Case Title: HIXSON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-140

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
HIXSON v. STATE2001 WY 9933 P.3d 154Case Number: 00-140Decided: 10/18/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

GREGORY 
JOHN HIXSON, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, 
Director, Defender Aid Program; and Mark Scarr, Student Intern. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Thomas Kelley, Student 
Intern.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a Judgment and Sentence entered after the appellant, Gregory John Hixson, 
was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2001), 
a felony, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), both being 
misdemeanors.  The primary issue is 
the sufficiency of an affidavit that resulted in the issuance of a search 
warrant.  The appellant also argues 
that the plain view doctrine is not available to the State to salvage the fruits 
of the search.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues before 
this Court are:

 

            
1.         
Was the affidavit sufficient to support the judicial officer's conclusion 
that probable cause existed for issuance of the search 
warrant?

 

            
2.         
Was the seizure of items from the appellant's home during his arrest 
nevertheless justified under the plain view doctrine?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Analysis of this 
case must begin with a chronology of significant events.  On August 10, 1999, law enforcement 
officers worked with a confidential informant (CI1) to purchase controlled 
substances from Jason Schibig.  CI1 
told Wheatland Police Officer Don London that Schibig had told her that Schibig 
had purchased the controlled substances from the appellant.  On August 14, 1999, the police officers 
worked with a second confidential informant (CI2) to purchase controlled 
substances directly from the appellant.  
On August 25, 1999, an Information was filed charging the appellant with 
unlawful delivery of a controlled substance based on the August 14, 1999, 
transaction.1  Also on August 25, 1999, an arrest 
warrant was issued for the appellant, and Officer London signed an affidavit to 
support his request for a search warrant directed to the appellant's 
residence.  The search warrant was 
obtained on August 26, 1999, and executed, along with the arrest warrant, on 
August 27, 1999.  Finally, a second 
Information was filed on August 28, 1999, charging the appellant with the three 
counts that are at issue in this appeal.  
The charges contained in the second Information stemmed from evidence 
obtained during the search of the appellant's residence pursuant to the warrant, 
and on his person following his arrest.

 

[¶4]      After being bound 
over to the district court for trial on all four of the charges, the appellant 
filed a Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence.  The gist of that motion was that Officer 
London's affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis from which the issuing 
judicial officer could conclude there was probable cause to issue the search 
warrant.  Specifically, the 
appellant contended that the affidavit contained conclusions and false 
statements.  The present appeal is 
from the district court's denial of the motion to suppress 
evidence.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
The Search 
Warrant

 

[¶5]      The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 
both protect the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.  This Court has had many occasions to 
compare and apply these two provisions.  
See Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, ¶¶ 5-11, ___ P.3d ___, 
___, slip op. at 3-5 (Wyo. 2001) and Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 482-89 (Wyo. 1999).  Because of the desire recognized in 
Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 6, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 3, and 
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 486, to "develop our own constitutional principles 
under the state provision," we begin by looking to Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, 
which provides:

 

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 

See 
Cordova, 2001 
WY 96, ¶ 6, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 3; 
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 485.  Of significance to our analysis is the 
language therein requiring the probable cause finding for the issuance of a 
search warrant to be supported by affidavit.2  The requirement of an affidavit 
"strengthens" the Wyoming citizen's rights by creating a permanent record.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 
483; 
Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 93 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶6]      Wyoming's law 
concerning the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a search warrant, as 
well as the standard for review of that decision, is succinctly stated in 
Davis, 859 P.2d at 94 (quoting Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 378, 379 (Wyo. 1989); 
Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Wyo. 1983); 
Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 478 (Wyo. 1983); 
United States v. Shelton, 742 F. Supp. 1491, 1498-99 (D.Wyo. 1990); and 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684, 87 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978)):

 

            
In order to issue a search warrant, the judge or magistrate must have a 
"substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause exists.  * * *  The judge or magistrate must be supplied 
with sufficient information to support his independent judgment that probable 
cause exists.  * * *  The affidavit "must include facts 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent and cautious man to believe that a 
crime has been committed and that there is evidence of the crime at the place to 
be searched."  * * *  While mere suspicion is not enough, 
certainty is not required.  * * 
*

 

            
There is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit 
supporting a search warrant.  * * 
*  Furthermore, the affidavit is to 
be tested by much less vigorous standards than those governing the admissibility 
of evidence at trial.  * * *  The issuing judge's determination should 
be paid great deference upon appeal.  
* * *  Because of the 
preference for warrants, and the desire to encourage law enforcement personnel 
to seek warrants, any doubt should be resolved by sustaining the 
search.

 

We 
further delineated the nature of our scope of review in Cordova, 2001 WY 
96, ¶¶ 9-15, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 4-7.

 

[¶7]      We traditionally 
review the sufficiency of an affidavit to support the issuance of a search 
warrant under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 de novo, giving deference3 to the issuing magistrate's 
determination of probable cause such that it places the burden on the appellant 
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his rights were 
violated.  Cordova, 2001 WY 
96, ¶ 10, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5; Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 
1367 (Wyo. 1996); Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo. 1995).  Review of the magistrate's decision is 
accomplished under a "totality of the circumstances" test, but it must not be 
forgotten that, in determining probable cause to issue a search warrant, the 
magistrate is limited to "the four corners of the proffered affidavit in 
determining existence of probable cause."4  Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 448 (Wyo. 1996); 
Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1368; 
Guerra, 897 P.2d  at 453; 
Ostrowski, 665 P.2d  at 478.  Likewise, Wyoming's constitutional 
affidavit requirement means that "[s]upplemental testimony taken [during a 
suppression hearing] cannot be considered in determining whether probable cause 
existed at the time the warrant was issued."5  Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 9, ___ 
P.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.  The 
affidavit must "supply the issuing officer with sufficient information to make 
an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the 
warrant.  To that end, the affidavit 
must include more than bare conclusions of the affiant" and the affiant must 
"adequately articulate the factual basis for their request . . .."  Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶¶ 13-14, 
___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 6 (emphasis in original).

 

[¶8]      The affidavit 
used to obtain the warrant to search the appellant's residence reads in full as 
follows:

 

AFFIDAVIT 
OF DON LONDON

 

            
COMES NOW the Affiant, Don London, who after being duly sworn upon his 
oath, states as follows:

 

            
1.         
I am employed as an officer with the Wheatland Police 
Department.

 

            
2.         
I am certified as a peace officer in the State of Wyoming, and have been 
so certified at all times relevant herein.

 

            
3.         
Pursuant to an investigation conducted in Wheatland, Wyoming, a 
confidential informant purchased controlled substances from a Jason 
Schibig.

 

            
4.         
As part of the purchase on August 10, 1999, money was given to Schibig by 
the confidential informant at a motel in Wheatland.

 

            
5.         
After receiving the money from the confidential informant, Schibig 
traveled to 905 14th Street, Wheatland, and then returned to the 
motel bringing marijuana and methamphetamine.

 

            
6.         
On a second occasion on that same date, Jason Schibig received an 
additional order for methamphetamine and again traveled to 905 14th 
Street, Wheatland, and returned bearing the controlled 
substance.

 

            
7.         
The amounts of controlled substances ordered by the confidential 
informant and delivered by Schibig were of differing weights and discussion was 
had between Schibig and the confidential informant of the differing weights of 
the materials and the various pricing for different amounts of these 
substances.

 

            
8.         
One of the residents at 905 14th Street, Wheatland, is a 
Gregory John Hixson.

 

            
9.         
On August 14, 1999, a different confidential informant purchased 
approximately ¼ oz. of marijuana from Mr. Hixson.

 

            
10.       
In the course of the Schibig transactions, Mr. Schibig informed the 
confidential informant that the drugs he was delivering were coming from 
Hixson.

 

            
11.       
The serial numbers of all bills used in the transactions were 
recorded.

 

            
12.       
Based upon the foregoing information, the undersigned believes that 
Hixson is actively engaged in the distribution of controlled substances 
including both marijuana and methamphetamine and that he is keeping and storing 
those controlled substances at his residence at 905 14th Street, 
Wheatland, Wyoming.

 

            
13.       
The undersigned requests that the Court issue a search warrant 
authorizing the search of the premises at 905 14th Street for 
controlled substances, scales, packaging material and business records 
associated with the distribution of controlled substances and money delivered in 
exchange for the controlled substances in the transactions noted 
above.

 

            
14.       
The premises at 905 14th Street include a number of out 
buildings and parked vehicles which may be being used to store these 
materials.

 

            
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

 

[¶9]      Counsels' 
arguments and the district court's comments at the suppression hearing focused 
on the distinction between facts and conclusions.6  One example from the affidavit may 
suffice to illustrate the nature of the discussion.  Paragraph 3 states:  "Pursuant to an investigation conducted 
in Wheatland, Wyoming, a confidential informant purchased controlled substances 
from a Jason Schibig."  The gist of 
the appellant's argument is that, from this statement, the magistrate could not 
tell who conducted the investigation, or who determined that an informant 
purchased controlled substances from Schibig.  The information is not attributed to any 
particular source.  Was Officer 
London part of the investigation?  
Did Officer London witness the purchase?  Was it the informant or someone else who 
told Officer London of the purchase?  
Similar uncertainty pervades the affidavit's remaining 
paragraphs.

 

[¶10]   The prosecutor argued, and the 
district court concluded, that a statement such as that found in paragraph 3 of 
the affidavit is not a conclusion, but is a statement of fact.  The State's argument is that "an 
informant purchased drugs from Schibig" is a statement of fact.  The district court concluded that a 
failure to attribute an individual fact to a particular source does not render 
the fact a conclusion.

 

[¶11]   We do not find the attempt to 
categorize the statements of this particular affidavit as either facts or 
conclusions to be helpful in deciding the issue before us.  The real difficulty with the affidavit 
is that it did not provide the issuing magistrate with sufficient information 
from which he independently could assess the reliability of the statements 
made.  It is true that hearsay, in 
general, and statements of informants, in particular, may provide the basis for 
the issuance of a search warrant.  
McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 543 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting 
Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 127 (Wyo. 1970)).  Under the "totality of the 
circumstances" test, however, there must be information provided within the 
affidavit from which the magistrate may assess the veracity and the basis of 
knowledge of the persons supplying the information.  Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 15, ___ 
P.3d at ___, slip op. at 7.  In our 
case, because the affidavit does not identify the foundation for any of the 
statements, be they fact or conclusion, it is impossible to assess their 
reliability.

 

[¶12]   Officer London's affidavit simply 
does not compare to the affidavits found to be sufficient, for example, in 
Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 521-25 (Wyo. 2000); 
Southworth, 913 P.2d at 447-49; and 
Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1368-69.  Nor does it contain the "confirm[ations] 
by the personal knowledge" seen in the affidavit approved in Almada v. 
State, 994 P.2d 299, 312 (Wyo. 1999).  For a judge or magistrate to issue a 
search warrant, the affidavit of probable cause must contain sufficient 
information for an independent determination of the reliability of the 
statements made therein, which shall include sufficient identification of the 
source of the information.7

 

            
Plain 
View

 

[¶13]   Neither the federal nor the state 
constitution forbids all searches and seizures done without a 
warrant.   What are prohibited 
are unreasonable searches and seizures.  One of the recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement is the "plain view doctrine."  As that doctrine is presently formulated 
in Wyoming, it contains three requisites for the lawful seizure of 
property:

 

(1) the 
officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place 
from which the evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating character 
of the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (3) the officer must have a 
lawful right of access to the object itself.

 

Taylor 
v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 21 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 
(1990)).  The first factor is sometimes stated as 
a requirement that "the officer is lawfully present in the place in which the 
objects are found . . .."  
Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Wyo. 1998).  A former fourth factor, that there be 
exigent circumstances, has been abandoned.  
Pendelton v. State, 966 P.2d 951, 954 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692 (Wyo. 1995)).8

 

[¶14]   The plain view doctrine arises in 
our case out of the fact that, when the officers arrived at the appellant's 
residence with the search warrant issued on August 26th, they also 
possessed the warrant issued on August 25th for the appellant's arrest.  It is the State's contention that the 
arrest warrant gave the officers "lawful presence" in the residence, regardless 
of the validity of the search warrant.  
Indeed, the district court came to such a conclusion at the end of the 
suppression hearing.  Application of 
the three-part test set forth in Taylor requires a sojourn into the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing.

 

[¶15]   The suppression hearing transcript 
contains thirty-nine pages of Officer London's testimony.  The bulk of his testimony concerns the 
issuance and execution of the search warrant.  Seemingly as an afterthought, the 
prosecutor's final question to Officer London on cross-examination, and the 
officer's response, were as follows:

 

            
Q.        Was 
there evidence in plain view within the house once you went in 
there?

 

            
A.        Yes, 
there was.

 

[¶16]   No other testimony having to do 
with plain view was elicited during the hearing.  In fact, Officer London, the only 
officer to testify at the hearing, testified further that when the other 
officers entered the house and detained the appellant, Officer London was not 
present because he was chasing a fleeing suspect down the alley behind the 
house.  Nevertheless, in a colloquy 
with counsel at the end of the hearing, the district court followed up on the 
prosecutor's question by asking defense counsel:

 

            
THE COURT:  Let me ask you 
one other question, back to the warrant issue.  The testimony indicates that the 
officers, when they went to this house, had an arrest warrant for Mr. Hixson as 
well.  So didn't they have a right 
to be on the premises, with or without a search warrant?

 

After a 
brief discussion about the arrest warrant, the district court then asked defense 
counsel two more questions:

 

            
THE COURT:  And pursuant to 
that warrant, regardless of the outcome of the case, ultimately, they had the 
authority to be on the premises, to execute that warrant, even without the 
search warrant, didn't they?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your 
Honor, they did.

 

            
THE COURT:  And pursuant to 
that, they had the authority to act on evidence in plain sight, didn't 
they?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, they 
did, Your Honor.

 

[¶17]   At this point in the hearing, it is 
clear that a plain view scenario is being explored because the district court is 
attempting to find an alternative justification for the seizure of 
evidence.  It must be remembered, in 
that regard, that searches and seizures not supported by warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable and the state bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances of a particular case fit 
within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 
362 (Wyo. 1998).  In the context of our case, Officer 
London's testimony must be measured under the three Horton factors 
adopted in Taylor.  All we 
know from that testimony is that Officer London, who was not present when entry 
into the house was accomplished, says there was evidence in plain view.  Even if we assume the officers were 
rightfully on the premises, we do not know where any items were found or who 
found them.  In truth, we do not 
know if anything actually was in "plain view."9  Accordingly, the State did not meet its 
burden of proving the elements of the plain view exception to the warrant 
requirement.

 

[¶18]   Finally, we must dispose of the 
State's contention that, if we find there was inadequate justification for 
issuance of the search warrant, we must remand this case for a "full hearing" on 
the plain view issue.  The State 
cites no authority for this contention.  
We are aware of no rule or precedent that gives the State an opportunity, 
upon an appeal brought by the losing defendant, to have a criminal case remanded 
to the district court to allow the State to present additional evidence at a 
pre-trial motion hearing in limine.  
Such would be exceedingly odd in the circumstances of the instant case, 
where the State was successful on the issue at the motion 
hearing.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]   Officer London's affidavit 
contained insufficient information to give the issuing judicial officer a 
substantial basis from which he could independently find the requisite probable 
cause.  None of the statements 
within the affidavit were attributed to anyone, making it impossible to judge 
their reliability.  In addition, the 
testimony at the suppression hearing did not establish the facts necessary to 
support admissibility of any particular items of evidence under the plain view 
doctrine.

 

[¶20]   Reversed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The appellant 
was acquitted of this charge, so it is not one of the convictions being appealed 
in the instant case.

  2The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as 
follows:

 

The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

  3As we stated in 
Cordova, this deference is not "to be employed to blindly sustain the 
actions of the magistrate or to place any reviewing court in a position that it 
may refuse to examine the factual basis for such issuance.'"  Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 11, ___ 
P.3d at ___, slip op. at 6 (quoting Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 133 
(Wyo. 1976)).

  4"[I]t is the 
information available at the time the warrant was issued that is material to the 
question of probable cause."  Lee 
v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 524 (Wyo. 2000).  Oral 
statements of witnesses made at the time may be considered by the magistrate 
only if they have been made and recorded pursuant to the formalities of 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(c).  Guerra, 897 P.2d  at 453.  As in Guerra, there is no 
suggestion in the record of the instant case that the officer's affidavit was 
supplemented in this manner.

  5An exception "to 
this rule applies when defendants meet their burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the affiant gave deliberately false 
statements or recklessly disregarded the truth in creating the affidavit."  Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 9 n.4, ___ 
P.3d at ___ n.4, slip op. at 5 n.4.

  6Questions were 
also raised about the truth of some of the statements made in the 
affidavit.  For example, the 
statement in paragraph 11 apparently was not accurate because the confidential 
informant made change with the "buy money" at a convenience store before one of 
the transactions.  Because we are 
reversing based on the nature of the affidavit as a whole, we need not discuss 
the effect of the alleged inaccuracies.  
See Davis, 859 P.2d  at 92-94, for a review of the law in regard to 
false statements in search warrant affidavits.

  7The specific 
identity of the confidential informant need not be revealed in the affidavit so 
long as the test of reliability can otherwise be made.  As in Cordova, we do not now 
choose to adopt a "rigid test for the level of factual support or corroboration 
necessary to make a determination of adequate probable cause 
. . .."  Cordova, 
2001 WY 96, ¶ 15, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 7.

  8For an analysis 
of the underpinnings of the plain view doctrine, including the different rights 
implicated by a search, as opposed to a seizure, see McDermott v. 
State, 870 P.2d 339, 343-45 (Wyo. 1994).  
Only the exigent circumstances requirement of McDermott has been 
overruled.

  9The district 
court recognized these deficiencies.  
After asking the questions quoted above, the district court went on to 
acknowledge that "I don't know what that evidence was at this 
point."