Case Title: Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Wuensch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000175

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP175 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Thomas P. Wuensch, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Heidi Wuensch, 
          Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 17, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd W. Bjerke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas C. Dill and BP Peterman Group, Brookfield; 
Robert W. Brunner and Bryan Cave LLP, Chicago, Illinois; and 
Kenneth Lee Marshall and Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco, 
California.  There was an oral argument by Kenneth Lee Marshall. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by 
Christa O. Westerberg, Susan M. Crawford, Aaron G. Dumas, and 
Pines Bach LLP, Madison.  There was an oral argument by Christa 
O. Westerberg. 
 
 
2018 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP175   
(L.C. No. 
2009CV752) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas P. Wuensch, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Heidi Wuensch, 
 
          Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 17, 2018 
 
Shelia T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW from a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals summary disposition reversing the 
La Crosse County Circuit Court's1 foreclosure judgment against 
Thomas P. Wuensch in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Todd W. Bjerke presiding. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
2 
 
Company (Deutsche Bank).2  The circuit court admitted the 
promissory note signed by Wuensch (the Note) into evidence when 
offered by Deutsche Bank through its attorney, and permitted the 
Bank to enforce the Note, ruling that the original Note, 
endorsed in blank, was sufficient to establish possession.  We 
reverse the court of appeals' summary disposition3 and affirm the 
circuit court's judgment of foreclosure.   
¶2 
The issue before this court is whether presentment by 
a party's attorney of an original, wet-ink note endorsed in 
blank is admissible evidence and enforceable against the 
borrower without further proof that the holder had possession at 
the time the foreclosure action was filed.  To answer this 
question, we must determine the evidence necessary to prove that 
an entity seeking to enforce a note against a borrower has the 
right to do so.  We hold that presentment to the trier of fact 
in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the original, wet-ink 
note endorsed in blank, establishes the holder's possession and 
entitles the holder to enforce the note.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Deutsche Bank's full title in this action is "Deutsche 
Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for American Home 
Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-2 Mortgage-Backed Pass Through 
Certificates, Series 2007-2, by American Home Mortgage Servicing 
Inc., its attorney-in-fact." 
3 Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wuensch, No. 2015AP175, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016). 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
3 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In December 2006, Wuensch signed an adjustable rate 
Note issued by HLB Mortgage for $301,500.  Wuensch secured the 
Note with a mortgage he executed in favor of the mortgagee, 
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. as nominee for 
HLB Mortgage, the lender.  By the time this action was filed, 
HLB 
had 
transferred 
the 
Note 
to 
American 
Home 
Mortgage 
Servicing, Inc. (AHM),4 HLB's parent entity, and AHM had endorsed 
the Note in blank.   
¶4 
It is uncontested that in February 2008, Wuensch 
defaulted.  He failed to make any payment on the Note after 
February 2008 and has remained in default through the pendency 
of this foreclosure action.  The events surrounding the default 
underlie the circuit court's ruling that "equity dictates that 
Wuensch be allowed one last opportunity to cure his default, 
because his default on the Note may have been caused by the 
actions of the preceding Note holders."  They also color 
Wuensch's arguments on the primary issue regarding whether 
Deutsche Bank in fact possessed the original Note.   
¶5 
Wuensch's Note required him to remain current on all 
property taxes by paying into an escrow account serviced by the 
lender, which would pay his property taxes directly from the 
escrow account.  His promised monthly mortgage payment, due the 
                                                 
4 By the time the case was before the circuit court, AHM had 
changed its name to Homeward Residential, and subsequently 
merged with or was purchased by Ocwen Financial Services, the 
current servicer of the Note. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
4 
 
first of each month, totaled $1,487.68, consisting of $1,210.98 
for the Note itself, plus $276.70, which went into escrow to 
cover property taxes.5  In August 2007, although Wuensch was 
current on his mortgage payments, he received notice from the 
Town of Onalaska that his property taxes had not been paid.  
Around this time, Wuensch learned that AHM, then in possession 
of his Note, had filed for bankruptcy earlier in the month.   
¶6 
In a letter dated February 23, 2008, AHM informed 
Wuensch it had not received his February mortgage payment.  
Wuensch claimed he had submitted payment via Western Union on 
February 15, 2008.  Wuensch's attempts to resolve the February 
payment issue were unsuccessful.  Allegedly based on the 
recommendation of an AHM employee, Wuensch stopped making 
payments on the Note altogether.  As a result, AHM sent Wuensch 
notice of acceleration dated March 4, 2008, indicating that he 
was in default and owed $2,355.89, which had become due on or 
after February 1, 2008.  Regardless of why Wuensch stopped 
making payments, there is no dispute that AHM never received any 
mortgage payments from Wuensch after February 15, 2008.  
¶7 
Deutsche Bank filed this foreclosure action against 
Wuensch in August 2009, attaching a copy of the Note to the 
complaint.  It elected to proceed to foreclosure under Wis. 
Stat. § 846.101 (2013-14), waiving any deficiency judgment 
against Wuensch, and consenting to Wuensch's continued occupancy 
                                                 
5 The moneys held in the escrow account also covered hazard 
insurance and other costs and fees.   
No. 
2015AP175   
 
5 
 
of the property until the circuit court entered confirmation of 
a sale.6   
¶8 
Deutsche Bank claimed to be the "lawful holder of said 
note and mortgage."  During the life of the loan, Wuensch's Note 
and mortgage were transferred multiple times, ultimately landing 
with Deutsche Bank on August 4, 2009.  Because of the nature of 
a note endorsed in blank, precisely how Deutsche Bank came into 
physical possession of the Note is not relevant.  For purposes 
of enforcing the Note, it is enough that Deutsche Bank was in 
possession of the original Note at trial, a copy of which was 
attached to the complaint. 
¶9 
In his answer, Wuensch denied that Deutsche Bank was a 
holder entitled to enforce the Note and denied that any payments 
were past due.  Wuensch also asserted the following affirmative 
defenses:  material misrepresentation, laches, estoppel, lack of 
standing, improper joinder of parties, and lack of note.  In an 
amended answer, Wuensch also alleged fraud and unclean hands by 
Deutsche Bank and again asserted that the Bank lacked the 
ability to foreclose.   
¶10 Pretrial proceedings continued for five years before 
the case finally came before the circuit court for a bench 
trial.  In May 2014, Deutsche Bank's attorney presented the 
original, wet-ink Note to the circuit court to inspect and asked 
the circuit court to admit into evidence a copy of the Note as a 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
6 
 
self-authenticating, "non-hearsay instrument . . . offered for 
its legal significance, not to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."7  Wuensch's counsel objected on the bases of hearsay 
and lack of personal knowledge on the part of Deutsch Bank's 
counsel, while also asserting that Deutsche Bank's counsel was 
impermissibly acting as a witness.  The circuit court overruled 
these objections and after inspecting the Note, observed: 
THE COURT:  When I looked at the document purporting 
to be an original, looks like original ink on 
signatures and appears to be the same as what has now 
been marked as a copy Exhibit 1 . . . . 
 . . . . 
It will be admitted.  
The circuit court then concluded that "plaintiff is, in my mind, 
the holder in due course of a note endorsed in blank and they 
can proceed on it."  Wuensch's counsel objected to the admission 
of the Note and questioned the validity of the signatures on and 
the assignment of the instrument, arguing that there were "no 
indentations on the initials" and "the assignments of the 
mortgage are relevant because of the false nature of them."  The 
circuit court responded, "the law is pretty clear that somebody 
that is holding a note endorsed in blank has the right to seek 
foreclosure of such a document" and that it did not think "the 
assignments were relevant when there's a note endorsed in 
blank."   
                                                 
7 Deutsche Bank's counsel also moved to admit the mortgage, 
to which Wuensch's counsel made no objection. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
7 
 
¶11 Deutsche Bank called one witness at trial, Rasheed 
Blanchard, a loan analyst from Ocwen Financial Corporation, the 
entity that serviced the loan.  He testified as to Wuensch's 
payment history and the processes by which Ocwen serviced the 
loan.   
¶12 Wuensch testified regarding the difficulty he had 
contacting AHM to resolve the 2007 property tax issue, the 
payment history leading up to his default, and the events that 
followed his default.  He also claimed that the Note presented 
by 
Deutsche 
Bank 
did 
not 
contain 
his 
original, 
wet-ink 
signature. 
¶13 In December 2014, the circuit court issued findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in its judgment and order.  It 
determined that Deutsche Bank "is entitled to a judgment of 
foreclosure of the Defendant's mortgage."  It found Deutsche 
Bank:  
is the holder of the original Note, endorsed in blank.  
The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has in its 
possession the original ink Note.  The Plaintiff 
produced the original Note at trial and the Court 
examined it.  The Court is satisfied that it is the 
original Note executed by Wuensch on December 18, 
2006.  Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate copy of the 
original ink Note.  
No. 
2015AP175   
 
8 
 
It further found Wuensch was in default on the Note in the 
principal amount of $315,233.64.8   
¶14 The circuit court concluded that Wuensch's arguments 
regarding 
allegedly 
fraudulent 
practices 
associated 
with 
mortgage-backed securities comprised of pooled mortgages such as 
his own were "beyond the scope of this case."  Relying on Dow 
Family, LLC v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 2014 WI 56, ¶21, 354 Wis. 2d 
796, 848 N.W.2d 728, the circuit court ruled that "[u]nder the 
doctrine of equitable assignment, a mortgage automatically 
follows the assignment of the note."  The circuit court applied 
the Dow Family holding that "security for a note is equitably 
assigned upon transfer of the note, without need for a written 
assignment."  Pivotally, the circuit court held that "[t]he 
holder of an original note endorsed in blank has the right to 
enforce the note"; therefore, Deutsche Bank had standing to 
bring the foreclosure action against Wuensch.   
¶15 The circuit court, however, exercised its equitable 
authority to delay entry of the foreclosure judgment and permit 
Wuensch the opportunity to return to the position he occupied 
prior to the default event of February 2008.  It explained:  
                                                 
8 The principal amount for which Wuensch was found liable 
exceeds the original principal amount in the Note because the 
Note provided for changes in the interest rate and the monthly 
payment, resulting in the amount of Wuensch’s monthly payment 
not fully paying accrued interest.  In the Note, Wuensch agreed 
"THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT I MUST REPAY COULD BE LARGER THAN THE 
AMOUNT I ORIGINALLY BORROWED" but the Note capped the principal 
amount at not more than 110% of the original amount.   
No. 
2015AP175   
 
9 
 
Even if the Plaintiff is without blame for the 
problems with Wuensch's mortgage, the same cannot be 
said 
about 
the 
preceding 
holders 
of 
his 
Note.  
Although the question of whether Wuensch's Note was 
fraudulently passed between creditors before it came 
into the Plaintiff's possession is beyond the scope of 
this case, the Court is convinced that the seemingly 
unregulated 
transferring 
of 
mortgages 
during 
the 
housing bubble and crash contributed to Wuensch 
finding himself in this position. 
Accordingly, the circuit court stayed entry of the judgment 
until January 24, 2015, to allow Wuensch to cure the default by 
paying 
Deutsche 
Bank 
$347,826.03——the 
sum 
of 
the 
unpaid 
principal, plus expenses paid by Deutsche Bank for property 
taxes, hazard insurance, and other costs and fees.  If Wuensch 
did not pay that amount by January 24th, the circuit court would 
enter judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank for the 
entire amount sought——totaling $455,641.85. 
¶16 Wuensch appealed in September 2015 and the court of 
appeals 
summarily 
reversed 
the 
judgment 
of 
foreclosure.  
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wuensch, No. 2015AP175, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016).  Wuensch argued 
the circuit court lacked a factual basis to enter judgment of 
foreclosure against him because Deutsche Bank did not prove it 
was the holder of the original Note entitled to enforce it.  Id. 
at 4.  He contended that Deutsche Bank was required to present 
evidence not only that the purported original Note was in fact 
the original Note, but also that Deutsche Bank's counsel had 
obtained the Note from the Bank.  Id.  Wuensch insisted that 
possession alone of the purported original Note endorsed in 
blank was not enough to prove possession.  Id. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
10 
 
¶17 The court of appeals agreed.  It held that Wuensch's 
pleadings and his objections as to authenticity and possession 
at trial placed "possession of the original note in dispute, and 
there is no dispute that this was an issue that the plaintiff 
had to prove at trial."  Id.  Citing Wis. Stat. §§ 906.02 ("A 
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter."), 906.03(1) ("which provides 
that a witness must take an oath before testifying"), and 
901.04(2) ("a judge is to make preliminary determinations on the 
qualifications of a person to be a witness"), the court of 
appeals held as "axiomatic" the rule "that 'unsworn statements' 
have 'no proper place' as substitutes for evidence in a trial."  
Id. at 5 (citations omitted).  The court of appeals recognized 
the "difficulties" the Bank's counsel would have encountered had 
he attempted to testify as to his personal knowledge surrounding 
the Note and its possession.  Id. at 5.  Nevertheless, the court 
of appeals held that the Bank was required to present testimony 
from a witness with personal knowledge who could verify 
possession of the Note by the Bank up to the moment Deutsche 
Bank's attorney presented the Note to the circuit court.  Id. at 
6-7. 
¶18 Acknowledging that the "mandate reversing the judgment 
of foreclosure in this action may appear at first blush to 
elevate form over substance and to produce a highly inefficient 
result," the court of appeals nonetheless persisted in holding 
that possession by the Bank's counsel would not suffice to prove 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
11 
 
possession by the Bank itself or the concomitant right to 
enforce the Note endorsed in blank.  Id. at 8.  Deutsche Bank 
filed a petition for review, which this court granted.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 "Our review requires us to construe a statute and 
apply it to the facts of the case."  Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 
2006 WI 62, ¶4, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213.  Ordinarily, a 
circuit court's "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses."  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  Furthermore, "the 
decision whether to admit evidence is within the circuit court's 
discretion."  State v. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, ¶10, 374 Wis. 2d 220, 
892 N.W.2d 637 (citing State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶17, 361 Wis. 
2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 501 (2017).  
However, the application of a statute to the facts of a case is 
a question of law this court reviews de novo, although the court 
benefits from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Warehouse II, 291 Wis. 2d 80, ¶4 (first citing State 
v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315; and 
then citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700). 
III. DISCUSION 
¶20 In mortgage foreclosure actions, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving the terms of indebtedness secured by a 
mortgage.  Mitchell Bank v. Schanke, 2004 WI 13, ¶32, 268 Wis. 
2d 571, 676 N.W.2d 849 (citing Doyon & Rayne Lumber Co. v. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
12 
 
Nichols, 196 Wis. 387, 390, 220 N.W. 181 (1928)) (noting the 
"requirement that the mortgagee prove the existence of debt in 
order to foreclose on the mortgage, as a mortgage cannot exist 
without a debt"); see PNC Bank, N.A. v. Bierbrauer, 2013 WI App 
11, ¶10, 346 Wis. 2d 1, 827 N.W.2d 124.  This includes verifying 
that foreclosure proceedings are maintained by the party with 
the right to enforce the note, a requirement that is not a mere 
formality.  See Bierbrauer, 346 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10.  It is in fact a 
foundational precondition for any foreclosure action, protecting 
borrowers from wrongful loss of their homes, affording lenders a 
procedure 
for 
enforcing 
notes, 
and 
providing 
certainty 
surrounding property rights in mortgages.  See, e.g., David A. 
Dana, Why Mortgage "Formalities" Matter, 24 Loy. Consumer L. 
Rev. 
505, 
507-08 
(2012); 
Elizabeth 
Renuart, 
Uneasy 
Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the U.C.C., 48 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 1205, 1212 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, The Paper 
Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of 
Mortgage Title, 63 Duke L.J. 637, 648 (2013). 
¶21 In ascertaining who has the right to enforce a note, 
we begin with the language of the relevant statutes, a step the 
court of appeals mostly relegated to footnotes.  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 663, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Article 3 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), codified in Wisconsin at ch. 403 in 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
13 
 
1995, provides that where a note is negotiable,9 it may be 
enforced by a "holder."  Wis. Stat. § 403.301.  A "holder," as 
relevant 
here, 
includes 
"the 
person 
in 
possession 
of 
a 
negotiable instrument that is payable . . . to bearer."  Wis. 
Stat. § 401.201(2)(km)1.  A "bearer" includes a person in 
possession of an instrument endorsed in blank.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 401.201(2)(cm).  "If endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes 
payable to bearer," and can be "negotiated by transfer of 
possession alone."10  Wis. Stat. § 403.205(2); Bierbrauer, 346 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶12. 
                                                 
9 A note is a negotiable instrument, defined as "an 
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, 
with or without interest or other charges," provided that all of 
the following apply: 
(1) The note "is payable to the bearer or to order at the 
time that it is issued or first comes into possession of a 
holder." 
(2) The note "is payable on demand or at a definite time." 
(3) "It does not state any other undertaking or instruction 
by" the borrower or lender (subject to a few, inapplicable 
exceptions). 
 
Wis. Stat. § 403.104(1) (2013-14).  The Note at issue here is 
unquestionably a negotiable instrument.   
10 A blank endorsement, or an endorsement in blank, is 
"[o]ne made by the mere writing of the indorser's name on the 
back of the note or bill, without mention of the name of any 
person in whose favor the indorsement is made, but with the 
implied understanding that any lawful holder may fill in his own 
name above the indorsement if he so chooses."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 774 (6th ed. 1990) (also spelled "indorsement"). 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
14 
 
¶22 Wuensch makes a variety of arguments undercut by a 
plain reading of the statutes and application of relevant case 
law.  First, Wuensch argues that Deutsche Bank is not a 
"holder."  He asserts that self-authentication is not equivalent 
to showing physical possession.  He also insists that physical 
possession of the original Note by Deutsche Bank's trial counsel 
does not make the Bank a "bearer" and that "unsworn statements" 
by trial counsel were insufficient to prove possession by 
Deutsche Bank.  
¶23 We reject Wuensch's arguments and uphold the circuit 
court's admission of a copy of the original Note into evidence 
based upon the court's inspection of the original Note and its 
self-authentication.  The circuit court compared the Note and 
the copy side-by-side, observed that the copy was identical to 
the original, and admitted the copy into evidence.11  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 909.015(3) permits the trier of fact to compare 
specimens 
that 
have 
been 
authenticated, 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 909.02(9) 
provides 
that 
commercial 
paper 
is 
self-
authenticating under chs. 401-411.  Because the circuit court 
admitted the copy of the self-authenticating Note based upon a 
proper application of the law, its exercise of discretion was 
not erroneous.   
                                                 
11 We note Wis. Stat. § 910.03 provides that "[a] duplicate 
is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a 
genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the 
original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit 
the duplicate in lieu of the original." 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
15 
 
¶24 As a preliminary matter, we conclude that a person who 
possesses an original note endorsed in blank is the "holder" of 
that note.  The "holder" is a person entitled to enforce the 
note.  Wis. Stat. § 403.301.  As Deutsche Bank's counsel 
physically possessed the original Note on his client's behalf at 
trial, § 403.301 is satisfied.  This rule alone resolves the 
issue in favor of Deutsche Bank. 
¶25 The rule that possession of an original note endorsed 
in blank confers a right to enforce the note is not a new 
concept or even one originating in the U.C.C.  Deutsche Bank 
accurately explains in its briefing that the principle traces 
back to Lord Mansfield and took root in American common law as 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
16 
 
early as 1895.12  See Miller v. Race (1758), 97 Eng. Rep. 398; 1 
Burr. 452 (Lord Mansfield) (KB) ("bank notes are paid by and 
received of the holder or possessor of them, as cash; and that 
                                                 
12 William Murray, Earl of Mansfield, served as Chief 
Justice on the Court of King's Bench, the highest common law 
court in England, from 1756 to 1788.  Bernard L. Shientag, Lord 
Mansfield Revisited——A Modern Assessment, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 
345, 348-49 (1941).  While the basic principles of negotiability 
and the enforcement of notes endorsed in blank were established 
prior to Lord Mansfield's tenure as Chief Justice, the holdings 
in Miller v. Race and its progeny were revolutionary in setting 
the course for modern doctrines on negotiable instruments.  
Edward L. Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield: Toward A 
Transferability Law for Modern Commercial Practice, 31 Idaho L. 
Rev. 775, 778 (1995).  For example, they informed Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, which defined a "promissory 
note" as "a plain and direct engagement in writing, to pay a sum 
specified at the time therein limited to a person therein named, 
or sometimes to his order, or often to the bearer at large."  2 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 467 
(Oxford 1766) (emphasis added); see also W. S. Holdsworth, 
Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 
(1929) ("Blackstone owed much to Lord Mansfield. . . . [W]e can 
see that in [Blackstone's] treatment of commercial law . . . as 
well as in his treatment of equity, he accepted and incorporated 
into his book the reasoning and the results of the decisions of 
Lord Mansfield . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).  In the United 
States, these early cases also eventually led to codification in 
every state of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the 
precursor to the U.C.C.  See, e.g., § 2675-9, ch. 356, Wis. Laws 
of 1899 ("The instrument is payable to bearer . . . [w]hen the 
only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank."); see also 
Mark B. Greenlee & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Reconsidering the 
Application of the Holder in Due Course Rule to Home Mortgage 
Notes, 41 Unif. Com. Code L.J. 225 (2009).  While a promissory 
note is no longer transferred as readily as cash, "the 
underlying purpose of negotiability——facilitating the transfer 
of debt instruments——remains relevant."  See Rubin, supra, at 
796.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 403.301 and 403.205(2), which permit 
the transfer of promissory notes endorsed in blank, likewise aid 
in the transferability of debt instruments. 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
17 
 
in the usual way of negotiating bank notes, they pass from one 
person to another as cash, by delivery only and without any 
further inquiry or evidence of title, than what arises from the 
possession."); Dawson Town & Gas Co. v. Woodhull, 67 F. 451, 452 
(8th Cir. 1895) ("When these notes were offered, they were in 
the hands of the plaintiff's attorneys.  The legal presumption 
was that they had received them from the hands of their 
client . . . ."); see also Peacock v. Rhodes (1781), 99 Eng. 
Rep. 402, 403; 2 Doug. 633, 636 (Lord Mansfield) (KB) ("I see no 
difference between a note indorsed blank, and one payable to 
bearer.  They both go by delivery, and possession proves 
property in both cases.").  Wuensch argues that these cases are 
"inapposite" and outmoded.  We disagree.  Although the cases are 
not controlling authority, the principles derived from them 
persuasively inform the interpretation of Wisconsin's U.C.C., 
which has not displaced them.  Wis. Stat. § 401.103(2) ("Unless 
displaced by the particular provisions of chs. 401 to 411, the 
principles 
of 
law 
and 
equity . . . shall 
supplement 
its 
provisions."); Met-Al, Inc. v. Hansen Storage Co., 844 F. Supp. 
485, 489 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("[P]re-Code case law is available to 
aid in interpretation of the UCC unless violative of its 
specific provisions."). 
¶26 This rule is as widely supported today as it has been 
historically.  See, e.g., Dow Family, 350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶¶15, 24 
(relying on ch. 403 to define the right to enforce a note: "if 
an instrument is endorsed in blank, it becomes payable to the 
bearer 
and 
may 
be 
negotiated 
by 
transfer 
of 
possession 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
18 
 
alone. . . . Without 
the 
original 
note, 
or 
a 
properly 
authenticated 
copy, 
there 
is 
no 
showing 
that 
[mortgage 
corporation] is entitled to enforce the note as the party in 
possession of a note endorsed in blank." (citing Mitchell Bank, 
676 N.W.2d at 849)); Rodger v. Bliss, 130 Misc. 168, 169 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1927) ("The notes were presented by the plaintiff in 
open court . . . .  They were negotiable instruments and their 
possession was prima facie evidence of ownership." (citations 
omitted)); Schmoldt v. Chi. Stone Setting Co., 33 N.E.2d 182, 
183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) ("The production of the note by 
plaintiff was prima facie evidence of his ownership"); In re 
Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Rawls, 777 S.E.2d 
796, 799-800 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) ("[n]egotiable instruments 
like mortgage notes that are endorsed in blank may be freely 
transferred.  And once transferred, the old adage about 
possession being nine-tenths of the law is, if anything, an 
understatement.  Whoever possesses an instrument endorsed in 
blank has full power to enforce it." (quoting Horvath v. Bank of 
New York, N.A., 641 F.3d 617, 621 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in 
original))).  However, the 2008 financial crisis precipitated 
inconsistent judicial application of a previously longstanding 
rule.13  Renuart, supra ¶20, at 1241 ("The connection between the 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin has not been immune to this dissonance and the 
court of appeals has issued numerous discordant opinions in the 
years following the financial crisis addressing the precise 
issue before this court.  See, e.g., Bank of New York Mellon v. 
Harrop, No. 2014AP2200, unpublished slip op., ¶¶ 8, 15 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 31, 2016) (per curiam) (contradicting its holding in 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
19 
 
right to foreclose and the U.C.C. is one of the most common 
issues faced by courts over the last five years due primarily to 
the mishandling of the notes and mortgages and the foreclosing 
party's response to the lack of proper documentation.").  In 
2011, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code issued a report addressing "[r]ecent economic developments 
                                                                                                                                                             
the instant case when it ruled the Bank could enforce the note 
against Harrop based on presentment of "the original Note" with 
the debtor's signature "in original pen ink" and admission of a 
copy into evidence; the court of appeals upheld the circuit 
court's 
finding 
that 
"the 
fact 
that . . . counsel 
is 
representing the [Bank] in this case, has the note physically in 
his possession, is enough to establish that the note is in 
possession of the [Bank]."); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Minkov, No. 
2012AP2643, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2013) ("Under this principle, because the note is endorsed in 
blank, Bank of America is entitled to enforce the note if indeed 
it possesses the note.  However, as discussed above, Bank of 
America has failed to identify any evidence in the record that 
it possesses the original note.  Therefore, it has not made a 
prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment."  
(Emphasis added.)); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Kolodziej, No. 2010AP60, 
unpublished slip op., ¶28 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2011) 
("Because PHH's submissions do not provide authentication for 
the 
mortgage 
assignment 
and 
for 
the 
endorsed 
note, 
its 
submissions do not make a prima facie showing that it is the 
holder of the mortgage and note."). 
The Wisconsin appellate court system functions fairly and 
efficiently 
only 
if 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
fulfills 
its 
responsibility to publish opinions according to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.23(1).  The court of appeals, in particular 
district IV with respect to the very issue presented here, has 
been issuing unpublished opinions, per curiam opinions, or 
summary disposition decisions even when the issue satisfies the 
criteria for publication.  This not only deprives the bench and 
bar of important guidance on legal issues of substantial and 
continuing public interest, it risks inconsistent disposition of 
cases across Wisconsin.     
No. 
2015AP175   
 
20 
 
[that] have brought to the forefront complex legal issues about 
the 
enforcement 
and 
collection 
of 
mortgage 
debt."14  
Specifically, the board addressed the situation where "the party 
to whom a note is payable may be changed by indorsement."  The 
board offered the following illustration mirroring the instant 
case: 
Maker issued a negotiable mortgage note payable to the 
order of Payee.  Payee indorsed the note in blank and 
gave possession of it to Transferee.  Transferee is 
the holder of the note and, therefore, is the person 
entitled to enforce it.  UCC §§ 1-201(b)(21)(A), 3-
301(i).[15] 
¶27 As applied here, Wuensch was the maker and issued the 
original Note to the order of HLB Mortgage, the payee.  HLB 
Mortgage subsequently endorsed the Note to AHM, also the payee, 
which then endorsed the Note in blank.  At this point, the Note 
became enforceable upon transfer by the party in possession.  
See Dow Family, 350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶17 n.6.  When Deutsche Bank 
took possession of the Note before trial, it mirrored the 
position of the illustration's transferee.  Thus, physical 
possession of the original Note, endorsed in blank, by Deutsche 
                                                 
14 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Report: Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes 1 (2011). 
15 This report largely reflects in form and function the 
official comments to the U.C.C.  While this report and its 
illustrations are not law, we find them to be persuasive 
authority.  See, e.g., Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., Inc., 107 
Wis. 2d 510, 523–24, 319 N.W.2d 855 (1982); State v. Eugenio, 
210 Wis. 2d 347, 352, 565 N.W.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 219 
Wis. 2d 391, 579 N.W.2d 642 (1998). 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
21 
 
Bank's attorney at trial was sufficient evidence to support the 
circuit court's conclusion that Deutsche Bank was the holder of 
the Note, enabling the Bank to enforce it.  Rawls, 777 S.E.2d at 
800. 
¶28 Second, possession of the original Note by Deutsche 
Bank's trial counsel in his capacity as legal representative of 
the Bank does not impair the Bank's status as bearer.  When 
trial counsel presented the original Note to the circuit court, 
he was not acting to enforce the Note himself of course, but on 
behalf of his client.  Dawson Town & Gas Co. v. Woodhull, 67 F. 
451, 452 (8th Cir. 1895) ("When the notes were offered, they 
were in the hands of the plaintiff's attorneys.  The legal 
presumption was that they had received them from the hands of 
their client . . . ."); see also U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (Am. Law 
Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2013-14) ("Delivery to an agent [of the 
payee] is delivery to the payee.").16  On this issue, we find 
particularly persuasive In re Hernandez, No. 13-04735-8-SWH, 
slip op., at 5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 24, 2014), in which a 
bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of North Carolina 
concluded that in presenting an original note during court 
proceedings in order to establish the client's possession 
thereof, an attorney acts as an agent for the holder:   
At 
the 
hearing . . . counsel 
for 
[petitioner] 
presented the original Note with a blank endorsement.  
While [petitioner's counsel] was in actual possession 
of the Note, he was acting as attorney, agent and 
                                                 
16 See supra note 15.  
No. 
2015AP175   
 
22 
 
proxy for [petitioner] and it is clear from the 
court's examination of the Note that it was the 
original 
document 
clearly 
in 
the 
possession 
of 
[petitioner]. . . .    
Because one underlying purpose of Wisconsin's U.C.C. is "[t]o 
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions," Wis. 
Stat. § 401.103(1)(c), Wisconsin courts "give substantial weight 
to cases from other jurisdictions" when resolving issues that 
arise under that code.  Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 
N.A., 217 Wis. 2d 565, 577, 579 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1998).  
¶29 The court of appeals erred in concluding that Deutsche 
Bank was required to prove "the document in the plaintiff's 
counsel's hands in fact came from his client and not from some 
other person or entity."  Deutsche Bank, No. 2015AP175, at 7.  
The U.C.C. requires nothing more than presentment of the 
original wet-ink note endorsed in blank in order to enforce it, 
and 
presentment 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
at 
trial 
may 
be 
accomplished through the holder's attorney without the need for 
testimony regarding how the holder came to possess the note.   
¶30 Further, 
trial 
counsel 
did 
not 
issue 
"unsworn 
statements" when he presented the original Note and the copy to 
the circuit court for inspection.  An attorney presenting self-
authenticating evidence to the trier of fact on behalf of his 
client is not acting in the same capacity as a witness 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
23 
 
delivering testimonial evidence.17  Thus, the court of appeals' 
holding that "[t]he plaintiff was obligated to prove, under the 
rules of evidence, that the document in the plaintiff's 
counsel's hands in fact came from his client and not from some 
other person or entity" is patently wrong.  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Such testimony is entirely unnecessary where, as here, 
no extrinsic evidence was needed to admit the Note, Wis. Stat. 
§ 909.02(9), and no testimony was needed to explain the 
circumstances of Deutsche Bank's possession; rather, the Bank 
had the right to enforce the Note endorsed in blank solely by 
virtue of its possession of the original Note.  Trial counsel 
was merely acting in the ordinary course of his representation 
of Deutsche Bank when he offered the original Note to the 
circuit court for inspection and the copy of the Note for 
admission into evidence.  
                                                 
17 We can find no Wisconsin law directly stating this point, 
which comes as no surprise because "[t]he proposition is so 
apparent on its face that it is difficult to find legal citation 
to support it."  State v. Groppi, 41 Wis. 2d 312, 323, 164 
N.W.2d 266 (1969), vacated on other grounds, 400 U.S. 505 
(1971).  "Lawyers routinely make assertions of procedural and 
process 
facts 
and 
provide 
background 
information 
to 
judges . . . .  Lawyers do not need to be sworn when asserting 
these process and background facts because they have an ethical 
obligation not to make false statements of fact or law to the 
judge." 
 
Judith 
A. 
McMorrow, 
The 
Advocate 
as 
Witness: 
Understanding Context, Culture and Client, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 
945, 946 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) 
("A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer."). 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
24 
 
¶31 Finally, the nature of the original Note as self-
authenticating commercial paper under Wis. Stat. § 909.02(9) is 
entirely independent of the issue of possession.  Despite the 
fact that § 909.02(9) definitively answers the question, Wuensch 
argues that a trier of fact would need to determine the 
authenticity of the Note.  However, "[e]xtrinsic evidence of 
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not 
required with respect to . . . [c]ommercial paper, signatures 
thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided 
by chs. 401 to 411."  Wis. Stat. § 909.02(9).  Among its 
findings of fact, the circuit court was "satisfied that the 
Plaintiff has in its possession the original ink Note.  The 
Plaintiff produced the original ink Note at trial and the Court 
examined it.  The Court is satisfied that it is the original 
Note. . . ."  The circuit court was the trier of fact in this 
case, its personal examination is supported by Wis. Stat. 
§ 909.015(3), and its findings are not clearly erroneous.   
¶32 Wuensch suggests that admission of the copy into 
evidence itself is problematic.  He urges us to consider Dow 
Family, 
350 
Wis. 2d 411, 
but 
ultimately 
misconstrues 
its 
holding.  In Dow Family, the court of appeals held that a copy 
of an original note is insufficient evidence of possession and 
was inadmissible in absence of the original wet-ink note.  Id., 
¶20.  The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 909.01 
requires "a document [to] be authenticated in order to be 
admissible."  Id.  Accordingly, the court of appeals considered 
the 
copy 
of 
the 
note 
alone 
insufficient 
to 
support 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
25 
 
authentication and admission into evidence.  Id., ¶21-22.  
Although under Wis. Stat. § 909.02(9) "[e]xtrinsic evidence of 
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not 
required with respect to . . . [c]ommercial paper, signatures 
thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided 
by chs. 401 to 411," in Dow Family, the plaintiff was unable to 
"explain the extent to which a copy of a note is self 
authenticating . . . ."  350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶22 (emphasis added).  
Most relevantly, the court of appeals reasoned that because "the 
original note's whereabouts were unknown to [the plaintiff]," 
this, along with other evidence, suggested that Fannie Mae, 
rather than the plaintiff, was actually in possession of the 
original note.  Id., ¶23.   
¶33 The facts in the instant case are distinguishable.  
Whereas in Dow Family the original note was unavailable for 
court 
inspection, 
Deutsche 
Bank's 
trial 
counsel 
actually 
presented the original Note for inspection and comparison 
against the copy.  After examining the copy and the original 
side-by-side, the circuit court found the Note presented by 
Deutsche Bank's trial counsel to be the original Note and 
accordingly admitted a copy into evidence.  In finding that the 
Note was what Deutsche Bank's trial counsel purported it to be, 
a 
"non-hearsay 
instrument . . . offered 
for 
its 
legal 
No. 
2015AP175   
 
26 
 
significance, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted," 
the circuit court properly admitted the copy into evidence.18   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶34 We reject the court of appeals' legal conclusions 
because they disregard the plain meaning of the applicable 
U.C.C. provisions and impose evidentiary hurdles with no legal 
foundation. 
 
Affirming 
longstanding 
principles 
governing 
negotiable instruments, we hold that presentment to the trier of 
fact in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the original, wet-
ink note endorsed in blank, establishes the holder's possession 
and entitles the holder to enforce the note.  We reverse the 
summary disposition order of the court of appeals and uphold the 
circuit court's judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche 
Bank.   
                                                 
18 Because we uphold the judgment of the circuit court in 
concluding Deutsche Bank may enforce the Note against Wuensch, 
we need not reach Deutsche Bank's secondary argument that we 
should remand this case for Deutsche Bank to present additional 
testimony regarding its possession of the original Note. 
This conclusion is also dispositive of Wuensch's secondary 
argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it allowed Deutsche Bank an equitable remedy 
despite its predecessor-in-interests' "unclean hands."  While 
the primary issue is dispositive, we note that the circuit court 
considered AHM's actions in fashioning its remedy for Deutsche 
Bank while also considering that Wuensch was (and remains) in 
default as of February 2008.  Because we uphold the circuit 
court's judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank, which 
factored Wuensch's claim of unclean hands into its equitable 
remedy for Deutsch Bank, we need not consider Wuensch's 
arguments regarding unclean hands further.   
No. 
2015AP175   
 
27 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
1 
 
¶35 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the court of appeals that "the rules of evidence may not be 
sidestepped based on the common sense expectation that the 
particular entity seeking to enforce a note is generally going 
to be the entity legally entitled to enforce the note."  
Deutsche Bank Nat'l. Tr. Co. v. Wuensch, No. 2015AP175, 
unpublished order at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016). 
¶36 The precepts that govern the admissibility of evidence 
at trial do not rest merely on a particular person's idea of 
common sense.  Rather they rest on the rule of law.  The rules 
of evidence have been hued over centuries so "that the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.02.  Indeed, the rules of evidence stand as both a 
safeguard and cornerstone for the fair administration of 
justice. 
¶37 The presentation of admissible evidence is carefully 
circumscribed. 
 
There 
are 
only 
four 
pathways 
for 
the 
introduction of admissible evidence.  See Wis JI——Civil 50 
(2014).  Given that "possession" is the essential question here, 
even a cursory review of the record reveals that no evidence was 
presented bearing on that issue: 
 Evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses——no sworn 
testimony on possession was presented. 
 Evidence is deposition testimony presented at trial——
no deposition testimony on possession was presented. 
 Evidence 
is 
exhibits 
admitted 
by 
the 
court——no 
exhibits addressing possession were admitted. 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
2 
 
 Evidence is agreements, stipulations, or facts the 
court 
directs 
the 
jury 
to 
find——there 
are 
no 
agreements or stipulations that Deutsche Bank holds 
the Note and its possession is not subject to judicial 
notice.1 
¶38 Disregarding 
the 
evidentiary 
rules, 
the 
majority 
allows an attorney to introduce dispositive facts through 
unsworn statements and without calling a witness.  Because I 
determine that Deutsche Bank's end run around the evidentiary 
rules is impermissible, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶39 The majority initially states that "[t]he issue before 
this court is whether presentment by a party's attorney of an 
original, wet-ink note endorsed in blank is admissible evidence 
and enforceable against the borrower without further proof that 
the holder had possession at the time the foreclosure action was 
filed."  Majority op., ¶2 (emphasis added).  Yet, it is unclear 
what the majority considers the issue to be.  Without even 
attempting to answer the question as initially presented, it 
jettisons this question and focuses instead on possession at the 
time of trial.  Which is it? 
                                                 
1 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact 
that is "not subject to reasonable dispute" in that it is 
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
trial court" or "capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort 
to 
sources 
whose 
accuracy 
cannot 
reasonably 
be 
questioned." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 902.01(2). 
 
Deutsche 
Bank's 
possession of the Note is not subject to judicial notice.  Not 
only is it subject to reasonable dispute, but it is in fact 
vigorously disputed. 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
3 
 
¶40 If 
the 
question 
we 
are 
answering 
is 
based 
on 
possession at the time of filing, then Deutsche Bank must surely 
lose.  Not only did Deutsche Bank fail to provide admissible 
evidence of its possession of the Note at the time of trial, it 
also certainly failed to present any information whatsoever to 
indicate that it possessed the Note at the time this action was 
filed.  In other words, it failed to establish that it had 
standing to maintain the action in the first instance.2  On this 
additional basis alone, Deutsche Bank may have failed to 
demonstrate its entitlement to enforce the Note. 
¶41 Ultimately, the majority determines that "presentment 
to the trier of fact in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the 
original, wet-ink note endorsed in blank, establishes the 
holder's possession and entitles the holder to enforce the 
note."  Id.  In its view, Wis. Stat. § 403.3013 is satisfied 
                                                 
2 Courts around the country have concluded that a party 
attempting to enforce a note must have possessed the note not 
only at the time of trial, but also at the time of filing in 
order to establish standing.  See, e.g., Country Place Community 
Ass'n, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp., 51 So. 
3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Deutsche Bank Nat'l. 
Tr. Co. v. Haller, 100 A.D.3d 680, 682 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); 
U.S. Bank, Nat'l. Ass'n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596, ¶13 (Okla. 
2012). 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 403.301 provides: 
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the 
holder of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of 
the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a 
person not in possession of the instrument who is 
entitled 
to 
enforce 
the 
instrument 
under s. 
403.309 or 403.418(4).  A person may be a person 
entitled to enforce the instrument even though the 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
4 
 
because "Deutsche Bank's counsel physically possessed the 
original Note on his client's behalf at trial . . . ."  Id., 
¶24. 
II 
¶42 In order to maintain a foreclosure action, Deutsche 
Bank must demonstrate its entitlement to enforce the Note and 
Mortgage.  The Note in this case is endorsed in blank and is 
therefore 
enforceable 
by 
the 
bearer. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 403.205(2).  Accordingly, Deutsche Bank must prove, by 
admissible evidence, that it is the bearer of the Note. 
¶43 Neither the majority's approach nor its conclusion is 
framed by the rules of evidence.  Relying on Wis. Stat. 
§ 403.301 only, the majority sidesteps normal and accepted 
evidentiary procedure. 
¶44 Possession, like any other evidentiary fact, is 
typically presented through the sworn testimony of a witness 
with knowledge of such possession.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 909.01, 
909.015(1).  This remains as true in the foreclosure context as 
it is in all others. 
¶45 Despite this well known and established procedure, the 
Note here was merely presented to the court by Deutsche Bank's 
counsel.  The transcript reveals the following exchange between 
Deutsche Bank's counsel, Mr. Karnes, and Wuensch's counsel, Mr. 
Peterson: 
                                                                                                                                                             
person is not the owner of the instrument or is in 
wrongful possession of the instrument. 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
5 
 
MR. KARNES:  Your Honor, I’m handing Mr. Peterson a 
copy of the original [N]ote.  I also have the original 
here today.  I’m going to allow him to inspect the 
original document and compare it to the copy. 
MR. PETERSON:  Your Honor, I have inspected two 
different documents.  One appears to be a copy of 
another document.  Whether this is an original [N]ote, 
I have no idea nor could I conclude that, I’m not a 
witness. 
¶46 The circuit court examined the documents and stated, 
"When I looked at the document purporting to be an original, 
looks like original ink on signatures and appears to be the same 
as what has now been marked as a copy Exhibit 1 . . . ."  It 
subsequently found: 
The Plaintiff is the holder of the original Note, 
endorsed in blank.  The Court is satisfied that the 
Plaintiff has in its possession the original ink Note.  
The Plaintiff produced the original ink Note at trial 
and the Court examined it.  The Court is satisfied 
that it is the original Note executed by Wuensch on 
December 18, 2006.  Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate 
copy of the original ink Note. 
¶47 In comparing the circuit court's subsequent findings 
of fact to the actual exchange in court4 underlying the circuit 
court's findings, a critical inaccuracy in the findings of fact 
is illuminated.  As cited above, Deutsche Bank's counsel, and 
not any employee of Deutsche Bank, presented the purported Note 
to the court ("I also have the original here today.  I’m going 
to allow him to inspect the original document and compare it to 
                                                 
4 I use the term "exchange in court" here rather than 
"testimony" because counsel for Deutsche Bank was not testifying 
as a witness when introducing the Note, and the circuit court's 
finding that Deutsche Bank possessed the Note was not based on 
any actual testimony. 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
6 
 
the copy.") (emphasis added).  The attorney did not actually 
address Deutsche Bank's possession of the Note. 
¶48 Nevertheless, the majority accepts Deutsche Bank's 
invitation to simply infer that because Deutsche Bank's counsel 
had the Note in his possession, he must have received it from 
Deutsche Bank.  Yet no witness testified to this and no evidence 
was presented at trial that would support this inference.5 
¶49 The circuit court took no sworn testimony on the issue 
of possession.  The Note was put before the circuit court only 
through the unsworn remarks of Deutsche Bank's attorney.  This 
is problematic for several reasons.  First, remarks of counsel 
are not evidence.  Kenwood Equip., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 48 
Wis. 2d 472, 481, 180 N.W.2d 750 (1970); Wis JI——Civil 50, at 5, 
110 (2017).  Indeed, Deutsche Bank's attorney could not have 
acted 
as 
a 
witness 
without 
potentially 
violating 
his 
professional ethical obligations.  See SCR 20:3.7(a).6 
                                                 
5 There was likewise no statement made regarding where 
counsel obtained the Note.  I agree with the majority that such 
testimony is unnecessary:  "[b]ecause of the nature of a note 
endorsed in blank, precisely how Deutsche Bank came into 
physical possession of the Note is not relevant."  Majority op., 
¶8.  Thus, testimony on the topic of possession need not be 
extensive.  A hypothetical witness need only provide testimony 
that the original note is in Deutsche Bank's possession, not 
testimony regarding how Deutsche Bank came to possess it. 
6 SCR 20:3.7(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in 
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness 
unless: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested 
issue; 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
7 
 
¶50 Second, the attorney's statements were unsworn.  It is 
well understood that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall 
be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, 
by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to 
awaken the witness's conscience and impress the witness's mind 
with the witness's duty to do so."  Wis. Stat. § 906.03.  
Unsworn statements are "not evidence" and have "no proper place 
in [a] trial."  Nelson v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 797, 812, 151 
N.W.2d 694 (1967). 
¶51 Finally, Deutsche Bank's attorney gave no indication 
he had personal knowledge of Deutsche Bank's possession of the 
Note.  "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter."  Wis. Stat. § 906.02.  When 
proffering the Note to the circuit court, counsel did not use 
the word "possession" and did not make any statement akin to a 
claim that Deutsche Bank possessed the Note.  In sum, no 
evidence was presented that Deutsche Bank possessed the Note. 
¶52 The majority attempts to escape the conclusion that 
the circuit court erred with the assertion that "[a]n attorney 
presenting self-authenticating evidence to the trier of fact on 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value 
of legal services rendered in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client. 
Sub. (1) does not apply here because the issue of 
possession was contested, and neither sub. (2) nor (3) applies 
on its face. 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
8 
 
behalf of his client is not acting in the same capacity as a 
witness delivering testimonial evidence."  Majority op., ¶30.  
Then in what capacity was he acting?  He was attempting to 
introduce evidence.  If he was acting as counsel, then his 
remarks are not evidence.  See Kenwood Equip., 48 Wis. 2d at 
481.  If he was acting as a witness, then he impermissibly 
provided unsworn testimony.  See Wis. Stat. § 906.03. 
¶53 The comments to SCR 20:3.7 emphasize the distinction 
between testimony and advocacy:  "A witness is required to 
testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is 
expected to explain and comment on the evidence given by 
others."  Here, the attorney attempted to straddle this line, 
but ultimately was unsuccessful on both fronts.  He did not 
testify to any personal knowledge of possession, and there was 
no evidence offered on the topic about which he could comment. 
¶54 By accepting Deutsche Bank's attorney's presentation 
of 
the 
Note, 
the 
circuit 
court 
created 
in 
essence 
an 
unrebuttable presumption that Deutsche Bank possessed it.  After 
the circuit court accepted the Note as the original and in the 
possession of Deutsche Bank, what was the homeowner to do?  He 
could not cross examine the attorney, who was not under oath and 
not called as a witness. 
¶55 Based on the actual evidence presented, I conclude 
that the circuit court's finding of fact that Deutsche Bank 
possessed the Note was clearly erroneous.  There was no evidence 
to that effect presented and therefore Deutsche Bank failed to 
prove it possessed the Note. 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
9 
 
III 
¶56 The court of appeals recognized that its "mandate 
reversing the judgment of foreclosure in this action may appear 
at first blush to elevate form over substance and to produce a 
highly inefficient result."  Deutsche Bank Nat'l. Tr. Co. v. 
Wuensch, No. 2015AP175, unpublished order at 8 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Aug. 23, 2016).  Contrarily, the majority opinion is certainly 
efficient. 
¶57 Although 
efficiencies 
are 
admittedly 
important, 
adherence to the evidentiary rules should drive foreclosure 
proceedings.  Courts should ensure that a lender has everything 
in order before issuing a foreclosure judgment.  The rules exist 
to ensure that "proceedings [are] justly determined."  Wis. 
Stat. § 901.02.  The corner cutting endorsed by the majority 
eschews the evidentiary rules and subverts that goal. 
¶58 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent. 
¶59 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2015AP175.awb 
 
 
 
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