Case Title: State v. Dist. Court (Armstrong)

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 84

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion BOF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE
STEFANY ANN MILEY, DISTRICT
JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
BOBBY ARMSTRONG,
Real Party in Interest.

No, 55918

 
         
       
     
     
 
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
 
  
  

FILED

vee 29 2011

Original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenging an order of the district court granting in part the real party in
interest’s motion to preclude the introduction of his blood alcohol test
results in a prosecution for driving under the influence.

Petition denied,

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and

Bruce W. Nelson, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Petitioner.

Daniel J. Albregts, Ltd., and Daniel J. Albregts, Las Vegas; Mueller,
Hinds & Associates and Craig A. Mueller and Michael J. Morey, Las
Vegas,

for Real Party in Interest.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

 
OPINION
By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.:

In this original writ proceeding, we consider the admissibility
of retrograde extrapolation evidence to estimate a defendant's blood
alcohol level at a point in time based on a blood sample taken at a later
point in time. We conclude that although retrograde extrapolation
evidence is relevant in a prosecution for driving under the influence, under
certain circumstances such evidence may be unfairly prejudicial and
therefore inadmissible. Because the prosecution in this case had to rely on
the results from a single blood sample and a number of the factors that
affect the mathematical calculation necessary to a retrograde
extrapolation were unknown, we cannot conclude that the district court
manifestly abused or arbitrarily or capriciously exercised its discretion in
concluding that the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial in this case.
We therefore deny the petition.

EACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘The State charged real party in interest Bobby Armstrong
with driving under the influence causing death and/or substantial bodily
harm under two theories of liability: that he (1) was “under the influence
of intoxicating liquot” or (2) had “a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more
+ blood or breath” and did “any act or noglect{ed] any duty
imposed by law while driving or in actual physical control” of a vehicle.
NRS 484C.430(1) (formerly NRS 484.3795). According to the indictment,

in hi

 

Armstrong was driving when his vehicle collided with another vehicle,
causing substantial bodily harm to the other driver. ‘The collision occurred
at approximately 1:30 in the morning. A single blood sample was taken
from Armstrong at 3:51 a.m., more than two hours after the collision.

2
om a
a

 
That blood sample had an alcohol level of .18. Armstrong filed a pretrial
motion to exclude the blood alcohol test result. He argued that his blood
was drawn outside the statutory two-hour window provided in NRS
484C.430(1)(@)! and that the test was inadmissible because only one blood
sample was obtained, He further argued that the retrograde extrapolation
that the State would have to use to determine his blood alcohol level at the
time he was driving was unreliable and therefore irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial. The State opposed the motion, arguing that retrograde
extrapolation was not required to determine Armstrong's blood alcohol
level at the time of the collision because his alcohol level was sufficiently
high that a jury could determine that it was above .08 while he was
driving, but even if the State were required to do so, any variables in the
retrograde extrapolation go to the weight of that evidence rather than its
admissibility. The State also argued that the blood alcohol test was
admissible to show that Armstrong was driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.

‘After a lengthy evidentiary hearing involving the conflicting
testimony of two expert witnesses, the district court granted Armstrong’s
motion in part. The district court excluded retrograde extrapolation as a
‘means of determining Armstrong's blood alcohol level at the time he was
driving and the numerical result of the blood alcohol test but allowed the
State to present more generalized evidence that the blood test showed the

'The State did not charge Armstrong with a violation under NRS
484C.43001)(¢)..

 

 
presence of alcohol. This original petition for a writ of mandamus
followed.
DISCUSSION

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or
capricious exercise of discretion, see Round Hill Gen, Imp. Dist. v,
Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 634, 636 (1981). The writ will not
issue, however, if a petitioner hi

 

a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law. NRS 34.170. Ultimately, the decision to
entertain an extraordinary writ petition lies within our discretion, and we
must “consider{] whether judicial economy and sound judicial
administration militate for or against issuing the writ,” Redeker v. Dist,
Ct, 122 Nev. 164, 167, 127 P.3d 620, 522 (2006), limited on other grounds
by Hidalgo v, Dist. Ct,, 124 Nev. 330, 341, 184 P.3d 369, 877 (2008),
including whether “an important issue of law needs clarification and
public policy is served by this court’s invocation of its original
jurisdiction,” Diaz v. Dist. Ct,, 116 Nev. 88, 93, 993 P.2d 50, 54 (2000)
(quoting Business Computer Rentals v. State Treas., 114 Nev. 63, 67, 953
P.2d 13, 15 (1998)). The instant petition challenges the district court’s

*The State filed its petition in the alternative, seeking relief in
mandamus or prohibition. Because prohibition is focused on arresting the
proceedings of a district court that is acting in excess of its jurisdiction,
RS 34.320, and the district court here clearly had jurisdiction over the
prosecution and to decide evidentiary issues, we conclude that prohibition
is not the appropriate vehicle for seeking relief in this matter.

 

 
exercise of discretion, and the State has no other remedy at law because it
cannot appeal the final judgment in a criminal case, NRS 177.015(3)
(‘The defendant only may appeal from a final judgment or verdict in a

criminal case.”), Because the petition raises an important issue of law

 

that needs clarification, we exercise our discretion to consider its merits.
‘The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the
district court's sound discretion. Thomas v, State, 122 Nev. 1361, 1370,

148 P.3d 727, 734 (2006). In the context of mandamus, this court

 

considers whether the district court's evidentiary ruling was a manifest

 

abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of its discretion. See NRS 34.16"

 

Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 603-04, 637 P.2d at 636. An arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion is one “founded on prejudice or preference rather
than on reason,” Black's Law Dictionary 119 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“arbitrary”), or “contrary to the evidence or established rules of law,” id, at

239 (defining “capricious”). See generally City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev.
277, 279, 721 P.2d 371, 372 (1986) (concluding that “[a] city board acts

arbitrarily and capriciously when it denies a license without any reason
for doing so”). A manifest abuse of discretion is “a] clearly erroneous
interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of a law or
rule.” Steward v. McDonald, 958 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Ark. 1997); see Jones
Rigging and Heavy Hauling v, Parker, 66 S.W.3d 599, 602 (Ark. 2002)
(stating that a manifest abuse of discretion “is one exercised improvidently
or thoughtlessly and without due consideration”); Blair v. Zoning Hearing
Ha. of Tp. of Pike, 676 A.2d 760, 761 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (“{Mlanifest
abuse of discretion does not result from a mere error in judgment, but

occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or when the judgment

 

 
nen

exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill will”).

‘The evidence at issue in this case involves retrograde
extrapolation, Retrograde extrapolation is a “mathematical calculation
used to estimate a person's blood alcohol level at a particular point in time
by working backward from the time the blood [sample] was taken.” Com,
v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Mass. 2001). The calculation requires
information regarding the rates at which alcohol is absorbed and excreted.
‘Those rates can vary based on a number of factors, including: the amount

of time between a person's last drink and the blood test, the amount and

 

type of alcohol consumed, the time period over which alcohol wa
consumed, and personal characteristics such as age, weight, alcohol
tolerance, and food intake. See Mata v, State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 915-16 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Bagheri_v. State, 87
S.W.3d 657, 660-61 (Tex. App. 2002).

Relevance is the first question in determining whether
retrograde extrapolation evidence is admissible. See NRS 48.025
(providing that “falll relevant evidence is admissible” unless otherwise
excluded by statute or constitutional provision and that “[elvidence which
is not relevant is not admissible’). “[RJelevant evidence’ means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
‘consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than,
it would be without the evidence.” NRS 48.015. The district court appears
to have concluded that retrograde extrapolation evidence had some

 
relevance to the State's theories that Armstrong w:

 

driving under the
influence or had a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit at the
time he was driving.* Although we have not addressed the admissibility of
retrograde extrapolation as a matter of law, we have alluded to its
relevance in prosecutions for driving under the influence. See. e.., Sheriff
v. Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1261, 198 P.3d 826, 335 (2008) (holding that
State was not required to present retrograde extrapolation evidence to
obtain grand jury indictment where grand jury could reasonably infor
from two blood alcohol tests taken within reasonable time after driving
that defendant's blood alcohol concentration was .08 or higher when he
was driving); Anderson v, State, 109 Nev. 1129, 1135, 865 P.2d 318, 321
(1993) (pointing to retrograde extrapolation evidence in concluding that
State presented sufficient evidence to support conviction). We take this
opportunity to expressly recognize the relevance of retrograde
extrapolation evidence. Retrograde extrapolation evidence is relevant to
the two theories of driving under the influence charged in this case, as it,
has a tendency to make the existence of a consequential fact—the level of
alcohol in a defendant's blood at a certain point in time—more probable
than it would be without the evidence.

*The district court's order is not entirely clear on this point, but its
focus on unfair prejudice indicates that the district court determined that
the evidence was relevant since the weighing determination for unfair
prejudice presupposes that the evidence is relevant. See NRS 48.035(1)
(Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . ..")

 

 

 
Having determined that retrograde extrapolation evidence is
relevant, we turn to the second question in determining whether
retrograde extrapolation evidence is admissible: the danger of unfair
prejudice. Under NRS 48.036(1), relevant evidence is inadmissible “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” Because all evidence against a defendant will on some level
“prejudice” (ie., harm) the defense, NRS 48.035(1) focuses on “unfair”
prejudice. This court has defined “unfair prejudice” under NRS 48,035 as
an appeal to “the emotional and sympathetic tendencies of a jury, rather
than the jury's intellectual ability to evaluate evidence.” Krause Inc, v.
Little, 117 Nev. 929, 935, 34 P.3d 566, 570 (2001); Schlotfeldt v. Charter
Hosp. of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 46, 910 P.2d 271, 273 (1996), Although
unfair prejudice commonly refers to decisions based on emotion, it is not so
limited. See_generally Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note
(explaining that unfair prejudice in federal analog to NRS 48.038(1) is an
“undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one”); Tome v, United States, 513
U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (stating that Advisory Committee Notes are helpful
guide to interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence). As the United States
Supreme Court has explained in addressing Federal Rule of Evidence
403,* “[t]he term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to

‘Rule 403 is the federal counterpart to NRS 48.035 and provides:
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

 

 
8

the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder

into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense

charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997); see also
Bhaya_v. Westinghouse Elec, Corp,, 922 F.2d 184, 188 (8d Cir. 1990)

(describing unfair prejudice as “undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis" (internal quotations omitted)); accord People v, Greenlee,
200 P.3d 363, 367 (Colo, 2009) (noting that “[elvidence is unfairly
prejudicial where it introduces into the trial considerations extraneous to
the merits, such as bias, sympathy, anger, or shock”); Camp Takaio, Inc. v,
SimplexGrinnell, L.P., 957 A.2d 68, 72 (Me. 2008) (stating that “unfair
prejudice . .. refers to an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on
an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one”
(quotation and footnote omitted))

Here, the district court’s concern regarding unfair prejudice
centered on the “many unknown variables” in the retrograde extrapolation
calculation coupled with the reliance on a single blood sample. The
suggestion is that the evidence is of limited probative value given those
variables and the single sample, but the evidence itself is likely to move a
jury to declare guilt based solely on a reaction to the blood alcohol level,
and the very real devastation caused by drunk driving rather than proof
that the defendant was driving while under the influence or with a
prohibited blood alcohol level. We, along with other jurisdictions, share
the district court's concern.

Some jurisdictions have determined that the admissibility of
retrograde extrapolation depends on whether enough factors affecting the
calculation are known and have expressed concerns with calculations that

rely solely on average rates of absorption and excretion. For example, in

 
Mata_v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals provided some
guidance by explaining three factors courts should use in evaluating the
reliability of retrograde extrapolation:

(@) the length of time between the offense and the

test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given

and the length of time between each test; and (c)

whether, and if s0, to what extent, any individual

characteristics of the defendant were known to the

expert in providing his extrapolation. These

characteristics and behaviors might include, but

are not limited to, the person's weight and gender,

the person's typical drinking pattern and tolerance

for alcohol, how much the person had to drink on

the day or night in question, what the person

drank, the duration of the drinking spree, the time

of the last drink, and how much and what the

person had to eat either before, during, or after

the drinking.

46 S.W.3d 902, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
Bagheri v. State, 87 S.W.3d 657, 660-61 (Tex. App. 2002). ‘The court
declined to design an “exact blueprint” for all cases and recognized that
not every personal fact about the defendant must be known to construct a
reliable extrapolation—otherwise “no valid extrapolation could ever occur
without the defendant's cooperation, since a number of facts known only to
the defendant are essential to the process.” Id, at 916-17. ‘The court also
indicated that the significance of those personal factors is influenced by
the number of blood alcohol

 

mples obtained and the time between
multiple samples:

If the State had more than one test, each test a
reasonable length of time apart, and the first test
were conducted within a reasonable time from the
time of the offense, thon an expert could
potentially create a reliable estimate of the
defendant's [blood alcohol content] with limited

noe 10
or

 

cara RER SRNR RNA ARISE
Knowledge of personal characteristics and
behaviors. In contrast, a single test conducted
some time after the offense could result in a
reliable extrapolation only if the expert had
Knowledge of many personal characteristics and
behaviors of the defendant. Somewhere in the
middle might fall a case in which there was a
single test a reasonable length of time from the
driving, and two or three personal characteristics
of the defendant were known to the expert. We
cannot and should not determine today the exact
blueprint for reliability in every case. Suffice it to
say that the factors must be balanced.

Id; see also Burns v, State, 298 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. App. 2009)
Goncluding that expert’s testimony was unreliable due to expert's

 

admission that “he knew none of the factors required by Mata when only a

single test is available” and because testimony was unreliable, it wa:

 

irrelevant and “its probative value was greatly outweighed by its
prejudicial effect”); accord Com, v, Petrovich, 648 A.24 771, 73 (Pa. 1994)
(upholding trial court’s conclusion that retrograde extrapolation expert's

testimony was incomplete and olicited “an expert opinion which is

 

necessarily based upon average dissipation rates, average absorption
rates, and the alcohol content of the average drink” (internal quotations
omitted). See generally Kimberly S. Keller, Sobering Up Daubert: Recent
Issues Arising in Alcohol-Related Expert Testimony, 46 S. Tex. L. Rev.

111, 122-29 (2004) (discussing concern in scientific community over the

use of retrograde extrapolation calculations that do not employ factors

that affect individual absorption and elimination rates, including (1) the
type and amount of food in the stomach, (2) gender, (3) weight, (4) age, (6)
‘mental state, (6) drinking pattern at the relevant time, (7) type and

 

 
amount of beverage consumed, and (8) elapsed time between the first and
last drink taken)

We agree that achioving a reliable retrograde extrapolation
calculation requires consideration of a variety of factors. The following
factors are relevant to achieving a sufficiently reliable retrograde
extrapolation calculation: (1) gender, (2) weight, (3) age, (4) height, (6)
mental state, (6) the type and amount of food in the stomach, (7) type and
amount of alcohol consumed, (8) when the last alcoholic drink was
consumed, (9) drinking pattern at the relevant time, (10) elapsed time
between the first and last drink consumed, (11) time elapsed between the
last drink consumed and the blood draw, (12) the number of samples
taken, (13) the length of time between the offense and the blood draws,
(14) the average alcohol absorption rate, and (15) the average elimination
rate. We observe, as the Mata court did, that not every personal fact
about the defendant must be known to construct a reliable extrapolation,
4G S.W.3d at 916-17, but rather those factors must be balanced.

Turning to this case, the State and Armstrong presented
experts who calculated Armstrong's estimated blood alcohol level based
primarily on factors attributed to the “average” person and various
hypothetical situations. The factors used in those calculations included:
Armstrong’s admission to the investigating officer at the scene that he
drank two beers between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m., records indicating that
Armstrong weighed 212 pounds, the time of the accident, the time of the
blood draw, and the blood alcohol level in the single sample (.18). There
was no evidence presented concerning Armstrong's age or height, the type
and amount of food in his stomach, if any, his regular drinking pattern, or

his emotional state after the collision.

 

 
a

Although several of the factors identified above were known,
other significant factors were not and, significantly, only one blood draw

 

obtained. As the Mata court recognized, the significance of personal
factors is influenced by the number of blood alcohol tests. “{A] single test
conducted some time after the offense could result in a reliable
extrapolation only if the expert had knowledge of many personal
characteristics and behaviors of the defendant.” Id, at 916. Here,

significant personal characteristics, such

 

the type and amount of food, if
any, in Armstrong's stomach—a factor that Armstrong's expert testified

was the most important and the Stats

 

expert acknowledged significantly
affects alcohol absorption—were unknown, And the single blood draw
makes it difficult to determine whether Armstrong was absorbing or
eliminating alcohol at the time of the blood draw. The admission of
retrograde extrapolation evidence when a single blood draw was taken
more than two hours after the accident and the extrapolation calculation
is insufficiently tethered to individual factors necessary to achieve a
reliable calculation potentially invites the jury to determine Armstrong's
guilt based on emotion or an improper ground—that the defendant had a
high blood alcohol level several hours later—rather than a meaningful
evaluation of the evidence. Thus, although relevant, the probative value
of the extrapolation evidence could be sufficiently outweighed by this
danger of unfair prejudice to preclude its admission.» Under the

The district court also excluded the blood alcohol level shown in the
test result but allowed the State to present general evidence that there
was alcohol in the blood sample, which was relevant to the State's theory
under NRS 484C.430(1)(a). Admitting the specific blood alcohol level in
continued on next page. .

13.

 
or ae

 

circumstances presented, we cannot say that the district court manifestly
abused or arbitrarily or capriciously exercised its discretion, that is,
applied a clearly erroneous interpretation of the law or one not based on
reason or contrary to the evidence or established rules of law.

We are not unmindful of the State's concerns about
prosecuting offenders for driving under the influence, but the State's
accusations that the district court's order “precludes the state from ever
convicting a drunk driver of having a .08 or more at [the] time of driving”
and “Iegalizes driving under the influence of alcohol so long as a chemical
test is not done within two hours of driving” go a step too far, The State
may present evidence that is relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. NRS
48.025(1); NRS 48.035(1). Although retrograde extrapolation has its place
in proving that a defendant was driving under the influence, it also has
the potential to encourage a conviction based on an improper basis when
the calculation is not sufficiently reliable in a given case. ‘There may be
circumstances consistent with this opinion in which a calculation based on
the results of a single blood sample is reliable and whose relevance is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; that is up to
the district court to determine on a case-by-case basis. But even when

continued

this case, where there was a single blood draw, without extrapolation
testimony could encourage a guilty verdict based on similar improper
grounds as discussed above.

4

 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   

retrograde extrapolation evidence is not admissible, other evidence may
establish that a defendant was driving under the influence as prohibited
by NRS 484C.430(1)(a). See Sheriff v. Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1268, 198
P.3d 826, 333 (2008) (concluding that State presented sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause to believe defendant was driving under the
influence based on testimony about defendant's driving and circumstances
of accident, defendant's smell and physical appearance after accident, and
defendant's admissions about drinking). Because the State has not
demonstrated a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of
discretion in this case, we deny the petition.

 
oe

 

PICKERING, J., with whom HARDESTY, J., agrees, dissenting:

‘The majority's analysis does not distinguish between the
science of retrograde extrapolation and the legal standards by which the
admissibility of expert testimony is judged and, as a resulk, falls into error.
Only one toxicologist, Dr. Hiatt, testified at the hearing on Armstrong's
motion to suppress.! (The other witness, Terry Cook, is a forensic chemist
who tests blood for alcohol content; he does not perform retrograde
extrapolation.) Dr. Hiatt testified that the known facts of this case “fit”
the science of retrograde extrapolation, permitting an inference that, if
Armstrong's blood alcohol level was .18 two hours and 21 minutes after
the collision, it was at least that, and probably higher, at the time the
collision occurred. Such evidence is directly relevant to the charges
Armstrong faces: driving under the influence of alcohol, NRS
484C.430(1)(a), and/or driving with a .08 or greater blood alcohol level,
NRS 484C.430(1)(b), resulting in substantial bodily harm, a category B
felony,

‘The “unknown variables” that led the district court to exclude

Armstrong's test results—variables the majority recasts as “factors” but

 

equally fails to tie to the scienco—might invite unreliable extrapolation in
some cases but, per Dr. Hiatt, this is not such a case. True, there was only
‘one blood draw. If we didn't know whether Armstrong was in the
absorption or the elimination phase when his blood was drawn, that could
render the test scientifically indeterminate and the test results

'Dr. Hiatt holds a B.A. in chemistry from Occidental College, a
Ph.D. in organic chemistry from Yale University, and did significant post-
doctoral work in clinical chemistry at the University of California Medical
Center in San Francisco, He worked for many years as a toxicologist in
Las Vegas before his retirement.

 
inadmissible. Here, however, Dr. Hiatt testified that the known facts,
combined with the science of retrograde extrapolation, put Armstrong
squarely in the elimination phase when his blood was drawn.

‘The known facts on which Dr. Hiatt relies are these: (1)
Armstrong told the police at the scene that he had been drinking beer but
that he stopped drinking at 10 p.m.; (2) the collision occurred at 1:30 a.m.;
and (8) Armstrong traveled by ambulance from the scone to the hospital,
where his blood was drawn at 3:51 a.m, Unless Armstrong lied to the
police—significant in its own right—three and one-half hours elapsed
between the time of his last drink and the collision. And unless the police,

 

the ambulance technicians, or the hospital staff served Armstrong alcohol,
of which there is zero evidence, nearly six hours elapsed between the time
of Armstrong's last drink and the blood draw,

“When a person stops consuming alcohol, his or her body
eventually reaches an absorption point, where the body completes
absorption of the alcohol he or sho has ingested, and enters the
elimination phase, where the body is only eliminating alcohol.” United
States v, Tsosie, 791 F. Supp. 24 1099, 1103 (D.NM. 2011). While a
person's blood alcohol level will rise even after he or she stops drinking,
once the absorption phase ends, the blood alcohol levels decline. Id, The
uncontested evidence presented to the district court established that the
absorption process generally requires one to three hours. Based on
Armstrong's statement to the police that he finished his last drink by 10
p.m., Dr. Hiatt opined that Armstrong had completed his absorption phase
before the collision. His blood alcohol level “should have peaked by [1:30
a.m]. It’s hard to imagine a scenario in which it would not have reached a
peak at the time.”

 
Once a person completes absorption and enters the
elimination phase, blood alcohol levels decline in linear fashion at a rate
ranging from .016 to .02 mg/mL/h (Dr. Hiatt) or .01 to .03 mg/mL/h (Mr.
Cook). Since Armstrong's blood alcohol was .18—more than twice the
logal limit—two hours and 21 minutes after the collision and almost six
hours after he said he took his last drink, Dr. Hiatt was prepared to opine
to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Armstrong's blood level,
at the time of the collision was at least a .08 which, assuming the other
elements of the offense are shown, establishes a violation of NRS
484C.430()@). “[I]f this was a borderline case, IT would not feel
comfortable making these statements, but this is clearly not a borderline
case.” Using Armstrong's 3:51 a.m. blood alcohol level of .18 and Dr.
Hiatt’s .015 elimination rate, and accepting that Armstrong had entered

 

the elimination phase by 1:30 a.m., in fact, yields an approximate blood

 

alcohol level at the time of the collision of 21,

Retrograde extrapolation enjoys “general acceptance in the
scientific community,” Shea v. Royal Enterprises, Inc,, No. 09 Civ. 8709
(THK), 2011 WL 2436709, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2001) (canvassing
cases), and has been recognized as the legitimate subject of expert
testimony in Nevada, Anderson v. State, 109 Nev. 1129, 1135, 865 P.2d
318, 321 (1993); see Sheriff v. Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 198 P.3d 326
(2008), and in state and federal courts across the country, 1 Kenneth S,
Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 205, at 849 (6th ed. 2006) (“arguments
that the extrapolation process itself is so uncertain as to be inadmissible
under [either the] Frye or Daubert [tests for admitting expert testimony]
have not prevailed”). Individual facts in individual cases may make it

 

 

scientifically inappropriate to use a defendant's post-accident blood aleohol

 

 
level to infer his blood alcohol level while driving. Classic examples
include the case of a defendant who continues to drink after the accident
and before the blood draw, skewing his test results, United States v.
DuBois, 645 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1981); the hypothetical defendant who
drinks nothing until seconds before the accident, then “chug-a-lugs” a

  

huge quantity of vodka, and so was just beginning his absorption phase
when he crashed, but see State v, Burgess, 5 A.3d 911, 917-18 (Vt, 2010)

(rejecting hypothetical “chug-a-lug” theory as a basis for excluding blood

 

alcohol results where there was no evidence to support it and the
defendant told the police he had had only had one beer); or where the
blood alcohol test results are close to the legal limit and their relevance
depends on whether the defendant was in the absorption or elimination
phase, of which there is no proof. For a general discussion, see 5 David L.
Faigman, Michael J. Sakes, Joseph Sanders & Edward K. Cheng, Modern
Scientific Evidence: The Law_and Science of Expert Testimony § 41:7
(2010)2

"The majority places great emphasis on Mata v, State, 46 8.W.3d
902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Of critical significance, the expert in Mata did
not know “the length of the drinking spree, the time of the last drink, and
the person's weight,” id, at 915, all of which were established here by
Armstrong or his hospital records. Also significant, Texas requires expert
proof to be by clear and convincing evidence, Morris v, State, 214 8.W.3d
159, 173 (Tex. App. 2007), and Mata has since been limited and held not to
preclude blood test result evidence when expert retrograde extrapolation
testimony is not offered. Bagheri v. State, 329 S.W.3d 23, 27 (Tex. App.
2010). The evidentiary use Bagheri permits is, of course, one of the uses to
which the State wishes to put Armstrong's blood test results here, a point
the majority elides.

 

 
Nothing approaching these situations obtains here. The

 

jon or exclusion of evidence is unquestionably entrusted to the
sound discretion of the district court. See Williams v. Dist, Ct,, 127 Nev.
262 P.3d 360, 364 (2011). Nonetheless, the majority has elected

admi

 

to accopt writ review in this case and to affirm a decision that misapplies

 

 

established law recognizing the admissibility, in proper circumstances, of
blood test result and retrograde extrapolation evidence in DUI cases. My
research shows no other case to have excluded such evidence on
comparable facts and a number that have deemed it scientifically reliable
and admissible. State v, Patterson, 708 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)
(canvassing cases); State v. Burgess, 5 A.3d 911 (Vt. 2010); United States
v. Cope, No. 11-cr-00106-JRT, 2011 WL 2491288 (D. Colo. June 17, 2011);
United States v. Tsosie, 791 F. Supp. 24 1099 (D.N.M. 2011). Where, as
here, an evidentiary issue concerning expert testimony presents questions
of law as well as discretion, and is of significant importance to the
administration of justice, this court has not hesitated to grant writ relief.
Williams, 127 Nev. at __, 262 P.3d at 364-65. Because I would grant writ,
relief in this case and direct the district court to admit the evidence it has
suppressed, I respectfully dissent.

ul 4
Pickering

I concur:

Hardesty