Case Title: Lovelace v. Anderson

Citation: 366 Md. 690

Docket Number: 70/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 70, September Term, 1999
JAMES LOVELACE, INDIVIDUALLY, ETC. v.
KENNETH ANDERSON, et al.
[Relates To The Tort Liability Of An Off-duty Police Officer And A Private Business When
The Off-duty Police Officer Is Working As A Security Guard For The Business And Tortiously
Injures An Innocent Third Person]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 70
September Term, 1999
___________________________________________
JAMES LOVELACE, INDIVIDUALLY, ETC.
v.
KENNETH ANDERSON, et al.
__________________________________________
        
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
        * Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Karwacki, Robert L.
 (retired, specially assigned), 
                                
         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
     
Filed:    December 3, 2001
* Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
In this tort case, an off-duty Baltimore City police officer, Kenneth Anderson, was
employed by a hotel as a private security guard.  While Anderson was on duty as a security
guard at the hotel, two men entered the hotel lobby and pointed a sawed-off shotgun at the desk
clerk, attempting a robbery.  Anderson, who was in the hotel lobby at the time, took out his
police service handgun, and a gun battle ensued between Anderson and the robbers.  The
plaintiff James Lovelace, a guest of the hotel who happened to be in the lobby at the time, was
struck and injured by a bullet fired from Anderson’s handgun.  
In Lovelace’s tort action against Anderson and the hotel owners and operators, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Anderson and the hotel owners and operators, and
the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  We granted Lovelace’s petition for a writ of certiorari
to consider the tort liability, if any, of Anderson and the hotel owners and operators for
Anderson’s allegedly negligent shooting of Lovelace.  We shall reverse the grant of summary
judgment.
I.
A.
The trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based on numerous depositions,
affidavits, and exhibits.  The testimony on several matters was conflicting, and we shall in our
review of the facts note some of those conflicts.  Nevertheless, as the tort action against the
defendants Anderson and the hotel owners and operators was decided by a grant of the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, we must review the facts, and all inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Taylor v. NationsBank, 365
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Md. 166, 173-174, 776 A.2d 645, 650 (2001) (in reviewing “the propriety of the court’s grant
of summary judgment * * *, the evidence, and all inferences therefrom, are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party”); Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding, 362 Md. 661, 679,
766 A.2d 617, 626 (2001) (“when considering the granting of summary judgment we examine
the facts and the inferences derived from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party”); Walpert v. Katz, 361 Md. 645, 650 n.2, 762 A.2d 582, 584 n.2 (2000);
Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 187, 757 A.2d 118, 127, 132 (2000); Williams v.
Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 113-115, 753 A.2d 41, 47-48 (2000); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md.
70, 79-80, 660 A.2d 447, 451-452 (1995), and cases there cited.
Furthermore, it is an established rule of Maryland procedure that, “[i]n appeals from
grants of summary judgment, Maryland appellate courts, as a general rule, will consider only
the grounds upon which the [trial] court relied in granting summary judgment.”  PaineWeber
v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036 (2001).  Judge Rodowsky for the Court in
the PaineWeber opinion, 363 Md. at 422-423, 768 A.2d at 1036-1037, went on to set forth
the reasons for this principle, quoting from Gresser v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 542,
709 A.2d 740 (1998), and Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658
(1988), as follows:
“‘[W]e will not speculate that summary judgment might have been
granted on other grounds not reached by the trial court.’  Gresser, 349
Md. at 552, 709 A.2d at 745.  In Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr.,
313 Md. 301, 314, n.5, 545 A.2d 658, 664 n.5 (1988), we stated the rule
as follows:
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“‘On an appeal from the grant of a summary judgment
which is reversible because of error in the grounds relied upon by
the trial court the appellate court will not ordinarily undertake to
sustain the judgment by ruling on another ground, not ruled upon
the trial court, if the alternative ground is one as to which the trial
court had a discretion to deny summary judgment.  For example,
a motion might be denied in order to allow the party opposing the
motion a further opportunity through discovery to present a
triable issue of fact.  See Metropolitan Mtg. Fund v. Basiliko,
288 Md. 25, 415 A.2d 582 (1980).  Thus, in Henley v. Prince
George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986), a case
of alleged negligent hiring, we reversed a summary judgment for
a defendant because, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, we
found a triable issue of hiring.  We would not, however, consider
if a lack of proximate cause was an alternative support for the
judgment because “[t]he effect of our ruling on the issue of
proximate cause, or any other issue not considered by the trial
judge would be to deprive the trial judge of discretion to deny or
to defer until trial on the merits the entry of judgment on such
issues.”  Id. at 333, 503 A.2d at 1340.’”
See also, e.g., Bishop v. State Farm, 360 Md. 225, 234, 757 A.2d 783, 787 (2000) (“it is a
settled principle of Maryland appellate procedure that ordinarily an appellate court will review
a grant of summary judgment only upon the grounds relied upon by the trial court”); Ashton
v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 80, 119, 660 A.2d at 452, 471; Gross v. Sussex, 332 Md. 247,
254 n.3, 630 A.2d 1156, 1159 n.3 (1993); T.H.E. Ins. v. P.T.P., Inc., 331 Md. 406, 409 n.2,
628 A.2d 223, 224 n.2 (1993); Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 588, 594 A.2d 121, 136 (1991).
B.
In December 1993, Kenneth Anderson was employed by the Baltimore City Police
Department, working 40 hours per week as an “administrative sergeant” in the southwest
district of Baltimore City.  Anderson’s duties for the Baltimore City Police Department at that
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time consisted of “administrative stuff that . . . came across my desk, with reference to
photographs, vehicles, vehicle maintenance, . . . medical.”  He was not, at the time, “on the
streets” for the Police Department.
Also in December 1993, during his off-duty hours as a Baltimore City policeman,
Anderson was employed as a security guard at a hotel outside of Baltimore City.  The hotel was
then called the Days Inn, and it was located on Security Boulevard in Baltimore County.
According to Anderson’s deposition testimony, he worked 24 or 25 hours per week for the
Days Inn.  Anderson further testified that, at the time he and other security guards were hired
by the Days Inn, the person who hired them “wanted us to work security.  She had special, you
know, assignments for us that she wanted, and one of them was to prevent robberies if we could
. . . .”  When on duty as a security guard for the Days Inn, Anderson would not wear his police
uniform but would dress in “just regular everyday plain clothes.”  Anderson further testified
that, when he and others were on duty as security guards, the management of the Days Inn “did
not want our guns to show.”  Anderson’s police service handgun was a Glock 17 nine
millimeter semi-automatic pistol which, when fully loaded, would hold seventeen bullets.  He
carried this handgun, concealed, when acting as a security guard for the hotel.  Anderson had
not obtained from the Maryland State Police a permit to carry a handgun when employed as a
security guard at the Days Inn in Baltimore County.  
During the late afternoon and evening of December 2, 1993, Anderson was not on duty
in Baltimore City as a policeman.  Instead, he was on duty as a security guard at the Days Inn,
working the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift.  He was paid by the owners and operators of the Days
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Inn for the 4:00 p.m. to midnight period on December 2, 1993.
On the evening of December 2, 1993, James Lovelace was a guest at the Days Inn on
Security Boulevard, and he had been a guest at the hotel for the previous five or six days.  Prior
to the evening of December 2, 1993, Lovelace had been introduced to Anderson, and he knew
that Anderson was one of the security guards at the Days Inn.  Michael Gordon was employed
as a desk clerk at the Days Inn, and he was on duty behind the desk during the evening of
December 2, 1993.
At about 8:10 p.m. on December 2, 1993, Lovelace walked into the lobby at the Days
Inn and stood at one end of the front desk which was about ten feet in length.  Gordon was
behind the front desk, and Anderson was sitting on a sofa in the lobby.  A few seconds after
Lovelace entered the hotel lobby, two men, later identified as Earl Jennings and Randy Terry,
and both “dressed in a scrubby fashion,” entered the hotel lobby and walked to the front desk.
The testimony as to where Jennings and Terry were standing at the front desk was conflicting.
Terry removed a sawed-off shotgun from under his coat, pointed it at the desk clerk Gordon,
and yelled “hold up.”  Jennings immediately thereafter took out a bag, handed it to Gordon, and
Gordon started toward the cash register.
Anderson testified that when Terry pointed the shotgun at Gordon and yelled “hold up,”
Anderson stood up, unzipped his jacket, got out his pistol, and announced “police.”  According
to Anderson, Terry turned around and fired at Anderson.  Anderson stated that he returned the
fire, that he was shooting with “tunnel vision,” that the “only thing I could see was that shotgun
and the two suspects,” and that he lost “sight of Mr. Lovelace.” Anderson discharged twelve
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rounds of ammunition in “about three seconds.”
Jennings was killed by a shot to his head.  Terry was shot in the back, but he was able to
flee.  Terry was later apprehended, convicted of attempted robbery and attempted murder, and
sentenced to imprisonment for 32 years.  Anderson lost three fingers from his left hand as a
result of the gun battle.  Anderson did not know that Lovelace had been shot until sometime
after the gun battle.  
Lovelace’s testimony contradicted Anderson’s in some particulars.  According to
Lovelace, after Terry pointed a shotgun at Gordon and yelled “hold up,” and after Jennings
handed a bag to Gordon, Anderson stood up and fired the first shot.  Lovelace testified that
Anderson did not say “police” before firing that initial shot.  Lovelace also indicated that
Anderson’s first shot struck Jennings, and that Jennings then fell to the floor.  Immediately
thereafter, Lovelace dropped to the floor although he had not been hit at that time.  Lovelace
stated that he was lying on the floor with his feet near Jennings’s head, and that he saw Terry
get shot and stagger out of the lobby.  Lovelace testified that he then saw that Anderson was
pointing his gun in the direction of Jennings’s head and Lovelace’s feet, that the gun went off,
and that the bullet hit Lovelace’s feet.  The bullet went through one foot and into the ankle of
Lovelace’s other foot.  After he was shot, Lovelace was able to move over to the sofa.  When
Lovelace was at the sofa, he saw Jennings sit up, clutch his mid-section, and heard him
“moaning and groaning.”  Thereupon, Lovelace testified, “Sergeant Anderson stood in back of
him [Jennings] and shot him in the back of the head and killed him.”
Lovelace was initially taken to St. Agnes hospital in Baltimore, and he was later treated
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at a Veterans Administration (VA) hospital.  At the time of his deposition in 1997, Lovelace
was still going to the VA hospital every two weeks for treatment because of the injury to his
feet, and he needed a cane in order to walk.
Terry testified that, after he yelled “hold up,” Anderson fired the first shot, that the first
bullet hit Terry, and that Terry returned the fire.  According to Terry, Anderson did not identify
himself as a police officer.  Terry stated that Jennings did not fire a gun, that Terry had both
a 12 gauge shotgun and a .357 magnum handgun, and that he did not begin shooting until
Anderson shot him.  Terry testified that he fired the shotgun twice and the handgun six times.
Terry claimed that he did not see Anderson until Anderson fired his gun.  Terry estimated that
the gun battle lasted five or six minutes.
A ballistics expert, who had worked fifteen years for the Maryland State Police Crime
Laboratory, stated that the bullet recovered from Lovelace’s body was fired from Anderson’s
Glock 17 nine millimeter pistol.
This case was further complicated by the fact that the ownership of the Days Inn
changed on December 2, 1993.  Up until sometime on December 2nd, Sage Hospitality
Resources, Inc., managed the hotel under a managing agreement with the owner, the Bank of
Baltimore, and Sage employed Anderson as a security guard.  On December 2, 1993, the hotel
was sold to Sterling Hotel, Inc., and Sterling, either then or sometime thereafter, became
Anderson’s employer.  Although the closing occurred in the evening of December 2nd shortly
before the attempted robbery, the evidence was conflicting as to the private hotel corporation
which was Anderson’s employer when the attempted robbery took place.  When asked “what
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1
We have in this opinion used the word “hotel” or the phrases “hotel owners and operators” or “Days
Inn” to refer to Anderson’s private employer or employers, whether Sage or Sterling or both.
2
An action for judicial review of the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s decision was filed in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  While the action was pending in the Circuit Court, the parties reached
an agreement that Baltimore City would pay two-thirds of the compensation award and Sage would pay
one-third of the award.  The Circuit Court thereupon remanded the case to the Commission for
modification of its prior decision.  The Commission then modified its prior decision and directed that
Baltimore City pay two-thirds of the award and Sage pay one-third of the award.  There was no
modification of the decision that Baltimore City and Sage were co-employers of Anderson at the time of
the incident.
if any participation did Sage Resources, Inc., have in the managing of the premises” after “the
closing took place,” a representative of Sage testified, “none I believe.”  Certain documentary
evidence supported an inference that Sage’s management responsibilities ended prior to the
attempted robbery. Other documentary evidence and pay records, however, indicated that
Sage’s management responsibilities extended beyond the closing to the end of the day.1  The
Workers’ Compensation Commission determined that Sage Hospitality Resources, Inc., and
the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, were co-employers of Anderson at the time of his
injury.2
C.
Certain regulations of the Baltimore City Police Department, as well as state statutory
provisions, have been relied upon by various parties in this case.  These concern secondary
employment of police officers, authority of police officers outside of their territorial
jurisdiction, and immunities of police officers.
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 729A, provides as follows:
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3
For a review of the background and legislative history of this statute, see Chief Judge Bell’s opinion
for the Court in Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 680 A.2d 1052 (1996).
“A law enforcement agency may not prohibit secondary employment
but may promulgate reasonable regulations as to a law enforcement
officer’s secondary employment.”
3
Rules and Regulations of the Baltimore City Police Department, contained in various “General
Orders” of the Department, specifically regulate secondary employment by police officers,
including secondary employment outside of Baltimore City.  General Order 6-90, paragraphs
one and two, provide for the obtaining of the Department’s permission to engage in secondary
employment and limit allowable secondary employment to that specified in the permission.
Paragraph nine of the same General Order requires a police officer engaging in secondary
employment to 
“9.  Obtain a handgun permit from the Maryland State Police, when you
are required by your secondary employers to be armed as a condition of
your employment.  In this case, you are armed under the authority of
your secondary employer.”
Paragraph eleven of the same General Order, relating to secondary employment outside of
Baltimore City, states that a police officer 
“11.
May obtain secondary employment outside the City of Baltimore,
as long as all the following conditions are met:
a.  You are acting as a private citizen, without exercising powers and
duties of a police officer.
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b.  You are not using Baltimore City Police credentials or equipment.
c.  You are not acting as a special police officer or private detective,
except when employed in accident reconstruction or arson investigation.
d. You are not operating as a private detective, guard and/or watchman
agency.”
Anderson had received permission from the Baltimore City Police Department to work
as a security guard at the Days Inn.  Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, Anderson had not
obtained a permit from the Maryland State Police to carry a handgun while engaged in his
secondary employment.  In an affidavit filed in support of the plaintiffs’ opposition to the
motions for summary judgment, Colonel Wilbert T. Travers, Jr., a former Superintendent of
the Maryland State Police, expressed the opinion that Anderson’s secondary employment was
in violation of Baltimore City Police Department regulations concerning secondary
employment, that he was not acting as a Baltimore City Police Officer during the gun battle,
and that he was guilty of gross negligence.
A state statutory provision in effect in December 1993, and presently codified as Code
(2001), § 2-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article, delineates the authority of a police officer
to exercise police powers outside of the officer’s jurisdiction.  Subsections (b) (c) and (d) of
§ 2-102 provide in pertinent part as follows (emphasis added):
“(b) In general. – (1) Subject to the limitations of paragraph (3) of
this subsection, a police officer may make arrests, conduct
investigations, and otherwise enforce the laws of the State throughout the
State without limitations as to jurisdiction.”
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* * *
“(3) A police officer may exercise the powers granted by this
section when:
(i)
1. the police officer is participating in a joint
investigation with officials from another state, federal, or local law
enforcement unit, at least one of which has local jurisdiction;
2. the police officer is rendering assistance to another
police officer;
3.  the police officer is acting at the request of a police
officer or State Police officer; or 
4.  an emergency exists; and 
(ii) the police officer is acting in accordance with
regulations adopted by the police officer’s employing unit to carry
out this section.”  
* * *
“(c) Required notifications. – (1) A police officer who acts under
the authority granted by this section shall notify the following persons
of an investigation or enforcement action:
* * *
“3.  the chief of police or chief’s designee, when in a
county with a county police department, except Baltimore City;
* * *
“(d) Immunities and exemptions; employee status. – A police
officer who acts under the authority granted by this section:
(1) has all the immunities from liability and exemptions as a State
Police officer in addition to any other immunities and exemptions to
which the police officer is otherwise entitled; and
(2) remains at all times and for all purposes an employee of the
employing unit.”
The plaintiffs have consistently argued that Anderson was in violation of subsections
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4
For a recent review of the statute now codified as § 2-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article, see
Judge Wilner’s opinion for the Court in Boston v. Baltimore County Police, 357 Md. 393, 744 A.2d
1062 (2000).
(b)(3)(4)(ii) and (c)(1)(i)(3) of the above-quoted statute, that, therefore, he was not acting as
a Baltimore City police officer during the evening of December 2, 1993, and that, for this
reason, he was not entitled to the immunities of a police officer.4  
Some statutory provisions referred to by the parties concern the immunities of
government officers or, specifically, police officers.  Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 5-
507(b)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, provides:
“An official of a municipal corporation, while acting in a discretionary
capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official’s
employment or authority shall be immune as an official or individual
from any civil liability for the performance of the action.”
See also § 5-511(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“an official of a
governmental entity, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the
scope of the official’s authority is immune” from tort liability).  We have pointed out that the
purpose of these provisions “was to codify existing public official immunity, and not to extend
the scope of qualified immunity beyond its Maryland common law boundaries.”  Ashton v.
Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 116 n. 23, 660 A.2d at 470 n.23.  We have also held that a police
officer, while acting in the scope of his employment as a police officer, is a “public official”
for purposes of the public official immunity doctrine.  Williams v. Baltimore, supra, 359 Md.
at 138-139, 753 A.2d at 58-59, and cases there cited.
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The doctrine of public official immunity under Maryland law was summarized by the
Court in James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323-324, 418 A.2d 1173, 1178
(1980) (emphasis in original):
“Before a governmental representative in this State is relieved of
liability for his negligent acts, it must be determined that the following
independent factors simultaneously exist: (1) the individual actor, whose
alleged negligent conduct is at issue, is a public official rather than a
mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct
occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to
ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties.” 
* * *
“Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort
was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of
discretion, a qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of
malice, the individual involved is free from liability.”
As indicated above, the defense of public official immunity generally applies only to negligent
acts.  In Di Pino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 49, 729 A.2d 354, 370 (1999), after setting forth the
above-quoted language from James v. Prince George’s County, supra, Judge Wilner for the
Court stated:
“Those principles apply to negligent conduct, not to intentional conduct.  In
Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), we made
clear that a police officer, who might otherwise have the benefit of this
immunity, does not enjoy it if the officer commits an intentional tort or acts
with malice.”
See also Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 117, 660 A.2d at 470 (“Public official immunity
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is not a defense to . . . intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285, 653 A.2d 436,
443 (1995).
There are other limitations to the defense of public official immunity.  The defense is
not applicable “in an action based on rights protected by the State Constitution.”  Di Pino v.
Davis, supra, 354 Md. at 51, 729 A.2d at 371.  See also Okwa v. Harper, supra, 360 Md. at
201-202, 757 A.2d at 140; Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 102-106, 660 A.2d at 463-
465, and cases there cited.  
Furthermore, unless the public official’s governmental employer itself has immunity
from an independent source, the public official’s qualified immunity does not extend to the
employer, and the employer can be held liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for
the official’s negligence occurring in the scope of employment even though the official may
be entitled to immunity.  Di Pino v. Davis, supra, 354 Md. at 48 n.6, 729 A.2d at 370 n.6;
Parker v. State, supra, 337 Md. at 286, 653 A.2d at 443; Boyer v. State, supra, 323 Md. at
582-583, 594 A.2d at 133; Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 443-445, 578
A.2d 745, 747-748 (1990); Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 355-356, 550 A.2d
947, 954-955 (1988); Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 667 n.2, 541 A.2d 1303, 1305
n.2 (1988); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 167-169, 460 A.2d 1038, 1041
(1983); James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 331, 418 A.2d at 1182
(“Consequently, if the complained of conduct is performed by a county representative while
acting within the scope of his employment but in a negligent manner, Prince George’s County
will be subject to suit for the resulting damage, without regard to the fact that the agent had
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public-official immunity”).
Another limitation to a police officer’s defense of public official immunity occurs
when, under the circumstances, a special relationship exists between the officer and the injured
person which creates a duty on the part of the officer to protect the victim.  Judge Cathell for
the Court, in Williams v. Baltimore, supra, 359 Md. at 143-145, 753 A.2d at 64-65, recently
discussed in detail this principle, as well as our earlier cases, and particularly Ashburn v. Anne
Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).  We explained in Williams, 359 Md.
at 143-144, 753 A.2d at 64 (footnotes and some citations omitted, emphasis in original):
“Thus, we recognize the general rule, as do most courts, that absent
a ‘special relationship’ between police and victim, liability for failure to
protect an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen does
not lie against police officers.  Rather, the ‘duty’ owed by the police by
virtue of their positions as officers is a duty to protect the public, and the
breach of that duty is most properly actionable by the public in the form
of criminal prosecution or administrative disposition.”
* * *
“As evidenced in the wording of Ashburn, Maryland recognizes that
liability for failure to protect an individual citizen against injury caused
by another citizen, where the officer is performing a discretionary act,
does not lie against an officer, absent a ‘special relationship.’  In the
presence of a ‘special relationship’ liability may lie and immunity may
not survive.  Thus, ‘[t]he public duty doctrine . . . is not an absolute bar to
recovery.’ . . .  As we continued in Ashburn:
“‘A proper plaintiff, however, is not without recourse.  If he
alleges sufficient facts to show that the defendant policeman created
a ‘special relationship’ with him upon which he relied, he may
maintain his action in negligence.  See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 315(b).’”
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Moreover, when a police officer is acting outside of his or her jurisdiction, the General
Assembly has appeared to require the presence of two additional circumstances as a condition
for immunity.  Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 5-605(a) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, states:
“§ 5-605. Law enforcement officer acting outside jurisdiction.
(a) When not civilly liable. – A law enforcement officer acting
outside the officer’s jurisdiction but in the State, is not civilly liable,
except to the extent that he would be if acting in his own jurisdiction, for
any act or omission in preventing or attempting to prevent a crime, or in
effectuating an arrest, in order to protect life or property if:
(1) The action is not grossly negligent; and
(2) The action is taken at the scene of the crime or attempted
crime.”
Finally, the Local Government Tort Claims Act, Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2001
Supp.), § 5-301 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, provides an immunity,
from paying a judgment, to a local government employee who commits a tortious act within
the scope of his local government employment, provided that the employee did not act with
malice.  See § 5-302(b).  This provision, however, has no application to the present case.
Employees of the Baltimore City Police Department were not included within the Local
Government Tort Claims Act until the enactment of Ch. 364 of the Acts of 1997, effective
October 1, 1997.  Section 2 of Ch. 364 provides that “this Act shall be construed only
prospectively and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or application to any
cause of action arising before the effective date of this Act.”
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D.
This action commenced when James Lovelace and the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a complaint for compensatory
tort damages, based on the injury Lovelace suffered during the evening of December 2, 1993,
at the Days Inn.  Named as defendants were Kenneth Anderson, Sage Hospitality Resources,
Inc., Sterling Hotel, Inc., the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Police
Department, the Baltimore City Police Commissioner, and the State of Maryland.  The
plaintiffs asserted that Anderson acted both with negligence and with gross negligence.  The
plaintiffs alleged, in the alternative, that each of the defendants (other than Anderson) was
Anderson’s employer at the time and that Anderson was acting in the scope of his employment
for such defendant.
Upon the motion of the defendant Sterling Hotel, Inc., the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
Thereafter, motions to dismiss were filed on behalf of the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, the Baltimore City Police Department, the Baltimore City Police Commissioner,
and the State of Maryland.  The motions to dismiss on behalf of the Mayor and City Council,
the Police Department, and the Police Commissioner, asserted that the complaint failed to
state a claim against the movants upon which relief could be granted, that the movants were
protected by immunity, that the movants were not proper defendants, and that, for purposes of
respondeat superior tort liability, the governmental employer of Anderson on December 2,
1993, was not Baltimore City but was the State of Maryland.  See Clea v. City of Baltimore,
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supra, 312 Md. at 666-671, 541 A.2d at 1305-1307.  In the motion to dismiss by the State of
Maryland, the State asserted, inter alia, that it was entitled to governmental immunity and that
“[t]he State of Maryland is not vicariously liable for alleged tortious conduct of a police
officer who did not act in the scope of his public duties.”  By separate orders entered at various
times, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted the motions to dismiss filed by the
Mayor and City Council, the Police Department, the Police Commissioner, and the State of
Maryland.
After extensive discovery, including numerous depositions, and the filing of affidavits
and exhibits, the defendants Anderson, Sage, and Sterling filed motions for summary judgment.
Following a hearing, the Circuit Court on June 12, 1998, rendered a final judgment granting
the motions for summary judgment.  In its judgment order, the court determined that Anderson
was at the time of the gun battle working as a security guard for the hotel and not as a police
officer.  The summary judgment was premised upon the assumption that there was sufficient
evidence to show that Anderson acted negligently, but the court held that there was no evidence
to show that his action “was intentional, [or] with malice or gross negligence.”  The court
further held that “Anderson, though working as a security guard at the time, possessed the same
immunity from suit as if he [were] working as a police officer.”  Since, in the court’s view,
there was no evidence of malice or gross negligence, Anderson was held to be immune from
a tort suit based on simple negligence.  The Circuit Court’s final judgment on June 12, 1998,
did not expressly purport to resolve the conflict as to whether Sage or Sterling or both were
Anderson’s employers when the shooting incident took place, and the order simply granted
-19-
5
At an earlier stage in the case, and despite the conflicting evidence, the Circuit Court did appear to
make an interlocutory ruling that Sterling, not Sage, was Anderson’s employer.
In addition, at an earlier stage in the proceedings Lovelace had argued that Sage was collaterally
estopped from asserting that it was not Anderson’s employer when the attempted robbery took place.
Lovelace relied on the adjudication in the workers’ compensation case that Sage was Anderson’s co-
employer at the time of the gun battle.  The Circuit Court, during a hearing, rejected the collateral estoppel
argument, apparently being of the view that “Maryland has never had a rule of . . . issue preclusion” based
on adjudications in workers’ compensation proceedings.  The Circuit Court’s June 12, 1998, final judgment
order did not deal with the issue, since the court was of the view that Anderson’s hotel employer would
be entitled to immunity regardless of whether that employer was Sage or Sterling or both.  Presumably
because it was not an issue underlying the grant of summary judgment, the collateral estoppel issue has not
been raised on this appeal.  The issue could, of course, be raised in the Circuit Court after remand.
summary judgment in favor of both Sage and Sterling, as well as Anderson.  The court seemed
to be of the view that Anderson’s qualified immunity extended to his hotel employer.5 
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  Lovelace v.
Anderson, 126 Md. App. 667, 730 A.2d 774 (1999).  While agreeing with the Circuit Court
that there was no evidence of malice or gross negligence on the part of Anderson, the Court
of Special Appeals’ reasoning differed substantially from that of the trial court.  Whereas the
Circuit Court had held that, during the gun battle, Anderson was acting as a private security
guard for the hotel and not as a police officer, the Court of Special Appeals held that when the
hold up began, “Anderson reverted to his police officer status,”  that he “was not the agent of
either Sage or Sterling,” and that he was acting exclusively “within the scope of his
employment as a law officer at the time of the shooting,” Lovelace v. Anderson, supra, 126
Md. App. at 689, 705, 707-708, 730 A.2d at 786, 795, 796.  Since, in the Court of Special
Appeals’ view, Anderson was acting solely as a police officer, the appellate court concluded
-20-
that neither Sage nor Sterling were liable under the principle of respondeat superior, and that
Anderson was entitled to public official immunity.
Relying on the holding of Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 305,
396 A.2d 255, 262 (1979), that a governmental employer “cannot be held liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior” when the governmental employee individually is not liable
because of public official immunity, the Court of Special Appeals held that “there can be no
liability on the part of [Anderson’s] employers, the State of Maryland,” the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Police Department, and the Police Commissioner.
Lovelace v. Anderson, supra, 126 Md. App. at 707, 730 A.2d at 796.  The Court of Special
Appeals overlooked the fact that the above-mentioned holding in Bradshaw v. Prince
George’s County, supra, had been expressly overruled in James v. Prince George’s County,
supra, 288 Md. at 331, 418 A.2d at 1182.  See De Pino v. Davis, supra, 354 Md. at 48 n.6,
729 A.2d at 370 n.6.
The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari presenting several questions, and
this Court granted the petition.  Lovelace v. Anderson, 355 Md. 610, 735 A.2d 1105 (1999).
None of the defendants filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari.  Our order granting the
certiorari petition neither limited nor expanded the issues for review by this Court.
II.
The plaintiffs baldly assert in their brief that the Circuit Court erred in granting the
motions to dismiss filed on behalf of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore
City Police Department, the Police Commissioner, and the State of Maryland, and that “the
-21-
judgments in favor of all of the defendants should be reversed.”  (Petitioners’ brief at 41, 49).
Nevertheless, the questions presented in the certiorari petition, and repeated in the plaintiffs’
brief, relate solely to the liability of Anderson, Sage, and Sterling.  Furthermore, the arguments
in the certiorari petition and in the plaintiffs’ brief are directed exclusively at the tort liability
of Anderson, Sage, and Sterling.
The plaintiffs contend that it was error to grant the motions for summary judgment filed
by Anderson, Sage, and Sterling, because there were numerous material facts in dispute relating
to the liability of these three defendants.  In addition, the plaintiffs maintain that the evidence
was sufficient to show that  Anderson was guilty of ordinary negligence and, alternatively,
gross negligence.  The plaintiffs further argue that, for several reasons, neither Anderson nor
the hotel owners and operators were entitled to any form of immunity.  The plaintiffs claim
that Anderson was not acting as a police officer during the evening of December 2, 1993, that
Anderson was acting in the scope of his employment as a security guard for the hotel, and that
he was, during the attempted robbery and gun battle, doing precisely what he was hired to do
and paid to do for the hotel.  A principal thrust of the plaintiffs’ argument is that Anderson was
acting exclusively for the hotel owners and operators during the evening of December 2, 1993.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs assert that Anderson was acting within the scope of his employment
for both the hotel and the Police Department during the incident on December 2nd, and that,
therefore, a jury could properly find that Sage, or Sterling, or both, were liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.  The plaintiffs do not in any manner deal with the holdings of
the courts below or the defendants’ arguments as to why Baltimore City, the Police
-22-
Department, the Police Commissioner, or the State, are not liable in tort for Anderson’s
actions during the evening of December 2, 1993.
Maryland Rule 8-131(b) provides that, in reviewing the decision of an intermediate
appellate court, unless otherwise provided by order of this Court, “the Court of Appeals
ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any
cross-petition . . . .”  For a detailed discussion of this provision, see Judge Cathell’s opinion
for the Court in Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 319-325, 718 A.2d 588, 594-597 (1998).  As
the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari presented no issues relating to the possible tort
liability of Baltimore City, the Police Department, the Police Commissioner, and the State,
we shall not in this opinion decide whether the motions to dismiss filed by these defendants
should have been granted.
In addition, even if a question concerning the liability of these four governmental
defendants had been included in the certiorari petition, the absence of any argument in the
petitioners’ brief dealing with the possible liability of these defendants would ordinarily
preclude our consideration of such issue.  In another case involving an attempt to impose tort
liability upon the Baltimore City Police Department and the Police Commissioner, based upon
the tortious conduct of a police officer, we stated (
Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md.
at 671, 541 A.2d at 1307, emphasis deleted):
“The issue of the Police Department’s and the Commissioner’s liability
or non-liability, as state agencies, for Officer Leonard’s conduct has
never been raised in this case.  The pertinent principles, considerations,
and authorities have been entirely overlooked.  Absent any briefing or
-23-
argument whatsoever concerning the issue, we decline to decide it.”
Consequently, for the reasons set forth above, we shall affirm the judgment in favor of
Baltimore City, the Baltimore City Police Department, the Baltimore City Police
Commissioner, and the State of Maryland, without directly ruling upon any of the issues raised
or discussed in the courts below relating to the liability or non-liability of those four
defendants.
III.
We shall next address the Circuit Court’s holding that, although Anderson was working
as a security guard for the hotel and not as a police officer during the attempted robbery,
Anderson nevertheless was entitled to a police officer’s public official immunity and that such
immunity extended to his private employer or employers.
Preliminarily, as we have previously discussed, even if the defense of public official
immunity were available to Anderson, it would not extend to his employer or employers.
Di Pino v. Davis, supra, 354 Md. at 48 n.6, 729 A.2d at 370 n.6; James v. Prince George’s
County, supra, 288 Md. at 332, 418 A.2d at 1182 (“the master remains liable for the servant’s
conduct even though the servant is himself not liable because of a personal immunity”).
Moreover, while acting as a private security guard for the hotel, Anderson was clearly
not entitled to public official immunity.  One is entitled to public official immunity only when
he is acting as “a public official rather than” in some other capacity and only when “his tortious
conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in
-24-
furtherance of his official duties,” James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 323,
418 A.2d at 1178 (emphasis added and deleted).  See, e.g., Di Pino v. Davis, supra, 354 Md.
at 48-49, 729 A.2d at 370; Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 672-673, 541 A.2d
at 1308; Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 306 Md. at 622-624, 510 A.2d at 1080-
1081.
Privately employed security guards, however, are not entitled to immunity when their
negligence in attempting to prevent crimes or apprehend criminals is a proximate cause of
injury to innocent third persons.  Giant Food v. Scherry, 51 Md. App. 586, 591, 444 A.2d 483,
487 (1982), and cases there cited.  See also Giant Food v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 645, 640
A.2d 1134, 1139-1140 (1994), discussing with approval the Scherry opinion.  
The Scherry case involved an armed robbery of a cashier at a store in a shopping center.
An armed security guard employed by the store, and on duty at the store, fired two shots at the
fleeing robber.  One of the shots went through a window at the plaintiff’s residence across the
street from the shopping center, and caused injury to the plaintiff.  The Court of Special
Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the store.  After pointing out
that Maryland law gave the security guard the right and authority to arrest the robber, Judge
Wilner for the Court of Special Appeals continued (51 Md. App. at 591, 444 A.2d at 487):
“These kinds of situations, in which an innocent bystander is injured
or killed in the course of an attempt to apprehend a criminal or defend an
attack on one’s person or property, arise in a variety of contexts – some
more life-threatening to the actor than others, some involving felons and
felonies, others involving misdemeanants and misdemeanors.  The
context is important in determining the reasonableness of the action
-25-
6
Even if an off-duty police officer, while working in the scope of employment as a security guard for
a private business, were somehow entitled to public official immunity, such immunity would not apply under
the facts of this case.  As earlier mentioned, a police officer is not entitled to the qualified immunity if there
is a special relationship between the victim and the police officer.  Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101,
143-144, 753 A.2d 41, 64-65 (2000); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078
(1986).  There does exist a special relationship between an innkeeper’s employees and the innkeeper’s
guests.  As discussed in Part IV of this opinion, infra, an innkeeper and the innkeeper’s employees owe
a duty to the inn’s guests to protect the guests and their property.
taken, but the basic standard seems to be the same.  Where the evidence
shows that the actor . . . acted without due regard to the danger caused to
innocent third parties, he (and his employer) have been held liable.”
A  person, including an off-duty public official, who negligently injures someone while
acting in the scope of his or her employment for a private employer, is not entitled to public
official immunity.6
IV.
The theory of the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmance of the summary judgment was
that, when the attempted robbery began during the evening of December 2, 1993, Anderson’s
status automatically changed from a privately-employed security guard to a Baltimore City
police officer, that he was acting exclusively as a Baltimore City police officer, and that he
“was not the agent of either Sage or Sterling,” 126 Md. App. at 705, 730 A.2d at 795.  
In light of the evidence presented in the Circuit Court, as well as the pertinent
regulations and statutory provisions, Lovelace makes a forceful argument in support of the
Circuit Court’s holding that Anderson was acting entirely as a private security guard for the
hotel and not as a Baltimore City police officer.  At the very least, a factual matter for the jury
-26-
on this issue may have been presented.  See Great Atlantic Tea v. Imbraguglio, 346 Md. 573,
590, 697 A.2d 885, 893 (1997) (“Ordinarily, the existence of the employer/employee
relationship is a question reserved for the fact finder”).  Nonetheless, solely for purposes of
these appellate proceedings, we shall assume arguendo that Anderson was acting in the scope
of his employment as a Baltimore City police officer during the incident on the evening of
December 2, 1993.  We shall further assume arguendo that he was not acting maliciously or
with gross negligence. 
What the Court of Special Appeals’ holding overlooked, however, is the settled
principle of Maryland law that “[a] worker may simultaneously be the employee of two
employers.”  Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, 304 Md. 67, 79, 497 A.2d 803, 809
(1985).  See also, e.g., Great Atlantic Tea v. Imbraguglio, supra, 346 Md. at 591, 697 A.2d
at 894 (“That an employee can concurrently serve two employers is not a novel concept in
Maryland law”); Auto. Trade Ass’n v. Harold Folk Enterprises, 301 Md. 642, 659, 484 A.2d
612, 621 (1984) (“As an initial matter, we recognize ‘that, under certain circumstances, a
person performing a given function simultaneously may be the employee of two employers’”);
Comptroller v. Atlantic Supply Co., 294 Md. 213, 222, 448 A.2d 955, 960 (1982); Keitz v.
National Paving Co., 214 Md. 479, 491, 134 A.2d 296, 301 (1957).
Thus, in a case somewhat like the present one in that a workers’ compensation
proceeding had determined that one entity was the employer when an incident occurred, and
the issue in a later tort case was whether a different entity was the employer for purposes of
respondeat superior liability, this Court explained (Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221,
-27-
228-229, 443 A.2d 98, 102 (1982)):
“The relevant issue actually litigated in the workmen’s compensation
proceeding was Alden’s status as an employer and the fact determined
there was that Alden was Mackall’s employer.  Zayre’s status as
Mackall’s employer was not in issue and, therefore, was not determined
in the workmen’s compensation proceeding.  The issue presented in the
subsequent tort action was Zayre’s status as Mackall’s employer, and the
fact to be determined there was whether Zayre, as well as Alden, was her
employer.  Accordingly, under the applicable principle of collateral
estoppel, Zayre was not prevented, in the subsequent tort action, from
litigating its status as Mackall’s employer.”
* * *  
“This 
Court 
has 
repeatedly 
recognized 
that, 
under 
certain
circumstances, a person performing a given function simultaneously may
be the employee of two employers.  Keitz v. National Paving &
Contracting Co., 214 Md 479, 491, 134 A.2d 296, 301 (1957); Baur v.
Calic, 166 Md. 387, 398-401, 171 A. 713, 717-19 (1934); see Greer
Lines Co. v. Roberts, 216 Md. 69, 80-81, 139 A.2d 235, 240-41 (1958).
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.  E.g.
Nash v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 383 Mich. 136, 143, 174 N.W.2d 818,
820 (1970); Antonini v. Hanna Indus., 94 Nev. 13, 17, 573 P.2d 1184,
1187 (1978); DeNoyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273, 275, 116 N.E.
992, 992 (1917); Janikowski v. Yardley’s of London, Inc., 11 A.D.2d
577, 577, 201 N.Y.S.2d 157, 159 (1960).”
After pointing out that, for the period when the alleged tortious act occurred, Zayre had hired
the employee, paid her wages, etc., this Court in Mackall concluded that “[t]he evidence was
more than sufficient to support an inference that both Alden and Zayre simultaneously were
Mackall’s employers.”  293 Md. at 231, 443 A.2d at 103. 
This Court has frequently discussed the various factors or criteria for determining
whether an employer-employee relationship existed at a particular time and whether the
-28-
employee’s actions were within the scope of that employment relationship. In Great Atlantic
Tea v. Imbraguglio, supra, 346 Md. at 590-591, 697 A.2d at 893-894, Judge Karwacki for
the Court listed five principal criteria for determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship:
“They include ‘(1) the power to select and hire the employee, (2) the
payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control
the employee’s conduct, and (5) whether the work is part of the regular
business of the employer.’ [Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products,
supra,] 304 Md. at 77-78, 497 A.2d at 808-09 (citing Mackall v. Zayre
Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103 (1982); see also Keitz v.
National Paving and Contracting Co., 214 Md. 479, 491, 134 A.2d
296, 301 (1957).”
As to whether a particular action is within the scope of the employment relationship,
we have delineated numerous considerations, including whether the action was in furtherance
of the employer’s business or was personal to the employee, whether it occurred during the
period when the employee was on duty for the employer, whether it related to the employee’s
duties, whether the action was in a broad sense authorized by the employer, whether the
employer had reason to expect that the type of action might occur, whether it occurred in an
authorized locality, etc.  See Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 255-260, 587 A.2d 467,
470-473 (1991), and cases there cited.
In applying these and other factors, “there are few, if any, absolutes.”  Sawyer v.
Humphries, 322 Md. at 255, 587 A.2d at 471.  Moreover, in ascertaining whether there is an
employer-employee relationship and whether certain action is within the scope of that
-29-
relationship, “the same basic principles and considerations, applicable to employees generally,
are used to determine whether ‘police officers, [and] watchmen . . .’ are acting within the scope
of their employment.  See Cox v. Prince George’s County, supra, 296 Md. at 170-171, 460
A.2d at 1042 . . . .”  Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. at 258, 587 A.2d at 472.
Turning to the present case, the evidence that was before the Circuit Court for purposes
of the motions for summary judgment was more than sufficient to show an employment
relationship between Anderson and the hotel during the attempted robbery, and to show that
Anderson was acting within the scope of that employment relationship, even assuming
arguendo that he was also acting as a Baltimore City police officer.  Anderson was hired as
a security guard by the hotel, and he was paid by the hotel for the entire period of time in
question.  He was on duty as a hotel employee at 8:10 p.m. on the evening of December 2,
1993.  The hotel had the authority to discharge him as a hotel security guard.
 
The evidence also shows that providing security for the hotel and its guests was part
of the hotel’s business.  Anderson himself testified that, when he was hired, he was told that
one of his duties for the hotel was to prevent robberies if he could.  In addition, under
Maryland common law, an innkeeper owes a duty of providing security for the innkeeper’s
guests and their baggage, and is liable if that duty is breached by the negligence of the
innkeeper or the innkeeper’s employees.  See, e.g., Roueche v. Hotel Braddock, 164 Md. 620,
622-628, 165 A. 891, 892-895 (1933); Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130, 143-147 (1867);
Giles v. Faunterloy, 13 Md. 126, 137 (1859); Apper v. Eastgate Associates, 28 Md. App.
581, 586, 347 A.2d 389, 392-393 (1975), modified on other grounds and affirmed, 276 Md.
-30-
7
As pointed out by Chief Judge Orth for the Court of Special Appeals in the Apper case, 28 Md. App.
at 586 n.7, 374 A.2d at 392-393 n.7, and discussed by this Court in the Hotel Braddock case, 164 Md.
at 622-628, 165 A. at 892-895, and the Treiber case, 27 Md. at 143-147, at an early period under the
common law, an innkeeper was an insurer of the safety of the innkeeper’s guests and their baggage, and
was strictly liable for injury to the guests or their baggage.  The absolute duty of an innkeeper was later
changed to a duty to use reasonable care.
698, 350 A.2d 661 (1976).  See also Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529, 180 A.2d 677,
679 (1962).7
Furthermore, Anderson’s testimony concerning the duties for which he was hired by the
hotel, the manner of dress, the hotel management’s direction that security guards’ handguns
be concealed, and the assignments given to Anderson and other security guards, showed the
type of control which is typical of an employer-employee relationship.  Anderson testified that
the hotel management person who hired and supervised the security guards
“wanted us to work security.  She had special, you know, assignments for
us that she wanted and one of them was to prevent robberies, if we could,
and police the lot to prevent vehicle thefts, thefts from the vehicles, and
wanted us to check on rooms because people would more or less get
done with the room and pass the key on to a friend.
“We had to check the rooms and make sure the rooms were empty
and supposed to be empty.  We also worked as guest service, if people
needed towels or soap in their rooms, we did that, too.  We had a
multitude of assignments there.”
The hotel management may not have exercised control over all of the details of how a security
guard would attempt to stop a robbery in progress, regardless of whether the security guard was
an off-duty police officer or was a trained security guard who was not connected with a police
-31-
department.  Nevertheless, such control is not a prerequisite for an employer-employee
relationship.  What this Court said in Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts, 216 Md. 69, 81, 139 A.2d
235, 240-241 (1958), is fully  applicable to the employment of a security guard trained in law
enforcement:
“It was suggested by the companies that they could not exercise
control over Jarvis because of a lack of knowledge of mechanical work.
The right to control may exist, although the ability to control does not.
The fact that a particular occupation involves technical skill and training,
which put control of the details beyond the capacity of the employer,
while a circumstance to be considered, does not require a conclusion of
law that no member of a trade or profession involving skill or technical
training can be an employee.”
The evidence that was before the Circuit Court for purposes of ruling on the motions
for summary judgment demonstrated that, during the attempted robbery of the Days Inn,
Anderson was employed by the hotel as a security guard and was acting within the scope of that
employment.  In preventing the completion of an armed robbery, Anderson was performing one
of the specific duties for which he had been hired by the hotel management.
V.
Neither the Circuit Court’s holding nor the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in the
case at bar can be reconciled with settled principles of Maryland agency law.  To reiterate, the
same basic principles of Maryland agency law, for determining whether actions of employees
generally are within the scope of particular employment relationships, are equally applicable
to police officers.  Sawyer v. Humphries, supra, 322 Md. at 258, 587 A.2d at 472; Cox v.
-32-
Prince George’s County, supra, 296 Md. at 170-171, 460 A.2d at 1042-1043.  Under those
principles of Maryland agency law, the plaintiffs clearly produced sufficient evidence that
Anderson was acting within the scope of his employment for the hotel to preclude summary
judgment in favor of the hotel.
In other jurisdictions which apply normal principles of agency law under circumstances
similar to those in the present case, courts regularly hold that the off-duty police officers and
their private employers are liable for injuries resulting from the police officer’s tortious
conduct in the scope of the officer’s secondary private employment.  For example, in Dillard
Department Stores v. Stuckey, 256 Ark. 881, 511 S.W.2d 154 (1974), the plaintiff, while
shopping at the defendant’s department store, was arrested for alleged shoplifting by an off-
duty police officer employed by the store as a security guard.  In affirming a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against the store, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated (256 Ark. at 883,
511 S.W.2d at 155):
“In essence the appellant contends that . . . an employer, by engaging
an off-duty policeman as its agent, can immunize itself from liability for
an unlawful arrest whenever the officer acts upon his own initiative.  That
contention, however, runs counter to the basic rule that a principal is
liable for its agent’s torts when committed in the course of his
employment and for the principal’s benefit.”
As indicated by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the application of special rules for off-duty
police officers, engaged in secondary private employment, grants to the private employers an
immunity which cannot be squared with traditional agency principles.
-33-
Moreover, there is little rational basis for exempting off-duty police officers employed
as security guards and their private employers from liability for the tortious acts of the
security guards, but not exempting former police officers, retired police officers, trained
security guards, and their employers, from liability.  Several cases applying traditional agency
principles have made this precise point.  Long ago, one federal judge expressed the following
view (Kusnir v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 201 F. 146, 150-151 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)):
“Where private parties, even with the consent of the state, employ its
police officers to represent them, and do special work for them in
protecting and preserving their property and maintaining order on their
premises, and such officers are engaged in the performance of their
duties to their employers, and are acting within the scope of their powers
and duties, they become and are the servants and employes of such
private parties and their representatives, and for [tortious] acts, . . .
unnecessarily committed by them in the line of their duty, and when
engaged in the performance of such duties, to the injury of others, the
master or employer is liable.  Employers cannot escape responsibility
for the [tortious] acts of persons employed by them, and representing
them, and paid by them, by employing constables, marshals, sheriffs, and
peace officers of the state, provided such . . . acts are done by such
representatives where and while acting within the general scope of the
authority conferred on them.  To establish a rule to the contrary would
lead to the grossest acts of infamy and outrage, and destroy, as it ought,
respect for government and courts.
“The state would not be liable for such acts, and if the employer –
that is, the master, who makes the officer his representative for his
private purposes – is not, because the wrongdoer is a police officer, such
officer may perform the work he is employed to do in the most grossly
careless, wanton, and willful manner, fraught with great peril to others,
and the injured party must look to the wrongdoer, usually of no pecuniary
responsibility , and not the employer, who employed the wrongdoer to
do the very acts complained of . . . .”
-34-
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in White v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, 33 S.W.3d
713, 721 (Tenn. 2000), pointed out that cases applying special rules, and refusing to apply
traditional agency principles, to the private secondary employment of off-duty police officers,
have “resulted in over-insulating private employers who would otherwise be subject to liability
if the security guard were not also employed by a municipal police department.”  The court
continued (33 S.W.3d at 722): “Moreover, eliminating vicarious liability for private employers
who hire off-duty police officers encourages such employers to shift their risk of liability to
the municipality solely because their employees are also employees of the local police
department.”  The Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded (id. at 722):
“Under the . . . rule [applied in some states], the private employer may
take advantage of the benefits of hiring an off-duty officer without
assuming any of the normal risks of liability associated with hiring non-
officer employees.  We simply do not believe that in many cases, the
risk of loss is properly shifted from the private employer to the
municipality or to an innocent plaintiff, and we therefore disagree with
the public policy rationales advanced by many of our sister jurisdictions
. . . on this issue.
* * * 
“After due consideration, we conclude that issues of employer
liability for the acts of off-duty police officers are best resolved under
traditional principles of Tennessee agency law.  Use of agency principles
in Tennessee to resolve this complex issue has several advantages.  First,
because traditional agency principles have been used in this state for two
centuries, they possess the advantages of experience and straightforward
application.  In addition, these principles do not depend upon the splitting
of legal hairs into meaningless distinctions, which is a hallmark of many
of the other approaches.”
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See also, e.g., J. J. Newberry Co. v. Smith, 227 Ala. 234, 236-237, 149 So. 669, 671-672
(1933) (in reversing a judgment for the store, where an off-duty police officer was working
as a security guard, and where the officer falsely imprisoned the plaintiff who was a shopper
in the store, the Alabama Supreme Court appeared to apply normal agency principles);
Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979)
(an off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a
customer for shoplifting, and the Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment in favor of
the store and ordered a new trial); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La. 1993) (the
private secondary employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the
tortious conduct of off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700
So.2d 1123 (La. App. 1997) (applies traditional agency principles to hold that the private
employer was liable for the tortious conduct of an off-duty deputy sheriff); Rand v. Butte
Electric Railway Co., 40 Mont. 398, 408-410, 107 P. 87, 91-92 (1910) (private railroad was
liable for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of deputy sheriffs while employed as railroad
trainmen); Domanoski v. Borough of Fanwood and the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company, 237 N.J. Super. 452, 456-457, 568 A.2d 123, 125-126 (1989) (an off-duty police
officer, employed by a grocery store as a security guard, arrested a suspected shoplifter, and
the court held that the officer was simultaneously the employee of the police department and
the employee of the store at the time of the arrest); Tillman v. Johnson, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17803 (E.D. La. 1998) (recognizes that the “dual employment doctrine” may be
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8
With regard to the employment of off-duty police officers by private businesses as security guards,
very few cases in other states take the same position that the Court of Special Appeals adopted in the case
at bar, namely that when an incident involving unlawful conduct occurs, the security guard always reverts
to his status as a police officer and is no longer an employee of the private business.  One case taking this
position, and the only case on point relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals, is Bauldock v. Davco
Food, Inc., 622 A.2d 28 (D.C. App. 1993).  See also Whitely v. Food Giant, Inc., 721 So.2d 207 (Ala.
App. 1998); Darden v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 171 Ohio St. 63, 167 N.E.2d 765 (1960).
As discussed in the text above, numerous cases apply ordinary agency law principles to the
employment of off-duty police officers by private businesses.  This position, we believe, is most consistent
with the prior holdings of this Court.  See, e.g., Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 258, 587 A.2d 467,
472 (1991); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 170-171, 460 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1983).
Many cases apply various “middle grounds” between the position of the Court of Special Appeals and
the cases applying normal agency law principles.  The most frequent “middle ground” is to examine the
nature or the character of the off-duty officer’s conduct and to determine whether it is the type of act for
which the private employer hired the officer or is the type of act which police officers perform.  See
McWain v. Greyhound Lines, 357 So.2d 780 (Fla. App. 1978); Gentry v. Auto Dealers Exchange,
498 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. App. 1986); Neallus v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 126 Me. 469, 470-471,
139 A. 671, 672 (1927); Graalum v. Radisson Ramp, Inc., 245 Minn. 54, 57-59, 71 N.W.2d 904, 907-
908 (1955); Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1989); Rice v. Harrington, 38 R.I. 47, 50-51,
94 A. 736, 737-738 (1915); Duran v. Furr’s Supermarkets, 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App. 1996);
Wheatley v. Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wash.2d 163, 165-166, 234 P.2d 878, 879-880 (1951).
As several of these cases recognize, however, the difficulty with this test is that the nature of the activity for
which the private employer hired the off-duty policeman is often the same as the nature of the activity which
the policeman performs when on duty for the police department.  See also the discussion by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee in White v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, 33 S.W.3d 713, 719-722 (Tenn. 2000).
Consequently, most of the cases in this middle category take the position that it is for the jury to determine
whether the private business or the police department is the employer.  The typical result is an affirmance
of the jury’s decision that the off-duty officer and the private employer are liable.
applicable where a police officer is working for a private employer).8  
In light of settled principles of Maryland agency law, the motions for summary
judgment by Anderson, Sage, and Sterling should have been denied.
WITH REGARD TO THE ACTIONS AGAINST THE
STATE OF MARYLAND, THE MAYOR AND CITY
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COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, THE BALTIMORE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE POLICE
COMMISSIONER OF BALTIMORE CITY, THE
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL OF
APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, AND THE COSTS
SHALL BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
WITH REGARD TO THE ACTIONS AGAINST
KENNETH ANDERSON, SAGE HOSPITALITY
RESOURCES, INC., AND STERLING HOTEL,
INC., THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED, AND THE
CASE IS REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEED-
INGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  THE
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
SPECIAL APPEALS SHALL BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENTS.