Case Title: Ronnie Johnson v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-362

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-362 
____________ 
 
RONNIE JOHNSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1752 
____________ 
 
RONNIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[March 31, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Ronnie Johnson appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions 
 
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the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  We affirm the circuit court's order denying 
Johnson's rule 3.850 motion, and we deny Johnson's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Johnson was convicted of the March 20, 1989, first-degree murder of Lee 
Arthur Lawrence.  The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to 
five.  The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Johnson to 
death.  His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.  
The relevant facts in this case are contained in this Court’s opinion on direct 
appeal.  See Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1997) (Johnson I). 
 
In a separate trial conducted prior to the Lawrence trial, Johnson was 
convicted of the March 11, 1989, first-degree murder of Tequila Larkins.  See 
Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1997) (Johnson II).  The jury recommended 
the death penalty by a vote of nine to three, and Johnson was sentenced to death by 
the trial court.  Johnson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on 
direct appeal. 
Johnson filed a motion for postconviction relief regarding the Lawrence case 
on March 1, 2001, an amended motion on March 20, 2001, and a second amended 
motion on January 18, 2002.  In the second amended motion Johnson asserted 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
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eight ineffective assistance of counsel claims and eight other claims.2  After a 
                                          
 
 
2.  Johnson asserted the following claims: (1) his counsel was ineffective in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment and deprivation of his right to due process and 
equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for the following 
eight claims: (A) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, right to due process and 
equal protection were violated when his court-appointed counsel improperly 
delegated representation to an unqualified attorney; (B) for effectively waiving 
voir dire on death qualification; (C) for failure to have requested individual voir 
dire on pretrial publicity or failing to move to strike the panel when jurors made 
prejudicial remarks; (D) for ineffectiveness during penalty phase and sentencing; 
(E) for conducting an inadequate investigation into the facts and circumstances 
surrounding his detention by police that led to his taped confession; (F) when no 
effort was made to impeach the credibility of Tremaine Tift; (G) for failing to 
object to the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) on the 
grounds of unconstitutional vagueness, and that Johnson was denied due process 
and equal protection when the jury was given insufficient guidance to determine 
whether to apply the aggravator; (H) because Johnson was deprived of his personal 
right to testify; (2) Johnson’s confession was obtained in violation of the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (3) the State 
suppressed immunity granted to Tremaine Tift for being an accessory after the fact 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution; (4) that the State suppressed the identities of 
witnesses who could have testified to the circumstances under which Johnson was 
taken into custody; (5) Johnson is being denied his rights to due process and equal 
protection because access to the files and records pertaining to his case in the 
possession of certain state agencies has been withheld in violation of chapter 119, 
Florida Statutes, and he cannot prepare an adequate motion to vacate, set aside, or 
correct illegal sentence until he has received those materials and been afforded due 
time to review them; (6) that the sentencing jury was misled by comments, 
questions, and instructions that unconstitutionally and inaccurately diluted the 
jury’s sense of responsibility towards sentencing in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and trial counsel was 
ineffective for not properly objecting; (7) that the death sentence in this case was 
unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution as a matter of law in light of the fact that Johnson was 
not the triggerman and the triggerman received a reduced sentence; (8) Johnson 
was prejudiced by the court’s instructions concerning nonstatutory aggravating 
 
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Huff3 hearing the circuit court ordered an evidentiary hearing on only one claim: 
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Johnson’s mental health.  
This issue was common to Johnson’s 3.850 motion in the Lawrence and Larkins 
murder cases.  The court held a single evidentiary hearing for both cases on 
October 4, 2002.  Johnson presented the testimony of Dr. Merry Haber, a clinical 
and forensic psychologist, his mother, and himself.  The State presented the 
testimony of Raymond Badini, Johnson’s trial counsel in both of his murder cases.4 
The Lower Court’s Order 
Written closing arguments were submitted after the evidentiary hearing.  On 
January 17, 2003, the lower court issued its order denying Johnson’s motion for 
postconviction relief.  The court found that all of the claims it had summarily 
denied were facially insufficient, refuted by the record, or procedurally barred.5  As 
                                                                                                                                        
circumstances; and (9) that Florida’s death penalty procedure violated Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
4.  For a description of the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, see Johnson 
v. State, Nos. SC03-382 & SC03-1680 (Fla. Mar. 31, 2005). 
 
 
5.  Because the circumstances of Johnson’s detention, questioning, and 
confession are common to the Lawrence and Larkins murders, some of the 
proceedings in Johnson I and Johnson II were combined.  A single hearing was 
held to determine the admissibility of the defendant’s confession in Johnson I and 
in Johnson II.  On direct appeal of the Lawrence murder conviction, this Court 
adopted by reference the reasoning and analysis in the case involving the murder of 
Ms. Larkins related to the trial court’s refusal to suppress Johnson’s confession.  
 
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for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, the court 
found that Johnson was evaluated at the time of trial for mental mitigation and that 
Johnson failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the failure to present at the 
penalty phase the results of a psychological evaluation.  Johnson now appeals the 
                                                                                                                                        
Furthermore, one Huff hearing was conducted related to the rule 3.850 motions for 
both cases.  The trial court’s order following the Huff hearing granted a combined 
evidentiary hearing for both cases on the single issue that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to present statutory mental health mitigating evidence during the penalty 
phase and summarily denied all of Johnson’s other claims.  The court’s orders 
denying postconviction relief in both murders were filed on the same day.  In 
Johnson I, the trial court seems to have made a clerical error by writing its order 
addressing Johnson’s claims as raised in his amended 3.850 motion, rather than as 
raised in his second amended 3.850 motion.  Consequently, the court did not 
provide reasons for denying the following five issues (as numbered in Johnson’s 
brief on appeal to this Court) in its order:   (i) issue 5, whether the circuit court 
erred in not granting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of trial counsel’s 
constitutionally inadequate investigation into the facts and circumstances 
surrounding his detention by the police that led to his taped confession; (ii) issue 6, 
whether the lower court properly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress; (iii) issue 7, 
whether the lower court erred in summarily denying the claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to impeach Tremaine Tift; (iv) issue 9, whether the lower 
court erred in summarily denying the claim that the State suppressed the identities 
of witnesses; and (v) issue 13, whether Florida’s death penalty statute violates Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi.   
These five issues were raised in the 3.850 motion for both cases.  The trial 
court provided detailed reasons for denying these five identical claims in its order 
denying relief in the 3.850 motion in Johnson II.  Johnson raised all five of these 
issues in his 3.850 appeal to this Court without arguing that he is entitled to relief 
for the trial court’s clerical error.  Based on the Huff hearing and the order 
prepared in Johnson II, it is clear that the trial court made findings of fact and 
determinations of law on these five issues and that Johnson was not prejudiced by 
the trial court’s clerical error.  In addressing these five issues, we accept the 
detailed reasoning of the trial court on the identical issues in Johnson II as the trial 
court’s reasoning for the same issues in Johnson I. 
 
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circuit court's denial of relief.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
I.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO 
INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT MITIGATION EVIDENCE 
 
Johnson argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present mitigation evidence.  Specifically, Johnson argues that counsel (1) failed to 
conduct a reasonable investigation into mitigating evidence by failing to obtain a 
psychiatric evaluation of Johnson; and (2) failed to present mitigating evidence 
during the penalty phase.  In a lengthy analysis of Johnson’s claim, the circuit 
court found that (1) Badini did have an evaluation performed by a competent 
doctor and cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to have Johnson evaluated; (2) 
Badini was not ineffective for failing to discover Johnson’s sexual orientation, 
especially since there is no correlation between homosexuality and committing 
murder; (3) Badini presented mitigation evidence; and (4) Johnson failed to show 
that the presentation of further evidence would have resulted in a life sentence.   
A.  Applicable Law 
As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 29 Fla. L. Weekly S719 (Fla. 
Nov. 24, 2004): 
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in  
Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], this Court held that 
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two 
requirements must be satisfied:  
 
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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be 
considered meritorious, must include two general 
components. First, the claimant must identify particular 
acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be 
outside the broad range of reasonably competent 
performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must 
further be demonstrated to have so affected the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is 
undermined.  
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law and fact 
and, therefore, are subject to plenary review based upon the Strickland 
test.  See id.; see also Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 
1999).  Under this standard, this Court conducts an independent 
review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to 
the trial court's factual findings.  See id. 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance 
was effective.  Strickland provides: "Because of the difficulties 
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance," 466 U.S. at 689, and further: 
"[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment."  Id. at 690.  The defendant alone carries the 
burden to overcome the presumption of effective assistance: "[T]he 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy.' "  Id. at 689.  The United States Supreme Court explained:  
[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must 
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct 
on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time 
of counsel's conduct.  A convicted defendant making a 
claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or 
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the 
result of reasonable professional judgment.  The court 
must then determine whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were 
 
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outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  
Id. at 690; see also Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 984 (Fla. 2000) 
("[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's 
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional 
standards and was not a matter of sound trial strategy.").  Finally, 
"[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential."  466 U.S. at 689. 
Duncan, 29 Fla. L. Weekly at S720. 
 
As previously stated, a single evidentiary hearing was held on this identical 
issue for both of the murder cases involving Johnson.  We have analyzed 
Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and 
present mitigation evidence in Johnson v. State, Nos. SC03-382 & SC03-1680 
(Fla. Mar. 31, 2005).  We adopt by reference the reasoning and analysis therein 
and, accordingly, find no error in the trial court’s denial of relief on this issue. 
 
II.  IMPROPER SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
 
Johnson argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying Johnson’s 
claim that court-appointed counsel improperly delegated6 his case to an unqualified 
attorney.  The circuit court appointed Arthur Huttoe to represent Johnson in both 
murder cases.  Over the course of the proceedings in both cases, Johnson was 
                                          
 
 
6.  Effective May 24, 1997, section 925.036(3), Florida Statutes (2004), 
prohibits “[a]n attorney appointed in lieu of the public defender to represent an 
indigent defendant [from] reassign[ing] or subcontract[ing] the case to another 
attorney.” 
 
 
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represented by Badini and Carr.7  Johnson argues that he did not consent to 
representation by Badini and Carr, and he contends that absent his consent to 
Badini and Carr’s representation, his rights were violated.  We have analyzed 
Johnson’s identical claim in Johnson v. State, No. SC03-382 & SC03-1680 (Fla. 
Mar. 31, 2005).  We adopt by reference the reasoning and analysis therein and, 
accordingly, find no error in the trial court’s summary denial of this claim. 
 
III.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
DURING VOIR DIRE 
 
Johnson alleges that the lower court erred in summarily denying his claim 
that counsel was ineffective during voir dire for failing to properly question the 
panel on death qualification.  He argues that counsel failed to question the panel as 
to the effect mitigating circumstances might have on their willingness to apply the 
death penalty.  He further argues that his counsel’s failure to have conducted any 
meaningful voir dire on death qualification constituted a waiver of Johnson’s right 
to due process and constituted a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
 
We begin by noting the importance of adequate voir dire on death 
qualification.  Voir dire is an essential part of any first-degree murder trial in which 
the death penalty is sought.  With that said, it is apparent from the record in this 
                                          
 
 
7.  No motion to substitute counsel or order granting such a motion is 
included in the record.  It appears from the record that although Johnson was 
represented throughout his case by Badini and Carr, Huttoe remained counsel of 
record for the duration of the proceedings. 
 
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case that both the court and the State questioned the venire members in detail about 
their views both for and against the death penalty.  The State and the court 
explained both aggravating and mitigating factors and the weighing process during 
the jury selection process. 
Both the trial court and the State questioned the prospective jurors about 
their views on the death penalty.  The State repeatedly stated during voir dire that 
if the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors a sentence of life had 
to be imposed.  Additionally, the State repeatedly asked the jurors whether they 
could recommend life imprisonment if they were reasonably convinced that the 
mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.  The circuit court noted in 
its order denying postconviction relief that Johnson failed to state what additional 
questions counsel should have asked during voir dire. 
In Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1999), the defendant alleged 
that counsel did not adequately question the prospective jurors about their pretrial 
knowledge of the case.  In denying Teffeteller’s claim, the Court noted that the 
voir dire record indicated that the judge questioned the prospective jurors about 
pretrial publicity and their knowledge of the case.  Those who expressed even the 
slightest knowledge of the case were further questioned to determine whether they 
could disregard this information and render an impartial verdict based solely on the 
 
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evidence at the resentencing proceeding.  The prosecutor also questioned the 
prospective jurors about their exposure to news reporting.  The Court held:  
In light of this questioning of the prospective jurors, we cannot fault 
trial counsel for failing to repeat the questioning.  Thus, Teffeteller 
has failed to prove deficient performance in this regard.  Moreover, in 
light of the procedure followed by the court, even if counsel was 
remiss in not asking additional questions during voir dire, it resulted 
in no prejudice to Teffeteller and no relief is warranted on this basis. 
Id. at 1020-21.  The same is true in this case.  The trial court and State thoroughly 
questioned the prospective jurors about their views of the death penalty. 
Johnson seems to argue that Badini could have asked different questions and 
have used his peremptory challenges8 in a different manner to obtain a more 
defense-friendly jury.  Such speculation fails to rise to the level of ineffective 
assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Reaves v. 
State, 826 So. 2d 932, 939 (Fla. 2002) (holding that an allegation that there would 
have been a basis for a for-cause challenge if counsel had "followed up" during 
voir dire with more specific questions was mere conjecture).  Essentially, as in 
Teffeteller, even if we were to assume counsel’s performance was deficient, given 
the thorough questioning by the State and the court, Johnson has failed to show any 
prejudice.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in summarily denying the claim. 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
8.  Badini used eight of his peremptory challenges in this case. 
 
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IV.  FAILURE TO REQUEST INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE  
ON PRETRIAL PUBLICITY 
 
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request individual voir dire on pretrial 
publicity and for failure to move to strike the panel when jurors made prejudicial 
remarks.  He alleges that statements were made that demonstrated bias and 
prejudgment based upon media coverage which tainted the entire panel.  Johnson 
argues that Badini’s failure to request individual voir dire or to move to strike the 
entire panel was ineffective assistance and he was prejudiced. 
The circuit court held that Johnson failed to demonstrate how the exposure 
to other venire members’ opinions affected the outcome of the case.  The court 
asked all the venire members if they had heard anything about the case in the 
media.  Of the individuals who indicated that they heard about the case, three 
venire members expressed opinions concerning how they felt about what they 
heard.  Those venire members who stated an opinion or who expressed a doubt 
about being fair-minded were subsequently stricken for cause.  The remaining 
venire members who stated, without more, that they had heard about the case in the 
media stated that they could be fair-minded.  
 
The purpose of voir dire is to secure an impartial jury.  Teffeteller v. Dugger, 
734 So. 2d 1009, 1028 (Fla. 1999).  “Additionally, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that individual voir dire to determine juror impartiality in the face 
 
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of pretrial publicity is constitutionally compelled only if the trial court's failure to 
ask these questions renders the trial fundamentally unfair.”  Id. at 1028-29 (citing 
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991)).  The selection process that the Johnson 
I trial court used, asking the venire members about their knowledge of the case and 
their ability to set aside that knowledge, was sufficient to ensure that the trial was 
not fundamentally unfair.  See State v. Knight, 866 So. 2d 1195, 1210 (Fla. 2003) 
(where voir dire method used did not expose venire to other venire members’ 
knowledge of the case, refusal to conduct individual voir dire was not error).  In 
order for the statement of one venire member to taint the panel, the venire member 
must mention facts that would not otherwise be presented to the jury.  Pender v. 
State, 530 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Wilding v. State, 427 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1983).  No venire member in Johnson’s case mentioned a fact that would 
not otherwise be presented to the jury.  A venire member’s expression of an 
opinion before the entire panel is not normally considered sufficient to taint the 
remainder of the panel.  Brower v. State, 727 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1999). 
 
Thus, the fact that the comments were made does not show that Johnson was 
prejudiced by the failure of counsel to request individual voir dire.  Nor would a 
motion to strike the venire have been meritorious.  The trial court did not err in 
summarily denying the claim. 
 
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V.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REGARDING  
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Johnson argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
investigate Johnson’s alleged illegal arrest and for failing to cross-examine 
Detective Borrego to show how deception was used to obtain Johnson’s 
confession.  Specifically, Johnson alleges that if counsel had interviewed Terrace 
Isom, David Faison, and Anita Miller,9 counsel would have determined that 
Johnson did not voluntarily accompany Officer Hull to the police station. 
The trial court summarily denied the claim on the basis that Officer Hull had 
probable cause to arrest Johnson.  Therefore, whether Johnson voluntarily went 
with Officer Hull was not an issue that would have affected the outcome of the 
trial.  Detective Borrego testified at the suppression hearing that prior to the time 
Johnson was approached by Officer Hull, Eric Bettle10 had made a positive 
identification of Johnson as the person who killed Larkins.  Thus, at the time 
Johnson accompanied Officer Hull to the police station, he had already been 
                                          
 
 
9.  This witness is inconsistently referred to as Anita Brown and Anita 
Miller in the record.  For purposes of this appeal, the witness will be referred to as 
Anita Miller. 
 
 
10.  In Johnson I, Officer Hull seems to have mistakenly referred to Eric 
Bettle as the witness who identified Johnson as the person who killed Tequila 
Larkins, instead of Mr. Briggs.  Both Bettle and Briggs were present at the 
laundromat where Tequila Larkins was murdered.  The record in Johnson II (the 
Larkins murder) shows that Jeffrey Briggs identified Johnson in a photo lineup at 
10:40 a.m. on April 1, 1989.  Johnson accompanied Officer Hull to the police 
station sometime after 6 p.m. on April 1, 1989. 
 
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identified in a photo lineup and probable cause to arrest Johnson existed.  See State 
v. Gavin, 594 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).  The photo lineup was apparently 
conducted by Detective Borrego.  Officer Hull picked up Johnson at the request of 
Detective Borrego.  Under the fellow officer rule, probable cause is imputed to 
Officer Hull.  See Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (Fla. 1983).  Even if 
Johnson did not voluntarily accompany the officers to the police station, the claim 
is without merit because probable cause to arrest Johnson existed. 
Johnson also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine 
Detective Borrego to show how deception was used to obtain Johnson’s 
confession.  Johnson alleges that he was deceived when he was told during his 
questioning that Rodney Newsome11 was in the police station providing 
information.  Johnson alleges that Newsome did not make a statement until after 
Johnson himself made a statement.  Even if Johnson’s allegations are taken as true, 
this Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that police officers are 
permitted to deceive suspects regarding the evidence they have against them.  See 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding that falsely informing a 
defendant that a codefendant had confessed did not result in the defendant’s 
confession being involuntary); Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988, 994 (Fla. 1997); 
                                          
 
 
11.  Rodney Newsome, one of four suspects charged in the crime, was 
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. 
 
 
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Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361, 363 n.1 (Fla. 1965).  This claim is legally 
insufficient and summary denial was proper. 
 
VI.  DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
 
Johnson alleges that the police coerced him into waiving his Miranda12 
rights by administering an oath.  The circuit court held that Johnson’s allegations 
were vague and insufficient to state a claim.  In addition, the court noted that this 
claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal.    
Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991).  We agree.  Issues regarding 
whether a confession should have been suppressed as involuntary are issues that 
could have been raised on direct appeal.  See Christopher v. State, 489 So. 2d 22, 
24 (Fla. 1986).  This claim is procedurally barred. 
 
VII.  FAILURE TO IMPEACH TREMAINE TIFT 
 
Johnson alleges that counsel was ineffective for not cross-examining Tift as 
to why he was not prosecuted as an accessory after the fact to the murder of 
Lawrence.  Johnson alleges that Tift rented a hotel room for Johnson and his 
codefendants to hide out in after the murder.  He asserts that Tift should have been 
charged as an accessory after the fact for this reason.  The State points out that the 
mere fact that Tift rented a hotel room for Johnson is not sufficient to have exposed 
                                          
 
 
12.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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Tift to liability as an accessory after the fact.  Johnson’s allegations were 
insufficient to show that Tift could have been impeached with the State’s failure to 
prosecute him as an accessory after the fact.  Furthermore, the record does not 
support the allegation that Tift was an accessory after the fact.  Tift testified that he 
was not aware of the murder until two to three weeks after the murder.  Johnson’s 
allegations are insufficient to show that Tift could have been impeached with the 
State’s failure to prosecute him as an accessory after the fact.   
 
Additionally, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial 
would have been different had counsel attempted to impeach Tift.  The circuit 
court did not err in summarily denying this claim. 
 
VIII. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PENALTY PHASE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Johnson argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the CCP 
jury instruction which was found by this Court to be unconstitutionally vague in 
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994).  This claim was specifically addressed 
in Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 445 (Fla. 2003).  In disposing of Walton’s 
claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to anticipate Jackson and the 
underlying United States Supreme Court decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 
1079 (1992), the Court stated: 
Because the Espinosa decision was delivered by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1992, and refinement of Florida's jury instructions 
 
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by this Court began thereafter, trial and appellate counsel cannot be 
faulted for failing to assert claims that did not exist at the time they 
represented Walton.  This Court has consistently held that trial and 
appellate counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate 
changes in the law.  See, e.g., Nelms v. State, 596 So. 2d 441, 442 
(Fla. 1992); Stevens v. State, 552 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1989). 
Walton, 847 So. 2d at 445.  This Court has never held the giving of the standard 
CCP jury instruction to be fundamental error.  See Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 90 
(holding that claims that the instruction on the CCP aggravator is 
unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless a specific objection is 
made at trial and pursued on appeal.)  The circuit court did not err in summarily 
denying the claim. 
IX. BRADY13 CLAIM 
Johnson argues that the State suppressed the identities of witnesses, Anita 
Miller, Terrace Isom, and David Faison, who could have testified to the 
circumstances under which defendant was taken into custody.  The facts 
underlying this claim are common to the identical claim in Johnson II.  We have 
analyzed Johnson’s Brady claim in Johnson v. State, Nos. SC03-382 & SC03-1680 
(Fla. Mar. 31, 2005).  We adopt by reference the reasoning and analysis therein 
and, accordingly, find no error in the trial court’s summary denial of this claim. 
                                          
 
 
13.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
 
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X. PENALTY PHASE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Johnson argues that the penalty phase jury instructions given in his case 
violated the requirements of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), and 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions.  Because no 
objection was raised at trial, the claim is procedurally barred.  Griffin v. State, 866 
So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 2003).  Even if it was not procedurally barred, the claim is 
without merit and Johnson is not entitled to relief.  Counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue.  Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So. 2d 
138, 143 (Fla. 1998).  The circuit court did not err in summarily denying this 
claim. 
 
XI. PROPORTIONALITY OF DEFENDANT’S DEATH SENTENCE 
 
Johnson argues that his death sentence is disproportionate in comparison to 
the life sentence received by codefendant Ingraham, who was also a triggerman 
and first shot and hit Lawrence.  This issue was raised and rejected by this Court 
on direct appeal.  Johnson I, 696 So. 2d at 325-26.  Issues raised and rejected on 
direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.  Windom v. State, 886 
So. 2d 915, 930 (Fla. 2004).  The trial court did not err in holding this issue to be 
procedurally barred. 
 
 
 
 
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XII.  THE NONSTATUTORY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE JURY 
INSTRUCTION 
 
Johnson argues that the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance jury 
instruction in his case was erroneous and that Badini’s failure to object to the 
instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Counsel did not object to the nonstatutory mitigation jury instruction at trial. 
Therefore, Johnson’s challenge as to the jury instruction is procedurally barred.  
Turning to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court has repeatedly 
affirmed the giving of the same catch-all nonstatutory mitigation jury instruction 
that was given in Johnson’s case.  Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678, 684-85 (Fla. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1054 (2003); Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 913 
(Fla. 2001) (holding that the “catch-all” standard jury instruction on nonstatutory 
mitigation when coupled with counsel’s right to argue mitigation is sufficient to 
advise the jury on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances).  Counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue.  Kokal, 718 So. 2d at 
143.  The circuit court did not err in summarily denying this claim. 
 
XIII.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLORIDA’S  
DEATH PENALTY 
 
Johnson argues that Florida’s death penalty scheme violates Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court has repeatedly rejected similar claims.  
See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 
 
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143 (Fla. 2002).  Furthermore, one of the aggravating circumstances found by the 
trial court in this case was Johnson’s prior conviction of a violent felony,14 "a 
factor which under Apprendi15 and Ring need not be found by the jury."  Jones v. 
State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); see also Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 
963 (Fla.) (rejecting Ring claim where one of the aggravating circumstances found 
by the trial judge was defendant's prior conviction for a violent felony), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003).  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in 
summarily denying this claim. 
 
XIV. PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Johnson asserts a number of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel in his petition for habeas corpus.  In considering the petition for habeas 
relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we must 
determine:  
 [W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
                                          
 
 
14.  Johnson was convicted of the attempted first-degree murder of Marshall 
King on August 8, 1991. 
 
 
15.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 
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Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman v. State, 
761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 
2000).  Moreover, "[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious 
omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can 
be based."  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 
1001 (Fla. 1981). 
Johnson alleges the following five claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel: (1) failure to allege error concerning substitution of counsel; (2) 
failure to allege error concerning the denial of the motion to suppress; (3) failure to 
claim that the CCP jury instructions were erroneous; (4) failure to claim error 
under Caldwell; and (5) failure to argue that the nonstatutory mitigation instruction 
was erroneous.  Johnson makes the identical claims in Johnson II.  We have 
analyzed these five claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in Johnson 
v. State, Nos. SC03-382 & SC03-1680 (Fla. Mar. 31, 2005).  We adopt by 
reference the reasoning and analysis therein and, accordingly, deny these claims. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the lower court's denial of Johnson's 
rule 3.850 motion and deny Johnson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurs with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring. 
While I continue to disagree with this Court’s analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Ring v. Arizona, I recognize that a majority of the Court has 
rejected the application of Ring to collateral claims. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Ronald C. Dresnick, Judge - Case No. F89-12383B 
and an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Charles G. White, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent