Case Title: GREENWALT v. RAM RESTAURANT CORPORATION OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
GREENWALT v. RAM RESTAURANT CORPORATION OF WYOMING 2003 WY 7771 P.3d 717Case Number: 01-103Decided: 06/26/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                            

DEAN 
GREENWALT; LIZABETH GREENWALT;

RACHEL 
GREENWALT, a minor, by DEAN

GREENWALT, 
her conservator; and DEAN

GREENWALT, 
as personal representative for

the 
Estate of JOHN DOUGLAS GREENWALT,

Deceased,

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

                                                                                                

RAM 
RESTAURANT CORPORATION OF

WYOMING, 
a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a

C.B. 
& POTTS & BIG HORN BREWING

COMPANY; 
CHEYENNE 28, LLC, a

Washington 
Limited Liability Company; and

JOHN DOES 1-5,

 
 
 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

Certified 
Question from the District Court of Laramie County

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
B. "Jack" Speight, Robert T. McCue, and Ian D. Shaw of Hathaway, Speight & 
Kunz, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Messrs. 
Speight and Shaw.

 
     

Representing 
Appellee:

Thomas 
G. Gorman, Richard A. Mincer, and Ryan T. Schelhaas of Hirst & Applegate, 
P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Mincer.

 
 
  

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

Golden, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; 
Kite, 
J., files a dissenting opinion, in which Voigt, J., joins.

 
 
 

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 
 
     

GOLDEN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
In 
response to a complaint asserting a wrongful death and negligence claim against 
Appellees' restaurant and bar, the district court certified a question of law 
concerning the constitutionality of a statute that limits a liquor vendor's 
liability when that vendor has legally provided alcohol to another.  The statute at issue, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-8-301 (LexisNexis 2001), provides that no person who has legally provided 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages 
caused by the intoxication of the other person.  Appellants (Greenwalts) are the family 
of John Douglas Greenwalt (Mr. Greenwalt) and the personal representative of his 
estate, and they contend that this statute violates the equal protection and due 
process rights provided by both the United States and the Wyoming Constitutions 
and further violates the open courts provision found in the Wyoming 
Constitution.  

 

[¶2]           
We hold that § 12-8-301 does not infringe upon the 
fundamental right of access to the courts declared in Article 1, Section 8 of 
the Wyoming Constitution, and that § 301 does not infringe upon any other 
fundamental interest and does not create an inherently suspect classification as 
alleged by the Greenwalts.  Based upon a review of § 301 under this 
Court's rational basis test, we conclude that § 301 does not violate the equal 
protection guarantees of either the United States or Wyoming Constitutions.

CERTIFIED QUESTION

[¶3]           
Is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 unconstitutional?

FACTS

[¶4]           
Mr. Greenwalt died in a motor vehicle accident caused by 
Quay Sampsell.  
Appellee Ram Restaurant Corporation of Wyoming (Ram) operated a 
restaurant and bar in Cheyenne, Wyoming, called C.B. & Potts & Big Horn 
Brewing Company (restaurant).  On the night of the accident, Sampsell 
purchased alcohol in the restaurant's bar, and later, while driving his vehicle, 
collided with Mr. Greenwalt's vehicle, killing Mr. Greenwalt.  After the accident, 
Sampsell's blood alcohol level tested at .217.  Sampsell v. State, 
2001 WY 12, ¶3, 17 P.3d 724, ¶3 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶5]           
Greenwalts sued Ram for wrongful death and negligence, 
contending that it was the sales and service of alcohol to Sampsell that was the 
direct and proximate cause of Mr. Greenwalt's death.  Ram filed a motion 
to dismiss denying liability pursuant to § 12-8-301.  The parties jointly 
filed for certification of the constitutional issue and, on June 19, 2001, this 
Court granted certification of the question presented. 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]           
Greenwalts contend that § 12-8-301 is special legislation 
that violates both the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection, due process, and access to the 
courts by treating victims of liquor vendor negligence differently from all 
other tort victims.  
Greenwalts argue that this class of victims is statutorily prohibited 
from receiving redress in a Wyoming court of law because they believe that § 301 
grants immunity to liquor vendors.   Claiming that the open courts provision 
is violated by any statute that bars a victim of negligence from bringing suit 
in Wyoming courts, Greenwalts reason that the statute violates the fundamental 
right to access the courts and due process protections.  Greenwalts further 
contend that by violating the fundamental right of access to courts, the 
legislatively created classification requires strict scrutiny review, and that 
review reveals that it does not serve any compelling state interest and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional.

 

[¶7]           
In response, Ram contends that the statute is neither 
special legislation that provides absolute immunity to liquor vendors nor a law 
that abolishes a well-recognized common law cause of action.  Noting that the 
common law rule is one of non-liability for liquor vendors, Ram asserts that the 
statute modifies this non-liability rule by creating a cause of action against 
those persons violating the extensive mandates governing sales and service of 
alcoholic beverages found in Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.  Ram states that the 
purpose of the open courts provision is to guarantee access to the courts for 
the administration of justice for recognized rights that have a known remedy and 
argues that the Greenwalts' contentions concerning the open courts provision 
amount to a request that this Court determine that there is a fundamental right 
to sue anyone who allegedly causes injury or death.  Ram warns that such 
a determination would remove all limitations from tort actions and preclude the 
legislature from altering, repealing, or restricting the common law within 
constitutional bounds.  

 

[¶8]           
Our treatment proceeds along the following lines.  First, it reviews 
this Court's past common law decisions involving liquor vendor liability because 
they provide an important historical and analytical backdrop for consideration 
of the constitutional questions.  Next, it reviews the nature and scope of the 
legislative department's exercise of its police power in its central law-making 
role under our form of government.  Then, it explains the legislative 
department's exercise of its police power in its 1985 enactment and subsequent 
1986 amendment of § 301 which codified and then expanded the common law 
decisions of this Court thus creating a statutory tort cause of action for 
victims of the tortious behavior of intoxicated consumers unlawfully furnished 
intoxicating liquor by liquor providers.  It parses § 301 and explains its 
elements.  
Next, it reviews the heavy burden that must be carried by a litigant who 
challenges the constitutionality of a statute.  In this review, we identify and comment on 
the pertinent court access and equal protection guarantees located within the 
provisions of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.  Next, it reviews 
the elements of the rational basis test used in equal protection analysis.  Finally, it applies 
those elements to § 301 in order to determine whether that section passes 
or fails equal protection muster.

 

[¶9]           
As we begin our review, we accept, as do all members of the 
judicial department, that decision-making in response to a constitutional 
challenge to a product of the legislative and executive departments of our state 
government is a burden profoundly felt by the judicial department which is 
invested under our constitution with the responsibility to resolve the 
challenge.  
This Court cannot refuse to bear that burden.  Such is the special 
nature of the judicial enterprise.  Of that, Justice Stephen Breyer has 
written

 

[t]hat enterprise, Chief Justice Marshall explained, may 
call upon a judge to decide "between the Government and the man whom that 
Government is prosecuting; between the most powerful individual in the community 
and the poorest and most unpopular." Independence of conscience, freedom from 
subservience to other Government authorities, is necessary to the 
enterprise.

 

Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 921, 122 S. Ct. 1221, 1227, 152 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting, with whom Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., join) (citation omitted).  As Justice Breyer 
explains, judges, who are often called upon to answer our society's thorniest 
legal questions where a constitution demands it, should not be moved by 
potential adverse public opinion, whichever way it might cut.  Id. at 919, 122 S. Ct.  at 1226.  Whenever a court 
considers a matter where public sentiment is strong and emotions are high, it 
risks public alienation.  Id.  However, the 
Wyoming public has understood the need and importance of judges deciding 
important constitutional issues without regard to such considerations.  In the final 
analysis, this Court has the non-transferable responsibility and the unavoidable 
obligation to decide.  
Id.

 

The Court's Past Decisions

 

[¶10]      "We presume the legislature enacts statutes with full 
knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it."  Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 306 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶11]      In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971), 
this Court affirmed the district court's order which dismissed the tort claim of 
Parsons, an underage passenger in an automobile operated by McCall, also 
underage, asserted against Jow, the owner of a bar, whose employee had sold 
intoxicating liquor to the underage McCall.  McCall had consumed the liquor, become 
intoxicated, and driven his automobile into a school building, causing permanent 
injuries to Parsons.  
Affirming the district court's order that Parsons' complaint against Jow 
had failed to state a legally cognizable tort claim upon which relief could be 
granted under Wyoming tort law, this Court recognized and applied the common law 
rule that no cause of action existed "against a vendor of liquor in favor of one 
injured by a vendee who becomes intoxicatedthis for the reason that the 
proximate cause of the injury was deemed to be the patron's consumption of 
liquor and not its sale."  Id. at 397.  Parsons had 
apparently argued that a Wyoming statute, then § 12-33, W.S. 1957, 1969 
Cum.Supp., made unlawful the sale of liquor to an underage person; that the 
statute established a civil duty of care owed by the liquor vendor to a 
third-party like Parsons; and that the liquor vendor's violation of the statute, 
and thus the duty of care, was either negligence per se or evidence of the 
liquor vendor's negligence.  Id.  This Court rejected 
that argument because, even assuming the liquor vendor's violation of the 
statute (duty), the statutory violation (duty breach) "would not be a proximate 
cause of injury."  Id.  In conclusion, this 
Court noted that modification of the common law rule of civil non-liability of 
the liquor vendor was "within the province of the legislature."  Id. at 398.  Following this decision, the Wyoming 
legislature did not address the subject.

 

[¶12]      Twelve years later, this Court decided McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 
1983).  In that 
case, "[t]he sole issue on appeal [was] whether a complaint against a vendor 
unlawfully selling liquor to a minor [in his automobile at a liquor drive-in 
facility] who becomes intoxicated and injures a third-party states a claim for 
relief in Wyoming."  
Id. at 409.  The McClellans' complaint alleged that the 
liquor vendor's employee, making no effort to check the identification of James 
Staatz, a 17-year-old who looked young, negligently sold liquor to Staatz who 
was in his automobile at the liquor vendor's drive-in window; Staatz became 
intoxicated and killed Chad McClellan in an automobile accident.  Id. at 409, 414.  Relying upon Parsons, the district court had dismissed the 
McClellans' complaint for failure to state a legally cognizable tort claim under 
Wyoming law.  
Id. at 409.  Thinking that statements in Parsons concerning the legislature's province and 
proximate cause had misconstrued the nature of the common law, this Court 
overruled Parsons.  Id. at 410.  Relying upon the 
common law's inherent dynamic principle which allows the judicially-created 
common law to grow and to tailor itself to meet society's changing needs and 
relying upon the reasoning of common law decisions from courts in Illinois, 
Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon, this Court as a common law 
court established a liquor vendor's common law duty of reasonable care owed to 
third-parties injured by an intoxicated underage vendee.  Id. at 411-12.  In legal effect, then, this Court established 
a common law tort claim upon which relief could be granted against a liquor 
vendor and in favor of an injured third-party.  This Court based the liquor vendor's duty of 
reasonable care upon both §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), W.S. 1977. Id. at 412-13. Section 12-5-301(a)(v) proscribed as a 
misdemeanor a liquor licensee's receiving a liquor order from or making a liquor 
delivery to a minor or an intoxicated person in a drive-in area of the licensed 
premises.  
Section 12-6-101(a) proscribed as a misdemeanor a liquor provider's 
furnishing of liquor to an underage person who was not the liquor provider's 
legal ward, medical patient, or immediate family member.  Id. at 413.  This Court held that violation of either 
section was evidence of negligence.  Id. Addressing 
the element of proximate cause, this Court noted that that element's 
well-settled meaning in negligence law was appropriate in the context of a 
violation of either a non-statutory or statutory duty, the ultimate test being 
whether the liquor licensee could foresee injury to a third-party, which was a 
question of fact.  
Id. at 414.

 

[¶13]      Paying careful attention to this Court's analysis in McClellan, one is struck by the close connection 
between the operative allegations in the complainta liquor vendor selling 
intoxicating liquor to an underage patron in his automobile at the vendor's 
drive-in areaand this Court's seizing upon the statutory prohibitions against 
selling intoxicating liquor to an underage person (§ 12-6-101(a)) and to an 
underage person or an intoxicated person in the vendor's drive-in area (§ 
12-5-301(a)(v)) in order to create a common law tort claim.  Recognizing this 
close connection between the complaint allegations and the statutory 
proscriptions, one can confidently and reasonably conclude that the McClellan holding was narrow.  This conclusion 
finds support in this Court's identification in that decision of the two ways in 
which society is harmed by the old common law rule of liquor vendor 
non-liability.  
Id. at 415.  The first way is that the old non-liability 
rule "limits recovery when an intoxicated minor driver injures someone;" liquor 
vendors "are usually in a more solid financial position than a minor."  Id.  The second way is that the old non-liability 
rule deprives society of an "effective deterrent to keep liquor vendors from 
selling liquor to minors or to intoxicated persons."  Id.  This latter reference was obviously made with 
§ 12-5-301(a)(v) in mind because it is that section which proscribes a liquor 
vendor's selling liquor to an intoxicated person at the vendor's drive-in 
area.  In other 
words, this Court was stating that the non-liability rule harmed society by 
limiting compensation to injured third parties and by failing to deter 
undesirable conduct.  
As a leading authority of tort law instructs, "[t]he most commonly 
mentioned aims of tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) 
deterrence of undesirable behavior."  Dan B. Dobbs, The Law 
of Torts § 8, at 12 (2000).

 

[¶14]      McClellan's narrow holding is best seen, therefore, as a common law 
court's effort to cure the public mischief of the harm done to society by liquor 
vendors' selling intoxicating liquors to underage persons and intoxicated 
persons at the vendors' drive-in areas.  The opinion is an excellent example of a 
common law court's abrogation by judicial decision of an old common law rule in 
order to shape social policy.  In the absence of legislative activity, such 
judicial activity is arguably an appropriate role for a common law court in our 
democratic society.  
When the judiciary abrogates a common law rule created by the judiciary 
in the first place, as was done in McClellan, the 
judiciary is changing the common law because that change is suitable to new 
circumstances or conditions, the needs of society, and because the old common 
law rule is perceived by the judiciary to conflict with public policy.  Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 551 (Wyo. 
1985).  Indeed, 
as this Court pointed out in Adkins, in McClellan this Court was declaring "public policy" and 
"the purposes to be served" by the new judicially-created tort claim of liquor 
vendor liability to third parties.  Id. at 553.  In deciding that McClellan would not be applied retroactively, this 
Court said that retroactive application of the new rule would not promote "[t]he 
stated public policy" of that new rule.  Id.

 

[¶15]      That common law courts, in the absence of legislative 
activity, make and shape public policy in cases like McClellan should come as no surprise.  In numerous cases, 
this Court has enumerated the several factors of public policy which this Court 
considers when contemplating a judicial abrogation or modification of an 
existing common law rule.  For example, in Gates 
v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986), in contemplating extending a limited duty of care to 
persons who suffer mental distress upon observing a family member's severe 
injuries at the scene of an accident, this Court quoted favorably from a leading 
authority of tort law when it said that duty "is only an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is entitled to protection."  Id. at 196 
(quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts § 54, at 357-58 (5th ed. 
1984)).  This 
Court then enumerated some of the key policy factors to be considered by a 
court:

 

(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury 
suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) 
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of 
preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the 
consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, 
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

 

Gates, 719 P.2d  at 916.  For other recent examples, see also Anderson v. Two-Dot, 2002 WY 105, ¶44, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶44 (Wyo. 
2002); Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203 n.3 
(Wyo. 1995); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992); 
Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire 
Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990); 
Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 
1987); and Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 
1987).

 

[¶16]      It is elementary that public policy considerations are not 
the exclusive province of the judicial department.  The legislative 
department of our state government lives and works in that province, too, 
because it exercises plenary legislative power.  Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 (separation of 
powers); art. 10, § 2 (the police power of the state); and art. 19, § 10 
(manufacture, sale and keeping for sale intoxicating liquor permitted in the 
state under such regulation as the legislature may prescribe).1  

 

[¶17]      Following this Court's publication of McClellan, the Wyoming legislature became active in 
this province of public policy considerations surrounding the particular social 
problem narrowly addressed in that case.  In the General Session of the Forty-Eighth 
State Legislature, which convened in January 1985, Representative Thomas Jones 
introduced House Bill No. 0390, an act to create Wyoming statute § 12-8-301 
relating to alcoholic beverages and limiting causes of action in cases of 
voluntary intoxication in some cases.  Dig. of House J., Forty-Eighth State Legis., 
Gen. Sess., at 416 (1985).  Winding its way through the legislative 
process, the bill was passed by both the House and the Senate and was signed by 
the Governor, becoming effective May 23, 1985, as 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 205, 
§ 1.  It became 
Wyoming statute § 12-8-301 in its enacted form.  Before we closely examine its provisions and 
compare the tort claim thus legislatively created with that judicially created 
tort claim in McClellan, we pause to explain the 
nature and scope of the legislative department's exercise of its 
constitutionally-secured police power.

 

The Legislative Department's Police Power

 

[¶18]      As we noted a few lines ago, the Wyoming Constitution 
expressly recognizes the legislative department's police power.  In Article 2, § 1, 
of the Wyoming Constitution, the people have granted the legislative department 
its powers of government.  In Article 10, § 2, of the Wyoming 
Constitution, the people have specifically granted the legislative department 
the police power of the state which "is supreme over all corporations as well as 
individuals."  
And, in Article 19, § 10, of the Wyoming Constitution, the people have 
granted the legislative department regulation of the manufacture, sale, and 
keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors.  In the early days of statehood, this Court 
expressed unqualified recognition of the plenary legislative power when it 
said:

 

The people of a State, in framing their constitution, 
committed to the legislature the whole lawmaking power of the State, which they 
did not expressly or impliedly withhold.  Plenary power in the legislature is the rule, 
for all purposes of civil government, and a prohibition to exercise a particular 
power is an exception. . . . [E]very subject within the scope of civil 
government is liable to be dealt with by the legislature.

 

State ex rel. Bennett v. Barber, 4 Wyo. 56, 61-62, 32 P. 14, 16 (1893) 
(citation omitted).  
In addition, this Court has said that the police power is

 

most essential and very comprehensive.  Under that power 
regulations are prescribed for the protection of the public health, public 
safety, and public morals, or, as more generally stated, the public welfare; and 
it is held to embrace regulations not only to promote the health, peace, morals, 
education, and good order of the people, but to extend to regulations designed 
to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its 
wealth, or to promote the public convenience or general prosperity.

 

State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 176, 105 P. 299, 300 
(1909).

 

[¶19]      No one disputes that regulation of all matters concerning 
intoxicating liquors is an area over which the legislative department is free to 
exercise its plenary police power.  The judicial department has always recognized 
that "the power of the lawmaker to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic 
beverages is practically unlimited."  Berry v. Arapahoe 
& Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D. Wyo. 1976) (citations of 
Wyoming cases omitted).  And see generally, 
Pierce v. Albanese, 129 A.2d 606, 611 (Conn. 1957); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138-41, 60 S. Ct. 163, 167-68, 84 L. Ed. 128 (1939); 1 James F. Mosher, Liquor Liability Law § 2.05[1], at 2-50 (1987); and 
Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Supreme Court's views as to 
extent of states' regulatory powers concerning or affecting intoxicating 
liquors, under Federal Constitution's Twenty-First Amendment, 134 L. Ed. 2d 1015 (2000).

 

[¶20]      The product of the legislative department's comprehensive 
exercise of its plenary police power in matters concerning alcoholic beverages 
is largely found in Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes which contains nine 
chapters, numerous articles within each chapter, and numerous sections within 
each article.  
For other provisions in other titles addressing still other matters 
concerning intoxicating liquors, see Wyo. Stat. 
Ann., Cross References Ann., Title 12, at 215.  It is within this comprehensive regulatory 
scheme that we find the evidence of the legislature's exercise of its plenary 
police power in the form of those specific sections creating the third-parties' 
tort claim against those liquor licensees and non-licensees who furnish 
intoxicating liquor to persons who become intoxicated and cause damage to those 
third parties.  

 

[¶21]      We now return to the Forty-Eighth State Legislature's 
product of 1985, § 12-8-301.  In its enacted form, that 1985 law read as 
follows:

 

(a) No licensee is liable for damages caused by an 
intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or furnished alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverages unless the licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor 
or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated, and:

(i) It was reasonably apparent to the licensee that the 
person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was 
intoxicated; or

(ii) The licensee knew or reasonably should have known from 
the circumstances that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or 
malt beverages was intoxicated.

(b) No person who is not a licensee who has gratuitously 
and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is 
liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.

(c) This section does not affect the liability of the 
intoxicated person for damages.

(d) This section does not affect the liability of the 
licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided 
in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.

(e) For purposes of this section "licensee" is defined in 
W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee's employee or 
employees.

 

1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 1.

 

[¶22]      Presumably, the legislature enacted this statutory tort 
claim with full knowledge of and with reference to Parsons and McClellan.  Almada, 994 P.2d  at 306 ("We presume the legislature 
enacts statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and 
with reference to it.").  It is in that light that we closely examine 
this 1985 statute to identify the ways in which the legislature, in its first 
entry onto the field of liquor provider civil liability, changed the landscape 
established by this Court in those two earlier common law decisions.  As we begin that 
examination, let us remember, too, that legislative authority repeals common law 
decisions.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 (LexisNexis 2001); and 
see, Snell v. Rupert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on other 
grounds, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

[¶23]      The 1985 version of § 301 consisted of five subsections, 
(a) through (e).  
Subsection (a) addressed the civil liability of a "licensee," as that 
term was defined in subsection (e).  In regard to a licensee's civil liability for 
damages caused by an intoxicated person to whom the licensee lawfully provided liquors, the legislature declared 
that a licensee was not liable unless the intoxicated customer was intoxicated 
at the time the liquor was furnished and either (1) 
it was reasonably apparent to the licensee that the customer was intoxicated or (2) the licensee knew or reasonably should have 
known from the circumstances that the customer was intoxicated.  1985 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 205, § 1; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 (Michie May 1985 Cum. Supp.)  In addition, in 
subsection (d) the legislature declared that a licensee was liable if it 
furnished liquor in violation of Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.  Id.  Importantly, in this law the legislature 
also addressed the question of a non-licensee's 
civil liability.  
Subsection (b) states that the non-licensee was not liable if he/she 
gratuitously and legally provided liquor to any 
person.  Id. 

 

[¶24]      Comparing the narrow common law tort claim judicially 
created in McClellan with this 1985 legislatively 
created tort claim, one immediately sees that the legislature substantially 
changed the common law tort claim landscape.  The narrow common law tort claim of liquor 
vendor liability for furnishing liquor to an intoxicated minor in his automobile 
at the vendor's drive-in area was expanded to a broad statutory tort claim of 
liquor vendor liability for furnishing liquor to any intoxicated person at any 
location, whether a drive-in area or inside the licensed premises.  Also, the 
non-licensee liquor provider was addressed. One also notes that the legislature 
did not change the pre-existing common law rule of the intoxicated person's 
liability.  § 
12-8-301(c) (Michie May 1985 Cum. Supp.)

 

[¶25]      As the above and foregoing examination makes clear, at the 
close of the Forty-Eighth State Legislature's General Session in 1985, the 
legislative and executive departments had enacted a full and comprehensive 
regulatory scheme expressing the state's social policy in the problematic area 
of liquor provider liability.  That scheme covered, as the common law had 
not, all the actors:  
the licensed liquor provider, the non-licensed liquor provider (social 
host), the intoxicated person, and the injured third party.

 

[¶26]      In less than a year after the close of that general 
session, however, the budget session of that same legislature saw legislative 
activity to amend § 12-8-301.  Representatives Thomas Jones, Jack Sidi, 
Ellen Crowley, Dick Wallis, and Donald Jackson sponsored House Bill 0013, "[a]n 
act to amend W.S. § 12-8-301 relating to alcoholic beverages, denying liability 
for legally selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages."  Dig. of House J., 
Forty-Eighth State Leg., Budget Sess., at 60-62 
(1986).  
Introduced February 18, 1986, the bill moved quickly without incident 
through the legislative process of both chambers and was approved by the 
Governor on March 11, 1986.  Id.; 1986 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 6, §§ 1, 2.  In its enacted form as § 12-8-301, it reads 
today as it did then:

 

           
(a) No person who has legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage 
to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the 
other person.

           
(b) This section does not affect the liability of the intoxicated person 
for damages.

           
(c) This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person 
if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided in violation of 
Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.

           
(d) For purposes of this section "licensee" is as defined in  W.S. 
12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee's employee or employees.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶27]      Examining the section's four subsections, one readily sees 
significant legislative retrenchment of civil liability compared to the 1985 
legislation.  
Importantly, in this regard a licensee which legally furnishes liquor to an intoxicated customer is 
not liable for damages caused by that customer's intoxication.  § 12-8-301(a).  However, the civil 
liability of a licensee or non-licensee person who sells or provides liquor in 
violation of Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes remains intact.  § 
12-8-301(c).

 

[¶28]      Searching Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes for those 
provisions which if violated will expose the licensee or non-licensee person to 
civil liability for damages caused by an intoxicated person to whom liquor was 
sold or provided, one finds several that are pertinent.  A non-licensee 
person, for example, a social host, is exposed to civil liability if he or she 
furnishes liquor to an underage person who is not the liquor provider's legal 
ward, medical patient, or immediate family member.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-6-101(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  Stated conversely, if the relationship of 
legal ward, medical patient, or immediate family member does exist between the 
liquor provider and the underage person, the liquor provider is deemed to have 
legally furnished liquor to the underage person and, therefore, is not liable to 
a third party damaged by the intoxicated underage person.

 

[¶29]      On the other hand, a licensee is exposed to civil liability 
in several instances.  
If a licensee, after receiving written notice from a court, parent, or 
guardian of an underage person or ward of the latter's minority, sells liquor to 
the underage person, then the licensee is exposed to liability.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-5-502 (LexisNexis 2001).  Similarly, if a licensee, after receiving 
written notice from the spouse or dependent of a habitual drunkard of the 
latter's neglect of support obligations, sells liquor to the habitual drunkard, 
then the licensee is exposed to liability.  Id.  Another instance of 
a licensee's liability exposure is found if a licensee sells liquor at the 
licensee's drive-in area to an underage person or to an intoxicated person.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-5-301(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶30]      We note that the legislature has not changed the 
intoxicated person's exposure to civil liability for damages he or she 
causes.  § 
12-8-301(b).  
Consequently, if a licensee or non-licensee person sells or provides 
liquor to another in violation of Title 12 and that consumer damages a third 
party, then both the liquor provider and the intoxicated person are exposed to 
civil liability.  
On the other hand, if the licensee or non-licensee person legally 
provides liquor to a consumer and that consumer damages a third party, then only 
the intoxicated consumer is exposed to civil liability.

 

[¶31]      As the legislature has broadly drawn the statutory tort 
claim, it covers the myriad ways by which an intoxicated person can cause 
damage.  An 
intoxicated person can cause damage to himself or herself or a third party 
negligently or intentionally, when using a mobile vehicle (automobile, airplane, 
railroad engine, etc.), or when not using a mobile vehicle.  See Mosher, supra, § 
1.02[2]  [4], at 1-5 through 1-9. 

 

[¶32]      Our foregoing review of the statutorily created and amended 
tort claim as it existed in 1986 and at the time of the Sampsell-Greenwalt 
automobile accident in question reveals that, although retrenchment of liability 
occurred in some ways, the legislative product remained a full and comprehensive 
regulatory scheme expressing the State's social policy in this most complex area 
of damages caused by intoxicated members of our society.  

 

Open Courts Provision

 

[¶33]      With that background in mind, we consider Greenwalts' 
contention that §12-8-301 prevents or impedes access to the courts because it 
grants immunity from tort actions to alleged tortfeasor vendors whose sale and 
service of liquor to patrons result in injuries to another and, by impinging on 
this fundamental right, strict scrutiny must be applied when considering any 
classification. Article 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

 

All courts shall be open and every person for an injury 
done to person, reputation, or property shall have justice administered without 
sale, denial or delay.  Suits may be brought against the state in 
such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.

 

The right to access to the courts is a fundamental 
right.  Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 54 (Wyo. 
1992)).   
The provision is not a limitation on lawmakers who, in the proper 
exercise of the legislative power, may alter or abolish common law causes of 
action as long as that legislative action does not violate some other provision 
of our constitution.  
Mull v. Wienbarg, 66 Wyo. 410, 419-20, 212 P.2d 380, 382-83 
(1949).  The 
open courts provision was included in our constitution to insure equal 
administration of justice by the judiciary and did not intend application to the 
legislature nor to create a fundamental right to full legal redress.  No one has a vested 
right to any rule of common law.  Id. 

 

[¶34]      The Wyoming legislature has the power to abolish 
substantive common law rights, including those traced to the common law of 
England, in order to attain a permissible legislative object.  Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 960-62 
(Wyo.1973).  
The common law of England was not adopted in the State of Wyoming by our 
constitution and prevails here only by virtue of its adoption into the law of 
the state by legislative enactment.  Id. This 
provision means "no more nor less than that . . . the courts must be accessible 
to all persons alike . . . and afford a speedy remedy for every wrong recognized 
by law as being remedial in court."  Mull, 66 Wyo. at 
423, 212 P.2d  at 384 (quoting Shea v. North Butte Mining 
Co., 179 P. 499, 502 (Mt. 1919)).  It does not strip the legislature of all 
power to alter or repeal any portion of the common law relating to accidental 
injuries or the death of one person by the negligence of another.  Id. 

 

[¶35]      The legislature, however, cannot destroy vested rights. Id. Where an injury has already occurred for which the 
injured person has a right of action, the legislature cannot deny a remedy; but 
the remedies recognized by the common law in this class of cases, together with 
all rights of action that may arise in the future may be altered or abolished to 
the extent of destroying actions for injuries or death arising from negligent 
accident, so long as there is no impairment of rights already accrued.  Id. at 382-84.

 

[¶36]      Thus, the courts are to afford remedies not for every wrong 
but for every wrong recognized by law.  In order to establish an "open courts" 
violation, a litigant must satisfy a two-part test:  first, he must show 
that he has a well-recognized common-law cause of action that is being 
restricted; and second, he must show that the restriction is unreasonable or 
arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute.  Robinson, 10 P.3d  at 1137.

 

[¶37]      The Greenwalts' contentions cannot survive this first prong 
of the test.  
Our historical review just set forth established that the common law did 
not recognize a cause of action against a liquor vendor for injuries to a third 
person by a consumer of alcohol.  Although McClellan 
altered the common law, our previous discussion reveals that its holding was 
narrow and limited to its particular facts, the illegal sale of liquor to a 
minor at a drive-in area.  Here, the liquor vendor's sales and service 
was legal, and McClellan would not apply to these 
particular facts.  
We find no violation of the open courts provision.

 

Equal Protection

 

[¶38]      With all that has gone before fresh in our mind, we are now 
ready to turn our attention to the equal protection constitutional question at 
hand.  In 
creating the statutory tort claim in question, the Wyoming legislature has 
designed a law that is at once both encompassing and symmetrically simple.  It is encompassing 
in the sense that it covers all liquor providers, licensees as well as 
non-licensees (social hosts), and liquor consumers, i.e., intoxicated persons; it is simple in the sense 
that liquor providers are exposed to civil liability if they unlawfully furnish liquor to another who then causes 
damage to a third party, and in the sense that the intoxicated person, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully provided liquor, remains exposed to civil liability for 
damage he causes a third party.  At the heart of this statutory tort claim, 
the legislature has drawn a distinction between liquor providers (licensees and 
non-licensees) who legally furnish liquor to 
consumers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, liquor providers (licensees 
and non-licensees) who unlawfully furnish liquor to 
consumers.  As 
a natural consequence of this explicit legislatively-drawn distinction, an 
implicit legislatively-drawn distinction appears:  a distinction between third parties damaged 
by the intoxicated consumer legally served, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, third parties damaged by the intoxicated 
consumer unlawfully served.  The former class of 
damaged third parties has tort claims against the intoxicated consumer, but not 
against the liquor provider who legally served that 
consumer; the latter class of damaged third parties have tort claims against the 
intoxicated consumer and the liquor provider who unlawfully served that consumer.  The question before 
us is whether a rational basis exists justifying these legislatively-drawn 
distinctions for purposes of the equal protection provisions of the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions.

 

[¶39]      At this juncture, some preliminary observations of the 
applicable constitutional law are in order.  The Greenwalts are challenging the 
legislature's liquor-provider tort claim law under the equal protection 
provisions of both the federal and Wyoming Constitutions.  The federal equal 
protection clause provides:  "No state shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1.  The 
Wyoming Constitution does not contain such an express "equal protection" clause; 
rather, it contains a variety of equality provisions, viz., Article 1, §§ 2, 3, and 34; and Article 3, § 
27.  Like the 
Wyoming Constitution, "[m]ost state constitutions do not contain an equal 
protection' clause . . . [b]ut . . . do contain a variety of equality 
provisions."  
Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State 
Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1196 (1985).  Despite the 
difference in text between the federal equal protection clause and the equality 
provisions in most state constitutions, "[m]ost state courts use conventional 
federal equal protection analysis when interpreting the various equality 
provisions of their state constitutions."  Id. at 1222.  Comparing the 
bedrock principles of rational-basis review in federal equal protection 
analysis, including the presumption of the constitutionality of a statute and 
the burden of a party challenging a statute, with those used in this Court's 
equal protection analysis from the early days of statehood to the present, one 
does not find any significant difference.  The bedrock principles are these:2

 

1.         The 
federal equal protection clause and the Wyoming equality provisions "have the 
same aim in view."  
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 
1980); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 76 (Wyo. 
1978); Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 94, 229 P.2d 927, 930-31 
(1951); In Re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 
239, 11 P.2d 265, 269 (1932); 
26 A.L.R.2d 647.

2.         A 
classification in a statute, such as § 301 (the liquor provider civil liability 
statute), comes to the reviewing court bearing a strong presumption of 
validity.  F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-02, 124 L. Ed. 211 (1993); Heller v. 
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993); Clajon Prod. 
Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1580 (10th Cir. 1995); Painter v. 
Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939 (Wyo. 2000); Hoem v. 
State, 756 P.2d 780, 782 (Wyo. 
1988); State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 345, 84 P.2d 767, 771 
(1938).

3.         A 
party attacking the rationality of the legislative classification has the heavy 
burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a statute beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.  at 315, 
113 S. Ct.  at 2102; Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 426 (Wyo. 
1984) Nehring, 582 P.2d  at 74.

4.         
Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of legislative choices and line-drawing.  In areas of social 
policy, a statutory classification must be upheld if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.  
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.  at 315, 113 S. Ct.  at 2102; Clajon Prod. Corp., 
70 F.3d  at 1580; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970); Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Wyo. 1978); Sherman, 18 Wyo. at 177, 105 P.  at 300; McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 139, 96 P. 697, 702 (1908).

5.         The 
reviewing court never requires a legislature to articulate its reasons for 
enacting a statute; therefore, it is entirely irrelevant for equal protection 
purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually 
motivated the legislature.  The absence of "legislative facts" explaining 
the distinction on the record has no significance in rational-basis review.  In other words, a 
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and need not be 
based upon evidence or empirical data.  F.C.C. v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.  at 315, 113 S. Ct.  at 2102; Clajon Prod. Corp., 70 F.3d  at 1580.

            
To ascribe a purpose or purposes to the statutory classification, "the 
court may properly consider not only the language of the statute but also 
general public knowledge about the evil sought to be remedied, prior law, 
accompanying legislation, enacted statements of purpose, formal public 
announcements, and internal legislative history.  If an objective can confidently be inferred 
from the provisions of the statute itself, recourse to internal legislative 
history and other ancillary materials is unnecessary."  Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. 
Rev. at 1077.  
"The court is expected to safeguard constitutional values while at the 
same time maintaining proper respect for the legislature as a coordinate branch 
of government."  
Id. at 1078.

6.         
These restraints on judicial review have added force where the 
legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.  Defining the class 
of persons subject to a regulatory requirement inevitably requires that some 
persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed 
on different sides of the line, and that the line might have been drawn 
differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, 
consideration.  
Such scope-of-coverage provisions are unavoidable components of most 
social legislation.  
The necessity of drawing lines renders the precise coordinates of the 
resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable because the legislature 
must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived mischief incrementally.  F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.  at 
315-16, 113 S. Ct. at 2102;  see also Williamson 
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S. Ct. 461, 465, 99 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1955); Clajon Prod. Corp., 70 F.3d  at 1581; Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 1355 (Wyo. 1996); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1315-16 
(Wyo. 1989); Troyer v. State, 722 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 
1986); Galesburg Const. Co. v. Bd. of Trustees of Mem. 
Hosp. of Converse Cty., 641 P.2d 745, 750 (Wyo. 1982) (citing Denny v. Stevens, 
52 Wyo. 253, 75 P.2d 378 (1938)); Kenosha Auto Transport Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 55 
Wyo. 298, 312-13, 100 P.2d 109, 114 (1940); Trent v. Union Pacific, 68 Wyo. 
146, 162-63, 231 P.2d 180, 185 (1951), 
overruled on other grounds, Bowers v. Wyo. State 
Treasurer, 593 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 1979); 
In Re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. at 242, 11 P.2d  at 269-70.

7.         The 
rational-basis test is "not a toothless one."  It allows the court to probe to determine if 
the constitutional requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class 
singled out has been met.  Schweiker v. 
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1082, 67 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1981); James v. 
Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140, 92 S. Ct. 2027, 2034, 32 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1972); Johnson v. State 
Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 172 (Wyo. 1992); Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 
134, 169, 197 P.2d 252, 267 
(1948).

8.         
Equal protection permits a state a wide scope of discretion in enacting 
laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others; it does not 
prevent a reasonable classification of the objects of legislation.  The question in 
each case is whether the classification is reasonable in view of the object 
sought to be accomplished by the legislature.  All reasonable doubts are to be resolved in 
favor of the validity of the statute.   The legislature is presumed to have 
acted upon a knowledge of the facts and to have had in view the promotion of the 
general welfare of the people as a whole.  The legislature having presumably determined 
that a difference of conditions exists rendering the legislation proper, the 
court must be able to say, upon a critical examination of the statute in the 
light of the object sought to be accomplished, or the evil to be suppressed, 
that the legislature could not reasonably have concluded that distinctions 
existed relating to the purpose and policy of the legislation.  Sherman, 18 Wyo. at 177, 105 P.  at 300; see also F.C.C. v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.  at 313-16, 113 S. Ct. at 2101-02; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961); WW 
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 
1998); Nehring, 582 P.2d  at 78.

 

[¶40]      Let us now apply these bedrock principles to the question 
at hand.  These 
principles are, of course, the foundation of this Court's multi-part test as 
described in several past decisions.  Succinctly stated, the elements of the test3 are:

1.  Identify the legislative classification at 
issue;

2.  Identify the legislative objectives;

3. Determine whether the legislative classification is 
rationally related to the achievement of an appropriate legislative 
purpose.  In 
this element the court is evaluating whether the legislature's objectives 
justify the statutory classification.

 

See generally, Allhusen v. State Mental Health Prof. Lic. 
Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 885-86 (Wyo. 1995); Johnson, 838 P.2d at 
166-67; and Doering v. WEA Ins. Group, 532 N.W.2d 432, 439 (Wis. 1995).

