Case Title: Cousino Constr. Co. v. Wilkins

Citation: 2006-Ohio-162

Docket Number: 20041560

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cousino Constr. Co. v. Wilkins, 108 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006-Ohio-162.] 
 
 
COUSINO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. 
WILKINS, TAX COMMR., APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Cousino Constr. Co. v. Wilkins, 108 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006-Ohio-162.] 
Use tax – Janitorial services used by general contractors are consumed by the 
contractors, not resold, and are subject to use tax — To preserve an issue 
for review, notice of appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals must specify 
exemption sought. 
(No. 2004-1560 — Submitted October 11, 2005 — Decided  
February 1, 2006.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2002-N-919. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to decide in this appeal as of right whether Cousino 
Construction Company owes use taxes on its use of services provided by 
professional cleaners who removed soot, dirt, and odors from buildings that 
Cousino reconstructed and restored. 
{¶ 2} The Tax Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) 
found that Cousino used or consumed taxable janitorial services and did not resell 
those services to others.  The BTA ruled that the R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception 
to the sales and use tax therefore did not apply.  We affirm the decision of the 
BTA on those issues, which are the focus of Cousino’s cross-appeal. 
{¶ 3} On the other issue in the case, the Tax Commissioner and the BTA 
disagreed.  The Tax Commissioner found that Cousino was not entitled to a tax 
exemption under R.C. 5739.02(B)(13), which provides a sales- and use-tax 
exemption for the sale of any materials or services to construction contractors 
when those materials or services are to be incorporated into a government-owned 
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building.  The BTA reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the exemption 
did apply and that Cousino therefore did not owe use taxes on its use of the 
janitorial services that it purchased. 
{¶ 4} We reverse the decision of the BTA on this issue without reaching 
the merits because Cousino did not preserve the issue in its notice of appeal filed 
with the BTA, and the BTA therefore had no jurisdiction to consider it. 
Facts 
{¶ 5} Cousino Construction Company of Perrysburg, Ohio, is a general 
contractor that helps restore homes, offices, and cars damaged by fires, floods, 
and other disasters.  Subcontractors hired by Cousino typically provide a thorough 
cleaning of a damaged site to remove soot, smoke, odors, mold, and water, and 
then Cousino’s employees reconstruct the site with drywall, paint, floor 
coverings, and any other materials and services needed to return the structure to 
its original condition. 
{¶ 6} In 1997, the Tax Commissioner conducted an audit of the 
purchases reported by Cousino for the period July 1, 1993, through December 31, 
1996, and concluded that the company owed more than $46,000 in unpaid use 
taxes, penalties, and interest charges.  Cousino paid some of the assessed taxes but 
objected to others in a petition for reassessment.  A hearing was held before the 
Tax Commissioner in May 1999. 
{¶ 7} After that hearing, the Tax Commissioner prepared a written 
decision in which he rejected the objections raised by Cousino.  The Tax 
Commissioner concluded that Cousino owed use taxes on janitorial services that it 
had purchased from several subcontractors and found that the resale exception to 
the use tax did not apply to Cousino because the services provided to Cousino 
were not resold by it in the form in which they were received, as the resale 
exception requires. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 8} Cousino appealed to the BTA, which held a hearing on the matter 
in July 2003.  Cousino presented the testimony of two witnesses.  The BTA sided 
with the Tax Commissioner on the question whether Cousino was exempt from 
use taxes under the R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception, but agreed with Cousino 
that the company’s purchases of cleaning services for the restoration of school 
buildings were exempt from taxation under R.C. 5739.02(B)(13).  The latter 
provision states that some services sold to construction contractors and 
incorporated into a structure under a contract with a governmental entity are not 
subject to sales or use taxes. 
{¶ 9} The Tax Commissioner appealed from the latter portion of the 
BTA’s decision, and Cousino cross-appealed from the former. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 10} In reviewing a BTA decision, this court looks to see whether that 
decision was “reasonable and lawful.”  Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Zaino (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 496, 497, 739 N.E.2d 783; R.C. 5717.04.  The court 
“will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal 
conclusion.”  Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789.  But “[t]he BTA is responsible for 
determining factual issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative 
support for these BTA determinations,” this court will affirm them.  Am. Natl. 
Can Co. v. Tracy (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483. 
{¶ 11} As for the burden of proof, it rests on the taxpayer “to show the 
manner and extent of the error in the Tax Commissioner’s final determination.”  
Standards Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. Zaino, 100 Ohio St.3d 240, 2003-Ohio-
5804, 797 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 30.  The Tax Commissioner’s findings “are 
presumptively valid, absent a demonstration that those findings are clearly 
unreasonable or unlawful.”  Nusseibeh v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 292, 2003-Ohio-
855, 784 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 10.  Any claimed exemption from taxation “must be strictly 
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construed,” and the taxpayer “must affirmatively establish his or her right” to the 
exemption.  Campus Bus Serv. v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-1915, 786 
N.E.2d 889, ¶ 8. 
Ohio’s Use Tax 
{¶ 12} Under R.C. 5741.02(A)(1), a tax is levied on “the storage, use, or 
other consumption in this state of tangible personal property or the benefit 
realized in this state of any service provided.”  However, if the acquisition of the 
tangible personal property or services “would be a sale not subject to the [sales] 
tax imposed by sections 5739.01 to 5739.31 of the Revised Code,” then the use 
tax described in R.C. Chapter 5741 is likewise not imposed.  R.C. 5741.02(C)(2). 
{¶ 13} Generally, the purchase of cleaning services is subject to the sales 
and use tax.  See R.C. 5739.01(B)(3)(j) (“ ‘Sale’ and ‘selling’ include * * * [a]ll 
transactions by which * * * [b]uilding maintenance and janitorial service is or is 
to be provided”) and R.C. 5739.02 (the sales tax is “levied on each retail sale 
made in this state”).  The term “[b]uilding maintenance and janitorial service” is 
defined in R.C. 5739.01(II) as “cleaning the interior or exterior of a building and 
any tangible personal property located therein or thereon.” 
Cousino’s Cross-Appeal 
{¶ 14} Cousino hired subcontractors to clean fire- or flood-damaged 
buildings during the audit period, and the Tax Commissioner concluded that 
Cousino’s purchases of those cleaning services were subject to the use tax 
imposed on building maintenance and janitorial services.  Cousino contends 
instead that the cleaning services it (with the help of subcontractors) provided to 
the company’s nonprofit customers — most notably, public school districts and 
churches — were not subject to the use tax, because these tax-exempt entities, not 
Cousino, were the consumers of the services that the Tax Commissioner assessed. 
Cousino was a Consumer of Cleaning Services 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 15} First, the Tax Commissioner and the BTA both found that Cousino 
was eligible for imposition of use taxes on the cleaning services because Cousino 
was the consumer of those services.  That finding is well supported by facts in the 
record. 
{¶ 16} Under R.C. 5741.02(B), the consumer who realizes the benefit of a 
service is liable for the use tax imposed on that service.  And “consumer” is 
defined in R.C. 5741.01(F) as “any person who has purchased tangible personal 
property or has been provided a service for storage, use, or other consumption or 
benefit in this state.”  Several terms in that definition are themselves defined as 
well:  “person” is defined in R.C. 5741.01(A) to include corporations; “purchase” 
is defined in R.C. 5741.01(D) as “acquired or received for a consideration”; and 
“providing a service” is defined by R.C. 5741.01(M) and R.C. 5739.01(X) as 
“providing or furnishing * * * [any taxable service, including building 
maintenance and janitorial service] for consideration.” 
{¶ 17} Cousino was the consumer of the cleaning services that were 
provided to it by the various subcontractors.  It benefited from those services 
because it was able to charge its final customers — insurance companies and the 
owners of dirty and damaged buildings who had purchased insurance — both for 
those cleaning services and for the materials and skilled labor that Cousino’s own 
employees provided to those customers when reconstructing and restoring the 
buildings.  The cleaning services that Cousino consumed allowed Cousino to 
deliver fully cleaned and restored buildings to Cousino’s customers.  And as 
Cousino itself acknowledges, it received the subcontractors’ services in return for 
a consideration.  That is to say, Cousino paid the subcontractors for their work. 
{¶ 18} In addition, nothing in the record suggests that Cousino or the 
companies from which it purchased cleaning services were exempt from sales and 
use taxes, and there is likewise no indication in the record that the cleaning 
companies collected sales taxes on the “building maintenance and janitorial 
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services” that they provided to Cousino.  R.C. 5739.01(II).  Had they done so, 
Cousino would not be liable for use taxes.  See R.C. 5741.02(C)(1). 
{¶ 19} Cousino was, therefore, the consumer of the taxable janitorial 
services that the cleaning subcontractors provided to it.  The fact that Cousino’s 
customers — some of which were nonprofit entities — also benefited from the 
cleaning services does not change the fact that Cousino was rightly viewed by the 
Tax Commissioner as the consumer of those services because Cousino realized a 
benefit from them and paid a consideration for them to the service providers. 
The Resale Exception Does Not Apply 
{¶ 20} The Tax Commissioner and the BTA both found as well that 
Cousino did not “resell” the cleaning services in the same form in which they 
were purchased.  That conclusion is also a sound one. 
{¶ 21} R.C. 5739.01(E) excludes from the definition of “[r]etail sale” (and 
therefore excludes from the R.C. 5739.02 sales tax on retail sales) any sale “in 
which the purpose of the consumer is to resell the thing transferred or benefit of 
the service provided, by a person engaging in business, in the form in which the 
same is, or is to be, received by the person.”  In other words, when the purchaser’s 
intent in buying goods or services is to resell them to yet another purchaser 
without changing the goods or services in any way, the original purchase is not 
considered a “retail sale” and is therefore not subject to the sales tax on retail 
sales.  (And under R.C. 5741.02(C)(2), any sale not subject to sales tax is likewise 
not subject to the use tax.) 
{¶ 22} The BTA concluded that the resale exception in R.C. 5739.01(E) 
does not apply in this case.  The Tax Commissioner’s final determination had 
likewise rejected the application of the resale exception, explaining: 
{¶ 23} “The cleaning services were not resold to the petitioner’s 
[Cousino’s] customers in an unchanged form.  Rather, the petitioner received the 
January Term, 2006 
7 
benefit of the cleaning services and added its project management/general 
contractor skills to the cleaning services.” 
{¶ 24} That statement by the Tax Commissioner aptly summarizes the 
facts.  According to testimony presented by Cousino to the BTA, the cleaning 
subcontractors typically billed Cousino for their services, and then those charges 
were incorporated into the invoices that Cousino would send to its customers (i.e., 
insurance companies or the property owners whose buildings Cousino had agreed 
to restore).  The cleaning services were consumed – not resold – by Cousino.  
Cousino was not a retail seller of those services.  The insurance companies and 
property owners promised to pay Cousino to provide a restored and rebuilt 
building, and Cousino in turn hired and paid cleaning subcontractors to, as one of 
those subcontractors told the BTA, “get[] the building prepped for Cousino to 
rebuild.” 
{¶ 25} Although this case involves janitorial or cleaning services, a recent 
case involving employment services is instructive.  In Corporate Staffing 
Resources, Inc. v. Zaino (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 1, 764 N.E.2d 1006, the court 
found that a provider of employment services was not entitled to the resale 
exception, because the computer-hardware company that hired the temporary 
employees from the employment-service provider did not resell those services.  
The computer-hardware company had purchased “a temporary and flexible work 
force of sufficient size and expertise,” and the computer company’s customers 
had in turn paid the computer company to keep the customers’ computers “up and 
running.”  Id. at 3, 764 N.E.2d 1006.  The employment services (the temporary 
workers) were “a means to an end” for the computer company’s customers, rather 
than an end in itself.  Id.  Those services were not, in other words, resold “in the 
form in which * * * [they had been] received,” as would be required for the R.C. 
5739.01(E) resale exception to apply to the initial sale of the employment 
services.  The computer company paid for employment services and used the 
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workers it hired to service computers.  The company that had provided the 
temporary workers and had been paid for that service owed taxes on the money it 
earned in the transaction.  Id. at 5, 764 N.E.2d 1006. 
{¶ 26} The same is true in this case.  Cousino brought in cleaning-service 
subcontractors to “do the cleaning end” of the restoration projects that Cousino 
performed for its customers and paid those subcontractors for their work, 
according to the production manager for one of the subcontractors.  Cousino, in 
turn, performed, as a Cousino official who serves as a salesman and estimator 
explained, “the overall job,” which he characterized as “a restoration process” 
involving “construction or reconstruction” of damaged buildings. 
{¶ 27} Like the computer company in Corporate Staffing Resources, 
Cousino hired skilled service providers to perform certain jobs and then relied on 
the efforts of those workers to help Cousino deliver the reconstructed and restored 
buildings that Cousino’s customers needed.  The employment services were not 
resold by the computer company in Corporate Staffing Resources, and the 
cleaning services were not resold by Cousino in this case.  The companies that did 
sell “[b]uilding maintenance and janitorial service,” as that term is defined in R.C. 
5739.01(II), were the subcontractors hired by Cousino to clean the buildings that 
Cousino planned to restore.  The R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception does not 
exempt Cousino from paying use taxes for the cleaning services that it purchased 
and used, just as that exception did not exempt the computer company in 
Corporate Staffing Resources from paying use taxes for the employment services 
that it purchased and used.  See, also, Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. v. Tracy 
(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 351, 353, 725 N.E.2d 1132 (rejecting a taxpayer’s effort to 
rely on the resale exception when the taxpayer “received the benefit” of services 
that it purchased and then combined that benefit with the taxpayer’s materials and 
the work of its own employees “to create the item sold”). 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 28} The burden rested on Cousino to prove to the Tax Commissioner 
and the BTA that the R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception applied to the janitorial 
services that Cousino claims to have resold to its customers.  Cousino did not 
meet that burden.  Cousino is not in the business of selling or reselling cleaning 
services and indeed is not even licensed to sell cleaning services under R.C. 
5739.17(A)(3), which requires vendors of taxable goods and services to purchase 
a vendor’s license from the county treasurer.  The benefit that Cousino delivered 
to its customers (reconstructed and restored buildings) was not the same benefit 
that Cousino purchased in the same form in which Cousino received it from the 
cleaning subcontractors.  The BTA therefore reached the reasonable and lawful 
conclusion that Cousino had not proven its entitlement to the resale exception. 
{¶ 29} For those reasons, we do not agree with the arguments presented 
by Cousino in its cross-appeal.  Instead, we affirm the decision of the BTA on the 
issues raised in the cross-appeal because (1) Cousino was the consumer of the 
cleaning services that it purchased from the subcontractors and (2) Cousino did 
not resell the benefit of those services in the form in which it was received (as 
would be required for the R.C. 5739.01(E) exception to apply). 
The Tax Commissioner’s Appeal 
{¶ 30} Although the BTA found Cousino ineligible for the R.C. 
5739.01(E) resale exception, it concluded that a different provision, R.C. 
5739.02(B)(13), nonetheless exempted Cousino from the obligation to pay use 
taxes on some of the company’s purchases of cleaning services from the 
subcontractors.  Under that latter statutory provision, sales and use taxes do not 
apply to certain construction-related sales, including the sale of (1) “[b]uilding 
and construction materials and services sold to construction contractors for 
incorporation into a structure or improvement to real property under a 
construction contract with this state or a political subdivision of this state” or (2) 
building and construction materials and services sold to construction contractors 
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for incorporation into a structure or improvement to real property “that are 
accepted for ownership by this state or any of its political subdivisions.”  R.C. 
5739.02(B)(13). 
{¶ 31} The Tax Commissioner has appealed the BTA’s decision granting 
the tax exemption, challenging the decision both on procedural grounds and on 
the merits. 
Cousino Failed to Cite R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) in its Notice of Appeal to the BTA 
{¶ 32} The Tax Commissioner argues first that Cousino did not properly 
raise an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) exemption request before the BTA and therefore 
should not have been given that exemption in that forum.  We agree. 
{¶ 33} The Tax Commissioner’s May 2002 final determination rejected 
Cousino’s request for an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) exemption.  Cousino then appealed 
to the BTA. 
{¶ 34} R.C. 5717.02, which explains the proper procedure for challenging 
the Tax Commissioner’s final determinations, directs any appellant who files a 
notice of appeal with the BTA to attach a copy of the Tax Commissioner’s final 
determination to that notice and to “also specify the errors therein complained of.”  
When Cousino appealed to the BTA in July 2002, however, Cousino never 
mentioned R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) in its four-page notice of appeal, despite listing 
several other statutory provisions in the notice.  Cousino also did not cite R.C. 
5739.02(B)(13) anywhere in its 12-page posthearing appellant’s brief filed with 
the BTA in September 2003 or in its six-page reply brief filed with the BTA in 
November 2003. 
{¶ 35} Even so, when the BTA issued its decision in August 2004, the 
BTA found that the omission of R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) from Cousino’s notice of 
appeal was “a typographical error” on Cousino’s part that the BTA could 
overlook.  Our examination of the notice of appeal leads us to conclude that that 
finding was an incorrect one. 
January Term, 2006 
11 
{¶ 36} This court has held in past cases that an appellant must specify the 
particular exemption it seeks in its notice of appeal to the BTA in order to 
preserve the issue for review.  See, e.g., Kern v. Tracy (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 347, 
349, 650 N.E.2d 428 (appellants’ failure to mention the R.C. 5739.02(B)(14) 
exemption claim was “fatal”); Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Lindley (1982), 69 
Ohio St.2d 71, 75, 23 O.O.3d 118, 430 N.E.2d 939 (“Under R.C. 5717.02, a 
notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction upon the Board of Tax Appeals to 
resolve an issue, unless that issue is clearly specified in the notice of appeal”); 
Lenart v. Lindley (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 110, 114, 15 O.O.3d 152, 399 N.E.2d 
1222 (“R.C. 5717.02 is a jurisdictional enactment and * * * adherence to the 
conditions and procedure set forth in the statute is essential”); Queen City Valves 
v. Peck (1954), 161 Ohio St. 579, 583, 53 O.O. 430, 120 N.E.2d 310, quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.1951) (R.C. 5717.02 requires the appellant to 
“specify” any alleged errors, and “specify” means “ ‘to mention specifically; to 
state in full and explicit terms; to point out; to tell or state precisely or in detail; to 
particularize; or to distinguish by words one thing from another’ ”).  
{¶ 37} Cousino’s four-page, single-spaced notice of appeal to the BTA 
was certainly detailed, but it contained no mention of an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) 
exemption or any language that might suggest to the reasonable reader that 
Cousino intended to claim an exemption under that section.  Cousino did refer in 
the notice to the R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception addressed earlier in this 
opinion and also referred in three different paragraphs to tax exemptions under 
R.C. 5739.02(B)(1) (exempting sales to the state and its political subdivisions) 
and R.C. 5739.02(B)(12) (exempting sales to churches, nonprofit organizations, 
and other tax-exempt entities).  The accompanying text of the notice of appeal 
surrounding the references to those two exemptions repeatedly mentioned “non-
profit” organizations and “churches.”  Those terms suggest that Cousino intended 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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to claim exemptions under the two statutory provisions that it listed in three 
places in the notice. 
{¶ 38} Significantly, the notice did not refer to any of the terms that are 
unique to R.C. 5739.02(B)(13), such as “[b]uilding and construction materials and 
services” or “incorporation” into real estate.  While the notice did mention “sales 
to the State or any of its political subdivisions,” that language is a direct quote 
from R.C. 5739.02(B)(1), one of the two exemption provisions that Cousino cited 
in the notice of appeal, rather than from R.C. 5739.02(B)(13), which the BTA’s 
decision addressed. 
{¶ 39} The BTA concluded that Cousino’s three references in the notice 
to R.C. 5739.02(B)(1) were actually typographical errors and that Cousino had 
intended to type R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) instead.  The text surrounding the three 
references to R.C. 5739.02(B)(1) in the notice does not support that view, 
however, and Cousino’s failure to mention R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) in its two 
posthearing briefs filed with the BTA reinforces our conclusion that Cousino 
never intended to ask the BTA for an exemption under R.C. 5739.02(B)(13). 
{¶ 40} If the omission of any reference in the notice to R.C. 
5739.02(B)(13) were truly a typographical error, and if Cousino’s true intent were 
evident from the text of the notice taken as a whole, then perhaps the 
“typographical error” could rightly be overlooked.  This omission was not a 
typographical error, however, and the BTA exceeded its jurisdiction by 
considering and granting a tax exemption to Cousino based on a statutory 
provision that is mentioned nowhere in the notice of appeal or in Cousino’s two 
posthearing briefs. 
{¶ 41} For more than 50 years, this court’s decisions interpreting the 
specificity requirement of R.C. 5717.02 have made clear that a notice of appeal 
filed with the BTA must explicitly and precisely recite the errors contained in the 
Tax Commissioner’s final determination.  The notice of appeal that Cousino filed 
January Term, 2006 
13 
with the BTA did not challenge the Tax Commissioner’s denial of an R.C. 
5739.02(B)(13) exemption, and no objective and reasonable reader could honestly 
say that it did.  Though this court is “ ‘not disposed to deny review by a 
hypertechnical reading of the notice,’ ” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
Limbach (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 195, 197, 625 N.E.2d 597, quoting Buckeye 
Internatl., Inc. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 264, 268, 595 N.E.2d 347, the 
notice in this case, just like Cousino’s posthearing briefs, provided no indication 
that Cousino was seeking an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) exemption before the BTA.  
Cousino did not satisfy the specificity requirement of R.C. 5717.02 with respect 
to the R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) tax exemption. 
{¶ 42} On the Tax Commissioner’s appeal, then, we must reverse the 
BTA’s decision granting an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) exemption to Cousino.  The 
BTA had no jurisdiction to consider that exemption in this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 43} For the reasons stated above, the BTA’s decision is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.  The BTA correctly determined that (1) Cousino was the 
consumer of the cleaning services that it purchased and (2) Cousino did not resell 
those services in the same form in which they were purchased (and therefore was 
not entitled to a tax exemption under the R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception).  The 
BTA incorrectly found that Cousino preserved its claim to an R.C. 
5739.02(B)(13) exemption in the notice of appeal that Cousino filed with the 
BTA, and therefore we find that the BTA had no jurisdiction to address or grant 
an exemption under that statutory provision. 
{¶ 44} The case is remanded for further proceedings.  The BTA did not 
consider Cousino’s requests for tax exemptions under R.C. 5739.02(B)(1) and 
5739.02(B)(12), and the BTA should now consider whether Cousino is entitled to 
an exemption under either or both of those provisions. 
Decision affirmed in part 
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and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Lane Montz, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Janyce C. Katz, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
_______________________