Case Title: Ex parte PinnOak Resources, LLC, et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Linda Weekley et al. v. U.S. Steel Mining Company et al. and Jo Ann Waid et al v. U.S. Steel Mining Company et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070984

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 06/26/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070984
____________________
Ex parte PinnOak Resources, LLC, et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Linda Weekley et al.
v.
U.S. Steel Mining Company et al.
and
Jo Ann Waid et al.
v.
U.S. Steel Mining Company et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division,
CV-96-790 and CV-04-1234)
1070984
The 
affiliated 
business 
entities 
include 
PinnOak
1
Resources, LLC; PinnOak Coal Sales, LLC; Questor Management
Co., LLC; and National Resources Partners, LP.
In their submissions, the parties sometimes refer to this
2
as the Smith action.  
2
MURDOCK, Justice.
Oak Grove Resources, LLC, and several affiliated business
entities ("the Oak Grove defendants")  petition this Court for
1
a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
dismiss two consolidated cases against them.  We deny the
petition in part and dismiss it in part.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On September 16, 1996, Linda Weekley and approximately
185 other individuals ("the Weekley plaintiffs") filed an
action in the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court
alleging trespass, nuisance, negligence, and wantonness
against U.S. Steel Mining Company and affiliated business
entities ("the USM defendants") for allegedly allowing coal
dust from U.S. Steel Mining's coal-processing plant in Concord
("the plant") to pollute their neighborhood ("the Weekley
action").   The action sought compensatory damages for injury
2
to the Weekley plaintiffs' properties and injunctive relief to
1070984
In their submissions, the parties sometimes refer to this
3
as the Bowden action.
3
enjoin the USM defendants from emitting pollution onto the
affected properties.
On July 31, 1997, Tommy White filed an action ("the White
class action") identical to that filed by the Weekley
plaintiffs against the USM defendants,  except that White
3
sought and received class-action treatment on behalf of
everyone living within a five-mile radius of the plant.  Like
the Weekley plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in the White class
action sought monetary and injunctive relief against the USM
defendants for U.S. Steel Mining's operation of the plant.
Both cases were assigned to Judge Dan C. King. 
In March 1999, eight of the Weekley plaintiffs tried
their case to a jury; the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the USM defendants.  On August 28, 2002, the trial court
granted those plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.  The USM
defendants appealed that order to this Court.  On October 2,
2002, while that appeal was pending, the Weekley plaintiffs
entered into a settlement agreement with the USM defendants
regarding their claims against the USM defendants ("the
1070984
4
Weekley settlement").  The Weekley settlement provided, in
pertinent part: 
"[The Weekley plaintiffs'] claims for monetary
damages will be dismissed with prejudice on payment
of the sum of Three Million Dollars.  Payment must
be made immediately, and deposited into the trust
account 
of 
[the 
Weekley plaintiffs'] counsel.
Immediately upon said deposit, each Plaintiff, or
their Court-appointed guardian or other legally
authorized representative, will dismiss his/her
monetary claims, and the trial court shall enter an
order of dismissal, costs taxed to defendant. 
"[The Weekley plaintiffs'] claims for equitable
and injunctive relief will remain pending, but
inactive, during the pendency of the class action
claims' for injunctive relief made in [the White
class action] subject to the stipulation that, under
no circumstances, shall the pending claims for
equitable and injunctive relief in [the Weekley
action] remain inactive longer than 18 months
following the date of dismissal of [the Weekley
plaintiffs'] monetary claims for relief. 
"In further consideration for settlement, each
[Weekley] plaintiff will execute an irrevocable and
binding agreement ... with respect to [the White
class action, which shall provide]:
"....
"4.  [The Weekley plaintiffs] will not file
lawsuits against [the USM] defendants, or
take legal action in [the White class
action], before the expiration of 18 months
following 
dismissal 
of 
[the 
Weekley
plaintiffs'] monetary claims, or before the
date that the injunctive relief awarded by
the trial court in [the White class action]
becomes a final non-appealable order,
1070984
5
whichever date first occurs.  In other
words, under no circumstance shall this
provision remain in force for more than 18
months following the date of dismissal of
[the Weekley plaintiffs'] monetary claims.
"5.  The claim for injunctive relief made
in [the Weekley action] shall be dismissed
on such date as the trial court's order of
specific injunctive relief becomes final
and non-appealable in [the White class
action] but only if this date occurs within
18 months of the date of dismissal of [the
Weekley plaintiffs'] monetary claims.
"6.  On and after the expiration of said 18
month period, [the Weekley plaintiffs]
shall not be bound by the agreements set
out in Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 above, but
will be free to take such legal action in
[the White class action], or in any other
court proceeding, as may be authorized by
Alabama law, both case law and statutory
law, or to enforce such injunctive relief
as may have been awarded by the Court in
[the White class action], or to seek such
further injunctive remedies as may be
permitted by law with respect to the issues
of fugitive dust including coal dust that
are raised in this action and in [the White
class action]."
Two days later, on October 4, 2002, the plaintiffs in the
White class action settled with the USM defendants ("the White
settlement").  The White settlement defined the non-opt-out
plaintiff class as "all natural persons, who at any time
between and including January 1, 1990 and the Effective Date
1070984
6
... lived on, leased or owned property within a radius of five
(5) miles of operations conducted by [the USM defendants] at
[the plant]."  The Weekley plaintiffs do not dispute for
purposes of this petition that they fall within the definition
of membership in the White class action.  
The White settlement provides for the plaintiff class in
that action to forgo monetary damages in exchange for the
agreement of the USM defendants to implement 14 actions toward
"the proper maintenance and upgrade of the system to
facilitate the goals of eliminating or minimizing particulate
matter 
and 
other 
airborne emissions" ("the injunctive
relief").  The White settlement provided that the trial court
would enter an order "retaining exclusive jurisdiction over
this controversy" and that the expert for the plaintiffs in
the White class action would "review [the injunctive relief]"
and periodically "inspect the facility" and "approve or
suggest modifications or additional remedial measures."  The
White settlement provided that in exchange for the USM
defendants' compliance with the injunctive relief, the members
of the White class would release the USM defendants from all
1070984
The "Applicable Time Period" is defined in the White
4
settlement as the period between January 1, 1990, and the
"Effective Date" of the White settlement.  
There is reference in the briefs of an "effective date"
5
of December 22, 2002; that date is also stipulated in the
record as the "effective date."  The discrepancy between that
date and December 14, 2002, is of no significance to the
disposition of this petition.  
7
"settled claims."  The White settlement defined "settled
claims" as 
"all known and unknown claims that [the White class]
may presently have or in the future may have against
[the USM defendants], arising from or in any way
relating in whole or in part to any discharge or
release of particulate matter or other airborne
emissions during the Applicable Time Period,[ ] ...
4
including without limitation all known or unknown
claims for present or future damages or remedies, of
whatever kind or character ... from exposure
occurring prior to the Effective Date ...."  
The White settlement stated that it was binding on the USM
defendants and "their successors and assigns which continue to
operate [the plant]."  
The White settlement defined the "effective date" of the
settlement to be 10 days following the expiration of the time
to appeal the judgment in the White class action.  Judge King
entered the final order in the White class action on
October 23, 2002, making the "effective date" of the
settlement December 14, 2002.   That order "permanently barred
5
1070984
8
and enjoined" the members of the White class from "instituting
or prosecuting any action or proceeding seeking relief in any
form against [the USM defendants], ... [their] successors [or]
assigns, ... relating to and arising out of the Settled
Claims, all of which claims or causes of action are hereby
declared 
to 
be 
compromised, 
discharged, 
settled, 
and
released."  The order also provided that without affecting the
finality of the order, "the Court ... retains jurisdiction
over this action for the purposes of enforcing this Final
Judgment Order and for the purposes of exercising its
equitable 
powers 
supervising 
[the 
USM 
defendants'] 
commitments
in carrying out [the White settlement]."  The order
specifically found that,
"based on the evidence presented at the Fairness
Hearing and the submittals of the parties, that
completion 
and 
continued 
performance 
of 
the
Injunctive 
Relief 
set 
forth 
in 
[the 
White
settlement] will prevent or minimize the off-site
migration of particulate matter or other airborne
emissions generated in the operations of [the plant]
such that any such off-site migration will not be so
offensive as to impair comfortable enjoyment of
property or to materially interfere with the
ordinary comforts of human existence."
During the next 24 months, the USM defendants began
implementing the actions required by the injunctive relief
1070984
9
granted in the White settlement.  On June 30, 2003, Oak Grove
Resources, LLC, purchased the plant from the USM defendants,
and it is undisputed that Oak Grove is bound by the terms of
the White settlement.  
Also on October 4, 2002, the Weekley plaintiffs filed a
motion in which they moved to 
"dismiss[] the monetary claims made by [the Weekley
plaintiffs] with prejudice, ... with the court
retaining jurisdiction to enter an award of costs
with respect to the monetary claims and preserving
all non-monetary claims, that is, [the Weekley
plaintiffs'] claims for injunctive relief."
In that motion, the Weekley plaintiffs also "request[ed] that
the Court's order place their claims for injunctive relief on
the Court's administrative docket for a period not to exceed
24 months with leave for [the Weekley plaintiffs] to proceed
with injunctive relief pursuant to the terms of [the Weekley
settlement]."  At no time following the entry of Judge King's
final order in the White class action on October 23, 2002, did
the Weekley plaintiffs move to dismiss their claims for
injunctive relief.
On August 30, 2004, Judge King placed the Weekley action
on the administrative docket.  On September 20, 2004, the
Weekley plaintiffs filed a motion to restore the case to the
1070984
10
active docket.  The Oak Grove defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the Weekley plaintiffs' remaining claims based on the
Weekley settlement, but Judge King denied the motion and
granted the Weekley plaintiffs' motion, noting that "[t]he
Court continues to retain jurisdiction" of this case. 
On September 22, 2004, Jo Ann Waid and approximately 180
other individuals ("the Waid plaintiffs") filed an action in
the Jefferson Circuit Court against the USM defendants and the
Oak Grove defendants, alleging that the plant "caused and
continues to cause particulate emissions of coal fines and
coal dust into the air" ("the Waid action").  The Waid
plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief
for the alleged damage to their properties caused by emissions
from the plant.  The Waid plaintiffs do not dispute that they
fall within the definition of membership in the White class
action. 
The Oak Grove defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Waid action, arguing that it was precluded by the White
settlement.  In response, the Waid plaintiffs conceded that
they had filed the action because they "have been injured and
continue to be injured by [the USM defendants'] past and
1070984
11
continued emission of airborne pollutants and their continued
failure and refusal to abide by the injunctive requirements of
[the White settlement]."  They contend, however, that their
action was not precluded by the White settlement because, they
say, their claims concerned injuries occurring after the
effective date of the White settlement.  
On July 14, 2005, Judge King granted the Oak Grove
defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Waid plaintiffs'
claims for monetary damages, concluding that those claims
"cannot be maintained while this Court oversees implementation
of the injunctive relief ordered in [the White class action]."
The July 14 order further noted that the Waid plaintiffs'
claims for injunctive relief would remain pending "and [would]
be considered with the Court's ongoing consideration of the
remedial relief ordered in [the White class action]."  The
Waid plaintiffs appealed, and the Oak Grove defendants moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the July 14, 2005,
order was not a final order; this Court agreed, dismissing the
appeal (case no. 1041764, Oct. 13, 2005).  On October 21,
2005, the Waid plaintiffs filed a "Motion to Lift [the] Stay"
on their damages claims arising from emissions after the
1070984
12
December 2002 effective date, arguing that this Court's
dismissal of the appeal from the July 14, 2005, order as being
from a nonfinal judgment meant that the July 14 order was an
order staying the litigation.  
On March 6, 2006, the Weekley plaintiffs filed a motion
to amend their complaint to add the Oak Grove defendants as
defendants and to add post-effective-date damages claims,
which Judge King granted.  On June 5, 2006, the Oak Grove
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Weekley plaintiffs'
amended complaint.  In his brief to this Court, Judge King
relates that in early 2007 he began reviewing the Waid
plaintiffs' argument (in their motion to lift the stay)
related to the specific language of the White settlement, as
well as the Weekley plaintiffs' motion to amend their
complaint.  He states that their arguments caused him
"to recognize my earlier dismissal of [the Waid
plaintiffs'] post-Effective Date damages claims was
in direct contradiction of the express terms of [the
White settlement], and that the Waid plaintiffs were
correct in their argument that construing [the White
settlement] to bar claims that arose after the
Effective Date/Applicable Time Period would be void
against public policy."  
Judge King states that he was preparing to revise his prior
rulings to allow the Waid plaintiffs and the Weekley
1070984
13
plaintiffs to pursue their post-effective-date damages claims
when he was removed from the bench.  
As a result of an indictment, Judge King was disqualified
in April 2007.  Retired Judge Dan Rogers assumed Judge King's
caseload, including the Waid action and the Weekley action.
On October 10, 2007, Judge Rogers held a hearing concerning
the Waid plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay.  He denied the
motion, noting that no further evidence had been presented to
change his mind regarding the logic of Judge King's July 14,
2005, order dismissing the Waid plaintiffs' claims for
damages.  On October 16, 2007, Judge Rogers issued an order in
which he found that the Weekley settlement "contemplated
dismissal of all of [the Weekley plaintiffs'] claims upon
entry of a final judgment order settling [the White class
action]."  Accordingly, Judge Rogers dismissed the Weekley
plaintiffs' 
amended 
complaint 
without 
prejudice 
and 
"dismissed
all and every part of the case remaining that has not been
dismissed ... with prejudice, pursuant to [the Weekley
settlement]."  
The indictment against Judge King was dismissed in
October 2007, and he resumed his judicial duties.  On
1070984
14
November 16, 2007, the Weekley plaintiffs and the Waid
plaintiffs filed motions to reconsider Judge Rogers's orders
of October 10 and October 16, which Judge King treated as
motions to vacate under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.  On
November 19, 2007, Judge King vacated the orders of Judge
Rogers without receiving a response from the Oak Grove
defendants, explaining in his brief to this Court that he was
simply doing what he had previously decided he was going to do
before his disqualification.  The Oak Grove defendants then
filed a motion seeking Judge King's recusal from presiding
over the White settlement because one of the lawyers in the
White action was also Judge King's defense attorney in the
criminal case against him.  Judge King declined to recuse
himself, but on February 13, 2008, he issued an order
assigning the White action to Judge Mac Parsons. 
On November 27, 2007, at the Oak Grove defendants'
request, Judge King set aside his order vacating Judge
Rogers's October 10, 2007, order in the Waid action and Judge
Rogers's October 16, 2007, order in the Weekley action, and
set the matter for a hearing.  On February 29, 2008, Judge
King held a hearing in which he again declared that he was
1070984
15
vacating Judge Rogers's October 10 and October 16, 2007,
orders, thus reinstating the Weekley action and the Waid
action, but only as to post-effective-date damages claims.  In
doing so, Judge King stated that he was "clarifying" his
July 14, 2005, order to reflect that he now believed he could
not bar the Weekley plaintiffs and the Waid plaintiffs from
pursuing post-effective-date damages claims.  In explaining
his reasoning, Judge King stated:
"There was a bar date on [the White class
action], and in [the Weekley action and the Waid
action] any damages they may have are outside of
that bar date and it's a continuing trespass so it
continues to go on.  So, number one, what happens in
[the White class action] has absolutely zero to do
with [the Weekley action and the Waid action]
because their damages are separate and apart from
those people outside of that bar date."
Judge King consolidated the Weekley action and the Waid
action in his order from the bench.  Also at the hearing, the
Weekley plaintiffs and the Waid plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed the USM defendants from the case, and they
voluntarily dismissed any possible claims accruing before
July 1, 2003.  Judge King memorialized his rulings from the
bench in a written order on March 5, 2008.
1070984
On February 6, 2009, the Oak Grove defendants filed a
6
motion to supplement their mandamus petition to include an
order filed on December 11, 2008, by Judge Parsons in the
White class action purporting to exercise the court's
exclusive jurisdiction to "suggest ... additional remedial
measures."  The order approved a "supplement" to the White
settlement that "provides for [air] monitoring to determine
whether there exists an excessive migration of particulate
matter onto the property of the [White class] that is
attributable to [the Oak Grove defendants]."  
In their motion, the Oak Grove defendants contend that
the December 11, 2008, order further demonstrates that the
Waid action and the Weekley action represent collateral
attacks upon claims that are within the province of the White
settlement.  On April 7, 2009, the Waid plaintiffs and the
Weekley plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the Oak Grove
defendants' motion to supplement the record, their most
persuasive argument being that Judge Parsons's order was not
before Judge King when he reinstated the Waid action and the
Weekley action as to post-effective-date damages claims. 
"Of course, there is no 'record on appeal' in a mandamus
proceeding; it [is the petitioner's] obligation to attach to
[the] petition 'copies of any order or opinion or parts of the
record that would be essential to an understanding of the
matter set forth in the petition.'"  Ex parte Trawick, 959 So.
2d 51, 62-63 (Ala. 2006) (opinion on rehearing) (quoting Rule
21(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P.).  Consequently, the requirements
for supplementing the record on an appeal do not apply in a
mandamus proceeding.  We therefore grant the Oak Grove
defendants' motion.  But see infra note 7.
16
The Oak Grove defendants petition this Court for a writ
of mandamus,  requesting that this Court order the trial court
6
to dismiss the Weekley action and the Waid action as
1070984
On March 25, 2009, Judge King filed an amendment to his
7
March 5, 2008, order, which appears to be a response to Judge
Parsons's December 11, 2008, order in the White class action.
In substance, the amended order simply restates Judge King's
conclusion that the White class action "subsumed all claims of
any individuals ... up to the time of the 'Effective Date' set
forth in the Final Judgment Order of that action."  Judge King
reiterated his belief that he "retain[ed] personal and subject
matter jurisdiction to preside over and hear all post-
Effective Date damages claims raised by plaintiffs in [the
Waid action and the Weekley action]."
The Oak Grove defendants contend that we should ignore
Judge King's March 25, 2009, order because this Court issued
a stay of the proceedings when it ordered answers and briefs
on the Oak Grove defendants' petition for mandamus.  We agree,
and we have not considered that order in reaching our
decision, although we note that it appears only to have
restated Judge King's previous ruling.  
17
collateral to the White class action.   The Oak Grove
7
defendants also contend that the Weekley action should be
dismissed on the basis of the Weekley settlement, specifically
paragraph 5 of the settlement document.  
II.  Standard of Review
"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court." 
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).  The
Oak Grove defendants contend that the trial court lacks
1070984
18
subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the Weekley action
and the Waid action.  "The question of subject-matter
jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus."  Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So. 2d
478, 480 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775
So. 2d 805 (Ala. 2000)).  "We review de novo whether the trial
court had subject-matter jurisdiction."  Solomon v. Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 1211, 1218 (Ala. 2006).
III.  Analysis
A.  The Weekley Action
Before we evaluate the Oak Grove defendants' arguments
pertaining to the Weekley action, we must review whether this
Court possesses jurisdiction to address any aspect of the
Weekley action.  See, e.g., Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712
(Ala. 1987) ("[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude
that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero
motu.").
Judge Rogers issued an order on October 16, 2007,
dismissing 
the 
Weekley 
action 
in 
its 
entirety. 
 
On
November 16, 2007, the Weekley plaintiffs filed a Rule 59(e),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate Judge Rogers's order of
1070984
19
dismissal.  Judge King issued an order on November 19, 2007,
granting the Weekley plaintiffs' motion to vacate Judge
Rogers's order of dismissal.  Because it had been granted, the
Weekley plaintiffs' motion to vacate, like Judge Rogers's
order 
itself, 
no 
longer 
remained 
"pending" 
beginning
November 19, 2007. 
On November 27, 2007, however, in response to a motion
from the Oak Grove defendants, Judge King set aside his
November 19 order vacating Judge Rogers's order of dismissal
and set the matter for a hearing.  Judge King then held a
hearing on February 29, 2008, in which he purported again to
vacate Judge Rogers's October 16, 2007, order of dismissal and
to reinstate the Weekley plaintiffs' claims against the Oak
Grove defendants.  
The 
November 
27, 
2007, 
order 
had 
the 
effect 
of
reinstating the dismissal of the case as of that date; this,
in turn, had the effect of reviving, as of that date, the
Weekley plaintiffs' motion to vacate.  See Campbell v. I.L.
Lyons & Co., 420 So. 2d 66, 67 (Ala. 1982) (treating as final
for purposes of appeal a June 4, 1981, order that set aside a
prior, May 29, 1981, order that, in turn, had set aside an
1070984
20
earlier, May 22, 1981, order denying motion to vacate a
summary judgment entered on April 10, 1981).  Under
Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., the time for filing an appeal
is suspended during the pendency of a postjudgment motion
filed pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., such as the motion
to vacate filed by the Weekley plaintiffs. 
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, however, that "[n]o
post-judgment motion filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55, or 59
shall remain pending in the trial court for more than ninety
(90) days, unless with the express consent of all the parties,
which consent shall appear of record ...."  The 90th day from
November 27, 2007, was February 25, 2008.  Judge King did not
rule on the motion to vacate until February 29, 2008.  There
is no indication in the record before us of the express
consent of the parties to extend the time beyond 90 days.
"'The language of Rule 59.1 requires express consent.'"
Harrison v. Alabama Power Co., 371 So. 2d 19, 21 (Ala. 1979)
(quoting Personnel Bd. for Mobile County v. Bronstein, 354 So.
2d 8, 11 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)).  As a result, under
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the Weekley plaintiffs' motion to
vacate was deemed denied by operation of law as of
1070984
Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides: 
8
"If such post-judgment motion is deemed denied under
the provisions of Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure, then the time for filing a notice
of appeal shall be computed from the date of denial
of such motion by operation of law, as provided for
in Rule 59.1."
Thus, the Weekley plaintiffs had 42 days from February 25,
2008, to file an appeal of Judge Rogers's order dismissing
their case.  No such appeal was filed.  
21
February 25, 2008.  Therefore, Judge King was without
jurisdiction to enter his February 29, 2008, order purporting
to vacate Judge Rogers's order so as to reinstate the Weekley
action, and, accordingly, Judge King's February 29, 2008,
order is void.  The Oak Grove defendants' petition for a writ
of mandamus as to the February 29, 2008, order, insofar as it
pertains to the Weekley action, therefore is moot.  
8
B.  The Waid Action
The Oak Grove defendants contend that the Waid action is
due to be dismissed as a collateral attack on the White class
action.  The Oak Grove defendants observe that the court  in
the  White class action "retain[ed] jurisdiction over this
action for the purposes of enforcing this Final Judgment Order
and for the purposes of exercising its equitable powers
supervising [the USM defendants'] commitments in carrying out
1070984
22
[the White settlement]" and that the final order enjoined the
members of the White class from bringing actions "relating to
or arising out of the Settled Claims."  They also note that it
is undisputed that all the Waid plaintiffs fall within the
definition of the class in the  White class action.  The Oak
Grove defendants therefore conclude that the Waid plaintiffs
are attempting to litigate matters that fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court in the White class action.
The Oak Grove defendants rely on Ex parte Liberty
National Life Insurance Co., 888 So. 2d 478 (Ala. 2003), in
contending that the Waid action represents an improper
collateral attack on the White class action.  In Liberty
National, this Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus
requesting that the Choctaw Circuit Court dismiss a class
action by insureds challenging premium increases for cancer
policies because all the class members had participated in a
previous class action, Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265
(Ala. 1995), which was filed in the Barbour Circuit Court,
involved the same insurance policies, and ended in a
settlement.  That settlement resulted in a court order by the
Barbour Circuit Court stating that it reserved
1070984
23
"'continuing jurisdiction over all matters relating
to the Settlement or the consummation of the
Settlement; the validity of the Settlement; the
construction and enforcement of the Settlement and
any orders entered pursuant thereto; ... and all
other matters pertaining to the Settlement or its
implementation and enforcement.'"
888 So. 2d at 480 (quoting Robertson, 676 So. 2d at 1307).  
This Court concluded that the underlying action in
Liberty National "involve[d] matters 'relating to' the
Robertson settlement and its enforcement" because the action
concerned the "special policies" that were created in the
Robertson settlement as well as future premium increases in
those special policies that were governed by the Robertson
settlement.  888 So. 2d at 480.  This Court found:
"This 
type 
of 
collateral 
attack 
is 
not
permitted. The boundary lines between courts of
concurrent 
jurisdiction 
must 
be 
preserved.
'"'[W]here two courts have equal and concurrent
jurisdiction, the court that first commences the
exercise of its jurisdiction in a matter has the
preference and is not to be obstructed in the
legitimate exercise of its powers by a court of
coordinate jurisdiction.'"'  Ex parte First Nat'l
Bank of Jasper, 717 So. 2d 342, 350 (Ala. 1997)
(quoting Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 631
So. 2d 865, 867 (Ala. 1993), quoting in turn Ex
parte State ex rel. Ussery, 285 Ala. 279, 281, 231
So. 2d 314, 315 (1970))."
888 So. 2d at 481.  Because the Barbour Circuit Court
expressly retained continuing jurisdiction over matters
1070984
24
relating to the Robertson settlement, the Court concluded that
the Choctaw Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
underlying action in Liberty National.
Although it is true that the court in the White class
action retained exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating
to or arising out of the claims settled as a result of the
White settlement, the Waid plaintiffs' claims do not involve
those claims.  The settled claims are those "arising from or
in any way relating in whole or in part to any discharge or
release of particulate matter or other airborne emissions
during the Applicable Time Period"; the "Applicable Time
Period" is the period between January 1, 1990, and the
"effective date" of the settlement in December 2002.  See
supra note 5.  The Waid plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive
relief for injuries to their properties caused by coal fines
and dust emitted from the plant after July 1, 2003, a date
after the effective date of the White settlement.  Judge King
expressly limited the Waid action to damages for injuries
sustained after the effective date of the White settlement,
1070984
The White court's December 11, 2008, order concerning
9
further remedial action in the White class action, far from
refuting this fact, as the Oak Grove defendants contend,
actually confirmed it by stating again that that court
"retain[ed] exclusive jurisdiction over this case," that its
order "enforce[d] the Final Judgment Order and exercise[d] its
equitable powers in supervising the [White settlement]," and
that if the "supplement" to the White settlement is
successfully implemented, "the [White] Class will dismiss [the
Oak 
Grove 
defendants] 
from 
this 
lawsuit, 
and 
become
permanently enjoined from prosecuting any claims that were or
could have been asserted in this lawsuit ...."  (Emphasis
added.)  Thus, the latest order from the court in the White
class action confines itself, as it must, to the settled
claims.  
25
precluding injunctive relief because it would conflict with
the jurisdiction of the court in the White class action.   
9
Thus, Liberty National does not mandate that the Waid
action be dismissed as a collateral attack on the White class
action because the claims in the Waid action do not relate to
the White class action.  To hold otherwise would contradict
the nature of settlement agreements, which are "'conclusive
only as to those matters which the parties fairly intended to
include within its terms, and settlement is effective except
as to those elements of the claim specifically reserved.'"
Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So. 2d 1196, 1202 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Constr.
Co., 466 So. 2d 83, 91 (Ala. 1985)).
1070984
This 
Court 
has 
released 
at 
least 
five 
opinions
10
pertaining to claims against Liberty National brought by
holders of cancer-insurance policies: Solomon v. Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 1211 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So. 2d 478 (Ala. 2003); Grimes v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 726 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1998); Adams
v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. 1995); and Ex parte
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 631 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 1993). 
26
One of the other cases in the line that this Court has
decided 
concerning 
claims 
of 
a 
class 
of 
holders 
of
cancer-insurance 
policies 
sold 
by 
Liberty 
National10
illustrates that new claims brought after the effective date
of a settlement are not necessarily precluded, even when the
trial court retains jurisdiction for purposes of overseeing
the settlement.  In Grimes v. Liberty National Life Insurance
Co., 726 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1998), one of the members of the
Robertson class filed an action in the Jefferson Circuit Court
seeking compensatory damages and punitive damages based on
allegations of the tort of outrage, fraud, breach of contract,
and bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim.  In response,
Liberty National requested that the Barbour Circuit Court
issue an order enforcing its injunction in Robertson because
Grimes based at least some of her claims on statements or
representations alleged to have been made by Liberty National
at the time it sold Grimes her cancer policy.  The Barbour
1070984
27
Circuit Court agreed with Liberty National and issued an order
enjoining Grimes from "'asserting in a separate action any
claims based upon representations or statements allegedly made
to the plaintiff in connection with her decision to purchase
her 1986 policy.'"  Grimes, 726 So. 2d at 617.  
The Barbour Circuit Court did not, however, preclude all
Grimes's claims.  Specifically, the circuit court stated:
"'As to claims of fraud based upon alleged
representations made after the entry of the Final
Judgment [in Robertson], which the plaintiff in the
underlying action contends were made in 1995 and
1996, such claims are not barred by the existing
injunction.  Likewise, claims for breach of contract
based upon the written policy and claims for bad
faith failure to pay claims under the policy as
written are not barred by the existing injunction.
As noted above, however, any claim for breach of
contract or bad faith based upon an alleged oral
contract or representation arising prior to the
entry of the Final Judgment is barred by the
existing injunction.'"
888 So. 2d at 617 (bracketed language in Grimes).  In other
words, the Barbour Circuit Court did not enjoin Grimes from
maintaining claims in her separate action that arose after the
entry of the final judgment in Robertson.  This Court upheld
the Barbour Circuit Court's authority to issue the injunction,
noting that the Barbour Circuit Court "was acting well within
its power in enforcing its permanent injunction so as to
1070984
28
prevent Ms. Grimes from relitigating in another forum any
claims against Liberty National that she, as a member of the
Robertson class, had released in 1994."  888 So. 2d at 618.
Thus, this Court agreed with the Barbour Circuit Court that
Grimes had not released claims that arose after the final
judgment in Robertson, even though the Barbour Circuit Court
retained jurisdiction over the Robertson settlement.
Similarly, although the Waid plaintiffs are precluded
from pursuing claims that, as members of the White class, they
released in the White settlement, Judge King correctly
permitted them to pursue claims that fall outside the terms of
the release.  "When the language of a release specifically
limits the scope of the release, the release will not bar
claims outside the scope of the release."  Cavender v. State
Mut. Ins. Co., 748 So. 2d 863, 868 (Ala. 1999).  The Waid
plaintiffs' damages claims do not fall within the continuing
jurisdiction reserved to the court in the White class action
under the White settlement because that settlement concerns
claims that arose within the "Applicable Time Period," i.e.,
January 1, 1990, to the effective date in December 2002, while
1070984
29
the Waid plaintiffs' damages claims specifically concern
alleged injuries suffered after July 1, 2003.  
Based on the foregoing, the Oak Grove defendants do not
have a clear legal right to a dismissal of the Waid action;
accordingly, its petition for a writ of mandamus regarding the
Waid action is due to be denied.  
IV.  Conclusion
Because the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over
the Weekley action, its order purporting to vacate the
dismissals of the various claims in the Weekley action as
ordered by Judge Rogers is void and those dismissals remain in
effect.  Therefore, the Oak Grove defendants' petition for a
writ of mandamus concerning the Weekley action is moot and is
dismissed as such.  Because the claims in the Waid action do
not fall within the reserved jurisdiction of the court in the
White class action, the Oak Grove defendants do not have a
right to a dismissal of the Waid action on that basis, and the
Oak Grove defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus
concerning the Waid action therefore is denied.
1070984
30
PETITIONERS' MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT GRANTED; PETITION
DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.