Case Title: Jordan v. National Steel Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jordan v. National Steel Corp., Nos. 84271, 84282 (10/1/98) 
                              Docket Nos. 84271, 84282 cons.--Agenda 35--May 1998. 
           ANSEL RAY JORDAN, Appellant, v. NATIONAL STEEL 
           CORPORATION et al. (National Steel Corporation et al.,                                                                 
           Appellees). 
           Opinion filed October 1, 1998. 
 
             JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court: 
             Plaintiff, Ansel Ray Jordan, filed suit in the circuit court of 
           Madison County for injuries suffered while working as a 
           pipefitter at a construction site. Plaintiff alleged that he injured 
           his back after grabbing a defective handrail at the site. 
           Defendants at trial were National Steel Corporation (National), 
           the owner of the site; Davy McKee Company (McKee), a major 
           subcontractor that had general control of the site; and Clayco 
           Construction Company, a subcontractor that installed the 
           handrail. None of the three named defendants was plaintiff's 
           employer. 
             The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants. 
           Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, asking for a new trial 
           only with respect to defendants National and McKee. The circuit 
           court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the 
           appellate court found that the jury's verdict was against the 
           manifest weight of the evidence and remanded for a new trial. 
           No. 5--94--0666 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 
           23). Defendants National and McKee filed petitions for leave to 
           appeal. We allowed the petitions (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and 
           consolidated the appeals. Clayco Construction Company is not 
           involved in this appeal. We reverse the appellate court. 
 
                     BACKGROUND 
             On October 12, 1990, plaintiff was working at a 
           construction site of a continuous caster facility in Granite City, 
           Illinois. The facility consisted of a seven-story building that 
           enclosed a 100-foot-tall caster machine for the manufacture of 
           steel. Plaintiff was working as a pipefitter for Corrigan 
           Company, a subcontractor on the project. 
             At trial, plaintiff testified that, on October 12, he was 
           working at the facility with another individual, Bernard Mundy. 
           Plaintiff testified that he and Mundy were checking the grease 
           lines within the caster for leaks. Plaintiff and Mundy were 
           walking on a catwalk several floors above the ground. Plaintiff 
           testified that there was dim temporary lighting in the area and 
           that he and Mundy used flashlights to make their way. They 
           reached a series of rungs and steps leading to a higher level. As 
           plaintiff started up the rungs and steps, he grabbed the adjoining 
           handrail with his left hand. Plaintiff testified that the handrail 
           shifted 10 to 12 inches and that he did not expect the handrail 
           to shift in that manner. He fell backwards and hit his back 
           against the handrail. After plaintiff hit the handrail, he felt a dull 
           pain in his back. At that time, Mundy was behind plaintiff and 
           prevented him from falling. Plaintiff told Mundy that his back 
           hurt, and later that day, plaintiff completed an accident report 
           form, which he gave to his foreman. Plaintiff testified that the 
           pain in his back increased over the next several days and that he 
           also felt pain in his right hip and leg. Plaintiff sought medical 
           attention and ultimately had surgery performed on his back. 
           Plaintiff's condition improved after the surgery. 
             On cross-examination, plaintiff stated that, after the injury, 
           he continued his work for the rest of the day. Plaintiff further 
           testified that he worked for several days after the injury. 
           Plaintiff did not complain about the handrail to Mundy or 
           others. Plaintiff also testified that there were a number of similar 
           removable handrails throughout the caster and that such 
           handrails are common at job sites. He testified that they are not 
           intended to move and that he had had no previous problems 
           with any handrails. 
             Plaintiff also presented the evidence deposition of Dr. 
           Harlen Hunter. Dr. Hunter stated that he was a doctor 
           specializing in the field of orthopedic surgery. He testified that 
           plaintiff came to see him on October 29, 1990. Plaintiff told him 
           that he hurt his back on a handrail at work. Plaintiff also told 
           him that his back pain was getting progressively worse and that 
           he felt pain in his right leg. After examining plaintiff, Dr. 
           Hunter determined that plaintiff had a herniated disc in his back. 
           On November 16, 1990, Dr. Hunter performed surgery and 
           removed the herniated disc. After the operation, plaintiff's 
           condition improved. Dr. Hunter stated that plaintiff's activity 
           should be limited by pain, that plaintiff should avoid any heavy 
           lifting, and that plaintiff should avoid the possibility of climbing 
           to heights. Dr. Hunter stated, in his opinion, that these 
           limitations were permanent. Dr. Hunter also opined that the 
           accident, as related to him by plaintiff, was the cause of the 
           herniated disc. 
             In defense, National called Bernard Mundy to testify. 
           Mundy testified that he was a self-employed mechanical 
           engineer. Mundy had not been an employee of any of the 
           defendants and was testifying in response to a subpoena. Mundy 
           had been hired to check the lubrication system for the 
           continuous caster. Mundy testified that plaintiff was one of the 
           pipefitters helping him on the project. Mundy testified that, on 
           October 12, 1990, he and plaintiff were checking different 
           points of the lubrication system. 
             Mundy testified that he and plaintiff were walking on a 
           catwalk having a permanent handrail on the left side. Mundy 
           distinguished between permanent handrails and temporary, 
           removable handrails at the job site. Permanent handrails are 
           welded to the superstructure and do not move. In contrast, 
           removable handrails fit into sockets and will ordinarily have 
           some play in them. They can be removed to permit access to 
           machinery and the movement of equipment and personnel. 
             Plaintiff and Mundy approached a set of steps leading up to 
           the next chamber. Mundy testified that the handrail next to the 
           steps was a removable handrail. Mundy stated that the handrail 
           moved three to six inches when plaintiff grabbed it. Mundy 
           testified that a removable handrail that is three feet above the 
           base will ordinarily move three to six inches. Mundy stated that, 
           as plaintiff ascended the steps, plaintiff suddenly went down and 
           to the left. Mundy testified that plaintiff did not fall backwards 
           and did not hit his back against anything. Mundy testified that 
           he and plaintiff continued their work after the incident, and 
           plaintiff did not claim there was anything wrong with the 
           handrail. Mundy did not report any problem with the handrail 
           because, in his opinion, the removable handrail functioned the 
           way it would be expected to function. Mundy testified that both 
           he and plaintiff knew removable handrails were used at the job 
           site. According to Mundy, the handrail did not move beyond a 
           normal expected range. 
             On cross-examination, Mundy testified that he grabbed and 
           steadied plaintiff after plaintiff lost his balance. Plaintiff told 
           Mundy later in the day that plaintiff had hurt his back. Later 
           that day, Mundy reported the incident to the superintendent at 
           McKee. Mundy testified that plaintiff grabbed a removable 
           handrail that shifted, as would be expected. The removable 
           handrail shifted more than a permanent handrail would. The 
           removable handrail failed to prevent plaintiff from losing his 
           balance. Mundy also testified that he had built permanent and 
           removable handrails for 20 years and was therefore familiar with 
           them. 
             After hearing the evidence, the jury was instructed on a 
           premises liability theory. With respect to both National and 
           McKee, the jury was instructed that plaintiff had the burden of 
           proving six propositions: (1) that there was a condition on the 
           property that presented an unreasonable risk of harm to persons 
           on the premises; (2) that defendants knew, or in the exercise or 
           ordinary care should have known, that the condition of the 
           property involved an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on 
           the premises; (3) that defendants should have anticipated that 
           persons on the premises would not discover or realize the 
           danger or would otherwise fail to protect themselves against it; 
           (4) that defendants performed some negligent act or omission; 
           (5) that plaintiff was injured; and (6) that the condition of the 
           property was a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff. The 
           jury was also instructed on a count of ordinary negligence 
           against McKee only. Under this instruction, plaintiff was 
           required to prove that McKee performed a negligent act or 
           omission, that plaintiff was injured, and that the negligence of 
           McKee was the proximate cause of the injury. 
             The premises liability theory against both defendants and 
           the count of ordinary negligence against McKee each required 
           proof of negligent acts or omissions. The jury was instructed on 
           alleged overlapping negligent acts or omissions by National and 
           McKee. Plaintiff alleged that National was negligent for failing 
           to adequately inspect and supervise the work, failing to warn 
           plaintiff of a hazardous condition, failing to adequately 
           coordinate the work performed by contractors and 
           subcontractors, and failing to restrict use of the rungs and steps. 
           Plaintiff alleged that McKee was negligent for failing to 
           adequately inspect the work done by subcontractors under its 
           control, failing to adequately supervise subcontractors under its 
           control, failing to warn individuals about the danger, and failing 
           to restrict the use of the rungs and steps. No party has raised 
           any specific challenge to these jury instructions. 
             After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all 
           defendants. On September 2, 1994, plaintiff filed a post-trial 
           motion, seeking a new trial against National and McKee. The 
           circuit court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed the circuit 
           court's denial of the post-trial motion to the appellate court. 
             The appellate court found that the jury's verdict was against 
           the manifest weight of the evidence and reversed and remanded 
           for a new trial. In reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated 
           each of the six propositions that plaintiff was required to prove. 
           The court stated that, although there was a dispute as to the 
           exact details of the accident, certain essential facts were 
           undisputed. The evidence at trial showed that plaintiff suffered 
           a back injury following an accident at the work site. The 
           evidence also showed that the removable handrail swayed when 
           used by plaintiff and plaintiff was not warned about any hazard 
           in using the removable handrail. 
             Justice Chapman dissented. He stated that plaintiff presented 
           sufficient evidence to warrant consideration by a jury. When the 
           jury considered the matter, however, plaintiff lost. Although 
           plaintiff presented evidence supporting his claims, this evidence 
           did not require the jury to find in his favor. Justice Chapman 
           stated that the majority had usurped the jury's function of 
           deciding whether a duty of care was violated and that the 
           majority substituted its judgment for the jury's on disputed 
           questions of fact. 
 
                      ANALYSIS 
             On appeal, National and McKee argue, inter alia, that the 
           jury s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the 
           evidence.  They reiterate some of the arguments made by the 
           dissent in the appellate court. They also rely on this court s 
           decision in Maple v. Gustafson,  151 Ill. 2d 445  (1992).  
             In Maple, this court addressed the general principles that 
           apply to review of the circuit court's denial of a motion for new 
           trial. This court first discussed the deference given to a jury 
           verdict when the verdict is challenged: 
               "An initial step in analyzing the issue before us is to 
                        determine the authority of the jury, trial court, and appellate 
                        court, and their relationship to one another. Unquestionably, 
                        it is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 
                        evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and 
                        to decide what weight should be given to the witnesses' 
                        testimony. [Citation.] A trial court cannot reweigh the 
                        evidence and set aside a verdict merely because the jury 
                        could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or 
                        because the court feels that other results are more 
                        reasonable. [Citations.] Likewise, the appellate court should 
                        not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its 
                        judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and 
                        determined from the evidence which did not greatly 
                        preponderate either way. [Citations.]" Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 
                        452-53. 
             This court later stated the standard the circuit court should 
           use when deciding whether to grant a new trial. The circuit 
           court should only set aside the verdict if it is against the 
           manifest weight of the evidence. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 454. " `A 
           verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the 
           opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of 
           the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of 
           the evidence.' [Citations.]" Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 454; see also 
           Leonardi v. Loyola University,  168 Ill. 2d 83 , 106 (1995). This 
           court further emphasized the deference to be given the circuit 
           court's ruling on the motion for new trial. This deference is 
           based on the fact that the circuit court had the benefit of 
           personally observing and gauging the credibility of the 
           witnesses. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 455-56. This court then applied 
           these principles to the case before it, determined that there was 
           sufficient evidence supporting the jury verdict, and found that 
           the circuit court correctly denied the motion for a new trial. 
             In the instant case, plaintiff alleged that defendants' liability 
           arose due to a dangerous condition on the premises. In order to 
           prove premises liability, plaintiff was required to prove some 
           negligent conduct by National and/or McKee in connection with 
           the dangerous condition. Plaintiff separately alleged a theory of 
           ordinary negligence by McKee predicated on McKee's activities 
           at the site. 
             With respect to premises liability, plaintiff was required to 
           prove six propositions. First, plaintiff was required to prove the 
           existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition on the 
           premises. Plaintiff put on no expert testimony about handrail 
           and safety issues. Aside from his own testimony, plaintiff 
           presented no evidence that the removable handrail was 
           unreasonably dangerous or violated any industry or safety 
           standard. In defense, Mundy testified that the handrail moved 
           three to six inches and that this is a normal characteristic of 
           removable handrails. Mundy testified that he was familiar with 
           handrails because he had been building them for 20 years. The 
           jury may have viewed Mundy as an impartial witness and given 
           his testimony greater weight because Mundy was not an 
           employee of any of the defendants. Based on the evidence, the 
           jury could have rationally found that the handrail was not an 
           unreasonably dangerous condition. 
             Second, plaintiff was required to prove that defendants 
           knew or should have known that the handrail posed an 
           unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff testified that he did not 
           know if defendants had any notice of any problems with the 
           handrail. Plaintiff presented no evidence that anyone had 
           previously reported a defective handrail to defendants. Mundy 
           testified that he did not report the handrail because he did not 
           consider the handrail defective. After the incident, plaintiff 
           himself did not inform defendants that the handrail was 
           defective. Accordingly, the jury could have rationally 
           determined that defendants had no notice that the handrail posed 
           an unreasonable risk of harm. 
             Third, plaintiff had to prove that defendants should have 
           anticipated that individuals would fail to recognize the danger 
           or would fail to protect themselves against it. Mundy testified 
           that removable handrails were common at the work site and 
           were common in the industry. Mundy testified that it is 
           commonly known that such handrails have some play in them. 
           Plaintiff had extensive experience in working at industrial sites. 
           Plaintiff conceded that he had seen such handrails at the caster 
           work site and on other jobs. Based on the evidence, the jury 
           could reasonably have concluded that plaintiff recognized the 
           danger and could have protected himself against it. 
             Fourth, plaintiff was required to prove some negligent act 
           or omission by National or McKee. National presented evidence 
           and argument that it was not negligent by disputing the amount 
           of control it was required to exercise over the work site, 
           pursuant to contract. McKee presented evidence and argument 
           that it was not negligent because the defect, if any, was a design 
           defect. McKee did not design the caster or specify the use of 
           removable handrails. Mundy testified that the use of a 
           removable handrail was an engineering decision and he would 
           not second-guess this design decision. McKee argued that it 
           would have no reason to believe the handrail was a dangerous 
           condition. Based on this evidence and the evidence previously 
           discussed, the jury could reasonably have determined that 
           plaintiff failed to prove his case. 
             There was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding for 
           defendants on any of the issues addressed above. Similarly, 
           there was sufficient evidence to support a finding for McKee on 
           plaintiff's negligence count. The jury was in the best position to 
           evaluate the evidence and make inferences based on the 
           evidence. We find that the jury's verdict was not against the 
           manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the circuit court 
           did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new 
           trial. See Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 455. 
 
                     CONCLUSION 
             The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the 
           judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
           Appellate court judgment reversed; 
                     circuit court judgment affirmed.