Case Title: Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc.1991 WY 21806 P.2d 834Case Number: 90-161Decided: 02/21/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 
Michael 
PHILLIPS, 

Appellant (Plaintiff),

 
 

v.

 

DURO-LAST 
ROOFING, INC., 

Appellee (Defendant).

 
 

Appeal from 
the District of Wyoming, Clarence 
A. Brimmer, Chief Judge.

 
 

Cardine, J., dissented and filed opinion.

  
    

James E. 
Fitzgerald, Sharon A. Fitzgerald and A.G. McClintock, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

  

Gary R. 
Scott of Hirst & Appellate, Cheyenne, for appellee.

 

G.G. 
Greenlee of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for amicus curiae Defense Lawyers Ass'n of 
Wyoming.

 

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
        
 

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice.

  
 

[¶1]      Presented are 
certified issues from the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming, asking whether W.S. 1-1-109 (1988), a comparative negligence attribution, 
allocation and apportionment statute,1 applies to 
recovery on a claim

      
 

of strict 
liability under Restatement of Torts (Second) § 402A?

* * * of 
strict liability under Restatement of Torts (Second) § 
402B?

* * * for 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability?

* * * for 
breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose?

* * * for a breach of express warranty?

     
    

[¶2]      As initially 
passed in 1973 and last amended in 1986, the Wyoming 
legislature enacted a comparative negligence statute, of which sections (c) and 
(d) are directly involved in this certified question review. We are asked to 
apply or disassociate the negligence apportionment and allocation provisions 
from that statute to recovery theories of strict liability, implied warranty of 
merchantability, implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose and 
express warranty. The Wyoming statute states:

  
 

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said 
person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed 
to the person recovering.

(b) The 
court may, and when requested by any party shall:

(i) If a 
jury trial:

(A) Direct 
the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a 
party; and

(B) Inform 
the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

(ii) If a 
trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining 
the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each 
actor whether or not a party.

(c) The 
court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this 
section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person recovering 
and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under 
subsection (d) of this section.

(d) Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the 
total dollar amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this 
section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under 
paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section.

  
            
             
             
    

W.S. 1-1-109.

 
 

[¶3]      The certification 
order provides a specific and directly stated factual perspective for our 
decision:

  
           
 

Plaintiff 
Michael Phillips was employed as a roofer by Nyfogle, Inc. dba, Gem City 
Enterprise in Laramie, 
Wyoming. On 
July 1, 
1988, he was 
applying a roofing material distributed by defendant Duro-Last Roofing, Inc. 
(Duro-Last), when the material tore and he fell two and one-half stories to the 
ground, sustaining severe injuries. 

Plaintiff 
brought this action against defendant Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., seeking to 
recover damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of using defendant's 
product. Phillips sought recovery under theories of negligence, strict liability 
under Restatement of Torts (Second) § 402A and § 402B, breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, and breach of express warranty.

The jury 
found that Duro-Last was forty percent (40%) negligent, that plaintiff's 
employer (a "ghost" defendant) was forty percent (40%) negligent, and that 
plaintiff was twenty (20%) negligent. The jury went on to find for the plaintiff 
on all three warranty claims, and on both strict liability claims. It held that 
the total amount that would compensate plaintiff was 
$187,000.

The parties dispute whether Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (1988) 
should apply to reduce plaintiff's recovery to forty percent (40%) on each of 
his claims.

  
            
          

[¶4]      In addition to the 
federal court litigants, excellent extended briefing is provided by the amicus 
curiae, Defense Lawyers Association of Wyoming.

   
           
       

[¶5]      Through motions, 
objections and briefing, the issues presented become two-fold. We are first 
asked whether W.S. 1-1-109 applies to non-negligent causes of action, including 
strict liability and warranty. In second approach, this court is directed by 
responding litigants to further consider whether even if the statute does not 
directly apply, that the court should adopt theories of allocation and 
apportionment for non-negligent actions which might be similar to or the same as 
statutorily provided by W.S. 1-1-109 for negligence litigation.

  
           
           
            
            
           
             
       
 

[¶6]      This court answers the 
certified questions in the negative and declines to use this case to assess the 
broad subject of apportionment of damage liability for application to warranty 
and strict liability recovery theories.

  
              
            
      

[¶7]      W.S. 1-1-109 in 
present form was enacted by Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24, § 1 (1986) to change prior 
Wyoming law first provided in 1973 when contributory negligence was displaced 
with comparative negligence by Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28, § 1 (1973). The 1986 
enactment was clearly directed to ameliorate perceived problems as part of a 
tort system "reform" legislation. The statute and its predecessor had been 
confined by its text and title to actions involving negligence.2 The 1973 act allocated liability between 
plaintiff and defendant or defendants and the 1986 act apportioned payment 
responsibility among defendants to eliminate the joint and several liability of 
each.

      
           
          
   

[¶8]      This court also, 
five days after Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24 (1986) became law without the Governor's 
signature, rendered Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986), 
which first clearly approved strict liability recovery theories. Consequently, 
the legislature had no specific reason to anticipate its result. In the sessions 
since Ogle, the legislature has not enacted any extension of the apportionment 
provisions of W.S. 1-1-109(d) to apply to the non-negligent actions.

   
         
             
            
         
 

[¶9]      Without additional 
legislative history to be of assistance, we will not now engage in comprehensive 
judicial legislating which is required in order to extend the application of the 
allocation and apportionment statute from its express and intended arena of 
negligence into warranty and strict liability proceedings by either statutory 
interpretation or common law extension.

 
             
           
           
           
       

[¶10]   Statutory interpretation and 
application addresses review of the perceived legislative intent. With little or 
nothing more than the specific language of the enactment, we cannot be justified 
in superimposing over its plain provisions what is not otherwise stated.3 We concur with appellant that the plain and 
unambiguous language of W.S. 1-1-109 demonstrates that the statute applies only 
to causes of action arising out of appellee's negligence.

       
           
          
 

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, we do not resort to rules of statutory 
construction. * * * Neither this Court nor the agency charged with administering 
the statute has a right to look for and impose another meaning.

  
              
               
              
     

Wyoming Ins. Dept. 
v. Avemco Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 507, 510 (Wyo. 1986). We are also directed to our recent case of Belle 
Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo. 1988):

   
               
     

Whenever this court is engaged in the construction of a 
statute, the primary consideration is to discern the intention of the 
legislature. * * * That legislative intent should be ascertained, as nearly as 
is possible, from the language incorporated in the statute, which is viewed in 
the light of its object and purpose. * * * In those instances in which the 
language in the statute is plain and unambiguous, the words used are to be 
accorded their plain and ordinary meaning unless there is some manifestation of 
a legislative intent that they not be accorded the plain and ordinary 
meaning.

 
            
             
            
              
                
             
            
         

[¶11]   In next argument, appellee and the 
amicus curiae argue comprehensively and stridently that this court should apply 
a judicial apportionment and allocation concept in this case by going beyond the 
specific questions asked by the United States District Court in its certified 
questions. We decline to take this additional adjudicatory step for three 
reasons. First, pursuant to W.S. 1-13-104 through 1-13-107, the Federal Court 
State Law Certificate Procedure Act, nothing is indicated that this court is 
authorized to answer more than is asked. To go further might impose on a comity 
relationship with the certifying court in the pending case, or otherwise 
constitute an advisory opinion for the issues not presented by the 
certification. We are limited to actual cases and controversies and do not issue 
advisory opinions under the constitutional perspective established by the 
Wyoming Constitution for the operation of the Wyoming Supreme Court. Kurpjuweit 
v. Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 
(Wyo. 1985); 
Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976); 
Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1975).

 
 

[¶12]   The second impedance is absence of 
a record. This opinion quotes the entire factual record presented for our 
consideration. We would, in order to address non-certified issues, be required 
to suppose or conjecture factual situations in order to address possible 
theories, factual situations and controlling principles.4 Korkow v. Markle, 746 P.2d 434 
(Wyo. 1987).

 
 

[¶13]   The third reason for this confined 
approach devolved from the broadly reaching effect and results of any decision 
on allocation and apportionment to non-negligence actions that we might take 
whether negative or affirmative. In this case, appellant succeeded in securing a 
verdict on negligence, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965) and 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402(B) (1965), strict liability, and three 
different applications of warranty, express and implied. It is recognized that 
Wyoming has one of the strictest apportionment statutes to be found 
in any jurisdiction. Under W.S. 1-1-109, the injured party can never recover for 
complete damage unless each potential defendant is accessible to enforce 
payment.

    
            
            
       

[¶14]   Appellant recognizes that concern since 
here the employer is a worker's compensation "ghost" defendant and was assessed 
forty percent negligence. If this case is utilized for identical apportionment 
in contract and strict liabilities, appellant would be ghosted out of forty 
percent of his damage - even though obviously the employer had nothing 
whatsoever to do with warranty or strict liability for product failure. We 
cannot even properly conceptualize at this time whether identical rules or rules 
identically applied should be crafted through judicial action which embrace 
negligence to then identically be applied to Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
supra, § 402(A), faulty product and Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 
402(B), misrepresentation, express warranty, implied warranty of fitness for the 
purpose intended, and implied warranty of merchantability. It may be a valid 
supposition that consideration might be significantly different for judicial 
allocation and apportionment of damage responsibility to very different recovery 
theories. As an illustration, warranty theories have a statutory foundation in 
present time based upon the Uniform Commercial Code and strict liability 
develops out of common law with authentication found in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.

    
            
           
           
              
            
            
          
           
            
          
            
         
          
           
           
            
  

[¶15]   Hypothetical facts for all cases on the 
simple record here presented do not provide an adequate foundation to either 
relate to the facts creating the precedent provided by other jurisdictions or to 
confine any decision to whatever facts a specific future case will 
present.

      
             
             
           
 

[¶16]   Consequently, we decline the invitation 
to expand this opinion as a certified issue case and answer each of the 
questions that are actually presented in the negative.

    
              
         

CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

   
   

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting.

  
 

[¶17]   I would answer the certified questions 
"yes." From the standpoints of both statutory construction and policy 
considerations, an injured party should recover only those damages attributable 
to the fault of the offending party. It is neither fair nor equitable that a 
party whose fault causes 40 percent of a loss should be required to pay 100 
percent of the loss and damages. The goal of tort reform has been to create a 
system for compensating injured persons which is fair to both the party 
recovering and the party paying damages. Implicit in the system is that a party 
pay only for the damage caused by his fault.

     
           
          
               
               
                
            
              
          

[¶18]   For more years than I care to 
remember, contributory negligence, no matter how slight, was a complete bar to 
recovery in an action to recover damages caused by negligence. Ford Motor Co. v. 
Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1963). 
Under this contributory negligence doctrine, a party whose fault caused 99 
percent of the damage suffered paid nothing because the plaintiff was one 
percent at fault. The doctrine, of comparatively recent origin in the common 
law, is attributed to an 1809 English case. See Leflar, The Declining Defense of 
Contributory Negligence, 1 Ark.L.Rev. 1 (1946); and Annotation, Modern 
Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to 
Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339, 345 § 2 (1977). It was not long 
before courts began developing exceptions to or abrogating the doctrine. 
Admiralty courts recognized a form of comparative negligence in 1854. Leflar, 1 
Ark.L.Rev. at 16, n. 65. Illinois began applying comparative negligence principles in 1858. 
Annotation, 78 A.L.R.3d at 345. There was a move to allow recovery of personal 
injury and property damage under warranty which ordinarily involved actions on 
contract. Privity of contract was an obstacle, but it was soon held that privity 
of contract was not required. All of this resulted from efforts to avoid the 
harsh consequences of contributory negligence.

  
          
              
          
               
             
  

[¶19]   The 
Wyoming 
legislature enacted a comparative negligence statute in 1973. 1973 
Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 28 § 1. See § 1-7.2 (W.S. 1957, Cum.Supp. 1975). Under the act, a plaintiff 
could recover for his injuries although the award would be reduced by the amount 
of fault attributed to him. Thus, the statute abolished the "harsh result" that 
the contributory negligence doctrine required. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 
1360 (Wyo. 1981). In 
Barnette, we noted that the legislative enactment and public policy favored 
leaving to the "jury to balance the relative measurements of fault." 
Id. at 1361.

  
 

[¶20]   The 1973 version of the statute 
read:

      
 

"(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.

Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished, in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributed to the person recovering.

"(b) The 
court may, and when requested by any party, shall:

"(i) If a 
jury trial, direct the jury to find separate special 
verdicts;

"(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special 
findings of fact; determining the amount of damages and the percentage of 
negligence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the 
amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to 
the person recovering." § 1-7.2 (W.S. 1957, Cum.Supp. 1975).

   
            
            
              
             
   

When renumbered in 1977, the above language contained a few 
grammatical changes and a subsection (b)(iii) was added. The new subsection 
stated:

 
             
        

"(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its 
determination of the percentage of negligence." W.S. 1-1-109(b)(iii) (December 
1977 pamphlet).

 
             
     
 

The current statute as amended in 1986 reads:

  
      

"(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said 
person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person 
recovering.

"(b) The 
court may, and when requested by any party shall:

"(i) If a 
jury trial:

"(A) Direct 
the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages and the percentage of fault 
attributable to each actor whether or not a party; and 

"(B) Inform 
the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault.

"(ii) If a 
trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining 
the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether 
or not a party.

"(c) The 
court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this 
section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person 
recovering and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined 
under subsection (d) of this section.

"(d) Each 
defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount 
determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the 
percentage of the amount of fault attributed to 
him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section." 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24 
§ 1; W.S. 1-1-109 (emphasis added).

 
             
          

[¶21]   This word "fault" appears in the 
current version of the statute six times. The court trivializes this change 
contending that "fault" in the statute is synonymous with "negligence." When the 
legislature adopts a statute, it is presumed to have done so with full knowledge 
of existing state law with reference to the subject matter. Wetering v. Eisele, 
682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984). It must be assumed that the legislature did not 
intend futile acts and that in amending the statute the legislature intended to 
change the law. Id. Significantly, the word "fault" receives a broad definition 
in the Uniform Commercial Code:

   
              
           
           
  

"`Fault' 
means wrongful act, omission or breach." W.S. 
34.1-1-201(a)(xvi).

Actions for damage caused by breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, 
and breach of express warranty are brought pursuant to the U.C.C. W.S. 
34.1-2-313, -314, -315.

  
           
           
          
 

[¶22]   In a warranty action, recovery is for 
fault in the breach of a warranty and under § 402A, Restatement, Second, Torts 
(1965) for fault in creating a defective product and placing it in the stream of 
commerce. Plaintiff's fault may contribute to his injury through product misuse, 
voluntary exposure to a known danger and otherwise. Thus, it logically follows 
that appellant's actions to recover loss or damage caused by the fault of 
another party should be governed by W.S. 1-1-109 as amended with fault of the 
parties being compared. The majority of this court disagrees. It makes no sense 
that plaintiff's own fault should be chargeable on one theory of recovery but 
paid for by defendant on another theory. The legislature should consider 
correcting the anomaly that now exists among the various actions to recover 
damages for injuries caused by the fault of another.

      
              
              
           
            
            
              
             
              
            
            
          
 

Footnotes

 

 1 An allocation 
and apportionment statute addresses separate responsibilities and divides up 
resulting liability among defendants or potential defendants - the direct 
opposite in result of joint and several liability. See Seaton v. 
State of 
Wyo. Highway Com'n, 
Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 207 n. 11 (Wyo. 1989); 
Kirby Bldg. Systems v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 
(Wyo. 1985); and 
Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981).

 
 

2  AN ACT to create section 1-7.2 of the statutes relating to civil actions 
for personal injuries, wrongful death and injury to property; abolishing common 
law defense of contributory negligence; establishing a rule of comparative 
negligence.

Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 28 (1973).

AN ACT to amend W.S. 1-1-109; and to repeal W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 
relating to civil procedure; providing that a plaintiff in a negligence action 
is entitled to a proportionate recovery of his damages if the plaintiff's 
contributory negligence is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault; 
eliminating the doctrine of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors; 
providing that each defendant is liable only to the extent of his percentage of 
fault as compared to all other actors whether or not parties to the action; 
repealing provisions relating to the right of contribution among joint 
tortfeasors and the effect to be given the release or covenant not to sue one of 
several joint tortfeasors; and providing for an effective 
date.

Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24 (1986).

   
   

3 Argument is made that the use of the word "fault" instead of 
"negligence" is significant. We recognize the Senate floor amendment in 
substitution within the actual text, but cannot find that the casual amendment 
was intended to reach warranty and strict liability. The topic of the bill by 
title in general text was before amendment and remained thereafter related to 
negligent actions. See Digest of the Senate 41 
(1986).

We do not 
have any way to factually analyze why "fault" was inserted and "negligence" 
deleted in the several places where it occurred. Black's Law Dictionary 548 (5th 
ed. 1979) lists the first synonym for fault to be negligence. Likewise, 
negligence is listed as a synonym by W. 
Burton, Legal 
Thesaurus 223 (1980) for fault. There is an adaptation that defines fault in 
terms of responsibility and negligence in terms of action or lack of care. 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 452, 791 (1986). However, Sissons, 
Word and Expression Locater 117, 216 (1966) uses the word delinquency as a 
synonym for both. We cannot find any real difference in statutory effect that 
results from the change made. A purist might differentiate negligence to be a 
character of conduct while fault relates to proximate cause of result. "By my 
negligence, the accident occurred and, as a result, I was at fault for the 
damages which resulted." The trouble with this is the conventional expression 
"faulty conduct" usually involves negligent if not intentional conduct in 
popular usage. For a comparison, see the discussion of the definition of fault 
by Chief Judge Holloway in Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1474, 1476 
(10th Cir. 1990).

 
     

4 It is true 
that in briefing, both litigants have comprehensively related to what may have 
been shown in the record of the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming, which resulted in the favorable jury verdict for appellant. Neither 
briefs nor oral argument provide a total consistency of opinion as to what might 
be shown in the record. Whether the parties did or did not consistently 
represent what would be found in the record, there is no record and this court 
has clearly stated that we are confined in decision to facts presented as a 
matter of record for review. Matter of Wyoming Game and 
Fish Com'n, 773 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1989); 
Nicholls v. Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 
1986).