Case Title: FRANKS v. INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
FRANKS v. INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC.2004 WY 9796 P.3d 484Case Number: 02-269Decided: 08/24/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

JUDITH 
L. FRANKS, Personal Representative

of 
the Estate of Wayne Franks, Deceased,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

INDEPENDENT 
PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC.,

a 
Colorado corporation, d/b/a INDEPENDENT

PRODUCTION 
COMPANY; R & J PRODUCTION;

and 
JACK ANDREGG, individually,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Philip 
A. Nicholas and Julie M. Yates of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, LLC, 
Laramie, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Nicholas.

 

Representing 
Appellee Independent Production Company, Inc.:

Patrick 
J. Murphy, Scott W. Skavdahl, and Jason A. Neville of Williams, Porter, Day 
& Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Murphy.

 

Representing 
Appellees R & J Production and Jack Andregg:

Paul 
J. Drew of Drew & Carlson, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming. 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Appellant 
Judith L. Franks (Franks), personal representative for the estate of Wayne 
Franks, appeals from the grant of summary judgment to Appellees in an action for 
wrongful death.  Franks brought this 
action after her husband, Wayne Franks (Wayne), died from injuries he sustained 
when well casing was dropped on him at a coal bed methane well site leased and 
operated by Independent Production Company (IPC).  Franks contends that the trial court 
wrongly granted summary judgment after determining that Appellees owed no duty 
of care based on the facts of the case.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
affirm the grant of summary judgment to Appellees. 

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Franks 
presents the following statement of the issues for our 
review:

 

1.                  
Whether 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants, Independent 
Production Company, Inc., R&J Production Services, and Jack Andregg on 
either of the following bases:

 

a.      
Whether 
IPC, R&J Production, and Jack Andregg each owed a duty of reasonable care to 
Wayne Franks under the facts of this case.

 

b.      
Whether 
the nature and location of the activity being performed imposed independent, 
non-delegable duties on IPC, and its Agents R&J Production and Jack 
Andregg.

 

c.      
Whether 
IPC, R&J Production and Jack Andregg owed duties of care to Wayne Franks 
either because they exercised control over the activity resulting in his death, 
or because he was an "other" as referred to in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§ 413, 416, and 427.

 

2.                  
Whether 
stepchildren, dependent on the decedent similar to that of biological or adopted 
children, can recover under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Act.

 

Appellee 
IPC presents no statement of the issues.  
Appellees R & J Production and Jack Andregg present the 
following:

 

1.                  
Whether 
the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant-appellees R & J Production and Jack Andregg on the basis that the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm to another 
caused by the independent contractor.

 

2.                  
Whether 
stepchildren are persons for whose benefit a wrongful death action may be 
brought.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
IPC 
operated a Campbell County coal bed methane well site leased from the United 
States Bureau of Land Management.  
IPC hired R & J Production to supervise all development, production, 
and drilling operations on the well site.  
R & J was a general partnership informally created by Rod Hicks and 
Jack Andregg, the only two employees of R & J.  IPC also contracted with A-1 Drilling, 
Inc., to drill its coal bed methane well.  

 

[¶5]           
Colorado 
Tubular was called, and an order placed for well casing for delivery to the well 
site.  Cole's Construction Services, 
Inc., (Cole's), Wayne's employer, was hired by Colorado Tubular to make the 
delivery, and Cole's directed Wayne to deliver the load of well casing to IPC's 
well site.  On March 4, 2000, after 
Wayne arrived at the well site, Justin Browning, an A-1 employee, used a backhoe 
to unload the well casing.  Each 
length of well casing measured seven inches in diameter, forty feet in length, 
and weighed about 680 pounds.  Wayne 
climbed up on the bed of the trailer to assist Browning, the backhoe operator, 
with the unloading.  During the 
process, Wayne fell to the ground and several casing rolled off the end of the 
backhoe clamp forks onto Wayne, crushing him.  An ambulance arrived, but Wayne died on 
the way to the hospital. 

