Case Title: Ex Parte Anonymous

Citation: 808 So. 2d 1030

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
808 So. 2d 1030 (2001)
Ex parte ANONYMOUS, a minor.
In the matter of Anonymous, a minor.
1001649.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 5, 2001.
PER CURIAM.
An unemancipated minor petitioned this Court to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of the minor's petition for a waiver of parental consent to an abortion. In re Anonymous, 808 So. 2d 1024 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001). This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the cause to that court with instructions that it remand the case to the trial court for the trial court to supplement its findings. Because time was of the essence, the trial court was instructed to submit its findings, as supplemented, to this Court. Ex parte Anonymous, 808 So. 2d 1025 (Ala. 2001). The trial court has now submitted its supplemental findings.
The record in this case reflects that the minor is 16 years old. She is a sophomore in high school; her grades are Bs and Cs. She is presently not employed and has never been employed. She says that she plans to attend college. At the time of the hearing on her petition she was six to seven weeks pregnant. The minor testified that the baby's father, who is 18 years old, has completed his freshman year of college. She further testified that she has not informed him of her pregnancy.
The minor's parents are divorced, and she resides with her father, who has sole custody. She testified that she has a good relationship with her father and that she has virtually no relationship with her mother.
*1032 She testified that her father is a devout Catholic who is opposed to abortion. She further testified that she believed her father would "freak out" if she told him of her pregnancy. She stated that she believed if he found out about her pregnancy he would send her to stay with one of her relatives and that he would want her to carry the baby to term and then place the baby for adoption. She believed this would be his response because she had an older sister who had become pregnant; she said her father had planned to have her older sister live with relatives out-of-state until the baby was born and then the baby was to be placed for adoption. The sister, however, miscarried before the plan could be implemented. The minor stated that she decided to proceed with a judicial-bypass action rather than ask her father to consent to her having an abortion because she had gone to a clinic operated by Planned Parenthood and the people there had talked to her about the abortion and told her that she could get a "judicial-bypass termination."
The minor testified that she had discussed abortion with a number of friends her age and with a 25-year-old male friend. The minor testified that a woman who worked at the Planned Parenthood clinic had informed her about the abortion procedure and the alternatives to abortion.
When the hearing on her petition began, the minor had not discussed the matter with a physician. At the request of the minor's counsel, the hearing was recessed. When the hearing reconvened four days later, the minor had spoken to her long-time pediatrician. She had discussed with the pediatrician the alternatives to abortion. She testified that she understood that she could give the baby up for adoption, keep it herself, or have an abortion. She had discussed with her pediatrician whether she was physically able to have an abortion. When asked whether she and the doctor discussed any physical problems that would pose a danger to her if she had an abortion, she responded that the doctor had said that she would not have any problem or that more than likely she would not have any.
The minor had scheduled an appointment to discuss the abortion procedure with the doctor who was to perform the abortion. However, when the minor was told that she would have to wait at the clinic for a short time before she could see the doctor, she left the clinic.
The minor has received no counseling concerning the psychological impact of undergoing an abortion. She states that she has read a pamphlet from Planned Parenthood that states "[M]any women are relieved after an abortion" and that even though "some are sad after killing their baby, they recover quickly."
When asked to describe her understanding of the abortion procedure, she stated:
She also stated that she understood that about three weeks after the abortion the patient goes in for a follow-up visit. She stated that the risks of the procedure are hemorrhaging, damage to the uterus, infertility, and death.
When asked if she had considered the alternatives and had reached a decision she stated: "I would like to have an abortion *1033 but if not then I'd give the baby up for adoption." When the trial judge asked her why she chose abortion as her first option, she responded, "Because I want to finish school. I feel like my dad would send me to live with a relative."
The trial court's supplemental findings read, in pertinent part:
Applying the ore tenus rule, as we are required to do by Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542 (Ala.2001), this Court affords the trial court's findings considerable deference and will reverse the trial court's judgment only when that judgment is "plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust." The trial court's responsibility in this case was to determine whether the minor is mature and well-informed enough about *1034 the abortion procedure to make an independent decision to undergo an abortion without parental consent or whether an abortion would be in the minor's best interest. See § 26-21-4(f), Ala.Code 1975.
In this case the trial court denied the request for a waiver, finding that the minor was not sufficiently mature to make such a decision without consulting her parent or legal guardian and that the performance of an abortion is not in the minor's best interest. See In re Anonymous, 805 So. 2d 726, 728 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). Our review of the cold appellate record indicates that this conclusion is correct. The trial court had the opportunity to observe the minor and consider her demeanor as she testified. The trial court is in a far better position than is this Court to determine as a matter of fact the minor's maturity and level of knowledge. The trial court's findings after hearing the minor and observing her demeanor as she testified bolster our conclusion.
We conclude that the trial court's judgment is correct; it is not plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. Therefore, we deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
LYONS and STUART, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE and BROWN, JJ., concur specially.
HOUSTON and HARWOOD, JJ., concur in the result.
JOHNSTONE and WOODALL, JJ., dissent.
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
The petitioner asks us to reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals and to grant her petition. She argues that Alabama courts have in-correctly construed controlling precedent on the issue of the application of the ore tenus rule in waiver-of-parental-consent cases. We have previously rejected this argument, and we again reject it here. See Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d 1269 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542 (Ala.2001).
The petitioner also argues that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, this Court must independently review the merits of her petition, without deferring to either the trial court's factual conclusions or its assessment of the witnesses' demeanor. In support of her contention, the petitioner cites Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 509, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965). In those cases, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad principle that when an action raises constitutional claims, appellate courts must independently review the facts in the case, generally without deferring to the trial court's factual determinations. Bose, 466 U.S.  at 514, 104 S. Ct. 1949.
However, such an independent appellate review is not required in all proceedings in which constitutional claims are raised. For example, criminal cases frequently include claims of constitutional violations. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from jury service because of their race. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991), the defendant, citing Bose, supra, argued that a prosecutor in exercising his peremptory *1035 strikes had violated the defendant's constitutional rights and the principle of Batson; he maintained that the United States Supreme Court was obligated to perform an "independent appellate review." The United States Supreme Court distinguished Bose and refused to apply the independent-appellate-review standard, despite the clear involvement of constitutional rights.
Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 366, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (emphasis added). See Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority, 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir.1985) ("However, the presence of a First Amendment issue in a case does not, in and of itself, trigger the rule of independent review of the factual findings of the lower court."); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 64 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1980)(question whether electoral-district structure had discriminatory effect in diluting minority vote is a question of fact subject to "clearly erroneous" standard of review). Thus, an appellate court does not engage in independent appellate review merely because a case allegedly infringes on a constitutional right. The pertinent inquiry then, is whether the appellate court should conduct an independent review in judicial-bypass cases.
I note at the outset that the petitioner has not cited any case where the courts have conducted an independent appellate reviewgiving little or no deference to the trial court's findingsin the context of abortion, parental consent or notification, or judicial-bypass proceedings. In fact, noting the unusual posture of judicial-bypass proceedings, the United States Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 111 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1990), specifically allowed a heightened standard of proof. "A State, moreover, may require a heightened standard of proof when, as here, the bypass procedure contemplates an ex parte proceeding at which no one opposes the minor's testimony." 497 U.S.  at 516, 110 S. Ct. 2972.
Recently, we emphasized the unusual and unilateral nature of judicial-bypass proceedings as one reason for applying the ore tenus standard of review in these cases:
Opinion of the Justices No. 280, 417 So. 2d 936, 936 (Ala.1981).
Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d  at 1276.[1]
Furthermore, those cases in which an independent appellate review has been undertaken are distinguishable from this case. First, those cases involved questions of law as opposed to questions of fact. Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 367, 111 S. Ct. 1859 ("whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law"). Likewise, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S. Ct. 2750, 41 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974), the United States Supreme Court rejected the State of Georgia's contention that whether a film was obscene was a question of fact for the jury's determination, and that its determination should not be disturbed, absent clear error. Rather, the United States Supreme Court ruled that, as a matter of constitutional law, the film could not be found to be obscene. 418 U.S.  at 161, 94 S. Ct. 2750.
Here, however, we are faced not with questions of law, but rather questions of fact. Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d  at 1273. See Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1136 (7th Cir.1983) ("[T]he determination of maturity is largely an issue of fact...."); In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex.2000) ("This requirement [that the petitioner be mature and sufficiently well-informed] implies that the trial judge is to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the minor or any other witnesses. These are typical fact-finding functions, performed by a trial court only after hearing the minor's live testimony and viewing her demeanor."); Schotz v. Oliver, 361 So. 2d 605, 607 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) ("[T]he question of what is or is not in `the best interests of the child' is a question of fact...."); Pace v. Pace, 22 P.3d 861, 865 (Wyo.2001) ("The determination of the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of fact. `We do not *1037 overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal principle.'"); In re Doe, 89 Haw. 477, 487, 974 P.2d 1067, 1077 (Ct. App.1999) (the decision of what is in the "best interests of a child is a matter or question of ultimate fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard of review").
The United States Supreme Court has referred to the questions raised in judicial-bypass cases as questions of fact. "The principal opinion in Bellotti [v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979)] indicates that a State may require the minor to prove these facts in a bypass procedure." Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S.  at 515-16, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (emphasis added.)[2] Second, independent appellate review is typically associated with cases involving obscenity and child pornography, e.g., Jenkins, supra, and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), and cases involving defamation and cases in which words have incited anger or violence. Bose, supra, and Cox, supra. In these types of cases, appellate courts are generally not at a disadvantage in conducting an independent review, because an appellate court can review words, pictures, or films as easily as, and in the same context as, a trial court.
In Cox, supra, a person speaking in public was arrested and convicted of disturbing the peace; he had merely told students to stage peaceful "sit-ins" at local segregated lunch counters. 379 U.S.  at 545, 85 S. Ct. 453. Because the speaker's statements were part of the record, the trial court was not in a better position than an appellate court to determine if the statement constituted a breach of the peace. The appellate court could evaluate the speaker's statement as well as the trial court.
In Jenkins, supra, the United States Supreme Court applied an independent review to determine whether a film was obscene. The Court noted: "We held in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973), decided on the same day, that expert testimony as to obscenity is not necessary when the films at issue are themselves placed in evidence." Jenkins, 418 U.S.  at 159-60, 94 S. Ct. 2750 (emphasis added). Again, the fact that the film was part of the record allowed the appellate court to review the evidence in the same manner as would the trial court.[3] The Court ultimately concluded that the film could not, as a matter of law, be held to be obscene because "we [the United States Supreme Court] made it plain that ... `no one will be subject to prosecution' for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive `hard core' sexual conduct...." Jenkins, 418 U.S.  at 160, 94 S. Ct. 2750. Because the Court reviewed the material firsthand, and saw, firsthand, that it did not contain "hard core" sexual conduct, it could not be classified as obscene as a matter of law.
Here, we are confronted with a situation where our review is the not same as that applied by the appellate court in Cox or in Jenkins. Neither is our review the same as the trial court's.
Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d  at 1274.[4] Unlike the appellate courts in Cox, Bose, and Jenkins, we cannot personally review the subject of the controversy, nor do we have the advantages noted in Ex parte Anonymous that a trial judge has.
In fact, when viewed in context, the constitutionally based rule of independent appellate review does not differ significantly from the normal rules guiding our appellate review.
Bose, 466 U.S.  at 499-500, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 369, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (first bracketed language added; citations omitted). In other words, in those cases, the trial courts' conclusions were plainly and palpably wrong.
We are always required to review the record to determine what quantum of evidence supports that trial court's judgment. Moreover, if the trial court's ruling is plainly wrong, as it was in Jenkins, supra, and Cox, supra, we must overturn the trial court's ruling. When viewed in this context, it is easy to see why the United States Supreme Court has said that "[t]he conflict between the two rules [the rule of independent appellate review and the ore tenus rule] is in some respects more apparent than real," Bose, 466 U.S.  at 499, 104 S. Ct. 1949, and that "the Norris line of cases [implementing independent appellate review] [is] reconcilable with th[e] clear error standard of review." Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 369, 111 S. Ct. 1859.
Moreover, we are guided by this Court's prior ruling on the application of the independent-appellate-review standard, albeit in the context of defamation cases. In Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co., 482 So. 2d 257, 260 (Ala.1985), this Court stated that federal constitutional law required an independent appellate review of the facts to determine whether the evidence of actual malice presented in a defamation case was clear and convincing. We, however, continued: "This does not mean, however, that we ignore the jury verdict. It is entitled to some weight, especially on matters involving the credibility of witnesses." Id. Other courts considering this issue have reached similar results.
Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 367-68, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
*1040 Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 401-02, 65 S. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945) (citations omitted).
Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 19-20, 325 S.E.2d 713, 727-28 (Va.1985) (emphasis added; citations omitted). "Even where a question of fact may have constitutional significance, we normally accord findings of state courts deference in reviewing constitutional claims here." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 463, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976).
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601-02, 64 S. Ct. 1208, 88 L. Ed. 1481 (1944).
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 538, 71 S. Ct. 377, 95 L. Ed. 517 (1951) (footnote omitted).
None of the cases cited by the petitioner that advocate independent appellate review requires a purely factual determination, let alone a determination of maturity and best interest, a determination the United States Supreme Court has said requires a "case-by-case evaluation." Here, after reviewing the record, I am not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Neither are the trial court's findings "simply too incredible to be accepted by this Court." Stated another way, the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence in the record.
The United States Supreme Court has also stated that it is "difficult to define, let alone determine, maturity...." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 n. 23, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979). The trial court is most decidedly in the best position to determine the facts in a case such as this one. After reviewing the record, which I am obliged to do in every case, I conclude that the trial court's judgment is supported by the evidence and that its ruling should not be disturbed.
SEE and BROWN, JJ., concur.
*1041 JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting).
My observations about the errors of the trial court and of this Court as stated in my original special writing when the majority remanded this case, are as true now as they were then. I further observe that the trial court continues to impose on this minor's right to relief preconditions not authorized by the statute and therefore continues to violate Art. III, § 43, Alabama Constitution of 1901, which commands: "the Judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative ... powers...." Moreover, the trial court continues to ignore the minor's uncontroverted proof.
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Once again, this Court's blind adherence to the ore tenus rule has defeated the constitutional and statutory rights of a minor who seeks to have an abortion without parental consent.
The trial court found that the petitioner was not well-informed, because she had not spoken with the doctor who was to perform the abortion. There is no statutory requirement that a minor consult with the doctor who is to perform the abortion. See my dissent in Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542, 569 (Ala.2001). This petitioner discussed abortion with her longtime personal physician, and there is no legal or factual basis for the trial court's conclusion that that discussion did not provide sufficient information concerning the abortion procedure.
The trial court found that the petitioner was not informed that the abortion might have long-term negative psychological effects. That conclusion is not supported by the record. The minor testified that she had read a paper from Planned Parenthood which dealt with the possible emotional aftermath of an abortion, including possible feelings of relief and guilt. When asked by the trial judge whether she had spoken with her pediatrician about the possible psychological or emotional consequences, the child stated: "Sort of. I talked to [the pediatrician]. I don't really think that I'dI'd probably feel bad, but I don't think it would have a long-term effect on me." The trial judge asked no follow-up questions about the substance of that conversation. The minor also testified that she was emotionally and mentally prepared to go through with the abortion.
If this Court is determined to apply the ore tenus rule in these sad cases, it should remember that the "rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law, or incorrect application of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness." Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala.1999). I would grant the petition. Therefore, I must dissent.
[1]  In Ex parte Anonymous, we also noted that the fact that hearsay evidence is admissible in waiver-of-parental-consent proceedings militates in favor of application of the ore tenus standard of review:

"Another significant and distinguishing characteristic of these types of cases is the admission of hearsay evidence. Under § 26-21-4(b), Ala.Code 1975, hearsay evidence is admissible in waiver-of-parental-consent proceedings. This, most certainly, is not the rule of law favored by our courts. `Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama or by statute.' Rule 802, Ala.R.Evid. This evidentiary rule is designed to ensure that the testimony elicited has a degree of reliability and truthfulness. Of course, the testimony offered in ordinary proceedings would be further subject to cross-examination, thus increasing its reliability. Here, neither of those safeguards is present. `The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle that when the trial court hears oral testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses.' Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala.1986). This rule of law is equally, if not especially, important in the context of waiver-of-parental-consent proceedings."
806 So. 2d  at 1276.
[2]  "Equally clearly, an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113, 106 S. Ct. 445, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1985).
[3]  In fact, in Jenkins, supra, the Court noted, "There is little to be found in the record about the film `Carnal Knowledge' other than the film itself." Jenkins, 418 U.S.  at 158, 94 S. Ct. 2750.
[4]  We also stated another concern in Ex parte Anonymous:

"In In the Matter of Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 529, 534 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), the Court of Civil Appeals expressed its concern that attorneys representing minors in waiver-of-parental-consent cases were scripting their clients' testimony.
"`This causes particular concern for this court, which has reviewed too many cases in which a minor seeking a waiver of parental consent to an abortion testifies in an almost rehearsed manner that is virtually identical to the testimony detailed in many of the published opinions of the appellate courts of this state.'
"The trial court is better suited to evaluate whether the minor's testimony is spontaneous or rehearsed. It is the only court that can perceive furtive or reassuring glances and gestures. Contrary to the petitioner's argument, this Court is not in a better position than the trial court to determine maturity. Clearly, the trial court, as the factfinder, has the advantage in discerning maturity and best interest."
806 So. 2d  at 1274.