Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Miroslaw Thomas Lobasz

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-1105

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1105 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MIROSLAW THOMAS LOBASZ,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 3, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Miroslaw Thomas 
Lobasz be found in indirect contempt and suspended from the practice of law for 
three years effective, nunc pro tunc, April 10, 2008.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendation of guilt, but disapprove the recommended sanction.  We hereby 
disbar Miroslaw Thomas Lobasz from the practice of law in Florida. 
BACKGROUND 
 
On March 7, 2008, the Court entered an order suspending Lobasz for three 
years.  Fla. Bar v. Lobasz, 979 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2008) (table).  Subsequently, in 
 
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June 2008, pursuant to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-7.11(f) (Contempt), The 
Florida Bar filed a petition for contempt alleging that Lobasz practiced law after 
his suspension took effect by appearing at an immigration hearing on behalf of a 
former client.  The Court issued an order directing Lobasz to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt and disbarred.  After responses were filed, the case 
was referred to a referee.  Thereafter, the referee submitted a report to the Court, in 
which he makes findings of fact and recommendations, which are discussed below.   
 
The Bar’s petition alleged that Lobasz, while suspended, appeared at an 
immigration hearing on behalf of a former client along with the client’s new 
counsel, made legal arguments at the immigration hearing, and questioned his 
former client at the hearing.  Before the referee, the Bar moved for summary 
judgment regarding the facts of Lobasz’s conduct at the immigration hearing and 
on the conclusion of law that his actions constituted the practice of law.  The 
referee entered an order, with the agreement of Lobasz, granting partial summary 
judgment and finding that Lobasz actively participated in a hearing before the 
Honorable Denise A. Marks Lane, a United States Immigration Judge, on April 10, 
2008, in Removal Proceedings of Alberto Gaspar-Martinez, Case No.  
A028957234.  The referee further found that Lobasz, at the immigration hearing, 
addressed and responded to the court and conducted a direct examination of 
Gaspar-Martinez, his former client, which constituted the practice of law. 
 
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After holding a hearing, the referee found that Lobasz’s three-year 
suspension (Fla. Bar v. Lobasz, 979 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2008)) took effect on April 7, 
2008.  Pursuant to the Court’s order of suspension, Lobasz was directed to close 
his law practice during the thirty-day period before the suspension became 
effective.  In the course of that ―close out‖ period, Lobasz transferred most of his 
open cases to Linda Amy Ann Cahill, a member of The Florida Bar with whom he 
shared office space.  Gaspar-Martinez was one of Lobasz’s former clients, whose 
case had been transferred to Cahill.  Cahill had filed the appropriate administrative 
form to appear as counsel for Gaspar-Martinez.   
 
Three days after his suspension became effective, Lobasz accompanied 
Cahill, at her request, to the April 10, 2008, immigration hearing in Removal 
Proceedings of Alberto Gaspar-Martinez, Case No. A028957234.  This was a 
deportation hearing.  Lobasz intended to assist Cahill as needed, to ―make sure that 
everything was done right,‖ and ―to whisper in her ear when [he] thought 
something had to be done.‖   
 
At the hearing, Cahill informed Judge Lane that she was representing 
Gaspar-Martinez.  Neither Lobasz nor Cahill informed the court or opposing 
counsel that Lobasz was suspended from the practice of law.  Lobasz sat at counsel 
table with Cahill.  He responded to questions posed by Judge Lane regarding the 
procedural history of the case.  Further, Lobasz conducted a direct examination of 
 
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Gaspar-Martinez because Cahill did not understand the foundation needed to 
qualify Gaspar-Martinez for voluntary departure. 
 
Before the referee, Lobasz testified that at the time of the immigration 
hearing, he was suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety, and 
depression.  In addition, his father was hospitalized and dying.  Lobasz stated that 
his actions at the immigration hearing were motivated by his emotional state and 
desire to help a former client.   
 
The referee recommended that Lobasz be found in indirect contempt of the 
Court for his ―technical violation‖ of the Court’s March 7, 2008, order of 
suspension.  As a sanction for the contempt, the referee recommended that Lobasz 
be suspended for a period of three years effective, nunc pro tunc, April 10, 2008 
(the date of Lobasz’s appearance at the immigration hearing), to run concurrently 
with the three-year suspension already imposed in Case No. SC06-2500.  The 
referee further recommended that Lobasz pay the Bar’s costs in the amount of 
$3,259.80.  
 
In recommending this sanction, the referee found two aggravating and five 
mitigating factors.   The aggravating factors are: (1) prior disciplinary offense (the 
case in which Lobasz was suspended for three years for his trust-accounting 
violations, Florida Bar v. Lobasz, 979 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2008) (Case No. 
SC06-2500)); and (2) injury to the legal system due to Lobasz’s failure to inform 
 
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the immigration judge of his suspension, which disrupted a legal proceeding to the 
extent that it required the immigration judge to reschedule a hearing that was set 
for the following week.  The mitigating factors found by the referee are: 
(1) absence of a conscious intent to violate the Court’s disciplinary order; 
(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; 
(4) remorse; and (5) the absence of any injury to the client. 
The Florida Bar petitions the Court for review, arguing that (1) the referee 
abused his discretion in allowing Lobasz to testify in mitigation concerning 
medical conditions that he failed to disclose during discovery; (2) the referee’s 
finding that Lobasz lacked a conscious intent to violate the Court’s order is not 
supported by competent, substantial evidence; and (3) the referee’s recommended 
sanction is not supported.  
ANALYSIS 
First, The Florida Bar argues that the referee abused his discretion in 
allowing Lobasz to testify concerning his mental conditions.  Lobasz failed to 
disclose his mental status as a mitigating factor in his answers to interrogatories.1  
                                          
 
 
1.  The Bar also asserts that the referee should not have permitted Lobasz to 
introduce a copy of his therapist’s report concerning Lobasz’s mental condition 
because the report was not produced after the Bar served a request to produce.  We 
find this argument to be without significance because Lobasz’s counsel withdrew 
his proffer of the report after Bar counsel objected to its admission.  As the report 
was not admitted into evidence, the Court will not consider this argument further. 
 
 
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The Bar claims that the referee allowed Lobasz to testify, overruling the Bar’s 
objection.  A review of the transcript from the hearing before the referee, however, 
reveals that the Bar did not object when Lobasz testified that he suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression.  In fact, later in the hearing, 
when Lobasz testified further regarding his symptoms and treatment, the Bar again 
failed to object to his testimony.  Thus, the Bar waived its objection to Lobasz’s 
testimony by failing to object when the testimony was first given.2   
Even if the Bar had preserved its objection, ―a referee has wide latitude to 
admit or exclude evidence and may consider any relevant evidence, including 
hearsay and the trial transcript or judgment in a civil proceeding.‖  Fla. Bar v. 
Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted).  ―A referee’s decisions 
about the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion.‖  Id.; see also Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 2002).  
Based on the record, the referee did not abuse his discretion.  The Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply in attorney disciplinary proceedings before a referee to the extent 
that they are not inconsistent with any provision of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 
3-7.6 (governing procedures for proceedings before a referee).  See Fla. Bar v. 
Daniels, 626 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1993); see also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.6(f)(1).  
                                          
 
 
2.  The Bar did object later to the introduction of an e-mailed report from his 
therapist. 
 
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―Discovery shall be available to the parties in accordance with the Florida Rules of 
Civil Procedure.‖  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.6(f)(2) (discovery in proceedings 
before the referee).  In civil cases, like Bar disciplinary cases, a trial court’s 
decision to impose discovery sanctions is discretionary and is only reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Vega v. CSCS Int’l, N.V., 795 So. 2d 164, 167 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2001).  Further, the exclusion of a witness’s testimony as a discovery 
sanction is a drastic remedy that should be used only under the most compelling 
circumstances.  Id.; see also Griefer v. DiPietro, 708 So. 2d 666, 670 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1998).  Based on case law and the record, we conclude that the referee did 
not abuse his discretion in allowing Lobasz to testify concerning his mental status 
at the final hearing.  Additionally, this evidence supports the referee’s finding that 
Lobasz suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. 
Although a referee has wide latitude to admit evidence and may consider 
any relevant evidence, we must emphasize that ―trial by ambush‖ tactics will not 
be condoned.  Lobasz failed to update his responses to the Bar’s discovery 
requests.  The Bar, in interrogatories propounded to Lobasz during the discovery 
phase, asked Lobasz to identify any mitigation that he would seek to advance at the 
final hearing.  In response, Lobasz stated that any potential mitigation had not yet 
been determined.  He did not amend or supplement this answer and, thus, never 
identified any mitigation evidence he planned to introduce at the hearing.  While 
 
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we conclude that the instant referee did not abuse his discretion in allowing the 
testimony, we feel compelled to reiterate that parties who evade their discovery 
responsibilities will not be permitted to benefit from such improper tactics.   
Second, the Bar argues that there is not competent, substantial evidence to 
support the finding that Lobasz lacked a conscious intent to violate the Court’s 
suspension order.  The Court’s review of a referee’s factual findings is limited, and 
if a referee’s finding of fact is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the 
record, the Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that 
of the referee.  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000); see also Fla. 
Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  To succeed in challenging a 
referee’s finding of fact, the party, in this case the Bar, must establish that there is a 
lack of evidence in the record to support the finding or that the record clearly 
contradicts the referee’s conclusion.  Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741, 746 
(Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Karten, 829 So. 2d 883, 888 (Fla. 2002).   
 
The referee found that Lobasz did not intentionally violate the Court’s order 
of suspension, due to Lobasz’s state of mind (the mitigating factors regarding 
Lobasz’s mental conditions).  Even though the referee made these findings, he 
recommended that Lobasz be found in indirect contempt for violating the order of 
suspension.  Our review of the record finds support for these mitigating factors, 
which in turn support the referee’s finding as to intent. 
 
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Third, the Bar asserts that the referee’s recommended sanction of a three-
year suspension is not supported and argues that disbarment is the appropriate 
sanction.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, ' 15, Fla. Const.  
However, generally speaking this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
In contempt cases, a respondent’s ―[c]lear violation of any order or 
disciplinary status that denies an attorney the license to practice law generally is 
punishable by disbarment, absent strong extenuating factors.‖  Fla. Bar v. Brown, 
635 So. 2d 13, 13-14 (Fla. 1994).  Lobasz violated the Court’s order of suspension 
and, consequently, we find him in contempt.  Thus, the presumptively correct 
sanction in this case is disbarment unless there are strong extenuating factors.  
Brown; see also Fla. Bar v. Bitterman, 33 So. 3d 686, 688 (Fla. 2010) (holding 
suspended attorney in contempt for engaging in the practice of law and disbarred); 
Fla. Bar v. D’Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 1209, 1220 (Fla. 2009) (same); Fla. Bar v. 
Heptner, 887 So. 2d 1036, 1045 (Fla. 2004) (same).   
 
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The referee found five mitigating factors: (1) absence of a conscious intent 
to violate the Court’s disciplinary order; (2) absence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) remorse; and (5) the absence of 
any injury to the client.  In determining whether these mitigating factors constitute 
strong extenuating circumstances, we reviewed the record.  We find that the weight 
of the mitigating evidence is significantly diminished. 
By his own admission, Lobasz continued to advise Cahill on the cases of his 
former clients and briefed her to prepare her for hearings.  Lobasz testified:  ―As 
the hearing gets closer, I have to review the case with her, let her know exactly 
where the case stands and what’s going on with it.‖  His continuing role in the 
cases of his former clients cannot be attributed to the mitigating factors found by 
the referee.  Plainly stated, a year after his suspension became effective, Lobasz 
should not have been involved in these cases.  Lobasz testified that he was not 
compensated by Cahill for his services.  Nevertheless, even the voluntary services 
of a suspended lawyer can constitute the practice of law and violate an order of 
suspension.  Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-6.1 provides guidance.  Subdivision 
(a) only permits lawyers to employ suspended lawyers ―to perform those services 
that may ethically be performed by nonlawyers.‖  The rule applies whether the 
suspended lawyer is ―a salaried or hourly employee, volunteer worker, or an 
independent contractor providing services to the entity.‖  (Emphasis added.)  
 
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Subdivision (c) of the rule requires notice to the Bar ―[b]efore employment 
commences.‖  Thus, Lobasz was on notice that he should not advise Cahill 
regarding the cases of his former clients.  See Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 916 So. 2d 647, 
653 (Fla. 2005) (holding the respondent in a contempt case, as a lawyer, was on 
notice of the Court’s case law establishing the parameters for permissible activities 
for suspended attorneys who work as law clerks in a law office during a period of 
suspension).  Further, Lobasz testified that he continued to go to his former law 
office almost daily, met with former clients one-on-one to collect fees he allegedly 
earned before the suspension was imposed, and prepared pleadings for Cahill, and 
that occasionally Cahill would call him into her office to ask him a question about 
a case with the client present.  Even if Lobasz provides these services voluntarily, 
the rule required notice to the Bar before Lobasz began advising Cahill, as well as 
compliance with the rule (such as the quarterly reporting requirements stated in 
subdivision (e)).  Thus, while Lobasz asserts that he lacked a conscious intent to 
violate the Court’s order of suspension when he engaged in misconduct at the 
immigration hearing, the record demonstrates that his misconduct did not stop after 
the hearing.  Long after the April 10, 2008, immigration hearing, Lobasz continued 
to engage in the practice of law by advising Cahill regarding cases that were 
allegedly transferred to her over a year before.  These facts prevent the mitigating 
factors, which applied to his misconduct at the immigration hearing, from 
 
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constituting extenuating circumstances.  As Lobasz has failed to overcome the 
presumption of disbarment, we disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction of 
a three-year suspension and impose disbarment.  See Brown; Bitterman; 
D’Ambrosio. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Miroslaw Thomas Lobasz is hereby disbarred from the 
practice of law in Florida, effective immediately.  As Respondent is currently 
suspended, it is unnecessary to provide him with thirty days to close out his 
practice to protect the interests of existing clients.  Miroslaw Thomas Lobasz shall 
fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(g).  Further, Respondent 
shall accept no new business until he is readmitted to the practice of law in Florida. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Miroslaw Thomas 
Lobasz in the amount of $3,259.80, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and 
POLSTON, J., concur. 
 
 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
 
 
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PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree with the majority’s decision to disbar the respondent.  I disagree, 
however, with separately chastising Lobasz for not updating his interrogatories in 
this case.  Majority op. at 7-8.  It is incumbent upon the party prejudiced by a 
discovery violation to object to the testimony or evidence that was not previously 
disclosed.  In this case, the Bar never objected to Lobasz’s testimony regarding his 
mental health.  The majority actually acknowledges the waiver by the Bar.  See 
majority op. at 6.  Thus, although discovery in a bar discipline case is governed by 
the rules of civil procedure, because the Bar did not object to Lobasz’s testimony 
as to his state of mental health, we do not know if there were other informal 
methods employed by the parties to exchange information. 
Further, although the majority criticizes Lobasz’s failure to update his 
interrogatories to identify mitigation he planned to introduce at the hearing, Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.340 does not contain a provision that automatically 
mandates supplementation of answers to interrogatories.  Rather, Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.280(e) states that a party who has properly responded to 
discovery ―is under no duty to supplement the response to include information 
thereafter acquired.‖  In this case, there was no determination made as to whether 
the answer ―not yet determined‖ was inaccurate when the answers were provided 
 
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on December 4, 2008, and the hearing on sanctions did not take place until April 
30, 2009.   
 
  More disturbing to me in this case is the fact that the Bar represented to this 
Court at oral argument, in response to numerous questions, that it had ―repeatedly 
and vociferously‖ objected to Lobasz’s testimony about mental health issues, 
despite the fact that the record clearly demonstrates to the contrary—that there was 
no such objection.3  After counsel for the Bar explicitly answered questions from 
Justice Quince and from me by stating that the Bar had repeatedly objected, Chief 
Justice Canady revisited the issue as follows: 
[Chief Justice Canady:]  Let me make sure I understand here, you’re 
saying when Mr. Lobasz testified concerning his mental health issues, 
the Bar objected? 
[Bar response:]  Repeatedly. 
[Chief Justice Canady:]  To his testimony? 
[Bar Response:]  Yes, Sir. 
Shortly after this exchange, the following occurred: 
[Chief Justice Canady:]  Let me go back to objections on the mental 
health testimony. 
                                          
 
 
3.  During the hearing, the Bar did object to the admissibility of two 
documents: (1) a list of clients that Lobasz represented at the time of his 
suspension; and (2) a letter/e-mail from his current mental health provider 
regarding the history and treatment that Lobasz was receiving for mental health 
issues.  Although Bar counsel objected to the admissibility of these documents, 
counsel for the Bar never once during the hearing objected to Lobasz’s testimony 
concerning his mental health issues.    
 
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 [Bar Response:]  Certainly. 
[Chief Justice Canady:]  Did he give any testimony related to his 
mental health to which you did not object?  Specifically, when he 
gave testimony concerning his posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety 
and depression, were, was—did the Bar make objection to testimony 
on those subjects from Mr. Lobasz? 
 [Bar Response:]  Yes, Justice Canady.  The Bar objected repeatedly 
and vociferously.  It was something of a skirmish because there was a 
point where the referee actually teased out evidence . . . . 
After oral argument, the Bar never corrected its repeated misstatements.  Bar 
counsel’s inaccurate representations concerning the record are exceedingly 
troubling.  All sides in bar proceedings must conduct themselves according to the 
applicable rules, without misleading the opposing party or this Court. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lorraine Christine Hoffman, 
Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
D. Culver Smith, III of Fox Rothschild, LLP, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent