Case Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr.

Citation: 2012 WI 103

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP566-J 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable David T. 
Prosser, Jr. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
The Honorable David T. Prosser, Jr., 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF JUSTICE ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 27, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2012 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP566-J 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable David T. 
Prosser, Jr. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable David T. Prosser, Jr., 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 27, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF 
JUSTICE ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER 
 
 
 
Before Annette Kingsland Ziegler, J. 
 
¶1 
This 
matter 
is 
highly 
unique 
and 
presents 
extraordinary facts and legal circumstances.  On June 25, 2012, 
Justice David T. Prosser, through his attorney, requested that I 
disqualify or recuse myself from the above-referenced matter, 
asserting that I am a material witness who was present at the 
February 10, 2010, and June 13, 2011, events that are the 
No. 
2012AP566-J   
 
2 
 
subject of the complaint.1  Justice Prosser has made essentially 
the same request of each of his six colleagues on the supreme 
court.  In State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, ¶2, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 
N.W.2d 175, this court concluded that "determining whether to 
recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual justice for 
whom 
disqualification 
from 
participation 
is 
sought."  
Accordingly, this decision addresses my individual position on 
my recusal or disqualification.  Nonetheless, each justice is 
presented with a similar fundamental issue.  
¶2 
The highly unusual issue each justice is called upon 
to decide is whether he or she, being a material witness to or 
co-actor in an alleged altercation between two colleagues, may 
sit in judgment of one or both of the justices involved in the 
alleged altercation?  The answer to that issue, for me, is an 
ineluctable "no." 
¶3 
First and foremost, my conclusion is dictated by the 
law on judicial ethics.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b) 
(2009-10),2 "[a]ny judge," including a supreme court justice,3 
"shall disqualify himself or herself from any civil . . . action 
                                                 
1 Supreme court justices follow a longstanding practice of 
recusing themselves without providing an explanation for the 
recusal.  Given the extremely unique factual situation and legal 
issue presented by this case, I depart this one time from that 
longstanding practice. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 For purposes of Wis. Stat. § 757.19, "'judge' includes the 
supreme court justices, court of appeals judges, circuit court 
judges and municipal judges."  § 757.19(1). 
No. 
2012AP566-J   
 
3 
 
or 
proceeding 
when 
one 
of 
the 
following 
situation 
occurs . . . (b) When a judge is a party or a material 
witness . . . ."  That rule is echoed by SCR 60.04(4)(e)4. of 
our Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that a judge "shall 
recuse himself or herself in a proceeding when the facts and 
circumstances 
the 
judge 
knows 
or 
reasonably 
should 
know 
establish one of the following . . . (e) The judge . . . 4. Is 
to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 
proceeding."4  Likewise, SCR 60.04(4)(a) directs that a judge 
shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding when the judge 
has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning 
the proceeding."  Again, the law leads me to the irrefutable 
conclusion that I must disqualify or recuse myself from the 
above-referenced matter.5   
¶4 
My 
conclusion 
is 
also 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
principles of fundamental fairness and the right to a fair and 
impartial decision-maker, a right that precludes a judge from 
prejudging a case.6  In our country and in our state, everyone, 
                                                 
4 The preamble to SCR ch. 60 instructs that the use of the 
word "shall" is "intended to impose binding obligations the 
violation of which can result in disciplinary action." 
5 Under far less dramatic circumstances than the one 
presented today, recusal is appropriate.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Ziegler, 2008 WI 47, 309 Wis. 2d 253, 750 
N.W.2d 710, in which this court deemed recusal mandatory even in 
cases in which no legal issues were in dispute; no witnesses 
were called; no trial occurred; no parties appeared; and no 
benefit could be gained by the judge or her family. 
6 Here, 
the 
justices, 
also 
witnesses, 
are 
intimately 
involved in the facts and have a keen interest in his or her 
version of the facts being accepted as true. 
No. 
2012AP566-J   
 
4 
 
even a supreme court justice, is entitled to a fair tribunal.  
Indeed, both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantee equal protection under the law.  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 1.  Under the 
highly unusual factual situation in the instant case, each 
justice is in the position to have already formed conclusions 
regarding the nature of the events that occurred on February 10, 
2010, June 13, 2011, and prior thereto.  That is, each justice, 
as a witness, has his or her own perspective on what occurred on 
February 10, 2010, and June 13, 2011.  As far as I am concerned, 
there is simply no way for me to separate my personal 
perceptions and fairly and impartially judge this matter.  
Because, at a minimum, the justices are witnesses and all 
justices are likely to be called as material witnesses in the 
proceeding, recusal is required.  Frankly, there is no need for 
a three-judge panel to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make 
findings of fact, see Wis. Stat. § 757.89, because the justices, 
the 
final 
decision-makers, 
already 
know 
the 
facts.  
Consequently, any findings of fact by the three-judge panel 
would be window-dressing at best.7   
¶5 
In the recent past, this court has employed the common 
law "Rule of Necessity" when deciding to adjudicate a particular 
                                                 
7 In a judicial discipline case, the supreme court need not 
heed the recommendations of the three-judge panel.  See, e.g., 
In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 
WI 61, 325 Wis. 2d 579, 784 N.W.2d 605. 
No. 
2012AP566-J   
 
5 
 
matter8 but has never applied the Rule of Necessity in a case in 
which the justices were also material witnesses.  Under the Rule 
of 
Necessity, 
"where 
all 
are 
disqualified, 
none 
are 
disqualified."  Ignacio v. Judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Given the unique factual 
situation of the instant case, applying the Rule of Necessity 
would produce an absurd result: even Justices Bradley and 
Prosser would presumably be required to participate.  Certainly, 
application of the common law Rule of Necessity should not 
result in the defendant, potential defendant, and the witnesses 
also sitting in final judgment of the case. 
¶6 
Unfortunately, some parties do not receive their day 
in court despite wishing to be heard.  For example, some parties 
are deprived of their day in court because the statute of 
limitations has passed, a court order has been violated, 
evidence is suppressed, or a myriad of other circumstances occur 
that have nothing to do with the merits of the underlying 
dispute.  Here, if a quorum of four justices cannot hear this 
matter, this may be one of those circumstances. 
                                                 
8 For 
example, 
each 
of 
the 
seven 
current 
justices 
participated in both Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Insurance 
Co. (Heritage Farms I), 2009 WI 27, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 
N.W.2d 652, and Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Co. 
(Heritage 
Farms 
II), 
2012 
WI 
26, 
339 
Wis. 2d 125, 
810 
N.W.2d 465, even though all seven were arguably disqualified 
based on the fact that former Justice Jon P. Wilcox was 
essentially a party to the action.   
No. 
2012AP566-J   
 
6 
 
¶7 
Justice is supposed to be blind, but justice is not 
supposed to turn a blind eye to the obvious.  An obvious 
conflict 
is 
presented 
by 
simultaneously 
participating 
as 
material 
witness 
and 
final 
decision-maker. 
 
Given 
these 
extraordinary circumstances, I simply see no legitimate basis 
upon which I could participate in this case.  Thus, I 
respectfully disqualify and recuse myself from the above-
referenced matter. 
 
No. 
2012AP566-J   
 
 
 
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