Case Title: State v. Tillery

Citation: 107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1971-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
107 Ariz. 34 (1971) 481 P.2d 271 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Webster TILLERY, Appellant. No. 1835. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 19, 1971. *35 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Mangum, Wall & Stoops by Richard K. Mangum, Flagstaff, for appellant. UDALL, Justice: Daniel Webster Tillery appeals from his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and armed robbery. He was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of not less than nine nor more than ten years for the former offense and not less than fifteen nor more than thirty years for the latter. The evidence introduced at trial indicates that on January 31, 1967, at approximately 5:30 p.m., defendant and his brother, Albert, stopped at the "Cliff Dwellers Trading Post" in northern Coconino County to service their car, a 1953, two-tone Chevrolet. As defendant was pouring oil into his engine he spilled some on the concrete near the gasoline pumps. This caused an argument to flare up between defendant and Vern Baker, the operator of the Trading Post. At their trial Albert Tillery turned state's evidence and accepted the bargain offered him by the state. He testified that Vern Baker had insulted his brother, who then followed Mr. Baker into the service station office. Before going inside the defendant allegedly told Albert he was "going to get" Baker. Albert testified that he heard sounds of a struggle and upon entering the office found defendant leaning over the now prostrate Vern Baker, repeatedly striking him over the head with a wrench. Albert then allegedly pulled him away from the seriously injured Baker and together they fled. Minutes later, a patron of the cafe discovered Baker's body and, with the help of another customer, rushed him to a hospital. Although Baker had partially recovered, the numerous skull fractures inflicted by the beating have left him in a childlike condition. Dr. Ivan Wesley Kazan, the examining physician, testified as to the nature and extent of Mr. Baker's injuries: *36 Defendant and his brother were subsequently arrested while walking along the highway after their car had broken down. The initial arrest was effected by the two Utah police officers who, having been warned to be on the look-out for two suspects believed to be heading toward the Utah State border in a 1953, two-tone Chevrolet, joined Arizona officials in the search. They came upon defendant and his brother in Arizona, about one mile from the road-block which had been set up by Arizona authorities. A few minutes after placing them under arrest, but prior to giving the standard Miranda warnings, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), two Arizona highway patrolmen drove up. As they were getting out of their patrol car one of the officers called out: "Where's their car?" Defendant spontaneously responded that it was "up the road aways." The car was, shortly thereafter, found parked along the highway a short distance from where they were arrested. The car was parked in plain sight of traffic; no attempt having been made to hide the vehicle. A search warrant was subsequently issued; their car impounded and searched; and the wrench, used by defendant in beating Mr. Baker, was seized. At defendant's trial Federal Bureau of Investigation agents testified as to the results of certain tests performed on the wrench. Their testimony indicated that traces of human blood, as well as uprooted human hairs matching those of Vern Baker, were found caked onto the upper, heavy part of the wrench. Other witnesses testified as to defendant's presence at the scene of the crime just minutes before Vern Baker was found lying unconscious in a pool of blood. This evidence, along with defendant's brother's testimony, helped set the stage for his conviction. Defendant's first contention is that the trial court committed reversible error in "refusing to let him testify over his request that he be allowed to do so." We cannot agree with defendant that he was refused an opportunity to testify in his own behalf. Nowhere does the record indicate that the defendant made any request to the court, whatsoever, of his intention to take the witness stand. What the record does reveal is that defendant's counsel did bring to the court's attention the fact that defendant had, on several occasions, expressed a desire to testify. This alleged desire was first made known to the presiding judge only after defense had rested but just prior to closing arguments. His attorney noted, however, that defendant's desire was unsettled: constantly vacillating. One moment his enthusiasm would loom large; the next moment it would vanish. The following dialogue between the trial judge and defense counsel in chambers, just prior to closing arguments, clearly portrays the situation as it then existed: In State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967), we stated that where the record "clearly" shows that defendant and his attorney were in disagreement as to the attorney's determination to keep defendant off the stand, and where the record also disclosed no evidence of the defendant's later acquiescence not to take the stand, we would consider the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to take the stand reversible error. The facts in the instant case are fundamentally different from those in the Martin case. Here, there was no real disagreement. While defense counsel thought it best to keep defendant off the witness stand; the record, supra, discloses that defense counsel agreed with defendant that "if he wanted to take the stand he was entitled to take the stand and he could so take the stand." Were defendant's desires to testify in his own behalf as strong and unrelentless as he now claims they were, he would not have maintained his silence throughout the entire trial. He might very easily have directed his request to the court or made motion to have his attorney removed. In State v. Martin, supra, we also stated that our position in that case is "subject to the limitation that the defendant make his objection known at trial; not as an afterthought." 102 Ariz. at 147; 426 P.2d at 644. Defendant, not having made his objection known during his trial, will not now be heard to complain. We find no error here. Defendant's second argument is that the trial court erroneously allowed "cash register tapes, weakly corroborated," over defendant's objection to be used in supporting the state's contention that money was actually taken from the victim's cash register. We find no merit in this contention. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, as adopted in Arizona, is embodied in both: A.R.S. § 12-2262 and Civil Rule 44, 16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure. Such civil rules of evidence apply to criminal actions as well. 17 A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 272. Rule 44(q), Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows: Under Rule 44(q), supra, the trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of such business records. State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1014, 89 S. Ct. 613, 21 L. Ed. 2d 559; Builders Supply Corporation v. Shipley, 86 Ariz. 153, 341 P.2d 940 (1959). While the initial determination of admissibility is for the trial court its probative value is solely a matter for the jury to decide. The fact that the cash register tapes produced some conflicting testimony goes not to admissibility but rather to its weight. We therefore, find that no error was committed in admitting the cash register tapes. It might be noted that several witnesses had already testified to the following: (1) sales had been made during that particular day; (2) there was money in the cash register prior to the alleged robbery; and (3) the cash register was found open and empty shortly after the defendant and his brother fled. The cash register tapes were, therefore, evidence to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether or not, and how much, money was actually taken. Defendant's third contention is that the trial court committed reversible error in not ordering a hearing pursuant to Rule 250, Rules of Criminal Procedure 17 A.R.S., to determine his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. We find little merit to this contention. This Court has repeatedly held that the initial determination, whether reasonable grounds exist to order a Rule 250 hearing, is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge's decision will be upheld unless there has been a manifest abuse of that discretion. See: State v. Boag, 104 Ariz. 362, 453 P.2d 508 (1969); State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967); State *39 v. McClendon, 101 Ariz. 285, 419 P.2d 69 (1966); State v. Reid, 87 Ariz. 123, 348 P.2d 731 (1960). By leaving the initial determination to the "sound discretion" of the trial judge does not mean that he is given "carte blanche" to rule as he pleases. On the contrary: While the record reveals that defendant at times became somewhat emotionally strained, we do not feel that there was any such "manifest abuse of discretion" which would necessitate a reversal on this ground alone. Defendant's fourth contention sets forth three reasons why the search warrant, under which certain incriminating evidence was seized, should have been declared invalid and the evidence obtained thereunder rendered inadmissible at his trial: (1) defendant was not provided with a receipt for property seized under the search warrant; (2) the search warrant was executed but not returned within the statutory ten day period; (3) the evidence was rendered inadmissible because of a statement made by defendant as to the location of his car prior to receiving the standard warnings as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. While we agree with defendant that error was committed in both (1) and (2), supra, we cannot accept his contention that the search warrant was thereby rendered invalid. Even though defendant should have been given a detailed receipt listing all items seized, 5 A.R.S. § 13-1449; and the search warrant should have been returned within the statutory ten day period, 5 A.R.S. § 13-1451, these errors were not such as to render the search warrant invalid. In State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz. 46, 402 P.2d 1 (1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1022, 86 S. Ct. 1938, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1024, we held that failure to make inventory and return of the search warrant until approximately 60 days after issuance and execution thereof, instead of within the ten days allowed by statute, was not fatal in view of clear execution of the warrant within ten days. In the present case, while return was made shortly after the ten day statutory period, the warrant was executed well within the ten day period. We, therefore, hold the search warrant was valid. Defendant claims in (3), supra, that the evidence seized should not have been admitted because he gave the location of his car prior to being given the Miranda warnings. The record indicates that defendant had spontaneously volunteered the information as to the location of his car. While defendant and his brother were being placed under arrest by two Utah police officers an Arizona highway patrolman pulled up and asked generally where their car was. He testified that he had not specifically directed the question to either of the Tillery brothers but merely was inquiring as to the whereabouts of the car, known to have been used in fleeing the scene of the crime. We do not believe that the evidence seized from defendant's auto should be excluded merely because defendant believed it wise to volunteer information that his car was "up the road aways." This fact was obvious since the defendant, when arrested, was walking away from the scene of the crime but towards the roadblock. The car had to be somewhere between the point of arrest and the scene of the crime. It was inevitable that the car would soon be found: the officers already had an accurate description of the escape vehicle and defendant had abandoned the car at the side of the highway in plain sight of passing traffic. For these reasons we hold that the trial court committed no error in allowing the state to introduce evidence seized from defendant's car under the search warrant. Defendant's fifth and final contention is that a conviction may not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated *40 by other independent evidence which, in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense 5 A.R.S. § 13-139. We believe the evidence presented at defendant's trial was sufficient to corroborate his brother's testimony: (1) defendant was seen leaving the scene of the crime shortly before Mr. Baker was found unconscious and the robbery discovered; (2) the wrench used by defendant in inflicting the brutal beating was found hidden in defendant's car; (3) Federal Bureau of Investigation agents' testimony indicated that defendant's wrench had traces of blood and human hairs on it, matching those of Vern Baker; (4) defendant was found with an unusual amount of change on his person ($7.82) closely corresponding to the amount of change alleged to have been taken from the cash register. The evidence necessary to corroborate an accomplice's testimony need not be sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. Evidence which tends, in only a slight degree, to implicate defendant is sufficient and the necessary corroboration may be established by circumstantial evidence alone. State v. Springer, 102 Ariz. 238, 428 P.2d 95 (1967); cert. denied 390 U.S. 926, 88 S. Ct. 859, 19 L. Ed. 2d 986. Bearing this in mind we find no merit to this argument. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HAYS, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD and CAMERON, JJ., concur.