Case Title: Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110270

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
DOUGLAS v. COX RETIREMENT PROPERTIES, INC.2013 OK 37Case Number: 110270Decided: 06/04/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

CAROL A. DOUGLAS, Administratrix of the Estate of Richard Lee 
Douglas, deceased, Plaintiff-Petitioner,v.COX RETIREMENT PROPERTIES, 
INC., an Oklahoma Corporation, Defendant-Respondent.
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY,STATE OF 
OKLAHOMA,HONORABLE REBECCA BRETT NIGHTINGALE
¶0 Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Tulsa County against the 
Defendant, Cox Retirement Properties, alleging Richard Douglas died as a result 
of the facility's negligent care and treatment. Defendant moved to dismiss the 
case for Plaintiff's failure to comply with 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 § 19. Section 19 was enacted 
in 2009 as part of H.B. 1603, which is commonly known as the Comprehensive 
Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009. Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, 
arguing the CLRA of 2009 was unconstitutional logrolling in violation of the 
single-subject rule of Article 5, § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial 
court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and certified the dismissal 
order for immediate review. We granted Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari to 
Review Certified Interlocutory Order. We hold that H.B. 1603 violates the 
single-subject rule of Article 5, § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution and is 
unconstitutional and void in its entirety. 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING CASE IS REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED 
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT
Steven R. Hickman, Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, LLP, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-PetitionerMichael Carr, Anne Cardea, Holden 
& Carr, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Defendant-RespondentRandy 
Lewin, Richards & Connor, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Oklahoma Association of Defense Counsel
GURICH, J.
Facts & Procedural History
¶1 On April 2, 2009, Richard Douglas was admitted to the Defendant's 
rehabilitative care center for extended care. Douglas remained at the facility 
for approximately 21 days and was discharged on April 23, 2009. He died a short 
time later on May 12, 2009. The decedent's estate filed a wrongful death action 
in Tulsa County against the Defendant, alleging Douglas died as a result of the 
facility's negligent care and treatment. 
¶2 Defendant moved to dismiss the case for Plaintiff's failure to comply with 
12 O.S. Supp. 2009 § 
19. Section 19 was enacted in 2009 as part of H.B. 1603, which is commonly 
known as the Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009. Plaintiff responded to 
the motion to dismiss, arguing that the CLRA of 2009 was unconstitutional 
logrolling in violation of the single-subject rule of Article 5, § 57 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution.1 The trial court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and certified the dismissal order for immediate review.2 Plaintiff filed a 
Petition for Certiorari on January 9, 2012, and we granted review on February 
14, 2012. 
Standard of Review
¶3 "In considering a statute's constitutionality, courts are guided by 
well-established principles and a heavy burden is cast on those challenging a 
legislative enactment to show its unconstitutionality." Thomas v. Henry, 
2011 OK 53, ¶ 8, 260 P.3d 1251, 1254 (citing Fent v. Okla. Capitol 
Improvement Auth., 1999 OK 64, ¶ 3, 984 P.2d 200, 204). "Every presumption is to be 
indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute." Id. "It is also 
firmly recognized that it is not the place of this Court, or any court, to 
concern itself with a statute's propriety, desirability, wisdom, or its 
practicality as a working proposition." Fent, 1999 OK 64, ¶ 4, 984 P.2d 200, 204. "A court's function, when the 
constitutionality of a statute is put at issue, is limited to a determination of 
the validity or invalidity of the legislative provision and a court's function 
extends no farther in our system of government." Id. 
Analysis
¶4 The issue before us is the applicability of the single-subject rule of 
Article 5, § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution to H.B. 1603. Article 5, § 57 of 
the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "Every act of the Legislature shall embrace 
but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . ." Okla. 
Const. art. 5, § 57. This provision is commonly known as the single-subject 
rule. The purposes of the single-subject rule are to ensure the legislators or 
voters of Oklahoma are adequately notified of the potential effect of the 
legislation and to prevent logrolling. Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 
2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380. Logrolling is the practice of ensuring 
the passage of a law by creating one choice in which a legislator or voter is 
forced to assent to an unfavorable provision to secure passage of a favorable 
one, or conversely, forced to vote against a favorable provision to ensure an 
unfavorable provision is not enacted. Id. 
¶5 This Court has long rejected a broad, expansive approach to the 
single-subject rule. Campbell v. White, 1993 OK 89, ¶ 14, 856 P.2d 255, 258. In Campbell, we stated that 
the Legislature's "skillful drafting of a broad topic" defeats the purpose of 
the single-subject rule. Id. We reaffirmed such an approach in 
Weddington v. Henry, 2008 OK 102, 202 P.3d 143, where we struck down a bill whose subject 
was "uniform laws." In Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Capitol Improvement 
Auth., 2009 OK 
15, ¶ 20, 214 P.3d 799, 806, Nova Health Systems, 2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380, and Thomas, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 27, 260 P.3d  at 1260, we continued to 
reject a broad, expansive approach to the single-subject rule. 
¶6 In Thomas we reiterated that Oklahoma adheres to the germaneness 
test.3 Id. ¶ 26, 260 P.3d  at 1260. The most relevant 
question under such an analysis is whether a voter, or legislator, is able to 
make a choice without being misled and is not forced to choose between two 
unrelated provisions contained in one measure. Id. The question is not 
how similar two provisions in a proposed law are, but whether it appears that 
the proposal is misleading or that the provisions in the proposal are so 
unrelated that those voting on the law would be faced with an all-or-nothing 
choice. Id. The purpose is not to hamper legislation but to prevent the 
Legislature from making a bill "veto proof" by combining two totally unrelated 
subjects in one bill. Id. If a bill contains multiple provisions, the 
provisions must reflect a common, closely akin theme or purpose. Id. ¶ 
27, 260 P.3d  at 1260. 
¶7 H.B. 1603 contains 90 sections, encompassing a variety of subjects that do 
not reflect a common, closely akin theme or purpose. The first 24 sections of 
H.B. 1603 amend and create new laws within our civil procedure code found in 
Title 12. Many of these provisions have nothing in common. For example, Section 
3 purports to give a trial court the authority to transfer a case to another 
state. Section 10 creates a law that assists the Oklahoma Healthcare Authority 
in collecting refunds for the Medicaid program. In Section 13, the Legislature 
adopts a portion of the federal civil procedure code to control a state court 
action. 
¶8 Of the remaining 66 sections of H.B. 1603, 45 sections create entirely new 
Acts, which have nothing in common with each other, including The Uniform 
Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act, The Common Sense Consumption Act, 
The Asbestos and Silica Claims Priorities Act, The Innocent Successor 
Asbestos-Related Liability Fairness Act, and The School Protection Act. For 
example, sections 43 through 46 create The Common Sense Consumption Act. The Act 
creates immunity from suit only for entities defined under the federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and by its terms eliminates remedies for certain 
injured consumers. Sections 54 through 65 create the Asbestos and Silica Claims 
Priorities Act. Section 58(A) limits a physician's ability to testify in 
asbestos and silica litigation based upon his or her education, training, and 
experience, and instead requires adherence to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairment (5th Edition) (2000). 
¶9 Other dissimilar sections of H.B. 1603 amend the Mandatory Seat Belt Use 
Act and the Oklahoma Livestock Activities Liability Limitation Act, limit the 
liability of firearm manufacturers, and amend existing laws regarding school 
discipline. H.B. 1603 also creates a new law that a school district 
representative may not conduct or preside as the hearing officer or judge at a 
due process hearing and then attend, advise, or influence an executive session 
of the school board.4 
¶10 This Court finds the Legislature's use of the broad topic of lawsuit 
reform does not cure the bill's single-subject defects. Campbell, 
1993 OK 89, ¶ 14, 856 P.2d  at 258. 
Although the Defendant argues the CLRA of 2009 does not constitute logrolling 
because the provisions within it are not so misleading as to create for a 
legislator an all-or-nothing choice, we find the provisions are so unrelated 
that those voting on the law were faced with an all-or-nothing choice to ensure 
the passage of favorable legislation. 
¶11 Unlike in Thomas, where the Court severed the offending provision 
of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, H.B. 1603 
encompasses so many different subjects that severance is not an option.5 It would be both 
dangerous and difficult for this Court to engage in the exercise of severance in 
this case. By picking and choosing which provisions relate to lawsuit reform and 
which do not, this Court would essentially become the policy-maker. 
Policy-making is the job of the Legislature. And although the dissenters argue 
we should sever the unconstitutional portions of this bill, the separate writing 
does not provide an analysis of how severance should be accomplished. 
Additionally, unlike in Thomas, were we to sever all the invalid portions 
of H.B. 1603, we could not presume the Legislature would have enacted the 
remaining provisions of the bill without the voided provisions. 6 
Conclusion
¶12 This is not the first time we have invalidated a bill in its entirety for 
violation of the single-subject rule.7 Although we are mindful of the practical consequences 
of today's decision, we will not sit by and ignore violations of our 
Constitution. The Legislature should be well aware of the single-subject 
requirements of the Oklahoma Constitution. We do not doubt that tort reform is 
an important issue for the Legislature. But the constitutional infirmity of 
logrolling, which is the basis of this opinion, can only be corrected by the 
Legislature by considering the acts within the CLRA of 2009 
separately.8 We hold that H.B. 1603, commonly known as the 
Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009, violates the single-subject rule of 
Article 5, § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The bill is unconstitutional and 
void in its entirety. 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING CASE IS REVERSED; CAUSE 
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S 
PRONOUNCEMENT
¶13 Colbert, C.J., Reif, V.C.J., Watt, Edmondson, Combs, and Gurich, JJ., 
concur.
¶14 Kauger, J., (by separate writing) concurs specially.
¶15 Winchester, J., (by separate writing) and Taylor, J. (joins Winchester) 
dissent. 
FOOTNOTES
1 Today this Court also 
issued an opinion in Timothy Wall v. John S. Marouk, D.O., 2013 OK 36, 
____P.3d____, which disposes of Plaintiff's additional argument that the 
requirement for filing affidavits in malpractice cases was conclusively decided 
by this Court in Zeier v. Zimmer, 2006 OK 98, 152 P.3d 861. Therefore, we will not address the issue 
in this opinion. 
2 Ordinarily, an order dismissing a case is a final, 
appealable order unless the trial court grants leave to amend the petition to 
cure the defect. Kelly v. Abbott, 1989 OK 124, ¶ 10, 781 P.2d 1188, 1191. If leave to amend is granted, the 
order dismissing the case is an interlocutory order and does not become final 
until the petition is not amended within the time set by the trial court. 
Id. In this case, the trial court dismissed the action but gave the 
Plaintiff 30 days to file the affidavit required by 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 § 19. The trial court also 
certified the order for immediate review and ordered: "If Plaintiff chooses to 
file a certified interlocutory appeal of this Order, and not file the required 
affidavit, then the proceedings shall be stayed pending disposition of the 
interlocutory appeal by separate order to be filed by this Court." Journal Entry 
Sustaining Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2. Rather than filing the affidavit, 
Plaintiff appealed the order and filed a Petition for Certiorari to Review 
Certified Interlocutory Order with this Court. 
3 Other opinions discussing the single-subject rule 
include: Nova Health Sys., 2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380; Fent, 2009 OK 15, 214 P.3d 799; Weddington, 2008 OK 102, 202 P.3d 143; Fent v. Office of State Finance, 
2008 OK 2, 184 P.3d 467; In re: Initiative Petition No. 382, 
State Question No. 729, 2006 OK 45, 142 P.3d 400; Edmondson v. Pearce, 
2004 OK 23, 91 P.3d 605; Morgan v. Daxon, 2001 OK 104, 49 P.3d 687; Campbell, 1993 OK 89, 856 P.2d 255; Johnson v. Walters, 
1991 OK 107, 819 P.2d 694. 
4 The Defendant argues that this section, section 74, was 
repealed, so H.B. 1603 is cured of its single-subject defects. Section 74 is not 
the only section that violates the single-subject rule. However, even if it 
were, it has not been repealed as the Defendant claims. Section 74 was passed in 
two different bills in the 2009 session--H.B. 1603 (CLRA of 2009) and H.B. 1598. 
H.B. 1598 was repealed so as to prevent duplicate statutes. Section 74, 
as it was enacted in H.B. 1603, remains intact at 70 O.S. 2011 § 
6-101.7 and has not been 
repealed. 
5 Although the bulk of the Act in Thomas dealt 
with discouraging illegal immigration, only one section was found to violate the 
single-subject rule. Thomas, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 31, 260 P.3d  at 
1262. 
The bill had 13 sections, and this Court found Section 13 of the bill, which 
sought to amend 70 O.S. Supp. 2006 § 
3242(A)(1) and (2) so as to deny resident tuition for higher education to 
those who successfully completed the GED examination, did not relate to the 
common theme of discouraging illegal immigration and should be severed. 
Id. ¶ 31, 260 P.3d  at 1262. 
6 75 O.S. § 11a(1) reads:
In the construction of the statutes of this state, the following rules shall 
be observed:
1. For any act enacted on or after July 1, 1989, unless there is a provision 
in the act that the act or any portion thereof or the application of the act 
shall not be severable, the provisions of every act or application of the act 
shall be severable. If any provision or application of the act is found to be 
unconstitutional and void, the remaining provisions or applications of the act 
shall remain valid, unless the court finds:
a. the valid provisions or application of the act are so essentially and 
inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the 
court cannot presume the Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid 
provisions without the void one; or
b. the remaining valid provisions or applications of the act, standing alone, 
are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the 
legislative intent.
7 See Nova Health Sys., 2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380 (finding that S.B. 1878, which comprised 
portions of five separate bills and involved multiple subjects concerning 
freedom of conscience, obviously violated the single-subject rule and was void 
in its entirety); Weddington, 2008 OK 102, 202 P.3d 143 (finding that S.B. 1708, which related to 
uniform laws, was facially contrary to Article 5, § 57 and void in its 
entirety). 
8
8 Although our opinion in Nova Health Systems, 
2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380, was decided after the CLRA of 2009 was 
passed, in that case we explicitly told the Legislature that if it believed the 
subjects involved in a particular bill were important, it should enact those 
subjects in separate bills. We reiterate that idea today. 

KAUGER, J. concurring specially: 
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1 The issue of the legislative amendment to 12 O.S. 2011 §19 in the aftermath of Zeier v. 
Zimmer, 2006 OK 
98, 152 P.3d 861, was resolved in Timothy Wall v. John S. 
Marouk, D.O., 2013 OK 36, --- P.3d ---, which we promulgated 
today. After we held it to be unconstitutional, I had hoped that if only a small 
number of sections of the CLRA were infirm and unrelated, they could safely be 
severed. However, the bill is simply too large, and attempts to address too many 
subjects, to be reconciled with the requirements of the Okla. Const., art. 5, 
§57.1 
II.SECTION 74 OF THE CLRA VIOLATES THE OKLA. CONST., ART. 5, 
§57.
¶2 The respondents have conceded that 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, sec. 
74, might have constituted logrolling. Petitioner charges that because it places 
limits on a lawyer's representation in school board hearings on teacher 
terminations, it violates the single subject rule, and renders the CLRA an 
unconstitutional violation of Okla. Const., art. 5, §57.2 
¶3 Respondent, however, argues that §74 of the CLRA was subsequently 
repealed, and therefore no longer constitutes a part of the corpus of the 
legislation contained within the CLRA.3 This argument is also made by the Oklahoma Association 
of Defense Counsel in its Amicus Curiae brief:
The only other section of the Act cited by Petitioner is the portion banning 
attorneys in certain situations from participating in school employee 
termination hearings. This section of the law has indisputably been repealed. It 
is no longer part of the Act, so any question of whether this section made the 
law unconstitutional is moot.4 
Respondent made the same point during the August 30, 2011, hearing on its 
motion to dismiss, stating that "[t]he provision regarding teachers has been - 
or, excuse me, regarding due process hearing for teachers has been repealed .… 
Clearly that argument goes by the wayside."5 The arguments are unconvincing because the language of 
§74 remains part of the Oklahoma Statutes. It is found at 70 O.S. 2011 
§6-101.7.6 
III.OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CLRA ALSO VIOLATE THE OKLA 
CONST., ART. 5, §57.
¶4 If §74 had been repealed or was by itself severable from the CLRA,7 it is not the only 
offending provision in the CLRA that renders the Act itself in violation of the 
Okla. Const., art. 5, §57. In addition to changes to the civil procedure code, 
12 O.S. §1 et seq., H.B. 1603 
also creates entirely new Acts in other titles, such as the Uniform Emergency 
Volunteer Health Practitioners Act, The Common Sense Consumption Act, The 
Asbestos and Silica Claims Priorities Act, The Innocent Successor 
Asbestos-Related Liability Fairness Act, and the School Protection Act. 
¶5 For example, §§31-41 of the CLRA create the Uniform Emergency Volunteer 
Health Practitioners Act.8 Sections 33-35 detail the creation of a registration 
system for volunteer health practitioners who will provide health or veterinary 
services in the state in the event of an emergency declaration.9 Section 35, in 
particular, details the requirements a registration system must fulfill to 
satisfy the new law.10 An examination of §§31-41 reveals a comprehensive new 
set of laws for new categories of volunteer emergency workers, with no basis in 
lawsuit reform or civil procedure. 
¶6 Other provisions are indicative of the same fatal flaws. Sections 75-83, 
creating the School Protection Act, create a new criminal offense for making 
false accusations of criminal conduct against an education employee.11 It is difficult to argue that modifications to the 
criminal code are germane to the reform of civil procedure. Even if the stated 
goal is to prevent false accusations, the connection is simply too tenuous to 
say that the School Protection Act shares the same subject as something like the 
Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act. They are not germane to 
each other, other CLRA provisions, or the subject of the bill, civil procedure. 

¶7 The respondent has failed to address any of the other disparate provisions 
of the CLRA, beyond §74, in its reply brief. During the hearing held on August 
30, 2011, the Respondent mentioned12 §25 of the CLRA, which created a Health Care Indemnity 
Fund Task Force.13 Respondent argued that this particular section was no 
longer a problem because the statute had already lapsed by its own terms.14 Presumably Respondent was referring to the fact that 
the provision required the task force to report its findings and recommendations 
to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives by May 1, 2011, after which its purpose would be fulfilled.15 
¶8 The various pieces of the CLRA do not reflect a common, closely akin theme 
or purpose.16 The application of broad, sweeping categories such as 
civil procedure and lawsuit reform do not change the fact that the Constitution 
will not allow unrelated legislation to be included in a single enactment simply 
by the skillful drafting of a broad topic.17 In Nova Health Systems v. 
Edmondson, 2010 OK 21, ¶3, 233 P.3d 380, we explained the rational for the single 
subject rule. We said:
... Each subject brought into the deliberation of the legislative department 
of the government is to be considered and voted on singly, without having 
associated with it any other measure to give it strength. Experience had shown 
that measures having no common purpose, and each wanting sufficient support on 
its merits to secure its enactment, have been carried through legislative bodies 
and enacted into laws, when neither measure could command or merit the approval 
of a majority of that body.
IV.HISTORY OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
¶9 Addressing the violation of the single subject rule is a recurring theme 
in our jurisprudence. At the time of our 2010 holding in Nova 
Health Systems v. Edmondson, 2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380, we had addressed the single subject rule 
at least seven times over the previous two decades, and four times in three 
years, in the following cases: Fent v. State of 
Oklahoma ex. rel. Oklahoma Capitol 
Improvement Authority, 2009 OK 15, ¶¶10-23, 214 P.3d 799; Fent v. State ex. 
rel. Office of State Finance, 2008 OK 2, ¶30, 184 P.3d 467; Weddington v. Henry, 
2008 OK 102, ¶1, 202 P.3d 143; In Re Initiative 
Petition No. 382, State Question No. 729, 
2006 OK 45, ¶18, 142 P.3d 400; Morgan v. Daxon, 
2001 OK 104, ¶1, 49 P.3d 687; Campbell v. White, 
1993 OK 89, ¶20, 856 P.2d 255. 
¶10 One of the main reasons the logrolling continues to be a problem is the 
consolidation of multiple unrelated bills together. This was the problem in 
Nova, where five disparate bills related tangentially to freedom of 
conscience were consolidated together into one bill.18 If these individual bills, each in themselves 
concerning only one subject, had been left unconsolidated, then they would 
likely not have triggered the anti-logrolling provisions of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. 
¶11 For over a hundred years, this Court has considered the provisions of the 
Okla. Const., art. 5, §57. In 1908, in In Re County 
Comm'rs of Counties Comprising Seventh 
Judicial Dist., 1908 OK 207, ¶¶4-5, 98 OK 207, this Court enforced the 
requirement of the Oklahoma Constitution that bills shall embrace but one 
subject.19 
¶12 The real problem with logrolling is that it creates a situation where 
there is only the illusion of choice, where various legislative proposals are 
amalgamated into a statutory chimera in order to force individual Legislators to 
vote for all measures if they wish one to see the light of day. It is easy to 
see why the issue might be confusing. Because the United States Constitution 
does not have a provision prohibiting logrolling, Congress is permitted to 
combine various disparate subjects together in one bill and frequently does so. 
The Oklahoma Legislature may not.
¶13 In Campbell v. White, 1993 OK 89, 856 P.2d 255, this Court found unconstitutional two 
bills which contained multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const., art. 
5, §56.20 We stressed the important nature of the Oklahoma 
Constitution's anti-logrolling provisions and emphasized the reasons for such 
provisions, which are designed to prevent the enactment of legislation through 
the combination of unpopular causes with popular legislation on an entirely 
different subject.21 We further stated that not only does the single subject 
rule prohibit log-rolling, it also enables the public and the Legislature to 
understand the scope and effect of pending legislation.22 
¶14 Since Campbell, we have repeatedly addressed violations of the 
single subject rule. In Morgan v. Daxon, 2001 OK 104, 49 P.3d 687, the Court found a reconciliation bill 
unconstitutional for violating the anti-logrolling provisions of the Okla. 
Const., art. 5, §§56 and 57. Again, we addressed the application of the single 
subject rule in In Re: Initiative Petition 
No. 382, State Question No. 729, 
2006 OK 45, 142 P.3d 400. In that case, we responded to a challenge 
that an initiative petition addressing the power of eminent domain as well as 
the enforcement of zoning laws violated the single subject requirement of the 
Okla. Const., art. 5, §57.23 
¶15 Proponents of Initiative Petition No. 382 argued that previous decisions 
of this court implied adoption of an expansive test of germaneness that is 
broad, liberal, and satisfied by all proposed laws but those with the most 
scattered and disconnected provisions.24 We explained that such a reading is not consistent with 
the requirements of Okla. Const., art 5, §57, and held that:
… seeming inconsistences in our single subject rule jurisprudence melt away 
when one understands that each case was decided by determining whether the 
purposes behind the rule were offended. Whether we explicitly stated it or not, 
the issue is not how similar or "related" any two provisions in a proposed law 
are, or whether one can articulate some rational connection between the 
provisions of a proposed law, but whether it appears that either the proposal is 
misleading or provisions in the proposal are so unrelated that many of those 
voting on the law would be faced with an unpalatable all-or-nothing choice.25 
¶16 In Fent v. State ex rel. Office 
of State Finance, 2008 OK 2, 184 P.3d 467, the petitioner argued that an 
appropriations bill violated the single subject rule because it made multiple 
special appropriations to several different subjects or objects of state 
government. We rejected the notion that the subject of the legislation should be 
tested by broad, expansive themes such as allocating surplus or managing 
accounts, and once again affirmed the use of the germaneness test we put forward 
in Campbell.26 
¶17 A year later, in Fent v. State ex rel. 
Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 
2009 OK 15, 214 P.3d 799, we again addressed violations of the 
single subject rule, and discussed our previous cases on the subject. We 
rejected any kind of broad, expansive, and thematic based approach in favor of 
measuring the germaneness of various bill provisions to each other.27 We reiterated that while bond measures do not 
necessarily have to be brought individually, at the very least they must have 
some semblance of relation to each other and must not be misleading or provide 
the voter or legislator with an all or nothing choice.28 
V.GUIDELINES
¶18 Perhaps guidelines with regard to the single subject provision of Okla. 
Const., art 5, §57 will prevent this Court from having to revisit the issue. 
This Court interprets the single subject rule using a "germaneness" test.29 The single subject rule requires the following:
The provisions of a bill must be related to a single subject. The provisions 
are related to a single subject if the provisions are germane, relative, and 
cognate to a readily apparent common theme and purpose.30 
A voter or a legislator must be able to make a choice about voting for a bill 
without being misled, and may not be forced to choose between two unrelated 
provisions contained in one measure in order to embrace the one they support.31 
Legislation may not be made "veto proof" by combining two totally unrelated 
subjects in one bill.32 
A mere functional relationship between provisions is insufficient; rather, 
the subjects have to have at least a semblance of relation to each other and 
must not be misleading or provide the voter or legislator with an all or nothing 
choice.33 
¶19 A culinary example may be more illustrative. If you make a peanut butter 
cookie, it is apparent that it is a smooth, one flavor cookie. It is still a 
peanut butter cookie even if you use crunchy peanut butter, because its major 
flavor is still peanuts. When you add chocolate chips, pecans, coconut, 
M&M's, raisins, and dried cranberries, the additional discrete ingredients 
change the homogenous nature of a peanut butter cookie into a jumble of 
different tastes and textures. It is still a cookie, it is just not a peanut 
butter cookie. Likewise, the CLRA is still a statute, but it ceased to be a 
statute for the reform of civil procedure when sections having nothing to do 
with civil procedure were included.
¶20 The nature of the single subject rule necessarily requires that 
legislation be examined on a case by case basis.34 The aforementioned guidelines illustrate how 
legislation can be drafted which satisfies the requirements of Okla. Const., art 
5, §57. 
CONCLUSION
¶21 It is not the role of this Court to determine the wisdom of legislation. 
It is my hope that in the future the Court will not be forced to invalidate 
reform legislation because it runs contra to the Oklahoma Constitution. 
FOOTNOTES
1 The Okla. Const., Art. 5, 
§57 provides:
Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be 
clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general 
revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes; and 
no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or 
conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, 
amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length: 
Provided, That if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions 
of this section, such act shall be void only as to so much of the laws as may 
not be expressed in the title thereof.
2 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, sec. 74 provides:
SECTION 74. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma 
Statutes as Section 6-101.7 of Title 70, unless there is created a duplication 
in numbering, reads as follows:
An attorney, representative, or other designee of the school district who has 
represented or represents a school district or the administration of a school 
district at a hearing held for the purpose of affording due process rights and 
requirements for an administrator as provided for in Section 6-101.13 of Title 
70 of the Oklahoma Statutes, a teacher as provided for in Section 6-101.26 of 
Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or a support employee as provided for in 
Section 6-101.46 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes or who has been involved 
or participated in any prehearing actions of the school district with respect to 
a recommendation for the termination of employment or nonreemployment of an 
administrator, teacher, or support employee shall not:
1. Conduct or preside as the hearing officer or judge at a due process 
hearing or hearings; and 
2. Attend, advise at, or in any way influence an executive session of the 
school district board of education that is held in conjunction with a due 
process hearing or hearings if the attorney, representative, or other designee 
of the school district conducted or presided over the due process hearing or 
hearings as the hearing officer or judge. 
3 Respondent's Answer Brief, p. 2
4 Amicus Curiae Brief of Oklahoma Association of Defense 
Counsel, p. 3.
5 Transcript of Proceedings had on August 11, 2011 in the 
District Court of Tulsa County, 5:13-15. 
6 Title 70 O.S. 2011 
§6-101.7 provides:
An attorney, representative, or other designee of the school district who has 
represented or represents a school district or the administration of a school 
district at a hearing held for the purpose of affording due process rights and 
requirements for an administrator as provided for in Section 6-101.13 of Title 
70 of the Oklahoma Statutes, a teacher as provided for in Section 6-101.26 of 
Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or a support employee as provided for in 
Section 6-101.46 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes or who has been involved 
or participated in any prehearing actions of the school district with respect to 
a recommendation for the termination of employment or nonreemployment of an 
administrator, teacher, or support employee shall not:
1. Conduct or preside as the hearing officer or judge at a due process 
hearing or hearings; and
2. Attend, advise at, or in any way influence an executive session of the 
school district board of education that is held in conjunction with a due 
process hearing or hearings if the attorney, representative, or other designee 
of the school district conducted or presided over the due process hearing or 
hearings as the hearing officer or judge. 
7 Respondent asserts that even if Section 74, or any 
other part of the CLRA, were unconstitutional, they could be severed, allowing 
the CLRA itself to remain valid and in force. Respondent's Reply Brief, p. 5. In 
Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶31, 260 P.3d 1251, we held that severability was a 
possibility where the valid provisions of an act were not essentially and 
inseparably connected with and dependent on the invalid portion.
8 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, secs. 31-42.
9 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, secs. 33-35, see note 
13, infra.
10 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, secs. 33-35 provides: 

SECTION 35. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma 
Statutes as Section 684.18 of Title 63, unless there is created a duplication in 
numbering, reads as follows:
A. To qualify as a volunteer health practitioner registration system, a 
system must: 
1. Accept applications for the registration of volunteer health practitioners 
before or during an emergency; 
2. Include information about the licensure and good standing of health 
practitioners which is accessible by authorized persons; 
3. Be capable of confirming the accuracy of information concerning whether a 
health practitioner is licensed and in good standing before health services or 
veterinary services are provided under the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health 
Practitioners Act; and 
4. Meet one of the following conditions:
a. be an emergency system for advance registration of volunteer health 
practitioners established by a state and funded through the Health Resources 
Services Administration under Section 319I of the Public Health Services Act, 42 
U.S.C., Section 247d-7b,
b. be a local unit consisting of trained and equipped emergency response, 
public health, and medical personnel formed pursuant to Section 2801 of the 
Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 300hh,
c. be operated by a:
(1) disaster relief organization,
(2) licensing board,
(3) national or regional association of licensing boards or health 
practitioners,
(4) health facility that provides comprehensive inpatient and outpatient 
health-care services, including a tertiary care and teaching hospital, or 
(5) governmental entity, or 
d. be designated by the State Department of Health as a registration system 
for purposes of the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act.
B. While an emergency declaration is in effect, the State Department of 
Health, a person authorized to act on behalf of the Department, or a host entity 
may confirm whether volunteer health practitioners utilized in this state are 
registered with a registration system that complies with subsection A of this 
section. Confirmation is limited to obtaining identities of the practitioners 
from the system and determining whether the system indicates that the 
practitioners are licensed and in good standing.
C. Upon request of a person in this state authorized under subsection B of 
this section, or a similarly authorized person in another state, a registration 
system located in this state shall notify the person of the identities of 
volunteer health practitioners and whether the practitioners are licensed and in 
good standing.
D. A host entity shall not be required to use the services of a volunteer 
health practitioner even if the practitioner is registered with a registration 
system that indicates that the practitioner is licensed and in good 
standing.
11 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, secs. 75-83. 
Specifically, 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, sec. 78 provides: 
SECTION 78. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma 
Statutes as Section 6-143 of Title 70, unless there is created a duplication in 
numbering, reads as follows:
A. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person eighteen (18) 
years of age or older who acts with specific intent in making a false accusation 
of criminal activity against an education employee to law enforcement 
authorities or school district officials, or both, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, punished by a fine of not more than Two 
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).
B. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any student between seven 
(7) years of age and seventeen (17) years of age who acts with specific intent 
in making a false accusation of criminal activity against an education employee 
to law enforcement authorities or school district officials, or both, shall, 
upon conviction, at the discretion of the court, be subject to any of the 
following:
1. Community service of a type and for a period of time to be determined by 
the court; or
2. Any other sanction as the court in its discretion may deem 
appropriate.
C. The provisions of this section shall not apply to statements regarding 
individuals elected or appointed to an educational entity.
D. This section is in addition to and does not limit the civil or criminal 
liability of a person who makes false statements alleging criminal activity by 
another.
12 Transcript of Proceedings had in the District Court of 
Tulsa County on August 30, 2011, at 5:15-19. 
13 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, sec. 25 provides:
SECTION 25. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma 
Statutes as Section 2211 of Title 36, unless there is created a duplication in 
numbering, reads as follows:
A. There is hereby created the "Health Care Indemnity Fund Task Force". 
B. The task force shall study a mechanism for creating a health care 
indemnity fund for purposes of paying a portion of damages awarded by the court 
or settled and approved by the court in professional negligence cases against 
physicians as defined in subsection I of Section 24 of this act. The task force 
shall study the following issues:
1. Funding, expenses and investments;
2. Capping the fund at a rate of Twenty Million Dollars ($20,000,000.00) 
annually;
3. Limiting damage award payments from the fund to: 
a. professional negligence cases against physicians where the noneconomic 
damage cap has been removed, and
b. only that amount of damages that exceed the noneconomic damage cap of Four 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00) per occurrence;
4. Purchase of reinsurance;
5. Professional liability insurance coverage requirements, in an amount of no 
less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) for physicians; 
6. Qualifications for coverage under the fund;
7. Applicant, compliance, payment and rating procedures; and
8. Any other issues necessary for creating a health care indemnity fund.
C. The task force shall be composed of eight (8) members as follows:
1. The Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner or designee;
2. Three members appointed by the Governor;
3. Two members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, one of 
whom shall be a physician; and
4. Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one 
of whom shall be a physician.
D. The task force may meet as often as necessary to perform the duties 
imposed upon it. Members of the task force shall receive no compensation for 
their services, but shall receive travel reimbursement as follows:
1. Legislative members of the task force shall be reimbursed for necessary 
travel expenses incurred in the performance of their duties in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 456 of Title 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes; and
2. Nonlegislative members of the task force shall be reimbursed for necessary 
travel expenses incurred in the performance of their duties in accordance with 
the State Travel Reimbursement Act.
E. The task force shall be authorized to hire actuarial or any other 
professional services necessary to perform the duties imposed on it.
F. A quorum of the task force shall be required for any final action, and 
shall report its findings and recommendations to the President Pro Tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives not later than May 1, 
2011.
14 Transcript of Proceedings had in the District Court of 
Tulsa County on August 30, 2011, at 5:15-19.
15 2009 Okla. Session. Laws ch. 228, sec. 25(F).
16 Thomas v. Henry, see note 7, supra at 
¶27.
17 Campbell v. White, 1993 OK 89, ¶14, 856 P.2d 255. 
18 Nova Health Systems v. 
Edmondson, 2010 OK 21, ¶3, 233 P.3d 380.
19 In In Re County Comm'rs 
Comprising Seventh Judicial Dist., 1908 OK 207, ¶¶4-5, 98 OK 207, we held that: 
[t]he abuses which called such provision into existence are clearly 
understood, and are twofold. Each subject brought into the deliberation of the 
legislative department of the government is to be considered and voted on 
singly, without having associated with it any other measure to give it strength. 
Experience had shown that measures having no common purpose, and each wanting 
sufficient support on its merits to secure its enactment, have been carried 
through legislative bodies and enacted into laws. When [sic] neither measure 
could command or merit the approval of a majority of that body.
The other abuse against which this provision was levied was to prevent 
matters foreign to the main objects of a bill from finding their way into such 
enactment surreptitiously. 
20 The Okla. Const., art. 5, §56 concerns general 
appropriations bills, but contains a single subject provision similar in nature 
to Okla. Const., art. 5, §57. The Okla. Const., art. 5, §56 provides:
§ 56. General appropriation bills - Salaries - Separate appropriation 
bills.
The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for 
the expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the 
State, and for interest on the public debt. The salary of no officer or employee 
of the State, or any subdivision thereof, shall be increased in such bill, nor 
shall any appropriation be made therein for any such officer or employee, unless 
his employment and the amount of his salary, shall have been already provided 
for by law. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each 
embracing but one subject.
21 Campbell v. White, see note 17, supra at 
¶7.
22 Campbell v. White, see note 17, 
supra.
23 In Re: Initiative Petition 
No. 382, State Question No. 729, 
2006 OK 45, ¶10-12, 142 P.3d 400.
24 In Re: Initiative Petition 
No. 382, State Question No. 729, see 
note 23, supra at ¶13.
25 In Re: Initiative Petition 
No. 382, State Question No. 729, see 
note 23, supra at ¶14 (citing In Re: Initiative 
Petition No. 314, 1980 OK 174, ¶¶59-60, 625 P.2d 595).
26 Fent v. State ex rel. 
Office of State Finance, 2008 OK 2, ¶¶22-23, 184 P.3d 467.
27 Fent v. State of Oklahoma, 
ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement 
Authority, 2009 OK 15, ¶¶20-21, 214 P.3d 799.
28 Fent v. State of Oklahoma, 
ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement 
Authority, see note 27, supra at ¶24.
29 Fent v. State of Oklahoma, 
ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement 
Authority, see note 27, supra at ¶16.
30 Compare Fent v. State of 
Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol 
Improvement Authority, see note 27, supra at ¶16 (Senate Bill 1374 
violated the germaneness requirement of the single subject rule of art. 5, §57 
of the Oklahoma Constitution because it addressed the separate subjects of bond 
issuance for: 1) the Native American Cultural and Educational Authority; 2) the 
State's Oklahoma Conservation Commission; and 3) a local River Parks Authority.) 
with Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶45, 91 P.3d 605 (No violation of the single-subject 
requirement where Oklahoma's anti-cockfighting Act was unequivocally concerned 
with one subject and the Act was a unified, germane whole, having as its central 
purpose the prevention of cruelty to birds by outlawing cockfighting and related 
activities and providing, after a criminal conviction, for the forfeiture of 
birds or equipment used in any cockfighting endeavor.)
31 In Re Initiative Petition 
No. 382, see note 23, supra at ¶15 (We held that a ballot 
initiative proposing a new statute limiting the power of public bodies to take 
private property by eminent domain and in the same initiative also requiring 
just compensation to be paid to landowners negatively affected by a zoning law 
"presents a voter with exactly the sort of choice the single subject rule was 
enacted to prevent.")
32 Thomas v. Henry, see note 7, supra at 
¶¶29-31 (Insertion of a single non-germane provision restricting those who 
completed a GED from obtaining in-state tuition rates for higher education, into 
a bill purporting to control illegal immigration, violated the single subject 
rule.)
33 Fent v. State of Oklahoma, 
ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement 
Authority, see note 27, supra at ¶¶19-21. (We reiterated that this Court 
has rejected a broad, thematic approach to the single-subject requirement.)
34 Examination by this Court of a particular piece of 
legislation, at a particular time, is not always appropriate. In Fent v. 
Fallin et. al., 111,199 (Okla. 2013), we declined to assume 
original jurisdiction in a challenge to a bill authorizing a statewide charter 
school and designating a separate $30 million appropriation to public schools. 
The Supreme Court is not constrained to exercise its original jurisdiction in 
any case; whether it does so is always a matter of discretion. 
Application of Sewer Improvement Dist. 
No. 1, 1950 OK 64, ¶8, 216 P.2d 303. In exercising its discretion, the Court 
is mindful of the limited role of its original jurisdiction. Kitchens v. 
McGowen, 1972 OK 
140, 503 P.2d 218. A decision on the part of this Court not to accept original 
jurisdiction should not be taken as a decision on the merits in favor of one 
party or the other. A request that this Court assume original jurisdiction is 
not the same as an appeal. The right of appeal in Oklahoma is a constitutional 
right guaranteed by the Constitution. This cannot be taken away by any act of 
the Legislature. Peterman v. Chapman, 1921 OK 202, ¶5, 200 P. 776.

WINCHESTER, J., with whom Taylor, J. joins, dissenting:
¶1 I respectfully dissent. This opinion demonstrates how difficult the 
single-subject rule is to explain with the precision necessary to instruct a 
legislative body concerning the rule's application. House Bill 1603 is commonly 
called the Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009. Its purpose is tort reform. 
The majority opinion recites the number of sections and some of the subjects 
addressed within H.B. 1603. The majority opinion states that the provisions are 
so unrelated that those voting on the law were faced with an all-or-nothing 
choice. It says this Court will not pick and choose which provisions of the bill 
are germane and cites Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, 260 P.3d 1251, as a comprehensive review of our case law 
regarding the single-subject rule. The majority opinion explains that in 
Thomas this Court severed the offending provisions of the Oklahoma 
Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, but that bill had only 13 sections 
so the Court easily discerned the sections related to discouraging illegal 
immigration, the subject of that act. 
¶2 Early after statehood, the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Thomas, 
1922 OK 134, ¶ 17, 206 P. 604, 609, quoted with approval from 25 
R.C.L.1, § 88, p. 842:
"The term 'subject' as used in these provisions is to be given a broad and 
extended meaning, so as to allow the Legislature full scope to include in one 
act all matters having a logical or natural connection. If all parts of an act 
relate directly or indirectly to the general subject of the act, it is not open 
to the objection of plurality. . . .This constitutional provision does not 
contain any limitation on the comprehensiveness of the subject, which may be as 
comprehensive as the Legislature chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, in 
the constitutional sense, a single subject and not several; it may include 
innumerable minor subjects, provided that all the minor subjects, when combined, 
form only one general subject or topic."
¶3 The majority opinion gives little guidance to the legislature regarding 
why the law found in H.B. 1603 is unconstitutional. What is the lesson from the 
majority's analysis of Thomas v. Henry and the 13 sections the Court 
examined within it? Is this Court willing to examine a "comprehensive" bill and 
consider severing sections if the bill has only 13 sections, but not if it has 
90? 
¶4 I believe it more likely that the legislature and the public understood 
the common themes and purposes embodied in the legislation; it was tort reform. 
The vote in the House of Representatives was 86 in favor of the bill and 13 
opposed. The Senate voted 42 in favor of the bill and 5 against it. Governor 
Brad Henry signed the bill. This bill appears to have had overwhelming support 
of two branches of government.
¶5 Although the majority recites case law that "a heavy burden is cast on 
those challenging a legislative enactment to show its unconstitutionality" and 
that "[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of 
a statute," the majority's result does not appear to meet that burden or fulfill 
that presumption. Requiring affidavits in professional malpractice cases, 
12 O.S.2011, § 19, appears to me to be both 
related and germane to tort reform.2 Without deciding the wisdom, need, or desirability of 
H.B. 1603,3 I have no trouble concluding that the affidavit 
requirement of § 19 has a close relationship to the title of the Act, which 
subject is comprehensive lawsuit reform. 
¶6 In addition, this Act has a severability clause, as did the Oklahoma 
Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, which this Court reviewed for a 
violation of the single-subject rule in Thomas. Even if the H.B. 1603 did 
not have a severability clause, 75 O.S.2011, § 11a specifically provides for 
severance if any of the provisions of an act are found to be unconstitutional.4 
¶7 Are topics such as "civil procedure" or "tort reform" too broad to be 
encompassed within one bill? In 1978, the legislature passed the Civil 
Procedure--Criminal Procedure--Evidence Code.5 It had a total of 78 sections. It is likely that some 
of the legislators who voted in favor of the bill compromised to secure its 
passage. It did involve one subject, evidence. The Uniform Commercial Code was 
passed by the legislature in 1961.6 It had 10 articles and a total of 368 sections. Its 
articles included Sales, which contains 97 separate sections; Commercial Paper; 
Bank Deposits and Collections; Letters of Credit; Bulk Transfers; Warehouse 
Receipts and Special Provisions; Investment Securities; Secured Transactions, 
Sales of Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper; and a Repealer Section 
that removed amended statutes throughout titles 6, 9, 13, 15, 18, 23, 24, 42, 
46, 48, 55, and 60. When considering all that it encompasses, the Uniform 
Commercial Code likely resulted in compromises by legislators to pass an 
important and significant piece of legislation. 
¶8 Logrolling is the "legislative practice of including several propositions 
in one measure or proposed constitutional amendment so that the legislature or 
voters will pass all of them, even though these propositions might not have 
passed if they had been submitted separately."7 If this is a description 
of the "single-subject" rule, the legislature would have substantial difficulty 
passing any comprehensive legislation including any uniform codes that are 
generally adopted among the states. One recent article commented that although 
the single-subject rule "is a noble attempt to reign in state legislatures and 
encourage the passage of more coherent and uniform laws supported in fact by 
majority votes, the implementation of the states' various single subject rules 
has had mixed success, at best."8 It further observed:
"The Oklahoma Supreme Court defines a 'single subject' as one that has 'a 
readily apparent common theme and purpose.' Likewise, in Minnesota, the courts 
have found that a single subject means 'one general subject' and in Alaska, it 
means 'one general idea.' Similarly, in Alabama, 'one subject' means that the 
provisions are referable to and cognate of the bill's subject. No doubt, with 
definitions as amorphous as these, it is easy to see how determinations of 
whether a subject is indeed 'single' can be based on a number of subjective 
factors including possibly the popularity or necessity of the legislation." 
[Footnotes omitted.]
¶9 Legislation requires some compromise. At times, even the wording of a 
single statute on a single subject may result in an all-or-nothing choice for 
those voting on it. The single-subject dilemma leads me to conclude that this 
Court should adopt a more deferential approach toward the rule. Based on the 
majority's present opinion, statutes that were enacted in a comprehensive bill, 
and that have remained as law for years could be found unconstitutional. The 
legislature will have wasted its time in working on any comprehensive 
legislation. Such legislation may be declared unconstitutional immediately, or 
worse, after a few years codified in the official state statutes a whole 
comprehensive bill will be struck and cause the chaos that will inevitably 
follow this opinion. Court opinions containing an overly restrictive 
interpretation of the single-subject rule will likely have a chilling effect on 
the legislative process. The result will be an exponential number of bills filed 
along with an expanded legislative process but with no greater assurance the 
legislation will pass the single-subject test. The severance clause is included 
to allow the courts to remove unconstitutional sections and still preserve the 
legislation.
¶10 I would find that H.B. 1603 does not violate the single subject rule. 

FOOTNOTES
1 25 William Mark McKinney 
&Burdett Alberto Rich, RULING CASE LAW 842 (1919). 
2 "Oklahoma adheres to the germaneness test and the most 
relevant question under such analysis is whether a voter (or legislator) is able 
to make a choice without being misled and is not forced to choose between two 
unrelated provisions contained in one measure. In re Initiative Petition No. 
382, 2006 OK 
45, ¶9, 142 P.3d 400,405." Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 26, 260 P.3d 1251, 1260. 
3 Where legislation is constitutionally valid, this Court 
is not authorized to delve into the wisdom, need, or desirability of a 
legislative enactment. Oklahoma Industries Authority v. Barnes, 
1988 OK 98, ¶ 14, 769 P.2d 115, 119. 
4 Title 75 O.S.2011, § 11a(1) provides:
"In the construction of the statutes of this state, the following rules shall 
be observed: 
"1. For any act enacted on or after July 1, 1989, unless there is a provision 
in the act that the act or any portion thereof or the application of the act 
shall not be severable, the provisions of every act or application of the act 
shall be severable. If any provision or application of the act is found to be 
unconstitutional and void, the remaining provisions or applications of the act 
shall remain valid, unless the court finds:
"a. the valid provisions or application of the act are so essentially and 
inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the 
court cannot presume the Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid 
provisions without the void one; or
"b. the remaining valid provisions or applications of the act, standing 
alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the 
legislative intent.
"2. For acts enacted prior to July 1, 1989, whether or not such acts were 
enacted with an express provision for severability, it is the intent of the 
Oklahoma Legislature that the act or any portion of the act or application of 
the act shall be severable unless:
"a. the construction of the provisions or application of the act would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature;
"b. the court finds the valid provisions of the act are so essentially and 
inseparably connected with and so dependent upon the void provisions that the 
court cannot presume the Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid 
provisions without the void one; or
"c. the court finds the remaining valid provisions standing alone, are 
incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the 
legislative intent.
5 1978 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 285, §§ 101 through 1103. 
6 1961 Okla.Sess.Laws, pp. 69 through 182. 
7 Black's Law Dictionary (Westlaw 9th ed. 2009) 
8 Stanley Kaminski and Elinor Hart, Log Rolling versus 
the Single Subject Rule, 80 USLW 1156, 02/28/2012, 
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/kaminski_hart_bloombergbna_022812.pdf