Case Title: RAYMOND DEAN BROWN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-251

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
RAYMOND DEAN BROWN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 9175 P.3d 1158Case Number: 06-251, S-07-0127Decided: 01/30/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RAYMOND 
DEAN BROWN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling.  (Case No. 
06-251)

Pro Se 
(Case No. S-07-0127)

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On our own 
motion, we consolidated the two above-captioned appeals for purposes of their 
disposition.

 
 
[¶2]      On March 17, 
2000, Appellant, Raymond Dean Brown (Brown), was adjudged guilty of the crime of 
operating an unlawful clandestine laboratory operation and misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance, after he entered nolo contendere pleas to 
those offenses.  During the 
proceedings in his case, and especially in the process of negotiating a plea 
agreement, Brown incriminated himself in several other crimes, in particular 
federal firearms violations.  A part 
of the plea bargain included a promise by the prosecuting attorney that 
SweetwaterCounty would not further 
charge Brown with crimes related to those matters.

 
 
[¶3]      Brown contends 
that the State violated the terms of his plea bargain/immunity promise, and he 
has attempted to litigate that matter, with reams of paper, in the district 
court.  The district court entered 
orders denying relief as to all of his claims.  We will dismiss the appeals because the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Brown's claims and, thus, we too 
lack jurisdiction to consider them.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      Brown raises this 
issue in Case No. 06-251:

 
 
1.  The 
State's use of information obtained 
in a "proffer" for which Raymond Brown had been promised use and derivative use 
immunity as part of his plea agreement violated that plea agreement, and the 
court's refusal to grant relief from the judgment and sentence based on that 
plea agreement was an abuse of discretion.

 
 
In 
response, the State queries:

 
 
Did the 
district court have subject matter jurisdiction over [Brown's] W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion? If so, should [Brown] have been collaterally estopped from relitigating 
the issue of whether a violation of his plea agreement occurred and, in any 
event, does the record show a violation of the plea 
agreement.

 
 
In that 
case, Brown is represented by the Wyoming Public Defender, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
[¶5]      In Case No. 
S-07-0127 Brown, acting pro se, 
contends:

 
 
1.  The 
district court's order dated 5/10/2007 denying Mr. Brown's pro se "Motion Giving 
Notice That the Appeal Action (06-251) Has Been Mistakenly Docketed Prematurely 
before the Wyoming Supreme Court and Motion Seeking Appropriate Judicial Actions 
Consistent with the Protections Afforded by Procedural Due Process" was in 
contravention of W.R.APP.P. Rule 2.04; 2.02(a) and (b); and controlling 
authority, which deprived Mr. Brown of procedural due process and a complete 
record on appeal.  Moreover, said 
order was not in compliance with W.R.C.P. Rule 52(a), being void of any relevant 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Therefore, the denial of the motion was clearly erroneous and an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
2.  The 
district court's order dated 5/10/2007 denying Mr. Brown's "Renewed Motion 
Giving Notice of a Conflict of Interest with Current Counsel David Westling  
Public Defender  Appellate Division and Renewed Request for Appointment of 
Substitute Counsel" was in contravention of W.R.Cr.P. Rule 44(b)(1) and 
44(e)(2)(A) and (B).  Therefore, the 
denial of the motion was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.  Moreover, the court failed to conduct an 
adequate inquiry into Mr. Brown's documented claim of a potential conflict of 
interest by affording an evidentiary hearing after being sufficiently apprised 
of the matter.  Based on the 
totality of circumstances, this was an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
3.  The 
district court's order dated 5/10/2007 denying Mr. Brown's timely filed pro se 
"Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59" was based on 
inapposite Wyoming authority and therefore an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
4.  The 
district court's failure to timely resolve Mr. Brown's "Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel for Indigent the Defendant to Pursue Appeal Process  Pursuant to 
[Wyo. Stat. Ann.] § 7-6-104(a)(vi) (or applicable rule/statute  or  Motion for 
Appointment of Paralegal Services on this Appeal Action" i.e., S-07-0127 was in 
contravention of W.R.Cr.P. Rule 44(a)(1) and 44(b)(1).  Pursuant to the court's own advisement 
dated 12/06/2006 stating "I have no problem appointing appellate counsel for 
these  these motion[s] that he's filed in the district court," directly 
coincides with the court's order dated June 4, 2007 granting Mr. Brown's "Motion 
for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis on Appeal," which specifically referenced 
and included attorney's fees.  
Therefore, based upon the totality of circumstances, the error raised 
herein is an abuse of judicial discretion.

 
 
5.  The 
district court's failure to timely adjudicate Mr. Brown's "Motion for Judicial 
Notice of Adjudicative Facts Pursuant to Wyoming Rules of Evidence Rule 201," 
which was filed on 09/05/2006 and directly associated to Mr. Brown's issues on 
appeal now pending before this Court in Case Number (06-251) and (S-07-0127) 
violates procedural due process, Rule 201(d), and further deprived Mr. Brown of 
a complete record for his appeals.  
Therefore, based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the lower court has abused its discretion.

 
 
6.  The 
Wyoming Public Defender's Office, Appellate Division  Attorneys Donna Domonkos' 
and David Westling's abandonment of their obligations as counsel of 
record to diligently advocate Mr. Brown's motions in the district court, which 
are directly associated with the matters on appeal in Case No. (06-251) and 
(S-07-127), constitutes blatant ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

 
 
In 
response, the State contends:

 
 
            
Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over the motions 
that were denied in the court's order of May 10, 2007?  If so, did the court err in denying 
them? 

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]      Shortly after the 
State court proceedings associated with his plea agreement were concluded, Brown 
was charged with and convicted of several serious firearms crimes in Federal 
court:  (1) Being a felon in 
possession of a firearm; (2) unlawfully possessing a machine gun; and (3) 
carrying a machine gun during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.  He was sentenced to 115 months for the 
first two counts and 360 months for the third, to be served consecutively.1  United 
States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2005) (the opinion was published on March 
9, 2005).  One of the issues Brown 
raised in that appeal was that the court erroneously failed to suppress, or 
grant a hearing regarding, statements Brown made in exchange for an implicit 
immunity agreement with state authorities.  
Id. at 
1245.  The Court of Appeals disposed 
of that issue with this discussion:

 
 
Mr. 
Brown next claims the district court should have suppressed statements that he 
made to Wyoming state authorities on February 3, 2000, 
and should have held a hearing on the derivative use of the statements.  He maintains that state authorities 
implicitly promised, in exchange for his providing information, not to facilitate other jurisdictions in 
using the statements against him.  
He claims that the state nevertheless passed along his statements to 
federal authorities, and that they essentially formed the basis of federal 
charges against him.  Mr. Brown 
claims Special Agent Claman's recounting of his statements at trial helped prove 
Mr. Brown knew the gun was a machine gun for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 
922.  Although Mr. Brown filed a 
motion to suppress the statements, the district court reserved making a ruling 
and Mr. Brown did not renew the motion at trial or object to the introduction of 
the statements.  We therefore engage 
in plain error review.

An 
exhibit filed by the government in response to Mr. Brown's motion to suppress 
included a report by Special Agent Claman, who was present during Mr. Brown's 
discussion with the state.  The 
report noted Mr. Brown was informed 
that the purpose of the discussion was to assess what consideration he would be 
provided in exchange for his information, and that:

 
 
DCA 
[DeputyCounty and Prosecuting 
Attorney] Howard advised BROWN that information provided would not be used against him in 
state court proceedings.  DCA Howard 
specifically stated that the terms of the proffer/interview were not binding on 
federal authorities nor authorities in any other state.  DCA Howard further stated he had no 
authority to grant immunity in any charges that may be brought by federal 
authorities or authorities in any other state.  DCA Howard did state that any state 
crimes that BROWN admitted to would not be prosecuted with the exception of any 
crimes of violence.

During 
Mr. Brown's plea discussion in state court, the parties engaged in the following 
dialogue with the court:

 
 
MR. 
PROKOS [prosecutor]:  While under 
Wyoming law, 
your Honor, we can't specifically grant immunity, there  there was an agreement 
that we would not prosecute for any acts or wrongs that is use or derivative use 
of immunity that Mr. Brown testif[ied] to during his proffer or provided 
information regarding during his 
proffer.  We won't prosecute him for 
any of those acts that he's admitted to.

COURT:  Is he facing any federal 
charges?

MR. 
NELSON [defense attorney]we've had the matter for four months, and none have 
come forward, but he certainly could be charged federally

COURT:  Mr. Brown, is this your understanding of 
the plea agreement?

DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor, it 
is.

 
 
The 
record thus demonstrates the state prosecutor told Mr. Brown that any 
information he provided would not be 
used in state proceedings in Wyoming, and that Mr. Brown would not receive 
protection from federal charges.  
Mr. Brown expressly acknowledged that he understood these terms.  His theory that the state's active role 
in passing along information in the 
face of its informal immunity 
agreement with him constitutes a violation of the plea agreement is not 
persuasive; here, disclaimers about the lack of federal immunity were clearly 
provided and Mr. Brown stated his understanding of such.  The district court therefore did not err 
by permitting testimony regarding the relevant conversation or by failing to 
grant a hearing regarding its derivative use.

 
 

Brown, 400 F.3d  at 1255-56.

 
 
[¶7]      On February 14, 
2005, Brown filed a pleading in the Wyoming district court asking that he be 
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) because of the 
breach of his plea agreement and because that breach resulted in a manifest 
injustice.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) 
provides:

 
 
(d)  Plea Withdrawal. -- If a motion for 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason.  
At any later time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice.

 
 
[¶8]      On April 25, 
2006, Brown filed a motion for relief from a final judgment under W.R.C.P. 
60(b), which provides:

 
 
(a)  Clerical Mistakes. -- Clerical mistakes 
in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders.  During the pendency 
of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the Supreme Court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the Supreme Court.

            
(b)  Other Reasons. 
-- On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or 
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons:  (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;  (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b);  (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party;  
(4) the judgment is void;  
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;  or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment.  
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), 
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken.  A motion under 
this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation.  This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from 
a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided by statute, or to grant relief to a 
party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service 
than by publication as provided by statute.  Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, 
audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, 
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action.

 
 
[¶9]      These were both 
lengthy documents that rambled aimlessly for the most part, although Brown's 
clearly expressed complaint is that the State breached its plea agreement with 
him in the year 2000 by cooperating with the federal authorities, with respect 
to prosecutions against him in Federal court, which arose out of the same 
general facts and circumstances as his State crimes.

 
 
[¶10]   Brown posits, and it is true, that 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide in W.R.Cr.P. 1(a) that:  " In the event that a procedure is not 
established by these rules, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
govern."  However, our examination 
of the W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion will be brief because we are compelled to conclude 
that Rule 1, and Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are not properly invoked by 
Brown in this case.

 
 
[¶11]   On August 7, 2006, Brown added to 
the mix of his pleadings by filing a motion "Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59(b) (or, any 
other applicable rule or statute)."  
W.R.C.P. 59(b) provides for new trials or the amendment of judgments in 
the context of civil litigation. In the context of criminal actions, of course, 
W.R.Cr.P. 33 provides for motions for new trial, and W.R.Cr.P. 34 provides for 
motions in arrest of judgment.  
Although Brown's pleadings have far exceeded the reach of their grasp, we 
get his point.  He thinks he is 
entitled to some sort of substantive relief from the judgment and sentence 
imposed upon him, because the State participated peripherally in the proceedings 
against him in Federal court.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   The subject matter jurisdiction of 
a court is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 6, 
108 P.3d 838, 840 (Wyo. 2005).  The 
proceedings in Brown's state criminal cases reached a point of finality on March 
15, 2000.  Almost five years later 
he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the State court, but he did not 
further pursue that motion.  Taken 
as a whole, the record establishes that Brown did not actively pursue a remedy 
for the asserted breach of his immunity/plea agreement until April 25, 2006, six 
years after his State court sentencing.  
During that six-year period, Brown did not pursue a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, direct appeal, or post-conviction relief 
petition.  Instead, he waited more 
than six years and then attempted to set aside the judgment in his case using an 
inapplicable rule of civil procedure that lacked the capacity to invoke the 
district court's jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶13]   In Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, 
¶¶ 8-13, 51 P.3d 851, 853-54 (Wyo. 2002), we presented this detailed 
discussion of the operative theories that apply in circumstances such as those 
presented by the instant case:

 
 
As 
explained below, this Court's precedent, as well as policy considerations 
including the interest in the finality of criminal decisions, mandate that such 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed after an appeal of right from a 
judgment and sentence has been concluded, cannot be considered by the district 
court because of a lack of jurisdiction over such matters.  Further, because this Court enjoys no 
greater jurisdiction than that of the district court in such matters, this Court 
must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this 
Court.

 
 
ANALYSIS

 
 
            
Rule 32(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses the 
withdrawal of guilty pleas:

 
 
(d)  Plea withdrawal--If a motion for 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason.  
At any later time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice.  

 
 
Although 
this Rule does not, in and of itself, set a time limit for filing such a motion 
with the district court after 
sentencing, such a limit must exist as a logical corollary to the general 
rule that a case becomes final after judgment and sentence is entered and an 
appellate decision affirming the conviction has been made, or the time for 
taking an appeal expires without perfection of an appeal, or after the voluntary 
dismissal of such an appeal.  See Schuler v. State, 771 P.2d 1217, 
1220 (Wyo.1989) (citing Attletweedt v. 
State, 684 P.2d 812 (Wyo.1984); State 
v. Duswalt, 153 N.J.Super. 399, 379 A.2d 1278 (1977)), for the proposition 
that a case is no longer pending after a final judgment (in Wyoming, that is the 
judgment and sentence) has been entered in the trial court.  Unless a specific, express exception is 
created to this general rule by statute or court rule, a district court's 
jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw a plea--or any other motion not 
specifically provided for by statute or rule--ends when the case becomes final 
because of the expiration of the time for taking an appeal.  In sum, once a criminal case becomes 
final pursuant to the general rule, a trial court loses the power to act in that 
case unless it is expressly permitted to do so by statute or court 
rule.

 
 
            
In fact, this Court and the Wyoming Legislature have provided specific 
methods in both statutes and court rules for seeking review of prior and 
otherwise final criminal proceedings.  
With two exceptions, both confined to challenging the jurisdiction of the 
trial court--correcting an illegal sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) and 
state habeas corpus relief pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-27-101 et seq.--all 
available methods contain time limits for taking such actions.  For instance, a motion for sentence 
reduction must be made within one year after the sentence is imposed or 
probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the court of a mandate 
issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one 
year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court denying 
review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction or 
probation revocation.  W.R.Cr.P. 
35(b).  After expiration of that 
period, the district court no longer has jurisdiction to reduce a sentence.  Stewart v. State, 654 P.2d 727 
(Wyo.1982).

 
 
            
Similarly, Wyoming statutes provide two additional 
avenues for presenting a challenge of a conviction to a district court:  by way of the post-conviction relief 
statutes at Wyo. Stat.  Ann. §§ 
7-14-101 through 108, and state habeas corpus relief at Wyo. Stat.  Ann. §§ 1-27-101 through 134.  Review by way of a petition for 
post-conviction relief must be filed within the five-year limitation period, and 
the scope of such review is strictly limited.  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 7-14-103 (LexisNexis 
2001).

 
 
            
Review in a state habeas corpus action is not time limited, but is 
seriously limited in scope so that defendants may only raise a claim going to 
the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the court.  Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 265-67, 93 P. 305, 307-08 (1908).  This remedy is 
also unique in that the petition must be made to the court most convenient in 
distance to the petitioner.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-27-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  
In other words, this particular remedy is not even a continuation of the 
criminal proceeding, but is a separate civil proceeding, so the continuing 
jurisdiction of the district court in the original criminal action is not of 
concern.

 
 
            
In short, except where there has been a remand following an appeal in a 
criminal case, or where one of the statutes or rules mentioned above otherwise 
expressly permits a district court to continue to assert jurisdiction over that 
criminal case, no authority exists for the court to act in the case--and its 
jurisdiction over the case should end--once the defendant's conviction has 
become final because of his exercise or forfeiture of his right to appeal from 
that conviction.  See Frenzel v. State, 938 P.2d 867, 870 
(Wyo.1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 959, 118 S. Ct. 388, 
139 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1997) (recognizing the legislative mandate denying district 
courts jurisdiction to hear a second petition for post-conviction 
relief).

 
 
[¶14]   The remainder of the discussion in 
Nixon bears directly on the matters 
at issue here and we direct our readers' attention to it.  Nixon, ¶¶ 14-29, 51 P.3d  854-59; also see Taylor v. State, 2003 WY 97, 74 P.3d 1236 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   For reasons very much the same as 
those we explained in Nixon and Taylor, we conclude that the district 
court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings filed by Brown which 
are the subject of these appeals.  
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction, we likewise lack 
jurisdiction.  The appeals are 
dismissed, and these matters are remanded to the district court with directions 
that the district court dismiss all of Brown's pleadings for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Furthermore, we 
determine that Brown has exhausted all of his state remedies with respect to the 
convictions at issue in this matter.  
We authorize the district court to decline to permit the filing of any 
further papers from Brown, that relate to these convictions, unless Brown has 
first obtained the consent of the district court for such a filing.  Furthermore, we authorize the clerk of 
this Court to decline to file any papers submitted by Brown that relate to these 
matters without having first obtained the consent of the Court for such a 
filing.  See Amin v. State, 2006 WY 84, ¶¶ 5-7, 
138 P.3d 1143, 1144-45 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Eventually, 
Brown's federal sentences were reduced by 45 months.  United 
States v. Brown, 212 Fed.Appx. 747 
(   
C.A. 10 (Wyo. 
2007)).