Case Title: State v. Kamanao. Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Moon [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Levinson [pdf]. ICA s.d.o., filed 12/13/2007 [pdf], 116 Haw. 238. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/06/2008 [pdf].

Citation: 118 Haw. 210

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

‘se4f0R PUBLICATION If WEST'S HANAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000:

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee

ANDREW K, KAMANA'O, Petitioner/Defendant~Appellant

 

No. 28236

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 56708)

  

JOLY 23, 2008 5

aqaus

NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.; =
AND MOON, C.J., AND LEVINSON, J., DISSENTING!

Les ez

QBINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA. J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Andrew K. Kamana‘o
(Petitioner) seeks review of the judgment of the Intermediate
Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on January 3, 2008, pursuant to
its December 13, 2007 Summary Disposition Order (SD0)* affirming
the October 16, 2006 amended judgment of the first circuit court?

(the court) convicting Petitioner of two counts of rape in the

‘the S00 was issued by Presiding Judge Corinne K.A, Watanabe and
Associate Judges Daniel R. foley and Craig #. Nakamura.

= The Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall presided.
 

}FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

 

first degree, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-730(1) (a) (1)
(1985) (Counts VI and 1x); and one count of sodomy in the first
degree, HRS $ 707-733(1) (a) (i) (1985) (Count XI). The appeal to
the ICA was from the court's sentence of Petitioner to twenty
years of imprisonment for each count, with a mandatory minimum
term of five years on each count as a repeat offender, with the
terms of imprisonment for Counts IX and XI to run concurrently
with each other and consecutively to Count VI, with credit for
time served.”

We hold that the ICA did not gravely err in affirming
the court’s judgment because in Petitioner's case (1) under HRS
§ 706-606.5 (1985),‘ mandatory minimum sentences must be imposed
under specified conditions; (2) pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5, the
court may run mandatory minimum sentences consecutively for
multiple offenses; (3) mandatory minimum sentences imposed on
repeat offenders pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5 are part of
indeterminate maximum sentences; (4) HRS § 706-668 (Special
Pamphlet 1975)* requires that multiple sentences imposed by the
court shall be served concurrently; (5) HRS § 706-606.5 does not

conflict with HRS § 706-668 because the language of the latter

+ _AlL three terms were to run concurrently with any terms of
Amprisonnent imposed in Cr. No. 52291.

+ See intea note 7

+ oe intra note 9,
 

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may be construed as prohibit

 

1g consecutive term sentencing where

 

multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed at the same time,
except that in certain situations such as those contemplated by

the repeat offender provisions of HRS § 706-606.5, consecutive

 

term sentencing is permitted; (6) assuming arauendo a conflict
between HRS § 706-606.5 and HRS $ 706-668 exists, repeat
offenders must be sentenced in accordance with HRS § 706-606.
because a specific statute controls over a general statute
concerning a common matters and (7) inasmuch as Petitioner was
sentenced under HRS § 706-606.5 within the parameters described
above, Petitioner’s consecutive indeterminate maximum sentences
do not constitute a violation of the due process and sx post
facto provisions of the federal and Hawai'i constitutions.
1

‘The following matters, sone verbatim, are from the
application.

Petitioner was convicted on October 13, 1963 of, inter
alia, three Class A felonies. As Petitioner states in his

application,

 

oln February 18, 1982(,] the (g)rend (3]ury indicted
[Petitioner] for’ 14 counte, including three Class A felony
Sexual assault charges and three burglary charges. The
incidents giving rise to the charges occurred an September
16, 18, and 29, 1981. On October 13, 1983[, Petitioner) was
convicted by a Jury of the three counte that are the subject
of this appeal, two counts of rape in the first degree 27
Violation of His § 707-730, and one count of sodomy in the
Hirst degree in violation of HRS’ § 207-733. Bll three,

‘Sounte were Clase A felonies, requizing a maximum
ingsterainste erison sentence of 20 vesrs under HRs € 706~

 

 

 
VOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**+

 

 

"1 315, 82 P34 402

 

S001") State v. Kamans'o, 103 Hawa!
12003)

(Bophasis added.)

‘This sentence was subsequently vacated and in April
2004, Petitioner was sentenced to an extended term. As
Petitioner alleges in his application,

[his] first sentence was vacated by the [s]uprene [clourt
Based upon a Fifth Amendment violation claim that he was
Sentenced to an extended tezm solely on the grounds that
Fofused to admit guilt. {Kamanaol, 103 Hawai'i [at) 324, 62

 

Pisa at alo.
Resentencing hearings were held on April 21 and 23,
2008. “the [elourt granted . = (the) motion for an

extended term [filed by Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee State
Of Hawai's (Respondent)? under findings other than
{Petitioner's} refusal to admit guilt, including
peychological harm caused,

 

* gs § 706-659 was enacted in 1960. Se 1980 Haw. Seas. L. Act
298, § 1, at S62; ‘The 1993 version was in effect at the tine of the incidents

Gna! stated ss follows:

 

Sentence of imprisonment for class A felony.
Notwithstanding sections 706-620 to 706-631, suspension of
Sentence and probation, and sections 706-605, 706-606, 206=
Sess, 706-660.1, 70G-és1, 706-662, and any other law to he
gonteary, ¢ peison who has been convicted ofa class B

felony shail be sentenced to an indeterminate ten of
‘pciscnment of twenty veare without possibility of

 

‘gistension of sentence of crebation- ‘The minimum length of
Imprisonment shall be deterained by the Hawaii paroling
authority in accordance with section 106-063,

 

(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.) The current statute is
substantially the sane ac i¢ was in 1993 except that HRS § 706-659 was amended

in t99e

 

£0 allow the court to make an exception for a person
Convicted of a class A felony defined in chapter 712, part
IV, [offenses related to drug and intoxicating compounds, |
from the mandatory sentence of an indeterminate term of
imprisonment without the possibility of suspension of
sentence or probation{] ... . allowing jodges. sone
Giseretion in evalusting all’ appropriate sentencing and
treatment alternatives available for drag offenders,

 

Conmentary on HRS § 706-659 (Supp. 2007) (citing Conference Committee Rep. Ho.
62, in 199¢ House Journal at B08, 1994 Senate Journal ae 724)
‘s++PoR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

 

On June 21, 2006, the Hawai'i United States district
court vacated the extended term sentence under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Petitioner's application states

chat:

‘The April 2004 sentences were vacated by the United
States District Court of the District of Hawas’s on June 21,
2006 under. [Asorenail, the “Apprend: rule," and its progeny.
[Petitioner's] extended term sentence of Life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole [as a multiple offender
porsuant to HRS § 706-662(4] (a) 4 (o)] was ruled to have
Been inposed in violation of the Sixth Amendnent to the
United States Constitution's right tos trial by jury.

 

As recounted by Petitioner, at resentencing, the court
adjudged that the rape convictions would be served concurrently,
but that the sodomy conviction would run consecutively to the

rape convictions.

on Octaber 6, 2006{, Petitioner) vas resentenced as to
counts 6) 9, and li, the three Class A counts, The (eloure
Fesentenced [Petitioner] to mixed concurrent and consecutive
tema, i.e., concurrent 20-year terms az to counts 9 (rs
in'the first degree) and ll. (sedomy in the first degree), to

‘So a 20-year tern as to count 6 (rape
Tr with eredit for time served.

 

 

 

 

Erthe first dege

 

(Emphasis added.) As noted previously, the court also imposed
mandatory minimum sentences of five years, for each of Counts VI,
IX and XI, based on Petitioner’s status as a repeat offender

pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5."

> pertinent to this cage, HRS § 706-606.5 was amended in 1981. See
1981 Haw. Sess. L. Act 69, $1, at 102, The statute in effect at the tine of
the incidents sppiied through the 1985 version. That version stated in
pertinent part as follows

 

      

 

Sentencing of repeat offenders, (1) sotuithstanding
section 106-669 and any other lw to the contrary, an

 

Rexson convicted under section. 70-730 relating to
fone in the first degrees 09°75) relating to sodomy Inthe
: Tor] J0s-a10 relating to Burglary in the
first degree... ”, who has a prior conviction for any of
(continued...)
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

‘The court's October 16, 2006 amended judgment" stated
as follows:

WANOATORY MINIMUM: FIVE (5) YEARS FOR Counts VI, IX and X
HicanceRaTioN®

TWENTY 120] YEARS for each of COUNTS VI, 1X and

Snseeueively to COUNT UE
Said terns are to run concurrently with Cr. No. 52291.
Defendant 12 to receive credit for tine already served.
Niteimus to iseve foreneith

OTHER! DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED PURSUANT TO ORDER OF THE U.S.
BISTRICT COURT (CIV. NO. 05-0068] SOM-KSC) FILED JUNE 22,
2006

(Counts I and II: Severed)

[iicounts Tv, Vand XIT? Dismissed)

[counts Ii, vit, VItz, x, MIT and XIV: Terms of

 

 

 

“(os seontinued)

‘the above enumerated offenses or of any of those enunerated
in subsection (2) in this or another jurisdiction, within

 

the tine of the maximum sentence of the pricr conviction,
shail bs Sentenced for each conviction after the first
Conviction to a mandatcry minimus period of impctacoment
uithout possibility of earole during such period as follows:
‘al Secand_comiction = vears
te] third conviction +10 years:

 

(2) ST Section... 13429 relating to permite to
carey

Sandatory minimin denbenca without possibility of parole
than that mandated by this section where the court’ finds
that strong mitigating circumstances warrant such action.

(Boldface font in original.) (Emphases added.) During Petitioner's
January ¢, 198¢ sentencing hearing, the court took judicial noice that
Petitioner had been previously convicted for “[elarrying a [f)irearm on
(plersen (without (pJermit oF (l}icense pursuant to (sjection 134-9" and
Petitioner did not object. Amendments ware mage to the statute in 1986 "so
that mandatory minimum terms of imprisomment are increased es the severity of
the repeat offense increases. Thus the mandatory miniman term for s clase A
Fepeat offender is greater than that term for a clase B repeat offender.”
Commentary on HRS §'706-606.5 (1993). In aadition, convictions in other
Jurisdictions and other class C felonies were added to the list of felonies
Subject to repeat offender sentencing, The gist of the seatute 1s
Substantially the same

 

 

 

 

+ ‘the judgment filed on October 6, 2006 was amended on October 16,
2006. the october 6, 2006 judgment referred to Counts 1, 2) and 3 for the
Jarious police report nunbers in the box entitled “sEPOR? NOBER(S)<" The
October 16, 2006 amended Judgment corrected those counts to counts é 9, and
i
‘s#4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

Incarceration have been completed)
Defendant shall provide specinen samples and print
Impressions aa coquited By H-ReS. chap. 864

(emphases added.) (Capitalization in original.)

The seeming conflict between the concurrent sentencing
ordered by the court pursuant to HRS $ 706-668" and the
consecutive sentencing permitted by HRS § 706-606.5 and also
ordered by the court was the apparent dispute at sentencing
between the parties. Petitioner states that “in a(n SDO] issued
on Decenber 13, 2007[,]" “the ICA. . . affirmed the mixed

concurrent and consecutive sentence[.]” The S00 states with

 

respect to the questions raised as follow:

(2) the circuit court was not statutorily barred from
imposing consecutive terms. Consecutive terms we
authorized by HRS § 706-608.5(1) and (3), as ancnded in
iser.

 

 

(2) imposition of consecutive sentences vas pursuant
to HRS § 706-606.5(1) and (3) and was not in violation of
federai due process or ex pout facto, ARS $ 706-606.5(2)
and. (3) provided adequate notice, sae State v. Vinge, l
Hawai'i 303, 321, 916 P.2d 1210, 1222 (i996)

 

> ‘with respect to concurrent sentences, HRS § 706-663 (Special
Panphiet 1975), the version in effect at the tine Petitioner conmitted che
offenses, stated:

 

Concurrent and consecutive terms of isprisonnent.
(2) except as provided in subsection (2), shen multsple

Suze time, of when a person who 1s subject to any
Ghatscnarged term of imprisonment ss sentenced ¢3 sn

additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences

(2) “Ifa person whois imprisoned in a correctional
inetitution is convicted of a crime committed while he ss
imprisoned of during an escape from impriscrment, the
nazinin term of inprisonment authorized for the crime
Connitted during inprisonment or during an escape from
Impriscanent aay be adied to the portion of the term which
ronained unserved at the tine of the commission of the
Eine. For purposes of this section, escape is a crime
Soamitted during imprisonment.

 

(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.)

7
 

‘e+70R PUBLICATION IN WES?!

 

HAMAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

(3)_ the consecutive ters were not inconsistent with
the District Court's order or Apprendi. State, Kehansa,
TIT Mawai's 267, 142 P.3a 440 (2008)

‘800 at 5.
1.
Petitioner presents the following questions in his

Application.

1. Did the ICA gravely err in holding that the pertinent
ropeat offender statute, HRS § 706-606.5(1) and (3),
permitted consecutive maximum terms when the plain meaning
Be that provision Ls that it only provides for consecutive
‘mandatory minimum terns for repest offenders, and not for
2." bla the Ica gravely exr in upholding 2 new judicial
Sonatructicn that allows consecutive maximum term
Sentencing, which was expressly forbidden under the law in
Sffoct at cho tine of the commission of the offenses, asa
‘iolation the due process and ex post facts provisions of
the federal and liawai't constitutions?

 

 

 

Petitioner does not present argument with respect to
paragraph (3) of the ICA’s S00 pertaining to Apprendi, and, thus,
that holding is not discussed. Cf, Hill v. Inouye, 90 Hawai‘i
76, 82, 976 P.2d 390, 396 (1998) ("The general rule provides that
*[A]ssues not properly raised on appeal will be deemed to be
waived.'” (Quoting Pele Def, Fund vy, Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 613, 837
P.2d 1247, 1268 (1992).

 

(Brackets in original.)
rir.

On February 12, 2008, Respondent filed a response to
the Application. Essentially the response reiterates its
Answering Brief arguments. See infra. It repeats Respondent’ s
position that

((2)) The mandatory minimum periods of inpriscrment”
proscribed in HRS"§ 106-606.5 were part of the staturorsly
Bandates indeterminate terms of inprisonnent for the
 

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‘enumerated crines and sot sentences unto thenselves.
States. Feliciano, 10? Hawai 469, 503, 115 P-34 €48, 682
(2005) {heoba, Jvy dissenting). Therefore, the “sentences”
referred to in HRS § 206-606.5(3) that could regult from the
application of the statute wore the "enhanced criminal
Sentences” that consisted of the indeterminste terms Of
Imprisonment for the underlying crime and the “aandatory
inimum period of iaprisonsent” that directed "how a certain
Period of the indeterminate term was to be served." (1d.)

 

 

 

1121] ". . . (tyke (court’s] authority to order
Petitioner to sorve the sentences consecutively derived from
the clear and snanbiguous language of #82 § 70-606.5

 

 

ici l. . tals gar pack as nie original sentencing
hearing in 1984, ‘the precedent regarding statutory
construction was well settied and made the inposition of

 

   

   

Consecutive sentences pursuant co HRS 706~
eee Tana ehus
Benonstrate the | | consecutive sentences” [we
“fair warning” of a “Judicial expansion of his penel
adapility.”
(Brackets and footnote omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
wv.
aA

As to his first question, Petitioner argues that
“[w]ith no explanation of its reasoning, the ICA held that the
repeat offender statute applicable to the offenses in 1981, HRS
§ 106-606.5[,] gave the [c]ourt authority to impose consecutive
maximum terms, despite the fact that the multiple term statute in
effect in 1981 authorized only concurrent maxinum[s]. HRS § 706-
668.” He maintains that “(t]his is a grave error of law that is
inconsistent [with]/Hawai'i Supreme Court holdings requiring
strict adherence to plain and unambiguous meaning in Penal Code

language.”
/++FOR PUBLICATION I wES®’

 

MAWAL'T REEORES AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+*

Petitioner states that HRS $§ 701-101, 706-668(1) and
106-606.5 are relevant. With respect to HRS $ 701-101," he
argues that “HRS § 701-101 . . . mandates that the penal statutes

applicable to prosecutions for offenses are those in effect at

 

“RS § 701-102 was enacted in 1972. See 1972 Haw. Sess. L. Act 9,
§ 1 at 32-33," The statute wag reprinted in 197S as a Special Pamphlet that

Contained Title 37, the Hawai'i Penal Code, and was in effect at the tine of

The incidents, That version stated ae follow

 

Applicability to offenses consitted before the
effective date. (1) Except as provided in subsections

(2) and (3), this Code does not apply to offenses comitted
before ita effective date, Prosecutions for offenses
Conniteed before the effective date are governed by che
prior lau, which Ss continoed in effect for chat purpose, os
Te this Code were not in force. For purposes of this
Section, an of Gonmitted before the effective date
Lf-any of the elements of the offense occurred before that
Gace

 

    

 

(2) In any case pending on oF commenced after the
effective date of this Code, involving an offense coamitted
Before that date
(2)"" Open the request of the defendant a defense or
mitigation under this Code, whether specifically
Provided for herein or based upon the failure of

 

 

the Code to define an applicable offense, shall
apply; and
(®) Upon the request of the defendant and the
approval of the court:
(i) Procedural provisions of ths Code shail
apply insofar as they sre justly,
applicable; and

 

(44) The court may impose a sentence or suspend
imposition of a sentence under th
provisions of this Coge applicable to the
Sffense and the offender.

(3) Provisions of this Code governing the release or
discharge of prisoners, probationers, and parolees shall
apply to persons under sentence for offenses committed
Before che effective dace of this Code, axcept chat the
inimum or saxinum period of their detention or supervision
Shall_in no case be increased, nor shall the provisions of
this Code affect the substantive or procedural validity of
any Judgment of conviction entered before the effective aate
GE his Cous, regardiess of che fact that appeal tins has
Rot run oF that an appeal is pending.

   

 

 

 

 

(oldtaced font in original.)

In nis Application Petitioner does not state to which particular
provision he refers.

10
 

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the time of the commission of the offenses (in this case
Septenber of 1981)[.]” As to HRS § 706-668 (1), he declares that
vHRS § 706-668 (1) . . . in September 1981 mandated that multiple
terms of imprisonment must be concurrent." Petitioner relates,
to reiterate, that in 1961, HRS $ 706-606.5, the repeat offender
statute, stated in pertinent part that “[t]he sentencing court
may impose the above [mandatory minimum] sentences consecutive to
any other sentence then . . . imposed on the defendant...
Petitioner recounts that “{o)n direct appeal, [Respondent] argued
the ‘notwithstanding’ clause of the repeat offender statute
cancelled HRS § 701-101 and § 706-668, granting consecutive
maximum term powers to the sentencing court.”

However, Petitioner maintains (1) that “(t]he plain and
obvious meaning of this statute(, HRS § 706-606.5,] relative to
consecutive sentencing is that it refers entirely and only to
consecutive mandatory minimum term sentencing and in no way
addresses the subject matter of consecutive maximum term
sentencing.” According to Petitioner, “[tJhe phrase ‘above

sentence

 

in subsection (3) [of HRS § 706-606.5] is clear
because the only sentences addressed above that language are
mandatory minimum term sentences.” (Emphasis in original.)

Petitioner contends that “ironically” “[t}he [eJourt, and

 

HRS § 706-668
314, $46, at 614.

 

12 repealed in 1986. See 1986 maw. Sess. L, Act

‘See supza note 7.
a
 

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POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’

 

 

presumably the . . . ICAI, without saying so,) relied upon State.

comelio, 44 Hawai'i 476, 935 P.2d 1021 (1997), and State v.
Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 978 P.2d 700 (1999) [,]” and that “[t]hose
cases, with holdings entirely unrelated to the instant case, both
stand for strict application of the plain meaning rule.” ‘Thus,
Petitioner posits that, “[iJn other words, it doesn’t matter that
the legislature failed miserably in carrying its intention into
effect, the reviewing court must adhere to the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the actual language of the statute. See,
generally, [Dudoitl, (supra).”

Further, Petitioner contends (2) “as a matter of law

- + Concurrent maximum terms do not contradict consecutive

minimum terms.” (Boldfaced font omitted.) Pointing to the

instant case, he argues:

The HRS § 106-668 bar to consecutive sentencing in multiple
Count indicenents
neing [petitioner to 7 consecutive Sevear mangater

‘Binimun terms, requiring hin to serve the entire 20 vear
Encinas without possibility of carole. the face that ¢
Ecnaecutive sandatory minimim sentences in [Petitioners]
Sage would have led toa mandatory 20 out of 20 years, in
face de the axsct amount of tine without parole the
ator requested at the initial sentencing hearing sn

‘The prosecutor said, ". - «if there could be some
[guatantes) that he would be out Of the community for that
20 years, then [Respondent] might consider asking for the 20
years.” {fsmansol, 103 Hawai'i [ati 317, 82 2.39 (atl 403.

   

(Bmphasis added.) According to Petitioner, this is because

w]nere the statutes sisply overlap in their application,
effect will be given to both if possible, as “repeal by
Implication 1s Sisravored.” State v. Kelis, 91 sawai'l 319,
330, 984 P.24 78, e9 (1999) (quoting Gtate . Vallesteros,
84 hawat's 295, 402, 933 P.24 ¢03, 640 (907}7 Seabee

80 Hawai'i 8, 19'n.16, 906 P.24 893, 904 na1e
(i995) (further citations onittea)-

12
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Petitioner argues (3) that “[tJhere is an irreconcilable conflict
between HRS § 706-668 and HRS § 706-606.5. The two statutes are
not even on the sane subject matter. MNathenatical impossibility
to impose consecutive mandatory minimum terms in some cases,
while not others, is not a contradiction.”
5

In its Answering Brief Respondent first argued that the
specific sentencing provisions of HRS § 706-606.5 controlled over
the general sentencing provisions of HRS § 706-668. According to
Respondent, (1) “HRS § 706-606.5 . . . [is] a apecific sentencing
statute, the provisions of which were reserved for a specific
+. . subclass of defendants: i.e,, ‘repeat offenders’ (emphasis
in original): (2) “foJn the other hand, HRS § 706-668 was a
general sentencing statute”; (3) “{Petitioner’s] assertion that
the specific sentencing provisions of HRS § 706-606.5 were
Limited by the general sentencing provision of HRS § 706-668 was
not expressed by the legislature”; (4) “[t}herefore, . . . the
specific provision of HRS § 706-606.5(3) that authorized the
imposition of consecutive sentences and not the general provision
of HRS § 706-668 was applicable to him{,]" (citing Kotia, 91
Hawai'i at 330, 984 P.24 at 89 (court noted that “where there 1s
a ‘plainly irreconcilable’ conflict between a general and a
specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific

will be favored”) (citation omitted).

B
 

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Second, Respondent argues that “[tJhe clause
‘notwithstanding . . . any other law to the contrary’ [in] HRS

§ 706-606.5(1)" indicates the “broad scope” of the statute as
apparently controlling. Third, Petitioner maintains that “[tJhe
‘mandatory minimum period of impriscnment’ was subsumed within
the statutorily mandated indeterminate term of imprisonment for
the enumerated crime for which it could be imposed and was not a
sentence unto itself” (citing Feliciano, 107 Hawai‘ at 503, 115
P.3d at 682 (Acoba, J., dissenting)}; and “[t]herefore, the
\sentences’ referred to in HRS § 706-606.5(3) that would result
from the application of the statute was the ‘enhanced criminal
sentence’ consisting of the statutorily proscribed indeterminate
term of imprisonment for the enumerated underlying crime and the
‘mandatory minimum period of imprisonment’ to which it attached.”
Fourth, Respondent asserts that “[Petitioner] cites no authority
that supports the proposition that the legislature intended to
treat the ‘mandatory minimum period of imprisonment’ as a
sentence separate and distinct from the underlying crime for

Which it was imposed.” (Emphasis in original.)

 

AL
With respect to Petitioner’s argument (1) that HRS

$ 706-668(1) is plain and unambiguous and controls, HRS § 706-

668(1) must be read with HRS § 706-606.5. Under HRS § 706-668,

when multiple prison sentences are imposed at the same tine, as

a4
 

in this case, the sentences must run concurrently (stating that
“when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person
at the sane time, . . . the sentence or sentences imposed by the
court shall be served concurrently”). As stated previously, the
court imposed sentence on three separate class A convictions at
the sane time and HRS § 706-668(1) thus applies. Under HRS

§ 706-606.5, however, mandatory minimum sentences imposed on a
repeat offender may be imposed consecutively in the discretion of
the court. See HRS § 706-606.5(3) (“The sentencing court may
impose the above sentences consecutive to any other sentence then
or previously imposed... 2")

In this regard, HRS § 706-668 is a general statute in
the sense that it pertains generally to all offenses and without
regard to the type of offender involved. On the other hand, HRS
§ 706-606.5 concerns certain enunerated offenses for which the
legislature has required “nandatory minimum periods of
imprisonment without possibility of parole” to be imposed for a

particular class of offender, that is, the repeat offender. This

 

 Sustice Levinson's dissent argues that, with this proposition, we
“essentially contend[] that the 'sentences’ referenced in paragraph (3)
sncluded the indeterminate maximum terns corresponding to each mandatory
minimus.” Levinson, "J; dissenting at 2. Relatedly, that dissent opines that
“the Language of HRS § ?06-e06.5(3) authorized (the court] to impose
consecutive mandatory pinimim terme. It did not, by its terms, plainly permit
[the court] to order consecutive indeterminate Eaximun sentences, becaues the
provisions found ‘above’ that paragraphs simply dig not govern the imposition
Sf indeterminate maxima terms.” dg at 3 (citations onittea) (emphases in
original] «

 

 

However, the construction of HRS § 106-606.5(3) 19 not before this
court, and therstore, is not addressed. It must be emphasized that our
Snalyais Le not concerned with “the above sentences" and our conclusion does
ot rely on that language

 

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court has said that “where there is a ‘plainly irreconcilable’
conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the
same subject matter, the specific will be favored. However,
where the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect
Will be given to both Sf possible, as repeal by implication is
disfavored." Richardson v. City 4 County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i
46, 98, 868 P.2d 1193, 1202 (1994) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

With respect to “overlapping” and Petitioner's argument
(3), BRS § 706-668 and HRS § 706-606.5 may be viewed as statutes
that overlap on the question of concurrent and consecutive term
sentencing. See Kienker v. Bauer, 110 Hawai'i 97, 109, 129 P.3¢
1125, 1137 (2006) ("observ(ing] that HRS § 663-10.5 and HRS
§ 663-10.9 are statutes that overlap on the question of joint and
several liability” and noting that “it is possible to give effect
to both statutes inasmuch as the broad language of HRS § 663-10.5
may be construed as abolishing the government's joint and several
Liability unless an exception such as that embodied in HRS § 663-
10.9 applies”). HRS § 706-606.5 is the specific statute in that
it deals expressly with sentencing for certain felony convictions
in cases involving repeat offenders, such as Petitioner. On the
other hand, HRS § 706-668 is manifestly general in scope as it
pertains to sentencing for all offenses and for all types of
defendants except as expressly designated in subsection 2 of HRS
§ 706-668 which is not relevant here.

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Although HRS $§ 706-668 and -606.5 overlap, it is
possible to give effect to both statutes inasmuch as the broad
Language of HRS § 706-668 may be construed as prohibiting
consecutive term sentencing where multiple sentences of
imprisonment are imposed at the same time, except that in certain
situations such as that embodied in the repeat offender
provisions of HRS § 706-606.5, consecutive term sentencing is
permitted, for instance, in the case where an HRS § 707-730 rape
or HRS § 707-733 scdomy is involved." The fact that the repeat
offender sentences may be run consecutively in the discretion of
the court leaves the question of how the HRS § 706-668 concurrent
indeterminate sentencing provision would be affected.
8.

In this regard and with respect to Petitioner's
argument (2), HRS § 706-606.5 must be construed with HRS $$ 706-
659 and -668. HRS § 1-16 (1993) states that “{1Jawa in pari
materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with

” See also Honda ex rel, Kamakana v. Bd

reference to each oth

 

Me Additionally, assuming, azguends, that HRS 5 706-668 and -606.5
are irreconcilable, § 706-606.5 will Control insofar as it is the more
specific statute and should be given effect. Where there is 2 conflict
Between two statutes, this court has said, as noted above, that a specific
statute controls over a general statute céncerning 2 common matter

2 76 Hawai'i at £5, 868 Pi2d at 12027 gee alge Renker, 110 Hawal's
3c 110, 129 P.24 at 1138 (noting that even ~(a)suming, arquends, that chore
fe 4 plainly irreconcilable conflict between a general stature snd a specific
statute conterning the same subject matter, .". . under rules of statutory
construction, the specific statute, in thie case, HFS § 663-10,9(4), would be
Given effect” (internal quotation marks and citation omstted)) Thus, HES
5° 706-606.5, the specific seatute, woold govern Petitioner's sentence:
Contrary to’ Petitioner's position, then, the general provisions of HA § 706-
65 would give way to the more specific provision of HRS § 706-606.5.

  

 

       

 

 

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of Trustees, 108 Hawai'i 338, 344, 120 P.3d 237, 243 (2005)
(citing HRS § 1-16 and reading HRS §§ 88-27 and ~127 in pari
materia); State v. Hoshijo ex rel, White, 102 Hawai'i 307, 317,
76 P.3d $50, 560 (2003) (using HRS § 1-16 as authority for its
decision to read HRS §§ 489-3 and 498-2 in pari materia). In
pari materia refers to things that are “(o]n the same subject” or
“relate[] to the same matter.” Black’s Law Dictionary 806 (8th
ed. 2004). All of these statutes relate to sentencing, and,
therefore, should be construed in pari materia.

“It is a canon of construction that statutes that are
in pari materia may be construed together, so that
inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at
another statute on the same subject.” Id. Thus, “[1Jaws in pari
materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with
reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be
called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.”
Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai'i 20, 31, 979 P.2d 1046, 1057 (1999)
(internal quotation marks and citation’ omitted).

Reading the statutes in pari materia, it is manifest
that HRS § 706-606. provides for sentencing in specific

circunstances whe:

 

1s HRS § 706-668 is a general rule. The
express language of HRS § 706-606.5, “[nJotwithstanding . . . any
other law to the contrary. . . [,]” clearly limits the
applicability of HRS § 706-668 in cases involving the

“[elentencing of repeat offender:

 

" HRS § 706-668 is precisely

 

ae
 

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the type of “law to the contrary” described in HRS § 706-606.5
Thus, reading the two statutes together, it is evident that HRS §
706-668 is the common starting point for sentencing, but that in

the specific circumstances presented here, i.e., where the

 

defendant is a repeat offender, the sentencing court may
disregard the general rule and apply the statutory provision that
applies to these particular facts.

HRS § 706-659 requires that “a person . . . convicted”
of a class A felony be sentenced to an “indeterminate” twenty
year term. (Emphasis added.) Rape in the first degree and
sodomy in the first degree are class A felonies. Accordingly,
pursuant to HRS § 706-659, the convictions for rape and sodoay
subject Petitioner to an indeterminate twenty-year term for each
of the offenses for which he was convicted. HRS § 706-606.5
indicates that “for each conviction,” a person guilty of any of

the enumerated offenses in HRS § 706-606.5 including rape and

 

 _ gustice Levinson’ dissent maintaine that HRS § 706-668 and HRS
$ 206-606.5 vere not contrary to each other because the former “plainly
Fequired that the indeterminate maximum prison terns of (Petitioner's) ~
Convictions run concurrently(,1” and the latter “did not authorize consecutive
indeterminate maximum terns.” Levinson, J., dissenting at 3. With all due
respect, this is unpersuasive.

Because wo conclude that a mandatory minimum term is inherently
part of the indeterminate maximum term of which it 12 a part, the two cannct
be‘ separated, ‘and both of the two components mist be served ae part of one
Sentence, Inasmuch as HRS § 706-606,5 authorizes the inposition of
Consecutive mandatory minimin sentences, such sentences ust be ser
Of indeterminate maximum tera of imprisonment, and, accordingly, the
Gndeterminete terms must run consecutively. Therefore, the prescription of
Consecutive inasterminate noximin terme ig contrary to the general
Proseription against such indeterminate sentences Funning consecutively as
Foquirea by HRS § 106-658

 

 

das part

     

  

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sodomy “shall be,” i.e., must be sentenced, to a mandatory

 

minimum sentence.
Because a person convicted of a class A felony such as
rape must be sentenced to a twenty-year indeterminate term under
HRS § 706-659 and, if such @ person is @ repeat offender, he must
also be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment
under HRS § 706-606.5, that person is subject to both sentences
for that one offense. Reading HRS §§ 706-659 and ~606.5 in pari
materia, inasmuch as HRS § 706-606.5 refers to a “minimun” term
of imprisonment that a person must serve for the enumerated
offense, the maximum term for that same offense must be the
maximum indeterminate term described in HRS § 706-659." The
mandatory minimum term, then, is served as part of the maximum
indeterminate term. By definition, a mandatory minimum sentence
must be less than the maximum sentence imposed of which it is a
part. Tt follows that a mandatory minimum sentence is part of
the lengthier indeterminate maximum of which it is a component.

A mandatory minimum sentence imposed as a result of a
conviction ia not ancther “offense,” ©

s'. The mandatory sentence, although allowed to be
imposed with the indeterminate term, does not exceed that

 

M justice Levineon’s dissent takes issue with this portion of our
analysis, positing that we hold “that HRS § 706-606.5(3) authorized (the
Sourt] 0 Impose consecutive maxinum terms by implication.” Levinson, J-,
dissenting at 4. To the contrary, we do not hold that HAS § 706-606. 5 (2)
implicitly authorizes the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximus
tems of inprisonnent. Rather, reading that statute in pati matexia with the
Gther sentencing provisions noted, and eppiying this coure’e precedent
Guplaining the nature of the relationship inherent between miniman and maxima
Sentences, we conclude that mandatory minimum sentences are not separate
Sentences and therefore, cannot be divorced fram the indeterminate, maximum
Sentences of which they are a part. The statutes cannot be construed in
ieelation.

 

 

   

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term, but only directs how a certain period of the
indeterminate term is to be served, in this cage, mandating
that Defendant be imprisoned for a least three years out of
the indeterminate term.

ence, Defendant io hot punished twice for the same
acts he ie punished once, the mandatory minimum indicating
how he must serve the initial part of his sentence. In
effect, the mandatory mininun, then, is a restriction on the
parole board's discretion on setting the mandatory minimum
Sentence a convicted person mist serve, See HRS § 706-656
(1993 ¢ Supe. 2004")

 

Feliciano, 107 Hawai'i at 503, 118 P.3d at 682 (Acoba, J.,
dissenting) .”

‘This is also reflected in the effect the sentences
would have on the availability of parole. HRS § 706-659

mandates, with respect to a class A felony, that the court impose

 

© Respectfully, to hold that mandatory minimum sentences exist
independent of the maximum indeterminate sentence inposed, as Petitione®
suggests, would be legally incorrect. See State v. Gomes, 117 Hawai! 218,
252,177’ P.3d 928, 942 (2008) (interpreting HRS 5 710-1070, a statute
prohibiting bribery of a witness in a criminal case, ina manner that avoided
Sgbourd interpretation of the express language of [che statute]")) Zausss v
State, Dep't of Labor ¢ indus. Helationg, 113 Mavaii i, 1, 147 P.3a 785, 815
(2006) (holding that this court te "bound to construe statutes so as to avoid
baurd resulta” [citation caltted)). the indeterminate maximum sentence
allows the Hawai'l Paroling Authority (HPA) to exercise its discretion in
Seckding when a defendant should be released on parole. Gea HRS § 706-€69(1)
(Supp. 1996) (requiring that for incarcerated prisoners serving “an
indeterminate or an extended term of imprisonment, the [HPA] shall{) . -

hold s hearing, and. . , make an order fixing the ainiaun term of
Imprisonment to be served before the prisoner shall becene eligible for
parole") ARS '§ 706-670(1) (Supp. 2007) (stating that [a] pefaon sentenced to
bn indeterminate term of imprisonment shall receive an initial parole hearing
ft least one month before the expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment
Getermined sy the (HPA) pursuant to section 706-665(]” and thst “[1]f perole
fe not granted at that time, additional hearings shall be held at twelve-month
Antervale or lesa until parole 1s granted or the maximum period of
imprisonment expires(]*)

Relatedly, a3 discussed previously, the mandatory minimum sentence
sets how the first part of the defendant's indeterminate sentence 1s to be
ea Eelicians, 107 Hawai's at 503, 11 F.3d at 682 (Acoba, J.»
Gissenting). Essentially, the mangstory minimum tera prohibits the HPA from
‘exercising its discretion to release the defendant on parole for a set period
Of tine. Sag dd, (citing HAS'S 206-656 (1999 4 Supp. £004) (footnote
omitted)).- Because a mandatory minimun sentence is by definition incorporated
nto andy ‘thus, La a part of the indeterminate maximum sentence, st would be
Legally incorrect to hold that mandatory minimum sentences exist independent
‘of the indeterminate maximum sentences to which they are applied and would run
Separately rom the indeterminate maximum sentences of which they aze a part.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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a twenty-year indeterminate term of imprisonment and that the
court is prohibited fron suspending the sentence or granting
probation, “notwithstanding section{} . . . 706-606.5 . . . and
any other law to the contrary{.]" The purpose of requiring a
twenty-year sentence was based on the belief that

the seriousness of class A felonies . . . merits mandatory
anpriscoment, this bill effects this purpose by denying
Suspension of sentence and probation as sentencing opticns
in class A convictions,

Srder that unusual extenuating cifcumstances can be given
Sue consideration.”

Conmentary on HRS § 706-659 (1993) (quoting Senate Stand. Coan.
Rep. No. 965-80, in 1980 Senate Journal, at 1491) (emphasis
added). Contrastingly, HRS § 706-606.5 requires that the
mandatory miniman term of imprisonment be served “without
possibility of parole.” As noted above, the HRS § 706-659
indeterminate term provision “retains through [an] indeterminate
sentence, the option of parole by the paroling authority.”
Commentary on HRS § 706-659. Thus, inasmuch as Petitioner was
convicted of rape in the first degree and sodony in the first
degree, he 1s not subject to parole for the mandatory minimun
terms specified in HRS § 706-606.5. That part of the maximum
indeterminate term unaffected by the mandatory minimum term,
however, remains available for the parole board’s exercise of
discretion with respect to parole.

Additionally, reading the statutes to allow the

imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum sentences in

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conjunction with mandatory minimum sentences would comport with
the legislative intent. For example, if a defendant were
sentenced to consecutive five-year mandatory minimum tezms on six
Class A felony counts, the conbined mandatory minimum term would
be thirty years. However, the indeterminate maximum term for
each individual Class & felony would be twenty years. Thus, if
the indeterminate maximums were served concurrently, they would
be shorter than the combined mandatory minimum terms.
Contrastingly, reading HRS § 706-606.5(3) as allowing the
imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximun sentences where
the mandatory minimum sentences are imposed consecutively
guarantees that the mandatory minimum term will not exceed the
indeterminate maximum term, and is consistent with the
legislative directive that mandatory minimum sentences for
multiple offenses may run consecutively.

Under the reading espoused by Justice Levinson’s
dissent, there is no relationship between the mandatory mininun
terms of imprisonment and the correlative indeterminate maxinun
sentences. This is inconsistent with the dissent’s own
rationale, which relies on the premise that minimum and maximum
terms are defined by thelr relation to one another. See
Levinson, J., dissenting at 6 (agreeing “that a mandatory minimum
prison term is subsumed within an indeterminate maximum prison

term” (citations omitted)). Such an interpretation of HRS § 706-

23
   

606.5(3) abrogates this relationship insofar as it is posited
that mandatory minimum terms could exceed indeterminate maximum
Moreover, Justice Levinson‘s solution to the
hypothetical problem of consecutive mandatory minimum terms that
would run longer than the concurrent indeterminate maximun terms,

dues, releasing the defendant at the expiration of the latter,
see Levinson, J., dissenting at 6-9 n.3, is incompatible with the
purposes of the penal code. The purpose of mandatory minimum
terms in the case of multiple offenses is to guarantee that 2
defendant is punished more severely if he or she demonstrates
repeated inability to abide by the law. See State v. Rodrioues,
68 Haw. 124, 131, 706 P.24 1293, 1298 (1985) (“What is quite
evident from the history is a growing legislative concern with
the problem of recidivism in crime.”) Releasing a defendant
“early” because the concurrent indeterminate maximum terms
expired, as the dissent suggests, but whose criminal activity
warranted more severe punishment, undermines the legislative
intent of allowing sentencing courts to impose mandatory minimum
terms of imprisonment consecutively under HRS § 706-606.5 in
multiple offense situations.

Pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5, mandatory minimum terns
are imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense committed.

See Commentary on HRS § 706-606.5 (1993) (explaining that, when

24
 

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this section was added in 1976, the legislature found “a clear
danger to the people of Hawai'i in the high incidence of offenses
being committed by repeat offenders” and “felt it necessary to
provide for mandatory terms of imprisonment without possibility
of parole in cases of repeated offenses by prior offenders”
(citing House Conf. Conm. Rep. No. 33, in 1976 House Journal at
1141, Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 32, in 1976 Sen. Journal at
883)): o£. Commentary on HRS § 706-620 (stating that there is a
presumption against imprisonment “unless . . . there is (1) undue
risk by repetitive criminal behavior, (2) need for
institutionalized correctional facilities, or (3) need to reflect
the seriousness of the crime which, under the circunstances of
the case, can only be accomplished by imprisonment"). Similarly,
the imposition of consecutive sentences reflects the seriousness
of the defendant’s conduct and the degree of threat that the
defendant poses to the community. See HRS § 706-606(2) (1993)
(isting the need “(t]o reflect the seriousness of the offense”
and “[tJo protect the public” as factors to be considered in
determining an appropriate sentence). Thus, reading HRS § 706-
606.5(3) aa authorizing the imposition of consecutive
indeterminate maxinum sentences where consecutive mandatory
nininum sentences are mandated in multiple offense situations,
conports with both the plain reading of the statutes, ie., that
a minimum sentence must be contained within the maximum sentence,
and with the legislative intent, that consecutive mandatory

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minimum terms in multiple offense situations be available at the
discretion of the court “notwithstanding . . . any other law to
the contrary[,]” as discussed above.

‘The disposition suggested herein draws the parameters
for imposing consecutive mandatory minimum sentences. By
statute, the sentencing courts and the HPA retain broad
discretion to set sentences that are appropriate under the given
circumstances of each case on a case-by-case basis. See State v,
Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i 421, 427, 918 P.2d 228, 234 (App. 1996)
(affirming the imposition of consecutive indeterminate terms
pursuant to HRS § 706-688.5 and explaining that the legislative
history of that statute revealed that “[t]he legislature assumed
“that judges will exercise their discretion in invoking
consecutive terms of imprisonment when appropriate as in
instances where the defendant committed multiple or subsequent
offenses’ (quoting Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 382, in 1982 Sen.
Journal, at 1111)), overruled on other rounds by State v.
Veikoso, 102 Hawai'i 219, 74 P.3d 575 (2003). Thus, the
sentencing court can readily adjust its sentence within such
parameters.

At oral argument, Petitioner referred to Keawe va
State, 79 Hawai'i 261, 282, 901 P.2d 481, 482 (1995), in which
the defendant was charged with fourteen Class C felony counts.
Petitioner hypothesized that, had the sentencing court imposed
consecutive mandatory minimum terms and hence, resulting

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consecutive indeterminate maximum terms on all fourteen counts,
the result would have been an indeterminate maximun term of
seventy years and a mandatory minimum term of forty-two years.
MP3: Oral Argument, Hawai'i Supreme Court, at 9:05 to 10:11
(June 5, 2008) available at

http://www, state.hi-us/jud/oa/08/SCOA_060508_28236.mp3/2-line.mp3
However, this arguably excessive hypothetical sentence, as are
all sentences, would be subject to review for abuse of
discretion. State v. Putnam, 93 Hawai'i 362, 372, 3 P.3d 1239,
1249 (2000) (“The applicable standard of review in sentencing
matters is whether the court committed a plain and manifest abuse
of discretion in its decision.” (Citations and internal
quotation marks omitted.)); see also People v. Alexander, 599
N.W.2d 743, 756 (Mich. App. 1999) ("An abuse of discretion may be
found where a sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of
the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)). Although the
discretion of the sentencing court and the HPA is broad, it is
not unlimited, and the appellate courts retain the authority to
review extraordinary sentences for an abuse of that discretion on
a case-by-case basis.

Manifestiy, the sentencing court’s discretion includes
the discretion to run some mandatory minimum sentences
consecutively and others concurrently under HRS § 706-606.5.
Because the sentencing court has discretion to run mandatory

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minimum sentences consecutively or not, of to run some such
sentences concurrently and sone consecutively and thereby affect
the extent to which indeterminate sentences run consecutively,
any questions may be settled on the basis of the facts of each
case. Of course, the court also possesses the discretion to
impose mandatory minimum terms shorter than those set forth in
the statute based on the circunstances of the case. See State v
‘Smith, 103 Hawai'i 228, 232, 81 P.34 408, 412 (2003) (affirming
the circuit court's imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of
eighteen months pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5, rather than the
statutorily prescribed twenty months based on the defendant’ s
commitment to drug treatment and willingness to accept
responsibility).

Because it appears that Justice Levinson’s argunent
does not comport with the statutes involved, it follows that the
call to overrule State v. Sautua, 67 Haw. 616, 699 P.2d 988
(1985), is incorrect. Applicable to this case, Saufua implicitly
held that, under HRS § 706-606.5, indeterminate terms may be
served consecutively. The defendant in that case was convicted
of robbery in the second degree, which he committed while on
probation for prior convictions of robbery in the first degree
and burglary. Id, at 617, 699 P.2d at 909. The circuit court
sentenced the defendant to concurrent indeterminate maxinum terns
of twenty and ten years for the previous convictions and to a
consecutive ten-year term for the second degree robbery

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conviction. Id, Additionally, the court ordered defendant to
serve a three-year mandatory minimum term for the second degree
robbery conviction consecutive to the other sentences. Ids
Thus, in total, defendant was sentenced to thirty-three years!
imprisonment. Id. at 617, 699 F.2d at 989-90.

on appeal, this court considered the question of
“whether the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of (HRS)
§ 706-606.5{] may be imposed consecutive to the terms of
imprisonment for the underlying felony convictions.” Id. at 616,
699 P.2d at 989. This court appeared to be guided by the
statutory construction principle that “[i]n ascertaining intent,
the language of the provision must be read in the context of the
entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with its
purposes.” Id, at 618, 699 P.2d at 990. In the case of HRS

§ 706-606.5, the legislative intent was that

 

ny person
convicted for some of the most serious and reprehensible felonies
as defined by the (HPC) be sentenced, for each conviction after
the firet conviction{,] to a mandatory [minimum] sentence without
the possibility of parole.” Id, (quoting Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep.

No. 33-76, in 1976 Senate Journal at 863;

 

lise. Conf. Comm. Rep.
No. 32, in 1976 House Journal at 1141) (emphasis omitted).

In answering the question on appeal, the Saufua court
said that

{tthe pandstory minimus sentencing provisions are intended
toapely te sentences imoosed for the underiving subsequent
‘Sonuiction wnich triaaered application of the stature.

29
 

‘Eubsuned within the maxinum sentence inposed fort
Sffense. ‘This Ts in harmony with the statutory. ache
a i nO

 

 

Id at 619, 699 P.2d at 991 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
‘Thus, in Saufua, this court had already determined that where
mandatory minimum sentences were involved, the maximum punishment,
available was the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum
terms. If the sentencing court increased the severity of the
punishnent by imposing a mandatory minimum term, it had to be
done in a way that would not exceed the consecutive indeterminate
sentences. In that regard, this court indicated that if
lengthier sentences were sought to be imposed, the sentencing
court would have to resort to the enhanced sentencing statutes,
HRS §§ 706-661 and -662. Id, at 618-19, 699 P.2d at 990-91
(noting that “[w]ith the exception of special problems calling
for extended terms of imprisonment, the statutes are intended to
allow imposition of only one maximum length of imprisonment

<" and that such “extended terms are provided for under HRS
§ 706-661 and may be imposed only upon proper motion and hearing,
and specific findings by the sentencing court” (footnote
omitted) ).

Justice Levinson “doles] not . . . agree with the

Saufua court's conclusion that HRS $ 706-606.5(3) ‘necessarily

must’ be read to authorize [the court] to impose indeterminate

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sentences consecutively.” Levinson, J., dissenting at 6 (citing
Sautua, 67 Haw. at 619-20, 699 P.2d at 991). Inasmuch as that
proposed interpretation of HRS § 706-606.5 conflicts with a
straightforward reading of the relevant sentencing statutes and
the underlying policies of the penal code, the justification

offered for overruling Saufua, id. at 8, is not persuasive."

 

% the Chief Justica’s dissent alec criticizes reliance on Saufva.
‘$28 Moon, C.J.y dissenting at 1-9, According to hin, “the gautsa coare
Believed that ies § 706-606.5 permitted the sentencing court to impose =

mntence on the underlying offense to run consecutive(1y] to that of the orior
offense.” 1d. at 9 (enpnases in original). However, the Chief Justice
Concludes that “Gautua is distinguishable from, and inapplicable to” this case
because *[Petitioner's] case involves only the sentence for the underlying
Offense(.]” Id. at 9. Respectfully, this aisapprehends the degree to which
Fellance 1s placed on’ sautua.

Relative to this matter, Saufua is cited because it implicitly
approved of the inposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum sentences. To
repeat, that court explained that, with respect to mandatory mininlum
Sentences, “the required period of unparoled imprisonment [, ina the
mandatory minimum cerm,] is gubsuned Within the aximun sentence{.J”" Sautua
6? Haw. st 619, 695 P.2d at S91 (emphasis added). This supports the
Gonclusion that mandatory minimum sentences cannot be severed fron the
Gndeterminate maximum sentences of which they area part. The Saufua court
wont on to hold that the sentence inposed for the subsequent conviction could
Be'run consecutively to the sentence imposed for the prior conviction under
Rs §"706-606.5. Ld.

Thus, Saitua had determined that the mandatory ainimum and
Andeterminate maximum components of a sentence could not be separated, Under
Suutua, the mandatory minimm sentence for the subsequent conviction can be
Fun consecutively to the sentence for the prisr conviction. Because that
andatory minimum ia part of an indeterminate maximum sentence, the
Undeterainate maximum must be serves in the same manner as the mandatory
‘minimum. Thus, under gaufua, when the mandatory minimin sentence imposes for
the subsequent’ conviction is ordered to be run consecutsvely to che sentence
imposed for the prior conviction, it follows that the indeterminate maximum
Component of the sentence for the subsequent conviction would also run
Eonsecutively £9 the sentence for the prior conviction.

This court, via gaufua then, had previous to the instant cai
affirmed that the indeterminate maximun sentences for separste convictions
Gould run consecutively inasmuch as the mandatory minimums could not be
treated as sentences separate from the indeterminate maximuns to which they
Felated. Because the mandatory minimums and indeterainate maximums imposed
for individual counts comprising a subsequent conviction are similarly
inseparable, it follows that indeterminate nayimun sentences for the
individval count comprised An's single conviction must be imposed
consecutively to each other where the corresponding mandstory minimins are
also inposed consecutively to each other. In that way, gautua, although not
Girectiy on point, is analogous and appliceble to the instant case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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©.

Somewhat analogously," this court recently held that
the “notwithstanding . . . any other law to the contrary” clause
in HRS § 706-606.5(1), as in this case, must govern, even over a
narrower sentencing provision, and that it should be given effect
“in all cases.” In Smith, the sentencing court initially
indicated uncertainty regarding whether the “notwithstanding

. . any other law to the contrary” caveat in HRS § 706-606.5
rendered HRS § 706-622.5 (Supp. 2002), which made certain first
time drug offenders eligible for probation, inapplicable in cases
where the defendant was a repeat offender, but a first time drug
offender. 103 Hawai'i at 231, 81 P.3d at 411. on

reconsideration, defendant

contended that the circeit court should have sentenced her
fea five-year tern of probation pursuant to HRS 5

706-622.5,.. . arguing that, as evidenced by the statute's
gugtice Levinson criticizes this rellance on Smith. Levinson, J.

dissenting se 10-11. Respectfully, this misapprenends the importance
attributed to that case, which we View as being alalogous to the instant case,
The gist of the dissent’s criticism appears to be thst Saith and its progeny
Gis not address the precise question Faised herein, i.ea, whether HRS § 706-
Goe.5(3) controls over HRS § 706-668 for purposes Of Seitencing Petitioner.
ag Levinson, J., dissenting at 10-11, il n.¢. However, Smith, State v. Aaiz,
TYE Hawai't 19, 65 p.a 980 (2007), and Staxe_v. Walker, 106 Hawai'i 1, Too
34.595 (2004), are similar in that they raised questions of the relationship
of HRS § 106-606.5(3) to other sentencing provisions. Jee discussion Ania at
33-34. “in that connection, this court held that HRS § 706-606.5(3) prevails
over other sentencing provisions “ip all casea|,)” Smith, 103 Hawai'i at 234,
81 8.33 at 414 (emphasis added), which manifestly ipeludes the instant case.

‘Justice Levingon attempts to further distingsish these cases a
vstandling) for the self-evident proposition that a defendant cannot be
sentenced to probation and a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment at the
Sune tine,” Lovingon, J-, dissenting at Il nef, such that auch and ite
progeny are not analogous to the instant case in any “mesningéul wayl,]” ide
However, thio argument is not persuasive inasmuch as it does not address the
fact that, as in this case, this court in SEith and its progeny considered the
role of HRS § 706-606.5 as part of the entire statutory sentencing echene.
Thus, Saith and les progeny are instructive on the issue now before us.

   

 

   

 

   

 

 

 

 

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‘veccides the repeat offender statute, oa set forth in HRS
ESPEESES Sith farther asserted that any _aabignity with
Fespect to the application of HRS $5 706-622-5 and =606.5,
should be resolved in favor of lenity,

Ad. at 232, 81 P.3d at 412 (emphasis added). However, the
cdreuit court concluded that “when the legislature provided for
treatment for first-time drug offenders, [it] did not mean to
preclude the application of repeat offender sentencing.” Id.
on appeal, to reiterate, this court affirmed that HRS
§ 106-606.5 was applicable despite HRS § 706-662.5, and further
held that “ig all cases in which HRS § 706-606.5 is applicable,
the circuit courts must sentence defendants pursuant to the
provisions of HRS § 706-606.5." Id. at 234, @1 P.3d at 414

(emphasis added) .

In the present matter, HRS § 706-606.5(1) states that the
repeat Offender statute applies “notwithstanding . . . any
other Law to the contrary. we RLenough ies

§ 706-622.5 does contain a similar phrase, che language of
the first-tine drug offender statute, as compared to the
foregoing wording of the repeat offender statute, is
markedly narrower in scope: "Notwithatanding any penalty or
Sentencing provision under part IV of chapter 712 =

 

ot! uis"¢ Teepe, S taquires application of the repeat
hold that the circuit court dia not errin sentencing Smith
as a repeat offender pursuant to lIRS $ 706-6065.
Furthermore, re 206
06.5 12 anol teal hi

‘Gefendants pursuant to the exovisions of HAS $ 706-6065.
Ids (brackets omitted) (emphases added). The case now before

% RS § 706-659, requiring that all clase A felonies be subject to a
haxinun indeterminate twenty-year term of imprisonment, and ARS § 706-606.5,
Tavolves sentencing £2r certain felonies, including raps and sodoy,
provide that their provisions shali be effective "notwithstanding aty
Sther law to the contrary." The preclusion of “suspension of sentence and
probation” ae sentencing options in the language of HRS § 706-659 is
Understandable in light of the requirenent that an indeterminate prison term
(Gontinved.--)

 

     

 

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us falls squarely within the category of cases in which HRS §
106-606.5 is applicable and, consistent with Saufua and Smith,
that section must be applied to Petitioner. Ses also Reis, 115
Hawai'i at 98, 165 P.3d at 999 (holding that, under smith and
Walker, and because the defendant “conceded that she qualified as
a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5," the sentencing court
“was required to apply HRS § 706-606.5” (emphasis added));
Walker, 106 Hawai'i at 9, 100 P.3d at 603 (holding that, pursuant
to Smith, the sentencing court “erred in sentencing [the
defendant] pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5 instead of applying HRS

§ 706-606.5" (internal citation omitted)); State v. Delmondo, 67
Haw. 531, 533, 696 P.2d 344, 346 (1985) (holding that where the
court made an affirmative finding that the defendant was a repeat
offender, it “was dutv bound to impose a mandatory minimun
sentence” (emphasis added)); State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 277,
60 P.2d 914, 925 (1985) (contrasting HRS § 706-662, pertaining to
extended term sentences, which “is discretionary,” with HRS

$ 706-606.5, which “is a mandatory sentencing statute and admits
ofno discretion” (emphasis added)); State v. Kanamu, 107
Hawai'i 268, 271, 112 P.3d 754, 757 (App. 2005) (rejecting as

“lack{ing] merit” the defendant’s argument that he should have

%(., .continued)
is mandated. However, it is unclear why HRS § 706-606.5 is expressly re!
to in the “notwithstanding” clause of HAS § 706-659 inasmuch ao HRS § 706~
606.5 applies to concurrent and consecutive sentences, and would not appear to
Gonfiice with HRS § 706-659.

 

red

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been sentenced under HRS § 706-622.5 rather than HRS § 706-606.5
because of the former statute’s intent “to rehabilitate drug
users rather than incarcerate then” on the ground that “HRS

§ 706-606.5, by its plain and unambiguous language, applies
notwithstanding the sentencing provisions of HRS § 706-606.5"
(quoting Smith, 103 Hawai'i at 234, 61 P.3d at 414) (internal
quotation marks, internal citation, and other citation

omitted) )).

Hence, to repeat, by virtue of the directive
“notwithstanding . . . any other law" present in HRS § 706-606.5,
where mandatory minimum terms are imposed consecutively in the
discretion of the court, indeterminate maxinun sentences must
also run consecutively despite (iie., “notwithstanding”) HRS
§ 706-668 because mandatory minimums are part of, or incorporated
within, the period or term of the indeterminate maximum sentence
involved, and indeterminate maximum terns must run consecutively
in order for the mandatory minimum sentence to be imposed
consecutively as permitted by HRS § 706-606.5. Any other view
would be inconsistent with the approach taken in Saufua and

‘smith.

 

vr.
Chief Justice Moon's dissent disagrees with the

conclusion that “under [HRS] $$ 706-606.5 (1985) and 706-668(1)

(1976), . . . [the court) was authorized to impose consecutive

indeterminate maximum terms of imprisonment.” Moon, C.J.

 

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dissenting at 1. He argues that (1) the plain language of Has
§ 706-668 (1) required that Petitioner's three indeterminate
maximum terms be served concurrently, (2) HRS § 706-606.5(3) does
not, by its terms, permit the imposition of consecutive
indeterminate maximum sentences, and (3) the holding in State v
Tavares, 63 Haw. 503, 630 P.2d 633 (1981), supports these
argunents.

Initially, it must be noted that Petitioner did not
raise this issue to this court or to the ICA. Thus, it may only
be considered under the doctrine of plain error.” See Hawaii
Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 40.1 (providing that,
when an issue is not presented in accordance with the appellate
rules, this court, “at its option, may notice a plain error not
presented”); see also Hawai'l Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)
Rule $2(b) (2007) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the court.”).

 

2 the chief Justice maintains that “resort to plain weolly
unnecessary” because “(t]he question [of] whether [Petitioner's] consecutive
Snseterainate maximun terms uae lawful is the precise issue oefore this

court (.)" Moon, CuJuy digsenting at 6 Respectfully, the Chief Justice’s
Sievert raises & thesty of error not advanced by the parties.” Specifically,
his dissent maintains that the multiple counts/one conviction rule embodied’ in
Tavares requires that the Andeterminate maximum sentences be run concurrently.
Xs noted in the discussion supra, the parties did not argue that Petitioner's
Sentence viclated Zavares. “Thus, any violation of Tavazas would have to be
treated as plain error. owever, as discussed nica, the sentences aid mot,
in fact, vislate Tavares insofar’ as Petitioner's convictions on all three
counts were trested af his second conviction for purposes of repeat offender
Sentencing, iue., the convictions on all three counts were treated as a single

 

 

 

   

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However, the Chief Justice has not offered any basis
for taking notice under the plain error rule. Moreover, because
none of the parties raised plain error here or below there is no

discernible argument on this point for this court to review. See

Citicorp Mortasae, Inc. v. Bartolome, 94 Hawai'i 422, 435, 16
P.3d 827, 840 (App. 2000) (concluding that appellants made no

discernible argument because “[tJhey cite(d) no apposite
authority and [made] no coherent argument on the issue from
cognizable precedent” (citing HRAP Rule 28(b) (7) (1999))). But,
to the extent that this proposition is raised, it must be

respectfully disagreed that Tavares” prohibits the imposition of

% tm their submissions to the ICA and to this court, the parties
discuss Tavages for the proposition that conviction an a maleicount.inaictnent
Scnstitutes ony.» single “conviction” under HRS § 706-€06.5, in 1ight of the
SEEEECISS Sethe “case contained Sp Cosnaiio and budgie. in’his Apgiicstion,
Fetitioner maintained that; because the Latter cases were decided efter

itioner committed the underlying offena feerpreeation of HRS § 706
606.5 expressed in Tavares must control hi icing. (Arguing that. the
court Improperly “clreuavent (ed). =. the Zavarea holding” by relying on
GGrneiio’ ent palose, wnich “simply Say Zavazea should have been decided
Gifferenciy(.]*1_ fa this connection, Fetitioner correctly explained that

held tehat convictions on several counts of an indicenent are to be

Teated os one conviction for repest offender purposes. However, Petitioner
does not elaborate on the eefect' thie rule ahotid have on his sentence. in
Sther words, fetitioner does not sesert the position adopted by the chief
Suatice’s dlesent.

Onvehe other hand, Respondent argued that this court later
corrected staeif, "aot{ing) that. the correct. ‘interpretation of the Language
Of the statste 9 thet a conviction on each count of en indictment represents
Siseparate conviction for the purposes of adding up the number of convictions
for sentencing.’" (Quoting Dugait, 30 Hawai'i at 271-73, 978 P.2d at 70S-11-)
‘Thus, according to Respondent and Contrary to Chief Justice Woon’ s position,
the Court wae suthorised fo inpose mandatory minimum sentences for each of the
felony counts of which Petitioner waa convicted

However, in this context, Respondent's reliance on Qudoit is
misplaced. Dudsit is distinguishable Sn thet it ineerpreved a Fepest offences
Statute, HRs" 706-906(5) (supp. 1997), with Language markedly different. from
fhe language of HRS §,106-696.5. “Spacificaily, the provisions st issue sn
Dudalt mandated speci tic prison terme for repest gftanges of that statute
Eugats, "30 fanos'l at 265, 976.24 at 003. The defendant in Gudoit argsed
Phat, porevant co Tavazad, “offences” 92 Used in HRS § 706-206(5) shoals be
equated with “convictions” as defined in Zayares.” Lda at 264, 978 F.2d at

{Gontinved...)

        

 

 

   

 

 

  

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consecutive indeterminate maximum tezms of imprisonment.
vir.
a
The defendant in Tavares had been previously charged
with two counts of burglary in a single indictment (the 1975
burglaries). 63 Haw. at 510, 630 P.2d at 634-35. He pled guilty
and judgment was entered on both counts in 1975. Id. at $10, 630
P.2d at 635. Subsequently, the defendant was charged with a
single count of burglary (1979 burglary) and convicted. Id, at
510, €30 P.2d at 634. At defendant's sentencing for the 1979

burglary, the sentencing court determined that the defendant had

2. .continued}
702. tis court arguments on the ground that (1) Tavares was
ietinguishable because it intexpreted the cerm “conviction” as opposed to
“offense,” and (2) this court had repudiated the reasoning of Tavazes in
Gamslic; end would have overruled Zavarea but for the legislative anendsents
that had essentially adopted the Tavares interpretation of “conviction.” a.
at 272-73, 978 P.2d at 710i, Inasmuch ae the court in Dudait expresely
Sistinguisned MRS § 106-906 (5} and HRS $ 106-606.5, that case cannot be relied
pen in the instant case to interpret the latter statute.

In any event, it Ls evident that, at the tise Petitioner committed
the subsequent offenses, Zauaree was precedent. However, as discussed herein,
{te application 1a nore linseed than the chief Justice would hold. For
purposes of calculating whether the subsequent conviction consticuted
Petitioner’ s second or third conviction for purposes of HRS § 706-606.5,
Tavares dictates that the three felony counts, Lec, Counts VI, IK, and’ XE,
re to be counted az a single conviction. On’ the other hand, contrary to the
Ghief Justice's position, favares does not impinge on the court's authority fo
impose a sentence that it deems appropriate for each separate count of the
Unaictnent on the grounds set forth anes.

‘The chief Justice also quote: a lengthy passage from Comelic in
wnich the Tavares court is criticized for ignoring the plain and onamotguous
Yanguage of the statute in “holding that convictions on several counts of an
indictment are to be treated as only one conviction for the purpores of (HRS
S$] 706-606.5(1)." Moon, CvJ., dissenting at 3 (quoting Comelie, 4 await
at 491, 936 F.2d at 1036 (quoting Tavares, 62 Haw. at 911-12, 915, 630 P.2d at
635-37}) [internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, he concedes that’
Gormelic di¢ not expressly overrule Tavares because “the legislature, in 1966,
had amended HRS § 706-€06,5 subsequent to Tavares in a manner essentially
Consistent with that decision’s approach to the statute(,)" implying that
Sornslio otherwise would have overruled Zavares. Moon, C.J., dissenting at 3-
PfEleing 1386 haw, Sess. L. Act 314, § 17 at €00-02) (emphasis omitted)

38

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

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two prior convictions, ists, the two 1975 burglaries. Id. at
510, 630 P.2d at 635, The sentencing court then decided that the
1979 burglary conviction was the defendant’s third conviction,
such that, under HRS § 106-606.5(1) (b), a ten-year mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment was required. Id.

on appeal, the defendant argued that the two counts
from the 1975 burglary should have been considered a single
conviction for purposes of HRS § 706-606.5 because he had been
convicted on both counts on the same day. Id. According to the
defendant, it would follow that the 1979 burglary conviction
would be considered the second conviction, not the third
conviction, and the defendant would be subject only to a five~
year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment rather than the ten
year mandatory minimum term that had been imposed. Id, at 511,
630 P.2d at 635.

‘Thus, the issue before the Tavares court was “whether a
conviction on the second count of a two-count indictment
constitutes a separate conviction under Hawaii‘s repeat offender
statute[.]” Id. at 509, 630 P.2d at 634. Ultimately, this court
agreed with that position and held “that convictions on several
counts of an indictment are to be treated as only one conviction
for the purposes of [HRS §] 706-606.5(1)." Id, at 515, 630 P.2d

at 637.

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‘The Chief Justice maintains that pursuant to Tavares,
Counts VI, IX, and XI in the instant case constitute a single
conviction for purposes of HRS § 706-606.5, and, because they
were imposed at the same time, HRS § 706-668 requires that the
sentences be served concurrently. However, this (1) misapplies
the holding of Tavares, (2) disregards the language of HRS § 706-
606.5, and (3) impermissibly severs the mandatory minimum terms
of imprisonment from the indeterminate maximums of which they are
a part.

vin.

 

As to item (1), because Petitioner was charged with the
pertinent two counts of rape and single count of sodomy in the
sane indictment, his convictions on those three counts would
constitute a single conviction for purposes of the repeat
offender statute under Tavares. See Tavares, 63 Haw, at 515, 630
P.2d at 637. Petitioner had one prior felony conviction (the
firearm conviction) and therefore, for purposes of determining
the applicable mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to HRS § 706-
606.5, the instant counts in total would be considered his second
conviction. Under Tavares then, it would have been incorrect in
the instant case for the court to sentence Petitioner to a five-
year mandatory minimum on Count VI as the second conviction, and
then to impose a ten-year mandatory minimum for Count IX by

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designating it as the third conviction for repeat offender
purposes.

However, that is not what happened in this case.
Consistent with Tavares, Petitioner was, in fact, sentenced to
five-year mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for the crimes
consistent with a second conviction (taking all three counts as
comprising one conviction). The court did not impose any ten-
year mandatory minimum terms, which could only be imposed upon a
third conviction as defined by Tavares. Thus, Petitioner's
sentence did not violate the rule set forth in Tavares.

Manifestiy, Tavares did not expressly consider the
treatment of individual sentences for each count in a multicount
indictment. In that case, because the defendant’s second
conviction was comprised of only a single count of burglary, he
was subject to only one mandatory term of imprisonment. Thus,
the Tavares court did not have occasion to address whether a
defendant whose second or third felony conviction arose from a
multicount indictment would be subject to multiple mandatory
minimum terms pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5, Inasmuch as the issue
was not reached, it cannot be said logically that the holding in
Tavares prohibits a court from imposing the applicable mandatory
minimum sentence for each count that makes up a single
conviction. Tavares, therefore, is not inconsistent with the

result reached herein.

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Nevertheless, the dissent contends that because, “in
the present case, [Clounts [VI], (1X], and [XI] constitute one
conviction,” Petitioner was subject only “to a single five-year

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment Moon, C-Jus
dissenting at 7 (first emphasis in original) (second emphasis
added). Insofar as this implies that the mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment does not apply to each count comprising a second
or third felony conviction under HRS § 706-606.5, it would be
legally incorrect. See State v. Buch, 83 Hawai'i 308, 326, 926
P.2d $99, 617 (1996) (explaining that “[e]very [statutory]
construction which leads to an absurdity shall be rejected”
(quoting HRS $ 1-15(3) (1993)) (brackets in original)). This
would be violative of the sentencing policies underlying the HPC
and contrary to the established principle that courts impose
distinct punishments for each count on which a defendant is

convicted.

 

> see gigs, Barnett v. State, $1 Hawai'i 20, 24, 979 P.24 1046, 1050
(2999) (defendant was charged ina forty-count indictment, and pursuant to a
plea agreement was "gontenced in Counts 1, 13, 21, 36, and 40 to five years in
Imprisonment. |. (a)nd aucouite Sid 16 16, 26 26, 31, 34 and 32,

to. + ilfe imprisonment” (emphases added)); State v. Spussle- 66
fawai's 433, 437, 967 B.2d 265, 269 (1996) (defendant was charged with two
counts ina single indictment, found guilty of both, and “sentenced to twenty
years incarceration gh count one and five years on Count cu” expnases
Sased))7 State c, Lohargs, eT Hawas's 293, 296, S16 P.23 703, 706 (1996)
(defendant was charged in 2 six-count indictment, found guilty on 11 counts,
ans “gantanced £0 s tere of inprisorsent of twenty years oh count one, - ~
ang co-senarate terns of life inprisonment for counts
fengnases asded))? State v. Yamada, 116 Havar't (22, @i, 173 F.3d 5e3, 578
(app. 2007), (after defendant was convicted on a three-count indictment, the
court “sentenced [bin] ‘to two twenty-year terns for Counts One and Three, and
ten-year term £o¢ count Twa” (enphases adced) ); state 2. Eaaaragan, 115
Mawai't 364, 365, 167 Fuad 733, 740 (App. 2007) (defendant was charged with
three offeriscs in a single docunant, found guilty and sentenced to “two terms

 

 

 

 

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Consequently, when a repeat offender is convicted of
multiple offenses enumerated in the same charging document, he oF
she 1s subject to distinct sentences addressed to each count. If
the defendant was a repeat offender under HRS $ 706-606.5, the
sentences applicable to those counts would be a five year
mandatory minimum term (for a second conviction) or a ten-year
mandatory minimum term (for a third conviction). Thus, when a
repeat offender’s subsequent conviction is comprised of multiple
counts, he or she is subject to mandatory minimum terms of

imprisonment for each count on which he or she is adjudged to be

 

guilty.
D(. . continued)

of twenty jears (Counts One and Two), and one term of five years (Count
} (enphases addea)) 24 Hawat't 162, 164, 158 P.34

Thea) Hiatew. icener,
2Ho, 262 (app. 2006) (defendant “was charged by Indictment with munerous drug
land’ drug paraphernalia offenses(, ]* found guilty, and was “sentenced to twenty
yours’ inpriacnment on count —L, with a mandatory minimum term of five yearsy
Hen years’ imprisonaen® on Count 3: tive years’ imprisorment on each of counts
2a. Ts and 6” (emphases added) |; 120 Hawar's 129,
TST Psa Ti87 1153 app. 2006). (setenaant twas charged in an
eleven-count indictment|,|” convicted of four offenses, and “sentenced on each
‘si-couste lang 10 to a ten-year term of inpriscament (Gna) on counte
GndLL1 to five-year terns of imprisonment” (emphases added) }; state ¥. Martin,
T03-Hawai's 66, 70, 79 F.3d 686, 688 (App. 2003) (after defendant wae
convicted on 4 tud-count indictuent, he was sentenced “to imprisonment for ten
Yours anveach count” (emphosis added) ); Stace v. Mara, 102 Hawai'i 346, 348,
yeers8 583, Soi (hop. 2003)  (atter defendant pled guilty to all the charges
contained in a three-count indictment, he was sentenced ro “ten years"
incarceration on Counts T and IT and twenty years’ incarceration gn Count ILI”
(emphases added); state w, Vinuua, 96 Hawaii 472, 476, 478, 32 P.3a 116,
120; 122, (App. 2001) {defendant was charged in a rulticount complaint, found
guilty on five counts, and sentenced "to an extended indeterminate term of
Imprisonment of ten years oo count ong, a twenty-year indeterminate term of
inpeldcrment wich & Aandacory suninun term Of six years and elght nonthe an
‘ount-tu0, a ten-year indeterminate term of imprisrment an each of counts
ise and tour, and a five-year indeterainate term of imprivonnent ao-count
emphases added)): State v, Palabay, 9 Haw. App. 414, 420, 844 Pod t, S
{235e Udetondant wae! chatgod Ina seven- count Indictnenty' convicted oi a1!’
counts and “aantensed te prison for'a term of twenty (20)'years for coun
five (5) ys R Eor Counts 2 3. and 4, and thirty (30) days each Lor
Counts 5, "band's" Temphasee satect=

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8

As additional support for the argument that
indeterminate maximum terms for individual counts of a single
conviction cannot be run consecutively to each other, the Chief
Justice relies on Cornelio. Respectfully, this reliance on
Gomelio is misplaced.

‘The question presented in Cornelio was “whether .
the sentencing court properly ran (Cornelio’s) mandatory minimum
sentences imposed under HRS § 706-606.5 (Counts 2-5)
consecutive(ly] to each other{] and consecutive(1y] to the
mandatory minimum sentence imposed under HRS § 706-606.1 (Count,

1)." 84 Hawai'i at 483, 935 P.2d at 1028 (footnote omitted)

 

(ellipsis and brackets in original). The court in Cornelio did
not consider the propriety of the consecutive indeterminate
maximum sentences imposed on the defendant, but vacated the
sentence on other grounds, specifically, as the Chief Justice
notes, “that HRS § 706-606.5(3) [*] divests a sentencing court of
the authority to impose consecutive mandatory minimum periods of
imprisonment on a defendant convicted of multiple felony counts
charged in the same indictment or complaint.” Id, at 494, 395
P.2d at 1039 (internal quotation marks omitted). This holding
was grounded in this court's determination that the 1986

the version of the repeat offender sentencing statute construed in

SpmagLis provided, in pertinent part, that *{t]he sentencing court may. impo
the above’ sentences tence impose

prick conviction, bub such sentence shall be imposed concurrent to the
sentence impased {or the instant conviction... .” (Eepheses added.)

 

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revisions” to HRS § 706-606.5 indicated “a presumptive
legislative preference for concurrent sentencing with respect to

multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time.” Id. at

 

493, 935 P.2d at 1038 (internal quotation marks omitted) .
But significantly, the version of HRS $ 706-606.5(3) in
effect at the time Petitioner committed the subsequent offenses,
was substantively different from the version considered in
Cornelio. The operative language of the 1985 version of the
statute, which is applicable to Petitioner, provided, in
pertinent part, that “(t]he sentencing court may impose the above
sentences consecutive to any other sentence then or previously
imposed on the defendant[.]” HRS § 706-606.5 (emphases added).
Contrastingly, the version of the same statute construed in
Cotnelio, HRS § 706-606.5(4) (1993 § Supp. 1996), provided that
“[t]he sentencing court may impose the above sentences
consecutive to any sentence imposed on the defendant for a prior
conviction, but such sentence shall be imposed concurrent to the

 

sentence imposed for the inatant conviction... .” (Emphases
added.) Thus, the version of HRS § 706-606.5 construed in
Tavares and applicable here, expressly permitted sentences
imposed at the same tine to be run concurrently whereas the

® ag noted previously, the 1986 revisions codified the holding in

Tavares, aes Coingli, 64 Hawai'i at 492, 935 P.24 at 1037 (citing State,
Gavlera, Te nawat't 127, 143," 690 P.2 1167, 1169 (1995}), *enae convictions
Sr several counts of an indictment are to be treated ae only one conviction
for the purposes of section 706-606.5(1)[/]* 4d at 491, 988 Prid at 1036
[quoting Tavares, €3 Haw. st S1i-15, €30 P.2d at 635-37

45
 

version of the same statute construed in Cornelio expressly
prohibited this.

In Cornelio, this court explained the implications of
the prior version of HRS § 706-606.5(3), which is applicable to
Petitioner, thusly: “by its plain language, ‘any other sentence
then . . . imposed on the defendant[,]' . . . necessarily
included mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment presently
being ordered in connection with convictions resulting from
multicount indictments or complaints.” 84 Hawai'i at 489, 935
P.2d at 1034 (emphases in original). Thus, Cornelio confirms
that the interpretation of HRS § 706-606.5(3) employed herein is
correct under Tavares, which is the law applicable to Petitioner.
Comelio further explained that, among the effects of the
amendments made to that section in 1986, the deletion of the
authorization to order sentences “then . . . imposed on the
defendant” to run consecutively and the addition of a mandate
that mandatory minimum sentences “be imposed concurrent to the
sentence imposed for the instant conviction[,]” “manifests al]

. clear legislative intent that @ sentencing court be
required to order that any such mandatory minimum( terms] run
concurrently with respect to the instant conviction.” Id. at
493, 935 P.2d 1038 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because the statute in effect at the tine of

Petitioner’s sentencing expressly authorized the court to impose

46
 

‘se+F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER?’

 

consecutive sentences for each of the offenses enumerated in the
charging document, and the statute applicable in Cornelio did
not, Cornelio’s holding is not pertinent to Petitioner's case.

rm.

As to item (2), the Chief Justice’s dissent disregards
the explicit provision in HRS § 706-606.5 mandating that that
statute controls for purposes of sentencing repeat offenders
“notwithstanding . . . any other law to the contrary,” including
URS § 706-668. As a result, the mandate in the latter statute
that sentences imposed at the sane time be served concurrently is
not controlling with respect to sentences rendered pursuant to
HRS § 706-606.5. To reiterate, in that connection, HRS § 706-
606.5(3) provides that mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment
may be imposed consecutively to any other sentence “then or
previously imposed on the defendant|.]” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
under that statute, when multiple mandatory minimum terms are
imposed at the same time, the court, in its discretion, may order
those terms to run consecutively to each other. Thus, contrary
to the Chief Justice's argument, the plain language of HRS § 706-
606.5(3) authorizes sentencing courts to impose consecutive
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for each count of a
multicount indictment, “notwithstanding” the mandate in HRS
§ 106-668 that sentences imposed at the same time be served

concurrently.

0
 

YOR PUBLICATION IN WES2’S IAWAL'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERE*+
x
As to iten (3), the mandatory minimum terms imposed
pursuant to HRS $ 706-606.5 are necessarily a part of the
indeterminate maximum terms with which they are associated. As
discussed in this opinion, the two components of the total
sentence cannot be treated as separate sentences. Thus, inasmuch
as HRS § 706-606.5(3) permits the imposition of consecutive
mandatory minimum terms, any concomitant indeterminate maximum
sentence must also be served consecutively. Based on the
foregoing, the Chief Justice's conclusion that Petitioner could
only have been sentenced to three concurrent indeterminate
maximum terms of imprisonment cannot be supported.
xr.
AL
Finally, the Chief Justice dissents from the conclusion
that Petitioner's mandatory minimum terms for Counts VI, IX, and
XI could be run consecutively to each other. Moon, C.J.,
dissenting at 6. The Chief Justice argues that

mandatory minimums for multiple counts in one indictment --
Tike indeterminate raximin terms =~ must alse be served
Concurrently under the holding in Tavares. Stated
Gifferently, the mandatory minimums under HRS § 706-606.5
can run consecutive(iy] to only the sentence for the prior
[conviction] under Iazaxaa’ definition of conviction. Thus,
applying Zavaxas to the present case, Counts [VI], [IX], and
TAI] constitute aie conviction, thereby subjecting
[Petitioner] to a single five-year mandatory minimum term of
Imprisonment (as a second tine offender under HRS § 706~
606.5(1) (al, the first [conviction] being his prior firearms
conviction):

Id. at 7.

 

  

 

ae
 

‘s#470R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER?

With all due respect, this position suffers from the
same defects as that dissent’s arguments related to the manner in
which Petitioner's indeterminate maximum terms must be served.
First, it extends the holding of Tavares to an issue not
addressed by that opinion. The Tavares court's inquiry was
Limited to the appropriate method of calculating the number of
convictions 2 particular defendant had for purposes of
determining whether that defendant should be sentenced as a
second time offender or a third time offender under the repeat
offender statute. Thus, the holding in Tavares is not related to
the issue of how mandatory minimum terms imposed pursuant to the

repeat offender statute should be served.

 

Second, this position flies in the face of the plain
Language of HRS § 706-606.5 itself, which expressly states that
mandatory minimum terms imposed pursuant to it may be ordered to
run “consecutive to any other sentences then or previously
Amposed.” HRS § 706-606.5(3) (emphases added). Inasmuch as the
sentences for each of the counts charged in a single indictment
are considered part of a single conviction pursuant to Tavares
and are imposed at the same time, each of those sentences can be
categorized as “other sentences then . . . imposed.” Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of HRS § 706-

606.5(3), mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for counts

49
 

charged in the same indictment may be run consecutively to each
other.
xIn.
As to the second question, Petitioner reiterates that
“application of (the court's} incorrect construction requires

that HRS § 706-668 be

 

pealed retroactively[,]” and, thus, this

violated the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Snendnents £0 the Unites States Constitution ae 3
Fetroactive expansion ef the scope of [Petitsoner’ 2]
Grininal Liability in violation of the x post sscte clause
Under [a]zticle 1, (aJection 10, [c]lause 1, - = (inasmuch
bo t)he ax post facts clause "is ained at lows that
Fetroactively alter the definition of crines or increase the
puniahsent far crininal acts.” Souch v, Schalvo, "269 F-34
6i6, 620 (9th cir. 2002)

 

(Brackets omitted.) He asserts that “the statute in effect at
the tine of the offenses allowed only concurrent maximum terms,
and disallowed consecutive terms except those comitted while
incarcerated. ‘Thus the. . . [statutory] construction that
allowed consecutive sentencing increased the punishment
retroactively[.]” Petitioner maintains that “(ulnder the law in
place at the time of his offenses, he could not be re-sentenced
to consecutive maximum terms of 20 years each for his 3 Class A
= convictions [,] . . . his sentence must be vacated and the
[clourt ordered to resentence [Petitioner] to concurrent 20-year
terms as to Counts 6 9, and 11." This argument, of course,
rests on the premise that HRS § 706-606.5(3) was incorrectly
applied to Petitioner at the time of his sentencing. Inasmuch as
it has been determined herein that HRS § 706-606.5(3), properly
construed (ise, giving effect to the “notwithstanding . . . any

50
JFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY*#

 

law to the contrary” clause), does apply to Petitioner,
Petitioner's argument on this question is wrong.

Based on the foregoing, the ICA's January 3, 2008

judgment is affirmed.

Mary Ann Barnard for Ree ON ex
petitioner /defendant~ He OG Ot
appeliant.

Donn R. Fudo, Deputy A a X

Prosecuting Attorney,
city and County ‘

Of Honoluta, Eee Coen « ya by
respondent /plaintift-

appellee.

51