Case Title: Rosemary K. Oliveira v. City of Milwaukee

Citation: 2001 WI 27

Docket Number: 1998AP002474

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2474 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Rosemary K. Oliveira and Shawnette J. Smart,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Robert E. Klavetter,  
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
City of Milwaukee and American Stores 
Properties, Inc.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 49 
Reported at:  233 Wis.2 d 532, 608 N.W.2d 419 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 3, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 9, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Louis J. Ceci 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, City of 
Milwaukee, there were briefs and oral argument by Thomas O. 
Gartner, assistant city attorney, with whom on the briefs was 
Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, American 
Stores Properties, Inc., there were briefs by Ralph A. Weber, 
 
2 
Colleen D. Ball, Marcia MacKenzie, and Reinhart, Boerner, Van 
Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Ralph A. Weber. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief 
by Joseph R. Cincotta and Schweitzer & Cincotta, LLP, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Joseph R. Cincotta. 
 
2001 WI 27 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 98-2474 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Rosemary K. Oliveira and Shawnette J.  
Smart,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Robert E. Klavetter,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee and American Stores  
Properties, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Oliveira 
v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI App 49, 233 Wis. 2d 532, 608 
N.W.2d 419, reversing the judgment of dismissal of the Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, Louis J. Ceci, Reserve Judge.  We 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the 
judgment of dismissal of the circuit court. 
FILED 
 
APR 3, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The circuit court dismissed the complaint of Rosemary 
K. Oliveira and Shawnette J. Smart, the plaintiffs, who sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Milwaukee 
and American Stores Properties, Inc. (together referred to as 
the City).  The plaintiffs challenged the rezoning of a parcel 
of land that would allow the defendant, American Stores 
Properties, Inc., to build a Jewell/Osco store on the parcel.  
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of dismissal of the 
circuit court.  
¶3 
At issue is the Milwaukee Common Council's enactment 
of two zoning amendments that had been referred initially to the 
common council's zoning committee for a hearing.  That hearing 
was properly noticed under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. (1997-98).1 
 Because the zoning committee did not act on the proposed zoning 
amendments, the common council president introduced duplicate 
zoning amendments and referred them to a different committee.  
The question of law before the court is whether notices of a 
hearing 
on 
proposed 
zoning 
amendments 
before 
the 
zoning 
committee were sufficient under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. and 
due process guarantees to enable the common council to enact 
duplicate zoning amendments that had been referred to a 
different committee without additional notices.2  
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 This court decides this question of law independently of 
the circuit court or court of appeals, although we benefit from 
their analyses. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
3 
¶4 
We conclude that the Milwaukee Common Council did not 
violate Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. or constitutional guarantees 
when it failed to give additional § 62.23(7)(d)2. notices 
relating to the duplicate zoning amendments that were referred 
to a different committee and enacted by the common council.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. and constitutional due process 
guarantees were satisfied in the present case by publishing 
notices for a committee hearing on the original proposed zoning 
amendments.  Accordingly we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.  The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the 
complaint is affirmed. 
 
I 
 
¶5 
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.  
Two zoning amendments were necessary to enable American Stores 
to build a Jewell/Osco store on the parcel in issue: one 
amendment to repeal the existing detailed planned development 
and a second amendment to implement a new detailed planned 
development in accordance with American Stores' proposal.   
¶6 
The two amendments, in files numbered 970857 and 
970859 respectively, were introduced in the Milwaukee Common 
Council on September 23, 1997.  The two amendments were referred 
to the zoning, neighborhoods, and development committee (zoning 
committee), the committee to which the common council assigns 
zoning matters.  
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
4 
¶7 
On February 3, 1998, the zoning committee held a 
public hearing on the two proposed zoning amendments after 
notices were given in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. 
 The City of Milwaukee published the notices regarding the 
proposed zoning amendments in file numbers 970857 and 970859, 
each stating: "Notice is hereby given that an ordinance (passage 
of which is now pending) was introduced at the September 23, 
1997 meeting of the Milwaukee Common Council, the essence of 
which is as follows."  The notices then provided detailed 
information regarding the substance of the proposed amendments. 
 The notices concluded by stating that the hearing would be held 
before the zoning committee, and by giving the date, time, and 
location of the hearing.  The notices of the public hearing were 
published on January 20 and 27, 1998. 
¶8 
After the public hearing, the zoning committee members 
voted to "hold to the call of the chair," meaning that the 
zoning committee would take no action on the files at that 
meeting.  The zoning committee considered the two amendments at 
a second hearing on February 24, 1998, when the zoning committee 
again voted to hold the files. 
¶9 
After the zoning committee held the files at this 
second hearing, the president of the common council wrote all 
members of the common council announcing his intent to create 
duplicate files for the two proposed zoning amendments and to 
refer the duplicate files to the steering and rules committee.  
His letter further stated that the steering and rules committee 
would act on these duplicate files only if the zoning committee 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
5 
failed to vote on the proposed zoning amendments at its next 
meeting.  
¶10 On February 26, 1998, the president of the common 
council introduced the two duplicate files, numbers 971743 and 
971744, and referred the duplicate files to the steering and 
rules committee.  When the zoning committee did not act on the 
original files on the proposed zoning amendments at its March 
17, 1998, meeting, the steering and rules committee held a 
public hearing on April 1, 1998, and approved the duplicate 
files.  
¶11 The City of Milwaukee did not give the type of notices 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. for the April 1, 1998, 
hearing before the steering and rules committee.  However, the 
plaintiffs acknowledge that the City of Milwaukee did mail a 
notice of the April 1, 1998, hearing before the steering and 
rules committee to a large number of persons in the vicinity of 
the property in issue.3  
¶12 The common council then approved the duplicate files 
at a public meeting on May 5, 1998, and the mayor subsequently 
signed the zoning amendments into law. 
¶13 The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the common 
council failed to comply with the notice provisions of Wis. 
                     
3 The City of Milwaukee claims that written personal notice 
of the April 1, 1998, hearing of the steering and rules 
committee 
was 
given 
to 
594 
individuals, 
including 
the 
plaintiffs, property owners within 200 feet of the land to be 
rezoned, all persons who attended the zoning committee hearings, 
and other individuals who had expressed interest in the matter. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
6 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. before 
enacting 
the 
proposed 
zoning 
amendments contained in the duplicate files.  The circuit court 
dismissed their action, holding that the complainants lacked 
standing and rejecting the legal challenges on the merits.  The 
court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
concluding that the common council was required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. to give second notices once duplicate zoning 
amendments were submitted to a different committee. 
¶14 After the court of appeals decision, the zoning 
committee released the original files, numbered 970857 and 
970859, for which the properly noticed public hearing had been 
held on February 3, 1998.  The common council enacted the zoning 
amendments in these original files on April 11, 2000.  The 
plaintiffs do not challenge the legality of this action before 
this court. 
¶15 Arguably, the common council's enactment of the zoning 
amendments in the original files on April 11, 2000, renders moot 
the plaintiffs' challenge in the present case to the enactment 
of the zoning amendments in the duplicate files.4  The parties 
have, however, asked this court to address the plaintiffs' 
challenge under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2.  They contend, and we 
agree, that a decision by this court regarding the scope of Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. will provide guidance to municipalities, 
                     
4 The record does not disclose whether the case is actually 
moot.  Challenges might be made to the common council's adoption 
of the original files two years after the notices were given.  
Therefore the present case might not be moot.   
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
7 
litigants, and courts.  Although a reviewing court will not 
ordinarily consider questions that have become moot, it will 
decide a moot question if it is of great importance.5  In light 
of the doubts about the mootness of the case and the importance 
of this issue for guidance to municipalities, litigants, and 
courts, this court now reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals without the necessity of determining whether the cause 
is moot. 
 
II 
 
¶16 Before we proceed to the question of law presented, we 
discuss the City of Milwaukee's assertion that the complaint 
should be dismissed because the plaintiffs have failed to comply 
with the notice of claim provision of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b). 
 The parties dispute whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) applies 
to the present cause of action.  The court of appeals concluded 
that § 893.80(1)(b) does not apply to injunction actions 
authorized by statute, citing Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 
Wis. 2d 806, 822, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998). 
¶17 During the hearing before the circuit court, the 
Milwaukee city attorney raised the notice of claim issue but 
asked the circuit court to decide the case anyway.  The city 
attorney argued that if the complaint were dismissed, the 
                     
5 See, e.g., State v. Seymour, 24 Wis. 2d 258, 261, 128 
N.W.2d 680 (1964).  
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
8 
plaintiffs would merely file the notice of claim and then 
proceed to litigation.  The City stated: 
 
We would ask the court, however, to make its decision 
today based on the merits of this case not based on 
the claim statute.  . . .  [I]f this action is 
dismissed based on that argument, it will simply delay 
things for as long as it takes the Council to act, for 
a hundred twenty days; and then the plaintiffs would 
be free to refile the same lawsuit.  As long as the 
affected 
parties 
are 
in 
Court 
today, 
it 
seems 
appropriate to resolve this matter on its merits.  
 
¶18 The City of Milwaukee made a similar argument before 
this court, stating: 
 
We did not waive [the notice of claim] issue, but if 
that had been the sole issue decided by the trial 
court at the motion to dismiss phase, then it would 
have simply delayed the process until a notice of 
claim could be filed, and in fact one had been filed 
after our motion, and they would have filed a new 
action and would have initiated the whole process.  So 
at that point, it would have only resulted in delay if 
the trial court had decided exclusively on the claims 
statute. 
 
¶19 The City of Milwaukee raised the notice of claim 
statute again in this court.  The City never expressly waived 
the issue of the lack of notice.  The Milwaukee city attorney's 
statements before the circuit court were in effect a request to 
the circuit court to treat the plaintiffs' action as if it had 
been dismissed and refiled in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b).  At that time the plaintiffs had adequate time 
to comply with the notice of claim statute and begin the action 
again. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
9 
¶20 If this court were now to state that the plaintiffs 
have to file a notice of claim and begin the action anew, the 
plaintiffs may be barred by a statute of limitations.  The 
plaintiffs relied on the City of Milwaukee's request that the 
circuit court treat the case as if notice had been given before 
the action was filed.  The City of Milwaukee is now estopped 
from changing its position to the plaintiffs' detriment by 
arguing in this court that the plaintiffs' failure to comply 
with the notice of claim provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) 
bars this action.  In Fritsch v. St. Croix Central School 
District, 183 Wis. 2d 336, 343-44, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 
1994), the school district was estopped from asserting a 
§ 893.80(1)(b) defense when the claimant relied on instructions 
of the school district and did not file the notice of her claim 
to her detriment.  In this case, as in Fritsch, the injustice 
caused to the plaintiffs if they were not allowed to pursue 
their claim outweighs the public's interest in a formal claim in 
the present case. 
 
III 
 
¶21 We begin our analysis of the validity of the zoning 
ordinances with the text of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7).  Section 
62.23(7)(a) authorizes a city council to regulate and restrict 
by 
ordinance 
the 
size, 
location, 
and 
use 
of 
buildings, 
structures, and land.  It further provides that the subsection 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
10
"shall be liberally construed in favor of the city and as 
minimum requirements adopted for the purposes stated."6  
¶22 Section 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. 
governs 
proposed 
zoning 
amendments, the fact situation presented in this case, and 
provides in part as follows: 
 
The council may adopt amendments to an existing zoning 
ordinance 
after 
first 
submitting 
the 
proposed 
amendments to the city plan commission, board of 
public land commissioners 
or plan 
committee for 
recommendation and report and after providing the 
notices as required in subd. 1. b. of the proposed 
amendments and hearings thereon. . . .  A hearing 
shall be held on the proposed amendments by, at the 
council's option, the council, the plan commission, 
the board of public land commissioners or the plan 
committee. 
If 
the 
council 
does 
not 
receive 
recommendations and a report from the plan commission, 
board of public land commissioners or plan committee 
within 60 days of submitting the proposed amendments, 
the council may hold hearings without first receiving 
the recommendations and report. 
 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(a) provides: 
(a) Grant of power.  For the purpose of promoting 
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the 
community, the council may regulate and restrict by 
ordinance, subject to par. (hm), the height, number of 
stories and size of buildings and other structures, 
the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size 
of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of 
population, and the location and use of buildings, 
structures and land for trade, industry, mining, 
residence 
or 
other 
purposes 
if 
there 
is 
no 
discrimination against temporary structures.  This 
subsection and any ordinance, resolution or regulation 
enacted or adopted under this section, shall be 
liberally construed in favor of the city and as 
minimum requirements adopted for the purposes stated. 
 This subsection may not be deemed a limitation of any 
power granted elsewhere. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
11
¶23 According to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2., a common 
council may adopt amendments to an existing zoning ordinance 
after first submitting the proposed amendments to the city plan 
commission for recommendation and report.  The plan commission 
approved the proposal in the present case, and the plan 
commission's approval is not at issue. 
¶24 Section 62.23(7)(d)2. further provides that notice 
shall be given of the proposed amendment and the hearing 
thereon.  The notice required is a "class 2 notice under ch. 
985" of the statutes.7  A class 2 notice requires two insertions 
of a legal notice to be published in a newspaper likely to give 
notice in the area or to the person affected.8 
¶25 On January 20 and 27, 1998, the City of Milwaukee 
published 
two 
notices 
in 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. regarding the zoning amendments in file numbers 
970857 and 970859.  According to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2., 
only one properly noticed public hearing is required before the 
council may pass a zoning amendment.  Section 62.23(7)(d)2. 
gives the council the option to designate the body that will 
                     
 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. refers to the notice 
required in § 62.23(7)(d)1.b., which in turn refers to notice 
pursuant to ch. 985 of the Statutes. 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 985.01(1) (defining "insertion" as 
publication once a week for consecutive weeks with the last 
notice 
published 
at 
least 
a 
week 
before 
the 
hearing); 
§ 985.02(1) (requiring publication in a newspaper "likely to 
give notice in the area or to the person affected"); § 985.07(2) 
(requiring two insertions for class 2 notice). 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
12
hold the required hearing.  It states that the hearing on 
proposed zoning amendments shall be held by, at a common 
council's option, the council, the plan commission, the board of 
public land commissioners, or the plan committee.  The zoning 
committee is not specified in § 62.23(7)(d)2. as an entity to 
hold hearings.  In the present case, the common council 
determined that it would not hold a hearing before the entire 
council pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. but would hold 
the hearing before the zoning committee. 
¶26 The 
council's 
procedures 
in 
enacting 
a 
zoning 
amendment are governed by Wis. Stat. § 62.11, which sets forth 
requirements for the council regarding quorums, public meetings, 
and voting.  It also states that "[t]he council shall in all 
other respects determine the rules of its procedure."9  The 
plaintiffs do not dispute the common council's right to assign 
the hearing to the zoning committee. 
¶27 The question before this court is whether the proper 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. notices of the initial hearing before 
the zoning committee were sufficient to authorize the common 
council to enact, without additional published notices, the 
duplicate proposed zoning amendments that had been referred to a 
different committee. 
¶28 
Relying on Herdeman v. City of Muskego, 116 Wis. 2d 
687, 343 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1983), the plaintiffs argue that 
the new file numbers represented a substantial change in the 
                     
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.11(3)(e).  
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
13
zoning amendments so that the common council was required to 
hold a second Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. noticed hearing.  In 
Herdeman the court of appeals held that a change to a proposed 
amendment of a zoning ordinance must be substantial before a 
second notice and hearing are required.10  
¶29 
The Herdeman court determined that a second Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. notice was not required in that case because the 
amendment did not alter the "fundamental character of the 
proposal."  It further reasoned that "the amendment did not 
affect 
different 
landowners 
nor 
did 
it 
affect 
the 
same 
landowners in a different way."11  The court of appeals concluded 
that a second notice and hearing "could only have resulted in 
repetitive statements by the same parties.  Nothing would have 
been accomplished by requiring another notice and public 
hearing, except delay."  Herdeman, 116 Wis. 2d at 691. 
¶30 As Herdeman makes clear, the notice and hearing 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. have a dual function. 
 Notices and hearings ensure that citizens have an opportunity 
                     
10 The court of appeals stated in Herdeman v. City of 
Muskego, 116 Wis. 2d 687, 690, 343 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(quoting Robert M. Anderson, Anderson's American Law of Zoning 
2d § 4.15 at 211 (2d ed. 1976)), as follows: 
Where changes are made due to testimony adduced at 
such a hearing, it usually will not be necessary to 
hold a second hearing on the revised proposal.  
Whether a second hearing is necessary will depend upon 
the nature and extent of the posthearing revision. 
 
11 Herdeman, 116 Wis. 2d at 691. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
14
to express their views regarding zoning amendments.12  When a 
zoning amendment is enacted without the required notice and 
hearing, the public has been denied its statutory right to 
appear and voice objections to the proposed amendment, and the 
amendment is therefore void.13  Furthermore, a hearing serves to 
inform the members of a municipal legislative body regarding the 
views of the affected community members.14 
¶31 The 
rationale 
for 
requiring 
a 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. notice and hearing when there is a substantial 
change in the substance of the zoning amendment ensures that the 
public has the opportunity to express views regarding the zoning 
amendments.  The statutory notice and hearing requirements 
implicate due process concerns because property rights are 
affected by changes in the zoning laws.  "Notice and hearing 
provisions 
are 
invariably 
intertwined 
with 
due 
process 
                     
12 See Eugene McQuillin, 8A Municipal Corporations § 25.251 
at 305 (3d ed. 1994); Arden H. and Daren A. Rathkopf, 1 Law of 
Zoning and Planning § 10.05 at 10-33 (4th ed. 2000); E.C. 
Yokley, 2 Zoning Law and Practice § 9-6 at 49 (4th ed. 1978). 
13 See Gloudeman v. City of St. Francis, 143 Wis. 2d 780, 
785, 422 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1988) (when municipality fails to 
comply with notice provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d) in 
enacting zoning ordinance, ordinance is void); Arden H. and 
Daren A. Rathkopf, 1 Law of Zoning and Planning § 10.03 at 10-13 
(4th ed. 2000) (notice requirements are "conditions precedent" 
to valid zoning ordinances); Eugene McQuillin, 8A Municipal 
Corporations § 25.251 at 306 (3d ed. 1994) ("The general rule is 
that compliance with the requirement of a public hearing by a 
zoning commission or other designated body is essential to the 
validity of a zoning ordinance or amendment."). 
14 Herdeman, 
116 
Wis. 2d 
at 
690 
(quoting 
Anderson, 
Anderson's American Law of Zoning 2d § 4.15 at 211). 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
15
considerations.  The legislature, in enacting sec. 62.23(7)(d), 
has attempted to protect this right to due process by requiring 
an adequate notice and hearing before a change in municipal 
zoning could affect the character of a neighborhood."15   
¶32 We agree with the City that the Herdeman decision 
supports the City's position.  No substantive difference exists 
between the original proposed zoning amendments, for which 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. notices were given, and the duplicate files 
containing the proposed zoning amendments that were adopted.  
The duplicate files containing the proposed zoning amendments 
affected the same people in the same manner as the proposed 
zoning 
amendments 
in 
the 
original 
files. 
 
A 
second 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. notice for a hearing before the steering and 
rules committee would provide the same people the opportunity to 
express the same views regarding the proposed zoning amendments. 
 Accordingly we conclude that § 62.23(7)(d)2. does not require a 
second notice in the present case. 
¶33 The plaintiffs argue, however, that failure to adhere 
strictly to the common council's committee assignment procedure 
for adoption of the proposed zoning amendment raises due process 
issues, as well as the issue of compliance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. 
¶34 Courts will examine the procedure a council uses to 
adopt zoning ordinances when the state legislature has set forth 
mandatory procedural requirements or when a council's alleged 
                     
15 Gloudeman, 143 Wis. 2d at 789-90.  
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
16
procedural omission raises a question of denial of due process 
of law.16  
¶35 In the present case the legislature did not mandate 
which common council committee should consider the proposed 
zoning amendments.  The plaintiffs' due process argument is 
grounded on the council's failure to give a second set of Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. statutory notices advising the public of 
the duplicate files of the proposed zoning amendments and the 
new committee assignment.  The plaintiffs apparently believe 
that because the proposed zoning amendments were held by the 
zoning committee and the public was not notified of the change 
of committee assignment by published notice, the public may have 
been lulled into thinking that the common council would not be 
taking action on the proposed zoning amendments.  
¶36 We disagree with the plaintiffs.  While a council vote 
to deny informs the public that a proposed zoning amendment has 
failed and the process has ended, a committee vote to hold 
                     
16 Kenneth H. Young, 1 Anderson's American Law of Zoning 
§§ 4.01-4.02 at 244-47 (4th ed. 1996). 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
17
advises the public that the matter is still pending before the 
council and has to be monitored.17 
¶37 In addition, only a short time had elapsed between the 
hearing noticed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d) and the 
common council's adoption of the proposed zoning amendments.  In 
the present case the common council adopted the duplicate 
proposals on May 5, 1998, approximately four months after the 
published notices and three months after the public hearing on 
the original files before the zoning committee.  There was no 
                     
17 Some courts have held that after a council has rejected a 
proposed zoning amendment, due process prevents the council from 
revisiting the matter without beginning anew the notice and 
hearing process.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Judd, 404 P.2d 553 
(Colo. 1965) (holding that a second notice was necessary before 
the council could approve a zoning amendment that had already 
been defeated); State ex rel. Kling v. Nielsen, 144 N.E.2d 278 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (public hearing on rejected zoning 
amendment did not satisfy notice and hearing requirements for 
similar amendment that was subsequently passed as an emergency 
measure). 
See also E.C. Yokley, 2 Zoning Law and Practice § 9-6 at 53 
(4th ed. 1978) ("After a proposed rezoning ordinance has been 
defeated 
following 
a 
public 
hearing, 
a 
council 
may 
not 
reconsider the vote and enact the ordinance at a subsequent 
meeting at which no notice was given of the council's action.") 
(citations omitted). 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
18
delay that could have lulled the public into thinking that the 
proposed zoning amendments were no longer being considered.18 
¶38 Lastly, no allegation is made by the plaintiffs that 
the common council tried to or did mislead the public regarding 
the matters for consideration at the relevant meetings of the 
steering and rules committee and the common council. 
¶39 Thus 
second 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. 
statutory 
notices were not required by due process.19  We conclude that the 
common council fulfilled 
its statutory 
and 
constitutional 
obligation under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. when it held a 
properly noticed hearing before the zoning committee on the 
proposed zoning amendments. 
¶40 The plaintiffs' final argument is a challenge to the 
authority of the steering and rules committee to consider and 
report on this proposed zoning amendment.  The plaintiffs are 
                     
18 Courts in other jurisdictions have held that statutory 
notice does not give a zoning authority indefinite license to 
pass an amendment.  See, e.g., Gricus v. Superintendent and 
Inspector of Buildings of Cambridge, 189 N.E.2d 209 (Mass. 1963) 
(delay of five years thwarts the purpose of a hearing, which is 
to allow residents to express current views regarding the zoning 
change).  See E.C. Yokley, 2 Zoning Law and Practice § 9-6 at 49 
(4th ed. 1978) ("The purpose of a public hearing is to insure 
that the current views of local residents will be taken into 
account by a council when it considers the enactment of a 
proposed zoning ordinance."). 
19 The plaintiffs cannot successfully challenge the hearing 
before the steering and zoning committee as violating notice and 
hearing requirements of due process.  Following the Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. notices, the City of Milwaukee gave written 
notice to interested persons, including the plaintiffs, of the 
hearing before the steering and rules committee, and interested 
persons were given an opportunity to appear. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
19
asking this court to invalidate an ordinance when a municipal 
legislative body has not complied with its self-prescribed 
formalities in enacting ordinances, just as courts invalidate 
ordinances 
that 
do 
not 
comply 
with 
constitutional 
and 
statutorily mandated procedural or substantive requirements.  
¶41 This court has frequently expressed its reluctance to 
determine whether the state legislature has complied with its 
own procedural formalities in enacting a statute, unless the 
legislative procedure is mandated by the constitution.  This 
reluctance stems from separation of power and comity concepts 
for a coordinate branch of government and the need for finality 
and certainty regarding the status of legislation.  The 
rationale is that the failure to follow a procedural rule 
amounts to an implied ad hoc repeal of the rule.20   
¶42 Similar considerations make us reluctant to consider a 
challenge to the procedural formalities of the common council in 
enacting the zoning ordinances at issue in the present case.  
The generally accepted rule is that a legislature, even a 
municipal one, should control its own procedures.21  This rule is 
especially applicable to the common council in the present case: 
The Wisconsin legislature has expressly empowered the council to 
                     
20 State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 364-
67, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983) (court refused to determine whether 
state legislature's failure to refer bills to committees 
invalidated legislation; examining long line of cases following 
this general rule).  
21 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning §§ 4.01-4.02 at 
244-47. 
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
20
determine its own rules of procedure,22 and zoning is, after all, 
a legislative function.23  Consequently, in this case we apply 
the 
general 
rule 
that 
a 
legislative 
body's 
self-imposed 
procedures regarding committee assignments are "a question of 
policy for legislative, not judicial, determination."24 
¶43 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the common 
council did not violate Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. when it 
failed to give additional Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. notices 
relating to the duplicate file containing the zoning amendments. 
 Nor did the common council violate any due process guarantees 
when it failed to give additional Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. 
notices relating to the duplicate proposed zoning amendments 
that were referred to a different committee and then adopted by 
the common council. 
                     
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.11(3)(e). 
23 State ex rel. Nagawicka Island 
Corp. 
v. City of 
Delafield, 117 Wis. 2d 23, 26, 343 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983). 
24 State v. P. Lorillard Co., 181 Wis. 347, 372, 193 N.W. 
613 (1923) (court rejected argument that state legislature had 
to refer a matter to a particular committee).  
No. 
98-2474 
 
 
21
¶44 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.  The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the 
complaint is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
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1 
¶45 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (dissenting).   The issue in this 
case is whether Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. requires a class 2 
notice of a public hearing for any legislative proposal to amend 
an existing zoning ordinance before that proposal may be 
approved.  The court of appeals concluded that such a notice is 
required.  The majority concludes otherwise.  Because I agree 
with the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent. 
 
FACTS 
 
¶46 On September 23, 1997, two "files" were introduced in 
the Milwaukee Common Council.  One file, Number 970857, removed 
from the existing zoning ordinances two planned developments at 
a particular site in the 6th aldermanic district and established 
in their place a general planned development to be known as 
Humboldt Yards.  A second file, Number 970859, changed the new 
zoning at that site from a general planned development to "a 
detailed planned development known as Humboldt Yards (Commercial 
Parcel) Phase 1."  Both files were referred to the zoning, 
neighborhoods and development committee of the common council.  
The zoning committee, in turn, sent the files to the city plan 
commission which recommended their approval on January 7, 1998, 
and then returned them to the zoning committee.  
¶47 Thereafter, the City published class 2 notices on 
January 20 and January 27, 1998, advising the public of a 
hearing on the two files to be held February 3, 1998.   
98-2474.dtp 
 
 
2 
¶48 The zoning committee held its hearing and received 
extensive testimony on the two files.  Then, over the objection 
of committee member Marlene Johnson-Odom, the alderwoman who 
represented the project site, the committee voted to hold the 
files to the call of the chair.  The zoning committee met again 
on February 24, 1998, and again it held the files.   
¶49 Council President John Kalwitz reacted immediately.  
In a letter to all members of the common council, Kalwitz 
indicated that he would introduce duplicate files, refer them to 
a different committee of which he was chair, and cause his 
committee to act on the new files if the zoning committee did 
not send the old files to the common council at its March 17, 
1998 meeting.  On February 26, Kalwitz introduced the new files, 
Numbers 971743 and 971744, and referred these new files to the 
steering and rules committee. 
¶50 As Kalwitz feared, the zoning committee did not act.  
Consequently, the steering and rules committee met on April 1, 
1998, held a hearing, approved the two new files, and sent them 
to the common council, which approved them on May 5, 1998.  
There is no dispute that the April 1 hearing on the new files 
was not preceded by a class 2 notice.25 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
                     
25 The term "class 2 notice" is explained in ¶24 of the 
majority opinion.  
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3 
¶51 As the majority correctly notes, the controlling 
statute is Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2., which reads in part: 
 
The council may adopt amendments to an existing zoning 
ordinance 
after 
first 
submitting 
the 
proposed 
amendments to the city plan commission, board of 
public land commissioners 
or plan 
committee for 
recommendation and report and after providing the 
notices as required in subd. 1.b. of the proposed 
amendments and hearings thereon. . . . A hearing shall 
be held on the proposed amendments by, at the 
council's option, the council, the plan commission, 
the board of public land commissioners or the plan 
committee. 
 
If 
the 
council 
does 
not 
receive 
recommendations and a report from the plan commission, 
board of public land commissioners or plan committee 
within 60 days of submitting the proposed amendments, 
the council may hold hearings without first receiving 
the recommendations and report. 
¶52 File Numbers 970857 and 970859 were sent to both the 
plan commission and a council committee and were the subject of 
a public hearing in the committee after publication of the class 
2 notice required by Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2.  In every 
respect, the treatment of these files complied with the statute. 
 By contrast, File Numbers 971743 and 971744 were referred to a 
council committee and were the subject of a public hearing 
before that committee, but the hearing was not preceded by a 
class 2 notice identifying the new files by number. 
¶53 The two sets of files may have been identical in 
substance.  Nonetheless, these files were separate legislative 
proposals.  They had different file numbers.  They could, in 
theory, have had different sponsors.  They were, in fact, 
introduced at different times.  They were, in fact, referred to 
different committees.  The evidence of this is in the record.  
98-2474.dtp 
 
 
4 
The Master Report on File Number 970857, as printed on April 3, 
1998, shows no action on this file subsequent to February 24, 
1998.  The Master Report on File Number 970859, as printed on 
April 3, 1998, shows no action on this file subsequent to 
February 24, 1998.  Yet, these two files were the very files 
approved by the Milwaukee Common Council on April 11, 2000, two 
years after the steering and rules committee had completed 
action on the other files.  
¶54 A citizen who carefully monitored the progress of File 
Numbers 970857 and 970859 could have been blindsided by council 
action on File Numbers 971743 and 971744, because the latter 
files were completely separate proposals.  As the court of 
appeals put it: 
 
Persons alerted by the publication that preceded 
consideration of File Numbers 970859 and 970857 (the 
old files) by the zoning committee would have no 
reason to suspect that a parallel effort was being 
started before a new committee . . . . Indeed, as the 
City candidly admits in its brief before us: "The 
Original Files were not 'taken from committee' but, as 
acknowledged in Appellant's Second Amended Complaint, 
remain pending before the Zoning, Neighborhoods and 
Development Committee."  (Capitalization in original, 
record reference omitted.)  Thus, anyone checking with 
the zoning committee would find that File Numbers 
970859 and 970857 were still on holdat the very time 
a public hearing on new files before a different 
committee was setting the stage for the rezoning of 
the land. 
Oliveira v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI App 49, ¶12, 233 Wis. 2d 
532, 608 N.W.2d 419. 
¶55 The arguments before the steering and rules committee 
may have been essentially the same as the arguments before the 
98-2474.dtp 
 
 
5 
zoning committee, but that is beside the point.  The make-up of 
the second committee was substantially different from the make-
up of the first committee.  The members of the second committee 
could not be expected to know what was said to the first 
committee any more than they could be expected to hear a tree 
fall in a forest if they were not there. 
¶56 The issue in this case transcends the parties.  It 
must be acknowledged that the plaintiffs cannot complain that 
they were uninformed about the proceedings in the steering and 
rules committee.  Individual notices were sent to interested 
parties.  Both Shawnette Smart and Robert Klavetter testified at 
the second hearing.  Moreover, the alderpersons on the zoning 
committee who blocked action on the old files represented a 
clear minority of the full council.  Hence, the council majority 
should have had some means to take action on the old files. 
¶57 The means selected, however, is too susceptible to 
abuse to pass muster.  It did not comply with either the letter 
or the spirit of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d)2. 
¶58 The majority holds that two distinct common council 
files, or, more specifically, two distinct sets of council 
files, are to be treated as indistinguishable if they are 
identical in substance.  The impact of this amazing conclusion 
is that as long as one file, or one set of files, receives the 
requisite class 2 notice and hearing, any identical file or set 
of files may be approved by the common council without a new 
class 2 notice or hearing.  The controlling statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2., allegedly requires nothing more. 
98-2474.dtp 
 
 
6 
¶59 This holding undermines fair notice to the public and 
invites legislative gamesmanship.  To illustrate, the statute 
clearly authorizes the common council to act on a zoning 
amendment after there has been a class 2 notice and hearing.  If 
the notice and hearing do not have to relate to a particular 
file, then one committee could approve File A before notice is 
given on File B in a different committee; the common council 
would be authorized to act on File A at any time after a class 2 
notice had been given and a hearing had been held on File B.  
Moreover, duplicate files could be introduced and referred to 
every committee of the council.  A class 2 notice and hearing 
would be required for only one of these files, diverting 
attention from the file that was eventually taken up and 
approved.  Finally, if a file were given proper notice and 
hearing and then defeated in committee, multiple other files 
would remain eligible for approval.  Because of these disturbing 
possibilities, the court has created a blueprint for mischief. 
¶60 The judiciary should not invade the inner workings of 
a legislative body to forestall or redress these potential 
abuses.  Instead, this court should interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(d)2. to create a bright line rule: Each legislative 
proposal to amend a zoning ordinance must receive a class 2 
notice and hearing before it may be approved by the common 
council. 
¶61 This is not unreasonable.  In the present case, the 
common council could have acted to withdraw the old files from 
the zoning committee by suspending the rules or otherwise 
98-2474.dtp 
 
 
7 
forcing 
release 
of 
the 
hostage 
files. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, the public would have received all the notice the 
statute requires.  In the alternative, the new files could have 
been given the proper class 2 notice and a prompt hearing before 
the plan commission or the steering and rules committee, with 
plenty of time for council approval. 
¶62 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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1