Case Title: In re A.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81711

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re A.A., Nos. 81771, 81800 cons. (1/23/98) 
 
        Docket Nos. 81711, 81800 cons.--Agenda 17--May 1997. 
     In re A.A., a Minor (The Department of Children and Family Services, 
     Appellant, v. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee). 
                  Opinion filed January 23, 1998. 
 
          JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court: 
          These consolidated appeals concern the constitutionality of legislation 
     preventing minors 13 years of age or older who have been charged with a criminal 
     offense or adjudicated delinquent from being committed to or placed in the 
     custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The two 
     appeals arise from orders in separate proceedings in the circuit court of St. Clair 
     County, both concerning custody of the same minor, A.A. In Docket No. 81711, 
     DCFS appeals from an order of the trial court declaring sections 2--10 and 2--27 
     of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2--10, 2--27 (West 1994)) 
     unconstitutional under the equal protection clauses of the Illinois and United States 
     Constitutions, and placing A.A. in the custody of DCFS. Since the trial court 
     declared a portion of a statute of this state unconstitutional, we have jurisdiction 
     to hear DCFS's direct appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) 
     (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). In Docket No. 81800, DCFS filed a petition under 
     Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)) for leave to appeal to the 
     appellate court from an interlocutory order entered by the circuit court awarding 
     temporary custody of A.A. to DCFS. The appellate court allowed the petition. 
     Thereafter, DCFS filed a motion to transfer the appeal to this court under Supreme 
     Court Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)) and to consolidate the appeal with No. 
     81711. We allowed the motion. 
          For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the orders of the circuit court 
     and remand the causes for further proceedings. 
 
                           BACKGROUND 
          A.A. was born in September 1980, and has a significant history of 
     behavioral problems. At some point in time, A.A.'s older sister was appointed as 
     his legal guardian under the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/1--1 et seq. (West 
     1994)). However, due to A.A.'s unmanageable behavior, his sister filed a petition 
     in the circuit court of St. Clair County to terminate her guardianship. The trial 
     court granted the petition and ordered that A.A. be placed in the temporary 
     custody of DCFS. The court further ordered the office of the State's Attorney of 
     St. Clair County to "file appropriate pleadings to place custody and guardianship 
     of [A.A.] with [DCFS]." On March 27, 1996, the State filed a petition under the 
     Juvenile Court Act to adjudicate A.A. a neglected minor on the basis that his 
     mother "refuses to provide [A.A.] with proper or necessary support, education or 
     medical or re-medial [sic] care necessary for [A.A.'s] well-being and has 
     abandoned [A.A.] in that she refuses to allow the minor to live with her and she 
     refuses to provide support of any kind." The petition requested that DCFS's 
     Guardianship Administrator be appointed guardian of the person of A.A. At a 
     hearing on April 15, 1996, A.A.'s mother admitted the allegations of neglect and, 
     on the same day, an order was entered finding A.A. to be neglected, making him 
     a ward of the court, appointing DCFS's guardianship administrator as A.A.'s 
     guardian, and placing A.A. in the custody of DCFS. 
          DCFS subsequently moved to intervene in both the probate proceedings 
     and the neglect proceedings under Juvenile Court Act. DCFS sought 
     reconsideration of the custody orders entered in both proceedings, arguing that 
     because A.A. was over the age of 13 and had previously been adjudicated 
     delinquent, he was statutorily ineligible for placement in the custody of DCFS 
     under recent amendments to the Juvenile Court Act (see Pub. Act 89--21, art. 15, 
     sec. 15--15, eff. July 1, 1995 (amending 705 ILCS 405/2--10, 2--27 (West 1994))) 
     and the Children and Family Services Act (see Pub. Act 89--21, art. 5, sec. 5--15, 
     eff. June 6, 1995 (amending 20 ILCS 505/5(l) (West 1994))). The record reflects 
     that in 1995, A.A. was adjudicated delinquent based on charges of burglary and 
     residential burglary. The State responded that the amendments to the Juvenile 
     Court Act and the Children and Family Services Act violated the equal protection 
     clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court in the neglect 
     proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act agreed. The court concluded that there 
     was no rational basis for preventing the class of minors 13 years of age or older 
     charged with an offense or adjudicated delinquent from receiving custodial care 
     by DCFS. These appeals followed. 
 
                            ANALYSIS 
          At the outset, we note that at the time of the trial court's decision, the 
     constitutionality of the provisions at issue had already been upheld against an 
     equal protection challenge by the Appellate Court, Second District, in In re C.T., 
     281 Ill. App. 3d 189 (1996). The record reflects that the trial court was apprised 
     of the decision in C.T., but the trial court inexplicably failed to follow it. It is the 
     absolute duty of the circuit court to follow the decisions of the appellate court. See 
     generally State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian,  152 Ill. 2d 533 , 539-40 
     (1992). 
          We turn now to the merits of the equal protection question raised in these 
     appeals. The analysis applied by this court in assessing equal protection claims is 
     the same under both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions. Jacobson v. 
     Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). The guarantee of equal 
     protection requires that the government treat similarly situated individuals in a 
     similar manner. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 322. While the government may not 
     accord different treatment to persons who have been placed by statute into 
     different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of 
     legislation, the equal protection clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing 
     proper distinctions in legislation among different categories of people. See 
     Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 322. The level of scrutiny applied in reviewing legislative 
     classifications under the equal protection guarantee depends on the nature of the 
     classification: those based on race or national origin, or affecting fundamental 
     rights, receive a heightened level of review under the strict scrutiny standard, 
     whereas economic and social welfare legislation is reviewed under the highly 
     deferential rational basis test. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 322-23. 
          Mindful of these principles, we examine the statutory provisions at issue 
     in the present case. Section 2--27 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, in pertinent 
     part: 
                    "(1) If the court determines *** [that] the parents, guardian, 
                    or legal custodian of a minor adjudged a ward of the court are unfit 
                    or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances 
                    alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are 
                    unwilling to do so, and that it is in the best interest of the minor to 
                    take him from the custody of his parents, guardian or custodian, the 
                    court may ***: 
                         (a) place him in the custody of a suitable relative or 
                         other person as legal custodian or guardian; 
                         (b) place him under the guardianship of a probation 
                         officer; 
                         (c) commit him to an agency for care or placement, 
                         except an institution under the authority of the Department 
                         of Corrections or of [DCFS]; 
                         (d) commit him to [DCFS] for care and service; 
                         however, a minor charged with a criminal offense under the 
                         Criminal Code of 1961 or adjudicated delinquent shall not 
                         be placed in the custody of or committed to [DCFS] by any 
                         court, except a minor less than 13 years of age and 
                         committed to [DCFS] under Section 5--23 of this Act." 
                         (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2--27 (West 1996). 
     Section 2--10 of the Juvenile Court Act, which pertains to temporary custody 
     orders in abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings, contains language identical 
     to the emphasized language quoted above from section 2--27(d). However, during 
     the pendency of this appeal, section 2--10 was amended to permit such delinquent 
     teenagers, or those charged with an offense, to be committed to DCFS or placed 
     in its custody if "an independent basis of abuse, neglect, or dependency exists, 
     which must be defined by departmental rule." See Pub. Act 89--582, sec. 5, eff. 
     January 1, 1997 (amending 705 ILCS 405/2--10 (West 1994)). 
          The parties agree that since the challenged statutory provisions do not 
     discriminate against members of a suspect class or affect any fundamental right, 
     the rational basis test applies. Under the rational basis test, judicial review of 
     legislative classifications is limited and generally deferential; the court simply 
     inquires whether the method or means employed in the statute to achieve the 
     stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to that goal. Jacobson 
     171 Ill. 2d  at 323. If any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the 
     classification, it must be upheld. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 324. Whether a rational 
     basis exists for a classification is a question of law, which we consider de novo. 
          As previously noted, our appellate court has rejected an equal protection 
     challenge to the provisions at issue in this case. In In re C.T., 281 Ill. App. 3d 189 
     (1996), it was argued that the challenged provisions frustrated the Juvenile Court 
     Act's stated objective of securing "custody, care and discipline as nearly as 
     possible equivalent to that which should be given by [the parents of minors 
     subject to the Juvenile Court Act]." 705 ILCS 405/1--2(1) (West 1994). The 
     appellate court in C.T. rejected the argument: 
               "Courts faced with abused, neglected, or dependent minors with a 
                    history of delinquency retain the options of (a) placing the minor 
                    in the custody of a suitable relative or other person as legal 
                    custodian or guardian; (b) placing the minor under the guardianship 
                    of a probation officer; or (c) committing the minor to an agency for 
                    care or placement, except an institution under the authority of [the 
                    Department of Corrections] or DCFS. [Citation.] In limiting the 
                    placement of delinquent minors with DCFS, the legislature could, 
                    within its broad discretion, have sought to restrict the allocation of 
                    DCFS' scarce resources to its core population of abused, neglected, 
                    or dependent minors with no history of delinquency. Further, the 
                    legislature reasonably could have concluded that delinquent minors 
                    aged 13 and older might present a danger to younger, more 
                    vulnerable children with whom they might be placed in foster 
                    homes and shelter care facilities." C.T., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 196-97. 
     The Appellate Court, Third District, has followed C.T. in In re C.M., 282 Ill. App. 
     3d 990 (1996). 
          We find the appellate court's reasoning in C.T. and C.M. to be sound and 
     we are unpersuaded by the State's contrary arguments. The State first contends 
     that the exclusion of delinquent teenagers from DCFS's custody cannot rationally 
     have been based on legislative concern for the safety of other minors in DCFS's 
     custody, as the C.T. court suggested. In support of this assertion, the State notes 
     that because the legislature has now carved out an exception allowing delinquent 
     teenagers to be placed in DCFS's temporary custody when there is an independent 
     basis for finding abuse, neglect or dependency, DCFS's younger charges are 
     potentially exposed to older delinquents. We disagree with the State's argument. 
     The legislature could rationally distinguish between teenaged minors whose need 
     for shelter care is directly related to their delinquency (for example, minors who 
     have been ejected from their family homes because of delinquent behavior) and 
     those whose delinquency is or was independent from the basis for finding abuse, 
     neglect or dependency. The legislature could reasonably conclude that the former 
     group poses a greater threat than the latter to young nondelinquent children in 
     DCFS's temporary custody. 
          The State also argues that the alternative placement options for delinquent 
     teenagers are not always realistic and there is no guarantee that a suitable 
     custodian will necessarily be available. As noted by the appellate court in C.T., 
     the Juvenile Court Act provides for placement with a suitable relative or other 
     person, placement under the guardianship of a probation officer, or placement with 
     an agency that is not under the authority of DCFS. In our view, the legislature 
     could rationally conclude that these options were sufficient to provide for the 
     needs of minors ineligible for placement with DCFS. We note that the " `a 
     legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on 
     rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' " Cutinello v. 
     Whitley,  161 Ill. 2d 409 , 421-22 (1994), quoting Federal Communications Comm'n 
     v. Beach Communications, Inc.,  508 U.S. 307 , 315, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211, 222, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993). 
          Finally, the State contends that provisions of the Juvenile Court Act 
     providing for the confidentiality of juvenile court records and limiting the 
     admissibility of juvenile court adjudications in other proceedings (see 705 ILCS 
     405/1--8, 1--10 (West 1994)) reflect a philosophy of minimizing the stigma 
     attached to a delinquency adjudication. The State argues that it is contrary to this 
     philosophy to disqualify teenagers from custodial care by DCFS based on the 
     status of having been adjudicated delinquent. We find the argument without merit. 
     The confidentiality provisions cited protect the juvenile's privacy and help the 
     juvenile make a fresh start in life. It does not logically follow, however, that a 
     juvenile's delinquency status cannot be taken into account in determining how to 
     provide for his or her needs after removal from the family. 
 
                           CONCLUSION 
          Sections 2--10 and 2--27 of the Juvenile Court Act do not violate the equal 
     protection clauses of our state and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the orders 
     of the circuit court of St. Clair County are reversed and the causes are remanded 
     for further proceedings consistent herewith and in accordance with the Juvenile 
     Court Act. 
 
     Reversed and remanded.