Case Title: State v. Pettus

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4836

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Pettus, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4836.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4836 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. PETTUS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Pettus, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4836.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2913.61(C)(1)—R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) allows for the 
aggregation of multiple theft offenses involving one victim into a single 
count, regardless of the status of the victim—Certified-conflict case 
dismissed as improvidently certified—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(Nos. 2019-0914 and 2019-1027—Submitted June 16, 2020—Decided October 
13, 2020.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-170712, 2019-Ohio-2023. 
__________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) 
permits aggregation of certain theft offenses only when the victim is an elderly 
person, a disabled adult, an active-duty service member, or a spouse of an active-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
duty service member.  We conclude that the language of the statute unambiguously 
allows for the aggregation of multiple theft offenses involving one victim into a 
single count, regardless of the status of the victim. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In connection with multiple alleged incidents of passing fraudulent 
checks at four separate banks, appellant, Lashawn Pettus, was charged with four 
counts of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), among other charges.  Each 
count of theft related to a different bank, and Pettus was alleged to have presented 
multiple fraudulent checks to each bank.  In accordance with R.C. 2913.61(C)(1), 
each theft count aggregated the multiple instances of theft alleged against each 
respective bank. 
{¶ 3} Pettus filed a motion to dismiss each of the four theft counts.  In 
support of his motion, he argued that each count was improperly aggregated into 
one offense, because R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) permits aggregation only when the victim 
of a theft offense was an elderly person, a disabled adult, an active-duty member of 
the military, or the spouse of an active-duty member of the military.  The trial court 
denied Pettus’s motion to dismiss.  After a bench trial, the court found Pettus guilty 
of each theft offense. 
{¶ 4} The First District Court of Appeals vacated Pettus’s sentences in part 
and remanded for resentencing after concluding that the trial court erred in 
imposing consecutive sentences without making required findings at the sentencing 
hearing.  2019-Ohio-2023, ¶ 85.  The appellate court otherwise affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment.  Id.  In doing so, the First District rejected Pettus’s argument that 
the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss.  Id. at ¶ 39-40.  The court 
stated that R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) is unambiguous and that based on the plain language 
of the statute, the clause requiring that the victim of an offense be an elderly person 
or disabled adult is limited to violations of R.C. 2913.31 and 2913.43.  Id. at ¶ 36.  
The court accordingly held that R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) does not limit the aggregation 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
of theft offenses under R.C. 2913.02 to theft offenses involving victims who are 
elderly persons, disabled adults, or military persons.  Id. at ¶ 39. 
{¶ 5} The First District certified a conflict after determining that its 
judgment was in conflict with the Twelfth District’s judgment in State v. Phillips, 
12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2009-03001, 2010-Ohio-2711.  This court determined 
that a conflict exists and ordered briefing on the conflict question certified by the 
First District: 
 
 
When a defendant is convicted of multiple theft offenses 
committed in the offender’s same employment, capacity, or 
relationship to another, does R.C. 2913.61(C) permit the offenses to 
be aggregated where the victim of the offense is not an elderly 
person, a disabled adult, or an active duty service member or spouse 
of an active duty service member? 
 
See 157 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2019-Ohio-3797, 131 N.E.3d 955.  This court also 
accepted jurisdiction over the first proposition of law set forth in Pettus’s 
jurisdictional appeal: “R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) allows aggregation of theft offenses only 
when the victims are elderly or disabled or who are in the military or who are 
spouses of those in the military.”  See 157 Ohio St.3d 1419, 2019-Ohio-3797, 131 
N.E.3d 962.  We consolidated the conflict case and jurisdictional case.  Id. 
II.  The Conflict Portion of this Case Was Improvidently Certified 
{¶ 6} Before analyzing the issue in this appeal, we first dismiss the certified-
conflict case as improvidently certified.  In order for a conflict to be properly before 
us, the judgment of the court of appeals certifying the conflict must conflict with 
the judgment of another court of appeals upon the same question.  Whitelock v. 
Gilbane Bldg. Co., 66 Ohio St.3d 594, 596, 613 N.E.2d 1032 (1993).  After 
reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that there is not a certifiable conflict 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
between the First District’s judgment in this case and the Twelfth District’s 
judgment in Phillips.  The facts of the two cases render them distinct. 
{¶ 7} In Phillips, the state charged the defendant with a single violation of 
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) that aggregated thefts involving multiple victims.  2010-Ohio-
2711 at ¶ 5.  The Twelfth District sua sponte raised the issue whether the state 
properly tried all the alleged theft offenses as a single offense.  Id. at ¶ 64.  In doing 
so, it first considered whether the offenses could be aggregated under R.C. 
2913.61(C)(2), which permits aggregation of offenses in certain cases involving 
multiple victims.  Id. at ¶ 70.  After analyzing that statute, it concluded that R.C. 
2913.61(C)(2) did not permit aggregation under the facts in Phillips.  Id. at  
¶ 70-71.  It then proceeded to state that “R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) does not apply because 
the subsection is limited to thefts involving elderly or disabled victims, through the 
offender’s employment, capacity, or relationship with another.”  Id. at ¶ 72.  
Notably, the court engaged in no analysis of R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) beyond that 
conclusory statement that the statute did not apply in the case. 
{¶ 8} Unlike Phillips, this case does not involve aggregation of thefts 
involving multiple victims into a single count.  Instead, this case involves 
aggregation of multiple thefts involving one victim into a single count for each 
victim.  Given this significant difference, we conclude that the two cases are not in 
conflict upon the same question.  We accordingly dismiss the certified-conflict case 
as improvidently certified. 
III.  Analysis 
{¶ 9} Despite dismissing the certified-conflict case, our consideration of the 
proposition of law presented in Pettus’s jurisdictional appeal provides us an 
opportunity to determine whether R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) permits aggregation of theft 
offenses only when the victims are elderly persons, disabled adults, active-duty 
members of the military, or spouses of those military members. 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
{¶ 10} Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  
State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 Ohio St.3d 
393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14, citing Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8.  When construing a statute, our 
primary concern is legislative intent.  State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-
Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 8.  When determining legislative intent, we first look 
to the plain language of the statute, and if that language is unambiguous and 
definite, we apply it as written.  Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 
2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18, citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 
77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 11} “To discern legislative intent, we read words and phrases in context 
and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  
Mahoning Edn. Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio 
St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 15.  When interpreting a statute, 
“ ‘significance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, 
sentence and part of an act.’ ”  Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 
2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio 
St. 231, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), paragraph five of the syllabus.  Furthermore, “we 
determine the intent of the legislature by considering the object sought to be 
attained.”  Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 554, 721 
N.E.2d 1057 (2000). 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) provides: 
 
 
When a series of offenses under section 2913.02 of the 
Revised Code, or a series of violations of, attempts to commit a 
violation of, conspiracies to violate, or complicity in violations of 
division (A)(1) of section 1716.14, section 2913.02, 2913.03, or 
2913.04, division (B)(1) or (2) of section 2913.21, or section 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
2913.31 or 2913.43 of the Revised Code involving a victim who is 
an elderly person or disabled adult, is committed by the offender in 
the offender’s same employment, capacity, or relationship to 
another, all of those offenses shall be tried as a single offense.  When 
a series of offenses under section 2913.02 of the Revised Code, or a 
series of violations of, attempts to commit a violation of, 
conspiracies to violate, or complicity in violations of section 
2913.02 or 2913.43 of the Revised Code involving a victim who is 
an active duty service member or spouse of an active duty service 
member is committed by the offender in the offender’s same 
employment, capacity, or relationship to another, all of those 
offenses shall be tried as a single offense.  The value of the property 
or services involved in the series of offenses for the purpose of 
determining the value as required by division (A) of this section is 
the aggregate value of all property and services involved in all 
offenses in the series. 
 
