Case Title: Taylor v. Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 020923

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J.1
 
RANDOLPH TAYLOR 
 
 
      OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 020923         February 28, 2003 
 
RICHARD A. DAVIS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 
Donald H. Kent, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff in an 
attorney malpractice action pled a cause of action against his 
former criminal defense attorneys who represented him in 
criminal proceedings. 
 
Plaintiff, Randolph Taylor, filed his motion for judgment 
against Richard A. Davis and Althea B. Hurt.  Plaintiff 
alleged the following facts in his motion.  On July 4, 1997, 
plaintiff "was arrested [in Albemarle County] and charged with 
a violation of [Code] § 46.2-301, driving a moped on a 
suspended license, a class 1 misdemeanor" even though a moped 
is "specifically exempted from the statute, [Code] § 46.2-301; 
thus driving a moped on a suspended license was not a crime in 
Virginia." 
 
The Circuit Court of Albemarle County appointed defendant 
Davis to represent plaintiff for that purported offense.  
Plaintiff alleged that he advised defendant Davis that 
                     
1 Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the 
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date 
plaintiff was lawfully permitted to drive a moped even though 
plaintiff's license had been suspended.  Plaintiff also 
alleged that Davis did not perform "any legal research on the 
issue, and failed to raise any defense to the criminal charge, 
including the statutory exemption."2
 
At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court 
found plaintiff guilty as charged in the summons.  The court 
entered an order dated May 18, 1998 that sentenced plaintiff 
to confinement in jail for a term of 60 days and ordered him 
to pay a fine in the amount of $100 and court costs.  
Plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle on the public 
highways of this Commonwealth was suspended for a term of six 
months. 
 
The Circuit Court of Albemarle County appointed Althea 
Hurt to represent plaintiff in the event he decided to appeal 
the judgment.  Plaintiff alleged in his motion for judgment 
that he contacted Hurt "to discuss his appeal and his 
understanding of the moped exemption contained in [Code] 
                                                                
of his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
2 Code § 46.2-301(B) states in relevant part: 
 
"Except as provided in §§ 46.2-304 and 46.2-357, no 
resident or nonresident (i) whose driver's license . . . has 
been suspended . . . shall thereafter drive any motor vehicle 
or any self-propelled machinery or equipment on any highway in 
the Commonwealth until the period of such suspension or 
revocation has terminated. . . .  For the purposes of this 
section, the phrase 'motor vehicle or any self-propelled 
machinery or equipment' shall not include mopeds." 
 
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§ 46.2-301."  Plaintiff further alleged that despite his 
representations to Hurt that he was legally permitted to drive 
a moped even though his driver's license had been suspended, 
Hurt advised plaintiff that he was incorrect, that he had no 
appealable issue, and "that there was no need to appeal."  
Plaintiff alleged that Hurt did not perform "any legal 
research on the issue" and that he "acceded to . . . Hurt's 
advice." 
 
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a "motion to reopen and 
dismiss" in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County.  Plaintiff 
asserted in his motion that he was wrongfully convicted of a 
violation of Code § 46.2-301 because, pursuant to Code § 46.2-
301(B), the phrase "motor vehicle or any self-propelled 
machinery or equipment" did not include mopeds.  He asserted 
that, therefore, he was permitted by statute to drive a moped 
even though his license had been suspended.  The 
Commonwealth's attorney endorsed the plaintiff's motion. 
 
The Circuit Court of Albemarle County entered an order 
that "reopened" the case and dismissed "the criminal charge 
upon which [plaintiff] was convicted."  The court directed the 
clerk "to take appropriate steps to correct the public records 
regarding this dismissal and to refund to . . . Taylor, all 
fines and court costs heretofore paid.  Furthermore, Mr. 
 
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Taylor's privilege to drive taken by this Court pursuant to 
the original conviction is void ab initio." 
Plaintiff also alleged that as a result of the 
defendants' negligent acts and omissions, he sustained a 
wrongful conviction, incarceration, monetary losses, and other 
damages. 
 
The defendants filed demurrers and asserted, among other 
things, that plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for 
attorney malpractice because he failed to allege that he 
obtained post-conviction relief as required by this Court's 
decision in Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 482 S.E.2d 797, 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997).  The circuit court entered 
an order that held that plaintiff could not proceed because he 
failed to plead that he had obtained post-conviction relief.  
Plaintiff appeals. 
 
In Adkins, we considered whether a plaintiff, in an 
attorney malpractice case, who had been convicted of numerous 
felonies, was required to plead in his motion for judgment 
that he had successfully obtained post-conviction relief.  At 
a preliminary hearing during the underlying criminal 
proceedings, the general district court found sufficient cause 
to certify ten felony charges relating to Jeffrey S. Adkins' 
alleged commissions of armed robberies, abductions, unlawful 
wearing of a mask, and sexual offenses.  Subsequently, a grand 
 
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jury returned indictments against him on the ten original 
charges and on six additional felony charges arising from the 
same incident. 
 
The circuit court fixed the trial dates for Adkins, who 
had been incarcerated on the ten original charges since his 
arrest.  Adkins filed a pro se motion to dismiss all 16 
charges based upon asserted violations of the speedy trial 
provisions of Code § 19.2-243.  The circuit court denied 
Adkins' motion and, at separate jury trials, he was convicted 
of all charges and subsequently sentenced to punishments of 
two life sentences plus 45 years. 
 
Adkins' counsel filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
and asserted speedy trial violations limited to the 
convictions resulting from the ten original charges.  The 
Court of Appeals agreed with Adkins, reversed the judgments of 
convictions, and discharged him from further prosecution of 
those ten charges.  Adkins' counsel appealed to this Court and 
raised the speedy trial defense to the six additional charges 
for the first time, and we denied the appeal for that reason. 
 
Subsequently, Adkins filed a motion for judgment against 
his criminal defense counsel alleging attorney malpractice.  
The defendant asserted that Adkins failed to plead viable 
causes of action against him because Adkins did not plead that 
he was innocent of the charges that resulted in his 
 
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convictions and he failed to plead that he secured reversals 
of his convictions in post-trial proceedings. 
 
We pointed out in Adkins that most jurisdictions have 
held "that a decision adverse to a criminal defendant in post-
conviction proceedings bars a recovery for the defense 
attorney's malpractice."  253 Va. at 281, 482 S.E.2d at 801.  
We noted that "courts will not assist the participant in an 
illegal act who seeks to profit from the act's commission."  
Id. (quoting Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 34, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 
(1990)).  We concluded that a post-conviction ruling adverse 
to the defendant barred any recovery for legal malpractice.  
Adkins, 253 Va. at 281-82, 482 S.E.2d at 801.  We also stated 
that "we think that a plaintiff in a case like the present 
should have the burden of alleging and proving as a part of 
his cause of action that he has obtained post-conviction 
relief."  Id. at 282, 482 S.E.2d at 801.  We also concluded in 
Adkins that the plaintiff in that case was required to plead 
that he was actually innocent, and we held that his guilt, not 
counsel's alleged failure to assert the speedy trial defense, 
was the proximate cause of his convictions.  Id. at 282, 482 
S.E.2d at 802. 
 
Our decision in Adkins, however, is not controlling in 
the present appeal, which is clearly distinguishable.  Unlike 
the plaintiff in Adkins, the plaintiff in the present case was 
 
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not guilty of a legally cognizable offense.  Plaintiff in this 
case, unlike the plaintiff in Adkins, pled that he was 
incarcerated upon a purported conviction of acts that did not 
constitute a crime.  And, unlike the plaintiff in Adkins, 
plaintiff in this appeal did not participate in an illegal act 
and, therefore, if he is able to recover judgments against his 
former attorneys, he will not profit from the commission of an 
illegal act. 
 
We hold that when, as here, a plaintiff in an attorney 
malpractice action against his former criminal defense 
attorneys makes allegations in his motion for judgment which, 
if true, establish that the plaintiff is actually innocent as 
a matter of law because the purported offense for which he was 
convicted did not constitute a crime at the time the plaintiff 
was charged, and the plaintiff was unable to establish actual 
innocence because of his attorneys' negligence, the plaintiff 
is not required to plead that he sought and obtained post-
conviction relief. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court, and we will remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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