Case Title: Vernier v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-53

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Vernier v. State1996 WY 8909 P.2d 1344Case Number: 95-53Decided: 01/12/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Gilbert Paul VERNIER, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. 
Brackley, J.

John P. LaBuda of Goddard, Perry & 
Vogel, Buffalo, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for 
Appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
manifests an effort by Gilbert Paul Vernier (Vernier) to persuade this court to 
adopt a judicial statute of limitation in a criminal case. Vernier contends his 
right to due process preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States was infringed when the State, after investigating 
allegations of indecent liberties and second-degree sexual assault in 1984, 
proceeded to prosecute him for those crimes in 1994. Vernier fails to assert any 
improper motivation by the prosecutor in connection with the pre-charging delay 
and, even though he asserts substantial prejudice due to the ten-year delay, he 
does not bring himself within our cases addressing that concept. Consequently, 
his assertions of prejudice due to loss of evidence and the failure of his 
memory articulate only the usual reasons justifying statutes of limitation. 
Vernier also contends the Information is so vague and indefinite as to deny him 
the right to defend himself under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming. In this regard, he also asserts the potential loss of his protection 
against double jeopardy found in Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming. We are not persuaded to follow Vernier's invitation to 
adopt a judicial statute of limitation. We hold Vernier's failure to demonstrate 
substantial prejudice to his rights to a fair trial and the presence of some 
intentional effort to obtain a tactical advantage due to the delay forecloses 
relief for pre-charging delay. In accordance with precedent, the Information 
filed was sufficient to enable him to prepare a defense and protect him from 
potential future charges arising out of the same conduct. We affirm the Judgment 
and Sentence entered in the district court.

[¶2]      The issues stated 
by Vernier, in his Brief of the Appellant, are:

I. The 
Pre-Accusation delay spanning ten (10) years violated the Appellant's due 
process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
his right to a fair trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution due to the fact the delay resulted in the loss of evidence, 
hindered the Defendant's right to effective cross examination, and caused the 
Government to be unable to specify in the information when the alleged acts 
occurred [in counts II and III].

II. The charging 
document in this case was fatally defective and vague thereby violating the 
Appellant's Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 10 and § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution.

In the Brief of Appellee filed by the State, 
the issues are said to be:

I. Were Appellant's 
due process rights violated by the filing of criminal charges ten years after 
the offenses occurred?

II. Did the 
Information adequately inform Appellant of the essential elements of the crimes 
for which he was charged?

[¶3]      Vernier is the 
sixty-nine-year-old grandfather of the victims. In July of 1984, ME, then seven 
years old, supported by her sister, JV, informed their mother, "Grandpa touched 
me in a bad way." An investigation of these claims was conducted by the 
Department of Family Services and the Sheridan County sheriff's department. Two 
interviews of the victim and her sister were conducted and recorded on audio 
tape. The second tape was transcribed by a lieutenant in the sheriff's 
department who was present during the interview. No charges were filed at that 
time, and the investigation was terminated.

[¶4]      Ten years later, 
in March of 1994, LL, another granddaughter, reported to the sheriff's 
department that, in June, July, and August 1977, she had been molested when she 
was nine years old and living with Vernier and his wife in Ranchester.1 Two weeks after LL presented her Information 
relating to sexual abuse, ME again informed the sheriff's department that 
Vernier had sexually assaulted her in 1984, during the time she lived with him 
and his wife along with her father and her sister, JV. JV provided 
corroboration, stating that Vernier routinely took ME into the bedroom and 
locked the door. She could hear ME crying, and Vernier telling ME to be quiet. 
ME, in turn, said that JV kicked and screamed at the locked door while Vernier 
was sexually abusing ME. ME advised that the abuse occurred several times a week 
from March through May 1984, while her grandmother was at 
work.

[¶5]      During the same 
time frame in 1994, other evidence emerged about sexual abuse perpetrated by 
Vernier. DH and DP, Vernier's daughters, recounted repeated sexual abuse and 
rape by their father when DH was between the ages of twelve and sixteen and DP 
between the ages of eight and thirteen. Two grandsons disclosed they also had 
been sexually abused by Vernier.

[¶6]      Following the 
1994 investigation by the sheriff's department, the State charged Vernier with 
two counts of indecent liberties in violation of WYO. STAT. § 14-3-105 (1993) 
and one count of second-degree sexual assault proscribed by WYO. STAT. § 
6-2-303(a)(v) (1988).2 At his 
arraignment, Vernier entered a plea of not guilty and filed a motion for a bill 
of particulars requesting that the State be required to furnish specific dates 
for the alleged offenses; a motion for discovery requesting the State furnish 
the audio tape recordings from the 1984 interviews of ME, the victim named in 
Counts II and III; and other motions not material to his appeal. The district 
court denied Vernier's motion for a bill of particulars, and no ruling was made 
on his motion for production of the audio tapes.

[¶7]      Later, Vernier 
moved to dismiss, claiming the State intentionally had delayed filing charges. 
He contended his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the lengthy delay since 
the alleged offenses were committed, the lack of specificity as to dates, and 
loss of potential evidence. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
holding Vernier had failed to demonstrate both an intentional delay to gain 
tactical advantage by the State and substantial prejudice to his right to a fair 
trial. Vernier then entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere, as provided in 
WYO. R.CRIM.P. 11(a)(2),3 to all 
three counts in the Amended Information. Vernier reserved the right to appeal 
the rulings of the district court in denying his motion for a bill of 
particulars and his motion to dismiss. Vernier was sentenced to not less than 
five, nor more than seven, years on each count, with the sentences to run 
consecutively, and he was ordered to pay $912 in restitution to LL and $300 to 
the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. Vernier's appeal is from that Judgment and 
Sentence.

[¶8]      Vernier quotes 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,4 stating "* * * nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *." Vernier 
contends the pre-accusation delay of ten years from 1984, when the events 
relating to Counts II and III were first investigated, until 1994, when charges 
were actually filed, violated his right to due process. He cites United States 
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S. Ct. 242, 54 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1977), for the proposition that statutes of 
limitation in criminal cases provide protection against undue delay in charging 
and are "the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges." 
Lovasco, 431 U.S.  at 789, 97 S. Ct.  at 2048. Acknowledging Wyoming has no 
statutes of limitation in criminal cases, Vernier strongly contends, 
particularly in his oral argument, that the judicial imposition of a statute of 
limitation is necessary to protect him from the overly stale 
charges.

[¶9]      In a case 
involving a longer period of delay, but perhaps distinguishable because a prior 
investigation was not conducted, we discussed statutes of limitation with 
respect to criminal cases and said:

At common law there 
was no limitation period for the prosecution of any criminal offense. Where no 
statute of limitations pertaining to criminal offenses has been adopted, 
prosecution for such an offense may be commenced at any time during the life of 
the offender. When statutes of limitations governing the commencement of 
prosecution for specific crimes are adopted, they are said to be acts of grace 
under which the sovereign surrenders its right to prosecute. Being acts of 
grace, statutes of limitations may be changed or repealed without violating ex 
post facto prohibitions; but in the final analysis, whether statutes of 
limitations governing prosecution of criminal offenses should be adopted at all 
is a matter solely for the legislature.

Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1026 (Wyo. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986) 
(citations omitted, emphasis added).

The proposition articulated there - that 
since Wyoming has no statutes of limitation in criminal cases, the prosecution 
may be commenced any time during the life of the offender - has been reaffirmed 
in a number of cases. McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295 (Wyo. 1995); Parker v. 
State, 882 P.2d 1225 (Wyo. 1994); Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1992); 
Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶10]   The legislature in Wyoming has yet 
to adopt a statute of limitation, even though the point has repeatedly been made 
that Wyoming has none. There is no question the legislature would have the 
authority to enact a statute of limitation, and the failure to adopt one does 
not appear to be oversight. Instead, it represents a conscious decision to 
refrain from extending grace through a statute of limitation in criminal cases. 
Consistently with our statement in Story, 721 P.2d  at 1026, "whether statutes of 
limitations governing prosecution of criminal offenses should be adopted at all 
is a matter solely for the legislature" (emphasis added). We decline the 
proposition of Vernier that we adopt a judicial statute of limitation in this 
case.

[¶11]   We proceed to address the 
constitutional claim arising out of pre-charging delay in the context of our 
prior cases. We recently reiterated the test, saying:

Wyoming has no 
statute of limitations for criminal offenses, and prosecution for such offenses 
may be commenced at any time during the life of the offender. However, when a 
delay in bringing charges results in prejudice to a defendant, due process 
considerations may arise. In order to require dismissal of a charge, it is 
necessary that a preindictment delay cause "substantial prejudice to 
[appellant's] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional 
device to gain tactical advantage over the accused." Story [v. State], 721 P.2d 
[1020,] 1027 [(Wyo. 1986)], quoting from United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 465, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971). Substantial prejudice requires 
the showing of the loss of a witness, exhibit or other evidence, the presence of 
which would probably bring a different result.

Phillips v. State, 
835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo. 1992) * * *. The burden of proof to make the required 
showing is on the defendant. See United States v. Engstrom, 965 F.2d 836, 838-39 
(10th Cir. 1992).

McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1300 
(Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted, emphasis added). 

In Fortner, 843 P.2d  at 1142, we stated we 
have adopted the rule from Lovasco and Marion, and we clarified the application 
of the test for pre-accusation delay:

Wyoming has taken a 
conjunctive approach to the Marion rule which requires the defendant to 
establish both an improper prosecutorial motivation which caused the delay and 
substantial prejudice resulting from it. Cf. State v. Gonzales, 110 N.M. 218, 
794 P.2d 361, 363-67 (Ct.App. 1990), aff'd as modified, 111 N.M. 363, 805 P.2d 630 (1991) (discussing the "conjunctive" and "balancing" approaches to the 
Marion test.)

[¶12]   Vernier makes no claim of any 
improper motivation by the prosecutor with respect to pre-indictment delay. 
Instead, Vernier's interpretation of the sequence of events is that the decision 
of the prosecutor not to file in 1984 manifests the lack of any basis for the 
accusations. He contends that, otherwise the prosecutor would have filed the 
charges then, and he points out no new evidence concerning Counts II and III was 
discovered after 1984. In his argument before the court, he pressed the 
proposition that, because there was no basis to file charges in 1984, there was 
still no basis in 1994. We have firmly adopted and followed the doctrine of 
prosecutorial discretion. Hansen v. State; Pappan v. State, 904 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 
1995); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990); Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984); State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Consequently, the failure to file charges in 1984 appears to be 
equivocal rather than representing a conclusion that the evidence would not 
justify prosecution.

[¶13]   The Supreme Court of the United 
States analyzed reasons for pre-accusation delay in Lovasco, and it concluded no 
due process violation exists with respect to investigative delay. Exploring 
investigative delay and its effect on the charging of defendants with a crime, 
the court explained that it could apply to a case where probable cause was 
lacking, because "it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an 
indictment on less than probable cause." Investigative delay could also pertain 
in a case where probable cause existed, for "prosecutors are under no duty to 
file charges * * * before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the 
suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," as charging would "increase the 
likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed," cause "potentially fruitful 
sources of information to evaporate," and "cause scarce resources to be consumed 
on cases that prove to be insubstantial." Finally, with respect to investigative 
delay, in a case where "sufficient evidence to prove guilt" exists, the court 
noted that to compel immediate charging "would preclude the Government from 
giving full consideration to the desirability of not prosecuting in particular 
cases." Lovasco, 431 U.S.  at 791-92, 794, 97 S. Ct.  at 2049-51. A prosecutor is 
only required to file the charges if the motive for delay is an effort to gain 
tactical advantage over the accused, thus, creating a need to protect the 
defendant from oppressive delay.

[¶14]   This record discloses that, in 
addition to the evidence provided in 1984, a substantial increase in the quality 
and quantity of the evidence was available in 1994. While the basis of the 
prosecutor's decision not to pursue the case in 1984 may be mysterious, it is 
also clear the case was much more substantial in 1994. We conclude there was no 
improper motive by the prosecutor for obtaining a tactical advantage in 
connection with this delay in filing. We previously noted Vernier does not argue 
to the contrary.

[¶15]   Vernier asserts the several aspects 
of prejudice because of pre-accusation delay, including the loss of two 1984 
audio tapes, his loss of memory, the loss of a possible alibi defense, and the 
State's failure to perform a medical examination on the alleged victim in 1984. 
While we recognized in Fortner, 843 P.2d  at 1143, that loss or destruction of 
exculpatory records after many years might provide a claim of prejudice 
attributable to prosecutorial delay, we held that was not the case in Fortner. 
Neither do we find prejudice in this regard in this case. Vernier speculates the 
loss of the tapes precluded him from obtaining exculpatory evidence or 
cross-examining the victim on the basis of the 1984 interviews. He argues the 
transcript of one of the tapes is unreliable because a sheriff's officer, not a 
court reporter, transcribed it and included extra notes. A similar claim with 
respect to a witness, not a victim, was rejected by this court in Young v. 
State, 849 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1993). In this instance, the witnesses were all still 
available and Vernier, at a trial, would have been afforded his constitutional 
right to confrontation and cross-examination. Furthermore, he eschewed the 
suggestion of the trial judge that he pursue discovery through 
depositions.

[¶16]   In our view, actual prejudice, not 
possible prejudice, is the standard that must be invoked with respect to this 
prong of the pre-charging delay test. We do not perceive actual prejudice to 
Vernier from the loss of the 1984 tapes. We hold he failed to demonstrate the 
requisite actual and substantial prejudice due to the loss of those 
tapes.

[¶17]   Turning to his concern with respect 
to his loss of memory in the passage of the ten years, as we have said, the 
passage of time cuts both ways:

It is difficult to 
see how Appellant was prejudiced by these memory lapses, assuming they were 
caused by the delay. When it is the prosecution's witnesses who have suffered 
memory losses, the State is prejudiced at least as much as, or more than, the 
defendant.

"[D]elay is a 
two-edged sword. It is the Government that bears the burden of proving its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or 
impossible for the Government to carry this burden."

Fortner, 843 P.2d  at 1143 (citations 
omitted).

In this connection, Vernier also argues 
that, in 1984, he might have recalled an alibi that would have been helpful. He 
attaches no specificity to that prospect, however, such as the names of 
individuals with whom he spent time or activities in which he participated. He 
does not even generally describe his other activities. Essentially, he claims he 
might have an alibi, but he does not demonstrate he did have an 
alibi.

[¶18]   The victims were quite specific 
with respect to their recollection that sexual abuse from Vernier was inflicted 
"several times a week," about an "every night occurrence," and "twice a week for 
a couple of years," all while his wife was at work, and they were alone with 
Vernier. Certainly, at trial, the opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses 
and to impeach such testimony would have been available. Their credibility would 
have been an issue for the jury. Our conclusion is that, in this regard also, 
Vernier has failed to demonstrate prejudice attributable to pre-accusation 
delay, and his contention that he might have had an alibi defense is too 
speculative.

[¶19]   As to the absence of a medical 
examination, WYO. STAT. § 6-2-309(d) (1988) states a medical report is not 
necessary to obtain a conviction of sexual assault. The failure of the State to 
obtain a medical report for trial does not rise to the level of a due process 
violation. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1988). The record does not 
indicate, and Vernier does not articulate, that a medical examination was not 
accomplished for the purpose of prejudicing Vernier or in order to obtain a 
tactical advantage. Indeed, with respect to allegations in July 1984 of sexual 
abuse from March through May 1984, it is problematical whether a medical 
examination would have been useful.

[¶20]   To summarize, Vernier has neither 
demonstrated substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial, nor improper 
motivation with respect to the pre-accusation delay. He argues about the 
possible lack of evidence with respect to Counts II and III in 1984 and 1994. In 
the ten years between 1984 and 1994, a substantial increase in the quality and 
the nature of the evidence is manifested. The State, indeed, had more reason to 
prosecute in 1994. We hold Vernier's right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not violated.

[¶21]   Vernier also contends the charges 
in the Information are so vague and indefinite that he was denied his right to 
defend himself. As we noted, he focuses on the initial Information, but the 
Amended Information, to which he entered his pleas of nolo contendere, is more 
specific with respect to dates. Still, Vernier argues Count I alleges the 
occurrence of the crime sometime during the period of sixty days, more than 
seventeen years earlier, and Counts II and III occurred during a period of 
ninety days, more than ten years previously. The constitutional provisions upon 
which Vernier pins his argument are the language in the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation * * *," and Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming, which provides "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation * * *." The 
purpose of these provisions is to assure adequate notice of the accusations to 
the defendant to enable him to prepare a defense. In WYO.R.CRIM.P. 3(b)(1), the 
constitutional requirements are implemented, and the information must be "a 
plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged."

[¶22]   In Stewart v. State, 724 P.2d 439, 
440-41 (Wyo. 1986), we applied the standards for an indictment to an information 
saying:

The question of 
sufficiency of an indictment was resolved in Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 
(1979). The requirements are that an indictment is sufficient if it contains, 1) 
the elements of the offense charged, 2) if it fairly informs a defendant of the 
charge against which he must defend, and 3) if it enables the defendant to plead 
an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. * 
* * In Faltynowicz we said:

"* * * The same 
standards, [of Hovee, supra] of course, would apply in judging the sufficiency 
of an information." Id., at 371.

* * 
* * * *

[¶23]   We have said that where the 
specific date is not a requirement of the crime, alleging a general time period 
in lieu of a specific date is sufficient to give a defendant notice and allow 
him to adequately prepare a defense.

"* * * [W]here the charge follows the 
statutory language and such language contains all that is essential to 
constitute the crime, the indictment is sufficient. * * *" Boyd v. State, Wyo., 
528 P.2d 287, 289 (1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1975).

[¶24]   A specific date is not essential to 
the commission of indecent liberties under § 14-3-105; therefore, the 
information supplemented by the bill of particulars was sufficient, and complied 
with the requirements of Hovee v. State, supra.

* * 
* * * *

"* * * We have 
stated repeatedly that in the interests of justice and recognizing that young 
children cannot be expected to be exact regarding times and dates, a child's 
uncertainty as to time or date upon which the offense charged was committed goes 
to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. * * * Nonsuit may 
not be allowed on the ground that the State's evidence fails to fix any definite 
time for the offense where there is sufficient evidence that defendant committed 
each essential act of the offense. * * *"

[¶25]   The Nevada Supreme Court, quoting 
the Idaho Supreme Court said:

"`It would be a 
very weak rule of law that would permit a man to ravish a fifteen year old girl 
and then say in effect: "You cannot convict me of this crime, as you did not 
guess the right date." * * *.'"

[¶26]   Consistently, we have not required 
a charge of sexual abuse of a child to state the exact date or dates in 
question. Instead, we have held the allegation of a general time period in lieu 
of a specific date is sufficient to give the defendant notice and allow him to 
adequately prepare a defense. Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1995) (finding 
a fivemonth general time period was sufficient); Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429 
(Wyo. 1991) (holding a four-month time period was sufficient); Rhodes v. State, 
462 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1969) (stating although the victim specified no date, the 
occurrence as testified by the witness was not subject to challenge); State v. 
Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162 (1948) (finding ordinarily a charge that the 
crime was committed at or about the time alleged in the information or within a 
given period before the filing of the indictment or information is sufficient 
and the lack of a specific date neither prejudices a defendant nor hinders his 
ability to present a defense of alibi). In Brown, 817 P.2d  at 437-38, we stated 
specifically, "[w]e have held that in the case of sexual abuse of a child, it is 
sufficient to establish the transaction rather than the exact date or dates in 
question."

[¶27]   Vernier does not complain that the 
elements of the offenses are not alleged. Our examination of the Information 
confirms the fact that they are appropriately pleaded. Instead, Vernier's 
challenge focuses upon the second requirement found in Hovee v. State, 596 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1979). He contends he was inhibited in preparation of his defense 
because of vagueness as to dates and the denial of his motion for a bill of 
particulars.

[¶28]   The Amended Information described 
details of the incidents charged, articulating the names of the victims and 
stating the incidents occurred at Vernier's home when the victims were living 
with him and his wife. Count I describes his getting into bed with his nine-year 
old granddaughter and touching her vaginal area. Count II describes his removing 
the clothes of the victim, rubbing her breasts, and penetrating her vaginal area 
with his finger. Count III describes his exposing his penis to the victim while 
she was using the toilet and forcing her to touch it. These details were 
provided in Exhibit "A" attached to both the original Information and the 
Amended Information. The victims said these events occurred repeatedly and 
often. We are satisfied adequate specificity was articulated according to our 
cases cited previously.

[¶29]   Finally, Vernier asserts a 
violation of the third requirement of Hovee. He argues the absence of 
specificity with respect to dates could expose him to a future prosecution for 
the same offense in violation of WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 11, providing "nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." With respect to such 
a contention, we said in Stewart, 724 P.2d at 442:

"[An information is 
sufficient if] the nature of the offense, the place where it is alleged offenses 
were committed, the period of time covered thereby, as well as the specific 
statutes which it was claimed appellant violated, are specifically set out. * * 
*" Butler v. United States, 197 F.2d 561, 562 (10th Cir. 
1952).

[¶30]   And,

"* * * [w]here the 
time is not an essential element of the offense, it is sufficient to charge 
facts which show that the offense was committed. * * *" Id., at 
562.

In the Amended Information, Vernier was 
advised of the nature of the offenses; the specific statutes violated; the 
location of the events in his home at Ranchester while the victims were living 
with him; and the time periods. We are satisfied the Amended Information 
articulates adequate information to bar future prosecutions for the same 
offenses. If, in the unlikely event a subsequent prosecution were initiated, the 
burden would be on the State to establish a crime different from those to which 
Vernier entered his pleas.

[¶31]   In addition, we think Vernier's 
argument is conjectural. There is no contention he has been charged a second 
time for the same offenses nor is there any contention such charges have been 
suggested. The statute and our cases do not require the allegation of specific 
dates for charges alleging sexual abuse of children. The facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate the commission of the offenses. We find no merit in this argument by 
Vernier and conclude the Amended Information provided him notice of the charges 
against him and allowed him to prepare a defense and protect himself from 
possible future prosecutions.

[¶32]   We refuse to adopt a judicial 
statute of limitation for criminal offenses. We hold the ten-year, 
pre-accusation delay did not infringe upon Vernier's right to due process. We 
hold there was no showing of substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial 
or a demonstration that the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical 
advantage. The Information sufficiently alleged the elements of the offenses, 
informed the defendant of the charges against which he should defend, and 
permitted him to plead an acquittal or conviction as a bar to future 
prosecutions.

[¶33]   The Judgment and Sentence of the 
district court is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 The 
Information filed June 3, 1994, alleged that the events charged in Count I 
occurred on or about the months of June, July, and August 1978, and the events 
resulting in the charges in Counts II and III occurred on or about the year 
1984. On October 12, 1994, an Amended Information was filed, and it alleged that 
the events constituting Count I occurred on or about mid-June to mid-August 
1977, and the events leading to Counts II and III occurred on or about March 
through May of 1984. Vernier prefers to argue based upon the allegations of the 
initial Information, but we rely upon the allegations in the Amended 
Information, the one to which Vernier entered his 
plea.

2 WYO. 
STAT. § 14-3-105 (1993) defines the crime of indecent liberties as 
follows:

(a) Any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, * * 
*.

(b) As used in this section, 
"child" means a person under the age of eighteen (18) 
years.

WYO. STAT. § 6-2-303(a)(v) 
(1988) provides:

(a) Any actor who inflicts 
sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, 
under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

* * * * * *

(v) At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim; * * 
*.

3 
WYO.R.CRIM.P. 11(a)(2) provides:

(a) 
Alternatives.

* * * * * *

(2) Conditional Pleas. - With 
the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving 
in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.

4 Vernier 
also asserts in this issue that his right to a fair trial pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution was breached but he fails to present 
that argument. We agree with United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S. Ct. 242, 54 L. Ed. 2d 164 
(1977), and United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 
(1971), that the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial has no application to 
delay which precedes both arrest and 
charge.