Case Title: WHEATON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
WHEATON v. STATE2003 WY 5668 P.3d 1167Case Number: 01-6Decided: 05/01/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                
         

WILLIAM 
WHEATON,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon 
County

The Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 

Representing Appellant:

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Tina 
Kerin.

 

Representing Appellee:

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker; Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Shawn L. Barlow, Student 
Director.  
Argument Mr. Barlow.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 

**Judge Terry Rogers heard oral arguments in this matter, 
and the case was originally assigned to him on February 20, 2002 for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  This case was reassigned to Chief Justice 
Hill on January 3, 2003.  Judge Rogers did not take part in this 
decision.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, William 
Wheaton (Wheaton), appeals from the judgment and sentence finding him guilty of 
causing bodily injury to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of 
his duties, and property destruction.  Wheaton contends that the State engaged in 
misconduct when it utilized the results of a blood alcohol test which was 
accomplished without his consent, and that the blood test was the result of an 
unreasonable search and seizure.  Wheaton also asserts that his arrest was 
unlawful and that the district court erred in instructing the jury.

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Wheaton poses the 
issues as follows:

 

I.          
Did the prosecutors commit prosecutorial misconduct when they utilized 
blood alcohol levels of [Wheaton] obtained without his consent?

II.          
Were [Wheaton's] rights, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure 
and to due process of law, violated by the obtaining of his blood alcohol level 
without his consent?

III.         Was 
[Wheaton's] arrest unlawful?

IV.        Did the 
trial court err in refusing [Wheaton's] proffered jury instruction regarding 
whether the police officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his 
duties?

 

The State outlines the issues somewhat 
differently:

 

I.          
Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct when evidence of 
[Wheaton's] blood alcohol content was introduced at trial and reference to this 
evidence was made in closing argument?

II.          
Did the State violate [Wheaton's] constitutional rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and to due process of law when it obtained a 
sample of [Wheaton's] blood?

III.         Did 
Officer Rose have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that [Wheaton] had 
been driving while under the influence and therefore lawfully arrest [him]?

IV.        Did the 
trial court err when it refused to give a jury instruction relating to resisting 
arrest?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On January 25, 2000, 
Rawlins Police Officer Michael Rose was dispatched to the scene of an 
accident.  
There were two vehicles at the scene, a pickup truck that was off the 
road and up against a fence, and a van that appeared to be in use to pull the 
pickup back onto the roadway.  There were two men at the scene, Wheaton and 
his friend, Alexander Orloff (Orloff).  The pickup belonged to Wheaton's girlfriend 
and the van belonged to Orloff.  Officer Rose asked Wheaton if he had been 
driving the pickup and he responded that he had.

 

[¶5]      Rose detected the 
smell of alcohol emanating from Wheaton and observed that he had poor balance, 
slurred speech, and was "emotional."  Officer Rose could tell that Orloff had been 
drinking as well.  
Because he was confronted with two intoxicated men, Rose called for 
backup police support and, soon after his call, the Rawlins Chief of Police and 
two other Rawlins police officers arrived on the scene.  Officer Rose again 
asked Wheaton if he had been driving the pickup and Wheaton pointed to his 
dog.  The dog 
was loose and running around the scene of the accident.  Rose again asked 
Wheaton who was driving the pickup, and this time Wheaton pointed to the Rawlins 
Police Chief.  
Based upon Wheaton's initial admission that he had been driving the 
pickup which belonged to his girlfriend, the fact that there were two people 
present and two vehicles, the fact that Wheaton was obviously intoxicated, and 
Wheaton's refusal to perform field sobriety maneuvers or do a breathalyzer test 
(Alcosensor), Officer Rose determined that Wheaton should be arrested for 
driving while under the influence (DWUI).

 

[¶6]      After being 
handcuffed, Wheaton became combative when Officer Rose attempted to do a pat 
down search on Wheaton before placing him in the police car.  It took two police 
officers to complete the pat down search and get Wheaton into the police 
car.  Wheaton 
expressed concern about his dog and Officer Rose told him he would call animal 
control to have the dog picked up.  With Wheaton in the back seat of Officer 
Rose's patrol car, the police officers turned their attention to 
Orloff.

 

[¶7]      At this point, 
Wheaton, who was lying on the back seat of the patrol car, began kicking the 
right rear window of the vehicle.  Wheaton also was screaming that the police 
were going to kill his dog.  In his testimony at trial, Wheaton testified 
that Officer Rose threatened to shoot his dog and/or send it to the pound to be 
put to sleep.  
Officer Rose denied making any such threats and another police officer 
corroborated that testimony.  An audio/video tape made at the scene did not 
reveal any such threat.  Orloff did corroborate Wheaton's testimony in 
this regard.  
In any event, Wheaton's dog was taken to the pound and he was able to get 
it back the day after his arrest, which was what Officer Rose testified that he 
told Wheaton would happen.

 

[¶8]      Wheaton continued 
kicking the patrol car's rear window until it finally shattered.  Wheaton was placed 
in leg chains, his feet were secured to the floor of the patrol car, and he was 
then driven to the county jail.  Because of the difficulties at the accident 
scene, two deputy county sheriffs and a state trooper were called to assist, and 
they followed Officer Rose to the county jail to help him with the combative 
Wheaton.  Four 
police officers, including Officer Rose, were involved in moving Wheaton from 
the back seat of Rose's car and into the jail.  Once out of the patrol car, Wheaton screamed 
out Officer Rose's name ("that f---ing Rose") and then reared backwards striking 
Rose in the forehead with the back of his head.  Rose suffered serious injuries as a result of 
that attack.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 

§6-5-204.  Interference with peace officer; disarming 
peace officer; penalties.

(a)  A person commits a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly obstructs, impedes or 
interferes with or resists arrest by a peace officer while engaged in the lawful 
performance of his official duties.

            
(b)  A person who intentionally and 
knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace officer engaged 
in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.

            
(c)  A person who intentionally and knowingly disarms a peace 
officer of his firearm while that peace officer is engaged in the lawful 
performance of his official duties is guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than five (5) years.

 

[¶9]      Wheaton also caused 
significant damage to Officer Rose's police car, including a broken window and 
window run channel, and a torn fabric head liner, at a total cost of 
$1,489.27.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 

§ 6-3-201.  Property destruction and defacement; grading; 
penalties; aggregated costs or values.

(a)  A person is guilty 
of property destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, injures or 
destroys property of another without the owner's consent.

            
(b)  Property destruction and defacement is:

(i)  A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00), or both, if the cost of restoring injured property or the 
value of the property if destroyed is less than five hundred dollars 
($500.00);

                        
(ii)  Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 44, § 2.

            
(iii)  A felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the cost of restoring injured 
property or the value of the property if destroyed is five hundred dollars 
($500.00) or more.

            
(c)  If a series of injuries results from a single continuing 
course of conduct, a single violation of this section may be charged and 
penalties imposed based upon the aggregate cost or value of the property injured 
or destroyed.

 

[¶10]   A focal point of Wheaton's defense was 
that he was not driving at the time he was arrested, so there did not exist 
probable cause to arrest him for DWUI.  Indeed, the record is clear that Wheaton was 
not actually driving at the time Officer Rose came upon the scene of the 
accident.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis Supp. 2002) (emphasis added):1

 

§ 31-5-233.  Driving or having control of vehicle while 
under influence of intoxicating liquor or controlled substances; penalties.

(a)  As used in this section:

                        
(i)  "Alcohol concentration" means:

(A)  The number of grams of alcohol per one 
hundred (100) milliliters of blood;

(B)  The number of grams of alcohol per two 
hundred ten (210) liters of breath; or

(C)  The number of grams of alcohol per 
seventy-five (75) milliliters of urine.

                        
(ii)  "Controlled substance" includes:

(A)  Any drug or substance defined by W.S. 
35-7-1002(a)(iv);

(B)  Any glue, aerosol or other toxic vapor which 
when intentionally inhaled or sniffed results in impairment of an individual's 
ability to drive safely.

(iii)  "Conviction" means as defined in W.S. 
31-7-102(a)(xi);

(iv)  "Driver's license" means as defined in W.S. 
31-7-102(a)(xxv) and includes nonresident operating privileges as defined in 
W.S. 31-7-102(a)(xxx);

(v)  "Other law prohibiting driving while under 
the influence" means a statute of another state, the United States or a 
territory or district of the United States or an ordinance of a governmental 
entity of this or another state or of an Indian tribe which prohibits driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled substances 
or drugs.

            
(b)  No person shall drive or have 
actual physical control of any vehicle within this state if the person:

(i)  Has an alcohol 
concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more;  or

(ii)  To a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving:

                                    
(A)  Is under the influence of 
alcohol;

            
(B)  Is under the influence of a controlled substance; or

(C)  Is under the influence of a combination of 
any of the elements named in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph.

            
(c)  Upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding 
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving 
or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time alleged as 
shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily 
substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:

(i)  If there was at that time an alcohol 
concentration of five one-hundredths of one percent (0.05%) or less, it shall be 
presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcohol;

(ii)  If there was at that time an alcohol 
concentration of more than five one-hundredths of one percent (0.05%) and less 
than eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%), that fact shall not give rise 
to any presumption that the person was or was not under the influence of 
alcohol, but it may be considered with other competent evidence in determining 
whether the person was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders 
him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.

            
(d)  Subsection (c) of this section 
shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent 
evidence bearing upon the question of whether the person was under the influence 
of alcohol, including tests obtained more than three (3) hours after the alleged 
violation.  The 
fact that any person charged with a violation of subsection (b) of this section 
is or has been entitled to use the controlled substance under the laws of this 
state shall not constitute a defense against any charge under subsection (b) of 
this section.

            
(e)  Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, a 
person convicted of violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven 
hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.  On a second conviction within five (5) years 
after a conviction for a violation of this section or other law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than seven (7) days nor more than six (6) months and shall not be eligible 
for probation or suspension of sentence or release on any other basis until he 
has served at least seven (7) days in jail.  In addition, the person may be fined not less 
than two hundred dollars ($200.00) nor more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00).  On 
a third or subsequent conviction within five (5) years after a conviction for a 
violation of this section or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) 
days nor more than six (6) months and shall not be eligible for probation or 
suspension of sentence or release on any other basis until he has served at 
least thirty (30) days in jail.  The court, after consultation with the 
sheriff, may order the person to undergo outpatient alcohol or substance abuse 
treatment during any mandatory period of incarceration.  The minimum period 
of imprisonment for a third or subsequent violation shall be mandatory, but the 
court may suspend up to fifteen (15) days of the mandatory period of 
imprisonment if, subsequent to the date of the current violation, the offender 
completes an inpatient treatment program approved by the court.  In addition, the 
person may be fined not less than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) nor more 
than three thousand dollars ($3,000.00).  The judge may suspend part or all of the 
discretionary portion of an imprisonment sentence under this subsection and 
place the defendant on probation on condition that the defendant pursues and 
completes an alcohol education or treatment program as prescribed by the 
judge.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of probation imposed 
by a judge under this section may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment 
established for the offense under this subsection provided the term of probation 
together with any extension thereof, shall in no case exceed three (3) 
years.

            
(f)  Any person convicted under this section or a municipal 
ordinance which substantially conforms to the provisions of this section shall, 
in addition to the penalty imposed, have his driver's license suspended or 
revoked pursuant to W.S. 31-7-127 or 31-7-128.  The court shall forward to the department a 
copy of the record pertaining to disposition of the arrest or citation.

            
(g)  The court may, upon pronouncement of any jail sentence 
under subsection (e) of this section, provide in the sentence that the defendant 
may be permitted, if he is employed or enrolled in school and can continue his 
employment or education, to continue such employment or education for not more 
than the time necessary as certified by his employer or school administrator, 
and the remaining day, days or parts of days shall be spent in jail until the 
sentence is served.  
He shall be allowed out of jail only long enough to complete his actual 
hours of employment or education and a reasonable time to travel to and from his 
place of employment or school.  Unless the defendant is indigent, the court 
shall require him as a condition of special treatment under this subsection to 
pay a reasonable amount for room and board as determined by the sheriff.

            
(h)  As used in this subsection, "serious bodily injury" means 
bodily injury which creates a reasonable likelihood of death or which causes 
miscarriage or serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment 
of any bodily member or organ.  Whoever causes serious bodily injury to 
another person resulting from the violation of this section shall be punished 
upon conviction as follows:

(i)  If not subject to the penalty under 
paragraph (ii)  of this subsection, by a fine of not less than two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), 
imprisonment for not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year, or 
both;

(ii)  If previously convicted and sentenced under 
this subsection, or any other law substantially conforming to the provisions of 
this subsection, by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years;  and

(iii)  Any person convicted under this subsection 
shall have his driver's license revoked as provided in W.S. 31-7-127.

            
(j)  Any person charged under this section or a municipal 
ordinance which substantially conforms to the provisions of this section shall 
be prosecuted under this section or the ordinance and not under a reduced charge 
or dismissed unless the prosecuting attorney in open court moves or files a 
statement to reduce the charge or dismiss, with supporting facts, stating that 
there is insufficient evidence to sustain the charge.

            
(k)  Chemical analysis of a person's blood, breath or urine to 
determine alcohol concentration or controlled substance content shall be 
performed in accordance with W.S. 31-6-105(a).

 

[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(d) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2002) provides:  "If a person under arrest refuses upon the 
request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical test designated by the agency 
employing the peace officer as provided in subsection (a) of this section, none 
shall be given except in cases where serious bodily injury or death has 
resulted."  
Although Wheaton refused to submit to a chemical test, and there was no 
apparent basis for the "serious bodily injury or death" exception, Wheaton was 
subjected to a blood test which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be 
.19%.  A 
Rawlins police officer testified that it was "normal practice to get a blood 
alcohol level in any assault case where alcohol may be a factor."  There was no 
objection made to the admission of the blood alcohol test.  Wheaton was charged 
with DWUI, but at his trial in the county (now circuit) court on that charge, 
the blood test evidence was suppressed on the basis of § 31-6-102(d).  Ultimately, Wheaton 
was acquitted of the DWUI charge.

 

[¶12]   Wheaton asks that we take judicial 
notice of a transcript of the proceedings from his DWUI trial in the Circuit 
Court.  Wheaton 
offers no satisfactory explanation why the transcript was not offered to the 
trial court or why no effort was made to supplement the record on appeal through 
use of the applicable rules of appellate procedure.  More importantly, 
we have carefully examined that transcript and determined that it is of no 
material assistance to this Court in resolving the issues presented by the 
appeal.  
Therefore, we decline to take judicial notice of it.  See 37 Gambling Devices (Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne 
Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, 694 P.2d 711, 716-17 (Wyo. 
1985).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶13]   Wheaton contends that the prosecutor 
committed an act of misconduct by advancing the admission of the blood alcohol 
test done on Wheaton.  
At trial Wheaton made no objection to the admission of the blood alcohol 
test.  
Wheaton's argument is based on a theory that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102(d) prohibited the use of a blood alcohol test because Wheaton refused 
the test and "serious bodily injury or death" were not a factor in his 
case.  The 
record in this case is clear, without need for reference to the proceedings at 
Wheaton's DWUI trial, that the blood alcohol test was not admitted at that trial 
because Wheaton refused the test and, thus, it could not be used in his DWUI trial.  However, § 31-6-102(d) applies only to a DWUI 
situation and, thus, it does not answer the question of whether or not it was 
admissible under the circumstances of the instant charges in this 
trial.

 

[¶14]   Whether or not the blood test should 
have been admitted in this case was not called to the trial court's attention 
and, thus, that issue was not explored below.  Wheaton contends that the State made much ado 
about his intoxication, and that is essentially correct, though we will not 
detail each and every such reference made by the State.  For purposes of our 
analysis here, we are more concerned with the use Wheaton made of that 
evidence.  
During voir dire, Wheaton's attorney emphasized that his client had been 
drinking, and in opening statement emphasized that he had been "drinking quite a 
bit."  The 
record is replete with testimony concerning Wheaton's state of intoxication, 
including his admission on cross-examination that his blood alcohol was 
.19%.  It is 
readily evident that a part of Wheaton's trial strategy was that he was 
intoxicated and the unlawful actions of the police pushed him into a rage that 
justified his actions.  A third part of his strategy was one he 
referred to as the "blue wall," i.e., that the 
police were unified in telling lies to justify their actions.

 

[¶15]   Because no objection was made to the 
admission of the blood alcohol test, Wheaton asks that we review this asserted 
error under the plain error doctrine.  Plain error exists when:  (1) the record is 
clear about the incident alleged as error; (2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Weidt v. State, 2002 WY 74, ¶14, 46 P.3d 846, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2002).  The 
record clearly demonstrates that the blood alcohol test was admitted, but 
Wheaton does not, and cannot, point to a clear and unequivocal rule of law that 
was transgressed.  
The blood alcohol test was not admissible in a DWUI prosecution, but that 
does not necessarily prohibit its admission for another purpose.  See Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶¶22-25, 43 P.3d 551, ¶¶22-25 (Wyo. 
2002).  Wheaton 
was under arrest and, in addition to a DWUI charge, he was also charged with two 
other discrete felonies as set out above.  A police officer testified that it was a 
policy of the Rawlins police department to obtain a blood test in cases 
involving assault.  
That policy is not fleshed out by the record, but the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit blood testing on the basis that it is inherently an 
unreasonable search.  
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure, § 4.1(e), at 412-13 (1996); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 5.3(c) at 130-45 (1996); Vitauts 
M. Gulbis, Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of 
Blood-Alcohol Test where Blood was Taken Despite Defendant's Objection or 
Refusal to Submit to Test, 14 A.L.R.3d 690 (1982 and Supp. 2001).  There is no "bright 
line" which sets out the limits on the taking of a blood test, but this excerpt 
from Professor LaFave's treatise provides guidance:

 

            
As for the taking of a blood sample from an arrested person, it is 
necessary under Schmerber that the test be "a 
reasonable one" and that it be "performed in a reasonable manner."  Given the objective 
of determining if the defendant was intoxicated, the Court deemed the taking of 
the sample to be a reasonable means of accomplishing that purpose.  And because the 
"blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to 
acceptable medical practices," the test was performed reasonably.  It is also 
necessary under Schmerber that there be "a clear 
indication that in fact [the evidence sought] will be found" as "the Fourth 
Amendment [forbids] any such intrusion on the mere chance that desired evidence 
might be obtained."  
Whether this "clear indication" requirement is somewhat more demanding 
that the usual probable cause requirement is a matter of continuing uncertainty, 
but it can be forcefully argued that it is.  In any event, the test was met in Schmerber, for defendant's condition "suggested the 
required relevance and likely success of a test of petitioner's blood for 
alcohol."  As 
for exigent circumstances, the Court in Schmerber 
concluded that while a search warrant is ordinarily required "where intrusions 
into the human body are concerned," no warrant was needed under the facts 
presented because the officer quite reasonably believed there was a need to take 
the test before the percentage of alcohol in the blood diminished.  This means, of 
course, that if the purpose of the test were merely to determine the arrestee's 
blood type, then a search warrant would be required.  Because "Schmerber viewed the seizure and separate search of the 
blood as a single event for Fourth Amendment purposes," exigent circumstances 
need exist only as to the blood removal, and if they exist no warrant is 
required even though the removed sample need not be immediately 
tested.

 

3 LaFave, supra, § 5.3(c) at 
136-39.

 

[¶16]   In this case, the record does reflect 
that the blood test was taken by a trained person in the county jail, rather 
than a doctor in a hospital, but given Wheaton's failure to further develop the 
record in that regard, we need not attempt to definitively answer the question 
of whether this test was "reasonable."  Had an objection been lodged, it would have 
been the State's burden to clearly demonstrate the reasonableness of the 
test.  However, 
we do conclude that the taking of the blood test did not violate a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, for the law does allow such testing under the 
strictures set out above.

 

[¶17]   We also note that Wheaton did not 
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of the blood test.  Establishing the 
fact that he was intoxicated was a part of his trial strategy and the blood test 
was merely cumulative of other evidence, which clearly demonstrated that he was 
intoxicated.  
Finally, given these circumstances, we can only conclude that the 
prosecutor did not commit an act of misconduct.

 

[¶18]   Wheaton contends that his arrest was 
unlawful because Officer Rose lacked probable cause to arrest him for DWUI.  We answered a 
virtually identical question very recently:

 

Kimsey contends that Officer Johnson lacked probable cause 
to arrest him for driving while under the influence because no one saw Kimsey 
actually driving his vehicle.  WYDOT counters that Officer Johnson had 
reasonable grounds to believe that Kimsey drove his vehicle while intoxicated, 
giving him probable cause to arrest him.

            
The party who challenges whether the agency's decision was supported by 
sufficient evidence bears the burden of showing that it was not supported by 
such evidence.  
Smith v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 11 P.3d 931, 937 
(Wyo.2000).  A 
police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if at the time of the 
arrest he possesses probable cause to believe that the person has committed a 
crime.  Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 517 
(Wyo.1989).  
Probable cause exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, a 
prudent, reasonable, and cautious police officer is led to believe a crime has 
been committed by the person who is being arrested.  Smith, 11 P.3d  at 937.  Probable cause by definition involves 
probabilities rather than certainties.  Id.

            
After analyzing the totality of the circumstances that led up to Kimsey's 
arrest, we hold that Officer Johnson possessed adequate probable cause to arrest 
Kimsey for driving while under the influence of alcohol.  It took only a few 
minutes for Kimsey to arrive at the Law Center after he called to inquire about 
the condition of his wife.  Officer Johnson left the building just before 
Kimsey arrived, and when he returned to speak with Kimsey, he noticed the 
vehicle in the parking lot.  When Officer Johnson asked Kimsey about the 
truck, Kimsey admitted that it was his and that he had driven it to the Law 
Center, assuring Officer Johnson that he was okay to drive.  Officer Johnson 
told Kimsey that he thought Kimsey was too intoxicated to be driving, and Kimsey 
again assured Officer Johnson that he was all right to drive.  When Officer 
Johnson asked Kimsey to perform some field sobriety tests, Kimsey asked if he 
could just collect his wife and promised to walk home.  Officer Johnson 
again requested Kimsey perform sobriety tests, and Kimsey replied that he did 
not drive the vehicle to the Law Center and that he did not know how it got 
there.  Kimsey 
next gave the explanation that maybe his wife had driven the vehicle to the Law 
Center.

            
Given the confusing nature of Kimsey's statements, along with his slurred 
speech, instability, and the strong odor of alcohol, Officer Johnson concluded 
that Kimsey was intoxicated.  This conclusion, coupled with the presence of 
Kimsey's vehicle in the parking lot, encompass the reasonable conclusion that 
Kimsey was intoxicated and that he had driven his vehicle to the Law Center to 
check on his wife.

            
Kimsey asserts to this court that when he told Officer Johnson he drove 
to the Law Center, he meant he had received a ride to the Law Center.  We find it peculiar 
that Kimsey neither offered this excuse to any of the officers on the night he 
was arrested, nor did he present any evidence at the hearing regarding the 
identity of the individual he claims gave him the ride.

            
We hold that the totality of the circumstances were adequate to cause a 
reasonable police officer to believe Kimsey had driven while under the influence 
of alcohol even though no one actually saw him driving the vehicle.  Officer Johnson, 
therefore, possessed adequate probable cause to arrest Kimsey for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol.

 

Kimsey v. Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, 2002 WY 
15, ¶¶15-20, 39 P.3d 425, ¶¶15-20 (Wyo. 2002); and see Adams v. 
State, 697 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Wyo. 
1985) (defendant, intoxicated and asleep in vehicle, has actual physical control 
of vehicle).

 

[¶19]   Without reiterating the facts and 
circumstances set out in detail above, we conclude that Officer Rose had 
probable cause to arrest Wheaton for DWUI and, of course, the fact that he was 
ultimately acquitted of that charge is not an element of our analysis of the 
probable cause issue.

 

[¶20]   The applicable standard of review is 
well-established:  
Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law 
so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material 
facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal 
theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one 
of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an 
instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, 
as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has 
been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.  Mueller v. State, 
2001 WY 134, ¶9, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2001).  With 
specific regard to a defendant's "theory of the case" instruction we have held 
that:

 

Due process requires the trial court to give a correct 
instruction to the jury that details the defendant's theory of the case.  Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 129 
(Wyo.1970).  
The instruction must sufficiently inform the court of the defendant's 
theory and must be supported by competent evidence.  Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 
(Wyo.1992).  A 
theory of the case is more than a comment on the evidence that tells the jury 
how to consider the evidence.  Ellifritz v. 
State, 704 P.2d 1300 
(Wyo.1985).  
Fundamentally, the instruction must in the first instance be a proper 
theory of the case, or theory of defense, instruction.  That is, the 
offered instruction must present a defense recognized by statute or case law in 
this jurisdiction.  
Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 490.

As Bouwkamp explained, 
"[t]heory of defense instructions are to be derived from and address criminal 
defenses provided for by statute or acknowledged by this court."  Id. It further noted "common-law defenses are retained 
unless otherwise provided by this act."  Id. (quoting Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 
6-1-102(b)).  
Additionally, this Court has discussed acceptable defenses, notably in Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 
(Wyo.1985).  
See also 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 21, at 70 n. 1 
(1984);  1 
Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 39 (15th ed.1993).

Any competent evidence is sufficient to establish a defense 
theory even if it consists only of testimony of the defendant.  Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 
(Wyo.1987).  We 
view the evidence in a light favorable to the accused and the accused's 
testimony must be taken as entirely true to determine if the evidence is 
competent.  Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944 
(Wyo.1998).  
Even if the court deems the evidence to be weak, or unworthy of belief, 
the instruction must be given if a jury could reasonably conclude the evidence 
supports the defendant's position.  Id. The refusal 
to allow an instruction requested by the defendant when due process requires the 
defendant's instruction be given is reversible error per se. Id.

 

Holloman v. State, 2002 WY 
117, ¶¶15-17, 51 P.3d 214, ¶¶15-17 (Wyo. 2002).

[¶21]   In this instance Wheaton offered the 
following instruction:

 

The law generally does not allow a person who is arrested 
by a police officer to resist arrest.  The law does allow a person to resist arrest 
if the activity of the police is so provocative that resistance is 
understandable.  
After you have consideration [sic] of all the 
facts and circumstances you may find the police officer was not engaged in the 
lawful performance of his duty if you find that the police activity is so 
provocative that the resistance by the Defendant was understandable.

 

[¶22]   The district court gave the following 
instruction:

 

You are instructed that there may be situations that police 
activities are so provocative and resistance so understandable that it can only 
be concluded that the police were not engaged in the lawful performance of their 
official duties and that such conduct by the officer may give rise to right of 
self defense, i.e., a right to resist the use of 
excessive force.

 

[¶23]   The instruction given by the district 
court is an improvement upon the instruction offered by Wheaton and adequately 
conveyed to the jury his theory of the case.  Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 (Wyo. 
1987); Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131, 1133-36 
(Wyo. 1985).  
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the 
instruction offered by Wheaton, in favor of the instruction that it did 
give.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   The prosecutor did not engage in 
misconduct in offering Wheaton's blood alcohol test as evidence, and it was not 
plain error for the district court to allow its admission.  The blood test 
performed by the State on Wheaton was not inherently an unreasonable search and 
seizure and, thus, did not violate Wheaton's constitutional rights.  Officer Rose had 
probable cause to arrest Wheaton for DWUI.  The instructions given by the district court 
were adequate.  
The judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1The 
statute has been amended since the time of Wheaton's arrest, but not in a manner 
that affects our disposition of this case.