Case Title: Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000283

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP283 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Gail Moreschi, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Village of Williams Bay and Town of Linn ETZ 
Zoning Board of Appeals, William L. Edwards and 
Suzanne Edwards, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 475,934 N.W.2d 573 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 8, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Reddy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to all parts except ¶¶23 and 24, in which ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion with respect to ¶¶23 and 24, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., joined.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Charles W. Pollard, Edward F. Thompson and Clair, Thompson 
& Pollard, S.C., Delavan. There was an oral argument by Charles W. 
Pollard. 
 
For the defendant-respondents Village of Williams Bay Town 
of Linn ETZ Zoning Board of Appeals, there was a brief filed by 
 
 
2 
Thomas C. Cabush, Dustin T. Woehl and Kasdorf Lewis & Swietlik, 
SC, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Thomas C. Cabush. 
 
For the defendants-respondents William L. Edwards and 
Suzanne Edwards, there was a brief filed by Anthony A. Coletti 
and Law Offices of Anthony A. Coletti, S.C., Elkhorn.  There was 
oral argument by Anthony A. Coletti. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 95 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP283 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV338) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gail Moreschi, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Williams Bay and Town of Linn ETZ 
Zoning Board of Appeals, William L. Edwards and 
Suzanne Edwards, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to all parts except ¶¶23 and 24, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and an 
opinion with respect to ¶¶23 and 24, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   A person aggrieved by a local 
zoning board's decision may commence a certiorari-review action 
"within 30 days after the filing of the decision in the office of 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
2 
 
the board of appeals."  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. (2017-18).1  
After the Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning Board of 
Appeals (the "Board") approved Suzanne and William Edwards' 
variance request, Gail Moreschi, the Edwardses' neighbor, filed a 
writ of certiorari.  She filed her writ within 30 days after the 
Board orally voted to grant the Edwardses a variance but well 
before the Board issued and filed a written copy of its decision.  
We must determine the "triggering event" for an aggrieved party's 
right to certiorari review of a local zoning board of appeals' 
decision.  We conclude that, pursuant to § 62.23(7)(e)10., 
certiorari review of the board's decision is triggered when a 
written copy of the decision is filed in the board's office. 
¶2 
That 
conclusion 
informs 
our 
decision 
regarding 
Moreschi's other two claims:  (1) that her due process rights were 
violated by the inclusion of the Board's written decision and its 
approved minutes in the certiorari record; and (2) that the Board 
reached its decision under the incorrect theory of law because at 
the time she filed her writ, the Board had not made the findings 
required under the relevant local ordinance.  We reject both 
claims.  The Board's written decision and approved minutes were 
properly included in the certiorari record and the Board's filed 
decision contains all findings required by the local ordinance.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017–18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
3 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
Gail Moreschi owns residential property in Linn Township 
next to Suzanne and William Edwards.  The Edwardses tore down the 
existing home on their property with plans to rebuild it, but their 
plans required a variance to the setback zoning ordinance.  After 
Linn Township approved their building plans, the Edwardses 
petitioned the Board for a zoning variance.2 
¶4 
On May 23, 2017, the Board held a public hearing on the 
Edwardses' request.  The Edwardses argued that a variance was 
necessary in order to install a septic system and, because their 
lot had a 12-percent slope and trees that Linn Township required 
them to preserve, there was only one place they could put it.  The 
septic system's placement, in turn, dictated where the Edwardses 
could build their home.  They noted that their new home would have 
"roughly . . . the same footprint" as the previous home although 
it would "actually encroach[] a little bit less into the setbacks."  
The Edwardses argued that their request satisfied the five 
conditions necessary for the Board to grant a variance pursuant to 
Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning (ETZ) Ordinance 
§ 18.1716(H)3:  (1) their proposal was consistent with the local 
development's purpose and intent; (2) the lot's slope constituted 
                                                 
2 The Board hears such variance requests from residents of 
Linn, Delavan, Geneva, and Walworth Townships and the Village of 
Williams Bay.  Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning 
(ETZ) Ord. § 18.1700(H). 
3 ETZ Ord. § 18.1716 contains two subsections labeled "(H)."  
Throughout this opinion, each reference to subsec. (H) is to the 
one titled "Findings." 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
4 
 
an exceptional circumstance; (3) they had not caused any of the 
reasons necessitating the variance; (4) they could not build their 
home without the variance; and (5) there was no detriment to 
Moreschi's property because the Edwardses' new home would be three 
feet further away from Moreschi's property line than the previous 
one.4 
¶5 
Moreschi opposed the Edwardses' variance request on the 
grounds that it failed to meet at least one of those conditions.  
Specifically, she argued that, according to an affidavit of the 
Walworth County Sanitarian, the Edwardses had several other 
options available that would not require a variance.  Those options 
included moving their driveway to accommodate the septic system, 
installing a smaller system, using a holding tank instead of a 
septic system, or simply building a smaller home.  Moreschi 
asserted that because the Edwardses would not be prevented from 
building any home, a variance was not necessary to preserve their 
property rights.   
¶6 
At the hearing, the Board heard community commentary on 
the Edwardses' request.  Some in favor of the variance noted that 
                                                 
4 The Board's governing ordinance provides that the Board 
"shall grant no variance" unless it finds "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that the following five conditions are satisfied:  (1) the 
variance is "consistent with the purpose and intent" of the local 
development; (2) there are "exceptional, extraordinary, or unusual 
circumstances" requiring the variance; (3) the basis for the 
variance is not solely "economic gain or loss" or a "[s]elf-imposed 
hardship[]"; (4) the variance is "necessary" to preserve the 
applicant's "enjoyment of substantial property rights" similar to 
those of neighboring properties; and (5) the variance will not 
cause "substantial detriment" to others' property or the "public 
interest."  ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H)(A)-(E). 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
5 
 
the Edwardses' plans were consistent with attempts to "modernize" 
the subdivision and that denying the Edwardses a variance would 
frustrate that process.  Some against it pointed out that what the 
Edwardses claimed as an "exceptional circumstance," a 12-percent 
slope, was not exceptional at all because "virtually all 
properties" in the subdivision had similar slopes.  At the end of 
the hearing, the Board unanimously approved the Edwardses' 
variance request by oral vote. 
¶7 
On June 12, 2017, Moreschi filed for a writ of certiorari 
in the Walworth County Circuit Court.5  She alleged that the Board 
improperly granted the Edwardses a variance because it failed to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt all five conditions required under 
ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H).  The circuit court granted the writ on June 
28, 2017, giving the Board until July 7 to return a certified 
transcript of the record.  Also on June 28, Moreschi received draft 
minutes of the Board's May 23 hearing via an open records request.  
The draft minutes reflected the Board's unanimous approval of the 
Edwardses' variance.  Under the heading "Board of Appeals['] 
Findings," the draft minutes indicated that the Board had approved 
the variance because it "felt that there was a lack of detriment." 
¶8 
At the Board's next meeting on July 31, the Board issued 
"approved" minutes of the May 23 hearing, which included expansive 
factual findings not included in the draft minutes.6  At the July 
                                                 
5 The Honorable David M. Reddy of the Walworth County Circuit 
Court presiding.  Moreschi filed her complaint pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 801.02(5).  
6 In the approved minutes, the Board's findings read: 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
6 
 
31 meeting, the Board also issued a signed, written document titled 
"Determination Form." The Determination Form reiterated the 
factual findings from the approved minutes and included specific 
conclusions on each of the five conditions required under ETZ Ord. 
§ 18.1716(H): 
The Board found beyond a reasonable doubt that:  (1) the 
requested variance is consistent with the purpose and 
content of the regulations for the district and a 
permitted 
use——a 
single 
family 
residence; 
(2) exceptional circumstances exist re: the location of 
the septic system on the lot and a 12% slope on the lot 
justifying the requested variance; (3) economic hardship 
is not the basis for granting the variance; (4) the 
variance is necessary to preserve the property rights 
and enjoyment of the property by the owner who looks to 
build a single family home on the property that is 
consistent with other homes in the district; and (5) the 
variance will not create a substantial detriment to the 
adjacent properties because the new home will be set 
back further from the property lines than the pre-
existing home. 
                                                 
The Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning 
Board of Appeals having considered all of the testimony 
and evidence presented at the hearing found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that all of the facts and conditions 
set forth in ETZ Zoning Ordinance Sec. 18.1716(H) exist 
in favor of granting the requested variance.  The Board 
reviewed the application for variance and attached 
documents; letter from Town of Linn approving the 
variance; letters from citizens in favor and opposed to 
the variance; documents presented by Attorney Thompson; 
along with other documents presented at the hearing.  
The Board heard testimony from Mr. Edwards and his 
attorney, Mara Spring re: why the variance was 
necessary.  The Board heard testimony from citizens in 
favor and opposed to the variance, including Attorney 
Thompson on behalf of Ms. Moreschi. 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
7 
 
That same day, both the approved minutes and the Determination 
Form were filed in the Board's office.7 
¶9 
The day after the Board's July 31 meeting, the Board 
submitted the certiorari record to the circuit court.  The record 
contained the approved minutes, the Determination Form, a 
recording of the May 23 hearing, the Edwardses' variance 
application, and documents the parties presented at the May 23 
hearing.  Following briefing and a hearing, the circuit court 
affirmed the Board's decision granting the Edwardses a variance. 
¶10 Moreschi appealed the circuit court's decision on both 
procedural and substantive grounds.  Her procedural claim was that 
the Board violated her due process rights when it included the 
approved minutes and Determination Form in the certiorari record.  
She maintained that the circuit court should have reviewed only 
the documents that existed at the time she filed for a writ:  the 
transcript of the May 23 hearing and the draft minutes.  As for 
Moreschi's substantive claim, she argued that the Board made its 
decision under the incorrect theory of law because at the time she 
filed for a writ, the Board had not explicitly found beyond a 
                                                 
7 The record is unclear regarding when the Determination Form 
and the approved minutes were filed in the Board's office.  The 
record indicates that the Board issued both documents at its July 
31, 2017 meeting.  It also shows that the Williams Bay Zoning 
Administrator included both documents in the certiorari record 
that was delivered to the circuit court on August 1.  At oral 
argument, the Board explained that the Zoning Administrator could 
not have included the documents in the certiorari record unless 
they were filed in the Board's office.  We therefore accept July 
31, 2017, as the date the Determination Form and the approved 
minutes were filed in the office of the Board. 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
8 
 
reasonable doubt that the Edwardses' variance met the five 
conditions set forth in ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H). 
¶11 The court of appeals rejected both of Moreschi's claims.  
Moreschi v. Vill. of Williams Bay and Town of Linn ETZ Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, No. 2018AP283, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 31, 2019).  The court of appeals held that the Determination 
Form was the Board's decision that was filed in the office of the 
Board for purposes of triggering certiorari review.  In reaching 
its conclusion, the court of appeals determined that only the 
Determination Form could be both filed as set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10. and signed and transmitted to the applicant or 
appellant as required by ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(J).  It also held that 
the Board did not violate Moreschi's due process rights by 
including the Determination Form and approved minutes in the 
certiorari record because Moreschi had no right to certiorari 
review until after the Determination Form was filed.  Lastly, the 
court of appeals rejected Moreschi's substantive challenge, 
holding that the Board's findings on the requisite five conditions 
as stated in the Determination Form were "reasonable and supported 
by the evidence."  Id., ¶¶22–27. 
¶12 On appeal to this court, Moreschi raises three issues:  
(1) whether the court of appeals properly determined what 
constitutes the "triggering event" for purposes of appealing the 
Board's decision on a writ of certiorari; (2) whether her due 
process rights were violated by the inclusion of the Determination 
Form and approved minutes in the certiorari record; and (3) whether 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
9 
 
the Board failed to follow the correct theory of law in granting 
the Edwardses' variance request. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 To determine what constitutes the triggering event for 
purposes of certiorari review, we must engage in statutory 
interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Myers v. DNR, 2019 WI 5, ¶18, 385 
Wis. 2d 176, 922 N.W.2d 47.  Statutory interpretation begins with 
the language of the statute and if it "yields a plain [and] clear" 
meaning, there is no need to consult extrinsic sources.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45–46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  When interpreting the meaning of a 
specific statutory term, we "focus primarily on the language" 
itself and give that term its "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning," unless the statute provides a special or technical 
definition.  Id., ¶¶44–45, 53.  We interpret a statute "in the 
context in which it is used" and in such a way "to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id., ¶46.8 
¶14 The question of whether the Board violated Moreschi's 
due process rights by including the Determination Form and the 
approved minutes in the certiorari record is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  See State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, 
¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354.  
                                                 
8 To the extent that we must also interpret ETZ Ord. 
§ 18.1716, we do so under the same rules as when we interpret a 
statute.  See Stoker v. Milwaukee Cty., 2014 WI 130, ¶17, 359 
Wis. 2d 347, 
857 N.W.2d 102 
("The 
rules 
for 
statutory 
interpretation apply to our interpretation of an ordinance."). 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
10 
 
