Case Title: State v. A. S.

Citation: 2001 WI 48

Docket Number: 1999AP002317

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2317 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Interest of A. S., a person Under  
the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
A. S.,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 94 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 527, 611 N.W.2d 471 
(Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 3, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Moria Krueger 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Stephen P. Hurley, Marcus J. Berghahn and Hurley, 
Burish & Milliken, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Marcus J. 
Berghahn. 
 
 
 
2 
 
For the petitioner-appellant the cause was argued 
by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 48 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 99-2317 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of A.S.,  
a person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
A.S., 
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   A.S., a juvenile, seeks 
review of two determinations by the court of appeals:  (1) that 
the facts as pleaded in a delinquency petition alleging 
disorderly conduct were sufficient to constitute probable cause, 
and (2) that A.S.'s statements were not protected speech under 
the First Amendment.  The disorderly conduct charge was based on 
statements made by A.S. threatening violence toward a number of 
named individuals.  A.S. argues that (1) speech alone cannot 
constitute disorderly conduct; (2) his speech is protected under 
the First Amendment; and (3) under the facts of this case, the 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
2 
elements of disorderly conduct are not met.  We conclude that 
speech alone in certain contexts can constitute disorderly 
conduct; that in context A.S.'s speech is not protected by the 
First Amendment; and that the two elements of disorderly conduct 
are met here.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
I 
¶2 
On April 29, 1999, the State of Wisconsin (State) 
filed a delinquency petition against A.S., charging him with two 
counts of disorderly conduct.  The circuit court dismissed the 
second count of the petition on June 4, 1999, after concluding 
that the petition lacked sufficient facts to support a finding 
of disorderly conduct on this count.  The State does not contest 
this dismissal.  Thus, our review is limited to the first count. 
¶3 
The petition alleges the following facts in support of 
the first count.  On April 27, 1999, the DeForest Police 
Department received a report from a juvenile girl, A.H., about 
several threatening comments that A.S. made on April 26, 1999, 
at a local youth center.  At that time, A.S. was 13 years old.  
The petition states in relevant part as follows: 
 
A.H. reported that while [she, A.S. and another girl, 
M.L.] were playing a computer game, A.S. made several 
statements that he was going to kill everyone at the 
middle school, that this would occur over a 10 minute 
period of time, and while discussing the Colorado 
school shootings, A.S. stated that he was going to "do 
something similar."  A.H. further reported that A.S. 
stated that he was going to "make people suffer" and 
that he wished to kill everyone except for [A.H.], 
M.L., and some other buddies.  A.H. further reported 
that A.S. stated that he wanted to "hang" DeForest 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
3 
Police Officer O'Neill as well as beat her at the 
knees.  A.H. reported that A.S. stated that he would 
have Assistant Principal McHugh lie on the ground face 
down with his hands behind his back, that he would 
tell McHugh to count to 10, and prior to reaching 10, 
he would then shoot McHugh.  A.H. reported that A.S. 
also stated that he wanted to shoot Mr. Clifford, the 
social studies teacher.  A.H. further reported that 
A.S. also informed her that he would "rape" M.P., then 
let her go, and that A.S. appeared to be excited about 
this 
rape. 
 
(Names 
of 
juveniles 
replaced 
with 
initials.) 
According to the petition, A.H. believed that A.S. would 
possibly commit the rape.  A.H. noted that A.S. was not laughing 
when he made these statements and that he spoke in a "very 
matter-of-fact manner."  The reference to school shootings in 
Colorado in the petition pertains to the shooting deaths of 15 
individuals at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado on 
April 20, 1999.  Two students who attended the high school 
caused these deaths.  This incident received extensive national 
media attention. 
¶4 
The petition also states that the police interviewed 
two other juveniles, M.L. and J.G., about A.S.'s statements at 
the youth center.  M.L. confirmed the allegations made by A.H. 
concerning A.S.'s statements at the youth center.  M.L. also 
alleged that she told A.S. that his statements scared her and 
that she had to ask A.S. several times to stop making the 
statements before he stopped.  J.G. reported that he heard A.S. 
talking to two girls at the youth center about bringing guns to 
school with him. 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
4 
¶5 
Finally, 
the 
petition 
states 
that 
the 
police 
interviewed A.S. about his statements and that he admitted 
making them.  The petition provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
A.S. admitted that he stated, "I'm going to take over 
the school like in Colorado."  A.S. admitted that he 
also made statements about shooting [the assistant 
principal] as he knelt and counted to 10.  A.S 
admitted that he also stated he would hang Officer 
O'Neill by her wrists, break her legs and shoot her.  
A.S. further admitted that he also made statements 
that he would like to rape M.P.  (Names of juveniles 
replaced with initials.)  
Based on these facts, the delinquency petition alleges that A.S. 
"engage[d] in abusive and otherwise disorderly conduct under 
circumstances in which such conduct tended to cause or provoke a 
disturbance; contrary to Section 947.01 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes. . . ."   
¶6 
A.S. moved to dismiss the petition.  The circuit court 
granted A.S.'s motion.  The court concluded that A.S.'s 
statements needed "some additional basis" before they would 
constitute disorderly conduct.  Although the court believed 
A.S.'s comments were "repulsive and shocking," it regarded the 
statements as "an extreme level of adolescent 'trash talking,'" 
which produced no immediate disorder.  The court noted that the 
failure of the listener to report A.S.'s conduct until the 
following day showed a lack of any immediate disorder and that 
such circumstances were "simply not of the type (charged, tense, 
volatile, disruptive, interfering, etc.) so as to allow probable 
cause 
to 
be 
found 
that 
these 
actions 
were 
'otherwise 
disorderly.'"   
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
5 
¶7 
The court of appeals, in a one-judge unpublished 
decision, reversed the order of dismissal.  The court first 
concluded that A.S.'s comments were not protected speech under 
the First Amendment.  It opined that A.S. could be prosecuted 
because the government has an interest in protecting individuals 
from such threats of violence.  The court then found that the 
allegations in the petition could support a conclusion that 
A.S.'s statements constituted disorderly conduct.  As a result, 
based on the totality of the circumstances and the specific 
nature of A.S.'s statements, the court concluded that further 
proceedings on the disorderly conduct count were justified.  
A.S. petitioned this court for review. 
¶8 
The following three issues are presented for review:  
whether the disorderly conduct statute can be applied solely to 
speech; whether A.S.'s speech is protected under the First 
Amendment; and whether the elements of disorderly conduct are 
met in this case.  We address each issue in turn. 
II 
¶9 
The disorderly conduct statute, Wis. Stat. § 947.01 
(1999-2000),1 states as follows:  "Whoever, in a public or 
private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
6 
provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor."  The 
statute 
contains 
two 
elements: 
(1) 
conduct 
of 
the 
type 
enumerated in the statute or similar thereto, and (2) the 
conduct must be engaged in under circumstances which tended to 
cause or provoke a disturbance.  State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 
497, 515, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969). 
¶10 The delinquency petition in this case reveals that the 
disorderly conduct charge against A.S. is based solely on his 
statements to other juveniles at the youth center.  A.S. argues 
that it is impermissible for the State to proceed in this manner 
because the disorderly conduct statute cannot be applied solely 
to his speech.  Instead, A.S. contends that, consistent with 
prior cases that have applied the statute, the statute can only 
be applied to speech when the speech is accompanied by conduct. 
 A.S. argues that, by applying the statute solely to his speech, 
the State has effectively transformed the disorderly conduct 
statute into a content-based regulation, and as a result, an 
examination of the constitutionality of the statute must take 
place in light of this classification.  In particular, A.S. 
asserts that the application of the statute in this manner 
requires us to ensure that the statute is narrowly drawn to 
proscribe only speech outside the protections of the First 
Amendment. 
¶11 In essence, this challenge asks whether the disorderly 
conduct statute can be applied to regulate speech when that 
speech is unaccompanied by any physical conduct and is not 
unreasonably loud.  We acknowledge that no Wisconsin court has 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
7 
ever examined whether the statute can be permissibly applied in 
this manner.  This question, one of the nature and scope of the 
disorderly conduct statute, presents a question of law that we 
review de novo.   
¶12 We examined the regulatory scope of the disorderly 
conduct statute in Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497.  In that case, we 
particularly examined whether the statute was vague and overly 
broad and whether its application could be extended into the 
area of protected speech.  Id. at 507-11.  We concluded that the 
statute was sufficiently designed to overcome an attack for 
vagueness and that it was not so broad that it could be applied 
to conduct protected by the constitution.  Id. at 507-09.  We 
also noted that the statute could be applied to "activities 
intertwined 
with 
protected 
freedoms," 
but 
only 
if 
these 
activities were "carried out in a manner" consistent with the 
disorderly conduct statute.  Id. at 509. 
¶13 In the course of our examination, we specifically 
noted 
that 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
is 
aimed 
at 
proscribing conduct in terms of the results that could be 
reasonably expected therefrom.  Id. at 508.  In other words, the 
statute is not aimed at circumscribing the content of speech 
directly.  Cf. City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 673, 
678-81, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991) (citing Zwicker, this court upheld 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
city 
ordinance 
that 
was 
"substantially analogous" to the disorderly conduct statute, 
concluding that the ordinance's purpose was not to regulate 
speech).  However, we noted in Zwicker that, even though such 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
8 
general 
regulatory 
statutes, 
like 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute, are not aimed at directly controlling speech, their 
application may result in the incidental limitation on the 
content of speech.  Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 510 (quoting 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961)); 
cf. State v. Wickstrom, 118 Wis. 2d 339, 353-54, 348 N.W.2d 183 
(Ct. App. 1984) (citing Zwicker, the court of appeals concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 946.69(1), which prohibits falsely assuming to 
act as a public officer or employee, could also incidentally 
limit speech because the statute penalized conduct, not speech). 
We noted that this limitation on speech is permissible because:  
 
Constitutionally 
protected 
rights, 
such 
as 
freedom of speech and peaceable assembly, are not the 
be all and end all.  They are not an absolute 
touchstone.  The United States Constitution is not 
unmindful of other equally important interests such as 
public order.  To recognize the rights of freedom of 
speech and peaceable assembly as absolutes would be to 
recognize the rule of force; the rights of other 
individuals and of the public would vanish. 
Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 509.   
¶14 Indeed, in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), 
the United States Supreme Court recognized that disorderly 
conduct statutes, which are not designed to specifically 
proscribe pure speech, may apply to incidentally limit speech in 
this manner. 
 
The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a 
great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public 
order and tranquility.  It includes not only violent 
acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in 
others.  No one would have the hardihood to suggest 
that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
9 
incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes 
the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon 
those belonging to another sect.  When clear and 
present danger of riot, disorder, interference with 
traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate 
threat to public safety, peace, or order appears, the 
power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious. 
Feiner, 340 U.S. 
at 320 
(quoting 
Cantwell 
v. 
State of 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)).  
¶15 In Zwicker, we discussed certain types of speech, 
which by their very nature cause a breach of the peace. 
 
There 
are 
certain 
well-defined 
and 
narrowly 
limited 
classes 
of 
speech, 
the 
prevention 
and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, and libelous, and the 
insulting or "fighting" words——those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.  It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality. 
Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 510 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).  Thus, even though, as in this case, 
the disorderly conduct statute is being applied to speech, this 
application is permissible because the application is not 
directed at the content of the speech itself.  Instead, the 
prosecution is directed at controlling the harmful effects of 
the speech. 
 
¶16 Because the disorderly conduct statute only proscribes 
speech that is not constitutionally protected, it does not 
result in the statute becoming overly broad.  See In the 
Interest of Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶¶21, 24, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
10
___ N.W.2d ___.  As Douglas D. concludes, the disorderly conduct 
statute does not infringe on speech that is protected under the 
First Amendment because the statute sanctions only categories of 
speech that have been traditionally regarded as beyond the 
protection of the First Amendment.  Id.  Thus, A.S.'s speech can 
be prosecuted only if his speech is one of the limited 
categories of speech that fall outside the protections of the 
First Amendment. 
¶17 We conclude that application of the disorderly conduct 
statute to speech alone is permissible under appropriate 
circumstances.  The right of free speech is not absolute.  When 
speech is not an essential part of any exposition of ideas, when 
it is utterly devoid of social value, and when it can cause or 
provoke a disturbance, the disorderly conduct statute can be 
applicable. 
III 
¶18 A.S. also argues that, even if the disorderly conduct 
statute can be applied solely to his speech, application of the 
statute in this case is unconstitutional because his statements 
are protected under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
11
Constitution.2  A.S. contends that his speech is protected 
because it is mere hyperbole and that it is simply, as the trial 
court stated, immature "trash talking."  A.S. argues that, in 
order for his speech to fall outside the protections of the 
First Amendment, it must have either incited immediate lawless 
action or caused an immediate physical reaction from a listener. 
 A.S. contends that neither occurred in this instance.  As a 
result, the petition must be dismissed because it is based on 
speech that is protected under the First Amendment.   
¶19 This challenge presents a question of law that we 
determine de novo.  State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶¶6-7, 235 
Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684; see also State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 
77, ¶¶26-27, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568 (concluding that 
application of constitutional principles to a set of facts is a 
question of constitutional fact, which is a question of law).  
¶20 A.S. relies primarily on Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969), to support his argument that his speech is 
protected.  Brandenburg involved the conviction of a Ku Klux 
Klan leader for violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute.  
                     
2 "The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .'  It applies to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 368 
n.4, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  Article I,  Section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution states that "[e]very person may freely 
speak . . . and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge 
the liberty of speech."  County of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 
223 Wis. 2d 373, 387 n.4, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).  Despite 
differences in language, Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantees the same freedom of speech rights as the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 388. 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
12
Id. at 444-45.  This statute prohibited the advocacy of violent 
political reform and the assembly in a group to teach or 
advocate such doctrine.  Id.  The speech at issue in Brandenburg 
was delivered during a rally and advocated, in part, that "if 
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to 
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there 
might have to be some revengeance taken."  Id. at 446.  The 
Court 
reversed 
the 
leader's 
conviction 
on 
this 
statute, 
concluding that the mere advocacy of violence was protected by 
the First Amendment as long as the advocacy did not incite 
people to imminent action.  Id. at 447.  Relying on this 
holding, A.S. contends that his statements are protected speech 
because they constituted mere advocacy and did not incite any 
immediate lawless action.   
¶21 The State argues, however, that A.S.'s statements more 
closely resembled "true threats," which the United States 
Supreme Court first recognized as a class of unprotected speech 
in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  Watts involved 
the conviction of an antiwar demonstrator under a federal 
statute prohibiting threats against the President.  Id. at 706. 
 Watts told a crowd of demonstrators that "'[i]f they ever make 
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J.'"  Id.  Based on this statement, he was convicted of 
"'knowingly and willfully . . . [making a] threat to take the 
life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the 
United States.'"  Id. at 705.  In reversing Watts' conviction, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the statute required the 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
13
Government to initially prove a "true threat."  Id. at 708.  The 
Court concluded that a "true threat" was not proven; instead the 
court regarded the statement made by Watts as mere "political 
hyperbole."  Id.  The Court reasoned that "[t]aken in context, 
and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement 
and the reaction of the listeners,3 we do not see how it could be 
interpreted otherwise."  Id.  The Watts Court did not provide 
any other guidelines for determining "true threats."   
¶22 We conclude that the factual allegations in the 
petition more closely resemble that of a threat under Watts than 
of an incitement to action under Brandenburg.  Thus, we examine 
A.S.'s statements under a "true threat" analysis.  In our 
examination, we apply a test for a "true threat" that was 
adopted in our decision in State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  This test employs an objective 
reasonable person standard and defines a "true threat" as 
follows:  
 
A true threat is a statement that a speaker would 
reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably 
interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to 
inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, 
innocuous talk, expressions of political views or 
other similarly protected speech.  It is not necessary 
that the speaker have the ability to carry out the 
threat.  In determining whether a statement is a true 
threat, the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered.   
                     
3 At the circuit court level, it was noted that the comments 
made by Watts were greeted with laughter and applause.  Watts v. 
United States, 402 F.2d 676, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1968).  
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
14
Id. at ¶29.  Consideration must be given to "the full context of 
the statement, including all relevant factors that might affect 
how the statement could reasonably be interpreted."  Id. at ¶31. 
To this end, various factors should be considered, including: 
 
how the recipient and other listeners reacted to the 
alleged threat, whether the threat was conditional, 
whether it was communicated directly to its victim, 
whether the maker of the threat had made similar 
statements to the victim on other occasions, and 
whether the victim had reason to believe that the 
maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in 
violence. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶23 In applying the test to A.S.'s statement, we conclude 
that his statements, as alleged in the petition, did constitute 
true threats.  Under the totality of the circumstances, a 
reasonable speaker in the position of A.S. would foresee that 
reasonable listeners would interpret his statements as serious 
expressions of an intent to intimidate or inflict bodily harm.  
M.L. told him that his statements were scaring her.  She asked 
him several times to stop making the statements.  The recent 
events at Columbine High School, which A.S. made reference to 
during the course of his statements, heightened the anxiety of 
the listeners.  A reasonable person in the position of A.S. had 
to know that his listeners were concerned about what had 
happened at Columbine and about what could happen if A.S. was 
determined to carry out his threats.   
¶24 The alleged facts in the petition also indicate that 
he made the statements in a very matter of fact manner and was 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
15
not laughing at the time.  There was nothing in the statements, 
nor was there anything in the context, that would indicate that 
A.S. was simply engaging in hyperbole, jest, or political 
dissent.  These were true threats.  A.S. had no more right to 
make these statements than, in the words of Holmes, does a man 
have the right to cry "fire" in a crowded theater.   
IV 
¶25 Our conclusion that, based on the facts in the 
petition, A.S.'s statements constituted a "true threat" is alone 
not determinative of whether the pleading contains probable 
cause for disorderly conduct.  Indeed, the State is also 
required to provide sufficient facts in the petition to support 
the charge of disorderly conduct.  See State v. Becker, 51 
Wis. 2d 659, 664-66, 188 N.W.2d 449 (1971).  A.S. challenges the 
petition in this respect, arguing that it must be dismissed 
because it fails to allege sufficient facts to support a finding 
of disorderly conduct. 
¶26 The sufficiency of a criminal complaint is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  State v. Smaxwell, 2000 WI App 
112, ¶5, 235 Wis. 2d 230, 612 N.W.2d 756.  The same principles 
that apply when reviewing the sufficiency of a criminal 
complaint apply to a petition in juvenile court proceedings.  In 
Interest of L.A.T., 167 Wis. 2d 276, 283, 481 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  In turn, a petition "must charge a crime under the 
law, must describe the conduct alleged to constitute the 
offense, and must contain sufficient facts to persuade a neutral 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
16
and detached magistrate that the charged crime has probably been 
committed by the accused."  State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 
275-76, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977).  The petition should state what 
charge is alleged, who is charged, when and where the offense is 
alleged to have taken place, why this juvenile is being charged, 
and who is making the allegations.  Becker, 51 Wis. 2d at 663; 
State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 Wis. 2d 223, 230, 161 
N.W.2d 369 (1968). 
¶27 It is not necessary that the petition establish the 
juvenile's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Hoffman, 
106 Wis. 2d 185, 200, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982).  The 
petition's function is informative, not adjudicative.  State v. 
Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 583, 250 N.W.2d 12 (1977).  The petition 
will be sufficient if the facts, by themselves or together with 
the reasonable inferences to which they give rise, lead a fair-
minded magistrate to reasonably conclude that the facts alleged 
justify further criminal proceedings.  Becker, 51 Wis. 2d at 
662-63.   
¶28 We examine the facts alleged in the petition in light 
of the elements of the charged offense.  Disorderly conduct has 
two elements.  The first requires that the conduct must be 
violent, abusive, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or 
otherwise disorderly.  To satisfy this element, the petition 
alleges that A.S.'s statements were both abusive and otherwise 
disorderly.   
¶29 We provided a limited definition of "abusive" language 
in Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 70-72, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965). 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
17
 In Lane, the defendant was arrested for violating a city 
disorderly conduct ordinance after he called a police officer a 
"son-of-a-bitch."  Id. at 70-71.  We concluded that the city 
ordinance was similar in import to the first element of the 
state disorderly conduct statute and noted: 
 
The underlying reason for disorderly conduct statutes 
and ordinances proscribing abusive language is that 
such language tends to provoke retaliatory conduct on 
the part of the person to whom it is addressed that 
amounts to breach of the peace.  Calling another 
person a "son-of-a-bitch" under charged circumstances 
might well constitute abusive language which is likely 
to have that result. 
Id. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).  Thus, following this language, 
A.S.'s statements will constitute "abusive" statements if under 
the circumstances they tended to provoke retaliatory conduct on 
the part of the person or persons to whom the statements were 
addressed.   
¶30 The petition alleges that A.S. told two girls that he 
intended to kill everyone at the middle school, except the girls 
and some other friends, and that he would make people suffer in 
the process.  A.S. then provided graphic detail on the manner he 
would use to kill or seriously harm specific individuals, 
including a teacher, an assistant principal, a police officer, 
and a classmate.  The petition states that A.S.'s statements 
were made during a discussion of recent school shootings in 
Colorado.  This context could provide charged circumstances, and 
under such circumstances, such language may tend to provoke 
retaliatory conduct from the persons hearing the statements.  As 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
18
a result, the petition contains sufficient facts to establish 
probable cause that the language was abusive.  
¶31 We also conclude that the petition contains sufficient 
facts to support a finding of probable cause that A.S.'s conduct 
was "otherwise disorderly."  We have examined the "otherwise 
disorderly" provision in other cases, such as City of Oak Creek 
v. King, 148 Wis. 2d 532, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989), and State v. 
Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d 668, 211 N.W.2d 437 (1973); however we have 
never examined this provision in a context where the conduct 
consists solely of pure speech.  Nevertheless, Werstein and King 
provide guidance on how this section should be interpreted.   
¶32 In particular, in Werstein, we recognized that our 
analysis of whether certain conduct is "otherwise disorderly" 
must include an examination of the circumstances surrounding the 
conduct.  Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d at 672-73.  We concluded that 
such an examination is necessary because certain circumstances 
may require criminal culpability, even in instances where the 
alleged disorderly conduct may be protected under the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 673. 
¶33 In 
King, 
we 
provided 
additional 
guidance.  
Specifically, we noted that "'[w]hen the statute, after the 
specific 
enumerations, 
in 
a 
'catchall' 
clause 
proscribes 
'otherwise disorderly conduct' which tends to 'provoke a 
disturbance,' this must mean conduct of a type not previously 
enumerated but similar thereto in having a tendency to disrupt 
good order and to provoke a disturbance.'"  King, 148 Wis. 2d at 
541 (quoting State v. Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109, 115, 135 N.W.2d 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
19
780 (1965)).  This interpretation is based on the rule of 
ejusdem generis.4  Givens, 28 Wis. 2d at 115.  In light of this 
analysis, we noted the conduct must be of the type that tends to 
"disrupt good order."  King, 148 Wis. 2d at 540.  Thus, 
following Werstein and King, conduct will fall under the 
"otherwise disorderly" provision if under the circumstances the 
conduct is of the type that tends to disrupt good order.  This 
test requires an objective analysis of both the conduct and the 
circumstances. 
¶34 According to the petition, A.S. made several violent 
threats 
about 
specific, 
identifiable 
individuals. 
 
A.S. 
expressed these threats in a serious manner and provided 
specific accounts on the violent manner in which he would carry 
out the threats.  In addition, A.S. made these threats during a 
discussion of recent murders that occurred at Columbine High 
School in Colorado.  We conclude that under these circumstances 
such conduct supports a finding of probable cause of "otherwise 
disorderly" conduct.  Such violent threats are of the type that 
tend to disrupt good order under the circumstances because they 
could cause the listeners to be seriously concerned about the 
safety of those threatened.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
petition is sufficient on the first element. 
                     
4 Ejusdem generis is a "canon of construction that when a 
general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or 
things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to 
include only persons or things of the same type as those 
listed."  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999).  
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
20
¶35 We acknowledge, as the circuit court did, that some 
facts and inferences from the petition may weigh against a 
finding that the conduct was otherwise disorderly.  For example, 
the age and relative immaturity of A.S. is one possible 
countervailing factor.  Another is that A.S.'s alleged threats 
were not directed toward any person who heard the threats.  
However, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, we do not weigh the 
facts in the petition and make a determination as to the 
legitimacy of the claim.  We only determine whether the petition 
establishes probable cause. 
¶36 Having concluded that the petition contains sufficient 
facts for probable cause on the first element, we now examine 
the second element.  This element requires us to determine 
whether under the circumstances A.S.'s statements tended to 
cause or provoke a disturbance.  In making this determination, 
we do not examine whether a particular person was disturbed or 
annoyed. Givens, 28 Wis. 2d at 116.  Further, it is not 
necessary that an actual disturbance result from the conduct of 
a defendant.  King, 148 Wis. 2d at 545.  Instead, the court only 
examines whether the conduct was of the type that tends to cause 
or provoke a disturbance under the circumstances as they then 
existed.  Id.   
¶37 We conclude that the petition was sufficient to 
establish probable cause on the second element.  As mentioned in 
the analysis of the first element, the petition alleges that 
A.S. 
made 
violent 
and 
detailed 
threats 
about 
specific 
individuals during a discussion about the murders at Columbine 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
21
High School.  Under these circumstances, such violent threats to 
kill and seriously harm others could only serve to frighten and 
cause serious concern to the listeners. 
¶38 In addition to considering the potential effects of a 
defendant's conduct in disorderly conduct cases, our prior cases 
also indicate that the actual effects of a defendant's conduct 
are probative.  For example, in State v. Maker, 48 Wis. 2d 612, 
180 N.W.2d 707 (1970), we reviewed a defendant's conviction of 
disorderly conduct and specifically considered the reaction of 
those observing the defendant's conduct.  In Maker, the 
defendant performed as part of a musical group in a tavern in 
Milwaukee, and while on stage, he wore only a supporter and body 
paint.  Id. at 613, 617.  The testimony at the defendant's trial 
indicated that the crowd's reaction to the defendant was not 
delayed; the crowd stood on tables to see the defendant and 
yelled loudly in reaction to the defendant's performance.  Id. 
at 618.  In light of this reaction, we noted that "it is as a 
reasonable alternative inference that, in a crowded tavern, 
there existed a situation of mounting disorder, accumulating 
tension and predictable explosiveness.  This inference the trial 
court drew finding that the defendant did in fact 'cause and 
provoke a disturbance.'"  Id.  We concluded that when viewing 
the conduct in light of the circumstances, especially the time 
and 
place 
of 
the 
conduct, 
the 
defendant's 
actions 
were 
disorderly and did cause and provoke a disturbance.  Id. at 618-
19.   
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
22
¶39 In A.S.'s case, the reaction of the listeners and the 
other actual effects of A.S.'s conduct are also probative.  In 
particular, the petition indicates that M.L. was allegedly 
frightened by A.S.'s statements and that she asked him several 
times to stop making the threats.  The petition also indicates 
that A.H. was concerned enough to report A.S.'s conduct to the 
police the next day.  The police then spent considerable time 
conducting interviews concerning A.S.'s threats.  These actual 
effects of A.S.'s conduct support our finding that his conduct 
tended to cause or provoke a disturbance. 
¶40 A.S. asserts that our prior case law interpreting this 
statute has required an immediate physical and visible reaction 
by those subject to the conduct, and because the petition in his 
case lacked any information on an immediate reaction from the 
listeners, the petition is insufficient.  We disagree.  None of 
the cases upon which A.S. relies state that an immediate, 
physical reaction is necessary for disorderly conduct to occur. 
 See King, 148 Wis. 2d 532; Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d 668; State v. 
Elson, 60 Wis. 2d 54, 208 N.W.2d 363 (1973); Maker, 48 Wis. 2d 
612; Lane, 29 Wis. 2d 66; Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109.  Indeed, all 
of the cases recognize that the emphasis of the disorderly 
conduct statute is not on the reaction of the listener or 
observer, but instead on the conduct itself in light of the 
circumstances.  As a result, this argument is without merit. 
¶41 Finally, we acknowledge that only certain types of 
conduct fall under the statute, specifically: 
 
No. 
99-2317 
 
 
23
The statute does not imply that all conduct which 
tends to annoy another is disorderly conduct.  Only 
such conduct as unreasonably offends the sense of 
decency or propriety of the community is included.  
The statute does not punish a person for conduct which 
might possibly offend some hypercritical individual.  
The design of the disorderly conduct statute is to 
proscribe substantial intrusions which offend the 
normal sensibilities of average persons or which 
constitute 
significantly 
abusive 
or 
disturbing 
demeanor in the eyes of reasonable persons. 
Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 508.  We make our determination in light 
of this language and conclude that the petition set forth 
sufficient facts to establish probable cause that A.S.'s conduct 
constituted disorderly conduct.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
99-2317.ssa 
 
1 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  In 
my concurrence to In the Interest of Douglas D.: State v. 
Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, I 
explained why the disorderly conduct statute (Wis. Stat. 
§ 947.01) should not apply to the pure content of speech, 
unaccompanied by any disorderly conduct, and why specific intent 
is required if the statute is to apply to a true threat.  I am 
bound, but not bowed, by the majority opinion in Douglas D., now 
precedent in this state. 
¶43 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
 
No. 99-2317.wab 
 
1 
 
¶44 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring).  A majority of 
this court adopts the definition of "true threat" found in State 
v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46.  I would adopt a more stringent test for 
a true threat when the crime charged, as here, does not require 
intent.  See In the Interest of Douglas D., 2001 WI 47 at ¶¶61-
64 (Bablitch, J., concurring).  I conclude, however, that, under 
either test, the statements made by A.S. would constitute a true 
threat.  For this reason, I concur in this case.  I refer to my 
concurrence in Douglas D., which explains my reasons for 
adopting a different test.