Case Title: State v. Hayes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121881

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 121,881 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL STEVEN HAYES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The plain language of K.S.A. 22-3504, which allows an illegal sentence to be 
corrected at any time, operates as a legislative override of traditional principles of waiver, 
abandonment, and res judicata. 
 
2.  
 
The plain language of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504(3) defines an illegal sentence as 
one imposed by a court without jurisdiction, one that does not conform to statutes, or one 
that is ambiguous. This definition does not include a claim that the sentence is illegal 
because it violates a constitutional provision. 
 
3.  
 
The holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 
2d 435 (2000)—that a jury, not the sentencing court, must determine that the State has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases a sentence beyond its statutory 
maximum—does not apply to cases final before Apprendi's filing. 
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Appeal from Atchison District Court; ROBERT J. BEDNAR, judge. Opinion filed March 5, 2021. 
Affirmed. 
 
John R. Kurth, of Kurth Law Office Incorporated, P.A., of Atchison, was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Patrick E. Henderson, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on 
the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, C.J.:  Michael Steven Hayes seeks review of the district court's 
summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Hayes argues his sentence is 
illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 
(2000). In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and held that the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum and that a jury, not the sentencing judge, must determine if the State met that 
burden. 530 U.S. at 476-77. Here, the sentencing judge granted the State's request for an 
upward departure without the use of a jury.  
 
But several factors prevent Hayes from pursuing relief through a motion for illegal 
sentence. First, a motion for illegal sentence cannot serve as a vehicle for raising 
constitutional issues, such as an Apprendi Sixth Amendment claim. Second, in State v. 
Gould, 271 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ 6, 23 P.3d 801 (2001), this court held that Apprendi did not 
apply retroactively to cases final before it was decided. Hayes' direct appeal ended in 
1996—about four years before Apprendi became final.  
 
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We thus affirm the district court's summary dismissal of Hayes' motion to correct 
an illegal sentence.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
An Atchison County jury convicted Hayes of first-degree murder, aggravated 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions arose from his role in a 
robbery and murder. State v. Hayes, 258 Kan. 629, 629-30, 908 P.2d 597 (1995); State v. 
Cox, 258 Kan. 557, 560-61, 908 P.2d 603 (1995).  
 
Before sentencing, the State filed a motion for upward departure for the 
aggravated robbery and conspiracy convictions based on aggravating factors. In its 
motion, the State argued the crime was excessively brutal because testimony from the 
doctor who conducted the autopsy revealed that the victim was shot in the back of the 
head at a range of less than one foot. The district court granted the motion and doubled 
the sentence for both the aggravated robbery and the conspiracy convictions and ordered 
them to run consecutive to each other and to the life sentence for murder.  
 
This court affirmed Hayes' convictions on direct appeal. Hayes, 258 Kan. at 638. 
The mandate, which marks the judgment's finality, issued on January 9, 1996.  
 
Hayes has sought relief from his sentence through several motions. Before filing 
the motion we now consider, he had filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and an earlier motion 
for illegal sentence. The district court denied both motions, and those decisions were 
affirmed on appeal. See State v. Hayes, 307 Kan. 537, 539, 411 P.3d 1225 (2018); Hayes 
v. State, No. 102,448, 2010 WL 5139930 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion), rev. 
denied 291 Kan. 912 (2011).  
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In this his latest motion, Hayes cites Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, and Gould, 271 Kan. 
394, and argues the upward departure sentence violates his due process rights because he 
had a right to have a jury, rather than the court, determine facts that increased his 
maximum sentence.  
 
The district court summarily denied the motion in a written order, citing caselaw 
that holds that Apprendi does not apply to cases final before Apprendi's filing. The 
district court also held that Hayes' sentences conformed to applicable statutes and the 
sentencing court had jurisdiction.  
 
Hayes appeals the district court's summary denial.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Whether Hayes' sentence was illegal presents an issue of law. That means our 
review of the district court's ruling is unlimited and we do not grant any deference to the 
district court. See State v. McAlister, 310 Kan. 86, 89, 444 P.3d 923 (2019). 
 
In considering the issue of law, we begin with an argument raised by the State. It 
argues Hayes waived the constitutional argument he asserts here by failing to raise it in 
his prior motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State relies on res judicata principles. 
We reject this argument based on our many decisions holding that the plain language of 
K.S.A. 22-3504, which allows correction of an illegal sentence "at any time," operates as 
a legislative override of traditional principles of waiver, abandonment, and res judicata. 
See McAlister, 310 Kan. at 90; State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018, 1032, 350 P.3d 1054 
(2015) (Dickey I). Under these cases, serial motions to correct an illegal sentence can be 
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filed and the failure to raise an issue in the first such motion is not a bar to appellate 
review.  
 
Even though Hayes can raise the argument, his effort still fails for at least two 
reasons.  
 
First, Hayes' argument does not fall within the allowed parameters of a motion for 
illegal sentence. The illegal sentence statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504(3), defines an 
illegal sentence as one imposed by a court without jurisdiction, one that does not conform 
to statutes, or one that is ambiguous. This court has long held the plain language of this 
narrow statutory definition does not include a claim that the sentence is illegal because it 
violates a constitutional provision. See State v. Kirtdoll, 306 Kan. 335, 339, 393 P.3d 
1053 (2017); State v. Brown, 306 Kan. 330, 332, 393 P.3d 1049 (2017); State v. Dickey, 
305 Kan. 217, 221, 380 P.3d 230 (2016) (Dickey II); State v. Lee, 304 Kan. 416, 418, 
372 P.3d 415 (2016); State v. Warrior, 303 Kan. 1008, 1010, 368 P.3d 1111 (2016); State 
v. Moncla, 301 Kan. 549, 553-54, 343 P.3d 1161 (2015); State v. Noyce, 301 Kan. 408, 
410, 343 P.3d 105 (2015). And Apprendi's holding rests on constitutional grounds, 
specifically on the Sixth Amendment. 530 U.S. at 476-77. 
 
Hayes does not discuss this longstanding holding nor does he offer any authority 
that would allow this court to reconsider this principle. Because his argument rests on 
constitutional grounds, the district court did not err in denying Hayes' motion to correct 
his sentence.  
 
Second, Hayes' motion fails because Gould, 271 Kan. at 414, directly contradicts 
his argument—a point Hayes acknowledges. In Gould, the court held that the holding in 
Apprendi—that a jury, not the court, must determine facts that increase a sentence 
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beyond its statutory maximum—does not apply to cases final before Apprendi's filing. 
See Sherwood v. State, 310 Kan. 93, 102, 444 P.3d 966 (2019); State v. Tauer, 310 Kan. 
1, 2, 444 P.3d 936 (2019); State v. Elliott, 281 Kan. 583, 592, 133 P.3d 1253 (2006). 
 
Hayes argues his case should be an exception because the charges did not give him 
notice of the facts used to enhance his sentence. Hayes offers only Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999), to support his position. In 
Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that the government needed to include 
aggravating factors increasing a sentence in a federal indictment. Gould declined to rule 
on whether that holding applied to a Kansas charging document because it was 
unnecessary in that case. 271 Kan. at 412. Hayes now asks us to apply Jones to Kansas 
procedures.  
 
Other defendants have made the same request and failed. We discussed and 
rejected the argument in State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 101-02, 183 P.3d 801 (2008), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). As we 
explained there, Jones applied to federal grand jury procedures, which do not apply to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Hayes offers no reason we should abandon 
our holding in Scott. 
 
In conclusion, Hayes' argument that Apprendi renders his sentence illegal because 
the judge, and not the jury, found the existence of aggravating factors is unavailing 
because unconstitutional sentences are not illegal sentences and Apprendi does not apply 
to cases final before the date it was filed. The district court did not err in summarily 
denying Hayes' motion to correct illegal sentence.  
 
Affirmed.