Case Title: Catamount Const., Inc. v. Town of Milford

Citation: 121 N.H. 781

Docket Number: 

State: new-hampshire

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Date: 1981-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
121 N.H. 781 (1981) CATAMOUNT CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. TOWN OF MILFORD. No. 80-349. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. September 16, 1981. *782 Wiggin & Nourie, of Manchester, and Snyder, Tepper & Berlin, of Boston, Massachusetts (Gary Ellis Hicks & a. on the brief and Mr. Hicks orally), for the plaintiff. Patrick J. Enright, of Milford, by brief and orally, for the defendant. BROCK, J. In this petition for declaratory judgment (RSA 491:22) the plaintiff, Catamount Construction, Inc., seeks a judicial determination of its obligations under a construction contract with the defendant, Town of Milford. Specifically, the issue is which party must reimburse the Boston & Maine Railroad for the cost of a railroad crossing associated with the construction of a wastewater treatment plant being built by the plaintiff. The Superior Court (Goode, J.) ruled that the plaintiff was obligated to pay the costs of the railroad crossing, and the plaintiff then filed its notice of appeal in this court. For the reasons which follow, we reverse. On July 19, 1979, the parties entered into a construction contract which called for the construction of a wastewater treatment facility and pumping station in Milford. Because of the location of the proposed plant, the construction of a railroad crossing was contemplated, and the contract, therefore, required the plaintiff to "furnish all materials, labor, tools and equipment necessary to install the sewer pipe under the railroad tracks and construct the rubber track" railroad crossing. The trial court found that both parties were aware that the Boston & Maine Railroad would require that its personnel perform the required track work. Moreover, the contract called for the plaintiff to cooperate with the railroad and perform the crossing work "in a manner fully satisfactory" to the railroad. The plaintiff requested the railroad to install the crossing, and the railroad agreed on the condition that it be paid a $25,000 deposit toward actual construction costs. That amount exceeded the contract allowance of $3,200 for the crossing. The plaintiff therefore requested that the defendant town assume all costs for the crossing in excess of that amount. The town took the position that the stated allowance of $3,200 was the total it was required to pay under the contract for the crossing, and it denied the plaintiff's request. Following that decision, the plaintiff filed its petition for a declaratory judgment in the superior court. [1, 2] The proper interpretation of contracts is a question of law. Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). "In reaching the proper interpretation we require that the words and phrases used by the parties be given their common *783 meaning . . . and this court will determine the meaning of the contract based upon the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person." Id. at 611-12, 419 A.2d at 1108. (Citation omitted.) Applying that rule to the facts of this case can result in only one conclusion: the defendant town must bear the entire cost of the railroad crossing. The pertinent portion of the "Stated Allowances" section of the contract provides: (Emphasis added.) [3] The town contends that the "Stated Allowances" section only contemplated the expenses associated with railroad inspectors and railroad flagmen, who were needed to control traffic. We cannot accept such an interpretation because paragraph "H.1" clearly states that the allowance is for "personnel, inspection and other items of expense . . ." for work performed by the railroad in the normal course of construction. In addition, section 1.03 clearly *784 provides that the plaintiff shall be reimbursed if actual costs are greater than the stated allowance. [4] We can find no portion of the contract that can reasonably be interpreted as supporting the town's position. Indeed, the town's position is made even more untenable when the following contract provision is considered: (Emphasis added.) The phrase "any other required activity" is used without limitation; it encompasses all costs associated with work that the railroad determines it must perform. The contract provisions are clear. All costs billed to the plaintiff by the Boston & Maine Railroad for construction of the crossing in question must be paid by the defendant. So ordered; judgment below vacated. DOUGLAS and BATCHELDER, JJ., did not sit; BOIS, J., dissented; the others concurred. BOIS, J., dissenting: I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "no portion of the contract . . . can reasonably be interpreted as supporting the town's position," and, therefore, would reach a different result. Section 02850 of the contract, entitled "Work on Railroad Property", reads in pertinent part: As noted by the majority, there is no doubt that "the contract, *785 therefore, required the plaintiff to `furnish all materials, labor, tools and equipment necessary to install the sewer pipe under the railroad tracks and construct the rubber track' railroad crossing." (Emphasis supplied.) The contract contained further provisions for "stated allowances." Section 00231 contains the following language: The trial court found that: This, of course, would be in direct contravention of Part 1Scope 1.03 which designates the railroad as the ultimate controlling authority for work performed on its property. *786 Section 01020 "STATED ALLOWANCES" in pertinent part provides: The majority rejects the town's contention that the "STATED ALLOWANCES" section of the contract only contemplated expenses for railroad inspectors and railroad flagmen. The majority quotes and emphasizes Part 1.01 H. and 1 of the "STATED ALLOWANCES" portion of the contract, which provides that "Railroad Personnel Expenses" (emphasis added) shall be in the amount of $3,200 and that "[s]tated allowance for railroad work shall be for personnel, inspection and other items of expense billed to the Contractor by the railroads in the normal course of constructing the work on or under railroad property. . . ." They choose to ignore the further explanation of the expenditures contained in section 00141 of the contract which provides in pertinent part: Their reliance on section 4.02 under Part 4 "Measurement and Payment," in my opinion, is misplaced because this section again deals only with stated allowances. *787 The majority concludes that the phrase "other items of expense" embraces the entire cost of constructing the crossing. They cannot and do not explain away the responsibility of the contractor to furnish all materials, labor, tools and equipment imposed by the terms of the contract, nor can they find such clear and concise language but in Part 1Scope 1.01. Accordingly, I conclude, as did the trial court, that the contract language is clear and unambiguous, and that the parties contemplated the inclusion of the cost of constructing the crossing and that "[s]uch a strained and tortured interpretation" as proposed by the plaintiff "has no basis under the terms of this contract." I further wholeheartedly agree with the lower court, which stated: See Mills v. Nashua Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, 433 A.2d 1312 (1981).