Case Title: Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park District

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93852

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93852-Agenda 17-November 2002.
FRIENDS OF THE PARKS et al., Appellants, v. THE 
								 CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed February 21, 2003.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Friends of the Parks, together with 11 individual
members of that organization and the Landmarks Preservation
Council of Illinois, sued the Chicago Park District (Park District),
the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority (Authority), the Chicago
Bears Football Club, Inc. (Bears), the Chicago Bears Stadium
L.L.C. (Stadium), and the City of Chicago (City) seeking a
declaratory judgment that section 3 of the Illinois Sports Facilities
Authority Act (Act) (70 ILCS 3205/1 et seq. (West 2000)), as
amended by Public Act 91-0935, eff. June 1, 2001, is
unconstitutional. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging,
inter alia, that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
legislation. The trial court dismissed all but two counts of
plaintiffs' complaint and, subsequently, granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). We granted leave to
appeal directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)) and granted leave to Openlands
Project to file a brief as amicus curiae (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 345). The
only issues for our determination are whether the legislation: (1)
violates the requirement in article VIII, section 1(a), of the Illinois
Constitution that public funds, property or credit shall be used only
for public purposes (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §1(a)); (2)
violates the public trust doctrine; and (3) was enacted in violation
of the three-readings requirement in article IV, section 8(d), of the
Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)). We
answer all three questions in the negative and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND
	Section 3 of the Act is essentially enabling legislation
permitting the public financing of physical improvements to
Burnham Park, including Soldier Field on Chicago's lakefront.
Soldier Field occupies land that once was navigable water of Lake
Michigan. It was opened as Municipal Grant Park Stadium in 1924
and has, since that time, been used for a variety of public events,
including professional boxing matches, high school and college
football games, professional soccer matches, tennis tournaments,
religious convocations and, since 1971, Chicago Bears football
games. From that year until 1980, the Bears used the field on game
days under a series of annual and biannual permit use agreements.
The Bears and the Park District entered into a long term lease in
1980, expiring in 2000.
	The Act created the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority and
authorized it to finance, construct, own, and operate sports
facilities in the City of Chicago, including baseball and football
stadiums. The Act contains the following findings:
			"It is hereby found that as a result of deteriorating
infrastructure and sports facilities in the metropolitan area
of Chicago, there is a shortage of facilities suitable for use
by professional and other sports teams and musical,
theatrical, cultural, and other social organizations.
			It is further found that as a result of the costs to
maintain, repair or replace such infrastructure and
facilities, and as a result of current high financing costs,
the private sector, without the assistance contemplated in
this Act, is unable to construct feasibly adequate sports
facilities.
			It is further found that the creation of modern sports
facilities and the other results contemplated by this Act
would stimulate economic activity in the State of Illinois,
including the creation and maintenance of jobs, the
creation of new and lasting infrastructure and other
improvements, and the attraction and retention of sports
and entertainment events which generate economic
activity.
			It is further found that professional sports facilities can
be magnets for substantial interstate tourism resulting in
increased retail sales, hotel and restaurant sales, and
entertainment industry sales, all of which increase jobs
and economic growth.
			It is further found that only three major league
professional baseball franchises play in stadium facilities
the construction of which has not been government-assisted and of those three the most recently constructed
facility was completed in 1914." 70 ILCS 3205/3 (West
2000) (as amended by Pub. Act 91-0935, eff. June 1,
2001).
	Under the Act, the Authority received revenue from hotel
taxes, and this revenue funded payments on bonds issued by the
Authority to finance the construction of the new Comiskey Park.
In the year 2000, when tax revenues exceeded the amount
necessary for the Authority to fulfill its obligations to Comiskey
Park, the Bears, in conjunction with the National Football League
(NFL), offered to commit $200 million to a project to improve
Soldier Field. In response to the Bears' offer, the legislature
amended the Act to include the following additional legislative
findings:
			"It is further found that government assistance was or
is an essential component in the financing of the
construction of most recently built or planned National
Football League stadiums.
