Case Title: Sherman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-18-3

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Patrick L. SHERMAN v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-183                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 30, 1996


1.   Criminal law -- order denying motion to dismiss on former
     jeopardy considerations is appealable. -- An order denying a
     motion to dismiss based on former jeopardy considerations is
     an appealable decision. 

2.   Appeal & error -- when trial court loses jurisdiction --
     filing of notice of appeal insufficient. -- It is the filing
     of the transcript in an appellate court or the placing of the
     sentence into execution that deprives a trial court of
     jurisdiction, not the filing of the notice of appeal; after
     the notice of appeal has been filed and the transcript has
     been lodged with the appellate court, the trial court loses
     jurisdiction of the case except for matters such as appointing
     defense counsel or correcting its judgment to speak the truth.

3.   Appeal & error -- when appeal divests trial court of
     jurisdiction -- independent matters remain within trial
     court's jurisdiction. -- The rule that an appeal divests the
     trial court of jurisdiction applies only to matters
     necessarily or directly involved in the matter under review; 
     it does not stay further proceedings with respect to rights
     not passed on or affected by the judgment or decree from which
     the appeal is taken; matters that are independent, or
     collateral or supplemental, are left within the jurisdiction
     and control of the trial court, notwithstanding the appeal.

4.   Appeal & error -- filing of interlocutory appeal on denial of
     motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy -- protection of
     defendant's double-jeopardy rights requires court to refrain
     from determining guilt. -- When a defendant has filed an
     interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss based
     on double jeopardy, although the trial court has jurisdiction
     to determine the defendant's guilt, to do so erroneously risks
     violation of the defendant's double-jeopardy rights; it is a
     matter of protection of the defendant's double-jeopardy rights
     and not a matter of jurisdiction that requires a trial court
     to refrain from proceeding to determine guilt. 

6.   Appeal & error -- interlocutory appeal -- Double Jeopardy
     Clause protects against more than just being convicted twice
     for same crime. -- The Double Jeopardy Clause protects an
     individual against being twice convicted for the same crime,
     however, the Double Jeopardy Clause is also a guarantee
     against being twice put to trial for the same offense;
     consequently, if a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to
     double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the full protection of the
     Clause, his double-jeopardy challenge to the indictment must
     be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs.

7.   Appeal & error -- trial court erred in proceeding with trial 
     -- interlocutory appeal should have been dealt with first. -- 
     The trial court erred in proceeding with appellant's trial in
     circuit court after appellant had filed notice of appeal from
     the denial of his motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. 
     
8.    Trial -- appellant forced to stand trial over valid jeopardy-
     based objection -- prejudice cannot be shown when the trial
     was for a charge that was not jeopardy-barred. -- When an
     accused is forced to stand trial over a valid jeopardy-based
     objection, it is not error for the state appellate court to
     reduce the conviction to a non-barred lesser-included offense
     because the defendant has not demonstrated prejudice;
     prejudice cannot be shown when the forced trial was for a
     charge that was not jeopardy-barred.

9.   Criminal law -- Blockburger test -- determination as to
     whether one or two offenses occurred. -- Where the same act or
     transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
     provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
     are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
     requires proof of a fact which the other does not; a single
     act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each
     statute requires proof of an additional fact that the other
     does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does
     not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under
     the other.

10.  Criminal law -- potentially overlapping offenses -- first-
     degree battery and aggravated assault are not lesser-included
     offenses of reckless driving for double-jeopardy purposes. --
     The offense of reckless driving requires proof of the actual
     driving of a vehicle; the offenses of assault and battery do
     not; the offense of first-degree battery requires proof of
     actual physical injury to another person; the offense of
     reckless driving does not; the offense of aggravated assault
     requires proof of creating danger of serious physical injury
     to another; the offense of reckless driving does not; reckless
     driving requires proof of elements that first-degree battery
     and aggravated assault do not, and first-degree battery and
     aggravated assault require proof of elements that reckless
     driving does not; therefore, first-degree battery and
     aggravated assault are not lesser-included offenses of
     reckless driving, and they are not considered the same
     offenses for double-jeopardy purposes.

11.  Criminal law -- whether punishments are multiple under Double
     Jeopardy Clause -- legislative intent determinative. -- 
     Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and
     determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the
     question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments
     are "multiple" is essentially one of legislative intent.

12.  Criminal law -- legislative intent clear -- fleeing clearly a
     separate offense -- felony prosecutions were not barred. --  
     Given the clear legislative intent expressed in Ark. Code Ann.
      5-54-125(b) that fleeing is to be considered a separate
     offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar appellant's
     trial or punishment; therefore, under the Blockburger rule and
     the Double Jeopardy Clauses, the felony prosecutions and
     punishments for first-degree battery, aggravated and first-
     degree assault, and fleeing were not barred.

13.  Appeal & error -- appellant's jeopardy plea with respect to
     felonies meritless -- although trial court erred in proceeding
     with trial without allowance for interlocutory appeal,
     reversal not required. -- With respect to all felonies,
     appellant's jeopardy plea had no merit, and, consequently,
     appellant could not demonstrate any prejudice from having
     endured the trial in circuit court; thus, although the trial
     court erred in proceeding with appellant's trial without
     allowing for an interlocutory appeal, reversal was not
     required because appellant had not demonstrated that the trial
     was for a jeopardy-barred offense.

14.  Criminal law -- collateral estoppel not a bar to criminal
     prosecution -- second required element not present. -- Two
     factors must be present for collateral estoppel to bar a
     criminal prosection: (1) both adjudicatory entities must be
     arms of the same sovereign and (2) a factual issue essential
     to the first verdict must be an essential element of the
     second charge; here, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was
     not applicable because the second element was not satisfied; 
     a favorable finding of fact is essential to a collateral-
     estoppel defense.  

15.  Criminal law -- res judicata defense not complete --
     prosecution and sentences for felonies not precluded by
     doctrine. -- One of the five elements of a res judicata
     defense is that both proceedings involve the same claim or
     cause of action that was litigated or could have been
     litigated but was not; here, the felony charges could not have
     been tried in municipal court because municipal court lacked
     jurisdiction of felony charges, thus, appellant's prosecutions
     and sentences for the felonies were not precluded by the
     doctrine of res judicata.


     Appeal from Clark Circuit Court, Ninth Judicial District;
W.H."Dub" Arnold, Judge; affirmed.
     Benny M. Tucker, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant, Patrick L. Sherman, appeals the judgment of the
Clark County Circuit Court convicting him of fleeing, first-degree
assault, and two counts of first-degree battery, fining him $10.00,
and sentencing him to a cumulative sentence of forty years in
prison.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(2).  Appellant's four points for reversal of the judgment,
which was entered pursuant to a jury verdict, relate to his claims
of double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.  We
affirm.  
     All four felony charges at issue in this appeal were the
result of a single incident occurring on April 4, 1995.  While
driving a stolen truck, Appellant tried to outrun the police,
ultimately driving through a police road block and causing property
damage to two vehicles and personal injuries to the driver of one
of the vehicles and a pedestrian.  As a result of this single
incident, Appellant was not only charged by information with the
four felonies at issue here, but he was first charged by citation
with four misdemeanors to which he pleaded guilty in municipal
court and was sentenced:  driving while intoxicated, failure to
yield to an emergency vehicle, driving without a license, and
reckless driving.
     Appellant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the felony
prosecutions on the basis that they were barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the Arkansas and United States Constitutions
and by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Appellant filed a
notice of appeal from that denial.  However, while recognizing that
an order denying such a motion to dismiss is a final order for
purposes of filing an interlocutory appeal, the trial court
proceeded with Appellant's jury trial.  Appellant then filed this
appeal from the judgment of conviction, asserting four points for
reversal.
                 I.  ERROR TO PROCEED WITH TRIAL
     Appellant's first point for reversal is that the trial court
erred in requiring him to be tried after he filed a notice of
appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss based on grounds of
double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.  At a
hearing on the day before trial, Appellant objected to his trial on
the basis that he should be allowed to pursue an interlocutory
appeal and that his filing a notice of appeal deprived the trial
court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The trial court recognized
that the denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy was
an appealable order, but stated that Appellant's motion for double
jeopardy had no merit and that the court did indeed have
jurisdiction to hold the trial because the transcript had not been
lodged in an appellate court.  The trial court also reasoned that,
because the case had been set for trial the next day and Appellant
had been a very unruly inmate causing damage to the jail facility,
and because the jeopardy motion lacked merit, Appellant would not
be prejudiced by going to trial.
     In support of his first argument for reversal, Appellant
challenges the aforementioned proceedings on three bases.  First,
he claims that because the denial of a double jeopardy-based motion
is amenable to interlocutory appeal, the trial court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed with his trial.  Second, he
claims that the trial court's reliance on an alleged ex parte
communication with the county sheriff about Appellant's bad
behavior in jail formed an improper basis for the trial court's
decision.  Third, Appellant claims that the denial of a double
jeopardy-based motion to dismiss is not subject to harmless-error
analysis, as the trial court stated, because of the very nature of
the right -- protection from subjection to a second, barred trial. 
We need not address the second contention because Appellant did not
raise it below.  Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728,