Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102615

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,615 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KESHIA DENISE WILLIAMS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A typical appeal follows a three-step process:  (1) determining whether the 
appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e., whether there is a lack of appellate 
jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) considering the merits of the 
claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) assessing whether the error 
requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed harmless. 
 
2. 
 
 
An appellate standard of review focuses on the deference to be afforded the lower 
tribunal and establishes the framework by which a reviewing court determines whether 
the lower tribunal erred.  
 
3. 
 
 
K.S.A. 22-3414(3) establishes a preservation rule for instruction claims on appeal.  
It provides that no party may assign as error a district court's giving or failure to give a 
particular jury instruction, including a lesser included crime instruction, unless:  (a) that 
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party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to 
which the party objects and the grounds for objection; or (b) the instruction or the failure 
to give the instruction is clearly erroneous. If an instruction is clearly erroneous, appellate 
review is not predicated upon an objection in the district court. 
 
4. 
 
To determine whether an instruction or a failure to give an instruction was clearly 
erroneous, the reviewing court must first determine whether there was any error at all. To 
make that determination, the appellate court must consider whether the subject instruction 
was legally and factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the entire record. 
 
5. 
 
If the reviewing court determines that the district court erred in giving or failing to 
give a challenged instruction, then the clearly erroneous analysis moves to a reversibility 
inquiry, wherein the court assesses whether it is firmly convinced that the jury would 
have reached a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred. The party claiming 
a clearly erroneous instruction maintains the burden to establish the degree of prejudice 
necessary for reversal. 
 
6. 
 
Although a defendant has a fundamental right to present his or her theory of 
defense, a defendant does not have a right to have the trial judge develop the defense 
theory. 
 
7. 
 
Ordinarily, whether a victim has suffered great bodily harm is a question of fact 
for the jury to decide.  
 
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8. 
 
Where a defendant is charged with severity level 4 aggravated battery for having 
caused great bodily harm to the victim, but there is evidence that would reasonably 
justify a jury in convicting the defendant of severity level 7 aggravated battery for having 
caused bodily harm in a manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, or death can 
be inflicted, the district court errs in failing to give a lesser included crime instruction on 
the severity level 7 offense. But the failure to give a lesser included crime instruction is 
clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced that the jury would have 
convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense, if given the choice. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 8, 2010. 
Appeal from Labette District Court; ROBERT J. FLEMING, judge. Opinion filed September 21, 2012. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Stephen P. Jones, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Hillary McKinney, county 
attorney, Lucas J. Nodine, assistant county attorney, Derek Schmidt, attorney general, and Steve Six, 
former attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Keshia Denise Williams was convicted of aggravated battery for 
stabbing her long-time friend, Sandra Kelly, multiple times in the head with a steak knife 
during an altercation inside of Williams' home. On appeal, Williams claimed, inter alia, 
that the trial court should have given certain instructions even though Williams did not 
request them. We granted review of the instruction issues, in which Williams claims the 
district court should have, sua sponte, given the following instructions:  PIK Crim. 3d 
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54.17-A on no duty to retreat; PIK Crim. 3d 54.18 on use of force in defense of a 
dwelling; and a lesser included offense instruction on severity level 7 aggravated battery. 
We find that the failure to give the instructions was not clearly erroneous and therefore 
the defendant is not entitled to obtain relief on appeal. We affirm the Court of Appeals' 
affirmance of the district court. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
On April 26, 2008, Kelly and her boyfriend, Steve Jones, had been staying with 
Williams for 3 days. That night, Cynthia Edwards and Donald Ray McWilliams were 
also present in Williams' house. The conflict between Williams and Kelly began when 
Williams, while seated at the kitchen table, told Jones that he and Kelly, who was then in 
the bedroom, would have to leave her house. Jones relayed comments between the two 
women to and from the kitchen and bedroom until Kelly entered the kitchen to directly 
engage in a verbal altercation with Williams. 
 
Kelly repeatedly challenged Williams to "take it outside." Initially, Williams tried 
to defuse the situation, but eventually she agreed to go outside. When Kelly went to the 
bedroom to put on her tennis shoes, Williams feared that Kelly had obtained a weapon. 
Accordingly, at some point after Williams got up from the kitchen table to follow Kelly 
outside, she picked up a knife. The two only made it to the door before the physical 
fighting began. According to Edwards, Kelly started that altercation by "throwing blows" 
and pulling two braids out of Williams' hair. Williams responded by stabbing Kelly in the 
head. 
 
The fight stopped when Kelly realized blood was coming down her face. 
McWilliams then took the knife from Williams, and Edwards threw it into some trees. 
Police subsequently recovered a knife north of Williams' house, near some trees. But 
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evidence was not produced at trial that definitively established that the found knife was 
the one used to stab Kelly. 
 
Williams grabbed a towel and wrapped it around Kelly's head. She then called 911 
and reported that she had stabbed Kelly, albeit she would later tell police that she 
believed that she had acted in self-defense.  
 
Jones and another person took Kelly to the hospital, where she received "about a 
hundred stitches." Kelly would later say that she had not felt much, if any, pain; that the 
only subsequent medical attention she required was to have the stitches removed; and that 
her wounds healed in a couple of months.  
 
The police interviewed Kelly at the hospital. She initially told them that she had 
fallen and cut her head on a piece of glass. After the officers threatened to "get [her] for 
making a false statement," Kelly related that she had been cut while fighting with 
Williams.  
 
Eventually, Williams was charged with and tried on one count of severity level 4 
aggravated battery, K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A). Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal 
at the close of the State's evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that, 
although there was no evidence connecting the knife the police had found with Kelly's 
stabbing injuries, there was evidence from which a jury could find that Kelly suffered 
great bodily harm. In the process of explaining that ruling, the court opined that "a 
hundred stitches is more than slight, trivial, minor or moderate harm." 
 
During trial, the prosecutor cross-examined Williams about the fact that she did 
not try to run from Kelly and hide or "do anything to get away from her." In closing 
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argument, the prosecutor returned briefly to the theme that Williams did not try to get 
away from Kelly.  
 
The trial judge gave the jury a general self-defense instruction, but Williams was 
nevertheless found guilty of the level 4 aggravated battery charge. Upon appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, a split panel affirmed the conviction. The dissent opined that the trial 
court should have given a no duty to retreat instruction and a lesser included offense 
instruction on severity level 7 aggravated battery, notwithstanding the absence of any 
request for those instructions. See State v. Williams, No. 102,615, 2010 WL 4156759, at 
*9-13 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (Leben, J., dissenting). The majority 
accepted the State's explanation that it proffered Williams' failure to run and hide as proof 
that she was not afraid of Kelly and, therefore, resorting to a deadly weapon was 
unjustified under the subjective prong of self-defense.  
 
As noted, we granted review on the three issues involving unrequested 
instructions.  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS STANDARD 
 
 Currently, when an instruction issue is being raised for the first time on appeal or 
has not been properly preserved with an appropriate objection in the trial court, we 
generally refer to K.S.A. 22-3414(3) and recite simply that "the standard of review is 
whether the instruction is clearly erroneous." State v. Adams, 294 Kan. 171, 183, 273 
P.3d 718 (2012); see State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 196, 262 P.3d 314 (2011); State v. 
Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 925, 235 P.3d 460 (2010); State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 
1145, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3410 (2010). Often then, while still 
discussing the standard of review, we will explain that "'[j]ury instructions are clearly 
erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced that the jury would have 
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reached a different verdict had the error not occurred.' State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 196, 
262 P.3d 314 (2011)." Adams, 294 Kan. at 183.  
 
That shorthand has tended to blur the distinction between what is to be decided on 
appeal and how the appellate decision is to be made. The "what" that must be decided on 
appeal typically follows a three-step process:  (1) determining whether the appellate court 
can or should review the issue, i.e., whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a 
failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) considering the merits of the claim to 
determine whether error occurred below; and (3) assessing whether the error requires 
reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed harmless. How those decisions are made is 
driven by the applicable standard of review, which "focuses on the deference due a lower 
court, jury, or agency." 1 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 1.03, p.1-17 
(3d ed. 1999). In other words, the standard of review establishes the "framework by 
which a reviewing court determines whether the trial court erred." Hall, Hall's Standards 
of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary's L.J. 3, 13 (2010).  
 
In that vein, our defining clearly erroneous in terms of the likelihood of a different 
jury verdict is more akin to stating a harmless error test than a standard of review, 
because it "assumes that an error has occurred; it does not guide the appellate court in 
determining whether an error has occurred or how much deference to give to a lower 
court decision." Hodgkinson, Clear as Mud? "Clearly Erroneous" as a Standard of 
Review for Instructional Claims, Kansas Bar Association Appellate Practice Newsletter, 
at p. 2 (Spring 2012). Accordingly, we will pause to take a critical look at how we have 
historically handled unpreserved appellate challenges to jury instructions with a view to 
establishing a more precise analytical framework and more accurate standards of review. 
 
