Case Title: Fellows v. Shultz

Citation: 469 P.2d 141, 81 N.M. 496

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1970-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
469 P.2d 141 (1970) 81 N.M. 496 Leland L. FELLOWS and Doralea Sanders Bean, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Addie SHULTZ, Leon Ramey and Ethel Ramey, Respondents-Protestants-Appellants, v. STATE of New Mexico ex rel. S.E. REYNOLDS, State engineer, Defendant-Appellee. No. 8804. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 4, 1970. D.D. Archer, Artesia, for respondents-appellants. Sanders & Bruin, Roswell, for petitioners-appellees. James A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., F. Harlan Flint, Peter B. Shoenfeld, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for defendant-appellee. SISK, Justice. Appellants protested an application filed by appellees with the State Engineer for a change of location of a water well, in accordance with the provisions of § 75-11-7, N.M.S.A. 1953, as amended in 1967. The constitutionality of this statute is challenged by both appellants and the State Engineer. The trial court entered judgment for appellees on the merits of their application, but because the constitutional question is determinative it is not necessary to consider the additional points asserted on appeal. We must first determine whether § 75-11-7, supra, is constitutional or whether it is violative of art. III, § 1 of the New Mexico Constitution, which provides for the separation of powers between the three departments of government. If the statute is repugnant to the separation of powers clause, we must then determine whether its constitutionality was saved or validated by the subsequent adoption of art. XVI, § 5 of the New Mexico Constitution. Article III, § 1, supra, provides: The purpose, meaning and interpretation of this section of our constitution was first *143 considered in detail in Kelley v. Marron, 21 N.M. 239, 153 P. 262 (1915). Our first concern in the present case is whether § 75-11-7, supra, requires the exercise by the courts of powers which are fundamentally executive or administrative in nature. The problem arises because of the development of administrative agencies, which we have had in New Mexico since statehood. See art. XI, §§ 1 through 11, New Mexico Constitution, which establish the State Corporation Commission and grant to it powers which would otherwise generally be legislative in nature. San Juan Coal & Coke Co. v. Santa Fe, S.J. & N. Ry., 35 N.M. 512, 2 P.2d 305 (1931). This court has also determined that certain powers granted to that administrative agency by statute were legislative or administrative as opposed to judicial. State ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n v. Zinn, 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182 (1963); Harris v. State Corp. Comm'n, 46 N.M. 352, 129 P.2d 323 (1942). In Fischer v. Rakagis, 59 N.M. 463, 469, 286 P.2d 312, 316 (1955), we said, "[t]hat the legislature may create boards, such as boards for the licensing of contractors, and vest them with administrative powers, needs no citation of authorities." This court has held that the legislature, in exercising its police powers, may confer certain "quasi-judicial" powers on administrative agencies with regard to laws affecting the general public, but that such powers do not extend to determinations of rights and liabilities between individuals. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 252, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957); State v. Kelly, 27 N.M. 412, 202 P. 524, 530, 21 A.L.R. 156 (1921). The State Engineer has been held to have administrative powers. In Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation District, 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763 (1963), the court determined that a review on appeal from a decision of the State Engineer was controlled by the rules applicable to review of decisions and orders of administrative agencies as announced in Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962). Section 75-11-7, supra, the statute here in question, reads: The last two paragraphs, which were added by amendment in 1967 (ch. 308, § 3, Laws of 1967), create the constitutional problem. We recognize and reaffirm the long-established rule which was stated in the opinion on rehearing in State v. Armstrong, 31 N.M. 220, 255, 243 P. 333, 347 (1924): For some of the numerous other cases which announce this rule, see In re Estate of Welch, 80 N.M. 448, 457 P.2d 380 (1969); City of Raton v. Sproule, 78 N.M. 138, 429 P.2d 336 (1967); Drink, Inc. v. Babcock, 77 N.M. 277, 421 P.2d 798 (1966). The crucial question here, however, is whether a proceeding which has long been established as administrative in nature can be made judicial in nature by the legislative act of removing such proceeding from the jurisdiction of an administrative body and placing it within the original jurisdiction of the courts, as was attempted by the change in procedure contained in the 1967 amendment to § 75-11-7, supra. In Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, supra, this court said: In Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation District, supra, which also involved the State Engineer, this court considered the proper scope of review under § 75-6-1, N.M.S.A. 1953, of a decision denying an applicant the right to change the point of diversion of surface water under § 75-5-23, N.M.S.A. 1953. Section 75-6-1, supra, provided that on appeal the proceeding should be "de novo," which in effect would make it a judicial determination. We quote at length from Kelley, supra: Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation District, supra, and Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, supra, expressly deal with the scope of review of administrative decisions rather than, as here, the propriety of the judiciary making certain determinations in the first instance, but both cases clearly establish the distinction between administrative and judicial functions. We cannot recognize any difference in the nature of the proceedings where change of point of diversion is sought, as in Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation District, supra, under § 75-6-1, supra, and where change of location of a well is sought under § 75-11-7, supra. That which is prohibited by art. III, § 1 of our constitution is exactly what this court said could not be done in Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, supra, and in Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation District, supra. We therefore hold that the 1967 amendment to § 75-11-7, supra, violates the separation of powers doctrine of our constitution. We must now consider whether the unconstitutional amendment to § 75-11-7, supra, was validated by the adoption of art. XVI, § 5 of the New Mexico Constitution. The last clause of art. III, § 1, supra, reads: "* * * except as in this Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted." This allows the people, by *146 constitutional amendment in accordance with art. XIX of our constitution, to make certain exceptions to the absolute separation otherwise required by art. III, § 1, supra. At the same session of the legislature which passed the unconstitutional amendment to § 75-11-7, supra, an amendment to our constitution was proposed. This proposed amendment was approved by the people on November 7, 1967, and became art. XVI, § 5 of the New Mexico Constitution. It reads: This amendment specifically refers to "appeal" to the district court, whereas § 75-11-7, supra, contemplates an original proceeding in the district court without the requirement of a prior decision, act or refusal to act by the State Engineer. However, even if the constitutional amendment would permit the legislature to pass an act providing for the judicial procedures set forth in § 75-11-7, supra, the timing here involved becomes important. Both the constitutional amendment and the statutory amendment were passed at the 1967 legislative session. We have noted that the constitutional amendment became effective on November 7, 1967, upon approval by the voters. The statute, however, became effective ninety days after the adjournment of the legislature which enacted it. Article IV, § 23, New Mexico Constitution. See, also, State v. Chavez, 79 N.M. 741, 449 P.2d 343 (Ct.App. 1968). The statute was passed during the session which adjourned on March 18, 1967, and became effective ninety days thereafter, which was substantially before the November 7, 1967 effective date of the constitutional amendment. Therefore, the amended § 75-11-7, supra, was purported to become effective before it was constitutionally permissible. The question then arises whether the later constitutional amendment could validate the statute which was unconstitutional when it purportedly became effective. This issue presents a question of first impression in this jurisdiction and we must look to the decisions of other jurisdictions. It is a well-established rule of constitutional law that an unconstitutional statute is wholly void from the time of its enactment and is not validated by a subsequent constitutional change which would allow the enactment of such a statute. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); City of Little Rock v. Cavin, 238 Ark. 333, 381 S.W.2d 741 (1964); Jamison v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51, 165 S.E.2d 647 (1969); Plebst v. Barnwell Drilling Co., 243 La. 874, 148 So. 2d 584 (1963); State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 S.W.2d 319 (1938). In the case of Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 65 P. 309 (1901), the court, in discussing the fact that an unconstitutional statute was not validated by a subsequent constitutional amendment, said: This same general rule has been followed consistently. In the recent case of Jamison v. City of Atlanta, supra, it was held: See, also, Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912); Trustees of Philips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569 (1940); Annot., 171 A.L.R. 1070; 16 Am.Jur.2d Const.Law § 180; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 43 and 45. Under certain very limited circumstances, constitutional amendments have been held to validate prior unconstitutional statutes. Where the constitutional amendment expressly or impliedly ratifies or confirms the unconstitutional statute, it has been held to validate the statute, provided that such validation does not impair the obligations of a contract or divest vested rights. Almost all of the cases in this area have involved express ratification. See, Lee v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 46, 214 P. 972 (1923); Fontenot v. Young, 128 La. 20, 54 So. 408 (1911); Annot., 171 A.L.R., supra. In Matthews v. Quinton, supra, the court said: In our case, there clearly was no express ratification because the constitutional amendment did not refer to any section or sections of our statutes which were intended to be validated, nor did the statute provide that it was to become effective if and when any subsequently proposed constitutional amendment was approved by the voters. Few cases even speak in terms of implied ratification, and those bear no similarity to the circumstances of our case. State ex rel. Marr v. Luther, 56 Minn. 156, 57 N.W. 464 (1894); State ex rel. Faust v. Thomas, 313 Mo. 160, 282 S.W. 34 (1926). In each of these cases the language of the constitutional amendment clearly indicates that it was intended to cure statutes known or suspected to be unconstitutional. We do not find any attempted implied ratification of the amendment to § 75-11-7, supra, in art. XVI, § 5, supra, the constitutional amendment here in question. Its language is prospective only, and not retrospective. Further, as previously noted, the amendment speaks in terms of "appeal" to the district court from actions of the executive officer, whereas the statute provides for what is in effect an original action in the district court. This distinction reinforces our determination that the amendment did not impliedly ratify § 75-11-7, supra. The other exception to the general rule concerns statutes passed specifically in anticipation of a constitutional amendment. Annotation, 171 A.L.R., supra, at 1075, states: The authorities supporting this proposition indicate that statutes passed in anticipation of constitutional amendments never become operative until the amendment is adopted. An examination of these authorities shows that in almost all cases the amendment or the statute, or both, state or clearly imply that they were passed in anticipation of the subsequent amendment. See Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36, 46 S. Ct. 14, 70 L. Ed. 151 (1925); Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926); Fry v. Rosen, 207 Ind. 409, 189 N.E. 375 (1934), appeal dismissed 293 U.S. 526, 55 S. Ct. 143, 79 L. Ed. 636 (1934). Clearly, there is nothing in § 75-11-7, supra, which in any manner indicates that it was passed in anticipation of a subsequent constitutional amendment, or that it was not to become effective until and unless any such constitutional amendment was adopted. There are two cases which contain some language to the effect that statutes which are unconstitutional when passed may be intended to take effect only subsequently, even in the absence of a showing that the statute was passed in anticipation of a constitutional change. Busch v. Turner, 26 Cal. 2d 817, 161 P.2d 456 (1945); Galveston, B. & C. Narrow-Gauge Ry. v. Gross, 47 Tex. 428 (1877). Both of these cases strain unduly to uphold the statutes in question, and we are not persuaded by their reasoning or their result, which if followed could cause prejudice resulting from uncertainty as to when statutes become effective. The present controversy involves only the amended portion of § 75-11-7, supra. This section is § 3 of ch. 308 of the New Mexico Laws of 1967. Our reasoning applies equally to all of the amended portion of § 2 of that act (§ 75-11-3, N.M.S.A. 1953, Application for use of underground water Publication of notice Permit Hearing.), except that portion relating to obtaining an acknowledged statement from the landowner. It also applies to the proviso contained in § 1 of the same act (§ 75-2-15, N.M.S.A. 1953, Hearing required before appeal.). The act does contain a severability clause, so the remainder of the act remains unaffected. The unconstitutional portions were invalid on the effective date of the act and were not ratified or validated by the subsequent adoption of art. XVI, § 5 of the New Mexico Constitution. The district court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to hear this case; the judgment appealed from is void; and the case is dismissed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J. and TACKETT, WATSON and McKENNA, JJ., concur.