¶15 Statutory certiorari review is limited to, among other 
considerations, whether the Board "proceeded on a correct theory 
of law."9  State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington Cty. Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.  This 
is also a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.  "A board 
proceeds under a correct theory of law when it relies on the 
applicable ordinances . . . and applies them properly."  Edward 
Kraemer & Sons v. Sauk Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 8-
9, 515 N.W.2d 256 (1994). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 Moreschi urges us to hold that the triggering event for 
certiorari review occurred either immediately after the Board 
orally voted at the May 23, 2017 hearing or when she received the 
Board's draft minutes of that hearing on June 28, 2017.  She claims 
that Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)3. and ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(C)(2) 
support 
her 
position 
because 
they 
require 
the 
Board 
to 
"immediately" file its minutes "showing the vote of each member 
upon each question."10  She points to ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H), which 
                                                 
9 The other considerations, which are not at issue in this 
case, are whether the Board kept within its jurisdiction, whether 
its action was arbitrary or unreasonable, and whether its decision 
is reasonably based on the evidence.  State ex rel. Ziervogel v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶14, 269 
Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)3. provides, in relevant part: 
The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing 
the vote of each member upon each question, or, if absent 
or failing to vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep 
records of its examinations and other official actions, 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
11 
 
requires the Board's minutes to indicate that the Board found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that all variance requirements were 
present.11  Moreschi further relies upon ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(J), 
which states that the Board "shall decide all appeals and 
applications within thirty (30) days after the final hearing and 
shall transmit a signed copy of the Board's decision to the 
appellant or applicant."  Moreschi also asserts that the Board 
violated her due process rights by "supplementing" the certiorari 
record with the approved minutes and the Determination Form after 
she had filed her certiorari petition.  Lastly, she claims that 
the Board proceeded under an incorrect theory of law because the 
draft minutes do not contain the findings of fact necessary to 
grant a variance under ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H). 
                                                 
all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of 
the board and shall be a public record. 
ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(C)(2) reads as follows: 
Minutes of the proceedings and a record of all actions 
shall be kept by the secretary, or other designated 
person, showing the vote of each member upon each 
question, the reasons for the Board's determination, and 
its findings of facts.  These records shall be 
immediately filed in the office of the Board and shall 
be a public record. 
11 The text of ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H) is as follows: 
No variance to the provisions of this Ordinance shall be 
granted by the Board unless it finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that all of the following facts and conditions 
exist and so indicates such in the minutes of its 
proceedings. 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
12 
 
¶17 The Board counters that certiorari review was triggered 
on the date the Board filed the Determination Form and the approved 
minutes of the May 23 hearing.  The Board issued both documents at 
its July 31 meeting and it submitted the certiorari record to the 
circuit court the next day.  Therefore, the Board argues, both 
documents were properly included as part of the certiorari record.  
The Board further claims that it made its decision under the 
correct theory of law because both the Determination Form and the 
approved minutes reflect all findings of fact and legal conclusions 
required under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e) and ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H). 
¶18 We agree with the Board that the filing of the 
Determination Form was the triggering event for Moreschi's right 
to certiorari review.  Accordingly, we conclude that Moreschi's 
due process rights were not violated by the Board's inclusion of 
the Determination Form and the approved minutes in the certiorari 
record.  We also decide that the Board applied the correct theory 
of law in its decision to grant the Edwardses a variance as 
reflected in the Determination Form. 
A.  The Certiorari-Triggering Event 
¶19 Moreschi's appeal turns on our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.,12 which allows any person "aggrieved by any 
decision of the board of appeals" to commence an action seeking 
certiorari review "within 30 days after the filing of the decision 
                                                 
12 We do not address Moreschi's arguments that rely on the ETZ 
Ordinances because that reliance is misplaced.  Nothing in those 
ordinances affects the criteria for triggering certiorari review 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. and our interpretation of that 
statute fully resolves the certiorari-triggering question. 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
13 
 
in the office of the board of appeals."  Specifically, we must 
determine what constitutes the filing of the Board's decision for 
purposes of certiorari review.   
¶20 We first observe that the "filing of the decision" must 
mean something more than the Board's oral decision to grant the 
Edwardses a variance.13  We must give effect to every word of Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. and the statutory text makes clear that 
certiorari review is triggered by the filing of the decision, not 
the decision itself.  See State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶¶17-19, 
353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.  Focusing on the statutory text, 
our next step is to define "filing." 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23 contains no special or technical 
definition of "filing."  Absent a technical definition, we turn to 
the dictionary definition of "filing" for its common and accepted 
meaning.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶53 (explaining that a word's 
ordinary meaning is "ascertainable by reference to [its] 
dictionary definition").  The common dictionary definitions of 
"filing" suggest that only tangible things may be filed.  See 
Filing, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("submitting or 
lodging a document with a court clerk or record custodian" 
(emphasis added)); File, Webster's Third New International 
                                                 
13 We have previously held that a board may render its decision 
either orally or in writing.  See Lamar Cent. Outdoor, Inc. v. Bd. 
of Zoning Appeals, 2005 WI 117, ¶¶31-35, 284 Wis. 2d 1, 700 
N.W.2d 87.  Here, the Board decided to grant the Edwardses' 
variance at the May 23 hearing when, after gathering evidence, it 
voted on the Edwardses' variance request.  See Decision, Black's 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "decision" as a 
"determination after consideration of the facts and law."). 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
14 
 
Dictionary of the English Language 849 (2002) ("to deliver (as a 
legal paper or instrument) . . . to the proper officer" (emphasis 
added)).  Therefore, the "filing of the decision in the office of 
the Board" must be the delivery of a document to the Board's office 
that states the Board's decision. 
¶22 The parties present three possibilities for what may 
constitute the filing of the Board's decision:  the Board's oral 
vote, the minutes of the May 23 hearing (draft or approved), and 
the Determination Form.  Given the above definition of "filing," 
the Board's oral vote cannot be the filing of its decision.  It is 
neither a tangible thing nor a document.  The oral vote simply 
cannot be filed.   
¶23 As for the minutes, they are a tangible document, but 
the language of the surrounding statutory provisions suggests that 
they are something different than the filing of the decision.  See 
United States v. Sahm, 2019 WI 64, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 259, 928 
N.W.2d 545 ("Evaluation of the context of a statute is part of a 
plain-meaning analysis and includes review of the language of 
'surrounding or closely-related statutes.'") (quoting Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  Under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)(3)., the Board 
is required to "keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote 
of each member upon each question" and to file those minutes in 
its office.  But § 62.23(7)(e)10. states that certiorari review is 
triggered by the filing of the Board's decision, not its minutes.  
In order to give meaning to every word in the statute, filing the 
minutes and filing the decision must refer to separate actions and 
separate documents.  See Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶¶17-19.  
No. 
2018AP283 
 
