Case Title: Coletti v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Coletti v. State1989 WY 42769 P.2d 361Case Number: 88-96Decided: 02/16/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DIETER 
COLETTI, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 
 
Richard H. 
Honaker of Honaker & Hampton, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, and Roger C. Fransen, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Dieter 
Coletti seeks remand for resentencing before a different judge. The issue arises 
because the sentencing judge received an ex parte communication from a deputy 
county sheriff just prior to the sentencing hearing.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Coletti was charged in 
two separate informations with eight counts detailing various violations of the 
Wyoming Controlled Substances Act of 1971, W.S. 35-7-1001 through -1057. He 
entered into a plea bargain; and, on November 6, 1987, he pled guilty to three 
charges: Possession with intent to deliver marijuana in violation of W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(ii); delivery of marijuana in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii); 
and possession of marijuana in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(c). Other terms of 
the plea bargain included that the prosecution agreed that concurrent sentences 
would be appropriate in this case and that the prosecution would stand mute at 
sentencing. A presentence investigation was ordered and prepared, and it was 
transmitted to the district court on December 18, 1987. The sentencing was 
originally scheduled for January 8, 1988, but was continued until January 21, 
1988. A deputy county sheriff sent a letter to the district judge dated January 
18, 1988. On January 20, a copy of the letter was also sent to Coletti's 
attorney. We will not set the letter out verbatim, but it detailed the deputy 
sheriff's law enforcement contacts with Coletti and included references to 
suspicions and a conclusion that Coletti was "a major drug dealer in Cheyenne" 
and in the "drug business strictly to make money, as [his] `addiction' is the 
`money' not the drugs." Upon receipt of the letter, Coletti's attorney filed a 
motion requesting the deputy sheriff be reprimanded, the sentencing be 
continued, the letter be quashed and that Coletti be sentenced by another judge. 
The sentencing was continued, and at a hearing held on February 2, 1988, the 
district judge declined to reprimand the deputy sheriff who wrote the letter 
although he did transmit to the sheriff's office, via the district attorney, an 
admonition that such communications should never again be addressed to the 
district court and that the appropriate statutory procedures should be followed 
in all cases. At that hearing, the district court also specifically found that 
the communication was improper. He stated:

 
 
"It appears 
to the court that it is not authorized by statute to consider this letter in 
passing upon the sentencing, and I won't consider this 
letter.

 
 
"The 
question, then, the court has to answer is this: Can it fairly pass sentencing 
on this individual in the face of this particular letter?

 
 
"The law of 
evidence is always, at least in matters tried to the court, it is always assumed 
that the court can separate in its own mind those matters which are relevant and 
those matters which are irrelevant; those matters which are competent and those 
matters which are incompetent. And, therefore, based upon those legal 
principles, the court will not grant the motion for change of judge. It will, 
however, grant the motion to quash the ex parte communication. It will grant the 
motion for continuance. * * *

 
 
"I will not 
pass sentence at this time. I want to go back and review in great detail the 
presentence report, to see what that report shows to this court, and then I will 
be in a position to determine how this case should be disposed 
of."

 
 
Sentencing 
was then scheduled for February 12, 1988. The district court sentenced Coletti 
to two terms of eight to ten years and one term of four to five years, all 
sentences to be served concurrently.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant stated his 
argument in this court to be:

 
 
"A 
fundamental component of due process is a fair and impartial tribunal. In this 
case, after the entry of guilty pleas but before sentencing, an agent of the 
prosecution communicated ex parte with the sentencing judge in an illegal and 
unethical manner. This communication tainted the fairness and impartiality of 
the tribunal to such a degree that the trial court's denial of appellant's 
motion for change of judge and subsequent sentencing of appellant operated to 
deny appellant liberty without due process of law."

 
 
The State 
argues that the issue was not properly brought before the district court in a 
motion pursuant to Rule 23(e), W.R. Cr.P. and therefore the issue should not be 
addressed by this court. Under the circumstances presented here, we hold that 
the issue was properly addressed and preserved in the district court. The 
district court acknowledged receiving and reading the letter, and there is no 
question but that the communication was improper. Such a communication is 
clearly contrary to the procedures established by statute and rule. W.S. 
7-13-303; Rule 33(c), W.R.Cr.P. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct 
specifically prohibits a judge from considering ex parte or other communications 
concerning a pending proceeding. Canon 3A(4), Code of Judicial Conduct. In this 
case, we question the propriety of the judge reading the contents of the letter. 
In its very first paragraph the deputy sheriff announces that his intent is to 
communicate additional information to the court because the presentence report 
was not complete. The district court should have read no further, and perhaps 
this issue would have been defused. As much as we might deplore the deputy 
sheriff's action in sending the letter and the district court's action in 
reading it, we hold that merely because these acts might merit censure, they do 
not automatically require reversal and remand for resentencing. SeeState v. 
Lake, 12 Kan. 
App. 275, 740 P.2d 106, 111 (1987).

 
 

[¶5.]     Coletti contends that 
the trial court's failure to assign another judge to pronounce sentence violates 
his right to due process of law. He cites no authority for this proposition, and 
we have found none to support it. The relevant standard is this: A sentence will 
not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show 
an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play. Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Wyo. 1981); Hicklin v. 
State, 535 P.2d 743, 751, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 (1975). We recognize the rule that 
where a matter is tried to the court sitting without a jury, and in a 
circumstance such as this where the court is pronouncing sentence, a presumption 
exists that the court will not be misled or confused by what is irrelevant and 
is able to eliminate that which is immaterial from that which may be properly 
considered. See Salem v. Flowers, 26 N.C. App. 
504, 216 S.E.2d 392, 393 (1975); State v. Whaley, 512 S.W.2d 431, 435 
(Mo. App. 
1974); 89 C.J.S. Trial, § 589, pp. 373-74 (1955). In this case, the district 
court stated on the record that the letter was quashed and that he would not 
consider it in sentencing. He specifically stated that he would review the 
presentence report in reaching his decision. We perceive no possible prejudice 
where, as here, the judge states that the letter was not considered. 
SeeState v. Dogan, 150 Ariz. 595, 724 P.2d 1264, 1271 (1986); State v. Matthews, 
108 Idaho 482, 700 P.2d 104, 108-109 (1985); 
State v. Igo, 194 Kan. 550, 400 P.2d 968, 971 
(1965).

 
 

[¶6.]     Coletti refers us to 
Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1985), wherein this court overturned a 
sentence because of a perceived substantial failure of justice. He contends that 
the sentence given him by the district court is excessive in comparison to other 
similar cases and that an inference may be drawn that the district court's 
sentence therefore reflects the taint of the ex parte communication. Coletti 
does not refer us to cases with similar facts where lesser sentences were 
imposed. At the sentencing, the district court clearly stated what he considered 
in imposing sentence:

 
 
"I have 
studied this presentencing report in great detail, and I note that there is a 
history - an adult history of offenses. I see four offenses, the last one being 
1982. There is some indication that the '73 offense was pardoned. I see two 
offenses dealing with possession of a - one of them is possession of marijuana, 
the other one is possession with intent to deliver. Those go back to 1972 and 
1982. I see a charge of breaking and entering in 1974.

 
 
"There are 
three counts that are at issue today. One of them dealt with a transaction 
taking place October 29, 1986. The second one, another transaction dealing with 
that same date * * *. And a third one dealing with a count of August 15, 
1987.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"The 
question that I had asked myself is, in the face of the two transactions of * * 
* 1986, and the subsequent event of 1987 taking place in August, albeit 
possession, has this system done anything to get Mr. Coletti's attention, and 
would probation do anything to get this gentleman's attention? I think the 
record is clear that the answer is no."

 
 

[¶7.]     We can draw no 
inference from the above that the district court was tainted by the ex parte 
letter. He said he did not consider it, his enunciated reasons for imposing 
sentence are drawn only from materials which were proper for his consideration, 
and the sentence finally imposed is within the set statutory limits and, in our 
view, wholly consistent with the seriousness of the crimes of which Coletti was 
found guilty.

 
 

[¶8.]     We hold that the 
district court properly denied the motion for change of judge, and the judgment 
and sentence of the district court is affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., 
dissented in the result without opinion.

 
 

MACY, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶9.]     I dissent. Regardless 
of the judge's affirmative statement that he did not consider the deputy 
sheriff's letter, it appears that he did so. The form completed by the judge 
setting forth factors involved in the sentencing decision clearly shows that he 
attached great importance to the defendant being the leader of the criminal 
enterprise. Other than the letter, there is nothing in the record to indicate 
such.

 
 

[¶10.]  I would reverse and remand for 
resentencing before another judge.