Case Title: Myron Owens v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S02-0910-CR-429

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Ellen M. O’Connor 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0910-CR-429 
 
MYRON OWENS, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court, No. 49G20-0710-FA-224725 
The Honorable William Young, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0811-CR-1052 
_________________________________ 
 
June 29, 2010 
Boehm, Justice. 
The Indiana habitual offender statute enhances the penalty for crimes by offenders with 
two prior unrelated felony convictions, but counts only certain offenses as prior felonies.  We 
hold that a conspiracy to deal conviction is not equivalent to a dealing conviction for the 
purposes of this statute. 
 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 29 2010, 9:17 am
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Facts and Procedural History 
A confidential informant bought twenty dollars worth of crack cocaine from Myron 
Owens in a controlled buy.  The Indianapolis police maintained audio and visual surveillance of 
the transaction, and arrested Owens at its completion.  Owens refused to comply with the 
officers’ instructions, attempted to eat the cash he was paid for the cocaine, and struggled with 
the officers.  The transaction took place about 955 feet away from Mount Zion Baptist Church 
Daycare Center, which cares for children between the ages of eighteen months and twelve years 
and was open at the time of the buy. 
A jury convicted Owens of Class A felony dealing in cocaine within 1,000 feet of a youth 
program center, Class B felony possession of cocaine, Class D felony escape, Class D felony 
obstruction of justice, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.  The jury also found 
that Owens was a habitual offender.  Owens’s prior felony convictions were a 1995 conviction 
for dealing cocaine, a 1998 conviction for possession of a handgun without a license, and a 2004 
conviction for conspiracy to deal.  The trial court imposed a fifty-year sentence for the 
underlying convictions and added a thirty-year habitual offender enhancement. 
Owens appealed.  In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
conviction for dealing cocaine and obstruction of justice, he argues that he did not have the 
requisite prior convictions to support the jury’s habitual offender finding.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed.  Owens v. State, 911 N.E.2d 18, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  The Court of Appeals held 
that Owens had more than one prior because his conviction for conspiracy to deal cocaine 
qualified as a prior conviction for “dealing cocaine” under the habitual offender statute.  Id. at 
23–26.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed Owens’s habitual offender enhancement.  
We granted transfer. 
Habitual Offender Enhancement 
The Indiana habitual offender statute is codified at Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 
(2004).  Subsection 8(a) provides that the State may seek to enhance a sentence if the defendant 
has accumulated two “prior unrelated felony” convictions.  Subsection 8(b)(3) limits the 
application of this general rule when the instant offense is a drug offense: 
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(b) The state may not seek to have a person sentenced as a habitual offender for a 
felony offense under this section if: 
. . . 
(3) all of the following apply: 
(A) The offense is an offense under IC 16-42-19 [legend or 
prescription drug offenses] or IC 35-48-4 [controlled substances 
offenses]. 
(B) The offense is not listed in section 2(b)(4) of this chapter 
[dealing while possessing a firearm and certain dealing to minors]. 
(C) The total number of unrelated convictions that the person has 
for: 
(i) dealing in or selling a legend drug under IC 16-42-19-
27; 
(ii) dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug (IC 35-48-4-1); 
(iii) dealing in a schedule I, II, III controlled substance (IC 
35-48-4-2); 
(iv) dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance (IC 35-
48-4-3); and 
(v) dealing in a schedule V controlled substance (IC 35-48-
4-4); 
does not exceed one (1). 
Subsection 8(d) provides that a prior conviction meeting the same conditions set out in 
Subsection 8(b)(3) does not count as a “prior unrelated felony” for purposes of Subsection 8(a).  
In other words, if the instant offense falls under Chapter 16-42-19 (legend or prescription drugs) 
or Chapter 35-48-4 (controlled substances) and is not one of those specified in  I.C. 35-50-2-
2(b)(4) (dealing while possessing a firearm or certain dealing to minors), the State may seek to 
enhance the sentence only if defendant has two or more unrelated convictions for a dealing 
offense identified in Subsection 8(b)(3)(C).  Johnican v. State, 804 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004).  Conspiracy to deal is not explicitly set out in Subsection 8(b)(3)(C).  The State 
contends that Owens’s conviction for conspiracy to deal is a conviction for dealing for purposes 
of this subsection.  For the reason explained below, we do not agree that the conspiracy to deal 
cocaine qualifies as a dealing conviction under Subsection 8(b)(3)(C).  We conclude however 
that Owens nonetheless has two unrelated dealing convictions, namely the 1995 dealing 
conviction and the instant dealing conviction. 
Well-settled Indiana law provides that the conspiracy to commit a felony is a distinct 
offense from the contemplated felony.  Lane v. State, 259 Ind. 468, 472, 288 N.E.2d 258, 260 
(1972).  The crime of conspiracy to commit a felony has three elements: “1) the intent to commit 
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a felony, 2) an agreement with another person to commit a felony, and 3) an overt act, performed 
by either the defendant or the person with whom the defendant has entered into the agreement.”  
Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 2000) (citing I.C. § 35-41-5-2).  A conspiracy “is 
complete upon the agreement and the performance of an overt act in furtherance of the 
agreement.”  Smith v. State, 655 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.  The overt 
act need not rise to the level of a “substantial step” required for an attempt to commit the felony.  
Id. at 540 n.12; I.C. § 35-41-5-1.  A defendant may therefore be convicted of a conspiracy to 
commit a felony without committing the felony and without even an attempt to commit it.  See, 
e.g., Edward v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 621 n.2 (Ind. 2001) (finding that defendant’s leaving in 
the car driven by coconspirator the night of the victim’s murder was an overt act in furtherance 
of an agreement); Smith, 655 N.E.2d at 540, 548, (finding that defendant’s giving coconspirator 
the money to purchase a gun was an overt act sufficient for conspiracy to murder); Hopper v. 
State, 539 N.E.2d 944, 946 (Ind. 1989) (finding defendant’s participation in discussions 
regarding trading cocaine for marijuana and giving instructions for where to deliver the 
marijuana was sufficient to establish conspiracy to deal in cocaine); Lynn v. State, 207 Ind. 393, 
399–400, 193 N.E. 380, 383 (1935) (“[T]he offense of conspiracy to commit perjury may be 
committed even though none of the steps which are essential elements of the offense of perjury 
have been taken.”). 
The overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to deal a controlled substance often also 
supports a dealing conviction.  E.g., Derado v. State, 622 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ind. 1993) (delivery 
of the contraband), overruled on other grounds by Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 
1997).  But an overt act that supports a conspiracy conviction may fall short of the possession, 
manufacturing, or delivery of a controlled substance necessary for the underlying offense.  E.g., 
Huff v. State, 443 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding a conspiracy to deal 
conviction where defendant’s arranging of a drug deal with his suppliers did not result in a 
dealing conviction).  Because conspiracy to deal is a separate offense and is not listed along with 
dealing among the nonsuspendable offenses, Huff held that conspiracy to deal is not 
nonsuspendable under I.C. 35-50-2-2.  Id. at 1239.  We agree and find the same reasoning 
applicable here.  More generally, conspiracy was viewed as a lesser crime at common law, and 
most jurisdictions punish a conspiracy less severely than the target offense.  Joshua Dressler, 
Understanding Criminal Law § 29.03[A][1], at 460–61 (4th ed. 2006); Model Penal Code § 5.03 
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cmt. third at 391 (1985).  Penal laws are to be construed strictly.  Merritt v. State, 829 N.E.2d 
472, 475 (Ind. 2005).  We therefore cannot equate conspiracy to deal with the dealing offenses 
found in Subsection 8(b)(3)(C).  In sum, we hold that a conviction for conspiracy to deal is not 
the same as a conviction for dealing for purposes of the general habitual offender enhancement 
statute found in I.C. 35-50-2-8. 
Here, the State alleges that Owens had three prior unrelated felonies: dealing cocaine in 
1995, carrying a handgun without a license in 1998, and conspiracy to deal cocaine in 2004.  Of 
these felonies, only the 1995 dealing conviction under Section 35-48-4-1 is enumerated in 
Subsection 8(b)(3)(C).  The statute exempts specified drug offenses when determining the 
number of felonies for purposes of habitual offender status, but it denies that exemption to those 
with more than one unrelated dealing conviction, whether or not the convictions are prior 
unrelated dealing convictions.  Peoples v. State, __ N.E.2d __, __ (Ind. 2010).  The instant 
dealing conviction together with the 1995 dealing conviction “exceed one” dealing conviction.  
Owens has therefore accumulated two unrelated and enumerated convictions, and Subsection 
8(b) does not prohibit the habitual offender enhancement of Owens’s sentence. 
Owens’s convictions for dealing cocaine and obstruction of justice are summarily 
affirmed.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Conclusion 
Owens’s convictions and sentence are affirmed. 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.