Case Title: Woods v. Cole

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82895

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Woods v. Cole, No. 82895 (3/19/98) 
 
            Docket No. 82895--Agenda 30--September 1997. 
     YVONNE WOODS, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Eric Woods, Deceased, 
                 Appellee, v. TODD COLE, Appellant. 
                   Opinion filed March 19, 1998. 
 
          JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court: 
          Section 2--1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1117 (West 
     1992)) provides that in negligence and strict product liability actions which result 
     in death, bodily injury or damage to property, any defendant whose fault is 
     determined to be less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the 
     defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any other third-party defendant who could 
     have been sued by the plaintiff shall be severally liable for any nonmedical 
     damages. If a defendant's fault is determined to be 25% or more, then the 
     defendant shall be jointly and severally liable for any nonmedical damages.[fn1]  
     The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether section 2--1117 is applicable in 
     negligence actions where several tortfeasors act "in concert" to cause a single, 
     indivisible harm. For the following reasons, we conclude that it is not. 
 
                           Background 
          The plaintiff, Yvonne Woods, as special administrator of the estate of the 
     decedent, Eric Woods, brought a wrongful death action in the circuit court of 
     Morgan County against the defendant, Todd Cole. As ultimately amended, 
     plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant had negligently entrusted a firearm to 
     Jason Hill, who was under the influence of alcohol; that defendant had negligently 
     loaded the weapon used by Hill in such a manner that Hill would think the 
     weapon was empty when pointed at decedent; that defendant had induced Hill to 
     discharge the firearm toward decedent, causing decedent's death; and that 
     defendant had acted in concert with Hill in pointing and discharging the firearm 
     at decedent. 
          Plaintiff's wrongful death action was based upon events which had 
     previously led to defendant's criminal convictions of involuntary manslaughter and 
     the concealment of a homicidal death. See People v. Cole, 253 Ill. App. 3d 603 
     (1993). Evidence presented at the criminal trial established that on the night of 
     May 8, 1992, defendant, decedent, and their two friends, Hill and Laurenzio 
     Carrera, decided to go shooting at a farm belonging to defendant's grandfather. 
     The group drove to the farm in defendant's pickup truck. During the drive to the 
     farm, decedent fell asleep. 
          Hill testified at the criminal trial that defendant conceived of a plan to 
     frighten decedent. According to Hill, the plan was for defendant, Carrera and Hill 
     to prepare the guns which they had with them so that they would fire only one 
     shell or bullet. The group would waken decedent by simultaneously firing the 
     single shot in their weapons into the ground. The group would then point their 
     weapons at decedent and click the triggers on an empty chamber or cylinder. 
          Hill testified that when they got to the farm, defendant's plan was carried 
     out. The pickup truck was driven inside a barn. Defendant, Carrera and Hill got 
     out of the truck, leaving decedent asleep on the front seat. The group fired their 
     weapons into the ground near the truck, awakening decedent. Defendant and 
     Carrera then pointed their guns at decedent, said "it's time to die," and pulled the 
     triggers, producing a click. However, when Hill pulled the trigger on his weapon, 
     the gun discharged, killing decedent. Cole, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 605-08. 
          Before trial in the instant matter, defendant filed a counterclaim in which 
     he asserted that if he were found liable for plaintiff's death, he would have the 
     right under section 2--1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1117 
     (West 1992)) to have his liability apportioned relative to the liability of Hill and 
     Carrera. Plaintiff objected to the counterclaim. Plaintiff maintained that defendant, 
     Hill and Carrera were "persons acting in concert" under section 876 of the 
     Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979), that the liability for decedent's death could 
     not be apportioned among them, and, therefore, that section 2--1117 was 
     inapplicable. The trial court agreed with plaintiff but certified the following 
     question for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 
     2d R. 308): 
               "Whether the provisions of 735 ILCS 5/2--1117 are applicable to 
                    a person found liable in negligence for the bodily injury or death 
                    of another where the liability of the person found liable is based on 
                    that person having been found to be `acting in concert' under 
                    Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 876." 
          The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, concluded that section 2-- 
     1117 could not be applied under the facts of this case. 285 Ill. App. 3d 721. The 
     appellate court reasoned that the conduct of tortfeasors who act in concert cannot 
     be compared for purposes of apportioning liability under section 2--1117 because 
     each tortfeasor "agreed to cooperate in the tortious conduct or tortious result and 
     each is liable for the entirety of the damages as if there were but one actor." 285 
     Ill. App. 3d at 724. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 
     2d R. 315. 
 
                            Analysis 
          The question presented in this appeal is one of law. Accordingly, our 
     review is de novo. Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997). 
          Section 2--1117 provides in full: 
                    "Except as provided in Section 2--1118, in actions on 
                    account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, 
                    based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort 
                    liability, all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable 
                    for plaintiff's past and future medical and medically related 
                    expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of 
                    fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, 
                    the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant 
                    who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally liable 
                    for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by 
                    the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to 
                    the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third 
                    party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall 
                    be jointly and severally liable for all other damages." 735 ILCS 
                    5/2--1117 (West 1992). 
          Section 2--1118 excludes two types of actions, those involving 
     environmental pollution and those alleging medical malpractice, from the precepts 
     of section 2--1117. A defendant who is liable in either of these two types of 
     actions is held jointly and severally liable. 735 ILCS 5/2--1118 (West 1992). 
          As previously noted, the question which the trial court certified for appeal 
     is whether section 2--1117 is applicable to a defendant whose liability is 
     predicated on acting "in concert" under section 876 of the Restatement (Second) 
     of Torts. Section 876 is entitled "Persons Acting in Concert" and provides: 
               "For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
                    another, one is subject to liability if he 
                    (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant 
                    to a common design with him, or 
                    (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of 
                    duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other 
                    so to conduct himself, or 
                    (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing 
                    a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, 
                    constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." Restatement 
                    (Second) of Torts sec. 876, at 315 (1979). 
          Defendant acknowledges that, under the common law, individuals who 
     engage in tortious, concerted action are held jointly and severally liable for any 
     damages resulting from that action. Defendant emphasizes, however, that section 
     2--1117 modifies the common law with respect to joint and several liability. 
     Defendant further notes that while section 2--1118 expressly exempts medical 
     malpractice actions and environmental pollution actions from the provisions of 
     section 2--1117, neither section 2--1118 nor section 2--1117 includes any 
     exception for cases involving concerted action. 
          Defendant also observes that liability under section 876 of the Restatement 
     requires a finding of some affirmative conduct on the part of those who are 
     alleged to have acted in concert. Defendant distinguishes liability based upon 
     concerted action from liability founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
     Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principle may be held liable for the 
     tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff's injury, even if the principle 
     does not himself engage in any conduct in relation to the plaintiff. In such a 
     situation, defendant notes, it is inappropriate to compare the actions of the 
     principal and agent for purposes of apportioning liability. See, e.g., American 
     National Bank & Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center,  154 Ill. 2d 347 , 354 (1992) (noting that for purposes of the Contribution Act, "[i]n cases 
     of vicarious liability, there is only a basis for indemnity, not for apportionment of 
     damages as between the principal and agent [citation]. Only the agent is at fault 
     in fact for the plaintiff's injuries"). However, defendant asserts that there is no 
     barrier to apportioning the liability of tortfeasors who act in concert, each of 
     whom must engage in some form of affirmative conduct to be liable under section 
     876. Therefore, defendant reasons, section 2--1117 should apply to a defendant 
     whose liability is based upon having acted in concert with other individuals. We 
     disagree. 
          In general, the common law doctrine of joint and several liability provides 
     that when two or more individuals tortiously contribute to the same, indivisible 
     injury, each individual may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire 
     injury. See generally 3 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts secs. 10.1, 10.2 (2d 
     ed. 1986); W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts secs. 47, 50 through 52 (5th ed. 
     1984); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,  97 Ill. 2d 104 , 119-20 (1983). Under the 
     common law, there are several distinct circumstances in which a contributing 
     tortfeasor may be held jointly and severally liable. See 3 F. Harper, F. James & 
     O. Gray, Torts sec. 10.1 (2d ed. 1986) (identifying four categories in which the 
     courts have historically imposed joint and several liability). In perhaps the most 
     frequently occurring situation, a tortfeasor who acts independently and 
     concurrently with other individuals to produce an indivisible injury to a plaintiff 
     may be held jointly and severally liable for that injury, even though the tortfeasor 
     does not act in concert with the other individuals, and shares no common purpose 
     or duty with them. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc.,  148 Ill. 2d 429 , 
     438 (1992). Such an "independent concurring tortfeasor" (3 F. Harper, F. James 
     & O. Gray, Torts sec. 10.1, at 7 (2d ed. 1986)) is not held liable for the entirety 
     of a plaintiff's injury because he or she is responsible for the actions of the other 
     individuals who contribute to the plaintiff's injury. Rather, an independent, 
     concurring tortfeasor is held jointly and severally liable because the plaintiff's 
     injury cannot be divided into separate portions, and because the tortfeasor fulfills 
     the standard elements of tort liability, i.e., his or her tortious conduct was an 
     actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See generally 3 F. Harper, F. 
     James & O. Gray, Torts sec. 10.1, at 17-28 (2d ed. 1986); R. Wright, Allocating 
     Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and 
     Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
     1141, 1141-68 (1988); R. Michael, Joint Liability: Should It Be Reformed or 
     Abolished?--The Illinois Experience, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 867, 906-08 (1996). The 
     fact that another individual also tortiously contributes to the plaintiff's injury does 
     not alter the independent, concurring tortfeasor's responsibility for the entirety of 
     the injury which he or she actually and proximately caused. See Restatement 
     (Second) of Torts sec. 875, Comment c, at 315 (1979); Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 121- 
     22.  
          In contrast, a tortfeasor who acts in concert with other individuals in 
     causing a plaintiff's injury is held jointly and severally liable for that injury 
     because the tortfeasor is legally responsible for the actions of the other individuals. 
     See 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. at 909. A determination that a tortfeasor has acted in 
     concert with other individuals establishes a legal relationship with those 
     individuals. By virtue of this relationship, the tortfeasor becomes liable for the 
     actions of those with whom he acted in concert. "In legal contemplation, there is 
     a joint enterprise, and a mutual agency, so that the act of one is the act of all, and 
     liability for all that is done is visited upon each." (Emphasis added.) W. Keeton, 
     Prosser & Keeton on Torts sec. 52, at 346 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, while the 
     tortfeasors who act in concert in causing a plaintiff's injury may all engage in 
     some affirmative conduct relating to that injury, the legal relationship which exists 
     among them eliminates the possibility of comparing their conduct for purposes of 
     apportioning liability. Indeed, if an apportionment of liability were permitted, the 
     act of one tortfeasor would no longer be the act of all, and the essence of the 
     doctrine of concerted action would be destroyed.  
          Defendant maintains, however, that section 2--1117 contains no exception 
     for concerted action. Therefore, according to defendant, under the plain terms of 
     the statute, section 2--1117 must apply in cases where the tortfeasors act in 
     concert in causing the plaintiff's injury. We believe this argument reflects a 
     fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of section 2--1117. Section 2--1117 
     requires, as a threshold matter, that the liability of the tortfeasors which is at issue 
     be capable of being legally apportioned. If the liability cannot be legally 
     apportioned, then section 2--1117 never comes into play. We have noted that it 
     is legally impossible to apportion liability among tortfeasors who act in concert. 
     Logically, therefore, section 2--1117 cannot apply to cases where the tortfeasors 
     act in concert to cause a plaintiff's injury. See also L. Pressler & K. Schieffer, 
     Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform, 64 Denv. U.L. Rev. 651, 680-81 
     (1988) (advocating the abolition of joint and several liability for independent 
     concurring tortfeasors but noting that the doctrine should be retained for concerted 
     action); R. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 
     Memphis St. U.L. Rev. 45, 47 n.7 (1992) ("All parties [those advocating the 
     abolition of joint and several liability and those in favor of retaining the doctrine] 
     generally agree that joint and several liability should be retained at least for 
     defendants acting in concert"). 
          We note, moreover, that defendant's argument that section 2--1117 
     contains no exception for concerted action is simply another way of saying that, 
     by enacting section 2--1117, the legislature intended to eliminate concerted action 
     as a basis for joint and several liability in the nonintentional torts. The general 
     principle that tortfeasors who negligently act in concert are held jointly and 
     severally liable for the damages which they cause has been recognized in Illinois 
     for over 100 years. See Andrews v. Boedecker, 126 Ill. 605, 610 (1888) ("Parties 
     who act in concert, and co-operate in doing a negligent act which causes an 
     injury, are liable, either jointly or severally, to the person injured, for the damage 
     thereby occasioned"). There is no indication, in either the operation or language 
     of section 2--1117, that the legislature intended to abolish this well-established 
     principle of the common law. See In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 
 161 Ill. 2d 233 , 240 (1994) (statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
     strictly construed, and nothing will be read into them by implication). 
 
                           Conclusion 
          For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative. 
     Section 2--1117 is not applicable in negligence actions where several individuals 
     act in concert to cause a single, indivisible harm. We note that it remains to be 
     determined, as a question of fact, whether the defendant in this case engaged in 
     concerted action so as to preclude the application of section 2--1117. The 
     judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. 
 
     Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
 
                                                                 [fn1] A 1995 amendment to section 2--1117 eliminated the doctrine of joint and 
     several liability entirely, replacing it with proportionate several liability. The 
     amended version of section 2--1117, which is not at issue in this case, was 
     declared unconstitutional by this court in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 423-33 (1997).