Case Title: WILLIAM S. HANSULD and TIA J. HANSULD, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION, and MARVIN PIEL, Appellees (Defendants) AND LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION, and MARVIN PIEL, Appellants (Defendants), v. WILLIAM S. HANSULD and TIA J. HANSULD, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Citation: 2010 WY 160

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM S. HANSULD and TIA J. HANSULD, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION, and MARVIN PIEL, Appellees (Defendants) AND LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION, and MARVIN PIEL, Appellants (Defendants), v. WILLIAM S. HANSULD and TIA J. HANSULD, Appellees (Plaintiffs).2010 WY 160Decided: 12/09/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
WILLIAM 
S. HANSULD and TIA J. HANSULD,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.LARIAT 
DIESEL CORPORATION, and MARVIN PIEL,Appellees(Defendants).LARIAT 
DIESEL CORPORATION, and MARVIN 
PIEL,Appellants(Defendants),v.WILLIAM S. HANSULD and TIA J. 
HANSULD,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 
 

Representing 
William S. Hansuld and Tia J. Hansuld:

Larry 
W. Harrington of Harrington Law Firm, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Lariat Diesel Corporation and Marvin Piel:

Thomas 
M. Hogan, Casper, Wyoming 

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, two adjoining landowners dispute two separate 
easements.  In appeal No. S-09-0206, 
the Hansulds appeal a district court finding that they do not have an easement 
for a water line across the property of Lariat Diesel Corporation.  We reverse.

 
 
[¶2]      In appeal No. 
S-09-0207, Lariat Diesel Corporation and its president, Marvin Peil, appeal a 
district court's ruling declining to require a precise description in metes and 
bounds of the location of an access easement across the Hansulds' property.  We reverse.

 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      We begin with the 
facts because both appeals share common facts.  This is the second time these parties 
have been before this Court.  See Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 
165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) (Hansuld I).  In Hansuld I, this Court related the 
following facts:

 
 
Originally, 
Chapin and Ratcliff, LLC (LLC) owned both 3100 East Yellowstone and 3110 East 
Yellowstone, Natrona County, Wyoming.  
In 1995, LLC owner, Hardy Ratcliff, approached Lariat owner Marvin Piel 
(Piel) with the thought of selling Lariat both properties located at 3100 and 
3110 East Yellowstone.  Lariat was 
interested in 3100 East Yellowstone only and did not require the other 
lot.

 
 
The 
parties agreed that if Lariat would purchase 3100 East Yellowstone, Lariat would 
be allowed access over the 3110 East Yellowstone lot for its truck access.  Access across 3110 East Yellowstone was 
key to Lariat's business located at 3100 East Yellowstone.  Without it, Lariat could not get heavy 
trucks in and out of its shop without great difficulty.  On July 2, 1995, the LLC sold 3100 East 
Yellowstone to Lariat.

 
 
A 
little over a year later, on August 5, 1996, the LLC and Gary L. Petley (Petley) 
entered into a Purchase Agreement concerning the property adjoining Lariat, 3110 
East Yellowstone.  American Title 
Company issued a title commitment for the property on August 19, 
1996.

 
 
Some 
days before the closing date of the sale of 3110 East Yellowstone to Petley, the 
LLC proposed at a meeting with Lariat that it would give Lariat a formal written 
ingress and egress easement for customers crossing 3110 East Yellowstone in 
exchange for Lariat's giving the LLC a sewer "easement" across the Lariat 
property for the sewer line servicing the adjoining property at 3110 East 
Yellowstone.  Mr. Petley was invited 
to this meeting because this "reciprocal easement" arrangement would both burden 
and benefit 3110 East Yellowstone and his proposed purchase.  No other consideration was 
exchanged.  Petley understood the 
arrangement and had no problems with it.

 
 
After 
the meeting and before the closing on 3110 East Yellowstone, the LLC executed 
and filed an "Access Agreement" that contained a legal description granting 
egress and ingress over the southerly 100 feet of 3110 East Yellowstone.  The Natrona County Clerk filed the 
"Sewer Easement" at 4:00 p.m. and the "Access Agreement" at 4:02 p.m. on August 
30, 1996.  Also on that same day, 
the Petley purchase of 3110 East Yellowstone closed, and the warranty deed was 
filed with the Natrona County Clerk at 10:41 a.m. The title policy that issued a 
few days after the closing included the recorded access agreement in the policy 
for informational purposes.

 
 
Petley 
sold 3110 Yellowstone to Wildcat Whackers on June 25, 1999.  Later, Wildcat Whackers listed it for 
sale with a realtor who noticed the access agreement and consulted an 
attorney.  In the course of 
soliciting Lariat to buy the property, the realtor indicated to it that the 
realtor believed the easement was void because it was outside of the chain of 
title.  Lariat summarily rejected 
the offer to purchase and told the realtor that it believed the easement was 
valid and enforceable.  That same 
realtor advised Hansulds of the easement, and Hansulds purchased the property on 
October 31, 2001.

 
 
Immediately 
after purchasing the property at 3110 East Yellowstone, Hansulds notified Lariat 
that any future access across 3110 East Yellowstone would be denied.  Hansulds then constructed a chain link 
fence along the property line between 3110 and 3100 East Yellowstone and along 
the East Yellowstone frontage to insure that Lariat had no access across 3110 
East Yellowstone.  Hansulds filed 
suit to quiet title and sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of the 
access agreement.  Summary judgment 
motions were denied, and the case proceeded to a bench 
trial.

 
 
After 
suit was filed, East Yellowstone Highway, the access road to both parties' 
property, was straightened, resulting in the abandonment of a portion of the 
right-of-way by the State of Wyoming.  
The "Resolution  for 
Abandonment" was filed with the county clerk on September 20, 2001.  Wildcat Whackers conveyed the abandoned 
property to Hansulds by quitclaim deed.  
The land acquired by Hansulds is approximately forty feet wide and lies 
between Hansulds' southern boundary and Yellowstone 
Highway.

 
 
The 
district court found that the abandonment added property to the southerly parts 
of both Hansulds' and Lariat's properties.  
The district court determined that the LLC intended to convey an easement 
for access to the 3100 property and held that an implied easement existed.  

 
 

Hansuld 
I, 
¶¶ 4-12, 81 P.3d  at 217-18.

 
 
[¶4]      The Hansulds 
appealed the finding of the existence of an implied access easement.  While the appeal was pending, Lariat 
filed a motion to show cause why the Hansulds should not be held in contempt for 
not allowing adequate ingress and egress along the implied access easement to 
its property.  The district court 
held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and, on March 3, 2003, issued its 
decision letter determining the Hansulds were not in contempt because they had 
established a passageway sufficient to accommodate the semi-tractor trailers 
needing to travel to and from the Lariat property.  

 
 
[¶5]      The Hansuld I Court affirmed the district 
court decision finding an implied access easement.  Since Hansuld I was decided, the parties have 
continued to feud.  A water line 
crosses Lariat's property before reaching the Hansulds' property.  A valve on Lariat's property controls 
the flow of water to the Hansulds' property.  In January 2006, Piel turned off the 
Hansulds' water, claiming that no easement existed in favor of the Hansulds' 
property for the water line.  The 
Hansulds brought the instant legal action, seeking, among other things, an 
injunction and a declaration that they had an implied water line easement across 
Lariat's property.  Lariat 
counterclaimed seeking, among other things, declaratory relief for a precise 
legal description of the location and extent of its implied access 
easement.  The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.

 
 
[¶6]      After a hearing, 
the district court granted summary judgment to Lariat on the issue of the 
implied water line easement.  The 
district court found there was no intent on the part of LLC, the common owner, 
to create an easement for the water line and that such an easement was not 
necessary because the Hansulds had ready access to the water main and could 
easily install their own water line.  

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court granted summary judgment to the Hansulds on Lariat's request for 
clarification of the exact location of the access easement, deciding the claim 
was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata in that the same issue and 
claim was before the district court in Hansuld I.  The district court then certified its 
summary judgment rulings as immediately appealable pursuant to W.R.C.P 54(b).1  The parties 
cross-appealed.

 
 
 
 

APPEAL 
NO. 
S-09-0206

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶8]      The Hansulds 
present the following issues for this Court's review:

 
 

I.                   
Did 
the trial court err by finding that the water line crossing property at 3100 
East Yellowstone is not necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of Appellant's 
property at 3110 East Yellowstone?

II.                
Did 
the court err in finding that "certainly, the original owner was aware of the 
utilities and their location but never sought more than a sewer line and access 
to the sewer line, to fix and maintain?"  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      This is an appeal 
from a summary judgment.  We engage 
in a de novo review of summary judgments.  
Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. 
Co., 2008 WY 16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).  We use the same criteria and materials 
as the district court.  Fayard v. Design Comm. of the Homestead 
Subdivision, 2010 WY 51, ¶ 9, 230 P.3d 299, 302 (Wyo. 2010); McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt., 2009 WY 84, 
¶ 10, 211 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 2009).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
[¶10]   Wyoming will recognize an implied 
easement across another person's property under certain circumstances.  Shirran v. Shirran, 987 P.2d 140, 142 
(Wyo. 1999); Beaudoin v. Kibbie, 905 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wyo. 1995); Corbett v. 
Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293-94 (Wyo. 1979).  Our goal in determining whether an 
easement exists by implication is to discern the intent of the parties: 

 

The 
creation of easements by implication is an attempt to infer the intention of the 
parties to a conveyance of land.  Gray v. Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 1999).  "This 
inference drawn from the circumstances surrounding the conveyance alone 
represents an attempt to determine the intention of parties who had not thought 
or had not bothered to put the intention into words, or perhaps more often, to 
parties who actually had formed no intention conscious to themselves."  Id. (citing Corbett, 603 P.2d at 1293).  "The doctrine of implied easements was 
created for courts to examine the particular facts suggesting the intent of the 
parties to a conveyance and determine if the parties omitted granting an 
easement reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the property."  Id. The implied easement does not arise 
where the parties to the conveyance expressly agree otherwise or where proof of 
its elements is not established.  Id.

 
 
In 
applying the doctrine of implied easements, we must determine the parties' 
intent at the time that the unified property was severed from a single 
possessory interest by conveyance from the common owner to a grantee.  

 
 

Hansuld 
I, 
¶¶ 16-17, 81 P.3d  at 218-19.  The elements which must be satisfied in 
order to establish an implied easement are: 

 
 
(1) 
common ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) 
before severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of 
the other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the 
claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel 
previously benefitted.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 15, 81 P.3d  at 218.  See also Kawulok v. Legerski, 2007 WY 133, ¶ 13, 
165 P.3d 112, 116 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Issue 
I  Is an easement for a water line across the Lariat property, in favor of the 
Hansulds' property, necessary and beneficial?

 
 
[¶11]   Of the three elements that must be 
satisfied in order to find the existence of an implied easement, the first two 
elements are conceded.  Thus, only 
the third element is at issue in this appeal.  An easement for a water line is 
certainly beneficial to the Hansulds.  
The question is whether such easement is necessary.  The evidence developed for summary 
judgment was that the Hansulds could lay a direct water line from the water main 
for approximately $25,000.  As a 
result, the district court determined the Hansulds had a reasonable alternative 
access directly to the water main and thus the proposed easement for a water 
line was not necessary.  We 
disagree.

 
 
[¶12]   One of the factors we analyze in 
order to determine the necessity of an easement is whether the expense of 
pursuing an alternative to the easement is disproportionate to the burden on the 
servient estate of implying an easement across the property.  Shirran, 987 P.2d  at 142; 
Corbett, 603 P.2d  at 1293.  
In the instant case, we are dealing with an underground utility 
line.  This creates only a minimal 
burden on Lariat's property.  On the 
other hand, although it would not be technically complex, it would cost the 
Hansulds approximately $25,000 to run their own water line to the water 
main.  Under the circumstances, we 
do not see why this money should be expended to essentially duplicate a resource 
already in place.  The burden to the 
Lariat property is simply not great enough.  We find that putting the Hansulds to the 
expense of laying an equivalent water line entails a disproportionate effort and 
expense to the finding of the existence of an easement for the water line by 
implication.

 
 
Issue 
II  Intent of LLC

 
 
[¶13]   Although necessary and beneficial 
to the Hansuld property, it remains to be determined whether the creation of an 
easement was intended by LLC when it originally divided the property.  The district court, in finding that LLC 
did not intend to convey an easement to a water line, looked to the express 
agreement at the time of transfer that exchanged an easement for the sewer line 
for the access easement.  The 
district court reasoned that the parties must have known about the existence of 
the water line and the failure to include a grant of an easement for a water 
line at the same time reveals an intent not to grant such easement.  We agree with the Hansulds that this is 
pure speculation on the part of the district court, unsupported by any record 
evidence.

 
 
[¶14]   A legal presumption exists that the 
intent of LLC was to convey the property in the same condition as it was at the 
time of the transaction.  Hansuld I, ¶ 19, 81 P.3d  at 219; Shirran, 987 P.2d  at 143.  Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes § 2.12 (2000) states:

 
 
Unless 
a contrary intent is expressed or implied, the circumstance that prior to a 
conveyance severing the ownership of land into two or more parts, a use was made 
of one part for the benefit of another, implies that a servitude was created to 
continue the prior use if, at the time of the severance, the parties had 
reasonable grounds to expect that the conveyance would not terminate the right 
to continue the prior use.

 
 
The 
following factors tend to establish that the parties had reasonable grounds to 
expect that the conveyance would not terminate the right to continue the prior 
use:

 
 
(1) 
the prior use was not merely temporary or casual, and

 
 
(2) 
continuance of the prior use was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of the 
parcel, estate, or interest previously benefited by the use, 
and

 
 
(3) 
existence of the prior use was apparent or known to the parties, 
or

 
 
(4) 
the prior use was for underground utilities serving either parcel.  

 
 
The 
water line meets all these factors.  
Lariat presented no evidence to adequately rebut the presumption that an 
easement for the water line was intended.  
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, we find the 
district court's decision granting summary judgment to Lariat on this issue was 
in error.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The decision of the district court 
finding no easement exists by implication for the water line, and consequently 
granting summary judgment to Lariat, is reversed.  Further, the record extant contains no 
genuine questions of material fact and supports the sole legal conclusion that 
an easement for the water line should be implied.  Thus, summary judgment in favor of the 
Hansulds is appropriate.  Because of 
the history of the feuding between these parties and the length of time they 
have spent in litigating, we hereby remand to the district court with directions 
to enter partial summary judgment in favor of the Hansulds on the issue.  See Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 
721 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Wyo. 1986). The case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 
 
 
 
APPEAL 
NO. S-09-0207

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶16]   Lariat presents the following 
issues for this Court's review:

 
 

1.            
Did 
the trial court err as a matter of law in granting Summary Judgment to the 
Appellees/Hansulds on Appellant's/Lariat's Third Claim for Declaratory 
Relief?

2.            
Is 
Appellant/Lariat entitled to Summary Judgment on its Third Claim for Declaratory 
Relief?

More 
simply, the issue in this appeal is whether the district court correctly ruled 
on summary judgment that Lariat was precluded from seeking a declaration of the 
exact legal description of the location of its access easement across the 
Hansulds' property.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶17]   This is an appeal from a summary 
judgment.  We engage in a de novo 
review of summary judgments.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008). 

 
 

[¶18]   While res judicata and collateral 
estoppel share the same goal of serving the interest of finality, they do so in 
substantially different ways.  Res 
judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of 
action as well as those that could have been litigated within the preceding 
action.  Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Wyo. Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n, 2010 WY 21, ¶ 15, 225 P.3d 1061, 1065 (Wyo. 2010); Burke v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health, 
2009 WY 138, ¶ 14, 219 P.3d 122, 125 (Wyo. 2009).  Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, 
bars relitigation of previously litigated issues.  R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline, 2008 WY 96, ¶ 
17, 190 P.3d 140, 153 (Wyo. 2008); Pokorny v. Salas, 2003 WY 159, 
¶ 12, 
81 P.3d 171, 175 (Wyo. 2003)   
More simply: res judicata applies to whole claims, whether litigated or 
not, whereas collateral estoppel applies to particular issues that have been 
contested and resolved.

 
 
[¶19]   Turning first to the applicability 
of res judicata to the instant case, as stated res judicata is intended to 
prevent repetitious lawsuits over claims that have been, or, because of an 
intrinsic relationship to matters presented, should have been, decided in an 
earlier legal action.  The district 
court in the instant case reasoned that the precise legal description of the 
access easement was a matter intrinsic to the determination that an access 
easement existed by implication.  As 
such, the matter should have been brought before the trial court in Hansuld I.  We disagree.

 
 
[¶20]   The criteria used to determine res 
judicata's applicability to a situation are: (1) the parties are identical; (2) 
the subject matter is identical; (3) the issues are the same and related to the 
subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference 
to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  Osborn v. Kilts, 2006 WY 142, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Wyo. 2006); Newell v. Trumper, 765 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo. 
1988).  While factors one and four 
are met in the instant case, factors two and three are not.  The subject matter presented to the 
district court in Hansuld I (and 
subsequently this Court on appeal) was whether an access easement across the 
Hansuld property, to the benefit of the Lariat property, existed by 
implication.  Location is a distinct 
subject matter from existence.   
The subject matters are not intrinsically interwoven, but rather 
sequential.  Only after an access 
easement is determined to exist would the location of the alleged access 
easement come into question.  A 
judgment cannot be given effect of precluding claims that did not even exist at 
time of judgment.

 
 
[¶21]   Moving then to collateral estoppel, 
collateral estoppel precludes litigation of issues actually litigated and 
necessary to the outcome of the prior case.2  The district court in the instant case 
reasoned that collateral estoppel applied because the exact location of the 
access easement was before the district court in Hansuld I when it determined the issue 
of whether the Hansulds were in contempt of its declaration that an access 
easement existed.  In determining 
the issue of contempt, the district court in Hansuld I considered evidence as to 
whether the path established by the Hansulds allowed sufficient ingress and 
egress to allow semi-tractor trailers and other large vehicles access to the 
Lariat property.   The district 
court in the instant case reasoned that the issue of contempt could not be 
determined without first determining the location of the access easement, even 
if it was not expressed in metes and bounds.  

 
 
[¶22]   Although this reasoning has a 
certain appeal, we find we must disagree.  
The issue put before the court by Lariat in its motion for order to show 
cause was simply whether the Hansulds had opened enough space for large vehicles 
to access the Lariat property.  The 
evidence was primarily on how much room was needed for large vehicles to 
maneuver in and out of the Lariat property and whether the Hansulds had opened 
the required room.  The ultimate 
finding of the district court was that the Hansulds were "not in contempt of 
this Court for failing to allow ingress and egress along [the Hansulds'] 
property for access to [Lariat's] property."  In short, collateral estoppel does not 
apply unless the issue decided in a prior adjudication was identical to the 
issue presented in the present action.  
As can be seen, the only issue was whether the Hansulds were allowing 
adequate access.  The exact location 
of the access easement found to exist by implication was not at issue.  Lariat's request for declaration of the 
exact legal description of the location of its access easement across the 
Hansulds' property is not precluded by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   The matter before the district 
court in Hansuld I dealt solely with 
whether an access easement existed by implication.  This matter is distinct from where such 
easement might be situated.  As 
such, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel preclude Lariat from seeking 
an exact legal description of the access easement in the instant action.  The district court's decision in this 
appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1W.R.C.P 54(b) states in pertinent part:

 
 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment.   

2The elements of collateral estoppel are as follows: (1) the issue decided 
in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue presented in the present 
action; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the prior proceeding.  Pokorny, ¶ 12, 81 P.3d  at 
175.