Case Title: Powell v. Daily

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Powell v. Daily1986 WY 6712 P.2d 356Case Number: 85-81Decided: 01/08/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
CALVIN POWELL, PETITIONER 
(PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
O.R. "BUD" DAILY, FRANCES 
OSBORN, ED P. MORIARITY, GENE HARRIET, ALICE HAYS, DENZEL L. COFFEY, AND DENNIS 
DALY, CONSTITUTING THE WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION; AND W. DONALD DEXTER, 
DIRECTOR OF THE WYOMING GAME AND FISH DEPARTMENT, RESPONDENTS 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
 
 
Representing Petitioner: 

John B. Rogers, 
Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Respondents:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Lawrence J. Wolfe, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Marion Yoder, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case is presented 
to us through the certification of a constitutional issue from the District 
Court of the First Judicial District in Wyoming. The question presented is whether § 
23-2-402(a)(iii), W.S. 1977, violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the United States Constitution. Because the challenged statute burdens a 
fundamental right, and because the degree of discrimination does not bear a 
close relation to any of the State's asserted reasons for the discriminatory 
treatment, we hold that § 23-2-402(a)(iii) impermissibly infringes upon the 
privileges and immunities of the citizens of states other than 
Wyoming.

 
 
BACKGROUND

 
 

[¶2.]     Petitioner Calvin 
Powell resides in Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. Powell 
applied to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission for a guide license so that he 
could guide hunters and fishermen in Wyoming. Powell stated in his application that 
he had 30 years of hunting and fishing experience in Idaho, Montana, and 
Wyoming, and four years of hunting experience 
on the private ranches in Wyoming where he would be working as a 
guide.

 
 

[¶3.]     The game and fish 
officer in LaramieCounty rejected Powell's application because Powell 
was not a resident of the state of Wyoming. Powell appealed this rejection to the 
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (Commission) requesting a "waiver" of the 
residency requirement of § 23-2-402(a)(iii).

 
 

[¶4.]     Section 23-2-402(a), 
W.S. 1977, states:

"(a) No person shall 
engage in the business of guiding for any consideration or compensation without 
a professional guide's license. Any competent person who possesses the following 
qualifications shall upon payment of the license fee, receive a professional 
guide's license:

"(i) Citizen of the 
United 
States;

"(ii) At least eighteen 
(18) years of age;

"(iii) Resident of 
Wyoming;

"(iv) Knowledgeable of 
trophy care and appropriate game and fish laws;

"(v) Can satisfactorily 
pass a written or oral examination which is devised and administered at the 
discretion of the commission. The examination may include knowledge of the area, 
of hunting practices, of big game, or guiding practices and of game and fish 
laws."

 
 
The Commission refused to 
"waive" the statutory requirement and, relying upon our decision in Belco Petroleum Corporation v. State Board 
of Equalization, Wyo., 587 P.2d 204 (1978), refrained from passing upon the 
constitutional questions Powell attempted to raise concerning the 
statute.

 
 

[¶5.]     Powell filed a petition 
for review in district court, which resulted in the court's upholding the 
Commission's refusal to consider the constitutional questions involved. Powell 
then filed a declaratory-judgment action in the same court seeking to have the 
court hold the residency requirement of § 23-2-402(a)(iii) to be void, and to 
order the Commission to disregard the requirement in acting upon his 
application. The district court certified the constitutional question involved 
to this court, after stipulation of the parties, pursuant to §§ 1-13-101 through 
1-13-107, W.S. 1977, and Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P.

 
 

[¶6.]     The question to be 
answered is:

"Whether W.S. 
23-2-402(a)(iii) which requires an applicant as a Game and Fish Guide to be a 
resident of the State of Wyoming for a period of one (1) year is contrary to 
constitutional right, power, or immunity (Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution and Article IV, Section 2 and Amendment XIV of the United 
States Constitution) in that it infringes upon the applicant's rights of 
national citizenship and effectively restricts his right to interstate travel in 
pursuance of and in furtherance of his right to earn a living in his chosen 
field."

 
 

[¶7.]     Powell claims that the 
statutory scheme which requires a guide to be a resident of Wyoming for not less 
than one year1 restricts his fundamental 
constitutional right to pursue his chosen means of livelihood, establishes a 
discriminatory scheme which does not bear a close relation to a valid interest 
of the State, and relies upon a durational residency requirement. Thus, Powell 
contends that the statute is fatally deficient.

 
 

[¶8.]     The State, on the other 
hand, maintains that "guiding" is not a fundamental right, but is instead merely 
a recreational privilege and that restricting that privilege to residents is a 
valid exercise of the State's police power. The State also urges that because 
protection of wildlife lies peculiarly within the ambit of the State's police 
power, we must give the legislature great latitude in determining what means are 
appropriate for wildlife protection.

 
 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
CLAUSE ANALYSIS

 
 

[¶9.]     Article IV, § 2 of the 
United States Constitution provides in relevant part:

"The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States."

 
 

[¶10.]  This court has recently dealt with 
another challenge to a state enactment under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in State v. Antonich, Wyo., 
694 P.2d 60, 61-62 (1985).

"An examination of a 
state enactment to determine its validity under the privileges-and-immunities 
clause involves a two-step analysis. First, the reviewing court must determine 
whether the statute burdens a fundamental right or activity, since only those 
`privileges' and `immunities' which bear upon the concept of interstate harmony 
fall within the scope and purpose of the clause. United Building and Construction Trades 
Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of 
Camden, 465 U.S. 208, ___, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1027, 79 L. Ed. 2d 249, 258-259 
(1984); Baldwin v. Fish and Game 
Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383-388, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1860-1862, 56 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1978); Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-396, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1161-1162, 92 L. Ed. 1460 
(1948). Second, the court must examine the reasons for the discriminatory 
treatment to determine their validity and their relation to the degree of 
discrimination imposed by the statute. This portion of the test was developed by 
the United States Supreme Court in Toomer 
v. Witsell, supra:

"`Like many other 
constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an 
absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where 
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that 
they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of 
treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent 
reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether 
such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close 
relation to them. The inquiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard 
for the principle that the States should have considera[ble] leeway in analyzing 
local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.' (Emphasis added.) 334 U.S.  at 396, 68 S. Ct.  at 1162. 

 
 
"The Toomer court 
established that classifications based on non-citizenship cannot 
stand

"`* * * unless there is 
something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil 
at which the statute is aimed.' 334 U.S.  at 398, 68 S. Ct.  at 
1163."

 
 
Fundamental 
Right

 
 

[¶11.]  In State v. Antonich, supra, the statute 
before us was the Wyoming Preference Act of 1971, §§ 16-6-201 through 16-6-206, 
W.S. 1977 (October 1982 Replacement), which required contractors to employ 
available qualified Wyoming laborers for publicworks projects in 
preference to nonresident laborers. The State conceded, in State v. Antonich, supra, that the act 
burdened a fundamental right. 694 P.2d  at 62. Here, however, the State claims 
that guiding, contrary to construction work, is not a fundamental right but is 
"merely a recreational privilege." We cannot agree with the State's 
conclusion.

 
 

[¶12.]  "[T]he pursuit of a common calling is one 
of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the [Privileges and 
Immunities] Clause." Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire v. Piper, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1277 n. 9, 84 L. Ed. 2d 205 
(1985). The clause "has long been held to apply to States' attempts to 
discriminate against nonresidents who seek to ply their trade interstate." 
Id. at 1281 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has repeatedly found that "`one 
of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of 
doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of 
that State.'" Id. at 1276, quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1162, 
92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948). All of these statements make clear that pursuing a common 
calling, plying a trade, and doing business in another state are privileges 
protected by the clause.

 
 

[¶13.]  The State maintains that guiding is not 
within any of the above activities but is, instead, a recreation. According to 
the State, guiding is rarely a sole means of livelihood for Wyomingites, and 
part-time seasonal hunting and fishing guiding may well be considered a 
recreational activity. The State relies on Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of 
Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 56 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1978), as support for this contention. In Baldwin the United States Supreme Court was 
confronted with the question of whether a hunting license fee seven and one-half 
times greater2 for nonresidents than that charged 
for residents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court 
stated:

"* * * [A] state's 
interest in its wildlife and other resources must yield when, without reason, it 
interferes with a nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other 
than his own, a right that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause." 436 U.S.  at 386, 98 S. Ct.  at 
1861.

 
 
However, the right to 
hunt for elk was no more than a chance to engage temporarily in a recreational 
activity in a sister state, and was not fundamental. Elk hunting was not a means 
of the nonresident's livelihood; there, the mastery of the animal and the trophy 
were the ends sought. Baldwin v. Fish and 
Game Commission of Montana, supra, 436 U.S.  at 388, 98 S. Ct.  at 1862.

 
 

[¶14.]  Clearly the Supreme Court has held that 
the hunter is only engaging in a recreational activity and that receiving such 
an opportunity is not a fundamental right. On the other hand, pursuing a common 
calling, plying a trade, and doing business in another state are fundamental 
rights protected by the clause. The State would have this court hold that the 
guide is a hunter, not a businessperson.

 
 

[¶15.]  The question of whether "guiding" is 
within the ambit of a common calling, trade or business or whether it is merely 
recreational can be answered by reading the statute here in question. Section 
23-2-402(a) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in the business of guiding for any 
consideration or compensation without a professional guide's license." 
(Emphasis added.) One who wishes to "guide" friends in Wyoming for recreation 
need not be concerned with § 23-2-402, W.S. 1977. Only those who seek to guide 
for compensation, those engaged in "the business of guiding," are prohibited by 
the statute from doing so because they are nonresidents. Although the hunter is 
engaged temporarily in a recreational activity, the person guiding him for 
compensation is engaged in a business - his livelihood. The guiding dealt with 
by this statute is a business and is a fundamental right protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.

 
 
The Statutory Scheme of 
Discrimination

 
 

[¶16.]  Even where fundamental rights are 
involved, not all residency classifications are invalid. The statute burdening a 
fundamental right "offends the privileges-and-immunities clause unless a close 
link exists between valid reasons for the Act and the discrimination practiced." 
State v. Antonich, supra, 694 P.2d  at 
62. In State v. Antonich, supra, we found that the Wyoming Preference Act of 
1971 precisely fit the particular evil identified by the State. Here we cannot 
say that the statutory scheme of discrimination against nonresidents precisely 
fits any peculiar evil identified by the State.

 
 

[¶17.]  The State claims that residents are 
simply much more likely to know the rough country than are visiting guides, and 
that this is the most compelling reason for discriminatory treatment. The State 
also asserts that residents are far more familiar with local laws, which as 
guides they are required to observe, and that there is no particular need to 
increase the number of guides in Wyoming. We do not believe that these bald 
assertions by the State can support the necessary finding that nonresidents are 
a peculiar source of evil.

 
 

[¶18.]  Stating that there is no particular need 
to increase the number of guides in Wyoming provides no support for this statute. 
If the State is claiming that there is too much hunting pressure on our 
wildlife, clearly nonresident guides cannot be the source of such an evil when 
they are prohibited from operating in the state. Certainly the State cannot mean 
that it is seeking to protect resident guides from competition provided by 
nonresident guides. "The Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed primarily 
to prevent such economic protectionism." Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 
supra, 105 S. Ct.  at 1279 n. 18. We do not see how nonresidents present a 
peculiar source of the evil of too many guides, if such an evil does in fact 
exist.

 
 

[¶19.]  The State also asserts that residents are 
far more familiar with local laws which, as guides, they are required to 
observe. Guides are also required to report violations of the game and fish 
laws.3 The State relies on no evidence to 
support its claim that nonresidents are less likely to know or obey the laws of 
our state. Montana rejected the similar contention that a 
statute prohibiting nonresidents from hunting without a guide promoted adherence 
to the game laws. State v. Jack, 167 
Mont. 456, 539 P.2d 726, 729 (1975). More recently the Montana court refused to accept the claim that 
nonresident outfitters were any less respective of property rights, or any less 
subject to law enforcement procedures, than resident outfitters. Godfrey v. MontanaState 
Fish & Game Commission, Mont., 631 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1981). We likewise 
cannot assume that resident guides are any more likely to obey our laws than 
nonresident guides, and we cannot allow this statute to discriminate against 
nonresidents based upon such an assumption. 

 
 

[¶20.]  Even if we assume that nonresident guides 
would present a peculiar evil because they are usually less likely to know the 
game and fish laws of our state, flatly prohibiting all nonresidents from 
guiding does not precisely fit the perceived evil. Section 23-2-402(a)(iv) 
provides that the applicant must be "[k]nowledgeable of trophy care and 
appropriate game and fish laws." The statute also provides for an examination 
which may consist, in part, of questions relating to game and fish laws. Section 
23-2-402(a)(v). The nonresident who passes such an examination leaves little of 
the claim that he does not know the appropriate game laws. And, as previously 
stated, there is nothing to indicate that a nonresident guide knowledgeable of 
our game laws is more likely than a resident guide to violate those 
laws.

 
 

[¶21.]  The State claims that the statute 
promotes safety because residents are simply more likely to know the rough 
country than are nonresident guides. We repeat Justice Guthrie's words that it 
is a "violent presumption that mere residence in this State makes a competent, 
knowing guide whether he be acquainted with the area or not." Schakel v. State, Wyo., 513 P.2d 412, 415 
(1973). In Schakel, this court struck 
down a statute which required a nonresident to employ a guide while hunting on 
national land in Wyoming despite the contention that such a 
statute promoted the State's interest in the safety of nonresident 
hunters.

 
 

[¶22.]  We still believe that mere residence in 
this state does not make a competent guide. If the State's position were to be 
upheld, a person born and raised in New York City 
who moved to Cheyenne over a year ago could 
qualify for a guiding license, while Mr. Powell, who has hunted and fished in 
Idaho, Montana 
and Wyoming for 30 years, cannot qualify 
because he makes his home in Idaho 
Falls. The State cannot seriously contend that merely 
living in Cheyenne for a year makes a prospective guide a 
better safety risk when guiding hunters in the rugged wilderness areas of our 
state.

 
 

[¶23.]  The statute provides that an applicant 
can be required to "satisfactorily pass a written or oral examination which * * 
* may include knowledge of the area, of hunting practices, of big game, or 
guiding practices and of game and fish laws." Section 23-2-402(a)(v). After 
requiring an applicant to pass an examination which includes questions having to 
do with the knowledge of the area, it seems absurd to claim that, because the 
applicant is a nonresident, he is a safety threat as a guide because he does not 
know the area.

 
 

[¶24.]  It is proper to recognize that there 
exist alternative, less discriminatory means of achieving the State's purported 
goals of ensuring safety and compliance with the game laws. See Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire v. Piper, supra, 105 S. Ct.  at 1279; Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S.  at 398-399, 68 S. Ct.  at 
1163-1164. An objective application requirement such as testing is an 
alternative means to accomplish the ends sought by the State. As previously 
noted, the statute already provides for this objective testing to ensure that 
the applicant knows the game laws of our state and the area where he will be 
guiding. Such less restrictive means should be used when 
available.

 
 
State 
Resources

 
 

[¶25.]  The State correctly notes that this court 
has proclaimed that wildlife is held by our state as a trustee. Schakel v. State, supra. Because of this 
relationship, it is claimed that the state not only has a right but an 
obligation to use the resources for the benefit of its people. Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 49 L. Ed. 2d 34, reh. denied 429 U.S. 873, 97 S. Ct. 189, 50 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976). A state's 
duty or right to use these resources for the benefit of its people, however, 
does not mean that laws enacted in connection with these resources are free from 
constitutional scrutiny.

 
 

[¶26.]  In Schakel v. State, supra, 513 P.2d  at 
414, we said:

"* * * This trust 
relationship would give the State the power and the duty to preserve, protect, 
and nurture the wild game - not an arbitrary power to make discriminatory laws 
affecting the hunting thereof."

 
 
Likewise, the United 
States Supreme Court has noted that state ownership does not place a statute 
completely beyond the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 2489, 
57 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1978). Speaking of a state's relation to its natural resources, 
the United States Supreme Court has stated that the ownership theory is but a 
fiction expressing in legal shorthand the importance to its people of a state's 
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important 
resource.

"* * * [T]here is no 
necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and the 
constitutional command that the State exercise that power, like its other 
powers, so as not to discriminate without reason against citizens of other 
States." Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 
334 U.S.  at 402, 68 S. Ct.  at 
1165.

"* * * [A] State's 
interest in its wildlife * * * must yield when, without reason, it interferes 
with a nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own 
* * *." Baldwin v. Fish and Game 
Commission of Montana, supra, 436 U.S.  at 386, 98 S. Ct.  at 
1861.

 
 

[¶27.]  We recognize the importance of scarce 
resources such as elk, moose and other game animals to both Wyoming and the entire 
country. The importance of the resource and the State's duty to use such 
resources for the benefit of its people cannot, however, change the fact that 
this statute discriminates against nonresidents when they have not been 
identified as a peculiar source of evil. We have previously said that 
classifications based on non-citizenship cannot stand

"`* * * unless there is 
something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil 
at which the statute is aimed.' [Toomer v. Witsell, supra,] 334 U.S.  at 398, 68 S. Ct.  at 1163." State 
v. Antonich, supra, 694 P.2d  at 62.

 
 

[¶28.]  Even if the State has pointed to a 
particular evil caused by nonresidents, the statute prohibiting all nonresidents 
from guiding in Wyoming does not precisely fit any evil 
identified. The Supreme Court of Montana dealt with a similar statute requiring 
outfitters to be residents of Montana. That court found that such 
classification did not even bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate 
governmental interest. Godfrey v. Montana 
State Fish & Game Commission, supra. We believe that the statute in the 
present case burdens a fundamental right and so must overcome even a stricter 
test than that applied by the Montana court. A statute burdening a 
fundamental right "offends the privileges-and-immunities clause unless a close 
link exists between valid reasons for the Act and the discrimination practiced." 
State v. Antonich, supra, 694 P.2d  at 
62. The statute fails to pass this test.

 
 

[¶29.]  Section 23-2-402(a)(iii) burdens a 
fundamental right. Because it does so and because the degree of discrimination 
does not bear a close relation to any of the State's asserted reasons for the 
discriminatory treatment, we hold that the statute violates the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2 of the United States 
Constitution.

 
 

[¶30.]  Remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 
 

1 The definition of 
resident for purposes of § 23-2-402(a)(iii) is found in § 23-1-102(a)(ix), W.S. 
1977, 1985 Cum.Supp:

"`Resident' means a 
United States citizen who has been a resident of Wyoming for not less than one 
(1) year and who has not claimed residency elsewhere for any purpose during that 
one (1) year period immediately preceding the date of application for a license, 
permit or certificate. * * *"

 
 

2 This difference in fees 
was based on a combination license; the nonresident who wished to hunt only elk 
paid 25 times as much as the resident. 436 U.S.  at 374, 98 S. Ct.  at 1855.

 
 

3 Section 23-2-403, W.S. 
1977, provides that:

"Every guide shall 
promptly report to the department or any game warden each violation of this act 
or order of the commission by any person guided."

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom BROWN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶31.]  I agree with the general law set forth in 
the majority opinion, but I do not believe that we have sufficient facts before 
us upon which to apply such law. Accordingly, the opinion in this case is an 
advisory one and, thus, is improper. The matter should be remanded to the 
district court for the purpose of an evidentiary hearing to establish the facts, 
if such exist, upon which a determination of a constitutional question will be 
dispositive.

 
 

[¶32.]  Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

 
 

[¶33.]  "In all cases in which a district court 
reserves an important and difficult constitutional question arising in an action 
or proceeding pending before it, the district court, before sending the question 
to the Supreme Court for decision, shall (1) dispose of all necessary and 
controlling questions of fact and make special findings of fact thereon, and (2) 
state its conclusions of law on all points of common law and of construction, 
interpretation and meaning of statutes and of all instruments necessary for a 
complete decision of the case. No constitutional question shall be deemed to 
arise in an action unless, after all necessary special findings of fact and 
conclusions of law have been made by the district court, a decision on the 
constitutional question is necessary to the rendition of final judgment. The 
question reserved shall be specific, and shall identify the constitutional 
provision to be interpreted. The special findings of fact and conclusions of law 
required by this subdivision of this rule shall be deemed to be a final order 
from which either party may appeal, and such appeal may be considered by the 
Supreme Court simultaneously with the reserved question."

 
 

[¶34.]  Pursuant to this subsection, the district 
court must dispose of all necessary and controlling questions of fact and state 
its conclusions of law on all points of construction, interpretation and meaning 
of statutes. Griffith ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department 
v. Stephenson, Wyo., 494 P.2d 546 (1972); Harding v. State, Wyo., 478 P.2d 64 
(1970).

 
 

[¶35.]  The power of the Supreme Court to decide 
reserved constitutional questions does not authorize the court to render 
advisory opinions. State v. Rosachi, Wyo., 549 P.2d 318 (1976); Tobin v. Pursel, Wyo., 
539 P.2d 361 (1975).

 
 

[¶36.]  In this case, the certification from the 
district court contains a section captioned "Statement of Facts," but it is no 
more than a recital of the previous procedure in the matter; i.e., plaintiff 
submitted his application for a guide license to the game warden; it was refused 
because plaintiff was not a resident of Wyoming as required by statute; the 
refusal of the game warden was appealed to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission; 
the commission, after consultation with the Attorney General's office, supported 
the decision of the game warden; an appeal of the administrative ruling to the 
district court resulted in affirmance of the decision of the Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission; plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action; and the question 
before us was certified to this court. The trial court did not make any 
conclusions of law.

 
 

[¶37.]  The record also contains findings by the 
trial court which recite:

"THIS MATTER having come 
before the Court upon the Stipulation of the parties to reserve a constitutional 
question to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 52(c) 
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does find as 
follows:

"1. The parties have 
stipulated to all necessary and controlling questions of 
fact;

"2. The only question of 
law necessary for a complete decision of the case is the constitutional question 
being reserved to the Wyoming Supreme Court;

"3. A decision on the 
constitutional question is necessary to the rendition of final 
judgment."

 
 

[¶38.]  However, the only stipulation in the 
record reads:

"The parties to this 
matter hereby stipulate that it is appropriate to reserve the constitutional 
question presented herein to the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming and, for that 
reason, that Petitioner's Motion to that effect should be granted by the Court 
without further hearing."

 
 

[¶39.]  The complaint for the declaratory 
judgment also makes only a recital of previous procedures taken in the case. 
Through denials, the answer places in issue the refusal by the Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission to accept plaintiff's request for a guide license. The majority 
opinion reflects the undecided factual issue. 

"Powell claims that the 
statutory scheme which requires a guide to be a resident of Wyoming for not less 
than one year restricts his 
fundamental constitutional right to pursue his chosen means of livelihood, 
establishes a discriminatory scheme which does not bear a close relation to a 
valid interest of the State,[1] and relies upon a durational 
residency requirement. Thus, Powell contends that the statute is fatally 
deficient.

"The State, on the other hand, maintains that 
`guiding' is not a fundamental right, but is instead merely a recreational 
privilege and that restricting that privilege to residents is a valid exercise 
of the State's police power. The State also urges that because protection of 
wildlife lies peculiarly within the ambit of the State's police power, we must 
give the legislature great latitude in determining what means are appropriate 
for wildlife protection." (Emphasis added and footnote 
omitted.)

 
 
The factual condition 
behind these two contentions has not been resolved.

 
 

[¶40.]  There is no finding by the trial court 
that guiding is plaintiff's "chosen means of livelihood." Plaintiff's 
application for a guide license (attached to the complaint) reflects that he 
will guide for Bolten Ranch Outfitters and that he has "4 years hunting 
experience on private ranches in Wyoming, where I will be working." The obvious 
fact questions then are whether the "working" is other than "guiding," and, if 
not, what the "means of livelihood" is during the time other than that in the 
short hunting season each year.

 
 

[¶41.]  Included in the correspondence presented 
during the review of the administrative action was a letter from plaintiff's 
attorney to the senior assistant attorney general in which it was represented 
that plaintiff was "involved in the `blue print' business" in Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. It also stated that he

"* * * spends a 
considerable amount of his time (upwards of six months each year) in the State 
of Wyoming actively involved in hunting and fishing activities which he pursues 
for compensation. * *"

 
 
The question is not 
whether plaintiff has been violating the law for the past activities pursued for 
compensation, but whether plaintiff desires the guide license as a means of 
livelihood. The "business of guiding for any consideration or compensation" as 
recited in the statute does not mean that one receiving a guide license is using 
it to provide his livelihood. He may never actually use it, or he may use it 
primarily as a recreational activity which provides a little "pocket money." 
Many people use an avocation as a recreational activity. If plaintiff is doing 
so here, he is not concerned with a fundamental right and lacks the required 
standing to test the constitutionality of the statute. We should have the facts 
in this respect before addressing the issue certified to us. Perhaps such facts 
would make proper the result reached by the majority opinion. Justice White 
wrote in an opinion concurring in the result in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 
___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1281, 84 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1985):

"Respondent Piper lives 
only 400 yards from the New 
Hampshire border. She has passed the New Hampshire bar and intends to practice law in 
New Hampshire. 
Indeed, insofar as this record reveals, the only law office she will maintain is 
in New 
Hampshire. But because she will commute from Vermont rather than reside in New Hampshire, she will 
not be allowed to practice in the latter state.

"I have no doubt that the 
New Hampshire 
residency requirement is invalid as 
applied to respondent Piper. Except for the fact that she will commute from 
Vermont, she would be indistinguishable from 
other New 
Hampshire lawyers. There is every reason to believe that 
she will be as able as other New Hampshire 
lawyers to maintain professional competence, to stay abreast of local rules and 
procedures, to be available for sudden hearings, and to satisfy any requirements 
of a member of the New 
Hampshire bar to perform pro bono and volunteer work. It 
does not appear that her nonresidency presents a special threat to any of the 
state's interests that is not shared by lawyers living in New Hampshire. Hence, I 
conclude that the Privileges and Immunities Clause forbids her exclusion from 
the New 
Hampshire bar. "The foregoing is enough to dispose of 
this case. I do not, and the Court itself 
need not, reach out to decide the facial validity of the New Hampshire residency 
requirement. I would postpone to another day such questions as whether a 
state may constitutionally condition membership in the New 
Hampshire bar upon maintaining an office for the practice of law in 
the state of New 
Hampshire.

"I concur in the judgment 
invalidating the New 
Hampshire residency requirement as applied to respondent 
Piper." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
We do not pass on 
constitutional questions until matters of fact or of statutory construction 
which may dispose of the case have been decided by the trial court. Boode v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 
Wyo., 458 P.2d 653 (1969); McFarland v. City of Cheyenne, 48 
Wyo. 86, 42 P.2d 413 (1935); In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 
Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265 (1932), as supplemented 
by 45 Wyo. 
173, 17 P.2d 665 (1933).

 
 

[¶42.]  Finally, I direct attention to the nature 
of this action, which is one for a declaratory judgment. This fact does not 
circumvent the proscription against advisory opinions or the requirement of 
justiciable controversy. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Company v. Langdon, Wyo., 624 P.2d 240 (1981); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, Wyo., 577 P.2d 1386 (1978); Police Protective Association of 
Casper v. City of Casper, Wyo., 575 P.2d 1146 
(1978).

 
 

[¶43.]  I would return this case to the district 
court for reception of evidence and findings thereon relative to the need on the part of plaintiff for a guide 
license to enable him to exercise his 
fundamental right to earn a livelihood rather than a desire on his part to use 
it primarily to further his recreational activity. I would refuse to answer the 
certified question in a vacuum. After the facts have been determined by the 
trial court, the question can properly be certified.

 
 

1 IN THE MATTER OF THE 
INJURY TO KENNETH A. KEMP, AN EMPLOYEE OF WINKS, INC. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. 
WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLANT (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
KENNETH A. KEMP, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing Appellant: 

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick J. Crank, Asst. Atty. 
Gen.(objector-defendant).

 
 
Representing Appellee: 

Kenneth G. Vines, of 
Vines, Rideout, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne 
(employee-claimant).

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

MACY, Justice.

 
 

[¶44.]  This is an appeal from an order allowing 
the claim of Kenneth A. Kemp, appellee, for benefits provided by the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act for a nonfatal heart attack which occurred during the 
course of his employment.

 
 

[¶45.]  The only question to be answered by this 
Court is whether there was sufficient competent medical testimony before the 
trial court to find a direct causal connection between appellee's exertion and 
his cardiac condition. We find that there was such evidence and affirm the order 
of the trial court.

 
 

[¶46.]  On July 24, 1984, as appellee was driving 
his tractor-trailer in the course of his employment, the stabilizing bar on the 
unit malfunctioned. After spending anxious moments wrestling with the wheel, 
appellee was unable to keep the truck from going into the ditch. About 30 
minutes after the accident occurred, appellee suffered a heart 
attack.

 
 

[¶47.]  Appellant now contends that appellee 
failed to meet his burden of proof as to medical causation under § 27-12-603(b), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). We have previously said that to meet this 
requirement the claimant must establish by competent medical evidence a direct 
causal connection between the exertion and the myocardial infarction. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division 
v. McCarley, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1333 
(1979).

 
 

[¶48.]  In Kaan v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 689 P.2d 1387, 1389 
(1984), we held that the causal connection requirement is met if a medical 
expert testifies

"* * * that it is more 
probable than not that work exertion or stress contributed in a material degree 
to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial 
infarction."

 
 

[¶49.]  In this regard, the following is an 
excerpt from the deposition of Dr. Robert James Davis II, the cardiologist who 
was appellee's only medical witness:

"Q. Based on your 
knowledge as a cardiologist and on your knowledge of these records that you have 
reviewed, do you have an opinion, based on reasonable medical certainty, as to 
whether the stress involved in this truck accident could be a probable cause of 
the immediate probable cause of Mr. Kemp's myocardial infarction? 

"A. I have an opinion. 
And my opinion is that probable is a heavier word than I would use. And I would 
have to say that he suffered a heart attack in and around the events of having 
been involved in a truck accident, and there is a possible causal relationship, 
due to the background of the known arteriosclerosis, and that I think to deny 
that relationship would be foolish.

"But I think for me to 
say probable cause would also be saying more than I can absolutely 
say.

"Q. * * 
*

"Do you, in your opinion, 
see it as a likely cause? Is that a better word?

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"THE WITNESS: I don't 
think that I can say that's the likely cause, because I just don't know the 
physiologic way that happens. I think there is an undeniable 
relationship.

"I think there is a - 
there is something that happened in this man's day that does not happen every 
day in the course of his job, and that in and around that unusual event he had a 
heart attack.

"And we know that 
stressful situations sometimes seem related to heart attacks. And to say that 
there is absolutely no relationship between those two things would be 
incredulous."

 
 

[¶50.]  The direct causal connection requirement 
is not whether or not the truck accident was the probable cause of appellee's 
myocardial infarction, but whether, as stated in Kaan,

"* * * it is more 
probable than not that work exertion or stress contributed in a material degree 
to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction." 
Kaan v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 689 P.2d  at 1389.

 
 

[¶51.]  The cardiologist was not asked the 
question in such a manner that he could recite the magic words in a concise 
affirmative opinion statement. His statements, however, when considered 
together, satisfy the holding in the Kaan case:

"* * * I think there is 
an undeniable relationship.

"I think there is a - 
there is something that happened in this man's day that does not happen every 
day in the course of his job, and that in and around that unusual event he had a 
heart attack.

"And we know that 
stressful situations sometimes seem related to heart attacks. And to say that 
there is absolutely no relationship between those two things would be 
incredulous."

 
 

[¶52.]  We, therefore, affirm the order of the 
trial court.

 
 
 The majority opinion refers to defendants 
as the "State."