Case Title: Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing

Citation: 

Docket Number: 40970

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 40970 
 
FRANCISCO SERRANO, 
 
       Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
FOUR SEASONS FRAMING, Employer and  
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE  
CORPORATION, Surety, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents. 
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Boise, April 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 88 
 
Filed:  August 22, 2014 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
 
Hammond Law Office, P.A., Caldwell, for appellant.  Richard L. Hammond  
  
argued. 
 
 
Law Offices of Kent W. Day, Boise, for respondents.  Kent W. Day argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission finding that Francisco 
Serrano failed to prove that the condition for which he claimed additional benefits was caused by 
industrial accidents occurring in 2004 and 2008 while he was working for Four Seasons Framing 
(Four Seasons). We affirm.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Serrano worked as a framer for Four Seasons from September 2001 through February 
2008. It is undisputed that Serrano was injured in two work-related accidents. The first injury 
occurred on January 16, 2004. Serrano was working on a roof at a construction site when he fell 
from a height of approximately fifteen feet, landing on the right side of his body and suffering 
transverse process fractures to his spine at L2 and L3 in addition to a fractured pelvis. Serrano 
also suffered shoulder impingement syndrome, which was the main source of his pain following 
the accident. His shoulder injury required surgery which was performed by Dr. James Johnston 
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on March 19, 2004. Serrano’s shoulder recovered well, but his low back pain persisted. In April 
of 2004, Serrano was still experiencing lower back pain, and Dr. Johnston ordered an MRI of the 
lumbar spine, which revealed mild degenerative changes and a bulging disc. Dr. Johnston noted 
that he thought much of Serrano’s “pain [was] from degenerative changes” but it was possible 
that Serrano had “a truly symptomatic disc problem.”  
Serrano was referred to a pain specialist, Dr. Sandra Thompson, who administered two 
epidural steroid injections, which successfully alleviated Serrano’s low back pain. On June 28, 
2004, Dr. Johnston concluded that Serrano’s condition was fixed and stable, and he informed the 
surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp. (Liberty) that Serrano had no permanent impairment. 
Four Seasons paid for Serrano’s medical care, temporary total disability (TTD), and temporary 
partial disability (TPD) benefits from January 16, 2004 through June 12, 2004.  
 
Serrano returned to Dr. Johnston in November 2004, presenting with severe lower back 
pain. Dr. Johnston’s impression was that the “MRI findings of degenerative disease with disc 
bulge/herniation may have progressed,” but were manageable. Serrano returned to work and 
ceased seeking medical care for his back pain by late 2004 or early 2005. In May of 2005, Dr. 
Johnston reviewed an independent medical evaluation of Serrano that had been conducted for the 
benefit of Liberty and reported that he felt Serrano’s “discogenic back problems (that were 
almost certainly preexisting the industrial injury) were exacerbated by the twenty foot fall that he 
took from the roof.”  
 
The second accident occurred on January 28, 2008, when Serrano slipped on ice and 
landed on his back. Serrano stopped working for Four Seasons in February 2008, and he first 
sought medical care for the second accident on February 4, 2008, presenting in the emergency 
room at St. Alphonsus. He was diagnosed with an acute myofascial strain and prescribed pain 
medication. Two days later, Serrano went to Dr. Joseph Verska for evaluation. Dr. Verska 
assessed sciatica, degenerative disc disease and a herniated disc.  On February 21, 2008, Dr. 
Michael Rothman performed an MRI and compared the 2008 MRI to the 2004 MRI. Dr. 
Rothman concluded that there were “[m]inor L4-L5 degenerative changes, unchanged from prior 
study” and “[m]ild/moderate degenerative changes [at] L5-S1.”  
 
Serrano went to Dr. Beth Rogers for an impairment evaluation on April 21, 2008. Dr. 
Rogers concluded that Serrano had a whole person impairment of 6% due to the disc protrusion 
at L5-S1. Dr. Rogers did not take into account the 2004 injury and did not review the 2004 MRI. 
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Dr. Verska referred Serrano to Dr. Timothy Doerr for a second opinion as to whether 
Serrano required surgery on his low back. Dr. Doerr saw Serrano on April 22, 2008, and assessed 
Serrano’s lower back pain as “secondary to his degenerative changes at L5-S1 greater than L4-
5.” Given the absence of neurological impingement, Dr. Doerr recommended physical therapy 
rather than surgery. 
  
