Case Title: Pullman v. Outzen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pullman v. Outzen1996 WY 128924 P.2d 416Case Number: 95-260Decided: 10/04/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Monte R. PULLMAN,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Kari M. OUTZEN, formerly 
known as Kari M. Pullman,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price, II, J.

Don M. Empfield, 
Gillette, for appellant. 

Joseph E. 
Hallock and Brian C. Shuck of Stevens, Edwards & Hallock, P.C., Gillette, 
for appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue 
presented in this case is whether appellee owes appellant a duty to clear snow 
and ice from the front steps of a trailer home. Concluding that the natural 
accumulation rule bars the imposition of such a duty, we affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
presents the following issues:

A.        Did the 
lower court correctly grant summary judgment to the defendant on the issue of 
causation where:

1.         The 
court determined that there was a single cause of the plaintiff's injuries while 
ignoring several causation factors asserted in the complaint and the plaintiff's 
deposition; and

2.         The 
only competent evidence on single or multiple factors was the sworn testimony of 
the plaintiff; and

3.         This 
issue was a genuine issue of material fact?

B.        Did the 
lower court correctly grant summary judgment to the defendant where she did not 
meet her initial burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of 
material fact?

C.        Did the 
court correctly rule that packed ice and snow on a set of steps built in 
contravention of the provisions of the Uniform Building Code pertaining to 
handrails, the allowable height of steps and the allowable variance between step 
heights, constituted a "natural accumulation" as defined in Eiselein v. K-Mart, 
Inc., [868] P.2d 893 (Wyo. 1994)?

D.        Did the 
trial court rule correctly in dismissing the plaintiff's second claim for relief 
on the basis that the "evidence does not indicate that the Uniform Building Code 
is applicable to the stairs and deck being used for access to the 
home"?

[¶3]      Appellee states 
the issues:

I.          
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee based upon the trial court's dual findings that: 1.) no genuine issues 
of material fact existed with respect to Appellant's claim that Appellee 
negligently maintained her steps; and 2.) that Appellee was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.

II.          
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee based upon the trial court's dual findings that: 1.) no genuine issues 
of material fact existed with respect to Appellant's negligence per se claim; 
and 2.) Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Monte R. Pullman 
(Pullman) slipped and fell on a set of steps covered with snow and ice. The 
free-standing steps led to a deck which rested against Kari M. Outzen's (Outzen) 
trailer home. The stairs, which had been built by Outzen and a friend, did not 
fully comply with the Uniform Building Code (UBC). One riser was eight and three 
quarters inches high rather than the maximum allowable eight inches. Further, 
the thirty-two inch high set of steps lacked a handrail. The UBC required a 
handrail for all stairs that were more than thirty inches high.

[¶5]      Pullman incurred 
injuries as a result of his fall and filed suit against Outzen In his first 
claim for relief, Pullman alleged that Outzen had a duty to remove the snow and 
ice from the deck and steps and that her negligent failure to remove the snow 
and ice caused his injuries. In his second claim for relief, Pullman alleges 
that Outzen was negligent per se in not complying with the UBC in the 
construction of the steps. His final claim for relief alleged that the steps 
were inherently dangerous in design and that design caused his 
injuries.

[¶6]      Outzen filed a 
motion for summary judgment which was granted. The district court concluded that 
Outzen owed Pullman no duty to remove the snow and ice, and that the UBC was not 
applicable to the steps. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the third 
claim for relief. Pullman appeals.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A.        STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
is proper, even in negligence cases, when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 517-18 (Wyo. 1994). In reviewing a 
motion for summary judgment, we view the record on appeal in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion and will accept all favorable 
inferences in favor of that party that can be drawn from the record. Id. 
(quoting Lynch v. Norton Constr., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 1993)).

B.        NATURAL 
ACCUMULATION ANALYSIS

[¶8]      In Wyoming, the 
owner or occupier of premises is not liable for injuries resulting from a slip 
and fall on a natural accumulation of snow and ice. Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 
868 P.2d 893, 897 (Wyo. 1994). Further, we have held that there is no liability 
when the dangers surrounding such natural accumulation are obvious or are as 
well known to the plaintiff as the defendant. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982). Liability attaches only if the owner or occupier creates 
an unnatural accumulation that is substantially different in volume or course 
than would naturally occur. Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 898. To prove that an 
accumulation of snow and ice is unnatural, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant created or aggravated the hazard, that the defendant knew or should 
have known of the hazard, and that the hazardous condition was substantially 
more dangerous than it would have been in its natural state. Myers v. Forest 
City Ent., Inc., 92 Ohio App.3d 351, 635 N.E.2d 1268, 1269 (1993).

[¶9]      The issue in this 
case is whether pedestrian packed snow and ice on a deck and the steps 
descending from that deck is a natural accumulation of snow and ice. We conclude 
that pedestrian packed snow and ice is not substantially more dangerous than 
snow and ice in its natural state. Therefore, we hold that pedestrian packed 
snow and ice is a natural accumulation and that an owner or occupier of premises 
upon which such an accumulation occurs is not liable for injuries incurred as a 
result of a slip and fall accident on that natural accumulation. Erasmus v. 
Chicago Housing Authority, 86 Ill. App.3d 142, 41 Ill.Dec. 533, 535, 407 N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (1980). The district court correctly applied the natural accumulation 
rule in granting summary judgment against Pullman on his first claim for 
relief.

C.        IMPACT OF 
THE UNIFORM BUILDING CODE

[¶10]   In his second claim for relief, 
Pullman insisted that Outzen's failure to strictly comply with the UBC 
constituted negligence per se. We disagree. This court has held, pursuant to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965), that a court may, under 
certain circumstances, adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the 
requirements of a legislative enactment. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 175 
(Wyo. 1981). However, if such a standard is not adopted the unexcused violation 
of the enactment may serve as evidence of negligence. Id. at 176.

[¶11]   The UBC violations alleged in this 
case are irrelevant because the natural accumulation rule eliminated Outzen's 
duty. See Wicichowski v. Gladieux V. Enterprises, Inc., 54 Ohio App.3d 177, 561 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (1988) (holding that insubstantial defects should not be 
actionable unless unreasonably dangerous and rejecting proximate cause arguments 
in the absence of a duty). Summary judgment was properly granted against Pullman 
on his second claim for relief.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶12]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.