Case Title: Brown v. Cleveland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Darryl BROWN v. Angela CLEVELAND

96-586                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 7, 1997


1.   Parent & child -- child-custody decisions within chancery
     courts broad discretion -- best interest of child primary
     consideration. -- The welfare and best interest of the child
     are of primary consideration in custody cases, with all other
     interests being secondary; child-custody decisions are within
     a chancery court's broad discretion; the deference to the
     chancellor is even greater than usual when dealing with child
     custody; there are no cases in which the superior position,
     ability, and opportunity to view the parties carry as great a
     weight as those involving minor children.

2.   Parent & child -- award of child support allows use of
     discretion -- chancellor not required to order support from
     noncustodial parent. -- While the plain language of Ark. Code
     Ann.  9-14-105 (Repl. 1993) provides for access to the court
     for purposes of petition and clearly authorizes the court to
     provide child support to anyone to whom physical custody of a
     minor has been given or relinquished, the statute does not
     prohibit the use of discretion in making awards of child
     support; it does not mandate the actions a court must take
     when presented with a support request under its provisions,
     nor does it require the court to grant such a request with use
     of such authoritative words as "the court shall" or "the court
     must."  

3.   Parent & child -- custodial parent had right to seek child
     support without legal custody -- chancellor did not abuse
     discretion in determining that best interest of child better
     served by appellant's first gaining legal custody. -- It was
     not an abuse of the chancery court's discretion to require
     appellant to seek legal custody before it granted child
     support where the chancellor noted that the father would
     likely be awarded legal custody and urged that notice be given
     and a hearing held for that purpose; even though appellant, as
     physical custodian, had a legal right to seek child support
     from appellee, the chancellor did not clearly abuse her
     discretion by determining that it was in the best interest of
     the child to effectuate a change of legal custody to appellant
     before ordering appellee to pay child support.
     

     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Joyce Williams Warren,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Child Support Enforcement Unit of Pulaski County, by:  Ann
Dodson, for appellant.
     No response.
     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     In 1995, Darryl Brown, appellant, had physical custody of
K.B., a minor child, and petitioned for an award of child support
from K.B.'s mother, Angela Cleveland, appellee, who had legal
custody of K.B.  The matter was heard in the Pulaski County
Chancery Court, tenth division, and the chancellor declined to
award child support, pending a hearing for determination of legal
custody.  Mr. Brown urges that the court erred in ruling that Ms.
Cleveland cannot be ordered to pay child support simply because she
is the legal custodian of the minor child.  We are not persuaded
that this allegation of error accurately reflects the ruling of the
court.  The real issue is whether the chancellor's exercise of
discretion was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
We find that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion, and we
affirm her decision.
     In 1987, Ms. Cleveland instituted a paternity action against
Mr. Brown, seeking to have him named as her daughter's father, and
seeking an award of child support and other relief.  When the
matter was heard in May of 1988 before Judge Joyce Warren, Mr.
Brown admitted that he was K.B.'s father, and the court so found. 
However, no award of child support was made to Ms. Cleveland
because K.B. was living with her paternal grandmother.  In 1989,
with the assistance of the Pulaski County Child Support Enforcement
Unit (PCCSEU), Ms. Cleveland again sought an award of child
support, but again the case was dismissed without prejudice because
she did not have physical custody of the child.
     On June 14, 1995, the State of Arkansas, Office of Child
Support Enforcement (OCSE), sought to intervene in the case,
seeking child-support payments from Ms. Cleveland to be effective
retroactively to December 12, 1994.  OCSE alleged that Mr. Brown,
as physical custodian of K.B., had assigned to it his right to
child support.  The matter was set for hearing on September 20, at
which time OCSE was granted permission to intervene.  Ms. Cleveland
was present, and the issue of who had custody of the child arose at
the hearing; but because Mr. Brown was not present, the court reset
the matter for December 20.  On that date, Mr. Brown was present,
but Ms. Cleveland was not.  The court advised Mr. Brown that he
could request a change in legal custody by a written motion, served
upon the mother, and thereafter a hearing could be scheduled at
which time custody could be changed based upon the testimony, or
based upon default if the mother failed to appear.
     On December 27, OCSE, the intervenor, requested findings and
conclusions to support the court's decision declining to make an
award of child support pending a determination of legal custody of
the child and referred the court to Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-105
(Repl. 1993) which provides in part as follows:
(b)  The following may file a petition to require the
noncustodial parent or parents of a minor child to
provide support for the minor child:   
     ....
     (2)  Any other person or agency to whom physical
custody of a minor child has been given or relinquished;
     ....
(d)  As used in this subchapter, unless the context
otherwise requires:
     ....
     (2)  "Noncustodial parent" means a parent who
resides outside the household or institution in which the
minor child resides.
Id.  9-14-105(b)(2) & (d)(2).  Clearly, the statute allows that
parent who has physical custody of the child to seek child support
from the parent who does not have physical custody; however, it
does not address the legal custodian issue raised here.  On appeal,
Mr. Brown, now represented by the PCCSEU, asserts that the
chancellor erred in ruling that Ms. Cleveland cannot be ordered to
pay child support simply because she is the legal custodian of the
minor child.  Mr. Brown claims that legal custody is not a
prerequisite to qualify for child support under Ark. Code Ann.  9-
14-105 or any other statute.  They claim the statute is "clear and
unambiguous" in granting child support to one who holds physical
custody only; therefore, the chancellor abused her discretion by
resorting to statutory construction.
     However, this assertion mistakes the thrust of Chancellor
Joyce Warren's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in
January 24, 1996.  In her order, after specifically pointing out
that in the 1988 hearings on paternity the mother had legal custody
but that no child support was ordered, Chancellor Warren stated the
following:
9.   Pursuant to Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
     Procedure allowing the Court to modify its Order
     within ninety days, the Court concedes that
     Intervenor's argument is well taken that the Court
     could possibly order support pursuant  9-14-105
     based on the fact that Mr. Brown does have physical
     custody and Ms. Cleveland would fit the definition
     of a non-custodial parent under that statute. 
     However the Court does not agree that it is
     required to set support on a request such as this
     given the fact that Ms. Cleveland has legal
     custody.  The Court has the authority to require
     the father to first effect a change of custody.
10.  In orders entered in cases of divorce or paternity
     adjudication, the Chancery Court retains
     jurisdiction to make all necessary future orders
     regarding custody, child support, visitation, et
     cetera.  It is not unreasonable or contrary to
     statute or case law to require a change of custody
     in this situation.  To rule otherwise, the Court
     would have to interpret this enactment to mean that
     a parent need not bother with changing legal
     custody of a child, but could simply obtain
     physical custody through whatever means and then be
     entitled to come to court and ask for child
     support.
(Emphasis in original.)
     The issue before us is not whether the chancellor erroneously
ruled that she was barred from awarding child support; she did not
make that ruling.  To the contrary, the chancellor correctly found
that she had authority to award child support if such an award were
appropriate.  The issue is whether in exercising that authority,
the chancellor may use discretion in determining that the need for
an orderly procedure for changing legal custody prior to awarding
support is in the best interest of the child and could reasonably
be required.
     It is well established that "[i]n custody matters the
unyielding consideration is the welfare of the children." 
Stephenson v. Stephenson, 237 Ark. 724, 726,