Case Title: Micah Louis Nelson v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-589

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
Nos. SC08-589 & SC08-1965 
____________ 
 
MICAH LOUIS NELSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
MICAH LOUIS NELSON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[April 29, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Micah Louis Nelson appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
 
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reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court‘s order and deny the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellant, Micah Louis Nelson, was convicted of and sentenced to death for 
the first-degree murder of Virginia Brace.1  The facts were set forth in Nelson v. 
State, 850 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2003), and are provided in relevant part below: 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that during the early 
morning hours of November 17, 1997, Micah Louis Nelson (Nelson) 
entered Virginia Brace's (Brace) home by removing the screen and 
climbing through the bathroom window. Seventy-eight-year-old Brace 
had been in bed and her glasses and hearing aid were on her bedroom 
dresser. Nelson sexually assaulted Brace, took her car keys from her 
purse, and then placed her in the trunk of her own car. He drove 
around with Brace in the trunk for a period of hours and eventually 
drove to an orange grove, where he apparently intended to leave her. 
However, the car became stuck in soft sand and had to be pulled out 
with the assistance of machinery at about 9:30 a.m. on November 17, 
1997. 
 
Steven Weir, the heavy equipment operator who pulled the car 
out of the sand, felt a thud when he put his hand on the car's trunk. 
Nelson advised him that there was a dog in the trunk and then 
proceeded to turn up the car radio. The heavy equipment operator 
observed Nelson to be nervous and pacing, and Nelson would not look 
him in the eye when they spoke. Nelson sped off as soon as the car 
was lifted out of the sand and drove to another orange grove where he 
let Brace out of the trunk and walked her or dragged her 175 feet into 
the grove. With Brace on the ground, Nelson attempted to strangle her 
with his bare hands, emptied the contents of a fire extinguisher into 
                                          
 
 
1.  Nelson was also tried and convicted of grand theft, burglary, and sexual 
battery, for which he received fifteen-year and life sentences. 
 
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her mouth, and forced a tire iron into her mouth and through the back 
of her head. 
 
At 3:30 p.m. on November 17, 1997, Joann Lambert noticed an 
unfamiliar car parked on the road behind her house. The car was still 
parked in the same location when it began to get dark that evening so 
she called the Highlands County Sheriff's Department. When Deputy 
Vance Pope arrived to investigate the car, he found Nelson asleep in 
the back seat. Deputy Pope also noticed an insurance card on the 
floorboard with the name Virginia Brace. Nelson told Pope that he 
borrowed the car from a family friend. Pope could not verify the 
vehicle's registration because the DMV computer was not working at 
that time. Pope would not allow Nelson to drive because he did not 
have a driver's license, so he gave Nelson a ride to Nelson's sister's 
house. Later that evening, Pope heard the name Virginia Brace over 
the police radio, which prompted him to contact Sergeant Hofstra 
regarding his earlier contact with Nelson. Police recovered the car 
where Deputy Pope had last seen it, and it was identified as belonging 
to Brace. 
 
At 11 p.m. on November 17, 1997, Deputy Pope returned to the 
house where he previously dropped off Nelson. Nelson agreed to be 
questioned by the Avon Park Police. After a series of interrogations 
on November 18, 1997, and November 19, 1997, Nelson showed the 
police where Brace's body was located and he confessed to killing her. 
 
Nelson told police that some time after midnight, he broke into 
Brace's home through her bathroom window. He stated that he entered 
her bedroom and she woke up and started screaming. He said that they 
had a struggle on her bed, after which he took her car keys and placed 
her in the trunk of her car. Nelson stated that he drove around in the 
car for hours and that at one point he stopped to get gas. He then 
drove to an orange grove where he was going to kill Brace, but the car 
became stuck in the sand and he required help to extricate the car 
from the sand. He then took Brace to another orange grove where he 
and Brace walked into the grove. He stated that he started to choke 
Brace on the ground, but she did not pass out, so he sprayed a fire 
extinguisher into her mouth, which made her cough. He stated that he 
then took the tire iron and stuck it into her mouth until it came through 
the back of her neck and into the ground. He stated that Brace gasped 
 
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for air when he pushed the tire iron into her mouth. Nelson denied 
having any sexual contact with Brace. 
 
At trial, Dr. Melamud, the medical examiner, testified that the 
condition of Brace's body corresponded with her being dead for two 
days before she was found. He testified that Brace's injuries were 
consistent with asphyxiation, an object being forced into her mouth 
through the back of her neck, such as a tire iron, and a fire 
extinguisher being discharged into her mouth. He stated that she also 
suffered a crushed vertebra as a result of the compression of her neck 
and spinal cord, and three broken ribs. He testified that her death 
could have resulted from any one of those injuries, or a combination 
of them. Although he could not assign an order in which the injuries 
occurred, he stated that the medical evidence indicated that she was 
alive both when the object was forced into her mouth and through the 
back of her neck, and when the fire extinguisher's contents were 
expelled into her mouth. He could not say with certainty if she was 
conscious when those injuries were inflicted, but he opined that if 
Brace had been conscious during the infliction of any of these injuries, 
she would have experienced severe pain. 
 
 . . . . 
 
The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of nine to 
three and the trial court sentenced Nelson to death. The trial court 
found six statutory aggravators: (1) the defendant was previously 
convicted of a felony, was under a sentence of imprisonment, and was 
on felony probation, or controlled release, at the time of the murder; 
(2) the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was 
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or 
flight after, committing a sexual battery, burglary, or kidnapping; (3) 
the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel (HAC); (5) the murder was committed in a cold and 
calculated and premeditated manner, and without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (CCP); and (6) the victim was particularly 
vulnerable due to advanced age or disability. The trial court found that 
all six aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 
assigned five of them great weight. The trial court assigned little 
weight to the sixth aggravator of the victim being ―particularly 
vulnerable due to age or disability.‖ 
 
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The trial court addressed and rejected three statutory mitigating 
factors. [n.3] Twenty-one nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were 
addressed by the trial court: (1) at the time of the offense the 
defendant was impulsive and his ability to exercise good judgment 
was impaired (not proven); (2) defendant was remorseful for his 
conduct (not proven); (3) defendant did not plan to commit the 
offense in advance (not proven); (4) defendant demonstrated 
appropriate courtroom conduct and behavior (very little weight); (5) 
defendant is capable of forming loving relationships with family 
members and friends (very little weight); (6) any mental illness of the 
defendant may have been controlled by medication (little weight); (7) 
it is unlikely the defendant will be a danger to others while serving a 
life sentence in prison (very little weight); (8) defendant did not resist 
arrest, cooperated with the police, and showed the authorities where 
the body was located (moderate weight); (9) defendant never knew his 
father and lost his mother at a young age (moderate weight); (10) 
defendant had a troubled and neglected childhood (not proven); (11) 
defendant was the victim of inappropriate sexual conduct and abuse as 
a child (little weight); (12) defendant has organic brain damage (not 
proven); (13) defendant suffered from depression as a result of his 
conduct and attempted suicide in the jail (little weight); (14) defendant 
had diminished educational experience (little weight); (15) defendant 
was sexually assaulted while in prison (some weight); (16) defendant 
has limited intelligence (some weight); (17) defendant has no prior 
violent felony convictions (little weight); (18) the circumstances 
which resulted in the homicide are unlikely to recur since the 
defendant will be spending the rest of his life in prison (some weight); 
(19) defendant has accepted responsibility for his action (not proven); 
(20) defendant has never received treatment for his mental or 
emotional problems (little weight); and (21) defendant was willing to 
plead guilty to all charges for consecutive life sentences without 
parole (very little weight). 
[N.3] The three statutory mitigating factors addressed by 
the trial court were: (1) age of the defendant at the time 
of the offense (twenty-one years old) (not proven); (2) 
the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offense (not proven); and 
(3) his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
 
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conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law was substantially impaired (not proven). 
Id. at 518-21 (some footnotes omitted). 
         On direct appeal, Nelson‘s sole challenge to his conviction of first-degree 
murder focused on the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress certain 
statements and admissions.  Id. at 521.  Nelson claimed that he made incriminating 
statements as a result of police coercion, which included an allegedly false 
indication by police that DNA evidence linked Nelson to the crime, the use of the 
―Christian burial‖ technique, and the fact that police did not afford Nelson breaks 
during the interrogation despite fatigue.  Id.  We rejected these arguments and 
affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the trial court‘s factual 
findings and legal conclusions were sufficiently supported.  Id. at 521-24.  We 
affirmed the conviction, citing to the ―plethora of physical evidence linking Nelson 
to [the crime].‖  Id. at 521. 
Nelson raised several issues pertaining to his sentence, including that (1) the 
trial court erred by finding the avoid arrest and cold, calculated, and premeditated  
(CCP) aggravators; (2) the trial court failed to consider and properly weigh certain 
mitigating factors; (3) his death sentence was disproportionate; and (4) the Florida 
death penalty scheme was unconstitutional.  Id. at 524-33.  We rejected each 
argument pertaining to aggravators and mitigating factors, finding competent 
substantial evidence to support the trial court‘s findings on each claim.  Id. at 528-
 
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32.  We also rejected Nelson‘s proportionality claim based on the totality of the 
circumstances and rejected Nelson‘s constitutional argument.  Id. at 532-33.  We 
ultimately affirmed Nelson‘s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 533. 
Nelson filed a rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief on September 16, 
2004, and raised twelve claims.2  The postconviction court granted an evidentiary 
hearing, during which attorney Robert John Trogolo, Dr. Mark Ashby, Dr. Henry 
L. Dee, attorney Julia Williamson, and Dr. Michael Scott Maher testified.  The 
postconviction court ultimately denied Nelson‘s motion for postconviction relief, 
concluding that all of the claims were either lacking evidentiary support, without 
                                          
 
 
2.  Nelson‘s claims were (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
for a determination of competency; (2) Nelson was tried and convicted while 
mentally incompetent; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness 
in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial to establish a lack of mens rea in the 
guilt phase and statutory mental mitigation in the penalty phase; (4) trial counsel 
was ineffective in the investigation and preparation of the penalty phase by failing 
to call a witness to establish statutory mitigation in the penalty phase; (5) trial 
counsel failed to request the court to instruct the jury on statutory mitigation in the 
sentencing phase; (6) section 921.141, Florida Statute (1997) is facially vague and 
overbroad causing the death sentence to be premised on a fundamental error; (7) 
Nelson is incompetent to proceed; (8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the court instructing the jury on and finding that Nelson killed the victim 
to avoid arrest despite contrary evidence; (9) the death sentence is cruel and 
unusual punishment because Nelson may be incompetent at the time of execution; 
(10) the trial was filled with procedural and substantive error which cannot be 
harmless when viewed as a whole; (11) the Florida Capital Felony Sentencing 
Statute is unconstitutional; and (12) Florida‘s Capital Felony Sentencing Statute is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and Nelson received prejudicially 
ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly litigate this 
issue.   
 
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merit, or procedurally barred.  Nelson appeals the denial of his postconviction 
motion to this Court and has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  For the 
reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction court‘s order and deny 
Nelson‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
RULE 3.851 APPEAL 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
 
Nelson asserts the following four claims in his motion for postconviction 
relief regarding ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) trial counsel was ineffective 
by failing to move for a determination of competency; (2) trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing to call a witness in both the guilt and penalty phases of the 
trial to establish that Nelson lacked mens rea and to establish statutory mental 
mitigation in the penalty phase; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in the 
investigation and preparation of the penalty phase for failing to call a witness to 
establish statutory mitigation in the penalty phase; and (4) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request that the court instruct the jury on statutory 
mitigation in the sentencing phase of Nelson‘s trial.  As explained below, we 
affirm the trial court‘s denial of relief on all ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims raised by Nelson.   
 
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Following the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we have held that for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceedings that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).   
To prove the first prong under Strickland, Nelson must prove that counsel‘s 
performance was unreasonable under the ―prevailing professional norms.‖  Morris 
v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  In 
other words, Nelson must establish that ―counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 
1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  To establish the second prong under Strickland, the 
defendant must prove that ―there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  ―Unless a defendant makes both showings, 
 
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it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown 
in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.‖  Id. at 687.   
 
Additionally, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel‘s performance 
was not ineffective.  See id. at 689.  ―A fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id.  Therefore, the defendant 
carries the burden to ―overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‗might be considered sound trial strategy.‘ ‖  Id. at 689 (quoting 
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  In Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 
1037 (Fla. 2000), this Court held that ―strategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel‘s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.‖  Id. at 1048 (citing Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998)).   
Generally, this Court‘s standard of review following a denial of a 
postconviction claim where the trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing 
affords deference to the trial court‘s factual findings.  McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 
948, 954 n.4 (Fla. 2002).  ―As long as the trial court‘s findings are supported by 
competent substantial evidence, ‗this Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as 
 
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well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.‘ ‖  Blanco v. State, 
702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 
(Fla. 1984)).  However, the circuit court‘s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 772 (Fla. 2004). 
Failure to Move for a Competency Determination 
 
Nelson‘s first ineffective assistance claim asserts that trial counsel failed to 
move for a competency determination.  Nelson contends that his suicide attempt  
and the opinion of the defense mental health expert that he was marginally 
competent placed trial counsel on notice that Nelson‘s competency to proceed was 
at issue.  However, because Nelson is unable to demonstrate that trial counsel was 
deficient, the postconviction court properly denied this claim. 
 
In Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1989), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered an ineffective assistance claim 
regarding trial counsel‘s failure to determine the petitioner‘s competency to stand 
trial.  Id. at 1486.  The court stated, ―In order to demonstrate prejudice from 
counsel‘s failure to investigate his competency, a petitioner has to show that there 
exists ‗at least a reasonable probability that a psychological evaluation would have 
revealed that he was incompetent to stand trial.‘ ‖  Id. at 1487 (quoting Alexander 
v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 371, 375 (11th Cir. 1988)).  Here, the record demonstrates that 
Nelson‘s trial counsel were experienced in handling capital cases and deemed 
 
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Nelson competent to proceed based on Dr. Dee‘s evaluation and through their own 
contacts with Nelson.  Trial counsel indicated during the evidentiary hearing that, 
based on face-to-face dealings with Nelson, it was never deemed necessary to 
move for a competency determination.  Trial counsel also indicated that they 
would have filed a motion for a competency determination if Dr. Dee had clearly 
indicated that Nelson was incompetent.  In addition, once the court ordered a 
competency determination, Nelson was found to be competent and capable of 
assisting his attorneys.  Nelson‘s reliance on Dr. Dee‘s testimony that Nelson was 
―marginally competent‖ appears to be misplaced because neither the allegation nor 
the record demonstrates that Dr. Dee ever deemed Nelson incompetent to proceed.  
Further, nothing in the record indicates that Nelson was incompetent at the time of 
trial or at the time of the murder.   
Also, Nelson alleges that his suicide attempt alone was sufficient to raise a 
question about his competency to stand trial.  However, no such presumption 
exists.  In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), the United States Supreme 
Court suggested that while a suicide attempt is an indication of possible mental 
instability, it alone does not necessarily create a reasonable doubt about a 
defendant‘s competency to stand trial.  Id. at 180.  Trial counsel testified that 
Nelson met with the defense team regularly and understood the factual and 
procedural elements of the case and the charges against him and the roles of the 
 
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judges and the lawyers.  Also, trial counsel indicated that Nelson‘s suicide attempt 
was heavily considered when determining whether to raise the issue of 
competency, but it was their opinion that it did not necessarily render him 
incompetent.   
Furthermore, the administration of Mellaril, a powerful antipsychotic drug, 
did not necessarily render Nelson incompetent.  In Groover v. State, 574 So. 2d 97 
(Fla. 1991), we reviewed a similar issue where the petitioner raised an 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim for counsel‘s failure to request a psychiatric 
evaluation after it became clear prison officials had administered large doses of 
Mellaril.  Id. at 98.  The postconviction court determined that there had been no 
sufficient evidence of incompetency, deficient performance of counsel, or 
prejudice where trial counsel testified there was no genuine issue of sanity or 
indication the defendant was suffering from diminished capacity.  Id. at 98-99.  We 
agreed, stating, ―Where there is no evidence calling a defendant‘s competency into 
question, counsel is not bound to seek an evaluation . . . .‖  Id. at 99 (citing Blanco 
v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1987)).  Thus, while the administration of 
Mellaril warrants an evidentiary hearing when a postconviction claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for failure to seek a competency 
determination, Mellaril is not per se evidence of incompetency.    Accordingly, 
trial counsel cannot be said to have performed below an objective standard of 
 
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reasonableness or that trial counsel‘s performance was unreasonable under 
prevailing professional norms.     
 
Because Nelson has not demonstrated deficiency of his trial counsel, we 
need not address prejudice.  See, e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 
(Fla. 2001); Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932 (―A court considering a claim of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance 
component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not 
satisfied.‖).  
Failure to Call Dr. Ashby  
 
Nelson‘s second ineffective assistance claim alleges that trial counsel failed 
to call Dr. Ashby in the guilt phase to establish that Nelson lacked mens rea and 
also in the penalty phase to establish statutory mental mitigation.  Nelson asserts 
that Dr. Ashby‘s testimony was critical to establish his state of mind because 
Ashby diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder shortly after the crime.  
However, for the reasons stated below, Nelson has failed to demonstrate trial 
counsel‘s deficiency and we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of this claim.    
Regarding trial counsel‘s failure to call Dr. Ashby during the guilt phase of 
trial, Nelson relies on Bunney v. State, 603 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1992), where we 
considered whether it was error for the trial court to refuse to allow testimony 
concerning the defendant‘s alleged epileptic condition absent a plea of insanity.  
 
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Id. at 1271.  We reasoned that ―while evidence of diminished capacity is too 
potentially misleading to be permitted routinely in the guilt phase of criminal trials, 
evidence of ‗intoxication, medication, epilepsy, infancy, or senility‘ is not,‖ and 
held that ―evidence of certain commonly understood conditions that are beyond 
one‘s control . . . should also be admissible.‖  Id. at 1273.  Nelson argues that his 
psychosis is a condition beyond his control, which was thus admissible.  However, 
Nelson‘s reliance on Bunney is misplaced.  Our precedent has firmly established 
the inadmissibility of evidence relating to mental capacity absent an insanity plea.  
See, e.g., Everett v. State, 97 So. 2d 241, 245-46 (Fla. 1957) (trial court did not err 
in refusing to give an instruction that the defendant‘s mental condition could be 
considered by the jury in deciding whether he was capable of forming a 
premeditated design even though he was not found insane);  Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 
2d 280, 282 (Fla. 1956) (―Since the plea of insanity was out and there was no 
defense based on mental defects less than insanity, there was no reason for . . . 
testimony or to labor the question.‖).  In Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 
1989), we squarely addressed the admissibility of mental defects where the 
defendant does not raise an insanity defense.  Id. at 820.  Ultimately, we explained: 
 
If [alleged] mental deficiencies are sufficient to meet the 
definition of insanity, these persons should be acquitted on that 
ground and treated for their disease. Persons with less serious mental 
deficiencies should be held accountable for their crimes just as 
everyone else. If mitigation is appropriate, it may be accomplished 
through sentencing, but to adopt a rule which creates an opportunity 
 
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for such persons to obtain immediate freedom to prey on the public 
once again is unwise. 
Id. at 825.  Therefore, because Nelson did not raise an insanity defense, counsel 
cannot be found deficient for failing to call Dr. Ashby in the guilt phase. 
Nelson has likewise failed to demonstrate counsel‘s deficiency at the penalty 
phase.  The postconviction court denied this claim, noting that Dr. Dee testified 
extensively in the penalty phase with regard to Nelson‘s mental state and 
applicable mitigating factors.  The record demonstrates that Nelson received the 
benefit of penalty phase testimony from Dr. Dee, whose testimony was more 
extensive than what could have been offered by Dr. Ashby.  Trial counsel retained 
Dr. Dee, a trained forensic neuropsychologist, to testify during the penalty phase.  
Though Dr. Ashby did not examine Nelson for the purpose of presenting 
mitigating evidence, Dr. Dee did.  Further, the record demonstrates that Dr. Dee 
had access to Dr. Ashby‘s records relating to Nelson.  As demonstrated at the 
evidentiary hearing, Dr. Ashby‘s testimony would have been cumulative to, and 
much less detailed than, Dr. Dee‘s testimony.  Trial counsel testified that he did not 
give much thought to calling Dr. Ashby, who as a jail psychiatrist worked on a 
contract basis with the jail and had not examined Nelson for the purpose of 
testifying to mitigating evidence.   
 
