Case Title: State v. Noling

Citation: 2016-Ohio-8252

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Noling, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8252.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8252 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE v. NOLING, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Noling, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8252.] 
Criminal 
law—R.C. 
2953.73—Postconviction 
DNA 
testing—Appellate 
jurisdiction—R.C. 2953.73(E)(1), which denies appeals of right from 
rejections of applications for DNA testing in cases in which the death 
penalty is imposed, is unconstitutional—Unconstitutional portions of R.C. 
2953.73 are severed—After severance, R.C. 2953.73 entitles capital 
offenders to appeals of right to this court. 
(No. 2014-1377—Submitted May 31, 2016—Decided December 21, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Portage County, No. 1995-CR-220. 
________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 1} A jury found Tyrone Noling guilty of the April 1990 aggravated 
murders of Bearnhardt and Cora Hartig in Portage County, Ohio.  The trial court 
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sentenced him to death.  On direct appeal, the court of appeals and this court 
affirmed the convictions and death sentences.  State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 
2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88 (“Noling I”). 
{¶ 2} Noling has made numerous applications for postconviction relief.  
This appeal arises from the Portage County Common Pleas Court’s denial of his 
2013 amended application for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Ohio’s 
statutory scheme, R.C. 2953.71 through 2953.84.  Noling filed an appeal with the 
11th District Court of Appeals and sought a discretionary jurisdictional appeal with 
this court.  The court of appeals dismissed Noling’s appeal pursuant to R.C. 
2953.73(E)(1), which grants appellate review of the denial of DNA applications 
from capital offenders to the Supreme Court of Ohio exclusively. 
{¶ 3} We accepted Noling’s jurisdictional appeal from the court of common 
pleas on the following proposition of law:  
 
Ohio Revised Code 2953.73(E)(1) violates both the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as it: 
(1) discriminates between capital and non-capital criminal 
defendants, (2) fails to provide appellate review, and (3) results in 
the arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty.  
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
143 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2015-Ohio-3958, 38 N.E.3d 899. 
{¶ 4} Although the parties’ briefs go into detail concerning the merits of the 
application for DNA testing, the question before us is a constitutional one 
concerning the statutory procedure for appealing the denial of an application for 
postconviction DNA testing, not the merits of Noling’s application itself. 
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{¶ 5} The challenged statute, R.C. 2953.73(E)(1), sets forth the procedure 
by which an offender sentenced to death may appeal the trial court’s denial of an 
application for postconviction DNA testing.  According to the statute, the capital 
offender “may seek leave of the supreme court to appeal the rejection to the 
supreme court.”  Id.  The statute departs from typical appellate procedure by 
skipping the court of appeals altogether.  And it is also distinct from the procedure 
in the initial appeal of a capital sentence, which comes straight to this court on a 
direct, not a discretionary, appeal.  Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(c), Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶ 6} To “seek leave,” the capital offender must file a notice of appeal and 
memorandum in support of jurisdiction with this court.  R.C. 2953.73(E)(1).  At 
least four justices must vote to accept jurisdiction before an appeal may proceed.  
Article IV, Section 2(A), Ohio Constitution; S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.08(B).  If a majority of 
justices declines to assert jurisdiction over the claim, the decision of the common 
pleas court will stand.  After the denial of a postconviction DNA application, 
however, R.C. 2953.73(E)(2) provides a noncapital offender the right to appeal that 
determination in the court of appeals.  The appellate court has no discretion to 
decline to consider the case and must hear the appeal. 
{¶ 7} Noling argues that because the statutory scheme denies appeals of 
right to those sentenced to death while guaranteeing appeals to noncapital 
offenders, the scheme denies capital offenders their fundamental rights—
specifically, their state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection and the federal constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.  The state counters that postconviction relief is civil in nature, not 
criminal, and thus, no fundamental right to appeal exists.  The state further contends 
that the scheme is constitutionally permissible because the state has a rational basis 
for the statute’s different appeal paths and because the Eighth Amendment to the 
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United States Constitution does not require a specific appellate process for 
postconviction DNA-testing denials. 
{¶ 8} We agree that R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) violates the equal protection right 
guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  Because we can decide 
this case on equal protection grounds, we do not consider Noling’s due-process 
claims.  But we also hold that the unconstitutional portion of the statute can be 
excised to create a constitutionally sound procedure that provides capital offenders 
an appeal of right to this court.  We therefore apply the severance remedy, strike 
the unconstitutional portions of the statute, and permit the remainder of R.C. 
2953.73(E) to stand.  We find that our constitutional analysis applies equally to a 
related section of the statutory scheme, R.C. 2953.72(A)(8), that summarizes the 
procedure for appealing a denial of postconviction DNA testing, and apply the 
severance remedy to that section as well.  In accordance with our holding and 
remedy, Noling will be permitted an appeal of right to this court from the trial 
court’s denial of his amended application for postconviction DNA testing. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of review 
{¶ 9} We begin with the premise that statutes are presumed constitutional.  
R.C. 1.47. 
{¶ 10} To find a statute unconstitutional, we must determine “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly 
incompatible.”  State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 
59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus.  “[D]oubts regarding the validity of 
a legislative enactment are to be resolved in favor of the statute.” State v. Smith, 80 
Ohio St.3d 89, 99-100, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), citing State v. Gill, 63 Ohio St.3d 
53, 55, 584 N.E.2d 1200 (1992). 
{¶ 11} Because the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution is 
coextensive with, or stronger than, that of the federal Constitution, we cite both 
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throughout this opinion.  E.g., State v. Mole, ___ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-5124, 
___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 14-23 (Article I, Section 2 of Ohio’s Constitution, the Equal 
Protection Clause, provides equal or greater protections when compared to those 
arising from the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment); Am. Assn. 
of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 
55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999) (“the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses are 
to be construed and analyzed identically”). 
Equal protection 
{¶ 12} The federal Equal Protection Clause mandates that the state may not 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 1.  Similarly, the Ohio 
Constitution, Article I, Section 2 guarantees that “[a]ll political power is inherent 
in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit.”  But 
these admonishments shall “not deny to [the] State the power to treat different 
classes of persons in different ways.”  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-447, 
92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 
S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885).  Legislative power is not boundless, however. 
{¶ 13} “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ 
justify disparate treatment of that group.”  United States. v. Windsor, __ U.S. __, 
133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013), citing Dept. of Agriculture v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-535, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973).  In other 
words, equal protection prohibits treating similar groups differently based on 
criteria that are unrelated to the purpose of the law.  Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 
361, 374, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974).  “[A]ll persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike,” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 
S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), and “a legislative classification must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must bear a rational relationship to a permissible 
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governmental objective,” Felske v. Daugherty, 64 Ohio St.2d 89, 92, 413 N.E.2d 
809 (1980).  See also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct.1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 
465 (1988).  While the challenging party has the burden to negate “any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,” 
Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 
113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993), the state must offer some “rational 
speculation” to support it.  Id. at 315. 
Statute’s classification 
{¶ 14} “In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment * * * [courts] apply different 
levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications.  At a minimum, a statutory 
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”  
Clark at 461. 
{¶ 15} While asserting that R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) cannot survive even this 
rational-basis scrutiny, Noling urges us to apply strict scrutiny to the statute, the 
most stringent level of analysis, asserting that the law impedes access to the courts, 
a fundamental right.  But that argument is unsound. 
{¶ 16} This court has established that “a postconviction proceeding is not 
an appeal of a criminal conviction but rather, is a collateral, civil attack on a 
criminal judgment.”  State v. Broom, 146 Ohio St.3d 60, 2016-Ohio-1028, 51 
N.E.3d 620, ¶ 28, citing State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67 
(1994).  And “[t]he right to file a postconviction petition is a statutory right, not a 
constitutional right.”  Id.  See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 
2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554, 107 S.Ct. 
1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Steffen at 410.  Because an appeal of the denial of 
postconviction DNA testing does not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, 
we do not apply strict scrutiny. 
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{¶ 17} Noling has offered no evidence that intermediate scrutiny, the next 
level of deference in equal-protection law, State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 
2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 13, should be applied in this case.  Because 
this case is not entitled to elevated scrutiny, we apply the rational-basis test, the 
standard most deferential to the legislature.  Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. 
v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 18} Before we proceed to apply the test, we note that the attorney 
general, as amicus curiae, advances the argument that the rational-basis test is not 
applicable because capital and noncapital offenders are not similarly situated.  As 
an initial matter, this court has previously held that “amici curiae are not parties to 
an action and may not, therefore, interject issues and claims not raised by parties.”  
State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 26, citing 
Lakewood v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 66 Ohio App.3d 387, 394, 584 N.E.2d 70 
(8th Dist.1990).  Although the state notes that this court has previously reasoned 
that “ ‘the reality is that capital and noncapital defendants were not treated 
similarly,’ ” quoting Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 100, 684 N.E.2d 668, it does not 
directly argue that the rational-basis test is inapplicable.  But even considering the 
attorney general’s claims, we would still find capital and noncapital offenders 
similarly situated here. 
{¶ 19} The case law and statutes cited by the attorney general are inapposite 
because they are focused on imposition of a sentence.  The cases discuss capital 
sentencing, and the statutes set forth procedures for cases in which an accused is 
defending against a capital charge.  In contrast, the statutory scheme relevant here 
concerns applications for postconviction DNA testing.  It is unrelated to sentencing.  
That certain applicants are sentenced to death and others to prison terms is nearly 
irrelevant under the statute.  And we do not agree with the attorney general that the 
two classes are dissimilar merely because the description of what testing is 
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“outcome determinative” is slightly broader for capital offenders.  R.C. 2953.71(L).  
Under the statute, capital and noncapital offenders follow the same application 
process for DNA testing, R.C. 2953.72, and the application is subject to the same 
level of scrutiny in the trial court, R.C. 2953.73(D). 
{¶ 20} Moving to application of the rational-basis test, the Equal Protection 
Clause is satisfied if “there is a plausible policy reason for the classification.”  
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).  We 
may find a statute unconstitutional only if “the General Assembly’s action lacked 
all rational relation to the legitimate state interest.”  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 
116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 72.  Under this test, the 
Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if “there is a plausible policy reason for the 
classification.”  Nordlinger at 11. 
{¶ 21} In this case, we consider whether there exists a legitimate 
governmental purpose in affording noncapital defendants an appeal of right of the 
denial of their postconviction DNA-testing application, but affording capital 
defendants only a discretionary appeal of the same denial.  Although we apply the 
rational-basis test and give all due deference to the legislature, we are mindful that 
this case involves a person sentenced to death, and “the finality of the [death] 
sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other 
cases.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
Legitimate governmental purpose 
{¶ 22} In its merit brief, the state offers the following purpose: “ensuring 
that the final judgments of its courts are expeditiously enforced.” Are we to take 
this to mean that expeditious enforcement of the death penalty is the guiding factor 
and goal?  Are we to value speed over certainty?  Of all cases that cry out for 
certainty, it is cases that result in the extinguishing of a human life.  If, however, 
the generic expeditious enforcement is the basis of the state’s argument, even a 
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cursory investigation reveals that this rationale is faulty.  See State ex rel. Nyitray 
v. Indus. Comm., 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 443 N.E.2d 962 (1983).  Indeed, 
expedience is subverted by the statutory scheme. 
{¶ 23} Requiring the parties to draft memos in support of and in opposition 
to jurisdiction takes the parties additional time.  The court rules grant the appellant 
45 days from the entry of the lower court’s judgment to file a notice of appeal and 
a memorandum in support of jurisdiction.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.01(A)(1).  After that 
filing, the appellee has 30 days to file a response to the memorandum in support of 
jurisdiction.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.03(A)(1).  After the time for filing a response passes, 
the court must review the filings and decide whether to accept jurisdiction.  
S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.08(B).  If the court agrees to accept jurisdiction, it will issue an order 
to the clerk of the common pleas court to certify and submit the case record to the 
clerk of the Supreme Court within 20 days of the issuance of the order.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
15.03(A).  After the clerk files the record, the appellant has 40 days to file a merit 
brief.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.02(A)(2).  If each filing and submission takes the maximum 
amount of time, this process will last at least 135 days before a merit brief is ever 
filed.  That number is conservative because it does not include any time for the 
justices to consider the appeal, deliberate, vote, and release a decision. 
{¶ 24} In contrast, an appeal as of right from a case originating in the court 
of appeals (the most similar appeal currently covered by the Supreme Court Rules 
of Practice) goes from judgment entry to merit briefing faster.  For appeals of right 
from courts of appeals, an appellant must file a notice of appeal within 45 days of 
the entry of judgment, S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.01, and must file a merit brief within 40 days 
of the clerk’s submission of the record, S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.02.  Although the rules do 
not specify a time limit for filing the record, assuming it takes the 20 days permitted 
in a discretionary appeal, this court would still have a merit brief in 105 days in an 
appeal of right, at least a month faster than one would even potentially be filed in a 
discretionary appeal.  If the state’s legitimate interest is in expeditious enforcement 
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of judgments, that interest is better advanced by permitting capital offenders an 
appeal of right.  We find that providing only a discretionary appeal is not rationally 
related to the governmental purpose of expeditiously enforcing final judgments 
and, accordingly, the law does not meet the rational-basis test and violates both the 
federal and state equal-protection clauses. 
Attorney general’s rational-basis claims 
{¶ 25} As with the attorney general’s claim that capital and noncapital 
offenders are not similarly situated, we need not address the attorney general’s 
suggestions of additional legitimate government purposes underlying R.C. 
2953.73(E)(1).  However, we will briefly explain why these suggestions are not a 
rational basis for providing a discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 26} First, the attorney general suggests that the appellate process in R.C. 
2953.73(E)(1) parallels the process for appealing an initial death-penalty sentence.  
But this is not true.  While both processes bypass the court of appeals, an offender 
appealing a death sentence is entitled to an appeal of right to this court.  Here, the 
capital offender is offered only a discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 27} Second, the attorney general suggests that the General Assembly 
drafted the process to accord with ambiguous constitutional text that requires 
Supreme Court review “in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.”  
Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(c).  But the full text of that section 
requires Supreme Court review “as a matter of right,” not discretionary review, 
which is the only avenue R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) provides. 
{¶ 28} Third, the attorney general suggests that distinct review paths are 
appropriate because capital offenders have broader access to testing.  Capital 
offenders are permitted to seek postconviction DNA testing related to the offense 
itself or to aggravating circumstances supporting the capital sentence, while 
noncapital offenders are limited to the former.  R.C. 2953.71(L).  The attorney 
general notes that “broader access to testing logically results in more appeals in 
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each case, and so justifies discretionary appellate review.”  The state fails to clarify 
how the presence of more appeals is a rational basis for discretionary review.  The 
“logical” cause and effect analysis is also faulty.  In the nearly 13 years since this 
law has been in effect, only three capital offenders have sought review from this 
court.  And the General Assembly was aware of this fact, as evidenced by an Ohio 
Legislative Service Commission (“LSC”) report that there would be few capital 
appeals, given the relatively small number of death-row offenders and the fact that 
many of them would have no bases for postconviction DNA testing under the law.  
Fiscal Note and Local Impact Statement for 2003 Sub.S.B. No. 11 (“S.B. 11”), 150 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6498-6526. 
{¶ 29} Fourth, the attorney general suggests that the discretionary-appeal 
process is less susceptible to delay.  We have already concluded that discretionary 
review significantly increases the average amount of time a case is pending before 
disposition as compared to an appeal of right, so this rationale is faulty. 
{¶ 30} Finally, the attorney general suggests that the single-tier system of 
review promotes consistency, given that the Supreme Court is responsible for 
handling direct appeals of death-penalty cases.  We agree, but we identify the 
relevant disparate treatment not to be the lack of an appeal to the court of appeals, 
but instead to the denial of direct appeal to the Supreme Court for capital offenders.  
We see no means by which discretionary review promotes consistency, given that 
we do not have discretion to reject a challenge to a conviction imposing the death 
sentence. 
{¶ 31} Finding no legitimate purpose in a two-track appellate process that 
discriminates between capital and noncapital offenders, we hold that R.C. 
2953.73(E)(1) is unconstitutional in violation of both state and federal principles of 
equal protection. 
 
 
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Eighth Amendment 
{¶ 32} The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not violated when 
a capital offender has no opportunity for postconviction relief.  Specifically, in 
finding no Eighth Amendment violation, the court noted that “[s]tate collateral 
proceedings are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal 
proceedings.”  Murray, 492 U.S. at 10, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1.  Even here, 
where we have determined that capital offenders have a state-created liberty interest 
in postconviction DNA testing, we cannot find that the interest broadens the 
protections of the Eighth Amendment beyond the bounds set by the Supreme Court.  
Because the high court has held that imposition of the death penalty is not arbitrary 
and egregious, even without the option of postconviction relief, we likewise hold 
that a statute that provides for postconviction relief, even without effective 
opportunity for appeal, is not arbitrary and egregious. 
Remedy 
{¶ 33} As discussed above, we do not hold that the entire postconviction 
DNA-testing statute is unconstitutional.  Our holding is limited to the portion of the 
statute that affords capital offenders a discretionary appeal instead of an appeal as 
of right.  R.C. 1.50 provides that when only a portion of a statute is “invalid,” that 
portion may be severed: “the invalidity does not affect other provisions or 
applications of the section or related sections which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision, and to this end, the provisions are severable.” 
{¶ 34} Ohio law establishes a three-part test to determine whether an invalid 
portion of a statute can be severed or the entire law must be struck down:  
 
“(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of 
separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself?  (2) Is 
the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the 
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whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent 
intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out?  (3) 
Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the 
constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect 
to the former only?”  
 
Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927), quoting State v. 
Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407, 409 (1913). 
{¶ 35} A portion of a statute can be excised only when the answer to the 
first question is yes and the answers to the second and third questions are no.  State 
v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 16 (severance 
was not appropriate because the severance of the requested word would still make 
the statute overbroad and unconstitutional).  See also Cleveland v. State, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 232, 2014-Ohio-86, 5 N.E.3d 644, ¶ 20-22 (severance was appropriate 
because each sentence of the statute could stand by itself, the general intent of the 
legislature was still given effect by the portions not severed, and no words needed 
to be added to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part). 
{¶ 36} In this case, we conclude that severance of the offending portion of 
the statute is proper under Geiger. 
Severance of R.C. 2953.73(E) 
{¶ 37} The first question requires us to determine whether the constitutional 
parts of the statute may be read and stand by themselves following the severance.  
State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 523, 644 N.E.2d 369 (1994). 
{¶ 38} The sentence at issue is found in R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) and states, “If 
the offender was sentenced to death for the offense for which the offender claims 
to be an eligible offender and is requesting DNA testing, the offender may seek 
leave of the supreme court to appeal the rejection to the supreme court * * *.”  By 
severing the phrase “seek leave of the supreme court to,” we remove the offending 
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discretionary-review process.  The statute then permissibly reads, “If the offender 
was sentenced to death for the offense for which the offender claims to be an 
eligible offender and is requesting DNA testing, the offender may appeal the 
rejection to the supreme court.” 
{¶ 39} Removing the unconstitutional language concerning a discretionary 
appeal simply leaves capital offenders with an appeal of right, and the severed 
statute is readily comprehensible.  The answer to the first Geiger question is yes. 
{¶ 40} As to the second question, we conclude that the unconstitutional part 
of the statute is not so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it 
impossible to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature if the clause is 
stricken.  The purpose of the statute is to outline the procedure for postconviction 
DNA testing, and the purpose of this specific section is to describe appellate rights. 
{¶ 41} The right to an appeal was apparently very important to the 
legislature, such that it added an appeal provision prior to passage of the law.  As 
introduced, S.B. 11 provided that “[a] judgment of a court entered under division 
(E) of this section is final and is not appealable by any person to any court.”  But at 
hearings before the Senate Judiciary on Criminal Justice Committee, a witness for 
the Ohio Common Pleas Judges Association testified that the lack of an appeal 
process would leave the prosecuting attorney as a “gatekeeper.”  Notes, Hannah 
Capitol Collection (Mar. 19, 2003).  When the committee voted the bill out of 
conference, it contained the appeal process set forth in the enacted statute—
affording capital offenders a discretionary appeal to this court and noncapital 
offenders an appeal of right to a district court of appeals, with both classes of 
offenders subject to strict limitations on the claims that may be made on appeal.  
R.C. 2953.72(A)(8). 
{¶ 42} The severance we perform modifies the appeal process for a very 
limited number of eligible offenders.  It does not impact the statute’s overall goal 
of setting forth a scheme for postconviction DNA testing or the provision’s specific 
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15 
goal of providing a limited appellate process for offenders.  The answer to the 
second Geiger question is no. 
{¶ 43} The third question queries whether it is necessary to insert any words 
or terms to give effect to the constitutional part of the statute.  In this case, only 
severance is necessary to render the statute constitutional and, as discussed in 
relation to the first question, the remaining clause is coherent and effective in its 
own right.  The answer to the third Geiger question is no. 
Constitutionality of severed R.C. 2953.73(E) 
{¶ 44} Having excised the offending language in accordance with Geiger, 
we conclude that the statute is rendered constitutional.  By providing an appeal of 
right to capital offenders, the revised statute avoids equal-protection violations by 
providing both capital and noncapital offenders the right to an appellate review and 
permits the state to achieve its objective of efficient enforcements of judgments by 
removing an often lengthy jurisdictional review period.  For the reasons that we 
articulated in Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 100-102, 684 N.E.2d 668, we reiterate that 
providing those convicted of capital crimes with a single appeal of right while 
granting those convicted of noncapital crimes an appeal of right and a possible 
discretionary appeal is not unconstitutional. 
{¶ 45} Relying on our opinion in State v. Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-
Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, the dissent states that “[t]he duty to review error 
allegedly occurring in postconviction proceedings in death-penalty cases belongs 
in the first instance to the appellate courts of this state.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 79.  
In dicta, Davis states that “[a] holding that the Supreme Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over all matters relating to a death-penalty case would be contrary” to 
the constitution.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 22.  Our holding today is not contrary to 
Davis.  Indeed, we have already considered the narrower question of whether R.C. 
2953.73(E) conflicts with the Ohio Constitution’s jurisdictional provisions and held 
that it does not.  State v. Noling, 136 Ohio St.3d 163, 2013-Ohio-1764, 992 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
1095, ¶ 20 (“Noling II”)  In that case, the first time we considered a postconviction-
DNA-testing appeal from Noling, we held that “this court has concurrent appellate 
jurisdiction with courts of appeals to review postconviction judgments and final 
orders in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.”  Id. 
The remedy is sound 
{¶ 46} The dissent makes two related objections to this reasonable, limited 
remedy:  that the remedy rewrites the statute and that the remedy is contrary to the 
court’s previous use of the severance remedy.  The dissent also rejects the notion 
that in applying the severance remedy, we should, whenever possible, respect the 
role of the legislature by limiting our severance to only those unconstitutional 
portions of the statute in order to most effectively preserve the General Assembly’s 
goal.  We address these arguments in turn. 
{¶ 47} Foremost, the remedy does not rewrite the statute.  The dissent 
disputes that we can sever only a portion of R.C. 2953.73(E) because “the authority 
to sever the unconstitutional part of a statute does not give this court license to 
rewrite it by selectively deleting words to change the meaning of the language that 
the legislature enacted.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 70.  But our remedy requires no 
rewriting.  It severs unlawful provisions according to the Geiger test and leaves 
behind words already written by the General Assembly. 
{¶ 48} The dissent cites dicta in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-
Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 100-102, abrogated in part on other grounds by 
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), and states that 
“we should resist the temptation to reconfigure by judicial fiat” the statute.  
Dissenting opinion at ¶ 84.  But the dissent’s words again belie our actions.  Just as 
our remedy requires no rewriting, it also requires no reconfiguring.  Consistent with 
Geiger, the remedy deletes the words of the unconstitutional provision but neither 
adds words to nor removes words from the constitutional portions.  The General 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
Assembly’s original words remain, and in their original order.  We have merely 
excised text, pursuant to the guidance of Geiger. 
{¶ 49} Next, the remedy is in accordance with our precedent.  The dissent 
recognizes, dissenting opinion at ¶ 71, that the court has severed portions of a 
statute on a number of occasions.  State ex rel. Sunset Estate Properties, L.L.C. v. 
Lodi, 142 Ohio St.3d 351, 2015-Ohio-790, 30 N.E.3d 934, ¶ 18; Cleveland v. State, 
138 Ohio St.3d 232, 2014-Ohio-86, 5 N.E.3d 644, ¶ 20-21; Norwood v. Horney, 
110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 127; State v. 
Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 464, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996); Hausman v. Dayton, 
73 Ohio St.3d 671, 679, 653 N.E.2d 1190 (1995); Maurer, 71 Ohio St.3d at 523-
524, 644 N.E.2d 369; State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 115, 
122, 543 N.E.2d 1169 (1989). 
{¶ 50} The dissent notes that in some cases, the court “deleted whole 
sentences” and in others it “struck individual words,” but offers no explanation of 
how striking words is different from the remedy we advance here.  Dissenting 
opinion at ¶ 71.  Particularly, in both Doersam and Maurer, the remedy was similar 
to the one in this case.  In Doersam, the court struck only that provision that was 
“violative of the mandate that no person shall be denied equal protection of the 
laws” and accordingly deleted the words “if the death is due to injury received or 
occupational disease first diagnosed.”  Id. at 122.  Despite the dissent’s novel 
interpretation of Doersam, dissenting opinion at ¶ 75, the case is good law and has 
been for more than 25 years.  The dissent’s reference to an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part in that case does not change the majority’s holding or 
remedy.  In Maurer, the court excised all references to commutations and reprieves 
in a statute, including the phrase “commutation of sentence, or reprieve.”  Id. at 
523-524.  In order to excise all the unlawful provisions related to commutations or 
reprieves, the court had to sever ancillary words, not merely “one or more terms in 
a series that were unconstitutional,” as the dissent claims.  Dissenting opinion at  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
¶ 71.  Thus, our own precedent in severing language in Doersam and Maurer further 
establishes that the severance remedy we employ in this case is permissible. 
{¶ 51} Finally, R.C. 1.50 and our case law support our limited severance 
remedy.  The Geiger test prohibits severance if the unconstitutional part of the 
statute is “so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible 
to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is 
stricken out.”  Geiger, 117 Ohio St. at 466, 160 N.E. 28.  In other words, if it is 
impossible to excise the unconstitutional language and still achieve the General 
Assembly’s intent, then severance is not an option, and we must find the entire 
statute unconstitutional. 
{¶ 52} We have reiterated the primacy of preserving the legislature’s intent 
on a number of occasions.  In Doersam, we recognized “our obligation to preserve 
as much of the General Assembly's handiwork as is constitutionally permissible.”  
Id. at 121.  And in Foster, we emphasized that goal on at least three occasions.  
First, we recognized that “[e]xcising the unconstitutional provisions does not 
detract from the overriding objectives of the General Assembly * * *.”  Id., 109 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 98.  Next, we noted, 
“Significantly, the severance remedy preserves ‘truth in sentencing,’ a fundamental 
element of S.B. 2.”  Id. at ¶ 101.  And finally, we admired the remedy: 
 
Severance also is the remedy that will best preserve the paramount 
goals of community safety and appropriate punishment and the 
major elements of our sentencing code.  Removing presumptive 
terms and preserving the remainder of the sentencing provisions of 
the code will most effectively preserve the General Assembly’s goal 
of truth in sentencing. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
Id. at ¶ 102.  Just as the court attempted to apply the severance remedy in Foster in 
a way that preserved the General Assembly’s intent, we endeavor to give effect to 
the legislature’s intent by carefully excising only those provisions of the statute that 
are unconstitutional and can be severed. 
{¶ 53} Conversely, the dissent’s proposed severance of R.C. 2953.73(E) in 
its entirety would violate Geiger by “chang[ing] the meaning of the language the 
legislature enacted”—just what the dissent forswears.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 80.  
Most obviously, the dissent seeks to reject the legislature’s intent altogether by 
removing the entire statutory section by which the General Assembly provided 
eligible capital offenders an appeal to the Supreme Court.  Indeed, the dissent 
makes this intent clear:  “The duty to review error allegedly occurring in 
postconviction proceedings in death-penalty cases belongs in the first instance to 
the appellate courts of this state.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 79.  Additionally, R.C. 
2953.73(E) currently provides a right of appeal only to offenders, but wholly 
severing (E), could open up the right of appeal to the state. 
{¶ 54} As the Eighth District Court of Appeals explained in State v. 
Montgomery: 
 
The first sentence of R.C. 2953.73 makes it clear that R.C. 2953.71 
to 2953.84 govern the appealability of orders entered in such 
proceedings: “A judgment and order of a court entered under 
division (D) of this section [concerning a court's determination to 
accept or reject an application for DNA testing] is appealable only 
as provided in this section.”  * * *  [W]e find that only the defendant 
whose application for DNA testing has been rejected is permitted to 
appeal. R.C. 2953.73(E) provides that if the trial court rejects an 
application for DNA testing, the defendant can appeal by leave of 
court to the supreme court in a death penalty case; in any other case, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
the defendant can appeal as of right to the relevant court of appeals.  
There is no provision for an appeal by the state. 
 
(Brackets sic.)  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97143, 2012-Ohio-1640, ¶ 12-13. 
{¶ 55} By entirely severing (E), the dissent ensures that the only means of 
appealing a decision concerning a postconviction DNA testing application is R.C. 
2505.03(A), which provides, “Every final order, judgment, or decree of a court  
* * * may be reviewed on appeal by a court of common pleas, a court of appeals, 
or the supreme court, whichever has jurisdiction.”  Unlike the language in (E) that 
the dissent would sever, R.C. 2505.03 does not restrict the state’s right to file an 
appeal. 
{¶ 56} The dissent posits that the state’s right to appeal would arise in R.C. 
2945.67(A), but that law applies specifically to criminal cases.  It is well settled 
that postconviction relief is civil in nature, so R.C. 2945.67 is inapplicable.  Broom, 
146 Ohio St.3d 60, 2016-Ohio-1028, 51 N.E.3d 620, ¶ 28, citing Steffen, 70 Ohio 
St.3d 399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994).  But even if R.C. 2945.67 did govern 
postconviction appeals, it still allows the state to appeal with the court’s permission, 
while the legislature clearly intended to eliminate the state’s appellate right when it 
drafted R.C. 2953.73 and gave appellate rights only to offenders. 
{¶ 57} Because the dissent’s remedy fails to satisfy the second part of the 
Geiger test, it is unworkable.  The dissent’s strict adherence to its own faulty 
interpretation of the Geiger test would render it necessary for us to strike down the 
entire postconviction DNA-testing statute.  See State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 133 Ohio St.3d 561, 2012-Ohio-4837, 979 N.E.2d 1193,  
¶ 40-41. 
Severance of R.C. 2953.72(A)(8) 
{¶ 58} Because we sever the challenged portion of the postconviction law, 
we must consider a related section, R.C. 2953.72(A)(8), which delineates the 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
requirements that the offender must acknowledge and submit on a form provided 
by the attorney general with the offender’s application for DNA testing. 
{¶ 59} Pursuant to this section, the offender acknowledges that “the 
offender may seek leave of the supreme court to appeal the rejection to that court if 
the offender was sentenced to death for the offense for which the offender is 
requesting the DNA testing and, if the offender was not sentenced to death for that 
offense, may appeal the rejection to the court of appeals * * *.”  R.C. 
2953.72(A)(8).  This section is unconstitutional for the same reasons that R.C. 
2953.73(E) is invalid.  But we can save the section by excising text from this portion 
in a way that passes the Geiger test and results in a constitutional statute. 
{¶ 60} Specifically, by severing the text that reads “seek leave of the 
supreme court to,” “that court if the offender was sentenced to death for the offense 
for which the offender is requesting the DNA testing and, if the offender was not 
sentenced to death for that offense, may appeal the rejection to,” and “to the court 
of appeals,” the section is left with the direction that “the offender may appeal the 
rejection.”  The revised R.C. 2953.72(A)(8) has meaning, can be read alone without 
the addition of any new language, comports with the revised R.C. 2953.73(E)(1), 
and continues to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent (in this case providing 
a summary of the right of appeal set forth in R.C. 295.73).  Because R.C. 
2953.72(A)(8) refers applicants back to R.C. 2953.71 through 2953.81, we are not 
concerned that the statute’s instructions for appeal are now less detailed.  R.C. 
2953.72(A)(8) is meant to provide only a summary of the statutory scheme for 
postconviction DNA testing, and it still achieves that goal. 
{¶ 61} Without undertaking a Geiger analysis, the dissent states that it 
would sever all of R.C. 2953.72(A)(8) and 2953.72 (A)(9).  But entirely excising 
both of these sections would violate the Geiger test by failing to give effect to the 
intention of the legislature, and create another unworkable remedy.  Once again, 
the dissent’s proposed remedy fails by significantly expanding the scope of appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 62} R.C. 2953.72(A)(8) specifies: 
 
[T]he court of common pleas has the sole discretion subject to an 
appeal as described in this division to determine whether an offender 
is an eligible offender and whether an eligible offender’s application 
for DNA testing satisfies the acceptance criteria described in 
division (A)(4) of this section and whether the application should be 
accepted or rejected [and] no determination otherwise made by the 
court of common pleas in the exercise of its discretion regarding the 
eligibility of an offender or regarding postconviction DNA testing 
under those provisions is reviewable by or appealable to any court. 
 
R.C. 2953.72(A)(9) emphasizes: 
 
[A]n offender who participates in any phase of the mechanism 
contained in [R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81], including, but not limited 
to, applying for DNA testing and being rejected, having an 
application for DNA testing accepted and not receiving the test, or 
having DNA testing conducted and receiving unfavorable results, 
does not gain as a result of the participation any constitutional right 
to challenge, or, except as provided in division (A)(8) of this section, 
any right to any review or appeal of, the manner in which those 
provisions are carried out. 
 
{¶ 63} Sections (A)(8) and (A)(9) closely circumscribe the issues that an 
offender may raise on appeal.  The dissent, by excising (A)(8) and (A)(9), and 
therefore implicitly seating the appellate right in R.C. 2505.03, would broadly 
expand the rights of offenders to appeal any final order or judgment of the court in 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
relation to their application for postconviction DNA testing and to seek review of 
any element of the decision with which the offender disagrees.  The legislature 
plainly intended, through (A)(8) and (A)(9), to limit what findings a court could 
review on appeal.  The dissent’s remedy would frustrate that intent, violating 
Geiger and the dissent’s own admonition.  Because we can lawfully sever the 
unconstitutional portions of Ohio’s postconviction DNA testing law under the rules 
set forth in Geiger, we conclude that severance is the appropriate remedy.  
Accordingly, we hold that the unconstitutional and void provisions of the law are 
severed, as described above. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 64} We hold that R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) violates the right to equal 
protection under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  We further hold that 
the unconstitutional portions of the statutory scheme can be excised to create a 
lawful procedure that provides an appeal of right to this court for capital offenders.  
Consistent with our constitutional duty to preserve the constitutional portions of a 
statute, we apply the severance remedy to the legislatively created appellate process 
for capital offenders seeking postconviction DNA testing pursuant to R.C. 
2953.73(E)(1).  Noling and other eligible capital offenders are now entitled to an 
appeal of right to the Ohio Supreme Court.  This appeal is sua sponte converted to 
an appeal as of right, and the parties shall proceed in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 
16.01 to 16.08.  Noling shall file his brief addressing the merits of the trial court’s 
judgment denying his application for postconviction DNA testing within 40 days 
from the issuance of this decision. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and MOORE, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and FRENCH, 
JJ. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
CARLA D. MOORE, of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
O’NEILL, J. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 65} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 66} At issue here are the provisions of R.C. 2953.73(E), which purport 
to vest this court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court’s 
denial of postconviction DNA testing pursuant to R.C. 2953.71 et seq. 
{¶ 67} R.C. 2953.73(E) provides: 
 
A judgment and order of a court entered under division (D) 
of this section is appealable only as provided in this division. If an 
eligible offender submits an application for DNA testing under 
section 2953.73 of the Revised Code and the court of common pleas 
rejects the application under division (D) of this section, one of the 
following applies: 
(1) If the offender was sentenced to death for the offense for 
which the offender claims to be an eligible offender and is 
requesting DNA testing, the offender may seek leave of the supreme 
court to appeal the rejection to the supreme court. Courts of appeals 
do not have jurisdiction to review any rejection if the offender was 
sentenced to death for the offense for which the offender claims to 
be an eligible offender and is requesting DNA testing. 
(2) If the offender was not sentenced to death for the offense 
for which the offender claims to be an eligible offender and is 
requesting DNA testing, the rejection is a final appealable order, and 
the offender may appeal it to the court of appeals of the district in 
which is located that court of common pleas. 
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
 
{¶ 68} I agree with the majority that this statute is unconstitutional because 
it creates different appellate remedies for capital and noncapital offenders: capital 
offenders may seek leave to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, but noncapital 
offenders may appeal to a district court of appeals as of right.  However, I dissent 
from the remedy imposed by the majority to selectively sever words, not provisions, 
from the statute, changing the discretionary appeal to the supreme court intended 
by the General Assembly into a direct appeal to this court. 
Severance 
{¶ 69} R.C. 1.50 permits courts to sever unconstitutional provisions of a 
statute in order to preserve its constitutional provisions:  
 
If any provision of a section of the Revised Code or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the 
section or related sections which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions are 
severable. 
 
Thus, our role in applying the severance remedy is to determine whether we can 
give effect to the statute “without the invalid provision.” 
{¶ 70} But the authority to sever the unconstitutional part of a statute does 
not give this court license to rewrite it by selectively deleting words to change the 
meaning of the language that the legislature enacted.  Rather, we are to consider 
whether the unconstitutional provision is capable of separation from the remaining 
parts of the statute. 
{¶ 71} The majority notes that “the court has partially severed portions of a 
statute on a number of occasions.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 49.  That may be true, but 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
that does not justify selectively deleting words to rewrite the statute that the 
legislature enacted.  Notably, the court in State ex rel. Sunset Estate Properties, 
L.L.C. v. Lodi, 142 Ohio St.3d 351, 2015-Ohio-790, 30 N.E.3d 934, ¶ 18, Cleveland 
v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 232, 2014-Ohio-86, 5 N.E.3d 644, ¶ 20-21, Norwood v. 
Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 127, and State 
v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 464, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996), deleted whole 
sentences from the statute.  And while the court in Hausman v. Dayton, 73 Ohio 
St.3d 671, 679, 653 N.E.2d 1190 (1995), and State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 71 
Ohio St.3d 513, 523-524, 644 N.E.2d 369 (1994), struck words, it did so to 
eliminate one or more terms in a series that were unconstitutional while allowing 
the valid provisions to remain.  In each of these cases, the court struck the invalid 
provisions in their entirety. 
{¶ 72} The majority, however, now asserts that in applying the severance 
remedy, the court must, “whenever possible,” respect the role of the legislature to 
create laws by saving as much of a statutory scheme as possible through severing 
what is unconstitutional and allowing what is not to remain.  Majority opinion at  
¶ 46.  That test, however, has never been part of our jurisprudence until today. 
{¶ 73} In Cleveland v. State, for example, the court invalidated a provision 
of R.C. 4921.25, which at that time provided: 
 
Any person, firm, copartnership, voluntary association, 
joint-stock association, company, or corporation, wherever 
organized or incorporated, that is engaged in the towing of motor 
vehicles is subject to regulation by the public utilities commission 
as a for-hire motor carrier under this chapter. Such an entity is not 
subject to any ordinance, rule, or resolution of a municipal 
corporation, county, or township that provides for the licensing, 
registering, or regulation of entities that tow motor vehicles. 
January Term, 2016 
 
27 
 
2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 487. 
{¶ 74} We held that the first sentence of the statute was constitutional but 
that the second sentence was not, because it “unconstitutionally limits municipal 
home-rule authority.”  Cleveland at ¶ 17.  Applying the majority’s novel severance 
remedy advanced today, we could have saved as much of a statutory scheme as 
possible by simply deleting the word “not” from the second sentence of former R.C. 
4921.25.  We did not, because doing so would have usurped the role of the General 
Assembly.  Rather, because the second sentence of former R.C. 4921.25 created an 
unconstitutional limitation on municipal home rule, we severed it in its entirety. 
{¶ 75} The majority points to a case supporting its novel position, State ex 
rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 115, 543 N.E.2d 1169 (1989).  In 
Doersam, the court held that an amendment to R.C. 4123.59(B) violated equal 
protection by creating two classes of claimants who may receive workers’ 
compensation death benefits and providing greater benefits “ ‘if the death is due to 
injury received or occupational disease first diagnosed after January 1, 1976.’ ”  
(Emphasis omitted.)  Doersam at 117, quoting former R.C. 4123.59(B), 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 545, 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1075, 1167.  Although the court 
initially struck the amendment in its entirety with the effect of eliminating increased 
benefits for all claimants, id. at 121 fn. 1, on reconsideration a majority of the court 
decided to strike the phrase “if the death is due to injury received or occupational 
disease first diagnosed,” resulting in all claimants receiving increased benefits, id. 
at 122. 
{¶ 76} Doersam was wrongly decided and represents a blatant exercise of 
judicial activism.  As Justice Wright indicated in his separate opinion, the 
majority’s approach, “well meaning though it may be,” id. at 124 (Wright, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), failed to recognize the difference between 
severing a part of a statute—leaving any remedy to the wisdom of elected 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
lawmakers—and amending it by judicial fiat.  In his view, “the entire [provision] 
must be stricken rather than the court picking and choosing words to delete.”  Id. at 
123.  And because it was the entire amendment that violated equal protection, it 
was the entire amendment that had to be severed. 
{¶ 77} In this case, the invalid provision to be severed is the entirety of R.C. 
2953.73(E), because that provision denies capital offenders equal protection of law 
by providing different appellate remedies for capital and noncapital offenders.  The 
majority, by selectively striking words from within this provision—deleting only 
the phrase “seek leave of the supreme court to”—has not severed an invalid 
statutory provision but rather has engaged in judicially legislating from the bench, 
because it transforms a capital offender’s discretionary appeal into a direct appeal 
to this court. 
{¶ 78} Thus, contrary to its claim to the contrary, it is the majority’s remedy 
that fails the severance test established in Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 
160 N.E. 28 (1927).  The threshold question in that test is, “ ‘Are the constitutional 
and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and 
may stand by itself?’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., quoting State v. Bickford, 28 N.D. 
36, 147 N.W. 407, 409 (1913).  The point of the first prong of the Geiger test is to 
ensure that a court severs the invalid provision in its entirety rather than selectively 
deleting a few words from within it, and here, it is manifest that the phrase “seek 
leave of the supreme court to” cannot be read and stand by itself. 
{¶ 79} Further, severance is appropriate only if it serves and effectuates 
legislative intent.  The majority, however, only speculates that the General 
Assembly, if it had foreseen our decision today, would have provided a direct 
appeal as of right to our court rather than a direct appeal to the courts of appeals, 
which the legislature has afforded to all other offenders requesting DNA testing as 
well as all those seeking postconviction relief.  The duty to review error allegedly 
occurring in postconviction proceedings in death-penalty cases belongs in the first 
January Term, 2016 
 
29 
instance to the appellate courts of this state.  See generally State v. Davis, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516. 
{¶ 80} The majority claims that severing R.C. 2953.73(E) in its entirely 
changes the meaning of the statute as enacted by granting the state a right to a direct 
appeal not provided by the statute.  However, the state’s right to appeal in a criminal 
case is provided by R.C. 2945.67(A), not R.C. 2505.03, and thus, severance of R.C. 
2953.73(E) would potentially allow the state an appeal by leave of the appellate 
court, not an appeal as of right.  This results not from rewriting the statute but 
because generally applicable law—here, R.C. 2945.67(A)—fills the gap left by the 
severed invalid provisions. 
{¶ 81} There is a difference between a severance that makes preexisting law 
applicable and a severance that rewrites a statute by selectively deleting its words 
to reach a specific result, and that distinction is respected by our case precedent. 
{¶ 82} For instance, the majority cites State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, as an example of the court’s respecting “the role 
of the legislature to create laws by saving as much of a statutory scheme as possible 
through severing what is unconstitutional and allowing what is not to remain.”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 46.  But in Foster, we concluded that various provisions of 
S.B. 2 violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and held that these 
“sections are severed and excised in their entirety.”  (Emphasis added.)  Foster at 
¶ 97.  The Foster remedy similarly reinstated preexisting law, such as the common 
law presumption that multiple sentences run consecutively, filling the gaps left 
when we severed the invalid provisions of S.B. 2.  See State v. Bates, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 174, 2008-Ohio-1983, 887 N.E.2d 328, ¶ 16, 18. 
{¶ 83} In applying the severance remedy in Foster, we explicitly sought to 
uphold the legislative intent of the General Assembly in enacting S.B. 2, and we 
decided that “[r]emoving presumptive terms and preserving the remainder of the 
sentencing provisions of the code will most effectively preserve the General 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
Assembly’s goal of truth in sentencing.”   Foster at ¶ 102.  And although we 
recognized that severance arguably “vitiates S.B. 2’s goals,” id. at ¶ 100, we 
nonetheless explained that “we are constrained by the principles of separation of 
powers and cannot rewrite the statutes,” id., emphasizing that “[h]owever tempting 
it may be for this court to reconfigure the sentencing code to cause the least impact 
on our criminal-justice system, we must adhere to our traditional judicial role,”  id. 
at ¶ 102. 
{¶ 84} In my view, R.C. 2953.73(E) is unconstitutional, and as in Foster, 
we should resist the temptation to reconfigure by judicial fiat the invalid appellate 
process that the legislature enacted.  Severing R.C. 2953.73(E) from the statute and 
severing R.C. 2953.72(A)(8) and (9)—which require the form for requesting DNA 
testing to provide notice of the offender’s appellate rights as provided in R.C. 
2953.73(E)—is in line with our precedent and permits this court to give effect to 
the remaining provisions of R.C. 2953.71 et seq., clarifying that an offender denied 
DNA testing may bring a direct appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to the law 
governing appeals in other postconviction proceedings, in accord with our holding 
in Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, in which we stated:  
 
A holding that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
over all matters relating to a death-penalty case would be contrary 
to the language of the constitutional amendments and the statute and 
would have the effect of delaying the review of future cases, a 
scenario that the voters expressly rejected in passing the 
constitutional amendments.  We see no reason why the courts of 
appeals may not currently entertain all appeals from the denial of 
postjudgment motions in which the death penalty was previously 
imposed. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
31 
(Emphasis sic and footnote omitted.)  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 85} For these reasons, I would sever the provisions of R.C. 2953.73(E) 
and 2953.72(A)(8) and (9) and transfer this appeal to the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals for its consideration of this matter in the first instance. 
 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela 
Holder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Ohio Innocence Project and Mark Godsey; and Timothy Young, Ohio 
Public Defender, and Carrie Wood, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Peter 
T. Reed, Deputy Solicitor, and Thomas E. Madden, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Michael 
DeWine. 
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