Case Title: State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4382

Docket Number: 20050419

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St.3d 180, 2005-Ohio-4382.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DOUGLAS, APPELLANT, v. BURLEW, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St.3d 180, 2005-Ohio-4382.] 
Writ of prohibition sought to prevent municipal court from proceeding in a 
driving-under-the-influence case — Upon remand from appellate court, 
lower court is required to proceed from point at which error occurred — 
If error occurred prior to dismissal of one charge, court does not lack 
jurisdiction to set aside that dismissal upon remand — Court of Appeals’ 
dismissal of petition affirmed. 
(No. 2005-0419 ─ Submitted June 14, 2005 ─ Decided September 7, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-040872. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ 
of prohibition to prevent a municipal court judge from exercising jurisdiction over 
a criminal charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). 
{¶ 2} In June 2003, appellant, Amber Douglas, was cited for two DUI 
counts.  Count A charged Douglas with violating former R.C. 4511.19(A)(6) (“No 
person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if any of the following 
apply:  The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one gram or 
more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person’s breath.” 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3564).  Count B charged 
Douglas with violating former R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) (“No person shall operate any 
vehicle * * * within this state, if any of the following apply:  The person is under 
the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse.”  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3564).  Counts A and B 
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were both charged in one criminal case against Douglas in the Hamilton County 
Municipal Court. 
{¶ 3} Douglas moved to suppress the results of her breath-alcohol test.  
On October 8, 2003, appellee, Judge John H. Burlew, of the municipal court, 
denied the motion. 
{¶ 4} On November 18, 2003, Douglas entered into an agreement with 
the state in which she pleaded no contest to Count A (R.C. 4511.19(A)(6)) in 
return for the state’s dismissal of Count B (R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)).  Judge Burlew 
sentenced Douglas upon her no-contest plea to Count A and dismissed Count B. 
{¶ 5} Douglas appealed her conviction and sentence.  She asserted that 
Judge Burlew erred in not granting her motion to suppress her breath-alcohol-test 
results.  The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County reversed the municipal court 
judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  State v. Douglas, 
Hamilton App. No. C-030897, 2004-Ohio-5726, 2004 WL 2421847.  The court of 
appeals determined that the state had failed to establish that it had substantially 
complied with an Ohio Department of Health regulation governing the testing of 
breath-alcohol levels.  Id. at ¶ 5-7, 11. 
{¶ 6} On November 16, 2004, Judge Burlew granted the state’s motion 
to set aside the dismissal of Count B.  Judge Burlew then set the case for trial. 
{¶ 7} On December 17, 2004, Douglas filed a petition in the court of 
appeals, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Burlew from exercising 
jurisdiction over Count B.  Judge Burlew moved to dismiss the petition for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On January 21, 2005, the court 
of appeals granted Judge Burlew’s motion and dismissed the petition. 
{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court upon Douglas’s appeal as of 
right. 
{¶ 9} Douglas asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing her 
prohibition action.  In order to be entitled to the writ, Douglas must establish that 
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(1) Judge Burlew is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that 
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for 
which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  Tatman v. 
Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 
1130, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 10} “ ‘In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, 
a court having general subject matter jurisdiction can determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by 
appeal.’ ”  State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 99 Ohio St.3d 402, 2003-Ohio-4124, 
792 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio 
St.3d 426, 428-429, 751 N.E.2d 472.  For the following reasons, Judge Burlew 
does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal of 
Count B and proceed on that DUI charge. 
{¶ 11} “Upon remand from an appellate court, the lower court is required 
to proceed from the point at which the error occurred.”  State ex rel. Stevenson v. 
Murray (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 112, 113, 23 O.O.3d 160, 431 N.E.2d 324.  This 
rule has been applied to criminal cases.  See State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867; State v. Gonzales, 151 Ohio App.3d 160, 2002-
Ohio-4937, 783 N.E.2d 903, ¶ 61; State v. Leonard (June 21, 2001), Franklin 
App. No. 00AP-1229, 2001 WL 697999. 
{¶ 12} As Judge Burlew notes, the error occurred when he denied 
Douglas’s motion to suppress her breath-alcohol-test results, which occurred 
before Douglas entered a plea of no contest to one DUI charge in return for the 
state’s dismissal of the remaining DUI charge in the criminal case.  Therefore, 
setting aside the dismissal of Count B is arguably supported by Stevenson and 
comparable cases. 
{¶ 13} Moreover, the sole case relied upon by Douglas is distinguishable 
from this case.  In State ex rel. Flynt v. Dinkelacker, 156 Ohio App.3d 595, 2004-
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Ohio-1695, 807 N.E.2d 967, the court of appeals held that a trial court judge 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to reinstate a 15-count indictment 
when the indictment had been voluntarily dismissed by the state pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  In Flynt, the court emphasized that permitting “[a] conditional 
dismissal in a criminal matter would allow a prosecutor to keep a defendant 
perpetually indicted, without any idea concerning, or control over, when the 
matter would be resolved.”  Id. at ¶ 15; see, also, ¶ 26 (“The state cannot reinstate 
a dismissed indictment and perpetually save a place in a judge’s courtroom to 
prosecute the Flynts”).  By contrast, this case does not involve any perpetual 
condition.  Furthermore, Flynt involved the dismissal of an entire indictment 
against the named relators, whereas this case involves the dismissal of one of two 
counts in the case against Douglas.  Cf.  Crim.R. 48(A)1 (“The state may by leave 
of court and in open court file an entry of dismissal of an indictment, information, 
or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate”).  And as the court in 
Flynt noted, “When a criminal case is dismissed, it is over – except in the case 
where the dismissal is appealed.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  Here, unlike in Flynt, a part of the 
criminal case was appealed. 
{¶ 14} Similarly, we have held that a writ of prohibition will prevent the 
exercise of jurisdiction when an entire case has been dismissed.  See, e.g., Page v. 
Riley (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 621, 623, 710 N.E.2d 690 (“When a trial court 
unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has been properly voluntarily dismissed 
* * *, the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed, and 
a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction”); see, also,  
State ex rel. Hunt v. Thompson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 182, 183, 586 N.E.2d 107; 
State ex rel. Rice v. McGrath (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 70, 577 N.E.2d 1100. 
                                                 
1.  Traf.R. 20 provides, “If no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the applicable law apply.” 
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{¶ 15} Finally, we have held that comparable claims of breached plea 
agreements or double jeopardy are remediable by appeal rather than by 
extraordinary writ.  See Howard v. Randle, 95 Ohio St.3d 281, 2002-Ohio-2122, 
767 N.E.2d 268; State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 
491, 633 N.E.2d 1128; Wenzel v. Enright (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 63, 623 N.E.2d 
69, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, Judge Burlew does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal of the DUI charge and 
proceed upon the charge.  We need not expressly decide Douglas’s claims that 
Judge Burlew lacks jurisdiction, because our review is restricted to whether Judge 
Burlew patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Hummel v. 
Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 32.  Because 
Douglas has an adequate remedy by appeal to raise her claims, she is not entitled 
to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
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Lyons & Lyons Co., L.P.A., and Robert H. Lyons, for appellant. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. 
Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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