Case Title: Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co

Citation: 349 N.C. 196

Docket Number: 426PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 426PA97
ESTATE OF JACQUELINE MELISSA MULLIS, by KATHY DIXON,
Administrator
v.
MONROE OIL COMPANY, INCORPORATED, CITY OF MONROE ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE CONTROL, LISTON S. DARBY, Administrator of the Estate of
Dwaine Lydell Darby, and the Estate of Otis Stephen Blount
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 127 N.C. App. 277,
488 S.E.2d 830 (1997), affirming the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment for defendants Monroe Oil Company and City of
Monroe Alcoholic Beverage Control by Martin (Jerry Cash), J., on
10 May 1996 in Superior Court, Union County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 11 February 1998.
Clark, Griffin & McCollum, by Joe P. McCollum, Jr., and
William L. McGuirt, for plaintiff-appellant.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Timothy G.
Barber and Steven D. Gardner, for defendant-appellee Monroe
Oil Company.
R. Gregory Lewis, Anna L. Baird, and Joseph E. Wall for
defendant-appellee Monroe ABC.
ORR, Justice.
This case arises out of a drunk-driving accident in which
four young people were tragically killed.  On 30 April 1993, the
four persons involved, Otis Blount, twenty; Dwaine Darby,
nineteen; Melissa Mullis, fifteen; and Patricia Teel, eighteen,
decided to meet several other individuals at a local teen
nightclub in Monroe between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m.  Before meeting at
the Monroe club, Blount bought some liquor for himself and two
other individuals from a store operated by defendant City of
Monroe Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control (“Monroe ABC”). 
Blount returned to the same Monroe ABC store later that evening
and bought some more liquor for himself and the other
individuals.  Later, Blount left the club again and this time
bought beer from a convenience store owned by defendant Monroe
Oil Company, Inc. (“Monroe Oil”).
At about 11:00 p.m., Blount, Darby, Mullis, and Teel 
decided to go to a party at a friend’s house.  The four got into
Darby’s Volkswagen Jetta:  Darby in the driver’s seat; Blount in
the front passenger seat; and the two girls, Mullis and Teel, in
the back passenger seat.  Prior to leaving the club, Blount was
given money which had been collected at the club to buy beer for
the party, and on the way to the party, Darby stopped at the
convenience store owned by Monroe Oil so that Blount could buy
the beer.  Two other carloads of teenagers in the group also
stopped at the store.
After Blount bought the beer, he returned to Darby’s car and
got behind the wheel to drive.  Darby sat in the front passenger
seat, and the two girls remained in the backseat.  After
consuming alcohol in the parking lot, Blount drove the car out of
the parking lot and headed towards the location of the party. 
Moments later, at approximately midnight, Blount drove the car
off the road into a tree.  The car caught fire, killing all four
occupants.  An officer responding to the scene concluded that
Blount’s alcohol use contributed to the accident.  Blount’s
autopsy report also revealed that his blood-alcohol content was
0.13 at the time of the accident, an amount exceeding the then-
legal limit of 0.10 alcohol content under our impaired-driving
statute, N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1 (1989) (amendment for offenses
committed on or after 1 October 1993 substituted “0.08” for
“0.10”).
Based on the above, the administrator of the estate of
Melissa Mullis, one of the passengers, filed suit alleging that
defendants Monroe ABC and Monroe Oil were negligent for selling
alcohol to an underage person under the Dram Shop Act, N.C.G.S.
§§ 18B-120 to -129 (1995).  Plaintiff brought the action under
N.C.G.S. §§ 28A-18-1 to -18-8, dealing with the survival of
actions and wrongful-death provisions.  Defendants answered the
complaint and moved to dismiss it for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  In their 12(b)(6)
motions, defendants contended that the Dram Shop action should be
dismissed because plaintiff had failed to file the complaint
within the statute of limitations period under the Act. 
Plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the complaint, which was
granted on 11 April 1995.  In the amended complaint, plaintiff
withdrew the Dram Shop action and asserted a negligence per se
claim alleging that defendants’ acts were in violation of
N.C.G.S. § 18B-102, which prohibits the illegal sale of alcohol,
and, more specifically, were in violation of N.C.G.S. § 18B-302,
which prohibits the sale of alcohol to underage persons.  In
addition to the negligence per se claim, plaintiff also alleged
that defendants were liable for the negligent sale of alcohol to
an underage person under common law negligence.
Defendants renewed the 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the
complaint, and both motions were denied.  Defendants subsequently
moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact as shown by the pleadings,
depositions, and responses, and that defendants were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.  The trial court granted the summary
judgment motions for defendants on 10 May 1996, and plaintiff
appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and
held that plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy was under the
Dram Shop Act.  The Court of Appeals explained that to maintain a
wrongful-death suit, plaintiff/estate had to show that the
deceased, Melissa Mullis, could have maintained a negligence
action against defendants if she had lived.  N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-2
(1984) (amended 1995); Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of
Asheville, 332 N.C. 645, 647, 423 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1992); Carver v.
Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 673, 314 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1984).  The Court
of Appeals concluded that, here, a negligence per se or common
law negligence claim could not be so maintained based on this
Court’s decision in Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174
(1992).  The Court of Appeals stated that a negligence per se
action could not be maintained because this Court held in Hart
that a violation of N.C.G.S. § 18B-302 is not negligence per se. 
Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 127 N.C. App. 277, 279, 488
S.E.2d 830, 832 (1997).  Plaintiff, therefore, could not
establish that defendants’ violation of N.C.G.S. § 18B-302 in
this case was negligence per se.  Id.
The Court of Appeals also held that plaintiff could not
maintain a common law negligence claim against defendants for
selling alcohol to an underage person.  The Court of Appeals
explained that in Hart, this Court held that a common law
negligence suit could be maintained against a social host for
furnishing alcohol to an underage guest if it was shown that the
social host served alcohol to the guest when the host knew or
should have known that the guest was intoxicated and was going to
drive a car.  Id. at 280, 488 S.E.2d at 832.  The Court of
Appeals noted that, here, plaintiff did not allege that
defendants knew or should have known that Otis Blount was
intoxicated when defendants sold him the alcohol on 30 April
1993.  Id.  Emphasizing plaintiff’s failure to allege knowledge
of intoxication, the Court of Appeals concluded that a common law
negligence action could not be maintained and that the Dram Shop
Act provided the sole cause of action available to plaintiff. 
The Court of Appeals stated that since plaintiff failed to timely
file an action under the Dram Shop Act, the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment was proper.  For reasons set forth below, we
affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s
orders of summary judgment for defendants.
The issues in this case are whether plaintiff may maintain
negligence claims against defendant commercial vendors for
selling alcohol to an underage person on two grounds: 
(1) negligence per se, based on a violation of N.C.G.S. §
18B-302; and (2) common law negligence.  First, the Court of
Appeals correctly determined that plaintiff may not maintain a
negligence per se action based on a violation of N.C.G.S. §
18B-302.  In Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174, this
Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that a violation of
N.C.G.S. § 18B-302 is not negligence per se.  Under N.C.G.S. §
18B-302, it is a misdemeanor to give or sell alcoholic beverages
to anyone less than twenty-one years old.  Id. at 306, 420 S.E.2d
at 178.  In a divided opinion, this Court held that a violation
of N.C.G.S. § 18B-302 was not negligence per se because the
statute was not a public safety statute which imposed a duty for
the protection of the public.  Id. at 303-04, 420 S.E.2d at 177. 
The majority in Hart concluded that the purpose of N.C.G.S. §
18B-302 was to restrict minors’ consumption of alcohol, that it
was therefore not a public-safety statute, and that it could not
be the basis for a negligence per se claim.  In light of the
majority decision in Hart, we are bound in this case to conclude
that plaintiff may not maintain a negligence per se action based
on a violation of N.C.G.S. § 18B-302.
The next issue we must address is whether plaintiff may
maintain a common law negligence action against defendant
commercial vendors arising out of the sale of alcohol to an
underage person.  Presently, commercial vendors are subject to
liability for the negligent sale of alcohol to an underage person
under the North Carolina Dram Shop Act.  N.C.G.S. §§ 18B-120 to
-129.  Any effect that the Dram Shop Act may have on the
existence of a common law negligence suit must be addressed first
since the Act was specifically created to impose liability for
the conduct upon which plaintiff’s suit is based.
Under the Dram Shop Act, an aggrieved party has a claim
against a “permittee or local Alcoholic Beverage Control Board”
if the party shows that the seller “negligently sold or furnished
an alcoholic beverage to an underage person,” that consumption of
the beverage caused or contributed to the underage driver’s
impairment, and that the injury which resulted was “proximately
caused by the underage driver’s negligent operation of a vehicle
while so impaired.”  N.C.G.S. § 18B-121.  The legislature has
also provided that “[t]he creation of any claim for relief by
this Article may not be interpreted to abrogate or abridge any
claims for relief under the common law.”  N.C.G.S. § 18B-128. 
Under this section, the legislature has made clear that
previously existing common law rights are preserved.  We may
conclude, therefore, that the Dram Shop cause of action was not
intended to be the exclusive remedy available to a third party
who wishes to assert a negligence suit against a seller based on
the sale of alcohol to an underage person.
In addition to the Dram Shop Act’s not excluding common law
remedies, this Court held in Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420
S.E.2d 174, that a common law negligence claim could exist for
the negligent provision of alcohol by a social host.  There, we
held that a common law negligence claim could be maintained where
the plaintiff alleged that the social host provided alcohol to an
underage guest when the host knew or should have known that the
guest was intoxicated and was going to drive a car shortly after
consuming the alcohol.  In acknowledging this common law claim in
Hart, we stated that we were not creating a new cause of action
but were instead merely allowing “established negligence
principles” to be applied to the facts alleged.  Id. at 306, 420
S.E.2d at 178.  We stated that, under established common law
negligence principles, a plaintiff must offer evidence of four
essential elements in order to prevail:  duty, breach of duty,
proximate cause, and damages.  Id. at 305, 420 S.E.2d at 177-78;
see Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. 412, 395 S.E.2d 112
(1990).  In Hart, we further explained that
[a]ctionable negligence is the failure to exercise that
degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person
would exercise under similar conditions.  A defendant
is liable for his negligence if the negligence is the
proximate cause of injury to a person to whom the
defendant is under a duty to use reasonable care.
Hart, 332 N.C. at 305, 420 S.E.2d at 177-78.
Applying these long-standing negligence rules to the
plaintiff’s allegations in Hart, we concluded that the
plaintiff’s factual averments were sufficient to satisfy all
common law negligence elements.  First, the defendants had a
“duty to the people who travel on the public highways not to
serve alcohol to an intoxicated individual who was known to be
driving.”  Id. at 305, 420 S.E.2d at 178.  Furnishing alcohol to
a noticeably intoxicated person who is going to drive would
constitute a breach of that duty, and a jury could determine that
this breach proximately caused harm.
The Court next addressed social-host liability in Camalier
v. Jeffries, 340 N.C. 699, 460 S.E.2d 133 (1995).  In Camalier,
Charles Jeffries attended a party at the home of defendant Frank
Daniels and consumed several gin and tonics over a three-hour
period.  Jeffries then left the party in his car and collided
into a car driven by Caleb Camalier.  Camalier died from injuries
received in the accident, and his estate asserted a common law
negligence claim against the social hosts of the party.  The
trial court later granted summary judgment for the defendants,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  See Camalier v. Jeffries, 113
N.C. App. 303, 438 S.E.2d 427 (1994).  We subsequently affirmed
the Court of Appeals’ decision, finding that summary judgment for
the defendants was proper.  We determined that evidence presented
by the plaintiffs established that the hosts had served Jeffries
alcohol and that the hosts knew that Jeffries was going to drive
a car shortly after consuming the alcohol.  The plaintiffs’
evidence failed, however, to show whether the social hosts knew
or should have known that Jeffries was intoxicated when they
served him the alcohol.  While the plaintiffs’ evidence did show
that Jeffries had a blood- alcohol concentration of 0.191 and
that he was visibly intoxicated after the accident, it failed to
show that he was visibly intoxicated while at the party or that
anyone at the party should have known that he was intoxicated. 
No one at the party said that Jeffries appeared intoxicated, and
fifty-three people who were present at the party expressly stated
that he did not appear intoxicated.  Thus, we held that the
plaintiffs in Camalier failed to produce sufficient evidence to
establish a common law negligence claim against the social host.
Applying the foregoing principles developed in Hart and
Camalier to the present case, we conclude that a common law
negligence suit may be maintained against a commercial vendor,
based on a sale of alcohol to an underage person, provided that
the plaintiff in such a case presents sufficient evidence to
satisfy all elements of a common law negligence suit, that is,
duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.  As was the
case in Hart, we do not recognize a new cause of action but
merely allow “established negligence principles” to be applied to
the facts of plaintiff’s case.
Having determined that a common law cause of action may be
maintained for the negligent sale of alcohol to an underage
person if all common law negligence elements are satisfied, we
must now determine whether plaintiff’s forecast of evidence was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of common law
negligence.  Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure, dealing with summary judgment motions, “[t]he
motion shall be allowed and judgment entered when such evidence
reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, and when the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 
Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d
897, 901 (1972).  The party moving for summary judgment meets its
burden “by proving that an essential element of the opposing
party’s claim is non-existent, or by showing through discovery
that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an
essential element of his claim.”  Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C.
331, 342, 368 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1988), quoted in Camalier, 340
N.C. at 710-11, 460 S.E.2d at 138.  To survive a motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must therefore “‘forecast
sufficient evidence of all essential elements of [his] claim[]’
to make a prima facie case at trial.”  Camalier, 340 N.C. at 711,
460 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 82, 414
S.E.2d 22, 27 (1992)).
Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence showed the following:  On
the night of 30 April 1993, Otis Blount, who was twenty years old
and under the legal age to buy alcohol, purchased alcohol twice
from defendant Monroe ABC and twice from defendant Monroe Oil. 
Melissa Baucom stated in her deposition that she drove Blount to
the Monroe ABC store twice that evening to buy liquor for himself
and two other individuals; she also stated that she later drove
Blount to an Amoco station convenience store owned by Monroe Oil,
where he bought beer.  Several other teenagers stated that
shortly after 11:00 p.m., Blount went back to the Amoco station
owned by Monroe Oil with Darby in Darby’s car and purchased more
beer.  Witnesses present stated that Melissa Mullis and Patty
Teel were with Blount in Darby’s car when Darby and Blount drove
to the Amoco station to buy the beer.  Aaron Tedder and
Christopher Mullis, two teenagers present that night, stated that
they saw Blount walk out of the Amoco station with beer and drink
a portion of it in the parking lot.  Blount then drove Darby’s
Volkswagen from the Amoco station; a short time later, he drove
the car off the road and into a tree, killing himself and the
other car occupants, Melissa Mullis, Patty Teel, and Dwaine
Darby.
Other evidence tended to show that, although Blount was
intoxicated, he did not readily appear so.  Blount’s autopsy
report revealed that he had a blood-alcohol content of at least
0.13 and was therefore driving while impaired; an officer who
responded to the scene also concluded that Blount’s alcohol use
caused the accident.  Melissa Baucom, however, stated that she
did not notice anything unusual about Blount’s eyes or speech to
indicate that he had been drinking, adding that it was usually
difficult to tell if Blount had been drinking alcohol.  Several
other teenagers stated that Blount’s speech was normal that
evening, that he was walking straight and had control over his
body motions, and that he did not smell of alcohol.  Tommy Quick,
another teenager present that night, stated that he had not seen
Blount drink that evening, but that the only way to tell if
Blount was intoxicated was “if you knew him.”  Quick stated that
“Otis [Blount] usually when he drinks, he gets in a cheery mood
. . . .  If you didn’t know him, he would be sober to you.” 
Several other witnesses also stated that Blount was not
noticeably intoxicated and that it would be difficult to know
when he was because he did not typically show outward signs of
intoxication.
While plaintiff’s evidence tends to show that defendants
Monroe Oil and Monroe ABC illegally sold alcohol to Blount on
30 April 1993 and that Blount shortly thereafter drove a car
while impaired and caused irrevocable harm, it fails to forecast
sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case for common law
negligence.  Plaintiff has not established that defendants owed a
duty based on a forecast of evidence showing only that defendants
sold alcohol to an individual who was later found to be an
underage person.  As we have explained, a duty is “‘an
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.’” 
Peal v. Smith, 115 N.C. App. 225, 230, 444 S.E.2d 673, 677 (1994)
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al., The Law of Torts § 53 (5th ed.
1984)), aff’d per curiam, 340 N.C. 352, 457 S.E.2d 599 (1995).  A
legal duty is owed “‘whenever one person is by circumstances
placed in such a position [towards] another that every one of
ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he
did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to
the person or property of the other.’”  Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C.
285, 287, 66 S.E. 135, 136 (1909) (quoting Heaven v. Pender, XI
Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883)).  “‘Every man is in general bound to use
care and skill in his conduct wherever the reasonably prudent
person in his shoes would recognize unreasonable risk to others
from failure to use such care.’”  Firemen’s Mutual Ins. Co. v.
High Point Sprinkler Co., 266 N.C. 134, 140-41, 146 S.E.2d 53, 60
(1966) (quoting 2 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law
of Torts § 28.1, at 1535 (1956).  Risk-creation behavior thus
triggers duty where the risk is both unreasonable and
foreseeable.  Charles E. Daye & Mark W. Morris, North Carolina
Law of Torts § 16.30, at 135 (1991); David A. Logan & Wayne A.
Logan, North Carolina Torts § 1.10, at 7 (1996).  As explained by
Justice Cardozo in his classic analysis of duty in Palsgraf:
We are told that one who drives at reckless speed
through a crowded city street is guilty of a negligent
act and therefore of a wrongful one, irrespective of
the consequences.  Negligent the act is, and wrongful
in the sense that it is unsocial, but wrongful and
unsocial in relation to other travelers, only because
the eye of vigilance perceives the risk of
damage. . . .  The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports
relation; it is risk to another or to others within the
range of apprehension.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99,
100 (1928) (emphasis added).  “[T]he orbit of the danger as
disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance [is] the orbit of
the duty.”  Id. at 343, 162 N.E. at 100.
In this case, there is no evidence showing that the
defendant commercial vendors should have recognized that Mullis,
or anyone similarly situated might be injured by their conduct,
and thus there was no duty.  Plaintiff’s evidence tends to show
that defendants sold alcohol to Blount on 30 April 1993 and that
Blount consumed some of the alcohol prior to driving Darby’s car. 
Although the evidence tends to show that a sale was made,
plaintiff’s evidence fails to show that defendants should have
perceived that the sale of alcohol to Blount was going to create
an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons.  The evidence in
fact fails to indicate that the sellers should have been aware
that anything but an ordinary transaction was occurring when
selling the alcohol to Blount.  Blount did not appear inebriated
that evening according to observers, and there is no evidence in
the record showing that Blount was noticeably intoxicated when
buying the alcohol from defendants.  Plaintiff’s evidence tends
to show the contrary:  that although Blount may have been
intoxicated, he appeared sober throughout the evening when buying
liquor from Monroe ABC and when buying beer from the Amoco
station owned by Monroe Oil.
There was also no evidence tending to show that the
defendant commercial vendors should have known that Blount was
going to drive a car even if he had appeared inebriated.  The
evidence tended to show instead that, as previously stated,
Blount did not appear intoxicated and that every time he
purchased alcohol from defendants, he was driven to the store by
other persons and was not driving a car.  Thus, from the
perspective of the vendors, this was an ordinary transaction for
the sale of alcohol to a person who was driven to the store by
another.  Thus, there was no indication that foreseeable harm
would occur from the sale of alcohol to Blount.
Such a scenario is quite different from that which occurred
in Hart where the facts alleged were sufficient to establish
foreseeability and the duty element.  The plaintiff’s allegations
in Hart that the host served alcohol to an underage person who
the host knew or should have known was intoxicated and was going
to shortly drive a car were sufficient to show that the host
should have perceived a risk of harm.  There, we stated that a
jury could find that “a man of ordinary prudence would have known
that such or some similar injurious result was reasonably
foreseeable from this negligent conduct.”  Hart, 332 N.C. at 305,
420 S.E.2d at 178.  Furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated driver
was conduct creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.  In
such a situation, the host could also perceive the risk:  Serving
alcohol to an inebriated individual who is going to drive is a
foreseeable risk “clear to the ordinarily prudent eye.”  Munsey
v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150, 156, 58 L. Ed. 162, 166 (1913).
Such is not the case here.  No evidence tended to show that
defendants should have been aware that selling alcohol to Blount
could produce foreseeable harm and subject other drivers or
passengers to an unreasonable risk of harm.  Evidence offered by
plaintiff indicated merely that defendants sold alcohol to an
individual who was later discovered to be underage.  Evidence of
this alone, without an offer of some additional factor or factors
which would put the vendor on notice that harm was foreseeable,
is insufficient to establish the duty element and thus maintain a
common law negligence suit.  It was necessary, in other words,
for plaintiff’s forecast of evidence to point to some additional
factor or factors that would alert the defendant commercial
vendors that the act of selling the alcohol would likely produce
some foreseeable injury.  Whether harm is foreseeable simply
depends on the circumstances of each case and is not determined
according to any predetermined set of factors.  However, since
plaintiff’s forecast of evidence failed to have such an
additional factor or factors which would have enabled the vendors
to foresee that harm was, in all likelihood, going to occur, the
duty element is not satisfied, and plaintiff’s prima facie case
must fail.
Thus, based on the foregoing, plaintiff has not produced a
sufficient forecast of evidence to maintain a common law
negligence claim against defendants based on the sale of alcohol
to Otis Blount.  Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’
decision affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
for defendants.
AFFIRMED.
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
=======================
Justice FRYE concurring.
I agree with the majority that plaintiff has not produced a
sufficient forecast of evidence to maintain a common law
negligence claim against defendants based on the sale of alcohol
to Otis Blount.  However, the crucial question here is not
whether there was a duty, but whether the evidence forecast a
breach of duty.
“Actionable negligence is the failure to exercise that
degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would
exercise under similar conditions.”  Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299,
305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (1992).  Under this Court’s decisions
in Hart and Camalier v. Jeffries, 340 N.C. 699, 460 S.E.2d 133
(1995), “an individual may be held liable on a theory of common-
law negligence if he (1) served alcohol to a person (2) when he
knew or should have known the person was intoxicated and (3) when
he knew the person would be driving afterwards.”  Id. at 711, 460
S.E.2d at 138.  Here, as in Camalier, the forecast of evidence
was insufficient to show that defendants knew or should have
known that Blount was intoxicated at the time they sold alcohol
to him.  Thus, plaintiffs failed to forecast evidence of a breach
of duty, and summary judgment for defendants was proper. 
Accordingly, I agree that the decision of the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed.