Case Title: In Re: Moseley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061237

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
OPINION BY 
IN RE: JONATHAN A. MOSELEY 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
Record Number 061237 
 
 
 
 
April 20, 2007 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge 
Jonathan A. Moseley appeals the judgment of the Circuit 
Court of Arlington County, which revoked his “right to practice 
before the Circuit Court of Arlington.”  Moseley contends the 
circuit court erred for two reasons: First, he argues the court 
“was without jurisdiction” to revoke his right to practice.  
Second, he asserts that even if the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to act, it failed to provide him “notice of the 
alleged misconduct” before the revocation.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
This case arises from the proceedings in two breach of 
contract cases filed by Moseley on behalf of his client, Tracy 
E. Ammons, against The Christian Coalition of America, Inc. 
(“the Christian Coalition”).  In the first suit, both parties 
denied having a copy of the consulting agreement in controversy, 
so the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the nature of the agreement.  A primary issue before 
the court was whether the agreement contained an arbitration 
 
2
clause, as the Christian Coalition contended, but which Ammons 
denied.  On cross-examination during the hearing, Ammons 
testified he had found a copy of the consulting agreement, and 
that he had given a copy to his attorney, Moseley, who had it in 
the courtroom.  Ammons further admitted that the agreement 
contained an arbitration clause. 
Moseley, acting on behalf of Ammons, immediately requested 
a nonsuit.  The circuit court stated it was compelled to grant 
the nonsuit, and then strongly reprimanded Moseley for his 
conduct during the course of the proceedings.  In particular, 
the circuit court cited Moseley’s failure to inform the court 
and opposing counsel that the contract had been located and 
contained the very arbitration provision he had previously 
denied existed.  Furthermore, the circuit court cited Moseley’s 
prior filing of numerous frivolous pleadings and motions in the 
matter, which needlessly wasted the time of the court and 
counsel.  The circuit court then awarded sanctions against 
Moseley and Ammons, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$83,141.24, which represented a portion of the Christian 
Coalition’s attorney’s fees and costs related to Moseley’s 
actions (“the monetary sanctions award”).1 
                                                 
1 Moseley filed a timely notice and petition of appeal from 
this order.  However, on March 15, 2005, this Court dismissed 
the petition for appeal under Rule 5:11 for failure to timely 
file a transcript or written statement of facts.  The monetary 
 
3
Ammons and the Christian Coalition then entered into 
arbitration proceedings concerning the Christian Coalition’s 
alleged breach of the consulting agreement.  While the 
arbitration was ongoing, Moseley filed a second motion for 
judgment on Ammons’ behalf, alleging substantially the same 
claims against the Christian Coalition as in the first motion 
for judgment.2  The Christian Coalition filed a motion to 
disqualify Moseley from representing Ammons, asserting Moseley 
had an “irreconcilable and unwaiveable per se conflict” because 
his “personal interest inextricably [is] intertwined [and] 
adverse to his own client.”3 
 
On February 16, 2006, the circuit court heard argument 
regarding the motion to disqualify Moseley from representing 
Ammons regarding the second motion for judgment.4  Despite being 
                                                                                                                                                             
sanctions award against Moseley and Ammons is not before the 
Court in this appeal. 
2 The second motion for judgment attached a copy of the 
consulting agreement and contended the Christian Coalition 
waived its right to rely on the arbitration provisions by 
defending the prior motion for judgment. 
3 Among the factors the Christian Coalition cited in its 
motion to disqualify were: Moseley and Ammons’ joint and several 
liability for the monetary sanctions award, Moseley’s subsequent 
declaration of bankruptcy that would insulate him from 
collection of the monetary sanctions award, Moseley’s failure to 
perfect an appeal of the monetary sanctions award, and Moseley’s 
potential testimony in the pending case regarding the contract’s 
arbitration clause.   
4 Judge Joanne F. Alper was the presiding judge in the 
proceedings related to the first motion for judgment, and 
entered the monetary sanctions award.  However, Judge Alper 
“voluntarily recused herself for the limited purpose of hearing 
 
4
sent a copy of the praecipe setting the hearing for that date, 
Moseley did not appear at the hearing due to an apparent 
miscommunication from the clerk’s office and the judge’s 
chambers, which led Moseley to believe no hearing would occur 
that day.  However, the hearing did proceed as scheduled on 
February 16th and the Christian Coalition argued its motion to 
disqualify Moseley from the second motion for judgment 
proceeding and it urged the court to consider additional 
sanctions, including issuing a rule to show cause based on 
Moseley’s conduct.  In addition, the Christian Coalition called 
David R. Rosenfeld to testify as an expert in the field of legal 
ethics in Virgina.  Rosenfeld testified that Moseley had a 
conflict of interest with Ammons and that Moseley’s “conduct 
falls well below the [ethical and professional] standard of 
care” for attorneys licensed to practice law in Virginia.  
Rosenfeld also testified that he examined a letter written by 
and a motion filed by Moseley, and they contained “entirely 
inappropriate, inaccurate, and in some instances, just downright 
. . . false” allegations about Judge Alper.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
from Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.”  Judge Benjamin N.A. 
Kendrick presided over the remaining proceedings relevant to 
this appeal, including the February 16, 2006 and March 16, 2006 
hearings.  
5 Moseley’s letter and motion, which the Christian Coalition 
introduced into evidence at the hearing, indicated that Judge 
Alper decided to recuse herself from hearing the motion to 
disqualify him from representing Ammons because she had engaged 
 
5
As a result of the hearing, the circuit court entered an 
order on February 27, 2006 that granted the Christian 
Coalition’s motion to disqualify Moseley and further directing 
Moseley “to appear before this Court on the 16[th] day of March 
2006 to show cause why Moseley’s right to practice before this 
Court should not be revoked.” 
As directed by the circuit court, Moseley received a copy 
of the February 27 order and a transcript of the February 16 
hearing.  Moseley petitioned the circuit court for a rehearing 
regarding the February 27 order, and explained the reason for 
his absence from the February 16 hearing.  In light of Moseley’s 
explanation, the circuit court “vacated [the February 27 order] 
pending the outcome of the March 16, 2006 hearing.” 
Prior to the March 16 hearing, the Christian Coalition 
alerted the circuit court that it had just obtained an e-mail 
written and circulated by Moseley, which the Christian Coalition 
asked be considered at the March 16 hearing.  Moseley was sent a 
copy of both the Christian Coalition’s letter to the circuit 
court and the e-mail.  In the e-mail, Moseley characterized 
opposing counsel as “certainly demonically empowered.  I have 
never seen anyone who reeks of evil so much.”  Furthermore, 
Moseley described the monetary sanctions award entered by Judge 
                                                                                                                                                             
in “misconduct” during the first motion for judgment 
proceedings.   
 
6
Alper as “an absurd decision from a whacko judge, whom I believe 
was bribed.” 
At the March 16 hearing, which included the Rule to Show 
Cause, the circuit court directed the Christian Coalition to 
reargue its motion to disqualify Moseley.  In its opening 
statement, the Christian Coalition argued “the evidence is 
overwhelming that [Moseley] should not only be disqualified 
[from representing Ammons], but within this judicial district 
[have his right to practice] suspend[ed] or revoke[d],” and have 
his conduct reported to the State Bar for further investigation.  
The presiding judge then reiterated that those would be the 
three issues before the court during the hearing. 
The Christian Coalition again called David Ross Rosenfeld 
as an expert witness, and he gave substantially the same 
testimony as in the February 16 hearing.  When asked about 
Moseley’s recent e-mail, Rosenfeld testified that in his expert 
opinion, “the characterization of a sitting judge as a wacko 
judge constitutes a per se violation of the standard of care 
established through Rule 8.2” of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in Virginia. 
During the hearing, Moseley repeatedly contended that he 
had not been given notice that the court was considering the 
revocation of his privilege to practice before it.  The circuit 
court rejected Moseley’s argument, finding that Moseley had been 
 
7
given adequate notice of the issue in the motion to disqualify, 
the transcripts of the February 16 hearing, the specific terms 
of the February 27 order, particularly the rule to show cause, 
and the enunciation by counsel and the court of the issues 
before it at the hearing.   
The circuit court then entered an order dated March 16, 
2006, finding that Moseley had “an irreconcilable [and 
unwaiveable] conflict of interest” and ordered that he 
“immediately terminate his representation” of Ammons.  The court 
also made a specific finding that Moseley “had timely, adequate, 
and proper notice of this proceeding” and that it had “the 
inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney 
practicing before it.  § 54.1-3915, Code of Virginia [and] Legal 
Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249[, 119 S.E. 55] (1923).”  
The order then recited that “Moseley’s conduct during . . . this 
cause . . . raises sufficient and serious questions for this 
Court regarding [his] competency and fitness to practice law 
before this Court” and found Moseley had “engaged in unethical 
conduct in violation of the Virginia Code of Professional 
Conduct and . . . made contemptible, irresponsible and false 
statements about a sitting judge.”  The March 16, 2006 order 
then provided that “Moseley’s right to practice before the 
Circuit Court of Arlington . . . be and hereby is revoked” and 
 
8
referred to the Virginia State Board and this Court 
“consideration of reciprocal revocation of licensure.” 
We awarded Moseley this appeal from the March 16, 2006 
order as to the revocation of his privilege to practice before 
the Circuit Court of Arlington County.6 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal to this Court, Moseley makes two assignments of 
error.  First, he contends the circuit court erred because it 
“was without jurisdiction” to revoke his entitlement to practice 
law before the Circuit Court of Arlington County.  Second, 
Moseley asserts the circuit court failed to properly provide him 
“notice of the alleged misconduct” prior to taking such action.  
We address each assignment of error in turn. 
A. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court 
Moseley contends the Circuit Court of Arlington County did 
not have jurisdiction to revoke his entitlement to practice 
before it because the “whole field of disbarment in Virginia” is 
now regulated by statute.  He argues that because the circuit 
court did not follow the procedure for disbarment set forth in 
                                                 
6 Moseley’s disqualification from representing Ammons and 
the referral to the Virginia State Bar are not before this Court 
on appeal.  The underlying dispute between Ammons and the 
Christian Coalition has subsequently settled.  Consequently, we 
granted Moseley’s motion to dismiss the Christian Coalition as 
appellee in the matter and the appeal was re-styled In re 
Moseley.  The Court designated counsel to argue as amicus curiae 
in support of the circuit court’s actions.  
 
9
Code § 54.1-3935, it was without authority to act so as to bar 
his practice before that court.  Moseley distinguishes the 
circuit court’s authority “to remove counsel in a particular 
case or to punish for contempt,” and the type of action here, 
which removes his ability to appear before the court. 
At the outset, it is important to note that Moseley’s 
license to practice law in Virginia was not affected by the 
March 16, 2006 order.  Licensure of an attorney, and revocation 
of that license, are matters governed by statute.  Code §§ 54.1-
3928, -3934 et seq.  It is not within the jurisdiction of a 
circuit court to adjudicate the revocation of a license to 
practice law except in compliance with the statutory authority.  
Code § 54.1-3935.7  The circuit court clearly recognized that 
limitation because it referred any action regarding Moseley’s 
license to practice law to the Virginia State Bar.  A license to 
practice law covers the full panoply of actions an attorney can 
undertake from writing a will to representing a person in a 
controversy before a court.  And while the issuance of a license 
to practice law carries with it certain rights for the holder of 
that license, the ability to practice before a particular court 
is a distinct and separate consideration. 
                                                 
7 Even before the unification of the various bars within the 
Commonwealth and creation of the Virginia State Bar in 1938, 
revocation of a license to practice law was a matter governed by 
statute.  Ex Parte Fisher, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835).   
 
10
The matter before the Court on appeal, however, is not the 
status of Moseley’s license to practice law, but whether a court 
can revoke his privilege to practice before a particular court 
when no statute specifically provides for that action.  The 
answer to that query is answered by our long-standing 
jurisprudence. 
We addressed the basic issue now before us in 1835 in Ex 
Parte Fisher, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835).  Our 
resolution of the issue then remains as valid today as it was 
nearly two centuries ago.  “[I]ndependently of any statutory 
restriction, the courts of record of this [C]ommonwealth might, 
in a proper case, suspend or annul the license of an attorney, 
so far as it authorized him to practice in the particular court, 
which pronounced the sentence, but no farther.”  Id. at 624. 
Although the local circuit courts had jurisdiction in the 
19th century both to issue a license to practice law and control 
the actual practice before that court, the intervening statutory 
regimen ceding licensure to the Virginia State Bar (as opposed 
to the various circuit courts) has no effect on the continuing 
authority of a court to regulate the privilege of practicing 
before that court.  We explained this concept in Legal Club of 
Lynchburg: 
Independent of statutory authority, all courts of 
record in Virginia have inherent power in a proper 
case to suspend or annul the license of an attorney 
 
11
practicing in the particular court which pronounces 
the sentence of disbarment. 
 
137 Va. at 250, 119 S.E. at 55.  This independent and inherent 
power to regulate the lawyers practicing before it is vested in 
courts as part of the authority necessary to the existence and 
function of a court.  See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 630-31 (1962). 
In Code § 54.1-3935, on which Moseley relies, the General 
Assembly has set forth the procedure by which the appropriate 
court is empowered to revoke or suspend a license to practice 
law that affects the right to practice law throughout the 
Commonwealth.8  However, as recognized in Legal Club, this 
statutory authority does not curtail a court’s pre-existing and 
                                                 
8 Subsection (A) of Code § 54.1-3935 states: 
If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any 
circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a 
complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person 
to such court, that any attorney has been convicted of 
a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a felony or 
has violated the Virginia Code of Professional 
Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the 
Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of 
the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may 
issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why 
his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If 
the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a 
district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the 
court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show 
cause why his license to practice law shall not be 
revoked. 
The remaining subsections set forth how the case will proceed 
and the attorney’s rights during the proceedings.  Subsection 
(D) specifically authorizes the court to, inter alia, revoke or 
suspend an attorney’s “license to practice law in this 
Commonwealth” if the attorney is found guilty by the court.   
 
12
independent authority to control those who practice before it, 
including the authority to suspend or revoke an attorney’s 
privilege to practice before that court.  137 Va. at 250-51, 119 
S.E. at 55.  “Such power does not depend for its existence upon 
either constitutional or statutory provisions, but is possessed 
by all courts of record, unless taken away by express 
constitutional (or possibly legislative) inhibition.”  Id. at 
251, 119 S.E. at 55. 
Although Legal Club seemed to leave open the possibility 
that a legislative enactment could circumscribe a court’s 
authority to discipline attorneys practicing before it, this 
Court’s decision in Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass’n v. Drewry, 
161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934), annuls that possibility.  In 
Drewry we reiterated not only that a court has “an inherent 
power” to discipline and regulate attorneys practicing before 
it, but also recognized that “[t]his power, since the judiciary 
is an independent branch of government, is not controlled by 
statute.”  161 Va. at 836, 172 S.E. at 283.  Thus, the court’s 
authority to discipline attorneys and regulate their conduct in 
proceedings before that court is also a constitutional power 
derived from the separation of powers between the judiciary, as 
an independent branch of government, and the other branches.  
Va. Const. art. III, § 1; art. VI, § 1; see, e.g., Harlen v. 
Helena, 676 P.2d 191, 193 (Mont. 1984); Hustedt v. Workers’ 
 
13
Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1142-44 (Cal. 1981); R.J. 
Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 411 (Okla. 1972); State ex 
rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 407 P.2d 250, 254-56 (Or. 
1965); In re Sparks, 101 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Ky. 1936).  As the 
circuit court implied, this inherent and constitutional power is 
essentially acknowledged in Code § 54.1-3915, where even this 
Court is prohibited from promulgating “any rule or regulation or 
method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the 
courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” 
Our more recent cases continue to recognize this inherent 
and constitutional authority of a court to discipline attorneys 
apart from the formal statutory disciplinary procedures 
affecting the attorney’s license to practice law.  For example, 
as recently as March of this year, we summarized our 
jurisprudence in this area in Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 
641 S.E.2d 494 (2007): 
[T]his Court has recognized that the courts of this 
Commonwealth have the inherent power to supervise the 
conduct of attorneys practicing before them and to 
discipline any attorney who engages in misconduct.  A 
court’s inherent power to discipline an attorney 
practicing before it includes the power not only ‘to 
remove an attorney of record in a case,’ [Judicial 
Inquiry and Review Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 
447, 611 S.E.2d 392, 402 (2005)], but also ‘in a 
proper case to suspend or annul the license of an 
attorney practicing in the particular court.’ ”   
 
Id. at 399, 641 S.E.2d at 501 (citations omitted).  Thus, the 
authority of a court to regulate the conduct of attorneys 
 
14
practicing before that court by revoking or suspending that 
privilege is both an inherent and a constitutional power that is 
not dependent on its creation by legislative enactment and thus 
cannot be limited by statute.  Accordingly, under our long-
standing precedent, the circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke 
Moseley’s privilege to practice before that court.9  
The March 16, 2006 order by its plain terms applies only to 
Moseley’s right to practice before the Circuit Court of 
Arlington County.  By necessity, the circuit court’s action is 
the act of that court and not limited to practice before the 
individual judge presiding over the case.  See Commonwealth v. 
Epps, 273 Va. 410, 414, 641 S.E.2d 77, 80 (2007) (In the context 
of contemptuous behavior in the courtroom, “[a]ny harm in this 
case was suffered by the court as an institution, not by [the 
judge] personally.”).  By that, we mean the order of March 16, 
2006, by its very issuance, is an act binding within the 
jurisdictional limits of the Circuit Court of Arlington County.  
Therefore, the Circuit Court of Arlington County, which is 
coterminous with the 17th judicial circuit, has authority to 
regulate the conduct of attorneys throughout that circuit, but 
                                                 
9 Moseley raises no issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the circuit court’s judgment, nor does he raise an 
issue as to whether the circuit court abused its discretion, 
based on the evidence, in revoking his privilege to practice 
before the court.  Thus, we address neither matter.  Rule 
5:17(c). 
 
15
no further.  Indeed, as we recognized in Ex Parte Fisher, Legal 
Club, and Drewry, a court’s authority in the discipline of 
attorneys practicing before it is limited to the jurisdictional 
boundaries of that court and cannot extend to other courts 
beyond that boundary.10 
For all these reasons, we conclude the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to revoke Moseley’s privilege to appear in that 
court and thus did not err in the judgment of March 16, 2006. 
B. Notice of the Alleged Misconduct 
Moseley also alleges the circuit court erred in revoking 
his privilege to practice before the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County “without notice of the alleged misconduct.”  Although 
Moseley also argues on brief the broader contention that he did 
not have notice “that his right to practice law was in 
jeopardy,” he made no assignment of error as to that issue.  We 
thus limit our review to the specific issue to which he assigned 
error.  Rule 5:17(c); see Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 551, 557, 554 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2001). 
                                                 
10 As noted above, the March 16, 2006 order, in and of itself, 
does not affect Moseley’s license to practice law.  Moseley’s 
license to practice law remains in effect, even within the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County; he simply cannot appear in that court.  We also note 
that the March 16, 2006 order, by its specific terms, applies 
only to the Circuit Court of Arlington County, and does not 
undertake to revoke Moseley’s privilege to practice before the 
juvenile and domestic relations or general district courts of 
Arlington County. 
 
16
Moseley’s argument that he lacked notice of the alleged 
misconduct is without merit.  Courts are not required to list 
with specificity their factual basis for issuing a rule to show 
cause.  Moreover, the record clearly shows Moseley received, 
inter alia, copies of the motion to disqualify, communication 
from the Christian Coalition to the court stating the intent to 
raise correspondence written by Moseley (with copies of the 
referenced correspondence attached), a transcript of the 
February 16 hearing detailing the evidence on which the 
Christian Coalition was relying to support Moseley’s 
disqualification, and the issuance of a rule to show cause in 
the circuit court’s February 27 order.  Moseley received more 
than adequate “notice of the alleged misconduct,” which was the 
subject of the March 16 hearing and embodied in the findings of 
the March 16, 2006 order.  Thus, Moseley’s second assignment of 
error also fails. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court had the 
jurisdiction to revoke Moseley’s privilege to practice before 
it.  Moseley also had adequate notice of the conduct the circuit 
court would consider in deciding on that revocation.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.