Case Title: Terry Sue Turner v. City of Clearwater

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-2296

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-2296
____________
TERRY SUE TURNER,
Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF CLEARWATER,
Appellee.
[April 12, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Terry Sue Turner appeals a circuit court judgment validating a proposed
bond issue.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the bond validation judgment.
BACKGROUND
In May 1996, the City Commission of Clearwater adopted Resolution 96-38,
determining the necessity to replace the existing Memorial Causeway Bridge.  See
City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla., Resolution 96-38 (May 2, 1996). 
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Therein, the City Commission recognized that the Memorial Causeway Bridge
serves as the evacuation route for the north end of Sand Key, all of Clearwater
Beach and Island Estates; the bridge is one of the top ten accident sites within the
City; the bridge is deficient under current design standards; and the number of
bridge openings exhibits the highest average annual daily traffic of any four-lane
drawspan bridge along the entire west coast of Florida.  See id.  The City stated
that a new four-lane, high-level fixed bridge built to current state standards would
eliminate most of the problems associated with the existing bridge.  See id. 
Accordingly, the City Commission concluded that the replacement of the Memorial
Causeway Bridge was of the highest priority to the City of Clearwater and
authorized city officials to take the necessary steps to obtain funding from the state
for its replacement.  See id. §§ 1-2.  On the same day, the City Commission also
adopted Resolution 96-39, requesting congressional representatives to assist the
City in obtaining federal funding to replace the bridge.  See City of Clearwater,
Pinellas County, Fla., Resolution 96-39 (May 2, 1996).       
Thereafter, on June 19, 1997, the City Commission adopted Resolution 97-
41, authorizing the execution of a Joint Participation Agreement between the City
and the Florida Department of Transportation to construct a new Memorial
Causeway Bridge.  See City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla., Resolution 97-41
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§ 1 (June 19, 1997).  Pursuant to this authority, the City and the Florida Department
of Transportation entered into a Joint Participation Agreement on June 27, 1997, for
the design, right-of-way acquisition and construction of a replacement bridge.  See
Joint Participation Agreement Between Florida Department of Transportation and
the City of Clearwater (June 27, 1997) (hereinafter Joint Participation Agreement). 
Under the Joint Participation Agreement, the City will advance the funds for the
project and the Florida Department of Transportation will reimburse the City up to
$13 million.  
Pursuant to article IX of the City’s Charter, which requires the City to 
provide fiscal aspects of bond issuances by ordinance, the City enacted Ordinance
No. 6352-99 on May 6, 1999, authorizing the issuance of Infrastructure Sales Tax
Revenue Bonds, Series [to be determined], to finance the cost of capital
improvements in Clearwater.  See City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla.,
Ordinance 6352-99 § 3 (May 6, 1999) (hereinafter Bond Ordinance).  The Bond
Ordinance specifies that the sole source of repayment of the bonds is derived from
the City’s infrastructure sales tax revenues.  See Bond Ordinance § 3(B).  These
revenues are generated pursuant to an interlocal agreement with Pinellas County and
other participating municipalities regarding the distribution of the additional
infrastructure sales tax revenues collected by Pinellas County.  See id. § 2 (defining
1. Prior to adopting Resolution 00-19, the City entered into an interlocal
agreement with Pinellas County under which the county intends to provide $10
million of funding to the City to assist with the direct expenditures for the bridge
project.  See Interlocal Agreement Between Pinellas County and the City of
Clearwater for Memorial Causeway Bridge Replacement (April 7, 2000) (hereinafter
Interlocal Agreement). 
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“Sales Tax Revenues”).  The Bond Ordinance further provides that the City shall
never be required to levy ad valorem taxes to fund repayment of the bonds.  See id.
§ 3(D). 
On June 1, 2000, the City adopted Resolution 00-19, providing for the sale
of Infrastructure Sales Tax Revenue Bonds, Series 2000, not to exceed
$51,000,000.  See City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla., Resolution 00-19 (June
1, 2000) (hereinafter Resolution 00-19).  In its legislative findings, the City
concluded that the Series 2000 project, consisting of the right-of-way acquisition,
planning and construction of a replacement bridge, was necessary for the continued
health and safety of the citizens of Clearwater and that the financing thereof with
proceeds of the Series 2000 Bonds was in furtherance of public health and safety.1 
See Resolution 00-19 § 1(C).  Under article IX of the City’s Charter, revenue
bonds for projects in excess of $1 million must be approved by public referendum. 
See City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla., Charter art. IX (March 9, 1999)
(hereinafter Charter).  An exception to the referendum requirement is provided,
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however, for revenue bonds issued for “public health, safety or industrial
development and revenue bonds for refunding.”  Id.  The City did not hold a public
referendum for the issuance of the Series 2000 bonds.
The City filed a complaint for bond validation with the Sixth Judicial Circuit
Court in Pinellas County on June 8, 2000.  Terry Sue Turner intervened and filed an
answer contesting the City’s authority to issue the bonds without a public
referendum.  Following a hearing, the circuit court entered its final judgment finding
the City was authorized to issue bonds for the bridge project without public
referendum.  This appeal followed.  
ANALYSIS
The scope of this Court’s review in bond validation cases is limited to the
following issues: (1) whether the public body has the authority to issue the bonds;
(2) whether the purpose of the obligation is legal; and (3) whether the bond
issuance complies with requirements of the law.  See State v. Osceola County, 752
So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1999); Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 675
(Fla. 1997).  A final judgment validating bonds comes to this Court with a
presumption of correctness.  See Wohl v. State, 480 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1985). 
The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the record and evidence fail to
support the lower court’s conclusions.  See id.
2. As defined in the Florida Transportation Code, the term “road” includes
bridges.  See § 334.03(23), Fla. Stat. (1999).
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The second and third prongs, i.e., the legality of the bond purpose and
compliance with bond issuance requirements, are not at issue in this case.  Turner
acknowledges that a valid municipal purpose exists.  Indeed, this Court has
recognized that road construction is a valid public purpose for which bonds may
be issued.2  See Northern Palm Beach County Water Control Dist. v. State, 604
So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1992); Washington Shores Homeowners’ Ass’n v. City of
Orlando, 602 So. 2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Fla. 1992).  Further, the City followed the
procedures for validating bonds set forth in chapter 75, Florida Statutes (1999). 
The City enacted an ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds, adopted a
resolution approving the bridge project, and filed a complaint for validation in
circuit court, which properly joined the state, taxpayers, property owners, and
citizens of Clearwater.  In accordance with section 75.04, the complaint alleged the
City’s authority to issue the bonds, the ordinance and resolution authorizing the
issuance of bonds, the amount of the bonds, and the interest the bonds will bear. 
Thus, the City complied with the requirements of chapter 75 in seeking to issue and
validate the bonds.  See Osceola County, 752 So. 2d at 540 (holding that county,
which followed the same course of action, had satisfied requirements of chapter 75
3. Article VII, section 12, provides: 
Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and
local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds,
certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates,
payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve
months after issuance only: 
(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and
only when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of
freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation; or 
(b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption
premium thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate.
Art. VII, § 12, Fla. Const.
4. The City’s chief financial officer, Margaret Simmons, testified during the
validation proceeding below that the City’s share of the infrastructure sales tax
revenues is adequate to fund repayment of the Series 2000 bonds.
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and was not required to do anything more). 
Although Turner challenges the City’s authority to issue bonds for the
proposed project without prior referendum approval, there is generally ample
authority for the City’s issuance of bonds to finance capital improvements.  First,
article VII, section 12, Florida Constitution, authorizes municipalities to issue
bonds to finance capital projects, although a referendum is required when the
bonds are payable from ad valorem taxation.  See art. VII, § 12, Fla. Const.3  In the
case presented, the funds for repayment of the bonds are derived solely from
infrastructure sales tax revenues and do not include ad valorem taxes.4  Thus, the
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City’s issuance of the bonds does not trigger the state constitutional referendum
requirement.  See, e.g., State v. Sarasota County, 549 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1989). 
Second, article VIII, section 2, Florida Constitution, has been construed as giving
municipalities broad home rule powers, providing that municipalities “may exercise
any power for municipal purposes except as provided by law.”  Art. VIII, § 2(b),
Fla. Const.; see State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978). 
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the Legislature enacted the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act, codified in chapter 166, Florida Statutes, which provides
that municipalities shall have full authority to issue bonds.  See §§ 166.021,
166.111(1), 166.141, Fla. Stat. (1999);  see also Washington Shores, 602 So. 2d at
1302 n.2.  The Charter similarly vests the City with broad authority.  See Charter
art. I, § 1.01, art. IX.  Moreover, the City’s Bond Ordinance specifically authorizes
the issuance of the bonds to finance the costs of capital improvements in
Clearwater.  See Bond Ordinance § 3.
As previously mentioned, however, article IX of the City’s Charter requires
that “revenue bonds for projects in excess of one million dollars be put to
referendum with the exception of revenue bonds for public health, safety or
industrial development and revenue bonds for refunding.”  Charter art. IX.  Turner
maintains that the public health and safety exception to the Charter’s referendum
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requirement includes only essential governmental functions.  This Court, however,
recently rejected this argument in Boschen v. City of Clearwater, 26 Fla. L. Weekly
S32 (Fla. Jan. 18, 2001).  In so doing, this Court recognized its previous decision
in State v. County of Dade, 234 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1970), wherein it abandoned the
essential governmental function doctrine as the test for determining when
referendum approval was required.  See Boschen, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S35;
see also State v. School Board of Sarasota County, 561 So. 2d 549, 553 (Fla.
1990) (declining to reinstate the essential governmental function referendum
exception which was rejected in State v. County of Dade).  More importantly, this
Court in Boschen rejected the argument that the Charter’s public health and safety
exception reinstated the essential governmental function doctrine in Clearwater. 
Specifically, this Court stated:
Nevertheless, Boschen contends the Charter’s public health and
safety exception reinstated the older doctrine in Clearwater.  This
argument is wholly devoid of merit.  First, the plain language of the
Charter does not support this interpretation.  By using the words
“public health, safety or industrial development,” the Charter refers to
situations that could reasonably be construed as falling within the
ambit of those categories.  To be sure, the stipulation that the bond
obligation must preserve public health and safety indicates a more
narrow objective than routine municipal purposes.  But given the
absence of any explicit reference to the essential governmental
function doctrine, the language cannot reasonably be construed as
resurrecting this stringent exception to the former constitutional
referendum requirement.  Second, contrary to Boschen’s contentions,
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the citizens of Clearwater did not expressly retain this exception
merely by voting not to repeal article IX of the Charter in March 1999. 
Indeed, the ballot for that election merely crossed out current article
IX and inquired whether voters would support its repeal.  Although
voters elected to maintain article IX, they did not vary its express
terms.  Therefore, voter retention of article IX in no way suggests that
the electorate also intended to incorporate the essential governmental
function doctrine.  Third, our express repudiation of this stringent
restriction is further evidence that the Charter should not be interpreted
as reinstating the doctrine.  Fourth, the rationale of the doctrine is no
longer applicable.  It was created at a time when local governments
had little authority to finance important government projects without
prior referendum approval.  In recent years, local governments’
authority to issue bonds has increased significantly.  See generally art.
VII, § 2, Fla. Const.  Moreover, the doctrine itself is unduly restrictive,
in part because it struck a balance between the need for essential
governmental operations and the duty to follow the former
constitutional provision, which expressly imposed referendum
requirements on local government spending in most circumstances. 
Thus, given the historical underpinnings of the doctrine, it is imprudent
to construe the Charter as incorporating this stringent exception,
especially without any credible evidence indicating such an intent.  To
be sure, the City could elect to limit its authority further by including
more stringent requirements in the charter.  However, there is no
evidence to indicate that it did so.  On the contrary, the Charter vests
the City with broad governing authority.  In short, the exception to the
referendum requirement refers only to bond obligations that improve
“public health, safety and industrial development,” and this term
should not be construed as the equivalent of essential governmental
functions.
Boschen, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S35 (footnote omitted). 
 Notwithstanding our conclusion as to the Charter, this Court must also
determine whether the evidence presented during the validation proceeding
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supported the trial court’s validation of the bonds.  Turner alleges that the evidence
failed to establish that the bridge project was an essential governmental function. 
Rather, Turner contends that the evidence revealed the primary purpose of the
bridge project is to provide a focal point for tourists and residents traveling
between Clearwater Beach and downtown, to act as a signature piece entrance to
Clearwater Beach and the downtown business district, and to cure some functional
obsolescence with the existing bridge.  By contrast, the City maintains that there
was ample evidence to support the legislative determination that the bridge project
furthered public health and safety.  Morever, the City asserts that the testimony of
the City’s public works administrator demonstrated the relationship between the
project and the City’s public health and safety concerns.
As noted previously, the City in Resolution 00-19 found that the bridge
project was necessary for the continued health and safety of the citizens of
Clearwater and that financing the project with the bonds at issue was in furtherance
of public health and safety.  See Resolution 00-19 § 1(C).  Although these
legislative expressions of public purpose are not controlling, they are entitled to
great weight.  See Northern Palm Beach County Water Control Dist., 604 So. 2d at
442; State v. Leon County, 400 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla. 1981).  The record in this
case demonstrates that these findings are not clearly erroneous.  Indeed, the City
5. According to Arasteh, the Public Works Administration and the Florida
Department of Transportation have held approximately thirty public meetings
concerning the project since 1995, including seven before the City Commission
where presentations were made by consultants and the public works staff.  
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considered numerous public health and safety issues in evaluating the proposed
bridge project including accident rates, pedestrian and bicyclist safety, air pollution,
and the need for an efficient evacuation route.   
At the validation proceeding below, the City’s public works administrator,
Mahshid Arasteh, testified regarding the necessity and purpose of the proposed
bridge project, as well as the numerous health and safety concerns surrounding the
existing bridge.5  Arasteh stated that although not structurally obsolete, the existing
bridge is functionally obsolete.  Arasteh noted that the existing bridge has ten-foot
wide lanes, lacks a barrier between pedestrians and the traffic lanes, and lacks a
shoulder.  Further, the existing bridge is one of the top ten accident sites in the City
and its level of service is ranked “F.”  According to Arasteh, the increased air
pollution generated by traffic backups on the existing bridge as a result of the
frequent bridge openings was also a concern.  Moreover, Arasteh reiterated that the
bridge serves as the main evacuation route for the north end of Sand Key, all of
Clearwater Beach and Island Estates and that safety issues concerning evacuation
were a major factor.
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Arasteh dismissed the assertion that public health and safety concerns were
not the primary reason for replacing the existing bridge, stating that “the
Commission has been very specific to take a bridge to them that is a bridge that is
for health and safety of the residents of Clearwater, number one.”  In contrast to
the existing bridge, the replacement high-span bridge will not require any openings
and will be built to current state standards with safety shoulders, a raised separator
between pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and adequate sidewalk width for
pedestrians and bicyclists.  Indeed, Arasteh noted that the types of accidents which
have occurred on the existing bridge were factored into the design of the
replacement bridge to help avoid those types accidents in the future.
Notwithstanding the evidence relating to public safety discussed above,
Turner alleges additional evidence demonstrated that the bridge project is motivated
by concerns other than public health and safety.  For instance, Turner asserts that
the Joint Participation Agreement provides the new bridge will be a focal point to
tourists and residents who travel between Clearwater Beach and the redeveloped
downtown area.  Likewise, Turner notes that both the Joint Participation Agreement
and Interlocal Agreement recognize the replacement bridge will act as a signature
piece entrance to Clearwater Beach and the downtown business district.  However,
the Joint Participation Agreement also states that the project is necessary and in the
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best interests of the citizens of the State of Florida.  See Joint Participation
Agreement, ¶ 16.  Further, the Interlocal Agreement recognizes that the existing
bridge needs to be replaced to “optimize traffic flow.”   Thus, despite Turner’s
contention, there was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
determination that the project furthered public health and safety within the meaning
of Article IX of the City’s Charter.  Similarly, Turner’s contention that the trial
court’s ruling created an implied exception to the referendum requirements of the
Charter by allowing revenue bonds to be issued for advance funding of a state
project is without merit.  
Turner also argues that there is no evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s finding and discussion of the terms “development” and “city facility.”  The
trial court found as follows:
EIGHTH.  That the Series 2000 Project, consisting of the construction
of a new Memorial Causeway Bridge to replace the existing draw
bridge is necessary and in the interests of the public health and safety
of the citizens of the City, that Section 2.01(d) of the City Charter
does not require that the City obtain prior referendum approval before
the City undertakes the Series 2000 Project in that such Series 2000
Project is not “development” within the meaning of Section 2.01(d)(6)
of the Charter and that Sections 2.01(d)(5)(v) and 2.01(d)(7) of the
City’s Charter, when read together, permit the City to grant the
necessary rights of way for the Series 2000 Project.  That this holding
is consistent with this Court’s determination in Spatuzzi, et al. v City
of Clearwater, Case No. 99-1080-CI-21.  In reaching this conclusion,
the Court specifically finds that [the] Series 2000 Project is a part of
6. Section 2.01(d)(6) of the City’s Charter provides:
No municipal or other public real property lying west of Osceola
Avenue, east of Clearwater Harbor between Drew and Chestnut
Streets, being further described as: [legal description omitted], and no
municipal or other public real property constituting the Memorial
Causeway or lands immediately contiguous thereto, more particularly
described as: [legal description omitted], shall be developed or
maintained other than as open space and public utilities together with
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the City’s street system and thus constitutes a “city facility” within the
meaning of the City’s Charter, that the Series 2000 Project is
necessary and in the interest of the public health, safety and welfare of
the citizens of the City, that the existing bridge is one of the top ten
accident locations in the City and is deficient under current design
standards, and that the City has concluded that the Series 2000 Project
will cure the deficiencies of the existing bridge.
City of Clearwater v. State, No. 00-4060-CI-021 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2000).
Turner maintains that no testimony adduced or evidence admitted during the
proceeding was relevant to defining the term “development” as it pertains to the
Charter.  This argument, however, ignores the trial court’s previous determination
in Spatuzzi v. City of Clearwater, No. 99-1080-CI-21 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Jan. 26,
2000), that the bridge project the City sought to have bonds validated for in the
proceeding below did not constitute “development” within the meaning of section
2.01(d)(6) of the City’s Charter.  The plaintiffs in Spatuzzi alleged that the bridge
project constituted development under section 2.01(d)(6) of the City’s Charter and
hence, must be approved by public referendum.6  The trial court rejected the
associated appurtenances, except upon a finding by the commission at
a duly advertised public hearing that such development is necessary in
the interest of the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of
the city and approval of such finding at referendum, conducted
subsequent to the public hearing. City-owned tennis courts and
associated appurtenances may be constructed and maintained on such
property south of Cleveland Street.
Charter art. II, § 2.01(d)(6) (emphasis added).  The Charter does not define the
terms “developed” or “maintained.”
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plaintiffs’ argument, concluding that the bridge project was not development as
contemplated under section 2.01(d)(6).  See id. at 5.  The Second District
subsequently affirmed the trial court’s decision without written opinion.  See
Spatuzzi v. City of Clearwater, No. 2D00-1482 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 1, 2000). 
Significantly, the trial court’s decision in Spatuzzi involved the bridge project that
was the subject of the validation proceeding below.  As such, the trial court’s legal
conclusion that the bridge project was not “development” under section 2.01(d)(6)
was binding on the City, as well as the trial court.
Nonetheless, Turner asserts that the City never made a request that the trial
court take judicial notice of Spatuzzi under section 90.202(6), which provides that a
court may take judicial notice of records of any court.  See § 90.202(6), Fla. Stat.
(1999).  As a result, Turner maintains the trial court’s decision in Spatuzzi cannot
serve as the basis for a finding in the decision below.  Section 90.201, however,
7. Section 2.01(d)(7) provides:
No city owned real property in the area bounded on the north by Drew
Street, on the east by Osceola Avenue, on the south by Pierce Street,
and on the west by the waters of Clearwater Harbor, shall be sold,
donated, leased, or otherwise transferred or used for other than city
facilities except upon a finding by the commission at a duly advertised
public hearing that such transfer or use is necessary and in the interest
of the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city and
the approval of such finding at referendum . . . .
Charter art. II, § 2.01(d)(7) (emphasis added).  Notably, the term “city facilities” is
not defined in the City’s Charter.  The term “facilities,” however, has been defined
as follows: “That which promotes the ease of any action, operation, transaction, or
course of conduct.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 591 (6th ed. 1990).
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provides that a court shall take judicial notice of decisional law.  See § 90.201(1),
Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 201.2 (1999
ed.) (noting that decisions of the Florida courts must be judicially noticed).  Thus,
Turner’s argument as to the trial court’s reliance on its earlier decision in Spatuzzi
is without merit.   
As noted above, Turner also asserts that there is no evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s finding that the bridge project constitutes a “city facility”
within the meaning of section 2.01(d)(7) of the City’s Charter.7  Rather, Turner
contends that the evidence demonstrated the project is in fact a “state facility.” 
Indeed, the public works administrator acknowledged that the bridge is a
Department of Transportation roadway and is a state facility.  Similarly, the Joint
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Participation Agreement provides that the project is located “on a State facility.” 
Joint Participation Agreement, ¶ 16.  
The City acknowledged during the proceeding below that the real property
on which the bridge project will be located, as well as certain access roads, are
lands described in section 2.01(d)(7) of the Charter.  Notwithstanding this fact, the
City asserted that the bridge project was exempt from the referendum requirement
of section 2.01(d)(7).  Although the bridge project and certain of the access roads
constitute a portion of State Road 60, the City argued that they also form a part of
the City’s integrated street system and thus constitute “city facilities.”  Relying on
Welker v. State, 93 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1957), the City maintained that in facilitating
the transportation needs of City residents, the bridge and associated roadways will
clearly be city facilities, notwithstanding the fact that title to the bridge may also
vest in the State Department of Transportation. 
In Welker, a taxpayer sought reversal of a trial court’s order validating excise
tax improvement bonds that the City of Fort Lauderdale sought to issue for the
construction of an off-street parking lot, a police station, and three bridges.  See id.
at 593.  In addressing the taxpayer’s contention that the city was using the bond
proceeds to improve a state highway, inasmuch as one of the bridges sought to be
built was on a road designated as a “municipal connecting link road” in the state
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highway system, this Court stated:    
We judicially know that many municipal streets in Florida constitute
component parts of the state highway system to the extent that traffic
entering the city on a state highway is channeled through the
municipality in connecting state highways at other points on the
municipal limits.  It may be that this boulevard is a part of the state
highway system.  It is, however, at the same time, according to this
record, an essential artery of travel serving the people of the
municipality.  As to whether municipal funds should be expended for
this particular improvement in the interest of the people of the city is a
matter of local concern to be settled by the city officials in their
wisdom.  It is not a diversion of municipal funds to a nonmunicipal
purpose.  It is not a problem for this Court to resolve.
Id. at 594-95; see also Lewis v. Leon County, 107 So. 146, 152 (Fla. 1926) (“It
may be a state road, both in name and in ownership, but as to that portion which
passes through a particular county it is also, to all intents and purposes, and in its
beneficent effect, a county road as well.”).
This Court has recognized that the primary purpose of building roads and
bridges is to serve the general public.  See State v. Florida State Improvement
Comm’n, 75 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1954).  Indeed, the bridge project at issue in this
case will promote the transportation needs of the City’s residents and visitors. 
Moreover, the trial court was well aware of the location of the bridge and its relation
to the City.  For example, evidence was presented during the validation proceeding
below that the bridge connects the downtown and beach areas, an average of
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38,000 vehicles traverse the bridge daily, the bridge is the primary and sole
evacuation route for several beach areas, and the eastern end of the replacement
bridge will follow the alignment of Pierce Boulevard and tie into the Court/Chestnut
Streets one-way pair, with an additional connection to downtown in the vicinity of
Pierce Street.  Thus, despite some evidence denoting the project as a state facility,
the trial court’s reasoning and finding that the bridge project “is a part of the City’s
street system and thus constitutes a ‘city facility’ within the meaning of the City’s
Charter” is supported by the record.  
Lastly, Turner contends that there is no legislative authority for the City to
provide funding for a State project by way of bond issuance.  We disagree.  As
previously discussed, the City and the Florida Department of Transportation
entered into a Joint Participation Agreement, pursuant to section 339.12, Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1996), and section 339.121, Florida Statutes (1995), for the design,
right of way acquisition and construction of a replacement bridge.  At the time the
Joint Participation Agreement was entered, section 339.12 provided, in pertinent
part, that:
(1)  Any governmental entity may aid in any project or project
phase, including, but not limited to, preliminary engineering, design,
acquisition of rights-of-way, construction, or maintenance of any road
on the State Highway System, by contributions to the department of
cash, bond proceeds, time warrants, or other goods or services of
8. Section 339.12 has subsequently been amended.  See ch. 97-280, § 23,
Laws of Fla.; ch. 99-218, § 20, Laws of Fla.; ch. 2000-257, § 15, Laws of Fla.  As
amended, section 339.12, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(1)  Any governmental entity may aid in any project or project
phase included in the adopted work program by contributions to the
department of cash, bond proceeds, time warrants, or other goods or
services value.
. . . . 
(4)(c)  The department may enter into agreements under this
subsection for a project or project phase not included in the adopted
work program.  As used in this paragraph, the term “project phase”
means acquisition of rights-of-way, construction, construction
inspection, and related support phases.  The project or project phase
must be a high priority of the governmental entity.  Reimbursement for
a project or project phase must be made from funds appropriated by
the Legislature pursuant to s. 339.135(5).  All other provisions of this
subsection apply to agreements entered into under this paragraph. 
The total amount of project agreements for projects or project phases
not included in the adopted work program may not at any time exceed
$100 million.
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value.
. . . .
(4)(c)  The department is authorized to enter into agreements
under this subsection for a project or project phase not included in the
adopted work program.  The project or project phase must be a high
priority of the governmental entity.  Reimbursement for a project or
project phase must be made from funds appropriated by the
Legislature pursuant to s. 339.135(5).  All other provisions of this
subsection apply to agreements entered into under this paragraph.  At
no time shall the total amount of project agreements for projects or
project phases not included in the adopted work program exceed $50
million.
§ 339.12, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).8  Indeed, subsection (4)(c), as
§ 339.12, Fla. Stat. (2000).
9. Section 339.121 has since been repealed.  See ch. 97-280, § 35, Laws of
Fla.
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quoted above, was incorporated into the Joint Participation Agreement.  See Joint
Participation Agreement, ¶ 12.  Further, section 339.121(1) provided:
A governmental entity may also aid in right-of-way, capital acquisition,
construction, or construction-related expenses of any public
transportation project.  Such aid may be in the form of cash, bond
proceeds, time warrants, or goods and services.  By specific
provisions in a written agreement between the department and the
governmental entity, the department may agree to reimburse the
governmental entity for the full amount of the cash, bond proceeds,
time warrants, and/or direct goods and services provided for use on a
project or project phase that is contained in the department's adopted
work program.  Reimbursement to the governmental entity for such
project or project phase must be made from funds appropriated by the
Legislature, and reimbursement for the entire amount of the cash, bond
proceeds, time warrants, or direct cost of goods and services
provided for the project or project phase is to begin in the year the
project or project phase is scheduled in the adopted work program.
§ 339.121, Fla. Stat. (1995).9  Accordingly, we find the City is authorized to use
bond proceeds to provide advanced funding for the construction of the bridge
project to be undertaken by the Florida Department of Transportation.  See §
339.12, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996); see also Lewis, 107 So. at 154 (holding that county
had power under statute to authorize issuance of bonds to contribute to, or aid in,
the construction of a public road located in and benefitting the county, although
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when constructed it was to be owned and maintained by the state). 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the final judgment of the circuit court
validating the issuance of the Series 2000 bonds.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County - Bond Validations
James R. Case, Judge - Case No. 00-4060-CI-021
Patrick T. Maguire, Clearwater, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert C. Reid, Randall W. Hanna and Michael S. Davis of Bryant, Miller and Olive,
P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Pamela K. Akin, City Attorney, Clearwater, Florida,
for Appellee