Case Title: In re Illuzzi

Citation: 160 Vt. 474, 632 A.2d 346

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_ILLUZZI.92-602; 160 Vt. 474; 632 A.2d 346



                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 92-602

                               MARCH TERM, 1993


 In re Vincent Illuzzi             }          APPEALED FROM:
                                   }
                                   }          
                                   }          Professional Conduct Board
                                   }
                                   }          DOCKET NO. 89.47


              In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:


     The decision of the Professional Conduct Board is adopted and its 
 recommendation for discipline is approved.  Vincent Illuzzi is suspended 
 from the practice of law for the period of six months, beginning September 
 1, 1993, during which time he shall successfully complete the multi-state 
 professional responsibility examination.





                                    BY THE COURT:



                                    Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice
 Dissenting:

 Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice   John A. Dooley, Associate Justice


                                    James L. Morse, Associate Justice


                                    Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

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 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                                 No. 92-602


 In re Vincent Illuzzi                        Supreme Court


                                              Original Jurisdiction


                                              March Term, 1993


 Wendy S. Collins, Special Bar Counsel, Montpelier, for petitioner-appellee

 David Putter of Saxer, Anderson, Wolinsky and Sunshine, Montpelier, for
  respondent-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      PER CURIAM.     This case is before us a second time.  In In re Illuzzi,
 ___ Vt. ___, ___, 616 A.2d 233, 236 (1992), we held that DR 7-104(A)(1)
 (lawyer shall not communicate with a represented party without consent of
 party's attorney) prohibits lawyers for plaintiffs from communicating directly
 with defendant insurance companies without the consent of the companies'
 counsel.  We remanded the case to the Professional Conduct Board because the
 Board "failed to adhere to the requirements of its procedural rules when it
 adopted a second hearing panel report that had not been submitted to
 respondent."  Id. at ___, 616 A.2d  at 234; see Administrative Order 9, Rule
 8C, 8D.  That procedural deficiency was remedied when respondent was given an
 opportunity to address the panel's second report, which the Board again
 adopted.  Respondent appeals anew on the grounds that there are procedural
 
                                

 errors in the Board's decision; that the recommended sanction is too harsh
 because it is based upon an erroneous conclusion that he violated DR 1-102(A)
 and DR 1-102(A)(5); and that the Board failed to acknowledge certain
 mitigating factors, while considering inapplicable aggravating factors.  Bar
 Counsel responds by contending that the recommended sanction is too lenient in
 light of respondent's long history of unethical conduct and repeated
 violations of the Code.  She recommends that respondent be disbarred or, at
 minimum, suspended from practice for three years as provided in A.O. 9, Rule
 7A(2).  We adopt the Board's recommendation that respondent be suspended from
 the practice of law for six months.
                                      I.
      We begin by chronicling respondent's prior disciplinary record and the
 incidents that led to the present petition.  Respondent was admitted to the
 Vermont bar in 1979.  Shortly thereafter, he received his first reprimand for
 a disciplinary infraction.  In re Illuzzi, 138 Vt. 621, 622, 413 A.2d 1220,
 1220 (1980).  Then a deputy state's attorney, he was cited for a traffic
 violation en route to work.  The next day, his employer, the Orleans County
 State's Attorney, wrote a letter to the Washington County State's Attorney's
 office falsely stating that his deputy was responding to an emergency call
 regarding a homicide investigation when he was stopped for speeding.  This
 Court publicly reprimanded respondent for requesting that his employer
 fabricate a story aimed at persuading another prosecutor to dismiss the
 ticket, or for acquiescing in the false account, in violation of DR 1-
 102(A)(4) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty or deceit)
 and DR 1-102(A)(5) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to
 administration of justice).  Respondent admitted to the falsity of the story
 
                                 

 and stipulated to the infraction after it became apparent that the story had
 been fabricated.
      Less than a year later, respondent received a private reprimand after he
 stipulated to violating DR 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or knowingly failing to
 disclose that which attorney is required to reveal), DR 7-103(B) (failing to
 disclose existence of exculpatory evidence to counsel of criminal defendant),
 and DR 7-104(A)(1) (communicating with party known to be represented by
 counsel).  In that instance, respondent, still a deputy state's attorney, was
 sanctioned after the Board found he should have known that a criminal
 defendant was represented by counsel, but nevertheless allowed the police to
 interview the accused without counsel present.  Not only did respondent fail
 to seek permission for the interview from the defendant's attorney, he also
 failed to inform the attorney that the interview had occurred or to furnish
 the attorney with a copy of the supplementary investigation report that
 recounted the interview.
      In 1983, respondent received another private reprimand for knowingly
 concealing facts, or making a false statement of fact, when he suggested to
 the court that his client, who had been released pending trial on other
 charges, remained incarcerated on the other charges.  This conduct constituted
 another violation of DR 7-102(A)(3).  Although a majority of the Board
 recommended a private reprimand, some members felt stronger action should have
 been taken.  The Board warned respondent that the violations were serious,
 that he had not acted within the standards of character and behavior expected
 of members of the bar, and that he must strictly adhere to the ethical
 standards set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
      
                                 

     In August 1987, respondent received yet another private reprimand after
 the Board accepted a stipulation between respondent and bar counsel stating
 that he had committed acts prejudicial to the administration of justice, in
 violation of DR 1-102(A)(5).  In that incident, respondent had taken over a
 case from another attorney.  Despite the fact that he knew his client's former
 attorney claimed part of any future settlement as payment for services
 rendered, respondent failed to notify the attorney when the case settled or to
 resolve the issue of attorneys' fees before disbursing the settlement funds.
      The present allegations against respondent resulted from his
 representation of two plaintiffs in separate personal injury actions.  In one
 case, respondent represented a woman injured in an accident while a passenger
 in a car driven by her husband.  Respondent contacted the insurance company
 covering the vehicle, Travelers Insurance Company, and attempted to settle the
 matter with its claims supervisor, Linda Fritsch.  When they could not agree
 on the value of the claim, respondent filed a lawsuit on behalf of the
 plaintiff in the summer of 1989, and Travelers retained a law firm to defend
 the claim.  Respondent continued to communicate directly with Travelers,
 despite being told by Fritsch that the law firm had entered an appearance and
 that respondent should speak with counsel rather than the company.  He sent
 letters on September 26 and 28, suggesting that Travelers' counsel had not
 expeditiously handled the case or made the company aware of the relevant law.
 In the second letter, respondent made the following statement: "If you want to
 keep the meter running on your legal costs and expenses in this case, that is
 a decision which is up to you."
        When respondent did not cease direct contact with Travelers, Fritsch
 faxed him a letter on October 2, in which she reiterated that the company was
 
                              

 represented by counsel and stated, "As such, I am at a loss to understand why
 you keep communicating directly with this office."  Three days later,
 respondent replied:
         I think you know very well why I am communicating with
         your office.  I believe the manner in which this case
         has been handled both by your company and the law firm .
         . . may give rise to a bad faith action directly against
         Travelers and the law firm which you have retained.  I
         need one further point of clarification.  Is the law
         firm . . . representing the interests of Travelers
         Insurance Company?

 Respondent telephoned Fritsch once again and was again told to contact
 Travelers' attorney.  The last direct contact occurred on October 11, 1989,
 when respondent called Travelers and angrily demanded to know why the
 company's counsel had failed to show up for a deposition.  Shortly
 thereafter, Fritsch advised the company's attorney to settle the bodily
 injury portion of the claim for the $20,000 policy limit.
      The second incident giving rise to this disciplinary action again
 concerned respondent's representation of a plaintiff in a personal injury
 case.  Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which was represented
 by the same law firm that represented Travelers in the other action, insured
 the defendant in this second case.  During the course of the trial in May
 1987, defense counsel Lawrence Miller telephoned GEICO's claims
 representative, who informed him that respondent had just called and had
 suggested the company settle the case because the trial was going badly.
 Miller confronted respondent, expressed his dismay that respondent had
 called the insurer, and stated that both the defendant driver of the car
 and the insurance carrier were his clients and that respondent should not
 call GEICO.  Respondent told Miller that he did not know that Miller also
 represented GEICO, and that had he known, he would not have called.  He
 
                                   

 asked whether Miller was going to report him for an ethical violation.
 Miller responded that he "would accept his explanation at face value" and
 would not file a complaint with the Professional Conduct Board.
 Approximately two years later, while the case was pending on appeal,
 respondent again contacted GEICO by letter without Miller's permission.
 Miller then filed a complaint with the Board.
      Based on these two incidents, the Board adopted the second panel's
 determination that respondent violated DR 7-104(A)(1), DR 1-102(A)(7)
 (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice
 law), and DR 1-102(A)(5).  In the first appeal, we rejected respondent's
 argument that DR 7-104(A)(1) should not be applied to prohibit contact
 between plaintiffs' lawyers and insurance company adjusters, holding that
 "the definition of 'parties' under the rule is not restricted to named
 parties in a lawsuit.  The language of the rule suggests no limitation on
 the word 'party.' . . . The rule clearly prohibits direct contact without
 defense counsel's prior consent."  Illuzzi, ___ Vt. at ___, 616 A.2d  at 236.
                                     II.
      The hearing panel found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(7) "when
 he disparaged Mr. Miller with the suggestion to the client that he was
 'running the meter.'"  Respondent argues that the petition did not provide
 adequate notice of a violation of this rule, that the rule is
 unconstitutionally vague as applied to the alleged misconduct, and that the
 Board's conclusion that he violated the rule is not supported by the
 evidence.  We reject each of these arguments.
      The petition cited a violation of DR 1-102(A)(7) with respect to both
 counts.  Count II of the petition, on which the Board based the violation,
 
                                

 states that respondent communicated directly with the insurer several times
 after the company specifically told him to direct his communications to its
 counsel for that particular matter.  The petition alluded to the September
 28, 1989 letter on which the violation was founded, noting that in the
 letter respondent challenged the insurer's legal position and insinuated
 that the company was wasting money on defense of the case.  A copy of the
 letter was attached to the petition.
      Given these factual allegations, respondent received adequate notice of
 the charge against him.  Rule 8C of A.O. 9 requires that the petition
 alleging misconduct be "sufficiently clear and specific to inform the
 respondent of the alleged misconduct."  Attorney disciplinary proceedings,
 like other legal actions, require only that notice "inform the lawyer of the
 nature of the charges . . . in sufficient detail to permit the lawyer to
 prepare a defense."  C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics { 3.4.2 (1986); see In
 re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 487-88,