Case Title: McCoy v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: cr96-6

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Corinthian McCOY v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-6                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 24, 1996


1.   Search & seizure -- motion to suppress -- standing to
     challenge a search necessary. -- A proponent of a motion to
     suppress bears the burden of establishing that his Fourth
     Amendment rights have been violated; Fourth Amendment rights
     are personal in nature, the pertinent inquiry regarding
     standing to challenge a search is whether a defendant
     manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area
     searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that
     expectation as reasonable; the constitutionality of a search
     will not be reached where a defendant has failed to show that
     he had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search;
     a defendant has no standing to question the search of a
     vehicle owned by another person, unless he can show that he
     gained possession from the owner or from someone who had
     authority to grant possession. 

2.   Search & seizure -- no proof appellant had legitimate
     expectation of privacy in car -- trial court's ruling
     affirmed. -- Where appellant presented no proof whatsoever
     that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car, 
     appellant's own counsel elicited testimony that there was no
     evidence to indicate that appellant was the actual owner of
     the vehicle or that he lawfully possessed it, appellant had no
     standing to challenge the search of the car; the merits of his
     argument on appeal were not reached on appeal, and the trial
     court's ruling on the motion to suppress allowing the evidence
     found in the search of the vehicle was affirmed.

3.   Criminal procedure -- voluntariness of custodial statement in
     issue -- factors on review. -- When voluntariness of a
     statement is an issue, the court makes an independent
     determination based on the totality of the circumstances
     surrounding the statement; the ruling of the trial court will
     be reversed only if that ruling was clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence; a custodial statement is
     presumed involuntary, and the burden is on the state to show
     that the statement was voluntarily given; a confession based
     on threats of harm is inadmissible; in making a determination
     of whether a statement was voluntarily made, the court will
     consider many factors, among which are the age, education, and
     intelligence of the accused; the length of questioning; the
     advice or lack of advice on constitutional rights; the
     repeated or prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of
     mental or physical punishment.  


4.   Witnesses -- conflicts in testimony -- credibility issue for
     trial court to resolve. -- Conflicts in testimony are for the
     trial court to resolve, as it is in a superior position to
     determine the credibility of the witnesses.

5.   Criminal procedure -- waiver of rights by appellant found
     voluntary -- no error in denying appellant's motion to
     suppress. -- Where, during the suppression hearing, appellant
     and an officer were the only persons to testify, and their
     testimony was conflicting, appellant was twenty-one years old
     at the time of the interview, he was advised of his rights, he
     admitted that he understood that he did not have to say
     anything at all without a lawyer present, appellant had been
     in this situation twice before and clearly understood that he
     did not have to make a statement without his attorney present,
     but he went ahead and gave a statement, the state introduced
     into evidence the statement of rights form signed by appellant
     as well as the transcript of the taped interview, the
     transcript of the interview reflected that the officer
     informed appellant that there were enough statements and
     enough witnesses to obtain the bench warrant, and that he was
     going to arrest appellant regardless of whether appellant gave
     a statement, appellant then gave a statement denying any
     involvement in the shooting, and at no point during the
     interview, which lasted only twelve minutes, did appellant
     inculpate himself in the crime, the appellate court found that
     appellant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, that he gave
     the statement voluntarily without the presence of an attorney,
     and that no threats or coercion were used on appellant; there
     was no evidence that appellant was so lacking in either
     education or intelligence that he did not understand what he
     was doing. 

6.   Criminal procedure -- officer's statement of intent to arrest
     appellant not a threat -- appellant's statement voluntarily
     given. -- The officer's statement that he was going to arrest
     appellant regardless of whether appellant told his side of the
     story did not rise to the level of being a threat, instead it
     indicated that the officer had already planned to arrest
     appellant and that appellant's actions in choosing either to
     give a statement or not to give a statement would not have
     changed the officer's plans; there was no evidence to support
     appellant's claim that he thought that if he gave a statement
     the officer would release him without arresting him;
     appellant's claim that he felt threatened or pressured into
     giving a statement was unpersuasive in light of the fact that
     his statement was exculpatory in nature and amounted to
     nothing more than a blanket denial of the allegations; the
     statement was voluntarily given and that the trial court did
     not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress it.      


     Appeal from Saline Circuit Court; John E. Cole, Judge;
affirmed.
     Joe Kelly Hardin, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.


Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 6-24-96   *ADVREP*SC8*





CORINTHIAN MCCOY,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,



CR 96-6



APPEAL FROM THE SALINE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR-94-400-1,
HON. JOHN W. COLE, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED.






     Appellant, Corinthian McCoy, was convicted by a jury of first-
degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, and sentenced by
the Saline County Circuit Court to life in the Arkansas Department
of Correction.  McCoy appeals the circuit court's judgment of
conviction, and this court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant
to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2).  McCoy raises two points on appeal: 
(1) The trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce
items seized in an illegal search of appellant's vehicle; and (2)
the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce
appellant's custodial statement, as it was involuntary and taken
without regard to appellant's request for an attorney.  We affirm.
     In the early-morning hours of August 6, 1994, a shooting
occurred at Jimmy Dirden's Club in Benton, Arkansas, which resulted
in the death of Willie Mills and the injury of Raymond Lewis. 
Benton Police officers discovered a piece of metal in the club's
 parking lot that was similar to a .22 caliber bullet.  Raymond
Lewis, who suffered a gunshot wound to the leg, told officers that
a black male driving a light-colored big car, such as an Oldsmobile
or a Buick, left Dirden's and began shooting from inside his
vehicle into a crowd of people standing outside the club.  Lewis
told the officers that the vehicle driven by the shooter had no
license plate, and that the man who did the shooting was kin to
Demetrius Woods.
     Officers spoke to Demetrius Woods, who stated that he was
present when the crime occurred and that it was his cousin
Corinthian who did the shooting.  Woods told police that he did not
know Corinthian's last name, but that he did know that Corinthian
had recently received a traffic ticket for no vehicle license in
Alexander or Bryant, Arkansas.  Woods also stated that at the time
of the incident, Corinthian was driving a big, light-colored car,
possibly an Oldsmobile, which had no license plate. 
     Investigating officers subsequently located the Arkansas State
Police officer who issued the traffic ticket to the individual
known to the officers only as "Corinthian."  A copy of the traffic
citation, which was written for no vehicle license, revealed that
the driver of the vehicle was identified as Corinthian McCoy and
that the vehicle driven was a white Oldsmobile.  Upon having
identified appellant as the suspect, officers located appellant's
residence in Little Rock, Arkansas, and arrested him later that
same day of the shooting.  Officers also located the vehicle in
question at appellant's residence and identified it as a 1980 light
gray Oldsmobile Delta 88 bearing no license plate.  Upon his
arrest, appellant was interviewed by a police detective and denied
any involvement in the shooting.  Officers seized the vehicle from
appellant's residence and later conducted a search of its contents
pursuant to a search warrant.  The only evidence of the crime found
during the search of the vehicle was a .22 caliber bullet.    
     Prior to appellant's trial, a hearing was conducted on the
motions to suppress appellant's statement and the evidence
recovered in the search.  After hearing the testimony presented,
the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the physical
evidence, stating that there was sufficient identification of the
vehicle in the affidavit to support application for the search
warrant.  After reviewing the contents of the statement itself, the
trial court also denied appellant's motion to suppress the
custodial interview.  
                    I.  Search of the Vehicle
     Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress the evidence found in a search of the vehicle appellant
was driving on the night of the shooting.  Specifically, appellant
argues that the affidavit for search warrant insufficiently
identified the proper vehicle to be searched, and that the trial
court erred in allowing a witness to testify beyond the information
contained in the affidavit.  The state argues that appellant lacked
standing to challenge the search as he did not present any proof
that he owned or legally possessed the automobile.  We agree.  
     It is well settled that a proponent of a motion to suppress
bears the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated.  Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335,