 

[¶6]           
Wayne 
had no children of his own but had stepchildren from two marriages, one of whom 
he had adopted and three stepchildren from his second marriage, all of whom are 
parties to the suit brought by Franks against IPC, R & J Production, Jack 
Andregg, A-1 Drilling Inc., Justin Browning, and John Does I, II, and III 
(Appellees).  Appellees filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on the claims brought on behalf of Wayne's 
stepchildren.  Determining that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(c) (LexisNexis 2003)1 governs who may bring a wrongful 
death action, the trial court determined that the plain language precluded an 
action by stepchildren, granted the Appellees' motion and dismissed all claims 
filed on behalf of the stepchildren.  
Summary judgment was also granted to IPC, R & J, and Jack 
Andregg.  Later, Franks settled with 
A-1 and Justin Browning, and the case was dismissed although Franks reserved 
determination of whether Justin Browning was  IPC's loaned employee.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Parties' 
Contentions

 

[¶7]           
Franks 
contends that the trial court erred when it decided on the basis of Noonan v. 
Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1986), and its progeny,2 that Appellees were entitled to 
summary judgment on the basis that "an employer of an independent contractor is 
not liable for physical harm to another caused by a contractor unless 
Plaintiff's case falls within one of two exceptions."  Franks contends that the facts of this 
case are not governed by the line of independent contractor cases cited by the 
trial court because IPC did not contract the unloading of well casing to any of 
its independent contractors but retained that obligation itself although it 
delegated that actual performance to its agent, Jack Andregg, and his 
partnership, R & J.  Franks 
contends that Justin Browning's role was that of a borrowed servant and not that 
of an employee of an independent contractor.  Second, Franks contends that a 
non-delegable duty was imposed on IPC, as the operator of a federal oil and gas 
lease, and its agents on the bases of (1) federal and state regulations, and (2) 
the extrahazardous nature of the work being performed by IPC.  Finally, Franks asserts that even if 
this case is analyzed under the independent contractor line of cases, IPC, R 
& J, and Jack Andregg still owed duties of reasonable care to Wayne because 
Wayne was not the employee of a contractor with whom IPC contracted the 
unloading obligation, because IPC assumed affirmative safety duties and 
controlled A-1's and Justin Browning's work at the time of Wayne's injuries, 
and, finally, because Wayne was an "other" as referred to in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 413, 416, and 427 (1965).  

 

[¶8]           
Franks' 
multiple arguments attempt to impose a duty of care upon IPC and its agent.  IPC, R & J, and Andregg contend that 
this is a "no duty" case for which summary judgment was properly granted.  Each of Franks' contentions is addressed 
in the following discussion, and we ultimately conclude that no duty of care 
existed for the Appellees. Summary judgment was properly 
entered.

 

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶9]           
The 
elements of a prima facie case of negligence are duty, breach, causation and 
damages. Garnett v. Coyle, 2001 WY 94, ¶24, 33 P.3d 114, ¶24 (Wyo. 
2001).  Summary judgment is not 
favored in negligence actions, since such actions by their nature are factually 
dependent.  Id., ¶¶ 4, 6. 
Accordingly, summary judgment in negligence actions is subject to more exacting 
scrutiny.  Id.; Woodard v. Cook 
Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996).  On appeal, we review summary judgment de 
novo and do not defer to the district court's ruling.  Act I, LLC v. Davis, 2002 WY 183, 
¶9, 60 P.3d 156, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002).  
Using the same standards and materials used by the district court, we 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmovant party 
and that party receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly 
be drawn from the record.  
Id.  Summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the 
parties have asserted.  Act 
I, ¶9.   If the movant 
carries its burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment, the 
party opposing summary judgment must come forward with specific facts to 
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.  Garnett, ¶4.  General allegations and conclusory 
statements are not sufficient.  
Id., ¶5. 

 

 

Duty 
for Employer/Independent Contractor Relationship

 

[¶10]      We 
have defined an independent contractor as "one who, exercising an independent 
employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and 
without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of 
the work."  Combined Ins. Co. of 
America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Wyo. 1978) (quoting Lichty v. 
Model Homes, 66 Wyo. 347, 211 P.2d 958, 967 (Wyo. 1949)).  Generally, the employer of an 
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an 
act or omission of the contractor or his servants. Hittel v. WOTCO, Inc., 
996 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 
(1965)); Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Wyo. 
1988); see also, Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 164-67.  Two limited exceptions to non-liability 
have been recognized in our previous decisions:  (1) workplace owner/employer (owner) 
exercises controlling and pervasive role over the independent contractor's work; 
or (2) owner assumes affirmative safety duties.  Hittel, 996 P.2d  at 676; Jones 
v. Chevron, 718 P.2d 890, 896 (Wyo. 1986). The first exception does not 
apply unless the employer (owner) has the right to control the details of the 
work.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 
164.  "The owner may retain a broad 
general power of supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to 
insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract -- including the 
right to inspect, the right to stop the work, the right to make suggestions or 
recommendations as to details of the work, the right to prescribe alterations or 
deviations in the work -- without changing the relationship from that of owner 
and independent contractor or the duties arising from that relationship."  Id. at 165.  We have reaffirmed this rule in 
Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1987), and 
Ramsey v. Pacific Power & Light, 792 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Wyo. 
1990).  

 

[¶11]      To 
determine whether the nature and extent of the control present is sufficient to 
impose liability, both applicable contractual provisions and the actual exercise 
of control are relevant.  Jones 
v. Chevron, 718 P.2d  at 896.  
Franks contends that Jack Andregg, as IPC's agent, exercised pervasive 
control over the site daily by stopping work and over Justin Browning and Wayne 
Franks on the day of the accident; however, our review of the record indicates 
that, under the respective oral or written contracts, A-1 and R & J were the 
independent contractors employed by IPC, and Jack Andregg and Justin Browning 
were employees of the respective independent contractors.  "Agency is a fiduciary relation which 
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent.  There is no presumption that an agency 
exists."   Krier v. Safeway 
Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 411 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting True v. Hi-Plains 
Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991, 999 (Wyo. 1978)).  "In Wyoming, the overriding element in 
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is dependent 
on whether the employer has a right to control the details of the work whereby 
liability is sought to be established."  
Krier, at 411 (quoting Noonan, 713 P.2d at 164).  Andregg and IPC have established an 
employer/independent contractor relationship; however, even if Andregg was IPC's 
agent, we disagree that the record shows that Andregg exceeded the scope of 
control allowed under Noonan by his daily actions on the well site that 
would allow duty to be imposed against IPC or Andregg and R & J.  The evidence shows that Andregg ordered 
use of the backhoe to unload the casing and then sat in his truck as Justin and 
Wayne proceeded and had nothing else to do with the unloading until the 
accident.  Andregg can require that 
employees of other independent contractors begin working without giving rise to 
liability. Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 165-67.  

 

[¶12]      Franks 
further contends that a tort duty was created because IPC's drilling contract 
with A-1 provided that IPC would unload well casing, and IPC delegated that 
obligation to Jack Andregg, who then arranged for A-1's backhoe to unload casing 
brought by Wayne.  The drilling 
contract contained an Exhibit A that had a list of the equipment, materials and 
services to be furnished by A-1 and a separate list of equipment, materials and 
services to be furnished by IPC.  
Our review of the record shows that IPC agreed to allow A-1 to invoice it 
for use of its equipment at IPC's request by a provision that stated:  "Backhoe:  To be invoiced at $45.00/hour when used 
at Operator's convenience to (a) [u]nload, move or handle casing."  Another provision detailed how much A-1 
could bill IPC for labor when unloading casing.  IPC contends that the drilling contract 
did not provide that it would unload casing and this provision was not a leasing 
arrangement separate and apart from A-1's obligations for drilling the well, but 
merely a provision governing invoicing procedures.  Our review of the drilling contract 
shows that it plainly states that A-1 is an independent contractor who would 
drill and case to depths specified in the contract.  The contract did not provide that A-1 
would be paid one set amount for this service.  Instead, the contract contained 
extensive lists of equipment, materials, and services that were individually 
priced.  We found no language 
assigning unloading casing to a particular party and none of the parties claim 
that such language exists. The complete text of the provision in Exhibit A 
allows invoicing for use of the backhoe to "[u]nload, move or handle casing;" 
"[d]ig more than one (1) drilling pit;" "[b]ackfill drilling pits upon 
completion of drilling;" and "[a]ny use at operator's request other than 
drilling of first drilling pit."  We 
must agree with Appellees that the plain language of the provision read in the 
context of the whole contract provides pricing for services and was not a 
statement that IPC was responsible for unloading well casing.  See Massengill v. S.M.A.R.T. Sports 
Medicine Clinic, P.C., 996 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶13]      Franks 
contends that IPC's agent, Jack Andregg, conducted frequent safety meetings and 
frequently shut down the well site for safety reasons and by doing so assumed 
affirmative safety duties with the result that all Appellees owed a duty of care 
to Wayne.  Our review shows, 
however, that Andregg did not direct Justin or Wayne in the performance of their 
duties for unloading well casing and no genuine issue of fact exists as to 
whether Andregg was an independent contractor or assumed affirmative safety 
duties for the unloading of the casing.  
Andregg, as an employee of R & J, served as a site supervisor within 
the parameters set forth in Noonan, and no duty of care was 
created.

