Case Title: Mower v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mower v. State1988 WY 18750 P.2d 679Case Number: 87-215Decided: 02/23/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL PETER MOWER, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Julie D. Naylor, 
Appellate Counsel, Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(defendant).

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Michele J. Neves, Legal 
Intern, for appellee (plaintiff). 

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order revoking probation and reimposing the original sentence given appellant 
Michael Peter Mower upon his conviction of delivery of a controlled 
substance.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On March 25, 1980, 
appellant pleaded guilty to the delivery of marijuana in violation of § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, and was sentenced to a term of three to ten years 
in prison. This sentence was suspended, and appellant was placed on probation 
for a period of four years. The probation carried with it certain 
conditions:

1. Appellant was to serve 
a 60-day jail sentence in the county jail during times when he was not 
working;

2. Appellant was to pay a 
$3,000 fine by making payments of $150 per month;

3. Appellant was to not 
associate with individuals involved in criminal activities; 
and

4. Appellant was to obey 
the laws of the state of Wyoming and the rules and regulations of the 
department of probation and parole.

[¶4.]     On August 27, 1981, a 
petition for revocation of appellant's probation was filed, alleging that, since 
the date of the judgment and sentence, appellant had spent only three days in 
the county jail; that appellant had pleaded guilty to three separate offenses of 
driving while his driver's license was suspended; that appellant had been 
charged with and/or convicted of various other offenses during the period of his 
probation; and that at least twice appellant had been in possession of a firearm 
in violation of the United States Code. Appellant was served with a summons to 
appear at a probation revocation hearing scheduled to be held on September 22, 
1981. However, appellant did not appear, and a bench warrant was 
issued.

[¶5.]     Ultimately, appellant 
was arrested and appeared on August 11, 1987, for his probation revocation 
hearing, at which time his probation was revoked and his original sentence of 
three to ten years in the state penitentiary was reimposed. This result was not 
the recommendation of the prosecuting attorney who suggested fulfillment of the 
original probation conditions or, alternatively, a lesser 
sentence.

[¶6.]     On appeal, appellant 
does not contend that the court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. 
He admits that he violated the terms of his probation. Rather, appellant alleges 
that the district court abused its discretion in reimposing the original 
sentence instead of a lesser one as recommended by the prosecution since only 
$600 remained to be paid on the fine assessed against him and since he had not 
had any "run-ins" with the law in almost six years.

[¶7.]     According to Rule 36, 
W.R.Cr.P., a court "may * * * reduce a sentence upon revocation of a probation 
as provided by law." (Emphasis added.) A sentencing court has broad discretion 
in determining whether to reduce a criminal defendant's sentence. Peterson v. 
State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 276 (1985); Montez v. 
State, Wyo., 
592 P.2d 1153 (1979). Also,

"The imposition as well 
as the revocation of probation lies within the sound discretion of the district 
court, and we will not reverse the actions of the district court unless that 
discretion is abused." Gronski v. State, Wyo., 700 P.2d 777, 778 
(1985).

See also Schmidt 
v. State, Wyo., 738 P.2d 1105, 1106 (1987). Therefore, 
the decision of a court to revoke probation and deny a sentence reduction motion 
in reimposing an original sentence is entitled to considerable deference by an 
appellate court. Id.; Peterson v. State, supra. We will not 
reverse the actions of the district court in sentence reduction, probation 
revocation, and sentence imposition cases unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion.

[¶8.]     We stated in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980), 
that:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances."

See also Schmidt 
v. State, 738 P.2d  at 1107.

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Each case must be 
determined on its [own] peculiar facts." Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(1986) (citation omitted).

[¶9.]     In this case, it is 
clear from the record that the court considered the recommendation made by the 
prosecution at the revocation hearing and the circumstances referred to by the 
parties when it made its decision to not reduce appellant's sentence. The court 
simply did not accept the prosecution's recommendation. To require the court to 
accept the recommendation of the prosecution as a matter of law would transfer 
the sentencing duty from the court to the prosecution. Wright v. State, 
Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090 (1983), reh. denied 707 P.2d 153 (1985). It is the court's duty to impose 
the sentence, not the prosecution's.

[¶10.]  Given these circumstances, we hold that 
the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to accept the prosecution's 
recommendation for a lesser sentence when it revoked appellant's probation and 
reimposed upon appellant the original sentence which was within the statutorily 
prescribed limits.

[¶11.]  Affirmed.