Case Title: Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90-82

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n1991 WY 55809 P.2d 775Case Number: 90-82Decided: 04/18/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
The LOUISIANALAND AND EXPLORATION COMPANY, Petitioner 
(Plaintiff),

v.

The WYOMING OIL AND GAS 
CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent (Defendant), and Woods Petroleum 
Corporation, Respondent (Intervenor).

Appeal from the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission.

Remanded.

S. Thomas Throne, 
Sheridan, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Joe Scott, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for respondent Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Com'n.

Craig Newman of Brown 
& Drew, Casper, for respondent Woods Petroleum 
Corp.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. 

Urbigkit, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal provides a 
geographical and geologically related conflict to the oil and gas well 
production controversy considered in ANR Production Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Com'n, 800 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1990). We are presented with, following a 
June 1989 hearing, a Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (Commission) 
shut down order for a producing oil and gas well drilled by petitioner, 
LouisianaLand and Exploration 
Company (LL & E), to the Second Bench of the First Frontier Formation in the 
Powell Unit. The basic issue pursued on appeal is the Commission's procedure in 
denial of a motion for rehearing based on newly discovered evidence or, 
alternatively, this court's authority to remand for additional evidence to be 
produced to provide a supplemental record.

[¶2.]     We remand for 
additional hearing.

[¶3.]     As this court discussed 
in the parallel case of ANR Production Co., this litigation results from the 
1983 establishment of the Powell Pressure Maintenance Unit (PPMU) which produced 
from the First Bench; while in that case, ANR Production Co. and, in this case, 
LL & E, produced wells from the Second Bench. This well, Devex 32-11, was 
drilled in the summer of 1984 in the border area surrounding the PPMU. At the 
drill site, the First Bench of the First Frontier Formation utilized in the 
pressure maintenance unit was not present in producing capacity and the well was 
developed into the productive Second Bench sand which is geologically located 
approximately fifty feet lower in the formation.

[¶4.]     The Devex 32-11 well 
was productive from 1984 until the summer of 1988 when unusual production 
characteristics were noted. Woods Petroleum Corporation, as a PPMU unit 
operator, was notified. Hearings were then also underway for the well discussed 
in the ANR Production Co. case. On May 18, 1989, Woods Petroleum filed its 
application to shut down the Devex 32-11 well pursuant to allegations that the 
Devex 32-11 well was in communication with the oil production sand being 
pressurized into secondary recovery through the PPMU. The application was served 
on LL & E on May 30, 1989 and a hearing was held less than two weeks later 
on June 13, 1989. The Commission, immediately after the hearing, entered an 
interim order shutting down the Devex 32-11 well.

[¶5.]     It is what happened 
immediately after the June 13 hearing that presents the issues of this appeal in 
contention of procedural abuse of discretion when the Commission denied an 
opportunity for a rehearing to the well owner based on newly discovered evidence 
and the record supplementation request addressed to and unanswered by the 
district court before certification by-pass to this court.1

[¶6.]     We determine this case 
on a narrow basis in remanding to the Commission for a further hearing to permit 
LL & E to present its evidence which relates to the claimed invalidity of 
the expert witness computer simulator model produced by Woods Petroleum for the 
Commission hearing.

[¶7.]     LL & E advances its 
contention regarding the controversy in briefing:

     At the June 13, 1989 
hearing, Woods surprised Petitioner/LL & E by presenting technical evidence 
through expert testimony (apparently developed long before Petitioner/LL & E 
was notified of the hearing) that the fracture treatment of the Devex 32-11 
allegedly created communication between the First Bench Reservoir and the Second 
Bench in the vicinity of the Devex 32-11 well bore * * *. In order to overcome 
the factual absence of the First Bench reservoir in the well bore of the Devex 
32-11, Woods' expert witness hypothesized the existence of the First Bench 
reservoir of the First Frontier to be within twenty-two feet of the Devex 32-11 
well bore. This conclusion was reached by use of a computer simulation model by 
Dr. Holditch * * *. Because of the high permeability of the First Bench 
reservoir in the PPMU, Woods expert, Dr. Holditch, indicated he could only 
obtain a history match with available data, using his computer simulation, by 
hypothesizing the existence of the First Bench within twenty-two feet of the 
Devex 32-11 well bore * * *. To reach his conclusion, Dr. Holditch used all of 
the data points obtained in a 1984 transient test of the Devex 32-11 as well as 
the base reading from a 1984 flow test on the Devex 32-11 * * *.

[¶8.]     Immediately after the 
conclusion of the June 13 hearing, LL & E undertook a study of the hearing 
evidence and now contends that a portion of the pressure transient test used in 
the study was faulty and the input data used for simulation was wrong, producing 
erroneous computer output. Upon discovery of the alleged error, LL & E 
immediately filed an application for rehearing with the Commission to secure an 
opportunity to present newly discovered and additional evidence relating to 
contention of faulty data in the computer simulation. Essentially, the claimed 
error is alleged to relate to mechanical mistakes in process and failure to 
recognize in simulation the drilling mud characteristics used when the original 
well had been drilled.

[¶9.]     In October, a hearing 
was held to consider the application for rehearing and the Commission, by 
application denial, refused to allow any evidence or testimony regarding the 
newly discovered evidence. LL & E took its adverse ruling on the motion for 
rehearing to the district court by a petition for review and the proceeding was 
then certified to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09, without further 
evidence being presented. See ANR Production Co., 800 P.2d 492. Cf. Natrona 
County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039, 1047 n. 7 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10.]  LL & E contends in basic argument 
that the Commission was arbitrary and in abuse of discretion in denial of the 
motion for rehearing since the time from initial notice for hearing through 
hearing date of less than a month and without notice of the proposed simulation 
report afforded no realistic opportunity for preparation and defense. It is 
argued that upon discovery of the contended error in the submission, a further 
hearing should have been afforded in order to provide a bilateral opportunity to 
present evidence on computer simulation model testimony to the Commission. 
Conversely, Woods Petroleum contends that LL & E was an actual participant 
in the ANR Production Co. proceeding and should have been informed and prepared 
as a result of the knowledge gained in that earlier course of Commission 
hearings so that a rehearing on the present case is unnecessary to provide a 
fair opportunity to defend.

     Some development of 
these matters is necessary and advisable in Woods' view to correct the otherwise 
misleading impression one might gain upon reading the Brief of LL & E that 
the instant controversy developed all of a sudden and out of nowhere with the 
Application by Woods of May 18, 1989, and the hearing before the Commission on 
June 13, 1989, and further to rebut certain purely factual arguments by LL & 
E that it was surprised by a computer simulation and expert evidence introduced 
by Woods at the June 13, 1989, hearing before the Commission.

     The transcript of 
proceedings in Docket No. 48-89, already before this Court in Case 

Nos. 89-276 and 89-277 
[ANR Production Co., 800 P.2d 492], reveals that procedurally the Devex Well, 
though not the focus of the March, 1989, Commission proceeding, was the subject 
of considerable evidence and testimony at the March, 1989, hearing of the 
Commission concerning another well which is before this Court in Case Nos. 
89-276 and 89-277. Further, the transcript of the March, 1989, proceeding before 
the Commission will reveal that LL & E not only appeared through counsel and 
witnesses, but further that LL & E participated fully in the March, 1989, 
proceeding and examined not only its own witnesses but the witnesses of the 
other parties involved in that hearing.

     Accordingly, Woods 
believes that the Statement of the Case of both LL & E and the Commission 
needs to be supplemented so that the Court is aware that the Commission became 
aware of the Devex Well and the alleged problems concerning that well as early 
as March of 1989, some three months before the hearing in Docket No. 166-89, 
before the Court in the instant matter, and further that the Appellant in this 
cause participated fully in that earlier proceeding.

[¶11.]  The generic factual situation which 
permeates these cases, and this one in particular, is the consideration that 
communication between the two benches for augmenting production in the Devex 
32-11 well may develop in two separate ways. In the first instance, the Devex 
32-11 well and its production methods may have opened up communication into the 
First Bench in the immediate vicinity of the well site. In the second instance, 
the activities of ANR Production Co. or any other wells in the entire area that 
may have been drilled into the Second Bench opened up communication so broadly 
between the two benches that the Devex 32-11 well became the beneficiary of the 
gas pressurization which was leaking at other well sites as communication 
between the two benches.

[¶12.]  The procedural problem is that nothing 
indicates that the Commission took judicial notice of information obtained in 
the ANR Production Co. hearings in order to render the decision in this case. 
Cockreham v. Wyoming Production Credit Ass'n, 
743 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1987). Cf. Texas West Oil and Gas 
Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (1987), reconfirmed 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988). Application of judicial notice for 
the purpose of the later related hearing requires written notice of what matters 
are considered as judicially noticed with notice to be seasonably furnished to 
the litigants before hearing application and thereafter an appropriate record of 
any notice to evidence would be included in this record for appellate review. 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432 
(Wyo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy R. Co. v. Bruch, 400 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 
1965); Bloomenthal, Administrative Law in Wyoming - An Introduction and Preliminary 
Report, 16 Wyo.L.J. 191, 206 (1962). Judicial review is confined to the 
administrative record. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety v. Pida, 
106 Nev. 897, 
803 P.2d 227 (1990). See also Exxon Corp. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 
783 P.2d 685 (Wyo. 1989), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 1937, 109 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1990), when by-pass certification to this court occurs. Since the cases are 
not consolidated, we are confined in analysis of the stated issue to this 
record, Wyoming Hospital Ass'n v. Harris, 527 F. Supp. 551 (D.Wyo. 1981), aff'd 
727 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1984), and the specific documentation presented which is 
inclusion of the simulator testimony as clearly a significant contributor to the 
Commission's technical decision. We will not judicially notice what was not 
included in this record by Commission action as the factual basis for their 
decision.

[¶13.]  This court is familiar with the efficient 
and expeditious processes used by the Commission as appropriate, if not 
indispensable, to the proper performance of the administrative agency 
activities. Majority of Working Interest Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 721 P.2d 1070 (Wyo. 1986). Under the scheduling processes in 
this case with time from notice to hearing of less than a month, either the 
contestant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity for discovery and defense or, 
if actually surprised by the testimony provided at the scheduled hearing, to be 
granted the right to an extension of the hearing, id., or a rehearing in order 
to have received a realistic opportunity to competently litigate its contention. 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 713 P.2d 240 
(Wyo. 1986).2 Within the record presented, we 
cannot assess insignificance or lack of substantiality to the requested 
introduction of evidence attacking the validity of one principal part of the 
evidence of decision.

[¶14.]  In specific position taken by the 
litigants, LL & E argues for a procedural disaffirmance in its inability to 
present an adequate defense, while Woods Petroleum contends that sufficient 
evidence under the rules applicable to administrative agencies requires 
affirmance. The difficulty that is left for this court is to assess technically 
the evidentiary contribution made by the computer simulation study of Dr. 
Stephen Holditch to determine factually whether (a) LL & E should have 
guessed at its existence, and (b) whether it was sufficiently significant in 
effect, even if invalid, to create a due process problem in hearing procedure.3

[¶15.]  LL & E advances the argument that the 
Commission was required to have an evidentiary hearing in order to determine 
whether a rehearing should be granted. We do not accept that position which 
would effectively delineate two rehearings, one with evidence to determine if it 
should be held and the second then to determine what was found. In analysis, 
whether the action of the Commission in denying the opportunity for rehearing 
and the submission of additional evidence was an abuse of discretion, Utah Power 
& Light Co., 713 P.2d 240, present consideration of the administrative rule, 
W.R.A.P. 12.08, is to be compared with W.R.C.P. 59(a) and 60(b) and W.R.Cr.P. 
34. Matter of Swasso, 751 P.2d 887 (Wyo. 1988). What we do conclude is that in an 
administrative hearing of this type, where provisions for rehearing are provided 
in administrative rules and regulations, normal rules which apply in the courts 
for a new trial under W.R.C.P. 59(a) and 60(b) should also apply, invoking 
requirements of newly discovered evidence, including materiality, and that the 
evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced 
at hearing.

[¶16.]  W.R.A.P. 12.08, Presentation of Evidence, 
provides:

     If, before the date 
set for hearing [by the court on review petition], application is made to the 
court for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material, and there 
was good reason for failure to present it in the proceeding before the 
agency, the court in contested cases shall order that the additional 
evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court. The 
agency may adhere to or modify its findings and decision after receiving such 
additional evidence, and shall supplement the record to reflect the proceedings 
had and the decision made. Supplemental evidence may be taken by the court in 
cases involving fraud or involving misconduct of some person engaged in the 
administration of the law affecting the decision. In all cases other than 
contested cases additional material evidence may be presented to the 
court.

(Emphasis added.) LL 
& E argues:

     As can be seen, Rule 
12.08 W.R.A.P. and Rule 60(b) W.R.C.P. both allow newly discovered evidence to 
be received and reviewed by an appellate court if the proper criteria are met. 
The common denominator between the two rules is that new evidence will be 
allowed at a subsequent hearing as long as there is a good reason why the 
evidence was not presented at the original hearing. The distinguishing factor 
between the two rules, though, is that Rule 12.08 requires a lower standard to 
be met by the party wishing to show new evidence; 12.08 requires a showing that 
the additional evidence is material and that the presenting party has a good 
reason for not presenting the evidence at the previous hearing, while Rule 60(b) 
requires that the new evidence be of the type that by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.[4]

[¶17.]  The factual structure of this case in 
relation to the procedural issues presented deserves clear identification. In 
considering shut down of the Devex 32-11 well, the Commission faced a factual 
decision to justify a proposed administrative action:

     Was the communication 
between bench one and bench two oil sands so that the secondary recovery gas 
pressurizing efforts of the PPMU were escaping into the second sand for 
production enhancement of non-unit wells?

[¶18.]  The evidence of the hearing addressed the 
two issues of contended communication: (a) was the Devex 32-11 well itself the 
source of the gas sand escape, or (b) were wells at other field locations 
permitting the significant pressure enhancement benefit claimed to have 
developed for the Devex 32-11 well.5 The significance of the difference 
and why communication existed is procedurally presented by the sequence of 
hearings held regarding separate wells in the field. The ANR Production Co. 
proceedings went first and followed earlier also into this court. Many of the 
same oil and gas geological formation basic contentions were addressed in each 
hearing. Although not a contestant party, LL & E was apparently present at 
the ANR Production Co. administrative agency proceedings. The record of the ANR 
Production Co. administrative hearing was not, however, in any way judicially 
noticed for later inclusion in the LL & E hearing of 1989. Consequently, we 
are confined to the actual record in this case for whatever the Commission 
overtly or subconsciously may have done in analysis decision. Computer 
simulation testimony and opinion was present in ANR Production Co., but it did 
not relate to the Devex 32-11 well and the computer simulation testimony for 
other wells is not now available for resolution in this case where 
introduced in the ANR Production Co. proceedings.

[¶19.]  It is the persuasion of this court that 
either a litigant, such as LL & E in this case, should have some realistic 
opportunity to pursue discovery or have flexibility in hearing proceedings 
provided when unnoticed and unexpected technical information is presented where 
validity factors may determine the result of the hearing. On this record, we 
find no basis to believe that LL & E knew of this particular simulation 
study prior to the commencement of the June 1989 hearing and, until the text of 
the study was available at that hearing, had no opportunity to assess the 
validity of the factors included in its development.

[T]here is considerable 
potential for misuse in reservoir simulation. A modeler so inclined may slant or 
tilt the simulator in such a manner that the simulator will produce only the 
results desired by the modeler. The simulator may be affected by the manner in 
which the underlying programs are written, by the data used, by model 
manipulation, or by a combination of these. In turn, expert testimony based upon 
misuse of a reservoir simulation will mislead the trier of fact, rather than 
assist as required by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Only through complete 
discovery of all aspects of a party's simulation work can the potential for 
misuse be avoided.

Lang, A Primer on 
Computer Simulation of Hydrocarbon Reservoirs, XXIILand & Water L.Rev. 119, 133-34 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 

[¶20.]  Another factor makes this case and its 
present status unusual. Since this is a direct certification case, the W.R.A.P. 
12.08 motion filed by LL & E in the district court is now before us for 
first decision (nisi prius) since we are in effect substituted into the initial 
judicial review by certification by-pass. Exxon Corp., 783 P.2d 685; Buck Draw 
Field Area, 721 P.2d 1070. See also McKnight, 764 P.2d  at 1047 n. 7.

[¶21.]  The specific computer simulation of Dr. 
Holditch was first brought to the attention of LL & E within the brief 
period between notice of hearing and its conclusion, and now develops two 
totally independent review issues. In first instance, LL & E challenges the 
denial before the administrative agency of the motion for rehearing, 
which issue now provides an operational administrative agency concept. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 240. It would be unusual indeed where the 
authority with the administrative agency does exist, Hupp v. Employment Sec. 
Com'n of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1986), that abuse of discretion would be 
found if the agency permits or requires contestants to introduce additional 
information.6

[¶22.]  In second instance, LL & E also 
requests that W.R.A.P. 12.08 be applied to provide record supplementation before 
final appellate review. This decision for the remand presents a judicial 
function.7 Matter of State Bank Charter 
Application of Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶23.]  Complete disparate considerations are 
presented in analysis of LL & E's access to augment the record with a 
response and criticism of the computer simulation. First presented is the 
administrative agency denial of rehearing under its procedural rules and second 
is supplementation authority provided to the reviewing court by W.R.A.P. 12.08. 
The administrative agency action is considered in appellate concept of abused 
discretion under the provisions of W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii). That rehearing or 
supplementation request in denial provides an analysis of abused discretion. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 240; United States v. Pierce Auto Freight 
Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 66 S. Ct. 687, 90 L. Ed. 821 
(1946). Cf. Hupp, 715 P.2d 223.

[¶24.]  This court will not be called to decide 
the administrative agency abuse of discretion inquiry since we will first 
address this court's discretion in first instance to provide for 
supplementation under W.R.A.P. 12.08. Although little consideration has been 
given in Wyoming case law to the subject of a reviewing 
court's discretion under remand provisions similar to W.R.A.P. 12.08, the 
authoritative language is clearly a broad provision for discretion in providing 
two criteria and then directing a mandatory implementation. Initially, 
satisfaction is used in the rule which is, in reality, discretion in 
application. This court described in review of W.R.C.P. 72.1(h), which is the 
predecessor of the present W.R.A.P. 12.08, in Matter of State Bank Charter 
Application of Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d  at 301 (quoting Johnson v. Schrader, 
502 P.2d 371, 376 (1972), reh'g 507 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1973) and emphasis in 
original):

     "Rule 72.1(h) 
generally requires that additional evidence be brought before the agency when 
such is allowed by the district court. However, where if misconduct or fraud has 
been engaged in by an administrator, the evidence can be taken directly before 
the Court.

     "The decision to allow 
additional evidence to be presented is not discretionary with the Court; it is 
mandatory. Such evidence shall be presented if (1) the evidence is 
material; and (2) there is good reason for failure to have presented it in the 
agency proceedings. A somewhat lesser standard is required only in uncontested 
cases."

[¶25.]  Within the satisfaction (discretion) 
criteria, if we find (1) the additional evidence is material, and (2) 
good reason is provided for nonproduction at hearing, then we shall order 
further agency examination and opportunity for evidentiary presentation. Our 
first decision, materiality, turns out to be factual in contemplation and the 
second, essentially legal in consideration of good cause. In order to clarify 
the status of the law, it is first necessary to identify the argument from 
submitted briefing and recognize that the good cause inquiry in W.R.A.P. 12.08 
is quite dissimilar from the motion for new trial/good cause shown concept of 
W.R.C.P. 59 and 60 and W.R.Cr.P. 34. Administrative agency proceedings should be 
less formalized and more flexible than courtroom trials. Inflexibility of 
supplementation processes in appropriate cases would require extended 
pre-hearing discovery which would introduce delay and decisional deterrents 
inappropriate for administrative agency review.

[¶26.]  Consequently, we consider our present 
discretional decision to find good cause in the timing nature of the hearing 
held and a superintending concept of flexibility with expeditious conclusion 
while retaining reasonable opportunity in the interest of justice to have a 
record supplementation. That good cause is found in this case from a clear 
record that LL & E had not been furnished the computer simulation 
documentation and analysis at a time in advance of the expeditiously scheduled 
hearing so that appropriate technical consideration for response could be 
prepared and given. We determine that responsive testimony regarding the 
accuracy of the method and validity of the computer simulation is both 
appropriate and justified. Its weight and validity will remain for further 
decision with the Commission after analysis in a reconvened hearing. The 
litigants strenuously contest the "materiality" of any attack that LL & E 
might make on the Woods Petroleum/Dr. Holditch model and testimony. Obviously, 
both Woods Petroleum and the Commission originally found materiality in the 
hearing introduction. We do not have a harmless error ingredient overtly written 
into W.R.A.P. 12.08, since the level of decision for the judiciary on review is 
"satisfaction."

[¶27.]  Within facets of the administrative 
agency proceedings, there are principally three groups of evidence upon which 
the shut down order might have been granted. Evidence from the ANR Production 
Co. hearing which carried over without judicial notice could have been one, the 
second could be results of the computer simulation model and witness recitation, 
and finally, all of the other evidence provided at the hearing. Clearly, the 
computer simulation directed to demonstrative evidence and opinion of 
communication was in the central core of this hearing and decision. Its 
relevance is self-evident in examination of the trial transcript without 
requirement for this court to weigh applied discretional significance. Matter of 
State Bank Charter Application of Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296; Johnson, 502 P.2d 371.

[¶28.]  Pursuant to the provisions of W.R.A.P. 
12.08, we order additional evidence to be taken by the Commission in order to 
permit LL & E to present evidence contradicting or contesting the computer 
simulation and supplementary analysis which was prepared by Dr. Holditch and 
previously introduced by hearing testimony. The Commission and Woods Petroleum 
may elect to respond for rebuttal by any additional testimony appropriate for 
the supplementary hearing to be conducted by the Commission.

[¶29.]  We will not further address the 
contentions involving discretion of the Commission to deny rehearing testimonial 
supplementation. The anomaly is self-evident. By this decision, we address our 
discretion under W.R.A.P. 12.08 and no justification separately remains to 
overlay our exercised discretion to consider contested administrative agency 
abuse discretion. Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1990); Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 240. It is singularly apparent that the review process and flexibility 
provided to the reviewing court is considerably broader under W.R.A.P. 12.08 
than is appellate review under W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii). See Matter of State Bank 
Charter Application of Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296. Compare the final order 
cases, Public Service Commission v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1980) and Big Horn County Com'rs v. Hinckley, 593 P.2d 573 (Wyo. 
1979).

[¶30.]  We remand the case to the administrative 
agency for further proceeding in accord herewith. We do not retain jurisdiction. 
Any future review after completion of the additional hearing required will be 
addressed again to the district court which may elect to decline direct 
certification.

[¶31.]  Remanded to the administrative agency for 
further proceeding.

FOOTNOTES

1 Ancillary to this 
litigation is the use that Woods Petroleum made of the Commission decision in 
filing a suit in Oklahoma alleging collateral estoppel in order 
to obtain a large recovery for claimed production that LL & E had obtained 
through its Second Bench well by communication with the First Bench. LL & E 
claims that, by request from Woods Petroleum, the initial interim order was 
amended without hearing additional evidence and adding an unnecessary finding of 
fact which then constituted a basis for the claimed collateral estoppel of 
factual issues regarding source of oil obtained in production of the Devex 32-11 
well. Those contentions will not be addressed by this decision.

2 Buck Draw Field Area, 
721 P.2d  at 1078, although considering post-hearing supplementation of the 
record, has relevance when we said "a party is entitled to at least one response 
to any new evidence submitted."

3 The transcript of 
evidence produced at the hearing of about six hours totals 184 pages; of that 
total, Dr. Holditch was the witness for sixty-seven pages in applicant's case 
and ten pages in rebuttal within the applicant Woods Petroleum's total case of 
113 pages of transcript.

4 Comparable is W.R.Cr.P. 
34 which generally provides an interpretive test and application defined as the 
Opie rule, Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84 (Wyo. 1967), which is directed to achieve an 
identical application trial procedure for both criminal and civil cases. Note, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence 
and Effective Assistance of Counsel: If Counsel is Not Diligent is He 
Necessarily Ineffective? Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986), XXIILand & Water L.Rev. 597 
(1987).

5 No one questions that 
"something" had occurred by 1989 since at that time, LL & E reported greatly 
enhanced production from the Devex 32-11 well and, as a consequence, had 
voluntarily partially shut down its production.

6 We said in Utah Power 
& Light Co., 713 P.2d at 244:

     A rehearing requires a 
"judgment" by the commission that there is "sufficient reason therefor." A 
rehearing is in the discretion of the agency and will be interfered with only 
for a clear abuse of such discretion. United 
States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 66 S. Ct. 687, 90 L. Ed. 821 
(1946); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 S. Ct. 1490, 89 L. Ed. 2051 (1945).

See also Vandehei 
Developers v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1990).

7 ANR Production Co. could 
properly ask why its similar request in ANR Production Co., 800 P.2d 492 was not 
accorded substantive analysis in that decision where it also asked for record 
supplementation under W.R.A.P. 12.08. The answer is simple. We found in that 
decision that the request was untimely filed before the district court and was 
not presented for nisi prius decision by this court upon certification bypass. 
In ANR Production Co., 800 P.2d  at 496 (emphasis in original), we 
said:

     W.R.A.P. 12.08 
provides in pertinent part:

"If, before the date 
set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present 
additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the 
additional evidence is material, and there was good reason for failure to 
present it in the proceeding before the agency, the court in contested cases 
shall order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon 
conditions determined by the court.

(Emphasis 
added.)"

The "plain meaning" 
principle of interpretation requires us to interpret the phrase "before the date 
set for hearing" in W.R.A.P. 12.08 to mean a motion for additional evidence must 
be presented before the hearing date.

See similarily Grams v. 
Environmental Quality Council, 730 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1986).