 

[¶14]      Franks 
also contends that a tort duty was created because the well casing was delivered 
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) by IPC's order and the UCC requires that 
the buyer furnish suitable facilities for the receipt of goods under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34.1-2-503(a)(ii).  Although 
the UCC provision probably governs the relationship between a buyer and seller, 
no authority is provided that application of the UCC to IPC as a buyer is 
evidence that IPC retained the obligation for unloading well casing.  We find the UCC inapplicable to that 
question.   In this case, 
Justin Browning, the employee of an independent contractor, A-1 Drilling, and 
Wayne Franks, as the employee of a vendor, Cole's, unloaded the well head casing 
with A-1's backhoe.  Under IPC's 
contract with A-1, IPC would be billed a certain amount per hour for this 
service as part of the drilling services.  
Under these circumstances, the employer/independent contractor 
relationship was maintained and IPC had no duty of care to Wayne under these 
asserted contractual or statutory provisions.  Jack Andregg, employee of another 
independent contractor, R & J, ordered the unloading to begin; however, this 
control is not pervasive within the meaning of Noonan, and this is not an 
action for which liability arises for Andregg and his partnership company or for 
his employer, IPC.

 

Applicability 
of Business Invitee Principles

 

[¶15]      
Franks 
next contends that a duty of care is imposed on IPC apart from the protections 
offered by our employer-of-independent-contractor line of authority.  She asserts that Wayne was a business 
invitee on IPC's leased premises and Justin Browning's negligence created a 
foreseeable unsafe condition of the premises that caused Wayne's death.  She relies upon Ruhs v. Pacific Power 
& Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982), which held that 
under Wyoming's common law, "[a]n independent contractor's employee who goes on 
the owner's premises is an invitee to whom the owner may be liable for injury 
caused by an unsafe condition of the premises."  Id. at 1272.  In Ruhs, Kyle Ruhs was employed 
by Wright's Tree Service, Inc.; Wright's had contracted with PP&L to trim 
trees around PP&L's electrical lines.  
While doing this trimming, Ruhs was electrocuted and severely 
injured.  In the action that 
followed, summary judgment was granted for PP&L under the rule that it owed 
no duty to its independent contractor's employees.  The Tenth Circuit reversed upon evidence 
showing that PP&L had been negligent by failing to de-energize the power 
lines before Ruhs began working near them in violation of the National 
Electrical Safety Code. Ruhs, 671 F.2d  at 1274. Determining that PP&L 
owed Ruhs a duty of care as an invitee, and finding that a jury could determine 
that PP&L's own negligence had caused Ruh's injuries, the Tenth Circuit 
remanded for trial.  Id.  Franks now contends that Ruhs can 
be applied to the facts of this case, while IPC contends that no direct 
negligence claim is permitted against the employer of an independent contractor 
whose employee injures the employee of another independent contractor.  The rule in Ruhs originally was 
developed by our own precedent, Pan 
American Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 
381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963), 
and remains law today. Hittell, 996 P.2d  at 678.  The precise question is the direct 
negligence of IPC; an issue of direct negligence is not applicable to Andregg or 
R & J Production.  Franks 
provides no authority that this theory applies to Andregg and R & J 
Production as an owner or possessor of the land, and we do not consider its 
application to them.

 

[¶16]      
With 
the exception of trespassers, we impose a duty of reasonable care under the 
circumstances upon an owner or possessor for all other entrants upon land.  Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 
296 (Wyo. 1993).  Wyoming 
law recognizes that the drilling of an oil and gas well is an ultrahazardous 
activity, a dangerous agency. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 381 P.2d  at 
73-74.  However, Wyoming law 
remains, as previously stated by this Court, that the owner's duty to an invitee 
who may be the employee of an independent contractor is that of reasonable care 
under all the circumstances, "including the duty to take reasonable precautions 
to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement 
or use." Ruhs, 671 F.2d  at 1272; Hittel, 996 P.2d  at 678; see 
also, Pan American Petroleum Corp., 381 P.2d  at 74.  In Hittel, we limited the 
application of Ruhs and Pan American to ultrahazardous 
activity.  996 P.2d  at 678-79.  Franks contends that Hull v. Chevron, 
812 F.2d 584, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1987), established the rule that 
ultrahazardous activities create a non-delegable duty of the owner to maintain a 
safe workplace.  IPC contends that 
offloading well casing is not an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity 
but does not address Hull's application.  

 

[¶17]      
In 
Hull, 

 

John 
C. Hull, an employee of Chase Drilling Company (Chase), was assisting two 
co-employees in unloading and moving drill collars, 8,000 pound cylinders 
utilized around the drill bit. The low man on the totem pole or "worm" in oil 
field parlance, Mr. Hull was positioning certain racks onto which the drill 
collars were temporarily being placed when one of the drill collars rolled off 
the tines of the forklift and onto his right leg, seriously injuring it.  

Mr. 
Hull filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming 
seeking damages for this injury against his employer, Chase, and the lessee, 
Chevron, which had hired Chase to drill the well.  Pursuant to the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act, the district court dismissed the action against Chase. In an 
amended complaint, Mr. Hull then alleged in three causes of action for 
negligence, strict liability, and culpable negligence that Chevron (1) had 
a nondelegable duty in an ultrahazardous activity to maintain a safe working 
environment; (2) was negligent in failing to supervise the proper operation of 
the forklift which it had leased and placed on the site; (3) had failed to 
maintain a smooth and level terrain around the rig; (4) retained control of the 
drilling operations and, thus, was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of 
Chase's employees; and (5) owed Hull a duty of care as a third-party beneficiary 
of Chevron's federal lease which imposes certain safety requirements on oil and 
gas operators.  

During 
the six-day trial, the jury heard testimony from Chase and Chevron employees, 
various safety and oil and gas experts, and medical and rehabilitation 
specialists. Mr. Hull sought to prove that under the particular day rate 
contract governing the relationship between Chase and Chevron, Chevron retained 
the right to control and direct the entire drilling operation. In defense, 
Chevron attempted to establish Chase's role as an independent contractor with 
primary control over the details of the drilling operation, Chase's negligence 
in failing to supervise its forklift operator who was alleged to have used 
amphetamines on the morning of the accident, and the plaintiff's negligence and 
contributing drug use. As a third-party defendant, Chase abandoned its pretrial 
contention that it was an independent contractor and put on evidence to 
underscore its theory that the "company man," Chevron's employee, Mr. Bobby 
Haynes, directed and supervised the drilling operation.  

In 
returning a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Chevron and Chase were governed by a principal/agent, not 
operator/independent contractor, relationship.  

 

812 F.2d  at 585-86.

 

[¶18]      
Thus, 
Hull is distinguishable from this case where no genuine dispute exists 
that A-1 was an independent contractor.  
Franks cannot establish the requisite principal/agent relationship 
required to proceed under a theory of non-delegable duty should we decide that 
rule existed.  By contract, IPC and 
A-1 agreed upon an independent contractor relationship and while that fact is 
not definitive, neither IPC nor Andregg exercised the requisite control over the 
well site required by Noonan to impose liability on IPC.  

 

 

Borrowed 
Servant Theory

 

[¶19]      
Franks 
contends that Justin Browning was borrowed by IPC's agent, Jack Andregg, to 
perform unloading duties usually controlled by Andregg and, under the borrowed 
servant theory, all Appellees are now liable for Justin's negligence.  Appellees contend that Franks is 
improperly raising this issue for the first time on appeal; however, in her 
brief in opposition to summary judgment, Franks specifically cited to the 
provision in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 which governs borrowed 
servant.  We will, therefore, 
consider the issue.  Appellees also 
contend that the law prohibits an employee from serving two employers at the 
same instant and because Franks has accepted a settlement from A-1 on the theory 
that Browning was its employee, judicial estoppel does not permit her to now 
assert differently.  In reply, 
Franks contends that any consideration of a settlement agreement to resolve this 
specific issue would be improper and then she quotes the settlement agreement as 
proof that she reserved the issue of whose employee Browning was at the time of 
the accident.  We need not decide 
the propriety of either parties' actions since we have determined that Appellees 
exercised no control over Browning's actions in unloading casing and, therefore, 
under the relevant law, we can decide as a matter of law that Browning was not a 
borrowed servant of any of the Appellees.  
See Franks v. Olsen, 975 P.2d 588, 594 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

[¶20]      
According 
to the "borrowed 
servant" doctrine, 

 

when 
one employer provides an employee to another employer, the employee becomes the 
"borrowed 
servant" of the second employer for that particular transaction. 
If the second employer exercises control over the "borrowed 
servant," the second employer assumes 
liability for the activities of that borrowed employee, and the original 
employer is not liable for any of that employee's conduct.  Blessing v. Pittman, 70 Wyo. 416, 
251 P.2d 243, 246-47 (1952); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 462 
(1996).  In determining which 
employer must assume liability, the court looks to the dual factors of who 
controls the employee and whose business the employee is furthering at the time 
of the accident. Blessing, 251 P.2d  at 247.  Under our law, however, the primary test 
to establish the existence of employment is the right of control of the alleged 
employer. Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 743 (Wyo. 1938)).  

 

Franks, 
975 P.2d  at 593.  The factor of 
whose business the employee was furthering is not helpful in this case. A-1's 
business consisted of providing personnel to perform work for IPC. When Browning 
was engaged in the performance of his duties at the well site, he necessarily 
was furthering and doing the business of both employers.  See id. (citing Blessing, 251 
P.2d at 247).  Under these 
circumstances, the primary test to apply is the right of control test. Franks 
contends that the "right of control" test supports her position because IPC was 
responsible for unloading casing and Andregg controlled Browning as he used the 
backhoe to unload.  Our preceding 
discussion has determined that the evidence does not establish these facts and, 
under that right of control test, Browning was A-1's employee and not a borrowed 
servant.

 

 

Duty 
Imposed by Regulations

 

[¶21]      Franks 
next contends that regulations applied to IPC as a well operator by virtue of 
its BLM lease and OSHA authority that imposed a duty of care on IPC.  While we agree that an applicable 
statute or regulation may confirm a duty of care based upon the relevant common 
law governing employer/independent contractor relationships, it cannot impose a 
duty beyond it.  Without a showing 
of pervasive control or an assumption of safety duties, the regulations do not 
create a duty of care.  Here, none 
is shown.

 
 

"Other"

 

[¶22]      Franks 
next contends that because Wayne was the delivery person for a supplier, not the 
employee of an independent contractor, he was an innocent third party invitee at 
the well site.  She recites 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 413, 416, and 427 (1965) as providing for a 
duty of care by the employer of independent contractors to "others" under 
certain conditions.  Sections 413 and 416 require a finding that 
there was a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm or a peculiar risk of 
physical harm to others.  There is 
no evidence of any peculiar risks in this case.  Also, it does not appear that the term 
"others" includes the employees of the independent contractor; rather, it refers 
to the general public or others who have no relationship to the independent 
contractor.  Stockwell, 
733 P.2d  at 1031 (citing Jones 
v. Chevron, 
718 P.2d  at 899, 901).  By 
contending that the hazardous work of unloading casing created a peculiar or 
special risk of harm, Franks asserts that IPC owed Wayne a duty of care although 
no contractual or fiduciary duties existed between IPC and Cole's.  Wayne was on the well site to provide a 
specific service for Cole's, and he died in the performance of that 
service.  He was not a bystander, 
and, therefore, not an "other" within the meaning of these Restatement 
provisions.

 

[¶23]      Restatement 
(Second) of Torts  §§ 416 and 427 
simply restate the time-honored rule that an owner cannot delegate to an 
independent contractor the duty to protect others from "inherently dangerous" 
activities conducted on the owner's land. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 71, at 512-15 (5th ed. 1984).  Section 416 states: 

Work 
Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions

One 
who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical 
harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise 
reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided 
for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.

Similarly, 
§ 427 
states:   

Negligence 
as to Danger Inherent in the Work

One 
who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to 
others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or 
normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when 
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such 
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such 
danger.

Many 
courts have applied the "inherently dangerous" exception, as synthesized in §§ 
416 and 427, when bystanders unconnected with the work are the "others" who are 
injured. But most jurisdictions that have decided the issue have refused to 
apply the exception when an employee of the contractor is the injured party. 
Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d  at 899 (citing Tauscher v. Puget Sound 
Power & Light Company, 635 P.2d 426, 429 and n.2. (Wash. 1981)).  

 

There 
are several good reasons for this view. First, if a bystander is injured by the 
negligence of a financially irresponsible contractor, the owner may be the 
bystander's only source of recompense. The bystander is a totally innocent third 
party having no involvement in the work; and, if it is inherently 
dangerous and likely to cause harm, the owner undertaking the work should 
be responsible for the harm. The employee, on the other hand, is covered by 
worker's compensation even if the contractor is insolvent. The owner should not 
have to pay for injuries caused by the contractor when the worker's compensation 
system already covers those injuries. 

 

Jones 
v. Chevron, 
718 P.2d  at 899 (citing Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 552 P.2d 157, 160-61 (Alaska 1976)).  The 
owner "has in a sense already assumed financial responsibility for the injuries" 
because the independent contractor passes along his worker's compensation costs 
to the owner.  Jones, at 
899 (citing Tauscher, 635 P.2d  at 430; Eutsler v. United 
States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir. 1967)).  Under Jones, Wayne was connected 
with the work at hand and cannot be considered an "other" for the benefit of 
these provisions.

 

 

Stepchildren

 

[¶24]      In 
Butler v. Halstead, 770 P.2d 698, 700 (Wyo. 1989), this Court held that 
the persons for whose benefit a wrongful death action is brought are all of 
those persons identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101.  That statute does not specify 
stepchildren.   Franks invites 
us to expand the class to include stepchildren; however, we need not consider 
that issue at this time since this action will not be reversed and remanded for 
trial.

 

[¶25]      The 
order of summary judgment is affirmed.

 

 FOOTNOTES

1(c) 
Except in cases above enumerated, the estate of any intestate shall descend and 
be distributed as follows:

            
(i) To his children surviving, and the descendents of his children who 
are dead, the descendents collectively taking the share which their parents 
would have taken if living;

            
(ii) If there are no children, nor their descendents, then to his father, 
mother, brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who 
are dead, the descendents collectively taking the share which their parents 
would have taken if living, in equal parts;

            
(iii) If there are no children nor their descendents, nor father, mother, 
brothers, sisters, nor descendents of deceased brothers and sisters, nor husband 
nor wife, living, then to the grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts and their 
descendents, the descendents taking collectively, the share of their immediate 
ancestors, in equal parts.

 

2Hittel v. WOTCO, 
Inc., 996 P.2d 673, 
676 (Wyo. 2000); Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 411 
(Wyo. 1997); Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1349 
(Wyo. 1988); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 894 (Wyo. 
1986).