 
Physical therapy did not alleviate Serrano’s pain, and he returned to Dr. Doerr on June 6, 
2008. Dr. Doerr ordered a discogram to determine if disc issues were responsible for Serrano’s 
symptoms, and if so, which discs were problematic. Dr. Sandra Thompson performed the 
discogram on July 16, 2008, and observed no pain at the L3-L4 and the L4-L5 levels. Dr. 
Thompson was unable to access the space at L5-S1 without irritating the nerve root. Dr. 
Thompson concluded that Serrano had “non-concordant pain, implying that his pain was not just 
discogenic in nature.” 1  
After steroid injections at L5-S1 failed to provide relief to Serrano, Dr. Doerr ordered 
another discogram in order to evaluate the L5-S1 level. The second discogram was performed on 
September 8, 2008, by Dr. William Binegar. Dr. Binegar noted that Serrano began to report pain 
and pressure at L5-S1 prior to the injection of dye at this level. When the dye was injected, 
Serrano reported “minor” pain and pressure. Dr. Binegar stated:  
I feel this discogram is indeterminant [sic] for determining if this L5-S1 disc is 
contributing to his pain. I felt Mr. Serrano was somewhat unreliable in his 
presentation indicating pain even prior to the injection of dye at this level. Also I 
will state during the entire injection process he kept asking which disc are we 
doing. 
After reviewing Dr. Binegar’s discogram on September 16, 2008, Dr. Doerr concluded 
“that it is unlikely that L4-5 and L5-S1 is [sic] contributing to any of [Serrano’s] symptoms.” Dr. 
Doerr found that Serrano was at maximal medical improvement, that there was no objective 
evidence upon which to impose work restrictions, and that Serrano had 0% permanent partial 
impairment. At this point, Liberty ceased paying benefits.  
 
Then, on October 5, 2008, Serrano was attempting to get up from his couch when he felt 
a pop in his back and immediately began suffering from severe back pain. He was taken to the 
hospital, and an MRI was ordered. Dr. Peter Angleton treated Serrano at the emergency 
department and noted that the cause of Serrano’s pain was “unclear” but seemed “to be related to 
                                                 
1 Non-concordant pain is pain that is inconsistent with a discogenic source. 
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lumbar disc disease.” On October 13, 2008, Serrano presented to Dr. Thompson, who noted that 
Serrano was demonstrating a “worsening of his initial symptoms since his accident” and 
indicated that she believed Serrano was now a surgical candidate. However, by April of 2009, 
Serrano was no longer considered a surgical candidate. Serrano returned to Dr. Thompson in 
October of 2009, March of 2010, July 2010, and February 2011, each time reporting severe back 
pain.  
 
Serrano filed a workers’ compensation complaint for the January 16, 2004, injury in 
December 2008. He began working for a landscaping company in 2009. After the parties began 
discovery, Serrano filed a motion for a protective order prohibiting Four Seasons from 
investigating Serrano’s immigration status. Serrano argued that being required to answer 
questions regarding his immigration status would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. Although the Commission denied Serrano’s motion, Serrano did not respond 
to Four Seasons’ discovery requests. Four Seasons filed a motion to compel and for sanctions. 
The Commission concluded that Serrano’s immigration status was relevant to his entitlement to 
partial permanent disability (PPD) and, due to Serrano’s failure to respond to discovery, the 
Commission denied Serrano’s claim for disability benefits as a sanction.   
 
A hearing on the case was scheduled for July 28, 2011. On July 22, 2011, Serrano filed a 
motion to amend the complaint to include his claim for the January 28, 2008, accident. The 
parties agreed to supplement their notices of exhibits, and Serrano filed a separate complaint for 
the 2008 claim, which was then consolidated with the first complaint and taken up at the July 28, 
2011, hearing. The post-hearing deposition of Dr. Doerr was taken on December 21, 2011. The 
parties submitted post-hearing briefs, and the case was taken under advisement by the 
Commission on July 26, 2012.  
 
The Commission issued its decision on March 20, 2013. The Commission determined 
that Dr. Doerr’s post-hearing deposition testimony was admissible and, after finding that Serrano 
was “not an entirely credible witness,” concluded that Serrano failed to prove that the medical 
condition for which he claimed additional benefits was caused by his industrial accidents. 
Serrano timely appealed. On June 18, 2013, Serrano filed an objection to the agency record and 
moved to augment the agency record under I.A.R. 28 and 29(a). This motion was denied in part 
on July 8, 2013.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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“When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free 
review over the Commission’s conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission’s factual 
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Knowlton v. Wood River 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.3d 36, 41 (2011) (citing I.C. § 72–732). “Substantial and 
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion.” McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 584–85, 272 P.3d 554, 556–57 
(2012) (quoting Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 
(2003)). This Court will not re-weigh the evidence and “[t]he Commission’s conclusions 
regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous.” Knowlton, 151 Idaho at 140, 254 P.3d at 41.  
This Court reviews the Commission’s decisions regarding the admission of evidence and 
the settlement of the record on appeal for an abuse of discretion.  
 
A three-part test is used when reviewing whether the Commission abused 
its discretion. This Court determines: “(1) whether the Commission correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason.”  
Fonseca v. Corral Agric., Inc., 156 Idaho 142, 147, 321 P.3d 692, 697 (2014) (quoting Flowers 
v. Shenango Screenprinting, Inc., 150 Idaho 295, 297, 246 P.3d 668, 670 (2010)). 
III. ANALYSIS  
A. The Commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting the post-hearing testimony of 
Dr. Doerr.  
In his post-hearing deposition, Dr. Doerr opined that Serrano’s condition was caused by 
pre-existing degenerative conditions. Serrano objected to the admissibility of this testimony, 
arguing that Dr. Doerr’s opinion was beyond the scope of discovery provided to him. The 
Commission disagreed and concluded that “Dr. Doerr was properly disclosed” in April of 2009 
and that Dr. Doerr could testify as to Serrano’s “alleged injury, medical condition, diagnosis, 
prognosis” and his medical opinion based on evidence that was already admitted into evidence.  
On appeal, Serrano advances two arguments regarding the admissibility of Dr. Doerr’s 
testimony. First, he argues that Four Seasons’ Second Motion to Enlarge the Period for Taking 
Dr. Doerr’s post-hearing deposition was untimely because it was filed after the expiration of the 
original period for taking the deposition under J.R.P. 10(E)(3).  
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This Court reviews the Commission’s decision to allow post-hearing deposition 
testimony for an abuse of discretion. Cantu v. J.R. Simplot Co., 121 Idaho 585, 587, 826 P.2d 
1297, 1299 (1992). The Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers’ 
Compensation Law provide that after the conclusion of the hearing, “the record shall remain 
open for the submission of expert testimony through post-hearing deposition.” J.R.P. 10(E)(1). 
Notices of depositions must be filed “not later than 10 days prior to the hearing.” Id. All post-
hearing depositions submitted on behalf of the defendant “must be taken no later than 28 days 
after the conclusion of the hearing.” J.R.P. 10(E)(3). However, “upon the filing of a motion 
showing good cause,” the Commission may extend “the time limits within which to notice or 
take post-hearing depositions” so long as the motion or stipulation to extend the time period is 
“submitted to the Commission for its approval prior to the expiration of the original period” and 
sets forth “reasonable grounds” for the extension. Id.  
Here, Four Seasons filed its notice to take the post-hearing deposition of Dr. Doerr on 
July 26, 2011. Although this notice was filed only two days prior to the hearing date, Serrano 
agreed to the late filing after Four Seasons agreed to address Serrano’s 2008 claim for the fall on 
the ice at the upcoming hearing. The post-hearing deposition was set for August 18, 2011, within 
the twenty-eight day limit. Due to scheduling conflicts, the deposition was rescheduled for 
October 20, 2011, and Serrano agreed to this extension. On October 25, 2011, Four Seasons filed 
a second motion to enlarge the period for taking the post-hearing deposition. Four Seasons 
indicated in its motion that Serrano was contacted and gave his approval to reschedule the 
deposition to December 1, 2011. The Commission granted the extension finding Four Seasons 
demonstrated good cause to extend the time for taking the deposition and because Serrano 
stipulated to the filing.  
The motion to enlarge the period for taking the deposition was untimely. However, when 
reviewing the decision of the Commission, this Court is “limited to the evidence, theories and 
arguments” that were presented to the Commission below. Obenchain v. McAlvain Const., Inc., 
143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) (quoting State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 469, 872 
P.2d 728, 731 (Ct. App. 1994)). Consequently, we “will not consider arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal.” Locker v. How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 701, 263 P.3d 750, 755 (2011). 
Serrano did not raise his current contention that Dr. Doerr’s deposition was untimely under 
J.R.P. 10(E)(3) before the Commission, and the Commission was never informed of Serrano’s 
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claim that he did not stipulate to the late filing of the second motion to enlarge time. The record 
before this Court reflects only that Serrano agreed to the late filing, and there is nothing therein 
that supports Serrano’s current claim to the contrary.2 Thus, we can find no error in the 
consideration of Dr. Doerr’s post-hearing deposition testimony based on the untimely motion to 
enlarge time.  
Serrano’s second argument is that Dr. Doerr’s post-hearing deposition testimony is 
inadmissible under I.R.C.P. 26 because Four Seasons failed to properly disclose Dr. Doerr’s 
opinions. Four Seasons responds that Dr. Doerr’s deposition testimony simply expanded upon 
the medical evidence already in the record at the time of the hearing with regard to Serrano’s 
pre-existing conditions and that Dr. Doerr’s opinions were properly disclosed. 
Procedural matters relating to discovery are governed by the appropriate provisions of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than the Commission’s own Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. J.R.P. 7(C). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26 imposes a duty to “supplement 
responses to discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert’s testimony” 
when the testimony has altered from the initial disclosure. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 
874, 136 P.3d 338, 345 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 
(2002)); I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1). Nevertheless, the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under 
Idaho Workers’ Compensation Law specifically address the use and proper scope of post-hearing 
depositions. In particular, J.R.P. 10(E)(4) provides:  
Unless the Commission, for good cause shown, shall otherwise order at or 
before the hearing, the evidence presented by post-hearing deposition shall be 
evidence known by or available to the party at the time of the hearing and shall 
not include evidence developed, manufactured, or discovered following the 
hearing. Experts testifying post-hearing may base an opinion on exhibits and 
evidence admitted at hearing as well as on expert testimony developed in post-
hearing depositions. 
In Watson v. Joslin Millwork, Inc., 149 Idaho 850, 858, 243 P.3d 666, 674 (2010), this Court 
explained that an expert’s opinion provided at a post-hearing deposition may expand upon the 
previous disclosure so long as the expert’s addition of detail is consistent with the opinions that 
                                                 
2 Serrano did attach a letter from his attorney to opposing counsel, dated October 25, 2011, in which his attorney 
indicated that he could not stipulate to the motion to enlarge time. This letter “is not contained within the agency 
record and thus is not part of the appellate record before this Court.” Simpson v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab Of 
Midland L.P., 150 Idaho 154, 156 n.1, 244 P.3d 1240, 1242 n.1 (2010) (citing Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty’s Duro–
Bilt Generator, Inc., 147 Idaho 56, 59, 205 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009); State ex rel. Ohman v. Ivan H. Talbot Family 
Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 827, 820 P.2d 695, 697 (1991).  
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had been previously disclosed. We review the Commission’s decision whether to exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion, Fonseca v. Corral Agric., Inc., 156 Idaho 142, 148, 321 P.3d 
692, 698 (2014), which is the same standard we apply when reviewing a trial court’s 
determination whether to exclude testimony for a failure to properly supplement disclosures. See 
City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 453, 299 P.3d 232, 260 (2013). 
 
Here, the Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, explicitly stating 
in its opinion and order that the decision to exclude expert testimony was committed to its 
discretion. Further, the Commission acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with I.R.C.P. 26 and J.R.P. 10(E). Dr. Doerr was disclosed as a potential witness in Four 
Seasons’ answers to Serrano’s first set of interrogatories, filed in April of 2009. Four Seasons 
responded that Dr. Doerr was a potential witness who “may be called to testify to any matters at 
issue, including, but not limited to Claimant’s alleged injury, medical condition, diagnosis, 
prognosis, and opinions.” Further, Dr. Doerr indicated the presence of a pre-existing condition in 
his 2008 records and these records were admitted at the hearing. Specifically, Dr. Doerr’s 
medical progress notes contained the following statement: “I suspect that [Serrano’s] low back 
pain is secondary to his degenerative changes . . . .” Finally, the Commission’s decision was 
reached by the exercise of reason and consistent with applicable legal standards. The 
Commission noted our holding in Watson, Dr. Doerr’s progress notes that we have just 
described, and concluded that his “testimony complies with the admissibility standards described 
by the court in Watson.”  We are unable to conclude that the Commission abused its discretion 
by admitting and considering Dr. Doerr’s post-hearing deposition testimony.3  
B. The Commission did not err in partially denying Serrano’s motion to augment the 
agency record on appeal. 
Serrano argues that the Commission abused its discretion by declining to augment the 
record on appeal with certain audio recordings. Serrano filed a motion to augment the record on 
appeal on June 18, 2013. Serrano requested, among other things, inclusion of all transcripts and 
audio recordings of all hearings and telephonic conferences for the dates of July 27 and 28, 2011, 
December 21, 2010, and August 12, 2010. The Commission concluded that “[t]here are no 
                                                 
3 We note that the Commission articulated an independent basis for its decision on this issue based upon timing 
considerations. The Commission noted that Dr. Doerr’s testimony related only to the 2008 injury and that Serrano 
had waited until the eve of hearing before seeking to add that claim to the issues to be decided at the hearing. The 
Commission expressed skepticism as to Serrano’s motive for objecting, observing that it appeared that Serrano’s 
objection was “based more on strategic considerations than substantive or equitable ones.” Our holding on the 
alternative ground for the Commission’s decision makes it unnecessary to address this issue further. 
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transcripts or audio recordings for the telephone conferences that occurred on July 27, 2011, 
December 21, 2010, and August 12, 2010” but ordered that “[t]he hearing transcript and exhibits 
will be lodged with the Court, as prescribed by the Idaho Appellate Rules.” The Commission 
also noted that “[t]he remaining items to which Claimant refers either do not exist or are not in 
the Commission’s possession.”  
This Court reviews decisions regarding the settling of the record and transcript on appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a) for an abuse of discretion. Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 155 Idaho 75, 
79, 305 P.3d 519, 523 (2013). On appeal from the Commission, there is no standard transcript, 
and the transcript must be requested by identifying the date and title of the proceedings. See 
I.A.R. 25(c). While “audio recording or audiovisual recording of testimony given under oath and 
played during the proceeding shall be reported by the reporter and included in the reporter’s 
standard transcript,” the Idaho Appellate Rules do provide for the inclusion of any audio 
recording of the hearing itself when the written transcript is included. See I.A.R. 25(g); I.A.R. 
31(a); I.C. § 72-710 (“A stenographic or machine transcription of any proceeding or of testimony 
adduced at any hearing, shall be taken by the commission.”). 
Here, the Commission explicitly addressed Serrano’s request to augment the record and 
included the transcript from the hearing on July 28, 2011, and ordered this transcript be “lodged 
with the Court, as prescribed by the Idaho Appellate Rules.” As to Serrano’s request for the 
audio recording from this date, the Commission indicated that it did not exist or was not in the 
Commission’s possession. Because the Commission reviewed Serrano’s request under I.A.R. 
29(a), it is evident that the Commission understood the decision to augment the record was 
discretionary. The Commission acted consistently with the rules governing the creation and 
augmentation of the record on appeal and through the exercise of reason by including the only 
transcript requested that was in existence. As we recently noted in a different appeal pursued by 
Serrano’s attorney, the Commission does not “have the obligation—much less the ability—to 
include that which does not exist.” Fonseca, 156 Idaho at 148, 321 P.3d at 698. For these 
reasons, we hold that Serrano has failed to demonstrate that the Commission abused its 
discretion by partially denying his motion to augment the record.  
C. There is substantial and competent evidence supporting the Commission’s conclusion 
that Serrano failed to prove causation. 
The issues to be decided at the July 28, 2011 hearing were whether Serrano was entitled 
to additional TPD and TTD benefits, whether Serrano was entitled to additional medical care 
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pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-432, and whether Serrano was entitled to permanent partial 
impairment benefits. However, the Commission did not reach these issues after concluding that 
Serrano failed to prove that the condition for which he claimed benefits was caused by either his 
2004 or 2008 industrial accidents. Serrano argues that there is insufficient evidence to support 
the Commission’s conclusion regarding causation based on the erroneous inclusion of Dr. 
Doerr’s post-hearing testimony.4 Four Seasons argues that the only evidence to support 
Serrano’s claim to additional benefits are his subjective complaints which were not entirely 
credible.  
 
“The claimant in a worker’s compensation case carries the burden of proving that the 
condition for which compensation is sought is causally related to an industrial accident.” Duncan 
v. Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 203, 998 P.2d 1115, 1116 (2000). In fact, “causation is an 
issue whenever entitlement to benefits is at question.” Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 
601, 272 P.3d 569, 573 (2012). The proof required is “a reasonable degree of medical 
probability” that the claimant’s “injury was caused by an industrial accident.” Anderson v. 
Harper’s Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006). “The Commission may not 
decide causation without opinion evidence from a medical expert.” Id. In determining causation, 
it is the role of the Commission “to determine the weight and credibility of testimony and to 
resolve conflicting interpretations of testimony,” and as such, this Court does not “conduct a de 
novo review of the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion 
from the evidence presented.” Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 565, 130 P.3d 
1097, 1103 (2006). Because the Commission is the factfinder, this Court will not disturb 
conclusions of credibility “unless such conclusions are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 566, 130 P.3d at 
1104.  
 
Here, Serrano seeks benefits for medical costs incurred after Four Seasons ceased paying 
benefits in 2008 and for TTD and TPD benefits from September 2008 through March 2012, 
arguing that his continued pain is a result of an injury to a spinal disc caused by his accident in 
2004 that was aggravated by his accident in 2008. The Commission relied upon the opinion of 
Dr. Johnston, Serrano’s treating physician, who noted that after Serrano’s 2004 accident the MRI 
showed mild degenerative changes and a herniated disc. Dr. Johnston opined that Serrano’s back 
                                                 
4 Serrano devotes three paragraphs of his 51-page opening brief to his thrice-repeated claim that he met his burden 
of proving causation. Nowhere does he attempt to identify evidence in the record that supports this assertion.  
11 
 
problems were “almost certainly preexisting the industrial injury” but were “exacerbated by the 
twenty foot fall” he took in 2004. Dr. Johnston did not explain the extent to which the fall 
exacerbated Serrano’s pre-existing injury, nor did he explain whether the exacerbation was 
permanent or temporary. Further, despite his impression of exacerbated back problems, Dr. 
Johnston expressed his opinion that Serrano had suffered no permanent impairment as a result of 
the 2004 fall. The Commission also noted that, after the 2008 fall, the second MRI showed no 
changes from the 2004 MRI. 
Although Serrano has not favored us with citations to the record supporting his claim that 
he met his burden of proving causation, our review of the record reveals that the primary 
evidence supporting Serrano’s claim of worsening symptoms was Serrano’s subjective 
complaints, which were unsubstantiated by the discograms, and given little weight due to the 
Commission’s finding that Serrano was “not an entirely credible witness.”5 In making this 
credibility determination, the Commission noted: (1) Serrano’s “troubling” behavior during the 
discogram conducted by Dr. Binegar; (2) Serrano’s claims that two physicians had recommended 
surgery, despite the absence of medical records supporting these claims; and (3) that “Dr. Doerr, 
Dr. Rogers, and even Dr. Thompson observed that [Serrano] reported symptoms that were 
inconsistent, non-concordant, or nonorganic.” We have no difficulty concluding that the 
Commission’s finding that Serrano was not “entirely credible” is not clearly erroneous.  
As of September 16, 2008, Dr. Doerr indicated that Serrano was at maximum medical 
improvement and that there was no basis to impose work restrictions. After the pop in Serrano’s 
back in October 2008, there was no evidence presented connecting Serrano’s pain to the accident 
other than Dr. Thompson’s notes reflecting her impression that Serrano’s pain was a result of a 
“worsening of his initial symptoms since his accident.” The Commission observed that “[t]hough 
it is certainly possible that [Serrano’s] disc herniation was caused or worsened by his 2004 
accident, it is not enough for [Serrano] to show that it is possible. He must show that it is 
probable.” The Commission found that Serrano failed to meet his burden of proof as to 
causation. We can find no error in the Commission’s decision.   
D. We do not reach Serrano’s constitutional claims.  
                                                 
5 We note that the Commission conducted the hearing itself, rather than referring the matter to a referee. This 
presumably is because of the nature of the pre-hearing motions and claims that Serrano advanced. 
12 
 
Serrano also raises numerous issues related to the Commission’s denial of Serrano’s 
motion for a protective order and the imposition of sanctions in connection with Four Seasons’ 
discovery requests for information regarding Serrano’s immigration status. The Commission 
ultimately denied Serrano’s claim for PPD benefits as a sanction for Serrano’s failure to respond 
to discovery directed at ascertaining his immigration status. The Commission concluded this 
information was relevant to Serrano’s entitlement to disability in excess of impairment. Serrano 
argues that the Commission violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by 
imposing these sanctions.  
In general, “when a case can be decided upon a ground other than a constitutional 
ground, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is necessary for a 
determination of the case.” Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 710, 791 P.2d 1285, 1289 
(1990). Because we affirm the Commission’s finding that Serrano failed to prove causation, he is 
not entitled to disability benefits.  Therefore, we decline to address Serrano’s constitutional 
claims.  
E. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Serrano requests attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 72-804, arguing that Four Seasons’ denial of his claim was without 
reasonable grounds. “Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under 
worker’s compensation law, but may only be affirmatively awarded under the circumstances set 
forth in I.C. § 72–804.” Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154 Idaho 633, 640, 301 P.3d 639, 
646 (2013) (quoting Stevens–McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 336, 179 P.3d 288, 299 
(2008)). “Idaho Code § 72–804 permits the award of attorney fees if it is determined that an 
employer or its surety contested a workers’ compensation claim without reasonable ground.” 
Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 761, 302 P.3d 718, 729 (2013). Serrano is not 
entitled to attorney fees because he was not entitled to compensation. Id. 
Four Seasons also requests fees on appeal under I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code section 12-
121, arguing that Serrano is simply asking this Court to reweigh the evidence submitted to the 
Commission. “Because the present action comes to this Court on an appeal from 
the Industrial Commission, the Defendants cannot be granted attorney fees on appeal pursuant 
to I.C. § 12–121.” Curtis v. M.H. King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 388–89, 128 P.3d 920, 925–26 
(2005); see also Clark v. Shari’s Mgmt. Corp., 155 Idaho 576, 583, 314 P.3d 631, 638 (2013).  
13 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the Commission’s denial of Serrano’s request for additional benefits and 
award costs, but not attorney fees, to Respondents. 
 
 
Justices EISMANN and W. JONES CONCUR. 
 
J. JONES, Justice, specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the Court’s opinion. The Commission’s factual findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and Serrano has failed to show otherwise. Indeed, only a 
minuscule part of Serrano’s opening brief was devoted to that issue. Almost two-thirds of the 
brief was directed at the Commission’s pre-hearing order that “the Claimant’s claim for PPD 
benefits shall be omitted as an issue on the claim currently before the Commission.” The 
Commission explained:  
Since Claimant has refused to provide Defendants with a response to discovery 
intended to ascertain Claimant’s immigration status, and since Claimant’s status is 
relevant to Claimant’s entitlement to disability in excess of impairment, an 
appropriate sanction for Claimant’s refusal to comply with the discovery order is 
the striking of his claim for disability benefits from consideration for so long as he 
continues to refuse to respond to Defendants’ discovery requests. 
Serrano devotes 37 pages of his opening brief to an attack on this order, claiming that it was a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights to require that he disclose his immigration status and 
claiming that it had no bearing on his entitlement to PPD benefits.  
Serrano’s counsel had no justifiable grounds for failing to answer Respondents’ 
discovery regarding Serrano’s immigration status. It is somewhat understandable that counsel 
would resist in light of the Commission’s decision in Jesus Diaz v. Franklin Building Supply, 
I.C. 2006-507999 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 20, 2009). A majority of the Commission decided, in 
effect, that an undocumented worker’s compensation claimant cannot qualify for permanent 
disability benefits because he is not legally eligible to obtain lawful employment in the United 
States. Commissioner Baskin concluded otherwise, filing a dissent worthy of note. It is unknown 
why Diaz did not appeal the decision in his case. Likewise, it is unclear why Serrano did not 
answer the propounded discovery, provide full details of his immigration status, and appeal to 
this Court in the event his claim was rejected based on the holding in Diaz. 
 
The immigration issue is not presently before the Court but, nevertheless, Commissioner 
Baskin’s dissent is instructive on the issue. In relevant part, he said: 
14 
 
The parties have conceded, and the majority has found, that Claimant is a covered 
employee subject to the provisions of the [Worker’s Compensation] Act under 
Idaho Code § 72-204, notwithstanding that his employment is “unlawful.” I agree 
with this conclusion despite the fact that there is some difficulty in ascertaining 
what the Legislature intended in crafting the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-204. 
That section provides: 
 
“72-204. Private employment – Coverage. – The following shall 
continue employees in private employment and their employers 
subject to the provisions of this law: 
(1) 
A person performing service in the course of the 
trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer. 
(2) 
A person, including a minor, whether lawfully or 
unlawfully employed, in the service of an employer under any 
contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, and all 
helpers and assistants of employees whether paid by the employer 
or employee, if employed with the knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the employer. 
(3) 
An officer of a corporation. 
(4) 
“Employment,” in the case of private employers, 
includes employment only in that trade, business, profession or 
occupation which is carried on by the employer and also includes 
any of the pursuits specified in section 72-212, Idaho Code, when 
the employer shall have elected to come under the law as provided 
in section 72-213, Idaho Code. [I.C., § 72-204, as added by 1971, 
ch. 124, § 3, p. 422; am. 2006, ch. 213, § 1, p. 688.] 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
With respect to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-204(2), there is some difficulty 
in ascertaining whether the language “whether lawfully or unlawfully employed” 
is intended to modify “a minor” or “a person.” If [a “person”], then the parties, 
and the majority, have correctly discerned the intention of the Legislature, and the 
provisions of the Act apply to all employments generally, whether lawful or 
unlawful. However, if the language in question is intended only to modify the 
term “a minor,” then the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-204 do not lend support to 
the proposition that the Act applies to all employments, regardless of whether 
they are lawful or not. 
 
If it was Legislature’s intent that the modifying language apply only to minors, it 
could have crafted the statute differently to make this clear. For example, the 
Legislative could have stated: “a person, including a minor lawfully or unlawfully 
employed, . . . .” That the Legislature intended the modifying language to apply 
to all employments, is also suggested by the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-212. 
That section exempts certain employments from coverage under the Act, such as 
casual employment, the employment of domestic servants, etc. If the language 
15 
 
“whether lawfully or unlawfully employed” was intended by the Legislature to 
only modify the term “a minor,” then Idaho Code § 72-204 provides no guidance 
on the question of whether other unlawful employments are subject to the 
provisions of the Act. This would have provided the Legislature with the 
opportunity to address whether other unlawful employments are exemption from 
coverage pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-212. This, the Legislature failed to do, 
which further supports the conclusion that the modifying language of Idaho Code 
§ 72-204(2) was intended to apply to all employees, and not just minors. For these 
reasons, I agree with the majority that under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-
204(2) Claimant’s unlawful employment is a covered employment under the Act. 
However, as developed below, I disagree with the majority in its treatment of 
Claimant’s status as an undocumented worker in assessing his entitlement to an 
award of disability benefits. 
 
Defendants argue that as a prerequisite to the Commission’s consideration of 
permanent partial disability, Claimant bears the burden of first demonstrating that 
the disability is, at least in part, referable to the accident [-] produced permanent 
partial impairment. I believe this is a correct reading of the provisions of Idaho 
Code §§ 72-423 and 72-425. However, Defendants further argue that since 
Claimant’s immigration status leaves him altogether unemployable in the United 
States, he cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that his loss of earning 
capacity is, in some respect, caused by his permanent partial impairment.  
 
[The Referee] accepted this argument, concluding that whatever accident [-] 
produced disability Claimant may have suffered as a result of his permanent 
partial impairment and related limitations is subsumed by the fact that he has no 
legal access to the labor market on a post-injury basis. Adopting [the Referee’s] 
decision, the majority reasons that if Claimant cannot legally work in the United 
States subsequent to the subject accident, then the physical impairment which 
would otherwise cause some additional disability is rendered irrelevant.6 
 
The majority opinion is premised on the assumption that Claimant’s lack of legal 
access to the labor market equates to an actual lack of access to the labor market. 
This, I believe, ignores facts taught by common experience, facts of which the 
Industrial Commission must take notice; a real and significant labor market exists 
for undocumented workers in this state. 
 
One need look no further than the facts of the instance matter to find the 
confirmation of this conclusion. Claimant, who admits to being an undocumented 
                                                 
6 It is tempting to search for an explanation for the decision to award Claimant 0% disability in the 
assertion that he did not apply himself to a job search after his industrial injury, and therefore his 
loss of earning capacity is entirely “volitional.” In fact, Claimant testified that he did look for work 
following his industrial injury, but that he was hampered in this search by his limitations. More to 
the point, if this case really is like Ruiz v. Blaine Larson Farms, Inc., 2006 IIC 0314, then the 
Commission’s lengthy discussion of the legality of Claimant’s employment in the United States 
would be unnecessary. Clearly, this case was decided not on the basis of Claimant’s work search, 
but rather on the basis of his status as an undocumented worker.  
16 
 
worker, came to the United States in approximately 2004. He lived in Phoenix for 
one year and found employment performing landscaping work. He then moved to 
Idaho, where he worked in painting preparation for about a year. In early 2005, 
Claimant applied for and obtained employment at Franklin Building Supply. 
Claimant testified that his immigration status has never prevented him from 
getting a job since he moved to the United States in 2004.  
 
In support of its decision, the Majority has held that in evaluating disability 
exposure, the Commission is limited to considering the injured worker’s ability to 
engage in lawful activity. The majority reasons that in assessing disability, no one 
would argue that consideration should be given to an injured worker’s ability to 
work as a hit man, or traffic in illegal drugs, even though such gainful 
opportunities assuredly exist. By analogy, neither should the Commission 
consider the fact that undocumented workers may be able to find gainful 
employment, since such employment is illegal. I would distinguish the hiring of 
illegal aliens for otherwise lawful work, from the other illegal activities discuss in 
the majority opinion. These “employments” are illegal due to the nature of the 
activity involved. The employment of Claimant is illegal, not because of any 
impropriety associated with the gainful activity, but rather, because of 
Claimant’s status as an illegal alien. In performing its assessment of Claimant’s 
disability, for the Commission to recognize that Idaho employers, wittingly or not, 
employ undocumented workers does not “offend justice, condone illegal activity 
and dramatically alter the meaning and evaluation of disability.”7 . . . . Indeed, I 
believe that to ignore the facts plainly before us, in favor of the fiction that illegal 
aliens have no labor market in this state, does more to imperil our obligation to 
fairly administer the workers’ compensation laws. Within the ambit of our narrow 
jurisdiction, the Commission must treat all facts relevant to the determination of 
Claimant’s loss of earning capacity. 
 
Idaho Code § 72-425 provides: 
 
“Permanent disability evaluation. – “Evaluation (rating) of 
permanent disability” is an appraisal of the injured employee’s 
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as 
                                                 
7 Although it is not within the statutory authority of the Industrial Commission to enforce the 
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), it is worth noting that the 
majority decision may do more damage to the policy behind that Act, and actually incentivize 
employers to continue to hire undocumented workers. If, as the majority has found, undocumented 
workers are not entitled to disability beyond impairment, one is forced to recognize that these 
savings will be enjoyed by someone, i.e. the employer, or its surety. Instead of discouraging the 
hiring of undocumented workers (if that is part of the majority’s intent in adopting the Referee’s 
decision) the decision actually provides an additional incentive to perpetuate the status quo. 
Similarly, it seems quite plausible that in specifying that the Workers’ Compensation Laws of this 
state apply to all employees “whether lawfully or unlawfully employed,” the Legislature actually 
intended to discourage employers from engaging in unlawful employment. See, Idaho Code § 72-
204(2). If those who are unlawfully employed enjoy the same benefits as the lawfully employed, 
then, arguably, employers will not enjoy any savings by virtue of the unlawful employment of 
another.  
17 
 
it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and 
by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430, 
Idaho Code.” 
 
As the majority has found, Claimant’s status as an undocumented worker must be 
included among those “nonmedical” factors which the Commission is required to 
consider when assessing the vocational impact of Claimant’s permanent partial 
impairment. However, I believe the majority erred when it concluded that 
Claimant’s status as an undocumented worker forecloses consideration of whether 
he has a labor market in this state notwithstanding his immigration status. The fact 
that undocumented workers are employed in this state is, as well, a nonmedical 
factor which the Industrial Commission must grapple with when assessing 
Claimant’s disability. 
 
How then should Claimant’s status as an undocumented worker be treated by the 
Commission in evaluating Claimant’s disability? Some jurisdictions that have 
addressed this issue have determined to evaluate the injured worker’s disability by 
ascertaining what employment opportunities would be available to the 
undocumented worker “but for” his or her immigration status. See, Gayton v. 
Gage Carolina Metals, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 346, 560 S.E.2d 870 (2002); Economy 
Packing Company v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 387 Ill. App. 
Ct. 3d, 283, 901 N.E.2d 915 (2008). Under this approach, the Commission would 
ignore Claimant’s immigration status and evaluate his disability under the 
assumption that Claimant is legally entitled to hold employment in the United 
States. The same criticism I have made of the majority opinion could as well be 
made against this approach; in both cases, the fact that Claimant is an illegal alien, 
and the fact that a labor market exists for illegal aliens, is ignored in favor of an 
all-or-nothing approach. 
 
An approach to evaluating disability in these cases that is more consistent with the 
humane purposes of the Act requires recognition of the fact that Claimant’s status 
as an illegal alien limited (but did not foreclose) his access to the labor market on 
both a pre-injury and a post-injury basis. 
 
Claimant is an unskilled laborer. He does not speak English. The vocational 
evidence adduced at hearing, and discussed in the reports of Barbara Nelson and 
Mary Barros-Bailey, suggests that Claimant is not possessed of education or 
transferrable job skills that would allow him to compete for anything but unskilled 
labor in the United States. Certainly, his pre-injury employment history in the 
state of Idaho supports this conclusion. As such, Claimant’s pre-injury labor 
market in Idaho consisted of those unskilled jobs which Claimant was physically 
capable of performing and which were available to Claimant, his status as an 
undocumented worker notwithstanding. 
 
Obviously, on a pre-injury basis, Claimant’s labor market did not include all 
unskilled work which he was physically capable of performing. Some of the work 
18 
 
that Claimant was otherwise qualified to perform on a pre-injury basis was 
unavailable to him simply because Claimant’s false documentation would not 
have survived vetting by some potential employers.  
 
* * * 
In conclusion, the statutory scheme anticipates that the Commission will consider 
all relevant non-medical factors when assessing disability in a particular case. 
This, the majority has failed to do. By failing to recognize that a labor market 
exists for undocumented workers, the majority opinion denies Claimant the 
compensation to which he is entitled under the Act. Claimant’s status as an 
undocumented worker should not, as a matter of law, foreclose consideration of 
the issue of disability. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK concurs.