Case Title: In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF RHA, a Minor v. John DOE and Jane Doe; In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF RHA, a Minor v. PAA, Appellee

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-84-3

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF RHA, a Minor v. John DOE and Jane Doe; In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF RHA, a Minor v. PAA, Appellee1985 WY 84702 P.2d 1259Case Number: C-84-3, C-84-4Decided: 07/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of 
the ADOPTION OF RHA, a Minor.

 
 
PAA, Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
John DOE and Jane 
Doe, Appellees (Petitioners).  In 
the Matter of the ADOPTION OF RHA, a Minor.

 
 
John DOE and Jane 
Doe, Appellants (Petitioners), 

 
 
v.

 
 
PAA, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
Chris Dull Edwards of Edwards & 
Edwards, Cody, for respondent, 
PAA.

 
 
John W. Davis of Davis, Donnell, 
Worral & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for petitioners John and Jane 
Doe.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, 
BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 

BROWN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
"Final Order of Adoption" granted by the Washakie County District Court, 
permitting John and Jane Doe to adopt RHA. Appellant PAA, the father of RHA, 
raises the following issues:

 
 
"The district court's failure to make 
a finding of fact as to whether the appellant [PAA] willfully failed to 
contribute to the support of [RHA] for a period of one year immediately prior 
to the filing of the petition to adopt resulted in an erroneous conclusion 
of law as to whether appellant [PAA's] consent was required for the adoption of 
[RHA].

 
 
"The district court's failure to make 
a finding of fact as to whether the appellant [PAA] willfully permitted 
[RHA] to be maintained by Park County D-PASS for a period of one year 
immediately prior to the filing of the petition of adoption without 
substantially contributing to the support of [RHA] resulted in an erroneous 
conclusion of law as to whether appellant [PAA's] consent was required for the 
adoption of [RHA].

 
 
"There was not substantial evidence to 
support the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated by the district 
court.

 
 
"The district court abused its 
discretion when it bifurcated the adoption proceeding and refused to allow [PAA] 
any knowledge of the petitioner's identity or refused participation of the 
appellant in the best-interests' portion of the proceeding.  "Wyoming Statutes §§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-318 
for termination of parental rights and Wyoming Statute § 1-22-110 for 
adoption without parental consent violate appellant [PAA's] substantive due 
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.  Constitution because they arbitrarily 
and without reason, set different standards for termination of parental 
rights."

 
 

[¶2.]     Petitioners in the 
district court, John and Jane Doe, cross-appeal and raise an additional 
issue:

 
 
"Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it refused to grant a permanent injunction

 
 
"1) Restraining [PAA] from contacting 
certain named and unnamed persons or seeking them out after his release from 
Prison; and

 
 
"2) Enjoining [PAA] from entering Park 
or Washakie Counties after his release from prison."

 
 

[¶3.]     We will affirm the 
district court in both appeals.

 
 

[¶4.]     RHA is one of the 
children of the marriage of RA and PAA. The marriage ended in divorce, with PAA 
abandoning his family. In 1981, seven years later, after RHA had been molested 
by her stepfather, she went to live with her father, PAA, in Powell, Wyoming. 
Appellant PAA began sexual intercourse with his twelve-year old daughter in 
July, 1981, and had sexual intercourse with her about fifty times before she 
revealed to authorities what had been taking place. She was removed from her 
father's home in late October 1981, and criminal charges were brought against 
him. At a criminal trial in July, 1982, PAA was convicted of the crimes charged 
in the information, and was

 
 
"* * * sentenced to: six to eight 
years in the penitentiary for taking indecent liberties with a child in 
violation of § 14-3-105, W.S.1977; four to five years in the penitentiary for 
committing incest in violation of § 6-5-102, W.S.1977; and four to five years in 
the penitentiary for engaging in illicit sexual relations with a child in 
violation of § 14-3-104, W.S.1977; all sentences to be served concurrently." [PAA] v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 1156 (1983).

 
 

[¶5.]     From October, 1981 
until May of 1982, PAA was earning $1,400 per month as a truck driver. From 
October, 1981, the Park County Division of Public Assistance and Social Services 
was paying about $300 per month for RHA's maintenance, plus other medical and 
counseling costs. Between the time criminal charges were filed and trial was 
held, PAA sent a total of $45 to RHA for her support. He declared to Peter 
Dvorak, a social worker, that he was willing to give his daughter 
"walking-around" money, but "that under no conditions would he make payments to 
the State of Wyoming or any other state." From January 6, 1983 to January 6, 
1984, the year immediately before the petition to adopt was filed, and while PAA 
was incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, he earned $35 a month. From 
this PAA contributed a total of $16 toward the care of his 
daughter.

 
 

[¶6.]     A petition to adopt RHA 
was filed in the district court on January 6, 1984, the petitioners being 
allowed to file under the names of John and Jane Doe. The petitioners alleged 
that the statutory reasons for nonconsent of the parent had been met, pursuant 
to § 1-22-110, W.S.1977. The district court ruled that the trial should be 
bifurcated, so that the question of whether the consent of PAA was required 
would be heard separately from the question of whether John and Jane Doe were 
fit and proper persons to adopt RHA, and also whether the adoption was in her 
best interests.

 
 

[¶7.]     An order and judgment 
entered on May 21, 1984, held that the consent of PAA to the proposed adoption 
by John and Jane Doe was not required. PAA was denied further participation in 
the adoption proceedings, and John and Jane Doe were allowed to adopt 
RHA.

 
 

 

[¶8.]     The first issue is 
whether the consent of appellant to adopt was necessary. Section 1-22-110, 
W.S.1977, provides in part:

 
 
"(a) In addition to the exceptions 
contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child may be ordered without the 
written consent of the parents or putative father * * * if the court finds that 
the nonconsenting parent or putative father has:

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
"(iii) Willfully abandoned or deserted 
the child; or

 
 
"(iv) Willfully failed to contribute 
to the support of the child for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to 
the filing of the petition to adopt; or

 
 
"(v) Willfully permitted the child to 
be maintained in or by a public or private institution or by the division of 
public assistance and social services within the department of health and social 
services for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition without substantially contributing to the support of the child; or 

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
"(vii) Been adjudged by a court to be 
guilty of cruelty, abuse, neglect or mistreatment of the child. * * * " 

 
 

[¶9.]     The court's Order and 
Judgment dated May 21, 1984, reflects that in the first part of the bifurcated 
hearing the court determined "That the consent of [PAA] to the proposed adoption 
* * * is not required." To support this conclusion the court 
found:

 
 
"6. That from October 26, 1981 until 
May of 1982 [PAA] received substantial income and was able to contribute to the 
support of his daughter and that he failed to do so without justifiable excuse 
and during that period contributed the sum of $55.00.

 
 
"7. That in May of 1982 [PAA] was 
convicted in Park County, Wyoming and was sentenced to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary for a period of six to eight years.

 
 
"8. That since the incarceration [PAA] 
has contributed a total of $16.00 to his daughter for support in the form of 
insurance premium at her school and further sent her $15.00 for Christmas while 
earning a sum of $35.00 a month.  
"9. That [PAA] has not substantially contributed to the support of [RHA] 
since October 26, 1981 and that the Park County D-PASS has since October 26, 
1981 and until the filing of the Petition herein maintained and supported 
[RHA].  "10. That the above findings 
constitute evidence of clear and convincing nature that [PAA] has not 
substantially contributed to the support of [RHA] since October 26, 
1981."

 
 

[¶10.]  
We do not express an opinion whether or not the trial court was correct 
in determining that the consent of appellant to adopt was unnecessary for the 
reasons stated above. It is clear, and more significant that appellant had been 
adjudged by a court to be guilty of cruelty, abuse, neglect or mistreatment of 
RHA. Because of this conviction the consent of *1263 appellant to adopt 
RHA was not required.  § 
1-22-110(a)(vii), W.S.1977.

 
 

[¶11.]  
We have held numerous times that if the determination of the trial court 
is correct on any theory it will not be disturbed, or if there exists any 
legally valid ground appearing in the record, we must affirm.  Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); Valentine v. Ormsbee 
Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 (1983); People v. Fremont Energy Corporation, Wyo., 
651 P.2d 802 (1982); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981).

 
 

[¶12.]  
Appellant makes an ingenious argument that § 1-22-110(a)(vii), W.S.1977, 
has no application to this case. He states in his brief:

 
 
"Subsection (vii) of Wyoming Statute 
Section 1-22-110 (1977) specifically lists the crimes for which a parent must be 
adjudged guilty. It is asserted by Respondent that the crime of abuse' in 
Section 1-22-110(a)(vii) is referring to Section 6-2-503 of the Wyoming Statutes 
(1977, as amended 1982), or section 6-4-504 (before recodification and as it 
existed at the time of Mr. [PAA's] trial). The crime of cruelty refers to 
Section 14-3-101(a)(ii) of the Wyoming Statutes (1977, repealed 1982)."1 

 
 

[¶13.]  Succinctly stated, appellant 
contends that he has not been convicted of the specific statutory crimes of 
cruelty, abuse, neglect, or mistreatment, of a child, and therefor § 
1-22-110(a)(vii), W.S.1977, is inapplicable. We are unable to determine that the 
legislature intended that the words, cruelty, abuse, neglect, and mistreatment, 
set out in § 1-22-110(a)(vii), W.S.1977, refer to specific statutory crimes. 
Counsel, in walking us through the statutes, has not added to our understanding 
of legislative intent.

 
 

[¶14.]  It seems reasonable to conclude, 
as we do, that "cruelty" as used in § 1-22-110(a)(vii), encompasses much more 
than a statutory crime of cruelty.  
Likewise, "abuse" used in the same statute encompasses more than a 
statutory crime of abuse. An incestuous relationship with a twelve-year old girl 
constitutes cruelty, abuse and mistreatment by any definition of those 
terms.

 
 

[¶15.]  
We hold that PAA had been adjudged guilty of cruelty, abuse and 
mistreatment of RHA by reason of his conviction of taking indecent liberties, 
and incest and illicit sexual relations. Because of the conviction it was not 
necessary to obtain the consent of PAA in order that RHA be adopted by John and 
Jane Doe.

 
 

 

[¶16.]  
Appellant contends that it was error to bifurcate the adoption 
proceedings and deny him knowledge of the identity of John and Jane Doe, 
petitioners for adoption. PAA also complained that he was denied participation 
in the second phase of the adoption proceeding, that is, the hearing that 
considered the fitness and qualifications of the petitioners for adoption and 
the "best interests" of RHA.

 
 

[¶17.]  
Rule 42(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
regarding separate trials, provides:

 
 
"The court in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue 
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, 
or issues." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶18.]  
Appellant does not contend that the district court was without authority 
to bifurcate the adoption proceedings, but rather that the court abused its 
discretion in ordering bifurcation. We disagree. Until the threshold question, 
whether or not the consent of PAA was required, the identity of John and Jane 
Doe was irrelevant. Also, the fitness of John and Jane Doe and the best 
interests of RHA were irrelevant matters until the consent issue had been 
resolved. In re Adoption of Strauser, 
65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).

 
 

[¶19.]  
A determination by the district court that appellant's consent to adopt 
was not required effectively terminated his parental rights to RHA. After this 
determination, appellant was, in effect, a stranger to the adoption proceedings. 
The court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the adoption proceedings 
and exclude PAA from the hearing on the merits of the petition to 
adopt.

 
 

 

[¶20.]  
Appellant makes an oblique attack on the constitutionality of § 1-22-110, W.S. 1977. 
This section is part of the statutory scheme of adoption. §§ 1-22-110 
through 1-22-115, W.S. 1977. We could, with justification, summarily decide 
against appellant on the constitutional issue. He does not cite any cases nor 
make any logical argument in support of this assignment of error. We need not 
notice a claimed error unsupported by authority or authoritative argument. 
Klatt v. Klatt, Wyo., 654 P.2d 733 (1982).

 
 

[¶21.]  
Apparently, appellant contends that § 1-22-110 is unconstitutional 
because this statute has different standards for terminating parental rights 
than does §§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-318 (1984 
Cum.Supp.).  Grounds for terminating 
parental rights are contained in § 14-2-309:

 
 
"(a) The parent-child relationship may 
be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by 
clear and convincing evidence:

 
 
"(i) The child has been left in the 
care of another person without provision for the child's support and without 
communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year.  In making the above determination, the 
court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and 
communications;

 
 
"(ii) The child has been abandoned 
with no means of identification for at least three (3) months and efforts to 
locate the parent have been unsuccessful;

 
 
"(iii) The child has been abused or 
neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family 
has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health 
and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent;

 
 
"(iv) The parent is incarcerated due 
to the conviction of a felony and showing that the parent is unfit to have the 
custody and control of the child."

 
 

[¶22.]  
Appellant states in his brief: "The different standards under these two 
different sets of statutes, (§ 1-22-110, Adoption, and 14-2-309, Termination) as 
applied to [PAA], have greatly affected his rights." Appellant continues by 
trying to demonstrate that his parental rights could not be terminated under § 
14-2-309(a)(i), given the facts of this case. We do not see the relevance of 
that argument. No one in this case makes any claim that parental rights could be 
terminated under § 14-2-309(a)(i). And finally, appellant contends that "The 
statutes operate in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner when separate standards 
are applied. * * * The two statutes should be combined to effectively and 
uniformly give notice to [PAA] of his rights."

 
 

[¶23.]  
Terminating parental rights by operation of law under § 1-22-110 is 
always in connection with an adoption. Terminating parental rights under 
§§ 14-2-309 through 14-2-318 may be for purposes other than the possibility of 
an adoption. The two statutes in question do not serve identical purposes, and 
appellant has not cited authority or suggested any logical reason why the two 
statutes should have identical standards.

 
 

[¶24.]  
In appellant's constitutional attack he quotes from Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy L, 231 
Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168, 187 (1982): "A statute, apparently valid upon its face, 
may be unconstitutional in its application to a particular set of facts, 
circumstances or classifications," citing Flax v. Kansas Turnpike 
Authority, 226 Kan. 1, 596 P.2d 446 (1979). We do not disagree with that abstract principle of law. 
However, appellant does not relate such principle of law to this case, or if he 
does, his argument is so subtle that we fail to appreciate it.  

 
 

 
"When this court is presented with a 
constitutionally based challenge to a statute, it presumes the statute 
constitutional. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Before 
we strike it down we must find that it clearly violates some constitutional 
principle, state or federal. [Citations.] The Supreme Court of the United States 
has said that, even when a serious doubt of constitutionality is present, courts 
should ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided.' [Citation.]" 

 
 
In Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235, 1238-1239 (1982), we said:

 
 
"When the constitutionality of a 
statute is assailed, we are governed by the following 
standards:

 
 
" Statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, and one who would 
deny the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. The alleged 
unconstitutionality must be clearly and exactly shown beyond any reasonable 
doubt. Stephenson v. Mitchell ex 
rel. Workmen's Compensation Department, Wyo. 1977, 569 P.2d 95, 97. * * * '

 
 
* * * * * * 

 
 
" Courts have a duty to uphold the 
constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if that is at 
all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Witzenburger v. State, Wyo. 1978, 575 P.2d 1100, 1112; Lund v. Schrader, Wyo. 1971, 492 P.2d 202, 206. * * * ' [Citation.]"

 
 

[¶25.]  
Appellant has fallen far short of meeting his burden to demonstrate the 
unconstitutionality of § 1-22-110.

 
 

 

[¶26.]  
In connection with the adoption proceedings, petitioners John and Jane 
Doe applied to the court for a permanent injunction against PAA. They asked that 
he be 

 
 
"permanently restrained from any of 
the following acts against [RHA], the Petitioners, Peter Dvorak, [John Doe and 
Jane Doe], the Court, the attorneys of record, officials of the Wyoming DPASS or 
witnesses testifying herein:

 
 
"A. From threatening, intimidating or 
harassing said persons by letters or in any form;

 
 
"B. From attempting, in any manner, to 
obtain the identity of Petitioners or the whereabouts of any of the above-named 
persons.

 
 
"C. From seeking out any of the above 
persons from coming in or upon or about any premises in which they may be 
located, from harming or attempting to harm them in any way. From and after the 
time of [PAA's] release from the Wyoming State Penitentiary, he should be 
enjoined from coming to Park County or Washakie County, Wyoming and if he should 
do so, it should be deemed a direct contempt of court and the Sheriff of those 
counties should be empowered and ordered to immediately arrest him if he should 
be found in such counties and incarcerate him pending contempt proceedings or 
further Order of the Court."

 
 

[¶27.]  
Although a preliminary injunction against PAA had been granted, the trial 
court denied a permanent injunction because PAA was incarcerated in the state 
penitentiary. The court said, "At some future time, upon his release, there may 
be additional evidence to warrant a temporary or permanent injunction, but at 
this time, the court sees no need for this type of relief." Petitioners 
cross-appealed the denial of a permanent injunction.

 
 

[¶28.]  
There was evidence that PAA threatened to "destroy" or do bodily harm to 
numerous people, including the prospective adoptive parents and anyone that had 
anything to do with the adoption or the criminal case against him. PAA testified 
that at a certain time if he could have gotten his hands on petitioners he would 
have killed them. He could not assure the court that after his release from the 
penitentiary he would not kill petitioners. The most charitable thing we can say 
about PAA is that he was grossly deficient in acceptable social behavior 
patterns. Furthermore, if he had any redeeming qualities, he managed to keep 
them fairly well concealed.

 
 

[¶29.]  
PAA characterizes petitioners' reasons why an injunction should have been 
granted as "twenty pages of predominently emotional argument." Not so, and under 
the facts of the case it could reasonably be concluded that PAA was a depraved, 
dangerous and violent man.

 
 

[¶30.]  
We have great sympathy for everyone involved with PAA; however, the 
requested injunctive relief was overbroad, sought protection for persons not 
parties to the court proceedings, requested protection for persons not named, 
and unnecessarily sought to restrict activities of PAA. The application for 
injunctive relief does not comply with Rule 65(d), W.R.C.P., which 
provides:

 
 
"Every order granting an injunction 
and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall 
be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference 
to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and 
is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or 
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal 
service or otherwise."

 
 
One authority has 
stated:

 
 
"* * * An injunction, whether 
temporary or permanent, cannot as a general rule be sought as a matter of right, 
but the power to grant or refuse it rests in the sound discretion of the court 
under the circumstances and the facts of the particular case * * *." 43 
C.J.S.  Injunctions § 14, pp. 
768-769 (1978).

 
 

[¶31.]  In Kincheloe v. Milatzo, Wyo., 678 P.2d 855, 861 (1984), we said:

 
 
"Preliminarily, it is to be remembered 
that, when courts are called upon to employ their injunctive authority, they 
must utilize this power with great caution. We have said:

 
 
" The extraordinary remedy of an 
injunction is a far-reaching force and must not be indulged in under hastily 
contrived conditions. It is a delicate judicial power and a court must proceed 
with caution and deliberation before exercising the 
remedy.' Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., Wyo., 548 P.2d 1, 3 (1976).

 
 
"Injunctions are extraordinary 
remedies and are not granted as of right. In granting an injunction, the court 
exercises broad, equitable jurisdiction. Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., D.C.Wyo., 54 F. Supp. 488 (1943). This discretion is, however, not unfettered, but must be 
exercised reasonably and in harmony with well established principles.' 43 C.J.S. 
Injunctions § 14 P. 772."

 
 

[¶32.]  
For the reasons set forth in this opinion and authority cited, we hold 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a permanent 
injunction.  

 
 

[¶33.]  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 6-4-504, W.S.1977, 
provides:

 
 
"Any adult who intentionally or in 
reckless disregard of the consequences causes violent physical injury or mental 
trauma to a child under the age of sixteen (16) or commits any assault or 
assault and battery upon the child to a degree as to require medical, 
psychological or psychiatric treatment to heal or overcome the injuries or 
damages sustained by the child, or who sexually molests a child under the age of 
sixteen (16) is guilty of child abuse and upon conviction shall be sentenced to 
the state penitentiary for a term of not more than five (5) 
years."

 
 

"Section 14-3-101(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 
(Dec. 1978 pamphlet), 
provides:

 
 
"(a) No parent, guardian or custodian 
of any child shall:

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
"(ii) Abuse, torture, expose or 
cruelly punish the child * * *."