Case Title: Osborn v. Manning

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Osborn v. Manning1984 WY 90685 P.2d 1121Case Number: 84-5Decided: 08/17/1984RICHARD B. OSBORN, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

CLARICE LYLE MANNING, CLARICE ANN MANNING STARNES, THOMAS MANNING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD B. OSBORN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

CLARICE LYLE MANNING, 
CLARICE ANN MANNING STARNES, THOMAS MANNING, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Richard B. 
Osborn, pro 
se.

Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, 
for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant-plaintiff 
appeals from a judgment rendered against him after a trial to the court in an 
action seeking recovery from appellees-defendants of one-half of the cost of a 
partition fence and for damages occasioned by trespassing animals. 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Section 11-28-106, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"The owner of any lawful 
fence which is or becomes a partition fence separating the owner's land from 
that belonging to some other person may require the person to pay for one-half 
(1/2) of what it would or does actually cost to construct the partition fence. 
In case of refusal, the owner may maintain a civil action against the person 
refusing and is entitled to recover one-half (1/2) of what it would or did 
actually cost to construct that portion of the partition fence used by the 
person and costs of suit. The joint users of a partition fence shall contribute 
to the cost of maintenance in proportion to their respective interests and if 
either refuses to pay his share of the cost of maintenance, the other may 
recover maintenance costs in the manner provided for recovering the cost of 
construction."

[¶4.]     A "lawful fence" is 
defined in § 11-28-102, W.S. 1977, with specificity. For example, this section 
provides that one form of lawful fence is:

"A fence made of steel, 
concrete or sound wooden posts and three (3) spans of barbed wire not more than 
fifteen (15) inches or less than ten (10) inches apart, or two (2) spans of 
barbed wire with a wooden rail on top. Wooden posts shall be at least four (4) 
inches in diameter. Posts shall be set firmly in the ground at least twenty (20) 
inches deep, at no greater distance apart than twenty-two (22) feet between the 
posts or thirty-three (33) feet with at least two (2) iron or wooden stays 
between the posts. Stays shall be placed equal distance apart from themselves 
and the post on either side."

[¶5.]     Appellant's pro se 
complaint was divided into six sections by that referred to as "claims for 
relief," but which were actually six types of alleged forms of damages, i.e., 
wages, materials, legal costs, property damage, etc. The basis for relief set 
forth therein from which the alleged damages arose was a refusal by appellees to 
share the cost of a partition fence and damages occasioned by trespassing 
animals. Appellant so recognizes these to be his claims in his pretrial 
memorandum.

[¶6.]     Appellant filed a 
motion for summary judgment and two amended motions for summary judgment, 
attaching thereto a number of exhibits reflecting such items as costs of 
materials and labor for constructing a fence, indicating the location of the 
fence, and showing, through photographs, some grazing cattle and some wooden 
fence posts in place.

[¶7.]     Appellee Thomas Manning 
also filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit setting forth 
the fact that the fence constructed by appellant was not a lawful fence in that 
the spacing of the wires was improper; contesting the claimed cost of 
construction in that the fence posts were salvaged material obtained without 
cost and by itemizing the going cost of labor and normal labor time incident to 
fence construction; denying any ownership interest by defendants Clarice Ann 
Manning Starnes and Thomas Manning in the property adjacent to that of 
appellant; and alleging the appellees have not run livestock on land adjacent to 
that of appellant for several years and, therefore, that appellees' livestock 
had not trespassed on `appellant's property. Both motions for summary judgment 
were denied.

[¶8.]     On October 7, 1983, 
appellant filed a "Motion to Vacate Order and Enter Summary Judgment" alleging 
that statements in the affidavit filed in support of appellees' motion for a 
summary judgment were hearsay, conclusions and perjured, and on November 2, 
1983, he filed an "Amended Motion to Void Affidavit." On October 7, 1983, 
appellant filed a "Motion to Disqualify Judge" because "I feel that I cannot 
receive a fair hearing, and prefer that this action be assigned to another 
judge." The motions were heard before the start of the trial which was set for 
November 23, 1983, and they were denied.

[¶9.]     At the trial, appellant 
presented testimony from one witness who had examined the fence and he testified 
himself. At the conclusion of appellant's case, appellees moved to dismiss the 
action pursuant to Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P., on the grounds that, under the facts 
and the law, appellant had failed to show entitlement to relief. The motion was 
granted and the court ordered dismissal of the complaint and awarded judgment to 
appellees.

[¶10.]  Appellant words the issues on appeal as 
follows:

"1. The compliance of the 
Appellee's affidavit in opposition to the Appellant's motion for summary 
judgment, in respect to Rule 56 W.R.C.P. When the affidavit contained untrue 
statements, opinions, beliefs, conclusions of law, hearsay and immaterial 
statements, denials and allegations, all without supporting 
evidence.

"2. The failure of the 
court to grant the Appellant a proper hearing on his motions, when such motions 
were a factual dispute on a material point of issue and reflected on the outcome 
of the action, which would have been summary judgment for the Appellant as a 
matter of law. Thus denying the Appellant due process of law and a fair 
trial.

"3. The Court's finding 
of a directed verdict for the Appellee, when such finding was unsupported, and 
contrary to the evidence introduced and statements of the witnesses in behalf of 
the Appellant."

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶11.]  Appellant's attack on appellee's 
affidavit, which the court found sufficient to raise a question of material 
fact, is directed to the credibility of the affiant rather than whether or not 
the affidavit resulted in the existence of a question of material 
fact.

[¶12.]  The purpose of a motion for summary 
judgment is not to decide facts but to determine if any real issue exists. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112 (1977); Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 443 (1982). The motion should be granted only when there is no conflict 
as to the material facts. McClure v. Watson, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1059 (1971); Kirby Building Systems, Inc. 
v. Independence 
Partnership No. One, Wyo., 634 P.2d 342 (1981). A fact is material 
if proof of it would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the 
essential elements of a claim for relief or a defense asserted by the parties. 
Laird v. Laird, Wyo., 597 P.2d 463 (1979); Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company, Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981). The burden is on 
the movant to demonstrate clearly that there is no issue of material fact and 
that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1350 (1974); Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 
(1980).

[¶13.]  A material fact in this case is whether 
or not the fence is a legal one. Appellant points to evidence that it was. The 
affidavit filed by appellee recites that the affiant observed it and that it is 
not a legal one. Another material fact is the cost of the fence. The affidavit 
filed by appellee sets forth costs in conflict with those set forth by 
appellant. With reference to the trespass, appellee's affidavit asserts that 
none of appellees' livestock were in a location from which they could trespass 
on appellant's premises - contrary to appellant's contention that there was such 
trespass.

[¶14.]  The court must not attempt to decide 
factual issues at the summary judgment stage. It properly denied appellant's 
motion for a summary judgment.

HEARING ON 
MOTIONS

[¶15.]  Appellant does not argue that there was 
no hearing on his motions but that it was

"conducted in an improper 
manner, with the District Court Judge stating that it made no difference if the 
affidavit was made with untrue statements. * * * It is apparent from his 
statements, that he has forgotten about the law on perjury, or he is prejudiced 
against the Appellant."

[¶16.]  Appellant's motions to "Vacate Order and 
Enter Summary Judgment," together with the "Amended Motion to Void Affidavit" 
further evidence appellant's misconception of the purpose and procedure relative 
to summary judgments. The affidavit filed by appellee states that the fence was 
not a lawful one according to his inspection and that the trespassing livestock 
were not that of appellees. The affidavit filed by appellant recites just the 
opposite with reference to the fence and at least infers that the trespassing 
livestock were owned by appellees. Both affiants could have honest beliefs on 
these contentions. The court could not settle the differences at a hearing on 
the filed motions. The decision could come only at the 
trial.

[¶17.]  Appellant's "Motion to Disqualify Judge" 
was not supported by an affidavit as required by Rule 40.1(b), W.R.C.P., and 
facts were not set forth to support a ground for disqualification.1 Additionally, the issue relative to 
this motion was not argued on appeal, cogently or otherwise, and no authorities 
were presented in support thereof. We do not consider issues not supported by 
proper citation of authority and by cogent argument. Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349 (1981); Knadler v. Adams, 
Wyo., 661 P.2d 1052 
(1983).

[¶18.]  The hearing conducted by the trial court 
on these motions and their denial were proper.

DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 
RULE 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P.

[¶19.]  In reviewing the propriety of a dismissal 
of an action pursuant to Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P.2, the entire evidence must be viewed 
most favorably to the plaintiff, giving him the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences which may be deduced therefrom. Shook v. Bell, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1320 (1979); Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. 
Reb, Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 645 (1978). However, the 
plaintiff must have submitted some evidence on each of the essential elements of 
his action upon which to cast the favorable view. In other words, he must 
sustain his burden of proof. Appellant apparently does not understand this 
requirement. He states:

"* * * [I]t was the 
requirement of the Appellee to prove that it [the fence] did not meet with the 
requirements of the statute. * * *"

The burden of 
proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of any issue. Morrison v. Reilly, Wyo., 
511 P.2d 970 (1973). Accordingly, the plaintiff has the burden of proof as to 
all of the elements of his claim. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. 
Landes, 28 Utah 2d 392, 503 P.2d 444 
(1972); Board of CountyCommissioners of MarshallCounty v. Snellgrove, Okla., 
428 P.2d 272 (1967).

[¶20.]  One of the necessary elements which 
appellant had to establish in support of his claim was the cost of constructing 
the fence. A judgment in appellant's favor for one-half of that cost could not 
be entered until such cost was placed in evidence. Appellant testified that he 
built the fence himself and that he worked on it during his spare time over a 
period of years; but there was no evidence whatsoever relative to the dollar 
cost of the fence, i.e., of the dollar value of the labor or the materials which 
resulted in the fence.

[¶21.]  Appellees suggest that appellant may have 
had the mistaken assumption that the exhibits attached to previous motions were 
in evidence. There is nothing in the record to support this assumption, but in 
any event, we cannot react to such assumption in aid of appellant simply because 
of his pro se position. Appellant argues that:

"The court in the 
interest of fair determination of the merits should have asked such questions 
and have sugested [sic] the production of such evidence as may be necessary to 
supplement or clarify the litigant's presentation of the 
case."

Such action 
would not be consistent with the impartial position required of all judges. A 
judge may call or interrogate witnesses, Rule 614, W.R.E., but he is not 
required to present or defend a case for a party. Although a litigant should not 
be punished for self-representation, it is not the function of the court to 
supervise him in the practice of law. A pro se litigant has no greater right 
than other litigants and must expect and receive the same treatment and 
consideration as if represented by an attorney. Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture 
Company, Wyo., 685 P.2d 678 (1984); Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company 
of Hartford, Connecticut, Wyo., 630 P.2d 514, appeal dismissed, cert. denied 
454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981), reh. denied 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S. Ct. 1743, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1982); Suchta v. O.K. Rubber 
Welders, Inc., Wyo., 386 P.2d 931 
(1963).

[¶22.]  To prevail, appellant had to present 
evidence that the fence, as constructed, was a legal fence. An exhibit did 
reflect (1) the nature of the posts (the wooden posts were construction timbers 
or standard posts four inches in diameter; the metal posts were standard metal 
posts; the corner posts consisted of water tanks set in concrete, a six-inch 
diameter oil well casing, a four-inch diameter pipe in concrete, and a 
twelve-inch diameter electric pole, and other corner posts from eight to twelve 
inches in diameter), and (2) the fact that the wire was two-point barbed, three 
strand, placed fifteen inches apart. There was no evidence as to the depth at 
which the posts were placed in the ground, the distance between the posts, or 
the existence or location of stays.

[¶23.]  Appellant introduced some photographs of 
livestock into evidence and there was testimony that they were on his property, 
but the livestock were not identified in any fashion, and there was no evidence 
that appellees were the owners of such livestock. Appellant presented no other 
evidence relative to trespassing livestock. In fact, he presented no evidence as 
to the ownership of the property partitioned by the fence.

[¶24.]  The trial court properly dismissed 
appellant's complaint and awarded judgment to appellees at the conclusion of 
appellant's case for failure of appellant to establish a prima facie case. Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., 
supra; Fuller v. Fuller, 
Wyo., 606 P.2d 306 (1980).

[¶25.]  Affirmed.

1 At the time there was no 
provision for peremptory challenge.

2 Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P., 
provides in part:

"* * * After the 
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the 
presentation of his evidence, the defendant * * * may move for a dismissal on 
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff * * *."