Case Title: Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ.

Citation: 363 N.C. 165

Docket Number: 230PA08

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO: 230PA08
FILED: 1 MAY 2009
WAKE CARES, INC.; PATRICE LEE, individually and as guardian ad
litem of her minor children, IAN LEE, DELANEY LEE, MARGARET LEE,
and BAILEY LEE; KATHLEEN BRENNAN, individually and as guardian ad
litem of her minor child, ELIZABETH BRENNAN; SCOTT P. HAVILAND
and GIHAN I. EL-HABBAL, individually and as guardians ad litem of
their children, AHMED HAVILAND, AYAH HAVILAND, and IMAN HAVILAND;
MICHAEL JOHN STANTON and ANGELA MARIE STANTON, individually and
as guardians ad litem of their children, JACOB STANTON, ALEXIS
STANTON, DANIELLE STANTON, DALLAS STANTON, and JORDAN STANTON;
and KIMBERLY SINNOTT and JOHN NADASKY, individually and as
guardians ad litem of their children, REID NADASKY, SEAN NADASKY,
and JAMES NADASKY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and LORI MILBERG,
HORACE J. TART, CAROL PARKER, ROSA GILL, SUSAN PARRY, PATTIE
HEAD, ELEANOR GOETTEE, RON MARGIOTTA, and BEVERLEY CLARK, in
their official capacities as members of the WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION 
Schools and Education–mandatory year-round schools–statutory authority
The Wake County Board of Education is statutorily authorized to compel
attendance at year-round calendar schools.  The General Assembly has conferred broad, specific,
and sole authority upon local school boards to determine school calendars, and year-round
schools are explicitly recognized as acceptable school calendars by N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2. 
Parental consent is no more a factor in assignment to year-round schools than it is to traditional
schools.
Justice EDMUNDS concurring.
Justice MARTIN dissenting.
Justices BRADY and NEWBY join in this dissenting opinion.
Justice BRADY dissenting.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 190 N.C. App. ___,
660 S.E.2d 217 (2008), reversing and remanding an order granting
summary judgment for plaintiffs entered on 3 May 2007 by Judge
Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County.  Heard in
the Supreme Court 16 December 2008.
Hunter, Higgins, Miles, Elam & Benjamin, PLLC, by
Robert N. Hunter, Jr.; and William Peaslee for
plaintiff-appellants.
-2-
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Ann L. Majestic and
Curtis H. Allen III, for defendant-appellee Wake County
Board of Education. 
Roberts & Stevens, P.A., by Christopher Z. Campbell and
K. Dean Shatley, II, for North Carolina Council of
School Attorneys, amicus curiae.
North Carolina School Boards Association, by Allison
Schafer, Legal Counsel; and Poyner Spruill LLP, by
Edwin M. Speas, Jr., for North Carolina School Boards
Association, amicus curiae.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Justice.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the
North Carolina General Statutes require the Wake County Board of
Education to obtain parental consent before assigning students to
year-round calendar schools.  Because the plain language of the
statutes authorizes the creation and assignment to year-round
calendar schools, we conclude the Board may assign students to
year-round schools without parental consent, and we therefore
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I. Background
The underlying facts of this appeal, as found by the
trial court and recited by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed. 
The Wake County public school system (WCPSS) is the second-
largest school system in the state and one of the fastest-growing
school systems in the country, having grown more than thirty
percent since 2000.  Over 128,000 students were enrolled during
the 2006-2007 school year, and the school population is expected
to gain an additional 65,000 students by 2015.  The most dramatic
growth and overcrowding are in schools along the N.C. 55
corridor, which includes Cary, Apex, and Holly Springs.  
-3-
To accommodate the tremendous student population
growth, the Wake County Board of Education (the Board) has opened
thirty-three additional schools since July 2000, renovated many
other schools, and plans to build thirty-one new schools by 2012. 
Despite the extensive construction, many Wake County schools
remain extremely overcrowded and are forced to use cafeterias,
libraries, auditoriums, offices, common areas, teacher lounges,
and even converted storage rooms as classrooms.  School campuses
are also increasingly resorting to using mobile classrooms, a
situation that overtaxes facilities such as restrooms, media
centers, and cafeterias. 
In addition to building new schools and using more
mobile classrooms, the Board has attempted to alleviate
overcrowding by operating a limited number of elementary and
middle schools on a multi-track year-round calendar.  The WCPSS
operates on three different calendars:  a traditional calendar,
in which school begins in late August and continues until early
June; a modified calendar (a single-track year-round calendar),
in which the school year begins in late July and ends in late
May; and a multi-track year-round calendar.  In the multi-track
year-round schools, students are divided into four “tracks,” each
with its own schedule.  Track schedules are staggered so that
three tracks are in school and one track is on break at all
times.  Because the multi-track system allows year-round schools
to use their buildings twelve months a year, rather than nine, a
year-round school can accommodate up to one-third more students
than a traditional calendar school.  Regardless of which calendar
-4-
1 Contrary to Justice Martin’s assertion that this case
arises from the Board’s decision to “change its year-round school
program from voluntary to mandatory,” each year-round school has
had a portion of students involuntarily assigned to it since
2003.  Thus, the Board has not “changed” its program, merely
expanded it to encompass more students, including plaintiffs’
children.  It is this expansion of mandatory year-round school
assignment that has prompted the instant case.
students follow, all students attend school for 180 days.  Year-
round students receive the same amount of vacation time as those
at traditional calendar schools; the vacation time is simply
spread throughout the year, rather than limited to the summer
months.  Year-round students also have the same holidays as
students on the traditional calendar. 
In September 2006 the Board voted to convert nineteen
elementary and three middle schools to a year-round calendar
starting in the 2007-2008 school year.  On 6 February 2007, after
holding three public hearings, the Board approved its final
student assignment plan for the 2007-2008 school year.  Under
that plan, 20,717 students were assigned to newly-converted or
newly-built year-round schools.  Previously 17,855 of those
students had been assigned to traditional calendar schools.1 
On 13 March 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from the Board’s
assignment plan, asserting that the Board lacked the authority to
convert traditional calendar schools to year-round schools and
then assign WCPSS students to those schools on a mandatory basis. 
Upon hearing the matter, the trial court concluded the Board was
authorized to operate and assign students to year-round calendar
schools, but only with “informed parental consent.”  Accordingly,
-5-
the trial court entered an order prohibiting the Board from
requiring “the attendance of students at year round calendar
schools without informed parental consent.” 
The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
unanimously reversed the trial court, holding that “the Board is
authorized by the General Assembly to establish year-round
schools and to assign students to attend those schools without
obtaining their parents’ prior consent.”  Wake Cares, Inc. v.
Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., __ N.C. App. __, __, 660 S.E.2d 217, 220
(2008).  We dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal based on a substantial
constitutional question, but allowed their petition for
discretionary review.  We now affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
II. Analysis
The trial court and plaintiffs agree that the Board has
the authority to create and to assign students to year-round
calendar schools.  Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Board must
obtain parental consent before assigning students to year-round
schools.  We must therefore determine whether parental consent is
a prerequisite condition to year-round school assignment by the
Board under the North Carolina General Statutes.
We begin by recognizing that local boards of education
have broad general statutory power to control and supervise
public schools:
All powers and duties
conferred and imposed by law
respecting public schools, which
are not expressly conferred and
imposed upon some other official,
-6-
are conferred and imposed upon
local boards of education.  Said
boards of education shall have
general control and supervision of
all matters pertaining to the
public schools in their respective
administrative units and they shall
enforce the school law in their
respective units.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-36 (2007); see also id. § 115C-40 (2007) (“Local
boards of education, subject to any paramount powers vested by
law in the State Board of Education or any other authorized
agency shall have general control and supervision of all matters
pertaining to the public schools in their respective local school
administrative units . . . .”).  Thus, unless such power is
expressly delegated elsewhere, local school boards possess the
inherent authority to control and supervise “all matters
pertaining to the public schools.”  Id.  
In addition to the broad grant of authority reserved
under N.C.G.S. § 115C-36, section 115C-47 sets forth a list of
fifty-four specific powers and duties vested in local boards of
education.  N.C.G.S. § 115C-47 (2007).  Such powers and duties
include the duty to provide “adequate school systems,” id. §
115C-47(1), to “assure appropriate class size,” id. § 115C-
47(10), and, notably, to “determine the school calendar,” id. §
115C-47(11).  Indeed, N.C.G.S. § 115C-47(11) instructs that
“[l]ocal boards of education shall determine the school calendar
under G.S. 115C-84.2.”  Clearly, local boards of education are
not only authorized, but statutorily required to set school
calendars, subject to N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2.  With these broad
-7-
powers and duties in mind, we therefore turn to the specific
school calendar guidelines of N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2.  
Subsection 115C-84.2(a) states that “[e]ach local board
of education shall adopt a school calendar consisting of 215 days
all of which shall fall within the fiscal year.”  Id. § 115C-
84.2(a) (2007).  School calendars must include a “minimum of 180
days and 1,000 hours of instruction covering at least nine
calendar months.”  Id. § 115C-84.2(a)(1).  The statutory
requirement of school calendars covering at least nine calendar
months comports with Article IX of the North Carolina
Constitution, which states that a “general and uniform system of
free public schools . . . shall be maintained at least nine
months in every year.”  N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1.  These
nine months represent only the minimum amount of time required
for instruction; the legislature may provide for a longer term if
desired.  Harris v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 274 N.C. 343, 353, 163 S.E.2d
387, 394 (1968); Frazier v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 194 N.C. 49, 63, 138
S.E. 433, 440 (1927).  The local board “shall designate when the
180 instructional days shall occur.”  N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2(a)(1);
see also id. § 115C-84.2(d) (2007) (“Local boards of education
shall determine the dates of opening and closing the public
schools . . . .”).   
Section 115C-84.2 does not classify school calendars as
“traditional,” “modified,” or “year-round,” nor does it express
any preference as to the school calendars local boards should
adopt.  N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 indicates, however, that local
school boards may devise different types of school calendars to
-8-
achieve educational goals:  “Local boards and individual schools
are encouraged to use the calendar flexibility in order to meet
the annual performance standards set by the State Board.”  Id. §
115C-84.2(a).  Notably, N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 specifically
recognizes year-round schools as a legitimate calendar option. 
While N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 places some limitations on school
calendars, see id. § 115C-84.2(b) (2007), year-round schools are
expressly exempted from several of these limitations.  For
example, a school calendar “shall include at least 42 consecutive
days when teacher attendance is not required unless . . . the
school is a year-round school.”  Id. § 115C-84.2(b)(2) (emphasis
added).  Further, “[e]xcept for year-round schools, the opening
date for students shall not be before August 25, and the closing
date for students shall not be after June 10.”  Id. §
115C-84.2(d) (emphasis added).  Thus, N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2
explicitly acknowledges year-round calendars as a valid school
calendar option.  We find no statutory restrictions or
legislative disapproval of the use of year-round school calendars
in N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2.  To the contrary, subsection 115C-
84.2(a) encourages local school boards to utilize calendar
flexibility.
Having determined that utilization of a year-round
calendar is authorized and, indeed, even to some extent
encouraged, there remains only the question of whether parental
consent plays any role in the year-round school assignment
process.  The plain language of our General Statutes expressly
rejects any such implication.  School assignment is solely within
-9-
the power of the local school board, and “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law, the authority of each board of education in the
matter of assignment of children to the public schools shall be
full and complete, and its decision as to the assignment of any
child to any school shall be final.”  Id. § 115C-366(b) (2007). 
Although N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2(a) states that “[l]ocal
boards of education shall consult with parents and the employed
public school personnel in the development of the school
calendar,” id. § 84.2(a) (emphasis added), it does not require
parental consent in developing school calendars, nor does it
implicate school assignment in any manner.  Parents who are
dissatisfied with their child’s school assignment may apply to
the local school board for reassignment and receive a hearing on
the matter.  See id. § 115C-369 (2007).  At such hearing, the
local board must consider “the best interest of the child, the
orderly and efficient administration of the public schools, the
proper administration of the school to which reassignment is
requested and the instruction, health, and safety of the pupils
there enrolled, and shall assign said child in accordance with
such factors.”  Id. § 115C-369(c).  Any final determination by
the local board as to reassignment is then subject to judicial
review.  Id. § 115C-370 (2007).
In sum, the General Assembly has conferred broad,
specific, and sole authority upon local school boards to
determine school calendars.  Moreover, N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2 
explicitly recognizes year-round calendars as acceptable school
calendars.  As such, parental consent is no more a factor in
-10-
assignment to year-round schools than it is to traditional
schools.  When assignment to a particular school places too great
a burden on individual children, as is alleged by plaintiffs in
the instant case, parents may seek reassignment and judicial
review of any assignment decision.  
Plaintiffs argue, however, that N.C.G.S. § 115C-1
requires the Board to operate and provide equal access for all
students to traditional calendar schools.  N.C.G.S. § 115C-1
states: 
A general and uniform system
of free public schools shall be
provided throughout the State,
wherein equal opportunities shall
be provided for all students, in
accordance with the provisions of
Article IX of the Constitution of
North Carolina. . . .  There shall
be operated in every local school
administrative unit a uniform
school term of nine months, without
the levy of a State ad valorem tax
therefor.
Id. § 115C-1 (2007).  Plaintiffs contend there are fundamental
differences in the educational experiences and opportunities
available to children attending year-round schools and those
attending traditional calendar schools.  According to plaintiffs,
year-round schools are therefore not part of a “uniform system”
of public schools under N.C.G.S § 115C-1.  Thus, plaintiffs
reason, while the Board may offer year-round schools as an
alternative to traditional schools, it must give all students the
option of attending a traditional calendar school, and the Board
cannot compel students to attend a non-traditional calendar
school.  Further, contend plaintiffs, N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 requires
-11-
“a uniform school term of nine months,” and that the word “term”
indicates that such nine months must be consecutive, rather than
spread throughout the calendar year.  We are not persuaded.
Section 115C-1 merely codifies our state’s
constitutional requirement of “a general and uniform system of
free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine
months in every year.”  N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1.  This
constitutional requirement that the public school system be
“uniform” in no way implicates the school calendar.  See Bd. of
Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 174 N.C. 469, 473, 93 S.E. 1001,
1002 (1917) (noting that the term “uniform” qualifies the word
“system” and requires only that provision be made “for
establishment of schools of like kind throughout all sections of
the State and available to all of the school population of the
territories contributing to their support” (citations omitted)). 
The “general and uniform” system of public schools indicates “a
fundamental right to a sound basic education.”  Leandro v. State,
346 N.C. 336, 348, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997).  The
constitutional guarantee of the opportunity for a sound basic
education does not require, however, “that equal educational
opportunities be afforded students in all of the school districts
of the state.”  Id. at 351, 488 S.E.2d at 257.  Plaintiffs do not
argue that year-round schools fail to provide a sound basic
education.  In fact, the trial court found that “there is no
contention that the educational opportunity offered by a year
round school is better or worse than the educational opportunity
offered by a traditional elementary or middle school.”  Thus,
-12-
while the educational opportunities available to children
attending year-round schools may differ from those available to
pupils at traditional schools, these differences do not remove
year-round calendar schools from the “uniform system” of public
schools.
Further, on its face, N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 does not
require that the school term consist of nine consecutive months
or otherwise dictate the manner in which the school term should
be calendared.  Plaintiffs’ reading of the word “term” to mandate
nine consecutive months places the very general language of
section 115C-1 in conflict with the specific guidelines of
section 115C-84.2, a position repugnant to our canons of
statutory interpretation.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs, 240 N.C. 118, 126, 81 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1954) (stating
that “‘[a]n unnecessary implication arising from one [statutory]
section, inconsistent with the express terms of another on the
same subject, yields to the expressed intent’” (citations
omitted)).  We agree with the Court of Appeals that N.C.G.S. §
115C-1, “consistent with the purpose of the constitutional
provision it was designed to implement, does not mandate equal
access to a school term of nine consecutive months, but rather
refers to the minimum quantum of educational instruction
required.”  Wake Cares, __ N.C. App. at __, 660 S.E.2d at 231. 
Plaintiffs offer no other statutory support for their position,
and we have found none.  We conclude N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 does not
limit the Board’s authority to assign students to year-round
schools.
-13-
III. Conclusion
We hold that the Board is statutorily authorized to
compel attendance at year-round calendar schools.  The Board’s
action in converting traditional calendar schools to year-round
calendar schools comports with its statutory duty to provide a
school system adequate to the needs of increasing student
enrollment while assuring appropriate class sizes in its schools. 
See N.C.G.S. § 115C-47(1), (10).  Moreover, the more efficient
use by year-round calendar schools of existing school facilities
complies with the public policy of the state to create a public
school system “in the most cost-effective manner” while ensuring
a sound basic education for all North Carolina children.  Id. §
115C-408(a) (2007).
We recognize the emotional nature of this case, but we
must emphasize that our duty goes no further than to determine
the legal authority for implementing mandatory year-round
schools, not the wisdom of such a decision.  This Court cannot
substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.  See Leandro,
346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (“[T]he administration of the
public schools of the state is best left to the legislative and
executive branches of government.”); see also Coggins ex rel.
Coggins v. Bd. of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 769, 28 S.E.2d 527, 531
(1944).  As noted by the Court of Appeals, “if plaintiffs
disagree with mandatory assignment to year-round schools, their
remedy lies with the electoral process or through communications
with the legislative and executive branches of government.”  Wake
-14-
Cares, __ N.C. App. at __, 660 S.E.2d at 233.  We agree, and we
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.   
Justice EDMUNDS concurring.
I concur with the majority holding affirming the Court
of Appeals reversal of the trial court’s order.  However, while I
acknowledge the grave difficulties faced by defendant Wake County
Board of Education and detailed in the majority opinion, I write
separately to emphasize that this Court’s decision is compelled
by the applicable constitutional provisions and statutes.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs are not without recourse.  The
record includes affidavits from individual plaintiffs
establishing that mandatory year-round schools will be
inordinately disruptive in their family lives.  Under
section 115C-369, parents or guardians of any student assigned to
a year-round school may seek reassignment and apply for a
mandatory hearing if the request is denied.  N.C.G.S.
§ 115C-369(a) (2007).  At such a hearing, one of the factors that
“shall” be considered is “the best interest of the child.”  Id.
§ 115C-369(c) (2007).  I cannot believe that “best interest” does
not include at least some of the factors raised by plaintiffs,
such as sibling placement, family schedules, and the like.
Moreover, plaintiffs have the ultimate remedy of the
ballot box.  Id. § 115C-37 (2007) (mandating election of county
boards of education).  While boards of education must make
difficult choices as to how to allocate scarce resources, those
-15-
2  This new policy was initiated in 2003 with a small number
of students but has now been expanded to approximately 20,000
students.  The instant case is the first legal challenge to the
new policy. 
boards are responsible to the voters, who have the power both to
elect candidates of their choice and to unseat incumbents.
For the reasons given above, I concur in the majority
opinion.
Justice MARTIN dissenting.
This case arises from the decision of the Wake County
Public School System (WCPSS) to change its year-round school
program from voluntary to mandatory.  Despite a tradition of
using year-round schools as a voluntary supplemental program, and
in the absence of specific legislative authorization, WCPSS
mandatorily placed approximately 20,000 students at schools
operating on year-round calendars.2  These students were not
offered placements at schools operating on the traditional school
schedule, as had previously been the expectation of students and
families within WCPSS.  The actions of WCPSS violate the North
Carolina school calendar law.  They are also inconsistent with
long-standing education practice in this State.  Because WCPSS
exceeded its authority when it materially and substantially
changed the school calendar for some of its students, I
respectfully dissent. 
As Judge Manning observed, mandatory placement on a
year-round calendar “is a systemic, material change for the
students and families” so affected.  Since the advent of public
-16-
education in North Carolina over 160 years ago, the overwhelming
majority of our schools have operated on a traditional calendar. 
Although breaks from educational tradition may prove valuable and
effective, the process used to implement such fundamental policy
changes must necessarily comply with the law. 
The legislature has not authorized any local school
board to mandate year-round schooling for public school students. 
It is unreasonable to suggest that the legislature’s 2004
amendment to the school calendar statute, which was enacted to
preserve summer vacation, was actually intended to grant local
school boards the authority to impose on public school students a
schedule that requires them to attend school throughout the
summer months.  A careful reading of the applicable statutes
reveals that they prohibit a local school board from mandating
that students attend a year-round calendar.
The trial court properly preserved our students’ legal 
right to attend a traditional calendar school.  This Court should
require the local board to direct its policy arguments to the
General Assembly.  The consequences of the majority’s decision
are starkly different from those of the trial court’s order. 
Instead of maintaining the status quo and allowing the General
Assembly to consider and clearly resolve this important policy
question, the majority’s holding opens the door for any local
school board in North Carolina to impose mandatory year-round
schools. 
Despite the long history of public education in North
Carolina, year-round schooling is a relatively recent innovation. 
-17-
The practice began in our State as an experimental program in
which student and family participation was purely voluntary. 
WCPSS opened North Carolina’s first year-round school in 1989,
and interested parents sought admission for their children via an
application process.  In 1991 the State Board of Education (State
Board) issued a policy statement supporting local boards’ study
and exploration of year-round “models.”  See N.C. State Bd. of
Educ., Policy Manual, Policy No. EEO-G-000 (titled “Policy
supporting local efforts to implement year-round education
models”) (Dec. 5, 1991), available at
http://sbepolicy.dpi.state.nc.us.  The local board implemented
the State Board’s policy throughout the 1990s, opening a handful
of voluntary year-round schools each year. 
According to the local board’s own account, for most of
their short history, year-round schools in WCPSS have operated
only with the support of local communities and the consent of
individual attendees.  For example, in 1992 the local board
discarded its original proposal for the first year-round middle
school due to “negative community response,” whereas the first
conversion of a traditional elementary school to a year-round
calendar was spawned by “[a] high level of staff and parent
support.”  During the 1995-1996 school year, the local board
approved a plan for “expanding the voluntary year-round calendar”
in the upcoming years.  In 1999 a citizens’ advisory committee
recommended that WCPSS “provide more optional year-round schools,
especially in areas where the year-round option does not
currently exist.”  In sum, WCPSS and children and families
-18-
functioned under the premise that students necessarily retained
the right to attend traditional calendar schools.
In 2003 the local board removed the traditional
calendar option for a small number of students by mandatorily
placing them at year-round schools that were otherwise populated
by willing applicants.  In 2006 the local board substantially
expanded the new policy by developing a comprehensive plan to
impose year-round schooling on a significant percentage of
students.  During the 2006-2007 school year, the board opened
five new multi-track year-round schools populated almost entirely
by mandatory placements.  That year, nearly 7,000 students were
involuntarily placed at year-round schools.  Furthermore, the
local board voted to convert nineteen additional elementary
schools and three additional middle schools to a multi-track
year-round schedule beginning in the 2007-2008 term.  The board’s
plan for the 2007-2008 term more than doubled both the number of
schools designated as year-round and the number of students
mandatorily slotted for year-round schools.  Nearly 18,000
students who attended traditional calendar schools during the
2006-2007 school year faced involuntary placement at year-round
schools in 2007-2008, bringing the total number of mandatory
year-round placements to over 20,000.  The local board stated
that a mandatory year-round schedule for these students was
necessary to address existing and anticipated overcrowding.
The year-round school schedule is fundamentally
different from the traditional schedule.  Specifically, the
multi-track year-round schedule replaces the traditional nine and
-19-
a half month instructional period followed by a two and a half
month summer vacation with four rotating intervals of nine
instructional weeks followed by three vacation or “track out”
weeks.
Although families who elected to participate in year-
round schooling presumably felt there were benefits to that
schedule, the resistance of other families to a mandatory year-
round program is not surprising.  At least some children and
families have benefitted from, and indeed have come to rely upon,
summer vacation.  The long summer break gives children the
opportunity to learn about subjects school does not teach through
methods school cannot use.  During the summer students may pursue
a passion for an instrument or sport, gain and hone skills like
computer programming for future employment, spend time with
family near and far, expand their perspectives by making friends
from outside their neighborhoods while at camp, or simply learn
self-direction as they plot their own course each day.  The year-
round schedule seriously hinders these opportunities, enjoyed by
virtually every generation of North Carolina’s children, and
upsets families’ reliance on the traditional summer vacation.  
In this case, plaintiffs allege the following hardships
arising from mandatory placement of public school students at 
year-round schools: 
(1) Children within the same family unit are placed at
both traditional and year-round calendar schools.  Different
vacation periods for children within the same family unit deprive
-20-
siblings of bonding time and significantly reduce the periods
available for family travel.
(2) Lack of a traditional summer vacation prevents
extended trips to visit out-of-state relatives and potentially
interferes with shared custody arrangements in which one divorced
parent lives outside of North Carolina.
(3) Children enrolled in year-round schools cannot
participate in some valuable summer programs that are scheduled
to accommodate the much larger number of children who attend
traditional calendar schools.  Such activities include day camp;
music, art, and dance programs; sports leagues; educational and
university enrichment programs; and religious education and
activities.  For example, year-round students are precluded from
participating in, among other things, the Duke University Talent
Identification Program for academically gifted students and the
North Carolina State University Summer Reading Skills Program
(http://continuingeducation.ncsu.edu/reading/).
(4) Some parents, including many teachers, have chosen
jobs with schedules matching the traditional school calendar,
enabling them to stay at home with their children during the
summer.  When children of these parents are placed at year-round
schools, the parents must choose between finding and paying for
child care during the periodic three-week breaks, or quitting
their jobs.
(5) Year-round schooling imposes financial hardships on
many families.  Particularly, year-round families often face
increased difficulty and expense in securing child care
-21-
arrangements because the frequent three-week track out periods
preclude utilization of more traditional and less expensive child
care options such as older students, summer nannies, or day care. 
For instance, the YMCA’s track out program, recommended to
parents by WCPSS, costs $1,885 per year per child.
In sum, plaintiffs contend that the periodic rotation
in and out of school and the loss of summer vacation alter the
personal development of students and interfere with many
important facets of family life.  Weighing the detrimental impact
on individual families against the challenges facing WCPSS
requires thorough examination and resolution of the mandatory
year-round question by the appropriate policy-setting bodies for
public education.  The local board is not one of those bodies.  
The General Assembly, State Board, and local school
boards have different institutional roles with respect to
education administration.  Consideration of these roles indicates
that absent legislative authorization, local boards may not
fundamentally alter the customary public school calendar.  
Under the North Carolina Constitution and Chapter 115C
of our General Statutes, the General Assembly and State Board are
responsible for setting major educational policy.  Our State 
Constitution states that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide .
. . for a general and uniform system of free public schools,” and
“[t]he State Board of Education shall supervise and administer
the free public school system . . . and shall make all needed
rules and regulations in relation thereto.”  N.C. Const. art. IX,
-22-
§§ 2(1), 5.  No such constitutional authority is vested in local
boards of education.  
Section 115C-12 of the General Statutes builds upon the
constitutional provisions and specifically charges the State
Board with establishing educational policy:  “The general
supervision and administration of the free public school system
shall be vested in the State Board of Education.  The State Board
of Education shall establish policy for the system of free public
schools, subject to laws enacted by the General Assembly.” 
N.C.G.S. § 115C-12 (2007).  Local boards, on the other hand, are
charged with “enforc[ing] the school law in their respective
units.”  N.C.G.S. § 115C-36 (2007). 
Local boards are not well suited to consider
implementation of mandatory year-round schooling without guidance
from the General Assembly.  There are statewide ramifications to
such a substantial policy shift.  Although the local board
asserts cost-savings from its use of year-round schools, the
long-term implications—financial, educational, or otherwise—of
imposing year-round schedules on children and families are simply
not clear from the present record.  The General Assembly is far
better situated than any one local school board to balance the
benefits of maintaining the traditional calendar for students,
families, industries such as tourism, or other parties against
any benefits of year-round schooling to facility use, academic
achievement, or other interests.  
Moreover, the majority’s proposed recourse for affected
families, assignment appeals procedures and local school board
-23-
elections, ignores the factual record.  The trial court’s
findings specifically refute any assertion that application by
year-round students for reassignment to traditional calendar
schools constitutes a practical solution.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-
369 (2007) (permitting application to the local board for
reassignment to a different school).  Indeed, the trial court
found that “the assignment appeals process under G.S. 115C-366,
et seq. is futile and inadequate.”  In this regard, the trial
court observed that the traditional calendar seats available for
reassignment “are materially fewer in number than [the] . . .
seats mandatorily assigned to four (4) track year round schools
under the [board’s] conversion plan.”  Additionally, the board’s
policy requires at least some of the families who are granted
reassignment to provide their own transportation to the
traditional calendar schools, which the trial court found
“imposes an undue burden and expense on the parents.”  
With respect to the political process:  The vast
majority of Wake County students are not affected by the
compulsory year-round policy, and the students who are affected
all reside in a particular area within the county.  Together,
these factors mean that year-round students and their families
are unlikely to muster the political strength necessary to avoid
selective imposition of mandatory year-round schooling.  In sum,
the inevitable difficulties associated with unilateral imposition
of mandatory year-round placements at the local level emphasize
the importance of the General Assembly’s statewide consideration
of this issue.
-24-
Although the role local boards play in the operation of
our public schools is important and multi-faceted, see, e.g.,
N.C.G.S. § 115C-47 (2007) (listing approximately fifty of the
powers and duties vested in local boards by the legislature),
this Court has previously stated that it is the General Assembly
that “has the power to provide for a longer term for the public
schools of the State.”  Frazier v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 194 N.C. 49,
63, 138 S.E. 433, 440 (1927).  We have also observed, “Whether
the term shall exceed the minimum fixed by the Constitution must
be determined from time to time by the General Assembly, in
accordance with its judgment, and in response to the wishes of
the people of the State.”  Id.  Only after our General Assembly
decides that mandatory year-round calendars are appropriate in
this State may a local school board impose such calendars within
its district. 
A careful and reasoned analysis of the calendar statute
reveals that the General Assembly has not granted local boards
the power to impose mandatory year-round schooling.  See N.C.G.S.
§ 115C-84.2 (2007).  First, the statute prohibits a local board
from adopting a school calendar that violates the opening and
closing dates set by section 115C-84.2(d).  Second, as explained
below, the statute precludes local boards from mandating that
different children attend different school calendars.  For these
reasons, the local board lacked authority to place students at
year-round schools on an involuntary basis.
The local board’s placement of students on a year-round
calendar violates the calendar statute’s limitations on opening
-25-
and closing dates.  Section 115C-84.2(d) states that school shall
not begin before August 25 nor end after June 10.  § 115C-
84.2(d).  A year-round calendar, which includes instructional
days outside the allowed period, does not comply with this
provision.  The majority holds that statutory exemptions of year-
round schools from the opening and closing date requirements
permit local boards to adopt mandatory year-round calendars.  See
id. (“Except for year-round schools, the opening date for
students shall not be before August 25, and the closing date for
students shall not be after June 10.”); see also § 115C-
84.2(b)(2) (exempting year-round schools from the mandatory
teacher vacation requirement).
The majority’s holding does not comport with our canons
of statutory interpretation.  In reading a statute, this Court
routinely seeks the intent of the legislature.  See Lithium Corp.
of Am. v. Town of Bessemer City, 261 N.C. 532, 536, 135 S.E.2d
574, 577 (1964) (stating that, when the meaning of a statute is
unclear, “[t]he spirit and intent of an act controls its
interpretation”).  Further, provisions “should be construed in a
manner which tends to prevent them from being circumvented.” 
Meads v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 666, 509 S.E.2d 165,
172 (1998).
The legislature added the opening and closing date
requirements and accompanying exception for year-round schools in
a 2004 amendment.  See Act of July 18, 2004, ch. 180, sec. 1,
2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 701, 704 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 115C-
84.2(d)).  It is illogical to reason that, in an amendment
-26-
expressly bounding the school year and thereby preserving the
traditional summer break, the legislature meant to allow all
local boards to eliminate that break by imposing mandatory year-
round calendars.  That interpretation, adopted by the majority,
permits the exception to swallow the overarching intent of the
amendment:  to curtail calendar expansion and protect summer
vacation.  The more reasonable interpretation of the statute is
that the legislature, aware of year-round schools operating on a
small-scale, voluntary basis throughout the State, included the
statutory exception to allow for their continued existence.  Had
the legislature intended to allow mandatory year-round schooling
for every North Carolina student—a startling break from over 160
years of educational practice—it could have, and would have, done
so in a straightforward fashion.
Furthermore, other provisions of the calendar statute
prohibit a local board from placing some children on a customary
school schedule but placing other children on a year-round
schedule.  These provisions require that, for purposes of the
mandatory calendar, all students in a single administrative unit
attend school on the same days.  Section 115C-84.2(a) states that
“[e]ach local board of education shall adopt a school calendar”
and “shall designate when the 180 instructional days shall
occur.”  § 115C-84.2(a).  “A school calendar” means one school
calendar, which the local board must adopt for all students in
its administrative unit.  Id.  The statute then instructs the
board to choose “the 180 instructional days.”  Id.  The plain
-27-
language indicates that the board must adopt a single set of 180
instructional days in setting its mandatory calendar.
The calendar statute does not permit variation within
the local unit with respect to the 180 instructional days of the
mandatory calendar.  When the General Assembly did intend to
grant flexibility within the unit, it did so explicitly.  For
example, the legislature expressly allowed for variation among
schools with respect to instructional hours.  See §
115C-84.2(a)(1) (“The number of instructional hours in an
instructional day may vary . . . and does not have to be uniform
among the schools in the administrative unit.”).  Additionally,
the legislature permitted local boards to schedule certain
calendar days beyond the 180 instructional days “in consultation
with each school’s principal for use as teacher workdays,
additional instructional days, or other lawful purposes.”  §
115C-84.2(a)(5).  The language used in these provisions is
markedly different from that discussing the basic 180 days, see §
115C-84.2(a)(1) (“The local board shall designate when the 180
instructional days shall occur.”), which leaves no room for
flexibility within the local unit.  Moreover, in a recent
amendment, the legislature deleted a sentence found in prior
versions of the statute providing that “[d]ifferent opening and
closing dates may be fixed for schools in the same administrative
unit.”  See ch. 180, sec. 1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws at 704. 
Because the legislature capably expressed its intent to allow for
flexibility within the local unit in certain instances, but
-28-
3  A multi-track schedule on its own violates the calendar
statute, because the different tracks operate to assign students
in the same administrative unit to different sets of 180
instructional days.
4  Year-round schooling is described elsewhere in the
education statutes as an optional program.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-
238.31(a) (2007) (listing “[c]alendar alternatives,” including
year-round school, in Article 16, titled “Optional Programs”). 
Like year-round schooling, the other optional programs discussed
in Article 16, including adult education programs, summer
schools, and charter schools, are far more extensive than mere
after school activities.  See N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-230 to -238.55
declined to allow for variation regarding the 180 instructional
days, those days must be the same for every school in the unit.
Local boards may not mandate multiple, wholly different
sets of 180 instructional days for different schools or students
in the same administrative unit.  See § 115C-84.2.  Students on a
year-round calendar attend school on different days than do
students on a traditional calendar.  Therefore, the local board’s
imposition of mandatory year-round schooling on certain students
in its unit, while other students remain at traditional schools,
violates the calendar statute.3
The local board may, however, continue to offer year-
round schooling as a voluntary program.  This authority is found
in section 115C-84.2(d)’s exemption of year-round schools from
the opening and closing date requirements and in section 115C-
84.2(e), which provides:  “Nothing in this section prohibits a
local board of education from offering supplemental or additional
educational programs or activities outside the calendar adopted
under this section.”  § 115C-84.2(d), (e).  The reference in
section 115C-84.2(e) to “additional programs” encompasses year-
round schooling.4 
-29-
(2007).  For instance, a large portion of the Article is devoted
to charter schools, which constitute a full replacement for the
customary public education program.  See §§ 115C-238.29A to -
238.29K.
These additional programs, however, must be voluntary. 
This conclusion derives from the plain language of section 115C-
84.2(e):  “Nothing . . . prohibits a local board of education
from offering” the additional programs.  § 115C-84.2(e) (emphasis
added).  The definition of an offer is to “present[] something
for acceptance.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1113 (8th ed. 2004). 
Therefore, the board is authorized to offer programs with
alternative calendars, including year-round, but it is not
authorized to compel their acceptance.  Rather, the local board
must make available, to all students who wish, a spot in a school
operating on the traditional calendar.  See § 115C-84.2(d)
(setting allowable school starting and ending dates).  Though
students may opt for a year-round school, they retain the right
to attend a school operating on the traditional calendar.
The majority points to section 115C-36 in concluding
that a local school board may place students at year-round
schools.  See § 115C-36 (conferring on local boards of education
“[a]ll powers and duties conferred and imposed by law respecting
public schools[] which are not expressly conferred and imposed
upon some other official” and providing that local boards “shall
have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to
the public schools in their respective administrative units”). 
The majority further points to section 115C-47(11), which
-30-
provides that local boards “shall determine the school calendar
under G.S. 115C-84.2.”  § 115C-47(11).  
Both the residual power to supervise the public schools
and the general authority to determine the local school calendar,
however, must yield to the more specific limitations imposed by
the legislature in section 115C-84.2.  “Where there is one
statute dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive
terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a
more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and
harmonized . . . ; but, to the extent of any necessary repugnancy
between them, the special statute . . . will prevail over the
general statute. . . .”  Krauss v. Wayne Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 378, 493 S.E.2d 428, 433 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C.
629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995) (alterations in original)). 
Section 115C-36 is a general statute, in that it grants to local
boards “general control and supervision of all matters pertaining
to the public schools,” but addresses no specific area of
control.  § 115C-36.  Section 115C-47(11) is more specific, in
that it directs local boards to determine the school calendar,
but it expressly states that such a determination must be in
accord with section 115C-84.2.  § 115C-47(11).  Section 115C-84.2
sets out “minute and definite” requirements and the limited
circumstances under which those requirements may be waived. 
Krauss, 347 N.C. at 378, 493 S.E.2d at 433 (quoting McIntyre, 341
N.C. at 631, 461 S.E.2d at 747).  As discussed, mandatory year-
round schools violate the provisions of section 115C-84.2. 
-31-
Accordingly, the argument that Chapter 115C’s general grant of
residual authority permits this violation is inconsistent with
well established canons this Court uses to discern legislative
intent.
Additionally, the majority’s reliance on section 115C-
366(b), which gives local boards authority to assign students to
the public schools, is misplaced.  As stated by the trial court,
this is not a case about the assignment of students to a
particular school.  Rather, this case is about the local board’s
decision to “materially and decisively change the schedule and
manner in which students and their families are required to
attend school during the calendar year.”  Section 115C-366 itself
states that the local board’s assignment authority is complete
and final “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.”  N.C.G.S. §
115C-366(b) (2007).  Because section 115C-84.2 requires operation
of a calendar beginning no sooner than August 25 and ending no
later than June 10, and because it requires that local boards
make that calendar available to all students, the local board is
prohibited from mandatorily placing students at year-round
schools.
Perhaps because year-round schooling is a fairly recent
development in North Carolina and has thus far been implemented
on an experimental, overwhelmingly voluntary basis, our General
Assembly has not yet taken the opportunity to address the
propriety of mandatory year-round calendars.  In this situation,
when the current statutes do not permit mandatory year-round
-32-
calendars, the local board must argue the benefits of its new
education policy to the legislature rather than to this Court.
The legislature is best equipped to craft a solution
that balances the legitimate needs of local school systems with
the interests of students and their families.  See Leandro v.
State, 346 N.C. 336, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997) (“[T]he
administration of the public schools of the state is best left to
the legislative and executive branches of government.”).  
The members of the General Assembly are
popularly elected to represent the public
for the purpose of making just such
decisions.  The legislature, unlike the
courts, is not limited to addressing only
cases and controversies brought before it by
litigants.  The legislature can properly
conduct public hearings and committee
meetings at which it can hear and consider
the views of the general public as well as
educational experts and permit the full
expression of all points of view . . . .
Id. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 259; see also Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.
State, 358 N.C. 605, 645, 599 S.E.2d 365, 395 (2004) (observing
that the legislative and executive branches “have developed a
shared history and expertise in the field that dwarfs that of
this and any other Court”).  There is no doubt that the
legislative and executive branches enjoy a myriad of
institutional advantages over this Court in setting education
policy.
Although this Court has not hesitated to defend our
citizens’ right to a sound basic education, see Leandro, 346 N.C.
at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Hoke County, 358 N.C. at 609, 599
S.E.2d at 373, we have repeatedly emphasized the primacy of the
General Assembly in enacting new policy.  We have consistently
-33-
refused to allow courts to intrude “into an area so clearly the
province, initially at least, of the legislative and executive
branches.”  Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.  For
example, we reversed a trial court when it mandated that the
State begin educating four-year-olds to rectify a failure to
provide a sound basic education.  See Hoke County, 358 N.C. at
645, 599 S.E.2d at 395.  We overturned the trial court’s choice
of a specific policy both in recognition of courts’ institutional
limitations and because failing to give our coordinate branches
the initial chance to craft a solution would have “effectively
undermine[d] the authority and autonomy of the government’s other
branches.”  Id. at 643, 645, 599 S.E.2d at 393, 395. 
The circumstances here cry out for the legislature to 
speak first, before this Court or any local board of education,
on the question of mandatory year-round schooling.  This case
concerns a policy question of great importance to our State’s
educational institutions and its public school students and their
families.  In support of its position, the local board advocates
for a statutory interpretation counter to the vast weight of
traditional education practice.  Nothing in the current education
statutes indicates, however, that the General Assembly intended
to permit local school boards to mandatorily place students at
year-round schools.  Accordingly, this Court should uphold the
trial court’s order and preserve students’ legal right to attend
a traditional calendar school.   
I respectfully dissent.
-34-
Justices BRADY and NEWBY join in this dissenting
opinion.
Justice BRADY dissenting.
The majority opinion evinces a dramatic shift from the
traditional maxim that “mother knows best” to the “progressive”
idea that “bureaucrat and elected official knows best.”  I cannot
sit silently and watch as this Court removes the ultimate
responsibility of education from the hands of parents to the
hands of the education establishment.  While I concur fully in
Justice MARTIN’s well-reasoned dissenting opinion, I write
separately to emphasize both the importance that family plays in
the education of our young citizenry and how the majority opinion
fails to consider the harmful effect of its decision on the
family.
Initially, I note that the majority has failed to
properly construe the statutes at issue.  “When the language of a
statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this
Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and
judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.” 
Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3
(2006) (citing Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C.
205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)).  The majority’s
construction of N.C.G.S. § 115C-1, which mandates “[t]here shall
be operated in every local school administrative unit a uniform
school term of nine months,” is strained.  To interpret that
statute to mean anything other than a consecutive nine month
-35-
calendar is farcical.  Yet, the majority allows local school
boards the authority to stretch these nine months of instruction
over twelve months and then strips parents of the right to choose
whether their child should be subjected to this schedule in
contravention of our Constitution and the intent of the General
Assembly.
The absence of reason presented by this construction is
easily demonstrated through hypothetical situations involving
interpretations of the word “term.”  Members of this Court serve
an eight year term.  N.C. Const. art. IV, § 16.  Certainly no one
would interpret that provision to mean that a member of the Court
may sporadically spread his or her eight year term over the
course of his or her lifetime as long as the sum total of service
is only eight years.  Were this a matter of an employment
contract in which an employee was contractually obligated to work
a nine month term, this Court certainly would not interpret that
contract to allow the employee to work for three months and then
take a one month vacation before resuming work without being in
breach of contract.  However, when the question involves placing
more control of traditional family matters in the hands of
government officials, such a construction suddenly becomes
plausible.  In effect, the majority has assumed the role of the
General Assembly and rewritten the statute to say whatever it
wants.  I refuse to join in this blatant violation of the
separation of powers.
After having contorted principles of statutory
construction, the majority has now taken yet another decision
-36-
5 The school calendar act passed in 2004 and now codified in
N.C.G.S. § 115C-84.2(d) was intended to preserve the traditional
lengthy summer vacation enjoyed by families across North
Carolina.  Incredibly, this act, sought by an organization called
“Save our Summers North Carolina,” provided the death knell for
the traditional summer for many Wake County students because of a
passing mention of year-round schools relied upon by the majority
in fashioning its argument.
relating to the education of our children out of the hands of
parents, placing it into the hands of the education
establishment.  For years, families have been able to rely upon
the traditional school calendar to plan family vacations and
other family-oriented activities, which are important not only to
individual families, but to the health of our culture, economy,
and society in general.  Now, however, the distinct probability
exists that multichildren families will be presented with
mandatory year-round schedules that place each of their children
in a different calendar track, leaving little to no time when all
the children in the family unit are free from school
responsibilities.  Parents may have also wished to opt for a
traditional school calendar in order to give their teenagers
opportunities to gain valuable employment experience during the
extended summer vacations found in a nine month calendar, thereby
increasing their career skills and learning the personal
responsibility required of adults at an early age.  For some
unfortunate families in Wake County, that choice is no longer an
option.5  The majority additionally fails to recognize the severe
economic impact defendants’ action would have on seasonal
employment, especially in the service industry, where many
-37-
students experience the transition from teenagers to young adults
during the summer months.
Furthermore, the uneven geographical distribution of
Wake County schools subject to a mandatory year-round calendar is
problematic.  The mandatory year-round schedule has been
implemented by the board for schools located outside of the
Interstate 440 Beltline.  Many families choose to live in the
suburban areas outside the Beltline for reasons including school
choice, economic feasibility, and familial concerns.  Yet,
between forced year-round schedules and the ever-raging
reassignment debate, which has been chronicled in the local
media, families no longer receive what they bargained for in
their choice of the neighborhood in which they raise our most
valuable assets.
While constitutional issues of liberty are not before
the Court, the language used by this Court and the Supreme Court
of the United States in dealing with such issues demonstrates the
long-standing deference our judiciary and society has given to
traditional family decisions on education.  The liberty “interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children--
is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by” the Supreme Court of the United States.  Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality).  No other right
has been so glowingly discussed and vigorously protected by our
nation’s highest court.  See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western
civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
-38-
authority over minor children.  Our cases have consistently
followed that course . . . .”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that
the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected.” (citations omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children.  This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.”).  
This Court has likewise held the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children in high regard.  See,
e.g., Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 145, 579 S.E.2d 264, 266
(2003) (“The protected liberty interest complements the
responsibilities the parent has assumed and is based on a
presumption that he or she will act in the best interest of the
child.” (citations omitted)); Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397,
403-04, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905 (1994) (holding that “absent a
finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the
welfare of their children, the constitutionally-protected
paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their
children must prevail”); Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384 passim,
329 S.E.2d 636 passim (1985) (discussing home schools in relation
-39-
to compulsory school attendance statutes).  Yet, today the
majority decision gives no deference to the traditional notion of
family control of educational decisions.  While it could be
argued that parents have the right to remove their children from
public schools and provide alternative forms of education, such
an opportunity is simply not practical for many families. 
Considering today’s decision, one cannot help but wonder about
the majority’s dedication to this Court’s prior pronouncements on
the importance of the family in educational decisions.  
In the end, the majority decision is simply another
chapter in the ongoing saga in which more and more traditional
decisions made by the family are handed over to the government. 
While I certainly sympathize with the plight of the Wake County
School System and the explosive population growth in the county,
ease of administration should never take precedence over the
preservation of the oldest institution--the family.  I
respectfully dissent.