Case Title: Michigan v. Kabongo (Opinion - Leave Granted)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 159346

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEOPLE v KABONGO 
 
Docket No. 159346.  Argued November 10, 2020 (Calendar No. 3).  Decided May 20, 
2021. 
 
 
Jacques J. Kabongo was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, 
following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court.  Two police officers testified that they had seen 
defendant cover a holstered handgun with his shirt and that defendant’s license to carry a concealed 
weapon had expired.  The trial court, Catherine L. Heise, J., sentenced defendant to one year of 
probation and 50 hours of community service.  Defendant appealed by right, arguing, among other 
things, that the trial court had erred by overruling his objections to the prosecutor’s use of 
peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors 2(a), 3(a), and 14(a), all of whom were Black, 
and by disallowing defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror 5(a), 
who was white.  The Court of Appeals, MURRAY, C.J., and METER and GLEICHER, JJ., affirmed in 
an unpublished per curiam opinion issued December 27, 2018 (Docket No. 338733).  Defendant 
sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which granted the application with respect to (1) 
whether the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror 2(a) 
violated Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), which prohibits the prosecution from using a 
peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror solely on the basis of race; (2) whether the 
trial court erroneously precluded defendant from exercising a peremptory challenge against 
Prospective Juror 5(a), given that the same analytical framework from Batson applies when the 
prosecution opposes a defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge on the basis of alleged racial 
discrimination; (3) if so, whether such an error should be subject to automatic reversal or harmless-
error review; and (4) if so, whether reversal was warranted.  505 Mich 999 (2020). 
 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed by equal division. 
 
 
Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justices VIVIANO and CLEMENT, writing for affirmance, 
concluded that although the evidence was open to interpretation, the trial court had not clearly 
erred by finding that the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation for using a peremptory challenge 
to excuse Prospective Juror 2(a) was not a pretext for improper purposeful discrimination.  
However, Justice ZAHRA concluded that the trial court did clearly err by determining that defense 
counsel’s race-neutral explanation for seeking to excuse Prospective Juror 5(a) was a pretext for 
discrimination.  While defense counsel’s comments may have suggested an intent to discriminate 
against white prospective jurors during voir dire, the record did not reflect that defense counsel 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
actually engaged in purposeful discrimination against this particular prospective white juror, given 
that she had extensive familial ties to law enforcement and the sole evidence against defendant 
was to be the testimony of law enforcement officers.  Nevertheless, Justice ZAHRA would have 
held that the court’s denial of defendant’s peremptory challenge was not a structural error requiring 
automatic reversal under Michigan law.  He noted that the Supreme Court of the United States has 
recognized that states need not even provide peremptory challenges, and if a state does so, then 
the state is free to decide the remedy available for a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory 
challenge.  He stated that Michigan law provides no basis for a rule that would require automatic 
reversal when a trial court denies a peremptory challenge on the basis of an improperly granted 
Batson challenge, because Michigan law generally views peremptory challenges as a 
nonconstitutional right that is provided to both parties as one of the many optional means to secure 
the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.  Accordingly, he would have held that a trial 
court’s erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge is subject to harmless-error review 
and that under this standard, reversal was not warranted in this case given the lack of record 
evidence that any juror, let alone the juror whom defendant had hoped to excuse, harbored any 
bias against defendant.  Justice ZAHRA would have affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment for 
these reasons. 
 
 
Chief Justice MCCORMACK, joined by Justices BERNSTEIN and CAVANAGH, writing for 
reversal, concurred with the lead opinion that the trial court clearly erred by denying defense 
counsel’s request to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror 5(a) but 
disagreed with the rest of the lead opinion’s conclusions.  Specifically, Chief Justice MCCORMACK 
concluded that the trial court violated Batson by misapplying its three-part test and by accepting 
the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for excusing Prospective Juror 2(a), which were not 
supported by the record.  She also disagreed with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the error of 
refusing to remove Prospective Juror 5(a) was subject to harmless-error review, stating that such 
a rule effectively would lead to automatic affirmance.  Because a Batson violation requires 
automatic reversal, she would have reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded for a 
new trial.   
 
 
Justice WELCH did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 
considered it before she assumed office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  May 20, 2021 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 159346 
 
JACQUES JEAN KABONGO, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except WELCH, J.) 
 
ZAHRA, J. (for affirmance). 
In this case, we granted leave to appeal to address the trial court’s resolution of a 
pair of Batson1 challenges, each concerning the others’ use of peremptory challenges to 
remove prospective jurors on the basis of race.  The prosecution first exercised its statutory 
right to remove a white prospective juror from the panel, and then exercised the same right 
                                              
1 Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
to consecutively remove three black prospective jurors from the panel.2  At this point, 
defendant asserted a Batson challenge to the prosecution’s removal of the three black 
prospective jurors.  The trial court rejected this challenge.  We conclude that the trial court 
did not clearly err by finding that the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation was not a 
pretext for improper purposeful discrimination.  The record evidence before us is open to 
interpretation regarding defendant’s Batson challenge.  Though some trial courts may have 
reached a different conclusion, our deferential review of the trial court’s decision in this 
case does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred.   
The second Batson challenge at issue was raised by the prosecution upon the 
exercise of defendant’s third peremptory challenge.  The prosecution noted that all the 
peremptory challenges asserted by defendant excused white prospective jurors.  Defendant 
explained that his most recent peremptory challenge was directed toward a prospective 
juror with extensive familial ties to law enforcement.  The trial court sustained the 
prosecution’s Batson challenge, leaving on the prospective jury panel a prospective juror 
whom defendant preferred to remove.  We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by 
determining that defense counsel’s race-neutral explanation was a pretext to discrimination 
such that defense counsel engaged in purposeful discrimination by exercising a peremptory 
                                              
2 Ordinarily, jury selection involves a group of citizens in the community randomly 
summoned to the courthouse on a particular day for potential jury service, often referred to 
the “jury pool.”  Then, a subgroup of these citizens are called into a courtroom, and this 
subgroup is known as the jury venire.  From this venire, prospective jurors are drawn to a 
panel of 14 that constitutes a prospective jury.  In this opinion, we describe these 
prospective jurors as Prospective Juror(s) 1 through 14(a).  Replacements to any of these 
prospective jurors drawn from the venire are described as Prospective Jurors 1 through 
14(b), and so on. 
 
 
 
 
3 
challenge of this prospective juror.  While defense counsel’s comments may have 
suggested that he was previously engaged in purposeful discrimination against white 
prospective jurors during voir dire and that defense counsel perhaps even intimated an 
intent to continue to do so, the record does not reflect that defense counsel actually engaged 
in purposeful discrimination against this particular prospective white juror.  This 
prospective juror had extensive familial ties to law enforcement, and the sole evidence 
against defendant was to be the testimony of law enforcement officers.  
Having concluded that the trial court clearly erred by granting the prosecution’s 
Batson challenge, we must determine whether the court’s denial of defendant’s peremptory 
challenge is a structural error under Michigan law requiring automatic reversal, or whether 
the error is subject to harmless-error review.  A trial court’s erroneous denial of a 
defendant’s peremptory challenge is not a constitutional error, let alone a structural error 
requiring automatic reversal, under the federal Constitution.  The Supreme Court of the 
United States has repeatedly recognized that states need not even provide peremptory 
challenges.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to an “impartial jury,” not a right to 
the jury of one’s choosing.  The Court has explained that if a state does provide peremptory 
challenges, then the state is free to decide, as a matter of state law, the remedy available 
for a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge.3  Michigan law provides no 
basis for a rule that would require automatic reversal when a trial court denies a peremptory 
challenge on the basis of an improperly granted Batson challenge or otherwise.  Rather, 
Michigan law generally views peremptory challenges as a nonconstitutional right that is 
                                              
3 Rivera v Illinois, 556 US 148, 152; 129 S Ct 1446; 173 L Ed 2d 320 (2009). 
 
 
 
 
4 
provided to both parties as one of the many optional means to secure the constitutional 
guarantee of an impartial jury.  For reasons more fully discussed below, we conclude that 
a trial court’s erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge is not a structural 
error that requires automatic reversal under Michigan law.  Instead, the trial court’s error 
is subject to harmless-error review.   
Applying harmless-error review, we conclude that reversal is not warranted in this 
case.  There is no record evidence that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s peremptory 
challenge resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  There is no evidence that any juror, let alone 
the juror whom defendant hoped to excuse, harbored any bias against defendant.  Because 
defendant received a trial from an impartial jury, no harm resulted from the trial court’s 
erroneous denial of defendant’s peremptory challenge.  We would therefore affirm the 
Court of Appeals’ judgment holding that defendant is not entitled to a new trial. 
I.  BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On October 15, 2016, defendant was working on a rental property he owned on 
Monte Vista Avenue in Detroit.  Two Detroit police officers, Royer Hernandez and 
Alexander Collrin, saw defendant openly carrying a holstered handgun outside the house 
as they drove by on patrol.  Officer Hernandez looked in his rearview mirror as he passed 
and saw defendant walk to the rear door on the driver’s side of a pickup truck parked in the 
street.  Officer Hernandez testified that while defendant appeared to be taking tools from 
the back seat of the truck, he covered the gun with a blue shirt he was wearing.  Officer 
Collrin also saw defendant conceal the weapon.  The officers returned to the property to 
ask defendant if he had a concealed pistol license (CPL).  Defendant produced an expired 
 
 
 
 
5 
CPL.  The officers immediately arrested defendant for unlawfully carrying a concealed 
weapon, a felony. 
After a somewhat contentious jury-selection process, defendant was tried and 
convicted on the sole count of carrying a concealed weapon.  The trial court later sentenced 
him to nonreporting probation for one year and 50 hours’ community service.  Defendant 
appealed by right.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.4  
Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we granted the application with respect 
to the following issues: 
(1) whether the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against 
prospective juror no. 2 violated Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986); (2) 
whether the trial court erroneously precluded the defendant from exercising 
a peremptory challenge against prospective juror no. 5; (3) if so, whether 
such an error should be subject to automatic reversal or harmless error 
review . . . ; and (4) if so, whether reversal is warranted in this case.[5] 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  BATSON CHALLENGES 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no state 
shall deny “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”6  The 
                                              
4 People v Kabongo, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
December 27, 2018 (Docket No. 338733).  Defendant’s motion for reconsideration was 
denied on February 20, 2019. 
5 People v Kabongo, 505 Mich 999 (2020). 
6 US Const, Am XIV.  Two decades before Batson, the United States Supreme Court held 
that, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party may not 
remove a prospective juror solely on the basis of a person’s race.  Swain v Alabama, 380 
US 202, 203-204; 85 S Ct 824; 13 L Ed 2d 759 (1965), overruled in part by Batson, 476 
US 79.  As we explained in People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 336 n 9; 701 NW2d 715 
(2005), the Court in Batson, 476 US at 92-93, eliminated the requirement in Swain, 380 
 
 
 
 
6 
Michigan Constitution provides the same protection.7  In Batson, the Supreme Court of the 
Unites States held that a “State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory 
challenges is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.”8  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court held: 
Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory 
challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view 
concerning the outcome of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their 
race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable 
impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.[9] 
To assist courts in resolving Batson challenges, the Supreme Court implemented a 
three-part burden-shifting analysis to be used in resolving Batson challenges.  The process 
starts with the assertion of a challenge under Batson.  The party bringing the Batson 
challenge must first “make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing 
that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”10  
                                              
US at 223-224, that the defendant must show that the prosecution had a practice or pattern 
of using peremptory challenges in other cases. 
7 Const 1963, art 1, § 2 provides:   
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall 
any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be 
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color 
or national origin.  The legislature shall implement this section by 
appropriate legislation. 
8 Batson, 476 US at 89 (comma omitted).   
9 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
10 Id. at 93-94.   
 
 
 
 
7 
Upon an initial showing of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the burden then 
shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenge “ ‘to explain adequately the racial 
exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strike[].”11  Once the 
proponent of the peremptory challenge articulates a race-neutral explanation, the trial court 
must determine whether it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly 
motivated;12 that is, whether the proponent’s “race-neutral explanation is a pretext and 
whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination.”13  
Moreover, while the facts of Batson were limited to a criminal defendant’s challenge 
to the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror on the basis of race, 
the United States Supreme Court has also held that the prosecution may challenge a 
defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge for the same reason.  In Georgia v McCollum, 
the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from 
engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory 
                                              
11 Johnson v California, 545 US 162, 168; 125 S Ct 2410; 162 L Ed 2d 129 (2005), quoting 
Batson, 476 US at 94. 
12 Johnson, 545 US at 170 (“[I]n describing the burden-shifting framework, we assumed in 
Batson that the trial judge would have the benefit of all relevant circumstances, including 
the prosecutor’s explanation, before deciding whether it was more likely than not that the 
challenge was improperly motivated.”). 
13 Knight, 473 Mich at 338, citing Batson, 476 US at 98.  Also, “[o]nce a prosecutor has 
offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has 
ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of 
whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”  Hernandez v New 
York, 500 US 352, 359; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991).   
 
 
 
 
8 
challenges.”14  Notably, the same framework from Batson applies to cases in which the 
prosecution opposes a defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge on the basis of racial 
discrimination.15   
1.  A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION 
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge, the opponent of the challenge must show: (1) the defendant is a 
member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the exercise of a peremptory challenge to exclude 
a member of a certain racial group from the jury pool; and (3) circumstantial evidence that 
raises an inference that the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race.16   
Courts have described what evidence may be useful in showing the “inference” of 
purposeful discrimination.  Often, those bringing a Batson challenge have relied solely on 
a “numbers” argument (i.e., how many times the opposing party has struck members of a 
particular race).  As noted in several federal circuit courts of appeals, the use of numbers 
alone generally does not establish a prima facie case.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit has stated that, while the particular number of challenges exercised 
                                              
14 Georgia v McCollum, 505 US 42, 59; 112 S Ct 2348; 120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992).  The Court 
explained that the constitutionally significant harm related to this error concerned jurors 
and the justice system more than a defendant’s exercise of a discriminatory peremptory 
challenge.  Id. at 49-50. 
15 Id. at 59 (“Accordingly, if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination by the defendants, the defendants must articulate a racially neutral 
explanation for peremptory challenges.”).  Because McCollum held that Batson applies to 
a defendant’s peremptory challenges, the prosecution in this case was permitted to 
challenge defendant’s peremptory challenges of white jurors. 
16 Knight, 473 Mich at 336, citing Batson, 476 US at 96. 
 
 
 
 
9 
against a particular class of people is relevant, “a party who advances a Batson argument 
ordinarily should come forward with facts, not just numbers alone.”17  The court explained 
that “[r]elevant numeric evidence includes the percentage of strikes directed against 
members of a particular group,”18 “the percentage of a particular group removed from the 
venire by the challenged strikes,”19 and “a comparison of the percentage of a group’s 
representation in the venire to its representation on the jury.”20 
Relevant nonnumeric evidence may also include “a pattern of strikes against 
members of the racial group, as well as the types of questions the prosecutor asks in his 
voir dire examination.”21  Other relevant nonnumeric evidence is whether similarly situated 
jurors from outside the allegedly targeted group were permitted to serve.22   
These factors give effect to Batson’s statement that a “ ‘pattern’ of strikes . . . might 
give rise to an inference of discrimination.”23  We therefore conclude that when a party 
                                              
17 Aspen v Bissonnette, 480 F3d 571, 577 (CA 1, 2007) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
18 Id., citing Paulino v Castro, 371 F3d 1083, 1091 (CA 9, 2014). 
19 Aspen, 480 F3d at 577, citing Turner v Marshall, 63 F3d 807, 813 (CA 9, 1995), 
overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v Page, 182 F3d 677, 684 (CA 9, 1999). 
20 Aspen, 480 F3d at 577, citing United States v Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F2d 1501, 1521-
1522 (CA 6, 1988). 
21 McCain v Gramley, 96 F3d 288, 290 (CA 7, 1996).   
22 Boyd v Newland, 467 F3d 1139, 1148-1150 (CA 9, 2006). 
23 Batson, 476 US at 97.  Of course, we acknowledge that “statistical evidence about the 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes” is relevant evidence of a prima facie case.  Flowers 
v Mississippi, 588 US ___, ___; 139 S Ct 2228, 2243; 204 L Ed 2d 638 (2019).  Nothing 
in our conclusion would diminish a party’s ability to raise this statistical evidence.  We 
would simply conclude that a party must use this evidence to argue a pattern of 
 
 
 
 
10 
raises a “numbers” argument in a Batson challenge, those numbers, by themselves, are 
insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  In sum, a prima facie case of discrimination 
under Batson should be premised on facts over and above the number of individuals 
excused.  The number of jurors excused (or not excused) is important only to the extent 
that it demonstrates a pattern of discrimination. 
2.  OFFERING A NEUTRAL EXPLANATION IN SUPPORT OF THE  
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
If the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie showing of discrimination has been 
made, the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory challenge to come forward 
with a neutral explanation” to support the challenge.24  This second step “does not demand 
an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.”25  The issue is the “ ‘facial validity of 
the . . . explanation.  Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the . . . explanation, the 
reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ”26  While the explanation “need not rise to 
the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,” the proponent of the peremptory 
challenge must do more than state that the challenged juror would be biased because of 
race.27   
                                              
discrimination.  See id. at ___; 139 S Ct at 2246 (analyzing the statistical evidence in light 
of Batson’s endorsement to show a “pattern” of discrimination).   
24 Batson, 476 US at 97.   
25 Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995).   
26 Id., quoting Hernandez, 500 US at 360.   
27 Batson, 476 US at 97.   
 
 
 
 
11 
3.  RESOLVING A BATSON CHALLENGE 
If the proponent of the peremptory challenge provides a race-neutral explanation, 
the trial court must determine whether this explanation is a pretext to improper 
discrimination and whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful 
discrimination.28  This third step “requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason 
in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.”29  The “ultimate burden of persuasion 
regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”30  
Batson cautions that a trial court’s “findings in the context under consideration here 
largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,” and thus “a reviewing court ordinarily should 
give those findings great deference.”31  This directive was subsequently reaffirmed in 
Hernandez v New York, in which the Supreme Court noted that this deference “makes 
particular sense in th[e] context” of the third Batson step because of the importance of 
credibility.32  “In the typical peremptory-challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be 
whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.  
There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will 
be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”33  An evaluation of the 
                                              
28 Knight, 473 Mich at 337-338, citing Batson, 476 US at 98. 
29 Miller-El v Dretke, 545 US 231, 252; 125 S Ct 2317; 162 L Ed 2d 196 (2005).   
30 Purkett, 514 US at 768. 
31 Batson, 476 US at 98 n 21.   
32 Hernandez, 500 US at 365. 
33 Id. 
 
 
 
 
12 
attorney’s state of mind, demeanor, and credibility lies “peculiarly within [the] trial judge’s 
province.”34  Likewise, the trial court must also evaluate “whether the juror’s demeanor 
can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror . . . .”35  
This deference is necessary “because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts 
from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility 
determinations.”36  Consequently, “in the absence of exceptional circumstances,” an 
appellate court should defer to the trial court’s determination in this regard.37 
B.  APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The proper standard of review for a Batson challenge depends on which of the 
Batson steps the Court is reviewing: 
If the first step is at issue (whether the opponent of the challenge has satisfied 
his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination), we review 
the trial court’s underlying factual findings for clear error, and we review 
questions of law de novo.  If Batson’s second step is implicated (whether the 
proponent of the peremptory challenge articulates a race-neutral explanation 
as a matter of law), we review the proffered explanation de novo.  Finally, if 
the third step is at issue (the trial court’s determinations whether the race-
neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the opponent of the challenge 
has proved purposeful discrimination), we review the trial court’s ruling for 
clear error.[38]  
                                              
34 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
35 Snyder v Louisiana, 552 US 472, 477; 128 S Ct 1203; 170 L Ed 2d 175 (2008). 
36 Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 339; 123 S Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 (2003). 
37 Snyder, 552 US at 477 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
38 Knight, 473 Mich at 345. 
 
 
 
 
13 
“Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the 
trial court made a mistake.”39 
C.  REVIEW OF VOIR DIRE PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court began voir dire by questioning each of the initial 14 prospective jurors 
on the panel randomly selected from the venire to ensure that each was qualified and 
competent to serve as a juror.  The court then turned voir dire questioning over to the 
parties.  After the parties had questioned the prospective jurors and passed on challenges 
for cause, the prosecution exercised two peremptory challenges and removed Prospective 
Juror 3(a), who was black, and Prospective Juror 13(a), who was white.  Next, defense 
counsel was offered an opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges but declined to do 
so.  The trial court questioned the replacement venire jurors, found Prospective Jurors 3(b) 
and 13(b) qualified and competent, and allowed the parties to question the new prospective 
jurors.  The parties passed again on challenges for cause.  Thereafter, defense counsel 
exercised a peremptory challenge and removed Prospective Juror 11(a), who was white.  
The prosecution then exercised a third peremptory challenge and removed Prospective 
Juror 2(a), who was black.40   
                                              
39 People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011). 
40 The court on its own removed for cause the replacement Prospective Juror 11(b) because 
he answered “no” to the question whether he could “listen to the evidence that’s presented 
and base [his] verdict on the evidence[.]”  Specifically, Prospective Juror 11(b) claimed he 
had previously been 
arrested and the officer made statements in the report which were false.  My 
attorney brought this up with the prosecutor.  The prosecutor had this officer 
brought up in front of the judge to discuss but beyond that I don’t recall or I 
don’t know but . . . I pled guilty. 
 
 
 
 
14 
A replacement was chosen for Juror 2(a), and the court repeated its voir dire process.  
The prosecution then exercised its fourth peremptory challenge and removed Prospective 
Juror 14(a), who was black.  Juror 14(b) was removed for cause41 and replaced by Juror 
14(c).42  At this point, the court sent the venire and the 13 prospective jurors seated in the 
jury box to lunch. 
After the venire and prospective jurors had left the courtroom, defense counsel 
raised the following concern regarding the prosecution’s use of its peremptory challenges: 
[Defense Counsel]: The prosecution has excused four people and I 
can’t—I can’t recall whether or not the fourth person was an African 
American but three of them were.  And I believe that this Court needs to at 
least attempt to get a definitive answer from the prosecutor about dismissing 
at least three, and I’m not sure of myself, the four people that she has 
excused . . . .   
The Court: The fourth was juror number 13[(a)] and that was a 
Caucasian person. 
[Defense Counsel]: Yes. 
The Court: And, currently, our jury panel has one, two, three, African 
Americans. 
                                              
Neither party objected to the removal of Prospective Juror 11(b) for cause, nor did either 
party challenge for cause Prospective Juror 11(c).   
41 The court excused Prospective Juror 14(b) after he gave varying answers regarding 
whether he would be able to return a guilty verdict because of his religious beliefs.   
42 Defense counsel challenged Prospective Juror 14(c) for cause because she stated, “I just 
don’t think people should be visibly displaying guns [regardless] whether they’re legally 
car[ry]ing unless they’re in a safety position[.]”  When pressed, however, Prospective Juror 
14(c) asserted that while it was her “feeling” that people should not visibly be carrying 
guns, she would “uphold the law so I’ll set [my personal views] aside.”  The court denied 
defendant’s challenge for cause, and defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to 
remove Prospective Juror 14(c).   
 
 
 
 
15 
The prosecution offered justifications for each of its peremptory challenges of black 
jurors.  In regard to Prospective Juror 3(a), the prosecution cited several examples in which 
the juror showed a lack of interest in serving on a jury, stating: 
As it relates to juror number three who I believe was the first juror 
that I struck, Ms. Whitford.  She clearly did not want to be here.  She was 
refusing to make eye contact with myself asking her questions, she was 
sitting down rolling her eyes, she had her arms crossed [at] a number of 
points.  When the Court asked about real hardships it was my job, it was my 
kids.  The Court asked about medical reasons, oh, I have arthritis.  And then 
also she said she had a torn ligament in her leg and she said it made it difficult 
for her to sit stand [sic] and then she said she had a broken—and then didn’t 
even tell us what the broken part of her body was.  And the People would 
like jurors that—I know everyone doesn’t necessarily want to be here, it’s 
not their favorite thing, but people that are going to be attentive jurors.  And 
based on her body language and her lack of interaction with me when I was 
trying to interact with her as well as the multitude of excuses she gave[,] that 
is the reason that the People excused her.[43] 
                                              
43 In response, defense counsel argued: 
That’s the usual responses about the lack of contact, and she didn’t 
look at me, and her body language, and she really didn’t want to be here.  She 
didn’t tell us what part of her body was ever broken as if, I don’t know what 
that means, but that somehow is further justification so to speak.  I just don’t 
believe we’ve heard anything other than the usual excuses that cover up a use 
of a peremptory for racial reasons. 
The trial court permitted the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to Juror 
3(a), ruling: 
[T]he prosecution provided several reasons, and I would concur with her, 
because the first question out the box with juror number [3(a)] was is a one 
to two day trial a genuine hardship and she was the first person to raise her 
hand.  She then did sit with her arms crossed.  I did notice the eyes rolling.  
She proffered her reasons for not wanting to be on the jury; her job, her 
children, and physical condition. 
 
 
 
 
16 
In regard to Prospective Juror 14(a), the prosecution noted she was pregnant and 
having trouble paying attention because she did not feel well, explaining: 
With regard to juror 14[(a)], Ms. Reynolds, it’s not on record but Ms. 
Reynolds was clearly quite pregnant.  She indicated that she had gone to the 
doctor the day before for severe pain.  As she’s sitting in the jury seat her 
head was in her hand and she also just appeared to be in extreme pain.  It did 
not appear to the People that she was going to be necessarily inattentive or 
trying to off the jury [sic] but based on her quite extreme pregnancy and the 
fact that she said she was having sever [sic] pains the day before the People 
had a concern both with her being able to sit through today as well as possibly 
losing her over the weekend if she has to keep going back to the doctor.  But, 
again, the head in her hands, her eyes are closing and she’s clearly in distress.  
The People excused juror number 14[(a)].[44] 
In regard to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge as to Prospective Juror 2(a), 
one of two peremptory challenges this Court expressly granted leave to address, the 
                                              
So I’m going to find that there has been a reason offered that is not 
inherently discriminatory. 
44 In response, defense counsel argued: 
Yeah.  I mean, there’ [sic] was one juror sitting there, juror number 
eight, who was taking a quick snooze.  I mean, the point being that other than 
the fact that she was pregnant there was absolutely nothing whatsoever—and 
that didn’t disable her in anyway, you don’t become disabled, generally 
speaking, by being pregnant.  I can’t speak, I’m a guy.  But that’s no basis to 
excuse somebody because they’re pregnant.  And other than that there wasn’t 
anything that this witness exhibited that wasn’t exhibited by other jurors as 
well. 
The trial court ruled, under the third Batson step: 
[T]here is a race neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.  This lady 
is pregnant, she did have her head in her hand, she testified to having a 
doctor’s appointment, she was clearly not feeling well.  She testified she has 
flexible work hours, she has children at home, she [was] depend[e]nt upon 
her mother for childcare assistance. 
 
 
 
 
17 
prosecution cited concerns with the juror’s memory as the basis for its challenge, 
explaining: 
With regards to juror number two she had what seemed, at least to me, 
to be a very difficult time with short-term memory.  She could not remember 
the Court’s first question when asked what her occupation was, and she 
couldn’t remember any of the additional questions after that.  She had to ask 
a few times.  Also, she indicated having a senior moment here and there.  She 
indicated, when asked about contact with the police, she thought she had 
been pulled over or she thought she had contact with the police before.  She 
couldn’t remember any sort [of] specifics.  Same with whether herself or her 
family were a victim of the crime she thought, yes, maybe robberies or armed 
robbery or something, I can’t remember, I can’t remember, I don’t remember 
how long ago, I don’t remember anything.  So she had a problem with 
memory and it’s the People’s concern for her that if we’re going to hear 
testimony today and then have a long weekend and come back on Monday.  
And, so, the likelihood that she would forget testimony seemed fairly 
probable and the People were concerned about that. 
In response, defense counsel disputed the veracity of the prosecutor’s assertions, 
stating: 
There’s absolutely no validity to what was just stated.  That witness indicated 
only a difficulty in remembering whether something happened 10 years ago.  
And if the Court wants us to review anything I’m sure the court reporter could 
do so if the Court wished the exact word back and forth.  Just repeating 
memory, memory, by the prosecutor is not reflective of what that 
p[ro]spective juror indicated.  There was no memory problem whatsoever. 
The trial court rejected defendant’s Batson challenge, beginning its analysis at 
Batson’s second step: 
[S]tep two of the Batson framework is that the prosecutor must articulate a 
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. . . .  [T]he Court 
is only concerned with whether the proffered reasons violate[] the Equal 
Protection Clause and that’s, again, part of the Batson case. 
I’m going to find in this case that the prosecutor as to juror number 
two has offered a race neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and 
further has articulated a neutral explanation for the dismissal.  Juror number 
 
 
 
 
18 
two did indeed have a difficult time with memory[;] she did discuss senior 
moments.  She had to kind of . . . step back and reach back in her memory to 
recall things such as whether or not she had been the victim of a crime, such 
as—there were some other specific ones.  But I do remember she did seem 
to have a problem keeping up with this case. 
And Batson’s second step does not require[] articulation of [a] 
persuasive reason or even a plausible one[;] so long as the reason is not 
inherently discriminatory[,] it suffices. . . .   
So here the prosecutor has provided a race neutral explanation for her 
peremptory challenges to number two so I’m going to then deny the Batson 
challenge as to juror number two.   
*   *   * 
 . . . [T]he third step [of the Batson analysis] . . . requires that the trial 
[c]ourt make a final determination of whether the challenger of the strike, 
which would be the defense, has established purposeful discrimination.  And 
whether there is purposeful discrimination is the persuasiveness of the 
prosecutor’s justification for the peremptory strike.  It comes down to 
whether the trial [c]ourt finds the prosecutor’s race neutral explanations to 
be creditable [sic].  And in this case I will find that it was reasonable, her 
explanation is not improbable, there was a rationale that had some basis in 
accepted trial strategy.  And so I’m going to deny the Batson challenge as to 
juror number two.[45]  [Italics added.] 
After the lunch break, jury selection continued by seating a prospective juror to 
replace Prospective Juror 14(c), who was excused for cause.  After voir dire by the trial 
                                              
45 Almost immediately after the trial court denied defense counsel’s Batson challenges, the 
prosecution stated: 
With regard to Batson, your Honor, I just, for the record the, two 
jurors that defense counsel have excused have both been Caucasian I did 
make note of that.  I am not raising [a] Batson challenge at this time I just 
want the Court to be on notice that is a potential issue coming up. 
Defense counsel retorted, “Well, in terms of potential issue[s] let’s see how many more 
black people the prosecutor excuses.”  The trial court admonished defendant, stating, “[W]e 
don’t need that.  That was an unnecessary remark.” 
 
 
 
 
19 
court, the parties passed on any challenges for cause.  After consulting with his client, 
defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror 5(a)—
counsel’s third consecutive peremptory challenge of a white prospective juror and the other 
peremptory challenge this Court expressly granted leave to address.  The prosecution 
immediately objected, and the trial court excused the jury pool and prospective jurors from 
the courtroom to review the prosecution’s objection.  The following discussion took place: 
[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, the People are concerned that the 
defense has excused three jurors, they are all Caucasian, and based on, 
especially, the third challenge . . . , the People didn’t see any reason the 
defense would want to excuse her and are asking for a race neutral reason for 
excusing all three of the white jurors[.] 
The Court: Well, let’s start with juror number five because jurors 
numbers 11 and 14 were excused a while ago. 
[The Prosecutor]: They were. 
The Court: So let’s talk about juror number five.  Mr. Halpern? 
[Defense Counsel]: Juror number five’s father is or was a police 
officer.  Juror number five indicated that she had a felony conviction, 
although apparently nothing seemed to showup, but I would think the People 
know what they have a conviction of.  There was real closeness— 
The Court: I’m sorry, Mr. Halpern, I can’t hear you[.] 
[Defense Counsel]: Father and brother I think were somehow 
connected with law enforcement.  And there were some personal feelings 
back and forth that I had when I was questioning her that . . . seemed to me 
to be negative. 
The Court: Such as what? 
[Defense Counsel]: Just my feelings, my feelings of exchange of 
words that I felt were unfriendly, somewhat antagonistic I felt.  So all of those 
reasons. 
The Court: Ms. Posigian? 
 
 
 
 
20 
[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, that juror, juror number five, ha[s] 
been on the panel, I think she was on the initial panel.  And there are several 
people that have friends or family members that are in law enforcement.  
With regard to her felony conviction the officer-in-charge did run her name 
and her date of birth over the break that we had and she had no record. 
The Court: And that was placed on the record, too, as I recall. 
[The Prosecutor]: Yes.  And feelings aren’t anything that really had 
been articulated.  The people are concerned that there’s not a race neutral 
reason for excusing juror number five. 
[Defense Counsel]: I’ve used the same reasons . . . that the prosecutor 
used in terms of exchange of feelings, and the looks of somebody, the 
responses that were made.  And number five also didn’t really recall things 
so maybe she has a real problem remembering— 
The Court: I don’t recall that at all, Mr. Halpern.  We haven’t spoken 
to juror number five since we had our first round of dismissals.  Juror number 
five has been just sitting there.   
[Defense Counsel]: Right.  But my concern— 
The Court: So I’m confused.  I don’t remember her saying she 
couldn’t remember anything. 
[Defense Counsel]: Yeah, she couldn’t remember—First of all, the 
conviction was out of state so I don’t know whether or not the officer was 
able to check— 
At this point the court swore in the officer, who confirmed that Juror 5(a) did not 
have a criminal record.  The court then asked: 
The Court: So your objection to her criminal record— 
[Defense Counsel]: Well, then, my position is that she’s lying.  If they 
didn’t find it, and according to the officer, then she wasn’t telling the truth 
and I certainly don’t want my client to be judged by someone who isn’t 
telling the truth either way. 
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s Batson challenge, reasoning: 
 
 
 
 
21 
[S]tep two is to articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case 
to be tried.  And in this particular case Mr. Halpern articulates the fact that 
she has police officers in her family.  But during the voir dire of number five 
I did not hear any additional voir dire directed to her about her relationships 
with police officers.  She testified clearly to me during the voir dire that her 
relationships would not affect her ability to be a fair and impartial juror and 
she understood that the testimony of a police officer is to be put to the same 
challenges of weight and credibility as that of any other witness.   
As far as any—as far as the fact that she didn’t have a conviction or 
couldn’t remember a conviction I’d far rather a juror disclose that she thinks 
that she may have a conviction and we investigate it and find out that she 
doesn’t rather than a juror lie and say I don’t have one when in reality they 
do.  I don’t feel it’s appropriate to kick juror number five because she raised 
a concern which the Court was able to address.  
Finally, when we talk about evaluating the plausibility of a race 
neutral explanation for a strike in light of[] all the evidence with a bearing on 
it[,] this inquiry, according to the Tennielle [sic][46] case[,] necessarily 
includes careful consideration of relevant, direct, and circumstantial 
evidence of intent to discriminate.  And, also, in this case I have asked the 
defense very specifically what problems they have with juror number five 
considering the fact she has been seated on this jury since the original 14 
jurors were impanelled.  What I’m hearing is feelings.  There is—I have to—
I’m charged as the judge . . . to probe more deeply when someone just talks 
about feelings.  And there’s not sufficient facts here.  I’m not hearing about 
somebody that’s sleeping, somebody nervous, preoccupied, angry, 
disrespectful or agitated.  I’m just hearing about feelings.  I’m tasked with 
engaging in a more penetrating analysis focus[]ing on ascertaining whether 
the proffered race neutral reason is pretext intended to mask a discrimination.  
Evaluation of the central question requires the Court to permit argument by 
the opposing counsel who bears the burden of persuading the Court that 
the—that there was purposeful discrimination here.  This record lacks any 
objective indicia of concern—concerning the impartiality of juror number 
five or that she is otherwise unfit to serve as a juror in this case.  So I’m going 
to find . . . that the reason offered is insufficient and I am going to find that 
the challenger has established purposeful discrimination.  So I’m going to 
keep juror number five on the jury . . . .  
                                              
46 People v Tennille, 315 Mich App 51; 888 NW2d 278 (2016). 
 
 
 
 
22 
The venire jurors and prospective jurors then returned to the courtroom.  Defense 
counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror 8(a), who was of Middle 
Eastern descent.  Following a lengthy voir dire, the trial court dismissed Prospective Juror 
8(b) for cause.47  A replacement juror, Prospective Juror 8(c), was chosen and subjected to 
voir dire.  After the parties passed on challenges for cause on Prospective Juror 8(c) and 
passed on additional peremptory challenges, the jury was empaneled.   
In sum, the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges to remove three black 
prospective jurors and one white prospective juror.  Defense counsel exercised peremptory 
challenges to remove two white prospective jurors and was denied a third consecutive 
challenge to a white prospective juror, but later exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse 
one prospective juror of Middle Eastern descent.  The jury that was empaneled had at least 
three black jurors.48   
                                              
47 At the end of the trial court’s voir dire, the following was revealed by Prospective Juror 
8(b): 
[Defense Counsel]: You wouldn’t accept uncontradicted testimony of 
the two police officers that said they have a concealed weapon; wouldn’t be 
enough for you? 
[Prospective Juror 8(b)]: No, I wouldn’t. 
The Court: I think it’s very clear juror number eight would not follow 
the law.  He just simply would not follow the law no matter what I told him 
the law was.  So as disappointed as I am and juror number eight[’s] stated 
determination not to follow the law I’m going to dismiss him from the jury 
panel regretfully. 
48 Absent from the record is a demographic breakdown of the empaneled jury.  We know, 
however, that at least three black jurors were on the jury before Prospective Juror 8(c) was 
empaneled.  The record is silent as to the race of Prospective Juror 8(c).   
 
 
 
 
23 
1.  BATSON CHALLENGE TO PROSPECTIVE JUROR 2(a) 
With this background, we address defendant’s Batson challenge to the removal 
Prospective Juror 2(a).  Although the three-prong burden-shifting analysis from Batson 
requires defendant to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, we 
note that the trial court began its analysis with the second prong because the prosecution 
immediately offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges.  While we 
question whether defendant satisfied his initial burden of proving a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination, we will proceed as if he did.49 
                                              
49 The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan (PAAM), as amicus curiae, presents 
a cogent and credible argument that it is questionable whether defendant established a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.  Defense counsel’s objection was based 
solely on the prosecution’s exercise of three out of four peremptory challenges on 
prospective black jurors.  Defense counsel only requested to “get a definitive answer from 
the prosecution” about those challenges.   
In order to establish a prima facie case, defendant was required to show that he is a 
member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecution challenged one or more members 
of that group, and “all the relevant circumstances raise an inference” that the challenges 
were made on the basis of race.  Knight, 473 Mich at 336.  The first two requirements are 
clearly met, and, as for the third, it is true that a numbers-based showing may be relevant 
to raising an inference that the challenges were based on race.  See Aspen, 480 F3d at 577.  
However, defendant did not attempt to show that those numbers showed a pattern of 
discrimination by, for instance, highlighting the number of peremptory strikes against 
prospective jurors of one race in comparison to the remaining prospective jurors of that 
same race.  See, e.g., McCain, 96 F3d at 290; Walker, 490 F3d at 1291.  Here, at the point 
of the jury-selection process when the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenge on 
Juror 2(a), the prosecution had only excused one black prospective juror, Juror 3(a), and 
one white prospective juror, Juror 13(a).  Thus, because the trial court commenced its 
review of the jury-selection proceedings at Step Two of the three-prong Batson analysis, 
we decline to consider whether defendant established a prima facie case.  Nonetheless, we 
recognize there are cogent arguments to support the conclusion that defendant failed to 
satisfy his initial burden of proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the 
first prong of the Batson analysis. 
 
 
 
 
24 
Turning to the second step of the Batson analysis, the prosecution offered a race-
neutral reason for removing Prospective Juror 2(a): short-term memory problems.  This 
reason for requesting removal does not need to be persuasive or even plausible; as long as 
a discriminatory intent is not inherent in the explanation, it will be deemed race-neutral.50  
Here, the proffered explanation was certainly race-neutral.  Memory problems do not give 
rise to any inherent discriminatory intent by themselves.  Rather, they have been repeatedly 
held as constituting a valid, race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge.51  Therefore, 
the trial court did not err by ruling that the prosecution offered a race-neutral reason for 
dismissing Prospective Juror 2(a).  
Turning to Step Three, we find no clear error in the trial court’s rejection of 
defendant’s Batson challenge.  We are guided by the principle that a trial court’s finding 
that no Batson violation occurred is entitled to “great deference.”52  Here, defendant 
challenged the prosecution’s peremptory strike of three prospective jurors: 2(a), 3(a), and 
14(a).  Even viewing defendant’s challenge to Prospective Juror 2(a) in isolation, the record 
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Prospective Juror 2(a) did have some memory 
problems.  When asked about her qualifications, she had no problem remembering that she 
was retired from counseling, divorced, and had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice 
administration.  But when asked if she had served on a jury before, she replied that she had 
                                              
50 Purkett, 514 US at 768. 
51 See People v Armstrong, 6 Cal 5th 735, 774; 433 P3d 987 (2019); State v Toliver, 205 
So 3d 948, 955; 2015-1959 (La App 1 Cir 9/19/16); Woolf v State, 220 So 3d 338, 372 (Ala 
Crim App, 2014). 
52 Hernandez, 500 US at 364, citing Batson, 476 US at 98 n 21. 
 
 
 
 
25 
“years and years ago but we didn’t have to serve because the defendant pled or something 
and then we left.”  Further, when asked if she knew someone who had been a victim of a 
crime, she responded, “[y]eah, we have been—our family has been but it was a long time 
ago.  I can’t remember the years and stuff.  Senior moment.  I’m 64 so . . . .”  When asked 
if she ever had a bad experience with a police officer, she responded, “I’m sure I have been 
pulled over and stuff like that before but I don’t remember how long ago that was.”   
Although the evidence supporting the prosecution’s nonracial reasons for removing 
Prospective Juror 2(a) is not as clear and decisive as the reasons offered in support of the 
removal of Prospective Jurors 3(a) and 14(a), we conclude the challenge to Juror 2(a) 
cannot be reviewed in isolation.  Counsel’s exercise of other peremptory challenges is 
relevant evidence in assessing whether counsel exercised a particular peremptory challenge 
with improper motives.53  Reviewing the totality of the proceedings, we conclude the trial 
                                              
53 The evidence that the prosecution’s proffered reasons were credible goes far beyond the 
specific evidence pertaining to Prospective Juror 2(a).  Defendant’s Batson challenge 
concerned challenges to two other prospective jurors: 3(a) and 14(a).  In each instance, the 
prosecution’s race-neutral reasons were found to be credible based on strong record 
evidence.  In context, the most relevant challenge would be the prosecution’s peremptory 
challenge to Prospective Juror 3(a), as that strike was the only peremptory challenge of a 
black juror exercised by the prosecution before the peremptory challenge to Prospective 
Juror 2(a).   
In regard to Prospective Juror 3(a), the prosecution argued that she had medical 
reasons that made it difficult for her to sit for long periods of time and it was clear that she 
was antagonistic to participating in the trial.  These arguments are race-neutral and, if 
supported by the record, credible.  See United States v Garrison, 849 F2d 103, 106 (CA 4, 
1988) (“A prosecutor is justified in striking jurors that he or she perceives to be inattentive 
or uninterested.”).  Here, the prosecution’s arguments were supported by the record.  When 
asked what hardship jury service would present, Prospective Juror 3(a) answered, “my job 
and get[ting] my kids to school.”  She agreed with the trial court that she had not sought 
any deferment or excuse on the basis of hardship.  Immediately after, the trial court asked 
the prospective jurors whether they had any health problems that would make jury service 
 
 
 
 
26 
court did not clearly err by accepting the prosecution’s nonracial reasons for excusing 
Prospective Juror 2(a) peremptorily.  This record sufficiently supports the conclusion that, 
perhaps because of her age, Prospective Juror 2(a) had trouble remembering details.  While 
she did not have trouble remembering some basic information such as her age, educational 
background, and career history, she was unable to remember certain events that occurred 
in her life, some of which were significant and were relevant to her candidacy as a juror.  
For example, she claimed that her family had been the victim of a robbery, perhaps even 
                                              
difficult.  Prospective Juror 3(a) alone responded, and said she had a “torn ligament” and 
“arthritis bad in my knee so I can’t sit or stand at periods of time.”  Further, the record 
supports the prosecution’s contention that Prospective Juror 3(a) appeared antagonistic to 
the prosecution.  The trial court confirmed having seen Prospective Juror 3(a) sit with her 
arms crossed and roll her eyes during voir dire.  She also admitted that her “cousin . . . went 
to jail for armed robbery” and that three years ago she was convicted of third-degree retail 
fraud, a misdemeanor.  Accordingly, the prosecution’s history of peremptory challenges 
before the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror 2(a) revealed no suggestion of 
discrimination on the basis of race.  See, e.g., Flowers, 588 US at ___; 139 S Ct at 2243 
(noting that a prosecutor’s history of peremptory strikes is relevant evidence).   
In regard to Prospective Juror 14(a), the prosecution highlighted that she was 
pregnant and was in “extreme pain.”  Consequently, the prosecution was concerned with 
whether Prospective Juror 14(a) would make it through trial, especially given that trial was 
expected to continue the following week.  Again, these are race-neutral reasons to excuse 
a juror.  See State v Bell, 359 NC 1, 15; 603 SE2d 93 (2004) (holding that a concern that a 
juror would “suffer so much pain [from medical issues] that she would be unable to 
participate in the proceedings” was a “valid and race-neutral reason” to excuse the juror).  
They were also supported by the record.  Prospective Juror 14(a) stated that she was having 
trouble sleeping and caring for her children and that she had recently gone to the doctor for 
pain that was still persisting.  The trial court also observed that “[t]his lady is pregnant, she 
did have her head in her hand, she testified to having a doctor’s appointment, [and] she was 
clearly not feeling well.”  Thus, similar to Prospective Juror 3(a), the prosecution’s reasons 
for using a peremptory challenge as to Prospective Juror 14(a) in no way suggest racial 
discrimination.  The prosecutor’s reasons for excusing both challenged jurors were credible 
and clearly supported by the record.  While this reasoning is not dispositive as to 
Prospective Juror 2(a), it suggests that the prosecution’s use of its challenges throughout 
voir dire was not motivated by race. 
 
 
 
 
27 
an armed robbery—something most people would consider to be a very traumatic and 
memorable event.  When asked if she or her family had been the victim of a crime, she 
offered within that response that she could not “remember the years and stuff.”  She was 
briefly interrupted but continued to answer, stating “[w]e have had, you know, robbery and 
stuff like that but it was, like, a long time ago nothing recent.”  When viewed in context, 
we conclude it was reasonable that the prosecution believed this exchange called for 
Prospective Juror 2(a) to provide a more detailed and robust answer, and the absence of 
such left an impression that Prospective Juror 2(a) was unable to recall any details of this 
crime.54  Further, the trial court, in ruling on defendant’s Batson challenge, referred to the 
fact that Prospective Juror 2(a) repeatedly needed to “reach back into her memory to recall 
things” and that she “did seem to have a problem keeping up with this case.”  Those 
references pertain directly to the trial court’s assessment and evaluation of Prospective 
Juror 2(a)’s demeanor and courtroom presence—information that is permissible to 
consider, but impossible to assess from a cold reading of the transcript.55 
                                              
54 The opinion supporting reversal suggests the prosecution should have probed more 
deeply into whether Juror 2(a) could recall specific details of crimes committed against her 
and her family.  We disagree.  Litigation is an art, and counsel should be ever mindful that 
every action one takes leave an impression on the jurors.  It was enough that Juror 2(a)’s 
responses during voir dire caused counsel to question whether she would be able to recall 
details of evidence presented at trial.  It was not the duty of counsel to prove Juror 2(a) 
actually lacked capacity to serve.  Such action could leave an unfavorable impression of 
the prosecution with the other jurors; e.g., probing more deeply into Juror 2(a)’s memory 
might have given the impression that the prosecution was picking on one of the older jurors.  
It bears repeating that the “ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests 
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”  Purkett, 514 US at 768. 
55 See Hernandez, 500 US at 365; Cockrell, 537 US at 341.  Because the record shows that 
the trial court actually assessed the demeanor and relied on its personal observations of 
Juror 2(a) when it overruled defendant’s Batson challenge, we strongly disagree with the 
 
 
 
 
28 
While the prosecutor inaccurately described the nature and extent of Prospective 
Juror 2(a)’s memory problems, those inaccuracies, by themselves, are not demonstrative 
of an underlying discriminatory motivation to dismiss Prospective Juror 2(a) on the basis 
of race.  The prosecutor characterized Prospective Juror 2(a)’s memory issues as “short 
term,” yet all of her proofs related to long-term memory issues.  Further, the prosecutor 
mentioned that Prospective Juror 2(a) had multiple “senior moments,” even though she 
actually only mentioned such a moment once.  The prosecutor also argued that Prospective 
Juror 2(a) could not remember her level of education, but it is clear that she did.  While 
these inaccuracies, by themselves, could be evidence of discrimination,56 the prosecutor’s 
reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge as to Prospective Juror 2(a), taken as a 
whole, support the trial court’s finding that the prosecution did not operate with a 
discriminatory motive.  As mentioned above, Prospective Juror 2(a)’s responses were not 
altogether responsive to the questions posed to her during voir dire, and it is not 
unreasonable that the trial court shared the prosecution’s impression that she had memory 
problems.  Further, the record does not contradict the prosecution’s assessment that this 
prospective juror had trouble recalling the details of past events.  At best, the record 
evidence is mixed with regard to the prosecution’s motives in removing Prospective Juror 
2(a).  But when we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made 
                                              
proposition taken in the opinion to reverse: that we can ignore the deferential standard of 
review appellate courts have long given to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory 
intent in the context of a Batson challenge. 
56 See Miller-El, 545 US at 244 (explaining that considerations applicable to this fact-
finding process include statements by the prosecutor that “mischaracterized [the] 
testimony” regarding the excused prospective juror’s views). 
 
 
 
 
29 
a mistake, a mixed record is insufficient to support a finding of clear error.  That a 
reviewing court might have acted differently is not a basis on which to find clear error in 
the trial court.57   
Here, the record clearly establishes that Prospective Juror 2(a) had difficulty 
recalling some of the topics discussed during voir dire and had trouble remembering basic 
details of life events, which was relevant to her ability to consider all the evidence presented 
in a criminal jury trial and render a verdict on defendant’s guilt.  The trial court observed 
the demeanor of Prospective Juror 2(a) during the selection process, as well as the 
demeanor of the prosecutor in challenging Prospective Juror 2(a).  In light of these 
courtroom observations, the trial court found that the prosecutor’s reason for peremptorily 
removing Prospective Juror 2(a) was credible.  The evidence contrary to the trial court’s 
findings does not rise to the level of an “exceptional circumstance” justifying an appellate 
court’s departure from the “great deference” given to the trial court.58  Consequently, we 
conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by rejecting defendant’s Batson challenge 
as to Juror 2(a). 
                                              
57 Trial court proceedings often move at an expeditious and unscripted pace that can impose 
stress on counsel and the court.  Nonetheless, trial courts are presumed to understand the 
nature of their acts and to carry out their duties with proper preparation and knowledge.  
Bishop v Hartman, 325 Mich 115, 125; 37 NW2d 885 (1949).  This presumption cannot 
be maintained if appellate courts review such proceedings with an expectation of 
perfection, viewed with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.   
58 Snyder, 552 US at 477; Batson, 476 US at 98 n 21. 
 
 
 
 
30 
2.  BATSON CHALLEGE TO PROSPECTIVE JUROR 5(a) 
As earlier explained, Batson also applies to a defendant’s peremptory challenge of 
jurors, and, “if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the 
defendants, the defendants must articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory 
challenges.”59 
Once again, the trial court did not immediately address whether Batson’s first step 
was satisfied, turning instead to defendant’s proffered race-neutral reason for the challenge 
to Prospective Juror 5(a).  But, unlike the court’s Batson analysis in regard to Prospective 
Juror 2(a), the court here later readdressed whether the prosecution established a prima 
facie case.  The court concluded, “I think in this case the prosecution, as to juror number 
five, has established a prima facie case because this is the third peremptory challenge which 
the defendant has raised.”  Moreover, this aspect of the issue is reviewed de novo because 
whether the facts on which the prosecution’s argument relies constitute a prima facie case 
is a question of law.60  In other words, this Court need not give deference to either the trial 
court’s conclusions or the Court of Appeals’ conclusions in regard to our treatment of this 
issue.  Thus, while the parties do not raise the issue, we address whether the prosecution 
established a prima facie case raising an inference of racial discrimination as to Prospective 
Juror 5(a).  The prosecution’s argument regarding Prospective Juror 5(a) was nearly as 
perfunctory as defendant’s argument regarding Prospective Juror 2(a).  The prosecution 
stated that “the defense has excused three jurors, they are all Caucasian, and based on, 
                                              
59 McCollum, 505 US at 59.   
60 Knight, 473 Mich at 342, 345. 
 
 
 
 
31 
especially, the third challenge[d] witness[’]s reasons, the People didn’t see any reason the 
defense would want to excuse her and are asking for a race neutral reason . . . .”   
Like defendant’s argument regarding Prospective Juror 2(a), the prosecution’s 
argument was based on numbers alone, focusing only on the fact that defendant had 
excused three white jurors without placing those numbers in meaningful context.  The trial 
court was persuaded by this argument, concluding that the prosecutor’s citation of the 
numbers of peremptory challenges against white prospective jurors established a prima 
facie case.61  But the prosecution did not attempt to translate these numbers into an 
argument that there was a pattern of racial discrimination.  Again, it is a pattern, not just 
numbers, that can establish a prima facie case.62 
Further, the crux of the prosecution’s prima facie argument was not just that 
defendant had excused three white jurors, but rather that it did not “see any reason the 
defense would want to excuse her,” referring to Juror 5(a).  This statement does not raise 
any inference that defendant was engaging in purposeful discrimination.  A party need not 
have a strong legal reason for excusing a particular juror.63  Indeed, the concept of 
                                              
61 The record indeed shows that defendant exercised peremptory challenges only against 
three white jurors, and the number of peremptory challenges used against a particular racial 
group is somewhat relevant.  See Aspen, 480 F3d at 577.  But, given that white jurors made 
up a majority of the jury venire and prospective jurors, it is not surprising that defendant’s 
challenges had only been directed toward white individuals.   
62 See, e.g., McCain, 96 F3d at 290; Walker, 490 F3d at 1291. 
63 See Hayes v Missouri, 120 US 68, 70; 7 S Ct 350; 30 L Ed 578 (1887) (“The public 
prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered, from 
his habits and associations, and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection 
to him.”). 
 
 
 
 
32 
peremptory challenges rests on the notion that one need not have any reason to dismiss a 
prospective juror.  Batson’s only restriction on this otherwise unfettered right to strike 
prospective jurors is that one cannot be motivated by race.64   
Thus, as with defendant’s prima facie case regarding Prospective Juror 2(a), we 
again question whether a prima facie case was made, this time by the prosecution.  The 
prosecution’s reliance on the number of peremptory challenges to remove white jurors 
alone does not show any pattern of discrimination.  Defendant’s challenges were not 
against a minority ethnic group, so, presumably, there were plenty of white individuals left 
both on the prospective panel and in the venire.  And the prosecution was not necessarily 
entitled to “ask for” a reason for the peremptory challenge.  Even though no party has raised 
the argument that the prosecution’s prima facie case failed, we would conclude that it did. 
Even assuming that the prosecution did establish a prima facie case, we would also 
conclude that the trial court erred by sustaining the prosecution’s Batson challenge.  
Moving to the second Batson step, defense counsel offered several race-neutral reasons for 
challenging Prospective Juror 5(a).  Specifically, he stated that Juror 5(a) had family 
connections to law enforcement, that she purported to have a felony conviction that did not 
show up on her record, and that she appeared “antagonistic” and “unfriendly.”65  Each of 
these reasons is, on its face, valid and race-neutral.  That family connections to law 
                                              
64 See Batson, 476 US at 85-86. 
65 Defense counsel did little to nothing to support his claim that Prospective Juror 5(a) was 
“antagonistic” and “unfriendly.”  In fact, his initial articulation suggested he was exercising 
this peremptory challenge on the basis of his gut feelings, something inherently suspect 
when reviewing a challenge under Batson.  It was only in response to the trial court’s 
questioning that defense counsel supplemented his argument to assert that this prospective 
juror was “antagonistic” and “unfriendly.”   
 
 
 
 
33 
enforcement constitute a race-neutral reason to strike a juror is an unremarkable concept.  
Indeed, the parties themselves do not challenge the proposition.  Accordingly, defendant’s 
primary reason for striking Juror 5(a)—her familial connection to law enforcement—was 
a valid, nondiscriminatory reason to exercise a peremptory challenge.  Additionally, 
striking an antagonistic or hostile juror is a race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory 
challenge.  The parties do not challenge that proposition, and we have no reason to disagree.  
Therefore, defendant proffered at least two race-neutral reasons for his challenge. 
As with Prospective Juror 2(a), the ultimate question we must consider is whether 
the trial court’s decision to sustain the Batson challenge was clearly erroneous, i.e., the 
third Batson step.  Again, there must be an “exceptional circumstance” justifying an 
appellate court’s departure from the “great deference” given to the trial court.66  This is a 
very close and narrow question, but we ultimately conclude that the trial court clearly erred 
by upholding the prosecution’s challenge.  While the record does not significantly support 
the prosecution’s argument that defendant was engaging in a pattern of racial 
discrimination by exercising a peremptory challenge on Prospective Juror 5(a), the record 
does reflect that the trial court was inclined to agree with the prosecution’s earlier stated 
suspicions (following the denial of defendant’s Batson challenge) that defense counsel had 
previously exercised peremptory challenges on Prospective Jurors 13(a) and 14(c) on the 
basis of race and that a peremptory challenge to any white juror by defendant should be 
viewed as highly suspect.  Perhaps the trial court’s disposition was justified given that 
when the prosecution initially stated its concern with defendant’s use of peremptory 
                                              
66 Snyder, 552 US at 477; Batson, 476 US at 98 n 21. 
 
 
 
 
34 
challenges, defense counsel improvidently responded, “Well, in terms of potential issue[s] 
let’s see how many more black people the prosecutor excuses.”  This remark did not go 
unnoticed by the trial judge, who admonished defense counsel for his unprofessionalism. 
But a trial court cannot preclude the exercise of a peremptory challenge merely 
because the court suspects that a party has previously engaged in purposeful discrimination 
in the exercise of one or more peremptory challenges.  Rather, each and every peremptory 
challenge must be weighed on its own merit.67  In this case, defense counsel gave the court 
                                              
67 This Court has previously addressed a similar issue, albeit in a civil context.  In 
Pellegrino v Ampco Sys Parking, 486 Mich 330, 334; 785 NW2d 45 (2010), the trial court 
expressed the “goal” that the jury composition would “represent[] the racial composition 
of [Wayne] county.”  The defendant attempted to peremptorily excuse a black woman, and 
the plaintiff raised a Batson objection.  The trial court sustained the challenge, even though 
the defendant offered a valid race-neutral reason (she had recently been widowed and the 
facts of the case involved a widower).  Despite the defendant’s argument that the Batson 
issue was a red herring, the court commented that it would not “indulge in . . . race 
baiting . . . .”   Id. at 335.  This Court held that the trial court clearly erred by disallowing 
the peremptory challenge, explaining that denying a peremptory challenge in order to 
“attain a racially proportionate jury” violates the “rule of Batson that jurors must be 
indifferently chosen.”  Id. at 333 (quotation marks omitted).  This Court further held that 
the trial court’s actions violated the race-neutral requirements of both the state and federal 
Constitutions and MCR 2.511.  The trial court’s denial of the peremptory challenge 
expressly took the juror’s race into account, leading this Court to state that it was “hard to 
conceive of a more flagrant and unambiguous violation of the court rule.”  Id. at 343.  
Further, the trial court’s decision contravened caselaw from the United States Supreme 
Court, which holds that juries do not need to “ ‘mirror the community . . . .’ ”  Id., quoting 
Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 538 (1975).  Moreover, this Court observed that the 
Constitution requires an impartial jury, not a representative one.  Id. at 344, citing Holland 
v Illinois, 493 US 474, 480; 110 S Ct 803; 107 L Ed 2d 905 (1990).   
The facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts in Pellegrino.  Simply put, 
the trial court’s actions in this case cannot be likened to the defiant and egregious actions 
of the trial court in Pellegrino.  There, the trial court not only knowingly violated Batson 
and Michigan caselaw by actually influencing the racial composition of the jury, but in 
doing so, the court apparently sought to subvert all the relevant law to promote its own 
version of the “right” jury for a particular trial.  Here, by contrast, it is very evident that the 
 
 
 
 
35 
every reason to closely scrutinize his use of peremptory challenges after defense counsel 
gratuitously intimated on the record that he would continue to peremptorily challenge white 
jurors as long as the prosecutor challenged black jurors.  For this reason, we believe the 
trial court is aptly described by the following appraisal: 
[T]he trial judge’s conduct reflected a good-faith, if arguably overzealous, 
effort to enforce the antidiscrimination requirements of our Batson-related 
precedents.  To hold that a one-time, good-faith misapplication of Batson 
violates due process would likely discourage trial courts and prosecutors 
from policing a criminal defendant’s discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges.  The Fourteenth Amendment does not compel such a tradeoff.[68] 
But defense counsel’s imprudent remark, standing alone, was not a sufficient reason for 
the court to find that defense counsel’s third peremptory challenge of a white juror was 
racially motivated. 
We are not persuaded that the prosecution’s prima facie argument provided 
substantial, let alone strong or compelling, evidence that defendant had engaged in a pattern 
of striking members of a different racial group.  The prosecution’s argument, at most, 
revealed a correlation between defendant’s challenges and racial discrimination.  The 
record concerning Prospective Juror 5(a)’s peremptory challenge did not establish a 
purposeful discrimination on any improper basis, let alone race.  Defense counsel’s 
questioning of Juror 5(a) could have readily been the same as to any prospective juror, and 
it would have provided a legitimate excuse to exercise a statutorily provided peremptory 
challenge.  Juror 5(a) stated that she had extensive ties to law enforcement, including “[m]y 
                                              
trial court exercised a sincere and genuine effort to select the jury in conformity with the 
law established in Batson.  
68 Rivera, 556 US at 160. 
 
 
 
 
36 
father, my brother, stepmother all deputy sheriffs, and military police in my family, nephew 
and brother.”  She agreed to assess the police officer’s testimony without assigning it 
greater weight than other witnesses’ testimony, but defense counsel’s wariness of her 
extensive ties to law enforcement (particularly in this case, which turns on the credibility 
of law enforcement officers’ testimony) would reasonably lead defense counsel to exercise 
a preemptory challenge and excuse Juror 5(a) regardless of race.  The prosecution points 
out that other prospective jurors had ties to law enforcement69 and offers a few examples: 
one prospective juror had a brother who was a parole officer, another had a cousin who 
was a Wayne County Sheriff, and another had an uncle who was a police officer in Canton.  
While such comparisons may assist the trial court in determining whether a race-neutral 
reason in support of a peremptory challenge is a pretext for discrimination, the trial court 
here made no such finding with regard to Prospective Juror 5(a)’s ties to law enforcement.70  
Rather, the trial court merely concluded that it appeared this prospective juror could set 
aside these familial ties in assessing the credibility of police testimony.  This is insufficient 
reason to deny the exercise of a peremptory challenge under Batson.  Batson only requires 
                                              
69 See Flowers, 588 US at ___; 139 S Ct 2228 at 2243 (noting that a defendant may present 
other evidence showing that peremptory strikes were made on the basis of race, including 
“evidence of a prosecutor’s disparate questioning and investigation of black and white 
prospective jurors in the case” and “side-by-side comparisons of black prospective jurors 
who were struck and white prospective jurors who were not struck in the case”). 
70 The record reflects these jurors’ ties to law enforcement were not as extensive as the ties 
to law enforcement established by Prospective Juror 5(a).  Strong familial ties to law 
enforcement alone may provide a valid reason for a peremptory challenge in response to a 
Batson claim. 
 
 
 
 
37 
the proponent of a peremptory challenge to articulate a race-neutral reason for exercising 
the challenge.71   
We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by precluding defense counsel from 
peremptorily striking Prospective Juror 5(a).  We do not arrive at this determination lightly.  
We acknowledge that the trial court is in the best position to consider not only the demeanor 
of the prospective juror, but also the “demeanor of the attorney who exercises the 
challenge.”72  But the record reflects that the trial court disregarded defendant’s validly 
stated concerns relating to Juror 5(a)’s extensive ties to law enforcement.  While Juror 5(a) 
                                              
71 The record also reflects that defense counsel asked Prospective Juror 5(a) about issues 
relating to race.  Defense counsel asked her if she would be concerned about sitting on an 
all-black jury, and she responded: “I hope that I’m a person that looks beyond that.  I work 
for [a school district in which] there’s a lot of different culture.”  Defense counsel 
interjected “I hope,” suggesting that Prospective Juror 5(a) might have reservations about 
her ability to set aside matters relating to race.  But she clarified and stated, “I enjoy 
meeting other cultures and working with people getting to know people.  I hope I don’t 
look at people’s skin color.  I don’t believe I do.  It’s their actions.”  This exchange between 
Prospective Juror 5(a) and defense counsel, while not antagonistic, may have nonetheless 
left defense counsel with a concern that Prospective Juror 5(a) would be antagonistic to 
defendant’s case, such that a peremptory challenge of her would be in order. 
Instead of accepting defense counsel’s concerns about Juror 5(a)’s potential 
antagonism, the trial court took a highly skeptical view of the challenge, stating, “I’m not 
hearing about somebody that’s sleeping, somebody nervous, preoccupied, angry, 
disrespectful or agitated.  I’m just hearing about feelings.”  Further, the court dismissed 
defendant’s argument that Prospective Juror 5(a) had a prior conviction because the officer 
in charge testified that she had no record.  But defense counsel’s concern that a prospective 
juror would claim to have a criminal record only to discover during jury service that the 
juror had no criminal record is not unreasonable.  Frankly, had the prosecution proffered 
this reason to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror, it likely would have gone 
unnoticed, as it would have called into question whether the juror appreciated the gravity 
of the matter yet to be decided. 
72 Hernandez, 500 US at 365. 
 
 
 
 
38 
did say she could be impartial, nothing from Batson or its progeny informs us that a trial 
court can use this expression of impartiality to overcome the race-neutral concerns 
expressed by defense counsel. 
In sum, the prosecution’s prima facie case was weak.  It did not offer evidence or 
an argument that showed a pattern of discrimination, and defendant offered valid race-
neutral reasons that were supported by the record.  The trial court disregarded those reasons 
because of one imprudent remark that, standing alone, was insufficient for the court to find 
a racial motivation.  While the trial court’s findings are entitled to great deference, we 
conclude that, in this instance, the court clearly erred by sustaining the prosecution’s 
Batson challenge as to Prospective Juror 5(a). 
D.  REMEDY 
A plurality of this Court, in People v Bell, “recogniz[ed] the distinction between a 
Batson error and a denial of a peremptory challenge.”73  Namely, “[a] Batson error occurs 
when a juror is actually dismissed on the basis of race or gender.”74  “In contrast, a denial 
of a peremptory challenge on other grounds amounts to the denial of a statutory or court-
rule-based right to exclude a certain number of jurors.”75  The Bell plurality concluded that 
“[a]n improper denial of such a peremptory challenge is not of constitutional dimension.”76   
                                              
73 People v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 293; 702 NW2d 128 (2005), amended 474 Mich 1201 
(2005). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
 
 
 
 
39 
A few years later, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of 
certiorari in Rivera v Illinois77 “to resolve an apparent conflict among state high courts over 
whether the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal of a 
defendant’s conviction as a matter of federal law.”78  The Supreme Court cited this Court’s 
plurality opinion in Bell and identified it as one of those “rejecting [the] automatic reversal 
rule and looking to state law to determine the consequences of an erroneous denial of a 
peremptory challenge[.]”79  Ultimately, the Rivera Court, in an opinion issued by a 
unanimous Court, agreed with the plurality in Bell and stated: 
Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative 
to decide whether such errors deprive a [jury] of its lawful authority and thus 
require automatic reversal.  States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, 
that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible 
error per se.”[80] 
In reaching this holding, Rivera first iterated that “[t]his Court has ‘long recognized’ 
that ‘peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.’ ”81  Indeed, 
“[s]tates may withhold peremptory challenges ‘altogether without impairing the 
constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’ ”82  But “[w]hen States provide 
                                              
77 Rivera v Illinois, 556 US 148; 129 S Ct 1446; 173 L Ed 2d 320 (2009). 
78 Id. at 156. 
79 Id., citing Bell, 473 Mich at 292-299. 
80 Rivera, 556 US at 161-162. 
81 Id. at 152, quoting United States v Martinez-Salazar, 528 US 304, 311; 120 S Ct 774; 
145 L Ed 2d 792 (2000). 
82 Rivera, 556 US at 152, quoting McCollum, 505 US at 57. 
 
 
 
 
40 
peremptory challenges (as all do in some form), they confer a benefit ‘beyond the minimum 
requirements of fair [jury] selection,’ . . . and thus retain discretion to design and 
implement their own systems[.]”83 
In this state, the statutory right to peremptory challenges is found in MCL 768.12, 
which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person who is put on trial for an offense that is 
not punishable by death or life imprisonment shall be allowed to challenge peremptorily 5 
of the persons drawn to serve as jurors.”84  “The prosecuting officers on behalf of the people 
shall be allowed to challenge 5 jurors peremptorily if a defendant is being tried 
alone . . . .”85  “On motion and a showing of good cause, the court may grant 1 or more of 
the parties an increased number of peremptory challenges.  The number of additional 
peremptory challenges the court grants may cause the various parties to have unequal 
numbers of peremptory challenges.”86  This statutory provision is reflected in the court 
rules.87  Since Juror 5(a) was not dismissed from the jury, the trial court’s decision denying 
defendant’s peremptory challenge of Juror 5(a), even though predicated on the trial court’s 
improper resolution of the prosecution’s Batson challenge, only amounted to a partial 
denial of defendant’s statutory right to peremptory challenges.  Defendant was not in this 
case entirely deprived of his right “to challenge peremptorily 5 of the persons drawn to 
                                              
83 Rivera, 556 US at 157-158 (citations omitted). 
84 MCL 768.12(1).   
85 Id.   
86 MCL 768.12(2). 
87 See MCR 6.412(E)(1).   
 
 
 
 
41 
serve as jurors.”  After his peremptory challenge on Juror 5(a) was rejected, defendant did 
exercise a fourth peremptory challenge on Juror 8(a).88   
Significantly, state law also provides a standard for reviewing procedural errors in 
criminal cases.  The Michigan Legislature, which granted defendant the right to peremptory 
challenges, has also stated that a criminal conviction ought not be set aside for a procedural 
error except where, “after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear 
that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”89  The statutory 
provision granting peremptory challenges must be read in context with the statutory 
directive on procedural error in a criminal case.  It is apparent that, to the extent the 
statutory right to peremptory challenges is impaired, MCL 769.26 guarantees that a 
criminal conviction will only be set aside where the error results in a miscarriage of 
justice.90  This Court has interpreted the statutory phrase “miscarriage of justice” to require 
                                              
88 This appears to be the prospective juror earlier described by defense counsel as 
“snoozing” and the same prospective juror the trial court believed to be of Middle Eastern 
descent. 
89 MCL 769.26. 
90 The opinion for reversal suggests that our interpretation of MCL 769.26 ignores a portion 
of the statutory text, “which provides that an error on any matter of pleading or procedure 
shall not be a basis for reversal ‘unless in the opinion of the court’ the error has led to a 
miscarriage of justice.”  Post at 14.  But as the opinion for reversal itself notes, a 
miscarriage of justice “means that the error more probably than not was outcome-
determinative . . . .”  Post at 14, citing People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 
607 (1999).  And as the opinion for reversal further observes, defendant here cannot show 
that the error was outcome-determinative because there is no record evidence that Juror 
5(a) was biased.  
 
The opinion for reversal also criticizes our analysis of this case because it results in 
“automatic affirmance.”  Post at 1.  We believe the error in this case is more properly 
characterized as error that was not outcome-determinative.  In the heat of a contentious 
 
 
 
 
42 
reversal of a criminal conviction only where, “ ‘after an examination of the entire cause, it 
shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome 
determinative.”91  Thus, the Michigan Legislature has, as recognized in Rivera, “designed” 
                                              
trial presented by zealous advocates before an impartial jurist, there are bound to be 
occasional errors in procedure or substance.  Some of these errors materially affect the 
proceedings, but most do not.  Our criminal justice system guarantees an accused the right 
to a fair trial, not a perfect one.  Accordingly, convictions should be reversed only when 
trial error results in material harm to the criminal proceedings.  This is the policy of the 
state of Michigan—a policy enacted into law, MCL 769.26.  We disagree with the opinion 
for reversal, which posits that any Batson error categorically requires reversal.  Instead we 
find guidance from the United States Supreme Court opinion in Rivera, which holds that 
“a one-time, good-faith misapplication of Batson” does not violate due process, Rivera, 
556 US at 160, let alone amount to a “miscarriage of justice.” 
 
The opinion for reversal takes issue with our treatment of Rivera’s rejection of the 
assertion that “[t]he improper seating of a juror . . . is not amenable to harmless-error 
analysis,” id. at 157, given that “[t]he Rivera Court did not offer any explanation for how 
such errors could be reviewed for harmfulness,” post at 12.  The opinion for reversal also 
claims our opinion “distracts from the ramifications of its remedy holding—a rule of 
automatic affirmance—with the irrelevant statement (with which none of us would 
disagree) that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”  Post at 13 n 4.  These 
criticisms lose all force given the Rivera Court’s conclusion that “Rivera received precisely 
what due process required: a fair trial before an impartial and properly instructed jury, 
which found him guilty of every element of the charged offense.”  Rivera, 556 US at 162.  
Thus, regardless whether Rivera did not articulate “how such errors could be reviewed for 
harmfulness,” post at 12, the Court was clearly satisfied that Rivera received, in its 
understanding, a “fair trial.”  The opinion for reversal makes no attempt to distinguish how 
its understanding of a “fair trial” differs from ours or that of the Rivera Court.  Further, the 
opinion for reversal’s criticisms are misplaced given that it highlights that Rivera did not 
provide any “merits argument” yet fails in every respect to take up the mantle and itself 
provide a “merits arguments” to support its position that defendant received an unfair trial. 
91 Lukity, 460 Mich at 495-496, quoting MCL 769.26.  Note that Michigan’s standard in 
this regard appears less onerous than the Illinois standard upheld in Rivera, which required 
a court to consider whether it was “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found [the defendant] guilty absent the error.”  Rivera, 556 US at 155 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
 
 
 
43 
a system to review the erroneous denial of the statutory right to remove a particular juror 
peremptorily, and this Court is obliged to “implement” that design.92 
Nonetheless, defendant argues that the denial of a peremptory challenge under these 
circumstances may be a structural error under Michigan law, even though peremptory 
challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.  As Rivera suggested, structural 
errors are constitutional errors that require automatic reversal.93  Structural errors are those 
“structural defect[s] affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than 
simply an error in the trial process itself.”94  The United States Supreme Court has found 
structural errors in “a very limited class of cases[.]”95  “Such errors infect the entire trial 
process and necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair.  Put another way, these errors 
deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve 
its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence . . . and no criminal 
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”96 
The United States Supreme Court has not found structural error from error that is 
not of constitutional dimension; indeed, the category of errors that require automatic 
reversal, i.e., “structural errors,” has only been applied to certain constitutional errors in a 
                                              
92 Rivera, 556 US at 158. 
93 Id. at 161.   
94 Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 310; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991). 
95 Johnson v United States, 520 US 461, 468; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 (1997).   
96 Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 8-9; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   
 
 
 
 
44 
“limited class” of cases.97  Because it is a statutory right, the denial of the right to 
peremptory challenge has yet to fall under the “limited class of constitutional errors [that] 
are structural and subject to automatic reversal.”98  This Court has been similarly reluctant 
to find structural error when there is no federal constitutional violation.  Indeed, this Court 
has only once before—arguably, under Michigan law alone—found a “structural error 
requiring automatic reversal” that was not squarely within this limited class of 
constitutional errors.99  In People v Duncan, this Court held that automatic reversal is 
required when a jury is allowed “to deliberate a criminal charge where there is a complete 
failure to instruct the jury regarding any of the elements necessary to determine if the 
                                              
97 People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 51; 610 NW2d 551 (2000), citing Neder, 527 US at 8.  
As the Duncan Court noted, the Court in Neder identified “several examples of structural 
error”: 
“Indeed, we have found an error to be ‘structural,’ and thus subject to 
automatic reversal, only in a ‘very limited class of cases.’ ”  Johnson v United 
States, 520 US 461, 468; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 (1997) (citing 
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) 
(complete denial of counsel); Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437; 71 L 
Ed 749 (1927) (biased trial judge); Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254; 106 S Ct 
617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986) (racial discrimination in selection of grand jury 
[i.e., systematic exclusion of black jurors]); McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 
168; 104 S Ct 944; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984) (denial of self-representation at 
trial); Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39; 104 S Ct 2210; 81 L Ed 2d 31 (1984) 
(denial of public trial); Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275; 113 S Ct 2078; 
124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993) (defective reasonable-doubt instruction).  [Duncan, 
462 Mich at 52, quoting Neder, 527 US at 8.] 
98 Duncan, 462 Mich at 51. 
99 Id. (explaining that constitutional errors may be structural in nature). 
 
 
 
 
45 
prosecution has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”100  While Duncan cites an 
abundance of federal caselaw, the crux of Duncan’s analysis turns only on cited Michigan 
caselaw to extend a remedy of this magnitude, regardless of preservation, despite no 
definitive ruling from the United States Supreme Court on the issue.101 
Under Rivera, an erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge is not of federal 
constitutional dimension; therefore, there can be no structural error arising out of a 
violation of the US Constitution.  However, that does not end the inquiry.  Rivera provided 
that state courts may determine as a matter of state law whether to review the wrongful 
denial of peremptory challenge for harmless error or, alternatively, to remedy such errors 
by automatic reversal.102  Therefore, even though there may not be a federal constitutional 
violation, we must determine whether there is an independent state ground for concluding 
that there is a structural error that mandates automatic reversal.   
In ascertaining whether there are independent state grounds for finding structural 
error under the Michigan Constitution, our responsibility is to give meaning to the specific 
                                              
100 Id. at 52-53, citing People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296, 304; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), and 
noting People v Newland, 459 Mich 985, 593 NW2d 557 (1999).  See also 2A Gillespie, 
Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 24:16, p 148 (citing only Duncan as an 
example of the Michigan Supreme Court’s finding “structural error not subject to review 
for prejudice”). 
101 See Duncan, 462 Mich at 51-56.  See also 7 LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure (4th ed), 
§ 27.6(d), p 158 (“With a few exceptions, lower courts also have not hesitated to find 
harmless incomplete jury instructions omitting other elements, at least when proof of the 
element was introduced and uncontested at trial.”) (citations omitted). 
102 Rivera, 556 US at 158. 
 
 
 
 
46 
provision at issue, Const 1963, art 1, § 20.103  We are not obligated to follow the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution.104  Several factors are relevant to 
determine whether the Michigan Constitution supports an interpretation different from that 
of the federal Constitution, including the language of the provision at issue, the history of 
the constitutional provision, and our common-law history.105   
Beginning with the text of the Michigan Constitution itself, it guarantees that “the 
accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury by an impartial 
trial . . . .”  Const 1963, art 1, § 20.  This language is not materially different from that 
provided in the United States Constitution.106  Because the pertinent language of the 
Michigan Constitution is materially similar to that of the Sixth Amendment, the plain 
language of our Michigan Constitution manifests an intent to provide the same guarantees 
                                              
103 People v Tanner, 496 Mich 199, 233 n 16; 853 NW2d 653 (2014). 
104 Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 774, 763; 506 NW2d 209 (1993). 
105 These factors are:  
1) the textual language of the state constitution, 2) significant textual 
differences between parallel provisions of the two constitutions, 3) state 
constitutional and common-law history, 4) state law preexisting adoption of 
the relevant constitutional provision, 5) structural differences between the 
state and federal constitutions, and 6) matters of peculiar state or local 
interest.  [People v Tanner, 496 Mich 199, 233 n 17; 853 NW2d 653 (2014), 
quoting People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 31 n 39; 475 NW2d 684 (1991).] 
106 The operative language of Const 1963, art 1, § 20, which provides that “[i]n every 
criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an 
impartial jury,” is materially similar to that of US Const, Am VI, which states, “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury . . . .” 
 
 
 
 
47 
as those in the United States Constitution.  Michigan law, like federal law, has steadfastly 
recognized that a peremptory challenge is a right given by statute, not by the Constitution.  
As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, peremptory challenges are not 
guaranteed by the Constitution and may be withheld entirely without violating the 
Constitution.107  The language of the Michigan Constitution provides no textual reason 
why the Court should interpret Const 1963, art 1, § 20 in any way other than as consistent 
with the Sixth Amendment, which, as previously noted, is not implicated when a 
defendant’s peremptory challenge is erroneously denied.108   
Similarly, review of our common-law history does not suggest otherwise.109  Most 
recently, in People v Miller, this Court addressed whether a defendant was entitled to a 
                                              
107 See Martinez-Salazar, 528 US at 311; Rivera, 556 US at 152.   
108 Michigan’s constitutional history supports this conclusion as well.  The operative 
language from Const 1963, art 1, § 20 is nearly identical to the applicable provisions in 
prior Michigan Constitutions.  See Const 1835, art 1, § 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the 
vicinage . . . .”); Const 1850, art 1, § 28 (“In every criminal prosecution the accused shall 
have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .”); Const 1908, art 1, 
§ 19 (“In every criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public 
trial by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
109 This Court’s order granting leave cited a plurality opinion in Hardison v State, 94 So 
3d 1092, 1101 & n 37 (Miss, 2012), which identified “[a]t least five states” that have 
adopted an automatic-reversal rule as a matter of state law and followed those states.  Two 
of these cases, however, were decided pre-Rivera and are therefore of limited value.  See 
Angus v State, 695 NW2d 109 (Minn, 2005), and State v Vreen, 26 P3d 236 (Wash, 2001), 
both abrogated by Rivera, 556 US 148.   
The New York Court of Appeals in People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625, 661; 942 NE2d 
248 (2010), “look[ed] to our precedents and [held] that [a Batson error] under New York 
law mandates automatic reversal.”  The court recognized that although they are “not a trial 
tool of constitutional magnitude, peremptory challenges are a mainstay in a litigant’s 
strategic arsenal . . . .”  Id. at 662 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  As amicus 
 
 
 
 
48 
                                              
PAAM pointed out, the dissent in Hecker contended that “[t]he majority offers no reasoned 
justification for this holding [of automatic reversal], merely relying on pre-Rivera 
precedents,” and that the rule of automatic reversal is unwise, as it “load[s] the dice against 
the People” because a “defendant, who need not fear an appeal by the People, can and 
generally will vigorously contest any prosecution use of a peremptory challenge that might 
raise Batson problems,” while “the People will be reluctant to do the same thing, lest they 
lead the trial judge into an error that would upset a conviction.”  Id. at 667-668 (Smith, J., 
dissenting).  As the Hecker dissent observed, the Rivera Court itself had expressed this 
concern, stating that automatic reversal would “ ‘likely discourage trial courts and 
prosecutors from policing a criminal defendant’s discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges.’ ”  Id. at 668, quoting Rivera, 556 US at 160.   
The Supreme Court of Iowa in State v Mootz, 808 NW2d 207 (Iowa, 2012), held 
that automatic reversal was required because a defendant tried by an impartial jury cannot 
show prejudice from the loss of a peremptory challenge.  The court then stated that “[a]ny 
other conclusion would leave the defendant without a remedy.  We do not think this is the 
result intended when [Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure] 2.18(9) was drafted.”  Id. at 225-
226.  So, the court interpreted Rule 2.18(9)—which guarantees a defendant four 
peremptory strikes of prospective jurors, id. at 220—to require “automatic reversal of a 
defendant’s conviction when the trial court’s erroneous ruling on a reverse-Batson 
challenge leads to the denial of one of the defendant’s peremptory challenges.”  Id. at 226.   
Finally, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v Hampton, 457 Mass 
152; 928 NE2d 917 (2010), “continued to adhere” to its pre-Rivera precedent that “the 
erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal, without a showing 
of prejudice.”  Id. at 164.  This precedent established that “the right to be tried by an 
impartial jury is so basic to a fair trial that an infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error.  Thus, . . . the erroneous denial of the right to exercise a proper peremptory challenge 
is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.”  Commonwealth v Wood, 389 Mass 
552, 564; 451 NE2d 714 (1983), citing Commonwealth v Soares, 377 Mass 461, 492 
(1979).   
In an additional case of note, the Delaware Supreme Court in McCoy v State, 112 
A3d 239 (Del, 2015), recognized that peremptory challenges are “one of the most important 
of the rights” for an accused.”  Id. at 255 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Noting 
that Rivera held that a denial of a peremptory challenge does not violate the Constitution, 
the McCoy court relied on a provision in the Delaware Constitution that had been 
interpreted to include the right to exercise peremptory challenges.  Id. at 255-256.  
Accordingly, the court held that the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge requires 
automatic reversal.  Id. at 255. 
 
 
 
 
49 
                                              
On the other hand, many states have concluded that review for harmless error, not 
automatic reversal, applies as the remedy for a loss of a peremptory challenge, with some 
states even going so far as to overrule their precedent after the Rivera decision.   
For instance, in State v Carr, 300 Kan 1; 331 P3d 544 (2014), rev’d on other grounds 
577 US 108 (2016), a Kansas trial court erroneously sustained the prosecution’s Batson 
challenge to a defendant’s peremptory strike.  Id. at 130.  On appeal in the Kansas Supreme 
Court, the defendant argued that the error was structural, while the state contended that 
harmless-error review applied.  Id.  The court discussed Rivera and noted that the first issue 
to be decided was whether the judge acted in good faith.  Id. at 130-131.  Citing our decision 
in Pellegrino, the court concluded that the judge did not deliberately misapply Batson (as 
was true in Pellegrino); rather, the trial court’s Batson examination was incomplete.  Id. at 
132-133.  The court then outlined the differing caselaw addressing the remedy for a good-
faith mistake for an erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge, primarily discussing the 
Iowa decision in Mootz.  Id. at 134-136.  The court then analyzed the split among the states 
on this question and observed that since Rivera, the trend among the federal circuits has 
been to apply harmless-error review instead of automatic reversal.  Id. at 136-138, citing 
United States v Gonzalez-Melendez, 594 F3d 28 (CA 1, 2010); Jimenez v Chicago, 732 
F3d 710 (CA 7, 2013); Avichail ex rel TA v St John’s Mercy Health Sys, 686 F3d 548 (CA 
8, 2012).  See also United States v Lindsey, 634 F3d 541 (CA 9, 2011); United States v 
Williams, 731 F3d 1222 (CA 11, 2013).  The court had not previously addressed the 
question but noted that a prior Kansas Court of Appeals case had suggested that the denial 
of a valid peremptory challenge is prejudicial.  Carr, 300 Kan at 138.  However, other 
Kansas Supreme Court decisions noted that peremptory challenges were viewed as “little 
more than a procedural device to ensure compliance with a defendant’s constitutional right 
to trial by a fair and impartial jury[.]”  Id.  The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that 
harmless-error analysis applied and that such errors are not structural, because “[t]he 
mistake was made in good faith, and our Kansas precedent, although sparse, favors the 
view that a peremptory challenge is simply a procedural vehicle for vindication of a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”  Id. at 139.  
A number of other states have relied on a similar rationale as that in Carr, i.e., that 
the error is not of federal constitutional dimension and there is no independent state law 
supporting a finding of structural error.  See People v Singh, 234 Cal App 4th 1319; 184 
Cal Rptr 3d 790 (2015); People v Novotny, 320 P3d 1194; 2014 CO 18 (Colo, 2014); 
Robinson v State, 255 P3d 425; 2011 OK CR 15 (Okla Crim App, 2011); State v Lindell, 
245 Wis 2d 689; 629 NW2d 223 (2001); In re LDB, 454 P3d 908; 2019 WY 127 (2019); 
State v Hickman, 205 Ariz 192; 68 P3d 418 (2003); People v Rivera, 227 Ill 2d 1; 879 
NE2d 876 (2007). 
 
 
 
 
50 
new trial when a convicted felon sat on the jury.110  To qualify as a juror under Michigan 
law, “a person shall” “[n]ot have been convicted of a felony.”111  Defendant had the right 
to challenge a prospective juror who “is not qualified to be a juror” for cause.112  The Court 
held that the “the presence of a convicted felon on defendant’s jury did not constitute 
structural error.”113  There was no constitutional error because “there is no constitutional 
right to have a jury free of convicted felons.”114  Further, “ ‘not every instance of 
misconduct in a juror will require a new trial.  The general principle underlying the cases 
is that the misconduct must be such as to affect the impartiality of the jury[.]’ ”115  “The 
misconduct must be such as to reasonably indicate that a fair and impartial trial was not 
had[.]”116  Significantly, there was no evidence that the juror was actually partial or 
biased.117  Thus, even though the defendant was improperly denied a challenge for cause, 
                                              
110 People v Miller, 482 Mich 540; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). 
111 MCL 600.1307a(1)(e). 
112 MCR 2.511(D)(1).  
113 Miller, 482 Mich at 556.   
114 Id.   
115 Id. at 551, quoting People v Nick, 360 Mich 219, 230; 103 NW2d 435 (1960) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  While Miller focused on the misconduct of a juror that 
allowed the juror to be improperly seated, the rule from Miller applies in the context of 
reviewing a verdict rendered by a jury that included an improperly seated juror.   
116 Miller, 482 Mich at 551, quoting Nick, 360 Mich at 230.   
117 Miller, 482 Mich at 552.   
 
 
 
 
51 
a new trial was not required.118  “[T]he proper inquiry is whether the defendant was denied 
his right to an impartial jury.  If he was not, there is no need for a new trial.”119 
In People v DeHaven,120 the Court addressed whether a defendant who was charged 
with rape was entitled to a new trial when two jurors failed to disclose that a family member 
had also been convicted of rape.  The Court reasoned that the “[t]he right to be tried by an 
impartial jury is a constitutional guaranty.”121  Such a jury must “consist[] of twelve 
impartial [people].”122  The examination of those jurors during voir dire is “to ascertain 
whether it is wise and expedient to exercise the right of peremptory challenge given to 
parties by the law.”123  The challenged jurors said that they could fairly and impartially try 
the case, but they did not disclose their familial connection.124  This Court held “that the 
relationship of these two jurors to one who had committed a similar crime was such that it 
deprived them of the capacity to act impartially.  Defendant has the right to a trial by an 
impartial jury.  We cannot say that he had such a trial.”125 As recognized in Miller, “the 
crux of DeHaven’s holding was that a defendant has a constitutional right to an impartial 
                                              
118 Id. at 561.  
119 Id. 
120 People v DeHaven, 321 Mich 327; 32 NW2d 468 (1948). 
121 Id. at 334.   
122 Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
123 Id. at 332 (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
124 Id. at 334.   
125 Id.   
 
 
 
 
52 
jury and, because the jurors at issue in DeHaven lacked the capacity to act impartially, the 
defendant was entitled to a new trial.”126 
Those cases demonstrate that the Court has long held that a criminal defendant has 
only the right to an impartial jury.  Denials of peremptory challenges or even denials of 
challenges for cause do not necessarily violate that right.  If a challenge is denied, only a 
showing of prejudice demonstrates that the Michigan Constitution has been violated.127  
The denial of the right to challenge jurors peremptorily does not, by itself, deprive a 
criminal defendant of the right to an impartial jury.128  Further, MCL 768.12(2) recognizes 
that the number of peremptory challenges may not be equal between the two parties, as a 
judge may give one party more than the other.  All of this provides solid support for the 
conclusion that peremptory challenges in Michigan have long been considered part of the 
means to the end of an impartial jury, rather than part of that end itself. 
Our conclusion promotes consistency within our caselaw.  First, it holds that the 
same remedy applies to erroneous denials of peremptory challenges and challenges for 
cause.  Under Miller, challenges for cause are subject to harmless-error review.129  Under 
                                              
126 Miller, 482 Mich at 560, citing DeHaven, 321 Mich at 334.  Other cases hold similarly 
in both the criminal and civil context.  See People v Mullane, 256 Mich 54; 239 NW 282 
(1931) (holding that a defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated when his 
counsel exercised all peremptory challenges to which he was entitled); O’Neil, 67 Mich at 
561 (holding that the right to a “fair, impartial, and qualified jury” was unimpaired when a 
party exhausted his peremptory challenges). 
127 See Miller, 482 Mich at 561; Pearce v Quincy Mining Co, 149 Mich 112, 116-117; 112 
NW 739 (1907). 
128 See People v Mullane, 256 Mich 54, 56-57; 239 NW 282 (1931).   
129 Miller, 482 Mich at 556, 561.   
 
 
 
 
53 
Michigan law, only a denial of a challenge for cause that results in an impartial jury requires 
reversal.  If the Court holds here that denials of peremptory challenges are subject to 
automatic reversal, this would create a significant and illogical discrepancy in Michigan 
law.  Specifically, it would create a situation in which the denial of peremptory challenges 
would require automatic reversal, but challenges for cause would be subject to harmless-
error review, where reversal is only required if a biased jury actually sits.  This situation 
would be untenable, given that challenges for cause are typically granted greater 
protection.130  Our conclusion also maintains consistency with the Court’s recent caselaw 
discussing preserved constitutional error.  A decision holding that peremptory challenges 
are subject to automatic reversal would create a peculiar scenario in which automatic 
reversal applies to a denial of a statutory right, while other nonconstitutional errors are still 
subject only to harmless-error review.  In sum, we find no historical or textual reason to 
interpret the right to an impartial jury under the Michigan Constitution in the context of 
erroneous denials of peremptory challenges in a way different than that of the federal 
Constitution. 
As presented in the opinion for reversal, the argument commonly made in support 
of the position that an improper denial of a peremptory challenge following a successful 
Batson challenge should be deemed a structural error is that the error is simply too hard to 
measure; or, as more aptly argued by the defendant in Rivera: “The improper seating of a 
                                              
130 See Martinez-Salazar, 528 US at 316.  In addition, amicus PAAM persuasively argues 
that, if automatic reversal applies in this situation, “even the legislature could not alter the 
number of peremptory challenges, or abolish them, which is to give [peremptory 
challenges] constitutional status though the law is clear that they are a statutory creation.”   
 
 
 
 
54 
juror . . . is not amenable to harmless-error analysis because it is impossible to ascertain 
how a properly constituted jury—here, one without [the improperly seated juror]—would 
have decided his case.”131  Justice Marilyn KELLY elaborated on this argument in her 
dissenting opinion in Bell: 
Although no constitutional guarantee exists with regard to them, 
Batson errors resulting in a denial of the use of peremptory challenges must 
be structural.  They attack the fundamental framework of the trial proceeding.  
They change the very makeup of the jury.  And they do not occur during the 
presentation of evidence.  Given that they do not involve evidence, they 
cannot be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence.  This fact 
is a further indicator that they are not in the nature of trial errors.[132] 
Ubi jus, ibi remedium, “the principle that where one’s right is invaded or destroyed, 
the law gives a remedy to protect it or damages for its loss,”133 “is indeed a deep-seated 
principle of Anglo-American law . . . .”134  But then again, “[t]he Due Process Clause does 
not require states to provide effective remedies for every state-created right.”135  Indeed, 
Rivera highlighted that “[t]he Due Process Clause . . . safeguards not the meticulous 
                                              
131 Rivera, 556 US at 157. 
132 Bell, 473 Mich at 311-312 (KELLY, J., dissenting).   
133 Oxford Dictionary of Law (8th ed). 
134 The Supreme Court 2008 Term, Leading Cases—Constitutional Law, Due Process, 123 
Harv L Rev 212, 219 (2009). 
135 Id. at 218-219; see also id. at 219 n 63, citing Webster v Doe, 486 US 592, 613; 108 S 
Ct 2047; 100 L Ed 2d 632 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it is simply 
untenable [to suggest] that there must be a judicial remedy for every constitutional 
violation” in light of the sovereign-immunity, political-question, and equitable-discretion 
doctrines), and Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1786 (1991) (describing rights without “individually 
effective remedies” as a “fact of our legal tradition”). 
 
 
 
 
55 
observance of state procedural prescriptions, but ‘the fundamental elements of fairness in 
a criminal trial.’ ”136  “ ‘[A] principal reason for peremptories’ . . . is ‘to help secure the 
constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.’ ”137  And when presented with a 
variant of Justice KELLY’s argument that Batson errors “attack the fundamental framework 
of the trial proceeding” and “change the very makeup of the jury,”138 the Rivera Court 
dispatched it, stating that it did not “withstand scrutiny.”139  Further, while the Rivera Court 
readily acknowledged that an error involving peremptory challenges “ ‘may . . . result[] in 
a jury panel different from that which would otherwise have decided [the] case,’ ” it was 
not at all persuaded this fact alone transformed an aspirational and prophylactic procedural 
rule into a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process, let alone structural error.140  Accordingly, just as Rivera 
dispatched with the argument that a Batson error “is not amenable to harmless-error 
analysis because it is impossible to ascertain how a properly constituted jury—here, one 
without [the improperly seated juror]—would have decided his case,” we too reject this 
same unpersuasive argument that is set forth in the opinion for reversal in this case.  
                                              
136 Rivera, 556 US at 158, quoting Spencer v Texas, 385 US 554, 563-564, 87 S Ct 648, 17 
L Ed 2d 606 (1967). 
137 Rivera, 556 US at 159, quoting Martinez-Salazar, 528 US at 316 (emphasis added). 
138 Bell, 473 Mich at 312 (KELLY, J., dissenting). 
139 Rivera, 556 US at 157. 
140 Id. at 158 (citations omitted). 
 
 
 
 
56 
We do not take lightly that, for all intents and purposes, harmless-error review will 
almost always result in automatic affirmance.141  This, however, does not mean Batson and 
its progeny are rendered ineffective.  Courts must strike a balance between defendant’s 
right to fully participate in the jury-selection process and the trial court’s duty to police that 
process to insure against invidious discrimination.  As the United States Supreme Court 
observed, “[t]o hold that a one-time, good-faith misapplication of Batson violates due 
process would likely discourage trial courts and prosecutors from policing a criminal 
defendant’s discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
does not compel such a tradeoff.”142   
The above quotation from Rivera represents the only guiding statement of law 
offered by the Supreme Court of the United States to assist state courts in determining 
“whether [Batson] errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require 
automatic reversal.”  Yet, the opinion for reversal in this case does not heed this guidance; 
in fact, it would hold the opposite and conclude that the trial court’s “one-time, good-faith 
misapplication of Batson violates due process.” 
The opinion for reversal offers no reasoned justification to support a rule of 
automatic reversal for Batson errors.  And we find such a rule would be unwise, as it 
                                              
141 Exceptions may be rare but not impossible.  For instance, in this case, had the trial court 
sua sponte rejected defense counsel’s last peremptory challenge based on Batson as to Juror 
8(a), who the court had mentioned was a person of Middle Eastern descent who was 
snoozing during voir dire, reversal may have been required because the trial court had no 
legal basis at all to justify an arbitrary decision, perhaps even under an unpreserved-plain-
error standard.   
142 Id. at 160. 
 
 
 
 
57 
“load[s] the dice against the People” because a “defendant, who need not fear an appeal by 
the People, can and generally will vigorously contest any prosecution use of a peremptory 
challenge that might raise Batson problems,” while “the People will be reluctant to do the 
same thing, lest they lead the trial judge into an error that would upset a conviction.”143  In 
our view, a rule of automatic reversal for Batson error may incentivize tactics that 
undermine the aspirations of Batson itself and would also “undermine public confidence 
in the fairness of our system of justice.”144 
E.  APPLICATION OF HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW 
We conclude that the outcome of this case would have not have been any different 
had defendant been allowed the peremptory challenge on Prospective Juror 5(a).  
Prospective Juror 5(a) acknowledged during the voir dire, “My father, my brother, 
stepmother all deputy sheriffs, and military police in my family, nephew and brother.  My 
grandfather was an attorney who passed away but I think that’s it.”  The trial court then 
responded, “All right.  Juror number five, you heard what I said to juror number four which 
is that the law states that a police officer’s testimony is to be weighed the same way you 
weigh the testimony of any other witness[;] they don’t come in with an advantage [and] 
they don’t come in with a disadvantage.  Given the extensive law enforcement connections 
in your family will you be able to [do] that in this case?”  Prospective Juror 5(a) replied, 
“Yes.”   
                                              
143 Hecker, 15 NY3d at 667-668 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
144 Batson, 476 US at 87.  
 
 
 
 
58 
During voir dire, when defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to question the 
prospective jurors, he asked Prospective Juror 5(a) to assume he was representing her in a 
criminal trial, stating: “And so we’re sitting at the table, and I’m doing this kind of thing 
sitting at the table, and I turn to you and I say this is—I’m taking this jury.  I’m accepting 
this jury.  And you look up and you see 12, 14, whatever, you see 12 or 14 people and 
they’re all African-American the People who are going to sit in judgment of you.  Would 
you be concerned?”  She replied, “I hope that I’m a person that looks beyond that.  I work 
for the Dearborn School District and there’s a lot of different culture. . . .  I enjoy meeting 
other cultures and working with people getting to know people.  I hope I don’t look at 
people’s skin color.  I don’t believe I do.  It’s their actions.”  Later, when defense counsel 
questioned Prospective Juror 5(a) in regard to openly carried firearms, she asked defense 
counsel for clarification, stating, “Just to be clear you’re only asking if we have an opinion 
about open carry?  If that’s the case then that’s okay.  If it’s open carry it’s not a drawn 
weapon.  That’s a right.  But being a police officer’s daughter it’s not going to concern me 
unless the gun is raised.  There’s two different things here.  I’m trying to follow what you’re 
asking.  And you’re only asking the opinion of whether or not if the gun is in use; is that 
correct?”  Defense counsel responded, “I may be clearer so if I’m understanding what 
you’re saying.  When a person does an open carry, as the daughter of a police officer, do 
you have an opinion about that person doing an open carry?”  She answered, “It’s the law.  
They’re allowed to have it.  And I see they have it and it’s not in use or being misused 
there’s no problem.”  As is clear, the record reflects that Juror(5)(a) expressed that she 
would have no difficultly in following the law, even as explained by defense counsel.   
 
 
 
 
59 
Further, there is no indication on the record that Juror (5)(a) was biased such that 
defendant was denied his right to an impartial jury.  Juror 5(a)’s statement that she could 
be impartial supports not only a conclusion that Juror (5)(a) was actually impartial but also 
that she was not actually biased.  Other statements from voir dire make this clear.  When 
asked if she would be concerned about being tried by an all-black jury, Juror (5)(a) also 
clarified that she “hope[d]” that she was a person that “looks beyond [race]” and noted that 
she worked for the Dearborn School District where she encountered a lot of different 
people and cultures.  She clarified that she “[didn’t] believe” she looked at people’s skin 
color; rather, “[i]t’s their actions.”  That testimony does not show that it was more probable 
than not that Juror 5(a) was biased.  She used the word “hope” in response to a hypothetical 
question about being tried by an all-black jury.  Just as defense counsel asked Juror 5(a) 
about a hypothetical scenario, Juror 5(a) used language, i.e., “hope,” that reflected the 
hypothetical nature of her answer.  But she then clarified that, after thinking for another 
second, that she did not believe that such a situation would concern her.  That testimony 
does not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or demonstrate that it is more probable than 
not that trial court’s erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge on Juror 5(a) prejudiced 
defendant.  For those reasons, defendant has not demonstrated that Juror (5)(a) was biased 
against him.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
With respect to defendant’s Batson challenge, we conclude that the trial court did 
not clearly err by finding that the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation was not a pretext 
to improper purposeful discrimination.  We further conclude that the trial court erroneously 
 
 
 
 
60 
denied defendant’s peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror 5(a) based on the court’s 
clear error in granting the prosecution’s Batson challenge.  However, because there is no 
evidence that Juror 5(a) was actually biased against defendant, we conclude that defendant 
is not entitled to relief.   
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 159346 
 
JACQUES JEAN KABONGO, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
MCCORMACK, C.J. (for reversal). 
I concur with the lead opinion that the trial court clearly erred by denying defense 
counsel’s request to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror 5 (Juror 
5).  But I disagree with the rest of the lead opinion’s conclusions.  I would hold that the 
trial court violated Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), 
by accepting the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for excusing Prospective Juror 2 (Juror 
2).  Because a Batson violation requires automatic reversal, People v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 
293; 702 NW2d 128 (2005), I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for a new 
trial on that basis.  Had my view prevailed, it would have been unnecessary to reach the 
appropriate remedy for the erroneous failure to dismiss Juror 5.  But because it has not, I 
must disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the error of refusing to remove Juror 
5 is subject to harmless-error review.  As many courts have concluded and the majority all 
but concedes, such a rule effectively would lead to automatic affirmance. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
I.  JUROR 2 
A Batson claim that a prosecutor is using a peremptory challenge based on race is 
subject to the following three-part inquiry: “First, a defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if 
that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the 
juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must 
determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”  Snyder v 
Louisiana, 552 US 472, 476-477; 128 S Ct 1203; 170 L Ed 2d 175 (2008) (cleaned up).  
I agree with the lead opinion that the trial court correctly concluded that the 
prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for removing Juror 2.  But unlike the lead opinion, 
I conclude that the trial court clearly erred in applying Step Three of Batson.  When the 
defendant raised his Batson challenge, the prosecutor gave the following explanation for 
her decision to use a peremptory challenge to remove Juror 2: 
With regards to juror number two she had what seemed, at least to me, 
to be a very difficult time with short-term memory.  She could not remember 
the Court’s first question when asked what her occupation was and she 
couldn’t remember any of the additional questions after that.  She had to ask 
a few times.  Also, she indicated she’s having a senior moment here and 
there.  She indicated, when asked about contact with the police, she thought 
she had been pulled over or she thought she had contact with the police 
before.  She couldn’t remember any sort [of] specifics.  Same with whether 
herself or her family were a victim of the crime she thought, yes, maybe 
robberies or armed robbery or something, I can’t remember, I can’t 
remember, I don’t remember how long ago, I don’t remember anything.  So 
she had a problem with memory and it’s the People[’]s concern for her that 
if we’re going to hear testimony today and then have a long weekend and 
come back on Monday.  And, so, the likelihood that she would forget 
testimony seemed fairly probable and the People were concerned about that. 
The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s reason: 
 
 
 
3 
 
I’m going to find in this case that the prosecutor as to juror number 
two has offered a race neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and 
further has articulated a neutral explanation for the dismissal.  Juror number 
two did indeed have a difficult time with memory she did discuss senior 
moments.  She had to kind of had to step back and reach back in her memory 
to recall things such as whether or not she had been the victim of a crime, 
such as—there were some other specific ones.  But I do remember she did 
seem to have a problem keeping up with this case.  
And Batson’s second step does not required [sic] articulation of [a] 
persuasive reason or even a plausible one[;] so long as the reason is not 
inherently discriminatory it suffices.  And that’s the case of Rice versus 
Collings, 546 U.S. 333 which is a (2006) case.  
So here the prosecutor has provided a race neutral explanation for her 
peremptory challenges to number two so I’m going to then deny the Batson 
challenge as to juror number two. 
And I’ll even go to the third step which requires that the trial Court 
make a final determination of whether the challenger of the strike, which 
would be the defense, has established purposeful discrimination.  And 
whether there is purposeful discrimination is the persuasiveness of the 
prosecutor’s justification for the peremptory strike.  It comes down to 
whether the trial Court finds the prosecutor’s race neutral explanations to be 
creditable [sic].  And in this case I will find that it was reasonable, her 
explanation is not improbable, there was a rationale that had some basis in 
accepted trial strategy.  And so I’m going to deny the Batson challenge as to 
juror number two. 
First, the trial court clearly erred in applying Batson because it concluded that once 
the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for dismissing Juror 2, the defendant’s Batson 
challenge could be denied.  The court stated, “I’ll even go to the third step” and determine 
whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination, as if it didn’t have to.  
This procedural misstep reveals that the trial court misunderstood the Batson inquiry and 
applied it incorrectly.   
Second, to substance: the trial court clearly erred by concluding that the prosecutor’s 
race-neutral explanation for dismissing Juror 2 was not pretext for purposeful 
 
 
 
4 
 
discrimination.  The lead opinion emphasizes that our review of the trial court’s ruling on 
Batson Step Three is entitled to great deference and reviewed only for clear error.  True 
enough.  In a typical case, where “[t]here will seldom be much evidence bearing on that 
issue, . . . the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the 
challenge,” so “[d]eference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent 
makes particular sense in this context . . . .”  Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 365; 111 
S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991).   
Not so here.  Unlike the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing Prospective Jurors 3 and 
14, the prosecutor’s reason for dismissing Juror 2 is not grounded in demeanor evidence or 
based in personal observations uncaptured by a cold record.1  No, the question of Juror 2’s 
alleged “difficult time with memory” is one related to the substance of the juror’s answers, 
and therefore one we easily can review. 
The record doesn’t support the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution’s race-
neutral reason for excusing Juror 2 was credible.  The court accepted the prosecutor’s 
exaggeration about Juror 2’s memory; the prosecutor claimed that the juror mentioned “a 
senior moment here and there.”  But that was not correct.  When asked about whether the 
jurors, their families, or their close friends had been the victim of a crime, Juror 2 answered 
that her family had been, but “I can’t remember the years and stuff.  Senior moment.  I’m 
                                              
1 The lead opinion asserts otherwise, citing the trial court’s statements that Juror 2 had to 
“reach back into her memory to recall things” and “did seem to have a problem keeping up 
with this case.”  Neither of these observations suggests it is grounded in anything the trial 
court purportedly observed rather than Juror 2’s answers to questions.  A clear contrast is 
the trial court’s ruling on Juror 3, whom it dismissed after agreeing with the prosecutor that 
she sat with her arms crossed and rolled her eyes.  That is a quintessential 
demeanor/credibility finding on which we should be most deferential to the trial court.   
 
 
 
5 
 
64 so . . . .”  Thus, Juror 2 mentioned one “[s]enior moment” related to recalling the 
specific year of an event in her past.  The court, however, accepted the prosecutor’s 
misstatement: “Juror number two did indeed have a difficult time with memory she did 
discuss senior moments.”  (Emphasis added.)   
The prosecutor also erroneously stated that Juror 2 couldn’t remember the court’s 
question when asked what her occupation was “and she couldn’t remember any of the 
additional questions after that.”  To the contrary, Juror 2 quickly answered the prosecutor’s 
remaining questions without prompting and without the prosecutor reminding her what 
those questions were.  This is that exchange between the prosecutor and Juror 2 on those 
points: 
Potential Juror Two: Good morning. 
The Court: I’m going to ask you your occupation, your marital status, 
and if you are married what your spouse does and your highest level of 
education? 
Potential Juror Two: I’m retired. 
The Court: And what are you retired from? 
Potential Juror Two: Counseling. 
The Court: Okay. 
Potential Juror Two: I was a counselor and I retired a year ago. 
The Court: Are you enjoying your retirement? 
Potential Juror Two: Yeah.  I’m divorced.  Level of education 
Bachelors in Criminal Justice Administration. 
The Court: Thank you, juror number two. 
 
 
 
6 
 
The prosecutor erroneously characterized Juror 2’s answers as “I don’t remember 
anything” when she stated only that she couldn’t remember the specific timing of events 
that happened long ago.  Although Juror 2 stated that she “can’t remember the years and 
stuff” when her family had been victims of crime, she did say that it had involved “robbery 
and stuff like that” but had occurred “a long time ago nothing recent.”  The prosecutor 
made no attempt to ask the juror for additional information to test the extent of her 
perceived memory lapse.   
While the prosecutor correctly stated that the juror couldn’t remember specifics 
about her prior contact with police and being a victim of a crime, I find these failures 
unremarkable when weighed against the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of Juror 2’s 
answers.  Nor do I credit the lead opinion’s reference to Juror 2’s vague response about her 
prior jury service in which she couldn’t recall specifically why she didn’t have to serve 
(“the defendant pled or something and then we left”).  The failure to remember details from 
long-ago events is not unusual.  Nor does it suggest memory problems that someone would 
not remember a fact of so little consequence, such as the reason she didn’t have to serve on 
a jury previously. 
Juror 2’s alleged failure to recall details about being a crime victim and her 
experience with the police (beyond just the years involved) provide the strongest support 
for the trial court’s finding.  But standing alone, Juror 2’s statements that she couldn’t 
remember “the years and stuff” about her family having been victims of a crime and that 
she had “been pulled over and stuff like that before” is not enough to uphold the trial court’s 
basis for allowing her to be dismissed.  The lead opinion characterizes the former response 
as evidencing that Juror 2 was unable to recall “any details” of the crime, but that is another 
 
 
 
7 
 
exaggeration—that Juror 2 said she couldn’t remember “stuff” about having been a crime 
victim does not mean she couldn’t remember any details.  The prosecutor never asked her 
for details.  The juror’s general statements with no request for follow-up do not support the 
lead opinion’s characterization.  
Because I believe the trial court committed a Batson error in accepting the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for dismissing Juror 2, I would reverse the Court of 
Appeals on this basis and remand for a new trial. 
II.  JUROR 5 
The trial court’s treatment of the prosecution’s Batson challenge to Juror 5 confirms 
its error in denying the defendant’s Batson challenge to Juror 2.  The court’s application of 
Batson’s third step to the defendant’s peremptory challenge to dismiss Juror 5 stands in 
sharp contrast to its deferential treatment of the prosecutor’s proffered reason for 
dismissing Juror 2.  As to the former, the trial court twice explained that it had a duty to 
“probe” the defense’s reasons for excusing Juror 5 and apply a “more penetrating analysis” 
to those reasons: 
The Court: First of all, again, with Batson the first step is whether the 
facts and circumstances of the voir dire suggests that racial discrimination 
motivated a strike.  Evidence raising merely an inference of discrimination 
surmounts the first Batson test creating a prima facie case.  I think in this 
case the prosecution, as to juror number five, has established a prima facia 
[sic] case because this is the third peremptory challenge which the defense 
has raised.  The other two were Mr. Trueblood, juror number 11, and Ms. 
Lori Monkaba who was juror number 14. 
The step two is to articulate a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case to be tried.  And in this particular case Mr. Halpern articulates 
the fact that she has police officers in her family.  But during the voir dire of 
number five I did not hear any additional voir dire directed to her about her 
relationships with police officers.  She testified clearly to me during the voir 
 
 
 
8 
 
dire that her relationships would not affect her ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror and she understood that the testimony of a police officer is to 
be put to the same challenges of weight and credibility as that of any other 
witness. 
As far as any—as far as the fact that she didn’t have a conviction or 
couldn’t remember a conviction I’d far rather a juror disclose that she thinks 
that she may have a conviction and we investigate it and find out that she 
doesn’t rather than a juror lie and say I don’t have one when in reality they 
do.  I don’t feel it’s appropriate to kick juror number five because she’s raised 
a concern which the Court was able to address. 
Finally, when we talk about evaluating the plausibility of a race 
neutral explanation for a strike in light off [sic] all the evidence with a bearing 
on it this inquiry, according to the Tennielle case necessarily includes careful 
consideration of relevant, direct, and circumstantial evidence of intent to 
discriminate.  And, also, in this case I have asked the defense very 
specifically what problems they have with juror number five considering the 
fact that she has been seated on this jury since the original 14 jurors were 
impanelled.  What I’m hearing is feelings.  There is—I have to—I’m charged 
as the judge—I’m charged as the judge to probe more deeply when someone 
just talks about feelings.  And there’s not sufficient facts here.  I’m not 
hearing about somebody that’s sleeping, somebody nervous, preoccupied, 
angry, disrespectful or agitated.  I’m just hearing about feelings.  I’m tasked 
with engaging in a more penetrating analysis focussing on ascertaining 
whether the proffered race neutral reason is pretext intended to mask a 
discrimination.  Evaluation of the central question requires the Court to 
permit argument by the opposing counsel who bears the burden of persuading 
the Court that the—that there was purposeful discrimination here.  This 
record lacks any objective indicia of concern—concerning the impartiality of 
juror number five or that she is otherwise unfit to serve as a juror in this case.  
So I’m going to find—I’m sorry, let me just double check.  I’m going to find 
that the reason offered is insufficient and I am going to find that the 
challenger has established purposeful discrimination.  So I’m going to keep 
juror number five on the jury . . . . 
Juror 5’s strong ties to law enforcement provided a valid race-neutral reason for her 
removal; given that this case involved a pure credibility contest between the defendant and 
two police officers, those ties provided an obvious basis for defense counsel to exclude her.  
Yet the trial court parsed defense counsel’s other reasons for asking that Juror 5 be excused 
 
 
 
9 
 
and denied that request because those other reasons were unsupported by the record or 
insufficient.  Had the court engaged in the same “more penetrating analysis” of the 
prosecutor’s reason for excusing Juror 2, it would have recognized the prosecutor’s 
mischaracterizations of the record and, I believe, could not have reached the conclusion it 
did. 
III.  REMEDY   
Because I agree with the lead opinion that the trial court clearly erred by denying 
defense counsel’s request to remove Juror 5, the question becomes what remedy, if any, is 
required.  Contrary to the lead opinion, and consistent with many other state courts that 
have answered this question, I would hold that the erroneous denial of a defendant’s 
peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal.    
Bell doesn’t settle the matter.  Although Bell purported to decide that harmless-error 
review applies to erroneous denials of a defendant’s peremptory challenges, only three 
justices signed that portion of the lead opinion.  That statement was also dictum because a 
majority of the justices concluded that no error had occurred.  See Bell, 473 Mich at 292-
293 (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.) (stating that “[i]n light of our conclusion that the trial 
court’s initial error was cured, we need not address whether a denial of a peremptory 
challenge is subject to automatic reversal” and noting that had it concluded that error 
occurred, it “would have applied a harmless error standard to the error”) (emphasis added); 
id. at 300 (WEAVER, J., concurring) (joining the portions of the lead opinion finding no 
error).  Only then-Chief Justice TAYLOR concluded that error had occurred and would have 
applied harmless-error review.  Id. at 302 (TAYLOR, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
 
 
 
10 
 
in part).  Indeed, this Court has acknowledged that that portion of the Bell lead opinion 
both lacked majority support and constituted dictum.  See Pellegrino v AMPCO Sys 
Parking, 486 Mich 330, 340 n 5; 785 NW2d 45 (2010) (“Only parts I through III of the 
lead opinion in Bell garnered majority support.”); id. at 348 n 12 (stating that “[t]he lead 
opinion [in Bell] stated in dictum that the improper denial of a peremptory challenge on a 
basis other than race is subject to [harmless-error] analysis”). 
And, of course, the justices in Bell never conducted a harmless-error analysis or 
concluded that any error in that case was harmless—more evidence that the Court did not 
decide this question.  The Court’s statement that harmless-error review applies to erroneous 
denials of peremptory challenges was unnecessary to the disposition of the case (or even 
to any alternate holding) and is obiter dictum.  “[S]tatements concerning a principle of law 
not essential to determination of the case are obiter dictum and lack the force of an 
adjudication[.]”  Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594, 597-598; 374 NW2d 905 
(1985).  Thus, the remedy issue remains an open question. 
The lead opinion acknowledges that state courts post-Rivera have divided on the 
appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge.2  But despite 
                                              
2 Of course federal courts have applied harmless-error review post-Rivera—they are bound 
by its holding.  See, e.g., United States v Lindsey, 634 F3d 541, 550 (CA 9, 2011) 
(“[A]lthough Rivera left the states free to decide the proper remedy for the error at issue, 
we cannot in good faith apply [the holding in United States v Annigoni, 96 F3d 1132 (CA 
9, 1996)] here.  We are not a separate sovereign that may freely prescribe remedies to our 
own laws absent a federal constitutional violation.  Instead, we are an intermediate court 
within the federal system, and as such, we must take our cue from the Supreme Court.”).  
States, by contrast, are separate sovereigns, and state courts have an independent duty to 
ensure that their systems operate fairly. 
 
 
 
11 
 
concluding that application of a harmless-error analysis to such errors “will result in almost 
automatic affirmance,” it purports to adopt such a rule.  Of course, the issue remains an 
unsettled one in Michigan law because the lead opinion commands the votes of only three 
justices.3  “Plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree as to 
the reasoning are not an authoritative interpretation binding on this Court under the doctrine 
of stare decisis.”  Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 109; 244 NW2d 98 (1976).   
I would adopt an automatic-reversal rule.  I agree with the Iowa Supreme Court in 
State v Mootz, 808 NW2d 207, 225 (Iowa, 2012): 
In support of an automatic reversal rule, Mootz argues that the 
erroneous denial of a peremptory strike is not amenable to harmless error 
analysis because of the difficulty in showing actual prejudice.  This argument 
has merit.  The State has not provided, nor can we conceive of, any situation 
in which a defendant could ever show prejudice arising out of the wrongful 
denial of a peremptory challenge where, as is the case here, the juror was not 
also removable by a challenge for cause.  A defendant could only show 
prejudice by showing that the juror he sought to remove was biased.  
However, if the juror were biased, then the juror would be removable for 
cause, and the question regarding the peremptory challenge would become 
moot.  [Citations omitted.] 
The dissent in Bell made a similar point, and the majority offered no response: “Because 
we have no tools to gauge the effect of errors in denying peremptory challenges, a harmless 
error analysis of them is simply unworkable.”  Bell, 473 Mich at 317 (KELLY, J., 
dissenting).  And given the “fundamental role” of the peremptory challenge (although it is 
not of constitutional dimension), Mootz, 808 NW2d at 224, a balancing of the interests 
                                              
3 Indeed, the lead opinion goes out of its way to purportedly resolve issues that remain 
unresolved because it has the support of only three justices.  See, e.g., ante at 10 (a 
“numbers” argument is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination under Batson); ante at 31 (same). 
 
 
 
12 
 
involved favors an automatic-reversal rule over the speculative concern that such a rule 
will discourage trial courts and prosecutors from policing a defendant’s discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges.  
The rationale underlying an automatic-reversal rule in this context is precisely the 
same as one that drives the structural-error doctrine—the difficulty or impossibility of 
determining prejudice to the defendant as a result of the error.  See United States v 
Gonzales-Lopez, 548 US 140, 149 n 4; 126 S Ct 2557; 165 L Ed 2d 409 (2006) (stating 
that “here, as we have done in the past, we rest our conclusion of structural error upon the 
difficulty of assessing the effect of the error”); see also State v Campbell, 772 NW2d 858, 
862 (Minn App, 2009) (“automatic reversal remains the appropriate remedy when a trial 
court erroneously denies a defendant’s peremptory challenge, even after . . . Rivera,” 
because an “ ‘erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge . . . does not lend itself to 
harmless error analysis’ ”), quoting State v Reiners, 664 NW2d 826, 835 (Minn, 2003).  
The lead opinion correctly notes that in Rivera, the United States Supreme Court asserted 
that the defendant’s argument that “[t]he improper seating of a juror . . . is not amenable to 
harmless-error analysis” did “not withstand scrutiny.”  Rivera, 556 US at 157.  But the lead 
opinion misleadingly characterizes that statement as having dispatched the merits argument 
that the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge isn’t amenable to harmless-error 
review.  The Rivera Court did not offer any explanation for how such errors could be 
reviewed for harmfulness; it simply determined that the loss of a peremptory challenge due 
to a state court’s good-faith error could not be a matter of federal constitutional concern.  
Id.  That does not “dispatch” the question whether harmless-error review of such errors is 
impossible. 
 
 
 
13 
 
The lead opinion’s primary counterargument to a rule of automatic reversal is that 
the United States Supreme Court in Rivera and other cases has said that the erroneous 
denial of peremptory challenges is not an error of constitutional dimension.4  So goes the 
argument—because only structural errors are subject to automatic reversal, and structural 
errors are constitutional errors, the erroneous denial of peremptory challenges cannot be 
structural error and therefore cannot be subject to automatic reversal.  But that conclusion 
ignores the Supreme Court’s contrary invitation to states in Rivera, 556 US at 161-162: 
Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to 
decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus 
require automatic reversal.  States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, 
that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible 
error per se.[5]  
See also People v Novotny, 320 P3d 1194, 1206; 2014 CO 18 (Colo, 2014) (Hood, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “even if we were bound by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal harmless error standard when interpreting 
our own, which we are not, its interpretation ‘does not mean that all nonconstitutional 
errors must be subject to harmless-error analysis’ ”), quoting United States v Lane, 474 US 
438, 472; 106 S Ct 725; 88 L Ed 2d 814 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
                                              
4 The lead opinion also repeatedly distracts from the ramifications of its remedy holding—
a rule of automatic affirmance—with the irrelevant statement (with which none of us would 
disagree) that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.  It’s a fair trial, not a 
perfect one, the defendant wants.  An imperfect trial can become an unfair trial—the 
question is whether the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge causes that. 
5 Confronted with this point, the lead opinion inexplicably doubles down on it.  See ante at 
56 (criticizing this opinion for ignoring “the only guiding statement of law offered by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to assist state courts” on this point). 
 
 
 
14 
 
The lead opinion also cites MCL 769.26 in support of its conclusion.  It reasons that 
automatic reversal can’t be the rule because that statute requires a court to find that it 
“affirmatively appear[s] that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice”—which means that the error more probably than not was outcome-determinative, 
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999)—before setting aside a 
conviction.  This reasoning is unhelpful because it’s virtually impossible to discern whether 
this error is outcome-determinative.  It also neglects additional important statutory text, 
which provides that an error on any matter of pleading or procedure shall not be a basis for 
reversal “unless in the opinion of the court” the error has led to a miscarriage of justice.  
MCL 769.26.  The statute leaves it to the court’s discretion to find a miscarriage of justice, 
or not.  Because a harmless-error rule is unworkable in this context, leaving defendants 
who are erroneously denied a peremptory challenge without a remedy is a miscarriage of 
justice. 
Finally, this conclusion is also informed and supported by the real-world harm at 
stake with these errors.  It is no secret that people, including prospective jurors, have 
unconscious biases.  See, e.g., Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias 
Across the Legal System, 46 U Cal Davis L Rev 1563, 1577-1578 (2013) (noting “court 
decisions [that] have recognized that unconscious bias has the potential to impact jurors’ 
perceptions, assessments, and ultimately, their verdicts”).  Peremptory challenges—though 
not constitutionally required—are an important tool for maintaining fair trials by allowing 
prosecutors and defendants to remove jurors they perceive as being likely to be sympathetic 
to the other side.  See People v Luciano, 10 NY3d 499, 502; 890 NE2d 214 (2008) 
(“Though not a trial tool of constitutional magnitude, peremptory challenges are a mainstay 
 
 
 
15 
 
in a litigant’s strategic arsenal.”).  Indeed, here is precisely such a case: despite Juror 5’s 
assertion that she could treat a police officer’s testimony the same as any other witness, 
defense counsel might have reasonably believed her family background would 
(consciously or not) cause her to be unable to do so. 
When a trial court unjustly hampers a defendant’s ability to strike a juror without 
cause—and if that error can never be corrected on appeal—it erodes public trust in the jury 
system.  The lead opinion’s approach would give prosecutors free rein to raise frivolous 
challenges to defendants’ use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors who might not be 
able to decide a case fairly, because if the trial court erroneously grants such a challenge, 
it won’t matter.  The lead opinion’s approach raises the specter of less fair trials.  To me, 
that would be a disservice to the rule of law, which is sustained by the public’s confidence 
in it. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I would hold that the trial court committed a Batson error when it accepted the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for dismissing Juror 2, and I would reverse the Court of 
Appeals judgment and remand for a new trial on that basis.  While I concur with the lead 
opinion that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss Juror 5, I disagree with its 
conclusion that the remedy for the error is to review it using harmless-error analysis.  
Automatic reversal is appropriate.   
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
WELCH, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 
considered it before she assumed office.