Case Title: Oregon v. Kreis

Citation: 

Docket Number: S066329

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2019-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 62	
November 7, 2019	
659
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ERIC LAWRENCE KREIS,
Petitioner on Review.
(M-808542-2) (CA A157224) (SC S066329)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 6, 2019.
Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Ernest 
G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, 
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
WALTERS, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the Beaverton Municipal Court is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.
Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which 
Garrett, J., joined.
______________
	
*  On appeal from Beaverton Municipal Court, Les Rink, Judge. 294 Or App 
554, 432 P3d 245 (2018).
660	
State v. Kreis
Case Summary: Defendant, who was charged with interfering with a peace 
officer for refusing to obey a “lawful order” under ORS 162.247(1)(b), moved for a 
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the officer’s order, which directed defendant 
to turn around so that he could be handcuffed, was not a “lawful order” because it 
was issued in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial 
court denied defendant’s motion, a jury convicted defendant of interfering with a 
peace officer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: An order that effects a sei­
zure is not a “lawful order” for purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b) if it is issued in vio­
lation of Article I, section 9, and in this case, the officer’s order was issued in vio­
lation of Article I, section 9, because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was committing or about to commit a crime, and the officer’s safety 
concerns did not provide an independent constitutional justification for the order.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the 
Beaverton Municipal Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
661
	
WALTERS, C. J.
	
In this criminal case, an officer seized defendant 
without a constitutional basis for doing so, and, to effectuate 
that unconstitutional stop, ordered him to turn and be hand­
cuffed. Defendant refused and was convicted, under ORS 
162.247(1)(b), of interfering with a peace officer for refusing 
to obey a “lawful order.” For the reasons that follow, we con­
clude that the officer’s order was not a “lawful order” as that 
term is used in ORS 162.247(1)(b) and reverse defendant’s 
conviction.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
Because defendant was convicted of the offense of 
interfering with a peace officer, we state the facts that gave 
rise to that charge in the light most favorable to the state. 
See State v. Lupoli, 348 Or 346, 366, 234 P3d 117 (2010) (stat­
ing standard). Two officers, Crino and Mendez, were in their 
patrol car when they saw defendant in a restaurant park­
ing lot around midnight. The restaurant had been closed for 
about 20 minutes, and the parking lot, which provided park­
ing for the restaurant and a nearby golf course, had recently 
been the site of several thefts. Defendant was standing 
“near” one of the approximately five cars in the lot, and the 
officers suspected that defendant might be trying to break 
into that car or might be attempting to commit DUII. To 
investigate, Crino ran the car’s license plate and noted that 
defendant matched the description of the car’s registered 
owner. However, believing that the descriptions of registered 
owners are not always accurate, Crino remained unsure 
whether defendant owned the car. While Crino was running 
the car’s plates, Mendez, an officer-in-training, approached 
defendant and initiated a conversation. Defendant did not 
provide any information in response to Mendez’s questions; 
instead, he left the parking lot and walked toward a paved 
pathway leading to the back of the restaurant.
	
Crino and Mendez followed defendant and caught 
up with him as he stood on the restaurant’s back patio near 
the restaurant’s back door. Crino asked defendant for his 
name, whether the car that he had been standing near was 
his, and whether he was a restaurant employee. Defendant 
662	
State v. Kreis
did not respond, and when he took a few steps away from the 
officers, Crino informed him that he was not free to leave 
until the investigation was complete. Defendant responded 
that he did not “have to talk to” Crino and that he “was 
not answering any of [his] questions.” To Crino, defen­
dant appeared angry and exhibited signs of intoxication. 
Considering Mendez’s lack of experience, Crino called for 
assistance.
	
When two additional officers arrived, Crino explained 
to defendant that Crino needed to learn defendant’s iden­
tity, why he was at the restaurant, and whether he was a 
restaurant employee. Defendant’s brow furrowed, he balled 
his hands into fists, took a bladed stance, and began shift­
ing his weight back and forth. Crino noticed that defendant 
was looking at him and the other officers, while also look­
ing beyond them as if he were looking for an escape route. 
Crino told defendant that, if defendant did not provide the 
requested information, he would be arrested. In response, 
defendant stated through clenched teeth, “I am not going 
to be arrested.” At that point, Crino explained to defendant 
that he had concern for his safety and ordered defendant to 
turn around, face the building, and put his hands behind 
his back so that he could be handcuffed. Defendant refused. 
Crino gave the order a second time, again explaining to 
defendant that he was going to be handcuffed for safety 
reasons. Defendant said, “No,” and refused to turn around. 
Crino told defendant that he was under arrest “for inter­
fering.” Defendant physically resisted the officers’ attempts 
to subdue him, and the officers took him to the ground and 
handcuffed him.
	
The state charged defendant with interfering with 
a peace officer under ORS 162.247(1)(b) and with resisting 
arrest. The case went to trial before a jury. After the state 
presented its case, defendant moved for judgment of acquit­
tal on the interfering charge. Defendant argued that Crino 
did not have reasonable suspicion that defendant had com­
mitted, or was about to commit, a criminal offense, and con­
sequently, that neither his stop of defendant nor his order 
that defendant turn around to be handcuffed were lawful. 
The state responded with two arguments. First, it asserted 
that Crino had reasonable suspicion that defendant had 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
663
committed or was about to commit DUII, attempted DUII, 
or theft. Second, and alternatively, the state asserted that, 
even if Crino’s stop was not lawful, his order that defendant 
turn and be handcuffed was justified by reasonable officer-
safety concerns. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. 
The jury found defendant guilty on the interfering charge 
and acquitted defendant on the resisting charge, and the 
court entered judgment accordingly.1
	
Defendant appealed,2 assigning error to the trial 
court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. 
Defendant asserted that Crino had stopped him in viola­
tion of Article I, section 9, and that Crino’s subsequent order 
that defendant turn and be handcuffed also was unlawful. 
Defendant argued that, under this court’s decision in State 
v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524, 747 P2d 991 (1987), officer-safety 
concerns can justify an otherwise unconstitutional search 
or seizure only when effected during a “lawful encounter.”
	
The Court of Appeals disagreed, relying on its 
prior cases involving ORS 162.217(1)(b) and holding that, 
for purposes of that statute, the lawfulness of an encoun­
ter does not affect the lawfulness of a subsequent order. 
State v. Kreis, 294 Or App 554, 559, 432 P3d 245 (2018). 
The court acknowledged the tension between its cases and 
Bates, which involved a motion to supress evidence and not a 
conviction for interfering with a peace officer, but explained 
that, as presented, the court was not in a position to resolve 
that tension: Defendant had not argued that the Court of 
Appeals cases involving the interfering statute were irrec­
oncilable with Bates or that the Court of Appeals must over­
rule those cases. Id. at 561-62. Applying its rule from those 
cases, the court reasoned that the question before it was not 
	
1  The court’s judgment also required that defendant pay attorney fees for 
services provided in conjunction with both the interfering and resisting arrest 
charges. Defendant assigned error to that ruling, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. State v. Kreis, 294 Or App 554, 562-63, 432 P3d 245 (2018). We allowed 
review of that issue, but, because we reverse defendant’s conviction, we do not 
reach it.
	
2  Defendant appealed from a judgment entered by the Beaverton Municipal 
Court. Under ORS 138.035(1), “[a] defendant may take an appeal from * 
* 
* 
a municipal court * 
* 
* that has become a court of record * 
* 
* to the Court of 
Appeals[.]” 
664	
State v. Kreis
the lawfulness of the initial stop but of the subsequent order, 
and that, considered independently, orders issued to protect 
officer safety were lawful orders. Because defendant did not 
challenge the legitimacy of Crino’s officer-safety concerns, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. Defendant 
sought, and we allowed, review.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
In this court, defendant contends, as he did below, 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment 
of acquittal because Crino’s order that he turn and be hand­
cuffed was not a “lawful order,” as that term is used in ORS 
162.247(1)(b). That statute provides:
	
“(1)  A person commits the crime of interfering with a 
peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, 
knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole 
and probation officer * 
* 
*:
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(b)  Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer 
or parole and probation officer.”
The parties recognize that this court previously has inter­
preted the term “lawful order” and agree that the definition 
we provided frames the issue before us: A “lawful order” is 
an order that is “authorized by, and is not contrary to, sub­
stantive law.” See State v. Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 504, 85 P3d 
864 (2003) (so defining “lawful order” in statute proscrib­
ing refusal “to comply with a lawful order of the police to 
disperse”); see also State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228, 238, 142 
P3d 62 (2006) (reasoning that “lawful” in the interfering 
statute does not include an order that is “inconsistent with 
the substantive law”).
	
Drawing from that definition, defendant contends 
that an order that effects a seizure is authorized by, and 
not contrary to, substantive law only when issued in com­
pliance with Article  I, section 9. According to defendant, 
Crino did not have the reasonable suspicion constitutionally 
necessary to stop him, and Crino’s officer-safety concerns 
could not convert an otherwise unlawful order into a law­
ful one, because, according to defendant, the officer-safety 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
665
doctrine applies only during a lawful police encounter. The 
state responds that officers have broad authority to issue 
orders and that their orders are contrary to substantive 
law only when they direct a person to commit a crime or to 
refrain from statutorily or constitutionally protected activ­
ity. According to the state, Crino’s stop was justified by rea­
sonable suspicion, and, even if it was not, Crino’s subsequent 
order was lawful: Crino did not direct defendant to commit a 
crime or to refrain from constitutionally protected activity. 
Alternatively, the state argues that Crino’s order was inde­
pendently justified by his officer-safety concerns.
A.  Crino’s initial stop was not justified by reasonable 
suspicion.
	
As framed by the parties, the first question we must 
answer is whether Crino’s initial stop was justified by rea­
sonable suspicion of criminal activity. An officer has rea­
sonable suspicion when the officer “can point to specific and 
articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that 
the defendant committed or was about to commit a specific 
crime or type of crime.” State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 
163, 165, 389 P3d 1121 (2017). The officer must have a sub­
jective belief that the person stopped has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime, and that belief must be objectively 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. 
Belt, 325 Or 6, 11, 932 P2d 1177 (1977). An officer’s suspi­
cion must be particularized to the individual based on the 
individual’s own conduct. State v. Miglavs, 337 Or 1, 12-13, 
90 P3d 607 (2004). Reasonable suspicion requires less than 
probable cause but more than mere speculation. See State v. 
Holdorf, 355 Or 812, 822-23, 333 P3d 982 (2014) (articulat­
ing standard).
	
In this court, the state argues that Crino had rea­
sonable suspicion that defendant was committing criminal 
trespass, or had committed or was about to commit DUII 
or attempted DUII.3 Given that the state makes the former 
argument for the first time in this court, we discuss only the 
	
3  Below, the state also argued that Crino had reasonable suspicion that defen­
dant was committing or was about to commit theft. The state does not renew that 
argument here, and we do not address it.
666	
State v. Kreis
state’s latter argument.4 And, for the reasons that follow, 
we conclude that the facts in the record are insufficient to 
support a finding that Crino had an objectively reasonable 
belief that defendant had committed or was about to commit 
DUII or attempted DUII.5
	
A person “commits the offense of [DUII] if the per­
son drives a vehicle while the person: (a) [h]as a 0.08 percent 
or more [BAC] * 
* 
*; [or] (b) is under the influence of intox­
icating liquor.” ORS 813.010(1). To constitute an attempt, a 
person must “intentionally engage[ 
] in conduct which con­
stitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” 
ORS 161.405(1). There is evidence in the record that when 
Crino approached defendant, defendant exhibited signs of 
intoxication, and defendant does not dispute that Crino had 
a reasonable belief that defendant was intoxicated. Instead, 
defendant argues that the record does not indicate that 
defendant had taken a substantial step toward driving or 
was about to drive a vehicle.
	
The state argues that Crino had reasonable suspi­
cion that defendant was about to drive or had taken a sub­
stantial step toward driving, relying on the fact that Crino 
saw defendant standing “near” a car in the parking lot of 
a closed restaurant after midnight. The state adds that 
there was evidence that defendant matched the description 
of the car’s owner, that the parking lot was located a dis­
tance away from the road, and that there were few places 
within walking distance. Therefore, according to the state, 
Crino reasonably could conclude, based on his training and 
	
4  In the trial court, the state did not argue, in response to defendant’s motion 
for judgment of acquittal, that Crino had reasonable suspicion that defendant 
was committing or was about to commit criminal trespass. When certain condi­
tions are met, we can affirm a trial court’s decision on a basis not argued there. 
See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 
P3d 180 (2001) (articulating conditions necessary for argument that trial court 
was correct in its ruling, but for reason not advanced there). But, in this case, the 
state does not contend that those conditions are met or develop that argument, 
and we therefore decline to address it.
	
5  Neither party appears to argue that the evidence required to establish the 
lawfulness of the stop varies depending on whether Crino believed defendant had 
or was about to commit DUII or attempted DUII. At any rate, we conclude that 
the record is insufficient to establish that the stop was justified by reasonable 
suspicion of either DUII or attempted DUII. 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
667
experience, that defendant had taken a substantial step 
toward driving or was about to do so.
	
We disagree. Although “officers reasonably may 
draw inferences about human behavior from their training 
and experience,” Miglavs, 337 Or at 13, an officer’s “hunch” 
based on training and experience is, by itself, insufficient 
to form a basis for reasonable suspicion, see State v. Valdez, 
277 Or 621, 628, 561 P2d 1006 (1977) (“[I]nstinct and expe­
rience cannot * 
* 
* form the entire basis for ‘reasonable sus­
picion.’ 
”). An officer’s belief is objectively reasonable only if it 
is based on the individual’s own conduct. Miglavs, 337 Or at 
12. Here, Crino’s knowledge about defendant’s conduct was 
minimal: Although Crino testified that he saw defendant 
standing “near” a parked car, Crino did not know that the 
car belonged to defendant and did not see defendant at the 
door of the car or holding keys. That knowledge was insuf­
ficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that, at the time 
that defendant was standing “near” the car in the parking 
lot, defendant had taken a substantial step toward driving. 
It also was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion 
that, at the time that defendant stood at the back door of 
the restaurant, he was about to commit DUII. By that time, 
defendant had walked away from the parking lot where the 
car was located.6 Perhaps defendant intended to return to 
the parking lot and drive away while Crino watched, but, 
absent some indication that defendant was about to do so, 
Crino’s suspicion that defendant was about to commit DUII 
was not objectively reasonable. We conclude that Crino’s 
stop of defendant was not supported by reasonable suspi­
cion of attempted DUII or DUII, and we turn to the more 
difficult question of whether Crino’s order to effectuate that 
stop—his order that defendant turn and be handcuffed—
was, nevertheless, a “lawful order” under ORS 162.247(1)(b).
B.  Crino’s order was not a “lawful order.”
	
As discussed, under ORS 162.247(1)(b), a “lawful 
order” is an order that is authorized by, and is not contrary 
	
6  Crino testified that he had reasonable suspicion that a crime was “either 
occurring or about to occur with [defendant] lurking around the parking lot. Also, 
potentially going to drive out of the parking lot if that was indeed his vehicle.” 
668	
State v. Kreis
to, substantive law. No party argues that the legislature 
intended any other meaning of that term; thus, our inquiry 
is not one of statutory construction, but is one of substantive 
law: Was Crino’s order that defendant turn and be hand­
cuffed an order that was authorized by, and not contrary to, 
substantive law? To answer that question, a court must con­
sider the authority granted, and the restrictions imposed, 
by the substantive law, and that is now our task. In under­
taking it, we engage, as the legislature intended, in a judi­
cial analysis of the substantive law to determine whether 
Crino’s order was “lawful.”7
	
The state contends that officers have broad author­
ity to issue orders and that an order is contrary to substan­
tive law only if it directs a person to commit a crime or to 
refrain from statutorily or constitutionally protected activ­
ity. Crino’s order, the state argues, was not of that ilk: Crino 
did not direct defendant to commit a crime, and defendant 
had no statutory or constitutional right to ball his fists, take 
a bladed stance, and place Crino in apprehension of injury. 
Consequently, the state argues, Crino’s order was not con­
trary to substantive law. Alternatively, the state argues 
that Crino’s order was independently justified by his officer-
safety concerns.8
	
We agree with the state’s opening proposition that 
peace officers have broad authority to investigate crime and 
	
7  For that reason, we differ with the dissent in the importance of Court 
of Appeals cases decided prior to the amendment of ORS 162.247 in 1997 and 
the related legislative history. The legislature left the determination of what is 
authorized by, and not contrary to, substantive law to the courts, and the court 
is the final decision-maker on those state issues. Witnesses and legislators may 
have thought that officer safety was an important consideration in the enactment 
of the amendments to ORS 162.247, and we do not deny that it was, but the legis­
lature decided to permit prosecution only for refusing to obey orders that do not 
violate the substantive law, leaving that judicial determination to the courts.
	
8  The state also argues that when an order is “lawful by its terms,” it does 
not become unlawful merely because it is given during an unlawful seizure. The 
state argues that the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 162.247 demon­
strate that an order’s lawfulness does not turn on an encounter’s lawfulness. We 
do not address those arguments because, for purposes of this opinion, we accept 
them. Therefore, we agree with the dissent that, for purposes of ORS 162.247, 
a court must look at an order independently of the validity of the initial police 
confrontation. See State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 683, ___ P3d ___ (2019) (Balmer, J., 
dissenting).
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
669
protect the public.9 However, we disagree with the state’s 
argument that Crino’s order directing defendant to turn 
and be handcuffed was not contrary to substantive law. 
First, we reject the idea that an order is contrary to sub­
stantive law only when an officer directs a person to com­
mit a crime or refrain from protected activity. In Illig-Renn, 
we considered the constitutionality of the interfering stat­
ute, and we explained that the word “lawful” removes from 
the statute’s sweep “any refusal to follow an order that is 
inconsistent with the substantive law, including constitu­
tional provisions.” 341 Or at 238. The constitutional provi­
sions at issue in Illig-Renn were provisions guaranteeing 
the right of free expression and assembly. Id. However, as 
the state acknowledges, the same principle applies when an 
individual fails to follow an order that is inconsistent with 
other constitutional provisions, including the provision that 
protects the right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure. Accordingly, an order that is not consistent with 
Article I, section 9, or that is issued in violation of that pro­
vision, is not a “lawful order” for purposes of ORS 162.247
(1)(b).10
	
Second, when we analyze Crino’s order to turn and 
be handcuffed, we conclude that it is not consistent with 
Article I, section 9. In conducting that analysis, we consider 
the state’s two distinct arguments: (1) that, when considered 
independently, and without regard to the legality of Crino’s 
initial seizure, Crino’s order to turn and be handcuffed was 
“lawful by its terms” because it was not an order to refrain 
from constitutionally protected activity; and (2) that, even if 
that order was not “lawful by its terms,” it was constitution­
ally justified by the officer-safety doctrine.
	
9  For example, in addition to having authority to stop persons to investigate 
criminal activity and arrest persons upon probable cause, peace officers have 
authority to perform “any lawful acts that are inherent in the duty of the peace 
officer to serve and protect the public.” ORS 133.033(2).
	
10  We do not read the Court of Appeals cases cited by the dissent or the 
legislative history of ORS 162.247 as suggesting that the term “lawful order” 
means something different. See, e.g., State v Wilson, 283 Or App 823, 828, 390 
P3d 1114, rev den, 361 Or 801 (2017) (citing Ausmus for the proposition that an 
order is lawful if it is “authorized by, and is not contrary to, substantive law”); 
State v. Navickas, 271 Or App 447, 450, 351 P3d 801, rev den, 358 Or 248 (2015) 

(same).
670	
State v. Kreis
	
The state’s first argument, that Crino’s order was 
“lawful by its terms,” is an argument that does not rely on 
the officer-safety doctrine. It is an argument that defen­
dant did not have a “right” to engage in the conduct that 
he did, and therefore, that Crino’s order was lawful. The 
problem with that argument is that Article I, section 9, 
limits the actions of law enforcement; it does not proscribe 
or prohibit the actions of the public. Article I, section 9, 
grants Oregonians a right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and an officer violates that right if 
the officer seizes an individual without constitutional jus­
tification. Holdorf, 355 Or at 823-24. When an officer seizes 
an individual, we do not examine whether the individual 
had the “right” to engage in particular activity; instead, 
we examine whether the officer had a constitutional jus­
tification for the seizure. When an officer has reasonable 
suspicion that a person has engaged or is about to engage 
in activity that constitutes a crime, an officer may seize 
that person to investigate further, not because the per­
son does not have a “right” to engage in that activity, but 
because the officer’s interference with that individual’s lib­
erty interest is constitutionally justified. Here, the state 
contends that Crino’s order that defendant turn and be 
handcuffed did not violate substantive law because defen­
dant had no “right” to ball his fists, take a bladed stance, 
or place Crino in apprehension of injury; the state does 
not contend that Crino issued that order because Crino 
had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated or 
was about to violate Oregon law. The state does not con­
tend, for instance, that when defendant balled his fists, 
took a bladed stance, and placed Crino in apprehension 
of injury, Crino had reasonable suspicion that defendant’s 
conduct amounted to disorderly conduct (ORS 166.025), 
menacing (ORS 163.190), or harassment (ORS 166.065).11 
If Crino had had reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
about to commit those or other crimes, then we would 
	
11  Defendant does not seem to dispute that, if we were to hold that the officer-
safety doctrine provided constitutional justification for Crino’s order, then the 
requirements of that doctrine would be met—that Crino in fact had reasonable 
officer-safety concerns. We do not hold that such concerns could not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; we note only that the state does not so 
argue here. 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
671
agree that Crino’s seizure would have been constitution­
ally justified and “lawful” for purposes of ORS 162.247
(1)(b).12 But we do not agree with the state that Crino’s 
order was “lawful by its terms” because defendant had no 
“right” to engage in the conduct that he did. An order is 
also not “contrary to substantive law” only when it is an 
order to refrain from constitutionally protected activity. 
An order is also contrary to substantive law when it inter­
feres with an individual’s liberty interest to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Here, defendant had 
a liberty interest with which Crino could not interfere 
absent constitutional justification.
	
We therefore proceed to the state’s alternative argu­
ment that Crino’s officer-safety concerns provided the con­
stitutional justification for his order. We begin our analysis 
by recognizing that reasonable officer-safety concerns can, 
indeed, justify an otherwise unconstitutional search or sei­
zure. Bates, 304 Or at 524. In Bates, officers had lawfully 
stopped the defendant for a traffic violation, and, after they 
noticed a bag underneath his feet, they grew concerned that 
the defendant posed a threat to their safety. Id. at 521-22. 
When the officers asked the defendant to pull the bag into 
sight, he reached down and put his hand near the bag but 
would not pull it into view. Id. Concerned for their safety, 
the officers ordered the defendant out of the car and subse­
quently searched him and the bag, discovering evidence of 
criminal activity. Id. Although we did not uphold the offi­
cers’ actions in that case, we did explain that Article I, sec­
tion 9, permits officers to take reasonable steps to protect 
their safety and the safety of others during the course of 
lawful encounters:
	
12  We note, however, that when the issue is not the lawfulness of a police 
order under ORS 162.247(1)(b), but, instead, whether an unconstitutional act 
requires suppression of evidence, the analysis may be different. This case does 
not involve a question of whether evidence should be suppressed following Crino’s 
unconstitutional stop, thus, the state does not need to show that Crino’s order 
was not “tainted” by that stop. See State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 88-91, 333 P3d 1009 
(2014) (when determining whether evidence must be suppressed because it was 
obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the state must show 
that the evidence was not “tainted” by that violation). As we explain, we differ 
with the state as to whether the officer’s order was “lawful by its terms.” Under 
Article I, section 9, an order that constitutes a seizure is “lawful by its terms” 
only if it is constitutionally justified. 
672	
State v. Kreis
“Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution does not 
forbid an officer to take reasonable steps to protect [him-or-
herself] or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter 
with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, 
based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen 
might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury 
to the officer or others then present.”
Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
	
Since Bates, we have continued to uphold searches 
and seizures that have occurred during investigatory stops 
but without reasonable suspicion that those who were 
seized had committed or were about to commit a crime. For 
instance, in State v. Morgan, 348 Or 283, 285, 230 P3d 928 
(2010), officers stopped a car based on reasonable suspicion 
of the driver’s criminal activity, but searched the defendant, 
a passenger, based on safety concerns. And, in Miglavs, 337 
Or at 3, officers were investigating a curfew violation by 
the defendant’s acquaintance but conducted a pat down 
of the defendant for safety reasons. We also have applied 
Bates to justify searches and seizures occurring while offi­
cers were engaged in other activities. For example, in State 
v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9, 45 P3d 109 (2002), the officer-safety 
doctrine applied to a search of the defendant’s room con­
ducted incident to the arrest of another tenant. In State 
v. Foster, 347 Or 1, 3, 217 P3d 168 (2009), we upheld an 
officer’s entry onto the defendant’s property while serving a 
restraining order. And, most recently, in State v. Madden, 
363 Or 703, 705, 427 P3d 157 (2018), we held that a sei­
zure of an individual without reasonable suspicion could 
be justified under the officer-safety doctrine if the purpose 
is to safely execute a search warrant and the seizure is a 
reasonable response to an officer’s safety concerns. In each 
of those cases, the searches or seizures at issue were con­
stitutionally justified by officer-safety concerns alone; the 
officers did not have another constitutional basis for their 

actions.13
	
13  Thus, to the extent that defendant argues that an order that effects a sei­
zure can only be a lawful order when the officer has reasonable suspicion that 
the individual seized is engaged in criminal activity, defendant is incorrect. At 
least to effectuate other lawful activity, officer-safety concerns can supply that 
justification.
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
673
	
Defendant argues, however, that there is a limit to 
the justification that the officer-safety doctrine can provide: 
As articulated in Bates, the officer-safety doctrine applies 
only “during the course of a lawful encounter.” 304 Or at 
524. In defendant’s view, the officer-safety doctrine does not 
provide a constitutional basis for a search or seizure when 
an officer is not engaged in lawful activity, and officer-safety 
concerns cannot turn an otherwise unlawful order into a 
“lawful order” for purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b).
	
The state responds that Bates describes only one 
of many circumstances in which officer-safety concerns can 
justify police action and points us to State v. Guggenmos, 
350 Or 243, 253 P3d 1042 (2011), for a broader statement of 
the officer-safety doctrine. The principle that emerges from 
that case, the state contends, is that if officers are engaged 
in good-faith police work in a place they are entitled to be, 
they may issue “lawful orders” to protect themselves.
	
In Guggenmos, officers went to a residence to conduct 
a “knock and talk” and learn if residents with outstanding 
warrants were present. Id. at 246. The officers were invited 
inside and given permission to search. Id. During the 
search, and contrary to one resident’s statement concerning 
the number of people in the house, an officer, Mogle, saw two 
men—one of whom was the defendant—run down the stairs 
toward a back door. Id. Mogle ran after the men and yelled 
at them to stop, but the men did not heed Mogle’s command. 
Id. After an officer, who was waiting outside, stopped the 
men, Mogle went back inside to “clear” the house to make 
sure there were not any other persons present. Id. at 246-47. 
During that search, Mogle discovered drugs sitting in plain 
view in the defendant’s bedroom. Id. at 248.
	
This court ultimately determined that the officers 
did not have reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat 
to their safety sufficient to justify the search. Id. at 260. 
On the way to that conclusion, however, we explained that 
a protective sweep, though not its own exception to the war­
rant requirement, may be justified under the “court’s stan­
dards for an officer safety search.” Id. at 251. In response to 
the defendant’s argument that the protective sweep was not 
permissible because it was not made incident to an arrest, 
674	
State v. Kreis
we explained that the defendant read the cases on which he 
relied too narrowly:
“Bates confirmed that the necessity of taking protective 
measures can arise ‘during the course of a lawful encoun­
ter with a citizen * 
* 
*.’ [State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9, 45 P3d 
109 (2002)], stated that the officer-safety justification 
applies to the actions of police officers responding to an 
immediate threat when they are in a place where they are 
entitled to be. But, as Bates and Cocke indicated, an officer’s 
lawful encounter with a citizen may give rise to a reason­
able suspicion that the citizen poses an immediate threat 
of serious physical injury to the officer or others regardless 
of whether the officer is conducting an arrest. That kind of 
encounter may occur when the police are lawfully present 
in a private residence or an occupied building, even if they 
have no intention of arresting anyone.”
Id. at 254 (emphases added; omission in original).
	
The state reads that passage from Guggenmos to 
identify two circumstances in which officers are authorized 
to take reasonable officer-safety precautions under Bates: 

(1) during lawful encounters with citizens when there is a 
reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to safety; and 
(2) when officers are in a place “where they are entitled to 
be” and are “responding to an immediate threat.” The state 
contends that the second circumstance encompasses situ­
ations “when an initial encounter might straddle the line 
between a lawful and unlawful seizure.” The second circum­
stance, the state asserts, deserves protection under Bates, 
as the purpose of the officer-safety doctrine is to allow offi­
cers to take reasonable precautions to minimize risks that 
could arise during all encounters with citizens.
	
We do not read Guggenmos as an intentional expan­
sion of the officer-safety doctrine. Immediately after its ini­
tial description of the officers in Cocke as being where they 
were entitled to be, the court, in Guggenmos, describes those 
officers as being engaged in a “lawful encounter.” 350 Or 
at 254. In all of the cases in which we have applied Bates, 
we have noted or assumed that the officers were engaged 
in lawful police activity when their safety concerns arose, 
and we do not understand Guggenmos as a deliberate 
departure from the officer-safety doctrine as articulated in 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
675
Bates.14 That does not mean, however, that we are foreclosed 
from extending the officer-safety doctrine beyond the cir­
cumstances described in Bates and concluding, as the state 
urges, that all reasonable orders issued to protect officer 
safety are constitutionally justified.
	
The state argues that the purpose of the officer-
safety doctrine is to keep officers safe during all encoun­
ters, and that that purpose is served if it permits officers to 
take reasonable safety precautions against all threats that 
arise, including those that arise during encounters later 
determined to be unlawful. The state asks that we interpret 
Article I, section 9, to permit reasonable orders to protect 
officer safety even when issued to effectuate an unlawful 
stop.
	
14  We also do not read the other cases cited by the state as extending the 
officer-safety doctrine beyond lawful encounters. In Miglavs, the lawfulness of the 
encounter between the officer and defendant’s acquaintance was not specifically 
at issue; however, the officer engaged the defendant and his acquaintance for the 
same reason, which was to investigate curfew violations. This court explained 
that the lawfulness of the encounter determined whether Bates applied, and that 
the defendant conceded that his encounter with the officer was lawful. Miglavs, 
337 Or at 12 (noting that the defendant “concedes that [the officer] was engaged 
in a lawful contact with [the] defendant”). 
	
The state cites our recent decision in Madden as “observing the likelihood, 
but not deciding, that [the] initial seizure [of the defendant] was lawful before 
applying the officer-safety rule.” See Madden, 363 Or at 724 n 16 (noting that the 
detective who seized defendant for safety reasons also suspected that defendant 
was engaged in criminal activity). Although it is true this court did not analyze 
whether the detective in Madden could have seized the defendant based on rea­
sonable suspicion of criminal activity, we did not need to because the officer was 
engaged in other lawful police activity—the execution of a search warrant at a 
house where the defendant happened to be sitting in the driveway. 
	
The same is true of Foster. In Foster, the officers were engaged in serving a 
restraining order, and one of the officers went beyond the front door of the res­
idence to a side window and looked inside. 347 Or at 4. The state contends that 
Foster observed the possibility, but did not decide, that the “initial entry onto cur­
tilage was not fully justified by existing privileges before applying [the] officer-
safety rule.” See id. at 9 n 5 (noting that, in addition to the privilege of implied 
consent to go to the front door, the privilege to execute civil process, coupled with 
the sheriff’s duty under Oregon law to serve court orders, could have applied 
to the situation, though it would not necessarily “permit the server to roam at 
will across the property”). As in Madden, this court did not need to analyze 
whether a privilege permitted the officer to take a position beneath the window 
on the defendant’s property before determining whether the officer-safety doc­
trine applied; the lawful activity—which was not challenged in that case—was 
serving a restraining order. The question was whether the officer-safety doctrine 
permitted police action—positioning beneath a window—taken to effectuate that 
activity. 
676	
State v. Kreis
	
We recognize that police officers work in dangerous 
settings and encounter daily threats that may require offi­
cers to take safety precautions that we are not entitled to 
uncharitably second-guess. Bates, 304 Or at 524. But we do 
not agree that those dangers provide an independent consti­
tutional justification for all orders issued to counter them. 
It is important to remain cognizant that Article I, section 9, 
grants the people a “liberty interest to be free from unrea­
sonable searches and seizures.” Holdorf, 355 Or at 822-23. 
Officers are precluded from arresting an individual unless 
they have a warrant, the restraint is justified by an excep­
tion to the warrant requirement, or, for investigatory stops 
that fall short of an arrest, the stop is justified by reason­
able suspicion that an individual has committed or is about 
to commit a crime. See State v. Fair, 353 Or 588, 608-09, 302 
P3d 417 (2013) (an arrest based on probable cause requires 
warrant or exception to warrant requirement, and “tempo­
rary detention of criminal suspects” requires reasonable 
suspicion). The officer-safety doctrine is not a general excep­
tion to the warrant requirement; it is a rule of necessity 
that enables officers to take reasonable measures to carry 
out lawful police activity. See Bates, 304 Or at 524 (“The 
officer should be permitted to take every reasonable pre­
caution to safeguard his life in the process of making the 
arrest.” (Internal citation and quotation omitted.)); see also 
ORS 131.615(5) (when making a stop, an officer “may use 
the degree of force reasonably necessary to make the stop 
and ensure the safety of the peace officer”).
	
When officers have reasonable suspicion of crim­
inal activity, they may temporarily seize an individual to 
conduct further investigation and issue orders reasonably 
necessary to do so, including orders reasonably necessary to 
protect their safety.15 See, e.g., Bates, 304 Or at 524 (permit­
ting officers to take safety precautions during lawful stop). 
	
15  In this case we do not decide whether an officer’s safety concerns could 
justify a seizure if those concerns arose during the course of a noncoercive con­
versation. Although not raised here, it is important to remember that, even if 
permitted, action taken to protect officer safety must be a reasonably necessary 
response to the perceived threat. See State v. Foster, 347 Or 1, 12, 217 P3d 168 
(2009) (“The [officer-safety] doctrine generally requires that an officer’s response 
to officer safety concerns be reasonable in light of the specifically articulated and 
reasonably perceived circumstances.”). 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
677
But, when, as here, an officer has made an initial, unlawful 
seizure, and there is no independent constitutional justifica­
tion for further restraint, the officer-safety doctrine does not 
permit the officer to impose continued, and even more strin­
gent, restraint to effectuate that unlawful seizure.16 If we 
were to conclude that the officer-safety doctrine grants such 
authority, we would be expanding the doctrine beyond its 
purpose and diminishing the rights guaranteed by Article I, 
section 9. We are unwilling to do so.
	
In reaching that conclusion, we understand that 
there may be circumstances in which officers are not certain 
that an encounter is lawful; an encounter may, as the state 
suggests, “straddle the line.” For instance, an officer may 
not be certain that an order to stop is justified by reason­
able suspicion or that an order to disperse is issued in accor­
dance with the guarantees of free speech and assembly. 
That uncertainty is understandable, but it is not material 
for purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b). As we explained in Illig-
Renn, by including the word “lawful” in that statute, the 
legislature “remov[ed] from the statute’s sweep any refusal 
to follow an order that is inconsistent with the substantive 
law, including constitutional provisions.” 341 Or at 238. If 
an officer issues an order that is inconsistent with Article I, 
section 9, an individual who refuses to obey that order does 
not violate ORS 162.247(1)(b).
	
In summary, ORS 162.247(1)(b) makes it a crime 
for an individual to disobey a “lawful order.” An order that 
restrains an individual’s liberty in violation of Article I, sec­
tion 9, is not a “lawful order” for purposes of that statute. In 
this case, because Crino did not have reasonable suspicion 
	
16  Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we do not overturn the principle that, 
for purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b), the lawfulness of an order is to be judged inde­
pendently of the validity of the initial police confrontation. We hold only that 
when there is no constitutional justification for an initial seizure, such as reason­
able suspicion of criminal activity, and an officer is unconstitutionally restrain­
ing an individual without an independent constitutional basis for doing so, the 
officer-safety doctrine and Article I, section 9, do not permit the officer to impose 
continued, even more stringent, restraint to effectuate the seizure. We do not 
arrive at that conclusion to provide a “remedy” for the initial constitutional vio­
lation, or to deter police misconduct. We arrive at that conclusion because, in our 
view, Article I, section 9, does not permit that continued, more stringent, inter­
ference with an individual’s liberty interest. 
678	
State v. Kreis
that defendant had committed or was about to commit 
DUII or attempted DUII, his seizure of defendant violated 
Article I, section 9. Crino’s subsequent order that defendant 
turn and be handcuffed also was not constitutionally justi­
fied and was therefore inconsistent with that constitutional 
provision. We therefore conclude that Crino’s order was not 
a “lawful order” for purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b), and that 
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judg­
ment of acquittal.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the Beaverton Municipal Court is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceed­
ings consistent with this opinion.
	
BALMER, J., dissenting.
	
For more than thirty-five years, Court of Appeals 
caselaw has held that “the lawfulness of an order based on 
officer safety is to be judged independently of the validity of 
the initial police-citizen confrontation.” State v. Kreis, 294 
Or App 554, 559, 432 P3d 245 (2018) (citing cases). That rule 
requires citizens to follow police orders that are based on 
a reasonable, fact-based concern for the safety of police or 

others—even if a court later determines that the police 
lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the person at the time 
of the initial citizen contact. The salutary effect of the rule is 
to help de-escalate police-citizen confrontations; protect offi­
cer and public safety; and allow police to perform community 
care-taking functions, control crowds at public events when 
behavior turns dangerous, and investigate often ambiguous 
domestic violence situations.
	
The majority today states that it agrees that “the 
lawfulness of an order is to be judged independently of the 
validity of the initial police confrontation.” 365 Or at 676 
n 15. However, the majority holds—contrary to those cases 
with which it purports to agree—that “when there is no con­
stitutional justification for an initial seizure, such as rea­
sonable suspicion of criminal activity, and an officer [seizes] 
an individual without an independent constitutional basis 
for doing so, the officer-safety doctrine and Article I, sec­
tion 9, do not permit the officer to impose continued, even 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
679
more stringent, restraint to effectuate the seizure.”1 Id. In so 
holding, the majority today muddies the standards required 
of police officers under Article I, section 9. Because, in my 
view, the majority’s holding is not required by our cases or 
by any reasonable interpretation of ORS 162.247(1)(b), and 
is not necessary to protect a defendant’s Article I, section 9, 
rights, I respectfully dissent.
	
I first outline the Court of Appeals caselaw with 
which the majority theoretically agrees but with which its 
ultimate holding conflicts. Then, because this case turns—
or should turn—on the interpretation of ORS 162.247(1)(b), 
I consider the text and legislative history of that statute 
which, in my view, supports the result below. Finally, I dis­
cuss the Article I, section 9, overlay that appears to drive 
the majority’s decision and explain why the majority errs in 
its holding today.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CASES 
FROM GAFFNEY TO KREIS
	
The Court of Appeals decisions are persuasive in 
their own right and also are important because that court’s 
binding interpretation of the term “lawful order” when the 
interference statute was amended in 1997 tells us how the 
legislature understood the term at that time—and what 
they intended the term to mean in ORS 162.247(1)(b).
	
The Court of Appeals first encountered a related 
issue in State v. Gaffney, 36 Or App 105, 583 P2d 582 (1978), 
rev den, 285 Or 195 (1979), where the trial court had dis­
missed harassment and criminal mischief charges against 
the defendant for fighting with police and damaging a police 
car after he disobeyed police orders to stop and officers 
attempted to pat him down for weapons. The trial court had 
	
1  A “seizure” for purposes of Article I, section 9, occurs “when either (1) a 
police officer intentionally and significantly interferes with the person’s freedom 
of movement; or (2) the person believes, in an objectively reasonable manner, that 
his or her liberty of movement has been so restricted.” State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 
347 Or 610, 621-22, 227 P3d 695 (2010). A “stop” is “a temporary restraint of a 
person’s liberty for the purpose of criminal investigation,” and qualifies as a “sei­
zure” under Article I, section 9. Id. at 620. I use the terms “stop” and “seizure” 
interchangeably in this opinion. The majority describes the police interaction 
with defendant, prior to the officer-safety-based order at issue here, as a “sei­
zure.” 365 Or at 677. I agree with that characterization. 
680	
State v. Kreis
held that, because the police lacked probable cause for the 
initial stop, Article I, section 9, required the suppression of 
evidence of all actions by the defendant following the stop, 
including evidence that would support his prosecution for 
crimes against the officers. The Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that, although the exclusionary rule would prohibit 
the use of evidence obtained based on the unlawful stop,
“[t]he purposes underlying the exclusionary rule would not 
be well served by the exclusion of evidence of independent 
crimes directed at officers who illegally stop, frisk, arrest 
or search. Moreover, the results of such an extension of the 
exclusionary rule would be intolerable. A person who cor­
rectly felt that he had been illegally stopped, for example, 
could respond with unlimited violence and under an exclu­
sionary rule be immunized from criminal responsibility for 
any action taken after the stop. That cannot be an appro­
priate rule.”
36 Or App at 108-09 (citing cases from Illinois, North 
Carolina, and New York).2
	
The Court of Appeals applied that rule in numerous 
later cases, including State v. Rodinsky, 60 Or App 193, 653 
P2d 551 (1982), where the defendant, who was the subject 
of a traffic stop, disobeyed a police order to remain in her 
car (and 12 requests to return to her car, after she left it 
and approached the police car) and was loud and abusive 
towards police. She was charged with failing to obey a police 
officer under former ORS 487.100(1) (1981), which made it an 
offense to “fail[ 
] to comply with any lawful order, signal or 
direction of a police officer * 
* 
*.” The Court of Appeals held 
that, even if the traffic stop was unlawful (as the defendant 
had argued), “that did not immunize her from the conse­
quences of her subsequent conduct and did not deprive the 
officer of the authority to respond to those actions by appro­
priate orders.” 60 Or App at 196.
	
As I discuss in greater detail below, the statute mak­
ing it an offense to interfere with a peace officer by refusing 
	
2  I do not necessarily agree with everything that the Court of Appeals said 
in Gaffney, in part because it relied on “stop and frisk” statutes no longer on the 
books. I quote it because it is the basis for the Court of Appeals’ more recent cases 
on this issue and because it contains some seeds of wisdom. 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
681
to obey a “lawful order of [a] peace officer,” ORS 162.247(1)(b), 
has been amended a number of times, but the critical term 
“lawful order” was also in the version of the statute applied 
in Rodinsky and in all subsequent versions. And the Court of 
Appeals has continued to apply its earlier caselaw. In State 
v. Neill, 216 Or App 499, 173 P3d 1262 (2007), rev den, 344 
Or 671 (2008), the defendant was charged under that stat­
ute when police were sent to a scene of domestic violence fol­
lowing a 9-1-1 call and found a bloody victim, damaged prop­
erty, and other evidence of fighting. Although the blood and 
damaged property suggested that a crime had recently been 
committed, the defendant asserted there was no valid basis 
for the police to enter her apartment and that all evidence 
resulting from that unlawful entry should be suppressed, 
including evidence that she had refused to obey multiple 
officer orders, several of which were based on officer-safety 
concerns. The Court of Appeals extended earlier decisions 
such as Gaffney, which had involved crimes against police 
officers following an unlawful search or seizure, to situa­
tions where the defendant had threatened officer safety. 
Neill, 216 Or App at 507. Because the defendant’s conduct 
“reasonably led the officers to be concerned that defendant 
posed a legitimate threat to their safety and their ability to 
maintain control of a potentially dangerous situation,” the 
defendant was required to obey their reasonable orders:
“That the police may have acted unlawfully in initiating 
the search did not free defendant to interfere with reason­
able directions by the police designed to reduce the risk 
of violence and maintain safety once the search had com­
menced. As in Gaffney and its progeny, to hold otherwise 
would be intolerable and would not serve to advance the 
purposes underlying the exclusionary rule.”
Id. at 508.
	
Moreover, and directly relevant to this case, the 
court in Neill also rejected the defendant’s argument that 
her motion for judgment of acquittal should have been 
granted because the officer’s order was not “lawful” under 
ORS 162.247(1)(b). Id. at 508-09. The court reasoned that 
the same rationale for admitting evidence of the defendant’s 
failure to comply with reasonable officer-safety-based orders 
indicated that those orders were lawful: “The lawfulness 
682	
State v. Kreis
of the order disobeyed is to be judged independently of the 
validity of the initial police-citizen confrontation.” Id. at 509 
(quoting Rodinsky, 60 Or App at 196). The court also noted 
that “the order itself cannot be said to be unlawful for the 
purpose of precluding prosecution for failure to obey it.” 
Neill, 216 Or App at 508.
	
Another variation on the same theme was State 
v. Bistrika, 261 Or App 710, 322 P3d 583, rev den, 356 Or 
397 (2014), cert den, ___ US ___ (2015), where police officers 
had lawfully entered private property to provide emergency 
aid under ORS 133.033, but the emergency had dissipated, 
and the officers no longer had a lawful basis to remain on 
the property. Id. at 714. The court thus assumed that the 
officers were in violation of defendant’s Article I, section 9, 
rights when they gave orders to defendant and other family 
members in response to reasonable threats to the officers’ 
safety. Id. at 714-16. But the court nevertheless held that the 
trial court correctly had denied defendant’s motion for judg­
ment of acquittal on the charge of interfering with a peace 
officer: Even if the defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights had 
been violated, whether the order was a “lawful order” for 
purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b) was a separate question, and 
“the deputies’ orders were ‘reasonable in light of [the threat 
to officer safety], and defendant’s refusal to obey the orders 
added to the threat.’ 
” Id. at 718 (quoting Neill, 216 Or App at 
508).3
	
The Court of Appeals reviewed those cases again in 
State v. Wilson, 283 Or App 823, 828, 390 P3d 1114 (2017), 
and addressed further arguments about the “lawfulness” of 
officer-safety-based orders:
	
“ 
‘An order is “lawful” if it is authorized by, and is not 
contrary to, substantive law.’ State v. Navickas, 271 Or 
App 447, 450, 351 P3d 801, rev den, 358 Or 248 (2015) (cit­
ing State v. Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 504, 85 P3d 864 (2004)). 
‘When examining whether an order is “lawful,” * 
* 
* we 
look at whether the order at issue was lawful on its face.’ 
Id. at 451. Of critical importance here, ‘the “lawfulness of 
the order disobeyed is to be judged independently of the 
	
3  The court ultimately reversed and remanded the interfering convictions on 
the separate ground of instructional error. Bistrika, 261 Or App at 730.
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
683
validity of the initial police-citizen confrontation.” 
’ [cita­
tion omitted].”
	
That line of Court of Appeals decisions shows a 
careful distinction between the lawfulness of an initial 
stop or search and the lawfulness of a later police directive 
or order that is motivated by officer or public safety. And 
that distinction makes perfect sense, for reasons the Court 
of Appeals has explained repeatedly since Gaffney. The 
unlawful search or seizure of a citizen or unlawful entry 
into a home violates the citizen’s (or noncitizen’s) right under 
Article I, section 9, to be free from unreasonable searches 
or seizures. To redress such constitutional violations, and 
to deter police conduct that violates those rights, we sup­
press evidence obtained from such searches, unless it comes 
within some exception to the warrant requirement. But once 
a search or seizure has occurred—whether it is later judged 
to be lawful or unlawful—the safety of law enforcement 
personnel, potential victims, bystanders, and defendants 
requires that those in the vicinity follow reasonable officer 
orders based on the officers’ reasonable concerns for their 
safety or the safety of others. The majority’s approach chips 
away at that longstanding aspect of Oregon law.
THE MEANING OF “LAWFUL ORDER” 
IN THE INTERFERENCE STATUTE
	
The Court of Appeals cases are consistent with the 
text of ORS 162.247(1)(b), which provides that a person com­
mits the offense of interfering with a peace officer, when, 
“knowing that another person is a peace officer,” he or she 
“[r]efuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer.” Nothing 
in that text suggests that an order is “lawful” for purposes of 
the offense of interfering with a peace officer only if the ini­
tial seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause. The question the statute asks is whether the order 
was lawful, not whether the initial encounter was lawful, 
not lawful, or somewhere in the ambiguous area between 
the two that we see, for example, in this case or in respond­
ing to a domestic disturbance 9-1-1 call, as in Neill.4 The 
	
4  Here, of course, as the majority notes, defendant does not dispute the rea­
sonableness of the officer-safety concerns, or the reasonableness of the order as a 
response to those concerns. 365 Or at 663-64.
684	
State v. Kreis
statute itself thus does not state or imply that the lawful­
ness of the initial seizure or search has any bearing on the 
lawfulness of a later police order based on later conduct of 
the defendant. The legislature knows how to write statutes 
that do turn on whether the initial stop was lawful. See ORS 
807.570(1)(b)(A) (requiring person to obey officer request if 
the person is “lawfully stopped or detained”). ORS 162.247
(1)(b) is not such a statute.
	
The Court of Appeals cases are also relevant because 
they inform our understanding of what the legislature 
intended when it adopted the current version of the interfer­
ing with a police officer statute. That statute was amended 
in 1997 because other laws prohibited resisting arrest, but 
did not prevent interference with police-citizen encounters 
short of arrest. See Tape Recording, Senate Committee on 
Crimes and Corrections, SB 423, Feb 19, 1997, Tape 13, Side A
(comments of Rep Floyd Prozanski). When one police officer 
testified, in response to a question about how he understood 
the term “lawful order,” he gave as an example of an inter­
action short of arrest,
“a traffic stop where you might be performing field-sobriety 
tests and somebody who’s in the car is getting out and com­
ing back or wanting to become involved. * 
* 
* [T]here’s noth­
ing legally that they’re doing wrong other than I might be 
able to detain them on an officer-safety basis because that’s 
a threat to my ability to do my job. * 
* 
* But with this law, 
if that person did cross the line and didn’t listen to rea­
son, didn’t listen to commands to get back into the vehicle, 
[he could warn the person that he was about to violate the 
interference law.]”
Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Law, SB 423, June 5, 1997, Tape 140, 
Side A (statement of Albany Police Officer Eric Carter). 
Neither Carter, nor any other witness, nor any member of 
the subcommittee, suggested that the lawfulness of an offi­
cer’s order would turn on whether the initial stop was valid 
or not.5
	
5  The legislative history is replete with comments by witnesses and legisla­
tors as to the importance to officer safety of a statute penalizing the refusal to 
obey orders based on that concern. See Tape Recording, Senate Committee on 
Crimes and Corrections, SB 423, Feb 19, 1997, Tape 13, Side A; Tape 14, Side A 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
685
	
As significant, at the time the 1997 amendments 
were being considered, the Court of Appeals had several 
decades of cases, discussed above, holding that whether an 
officer’s order was “lawful” was a question independent of 
whether the initial stop was justified. The court had con­
sistently held that if an order made after the initial stop 
or search was justified by the individual’s conduct after the 
stop or after the entry into the home—such as a potential 
threat to an officer or others—that was a “lawful order,” 
whether the initial stop or entry was lawful or not. That 
definitive caselaw as to the meaning of a “lawful order” 
in the statute prohibiting interfering with a peace officer 
by refusing to obey such an order was a vital part of the 
statutory context of the 1997 amendments to ORS 162.247
(1)(b). A.G. v. Guitron, 351 Or 465, 471, 268 P3d 589 (2011) 
(explaining that “existing case law forms a part of a statute’s 
context” and that this court’s analysis begins “with a review 
of the law as it existed” at the time a statute was enacted). 
It strongly suggests that the legislature understood those 
kinds of orders to be “lawful” and intended the refusal to 
obey them to be prohibited by ORS 162.247(1)(b).
THE OFFICER-SAFETY-BASED ORDER HERE 
WAS A “LAWFUL ORDER”
	
Rather than probe the text and legislative history 
of the interference statute, or explain why it departs from 
the Court of Appeals’ cases, the majority relies instead on 
State v. Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 503-04, 85 P3d 864 (2003), 
where we discussed the term “lawful order” in a different 
statute, and State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228, 338, 142 P3d 
62 (2006), where we rejected a facial challenge to the inter­
ference statute on the ground that it was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad.
	
The actual holdings in those cases, as opposed to 
the dicta, are not particularly relevant to the majority’s 
argument. In Ausmus, a unanimous court had little trouble 
(comments of Rep Floyd Prozanski). The state argues that the legislative history 
demonstrates that the statute also was intended to require compliance with other 
types of police orders, even if they are not justified by a reasonable officer-safety 
concern. I express no view regarding that argument because it is not necessary 
to the resolution of this case.
686	
State v. Kreis
holding unconstitutional on its face a statute that made 
it a crime to “congregate[ 
] with other persons in a public 
place” and to “refuse[ 
] to comply with a lawful order of the 
police to disperse,” if the persons had congregated “with 
intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof.” Former ORS 166.025
(1)(e) (2001). The court found that the statute was uncon­
stitutionally overbroad and vague because at least some of 
the conduct it prohibited was protected by free speech and 
assembly rights, and the court could find no way to narrowly 
construe the statute to make it constitutional. That prob­
lem is not present here because of the very different stat­
ute and the recognized officer-safety basis for the officer’s 
order. Moreover, this case is not a facial challenge to the 
interference statute, nor does defendant argue that the stat­
ute is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague—arguments 
that have more salience in free expression and similar set­
tings. See Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.13(a), 
553-54 n 20 (5th ed 2012) (suggesting greater justification 
may be necessary for failure to obey orders violating First 
Amendment rights than other officer orders). In Illig-Renn, 
on the other hand, this court rejected defendants’ challenge 
to the very statute at issue in this case, ORS 162.247(1)(b), 
holding that it was not facially overbroad or vague in viola­
tion of constitutional protections for speech and assembly. 
341 Or at 338. Defendant raises no free speech or assembly 
argument here.
	
The majority instead relies on various statements in 
those cases about what constitutes a “lawful order,” but the 
cases are distinguishable. In Ausmus, we looked to the dic­
tionary to define that term in the statute creating the crime 
of disorderly conduct and came up with the unsurprising 
statement that a “lawful order” was one “authorized by, and 
not contrary to, substantive law.” Ausmus, 336 Or at 504. 
But here the order was “authorized,” because it was a reason­
able response to a legitimate concern for officer safety based 
on defendant’s aggressive and threatening conduct after he 
was stopped. As this court recognized in Ausmus, various 
statutes authorize police to give orders as part of their ordi­
nary investigative, community-caretaking, and protective 
policing functions. 336 Or at 505-06. And we explicitly held 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
687
in State v. Bates that an officer may take reasonable actions 
to protect himself or herself (or others) during an encounter 
with a citizen, if the officer develops “a reasonable suspicion, 
based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen 
might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury 
to the officer or to others present.” 304 Or 519, 524, 747 P2d 
991 (1987). No such officer-safety rationale was advanced as 
a basis for the orders in Ausmus or Illig-Renn being “lawful 
orders.” In contrast, the order here was “lawful” in the sense 
of being “authorized by law” based on Bates, as well as other 
statutes articulating the permitted scope of ordinary police 
work. And, as noted, defendant does not dispute that the offi­
cers who gave the order had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that he posed a threat of serious bodily harm to them.
	
Although I think the Court of Appeals’ approach 
has much to recommend it, it also is true that the majority 
has helpfully reframed the issue that was argued by the par­
ties and decided by the Court of Appeals. The majority does 
not focus on whether the initial police-citizen encounter was 
lawful, but instead announces a rule based on whether the 
later police order independently violated defendant’s consti­
tutional rights. See 365 Or at 674-77, 675 n 14. The majority 
agrees that even if the initial encounter results in a seizure 
that later is determined to be unlawful (as here), the law­
fulness of an order in response to defendant’s post-seizure 
conduct will not necessarily turn on the legal validity of the 
earlier seizure, but rather on whether the order “is incon­
sistent with Article I, section 9.” 365 Or at 677. Thus, the 
majority purports to preserve the concept that the lawful­
ness of a police order “is to be judged independently of the 
validity of the initial police citizen confrontation.” Kreis, 294 
Or App at 559.6 However, the majority goes on to say that 
where an order that constitutes a seizure is based only on 
	
6  The majority’s reframing thus suggests that it would conclude that an 
officer-safety based order that was not “contrary to substantive law” is a “law­
ful order” for purposes of ORS 162.247(1)(b), even if the order was given in the 
context of an unlawful search or seizure. Thus, an officer-safety-based order to 
“drop the gun” presumably would be lawful, even if the initial stop was not. I 
certainly agree with the majority on that point. But many cases, like this one and 
the Court of Appeals cases discussed in the text, will involve police orders that 
may interfere with a person’s freedom of movement and thus raise the Article I, 
section 9, issue upon which the majority and I disagree. 
688	
State v. Kreis
officer-safety concerns—and lacks “an independent consti­
tutional basis,” such as reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity—then the inquiry does depend on whether there 
was a “constitutional justification for [the] initial seizure.” 
365 Or at 676 n 15.
	
The majority proceeds to determine that the order 
here was not a “lawful order” because it was contrary to sub­
stantive law. The majority asserts that the order to defen­
dant to turn around and put his hands behind his back and 
be handcuffed was contrary to substantive law, because 
“defendant had a liberty interest with which [the officer] 
could not interfere absent constitutional justification,” 365 
Or at 671, and the officer lacked that justification. I dis­
agree. First, the majority is too quick to dismiss the state’s 
characterization of defendant’s argument: that he claimed 
the right “to ball his fists, take a bladed stance, or place 
Crino in apprehension of injury.’ 
” Id. at 670. In fact, that 
was the crux of defendant’s argument. This is not a case 
where the defendant chose to engage in passive resistance—
inactive, nonviolent noncooperation in response to a police 
order, which we have held cannot constitute interference 
under ORS 162.247(1)(b). See State v. McNally, 361 Or 314, 
392 P3d 721 (2017). Rather, after the initial stop, defendant 
intentionally engaged in further aggressive and threaten­
ing conduct to which the officers reasonably responded with 
the order at issue here. Such orders, until today, have been 
considered “lawful orders” under the interference statute, 
based on Bates. In my view, the officer-safety basis for the 
order was sufficient justification under Article I, section 9.
	
Second, the majority asserts that the order necessar­
ily was unlawful because it “is inconsistent with” Article I, 
section 9, as an unjustified seizure of defendant. 365 Or at 
677. The flaw in that argument, however, is that, at the time 
of the order, defendant already had been seized. As presented 
to us, this case involves a seizure by police (based on what 
they incorrectly believed to be probable cause) and a later 
police order, based on valid officer-safety concerns, to defen­
dant to turn around so that he could be handcuffed. But 
the order did not result in defendant’s seizure by police. The 
seizure already had occurred, and the order followed the 
seizure. Moreover, it was defendant’s post-seizure conduct 
Cite as 365 Or 659 (2019)	
689
that led to the order. Whether that order was lawful, as 
the state argues, or unlawful, as the majority has now con­
cluded, there is no doubt that, as a factual and legal matter, 
a person in defendant’s circumstances is seized only once. I 
see no particular substance in the majority’s statement, not 
argued by defendant, that the order was a new violation of 
his liberty interests because it “effectuated” the preexisting 
and continuing seizure of defendant.
	
The majority appears to agree that, if the initial 
stop is lawful—that is, based on reasonable suspicion that 
the person in question has committed or is about to com­
mit a crime—a later officer-safety-based order also would be 
lawful and, if not obeyed, could be the basis for an interfer­
ence charge. And, of course, if the initial stop is lawful and 
police obtain evidence of the crime for which the defendant 
was stopped (and perhaps other crimes), that evidence ordi­
narily can be used in subsequent prosecutions. On the other 
hand, if the initial stop is unlawful, the person’s Article I, 
section 9, rights are violated, and evidence of the crime for 
which the person was stopped will be suppressed. The per­
son’s constitutional rights will be vindicated, and there will 
be a deterrent effect on improper police conduct.
	
But it is a separate issue whether the person 
already stopped must obey a reasonable order based on rea­
sonable concern for the safety of a police officer or another 
person in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the per­
son is engaged in criminal activity. I see no legal reason 
why that person should not be required to obey such an 
order, whether or not the initial stop was lawful. Such a 
requirement would not violate the person’s Article I, sec­
tion 9, rights. As discussed above, if the initial stop was 
unlawful, the person already has been unconstitutionally 
seized, and the remedy that we have long imposed for that 

violation—suppression of evidence of the crime for which 
the person was stopped—will be the result. There is no 
need, in terms of deterrence of police misconduct or vindi­
cation of the constitutional rights of a person who is already 
seized, to hold that an order based on a reasonable phys­
ical threat is “unlawful” and to permit the subject of the 
order to ignore it without consequence. Such a result also 
is contrary to the intent of the legislature in enacting ORS 
690	
State v. Kreis
162.247(1)(b) and its understanding of how the term “lawful 
order” would be interpreted by the courts.
	
It probably should not have to be said, but “imme­
diate threat[s] of serious physical injury to the officer or to 
others present,” Bates, 304 Or at 524, are as likely to arise 
during stops that a court may later determine to be unlawful 
as during stops that are found to be lawful. Allowing police 
to give reasonable orders in response to such threats helps 
prevent confrontations from escalating, protects the safety 
of officers and the public, and promotes the nonviolent res­
olution of potentially dangerous situations. The threats are 
just as real whether the initial basis for the stop was lawful 
or not. The majority needlessly undermines an important 
tool for dealing with those threats.
	
I respectfully dissent.
	
Garrett, J., joins in this dissent.