{¶ 13} As can be seen in the clauses that form the first sentence of the 
provision, R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) provides for aggregation in two separate and distinct 
instances.  First, the statute provides for aggregation when there has been a “series 
of offenses” under R.C. 2913.02, which proscribes theft.  Second, the statute 
provides for aggregation when there has been a “series of violations of, attempts to 
commit a violation of, conspiracies to violate, or complicity in violations of” certain 
listed offenses involving a victim who is an elderly person or disabled adult.  This 
reading is not only logical given the structure of the sentence, but it is also necessary 
in order to accord full meaning to the provision. 
{¶ 14} With his proposition of law, Pettus argues that the portion of the 
sentence requiring that the victim be an elderly person or disabled adult applies to 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
all offenses listed in the statute.  This reading, however, renders a portion of the 
statute redundant, and we generally will not approve of a reading of a statute that 
renders its words superfluous.  See E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 39 Ohio 
St.3d 295, 299, 530 N.E.2d 875 (1988).  The redundancy inherent in Pettus’s 
preferred reading of the statute is embodied in the provision’s dual references to 
R.C. 2913.02.  If the “elderly person or disabled adult” clause applies to both 
references to R.C. 2913.02, then one of the references to R.C. 2913.02 is redundant.  
Instead, in order to accord full meaning to the provision, we must read the “elderly 
person or disabled adult” clause as having limited application.  As noted above, the 
“elderly person or disabled adult” clause applies to a series of violations of, 
attempts to commit a violation of, conspiracies to violate, or complicity in 
violations of R.C. 2913.02.  When, however, a person commits a series of R.C. 
2913.02 offenses, the offenses will be aggregated, regardless of the status of the 
victim. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) thus clearly delineates between the two 
instances in which theft offenses may be aggregated: (1) when an individual 
commits a series of theft offenses and (2) when an individual commits a series of 
violations of, attempts to commit a violation of, conspiracies to violate, or 
complicity in violations of the theft statute involving a victim who is an elderly 
person or disabled adult.  (It bears noting that pursuant to the final clause of the first 
sentence of R.C. 2913.61(C)(1), the offenses must have been committed by the 
offender in the offender’s same employment, capacity, or relationship to another in 
order to be aggregated.)  In other words, theft offenses can be aggregated under the 
first clause of R.C. 2913.61(C)(1), regardless of the status of the victim, while other 
series of violations of offenses listed in (C)(1), attempts to commit those offenses, 
conspiracies to commit those offenses, and complicity in those offenses can be 
aggregated only when the victim is an elderly person or disabled adult. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 16} This analysis also applies to the second sentence of R.C. 
2913.61(C)(1), as the subsection’s first and second sentences are substantially 
similar.  Like the first sentence, the second sentence of R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) initially 
states that a series of theft offenses under R.C. 2913.02 can be aggregated 
regardless of the status of the victim, while the second part of the sentence states 
that a series of violations of, attempts to commit a violation of, conspiracies to 
violate, or complicity in violations of R.C. 2913.02 or 2913.43 are aggregated only 
when the offenses involve a victim who is an active-duty service member or the 
spouse of an active-duty service member.  The absence of a comma in the second 
sentence (following the phrase “involving a victim who is an active duty service 
member or spouse of an active duty service member”) does not change this. 
{¶ 17} We also note that we see no significant distinction between 
“offenses” and “violations” as used in the statute.  The definitional statute of Title 
29 of the Revised Code treats the two words as functionally synonymous.  See, e.g., 
R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) (establishing that a “violation” of certain statutes, laws, or 
ordinances constitutes an “offense of violence”).  We accordingly conclude that 
there is no meaningful difference in R.C. 2913.61(C) between the use of “offenses” 
in relation to R.C. 2913.02 and “violations” in relation to other statutes. 
{¶ 18} In light of the above analysis, we hold that the unambiguous 
language of R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) allows aggregation of theft offenses, regardless of 
the status of the victim.  Having determined that the statute is unambiguous, we 
apply it as written, engage in no further analysis, and decline to address arguments 
relating to the legislature’s intent in enacting R.C. 2913.61(C)(1), whether the 
language of R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) achieves its intended effect, and whether other 
statutory language would be preferable. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 19} We dismiss the certified-conflict case as improvidently certified.  As 
to the jurisdictional appeal, we conclude that R.C. 2913.61(C)(1) is unambiguous 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
in allowing for the aggregation of multiple theft offenses involving one victim into 
a single count, regardless of the status of the victim.  We accordingly affirm the 
judgment of the First District. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, WILLAMOWSKI, DONNELLY, and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
JOHN R. WILLAMOWSKI, J., of the Third District Court of Appeals, sitting 
for DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. 
Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Anzelmo Law and James A. Anzelmo, for appellant. 
_________________