Case Title: State v. Langdon

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44978

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 9, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
	v.
DARYL WAYNE LANGDON,
(CC 95-04-32422; CA A94048; SC S44978)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 3, 1998.
	Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the petition was
Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.  With him on the brief was David
E. Groom, Public Defender.
	Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the response and brief for respondent
on review.  With him on the response and brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General,
Salem.
	Before, Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**
	CARSON, C.J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,
	 151 Or App 640, 950 P2d 410 (1997).
	**Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
The issue in this criminal case is whether consecutive
sentences imposed under Ballot Measure 11, adopted by the people
in 1994, Or Laws 1995, ch 2, § 1, are subject to the limitation
on incarceration terms prescribed by the Oregon Felony Sentencing
Guidelines (sentencing guidelines). (1)  The Court of Appeals
concluded that Measure 11 sentences are not subject to those
limitations.  State v. Langdon, 151 Or App 640, 950 P2d 410
(1997).  For the reasons that follow, we agree.  We therefore
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I. INTRODUCTION
We begin by reviewing the statutes upon which defendant
relies.
A.   Felony Sentencing Guidelines
In 1985, the legislature created the Oregon Criminal
Justice Council (Council) to develop a series of sentencing
guidelines. (2)  Or Laws 1985, ch 558, § 2.  The Council developed
the Felony Sentencing Guidelines, which apply to most felonies
and employ a grid system that prescribes presumptive sentences
based upon the seriousness of the current crime (the vertical
axis) and the offender's criminal history (the horizontal axis). 
OAR 213-004-0001.  The intersection of the two axes establishes
the presumptive sentence for the offense.  OAR 213-003-0001(16). 
The sentencing court may depart upward or downward from that
presumptive sentence, based upon aggravating or mitigating
factors.  OAR 213-008-0001.  Although the sentencing guidelines
were created as administrative rules, the legislature approved
them in 1989, giving them the authority of statutory law.  Or
Laws 1989, ch 790, § 87.    
In addition to establishing a system of presumptive and
departure sentences, the sentencing guidelines also impose two
limitations upon incarceration terms when multiple sentences are
imposed consecutively.  Those limitations often are referred to
as the "200-percent rule" and the "400-percent rule."  The 200-percent rule, set out in OAR 213-012-0020(2)(b), applies to
presumptive sentences that are being imposed consecutively and
states that 
"[t]he total incarceration term of the consecutive
sentences, including the incarceration term for the
primary offense, shall not exceed twice the maximum
presumptive incarceration term * * * of the primary
sentence except by departure as provided by [the 400-percent rule]."  
The "primary offense" is the offense with the highest crime-seriousness ranking under the guidelines.  OAR 213-003-0001(17).  
Thus, under the 200-percent rule, "no matter how many convictions
arise out of a single case, if any of the sentences are imposed
to run consecutively, the total incarceration term for all of the
convictions combined may not exceed twice the maximum presumptive
incarceration term for the primary offense, except by departure." 
State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 492, 847 P2d 834 (1993). 
The 400-percent rule is set out in OAR 213-008-0007(3)
and applies when the consecutive sentences that are being imposed
are not solely presumptive sentences but, instead, include one or
more departure sentences.  The 400-percent rule states:  
"When a departure sentence is imposed for any
individual offense sentenced consecutively, the
incarceration term of that departure sentence shall not
exceed twice the maximum incarceration term that may be
imposed for that offense as provided in [the 200-percent rule]. * * *"
In Davis, 315 Or at 493, this court explained the operation of
the 400-percent rule:
	"First, the sentencing judge must calculate the
presumptive incarceration term for each conviction
without departure, applying [the 200-percent rule]. 
These presumptive incarceration terms are limited by
the 200 percent rule, i.e., they cannot exceed 200
percent of the presumptive incarceration term for the
primary offense.  After calculating those terms, the
judge may impose a departure sentence on any or all of
the individual convictions.  Under [the 400-percent
rule], however, the incarceration term of each departure sentence may not exceed twice the presumptive
incarceration term already determined for that offense
under [the 200-percent rule].  Because these
presumptive incarceration terms will have been limited
already by operation of the 200 percent rule, the
maximum incarceration term that may be imposed for all
the consecutive sentences together by departure cannot
exceed four times the maximum presumptive incarceration
term of the primary offense. * * *"  
(Footnote omitted.)   
Thus, the sentencing guidelines set out the following
methodology for imposing consecutive departure sentences:  The
trial court initially must determine the presumptive sentence for
each offense.  In the process of determining those sentences, the
trial court must, if it wishes to impose some sentences
consecutively, apply the 200-percent rule to determine whether
the total incarceration term exceeds twice the maximum
presumptive sentence for the primary offense.  If the
incarceration term violates the 200-percent rule, then the trial
court must adjust the sentences as necessary to bring the total
incarceration term within the 200-percent limitation.  We refer
to presumptive sentences that the court has adjusted, if
necessary, to comply with the 200-percent rule as "adjusted
presumptive sentences."  
The court next must consider each adjusted presumptive
sentence separately and determine whether a departure sentence is
warranted.  When determining departure sentences, the trial court
must apply the 400-percent rule, reviewing each departure
sentence separately to ensure that it does not exceed twice the
adjusted presumptive sentence for that offense under the
calculations made earlier under the 200-percent rule.  
B.   Measure 11
Measure 11 prescribes mandatory minimum sentences for
certain felony offenses.  Subsection (1) of Measure 11 provides,
in part:
"When a person is convicted of one of the offenses
listed in subsection (2) of this section and the
offense was committed on or after April 1, 1995, the
court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at
least the entire term of imprisonment listed in
subsection 2 [sic].  The person is not, during the
service of the term of imprisonment, eligible for
release on post-prison supervision or any form of
temporary leave from custody.  The person is not
eligible for any reduction in the sentence for any
reason whatsoever under ORS 421.120, 421.121[ (3)] or any
other statute.  The court may impose a greater sentence
if otherwise permitted by law, but may not impose a
lower sentence than the sentence specified in Section 2
[sic]. * * *"  	 
Or Laws 1995, ch 2, § 1.  Thus, Measure 11 expressly states that
its minimum sentences may not be reduced for any reason. 
II.  FACTS
Defendant was convicted of and sentenced for two counts
of first-degree kidnapping, ORS 163.235 (counts one and two); one
count of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, ORS 163.411
(count three); two counts of attempted first-degree sodomy, ORS
163.405 (counts four and five); one count of first-degree sexual
abuse, ORS 163.427 (count six); and one count of fourth-degree
assault, ORS 163.160 (count seven).  Defendant's convictions on
counts one through six were subject to sentencing under the
sentencing guidelines.  Defendant's convictions on counts one,
two, three, and six also were subject to mandatory minimum
sentences under Measure 11.  Defendant's conviction on count
seven was not subject to the sentencing guidelines or Measure 11
and is not at issue on review.    
Under ORS 137.637, when a statute mandates a sentence
of imprisonment, the trial court must impose that mandatory
sentence or the sentence prescribed under the sentencing
guidelines, whichever is longer. (4)  For each of defendant's
convictions to which Measure 11 applied, the Measure 11 sentence
was longer than the corresponding sentence under the guidelines. 
The trial court imposed Measure 11 sentences of 90 months each on
counts one and two, 100 months on count three, and 75 months on
count six.  The court then imposed a presumptive, 17-month
sentence on each of counts four and five under the sentencing
guidelines.  The court ordered the sentences on counts one,
three, five, and six to be served consecutively, and the
sentences on counts two, four, and seven to be served
concurrently.  Defendant's total incarceration term was 282
months, 265 of which were attributable to Measure 11 sentences.   
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
in ordering that his sentences on counts two, three, five, and
six be served consecutively, because the resulting 282-month
sentence violated both the 200-percent and 400-percent rules.  
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by observing that the
200-percent rule applies only to presumptive sentences and the
400-percent rule applies only to departure sentences.  The court
then concluded that Measure 11 sentences were neither presumptive
sentences nor departure sentences and, accordingly, were not
subject to either the 200-percent or the 400-percent rule. 
Langdon, 151 Or App at 646-47.  
Although the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's
argument that the 200-percent and 400-percent rules apply to
Measure 11 sentences, the court held that the trial court had
violated the 200-percent rule by ordering that defendant's 17-month sentence, imposed under the sentencing guidelines, be
served consecutively to his Measure 11 sentences.  Because the
200-percent rule imposed a limit of 120 months on defendant's
consecutive sentences, and defendant's Measure 11 sentences alone
amounted to 265 months, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court's consecutive imposition of the 17-month sentence
violated the 200-percent rule.  Id. at 648.  According to the
Court of Appeals, although the 200-percent rule does not limit
the incarceration term of consecutive sentences under Measure 11,
a sentencing court must include the term imposed under Measure 11
in its calculations when determining whether sentences imposed
under the sentencing guidelines violate the 200-percent rule. (5) 
Id. at 647.  The court remanded for resentencing, instructing
that the incarceration term could not exceed the term of 265
months required under Measure 11.  Id. at 648. 
III.  DISCUSSION
  On review, defendant again argues that the trial court
lacked the authority to impose his Measure 11 sentences
consecutively because his total incarceration term exceeded that
permitted by the 400-percent rule.  He argues that the 400-percent rule applies to Measure 11 because Measure 11 sentences
are -- in his view -- "departure" sentences.  Defendant observes
that the 400-percent rule applies to all "departure" sentences,
which the sentencing guidelines define as sentences that are
"inconsistent with the presumptive sentence for an offender." 
OAR 213-003-0001(5).  Defendant argues that Measure 11 sentences
are inconsistent with presumptive sentences because Measure 11
and the presumptive sentencing system always will prescribe
sentences of different durations.  That being the case, defendant
continues, Measure 11 sentences must be departure sentences and,
therefore, are subject to the 400-percent rule.
The state responds that Measure 11 sentences are not
departure sentences and, alternatively, that, even if they were,
Measure 11 sentences are not subject to the 400-percent rule
because Measure 11 expressly forbids a reduction of its minimum
sentences.  It follows, the state argues, that, if defendant's
characterization of Measure 11 sentences as departure sentences
is correct, then Measure 11 would irreconcilably conflict with
the 400-percent rule.  If that is the case, the state concludes,
then Measure 11, as the later-enacted statutory provision,
amended the sentencing guidelines by implication and, therefore,
controls the outcome in this case.  
Defendant concedes that Measure 11 would not be subject
to the 400-percent rule if a conflict exists between the two
sentencing schemes because, "[i]f such were the case, the
provision enacted last in time -- Measure 11 -- would impliedly
amend the first-in-time provision -- the 400 percent rule." 
However, according to defendant, no conflict exists between
Measure 11 and the 400-percent rule, because a trial court is
authorized to comply with the 400-percent rule by imposing
Measure 11 sentences concurrently.  He points out that Measure 11
does not address whether its mandatory sentences may be imposed
concurrently or consecutively.  Defendant argues: 
	"* * * Measure 11 is completely silent about
consecutive sentences.  Its text only addresses
individual prison sentences for individual crimes, by
requiring that minimum prison sentences be imposed and
served. * * * 
"* * * * * 
"Measure 11 and the 400 percent rule can be
harmonized to say that[,] if imposing a Measure 11
sentence consecutively would violate the 400 percent
rule, the Measure 11 sentence still must be imposed and
served.  It is just that it must be imposed and served
as a concurrent sentence. * * *"
(Emphasis in original.)  Thus, the necessary premise for
defendant's argument that Measure 11 does not conflict with the
400-percent rule is that, as a matter of mechanics, when
consecutively imposed Measure 11 sentences result in an excessive
incarceration term, a trial court must adjust the length of that
term by changing the offending sentence so that it runs
concurrently.  Under defendant's view, if a trial court intends
to impose multiple departure sentences consecutively, then it
must consider the total incarceration term that would result.  If
that term exceeds 400 percent of the primary offense, then,
according to defendant, the court must reduce the total
incarceration term by imposing one or more of the departure
sentences concurrently. 
To determine how the 400-percent rule operates with
respect to Measure 11 sentences, we apply the familiar
methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Our first level analysis is
to examine both the text and context of the statute.  Id. at 610. 
Context includes other provisions of the same statute and other
related statutes.  If the legislature's intent is clear from that
inquiry into text and context, then further inquiry is
unnecessary.  Id. at 611.  Here the inquiry is whether the 400-percent rule and Measure 11 can coexist.  The state argues that
they cannot and, therefore, Measure 11 impliedly amended the 400-percent rule.  We turn to that inquiry.
To determine whether Measure 11 impliedly amended the
400-percent rule, we must determine whether there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the statute and the rule. 
"[W]hen the legislature enacts a subsequent statute which is
repugnant to or in conflict with a prior statute, but contains no
language expressly repealing the prior statute, the prior statute
is impliedly repealed."  State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 160, 630
P2d 796 (1981).  Repeal by implication is not favored and must be
established by "plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable
repugnancy."  Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
As discussed, the 400-percent rule states:
"When a departure sentence is imposed for any
individual offense sentenced consecutively, the
incarceration term of that departure sentence shall not
exceed twice the maximum incarceration term that may be
imposed for that offense as provided in [the 200-percent rule]. * * *"
That rule makes no reference to the total incarceration term of
all departure sentences imposed consecutively.  Instead, from its
references to a departure sentence in the singular, i.e., "a
departure sentence," "that departure sentence," and "the maximum
incarceration term that may be imposed for that offense", it is
clear that the limitation imposed by the rule applies separately
to the incarceration term of each departure sentence.  In other
words, the 400-percent rule does not limit the total
incarceration term that a trial court may impose by sentencing
consecutively but, instead, limits how far a trial court can
depart from each adjusted presumptive sentence prescribed by the
200-percent rule.  
The foregoing is an important distinction between the
limit imposed by the 400-percent rule and the limit imposed by
the 200-percent rule, which limits the total incarceration term
when the court imposes multiple sentences consecutively. (6)  In
arguing that the 400-percent rule imposes a limit on the total
incarceration term, defendant fails to recognize that
distinction. (7)  The fact that a trial court must evaluate each
departure sentence separately under the 400-percent rule is
significant -- and demonstrates why defendant's argument must
fail -- because it leaves a trial court with only one method to
make an excessive departure sentence comply with the rule:  By
reducing the length of the excessive departure sentence.  That is
so, because a court cannot reduce a departure sentence that more
than doubles the adjusted presumptive sentence for that offense
by changing that sentence so that it runs concurrently.  
A simple hypothetical example demonstrates this point. 
Suppose that a trial court sentences a defendant to serve several
consecutive sentences and that the adjusted presumptive sentence
for one of those offenses under the 200-percent rule is 25
months.  Suppose further that the trial court imposes a departure
sentence of 60 months for that offense.  That departure sentence
would violate the 400-percent rule, because 60 months is more
than twice the adjusted presumptive sentence of 25 months.  If,
consistent with defendant's argument, the trial court attempted
to "adjust" that 60-month departure sentence by changing it to
run concurrently with another sentence, then the length of that
incarceration term still would exceed twice the 25-month adjusted
presumptive sentence. (8)  Thus, the only way that the trial court
could modify that 60-month sentence to make it less than twice
the 25-month adjusted presumptive sentence would be to reduce the
length of that departure sentence so that it is not longer than
50 months.  
We have considered the context of the 400-percent rule,
but find nothing in the context that casts doubt on our reading
of the rule.  Thus, we conclude that the 400-percent rule
requires trial courts to modify each departure sentence that
violates the rule by reducing the length of that sentence, not by
changing its consecutive status.  We now turn to the text of
Measure 11.
As discussed, Measure 11 provides, in part:
"When a person is convicted of one of the offenses
listed in subsection (2) of this section and the
offense was committed on or after April 1, 1995, the
court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at
least the entire term of imprisonment listed in
subsection 2 [sic].  The person is not, during the
service of the term of imprisonment, eligible for
release on post-prison supervision or any form of
temporary leave from custody.  The person is not
eligible for any reduction in the sentence for any
reason whatsoever * * *.  The court may impose a
greater sentence if otherwise permitted by law, but may
not impose a lower sentence than the sentence specified
in Section 2 [sic]. * * *"  	    
Or Laws 1995, ch 2, § 1.  In three separate instances, Measure 11
addresses the subject of the reduction of its minimum sentences. 
First, it states that "the court shall impose, and the person
shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment listed in
subsection 2 [sic]."  Second, it states that a prisoner "is not
eligible for any reduction in the sentence for any reason
whatsoever * * *."  Finally, Measure 11 states that "[t]he court
may impose a greater sentence if otherwise permitted by law, but
may not impose a lower sentence than the sentence specified in
Section 2 [sic]."  Those provisions demonstrate that Measure 11
prohibits any reduction of its sentences. 
IV.  CONCLUSION
We have concluded that the 400-percent rule requires a
trial court to reduce the length of sentences that violate its
limitation.  We also have concluded that Measure 11 prohibits the
reduction of its sentences in any respect.  Read together, those
conclusions demonstrate that, even if we were to accept
defendant's argument that Measure 11 sentences are departure
sentences, Measure 11 and the 400-percent rule would conflict
irreconcilably.  In such a case, Measure 11, as the statute
enacted later in time, would impliedly amend the 400-percent
rule.  Therefore, we conclude that the 400-percent rule does not
limit Measure 11 sentences.  Accordingly, we reject defendant's
argument that the trial court in this case lacked the authority
to impose defendant's Measure 11 sentences consecutively.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.

1. 	Measure 11 now is codified as ORS 137.700.  Although
the legislature amended Measure 11 in June of 1995, Or Laws 1995,
ch 421, § 1; Or Laws 1995, ch 422, § 47, we apply the version in
effect on April 16, 1995, the date of defendant's crime.

2. 	The legislature later restructured the Council and
renamed it the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission.  Or Laws 1995,
ch 420, § 1.

3. 	ORS 421.120 and ORS 421.121 allow for reductions in
prison terms for good behavior and are not relevant to the issue
in this case.

4. 	ORS 137.637 provides: 
"When a determinate sentence of imprisonment is
required or authorized by statute, the sentence imposed
shall be the determinate sentence or the sentence as
provided by the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission, whichever is longer."

5. 	That part of the Court of Appeals' decision is not
before us on review.

6. 	Simply because the 200-percent rule limits the total
incarceration term of consecutive sentences does not, by itself,
establish that any adjustment under the 200-percent rule must be
made by changing consecutive sentences so that they run
concurrently, as the Court of Appeals has concluded.  Langdon,
151 Or App at 647.  However, that part of the Court of Appeals'
decision is not before us on review.

7. 	To some extent, it is understandable that defendant
mistakenly believes that the 400-percent rule imposes a limit on
the total incarceration term, because the shorthand title "400-percent rule" itself is misleading.  That shorthand title
suggests that the rule operates to ensure that the total
incarceration term never exceeds 400 percent of the primary
offense.  Although it is true that the 400-percent rule has that
practical effect, that is so only because the rule operates in
reference to presumptive sentences that the court already has
adjusted under the 200-percent rule.  Because the rule prevents
trial courts from more than doubling each of those adjusted
presumptive sentences, as a matter of arithmetic, the rule never
will allow a total incarceration term that exceeds 400 percent of
the primary offense.  See Davis, 315 Or at 493 (discussing
mechanics of the 200-percent and 400-percent rules).

8. 	Even if the trial court in our hypothetical example
originally had not imposed the sentence consecutively, by more
than doubling a presumptive sentence, the departure sentence
would violate OAR 213-008-0003(2), which mirrors the limit in the
400-percent rule, but applies to any departure sentence imposed
concurrently or as a single sentence.  OAR 213-008-0003(2)
provides that "[a] durational departure from a presumptive prison
term shall not total more than double the maximum duration of the
presumptive prison term."