Case Title: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boyer

Citation: 357 So. 2d 958

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
357 So. 2d 958 (1978)
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation
v.
Deborah D. BOYER, a minor, et al.
SC 2739.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 24, 1978.
*959 John S. Key and J. G. Tubb, of Eyster, Eyster, Key, Carmichael & Tubb, Decatur, for State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
David B. Cauthen, Decatur, for appellees: Lisa Kay Coates, a minor, Harry A. Coates, JoAnn V. Wallace, a minor, John H. Wallace, Rickey S. Holmes, a minor, and Fred Holmes.
Dan F. Nelson, Decatur, for appellees, Deborah D. Boyer and William E. Boyer.
BEATTY, Justice.
Appeal by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company from a decision adverse to it in a declaratory judgment action. We affirm.
State Farm initiated the action praying that the trial court would determine that no insurance coverage was afforded the insured, William E. Boyer, under a policy of insurance previously issued to Boyer by State Farm. The policy contained the following clause:
USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES
While this policy was in force Deborah Boyer, the insured's daughter, was involved in an accident while she was driving a non-owned automobile of her friend, Charlotte Dunn. The circumstances of that incident raised the question of whether Deborah was driving the non-owned automobile within the scope of the permission granted to her by Charlotte. The evidence at trial was extensive even though the defendants elected not to call any witnesses. At the conclusion of the evidence State Farm moved for a directed verdict; the trial court, however, submitted two written interrogatories to the jury under Rule 49(b), ARCP, one of which asked:
Judgment was entered upon the jury's affirmative finding. The denial of the plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict, judgment N.O.V., and a new trial constitute some of the claimed errors on this appeal. These rulings necessitate a review of the evidence on the scope of the permission granted to Deborah by Charlotte.
That evidence established that Charlotte Dunn and Deborah Boyer attended the same high school. On the occasion in question they had ridden to school in the Dunn automobile, and, according to Charlotte, during their second period class Deborah asked Charlotte to allow her to borrow the Dunn car to go to the store for a coke. This store is about 7/10 mile west of the school. Deborah had borrowed the Dunn car on several prior occasions for the same purpose, although Charlotte did not know on those occasions which store Deborah was going to. According to Charlotte, about 10:20 a. m. Charlotte gave Deborah the keys, telling her to "go to the store and come right back." It was Charlotte's idea that it would take about fifteen to thirty minutes. The accident occurred at a point about ½ mile east of the school. When Deborah failed to return the keys during the remainder of the school day, Charlotte began to look for her around 3:20.
On cross-examination at a later stage, however, Charlotte stated:
(There is evidence in the record that school ended for the day at 3:05 P.M.) And still later:
(Emphasis added)
(emphasis added)
Another witness, Dawn Davis, testified that she overheard a conversation on the day in question regarding Deborah's borrowing Charlotte's car, and that she heard Charlotte tell Deborah to go to the store and come right back.
Portions of the deposition of Deborah Boyer, a party defendant, were introduced by State Farm. Her testimony was that while the two of them were in assembly, earlier that morning, she asked Charlotte to let her borrow the car around 11:30, telling Charlotte that she was going to run up to the store. According to Deborah, Charlotte said "Okay." When she left the school she was not planning to go anywhere except to the store and straight back, but following her trip to the store she rode around town, occasionally stopping to visit with friends she encountered, until she began to return to the school when the accident occurred. Doubtless this testimony was introduced by State Farm to reveal Deborah's actual use of the automobile, but part of it also tended to establish a lack of positive instructions from Charlotte on the use of the automobile, contrary to some of Charlotte's testimony on both direct and cross-examination.
In determining whether it was error to overrule the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the defendant, and if any reasonable inference might be drawn adverse to the plaintiff's position that the automobile was used outside the permission granted, it was proper for the trial court to overrule the motion and let the issue be resolved by the jury. Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 484, 306 So. 2d 236 (1975); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 291 Ala. 548, 284 So. 2d 254 (1973). As we view the evidence in this case, a jury question was presented on whether Charlotte Dunn gave any limiting directions, and thus whether Deborah was driving the car within the scope of her permission at the time of the accident. On the other hand, Charlotte's testimony on direct examination established a limiting permission. But when we consider this evidence in connection with her cross-examination and that portion of Deborah Boyer's deposition introduced by State Farm, adverse inferences against the plaintiff's position become apparent, for Deborah deposed, in effect, that no limiting instructions were given to her.
In this stage of the evidence, it was the proper course for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict for plaintiff, State Farm:
In civil cases, the question must go to the jury if the evidence arising therefrom furnishes a scintilla in support of the theory, Huff v. Vulcan Life and Accident Ins. Co., 281 Ala. 615, 206 So. 2d 861 (1968) (testimony of attending physician in action by insured against insurance company); Glass v. Davison, 276 Ala. 328, 161 So. 2d 811 (1964) (testimony of employee in action by minor against employer); Southern Apartments, Inc. v. Emmett, 269 Ala. 584, 114 So. 2d 453 (1959) (testimony of employee in action by tenant against landlord); Parkinson v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 4, 88 So. 2d 793 (1956) (testimony of party favorable to opponent as well as to himself); Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Littrell, 246 Ala. 58, 18 So. 2d 744 (1944) (testimony of plaintiff and others in action based upon negligence and subsequent negligence; Edwards v. Earnest, 206 Ala. 1, 89 So. 729 (1921) (testimony of an employee-driver in action by pedestrian against employer).
The appellant also contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the burden of proof in this declaratory judgment action was upon the plaintiff, State Farm. Conceding a division of authority among the various state jurisdictions, the appellant maintains that the better reasoning would place the burden where it would be if the insured had brought an action on the policy. That question, however, has been decided already in General Ins. Co. of America v. Killen, 270 Ala. 604, 120 So. 2d 887 (1960) in which this Court held that a fire insurer which sought to have nonliability declared because of noncompliance with a policy provision had the burden of proving the existence of that policy provision. And in Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cofield, 274 Ala. 299, 148 So. 2d 226 (1962), in which the insurance company sought a declaration that it was not obligated to defend a pending action because of a violation of the "cooperation clause" contained in the policy, we held that the burden of proving those allegations was on the complainant. These cases have taken the position, properly we believe, that the insurer who seeks a declaration of relief from the terms of the policy which it has issued bears the burden of proving its entitlement to that relief. Because the plaintiff-insurer here seeks such affirmative relief the trial court's instruction regarding plaintiff's burden was proper.
State Farm also maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing the following charge requested by the plaintiff:
This charge was properly refused because it did not instruct the jury of the charge's relation to the issues being litigated. L. & N. R. Co. v. Dollar, 294 Ala. 276, 314 So. 2d 867 (1975); Bagley v. Grime, 283 Ala. 688, 220 So. 2d 876 (1969). The principal issue in this case was whether the use of an automobile was within the scope of the permission of the person in lawful possession of it. Apparently by requesting this charge the plaintiff wished to have the jury instructed that it could not consider Charlotte's inconsistent statements contained in her deposition as substantive evidence on the issue of her instructions to Deborah. This charge, however, does not clearly relate to that issue. Moreover, the charge is confusing because it fails to define a prior inconsistent statement, and it is misleading because it fails to distinguish rules applicable to such statements made by parties from those made by witnesses who are not parties. Hamilton v. Browning, 257 Ala. 72, 57 So. 2d 530 (1952); Engel v. Davis, 256 Ala. 661, 57 So. 2d 76 (1952).
*963 The appellant also claims as error the trial court's overruling its objection to the following question which, appellant states, was asked by defense counsel to Charlotte Dunn:
The record does not support the appellant's contention that this was error, principally because it reveals that State Farm's counsel, not defense counsel, first elicited this question before the jury. The record shows that on Charlotte's cross-examination defense counsel alluded to a Mr. Sanders who had asked Charlotte questions at her home, and also asked her whether she had gone over "the statement." Then the following occurred:
It can be readily observed that this question which was apparently contained in a previous statement made by Charlotte to Mr. Sanders was initially proved at the trial by the counsel who now complains that it was error to admit it. If there was any error in its admission at that stage, therefore, the error was self induced, Bradford v. Birmingham Electric Co., 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933); 2A Ala.Dig. § 882(8), and plaintiff cannot now complain of the trial court's ruling, even if we consider, as the trial court did, that his objection was made in timely fashion. That is, although the appellant's objection was made in time, any error in the trial court's admission of the question was brought on by the appellant himself.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for a mistrial when counsel for one of the defendants referred to appellant as "the big insurance company."
*964 The record shows that objecting counsel first asked "for an appropriate instruction to the jury to eradicate the prejudicial effect of it." The trial court complied with this request:
Then counsel asked for a mistrial.
First of all we note that the entire argument is not included in the record and there is not, therefore, enough revealed to identify the context of what was said to justify a conclusion that the remarks were improper. Housing Authority of City of Decatur v. Decatur Land Co., 258 Ala. 607, 64 So. 2d 594 (1953). In the matter of counsel's closing argument much must be left to the trial court's judgment, and his rulings are presumed to have been sufficient to remove any opprobrium unless the record reveals substantial prejudice. Birmingham Electric Co. v. Mann, 226 Ala. 379, 147 So. 165 (1933). We are not persuaded that any such prejudice existed after the trial court's admonition given immediately after the objection.
The same response would be applicable to another portion of defense counsel's summation before the jury, viz.:
We disagree that this statement is patently illegal or that it was calculated solely to create bias against the plaintiff. Indeed, the entire case represents an effort by State Farm to avoid liability based upon the scope of permission clause, and because that theory was present in the case it was not improper to argue the point. It appears to us that this argument was a permissible "expression of a critical opinion of the attitude of the insurer." Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Downey, 242 Ala. 482, 7 So. 2d 17 (1942). For that reason it was not reversible error to overrule the objection to it.
Our review of the record convinces us that it was not error for the trial court to overrule the motion for a new trial. The jury's verdict is supported by competent evidence, and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial strengthens the presumption of its correctness. Blount Bros. Construction Co. v. Rose, 274 Ala. 429, 149 So. 2d 821 (1962).
For these reasons the judgment is due to be, and is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.