Case Title: MARK A. MELEHES v. PATRICK WILSON ; JOHN A. MELEHES v. PATRICK WILSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK A. MELEHES v. PATRICK WILSON ;  JOHN A. MELEHES v. PATRICK WILSON 1989 WY 103774 P.2d 573Case Number: 88-126, 88-131Decided: 05/10/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK A. MELEHES, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
PATRICK WILSON, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
JOHN A. MELEHES AND 
TARGHEE VILLAGE, INC., APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

 
 
v.

 
 
PATRICK WILSON, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Lawrence B. Hartnett, 
Jackson, for appellant Mark A. 
Melehes.

 
 
W. Keith Goody of Goody 
& Lubing, Jackson, and Larry G. Reed of Parsons & Crowther, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for appellants John A. 
Melehes and Targhee Village, Inc.

 
 
Robert W. Horn, P.C., 
Jackson, for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellants are Targhee 
Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation and owner of the golf course 
in question (Corporation); John A. Melehes, president of the corporation 
(President); and Mark A. Melehes, the president's son and allegedly the golf 
course manager (Manager). They appeal from the district court's denial of their 
separate motions to set aside the default judgment in the sum of $175,443.01, 
entered against them jointly and severally in appellee Patrick Wilson's personal 
injury action. Appellee sued them because of a leg injury he received when he 
stepped into a grasscovered hole in the fourth fairway of the golf 
course.

 
 

[¶2.]     We address the 
following issues raised by appellants:

 
 
I. Whether each appellant 
"appeared in the action" for the purposes of W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), relating to the 
three-day written notice requirement which a plaintiff must satisfy before he is 
heard on his default judgment application;

 
 
II. Whether the default 
judgment for $175,443.01, for personal injury damages, entered after a proper 
hearing, is void under the provisions of W.R.C.P. 55(b), (c) and (d), 60(b), 
54(c), 8(a), and 9(g), as they relate to each other, if the underlying complaint 
did not contain, either in its body or its prayer, a specific dollar amount of 
damages for which the plaintiff demanded judgment;

 
 
III. In light of the 
provisions of W.S. 1-1-109(d), relating to the limitation of a defendant's 
liability proportionately to his percentage of fault, whether a default judgment 
jointly and severally against multiple defendants is void for purposes of relief 
under the provisions of W.R.C.P. 60(b);

 
 
IV. Whether the district 
court judge at the W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) hearing improperly included punitive 
damages in the default judgment damages award despite plaintiff's having 
withdrawn his punitive damages claim;

 
 
V. Whether fundamental 
notions of due process and fair play require that we set aside the default 
judgment against the Corporation.

 
 

[¶3.]     We affirm the district 
court's denial of appellants' motions to set aside the default judgments and 
affirm those judgments entered against appellants, including $101,039.01 of the 
$175,443.01 total damages award. As to the remaining $74,404 of that total 
award, however, we reverse, vacate and remand to the district court for its 
determination, in accordance with this opinion, of a damages award for past and 
future pain and suffering based upon only proper evidence and not upon any 
punitive considerations.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellee injured his 
leg on July 3, 1987, when he stepped into a grass-covered hole on a golf course 
owned by the Corporation. The concealed hole was lined with plastic pipe and 
contained sprinkling system valves. Appellee filed his complaint on November 19, 
1987, naming eleven individual and corporate defendants. Neither in the body nor 
in the prayer of the complaint did appellee state a specific dollar amount of 
damages for which he demanded judgment. Instead, after alleging a variety of 
elements of personal injury damages, he stated: "The amount of the damage 
incurred by Plaintiff will be proved at trial, but it exceeds the minimum 
jurisdictional limitation of this court." President and Manager were served with 
the complaint in their individual capacities on November 27, 1987. The 
Corporation received service through its registered agent, Betty Helderman, on 
December 17, 1987. None of the appellants timely filed proper responsive 
pleadings to appellee's complaint.

 
 

[¶5.]     The record includes 
five pages of "Interrogatories to Defendant" from appellee containing 
handwritten answers. President Melehes asserts by affidavit that the handwritten 
answers are his, and that he mailed them to appellee's counsel within twenty 
days of their receipt. The Corporation asserts that its registered agent, Betty 
Helderman, prepared and mailed a personal letter response to appellee's 
complaint to appellee's counsel within twenty days of service. The sole support 
for this assertion is the affidavit testimony of President. Neither the letter, 
nor an affidavit from Betty Helderman is included in the record. Manager asserts 
by affidavit that he gave the complaint that was served on him to President who 
promised him he would file an answer and take care of the 
lawsuit.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellee filed 
applications for entry of default against all three appellants in late December 
1987, and January 1988. Appellee moved the trial court for a hearing on damages 
on January 20, 1988, but none of the appellants were notified of that motion. 
The hearing on damages took place on March 10, 1988, after which the trial court 
entered default judgment against all three appellants, jointly and severally, in 
the amount of $175,443.01.

 
 

[¶7.]     On March 31, 1988, 
Manager filed a motion under W.R.C.P. 55 and 60(b), to vacate the judgment and 
entry of default. He also filed an answer to appellee's complaint. The complaint 
alleged Mark Melehes was the manager of the course when the injury occurred; 
Melehes denied that allegation in the answer. President and the Corporation 
filed similar motions and answers on April 4, 1988. The trial court denied 
Manager's motion to set aside default judgment on May 7, 1988, and did the same 
with President and the Corporation on May 13, 1988. Manager filed his notice of 
appeal to both the default judgment and the denial of his motion to set aside 
the default judgment on April 20, 1988. President and the Corporation appealed 
on May 22, 1988.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶8.]     The law does not favor 
default judgment because decisions on the merits are preferable when rules of 
civil procedure allow for them. Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 193 (Wyo. 1988). A defendant 
may move to set aside a default judgment or the entry of default pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b). A trial court exercises wide judicial discretion when 
it responds to such a motion, and we defer to that discretion unless it is shown 
to have been abused. Claassen, 756 P.2d  at 193. See also Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986) (defining judicial 
discretion).

 
 
I.

 
 
APPEARANCE IN 
ACTION

 
 

[¶9.]     W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(b) Judgment. - Judgment 
by default may be entered as follows:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(2) By the Court. - In 
all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the 
court therefor; * * * If the party against whom a judgment by default is sought 
has appeared in the action, he (or, 
if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the 
application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such 
application.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶10.]  None of the appellants, as parties 
against whom a judgment by default was sought, received a written notice of 
appellee's default judgment application. We must inquire, therefore, whether 
each appellant "appeared in the action."

 
 
A. Did Manager 
"appear"?

 
 

[¶11.]  By affidavit, Manager asserts that 
immediately after being served with the complaint and summons he gave them to 
President, also his father, who promised him he would file an answer and take 
care of the lawsuit. Manager reasons that President's act of mailing unsworn, 
unsigned, undated interrogatory answers to appellee's counsel before the answer 
date expired should inure to Manager's benefit and constitute an "appearance" 
for purposes of triggering the mandatory three-day written notice requirement in 
W.R.C.P. 55(b). Further, Manager claims his "mistake" was that he trusted 
President and his "excusable neglect" was that he did not check to see if 
President in fact had answered the complaint for him.

 
 

[¶12.]  Manager cites no legal authority, and we 
find none, supporting his claim that one defendant's asserted appearance can 
inure to a co-defendant's benefit in this situation. We have stated before that 
"[a]n appearance in an action involves some submission or presentation to the 
court by which a party shows his intention to submit himself to the jurisdiction 
of the court." (Citation omitted). U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 
Inc., 664 P.2d 121, 124 (Wyo. 1983) In Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture 
Company, 685 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1984), we affirmed the district court's entry of 
default judgment against defendants who timely requested an additional twenty 
days to answer, but then failed to file any other papers, or in any other way 
defend against the action for five months. In our concluding paragraph in Annis, 
685 P.2d  at 680, we sounded a warning to litigants who, like Manager, President 
and the Corporation here, choose to handle their lawsuits without benefit of 
counsel:

 
 
This court has 
consistently refused to give special consideration to a litigant who chooses to 
proceed without counsel; he must expect and receive the same treatment as if he 
were represented by an attorney. Thus, he is held to the same rules of procedure 
as are required of those qualified to practice law in our courts; otherwise, 
ignorance is unjustly rewarded.

 
 
(Citations omitted). Cf. 
Korkow v. Markle, 746 P.2d 434, 435 (Wyo. 1987)

 
 

[¶13.]  In Hochhalter v. Great Western 
Enterprises, Inc., 708 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 1985), where the defaulted defendant 
asserted that his failure to appear in the action was due to his counsel's 
personal problems or psychological disorders, we observed that a litigant who 
voluntarily chooses an attorney as his representative in an action may not be 
able to avoid the negligence of this freely selected agent. In Booth v. Magee 
Carpet Company, 548 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Wyo. 1976), defendant retained counsel 
fifty-three days after being served. Defendant's counsel telephoned plaintiff's 
counsel twenty-three days after the answer date had expired but before entry of 
default. In this telephone communication defendant's counsel advised he intended 
to file an answer. There, we found it impossible to equate the unexplained 
fifty-three day delay in obtaining an attorney with the actions of a reasonably 
prudent man.

 
 

[¶14.]  When the record here is considered in 
light of these holdings, and lacking any supporting authority for Manager's 
position, we cannot help Manager avoid the negligence of his freely selected 
agent. His conduct after service was not that of a reasonably prudent man. We 
hold, therefore, that he did not "appear in this action" for purposes of 
W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).

 
 
B. Did the Corporation 
"Appear"?

 
 

[¶15.]  The Corporation claims to have "appeared 
in the action" by virtue of an alleged "personal response" which Betty 
Helderman, its registered agent for service of process, is said to have mailed 
to appellee's counsel. That "personal response" is not in the record on appeal, 
nor does the record contain an affidavit from her concerning her composition and 
mailing of that "personal response." Instead, the alleged existence and mailing 
of the "personal response" is supported only by the affidavit testimony of 
President, stating that Betty Helderman told him she sent the response. 
President's unsupported affidavit is insufficient to show that the Corporation, 
through its registered agent for service, sent a response to appellee's counsel 
responding to the complaint. With this in mind, no evidence exists in the record 
to show that the Corporation made an appearance for purposes of W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2).

 
 
C. Did President 
"Appear"?

 
 

[¶16.]  President argues that the unsigned, 
undated, and unsworn handwritten responses to appellee's written 
interrogatories, which allegedly were received by appellee's counsel before the 
answer date expired, were sufficient to establish an "appearance" under W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2). We disagree, based on our precedent concerning what constitutes an 
appearance under the rule.

 
 

[¶17.]  President begins his argument by pointing 
to our holding in Sanford v. Arjay Oil Company, 
686 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1984). In Sanford, 686 P.2d  at 571, this court held that 
"[a] party will be deemed to have appeared in the action, even though no formal 
pleadings have been entered, when contacts between the parties clearly 
demonstrate an intent to defend." There, the contacts between the parties which 
were held to demonstrate clearly an intent to defend were responsive pleadings, 
extensive discovery and a stipulation to an amended complaint. In Hochhalter 708 P.2d  at 672, we contrasted the contacts in Sanford with a telephone call asking for an 
extension of time and with settlement discussions before the complaint was ever 
filed. Based on that comparison, we held the latter contacts did not clearly 
demonstrate an intent to defend. Our holding of no clear demonstration of an 
intent to defend in Booth, 548 P.2d  at 1254, is consistent with the logic of 
Sanford and Hochhalter. Defense counsel in Booth telephoned plaintiff's counsel 
after the answer was due but before the entry of default and requested 
additional time to answer. We also note Smith v. Gamma Construction Company, 
Inc., 387 So. 2d 188 (Ala. 1980), where a 
defendant's submission to deposition upon oral examination did not constitute an 
appearance within the meaning of the Alabama equivalent to W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2).

 
 

[¶18.]  As we have previously warned, a litigant 
who chooses to act as his own counsel must expect and receive the same treatment 
as if he had counsel. He is held to the same rules of procedure with which 
counsel must comply. W.R.C.P. 8(e)(2), provides, in pertinent part, "[a]ll 
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11." 
W.R.C.P. 11, provides, in pertinent part, "[a] party who is not represented by 
an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. * * * If a pleading 
is not signed * * * it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may 
proceed as though the pleading had not been served." W.R.C.P. 33, provides, in 
pertinent part: "Each interrogatory shall be answered * * * under oath * * *. 
The answers are to be signed by the person making them * * *." President failed 
to comply with these obligations.

 
 

[¶19.]  In light of our rules and our case law 
interpreting those rules, we hold that a defendant's unsigned, unsworn, and 
undated interrogatory responses do not constitute an appearance under W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2). Therefore, President did not "appear in the action" for the purposes 
of the rule.

 
 
II.

 
 
AD 
DAMNUM

 
 

[¶20.]  In the body of his complaint, appellee 
identified the parties; alleged various duties which the defendants owed to him; 
alleged the appellants' breaches of those duties; alleged that, as a result of 
those breaches, his "leg came into contact with the sharp edge of the PVC pipe 
causing a cut, avulsion of skin and muscle tissue and serious crippling injury;" 
and alleged that he "suffered a severe laceration and avulsion of tissue which 
has required surgical intervention and skin grafting to repair." In the 
complaint, under the heading "Damages," appellee specifically alleged that as a 
result of his injury he had incurred medical expenses, pain, loss of wages, loss 
of ability to earn an income through physical impairment, mental anguish and 
suffering, permanent disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life as past and 
future damages. He then alleged, "[t]he amount of the damage incurred by 
Plaintiff will be proved at trial but it exceeds the minimum jurisdictional 
limitation of this court." Appellee's complaint contained no specific dollar 
amount of damages for which he demanded judgment.

 
 

[¶21.]  Appellants argue that the default 
judgment against them is void under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), because the award exceeds 
in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment, as proscribed by W.R.C.P. 
54(c). We note that W.R.C.P. 55(d) provides in pertinent part: "In all cases a 
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c)." From these 
rules, appellants reason that appellee's complaint must have contained a demand 
for judgment in a specific dollar amount. They say a demand for damages lacking 
a specific dollar amount is tantamount to demanding nothing and, therefore, any 
damages amount awarded by the trial court on default exceeds the amount 
contained in the demand for judgment.

 
 

[¶22.]  In support of their argument appellants 
rely on White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102 (Wyo. 1984), where this court held that 
the legislature is prohibited from enacting a statute specifying the content of 
or foreclosing material from pleadings since such legislation is a clear 
infringement upon the constitutional and inherent power of this court to make 
rules. Id. at 
107. Under that holding we struck down a statute which provided that the ad 
damnum clause or prayer for damages in a personal injury or wrongful death 
complaint shall not state any dollar amount as alleged damages or demand a sum 
as judgment. We did not hold, as 
appellants here contend, that a personal injury or wrongful death complaint 
shall state a dollar amount as alleged damages or demand a sum as judgment. In 
fact, in nondefault cases we have consistently held that the ad damnum clause or 
prayer for relief is not a part of the complaint. Walton v. Atlantic Richfield 
Company, 501 P.2d 802, 805-06 (Wyo. 1972). Additionally, our procedural rules 
establish no requirement that a complaint state a dollar amount as alleged 
damages or demand a sum certain as judgment.

 
 

[¶23.]  In this regard we find that W.R.C.P. 
8(a), envisions general, not technical, rules of pleading: "A pleading which 
sets forth a claim for relief * * * shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." W.R.C.P. 
9(g) provides that items of special damage shall be specifically stated. We have 
never imposed the requirement that a personal injury and wrongful death 
complaint must state a dollar amount as alleged special damages or demand 
special damages in a sum certain as judgment. For example, a pleader may satisfy 
Rule 9(g) by specifically stating items such as "medical 
expenses."

 
 

[¶24.]  In further support of their position, 
appellants refer us to Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1982), 
which partly relied on Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Company, Inc., 27 Cal. 3d 489, 165 Cal. Rptr. 825, 612 P.2d 915 (1980). We reject these decisions since 
they depended on the application of specific provisions of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure which differ materially from our general procedural rules. 
For instance, 14A Cal. Civ.Proc.Code § 425.10 (West 1974), 
provided:

 
 
A complaint * * * shall 
contain both of the following:

 
 
(a) A statement of the 
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise 
language.

 
 
(b) A demand for judgment 
for the relief to which the pleader claims he is entitled. If the recovery of 
money or damages be demanded, the amount 
thereof shall be stated.

 
 
(Emphasis added.) In 
1979, § 425.10(b) was amended by adding after the word "stated" the following 
phrase, "unless the action is brought in the superior court to recover actual or 
punitive damages for personal injury 
or wrongful death, in which case the amount thereof shall not be stated." 14A 
Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.10 (West Cum.Pocket Part 1988). Also effective in 1974, 
§ 425.11 provided in pertinent part that a plaintiff seeking personal injury or 
wrongful death damages "shall give notice to the defendant of the amount of 
special and general damages sought to be recovered (1) before a default may be 
taken * * *." Under this rule, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirement of 
notice in relation to a defendant who has not appeared after valid service of 
process. Plotitsa v. SuperiorCourtofLos AngelesCounty, 189 Cal. Rptr. 769, 140 Cal. App. 3d 755 (1983). While interesting in terms of a comparison of Wyoming and California 
procedural rules, the California cases cited by appellants are 
obviously distinguishable.

 
 

[¶25.]  With respect to the federal counterpart 
of our W.R.C.P. 54(c), limiting the default judgment to the relief demanded in 
the complaint, it has been said, "[t]he theory of this provision is that once 
the defending party receives the original pleading he should be able to decide 
on the basis of the relief requested whether he wants to expend the time, 
effort, and money necessary to defend the action." 10 C. Wright, A. Miller and 
M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2663, at 139 (1983). We see no reason 
why this rationale requires a plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death 
action to state a specific dollar amount as damages in a demand for judgment. We 
think the rationale is served equally well when that plaintiff states the nature 
of the injury or death and sets forth the specific elements of damages for which 
he seeks judgment. Under that form of general pleading a defendant receives 
reasonable notice that he is at substantial monetary risk if he fails or chooses 
not to defend the action and suffers default. Our procedural rules charge a 
defendant in that situation with the knowledge that when the complaint demands 
unliquidated damages the district court shall conduct a hearing, take evidence, 
and determine an amount of damages based on the evidence presented to which the 
appellee is entitled. The lower court's award on default judgment is always 
subject to our review on proper grounds shown.

 
 
We hold that the default 
judgment is not void because the complaint did not contain a specific dollar 
amount in the demand for judgment.

 
 
III.

 
 
JOINT AND SEVERAL 
LIABILITY

 
 

[¶26.]  At the conclusion of the damages hearing, 
the district court judge entered a default judgment in the amount of 
$175,443.01, against appellants without attributing percentages of fault to each 
appellant so that each appellant would be liable only for his proportionate 
share of the total award. Appellants contend that this default judgment thereby 
imposed joint and several liability on them in violation of W.S. 1-1-109(b)-(d) 
(June 1988 Repl.). Those statutory provisions state:

 
 
(b) The court may, and 
when requested by any party shall:

 
 
(i) If a jury 
trial:

 
 
(A) Direct the jury to 
find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages and the 
percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; 
and

 
 
(B) Inform the jury of 
the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

 
 
(ii) If a trial before 
the court without jury, makes special findings of fact, determining the total 
amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether 
or not a party.

 
 
(c) The court shall 
reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this section in 
proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person recovering and enter 
judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under subsection (d) of 
this section.

 
 
(d) Each defendant is 
liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount determined as damages 
under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the percentage of the amount 
of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this 
section.

 
 

[¶27.]  Following the plain language of these 
provisions, we hold they come into play only if the case is tried by a jury or 
to the court and a party requests, or the court on its own, makes a 
determination of the percentages of fault attributable to each appellant. Here, 
no trial was held. No party requested a determination of fault percentages. The 
court on its own chose not to make that determination. We hold the default 
judgment valid as imposing joint and several liability on 
appellants.

 
 
IV.

 
 
PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES

 
 

[¶28.]  In personal injury actions, where the 
elements of damages include past and future pain and suffering, the law does not 
provide a specific measure for quantifying damages. The amount to be awarded 
rests almost totally within the discretion of the fact finder, which is the jury 
in a jury trial and a judge in a bench trial. Appellate courts are reluctant to 
interfere with that award decision unless by its amount it carries with it an 
implication of passion, prejudice or bias or the result of some erroneous basis. 
Booth v. Hackney, 516 P.2d 180, 181 (Wyo. 1973). We must use that standard here. 
Where an erroneous basis has not influenced the fact finder's verdict the 
amount to be assessed for damages suffered by a personal-injury plaintiff is 
within the sound discretion of the fact trier.

 
 

[¶29.]  Here, appellants claim that the fact 
finder included an unknown amount of punitive damages in the award of pain and 
suffering damages. This claim is premised upon the fact finder's 
statements:

 
 
THE COURT: I wish there 
was some way I could give you punitive damages. You can't run a public golf 
course and leave your sprinkler system concealed. It's like a 
trap.

 
 
[COUNSEL]: Well, Your 
Honor, that's what we alleged in our lawsuit that it is a trap, and I believe 
that the problem with punitive damages at this point is that there is no way 
that they can be based; that's what I see and I would withdraw my request for 
punitive damages.

 
 
THE COURT: I'll work that 
out another way.

 
 
Having said that, the 
fact finder then announced a total award of $175,443.01. By subtracting the 
amounts previously described and assigned specifically by the fact finder, which 
amounts together totaled $101,039.01, we can conclude that the fact finder 
assessed the amount of $74,404 ostensibly for past and future pain and 
suffering. The record contains sufficient evidence to support such an award. 
Unfortunately, the record also contains evidence, in the form of the fact 
finder's statements, which casts a cloud on the award of that specific amount. 
The statements suggest that an erroneous basis has influenced the fact finder's 
verdict. That evidence suggests that some unknown portion of that amount 
represents punitive damages. In other words, we are looking at a record which 
contains both proper evidence and improper evidence upon which to base an award. 
We are unable to determine to what extent the specific award was based on the 
improper evidence. In such circumstance, we believe the better course is to 
reverse and vacate that portion of the damages award and remand for the fact 
finder's determination of that specific element of damages based upon only 
proper evidence. See Reiman Construction Company v. Jerry Hiller Company, 709 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Wyo. 1985). In making this determination, the 
trial court, as fact finder, may consider whatever appropriate admissible 
evidence the plaintiff's counsel decides to offer. The trial court's 
determination shall be based upon such evidence and not on any punitive 
considerations.

 
 
V.

 
 
DUE 
PROCESS

 
 

[¶30.]  The Corporation claims that its 
registered agent's failure to notify its officers of the service of process 
received by her on behalf of the Corporation constitutes excusable neglect and 
that fundamental due process under that circumstance requires that the appellee 
not profit at the unnotified Corporation's expense. See W.R.C.P. 60(b). In 
support of this claim Corporation cites two cases which are easily distinguished 
from the facts here. In Clute v. A.B. Concrete, 179 Mont. 475, 587 P.2d 392 
(1978), the former president and registered agent, who had been earlier removed 
by the corporation's directors, was served with process and failed to notify the 
corporate officers or directors who, after removing him, had failed to notify 
the secretary of state of that removal and of the newly registered agent's 
identity. Under that set of facts, the appellate court affirmed the finding that 
the corporation did not have actual notice of the action and set aside a default 
judgment against the corporation. Here, however, the legitimate registered agent 
was served, as was the corporation's president, John A. Melehes. Under these 
facts, the Corporation had actual notice of the action. In the second case, 
Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc., 106 N.M. 25, 738 P.2d 519 (1987), the defendant 
corporation had failed to appoint a registered agent and the plaintiff served 
the secretary of state who failed to send the defendant corporation the required 
notice of the action. Since the defendant corporation did not have actual notice 
of the action because of the secretary of state's error, the court set aside the 
default judgment against the defendant corporation. Again, those facts do not 
match facts here.

 
 

[¶31.]  The Corporation's failure to support this 
issue by proper citation of authority and cogent argument precludes this court 
from considering it further. Johnston v. Conoco, 
Inc., 758 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 

[¶32.]  We hold that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgments. Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

CARDINE, C.J., filed an opinion, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., filed an opinion, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom CARDINE, C.J., partially 
joined.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

[¶33.]  I concur in the opinion of the court, 
except that I would set aside the default judgment against appellant Mark 
Melehes. I join in so much of Justice Urbigkit's dissenting opinion as would 
vacate and set aside this default judgment.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, in part 
concurring in the decision and otherwise dissenting, with whom CARDINE, Chief Justice, partially 
joins.

 
 

[¶34.]  One of the anathemas or, more explicitly, 
mine fields within the justice delivery system is procedural default, and 
expressly the default judgment. Default or forfeiture which denies substantive 
resolution seems a cultivated growth which is pervasive in the modern day 
adjudicatory mold. In this case, differing from many, the error is not 
attributable to attorney performance default with deleterious effect then 
visited upon the client. Here, the separate litigants in one way or another did 
it to themselves. Cf. Hochhalter v. Great Western Enterprises, Inc., 708 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 
1985). I dissent in part because the law should actually, and not in unperformed 
and empty promise, favor disposition of litigation on the merits and should 
disfavor forfeiture of rights by a determination which is not correctable after 
unintended default. See in current review as a summary reversal of denied 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) relief, Lee v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 
1988).

 
 

[¶35.]  In my analysis, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to deny corrective opportunity by failing to set 
aside the default as to the son, Mark Melehes. I might have applied a similarly 
beneficence to either or both the father and the corporation if motions to set 
aside the default had been adequately, comprehensively and factually supported 
by affidavits providing some reasoned and realistic supporting detail. The 
affidavits should have justified the default occurrence and more comprehensively 
defined an adequate defense. Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Co., 685 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1984); RIM Group v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp., 78 Wyo. 204, 321 P.2d 229, reh'g denied 323 P.2d 939 (1958).

 
 

[¶36.]  Since I do not perceive that the father 
and the corporation met the factual submission burden upon which the trial 
court's abuse of discretion should be placed, I will concur and affirm the 
default judgments entered against the father and the corporation, except as to 
amount, although I do not necessarily conclude that W.S. 1-1-109(d) application 
can justify the award made.1 

 
 

[¶37.]  As a second issue, I will concur in the 
result of the decision reflected in section four of the opinion since judgment 
amount, even within the factual context of the default hearing, was clearly an 
award of punitive damages. The evidentiary proof was totally insufficient to 
justify inclusion. Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1984). My 
reservation about punitive damages, except in the most unusual and egregious 
circumstance, is that even with acceptance of the entire pleading in this case 
as true, there still is no proper basis for such an award in addition to the 
actual proven damages.

 
 

[¶38.]  My foremost departure in dissent is 
postured on the trial court denial of the Mark Melehes' motion to set aside the 
default entered against him. Personally served, he delivered the document to his 
father, as president of the enterprise, for handling. No lack of concern or due 
diligence is demonstrated. Furthermore, realistic evidence of his liability for 
the injury to the appellee from the fall on the golf course is not reflected in 
the record.2 

 
 

[¶39.]  It is recognized that consideration of an 
appeal from a refusal of the trial court's exercise of discretion to set aside a 
default or default judgment entails an examination of that discretion evaluated 
with due regard to certain standards. Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1988); Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252 
(Wyo. 1976); RIM Group v. Mountain Mesa Uranium 
Corp., 78 Wyo. 
204, 321 P.2d 229 (1958). That principle, as a standard of justice, is defined 
for this jurisdiction in Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 
375, 182 P.2d 824 (1947) and then reemphasized in Westring v. Cheyenne National 
Bank, 393 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1964) and Claassen, 756 P.2d 189.

 
 
"* * * Judgments by 
default are not favored. Courts prefer that cases be tried upon the merits. `It 
is generally recognized that the discretionary power of the court should be 
liberally exercised in furtherance of justice, to the end that cases may be 
disposed of upon their merits rather than upon technicalities or fortuitous 
circumstances.' Freeman, supra [1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 580 (5 Ed.)], Sec. 
292. 31 Am.Jur. 265, Sec. 715. * * *"

 
 
Westring, 393 P.2d  at 122 
(quoting Lake, 182 P.2d at 
834).

 
 

[¶40.]  As this record is presented, there is 
nothing that Mark Melehes did which would be unusual or inattentively careless. 
Furthermore, his liability for the injury is surely tested under any theory 
which is directly controverted and supported by his affidavit regarding his 
non-relationship to the golf course and the operating entity. His liability, if 
any, should be proven before unjustified assessment is 
inflicted.

 
 

[¶41.]  I concur in the results only to affirm 
the default judgment against the father, John A. Melehes, and Targhee Village, 
Inc., and concur in the remand for a proper determination of amount. I would 
also reverse and remand for an order setting aside the default judgment against 
Mark Melehes so that his liability can be tried and determined on the merits. To 
me, justice is a substantive decision on the merits of the issues presented 
after a fair trial. That is not this case. This court continues to make bad law 
on non-thinking acceptance of default judgments and ignores our heritage. 
Justitia nemini neganda est. "Justice is to be denied to none." There is more to 
justice than disposition of litigation.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The factual basis for cause shown 
to set aside the default against both the father, as the corporation's 
president, and the corporation, is largely premised in hearsay and illusion. 
Specifically detailed first-party affidavit support from the company secretary 
as the registered agent (which arrangement is normally a serious organizational 
mistake) or from the president himself, is not provided. See RIM Group, 321 P.2d 229. Anyone who sets out to erase an entered default or default judgment incurs 
a realistic legal burden of detailed and sufficient affidavit support. Even 
those of us who do not believe in default judgments accept a persuasive 
submission as the price and basis for adequate trial court decision on the 
W.R.C.P. 55(c) and W.R.C.P. 60(b) motions to vacate.

 
 
The substance of the "excuse" 
afforded in behalf of the father is stated in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of his 
affidavit:

 
 
4. Due to your affiant's lack of 
training and absence of experience, after reviewing those pleadings, he 
reasonably believed that the only response required was to provide Answers to 
Interrogatories pursuant to the preamble to those 
Interrogatories.

 
 
5. In order to give notice of his 
intent to defend against Plaintiff's claims, your affiant prepared Answers to 
Interrogatories and mailed them to counsel for Plaintiff, Robert W. Horn, P.O. 
Box 3346, Jackson, Wyoming 83001, prior to the expiration of twenty days after 
service of the Summons and Complaint. A handwritten copy of those Answers is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The Answers submitted to counsel for Plaintiff 
were in type written form.

 
 
6. Based upon your affiant's limited 
knowledge of civil procedure and his general notions of fairness and due 
process, he believed that no further proceedings or judgment might be had 
without further notice to him.

 
 

2 In factual substance, Mark Melehes 
stated in his affidavit in support of his motion under W.R.C.P. 55(c) and 
60(b):

 
 
1. I am the same Mark A. Melehes 
named as a Defendant in the above-entitled civil action.

 
 
2. I am the natural son of John A. 
Melehes, who is also named as a Defendant in the above-entitled civil 
action.

 
 
3. To the best of my knowledge, the 
land upon which the golf course referred to in the Plaintiff's complaint was and 
is located and owned by a corporation called Targhee Village, 
Inc.

 
 
4. To the best of my knowledge, my 
father, John A. Melehes was president of Targhee Village, Inc., at the time that 
Patrick Wilson alleges to have been injured on the golf 
course.

 
 
5. I am not now, nor have I ever 
been, an officer, director, manager or an employee in any capacity, manager or 
otherwise, of Targhee Village, Inc. or the golf course upon which the Plaintiff 
claims to have been injured, or directed or controlled any of the activities of 
the corporation or golf course.

 
 
6. On November 27, 1987, Tracy 
Hansen, known to me as a Teton County, Wyoming deputy sheriff, gave me a copy of 
the complaint and summons issued to me in this action.

 
 
7. To the best of my recollection, 
on the same day that I was given a copy of the summons and complaint, I spoke in 
person to my father, John A. Melehes, showed him the summons and complaint, and 
asked him what this lawsuit was all about. At this time, my father took my copy 
of the summons and complaint and told me in substance that the lawsuit was not 
my problem; that I was not involved in the business of the golf course; and that 
he would file an answer and take care of the lawsuit.

 
 
8. That I am 36 years of age and to 
the best of my recollection during my entire life, my father has never told me 
he would do something that was important, and then fail to do 
so.

 
 
9. After giving the summons and 
complaint to my father, I heard nothing about this lawsuit until the evening of 
March 10, 1988, when my wife informed me that she received a telephone call from 
Larry Hartnett, an attorney who had represented me in the past, and that Mr. 
Hartnett had informed her that he had heard that a judgment in the amount of 
$175,000.00 had been entered against me by this Court that same 
day.

 
 
10. I spoke to Mr. Hartnett on March 
11, 1988, and he told me that he thought a judgment had been rendered against me 
the day before for $175,000.00, and asked me what I knew about 
it.

 
 
11. I told Mr. Hartnett that I 
didn't know anything about it, except that I had given my summons and complaint 
to my father and he (my father) had told me that he would take care of 
it.

 
 
12. On or about March 13, 1988, I 
was able to locate my father, who resides in Utah, and told my father what Mr. Hartnett had 
told me. My father told me that he had taken care of it and filed an 
answer.

 
 
13. On Monday, March 14, 1988, I 
again spoke to Mr. Hartnett by telephone and related to him my father's 
response, and Mr. Hartnett told me that he had checked the court file on that 
same day and that there was no answer or any other kind of paper filed by my 
father.

 
 
14. I contacted my father again by 
telephone on March 16, 1988, and told him * * * Mr. Hartnett said * * * there 
was no answer from him in the court file, to which my father responded that he 
had personally prepared an answer, signed it and mailed it to Mr. Robert Horn, 
the attorney who had filed the complaint, within the time 
allowed.

 
 
15. I was genuinely surprised and 
confused when I learned that my father had not filed an answer with the court on 
my behalf.

 
 
16. I am not an irresponsible person 
and I truly believed that my father would file the papers with the court to 
protect me.

 
 
17. The statements contained in this 
Affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge and are true to the best of my 
information and belief.