Case Title: Holmberg v. Brent

Citation: 161 Vt. 153, 636 A.2d 333

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
HOLMBERG_V_BRENT.92-300; 161 Vt. 153; 636 A.2d 333

[Filed 19-Nov-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-300


 Holger A. Holmberg                           Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Windham Superior Court

 Douglas Brent                                September Term, 1993



 Stephen B. Martin, J.,

 Thomas W. Costello, Clare A. Buckley and Joel T. Faxon, Law Clerk
   (On the Brief), of Thomas W. Costello, P.C., Brattleboro, for
   plaintiff-appellant

 Stephen S. Ankuda of Parker & Ankuda, P.C., Springfield, for defendant-
   appellee

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Geoffrey A. Yudien, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for intervenor State


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Plaintiff Holger Holmberg appeals the grant of summary
 judgment in favor of defendant Douglas Brent, holding that under 24 V.S.A.
 { 901(a) defendant cannot be sued for negligence in his individual capacity
 as fire chief of the Village of Bellows Falls.  We reverse.
      In March 1987, plaintiff was injured while employed as a firefighter by
 the Village of Bellows Falls Fire Department, when, in response to an
 emergency call, he slid down a fire pole and landed on the cement floor
 below.  Sometime before the incident, defendant, as fire chief, had ordered
 the removal of a pad surrounding the base of the pole.  Plaintiff brought a

 

 negligence action, alleging that removing the pad had created an unreason-
 ably dangerous condition and caused his injury.  Plaintiff received
 workers' compensation benefits, but sought damages from defendant under 21
 V.S.A. { 624, (FN1) which permits suits against third parties responsible for
 injury.(FN2)
      Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that he qualifies as a
 municipal officer under 24 V.S.A. { 901(a), which would require plaintiff to
 bring his action against the Village of Bellows Falls instead of defendant.
 Defendant argued in the alternative that qualified official immunity shields
 him from any liability, because removal of the pad was a discretionary
 function of the office of fire chief.  In deciding the motion, the trial
 court looked to 24 V.S.A. { 1951, which empowers municipalities to establish
 fire departments and appoint officers of the department, and 24 V.S.A.
 { 1953, which mandates the fire chief as an officer of the department.  The
 court concluded from a reading of these statutes that defendant is an
 "appointed or elected municipal officer" for purposes of { 901(a), and so
 any action against defendant in his capacity as fire chief must be brought
 against the village.  The trial court entered judgment for defendant

 

 without ruling on the qualified immunity issue.  As a result, plaintiff's
 only recourse would be to sue the village, his employer, directly for the
 fire chief's alleged negligence, but such an action is barred under the
 exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes.  See 21
 V.S.A. { 622.  In effect, the judgment would deprive plaintiff of a remedy
 under the workers' compensation exclusivity exception.
      Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ruling that no
 material fact was disputed and that defendant should prevail under a proper
 interpretation of { 901(a).  Summary judgment may be granted if no genuine
 issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
 as a matter of law.  V.R.C.P. 56(c); State v. Delaney, 157 Vt. 247, 252, 598 A.2d 138, 141 (1991).  Since the standard for summary judgment requires that
 both criteria be satisfied, however, we need not address the claim that
 material facts are contested if we determine that defendant is not entitled
 to summary judgment as a matter of law.
      In construing statutes, our goal is to effect the legislative intent.
 State v. Wilcox, __ Vt. __, __,