Case Title: People v. Campbell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94425

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 94425-Agenda 5-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
	 							RICHARD D. CAMPBELL, JR., Appellant.
Opinion filed December 18, 2003.
	
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether defense counsel, by stipulating to the
admission of evidence, can waive a defendant's constitutional right to
confront the source of the evidence without the defendant's knowing
consent to the stipulation. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting,
held that defense counsel can stipulate to prosecution testimony without
a defendant's knowing consent because the decision to stipulate is a
matter of trial strategy within defense counsel's sound judgment. 332 Ill.
App. 3d 808. The dissent believed that the decision whether to stipulate
to the testimony of a key witness belongs to the defendant, after
consultation with defense counsel. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 815-17 (Cook, J.,
dissenting). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of
Champaign County.

FACTS
	The State charged defendant, Richard D. Campbell, Jr., with
residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2000)), alleging that
defendant knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place of
Blake M. Hoerr and Griff P. Powell in Champaign, Illinois. Defendant's
trial began on May 14, 2001. After the jury was sworn, the prosecutor
moved for a continuance on the ground that Blake Hoerr had not
appeared for trial, even though he was under subpoena. Hoerr's father
had informed the prosecutor that Hoerr was in Maryland for a job and
would not be able to make it to court. The prosecutor asked for a brief
recess to obtain Hoerr's appearance, stating that Hoerr was a material
and critical witness for the State's case. Defense counsel objected, noting
that the State had answered ready at pretrial. The trial court agreed to
continue the matter to the following morning, stating that "if the witness is
not here at that time, then we're either going to have to dismiss the case,
or proceed with the witness, one or the other." The prosecutor then
elected to proceed with his other witnesses.
	Griff Powell testified for the State that he was a student at the
University of Illinois in Champaign. On March 13, 2001, Powell was living
with Hoerr and some other roommates at 1001 South First Street in
Champaign. The residence was a two-story home. Powell testified that
there were no signs on the home indicating that there were rooms for rent.
The front door to the home was made of wood, and there was a screen
door in front of the wood door. Only the wood door had a lock on it. 
	Powell said that March 13 was the Tuesday of spring break week for
the University, so that all of his roommates except Hoerr were out of
town. Both Powell and Hoerr were in town on March 13, although they
both planned to leave Champaign that day. Around 10:15 a.m., Hoerr
was sleeping on the couch in the living room and Powell was upstairs in his
room watching television when Powell heard a loud knocking on the door.
Powell assumed Hoerr would answer the door, but the knocking
continued for approximately two minutes. Just as Powell began to wonder
why Hoerr was not answering the door, he heard voices talking. Powell
could not hear what was going on, so he started walking down the stairs
and saw defendant walking out the front door. Powell did not know
defendant and had never seen defendant in the house. Powell and Hoerr
decided to call the police because they were both leaving town that day
and knew that it was easy to break into empty homes. At the time Powell
heard the knocking, the wood door was unlocked.
	Dennis Thomas testified that he is a police officer for the City of
Champaign and is assigned to the campus area, south of the University.
Thomas explained that winter breaks and spring breaks are significant
when working the campus area because all the students leave the area
during that time, and the burglary rate increases tremendously. On March
13, 2001, at 10:17 a.m., he was dispatched to 1001 South First Street to
check a report of a person that had walked into a house and then left,
going in a southerly direction. On his way to 1001 South First Street,
Thomas spotted defendant, who fit the description of the suspect, and
stopped to talk to him. Thomas asked defendant if he had been in the
building at 1001 South First Street. Defendant initially denied that he had
been there. When Thomas told defendant that someone fitting defendant's
description had been in 1001 South First Street, defendant then said that
he had been there looking for someone. Thomas asked defendant who he
was looking for, but defendant could not give him a name. 
	At the close of Thomas' testimony, the trial was continued until the
following day. The next day, the trial court asked the prosecutor whether
his witness was present. The prosecutor responded that Hoerr was not
present, but that he had a stipulation concerning Hoerr's testimony. The
trial court asked defense counsel whether he objected to the trial court
reading the stipulation and explaining the stipulation. Defense counsel
responded that he had no objection and "[i]n fact had signed the court's
copy" of the stipulation. 
	The stipulation of facts concerning Hoerr's testimony provided that
on March 13, 2001, at approximately 10:15 a.m., Hoerr was sleeping on
a couch in the living room when he was awakened by someone knocking
on the front door. After hearing several knocks, Hoerr heard the interior
wooden door open. Hoerr sat up, looked over the back of the couch, and
saw defendant in the hallway. When defendant saw Hoerr, defendant
asked if Hoerr had a room for rent. Hoerr said no, and defendant left the
home. Defendant did not have Hoerr's permission to enter the residence.
After defendant left, Hoerr called 911 and reported that a white male had
entered the residence without authority and described defendant to the
911 dispatcher. At 10:30 a.m., Hoerr was taken to the intersection of
First Street and Springfield Avenue and positively identified defendant as
the person who had entered his residence.
	After the stipulation concerning Hoerr's testimony was read to the
jury, both sides rested. The trial court then denied defendant's motion for
a directed verdict. Pursuant to defendant's request, the jury was instructed
concerning the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass to a residence
(720 ILCS 5/19-4 (West 2000)), in addition to the offense of residential
burglary. The jury found defendant guilty of criminal trespass to a
residence and defendant was sentenced to 364 days in jail.
	On appeal, defendant argued that he had been denied his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him because his
attorney stipulated to the testimony of Blake Hoerr without defendant's
knowing consent. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 812. The appellate court, with one
justice dissenting, held that defense counsel can stipulate to prosecution
testimony without a defendant's knowing consent because the decision to
stipulate is a matter of trial strategy within defense counsel's sound
judgment. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 814. The appellate court recognized two
exceptions to its holding: (1) when the State's entire case is to be
presented by stipulation; and (2) when the stipulation includes a statement
that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant. 332 Ill. App. 3d at
814. In those situations, "the stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea," so
a defendant must be admonished about the stipulation and must agree to
the stipulation before the court can accept such a stipulation. 332 Ill. App.
3d at 814. The dissenting justice asserted that the decision whether to
stipulate to the testimony of a key witness belonged to the defendant, after
consultation with defense counsel. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 817 (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
	This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	On appeal, defendant again argues that his constitutional right to be
confronted with his accuser was denied when his defense counsel agreed
to stipulate to the testimony of Hoerr, the prosecution's primary witness.
Defendant claims that the right to face-to-face confrontation belongs to an
accused, and only the accused may waive his right to confrontation.
Defendant further argues that there is nothing in the record to suggest that
he knowingly waived his right to be confronted with the key witness
against him. Finally, the error in failing to obtain defendant's knowing
waiver of his right to confrontation constituted reversible error, because
Hoerr's testimony clearly was necessary in order to sustain the State's
case against defendant.
	This court has recognized that criminal defendants possess two types
of constitutional rights and that a different waiver standard applies to each.
In People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 (1992), this court held that there are
four decisions that ultimately belong to the defendant in a criminal case
after consultation with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to
waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his own behalf; and (4) whether
to appeal. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d  at 54. This court then stated that:
			"Beyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the
right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of
tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters
include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct
cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial
motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also include
the defense to be presented at trial." Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d  at 54.
This court then held that the defendant's constitutional right to due process
was not violated when his trial counsel presented a defense against
defendant's wishes, because the defense theory to be presented at trial is
not one of the matters that a defendant has the ultimate right to decide.
Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d  at 54.
	Subsequently, in People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224 (1994), this
court held that in addition to the decisions specified in Ramey, a defendant
also had the exclusive right to decide whether to submit an instruction on
a lesser included offense at the conclusion of the evidence. Brocksmith,
162 Ill. 2d  at 229. We found that "the decision to tender a lesser included
offense is analogous to the decision of what plea to enter, and that the two
decisions should be treated the same." Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d  at 229.
Consequently, because defense counsel rather than defendant made the
ultimate decision to tender a lesser- included offense instruction,
defendant's conviction on the lesser- included offense was reversed.
Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d  at 230.
	Defendant asserts that the right to confrontation set forth in the United
States and Illinois Constitutions, like the rights specified in Ramey and
Brocksmith, belongs solely to a defendant, so that any waiver of the right
must be made by the defendant personally. The confrontation clause
provides:
			"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
*** to be confronted with the witnesses against him ***." U.S.
Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.
The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a
fundamental right made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923,
926, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965). There is a presumption against the
waiver of constitutional rights. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 317, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1247 (1966). Nonetheless, it is clear
that the right of confrontation may be waived. Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 4,
16 L. Ed. 2d  at 317, 86 S. Ct. at 1246-47; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452, 56 L. Ed. 500, 504, 32 S. Ct. 250, 252-53 (1912). In
order for a waiver to be effective, "it must be clearly established that there
was an 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.' " Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 4, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 317, 86 S. Ct.  at
1247, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461,
1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).
	Defendant cites People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127 (2000), in
support of his claim that any waiver of a defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation must be made by the defendant personally. We disagree
with defendant's interpretation of our holding in McClanahan. At issue in
McClanahan was a statute that allowed the State, in prosecutions under
the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1998)) or the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West
1998)), to use lab reports in lieu of actual testimony as prima facie
evidence unless the defendant filed a demand for the testimony of the
witness who prepared the report within seven days of the defendant's
receipt of the report. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 129. This court agreed
with defendant that the statute at issue impermissibly required a defendant
to take an affirmative step to secure his confrontation rights.
McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 134. In addition, the statute did not contain
sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that any such waiver was
knowing and voluntary because the waiver automatically occurred if the
defendant did not respond within seven days of being served with the lab
report. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 137. In so holding, this court stated:
		"In the absence of this statute, the State would have to secure a
knowing waiver of the confrontation right by acquiring a
defendant's stipulation to allow the lab report into evidence
without the testimony of the report's preparer. Unlike section
115-15, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes
to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report."
McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 137-38. 
Defendant argues that based upon the foregoing language, it is clear that
any waiver of the right to confrontation must be a knowing waiver made
by the defendant personally.
	We decline to read McClanahan so broadly. Contrary to
defendant's interpretation of McClanahan, this court has never held that
only a defendant can waive his sixth amendment right of confrontation. In
fact, this court has never directly addressed the issue of whether defense
counsel may waive a defendant's right of confrontation by stipulating to the
admission of evidence. We note, however, that a majority of the courts
that have addressed the issue have held that counsel in a criminal case may
waive his client's sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to
the admission of evidence.
	For example, in United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.
1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed whether and under what circumstances defense counsel could
waive a defendant's right to confrontation. The defendant in Plitman had
claimed that his attorney's stipulation concerning certain testimony was
invalid because: (1) the defendant had not waived his sixth amendment
right to confront the witnesses against him; (2) the defendant's attorney
never said that his client had waived his right of confrontation and/or knew
the risks involved in doing so; and (3) defense counsel's actions were not
justified as matters of trial strategy. Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 62. The
Plitman court noted that in an earlier decision, it had suggested that
defense counsel could make such a waiver where the stipulation involved
trial strategy and tactics, even thought the stipulation impacted on a
defendant's constitutional rights. Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 63. Similarly, other
federal courts of appeals had held that defense counsel in a criminal case
could stipulate to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant did
not dissent from his attorney's decision, and as long as it could be said that
the attorney's decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial
strategy. Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 63. The court concluded that given the
safeguards available to defendants from the constitutionally defective
actions of their attorneys:
		"[W]e reject Plitman's argument that a defendant in every
instance personally must waive the right to confront the witnesses
against him. We therefore join the majority of circuit courts of
appeals and hold that defense counsel may waive a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation where the decision is one
of trial tactics or strategy that might be considered sound."
Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 64.
The court therefore held that the defendant's waiver of his right of
confrontation through counsel was valid because the defendant achieved
several tactical advantages as a result of the stipulation, and defendant did
not object during the discussion concerning the stipulation or when his
attorney made the decision to stipulate. Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 64.
	As the Plitman court observed, a majority of the federal courts of
appeals that have considered the issue have held that defense counsel may
waive a defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation when the
decision is a matter of trial tactics or strategy and the defendant does not
object to the stipulation. See Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146,
1155-56 (10th Cir. 1999) (defense counsel effectively waived defendant's
confrontation rights where counsel's decision to stipulate to testimony was
a matter of prudent trial strategy and there was no evidence that defendant
disagreed with or objected to his counsel's decision); United States v.
Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1980) (defense counsel may
waive defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation by stipulating to
the admission of evidence as long as defendant does not dissent from his
attorney's decision and as long as the attorney's decision was a legitimate
trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy); Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1965) (defendant's right to confrontation was
effectively waived by his counsel where stipulation was made in the
presence of defendant and without his objection, and the decision to
stipulate was a matter of trial tactics and strategy); United States v.
Joseph, 333 F.2d 1012, 1013 (6th Cir. 1964) (right to confrontation may
be effectively waived by defense counsel in open court in the presence of
the defendant where the defendant indicates no dissent to the stipulation);
Cruzado v. People of Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1954)
(where a defendant is represented by counsel, counsel may waive
defendant's right to confrontation in defendant's presence, if the defendant
manifests no dissent to the waiver and where the stipulation is a matter of
trial tactics).
	In addition to the federal courts, a majority of the state courts that
have considered this issue have held that defense counsel may waive a
defendant's right to confrontation if the decision to stipulate is a matter of
trial tactics and strategy and the defendant does not object to the decision.
For example, in Carr v. State, 829 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Mo. App. 1992),
the defendant argued that he had been denied the right to confront a
witness against him when his counsel stipulated to portions of a witness'
deposition testimony. The defendant claimed that he had not given his
counsel permission to stipulate, and the record reflected that defendant did
not personally agree to waive his right of confrontation and was not asked
to waive that right. Carr, 829 S.W.2d  at 102. The court observed,
however, that the defendant voiced no objection when the stipulation was
presented to the trial court and listened "patiently" to his counsel read
portions of the deposition which were advantageous to defendant. Carr,
829 S.W.2d  at 102. The court denied defendant's claim that he was
denied his right to confront the witness against him, noting that in addition
to the defendant's failure to object to the stipulation, there were sound
strategic reasons for defense counsel's decision to stipulate. Carr, 829 S.W.2d  at 102. See also Lee v. State, 266 Ark. App. 870, 876-77, 587 S.W.2d 78, 82 (1979) ("it seems to be the universal rule that a defendant
in a criminal case may waive his right to confrontation *** and that the
waiver of this right may be accomplished by the accused's counsel as a
matter of trial tactics or strategy"); State v. Oyama, 64 Haw. 187, 188,
637 P.2d 778, 779-80 (1981) (defense counsel can waive certain aspects
of the right to confrontation where such waiver is a matter of trial tactics
and procedure and, in such case, the trial court is not required to
determine whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right); Waldon v. State, 749 So. 2d 262, 266 (Miss. App. 1999)
(defense counsel may waive a defendant's sixth amendment right of
confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence so long as
defendant does not dissent and so long as the stipulation is a matter of trial
tactics and strategy); State v. Bromwich, 213 Neb. 827, 830, 331 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1983) (counsel in a criminal case may waive his
client's right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence
if the decision to stipulate is a legitimate trial tactic and the defendant does
not dissent from the decision); Ludlow v. State, 761 P.2d 1293 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988) (lack of objection on the part of defense counsel to the
admission of evidence will be deemed a waiver of defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation where defendant does indicate
disagreement with counsel's decision, and counsel's decision is a
legitimate trial tactic); State v. Harper, 33 Wash. App. 507, 510, 655 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1982) (when a defendant does not object, defense
counsel may, as a matter of trial tactics, waive a defendant's right to
confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the
stipulation is not tantamount to a guilty plea); Bilokur v. Commonwealth,
221 Va. 467, 473, 270 S.E.2d 747, 752 (1980) (stipulation into evidence
of an incriminating extrajudicial statement was a legitimate trial tactic, and
defendant did not object when stipulation was tendered; therefore, counsel
properly waived defendant's right of confrontation). But see Lewis v.
State, 647 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (defendant must
consent in writing to waiver of confrontation and agreement to stipulate
and must have court's approval in writing); People v. Lawson, 124 Mich.
App. 371, 376, 335 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1983) (rights of the confrontation
clause must be personally waived by the defendant).
	We find the reasoning of the majority of the federal and state courts
to be persuasive and consistent with our decisions in Ramey and
Brocksmith setting forth the specific rights that only a defendant himself
may waive. We agree that defense counsel may waive a defendant's right
of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the decision
to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy. In so holding, we
observe that the concerns of the appellate court dissent-that defense
counsel may stipulate at trial over a defendant's objections-are not well
founded. We therefore affirm the appellate court's finding that defense
counsel may stipulate to the admission of evidence and thereby waive his
client's constitutional right to confrontation. 
	In so holding, we note that defendant has cited Clemmons v. Delo,
124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1997), in support of his claim that only a
defendant may waive his right to confrontation. We do not find Clemmons
persuasive. In Clemmons, neither the defendant nor his counsel waived
the defendant's right to confrontation. Clemmons, 124 F.3d  at 956. In
observing that the right to confrontation was not waived by defendant or
his counsel, the Clemmons court stated that "the law seems to be clear
that the right of confrontation is personal and fundamental and cannot be
waived by counsel." Clemmons 124 F.3d  at 956. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, however, Clemmons'
statement that counsel cannot waive a defendant's right to confrontation
was dicta. Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 63. In addition, the case cited by the
Clemmons court as support for the statement that counsel cannot waive
the right of confrontation, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 319, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1248 (1966), was distinguishable. Plitman,
194 F.3d  at 63 n.2. 
	In Brookhart, defendant's counsel agreed to a "prima facie trial,"
which was equivalent to a guilty plea. Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 6-7, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 318, 86 S. Ct.  at 1248. Notably, after the trial judge stated that
in a prima facie case the defendant in effect admits his guilt, the defendant
responded that he wished to point out that in no way was he pleading
guilty. Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 318-19, 86 S. Ct.  at
1248. The Court found that the stipulation at issue in Brookhart was not
merely a matter of trial tactics or strategy, but instead was "the practical
equivalent of a plea of guilty." Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at
319, 86 S. Ct.  at 1248. In fact, in reversing the defendant's conviction,
the Court stated that it was doing so because "petitioner neither personally
waived his right nor acquiesced in his lawyer's attempted waiver."
(Emphasis added.) Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 8, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 319, 86 S. Ct.  at 1249. Thus, as the appellate court correctly recognized in this case,
when the State's entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the
defendant does not present or preserve a defense (see People v. Horton,
143 Ill. 2d 11, 22 (1991) ("a stipulated bench trial is not tantamount to a
guilty plea if the defendant presented and preserved a defense")), or
where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to
convict the defendant, the stipulation implicates fundamental due process
concerns and can only be waived by the defendant personally. See 332
Ill. App. 3d at 814.
	Finally, we find that defense counsel's decision to stipulate was a
matter of trial tactics and strategy. Defendant claims that absent the
stipulation, he could not have been convicted of either residential burglary
or criminal trespass because both offenses require proof that defendant's
entry into the residence was unauthorized, and Hoerr was the only witness
in a position to establish that defendant had entered the premises without
authority. In support of this argument, defendant notes that when the State
requested a continuance in order to compel Hoerr's appearance, the trial
court granted the continuance but cautioned that the parties would then
have to either "dismiss the case, or proceed with the witness, one or the
other." Defendant claims that under the circumstances, the decision to
stipulate to the critical evidence of guilt was analogous to the decision to
plead guilty to a lesser offense and, accordingly, the decision to stipulate
was more than a matter of trial strategy and instead implicated defendant's
fundamental rights.
	As noted, we agree with defendant that defense counsel cannot
stipulate to facts which establish the guilt of the accused because the
constitutional right implicated in that situation is the right of a defendant in
a criminal case to plead not guilty. See United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d  at 233 n.2. Nonetheless, we are not persuaded by defendant's
characterization of the stipulation in this case as establishing his guilt.
Although the trial court stated, in granting the State's motion for a
continuance, that the court then would either dismiss the case or proceed
with the witness, we note that this statement was made prior to the
testimony of Griff Powell and Officer Thomas. After the trial court granted
the State's motion for a continuance, the State proceeded with the
testimony of Powell and Officer Thomas. Powell testified that after the
knocking had continued for some time, he started to go downstairs and
saw defendant walking out the front door. Powell did not know defendant
and had never seen defendant in the house. Powell and Hoerr decided to
call the police because they were both leaving town that day and knew
that it was easy to break into empty houses. Office Thomas testified that
he was called to check a report of a person that had walked into a house
and had left. Thomas spotted defendant, who fit the description of the
suspect, and stopped to talk to him. Defendant first denied that he had
been at Powell's apartment. When told he fit the description of someone
who had been there, defendant said that he had been in there looking for
someone, but could not give the name of that person.
	Following the testimony of Powell and Officer Thomas, defense
counsel agreed to stipulate to the testimony of Blake Hoerr and then relied
upon that stipulation in moving for a directed verdict and in his closing
argument. Defense counsel used the stipulation to establish defendant's
lack of any criminal intent, because the stipulated testimony established
that: defendant knocked on the door, then came into the hallway;
defendant saw Hoerr and asked if there was a room for rent; when Hoerr
said there was no room for rent, defendant left the premises. In moving for
a directed verdict, defense counsel argued that the State had to prove
intent in order to sustain a charge of residential burglary, and that the best
evidence of defendant's intent was what the defendant told Hoerr: that he
was looking for a room to rent. Similarly, in closing argument, defense
counsel again argued that the best indication of what defendant was
thinking when he entered the residence was what defendant told Hoerr
when he entered. Absent the stipulation, defendant had no explanation for
his presence at the residence and certainly risked the jury concluding,
based upon the testimony of Powell and Officer Thomas, that defendant's
entry was unauthorized. Although the stipulation contained Hoerr's
statement that defendant did not have Hoerr's permission to enter the
residence, the stipulation also allowed defense counsel to present evidence
that there was a reasonable and legitimate explanation for defendant's
entry into the premises. Under the circumstances, we find that defense
counsel's agreement to stipulate was a matter of sound trial tactics and
strategy.
	For the foregoing reasons, then, we hold that counsel in a criminal
case may waive his client's sixth amendment right of confrontation by
stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant does not
object to or dissent from his attorney's decision, and where the decision
to stipulate is a matter of legitimate trial tactics or prudent trial strategy.
Where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to
convict the defendant or where the State's entire case is to be presented
by stipulation, we find that a defendant must be personally admonished
about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation.
	The judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of
the circuit court, is therefore affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	I concur in the portion of the majority opinion holding that criminal
defense counsel may waive a client's right of confrontation by stipulating
to evidence when the defendant does not object and when the stipulation
constitutes legitimate trial tactics or strategy. I write separately on that
portion of the opinion only to emphasize the principle that, pursuant to our
decision, a defendant possesses the continuing right to object to or dissent
from counsel's decision to stipulate. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
439, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837, 869, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849 (1963) (choice to waive
made by counsel not participated in by petitioner does not automatically
bar relief to the petitioner), overruled in part on other grounds by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 608, 97
S Ct. 2497, 2507 (1977). Consequently, a defendant's knowing consent
to a stipulation should be found only when the defendant does not object
to or dissent from that decision. This contradicts the appellate court's
holding that a defendant need not knowingly consent to counsel's
stipulation of evidence. To uphold such a holding would improperly
deprive a defendant of the ability to object to or dissent from counsel's
stipulation. I write separately, in part, to reflect my firm belief that a
defendant's continued right to override counsel's decision to stipulate to
the admission of evidence must be unequivocally maintained.
	I also write separately because I do not believe defense counsel's
agreement to stipulate in this case can be considered "a matter of sound
trial tactics and strategy." See slip op. at 13. The majority opinion
concludes that the stipulation was part of defense counsel's trial strategy
because, in addition to showing that defendant entered the house without
permission, the statements also established his lack of criminal intent by
providing a reason for his entry. Slip op. at 13. While establishing these
facts may have been helpful in developing a defense to the charges, here
no defense was necessary because the State was unable to make a prima
facie case without Hoerr's stipulated statement.
	Both residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2000)) and
criminal trespass to a residence (720 ILCS 5/19-4 (West 2000)) require
the State to prove that defendant lacked authority to enter the house.
Without Hoerr's statement that he did not give defendant permission to
enter, the only evidence cited by the majority to show that defendant
lacked proper authorization is Powell's testimony that he and Hoerr
"decided to call the police because they were both leaving town that day
and knew it was easy to break into empty houses" and the investigating
officer's testimony that "he was called to check a report of a person that
had walked into a house and had left" and that, when questioned,
defendant could not provide the name of the person he was looking for in
the house. Slip op. at 12. This testimony is entirely consistent with Hoerr's
answering the door after several knocks and letting defendant into the
house, only to become concerned later about the events. The cited
testimony does not establish that Hoerr did not initially authorize defendant
to enter the house. Only Hoerr's statement, admitted by the inexplicable
stipulation of defense counsel, can serve that purpose.
	Without any evidence establishing the same element of both crimes,
defendant had no need to develop a further defense. Defense counsel's
stipulation only served to undermine defendant's case and provide the
State with the critical piece of proof it was missing. See slip op. at 12,
citing United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 233 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980).
Under these circumstances, admitting Hoerr's statement could not have
been part of any legitimate trial tactic or strategy. Thus, I respectfully
dissent from the portion of the opinion concluding that defense counsel's
stipulation was a matter of sound trial tactics or strategy.