Case Title: Forristall v. Ansley

Citation: 462 P.2d 116

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1969-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
462 P.2d 116 (1969) Frank L. FORRISTALL, Earl F. Forristall, and Earl F. Forristall, as Trustee of Forristall Trusts, L. F. Roark and Public Trustee of Lincoln County, Plaintiffs-in-Error, v. David L. ANSLEY, Defendant-in-Error. No. 22209. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. December 8, 1969. Rehearing Denied January 5, 1970. *117 Frances DeLost, George J. Francis, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Young & Young, John C. Young, Colorado Springs, for defendant in error. MOORE,[*] Justice. Defendant in error was plaintiff in the trial court and will be referred to as the plaintiff or by name. Plaintiffs in error were defendants in the trial court and will be referred to as defendants or by name. The action was brought to secure a judicial determination of the true boundary line between Section 6 and Section 7, in Township 16 South, Range 52 West, Sixth P.M. in Lincoln county, Colorado, as well as the true boundary between Section 7 and Section 12 in the adjoining township. In this court the question presented involves only the boundary line between Sections 6 and 7, no exceptions having been taken to the determination of the trial court settling the line as between the owners of Sections 12 and 7. The patent to Section 6 was issued to one Charles B. John in 1920 for 335.67 acres of land "according to the official plat of the survey of said land returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General." The defendant Roark purchased Section 6 on August 9, 1945, from Clara Allison, daughter of the homesteader John. The Forristalls received title to Section 6 from Roark on April 12, 1962. Section 7 adjoins Section 6 on the south and plaintiff Ansley acquired title to Section 7 on October 6, 1962. The complaint was filed on January 30, 1963. Roark was thereafter made a defendant as the holder of a deed of trust on Section 6 and the public trustee also was added as a defendant. Pursuant to statutory authority (C.R.S. '53, 118-11-4) the trial court appointed a commissioner to determine the boundary line between the two sections and to report the locations thereof to the court. S. G. Hillyer, a duly licensed engineer and surveyor, was named commissioner. He made a survey and submitted a plat and written report of the correct location of the disputed boundary line. The date of the report was July 15, 1963. Thereafter, by direction of the court, he submitted a supplemental plat and report containing additional information as to the manner in which the line which he established as the correct boundary was determined. The supplemental plat and report did not change the boundary as indicated in the commissioner's first report. Plaintiff was satisfied with the boundary line as established by the commissioner since it was a very close approximation to the line which he claimed to be correct. The defendants objected to the report of the commissioner basically and generally *118 because it was located by measurements from stones at the common corner of Sections 7, 8, 17 and 18 of Township 17 South, Range 52 West, Sixth P.M. in the intersection of two county roads and from a stone found at the common corner of Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 in Township 17 South, Range 52 West, Sixth P.M. (called the McKnight Corner). Both stones are at interior corners and not within the boundaries of Township 16 in which the line in dispute is located. Defendants also question the McKnight Corner being a government corner because it is marked with a rock buried in the road rather than by the pits and mound marking shown by the field notes as marking the common corner. These doubtless were obliterated when the road was built. The commissioner, in his supplemental report (Exhibit E), stated that from the appearance and markings he believed it was an original government stone set in the original survey of the township dated September 25, 1880. In disposing of the objections of the defendants to the report of the commissioner, and after hearing the testimony of numerous witnesses, the trial court included the following, inter alia, in its findings: *119 We have examined the three volumes of record and the numerous exhibits and have reached the conclusion that in the procedures followed in the trial court there has been no violation of applicable statutes of the State of Colorado, namely, C.R.S. '53, 118-11-1 to 12 inclusive. C.R.S. '53, 118-11-9 provides that: Without regard to the correctness of the starting point of the measurements made by the commissioner, there was ample evidence to support the specific finding of the trial court that for more than twenty years the boundary line between Section 6 and Section 7, as found by the commissioner, had been recognized and acquiesced in by the respective owners as the true line separating the sections. The commissioner being unable to locate a more acceptable landmark, commenced his survey as a point about seven miles south of the line ultimately located where he found what he said was an original government stone set in the original survey of that township in September 1880. Measuring northward from that point of beginning, at intervals of 5280 feet he found fence lines, or traces, indicating the correctness of his starting point and finally arrived at the point where witnesses testified that for more than twenty years the line had been acquiesced in by the respective owners of the two sections with which we are involved. Where such acquiescence is shown it is binding upon the parties and their successors in interest. Camp v. Winegar, 72 Colo. 160, 210 P. 64. The defendants called an expert witness who took issue with some of the material evidence offered by the plaintiff. In legal effect the argument for reversal of the judgment is that the trial court should have accepted the testimony offered by the defendants, and that as a matter of law this court must say that the evidence offered by plaintiff, construed in the light most favorable to him, does not support the judgment. We hold that the evidence sufficiently supports the findings of fact made by the trial court, and that no error was committed in applying the law to the facts as found by the court to exist. The judgment is affirmed. DAY, HODGES and LEE, JJ., concur. [*] Retired Supreme Court Justice sitting under assignment by the Chief Justice under provisions of Article VI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution of Colorado.