Case Title: STATE v PASCHKE MASON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12687 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - JON WILLIAM PASCHKE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Sandall, Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, Billings, Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, A. Clifford Edwards argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Doris M. Poppler, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Billings, Montana Submitted: September 13, 1974 Decided : OCJ 28 1 s Filed : DCT 2 2 1974 No. 12688 I N T H E SUPRENE C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - JOHN A R N O L D M A S O N , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Sandall, Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, Billings, Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, and A. Clifford Edwards argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Doris M. Poppler, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Billings, Montana Submitted: September 13, 1974 Decided : Filed : J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. These a r e combined appeals from the d i s t r i c t court of Yellowstone County wherein Jon William Paschke and John Arnold Mason were convicted of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Pursuant t o s t i p u l a t i o n of the p a r t i e s a single hearing was held before Judge Brownlee t o present a l l evidence applicable t o defendantsf motions t o suppress evidence o r the ultimate question of g u i l t o r innocence. Defendants appeal, challenging Judge ~ r o w n l e e ' s subsequent dsnial of t h e i r motions t o suppress. Defendants a l l e g e the warrant under which c e r t a i n drugs were seized was invalid; therefore t h a t evidence must be suppressed. Both Paschke and Mason claim the issuing magistrate was not shown s u f f i c i e n t probable cause f o r the issuance of the warrant, They further a l l e g e t h e warrant does not describe the premises t o be searched with s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i t y . Mason a l s o alleged t h a t since he was not named i n the warrant, the search of h i s room w a s not warranted. O n February 25, 1973, an application f o r a search warrant was executed by Richard Brennan, a deputy s h e r i f f of Yellowstone County. This application contained the following sworn statement of f a c t s : "~nformation shows t h a t Jon Paschke l i v e s a t 1930 Mullowney Lane Billings, Montana which i s t h e r e s i - dence of one Sally Johnson. Your a f f i a n t has had reports over the past nine months t h a t Jon Paschke and Sally Johnson have been dealing drugs here i n Billings and on the high line. Both of these individuals and t h e residence a t 1930 Mullowney Lane have been under investigation f o r the past seven months by t h e c i t y - county drug squad. Known drug users and dealers have been observed a t the house. A n informant who has fur- nished r e l i a b l e information i n the past t h a t has led t o drug a r r e s t s , advised within the l a s t 48 hours t h a t he had been contacted by a known drug user who offered t o s e l l h i m dru s t h a t he had obtained from Jon Paschke. This person to18 t h e informant t h a t Paschke would be bringing more drugs i n t o town (Amphetimines, Mescaline, Psilocybin) and he was t o g e t i n t o town on t h e evening of February 24, 1973. Paschke drives a 1970 Ford Van 3-27650. This u n i t was not a t the house on l a s t evening. The Van was observed a t the house (1930 Mullowney Lane) about noon today Feb. 25, 1973. The residence has been checked during the evening and morning. This same in- formation was a l s o received during the l a s t 48 hours from two other sources. I t The application was f i l e d with R. J. Williams, a j u s t i c e of t h e peace, on the same day. Although Deputy Brennan appeared personally before Judge Williams, he contributed no information toward the determination of probable cause other than that contained i n the quoted statement of f a c t s . A warrant bearing t h e caption, "THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f , - vs - JON P A S C H K E and SALLY JOHNSON, ~ e f e n d a n t " was issued the same day. The premises t o be searched were described a s "1930 Mullowney Lane, Billings, Montana. I I The warrant was executed shortly a f t e r i t s issuance. When the o f f i c e r s arrived a t the residence they observed defendant Mason with 8 112 grams of hashish i n h i s possession. Drugs were found a t various locations throughout the house, including a room shared by Mason and another. Paschke and Mason were among a number of persons arrested on the premises a s a r e s u l t of the search. On appeal appellants f i r s t argue t h a t Judge Williams was not presented with s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o s a t i s f y con- s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y requirements f o r the issuance of a search warrant. The record c l e a r l y establishes t h a t t h e only information before Judge Williams was t h a t contained i n the statement of f a c t s heretofore quoted. Our inquiry must therefore be limited t o the four corners of t h a t document. P e t i t i o n of Gray, 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532; S t a t e v. Bentley, 156 Mont. 129, 477 P.2d 345. Appellants would exclude from t h a t statement of f a c t s the information contributed by the anonymous "known drug user". Their objection i s not t h a t such information i s hearsay, o r even t h a t it i s double hearsay, but t h a t the trustworthiness of the known drug user and the information he provided have not been adequately established. It i s c l e a r t h a t probable cause can be based on the hearsay statements of an anonymous informer. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 723; State v. Troglia, 157 Mont. 22, 482 P.2d 143. However, Aguilar requires t h a t underlying circum- stances which support e i t h e r the c r e d i b i l i t y of the hearsay source o r the r e l i a b i l i t y of h i s information must be provided. In t h e a f f i d a v i t under consideration here, two hearsay sources a r e involved- - t h e "informant" and the "known drug user". Since the a f f i d a v i t i d e n t i f i e s the informant a s a source of r e l i a b l e information leading t o drug a r r e s t s i n the past, it i s apparent t h a t t h i s source s a t i s f i e s t h e f i r s t of Aguilar's a l t e r n a t i v e requirements. Appellants concede a s much but chal- lenge the "credentials" of the known drug user since there i s no allegation t h a t he had previously proven t o be r e l i a b l e . The information provided by t h e known drug user was t h a t : ) The known drug user had obtained drugs from Jon Paschke; (2) Paschke would be bringing more drugs i n t o town; and, (3) Paschke would a r r i v e on the evening of February 24, 1973. This information was transmitted t o the informant by the known drug user along with the l a t t e r ' s o f f e r t o s e l l drugs. Since the a f f i d a v i t f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h the known drug user's c r e d i b i l i t y under the f i r s t of Aguilar's t e s t s , it must neces- s a r i l y meet the second t e s t by demonstrating the r e l i a b i l i t y of the information, independent of i t s source. W e find i t s r e l i a b i l i t y t o be amply supported by the f a c t s found i n the statement of facts: (1) the information was provided during an o f f e r t o s e l l drugs t o t h e informer; (2) Paschke's van appeared a t t h e t i m e it was reported t h a t Paschke would return; ( 3 ) Paschke had been reported t o be dealing i n drugs i n Billings over the past nine months, and (4) the same information was verified by two other sources. The circumstances under which information i s supplied can support i t s r e l i a b i l i t y . For example: J u s t i c e White's concurring opinion i n Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 3, 21 L ed 2d 637, pointed out t h a t admissions aglnst i n t e r e s t a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause, even though r e l a t e d through a hearsay source. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L ed 2d 723. In Thompson v . State, 16 Md.App. 560, 298 A . 2 d 458, the court held under circumstances similar to those here that since the seller had no cause to mislead his customer, the very circumstances gave reasonable assurances of trustworthi- ness of the information. On that basis alone the court in Thompscn found that information given by an anonymous seller concerning his source was sufficient to establish probable cause. Here, we have much more. The evidence that the van returned at the time the known drug user said Paschke would arrive tended to verify that information. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L ed 2d 327. The receipt of similar information from two other sources also supported the informations' reliability. As the Court said in Jones v . United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S . Ct. 725, 4 L ed 2d 697: "* * * Corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale * * *." The reports that Paschke had been dealing in drugs in Billings over the past nine months provided further corroboration. We hold that sufficient probable cause was established for the issuance of the search warrant. The warrant issued described the premises to be searched as "1930 Mullowney Lane, Billings, Montana." Appellants urge that this description is insufficient to satisfy the particularity re- quirement of the Fourth Amendment to the constitution of the United States, as well as the requirements of section 95-704(b), R.C.M. 1947. They argue that a mere street address permits too much discretion in the executing officers as to the area to be searched. In Steele v . United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L ed 757, the Court said: "* * * It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. I I I n Steele the Court did not l i m i t the "reasonable e f f o r t " t o a reading of the face of the warrant only. Here, the o f f i c e r making application f o r the warrant had participated i n past sur- veillance of the premises t o be searched, and h i s application spoke only of a c t i v i t i e s i n the "house". He knew the detached garage was not t o be searched under t h e i n i t i a l warrant-- a knowledge borne out by h i s subsequent application f o r a warrant t o search t h a t garage. Under such circumstances, when t h e search actually conducted was limited t o t h e area f o r which probable cause had been demon- s t r a t e d , there i s no t h r e a t t o Fourth Amendment values. S t a t e v. Bisaccia, 58 N . J . 586, 279 A.2d 675. Furthermore, it has been held t h a t a s t r e e t address within a c i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t l y particular. In Re Hollywood Cabaret, 5 F.2d 651 (2nd C i r . 1925); Owens v. Scafati, 273 F.Supp. 428 (D. Mass., 1967), c e r t . den. 391 U.S. 969, 88 S.Ct. 2043, 20 L ed 2d 883. W e find no reason t o hold otherwise here. Finally, Mason urges t h a t the search of h i s room was invalid since no probable cause was demonstrated, nor was he even men- tioned i n the application o r warrant.He suggests S t a t e ex rel. Garris v. Wilson, ,162 Mont. 256- -, 511 P.2d 15, 30 St.Rep. 605, i s controlling. I n Garris we held ~ a r r i s ' constitutional r i g h t of privacy invalidated the search warrant a s t o him. The cases a r e similar i n t h a t appellants i n both were not mentioned i n the warrants o r i n the applications. However the s i m i l a r i t y between the cases ends there. Here, unlike Garris, there i s no evidence t h a t Mason paid r e n t f o r h i s room, o r t h a t he had the use of the room t o the exclusion of a l l others. The record c l e a r l y shows t h a t he shared the room with another. It further shows the o f f i c e r s had been unable t o positively ascertain whether Mason was l i v i n g there and whether he occupied a specific room. Undersuch circumstances we must be guided by the considera- t i o n s which prompted the United States Supreme Court t o say i n United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L ed 2d 684: "* * * the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. * * * A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. 1 I Here, the police had probable cause to believe that drugs were present in a house they knew to be occupied by Paschke and Johnson. Although they knew that Mason had been an occasional guest, their information stopped short of establishing him as an occupant. Under such circumstances the practicality required by the Fourth Amendment has been satisfied. Furthermore, Mason was arrested with drugs in his immediate possession. The search of his room produced more drugs, but he was tried only on a single count of possession of dangerous drugs. Thus the record demonstrates sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction without considering the drugs seized from his room. The district court's denial of all motions to suppress is affirmed. -------------------------------- Justice We Concur: Chief Justice