Case Title: People v. Love

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90806

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90806-Agenda 6-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								MARILYN LOVE, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Marilyn Love, was charged with possession of
a controlled substance with intent to deliver after two Chicago
police officers found 16 small plastic bags of rock cocaine in her
mouth. During a bench trial in the Cook County circuit court, the
defendant made an oral motion to suppress the cocaine. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion and ultimately convicted the
defendant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling on
the defendant's suppression motion and reversed her conviction.
318 Ill. App. 3d 534.
	The issue before us is whether the police officers had probable
cause to arrest and search the defendant. We reverse the appellate
court and reinstate the defendant's conviction.
	At trial, Chicago police officer Olson was the State's only
witness. On direct examination, Officer Olson testified that on
January 29, 1999, he and his partner, Officer Retner, were
conducting narcotics surveillance in a residential area on
Chicago's west side. Around 1:50 a.m., Officer Olson, looking
through binoculars, saw the defendant in front of an apartment
building. Nearby, he saw a man approach a person on a bicycle
and give that person some currency. The person on the bicycle
then directed the man toward the defendant. According to Officer
Olson, the defendant then "removed an item from her mouth and
handed it to that individual." Officer Olson and his partner
"approached and detained" the defendant and "asked her to spit
out some objects in her mouth." The defendant complied, and
Officer Retner recovered from the ground an object which looked
like a roll of clear tape with 16 small plastic bags stuck to it. The
officers believed the bags contained crack cocaine.
	On cross-examination, Officer Olson testified that, during his
10-minute surveillance, the person on the bicycle circled between
25 feet and 300 feet from the defendant. Officer Olson stated that
he saw the man hand money to the person on the bicycle, but he
did not see what the defendant handed to the man. Officer Olson
did not stop the person on the bicycle or the man. As he
approached the defendant, Officer Olson could not see what she
had in her mouth. According to Officer Olson, "We asked her, I
believe it was her name, and she had difficulty answering it. At
that time I told her to spit out what she had in her mouth, and she
did." Officer Olson did not know the defendant had drugs in her
mouth until she spit them out.
	The defendant's attorney then made an oral motion to
suppress, asserting that the information in "the transcript"
somehow conflicted with Officer Olson's testimony. In response,
the State summarized the police officers' observations. The
officers saw the man give currency to the person on the bicycle;
they saw the person on the bicycle point the man toward the
defendant; and they saw the defendant give the man an object out
of her mouth: "Upon that they approach. Upon that they had
probable cause to approach." The trial court asked the defendant's
attorney if he wanted to present additional evidence in support of
this motion; the defendant's attorney answered no. The court
ruled:
			"At some point [Officer Olson] approached the
defendant *** and that while conducting in essence at that
point an initial Terry stop or field interview or
questioning, which is allowed and codified under the
Illinois Criminal Code, *** noticed she had some
difficulties answering it because something was in her
mouth and asked her to spit the items out. I suppose
arguably so he can continue on with the questioning from
the temporary detention.
			At that time he observed what he believed to be
contraband which was recovered. The court does not
believe there's any 4th Amendment violation. So the
motion to suppress evidence based upon that lack of
probable cause will respectfully be denied."
	The parties stipulated that the plastic bags contained cocaine.
The defendant then testified in her own defense. Her version of the
events which led to her arrest differed wildly from Officer Olson's
version. The defendant stated that a police officer grabbed her
from behind and asked her some questions. According to the
defendant, another officer hit her in the face and told her to open
her mouth. The officer never asked her spit out what was in her
mouth; "he just told me to talk." The defendant never saw the
police officers recover anything from the ground. She asserted that
she did not possess or sell drugs on January 29, 1999. In rebuttal,
the State offered evidence of the defendant's 1997 conviction for
delivery of a controlled substance.
	The court accepted Officer Olson's testimony, rejected that of
the defendant, and found her guilty. The defendant then filed a
motion for a new trial, in which she reargued her motion to
suppress. The trial court denied this motion, stating:
		"This was not a situation where the officers approached
and arbitrarily searched the defendant recovering
contraband. Which might cause some concern with regard
to [the] search issue. But the officers observed what they
believed to be criminal activity afoot. That being the
narcotics transactions and approached to do basically a
Terry stop or field investigation.
			And when they attempted to speak to this defendant,
they were unable to because she had something in her
mouth. They did not indicate that they let-that that
substance was a controlled substance and ordering to be
produced, even though that might have been reasonable
based on the observations.
			As far as the testimony goes, it could have been
chewing gum or some other foreign substance or food or
some other item in her mouth. So that for the officers to
effectively carry on the field interview, in accordance with
statute, case law, it was necessary that she remove what
was in her mouth. It was causing her difficulty in
answering the questions that were being put to her."
	The defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress and reversed
her conviction. 318 Ill. App. 3d at 538. The appellate court held
that Officer Olson's detention of the defendant was constitutional
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968), but that his search of the defendant was not: "Officer
Olson effectually intruded upon defendant's body by ordering her
to spit out what was in her mouth. The officer's actions constituted
a sufficient intrusion upon defendant's privacy interest to qualify
as a search under the fourth amendment." 318 Ill. App. 3d at 538.
According to the appellate court, the defendant did not voluntarily
comply with Officer Olson's order; rather, she submitted to his
authority. 318 Ill. App. 3d at 538. Although Officer Olson could
demand the defendant's name, he could not compel a response.
318 Ill. App. 3d at 538.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. See 177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a).



ANALYSIS
	Initially, we note that the defendant has filed a motion to
strike portions of the State's opening brief. The defendant charges
that the State raises issues before this court regarding probable
cause which it never pursued below or in its petition for leave to
appeal. This motion was taken with the case.
	Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the State did discuss the
issue of probable cause in its petition for leave to appeal, where it
argued: "police could have arrested defendant, without defendant's
compliance to 'spit it out,' where the police arguably developed
probable cause during the Terry stop ***." Further, as we held in
People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 201 (1991), the State may raise
an issue before this court as an appellant which it did not raise
before the appellate court as an appellee. Accord Mueller v. Elm
Park Hotel Co., 391 Ill. 391, 398-99 (1945). We deny the
defendant's motion to strike, and turn to the merits of this appeal.
	When a motion to suppress evidence involves factual
determinations or credibility assessments, we will reverse the trial
court's ruling only if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Buss,
187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999). De novo review of the trial court's
ruling is appropriate when the parties do not dispute the facts or
the credibility of witnesses. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 615
(2000); see In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 49-50 (2000) (following
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911,
920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996)). Here, Officer Olson was the
only witness to testify for the State at trial; the defendant's oral
motion to suppress was made immediately after his testimony. The
trial court found that Officer Olson's testimony was more credible
than that of the defendant. This determination was not manifestly
erroneous. Accordingly, we will review de novo the legal issues
presented in this appeal under Officer Olson's version of events.
People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 412 (1998).
	The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV;
accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6; see Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302,
314 (1996) ("This court has construed the search and seizure
language found in section 6 in a manner that is consistent with the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence").
Reasonableness in this context generally requires a warrant
supported by probable cause. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967). The United
States Supreme Court, however, in Terry, provided an exception
to the warrant and probable cause requirements. Under Terry, if a
police officer has "knowledge of sufficient articulable facts at the
time of the encounter to create a reasonable suspicion that the
person in question has committed, or is about to commit, a crime"
(People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 434 (1980)), the officer may
briefly stop and detain the person to make reasonable inquiries
(People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (2001)). Additionally, if
the officer reasonably believes that the person questioned may be
armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited patdown
search for weapons, commonly called a frisk. People v. Flowers,
179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997); accord Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d  at 432;
see United States v. Arvizu, ___ U.S. ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002).(1) Recently, this court stated:
		"Viewed as a whole, the situation confronting the police
officer must be so far from the ordinary that any
competent officer would be expected to act quickly. The
facts supporting the officer's suspicions need not meet
probable cause requirements, but they must justify more
than a mere hunch. The facts should not be viewed with
analytical hindsight, but instead should be considered
from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the time
that the situation confronted him or her." People v.
Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (2001).
	Arguing that Officer Olson exceeded the bounds of a Terry
stop, the defendant directs us to People v. Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d
202 (1992). In Harper, police officers were conducting
surveillance of a house known for drug dealing. Around 9 p.m.,
the officers saw the defendant enter the house and emerge from it
less than a minute later. As the defendant approached the officers,
they stepped in front of him and identified themselves as the
police. One of the officers noticed that the defendant had his
mouth closed and his lips were pursed tight "as if there were
something in his mouth." Both officers shined flashlights into the
defendant's mouth and saw a folded paper packet on his tongue.
One of the officers ordered the defendant to spit the packet out,
and he complied. The packet later tested positive for cocaine. The
defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied.
The defendant was then convicted of possession of a controlled
substance and appealed. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.
The defendant further argued that even if the stop were proper, the
search of the his mouth was not.
	The appellate court held that the Terry stop was improper:
		"The facts known to the officers simply did not establish
an articulable basis to believe that a crime had been, or
was about to be, committed. The officers merely observed
defendant leave a car parked near the subject premises,
enter the building, remain for a short time, and leave. The
officers did not observe any transactions within the
building or hear any conversations. They did not know
what defendant did while inside the building. They had
not received a report of any crime or suspicious activity in
the vicinity. Their decision to stop defendant was based
on no more than a hunch that he might be involved in
drug activity." Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 205-06.
The court also held that were the stop justified, the search of the
defendant's mouth went beyond the weapons frisk permissible
under Terry. Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 207. The officers primary
concern was preserving evidence, not protecting themselves.
Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 207.
	Unlike the officers in Harper, Officer Olson observed what
appeared to be a drug transaction. He could have reasonably
concluded that the man gave the person on the bicycle money in
exchange for something illicit which the defendant pulled from her
mouth. Innocent explanations are implausible: common sense
dictates that the man probably did not go out at 1:50 a.m. in late
January to pay for prechewed gum. Officer Olson had more than
a mere hunch; he had first-hand knowledge of sufficient facts to
create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was selling drugs.
See State v. Desmond, 593 So. 2d 965, 969 (La. App. 1992)
(holding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop after observing the defendant place a plastic
packet into his mouth while retracing his steps away from the
officer). Though the defendant complains about "the terseness of
this record," her oral motion to suppress came after Officer Olson
had completed his testimony, and her attorney declined the trial
court's invitation to present additional evidence. We agree with
the appellate court that Officer Olson's detention of the defendant
was constitutional.
	Consequently, Officer Olson could ask the defendant her
name. A police officer does not violate the fourth amendment
merely by approaching a person in public to ask questions if the
person is willing to listen. See Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497-98, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983) ("The
person approached, however, need not answer any question put to
him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and
may go on his way"). However, Officer Olson's statement that the
defendant should "spit out what she had in her mouth" was an
imperative, not an interrogatory. See Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d at
207; see also People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001); but
see Florida v. Y.B., 659 So. 2d 323, 324 (Fla. App. 1994) (per
curiam) (holding that a police officer legally could ask a juvenile
suspect his name and ask him to remove an object from his mouth
in order to facilitate communication). We agree with the appellate
court that the defendant did not voluntarily agree to spit out the
object in her mouth. Officer Olson's order is constitutionally
permissible only if it constituted a search incident to a lawful
arrest. See People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 503 (1994); see
generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969).
	In order to make a valid, warrantless arrest, a police officer
must have probable cause to arrest. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 204; People
v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 525 (1986); see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1964); see
also 725 ILCS 5/107-2(c) (West 1998). Probable cause to arrest
exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest
are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that
the arrestee has committed a crime. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 614. That
is, the existence of probable cause depends upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the arrest. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 237-38 (1984) (following Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)). "In dealing with probable
cause, *** we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879,
1890, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949); accord People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 146 (1985) (probable cause is a practical concept).
	Our appellate court recently addressed whether the visible
presence of a suspicious object in a detainee's mouth provides
probable cause to arrest. In People v. Bunch, No. 1-00-3245
(February 13, 2002), a police officer stopped a car for a traffic
violation. After arresting the driver for driving without a license,
the officer told the defendant, a passenger, to exit the car. The
officer, while shining a flashlight in the defendant's face, asked
the defendant some questions because he was " 'curious to find
out exactly who he was.' " Bunch, slip op. at 2. During this
exchange, the officer saw a small clear plastic object containing
white material in the defendant's mouth. The officer suspected that
the plastic object was filled with cocaine or heroin. He arrested the
defendant and ordered him to spit out the object. The white
material tested positive for heroin. The defendant filed a motion
to suppress the heroin, arguing that the officer had no reasonable
suspicion to detain him. The trial court denied the defendant's
motion and found him guilty of possession of a controlled
substance.
	The appellate court held that the officer's detention of the
defendant was unlawful. Bunch, slip op. at 7. The defendant was
a passenger in the car of an arrestee and did nothing to create a
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity.
Bunch, slip op. at 6. The officer spoke to the defendant because he
was curious about his identity, but the court noted, "Curiosity is
not a good reason to detain." Bunch, slip op. at 7. The court further
held that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant:
though the officer suspected that the defendant had drugs in his
mouth, "[s]uspicions, no matter how reasonable, do not add up to
probable cause to arrest." Bunch, slip op. at 8.
	Unlike the officer in Bunch, Officer Olson had reasonable
suspicion to detain the defendant. More importantly, unlike the
officer in Bunch, Officer Olson's suspicion rose to the level of
probable cause. As we have noted, Officer Olson saw the man
trade currency to the person on the bicycle for something in the
defendant's mouth. When he approached the defendant to ask her
name and received a garbled response, Office Olson could have
reasonably concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that the defendant was concealing drugs in her mouth. Reasonable
suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest, and Officer
Olson's order to the defendant was a search incident to a lawful
arrest. See McCloud v. State, 736 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1998) ("When [the officer] saw what appeared to be crack
cocaine in the appellant's mouth, his suspicion [that the appellant
was engaged in criminal activity] was sufficiently confirmed to
supply him with probable cause to seize the substance"); State v.
Lewis, 115 Ariz. 530, 532-33, 566 P.2d 678, 680-81 (1977) ("The
actions of appellant in speaking with her teeth clenched and in
swallowing when asked to open her mouth, together with the tip
from [a person at her residence], gave the officers probable cause
to believe that appellant had drugs in her mouth"); see also United
States v. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1992); Curtis v. State, 748 So. 2d 370, 374-75 (Fla. App. 2000); State v. Victor, 76 Ohio App.
3d 372, 375-76, 601 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1991); Barnes v. State, 870 S.W.2d 74, 79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).



CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment
of the appellate court and reinstate the defendant's conviction.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.


1.      1The General Assembly has codified both the stop and frisk aspects
of Terry in the Code of Criminal Procedure. See 725 ILCS 5/107-14
(West 1998) ("Temporary Questioning without Arrest"); 725 ILCS
5/108-1.01 (West 1998) ("Search During Temporary Questioning").