Case Title: RICHARD A. COFFINBERRY V. THE TOWN OF THERMOPOLIS, a Municipal Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0261

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD A. COFFINBERRY V. THE TOWN OF THERMOPOLIS, a Municipal Corporation2008 WY 43183 P.3d 1136Case Number: S-07-0261Decided: 04/10/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RICHARD 
A. COFFINBERRY,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.THE TOWN OF 
THERMOPOLIS, a 
Municipal Corporation,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofHot 
SpringsCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
A. Coffinberry of Thermopolis, Wyoming, Pro se.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Michael 
S. Messenger and Wade Redmon of Messenger & Jurovich, P.C., Thermopolis, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is a 
declaratory judgment action in which the appellant tests the authority of a 
municipality to adopt an ordinance holding the property owner liable for water, 
sewer, and sanitation service fees unpaid by a tenant.1  We affirm summary judgment in favor of 
the municipality.2

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether a 
municipality is statutorily authorized to hold a property owner liable for 
water, sewer, and sanitation service fees unpaid by a 
tenant?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant 
owns property within the Town of Thermopolis.  In the past, the Town has required him 
to pay for water, sewer, and sanitation service fees unpaid by his tenants.  Thermopolis Town Code § 14-606 (2000) 
reads as follows:

 
 
Sec. 
14-606  Property owner liable for 
charges.

 
 
The 
owner of the property furnished water, sewer, or sanitation by the Town shall be 
liable for the utility charges incurred for such property; therefore, liability 
shall be imposed on the owner of the property for charges incurred by his 
tenants or agents.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court granted the Town's motion to dismiss the appellant's initial petition, 
insofar as the petition sought any monetary relief, for failure to comply with 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 
through 1-39-121 (LexisNexis 
2007).  The appellant has not 
appealed from that order, but only from the summary judgment later granted to 
the Town.  We will review this 
summary judgment under the following standard:

 
 
            
Summary judgment is appropriate in a declaratory judgment action so long 
as there are no genuine issues of material fact.  Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town of 
Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 4, 39 P.3d 397, 402 (Wyo. 2002).  We recently repeated our standard for 
review of summary judgments rendered under W.R.C.P. 56:

 
 
            
When a motion for summary judgment is before this court, assuming there 
is a complete record, we have exactly the same duty and materials as did the 
district court and must follow the same standards.  Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
propriety of granting summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's 
dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  This court looks at the record from the 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all the 
favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions, and other materials appearing in the record.  Id.

 
 
            
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for a summary judgment.  If the movant carries this burden, the 
party opposing the summary judgment must come forward with specific facts to 
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 
WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2001).  A material fact has been defined as a 
fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part.  Hoblyn, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, 
¶ 11.

 
 

Bertagnolli 
v. Louderback, 2003 
WY 50, ¶¶ 10-11, 67 P.3d 627, 630-31 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

Pullar 
v. Huelle, 2003 
WY 90, ¶ 6, 73 P.3d 1038, 1039-40 (Wyo. 2003) (footnote omitted).  The parties concur that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact in this case.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶5]      Municipalities 
can exercise only those express and implied powers that are granted to them by 
statute.  City of Buffalo v. Joslyn, 527 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Wyo. 1974).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103 
(LexisNexis 2007) sets forth some of 
the express and implied powers granted to Wyoming municipalities in regard to the 
matters at issuesewer, water, and sanitation (garbage 
collection):

 
 
(a)    The governing bodies of all 
cities and towns may:

 
 
        . . . 
.

 
 
(xi)        Take 
all necessary action to plan, construct or otherwise improve, modify, repair, 
maintain and regulate the use of streets, including the regulation of any 
structures thereunder, alleys, any bridges, parks, public grounds, cemeteries 
and sidewalks;

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(xxx)     Divide the city or town 
into suitable districts for establishing a system of drainage including surface 
water drainage, sanitary sewers and water mains and:

 
 
(A)     Provide and regulate 
the construction, repair and use of sewers and drains;

 
 
(B)     Provide penalties for 
violations of regulations;

 
 
(C)    Assess against the property 
concerned any penalty or costs and expenses in compliance with 
regulations.

 
 
                     
   . . . 
.

 
 
(xli)       Adopt 
ordinances, resolutions and regulations, including regulations not in conflict 
with this act and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of the city or 
town, necessary to give effect to the powers conferred by this act . . . 
.

 
 
[¶6]      Additional 
relevant municipal authority is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-7-101 
(LexisNexis 
2007):

 
 
(a)     In addition to all 
other powers provided by law, any city or town may make public improvements as 
follows for which bonds may be issued to the contractor or be sold as provided 
in this chapter to:

 
 
         
. . . .

 
 
(ii)       Establish, 
construct, purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a system of water works, for 
the purpose of supplying water for extinguishing fires and for domestic, 
manufacturing and other purposes. . . .  
Cities or towns may enact ordinances and make all necessary rules and 
regulations for the government and protection of their water works, ditches and 
reservoirs, and fix water rates and provide for their collection. . . .  

 
 
(iii)      Take any action 
necessary to establish, purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a water system 
for supplying water to its inhabitants and for any other public purposes, 
including:

 
 
(A)     Condemnation of 
property;

 
 
(B)     Prescribing and 
regulating of rates for the use of water; and

 
 
(C)    Enacting ordinances for their 
enforcement and collection.

 
 
(iv)      Establish, 
construct, purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a system of 
sewerage;

           

. . . 
.

 
 
(xi)      Plan, create, 
construct and equip liquid and solid waste facilities. . . .  Cities or towns may enact ordinances and 
make all necessary rules and regulations for the government and protection of 
liquid and solid waste disposal facilities, and fix rates and provide for 
collection and disposal[.]

 
 
[¶7]      The rectitude of 
the district court's decision in this case is nearly self-evident.  For a quarter of a century, and, indeed, 
much longer than that, this Court has recognized that statutory grants of 
authority to municipalities carry with them the powers necessarily implied from 
such grants:

 
 
            
It is settled that municipal corporations are creatures of the 
legislature and thereby subject to statutory control.  2 McQuillin Mun Corp (3d Ed), § 
4.03, p. 8; Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Rawlins, 
Wyo., 510 P.2d 301 (1973).  Thus, the legislature, except as limited 
by the Wyoming Constitution, may confer on municipal corporations such authority 
as it considers proper, and municipalities can exercise only those powers which 
are expressly or 
impliedly conferred.  2 
McQuillin, supra, §§ 10.08 and 10.09, p. 755;   City of Buffalo v. Joslyn, Wyo., 527 P.2d 1106 (1974); Scarlett v. Town 
Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969); May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300 (1942); Edwards v. City of 
Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 111, 114 P. 677 (1911).  We 
have recognized in the past that the powers of a municipality are not 
necessarily limited to those expressly conferred but that a municipality may 
also exercise powers fairly and necessarily implied from the grant contained in 
the statute or constitutional provision.  Whipps v. Town of Greybull, 56 Wyo. 355, 109 P.2d 805, 146 A.L.R. 596 
(1941).  McQuillin discusses these 
implied or inherent powers as follows:

 
 
"* * 
*  [I]t is beyond dispute that 
municipal corporations possess certain implied, sometimes referred to as 
incidental, powers * * *.  Such 
implied powers include, and are generally held to be limited to, the 
following:

 
 
"1.    Powers necessarily arising 
from those expressly granted, and also those reasonably inferred from the powers 
expressly granted.

 
 
"2.    Powers essential to give effect to 
powers expressly granted.

 
 
"The 
municipal corporation may adopt or employ devices, agencies, instrumentalities, 
or other means for the purpose of carrying out powers expressly conferred on it, 
although the particular means adopted is not expressly authorized.  The corporation cannot, however, under 
this rule enlarge or extend the power expressly granted."  (Footnotes omitted and emphasis 
added.)  2 McQuillin, supra, § 
10.12, p. 768.

 
 

Coulter 
v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo. 1983) (emphasis added).  See also 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other 
Political Subdivisions § 169 (2000).

 
 
[¶8]      It cannot 
seriously be argued that the authority of a municipality to operate sewer, 
water, and sanitation systems does not carry with it the authority to charge for 
those services in the manner most reasonably designed to obtain payment.  In that vein, it is not illogical or 
unreasonable for the Town of Thermopolis to make the property owner 
ultimately liable for the provision of town services to his or her 
property.  A municipal utility 
system that required the municipality to "swallow" the losses occasioned by 
tenants who "skipped out" without paying, would not be financially 
sound.

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant's 
position is that the relevant statutes do not specify that cities and towns may 
charge property owners with service fees, but use 
instead words like "user," "consumer," and "inhabitant."  For instance, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-7-101(a)(iii) authorizes the municipality to "maintain and regulate a water 
system for supplying water to its inhabitants[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-7-508(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007) authorizes cities 
and towns operating sewerage systems to "provide by ordinance that the users of the system pay a service 
rate sufficient to pay the cost of" the system.  (Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶10]   We conclude that the appellant's 
interpretation of these and similar statutes would have an unreasonably 
inhibitory effect upon the provision of municipal services, and runs contrary to 
the long-recognized principle that statutory authority granted to cities and 
towns carries with it necessarily implied powers to carry out the purposes of 
the grant.  The power to hold 
property owners liable for utility charges is necessary, and not just 
convenient, because it ensures the fiscal integrity of the utility system.  Moreover, it cannot have been the 
reasonable intent of the legislature to define "user" so narrowly as to allow 
the municipality to charge only the person who, at any given time, actually, in 
a physical sense, "uses" the service.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   The statutes that authorize cities 
and towns to provide water, sewer, and sanitation services also authorize those 
cities and towns to hold property owners ultimately liable for the cost of 
providing those services to the property.  
We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2007) 
reads as follows:

 
 
            
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or 
validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations.

 
 

2The 
appellant filed a motion for summary judgment.  The Town did not.  We have held, however, that "a district 
court may resolve a motion for summary judgment in favor of either party, even 
though only one has filed such a motion."  
Young v. Hawks, 624 P.2d 235, 
239 (Wyo. 
1981).