Case Title: The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida v. Survivors Charter Schools, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-2402

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-2402 
____________ 
 
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
SURVIVORS CHARTER SCHOOLS, INC.,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 27, 2009] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
This case involves charter schools; specifically the procedures a charter 
school sponsor must follow when it decides to “immediately” terminate a charter 
pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), because “good cause 
has been shown” or the “health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened.”  § 
1002.33(8)(d), Fla. Stat.1  The specific issue in this case is whether a school board, 
 
 
1.  Section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), provided in pertinent part 
as follows: 
A charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor determines 
that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or welfare of 
the students is threatened. 
as a charter school sponsor, must utilize the provisions of Florida’s Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), chapter 120, Florida Statutes, when immediately 
terminating a charter.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Survivors Charter 
Schools, Inc. v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 968 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2007), concluded that the APA must be followed when a school board immediately 
terminates a charter school charter under section 1002.33(8)(d) and concluded that 
“immediately” essentially meant anything less than ninety days.2   
The district court’s decision expressly affects school boards as a class of 
constitutional or state officers under article IX, section 4(b), Florida Constitution.  
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.   
The resolution of this issue is based on statutory interpretation.  After a 
careful review of the governing charter schools statute, pertinent provisions of the 
APA, and our application of principles of statutory construction to ascertain 
legislative intent, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend for the 
procedures of the APA to apply to the immediate termination of charter school 
charters under section 1002.33(8)(d).  Accordingly, we quash the decision of the 
                                          
 
 
2.  This Court granted discretionary review in School Board of Palm Beach 
County v. Survivors Charter Schools, Inc., 977 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2008).   The 
Florida School Boards Association, the Florida State Board of Education, and the 
Pacific Legal Foundation appeared as Amici Curiae in this case, are all in favor of 
the School Board’s position that the APA does not apply. 
 
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Fourth District and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On 
remand, the Fourth District may consider any of the other issues raised by 
Survivors Charter Schools but not reached, including specific due process and 
evidentiary issues related to the procedures followed by the School Board in this 
case. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal arose out of the immediate termination by the School Board of 
Palm Beach County (School Board) of the charters for two charter schools in Palm 
Beach County, based on a finding of severe fiscal mismanagement in both charter 
schools.  Survivors Charter Schools, Inc. (Survivors), operated both charter 
schools, Survivors Charter School West Palm Beach (Survivors WPB) and 
Survivors Charter School Boynton Beach (Survivors BB), under ten-year charters 
granted in 2001 and 2003, respectively.  Both charters included provisions for 
immediate termination after twenty-four hours’ notice.  Although there had been a 
history of the School Board’s concerns regarding the fiscal management of both 
schools, the precipitating event for the immediate termination was an audit report 
completed on January 13, 2006, which included fourteen findings of fiscal 
mismanagement by Survivors.3  The School Board considered the audit report 
                                          
 
3.  In December 2005 a draft audit report was provided to Survivors and 
responses requested.  Survivors provided written responses to the district auditor 
on December 30, 2005.  On January 23, 2006, the School Board published notice 
 
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along with the “Superintendent’s Recommendation to Immediately Terminate 
Charter Agreement” due to the “severity of the audit findings” at a specially 
noticed meeting on January 25, 2006.4  At that meeting, the School Board heard 
public comments as well as comments from individuals representing Survivors, but 
there was no presentation of testimony under oath and no formal admission of 
documents into evidence.  At the conclusion of the meeting, the School Board 
voted to terminate the charters and a notice of immediate termination was then 
hand-delivered to each school.  The notice indicated the termination was “for 
‘good cause’ because of the severity of the Audit Findings,” based on section 
1002.33(8)(d) as well as the charter provisions, and would become effective in 
twenty-four hours.  
Survivors appealed to the State Board of Education, which then referred the 
matter to the Charter School Appeal Commission (CSAC).  The CSAC held an 
                                                                                                                                        
of a special meeting to be held on January 25 to consider the disposition of the two 
charters.  On January 24, 2006, the School Board hand-delivered notifications to 
the two charter schools stating that the superintendent would recommend 
termination of the charters at the January 25 special meeting. 
 
4.   Cindy Adair, Chair of the Palm Beach County School District Audit 
Committee, spoke before the School Board at the January 25 special meeting.  She 
explained that the school district audit committee had been working with Survivors 
for over a year to correct the deficiencies but to no avail; and that if allowed to 
continue, the deficiencies would severely impair public confidence in the School 
Board and its role as trustees of the public education tax dollars.  
 
 
 
 
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informal hearing where representatives of Survivors spoke but unsuccessfully 
attempted to proffer evidence.  It was the CSAC’s position, based upon the Florida 
Charter School Appeals Commission Guidelines, that no additional evidence could 
be considered.5  Ultimately, the CSAC voted that the School Board had 
“competent, substantial evidence to support its finding regarding the severity of the 
audit findings.”  However, it concluded that although the School Board had good 
cause for the immediate termination of the Survivors BB charter, it did not have 
good cause for the immediate termination of the Survivors WPB charter.  The 
CSAC prepared written recommendations regarding both charter schools, and the 
matter proceeded to the State Board of Education for a final decision.  The State 
Board of Education then held a meeting at which it reviewed the recommendations.  
The State Board of Education took comments from representatives of Survivors, 
who raised due process concerns as to the procedures by which the charters had 
been terminated.  The State Board ultimately voted to uphold the immediate 
termination of both charters, rejecting the CSAC’s contrary recommendation as to 
                                          
 
 
5.  See Florida Department of Education, Charter School Appeal 
Commission Guidelines 12 (2003), available at  
http://www.fldoe.org/board/meetings/Aug_19_03/CharterSchoolAppealGuidelines.
pdf.  The guidelines were adopted by the State Board of Education on September 
16, 2003.  See State Board of Education, Minutes, Florida International University, 
Miami, Florida (Aug. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.fldoe.org/board/meetings/Sep_16_03/Minutes_2003-08-19.pdf.  
  
 
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the Survivors WPB charter.  Final orders were entered from which Survivors 
appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.  
Although multiple issues were raised on appeal, the Fourth District 
determined two “key” issues: “whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
applied to the School Board’s charter termination process”; and, if the APA did  
apply, “what due process protections were required and whether they were 
provided by the School Board.”  968 So. 2d at 42.  After reviewing both the APA 
and the Charter School statute, the Fourth District concluded that “the process 
leading to the School Board’s termination decision was subject to the APA.”  Id. at 
43.  Noting that under section 1002.33(8)(c),6 a charter school sponsor may 
terminate a charter on nonimmediate grounds after giving ninety days notice in 
writing, the district court concluded, by reading the two provisions together, that 
for “immediate” terminations:     
Under [section 1002.33(8)(d)], immediate means only something less 
than ninety days, which clearly encompasses the fourteen-day notice 
requirement of section 120.569(2)(b) as applied to the School Board’s 
                                          
 
 
6.  Section 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), provided in pertinent part: 
     (c)  At least 90 days prior to renewing or terminating a charter, the 
sponsor shall notify the governing body of the school of the proposed 
action in writing.  The notice shall state in reasonable detail the 
grounds for the proposed action and stipulate that the school’s 
governing body may, within 14 calendar days after receiving the 
notice, request an informal hearing before the sponsor. 
 
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determination of good cause for termination (plus twenty-four hours’ 
notice of termination once good cause is shown based on the charters). 
 
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).  The district court summarized the APA provisions that 
it held should apply in immediate charter school terminations: 
The APA includes defined procedures for providing due process 
regarding decisions which determine substantial interests.  Under 
section 120.569(2)(b), “[a]ll parties shall be afforded an opportunity 
for a hearing after reasonable notice of not less than 14 days,” unless 
waived by consent of all parties.  However, to receive such a hearing, 
a party is required to file a petition or request for a hearing.  § 
120.569(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat.  If a hearing is requested and the petition 
is granted, a hearing will be held and the “presiding officer has the 
power to swear witnesses and take their testimony under oath, to issue 
subpoenas, and to effect discovery.”  § 120.569(2)(f), Fla. Stat. . . .  
[The] evidence may be received in written form and testimony must 
be under oath.  Id.  Cross-examination is also permitted.  § 
120.569(2)(j).[7]  Additional procedures apply in cases involving 
disputed issues of material fact.  § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. 
 
968 So. 2d at 43.  The district court then concluded: 
 
[I]f substantial interests are affected and the APA applies, as we have 
determined, immediate termination can only mean termination 
following a determination of good cause subject to the fourteen-day 
                                          
 
7.  The district court did not address or attempt to harmonize the immediate 
order provisions of section 120.569(2)(n), Florida Statutes, with the immediate 
termination provisions of section 1002.33(8)(d).  In its brief, the School Board 
acknowledges the existence of this immediate order provision in the APA, but 
argues that it does not apply to charter school terminations.  We note that section 
120.569(2)(n) does provide that an agency may enter an immediate final order, 
such as a cease and desist order, if it finds an immediate danger to the public 
health, safety, or welfare.  However, this APA provision does not specify a “good 
cause” basis for immediate action, as is provided in section 1002.33(8).  Further, 
the provision for appeal of the immediate order under chapter 120 and the appeal 
provisions set forth in section 1002.33(6) for immediate terminations are not 
similar. 
 
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notice requirement and accompanying APA procedures (especially 
where such a requirement allows for more immediate termination than 
the general termination procedure).  As much as the audit report 
findings may have reflected serious financial transgressions, 
termination following a determination of good cause can only be so 
immediate as to afford due process, and due process can only be 
afforded with fourteen days’ notice and a hearing under the APA.  
 
Id. at 45.  
 
After deciding that the APA applied to the procedures the School Board was 
mandated to follow before “immediately” terminating a charter, the Fourth District 
then analyzed what APA protections applied.  It concluded that under the APA, the 
School Board was required to provide “reasonable notice of not less than 14 days” 
and to hold a quasi-judicial hearing under the APA, where testimony would be 
taken under oath, subpoenas issued and cross-examination could occur.  Because 
the School Board clearly did not follow the APA, the Fourth District reversed and 
remanded “so that the termination of Survivors’ charters based on a determination 
of good cause shown can be considered following proper notice and subject to the 
due process protections of the APA.”  In so holding, the Fourth District expressly 
declined to comment on the other specific due process and evidentiary issues 
raised by Survivors.  Id. at 46.   
OVERVIEW 
 
The question before this Court is whether the School Board must adhere to 
the Administrative Procedure Act when it decides to immediately terminate a 
 
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charter school charter under section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), or 
whether it is required to follow only the specific procedures set forth in various 
provisions contained in section 1002.33.8  The decision of the Fourth District, if 
upheld, would require pretermination notice and accompanying APA procedures—
procedures that could take up to ninety days.   
As a preliminary matter, certain parties have urged this Court to consider 
matters of policy in reaching a decision as to which statutory procedures control 
the immediate termination of charter school charters.  Survivors contends that not 
requiring adherence to the APA in immediate terminations may allow the school 
boards to operate on “whimsical notions” of due process at the “leisure” of the 
superintendent.  On the other hand, the School Board contends that requiring 
application of the APA to immediate terminations could cause irreparable harm to 
students or public funds.  They, along with the amici, assert that the type of quasi-
judicial proceeding called for under the APA “can realistically consume several 
months,” involving as it might “pleadings, motion practice, discovery, quasi-
judicial hearing, post-hearing submittals, a final order, etc.”   
Amicus Pacific Legal Foundation weighed in to argue against application of 
the APA to charter schools.  Its amicus brief advocates the benefits of charter 
                                          
 
 
8.  Provisions applicable to charter terminations are found in section 
1002.33(8)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes (2005).  The provisions applicable to appeals of 
charter terminations are found in section 1002.33(6)(c)-(e), Florida Statutes (2005). 
 
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schools and argues that burdening the charter schools with the costly, complex, and 
time-consuming requirements of the APA reduces the flexibility in public 
education that the charter school statutory scheme was intended to provide and 
conflicts with the express intent of the Legislature in the charter schools statute that 
a school board may “immediately” terminate a charter.   
We do not express any opinion as to these policy considerations, although 
they may have merit, because this case does not turn on our view of the “better” 
policy, but turns solely on statutory interpretation.  In statutory construction, our 
task is to ascertain the meaning of the phrases and words used in a provision, not to 
substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature.  See, e.g., Tillman v. State, 934 
So. 2d 1263, 1270 (Fla. 2006) (“[I]t is not this Court’s function to substitute its 
judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom or policy of a particular 
statute.” (quoting State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001))). 
Because the provisions of section 1002.33, the charter schools statute, are 
central to our analysis, we first discuss the general provisions of that statute.  
Within that discussion, we will focus primarily on the provisions in the statutory 
scheme that relate to termination of charter school charters.  We then provide an 
overview of the APA and the principles that govern its applicability.  Finally, using 
principles of statutory construction, we focus on whether the Legislature intended 
 
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that the procedures set forth in the APA should be followed in “immediately” 
terminating charter school charters under section 1002.33(8)(d).  
THE CHARTER SCHOOLS STATUTE 
Charter schools are nonsectarian public schools that operate under a 
performance contract (charter) with a public sponsor—either a district school 
board or a university.  See §1002.33(1), (7), (9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).9  Charter 
schools were first authorized in Florida in 1996 in chapter 228, Florida Statutes.  
See ch. 96-186, § 1, Laws of Fla.  In 2002, the charter school statute was moved to 
chapter 1002.  See ch. 2002-387, § 98, Laws of Fla.  Charter schools are 
considered “schools of choice,” in that their creation is now authorized under Part 
III of chapter 1002, Florida Statutes, titled “Educational Choice.”  That part 
provides for several different types of schools of choice, including charter schools.  
One of the legislatively stated guiding principles for charter schools is that they 
                                          
 
 
9.  In 2006, the Legislature enacted section 1002.335, Florida Statutes 
(2006), which established an independent state-level entity called the “Florida 
Schools of Excellence Commission” and provided it with the power to authorize 
charter schools throughout the state.  See ch. 2006-302, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Under 
that statute, a school board is required to obtain approval of the State Board of 
Education in order to retain exclusive authority to authorize charter schools in its 
district.  The First District Court of Appeal held section 1002.335 unconstitutional 
in Duval County School Board v. State Board of Education, 998 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2008), on the grounds that it conflicted with article IX, section 4 of the 
Florida Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that “[t]he school board shall 
operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the school district.”  
See art. IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.  We expressly do not address the merits of that issue 
in this opinion. 
 
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“provide[] parents with the flexibility to choose among diverse educational 
opportunities within the state’s public schools system.”  § 1002.33(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2005).  Private schools, parochial schools, and home education programs are not 
eligible for charter school status.  § 1002.33(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). 
Under the charter school statute, funding for students attending charter 
schools is provided on the same basis as for students in basic or special public 
programs, § 1002.33(17), Fla. Stat., and charter schools are eligible for capital 
outlay funding under chapter 1013.  See §1002.33(19), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The 
duties of the district school board include monitoring the revenues and 
expenditures of the charter schools.  See § 1002.33(5)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2005).   
Section 1002.33 also sets forth the requirements for eligible students and for 
employees of charter schools, bases for funding, requirements for charter school 
facilities, and procedures for charter school performance review.  See § 
1002.33(10), (18), (23), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Finally, section 1002.33 sets forth 
detailed procedures for the creation and operation of a charter school, as well as 
termination procedures that apply when a sponsor determines that a charter must 
be terminated.  § 1002.33(6)-(8), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Thus, the statute is 
comprehensive in its treatment of all aspects of the creation, operation, and 
termination of charter schools.  Within this detailed statutory scheme governing 
charter schools, we focus primarily on the provisions relating to immediate 
 
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termination of charter school charters and the process set forth in the statute for 
appeal of charter school terminations.  
   
 
CHARTER SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES 
Central to our decision in this case are the special termination procedures for 
charter school charters, including when a charter is not renewed or is to be 
terminated under nonemergency circumstances, as well as procedures for 
immediate termination of charters for good cause or where the health, safety or 
welfare of the students is threatened.  These two types of terminations are treated 
in different subsections of 1002.33(8).  Section 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes 
(2005), pertains to all terminations other than those requiring immediate action and 
provides:  
     (c) At least 90 days prior to renewing or terminating a charter, the 
sponsor shall notify the governing body of the school of the proposed 
action in writing.  The notice shall state in reasonable detail the 
ground for the proposed action and stipulate that the school’s 
governing body may, within 14 calendar days after receiving the 
notice, request an informal hearing before the sponsor.  The sponsor 
shall conduct the informal hearing within 30 calendar days after 
receiving a written request.  The charter school’s governing body 
may, within 14 calendar days after receiving the sponsor’s decision to 
terminate or refuse to renew the charter, appeal the decision pursuant 
to the procedure established in subsection (6). 
 
Section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), governing immediate terminations 
of charters, which was in effect when the School Board terminated Survivors’ 
charters, provides:  
 
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     (d) A charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor 
determines that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or 
welfare of the students is threatened.  The school district in which the 
charter school is located shall assume operation of the school under 
these circumstances.  The charter school’s governing board may, 
within 14 days after receiving the sponsor’s decision to terminate the 
charter, appeal the decision pursuant to the procedure established in 
subsection (6). 
 
§ 1002.33(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005).10  Both termination provisions make reference 
to an appeal pursuant to subsection (6) of section 1002.33.  Section 1002.33(6)(c
provides that an appeal of the determination of a charter school sponsor, such as 
the School Board, may be taken to the State Board of Education.  
) 
See § 
1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Under the statute, when an appeal is filed, the 
                                          
 
 
10.  Section 1002.33(8)(d) was amended in 2006 to provide in pertinent part 
as follows: 
     (d) A charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor 
determines that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or 
welfare of the students is threatened.  The sponsor shall notify in 
writing the charter school’s governing body, the charter school 
principal, and the department if a charter is immediately terminated. 
The sponsor shall clearly identify the specific issues that resulted in 
the immediate termination and provide evidence of prior notification 
of issues resulting in the immediate termination when appropriate. 
The school district in which the charter school is located shall assume 
operation of the school under these circumstances.  The charter 
school’s governing board may, within 30 14 days after receiving the 
sponsor’s decision to terminate the charter, appeal the decision 
pursuant to the procedure established in subsection (6).  
Ch. 2006-190, § 1, at 1935, Laws of Fla. (amendment emphasized).  The 
amendment dealt with the additional requirements of what should be 
contained in the notice, but no other requirements regarding pretermination 
procedures were affected.    
 
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State Board of Education must convene a meeting of the Charter School Appeal 
Commission (CSAC), which will study and make a recommendation to the State 
Board of Education regarding its decision about the pending appeal.   
§1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005).  
The stated purpose of the CSAC is to “assist the commissioner and the State 
Board of Education with a fair and impartial review of appeals by applicants whose 
charter applications have been denied, [or] whose charter contracts have not been 
renewed or have been terminated by their sponsors.”  § 1002.33(6)(e)(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2005).  The CSAC members “shall thoroughly review the materials presented to 
them from the appellant and the sponsor” and may “request information to clarify 
the documentation presented to it.”  § 1002.33(6)(e)5, Fla. Stat. (2005).  The 
CSAC must provide its recommendation to the State Board of Education and must 
include a “fact-based justification for the recommendation.”  Id.  The statute 
expressly provides that “[t]he decision of the Charter School Appeal Commission 
is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.”  § 
1002.33(6)(e)2, Fla. Stat. (2005).   
Once the recommendation of the CSAC is provided to the State Board of 
Education, the Board must either accept or reject the decision of the district school 
board no later than ninety days after the appeal is filed.  The district school board is 
mandated to implement the decision of the State Board of Education.  § 
 
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1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005).  While “[t]he decision of the State Board of 
Education is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,” § 
1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005), it is “final action subject to judicial review.”  § 
1002.33(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Because the resolution of this case requires us to 
determine whether the Legislature intended that the chapter 120 APA procedures 
apply to immediate termination decisions of the charter school sponsor, we 
proceed to a brief examination of the APA.   
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
The Administrative Procedure Act, set forth in chapter 120, Florida Statutes, 
is generally applicable to all forms of agency decision making.  Soon after 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, the First District confirmed that 
the APA “enforces its discipline on all agency action, unless specifically exempted, 
which affects the substantial interests of a party.”  Graham Contracting, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 363 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see also Legal 
Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 642 So. 2d 1081, 1083 
n.2 (Fla. 1994) (“The Administrative Procedure Act applies to all administrative 
agencies in Florida.”); §120.50, Fla. Stat. (2005) (indicating that the Legislature 
and courts are exempt from application of the APA).  No one disputes that a school 
board is an “agency” as that term is defined in the APA.  § 120.52(1)(b)3, Fla. Stat. 
(2005) (defining “agency” to include “Board”); see also Volusia County Sch. Bd. 
 
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v. Volusia Homes Builders Ass’n, Inc., 946 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2006) (holding that county school boards are agencies).   
The APA “was intended to simplify the administrative process and provide 
the public with a more certain administrative procedure, thereby insuring that the 
public would receive due process and significantly improved fairness of 
treatment.”  Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1136-37 (Fla. 1988).  
The APA prescribes a multitude of procedures to be followed by agencies in 
enacting regulatory provisions pursuant to legislatively granted authority, for 
parties challenging agency rules, and in agency decision-making in matters that 
affect the substantial interests of persons who are regulated by or do business with 
an agency.  The broad scope of the APA and the many specific procedures that it 
requires agencies to follow need not be examined in depth here.  Pertinent to our 
review are the provisions of section 120.569, Florida Statutes (2005), which 
generally governs agency action and procedure to be followed in making decisions 
that determine the substantial interests of a party, and section 120.57, Florida 
Statutes (2005), which prescribes procedures for fact-finding hearings.   
Substantial interests of a party as referred to in section 120.569 are 
determined where “(1) the proposed action will result in injury-in-fact which is of 
sufficient immediacy to justify a hearing; and (2) the injury is of the type that the 
statute pursuant to which the agency has acted is designed to protect.”  Fairbanks, 
 
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Inc. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 635 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).  In the event 
that there are disputed issues of material fact to be determined, and a hearing has 
been requested under section 120.569(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), an adversarial 
hearing must be provided under section 120.57, after reasonable notice is given not 
less than fourteen days before the hearing.  § 120.569(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The 
notice must contain certain information including the time, place, and nature of the 
hearing and the legal authority under which the hearing is to be held.  A number of 
post-hearing procedures can follow; and, where the case is presented to an 
administrative law judge, those procedures involve preparation of a recommended 
order by the administrative law judge, filing of exceptions to the recommended 
order by the parties, and preparation and issuance of a final order by the agency 
making the final decision.  A final order entered under the APA is then 
immediately reviewable in the district court of appeal.  § 120.68, Florida Statutes 
(2005). 
It is this general APA procedure for notice and hearing set forth in sections 
120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, that the Fourth District concluded must be 
followed by the School Board in immediately terminating a charter under section 
1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005).  However, the Fourth District 
acknowledged that the “relationship between chapters 120 and 1002 is . . . 
complex.”  Survivors, 968 So. 2d at 45.  Recognizing that an agency must follow 
 
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the APA unless exempted by the Legislature, the Fourth District attempted to 
harmonize the provisions of the APA and section 1002.33 by determining that the 
School Board could only terminate a charter under section 1002.33(8)(d) after 
compliance with section 120.569, and that an “immediate” termination in the 
charter schools statute “means only something less than ninety days.”  Id.  
While we endorse the general principle that absent a specific exemption the 
APA applies to agency action, that principle applies where there are no other 
countervailing indications of legislative intent.11  We must now determine if the 
Fourth District’s attempt to harmonize the APA with the “immediate” termination 
                                          
 
 
11.  We realize that in a different context, the First District rejected the 
proposition of an “implied exemption” in the case of Gopman v. Department of 
Education, 908 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).  Gopman involved the denial of 
a chapter 120 administrative hearing to an unsuccessful scholarship applicant 
under section 1009.42(1), Florida Statutes (2003), after the Department of 
Education (DOE) found him ineligible to receive the scholarship.  The First 
District rejected the DOE’s argument that an appeal procedure set forth in section 
1009.42(1), Florida Statutes (2003), created an implied exemption from the APA.  
However, the statutory procedure at issue in Gopman is distinguishable from that 
set forth in section 1002.33.  In Gopman, section 1009.42 created only 
“preliminary procedures” that “[l]ike ‘free form’ procedures . . . do not have 
express statutory sanction.”  Gopman, 908 So. 2d at 1121.  In section 1009.42(1), 
the statute leaves it to the State Board of Education to adopt a rule of procedure 
establishing “a committee to consider appeals that are not resolved by other 
administrative action.” (Emphasis added.)   In contrast, in section 1002.33, the 
Legislature expressly set forth the detailed procedure for deciding questions of 
immediate termination and for appealing those decisions.  Additionally, section 
1002.33(6)(c) provides that in charter school terminations, the decision of the State 
Board of Education, while final agency action, is not subject to the provisions of 
the APA. 
 
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provisions of section 1002.33(8)(d) is consistent with legislative intent relating to 
charter schools.  We thus proceed to a statutory construction analysis.  
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS 
 Because the question presented solely involves interpretation of a statute, it 
is subject to de novo review.  See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. 
Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 2008) (citing Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. 
J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007)).  In matters of statutory construction, we 
have repeatedly recognized that legislative intent is the polestar that guides the 
Court.  Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003).  While that principle 
is undisputed, the actual application of that principle is at times difficult.  In this 
case, if the Legislature had expressly stated that the APA governs terminations 
under section 1002.33(8)(d), this case would not be before us.  Conversely, if the 
Legislature had specifically exempted school boards from the APA, as the 
Legislature did in the case of the Charter School Appeals Commission and the 
State Board of Education, there would also be no need for statutory construction to 
determine legislative intent.12  The answer would be clear.  However, in this case, 
despite the comprehensive statutory scheme set forth in section 1002.33 for the 
creation, operation, and termination of charter schools, the Legislature neither 
                                          
 
12.  Legislation proposed for the 2009 legislative session, if enacted, would 
amend section 1002.33(8)(d) to do just that by stating that “[t]he sponsor’s 
determination is not subject to an informal hearing under paragraph (b) or pursuant 
to chapter 120.”  Fla. S. Comm. on Educ., CS for SB 278 (2009). 
 
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expressly subjected the school boards and other charter school sponsors to the 
APA in matters involving immediate terminations, nor expressly exempted school 
boards from the APA requirements. 
We determine that within the express text of section 1002.33, the Legislature 
has given clear indication of legislative intent as to procedures to be followed 
relative to charter schools by providing a comprehensive, detailed statutory scheme 
that does not intend that the provisions of the APA be incorporated into the charter 
school termination process.  In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the 
principle that specific statutes covering a particular subject area will control over a 
statute covering the same subject in general terms.  See Maggio v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Labor & Empl. Sec., 899 So. 2d 1074, 1079 (Fla. 2005).   
Basic to our examination of statutes, and an important aspect of our analysis 
here, is the “elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and 
effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if 
possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”  
Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 
(Fla. 2003)).  In this regard, we focus first on the word “immediately” in section 
1002.33(8)(d).  That section expressly states that a sponsor, here the School Board, 
may “immediately” terminate a charter school charter upon good cause shown or 
 
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where the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened.  § 1002.33(8)(d), 
Fla. Stat. (2005).  The Survivors charters then impose only a twenty-four-hour 
notice requirement upon such an immediate termination.   
“Where, as here, the legislature has not defined the words used in a [statute], 
the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”  Fla. Birth-Related 
Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So. 
2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 1997).  The word “immediately” in section 1002.33(8)(d) is 
not defined, and it is therefore “appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when 
construing statutes” in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of words 
used there.  Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 975 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (Fla. 
2008); see also Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000) (“When 
necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning ‘can be ascertained by reference to a 
dictionary.’” (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992))).  The word 
“immediately” means “without interval of time.”  See Merriam Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary 621 (11th ed. 2003).  Accordingly, the Legislature’s use of 
the word “immediately” in section 1002.33(8)(d) indicates that the charter may be 
terminated “without interval of time.”  Therefore, termination of a charter 
“immediately” means something different than termination accomplished over a 
period of weeks or months or, even as interpreted by the Fourth District, “only 
something less than ninety days,” which is the time frame established for non-
 
- 22 -
emergency terminations of charter school charters.  See Survivors, 968 So. 2d at 
45. 
Our conclusion that “immediate” contemplates prompt action is 
strengthened by the fact that the reasons for which section 1002.33(8)(d) may be 
invoked are limited to situations where “the health, safety, or welfare of the 
students is threatened” and where “good cause” for immediate termination is 
shown.  As to situations involving threats to the health, safety or welfare of 
students, the emergency nature of the circumstances are apparent, as well as the 
need for prompt action.  As to “good cause” for immediate termination, the School 
Board agrees that in the context of this statute, “good cause” would have to be 
something more than the other legally sufficient causes that govern non-emergency 
terminations, and that the circumstances must be exigent so as to necessitate 
immediate action.13  If grounds necessitating immediate action are not present, 
                                          
 
 
13.  Section 1002.33(8)(a) provides that for nonrenewal or termination of 
charters, cause includes failure to participate in the State’s education accountability 
system, failure to meet student performance requirements, failure to meet generally 
accepted standards of fiscal management, violation of law or other good cause 
shown.  The Charter School Appeal Commission Guidelines adopted by the 
Commission on August 8, 2003 and by the State Board of Education on August 19, 
2003 state that the component parts of “good cause” for immediate termination are 
“one or more of the other legally sufficient causes” listed for regular termination in 
section 1002.33(8)(a).  However, the guidelines state that to immediately 
terminate, the “good cause” must be a “higher standard” than that set forth for a 
regular termination and that the CSAC must take into account the totality of the 
circumstances including the immediacy of the district’s concerns, the extent of the 
concerns, the “amount of constructive notice” the school received about the 
 
- 23 -
then the district school board must utilize the provisions of section 1002.33(8)(c). 
On the other hand, when emergency-type situations are present, then the chance
harm to the students increases and the concomitant need for immediate action is 
obvious, thereby justifying immediate termination under section 1002.33(8)(d).  
Thus, in determining the legislative intent behind section 1002.33(8)(d), we look 
not just at the use of the word “immediately” but at the fact that this subsection 
addresses the type of circumstances requiring an immediate response, such as a 
threat to the health, safety, or welfare of the students.  
 
 of 
Further, because we are dealing with an entire statutory scheme for granting 
and terminating charters, we do not look at only one portion of the statute in 
isolation but we review the entire statute to determine intent.  See GTC, Inc. v. 
Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 787 (Fla. 2007).  This is in accord with the principle that 
we “give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory 
provisions in harmony with one another.”  Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 199 
(quoting Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 898 
(Fla. 2002)).  It is thus significant to our analysis that the Legislature set forth 
detailed procedures in section 1002.33(8)(c) for the school boards to follow for 
                                                                                                                                        
concerns, and the likelihood that the school could or would have remedied the 
concerns with proper notice.  See Charter School Appeal Commission Guidelines 
17, available at http: //www. 
fldoe.org/board/meetings/Aug_19_03/CharterSchoolAppealGuidelines.pdf.  
 
 
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nonemergency termination and nonrenewal of a charter.  Survivors concedes, and 
we agree, that because the Legislature set forth those detailed procedures in section 
1002.33(8)(c), the APA would not apply to nonemergency terminations under that 
subsection.  At the same time, Survivors urges us to find, as did the Fourth District, 
that when it comes to emergency terminations under section 1002.33(8)(d), the 
procedures of the APA would apply.14   
We are not required to abandon either our common sense or principles of 
logic in statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Bautista, 863 So. 2d at 1185 (applying a 
“common-sense approach” to statutory interpretation in order to give effect to 
legislative intent).  We consider Survivors’ view to be contrary to common sense 
in that a school board would be subjected to more extensive procedures under the 
APA when emergency circumstances are present than it would be subjected to for 
all other terminations under the procedures set forth in section 1002.33(8)(c).    
                                          
 
 
14.  Survivors states that because section 1002.33(8)(c) provides specific 
procedural guidance for ninety-day terminations, but did not delineate similar 
procedures for immediate terminations under section 1002.33(8)(d), the 
Legislature therefore intended that immediate terminations under section 
1002.33(8)(d) fall within the realm of the APA.  This contention ignores the fact 
that section 1002.33(8)(c) does not expressly require APA-type notice and hearing 
for nonemergency terminations and, further, that emergency terminations are an 
integral part of the overall detailed legislative scheme in place for charter school 
creation, operation, termination, and appeal in which the entity issuing the final 
order is expressly exempt from the APA.  
 
- 25 -
Finally, we also discuss due process considerations, in part because the 
Fourth District stressed its concern that the charter school termination procedures 
must provide due process to the school whose charter is being terminated and 
because the court appeared to conclude that due process could be provided only by 
compliance with the APA.  We are always mindful of our obligation to construe 
provisions of legislative acts consistent with the basic tenets of fairness and due 
process.  See Larimore v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S948, S953 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2008) 
revised on denial of rehearing, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S131 (Fla. Jan. 29, 2009) (citing 
State v. Atkinson, 831 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2002)).  We conclude, however, that 
constitutional considerations do not require us to find that the procedures mandated 
by the APA must apply in charter school terminations.    
While the notice and hearing procedures contained in the APA are crafted in 
part to provide due process in administrative proceedings, chapter 120 is not the 
sole method by which a party may receive due process.  The APA is a creature of 
the Legislature, as is the charter schools statute.  Just as the APA may be evaluated 
to determine what due process protections are provided there, the charter schools 
statute is subject to a similar review.  As we explained in Keys Citizens For 
Responsible Government, Inc. v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 795 So. 2d 
940 (Fla. 2001): 
     In order to determine what process is constitutionally required, the 
Court “must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the 
 
- 26 -
government function involved as well as of the private interest that 
has been affected by governmental action.”  Cafeteria & Restaurant 
Workers Union, 367 U.S. at 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743.  Three factors are 
relevant in determining what process is constitutionally due: (1) the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest.  
 
Id. at 948-49.  Due process “is not a technical concept with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”  Id. at 948 (quoting Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961)).  “Instead, ‘due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections 
as the particular situation demands.’”  Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 481 (1972)).  Most importantly, “[t]he specific parameters of the notice and 
the opportunity to be heard required by procedural due process are not evaluated 
by fixed rules of law, but rather by the requirements of the particular proceeding.”  
Id.  
In finding that the APA does not apply to immediate charter school 
terminations, we reiterate the Legislature’s clearly stated purpose of section 
1002.33(8)(d)—to provide school boards and other charter school sponsors with 
the ability to “immediately” terminate charters where there are emergency-type 
circumstances, such as those that threaten the health, safety or welfare of students, 
or where other good cause necessitating immediate action exists.  The principles 
 
- 27 -
we discuss have led us to an interpretation that gives the greatest effect to the 
actual legislative language set forth in section 1002.33, more fully accomplishes 
the legislative purpose apparent in that provision, and honors the detailed 
termination and appeal statutory scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the Legislature did not intend that school boards and other 
charter school sponsors follow the APA when immediately terminating charter 
school charters for good cause or where the health, safety or welfare of the students 
is threatened.  The Legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme specifically 
applicable to all aspects of charter schools.  Within that comprehensive scheme, 
the Legislature has provided charter school sponsors with a procedure to 
immediately terminate the charter where the health, safety, or welfare of the 
students is threatened or where other good cause circumstances exist that require 
immediate action.  
 
The district court’s interpretation that a charter may be “immediately” 
terminated, but only after fourteen days’ notice and an administrative hearing, a 
process the district court recognized may consume up to ninety days, engrafts 
requirements upon the termination procedure that are inconsistent with the overall 
statutory scheme for charter schools.  The use of APA procedures for “immediate” 
terminations is inconsistent with the expressed legislative intent that a school board 
 
- 28 -
act “immediately” when emergency-type circumstances arise such as those that 
threaten the health, safety or welfare of the students.  Therefore, we reject the 
district court’s conclusion that “immediate” termination under section 
1002.33(8)(d) “means only something less than ninety days.”  Survivors, 968 So. 
2d 45.  Further, to the extent that the Fourth District held that due process can only 
be satisfied by compliance with the APA, we reject that contention as a basis for 
statutory construction.   
We expressly do not address the issue of whether the termination procedures 
employed by the School Board in this case unconstitutionally deprived Survivors 
of due process of law, as Survivors claims, by failing to provide sufficient notice of 
a hearing, failing to provide a quasi-judicial hearing, and failing to provide a 
sufficient legal basis to find good cause for termination.  These and any other 
issues that were raised and not reached by the district court or this Court may be 
considered and decided by the district court upon remand of this proceeding.15  
                                          
 
 
15.  The pertinent claims not reached by the district court are summarized as 
follows: the School Board should not have relied on the audit report because it is 
hearsay; the failure to properly notice the January 25 meeting or to find a need for 
immediate action at that meeting violated due process; the School Board never 
initiated a proper action for termination because the Superintendent failed to file a 
petition for termination giving Survivors an opportunity to know the charges and 
appropriately respond; the termination cannot be upheld because there was no 
evidence submitted and no good cause shown; the audit report was not competent, 
substantial evidence or a legally sufficient reason for termination; the charters and 
statute required the School Board to commence alternative dispute resolution 
 
- 29 -
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We further reverse the 
order of the district court that awarded prevailing party attorney’s fees to 
Survivors. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Class of 
Constitutional Officers 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D06-2378 and 4D06-2379 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Randall D. Burks, Ph.D. and Gerald A. Williams, Office of Chief Counsel, The 
School Board of Palm Beach County, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bryan James Yarnall, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, Timothy D. 
Osterhaus, Deputy Solicitor General, Deborah Kearney, General Counsel, Jason 
M. Hand, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of The 
Florida State Board of Education; Janeia R. Daniels of Meyer and Brooks, P.A., 
                                                                                                                                        
before terminating the charters; and the School Board failed to consider Survivors 
WPB and Survivors BB separately. 
 
- 30 -
 
- 31 -
Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Florida School Boards Association, Inc.; and 
Steven Geoffrey Gieseler and Nicholas M. Gieseler on behalf of Pacific Legal 
Foundation, Stuart, Florida, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae