Case Title: State Of Florida v. Henry Maynard Barnum

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
_____________ 
No. SC03-1315 
_____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
HENRY MAYNARD BARNUM, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 22, 2005] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
LEWIS, J. 
We have for review the decision in Barnum v. State, 849 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2003) (“Barnum II”), which certified conflict with Sweeney v. State, 722 So. 
2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  See Barnum II, 849 So. 2d at 374.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.1  For the reasons explained below, 
                                          
 
1.  We originally accepted jurisdiction in this action on the basis of a 
question of great public importance certified by the First District Court of Appeal.  
See Barnum II, 849 So. 2d at 375 (certifying the following question as one of great 
public importance:  “Whether the analysis of State v. Klayman, 835 So. 2d 248 
(Fla. 2002), applies when an issue that the Supreme Court has clarified requires 
 
 
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we quash the First District’s decision in Barnum II and approve the Fourth 
District's decision in Sweeney.  Additionally, we find it necessary to reconsider, 
analyze, and recede from some aspects of our decision in State v. Klayman, 835 
So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2002), which propagated an interpretation of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001), that in some 
aspects is unnecessarily expansive, difficult in application, and somewhat at odds 
with the jurisprudence of this state.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The respondent was convicted of armed robbery, attempted first-degree 
murder of a law enforcement officer, depriving a law enforcement officer of his 
weapon, and grand theft following a jury trial.  See Barnum v. State, 662 So. 2d 
968, 968-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“Barnum I”).  Important for purposes of the 
instant analysis, Barnum was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law 
enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991).  In 
1991, section 784.07, “Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, 
or intake officers; reclassification of offenses,” provided, in relevant part: 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any 
person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement 
officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty or who is 
convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the 
                                                                                                                                        
resolution of a disputed factual matter?”).  However, upon further review, we 
decline to answer the certified question as worded and instead base our jurisdiction 
upon the basis of certified conflict of decisions of the district courts of appeal.  
 
 
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motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful 
duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as 
provided in s. 775.0825. 
§ 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).2  At trial, the jury in this case was not instructed with 
regard to a knowledge element of the crime of attempted first-degree murder of a 
law enforcement officer.  It is undisputed, and the record reflects, that Barnum’s 
defense counsel did not request an instruction that the jury was required to find that 
Barnum knew the victim was a law enforcement officer; however, it is clear that 
whether Barnum had knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer was 
a disputed fact at trial. 
On direct appeal, Barnum raised five issues, only one of which was 
addressed by the district court.  See Barnum I, 662 So. 2d at 969.  There, the lower 
court set aside Barnum’s conviction for grand theft of a firearm because he was 
also sentenced for robbery of the same firearm.  See id.  The district court 
affirmed, without discussion, Barnum’s remaining convictions.  See id.  Barnum 
preserved and asserted the issue of whether knowledge that the victim was a law 
enforcement officer is an essential element of the offense of attempted first-degree 
murder of a law enforcement officer, however that issue was not addressed by the 
district court.   
                                          
 
2.  In 1995, subsection (3) was removed from section 784.07.  See ch. 95-
184, §§ 17, 20, Laws of Fla.  
 
 
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While Barnum’s direct appeal was pending, the Fifth District decided 
Grinage v. State, 641 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), affirmed on other grounds, 
656 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1995), in which the district court held that knowledge is an 
essential element of the offense of attempted first-degree murder of a law 
enforcement officer.  Barnum filed a motion for rehearing in the district court, 
asserting conflict with Grinage and requesting that a certified question centered 
upon the knowledge element be presented to this Court.  Rehearing was denied.  
See Barnum I, 662 So. 2d at 968. 
On December 19, 1997, Barnum, acting pro se, filed a postconviction 
motion challenging his conviction for attempted first-degree murder of a law 
enforcement officer.  In his motion he argued that he was denied due process and 
was improperly convicted of attempted murder under the specific statute because 
the jury had not been instructed nor had it been required to separately find that he 
had knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer.  Subsequently, 
Barnum was appointed counsel, an amended motion was filed asserting error under 
Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1997),3 and an evidentiary hearing was 
held.  In Thompson, this Court held that “knowledge of the victim’s status as a law 
enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense under section 784.07(3), 
                                          
 
3.  Thompson was decided more than one year after Barnum’s conviction 
became final on appeal. 
 
 
 
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Florida Statutes (1993).”  Id. at 693.  The trial court denied Barnum’s motion, 
holding that at the time of Barnum’s trial, under existing Florida law knowledge 
was not an essential element of the crime of attempted first-degree murder of a law 
enforcement officer.  Further, the trial court determined that although this Court 
had held in Thompson that knowledge was an element of the offense, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in Sweeney held that Thompson was not retroactive, and 
the trial court was required to adhere to the Sweeney holding. 
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s 
determination.  The district court declined to follow the Fourth District’s decision 
in Sweeney because the Sweeney court had failed to consider this Court’s decision 
in Moreland v. State, 582 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1991).  See Barnum II, 849 So. 2d at 
374.  The district court noted that in Moreland, this Court held that fundamental 
fairness may require the retroactive application of a decision even when a Witt4 
analysis favors finality.  See Barnum II, 849 So. 2d at 374.  The First District 
reasoned that “if this court had certified conflict with Grinage in Barnum’s direct 
appeal, the supreme court could have considered Barnum’s case, decided it in the 
manner it did Thompson, and remanded for a new trial.  We therefore reverse, and 
certify conflict with Sweeney.”  Id. 
                                          
 
4.  Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980). 
 
 
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Additionally, the district court explained that in deciding the case before it, 
the court had considered this Court’s decisions in Klayman and Bunkley v. State, 
833 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2002), in which we held that Florida Supreme Court decisions 
that “clarify” statutory law apply to all cases, pending or final, while decisions that 
“change” the law require a Witt analysis to determine if the decision should be 
applied retroactively.  See Barnum II, 849 So. 2d at 374.  The First District held 
that it was unable to reconcile Thompson with either category, stating: 
Section 784.07(3) did not contain broad terms evincing that the 
legislature expected the courts to engage in judicial construction, but 
instead used language that was intended to include a knowledge 
requirement from the date of the law's enactment, which, under 
Klayman, would indicate that the court in Thompson was simply 
clarifying the meaning of the statute.  Yet the court also stated that 
when deciding the applicability of a decision to final cases, a “key 
consideration” is whether prior case law shows that the lower courts 
were imposing criminal sanctions under the statute in question where 
none were intended.  Klayman, 835 So. 2d at 254; Bunkley, 833 So. 
2d at 745.  As examples of decisions that clarified rather than changed 
the law, the court cited cases in which it could be readily determined 
from the record that the convictions or sentences had been imposed 
contrary to the statutes in question as a matter of law, and did not 
involve factually disputed matters.  Klayman, 835 So. 2d at 254, n.8 
& 12.  In contrast, it cannot be said in this case that the trial court 
imposed a criminal sanction where none was intended, because the 
jury might have convicted Barnum of attempted murder of a 
law-enforcement officer if it had been properly instructed. 
Barnum II, 849 So. 2d at 374-75 (footnote omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Continued Validity of Thompson 
 
 
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Initially, we address the State’s assertion that the decision in Thompson v. 
State, 695 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1997), has been altered by subsequent decisions of this 
Court, and thus the question of whether that decision is retroactive has been 
rendered moot.  The State’s claim is misplaced.  The issue presented in Thompson 
was “whether knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer is an 
element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under subsection (3) of 
section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993).”  Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 692.  There, we 
held that knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer is a 
necessary element of the offense.  See id.  Importantly, we wrote: 
Whether knowledge of the officer’s status did or did not exist in 
a particular case is a factual finding to be left to the jury.  While the 
jury’s status as fact finder implicates the notion that a substantive 
offense has been created under the statute, we need not reach this 
question to resolve the issue here. 
Id. at 693.  The Thompson Court determined that knowledge was an element of a 
violation of section 784.07(3), but refused to classify section 784.07(3) of the 
Florida Statutes (1993) as either a substantive offense or a sentencing 
enhancement.  See Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 693. 
Contrary to the State’s position, this Court’s decisions in Merritt v. State, 
712 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1998), and Mills v. State, 822 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2002), did not 
modify the Thompson holding, and the decision in Thompson remains valid, 
unaltered controlling authority today.  In Merritt, this Court held that attempted 
 
 
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assault, attempted battery, and attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law 
enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses.  See Merritt, 712 So. 2d at 385.  In so 
holding, we wrote:  “Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement 
statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense.”  Id.  
Notably, Thompson was not cited in the opinion, nor was there any issue presented 
or discussed regarding a knowledge element of the offense of attempted first-
degree murder of a law enforcement officer. 
Our recent decision in Mills clarified that, even though our reference in 
Merritt that section 784.07 addresses the concept of enhancement, this statute 
actually reclassifies the enumerated offenses based upon the status of the victim.  
See Mills, 822 So. 2d at 1287.  The issue presented in Mills was whether a 
defendant, who had been convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer, was 
eligible for an enhanced sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute.  See id. 
at 1286.  There, the defendant argued that because this Court had defined the 
statute for battery on a law enforcement officer as an enhancement statute in 
Merritt, a double enhancement under the habitual felony offender statute violated 
double jeopardy.  See id.  We disagreed, explaining that “there is a qualitative 
difference between a statute which reclassifies enumerated offenses committed 
against law enforcement officers and enhancement statutes such as the habitual 
offender statute, ‘which cut across some or all criminal statutes.’ ”  Id. at 1287 
 
 
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(quoting State v. Brown, 476 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1985)).  Clearly, in Mills we 
held that offenses that are reclassified as felonies pursuant to section 784.07 
qualify as felony offenses for purposes of the habitual felony offender statute, and 
double jeopardy principles are not violated.  See id.  Again, the Thompson decision 
was not cited in Mills, nor was an issue regarding a knowledge element of the 
offense of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer presented or 
discussed. 
Neither Merritt nor Mills modified the holding in Thompson, which requires 
that a jury determine if the defendant had knowledge of his victim's status as a law 
enforcement officer.  The language in Mills declaring section 784.07 to be a 
reclassification statute is of no separate importance here.  Thompson itself held that 
section 784.07(3) included a knowledge element, and section 784.07(3)'s 
classification as either a substantive offense or a sentencing enhancement was 
totally irrelevant to our determination on that issue.  See Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 
693.  Irrespective of whether section 784.07(3) is considered to create a substantive 
offense, an enhancement provision, or a reclassification statute, Thompson still 
mandates that a jury is required to determine whether the defendant had knowledge 
of his victim's status as a law enforcement officer. 
Retroactivity of Thompson and Related Due Process Concerns 
 
 
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As has been the case for the past twenty-five years, the standard enunciated 
in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), governs the retroactivity analysis in 
the instant matter.  With due deference to the importance of finality in any system 
of justice,5 the Court in Witt determined that only those changes in the law that 
constitute major constitutional changes, or “jurisprudential upheavals” are applied 
retroactively.  See id. at 929.  Acknowledging the fact that the significance of legal 
developments is largely a case-by-case consideration, the Witt Court stated: 
[H]istory shows that most major constitutional changes are likely to 
fall within two broad categories.  The first are those changes of law 
which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate 
certain conduct or impose certain penalties.  This category is 
exemplified by Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 
L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), which held that the imposition of the death 
penalty for the crime of rape of an adult woman is forbidden by the 
eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.  The second are 
those changes of law which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate 
retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall 
and Linkletter.  [N.25]  Gideon v. Wainwright, of course, is the prime 
example of a law change included within this category.  
                                          
 
5.  In the words of the Witt Court: 
   
It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at 
some point, come to an end.  In terms of the availability of judicial 
resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow 
effective appellate review of other cases.  There is no evidence that 
subsequent collateral review is generally better than contemporaneous 
appellate review for ensuring that a conviction or sentence is just.  
Moreover, an absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over 
the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the person convicted 
nor society as a whole. 
Id. at 925. 
 
 
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[N.25]. This category of law changes was adapted from 
Section 2.1(a)(vi) of the ABA Standards Relating to Post-
Conviction Remedies (Approv. Draft 1968), which 
provides in relevant part:  
A post-conviction remedy ought to be 
sufficiently broad to provide relief  
(a) for meritorious claims challenging 
judgments of convictions, including claims:  
. . . . 
(vi) that there has been a significant change 
in law, whether substantive or procedural, 
applied in the process leading to applicant’s 
conviction or sentence, where sufficient 
reasons exist to allow retroactive application 
of the changed legal standard; 
Id. at 929.   
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are “evolutionary refinements in 
the criminal law” which, according to Witt, are not applied retroactively.  
See id.  Changes falling into this category include those “affording new or 
different standards for the admissibility of evidence, for procedural fairness, 
for proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters.  
Emergent rights in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this 
genre, do not compel an abridgement of the finality of judgments.”  Id.  
 
The Witt analysis is distinct from, but informed by, the principle articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001)––a 
case which stands for the proposition that the due process guarantee requires the 
prosecution to prove each essential element of an offense beyond a reasonable 
 
 
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doubt.  See id. at 229.  If it were not, the “evolutionary refinement” aspect of the 
Witt nonretroactivity analysis would automatically conflict with Fiore.  That the 
government must prove each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt is a bedrock principle of our criminal justice system and one that guides the 
review of any criminal conviction in this state.  However, these due process 
concerns are somewhat distinct from the general legal questions pertaining to 
retroactivity, and the principle articulated in Fiore must be applied within the 
context of the constitutional and jurisprudential law governing Florida’s court 
system.    
Regrettably, this Court’s decision in State v. Klayman, 835 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 
2002), and its invocation of statutory analysis with regard to the Legislature 
“ceding” discretion to the courts for construction, apparently has substantially and 
unnecessarily confused the legal constructs applicable to the retroactivity analysis 
and due process concerns under Florida law.  Klayman presented the issue as to 
whether our prior decision in Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), in which 
this Court determined that Florida’s drug trafficking statute did not apply to 
possession of hydrocodone in amounts under a certain threshold, should be applied 
retroactively.  See Klayman, 835 So. 2d at 250.  In deciding that Hayes applied 
retroactively, the Klayman Court invoked the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Fiore as a basis for determining that any decision of the Florida 
 
 
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Supreme Court “clarifying” extant law must be applied in all cases, whether 
pending or final, that were decided under the same version of that law.  See id. at 
252.  According to the Klayman Court:  “A clarification is a decision of this Court 
that says what the law has been since the time of enactment.”  Id. at 253.  
Determination of whether a decision “clarifies” a statute turns first on the language 
of the decision itself; if the decision is silent or ambiguous, the Court looks to the 
statute to discern the intent.  See id.  “Where the Legislature cedes no discretion to 
the courts either directly or indirectly but instead employs definitive language that 
ordinarily requires no judicial construction, the Legislature intends that the statute 
be applied as enacted.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
One week after issuing the decision in Klayman, this Court issued its 
decision in Bunkley v. State, 833 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2002) (“Bunkley I”), vacated, 
538 U.S. 835 (2003), a case which required this Court to consider and determine 
whether to retroactively apply the holding in L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 
1997).  In L.B., this Court considered whether the “common pocketknife” 
exception to the statutory definition of “weapon” under section 790.001(13) of the 
Florida Statutes (1997), was unconstitutionally vague.  See id. at 371.  This Court 
held that the exception was not unconstitutionally vague and was capable of 
ascertainment by Florida’s juries.  We determined that the term applied to the type 
of knife in which the blade folds into the handle permitting it to be carried in one’s 
 
 
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pocket.  See id. at 372.  In determining that the exception applied to the knife 
carried by L.B., the Court noted an opinion of the Attorney General from 1951 
stating that a pocketknife with a blade of four inches or less was a “common 
pocketknife.”  See id. at 373. 
In Bunkley I, this Court refused to apply the decision in L.B. retroactively to 
reverse Bunkley’s conviction for armed burglary on the basis that the knife he 
carried during the burglary of a closed, unoccupied restaurant, which had a blade 
of 2 1/3 to 3 inches in length, fell within the “common pocket knife” exception.  
See Bunkley I, 833 So. at 746.  This Court applied what can only be called a 
hybridization of the Klayman and Witt standards,6 determining that the decision in 
L.B. was not a “jurisprudential upheaval” requiring retroactive application, but an 
“evolutionary refinement,” as evidenced by the fact that the statute ceded 
discretion to the courts to determine the meanings of “dangerous weapon” and 
“common pocketknife” in the burglary and weapon statutes since such terms would 
require judicial construction to provide a meaningful basis for sanction.  See id. at 
745.  With regard to the impact of Fiore on the analysis, the Court in Bunkley I 
simply stated that the body of precedent regarding “clarifications” and the decision 
in Fiore itself had no application in Florida law.  See id. at 744 & n.12.    
                                          
 
6.  The majority decision in Bunkley I did not, however, even cite the then-
recent decision in Klayman. 
 
 
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Thus, within a period of one week, the Court issued two opinions 
articulating slightly different standards for adjudging retroactivity and reaching 
divergent conclusions, with Klayman holding that Fiore required relief from a final 
district court decision and Bunkley I holding that Fiore did not apply to cause 
retroactive application.  This apparent irreconcilable conflict resulted, at least in 
part, from neither decision squarely addressing or discussing the manner in which 
the status of Florida law is defined at the time of conviction in cases where a 
Florida district court has clearly decided with finality a principle or concept of law 
in a particular way and the Florida Supreme Court subsequently considers and 
rules upon the same issue in a totally opposite manner.  Any differing results could 
semantically be characterized as a “change” and the “evolutionary refinement” 
nonretroactivity position of Witt render that decision totally invalid.  
Most certainly, it is now clear that the due process concerns addressed in the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Fiore apply to Florida cases under 
review by this Court, and this Court erred in Bunkley I to the extent we suggested 
or implied otherwise.  See Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 838 n* (2003).  The 
essential lesson from Fiore is that a conviction runs afoul of due process guarantees 
if, at the time it was rendered, the activity in which the defendant was engaged was 
not a crime.  Thus, as stated by the United States Supreme Court in its decision in 
 
 
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Bunkley,7 “[t]he proper question under Fiore is not whether the law has changed,” 
but rather what the state of the law was at the time of the defendant’s conviction.  
Id. at 840.  Instead of squarely addressing the Fiore principle, Klayman created a 
“clarification versus change” construct based on this Court’s interpretation of 
whether the Legislature had afforded any interpretive discretion to reviewing 
courts in the governing statute.  While championed under a banner of simplicity, 
that distinction appears to be confusing and unworkable in practice because it 
ignores the fact that in cases of statutory construction, “the law” is comprised of 
the statute plus decisional caselaw interpreting that statute.  Further, a 
“clarification” or “change” may seem at times to be interchangeable concepts with 
the Florida structure in place.  Thus, “the law” at the time a petitioner is convicted 
must be defined with regard to the manner in which and the extent to which the 
multiple district courts of appeal have determined the scope, application, and 
operation of the governing statute.   
                                          
 
7.  The United States Supreme Court determined that the question was not 
just one of retroactivity, because retroactivity is not an issue if the Florida Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the “common pocketknife” exception in L.B. was a 
correct statement of the law at the time of Bunkley’s conviction.  See Bunkley, 538 
U.S. at 840 (“The proper question under Fiore is not whether the law has changed.  
Rather, Fiore requires that the Florida Supreme Curt answer whether, in light of 
L.B., Bunkley’s pocketknife of 2 1/2 to 3 inches fit within [the] “common 
pocketknife” exception at the time his conviction became final.”).  
   
 
 
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Understanding this conclusion requires us to review the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Fiore.  There, Fiore was convicted of violating a 
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the operation of a hazardous waste facility without 
a permit.  See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 226.  Although Fiore had a permit, the state 
argued that he had deviated so dramatically from the permit’s terms that he had 
violated the statute.  See id.  After Fiore’s conviction became final, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the statute for the first time in 
Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 634 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1993).  David Scarpone was 
Fiore’s codefendant and the two were convicted of the same crime at the same 
time.  See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 227.  In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held that Scarpone’s conduct was not within the ambit of the statute, reasoning that 
one who deviates from the terms of a permit is not operating without a permit as 
required by the statute.  See id.   
Unsuccessful in his attempts to have his own conviction set aside, Fiore 
commenced a federal habeas corpus action.  See id.  The district court granted the 
writ, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had announced a new rule of law in Scarpone which 
was inapplicable to Fiore’s already final conviction.  See id.  The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Fiore’s conviction violated the 
Federal Due Process Clause.  See id. 
 
 
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In reviewing the case, the United States Supreme Court found it necessary to 
certify a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asking whether the statutory 
interpretation announced in Scarpone was the correct interpretation of the law at 
the time Fiore’s conviction became final.  See id. at 228.  In response, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that its interpretation was not a new rule of 
law, but merely a clarification of the plain language of the statute, and, as such, 
represented the proper statement of the law on the date that Fiore’s conviction 
became final.  See id.  Based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s answer to 
the certified question, the United States Supreme Court held that the question 
presented in its review of Fiore was not one of retroactivity, but instead, “whether 
Pennsylvania can, consistently with the Federal Due Process Clause, convict [the 
petitioner] for conduct that its criminal statute, as properly interpreted, does not 
prohibit.”  Id. 
The High Court concluded that Fiore’s conviction violated due process 
safeguards because after the litigation in his case was final, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court determined that failure to possess a permit was, at the time of his 
conviction, a basic element of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted.  
See id. at 229.  The State’s failure to prove that Fiore lacked the required permit––
indeed the State had conceded that Fiore possessed the required permit––rendered 
Fiore’s conviction unconstitutional.  See id. 
 
 
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Thus, Fiore requires vindication of due process guarantees by ensuring that 
each essential element of an offense at the time a conviction becomes final is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  As stated in Fiore, and echoed again by the 
United States Supreme Court in Bunkley, the pertinent question from a due process 
perspective is the state of the law at the time of the petitioner’s conviction.  See 
Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 840.  Through constitutional structure and as expressed in 
numerous decisions of this Court, the district courts have been designed to be the 
final appellate courts in the state of Florida for the purpose of this analysis.  See 
Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980); Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 
141, 143 (Fla. 1980) (“The decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the 
law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by this Court . . . .”).8  Moreover, 
in the absence of interdistrict conflict, decisions of the district courts represent the 
                                          
 
8.  In contrast to this Court’s extremely limited jurisdiction set forth in 
article V, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has more broadly defined jurisdiction to review the decisions of Pennsylvania’s 
intermediate appellate courts, and appears to have the power to assume jurisdiction 
of proceedings in any Pennsylvania state court.  See e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
724(a) (2004) (noting that “[e]xcept as provided by section 9781(f) . . . final orders 
of the Superior Court and final orders of the Commonwealth Court not appealable 
under section 723 . . . may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon allowance of 
appeal by any two justices of the Supreme Court upon petition of any party to the 
matter”); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 726 (Supp. 2005) (granting the Supreme Court 
the authority to, on its own motion or upon petition by a party, “in any matter 
pending before any court or magisterial district justice of this Commonwealth 
involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of 
such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause right and 
justice to be done”).   
 
 
- 20 - 
law of the state, binding all Florida trial courts.  See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 
666 (Fla. 1992); see also Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2000) (“This 
Court has determined the decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law 
of this State unless and until they are overruled by this Court, and therefore, in the 
absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial 
courts.”), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).   
A decision of a Florida district court of appeal is final for these purposes 
because in the absence of conflict with another district court decision or a decision 
of this Court, or certification of an issue by a district court, a United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court, or some other Florida 
constitutional basis, this Court has no jurisdiction to simply and routinely review 
the district court decisions.9  It is beyond dispute that this Court is without power 
                                          
 
9.  Our mandatory jurisdiction is limited to:  
1. trial court judgments imposing the death penalty;  
2. district court decisions invalidating a state statute or a 
provision of the state constitution;  
3. administrative actions of statewide agencies relating to 
utility service and rates; and  
4. bond validations by trial courts as provided by law. 
  
Our discretionary jurisdiction may be invoked to review:  
1. decisions of district courts expressly declaring a state 
statute valid; or expressly construing a provision of state 
or federal constitutions;  
 
 
- 21 - 
to simply assume jurisdiction in a case to correct what we perceive as error, even if 
the issue appears to be important or involves the construction of a criminal statute.  
Thus, a decision of a district court construing a statute can remain in effect 
indefinitely.   
 
Clearly, continued adherence to the Klayman “clarification versus change” 
framework and searching for a Legislative delegation of interpretive power to the 
courts would cause, in operation, conflict with regard to our constitutional structure 
and the constitutionally mandated jurisdiction of this Court.  Moreover, 
propagation of the decision in Klayman is certainly not compelled by the United 
States Supreme Court’s decisions in Fiore or Bunkley.  As we must recognize, the 
                                                                                                                                        
2. decisions of district courts expressly affecting a class 
of constitutional or state officers;  
3. decisions of district courts expressly and directly 
conflicting with one another or with the supreme court on 
the same question of law;  
4. decisions of a district court which certify a question to 
be of great public importance, or that certify direct 
conflict with decisions of another district court;  
5. trial court orders and judgments certified by a district 
court where the appeal is pending to be of great public 
importance or to have great effect on administration of 
justice throughout the state and to require immediate 
resolution by the supreme court; and  
6. questions of law certified by the United States 
Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals 
determinative of a cause of action where there is no 
controlling precedent of the Florida Supreme Court. 
 
See art. V, § 3, Fla. Const.  
 
 
- 22 - 
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the pertinent question under 
Fiore concerns the state of the law at the time of the conviction.  See Bunkley, 538 
U.S. at 840.  In reviewing this Court’s decision in Bunkley I, the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
Ordinarily, the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that L.B. constitutes 
a change in––rather than a clarification of––the law would be 
sufficient to dispose of the Fiore question.  By holding that a change 
in the law occurred, the Florida Supreme Court would thereby 
likewise have signaled that the common pocketknife exception was 
narrower at the time Bunkley was convicted. 
Here, however, the Florida Supreme Court said more.  It 
characterized L.B. as part of the “century-long evolutionary process.”  
833 So. 2d, at 745.  Because Florida law was in a state of evolution 
over the course of these many years, we do not know what stage in the 
evolutionary process the law had reached at the time Bunkley was 
convicted.  The Florida Supreme Court never asked whether the 
weapons statute had “evolved” by 1989 to such an extent that 
Bunkley’s 2 1/2– to 3–inch pocketknife fit within the “common 
pocketknife” exception.  The proper question under Fiore is not just 
whether the law changed.  Rather, it is when the law changed.   
Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 841-42.10  The due process concerns at root in Fiore and 
applied in Bunkley are satisfied by the necessary operation of Florida 
constitutional and decisional law, which clearly provide that the reversal of a 
district court interpretation of a statute by this Court necessarily changes the law as 
                                          
 
10.  This passage makes clear that the Bunkley Court did not prejudge the 
issue regarding whether the highest state court’s first interpretation of a statutory 
provision necessarily constitutes a “clarification” as opposed to a “change” in the 
law.  Accord Clem v. State, 81 P.3d 521, 529 (Nev. 2003).  In Klayman, we appear 
to have selected an unworkable construct.  “Where a change in decisional law has 
occurred, the only question under Fiore is:  when did the change occur, before or 
after the defendant’s conviction became final?”  Id. 
 
 
- 23 - 
it existed at the time of a defendant’s conviction.  The change may result from a 
multitude of reasons but it would still be change nonetheless.  We so held upon 
remand from the United States Supreme Court in Bunkley v. State, 882 So. 2d 890, 
897 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 939 (2005) (“Bunkley II”). 
Application of the Witt Standard 
Having determined that the question of the retroactivity of decisions should 
be controlled solely by Witt, we now turn to the issue presented in the instant 
action, namely the retroactivity of this Court's decision in Thompson.  To be 
applied retroactively, Thompson must satisfy the three-part Witt test.  First, it must 
emanate from this Court or the United States Supreme Court; second, the decision 
must be constitutional in nature; and third, it must constitute a development of 
fundamental significance.  See Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931.  Clearly, the first prong is 
satisfied, as Thompson was a decision of this Court.  The remaining two prongs 
are, however, not met, and therefore we hold that Thompson is not retroactive. 
In Sweeney v. State, 722 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal held that Thompson should not be applied retroactively 
because it failed to satisfy the second prong of the Witt test.  See id. at 930.  There, 
the court held that Thompson “merely applied principles of statutory construction 
in holding that the statute implicitly requires a factual finding of the victim’s 
status; it did not create nor abrogate any substantive rights or offense[s],” and 
 
 
- 24 - 
therefore it was not constitutional in nature.  Id. at 931.  The Sweeney court’s 
holding was correct with regard to the Witt analysis. 
In State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995), receded from on other 
grounds by Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999), this Court held that the 
decision in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993), satisfied all three prongs of 
the Witt test and should therefore be applied retroactively.  In Hale, we held that 
there was no statutory authority that allowed trial courts to impose consecutive 
habitual felony offender sentences for multiple offenses arising out of the same 
criminal episode.  See Callaway, 658 So. 2d at 985.  The Callaway Court 
determined that the second prong of Witt was satisfied because the “imposition of 
consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode could not withstand a due process analysis . . . [and] . . . the 
decision in Hale significantly impacts a defendant’s constitutional liberty 
interests.”  Id. at 986 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in State v. Stevens, 714 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1998), we held that the 
decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995), satisfied all three 
prongs of the Witt test and should be applied retroactively.  See Stevens, 714 So. 
2d at 348.  In Iacovone, this Court held that sections 784.07 and 775.0825 of the 
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), relating to sentencing for attempted murder of a law 
enforcement officer were not applicable to attempted second- and third-degree 
 
 
- 25 - 
murder, limiting the statutes’ scope to attempted first-degree murder.  See id. at 
347-48.  In Iacovone, we noted that applying the statutes’ mandatory life sentences 
for attempted second- and third-degree murder would lead to irrational results 
because the completed crimes of second- and third-degree murder were subject to 
lesser penalties.  See id. at 348 n.3.  Applying the Witt test to the Iacovone 
decision, we held that Iacovone was constitutional in nature because “imposition of 
a hefty criminal sentence pursuant to a patently ‘irrational’ sentencing scheme 
‘could not withstand a due process analysis’ of any sort.”  Id. at 348 (quoting 
Callaway, 658 So. 2d at 986). 
The Thompson decision, holding that section 784.07(3) contains a 
knowledge element, does not implicate due process concerns present in both 
Callaway and Stevens.  As noted in Sweeney, Thompson utilized principles of 
statutory construction, not a constitutional analysis.  The due process concerns 
present in both Callaway and Stevens related to lengthy sentences that this Court 
subsequently determined were not intended by the statute.  The trial courts had 
incorrectly interpreted the statutes and sentenced the defendants without statutory 
authority, i.e., their sentences were not what the Legislature intended.  The same 
cannot be said in the instant action.  Here, the respondent was convicted of 
attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, a life felony with a 
twenty-five year mandatory minimum under sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 of 
 
 
- 26 - 
the Florida Statutes (1991).  The trial court sentenced him to twenty-seven years’ 
imprisonment.  Unlike the defendants in Callaway and Stevens, Barnum was not 
sentenced against Legislative intent; in fact, he was sentenced precisely according 
to Legislative intent.  Additionally, in Callaway and Stevens, but for the erroneous 
sentencing by the trial courts, the defendants unquestionably would not have been 
sentenced to the same lengthy periods of incarceration.  Again, the same cannot be 
said here.  Pursuant to sections 777.04(4)(a) and 775.082(3)(b) of the Florida 
Statutes (1991), the penalty for attempted murder in 1991 was “a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.”  § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991).  
Although Barnum would not have been subject to the twenty-five year mandatory 
minimum, it is clear that he would still have had the potential for a substantial 
sentence.  Clearly, the due process concerns of Callaway and Stevens are not the 
prevalent consideration in the instant action.  Therefore, we hold that Thompson 
does not satisfy the second prong of the Witt test—that the decision sought to be 
applied is constitutional in nature. 
Similarly, Thompson does not satisfy the third prong of the Witt test because 
it is not a decision of fundamental significance.  Witt dictates that those decisions 
constituting “evolutionary refinements” and not “jurisprudential upheavals” should 
not be applied retroactively.  See Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.  Thompson was a 
conventional, nonconstitutional concept requiring that courts find a knowledge 
 
 
- 27 - 
element in the statutory scheme.  It was not a decision such as Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court held that “a sentence 
of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of 
rape.”  Id. at 592.  Thompson merely provided that section 784.07(3) contains a 
knowledge element; it did not “place beyond the authority of the state the power to 
regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties.”  Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.  In a 
similar manner, Thompson was not a major constitutional change of law, such as 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  As Thompson was not a major 
constitutional change, it will not be applied retroactively.     
Fundamental Fairness Inquiry 
The district court below did not conduct a retroactivity analysis on the basis 
of Witt, but instead applied this Court’s decision in Moreland v. State, 582 So. 2d 
618 (Fla. 1991), determining that the principle of fundamental fairness which 
mandated retroactive application in that case also controlled the instant matter.  See 
Barnum, 849 So. 2d at 374.  The First District's reliance upon Moreland was 
misplaced because the facts presented in Moreland are clearly distinguishable from 
those we consider here. 
Moreland addressed the issue of the retroactivity of this Court’s decision in 
Spencer v. State, 545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989).  Spencer held that a 1980 
administrative order of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit dividing Palm Beach County 
 
 
- 28 - 
into eastern and western jury districts was unconstitutional because it excluded 
blacks from the eastern district's jury pool.  See Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619.  As a 
result, this Court reversed a defendant's first-degree murder conviction and death 
sentence.  See id.  While Spencer was pending in this Court, Moreland was tried 
for first-degree murder.  He challenged the constitutionality of the administrative 
order, but his challenge was rejected.  See id.  Moreland was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  See id.  On direct appeal, 
Moreland again challenged the constitutionality of the administrative order, but the 
district court simply affirmed his conviction and sentence without opinion.  See id. 
After Spencer was released by this Court, Moreland filed a postconviction 
motion, arguing that Spencer should be applied retroactively, and that his 
conviction and sentence should be vacated.  See id.  The trial court conducted a 
Witt analysis and held that Spencer was retroactive.  The district court, however, 
disagreed, and held that Spencer was not retroactive under Witt.  See id.  On 
review, we agreed that Spencer should not be applied retroactively on the basis of 
Witt, but nonetheless held that Spencer should be applied retroactively to 
Moreland.   
Our justification for retroactive application there was fundamental fairness.  
We held that had Moreland been sentenced to death rather than life, his direct 
appeal would have been heard by the Supreme Court rather than the Fourth District 
 
 
- 29 - 
Court of Appeal, and he would have obtained the same result as Spencer and other 
defendants whose convictions and sentences were vacated due to the 
unconstitutional administrative order.  See id. at 620.  There, we wrote:  “It would 
be fundamentally unfair to deny Moreland the relief provided by Spencer merely 
because his sentence directed his appeal to a court other than this one.”  Id.  
Importantly, we noted that Moreland had claimed in the trial court and on direct 
appeal that the administrative order was unconstitutional, and that “[h]ad he not 
done so he would not be entitled to relief.”  Id. at 620 n.3; see also Owen v. 
Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 190-91 (Fla. 2003) (holding that Owen had not challenged 
jury selection at trial and was therefore not entitled to relief under Moreland). 
Applying Moreland to the instant action, the district court determined:  “[I]f 
this court had certified conflict with Grinage in Barnum’s direct appeal, the 
supreme court could have considered Barnum’s case, decided it in the manner it 
did Thompson, and remanded for a new trial.”  Barnum, 849 So. 2d at 374.  In 
Grinage, the Fifth District had held that “before [a defendant] can be convicted of 
attempting to murder a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his 
duty, the State must allege and prove that he knew his victim was a police officer.”  
Grinage, 641 So. 2d at 1364.  We accepted jurisdiction in Thompson on the basis 
of conflict between Grinage and Thompson v. State, 667 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1996), where the Third District held that section 784.07(3) was only a sentencing 
 
 
- 30 - 
enhancement and did not require the defendant to have knowledge that the victim 
was a law enforcement officer.  See Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 691-92. 
The First District’s reliance upon Moreland and its conclusion that 
fundamental fairness necessitates retroactive application of Thompson is in error.  
The instant action differs from Moreland in several respects.  First, we clearly held 
in Moreland that had the defendant not asserted at trial that the administrative order 
was unconstitutional, he would not have been entitled to relief based upon the 
retroactive application of Spencer.  See Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 620 n.3.  Here, it 
is uncontested and the record reflects that Barnum did not argue that the jury 
should be instructed on a knowledge element, nor did he object to the court’s jury 
instructions, despite the dispute regarding whether Barnum knew the victim was a 
law enforcement officer.11 
Second, in Moreland, we noted that had the defendant there received the 
death sentence, as opposed to a sentence of life imprisonment, his direct appeal 
would have been in this Court, rather than the district court.  Therefore, he was 
                                          
 
11.  A corollary point––in Moreland, the defendant had preserved the issue 
of the constitutionality of the administrative order, just as the defendant in Spencer 
had.  Here, the defendant in Thompson had preserved the relevant issue by 
requesting a jury instruction that knowledge was an element of section 784.07(3), 
see Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 691, while Barnum did not.  Therefore, Barnum and 
Thompson, although both convicted of the same offense, were not identically 
situated defendants.  Because their positions were not identical, there is no 
guarantee, as there was in Moreland, that we would have decided Barnum’s case as 
we eventually did in Thompson. 
   
 
 
- 31 - 
entitled to the benefit of what unquestionably would have occurred had his direct 
appeal been to this Court.  See id. at 620.  In the instant action, the First District 
assumed that had that court certified conflict with Grinage in 1995, this Court 
would have accepted jurisdiction and decided Barnum’s case as it eventually did 
Thompson’s in 1997.  See Barnum, 849 So. 2d at 374.  However, even if the First 
District had certified the conflict, there would have been no guarantee that this 
Court would have accepted jurisdiction.  Unlike the mandatory review in death 
penalty cases, a district court’s certification of conflict does not present this Court 
with mandatory jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Therefore, it is not 
beyond dispute, as it was in Moreland, that we would have reviewed Barnum’s 
case. 
Further, in Moreland, we had the benefit of not only our decision in Spencer, 
but also the benefit of at least two other decisions in which we had reached the 
same result.  See Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 620.  Thus, it could safely be inferred 
from those three decisions that Moreland’s outcome would have been the same had 
we had the opportunity to consider the issue.  The same cannot be said in 
Barnum’s case.  Although this Court held in Thompson that knowledge is an 
element of section 784.07(3), we have not addressed the issue in any other 
decision.  There is no sufficient guarantee, as there was in Moreland, that had we 
 
 
- 32 - 
accepted jurisdiction in 1995, we would have decided the issue the same way as we 
eventually did in Thompson and would have likewise granted Barnum relief. 
In Witt, this Court wrote:  “The doctrine of finality should be abridged only 
when a more compelling objective appears, such as ensuring fairness and 
uniformity in individual adjudications.”  Witt, 387 So. 2d at 925.  That concept, in 
part, led to the outcome in Moreland.  See Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619-20.  
However, Moreland presented a unique circumstance directly resulting from the 
dual-track system for appeals of first-degree murder convictions, which places 
appeals from death sentences before this Court and appeals from sentences of life 
imprisonment before the district courts.  Barnum’s is the more common situation in 
which district courts reach conflicting interpretations, and in reviewing only one of 
the decisions, this Court resolves the conflict in favor of the defendant.  The 
principle established in Moreland does not apply in this scenario. 
CONCLUSION 
For the stated reasons, we approve the decision in Sweeney and quash the 
First District's decision in Barnum.  Pursuant to Witt, our holding in Thompson is 
not retroactive.  Further, since we have now squarely held that all decisions of this 
Court disagreeing with a statutory construct previously rendered by a district court 
constitute “changes” in the applicable law from the law at the time of conviction, 
we recede from the “clarification/change” scheme and the “ceding” of discretion 
 
 
- 33 - 
analysis voiced in Klayman and reiterate that retroactivity will be adjudged solely 
through operation of the Witt standard with an overlay of the Fiore due process 
considerations. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and 
QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., 
and ANSTEAD, J., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring in result only. 
 
I agree that Barnum is not entitled to have his sentence reduced to eliminate 
the law enforcement victim enhancement under Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 
(2001), Moreland v. State, 582 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1981), or Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 
922 (Fla. 1980).  I further agree with the majority’s rationale for holding Moreland 
and Witt inapplicable.  My concurrence is in result only because I cannot agree that 
the due process principles vindicated in Fiore can be satisfied in Florida solely by 
application of the Witt test, which is the effect of the majority opinion.   
 
I would continue to fully apply both Witt and Fiore, with the critical limiting 
caveat that Fiore applies only in cases in which a clarification of the law 
 
 
- 34 - 
establishes that the defendant was convicted for conduct that does not constitute a 
crime.  In addition, I would distinguish clarifications subject to Fiore from changes 
in the law subject to Witt as follows.  A first-time interpretation by this Court of a 
statutory term would be a clarification subject to Fiore when we address an issue 
on which there is no “law of the state” because the district courts either have not 
addressed the issue or are in conflict, or when we adopt a district court 
interpretation on which there is no conflicting precedent.  A decision by this Court 
interpreting a statute would be a change in the law subject to the Witt retroactivity 
test when the decision is contrary to the “law of the state” established either by our 
own precedent or precedent from the district courts on which there is no 
interdistrict conflict. 
 
Consistent with this Court’s decision in Paul Thompson v. State, 887 So. 2d 
1260 (Fla. 2004),12 I believe that Fiore operates outside of, and in addition to, the 
retroactivity analysis of Witt.  In Paul Thompson, we rejected an argument for 
retroactive relief under Witt on two grounds.  First, we noted that the decision the 
petitioner sought to have applied to his conviction, Huss v. State, 771 So. 2d 591 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2000), was by a district court rather than this Court or the United 
States Supreme Court, contrary to the requirements of Witt.  Second, we concluded 
                                          
 
12.  The petitioner’s first name is used to distinguish this case from Darryl 
Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1997), which is discussed in the majority 
opinion and in my opinion below. 
 
 
- 35 - 
that the decision concerned a change in statutory law requiring two prior 
convictions of driving with knowledge that one’s license is suspended in order to 
make a third or subsequent conviction a felony, whereas Witt concerns 
retroactivity of changes in the decisional law.  See Paul Thompson, 887 So. 2d at 
1263-64.  We then conducted a Fiore analysis, concluding that Thompson’s 
conviction constituted a denial of due process of law because “the State did not and 
could not prove that Thompson had three prior convictions for the offense [of] 
driving with knowledge that his license had been canceled, suspended or revoked.”  
Id. at 1266.  Our decision in Paul Thompson fits the criteria for relief under Fiore 
set out above because this Court in effect adopted the district court’s interpretation 
of the statute, making it a first-time clarification by this Court on an issue on which 
there were no district court decisions to the contrary. 
 
The majority does not address Paul Thompson, which presumably remains 
good law because it involves the approval rather than “the reversal of a district 
court interpretation.”  Majority op. at 22.  However, the latter scenario arises much 
more frequently, as it did in State v. Klayman, 835 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2002), in 
which we also granted relief under Fiore.  The majority implicitly recedes from 
Klayman.  I disagree and would reaffirm Klayman’s importance. 
 
In Klayman, the Court applied Fiore to hold that this Court’s decision in 
Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), required that any conviction of trafficking 
 
 
- 36 - 
in hydrocodone be vacated, regardless of whether it was pending on appeal or 
final, if the drug contained no more than 15 milligrams of hydrocodone per dosage 
unit.  Under that interpretation, the defendant in Klayman, as in Hayes, was 
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law because the crime of drug trafficking did 
not occur.  See Klayman, 835 So. 2d at 251 (identifying issue as presenting a pure 
question of law).  Hayes clarified statutory terms to be applied by the courts, and 
was applicable to Klayman’s final conviction pursuant to the due process 
requirements of Fiore. 
 
As I have previously stated, I would dispense with Klayman’s distinction 
concerning decisions on statutes that cede interpretive discretion to the courts from 
those that do not as a dividing line for the application of Fiore.  See Bunkley v. 
State, 882 So. 2d 890, 926 (Fla. 2004) (Bunkley III) (Pariente, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that disparate results in Bunkley and Klayman “cannot be justified by 
any distinction between statutes that cede discretion to the courts and those that 
employ precise language”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 939 (2005).13  I would therefore 
recede from the portion of Klayman that distinguishes decisions on the basis of 
                                          
 
13.  This Court issued two decisions with opinions in Bunkley’s case, the 
first on review of the Second District’s decision, the second on remand from the 
United States Supreme Court.  See Bunkley v. State, 833 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 
2002) vacated, 538 U.S. 835 (2003), on remand, 882 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2004). 
Herein, I identify our first decision as Bunkley I, the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision on certiorari review as Bunkley II, and our decision on remand 
from the United States Supreme Court as Bunkley III. 
 
 
- 37 - 
whether the statutes they construe cede interpretive discretion to the courts.  On 
this the majority and I agree. 
However, I would adhere to the core holding in Klayman that a decision by 
this Court clarifying the statutory law must, pursuant to Fiore, be applied to final 
cases in which the clarification demonstrates that the defendant’s conduct “was 
never intended by the Legislature to be a crime.”  835 So. 2d at 254.  This is an 
important limitation, and restricts Fiore to situations that rarely occur.  But when 
these situations do arise, the due process imperative of fairness that drove the 
holding in Fiore demands relief. 
Answering the certified question in this case, I would limit relief under 
Klayman and Fiore to cases in which the clarification does not require resolution of 
a disputed factual matter.  Our 2004 decision in Paul Thompson, which concerned 
the driving while license suspended statute, is an example of the proper application 
of Fiore, because the State could not prove the requisite prior convictions that are 
an essential element of the felony offense.  See 887 So. 2d at 1266.  Thus, the 
crime was a misdemeanor and not the felony version of driving with a suspended 
license.  See id. at 1266 n.7. 
 
The majority in this case attempts to synthesize the tests set out in Fiore and 
Witt, but in the process leaves very few decisions, if any, subject to Fiore’s rule 
governing clarifications.  Under the majority’s view, there could be no relief under 
 
 
- 38 - 
Fiore when this Court has clarified the law after intermediate appellate courts 
reached differing conclusions on how a statute is to be interpreted, and those 
differing interpretations could result in a defendant being convicted of a crime in 
one district for conduct that another district court of appeal has determined is not a 
crime. The majority essentially adopts Justice Wells’ view that this Court can only 
change, but never clarify, the law of Florida when it overturns or disapproves a 
district court decision.  See Bunkley III, 882 So. 2d at 917 (Wells, J., concurring) 
(“It is simply incorrect under Florida’s court structure to conclude that a decision 
from this Court on a point of law that is contrary to a district court decision does 
not change that law.”).  As Chief Justice Anstead noted in his dissenting opinion in 
Bunkley III, this is an “extraordinary assertion” that unconstitutionally extends to 
district courts authority beyond their geographic boundaries.  882 So. 2d at 918 
(Anstead, C.J., dissenting).  In my dissenting opinion in that case, I noted that “the 
existence of mid-level courts does not diminish the authority of the state’s highest 
court to interpret the law, resolve conflicts among lower courts, and determine 
issues of constitutional stature or statewide importance.”  Id. at 925 (Pariente, J., 
dissenting). 
 
In drastically limiting Fiore, which involved Pennsylvania courts’ 
construction of state law, the majority relies on the fact that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s discretionary review authority is broader than ours.  See majority 
 
 
- 39 - 
op. at 19 n.8.  Therefore, following the majority’s logic, because decisions by 
midlevel appeals courts in Pennsylvania are widely reviewable by that state’s 
supreme court, those decisions are not the “law of the state” to the same extent as 
the decisions of intermediate appellate courts in Florida.  This view is incorrect for 
two reasons.  First, the differences on which the majority relies—the number of 
votes needed for discretionary review, the grounds for review, and whether “pass-
through” jurisdiction requires certification by the lower court—are not so great as 
to justify such elevated status for Florida district court decisions.  For example, 
some of the same considerations limiting our discretionary jurisdiction, such as 
conflict among the lower courts, are included in the Pennsylvania appellate rules as 
guides to the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by the state supreme court.  See 
Pa. R. App. P. 1114 (Considerations Governing Allowance of an Appeal).  Second, 
independently of how a state supreme court acquires discretionary jurisdiction, 
once the court has a case it is that court’s responsibility to settle questions of 
statutory interpretation when they arise and provide the definitive construction of a 
state statute.  Unless settled precedent from the midlevel appellate courts had held 
to the contrary, the state supreme court’s pronouncement will constitute a 
clarification rather than a change in state law. 
 
Moreover, the narrowing of this Court’s jurisdiction in the 1980 amendment 
to article V of the Florida Constitution was to relieve an overburdened docket in 
 
 
- 40 - 
order to allow the Court to focus on its supervisory role over the appellate courts to 
promote uniformity of the law, and not to weaken our authority.  See Jenkins v. 
State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980).  As we explained in Jenkins, the district 
courts were established to preserve the Florida Supreme Court’s “function[] as a 
supervisory body in the judicial system for the State, exercising appellate power in 
certain specified areas essential to the settlement of issues of public importance 
and the preservation of uniformity of principle and practice.”  Id. at 1357-58.   
 
Fiore itself is an illustration of a state supreme court’s resolution of 
conflicting decisions in the lower courts via a clarification that must be applied 
equally to all convictions, final or not, to comport with due process of law.  In 
Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 634 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1993), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court resolved a conflict between two different intermediate appellate courts on 
the interpretation of a state criminal statute.  See id. at 1122.  Answering the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s certified question in Fiore, the state supreme court held that its 
ruling in Scarpone “merely clarified the plain language of the statute.”  Fiore v. 
White, 757 A.2d 842, 848-49 (Pa. 2000).  The U.S. Supreme Court held that due 
process required application of this clarification to Fiore’s conviction despite its 
finality.  Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228-29.  This Court’s resolution of conflicting district 
court decisions in a first-time clarification of a statute should not be exempted from 
the due process requirements of Fiore. 
 
 
- 41 - 
 
Klayman demonstrates why a district court decision in Florida generally 
should not be regarded as the law of the state, because it is a textbook example of 
an issue that simmers for a period of time in the district courts before reaching us.  
The underlying issue was whether a defendant could be convicted of drug 
trafficking for possessing tablets that each contained no more than 15 milligrams 
of hydrocodone when the total amount of the prohibited substance in all the tablets 
surpassed the 4-gram threshold of the trafficking statute.  The first appellate court 
to interpret the pertinent language in the trafficking statute was the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), review 
denied, 694 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1997).  There the Fifth District determined that the 
amount of hydrocodone in all of the tablets could be aggregated to reach the 
trafficking threshold.  See id. at 833.  The decision in Baxley became final when 
this Court denied review.  Our denial meant either that we did not find a basis for 
jurisdiction or that we declined to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction.  Our 
denial cannot be construed to mean that we agreed with Baxley.   
Did that make Baxley the law of the State?  Only in the sense that a trial 
court anywhere in the state would have had to follow Baxley until a contrary 
decision appeared.  See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (“[I]n the 
absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial 
courts.”); see also Bunkley III, 882 So. 2d at 918 (Anstead, C.J., dissenting) 
 
 
- 42 - 
(noting that Supreme Court’s authority to direct trial courts to follow the decision 
of another district court where there is no decision in their districts is “solely for 
administrative convenience”).   
 
A contrary decision soon appeared.  A short time after Baxley, the First 
District Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion, determining that it was 
the amount of controlled substance per dosage unit and not the aggregate amount 
or weight that determined whether a defendant could be prosecuted for drug 
trafficking.  See State v. Holland, 689 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).  
The First District certified conflict with Baxley, but the State did not seek to 
invoke our jurisdiction.  The Second District Court of Appeal followed Holland in 
State v. Perry, 716 So. 2d 327, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), in affirming the dismissal 
of three counts of trafficking in hydrocodone.  The Second District also certified 
conflict with Baxley.  This Court initially granted and then dismissed review 
without explanation.  See State v. Perry, 727 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1998) (granting 
review); State v. Perry, 744 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1999) (dismissing review). 
Finally, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hayes sided with the Fifth 
District’s view in Baxley, reversed an order dismissing an information charging 
drug trafficking, and certified conflict with Holland and Perry.  See State v. Hayes, 
720 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), quashed, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).  
On this occasion, we retained jurisdiction and agreed with the First and Second 
 
 
- 43 - 
Districts that no crime of drug trafficking existed for possession of hydrocodone in 
tablets with dosage units of no more than 15 milligrams.  We directed that the trial 
court order dismissing the trafficking charge be affirmed.  See Hayes v. State, 750 
So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999). 
 
Before we decided Hayes, there was no settled law of Florida on the issue of 
statutory construction––how to determine the amount of hydrocodone for purposes 
of the drug trafficking statute––decided in that case.  Instead, the law in Florida 
was in a state of flux, as evidenced by the conflicting decisions discussed above.  
The law remained unsettled through the time that Klayman’s conviction became 
final and until this Court spoke and unanimously clarified the law of Florida in 
Hayes.  To say that either the decision of the First District in Holland or the 
contrary decision of the Second District in Baxley set out “the law of the state” on 
the issue in the same manner as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision at issue 
in Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228, would be incorrect. 
 
We should not categorically preclude Fiore relief in situations such as 
Klayman in which our clarification of the law results in a defendant being 
convicted for conduct that does not constitute a crime.  Controversies over 
interpretations of statutes often percolate in the district courts over a period of 
time, and we have discouraged district courts from certifying as questions of great 
public importance first-time interpretation of statutes since we prefer to see these 
 
 
- 44 - 
controversies develop in the district courts to enable us to make the most informed 
decisions.  During this process, district courts may dispose of the issue in some of 
the cases by per curiam affirmances without opinion, which precludes further 
review.  Even in those cases in which district courts address the issue in written 
opinions, the issue generally does not reach us unless and until there is certified 
interdistrict conflict or express and direct interdistrict conflict, as in Hayes, which 
Klayman applied to final convictions pursuant to Fiore.   
But our preference not to address questions on the proper interpretation of a 
criminal statute when they first arise in Florida law should not work to defendants’ 
disadvantage once the issue is resolved by us.  Otherwise, defendants in some 
districts would remain convicted for conduct that does not constitute a crime under 
the statute as interpreted in other districts and ultimately by this Court.  Klayman is 
a case in point.  Until our clarification in 1999 of the drug trafficking statute, 
defendants in 1997 and 1998 convicted of possessing an identical amount of 
hydrocodone tablets in the Fourth and Fifth Districts would be subjected to 
prosecution for possessing a Schedule II substance subject to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years and a mandatory fine of $500,000.  
See § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997).  At the same time, in the First and 
Second Districts those convicted of possessing the same number of identical tablets 
could not be convicted under the trafficking statute, and would be guilty only of 
 
 
- 45 - 
unauthorized possession of a Schedule III substance, a third-degree felony 
punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years.  See §§  
775.082(3)(d), 893.13(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1997).  
 
In implicitly receding from Klayman and eviscerating the due process 
protections of Fiore in this state, the majority unnecessarily places Klayman in the 
shadow of this Court’s decisions in the two Bunkley cases.  See Bunkley v. State, 
833 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2002) (Bunkley I), vacated, 538 U.S. 835 (2003) (Bunkley II), 
on remand, 882 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2004) (Bunkley III).  In Bunkley I, the Court, 
applying Witt, denied retroactive application of a decision in what the Court 
termed a “routine statutory construction case.”  833 So. 2d at 746.  The issue of the 
common pocketknife exception addressed in L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 
1997), which the petitioner in Bunkley sought to apply retroactively, reached us 
not via discretionary interdistrict conflict jurisdiction but rather in a mandatory 
review of a Second District decision declaring a statutory provision 
unconstitutional.  Until the Second District decision in L.B. v. State, 681 So. 2d 
1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), at all pertinent times, including when Bunkley’s 
conviction became final, Florida’s district courts had uniformly held that the 
determination whether a particular knife fit within the common pocketknife 
exception to the definition of a deadly weapon was for the jury.  See Bunkley III, 
882 So. 2d at 895 (observing that in holding the provision void for vagueness, “the 
 
 
- 46 - 
Second District’s decision in L.B. confirm[ed] the rule that whether a knife fell 
within the ‘common pocketknife’ exception was a jury question”).  Thus, under 
Bunkley III, when we decided in L.B. that a pocketknife with a blade of less than 
four inches was a common pocketknife as a matter of law, we created a 
nonretroactive change in the law.  We did not, as in Hayes, clarify unsettled law, 
which pursuant to Fiore would invalidate final convictions for conduct that did not 
constitute a crime under the law as clarified.  
 
The decision that Barnum asks us to apply here, Darryl Thompson v. State, 
695 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1997), resolved conflicting district court statutory 
interpretations on the enhanced or aggravated offense of attempted murder of a law 
enforcement officer.  The First District had held that knowledge of the victim’s 
status was not an essential element of attempted murder of a law enforcement 
officer.  See Carpentier v. State, 587 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).  The 
Fifth District had concluded to the contrary.  See Grinage v. State, 641 So. 2d 
1362, 1365 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), approved on other grounds, 656 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 
1995).  Thus, there was a law of the First District and a conflicting law of the Fifth 
District, but no law of the state.  Not until this Court’s decision in Darryl 
Thompson was there law of the state correctly interpreting section 784.07(3), 
Florida Statutes (1993), to require proof of knowledge that the victim was a law 
enforcement officer.  In Darryl Thompson we construed section 784.07(3) as it had 
 
 
- 47 - 
existed from its enactment in 1988, despite the First District’s erroneous 
interpretation in Carpentier.14  This Court’s decision in Darryl Thompson clarified 
section 784.07(3) by holding that knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement 
officer was indeed an essential element of the offense.   
 
In my view, when we determine whether decisions such as Hayes and Darryl 
Thompson apply to final convictions, the credibility of the system is at stake.  
Once we accept jurisdiction to resolve a conflict and interpret a statute, defendants 
throughout the state who were convicted for conduct that does not constitute a 
crime under our interpretation of the statute should reap the benefit of that 
decision, regardless of when they were convicted.  The harmony brought to the law 
by this Court’s conflict resolution should benefit all who were casualties in the 
conflict, no matter when their convictions became final.  This to me is the essence 
of due process of law as viewed through the lens of Fiore.   
However––and this bears emphasis––relief under Fiore is limited to those 
defendants whose conduct does not constitute a crime as a matter of law under the 
                                          
 
14.  The issue of whether section 784.07(3) included a knowledge element 
was clouded by uncertainty as to whether the enhanced punishment in the case of a 
law enforcement victim aggravator applied to all degrees of attempted murder or 
only attempted first-degree murder.  In a case decided before our decision in 
Darryl Thompson, we held that both section 784.07(3) and the accompanying 
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term in section 775.0825 applied only to 
attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer.  See State v. Iacovone, 
660 So. 2d 1371, 1374 (Fla. 1995). 
 
 
- 48 - 
law as properly interpreted.  In contrast to Klayman and Fiore, the law as correctly 
interpreted by this Court in Darryl Thompson created only a question of fact as to 
Barnum.  Our decision in Darryl Thompson made the defendant’s knowledge, 
which had been irrelevant under several district court opinions, an issue for the 
jury.  Because intent is a mental state seldom subject to direct proof, the 
determination whether the defendant knew that the victim was a law enforcement 
officer is an issue that in most circumstances remains for the jury.  See Washington 
v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208, 1215-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“The law is clear that a 
trial court should rarely, if ever, grant a motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
issue of intent.  This is because proof of intent usually consists of the surrounding 
circumstances of the case.”) (citation omitted).   
In Barnum’s trial, the victim of the alleged attempted murder testified that he 
announced that he was a police officer but did not display a badge when he 
confronted Barnum during a car burglary.  Barnum testified that he did not believe 
that the victim was a police officer.  Barnum v. State, 849 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2003).  The State’s evidence, though disputed, was sufficient for the trier of 
fact to have concluded that this element was met had the jury been instructed 
thereon.  This is different from Fiore and Klayman, in which the clarifications of 
the law provided in other cases established that the defendants were convicted of 
 
 
- 49 - 
crimes that did not take place under the law as correctly interpreted.15  Barnum’s 
conviction does not violate due process under Fiore or Klayman because Barnum 
does not stand convicted for conduct that, under the statute as properly interpreted, 
does not constitute a crime.  The First District’s certified question should be 
answered in the negative. 
Unfortunately for Barnum, the evidence remains sufficient to support 
conviction of the aggravated offense of attempted murder of a law enforcement 
officer even under the law as clarified in Darryl Thompson.  Therefore, my views, 
like those of the majority, do not avail Barnum relief.  Because the majority bases 
its conclusion on grounds with which I cannot fully agree, in particular its 
evisceration of Klayman, I concur in result only. 
Finally, because of the implications of the majority’s opinion, and despite 
our previous discouragement of certified questions on issues of first impression, I 
would urge district courts of appeal to certify questions of great public importance 
when they are the first to address an issue of statutory interpretation that could 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct constitutes a crime. 
ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
                                          
 
15.  Also distinguishable is our 2004 decision in Paul Thompson concerning 
the statute governing felony driving while license suspended, in which we held that 
the due process principles of Fiore required relief from a conviction that relied on 
predicate offenses that the State “did not and could not prove.”  887 So. 2d at 1266.   
 
 
- 50 - 
 
QUINCE, J., concurring in result only. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that Henry Barnum is not entitled to relief and his 
conviction should not be vacated.  I do so because Barnum was not convicted of a 
nonexistent crime, and therefore the principles enunciated in Fiore v. White, 531 
U.S. 225 (2001), and State v. Klayman, 835 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2002), do not change 
the outcome in this case.   
However, I cannot agree with the majority that we should recede from our 
decision in Klayman.  This court decided Klayman after the decision in Hayes v. 
State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).  The issue presented in Hayes was whether there 
existed the crime of drug trafficking when a defendant was in possession of 
numerous hydrocodone tablets but each individual tablet contained no more than 
15 milligrams of hydrocodone.  Several district courts of appeal addressed the 
issue.  The Fifth and Fourth Districts held that defendants under these 
circumstances could be convicted of trafficking.16  The First and the Second 
Districts, however, found that such facts did not demonstrate a crime of 
trafficking.17  We resolved the conflict and answered that question in the negative, 
holding a defendant in possession of numerous hydrocodone tablets could not be 
                                          
 
16.  See State v. Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), quashed, 750 
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999); State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).  
17.  See State v. Perry, 716 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. 
Holland, 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). 
 
 
- 51 - 
convicted of drug trafficking when the individual tablets possessed contained no 
more than 15 milligrams of hydrocodone.  
 
Thereafter, in Klayman we considered whether or not a defendant who was 
convicted of drug trafficking under the circumstances outlined in Hayes was  
entitled to relief based on Hayes.  In finding that a defendant was entitled to relief 
for a conviction for a nonexistent crime, we distinguished changes in the law from 
clarifications of the law and concluded that the situation presented in Hayes was a 
clarification of the law.  Thus, we held that where there had been differing 
decisions on the same issue by the various courts of appeal and one interpretation 
resulted in a defendant being convicted of a nonexistent crime, this Court’s 
resolution of the conflict was a clarification of the law, stating what the law was 
from its inception.  See Klayman, 835 So. 2d at 251.   
The Klayman decision is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fiore.  In Fiore the Supreme Court concluded that a clarification of the 
law, which indicates what the law was at the time of a defendant’s conviction, was 
not new law and thus did not present a question of retroactivity.  Instead, the 
question to be answered was whether the defendant could, under due process 
principles, be convicted of a crime for activity that was not prohibited by the 
statute.  Just as the defendant in Fiore could not be convicted for the crime of 
failure to have a hazardous waste permit when he in fact had one, the defendant in 
 
 
- 52 - 
Klayman could not be convicted of drug trafficking when the amount of drugs 
possessed did not reach the threshold of the trafficking amount. When this court is 
faced with situations where the district courts have decided questions of law 
differently and that difference may result in convictions for nonexistent crimes, the 
framework outlined in Klayman is a workable one. 
While I do not completely agree with this Court’s reasoning in Bunkley v. 
State, 882 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 939 (2005), I do believe 
that the situation presented in Bunkley is distinguishable from Klayman and should 
not be used as a basis to recede from Klayman.  Unlike Klayman, there were no 
district court of appeals’ opinions interpreting or defining the terms used in the 
statute that was at issue in Bunkley.  In fact there was no district court opinion in 
Bunkley until the decision that certified a question to this Court.  See Bunkley v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (certifying as a question of great public 
importance whether the decision in L.B. v. State 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1997), 
should apply retroactively), approved, 833 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2002), vacated, 538 
U.S. 835 (2003).  The other decisions from the Second District concerning 
Bunkley were per curiam affirmances without elaboration.  See Bunkley v. State, 
569 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bunkley v. State, 539 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1989).  
 
 
- 53 - 
For years, no district court of appeal squarely addressed in a written opinion 
the issue of whether or not a knife with a certain blade length was a common 
pocketknife or a weapon.  See §§ 790.001(13), 790.115(2), Fla. Stat. (2004).  It 
was generally accepted that the issue of whether a particular knife was a weapon 
was a question of fact to be determined by a jury.  It was only after the Second 
District in L.B. v. State, 681 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), rev’d, 700 So. 2d 
370 (Fla. 1997), declared section 790.001(13) unconstitutionally vague, because 
the term “common pocketknife” was vague, that the question came to this Court 
for resolution. 
In resolving the constitutional issue presented in L.B. and in determining the 
retroactivity issue in Bunkley, this Court was not faced with a situation where the 
various district courts of appeal were deciding the same issue of law differently.  In 
fact, as far as can be determined, the district courts appear to have been deciding 
the issue, over a number of years, in the same manner as the Second District 
decided all of Bunkley’s claims.  Thus, Klayman and Bunkley came to this Court 
in different procedural postures.  
 However, I agree with Chief Justice Pariente that we need not recede from 
Klayman.  The case before us does not present the situation where a district court 
opinion results in a conviction for a nonexistent crime.  This Court’s resolution of 
the conflict issue in Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1997), did not lead to 
 
 
- 54 - 
Barnum being convicted for a nonexistent crime.  Therefore, the issue of whether 
Barnum is entitled to relief is purely a matter of applying the retroactivity analysis 
articulated in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), to the Thompson issue.  
Application of Witt to this case demonstrates that Thompson should not be 
retroactively applied to convictions that are final. The principles espoused in Fiore 
and Klayman are simply not applicable here.   
Therefore, while I agree that Barnum is not entitled to relief under the Witt 
analysis, I do not believe that this Court should recede from the principles 
espoused in our Klayman decision.  Thus, I concur in the result only.         
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D01-4759 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Charlie J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Bureau Chief Criminal 
Appeals, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
 
- 55 - 
Kirk N. Kirkconnell and William R. Ponall of Kirkconnell, Lindsey, Snure and 
Yates, P.A., on behalf of The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(FACDL), Winter Park, Florida, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae