Case Title: P. v. Butler

Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 814

Docket Number: S068230

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/10/09 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S068230 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
RAYMOND OSCAR BUTLER, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. TA041759 
 
____________________________________) 
 
         
 
 
This is the second death penalty appeal brought by defendant Raymond 
Oscar Butler.  In People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847 (Butler I), we affirmed 
the conviction and sentence of death imposed on defendant for murdering two 
college students.  In this case, he was convicted of first degree murder and 
sentenced to death for stabbing a fellow jail inmate.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a) 
& 190.2, subd. (a)(2).)  Defendant contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to represent himself at trial.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 
(Faretta).)  We agree.  The trial court erroneously decided that defendant could 
not adequately represent himself because of jail restrictions resulting from his 
disciplinary infractions.  Faretta and its progeny require reversal of the judgment 
in its entirety. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The jailhouse murder occurred on March 26, 1995, while defendant was 
awaiting trial for the Butler I murders.  We need not detail the circumstances of  
 
 
2 
the stabbing; they were introduced at the penalty phase in Butler I and are set out 
in 46 Cal.4th at pages 852-853.  Here, we discuss only the facts relevant to 
defendant‟s Faretta claim. 
 
Defendant was represented by counsel in Butler I.  In the present case, 
however, he sought to represent himself early on, before special circumstance 
allegations were added to the complaint.  In December 1995, defendant filed a 
handwritten Faretta motion asserting his “unconditional constitutional right to 
represent himself without counsel.”  Defense counsel filed a supporting 
declaration, explaining that he was defendant‟s attorney in Butler I and had agreed 
with the county to represent him in this second prosecution for no additional fee.  
Because the jail stabbing would be the primary evidence at a penalty phase in 
Butler I, counsel would be preparing to address the incident.  He was willing to 
serve as advisory or standby counsel, and could take over the defense should 
defendant not continue in propria persona (hereafter, “pro. per.”). 
 
The prosecutor responded that defendant might be seeking self-
representation to gain pro. per. jail privileges, or for purposes of manipulation and 
delay.  However, she added that “[w]hatever the defendant‟s reasons for 
requesting pro per status, an otherwise appropriate request to proceed in propria 
persona must be granted.”  The trial court granted defendant‟s motion on 
December 12, 1995.  
 
On January 2, 1996, the county filed a motion to restrict defendant‟s “in 
custody pro per privileges.”  County counsel claimed that defendant was a 
demonstrated security risk, with a long and escalating record of disciplinary 
infractions:  In April 1994, he was insubordinate and disrespectful toward a deputy 
who was escorting him to his cell.  In May 1994, he was found with a razor blade 
modified for use as a weapon.  In August 1994, he possessed an unauthorized 
amount of cash.  In September 1994, he tried to prevent his cell door from locking, 
 
3 
was found with contraband razor blades, was insubordinate to staff, and caused a 
disturbance.  In March 1995, he participated in the stabbing for which he was 
currently being prosecuted.  In December 1995, he was again found with razor 
blades, along with contraband cigarettes and a lighter. 
 
County counsel explained that inmates in administrative segregation were 
allowed to use the “Pro Per Law Library” in compatible, multiracial groups to 
“prevent[] one group from establishing a power base” in the library.  Defendant‟s 
actions showed he was a threat to other inmates and a potential victim of 
retaliation for the stabbing incident.  The sheriff opposed giving him access to the 
law library, which would bring him into contact with other inmates and staff.  The 
sheriff was, however, willing to provide legal forms and supplies, to staple 
documents, and to approve a legal runner subject to security checks. 
 
At a hearing on January 3, 1996, defendant objected that he had no books 
and no opportunity to prepare a response to the county‟s motion.  He was also 
concerned about his telephone access.  County counsel told the court that no 
additional telephone privileges were granted to pro. per. inmates.  The court 
agreed to deny defendant access to the law library, but set a hearing for February 
1, 1996, regarding other restrictions on his pro. per. privileges.  On that date 
defendant filed written opposition, arguing that terminating his privileges “would 
stop progress and ultimately cause a[n] undue consumption of the court‟s time and 
effort.”  He claimed the violations cited by the sheriff were frivolous and did not 
justify the restriction of his privileges under Wilson v. Superior Court (1978) 21 
Cal.3d 816.  Defendant said the only major infraction was the homicide, with 
respect to which he intended to show that his actions, “if any at all were minor.” 
 
At the hearing, defendant complained that he was being treated differently 
from other pro. per. inmates with similar disciplinary records.  He claimed the 
county‟s concern that he might be a victim of retaliation was speculative, and said 
 
4 
he needed access to the library “because I do plan on representing myself all the 
way to the end in this case.”  County counsel denied that defendant had been 
singled out, and contended that taking him to and from the library and allowing 
him to be with other inmates in the library posed a “major security concern.”  The 
court granted the  motion to restrict defendant‟s privileges and denied his request 
for expanded telephone access.  It noted that he had a legal runner and advisory 
counsel. 
 
On July 30, 1996, the prosecutor informed the court that defendant had 
been sentenced to death in Butler I.  The court granted her motion to amend the 
complaint to include the murder convictions in that case as special circumstances.  
Defendant‟s advisory counsel reported that his client was being denied “all pro per 
privileges of any kind whatsoever,” and had been told by the deputies in jail that 
“he is no longer pro per.”  Counsel requested and received a minute order 
confirming defendant‟s pro. per. status. 
 
On October 29, 1996, defendant appeared for a hearing before a new judge, 
who handled the remaining pretrial proceedings and the trial itself.  Defendant 
complained that he was “receiving no pro per privileges at all.”  At the next 
hearing, on November 15, the court itself raised the subject of defendant‟s self-
representation, warning defendant and a codefendant who was also representing 
himself that “I want to resolve this [Faretta] issue . . . .  You guys are common-
sense people, you have been around.  It is pretty obvious with this type of situation 
that pro per status is probably going to be revoked.  It makes sense to me, it makes 
sense to you.” 
 
The court took up the matter on December 10, 1996, telling defendant, 
“This is nothing personal, Mr. Butler.  Understand?  You have always treated me 
with respect.  But I have a great concern, based on the fact you already have a 
sentence of death and this case is predicated, I believe, on the allegation that a 
 
5 
person in custody was shanked . . . .  That, in itself, puts the court in concern not 
only for your safety and retaliation, but concern for other prisoners and deputies.  
Does that make sense to you?”  Defendant said yes, but also affirmed that he 
wanted to keep representing himself. 
 
The court asked to hear from the prosecutor about other incidents involving 
defendant.  The prosecutor reported the following infractions in addition to those 
outlined in the county‟s January 1996 motion:  In October 1995, defendant was 
found with razor blades yet again.  In February 1996, he “slipped his cuffs and 
assaulted an inmate in line.”  In June 1996, he was found with tar heroin.  In 
October 1996, he and another inmate were discovered “making drugs,” and he also 
had a large container of jail-made alcohol.  Most significantly, in October 1996, as 
he was preparing to come to court, a jail deputy saw him insert something into his 
rectum, which turned out to be a four-inch-long piece of sharpened metal known 
in jail vernacular as a “shank” or “shiv.”  The prosecutor had reports on these 
incidents, but had not yet provided them to the court.  Defendant insisted that 
“most of [these reports] are not true.”  When questioned by the court, he said he 
knew of no one seeking retaliation against him.  He denied being in a gang since 
he had been in custody, but admitted he had been in one previously. 
 
The prosecutor argued that defendant was particularly dangerous because 
he had been sentenced to death, and “basically . . . has nothing to lose.”  She 
summarized the alleged facts of the jail stabbing.  Defendant, his two co-
defendants, and the victim were being taken to the showers.  One codefendant 
emerged from his cell unhandcuffed, and unlocked defendant‟s cuffs.  He and 
defendant then took turns stabbing the victim in the chest with a shank.  The other 
codefendant remained handcuffed, but assisted by preventing the victim‟s escape.  
The prosecutor called a deputy to the stand, who verified defendant‟s disciplinary 
reports and said he was a “very high security risk inmate” based on his continuing 
 
6 
infractions in jail and the death sentence he had already suffered.  He could not be 
allowed in the law library.  The 20 to 25 high-security inmates then representing 
themselves were assigned to compatible groups for trips to the law library.  
However, inmates like defendant posed too severe a risk to be placed in any group. 
 
The court observed that defendant had “always been courteous to this 
court,” and asked about the witness‟s experience with defendant.  The deputy said 
he had only limited contact with defendant, but that defendant‟s record spoke for 
itself.  Defendant declined to respond to the prosecutor‟s showing.  The court 
made the following observations and ruling: 
 
“Mr. Butler, the court asked for the hearing based on the charge here.  As I 
said, you treat us with respect.  I think it‟s inappropriate for this court to allow you 
to remain in pro per status based on at least ten incidents, most of them involving 
some type of violence or a weapon in the jail.  The most current is where you had 
a shiv in your rectum.  The case that you [have] pending now is a case 
. . . regarding a fellow inmate with the allegation that you and two other persons 
were involved in the death by shanking, and the fact [that] you have been found 
guilty and [are] facing a capital death sentence . . . .  Would you agree that some of 
those are pretty egregious?  I think for your benefit and the safety of the deputies 
that I will revoke the pro per status from you.  Do you understand?”  Defendant 
said, “Yes, your honor.”  The court added, “Okay.  This is, I think, a good 
precaution for everybody and to protect you as well.” 
 
The court then heard defendant‟s motion to replace his counsel.  (People v. 
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.)  Defendant claimed that counsel, while serving in 
his advisory status, had failed to confer with him or otherwise assist in preparing a 
defense.  The court denied the motion and reappointed counsel. 
 
The next hearing was six weeks later, in January 1997.  The prosecutor told 
the court she was concerned that defendant had not been given notice of the new 
 
7 
incident reports she introduced at the hearing in December.  She asked that he be 
given the opportunity to revisit the revocation of his pro. per. status and contest 
that evidence.  The court said, “I have no objection.  Mr. Butler and I have spoken 
before on the record here.  I have nothing against you at all.  You have a 
competent lawyer.  You have been given the death penalty; it is on appeal.  To 
proceed on a death penalty case without counsel to me just doesn‟t make sense.  
The court had a full hearing.  What she is saying is you probably didn‟t have 
proper notice. . . .  If you want to revisit that and bring some witnesses in, I will do 
that for you.  But I think you have a competent lawyer.  It is up to you to make a 
decision.” 
 
Defendant said he “would like to be able to bring witnesses in and dispute 
that.”  A hearing was held on April 9, 1997.  Acting as his own counsel, defendant 
called a witness but then hesitated to ask questions that might incriminate himself.  
The court told him that was always a danger of self-representation, and that 
questioning witnesses was particularly risky in cases with multiple defendants, 
like this one.  Ultimately, after consulting with his advisory counsel, defendant 
decided to ask no questions and submitted the matter for a ruling.  The court said, 
“for the record, Mr. Butler, . . . all of the defendants have been straight with this 
court.  I have not had any problems with any of you.  It wasn‟t based on anything 
you have done in my court with my bailiffs.”  However, defendant‟s misconduct 
in jail put “the court staff, the other defendants and yourself in some form of 
jeopardy.”  Noting the absence of any new evidence, the court reaffirmed the 
revocation of defendant‟s pro. per. status.  
 
Defendant filed a renewed Faretta motion on September 16, 1997.  At a 
hearing on September 22, he adamantly asserted his right to self-representation, 
telling the court, “it is my constitutional right and I would like to invoke it.  I mean 
I feel I can put more time and effort into it than [counsel].”  The court told him,  
 
8 
“Here is the problem:  the sheriff has the absolute right to shut down any pro per 
privileges that you have in jail.  Understand?  Based on your record of incidents, 
that is what will happen, I am sure.  They will not let you go anywhere, so you 
will be restricted [to] going from the jail to here.  While you are here, even if you 
are in pro per, we will use the react belt plus we will use probably some other 
things.  You can‟t walk around the courtroom; you won‟t be able to move.  I don‟t 
know what privileges, if any, you will have at the county jail.  Understand?”  
Defendant replied in the affirmative.  When pressed by the court as to how he 
could be better prepared than his lawyer, he said, “I‟ve got 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, to work on this case.” 
 
Defendant was unswayed by the court‟s repeated warnings about the 
restrictions on his ability to prepare a defense.  He claimed he could work in his 
cell, and said “we will have to work something out” to get him the resources he 
would need.  The court acknowledged that defendant had the right to represent 
himself, but said, “I also have another obligation to see whether or not you have a 
fair trial.  If you are in pro per and you have no access to the law library, you can‟t 
interview anybody, then you go right [from] there to here, how do you think you 
will be prepared?”  Defendant said, “I have never once broke any of the policies as 
a pro per, so I don‟t know why I would be . . . under the disadvantage of not going 
to the law library as the other pro pers.”  The court again told defendant that the 
sheriff was not going to give him the privileges he wanted.  The court said, “I am 
not concerned about the courtroom because we can handle you in the courtroom,” 
but asked defendant to think about the effect his limited preparation would have 
on the jurors who would hear the evidence “without an adequate lawyer.”  
Defendant replied, “I understand, your honor, but I still feel that I can represent 
myself in this trial.” 
 
9 
 
Defendant then requested “all items of discovery.”  The court warned him 
that it would not grant a continuance, and that he would have to be ready for trial 
in about a month, on October 20.  Defendant said he understood, but told the 
court, “I am only asking the same as any attorney would have, to have all items of 
discovery.”  The court reiterated that “they may not give you any privileges” in 
jail.  Defendant replied, “I understand, your honor, but I have a constitutional right 
and I would like to . . . go pro per.”  The court acquiesced, granting the Faretta 
motion.  Defense counsel said he had “boxes and boxes of stuff.”  The court 
observed that the names of witnesses would have to be redacted before the 
material was turned over to defendant.1  Counsel agreed to contact the sheriff to 
learn how they would handle the discovery material. 
 
On October 20, defendant informed the court that he had not yet received 
his discovery items.  The court asked counsel if he was “ready to go,” and counsel 
said yes.  The court asked defendant, “would you like to have this lawyer back?  It 
is up to you.”  Defendant responded, “I don‟t understand the question.”  When the 
court repeated it, defendant said, “so there is no way that I can get the items I need 
for trial?”  The court replied, “you can‟t be ready for trial.  When you went pro 
per, that is part of the situation where you have to be ready to go.  What are you 
missing that you didn‟t get?”  Defendant said he only had the material from the 
guilt phase of the Butler I trial. 
                                              
1  “If the defendant is acting as his or her own attorney, the court shall endeavor to 
protect the address and telephone number of a victim or witness by providing for 
contact only through a private investigator licensed by the Department of 
Consumer Affairs and appointed by the court or by imposing other reasonable 
restrictions, absent a showing of good cause as determined by the court.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 1054.2, subd. (b).) 
 
10 
 
Defense counsel disputed this.  He claimed that defendant had all the 
material relating to the jail stabbing, which was part of the Butler I penalty phase.  
However, counsel also reported that the jail had told him “they couldn‟t give 
[defendant] all the materials at one time, but that we could rotate stuff through.”  
Counsel further acknowledged that he still had “many, many cardboard boxes and 
thousands and thousands of pages of stuff which I‟m redacting page by page.”  
Counsel did not describe the nature of the material he had yet to turn over.  
Without further inquiry, the court revoked defendant‟s Faretta right for the second 
time, with this statement:  “It is not unique to your client.  This is the pro per 
problem.  You have a pro per that is in for another case; and the jail is a jail, it is 
not a law library.  They restrict what you can do there.  That is why it just doesn‟t 
make sense to do that.  In any event, I will just put you back on the case.  You 
have had some time to work on at least the guilt phase.  You can take a look at that 
and if we need to . . . we will take a short delay to look at the penalty phase.  We 
will not be starting that right away.” 
 
Jury selection began a week later, on October 27, 1997.  A jury was 
empanelled on November 4, and trial started the following day.  Defendant made 
no further Faretta motion.  The jury found him guilty of murder and returned a 
verdict of death. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court declared that a defendant 
“must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his 
advantage,” even though “he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own 
detriment . . . .”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834.)  “The Sixth Amendment . . . 
implies a right of self-representation.”  (Id. at p. 821, italics omitted.)  Thus, a state 
may not “constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a 
 
11 
lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.”  
(Id. at p. 807.) 
 
The tension between the right of self-representation and the interest in 
ensuring a fair trial was a matter of dispute in Faretta itself, and it persists to this 
day.2  The rule announced by the Faretta majority, however, remains the law of 
the land.  (See Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2388].)  This 
court, of course, may not adopt an alternative view of what the Sixth Amendment 
requires.  (See People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 740; People v. Dent, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at pp. 224-225 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) 
 
 “When „a motion to proceed pro se is timely interposed, a trial court must 
permit a defendant to represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily 
and intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a choice might 
appear to be.  Furthermore, the defendant‟s “technical legal knowledge” is 
irrelevant to the court‟s assessment of the defendant‟s knowing exercise of the 
right to defend himself.‟  (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, quoting 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836.)  Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is 
reversible per se.  (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8.)”  
(People v. Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 217.)  The same standard applies to 
                                              
2  See Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pages 839-840 (dis. opn. of Burger, J.); id. at 
page 849 (dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.); Indiana v. Edwards (2008) __ U.S. __ [128 
S.Ct. 2379, 2389] (Edwards) (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.); Martinez v. Court of Appeal 
(1999) 528 U.S. 152, 161; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 739-740; People 
v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 222-225 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.); United States v. 
Farhad (9th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 1097, 1105-1109 (conc. opn. of Reinhardt, J.); 
Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot:  An Assessment 
of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta (1996) 6 Seton 
Hall Const. L.J. 483; but see Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-
Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant (2007) 85 N. 
C. L. Rev. 423. 
 
12 
erroneous revocation of pro. per. status.  (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 
11, fn. 1.) 
 
   There are limits on the right to act as one‟s own attorney.  As the high 
court recently observed, “Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the 
right of self-representation is not absolute.”  (Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ 
[128 S.Ct. at p. 2384].)  The Faretta court noted that “the trial judge may 
terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious 
and obstructionist misconduct.”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46; see 
also People v. Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 8-9.)  It is settled that the Faretta 
right may be waived by failure to make a timely request to act as one‟s own 
counsel (People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 128-129), or by abandonment 
and acquiescence in representation by counsel (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 913, 929; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909-910).  The court 
may deny a request for self-representation that is equivocal, made in passing anger 
or frustration, or intended to delay or disrupt the proceedings.  (People v. Marshall 
(2006) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23.)  A defendant may be mentally incompetent to waive 
counsel.  (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-401.)  And in Edwards, the 
high court recently decided that “the Constitution permits States to insist upon 
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky 
[v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402] but who still suffer from severe mental 
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by 
themselves.”  (Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2388].) 
 
None of these circumstances, with the possible exception of obstructive 
misconduct, was present in this case.  Defendant timely, unequivocally, and 
 
13 
persistently invoked his Faretta right.3  The court expressed no concern that he 
was attempting to delay or disrupt the proceedings.  No question arose at any point 
as to his mental competence to waive counsel or present a defense.  The court did 
refer to defendant‟s misconduct in custody when it initially revoked his self-
representation.  At the time of the proceedings below, however, this was not a 
valid basis for the court‟s action.  In Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 
888 (Ferrel), this court held that only disruptive in-court misconduct would justify 
terminating a defendant‟s pro. per. status.  (Id. at p. 891.) 
 
We have since renounced that rule, deciding that it unduly restricted trial 
courts‟ authority to respond to misconduct occurring outside the courtroom.  
(People v. Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 8.)  In Carson, we held that “serious and 
obstructionist out-of-court misconduct” that threatens to “subvert the „core 
concept of a trial‟ [citation] or to compromise the court‟s ability to conduct a fair 
trial [citation]” may lead to forfeiture of the right to self-representation.  (Id. at p. 
10.)4 
                                              
3  The Attorney General contends defendant waived his claim of error by 
acquiescing in the court‟s revocation of his self-representation in December 1996, 
and abandoning the effort to defend his Faretta right in April 1997.  We disagree.  
Defendant said he understood the court‟s ruling in December, but he did not 
accept it.  As the Attorney General recognizes, defendant was not required to 
renew his request after it was conclusively denied.  (People v. Dent, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 219.)  When the prosecutor reopened the issue, conceding defendant 
had no notice of the disciplinary infractions she presented in December, defendant 
immediately sought to contest the matter.  Although he ultimately decided not to 
question his witness at the hearing in April, he continued to assert his right of self-
representation.  The following September, he filed another Faretta motion.  No 
waiver or abandonment can be gleaned from this record. 
4  In Carson, the defendant‟s investigator mistakenly gave him discovery material 
to which he was not entitled, including witness addresses and telephone numbers, 
and criminal history records.  (People v. Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 12.)  In 
light of the defendant‟s “antecedent attempts to suborn perjury, fabricate an alibi, 
and possibly intimidate a prosecution witness,” the trial court terminated his 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
14 
 
Here, defendant committed many disciplinary infractions in jail.  Some 
were minor but a number of them were quite troubling, even aside from the 
jailhouse stabbing for which he was being prosecuted.  He was repeatedly 
discovered with weapons.  On one occasion, he concealed a shank in his rectum 
just before he was to be taken to the courtroom.  The court had ample reason to be 
reluctant about defendant‟s self-representation.   
We agree with the dissent that 
defendant was an obvious security risk, and safety precautions were justified both 
in the jail and the courtroom.  However, there was no showing that his pro. per. 
status increased the risk in any way.  Self-represented or not, defendant was going 
to be housed in the jail, transported to and from court, and in attendance for his 
trial.  
 
In any event, we need not and do not decide whether defendant‟s out-of-
court misconduct might have justified the revocation of his Faretta right, because 
ultimately the court did not rely on that ground.  Indeed, it permitted defendant to 
resume representing himself shortly before trial, telling him that it was “not 
concerned about the courtroom because we can handle you in the courtroom,” and 
that he would be restrained from moving around freely whether or not he was 
acting as his own counsel.5  The court made no reference to defendant‟s 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Faretta right.  (Id. at p. 13.)  This court emphasized the necessity of developing an 
adequate record of the basis for terminating a defendant‟s self-representation when 
out-of-court misconduct is involved.  (Id. at p. 11.)  Because the record in Carson 
did not sufficiently reflect the actual impact of the defendant‟s misconduct on the 
trial, or whether sanctions short of termination would have addressed the problem, 
we ordered a remand to the trial court for a hearing on those questions.  (Id. at p. 
14.) 
5  A pro. per. defendant may be physically restrained during trial for security 
purposes.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1042-1043; People v. 
Superior Court (George) (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 350, 355.)  Defendant and his 
codefendants wore stun belts during the trial. 
 
15 
misconduct in jail, except to remind him that because of his record the sheriff was 
unlikely to allow him to exercise the privileges ordinarily available to pro. per. 
inmates.   
 
After less than a month, the court terminated defendant‟s self-
representation once again.  This time, the revocation was based on the limitations 
imposed on his ability to prepare for trial.  The court observed that the situation 
was not unique, but was “the pro per problem.”  It declared that pro. per. 
representation “just doesn‟t make sense” when “they restrict what you can do” in 
jail. 
 
The court erred in this instance.  In Ferrel, the Attorney General argued that 
“termination of a defendant‟s pro. per. status would . . . be justified when, by 
defendant‟s own misconduct in jail, he loses his pro. per. privileges, thereby 
making it practically impossible for him to prepare a defense.”  (Ferrel, supra, 20 
Cal.3d at p. 892.)  The Ferrel court disagreed, observing that while limitations on 
pro. per. privileges “may be necessary . . . as a result of a defendant‟s misconduct 
in jail,” they “would not, however, preclude a defendant from making an 
intelligent and voluntary decision to continue to represent himself provided that he 
has been warned of the dangers and difficulties that such a choice might entail.”  
(Ibid.) 
 
Ferrel‟s decision on this point remains undisturbed.  Restrictions on pro. 
per. privileges in custody are not unusual.  (See Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 
21 Cal.3d at pp. 824-826; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) 
Punishment, § 25, pp. 63-64; id., § 55, pp. 94-96.)  They have never been deemed 
a justification for depriving inmates of the right to represent themselves.   
Later cases are consistent with Ferrel‟s holding that the conditions of confinement 
are not a legal impediment to the exercise of Faretta rights.  It is settled that while 
self-represented inmates may not be deprived of all means of preparing a defense, 
 
16 
the Constitution does not require personal access to legal resources.  The 
provision of advisory counsel and reasonably necessary investigative assistance 
sufficiently protects the Sixth Amendment rights of pro. per. inmates.  (People v. 
Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1040; see also People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
pp. 732-733; People v. Ringo (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 870, 876-877; Kane v. 
Garcia Espitia (2005) 546 U.S. 9, 10; Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343, 350-
351.)  Therefore, contrary to the trial court‟s view in this case, inmates still have 
the right to represent themselves even when their ability to prepare is restricted in 
custody. 
 
Here, defendant had advisory counsel and was being given discovery 
materials.6  The record reflects no request for an investigator during the weeks 
before trial.  Thus, it appears defendant had adequate resources to conduct his own 
defense.  To the extent the trial court based its decision on his inability to martial 
those resources in his own defense, it was mistaken.  The court‟s conclusion that 
“it just doesn‟t make sense” to allow pro. per. representation under the 
circumstances faced by defendant may have been reasonable, but it was 
inconsistent with the requirements of Faretta and its progeny. 
 
It is established that the effectiveness of a self-represented defendant‟s 
preparation is ordinarily irrelevant.7  Defendants untrained in the law may well 
                                              
6  The record indicates that counsel served in both “advisory” and “standby” 
capacities.  (See People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 725; People v. Hamilton 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14.) 
7  Thus far, the only instance in which the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that a defendant‟s ability to conduct a defense has any bearing on the 
right of self-representation is the recent decision in Edwards, which is limited to 
cases of severe mental illness.  (Edwards, supra,  __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 
2388].)  We asked the parties for briefing on whether Edwards had any relevance 
to this case.  Both sides agreed that it did not. 
 
17 
provide themselves with inept representation.  But Faretta gives them the right to 
make a thoroughly disadvantageous decision to act as their own counsel, so long 
as they are fully advised and cognizant of the risks and consequences of their 
choice.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835-836; Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 
U.S. at pp. 399-400; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 739-740; People v. 
Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069-1070; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
701, 733-734.)  Those risks may include custodial limitations on the ability to 
prepare a defense in jail.  (Ferrel, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 892.)  Here, defendant 
was repeatedly and thoroughly admonished on that score, and made his decision 
despite the restrictions imposed on him. 
 
Defendant claims the court erred by failing to grant him a continuance so 
that he could complete his preparations for trial.  We do not reach this issue.  
Defendant did not ask for a continuance, though this may have been because the 
court admonished him that none would be granted.  Indeed, the court never 
considered the grounds for a continuance because of its view that defendant 
simply could not be prepared under the conditions of his confinement.   (See 
People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1039 [grounds for continuance must be 
found in particular circumstances and reasons presented to trial court].)8  As we 
                                              
8  We note, in any event, that the record does not support the Attorney General‟s 
claim that a continuance was unwarranted because defendant was dilatory in his 
preparation as the trial date approached in October 1997.  Defendant‟s lack of 
preparation appears to have resulted largely from factors beyond his control.  
Defense counsel acknowledged that he had yet to provide defendant with a 
substantial amount of discovery material.  The documents that counsel had turned 
over were being given to defendant on a piecemeal basis by jail staff, and the 
record does not show how far that process had progressed.  Furthermore, 
defendant‟s opportunity to prepare for trial had been substantially compromised by 
the revocation of his Faretta right during most of the previous year. 
 
18 
have explained, that determination afforded no ground for revoking defendant‟s 
pro. per. status. 
 
The dissent takes the position that a demonstrably dangerous defendant 
may be denied his Sixth Amendment right of self-representation if reasonable 
security measures restrict his opportunity to prepare for trial.  There is no case that 
stands for that proposition.  We decide this case under compulsion of United 
States Supreme Court precedent.  The high court is free to refine its jurisprudence 
in this area.  However well advised such a development might be, this court is not 
empowered to narrow the established scope of a federal constitutional right.  
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant‟s conviction and sentence must be 
reversed under the prevailing constitutional standards. 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is reversed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I dissent.  The question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment requires 
the trial court to allow a defendant who has already killed a jail inmate (and clearly 
intends more jail violence) to represent himself, with the obvious danger to jail 
inmates and staff and other difficulties inherent in such self-representation.  The 
majority holds that the trial court violated defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to 
represent himself when it revoked his self-representation status shortly before trial.  
(See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).)  In my view, the trial 
court properly refused to let defendant represent himself under the extreme 
circumstances the case presents.1 
When the trial court revoked defendant‟s self-representation status, in 
October 1997, he was already under a judgment of death in another case.  He was 
in jail awaiting trial in this case for murdering an inmate in the same jail while 
awaiting trial in the previous case.  The murder charge was not just an unfounded 
allegation, but had been supported by evidence presented in aggravation at the 
previous trial (see People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 852-853) and at the 
preliminary hearing in this case.  That evidence showed that, on March 26, 1995, 
                                              
1  
Because the majority holds that the entire judgment must be reversed due to 
the denial of self-representation, my views on the other issues defendant has raised 
cannot affect the judgment, and I express no opinion on those issues.  (See People 
v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85, 96 (dis. opn. of Kaus, J.).) 
2 
defendant and other inmates stabbed the victim to death with a metal shank in full 
view of a correctional officer. 
Additionally, defendant had a long series of jail disciplinary charges, 
ranging from minor to very serious.  On several occasions, some after he had 
already stabbed the inmate to death, he was found with razor blades modified for 
use as a weapon.  One time after the murder, defendant “slipped his cuffs and 
assaulted an inmate in line.”  Another time, again after he had stabbed the inmate 
to death with a shank, he was caught concealing a four-inch shank in his rectum. 
Defendant was an obvious and extreme jail security risk.  He had killed one 
inmate, clearly intended more violence and, because he was already under a 
judgment of death, may have believed he had nothing to lose in perpetrating 
further violence.  The sheriff, charged with protecting the inmates entrusted to his 
keeping, was understandably concerned about giving defendant self-representation 
privileges.  Human lives were at stake.  The sheriff had a duty to do all he 
reasonably could to ensure defendant had no opportunity to kill again. 
Under the circumstances, the sheriff could reasonably protect inmates and 
jail staff only by denying defendant access to the law library and imposing other 
security restrictions that would prevent him from adequately preparing his case 
and competently acting as his own counsel. There were also obvious problems 
with discovery, as the proceedings before trial attest.  How could defendant, with 
his history, be personally entrusted with sensitive discovery materials from within 
the jail system? 
The majority insists that, even under these circumstances, the Sixth 
Amendment forced the trial court to permit defendant to represent himself.  I 
disagree.  The right of self-representation is not absolute.  When, as here, 
defendant‟s own actions made it difficult, if not virtually impossible, for him to 
effectively represent himself, the trial court, consistent with protecting human 
3 
lives, may deny self-representation.  Two decisions, one from this court and one 
from the high court, neither directly on point but both highly instructive, make this 
clear.  Together, the two cases present intersecting theories supporting the denial 
of self-representation. 
The first case is Indiana v. Edwards (2008) __ U.S. __ [128 S.Ct. 2379] 
(Edwards).  In Edwards, the Indiana Supreme Court had concluded the trial court 
erred in denying self-representation to a defendant who, although competent to go 
to trial, was not mentally competent to represent himself.  It had believed that 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 required 
the state to allow the defendant to represent himself even under those 
circumstances.  (Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2383].)  The 
high court reversed the Indiana Supreme Court and held the state properly denied 
self-representation.  The court explained, “Faretta does not answer the question 
before us both because it did not consider the problem of mental competency 
[citation], and because Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right 
of self-representation is not absolute.”  (Id. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2384].) 
Edwards “concern[ed] a mental-illness-related limitation on the scope of 
the self-representation right.”  (Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 
2384].)  The court concluded that a trial court may deny self-representation to a 
defendant who is “not mentally competent to conduct [the] trial himself.”  (Id. at 
p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2381].)  Edwards is not directly on point.  The trial court 
here did not deny self-representation because of defendant‟s mental state, but 
because of his violent behavior in jail.  But the reasons Edwards gave for 
permitting the court to deny self-representation apply here.  “[A] right of self-
representation at trial will not „affirm the dignity‟ of a defendant who lacks the 
mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.”  
(Edwards, supra, at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2387].)  Here, we should be similarly 
4 
unconcerned with affirming the dignity of a defendant who is already under a 
sentence of death, and who is personally responsible for the actions that made him 
such a security risk that he could not effectively defend himself.  The specter of a 
defendant trying to defend himself while incarcerated under severe restrictions that 
make it impossible for him to capably do so is hardly consistent with affirming 
that defendant‟s dignity. 
“Moreover, insofar as a defendant‟s lack of capacity threatens an improper 
conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional circumstance 
undercuts the most basic of the Constitution‟s criminal law objectives, providing a 
fair trial.”  (Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2387].)  “ „[T]he 
government‟s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times 
outweighs the defendant‟s interest in acting as his own lawyer.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  
Accordingly, “the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the 
particular defendant‟s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks 
to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”  (Id. at p. __ 
[128 S.Ct. at pp. 2387-2388], italics added.)  Similarly, the Constitution permits 
judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant‟s history of jail 
misconduct, which makes it effectively impossible for him to capably defend 
himself, consistent with protecting the lives of inmates and staff. 
The second case that supports the trial court‟s denial of self-representation 
is our own decision in People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1 (Carson).  In Carson, 
the trial court revoked the defendant‟s right of self-representation due to his out-
of-court misconduct, possibly including witness intimidation, that threatened to 
obstruct the trial proceedings.  We explained that Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 
“understandably contains scant reference to the circumstances that would justify 
termination of the right of self-representation.”  (Carson, supra, at p. 8.)  We 
extended the grounds for denying self-representation to out-of-court misconduct 
5 
“that seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial.”  (Id. at p. 6.)  We also said 
that “we do not suggest witness intimidation is the only type of serious and 
obstructionist out-of-court misconduct that may warrant termination of self-
representation.”  (Id. at p. 10.)  Thus, Carson establishes that, under certain 
circumstances, the defendant can, by his own actions, effectively forfeit the right 
of self-representation. 
The majority is correct that Carson is not directly on point.  The trial court 
here did not deny self-representation because of courtroom security concerns.  
Indeed, it acknowledged that defendant had behaved himself in the courtroom.  
But it certainly denied self-representation due to jail security concerns.  Jail 
security concerns dominated the entire course of the litigation involving 
defendant‟s representation, beginning with county counsel‟s first appearance 
representing the sheriff and expressing the sheriff‟s concerns.  Beyond question, a 
court must ensure courtroom security, and fulfilling this duty may justify the 
denial of self-representation.  But the court must also be sensitive to jail security.  
The need to protect the lives of jail inmates and staff from a defendant‟s 
murderous conduct may also justify the denial of self-representation. 
The necessary limitations on defendant‟s self-representation, which he 
alone caused, would have threatened the core integrity of the trial.  The high court 
in Edwards concluded that the Sixth Amendment permits a court to deny self-
representation to a defendant who, through no fault of his own, lacks the ability to 
capably represent himself.  Similarly, the Sixth Amendment also permits a court to 
deny self-representation to a defendant whose own actions make it realistically 
impossible for him to capably represent himself. 
It might be possible, I suppose, for the sheriff and court to work out 
arrangements that could permit defendant to defend himself at least to some 
extent — for example, by supplying defendant with his own law library or perhaps 
6 
his own computer and Internet connection in his jail cell, combined with other 
measures.  I am sure the same was true in Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1.  But such 
arrangements would, no doubt, be extraordinarily difficult and expensive and still 
entail considerable risk.  Jail resources are limited, and any extraordinary 
expenditure of resources on defendant would mean reduced resources available for 
other inmates, including those who behave themselves.  Defendant‟s history of jail 
violence made his competent self-representation incompatible with jail security or 
the reasonable expenditure of jail and judicial resources.  As was the case in 
Carson, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to adopt extraordinary 
measures to shield defendants from the consequences of their own actions. 
The majority argues convincingly that the trial court could have permitted 
defendant to represent himself.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-16.)2  Assuming 
adequate admonitions and a knowing waiver, I do not doubt the court would not 
have erred in any way defendant could have complained of had it permitted him to 
represent himself, even with all of the restrictions that self-representation would 
have required under the circumstances.  However, the question is not whether the 
                                              
2  
However, the majority‟s description of what it claims is “settled” law (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 15) oversimplifies a more complex question, as attested by a 
review of the two high court decisions the majority cites in this regard.  Kane v. 
Garcia Espitia (2005) 546 U.S. 9 reversed a federal appellate court decision that 
had set aside a state criminal conviction for failure to provide a self-representing 
defendant with law library access.  The high court stated that its jurisprudence had 
not clearly established a law library access right, and the federal courts were 
divided on the question.  Thus, under federal habeas corpus law, the lower court 
erred in setting aside a state court conviction on that basis.  The high court 
expressly did not resolve the question of whether a self-representing defendant has 
a right to law library access.  (Id. at p. 10.)  Thus, if anything, Kane suggests that 
the relevant law is unsettled, at least within the federal courts. 
 
Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 did not involve self-represented 
criminal defendants at all, but rather the rights of prison inmates to court access 
after they have been convicted.  It has nothing whatsoever to do with this issue. 
7 
court erred in permitting self-representation, but whether it erred denying it.  As 
the high court stressed, holding that a court may permit a defendant to represent 
himself “simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant 
the right to represent himself — the right at issue here.”  (Edwards, supra, __ U.S. 
at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2385].)  The majority never confronts this question.  It 
simply leaps from the conclusion that defendant could have been permitted to 
represent himself to the non sequitor that “[t]herefore, contrary to the trial court‟s 
view in this case, inmates still have the right to represent themselves even when 
their ability to prepare is restricted in custody.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) 
The majority states that the trial “court‟s conclusion that „it just doesn‟t 
make sense‟ to allow pro. per. representation under the circumstances faced by 
defendant may have been reasonable, but it was inconsistent with the requirements 
of Faretta and its progeny.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)  Reasonable the court‟s 
conclusion certainly was.  But under the teachings of Edwards, supra, __ U.S. __ 
[128 S.Ct. 2379], and Carson, 35 Cal.4th 1, it was also fully consistent with Sixth 
Amendment requirements. 
I do not suggest a trial court may deny self-representation lightly.  In 
normal circumstances, the trial court must honor a criminal defendant‟s right of 
self-representation.  But the circumstances here were far from normal.  At least 
when a defendant awaiting trial has already killed a jail inmate and has shown that 
he intends further violence, the court may conclude that, by his own actions, he 
has forfeited his right of self-representation.  The Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation does not require courts to endanger human life or take heroic 
measures to satisfy a murderous defendant‟s desire to represent himself. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
I CONCUR:  BAXTER, J.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Butler 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S068230 
Date Filed: December 10, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: J. D. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
Jay Colangelo, Assistant State Public Defender, Jessica K. McGuire and Caroline Lange, Deputy State 
Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and 
Jason C. Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jessica K. McGuire 
Deputy State Public Defender 
801 K Street, Suite 1100 
Sacramento, CA  95814-3518 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Jason C. Tran 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 620-6042