Case Title: Care and Protection of Jaylen

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13494

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13494 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF JAYLEN.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 5, 2024. – April 17, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Parent and Child, Care and protection of minor, Custody.  
Jurisdiction, Care and protection of minor, Custody of 
child, Juvenile Court, Probate Court.  Juvenile Court, 
Jurisdiction.  Probate Court, Jurisdiction, Child born out 
of wedlock.  Practice, Civil, Care and protection 
proceeding.  Statute, Construction.  Due Process of Law, 
Care and protection of minor, Child custody proceeding, 
Substantive rights.  Constitutional Law, Parent and child. 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Essex County Division of the Juvenile 
Court Department on March 10, 2021. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Kerry A. Ahern, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Dawn M. Messer, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the child. 
Jennifer L. Kernan for Department of Children and Families. 
Roberta Driscoll-Weiss, for the father, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
2 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case lies at the intersection of two 
statutory schemes involving the Commonwealth's interest in the 
welfare of children and two departments of the Trial Court -- 
the Probate and Family Court and the Juvenile Court -- with 
overlapping jurisdiction.  The first statutory scheme provides 
safeguards for the care and protection of children.  See G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 24-26.  If a Juvenile Court judge adjudicates a child 
in need of care and protection, the judge may award "permanent" 
custody to the child's parent "qualified to give care to the 
child."  G. L. c. 119, § 26.  Such an order of custody is 
subject to "review and redetermination" at the request of a 
party during the pendency of the care and protection proceeding 
at six-month intervals.  Id.  In the present case, after custody 
was removed from the mother of the nonmarital child,2 a Juvenile 
Court judge awarded "permanent" custody to the father.  The 
child filed a motion to dismiss and to close the care and 
protection case, contending that the Juvenile Court's custody 
order, without an order from a judge of the Probate and Family 
Court, was sufficient to award permanent custody to the father.  
The Juvenile Court judge denied the child's motion in light of 
 
2 The statute governing the rights and obligations of 
parents who are not married to each other at the time of the 
child's birth refers to the child as a "child born out of 
wedlock."  G. L. c. 209C, § 1.  We will refer to such children 
as nonmarital children. 
3 
 
the second relevant statutory scheme, which comprehensively 
addresses the rights and responsibilities of the parents of 
nonmarital children and provides that the mother of a nonmarital 
child "shall" have custody "[i]n the absence of an order or 
judgment of a [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [judge] relative to 
custody."  G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b). 
The current practice in the Juvenile Court to resolve these 
seemingly imbricating schemes is to require the parent, who has 
been awarded permanent custody of the child in connection with a 
care and protection action, to seek an order of custody from the 
Probate and Family Court under the nonmarital child statutory 
scheme, G. L. c. 209C; the Juvenile Court judge will dismiss the 
care and protection proceeding only after a Probate and Family 
Court judge has issued an order regarding custody of the 
nonmarital child.  We agree that this practice best reflects the 
Legislature's intent and harmonizes the two statutory schemes.  
Further concluding that, in the circumstances presented here, 
the practice complies with due process, we affirm the Juvenile 
Court judge's order denying the child's motion to dismiss the 
care and protection case in the present matter. 
1.  Background.  The relevant facts are undisputed.  In 
March 2021, following removal of the child from the mother, the 
Department of Children and Families (department) filed a care 
and protection petition in the Juvenile Court on behalf of the 
4 
 
child pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24 (§ 24), alleging neglect by 
the mother.  At that time, the mother, who never was married to 
the father, was the custodial parent of the child.  The father 
established paternity when the child was born and was listed as 
the father on the child's birth certificate.3  The father did 
not, however, seek custody of the child prior to the filing of 
the care and protection petition.4 
Also in March 2021, the mother waived her right to a 
temporary custody hearing; a Juvenile Court judge approved the 
parents' written stipulation and granted temporary custody to 
the father, with conditions.  The father has maintained custody 
of the child since then. 
 
3 See G. L. c. 209C, § 2 ("Paternity may be established by 
filing with the court, the clerk of the city or town where the 
child was born or the registrar of vital records and statistics 
an acknowledgment of parentage executed by both parents pursuant 
to [§] 11 . . ."); G. L. c. 209C, § 11 (a) ("A written voluntary 
acknowledgment of parentage executed jointly by the putative 
father . . . and the mother of the child . . . and filed with 
the registrar of vital records and statistics or with the court 
shall be recognized as a sufficient basis for seeking an order 
of support, visitation or custody with respect to the child 
without further proceedings to establish paternity, and no 
judicial proceeding shall be required or permitted to ratify an 
acknowledgment that has not been challenged pursuant to this 
section"). 
 
4 See G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (setting forth mechanism for 
parents of nonmarital children to obtain custody in Probate and 
Family Court); G. L. c. 209C, § 11 (b) (parents may, through 
agreement, determine custody of nonmarital children "provided[] 
that any such agreement . . . must be filed with a division of 
the [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [D]epartment"). 
 
5 
 
A different Juvenile Court judge (second judge) 
subsequently issued an order requesting that the Probate and 
Family Court resolve the issue of the child's custody and 
further ordered the father to file a complaint in the Probate 
and Family Court, which he did in August 2022.  The father later 
filed a motion for temporary orders regarding the child's 
custody in the Probate and Family Court matter.5 
In January 2023, the mother waived her right to a hearing 
on the merits of the care and protection proceedings; instead, 
she stipulated that she was unfit, that the child be adjudicated 
in need of care and protection, and that the father maintain 
permanent physical and legal custody of the child.  The 
department, the father, and the child agreed.  Following a 
colloquy with the mother, the second judge found the mother 
currently unfit and awarded permanent physical and legal custody 
to the father under G. L. c. 119, § 26 (§ 26), with the 
condition that, inter alia, the father abide by the parenting 
 
5 In October 2023, the underlying care and protection case 
was dismissed because a judge of the Probate and Family Court 
had granted the father temporary custody of the child.  The 
father subsequently filed a request that we nonetheless decide 
the legal issues presented by the appeal despite it being moot.  
We agreed and allowed the father's motion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Feliz, 486 Mass. 510, 513 (2020) ("we have discretion to review 
a case notwithstanding its mootness where the issue is of public 
importance and is capable of repetition yet evading review"). 
 
6 
 
plan agreement executed by the parties.6  Per § 26 (c), the order 
of the second judge was subject to review and redetermination at 
six-month intervals.7 
In March 2023, the child filed a motion for permanent 
custody to be awarded to the father and for dismissal of the 
care and protection case.  By then, the father had maintained 
custody of the child for over two years. 
The second judge agreed with the undisputed position of the 
parties that the father presented no protective concerns, and 
that the father should be granted permanent legal and physical 
custody of the child.  Nevertheless, the judge denied the 
child's motion, reasoning that an order from a Probate and 
Family Court judge was required in order for the father to 
retain permanent legal and physical custody of the child, 
despite the order she had issued pursuant to § 26, awarding 
"permanent" custody to the father as part of the care and 
 
6 The parenting plan agreement, which included a schedule 
for the mother's parenting time, was signed by the mother and 
the father in January 2023; it was adopted by the second judge. 
 
7 As discussed infra, "permanent" custody is thus not 
permanent in the colloquial sense.  See Care & Protection of 
Thomasina, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 570 (2009) (pursuant to § 26, 
order of "permanent" custody can be revisited during pendency of 
care and protection proceeding). 
 
7 
 
protection proceedings.8  The child timely appealed, and we 
allowed his application for direct appellate review.9 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  This case 
presents a legal question as to the authority of a Juvenile 
Court judge under G. L. c. 119, § 26, regarding child custody 
matters, in light of the jurisdictional provisions of G. L. 
c. 209C, regarding custody of nonmarital children.  Accordingly, 
our review is de novo.  See Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, 492 Mass. 696, 707 (2023) (questions of pure 
law reviewed de novo).  See also Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. King, 
485 Mass. 37, 41 (2020) (where "[t]he interpretive question[s] 
. . . [are] purely legal," we review them "de novo because [t]he 
duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the 
courts" [citation omitted]).  
The starting point of our analysis is the language of the 
relevant statutes, which constitutes "the principal source of 
insight into Legislative purpose."  City Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 788 (2019), quoting Simon v. State 
Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985).  "Clear 
 
8 Concluding, as did the second judge, that dismissal of the 
care and protection proceeding would in effect vacate the order 
of permanent custody, the father did not join the child's motion 
to dismiss. 
 
9 The father filed a late notice of appeal and joined the 
arguments made by the child. 
8 
 
and unambiguous statutory language is 'conclusive as to 
legislative intent.'"  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 
322, 332 (2022) (Morris), quoting Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 
Mass. 356, 362 (2022).  However, "[w]here the statutory language 
is not conclusive, we may turn to extrinsic sources, including 
the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in 
our interpretation" (quotation and citation omitted).  Morris, 
supra at 332-333. 
We strive to construe a statute "in harmony with prior 
enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law" wherever 
possible, assuming as we must that the "Legislature was aware of 
the existing statutes" (citation omitted).  Charland v. Muzi 
Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583 (1994).  See School Comm. of 
Newton v Newton Sch. Custodians Ass'n, Local 454, SEIU, 438 
Mass. 739, 751 (2003) ("In the absence of explicit legislative 
commands to the contrary, we construe statutes to harmonize and 
not to undercut each other").  Thus, "where two or more statutes 
relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed 
together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with 
the legislative purpose."  FMR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
441 Mass. 810, 819 (2004), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of 
Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975). 
b.  Statutory framework.  We begin with a review of the 
statutory framework for care and protection proceedings, G. L. 
9 
 
c. 119, §§ 24-26, as well as the Legislature's comprehensive 
scheme regarding the rights of nonmarital children, G. L. 
c. 209C. 
i.  Care and protection proceedings.  Where a child "is not 
receiving adequate care and protection, the department may file 
a petition . . . to summons the child's parent 'to show cause 
why the child should not be committed to the custody of the 
department or why any other appropriate order should not be 
made.'"10  Care & Protection of Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 785 (2022), 
quoting G. L. c. 119, § 24.11  The Juvenile Court has 
jurisdiction over such petitions.12  See G. L. c. 218, § 59 
(setting forth Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over cases arising 
under G. L. c. 119). 
If the child is adjudicated in need of care and protection, 
the judge may order the child committed to the department's 
 
10 When granting custody to the department, the judge 
generally must "certify that the continuation of the child in 
his home is contrary to his best interests and shall determine 
whether the department . . . has made reasonable efforts . . . 
to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home."  
G. L. c. 119, § 29C. 
 
11 General Laws c. 119, §§ 24-26, were enacted in 1954.  See 
St. 1954, c. 646, § 1. 
 
12 In care and protection proceedings, parents are entitled 
to the appointment of an attorney at the State's expense.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 29. 
 
10 
 
custody.13  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b).  The judge also may "make any 
other appropriate order . . . about the care and custody of the 
child as may be in the child's best interest."  Id.  Relevant to 
the present action, the judge may "transfer temporary or 
permanent legal custody" of the child "to . . . any person, 
including the child's parent," who is "qualified to give care to 
the child."  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (2) (i).  Absent 
"extraordinary circumstances that require continued intervention 
by the court, the [judge] shall enter a final order of 
adjudication and permanent disposition," no later than fifteen 
months after the care and protection petition was filed in the 
Juvenile Court.14  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c). 
ii.  Nonmarital children.  The comprehensive statutory 
scheme regarding nonmarital children governs three essential 
 
13 If the department meets its burden to prove parental 
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, the Juvenile Court 
judge may "adjudge that the child is in need of care and 
protection."  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b).  See Care & Protection of 
Stephen, 401 Mass. 144, 150-151 (1987) (department bears burden 
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that parent is 
unfit and that child remains in need of care and protection). 
 
14 The fifteen-month period is extendable by three 
additional months if the "[judge] makes a written finding that 
the parent has made consistent and goal-oriented progress likely 
to lead to the child's return to the parent's care and custody."  
G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c).  But jurisdiction over the care and 
protection petition is not lost by a failure to enter a final 
order and the findings in support thereof within the prescribed 
time limits.  Id. 
 
11 
 
functions:  paternity determinations, provision of child 
support, and custody and visitation matters.  See G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 1 (establishing "a means for such children either to be 
acknowledged by their parents voluntarily or, on complaint 
. . . , to have an acknowledgment or adjudication of their 
paternity, to have an order for their support and to have a 
declaration relative to their custody or visitation rights 
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction"). 
Regarding the first two functions -- paternity and child 
support -- G. L. c. 209C provides for concurrent jurisdiction by 
the District Court, the Boston Municipal Court (BMC), and the 
Probate and Family Court.  G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (a).15  Also with 
regard only to paternity and child support, the statute provides 
for concurrent jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court in limited 
circumstances and for limited duration.  Specifically, a 
Juvenile Court judge, in connection with a care and protection 
proceeding brought under § 24, may issue orders regarding 
paternity and child support provided that the § 24 proceeding 
commenced prior to the G. L. c. 209C proceeding and that the two 
 
15 Actions brought in the District Court or the BMC may be 
transferred by any party to the Probate and Family Court, and 
pretransfer orders of the District Court or the BMC concerning 
paternity or support shall remain enforceable as an order of the 
Probate and Family Court.  G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (d). 
 
12 
 
proceedings are joined or consolidated.  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 3 (c).16 
With regard to custody,17 G. L. c. 209C states that the 
District Court and the BMC "shall have no jurisdiction" to 
determine custody of nonmarital children.18  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 3 (a).  And, while the Legislature clearly was aware of and 
considered the pendency of a § 24 proceeding affecting a 
nonmarital child, including presumably the power of the Juvenile 
Court judge to award "permanent" custody of a nonmarital child 
 
16 Child support orders by a Juvenile Court judge are of 
limited duration.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (e) (order for support 
entered by Juvenile Court judge enforceable "during the 
pendency" of care and protection proceeding, but will expire six 
months after dismissal of proceeding unless refiled beforehand 
in District Court, BMC, or Probate and Family Court). 
 
17 In actions involving custody or visitation, the "court 
may appoint counsel to represent either party whenever the 
interests of justice require."  G. L. c. 209C, § 7. 
 
18 Indeed, where a complaint to establish paternity or 
support is filed in the District Court or the BMC and the 
complaint also includes a request relative to custody or 
visitation, it "shall be filed only in the [P]robate and 
[F]amily [C]ourt [D]epartment" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 3 (a).  Similarly, where an action for paternity or support is 
pending or was previously adjudicated by the District Court or 
the BMC, and a party thereto seeks an order relative to custody 
or visitation, the party is instructed to file an action in the 
Probate and Family Court Department to determine custody or 
visitation.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (b).  Such a filing will 
have the effect of transferring the original action from the 
District Court or the BMC to the Probate and Family Court, and 
"the case shall thereafter be heard only in the [P]robate and 
[F]amily [C]ourt [D]epartment" (emphasis added).  Id. 
 
13 
 
to a parent "qualified to give care to the child," G. L. c. 119, 
§ 26, the statutory scheme provides that, "[i]n the absence of 
an order or judgment of [the] [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt 
relative to custody, the mother shall continue to have custody 
of a child after an adjudication of paternity or voluntary 
acknowledgment of parentage" (emphasis added).19  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 10 (b).  In addition, the statute directs that where a parent 
is unfit and "the other parent is fit to have custody, that 
parent shall be entitled to custody."20  G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (c). 
c.  Analysis.  i.  Statutory interpretation.  The child 
maintains that the second judge's order awarding "permanent" 
custody of the child to the father under § 26 sufficed to effect 
a permanent custodial change from the mother to the father.  The 
child relies on G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b), which permits a Juvenile 
 
19 The statute sets forth detailed guidelines for a Probate 
and Family Court judge to consider when determining custody of 
the nonmarital child.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (a) (discussing 
goal to preserve relationship between child and primary 
caretaker parent if possible, and consideration to be given to 
child's residence during six months prior to proceedings, 
whether parent has established parent-child relationship or has 
exercised parental responsibilities, whether parents agree to 
joint custody, and whether parents can communicate and plan with 
each other in child's best interest); G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (e) 
(setting additional criteria to be considered when awarding 
custody and determining visitation). 
 
20 Section 10 also provides that "[n]othing in this section 
shall be construed . . . to affect the discretion of the 
[P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt in the conduct of [a custody] 
hearing" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (e). 
14 
 
Court judge to make "any other appropriate order . . . about the 
care and custody of the child as may be in the child's best 
interest."  He also relies on G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c), which 
permits a Juvenile Court judge to enter a "final order of 
adjudication and permanent disposition" when "intervention by 
the court" is no longer needed.  Together, the child contends, 
these provisions evince the legislative intent to permit a 
Juvenile Court judge to enter a permanent change in custody over 
nonmarital children. 
As is evident from our review of the statutory schemes, the 
child's proposed construction of § 26 would render meaningless 
the provision of G. L. c. 209C directing that the mother of a 
nonmarital child "shall" have custody "[i]n the absence of an 
order or judgment of a [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [judge] 
relative to custody."  G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b).21  Given this 
legislative directive that custody of a nonmarital child "shall" 
be with the mother absent an order of the Probate and Family 
Court, and the Legislature's express consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court over care and protection 
 
21 See G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (a) (District Court and BMC "shall 
have no jurisdiction of custody" under G. L. c. 209C); G. L. 
c. 215, § 4 (Probate and Family Court Department "shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction of actions . . . relative to 
paternity, support, and custody of minor children provided for 
in [c. 209C] and shall have jurisdiction concurrently with the 
[D]istrict [Court] and [the BMC] [D]epartments of actions 
relative to paternity or support as provided in [c. 209C]"). 
15 
 
proceedings involving nonmarital children, see discussion supra, 
the scope of the authority of a judge of the Juvenile Court in 
care and protection proceedings to issue "permanent" custody to 
the parent of a nonmarital child must be more limited than 
advocated by the child.  See DiMasi v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 197 (2023), quoting Collatos v. 
Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 687 (1986) ("The 
'statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of 
other things omitted from the statute'"). 
The limited nature of the "permanent" custody order of the 
Juvenile Court is bolstered by the fact that any "permanent" 
custody order is subject to review and redetermination in view 
of the current needs of the child "not more than once every 
[six] months" at the request of, inter alia, the department, the 
child, or the parents.  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c).  See Care & 
Protection of Thomasina, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 570 (2009).  At 
a review and redetermination proceeding, the Juvenile Court 
judge revisits the permanent custody order.  See Care & 
Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571 (2005).  "This provision 
is 'primarily, the means by which a parent or other interested 
party, including the department, may bring to a judge's 
attention a change in the situation of a child, or of a child's 
parent, which might warrant reconsideration or modification of 
the original order adjudicating the child in need of care and 
16 
 
protection.'"  Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 861 (1999), 
quoting Care & Protection of Isaac, 419 Mass. 602, 611–612 
(1995).22 
In the case of nonmarital children, whose custody under 
G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b), "shall" remain with the mother until an 
order of the Probate and Family Court to the contrary, a 
Juvenile Court judge, as the second judge did here, may conclude 
that "intervention by the [Juvenile C]ourt" is needed until the 
father can have the custody issue determined by a Probate and 
Family Court judge.  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c).  This reading 
harmonizes the Legislature's directive that custody of a 
nonmarital child "shall" be with the mother in the absence of an 
order of a Probate and Family Court judge, with the Juvenile 
Court's limited authority to issue orders awarding permanent 
custody to a parent "qualified to give care" in connection with 
the care and protection process.  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 26 (b) (2) (i).  Therefore, the second judge properly 
concluded that keeping the care and protection proceeding open 
was in the best interest of the child, thereby allowing the 
 
22 The party seeking a review and redetermination proceeding 
has the burden to go forward with credible evidence of such a 
change, but "the department bears the ultimate burden to prove 
[by clear and convincing evidence] that the child is still in 
need of care and protection."  Care & Protection of Erin, 443 
Mass. at 572. 
17 
 
father to secure custody in the forum provided by the 
Legislature for him to do so. 
ii.  Substantive due process.  The child also contends that 
requiring the father, who has been found to be "qualified to 
give care" by the Juvenile Court judge, G. L. c. 119, 
§ 26 (b) (2) (i), to obtain custodial orders in the Probate and 
Family Court infringes on the rights of fit parents to raise 
their children free from unwarranted State involvement and 
judicial scrutiny.  To be sure, the due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights protect the 
"fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of their children."  Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).  Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 
649, 652-653 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003).  
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in the 
welfare of children.  Blixt, supra at 656.  See Matter of 
McCauley, 409 Mass. 134, 136 (1991).  And the child rightly does 
not contend either that the care and protection proceedings 
delineated in G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26, or that the statutory 
scheme targeted to protect the welfare of nonmarital children 
set forth in G. L. c. 209C, are not narrowly tailored to that 
interest such that either process violates the Federal or State 
Constitutions.  See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector 
18 
 
Auth., 461 Mass. 232, 236 (2012) (to pass strict scrutiny, 
statutory scheme "[1] must be narrowly tailored to further a 
legitimate and compelling governmental interest and [2] must be 
the least restrictive means available to vindicate that 
interest" [citation omitted]). 
Instead, the child's argument centers on the claim that the 
father must be excused from pursuing a custody determination in 
the Probate and Family Court –- a process that has been 
available to the father since the child's birth –- by virtue of 
the fact that the child, while under the mother's care, was the 
subject of a care and protection proceeding during which the 
father was found to be "qualified to give care to the child."  
G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (2) (i).  In other words, the child 
asserts that the Legislature's decision to limit the authority 
of the Juvenile Court to issue custodial orders in connection 
with a care and protection proceeding involving a nonmarital 
child violates substantive due process. 
Because there is no fundamental right to a particular 
forum, we apply a rational basis review.  See Gillespie v. 
Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 153 (2011) (statutes that do not 
"collide with a fundamental right" subject to rational basis 
standard of judicial review).  Where a court reviews a law for 
rational basis, it owes the utmost deference to the Legislature.  
See Carleton v. Framingham, 418 Mass. 623, 631 (1994).  "Under 
19 
 
the rational basis standard, a statute is constitutionally sound 
if it is reasonably related to the furtherance of a valid State 
interest."  Gillespie, supra, citing Goodridge v. Department of 
Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003).  A party raising such a 
challenge has "a heavy burden to meet" under this standard of 
review," and we will recognize every rational presumption in 
favor of the legislation."  Carleton, supra, citing American 
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 190 
(1978). 
Here, the Commonwealth has an important interest in having 
custody matters involving nonmarital children finally determined 
in one forum:  the Probate and Family Court.  The Legislature 
has set forth specific, detailed guidelines for Probate and 
Family Court judges to follow.  See discussion supra.  Such 
centralization of custody rationally relates to the goal of 
producing consistent custodial decisions and facilitates the 
Legislature's goal of treating marital and nonmarital children 
equally.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 1.  Providing one forum for final 
determinations of child custody is well within the Legislature's 
purview.23  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 
 
23 We do not address the child's belated argument that the 
limits on the authority of the Juvenile Court regarding 
nonmarital child custody matters violates equal protection.  See 
Assessors of Boston v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 398 Mass. 604, 
608 n.3 (1986) ("Any issue raised for the first time in an 
 
20 
 
Mass. 312, 329 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 794 (2019) 
(Legislature may designate jurisdiction over certain civil 
actions to one or more Trial Court departments). 
We are not unsympathetic to the child's protest that the 
requirement of seeking a final determination regarding custody 
in the Probate and Family Court has resulted in some delay, 
during which time the care and protection case remains pending 
and there is at least the specter of continued State 
involvement.  But the delay cannot be placed entirely at the 
feet of the busy court docket; a father, like the father in the 
present case, who has acknowledged paternity need not wait until 
the institution of a care and protection proceeding by the 
department to seek custody of the nonmarital child.  See G. L. 
c. 209C, § 10 (b).  Rather, that avenue has been available to 
the father since the child's birth.  The fact that a nonmarital 
child may be the subject of a care and protection action in the 
Juvenile Court does not render unreasonable the Legislature's 
choice to solemnize custodial orders in a different forum.  See 
 
appellant's reply brief comes too late, and we do not consider 
it"); Allen v. Allen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 302 n.11 (2014) 
(same).  We note, however, that the Probate and Family Court has 
jurisdiction over modification of custody matters generally, see 
G. L. c. 208, § 28, and that the purpose of the nonmarital child 
statutory scheme is to ensure that such children are treated the 
same as marital children -- a goal that is achieved by 
centralization of custody decisions in the Probate and Family 
Court.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 1. 
21 
 
Exxon Mobile Corp., 479 Mass. at 329.  In fact, where, as here, 
the mother has been found to be unfit and the father is fit, the 
Legislature has directed the Probate and Family Court to award 
custody to the fit parent.  See G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (c). 
In any event, as a result of the process delineated in 
G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26, the father has had legal custody of the 
child for years.  The relief provided in § 26 for review and 
redetermination of the custody order in this case is theoretical 
only because none of the parties intends to seek such relief.  
Indeed, the department represents that it plans to close its 
case with the family in response to the child achieving 
permanency with his father.24  While the potential of State 
involvement is no doubt unsettling, nothing in the process set 
forth under G. L. c. 209C "shocks the conscience" (citation 
omitted).  Murphy v. Commissioner of Correction, 493 Mass. 170, 
176 (2023).25 
 
24 As the department asserts, nothing in the record suggests 
that the father and child "would continue to receive home visits 
from probation officers or that the court investigator remained 
involved in the case.  Nor is there any indication that a court 
appointed special advocate (CASA), or guardian ad litem had been 
appointed in this case.  And, as [the c]hild has been placed in 
[the f]ather's custody, there is no need for annual permanency 
hearings pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 29B." 
 
25 We deny the department's motion to strike the child's 
January 11, 2024, postargument letter purportedly filed pursuant 
to Mass. R. A. P. 22 (c) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1651 
(2019).  We note, however, that we have not relied on the 
contents of the challenged letter in reaching our decision. 
22 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Based on the foregoing, we affirm the 
challenged order of the Juvenile Court denying the child's 
motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.