Because we frequently cite to K.S.A. 22-3414(3) as the source of our standard of 
review, we look first to that statute. It provides, in relevant part: 
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"No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction, 
including a lesser included crime instruction, unless the party objects thereto before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects 
and the grounds of the objection unless the instruction or the failure to give an instruction 
is clearly erroneous." K.S.A. 22-3414(3). 
 
Plainly, the statute sets forth the statutory preservation requirement that the 
complaining party must have objected prior to jury deliberations in order to get an 
appellate review of a claimed instruction error. A preservation rule for instruction claims, 
requiring an objection in the trial court, was part of this State's jurisprudence prior to the 
statute. For instance, in 1943, we declared that "the general rule is that where no 
objection is made to the giving of an instruction during the trial and no request was made 
for its modification or clarification and such instruction is not clearly erroneous a litigant 
cannot be heard to complain on appeal." Sams v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 157 
Kan. 278, 287, 139 P.2d 859 (1943); see also Collett v. Estate of Schnell, 194 Kan. 75, 
79, 397 P.2d 402 (1964) (following rule from Sams); Montague v. Burgerhoff, 152 Kan. 
124, 128-29, 102 P.2d 1031 (1940) (stating that when no objection is made to any of the 
jury instructions, instructions become law of the case); Hogan v. Santa Fe Trial 
Transportation Co., 148 Kan. 720, 724, 85 P.2d 28 (1938) ("No objection was made 
thereto at the time of the trial and a complaint at this time is too late."); Jones v. A., T. & 
S.F. Rly. Co., 148 Kan. 686, 695, 85 P.2d 15 (1938) (stating that instruction became law 
of the case and jury's findings must control appeal because appellant "made no complaint 
of it"); Lambert v. Rhea, 134 Kan. 10, 14-15, 4 P.2d 419 (1931) (stating that absent an 
objection, jury instruction complaints are unavailing in the Supreme Court where 
instructions correctly stated the law). 
 
Just as plainly, K.S.A. 22-3414(3) includes an exception to the preservation 
requirement where the instruction or failure to give an instruction was "clearly 
9 
 
 
 
erroneous." That exception also predated the statute. In Sams, we "conceded [that] the 
[preservation] rule does not apply to an instruction which is in itself erroneous and an 
appellant is not estopped from complaining of it as error by not having objected to it at 
the time it was given." Sams, 157 Kan. at 288; see also Collett, 194 Kan. at 79 ("This 
court adheres to the rule that where the instructions or directions of the trial court are in 
themselves erroneous, an appellant is not estopped of complaining of them as error by not 
having objected at the time they were given."); Richardson v. Business Men's Protective 
Ass'n., 129 Kan. 700, Syl. ¶ 2, 284 P. 599 (1930) (stating that when an instruction 
includes statements of  law which are "clearly erroneous," it is not necessary, in order for 
party to predicate error upon the giving of the instruction, to make an objection). The rule 
was applied in criminal cases, as well. See State v. Ragland, 173 Kan. 265, 269, 246 P.2d 
276 (1952) ("it is not necessary in order to predicate error thereon, that a defendant in a 
criminal action object to the giving of an instruction to the jury, if the instruction is 
clearly erroneous").  
 
What the statute does not specifically tell us is the meaning of "clearly erroneous." 
Likewise, it does not indicate that the district court is to be afforded any deference when 
the instruction or failure to give the instruction is clearly erroneous. Over time, this 
court's description and application of "clearly erroneous" has been fluid. In the earlier 
cases, the term related to the content of the instruction, with the inquiry being whether the 
instruction at issue on appeal correctly stated the law. The focus was on the patent bona 
fides of the instruction, rather than the degree of error or prejudice caused by any error. 
See, e.g., Lambert, 134 Kan. 10, Syl. ¶ 4; Richardson, 129 Kan. 700, Syl. ¶ 2; Foley v. 
Crawford, 125 Kan. 252, Syl. ¶ 10, 264 P. 59 (1928).  
 
State v. Severns, 158 Kan. 453, 456, 148 P.2d 488 (1944), nicely illustrates those 
early cases that equated "clearly erroneous" with legally invalid. There, the defendant 
argued for the first time on appeal that the murder instruction misstated the law by 
10 
 
 
 
indicating that murder at common law included the unlawful killing of a human being 
committed in the perpetration of a misdemeanor. The Severns court first noted that the 
appellant had not objected at trial, but then related that such an objection is "not 
necessary, in order to predicate error, if the instruction is clearly erroneous." 158 Kan. at 
456 (citing Richardson, 129 Kan. 700, Syl. ¶ 2). The court then held, as a matter of law, 
that the statutory definition of murder did not include a killing "in perpetration of a 
misdemeanor," i.e., the instruction was clearly erroneous. 158 Kan. at 457. The court 
went on to reverse without engaging in a separate harmless error analysis, concluding 
summarily that "[t]he instruction as given was erroneous and prejudicial." 158 Kan. at 
458. It appears that clearly erroneous instructions were generally treated as being 
presumptively prejudicial and, thus, reversible.  
 
In 1970, the legislature enacted K.S.A. 22-3414(3), in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which closely followed the provision regarding waiver of jury instructions 
found at K.S.A. 60-251(b) in the Code of Civil Procedure. Both required a party to make 
a proper objection to the giving or failure to give an instruction before the jury retired to 
consider its verdict, in order to preserve an appellate claim, unless the instruction was 
clearly erroneous. L. 1970, ch. 129, sec. 22-3414; L. 1963, ch. 303, sec. 60-251. For a 
time, our appellate courts appeared to continue to equate "clearly erroneous" with legal 
validity. See State v. Humbolt, 1 Kan. App. 2d 137, Syl. ¶ 4, 562 P.2d 123 (1977) 
(instruction "not 'clearly erroneous' where it correctly states the law and does not mislead 
the jury"). 
 
But later, the focus of the "clearly erroneous" analysis changed from a 
determination of whether the instruction was patently erroneous to a determination of 
whether the instruction was clearly prejudicial. Perhaps the first case to make that shift 
was State v. Stafford, 223 Kan. 62, 65, 573 P.2d 970 (1977), which declared: 
 
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"It is to be noted that none of the objections to instructions now raised were 
presented to the trial court; therefore, our scope of review is limited to a determination of 
whether the instructions are 'clearly erroneous.' (K.S.A. 22-3414[3]; State v. Birch, 221 
Kan. 122, 558 P.2d 119 [1976]; State v. Nesmith, 220 Kan. 146, 551 P.2d 896 [1976]; 
State v. Suing, 210 Kan. 363, 502 P.2d 718 [1972].) An instruction is clearly erroneous 
when the reviewing court reaches a firm conviction that if the trial error had not 
occurred there was a real possibility the jury would have returned a different verdict." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
Stafford did not cite to a source for its new definition of "clearly erroneous." 
Certainly, there is nothing in the statutory language which would naturally lead one to the 
conclusion that "clearly erroneous" was meant to be determined by a reversibility 
standard, i.e., by the error's perceived effect on the trial outcome. In fact, one might find 
it counterintuitive to make the reviewability of an issue hinge entirely upon its 
reversibility.  
 
Further, Stafford did not explain or acknowledge that it was changing the K.S.A. 
22-3414(3) clearly erroneous exception from a certainty-of-error concept to a certainty-
of-prejudice concept. In fact, the opinion seems to rely more on the legal validity of the 
challenged instructions than their impact on the verdict. Nevertheless, subsequent cases 
picked up Stafford's definition of clearly erroneous. See State v. Houck, 240 Kan. 130, 
139, 727 P.2d 460 (1986) (citing Maxwell and Stafford); State v. Maxwell, 234 Kan. 393, 
399, 672 P.2d 590 (1983) (citing Stafford). Eventually, the Stafford version of the 
meaning of "clearly erroneous" would achieve the status of "well known." See Ellmaker, 
289 Kan. at 1139. 
 
Additionally, after Stafford, in 1985, this court clearly and unequivocally assigned 
the "standard of review" label to the term "clearly erroneous." State v. Peck, 237 Kan. 
756, 764, 703 P.2d 781 (1985), declared: 
12 
 
 
 
 
"This 'clearly erroneous' standard is the correct standard of appellate review since 
appellant gave no basis for his objection to the instruction at trial. We have held a party 
may not assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects to the 
instruction stating the specific grounds for the objection. Absent such specificity an 
appellate court may reverse only if the instruction is clearly erroneous. State v. Korbel, 
231 Kan. 657, Syl. ¶ 4, 647 P.2d 1301 (1982)."  
 
Again, the origin of the statement designating clearly erroneous as the correct 
standard of appellate review is unexplained. Peck's citation to Korbel only refers to 
syllabus ¶ 4, where that opinion simply repeated the statutory language of K.S.A. 22-
3414(3). State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, 647 P.2d 1301 (1982), did not recite any standard 
of review on the applicable instruction issue in that case, much less call "clearly 
erroneous" the "correct standard of appellate review." But again, subsequent cases fell 
into step with Peck, consistently referring to "clearly erroneous" as a "standard of 
review." See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 262 Kan. 755, 764, 942 P.2d 579 (1997); State v. Hunt, 
257 Kan. 388, 394-95, 894 P.2d 178 (1995); State v. Crawford, 253 Kan. 629, Syl. ¶ 1, 
861 P.2d 791 (1993); State v. Perez, 251 Kan. 736, 737, 840 P.2d 1118 (1992). 
 
Obviously, designating "clearly erroneous" as a standard of review fails to impart 
the normal information about how the appellate court intends to go about its review. For 
instance, will the court conduct an unlimited review of the appellate record or look for an 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge? Likewise, declaring that jury instructions are 
clearly erroneous only if we are firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict had the error not occurred does not reveal the process to be used to 
determine whether there was any error at all.  
 
But before we can more accurately describe the standard of review, we need to 
clarify just what the court must decide when presented with a claim of error for giving or 
13 
 
 
 
failing to give an instruction that was not requested. As we noted earlier, the first step in 
the appellate process is normally a reviewability inquiry. Obviously, K.S.A. 22-3414(3) 
directly impacts that determination. Although it purports to withhold appellate 
jurisdiction in the absence of a proper objection, the statute's exception effectively 
conveys such jurisdiction and preserves for appellate review any claim that the 
instruction error was clearly erroneous.  
 
Moreover, to determine whether it was clearly erroneous to give or fail to give an 
instruction, the reviewing court would necessarily have to first determine whether it was 
erroneous. In other words, to determine whether the claim of error is properly reviewable, 
the court must first determine whether there is an error, i.e., perform the merits review in 
the second step of the normal appellate process. That review for error necessarily presents 
a legal question subject to unlimited review.  
 
Only after determining that the district court erred in giving or failing to give a 
particular instruction would the reviewing court engage in the reversibility inquiry. Given 
that it has been utilized for decades, the current definition of clearly erroneous sets up the 
test to determine whether the instruction error requires reversal, i.e., whether the 
reviewing court is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
had the instruction error not occurred. This assessment of whether there has been 
injustice would involve a review of the entire record and a de novo determination. Cf. 
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 8, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (harmless error analysis 
performed de novo), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).  
 
Before moving on, we pause to note that the burden of establishing reversibility 
differs in this context from the harmless error analyses discussed in Ward. Whereas the 
burden to show harmlessness generally shifts to the party benefitted by the error, the 
burden to show clear error under K.S.A. 22-3414(3) remains on the defendant. Cf. United 
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States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2002) (a silent, 
nonobjecting defendant has burden to satisfy plain error rule in context of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11). 
 
NO DUTY TO RETREAT INSTRUCTION 
 
Williams' first complaint is that the trial judge, on his own, did not give the jury 
the no duty to retreat instruction from PIK Crim. 3d 54.17-A (2007 Supp.). That 
instruction tracked the statutory provision at K.S.A. 21-3218 and provided: 
 
 
"A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in a 
place where (he)(she) has a right to be has no duty to retreat. (He)(She) has the right to 
stand (his)(her) ground and to meet force with force." PIK Crim. 3d 54.17-A (2007 
Supp.). 
 
Citing to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 
297 (1973), Williams first casts the issue in terms of her fundamental right to present a 
full and complete defense. But nothing precluded the defense from making the concept of 
no duty to retreat a part of its theory of defense by requesting the instruction. Requesting 
an instruction signals the trial judge that its contents are part of the defense theory. 
Certainly, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to have the trial judge develop 
the defense theory. 
 
Moreover, characterizing the issue as a constitutional claim does not significantly 
advance Williams' procedural posture. Even constitutional grounds for reversal are not 
properly before the appellate court for review if they are being asserted for the first time 
on appeal. See State v. Gaudina, 284 Kan. 354, 372, 160 P.3d 854 (2007). 
 
15 
 
 
 
Accordingly, Williams can pass the first step of establishing that the issue is 
properly reviewable by this court only if the failure to give a no duty to retreat instruction 
was clearly erroneous per K.S.A. 22-3414(3). As noted, to get to that determination, we 
must first consider whether it was error at all to omit the instruction. 
 
Williams relies heavily on our decision in State v. Scobee, 242 Kan. 421, 748 P.2d 
862 (1988). There, the victim and the defendant had an altercation while in separate 
vehicles on public roads. After the defendant returned to and parked in the driveway of 
his parent's home, the victim, who had followed the defendant home, charged at the 
defendant. The defendant shot and killed the victim. We reversed the defendant's 
involuntary manslaughter conviction based upon the trial court's refusal to give the no 
duty to retreat instruction as a supplement to the general self-defense instruction. 242 
Kan. at 429. The Scobee decision was heavily influenced by the State's trial strategy of 
emphasizing that the defendant had failed to retreat, specifically arguing that he could 
have driven to a police station or simply remained in his car and honked the horn.  
 
Williams suggests that this case is so factually similar to Scobee as to require the 
same result. Granted, the prosecution here used the same tactic of pointing out to the jury 
that the defendant had not reacted to the victim's aggression by retreating. Unlike the 
Court of Appeals majority, we do not find the State's explanation of the purpose for that 
strategy to be reasonably persuasive. The specific statement during closing was:  "She 
claims self-defense. She never tried to get away. She never tried to hide." The patently 
obvious inference to be drawn from that argument is that for a defendant to legitimately 
claim self-defense, he or she must have first tried to get away or tried to hide. A no duty 
to retreat instruction would have dispelled the State's implication that there was a duty to 
retreat. 
 
16 
 
 
 
But the differences in Scobee are more compelling than the similarities. First and 
foremost, Scobee involved a different procedural posture; Scobee requested that the trial 
judge give the no duty to retreat instruction. That distinction is a game changer. If 
Williams had requested the instruction here, it is possible that we would have found it to 
have been a legally and factually appropriate instruction that was supported by some 
evidence, i.e., found that the district court had erred in refusing to give the requested 
instruction. See State v. Plummer, 295  Kan. ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___ (August 24, 2012) 
(the district court errs if it refuses to give a requested instruction that is legally 
appropriate and factually supported by some evidence). In that event, we would have 
been looking at whether the State had carried its burden to establish harmless error, i.e., 
"if there is a reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial 
in light of the entire record." Ward, 292 Kan. at 569. Instead, the defendant, who must 
assume at least some of the responsibility for the omitted instruction by failing to request 
it, bears the burden of firmly convincing us that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict had the error not occurred. For the reasons discussed below, Williams did not 
clear that high hurdle. 
 
Factually, this case is more akin to what occurred in State v. Saleem, 267 Kan. 
100, 977 P.2d 921 (1999). There, the defendant and the victim started an argument inside 
the defendant's sister's house and then agreed to step outside to settle their differences. 
Once outside, a shoving match ensued, albeit the evidence was conflicting as to which 
person was the aggressor in the shoving match. After the shoving caused the defendant to 
fall to the ground, he pulled a weapon and fatally shot the victim, firing four shots in the 
process. This court found that a no duty to retreat instruction was not required in that 
scenario. 267 Kan. at 113-15. 
 
In reaching its decision, Saleem analyzed both Scobee and State v. Ricks, 257 Kan. 
435, 437, 894 P.2d 191 (1995), but found Ricks to be more applicable. Ricks involved a 
17 
 
 
 
confrontation in a public parking lot. The Ricks opinion limited Scobee's holding to the 
"infrequent factual situations . . . with such elements as a nonaggressor defendant being 
followed to and menaced on home ground." Ricks, 257 Kan. at 437.  
 
In this case, Williams agreed to go outside with Kelly to settle their argument. She 
must have thought that a physical altercation was likely, because she armed herself 
enroute. In essence, the evidence would support a reasonable inference that Williams 
agreed to engage in mutual combat with Kelly and took a knife to a fistfight. Granted, the 
testimony was that Kelly threw the first punch. But it seems strained to say that a person 
who has agreed to fight another is nevertheless a "nonaggressor" because the other 
combatant beat that person to the first punch. Moreover, Williams aggressively 
responded to the commencement of the fight by stabbing Kelly repeatedly in the head. 
  
Except for the fact that the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, it is 
questionable whether a no duty to retreat instruction was factually appropriate in this 
case. Nevertheless, even if we were to find that omitting the instruction was erroneous, 
Williams has failed to establish the requisite level of prejudice. At the time Kelly threw 
the first punch, Williams had agreed to "take it outside" and had armed herself with a 
deadly weapon. The jury heard and rejected the general self-defense instruction. Even 
Scobee said that ordinarily the general self-defense instruction, then contained in PIK 
Crim. 2d 54.17, would be sufficient. 242 Kan. at 428. Accordingly, we are not firmly 
convinced that the instruction would have made a difference in the jury verdict. 
 
USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE OF DWELLING INSTRUCTION 
 
Next, Williams contends that the trial judge should have given the defense of 
dwelling instruction, set forth in PIK Crim. 3d 54.18 (2007 Supp.), which provides: 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
"Defendant claims (his)(her) conduct was permitted as a lawful defense of 
[(his)(her)] (dwelling) (occupied vehicle). 
 
"Defendant is permitted to use force to the extent that it appears to (him)(her) and 
(he)(she) reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent another person from 
unlawfully (entering into) (remaining in) (damaging) [(his)(her)] (dwelling) (occupied 
vehicle). Reasonable belief requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of facts 
that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief. 
 
"[Defendant is permitted to use deadly force to prevent another person from 
unlawfully (entering into) (remaining in) (damaging) [(his)(her)] (dwelling) (occupied 
vehicle) only when (he)(she) reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent 
death or great bodily harm to (himself)(herself) (someone else). Reasonable belief 
requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a 
reasonable person to that belief.] 
 
"When use of force is permitted as a lawful defense of [(his)(her)] (dwelling) 
(occupied vehicle), there is no requirement to retreat." 
 
Again, Williams did not request the instruction, so our review is precluded unless 
the failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous. Williams is so far from reaching 
that standard that we will make short work of this issue. 
 
Simply put, Williams' dwelling was not under attack. Her argument is that because 
she had told Jones that he and Kelly could no longer stay at her house, Kelly's status 
transformed from a houseguest to a trespasser. Therefore, the argument continues, 
Williams could use force to prevent Kelly from remaining in the dwelling. If Williams 
wanted to be creative in crafting an argument that would have justified the giving of the 
defense of dwelling instruction, she should have done so in the district court. We will 
certainly not require trial judges to divine unique defense theories, especially where such 
theories are not revealed by the evidence. 
 
19 
 
 
 
Williams testified that she tried to defuse the argument by asking Kelly to sit down 
at the kitchen table to talk. One who has been invited to sit at the kitchen table is really 
not a trespasser, even if that person's status as a houseguest has been terminated. 
Moreover, when the two were at the front door, it was for the purpose of going outside to 
fight. Williams was not using force to prevent Kelly from remaining in the house; Kelly 
was voluntarily headed out the door. In short, the defense of dwelling instruction was not 
applicable to the facts of this case, and it was not clearly erroneous to fail to give that 
instruction. 
 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION 
 
Finally, Williams contends that the trial judge should have, on his own, given a 
lesser included offense instruction for severity level 7 aggravated battery. That version of 
aggravated battery is defined as "intentionally causing bodily harm to another person 
with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or 
death can be inflicted." K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(B). In contrast, the severity level 4 version 
with which Williams was charged, tried, and convicted is defined in relevant part as 
"[i]ntentionally causing great bodily harm to another person." K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A). 
In ruling on Williams' motion for judgment of acquittal, which is referred to in the record 
as a motion for directed verdict, the district court found that the State had not proved that 
the knife the police found was used to inflict the injuries on Kelly, indicating a failure of 
proof that bodily harm was caused with a deadly weapon. Therefore, the relevant 
difference between the two crimes in this case is whether Williams actually caused great 
bodily harm to Kelly or whether she merely caused bodily harm but did so in a manner 
that could have inflicted great bodily harm. 
 
Again, the reviewability of the issue is governed by the clearly erroneous 
exception in K.S.A. 22-3414(3), which specifically refers to the "failure to give an 
20 
 
 
 
instruction, including a lesser included crime instruction." On the way to making a clearly 
erroneous determination, we must necessarily look first at whether it was legally and 
factually appropriate for the district court to give a lesser included offense instruction on 
severity level 7 aggravated battery. See Plummer, 295 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 1. 
 
The instruction would have been legally appropriate because "level 7 aggravated 
battery is a lesser included offense of level 4 aggravated battery." State v. Hernandez, 294 
Kan. 200, 205, 273 P.3d 774 (2012); accord State v. Winters, 276 Kan. 34, 38, 72 P.3d 
564 (2003). Further, the giving of lesser included crime instructions is not a matter of 
discretion with the trial judge. K.S.A. 22-3414(3) directs that "where there is some 
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime . . . , 
the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included 
crime." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Here, there was obviously evidence of bodily harm. Eyewitnesses testified that 
Williams stabbed Kelly in the head, causing blood to flow down her face. Kelly testified 
that it took approximately 100 stitches to close her head wounds. Further, a reasonable 
jury could certainly find that stabbing someone in the head with a steak knife is a 
"manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted" under 
K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, there was the requisite evidence to support the 
giving of an instruction on severity level 7 aggravated battery.  
 
Williams attempts to portray the trial judge's statement that "a hundred stitches is 
more than slight, trivial, minor or moderate harm" as being a finding that the injuries 
suffered by Kelly were "great bodily harm" as a matter of law, thus precluding the lesser 
included offense instruction on merely "bodily harm." But that takes the judge's remarks 
completely out of context. He was ruling on a defense motion for directed verdict that 
required the court to determine whether the State had presented a prima facie case before 
21 
 
 
 
resting, i.e., whether it had presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could 
find each of the crime's elements beyond a reasonable doubt. One of those elements was 
that Williams had caused "great bodily harm." That term has been defined as "more than 
slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, that does not include mere bruising, which is 
likely to be sustained by simple battery." State v. Green, 280 Kan. 758, 765, 127 P.3d 
241, cert. denied 549 U.S. 913 (2006). Therefore, the district court was merely opining 
that the evidence that Kelly required 100 stitches would be sufficient to support a jury 
finding of great bodily harm, not that the court was making that finding as a matter of 
law. 
 
Nevertheless, we must consider the question, even if the trial judge did not. If the 
evidence established, as a matter of law, that Kelly suffered great bodily harm, then the 
evidence could not reasonably justify a conviction for causing mere bodily harm, and a 
lesser included offense instruction on the severity level 7 version of aggravated battery 
was not required. 
 
Ordinarily, whether a victim has suffered great bodily harm is a question of fact 
for the jury to decide. Green, 280 Kan. at 765. But that seemingly straightforward 
proposition has become muddled by some opinions that chose to take the decision away 
from the jury. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 271 Kan. 416, 420-21, 23 P.3d 815 (2001) 
(holding burns and scarring from hot iron on victim's legs, breast, and inner thighs 
constituted great bodily harm as matter of law); State v. Valentine, 260 Kan. 431, 435, 
921 P.2d 770 (1996) (holding that bullet wound which severed spinal cord and caused 
paralysis constituted great bodily harm as matter of law); State v. Gideon, 257 Kan. 591, 
614, 894 P.2d 850 (1995) (holding that rape or aggravated criminal sodomy constituted 
great bodily harm as matter of law); Doolin v. State, 24 Kan. App. 2d 500, 503-04, 947 
P.2d 454 (1997) (holding that bullet wound which required hip bone and hip socket to be 
replaced constituted great bodily harm as matter of law); but cf. State v. Brice, 276 Kan. 
22 
 
 
 
758, 773-74, 80 P.3d 1113 (2003) (bullet that goes through body without hitting any vital 
organs may or may not cause great bodily harm); State v. Vessels, No. 96,421, 2008 WL 
1847374, at *5 (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (broken bones do not necessarily 
constitute "great bodily harm" as matter of law). 
 
Here, Kelly's own testimony sent mixed signals to the jury as to whether her 
injuries were great bodily harm or mere bodily harm. Although she related that her 
wounds required a large number of stitches, she also minimized the pain she had suffered 
and said that she did not require any follow-up medical services other than to remove the 
stitches. A reasonable and rational jury could have gone either way:  bodily harm in a 
manner that could have caused great bodily harm, or great bodily harm. Accordingly, it 
was error not to give the lesser included offense instruction on severity level 7 aggravated 
battery.  
 
But our determination that the omission of the instruction was erroneous does not 
answer the question of whether the failure to give the unrequested instruction was clearly 
erroneous. In other words, just because we find that a rational jury could have found 
Williams guilty of the lesser included offense does not necessarily mean that we believe 
that the jury would have convicted her of the lesser offense. Here, the evidence is such 
that we simply cannot be firmly convinced of which crime the jury might have chosen, as 
between the severity level 4 and severity level 7 versions. That degree of certainty, or 
perhaps more accurately, that degree of uncertainty falls short of what is required to meet 
the clearly erroneous standard. Accordingly, we affirm Williams' conviction. 
 
Affirmed.