Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101628

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,628 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
TARLENE WILLIAMS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
K.S.A. 22-3210(d) addresses the withdrawal of a no contest or guilty plea. It 
establishes two standards for the district court. At any time before sentencing, a court may 
permit a plea to be withdrawn for good cause shown and within the discretion of the 
court. After a sentence has been adjudged, the court may permit a plea withdrawal only to 
correct manifest injustice. 
 
2. 
 
In reviewing a presentence denial of a motion to withdraw plea, an appellate court 
utilizes an abuse of discretion standard of review. But, in order for the district court's 
decision to receive the full measure of that standard's deference, it must have been based 
upon a correct understanding of the law.    
 
3. 
 
The factors identified in State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006), 
remain viable benchmarks for judicial discretion in deciding a motion to withdraw plea, 
but reliance on them to the exclusion of other factors should not conflate the good cause 
 
 
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and manifest injustice standards of K.S.A. 22-3210(d) nor overemphasize the role of plea 
counsel's competence in deciding presentence plea withdrawal motions. 
 
4. 
 
In a district judge's discretionary decision on the existence or nonexistence of good 
cause, all of the factors identified in State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 
(2006), need not apply in a defendant's favor in every case, and other factors may be duly 
considered. 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed August 6, 
2010. Affirmed. 
 
Michelle Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Cathy A. Eaton, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw plea. The appellant was sentenced to life without possibility of parole for 20 
years on her plea of no contest to felony murder.  
 
On April 22, 2007, fires were set outside the doors of a residence in Kansas City, 
Kansas. Fire engulfed the house and one of the two people inside, Marquetta Williams, 
died. The other, Billy Jones, was severely injured. Investigation led to the arrest of 
Tarlene Williams, who confessed that she set the fires after she had fought with Billy 
Jones for having another woman in the house.  
 
 
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Williams was charged with premeditated first-degree murder or, in the alternative, 
felony murder; attempted first-degree murder; and arson. Following plea negotiations, 
Williams pled no contest to felony murder, which carried a life sentence with no 
possibility of parole for 20 years. The State dismissed the attempted murder and arson 
charges. The Petition to Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere signed and filed with the district 
court by Williams specifically stated in bold type that she was satisfied with the advice 
and help her attorney had given her. At the plea hearing on April 15, 2008, the district 
court questioned Williams at length about her understanding of the plea negotiations and 
the consequences of entering a no contest plea, including her discussions with her 
attorney. Several off-the-record discussions with her attorney were required to complete 
the entry of the plea; however, Williams did indicate her satisfaction with her attorney 
and did enter a no contest plea to felony murder.  
 
Prior to sentencing, on May 28, 2008, Williams' counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw plea, stating only, "[I]n support of said motion defendant states, '. . . I don't 
believe that taking the plea is the best for me.'" A hearing on the motion was held on June 
6, 2008. At the hearing, counsel for Williams told the court that the language quoted in 
the motion to withdraw plea was from a letter to him from Williams. Further, counsel 
stated:  
 
"I would also put into the record a previous letter that she wrote to me [in] which 
she states, [']after a lengthy discussion with my family members, it would appear that this 
was not done with my best interest in mind, rather as a quick resolution for you[']—you 
referring to me, Your Honor—[']and the State of Kansas. Therefore, I would like to 
withdraw my plea agreement.[']  That was previous to the letter that I've quoted in the 
motion to withdraw."  
 
 
 
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Counsel then encouraged the court to hear directly from Williams and the court 
agreed.  
 
Williams addressed the court, saying, "My lawyer's talking about premeditation, 
but it wasn't premeditation and first-degree murder. I don't believe that I should have to 
get no first-degree murder because it wasn't that. I mean, involuntary manslaughter or 
something like that, but not no first-degree murder 'cause, you know, I was ran up out of 
my own house." The court explained that Williams had not pled no contest to an 
intentional act of killing someone, but to intentionally setting a fire that resulted in a 
death. Williams stated that she was concerned that the papers said that once she pled, she 
could not appeal, and that is what led her to question the plea with the court. The district 
court told Williams that she could appeal the court's ruling (on the motion to withdraw the 
plea) and she could appeal her no contest plea.  
 
The court stated that Williams had not said "anything of a legal nature that would 
support me [withdrawing the plea]." The court then inquired of the State, and the 
prosecutor argued that Williams had not stated a legal reason amounting to good cause for 
a plea withdrawal. The court did not inquire of Williams' counsel, who did not step 
forward with any argument. The court found that "based upon my recollections of the 
plea and the no contest plea petition, it was a voluntarily and freely given plea and you 
were not coerced," and that Williams understood what she was doing and why she was 
doing it. The court did not address Williams' claim that her lawyer had not acted in her 
best interests in advising her to plea. The court denied Williams' motion. Williams was 
sentenced to life with no possibility of parole for 20 years.  
 
The withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is governed by K.S.A. 
22-3210(d):   
 
 
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"(d)  A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the 
discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged. To 
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of 
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea."  
 
In State v. White, 289 Kan. 279, 284-85, 211 P.3d 805 (2009), the court explained 
the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea entered before 
sentencing: 
 
"K.S.A. 22-3210(d) addresses the withdrawal of a no contest or guilty plea. It 
establishes two standards for the district court. At any time before sentencing, a court 
may permit a plea to be withdrawn 'for good cause shown and within the discretion of the 
court.'  After a sentence has been adjudged, the court may permit a plea withdrawal only 
'[t]o correct manifest injustice.'  K.S.A. 22-3210(d). This case presents a situation in 
which the lesser, 'good cause' standard applies. 
 
"In considering if this standard has been met, White urges this court to apply an 
unlimited standard of review, contending that this issue involves statutory interpretation. 
It is well established, however, that in reviewing a presentence denial of a motion to 
withdraw plea, an appellate court utilizes an abuse of discretion standard of review, as 
suggested by the language of K.S.A. 22-3210(d). But, as this court has explained, in 
order for the district court's decision to receive the full measure of that standard's 
deference, it must have been based upon a correct understanding of the law. State v. 
Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 38, 127 P.3d 986 (2006); see State v. Schow, 287 Kan. 529, 541, 197 
P.3d 825 (2008); State v. Harned, 281 Kan. 1023, 1042, 135 P.3d 1169 (2006). The 
defendant bears the burden of establishing the abuse of discretion. Schow, 287 Kan. at 
541. 
 
"In determining whether the defendant has shown good cause to permit the 
withdrawal of a plea, the district court should consider whether: '(1) the defendant was 
represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or 
 
 
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unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) the plea was fairly and understandingly made.'  
Schow, 287 Kan. at 546 (citing Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36); see State v. Adams, 284 Kan. 
109, 114, 158 P.3d 977 (2007); State v. Sanchez-Cazares, 276 Kan. 451, 454, 78 P.3d 55 
(2003)."  
 
The appellant's argument is simple and straightforward. Pointing to the three 
factors set out in Edgar and Schow, she points out that the first responsibility of the 
district court in determining whether the defendant has shown good cause to withdraw her 
plea is to consider whether she has been represented by competent counsel. She argues 
that, despite the motion alleging that the plea had not been in her best interest, the district 
court failed to even inquire into competence of her counsel. Moreover, she argues, the 
district court also ignored the second inquiry regarding whether she had been misled, 
coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of.  
 
The State argues that the district court addressed the issue with which Williams 
indicated she was concerned—whether she had been convicted of a crime that required 
premeditation. It argues that Williams' remarks indicated she was not really concerned 
about the representation she had received and, therefore, the district court need not have 
addressed that issue.  
 
In our recent case of State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. ___, 231 P.3d 563 (2010), we 
considered both the provenance and the application of the three factors set out above. 
Noting that we had recently referred to them as the "Edgar factors," we pointed out that 
their origin actually far predated the Edgar case. 290 Kan. at ___. Most important for 
purposes of this discussion, moreover, is that when the factors were developed by the 
court for review of plea withdrawal decisions, our modern code of criminal procedure and 
the statute it contains specifically addressing motions to withdraw guilty pleas had not yet 
 
 
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been adopted. Aguilar clarified that the standard of review of motions to withdraw pleas 
is the statutory standard: 
 
"Our previous inconsistent adherence to the Edgar factors to inform the standard 
for considering motions to withdraw pleas—regardless of whether the statutory language 
requires good cause or manifest injustice—has no doubt been confusing for practitioners 
and the district bench. In Schow, we finally and explicitly recognized the distinction 
drawn in the statutory language, characterizing good cause for presentence motions as a 
'lesser standard' for a defendant to meet, when compared to manifest injustice for a 
defendant advancing a post-sentence motion. Schow, 287 Kan. at 541." Aguilar, 290 Kan. 
at ___. 
 
The court went on to say this about the future of the "Edgar factors": 
 
"The Edgar factors remain viable benchmarks for judicial discretion but reliance 
on them to the exclusion of other factors has not only conflated the good cause and 
manifest injustice standards of K.S.A. 22-3210(d) but also may have overemphasized the 
role of plea counsel's competence in deciding presentence plea withdrawal motions." 
Aguilar, 290 Kan. at ___. 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
". . . All of the Edgar factors need not apply in a defendant's favor in every case, 
and other factors may be duly considered in the district judge's discretionary decision on 
the existence or nonexistence of good cause." Aguilar, 290 Kan. at ____.  
 
While Aguilar was a case about the representation provided the appellant and 
whether that representation served as good cause to allow her to withdraw her plea, we do 
not believe that is what this case is about. In this case, the district judge heard directly 
from the appellant at the motion hearing, and the appellant's concerns were the nature of 
 
 
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the plea she had entered, not her attorney's performance. Initially, she complained that she 
should not get convicted of first-degree murder because there was no premeditation. The 
district court judge explained that she pled to felony murder, which was based upon 
intentionally setting a fire that resulted in a death, not upon premeditated murder. She 
responded that she then understood the difference and was "okay" with that 
understanding. 
 
Next, Williams told the district court she was concerned with the amount of time it 
had taken for the fire department to respond to the fire. When the district court pointed 
out that this concern had nothing to do with the plea, Williams returned to talking about 
the difference between premeditated first-degree murder and felony murder and again 
indicated she had not previously understood the difference but that she did understand it 
now. Then the district court went on to address her next concern, her appeal rights. Again, 
she indicated that she understood her plea better now.  
 
Nothing in Williams' discussion with the judge indicated that she was concerned 
with the representation provided by her attorney beyond the fact that she had a 
misunderstanding about what she had pled to—a misunderstanding that had now been 
clarified to her satisfaction. In fact, the judge's final question to Williams after denying 
her motion was, "Do you understand what I'm doing and why?" to which she responded, 
"Now I do, yes." We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that she 
had not shown good cause to withdraw her plea.  
 
Williams makes an additional argument in support of her contention that the trial 
court failed to make the proper inquiries during the motion hearing. She points to State v. 
Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 127 P.3d 307 (2006), and State v. Taylor, 266 Kan. 967, 975 P.2d 
1196 (1999), for the proposition that the district court had an independent duty to inquire 
 
 
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further after the defendant raised the potential of a conflict of interest between herself and 
her counsel. In Vann, the defendant had filed several motions including one to have his 
court-appointed counsel replaced and one to proceed pro se. The district court had failed 
to address any of these motions. This court found: 
 
"'It is the task of the district judge to insure that a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is honored. [Citation omitted.]'  State v. Taylor, 266 Kan. 967, 975, 975 
P.2d 1196 (1999). 'Where a trial court becomes aware of a possible conflict of interest 
between an attorney and a defendant charged with a felony, the court has a duty to 
inquire further.'  266 Kan. at 979 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272, 67 L. Ed. 
2d 220, 101 S. Ct. 1097 [1981] ). Likewise, 'where the trial court is advised of the 
possibility of a conflict by either the defendant or the State, the court is required to 
initiate an inquiry to insure that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not 
violated.'  State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074, 1083-84, 898 P.2d 1121 (1995). 'A trial court 
abuses its discretion if it fails to inquire further after becoming aware of a potential 
conflict between an attorney and client.'  State v. Carver, 32 Kan. App. 2d 1070, 1078, 
95 P.3d 104 (2004) (citing Taylor, 266 Kan. at 978)." 280 Kan. at 789. 
 
Williams sets this issue out as a separate error by the trial judge, subject to an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. The State agrees with the standard of review but 
maintains that Williams did not complain about her attorney at the hearing on the motion 
to withdraw and so the trial court was not remiss in failing to address the issue. We agree 
with the State's assessment and see no error in the district court's failure to address a 
nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Williams and her attorney.  
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed.  
 
DAVIS, C.J., not participating. 
 
 
 
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LARSON, S. J., assigned.