Case Title: People v. Fisher

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82308, 82309, 82310, 82311

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Fisher, No. 82308 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 82308, 82309, 82310, 82311 cons.-Agenda 30-May 
1998.
Opinion filed December 17, 1998.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The question presented in this consolidated appeal is whether the statutory 
summary suspension of driving privileges set forth in sections 6-208.1(a)(3) and 
6-208.1(g) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(3), (g) 
(West 1996)) violates the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection and due process. For the following reasons, we hold that it does 
not.
BACKGROUND
Illinois' implied consent statute, section 11-501.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 
5/11-501.1 (West 1996)), provides that any individual driving on an Illinois 
public highway who is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (625 
ILCS 5/11-501 (West 1996)) is deemed to have consented to chemical testing of 
blood, breath, or urine to determine the content of alcohol in his or her blood. 
The statute grants the arrested driver the right to withdraw this implied 
consent and refuse to be tested. People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418, 
427-28 (1992). The implied consent statute also provides, however, that refusal 
to submit to chemical testing will result in the administrative suspension of 
the arrested individual's driver's license.
When originally enacted, the implied consent statute authorized license 
suspensions only for those drivers who refused to submit to chemical testing 
and, in general, only following a hearing challenging the suspension. Later 
amendments eliminated the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing and expanded 
the suspension provisions of section 11-501.1 to include drivers who submit to 
chemical testing which reveals a blood-alcohol content at, or above, the legal 
limit. See L. Davis, Application of the Illinois Summary Suspension Law and 
Constitutional Implications, 76 Ill. B.J. 494 (1988). Thus, section 
11-501.1 authorizes the administrative, summary suspension of an individual's 
driver's license when that individual has been lawfully arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and has either refused to submit to chemical 
testing to determine blood-alcohol content, or has submitted to, and failed, 
such testing. The statutory summary suspensions authorized by section 11-501.1, 
whether for refusing or failing chemical testing, are civil in nature and are 
not part of the criminal prosecution for the offense of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85, 93-95 
(1988).
The length of the administrative suspension which is imposed under section 
11-501.1 depends upon the individual driver's past offenses and whether the 
driver submitted to chemical testing, or refused to submit to chemical testing, 
at the time of the arrest. Pursuant to section 6-208.1(a)(3) of the Code, if a 
driver who is not a "first offender" refuses to submit to chemical testing, the 
driver will have his or her driving privileges suspended for a period of two 
years. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(3) (West 1996).(1) 
However, if a driver who is not a "first offender" submits to chemical testing 
which discloses a blood-alcohol content at, or above, the legal limit, the 
driver will have his or her driving privileges suspended for only one year. 625 
ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(4) (West 1996). A "first offender" is defined in general under 
the Code as any person who has not had a previous conviction for driving under 
the influence, court assigned supervision for driving under the influence, or 
statutory summary suspension of driving privileges within five years prior to 
the date of the current offense. 625 ILCS 5/11-500 (West 1996).
The Code permits drivers whose privileges have been suspended under section 
11-501.1 to seek driving relief during the suspension period in limited 
circumstances. If the driver is not a first offender, and his or her driving 
privileges have been suspended after taking a chemical test that revealed a 
blood-alcohol content at, or above, the legal limit, the Secretary of State may 
issue the driver a restricted driving permit after 90 days from the effective 
date of the suspension. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(h) (West 1996). A restricted driving 
permit is issued under the discretionary authority of the Secretary of State and 
allows a person to drive on a limited basis for employment, medical or 
educational purposes. 625 ILCS 5/6-205(c) (West 1996). The Secretary of State 
will not issue a restricted driving permit unless the driver proves the lack of 
a driver's license is causing undue hardship, there is no alternative means of 
transportation, and the issuance of the permit will not endanger the public 
safety and welfare. 625 ILCS 5/6-205(c) (West 1996); Murdy v. Edgar, 
103 Ill. 2d 384, 391-92 (1984). However, under section 6-208.1(g) of the Code, 
if the driver is not a first offender, and his driving privileges have been 
suspended after refusing to submit to a chemical test, the Secretary of State 
"shall not issue a restricted driving permit." 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(g) (West 
1996).(2) 
No other driving relief is available to the driver who is not a first offender 
and who refused to submit to chemical testing.
The defendants in the case at bar, George Fisher, Ovanes Mikaelian and Diana 
Gaynor, were arrested in separate incidents for the criminal offense of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 1996)). None of the 
defendants were ultimately convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
At the time of their arrest, each defendant refused the request of the arresting 
officer to submit to chemical testing to determine blood alcohol content. In 
addition, each defendant was not a first offender as defined in section 11-500 
of the Code. Accordingly, under sections 6-208.1(a)(3) and 6-208.1(g) of the 
Code, each defendant was subject to a two-year suspension of his or her driver's 
license with no availability of hardship relief.
In separate proceedings in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendants 
each filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension of their driving 
privileges. See 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 1996). Gaynor's petition to rescind was 
filed on March 13, 1996, and denied by the circuit court on May 6, 1996. 
Mikaelian's petition to rescind was also denied on May 6, 1996. Fisher's 
petition to rescind was filed on August 23, 1996.
On May 31, 1996, Mikaelian filed a motion for rehearing of his petition to 
rescind in which he claimed that the statutory summary suspension of his 
driver's license was unconstitutional. On August 16, 1996, Gaynor filed a motion 
to vacate the circuit court's order denying her petition. She too alleged that 
the statutory summary suspension of her driver's license was unconstitutional. 
On August 29, 1996, a hearing was held before the circuit court on Mikaelian's 
motion for rehearing. The circuit court, sua sponte, consolidated the 
defendants' three cases for purposes of issuing a decision on Mikaelian's motion 
for rehearing, Gaynor's motion to vacate, and Fisher's petition to rescind.
On October 29, 1996, the circuit court entered a consolidated memorandum 
opinion and order which held that the license suspensions imposed on the 
defendants were unconstitutional in their entirety and which ordered the 
suspensions rescinded, nunc pro tunc, to their effective dates. The 
circuit court first held that section 6-208.1(g), which denies all hardship 
relief for non-first offenders who refuse to submit to chemical testing, 
violates the equal protection guarantee of the federal and state constitutions. 
The circuit court concluded that allowing hardship relief for non-first 
offenders who fail chemical testing but not for those who refuse testing, is 
"irrational and bears no relationship to the legislative goal of public safety." 
The circuit court also held that while section 6-208.1(a)(3) "standing alone" 
was constitutionally valid, "the two year summary suspension in combination with 
the lack of any hardship relief during the entire period *** constitutes a 
denial of due process."
The circuit court stayed its order rescinding the defendants' suspensions 
pending appeal by the State. The State appealed each of the defendants' cases 
directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). We allowed the State's motion to 
consolidate the defendants' cases for review.
ANALYSIS
Statutes are presumed constitutional. The party challenging the validity of a 
statute has the burden of clearly establishing that it is unconstitutional. 
People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 146 (1987). " `[I]t is our duty to 
construe acts of the legislature so as to uphold their constitutionality and 
validity if it can be reasonably done, and, further, that if their construction 
is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of the law 
attacked.' [Citations.] " Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d  at 146. The 
constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which we review de 
novo. Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 420 
(1996).
The defendants maintain that their license suspensions are unconstitutional 
on both equal protection and due process grounds. We turn first to the 
defendants' equal protection arguments.
Equal Protection
A
The defendants contend that the distinction which section 6-208.1(g) makes 
between drivers who submit to, and fail, chemical testing and drivers who refuse 
to submit to chemical testing is irrational and unrelated to the purpose of the 
summary suspension laws. The defendants note that under the Code, if a driver 
who is not a first offender submits to, and fails, chemical testing, he or she 
may obtain hardship relief during the period of the license suspension in the 
form of a restricted driving permit. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(h) (West 1996). In 
addition, the driver who fails chemical testing remains eligible for a 
restricted driving permit even if his or her license is ultimately revoked 
because of a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 
5/6-205(c) (West 1996). On the other hand, under section 6-208.1(g) of the Code, 
if a driver who is not a first offender refuses to submit to chemical testing, 
he or she may not obtain any form of hardship relief. This remains true even if 
the driver is not convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.
The defendants maintain that the purpose of the summary suspension laws is to 
promote highway safety, and further, that the driver whose license is revoked 
because of a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol may generally 
be deemed to pose a greater risk to highway safety than the driver who is not 
convicted of such conduct. The defendants contend that it is arbitrary and 
irrational to allow the more dangerous, convicted drunk driver to return to the 
public highways during the suspension period, while forbidding the driver who 
refused testing and was found not guilty of driving under the influence from 
doing so. Thus, according to the defendants, section 6-208.1(g) bears no 
rational relationship to the goal of promoting highway safety, and therefore, 
violates the federal and state constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
(U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
This court applies the same analysis to equal protection claims brought under 
both the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Jacobson v. Department of 
Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). The constitutional right to equal 
protection of the laws requires the government to treat similarly situated 
persons in a similar manner. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 361 
(1996). The guarantee of equal protection "does not preclude the State from 
enacting legislation that draws distinctions between different categories of 
people, but it does prohibit the government from according different treatment 
to persons who have been placed by a statute into different classes on the basis 
of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation." 
Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 322.
The parties agree that section 6-208.1(g) does not impinge upon a fundamental 
right or suspect class and, therefore, that the distinction which the 
legislature has drawn between those drivers who fail chemical testing, and those 
drivers who refuse testing, need only satisfy the rational basis test. Under the 
rational basis test we must inquire "whether the method or means employed in the 
statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally 
related to that goal." Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 323. "[I]f any set of 
facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the [statutory] classification, it 
must be upheld." Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 324.
The ultimate goal of the summary suspension laws is to improve highway 
safety. People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1992). Imposing a 
"swift and certain" license suspension upon drivers who submit to, and fail, 
chemical testing furthers this goal by providing a direct means of removing 
clearly dangerous drivers from the highways and by creating an effective 
deterrent to drinking and driving. L. Davis, Developments in the Illinois 
Summary Suspension Law, 79 Ill. B.J. 16, 16 (1991), citing Deterrence 
of Drunk Driving and Role of Sobriety Check Points and Administrative License 
Revocation, National Transportation Safety Board, Report SS8401 (1984).
The goal of improving highway safety is also furthered, however, by imposing 
an administrative license suspension upon those drivers who are lawfully 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and who refuse to submit to 
chemical testing for blood-alcohol content. As this court has explained,
See also People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 510 (1988); 7A Am. 
Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §133 (1997); People v. 
Frazier, 123 Ill. App. 3d 563, 566 (1984) ("[though constitutionally 
permissible under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966),] [t]he legislature has found involuntary tests 
distasteful and has chosen instead to permit drivers to refuse to take tests, to 
withdraw their implied consent, but bear the consequences that may flow from 
that decision").
The defendants' contention that it is irrational to eliminate hardship relief 
for drivers who refuse to submit to chemical testing fails to account for the 
fact that the summary suspension laws work in more than one way to achieve the 
ultimate goal of improving highway safety. The defendants assume that the only 
way in which the elimination of hardship relief can further highway safety is if 
that sanction is imposed upon drivers who have clearly demonstrated that they 
are a safety risk, i.e., those drivers who have failed chemical testing 
or have been convicted of driving under the influence. However, the elimination 
of hardship relief can also further highway safety when applied to drivers who 
refuse chemical testing. The threat that hardship relief will be eliminated for 
refusing chemical testing, like the threat of the summary suspension itself, 
provides arrested drivers with a strong incentive to submit to testing for 
blood-alcohol content. This, in turn, promotes highway safety. 
Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425; see also W. Syers, The Illinois 
Implied Consent Law: Reality and Reform, 67 Ill. B.J. 276, 280-81, 283 
(1979) (noting the need for strong incentives to induce arrested drivers to 
submit to chemical testing). Thus, when viewed as a means of providing 
motivation for non-first offenders to submit to testing to determine 
blood-alcohol content, the distinction which section 6-208.1(g) draws between 
those drivers who submit to chemical testing and those drivers who refuse is 
neither irrational nor arbitrary.
We note, moreover, that accepting the defendants' equal protection argument 
would undermine the long-standing practice of using license suspensions as a 
sanction to motivate drivers to submit to chemical testing for blood-alcohol 
content. The defendants contend that eliminating hardship relief for those 
drivers who refuse to submit to chemical testing but not for those who fail 
chemical testing is unconstitutional, because those drivers who fail chemical 
testing pose the greater risk to public safety. If this argument were correct, 
then logically, the state would be required to impose the longest period of 
license suspension upon the driver who fails chemical testing, because that 
driver poses the greater risk to highway safety and because the longer 
suspension would keep that driver off the highways for a longer period of time. 
Clearly, however, if the longer suspension were imposed upon those drivers who 
submit to, and fail, chemical testing, arrested drivers would never have any 
incentive to submit to chemical testing. We do not believe that either the 
federal or state constitution requires such a result. See also Callan v. 
Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Commw. 635, 639, 339 A.2d 163, 165 (1975) ("[I]f we 
were to hold that the one who refused the test could not be treated more 
severely, the clear legislative intent to encourage drivers to take the test 
would obviously be thwarted").
In addition, we note that the defendants have cited no authority in support 
of their argument that the right to equal protection of the laws is violated by 
eliminating hardship relief for drivers who refuse to submit to chemical testing 
but not for those who fail such testing. Our research reveals that courts in 
other jurisdictions have uniformly rejected this proposition. See, 
e.g., Burnett v. Department of Licensing, 66 Wash. App. 253, 
832 P.2d 1321 (1992) (upholding two-year license suspension with no availability 
of hardship relief); DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of 
Revenue, 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983); Walker v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 274 Cal. App. 2d 793, 79 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1969); Gableman v. 
Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 379 (N.D. 1974); In re McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 
660, 506 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (1973). As one court has observed,
See also Guerrero v. Ryan, 272 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951-52 (1995) 
(suspension of driver's license under Safety Responsibility Law did not violate 
right to equal protection); Murray v. Thorneycroft ex rel. Arizona, 131 
Ariz. 156, 639 P.2d 346 (App. 1981); Spencer v. State, Department of Public 
Safety, 315 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1975); Heer v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 252 Or. 455, 450 P.2d 533 (1969).
The State of Illinois "plainly has the right to offer incentives for taking a 
test that provides the most reliable form of evidence of intoxication for use in 
subsequent proceedings." Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 335, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (1979). Section 6-208.1(g) provides such an 
incentive. Under section 6-208.1(g), non-first offenders who refuse to submit to 
chemical testing are ineligible for hardship relief, while non-first offenders 
who do submit to chemical testing may receive hardship relief. This 
classification is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of 
improving highway safety and, therefore, is constitutionally valid.
B
The defendants raise a second equal protection challenge to section 
6-208.1(g) which was not considered by the circuit court. The defendants note 
that, as presently enacted, section 6-208.1(g) applies only to those drivers who 
are 21 years of age and older. While non-first offenders who refuse chemical 
testing and who are under 21 are subject to a two-year license suspension, they 
may, under the provisions of the Code, receive hardship relief. 625 ILCS 
5/6-208.2(f) (West 1996).
The defendants maintain that non-first offenders who are under 21 generally 
present more of a risk to highway safety than non-first offenders who are 21 and 
older. As with their initial equal protection argument, the defendants contend 
that it is irrational and arbitrary to permit the more dangerous driver to 
return to the highways during the period of the license suspension, while 
forbidding the less dangerous driver from doing so. Therefore, according to the 
defendants, section 6-208.1(g) creates an arbitrary, age-based classification 
which is wholly unrelated to the legislative purpose of improving highway 
safety.
We note that the defendants have offered no authority, either in the circuit 
court or in their briefs to this court, to support the assertion that non-first 
offenders under the age of 21 present more of a risk to highway safety than 
non-first offenders 21 and older. Recognizing this, the defendants ask this 
court to take judicial notice that non-first offenders under 21 pose the greater 
risk to highway safety. We cannot do so. Courts may take judicial notice of 
matters which are commonly known, or, if not commonly known, are readily 
verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy. Murdy v. Edgar, 103 Ill. 2d 384, 394 (1984). A cursory examination of relevant, if not indisputable, 
authority reveals that it is impossible to readily confirm that non-first 
offenders under the age of 21 pose the greater risk to highway safety. See, 
e.g., National Commission Against Drunk Driving, The Century Council, 
Young Drivers/Legal Drinkers: A National Agenda (1994) (the group of 
drivers aged 21 to 34 is the group least affected by conventional drunk driving 
countermeasures, and in 1992, was responsible for more alcohol-related 
fatalities than any other age group); R. Hingson, Prevention of Drinking and 
Driving, 20 Alcohol Health and Research World 219 (1996) (between 1982 and 
1995, alcohol-related traffic deaths declined among people aged 15 to 20 but 
increased among persons 21 and over).
The burden is on the defendants to rebut the presumption that section 
6-208.1(g) is constitutional and "to introduce evidence which demonstrates that 
the statute is unconstitutional." People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 
497 (1988). Because the defendants have failed to present any authority which 
would establish that non-first offenders under 21 present more of a risk to 
highway safety than non-first offenders who are 21 and older, the essential, 
underlying premise of their equal protection argument is missing. Accordingly, 
we do not consider this argument further.
Due Process
Before considering the merits of the defendants' due process claims, we must 
clarify the nature of the issues presented. In its memorandum opinion and order, 
the circuit court held that the statutory summary suspension set forth in 
sections 6-208.1(a)(3) and 6-208.1(g) "constitutes a denial of due process." In 
reaching this conclusion, the circuit court relied on the analysis employed by 
this court in People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491 (1988).
At issue in Esposito was whether Illinois' statutory summary 
suspension scheme, as it existed at the time of that decision, violated the 
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process because it failed to provide 
arrested drivers with an evidentiary hearing prior to imposing the license 
suspension. To determine whether a presuspension hearing was constitutionally 
mandated, the Esposito court applied the balancing test adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). The Eldridge balancing test requires 
courts to consider three factors: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail." Eldridge, 424 U.S.  at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 
903. After weighing the Eldridge factors, the Esposito court 
concluded that a presuspension hearing was not constitutionally required. 
Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 504-11; see also Mackey v. Montrym, 
443 U.S. 1, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979) (applying Eldridge 
test and upholding Massachusetts' summary suspension law).
The circuit court in the case at bar concluded that sections 6-208.1(a)(3) 
and 6-208.1(g) are unconstitutional based upon its application of the 
Eldridge balancing test employed in Esposito. Despite this 
fact, the circuit court did not specify whether the suspension provisions at 
issue here are unconstitutional because they do not afford the arrested driver a 
presuspension hearing. Indeed, the circuit court opinion makes no mention of any 
procedural defects in the suspension provisions or any mention of what 
additional or substitute procedures might be constitutionally required. Instead, 
the court's opinion simply concludes:
As the State points out, the circuit court's failure to discuss any 
procedural deficiencies in sections 6-208.1(a)(3) and 6-208.1(g) suggests that 
the court might have intended to find that the two-year suspension with no 
availability of hardship relief violated the defendants' substantive 
due process rights, rather than their procedural due process 
rights.
In their due process arguments before this court, the defendants have 
essentially repeated the circuit court's reasoning. At oral argument, counsel 
for defendants Fisher and Mikaelian explained:
In light of the foregoing, we offer two points of clarification. First, 
although the defendants discuss Esposito and the Eldridge 
balancing test, they do not contend that they were constitutionally entitled to 
a presuspension hearing. Consequently, we do not consider whether sections 
6-208.1(a)(3) and 6-208.1(g) are unconstitutional because drivers who are 
subject to those provisions are not provided pre-suspension hearings. Second, 
the Eldridge balancing test is a procedural due process test. We reject 
any suggestion that the Eldridge balancing test is to be employed in 
substantive due process analysis.
A
The defendants raise a procedural due process argument which is separate from 
the question of whether they were constitutionally entitled to receive a 
presuspension hearing. The defendants allege that, on its face, Illinois' 
statutory summary suspension scheme violates the due process guarantee of the 
federal and state constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 
I, §2) because it does not insure that drivers will receive prompt 
post-suspension hearings. In People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85 (1988), 
this court considered how long a post-suspension hearing could be delayed before 
a due process violation would occur:
Supreme Court Rule 504 has been amended since Gerke was decided to 
provide that the first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket must be not 
less than 14 days but within 60 days after the date of the arrest. 166 Ill. 2d 
R. 504. Thus, it is now possible that as many 14 days may elapse between the 
time the suspension goes into effect and the time the hearing on the suspension 
takes place. The defendants claim that this time frame does not insure drivers a 
constitutionally prompt post-suspension hearing.
At some point, a delay in a post-deprivation hearing may, in itself, become a 
constitutional violation. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 547, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 507, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1496 (1985). To 
determine how long a post-suspension hearing may be constitutionally delayed, 
"it is appropriate to examine the importance of the private interest and the 
harm to this interest occasioned by delay; the justification offered by the 
Government for delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest; 
and the likelihood that the interim decision may have been mistaken." 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242, 100 L. Ed. 2d 265, 279, 108 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1988).
Case law has established that drivers have a strong interest in the continued 
possession of their drivers' licenses; that the risk of error in the initial 
decision to suspend the license of a driver arrested for driving under the 
influence is insubstantial; and that the state has a compelling interest in 
highway safety. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d  at 506-11. It is also clear that 
drivers facing summary suspension of their driving privileges are provided 
extensive judicial hearings (see 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 1996)) and that the 
possible 14-day delay can be attributed to the need to manage those hearings 
fairly and efficiently (see, e.g., ILCS Ann. R. 504, Committee 
Comments, at 34 (Smith-Hurd 1993)). Weighing these factors, we conclude that the 
possibility of a 14-day delay between the effective date of the suspension and 
the date of the hearing does not render the statutory summary suspension scheme 
unconstitutional on its face. See Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 547, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 507, 105 S. Ct.  at 1496 (delay of nine months between discharge of 
public employee and conclusion of administrative proceedings not 
unconstitutional where the delay stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the 
procedure); United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty 
Dollars ($8,850) in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 76 L. Ed. 2d 143, 
103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (18-month delay between seizure of currency and the 
filing of a civil forfeiture proceeding not unconstitutional); Jones v. City 
of Gary, Indiana, 57 F.3d 1435, 1444 (7th Cir. 1995) (three-month delay 
between firefighter's suspension from employment and termination hearing not 
unconstitutional).
B
The defendants also allege that the summary suspension set forth in sections 
6-208.1(a)(3) and 6-208.1(g) is arbitrary and unrelated to the legislative goal 
of improving highway safety, and hence, violates their substantive due process 
rights. "The standard for determining whether substantive due process 
requirements have been met is to examine ` "whether the statute is 
reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to 
be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare." ' 
[Citation.]" People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). Under this 
standard, a statute will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d  at 11. We have explained elsewhere in 
this opinion that the two-year suspension with no hardship relief provides 
arrested drivers with an incentive to submit to testing for blood-alcohol 
content and, therefore, is rationally related to the legitimate state goal of 
promoting highway safety. Accordingly, we conclude that sections 6-208.1(a)(3) 
and 6-208.1(g) do not violate the defendants' substantive due process 
rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The 
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

Footnotes:
1. Section 6-208.1(a)(3) has recently been amended. Section 
6-208.1(a)(3) now provides that a three-year license suspension will be imposed 
upon drivers who are not "first offenders" and who refuse to submit to chemical 
testing. Pub. Act 90-738, eff. January 1, 1999 (amending 625 ILCS 
5/6-208.1(a)(3) (West 1996)). This amendment is not at issue in this appeal.
2. Section 6-208.1(g) has also recently been 
amended. Section 6-208.1(g) now states that a restricted driving permit may be 
issued to the driver "if at least 2 years have elapsed since the effective date 
of the statutory summary suspension." Pub. Act 90-738, eff. January 1, 1999 
(amending 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(g) (West 1996)). This amendment is not at issue in 
this appeal.
3. Counsel for defendant Gaynor did not present 
an oral argument. However, nothing in the very limited due process portion of 
Gaynor's three-page brief contradicts the position taken by Fisher and 
Mikaelian.