 

[¶41]      Because the Greenwalts have the burden of demonstrating 
that § 301 violates the equal protection guarantees beyond a reasonable doubt, 
as we work our way through each test element enumerated above, we shall lead 
with the challengers' (Greenwalts) position, follow with the defenders' (Ram 
Restaurant, et al.) position, and conclude with our own analysis.

 

Identification of the Legislative Classification within § 
301

 

[¶42]      The Greenwalts assert that § 301 "clearly sets apart 
victims of alcohol vendor negligence for treatment different from that enjoyed 
by the victims of any other tortfeasor's negligence."  They maintain that 
every other victim of a tort is guaranteed the right to pursue compensation for 
the damages caused by the negligent acts of others, but under § 301 they are 
precluded from pursuing compensation from a negligent Wyoming alcohol 
vendor.  Given 
these assertions, one can only concude that the Greenwalts are identifying the 
classification at issue as all tort victims versus alcohol vendor tort 
victims.  The 
Greenwalts also make the unsupported assertion that "[t]hese innocent tort 
victims are also a group which has been subject to a tradition of disfavor . . . 
. [V]ictims of alcohol vendor negligence are a class of politically powerless 
persons, unable to compete with the high-dollar lobbying efforts of insurance 
companies and the liquor industry . . . ."

 

[¶43]      Countering the Greenwalts' assertions, the sense of the 
defenders' reply is that the Greenwalts have failed to identify within the text 
of § 301 the classification at issue.  In this regard, the defenders maintain that 
the Greenwalts have failed to "show that they are members of an identifiable 
class that has been harmed by the statute and that other members of this class 
who are similarly situated . . . are treated differently."  The defenders argue 
that the Greenwalts' position that § 301 "impacts one tort plaintiff different 
than other tort plaintiffs . . . render[s] the first [element] of the . . . test 
meaningless" because it fails to identify within the 
text of the challenged statute the class allegedly harmed by the 
statute.  The 
defenders explain that § 301 creates a cause of action, a tort claim if you 
will, that treats everyone equally.  In § 301, they observe, "the legislature has 
simply defined the appropriate standard of care or duty as compliance with the 
provisions of Title 12."  Further explaining, they state:

 

All persons who are injured by an intoxicated person may 
have a cause of action against a person who illegally 
furnished alcohol in derogation of the statutorily defined duty.  A person does not 
violate any recognized duty and is, therefore, not negligent, where he legally serves alcohol to another person.  Similarly, all 
persons injured by an intoxicated . . . party who was legally served alcohol do not have a right of recovery 
against the supplier of alcohol.

 

(emphasis added).  The defenders also point out that all tort 
law necessarily involves a decision, either by a common law court in the case of 
a judicially-created tort claim or by a legislature in the case of a 
legislatively-created tort claim, to recognize or reject a right of recovery for 
any alleged wrong.  
In the defenders' words, "[w]ithout a duty, there is no actionable 
negligence and thus no right of recover."  Continuing with this line of reasoning, the 
defenders state that because a third person injured by an intoxicated person had 
no legally cognizable tort claim against the liquor provider under the old 
common law rule, "it is difficult to imagine how the legislature's expansion of 
[such] person's right to recover can be said to harm any class of persons.  Rather, the 
legislature simply has not granted as extensive a right as it might have. . . 
.'" (citing Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 
2000)).  
Concluding on the point, the defenders dismiss the Greenwalts' 
identification of the classification as being "all tort plaintiffs" versus 
"alcohol vendor plaintiff."  The defenders recognize that every 
statutorily-created tort claim may well treat the potential plaintiff or 
defendant in that particular regulated business differently from plaintiffs and 
defendants in unrelated businesses or areas of human activity in which tort 
claims may be either statutorily created or perhaps judicially created.  Equal protection 
simply does not apply to that species of disparate treatment.  The creation of a 
tort claim in any particular area of human activity, whether judicially created 
or legislatively created, is a function "of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is 
entitled to protection."  Mostert v. CBL & 
Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 
1987).  

 

[¶44]      Finally, the defenders summarily reject the Greenwalts' 
assertion that "innocent tort victims" are a group which has been subjected to a 
tradition of disfavor.  The defenders observe that the assertion 
enjoys no legal support and, moreover, ignores that "the people are the most 
powerful lobby in government [because they] can vote to elect their 
representatives" who enact legislation such as § 301.  The defenders also 
note that "Mothers Against Drunk Driving" (MADD) is a powerful national lobbying 
organization.  
Concluding on this point, the defenders point out that because this Court 
in Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 945 (Wyo. 
1994), similarly rejected "politically powerless" status for "physically injured 
youthful offenders," this Court should recognize in this case that the much 
broader class of "potential tort plaintiffs" has more political clout than 
"physically injured youthful offenders."

 

[¶45]      We reject the Greenwalts' identification of the legislative 
classification at issue.  We agree with much of that said by the 
defenders of § 301.  
The Greenwalts have misapplied this first element of the test because 
they have failed to look within the text of § 301 to identify the classification 
at issue.  See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.  at 309-310, 314, 113 S. Ct.  at 2099, 2101-02 (identifying classifications 
within the text of the pertinent provisions of the Cable Communications Act of 
1984); Nehring, 582 P.2d  at 70 n.1, 77 (identifying 
the classification within the text of Wyoming's Guest Statute, § 31-5-1116, to 
be paying passengers in automobiles and non-paying passengers in automobiles); 
Doering, 532 N.W.2d  at 439-40 (identifying 
classifications within the text of an alcohol providers civil liability/immunity 
statute similar to Wyoming's § 301); Cory v. 
Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 11-14 (Cal. 1981) (identifying classifications within the text of an 
alcohol providers civil liability/immunity statute similar to Wyoming's § 301); 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 987 P.2d 300, 306-09 (Id. 1999) (identifying classifications within the text of an 
alcohol providers civil liability/immunity statute similar to Wyoming's § 301); 
Tussman, supra, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 344 ("A 
legislature defines a class, or classifies,' when it enacts a law applying to 
all aliens ineligible for citizenship,' or all persons convicted of three 
felonies,' or all citizens between the ages of 19 and 25' . . . .").

 

[¶46]      Looking within the text of § 301, we readily discover that 
the legislature has expressly drawn a distinction between liquor providers (both 
licensees and non-licensees) who lawfully furnish 
liquor to consumers, on the one hand, and liquor providers (both licensees and 
non-licensees) who unlawfully furnish liquor to 
consumers, on the other hand.  As a natural result of this explicitly drawn 
distinction, an implicitly drawn distinction appears:  a distinction 
between third parties damaged by the lawfully served 
intoxicated customer, on the one hand, and third parties damaged by the unlawfully served intoxicated customer, on the 
other.  The 
liquor provider who lawfully furnishes liquor is 
immune from civil liability and the third party damaged by the lawfully served intoxicated customer has no tort claim 
against that liquor provider.  On the other hand, the liquor provider who unlawfully furnishes liquor is not immune from civil 
liability and the third party damaged by the unlawfully served intoxicated customer has a viable 
tort claim against that liquor provider.  And, in all cases, the third party damaged by 
the intoxicated customer has a viable tort claim against that intoxicated 
customer.

 

Identification of the Legislative Objectives

 

[¶47]      The Greenwalts assert that § 301 "is silent as to its 
intended purpose."  
They maintain, however, that "the history of the statute, as well as the 
comments of its drafter [Representative Tom Jones], sheds significant light on 
its intended function."  They infer that the legislature's "very 
clear" intent was the "liability insurance issue;" thus, they infer that "total 
immunity was granted to Wyoming's liquor vendors in an effort to protect their 
financial interests and liability insurers from the potentially large verdicts 
for which they could be held responsible," referencing this Court's McClellan decision.  In their effort "to negative every 
[reasonably] conceivable basis which might support [the legislative 
classification," F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, 
Inc., 508 U.S.  at 315, 113 S. Ct.  at 2102; see also, 
Hoem, 756 P.2d at 782-83; Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 578 P.2d  at 1355, the Greenwalts hypothesize, and then reject, the 
objective of allocation of all the consequences of intoxication to the 
intoxicated customer.  
Finally, they dismiss as a possible objective the legislating of 
proximate cause issues because Wyoming's comparative fault statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-109, "already accomplishes this function" and the legislature has no 
"interest in duplicating this task."

 

[¶48]      Countering the Greenwalts' assertions, the defenders of § 
301 propose that the obvious primary legislative objective is "to define a cause 
of action historically unknown at the common law that harmonizes . . . with the 
compelling State interest in regulating the sale, gift, and consumption of 
alcohol."  
Moreover, they contend that 

 

[t]he statute accomplishes this purpose by defining the 
extensive rules and regulations of Title 12 as the appropriate standard of care 
for those who furnish alcohol to others.  Thus, the State encourages compliance with 
the mandates of Title 12 by attaching the potential for civil liability for 
those who violate the law.

 

[¶49]      Having carefully considered the parties' contentions, we 
must disagree with the Greenwalts' identification of the legislative objective 
and agree with the defenders' identification.  As Professors Tussman and tenBroek remind us 
with simplicity, "[t]he purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a 
public mischief' or the achievement of some positive good."  Tussman, supra, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 346.  To discover the 
legislative objective, one commentator counsels:

 

[T]he court may properly consider not only the language of 
the statute but also general public knowledge about the evil to be remedied, 
prior law, accompanying legislation, enacted statements of purpose, formal 
public pronouncements, and internal legislative history.  If an objective can 
confidently be inferred from the provisions of the statute itself, recourse to 
internal legislative history and other ancillary materials is 
unnecessary.

 

Developments in the LawEqual Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. at 1077.

 

[¶50]      Another commentator writing of "the act of discovering . . 
. purpose," advises "[g]enerally it is unmistakable."  Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 398 
(1942).  At the 
risk of restating the obvious, Professor Radin observes:

 

The statute is expressed in definite written words.  They have been 
selected not for their symbolic or esoteric value, nor even for their logical or 
aesthetic quality, but primarily to let us know the statutory 
purpose.

Id. at 400.  He further helpfully explains:

A statute is better described as an instruction to 
administrators and courts to accomplish a definite result, usually the securing 
or maintaining of recognized social, political, or economic values.  If figures of 
speech will help, we may call the statute a ground design, or a plan in which 
the character and size of a structure are indicated, and in which details are 
given only so far as they are necessary to assure the erection of the desired 
structure.  We 
may follow the figure further . . . and say that details of construction may 
sometimes be provided in order that losses may not be suffered in other social 
structures of equal or even greater value.

Id. at 407.  Finally, Professor Radin observes:

The purpose of the statute is not quite the same as its 
policy.  The 
policy may be part of a general governmental theory.  The purpose is the 
specific result than can reasonably be taken to be what the statute is striving 
to attain.

* * * *

The determination both of the purpose and means must be 
affected by reading the words of the statute.  To be sure . . . it should be from a reading 
of the whole statute and not from an examination of detached words. . . . All 
things which are before us are expressed in words and not otherwise.

 

Id. at 408-09.

 

[¶51]      Having read the definite written words of § 301 and the 
other pertinent provisions of Title 12, having considered the general public 
knowledge about the evils attending the sale and furnishing of intoxicating 
liquors to our state's citizens, and having considered the prior common law 
decisions and statutory law, we can confidently conclude that the legislative 
objective of § 301 is unmistakably what the defenders of that law have 
identified:  a 
comprehensive statutory tort claim affecting liquor providers (both licensee and 
non-licensees), intoxicated customers/guests of all liquor providers, and third 
parties who are damaged by intoxicated customers/guests.  Unquestionably, § 
301 has at least three basic secondary purposes, as is common with respect to 
tort claims generally, namely:

 

(1) penal or deterrence (intended to punish liquor 
providers for the wrongful provision thereof);

(2) compensatory (intended to provide compensation for 
injured third-party victims); and

(3) regulatory (intended to impose some of the costs of 
alcohol-related injuries on the industry and citizenry and to ensure adequate 
financial responsibility/insurance from industry and citizen 
participants.

 

Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ¶16, 996 P.2d 540, ¶16 (Utah 
2000) (Durham, Assoc. C.J., dissenting), and authorities cited therein.  We believe that 
"[t]hese purposes reflect significant public policy choices about financial 
liability for a widespread source of private and public harmthe damage done by 
intoxicated persons to third parties."  Red Flame, Inc.¸ 
¶16.

 

[¶52]      We reject the Greenwalts' proffer of evidence, in the form 
of sponsor Representative Tom Jones' letter to the Legislative Service Office, 
as evidence of the legislature's intent in enacting § 301.  Independent Producers Marketing Corp. v. Cobb, 721 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 
1986); see also, Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 
147-48, 50 P. 819, 827-28 
(1897),  
(cautioning against the reliability of the various remarks of members of 
the Wyoming Constitutional Convention upon the subject of the construction of 
any particular provision of the state constitution).

 

[¶53]      We also reject Greenwalts' brief argument that the 
legislature would not have had the objective of legislating proximate cause 
issues because the comparative fault statute, § 1-1-109, "already accomplishes 
this function."  
While it is true that the legislature in that particular law generally 
espoused the comparative negligence approach for negligence actions, "this is 
not to say that the legislature is precluded from subsequently limiting, or even 
rejecting altogether, the application of comparative negligence in negligence 
actions arising out of particular circumstances."  Coghlan, 987 P.2d  
at 309; and see, Red Flame, Inc., ¶20 (Durham, J., 
dissenting). 

 

[¶54]      We have now identified both the legislative classification 
at issue and the legislative objectives.  Having worked our way through these first two 
test elements of rational-basis review, we next proceed to the third, and final, 
element, whether the legislative classification is rationally related to the 
achievement of an appropriate legislative purpose.

 

Whether the Legislative Classification is Rationally 
Related to the Achievement of an Appropriate Legislative Purpose

 

[¶55]      As we have noted in our above and foregoing treatment of 
the first two elements of the rational-basis test, the Greenwalts identified the 
relevant legislative classification at issue as "victims of alcohol vendor 
negligence" and identified the legislative objective as the protection of the 
financial interests of Wyoming's liquor vendors and their insurers against 
potentially large verdicts in cases arising out of tragic motor vehicle 
accidents like the ones described in Parsons and McClellan.  Because the Greenwalts have incorrectly 
identified both the legislative classification at issue and the legislative 
objectives, they do not enjoy a position of strength from which to launch a 
successful attack on this third, and final, element of the rational-basis review 
test.  
Proceeding from these incorrect premises, the Greenwalts assert here that 
the classification of "victims of alcohol vendor negligence" is not rationally 
related to the achievement of an appropriate legislative purpose in that the 
protection of the financial interests of Wyoming liquor vendors and their 
insurers is most certainly not an appropriate legislative purpose.  They contend, as 
noted earlier, that § 301 is irrational because it "attempts to legislate 
proximate cause" and because "it actually serves to damage the State's important 
interest in promoting public health and safety."  In § 301, they maintain, the legislature "has 
taken away the positive deterrent affect [sic] that civil liability has on every 
other individual and commercial citizen in Wyoming . . . despite the fact that 
vendors of alcohol are distributing a particularly dangerous product."  They ask this Court 
to consider the "unique position alcohol vendors enjoy."  In this regard, 
they say that "[c]ommercial vendors sell and distribute the majority of the 
intoxicating beverages which contribute to the intoxication and resulting injury 
of Wyoming citizens."  
They claim that alcohol vendors are "often the sole source of recovery 
for injuries which are caused by the vendor's improper sale of alcohol . . . 
[and] are in a unique situation to insure against potential loss suffered . . . 
and to spread the costs of insurance by increasing drink prices."  Finally, they 
contend that

 

vendors of alcohol, particularly restaurant and bar owners, 
are in an exceptional position to protect the public by preventing their patrons 
from imbibing excessive amounts of alcohol and, thereafter, being turned out 
into the night to endanger the public.  With the experience and training that many 
vendor's [sic] employees have in recognizing intoxication, combined with the 
vendor's own internal guidelines and standards for detecting and dealing with 
obviously intoxicated patrons, such as existed in the Defendant's organization, 
vendors are in a better position than law enforcement, the general public or the 
victims of intoxication to prevent the tragedies which arise from the 
consumption of alcohol.

 

The Greenwalts conclude that § 301 actually defeats the 
legitimate legislative objectives of protecting the public, spreading the costs 
of liability, and curbing the profit motives of alcohol vendors.4

 

[¶56]      As we noted earlier in this opinion, the defenders 
disagreed with the Greenwalts' analyses of the first two elements of the 
rational-basis test and set forth their own analyses with which, as previously 
explained, we were in agreement.  It is not surprising, then, on this final 
element of the rational-basis test, that we find the defenders of § 301 in 
disagreement once more with the Greenwalts.  The defenders correctly identified both the 
legislative classifications at issue and the legislative objectives.  Proceeding from 
these correct premises, the defenders here maintain that the classifications of 
lawful and unlawful 
liquor providers and third parties injured by lawfully and unlawfully 
served intoxicated persons are rationally related to the achievement of the 
primary legitimate legislative objective of creating all the necessary elements 
of a statutory tort claim historically unknown in Wyoming's common law that 
harmonizes with the State's legitimate interest in regulating the sale, gift, 
and consumption of alcohol.  They also maintain that these classifications 
are rationally related to the achievement of the several secondary legislative 
objectives that attend the creation of any tort claim, namely, deterrence, 
compensation, and regulating or cost-spreading.  It is elementary that the traditional 
elements of a negligence tort claim are duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, 
and damages.  
The legislative classifications clearly revolve around these elements and 
the traditional policy considerations that drive them.  As the defenders 
point out, the legislature has defined the duty/breach of duty elements in terms 
of the liquor providers' violations of the regulatory provisions of Title 
12.  As they 
contend, that mode of definition is, and always has been, perfectly acceptable 
in tort law.  
Indeed, in McClellan, this Court itself did 
just that, that is, it established the legal duty of the alcohol vendor as a 
function of compliance with two particular statutory provisions, one dealing 
with unlawfully providing alcohol to underage persons, the other dealing with 
unlawfully providing alcohol to an intoxicated person in a motor vehicle at the 
alcohol vendor's drive-in area.  With respect to the tort claim element of 
"proximate cause," the legislature has, as the defenders note, and as the 
Greenwalts protest, legislated the rationale of the old common law rule 
recognized by this Court in Parsons:  as long as the 
liquor provider lawfully provided the liquor, the 
proximate cause of the injury was deemed to be the consumption of liquor and not 
its sale.  The 
defenders advise us that other courts have recognized that it is not irrational 
for a legislature to adopt the public policy pronouncements expressed in the 
decisions of a common law court.  See, e.g., 
Doering, 532 N.W.2d  at 442.  Because the legislature has tied the elements 
of duty/breach of duty and proximate cause with the extensive mandates of Title 
12, the defenders reason, that tie well serves the legitimate interest of 
promoting compliance with those mandates.

 

[¶57]      The defenders also note that the classification "promotes 
one of the most fundamental public policies in Wyoming, that of personal 
responsibility."  
As the defenders state it, "[t]his is especially true when a person 
legally provides alcohol to a responsible adult."  The responsible adult is charged with the 
duty to act responsibly when drinking and, the defenders observe, even when 
intoxicated.  
Section 301 specifically preserves the third party's tort claim against 
that intoxicated person.  In the defenders' view, to the extent that 
another legislative configuration would impose liability upon the lawful liquor 
provider, that configuration may tend to discourage the drinker's responsibility 
to act reasonably under the circumstances.

 

[¶58]      Answering the Greenwalts' argument that the legislature 
would have been better advised to place on the alcohol provider (vendor, 
bartender, wait staff, liquor store clerks, and social hosts of every kind) the 
duty to monitor the drinking citizen's consumption, the defenders respond that, 
yes, the legislature could have drawn the line differently than it did, but 
sound reasons exist why it chose not to.  The defenders explain at length that placing 
the monitoring duty upon the alcohol provider

would then raise the question of whether it is proper and 
fair to require [an alcohol provider] to substitute his or her judgment for that 
of a responsible adult when it comes to the consumption of alcohol.  Who should have the 
responsibility to monitor a person's alcoholic intake and subsequent actionsa 
mature adult [drinker] or a waiter?

* * * *

If the legislature did decide to impose such a duty on 
suppliers of alcohol, what are its practical limits?  Is the duty limited 
to those [drinkers] who the [supplier] knows will be driving?  Must [the supplier] 
ask every patron to check [his or her] car keys at the door?  If so, when may 
[the supplier] return the keys?  Must [a supplier] administer a breathalyzer 
test before returning keys?  What if the person swears [he or she isn't] 
driving?  Is 
this promise sufficient or must [the supplier] actually follow the person out to 
the car to make certain [he or she doesn't] get behind the wheel?  Must [the supplier] 
ascertain whether the person consumed alcohol before arrival?  Should servers of 
alcohol institute a "drink count" and, if so, what is the limit?  Should the 
legislature attempt to enact such stringent rules?  How would these 
rules apply to vendors who face a wide variety of circumstances?  For example, how 
exactly would Cheyenne Frontier Days or the Casper Events Center monitor the 
intake of those buying beer?  And where does all of this leave the social 
host, or the non-profit organization that may serve alcohol at a 
function?

 

The defenders argue that "[t]he difficulty in enforcement 
is obvious."

 

[¶59]      They also observe that the legislature may have desired to 
"enact only those laws that clearly define the conduct required of its 
citizens."  
They posit that the legislature may have reasonably believed that 
"[w]ithout defined limits, [alcohol providers] potentially face liability or at 
least the costly threat of litigation every time they serve a beer."  They say that the 
legislature may have reasonably believed that that threat would "pose a hardship 
on the small businessmen and [business women] who own and operate the vast 
majority of the restaurants, bars, and package liquor stores in our state."  The defenders 
further observe that "[t]he legislature could also have been concerned that the 
creation of a new and expansive cause of action would create additional burdens 
on a court system," which would then implicate "the legislature's role in 
funding the judicial system."

 

[¶60]      Summing up, the defenders remind this Court that it falls 
to the legislative department to draw the lines in approaching the solution to a 
difficult and complex social problem, which intoxication certainly is.  In this instance, 
they urge, the legislature has made the tough choices and has rationally drawn 
those lines by declaring that the intoxicated adult, not the alcohol provider 
who lawfully serves alcohol, is legally responsible 
for his or her own actions.  They maintain that § 301 serves numerous 
legitimate state interests and applies equally to both alcohol vendors and 
social hosts.

 

[¶61]      We have carefully considered the parties' thrusts and 
parries, and gratefully acknowledge their excellent and thought-provoking 
arguments.  We 
must now decide.  
We disagree with the Greenwalts' analysis and are compelled to side with 
the defenders' stronger and more persuasive presentation.  To avoid extending 
unnecessarily the length of this opinion, we shall enumerate only briefly those 
telling points which are primary with us.

 

[¶62]      The legislature in 1985 enacted and then in 1986 amended § 
301 with full knowledge of and with reference to Parsons and McClellan.  Accordingly, the 
legislature could reasonably have concluded that the full nature and scope of 
the liability and immunity of all alcohol providers, licensed vendors and 
non-licensed persons alike, was uncertain.  The legislature could reasonably have 
concluded that McClellan's judicially-created tort 
claim was narrowly drawn given the operative facts of that case.  Given the Court's 
invitation in Parsons and the Court's impatience in 
McClellan, the legislature could reasonably have 
concluded that the time had come to address the social problem revealed in those 
cases.  The 
legislature could have rationally thought that it must create a comprehensive, 
yet simple-to-administer tort claim to cover all liquor providers and 
intoxicated persons.  
It could have rationally thought that the establishment of an 
unquestioned and predictable yet limited basis for legal liability would provide 
a more effective incentive for the responsible furnishing of alcohol and the 
realization of the primary purpose.  See, e.g., Peters v. 
Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 52-53 (Me. 1991).

 

[¶63]      The classifications are rationally related to the 
achievement of other legitimate secondary purposes as well.  Alcohol providers 
are encouraged to provide alcohol lawfully, in compliance with the mandates of 
Title 12.  
Injured persons have the opportunity in all cases to be compensated by 
the intoxicated persons, and to be compensated in those cases in which the 
intoxicated person was unlawfully served.  Underage persons are protected in the sense 
that alcohol providers are exposed to liability to third persons injured by 
unlawfully served underage persons; that exposure encourages alcohol providers 
not to unlawfully serve underage persons.  Dependents and spouses of habitual drunkards 
are similarly protected in that same fashion.  The legitimate purposes of deterrence, 
compensation, and regulation or cost-spreading, always present in the social 
justice system of tort law, are served in this legislation.  Among the policy 
considerations enumerated in Gates and similar 
common law decisions of this Court, the foreseeability factor looms large.  The legislature 
could have reasonably concluded that an alcohol provider cannot reasonably 
foresee the myriad ways in which any given intoxicated person might injure a 
third party.  A 
motor vehicle accident is certainly one way, but, the legislature may have 
reasonably thought, more often than not an alcohol provider will not know by 
what means of transportation the customer arrived and will leave the licensed 
premises.  
However, the legislature may have reasonably thought, in the instance of 
an intoxicated person in a motor vehicle at the drive-in area, the alcohol 
provider would have a better opportunity to know that customer's means of 
transportation; therefore, the legislature drew a line and provided for 
liability if the alcohol provider furnished alcohol to that intoxicated drive-in 
customer.  

 

[¶64]      Another of the public policy factors which may have been 
reasonably considered by the legislature is the burden on the potential alcohol 
provider defendant.  
The defenders have satisfactorily addressed this policy factor.  But we would add 
this.  Justice 
Abrahamson, writing for a unanimous Wisconsin Supreme Court in Doering, 532 N.W.2d  at 442-43, in which the court 
upheld that state's dramshop statute against an equal protection challenge much 
like the one we resolve today, posited that a legislature could reasonably 
conclude it places too difficult a task on the alcohol provider to determine 
when customers become intoxicated.

 

[¶65]      We could continue, but we shall not.  The points have 
been satisfactorily made.  The equal protection safeguards of both the 
Federal and Wyoming constitutions do not require that the legislature draw its 
lines with mathematical certainty or even that it exercise its policy-making 
judgment in the best or wisest way.  We hold that the legislative classifications 
at issue are rationally related to the legitimate legislative objectives of § 
301.

 

[¶66]      Having completed our rational-basis review, we hold that 
the Greenwalts have not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that § 12-8-301 
violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.

KITE, Justice, dissenting, with whom VOIGT, Justice, joins.

[¶67]   I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 (LexisNexis 2001) does not violate 
the equal protection guarantee of the Wyoming Constitution.  Were I writing the 
majority opinion, I would conclude the statute is unconstitutional because, 
contrary to the criteria for equal protection analysis to which this Court has 
long adhered, § 12-8-301 creates a classification which does not reflect a 
reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protectionthat is, it may 
not be fairly viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the state.  State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Wyo. 
1982).  In 
reaching this conclusion, I find particularly significant the principle that, 
although courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of statutes if at 
all possible, White 
v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 
1984), we do so only if it can be reasonably done.  Johnson v. State 
Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 172 (Wyo. 1992).  It is equally imperative that we declare 
legislative enactments invalid when they transgress the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
Hoem v. 
State, 756 P.2d 780, 782 (Wyo. 
1988). 

 

[¶68]   I depart from the majority opinion 
because it attributes to McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 410-12 (Wyo. 
1983), a narrow holding not supported by a fair reading of the case.  It proceeds from 
that narrow holding to conclude § 12-8-301 expands the common-law rights 
recognized in McClellan.  In my view, a 
careful reading of McClellan leads to the conclusion 
that, rather than expanding common-law rights and responsibilities, § 12-8-301 
as currently written severely limits those rights and responsibilities.  From its narrow 
reading of McClellan, the majority goes on to 
conclude, contrary to established equal protection analysis, that the class 
harmed by the statute must be identified in the text of the statute itself.  This is not correct 
under our prior case law or that of the United States Supreme Court, yet the 
majority relies on that incorrect premise in concluding the classification 
created by § 12-8-301 consists of liquor vendors who lawfully provide liquor 
versus liquor vendors who unlawfully provide liquor.  From that 
conclusion, the majority further concludes the legislature's objective was to 
"create a comprehensive, yet simple-to-administer tort claim to cover all liquor 
providers and intoxicated persons" and the legislature "could have rationally 
thought that the establishment of an unquestioned and predictable yet limited 
basis for legal liability would provide a more effective incentive for the 
responsible furnishing of alcohol and the realization of the primary 
purpose."  Maj. 
op. at ¶62.  I 
do not agree with the narrow definition the majority attributes to the 
legislative classification created by § 12-8-301, nor do I agree that the 
classification, when identified in accordance with accepted equal protection 
analysis, is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.  In contrast to the 
majority's conclusion that the statute covers all liquor providers and 
intoxicated persons and the legislature rationally could have concluded the 
current law provides a more effective incentive for responsible liquor sales, 
the statute in my view clearly covers only liquor providers and intoxicated 
persons in the drive-in area and, for that reason, is not rationally based and 
provides no incentive for responsible liquor sales occurring outside the 
drive-in area, particularly sales to intoxicated 
persons inside the 
drinking establishment. 

 

[¶69]   In addition, proper equal protection 
analysis must include consideration of the impact of the statute on those not 
specifically addressed thereinthose injured by intoxicated persons.  In my view, the 
statute creates a class of victimsthose injured by liquor providers who 
negligently serve intoxicated persons within the 
establishment (as opposed to in the drive-in 
area)which has no rational basis and no connection to a legitimate public 
interest.  Of 
equal importance to my departure from the majority, the statute creates another 
classification by subjecting liquor vendors who negligently sell to intoxicated 
persons in the drive-in area to liability while 
shielding liquor vendors who negligently sell to intoxicated persons inside the premises from liability.  No matter what 
gloss is applied, I can see no rational basis for drawing this distinction; in 
my view, it does not serve a legitimate state interest, and I would hold the 
statute unconstitutional.

 

A.        
Historical Development of Dram-Shop Liability 

 

[¶70]   A historical review of the development 
of dram-shop liability1 is relevant to a complete understanding 
of the current state of the law in Wyoming.  Prior to 1983, a Wyoming alcohol vendor who 
negligently furnished alcohol to a customer was not liable for resulting 
injury.  In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, 397 (Wyo. 
1971), overruled by McClellan, 666 P.2d 408, this Court 
stated:  "We 
think it cannot be denied there was no cause of action at common law against a 
vendor of liquor in favor of one injured by a vendee who becomes 
intoxicatedthis for the reason that the proximate cause of injury was deemed to 
be the patron's consumption of liquor and not its sale."  While this was the 
position adopted historically in most states, various courts began to question 
its propriety. 

 

Until recently, dram shop law in America remained virtually 
unchanged from the English common law.  Traditionally, dram shops were not held 
liable for damages sustained by third parties as a result of the conduct of an 
intoxicated patron to whom the alcohol was served.  Although the 
traditional common law approach is still referred to and has often been followed 
by courts, an emerging trend . . . has emerged, straying from common law 
principles by finding dram shops liable for damages to third parties caused by 
intoxicated patrons.  

 

Brett T. Votava, Comment, Missouri Dram Shop 
Liability: Last Call for Third Party Liability?, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 587, 592 
(2001).  

 

[¶71]   Consistent with this trend, this Court 
in 1983 rejected the common-law principles espoused in Parsons and 
recognized a cause of action against alcohol vendors based on common-law 
negligence principles.  McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 410-12.  We challenged the 
use of stare 
decisis "as a justification for the continuance of an unfair and improper 
rule which operates to the detriment of those who may suffer tortious 
injury.'"  Id. at 411 (quoting 
Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Wyo. 
1974)).  "We do 
not choose to stand by and wring our hands at the unfairness which we ourselves 
have created."  
Id. at 
415.  In 
support of our departure from the common law, we cited the existence of a 
possible causal connection between a vendor's conduct and a plaintiff's 
injuries:

 

"When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a 
minor or to an intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the 
minor or the intoxicated person but also to members of the traveling public may 
readily be recognized and foreseen; this is particularly evident in current 
times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so common-place and 
accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent.  [Citations.] 
. . ."  
Rappaport v. Nichols, 
. . . 156 A.2d [1,] 8 [(N.J. 1959)].  

The fact that the risk to the traveling public may readily 
be recognized and foreseen is supported by disturbing statistics.  In 1977, the year 
when the statute forbidding sale of alcohol to minors and the statute forbidding 
sale of alcohol at a drive-in to minors or to intoxicated persons were 
recodified, there were 212 fatal vehicular accidents in Wyoming; 119, or over 
fifty percent, involved alcohol as a contributing circumstance.  

            

Id. at 414-15.  

 

[¶72]   As further support for our departure 
from Parsons, we noted the following policy 
considerations:

 

Refusing to acknowledge a claim for relief against a liquor 
vendor harms society in two ways.  First, it is an unjust doctrine which often 
limits recovery when an intoxicated minor driver injures someone.  Businesses which 
sell liquor are usually in a more solid financial position than a minor.  Second, it is 
reasonable to assume that the current state of the law places us all at more 
peril, because there is no effective deterrent to keep liquor vendors from 
selling liquor to minors or to intoxicated persons.  Liquor licenses are 
seldom revoked.  
Perhaps the threat of civil liability or increased insurance premiums 
will serve to make liquor vendors more careful.

 

Id. at 415.  We cited cases from other courts finding a 
cause of action against a liquor vendor based upon common-law negligence 
principles and concluding "a liquor vendor owes the same duty to the whole world 
as does any other person."  Id. at 411.  We said:

 

Once the general duty to use reasonable care is 
acknowledged, then courts focus their attention on the foreseeability of the 
resulting harm to establish proximate cause.  We think this is a sensible and just 
approach.  Henceforth, cases involving vendors 
of liquor and injured third parties will be approached in the same manner as 
other negligence cases.

 

Id. (emphasis added).  We recognized "a duty [on the part of liquor 
vendors] based both upon the common law and upon statutes."  Id. at 414.  

 

[¶73]   We defined the common-law duty on the 
basis of ordinary negligence principlesa liquor vendor owes a duty "to exercise 
the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the 
circumstances."  
Id. at 411.  We defined the statutory duty on the basis of 
§ 12-5-301(a)(v), prohibiting the sale of alcohol in the drive-in area to minors 
or intoxicated persons, and § 12-6-101(a), making it a misdemeanor for anyone to 
furnish alcohol to a minor (except a legal ward, medical patient, or immediate 
family member).  
We held that the violation of either statute was evidence of negligence 
to be considered by the trier of fact together with other circumstances in 
determining liquor vendor negligence.  Id. at 413.  

 

[¶74]   Addressing the issue of proximate 
cause, we held "the ultimate test concerning proximate cause will be whether the 
vendor could foresee injury to a third person.  This question will be one of fact based on 
the circumstances of each particular case.  It is, however, not necessary that a specific 
injury be foreseen."  
Id. at 
414. Nowhere in the entirety of the opinion did we limit our holding to only 
those situations where a vendor sells intoxicating liquor to underage or 
intoxicated persons in the drive-in area.  Contrary to the majority's conclusion that 
"one can confidently and reasonably conclude that the McClellan holding was narrow," Maj. op. at ¶13, it is 
clear this Court intended the holding to apply broadly.  That is, we 
intended a complete abrogation of the common-law rule of nonliability in favor 
of the application of general negligence principles in cases alleging vendor 
liability.  

 

[¶75]   With an emerging trend of state court 
decisions attaching liability to dram shops, state legislatures responded by 
enacting statutes either authorizing or denying causes of action against dram 
shops.  Votava, 
supra, 69 UMKC L. 
Rev. at 
595-96.  In 
1985, just two years after our decision in McClellan, Wyoming 
followed suit and enacted § 12-8-301 which abrogated this Court's decision in McClellan. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 205, § 1.  With the enactment of § 12-8-301, liquor 
vendor liability became strictly a creature of statute.  The 1985 version of 
§ 12-8-301 
provided: 

 

12-8-301.  Limitation of liability.

(a)  No licensee is liable for damages caused by 
an intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or furnished alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverages unless the licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor 
or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated, and:

(i)  It was reasonably apparent to the licensee 
that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was 
intoxicated; or

(ii)  The licensee knew or reasonably should have 
known from the circumstances that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverages was intoxicated.

(b)  No person who is not a licensee who has 
gratuitously and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other 
person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.

(c)  This section does not affect the liability 
of the intoxicated person for damages.

(d)  This section does not affect the liability 
of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or 
provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.

(e)  For purposes of this section "licensee" is 
as defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee's employee or 
employees.

 

Id.  In what appears to be an attempt to codify and clarify the 
common-law duties established in McClellan, the 
legislature limited liquor vendor liability to two situations.  First, a liquor 
vendor could be liable if he furnished alcohol to an intoxicated person and 
either it was reasonably apparent to him the person was intoxicated or he knew 
or should have known the person was intoxicated.  Second, a liquor vendor could be liable if he 
furnished alcohol in violation of Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes.  Title 12 set hours 
of operation for liquor vendors, prohibited the sale of alcohol in the drive-in 
area to minors or intoxicated persons, prohibited the sale of alcohol generally 
to minors, and contained various other restrictions and rules relating to the 
sale of alcohol. Like McClellan, § 12-8-301 as 
originally written broadly imposed liability on liquor vendors for sales 
occurring not only in the drive-in areas but whenever they knew or should have 
known the purchaser was intoxicated.  Like McClellan, 
therefore, the original version of § 12-8-301 allowed for liquor vendor 
liability arising out of sales occurring inside a drinking establishment.

  

[¶76]   One year later, in 1986, § 12-8-301 was 
amended to provide (changes are indicated throughout): 

12-8-301.  Limitation of liability.

(a)  No licensee is liable for damages caused by 
an intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or furnished alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverages unless the licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor 
or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated, and:

(i)  It was reasonably apparent to the licensee 
that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was 
intoxicated; or

(ii)  The licensee knew or reasonably should have 
known from the circumstances that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverages was intoxicated.

(b)(a)  No person who is not a 
licensee who has gratuitously and legally 
provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for 
damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.

(c)(b)  This section does not affect the liability of 
the intoxicated person for damages.

(d)(c)  This section does not affect the liability of the 
licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided 
in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.

(e)(d)  For purposes of this section "licensee" is as 
defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee's employee or 
employees.

 

1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 6, § 1.  Under this version 
of the law, which remains in effect today, liquor vendors have complete immunity 
from civil liability unless they furnish alcohol in violation of Title 12.  That is, liquor 
vendors are immune unless they furnish alcohol in a drive-in area to minors or 
intoxicated persons, otherwise furnish liquor to a minor, or violate some other 
provision of Title 12.  Under the law as it currently reads, 
therefore, and in contrast to the law as it existed under McClellan and the original statute, liquor vendors who 
furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons inside a liquor establishment are immune 
from liability for injuries occurring after the intoxicated person leaves the 
establishmentno matter what the circumstances.  Clearly, § 12-8-301 as it currently reads 
does not broaden liquor vendor liability as the majority opinion concludes.  Rather, the statute 
as amended severely limits liquor vendor liability.2

 

B.        Equal 
Protection Analysis 

  

[¶77]   The majority opinion concludes the 
classifications created by the statute do not violate the equal protection 
provisions of the Wyoming Constitution.  The foundation for the equal protection 
guarantee is found in the following provisions of the Wyoming Constitution: 

 

In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, all members of the human race are equal. 

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 2.  

Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights 
is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting 
the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction 
of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than 
individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.  

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3.  

All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation.  

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34.  

The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any 
of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:  For . . . 
limitation of civil actions; . . . granting to any 
corporation, association or individual . . . any special or exclusive 
privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. . . .  In all other cases 
where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.  

 

Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27.  See also Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 52-53 (Wyo. 
1992).  Article 
3, Section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution specifically limits legislative 
authority in several enumerated instances.  Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The 
Wyoming State Constitution, A Reference Guide (1993).  We have said that 
Article 3, Section 27, which prohibits special laws, "means only that the 
statute must operate alike upon all persons in the same circumstances."  Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Wyo. 
1982); see also 
Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo. 1978).  We have also noted that the prohibition 
against special laws contained in Article 3, Section 27 is a more specific equal 
protection guarantee that enlarges the protections of Article 1, Section 34 of 
the Wyoming Constitution.  Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 826 (Wyo. 
1980).  The 
extent and interdependency of the various Wyoming constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing the right to equal protection demand that the judiciary carefully 
examine legislation claimed to violate that right.  Robert B. Keiter, 
An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 
21 Land & Water L. Rev. 527, 556 (1986).

 

The five separate state constitutional provisions that 
impose due process-like and equal protection-like limitations on state 
legislative power, read in conjunction with article 3, section 27 which 
specifically limits legislative power, might be construed as evidence that the 
Wyoming framers intended the judiciary to exercise more of a checking function 
over the legislature than might be inferred in the federal 
Constitution.

 

Id.  In fact, this Court has long recognized, "the 
Wyoming Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination 
than the federal constitution."  Allhusen v. State By and Through Wyoming Mental Health 
Professions Licensing Board, 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo. 1995). 

 

[¶78]   Perhaps in no other circumstance is the 
balance between the legislative and judicial functions more delicate than in the 
realm of equal protection.  Although in general the equal protection 
guarantee mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike 
both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed, Mills, 837 P.2d  at 
53, the constitutional provisions at issue do not prohibit legislatively created 
classifications.  
In fact, the very foundation of the legislative function is to establish 
differing legal obligations for different circumstances and persons in the 
process of furthering the public interest.

 

Here, then, is a paradox:  The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge 
of the protection of equal laws."  But laws may classify. And "the very idea of 
classification is that of inequality."  In tackling this paradox the [United States 
Supreme] Court has neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the 
legislative right to classify.  It has taken a middle course.  It has resolved the 
contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional 
generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification. 

 

Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of 
the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, 344 (1949).  The measure of 
reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating 
similarly those similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.  Id. at 344, 
346.

 

[¶79]   The process of testing legislative 
classifications is founded upon determining the legitimate legislative purpose 
"at which legislation must aim."  Id. at 350.  In performing this function of judicial 
review of legislative action, we must exercise "judicial statesmanship" by 
appreciating the political pressures and practical considerations that naturally 
exist in the legislative process.  Id. at 351.  But in doing so, we cannot ignore reason and 
logic in the name of judicial restraint, and, most importantly, we must act to 
protect the intent of the framers of our constitution and the paramount value 
they placed upon equal protection of the law.  While it clearly is not our function to 
substitute our view about what is desirable for that of the legislature, 
"self-restraint is no virtue if the Court has a unique function to 
perform."  Id. at 
366.

 

[¶80]   We want to make it clear:

 

Before testing the classifications herein presented we 
caution that our constitutional inquiry does not seek to determine whether the 
[statute at issue is] wise, sound, necessary, or in the public interest.  There are ample 
reasons for concluding otherwise.  We simply ask whether the legislation 
adopted, for whatever purposes disclosed or undisclosed, is reasonably 
supportable. Each day the devastating effects of the drinking driver rage 
unabated with all of their tragic social and economic consequences.  We do not speculate 
on the influences that might have prompted the Legislature to answer this acute 
and growing problem by narrowly restricting rather than enlarging civil 
liability.  In 
the final analysis the Legislature must answer to an informed, and perhaps 
ultimately aroused, public opinion for its action.  We do not 
substitute our judgment for its own.

 

Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 12 (Cal. 1981) (citation omitted).

 

[¶81]   I agree with the majority opinion that 
§ 12-8-301 does not infringe upon the fundamental right of access to the courts 
or any other fundamental interest, nor does it create an inherently suspect 
class.  
Consequently, I agree that the statute must be reviewed under the 
rational basis test.  
That test, as we have said, requires us to determine whether the 
classification created by § 12-8-301 bears a rationale relationship to a 
legitimate state concern.  See generally Allhusen, 898 P.2d at 885-86; Johnson, 838 P.2d  at 166-67.  

 

[¶82]   The equal protection guarantee of the 
Wyoming Constitution was intended as a restriction on state legislative action 
inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises.  Laude, 654 P.2d  at 
1226.  Even at 
its lowest scrutiny levelrational basisthe Wyoming Constitution provides 
greater protection against legal discrimination than the federal constitution 
does.  Johnson, 838 P.2d  
at 165.  The 
rational basis test, although a deferential standard of review, is not a 
toothless one.  
Id. at 
172.  

 

[¶83]   Like the federal constitution, the 
Wyoming Constitution does not prohibit legislative classification.  It does, however, 
require that the classification be reasonably related to a legitimate 
legislative purpose.  
Where such a relationship is nonexistent, the statute must be held to 
contravene the constitution.  Phillips, 611 P.2d  at 826.

 

[T]here must be some difference which furnishes a 
reasonable basis for different legislation as to different classes, and the 
differences must not be arbitrary and without just relation to the subject of 
the legislation.  
One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it 
does not rest on a reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.

 

Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 578 P.2d  at 1354-55 (citations omitted).  In a number of 
instances, we have struck down legislation that did not pass constitutional 
muster under the rational basis test.  Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978) 
(holding state automobile guest statute violated the state equal protection 
provision by distinguishing between paying and nonpaying guest passengers 
respecting their right to sue for injuries sustained as a result of the driver's 
negligence); Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 (holding ten-year limitation violated the equal protection guarantee 
because it immunized certain defendants from liability arising from their 
involvement in real property improvements); Hoem, 756 P.2d 780 (finding 
Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act was unconstitutional because it violated the 
equal protection clause of the Wyoming Constitution); State ex rel. Wyoming 
Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1990) 
(finding Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act violated the equal protection 
guarantees of the Wyoming Constitution); Johnson, 838 P.2d 158 (finding statute providing for loss of driver's license based on age was 
unconstitutional special legislation lacking rational differentiation and 
violating the equal protection guarantees); Allhusen, 898 P.2d 878 (holding 
certain licensure provisions violated the equal protection guarantees by 
affording disparate treatment of unlicensed counselors employed by private, for 
profit institutions).  

 

[¶84]   In Johnson, we 
outlined the four elements of the test to be applied in determining whether 
statutory classifications violate equal protection provisions of the Wyoming 
Constitution: (1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has the group been 
subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws, (2) what is the public service 
to be served by the law, (3) what is the characteristic of the disadvantaged 
class that justifies disparate treatment, and (4) how are the characteristics 
used to distinguish people for disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the 
challenged law purportedly intends to serve.  838 P.2d  at 166-67.  Each of the four 
elements must be applied in determining whether the classifications created by § 
12-8-301 violate the equal protection provisions. 
 

1.  Class harmed by the legislative 
classification       

 

[¶85]   In reaching the result it does, the 
majority relies heavily on the assertion that the classification must be 
identified within the text of the challenged statute.  This assertion is 
incorrect.  
Under proper equal protection analysis, a classification can be 
established one of three ways:

 

First, a law may establish a classification on its face 
requiring no proof of the classification other than the language of the statute 
itself.  
Second, a law, which on its face shows no impermissible classification, 
may be impermissibly applied in varying degrees to different identifiable 
classes of individuals.  When application of a law is at issue, proof 
beyond the language of the law is required to establish the classification that 
is challenged.  
Finally, a law that neither classifies on its face nor is applied 
unevenly may nonetheless be shown by outside proof to in reality constitute "a 
device designed to impose different burdens on different classes of 
persons."  
Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law, ch. 16 at 527 
(1978).

 

Laude, 654 P.2d  at 1226.  Thus, a classification can be shown:  (1) from the 
language of the statute itself, (2) by the manner in which the statute is 
applied, or (3) by outside proof that the statute in 
fact is designed to impose different burdens on different classes of 
people.  The 
statute at issue creates impermissible classifications in all three ways.  On its face, as 
applied and as shown by outside proof, § 12-8-301 specifically treats 
individuals injured as a result of liquor vendor negligence occurring in the 
drive-in area differently than those injured as a result of inside-the-premises 
liquor vendor negligence.  On its face, as applied and as shown by 
outside proof, the statute also treats liquor vendors who negligently sell in 
the drive-in area differently than other liquor vendors.  The end result of 
the classifications is that liquor vendors may be accountable for furnishing 
liquor to an intoxicated person in a drive-in area 
but cannot be held accountable for furnishing liquor to the same intoxicated 
person inside the premises.  To the same effect, an injured victim has no 
right to recover if the intoxicated person was served inside the premises but can recover if the person was 
served in the drive-in area.  Stated differently, 
a person injured by an intoxicated person who was negligently provided alcohol 
in a drive-in area has the right to seek a portion of his damages from the 
alcohol provider, whereas a person injured by the same intoxicated person who 
was served negligently inside the establishment does not.

 

[¶86]   The majority attempts to avoid this 
result by looking at only the face of the statute, drawing the classification 
narrowly by looking exclusively at liquor vendors, and ignoring the classes 
harmed by the statute.  This is not proper equal protection analysis 
under our precedent, which requires consideration of the class harmed by the 
legislation.  
Johnson, 838 P.2d  at 166.  Narrow formulation 
of a statutory classification does not avoid the requirements of the equal 
protection clause.  
See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 346-351, 360.  

 

[¶87]   In Hoem, we considered 
a similar classification of tort victims who had their right to recover for 
negligence diminishedmedical malpractice tort victims.  We held a statute 
creating the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act violated those victims' equal 
protection rights.  
The act created a panel to review all medical malpractice claims against 
health care providers before such claims could be pursued in court.  756 P.2d  at 
782.  The 
plaintiff in Hoem argued the act treated medical malpractice victims 
differently than those injured by the tortious conduct of someone other than a 
health care provider in that only medical malpractice victims were prohibited 
from filing a claim directly in court for personal injury.  Id.  Ultimately, we held 
the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act denied medical malpractice victims equal 
protection of the law.  Id. at 784.  Our review revealed the legislature's purpose 
was to reduce the number of medical malpractice lawsuits and lower insurance 
rates.  Id. at 783.  Although we agreed 
the legislature had a legitimate interest in protecting the health of the 
citizens of Wyoming as well as the economic and social stability of the state, 
we held:  "It 
cannot seriously be contended that the extension of special benefits to the 
medical profession and the imposition of an additional hurdle in the path of 
medical malpractice victims relate to the protection of the public health."  Id.  We have reviewed 
similar statutes by focusing on the classification of tort victims created.  See Mills, 837 P.2d  at 
53; Hoem, 756 P.2d  at 783; Nehring, 582 P.2d  at 77.

 

[¶88]   In Hoem, this Court made it clear that the equal protection 
violation was found in the disparity in treatment of injured persons, some of 
whom were required to submit their cases to the medical review panel while 
others did not encounter that impediment in pursuing their claims.  We said:  "We cannot condone 
the legislature's use of the law to protect one class of people from financial 
difficulties while it dilutes the rights under the constitution of another class 
of people."  Hoem, 756 P.2d  at 784.  As with the statute we struck down in 
Hoem, § 12-8-301 results in disparity in treatment in that it 
protects one class of people (liquor vendors who negligently sell to intoxicated 
persons inside the liquor establishment) while diluting the rights of another 
class of people (those injured as a result of the negligent sale inside the 
premises). 

 

2.  Legislative objectives

 

[¶89]   Having identified the class harmed by 
the legislation, we must determine what public purpose the law serves.  As is oftentimes 
the reality in Wyoming, there is a dearth of evidence of legislative intent 
regarding this statute.  The legislature did not expressly articulate 
the purpose of § 12-8-301, as it did with the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act, 
or the relation between the classification in the statute and its purpose.  However, when the 
legislative purpose is not explicit, courts are free to infer the purpose.  Tussman & 
tenBroek, supra, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 366.  It can be safely 
inferred the purpose of § 12-8-301, located in Title 12 which is entitled 
Alcoholic Beverages, is to protect the public.  A statute which purports to "limit liability" 
in all but illegal circumstances could arguably be intended to encourage 
compliance with that law, thus promoting public safety.  The Greenwalts 
assert the legislative objective was to protect the financial interests of 
liquor vendors and their liability insurers.  Rejecting that contention, the majority 
states:

 

Having read the definite written words of § 301 and the 
other pertinent provisions of Title 12, having considered the general public 
knowledge about the evils attending the sale and furnishing of intoxicating 
liquors to our state's citizens, and having considered the prior common law 
decisions and statutory law, we can confidently conclude that the legislative 
objective of § 301 is unmistakably what the defenders of that law have 
identified:  a 
comprehensive statutory tort claim affecting liquor providers (both licensee and 
nonlicensees), intoxicated customers/guests of all liquor providers, and third 
parties who are damaged by intoxicated customers/guests.

 

Maj. op. at ¶51.

 

[¶90]   Without an expressly stated legislative 
purpose, all these characterizations of the legislative purpose require some 
degree of speculation.  However, each characterization ultimately 
relates to protection of the public and public safety.

 

3.  Rational relationship between legislative 
classification and objective  

 

[¶91]   Having identified the class harmed by 
the legislation and the public purpose of the statute, we must examine the 
characteristic of the disadvantaged class justifying the disparate treatment and 
how that is relevant to the statute's purpose.  In other words, is there a rational 
relationship between the purpose of the statute and a characteristic of the 
class harmed by the legislation?  The fatal flaw in Wyoming's dram-shop statute 
appears in the final step of the Johnson test 
particularly because a reviewing court is no longer free to imagine any set of 
facts which could make the statute appear constitutional.  Johnson, 838 P.2d  at 167.  Can it be argued 
that preventing a tort victim from seeking damages for a negligent alcohol 
provider's share of responsibility is rationally related to protection of the 
public?  I 
struggle to see the connection.  It may be true that subjecting violators of 
Title 12 to liability encourages compliance with § 12-8-301.  However, it does 
not logically follow that granting immunity to negligent alcohol providers who 
comply with Title 12 will somehow promote public safety.  Under the statute, 
an alcohol provider may be motivated to diligently comply with each Title 12 
requirement to avoid liability, such as refusing to serve minors or intoxicated 
persons in drive-in areas, observing mandatory hours of operation, and following 
the myriad of other Title 12 requirements.  Yet, under § 12-8-301 the same alcohol 
provider has no legal incentive to refrain from serving more alcohol to an 
already intoxicated individual inside the establishment.  Both McClellan and the 1985 statute had the effect of encouraging 
compliance with Title 12 by holding all persons liable who illegally provided 
alcohol while also protecting the public by imposing that same liability on 
licensees who failed to exercise reasonable care in serving alcohol to 
intoxicated persons inside the establishment.  Viewed from this perspective, it is difficult 
to imagine how § 12-8-301 is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.  This 
is particularly true in light of the fact that the statute significantly 
curtails both the rights of tort victims and the responsibilities of liquor 
vendors as those rights and responsibilities existed after McClellan and prior to the 1986 amendment to § 12-8-301.  

 

[¶92]   When an intoxicated individual leaves 
the provider's premises, the public is in danger.  Usually, but not always, the heightened risk 
of harm to the public results from alcohol-related traffic accidents that are 
tragic and foreseeable events, evident in alarming statistics.  Regrettably, 
accidents involving intoxicated drivers in Wyoming are commonplace.  In 1986, the year 
the legislature enacted § 12-8-301, there were 146 fatal vehicular accidents in 
Wyoming. Wyoming's 
Comprehensive Report on Traffic Accidents, Wyoming Highway Department, 
Highway Safety Branch, Accident Data Management Section at 149 (1986).  Seventy-one 
vehicular accidents, or 48.6 percent of all vehicular accidents which resulted 
in death that year, were alcohol-related.  Id.  These statistics fail to account for the many 
people who had injuries that resulted from alcohol-related traffic accidents but 
did not result in death.  It is also important to note that, although 
the most obvious public safety concern is drinking and driving, intoxicated 
persons pose many other types of risks to third persons that do not involve the 
use of a motor vehicle.  Public safety cannot be enhanced by excusing 
alcohol providers from the same duty owed by all other personsacting reasonably 
under the circumstances.  Therefore, the classification of tort victims 
created by § 12-8-301 is not rationally related to the apparent purpose of the 
statuteprotection of the public.

 

[¶93]   In prior cases where this Court has 
found statutory classifications were not rationally related to the legislative 
objective, we have not hesitated to declare the statute at issue 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.  In Nehring, 582 P.2d 67, we held the automobile guest statute violated the equal protection 
provisions by distinguishing between paying and nonpaying guest passengers with 
regard to their right to sue for injuries as a result of a driver's 
negligence.  
While we recognized the legitimate legislative objective of promoting 
hospitality by generous drivers, we questioned whether the classification 
prescribed by statute had a rational relation to that objective.  582 P.2d  at 
78.  We quoted 
the New Mexico Supreme Court to expose the basic flaw in the 
relationship:

 

"The classification fails not because it draws some 
distinction between paying and nonpaying guests, but because it penalizes 
nonpaying guests by depriving them completely of protection from ordinary 
negligence. . . . No matter how laudable the State's interest in promoting 
hospitality, it is irrational to reward generosity by allowing the host to 
abandon ordinary care and by denying to nonpaying guests the common law remedy 
for negligently inflicted injury."

 

Id. (quoting McGeehan v. Bunch, 540 P.2d 238, 241 (N.M. 
1975)).  We 
held the guest statute exceeded all bounds of rationality and constituted a 
denial of uniform operation under the Wyoming Constitution.  Id. at 79.

 

[¶94]   In Phillips, 611 P.2d 821, we struck 
down a ten-year statute of limitation that immunized a class of defendants from 
certain enumerated liabilities arising from their involvement in real property 
improvements.  
The statute had the effect of granting a special immunity to architects 
and contractors.  
611 P.2d  at 825.  Conversely, it limited a specific class of 
plaintiffs from full recoverythose who suffered damages as a result of the 
negligence of an architect or contractor.  "The arbitrary quality of the statute 
clearly appears when we consider that architects and contractors are not the 
only persons whose negligence in the construction of a building or other 
improvement may cause damage to property or injury to persons.'"  Id. (quoting Skinner v. 
Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ill. 1967)).  "That the statute benefits all architects 
and construction contractors is significant only if the benefits conferred upon 
them are not denied to others similarly situated.'"  Id. at 826 (quoting 
Skinner, 231 
N.E.2d at 591).  We held in part 
that the statute granted immunity from suit for only a narrow spectrum of 
defendants in violation of the equal protection provisions.  Id. at 
831.

 

[¶95]   Here, the majority concludes the 
legislature could rationally have thought the classification requiring an 
injured third party to look to only the intoxicated adult for compensation 
promotes individual responsibility on the part of those who choose to drink and 
drive or otherwise abuse alcohol and, in that manner, protects the public.  The majority 
insists the legislature properly could have concluded that to do otherwise would 
impose an unacceptable burden upon the alcohol provider to recognize its 
customer is intoxicated and to foresee that a customer may drink and drive.  This assertion is 
fallacious for several reasons.  First, it can be presumed, in a great 
majority of the circumstances, a jury will consider proximate cause and place 
liability squarely on the shoulders of the intoxicated person.  Second, the 
legislature imposed responsibility on the alcohol provider to determine whether 
its drive-in customer is intoxicated, a much more difficult task given the 
attenuated nature of the contact with that personnot being able to observe the 
volume of alcohol previously consumed or the typical behaviors accompanying 
intoxication.  
See § 
12-5-301(a)(v) (forbids the furnishing of alcohol to an intoxicated person in 
the drive-in area).  
It is, at best, questionable whether serving alcohol to an intoxicated 
customer in the drive-in area poses any greater danger to the public than 
serving an intoxicated person inside the premises.  This is 
particularly true considering the intoxicated person must only be in the 
drive-in area and thus may not necessarily be driving a vehicle.  Finally, to support 
the conclusion that imposing the alcohol provider's share of liability on the 
intoxicated person will act as a deterrent and encourage personal responsibility 
on the part of the intoxicated person thereby assisting in protecting the 
public, this Court must agree that an already intoxicated customer is cognizant 
of the statute's effect and has the capacity to conclude he should refrain from 
further alcohol consumption to avoid assuming more than his personal share of 
responsibility for injuries he may cause upon leaving the establishment.  It is difficult to 
imagine a more illogical conclusion.  As between an intoxicated patron and a 
licensed alcohol provider, no doubt exists as to who has the greater capacity to 
control whether more alcohol is consumed and is in fact capable of exercising 
personal responsibility.  

 

[¶96]   I also question whether "individual 
responsibility" was the legislative objective behind the dram-shop statute 
because it is directly contrary to the policy underlying Wyoming's comparative 
negligence statute in which the legislature chose to allocate the consequences 
to all those with fault.  In 1986, the Wyoming legislature abolished 
joint and several liability by amending § 1-1-109 to provide that a party at 
fault be required to pay for his proportionate share of the fault.  1986 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 24, § 1; Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 708 (Wyo. 
1993).  The adoption of 
comparative fault mandates that the trier of fact determine issues of proximate 
cause and allocate liability accordingly.  
In a comparative fault case, the jury must consider the negligence of 
not only the parties but also all the participants in the transaction producing 
the injuries sued upon.3  Board of County Commissioners of County of Campbell v. 
Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1191 (Wyo. 
1981).  

 

[¶97]   Instead of promoting individual 
responsibility, the current version of § 12-8-301 excuses an alcohol provider 
from responsibility for its own negligence by precluding recovery for its 
proportion of fault when it acts legally but fails to exercise the degree of 
care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.  Try as I might, I 
can find no rational basis to distinguish between victims injured by persons 
illegally served alcohol or intoxicated persons served in a drive-in area and 
those injured due in part to the negligence of a person serving an obviously 
intoxicated adult inside an establishment.

 

[¶98]   The Greenwalts suggest the true 
legislative purpose of § 12-8-301 is to protect alcohol vendors from the expense 
of liability insurance to cover their potential negligence.  Lacking any 
indication in the legislative history of the intent of the body as a whole, we 
are offered evidence of the intent of the sponsor of the legislation which would 
suggest that, at least, to be his purpose.4  However, we cannot 
consider the intent of one legislator as reflecting the intent of the 
legislature as a whole.  Independent Producers Marketing Corp. v. Cobb, 721 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 
1986).  
Obviously, if the Greenwalts' contention were true, it would not 
constitute a legitimate legislative purpose and would raise other constitutional 
issues such as the prohibition in Article 3, Section 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution against special laws granting exclusive immunity to corporations or 
individuals.  
Having found the medical profession was not entitled to such preferential 
treatment, we certainly should not find alcohol providers are entitled to 
it.  Hoem, 756 P.2d  at 
783.

 

[¶99]   I am fully cognizant of the deference 
we are required to give the legislature and our obligation not to encroach into 
the legislative field of policy making.  However, it is likewise this Court's duty to 
declare unconstitutional statutes that clearly violate Wyoming's constitutional 
mandates.  Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939 (Wyo. 2000).  Even with considerable effort, I can find no 
rational relationship between this statute and a legitimate state concern. 
Following the rationale of our longstanding equal protection jurisprudence, I 
would find the Greenwalts have carried their burden of proof that the dram-shop 
statute creates classifications of tort victims and tortfeasors without 
furthering a legitimate state interest.  

 

FOOTNOTES

1Indeed, some former 
members of this Court strongly expressed the view that the legislative 
department is more legitimately positioned and better able in our form of 
government than the judicial department to consider our society's social 
problems, marshal appropriate information, identify relevant public policy 
factors, and enact laws expressing the public will about the appropriate public 
policies deemed necessary to address those social problems.  Dellapenta, 838 P.2d  at 1166-69 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting; Cardine, J., dissenting but concurring in result).

2See generally Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 
341-81 (1949) (a "comprehensive analysis of the principles of equal protection 
as a discrete technique of judicial decision," according to Developments in the LawEqual Protection, 82 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1065, 1067 (1969)).

3In their classic work, 
Professors Tussman and tenBroek reversed the order of the first two elements. 
Tussman, supra, at 366-68. 

4The Greenwalts reason 
that the more alcohol that vendors sell to a customer, the more profitable the 
business; but, the more alcohol sold to a customer, the more likely it will be 
that a customer will become intoxicated "to a level where he/she presents a 
danger to the general public; particularly at a bar where that customer is 
likely to need to drive home."

 
                                            
Footnotes for the Dissent

1Black's Law Dictionary 
509 (7th ed. 1999) defines dram-shop liability as: "Civil 
liability of a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for personal injury 
caused by an intoxicated customer."

2To better understand the 
positioning of § 12-8-301 in the continuum of dram-shop liability, it is 
instructive to examine the status of dram-shop law nationwide.  Ten states have 
failed to enact dram-shop statutes: Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and West 
Virginia.  The 
courts in five of those statesHawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, and 
West Virginiacurrently hold dram shops liable for third-party damages.  The courts of the 
remaining five states continue to follow the common-law rule holding dram shops 
are not liable for third-party injuries.  Thirty-three states hold dram shops liable 
for alcohol sales to already intoxicated patrons or minors.  Five 
statesCalifornia, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Wisconsinhave 
enacted dram-shop liability for third parties in the event the dram shop 
improperly sold alcohol to a minor.  Two states have made dram shops completely 
immune from civil liabilityNevada and South Dakota.  See Votava, supra, 69 UMKC L. 
Rev. at 
596-604.  
Wyoming's statute is unique and grants alcohol providers complete 
immunity from liability for negligence unless they violate Title 12.  See § 
12-8-301.  This 
background illustrates the wide statutory variations that exist state to state 
and further makes clear that such variations play a crucial role in determining 
whether a statute survives constitutional scrutiny.

  3Uncertainty exists as to 
whether an immune party would be placed on the verdict form.

  4In 1986, a representative sponsored the amendment to 
§ 12-8-301.  
The representative sent a letter to the Wyoming Legislative Service 
Office stating in pertinent part, "I have enclosed extremely rough drafts of 
proposed legislation dealing with the liability insurance issue."  (Emphasis 
added.)