Case Title: Knowles v. Mantua Township

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-128-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
On March 7, 1999, plaintiff sustained injuries when a gate struck his car in a park maintained by the Township of Mantua (Township) when leaving a soccer game. Initially, plaintiff was diagnosed with sprain and strain injuries to the soft tissue of his neck and back, sciatic neuritis of the left leg and possible disc herniation in the lower back. In June 1999, respondent was diagnosed with cervical and thoracic sprain and strain and lumbrosacral radiculopathy with abnormal EMG study. Subsequent testing disclosed a central disc herniation at L4-L5, post-traumatic discogenic pain syndrome, L4-L5 radiculopathy on the left, and tendonitis in plaintiff s left shoulder. This diagnosis was confirmed in a February 2000 report concluding that plaintiff s symptoms were permanent effects of the injuries suffered in the March 1999 accident. Plaintiff filed suit against the Township, Gloucester County (County), and the Mantua Township Soccer Association (Association). Plaintiff complained of pain and numbness and that his injuries had adverse, life-altering consequences. In particular, plaintiff alleged that the injuries caused him to loose sleep, made him irritable and moody, prevented him from sitting for more than thirty minutes at a time, or from standing for more than fifteen to thirty minutes without experiencing pain. He also claimed that he could not walk for more than a quarter mile and was no longer able to play baseball or softball, bowl, or complete household projects. The County and the Association are no longer parties. The Township filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff s injuries did not satisfy the permanent loss of a bodily function threshold of the TCA as explicated in Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395 (1997), and Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533 (2000) (the Brooks/Gilhooley test). The trial court agreed and granted the Township s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court. The Supreme Court granted plaintiff s petition for certification. HELD: Plaintiff has satisfied the two-prong Brooks/Gilhooley test and has met the threshold for recovery of non-economic damages against a public entity under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. 1. The TCA controls when and under what circumstances public entities are liable for non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. In order to recover for pain and suffering, a plaintiff must satisfy both prongs of the Brooks/Gilhooley test: (1) an objective permanent injury, and (2) a permanent loss of a bodily function. The Court must determine whether a rational factfinder could conclude that plaintiff s injuries satisfy both prongs of the test. (Pp. 6-8) 2. Plaintiff met the first prong of the Brooks/Gilhooley test by presenting proof of an objective permanent injury. The only remaining issue is whether the second prong of the test is satisfied. (Pp. 8-9) 3. The determination of whether a plaintiff s injury satisfies the permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial threshold under the TCA depends on a fact-sensitive analysis. There can be no per se rule that would be decisive in all cases of this kind. However, our past precedents are useful in classifying injuries as either substantial or minor. Plaintiff s injuries more closely resemble those in Gilhooley, supra, (fractured patella) and Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3 (2002) (torn rotator cuff), then the less severe injuries sustained by the plaintiffs in Brooks, supra, and Ponte v. Overeem, 171 N.J. 46 (2002). Plaintiff has presented evidence of a substantial inability to perform many of the functions he previously enjoyed. Plaintiff s evidence satisfies the TCA threshold, thereby permitting a jury to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for pain and suffering. (Pp. 9-15) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for trial. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate, dissenting opinion stating that plaintiff s injuries do not satisfy the TCA s high threshold for recovery; that plaintiff s circumstances are similar to those encountered by the Brooks claimant and, therefore, warrant the same result: no award for non-economic damages. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN join in Justice COLEMAN s opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 128 September Term 2001 JOSEPH M. KNOWLES and SUSAN M. KNOWLES, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MANTUA TOWNSHIP SOCCER ASSOCIATION, COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious), JOHN DOES 11-20 (fictitious) and JOHN DOES 21-30 (fictitious), jointly, severally and in the alternative, Defendants, and TOWNSHIP OF MANTUA, Defendant-Respondent. Argued February 20, 2003 Decided May 29, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Mark S. Kancher argued the cause for appellants (Shaffer & Scerni, attorneys). Robert A. Baxter argued the cause for respondent (Capehart & Scatchard, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. The primary issue raised in this appeal is whether plaintiff Joseph Knowles s injuries, sustained when his car was struck by a gate in a park maintained by defendant Township of Mantua, constitute a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial warranting recovery of damages for pain and suffering under N.J.S.A. 59:9-2d of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). The trial court granted summary judgment to the Township of Mantua on the ground that plaintiff failed to satisfy the TCA s threshold as explicated in Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395 (1997), and Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533 (2000). The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court s analysis. We disagree, and hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff s claim because there is objective medical evidence establishing a prima facie case that plaintiff suffered an injury that meets the TCA threshold. [Ibid.] Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff is able to work, he has nonetheless presented evidence of a substantial inability to perform many of the functions he previously enjoyed. Finally, plaintiff alleged in his petition for certification and at oral argument that he is unable to engage in sexual relations with his wife as a result of the injuries. Although such a permanent loss presumably would satisfy the second prong of the Brooks/Gilhooley test, we are unable to find medical evidence in the record connecting that claim to the injuries. Consequently, that claim has not been considered in our determination. This case is to be distinguished from recent cases in which the Appellate Division held that although the plaintiffs presented objective medical evidence of permanent injuries, those injuries were not severe enough to fulfill the second prong of the Brooks/Gilhooley test. Heenan v. Greene, 355 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 2002); Newsham v. Cumberland Regional High School, 351 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2002). Under our fact-sensitive analysis, those plaintiffs degree of injury and impairment were not as great as plaintiff s in this case. Kahrar, supra, 171 N.J. at 15. In Heenan, the plaintiff suffered a cervical disc herniation after her car was rear-ended by a truck driven by an employee of Washington Township. Heenan, supra, 355 N.J. Super. at 163-64. Although she was required to change to a less strenuous teaching job, [s]he did not miss a day of work, can do household chores but not in an uninterrupted fashion, and has begun to play sports with frequent breaks. Id. at 164, 167. Similarly, although the Newsham plaintiff suffered a compression fracture of her seventh thoracic vertebra as a result of a cheerleading accident, the fracture was well-healed within two years of the injury. Newsham, supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 187-88. That plaintiff complained that she was unable to sit for longer than forty-five minutes, could not lift more than minimal weight, could not exercise as strenuously as she once could, and required medicine and frequent breaks to complete her eight-hour work shift. Id. at 190. However, the trial court found that plaintiff was able to perform well in school, and work while attending school. Id. at 190. In the present case, plaintiff has provided objective medical evidence of injuries that have affected his life much more severely than in Brooks, Ponte, Newsham, or Heenan. Where plaintiff s medical proofs support a claim of permanent injury that is based on objective evidence and not merely on subjective complaints, such evidence raises an issue for the jury, and removes the case from the realm of summary judgment. Gerber v. Springfield Bd. of Educ., 328 N.J. Super. 24, 35 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Mack v. Passaic Valley Water Comm n, 294 N.J. Super. 592, 600 (App. Div. 1996)). We find that plaintiff s evidence satisfies the TCA threshold, thereby permitting a jury to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for pain and suffering. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 128 September Term 2001 Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MANTUA TOWNSHIP SOCCER ASSOCIATION, COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious), JOHN DOES 11-20 (fictitious) and JOHN DOES 21-30 (fictitious), jointly, severally and in the alternative, Defendants, and TOWNSHIP OF MANTUA, Defendant-Respondent. VERNIERO, J., dissenting. The Court holds that Joseph M. Knowles (plaintiff) has satisfied the threshold for recovery of non-economic damages against a public entity under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3 (the Act). In so doing, it concludes that plaintiff s asserted injuries resemble those experienced by the successful claimants in Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3 (2002), and Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533 (2000). I dissented in those two cases and likewise would do so here, assuming that the facts of this case are similar to those found in Kahrar and Gilhooley. More importantly, however, I do not believe that the three cases resemble each other. Rather, I find that plaintiff s injuries are comparable to those sustained by the claimant in Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395 (1997). The Brooks claimant suffered from stiffness, muscle spasms, dizziness, decreased range of motion in her neck, and post-traumatic headaches. Id. at 398-400. In addition, the claimant experienced severe lower back pain that radiate[d] into her left leg and had difficulty in performing household chores, including vacuuming, carrying groceries, or other activities that require[d] lifting or bending. Id. at 400. Notwithstanding those conditions, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the public entity s favor. In so doing, we accepted that the claimant experience[d] pain and that the limitation of motion in her neck and back [was] permanent. Id. at 406. In this case, plaintiff sustained injuries to his back and neck. As a result, he complains of headaches, neck and back pain, and numbness in his left leg. Plaintiff asserts that those symptoms have disturbed his sleep and hampered his ability to play sports, complete household projects, stand or sit for extended periods, and engage in lengthy walks. Although no doubt significant from plaintiff s perspective, his injuries do not satisfy the Act s high threshold for recovery. Plaintiff s circumstances are similar to those encountered by the Brooks claimant and, therefore, warrant the same result. Without an award for non-economic damages, plaintiff still would be entitled to economic damages consistent with the Act s two-tier approach. See Kahrar, supra, 171 N.J. at 26 (Verniero, J., dissenting) (explaining how Act distinguishes between economic and non-economic damages, making claims for the latter more difficult to sustain ). Regarding the Act s approach, I previously have recited the statute s history and purpose, id. at 16-20 (Verniero, J., dissenting), and need not repeat that discussion here. Suffice it to say that the Legislature intended an elevated threshold for recovery of non-economic damages such as pain and suffering to protect the public coffers. Brooks, supra, 150 N.J. at 402. That the Legislature would so act is consistent with the notion that such damages, by their nature, are more subjective and less certain than economic damages. See Comment, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2 (describing pain and suffering as non-objective type of damage); Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 571 (1987) (explaining that Act s ban against recovery of damages for pain and suffering resulting from any injury is intended to apply to the intangible, subjective feelings of discomfort that are associated with personal injuries ). The Court appears to center its analysis on the extent to which a claimant may complete normal tasks rather than on whether there has been a permanent loss of the use of a bodily function that is substantial. Brooks, supra, 150 N.J. at 406 (emphasis added). That type of analytical framework risks lowering the Act s bar to recovery in a manner not intended by lawmakers. In sum, I continue to believe that Brooks reflects an accurate reading of the Act, and I agree with the public entity in this case that plaintiff s claim is like the one in Brooks. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. NO. A-128 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court JOSEPH M. KNOWLES and SUSAN M. KNOWLES, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MANTUA TOWNSHIP SOCCER ASSOCIATION, COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, etc., et al., Defendants, and TOWNSHIP OF MANTUA, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED May 29, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Verniero