Case Title: Lang v. Lang

Citation: 177 Kan. 650, 282 P.2d 390

Docket Number: 39,640

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1955-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
177 Kan. 650 (1955)
282 P.2d 390
JOHN LANG, Appellee,
v.
GLADYS LANG, Appellant.
No. 39,640

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1955.
Howard W. Harper, of Junction City, argued the cause, and Lee Hornbaker, of Junction City, and Charles S. Murphy, of Worcester, Massachusetts, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
C.L. Hoover, of Junction City, argued the cause, and Robert A. Schermerhorn and A.B. Fletcher, Jr., both of Junction City, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is a divorce action, and the decisive question is whether the appeal was taken in time.
For reasons which will hereinafter appear, we are compelled to hold that it was not, and that the appeal must be dismissed.
*651 The facts are as follow:
Plaintiff husband sued his wife for divorce on the ground of abandonment for one year. She answered and filed a cross-petition for separate maintenance.
Trial of the case was had on February 15, 1954. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendant demurred on the ground of insufficiency thereof, and for the further reason that there was a lack of corroboration as required by law. It was agreed, however, that defendant would go ahead and introduce her evidence in support of her answer and cross-petition, notwithstanding the demurrer was taken under advisement. Following this the parties filed briefs on the question raised by the demurrer.
On March 3, 1954, the court overruled defendant's demurrer, denied her cross-petition for separate maintenance, and entered a decree of divorce to plaintiff.
No property rights were in any way involved.
On March 4, 1954, in compliance with G.S. 1949, 60-1512, defendant filed her notice of intention to appeal from the decree of divorce.
On March 4, 1954, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging the statutory grounds (G.S. 1949, 60-3001).
We also are advised that on March 4, 1954, defendant filed a motion to correct the court's written memorandum opinion.
On July 3, 1954, the court overruled defendant's motions for a new trial and to correct the written memorandum opinion, and adhered to its decision of March 3rd which overruled defendant's demurrer to the evidence, denied her cross-petition for separate maintenance, and granted a divorce to plaintiff. The journal entry of judgment provided that the decree of divorce was effective as of March 3, 1954.
On July 19, 1954, defendant filed her notice of appeal to this court. The notice states that she was appealing
The only specification of error is that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence.
*652 Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not taken in time.
The pertinent portions of our statute, G.S. 1949, 60-1512, relating to appeals from decrees of divorce, read:
It will be observed that the provisions just quoted refer to an appeal from a judgment granting a divorce, and do not mention an appeal from a judgment awarding alimony or making a division of property.
In the case before us no judgment was rendered with respect to property rights except that the court denied defendant's cross-petition for separate maintenance. In other words, the extent of the decree was to grant plaintiff a divorce.
As heretofore stated, defendant filed her notice of intention to appeal from the decree of divorce within the ten-day period, in compliance with the quoted portion of the statute, supra. However, the decree of divorce was rendered on March 3, 1954, and defendant's notice of appeal was not filed until July 19, 1954, some four and one-half months thereafter, which plaintiff contends was too late.
Defendant counters with the argument that under G.S. 1953 Supp. 60-3314a, which reads:
she is not precluded from obtaining a review of the order overruling her demurrer to plaintiff's evidence, inasmuch as her notice of appeal was filed within two months (G.S. 1949, 60-3309) from the date of the order overruling her motion for a new trial.
We are of the opinion that this contention may not be sustained.
From the record before us, including the journal entry of judgment, it is clear that the trial court's order overruling the demurrer *653 to plaintiff's evidence, and the order granting plaintiff a decree of divorce, were in fact one order or judgment, so to speak. This judgment was rendered on March 3, 1954, and is the judgment sought to be reversed. In fact, defendant's entire argument is based upon the premise that plaintiff's evidence did not make out a case of abandonment for one year and that there was an utter lack of corroboration as required by law.
In numerous decisions of this court dealing with the divorce appeal statute, now appearing as G.S. 1949, 60-1512, pertinent portions of which are quoted supra, it has been held that the features of a divorce action are separable and independent to such an extent that the requirement of the ten-day notice of intention to appeal does not apply to the alimony or property settlement feature of the case. In other words, it has been held that where the appeal is from the judgment of divorce the requirements of the mentioned statute are mandatory and imperative, but that they do not apply where the appeal is only from an award of alimony or an order making a division of property.
In Kremer v. Kremer, 76 Kan. 134, 90 Pac. 998, the appeal was from an order making a division of property. It was contended the appeal should be dismissed because of failure to file notice of intention to appeal within ten days, and for the further reason the appeal was not taken within four months after the rendition of the judgment. This contention was not sustained, and the court held that as the appeal was only from the order making a division of property the general code provision relating to appeals applied, rather than the divorce appeal statute. In syllabus 4 it was held:
In passing, it should be noted that section 647 of the code (Gen. Stat. 1901, § 5140) corresponds to G.S. 1949, 60-1512, and that section 556 (Gen. Stat. 1901, § 5042) corresponds to G.S. 1949, 60-3309, except that under the earlier statute the general code provision provided that an appeal must be commenced within one *654 year after the rendition of the judgment, while 60-3309 provides for a two-month period.
In Metcalf v. Metcalf, 132 Kan. 535, 296 Pac. 353, a divorce was granted and a judgment entered with respect to property rights, expenses and attorney fees, and from this judgment, and the several orders and rulings made, an appeal was taken. A motion was filed to dismiss the appeal on the ground no notice of intention to appeal had been filed within ten days after the rendition of judgment, as required by the statute, which now appears as G.S. 1949, 60-1512. It was held that due to failure to comply with the statute the divorce feature of the appeal was not reviewable but that matters relating to property rights were. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of the syllabus it was held:
A like situation was present in Farrow v. Farrow, 160 Kan. 30, 159 P.2d 492, reference to which is made for a recital of the facts. In the course of the opinion it was said:
In the syllabus it was held:
In Klemenc v. Klemenc, 164 Kan. 649, 192 P.2d 171, the question concerned the right of appellant to amend a notice of intention to appeal so as to include therein the judgment granting the divorce. In the course of the opinion it was said:
From the foregoing decisions it is clear that this court has consistently held that the features of a divorce action are separable and independent; that when a party seeks to appeal from the divorce feature of the judgment he must file a notice of intention to appeal within ten days after such judgment is rendered, as required by G.S. 1949, 60-1512; but that when the appeal is taken only from an award of alimony or an order making a division of property it is unnecessary to file the ten-day notice of intention to appeal, and in such case the appeal is governed by the general code provisions relating to appeals (G.S. 1949, 60-3309).
In the case before us, which is an appeal from the judgment granting a divorce, defendant did file her notice of intention to appeal within the ten-day period, and so  the question for decision really narrows down to whether, under the facts shown by the record, it was necessary for her to file her notice of appeal within four months from the date of the judgment granting the divorce, as also provided by G.S. 1949, 60-1512.
In our opinion it was.
It would be entirely illogical and contrary to the very language of the statute itself to hold that when one seeks to appeal from a decree of divorce he must comply with one provision of G.S. 1949, 60-1512, but not the other. It states that two things must be done  first, the notice of intention to appeal must be filed within ten days after rendition of judgment, and then, having filed such notice of *656 intention to appeal, proceedings for the reversal or modification of the judgment, that is, the notice of appeal, must be filed within four months from the date of the decree of divorce appealed from, and not thereafter. As previously stated, the notice of appeal in this case was filed some four and one-half months subsequent to the date the decree of divorce was granted. That, under the statute, was too late.
Reference already has been made to defendant's contention with respect to the application of G.S. 1953 Supp. 60-3314a, but it seems clear that provision is merely supplementary to, and is to be read in conjunction with G.S. 1949, 60-3309, the general code provision requiring appeals to be taken within two months from the date of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. When the Kremer case, supra, was decided the time for appeals generally, was within one year from the date of the judgment, and when the Metcalf case, supra, was decided the time was six months. However, during all of the intervening years the legislature has not seen fit to amend the pertinent portions of the divorce appeal statute now appearing as G.S. 1949, 60-1512.
In conclusion, we therefore hold:
When a party desires to appeal from a judgment granting a decree of divorce, as distinguished from alimony or property division phases of the judgment, he is required by the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-1512, to do two things in order to give this court jurisdiction of the appeal. First, he must within ten days after such judgment is rendered file a written notice of intention to appeal, and second, he must file a written notice of appeal within four months from the date of the decree appealed from. When, however, the appeal is from the alimony or property division features of the judgment, the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-1512, are inapplicable, and in such case the appeal is governed by the general code provisions relating to appeals (G.S. 1949, 60-3309).
The notice of appeal in this case, not being filed within four months from the date the divorce was granted, was too late, and did not confer jurisdiction upon this court to review the ruling under consideration. The appeal must be and is therefore dismissed.