Case Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Catanzarite

Citation: 2008-Ohio-4063

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-4063.] 
 
 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. CATANZARITE. 
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-4063.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Filing a lawsuit merely to harass another — Conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Charging excessive fees 
— One-year suspension, with six months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2008-0423 — Submitted June 4, 2008 — Decided August 14, 2008.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No.  06-085. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} We must determine in this case the appropriate sanction for a 
lawyer who, in attempting to collect legal fees from two prospective clients, sued 
them for an amount he knew he had not earned and then resorted to intimidation 
tactics in the ensuing disciplinary proceeding.  Finding that these acts constituted 
professional misconduct, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline recommends that we suspend the lawyer’s license for one year and stay 
the last six months on conditions, including one year of probation.  We accept the 
board’s findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶ 2} Respondent, Jeffrey A. Catanzarite of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0015203, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1979.  
Relator, Akron Bar Association, charged respondent in a multiple-count 
complaint with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and with 
failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation as required by Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G).  A three-member panel of the board heard the case in November 2007, 
found three Disciplinary Rule violations and a failure to cooperate, and 
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recommended the one-year suspension and conditioned six-month stay.  The 
board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶ 3} Respondent objects to the board’s report, arguing first that the 
findings of misconduct are not supported by the requisite degree of proof.  The 
objections, which merely lament that the panel and board did not accept 
respondent’s version of the underlying events, are overruled.  Relator’s witnesses 
testified to the facts set forth in Part I of this opinion, the panel credited these 
witnesses over respondent’s testimony, and consistent with our usual practice in 
disciplinary proceedings, we defer to those credibility determinations.  See 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 
1117, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 4} Respondent also objects to the board’s recommendation, arguing 
that the sanction is too severe.  We disagree.  As explained in Part II of our 
opinion, we find that a one-year suspension with the last six months stayed on 
conditions, including one year of probation, is appropriate. 
I.  Misconduct 
{¶ 5} To establish a lawyer’s professional misconduct, relator must 
prove a violation of the Disciplinary Rules with clear and convincing evidence.  
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J); Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 308, 
310, 691 N.E.2d 262; Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 
708 N.E.2d 193, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “ ‘Clear and convincing 
evidence’ has been defined as ‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than 
a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as 
is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce 
in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to 
be established.’ ”  Id. at 331, 708 N.E.2d 193, quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 
161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
The proof of respondent’s improprieties meets this standard. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
A.  Respondent Violated DR 2-106(A) by Charging a Clearly Excessive Fee 
{¶ 6} Respondent has a master’s degree in business administration in 
addition to his law degree and has practiced for most of his career in taxation and 
finance, representing closely held corporations.  Sometime in January 2006, 
David Hirsch called respondent to inquire about retaining his help in resolving 
difficulties that Hirsch and Robert Joyce, partners in a recruiting firm named 
Professional Dynamics, were having with a third partner.  During their 15-to-20-
minute conversation, respondent advised Hirsch that he would not charge for their 
initial consultation but if hired would require a $1,000 retainer fee and then 
charge fees as necessary.  Respondent, who typically charges $150 per hour, did 
not specify his hourly rate. 
{¶ 7} Hirsch, who admitted his inexperience in dealing with attorneys, 
and Joyce then met with respondent on January 13, 2006, for one and one-half to 
two hours.  They explained that their third partner had abandoned the business 
after incurring various debts.  Respondent advised Hirsch and Joyce to reconnect 
with the partner and “bring [him] back as a team player.”  Joyce testified that 
respondent, at some point during the meeting, had also mentioned the $1,000 
retainer, adding that he would cap his fees at $5,000.  Both Hirsch and Joyce 
testified that they made no commitment to hire respondent, telling him that they 
wanted to think more before engaging him and intending to consult with another 
attorney the following week. 
{¶ 8} Some time after their meeting, respondent called Hirsch and asked 
whether any progress had been made with the third partner.  Respondent also 
inquired about obtaining a check for $1,000.  Hirsch replied, according to his 
testimony, that he and Joyce would forward a check to respondent if they decided 
to hire him. 
{¶ 9} Before Hirsch and Joyce’s meeting with respondent, Joyce had 
already tried without success to reconcile the partnership’s differences with the 
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third partner.  Joyce tried again after the meeting, but the third partner would not 
meet with him.  Joyce testified that he relayed this information to respondent in a 
call on January 15, 2006, during which respondent neither offered another course 
of action nor revisited the matter of his fee.  After this conversation, the partners 
received the following communiqué to Joyce by facsimile: 
{¶ 10} “You have already begun implementation of our plan regarding 
your former partner.  We have agreed to my legal fee of $5,000, payable $1,000 
immediately and $1,000.00 on the 15th day of February, March, April and May of 
2006.  I will provide all necessary services to resolve the bank loan issue and the 
corporate procedures needed to reflect [your third partner’s] resignation.  This fee 
shall govern unless litigation becomes necessary * * * .” 
{¶ 11} A few days after their second telephone conversation, respondent 
again called Hirsch and asked about his retainer.  Hirsch again replied that he and 
Joyce would pay if they decided to hire respondent.  At that point, respondent lost 
his temper and became profane.  He demanded his fee and threatened suit if 
Hirsch and Joyce did not pay.  Hirsch testified to the shock and dismay he 
experienced after this call, and Joyce testified that Hirsch was visibly shaken 
when he reported respondent’s use of profanity and threats. 
{¶ 12} Hirsch never spoke to respondent again.  Joyce testified that 
respondent called him a few more times, offering first to charge a fee of only 
$1,000 and then of only $300.  Joyce did not accept either offer and told 
respondent that he wanted to consult Hirsch about paying respondent $300.  The 
next day, Hirsch and Joyce were notified that respondent had filed a lawsuit. 
{¶ 13} In early February 2006, respondent sued Professional Dynamics in 
Akron Municipal Court for breach of contract, claiming that Hirsch and Joyce had 
agreed to pay a $1,000 retainer and a total of $5,000 in fees.  His complaint 
alleged that he had advised Hirsch and Joyce in implementing “a specific 
strategy” to solve their partnership problem and that “shortly after implementing 
January Term, 2008 
5 
the first step,” Joyce had called him to report the success of the strategy and his 
optimism for a successful resolution.  Joyce specifically denied these claims at the 
panel hearing, reiterating that respondent’s “strategy” had gone nowhere and that 
he had told respondent so. 
{¶ 14} Hirsch and Joyce ultimately hired another lawyer to resolve the 
partnership’s troubles.  They also had to engage a different lawyer to represent 
them in municipal court; that lawyer settled respondent’s claim for $300.  Hirsch 
and Joyce resigned themselves to the settlement because “[e]nough time and 
enough money had been spent and it was time to move on.” 
{¶ 15} During the panel hearing, respondent insisted that Hirsch and 
Joyce had orally agreed to pay him $5,000 for his services and that he had then 
followed up with a facsimile to commit the agreement to writing.  We agree with 
the panel and board, however, and conclude that the evidence does not support 
respondent’s claim that Hirsch and Joyce agreed to respondent’s representation or 
his fee.  Moreover, respondent admitted at the hearing that he had spent no more 
than two hours of his time consulting with Hirsch and Joyce.  Respondent thus 
must have realized that his claim for $5,000, representing a charge of $2,500 per 
hour for the suggestion that the partners negotiate, was excessive. 
{¶ 16} In fact, respondent conceded during the hearing that he either 
should not have filed his lawsuit or should have asserted a claim for quantum 
meruit.1  The panel and board therefore found that respondent attempted to collect 
fees clearly in excess of the value of his services from these two prospective 
clients.  We agree and find that he thereby violated DR 2-106(A). 
B. Respondent Violated DR 7-102(A)(1) by Taking Legal Action  
Merely to Harass Another Person 
                                                 
1. “Quantum meruit is generally awarded when one party confers some benefit upon another 
without receiving just compensation for the reasonable value of services rendered.”  Aultman 
Hosp. Assn. v. Community Mut. Ins. Co (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 51, 55, 544 N.E.2d 920. 
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{¶ 17} Respondent sued Hirsch and Joyce on his own behalf and testified 
why he did so.  His demeanor and his explanation show that he filed the action to 
exact punishment for what he perceived to be an attempt to obtain free legal 
advice.  Indeed, respondent’s irritation with Hirsch and Joyce for supposedly 
trying to benefit, free of charge, from his experience and education is easily 
discernible from the pages of the transcribed record.  As an example, this 
exchange took place during respondent’s deposition, taken prior to the panel 
hearing: 
{¶ 18} “[Relator’s Counsel:]  Well, do you think it is fair to sue somebody 
for $5,000 for an hour’s worth of time?  I am sorry.  Two hours’ worth of time? 
{¶ 19} “[Respondent:]  I am sure defense lawyers do it all the time.  I 
would say yes. A breach of contract is a breach of contract.  They got $5000 
worth of advice, anyway.  They were too ignorant to follow it. 
{¶ 20} “[Relator’s Counsel:]  I thought you said earlier that you got a call 
from Mr. Joyce indicating that he – 
{¶ 21} “[Respondent:]  It went well.  They got $5000 worth of advice.  
They paid nothing for it.  I am glad they had problems.  They deserve it.  That is 
what shysters get for their dishonesty.” 
{¶ 22} From this evidence, the panel and board found that respondent had 
taken legal action for the sole purpose of harassing Hirsch and Joyce.  We agree 
and find that he thereby violated DR 7-102(A)(1). 
C.  Respondent Engaged in Intimidation Tactics that Adversely  
Reflected on His Fitness to Practice Law in Violation of DR 1-102(A)(6) and that 
Violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
{¶ 23} As a cautionary measure during prehearing proceedings, relator’s 
counsel moved for a psychological examination to determine whether respondent 
suffered from a mental illness that substantially impaired his ability to practice 
law.  See Gov.Bar R. V(7)(C)(1)(b).  Though respondent ultimately complied 
January Term, 2008 
7 
when the panel chairwoman ordered an exam, at first he vigorously resisted the 
motion.  After he unsuccessfully moved to strike, respondent moved to dismiss 
the complaint, to vacate the order for the exam, for the chairwoman’s recusal, and 
for sanctions.  He argued that a letter accompanying relator’s motion for a 
psychological examination revealed damaging information about him and 
constituted an ex parte communication with the chairwoman.  The motions were 
all denied. 
{¶ 24} On April 12, 2007, respondent composed a letter to Disciplinary 
Counsel complaining about the purportedly improper communication between 
relator’s counsel and the chairwoman.  Ultimately, respondent chose not to send 
the April 12 letter to Disciplinary Counsel; however, he did send a copy of the 
letter to relator’s counsel, creating the appearance that he had actually filed a 
grievance against counsel. 
{¶ 25} Through the pretense of a sham grievance, respondent plainly 
aimed to intimidate relator’s counsel and derail the disciplinary proceeding.  
Excerpts from respondent’s deposition provide specific proof of this intent.  At 
one point, relator’s counsel asked why respondent had not attended a meeting 
during the disciplinary investigation, prompting this exchange: 
{¶ 26} “[Respondent:]  [Y]ou are not going to put words in my mouth.  I 
am a lawyer.  You are not smart enough to catch me doing something dishonest.  I 
didn’t do anything wrong here.  You did. 
{¶ 27} “[Relator’s counsel:]  Okay.  Well, then, let’s mark this as Exhibit 
A. 
{¶ 28} “[Respondent:]  And, believe me, a complaint is going to be filed 
against you.” 
{¶ 29} Later, respondent’s deposition testimony left no doubt as to why he 
sent a copy of the April 12 letter to relator’s counsel and then said nothing about 
not having actually filed the grievance: 
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{¶ 30} “[Relator’s counsel:]  Tell me when you think you should have 
these people sign this [notice-of-no-malpractice-insurance] form. 
{¶ 31} “[Respondent:]  I think I already explained that before.  After I am 
engaged. That is what the DR provides.  Do you have a problem understanding 
that?  Or is that not the answer you want?  You want a convicting answer.  Well, 
you are not going to get one. 
{¶ 32} “[Relator’s counsel:]  Fair enough.  I want the truth.  That is what I 
want.  Now— 
{¶ 33} “[Respondent:]  You want the truth?  You have been hearing the 
truth.  All you want is something to hang me with.  It is so obvious.  All right.  I 
told you.  After I am engaged.  That is what the DR provides.  Do you understand 
that?  That is the truth.  You can’t handle the truth, can you?  That is not what you 
are looking for. 
{¶ 34} “[Relator’s counsel:]  You saw that movie, as well? 
{¶ 35} “[Respondent:]  Well, it applies here.  You want something that 
you can complain to the Supreme Court about me for.  Do it.  Do whatever you 
want.  And I am coming after you personally.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 36} From this evidence, the panel and board found that respondent had 
attempted to bully and intimidate his way out of the disciplinary process.  We 
agree and find that he thereby violated Gov.Bar V(4)(G) and DR 1-102(A)(6). 
II.  Sanction 
{¶ 37} To determine the appropriate length of any attorney’s suspension 
for professional misconduct, including any attendant conditions for a stay, we 
consider “the duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney’s 
mental state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.”  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 
266, 2006-Ohio-5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 44.  We weigh the aggravating and 
mitigating factors to decide whether circumstances warrant a more lenient or 
January Term, 2008 
9 
exacting disposition.  See Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In deciding on a sanction, we 
are always mindful that the disciplinary process exists not to punish the offender 
but to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and 
confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship and to allow us to ascertain 
the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio 
St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O'Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53, and Ohio 
State Bar Assn. v. Weaver (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 70 O.O.2d 175, 322 
N.E.2d 665. 
A.  Duties Violated, Injury, Mental State, and Case Law 
{¶ 38} In attempting to collect a clearly excessive fee from Hirsch and 
Joyce, respondent violated the legal profession’s duty to charge fees in reasonable 
amounts.  With his sham grievance against relator’s counsel, respondent also 
violated his duty to assist in the process that polices the legal profession.  Hirsch 
and Joyce suffered from respondent’s overbearing reaction to their decision not to 
hire him and their need to defend against his suit.  And until the panel hearing, 
relator’s counsel had no idea that respondent had not actually filed a grievance 
against him.  Moreover, respondent’s actions were meant to exact a toll from 
Hirsch, Joyce, and relator’s counsel rather than to advance legitimate claims. 
{¶ 39} As for comparable cases, neither respondent nor relator has cited 
case law for our consideration.  It seems that while we have sanctioned lawyers 
for charging excessive fees, taking legal action merely to harass another, or 
attempting to intimidate disciplinary authorities, we have not had a case 
previously that presented all three improprieties.  Sanctions imposed in similar 
cases are thus of little assistance in our review. 
B.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
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{¶ 40} Consistent with the board’s report, we find as aggravating factors 
that respondent’s misconduct manifested a selfish motive, showed an initial lack 
of cooperation in the disciplinary process, and caused actual harm to the victims.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (e), and (h).  Moreover, though respondent has 
since his deposition conceded that suing Hirsch and Joyce for $5,000 was wrong, 
he has remained staunchly committed to the notion that Hirsch and Joyce 
somehow took advantage of him, which does little to acknowledge wrongdoing.  
Respondent has also remained indignant toward the disciplinary process as a 
whole for checking his unethical conduct. 
{¶ 41} Against these improprieties, only one factor weighs in 
respondent’s favor – his lack of a prior disciplinary record.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a).  Respondent might have availed himself of BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g), which affords mitigating effect upon proof that (1) a lawyer has been 
diagnosed with a mental disability or alcohol or drug dependency, (2) the 
disability or dependence contributed to cause the misconduct, (3) the disability or 
dependence has been successfully treated, and (4) the lawyer is currently able to 
practice law competently and within ethical boundaries.  Respondent, however, 
vigorously denies any such disability or dependency. 
{¶ 42} In fact, respondent has eschewed any attempt to prove the 
mitigating effect of a possible mental health or substance-abuse problem, 
completely defying the findings of the psychiatrist appointed to examine him.  
Respondent insists that he suffers from no psychological or other health 
deficiencies because (1) the psychiatrist reported no mental illness and (2) a 
therapist’s report he submitted during prehearing proceedings supports that he is 
at low risk for having any dependency disorder. 
January Term, 2008 
11 
{¶ 43} It is true that Samuel A. Nigro, M.D., concluded that respondent 
did not suffer from mental illness.2  According to his August 2007 report, 
however, Dr. Nigro did find that respondent exhibited a maladaptive paranoid 
personality, and he suspected that this mental-health concern and possible alcohol 
abuse likely impede respondent’s ability to practice law within acceptable 
standards.  Though skeptical that respondent would do so, Dr. Nigro 
recommended that respondent be assessed further for potential problem areas and 
follow through with any recommended treatment plans. 
{¶ 44} We have no conclusive evidence that a psychological or other 
mitigating condition contributed to cause respondent’s misconduct.  Respondent’s 
lack of insight and combativeness toward Hirsch, Joyce, and relator’s counsel, 
however, is not at all consistent with the reaction of a reasonable practitioner 
under the circumstances.  Moreover, we are troubled that respondent has so 
strenuously resisted the possibility that his furious telephone call to Hirsch, the 
$5,000 lawsuit that he settled for $300, and his unwarranted threats to file a 
grievance are perhaps the result of disability or dependency. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 45} The panel and board recommended a one-year suspension with six 
months stayed under the conditions that respondent (1) consult with the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), enter into an OLAP contract to obtain 
whatever disability or dependency assistance he needs, and comply with all terms 
for the duration of the contract, and (2) complete a one-year probation under the 
supervision of a monitoring attorney, appointed by relator, to ensure compliance 
with ethical and professional standards of practice.  These conditions 
                                                 
2.  Mental illness generally connotes a condition more debilitating than a mental-disability 
diagnosis under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  Under Gov.Bar R. V(7)(A), “mental illness” has 
the same meaning as the definition in R.C. 5122.01(A) – “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, 
perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize 
reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.” 
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appropriately require respondent to address any possible disability or dependency 
he has and subject his practice to the rigorous monitoring, reporting, and other 
probationary restrictions imposed by Gov.Bar R. V(9). 
{¶ 46} We hereby suspend respondent’s license to practice law in Ohio 
for one year; however, the last six months of the suspension are stayed on the 
recommended conditions, with the one-year probation to commence upon 
reinstatement following the conclusion of the six-month actual suspension.  If 
respondent fails to comply with the terms of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and 
respondent shall serve the entire one-year suspension.  Costs, including those for 
the psychological examination performed in the public interest pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(7)(C)(1)(b), are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 47} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.  The board 
recommended that we suspend respondent’s license for one year and stay the last 
six months on conditions.  The majority accepts the board’s findings of 
misconduct and its recommendation for a one-year suspension with the last six 
months stayed on conditions.  I disagree with this decision because Jeffrey A. 
Catanzarite has practiced law for 28 years without any prior infractions and 
because this matter arises out of a simple miscommunication regarding attorney 
fees.  In my view, a suspension from the practice of law is unwarranted. 
{¶ 48} A panel of the board found several aggravating factors present in 
this case, including findings that respondent possessed a dishonest and selfish 
motive, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and refused to 
January Term, 2008 
13 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  The panel also found as 
mitigation, however, respondent’s lack of prior disciplinary offenses. 
{¶ 49} That a fee dispute sparked the Hirsch-Joyce grievance is clear.  
When respondent first spoke with Hirsch, he offered Hirsch a free consultation.  
Respondent claimed that he meant that he would not charge for the initial 
telephone conversation.  Hirsch and Joyce understood his offer differently.  They 
both thought, perhaps due to inexperience with retaining counsel, that their first 
face-to-face meeting with respondent would be free.  From this basic 
miscommunication came respondent’s furious telephone call to Hirsch, the $5,000 
lawsuit that he settled for $300, and his unwarranted threats to file a grievance 
against relator’s counsel. 
{¶ 50} We have no conclusive evidence that a psychological or other 
mitigating condition contributed to cause respondent’s misconduct.  His lack of 
insight and combativeness toward Hirsch, Joyce, and relator’s counsel, however, 
are not consistent with the reaction of a reasonable practitioner under the 
circumstances.  On the other hand, respondent has enjoyed a long and 
unblemished career in law, and this weighs heavily in his favor.  Moreover, 
respondent personally promised during oral argument that if ordered to do so, he 
would obtain a more decisive diagnosis as to any possible disability or 
dependency and follow up with any recommended treatment. 
{¶ 51} The panel and board recommended that respondent (1) consult 
with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), enter into an OLAP 
contract to obtain whatever disability or dependency assistance he needs, and 
comply with all terms for the duration of the contract, and (2) complete a one-year 
probation under the supervision of a monitoring attorney, appointed by relator, to 
ensure compliance with ethical and professional standards of practice.  These 
conditions appropriately require respondent to address any possible disability or 
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dependency he has and subject his practice to the rigorous monitoring, reporting, 
and other probationary restrictions imposed by Gov.Bar R. V(9). 
{¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, I would suspend respondent’s license to 
practice law in Ohio for one year but stay the suspension on the recommended 
conditions.  If respondent would fail to comply with the terms of the stay, the stay 
would be lifted, and respondent would serve the entire one-year suspension. 
{¶ 53} I respectfully dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Alfred E. Schrader, Patricia A. Vance, and David M. Lowry, for relator. 
Jeffrey A. Catanzarite, pro se. 
______________________