It is notable that Nelson does not cite a single case to demonstrate support 
for his claim that he is entitled to relief under Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 
 
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825 (8th Cir. 1990).  In Chambers, trial counsel ―(1) failed to interview, (2) failed 
to call at trial, and (3) failed to call at sentencing the only witness who would have 
testified that Chambers acted in self-defense.‖  Id. at 826.  Thus, the case is 
distinguishable because ―[t]he decision to interview a potential witness is not a 
decision related to trial strategy. . . .  It is a decision related to adequate preparation 
for trial.‖  Id. at 828.  Here, there is no allegation that Nelson‘s trial counsel failed 
to adequately prepare.  Accordingly, Nelson has not demonstrated that counsel was 
deficient for failing to call Dr. Ashby during the penalty phase. 
Failure to Call a Witness to Evaluate Dr. Kremper’s Reports 
 
Nelson‘s third ineffective assistance claim alleges that trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to secure a qualified psychiatrist to evaluate the report of Dr. 
Kremper and testify regarding Nelson‘s mental health history.  Nelson asserts that 
such testimony would have established that his mental illness was evident at an 
early age.  Trial counsel made the decision not to present Dr. Kremper‘s testimony 
to prevent the jury from hearing Nelson‘s prior bad conduct regarding sexual 
battery and lewd assault on a family member.  We agree with the postconviction 
court that this decision was reasonable and deny this claim.   
 
We confronted this issue in Sexton v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2008), 
where we considered whether trial counsel was deficient for choosing not to 
present testimony from Dr. Maher that the defendant had a history of bizarre 
 
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sexual and criminal behavior.  Id. at 1082-84.  Trial counsel‘s theory was to 
demonstrate brain damage as documented by a PET scan instead of behavior that 
―would be so inflammatory to the jury that it would counteract any possible 
mitigation.‖  Id. at 1084.  Trial counsel reasoned that ―Dr. Maher‘s description of 
Sexton as a sadistic sexual psychopath, if heard by the jury, would be ‗tantamount 
to stipulating to death.‘ ‖  Id.  We affirmed the postconviction court‘s order 
denying relief on this claim, finding that penalty phase counsel had made an 
informed strategic decision and that Sexton failed to demonstrate that counsel was 
deficient.  Id. at 1085. 
 
Also, in Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2007), we confronted a 
similar issue where we considered whether it was ineffective assistance for counsel 
to avoid presenting evidence that the defendant was a sociopath.  Id. at 143.  We 
found that the postconviction court‘s finding was supported by competent, 
substantial evidence and that counsel made a reasonable strategic choice, after 
investigation, to forego presentation of negative mitigating evidence.  Id. at 144.  
We held that Willacy ―[had] not shown prejudice because presenting [the] 
mitigating evidence ‗would likely have been more harmful than helpful.‘ ‖  Id. 
(quoting Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. 2006)). 
 
As illustrated, it is reasonable for trial counsel to forego evidence that, if 
presented in mitigation, could damage a defendant‘s chances with the jury.  
 
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Further, as we stated in Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2007), ―[B]eing 
able to secure an expert witness to provide an opinion as to mental health 
mitigation during postconviction proceedings, which arguably could have been 
helpful . . . does not, in and of itself, render trial counsel‘s performance 
ineffective.‖  Id. at 415.  Thus, trial counsel‘s decision not to present testimony that 
would have opened the door to Nelson‘s incestuous rape of his minor cousin 
cannot be deemed deficient.  Because Nelson cannot demonstrate deficiency, we 
need not address whether he was prejudiced.   
Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request the Court to Instruct the Jury on Statutory 
Mitigation in the Sentencing Phase 
 
In Nelson, we affirmed the trial court‘s rejection of the two statutory mental 
health mitigating circumstances, stating, ―The record reflects that there was 
competent, substantial evidence refuting the allegation that Nelson was under 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.‖  850 So. 2d at 530.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, trial counsel testified he was concerned that the State would successfully 
argue that mitigation was not established given the modifying adjective ―extreme.‖  
Trial counsel further testified that he was concerned the jury would not give proper 
weight to the nonstatutory mitigation if certain mitigation was singled out as being 
statutory.  Nelson alleges this strategy cannot be reasonable because it was based 
on ignorance of the controlling case law.  The postconviction court found the 
tactical decision to be reasonable because the decision not to request the jury 
 
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instructions on the two mental health mitigators did not prevent the defense from 
presenting mental health mitigating evidence to the jury from Dr. Dee.  We agree 
with the postconviction court and deny this claim. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel was asked whether he had read 
Bryant v. State, 601 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1992); Stewart v. State, 588 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 
1990); and Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1986).  Trial counsel testified that 
he did not recall the cases by their names, but that if they were capital cases, he had 
probably either read them or read summaries of them.  Trial counsel then asked 
collateral counsel to state what proposition they stood for.  The question went 
unanswered, and collateral counsel moved on to another line of questioning.  From 
this exchange, it does not appear accurate to state that counsel was ignorant of 
controlling case law.  The cases cited establish the right to jury instructions on the 
statutory mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
See, e.g., Bryant, 601 So. 2d at 533 (―We have previously stated that the 
‗Defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the rules of law applicable to 
this theory of the defense if there is any evidence to support such instructions.‘ ‖) 
(quoting Hooper v. State, 476 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1985)).  Here, trial counsel 
testified that he was aware he was entitled to the instructions, but made a strategic 
decision not to request them, opting instead for the ―catch-all‖ instruction.  
 
