Case Title: Mettee v. Urban Renewal Agency

Citation: 219 Kan. 165, 547 P.2d 356

Docket Number: 47,876

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1976-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
219 Kan. 165 (1976)
547 P.2d 356
LEONARD METTEE, Appellant,
v.
THE URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY and THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, et al., Appellees.
No. 47,876

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1976.
John H. Fields, of Carson, Fields, Kugler & Boal, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Robert H. Foerschler, of McAnany, Van Cleave and Phillips, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
The landowner in this condemnation case appeals from an order of the trial court disapproving the jury verdict and granting a remittitur or, alternatively, a new trial on the ground that the verdict is excessive and contrary to the evidence.
The court appointed appraisers awarded the landowners $18,750. The first jury awarded $17,500. The landowner appealed and this court reversed because of improper and prejudicial closing argument. Mettee v. Urban Renewal Agency, 213 Kan. 787, 518 P.2d 555.
The second trial was held in September 1974. Expert witnesses for the parties and their respective opinions of the value of the land taken were as follows:
*166 This was a total taking of six lots on Southwest Boulevard in the Rosedale area of Kansas City, Kansas. The second trial jury returned a verdict of $42,000.
Urban Renewal filed a motion for new trial in which it enumerated some twelve grounds, including its claim that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. Counsel for the landowners sought a hearing date for the motion. Thereafter the trial judge wrote to counsel, stating:
The landowner promptly filed a rejection of the remittitur, and a notice of appeal. Counsel were unable to agree upon a journal entry and therefore one was prepared and filed by the court. It states in part:
..............
The landowner lists four points on appeal. He contends that:
1. The Court was without jurisdiction to grant a new trial on the ground that the Court was of the opinion that the verdict of the jury was grossly excessive under the credible evidence.
*167 2. The Court was without jurisdiction to order a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial when the verdict of the jury was within the range of expert testimony.
3. The Court was without jurisdiction to weigh the testimony of the witnesses and determine its credibility having admitted the testimony of the witnesses in evidence.
4. The Court was without jurisdiction to invade the province of the jury and make findings of fact on contested factual issues.
These points are interrelated and were discussed together by both parties in their argument. The sole question is whether the trial judge in a condemnation case may grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is "contrary to the evidence" where the verdict is in fact within the range of the expert testimony and is therefore supported by the evidence.
Ordinarily an order granting a new trial is not a final order and is not appealable to this court except where, as here, the order is challenged on jurisdictional grounds. Landscape Development Co. v. Kansas City P. & L. Co., 197 Kan. 126, 415 P.2d 398; Herbel v. Endres, 202 Kan. 733, 451 P.2d 184. The landowner here contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction to take the action it took.
Prior to the enactment of our present civil code, the trial judge was a "thirteenth juror" and it was his right and duty to set aside a verdict which he did not approve. Allen v. Urban Renewal Agency, 192 Kan. 682, 685, 390 P.2d 1020. K.S.A. 1975 Supp. 60-259 (a) enumerates the specific grounds upon which a trial court may grant a new trial. The fourth of these is:
As will be seen from a summary of the expert testimony, the verdict was within the evidence adduced. It was in the exact amount fixed by the witness Vaughan, and was within the range of the evidence, being between $9,375 and $46,875. In Landscape, supra, the only reason given by the trial court in ordering a new trial was, "`the fact that the Court can not approve the verdict of the jury, period.'" (p. 127.) This court said:
..............
In Herbel v. Endres, supra, the trial court, in announcing its decision granting a new trial, said:
..............
We held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant a new trial simply because it was dissatisfied with the verdict.
Here, the trial judge stated both in his letter and in the journal entry that the verdict was grossly excessive under the credible evidence. He found the values fixed by the experts to be either unreasonably high or unreasonably low. He determined the fair market value of the property to be $28,000, granted a remittitur in order to reduce the amount of the verdict, and when the landowner rejected the remittitur, ordered a new trial on the expressed basis that the verdict was "contrary to the evidence." On this, we cannot agree.
As we pointed out in Landscape and Herbel, an order granting a new trial must be bottomed on one or more of the six enumerated grounds set forth in K.S.A. 60-259 (a), and the trial court must set out specifically the reasons for its order. The order here attacked *169 discloses that the court considered the verdict to be contrary to the "credible" evidence, though it was within the range of the values expressed by the witnesses.
The trial court complied with the form of the present statute, but not the substance. The court's order stated that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. K.S.A. 1975 Supp. 60-259 (a) The court also set forth specific reasons for its order. However, the reasons set forth constitute an impermissible basis for granting a new trial. Those reasons amount to a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the jury. In 58 Am.Jur.2d, New Trial, § 137, p. 344, it is noted that:
In 58 Am.Jur.2d, New Trial, § 145, pp. 351, 352, the author continues:
Appellee argues that the trial court should reject those portions of expert testimony that he believes unreliable where such testimony comprises a substantial and integral part of the entire evidence, citing Collins v. Merrick, 202 Kan. 276, 448 P.2d 1. Collins is easily distinguishable from the present case since that case involved a trial to the court, which was the trier of fact. Here, the jury was the trier of fact. The evidence was comprised of the testimony of expert witnesses called by both sides. The jury heard all the testimony and observed all the witnesses. The $42,000 verdict it rendered was within the range of the evidence. It was not for the trial court to assess the witnesses' credibility in setting aside that verdict and in granting a new trial.
A trial court cannot weigh the evidence, make its own determination, and substitute its judgment for that of a jury. In an eminent domain case the outside limits of the verdict are fixed by the *170 valuation evidence which the court has received, and which is before the jury. A verdict within the evidence cannot be disturbed by the trial court even though the court would have arrived at a different conclusion.
We hold that the trial court's order determining the fair market value of the land and directing a remittitur or alternatively a new trial on the stated ground cannot stand. The court was without jurisdiction to enter that order.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment for the landowner on the verdict of the second trial jury.