Case Title: Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11571

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11571 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  THE NGOC TRAN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 5, 2014. - April 10, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Mental 
Impairment.  Practice, Criminal, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Instructions to 
jury, Duplicative convictions, Jury and jurors, Conduct of 
juror, Capital case.  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 16, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J. 
 
 
 
Stephen Neyman for the defendant. 
 
Michael A. Kaneb, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  On April 28, 2011, Son Ngoc Tran was found dead 
in her home.  The cause of her death was multiple blunt-impact 
injuries to her head and brain inflicted by a rubber-headed 
2 
 
 
mallet.  Dispatched to the scene to investigate, Lowell police 
officers discovered the victim in a pool of blood in her 
bathroom and her husband, the defendant, sobbing in the living 
room.  As one officer approached, the defendant raised his hands 
and said, "I killed my wife." 
 
The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree 
and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a 
person sixty years of age or older.  He filed a motion to 
suppress statements he made in an interview with police 
investigators shortly after his arrest, which was denied 
following an evidentiary hearing.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
proceeded with respect to the murder charge on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty.  The 
defense was not lack of criminal responsibility, but the 
defendant's lack of the mental capacity to specifically intend 
his actions or to act in a cruel or atrocious manner.  A 
Middlesex County jury found the defendant guilty on both 
charges.1 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims several errors.  We reject 
each contention and find no reversible error arising from the 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was sentenced consecutively for a term of 
life without the possibility of parole on the conviction of 
murder in the first degree, and to a sentence of not less than 
nine and not more than ten years on the conviction of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a person sixty 
years of age or older. 
3 
 
 
defendant's various claims.  Further, we conclude that there is 
no basis for exercising our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or 
order a new trial.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our 
analysis of the issues raised on appeal. 
 
At approximately 7 P.M. on April 28, 2011, the defendant 
called Man Le,2 a family friend, and asked her to come to his 
house the following day with his son, McKinley Tran.  There was 
nothing unusual in the defendant's tone of voice, and when Man 
asked the defendant why he wanted her to visit he told her, 
"It's a secret."  The defendant also called McKinley directly 
and asked him to come to his house the next day, stating, "You 
will find out [why] when you come over." 
 
Sometime after these telephone calls, the defendant entered 
the bathroom of the home he shared with the victim in Lowell, 
armed with a metal-shafted, rubber-headed hammer.  The defendant 
proceeded to use the mallet to attack the victim with repeated 
blows to her head.  After the victim was knocked to the floor, 
the defendant continued to strike her with the hammer on her 
                                                          
 
 
2 Where appropriate the defendant's family members and 
family friend are referred to by their first names given their 
common last names. 
4 
 
 
face, skull, neck, arms, and legs until she was dead. The attack 
caused fractures to her skull, eye sockets, and cheekbones, 
multiple contusions to her brain, and numerous other injuries to 
her arms, legs, and extremities.  Each of these injuries was 
inflicted while the victim was still alive. 
 
At approximately 9 P.M., the defendant telephoned Man a 
second time and said, "I killed her dead."  He then asked Man to 
inform his son of this by telephone.  At this point, the 
defendant's voice sounded "different," and he instructed Man, 
"[C]all the police.  Come cuff me."  He explained that he 
attempted to report the murder at a nearby police station, but 
it was closed. 
 
Alerted by Man, McKinley and his wife, Chan Le,3 drove to 
the defendant's house and arrived shortly after 9 P.M.  On 
entering the house, Chan found the defendant sitting on the 
living room couch.  The defendant was surrounded by several 
chairs, which bore hand-lettered signs in both English and 
Vietnamese warning of the risk of electric shock.  The victim 
was found dead on the bathroom floor.  There was blood all over 
the bathroom, as well as on the defendant's pants, shirt, face, 
and hands.  The defendant told Chan that he had killed the 
victim and asked not to be touched because he was "someone with 
guilt." 
                                                          
 
 
3 Chan Le is also the niece of Man Le. 
5 
 
 
 
The defendant had planned to kill himself after killing the 
victim.  He had written his children a five-page letter, blaming 
the victim for treating him poorly and for "heartlessly 
shatter[ing] the happiness of [the] family."  He wrote, "Now the 
time has come for me to leave and take this wife with me. . . ."  
The remainder of this letter provided his children with details 
concerning the family automobiles and bank accounts.  After 
killing the victim, the defendant wrapped the exposed ends of an 
electrical cord, which he had previously spliced open, around 
his two thumbs, and plugged the cord into an electrical outlet.  
He received minor burns to his skin. 
 
Lowell police Officer Philip Valliant and his partner were 
dispatched to the scene at approximately 9:30 P.M.  They found 
the defendant, still seated on the living room couch, sobbing.  
When Officer Valliant approached the defendant, he raised his 
hands and told Officer Valliant, "I killed my wife.  I killed my 
wife."  The defendant was placed under arrest and instructed to 
walk to the kitchen and sit while the officers awaited the 
arrival of additional police officers and medical personnel.  
The defendant complied with these instructions and appeared 
"calm" and "rational." 
 
The defendant insisted that the victim did nothing to 
provoke him on the night of the killing.  Rather, he admitted to 
killing her out of a deep hostility that developed over the 
6 
 
 
course of their long and unhappy marriage.  The victim and the 
defendant, both immigrants from Vietnam, were married for more 
than thirty years at the time of the killing.  Throughout their 
marriage, the defendant verbally and mentally abused the victim.  
In the weeks leading up to the killing, the defendant and the 
victim faced particular financial strain.  Moreover, the 
defendant was convinced that the victim was "poison[ing] the 
minds of [his] children" against him and blamed her for causing 
him "endless suffering and anguish."  On the day of the killing, 
the victim had announced to the defendant, their children, and 
her friend that she was leaving him. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Miranda waiver.  The Commonwealth 
presented evidence at trial that the defendant, after being 
transported to the Lowell police station, agreed to speak with 
Lowell police Sergeant Joseph Murray and State police Trooper 
Erik Gagnon.  Sergeant Murray began advising the defendant of 
the Miranda rights by reading from the Lowell police 
department's preprinted Miranda advisement and waiver form.  
Although the defendant had told the officers that he understood 
them and read and spoke English, at some point it became 
apparent that the defendant, a native Vietnamese speaker, had 
some difficulty responding to Sergeant Murray's questions in 
English.  Sergeant Murray asked the defendant if he would like 
the assistance of a Vietnamese translator, to which the 
7 
 
 
defendant indicated he would.  At this point, the interview 
stopped.  After a series of telephone calls, Sergeant Murray was 
able to obtain translation assistance from two Boston police 
officers, Diep Nguyen and Hoang Nguyen. 
 
With the assistance of both a written Miranda advisement 
printed in Vietnamese and a running translation provided by the 
Boston police officers, the defendant was provided with complete 
Miranda warnings both in English and Vietnamese.  After Sergeant 
Murray read each of the enumerated warnings in English, the two 
Boston police officers asked the defendant, who was consulting 
the written Vietnamese translation, to confirm that he 
understood Sergeant Murray's warning, either by asking the 
defendant to explain the warning to them in Vietnamese or by 
restating the warning in Vietnamese and asking if the defendant 
understood.  On cross-examination at trial, Officer Diep Nguyen 
acknowledged that these translations from English to Vietnamese 
were "probably . . . not word for word."4  After receiving his 
Miranda warnings, the defendant signed the Vietnamese language 
                                                          
 
 
4 At trial, the only discussion of the distinctions between 
the English and Vietnamese advisements was on cross-examination 
of Boston police Officer Diep Nguyen.  For example, Officer 
Nguyen testified that the English on the Lowell police 
department form states, "You have the right to remain silent," 
whereas the translated Vietnamese form states, "You have the 
right to remain silent, which means you don't have to answer any 
questions." 
8 
 
 
form, which indicated that he understood his rights, and told 
the officers that he would speak with them. 
 
In the approximately forty-minute recorded interview that 
followed, the defendant gave Sergeant Murray and Trooper Gagnon 
a detailed account of the killing.  He again admitted to killing 
his wife by hitting her in the head "[m]any times" with a 
hammer.  He explained to the officers how he stopped his attack 
at one point to muffle the victim's cries with toilet paper, and 
then resumed.  The defendant explained to the officers how many 
years of unhappiness led him to "plan[] to kill [the victim] and 
then commit suicide." 
 
The judge instructed the jury, both when the recording was 
played at trial and in his final charge, that they could 
consider the defendant's statements only if the Commonwealth had 
proved the voluntariness of the statements beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The judge did not instruct the jury that they should 
specifically consider whether the defendant's Miranda waiver was 
valid.  As the defendant did not request such an instruction, 
and did not object to the form of the humane practice 
instruction the judge issued, we review this claim to determine 
whether any error created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Sunahara, 455 Mass. 
832, 836 (2010). 
9 
 
 
 
The defendant contends that it was error for the jury not 
to be explicitly instructed that when considering whether to 
accept the defendant's statements as evidence under the humane 
practice rule, see Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 149-
153, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), they were entitled to 
evaluate the validity of his Miranda waiver as a factor.  In 
Tavares, we explained that, "[o]ur humane practice requires that 
when statements amounting to a confession are offered in 
evidence, the question whether they were voluntary is to be 
decided at a preliminary hearing in the absence of the jury. 
. . . If the judge decides that they are admissible, he should 
then instruct the jury not to consider the confession if, upon 
the whole evidence in the case, they are satisfied that it was 
not the voluntary act of the defendant" (citations and 
quotations omitted).  Id. at 149-150.  The defendant grounds his 
argument in a footnote in Tavares in which we explained that 
evidence bearing on whether Miranda warnings were properly given 
and waived is relevant to the determination whether a 
defendant's confession was voluntary and therefore may be 
considered by the jury when making its over-all evaluation.  Id. 
at 153 n.19.  We find the defendant's argument unpersuasive. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Cryer, 426 Mass. 562, 572 (1998), we 
rejected the argument that a judge is obligated to instruct the 
jury on specific factors they should consider when assessing 
10 
 
 
voluntariness.  Moreover, "[i]n determining the propriety of a 
jury instruction, we must consider the instruction in the 
context in which it was delivered, in order to determine its 
probable effect on the jury's understanding of their function."  
Id.  Here, the judge, both when the recording of the interview 
was played and in his final charge, detailed various factors the 
jury could consider in their determination whether the 
defendant's statements were voluntary, including "the nature of 
the conversations" the defendant had with the police, as well as 
whether the defendant was "confused to any extent" at the time 
of the interview.  Additionally, the evidence presented at 
trial, especially defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer 
Diep Nguyen, "made clear to the jury what factors they should 
consider in weighing whether the defendant's statements were 
voluntary."  Id.  Further, the judge instructed the jury 
repeatedly to consider the "totality of the surrounding 
circumstances."  These instructions exceeded the minimum 
required under Cryer, and provided sufficient direction for a 
reasonable jury to disregard the defendant's statements if they 
had a reasonable doubt about the voluntariness of his 
statements. 
 
The defendant's argument rests on his contention that an 
instruction directing the jury to consider the validity of his 
Miranda waiver would have led them to consider that the 
11 
 
 
Vietnamese translation of the Miranda advisements did not track 
the English advisements "word for word," thereby casting real 
doubt on the voluntariness of his statement.  As an initial 
matter, we note that the judge found that the defendant 
understood his Miranda rights prior to making his statement to 
the police, and we discern no error in this finding.  In any 
event, while "[t]he four warnings Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444-445 (1966),] requires are invariable," the United 
States Supreme Court "has not dictated the words in which the 
essential information must be conveyed."  Florida v. Powell, 559 
U.S. 50, 60 (2010).  See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 
359 (1981) ("no talismanic incantation" required to satisfy 
Miranda's strictures).  "[R]eviewing courts are not required to 
examine the words employed 'as if construing a will or defining 
the terms of an easement.  The inquiry is simply whether the 
warnings reasonably "conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as 
required by Miranda."'"  Powell, supra at 60, quoting Duckworth 
v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989).  See Commonwealth v. Bins, 
465 Mass. 348, 358 (2013) ("No prescribed set of words must be 
used to provide the [Miranda] warnings . . ." [citation 
omitted]). 
 
There is nothing to indicate that this standard was not 
satisfied here, as the four essential Miranda warnings were 
12 
 
 
reasonably conveyed to the defendant in his native language.5  
The sufficiency of this translation is not diminished by the 
fact that the precise Vietnamese words employed did not 
completely mirror their English counterparts.  See Bins, 465 
Mass. at 362-363 (waiver voluntary where Portuguese translation 
that varied from precise English advisement still adequately 
conveyed required warnings).  Here, no warning was omitted from 
either recitation and none was "misstated to the point of being 
contradictory."  Id. at 363.  Where the defendant has not shown 
a substantive deficiency in the warnings he received, and the 
four required warnings were reasonably conveyed in the 
defendant's native language before he agreed to speak with the 
police, the fact that the Vietnamese translation did not track 
the English warnings "word for word" is of no legal consequence.  
The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the 
defendant was advised of his rights in a meaningful way and 
voluntarily waived them, and, in any event, the judge's 
instructions on the issue of voluntariness did not give rise to 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.6 
                                                          
 
 
5 Specifically, the defendant was advised that he had a 
right to remain silent, anything he said may be used against 
him, he had a right to speak to an attorney, and if he could not 
afford an attorney one would be appointed for him. 
 
 
6 Although we conclude that there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in this case, a judge's 
humane practice instruction should ordinarily advise the jury 
13 
 
 
 
2.  Mental impairment instruction.  The defendant also 
argues that the judge provided deficient instructions regarding 
his defense of mental impairment.  More specifically, he 
contends that the instructions failed to define "mental 
impairment," and failed to sufficiently emphasize the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof.7  Yet, the model jury 
instructions on homicide do not include a definition of the term 
"mental impairment."  We have also not required or offered such 
a definition.  "'All that we have ever required' be said to 
juries about the effect of mental impairment on a defendant's 
intent or knowledge is 'satisfied by a simple instruction that 
the jury may consider credible evidence' of the mental 
impairment 'in deciding whether the Commonwealth had met its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that among the many factors they may consider in determining 
whether a statement allegedly made by the defendant is voluntary 
is whether the Miranda warnings were given to and understood by 
the defendant. 
 
7 In his brief, the defendant quotes extensively from the 
model jury instruction on lack of criminal responsibility, yet 
he does not contend that the judge should have given such an 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Urrea, 443 Mass. 530, 535 
(2005) (explaining distinction between mental impairment 
doctrine and test regarding lack of criminal responsibility).  
Although some of the defense expert's testimony arguably 
supported a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, such an 
instruction was not required, as it was not requested.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 422 Mass. 420, 424 (1996) ("Such an 
instruction must be given if requested and supported by the 
evidence").  Moreover, the defendant did not argue lack of 
criminal responsibility in his closing argument.  Finally, the 
judge specifically asked defense counsel to confirm that she was 
"not asking for an instruction on criminal responsibility," to 
which she responded in the affirmative. 
14 
 
 
burden of proving the defendant's state of mind beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 207 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 300 
(1992). 
 
Here, four times during his final charge, the judge 
instructed the jury that they could consider "any credible 
evidence" that the defendant suffered from a mental impairment 
in determining whether the charges had been adequately proven 
against him.8  Twice, the judge also reminded the jury of the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof, which he discussed at length in 
the general portion of his instructions.  These instructions 
mirrored the model jury instructions on homicide, as well as the 
instructions requested by the defendant, and they appropriately 
explained the relationship between the Commonwealth's burden of 
proof and the defendant's defense of mental impairment. 
 
Moreover, in assessing the adequacy of the language 
employed in a jury charge, "we consider the jury charge as a 
whole, looking for the interpretation a reasonable juror would 
place on the judge's words" (citation and quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 658 (2002).  Here, we 
                                                          
 
8 The judge gave this instruction once when addressing the 
intent required for a conviction of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of deliberate premeditation, twice when addressing 
the intent required for a conviction of murder on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and once more when addressing the 
intent required for a conviction of murder in the second degree. 
15 
 
 
cannot say that the term "mental impairment" is so obscure that 
a reasonable jury would be unable to rely on the usual and 
accepted meanings of these words to determine whether the 
defendant was capable of informing the required intent.  
Further, the jury heard testimony from two expert witnesses 
regarding the defendant's claim of mental impairment and his 
capacity to intend his actions at the time of the murder.  
Accordingly, it was not error for the judge to leave the term 
"mental impairment" undefined. 
 
Last, the judge was correct to abstain from stating that 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was not mentally impaired.  Evidence of impairment is 
a "mere subsidiary fact[] that the jury consider in sifting the 
circumstantial evidence as to [the defendant's] mental state."  
Mercado, 456 Mass. at 207, quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 
Mass. 792, 805 (1996).  There is "no requirement that the jury 
find these subsidiary facts and inferences beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Waite, supra at 806.  In sum, the judge's instruction 
on mental impairment, particularly in light of the substantial 
evidence offered to demonstrate the defendant's criminal intent, 
did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
 
3.  Duplicative convictions.  The defendant additionally 
contends that his convictions of murder and assault and battery 
16 
 
 
by means of a dangerous weapon on a person sixty years of age or 
older were duplicative.  The defendant's argument relies on a 
theory that convictions are duplicative if they arise out of a 
single criminal episode.  We considered and rejected this theory 
in Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 430-436 (2009), and the 
defendant's reliance on pre-Vick case law is misplaced.  In 
Vick, the defendant was convicted of, among other things, 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing 
serious bodily injury and armed assault with intent to murder.  
Id. at 419.  He argued that "the two offenses were so closely 
related in fact as to constitute in substance but one crime."  
Id. at 430-431.  There, while recognizing that a series of cases 
provided some support for the view on which this argument 
rested, see id. at 433-434, we ultimately rejected this theory 
of merger and "affirmed the traditional elements-based 
approach."  Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 853 (2010).  
See Vick, supra at 431.  Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
461 Mass. 616, 632-634, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 433 (2012), we 
invoked Vick to explicitly overrule Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 
Mass. 281, 293-294 (2003), a case on which the defendant's brief 
and theory of merger substantially relies. 
 
In Vick, 454 Mass. at 431, we explained, "[an] elements-
based approach remains the standard for determining whether 
multiple convictions stemming from one criminal transaction are 
17 
 
 
duplicative."  See Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434-436 
(1871).  "As long as each offense requires proof of an 
additional element that the other does not, neither crime is a 
lesser-included offense of the other, and convictions on both 
are deemed to have been authorized by the Legislature and hence 
not [duplicative]" (citation and quotation omitted).  Vick, 
supra at 431.9  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 468 Mass. 286, 288-
289 (2014) (following Vick); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 
44, 52 (2011) (same).10 
 
As the defendant recognizes, under an elements-based 
approach, each of his convictions requires proof of an element 
not required by the other:  murder requires, among other things, 
the death of the victim; the assault and battery charge requires 
                                                          
 
 
9 As explained in Commonwealth v. Vick, "[t]he question 
whether two offenses are 'so closely related in fact as to 
constitute in substance but a single crime' . . . becomes 
pertinent in a single criminal proceeding where one crime is a 
lesser included offense of the other, or where there are 
multiple counts of the same offense."  454 Mass. 418, 435 
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 662-
663 (1979). 
 
 
10 A distinct merger rule is available in felony-murder 
cases.  See Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 275-276 
(1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010), and S.C., 459 Mass. 480, 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 218 (2011); Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 
Mass. 95, 113-114 (1995).  The defendant was not convicted of 
murder on a felony-murder theory, and "[w]e decline to 
categorize this case as one of the 'rare circumstances where the 
purposes of our lesser included offense jurisprudence are not 
served by a strict application of the [elements-based] 
doctrine."  Commonwealth v. Torres, 468 Mass. 286, 290 n.5 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 532 
(2010). 
18 
 
 
a touching of the victim with a deadly weapon and that the 
victim was sixty years of age or older, neither of which is 
required to prove murder under any theory.  See G. L. c. 265 
§ 15A (a); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 375 Mass. 308, 312 (1978).  
"Neither crime is a lesser included offense of the other, and, 
therefore, the Legislature has authorized punishment for both."  
Vick, 454 Mass. at 433.  See Morey, 108 Mass. at 434-436.  
Accordingly, the defendant's convictions and sentences were not 
duplicative and did not result in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
4.  Sleeping juror.  The Commonwealth noticed that one of 
the jurors appeared to be sleeping during presentation of the 
video recording of the defendant's police interview, and the 
judge noticed that this same juror appeared to be sleeping 
during a portion of the jury charge.  The judge suggested 
potential remedies at sidebar prior to the jury's deliberation, 
and the defendant's trial counsel, deferring to the judge, 
requested that the juror be made an alternate.  The judge 
instructed the clerk to do so.  On appeal, the defendant argues 
that this decision violated the statute concerning alternate 
jurors, which provides that "the court shall direct the clerk to 
place the names of all of the available jurors except the 
foreperson into a box . . . and to select at random the names of 
the appropriate number of jurors necessary to reduce the jury to 
19 
 
 
the proper number of members required for deliberation in the 
particular case."  G. L. c. 234A, § 68. 
 
This argument is unavailing.  While the nonrandom selection 
of the juror as an alternate was irregular, the applicable 
statute specifically states that such an irregularity "shall not 
be sufficient . . . to set aside a verdict . . . unless the 
objecting party has been specially injured or prejudiced 
thereby."  G. L. c. 234A, § 74.  While it may have been better 
practice for the judge to conduct a hearing to determine 
definitively whether the juror had been asleep and to what 
extent the juror was no longer capable of deliberating, see 
Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643-646 (2015),11 the 
                                                          
 
11 On the second day of evidence, the Commonwealth notified 
the judge that the juror in question had closed his eyes "for a 
matter of just [a] couple of seconds" while viewing the video 
recording of the defendant's police interview.  Defense counsel 
agreed with the Commonwealth's assessment.  At the close of the 
trial, the judge told counsel that the same juror appeared to 
have been sleeping during a part of his jury charge.  He stated 
that the juror had "the appearance that he was falling asleep" 
during "some key portions," but noted that he "can't be in [the 
juror's] head and make the absolute conclusion that [the juror] 
was in fact sleeping, -- he could have had his eyes closed and 
still listened."  In Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 644 
(2015), we explained that "[i]f a judge reaches a preliminary 
conclusion that information about a juror's inattention is 
reliable, the judge must take further steps to determine the 
appropriate intervention.  Typically, the next step is to 
conduct a voir dire of the potentially inattentive juror."  
However, "not every complaint regarding juror attentiveness 
requires a voir dire," Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78 
(2010), and "[j]udges have substantial discretion in this area."  
McGhee, supra at 644.  Here, the judge had a reliable basis to 
believe the juror had been asleep, and the lack of such a 
20 
 
 
defendant did not object at trial, and there is no indication 
that the designation of the sleeping juror as an alternate 
amounted to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Conversely, "[i]t is obviously not in the interest of 
justice to have a juror deliberate who has not heard the 
evidence or parts of the judge's charge."  Commonwealth v. 
Stokes, 440 Mass. 741, 751 (2004), S.C., 460 Mass. 311 (2011), 
(proper for judge to dismiss "dozing" juror to prevent 
participation in deliberations); United States v. Bradley, 173 
F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) 
(judge "had a legitimate basis to dismiss [snoring juror] . . . 
[and] had sufficient information to support the dismissal and so 
did not have to voir dire her"). 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's action effectively 
discharged the sleeping juror.  We disagree, as an alternate 
remains available to replace a deliberating juror should the 
need arise.  Nevertheless, "[a] judicial observation that a 
juror is asleep . . . requires prompt judicial intervention," 
and "[t]he judge has discretion regarding the nature of the 
intervention" (citations and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78 (2010).  "The burden is on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hearing is most problematic in cases in which a judge, despite 
being alerted to a significant problem of jury attentiveness, 
takes no action.  See id. at 645-646; Commonwealth v. Braun, 74 
Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905-906 (2009).  Such was not the case here, 
as the juror did not deliberate. 
21 
 
 
defendant to show that the judge's decision in the matter was 
'arbitrary or unreasonable.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 476 (1973).  In the instant case, the 
defendant has presented no evidence to meet this burden.  In 
fact, he takes no position on whether the juror should have been 
dismissed or permitted to deliberate.  He only takes issue with 
the juror being given the label of "alternate."  We cannot say, 
given that the judge and both parties observed that the juror 
appeared to be asleep at two distinct and key portions of the 
trial, that the judge's decision was "arbitrary or 
unreasonable," see Brown, supra, or that he abused his 
discretion in designating the juror as an alternate.  See 
Beneche, supra.  Accordingly, where the judge had both 
discretion in choosing the remedy best suited to address the 
situation and ample grounds to justify action, designating the 
sleeping juror as an alternate did not amount to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
5.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the entire 
record of the defendant's trial pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and we find no reason to exercise our authority to reduce the 
jury's verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or order a 
new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.