Case Title: State v. Morris

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107768

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 107,768 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANDREW H. MORRIS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
On the record in this case, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the defendant's postsentencing motion to withdraw his no contest pleas to two counts of 
felony murder and one count of aggravated arson. 
 
 
Appeal from Crawford District Court; DONALD R. NOLAND, judge. Opinion filed March 7, 2014. 
Affirmed.   
 
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellant.  
 
Natalie A. Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  Defendant Andrew H. Morris is imprisoned after conviction on two 
counts of felony murder and one count of aggravated arson. Although all involved in 
Morris' sentencing—the prosecution, the defense, and the district court judge—
 
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recommended that Morris serve his time in a security hospital, the Department of 
Corrections has chosen to house him in one of Kansas' penitentiaries. This appeal arises 
out of the denial of Morris' motion to withdraw his no contest pleas to the three charges. 
Morris argues that the denial was an abuse of discretion. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
At least the opening elements of the factual and procedural context helpful to 
decide this case can be borrowed from our earlier decision on Morris' direct appeal of the 
consecutive nature of his felony-murder sentences:  
 
 
"The State charged Andrew Morris with two counts of felony murder in violation 
of K.S.A. 21-3401(b) and one count of aggravated arson in violation of K.S.A. 21-3719 
for setting fire to a home in Pittsburg, Kansas, on February 11, 2006. Two people inside 
the home, Waylon S. Boots and Stephen J. Hayes, died as a result of the fire. 
 
"Prior to trial, the court ordered Morris to undergo a psychological examination 
to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. On May 30, 2006, the court found 
Morris incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to Larned State Security 
Hospital (LSSH) for a 90-day examination to determine whether Morris may attain 
competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future. 
 
"On August 24, 2006, the trial court found that, based on the information from 
LSSH, Morris had a substantial probability of attaining competency to stand trial. The 
court further ordered Morris to remain at LSSH for an additional 6 months, at which time 
the court would again take up the issue of Morris' competency for trial. Morris remained 
at LSSH until November 16, 2006, when LSSH discharged him with a recommendation 
to the court that it find him competent to stand trial. On April 2, 2007, the trial court 
again found Morris incompetent and ordered him committed to LSSH. Morris remained 
at LSSH until October 23, 2007, when it discharged him with another recommendation to 
the court that it find Morris competent to stand trial. The trial court held a competency 
hearing on January 24 and 30, 2008, and, after hearing all the evidence, took the matter 
 
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under advisement. On February 20, 2008, after reciting its extensive findings, the court 
announced its determination that Morris was competent to stand trial. 
 
"On April 21, 2008, the trial court held the preliminary hearing, finding probable 
cause to believe Morris committed the crimes of felony murder and aggravated arson. On 
June 27, 2008, at arraignment, Morris pleaded not guilty on all counts and the court set 
the matter for trial." State v. Morris, No. 102,051, 2010 WL 2816241, at *1 (Kan. 2010) 
(unpublished opinion). 
 
On November 7, 2008, defense counsel Edward Dosh filed a motion to suppress 
incriminating statements Morris had made to investigators, including his confession to 
setting the fire. The motion alleged that investigators failed to inform Morris of his 
Miranda rights and argued that the statements were uninformed and involuntary. 
Attached to the motion was a report by a licensed psychologist who had concluded that 
Morris was incapable, under the circumstances, of knowingly and intelligently waiving 
his Miranda rights.  
 
Before the motion to suppress was heard, on November 14, 2008, Morris entered 
into a plea agreement with the State. Under that agreement, he would plead no contest to 
the three charges. In exchange, the State would recommend that the life sentences for the 
felony murders run concurrently and that the "Court recommend to the Secretary of 
Corrections that [Morris] be placed in a secure mental health facility to serve [his] 
sentence."  
 
The plea agreement contained the following paragraph: 
 
"I offer my plea of 'NO CONTEST' freely and voluntarily, and further state that my plea 
of no contest is not the result of any force or threats against me, or of any promises made 
to me other than those noted in this petition."  
 
 
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At the plea hearing, the judge explained the charges Morris was facing, described 
the maximum punishment allowable for each, and heard Morris' pleas of no contest. The 
judge and Morris then engaged in the following colloquy: 
 
 
"THE COURT: Okay. Now, I'm going to ask you some questions, Mr. Morris, to 
make certain that your three pleas of no contest are knowing and voluntary. That is I want 
to make sure that you understand what you are doing when you plead no contest to these 
three charges. And I want to make sure that you are doing this voluntarily, that is that 
nobody is forcing you to enter into these pleas of no contest against your will. Do you 
understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: And, again, if I ask you something or if I say something or if I 
use some words that you don't understand, you need to tell me that, and I will further 
repeat myself. You can always consult or talk to your lawyer Mr. Dosh. Do you 
understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Now, let me ask you this. Are you pleading no contest to each of 
these three charges knowingly and voluntarily? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to Mr. Dosh, your lawyer, 
about your decision to plead no contest to these three charges? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Now, let me explain—let me explain a no contest plea. A guilty 
plea is when you admit that you did this, did these three crimes, that you committed these 
three crimes. You come into Court and you say, Judge, I'm going to plead guilty. I admit 
that I committed these three crimes. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: A no contest plea, however, you are not saying you are guilty but 
you are not saying you are innocent. When you plead no contest, you are telling me, 
Judge, I do not contest these three charges. I—I'm giving you—I'm allowing you to find 
 
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me guilty based upon my pleas of no contest. I'm not going to contest the charges. I'm not 
going to fight it. I'm not going to go to trial. I'm just going to plead no contest and, in 
doing so, I'm going to allow you to enter a finding of guilty against me on these three 
charges. 
 
"So when you plead no contest, you are not pleading guilty but you are going to 
be found guilty if I accept your pleas and when you are sentenced, you will be sentenced 
as a guilty person. Do you understand me? 
 
"[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"[THE COURT]: Now, knowing that you are going to be found guilty if I accept 
your pleas of no contest, knowing that you are going to be found guilty, do you still 
desire to follow through with your pleas of no contest? 
 
"[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
[District judge explaining rights defendant waives when pleading no contest.] 
 
"THE COURT: Now, when you plead no contest, do you understand a trial will 
not be conducted? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: So you give up your right to trial and you give up all of those 
rights that I just told you about. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Now, are you giving up your right to trial and all of those rights 
freely and voluntarily? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Now, do you understand that when I say freely and voluntarily, I 
mean this is a product—that you are doing it of your own accord. Nobody is forcing you 
to do this. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT[:] Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: And you are doing this freely; is that correct? And if I'm 
incorrect, you need to tell me that. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Do you understand the plea agreement, have you had enough 
time to go over the plea agreement with your lawyer? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
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"THE COURT: Do you have any questions of myself or of your lawyer Mr. Dosh 
with regard to anything that might be in the plea agreement? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Do you feel that you fully understand the plea agreement? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to your lawyer about the plea 
agreement? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
. . . . 
 
"THE COURT: Now, any agreement you may have with the State of Kansas with 
the prosecution that would call for you to be sentenced in a certain manner, for you to 
receive a certain sentence, I'm not bound by that agreement. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Knowing that, do you still desire to follow through with your 
plea agreement? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: It is very important that you understand this. You have a plea 
agreement with regard to sentencing and that's fine. It is done all the time but I'm not 
bound by that. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: Okay. And, again, knowing that, you still do desire to follow 
through with your plea; is that correct, sir? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
. . . . 
 
"THE COURT: And, again, I know I've asked this a few times but it is really 
important that you understand what we are doing today. You're pleading no contest. 
Based upon your three plea[s] of no contest, I will find you guilty of these three crimes. 
Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: And are you doing this voluntarily of your own free will? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
. . . . 
 
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"MR. DOSH: What he's asking you, Andy, number one, do you understand what 
you are doing here today? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
"MR. DOSH: And you understand that by entering this plea of no contest to these 
three charges, he's going to make a finding of guilt and you will be convicted of those 
three charges. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
"MR. DOSH: And do you understand that sentencing will come at a later date, 
that we've got a plea agreement with the prosecutor's office but the Judge does not have 
to follow that. Do you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
"MR. DOSH: And I have repeatedly told you, have I not, that there is no 
guarantee[] that he will go along with the agreement. I[t] is our hope that he will but there 
is no guarantee[]. Have I told that [to] you repeatedly? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
"MR. DOSH: And you understand what I mean by that, don't you? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
"MR. DOSH: And it is still your desire to go ahead and enter your plea because 
you think this is probably the best outcome in the long run that you can [get] out of this 
matter. Is that a fair statement? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
"MR. DOSH: Okay. 
 
"THE COURT: And you did understand what Mr. Dosh was just asking you, Mr. 
Morris? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: All right. Now, I want . . . you to think, is there anything else that 
you want to ask me about or is there anything I've said that you have not understood? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: So have you been able to understand the proceedings today, what 
we've done today, have you been able to understand it? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: And you understand you are going to be found guilty of these 
three crimes? 
 
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"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT: All right. The Court will accept your three pleas of no contest, 
Mr. Morris, I will find that all three pleas of no contest are knowing and voluntary and 
that . . . they are entered with concurrence of counsel." 
 
At a hearing 3 months later, the judge sentenced Morris to two consecutive life 
terms on the felony murders and 66 months on the aggravated arson to run concurrent to 
the life terms. The judge also "strongly recommend[ed] that [Morris] be incarcerated in a 
State security hospital during his sentence." After announcing the sentence, the district 
judge asked Morris if he had any questions. Morris responded:  "I am going to appeal 
this. I didn't do this. I have proof that I didn't do it." The judge thanked Morris for his 
comments and then concluded the hearing.  
 
The journal entry of sentencing again set out the judge's placement 
recommendation:  "THE COURT STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE 
SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS TRANSFER DEFENDANT TO THE STATE 
SECURITY HOSPITAL TO SERVE HIS SENTENCE. SEE K.S.A. 75-5209." The 
parties agree that Morris' placement decisions are in the hands of the Department of 
Corrections, see K.S.A. 21-4603d(a)(1); K.S.A. 75-5209, and the Department has decided 
that Morris is to be housed in a penitentiary rather than a security hospital.  
 
After Morris' unsuccessful appeal of the judge's decision to make the life 
sentences consecutive rather than concurrent, Morris filed the motion to withdraw plea 
underlying this appeal. Morris argued that his motion should be granted because:  (1) the 
district judge failed to advise him of the maximum penalties he was facing; (2) the 
district judge failed to ask specifically if Morris' plea had been induced by promises; (3) 
there was no factual basis for the plea; (4) Dosh failed to move to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds; (5) Dosh failed to file a timely motion to suppress and to resolve it before the 
 
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pleas were entered; (6) Dosh failed to conduct independent research into the State's case; 
(7) the district judge should have sua sponte dismissed on speedy trial grounds; (8) the 
district judge should have sua sponte determined the merits of the motion to suppress 
before accepting Morris' pleas; and (9) Morris did not comprehend the meaning of the no 
contest plea. Jason Wiske was appointed to represent Morris on the motion. Wiske filed 
an amendment to Morris' motion, arguing that the district judge failed at the plea hearing 
to inform Morris of his right against self-incrimination.  
 
The motion prompted an evidentiary hearing in district court, in which Wiske 
asked Dosh why he did not have the motion to suppress Morris' statements resolved 
before the no contest pleas were entered. Dosh responded: 
 
 
"I can't tell you specifically. But I would, based upon my experience, it's 
probably because it's like everything else in this business, you get crammed in for time 
and, you know, you got to prioritize things. I have got other cases going on and—and, 
you know, it's just a matter of getting to it and getting it done." 
 
Dosh testified that he had explained to Morris, before Morris entered his pleas, 
that the judge would not have to follow the recommendations in the plea agreement. 
Dosh also said he told Morris that "we can make a recommendation in your sentence that 
you go to Larned or some kind of facility like that. But, number one, that was just [a] 
recommendation [for] the Secretary of Corrections; they place you wherever they want to 
place you." Dosh also testified that Morris "probably doesn't understand the concept of no 
contest, although I attempted to explain it to him . . . a number of times."  
  
Morris also testified during the hearing on his motion to withdraw plea. He said 
that he was confused at times during the plea negotiations and hearing, but generally he 
understood what was going on at those times. 
 
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"[Q.]  What was your understanding of what would happen if you entered your 
no contest statement on November 14th, 2008? 
 
"A.  If I entered my statement, I—I would go to a state prison for life. 
 
"Q.  Andy, do you remember any discussions with Ed [Dosh] about a 
recommendation that you be sent to the prison hospital at Larned? 
 
"A.  Yeah. I was supposed to go to the prison state hospital, but they may turn 
around and decide to put me in a prison. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Q.  Did you understand that Judge Noland could have sentenced you to prison? 
 
"A.  Yeah. At that time, I understood he could send me to the prison instead of a 
state hospital. That's why I am trying to get it withdrawn today. 
 
"Q.  Andy, did you feel pressured to enter your no contest statements in any way? 
 
"A.  No. Not at that time."    
 
After Morris testified, Wiske asked the district judge to take judicial notice of the 
fact that Morris had trouble "understanding abstract principles" and "cannot think 
abstractly." Wiske then read transcript excerpts from an earlier competency hearing at 
which witnesses had testified about Morris' limited ability to think abstractly. 
 
In response to the evidence and argument, the district judge observed initially that 
Morris had been informed of the maximum penalties for the charges at both his 
arraignment and plea hearing and that abstract reasoning was unnecessary to understand 
that "a life sentence is just that; it is a life in prison." The judge also read portions of the 
plea hearing transcript in which he had asked Morris whether the pleas were entered 
freely and voluntarily. The judge expressed satisfaction that Morris had not been 
pressured to enter his pleas, and he explained that the case file and the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing were adequate to support the factual basis for the pleas. 
 
 
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The judge also addressed Morris' attempt to demonstrate that Dosh had provided 
ineffective assistance. The judge first noted that Morris had personally waived his right to 
a speedy trial at arraignment. Thus Dosh was not ineffective for not filing a motion to 
dismiss for an alleged speedy trial violation. Next the district judge noted that the motion 
to suppress had been filed after the motion deadline but that it was scheduled to be heard 
before trial. The judge said, "[I]t's not unusual for Counsel to file motions a few days late. 
I see that routinely." Then the district judge continued: 
 
"[R]outinely, defendants leave cards on the table when they enter a plea. Routinely, when 
defendants enter pleas, they still have potential defenses, potential legal arguments to 
present that they waive, that they give up through the process of entering the plea. 
 
"So the fact that the motion to suppress was not addressed is nothing that's out of 
the ordinary. It's routinely done. 
 
"And so I just don't find any error in Mr. Dosh, number one, in failing to file the 
motion because he did, in fact, do so, and in not having it heard. The State gave Mr. Dosh 
a timeline [to accept the plea agreement], and that is routinely done."   
 
The district judge also said: "[A]s a very practical matter, even had we conducted 
the hearing to determine whether your confession should be suppressed, there just wasn't 
much of a chance that would have been granted."  
 
Regarding Morris' allegation that Dosh failed to do independent research on his 
case, the district judge said that Dosh had been able to examine the State's witnesses at 
the preliminary hearing and that this was "the best opportunity . . . because he did it on 
the record where they are obligated to tell the truth." The district judge also explicitly 
considered Dosh's considerable efforts to have Morris' competency to stand trial reviewed 
and ruled upon. 
 
 
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The district judge also rejected Morris' claim that he should have dismissed the 
case sua sponte because of the speedy trial violation, given Morris' waiver of the right. 
The judge also explained that he was under no duty to determine the merits of Morris' 
motion to suppress before accepting his pleas. Finally, the district judge rebuffed Morris' 
argument that he did not understand the meaning or consequences of a no contest plea: 
 
"[T]he argument that a no contest plea requires abstract thought, I don't see that. It's 
relatively simple. You were told by the Court on several occasions, and the Plea Hearing 
transcript reflects this, that you were told by the Court on several occasions that by 
pleading no contest you are going to be found guilty. A no contest plea is just an 
admission to the Court that you are not going to fight the charges, and you're going to be 
found guilty. You were told that on several occasions in the Plea Hearing transcript. You 
also admitted that today, basically, in your testimony, today, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
"You admit understanding today, you admitted understanding that you would be 
found guilty and you could be sentenced to prison as a consequence of your no contest 
pleas. You admit that Mr. Dosh told you that you could be looking at a life sentence. You 
also indicate that Mr. Dosh told you that the Court, the Judge is not required to follow the 
plea agreement, but yet you say you didn't understand that."  
 
The district judge also read excerpts from the plea hearing transcript, in which he 
explained the nature and consequences of a no contest plea. 
 
Given all of the above, the district judge ruled that Morris failed to show that 
manifest injustice would result if he was unable to withdraw his pleas, and he denied the 
motion. Morris appealed to this court.  
 
Shortly before oral argument, Morris moved this court to take judicial notice of the 
fact that he is housed at Lansing Correctional Facility and not at Larned Correctional 
Mental Health Facility. The State did not respond to the motion. Although the subject 
 
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matter of this motion may or may not be suitable for judicial notice, there appears to be 
no dispute between the parties on this point. We therefore deny the motion as moot. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our standard of review on denial of a postsentencing motion to withdraw plea is 
abuse of discretion. State v. Bricker, 292 Kan. 239, 244, 252 P.3d 118 (2011). A 
defendant bears the burden to demonstrate such an abuse. 292 Kan. at 244. 
 
"Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is 
based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; 
or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support 
a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is 
based." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 
132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
To be successful in the district court on his motion, Morris had to demonstrate to 
the district judge that refusal to allow him to withdraw his pleas would result in manifest 
injustice. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) ("To correct manifest injustice the court after 
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 
the plea.").  
 
Kansas courts  
 
"review at least three factors, commonly known as Edgar factors, after State v. Edgar, 
281 Kan. 30, [127 P.3d 986 (2006),] when considering whether a defendant has 
demonstrated the requisite manifest injustice. These are: (1) whether the defendant was 
represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, 
mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and 
 
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understandingly made. Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36; see State v. Green, 283 Kan. 531, 545-46, 
153 P.3d 1216 (2007) (applying the Edgar factors to a postsentence plea withdrawal 
case); see also State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511, 231 P.3d 563 (2010) (collecting cases 
discussing the Edgar factors)." Bricker, 292 Kan. at 244-45. 
 
The Edgar factors are "'viable benchmarks for judicial discretion,'" but they are not the 
exclusive factors for this court to consider when reviewing the denial of a motion to 
withdraw plea. Bricker, 292 Kan. at 245 (quoting State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512, 
231 P.3d 563 [2010]).  
 
 
Summarizing her case at oral argument, Morris' appellate counsel stated that she 
had a mentally handicapped client who pleaded no contest to two murders based on a 
promise no one in the courtroom could keep and with ineffective assistance and a viable 
Fifth Amendment issue unlitigated. But, specifically, Morris contends on this appeal that 
we should hold the district judge abused his discretion because:  (1) the judge had failed 
to inquire explicitly at the plea hearing about promises made to Morris, which meant 
Morris was misled about the difference between a recommendation of security hospital 
placement and a guarantee of it; (2) Dosh provided ineffective assistance, particularly by 
failing to ensure resolution of the motion to suppress before Morris was pressured into 
entering his pleas; (3) Morris did not understand the meaning and consequences of a no 
contest plea; and (4) cumulative error tainted the denial of the motion.  
 
Promises 
 
 
With regard to promises, Morris contends that the district judge's failure to inquire 
misled him into entering his pleas "without understanding that the Larned 
recommendation was only that—a recommendation, not a hard-and-fast promise." The 
record before us does not support this assertion. 
 
 
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K.S.A. 22-3210(a)(3) requires that a district judge, before accepting a plea, 
determine that "the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the consequences of the plea." The transcript of Morris' plea hearing contains 
many passages in which the district judge asked Morris whether his pleas were voluntary, 
and Morris responded in the affirmative. 
 
 
In addition, the only relevant promise in Morris' plea agreement recorded that the 
State would "concur with the defense's request that the Court recommend to the Secretary 
of Corrections that [Morris] be placed in a secure mental health facility to serve [his] 
sentence." (Emphasis added.) Dosh testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw that 
he had explained the difference between a recommendation and a guarantee to his client. 
The written agreement itself stated that no promises not recorded in it had been made. 
Morris told the judge at his plea hearing and at the motion to withdraw hearing that he 
had understood the plea agreement's terms. At the plea hearing, he also told the judge he 
had no questions about those terms. 
 
Morris' reliance on Wilkinson v. State, 40 Kan. App. 2d 741, 195 P.3d 278 (2008), 
rev. denied 289 Kan. 1286 (2009), is inapposite.  
 
In Wilkinson, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea to a second drug 
charge because he was ignorant of a statutory provision that, under the facts of his case, 
required a finding of manifest injustice before the sentencing judge could impose 
concurrent sentences. Even though this statute made the parties' agreement on a joint 
recommendation for concurrent sentences ineffectual, when Wilkinson moved to 
withdraw his plea after he was given consecutive sentences, the district judge denied the 
motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals panel reversed, 
holding that Wilkinson's decision to enter a plea could not have been an informed one if 
he was unaware of the "nearly insurmountable" statutory obstacle a concurrent sentencing 
 
16 
 
 
 
recommendation would have to overcome. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 745. The panel remanded 
the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether Wilkinson's counsel had failed to inform 
him of the manifest-injustice standard. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 746.  
 
This case is factually and procedurally distinct from Wilkinson. Here, the district 
court held an evidentiary hearing on Morris' motion to withdraw. At that hearing, Dosh 
testified that he explained the limited nature of the judge's recommendation, and Morris 
testified that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including its 
recommendation language. The judge also had been careful to use recommendation rather 
than guarantee language at the plea hearing. 
 
Morris' appellate counsel sympathetically portrays her client's developmental 
disability and mental health issues, as is her charge. But these problems were well known 
to the district judge, who had presided over extensive litigation about Morris' competence 
to stand trial. Knowing what he did from that litigation, the judge engaged in a lengthy 
and thorough colloquy with Morris at the time the pleas were entered. And, at the hearing 
on the motion to withdraw, he heard Morris' testimony about his degree of appreciation 
of the choices facing him. The district judge ultimately concluded: "I think you 
understood the plea at the time, I think you understand now. I think you would have me 
believe otherwise, but I think you understood what you were doing at the time that you 
were entering these three pleas of no contest . . . ."  
 
On this record, we see no abuse of discretion due to the judge's failure to inquire 
explicitly about promises at the plea hearing or to Morris' inability to understand the only 
relevant promise that had been made and its distinction from those that had not been 
made. 
 
 
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
A defendant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for a 
postsentencing plea withdrawal must   
 
"meet constitutional standards to demonstrate manifest injustice. See also State v. 
Muriithi, 273 Kan. 952, 955-56, 46 P.3d 1145 (2002) (applying constitutional standard to 
a postsentence plea withdrawal motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Consequently, [a defendant] must meet the commonly known Strickland test and show 
that (1) [counsel's] performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) there is a reasonable probability that but for [counsel's] errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied 467 U.S. 1267 (1984); Chamberlain v. 
State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57, 694 P.2d 468 (1985) (adopting Strickland standards); 
Muriithi, 273 Kan. at 955-56. A '"reasonable probability"' is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 644, 88 P.3d 218 
(2004)." Bricker, 292 Kan. at 245-46. 
 
When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea, he or she must show that, but for counsel's 
unreasonably deficient performance, the defendant would not have entered a plea but 
would have insisted on going to trial. 292 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 5. 
 
Woven throughout Morris' ineffective assistance of counsel argument is the 
contention that he was "forced to choose between his Fifth Amendment rights and his 
Sixth Amendment rights." Morris argues that Dosh "wait[ed] until the last minute" to file 
the motion to suppress. This, Morris asserts, forced a dilemma:  Try the case or take 
advantage of the State's plea offer.  
 
In support of his argument, Morris relies on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
377, 394, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968) (defendant's testimony at suppression 
 
18 
 
 
 
hearing claiming ownership of suitcase inadmissible against defendant at trial on issue of 
guilt; contrary holding would impermissibly pit Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable search, seizure against Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).  
 
Morris' situation did not require him to surrender one constitutional right in order 
to assert another. He could have persisted in attempting to vindicate his Fifth Amendment 
right through the motion to suppress. His other option was to forego his chance for that 
vindication and plea bargain in exchange for a sentencing placement recommendation. 
"[A] defendant in a criminal action has no constitutional right to plea bargain." State v. 
Jackson, 223 Kan. 554, 558, 575 P.2d 536 (1978). Moreover, "[t]he very nature of [a 
plea] agreement is that the defendant waives statutory rights or constitutional rights in 
exchange for dismissal of other criminal charges or prosecutorial recommendations at 
sentencing" or both. State v. Perry, 39 Kan. App. 2d 700, 702, 183 P.3d 12, rev. denied 
286 Kan. 1184 (2008).  
 
The rest of Morris' ineffective assistance argument, as presented on appeal, turns 
on whether Dosh's delay in filing and pursuing a ruling on the motion to suppress fell 
below the objective standard of reasonableness.  
 
At the motion to withdraw plea hearing, the district judge noted that the motion to 
suppress was filed after the motions deadline set in the case. Dosh testified that he had 
talked with the prosecutor in order to ensure there would be no issue with the lateness of 
the filing, and the district judge stated that the late filing would not have prevented the 
motion from receiving a hearing before trial. Although an earlier filing of the motion may 
have facilitated its speedier decision, and knowing the outcome of the hearing could have 
been helpful to Morris in weighing his options, he was not prevented from factoring in 
his chances of success on the motion to suppress when he decided to sign the plea 
 
19 
 
 
 
agreement. Dosh's performance on the motion to suppress certainly could have been 
better, but it did not fall below the constitutional standard. 
 
Morris' ineffective assistance of counsel argument cannot support a holding that 
the district judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to withdraw. 
 
Understanding of a No Contest Plea 
 
Appellate counsel argues, as appointed district court counsel did, that Morris 
cannot understand abstract concepts, and, as a result, he did not understand a no contest 
plea or its likely consequences. As with Morris' argument on promises, the record does 
not support counsel's assertion.  
 
At the plea hearing, the district judge explained at length the charges against 
Morris, the nature of a no contest plea, and the guilty verdict consequence of such a plea. 
Morris said he understood the plea and its consequences. Dosh also explained the 
consequences of pleading no contest at the plea hearing. Morris again indicated he 
understood those consequences.  
 
This argument also cannot support a holding that the district judge abused his 
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw.  
 
Cumulative Error 
 
Finally, Morris invokes the cumulative error doctrine, typically applied when an 
appellate court examines a case for trial error. See State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 71, 209 
P.3d 675 (2009). Morris argues that the doctrine can support a reversal under our abuse 
of discretion standard if all of a defendant's arguments, taken together, persuade us that a 
 
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district judge failed to recognize or improperly disregarded manifest injustice on a 
postsentencing plea withdrawal motion. The State argues that Morris failed to preserve a 
cumulative error argument for appeal.  
 
We need address neither of these arguments. Even assuming that cumulative error 
may be applied in this situation because the existence of manifest injustice is determined 
with an eye to the totality of the circumstances, see State v. Moses, 280 Kan. 939, 950, 
127 P.3d 330 (2006) (appellate court considers totality of circumstances when 
determining whether plea knowingly and voluntarily made); State v. Smith, 278 Kan. 45, 
51-52, 92 P.3d 1096 (2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel based on totality of 
circumstances), and that Morris followed whatever procedure is necessary to preserve the 
issue for appellate review, we have detected no errors to consider cumulatively. See State 
v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 298, 312 P.3d 328 (2013) (cumulative error doctrine 
inapplicable when no errors identified).  
 
Morris is not entitled to reversal of the district judge's ruling on this basis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We affirm the district judge's determination that defendant Andrew H. Morris 
failed to demonstrate that manifest injustice compelled withdrawal of his pleas of no 
contest to two counts of felony murder and one count of aggravated arson. On the record 
of this case, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion.