earlier injuries.
	The majority bases its decision on its fear that allowing
evidence of a plaintiff's prior injuries without expert foundation
testimony "invite[s] the jury to speculate on the nexus between the
prior and current injuries." Slip op. at 3. The majority worries that
retaining the same part of the body rule would permit defendants
to introduce evidence of a plaintiff's prior injury " 'without any
further showing of relevance or causation, even if the prior injury
had completely healed and been symptom free for decades.' " Slip
op. at 3, quoting Brown v. Baker, 284 Ill. App. 3d 401, 404-05
(1996). These concerns are unfounded.
	If a prior injury has "completely healed" and the plaintiff has
"been symptom free for decades," the plaintiff has the opportunity
of rebutting defendant's evidence with competent medical
testimony, most likely plaintiff's own treating physician. Unlike the
majority, I am confident that jurors are quite capable of
understanding a plaintiff's argument that his prior injury has "long
since healed" (see slip op. at 3) and is therefore distinguishable
from the injury for which he presently seeks money damages. If, as
the majority also worries, there are medical complexities regarding
the relationship between the prior and current injuries, these
questions are resolvable through the evidentiary and trial processes
which are available to the plaintiff and his doctor. What is at issue
here is an evidentiary question of weight, not admissibility. On that
issue, the majority opinion misses the point. The trial court's
admission of defendant's evidence comports with both common
sense and the long-standing rule to that effect.
	Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.