- 21 - 
Because Nelson has not demonstrated that this decision was based on ignorance of 
the law as alleged, he is not entitled to relief. 
Competency 
Nelson next alleges that he was denied substantive due process because he 
was tried and convicted while mentally incompetent.  This issue fails for two 
reasons.  First, the issue is procedurally barred because he failed to raise it on 
direct appeal.  Second, the record establishes that Nelson was competent at the 
time of the trial. 
 
―[A] petitioner raising a substantive claim of incompetency is entitled to no 
presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or her incompetency by a 
preponderance of the evidence.‖  James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th 
Cir. 1992).  ―A defendant is considered competent to stand trial if ‗he has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and [if] he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.‘ ‖  Id. at 1574 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 
402 (1960)).  ―In order to make out his substantive incompetency claim, petitioner 
need not . . . allege any error on the part of any state actor.‖  James, 957 F.2d at 
1572.  ―[A] petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a substantive 
incompetency claim if he or she ‗presents clear and convincing evidence to create a 
 
- 22 - 
real, substantial and legitimate doubt‘ as to his or her competency.‖  Id. at 1573 
(quoting Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
 
Unlike the petitioner in James, Nelson has had an evidentiary hearing on his 
postconviction incompetency claim as well as a competency determination.  In 
both, the court has found Nelson competent.  Specifically, the postconviction court 
denied this claim, stating, ―The fact that Mr. Nelson had once tried to commit 
suicide and was on psychotropic medication does not mean he was incompetent or 
that the court was required to order a competency evaluation.  The evidence 
supports a conclusion that the Defendant was competent at the time of trial.‖  Thus, 
Nelson has not demonstrated that he was denied due process at any level of the 
proceedings against him.  Accordingly, Nelson is not entitled to relief on this 
claim. 
Pate Claim 
 
Next, Nelson argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte order a 
competency hearing.  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), held that once the 
question of competency is raised, there is a constitutional entitlement to a hearing 
on the issue of competency.  Also, Pate established a rebuttable presumption of 
incompetency upon a showing that the trial court failed to hold a competency 
hearing despite information raising a bona fide doubt as to the petitioner‘s 
competency.  See James, 957 F.2d at 1570.   However, Pate claims ―can and must 
 
- 23 - 
be raised on direct appeal.‖  Id. at 1572.  Accordingly, this claim is procedurally 
barred because Nelson raised no such claim in his direct appeal.  
HABEAS PETITION 
 
Nelson raises seven claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which 
can be summarized as follows: (1) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), is 
facially vague and overbroad; (2) he is incompetent to proceed and also may be 
incompetent at the time of execution in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (3) trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to the avoid arrest aggravator jury instruction; (4) appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the avoid arrest aggravator and was also ineffective for failing 
to raise the cumulative effect of the errors in Nelson‘s trial; and (5) the Florida 
capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied and on its face.   
We deny several of Nelson‘s claims without further discussion.  First, we 
deny Nelson‘s claims that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), is facially 
vague and overbroad and that the Florida death sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional as applied because they were not raised on direct appeal and are 
procedurally barred.  Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992) 
(―Habeas corpus is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate 
issues which could have been . . . or were raised on direct appeal.‖).  We also deny 
 
- 24 - 
Nelson‘s competency claims because they are not ripe for review and were raised 
solely for preservation purposes.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 n.19 
(Fla. 2003) (rejecting a claim that defendant was incompetent to be executed where 
he acknowledged that the claim was not yet ripe and was being raised only for 
preservation purposes).  Nelson‘s claim that trial counsel was ineffective is denied 
because ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not cognizable in habeas corpus.  
Griffin v. State, 976 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (―Habeas corpus is . . . 
the improper vehicle to address . . . the performance of trial counsel.‖).  Finally, 
Nelson‘s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of 
cumulative effect of multiple errors and his claim that Florida‘s capital sentencing 
statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied are each denied for lack of 
merit.  Nelson‘s claim of cumulative effect is likewise without merit because each 
individual claim is without merit.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) 
(―[W]here individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or 
without merit, the claim of cumulative error must fail.‖).  Nelson‘s claim that 
Florida‘s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional is without merit because we 
have previously found this claim to be without merit.  See, e.g., Hudson v. State, 
992 So. 2d 96, 118 (Fla. 2008). 
We now address Nelson‘s remaining claim that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
 
- 25 - 
the avoid arrest aggravator.  For the reasons set forth below, Nelson is not entitled 
to habeas relief on this claim. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Unlike a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel is cognizable in habeas corpus.  See Rutherford v. 
Moore, 774 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2000); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 
2000).  
 
Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas relief based on 
ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court must determine: 
[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a 
claim, ―[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 
1981).  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to 
camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a 
postconviction motion.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.  ―If a legal issue ‗would 
 
- 26 - 
in all probability have been found to be without merit‘ had counsel raised the issue 
on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel‘s performance ineffective.‖  Id. (quoting Williamson v. 
Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  Nor can appellate counsel be deemed 
ineffective for failing to prevail on an issue raised and rejected on direct appeal. 
Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2003). 
 
This Court has also stated that appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for 
failing to raise claims which were not preserved due to trial counsel‘s failure to 
object.  See, e.g., Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 188-89 (Fla. 2003); Ferguson 
v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 58 (Fla. 1993) (finding that appellate counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to raise allegedly improper prosecutorial comments made 
during the penalty phase where trial counsel did not preserve the issues by 
objection); Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 1991).  The only 
exception to this is when the claim involves fundamental error.  See Roberts v. 
State, 568 So. 2d 1255, 1261 (Fla. 1990).  Fundamental error is error that ―reaches 
down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could 
not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‖  Kilgore v. 
State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1997) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 
644-45 (Fla. 1991)).   
 
- 27 - 
 
Here, Nelson‘s complaints stem from the avoid arrest aggravator, which this 
court upheld because Nelson failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  Nelson, 850 
So. 2d at 525.  However, the Court also discussed the merits of the claim, finding 
that ―Nelson expressly agreed with the police when they asked him if he killed 
Brace because he felt like she could identify him.‖  Id. at 526.  Further, the Court 
found: 
Although Nelson's admissions to police alone support his 
intentional elimination of Brace as a witness, other considerations also 
support the avoid arrest aggravator in this case. . . . The evidence in 
this case indicates that Nelson probably could have accomplished the 
burglary of Brace's home and sexual battery without killing her since 
Brace likely posed little physical resistance to Nelson: she was 78 
years old; she was awakened from her bed in the middle of the night 
when she was wearing only a nightgown; and at that time her 
eyeglasses and hearing aids were on her night stand. Further, Nelson 
easily obtained access to her car. Therefore, it appears that once 
Nelson immobilized Brace by putting her in the trunk, he secured an 
uncontested getaway and there was no reason for him to kill her 
except to eliminate her as a witness.  
 
Nelson's act of taking Brace to a remote area to kill her also 
lends support to the finding of the avoid arrest aggravator in this case. 
The evidence at trial was that Nelson drove to an isolated orange 
grove to kill Brace, but his plan was stymied when the car became 
stuck in the sand and he needed the assistance of other people to 
extricate the car. Nelson then drove to another orange grove where he 
killed Brace. The record reflects that Nelson's journey to two different 
orange groves was intended to find an isolated place to kill Brace, the 
sole witness to his crimes.  
 
We find no error in the trial court's finding of the avoid arrest 
aggravator because the defendant's own statements and actions 
corroborate evidence that the sole or dominant murder motive in this 
case was to silence Brace as the sole witness against him. 
 
- 28 - 
Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 526 (citations omitted).  Accordingly, Nelson‘s claim must 
fail because appellate counsel did raise the claim, which this Court rejected as 
procedurally barred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction court's order 
denying Nelson‘s rule 3.851 motion, and we deny his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J, and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
J. Michael Hunter, Judge – Case No. CF97-06806A-XX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Andrew Shakoor, Richard 
E. Kiley, and James V. Viggiano, Jr., CCR Counsel Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee