Case Title: Brown v. Brown

Citation: 353 N.C. 220

Docket Number: 77A00

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
GLADYS BROWN v. CAROLL M. BROWN
No. 77A00
Filed 21 December 2000
1.
Appeal and Error--deceased party--motion by administratrix
to be substituted as plaintiff--appeal allowed under Rule 2
An appeal was properly before the Supreme Court where
plaintiff died shortly after filing for equitable distribution
and divorce, the administratrix of her estate moved to be
substituted as plaintiff, the trial court denied the motion and
dismissed the action, plaintiff’s counsel filed a notice of
appeal, and the Court of Appeals treated this as a petition for
certiorari.  Utilization of a writ of certiorari is not
appropriate under these facts and Rule 38 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure does not address the unusual circumstances of
this case; however, in order to address the issues, the
provisions of Rule 2 were used to vary the requirements of Rule
38. 
2.
Divorce--equitable distribution--plaintiff deceased between
filing of action and granting of judgment--abatement of
claim
The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s case and the
Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court when the
claim of a plaintiff in an action for divorce and equitable
distribution abated when plaintiff died before the trial court
entered a divorce decree or an equitable distribution judgment. A
careful consideration of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 indicates that
the General Assembly intended equitable distribution actions to
be available only when there has been a divorce or when there is
anticipation of the parties getting a divorce.  The most recent
amendment, which served as the premise of plaintiff’s argument
and the Court of Appeals decision, removes all limitations on the
timing of an equitable distribution judgment vis-a-vis the
granting of a divorce (the original version provided that a
judgment for equitable distribution shall not be entered prior to
the entry of a decree of absolute divorce), but there is no
indication that this declaration was intended to remove the link
between a divorce proceeding and a request to distribute property
acquired during the marriage.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 136 N.C. App. 331, 524
S.E.2d 89 (2000), reversing and remanding an order signed
6 August 1998 by Magee, J., in District Court, Gaston County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court 12 September 2000.
Max L. Childers for plaintiff-appellee.
Michelle D. Reingold for defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
Defendant presents a single argument for our consideration: 
Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that  equitable
distribution does not abate if one of the parties dies after
filing for equitable distribution and divorce, but before
receiving an equitable distribution judgment or an absolute
divorce decree?  We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its
decision.
We begin by explaining the unique procedural posture of this
case.  Plaintiff Gladys Brown died shortly after filing the
lawsuit out of which this appeal arises.  The administratrix of
her estate, Martha T. Russell, moved to be “substituted as
[p]laintiff” and “allowed to proceed as [p]laintiff in this
matter.”  The trial court denied this motion and dismissed
plaintiff’s action on 6 August 1998.
[1] Plaintiff’s counsel filed a notice of appeal on
13 August 1998, stating that “[p]laintiff, through counsel, . . .
gives Notice of Appeal.”  The Court of Appeals treated this
appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and allowed it so
that it could review the order of the trial court.  However,
utilization of a writ of certiorari is not appropriate under
these facts.  See Bailey v. State, ___ N.C. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d
___, ___, slip op. at ___ (Dec. 21, 2000) (No. 56PA00-2).
As a result, this Court faces a procedural dilemma in that
the appeal to the Court of Appeals was made on behalf of a
deceased party, and the appearance in this Court in response to 
defendant’s appeal was likewise made on behalf of a deceased
party.  Therefore, in order to address the merits of the issues
brought forward, we deem it necessary to use the provisions of
Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to vary
the requirements of Rule 38 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Rule 2 allows the Court “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to
a party . . . [by varying] the requirements or provisions of any
of [the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure] in a case
pending before it . . . upon its own initiative.”  N.C. R. App.
P. 2.
Rule 38 provides:  “If a party entitled to appeal dies
before filing a notice of appeal, appeal may be taken by his
personal representative or if he has no personal representative,
by his attorney of record . . . .”  N.C. R. App. P. 38.  We
acknowledge that Rule 38 does not address the unusual
circumstances of this case.  Here, plaintiff died before she was
entitled to an appeal.  We believe, however, that the specific
facts of this case and Rule 2 allow us to vary Rule 38 so that
plaintiff may take the appeal by plaintiff’s attorney of record. 
Therefore, we deem the appeal properly before us and proceed to
address the merits.
[2] The relevant facts in this case show that plaintiff
Gladys Brown and defendant Carroll M. Brown married in 1976 and
separated in 1997.  Six days after they separated, plaintiff
filed a complaint requesting equitable distribution and related
collateral relief, a divorce from bed and board, alimony pendente
lite, and permanent alimony.  Plaintiff, however, died before the
trial court entered either a divorce decree or a final equitable
distribution judgment.  Her administratrix filed a motion on
19 February 1998 requesting “that she be substituted as
[p]laintiff in the place of Gladys Brown, deceased, and that she
be allowed to proceed as [p]laintiff in this matter.”  The trial
court denied that motion and dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims
because it found that “[e]ach claim filed by the [p]laintiff
abated upon [p]laintiff’s death.”  Plaintiff, through counsel of
record, appealed the trial court’s decision, claiming in part
that the trial court improperly dismissed the equitable
distribution action and that the trial court should have
substituted the administratrix for the plaintiff in the equitable
distribution action.  A divided Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court on both issues.  The Court of Appeals did so because
the majority held that equitable distribution actions survive
even if one of the parties dies before a court enters an absolute
divorce decree.
It is settled law in North Carolina that the death of one of
the parties abates an action for divorce.  Elmore v. Elmore, 67
N.C. App. 661, 313 S.E.2d 904 (1984).  The original version of
the Equitable Distribution Act provided in N.C.G.S. § 50-21
provides that “[a] judgment for equitable distribution shall not
be entered prior to the entry of a decree of absolute divorce.” 
Thus, as held in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 93 N.C. App. 740, 379
S.E.2d 271, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 270, 384 S.E.2d 513
(1989), equitable distribution and divorce were inextricably
linked, and if the possibility of divorce was eliminated by the
death of a party, there was no question that the ability to
continue an equitable distribution action would abate.  However,
as a result of an amendment to N.C.G.S. § 50-21 in 1995,
plaintiff argues and the Court of Appeals majority held, an
equitable distribution action would not abate, even where, as
here, a party dies prior to either an equitable distribution
judgment being entered or a divorce granted.
We first look to N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 because these
statutory provisions articulate the right to equitable
distribution and the procedure to be followed.  In fact, prior to
the 1981 passage of the Equitable Distribution of Marital
Property Act, North Carolina courts, quite literally, lacked the
power to transfer real property, or any interest therein, upon
divorce.  See Sally Sharp, The Partnership Ideal:  The
Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.
L. Rev. 195, 196-97 (1987).  We therefore must look to the intent
of the legislature to determine if equitable distribution is
available when divorce is not.  State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202,
212, 470 S.E.2d 16, 22 (1996) (holding that the cardinal
principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the
legislature controls).  We conclude that a careful consideration
of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 indicates that the General Assembly
intended equitable distribution actions to be available only when
there has been a divorce or when there is anticipation of the
parties getting a divorce.
We acknowledge that the language of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and
-21 does not specifically address the issue before us.  N.C.G.S.
§ 50-21(a) provides in part that “[a]t any time after a husband
and wife begin to live separate and apart from each other, a
claim for equitable distribution may be filed.”  N.C.G.S. §
50-21(a) (1999) (emphasis added).  That statute addresses the
filing of an equitable distribution action but does not address
the relationship of an equitable distribution judgment to divorce
or the possibility of divorce.
The context and legislative history of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and
-21, however, show that equitable distribution actions invariably
contemplate divorce.  Courts may refer to the context of an act
to infer legislative intent when the meaning of a statute is in
doubt.  Sykes v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 398, 406, 163 S.E.2d 775, 781
(1968).  Discussion of equitable distribution is limited nearly
completely to chapter 50 of the General Statutes, a chapter
titled “Divorce and Alimony,” and all issues addressed in
chapter 50 concern the dissolution of marriage.  N.C.G.S. §§ 50-1
to -60 (1999).  Discussion of equitable distribution is further
limited to article 1 of that chapter, an article titled,
“Divorce, Alimony, and Child Support, Generally.”  N.C.G.S. §§
50-1 to -23.  The substantive rights provided by equitable
distribution are described in N.C.G.S. § 50-20, a section titled,
“Distribution by court of marital and divisible property upon
divorce.”  N.C.G.S. § 50-20 (emphasis added).  It is reasonable
to thus infer that the General Assembly intended equitable
distribution to be linked with divorce and did not intend
equitable distribution to proceed where there is no divorce and
no possibility of a final divorce decree, such as we have in this
case.
The General Assembly’s intent to link equitable distribution
and divorce can also be seen in the title of the act that most
recently amended N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a).  Although the title of an
act cannot control when the text is clear, In re Appeal of
Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203 S.E.2d. 51, 55 (1974), the
title is an indication of legislative intent, Smith Chapel
Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 812, 517 S.E.2d
874, 879 (1999).  The General Assembly titled the act that
amended N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a), “An Act to Allow Claims for
Equitable Distribution to be Resolved Either Before or After an
Absolute Divorce is Granted . . . .”  Act of June 14, 1995,
ch. 245, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 510 (emphasis added).  This title
makes clear that the General Assembly did not intend its
amendment to completely sever equitable distribution claims from
divorce proceedings; it meant only to expand the timing in which
an equitable distribution action may be filed and judgment
entered.  This legislative history and the context of the statute
convince us that equitable distribution actions are so related to
divorce proceedings that when death ends all chance for divorce,
any equitable distribution action then pending must abate.
N.C.G.S. § 50-20, which addresses the procedure for a court
to distribute “marital and divisible property upon divorce,”
provides additional support for our conclusion.  N.C.G.S. § 50-20
(emphasis added).  This statute carefully describes the factors
 This reasoning does not contradict Tucker v. Miller, 113
1
N.C. App. 785, 440 S.E.2d 315 (1994), in which the Court of
Appeals held that an equitable distribution action survived a
party’s death when the trial court had already entered a decree
of absolute divorce.  Id. at 788, 440 S.E.2d at 317.  In this
case, however, the trial court had not entered a divorce decree.  
the trial court should consider, weigh, and balance when it
equitably distributes marital property.  In evaluating these
factors, the trial court must consider the contemplated or prior
divorce of the parties.  Otherwise, the factors would be
senseless.  The trial court does not simply distribute the
property between the parties, but considers, for example, their
estates, income, and  financial liabilities.  When the court is
asked to equitably distribute marital and divisible property, it
must anticipate that the parties will at some time be
independent, divorced individuals.   This responsibility
1
reinforces our perception that the General Assembly intended to
link equitable distribution and divorce so closely that the death
of one party before the entry of a divorce decree requires the
abatement of any pending equitable distribution action.
The premise of plaintiff’s argument and the Court of
Appeals’ decision is that the most recent amendment of N.C.G.S. §
50-21 mandates a contrary conclusion.  See ch. 245, 1995 N.C.
Sess. Laws 510.  In 1995, the General Assembly deleted the
following text from N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a):
A judgment for equitable distribution shall not be
entered prior to entry of a decree of absolute divorce,
except for a consent judgment, which may be entered at
any time during the pendency of the action, or except
if the parties have been separated for at least six
months and they consent, in a pleading or other writing
filed with the court, to an equitable distribution
trial prior to the entry of the decree for absolute
divorce.
Ch. 245, sec. 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws at 511.
We believe the General Assembly never meant this change to
remove the link between equitable distribution and divorce.  The
changes the General Assembly made to N.C.G.S. § 50-21 between
1981 and 1995 indicate that the legislators meant this most
recent change to place no limit on the time in which a court
could enter an equitable distribution judgment.  The original
version of N.C.G.S. § 50-21 provided that “[a] judgment for
equitable distribution shall not be entered prior to the entry of
a decree of absolute divorce.”  N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1981)
(amended 1989).  The 1989 amendment to the statute allowed courts
to enter equitable distribution judgments before a final divorce
decree upon entry of a consent judgment.  N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a)
(1989) (amended 1991).  The 1991 amendment allowed courts to
enter equitable distribution judgments before entering a divorce
decree, either through a consent judgment or when an incompetent
spouse was involved.  N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1991) (amended 1995). 
The 1992 amendment again expanded the time in which a court could
enter a judgment of equitable distribution; it allowed a court to
enter an equitable distribution judgment before a divorce decree
through a consent judgment, when an incompetent spouse was
involved, or when the parties were separated for six months and 
consented in writing to allow the court to determine equitable
distribution.  N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1992) (amended 1995). 
Because each of these amendments aimed to change only when a
court could enter an equitable distribution judgment in
relationship to a divorce being granted, we believe the most
recent amendment of N.C.G.S. § 50-21 was similarly intended.
By deleting the provision previously noted, the General
Assembly eliminated the exceptions that had been engrafted over
the years on the original mandate that equitable distribution
could not be ordered until a divorce decree was entered.  The
amendment thus removes all limitations on the timing of an
equitable distribution judgment, vis-a-vis the granting of
divorce.  We find no indication, however, that this deletion was
intended to remove the link between a divorce proceeding and a
request to the court to distribute property acquired during the
marriage.  Therefore, we conclude that the 1995 amendment to
N.C.G.S. § 50-21 did not change the relationship between
equitable distribution and divorce.  Instead, the amendment
continued the legislative trend for equitable distribution to
occur at any time prior to or after an absolute divorce.
The Court of Appeals also relied in part on the provisions
of N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k).  The General Assembly passed N.C.G.S. §
50-20(k) in 1981.  Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1184.  At the same time, and in the same act, it also passed
the original version of N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a), ch. 815, sec. 6,
1981 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1186, which provided, in pertinent part,
that “[a] judgment for equitable distribution shall not be
entered prior to the entry of a decree of absolute divorce,” see
N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1981) (amended 1989) (emphasis added), and 
clearly indicated that equitable distribution depended on
divorce, Caldwell, 93 N.C. App. 740, 379 S.E.2d 271.  Thus, the
General Assembly cannot have intended N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k) to mean
that equitable distribution could proceed without divorce unless
it meant to directly contradict itself in N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a). 
Courts, of course, presume that the General Assembly would not
intend something so absurd as contradicting itself in the same
statute.  In re Brake, 347 N.C. 339, 341, 493 S.E.2d 418, 420
(1997) (holding that when the Supreme Court construes statutes,
it presumes that the legislature acted in accordance with reason
and common sense).  N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k), therefore, did not
indicate that equitable distribution was independent of the
possibility of divorce in 1981, nor does it indicate that now. 
N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k) does not contradict our holding that the
General Assembly did not intend a trial court to be able to enter
an equitable distribution judgment when there is no divorce and
no possibility of divorce.
 
In sum, equitable distribution is a statutory right defined
by N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 and is inextricably linked with
divorce proceedings.  Because death ends any chance for divorce
and because plaintiff in the instant case died before the trial
court entered a divorce decree, plaintiff’s claim for equitable
distribution abated, and the trial court correctly dismissed
plaintiff’s case.  We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the holding of the trial court.
REVERSED.