Case Title: State ex rel. Crossman Communities of Ohio, Inc. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Election

Citation: 1999-Ohio-308

Docket Number: 19991605

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Crossman Communities of Ohio, Inc. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections, 87 
Ohio St.3d 132, 1999-Ohio-308.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CROSSMAN COMMUNITIES OF OHIO, INC. ET AL. V. GREENE 
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Crossman Communities of Ohio, Inc. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 132.] 
Elections — Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit Greene County Board of 
Elections from conducting the November 2 election on the referendum 
issue dealing with the Indian Ridge development plan — Writ denied, 
when. 
(No. 99-1605 – Submitted September 29, 1999 – Decided October 5, 1999.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
Herbruck Farm consists of approximately 80.5 acres of land located in the 
city of Fairborn, Greene County, Ohio.  Relators Bank One Trust Company, N.A., 
and Robert A. Herbruck are cotrustees of an undivided half-interest in 
approximately 78.5 acres of Herbruck Farm, and Robert A. Herbruck is the sole 
trustee of the other half-interest in those 78.5 acres. Faircreek Church, Inc. 
(“Faircreek”) owns the remaining two acres of Herbruck Farm. 
 
Before 1999, relator Crossman Communities of Ohio, Inc. (“Crossman”) 
contracted to purchase Herbruck Farm from the trustees and Faircreek in order to 
develop a community of single-family residential homes to be known as Indian 
 
 
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Ridge.  At the time that Crossman contracted to purchase Herbruck Farm, the 
property was zoned AG, Agricultural District, under the Fairborn Zoning Code.  
Crossman applied to rezone the property to PD-1, Planned Residential District. 
 
Following extensive public hearings conducted by the Fairborn Planning 
Board and the Fairborn City Council, the city council enacted Resolution No. 3-99 
on February 1, 1999.  Resolution No. 3-99 approved Crossman’s amended concept 
plan for Indian Ridge and rezoned Herbruck Farm from AG, Agricultural District, 
to PD-1, Planned Residential Development District, subject to over thirty specified 
conditions.  Resolution No. 3-99 became effective on March 3, 1999. 
 
On April 19, 1999, the city council enacted Resolution No. 39-99, which 
approved Crossman’s preliminary development plan for Indian Ridge subject to six 
specified conditions.  On June 7, 1999, the city council enacted Resolution No. 59-
99, which approved Crossman’s final development plan for Indian Ridge subject to 
six conditions. 
 
On June 17, intervening respondents Teresa F. Little and Ruth Ann Eppley 
filed an unsigned referendum petition with the office of the Fairborn  
Clerk/Finance Director.  The referendum petition contained the following pertinent 
language: 
 
“The following is a full and correct copy of the title and number of the 
Ordinance: 
 
 
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“Ordinance No. 59-99 
 
“CITY OF FAIRBORN, OHIO 
 
“SPONSORED BY COUNCIL MEMBER TERWOORD ON THE 7TH OF 
JUNE 1999. 
 
“TITLE: 
APPROVING 
THE 
FINAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
PLAN 
DESIGNATED AND KNOWN AS INDIAN RIDGE SECTION 1 
 
“(SEE ATTACHED RESOLUTION) 
 
“THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION NO. 59-99 IS ALSO 
MARKED ON THE ATTACHED MAP 
 
“THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS:  SHALL AMENDED RESOLUTION NO. 
59-99 ATTACHED, APPROVING THE FINAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF 
RON ROOZE OF CROSSMAN COMMUNITIES, THE DEVELOPER,  
DESIGNATED AND KNOWN AS INDIAN RIDGE, SECTION 1 BE 
APPROVED?” 
 
Attached to the referendum petition was a full and correct copy of 
Resolution No. 59-99.  The copy contained the Fairborn Clerk/Finance Director’s 
signature, which was located under “ATTEST:”.  The copy, however, did not 
contain the notation that the copy was “CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF 
THE ORIGINAL ON FILE IN MY OFFICE,” which other copies of original 
records in the custody of the Clerk/Finance Director contained. 
 
 
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On July 6, the signed referendum petition was filed with the Clerk/Finance 
Director, and on July 28, respondent Greene County Board of Elections (“board”) 
certified to the Clerk/Finance Director that the petition contained a sufficient 
number of valid signatures to be placed on the ballot.  After relators, Crossman and 
the trustees, advised the Clerk/Finance Director that they disputed the validity of 
the referendum petition, the Clerk/Finance Director certified the petition to the 
board for its review, stating: 
 
“The referendum petition seeks to place on the November 1999 ballot the 
approval of the Final Development Plan for Section 1 of the Indian Ridge 
development.  While the City has always considered such approvals to be 
administrative rather than legislative actions and as such not subject to referendum, 
I feel that it is beyond my purview to make that determination in relation to this 
referendum petition.” 
 
In early August, relators, Crossman and the trustees, filed written protests to 
the referendum petition with the board.  Relators claimed in their protests that the 
petition was defective because  Resolution No. 59-99 was not subject to 
referendum, since it constituted administrative rather than legislative action and the 
petitioners had failed to submit a certified copy of the resolution, as required by 
R.C. 731.32. 
 
 
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On August 11, intervening respondents, referendum petitioners, and owners 
of property neighboring Indian Ridge who are opposed to the planned development 
filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Greene County for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the board, Fairborn, and certain Fairborn officials to submit 
Resolution No. 59-99 to the Fairborn electors at the November 2 general election.  
The court of appeals issued an alternative writ ordering the board to perform its 
duties under R.C. 731.29 with respect to the referendum petition or to show cause 
why it should be relieved of such duties.  Relators subsequently moved to 
intervene as respondents in the mandamus action. 
 
On August 24, the board held a quasi-judicial hearing on relators’ protests.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board denied the protests and decided to place 
the petition issue on the November 2 election ballot.  Relators then withdrew their 
motions to intervene in the mandamus action.  At an August 26 status conference 
in the mandamus action, the parties’ counsel indicated that they would enter a joint 
stipulation of dismissal of the case. 
 
On August 27, relators, Crossman and the trustees, filed this action for a writ 
of prohibition to prevent respondent board from conducting the November 2 
election on the referendum issue.  Relators subsequently filed an amended 
complaint, and intervening respondents filed a motion to intervene and an answer.  
On September 3, respondent board filed an answer to relators’ amended complaint.  
 
 
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On September 7, the date that relators’ evidence and brief were due under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), relators and respondent board stipulated to an extension to 
September 13 for relators to file their evidence and brief.  Relators had been 
informed by the Clerk’s Office of this court that their limited stipulated extension 
was permissible under our Rules of Practice.  We subsequently granted intervening 
respondents’ motion to intervene, and they filed a motion to dismiss the case for 
want of prosecution pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) and (11).  The parties also filed 
evidence and briefs. 
 
This cause is now before the court for its determination under S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9). 
____________________ 
 
O’Diam, McNamee & Hill Co., L.P.A., Michael P. McNamee and David M. 
McNamee, for relator Crossman Communities of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Roger E. Bloomfield, for relators Bank One Trust Company, N.A. and 
Robert A. Herbruck, Cotrustees, and Robert A. Herbruck, Trustee. 
 
William F. Schenk, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, Stephen K. Haller 
and Suzanne M. Schmidt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent Greene 
County Board of Elections. 
 
Dwight D. Brannon & Associates, Dwight D. Brannon and Kevin A. 
Bowman, for intervening respondents. 
 
 
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____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We initially reject intervening respondents’ contention that 
this expedited election case should be dismissed for want of prosecution because 
relators did not file their evidence and brief within the time specified by 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Relators entered into a limited stipulated extension with 
respondent board pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(3)(B)(2)(a) and X(8), which 
extended their time to September 13 to file their evidence and brief.  After 
construing S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) in pari materia with these provisions and 
emphasizing that relators confirmed their interpretation of the rule with the Clerk’s 
Office, that the only opposing party at the time — the board — agreed to the 
stipulation, and that the stipulation was limited to an extremely brief period of 
time, dismissal pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) and (11) is not warranted.  The 
intervening respondents’ assent to the extension was not required because they 
were not parties at the time the stipulation was entered into. 
 
We also reject intervening respondents’ additional preliminary argument that 
dismissal is appropriate because relators failed to list the addresses of all of the 
parties in their amended complaint, as intervening respondents claim is required 
under Civ.R. 10(A).  As relators note, S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(A) requires that only the 
name, title, and address of the respondent are necessary in an original action 
complaint filed in this court.  Relators’ complaint complied with S.Ct.Prac.R. 
 
 
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X(4)(A).  The spirit of our Rules of Practice, much like the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, favors the resolution of cases upon their merits rather than upon 
claimed pleading deficiencies.  See, generally, Cecil v. Cottrill (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 367, 372, 618 N.E.2d 133, 137. 
 
Having thus rejected intervening respondents’ arguments claiming pleading 
deficiencies, we now address the merits of relators’ claimed entitlement to a writ of 
prohibition. 
 
In order to be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, relators must 
establish that (1) the board of elections is about to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is not legally authorized, and (3) if 
the writ is denied, they will suffer injury for which no other adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law exists.  State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 
238, 241.  Regarding the first two requirements, in extraordinary actions 
challenging the quasi-judicial decision of a board of elections, the applicable 
standard is whether the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, 
or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.  E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Wood 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 298, 300, 699 N.E.2d 916, 918.  And 
despite respondents’ contentions to the contrary, the board exercised quasi-judicial 
authority in denying relators’ protests to the referendum petition following an 
 
 
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evidentiary hearing, and prohibition may issue to prevent the placement of names 
or issues on a ballot even though a protest hearing has been completed, as long as 
the election has not yet been held.  R.C. 3501.39(A)(2); Cooker Restaurant Corp., 
80 Ohio St.3d at 306, 686 N.E.2d at 242; Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 37, 671 N.E.2d 1, 3; State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 291, 649 N.E.2d 1205, 1207. 
 
Relators contend that the board abused its discretion and acted in clear 
disregard of applicable law by denying their protests and placing the referendum 
issue on the November 2 ballot.  In support of their contention, relators claim that 
Resolution No. 59-99 is an administrative act not subject to referendum, and the 
referendum petition failed to contain an attached certified copy of Resolution No. 
59-99 as required by R.C. 731.32. 
 
Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides initiative and 
referendum powers only on questions that municipalities “may now or hereafter be 
authorized by law to control by legislative action.”  See, also, Section 8.01, Article 
XVIII, Fairborn Charter, which specifies that “[t]he provisions for the Initiative 
and Referendum in municipal corporations, now in force or hereafter enacted, as 
prescribed by the laws of the State of Ohio, shall govern.”  Section 1f, Article II 
excludes administrative actions taken by a municipal legislative authority from 
referendum proceedings.  Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls 
 
 
10
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 697 N.E.2d 181, paragraph three of the syllabus; Myers 
v. Schiering (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 11, 14, 56 O.O.2d 6, 8, 271 N.E.2d 864, 866. 
 
“The test for determining whether the action of a legislative body is 
legislative or administrative is whether the action taken is one enacting a law, 
ordinance or regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or 
regulation already in existence.”  Donnelly v. Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 
1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Consequently, if 
the action creates a law, it is legislative and subject to referendum, but if the action 
executes or administers an existing law, the action is administrative and not 
referendable.  See Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 539, 544, 697 N.E.2d 181, 185. 
 
More specifically, in applying the foregoing test to zoning cases involving 
planned unit development (“PUD”), we have held that “the implementation of a 
PUD, as well as its creation, is a legislative act subject to referendum” because the 
action of approving a plat is the functional equivalent of traditional legislative 
zoning, although the entire PUD area is covered by the same nominal zoning 
classification both before and after the approval of the plat.  (Emphasis added.)  
State ex rel. Zonders v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 5, 11, 
630 N.E.2d 313, 317-318; Peachtree Dev. Co. v. Paul (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 345, 
 
 
11
351, 21 O.O.3d 217, 220, 423 N.E.2d 1087, 1092; Gray v. Trustees of Monclova 
Twp. (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 310, 314, 67 O.O.2d 365, 367, 313 N.E.2d 366, 369. 
 
In accordance with the foregoing precedent, Resolution No. 59-99 
constituted a referendable, legislative act because it implemented the PUD by 
approving the final development plan for Indian Ridge. 
 
Relators next contend that the referendum petitioners violated R.C. 731.32, 
which provides: 
 
“Whoever seeks to propose an ordinance or measure in a municipal 
corporation by initiative petition or files a referendum petition against any 
ordinance or measure shall, before circulating such petition, file a certified copy of 
the proposed ordinance or measure with the city auditor or the village clerk. 
 
“As used in this section, ‘certified copy’ means a copy containing a written 
statement attesting that it is a true and exact reproduction of the original proposed 
ordinance or measure or of the original ordinance or measure.” 
 
Relators claim that the Clerk/Finance Director’s signature beneath the word 
“ATTEST” on the copy of the resolution was insufficient to comply with the R.C. 
731.32 requirement of a “certified copy.”  While we require strict compliance with 
R.C. 731.32, verification and certification are both sufficient.  See State ex rel. 
Shaw v. Lynch (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 174, 175-176, 580 N.E.2d 1068, 1069, 
construing former R.C. 731.32.  “Attest” means “to certify to the verity of a copy 
 
 
12
of a public document formally by signature” and an attested copy of a document is 
“one which has been examined and compared with the original, with a certificate 
or memorandum of its correctness, signed by the persons who have examined it.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 127-128.  Accordingly, the City 
Clerk/Finance Director’s original signature attesting the copy of the resolution 
complied with R.C. 731.32.  Notably, relators attempt to introduce evidence that 
they did not present to the board at the protest hearing to support their argument.  
The board, however, could not have abused its discretion or clearly disregarded 
applicable law based on evidence that was never presented to it.  Relators should 
have presented such evidence to the board, but they failed to do so. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the board neither abused its quasi-judicial discretion 
nor clearly disregarded applicable law by denying relators’ protests to the 
referendum petition.  Therefore, relators are not entitled to the writ of prohibition 
to prevent the referendum election.1  Our holding is consistent with the general 
precepts favoring the right of electors to vote on these important issues.  See 
Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d at 40, 671 N.E.2d at 5, 
quoting State ex rel. King v. Portsmouth (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 27 OBR 73, 
75, 497 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (“ ‘[P]rovisions for municipal initiative or referendum 
should be liberally construed in favor of the power reserved so as to permit rather 
than preclude the exercise of such power, and the object sought to be attained 
 
 
13
should be promoted rather than prevented or obstructed’ ”); State ex rel. Taft v. 
Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 480, 481, 692 N.E.2d 
560, 562 (“[C]ourts should be very reluctant to interfere with elections, except to 
enforce rights or ministerial duties as required by law”).  Accordingly, we deny the 
writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., not participating. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
By so holding, we need not determine whether relators established that they 
lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because even if they did, 
they are not entitled to the writ. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the judgment addressing 
the merits of relators’ prohibition claim and denying the writ.  For the following 
reasons, the court should grant intervening respondents’ motion and dismiss the 
cause. 
 
 
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S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) provides: 
 
“Because of the necessity of a prompt disposition of an original action 
relating to a pending election, and in order to give the Supreme Court adequate 
time for full consideration of the case, if the action is filed within 90 days prior to 
the election, the respondent shall file a response to the complaint within five days 
after service of the summons.  Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, 
relator shall file any evidence and a merit brief in support of the complaint within 
three days following the response, respondent shall file any evidence and a merit 
brief within three days after the filing of relator’s merit brief, and relator may file a 
reply brief within three days after the filing of respondent’s merit brief.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), relators’ evidence and brief were due on 
September 7.  Relators, however, entered into a stipulation with respondent board, 
purportedly pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(3)(B)(2)(a) and X(8), which they 
claimed extended the time to September 13 to file their evidence and brief. 
 
Relators’ attempted stipulated extension did not extend the time to file their 
evidence and merit brief.  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) manifestly required relators to file 
their evidence and brief within three days of the board’s answer “[u]nless 
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.”  We did not order an extension of the 
briefing and evidence schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) in this case. 
 
 
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In addition, the stipulated extension provision of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(3)(B) 
does not apply to expedited election matters, which are governed by S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9).  Even if the language of the pertinent rules were ambiguous on this point, the 
Staff and Committee Notes to the 1996 amendment to the general extension 
provision specify that “[t]he [1996] amendment to S.Ct.Prac.R. X, Section 9, to 
impose directly in the rules a schedule for briefing expedited election cases, 
deliberately sets an abbreviated schedule which should not be extended by a 
general rule.”  (Emphasis added.)  Staff and Committee Notes to 1996 amendment 
to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(3).  Therefore, the general rule of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(3)(B)(2) 
permitting stipulated extensions of up to twenty days for parties to file briefs and 
evidence in Supreme Court cases does not apply to expedited election matters, 
which are governed by their own special provision, S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
 
Further, this result comports with the mandatory duty of extreme diligence 
and promptness in election matters.  State ex rel. The Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 712 N.E.2d 696, 701.  The 
purpose of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) “is to incorporate an expedited schedule for the 
presentation of evidence and briefs in election cases filed in that time period to 
assist the court in resolving such cases promptly.”  State ex rel. SuperAmerica 
Group v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 685 N.E.2d 
507, 511.  This purpose is not furthered by circumventing the manifest language of 
 
 
16
our rules and the intent specified in the associated commentary by permitting 
parties to delay our resolution of election cases up to forty or more days by 
stipulating to extensions.  Here, the two stipulated extensions used by relators and 
the board extended the S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) briefing schedule by ten additional days.  
We have held that a delay for as brief a period as nine days can preclude our 
consideration of the merits of an expedited election case.  See Paschal v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 141, 656 N.E.2d 1276. 
 
Finally, any mistaken advice by the Clerk’s Office and the board’s conduct 
in stipulating to relators’ attempted extension does not estop this court from 
holding that the attempted stipulation was unwarranted and invalid.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 302, 307, 686 N.E.2d 238, 242, citing State ex rel. Chevalier v. Brown 
(1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 61, 63, 17 OBR 64, 66, 477 N.E.2d 623, 625 (“ ‘The 
principle of estoppel does not apply against a state or its agencies in the exercise of 
a governmental function’ ”). 
 
Based on the foregoing, relators did not file their evidence and brief within 
the time required by S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Therefore, this case must be dismissed 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(11) (“Unless all evidence is presented and the relator’s brief 
is filed within the schedule issued by the Supreme Court, an original action shall 
be dismissed for want of prosecution”).  (Emphasis added.)  See, also, 
 
 
17
SuperAmerica, 80 Ohio St.3d at 183, 685 N.E.2d at 508; State ex rel. Vornholt v. 
Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1470, 709 N.E.2d 508.  We should 
apply, rather than ignore, the mandatory language of our own rules.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Cuyahoga Cty. v. State Personnel Bd. of Review (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 496, 
499, 696 N.E.2d 1054, 1057, where we observed that courts lack authority to 
ignore the plain language of provisions under the guise of interpretation or liberal 
or narrow construction.  Because the court does not dismiss this cause pursuant to 
the plain language of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) and (11), and in accordance with the 
manifest intent and policy underlying these rules, I respectfully dissent.