Case Title: ANDERSEN v. TWO DOT RANCH, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-67

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANDERSEN v. TWO DOT RANCH, INC.2002 WY 10549 P.3d 1011Case Number: 00-67Decided: 07/12/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

KATHY 
A. ANDERSEN, as Personal Representative

of 
the Estates of Jared Steffen, Decedent, and

Robert 
Dean Yates, Decedent; and

JODY 
McCAMPBELL, Individually and as

Conservator 
for Caleb Steffen, a Minor Child, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

v.

TWO 
DOT RANCH, INC., a Wyoming corporation;

and 
MARIA LOPEZ HERNANDEZ, 

Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

L. B. 
Cozzens of Cozzens, Warren & Harris, P.L.L.P., Billings, Montana; Matthew F. 
McLean of Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, P.L.L.P., Billings, 
Montana; and Stephen L. Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, 
Wyoming 

Representing 
Appellee Two Dot Ranch:

 Cody 
L. Balzer of Balzer Carman Murdock, P.C., Casper, Wyoming  

Representing 
Appellee Hernandez:

            
Katherine L. Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming 

Representing 
Amicus Curiae Wyoming Stock Growers Association and Wyoming Wool Growers 
Association:

Harriet 
M. Hageman and Kara Brighton of Hageman & Brighton, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Three vehicles 
collided with a cow on a state highway in an area posted as open range resulting in two 
fatalities.  The plaintiffs,1 representing the deceased and 
surviving passengers of the third vehicle, sued Two Dot Ranch, Inc. (Two Dot), 
the owner of the cow, and Maria Lopez Hernandez, the driver of the second 
vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants.  We affirm the summary judgment on the 
claims against Two Dot because allowing livestock on an unfenced highway in 
posted open range is not evidence of negligence.  We reverse the summary judgment in favor 
of Ms. Hernandez because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the 
care she exercised in warning other motorists of the danger and remand the case 
for further proceedings.

ISSUES

[¶2]      We restate the 
issues presented by the parties as follows:

1.  In 
light of Wyoming's historical adherence to the open range doctrine and statutory 
provisions regulating grazing and pasturing of livestock, does a livestock owner 
owe a duty of care to protect the motoring public by preventing his livestock 
from wandering onto an unfenced road in a posted open 
range?

2.  If 
there is such a duty, did genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the 
reasonableness of Two Dot's actions which precluded summary judgment? 

3.  Did 
genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment with regard to 
the reasonableness of Ms. Hernandez's efforts to warn other motorists of the 
dead cow in the road?

FACTS

[¶3]      Pursuant to our 
standard of review for summary judgments, we recite the facts from the vantage 
point most favorable to the plaintiffs, as the party opposing the motions, 
awarding them all the favorable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. 
S & G Investors, LLC v. Blackley, 
994 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 2000). 

[¶4]      Highway 294 
connects the highway from Belfry, Montana, to Cody, Wyoming, with the highway 
from Cody, Wyoming, to Powell, Wyoming.  
Portions of Highway 294 run through Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land 
commonly known as the North Badlands pasture.  Two Dot operates a ranch headquartered 
about seventeen miles north of Cody and grazes livestock on land leased from the 
BLM in addition to its own land.  
The accident occurred on the stretch of Highway 294 which runs through 
the North Badlands pasture.  This 
area is open range and, accordingly, unfenced.  Signs notify travelers that livestock 
may be on the road.

[¶5]      Two Dot had 
historically leased the North Badlands pasture; however, in 1994 the BLM decided 
to restrict grazing in that area to rejuvenate the pasture.  Two Dot continued to maintain cattle in 
adjoining, fenced pastures.  On May 
4, 1994, a range management specialist for the BLM discovered approximately 
thirty-seven head of Two Dot's black Angus cattle in the North Badlands 
pasture.  The cattle appeared to 
have escaped from the adjoining pasture through a gate with a broken lock.  Although Two Dot did not have permission 
at the time to graze its cattle in the North Badlands pasture, it had an 
informal agreement with the BLM which allowed it 
to remove stray livestock without penalty if accomplished in a timely 
manner.  After repairing the lock on 
May 4, 1994, the BLM agent informed Two Dot of the unconfined 
cattle.

[¶6]      Four days later, 
on the evening of May 8, 1994, the cattle were still in the North Badlands 
pasture.  Dennis and Betty Wagner 
were traveling west on Highway 294 at approximately 9:00 p.m. when they 
encountered a group of black Angus cattle on the road.  Despite taking evasive maneuvers, the 
Wagners hit one of the cows.  Their vehicle was still operable, so they continued 
on to their residence in Clark.  
There is some dispute as to where the Wagners left the cow which may 
still have been alive when they left the scene.  Mr. Wagner testified the cow was on the 
right shoulder along the edge of the highway when they drove away.  However, after returning home, Mrs. 
Wagner called the sheriff's office to report the accident and stated there was 
"a dead cow in the middle of the road."

[¶7]      Later that night, 
Ms. Hernandez and her family left Clark traveling east on Highway 294.  Ms. Hernandez encountered the cow lying 
in the middle of the road.  Since 
the black cow blended with the road and the night, she was unable to avoid 
hitting it.

[¶8]      Meanwhile, Robert 
Yates, his girlfriend Jody McCampbell, and her children Jared and Caleb Steffen 
were also traveling east on Highway 294 some distance behind the Hernandez 
vehicle.  The parties dispute what 
happened next.  Ms. Hernandez 
claimed that all her passengers were still in her vehicle when the third vehicle 
struck the cow.  Ms. McCampbell, 
however, stated that, as they approached the scene, a boy waving his arms 
appeared in their lane of travel.  
Mr. Yates, who was driving the third vehicle, moved into the other lane 
to avoid the boy and collided with the cow.  At the scene, Ms. Hernandez apparently 
made statements to police officers which indicated she had sent her son Anthony 
to warn oncoming traffic although she now denies making any such statements. Mr. 
Yates and Jared died as a result of the injuries they sustained in the 
accident.  Ms. McCampbell and Caleb 
were injured but 
survived.

[¶9]      The plaintiffs 
filed suit claiming negligence against Two Dot, the Wagners,2 and Ms. Hernandez.  Two Dot and Ms. Hernandez successfully 
moved for summary judgment.  The 
district court ruled in favor of Ms. Hernandez concluding there was insufficient 
evidence to determine whether she, or her son at her direction, acted 
unreasonably in attempting to warn oncoming traffic.  The court noted there was insufficient 
evidence to determine where Anthony was in relation to the cow or where the cow 
was located on the road when the third vehicle hit it.  From that, the district court determined 
a jury could not reasonably conclude Ms. Hernandez acted in an unreasonable 
manner.  The district court also 
granted Two Dot's motion for summary judgment concluding no duty was owed to motorists traveling through open range.  The plaintiffs appealed to this 
court.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶10]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist 
Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the 
parties have asserted.  Bachmeier v. Hoffman, 1 P.3d 1236, 1240 
(Wyo. 2000).  We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and 
we give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may fairly 
be drawn from the record.  Id.  
We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower 
court.  Scherer Construction, LLC, 2001 WY 23, 
¶15.  We do not accord any deference 
to the district court's decision on issues of law.  Id.

DISCUSSION

Two Dot 
Ranch

[¶11]   In order to maintain a claim of 
negligence, a plaintiff must prove that "the defendant was under a duty of care 
to protect the plaintiff from injury; the defendant breached that duty; the 
plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss; and the defendant's breach of the duty 
proximately caused the injury or loss."  
Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d 153, 156 (Wyo. 1999). We must determine whether Two Dot owed any duty of care to 
protect the plaintiffs from suffering injury as a result of colliding with 
livestock wandering on an unfenced roadway in posted open range.  "[W]hether a duty exists and the scope 
of that duty are questions of law for the court."  Kobos By and Through Kobos v. Everts, 
768 P.2d 534, 541 (Wyo. 1989); see 
also Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Wyo. 1983).  If no 
duty is established, there is no actionable claim of negligence.  Davis v. Black Hills Trucking, Inc., 929 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶12]   The district court concluded there 
was no duty because the accident occurred in an open range3 area.  The plaintiffs argue the open range 
doctrine does not excuse a livestock owner from the exercise of reasonable care 
in pasturing his cattle and applies only to claims for damage caused by trespass 
of the livestock, thus questioning its relevance to this case.  Two Dot counters that the open range 
doctrine effectively immunizes it from any claims of negligence arising from 
pasturing its cattle in open range.  
The Wyoming Stock Growers Association and the 
Wyoming Wool Growers Association, through their amicus brief, assert a duty of ordinary 
care already applies to both "enclosed" and "open range" livestock owners.  However, they maintain the plaintiffs 
are seeking a new and much broader duty which would require that all owners 
prevent their livestock from being on open range roadways or be held liable in 
negligence for failing to do so.  

[¶13]   This is an issue of first 
impression, which is striking considering the historical prominence of the 
livestock industry in this state.  
We note, "in Wyoming, the common law of negligence creates a general duty 
to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all 
the circumstances.'" Hill v. Park County 
By and Through Board of County Commissioners, 856 P.2d 456, 459 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 411 (Wyo. 1983)); see also 
Vassos v. Roussalis,  625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981) ("The 
standard is fixed as that which is required of a reasonable person in the light 
of all the circumstances.  Some 
circumstances have acquired particular legal significance which make it possible 
for the court to fix a more specific standard" (citations omitted)).4  Further, this court has long held that 
"common law is the law of Wyoming unless abrogated by statute."  Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 
1987). 

Statutes 
are not to be construed as changing the common law unless the purpose to effect 
such change is clearly expressed therein.  
To have such effect "the language (of the statute) must be clear, 
unambiguous, and peremptory."  Meek v. Pierce, 19 Wis. 300, 303.  That rule has been consistently adhered 
to ever since it was so stated in the case cited.

Unemployment 
Compensation Commission of Wyoming v. Mathews, 56 
Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111, 116 (1941); see 
also Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 
207, 73 P.2d 953, 961 (1937); Zancanelli 
v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 987 (1918).  Absent a manifestation of legislative 
intent to repeal a common-law rule, statutes should be construed as consistent 
with the common law.  Carrow Company v. Lusby, 804 P.2d 747, 
750 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc).  

[¶14]   Under English common law, the owner 
or possessor of livestock was strictly liable for damages resulting from their 
trespasses.  Hecht v. Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279, 40 P. 306, 308 (1895); 7 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 21:32 
(1990).  However, the owner of 
livestock had no duty to keep his animals off the public highways.  7 Speiser, The American Law of Torts, supra at § 21:34; James L. Rigelhaupt, 
Jr., Liability of owner of animal for 
damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from 
collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 29 A.L.R. 
4th 431, 439 (1984).  
Liability attached to the owner of livestock only where he knew the 
animal had a dangerous propensity or trait or unless he should reasonably have 
anticipated that injury would result from the situation. Id.  The "fence in" rule is the prevalent 
legal doctrine in the high population density states of the Eastern United 
States.  See generally Fogle v. Malvern Courts, 
Inc., 722 A.2d 680, 682-83 (Pa. 1999); Byram v. Main, 523 A.2d 1387, 1389 (Me. 
1987); Johnson v. Robinson, 162 N.W.2d 161, 162-63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968); Nixon v. Harris, 238 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 
(Ohio 1968). In the American West, the common-law "fence in rule" was generally 
rejected in favor of an open range or "fence out" rule because of the unique 
physical and demographic characteristics of the area.  Garretson v. Avery, 26 Wyo. 53, 176 P. 433, 434 (1918).  This court has not 
had the opportunity to apply the open range doctrine, or "fence out" rule, in a 
situation where personal injury is caused by a collision with livestock on a 
public highway in posted open range.  
Likewise, no specific statute addresses the respective liability of the 
parties in this type of situation.  
Consequently, we must determine how our common law, developed in concert 
with our statutes governing the control of livestock on public highways, should 
be applied in this context.

[¶15]   Dating from Wyoming's territorial 
days, the legislature has methodically enacted statutes which impact the 
common-law rules relating to animals running at large.  The territorial legislature enacted 
Wyoming's first "lawful fence" statute (Fence Out Statute) in 1869 which firmly 
rejected the common-law "fence in" rule.5  
1869 Wyo. Gen. Laws ch. 58.  
It provided, through various sections, the specifications for 
construction of a lawful fence, maintenance of joint partition fences, restraint 
and custody of breaching animals, and, most importantly to the instant 
discussion, liability for breach.  
This latter provision set forth:

Any 
person or persons owning or having in his or her or their possession or charge, 
any horses, mules, cattle, or any one of such animals, which shall breach over 
or under, or breach into any lawful inclosure belonging to any person or persons 
other than the owners of such animal or animals, such person or persons owning 
or having in charge or possession such breaching animal or animals shall be 
liable to the party or parties sustaining such injury, for all damages he, she, 
or they may have sustained by reason of such breaching as aforesaid, to be 
recovered in a civil action before any court having jurisdiction thereof or by 
arbitration . . . .

1869 
Wyo. Gen. Laws ch. 58, § 3.  The 
Fence Out Statute established the full liability of livestock owners for all 
damages caused by livestock breaching a "lawful fence," not just for damages to 
property.  It is notable that this 
provision has remained essentially unchanged since its enactment.6 

[¶16]   The rejection of the common-law 
"fence in" rule, in favor of the "fence out" open range doctrine, is well 
reflected in Wyoming case law and is perhaps most succinctly stated in Martin v. Platte Valley Sheep Co., 12 
Wyo. 432, 76 P. 571, 574 (1904) (emphasis added):

The 
common-law rule requiring the owner of cattle to confine them, or, in default 
thereof, to answer for any damages occasioned by their trespasses upon the lands 
of another, is abrogated, or, rather, never obtained, in this state, nor 
in the other Western states. . . . In this state cattle are 
permitted to run at large, and the principle in force here is that no actionable 
trespass is committed when domestic animals lawfully running at large wander 
upon and depasture the uninclosed lands of a private owner. 

[¶17]   Gillespie v. Wheatland Industrial Co., 
22 Wyo. 331, 140 P. 832 (1914), clarified the nature of the open range doctrine 
as applied in Wyoming.  In Gillespie, the plaintiff's cattle 
strayed from public range onto the defendant's unenclosed land and were killed 
when they fell into a ditch.  The 
issue presented was whether the landowner was liable to the livestock owner for 
creating an unsafe or dangerous condition on his unenclosed land.  The court concluded the landowner was 
not liable in that instance, and the court's logic is relevant to the matter at 
hand:

The gist 
of the argument of counsel for plaintiff is that the cattle were not unlawfully 
on the premises, and hence were not trespassing thereon.  This argument is based upon the holding 
that the owner of live stock running at large upon the range is not liable for 
damages done by such stock straying upon the uninclosed lands of another.  But 
the reason for such nonliability is, not because they are not trespassing, but 
because no duty rests upon the owner to keep his stock off uninclosed land, and 
he is not guilty of negligence in failing to do so, or in permitting them to run 
at large, and, being guilty of neither a willful trespass nor negligence in the 
care of his stock, he is not answerable in damages, and for the further 
reason that the landowner has the right to exclude such stock from his premises 
by fencing against them, or otherwise preventing them from coming or being 
thereon, and, if he neglects to do so, he takes the risk of trespass by animals 
lawfully running at large.  Such 
stock were not rightfully upon such uninclosed land in the sense that the owner 
had the right to run and graze them there, for, if they were, then the landowner 
would have no lawful right to exclude or remove them therefrom.  On the other hand, as a general rule, 
the owner of uninclosed lands is under no duty to make or keep them in safe 
condition for stock straying thereon.  

140 P. 
at 833 (emphasis added).  In Gillespie, this court clarified that the 
open range doctrine was not based solely on immunity from damages due to 
trespass but, more importantly, was founded on the absence of a duty.  

[¶18]   The absence-of-duty concept was 
reiterated four years later in Garretson, 176 P.  at 434.  In that case, Mr. Garretson's cow broke 
into Mr. Avery's fenced enclosure, ate the green alfalfa grass being grown 
there, and died.7  Mr. Garretson sued Mr. Avery for the 
value of the cow, interest, and costs alleging Mr. Avery was negligent in 
failing to maintain a lawful fence or in maintaining a fence in such defective 
condition that it allowed the cow to breach into the alfalfa field.  The court noted, if there were no fence 
at all, Mr. Avery would not be liable because he had no duty to fence against 
livestock.  The court concluded the 
lawful fence statute was intended to prevent harm to livestock caused by a 
poorly constructed fence and not from the hazards that might exist within a 
fenced enclosure once breached.  

[¶19]   In 1919, one year after the Garretson decision, the legislature 
enacted a statute entitled "Domestic Stock Shall Not Be Allowed to Run at Large 
in Lanes" (Strays in Public Lanes Statute),8 the precursor to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
11-24-108 (LexisNexis 2001) (Strays on Fenced Highways Statute) which is at 
issue in this case.  1919 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 109, §§ 1, 2.  Turning any 
domestic stock, saddle, or work horses on any public lanes and fenced roads to 
graze from May through September was made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of 
not less than ten dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars.  With the passage of the Strays in Public 
Lanes Statute, the legislature for the first time addressed and modified the 
common-law "running at large" rule,9 which provided an owner of domestic 
animals is under no legal obligation to restrain them from being loose or 
unattended on a highway.  Brauner v. Peterson, 557 P.2d 359, 361 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976).

[¶20]   The 1919 Strays in Public Lanes 
Statute did not wholly repeal the common-law rule.  It modified the rule to make turning 
domestic stock on public lanes and fenced roads, under specific circumstances, a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine.  
Two years later, the statute title was revised to "Live Stock in Lanes," 
and the language was amended in pertinent part as follows:10

Section 
3119.  It shall be unlawful for any person, 
persons, company or corporation to permit live stock of any kind, to run at 
large in any public lanes or fenced roads in the State of Wyoming.  Any person, persons, company or 
corporation violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than ten dollars 
($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars 
($100.00) and in addition shall pay all damage done 
by such stock unlawfully permitted to run at 
large in such lanes or roads; Provided that the 
provisions of this act shall not apply to range stock drifting into lanes or 
fenced roads in going to, or returning from their accustomed 
ranges.

1921 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 108, § 1 (emphasis added).  These significant changes removed the 
May through September application of the previous statute, considerably 
increased the maximum imposable fine, provided an exception for stock "drifting" 
into the public lanes or fenced roads going to or coming back from their 
accustomed ranges, and, perhaps most importantly, provided for civil liability 
for any damage caused by the livestock unlawfully running at large on public 
lanes or fenced roads.  At this 
juncture, the legislature had for a second time modified common law and the open 
range doctrine to impose full liability for damage done by livestock running at 
large under statutorily specified circumstances.11 Obviously the drifting livestock 
exception was something of a cavernous loophole, yet the modifications evidenced 
the legislature's measured refinements of the open range doctrine.  

[¶21]   Another amendment significant to 
this appeal was enacted in 1955.  
The language "any public lanes or fenced road,"12 established in the 1919 original 
enactment of the statute, was revised to "any fenced public lanes or fenced roads."  1955 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 15, § 1.  Prior to this change, the statute 
prohibited livestock from running at large on any public lane, whether fenced or 
unfenced.  The statute narrowed the 
prohibition to livestock running at large on any fenced public lane.  This development is interesting in light 
of the then contemporary legal trend toward greater restriction of animals 
running at large as evidenced in the following American Law Reports excerpt 
dating from 1954:  "The manifest 
danger to travelers of permitting domestic animals to roam at will on the 
highways has given rise in many jurisdictions to the adoption of statutes or 
ordinances prohibiting their owners from allowing them to be at large."  M. O. Regensteiner, Annotation, Owner's liability, under legislation 
forbidding domestic animals to run at large on highways, as dependent on 
negligence, 34 A.L.R.2d 1285, 1285 (1954).13

[¶22]   At first glance, it would seem the 
Wyoming legislature was bucking the tide of conventional wisdom.  However, on closer examination, it 
appears that the modification to the Strays in Fenced Public Lanes Statute was 
consistent with the trend for greater restrictions when viewed in the context of 
extant legislation and the enactment of the livestock district statutes in the 
same year. 

"All 
statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of 
the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to 
be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and 
uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be 
determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but 
also with reference to the decisions of the courts."

Fosler 
v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Voss 
v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976)).

[¶23]   A statute enacted in 1907 gave 
boards of county commissioners authority to erect lawful fences upon the 
right-of-ways of roads, with the costs apportioned between the benefiting 
landowner, petitioners, or the county as determined to be appropriate, with 
gates to be constructed as deemed necessary for the convenience of the 
public.  1907 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
39, § 1.  This provision (County 
Commissioners Fence Authorization Statute) was the predecessor of what we now 
know as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-105 (LexisNexis 2001).  It has been retained essentially intact 
with minor amendments in 1929, 1931, and 1978 which added (1) the term "cattle 
guards," (2) provisions for identifying signs to be placed on the cattle guards 
and gates, and (3) direction that construction be done as prescribed by the 
state highway department.  The 
statute gave county commissioners control and authority to make fencing 
decisions concerning roads in their county.  Clearly, when the 1955 amendment created 
the Strays in Fenced Public Lanes Statute, the legislature was aware of the 
County Commissioners Fence Authorization Statute and the boards of county 
commissioners' longstanding authority to fence any public road in their counties 
as they deemed appropriate.  
Subsequent to the 1955 amendment creating the Strays in Fenced Public 
Lanes Statute, a county's action to fence a lane or road brought with it the 
prohibition against animals running at large and accorded full liability for 
damage caused due to a violation.

[¶24]   In addition, in 1955 the 
legislature enacted the state's first livestock district legislation (Livestock 
District Statutes).  1955 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 104, §§ 1-9.  These 
provisions, now found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-33-101 to -109 (LexisNexis 2001), 
permitted seventy-five percent of the landowners owning at least seventy-five 
percent of the land in any irrigation district to petition the board of county 
commissioners to establish a livestock district.  When such a district was established, 
livestock was prohibited from running at large within the boundaries of the 
district including the public highways situated therein.  The Livestock District Statutes, like 
the Fence Out Statute, made any violation a misdemeanor and imposed liability on 
a livestock owner for all damages occasioned by such violation.  Wyo. Stat. §§ 11-606, -607 (Michie 
1957).  

The owner of animals permitted or allowed to run at large, 
or herded in violation of any order made in accordance with the provisions of 
section 4 [§ 11-603], shall be liable to any person who shall suffer damage from 
the depredations or trespasses of such animals, without regard to the condition 
of his fence; and the person so damaged shall have a lien upon 
said animals for the amount of damage done, and the cost of the proceedings to 
recover the same, and may take the animals into custody until all such damages 
are paid; provided, that the person so taking said animals into custody shall 
not have the right to retain the same for more than five days without commencing 
an action against the owner thereof for such damages.

Section 11-607 (emphasis added); see also §§ 
11-33-107, -108.  
Once again, the legislature granted counties local control and authority 
to make these designations. These statutes have also stood the test of time as 
the legislature has declined to significantly amend them in the intervening 
forty-five plus years.

  

[¶25]   In 1975, the legislature again amended 
the Strays in Fenced Public Lanes Statute and clarified the application of its 
running-at-large prohibition.  The amendment, to the extent it is pertinent 
to this discussion, modified the language from "any fenced public lanes or 
fenced roads" to "any fenced public highways in the state of Wyoming as defined 
in W.S. 31-12" (Strays in Fenced Public Highways Statute).  1975 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 68, § 1.  
Wyo. Stat. § 31-12(k) (Michie Supp. 1975) provided essentially a laundry 
list of roads or thoroughfares which were contained in the term "public 
highways."14  The last amendment, relevant to this 
discussion, was made in 1984 when the defining provision for the term "public 
highways" was repealed and recreated as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-101 (Michie 
1984).  This 
amendment eliminated the laundry list and defined "public highway" as "the 
entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained or if 
not publicly maintained, dedicated to public use when any part is open to the 
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel."  1984 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 47, § 3.

[¶26]   The foregoing review discloses that by 
1984 the Strays in Fenced Public Highways Statute had developed into a 
prohibition against livestock running at large on any fenced public highway, 
which meant any fenced way used, even if only in part, by the public for 
vehicular travel.  
Boards of county commissioners could fence any public way deemed 
appropriate and bring the road within the broad definition of a "fenced public 
highway," consequently restricting livestock from running at large.  They could also, 
upon petition by the appropriate configuration of landowners, establish 
livestock districts and in this manner limit livestock running at large.  In short, since 
1984 there have been three separate statutes on the books which have impacted 
the common-law rules governing livestock running at large and imposed full 
liability for all damage, not just property damage, caused by violating 
livestock in specifically defined locations.15  

[¶27]   The legislature established a statutory 
scheme to regulate livestock at large as it has deemed necessary and appropriate 
to the interests of the state and its citizens.  However, in this process the legislature did 
not address the livestock owner's duty of care to protect motorists from his 
livestock grazing in the vicinity of an unfenced highway.  The accident in this 
appeal occurred on an unfenced public highway. Consequently, the statutes 
provide the plaintiffs no basis for a claim. Likewise, since Wyoming's common 
law has heretofore recognized livestock owner liability only when the stock 
breaches a lawful fence, the plaintiffs ask this court to impose a duty not 
provided by statute or explicitly recognized in case law.

[¶28]   However, also relevant to this 
discussion, the legislature has not provided the livestock owner with a blanket 
shield from any claims of negligence.  For example, no statutes modify the 
common-law general duty of reasonable care as it pertains to open range 
pasturing of livestock.  Similarly, the old English common law was not 
an absolute bar to negligence claims.  Furthermore, the legality of a particular 
practice does not, of itself, provide immunity or absolve a person of the duty 
to act with reasonable care when engaging in the practice. 

[¶29]   The true issue we must address is not 
whether there is a duty of reasonable care owed by the rancher to motorists in 
posted open range, and vice versa.  As stated above, the common law of negligence 
creates a general duty to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable 
person in light of all the circumstances.  Hill, 856 P.2d  at 459; Vassos,  625 P.2d  at 
772.  The 
plaintiffs' argument seeks to have this general duty create a question of fact 
as to whether Two Dot was acting reasonably by allowing its livestock to graze 
on this highway that night. Two Dot does not deny it is subject to the 
common-law duty of care under the circumstances but rather argues that duty does 
not extend to requiring livestock owners to prevent livestock in open range from 
naturally wandering onto unfenced roads.  The Wyoming Stock Growers Association and the 
Wyoming Wool Growers Association, in their amicus brief, also 
acknowledge there is a limited duty of care on both fenced and unfenced highways 
but contend the plaintiffs' argument would require livestock owners to fence all 
roads to avoid negligence claims since that is the only way to prevent the 
livestock from wandering onto roadways.  These arguments frame the genuine, and 
somewhat narrow, issue in this case: whether the scope of the duty owed by 
livestock owners to motorists extends to preventing livestock from wandering 
onto an unfenced roadway in posted open range. 

[¶30]   In addressing this question, it is 
instructive to examine the case law from other jurisdictions to see how they 
have dealt with similar concerns.  In a factually similar Louisiana case, Willis v. Cloud, 
758 So. 2d 835, 837 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 760 So. 2d 347 (La. 2000), an ordinance 
made all roads in the parish "closed range" and provided, "It shall be unlawful 
for any person to intentionally or negligently permit any horse, mules, cattle, 
sheep, goats, or hogs to rove at large."  Ms. Willis hit Mr. Cloud's cattle on a road 
within the parish and subsequently sued for damages.  The trial court 
granted summary judgment to Mr. Cloud, and Ms. Willis appealed.  The Louisiana Court 
of Appeal concluded, on the basis of an exception to the ordinance, the portion 
of the road where the accident occurred was open range.  The court then 
concluded Mr. Cloud, pasturing his animals in open range, had no duty to keep 
his cows enclosed and, therefore, incurred no liability for Ms. Willis' personal 
injuries. 758 So. 2d  at 837. 

[¶31]   From a footnote in Willis, 758 So. 2d  
at 838 n.11, it appears the court relied on its prior holding in Harrington v. 
Upchurch, 331 So. 2d 506 (La. Ct. App. 1976).  In Harrington, another 
motorist-cow collision case, the court considered a statute which provided, "No 
person owning livestock shall knowingly, willfully or negligently permit his 
livestock to go at large upon the following public highways of this state," 
followed by a list of the highways covered by the statute.  331 So. 2d  at 
510.  The 
accident did not occur on one of the listed highways, and the area was 
determined to be open range.  The court stated, "Jurisprudence has 
. . . established the rule that in open range' areas, i. e., in areas 
where there is no state statute or local ordinance prohibiting an owner from 
allowing his animals to roam at large, the owner is under no duty to keep his 
domestic animals enclosed." Id.  The court then concluded the legislature had 
expressly imposed liability only for those damages caused upon the listed 
highways and had intentionally excluded application of this liability to "open 
range" highways.  
Id. 

[¶32]   In Gibbs v. Jackson, 
990 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1999), a motorist was injured when she hit a horse that was 
standing on a farm-to-market roadway.  Texas historically had been a "free range" 
state.  The 
injured motorist sued the horse owner for negligently failing to (1) maintain 
the fence, (2) restrain the horse, and (3) prevent the horse from roaming 
unattended onto the road.  No state statute or local stock law 
prohibited the horse from being on this particular stretch of roadway.  The Texas Supreme 
Court declined to impose a new common-law duty.  In reaching this decision, the court found it 
significant that the Texas legislature had often revisited its scheme for 
determining when restraint should or should not be imposed on livestock 
owners.  990 S.W.2d  at 750.  
The court reasoned:

The Legislature has not been oblivious to safety concerns 
raised by roaming livestock.  With its policymaking authority, the 
Legislature has considered fence and livestock restraint laws for virtually 
every type of roadway over which it has jurisdiction.  It is noteworthy 
that the Legislature has specifically excluded farm-to-market roads from such 
regulation.  We 
think it unwise in this instance for the Court to erect barriers that the 
Legislature has declined to impose.

            
Similarly, citizens of Upshur County have, through separate elections, 
adopted local stock laws in two areas of the county.  They have long had 
the opportunity to adopt a local stock law to prohibit horses from running at 
large in other parts of the county.  Those citizens, who know far more about their 
roads and livestock than do we, apparently have deemed it unnecessary to adopt 
such a law for the road adjacent to Gibbs's pasture.  We decline in this 
instance to impose upon them a duty which they have declined to self-impose.

Accordingly, we hold that Gibbs [the horse owner] had no 
common-law duty to prevent Tiny [the horse] from roaming onto a farm-to-market 
road in an area that did not have a local stock law.  We reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that Jackson take 
nothing.  We 
hereby disapprove of Merendino v. Burrell, 923 S.W.2d 258, 261 
(Tex.App.Beaumont 1996, writ denied), and Miller v. Cozart, 
394 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1965, no writ), to the extent that they 
hold that a person who owns or is otherwise responsible for horses has a duty to 
prevent the horses from roaming onto a farm-to-market road that is free from a 
local stock law.

Id. (footnote omitted).

[¶33]   The judicial restraint evidenced in 
these cases is persuasive.  In Gillespie, 140 P. 832, this court held the livestock owner had no duty to keep his animals off 
unenclosed lands.  
From 1869 through 1984, the Wyoming legislature enacted and modified 
three statutes which impose full liability on livestock owners for damage caused 
when their animals run at large in specified areas.  The legislature has 
refrained from imposing any duty on the livestock owner to keep livestock off 
unfenced posted open range highways.  Likewise, Wyoming's common law does not 
impose such a duty.

B.        
Application of Hinkle v. Siltamaki

[¶34]   The only Wyoming case with somewhat 
comparable factual circumstances to those in the instant appeal is Hinkle v. 
Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 1961), 
in which a motorist/horse accident occurred on a fenced public highway.  Mr. Hinkle, by his 
own admission, only had evidence of the horse's ownership and presence on the 
highway as foundation for his negligence claim.  The district court granted summary judgment 
to Mr. Siltamaki concluding:

"Section 56-1813, Wyoming Compiled Statutes of 1945, as 
amended, [precursor to § 11-24-108, Strays in Fenced Public Highways Statute] 
does not impose a liability upon the owner of livestock for livestock turned 
loose upon the open range which stray into any fenced public lanes or fenced 
roads in the State of Wyoming without the knowledge of the owners 
thereof[.]"

Hinkle, 361 P.2d  at 38.  This court, affirming the summary judgment, 
explicitly adopted the majority view that the mere presence of an animal on the 
highway does not constitute the owner's negligence per se.16  See Nylen v. 
Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112 (Wyo. 
1989).  If such 
evidence is insufficient to constitute a violation of the Strays in Fenced 
Public Highways Statute and to establish negligence per se on a fenced road, it 
is also insufficient to establish negligence per se on a posted open range 
highway.  

C.        Larson-Murphy v. 
Steiner Distinguished 

D.        Gates v. Richardson 
Policy Factors Analysis

[¶44]   In order to conclude the scope of the 
duty requires livestock owners to do anything to prevent livestock from 
wandering onto highways in posted open range, this court must consider the 
factors adopted in Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 
1986), and conclude 
a plaintiff's interests 
are entitled to legal protection against a defendant's otherwise legal 
conduct.  The 
plaintiffs' argument that this court should establish a more expansive duty does 
not survive this analysis. "[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law 
to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." Gates, 719 P.2d  at 
195; see also W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 at 357-58 (5th 
ed. 1984).

            
When this Court has considered whether a duty should be imposed based on 
a particular relationship, we have balanced numerous factors to aid in that 
determination: "(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury 
suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) 
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of 
preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the 
consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, 
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved."  Ortega v. Flaim, 
902 P.2d 199, 203, 206 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 
1987), citing to 
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986), quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (1976)).

Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo. 1999) (footnote omitted).  Those factors, evaluated under the facts of this case as follows, 
do not support a new duty to prevent livestock from wandering onto 
unfenced roads in posted open range:

(a)  A livestock owner, though not constantly 
supervising his animals, may arguably foresee people could drive their cars in 
such fashion so as to collide with livestock on posted open range roads.  However, the 
motorists on a posted open range highway, being forewarned, have greater 
capacity to foresee the potential danger by viewing the road at the exact time 
in question, to make affirmative choices whether to travel the road despite its 
open range status, to choose the time of day they will be on the road, and to 
determine the speed and manner of the operation of their vehicles.  In this case, the 
road was marked by open range signs, and the passenger testified that she and 
the driver had seen those signs.  Even so, the plaintiffs argue something 
more should have been done to alert the drivers that cattle were on the road at 
the precise time of the accidents, such as flashing lights activated when cattle 
were present.  
However, given the wandering nature of livestock, such additional 
precautions would accomplish no more than the posted signs indicating open 
range.  Cattle 
naturally grazing in open range pose no greater risk of harm to motorists than 
indigenous wildlife, such as antelope or deer, which might by happenstance be 
grazing in the vicinity of the same road.  Because motorists were advised in advance 
that cattle could likely be on and around this stretch of road, the cattle 
actually presented less of a danger than naturally roaming wildlife.  The fact that the 
cattle were of the black Angus breed would admittedly make them difficult to see 
on a dark night.  
However, this circumstance by itself is insufficient to justify 
imposition of a greater duty on black Angus owners to prevent their cattle from 
wandering onto roadways in posted open range.

(b)  There is little connection between Two Dot's 
conductgrazing cattle in a large area known to be posted open rangeand the 
injury suffered.  
There was no other "conduct" on the part of Two Dot.  No one alleged Two 
Dot drove the cattle onto the roadway in front of moving vehicles or took any 
action to encourage the cattle to be on the road surface.  The plaintiffs have 
asserted the cattle were on BLM land that, although leased and grazed in the 
past by Two Dot, at the time of the accident was in a period of rest and contend 
this "conduct" occasioned the fatal accident.  This argument is a red herring.  The question of 
whether Two Dot was trespassing on BLM land is solely an issue between the BLM 
and Two Dot.  
The plaintiffs provided no evidence any of the drivers or other 
plaintiffs acted either upon knowledge of lease arrangements or on the fact the 
BLM intended to keep this pasture in a resting state.  The area in 
question was land upon which cattle, by custom, license, lease, or permit, were 
grazed or permitted to roam.  Hubbard v. Howard, 758 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D. Idaho 
1990), aff'd, 927 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1991); Greer v. Ellsworth, 
751 P.2d 675 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). The plaintiffs also contend that, once notified 
by the BLM that the cattle had entered the open range despite the BLM's grazing 
restrictions in effect at the time, Two Dot had a duty to the traveling public 
to remove the cattle promptly.  Again, the plaintiffs confuse the issue of a 
possible trespass, a matter between only the BLM and Two Dot, with an alleged 
tort duty to prevent the livestock from wandering onto an unfenced roadway in 
open range.  
Given there was no duty to keep livestock off the unfenced roadway in the 
first place, Two Dot had no obligation to the plaintiffs to remove the cattle 
from the open range.  
The simple exercise of the right to pasture cattle on open range does not 
constitute the kind of "conduct" necessary to invoke, for policy reasons, an 
expanded duty of care essentially nullifying the intended purpose and benefits 
of the open range doctrine.

(c)  There can be no doubt as to the degree of 
certainty the plaintiffs suffered injury.  Tragically, two people were killed, and two 
others were injured.

(d)  No moral blame can be attached to Two Dot's 
conduct.  Two 
Dot was merely pasturing its cattle in open range, no more no less, and this 
carries with it no negative moral connotation of any kind.

(e)  Preventing future harm can only be fully 
assured through physically restraining livestock from wandering across roads by 
fencing them.  
Imposing such a broad duty, essentially nullifying the open range 
doctrine, is not prudent absent legislative participation and direction.  The boards of 
county commissioners and local landowners, who are most attuned to the potential 
danger presented by a posted open range road in their locale, have had the 
statutory authority since at least 1984 to regulate livestock running at large 
in their counties.  
An expansive remedy, if one is truly required, has been available for a 
long time.

(f)  The burden that would be placed on Two Dot 
by the creation of a broadened duty is 
substantial.  
Livestock owners would no longer be able to graze their livestock without 
being exposed to liability based on the limited intellect and behavioral 
vagaries of the animals they raise.  Absent construction of hundreds of miles of 
expensive fencing, the livestock industry would be exposed to a large and 
unpredictable risk.

(g)  The consequences to the community from the 
danger of collisions with livestock on open range are no greater than have 
existed over the past many decades of high speed motorized travel.  It is significant 
that this is the first case of its kind to be considered by this court despite 
the state's longstanding open range doctrine and the increase in motor vehicle 
travel over the years.  Statistically, motorist/cow collisions 
resulting in injuries are not significant in number or percentage of all 
motorist collisions resulting in injuries.  By way of example, in 1999 there were 4,071 
motor vehicle accidents resulting in injury and only thirty-seven of these 
involved a motorist/cow collision.  It cannot be discerned from the report how 
many of these occurred on fenced highways as opposed to posted open range.  Wyoming's 
Comprehensive Report on Traffic Crashes at 14 (1999).  We can safely 
assume the number of posted open range accidents was less than the total number 
of thirty-seven.  
Obviously, in the context of all motor vehicle accidents resulting in 
injuries, motorist/livestock accidents on posted open range do not present a 
large or extraordinary risk.  On the other hand, the consequences to the 
community from imposition of an expanded duty could be very great.  Such a duty could 
conceivably eliminate the open range as it has been known in Wyoming since the 
territorial days and impose additional obstacles to migrating wildlife.  It would also 
extinguish local assessment and control of the open range and roadways as 
superfluous functions.

(h)  Based on the number of motorist/cow 
collisions resulting in injury, discussed above, we can anticipate that the 
consequence to our court system would not be onerous or extreme. 

(i)  The final policy consideration is whether 
there is insurance available, prevalent, and at an affordable cost.  This requires a 
high degree of speculation.  It is most likely available to ranchers.  For a price, 
insurance can be obtained to cover almost any imaginable risk.  Is it 
prevalent?  
Probably not given Wyoming has been long known as a "fence out" state and 
the cost is likely high because of the unpredictable nature of the risk.  No doubt the total 
economic costs of imposition of an expanded duty, including both insurance and 
fencing or other livestock management techniques, would likely have a negative 
impact on the livestock industry.  It is also relevant that affordable 
insurance, which spreads the risk among a much broader participant pool, has 
been available to motorists for a long time.

 [¶45]  We have recognized there is a reciprocal and 
general duty of care owed by livestock owners pasturing animals in posted open 
range and motorists driving on unfenced highways passing through the open range 
area.  
Consistent with our review of the open range doctrine, the applicable 
statutes, the case law, and the Gates factors, that duty does not require a livestock 
owner to prevent livestock from wandering onto public highways so long as the 
area is posted as open range. That is all the plaintiffs alleged was done by Two 
Dot in this case.  
Furthermore, Two Dot owed no duty to the plaintiffs to remove the 
livestock when notified by the BLM they were in the pasture despite the grazing 
restriction.  
While circumstances could arise where other actions of a livestock owner 
on open range, beyond allowing livestock to wander onto a public roadway, could 
be considered unreasonable, we will not attempt to identify such circumstances 
until they are presented to us.  We affirm the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Two Dot.

Maria Hernandez

[¶46]   The plaintiffs challenge the district 
court's decision granting Ms. Hernandez's motion for summary judgment.  Ms. Hernandez was 
the driver of the second vehicle that struck the cow, doing so immediately prior 
to the third vehicle.  
The basis of the plaintiffs' claim is that, after colliding with the cow, 
Ms. Hernandez sent her young son back along the road towards where the cow had 
been to warn oncoming traffic.  The plaintiffs contend, as the third vehicle 
approached the scene, the young childAnthonywas in its lane of travel and, in 
order to avoid the boy, the vehicle moved into the other lane whereupon it 
collided with the cow.  In opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs 
relied on the passenger's testimony that Anthony was in the third vehicle's lane 
of travel.  In 
addition, the plaintiffs point to physical measurements taken at the scene 
indicating that their version of the events was possible.  Ms. Hernandez 
countered with her own testimony that she did not send her son back to warn 
other travelers but, rather, Anthony and all her passengers were still in her 
vehicle when the third accident occurred.  The district court ruled in favor of Ms. 
Hernandez and granted the motion.  The district court reasoned:

And I don't think that there's sufficient evidence in the 
record that a jury could reasonably conclude that he was in a position situated 
in relationship to the cow where his position would have been unreasonable in 
any respect.  I 
don't think there's any evidence from which they can find exactly where he was 
in relation to the cow.

The evidence indicates that Yates [driver of third car] 
swerved and hit the cow, but that still doesn't get us there, because we still 
don't know if he was farther -- if he was east of the cow or if he was north of 
the cow.  It's 
still a toss-up as to whether he was in the lane or at the side.  And it's a toss-up 
as to exactly where the cow was, whether it was in the middle of the road or 
where.

Considering what evidence there is, why -- and knowing the 
location -- the one thing, actually, that we do know here is the location of the 
Hernandez vehicle.  
And if Yates [driver of third car] had stayed in the eastbound lane of 
traffic and veered to the right to avoid the cow, why, that would have increased 
the danger of a collision with the Hernandez vehicle, which was ahead of him and 
on his side of the road.

So I can't say, considering all of that, that there is 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the -- any actions 
that were taken were unreasonable.

[¶47]   A person who voluntarily undertakes to 
render a service to another which he recognizes as necessary for the protection 
of a third person or his property is subject to liability to that person for 
physical harm resulting from the failure to exercise reasonable care if that 
failure increases the risk of harm to the third person or the harm was 
occasioned by reliance on the voluntary service. Kelly v. Roussalis, 
776 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 
1989); Beard v. 
Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 731-34 (Wyo. 
1980); Ellsworth 
Brothers, Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 524 (Wyo. 1965); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965 & Supp. 
1999).  In 
order to hold Ms. Hernandez liable for injuries suffered, the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that: (1) Ms. Hernandez voluntarily undertook to render a service 
she recognized as necessary for the protection of the third vehicle and its 
occupants; (2) she failed to exercise reasonable care in performing the service; 
and (3) failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm to the 
occupants of the third vehicle or the occupants' injuries resulted from the 
reliance of the driver of the third vehicle on Ms. Hernandez's actions.  The district 
court's decision related to the second element:  There was insufficient evidence upon which a 
jury could conclude Ms. Hernandez acted with unreasonable care.

[¶48]   We must disagree with the district 
court's decision.  
Our examination of the record discloses disputed material facts which, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs' position, counsel 
against summary judgment and support sending the matter to a jury.  First, there is 
eyewitness testimony that Anthony was in the third vehicle's lane of travel and, 
immediately after the vehicle moved into the other lane to avoid the child, the 
collision with the cow occurred.  Furthermore, the notes taken by the 
investigating officer at the scene of the accident indicate the plaintiffs' 
version of the events is, at least, physically possible.  This is sufficient 
evidence to raise a question for the jury as to whether or not Ms. Hernandez 
acted reasonably in attempting to warn the third vehicle's occupants.  The district 
court's decision implicitly acknowledges this when it states that certain facts 
are a "toss-up."  
It is when such questions are a toss-up that a jury trial is most 
appropriate.  
Whether or not Ms. Hernandez did, in fact, act unreasonably or whether 
her actions were the proximate cause of the injuries to the occupants of the 
third vehicle is a matter for a jury to determine.  Therefore, we 
reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Ms.  
Hernandez.

[¶49]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1The appellants-plaintiffs 
are Kathy A. Andersen, the personal representative for the estates of Jared 
Steffen and Robert Dean Yates, and Jody McCampbell, individually and as 
conservator for Caleb Steffen.  We will refer to them throughout this opinion 
collectively as "the plaintiffs."

  2The Wagners reached a settlement with the plaintiffs 
and are not a party to this appeal.

3Neither Wyoming case law 
nor statutory law provides a definition of the term "open range" although it is 
referenced in case law as if it is a self-defining concept.  One definition of 
the term is an area "where there is no stock law or ordinance prohibiting an 
owner from allowing his domestic animals to roam at large." Culpepper v. 
Rachal, 370 So. 2d 154, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1979).  Another definition 
provides "open range is an area in which livestock are kept at large, 
unrestrained and unattended."  Estate of Shuck v. Perkins County, 1998 S.D. 32, ¶13, 
577 N.W.2d 584, ¶13 (S.D. 1998).  Open range is also referred to as "free 
range" in some authorities.

4

Generality of the reasonable care standard.  In the latter half 
of the 19th century, courts began to develop a 
general duty or standard of care describing the duty of all persons to exercise 
ordinary care, meaning the care of a reasonable person, for the benefit of other 
persons, not merely the particular duties of, say, a veterinarian to a 
farmer.  The 
standard for determining negligence purports to apply invariantly to all 
negligence cases.

More specific standards.  It may be more 
accurate to say that the general duty or standard of ordinary care is a default 
rule, a standard applied when there is no other more specific standard addressed 
to the particular parties or their particular situation and where the defendant 
has not undertaken some different level of care. 

Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 117 at 277 
(2000).

5

[T]he proprietor or tenant of land is not obliged to fence 
it, but every man is bound at his peril to keep his cattle on his own 
premises.  This 
he may do in any manner he chooses, but in the event of their escape, he is held 
liable for their trespasses on the land of others, whether fenced or unfenced, 
no man being required to fence against the cattle of others, in the absence of 
an agreement, prescription, or statute to the contrary.

4 Am. Jur. 2d 
Animals § 59 at 
399 (1995).

6

Source:  C.L. 1876, ch. 51, §§ 3, 5 to 8;  R.S. 1887, §§ 4185, 
4187 to 4190;  
R.S. 1899, §§ 1976 to 1980;  C.S. 1910, §§ 2581 to 2585;  C.S. 1920, §§ 3074 
to 3078;  R.S. 
1931, §§ 42-104 to 42-108;  C.S. 1945, §§ 66-509 to 66-513;  W.S. 1957, §§ 
11-540 to 11-544;  
W.S. 1977, §§ 11-33-110 to 11-33-114;  Laws 1978, ch. 32, § 1;  1979, ch. 144, § 
1.  Amended by 
Laws 1996, ch. 69, § 1, eff. March 19, 1996;  Laws 2000, ch. 24, § 4, eff. July 1, 2000. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-108 (LexisNexis 2001).

In 1996, the language was amended from "horses, 
mules or cattle" to "livestock or domesticated buffalo," and, in 2000, all 
references to "county court" were amended to "circuit court" consistent with 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-102 (LexisNexis 2001).

7As set out in the facts 
portion of Garretson, green alfalfa grass is apparently toxic to 
cattle accustomed to eating "dry feed," causing them to bloat and then die.

8

Domestic Stock Shall Not Be Allowed to Run at Large 
in Lanes.

AN ACT making it unlawful for any person, persons, 
company or corporation to turn domestic stock, saddle or work horses in public 
lanes or fenced roads for grazing purposes. 

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of 
Wyoming.

Section 1.  It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, 
company or corporation to turn any domestic stock, saddle, or work horses in any 
public lanes or fenced road in the State of Wyoming for grazing purposes, during 
the months of May, June, July, August and September.

Section 2.  Any person, persons, company or corporation 
violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and 
upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor 
more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00).

Section 3.  This Act shall take effect and be in force 
from and after its passage.

Approved February 25, 1919.  

1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 109.

9

[T]he owner of domestic animals is under no legal 
obligation to restrain them from being loose or unattended on a highway absent a 
statute to the contrary.  Pennyan v. Alexander, 229 Miss. 704, 91 So. 2d 728, 59 
A.L.R.2d 1321 (1957); Hinkle v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 1961); 
Alioto v. 
Denisiuk, 23 Misc.2d 292, 205 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1960); Wilson v. Rule, 169 
Kan. 296, 219 P.2d 690 (1950); cf., Green v. Biles-Coleman Lbr. Co., 58 Wash. 2d 307, 308, 
362 P.2d 593 (1961); Burback v. Bucher, 
56 Wash. 2d 875, 879, 355 P.2d 981 (1960).

Brauner v. 
Peterson, 557 P.2d 359, 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).

10

Live Stock in Lanes.

An Act to amend and re-enact Section 3119 Wyoming Compiled 
Statutes, 1920, relating to stock at large in lanes and providing penalty 
therefore.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of 
Wyoming:

Section 1.  Section 3119 
Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1920, is hereby re-enacted to read as follows:

Section 3119.  It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, 
company or corporation to permit live stock of any kind, to run at large in any 
public lanes or fenced roads in the State of Wyoming.  Any person, 
persons, company or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not 
less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) and 
in addition shall pay all damage done by such stock unlawfully permitted to run 
at large in such lanes or roads; Provided that the provisions of this act shall 
not apply to range stock drifting into lanes or fenced roads in going to, or 
returning from their accustomed ranges.

Section 2.  This act shall take effect and be in force 
from and after its passage.

Approved February 21, 1921.

1921 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 108.

11Amendments made in 1951 gave certain public officials 
authority to impound animals found straying on public lanes and fenced roads, 
identify owners, sell impounded animals, and disburse sale proceeds.

12The 1919 version actually read "in any public lanes or 
fenced road," and the 1921 amendment changed the "fenced road" reference to the 
plural "fenced roads."

13See 
also 
Rigelhaupt, supra, 29 A.L.R. 4th at 439; R. P. D., 
Annotation, Liability for damage to vehicle or injury to person riding 
therein by animal at large in street or highway, 140 A.L.R. 742, 743 
(1942).

14"Public highways' shall include all public highways, 
county roads, state highways or roads, public streets, avenues or alleys, 
bridges, subways and viaducts, whether public or private, designed, intended or 
used for the passage of vehicles, in any county, city, town or other legal 
subdivision of the State of Wyoming."  Section 31-12(k).

15These are the Fence Out Statute (§ 11-28-108), the Strays 
on Fenced Highways Statute (§ 11-24-108 as defined by § 31-1-101(a)(viii)), and 
the Livestock District Statutes (§§ 11-33-101 to -109).

16The Hinkle court observed that the minority jurisdictions, 
which held the presence of an animal on a fenced highway constituted negligence 
per se, also had laws requiring livestock owners to provide fences to keep the 
animals on their property.  361 P.2d  at 41.

17The Montana herd districts are very similar in creation and 
purpose to Wyoming's Livestock District Statutes.