			It is further found that the exercise by the Authority and
governmental owners of the additional powers conferred
by this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly (i)
will materially assist the development and redevelopment
of government owned sports facilities and thereby
alleviate in part the deleterious conditions and confer the
public benefits described in this Section and (ii) is in the
public interest and is declared to be for public purposes."
70 ILCS 3205/3 (West 2000) (as amended by Pub. Act
91-0935, eff. June 1, 2001).
	Other amendments to the Act authorized the Authority to
issue $399 million in bonds (70 ILCS 3205/13(G) (West 2000) (as
amended by Pub. Act 91-0935, eff. June 1, 2001)) and to enter
into contracts for implementation of an improvement project.
Specifically, the Authority was authorized to enter into an
"[a]ssistance [a]greement" with a "governmental owner" of a
"facility" as defined in the Act. 70 ILCS 3205/2(E), 8(11) (West
2000) (as amended by Pub. Act 91-0935, eff. June 1, 2001).
Under the Act, a "governmental owner" includes a unit of local
government, such as the Park District, "that owns or is to own a
facility located within the corporate limits of the Authority ***
and to which the Authority provides financial assistance." 70 ILCS
3205/2(C) (West 2000) (as amended by Pub. Act 91-0935, eff.
June 1, 2001).
	The enabling legislation also amends the Chicago Park
District Act to allow the Park District to enter into an "assistance
agreement" with respect to any "facility" owned by the Park
District. 70 ILCS 1505/15d(1) (West 2000). The Park District is
also authorized to enter into a lease, license, or agreement with a
sports team or involving a "facility" upon such terms and
conditions as may be determined by the Park District. 70 ILCS
1505/15d(2) (West 2000).
	The Authority, the Park District, the Bears, and the Stadium,
as the developer, then entered into a series of agreements to
accomplish a general project for the improvement of 97 acres of
lakefront land owned by the Park District, surrounding Soldier
Field, generally known as Burnham Park. The Authority issued its
project certificate describing the scope of the project. Among other
objectives, the Authority sought to: (1) adapt and reconstruct
Soldier Field, and (2) construct an underground parking structure
and a two-story above-ground parking structure and reconstruct a
surface parking lot south of Soldier Field for use by the public,
including patrons of Soldier Field, the museums, and other
lakefront venues.
	The terms and conditions of the project are set out principally
in three separate agreements. In the "Burnham Park Development
Agreement," the Park District, as owner, expressly approves
various construction agreements entered into by the Stadium with
the Park District's consent. In the "Development Assistance
Agreement," the Park District, in conjunction with the Authority,
contracts with the Bears to have the Stadium complete the design
and construct the project in accordance with the Burnham Park
development agreement. Finally, the "Permit and Operating
Agreement" executed by the Park District, the Bears, and the
Stadium sets forth the terms and conditions for the Bears' use of
the renovated Soldier Field and certain surrounding areas.
	Under the terms of the agreements, the Bears are designated
as the primary sports user of the facility during the professional
football season. They are entitled to use Soldier Field on game
days as well as six times in a calendar year for club-related events.
During the football season, the field itself is not to be used by any
party, including the Park District and the Bears, for the five days
preceding a game day. Upon written request, the Bears may use
such other portions of the facility as the Park District may consent
to in the exercise of its reasonable discretion. This right is limited
to 34 events, related to the Bears and its sponsors, each year in
addition to NFL game days, and is subject to previously scheduled
events and the Park District's specifically reserved use rights. The
permit agreement expires in the year 2033. Subject to certain
limitations, the Bears have the option to extend the term for four
additional five-year periods.
	In their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that
the terms of the permit agreement disproportionately favor the
Bears over the Park District, especially when compared with the
terms of the prior lease. They argued that, contrary to the statement
of public purpose announced by the legislature, the Act
overwhelmingly benefitted a private interest, rather than serving
the declared public objectives announced in the Act. The motion
was supported by an affidavit of a University of Chicago
economics professor, consisting principally of a refutation of the
legislature's findings that a new sports stadium, constructed
largely with public financing, would serve its announced purposes.
The trial court considered the affidavit, found it to be irrelevant,
and denied plaintiffs' motion. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment because it was
precluded from inquiring into the merits or accuracy of the
legislative findings.

II. ANALYSIS
	Taken with the case was defendants' motion to strike the
statement of facts in plaintiffs' brief for failure to comply with
Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(6) (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6)). That rule
requires that facts necessary to an understanding of the case be
"stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment."
Although we believe the plaintiffs' recitation of the facts to be
generally accurate, it is certainly argumentative and in violation of
the rule. While we decline to strike the plaintiffs' factual
summary, we admonish counsel to be mindful in the future of the
requirement to eschew argument.
	Turning to the substance of the appeal, the decision to grant
or deny a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss is
reviewed de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992) (summary judgment);
Board of Managers of the Village Centre Condominium Ass'n,
Inc. v. Wilmette Partners, 198 Ill. 2d 132, 137 (2001) (motion to
dismiss). The applicable standard for reviewing legislative
enactments was articulated in In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414 (1997). In Lappe, the trial court found certain sections of the
Public Aid Code unconstitutional on their face. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 421. We began our analysis by observing:
			"It is well established that legislative enactments enjoy
a heavy presumption of constitutionality. [Citations.] The
party challenging the constitutionality of a statue has the
burden of clearly establishing its invalidity. [Citations.]
Courts have a duty to sustain legislation whenever
possible and resolve all doubts in favor of constitutional
validity. [Citations.]" Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 422.

A. Public Purpose
	Applying this standard to the legislation in question, this court
in Lappe rejected the argument that the challenged provisions did
not serve a public purpose. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 429. We further
stated:
		"This court has long recognized that what is for the public
good and what are public purposes are questions which
the legislature must in the first instance decide.
[Citations.] In making this determination, the legislature
is vested with a broad discretion, and the judgment of the
legislature is to be accepted in the absence of a clear
showing that the purported public purpose is but an
evasion and that the purpose is, in fact, private.
[Citations.] In the words of Justice Holmes, 'a declaration
by a legislature concerning public conditions that by
necessity and duty it must know, is entitled at least to
great respect.' [Citation.]
			*** What is a 'public purpose' is not a static concept,
but is flexible and capable of expansion to meet the
changing conditions of a complex society. [Citations.]
Moreover, ' "[t]he power of the State to expend public
moneys for public purposes is not to be limited, alone, to
the narrow lines of necessity, but the principles of wise
statesmanship demand that those things which subserve
the general wellbeing [sic] of society and the happiness
and prosperity of the people shall meet the consideration
of the legislative body of the State, though they ofttimes
call for the expenditure of public money." ' [Citation.]
The consensus of modern legislative and judicial thinking
is to broaden the scope of activities which may be
classified as involving a public purpose. [Citation.]"
Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 429-31.
	Applying these principles, we held in Lappe that our inquiry
was limited to examining whether the legislature's determination
was constitutionally permissible. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 436. This
court found no constitutional basis for overturning the judgment
of the legislature, recognizing that " '[t]he execution of a public
purpose which involves the expenditure of money is usually
attended with private benefits.' " Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 436-37,
quoting Hagler v. Small, 307 Ill. 460, 473 (1923). We further
reasoned that, if the principal purpose of the enactment is public
in nature, it is not relevant that there will be an incidental benefit
to private interests. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 437.
	Thus, the standards established in Lappe require us to defer to
the legislative findings announced in the Act unless the plaintiffs
make a threshold showing that the findings are evasive and that the
purpose of the legislation is principally to benefit private interests.
In view of Soldier Field's long history of hosting events that have
incidentally benefitted private interests, such as college and
professional football games, professional boxing, professional
soccer, horse shows, rodeos, and circuses, and because the same
rationale used by the legislature as authority to construct and
finance Comiskey Park is employed to establish the public purpose
of the Soldier Field project authorized by the Act, we can discern
no evasive or deceptive purpose in the legislature's findings. In
this regard, we note that, because Burnham Park was not dedicated
to a particular use or purpose, it is within the province of the
legislature to determine its use. Fairbank v. Stratton, 14 Ill. 2d 307, 318 (1958).
	The legislature identified that there was a shortage of suitable
sports facilities in metropolitan Chicago and that the private
sector, due to economic concerns, was unable to construct
"feasibly adequate" sports facilities. The legislature then found
that the creation of modern sports facilities would confer public
benefits by stimulating economic activity in the Sate of Illinois,
including the creation and maintenance of jobs, the creation of
new infrastructure and other improvements, and the retention of
sports and entertainment events, all generating economic activity.
70 ILCS 3205/3 (West 2000).
	In section 3 of the Act, the legislature found that the exercise
of the additional powers it was conferring would materially assist
the development and redevelopment of government-owned sports
facilities (such as Soldier Field) and would alleviate in part the
deleterious conditions, and confer the public benefits, described in
the 1987 version of the Act. Thus, the exercise of those powers
was declared to be for public purposes. 70 ILCS 3205/3 (West
2000) (as amended by Pub. Act 91-0935, eff. June 1, 2001).
	Plaintiffs argue that this legislative declaration is not
controlling, relying on our holding in Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C.,
199 Ill. 2d 225 (2002). In that case, we affirmed an appellate court
ruling that the development authority exceeded the bounds of its
statutory right to exercise eminent domain powers. In the
underlying "quick-take" proceedings, the trial court found that the
taking was for a public purpose because it would remedy some
public safety issues and confer some economic benefit to the
community. We held that, despite those findings, the project was
"a private venture designed to result not in a public use, but in
private profits." Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 238-39.
	Further, the facts in that case render it inapposite to the case
before us. There, the development authority used its statutory
power of eminent domain to take real estate from one private party
in order to transfer the land to another private party to facilitate
construction of a parking garage after the failure of negotiations for
a private sale. Here, there has been no eminent domain taking, nor
is one contemplated. The facial challenge to the Act presents us
only with the question of whether, after according great deference
to the legislative declaration of a public purpose, the stated public
purpose is but an evasion.
	Contrary to the suggestion of the special concurrence, our
holding is not a retreat from our analysis in Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority. Unlike Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority, here the Park District is not attempting to use its unique
powers of eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner
to another. Burnham Park and Soldier Field are public facilities
already owned and operated by the Chicago Park District. No
private property interests are at issue in this case. For this reason
alone, the two cases are readily distinguishable. Moreover, for the
reasons we have discussed, the improvements to Burnham Park
and Soldier Field benefit the members of the public who are served
by the District as well as incidentally benefitting the Bears. Despite
the special concurrence's implication to the contrary, Southwestern
Illinois Development Authority does not stand for the proposition
that the requirement of an admission fee necessarily eliminates all
public benefit. The requirement of an admission charge is only one
factor that we examined in deciding Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority. The benefit to the public is not inherently
diminished by the payment of an admission charge. The mere
existence of admission charges to public facilities, such as the
museums and attractions in Burnham Park, as well as the stadium
and parking facilities, does not impair the right of citizens to enjoy
the use of public property.
	In addition, the private beneficiary of the condemnation in
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority sought to acquire by
eminent domain what it could not favorably acquire in open market
negotiations. As we said in that case, the evidence established that
"members of the public are not the primary intended beneficiaries
of this taking. [Citation.] This condemnation clearly was intended
to assist Gateway in accomplishing their goals in a swift,
economical, and profitable manner." Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 240. Here, the evidence does
not support a similar conclusion.
	Additionally, other cases inform our public purpose inquiry.
In People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980),
this court found that the stated purpose of the Real Property Tax
Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (Ill. Rev Stat. 1977, ch.
24, par. 11-74.4-2, now codified at 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-2 (West
2000)) of "promoting the public purpose of the State in reducing
unemployment, relieving urban blight and increasing the general
tax base" was within the ambit of the public purpose doctrine and,
therefore, constitutional. Canton, 79 Ill. 2d  at 366, 369. Thus, this
court affirmed a summary grant of mandamus compelling the
mayor to execute general obligation bonds to finance a tax
increment financing project authorized by municipal ordinance.
Canton, 79 Ill. 2d  at 378. In doing so, we found that factual issues
presented by the record, such as the value and issue date of the
bonds and the possibility of the contracts of various taxing districts,
were not material to the constitutionality of the legislation. Canton,
79 Ill. 2d  at 377.
	We reached a similar result in People ex rel. City of Urbana
v. Paley, 68 Ill. 2d 62 (1977), finding valid a city ordinance
authorizing the issuance of municipal bonds to finance the
acquisition of a parcel of land as part of an urban development
program. The ordinance was upheld against a public purpose
challenge that it principally benefitted a private developer. This
court noted that the purpose of the project was "clearly and
predominantly a public purpose, and the benefit reaped by private
developers is merely an inevitable incident thereto." Urbana, 68 Ill. 2d  at 76.
	It is historically clear that Soldier Field has served public
purposes since its dedication in 1924. It will continue to do so after
the completion of the Burnham Park project as authorized by the
Act. A financial benefit accruing to the Bears, standing alone, does
not diminish the fact that the renovated Soldier Field will be used
and enjoyed by the public for a wide variety of public purposes,
whether or not the projected positive effects on jobs and the local
economy generally result as predicted by the legislature. Therefore,
we hold that the Act does not violate the terms of article VIII,
section 1(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VIII, §1(a)).

B. Public Trust
	Plaintiffs also argue that the Act violates the public trust
doctrine because it allows a private party (the Bears) to use and
control Soldier Field for its primary benefit with no corresponding
public benefit. All parties agree that Burnham Park, including
Soldier Field, is public trust property.
	The United States Supreme Court announced the public trust
doctrine in Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892). In 1869, the Illinois legislature had
granted the railroad, in fee simple, title to over 1,000 acres of
submerged land extending into Lake Michigan about one mile from
a portion of Chicago's shoreline and had authorized the railroad to
operate a rail line over the property. Illinois Central, 146 U.S.  at
444, 36 L. Ed.  at 1039, 13 S. Ct.  at 115. After the railroad
improved the property and commenced operations, the legislature
repealed the enabling legislation and revoked the original grant.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the railroad's challenge
to the State's action, holding that a state may not abdicate its
obligation to preserve its navigable waters for the use of the public.
The Court stated:
		"The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and
which can only be discharged by the management and
control of property in which the public has an interest,
cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property."
Illinois Central, 146 U.S.  at 453, 36 L. Ed.  at 1042, 13 S. Ct.  at 118.
	Illinois Central involved the conveyance of public trust
property to a private party. The doctrine was applied by this court
to a similar transfer in People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park
District, 66 Ill. 2d 65 (1976). In that case, the Illinois Attorney
General brought a declaratory judgment action asking the court to
declare an act of the legislature void because it allowed a transfer
of land in violation of the public trust doctrine. The act authorized
the sale of submerged lands owned by the Chicago Park District to
the United States Steel Corporation to allow the construction of an
additional facility extending the company's South Works Plant
some 194 acres into Lake Michigan. The enabling legislation
declared that:
			" '[T]he grant of submerged land contained in this Act
is made in aid of commerce and will create no impairment
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining,
but will instead result in the conversion of otherwise
useless and unproductive submerged land into an
important commercial development to the benefit of the
people of the State of Illinois.' " Scott, 66 Ill. 2d  at 80.
	The court observed that the waters over the submerged lands
were adjacent to waters presently in important public use and it
could not be said that the irretrievable loss of those waters would
not adversely affect the public use of the adjacent waters. Scott, 66 Ill. 2d  at 79-80. Despite the legislative declaration, the court could
only perceive a private purpose for the grant. Scott, 66 Ill. 2d  at 79-80. Thus, the court found that the act violated the public trust
doctrine. Scott, 66 Ill. 2d  at 80.
	There is little similarity between Illinois Central or Scott and
the case before us. The Park District is, and will remain, the owner
of the Burnham Park property, including Soldier Field. Neither the
Act, the implementing agreements, nor the project documents
provide for a conveyance of the Soldier Field property to the Bears.
There is no abdication of control of the property to the Bears. The
Park District will continue in its previous capacity as landlord
under a lease agreement with the Bears and will continue in its
existing role as owner of the remainder of the Burnham Park
property.
	Plaintiffs argue, however, that this court's decision in Paepcke
v. Public Building Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330 (1970), establishes that
the public trust doctrine may be applied even without an outright
conveyance of the trust property. Although the opinion does
suggest that a public trust challenge might be made on the basis
that a diversion from the previously designated use of trust
property is not justified unless certain standards are met, the court
nevertheless affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
challenge, holding that adequate legislative authorization existed
to support the proposed changes, allowing the use of park property
for school purposes. Paepcke, 46 Ill. 2d  at 342-45. In conclusion,
the court stated:
			"[T]he issues presented in this case illustrate the classic
struggle between those members of the public who would
preserve our parks and open lands in their pristine purity
and those charged with administrative responsibilities
who, under the pressures of the changing needs of an
increasingly complex society, find it necessary, in good
faith and for the public good, to encroach to some extent
upon lands heretofore considered inviolate to change. The
resolution of this conflict in any given case is for the
legislature and not the courts. The courts can serve only as
an instrument of determining legislative intent as
evidenced by existing legislation measured against
constitutional limitations. In this process the courts must
deal with legislation as enacted and not with speculative
considerations of legislative wisdom." Paepcke, 46 Ill. 2d 
at 347.
	The rationale we used in Paepcke is equally applicable here.
Further, we note that Soldier Field will continue to be used as a
stadium for athletic, artistic, and cultural events. With improved
parking, the public will gain better access to the stadium, the
museums, and the lakefront generally. The public will now enjoy
a fully renovated, multiuse stadium, instead of a deteriorating 78-year-old facility. These results do not violate the public trust
doctrine even though the Bears will also benefit from the
completed project.

C. Three-Readings
	Lastly, plaintiffs argue that Public Act 91-0935 violates the
three-readings requirement of the Illinois Constitution. The
Constitution provides that a "bill shall be read by title on three
different days in each house." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d).
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature did not follow this procedure,
and therefore we should invalidate the Act.
	Illinois follows the enrolled-bill doctrine. People v. Dunigan,
165 Ill. 2d 235, 253-54 (1995); Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 424 (1994); Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition
Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 259 (1992). This doctrine provides that
once the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate certify that the procedural requirements for passing
a bill have been met, a bill is conclusively presumed to have met
all procedural requirements for passage. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at
253-54; Cutinello, 161 Ill. 2d  at 424, quoting Geja's Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d  at 259. Under this precedent, we will not invalidate legislation
on the basis of the three-readings requirement if the legislation has
been certified. In this case, plaintiffs acknowledge that Public Act
91-0935 was certified, thus precluding judicial review.
	We noted in Geja's Cafe and again in Cutinello that the
legislature had shown remarkably poor self-discipline in policing
itself in regard to the three-readings requirement. Geja's Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d  at 260; Cutinello, 161 Ill. 2d  at 425. The same poor self-discipline is alleged to have occurred in this case. The record below
has not, however, been sufficiently developed to support or
contradict this claim. Nevertheless, because this court is ever
mindful of its duty to enforce the constitution of this state, we take
the opportunity to urge the legislature to follow the three-readings
rule. While separation of powers concerns militate in favor of the
enrolled-bill doctrine (see Cutinello, 161 Ill. 2d at 425), our
responsibility to ensure obedience to the constitution remains an
equally important concern.

III. CONCLUSION
	In sum, we hold that section 3 of the Illinois Sport Facility Act
violates neither the public purpose doctrine nor the public trust
doctrine and that Public Act 91-0935 is not subject to procedural
challenge in light of the enrolled-bill doctrine. We therefore affirm
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants.
Judgment affirmed.



	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:


	I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately, however,
to note that the majority opinion cannot be reconciled with the
requirement advanced in Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 199 Ill. 2d 225
(2002), that the public be entitled to use or enjoy the facilities of a
development project as of right and not as a mere favor or by
permission of the owner.
	In Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at
235, the majority recognized that the state, as a sovereign, has the
inherent right to condemn property, subject to the constitutional
mandate that private property may not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation to the owner. Further, the
majority recognized that the subsequent transfer of property to a
private entity does not transform a taking for public use into a
taking for private use. See Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 235. The majority correctly cited Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98 (1954), for these propositions. See Southwestern
Illinois Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 235-36. However,
contrary to the holdings of Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman,
the majority gave little deference to the legislature's public purpose
determination. Instead, the majority engrafted upon Hawaii
Housing Authority and Berman a requirement that property taken
for a development project be put into use for the public as of right,
a proposition specifically rejected by the Court in Hawaii Housing
Authority. See Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S.  at 243-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 199, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331. The majority explained:
		"As this court held in Gaylord [v. Sanitary District], 204 Ill.  at 584 '[t]he public must be to some extent entitled to
use or enjoy the property, not as a mere favor or by
permission of the owner, but by right.'
			***
			If this taking were allowed to stand, it may be true that
spectators at Gateway would benefit greatly. Developing
additional parking could benefit the members of the public
who choose to attend events at the racetrack, as spectators
may often have to wait in long lines of traffic to park their
vehicles and again to depart the facility. We also
acknowledge that a public use or purpose may be satisfied
in light of public safety concerns. [Citation.] The public is
allowed to park on the property in exchange for the
payment of a fee. Gateway's racetrack may be open to the
public, but not 'by right.' [Citation.] It is a private venture
designed to result not in a public use, but in private
profits." Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 238-39.
	The Southwestern Illinois Development Authority majority
concluded that the taking was for a private use and not a public
use. Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at
242. In so concluding, the majority failed to give due consideration
to the findings of the Authority and the St. Clair County board that
expansion of the Gateway racetrack would enhance the public
health and safety of the citizens of southwestern Illinois and would
increase the general welfare by generating economic growth in the
area. The majority also failed to give due consideration to the
uncontested testimony in the circuit court that expansion of the
racetrack would eliminate blight, alleviate traffic safety problems
and promote economic development in the area. The majority
eschewed these findings and the uncontested evidence adduced at
trial, in favor of its stated rule that " 'to constitute a public use,
something more than a mere benefit to the public must flow from
the contemplated improvement' " the public must have access to
the facility as of right. See Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 243 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by
McMorrow, J.)
	In the case at bar, the legislature amended the Illinois Sports
Facilities Authority Act (70 ILCS 3205/1 et seq. (West 2000)) to
authorize the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority to issue $399
million in bonds and enter into contracts for the implementation of
an improvement project relating to Burnham Park. Specifically, the
Act authorized the Facilities Authority to enter into an assistance
agreement with the Chicago Park District, the governmental owner
of Burnham Park for the renovation of the park. The Facilities
Authority, the Park District, the Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc.,
and the Chicago Bears Stadium L.L.C., the developer of the
project, entered into a series of agreements for the improvement of
Burnham Park, including the reconstruction of Soldier Field. The
bond issue is to be repaid from revenues the Facilities Authority
receives from hotel taxes. See 70 ILCS 3205/19 (West 2000).
Thus, the legislature authorized the use of public funds for the
improvement of Burnham Park and reconstruction of the stadium.
	Under the terms of the agreements, the Bears are designated as
the primary sports user of Soldier Field during the professional
football season. The Bears are entitled to use the stadium on game
days as well as six times in a calendar year. During the football
season, the field is not to be used by any party, including the Park
District, for the five days preceding a game day. The Bears may
also request the use of the stadium for up to 34 events each year.
The Bears' lease agreement is scheduled to end in 2033, subject to
the Bears' option to extend the term of the agreement for four
additional five-year periods.
	The plaintiffs at bar argue, inter alia, that the Act violates the
requirement in article VIII, section 1(a), of the Illinois Constitution
that public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public
purposes. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §1(a). They also argue that the
Act violates the public trust doctrine because it allows a private
entity, the Bears, to use and control the stadium for its primary
benefit, with no corresponding public benefit. The majority
disagrees. It holds that the Act does not violate either the
constitutional requirement that public funds be used only for public
purposes or the public trust doctrine. In so holding, the majority,
although it protests to the contrary, retreats from the requirement
in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority that the public
must be able to use the development project facilities as of right.
	It is quite evident that the public is not "entitled" to the use of
Soldier Field as of "right." On game days, members of the public
must pay a fee to view the Bears play at the stadium. The Park
District itself cannot use the stadium for the five days preceding a
game. Looking beyond the Bears, the stadium is used as a venue
for the presentation of sporting events, concerts and other cultural
events. In those instances also the public must pay an entrance fee.
It is also evident that private parties such as the Bears benefit from
the ability to charge an entrance fee to the public for the use of the
stadium. The legislature, however, determined that there are public
benefits from the development of sports arenas. As stated in the
Act, "professional sports facilities can be magnets for substantial
interstate tourism resulting in increased retail sales, hotel and
restaurant sales, and entertainment industry sales, all of which
increase jobs and economic growth." 70 ILCS 3205/3 (West 2000).
	The majority asserts that Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority is distinguishable because the Authority there used the
power of eminent domain to acquire the property at issue. This
purported distinction is of no avail since the power of eminent
domain, like the authority to issue the bonds in the present case, is
but a means employed by the legislature to achieve the public
purpose. Once the legislature has spoken regarding the public
interests to be served, the means by which those interests are to be
attained are also for the legislature to determine. See Berman, 348 U.S.  at 33-34, 99 L. Ed.  at 38, 75 S. Ct.  at 103.
	I note that, while the majority attempts to distinguish
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, the majority justifies
its finding of a public purpose in the present case by reference to
the financing and construction of Comiskey Park. The majority
states:
		"In view of Soldier Field's long history of hosting events
that have incidentally benefitted private interests, such as
college and professional football games, professional
boxing, professional soccer, horse shows, rodeos, and
circuses, and because the same rationale used by the
legislature as authority to construct and finance Comiskey
Park is employed to establish the public purpose of the
Soldier Field project authorized by the Act, we can discern
no evasive or deceptive purpose in the legislature's
findings." Slip op. at 8.
The legislature authorized the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority
to use the power of eminent domain in the construction of
Comiskey Park, including the construction of parking structures
serving the stadium. See 70 ILCS 3205/2, 12 (West 2000).
	In my dissent in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority,
I inquired of the majority
			"what development project can satisfy the requirement
that the public be 'entitled to use or enjoy the property, not
as a mere favor or by permission of the owner, but by
right'? Can a member of the general public enter a
manufacturing plant as of right? What of a sports facility?
Can a member of the general public enter a stadium, or for
that matter the racetrack at issue, without paying a fee for
the privilege?" Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority, 199 Ill. 2d  at 263 (Freeman, J., dissenting,
joined by McMorrow, J.).
The answer to my inquiries is that the public is not entitled to use
or enjoy the facilities of a development project as of right. In the
present case, the majority notes that "[t]he benefit to the public is
not inherently diminished by the payment of an admission charge."
Slip op. at 9. By this holding, the majority recognizes what it
refused to acknowledge in Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority. It only remains for this court to explicitly overrule the
"public entitlement" requirement advanced in Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special
concurrence.