Case Title: Polaski v. Dover Downs, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DIANE POLASKI and THOMAS   
)  
POLASKI, her husband,  
 
) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
)   
No. 82, 2012 
 
 
Plaintiffs Below,    
)  
   
 
Appellant,     
 
)   
Court Below:  Superior Court  
v.        
 
 
 
 
)   
of the State of Delaware in 
  
 
 
 
 
 
)  
and for Kent County 
DOVER DOWNS, INC.,   
 
)   
       
 
 
 
 
 
)  
C.A. No. K09C-12-029   
 
Defendant Below,   
 
)  
   
 
Appellee.     
 
)  
 
Submitted:  May 30, 2012 
Decided:  August 14, 2012 
  
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGLEY, Justices. 
  
O R D E R 
 
 
This 14th day of August 2012, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
A woman fell off a curb and injured herself while walking from Dover 
Downs Casino to a smoking area.  The woman sued Dover Downs, claiming in 
various ways that a problem with the curb led to her fall.  Dover Downs moved for 
summary judgment, and the trial judge granted the motion.  We affirm the Superior 
Court judge’s decision granting summary judgment to Dover Downs on all claims. 
 
(2) 
On her way to a smoking area outside Dover Downs Casino, Diane 
Polaski fell off a curb, injuring her arm and leg.  Both parties agree that the curb 
was painted bright yellow, was well lighted, and that Polaski did not trip over any 
debris.  Nevertheless, Polaski sued, focusing attention on the curb’s design, 
2 
 
claiming that Dover Downs either installed a defective curb or created a dangerous 
condition and then failed to warn her about it.  Polaski’s husband sued for loss of 
consortium. 
 
(3) 
Polaski fell off a portion of the curb that fits the normal conception of 
a curb.  That is, the curb possessed a sheer face that descended from a higher 
sidewalk to a lower street.  The problem, alleged Polaski, arose because the sheer 
face occupied only three inches of the curb’s length.  On one side of the sheer face, 
a concrete slope turned the transition from the sidewalk to the road into a gentle 
one, and on the other side, a handicap ramp offered an even milder slope to the 
road.  Polaski alleged the presence of the sheer face between these two graded 
transitions created a dangerous situation that Dover Downs either should have 
warned her about or never built in the first place, because it constituted a defective 
design. 
 
 
(4) 
Dover Downs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  The trial judge 
granted the Motion, finding that there were no disputed material facts.  Polaski 
filed a timely appeal in this Court. 
 
(5) 
This Court reviews the trial judge’s grant of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo.1   
                                                           
1 Talmo v. Union Park Auto., 2012 WL 730332, at *2 (Del. Mar. 7, 2012) (citing Hazel v. 
Delaware Supermarkets, Inc., 953 A.2d 705, 708–09 (Del. 2008)). 
 
3 
 
 
(6) 
To grant summary judgment, a judge must find that there are no 
disputed material facts when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.2  The moving party must show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.3  If a reasonable person could only draw one inference from the facts, judges 
may find a defendant not negligent as a matter of law, even though the existence of 
negligence is typically an issue for the jury.4  The moving party is also entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party fails to establish an element of 
its claim.5 
 
(7) 
Neither party disputes that Polaski was a business invitee when she 
fell.6  Polaski was on Dover Downs’ property and was en route to a designated 
smoking area where Dover Downs intended customers to go.  Thus, Dover Downs 
owed Polaski a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect her from foreseeable 
dangers that she might encounter while on Dover Downs’ property.7  Specific to 
this case, Delaware recognizes businesses have a duty to keep public walking areas 
                                                           
2 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967). 
 
5 Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-23 (1986)). 
 
6 Op. at 5. 
 
7 DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1364 (Del. 1988). 
 
4 
 
in a reasonably safe condition for customers.8  But a business’ duty to properly 
maintain walking areas does not exempt customers from exercising reasonable care 
while walking.9 
 
(8) 
Polaski argues on appeal that the judge should have allowed the jury 
to determine whether the curb constituted a dangerous condition.  The judge held 
that a “change in elevation on this well-lit, defect-free sidewalk leading down to a 
handicapped ramp is not a dangerous condition.”10  Even if the sidewalk was 
dangerous, the trial judge held, the sidewalk’s elevation change would be obvious 
to a person of ordinary care and prudence.11   
 
(9) 
The judge justifiably decided this case without requiring a jury to hear 
it.  As the plaintiff, Polaski bears the burden to demonstrate the existence of her 
claim’s elements, including the existence of a dangerous condition.12  If a plaintiff 
fails to create a genuine issue of material fact about the existence of an element of 
her claim, a judge should grant a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.13    
Polaski injured herself by falling off a normal curb.  Doing so does not cause an 
                                                           
8 Walker v. Shoprite Supermarket, Inc., 864 A.2d 929, *2 (Del. 2004). 
 
9 Id. 
 
10 Op. at 7. 
 
11 Id. 
 
12 Wilson v. Derrickson, 175 A.2d 400, 401 (Del. 1961). 
 
13 Kanoy v. Crothall Am., Inc., 1988 WL 15367, *2-3 (Del. Super. Feb. 8, 1988). 
 
5 
 
injury capable of redress through a negligence action.  In granting summary 
judgment here, the judge observed that the parties disputed no material facts about 
the fall.  Therefore, he properly ruled that a normal curb does not constitute a 
dangerous condition, even if it borders atypical portions of curb. 
 
(10) Before granting summary judgment, and after drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Polaski, the judge found no apparent defect with the curb.14  
He noted that the curb was brightly marked with yellow paint, was in a well lighted 
area, and was free from damage or debris.15  While Polaski characterizes the curb 
as a “precipitous ledge,”16 the trial judge found the curb’s change in grade 
“conspicuous.”17  From the evidence presented, the judge concluded that no 
reasonable juror could infer that the curb’s change in grade constituted a dangerous 
condition.18 
 
(11) The judge also granted summary judgment to Dover Downs on 
Polaski’s design defect claim.  The judge held that Polaski needed to present expert 
testimony to support a design defect claim.   
                                                           
14 Op. at 6. 
 
15 Id. 
 
16 Opening Br. at 4. 
 
17 Op. at 6. 
 
18 Id. at 7. 
 
6 
 
 
(12) We note that Polaski did not raise her arguments opposing the judge’s 
ruling that she must have expert testimony to support her design defect claims until 
her reply brief.  Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(A)(3) requires appellants to raise all 
arguments in the opening brief.  Thus, Polaski waived the arguments supporting 
her design defect claim by omitting those arguments from her opening brief. 
 
(13) Even if Polaski did not waive her arguments, her attempt to separate 
the requirement of expert testimony from design defect claims fails.  Although 
general negligence claims do not require expert testimony and can be evaluated by 
a layperson, design defect claims rely on facts beyond a layperson’s knowledge.19  
Plaintiffs must therefore establish, via expert testimony, what is “custom”20 or 
“very common practice”21 as an alternative means of determining negligent or 
defective design.  Here, the judge properly granted Dover Downs summary 
judgment because Polaski failed to produce necessary expert testimony. 
 
(14) Having properly granted summary judgment on both theories of 
negligence, the judge properly granted summary judgment to Dover Downs for the 
derivative loss of consortium claim.22   
                                                           
19 See Delmarva Power & Light v. Stout, 380 A.2d 1365, 1367 (Del. 1977) (“expert testimony is 
only relevant when the matter in issue is not one of common knowledge”). 
 
20 Slicer v. Hill, 2012 WL 1435014, * (Del. Super. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 
21 Ward v. Shoney's, Inc., 817 A.2d 799, 802 (Del. 2003). 
 
22 Op. at 8. 
7 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice