Case Title: Cochran v. Grubbs

Citation: 913 So. 2d 446

Docket Number: 1040038

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
913 So. 2d 446 (2005)
Jimmy Paul COCHRAN
v.
Aaron GRUBBS.
1040038.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 20, 2005.
*447 Albert H. Adams, Jr., Eufaula, for appellant.
Paul W. Brunson, Jr., Clayton, for appellee.
WOODALL, Justice.
Jimmy Paul Cochran appeals from a judgment annulling his election to the office of mayor of the Town of Bakerhill. We reverse and remand with directions.
On August 24, 2004, the Town of Bakerhill held an election for mayor. The candidates were Cochran and Aaron Grubbs. The day after the election, Cochran was officially declared the winner by one vote. Specifically, it was declared that Cochran had received 85 votes and that Grubbs had received 84 votes.
On August 30, 2004, Grubbs filed a "verified contest of election" pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-69 et seq., and § 17-15-20 et seq. The complaint contained the following pertinent averments:
(Emphasis added.)
On September 14, 2004, Grubbs filed a "notice of nature of evidence" ("the notice"). The notice stated, in toto:
Trial of the contest began on September 27, 2004. At the beginning of the proceedings, the following colloquy occurred:
(Emphasis added.) The trial then proceeded.
On October 4, 2004, the trial court annulled the election and ordered the Town of Bakerhill to conduct a new election. More specifically, the court stated:
(Emphasis added.) Cochran appealed.
Of the four ballots that the notice alleged were wrongly rejected, only three remain at issue on appeal. It is now uncontroverted that M.M. was ineligible to vote in the election. Also, there remains no issue regarding "duplicate" votes, or the double counting of votes. Thus, the only ballots at issue are the absentee ballots cast by M.L.H., D.M., and B.L. The trial court rejected those ballots, which represented votes for Grubbs. Nevertheless, by adding those voters to the vote tally, it concluded that neither candidate had received "the requisite number of votes" for election and refused to declare Cochran the winner.
Cochran contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike all issues of "misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of an election official," as alleged in the complaint. Cochran's brief, at 11. Alternatively, he insists that the trial court had no authority to order a new election. We first address the motion to strike.
In Cochran's written motion to strike, which he filed the morning of trial, he argued, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) Thus, he argued in the trial court, as he does here, that Grubbs failed to comply with § 17-15-21 and with cases applying that Code section.[1]
Section 17-15-21 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Section 17-15-21 applies to elections of municipal officials. Turner v. Cooper, 347 So. 2d 1339, 1344 (Ala.1977); Pope v. Howle, 227 Ala. 154, 149 So. 222 (1933). Strict compliance with this section is mandatory. Turner, 347 So. 2d  at 1345; Dobbs v. Brunson, 17 Ala.App. 318, 85 So. 38 (1920). Thus, the statute required Grubbs to "set out in his [notice] sufficient facts to show wherein and how the election official[] [was] guilty of malconduct," Carter v. Wiley, 406 So. 2d 340, 347 (1981) (Maddox, J., concurring specially), as alleged in the complaint, and to do so at least 10 days before the "taking of testimony." In the absence of such notice, Grubbs could not proceed on a malconduct theory at trial. See Turner, supra; Carter, supra; see also Thomas v. Kellett, 489 So. 2d 554 (Ala.1986).
In Carter, for example, a contest was commenced on the complaint of James A. Carter, an unsuccessful candidate for election to the Mobile County Commission. 406 So. 2d  at 341. The complaint asserted the following three grounds for the contest:
406 So. 2d  at 341 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, "Carter filed a pleading styled `Notice of Nature of the Evidence' *451..., which purported to comply with the terms of § 17-15-21" ("the notice pleading"). Carter, 406 So. 2d  at 343. The notice pleading stated, in pertinent part:
Carter, 406 So. 2d  at 343.
On motion of the contestee, Dan Wiley, the trial court struck the notice pleading on the ground that it failed to comply with § 17-15-21. When Carter declined the court's offer of an extension of time to amend the notice pleading, the court dismissed the action. 406 So. 2d  at 344-45.
This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. In doing so, it explained:
Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added).
The purpose of § 17-15-21 is to ensure that notice is given to parties adverse to the election contest, at least 10 days before the "taking of testimony," of what the contestant expects the evidence to show at trial. 406 So. 2d  at 341. It is certainly no answer that such evidence might surface during testimony at trial. Cochran was entitled to notice, no later than September 17, 2004, of "sufficient facts to show wherein and how the election[] official[] [was] guilty," 406 So. 2d  at 347 (Maddox, J., concurring specially), of *452 the "misconduct, fraud, or corruption" averred in the complaint. The notice, however, contained no mention of official misconduct. For all that appeared on the day of trial, Grubbs had abandoned his claim of "misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of an election official."
Not only was evidence of such conduct received at the trial, but it formed the basis of the judgment annulling the election. Specifically, the trial court found that M.L.H., D.M., and B.L. had mailed "their absentee ballots without [the] accompanying [a]ffidavit," and, therefore, that their votes for Grubbs could not be counted. It also found that their attempts at voting by absentee ballot were thwarted by wrongdoing on the part of the "Absentee Election Manager, and/or others without proper authorization acting in his stead." In particular, the court concluded that it was wrong for the election manager to be "absent from the office on the last three business days" before the week of the election, and that this absence constituted "negligence, misconduct, fraud and/or corruption." Thus, the court concluded, the unsuccessful attempts by M.L.H., D.M., and B.L. to vote by absentee ballot warranted a new election. The trial court erred in allowing Grubbs to present evidence of alleged improper conduct of the election manager and in relying on that evidence as a basis for annulling the election.
Because we hold that the trial court erred in annulling the election, we need not address Cochran's alternative argument that the trial court had no authority to order a new election.
In summary, the trial court correctly held that the absentee ballots of M.L.H., D.M., and B.L. "could not be added to Grubbs's total to declare him the winner." Indeed, Grubbs concedes on appeal that those ballots are invalid under Alabama law. With the vote tally at 85 votes for Cochran and 84 votes for Grubbs, the trial court should have declared Cochran the winner. Having failed to do so, it erred. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a judgment in favor of Cochran.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
NABERS, C.J., and LYONS, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
[1]  Grubbs does not respond to this argument in his brief to this Court.