Case Title: IDHW v. John Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49375

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2022-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 49375 
 
In the Matter of:   
John Doe I, Jane Doe I, and John Doe II, 
Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, 
 
     Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE (2021-54), 
 
     Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, April 2022 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: August 2, 2022 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County. Ralph L. Savage, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The decision of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Timothy D. French, Office of the Public Defender, Idaho Falls, for appellant, 
John Doe. 
 
Mark V. Withers, Deputy Idaho Attorney General, Idaho Falls, for respondent, 
State of Idaho. 
_____________________ 
 
STEGNER, Justice. 
John Doe (Father) appeals from the magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental 
rights to his three children: John Doe I (age 12), Jane Doe (age 11), and John Doe II (age 7). The 
children and their biological mother (Mother) lived in Idaho when the Idaho Department of Health 
and Welfare (the Department) petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother eventually 
voluntarily stipulated to the termination of her parental rights. Father resided in Tennessee during 
these proceedings and could not be located by the Department for several months. The Department 
amended its original petition in Idaho to establish jurisdiction over Father. The Department then 
moved to obtain authorization to serve the petition on Father by publication in the Tennessee city 
where Father resided. The magistrate court granted the Department’s request. Ultimately, Father 
was located in Tennessee and accepted personal service. The Department then filed a petition 
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seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights. The matter subsequently went to trial. 
Father participated in the termination trial via Zoom from Tennessee. Throughout the 
proceeding, Father’s internet connection proved to be unreliable, and he was repeatedly 
disconnected from the proceeding. Father rejoined the proceeding when the connection was 
reestablished. Father moved to continue the trial because of the connectivity issue, which the 
magistrate court denied, noting that it had given the parties the option of joining the proceedings 
remotely, but that they were required to ensure they had a reliable internet connection. Following 
the trial, the magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights based on the grounds of 
abandonment, neglect, and the inability to discharge parental responsibilities. Father timely 
appealed. For the reasons discussed, we affirm the decision of the magistrate court. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In August of 2020, the Department filed a petition under the Child Protective Act against 
Mother regarding John Doe I, Jane Doe, and John Doe II to remove the children from Mother’s 
custody after locating the family in a mobile home that did not have electricity or running water. 
After unsuccessfully working a case plan and a judicial finding of aggravated circumstances, 
discussed below, Mother stipulated to the termination of her parental rights for her children. At a 
hearing, the magistrate court accepted Mother’s voluntary termination of her parental rights, 
finding that Mother’s consent to termination was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The 
magistrate court then entered its findings, concluding that Mother had neglected the children, was 
unable to discharge her parental responsibilities, and that termination was in the best interests of 
the children. 
Prior to Mother’s stipulation, the Department filed a motion for a finding of aggravated 
circumstances and sought an order suspending visitation and reunification efforts. This motion 
stemmed from allegations by the children of sexual abuse voiced to their foster parents after they 
had been removed from Mother’s care. The allegations were made against Mother, Mother’s 
relatives, and Father, the biological father of John Doe I and John Doe II, and the legal father of 
Jane Doe. Specifically, Mother’s oldest daughter, H.H. (age 16), whose biological father is not 
Father, alleged that Father had been sexually abusing her in Tennessee since she was eight years 
old. The magistrate court concluded that aggravated circumstances could not be determined against 
Father because he had not been served or notified and therefore had no opportunity to respond to 
allegations contained in the motion. Consequently, the magistrate court denied the Department’s 
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motion without prejudice and suggested the Department serve Father and proceed accordingly if 
it sought to terminate his parental rights.  
In the interim, the Department made efforts to locate Father, which were unsuccessful. On 
April 30, 2021, the Department filed a motion to serve Father by publication using a local 
newspaper circulated in Crump, Tennessee, Father’s last known address. The magistrate court 
granted the motion and service by publication was completed. However, on May 27, 2021, Father 
accepted personal service. After he accepted service, the Department filed an amended petition 
under the Child Protective Act to add Father to a previously filed petition which only included 
Mother at the time. The Department then filed a subsequent petition to terminate Father’s parental 
rights.  
The magistrate court scheduled the termination trial to take place on September 24, 2021, 
noting that parties could appear by Zoom “provided [they] ha[d] a reliable internet connection for 
the duration of the trial.” Shortly before trial, the Department filed an amended petition, including 
a more detailed description of the allegations against Father.  
The termination trial took place as scheduled. As the magistrate court was identifying the 
various parties present, both in person and via Zoom, it became apparent that Father, who was 
participating via Zoom from Tennessee, was having connectivity issues. Counsel for Father asked 
the magistrate court if it could make a record of “when the connection is lost and he signs back 
on.” The magistrate court responded to the motion, noting that it had previously cautioned Father 
of the need to have a reliable connection if he chose to appear remotely and the trial proceeded. 
After a preliminary matter was addressed, the magistrate court noted that Father had lost his 
connection again: 
I will note also for the record at this time that [Father] is no longer with us. I don’t 
know when he dropped out again. He’s coming on and off. So we’ll let him in as 
soon as we can. I don’t want to do the yoyo all the time, but I’ll try to let you know 
as soon as he jumps in or when he’s off, but I may not get it all the time. 
 
The Department then presented its case, eliciting testimony from several witnesses. The 
first witness was David Strong, one of H.H.’s counselors, to whom she had disclosed sexual abuse 
by Father. As the Department called its second witness, Father’s counsel inquired of the magistrate 
court whether Father was still connected to the Zoom call. The magistrate court informed counsel 
that Father was not. Father’s counsel then moved for a continuance, which the magistrate court 
denied: “Your motion is denied. He was told he needed to get a good connection prior to, at the 
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pretrial conference. This is a civil proceeding. He does not necessarily have to be present in this 
proceeding. . . . So the [c]ourt will deny the motion. It’s his responsibility.” 
 
The trial proceeded to the remaining witnesses: Officer Patrick Malugen with the Wayne 
County Sherriff’s Office in Tennessee, who investigated H.H.’s allegations of sexual abuse against 
Father; H.H., who recounted her accusations against Father; Spencer Cook, another counselor for 
H.H.; Charles Brown, the Records Manager for the Department of Children’s Services in 
Tennessee; Michael Worley, the biological father of Mother’s youngest child (not subject to this 
case), who helped raise John Doe I, Jane Doe, and John Doe II; J.B., Father’s mother; Kailee 
Jackson, a social worker for the Department; Makayla Gray, another social worker for the 
Department; and Elmer Fleischman, the guardian ad litem appointed for all three children in this 
case. 
 
As Charles Brown was testifying, the Department sought to admit Exhibit 66, which 
consisted of numerous records from the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“Tennessee 
Department”) relating to Father’s children as well as H.H., under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6), 
the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Father objected, arguing that the records 
were prepared as part of an investigation and in anticipation of litigation. The magistrate court 
overruled Father’s objection, finding that the records fell within the parameters of Rule 803(6). 
 
After the Department rested, Father neither testified nor called any witnesses. The 
magistrate court ordered written closing arguments to be filed simultaneously. The magistrate 
court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 8, 2021. The magistrate 
court concluded that the Department had established a prima facie case of abandonment against 
Father, in that he had not seen the three children for well over one year and had not established 
any just cause for his failure. Next, the magistrate court concluded that Father had neglected the 
children due to his instability and unwillingness to provide proper parental care to the children. 
The magistrate court also concluded that Father was unable to discharge his parental 
responsibilities as demonstrated by his untreated substance abuse issues and “pedophilia-like 
characteristics.” Finally, the magistrate court concluded that it was in the best interests of the 
children to terminate Father’s parental rights, citing the risk of further sexual abuse, ongoing drug 
use, and the children’s marked improvement during their time in foster care. Based on these 
findings, the magistrate entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights over John Doe I, Jane 
Doe, and John Doe II. Father timely appealed.  
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II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2005(1), a court may terminate parental 
rights if it finds that doing so is in the best interests of the child and that at least one 
of five grounds for termination is satisfied. The trial court must find that grounds 
for terminating parental rights have been proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
The clear and convincing evidentiary standard is met when there is evidence 
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. 
On appeal, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to determine 
if it was clear and convincing. This Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s 
decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in 
the record to support the decision. Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court 
will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment. 
Matter of Doe I, 166 Idaho 79, 82–83, 454 P.3d 1162, 1165–66 (2019) (quoting Matter of Doe II, 
165 Idaho 199, 202, 443 P.3d 213, 216 (2019)). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Father makes several arguments on appeal. Father first asserts that the magistrate court’s 
judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Next, Father argues that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to continue the termination trial, in admitting Exhibit 66, and in 
granting the Department’s motion for service by publication. Finally, Father argues there was not 
substantial and competent evidence to support terminating his parental rights. 
A. The magistrate court had subject matter jurisdiction. 
Father alleges, for the first time on appeal, that the magistrate court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. Father’s briefing on this issue is inconsequential, as it lacks a cogent argument on this 
point. Nevertheless, because of the fundamental nature of the rights at issue in this case, and the 
importance of a court properly exercising subject matter jurisdiction, we will address the merits. 
See In re Termination of Parental Rts. of Doe, 155 Idaho 896, 902, 318 P.3d 886, 892 (2014) 
(“Parents have a fundamental right to maintain a familial relationship, and to the ‘custody, care 
and control’ of their children; this right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also 
Allen v. Campbell, 169 Idaho 613, 499 P.3d 1103, 1108 (2021) (“A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived.”). 
Idaho Code section 16-2003 confers exclusive jurisdiction in the magistrate court “to hear 
petitions to terminate the parent and child relationship when the child is present in the state.” I.C. 
§ 16-2003. This jurisdiction is exclusive for the life of the case unless the magistrate court consents 
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to a different jurisdiction “in the best interests of the child.” Id. A Department caseworker 
determined that the children were living in Idaho Falls, Idaho, on July 26, 2020. After a Shelter 
Care Hearing, the magistrate court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
children because they “live or were found in the state of Idaho.” The magistrate court did not 
consent to the transfer of jurisdiction at any point during this case. Furthermore, the magistrate 
court also noted its jurisdiction in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate court 
clearly had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2003. Father’s contention 
that the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is without merit and is therefore 
rejected. 
B. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to 
continue. 
Father argues on appeal that the magistrate court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to continue the trial due to Father’s poor internet connection and inability to remain 
connected to the proceeding via Zoom. Father asserts that because he was able to appear via Zoom 
at two pretrial hearings with no connectivity issues, he should not have been held accountable for 
the unreliable connection at the termination trial. In response, the Department argues that it was 
Father’s burden “to ensure his connection was reliable, but he failed to meet his burden.” The 
Department further argues that because Father “chose not to use a reliable connection, chose not 
to testify, and chose not to present any evidence to rebut the witness[’] testimony and exhibits 
presented by IDHW,” he was not prejudiced by the magistrate court’s denial of his motion to 
continue. Finally, the Department asserts that the magistrate court acted within its discretion in 
denying Father’s motion. 
“The decision whether to grant a motion to continue trial is within a trial court’s sound 
discretion.” Int. of Doe I, 166 Idaho 546, 557, 462 P.3d 74, 85 (2020) (quoting In re Doe (2016-
31), 161 Idaho 393, 397, 386 P.3d 916, 920 (2016)) (citation omitted). In determining whether a 
trial court abused its discretion, this Court looks to four factors: whether the trial court “(1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 
163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). 
“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so 
arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances 
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present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the 
time the request is denied.” State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 448, 511 P.2d 263, 
265 (1973) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 
921 (1964)). 
Int. of Doe I, 166 Idaho at 557, 462 P.3d at 85.  
Because court proceedings via Zoom involve new technology implemented as a result of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the due process implications of poor internet connectivity is an issue of 
first impression.1  In one Idaho termination case that also occurred during the pandemic, a mother 
moved to continue her termination trial because she was residing in Georgia, purportedly due to 
the pandemic. Int. of Doe I, 168 Idaho 105, 108, 480 P.3d 143, 146 (Ct. App. 2020). The mother 
alternatively moved to be allowed to appear and testify by video. Id. The magistrate court denied 
the mother’s motion to continue but allowed her to testify by video pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 7.2(a)(2) pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Id. (Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(a)(2) 
provides: “Hearings Allowed. The court may hold hearings by telephone or video teleconference 
on the following: . . . (2) any evidentiary hearing, when no oral testimony is to be introduced at 
the hearing, except the court may allow testimony by video teleconference if the parties 
stipulate[.]”) On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the mother failed to “articulate 
any abuse of discretion, [failed to] identify any factors weighing in favor of continuing the 
termination hearing indefinitely or otherwise, [failed to] assert any due process violation, and 
[failed to] identify any prejudice resulting from the denial of her motion.” Id. at 109, 480 P.3d at 
147. As a result, the Court of Appeals held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying her motion to continue. Id.  
In this case, the magistrate court allowed Father to appear via Zoom since his place of 
residence was Tennessee. Prior to trial, the magistrate court drafted a scheduling order, which 
allowed parties to appear via Zoom “as long as they use a reliable connection that includes their 
appearing via video.” Similarly, the summons sent to Father prior to trial stated: “You are allowed 
                                                 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court issued a number of emergency orders throughout the pandemic modifying court 
procedures. The order in effect at the time of Father’s termination trial provided that “[a]ll trials on a petition to 
terminate parental rights shall be held in person.” Order, September 22, 2021. However, the magistrate court’s 
scheduling order authorized parties located outside of Idaho (i.e., Father) to appear via Zoom: “The trial will be 
conducted in person. However, to the extent any parties or witnesses are appearing from outside the state of Idaho, 
they are authorized to appear via Zoom as long as they use a reliable connection that includes their appearing via 
video.” Father has not challenged his appearance via Zoom other than by appealing the magistrate court’s decision to 
deny his motion to continue. Consequently, Father has forfeited any challenge to the magistrate court’s authorization 
allowing him to appear at the termination trial via Zoom. 
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to appear by Zoom at the trial provided you have a reliable internet connection for the duration of 
the trial.” Father also appeared via Zoom at two pretrial hearings, apparently with no issue.  
On appeal, Father acknowledges that a decision on a motion to continue is within the 
magistrate court’s discretion. Father also sets out the four-part test we articulated in Lunneborg. 
However, Father’s briefing on appeal does not address how the magistrate court abused its 
discretion. Furthermore, Father does not allege any prejudice he sustained as a result of his 
connectivity issues. As noted by the Department, Father chose not to testify or present any 
evidence to rebut the Department’s case. He was also represented by counsel throughout the 
proceeding. Like the mother in Doe I, Father has not specifically asserted prejudice or supporting 
authority that the magistrate court abused its discretion. Consequently, Father has failed to 
establish error on the part of the magistrate court. 
C. The magistrate court did not err in admitting Exhibit 66.  
Father next argues on appeal that the magistrate court erred by admitting Exhibit 66. 
Exhibit 66 consists of 544 pages of records prepared by the Tennessee Department. These records 
were created as a result of 66 referrals and approximately 20 investigations of the family while 
they resided in Tennessee from 2006 to 2018. At trial, the Department sought to admit Exhibit 66 
through Charles Brown, the Records Manager of the Tennessee Department. The Idaho 
Department moved to admit the exhibit. Father’s counsel objected, arguing that it was hearsay and 
did not fall within the business records exception. The magistrate court concluded that Exhibit 66 
was admissible as a business record: 
This is a civil case. It’s not a criminal case. This is similar to a corporation, for 
instance, that would keep records as to investigating various things that occur with 
how they conduct business. . . . In this instance, I understand the records were kept. 
Although I have not had a chance to look at them and maybe if I looked at them, I 
would come to a different conclusion. But this is records of the Department of 
Children’s Services in Tennessee of their activity with regard to these children. So 
that meets the test for it being a regular activity. 
Importantly, in its decision, the magistrate clarified that it was only considering Exhibit 66 
regarding “actions taken by the [Tennessee] Department of Children’s Services and statements of 
[Father] to the investigators.”  
On appeal, Father argues that the “investigative records of the Department of Children’s 
Services in Tennessee are all [prepared] in anticipation of litigation.” 
“This Court reviews challenges to the district court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse 
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of discretion standard.” Phillips v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., 166 Idaho 731, 741, 463 P.3d 365, 
375 (2020). Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides that business records are not subject to the 
rule against hearsay if the following conditions are met: 
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition, 
opinion, or diagnosis if: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information 
transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a 
business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 
902(11) or (12); and 
(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method 
or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
I.R.E. 803(6). 
“This Court has established that ‘[t]he general requirement for admission under I.R.E. 
803(6) is that the document be produced in the ordinary course of business, at or near the time of 
occurrence and not in anticipation of trial.’ ” State v. Cunningham, 164 Idaho 759, 764, 435 P.3d 
539, 544 (2019) (quoting Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC. v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 233, 
395 P.3d 1261, 1266 (2017)). These elements indicate “the degree of trustworthiness necessary to 
justify an exception to the rule against hearsay.” Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 147 
Idaho 813, 815, 215 P.3d 533, 535 (2009)).  
Generally, business records are presumed reliable because (1) businesses 
depend on such records to conduct their own affairs; accordingly, the employees 
who generate them have a strong motive to be accurate; and (2) routine and habitual 
patterns of creation and retention lend reliability to business records. 7 Michael H. 
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803:6 (8th ed. 2018). “More specifically, 
the reliability of business records is supplied by systematic checking, by regularity 
and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business 
in relying upon them, and/or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a 
continuing job or occupation.” Id. However, when a document is created for a 
particular use that lies outside the usual operations of the business—especially 
when that use involves litigation—none of these justifications for admission hold 
true. United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Id.  
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) contains substantially similar language to that of Idaho 
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Rule of Evidence 803(6). See F.R.E. 803(6); I.R.E. 803(6). As noted by Wright & Miller, the 
“exclusion of litigation-minded records can be grounded not in Rule 803(6)(B) and (C)’s 
requirement that the record must be kept and made ‘in the course of a regularly conducted activity,’ 
but rather in Rule 803(6)(E)’s general requirement of trustworthiness.” Wright & Miller, § 6865 
Anticipation of Litigation, 30B FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. (2022 ed.). “Enforcement through 
803(6)(E) would result in case-by-case analysis of a particular record’s trustworthiness. This 
would mean that some trustworthy business records could be admitted under Rule 803(6) even if 
created in a litigation context.” Id.; see also In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of 
E.T., 808 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ind. 2004) (distinguishing between facts observed by social workers 
in routine reporting and opinions on an ultimate issue; discussing the importance of subjecting an 
opining witness to cross-examination). 
The magistrate court did not err in its limited consideration of Exhibit 66. First, and most 
importantly, the magistrate court only considered select portions of the voluminous exhibit. The 
records considered by the magistrate court involved two topics. As noted by the magistrate court, 
it only considered Exhibit 66 for “[1] actions taken by the [Tennessee Department] and [2] 
statements of [Father] to the investigators.” The actions taken by the Tennessee Department were 
imposed by statute. As a result, it was appropriate for the magistrate court to consider them since 
they were presumably trustworthy. The trial judge was not obliged to rely on the Tennessee 
Department’s actions, but he was not precluded from doing so. In addition, the magistrate court 
also limited its consideration of Exhibit 66 to statements made by Father during those 
investigations. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 defines statements of an opposing party as nonhearsay. 
I.R.E. 801(d)(2). As such, the magistrate court was entitled to consider and rely on statements 
attributed to Father. The magistrate court, by narrowing its review of the records to two topics, 
significantly limited the scope of the exhibit. 
Additionally, Charles Brown, the records manager at the Tennessee Department, testified 
at trial that the records contained in Exhibit 66 were prepared in the ordinary course of business of 
the Tennessee Department. Furthermore, Brown testified that the Department utilized “a case 
management system called TFACTS that tracks all our cases. . . . That system has certain rights 
that only allows certain persons, based on their job function, access to the system. It tracks changes 
they make and it’s secure.” A review of the 544-page exhibit itself shows the technical nature of 
the records kept by the Tennessee Department. Each document begins with the case identification 
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number, the case name, the status of the case, and other technical information. There is a place for 
a narrative to be entered that also records who entered the narrative comments and on what date.  
Father has not argued on appeal, nor did he argue at trial, that Exhibit 66 “indicate[s] a lack 
of trustworthiness.” I.R.E. 803(6)(E). Brown’s testimony at trial satisfies the elements of Rule 
803(6) for records of regularly conducted business activity. We note that not all case information 
records will, as a matter of course, be admitted into evidence as business records. However, when 
those records indicate trustworthiness and reliability, such records may be admitted under Rule 
803(6). In this instance, the Tennessee Department’s records have many indicia of reliability and 
trustworthiness. First, Brown testified that the TFACTS system monitored which users could 
access certain files and what changes could be made to those files. Second, a large portion of the 
records contained H.H.’s allegations of sexual abuse by Father. Importantly, H.H. testified at trial 
and was subject to cross-examination. See In re E.T., 808 N.E.2d 639, 644. Third, there is also no 
evidence that these records were created for any special or different purpose than all other records 
created by the Tennessee Department. For these reasons, we conclude that the magistrate court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibit 66 and limiting it in the way that the magistrate court 
did.2   
D. The magistrate court did not err in granting the Department’s motion for service by 
publication. 
After attempting to locate Father for several weeks, the Department moved for service by 
publication. The magistrate court granted the motion and ordered service by publication in The 
Courier, “a newspaper in general circulation in the Crump, Tennessee area.” The publication was 
in circulation from May 6, 2021, through May 13, 2021. On May 27, Father formally accepted 
personal service. 
On appeal, Father argues that the Department failed to exercise due diligence in 
determining his location. Father cites a case describing the parameters of due process but provides 
no argument as to how his due process rights were violated by his being served by publication.  
                                                 
2 Although not necessary for our conclusion that Exhibit 66 was properly admitted, we also note that Father, while 
challenging Exhibit 66’s admission, does not assert that the admission of the records affected his substantial rights. 
See In re Doe, 160 Idaho 154, 165, 369 P.3d 932, 943 (2016) (Horton, J., specially concurring) (“The failure to advance 
argument and authority on the effect of a claimed evidentiary error on a substantial right results in a waiver of the 
claim on appeal.”). 
 
 
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“An issue is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will 
have no practical effect upon the outcome. Mootness also applies when a favorable judicial 
decision would not result in any relief.” Frantz v. Osborn, 167 Idaho 176, 180, 468 P.3d 306, 310 
(2020) (citations and quotations omitted). 
We note that Father’s briefing on appeal lacks any cogent argument regarding service by 
publication. As a result, we decline to address this claim. However, it should also be noted that 
Father’s objection to being served by publication is moot. Father accepted personal service and 
appeared via Zoom at the termination trial. Therefore, Father suffered no prejudice from being 
served by publication prior to his actual acceptance of service. 
E. The magistrate court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights.  
The magistrate court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported termination 
of Father’s parental rights. The magistrate court concluded that three grounds existed to support 
terminating Father’s parental rights. First, the magistrate court concluded that Father had 
abandoned his children by failing to maintain any contact with them for over one year. (By the 
time of trial in September 2021, Father had not had any contact with the children since “mid-
2018.”) Because Father had not provided any “just cause” for why he had not had any contact with 
the children for over one year (actually over three years), the magistrate court concluded that “the 
prima facie burden has been met and it can be concluded that [Father] has abandoned his children.” 
Next, the magistrate court concluded that there was “substantial evidence of neglect in this 
matter which has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.” To support this conclusion, the 
magistrate court pointed to Father’s failure to provide any parental care or financial support to the 
children, Father’s failure to address ongoing substance abuse issues, his multiple periods of 
incarceration, and his failure to maintain stable employment. 
Finally, the magistrate court concluded that Father was unable to discharge his parental 
responsibilities because of his “pedophilia-like characteristics” (the magistrate court had 
previously concluded that Father had sexually abused H.H.) and his failure to address his housing 
situation or lack of financial resources. The magistrate court also concluded that Father’s inability 
to parent “will continue for an indefinite period of time in the future.” 
After finding three grounds to support termination, the magistrate court then concluded 
that termination was in the best interests of the children for several reasons. First, the magistrate 
court noted that “the evidence concerning the best interests of the children is so substantial it is 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that it is in the best interests of these children that [Father’s] parental 
rights be terminated.” To support this conclusion, the magistrate court noted that Father’s “sexual 
tendencies pose an unacceptable risk to the children.” Additionally, the court pointed to Father’s 
previous domestic violence toward family members, his lack of a safe and stable home, and his 
ongoing drug use. The court also acknowledged that the children were “thriving” in their foster 
care placements and that the children’s biological mother’s parental rights had also been 
(voluntarily) terminated. 
On appeal, Father argues that the magistrate court lacked substantial and competent 
evidence to establish grounds for termination. Father disputes each ground upon which the 
magistrate court based its termination: abandonment, neglect, and the inability to discharge his 
parental responsibilities. Father also argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it 
decided that termination was in the best interests of the children. Father’s claims of error will be 
addressed in turn. 
Idaho Code section 16-2005 provides the specific grounds upon which the court may 
terminate a parent’s rights. It provides:  
(1) The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where it finds that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child and that one (1) or 
more of the following conditions exist: 
(a) The parent has abandoned the child. 
(b) The parent has neglected or abused the child. 
(c) The presumptive parent is not the biological parent of the child. 
(d) The parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such 
inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be 
injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child. 
(e) The parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for 
a substantial period of time during the child’s minority. 
I.C. § 16-2005(1)(a)–(e).  
Importantly, at least one ground for termination must be coupled with a finding that 
termination is also in the best interests of the child. Id. “Once a statutory ground for termination 
has been established, the trial court must next determine whether it is in the best interests of the 
child to terminate the parent-child relationship. When considering the best interests of the child, a 
trial court may consider numerous factors.” In re Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015) 
(quoting In re Doe, 157 Idaho 765, 772, 339 P.3d 1169, 1176 (2014)). Some factors the trial court 
14 
may consider include: a “parent’s history with substance abuse, whether the parent has provided 
financial support, the child’s relationship with those currently caring for him or her and whether 
the child has improved under that care, the child’s need for stability and certainty, and the parent’s 
incarceration.” Id. 
1. The magistrate court did not err in concluding that Father abandoned his children. 
Regarding abandonment, Father acknowledges that failing to maintain any contact with a 
child for more than one year without just cause is prima facie evidence of abandonment. However, 
Father asserts that “the burden of persuasion of abandonment remains with the petitioner who 
seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship.” Father next contends that “[w]ithout testimony 
or other evidence specifically providing the court with information that [Father] had actual 
knowledge of the location of his children, there can be no finding of abandonment.”  
In response, the Department points to a myriad of evidence demonstrating that Father 
abandoned the children, including that while the children resided with Father’s mother (their 
paternal grandmother), Father provided no financial support and did not maintain a normal parental 
relationship with the children. Additionally, the Department points to the caseworkers’ testimony 
that Father never visited the children after they moved to Idaho. Finally, the Department notes that 
Father failed to show just cause for abandoning his children and failed to present evidence 
rebutting the prima facie evidence of abandonment.  
 
Idaho Code section 16-2002 provides that abandonment occurs when “the parent has 
willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable 
support or regular personal contact. Failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just 
cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment under this 
section[.]” I.C. § 16-2002(5).  
When a parent fails to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause 
for a period of one year, prima facie evidence of abandonment exists. There is no 
universal standard for what constitutes a normal parental relationship, and whether 
such a relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The 
burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the defendant lacks a 
normal parental relationship with the child and that there is no just cause for the 
failure to maintain such a relationship. If the petitioner is able to meet this burden, 
the defendant then has the burden of production to present evidence of just cause. 
If the magistrate court finds that just cause has not been established, the petitioning 
party has met its burden of persuasion. 
Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 50, 244 P.3d 190, 194 (2010) (citations omitted).  
15 
 
Here, there is substantial and competent evidence that Father abandoned his children. First, 
the magistrate court concluded that Father knew his children had relocated to Idaho. Substantial 
and competent evidence supports that finding. After Mother and the children moved to Idaho and 
were living with Mother’s boyfriend, Father sent a nude photo of himself to Mother’s boyfriend 
via Facebook. Father’s interaction with Mother’s boyfriend, while the family lived in Idaho, 
establishes his knowledge of their whereabouts. Next, it was established at trial that Father had not 
seen the children since spring or summer of 2018, well over three years at the time of trial. (The 
statute only requires that it be over one year.) Further, Father did not attempt to communicate with 
the children via cards, letters, or gifts. The Department demonstrated at trial that Father failed to 
maintain a normal parental relationship with his children for over one year. This constitutes prima 
facie evidence of abandonment. As such, Father was entitled to present evidence that he had just 
cause for his failure to maintain such a relationship. Father did not do so. Father presented no 
evidence at trial, let alone any evidence justifying his lack of parental care or interaction with his 
children for more than two years. As such, the magistrate’s conclusion that there was no just cause 
for Father’s failure to see his children is supported by substantial and competent evidence.  
2. The magistrate court did not err in concluding that Father neglected his children. 
Father next challenges the magistrate court’s conclusion that he neglected his children. 
However, Father’s brief lacks any cogent argument or authority challenging a finding of neglect 
or the facts that the magistrate court relied upon in finding neglect. Instead, Father’s briefing refers 
to the due process rights of parents facing termination of a fundamental right. Father asserts that 
he was “denied due process and a fair hearing under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.” Despite this contention, Father does not describe how his due 
process rights were violated or how such a violation relates to the magistrate court’s finding of 
neglect. 
In response, the Department recounts the various findings of the magistrate court 
supporting neglect, including Father’s near complete abdication of his parental role, his drug use, 
his unwillingness to provide a safe home for the children, and his prior criminal and sexually 
abusive conduct. The Department asserts that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Father neglected his children. 
Neglect is defined in Idaho Code section 16-1602(31) as a child  
(a) Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other 
16 
care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or omission of 
his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them 
[sic]; however, no child whose parent or guardian chooses for such child treatment 
by prayers through spiritual means alone in lieu of medical treatment shall be 
deemed for that reason alone to be neglected or lack parental care necessary for his 
health and well-being, but this subsection shall not prevent the court from acting 
pursuant to section 16-1627, Idaho Code; or 
(b) Whose parent, guardian or other custodian is unable to discharge the 
responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks 
the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being; or 
(c) Who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law; or 
(d) Who is without proper education because of the failure to comply with section 
33-202, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 16-1602(31).  
 
Irrespective of Father’s failure to properly challenge the neglect finding on appeal, we 
nevertheless conclude that the magistrate court did not err in concluding that Father had neglected 
his children. As discussed above, more than ample evidence was presented at trial concerning 
Father’s complete lack of interest in maintaining a normal parental relationship with his children. 
Father never demonstrated an interest in acting as a parental figure to his children, as shown by his 
absence for most of their lives, being in and out of prison or jail, his lack of financial support for 
the children,3 and his continued mental health and substance abuse issues. As such, we conclude 
that the magistrate court’s finding that Father neglected his children was based on substantial and 
competent evidence. 
3. The magistrate court did not err in concluding that Father was unable to discharge 
his parental responsibilities. 
Father also claims that the magistrate court erred when it determined that he was unable to 
discharge his parental responsibilities. Father argues that he was never given the opportunity to 
participate in a case plan with the Department. “Clearly, developing a case plan that allowed 
[Father] to participate and interact with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare would have 
afforded Appellant an opportunity to work for reunification, but it also would have provided the 
                                                 
3 The magistrate court included the following factual finding its order terminating Father’s parental rights: 
[Father] did not send any money to assist the children. However, [Mother] sporadically received 
approximately $40 from the State of Tennessee. It is unclear what this money was for, i.e. child 
support or some kind of support payment because [Father] was incarcerated. When the children 
were with [J.B., their paternal grandmother,] she indicated that [Father] never had money to take 
care of the children. He never came to any of the birthday parties and he did not help with Christmas. 
17 
Department with the opportunity to assess [Father] and his ability to parent.” 
In response, the Department notes that Father failed to engage with the Department even 
after he accepted service. The Department further points out that Father knew his children were in 
Idaho and failed to contact them. Finally, the Department notes that “the grounds for termination 
did not include a failure to comply with a case plan.” “In short,” the Department contends, “a 
parent cannot intentionally abandon his children for years and then surface shortly before the 
termination hearing with an expectation that he will be treated as if he had not abandoned the 
children.” 
It should be noted that the failure to comply with or complete a case plan can be a separate 
ground supporting termination. See I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Importantly here, the magistrate court 
did not rely on such a ground to support termination of Father’s parental rights. Instead, the 
magistrate court based its decision on Father’s “pedophilia-like characteristics,” his financial 
instability, and his failure to address his substance abuse issues. Furthermore, Kailee Jackson, one 
of the caseworkers on Father’s case, testified that the Department does not develop case plans for 
parents. Instead, Jackson testified, “[t]hey’re the ones that develop [a case plan] with us. We can’t 
develop it for them.” Jackson further testified that Father did nothing to develop a case plan with 
her. Mikayla Gray, another caseworker, testified that the Department did not create a case plan 
with Father: “Like I said, communication has not been consistent with him and him being 
responsive to us. We do create case plans with the parents. We can’t create the case plan for them. 
They have to assist.” It is apparent that Father, even once he accepted service, failed to maintain 
regular contact with the Department, let alone enough contact to develop a case plan. The burden 
was on Father, not the Department, to spearhead a reunification case plan; he did not do so.  
Regardless, we conclude that the magistrate court did not err in finding that Father was and 
would be unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. Idaho Code section 16-2005 allows for 
termination upon a finding that “[t]he parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and 
such inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, 
morals or well-being of the child.” I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). The evidence showed, and the magistrate 
court found, that Father had sexually abused H.H. (a half-sister to the children involved in this 
case) for several years, that Father admitted to being a “sexual freak,” and that Father had a 
preference for younger women and girls. As a result, the magistrate court concluded that Father 
posed an unacceptable risk to his three children. Even if Father began to address this, the magistrate 
18 
court concluded that Father’s inability to parent would continue for an indefinite period. We agree 
with the magistrate court’s conclusions. Father’s behavior would certainly be injurious to the 
health and well-being of his children. Further, Father demonstrated no interest in seeking treatment 
or a different living situation that would enable him to adequately care for the children. Therefore, 
the magistrate court’s determination that Father was unable to discharge his parental 
responsibilities is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
4. The magistrate court did not err in concluding that termination of Father’s parental 
rights was in the best interests of the children. 
Finally, Father contends that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it determined 
that termination was in the best interests of the children. The only argument Father advances on 
this point is that the magistrate court relied too heavily on H.H.’s testimony regarding Father’s 
sexual abuse of her. Father points to the fact that H.H. also faced abuse from her mother and that 
her allegations against Father have thus far gone uncharged in Tennessee. 
The Department responds by listing a number of Father’s shortcomings as a parent. 
Specifically, regarding the children’s best interests, the Department notes the children’s need for 
permanency and stability, which Father either cannot or will not provide. The Department 
emphasizes that the children have each improved in foster care and have bonded with their 
respective foster families. The Department argues that the magistrate court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be in the best interests 
of the children to terminate Father’s parental rights. 
A trial court may consider multiple factors in determining whether termination is in the 
best interests of a child. In re Doe, 156 Idaho at 111, 320 P.3d at 1270. The magistrate court set 
forth these factors extensively before concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights was 
in the best interests of the children “beyond a reasonable doubt.” (It should be noted the magistrate 
court found this fact by an even greater standard than that required by statute.) The magistrate 
court acknowledged Father’s reprehensible conduct, including sexual abuse and pedophilic 
predispositions, physical abuse, drug use, as well as his inability to provide a safe and stable home 
and financially provide for his children. These behaviors were established without contradiction 
at trial. The magistrate court’s determination was based on substantial and competent evidence; 
consequently, the magistrate court did not err in concluding that terminating Father’s parental 
rights was in the best interests of the children.  
 
19 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the magistrate court terminating Father’s 
parental rights regarding John Doe I, Jane Doe and John Doe II. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.