Case Title: PUD v. Cooper

Citation: 421 P.2d 1002, 69 Wash. 2d 909

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1966-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
69 Wn.2d 909 (1966) 421 P.2d 1002 PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, Petitioner, v. CLARKE LEE COOPER et al., Respondents. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, Petitioner, v. RONALD H. MORRIS et al., Respondents. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, Petitioner, v. ALVIN EDWARD HYMER et al., Respondents.[*] No. 39030. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. December 14, 1966. *910 Hughes & Jeffers and Harold A. Pebbles, for petitioner. William B. Holst (of Tonkoff, Holst & Hanson), for respondents. WEAVER, J. Writs of certiorari bring before us for review an order adjudicating public use and necessity entered in three cases consolidated for trial in the Superior Court of Okanogan County. The petitioner, Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County, Washington, a municipal corporation (hereafter designated as PUD), holds a license for Project No. 2149, dated July 12, 1962, from the Federal Power Commission, to construct, operate and maintain the Wells Hydroelectric Project on the Columbia River. The Wells Dam is located across the Columbia River between Douglas and Chelan Counties and its reservoir floods lands in Chelan, Okanogan and Douglas Counties, including the lands owned by defendants. 16 U.S.C. § 791a., et seq. (1964). In order to accomplish the purpose of its federal license, the three actions in eminent domain were commenced by the PUD to acquire the fee simple title to certain parcels of land owned by each of the various defendants. [1] Since an answer to a petition in eminent domain is not necessary (State ex rel. Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wn.2d 484, 490, 250 P.2d 536 (1952)), a landowner may urge at trial as many defenses as are supported by the law and the evidence. A plethora of contentions is presented by the assignments of error made by the PUD and the defendants, who are cross-petitioners; however, when the evidence is sifted and resifted, we find that the fundamental question is: does the PUD have the right to acquire in fee simple that portion of defendants' property necessary to accomplish its purpose under its federal license, or is the PUD limited to the acquisition of a flowage easement over defendants' property needed for the storage reservoir? *911 Defendants maintain that a flowage easement would fully satisfy the purpose of the license, and that the PUD is estopped from taking the fee simple title. The lands sought include the lands covered at maximum high water, plus the lands included by a "freeboard" of four vertical feet above high water. The land in the freeboard area would be affected by seepage, erosion, slipping and sloughing, and is deemed necessary in order to police and control the rim of the reservoir, remove debris, and protect against pollution, wave action and erosion. It is beyond dispute that the PUD has the authority, both by statute (16 U.S.C. § 814 (1964); RCW 54.16.020) and under its federal license, to acquire the fee simple title to the property needed for its project. The fundamental question presented by this review springs from the trial court's finding of fact 13: The record supports this finding of fact. We pass for the moment, however, a discussion of the legal effect, if any of the "impression" to which the trial court alluded in the last paragraph of finding No. 13. In addition, the trial court found, and the record supports the finding, that the PUD commissioners had considered all pertinent data when they determined it would be in the public interest to acquire fee title[1] to the land involved as opposed to a flowage easement over the portion that would be inundated. The court found that this determination was not "arbitrary, capricious or constructively in fraud," and concluded, as a matter of law, that the determination was "final and binding upon this court." This finding is supported by the record and the conclusion is well within the ambit of our definition of arbitrary and capricious. Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 684, 399 P.2d 330 (1965); State ex rel. Dawes v. Highway Comm'n 63 Wn.2d 34, 40, 385 P.2d 376 (1963), and authorities cited. *914 Based upon finding of fact No. 13, the trial court held in its conclusion of law No. 3: June 23, 1966, the court entered its Order Adjudicating Public Use and Necessity. It authorized the PUD to condemn and appropriate (a) the fee title to the lands of Earl F. and Mary L. Marsh (see note 2); and (b) the fee title to a portion of the lands of certain defendants because these tracts were of prime necessity in the relocation of a railroad. As to the remaining lands involved, the order authorized the PUD to condemn and appropriate only a flowage easement. Thus we come to the fundamental question: Is conclusion of law No. 3 (quoted supra), in which the court held the PUD estopped to condemn a fee simple title, supported by finding of fact No. 13 (quoted supra)? Stated another way, did defendants carry the burden of proof sufficient to establish an estoppel against a municipal corporation?[3] For a clearer understanding of the relationship between the finding of fact and the conclusion of law, we turn to *915 the trial judge's written memorandum opinion in which he states: We have examined the documentary evidence referred to by the trial judge in finding of fact No. 13 and conclusion of law No. 3. We find that his evaluation of it is accurate. The absence of any reference to the question of fee simple title versus flowage easement in the documentary evidence is almost conclusive that the issue was never crystallized. This is illustrated by the following: (a) The issue is not mentioned in the Petition to Intervene filed by Mid-Columbia Planners November 18, 1957, with the Federal Power Commission. Indicative that the issue did not exist is the intervenors' request that the PUD "be required to purchase and to condemn lands to be affected *916 prior to the start of the physical construction of the project." (Italics ours.) (b) After a series of meetings, a conference was held January 9, 1962, between defendants' agent, Mr. Schulke, and the PUD manager and its lawyer to discuss the contents of a proposed "letter of intent" to be given by the PUD. A 54-page verbatim transcript of the conference is in the record. There is a significant absence of any reference to the issue of the PUD taking a flowage easement instead of fee simple title. Insofar as land acquisition is concerned, the discussion centers around negotiated sales and land valuation by comparable sales. (c) April 25, 1962, after further negotiations, the PUD gave the Mid-Columbia Planners a "letter of intent." This is a most significant document. It poses 12 questions raised by Mid-Columbia Planners in the previous meetings and negotiations, and sets forth the PUD's answers thereto. Four of the questions and answers are directly or indirectly concerned with land acquisition by the PUD but do not mention or refer to the possibility that the PUD would confine its acquisitions to a limited easement. In answer to one question, the letter states: "This Commission cannot waive any of its legal rights pertaining to the condemnation of property." (d) April 30, 1962, Mid-Columbia Planners filed with the Federal Power Commission a withdrawal of their petition to intervene, stating that the differences between them and the PUD "have been resolved by and through the execution of a letter of intent satisfactory to the Mid-Columbia Planners." Again, there is no mention of the alleged agreement by the PUD to take only a flowage easement over defendants' properties. (e) October 1, 1963, a number of the members of Mid-Columbia Planners commenced an action against the PUD in the Superior Court for Douglas County entitled Stennes v. PUD No. 1 of Douglas Cy. Plaintiffs claimed that the PUD had breached the terms of its letter of intent dated April 25, 1962. The complaint contains no reference to flowage easements. *917 This action, which would have at least delayed the sale of the PUD bonds in New York, precipitated the meetings to which reference is made in finding of fact No. 13. Although defendants contend that fee simple acquisition versus flowage easements was the major subject of the meetings, it is puzzling to find no reference to this issue in the stipulation for dismissal of the action signed October 3, 1963, by all the plaintiffs. In the written stipulation between counsel the PUD reaffirms the letter of intent and agrees only As against this documentary evidence, which we deem most persuasive, defendants present notes made by Mr. Nickell of Mid-Columbia Planners on a small sheet of scratch paper at one of the meetings between the parties. The notes indicate that "flood easements" were agreed upon. Mr. Lieberg, the PUD manager, testified that the question of "fee or easement" was discussed, but stated: It would unduly extend this opinion to detail the oral evidence of the trial. Witnesses for the PUD testified unequivocably that no representations were ever made to take only a flowage easement. After a thorough examination of the record, we deem it sufficient to say that we agree with the trial court: "The testimonial evidence was evenly matched." We conclude that finding of fact No. 13 does not support conclusion of law No. 3 and the Order of Public Use and Necessity entered pursuant thereto, unless, as the court found, is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a municipal corporation. (See note 3, supra). [2] The parties agree that the burden of proving an estoppel is upon the defendants. In Heasley v. Riblet Tramway Co., 68 Wn.2d 927, 936, 416 P.2d 331 (1966), this court quoted from Stouffer-Bowman, Inc. v. Webber, 18 Wn.2d 416, 428, 139 P.2d 717 (1943), in which it is said: The Stouffer-Bowman opinion also states that [3] In the instant case we must recognize an additional rule: the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a favored one when applied to municipal corporations acting in a governmental capacity. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 141 b. We are concerned primarily with the quantum of proof necessary to establish an equitable estoppel. One text, supported by an abundance of case authority, states it thus: [4] With all of the vital documentary evidence negating *919 defendants' contention of estoppel, and "the testimonial evidence ... evenly matched," an "impression" is not sufficient to satisfy the quantum of proof necessary to estop a municipal corporation. (This conclusion is independent of the question of law suggested in note 3, supra.) State ex rel. Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wn.2d 135, 401 P.2d 635 (1965), upon which the trial court and defendants place great emphasis, is not apposite.[4] No question of fact was involved. The State Liquor Control Board had granted an application to change the location of a tavern. Relying upon the grant, the applicant spent his life savings remodeling new premises. The Board later withdrew its commitment and denied the application for change of location. The doctrine of equitable estoppel was correctly applied. Sponburgh did not involve a question of the quantum of proof necessary to prove an estoppel against a state agency or a municipal corporation. We turn briefly to the remaining issues presented by defendants' assignments of error. Defendants' contentions are these: (1) the PUD is taking lands for recreational use; (2) the PUD did not consider the effect of Canadian projects upon the flow of the Columbia River which will prevent future floods and tend to lower the extreme high water level of the reservoir; (3) the PUD does not have the right to take the fee title of lands owned by Earl F. and Mary L. Marsh in order to fulfill its contract in aid of the relocation of the town of Pateros; and (4) the survey of the project is inadequate, defective and improper. It would add nothing to this opinion to analyze each contention in detail. The findings and conclusions of the trial court dispose of the first three of the contentions adversely to the defendants. The findings and conclusions are supported by (a) the record; (b) the PUD's statutory authority; (c) the federal *920 license for Project No. 2149 of the Federal Power Commission; (d) the joint policy statements of the Department of the Interior and Corps of Army Engineers concerning land acquisition for federal reservoir projects; and (e) Order 313 dated December 27, 1965 of the Federal Power Commission. Either by design or inadvertence, the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do not pass upon defendant's fourth contention, supra the alleged inadequacy and defectiveness of the survey of the project. During trial, however, the trial judge ruled that defendants' "showing made was too inconclusive and nebulous"; and We find no error in the ruling of the trial court. In summary: The Order Adjudicating Public Use and Necessity dated June 23, 1966 is reversed insofar as it limits the Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County, Washington to the acquisition of flowage easements over the properties of defendants; in all other respects the order is affirmed. The consolidated cases are remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter an Amended Order Adjudicating Public Use and Necessity authorizing the Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County, Washington to condemn and appropriate fee title to the lands involved. It is so ordered. DONWORTH, FINLEY, and HAMILTON, JJ., and POYHONEN, J. Pro Tem., concur. March 8, 1967. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 421 P.2d 1002. [1] Out of approximately 700 parcels of land to be acquired, the PUD has acquired fee title to 600 through direct negotiations with the owners. [2] Except defendants Earl F. Marsh and Mary L. Marsh, owners of Tracts 336.0 and 366.0A described in case No. 16839, since neither of them "were parties to the Mid-Columbia Planners intervention or to the Stennes case, nor were they transferees of any parties to said matters." Conclusion of Law 5. [3] In view of our conclusion, we do not reach the question of whether a state court can, as a matter of law, prevent a federal licensee (even though a municipal corporation of the state) from exercising the federal power of eminent domain to take property necessary to the accomplishment of a public use licensed by a federal agency. See: Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 339-40, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1345, 1356, 78 Sup. Ct. 1209 (1958); Chapman v. PUD No. 1 of Douglas Cy., Washington, 367 F.2d 163 (9th Cir.1966); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 90 L. Ed. 1143, 66 Sup. Ct. 906 (1946). [4] The writer of the present opinion wrote the dissent in Sponburgh, based, not upon a disagreement with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but upon the grounds that the courts did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter.