Case Title: People v. Stamps

Citation: 

Docket Number: S255843

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM STAMPS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S255843 
 
First Appellate District, Division Four 
A154091 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
17CR010629 
 
 
June 25, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.   
 
1 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
S255843 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement for a specified 
term that included a prior serious felony enhancement (Pen. 
Code, § 667, subd. (a)).  While his appeal was pending, a new 
law went into effect permitting the trial court to strike a serious 
felony enhancement in furtherance of justice (Pen. Code, § 1385, 
subd. (a)), which it was not previously authorized to do.  We hold 
defendant was not required to obtain a certificate of probable 
cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) to claim on appeal that the new law 
applied to him retroactively, and that the new law applies 
because his case is not yet final on appeal.  Although we agree 
with defendant that the matter must be remanded to the trial 
court, we reject his contention that the court is authorized to 
exercise its discretion to strike the enhancement but otherwise 
maintain the plea bargain.  Defendant on remand may seek the 
court’s exercise of discretion, but if the court chooses to strike 
the enhancement, its decision will have consequences to the plea 
agreement.  (See discussion post, at pp. 21-27.)   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Defendant William Stamps was charged with three counts 
of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)).  The 
complaint also alleged two prior first degree burglary 
convictions as serious felonies under the “Three Strikes” law and 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
the serious felony enhancement provision.1  Three state prison 
prior convictions were also alleged.  (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. 
(b).)  Had defendant been convicted of all counts and 
enhancements, he would have been subject to the 25-years-to-
life provisions of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, 
subd. 
(c)(2)) 
along 
with 
any 
applicable 
fixed-term 
enhancements.   
In November 2017, pursuant to negotiation, defendant 
pled to one first degree burglary and admitted one serious felony 
conviction in exchange for a nine-year prison sentence, based on 
the low term for burglary (two years), doubled under the Three 
Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus five years 
for the serious felony enhancement.  All remaining counts and 
allegations were dismissed on motion of the district attorney as 
part of the plea agreement.  Defendant was sentenced in 
January 2018, subsequently filed a notice of appeal, and sought 
a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 8.304(b)), which the trial court denied.   
On September 30, 2018, the governor approved Senate Bill 
No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393) allowing a 
trial court to dismiss a serious felony enhancement in 
furtherance of justice.2  After the law was signed but before it 
became effective on January 1, 2019, defendant filed an opening 
brief in the Court of Appeal.  He raised a single claim that, in 
light of Senate Bill 1393, his case should be remanded to the 
trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the serious 
felony enhancement.  The Attorney General countered that 
                                        
1  
(See Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (a)(1), (4), 1170.12, subds. 
(b)(1), (c)(2), 1192.7, subd. (c)(18).)   
2  
(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1 & 2.)   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
defendant’s appeal was not cognizable because he failed to 
obtain a certificate of probable cause.  The Court of Appeal 
concluded a certificate was not required and Senate Bill 1393 
applied retroactively to defendant.  It then remanded, 
permitting the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to 
strike the enhancement.3  (People v. Stamps, supra, 34 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 120-124; see discussion post.)  We agree on 
the certificate question but modify the remand order.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  A Certificate of Probable Cause Was Not Required 
Generally, a defendant may appeal “from a final judgment 
of conviction.”  (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (a).)  However, if the 
judgment resulted from a guilty or no contest plea, Penal Code4 
section 1237.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), provide that no appeal 
may be taken unless “[t]he defendant has filed with the trial 
court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of 
perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or 
other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings,” and the 
court “has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for 
                                        
3  
The Court of Appeal concluded:  “In exercising its 
discretion, the trial court is not precluded from considering 
whether doing so would be incompatible with the agreement on 
which defendant’s plea was based.  If the trial court strikes the 
enhancement, it shall resentence defendant.  In selecting an 
appropriate sentence, the court retains its full sentencing 
discretion except that it may not impose a term in excess of the 
negotiated nine years without providing defendant the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea.  [Citation.]  If the trial court 
does not strike the enhancement, it shall reinstate the 
sentence.”  (People v. Stamps (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 117, 124.)   
4  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless noted.   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
such appeal with the clerk of the court.”  “[S]ection 1237.5 
admits of this exception:  The defendant may take an appeal 
without a statement of certificate grounds or a certificate of 
probable cause if he does so solely on noncertificate grounds, 
which go to postplea matters not challenging his plea’s validity 
and/or matters involving a search or seizure whose lawfulness 
was contested pursuant to section 1538.5.”  (People v. Mendez 
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 68, 74 (Panizzon); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.304(b)(4).)  A certificate of probable cause functions to 
discourage frivolous appeals following a guilty or no contest 
plea.  It promotes judicial economy by screening out baseless 
postplea appeals before time and money are spent on record 
preparation, briefing and appellate review.  (See Panizzon, at 
pp. 75-76.)   
“It has long been established that issues going to the 
validity of a plea require” a certificate of probable cause.  
(Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 76.)  “Even when a defendant 
purports 
to 
challenge 
only 
the 
sentence 
imposed, 
a 
certificate . . . is required if the challenge goes to an aspect of the 
sentence to which the defendant agreed as an integral part of a 
plea agreement.”  (People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 678 
(Johnson).)  “[T]he critical inquiry is whether a challenge to the 
sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, 
thus rendering the appeal subject to the [certificate] 
requirements of section 1237.5.”  (Panizzon, at p. 76.)   
We have stated in a different context that “a challenge to 
a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain is 
properly viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself.”  
(Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 79.)  This characterization was 
correct in its context, but it is not universally applicable.  
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
Panizzon’s claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual 
attacked the validity of his plea because “the sentence defendant 
received was part and parcel of the plea agreement he 
negotiated with the People.”  (Id. at p. 78.)  In so concluding, we 
rejected the defendant’s argument that “his claim of error, i.e., 
that the bargained sentence is unconstitutional when compared 
to the sentences of his codefendants, is based on events that 
occurred after the no contest plea was entered.”  (Ibid.)  The 
circumstance that Panizzon’s codefendants were later sentenced 
to lesser terms merely bolstered his essential claim that the 
sentence agreed to in the plea bargain was constitutionally 
defective at the time the agreement was made.  As Panizzon 
reasoned, “the essence of defendant’s claim is that his sentence 
is disproportionate to his level of culpability [citation], a factor 
that also was known at the time of the plea and waiver.  Thus, 
the real thrust of defendant’s claim concerns events predating 
entry of the plea and waiver.”  (Id. at p. 86.)  Such an argument 
attacks the plea itself.   
Similarly, we held that a claim the trial court violated the 
multiple punishment ban of section 654 constituted an attack on 
the plea where the court imposed the maximum term agreed 
upon by the parties:  “[T]he specification of a maximum sentence 
or lid in a plea agreement normally implies a mutual 
understanding of the defendant and the prosecutor that the 
specified maximum term is one that the trial court may lawfully 
impose and also a mutual understanding that, absent the 
agreement for the lid, the trial court might lawfully impose an 
even longer term.”  (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 768; 
see also People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379-384 
(Cuevas).)  Again, Shelton sought to attack the plea bargain as 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
defective when it was made because it permitted a sentence 
prohibited by statute.   
These cases teach that when the parties reach an 
agreement in the context of existing law, a claim that seeks to 
avoid a term of the agreement, as made, is an attack on the plea 
itself.  They do not, however, address the nature of a challenge 
based, not upon existing law, but on a subsequent change in the 
law.  Defendant’s appellate claim here relies on the principle 
that “the general rule in California is that plea agreements are 
deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend 
the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in 
pursuance of public policy.”  (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 
71.)  “That the parties enter into a plea agreement thus does not 
have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that 
the Legislature has intended to apply to them” (id. at p. 66), and 
“[i]t follows . . . that requiring the parties’ compliance with 
changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the 
terms of the plea agreement” (id. at p. 73).  (See Harris v. 
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 990-991; see discussion 
post.)   
Defendant argues that a certificate of probable cause was 
not required because he is not challenging the validity of his 
plea.  Rather, he is seeking retroactive application of a 
subsequently enacted ameliorative provision, which he contends 
has been incorporated into his plea agreement.  We agree 
defendant was not required to obtain a certificate.  His appellate 
claim does not constitute an attack on the validity of his plea 
because the claim does not challenge his plea as defective when 
made.  We separately discuss the retroactivity and remedy 
questions post.   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
As discussed, a claim that seeks to avoid a term of a plea 
agreement can constitute an attack on the validity of the plea 
itself, necessitating a certificate of probable cause.  “Exempt 
from this certificate requirement are postplea claims, including 
sentencing issues, that do not challenge the validity of the plea.”  
(Cuevas, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 379.)  Whether an appeal 
challenges the validity of the plea itself, requiring a certificate, 
or seeks merely to correct alleged postplea error can be a 
nuanced question.  Defendants who lack a required certificate 
may structure their appellate arguments to try and obviate the 
need for one.   
In People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55 (Ribero), the 
defendant sought to withdraw his plea, arguing he was misled 
by counsel as to the sentence he would receive.  He then 
appealed from the denial of that motion.  In Johnson, supra, 47 
Cal.4th 668, the defendant claimed on appeal his counsel was 
ineffective for not supporting his unsuccessful attempt to 
withdraw a plea.  Neither Ribero nor Johnson had obtained a 
certificate of probable cause and asserted one was not necessary 
because they were not attacking the validity of their plea but 
seeking instead review of postplea error.  Those arguments were 
rejected based on the facts of the cases.  In each case, the essence 
of the defendants’ argument was that his initial plea was 
invalid.  As the Ribero court explained:  “[T]he crucial issue is 
what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner in 
which the challenge is made. . . .  If a defendant challenges the 
validity of his plea by way of a motion to withdraw the plea, he 
cannot avoid the [certificate] requirements . . . by labelling the 
denial of the motion as an error in a proceeding subsequent to 
the plea.”  (Ribero, at pp. 63-64.)   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
In Ribero and Johnson, a certificate was required because 
the defendants were arguing their pleas were defective when 
made.  Their subsequent motions to withdraw those pleas rested 
on the argument that the plea itself was invalid.  The timing of 
their motions did not change the fact that the motions, the 
denial of which they sought to appeal, challenged the underlying 
integrity of the pleas themselves.  Under Ribero and Johnson, 
courts should look to the substance of a defendant’s claim and 
not to whether it is labeled a postplea or sentencing issue.  (See 
Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 681; Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 
p. 63.)   
Several cases serve to clarify the rule by way of distinction.  
They provide examples in which the appeal does not attack the 
validity of the plea itself but is properly understood as an appeal 
from a postplea decision.   
In People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 (French), the 
defendant was charged with 12 counts of lewd act with a child 
under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)).  If convicted on all counts, he faced a 
maximum sentence of 180 years to life.  He pled no contest to six 
counts as part of a plea agreement, and six counts were 
dismissed.  The parties agreed that the maximum sentence 
would be 18 years.  At sentencing, the court imposed that term, 
finding the aggravated term of eight years was called for in one 
of the counts and imposing an additional, consecutive, one-third 
of the midterm of two years for each of the remaining five counts.  
The trial court selected the upper term for one count because it 
found a circumstance in aggravation had been established.  
(French, at pp. 41-43.)   
At the time of French’s plea, the determination of whether 
aggravating factors supported a sentence above the midterm 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
was left to the discretion of the trial court.  After entry of the 
plea, United States Supreme Court cases held that a defendant 
has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, facts supporting an “exceptional sentence.”  
(Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303; see United 
States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 244; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584, 609; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
481-484; French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 48.)  In Cunningham v. 
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, the high court concluded that, 
under California’s determinate sentencing scheme (§ 1170), a 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury, not a 
judge, determine facts supporting an upper term sentence.  
(Cunningham, at pp. 288-294.)  French appealed the court’s 
imposition of the upper term based on its finding of aggravated 
circumstances.  He did not, however, secure a section 1237.5 
certificate.  This court held that the certificate was not required.  
The unanimous opinion reviewed holdings in Panizzon and 
Shelton and contrasted them to the outcome in People v. 
Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773 (Buttram).  (French, at pp. 44-
46.)   
Buttram was charged with felony possession of heroin and 
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 
11378), along with two prior strikes and serious felony 
convictions.  As charged, he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence.  He 
pled guilty in return for a promise that his maximum sentence 
would not exceed six years.  At sentencing, the defense argued 
against a prison term and urged instead that Buttram should be 
sent to a drug treatment program.  The court weighed the 
sentencing options on the record, dismissed one strike and 
sentenced Buttram to two concurrent six-year terms.  (Buttram, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 777-779.)  He appealed, without a 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
section 1237.5 certificate, arguing that the court abused its 
discretion in imposing a prison term rather than requiring drug 
treatment.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, 
concluding it was an attack on the validity of the plea, but the 
Buttram majority reversed.  It explained that the defendant was 
not attacking the validity of the plea as entered but only the 
court’s postplea exercise of its sentencing discretion.  It noted 
long-standing precedent that “where the terms of the plea 
agreement leave issues open for resolution by litigation, 
appellate claims arising within the scope of that litigation do not 
attack the validity of the plea, and thus do not require a 
certificate of probable cause.”  (Buttram, at p. 783, citing People 
v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576.)   
We concluded in French that the defendant’s challenge 
there was similar to Buttram’s.  It did not assert that the plea 
was invalid but, instead, that independent irregularities at his 
sentencing hearing required reversal of that sentence.5  (French, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 45.)   
Like Buttram and French, Stamps does not seek to put 
aside or withdraw his plea.  He does not urge that his plea was 
invalid when made.  Instead, he seeks relief because the law 
subsequently changed to his potential benefit.  His appeal, then, 
does not attack the plea itself and does not require a certificate 
                                        
5  
Nonsentencing cases, like People v. Vera (2004) 122 
Cal.App.4th 970, also help clarify the distinction.  Vera 
concluded a challenge to the court’s denial of a postplea Marsden 
(People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) motion did not require 
a certificate:  “We regard the issue of whether defendant 
currently needed a new attorney [at sentencing] as a postplea 
issue not essentially implicating the validity of the no contest 
plea.”  (Vera, at p. 978.)   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
of probable cause.  We turn now to the merits of his retroactivity 
claim and the proper remedy.   
B.  Senate Bill 1393 Applies Retroactively 
Defendant argues that Senate Bill 1393 applies 
retroactively to his plea bargain and requires a remand to the 
trial court to consider striking the serious felony enhancement.  
“It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate 
prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or 
a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, 
intended otherwise.”  (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
282, 287; see People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 845.)  
The Penal Code provides that “[n]o part of it is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared.”  (§ 3.)   
Defendant acknowledges that Senate Bill 1393 contained 
no provision regarding retroactive application but relies on our 
decision in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.  Estrada 
considered the retroactive application of a statutory amendment 
that lessened punishment, identifying the issue as “one of trying 
to ascertain the legislative intent—did the Legislature intend 
the old or new statute to apply?  Had the Legislature expressly 
stated which statute should apply, its determination, either 
way, would have been legal and constitutional.”  (Id. at p. 744.)  
Estrada concluded that, if no contrary indication exists, “When 
the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment 
it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty 
was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as 
punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.  It is an 
inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended 
that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
constitutionally could apply.  The amendatory act imposing the 
lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts 
committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting 
the defendant of the act is not final.”  (Id. at p. 745.)  “The 
Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a 
savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear 
intention concerning any retroactive effect, ‘a legislative body 
ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law 
to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as 
necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that 
are not.’ ”  (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 881, quoting 
People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657.)   
We agree with defendant that, under Estrada, Senate Bill 
1393 applies to his case retroactively because his judgment is 
not yet final.  Eliminating the prior restriction on the court’s 
ability to strike a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of 
justice constitutes an ameliorative change within the meaning 
of Estrada.  (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
299, 308-309.)  The Attorney General does not argue otherwise.   
C.  The Proper Remedy 
1.  Defendant’s Proposed Remedy 
Defendant contends the proper remedy is to remand to the 
trial court to consider striking the serious felony enhancement 
while otherwise maintaining the plea agreement intact.  We 
disagree.  The Estrada rule only answers the question of 
whether an amended statute should be applied retroactively.  It 
does not answer the question of how that statute should be 
applied.  Section 1385, subdivision (a) states in part that “[t]he 
judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon 
the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
of justice, order an action to be dismissed.”  Section 1385, 
subdivision (b)(1) provides that if a court “has the authority 
pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, 
the court may instead strike the additional punishment for that 
enhancement in the furtherance of justice . . . .”  As noted, 
Senate Bill 1393 removed provisions that prohibited a trial 
court from striking a serious felony enhancement in furtherance 
of justice under section 1385.   
If defendant stood convicted of a crime with an enhancing 
prior as a result of trial or an open plea of guilty as charged, his 
case could be remanded for the court to reconsider its sentence 
in light of its newly conferred authority to strike the 
enhancement.  This case is procedurally different because both 
parties entered a plea agreement for a specific prison term.   
Even when applicable, section 1385 ordinarily does not 
authorize a trial court to exercise its discretion to strike in 
contravention of a plea bargain for a specified term.  Section 
1192.5 allows a plea to “specify the punishment” and “the 
exercise by the court thereafter of other powers legally available 
to it,” and “[w]here the plea is accepted by the prosecuting 
attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the 
defendant, except as otherwise provided in this section, cannot 
be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that 
specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea 
other than as specified in the plea.”  (Italics added.)   
People v. Cunningham (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1044 
addressed an analogous issue.  There, the defendant claimed on 
appeal that his case should be remanded to allow the court to 
consider striking his prior strike conviction.  People v. Superior 
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, which was decided after 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
Cunningham’s plea, clarified that a court retained such 
discretion under section 1385.  (Romero, at pp. 529-530.)  
Cunningham declined to permit a remand for a sentence in 
contravention to the plea bargain:  “Here, defendant stipulated 
that he would be sentenced to the 32-month term imposed by 
the court.  Defendant cites no authority, nor have we found any, 
allowing a trial court to breach the bargain by striking the prior 
to impose less than the 32 months agreed upon.  ‘While no 
bargain or agreement can divest the court of the sentencing 
discretion it inherently possesses [citation], a judge who has 
accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within 
the limits of that bargain.  [Citation.]  “A plea agreement is, in 
essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to 
which the court consents to be bound.”  [Citations.]  Should the 
court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is 
to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.  [Citation.]  
Once the court has accepted the terms of the negotiated plea, 
“[it] lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a plea bargain so that 
it becomes more favorable to a defendant unless, of course, the 
parties agree.” ’ ”  (Cunningham, at p. 1047.)   
Even applying section 1385 as amended, long-standing 
law limits the court’s unilateral authority to strike an 
enhancement yet maintain other provisions of the plea bargain.  
“Some potential for confusion appears in broad statements to 
the effect that once a trial court has ‘accepted’ a plea bargain, it 
too is ‘bound’ by it. . . .  Taken out of context, they might suggest 
that the court surrenders its sentencing discretion the moment 
it accepts a negotiated plea.  Such a view is of course 
irreconcilable 
with 
the 
statute 
and 
cases . . . . 
 
The 
statements . . . are best understood as only prohibiting the court 
from unilaterally modifying the terms of the bargain without 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
affording . . . an opportunity to the aggrieved party to rescind 
the plea agreement and resume proceedings where they left off.”  
(People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1361 (Kim).)   
Thus, it is not enough for defendant to establish that the 
amended section 1385 applies to him retroactively under 
Estrada in order to receive the remedy he seeks.  In order to 
justify a remand for the court to consider striking his serious 
felony enhancement while maintaining the remainder of his 
bargain, defendant must establish not only that Senate Bill 
1393 applies retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision, 
the Legislature intended to overturn long-standing law that a 
court cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term by 
striking portions of it under section 1385.  We are not persuaded 
that the Legislature intended this result.   
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained that Senate 
Bill 1393 “would delete the restriction prohibiting a judge from 
striking a prior serious felony conviction in connection with 
imposition of the 5-year enhancement described above and 
would make conforming changes.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. 
Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).)  The author of the bill 
explained it was necessary because “ ‘[n]early every sentence 
enhancement in California can be dismissed at the time of 
sentencing if the judge finds that doing so would serve the 
interest of justice.  However, under existing law people with 
current and prior serious felony convictions receive a mandatory 
five-year enhancement. . . .  This has resulted in mandatory 
additional terms for thousands of individuals incarcerated 
throughout California’s prisons.  This rigid and arbitrary system 
has meted out punishments that are disproportionate to the 
offense, which does not serve the interests of justice, public 
safety, or communities.’ ”  (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 9, 2018, pp. 1-2.)  The author urged that 
“ ‘[a]llowing judicial discretion is consistent with other sentence 
enhancement laws and retains existing penalties for serious 
crimes.’ ”  (Id. at p. 2.)  As defendant observes, the Assembly 
Committee on Public Safety cited statistics showing that “as of 
September 2016, 79.9% of prisoners . . . had some kind of 
sentence enhancement; 25.5% had three or more.”  (Id. at pp. 3-
4.)  Another analysis suggested a prison cost savings of $15 
million over five years if “100 defendants annually have the five-
year 
enhancement 
struck . . . .” 
 
(Assem. 
Com. 
on 
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 9, 2018, p. 1.)   
Defendant argues “[t]he legislative history therefore 
demonstrates that the Legislature’s intent in enacting SB 1393 
was to reduce prison overcrowding, save money, and achieve a 
more just, individualized sentencing scheme.”  The Legislature 
may have intended to modify the sentencing scheme, but the 
legislative history does not demonstrate any intent to overturn 
existing law regarding a court’s lack of authority to unilaterally 
modify a plea agreement.  Indeed, none of the legislative history 
materials mention plea agreements at all.  What legislative 
intent can be discerned runs counter to defendant’s position.  As 
described, Senate Bill 1393 was intended to bring a court’s 
discretion to strike a five-year serious felony enhancement in 
line with the court’s general discretion to strike other 
enhancements.  Thus, the Legislature gave a court the same 
discretion to strike a serious felony enhancement that it retains 
to strike any other sentence enhancing provision.  Its action did 
not operate to change well-settled law that a court lacks 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
discretion to modify a plea agreement unless the parties agree 
to the modification.   
Defendant relies on Harris v. Superior Court, supra, 1 
Cal.5th 984 (Harris).  Harris pled to felony grand theft (§ 487, 
subd. (c)) and admitted a prior robbery conviction in exchange 
for a six-year prison term and dismissal of a robbery count.  
(Harris, at pp. 987-988.)  After passage of Proposition 47, which 
“reduced certain nonviolent crimes, including the grand theft 
from the person conviction in this case, from felonies to 
misdemeanors” (Harris, at p. 988), defendant petitioned to have 
his theft conviction resentenced as a misdemeanor.  (See 
§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)  The People argued the reduction violated 
the plea agreement and sought to withdraw from the bargain.  
Harris rejected the claim:  “Critical to this question is the intent 
behind Proposition 47.  As we explained in Doe v. Harris, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at page 66, entering into a plea agreement does not 
insulate the parties ‘from changes in the law that the Legislature 
has intended to apply to them.’  (Italics added.)  Here, of course, 
it was not the Legislature, but the electorate, that enacted 
Proposition 47.  So the question is whether the electorate 
intended the change to apply to the parties to this plea 
agreement.  We conclude it did.”  (Harris, at p. 991.)  Noting that 
section 1170.18, subdivision (a) specifically applied to a person 
“serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea,” 
Harris reasoned that “[b]y expressly mentioning convictions by 
plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible 
defendants.”  (Harris, at p. 991.)  “The resentencing process that 
Proposition 47 established would often prove meaningless if the 
prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition 
by withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and 
reinstating the original charges filed against the petitioner.”  
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
(Id. at p. 992.)  In such cases, “ ‘the financial and social benefits 
of Proposition 47 would not be realized, and the voters’ intent 
and expectations would be frustrated.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
Harris also found additional support from Doe, which 
“stands for the proposition that ‘the Legislature [or here, the 
electorate], for the public good and in furtherance of public 
policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the federal and 
state Constitutions, has the authority to modify or invalidate 
the terms of an agreement.’  [Citation.]  The electorate exercised 
that authority in enacting Proposition 47.  It adopted a public 
policy respecting the appropriate term of incarceration for 
persons convicted of certain crimes, including grand theft from 
the person.  The policy applies retroactively to all persons who 
meet the qualifying criteria and are serving a prison sentence 
for one of those convictions, whether the conviction was by trial 
or plea.  The electorate may bind the People to a unilateral 
change in a sentence without affording them the option to 
rescind the plea agreement.  The electorate did so when it 
enacted Proposition 47.”  (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 992.)   
Harris distinguished People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 
208 (Collins).  Pursuant to a plea bargain, Collins pled guilty to 
a single count of oral copulation under former section 288a in 
exchange for dismissal of 14 other felony counts.  Prior to 
sentencing, the Legislature repealed former section 288a, 
decriminalizing “the act of oral copulation between consenting, 
nonprisoner adults . . . .”  (Collins, at p. 211.)  Collins reasoned 
the decriminalization of oral copulation applied retroactively 
under Estrada because the conviction was not yet final, and the 
defendant could not be sentenced for that offense.  (Collins, at 
pp. 212-213.)  However, Collins concluded the prosecution was 
entitled on remand to reinstate the dismissed counts because, 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
“[w]hen a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to 
sentence, the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for 
which it agreed to enter the bargain.”  (Id. at p. 215.)  Collins 
reasoned:  “Defendant seeks to gain relief from the sentence 
imposed but otherwise leave the plea bargain intact.  This is 
bounty in excess of that to which he is entitled.  The intervening 
act of the Legislature in decriminalizing the conduct for which 
he was convicted justifies a reversal of defendant’s conviction 
and a direction that his conduct may not support further 
criminal proceedings on that subject; but it also destroys a 
fundamental assumption underlying the plea bargain—that 
defendant would be vulnerable to a term of imprisonment.  The 
state may therefore seek to reestablish defendant’s vulnerability 
by reviving the counts dismissed.”  (Ibid.)   
Harris is distinguishable from the present case.  
Proposition 47 reduced to misdemeanors certain theft and drug 
offenses and created a mechanism to allow defendants to seek 
relief under the new law, even though they had already been 
sentenced.  (See People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 597-
599; § 1170.18.)  The resentencing provision applied to those 
“serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea” 
(§ 1170.18, subd. (a)) and drew “no express distinction between 
persons serving final sentences and those serving nonfinal 
sentences, instead entitling both categories of prisoners to 
petition courts for recall of sentence.”  (DeHoyos, at p. 603.)  The 
provision also allowed defendants who had already completed 
their sentences to have their offenses designated as 
misdemeanors.  (§ 1170.18, subds. (f)-(h).)  The electorate thus 
evinced an intent that these offenses be treated as 
misdemeanors no matter how or when a defendant suffered the 
conviction.  As Harris reasoned, to allow the prosecution, in 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
response to a successful resentencing petition, to withdraw from 
a plea agreement and reinstate dismissed charges would 
frustrate electoral intent to treat these offenses uniformly as 
misdemeanors, essentially denying meaningful relief to those 
convicted through plea bargains.  (See Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at p. 992.)   
Similar considerations do not apply here.  Nothing in the 
language and legislative history of Senate Bill 1393 suggests an 
intent to modify section 1192.5’s mandate that “the court may 
not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea” 
without the consent of the parties.  As discussed, Senate Bill 
1393’s amendment of section 1385 now allows a trial court to 
strike a serious felony enhancement just as it may do with any 
other enhancement.  Unlike in Harris, the remedy defendant 
seeks, to allow the court to strike the serious felony 
enhancement but otherwise retain the plea bargain, would 
frustrate the Legislature’s intent to have section 1385 apply 
uniformly, regardless of the type of enhancement at issue, by 
granting the court a power it would otherwise lack for any other 
enhancement.  That Senate Bill 1393 is silent regarding pleas 
and provides no express mechanism for relief undercuts any 
suggestion that the Legislature intended to create special rules 
for plea cases involving serious felony enhancements.   
Recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 1618 (2019-2020 Reg. 
Sess.), cited by defendant, does not change this analysis.  That 
bill added section 1016.8, which codified our decision in Doe that 
the circumstance “the parties enter into a plea agreement does 
not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law 
that the Legislature has intended to apply to them” (§ 1016.8, 
subd. (a)(1)), and clarified that any “provision of a plea bargain 
that requires a defendant to generally waive future benefits of 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other 
changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date 
of the plea is void as against public policy” (§ 1016.8, subd. (b)).  
As we reasoned ante, we agree with defendant that Senate Bill 
1393 should be applied retroactively to him, and the 
circumstance that his conviction resulted from a plea agreement 
did not change that conclusion.  However, this bill, like Estrada, 
says nothing about the proper remedy should we conclude a law 
retroactively applies.   
2.  Limited Remand Is Appropriate 
Although we reject defendant’s contention that the court 
on remand should be allowed to exercise its discretion to reduce 
his prison term by five years but otherwise maintain the plea 
bargain, he is nevertheless entitled to some relief.  The proper 
remedy requires an examination of the court’s role in approving 
a plea agreement.  “The process of plea bargaining which has 
received statutory and judicial authorization as an appropriate 
method of disposing of criminal prosecutions contemplates an 
agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and 
approved by the court.  [Citations.]  Pursuant to this procedure 
the defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to obtain a 
reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe 
punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of 
all offenses charged.  [Citation.]  This more lenient disposition 
of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the 
imposition of such clement punishment [citation], by the 
People’s acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense than that 
charged, either in degree [citations] or kind [citation], or by the 
prosecutor’s dismissal of one or more counts of a multi-count 
indictment or information. . . .  But implicit in all of this is a 
process of ‘bargaining’ between the adverse parties to the case—
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
the People represented by the prosecutor on one side, the 
defendant represented by his counsel on the other—which 
bargaining results in an agreement between them.”  (People v. 
Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 942-943; see Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 
at p. 214; § 1192.5.)  “Judicial approval is an essential condition 
precedent to the effectiveness of the ‘bargain’ worked out by the 
defense and prosecution.”  (Orin, at pp. 942-943; see People v. 
Martin (2010) 51 Cal.4th 75, 79.)   
The statutory scheme contemplates that a court may 
initially indicate its approval of an agreement at the time of the 
plea but that “it may, at the time set for the hearing on the 
application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, 
withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the 
matter . . . .”  (§ 1192.5.)  “The code expressly reserves to the 
court the power to disapprove the plea agreement” up until 
sentencing.  (Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361.)  “In 
exercising their discretion to approve or reject proposed plea 
bargains, trial courts are charged with the protection and 
promotion of the public’s interest in vigorous prosecution of the 
accused, imposition of appropriate punishment, and protection 
of victims of crimes.  [Citation.]  For that reason, a trial court’s 
approval of a proposed plea bargain must represent an informed 
decision in furtherance of the interests of society . . . .”  (In re 
Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 941.)   
“[T]he court, upon sentencing, has broad discretion to 
withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea.”  (People v. 
Johnson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 868, 873.)  “Generally, a trial court 
may exercise its discretion to withdraw approval of a plea 
bargain because:  (1) it believes the agreement is ‘unfair’ 
[citation]; (2) new facts have come to light; (3) the court has 
become more fully informed about the case; or (4) when, after 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
further consideration, the court concludes that the agreement is 
‘ “ ‘not in the best interests of society’ ” ’ [citation].  But this list 
is not exhaustive.”  (People v. Mora-Duran (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 
589, 595-596 (Mora-Duran).)   
Guided by these principles, People v. Ellis (2019) 43 
Cal.App.5th 925 (Ellis) addressed the proper remedy in the 
present context.  Although Ellis agreed “that Senate Bill No. 
1393 does not entitle defendants who negotiated stipulated 
sentences ‘to whittle down the sentence “but otherwise leave the 
plea bargain intact,” ’ ” the court reasoned “Senate Bill No. 1393 
compels the conclusion that defendant is entitled to seek the 
benefit of change in the law.”  (Ellis, at pp. 943-944.)  Ellis 
initially observed that, on remand, “the trial court may simply 
decline to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancement and 
that will end the matter.”  (Id. at p. 944.)  “In other cases, the 
trial court might conclude, upon the defendant’s request, that it 
is in the interest of justice to strike the enhancement.  In such 
cases, it bears repeating that ‘in the context of a negotiated plea 
the trial court may approve or reject the parties’ agreement, but 
the court may not attempt to secure such a plea by stepping into 
the role of the prosecutor, nor may the court effectively 
withdraw its approval by later modifying the terms of the 
agreement it had approved.’  [Citations.]  ‘Yet, courts have broad 
discretion to withdraw their approval of negotiated pleas.  
[Citation.]  “ ‘Such withdrawal is permitted, for example, in 
those instances where the court becomes more fully informed 
about the case [citation], or where, after further consideration, 
the court concludes that the bargain is not in the best interests 
of society.’ ”  [Citation.]  However, once a court withdraws its 
approval of a plea bargain, the court cannot “proceed to apply 
and enforce certain parts of the plea bargain, while ignoring” 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
others.  [Citation.]  Instead, the court must restore the parties 
to the status quo ante.’  [Citations.]  Thus, while there may be 
cases in which the trial court will elect to strike the serious 
felony conviction enhancement, it is not without consequence to 
the plea bargain.”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)   
Ellis rejected the People’s argument that a remand would 
be futile “because the trial court accepted the plea bargain and 
sentenced defendant to the stipulated sentence.”  (Ellis, supra, 
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 945.)  After noting that the court, at the 
time of sentencing, was unaware of its discretion to strike the 
serious felony enhancement granted by Senate Bill 1393, Ellis 
reasoned:  “The parties agreed to a sentence of eight years four 
months, which the trial court approved and imposed.  We agree 
that if the court were to strike or dismiss the enhancement, or 
stay the sentence on the enhancement, defendant’s sentence 
would be reduced significantly and, therefore, as set forth 
previously, there are consequences attendant to defendant’s 
request for the court to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill 
No. 1393.  [Citations.]  However, the record does not clearly 
demonstrate that remand would be futile [citations], and the 
parties’ plea bargain is not insulated from the changes in the 
law effected by Senate Bill No. 1393.”  (Ellis, at p. 946.)  Ellis 
concluded “defendant is entitled to a limited remand to allow 
him the opportunity to request relief under Senate Bill No. 
1393.”  (Ibid.)   
We are persuaded by Ellis.  At the time the court accepted 
the plea agreement and sentenced defendant, the law did not 
allow it to consider striking the serious felony enhancement in 
furtherance of justice under section 1385.  Senate Bill 1393 
changed the law to allow such discretion, and we have now 
concluded that provision applies retroactively.  If he desires, 
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
defendant should be given the opportunity to seek the court’s 
exercise of its section 1385 discretion.  If the court on remand 
declines to exercise its discretion under section 1385, that ends 
the matter and defendant’s sentence stands.   
However, if the court is inclined to exercise its discretion, 
as Ellis observed, such a determination would have 
consequences to the plea agreement.  For the reasons discussed 
ante, the court is not authorized to unilaterally modify the plea 
agreement by striking the serious felony enhancement but 
otherwise keeping the remainder of the bargain.  If the court 
indicates an inclination to exercise its discretion under section 
1385, the prosecution may, of course, agree to modify the 
bargain to reflect the downward departure in the sentence such 
exercise would entail.  Barring such a modification agreement, 
“the prosecutor is entitled to the same remedy as the 
defendant—withdrawal of assent to the plea agreement . . . .”  
(Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362.)   
Further, the court may withdraw its prior approval of the 
plea agreement.  The court’s authority to withdraw its approval 
of a plea agreement has been described as “near-plenary.”  
(People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 195; see Mora-
Duran, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.)  The court’s exercise of 
its new discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement, 
whether considered a new circumstance in the case or simply a 
reevaluation of the propriety of the bargain itself, would fall 
within the court’s broad discretion to withdraw its prior 
approval of the plea agreement.  Section 1192.5 contemplates 
that “[a] change of the court’s mind is thus always a possibility.”  
(Stringham, at p. 194.)   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
In light of these potential consequences to the plea 
agreement, we emphasize that it is ultimately defendant’s 
choice whether he wishes to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393.  
As Ellis reasoned:  “Given that defendants in criminal cases 
presumably obtained some benefit from the plea agreement, we 
anticipate that there will be defendants who determine that, 
notwithstanding their entitlement to seek relief based on the 
change in the law, their interests are better served by 
preserving the status quo.  That determination, however, lies in 
each instance with the defendant.”  (Ellis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 944.)  While it is true that defendant has consistently 
argued on appeal that Senate Bill 1393 should retroactively 
apply to him, his argument has always been coupled with his 
claim that the proper remedy should be to simply allow the trial 
court to reduce his sentence by five years while otherwise 
maintaining the remainder of the plea agreement.  Now that we 
have rejected his proposed remedy, defendant’s calculus in 
seeking relief under Senate Bill 1393 may have changed.  
Defendant should be allowed to make an informed decision 
whether to seek relief on remand.   
People v. Wilson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 408 (Wilson) came 
to a contrary conclusion, reasoning a remand was not 
warranted:  “[A]ssume that a trial court acting in the here and 
now, with the benefit of Senate Bill No. 1393, is presented with 
a stipulated plea that includes a five-year term under section 
667, subdivision (a)(1).  This, of course, means that the 
defendant has agreed to the five-year term.  But let us indulge 
the fanciful notion that the trial court refuses to take the plea if 
it includes such a term because it would strike it.  What would 
then happen?  The trial court could not modify the plea to reduce 
it by five years.  The trial court would have to reject the plea.  
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
The prosecution would then find another way to get to its 
number, or the plea agreement would fall through.  The point is 
this:  what the trial court thinks the number should be is largely 
irrelevant, as this is not an open plea.  A trial court must accept 
the negotiated plea or reject the bargain outright, but it cannot 
come up with its own number.”  (Id. at p. 414.)   
Wilson’s reasoning misses the mark.  It is settled that a 
court may evaluate the fairness of a proposed sentence in 
determining whether to approve the bargain.  (See People v. 
Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931.)  In that regard, “what the 
trial court thinks the number should be” is not irrelevant as 
Wilson suggested.  (Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.)  
Further, it may not always be the case that the agreed-upon 
sentence can be reconstituted with other offenses or 
enhancements, and that, coupled with a court’s exercise of its 
new found discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement, 
may lead the court to reevaluate the fairness of the bargained-
for sentence.  These new circumstances may also lead the 
parties to reevaluate what constitutes a fair disposition of the 
case.  In any event, we agree with Ellis that short-circuiting this 
process by refusing a limited remand “would be effectively 
insulating the agreement from retroactive changes in the law, 
in contravention of the law.”6  (Ellis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 
946.)   
 
                                        
6  
We disapprove People v. Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 
408.   
PEOPLE v. STAMPS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with 
directions to remand the matter to the superior court to allow 
defendant an opportunity to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393.   
 
CORRIGAN, J.   
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Stamps 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 34 Cal.App.5th 117 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S255843 
Date Filed:  June 25, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Alameda 
Judge:  James P. Cramer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
James S. Donnelly-Saalfield, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Eric D. Share, Elizabeth W. 
Hereford and René A. Chacón, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
James S. Donnelly-Saalfield  
First District Appellate Project 
475 Fourteenth Street, Suite 650 
(415) 495-3119 
 
Elizabeth W. Hereford  
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3801