15 
 
Reading § 62.23(7)(e)10. to allow the filing of the minutes to 
trigger certiorari review would impermissibly strip the word 
"decision" of any independent meaning.  See id., ¶18.  Therefore, 
the filing of the minutes does not trigger certiorari review. 
¶24 All of which leads us to the conclusion that the filing 
of the Determination Form is the filing of the Board's decision.  
The Determination Form checks all the requisite boxes for a filing 
of the decision:  it is a tangible document, it states the Board's 
decision, it was filed in the Board's office, and it is a separate 
document from the Board's minutes.  Therefore, Moreschi's right to 
certiorari review was triggered on July 31, 2017, when the 
Determination Form was filed in the office of the Board. 
B.  Due Process 
¶25 Because Moreschi's certiorari-review right was not 
triggered until the Board filed the Determination Form, there is 
no merit to her claim that she was denied due process by the 
inclusion of the Determination Form or the approved minutes in the 
certiorari record.  As the court of appeals explained, Moreschi's 
premature filing of her certiorari action did not preclude the 
Board from reducing its decision to writing so that the decision 
could be filed as required by law.  Nor did Moreschi's early filing 
cut off the Board's process for finalizing and approving its 
meeting minutes.  Indeed, as Moreschi points out, the certiorari 
record must contain the "official history of [the Board's] 
proceedings."  See State ex rel. Augusta v. Losby, 115 Wis. 57, 
59, 90 N.W. 188 (1902).  Moreschi, however, provides no authority 
for the proposition that prematurely filing for a writ of 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
16 
 
certiorari precludes the Board from developing its official 
history in accordance with its standard procedures.  And nothing 
in the record indicates the Board deviated from those procedures 
when it issued the Determination Form and the approved minutes at 
its next meeting. 
¶26 We 
also 
reject 
Moreschi's 
argument 
that 
the 
Determination Form constituted a "new decision."  The Board's 
decision was to grant the Edwardses a variance; that decision 
remains unchanged in the Determination Form.  The Determination 
Form simply reduced the Board's decision to writing so that the 
decision could be filed as required by Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.  
Thus, both the Determination Form and the approved minutes are 
properly part of the certiorari record and Moreschi's due process 
claim is without merit. 
C.  Correct Theory of Law 
¶27 Finally, we conclude that the Board reached its decision 
under the correct theory of law.  "A board proceeds on a correct 
theory of law when it relies on the applicable ordinances . . . and 
applies them correctly." Edward Kraemer & Sons, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 8-
9 (emphasis added).  ETZ Ord. § 18.1716(H) provides that the Board 
"shall grant no variance" unless it finds "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that five conditions are satisfied.  In the Determination 
Form, the Board recounted the relevant facts, applied those facts, 
and concluded that each of the five conditions in ETZ Ord. 
§ 18.1716(H) were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, the 
Board relied on the correct ordinance and applied that ordinance 
No. 
2018AP283 
 
17 
 
correctly.14  The Board therefore proceeded under the correct 
theory of law.  See id. at 8-9. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶28 We conclude that an aggrieved party's right to 
certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. is triggered 
when a written copy of a zoning board of appeals' decision is filed 
in the office of the board.  Moreschi's right to certiorari review 
was therefore triggered on July 31, 2017, the date the 
Determination Form was filed.  Accordingly, Moreschi suffered no 
due process violation when the Determination Form and approved 
minutes were included in the certiorari record.  Finally, we decide 
that the Board acted under the correct theory of law because its 
explanation in the Determination Form satisfies the requirements 
of ETZ Ord. § 18.1716. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
14 Although the Board did not discuss each condition on the 
record at the May 23, 2017 hearing, the record makes clear that 
the Board did not reach its decision until it heard presentations 
from both parties regarding each condition required under ETZ Ord. 
§ 18.1716(H) as well as the appropriate burden of proof.  We cannot 
say, after reviewing the "whole record," that the Board's decision 
was not "reasonable based on the evidence before it."  See 
AllEnergy Corp. v. Trempealeau Cnty. Evn't & Land Use Comm'n, 2017 
WI 52, ¶89, 375 Wis. 2d 329, 895 N.W.2d 368.  Therefore, we must 
uphold the Board's decision.  See Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶13. 
No.  2018AP283.akz 
1 
 
¶29 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion's conclusions in this case and its 
analyses of Moreschi's due process and certiorari review 
challenges.  However, I do not join the majority's analysis of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. in full because the majority 
inexplicably concludes that minutes of a board's meeting may never 
serve as a triggering event under § 62.23(7)(e)10.  As I explain 
below, a board's minutes may also meet the statutory prerequisites 
for certiorari review.  While I write separately as to the proper 
interpretation of § 62.23(7)(e)10., I reach the same conclusion as 
the majority——the filing of the Determination Form is the 
triggering event in this case.  As a result, I respectfully concur, 
and I join all of the majority opinion except ¶¶23-24.  
I.  ANALYSIS  
A.  Filing an Oral Decision and Minutes 
¶30 While I agree with the majority that the Determination 
Form is the triggering event in this case, I disagree with its 
broad statements about a board's minutes.  As such, I write 
separately to demonstrate that the minutes can serve as a filed 
decision for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.   
¶31 A board's oral vote alone cannot serve as the triggering 
event.  Cf. Helmrick v. Helmrick, 95 Wis. 2d 554, 556, 291 
N.W.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1980) (denying appeal from an oral ruling of 
a circuit court).  However, if that oral vote is reduced to writing 
and filed in the office of the board, then it is sufficient to 
serve as a triggering event under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.  As 
required by statute, the minutes of a board must "show[] the vote 
of each member upon each question."  § 62.23(7)(e)3.  That means 
No.  2018AP283.akz 
2 
 
that the statute requires that any oral votes of a board be reduced 
to writing in the minutes.  Accordingly, if those minutes are filed 
in the office of the board, then they can sufficiently serve as 
the triggering event under § 62.23(7)(e)10.   
¶32 This is consistent with how we treat appeals of oral 
orders of circuit courts.  See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  This court 
has long recognized "that oral orders, although effective as soon 
as they are announced, must nevertheless be reduced to writing 
before an appellate court may have jurisdiction to review them."  
State v. Malone, 136 Wis. 2d 250, 257, 401 N.W.2d 563 (1987).  
Those oral orders, reduced to writing, must then be "filed in the 
office of the clerk of court."  Wis. Stat. § 807.11(2).  Once an 
oral order is "filed in the office of the clerk of court," the 
order is entered and appealable. § 808.03(1).  Appeals of final 
orders are similar to certiorari review of a board's decision 
because they both seek relief from a decision.  Compare Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1) ("[A] final order of a circuit court may be appealed 
as a matter of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law.") with Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. 
("Any person . . . aggrieved by any decision of the board of 
appeals . . . may . . . commence an action seeking the remedy 
available by certiorari.").  Accordingly, like an appeal of an 
oral order of a circuit court, an oral vote of a board, reduced to 
writing in the minutes and filed in the office of the board, can 
serve as the triggering event for § 62.23(7)(e)10.   
¶33 The majority disagrees and states that, "[i]n order to 
give meaning to every word in the statute, filing the minutes and 
filing the decision must refer to separate actions and separate 
No.  2018AP283.akz 
3 
 
documents."  Majority op., ¶23.  While it is true that the filing 
of minutes and the filing of a decision can be separate actions 
and separate documents, they can occur simultaneously in the filing 
of the same document in the office of the board.1  The board, 
regardless of whether a vote is taken at a meeting, must still 
file the minutes.  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)3.  Similarly, the board 
can, as it did here with the Determination Form, file a decision 
in the office of the board without any minutes.  Thus, the filing 
of minutes and the filing of a decision are clearly separate 
actions.  Notwithstanding the fact that they are separate actions, 
the filing of the minutes can serve as the filing of the decision 
if the minutes contain "the vote of each member upon each 
question."  § 62.23(7)(e)3. 
¶34 The majority claims that "allow[ing] the filing of the 
minutes to trigger certiorari review would impermissibly strip the 
word 'decision' of any independent meaning."  Majority op., ¶23.  
The majority is incorrect.  There will be occasions where the 
minutes do not contain a decision——for example, if a board defers 
                                                 
1 This conclusion is consistent with the language of the 
statute.  The only time the phrase "in the office of the board" 
appears in the statute is in reference to the filing of the minutes 
and the filing of a decision.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)3. 
("all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of the 
board . . . ." (emphasis added)) with § 62.23(7)(e)10. ("after the 
filing of the decision [of the board] in the office of the board 
of appeals . . . ." (emphasis added)).  Reading these two 
provisions together, the legislature used the exact same phrase 
indicating 
that 
these 
two 
separate 
actions 
could 
occur 
simultaneously.  If the majority's position stands, it would render 
these two provisions in conflict, contrary to our duty to construe 
statutes harmoniously.  See State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶29, 359 
Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811 (applying the harmonious reading 
canon).  
No.  2018AP283.akz 
4 
 
voting on the matter to a later meeting.  Similarly, there will be 
occasions where a board issues a decision outside of a meeting——
as the Board did in this case with the Determination Form.  As 
such, allowing the minutes to serve as the triggering event does 
not strip "decision" of any independent meaning.   
¶35 Therefore, under the plain text of the statute, minutes 
of a board's meeting can serve as a triggering event for Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10., 
if 
the 
minutes 
meet 
the 
two 
statutory 
prerequisites:  a decision and that decision is filed in the office 
of the board.  
B.  The Triggering Event Here 
¶36 While I disagree with majority's analysis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10., 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Determination Form serves as the triggering event in this case.  
The parties argue about which of three actions may serve as the 
triggering event in this case:  the oral vote at the May 23 meeting, 
the draft minutes of the May 23 meeting, or the Determination Form 
with the approved minutes.2  Applying the two statutory 
prerequisites, only the Determination Form with approved minutes 
may serve as the triggering event for § 62.23(7)(e)10.   
¶37 Neither the oral vote at the May 23 meeting nor the draft 
minutes of the May 23 meeting may serve as the triggering event 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.  As I explained above, the oral 
vote alone cannot serve as the triggering event.  The majority 
correctly points out that an oral vote "is neither a tangible thing 
nor a document" that can be filed.  Majority op., ¶22.  However, 
                                                 
2 Because the Determination Form and the approved minutes were 
filed simultaneously, I refer to them as one collective document. 
No.  2018AP283.akz 
5 
 
Moreschi argues that the board's draft minutes that she received 
on June 28, 2017, are the triggering event in this case.  Despite 
my conclusion above that minutes may serve as the triggering event, 
Moreschi failed to show that such minutes were filed in the office 
of the board.  She argues that because the board was required to 
file the minutes under § 62.23(7)(e)3. and Village of Williams Bay 
Extraterritorial Zoning Ordinance § 18.1716(C)(2), the draft 
minutes must serve as the triggering event.  While the filing of 
the minutes could normally serve as the triggering event, nothing 
in the record supports the conclusion that the draft minutes were 
actually filed in the office of the board, as the statute requires.  
As such, the draft minutes of the May 23 meeting cannot serve as 
the triggering event for certiorari review under § 62.23(7)(e)10.3   
¶38 Thus, in this case, the triggering event must be the 
Determination Form with the approved minutes.  Both the 
Determination Form and the approved minutes contain the board's 
decision to grant the Edwards' variance request, satisfying the 
first statutory prerequisite.  As the board acknowledges, these 
documents were filed in the office of the board on July 31, 2017, 
satisfying the second statutory prerequisite.  Accordingly, the 
Determination Form with the approved minutes meet the two statutory 
prerequisites of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. and serve as the 
triggering event in this case.  
II.  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
3 If Moreschi wished to compel the board to file the minutes, 
she could have filed an action in mandamus in the circuit court to 
compel the board to file the minutes.  See State ex. rel. Milwaukee 
Cnty. Pers. Rev. Bd. v. Clarke, 2006 WI App 186, ¶40, 296 
Wis. 2d 210, 723 N.W.2d 141. 
No.  2018AP283.akz 
6 
 
¶39 I agree with the majority opinion's conclusions in this 
case and its analyses of Moreschi's due process and certiorari 
review challenges.  But I do not join the majority's analysis of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. in full because the majority 
inexplicably concludes that minutes of a board's meeting cannot 
serve as a triggering event under § 62.23(7)(e)10., even though 
the minutes can meet the statutory prerequisites for certiorari 
review.  While I write separately as to the proper interpretation 
of § 62.23(7)(e)10., I reach the same conclusion as the majority—
—the filing of the Determination Form is the triggering event in 
this case.  As a result, I respectfully concur, and I join all of 
the majority opinion except ¶¶23-24.  
¶40 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶41 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence.  
 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶42 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The Board 
violated its own governing ordinance and then altered its minutes, 
adding findings that were never made during the hearing.  The 
majority overlooks these unlawful and improper acts.1  I cannot.  
I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶43 The Village of Williams Bay enacted Ordinance § 18.1700, 
the "Extraterritorial Zoning Ordinance for the Village of Williams 
Bay."2  Section 18.1701C details the "INTENT" of the ordinance, 
which, as material, provides: 
 
It is the general intent of this ETZ Ordinance to regulate 
and restrict the use of all structures, lands, and 
waters; . . . and regulate and restrict size and location 
of all structures so as to; lessen congestion . . .; secure 
safety from fire, flooding, panic, and other dangers; 
provide adequate light, air sanitation and drainage; 
prevent 
overcrowding; 
avoid 
undue 
population 
concentration; protect property values; further the 
appropriate use of land and conservation of natural 
resources[.]  
The ordinance then sets forth all the rules for each zoning 
district based on the classification of property.  As applicable 
to the Edwardses' property, the ordinance requires a Single-Family 
Residence to be placed at a "[m]inimum 25 feet" from the rear 
property line and at a "[m]inimum 15 feet" from the side property 
line.  Ord. § 18.1703M(D). 
                                                 
1 I use the term "majority" to refer collectively to the lead 
and concurring opinions.   
2 Williams Bay Ordinance § 18.1700 may be viewed at 
https://www.williamsbay.org/#ordinances (last accessed on Nov. 23, 
2020) (all caps omitted). 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
2 
 
 
¶44 The ordinance created the "Zoning Board of Appeals for 
each Extraterritorial Zoning District" for the "purpose of hearing 
appeals and applications and for granting variances[.]"  Ord. 
§ 18.1716(A).  This section also establishes the rules the Zoning 
Board must follow and directs that the Zoning Board's minutes 
"shall be kept" "showing the vote of each member upon each 
question, the reasons for the Board's determination, and its 
findings of facts."  Ord. § 18.1716(C)(2).  The ordinance prohibits 
the Zoning Board from granting a variance "unless it finds beyond 
a reasonable doubt that all of the following facts and conditions 
exist and so indicates in the minutes of its proceedings."  As 
pertinent to the variance sought by the Edwardses, Ordinance 
§ 18.1716(H) provides:3 
                                                 
3 Ordinance § 18.1716(H) contains a sixth factor in subsection 
(F) applicable only to C-4 ETZ Districts, the purpose of which "is 
to preserve, protect, and enhance the lakes, streams, and wetland 
areas in the ETZ Zoning District."  Ordinance § 18.1703J.  That 
factor provides: 
(F) 
Additional Requirements in C-4 ETZ Districts:  No 
variance shall be granted where: 
(A) Filling and development contrary to the purpose 
and intent of the C-4 ETZ District would result. 
(B) A change in the boundaries of the C-4 ETZ 
District would result. 
(C) A lower degree of flood protection that a point 
two (2) feet above the 100-year recurrence interval 
flood for the particular area would result. 
 
(D) Any action contrary to the provisions of 
Chapter NR-116 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
would result. 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
3 
 
No variance to the provisions of this Ordinance shall be 
granted by the Board unless it finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that all of the following facts and conditions 
exist and so indicates such in the minutes of its 
proceedings. 
(A) 
Preservation of Intent:  No variance shall be 
granted that is not consistent with the purpose and 
intent of the regulations for the district in which 
the development is located. No variance shall have 
the effect of permitting a use in any district that 
is not a stated permitted use, accessory use, or 
conditional use in that particular district. 
(B) 
Exceptional 
Circumstances: 
There 
must 
be 
exceptional, 
extraordinary, 
or 
unusual 
circumstances or conditions applying to the lot or 
parcel, structure, use, or intended use that do not 
apply generally to other properties of uses in the 
same district, and the granting of the variance 
should not be of so general or recurrent nature as 
to suggest that this Ordinance should be changed. 
(C) 
Economic Hardship and Self-Imposed Hardship Not 
Grounds for Variance:  No variance shall be granted 
solely on the basis of economic gain or loss. Self-
imposed hardships shall not be considered as 
grounds for the granting of a variance.  
(D) 
Preservation of Property Rights:  The variance must 
be necessary for the preservation and enjoyment of 
substantial property rights possessed by other 
properties in the same district and same vicinity.  
(E) 
Absence of Detriment:  No variance shall be granted 
that will create substantial detriment to adjacent 
property or that will materially impair or be 
contrary to the purpose and spirit of this 
Ordinance or the public interest.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶45 The record contains the transcript of the Zoning Board's 
May 23, 2017 hearing.  It is undisputed that during the hearing no 
                                                 
None of the parties claim that the Edwardses' property is located 
in a C-4 ETZ Lowland Reserve Conservation District. 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
4 
 
member of the Board expressed any finding "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" nor addressed the five findings required by the ordinance.  
The transcript reveals exactly what occurred: 
 The Edwardses' attorney explained they wanted a variance 
due to the 12 percent slope of their lot; because of the 
slope, the septic system needed to be in a certain spot, 
limiting where the home could be built. 
 Board Chairman Richard Tuma asked if there were any 
questions. 
 Board member Vernon Choyce asked whether the septic could 
be a mound system instead; Mr. Edwards answered they were 
told the preferred system for sanitation was "in ground." 
 Several neighbors stated they were in favor of the 
variance. 
 Moreschi's attorney relayed the history of the case, 
outlined the legal requirements the Edwardses needed to 
prove to secure the variance, and discussed with the Board 
whether the file was missing paperwork upon which the Town 
of Linn Plan Commission had conditioned its approval. 
 Board member Robert Winter asked Moreschi's attorney what 
he meant when he said granting a variance would be "against 
the law" and counsel explained the variance would be 
against the law unless the Board would find that the five 
ordinance factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 There was some discussion about the packet of documents 
Moreschi provided to the Board at the last minute, whether 
the ordinance reflecting the five factors was contained 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
5 
 
within the packet, whether the Town of Linn actually 
approved or merely recommended a variance and whether it 
did so without actually receiving the proper documentation. 
 Moreschi spoke at length about why she opposed the 
variance. 
 Several other people spoke in opposition to granting the 
variance. 
 The Edwardses' lawyer responded to some of the comments 
opposing the variance, argued that the five factors were 
satisfied, and addressed the burden of proof. 
 Mr. Edwards spoke, expressing it was not his intent to 
cause dissension in the community and discussing his 
investment in building his home. 
 Two more people spoke generally about the neighborhood and 
the changes happening there. 
 Moreschi told the Board that Mr. Edwards said he needed a 
variance in order to preserve the old trees, but since his 
trees had died, the space available on his lot had changed. 
 Moreschi's attorney apologized for not providing the packet 
of information to the Board earlier, explaining the timing 
was connected to the public notice date for the hearing. 
 An individual suggested the Board hold off on issuing a 
decision until it could ask the Town of Linn to determine 
whether it had in fact received the information upon which 
it had conditioned its approval. 
 Board member Choyce asked the Building Inspector about the 
Inspector's letter referring to the 12 percent slope in 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
6 
 
which he "said the remaining four items do not apply."  
Choyce explained he did not "know what the remaining four 
items are."  The building inspector responded that he would 
"strike that last sentence" in his letter.4 
 Chairman Tuma then attempted to call for a vote on the 
variance request, but Board member Winter asked if there 
could be "some discussion first[.]"  Winter then mentioned 
he lives in the Town of Linn——in the same subdivision 
involved——and how the area is changing, "[s]o what we do 
today might have a lot of impact upon what's gonna happen 
in the future."   
 Board member Mike O'Brien said it seems like the Board 
keeps trying to move forward with a decision on this but 
keeps discussing the same topics. 
 Board member Choyce said "the only thing that I see is the 
exceptional circumstances."  He said that he has built 
homes in that subdivision and suggested using a mound 
system would make everything work:  "I've built in 
Knollwood and put a house on a lot that had a significant 
slope for a client, we were able to make everything work 
and inclusive of the septic system by doing mounds.  So 
everybody's talked about holding tanks and regular septic 
systems, but I haven't heard a soul talk about a mound 
                                                 
4 This discussion during the hearing appears to relate to the 
Building Inspector's letter discussing conditions on the lot that 
may provide a topographical basis to satisfy the exceptional 
circumstances requirement for the variance.  This does not refer 
to the five ordinance factors. 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
7 
 
system, so I'm not certain I see that there's an 
exceptional circumstance that the home, uh, be approved."    
Choyce expressed not knowing how to deal with the fact that 
the variance request came so late——after the foundation 
had already been put in:  "I would've thought this would've 
all been done ahead of time.  Um, but I'm not sure how to 
get around that." 
 Chairman Tuma then immediately asked for a motion to 
approve, which Winter made, and Tuma seconded.  Then Tuma 
said:  "All those in favor, signify by saying 'aye,'" and 
all four Board members simultaneously said "aye." 
¶46 Aside from Choyce's concern about the exceptional 
circumstance factor, none of the Zoning Board's four members 
discussed or even mentioned any of the five required ordinance 
factors.  Additionally, not a single Board member acknowledged the 
burden of proof each member was required to apply.  Although the 
lawyers presented argument on the five ordinance factors as well 
as the burden of proof, the Board members simply voted "aye" as a 
group to granting the variance, without discussing or mentioning 
the required findings and without stating that each had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The original minutes from the May 23, 
2017 meeting, which were sent to Moreschi on June 28, 2017, 
provided:  
Consider Variance 
Williams and Susan Edwards, W4247 Indian Drive, Lake 
Geneva, WI 53147 (Linn Township), Tax Key ICI-160 
The petitioner is requesting a variance to zoning code 
section 18.1703M(D) to allow a rear yard setback of 18' 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
8 
 
(25' required) and a side yard setback of 6' (15' 
required). 
Board of Appeals Decision: The Village of Williams Bay 
Extraterritorial Zoning Board of Appeals, during the 
meeting of March 23, 2017 for the petition of Williams 
and Susan Edwards requesting a variance to the zoning 
code section 18.1703M(D) to allow a rear yard setback of 
18' (25' required) and a side yard setback of 6' (15' 
required). Robert Winter moved to APPROVE the request. 
Richard Tuma seconded the motion. A vote was taken and 
carried unanimously by those present. 4 – AYE (Richard 
Tuma, Vernon Choyce, Mike O'Brien, Robert Winter), 0 – 
NAY. The request was APPROVED. 
Board of Appeals Findings: 
The Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning 
Board of Appeals felt that there was a lack of detriment 
and allowed the variance. 
¶47 After Moreschi filed her certiorari action in the 
circuit court seeking reversal because the Zoning Board did not  
make the required findings at the hearing (beyond a reasonable 
doubt or otherwise), someone on the Zoning Board's behalf rewrote 
the minutes and prepared a written Determination form.  These new 
minutes, which the Board calls the "official" or "approved" 
minutes, were released on August 1, 2017, 70 days after the Board's 
oral decision: 
Consider Variance  
Williams and Susan Edwards, W4247 Indian Drive, Lake 
Geneva, WI 53147 (Linn Township), Tax Key ICI-160  
The petitioner is requesting a variance to zoning code 
section 18.1703M(D) to allow a rear yard setback of 18' 
(25' required) and a side yard setback of 6' (15' 
required).  
Board of Appeals Decision: A motion was made by Robert 
Winter to approve the variance requested by William and 
Susan Edwards to zoning code section 18.1703M(D) to 
allow a rear yard setback of 18' and north side lot set 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
9 
 
back of 6'. The motion was seconded by Richard Tuma. A 
vote was taken and the motion carried unanimously. 4 - 
Aye (Richard Tuma, Vernon Choice, Mike O'Brien, Robert 
Winter), 0- Nay. The variance was granted.  
Board of Appeals Findings: The Village of Williams Bay 
Extraterritorial 
Zoning 
Board 
of 
Appeals 
having 
considered all of the testimony and evidence presented 
at the hearing found beyond a reasonable doubt that all 
of the facts and conditions set forth in ETZ Zoning 
Ordinance Sec. 18.1716(H) exist in favor of granting the 
requested variance. The Board reviewed the application 
for variance and attached documents; letter from Town of 
Linn approving the variance; letters from citizens in 
favor and opposed to the variance; documents presented 
by Attorney Thompson; along with other documents 
presented at the hearing. The Board heard testimony from 
Mr. Edwards and his attorney, Mara Spring re: why the 
variance was necessary. The Board heard testimony from 
citizens in favor and opposed to the variance, including 
Attorney Thompson on behalf of Ms. Moreschi. 
¶48 The four members of the Board who were present at the 
May 23, 2017 hearing subsequently signed and issued a written 
decision, titled "Determination Form" and dated July 31, 2017.  
The Determination Form explicitly references all five ordinance 
factors and the proper burden of proof: 
The Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning 
Board of Appeals having considered all of the testimony 
and evidence presented at the hearing finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that all of the facts and conditions 
set forth in ETZ Zoning Ordinance Sec. 18.1716(H) exist 
in favor of granting the requested variance. The Board 
reviewed the application for variance and attached 
documents; letter from Town of Linn approving the 
variance; letters from citizens in favor and opposed to 
the variance; documents presented by Attorney Thompson; 
along with other documents presented at the hearing. The 
Board heard testimony from Mr. Edwards and his attorney, 
Mara Spring re: why the variance was necessary. The Board 
heard testimony from citizens in favor and opposed to 
the variance, including Attorney Thompson on behalf of 
Ms. Moreschi. The Board reviewed the Affidavit of the 
Walworth County Sanitarian. The Affidavit of the 
Sanitarian does not dispute the Edwards representations 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
10 
 
re: the location of the septic system on their property. 
The affidavit indicates some possibilities re: other 
septic alternatives, but does not state that any of these 
alternatives can definitely be applied on the Edwards 
property. The Board found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that: (1) the requested variance is consistent with the 
purpose and content of the regulations for the district 
and a permitted use - a single family residence; (2) 
exceptional circumstances exist re: the location of the 
septic system on the lot and a 12% slope on the lot 
justifying the requested variance; (3) economic hardship 
is not the basis for granting the variance; (4) the 
variance is necessary to preserve the property rights 
and enjoyment of the property by the owner who looks to 
build a single family home on the property that is 
consistent with other homes in the district; and (5) the 
variance will not create a substantial detriment to the 
adjacent properties because the new home will be set 
back further from the property lines than the pre-
existing home. 
While the Board may control the drafting of the minutes, it cannot 
control the past; it is what it was and not what the Board says. 
II 
¶49 In reviewing the Zoning Board's decision, this court's 
review is limited to determining: 
(1) whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) 
whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3) 
whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the board might reasonably 
make the order or determination in question based on the 
evidence. 
State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 
2004 WI 23, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401. 
¶50 The Zoning Board failed to proceed on a correct theory 
of law in considering the Edwardses' variance request.  The Board 
violated its own ordinance, which required it to make five findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt and on the record at the hearing before 
it had the authority to grant a variance.  The transcript of the 
No.  2018AP283.rgb 
 
11 
 
May 23, 2017, hearing reflects that the Board neither discussed 
nor made findings on the ordinance's five factors.  Chairman Tuma 
let everyone who wanted to make a statement speak, and then he 
immediately called for a vote.  Board member Winter asked for 
discussion time.  During that discussion, Board member Choyce said 
he had not seen evidence of exceptional circumstances, but did not 
know what to do about that since the home's foundation had already 
been completed.  Without any discussion of the five factors or any 
mention by any Board member of the burden of proof, a vote was 
taken and the variance was granted. 
¶51 The ordinance governing the Board required it to deny 
any variance unless it (1) finds that five facts and conditions 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) "so indicates such in the 
minutes of its proceedings."  Ord. § 18.1716(H).  In other words, 
the ordinance required the Board members to make findings beyond 
a reasonable doubt that "all of" the five "facts and conditions" 
are present before granting any variance.  In violation of the 
ordinance, the Board instead granted the variance with no mention 
of the five factors, which are:  (1) preservation of intent; (2) 
exceptional circumstances; (3) economic hardship cannot be the 
sole basis for the variance, nor can self-imposed hardship be 
considered as grounds for granting a variance; (4) preservation of 
property rights; and (5) absence of detriment.  If the Board makes 
those five findings at the hearing, they must be noted in the 
minutes.  More importantly, if the Board neglects to make any of 
these findings at the hearing, logically they cannot be indicated 
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in the minutes of the proceedings and the variance cannot be 
granted. 
¶52 At the May 23rd hearing, not a single Board member made 
a finding on preservation of intent——at all——let alone to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  Not a single Board member 
found that the Edwardses had proven the economic hardship, 
preservation of property rights, or absence of detriment factors 
either, and certainly not to the proper burden.  Only one Board 
member seemingly found that this property did not present 
exceptional circumstances, but the Board itself did not address 
this finding and the Board member ultimately ignored it when he 
voted to grant the variance.  This is a direct violation of the 
Board's own ordinance. 
¶53 Although the ordinance requires the Board to include its 
findings in the minutes, the Board failed to meet this requirement 
too.  The governing ordinance requires that "Minutes of the 
proceedings and a record of all actions shall be kept by the 
secretary, or other designated person, showing the vote of each 
member 
upon 
each 
question, 
the 
reasons 
for 
the 
Board's 
determination, and its finding of facts."  Ord. § 18.1716(C)(2).   
Minutes are a record of what happens at a hearing.  Minutes, 
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("Memoranda or notes of a 
transaction, proceeding, or meeting.").  They are "[a]n official 
record of the proceedings of a meeting."  Minutes, The American 
Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011).  Minutes, therefore, cannot 
contain things that did not actually happen at the meeting.  
Despite this fundamental characteristic of meeting minutes, the 
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Board's "official" minutes contain things that did not even occur 
at the meeting.  The transcript expressly shows the falsification 
of the minutes.  Of course, it is not unusual for minutes of a 
meeting to be circulated in a draft form first so that members of 
an organization may review the minutes to make corrections before 
they are finalized and approved.  This process, however, cannot 
reinvent history; minutes must be limited to that which actually 
occurred at the hearing.  The "official" minutes created by the 
Board do not reflect what really happened at the May 23rd hearing.  
Instead, the minutes contain content generated in reaction to 
Moreschi's certiorari petition. 
¶54 The Board's "findings" in the "official" minutes say the 
Board "found beyond a reasonable doubt" that all of the ordinance's 
factors "exist."  Board members never said anything close to this 
at the hearing.  The findings section also refers to the Board 
having "heard testimony."  To the contrary, no witnesses were 
sworn.  People spoke informally, giving statements in favor of or 
against the variance.  The rewritten minutes reflect a complete 
overhaul of the draft minutes to insert things that never happened 
in an attempt to rectify the Board's failure to comply with the 
ordinance's dictates. 
¶55 The Board's fabrication of the "official" minutes 
highlights what the Board neglected to do, in violation of the 
ordinance.  The "draft" minutes, which Moreschi obtained in June 
2017, fare no better.  Those minutes contain a single finding:  
"that there was a lack of detriment."  No Board member, however, 
discussed the lack of detriment factor and no Board member made 
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any finding with respect to that factor.  Those minutes do not 
reflect what occurred at the May 23rd hearing either. 
¶56 Instead of following the mandates of its own ordinance, 
the Board granted the variance first and only after Moreschi filed 
her certiorari action did the Board perfunctorily recite the facts 
and conditions to justify what amounts to an unlawful exercise of 
its will and not its judgment.5  The majority should have 
acknowledged what actually happened instead of ratifying the 
Board's acts.  This court should have sent the matter back to the 
Board and directed it to follow its own ordinance.  The Board's 
post hoc attempt to pretend it did what the ordinance required 
should not relieve it of its obligation to follow the law. 
¶57 I would reverse the Board's decision granting the 
variance and remand the matter to the Board to act in accordance 
with the law.  Even though this may have resulted in the Board 
simply reconvening on remand, stating the required findings on the 
record based on the proper burden of proof, and ultimately voting 
the same way, at least the Board would then have followed the law 
the Village of Williams Bay enacted.  Local government must follow 
the law that binds it.  When a zoning board blatantly violates its 
own rules, a court should not allow the decision to stand.  
Instead, the majority looks the other way without bothering to 
                                                 
5 I agree with court of appeals Judge Paul Reilly, who 
concluded, in his dissent to the court of appeals opinion affirming 
the Board's decision, that "[t]he Board's manufactured 'decision' 
seventy days later——after it learned what it did was wrong via 
Moreschi's certiorari action——invented findings that were never 
made by the Board and violated due process and is not fair play."  
Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay, No. 2018AP283, unpublished 
slip op., ¶35 (Wis. Ct. App. July 31, 2019). 
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address the Board's farcical if not mendacious procedures.  The 
majority gives the Board a free pass to disregard its own governing 
laws.  I will not, and I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
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