Case Title: LEONARD LEE HIRSCH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEONARD LEE HIRSCH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 66135 P.3d 586Case Number: No. 05-20Decided: 05/31/2006
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
LEONARD 
LEE HIRSCH,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

                                                                                                

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee (Plaintiff) 
.

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Wade Redmon, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Redmon.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Delicath.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Leonard Lee 
Hirsch (Hirsch) pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the third degree in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i)1(LexisNexis 2005).  Prior to sentencing, he filed a motion 
to withdraw the plea.  The district 
court denied the motion and sentenced Hirsch to a term of thirteen and a half to 
fifteen years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  On appeal, Hirsch seeks reversal of his 
conviction and sentence contending that the district court committed error when 
it: (1) accepted his guilty plea when there was an insufficient factual basis to 
support it; (2) erroneously denied the motion to withdraw his guilty plea given 
the ineffective assistance provided by his trial counsel; (3) sentenced Hirsch 
without requiring a previously ordered psychosexual evaluation; and (4) 
considered uncharged conduct at sentencing.  Finding no errors, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Appellant raises 
the following issues:

 
 

I.                     
Was a 
proper factual basis established, sufficient to permit acceptance of Mr. 
Hirsch's guilty plea, where the district court was presented with no evidence 
that Mr. Hirsch "inflicted" sexual intrusion upon the 
victim?

 
 

II.                   
Did the 
district court err by denying Mr. Hirsch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
based upon his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?

 
 

III.                  
Did the 
district court commit procedural error when it recanted its order for a 
psychosexual evaluation, and when it considered at sentencing alleged crimes for 
which Mr. Hirsch was never charged or convicted?

 
 
The 
State frames the issues as:

 
 

I.                     
Contemporaneous 
to his guilty plea, Appellant admitted that he performed oral sex on his 
twelve-year-old victim.  Did that 
admission provide the factual basis required by Wyoming Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(f)?

 
 

II.                   
The 
trial court denied Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Was that denial an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion?

 
 

III.                  
The 
trial court elected to sentence Appellant without a psychosexual 
evaluation.  Did the court abuse its 
discretion in doing so?

 
 

IV.               
The 
trial court considered Appellant's non-charged conduct in its sentencing 
decision.  Did the court commit 
plain error when it did so?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Hirsch befriended 
his neighbors, including their twelve-year-old daughter, the victim.  Hirsch would allow her to use his 
computer to surf the internet and check her email.  They began a sexual relationship that 
Hirsch alleged was instigated by the victim.  Over a period of months, Hirsch would 
perform oral sex on the victim on a weekly basis.  On at least two occasions, the victim 
performed oral sex on Hirsch.

 
 
[¶4]      On November 17, 
2003, a felony information was filed charging Hirsch with one count of third 
degree sexual assault.  Hirsch 
waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court.  At his arraignment on February 4, 2004, 
Hirsch entered a plea of guilty.  
The district court ordered Hirsch to obtain a psychosexual 
evaluation.

 
 
[¶5]      In March of 2004, 
Hirsch's trial counsel withdrew and new counsel was appointed in April.  On August 3, 2004, Hirsch filed a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea predicated upon a claim that his initial trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when advising him to plead guilty.  On October 13, 2004, the district court 
held a joint hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea and for sentencing.  After hearing argument from counsel, the 
court denied the motion.  Hirsch 
sought to delay sentencing on the basis that he had not yet obtained the ordered 
psychosexual evaluation.  The court 
concluded that an evaluation was not required by law and proceeded to sentence 
Hirsch to a term of thirteen and a half to fifteen years.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 21, 
2004, Hirsch filed a Motion to Re-Sentence claiming that he had received 
inadequate notice of the court's intent to proceed with sentencing during the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.  
The court held a re-sentencing hearing on December 8, 2004, at the 
conclusion of which it re-imposed the same sentence.

 
 
[¶7]      Additional facts 
will be set forth as we address the claims raised by Hirsch in his 
appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

Factual 
Basis for Plea

 
 
[¶8]      In his first 
issue, Hirsch challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis for his 
plea.

 
 
                        
W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) provides:

 
 

Determining 
accuracy of plea.  
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a 
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that 
there is a factual basis for the plea.

 
 
[¶9]      In Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶¶ 9-10, 
85 P.3d 1014, 1017-18 (Wyo. 2004), we said:

 
 
This 
Court reviews the conduct of a hearing in which a guilty plea is entered as a 
whole.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1106 
(Wyo. 
1993).  "Our inquiry determines if 
the district court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including 
the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; 
informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a 
factual basis for the plea."  
Id.  The intent of the procedural 
requirements is to prevent the individual charged with a crime from being misled 
into a waiver of substantial rights.  
Id.  W.R.Cr.P. 11 requires that the district 
court satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the guilty plea before 
accepting such plea.  Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 
(Wyo. 
1998).  A sufficient inquiry 
includes a determination that the defendant understood his conduct, in light of 
the law, to be criminal.  Barnes v. State, 951 P.2d 386, 389 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Rule 11 does not require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually 
guilty nor does it require complete descriptions of the elements in accepting a 
plea.  Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1108-09; see W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b).

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
 The 
trial judge may properly draw inferences from the defendant's admissions or the 
evidence presented by the state to satisfy all elements of the crime to which 
the defendant is pleading guilty. Rude, 851 P.2d  at 
18.

 
 
[¶10]   Hirsch pleaded guilty to 
"inflict[ing] sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen years" while 
being at least four years older than the victim under circumstances not 
constituting first or second degree sexual assault.2  Hirsch contends that the district court 
should not have accepted the plea because the factual basis was not sufficient 
to establish that he "inflicted" sexual intrusion3 on the victim.  Hirsch contends that the statute 
contemplates the use or threat of force by utilizing the verb "inflicts" in 
subsection (a) (i), and the verb "subjects" in subsections 
(a) (ii)-(iii).  Hirsch claims 
that there is nothing in the factual recitation given in support of the plea to 
indicate that force was present here.  
While acknowledging that consent is immaterial under the third degree 
sexual assault statute, Hirsch contends that this situation is different because 
the victim did not merely acquiesce in having sex with him; rather, the victim 
initiated the relationship.  Hirsch 
insists that obliging the victim's request is not sufficient to "inflict4" sexual intrusion.  According to Hirsch, his conduct was 
more properly characterized as a violation of the indecent liberties statute, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 2005).5

 
 
[¶11]   Initially, we note that whether or 
not another statute exists under which the defendant could have arguably been 
charged is an irrelevancy:  "The 
prosecutor is vested with the exclusive power to determine who to charge with a 
crime and with what crime to charge them."  
DeLeon v. State, 896 P.2d 764, 
768 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 417 
(Wyo. 1990)). 

 
 
[¶12]   In the context of circumstances 
prohibited under the third degree sexual assault statute, the distinction Hirsch 
attempts to draw between a situation in which an actor initiates sexual 
relations with a victim and one in which the relationship was initiated by the 
victim, as is alleged here, is one with no legal difference.  "Sexual intercourse is without consent 
when, for any reason, the victim is not in a position to exercise 
independent judgment about the matter."  
Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1258 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis added).  The third degree sexual assault statute 
provides an age of consent of sixteen.  
Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, 
¶ 13, 110 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Wyo. 2005).  As a matter of law, the victim in this 
case had no capacity to consent to the acts Hirsch admitted engaging in with 
her.  No act of hers could 
constitute a defense to the crime charged.

 
 
[¶13]   After entering a guilty plea, 
Hirsch gave the following responses to the district court:

 
 
Court:  Okay.  And you had a young girl who was your 
next-door neighbor.  Was she your 
next-door neighbor?  Tell me about 
your interaction with the young girl on October 16th, 
2003.

 
 
Hirsch:  All right.  I must clarify that it was not on 
October 16th.

 
 
Court:  Okay.  When was it?

 
 
Hirsch:  The best I can remember it was the 10th 
of October.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Court:  Okay. So October 10th of 2003.  And tell me what 
happened.

 
 
Hirsch:  All right.  As usual, she come over to see me, and 
she was on the computer for a little while.

 
 
Court:  And how old is this little 
girl?

 
 
Hirsch:  At that time she was 
12.

 
 
Court:  And you knew she was 
12?

 
 
Hirsch:  Yes, Your Honor, I 
did.

 
 
Court:  Okay.  And so she was at your home working on 
your computer or playing or whatever kids do on computers?

 
 
Hirsch:  She checks her e-mail, and sometimes she 
surfs the web.

 
 
Court:  Okay. And so then what happened?  She's over at your home e-mailing and 
surfing the web, and she's 12 years old, and you know that.  Okay.

 
 
Hirsch:  Yes, Your Honor.  This has been quite often, so this is 
like standard.  She comes over quite 
a bit.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Court:  Was this daily?

 
 
Hirsch:  No, about weekly.

 
 
Court:  Okay.  Okay, then tell me what 
happened.

 
 
Hirsch:  She just told me she wanted some, and we 
went back in the bedroom.  And I 
gave her oral sex, and that's what it was.  
I had no penetration that day or anything; it was oral sex for her and 
her only.

 
 
Court:  What did she say to 
you?

 
 
Hirsch:  Okay.  She just told me she wanted 
some.

 
 
Court:  And you, you know, "I want to have sex 
with you, or I want " I mean, can you remember her exact words?  Or did she just say, "I just want some," 
and you knew what she meant?

 
 
Hirsch: 
 The exact words  uh, I really 
can't remember the exact words.

 
 
Court:  Had she ever said anything like that to 
you before?

 
 
Hirsch:  Yes, Your Honor, she 
has.

 
 
Court:  And you had never done anything 
before?

 
 
Hirsch:  Yes, Your Honor, we 
had.

 
 
Court:  So it wasn't the first 
time?

 
 
Hirsch:  No, Your Honor.

 
 
Court:  Okay. And the affidavit  I mean, that 
is certainly enough  but tell me how old you are.

 
 
Hirsch:  Forty-nine.

 
 
Court:  Okay. And by oral sex  it's called 
cunnilingus.  But you had oral sex 
with her  or she performed oral sex on you? I didn't  

 
 
Hirsch:  No

 
 
Court:  Yes, just tell me.  Tell me.

 
 
Hirsch:  I licked her 
pussy.

 
 
Court:  Okay.  And did you make her perform oral sex on 
you?

 
 
Hirsch:  No.  I never made her do anything.  Everything was what she wanted, and only 
what she wanted.  And if she said 
"yes," it was yes; if she said "no," it was no.  And that's the way it was since I met 
her.

 
 
Court:  Did you ever have intercourse with 
her?

 
 
Hirsch:  No, Your Honor.  To the best of my knowledge, she is 
still a virgin.

 
 
Court:  Did you ever require her to perform oral 
sex on you?

 
 
Hirsch:  I never required it.  She did perform oral sex on me, two 
times.

 
 
Since 
the acts of sexual intrusion Hirsch engaged in with the victim were legally 
non-consensual, a reasonable inference could be drawn from the facts admitted by 
Hirsch that they were "inflicted" on the victim as that term is used in the 
definition proffered by Hirsch.  The 
foregoing admissions by Hirsch established a sufficient factual basis for the 
court to accept the guilty plea.

 
 

Denial 
of Motion to Withdraw Plea

 
 
[¶14]   Hirsch contends that the district 
court erred in denying the motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.

 
 
A 
district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or a plea of nolo 
contendere is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.

 
 
A 
defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to 
the imposition of sentence.  Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 788 
(Wyo. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1984); Ecker 
v. State, 545 P.2d 641, 642 (Wyo. 1976).  The trial court is vested with 
discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
made prior to sentencing, and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the 
withdrawal of the plea so long as the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 were complied 
with at the time the plea was accepted. Kaldwell v. State, 908 P.2d 987, 990 
(Wyo. 1995). 
Even when the defendant provides a plausible or just and fair reason for 
withdrawal of the plea of guilty, the denial of the defendant's motion does not 
amount to an abuse of discretion if the trial court conducted a careful hearing 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11 at which the defendant entered a plea or pleas of 
guilty that was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 
778-79.

 
 

Stout v. 
State, 2001 
WY 114, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 868-69 (Wyo. 
2000)); and see Becker v. State, 2002 
WY 126, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d 94, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002)(for purposes of a review 
such as this, a plea of nolo contendere is functionally equivalent to a guilty 
plea).

 
 
This 
standard of review has been further refined as follows:

 
 
A motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 
32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea is made 
before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a showing by 
the defendant of any fair and just reason.  
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before 
sentence is imposed, and where the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and 
the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of 
guilty, the district court's decision to deny such a motion is within its sound 
discretion. Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 2001).  Seven factors have been suggested as 
pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion: (1) Whether the defendant 
has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government would suffer prejudice; 
(3) whether the defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether 
withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close 
assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and 
voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources. 3 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 2001); 
United 
States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 
(10th Cir. 2000).

 
 

Frame v. 
State, 2001 
WY 72, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 86, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
Furthermore, 
"[t]he findings of fact that led to denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, while the decision to 
deny the motion is reversed only if it constituted an abuse of discretion." 3 
Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 
2003).

 
 

McCard 
v. State, 2003 
WY 142, ¶¶ 6-8, 78 P.3d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶15]   Hirsch does not claim that the 
requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 (LexisNexis 2005) were not followed.  Instead, Hirsch's motion was predicated 
on an allegation that his guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.

 
 
"When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 
(Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 
(Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 
1986).  The reviewing court should 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. 
Herdt, 891 P.2d  at 796; Starr, 888 P.2d  at 1266; Arner, 872 P.2d  at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064; Starr, 888 P.2d  at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 
(Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 
(Wyo. 1986); 
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145. In other 
words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 
appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as 
would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney' and that counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense of [the] case.'  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo. 
1990).  The benchmark for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on 
as having produced a just result.'  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064."

 
 

Doles v. 
State, 2002 
WY 146, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 29, 31-32 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 
33 P.3d 1129, 1134-35 (Wyo. 2001); Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 
18 P.3d 1164, 1168 (Wyo. 2001); and Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 
(Wyo. 2000)).

 
 
[¶16]   In considering the seven factors 
from Frame, we find the first, fifth, 
and sixth to be dispositive and focus our discussion on them.  The first factor asks whether or not the 
defendant has asserted his innocence.  
Hirsch contends that this factor favored granting the motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea because he "admitted only to obliging the victim's requests" and 
"did not consider himself guilty of inflicting' anything upon the victim."  This, of course, is simply a reiteration 
of the claim that we have already rejected.  Hirsch admitted to the conduct charged 
during the investigatory phase in interviews with law enforcement personnel and 
during arraignment when he pleaded guilty.  
At no time in these proceedings did Hirsch ever assert 
innocence.

 
 
[¶17]   The fifth factor asks if close 
attention of counsel was present.  
The basis of Hirsch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was that he was 
not afforded effective assistance of counsel.  Initially, Hirsch argues that a showing 
of ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute a fair and just reason to 
grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea by itself, beyond a showing under the 
Frame factors.  Hirsch admits that some "difficulty" 
exists here in making that showing because, although a claim for ineffective 
assistance formed the basis of his motion to withdraw, it was not argued during 
the hearing on the motion.  Not only 
was the claim not argued during the hearing, Hirsch provided no evidence in 
support of his claim.  At the motion 
hearing, Hirsch did not testify and, despite having subpoenaed his original 
counsel, Hirsch did not call him as a witness.  The burden was on Hirsch to demonstrate 
on the record that his counsel's performance was deficient and that it caused 
prejudice.  Doles, at ¶ 8, 55 P.3d  at 
31-32.  Hirsch failed to make the 
requisite showing and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
failed to grant his motion to withdraw on these grounds.  Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484, 486-87 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 
[¶18]   In a related argument, Hirsch 
contends that even if his ineffective assistance claim does not "constitute an 
independent fair and just reason' for allowing him to withdraw his plea because 
it was not argued at the motion hearing, the claim nevertheless should weigh 
strongly in [his] favor under the fifth factor of the abuse of discretion test 
set forth in Frame."  Hirsch notes that attached to the motion 
to withdraw was a sworn affidavit signed by him attesting to the truth of the 
assertions underlying the claim of ineffective assistance.  Hirsch argues that our decision in Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 
1999), required the district court to accept his statements regarding the 
ineffectiveness of his counsel as true in the absence of any contrary evidence 
presented by the State. 

 
 
[¶19]   Hirsch misinterprets our holding in 
Brock and we conclude that in the 
absence of any evidence of ineffective assistance from trial counsel, the factor 
does not weigh in his favor. 

 
 
[¶20]   In Brock, the defendant entered a guilty 
plea to aggravated assault, three misdemeanor counts of telephone harassment, 
and one misdemeanor count of terroristic threats.  981 P.2d  at 467-68.  After replacing counsel, Brock moved to 
withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.  Brock requested a hearing on the motion 
but the court denied the motion without a hearing concluding that the pleas were 
in compliance with W.R.Cr.P. 11, and that the motion did not articulate 
persuasive or cogent reasons for withdrawal.  Id. 
at 468.  On appeal, we reversed, 
finding that the district court had abused its discretion by denying the motion 
without granting a hearing.  
Id.  We analogized the situation to a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) where all facts 
alleged are accepted as being true and viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, and held that a hearing must be conducted on a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea based upon an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel if the factual assertions, taken as true, would demonstrate that there 
was a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have entered the plea 
except for the presence of the errors of counsel.  Id. 
at 468 -69. 

 
 
[¶21]   The holding in Brock merely requires the district court 
to take the allegations of ineffectiveness as true for the purpose of 
determining whether or not to hold a hearing on the motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea.  It does not absolve a 
defendant of his burden of proving the allegation of ineffective 
assistance.  Since there was a 
hearing on the motion to withdraw in this case, Brock is simply not applicable 
here.  There is "a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" and, in the 
absence of any evidence of ineffective assistance from Hirsch's counsel, we 
decline to presume that this factor favors allowing withdrawal of his 
plea.

 
 
[¶22]   The final Frame factor we must note is the sixth, 
which asks if the original plea was voluntary and knowing.  Hirsch acknowledges that W.R.Cr.P. 11 
was complied with, and our independent review of the transcript confirms that 
the plea was voluntarily and knowingly given. 

 
 
[¶23]   In light of the foregoing, we 
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Hirsch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

 
 

Psychosexual 
Evaluation

 
 
[¶24]   After accepting the guilty plea, 
the district court ordered Hirsch to obtain a psychosexual evaluation by April 
30, 2004.  Pursuant to a request 
from the State, the time for filing the evaluation was extended to June 30, 
2004.  On June 8, 2004, Hirsch filed 
a motion seeking a continuance of sentencing scheduled for June 10 as the 
evaluation had not yet been completed.  
The motion was granted.  At 
sentencing, defense counsel indicated that the evaluation was not completed 
because Hirsch was indigent and requested that he be sent to the StateHospital for evaluation.  The court concluded that the evaluation 
was not required and proceeded to sentence Hirsch.  On appeal, Hirsch contends that the 
district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him without an 
evaluation.

 
 
[¶25]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2) provides, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
(2) 
Report.  The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

(A) 
Information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including 
prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances 
affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or 
in the correctional treatment of the defendant;

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(D) Such 
other information as may be required by the court.

 
 
"The 
plain language of the rule gives the district court judge discretion to include 
any information which may aid him in his task of imposing a fair sentence in 
light of all the available facts without limitation."  Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1292 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
A 
sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the 
defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct 
which offends the public sense of fair play.

 
 

Brower 
v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Smith v. 
State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1997) and Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 
(Wyo. 1996)). 

 
 
[¶26]   In 1987, the Wyoming Legislature 
repealed a series of statutes that provided for, among other things, compulsory 
mental health evaluations of defendants convicted of certain sex offenses prior 
to sentencing.  1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 41, at 69-70.  In Hornacker, we addressed the effect of 
that repeal in the context of a claim by a defendant that the district court had 
abused its discretion by considering a psychosexual 
evaluation.

 
 
Hornecker 
asks us to view the repeal of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 7-13-605 as 
withdrawing judicial authority to order such mental evaluations.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 
7-13-605, repealed in 1987, provided for compulsory mental health evaluations 
for certain enumerated sex offenses prior to sentencing.  [Emphasis in original.] Hornecker argues 
that under the current statutory scheme, mental evaluations can only be ordered 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 12 (where the defendant pleads not guilty by reason [of] 
mental illness [or] deficiency) or Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 through 7-11-307 
(Michie 1997) (where it appears that the defendant is unfit to proceed due to 
mental illness or deficiency).  We 
decline to draw such an inference from the repeal.  The 
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the repeal of mandatory mental 
evaluation statutes, where the legislature has not specifically withdrawn the 
power of the court to order the evaluations, is that the legislature intended to 
make the decision to order an evaluation discretionary.  Therefore, we hold that the repeal of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 7-13-605 did not deprive the courts of their 
power to order mental health evaluations for sentencing purposes pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2).  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Hornecker, 977 P.2d  at 1292.  In a subsequent 
decision, we held that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
proceeded to sentencing without an evaluation:

 
 
Brower 
did not request the evaluation in his motion for continuance, to the probation 
officer during preparation of the presentence investigation report, or at 
sentencing.  He did not claim or 
specify what prejudice would occur in either his continuance motion or during 
the sentencing hearing should the court determine sentence without benefit of 
this information.  On appeal, he 
does not specify or explain the benefit that he would have derived from a sexual 
offender evaluation and what impact it potentially held for the ultimate 
sentencing determination.  Under 
these circumstances, we find no procedural violation of W.R.Cr.P. 32 occurred 
because these showings were not made. We further find that these circumstances 
establish that Brower suffered no prejudice when the district court proceeded 
with sentencing without the evaluation.

 
 

Brower 
v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶27]   Hirsch argues that the district 
court committed a procedural error when it proceeded to sentencing without the 
evaluation that it had previously ordered.  
Hirsch differentiates his situation from Brower by pointing out that he did 
request the evaluation prior to sentencing.  Furthermore, he claims prejudice because 
there was a "significant probability" that a psychosexual evaluation would have 
mitigated any concerns that Hirsch posed a continuing threat to the community 
given that he had no prior sexual offense convictions.

 
 
[¶28]   Our review of the record leads us 
to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Hirsch 
has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  
The order requiring a psychosexual evaluation was issued by the district 
court on February 27, 2004.  The 
deadline for obtaining the evaluation was set for April 30, which was later 
extended to June 30 at the request of the State.  On June 8, 2004, Hirsch sought and 
obtained a continuance of sentencing because the evaluation had not been 
completed.  Sentencing took place on 
October 13, 2004.  At the outset of 
the hearing, Hirsch informed the court that he had been examined by two 
evaluators but they had refused to release any report because he could not pay 
them.  Hirsch then suggested that 
sentencing be postponed and he be sent to the StateHospital to obtain an evaluation.  The problem with Hirsch's argument is 
that the court ordered the evaluation in February; two deadlines passed and 
sentencing was continued in June at Hirsch's request so that an evaluation could 
be completed.  Yet, it was not until 
sentencing was finally held later in October that Hirsch claims for the first 
time that he could not obtain an evaluation because of financial reasons.  Hirsch never filed any objection to the 
requirement that he pay for the evaluation.  Eight months elapsed from the date the 
evaluation was ordered until the sentencing hearing and not once, even in the 
motion seeking to delay sentencing in June filed by Hirsch for the express 
purpose of additional time to obtain the evaluation, was the question of his 
ability to pay for the evaluation brought to the court's attention.  Under these circumstances, we cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion when it decided to proceed with 
sentencing without an evaluation.

 
 
[¶29]   Additionally, Hirsch has failed to 
establish any prejudice arising from the district court's decision.  His claim that there was a "significant 
probability" that an evaluation would have shown little risk of re-offending is 
an inference he derives from his interpretation of selected facts in the 
record.  Similarly, the State points 
to other facts in the record that would support a reasonable inference that 
there is a significant risk of re-offense.  
In short, the views of both parties as to what a psychosexual evaluation 
would reveal are simply speculation.  
The burden, however, is on Hirsch to demonstrate prejudice.  Without any evidence as to what the 
findings of an evaluation would be in the record, he has failed to carry that 
burden and, under these circumstances, we find no procedural violation in 
sentencing.

 
 

Consideration 
of Uncharged Conduct Evidence in Sentencing

 
 
[¶30]   The charge against Hirsch was based 
on a single encounter with the victim occurring on October 10, 2003.  During sentencing, the district court 
considered evidence of a series of similar incidents between Hirsch and the 
victim.  In his final issue, Hirsch 
asks this Court to adopt "offense of conviction" 
sentencing.

 
 
The 
ABA standards 
advocate sentencing for the "offense of conviction," which limits the sentencing 
court to information pertaining strictly to the offense for which the defendant 
is sentenced plus narrowly defined mitigating and aggravating factors.  A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice 
Sentencing 18-3.6 (3d ed. 1994).  A 
"real-offense" sentencing jurisdiction allows the sentencing court to properly 
consider as much information about the defendant as the court finds is relevant 
to the determination of the sentence.  
Id.

 
 

Manes v. 
State, 2004 
WY 70, ¶ 11, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004).  If "offense of conviction" sentencing is 
adopted, Hirsch argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
considering the uncharged conduct and a remand for re-sentencing should be 
ordered.

 
 
[¶31]   Historically, trial courts have 
been granted broad discretion to consider a wide range of factors about the 
defendant and his crimes when imposing sentence.  Manes, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d  at 292 (citing 
Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo. 1993) and Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 477 
(Wyo. 1988)); 
see also Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, 
¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
We will 
not disturb a sentencing decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 
(Wyo. 
1989).  In sentencing, due process 
provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate information.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1117; Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 
(Wyo. 
1989).  On appeal, the defendant 
must demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in sentencing 
to prevail.  Mehring, at 1115.  "However, when no objection is made 
concerning the consideration of a particular factor, review is necessarily 
confined to a search for plain error.  
Plain error, as we have often stated, occurs when the record clearly 
shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which 
adversely affected a substantial right."  
Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Wyo. 1999); see also Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 
(Wyo. 
1997).  Victim impact information 
about other crimes or convictions unrelated to the particular crime for which 
sentence is about to be imposed is permissible.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1116-17. "W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a) specifically permits information about the prior criminal record of the 
defendant and his characteristics to be considered by the trial court before 
imposing sentence.  In evaluating 
character, the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad 
range of reports and information."  
Id.; see also Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 
(Wyo. 
1987).  Evidence of prior criminal 
activity is "highly relevant to the sentencing decision" and may be considered 
by the sentencing court despite the fact that no prosecution or conviction may 
have resulted.  Mehring, at 1117.

 
 

Manes, 
¶ 9, 92 P.3d  at 292. 

 
 
[¶32]   The question of whether or not 
Wyoming should 
adopt "offense of conviction" sentencing was raised by the defendant in Manes.  We declined to consider the matter 
because it was not necessary to resolution of the case.  Manes, ¶ 11, 92 P.3d  at 
292-93.  The same is true of this 
case.  Like the defendant in Manes, Hirsch did not object to 
consideration of the uncharged conduct in the presentence investigation 
report.  This means that application 
of the plain error standard is triggered.  
Hirsch cannot establish the second prong of that test by showing 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  Application of our well-established 
precedent means that Hirsch cannot demonstrate prejudice:  the information considered by the 
district court was accurate and the sentence imposed was within the parameters 
allowed by statute.  Without a 
showing of prejudice, Hirsch is not entitled a new sentencing hearing.  Id. 
¶ 13, 92 P.3d  at 293.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   There being no error, the judgment 
and sentence of the district court is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1§ 6-2-304.  Sexual Assault in the third 
degree.

(a)     
An actor 
commits sexual assault in the third degree, under circumstances not constituting 
sexual assault in the first or second degree:

(i)                   
The actor is 
at least four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim under the age of sixteen (16) years[.]

 
 
  2First degree 
sexual assault occurs when:

 
 

(a)     
Any actor 
who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the first 
degree if:

(i)                   
The actor 
causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably 
calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement;

(ii)                 
The actor 
causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, 
extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim 
reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these 
threats;

(iii)                
The victim 
is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know that the 
victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not consented; 
or

(iv)                
The actor 
knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental 
deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of 
the victim's conduct.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302(LexisNexis 2005).  Sexual 
assault in the second degree occurs under the following 
circumstances:

 
 

(a)     
Any actor 
who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second 
degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

(i)                   
The actor 
causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the future 
against he victim or the victim's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters or 
children, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will execute this 
threat.  "To retaliate" includes 
threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or extreme physical 
pain;

(ii)                 
The actor 
causes submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance by a 
victim of ordinary resolution;

(iii)                
The actor 
administers, or knows that someone else administered to the victim, without the 
prior knowledge or consent of the victim, any substance which substantially 
impairs the victim's power to appraise or control his 
conduct;

(iv)                
The actor 
knows or should reasonably know that the victim submits erroneously believing 
the actor to be the victim's spouse;

(v)                  
At the time 
of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age 
and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the 
victim;

(vi)                
The actor is 
in a position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority 
to cause the victim to submit; or

(vii)               
The actor 
inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or examination of a victim for purposes 
or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical 
practices.

(b)     
A person is 
guilty of sexual assault in the second degree if he subjects another person to 
sexual contact and causes serious bodily injury to the victim under any of the 
circumstances listed in W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or paragraphs (a)(i) 
through (vi) of this section.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303(LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
  3"Sexual 
intrusion" is statutorily defined as:

 
 
(A)  Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part 
of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital or anal 
opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be 
construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; 
or

 
 
(B)  Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or 
anal intercourse with or without emission.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vii)(A) & (B)(LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 
  4Hirsch cites the 
following definition of "inflict:"

 
 
1. to impose as something 
that must be borne or suffered * * *. 2. to impose (anything 
unwelcome)[.]

 
 
Random House 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd Ed.  
For purposes of this opinion, we will accept that 
definition.

 
 
  5That statutory 
provision states, in relevant part:

 
 
Except under 
circumstances constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third degree 
as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony.