Case Title: People v. Tenney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88208

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88208-Agenda 1-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								EDWARD TENNEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County,
defendant, Edward Tenney, was convicted of the first degree
murder of Virginia Johannessen. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West
1992). At a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury found
defendant eligible for the death penalty and further determined that
there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude
imposition of that sentence. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced
defendant to death. That sentence has been stayed pending direct
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
603, 609(a). We reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a
new trial.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was indicted on six counts of first degree murder.
Three counts of the indictment charged defendant with the January
2, 1993, murder of Johannessen, and three counts charged
defendant with the October 1, 1993, murder of Mary Oberweis. A
jury determined that defendant was fit to stand trial for the two
murders. Defendant was tried separately for each murder. Prior to
his trial for the Johannessen murder, defendant was convicted of
the Oberweis murder. Regarding the Johannessen murder,
defendant was tried on one count of knowing murder and one
count of felony murder based on residential burglary. See 720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1992). The State entered a nolle
prosequi on the remaining count.
	Johannessen (hereafter victim) lived at 1301 Felton Road in
Aurora. In January 1993, the victim, 74 years old, lived at that
address alone and had resided there for approximately 40 years.
	The victim's brother, Francis Reines, saw her every few
weeks. On January 5, 1993, Reines had a telephone conversation
with their sister Regina regarding the victim. That conversation,
coupled with the fact that Reines had not been able to contact the
victim, prompted him to drive to the victim's house and check on
her.
	Reines arrived at the victim's house at approximately 10:30
a.m. He unlocked the back door with his key and disarmed the
electronic burglar alarm. The alarm system included motion
detectors. However, according to the victim's daughter, Barbara
Johannessen-Bailey, the victim was able to disarm the motion
detector in the basement without deactivating the entire system.
According to Reines, the victim's house had been burglarized
twice prior to her murder. He did not believe that anyone was
present during these prior burglaries. He did not remember
whether anyone was ever apprehended for them.
	Walking through the house, Reines saw the victim sitting in
a chair in a corner of the living room. She appeared injured; her
head was tilted back, looking up. He immediately telephoned 911.
	At 10:51 a.m., Officer Thomas Blincoe of the Kane County
sheriff's department was dispatched to the victim's residence to
assist an ambulance in a possible death investigation. When he
arrived, the ambulance was already at the scene. Reines and the
ambulance crew directed Officer Blincoe to the victim, whom the
paramedics had pronounced dead. Blincoe saw the victim
sprawled in a chair with a large bloodstain on the right side of her
head.
	Officer Blincoe did not find any type of weapon near the
victim. He observed that the house was very cluttered with stacks
and piles of books, magazines, and other items throughout the
entire house, including the basement. These things were arranged
somewhat orderly; there were pathways to negotiate through the
house.
	Checking the exterior of the house, Officer Blincoe saw that
a basement window was broken. The window frame was ripped
out and lying on the ground. A two-day-old newspaper was in the
mailbox. Blincoe and Reines saw that the victim's garage was
empty. Blincoe reported the victim's car as stolen.
	At 11:28 a.m., evidence technician Kevin Hogle of the Kane
County sheriff's department arrived at the crime scene. He
photographed the exterior and interior of the victim's house. He
found broken glass from the basement window both outside the
house and in the basement. On a table next to the victim were
several items including a check that was filled out and dated
January 2, 1993. In the bedroom was a chest that appeared to have
been pried open. He recovered fingerprints inside of the house, but
did not find any fingerprints on the broken glass of the basement
window or the area surrounding the window. Subsequent
laboratory testing did not reveal any fingerprints on the window
frame. On the basement floor below the broken window, Hogle
saw only dust. He did not remember seeing mud, grass, or any
other material from the outside. Hogle believed that the point of
entry was the broken basement window.
	The victim's daughters, Barbara Johannessen-Bailey and
Karen Johannessen, examined the house shortly after the murder.
Barbara noted that some of the victim's jewelry was missing.
	At approximately 2:30 p.m., Captain Michael Anderson of the
Kane County sheriff's department found the victim's car, a 1984
blue Oldsmobile Delta 88, in the parking lot of an Eagle Food
Store approximately one mile from the victim's home. A store
employee saw the car on January 3, 1993, at 4 a.m. when he
arrived for work. The car was towed to the sheriff's department.
An evidence technician found in the car a "hatchet/hammer"
(hereafter hammer). It did not have any fingerprints.
	On May 2, 1995, Donald Lippert, defendant's alleged
accomplice, spoke with Captain Anderson. At defendant's trial,
Donald was called to testify for the State. Donald understood that
in exchange for his truthful testimony, he would receive a prison
term totaling 80 years for crimes committed in Kane and Du Page
Counties, with the possibility that the trial court might sentence
him as guilty but mentally ill. Defendant requested a competency
hearing, which was held outside of the presence of the jury. At the
close of the hearing, the trial court found that Donald was
competent to testify.
	Donald testified that Leslie Lippert was his father and that
defendant was his cousin. After identifying defendant, Donald
further testified as follows. He "vaguely" remembered the events
of January 1993. He remembered living at 759 Austin Avenue in
Aurora with his father, defendant, and his brother Michael. He
remembered committing a burglary at a small white house on
Felton Street. When shown photographs of the victim's house,
Donald testified that it could have been the house that he
burglarized.
	On the night in question, Donald and "Chris Nelson," whom
Donald knew as defendant, walked to the small white house to
burglarize it. Donald believed that defendant had chosen the
house. Defendant was armed with a .22-caliber handgun. Donald
had never been in that house before or after that date.
	Defendant broke a window and pulled the window frame out
of the structure. At defendant's direction, Donald entered the
house by crawling through the window. Donald, intoxicated from
alcohol and drugs, crawled out because he was frightened by the
dark and the noise of a washing machine. Donald told defendant
that he was not reentering the house and told defendant to do it.
Defendant instructed Donald to go to the front of the house and
stand guard. Donald then believed that no one was at home.
	Donald went to the front of the house and looked in the
window. Donald saw defendant approach an old lady facing a
table; defendant was pointing a gun at the back of her head.
Donald heard a gunshot. He ran back to the broken window,
entered the basement, and went into the living room. The woman
had been shot in the back of the head, her chin resting on her
chest. Donald told defendant that the woman apparently was still
alive. Defendant picked up a hammer, tilted the woman's head
back, and hit her on the forehead.
	Defendant told Donald to look for "jewelry, money, anything
valuable." Donald took jewelry from the bedroom and put it into
a pillowcase. After they looked through the house, they exited
through the broken window. They went to the victim's garage,
where they found her car. Defendant gave Donald a car key and
they entered the car. Donald drove to the Eagle Food Store and
parked in the lot. They walked to the Lippert home and hid the
stolen property in the yard. They moved the items later that night
or the next day. At trial, Donald acknowledged that the woman
was the victim, and that he never received permission from anyone
to enter the victim's house. Donald did not know what became of
the hammer.
	Donald identified several pieces of the victim's property as
those that he stole. He testified that the hammer found in the
victim's car resembled the hammer with which defendant hit the
victim. However, Donald also stated that he had seen the hammer
around his house after the crime.
	Cross-examination revealed that on the night in question,
Donald, who is diabetic, was taking insulin in addition to alcohol
and drugs. He did not remember many details regarding the broken
window and the basement interior. However, he did remember that
the window was small and difficult to pass through and that he had
to climb over a "[b]unch of garbage" near the window.
	Michael Lippert also testified for the State. According to
Michael, he and defendant had a conversation in January 1993 in
which defendant made the following inculpatory remarks.
Defendant had seen "an old lady living in this white house off of
Sheffer Road." A few days later, he and Donald went to the
victim's house. Donald entered through the basement window and
let defendant in through the back door. "Then [defendant] shot her
in the back of the head with a .22 caliber handgun." Defendant
also told Michael: "They [defendant and Donald] took jewelry,
any valuable old stuff, and they took the car, her car, to the Eagle's
parking lot, parked it there and brought all the stuff back to the
house. That was it."
	When Lieutenant Peter Burgert of the Kane County sheriff's
department first questioned Michael in August 1994, Michael
denied knowledge of defendant's involvement in this crime.
Michael did so because defendant had threatened his life.
However, in May 1995, Michael went to Captains Anderson and
Robert Cannon and related defendant's inculpatory remarks.
Referring to his knowledge of the murder, Michael testified that "it
was on my chest for too many years and I wanted to get it off my
chest." He also felt sympathy for the victim's family. Michael
additionally testified that he was a former member of a street gang
and, at the time of defendant's inculpatory remarks, he smoked
marijuana "a lot" and took cocaine occasionally. However,
Michael was not under the influence of any drug during his
conversation with defendant.
	Dr. Shaku Teas performed an autopsy on the victim. Dr. Teas
determined that the victim had been dead between 24 and 72
hours. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the back of the
head. Dr. Teas removed two fragments of a small-caliber bullet.
The victim also had a crescent-shaped wound to the forehead.
According to Dr. Teas, it was unlikely that the forehead wound
was an attempted exit wound. Rather, the forehead wound was
consistent with being struck with a hammer, including the hammer
recovered from the victim's car. However, Dr. Teas could not
identify that particular hammer as the cause of the forehead
wound.
	Subsequent laboratory testing revealed that the two fragments
removed from the victim's head were from a .22-caliber bullet.
However, the fragments were in such poor condition that it was
impossible to connect them to a specific gun.
	Leslie Lippert testified for the State as follows. In January
1993, he lived at 759 Austin Avenue in Aurora. Lippert's house
was 630 feet from where the victim's car was found. Leslie lived
with his sons, Michael and Donald, and with defendant, who is his
nephew.
	In the spring of 1993, they moved out of their house on Austin
Avenue. Prior to moving, Leslie rented space at a storage facility
in St. Charles. Michael, Donald, and defendant each put their own
items in boxes and other containers. According to Leslie, each
labeled his boxes with his name; however, some of the boxes did
not have any identification marks. Also, most of the containers
were not sealed. Leslie loaded the items onto his pickup truck,
drove to the storage facility, and placed the items in two storage
lockers. Only Leslie had access to these stored items.
	On May 8, 1995, Leslie Lippert went to the Kane County
sheriff's department and met with Captains Anderson and Cannon.
He feared being charged with possession of stolen property. The
officers arranged a meeting with the State's Attorney. The next
day, Leslie returned to the sheriff's office. He, Cannon, and
Anderson went to the State's Attorney's office, where Leslie
obtained assurances that he would be held harmless for any stolen
items that may have been in storage.
	Leslie then took the officers to the West Chicago house where
he then lived with his son Michael and others. Leslie gave the
officers a box containing items that he received from defendant at
their prior home in Aurora. The items included several forms of
false identification with the name Christopher Nelson. According
to Leslie, defendant sometimes used that name.
	Leslie took the officers to the storage facility. Accompanying
them were several additional officers in another car and a pickup
truck. Leslie unlocked the padlocks to the two lockers, which were
filled with boxes and other items. The boxes were not sealed;
either they were open at the top or, at the most, their flaps were
tucked in. When the officers selected a container, Leslie looked at
its contents and identified their owner. Only one box was labeled;
that box had "Ed" written on it. In this box were various items
including a sealed envelope containing three photographs of
defendant's girlfriend. Also in storage was a dresser that,
according to Leslie, defendant used. Its drawers were shut but not
locked. The search and inventory were photographed and
videotaped.
	In May 1995, the victim's daughters identified the following
items as belonging to the victim. From the box labeled "Ed," they
identified a radio, a wind-up clock, maps inscribed by the victim,
a pair of binoculars, and a folding travel alarm clock. From the
dresser found at the storage facility, they identified a case
containing a class ring and a can of pepper spray or mace. In
another box found in storage, there were several boxes containing
jewelry, various pieces of which they identified as the victim's
property.
	The State presented the following stipulated evidence.
Seventeen latent fingerprints suitable for comparison were
obtained from the victim's home and car, and hairs were recovered
from the victim's car. None could be matched to defendant or
Donald, or to Lionel Lane, Lester Salter, Corey Jenkins, or
Michael Turner. The latter four we shall discuss later. The State
rested its case.
	The defense asserted that the State failed to prove defendant
guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The
theory of the defense was that the true murderers were Lionel
Lane, Lester Salter, Corey Jenkins, and Michael Turner. Lane was
charged, tried, and convicted of the victim's murder in 1995.
However, when defendant was charged with committing the
crime, Lane's conviction was vacated on the State's motion. The
defense presented several witnesses in support of its theory. The
evidence that defendant presented consisted of much of the
evidence that the State presented at Lane's trial.
	Defendant's evidence at trial was essentially as follows. In
July 1993, Lieutenant Peter Burgert of the Kane County sheriff's
department interviewed Lane. On November 2, 1993, Burgert had
a conversation with Lorie Mohle, who was Lane's ex-girlfriend.
Burgert again interviewed Lane expressly regarding the victim's
death.
	On November 27, 1993, in the course of his investigation,
Lieutenant Burgert photographed an automobile belonging to
Michael Turner. It was a Plymouth Sundance that was "cream and
tan, maybe some brown in it." On December 23, after again
speaking with Mohle, Burgert, she, and another detective went to
the victim's house and parked about 100 feet away. In April 1994,
Burgert and other officers returned to the victim's house and
parked at the same location. Some officers entered the victim's
house and fired a gun several times. Those remaining in the car
could hear the gun while the engine was running, the windows
were down, and the radio was on; and also when the engine was
off, the windows were up, and the radio was off.
	Oscar Dorrise was an inmate at the East Moline Correctional
Center. In late May 1994, he was in the Kane County jail in the
same cellblock as Lionel Lane, whom he did not previously know.
At their first meeting, Lane said that "he had a lot of things on his
mind" and asked Dorrise if Lane could trust him. Dorrise
answered in the affirmative. Lane said that he had shot an "older
lady" in the head in a house in Aurora.
	In October 1994, Dorrise was released from jail on bond. He
received a visit from Lieutenant Burgert. As a result of their
conversation, Dorrise related Lane's confession to Burgert. At the
time of this conversation, charges were still pending against
Dorrise. Although Dorrise believed that Lieutenant Burgert could
"help" Dorrise with his pending charges, Burgert did not
intervene. Dorrise received nothing in return for his testimony at
Lane's trial. Further, his testimony for defendant was the same
testimony that he gave for the State at Lane's trial.
	The State adduced the following additional evidence on cross-examination. Dorrise had four prior felony convictions: two
robbery convictions and convictions of burglary and unlawful use
of weapons. At Lane's trial, Dorrise testified that Lane had
confessed to him in July 1994, when he and Lane were not in the
same cellblock. Lieutenant Burgert gave Dorrise $50 and informed
him of a reward for information leading to the arrest of the
victim's killer. However, Burgert did not offer or give Dorrise a
reward for his testimony at Lane's trial. Burgert ceased being
involved in the case in January 1995.
	Lorie Mohle was unavailable for defendant's trial. The court
ruled that her prior sworn, in-court testimony for the State at
Lane's trial was admissible. The State lodged hearsay objections
to portions of the transcript of Mohle's testimony. Defendant's
trial counsel argued that all of Mohle's prior testimony was
admissible. The trial court ruled that portions of Mohle's prior
testimony would not be admitted. The court excluded, inter alia,
a conversation that Mohle had with Lane, in which he made
inculpatory remarks that exculpated defendant.
	The following prior testimony of Mohle from Lane's trial was
read to the jury at defendant's trial. Mohle lived with her children
and Lane at 1665 Felton Road in Aurora. Mohle knew Lane's
friends: Lester Salter, Corey Jenkins, and Michael Turner. On the
afternoon of January 2, 1993, Salter, Turner, Mohle, and another
went to a store to steal athletic shoes. Turner drove his brown,
four-door, mid-size car. After they accomplished their objective,
Mohle placed the shoes in the trunk of Turner's car. There, she
saw a holster and the butt of a gun.
	Later that evening, Mohle asked Turner to take her to the
Eagle Food Store. Turner drove Mohle and her children, Lane,
Salter, and Jenkins to the store. Mohle went into the store, while
the others remained in the car. Mohle returned to the car and
placed her grocery bags by her feet. On the way home, Turner
pulled over on Felton Road. Lane, Salter, and Jenkins exited the
car, saying that they would return shortly. She did not see where
they went. Mohle, her children, and Turner waited in the car with
the engine off and the windows rolled up. Mohle heard a gunshot;
she grabbed her children and groceries and walked home.
	Lane eventually returned home, acting "jittery." Mohle did not
ask him what had happened. She did not hear of the victim's
murder for approximately one or two months. In April or May
1993, Salter, Jenkins, and Turner came over and spoke with Lane.
After they left, Mohle asked Lane what was happening, and Lane
instructed Mohle not to ask any questions. Mohle also testified
that in 1993 she was undergoing drug treatment, and that no one
had made any promises to her to obtain her testimony.
	The defense presented the following stipulated evidence. Dr.
Teas testified at Lane's trial that the wound to the victim's
forehead was a partial exit wound. However, Dr. Teas formed this
opinion prior to being told that a hammer might have caused the
forehead wound.
	On January 9, 1993, the victim's daughter Barbara told a
police detective that the hammer, found in the victim's car,
belonged to the victim. She kept it under the driver's seat; it had
been there for some time.
	When the Eagle Food Store closed at 11 p.m. on January 2,
1993, Robert Foley, a store employee, saw a black, hatchback-type
vehicle on the premises. It was the only vehicle there except for
employees' cars. He left the store at 12:05 a.m. on January 3 and
observed the same car and no others.
	On the night of January 2, 1993, Peter Popp, the victim's
neighbor, and his sister Mary were at home, sitting on an enclosed
porch. They saw a dark-colored, large vehicle turn onto Felton
Road and into the victim's driveway. They paid no attention to it
because they assumed that it was the victim returning home.
	At the close of the evidence in defendant's trial, the jury
returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder.
	In the eligibility phase of the death sentencing hearing, the
jury heard, inter alia, the following stipulation: defendant was
convicted of the Oberweis murder as a result of being legally
accountable for the conduct of Donald, who performed the acts
that caused Oberweis' death. The jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt the presence of three statutory aggravating factors:
defendant was convicted of murdering two or more persons (see
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992)); the murder was committed in
the course of a felony, namely, residential burglary (see 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1992)); and the victim was murdered in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived
plan, scheme, or design to take a human life by unlawful means
(see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1992)).
	At the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, following
the presentation of evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the jury
found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to
preclude imposition of the death penalty. The trial court
accordingly sentenced defendant to death on the Johannessen
murder conviction. We note that the court subsequently sentenced
defendant to an extended prison term of natural life on the
Oberweis murder conviction.
	Defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence regarding
the Johannessen murder. Additional pertinent facts will be
discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.



DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A criminal conviction
will not be set aside on appeal unless the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt
of the defendant's guilt. The question on review is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational fact finder could have found defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 247 (1998); People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191 (1989). We
note that this standard of review applies in all criminal cases,
whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v. Gilliam,
172 Ill. 2d 484, 515 (1996); People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420,
444 (1995). Applying this standard to the present case, we must
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's
conviction.
	Defendant argues that the testimony of his accomplice Donald
"was confused, conflicted, and unworthy of belief." Defendant
points to "numerous instances where he [Donald] does not
understand questions, pauses for long periods of time and
continually qualifies his testimony with 'I think' and 'I believe.' "
Defendant also argues that Donald's testimony "was substantially
impeached by his prior record and his plea agreement with the
prosecutor."
	Defendant also attacks the credibility of Donald's brother,
Michael Lippert. Defendant points to inconsistencies between
Michael's testimony and the other evidence. Defendant argues that
Michael would support Donald's version of events to save Donald
from the death penalty. According to defendant, these facts would
cast doubt on the veracity of Michael's testimony.
	When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence of a defendant's guilt, it is not the function of this court
to retry the defendant. People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 73 (1997);
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 443. Rather, it is the function of the jury
as the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. It is also for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts
or inconsistencies in the evidence. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179,
204-05 (1998); People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1989). "A
conviction will not be reversed 'simply because the defendant tells
us that a witness was not credible.' " People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 250 (1998), quoting People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299
(1995). Therefore, this court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the jury on questions involving the weight of the evidence
or the credibility of the witnesses. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 448-49; Young, 128 Ill. 2d  at 51. Defendant's arguments against
Donald and Michael address functions of the jury and not of this
court.
	Having heard Donald's testimony, the jury was fully aware of
its alleged infirmities. The jury knew of Donald's criminal
background and of his plea agreement with the State. The trial
court instructed the jury that accomplice testimony was subject to
suspicion and, therefore, should be viewed with caution. See
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (3d ed. 1992).
It was the jury's function to draw conclusions based on the
evidence and to decide whether there was a reasonable doubt as to
defendant's guilt.
	Defendant also argues that he "presented a more credible
case" that Lane, Jenkins, and Salter actually murdered the victim.
Defendant notes that he presented much of the evidence presented
by the prosecution in Lane's trial for this offense, which resulted
in Lane's conviction. However, an assertion that another person
committed the offense does not necessarily raise a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. See People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 211 (1998). "The jury in this case was not required to
accept any possible explanation compatible with the defendant's
innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt." People
v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 206 (1990); accord McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 447.
	Defendant contends that Donald's testimony "was not
corroborated in any significant manner." Defendant argues that
there is no corroboration that he accompanied Donald to the
victim's house that night. Defendant posits that Donald could have
committed the offense alone, or with someone other than
defendant. Defendant also contends that no physical evidence
corroborated Donald's testimony or otherwise linked defendant to
the victim's murder.
	We recognize that the testimony of an accomplice witness has
inherent weaknesses and should be accepted only with caution and
suspicion. Nevertheless, the testimony of an accomplice witness,
whether corroborated or uncorroborated, is sufficient to sustain a
criminal conviction if it convinces the jury of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d  at 74; accord Young,
128 Ill. 2d  at 47-48.
	In this case, Donald's testimony was sufficient to sustain
defendant's conviction. Donald knew details of the crime that only
a person present at the crime scene could know. Additionally,
other evidence presented at trial corroborated Donald's testimony
in several respects. The victim's physical injuries were consistent
with Donald's testimony. Defendant confessed his involvement in
the crime to Michael Lippert. Also, many of the victim's
belongings were found in storage, in the box labeled "Ed" and in
the dresser that defendant used.
	We note that this case is distinguishable from People v. Smith,
185 Ill. 2d 532 (1999). In Smith, we agreed with the defendant
"that the weakness of the State's chief witness, along with the lack
of other direct evidence linking defendant to the crime, required a
not guilty verdict as a matter of law." Smith, 185 Ill. 2d  at 542.
There was only one witness who identified defendant as the
gunman. Based on the serious inconsistencies in, and the repeated
impeachment of, her testimony, we found that no reasonable trier
of fact could have found her testimony credible. Further, we
concluded that the circumstantial evidence that purportedly linked
the defendant to the murder merely narrowed the class of
individuals who may have killed the victim, but did not point
specifically to the defendant. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d  at 545.
	In this case, however, we conclude that Donald's testimony
was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. Also, the other
evidence presented at trial sufficiently linked defendant to the
murder.
	We have reviewed all of the evidence presented in
defendant's trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We
note that the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming.
However, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have
found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.



II. Lionel Lane's Excluded Hearsay Statement
	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in excluding
an out-of-court statement of Lionel Lane. Following a trial, Lane
was convicted of the victim's murder. However, Lane's conviction
was vacated on the State's motion when defendant was charged
with the crime.
	In this case, the record shows that during several months prior
to trial, defense counsel, the State, and the trial court had several
discussions regarding the whereabouts of Lane and Mohle. The
defense, with the cooperation of the State, diligently and in good
faith attempted to locate Lane and Mohle, without success.
	Each side presented a motion in limine regarding Lorie
Mohle's testimony at Lane's trial. Defendant sought the admission
at his trial of Mohle's entire testimony, and the State sought its
exclusion on hearsay grounds. Initially, the trial court excluded
Mohle's entire prior testimony. However, the court granted a
subsequent motion to reconsider, ruling that Mohle's testimony
was admissible at defendant's trial because it was given under oath
and subject to cross-examination at Lane's trial (see M. Graham,
Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §804.4 (7th ed.
1999)). The trial court allowed an edited version of Mohle's prior
testimony to be read to the jury at defendant's trial. The court
excluded portions of Mohle's prior testimony on hearsay grounds,
including a conversation between Mohle and Lane, in which Lane
made inculpatory remarks that exculpated defendant.
	We earlier recounted Mohle's testimony regarding the actions
of herself, Lane, Lester Salter, Corey Jenkins, and Michael Turner
on the night of January 2, 1993. The following additional, edited
testimony of Mohle was read to the jury at defendant's trial. In
September 1993, Mohle and Lane moved from Felton Road to
another address in Aurora. One day during that time, Mohle heard
an automobile horn and looked out of her window. She saw Salter
and Turner in a car. Lane went out to the car, spoke with them for
approximately 10 to 15 minutes, and came back inside to Mohle.
	However, the jury did not hear Mohle's testimony regarding
the following conversation:
			"Q. And after he got back in the house, did you ask him
a question?
			A. Yes, I asked him what the hell is going on here.
			Q. And what did he tell you?
			A. He said that him and Salter and Corey had went into
the lady's, Johannessen's house, Mrs. Johannessen's
house.
			Q. Did he tell you what happened in there?
			A. He said they were ransacking the house trying to
look for jewelry, money, something that they could sell to
get money. The lady kept screaming and screaming and
Salter kept telling her to be quiet, be quiet.
			Q. Did he tell you what Salter did?
			A. He said that he shot her.
			Q. He meaning?
			A. Salter.
			Q. Did he tell you where he shot her?
			A. No.
			Q. Did he tell you where on the body she was shot?
			A. No.
			Q. Did he tell you if they took anything?
			A. No, he did not tell me if they took anything.
			Q. Did he tell you how they got in?
			A. No.
			Q. Did he tell you who went in?
			A. Him, Lionel Lane; Lester Salter and Corey Jenkins.
			Q. Did he say who remained out?
			A. No.
			Q. Now, did you know what day he's talking about?
			A. I put two and two together, yes."
Defendant contends that the trial court's exclusion of this
conversation denied him a fair trial.
	Defendant argues that Lane's statements fell within the
statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.
"Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due
to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the
hearsay rule." People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1997);
accord Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-99, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 310-11, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1047 (1973). A hearsay exception
applies to declarations against interest. The exception is founded
on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement
against his or her own interest. Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 299, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311, 93 S. Ct. at 1047-48; see generally M. Graham,
Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §804.7 (7th ed.
1999); 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §§316 through 320
(4th ed. 1992).
	"[C]onventional doctrine required that the statement be
contrary to the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant
***." M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois
Evidence §804.7, at 883 (7th ed. 1999); accord 2 S. Gard, Jones on
Evidence §9:9, at 205 (6th ed. 1972). Although "the subject of
considerable scholarly criticism," "[i]t is believed that confessions
of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous
considerations and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable as
statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest." Chambers,
410 U.S.  at 299-300, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048.
Accordingly, an unsworn, out-of-court declaration that the
declarant committed the crime, and not the defendant on trial, is
generally inadmissible, even though the declaration is against the
declarant's penal interest. Such a declaration will be admitted,
however, where justice requires. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 306 (1997); People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1986). This
court has explained:
		"The practicality of this rule is obvious. General
admission of such statements could seriously handicap the
administration of justice in tempting everyone accused of
crime to introduce perjured testimony that a third party,
then deceased or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, had
declared that he, and not the accused, had committed the
crime. The rule is sound and should not be departed from
except in cases where it is obvious that justice demands a
departure. But it would be absurd, and shocking to all
sense of justice, to indiscriminately apply such a rule to
prevent one accused of a crime from showing that another
person was the real culprit merely because that other
person was deceased, insane or outside the jurisdiction of
the court." People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 178 (1952).
	Where constitutional rights that directly affect the
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be
mechanically applied to defeat the ends of justice. Therefore,
where hearsay testimony bears persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness and is critical to the accused's defense, its
exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with due
process. Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 302, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 313, 93 S. Ct. 
at 1049; People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 215-16 (1996). Such
testimony may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 66.
	In Chambers, the defendant was prevented under
Mississippi's evidentiary rules from cross-examining McDonald,
who had confessed to the crime but subsequently recanted, and
introducing the testimony of witnesses to McDonald's
confessions. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction because the indicia of trustworthiness of McDonald's
confession were so overwhelming that exclusion of evidence of
the confession violated fundamental fairness. McDonald was not
a codefendant, had spontaneously confessed the crime to close
friends on three separate occasions within 24 hours of its
occurrence, and gave a subsequent sworn confession. Also, one
eyewitness stated that he saw McDonald shoot the victim, and
another stated that he had seen McDonald holding a gun
immediately after the shooting; thus, each confession was
corroborated by some other evidence. Finally, McDonald was
available as a witness and could have been cross-examined.
Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 287-301, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 304-12, 93 S. Ct. 
at 1041-49.
	Chambers identified four factors to help determine the
reliability of a hearsay statement: (1) the statement was
spontaneously made to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime
occurred; (2) the statement is corroborated by some other
evidence; (3) the statement is self-incriminating and against the
declarant's interests; and (4) there was adequate opportunity for
cross-examination of the declarant. Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01,
35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048-49. The Chambers
factors are merely guidelines to admissibility rather than hard and
fast requirements; the presence of all four factors is not a condition
of admissibility. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d  at 307; see People v. Keene,
169 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1995). "Rather, the question to be considered in
deciding the admissibility of such an extrajudicial statement is
whether it was made under circumstances which provide
'considerable assurance' of its reliability by objective indicia of
trustworthiness. [Citation.]" Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d  at 216.
	We note that the holding in Chambers is narrow. In reaching
its judgment, the Court stressed:
		"[W]e establish no new principles of constitutional law.
Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the
facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial
court deprived Chambers of a fair trial." Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 302-03, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 313, 93 S. Ct.  at 1049.
Other courts have recognized this narrow holding. See, e.g., Jones
v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 524-25 (Fla. 1988); State v. Sharlow, 110
Wis. 2d 226, 234, 327 N.W.2d 692, 696 (1983).
	"Chambers did not do away with the hearsay rule. The
Supreme Court contemplated that the [trial] judge would be a
gatekeeper, that unreliable statements could be excluded. *** It
did not abolish the hearsay rule on constitutional grounds." Lee v.
McCaughtry, 933 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, "Federal
and State courts have expressed the belief that Chambers has not
significantly trammeled judicial discretion to exclude unreliable
declarations against penal interest." Commonwealth v. Carr, 373
Mass. 617, 625, 369 N.E.2d 970, 975 (1977). The admission of
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
ruling should not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of
that discretion. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d  at 218; Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at
68.
	Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude
that Lane made his hearsay statement to Mohle under
circumstances that provide considerable assurance of its reliability.
We will discuss the Chambers factors in order of their significance
in this case.
	The third Chambers factor is satisfied. Lane's statement was
self-incriminating and against his penal interest. "As a statement
of such a nature is the bedrock for the exception, that factor,
obviously, must be present." Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 29. A
declaration against penal interest is one that would be admissible
against the declarant in a criminal prosecution; it need not be a
confession, but must involve exposure to criminal liability. 2 J.
Strong, McCormick on Evidence §319(b), at 323-24 (5th ed.
1999); accord Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (the declaration, at the time
of its making, must tend to subject the declarant to criminal
liability, so that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed
it to be true). "Whether a statement is actually against the
declarant's interest must be determined from the circumstances of
each case." People v. Caffey, No. 86975, slip op. at 29 (October
18, 2001). In this case, Lane told Mohle that he participated in the
home invasion of the victim's residence, which was a felony. In
the course of that felony, the victim was murdered, for which Lane
is accountable. See 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c), 9-1(a)(3) (West 1992).
"No credible argument could be made that making that declaration
was not against his penal interest." People v. Rice, 166 Ill. 2d 35,
47 (1995) (Harrison, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and
McMorrow, J.).
	The second Chambers factor is satisfied. It must be
remembered that this factor requires only that the statement be
corroborated by "some other evidence in the case." Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 312, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048. As one court
has noted:
			"In determining whether the declarant's statement has
been sufficiently corroborated to merit its admission in
evidence, the judge should not be stringent. *** If the
issue of sufficiency of *** corroboration is close, the
judge should favor admitting the statement. In most such
instances, the good sense of the jury will correct any
prejudicial impact." Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass.
65, 75 n.10, 489 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 n.10 (1986).
Accord United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135, 1141 (7th Cir.
1993) ("The district judge does not need to be completely
convinced that exculpatory statements are true prior to their
admission. Such a high burden was not intended by the
corroboration requirement of [Fed. R. Evid.] 804(b)(3). The
district court must find only that sufficient corroborating
circumstances exist and then permit the jury to make the ultimate
determination concerning the truth of the statements"); accord 2 J.
Strong, McCormick on Evidence §319(e), at 328-29 (5th ed.
1999).
	In this case, the trial court did not consider Lane's hearsay
statement to be corroborated. However, the record contains
evidence, independent of Mohle's testimony, that corroborated
Lane's hearsay statement. Lane told Mohle that he, with Salter and
Jenkins, entered the victim's residence looking for items to steal.
The State presented evidence that the victim's home was broken
into and that personal property was stolen. Lane told Mohle that
there was a lone woman present when they entered the house; the
State presented evidence that the victim was at home and there
was no evidence of any other occupant or visitor. Lane told Mohle
that Salter shot the woman in the house; the State presented
evidence that the victim was shot. In addition to this evidence, it
must be remembered that Mohle gave this testimony at Lane's
trial, under oath and subject to cross-examination. Mohle testified
that Turner drove a brown car on the night of the homicide; it was
stipulated that the victim's neighbors saw a dark-colored vehicle
pull up into the victim's driveway. Also, Mohle identified the
victim's residence as the house where the murder occurred. Lane's
hearsay statement was corroborated as contemplated by Chambers.
Our conclusion is in accord with other decisions in which
extrajudicial declarations inculpating the declarants and
exculpating the defendants were found to be sufficiently
corroborated to be admissible as declarations against penal
interest. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gooch v. McVicar, 953 F. Supp. 1001, 1009-10 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Thomas v. State, 580 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. 1991); Lacy v. State, 700 So. 2d 602, 607-08 (Miss. 1997); People v. Robinson, 267 A.D.2d 336, 337, 700 N.Y.S.2d 203, 204 (1999); Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 749
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
	Regarding the first Chambers factor, Lane made the statement
spontaneously to a close acquaintance, i.e., Mohle. The
relationship between the declarant and the testifying witness to
whom the declarant spoke, and the circumstances surrounding the
declaration, are factors of reliability. A statement made to a law
enforcement officer may be made in an attempt to curry favor and
obtain a reduced sentence; it may also be the product of coercion
or force and be involuntary. Such a statement might not be as
reliable as a statement made to a good friend or family member.
State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 27, 734 P.2d 563, 569 (1987). In
this case, the trial court did not view the statement as spontaneous
because it was in response to Mohle's demand for an explanation.
We cannot accept this reasoning. Mohle merely asked Lane what
was going on. This single, simple question did not rob Lane's
statement of spontaneity. This circumstance is distinguishable
from that found in cases such as People v. Hampton, 249 Ill. App.
3d 329, 337 (1993), where the hearsay statement was made in
response to comments and pointed questioning. There is no
evidence to suggest that Lane's statement was coerced or
rehearsed.
	The statement was made spontaneously and to a close
acquaintance, which provide additional indicia of reliability.
However, Lane did not make the statement shortly after the
victim's murder, but rather nine months subsequent to the crime.
Accordingly, the first Chambers factor is not satisfied.
	The fourth Chambers factor is not satisfied. Lane was not
available for cross-examination. However, "the presence of all
four factors is not a condition of admissibility. They are indicia,
not hard and fast requirements." House, 141 Ill. 2d  at 390. "The
question to be considered in judging the admissibility of a
declaration of this character is whether the declaration was made
under circumstances that provide 'considerable assurance' of its
reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness." People v.
Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 67 (1986), quoting Chambers, 410 U.S.  at
300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048-49.
	The unique and rare circumstances surrounding this case
provide Lane's hearsay statement with an additional indicium of
reliability. As defendant's trial counsel noted, it must be
remembered that the State previously prosecuted Lane for this
crime and obtained his conviction. In this case, the State conceded
that Lane did not testify at his trial. At Lane's trial, the State
presented Mohle's testimony-including Lane's hearsay
statement-as part of the State's case against Lane. In this case,
defendant's trial counsel cogently argued that it would be
anomalous for the State to now oppose admission of Lane's
hearsay statement for defendant because the State used the same
evidence to convict Lane.
	The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has concluded:
		"How reliable must hearsay be to fit the Chambers
approach? We concluded in Rivera v. Director,
Department of Corrections, 915 F.2d 280, 282 (7th Cir.
1990), that if a confession is sturdy enough for the state to
use in its own case-if it is the sort of evidence that
prosecutors regularly use against defendants-then
defendants are entitled to use it for their own purposes."
(Emphasis in original.) Lee, 933 F.2d  at 537.
Accord Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 481 (1st Cir. 1979)
(reasoning that if evidence "is sufficiently reliable for
prosecutorial use, the state cannot claim that it is too unreliable
when offered by the defendant"); Woods v. State, 101 Nev. 128,
135, 696 P.2d 464, 468 (1985) (same). We agree with these
principles. Based on the totality of the circumstances, it was
"shocking to all sense of justice" (Lettrich, 413 Ill. at 178), to
apply the hearsay rule to bar admission of Lane's declaration
against penal interest at defendant's trial, which concluded with
defendant being sentenced to death.
	Earlier in this opinion, we considered whether the evidence
was sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Although we found that the evidence was sufficient to
support the guilty verdict, we noted that the evidence against
defendant was not overwhelming. No fingerprints or hairs could
be matched to defendant. We recounted the alleged infirmities in
Donald's testimony, including his prior record and his plea
agreement with the State. Also, there was little corroboration that
defendant accompanied Donald to the victim's house. Because the
evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, we cannot say
that the exclusion of Lane's hearsay statement did not affect the
outcome of defendant's trial.
	Therefore, we conclude that Lane's hearsay statement was
made under circumstances that provide considerable assurance of
its reliability. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in
holding to the contrary. Lane's statement that he, with Salter and
Jenkins, committed the crime was critical to defendant's ability to
present a complete defense and cannot be deemed harmless. See
United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that the exclusion of such evidence "deprived appellant
of crucial substantiation of his asserted defense ***. *** As a
result, his case was 'far less persuasive then it might have been' "
(quoting Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 294, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 308, 93 S. Ct.
at 1045)); Woods, 101 Nev. at 136, 696 P.2d  at 470 (same;
exclusion of such evidence "clearly prejudicial" because, without
it, defendant unable to properly present her version of the events).
It is true that defendant presented evidence implicating Lane,
Salter, and Jenkins in this crime. From this evidence, the jury
could have inferred the facts supporting defendant's case.
However, this inference was no substitute for Lane's confession,
which would have provided crucial substantiation of defendant's
asserted defense.
	We are mindful of the narrow holding of Chambers, and we
re-acknowledge the efficacy of the general rule barring the
admission of an extrajudicial declaration that the declarant
committed a crime and not the defendant on trial. However, based
on the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we must
hold that the exclusion of Lane's hearsay statement denied
defendant a fair trial. For this reason, we reverse defendant's
conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.
	We found that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore find that there is
no double jeopardy impediment to a new trial. We note that we
have made no finding as to defendant's guilt that would be binding
on retrial. See People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 535 (1997);
People v. Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201, 215 (1995). Due to our
disposition of this cause, we need not address defendant's
remaining contentions. See, e.g., People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99,
140 (2000); People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 198 (1998);
People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 327 (1990).



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Kane County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court
for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write
separately because I would hold that Tenney is entitled to a new
trial for an additional reason not mentioned by my colleagues,
namely, that he was tried, convicted and sentenced under a death
penalty law that violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV)
and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2). People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 225 (1998)
(Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
	In response to the demonstrated failure of this state's death
penalty law, our court has now adopted a comprehensive set of
new rules governing the conduct of cases in which the State is
seeking imposition of a death sentence. For the reasons set forth
in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op.
at 35 (September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the
procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving
an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable
to all capital cases now coming before us on review. Whether the
new rules will be sufficient to place this state's capital punishment
system within the tolerances permitted by the state and federal
constitutions is a question we cannot yet answer. It is clear,
however, that no proceeding conducted without the benefit of
those rules can be deemed reliable. Tenney's was such a
proceeding. For that reason, in addition to the reasons given by the
majority, I agree that Tenney's conviction and sentence must be
set aside and that he must be granted a new trial.
	I completely agree with the majority's judgment and rationale
for a new trial in this cause. Nevertheless, I agree with Chief
Justice Harrison that defendant's convictions and sentence should
also be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted
in accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital
cases. As I stated in my dissents in People v. Hickey, No. 87286,
slip op. at 39 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and
People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35 (September 27, 2001)
(Kilbride, J., dissenting), the procedures in capital cases prior to
this court's adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable
and did not sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights. 
Consequently, the rules, promulgated to help remedy the flaws of
the old system, must be applied retroactively to all capital cases
currently pending on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson,195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For this
additional reason, defendant should receive a new trial in
compliance with the new rules.