Case Title: Dunklin v. Ramsay

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
George H. DUNKLIN Jr., Co-Executor of the
Estate of Hattie Boone Black, Deceased v.
Louis L. RAMSAY Jr., Lester Asher McKinley,
Warren A Jennings Jr., and Georgea Boone
McKinley Greaves, as Co-Executors of the
Estate of Hattie Boone Black, Deceased

96-471                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 28, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- appeal from probate court -- standard of review. -- As
     provided in Ark. Code Ann.  28-1-116 (1987), a right to
     review by the supreme court lies from all probate court
     orders, with a few exceptions; the supreme court reviews
     probate matters de novo but will not reverse the findings of
     the probate judge unless they are clearly erroneous.

2.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- standard of review. -- In an appeal
     from the grant of summary judgment, all of the facts and
     circumstances are viewed in a light most favorable to the
     party against whom judgment was entered.

3.   Statutes -- construction -- words given ordinary and usually accepted
     meaning. -- The first rule in considering the meaning and effect
     of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the
     words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common
     language; when the language of a statute is plain and
     unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory
     construction.

4.   Executors & administrators -- statute mandates that powers given to more
     than two executors be exercised only by joint action of majority. -- The
     supreme court concluded that the plain language of Ark. Code
     Ann.  28-48-104 (1987) clearly mandates that in situations
     where there are more than two executors of a decedent's
     estate, the powers given to them may be exercised only by the
     joint action of a majority of them, unless otherwise provided
     by the will; the language on the face of the statute was
     clear, and thus there was no need for further interpretation.

5.   Wills -- in terrorem clauses held valid. -- Where appellant contended
     that he was deprived of any meaningful opportunity to seek
     interpretation or construction of the will due to the harsh
     repercussions of its in terrorem clause, the supreme court
     concluded that any such deprivation was arranged by the
     decedent herself, not the probate judge; the court has
     previously reviewed such in terrorem clauses and has
     consistently held them valid.        

6.   Executors & administrators -- appellant co-executor lacked standing to
     oppose majority's action and interpretation of will. -- The supreme
     court affirmed the probate court's order finding that
     appellant, in his capacity as co-executor, lacked standing to
     oppose the action of the majority of the executors and the
     majority's interpretation or construction of the decedent's
     will.

     Appeal from Arkansas Probate Court, Southern District; Russell
Rogers, Probate Judge; affirmed.
     Malcolm R. Smith and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: William A.
Waddell, Jr., and J. Lee Brown, for appellant.
     Russell D. Berry and Eichenbaum, Scott, Miller, Liles &
Heister, P.A., for appellees.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     This appeal is from an order of the Arkansas County Probate
Court, Southern District, holding that Appellant George H. Dunklin
Jr., co-executor, did not have standing to challenge the petition
for partial distribution of the estate of Hattie Boone Black, filed
by the majority of the co-executors of the decedent's estate.  This
court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal on the basis that it
presents an issue of first impression requiring us to interpret an
act of the General Assembly.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(17)(i) and
(vi) (as amended by per curiam order July 15, 1996).  We find no
error and affirm the judgment of the probate court.
     The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute.  Miss
Hattie Boone Black died on February 5, 1993, and left as her last
will and testament an instrument dated July 22, 1988, which
nominated and appointed Appellant and all four Appellees, Louis L.
Ramsay Jr., Lester Asher McKinley, Warren A. Jennings Jr., and
Georgea Boone McKinley Greaves, as executors of the estate.  The
will also listed the surviving heirs and devisees of the decedent
as Georgea Oliver McKinley and Elisabeth Black Dunklin, both
sisters of the decedent, and the Hattie Boone Black Testamentary
Trust.  All five of the executors named in the will were
additionally named as trustees of the foregoing testamentary trust,
with three of the five, namely Appellant and Lester Asher McKinley,
both nephews of the decedent, and Georgea Boone McKinley Greaves,
niece of the decedent, being beneficiaries of the trust.  The will
provided that the powers granted to the trustees were to be
exercised by a majority of the trustees entitled to vote with
respect to the particular issue involved.  Additionally, subsection
(h) of Article III of the will included an in terrorem clause,
which provided that any named beneficiary who contested or disputed
the probate of the will would forfeit his or her interest in the
estate.
     On February 8, 1993, the executors filed a petition for
probate of the will, which was granted that same date.  On
November 30, 1994, Appellees filed a petition for partial
distribution of the estate.  Appellant responded to the petition
with an objection to the Appellees' interpretation of Article II of
the decedent's will, which provided in pertinent part:
          I give and bequeath all of my personal property,
     whether tangible or intangible (with the sole exception
     of all common stock in Black, Inc., and in all other
     corporations, owned by me at the time of my death), to my
     sister, Georgea Oliver McKinley.

     In their petition for partial distribution, Appellees stated
that a majority of the co-executors had agreed that this bequest
should be construed to include all tangible and intangible personal
property belonging to the decedent at the time of her death except
for the decedent's stock in Black, Inc., since that was the only
corporation that was owned by the decedent at the time of her
death.  Appellant was the sole dissenter, asserting that the
parenthetical clause included all common stock in Black, Inc., as
well as any other corporations in which the decedent had an
ownership interest.  In other words, the dispute here centers
around the question of whether the reference to the decedent's
ownership in the parenthetical clause applies to her ownership of
any common stock or her ownership in whole of any corporation.
     Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the
probate court to dismiss Appellant's response on the ground that he
had no standing as a co-executor to contest or resist the
construction agreed upon and sought by the majority of the
executors.  Appellees included in their motion a portion of the
interrogatories posed to Appellant in which Appellant indicated
that he was seeking an interpretation or construction of the will
solely in his capacity as co-executor.  
     Appellant responded to the motion by stating that he had
standing to request a construction of the will, as provided in Ark.
Code Ann.  28-26-101(b) (1987), as an "interested person" due to
his status as a fiduciary.  Appellant cites as authority Ark. Code
Ann.  28-1-102(a)(11) (1987), which defines "interested persons"
as including "any heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other
having a property right, interest in, or claim against the estate
being administered, and a fiduciary[.]"
     In their reply, Appellees asserted that Appellant was not
acting as an "interested person," but rather as a co-executor. 
Appellees further argued that as a dissenting co-executor,
Appellant had no power to act contrary to the will of the majority
of the executors pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  28-48-104(a) (1987),
which provides:  
          Unless otherwise provided by will, the powers given
     to two (2) personal representatives may by exercised only
     by their joint action, and powers given to more than two
     (2) personal representatives may be exercised only by the
     joint action of a majority of them.  [Emphasis added.]

     A hearing was held on the motion, and the probate court ruled
that Appellant's objection to the majority's interpretation of the
will was overruled on the basis that a dissenting co-executor has
no standing to object to the majority's actions under existing law. 
This appeal followed.
     As provided in Ark. Code Ann.  28-1-116 (1987), a right to
review by this court lies from all probate court orders, with a few
exceptions not applicable to this case.  Section 28-1-116(a), (b);
In re Guardianship of Vesa, 319 Ark. 574,