Case Title: Taylor v. Dixie Plywood Company of Miami, Inc.

Citation: 297 So. 2d 553

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1974-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
297 So. 2d 553 (1974)
Charles E. TAYLOR, Petitioner,
v.
DIXIE PLYWOOD COMPANY OF MIAMI, INC., and the Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
No. 44644.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 12, 1974.
Rehearing Denied August 9, 1974.
Israel Abrams, Miami, for petitioner.
R.E. Hodges of Miller & Hodges, Coral Gables, for respondents.
ERVIN, Justice.
This is a certiorari review of a compensation order of a Judge of Industrial Claims, upheld by the Industrial Relations Commission, denying compensation to claimant Charles C. Taylor. The facts appear to be as follows:
Claimant suffered injuries resulting from two separate accidents occurring on the same day. The first accident (stipulated to be compensable) occurred when claimant was making a delivery for respondent and some plywood fell against him causing injuries to his back and leg. The second accident (controverted on the basis of deviation) was an automobile collision occurring on the way to a doctor's office and resulting in the loss of claimant's right eye. Claim was filed for permanent partial disability of the back resulting from the plywood accident, and permanent partial disability, medical expenses, and attorney's *554 fees for loss of the eye resulting from the automobile accident.
The JIC found claimant's injuries arising out of the plywood accident compensable, but denied the claim for the automobile accident on the ground that while the trip to the doctor was authorized by respondent, claimant deviated from that purpose when the accident occurred. On review the Commission remanded to the JIC for further findings of fact concerning the deviation, and this Court denied certiorari at 276 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973).
On remand the Judge found in pertinent part as follows:
On review a second time, the Commission affirmed and this Court granted certiorari.
Claimant raises several points for our review; however, we believe that a correct decision of the case only requires consideration of the following:
(1) Whether the JIC erred in finding, as a matter of law, upon authority of Maroney v. Edward A. Kelly & Sons, Inc., supra, that it would not affect the compensability of the claim at hand whether claimant had, in fact, reached his home and departed therefrom or was still en route to his home at the time of the automobile accident.
(2) After having found that claimant deviated from the course and scope of his employment by going home and thereafter left home en route to the office of Dr. Rentz and was involved in an automobile accident, whether the JIC erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the claimant's deviation would not have ended until he had again returned at least as far south as Northwest 54th Street.
(3) Whether the JIC erred in failing to tax against the employer-carrier claimant's contribution to costs of the record.
Accepting as factually true the findings of the JIC, it is our conclusion that as a matter of law they do not render noncompensable the claim for the loss of claimant's eye.
The broad view we take of this case is that the deviation, if any, was insubstantial under the circumstances. Even though the injured claimant went by his home before proceeding to the doctor's office, the same did not in the instant circumstances amount to a legal deviation warranting disallowance of compensation. Technical excuses for denying workmen's compensation are not favored by the law. The material facts are that upon injury the claimant had been directed to go to the doctor's office for examination and treatment of his leg. Compliance therewith was an activity within the scope of his employment. See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 13.13. It is uncontradicted that when he suffered the automobile accident resulting in loss of his eye claimant was on the way to the doctor's office.
That claimant was a few blocks off the most direct route to the doctor's office is immaterial in these circumstances. Presumably an injured employee with good reason could go to his nearby home before going to a doctor's office, if for no other purpose than to let his wife know that it was necessary for him to see a doctor. Of course, if claimant had been shown to have deviated from the direct route to the doctor's office for some irrelevant, extraneous purpose  perhaps personal pleasure or personal business, e.g., to visit a bar, shoot pool, to shop, or for some other inconsistent personal purpose not incidentally germane *556 to the trip to the doctor's office  the result might be different. But here the record discloses no such unreasonable or extraneous deviation for a personal purpose. See Maroney, supra, and Wert v. Tropicana Pools, Inc. (Fla. 1973), 286 So. 2d 1. The Maroney case is readily distinguishable. There, the deviation was for personal pleasure (drinking); there is no such evidence in the record herein. Here, the JIC, though postulating that claimant went by his home, was unable to couple it with any facts that even if he did it was for an unreasonable and irrelevant purpose.
Insubstantial deviations of the kind here involved should not preclude compensation in the absence of a clear showing that the deviation was unreasonable and unjustifiable under the circumstances. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 19.00. Compare N & L Auto Parts v. Doman (Fla.App. 1959), 111 So. 2d 270.
We also find that taxation of the cost of the record on appeal against the employer-carrier is a necessary incident to our opinion herein. See Rule 3.16, F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., and Perez v. Carillon Hotel (Fla. 1973), 272 So. 2d 488, receding from Parrott v. City of Fort Lauderdale (Fla. 1966), 190 So. 2d 326. Therefore, we direct that on further proceedings below, claimant be reimbursed by the employer-carrier for his $70 contribution to preparation of the record on appeal.
Accordingly, the orders below are quashed with direction that further proceedings below accord herewith.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, J., dissent.