Case Title: People v. Castillolopez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S218861

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 6/2/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S218861 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D063394 
EMMANUEL CASTILLOLOPEZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD242311 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A police officer found a Swiss Army knife in a pocket of defendant 
Emmanuel Castillolopez‘s jacket.  One of the blades was fully extended.  
Defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of 
Penal Code section 21310.  Penal Code section 16470 defines a ― ‗dirk‘ or 
‗dagger‘ ‖ as ―a knife . . . that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that 
may inflict great bodily injury or death.‖  Under this definition, ―a pocketknife is 
capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon . . . only if the blade of the knife is 
exposed and locked into position.‖  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed defendant‘s conviction, ruling that there was 
no substantial evidence that the open blade of the Swiss Army knife was ―locked 
into position‖ within the meaning of Penal Code section 16470 because the knife 
could be closed simply by folding the blade back into the handle.  We agree that 
defendant‘s conviction cannot stand and therefore affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal. 
2 
 
I. 
At about 10 p.m. on July 29, 2012, San Diego Police Officer Bryce 
Charpentier stopped a car in which defendant Emmanuel Castillolopez was riding 
as a passenger.  During a patdown search, the officer found a knife in the front 
pocket of defendant‘s jacket.  Officer Charpentier testified that ―it was a 
collapsible knife, and the blade was in a locked, open position.‖  The knife was a 
Swiss Army knife with multiple blades; only the ―large blade‖ was exposed. 
Officer Charpentier demonstrated at trial how to return the blade to its 
closed position: 
―[Defense Counsel]  You took the body of the knife in your right hand; correct? 
―[Officer Charpentier]  Yes, sir. 
―Q  Put your left hand on the blade of the knife? 
―A  Correct, sir. 
―Q  Pushed the blade down into the body of the knife? 
―A  That is correct. 
―Q  Did you have to do anything to be able to perform that?  Is there 
anything you have to push on the knife or anything like that to be able to do that? 
―A  I have to use force to close it.‖ 
Cameron Gary, a supervising investigator for the San Diego County 
District Attorney‘s Office, testified for the prosecution as a weapons expert.  Gary 
testified that the blade of the knife was 2 to 3 inches long and had ―a friction, 
slash, spring lock.  There‘s many different terms for it.  I don‘t remember the exact 
term for this particular type.‖  He explained:  ―[Y]ou‘ve got . . . a fingernail type 
of indentation on the side of the blade.  So you can actually take your fingernail 
and pull out.  And you‘re going to feel some friction and spring tension.  The 
spring tension drops the spring mechanisms inside the knife that resists you from 
opening it.  Once you get past a certain point, the resistance releases, and then it 
3 
 
locks into place. . . .  [Y]ou have to overcome that spring tension and that friction 
in order to close it back up again.  That‘s what holds it in place.‖  Gary added that 
there was a ―kind of a clicking sound‖ when the blade opened, which meant the 
blade was ―locked‖ into position.  In Gary‘s opinion, every folding knife is 
similarly capable of being ―locked‖:  ―[T]here is no folding knife that doesn‘t lock 
some way because, otherwise, the blade wouldn‘t be able to stay in place if you‘re 
trying to impale something or to cut it.‖ 
Although Gary testified that, in his view, the blade was locked, he observed 
that he would ―have a difficult time punching through this binder obviously with 
this — without it collapsing.‖  When asked if he would describe a Swiss Army 
knife ―as a defensive weapon,‖ Gary answered, ―I would actually describe it as 
more of a tool.‖ 
On cross-examination, Gary again closed the knife and agreed with defense 
counsel‘s description that ―all you did was apply pressure to the blade and it 
closed.‖  He also agreed ―there are knives in existence where you have to 
manipulate the locking mechanism on the knife to be able to close the blade.‖  
Gary further agreed that the effectiveness of defendant‘s Swiss Army knife ―as far 
as stabbing is limited because should it hit something hard like bone, there is a risk 
of it collapsing on the user.‖  When asked whether he agreed that the knife was 
―primarily not a stabbing instrument,‖ Gary again testified that he would ―classify 
this as being more of a tool.‖ 
Defendant called as an expert witness Raymond Flores, who sells knives at 
a uniform store that caters to law enforcement and fire department personnel.  He 
described a ―locking blade knife‖ as follows: 
―[Flores]  It would be a knife that when it‘s expanded, it would lock into 
place, and you would have to press a release to collapse it, to make it fold again. 
4 
 
―[Defense counsel]  You would agree then, wouldn‘t you, that in order to 
close a locking blade knife, you would have to do something to unlock the blade? 
―A  That is correct. 
―Q  You can‘t just, by putting pressure on the blade, close a locking blade 
knife; correct? 
―A  No, sir.‖ 
Flores testified that defendant‘s Swiss Army knife was not a locking blade 
knife, because ―[t]here‘s no device that — once a blade is open, that you have to 
depress to collapse the knife.‖  Flores agreed that he would consider a Swiss Army 
knife to be ―a multi-tool or survival tool.‖ 
Defendant was convicted of a felony violation of carrying upon his person a 
concealed dirk or dagger and admitted that he had served a prior prison term and 
had suffered a ―strike‖ prior conviction for a serious or violent felony.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 21310, 667.5, subd. (b), 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12.)  He was sentenced 
to the lower term of 16 months in prison, doubled under the Three Strikes law 
based on his prior conviction, plus a one-year enhancement for the prior prison 
term, for a total of three years and eight months in prison.  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed defendant‘s conviction, holding that ―the 
phrase ‗locked into position‘ in section 16470 plainly means ‗firmly fixed in place 
or securely attached so as to be immovable,‘ ‖ and finding insufficient evidence 
that the exposed blade of defendant‘s Swiss Army knife satisfied that definition. 
II. 
A. 
Penal Code section 21310 makes it a criminal offense to carry ―concealed 
upon the person any dirk or dagger.‖  The origins of the statute can be traced to 
1917, when the Legislature enacted a statute that prohibited possessing several 
types of dangerous weapons ― ‗commonly associated with criminal activity‘ ‖ 
5 
 
(People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 544), including ―a blackjack, slungshot, 
billy, . . . metal knuckles, [or] bomb,‖ and carrying ―a dirk or a dagger.‖  (Stats. 
1917, ch. 145, § 2, p. 221; see People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328–
329 (Rubalcava).)  In 1923, the law was changed to prohibit carrying a dirk or 
dagger only if it was ―concealed upon his person.‖  (Stats. 1923, ch. 339, §§ 1, 17, 
pp. 696, 702.)1   
Neither of these statutes defined the terms ―dirk‖ or ―dagger.‖  Courts 
accordingly construed these terms in accordance with their dictionary definitions:  
―Dirk and dagger are used synonymously and consist of any straight stabbing 
weapon, as a dirk, stiletto, etc.  (Century Dict.)  They may consist of any weapon 
fitted primarily for stabbing.  The word dagger is a generic term covering the dirk, 
stiletto, poniard, etc.  (Standard Dict.)‖  (People v. Ruiz (1928) 88 Cal.App. 502, 
504; see also Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 329.)  The Legislature later 
codified the prohibition against carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in Penal Code 
former section 12020 (former section 12020), as part of The Dangerous Weapons‘ 
Control Law.  (Stats. 1953, ch. 36, § 1, p. 653.)  The terms ―dirk‖ and ―dagger,‖ 
however, remained undefined.  (Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 328–329; 
People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 850.) 
Whether a folding knife or pocketknife qualified as a dirk or dagger under 
the statute, as the courts understood it, depended on whether the blade ―locked‖ 
into place.  (See People v. Forrest (1967) 67 Cal.2d 478, 479 (Forrest) [an 
―oversized pocketknife‖ with blades that ―do not lock into place‖ was not a dirk or 
dagger]; People v. Bain, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 852 [a pocketknife with the blade 
                                              
1  
This provision was later amended in 1925 (Stats. 1925, ch. 323, § 1, p. 542) 
and again 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 753, § 1, p. 2120).  Neither amendment is relevant 
here. 
6 
 
open could be a dirk or dagger because the blade ―locks in place‖]; People v. Shah 
(1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 716, 718 [a ―long pocket knife‖ was a dirk or dagger 
because it had a ― ‗fixed blade‘ ‖ that could not be closed until the lock was 
―released‖].) 
In 1993, the Legislature undertook the first of several efforts to supply a 
definition of ―dirk or dagger.‖  In its initial effort, the Legislature defined ― ‗dirk‘ 
or ‗dagger‘ ‖ to mean ―a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard 
that is primarily designed, constructed, or altered to be a stabbing instrument 
designed to inflict great bodily injury or death.‖  (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. 
(c)(24), as added by Stats. 1993, ch. 357, § 1, p. 2155.)  But this definition 
―ultimately proved too narrow and too difficult of proof.  Prosecutors complained 
that ‗since we can never show that the primary purpose of a butcher knife, hunting 
knife, survival knife, ice pick, etc., is to cause death or great bodily injury by 
stabbing, we cannot obtain convictions under the statute,‘ even when the person 
was carrying the concealed instrument for potential use as a weapon.‖  
(Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 337 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) 
In 1995, the Legislature amended the reference to a knife or other 
instrument that is ―primarily designed, constructed, or altered to be a stabbing 
instrument‖ with a broader reference to a knife or other instrument that is ―capable 
of ready use as a stabbing weapon.‖  (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (c)(24) as 
amended by Stats. 1995, ch. 128, § 2, p. 504.)  The Legislative Counsel 
recognized that this change ―would expand the scope of existing crimes.‖  (Legis. 
Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1222 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1995, 
Summary Dig., p. 35.)  But this change, too, raised concerns — this time that the 
definition was too broad, rather than too narrow, particularly as applied to folding 
knives and pocketknives.  In response to those concerns, the Legislature amended 
the statute in 1997 to provide that a folding knife or pocketknife would qualify as 
7 
 
a dirk or dagger ―capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon‖ only if the blade of 
the knife was ―exposed and locked into position.‖  (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. 
(c)(24) as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 158, § 1, p. 778; In re George W. (1998) 68 
Cal.App.4th 1208, 1214 [quoting statute].)  The statute was later repealed and 
reenacted without substantive change as Penal Code section 16470 (section 
16470), as part of the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010.  (Stats. 2010, 
ch. 711, § 6, pp. 4146, 4150.) 
B. 
The version of the statute currently in force provides in full:  ―As used in 
this part, ‗dirk‘ or ‗dagger‘ means a knife or other instrument with or without a 
handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great 
bodily injury or death.  A nonlocking folding knife, a folding knife that is not 
prohibited by Section 21510,[2] or a pocketknife is capable of ready use as a 
stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death only if the blade of 
the knife is exposed and locked into position.‖  (§ 16470.)  The evidence at trial 
showed that defendant was carrying concealed on his person a pocketknife with 
                                              
2  
Penal Code section 21510 prohibits the possession, carrying, sale, loan, or 
transfer of switchblade knives with blades of two or more inches in length.  The 
term ―switchblade knife‖ is defined as ―a knife having the appearance of a 
pocketknife and includes a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or 
any other similar type knife, the blade or blades of which are two or more inches 
in length and which can be released automatically by a . . . flip of the wrist or 
other mechanical device, or is released by the weight of the blade or by any type 
of mechanism whatsoever.  ‗Switchblade knife‘ does not include a knife that 
opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of the 
knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, provided that the knife has a detent or 
other mechanism that provides resistance that must be overcome in opening the 
blade, or that biases the blade back toward its closed position.‖  (Pen. Code, 
§ 17235.) 
8 
 
one of the cutting blades exposed.  The question is whether that blade was also 
―locked into position‖ within the meaning of section 16470.   
This court‘s approach to questions of statutory interpretation is well-
established.  ―Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.  [Citation.]  Because the 
statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look 
first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.  
[Citation.]  We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation, but 
rather examine the entire substance of the statute in order to determine the scope 
and purpose of the provision, construing its words in context and harmonizing its 
various parts.  [Citation.]‖  (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 
1040.) 
The ordinary meaning of the word ―lock‖ includes to ―make fast‖ and, as 
applied in particular to mechanical devices, ―to make fast by or as if by the 
interlacing or interlocking of parts‖ — such as ―by the engaging of parts or the 
action of a restraint esp. friction,‖ as one might ―lock‖ the ―wheels of a carriage.‖  
(Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1328.)  The definition of ―fast‖ 
includes ―firmly fixed:  immovable or moved only with the greatest difficulty.‖  
(Id. at p. 826.)  On this understanding, a pocketknife blade is ―locked into 
position‖ if it is ―firmly fixed‖ in position by means of or as if by the interlacing or 
interlocking of parts.  While friction can be used in some circumstances to lock a 
device in position, the critical question is whether it has made the device ―fast‖ — 
that is, ―immovable or moved only with the greatest difficulty.‖  (Ibid.)  Although 
a blade might be held open in a particular position by means of friction, a blade 
that can be closed simply by applying pressure to the back of the blade has not 
been ―made fast,‖ and therefore is not ―locked into position‖ as the term is 
ordinarily understood. 
9 
 
This understanding is consistent with the more technical usage of the term 
―locked‖ in the context of knifemaking generally, and in construction of the dirk 
or dagger statute in particular.  As section 16470 indicates, folding knives come in 
locking and nonlocking varieties.  We explored the distinction between locking 
and nonlocking folding knives in our decision in Forrest, supra, 67 Cal.2d 478, 
which concerned whether an oversized pocketknife qualified as a dirk or dagger 
under the statute then in effect, which did not define those terms.  In concluding 
that the knife at issue was not a dirk or dagger, we noted that ―[t]he courts have 
only applied the section to instruments where the blades and handle are solid, or 
where the blade locks into place.‖  (Id. at p. 480, italics added.)  As an example, 
we cited People v. Shah, supra, 91 Cal.App.2d 716, which upheld the defendant‘s 
conviction for carrying a spring-blade knife with a ― ‗set lock‘ ‖ that ―opens by 
pressing a button‖ and could not be closed until the lock was ―released.‖  (Id. at 
p. 718; Forrest, 67 Cal.2d at p. 480 [describing the knife at issue in Shah as ―a 
dagger because the blade locked into place‖].)  By contrast, we held that the 
oversized pocketknife in question in Forrest was not a dirk or dagger because ―the 
knife folds like a pocketknife, and the blade of the knife when opened does not 
lock into place.‖  (Id. at p. 481.)  ―This,‖ we explained, ―severely limits its 
effectiveness as a stabbing weapon, because if the blade should hit a hard 
substance such as a bone, there is a grave danger that the blade would close upon 
the hand of the wielder.‖  (Ibid.) 
Other cases, decided both before and after the enactment of the present 
version of section 16470, have used the term ―locked‖ or ―locking‖ in the same 
manner.  (See People v. Bain, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 852 [jury could find the 
defendant guilty of violating the dirk or dagger statute where, unlike the knife at 
issue in Forrest, the blade of the folding knife ―locks in place‖]; In re George W., 
supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211 [folding knife had a blade that ―locked into place 
10 
 
when opened,‖ where, ―[t]o fold the knife closed one had to push a release lever to 
permit the blade to retract into the handle‖]; cf. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 332, fn. 6 [a defendant would not be guilty of knowingly and intentionally 
carrying a concealed dirk or dagger if a person gave the defendant ―a fixed-blade 
knife wrapped in a paper towel,‖ but told the defendant ―the knife has a folding 
blade that cannot lock‖]; In re T.B. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 125, 128-129 [multi-
tool found in student‘s possession on school grounds qualified as a ― ‗folding knife 
with a blade that locks into place‘ ‖ for purposes of Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a), 
where, ― ‗when the blade is open, certainly it is in a locked position, and one 
cannot move the blade‘ ‖].) 
As these decisions indicate, the essential difference between a nonlocking 
folding knife and a locking folding knife has been understood to be whether the 
exposed knife blade, is immobile, thereby preventing accidental collapse while the 
knife is in use.  (See Forrest, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 480.)  We presume the 
Legislature was aware of this usage when it enacted the present version of section 
16470 in 1997.  (See Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney (1989) 48 Cal.3d 602, 609 
[―The Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions 
construing the same statute in effect at the time legislation is enacted, and to have 
enacted and amended statutes ‗ ― ‗in the light of such decisions as have a direct 
bearing upon them.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖].)  It follows that when the Legislature referred to blades 
―locked into position,‖ it intended to refer to knives with blades rendered 
immobile, as by operation of a locking mechanism, rather than knives with blades 
that could be collapsed simply by folding the blade back into the handle. 
The Attorney General notes that, depending on the context, the phrase 
―locked in position‖ can also refer, less technically, to items that are ―secured in a 
rigid or fastened location,‖ but not rendered immobile.  For example, she observes, 
it is commonplace to refer to ―locking‖ one‘s knees, or ―[striking] a blow with a 
11 
 
[locked] wrist.‖  (Quoting Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 1328.)  
She contends that the reference to ―locked in position‖ in section 16470 should be 
read in a similarly flexible fashion in order to effectuate the statute‘s apparent 
purpose of ―criminaliz[ing] the carrying of such knives because — in the open 
position — pocketknives become readily capable of being used as a stabbing 
weapon.‖  She thus contends that the blade of a folding knife or pocketknife is 
―exposed and locked into position‖ within the meaning of the statute if the blade is 
―secured in the open position,‖ as by spring tension or friction, even if the blade 
can be folded back into the handle simply by applying pressure to the back of the 
blade.  
We can readily agree that the precise meaning of the term ―locked into 
position,‖ and the degree of rigidity involved, may vary by context; a locked knee 
is not rendered immobile in the same way as a locked door.  But as the Legislature 
was aware, while knees generally do not come in locking and nonlocking varieties, 
folding knives do.  Consideration of context suggests that by using the term 
―locked into position‖ in section 16470, the Legislature did not mean locked in the 
manner that a knee might be locked, but locked in the manner that a folding knife 
is locked — that is, locked so that the blade is fixed or immobile. 
The Attorney General‘s contrary submission would in effect make nearly 
every folding knife a locking knife, thereby rendering the category of nonlocking 
folding knives essentially a null set.  The testimony of the prosecution‘s own knife 
expert underscores the point.  In taking the view that the exposed blade of 
defendant‘s Swiss Army knife was ―locked into position,‖ he also testified that 
―there is no folding knife that doesn‘t lock some way because, otherwise, the blade 
wouldn‘t be able to stay in place if you‘re trying to impale something or to cut it.‖  
We are reluctant to adopt an interpretation of section 16470 that would drain the 
12 
 
statutory distinction between nonlocking and locking folding knives of any 
practical significance. 
Of course, as the Attorney General points out, the Legislature did not 
categorically exempt all nonlocking folding knives from the reach of section 
16470, instead providing that such knives qualify as covered dirks or daggers if 
the blades are ―exposed and in the locked position.‖  This could conceivably be 
read to suggest, as the Attorney General argues, that even the blade of a 
nonlocking folding knife — i.e., one lacking a means of rendering the blade 
immobile — can nevertheless be ―locked into position‖ when held in place by 
means of tension or friction, even though the application of ordinary pressure 
would suffice to collapse the blade.  Rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeal 
believed the more likely conclusion is that, by including an express reference to 
―nonlocking folding‖ knives, the Legislature intended to cover knives that, though 
designed without a locking mechanism, are ―altered in some manner to firmly fix 
or fasten the blade in an open position and thereby render the blade immovable.‖  
We need not here decide whether the Court of Appeal was correct or whether the 
language is better understood simply as the product of a drafting error.3  It suffices 
                                              
3 
As introduced, the bill that amended former section 12020 in 1997 did not 
mention nonlocking folding knives or pocketknives.  It would have amended 
former section 12020, subdivision (c)(24), to state:  ―A folding knife is capable of 
ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death only if 
the blade of the knife is exposed and locked into position.‖  (Assem. Bill No. 78 
(1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Dec. 18, 1976.)  Knife manufacturer 
Buck Knives suggested amending the bill to read:  ―A non-locking folding knife or 
a pocket knife is not ‗capable of ready use‘ within the meaning of this section.  A 
folding knife with a locking blade is not ‗capable of ready use‘ within the meaning 
of this section unless it is carried in an open and locked position.‖  (Chris Micheli, 
on behalf of Buck Knives et al., memo to Assem. Pub. Safety Com. et al., re:  
Assem. Bill No. 78 (1997-1998) Mar. 17, 1997, p. 5, italics omitted.)  The bill was 
thereafter amended to add the current language:  ―A nonlocking folding knife, a 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
13 
 
to note that either explanation is more plausible than the Attorney General‘s 
submission, which would require us to draw the unlikely conclusion that the 
Legislature used the term ―lock‖ to mean two different things in the very same 
sentence.  (Cf. People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1125 [― ‗[I]t is 
generally presumed that when a word is used in a particular sense in one part of a 
statute, it is intended to have the same meaning if it appears in another part of the 
same statute.‘ ‖].) 
Consideration of statutory purpose does not persuade us that, as the 
Attorney General contends, the reference to ―locked into position‖ must be read in 
a less ― ‗literal‘ ‖ manner.  As the Attorney General says, the 1995 amendment to 
the ―dirk or dagger‖ definition was designed to broaden the reach of the statute by 
covering knives or other instruments that are ―capable of ready use as . . . stabbing 
weapon[s],‖ and not only knives or other instruments specifically designed for that 
purpose.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 128, § 2, p. 504.)  But the purpose of the 1997 
amendment, which added the language at issue here, was to narrow the reach of 
the 1995 amendment with respect to nonlocking folding knives and pocketknives.  
The 1997 amendment thus expressly provides that a nonlocking folding knife or 
pocketknife is not ―capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon‖ unless the blade of 
the knife is both ―exposed‖ and ―locked into position.‖  (§ 16470.)  Had the  
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
folding knife that is not prohibited [as a switchblade knife], or a pocketknife is 
capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or 
death only if the blade of the knife is exposed and locked into position.‖  (Assem. 
Bill No. 78 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 17, 1997.) 
14 
 
 
Legislature intended to cover all folding knives and pocketknives that are carried 
in a way that makes it possible for the user to harm another, the Legislature could 
have required simply that the blade be ―exposed.‖  It instead required that the 
blade be both ―exposed‖ and ―locked into position.‖  (Ibid.)  The latter 
requirement is consistent with the understanding, expressed decades ago in 
Forrest, that if the blade of a folding knife is not ―lock[ed] into place‖ by means 
that render the blade fixed or immobile, the risk of accidental collapse ―severely 
limits its effectiveness as a stabbing weapon.‖  (Forrest, supra, 67 Cal.2d at 
p. 481.) 
C. 
In the present case, the prosecution‘s expert demonstrated that the exposed 
blade of defendant‘s Swiss Army knife was not fixed or immobile and could be 
closed simply by applying pressure to the back of the blade.  The blade therefore 
was not ―locked into position‖ within the meaning of section 16470, and the knife 
therefore was not a prohibited ― ‗dirk‘ or ‗dagger.‘ ‖  Defendant‘s conviction must 
therefore be reversed. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Castillolopez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 225 Cal.App.4th 638 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S218861 
Date Filed: June 2, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Albert T. Harutunian III 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Maureen M. Bodo, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck and Daniel C. Lawson for American Knife & Tool Institute as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Seiler Epstein Ziegler & Applegate and George M. Lee for Knife Rights Foundation, Inc., and Second 
Amendment Foundation, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, 
William M. Wood, Meagan J. Beale and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe 
Post Office Box 10790 
Southport, NC  28461 
(910) 713-8804 
 
George M. Lee 
Seiler Epstein Ziegler & Applegate 
601 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 979-0500 
 
Jennifer B. Truong 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 W. Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2224