Case Title: Rickman v. State

Citation: 103 N.E.2d 207, 230 Ind. 262

Docket Number: 28,728

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1952-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
230 Ind. 262 (1952)
103 N.E.2d 207
RICKMAN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA;
LAWRENCE
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 28,728.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 23, 1952.
*263 James W. Ingles, of Indianapolis, for appellants.
J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General; John Ready O'Connor and George W. Hand, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
*264 JASPER, J.
Appellants were charged by indictment in two counts with (1) robbery and (2) inflicting physical injury while engaged in the commission of robbery, under § 10-4101, Burns' 1942 Replacement. Arraignment was waived, pleas of not guilty were entered, and one appellant filed a notice of alibi. Trial was had by jury, a verdict of guilty under the first count was returned, and judgment and sentence followed.
Appellants assign as error the overruling of their motion for a new trial. They contend that the court committed error in admitting certain evidence over their objection.
The evidence which was admitted over objection arose out of a conversation with a detective sergeant while appellants were under arrest and while in the custody of the police. During the conversation between the detective sergeant and appellants, pages from a black notebook of the officer were referred to and then read to appellants. The record indicates that appellants have maintained throughout that they were not guilty.
The testimony in question, read to appellants, is as follows:
The detective sergeant then testified that the appellant Rickman said: "I still didn't rob the place."
Substantially the same evidence was introduced against the appellant Lawrence, except that the name of Rickman was deleted and the name of Lawrence used in its place.
The general rule is that when one charged with an offense, or against whom an accusation is made, remains silent or fails to contradict or explain the testimony, providing the circumstances afford him an opportunity to speak, then the charge or accusation is in the nature of an admission. *268 Diamond v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 285, 144 N.E. 250, 466; Fausett v. State (1942), 219 Ind. 500, 39 N.E.2d 728. However, in the case at bar the general rule does not apply, and appellants come within the exception to the rule, which is that a charge or accusation made while an accused is being held under arrest does not call for a reply or response on the part of the accused, and the charge or accusation cannot be taken as an admission. Diblee v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 571, 177 N.E. 261. Appellants being held under arrest, were therefore under no duty to reply or respond.
Appellee contends that, even though the admission of the testimony was error, it was harmless error, since sufficient evidence was introduced against each of the appellants to sustain their conviction exclusive of the testimony of the police officer. A great portion of the above testimony is hearsay, as well as being objectionable on other grounds, and was inadmissible. The evidence being inadmissible, we must therefore determine whether it was harmless. Appellants both denied the robbery, and witnesses testified as to their being at other places at the time the robbery was committed. The rule in respect to the admission of incompetent testimony, which would otherwise be reversible error, is that it may be regarded as harmless where there is other competent, uncontroverted testimony establishing the issue involved. Every issue covered by the incompetent testimony was controverted by appellants. The introduction of this incompetent testimony was prejudicial and reversible error. Caveney v. State (1936), 210 Ind. 455, 4 N.E.2d 137; Brown v. State (1934), 206 Ind. 223, 189 N.E. 133; Houston v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 409, 180 N.E. 582.
Appellee further maintains that appellants, in conversation with a police officer, while they were detained *269 under arrest, invited the reading of the testimony above set out, and, by so doing, made it admissible in evidence. Appellee cited no authority in support of this contention, and we have found none. If appellants did invite the officer to read his report, while they were detained under arrest and before trial, it could hardly be construed as an invitation to read it into evidence at the trial over appellants' objections. It could not be construed as a waiver of appellants' constitutional right to be confronted by witnesses face to face at the trial of the case.[1] Article 1, section 13, Constitution of Indiana. Constitutional rights cannot be held to be waived in any such an oblique manner.
Appellants further contend that without the incompetent testimony there was insufficient evidence. To this we cannot agree. We feel that without the incompetent testimony there was sufficient evidence on each material issue. However, because of the prejudicial nature of the incompetent testimony, this cause must be reversed.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
NOTE.  Reported in 103 N.E.2d 207.
[1]  See Right to be Confronted by Witnesses, 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, p. 888.