Case Title: Com. v. Rice

Citation: 383 A.2d 903, 477 Pa. 221

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
477 Pa. 221 (1978) 383 A.2d 903 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Earl L. RICE, Jr., Appellant (two cases). Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued October 17, 1977. Decided March 23, 1978. Reargument Denied May 16, 1978. *222 *223 John R. Merrick, Defender, Robert Shaffer, Charles M.J. Nester, P.A., Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant. Robert S. Gawthrop, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and PACKEL, JJ. PER CURIAM: The Court being equally divided, the judgments of sentence remain in effect. *224 PACKEL, J., took no part in the decision of this case. O'BRIEN, J., files an opinion in support of affirmance, which EAGEN, C.J., and POMEROY, J., join. ROBERTS, J., files an opinion in support of reversal. MANDERINO, J., files an opinion in support of reversal in which NIX, J., joins. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Earl L. Rice, Jr., was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County of murder of the first degree, robbery, theft, and criminal conspiracy. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, and five to ten years for the robbery conviction. No other sentence was imposed.[1] Appellant appealed the judgment of sentence for murder to this court and the judgment of sentence for robbery to the Superior Court, which certified that appeal to this court. We will begin by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, as we are required to do in a case of murder of the first degree under the Act of February 15, 1870, P.L. 15, § 2, 19 P.S. § 1187. The evidence establishes that in the early morning of September 2, 1973, appellant, who was then seventeen, and David Milburn, another juvenile, observed the victim, Ola Danenberg, walking along the street. During their investigation, the police learned that the victim had been at a club, had had several drinks, and was staggering somewhat. She was carrying a purse containing several hundred dollars. Appellant and Milburn decided to snatch the victim's purse. They waited for her to walk past an alley and then ran toward her from behind. Appellant grabbed the purse as they ran by the victim. The victim spun around, fell and struck her head on the sidewalk, which *225 caused fatal injuries. We must determine whether appellant's action constituted robbery, which in turn will determine whether his felony-murder conviction can be sustained. At the time of the incident, the Crimes Code of 1972, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701, defined robbery as follows: We find that the prosecution in the instant case met the requirement that it prove causation of serious bodily injury or the threat thereof by appellant. It is established that the victim fell and suffered fatal injuries when appellant grabbed her purse. These facts support a finding that appellant caused the fall and as such caused Danenberg's death. The robbery and murder convictions were therefore proper. See Commonwealth v. Farmer, 241 Pa.Super. 373, 361 A.2d 701 (1976). Compare Commonwealth v. Scott, 246 Pa.Super. 58, 369 A.2d 809 (1976). Appellant argues that the court below erred in limiting the scope of voir dire. We do not agree. Appellant submitted twenty-nine questions to be asked during voir dire.[2] The court below permitted eight *226 questions. The prospective jurors were asked whether they knew: 1. The defendant, 2. Witnesses 3. Attorneys 4. Any law enforcement officials. The jurors were also questioned about whether they knew anything about the case, whether they had ever been a victim of a crime, and whether they had previously been jurors. The court further interrogated the prospective jurors as to whether they could render a fair and impartial verdict, follow the instructions of the trial judge, and regard appellant as innocent until proven guilty. The defense was allowed to inquire whether any veniremen would give police testimony more weight and credence than that of non-police testimony. In Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422, 366 A.2d 246 (1976), we stated: *227 Our review of the record reveals that the areas of concern to defense counsel in twenty-nine proffered questions were adequately covered in the voir dire and we find no abuse of discretion. Appellant argues that a statement he gave to the police was erroneously admitted into evidence. Appellant said in the statement that he and Milburn saw the victim walking along the street and staggering, that they decided to snatch her purse, that he grabbed it as they ran past her, and that she fell down. Defense counsel did not move to suppress the statement prior to trial. However, the court held a hearing and ruled on its validity out of the presence of the jury before admitting the statement, pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). It may do so if the interests of justice require. Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(b). Appellant argues that the statement was not given voluntarily and that he did not have the opportunity to consult with an informed adult acting in his interests before giving the statement. Such consultation was required because appellant was a juvenile. Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975). Assuming, arguendo, that the confession was suppressible because of a violation of this court's juvenile confession rules, appellant in the instant case testified at trial to all of the facts contained in his formal confession rendering the error harmless. This court in Commonwealth v. Bridges, 475 Pa. 535, 381 A.2d 125 (1977), in considering the same fact situation as in this case, stated: As in Bridges, there is nothing in this record showing that appellant's decision to testify was "impelled" by the use of his confession. Therefore, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bridges, supra. Appellant next alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in three instances. We do not agree and will discuss each of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel separately. In Com. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604-05, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967), we stated: We have also held that counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise baseless or frivolous issues. Commonwealth v. Rice, 456 Pa. 90, 318 A.2d 705 (1974), and that appellant must be prejudiced by his counsel's action. Moore v. United *229 States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970). With this standard in mind, we will discuss appellant's claims concerning his trial counsel's effectiveness. Appellant's first allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel deals with trial counsel's failure to file a pretrial suppression motion. Appellant was not prejudiced by his defense counsel's failure to file a pretrial suppression motion as the court below interrupted the trial and conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of appellant's confession and its admissibility. See Jackson v. Denno, supra. Appellant's next claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on trial counsel's failure to call him as a witness at the Jackson-Denno hearing, but calling him as a witness at trial. Appellant has not articulated any prejudice to him that resulted from his failure to testify at the Jackson-Denno hearing, nor has he indicated what testimony he would have given at that hearing. Moreover, trial counsel cannot be deemed to be ineffective for putting appellant on the stand at trial. The Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to establish appellant's guilt. It was a rational and reasonable defense strategy to put appellant on the stand. Appellant did not testify to anything that was not already in the record. Appellant's testimony centered on his denial of any intent to harm the victim and on the issue of the voluntariness of his confession. We find that counsel was not ineffective. Appellant's third allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel relates to counsel's failure to object to the portion of the trial judge's charge that instructed the jury that if they found appellant guilty of murder of the first degree, they would retire to the juryroom to determine the penalty. The relevant portion of the charge is: Appellant's complaint is that since the United States Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), abolished the death penalty, the trial judge's charge misled the jury, when he referred to the jury's having to retire after the verdict to determine the penalty. We do not agree that the above-instructions prejudiced appellant. After the verdict of murder of the first degree was returned, the trial judge instructed the jury that the punishment was limited to life imprisonment. Appellant does not allege that the charge tainted the jury's determination of guilt or innocence; therefore, absent any allegation of prejudice, we cannot find that counsel was ineffective in failing to object. See Commonwealth v. Rice, supra, and Moore v. United States, supra. Judgments of sentence affirmed. PACKEL, J., took no part in the decision of this case. EAGEN, C.J., and POMEROY, J., join in this opinion. ROBERTS, Justice. For the fifth time since 1975, this Court refuses to comply with the constitutional principle established in Harrison v. *231 United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968), and holds that introduction of a constitutionally infirm confession is harmless error when the accused subsequently testifies to the facts contained in the confession. See Commonwealth v. Bridges, 475 Pa. 535, 381 A.2d 125 (1977) (Roberts and Manderino, JJ., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Hart, 471 Pa. 271, 370 A.2d 298 (1977) (Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 466 Pa. 332, 353 A.2d 381 (1976) (Nix, J., joined by Manderino, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa. 677, 331 A.2d 193 (1975) (Nix, J., joined by Roberts, J., dissenting). In Harrison, the United States Supreme Court stated: 392 U.S. at 224-25, 88 S. Ct. at 2011. Here, the Commonwealth has not even attempted to show that its illegal action did not induce appellant's testimony. I therefore dissent. MANDERINO, Justice. The opinion in support of affirmance states that even if appellant's confession was improperly admitted into evidence at trial because it was obtained without giving appellant the opportunity to consult with counsel or an informed, interested adult, see Commonwealth v. McCutcheon, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), the error was harmless beyond a *232 reasonable doubt because appellant's trial testimony repeated the substance of the confession. Once again I must disagree with such a result for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Commonwealth v. Bridges, 475 Pa. 535, 381 A.2d 125, 130-31 (1977) (Roberts & Manderino, JJ., dissenting), and the dissents of Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Roberts in Commonwealth v. Hart, 471 Pa. 271, 370 A.2d 298 (1977); see also id. 471 Pa. at 275, 370 A.2d at 300 (Manderino, J., concurring). I would reverse the judgments of sentence and grant appellant a new trial. NIX, J., joins in this opinion in support of reversal. [1] The court did not specify whether the sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. In the absence of such specification, they are to run concurrently. Halderman's Petition, 276 Pa. 1, 119 A. 735 (1923). [2] At the time this case was tried, May, 1974, this Commonwealth had no death penalty. See Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972). The then-applicable Pa.R.Crim.P. 1107 provided discretion in the trial judge to allow individual or collective voir dire. Appellant did not object to collective rather than individual voir dire. Questions 1-11 submitted by defense counsel dealt with personal background, i.e. age, education, marital status and residency. We find no abuse of discretion in not allowing those questions.