Case Title: Commonwealth v. Hobbs

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12216

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12216 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEITH HOBBS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2018. - June 28, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Cellular Telephone.  Constitutional Law, Search and 
seizure, Probable cause, Confrontation of witnesses.  
Search and Seizure, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  
Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Hearsay, Admissions and 
confessions, Admission by silence.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Motion to suppress, Disclosure of evidence, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Conduct of prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 26, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J.; the cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on May 8, 2017, was 
considered by her. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Montez D. 
Haywood, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Keith Hobbs, of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
2 
 
 
premeditation in connection with the shooting death of the 
victim, Demetrius Blocker.1  The defendant raises several issues 
on appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his motion 
for a new trial.  First, he argues that the motion judge erred 
in denying his pretrial motion to suppress the cell site 
location information (CSLI) used by the Commonwealth in this 
case.  Three and one-half months of CSLI were collected, and 
CSLI from the date of the murder figured prominently at trial.  
Next, he alleges that several reversible errors were committed 
during the course of his trial.  Specifically, the defendant 
argues (i) that the trial judge erred in permitting a police 
detective to testify to his observations of the defendant's 
gait; (ii) that the defendant's constitutional confrontation 
rights were violated when the trial judge admitted hearsay 
testimony that a particular cell phone number belonged to his 
friend; (iii) that the trial judge erred in admitting other 
hearsay testimony; and (iv) that the prosecutor's 
characterization of a photograph of the defendant as a "booking 
photo" amounted to misconduct.  Finally, he argues that even if 
no one error, standing alone, is sufficient to warrant the 
reversal of his convictions, reversal is nonetheless warranted 
due to cumulative error. 
                                                 
 
1 The jury also convicted the defendant on the related 
charge of possession of a firearm without a license. 
3 
 
 
 
For the reasons stated infra, we conclude that there has 
been no reversible error.  After a thorough review of the 
record, we also find no reason to exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or to either reduce or 
set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.  We 
therefore affirm the defendant's convictions and the denial of 
his motion for a new trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving other facts for our discussion of specific 
issues.  At approximately 4 P.M. on December 16, 2010, a sole 
gunman shot the victim in the arm, chest, and head while he sat 
in a parked car outside a housing complex in the Roxbury section 
of Boston.  The shooter fled the scene on foot.  Police and 
emergency medical personnel soon arrived and attempted to save 
the victim's life.  These efforts proved unsuccessful, and the 
victim was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. 
 
Police immediately began to canvas the crime scene.  In the 
course of their investigation, police interviewed several 
witnesses at the scene who provided detailed descriptions of the 
suspected shooter.  While their descriptions varied slightly, 
these witnesses consistently described the suspected shooter as 
a black- or brown-skinned male wearing a large black coat with a 
fur collar, dark jeans, and dark shoes.  Several witnesses also 
stated that the man had a distinctive gait, describing his walk 
4 
 
 
as something akin to a limp.2  Police also learned that the 
suspect had been seen throwing an object into a nearby Dumpster 
as he left the scene following the shooting. 
 
As police continued to search the crime scene, they 
discovered four spent shell casings near where the victim was 
shot and a .45 caliber handgun in the Dumpster identified by 
witnesses.  Subsequent ballistics testing revealed this firearm 
to be the murder weapon.  However, police were unable to recover 
any fingerprints from either the firearm or the shell casings. 
 
Acting on information from witnesses who described the 
route the suspect took to flee the scene, police reviewed video 
footage from surveillance cameras that were located throughout 
the surrounding neighborhood.  Surveillance video recordings 
from the time frame immediately following the shooting captured 
footage of a man in a puffy black jacket with a fur collar, dark 
jeans, and dark sneakers who appeared to have a limp walking 
away from the crime scene. 
 
Even with this information in hand, police were unable to 
immediately locate the suspect.  In an attempt to identify him, 
the police released one of the surveillance video recordings of 
the suspect to the public in February 2011.  To that end, the 
                                                 
 
2 However, no witnesses from the scene were able to 
positively identify the defendant at trial. 
5 
 
 
recording was posted online and broadcast by television news 
stations.  Several days after the video recording was released 
to the public, a man who identified himself as Michael Hobbs3 
telephoned Boston police and expressed his belief that the 
suspect in the recording was his brother, the defendant.  
Michael reiterated this identification in a follow-up interview 
with police, and again during subsequent testimony before a 
grand jury.  Before the grand jury, he testified that he was 
able to identify the suspect as his brother due to the clothing 
the suspect was wearing and the distinctive way that the suspect 
walked.4  In addition to identifying the defendant as the suspect 
in his initial call to police, Michael provided police with a 
telephone number for a cell phone that he understood to belong 
to the defendant.5  Police then requested a court order requiring 
the defendant's cellular service provider to produce, among 
                                                 
 
3 We refer to members of the Hobbs family by their first 
names to avoid confusion. 
 
 
4 Michael recanted these identifications at trial, stating 
that his brother walks "normal" and not in any distinctive way.  
He then testified that upon reviewing the surveillance footage 
further, he did not believe that the suspect in the footage was 
his brother.  The Commonwealth confronted this recantation with 
his prior identifications and the grand jury testimony, which 
was admitted in evidence for impeachment purposes and as 
substantive evidence. 
 
 
5 Trial testimony revealed that although this cell phone was 
purchased and owned by the defendant's former girlfriend, the 
defendant used it as his personal cell phone at all times 
relevant to this case. 
6 
 
 
other information, the historical CSLI from the defendant's cell 
phone spanning several months surrounding the day of the 
killing.  The application was granted.  The CSLI from the date 
of the killing was introduced at trial and showed that the 
defendant's cell phone was located in the general vicinity of 
the crime scene at and around the time of the killing. 
 
The Commonwealth introduced further evidence identifying 
the defendant as the suspect in the surveillance video footage 
through Roseanne Robinson, the wife of the defendant's friend, 
Bonae Swain-Price.  Robinson testified that the defendant and 
her husband knew each other well and that the defendant had 
lived with her family for a period of time.6  She explained that, 
having observed the defendant's gait on prior occasions, she 
believed that one of his legs turned inward as he stepped 
forward, giving the appearance that he walked with a limp.  She 
also testified that, based at least in part on her familiarity 
with the defendant's gait, she recognized the defendant as the 
suspect in the surveillance video recording that the police had 
released to the public.  After watching the video recording, she 
remarked to her cousin that she thought the suspect in the 
recording looked like the defendant, and later told the 
defendant directly that she had "seen him on the news."  In 
                                                 
 
6 Roseanne Robinson also testified that her husband used the 
defendant's cell phone from time to time. 
7 
 
 
addition to her testimony regarding his gait, Robinson testified 
that she believed the suspect in the recording to be the 
defendant due to the clothing that the suspect was wearing.  She 
explained that the defendant often wore dark shoes and dark 
jeans, and that her husband had given the defendant a large 
black jacket with a fur collar at some point before the date of 
the killing.  Evidence also revealed that Swain-Price had 
possessed a .45 caliber handgun that matched the general 
description of the murder weapon, and that Swain-Price possessed 
this weapon while the defendant lived with Swain-Price and his 
family. 
 
Finally, the lead detective in the case testified that he 
had recently reviewed a video recording of the defendant walking 
and had observed that the defendant had "a distinctive walk," 
which appeared to him to be a limp.7 
After the case was submitted, the jury returned guilty 
verdicts on both charges and the defendant was subsequently 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
The defendant now appeals. 
                                                 
 
7 Several other witnesses, however, testified that the 
defendant did not walk in a distinctive manner.  For example, 
the defendant's sister, Nicole, and his former girlfriend both 
testified that they had never noticed anything distinctive about 
the defendant's gait during the time that they had known him. 
8 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress CSLI.  The defendant 
appeals from the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress.  On 
March 17, 2011, approximately three months after the killing in 
this case, and after identifying the defendant as a suspect, the 
Commonwealth filed an application, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 
requesting a court order that would require the defendant's 
cellular service provider to produce, among other information, 
the historical CSLI from the defendant's cell phone spanning 
December 1, 2010, through March 15, 2011.8  The application was 
granted.  A review of the CSLI revealed that the defendant's 
cell phone was in the vicinity of the crime scene at and around 
the time of the killing.  Before trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress the CSLI, arguing that the Commonwealth did not have 
probable cause to obtain this information.  The motion was 
denied, and the CSLI was eventually admitted in evidence at 
trial. 
 
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we "accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but 
                                                 
 
8 Cell site location information (CSLI) refers to a cell 
phone "service record or records that contain information 
identifying the base station towers and sectors that receive 
transmissions from a [cellular] telephone" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 
231 n.1 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 
448 (2015).  Once obtained, law enforcement can use this 
information to identify the approximate location of the cell 
phone based on the cell phone's communication with a particular 
cell site.  See id. at 238. 
9 
 
 
conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 587 (2016).  Accordingly, 
we make an "independent determination of the correctness of the 
judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Before the government may request and obtain historical 
CSLI, it ordinarily must first obtain a warrant based on 
probable cause.9  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2221 (2018) (warrant required under Fourth Amendment to 
United States Constitution); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 
Mass. 230, 232 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 
Mass. 448 (2015) (warrant required under art. 14 of 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).  Because the Commonwealth 
in this case requested the historical CSLI several years before 
we first articulated this warrant requirement in 2014, in 
Augustine I, it did not obtain a warrant.10  The Commonwealth may 
                                                 
 
9 The Commonwealth need not obtain a warrant, however, if it 
requests six hours or less of "telephone call" CSLI.  
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 858 & n.12 (2015). 
 
 
10 Although the Commonwealth requested the historical CSLI 
in 2011, the defendant's trial did not occur until after we 
announced the warrant requirement in Augustine I.  Moreover, the 
defendant challenged the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's 
application pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 before trial.  The 
warrant requirement therefore applies in this case.  Augustine 
I, 467 Mass. at 257 (warrant requirement applies to "cases in 
10 
 
 
nevertheless still satisfy the warrant requirement if it can 
establish that its "application for the § 2703[] order met the 
requisite probable cause standard of art. 14."  Augustine I, 
supra at 256. 
 
An affidavit in support of a search warrant for historical 
CSLI must "demonstrate 'probable cause to believe [1] that a 
particular described offense has been, is being, or is about to 
be committed, and [2] that [there is a substantial basis to 
believe that the CSLI being] sought will produce evidence of 
such offense or will aid in the apprehension of a person who the 
applicant has probable cause to believe has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit such offense.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 870 (2015), quoting Augustine I, 
467 Mass. at 256.  See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 
387 (2018).  See also Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521 
(2017). 
 
We review the affidavit de novo to determine if it 
"satisfies the probable cause standard."  Robertson, 480 Mass. 
at 386.  Ordinarily, we look to the "four corners of the 
affidavit to determine whether . . . [the] application 
establishes probable cause" (quotation omitted).  Estabrook, 472 
                                                 
which a defendant's conviction is not final, that is, to cases 
pending on direct review in which the issue concerning the 
warrant requirement was raised"). 
11 
 
 
Mass. at 866.  The affidavit is to be evaluated "as a whole and 
in a commonsense and realistic fashion," and not "parsed, 
severed, and subjected to hypercritical analysis" (citations 
omitted).  Robertson, supra.  "[I]nferences drawn from the 
affidavit need only be reasonable, not required" (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 455 
(2015) (Augustine II).  "[N]o showing that the inferences are 
correct or more likely true than not true is required."  
Robertson, supra at 387. 
 
The affidavit accompanying the Commonwealth's § 2703 
application in this case included the following information.  
Boston police officers responded to a report of a gunshot victim 
in Roxbury on December 16, 2010.  Upon arriving at the crime 
scene, police found the victim lying on the ground and suffering 
from multiple gunshot wounds.  The victim was later pronounced 
dead at a local hospital.  Four .45 caliber shell casings were 
found at the scene, and several witnesses described the shooter 
as a black Hispanic male with curly hair and a thin beard, who 
was wearing a puffy black jacket with a fur collar.  Witnesses 
also reported seeing the shooter throw an object into a nearby 
Dumpster.  Police thereafter recovered from the Dumpster a .45 
caliber firearm that was still warm, indicating to police that 
it had recently been fired.  Acting on information from 
witnesses who described the route the suspect took following the 
12 
 
 
shooting, police reviewed footage from surveillance cameras, 
located in the surrounding neighborhood, that had captured 
images of a black or black Hispanic male in a puffy black jacket 
with a fur collar walking down the street.  On February 25, 
2011, after police released this surveillance footage to the 
public, the defendant's brother telephoned police and stated 
that, based on his independent review of the surveillance 
footage, he believed that the man in the footage wearing the 
puffy black jacket with a fur collar was the defendant.  The 
defendant's brother also stated that the defendant tended to 
"hang[] out around" the area in the vicinity of the street on 
which the victim lived.  Additionally, the defendant's brother 
told police that he did not know his brother's whereabouts, as 
he had not seen the defendant in several months and his family 
could not get in touch with him.  Finally, the defendant's 
brother provided police with a telephone number for a cell phone 
that he understood to belong to the defendant.  The defendant's 
association with the cell phone's number was subsequently 
corroborated by the defendant's former girlfriend. 
 
The defendant argues that the foregoing information was 
insufficient to satisfy the requisite probable cause standard.  
We disagree.  As to the first requirement, based on the facts 
discussed supra, there is no question that the affidavit 
demonstrated probable cause to believe that "a particularly 
13 
 
 
described offense ha[d] been . . . committed," and that the 
defendant had committed the offense.  Augustine II, 472 Mass. at 
453, quoting Augustine I, 467 Mass. 256.  Cf. Robertson, 480 
Mass. at 387 (probable cause to believe particular offense 
occurred where police found victim suffering from gunshot wound 
and percipient witnesses gave accounts of shooting to police). 
 
Whether the affidavit satisfied the second requirement, 
that there be a substantial basis to believe that the sought-
after CSLI "will produce evidence of such offense or will aid in 
the apprehension of a person who the applicant has probable 
cause to believe has committed . . . such offense," is a closer 
question.  Augustine II, 472 Mass. at 453, quoting Augustine I, 
467 Mass. 256.  See Robertson, 480 Mass. at 387; Holley, 478 
Mass. at 521.  The defendant argues that the affidavit fails to 
satisfy this requirement (i) because it did not establish the 
requisite nexus between the sought-after evidence and the 
crimes, and (ii) because its request for CSLI was 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  We address each argument in turn. 
 
a.  Nexus.  The defendant first argues that the affidavit 
categorically failed to establish the requisite nexus "between 
the crime[s] alleged and the article to be search or seized" 
(quotation and citation omitted), White, 475 Mass. at 588, 
because there was no assertion in the affidavit that the 
defendant actually used or possessed his cell phone during the 
14 
 
 
commission of the crimes.  We disagree, as neither this court 
nor the United States Supreme Court has required such a showing 
to satisfy the nexus requirement where the sought-after evidence 
is CSLI.  See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221; Estabrook, 
472 Mass. at 870; Augustine II, 472 Mass. at 453. 
 
The affidavit in support of a search warrant application 
must demonstrate a nexus between "the crime [for which there is 
probable cause to search] and the items sought, and the location 
to be searched."  Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 102 
(2018).  See Holley, 478 Mass. at 521.  The nexus "need not be 
based on direct observation" and it "may be found in the type of 
crime, the nature of the [evidence] sought, and normal 
inferences as to where such evidence may be found" (emphasis 
added; quotation omitted).  White, 475 Mass. at 589.  To 
establish the requisite nexus, the affidavit must demonstrate a 
substantial basis to conclude that "the items sought are related 
to the criminal activity under investigation, and that they 
reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched at the time the search warrant issues" (citation 
omitted).  Alexis, supra.  See Holley, supra; Augustine II, 472 
Mass. at 455. 
 
In the context of historical CSLI, the sought-after 
evidence is the location of the cell phone itself, not what 
information may be found in the cell phone's contents.  That 
15 
 
 
location can also be reasonably expected to be the location of 
the person possessing the cell phone.  We have repeatedly 
recognized that cell phones have become "an indispensable part 
of daily life and exist as almost permanent attachments to 
[their users'] bodies" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 45 (2019), quoting Augustine I, 467 Mass. 
at 245-246.  "Cell phones 'physically accompany their users 
everywhere' such that tracking a cell phone results in 'near 
perfect surveillance' of its user."  Almonor, supra, quoting 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; Augustine I, supra at 246.  
Accordingly, in light of the inseparability of person from cell 
phone, an affidavit establishing that a suspect committed a 
crime and that the suspect was known to own or use a particular 
cell phone, along with the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, demonstrates a substantial basis to believe that the 
CSLI from that cell phone was "related to the criminal activity 
under investigation, and that [the CSLI] reasonably may be 
expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time 
the search warrant issues" (citation omitted).  Alexis, 481 
Mass. at 102.  More precisely, the location of a suspect's cell 
phone at the time of the criminal activity provides evidence 
directly related to his or her participation, or lack thereof, 
in the criminal activity, and the location of the cell phone at 
16 
 
 
that time can reasonably be expected to be found in the CSLI 
records requested. 
 
Consequently, there is a sufficient nexus between the 
criminal activity for which probable cause has been established 
and the physical location of the cell phone recorded by the CSLI 
of the person the applicant has probable cause to believe has 
committed the offense, at least for the time and place of the 
criminal activity.  A direct observation of a suspect's actual 
use of the cell phone during the commission of the crime is thus 
not required to establish the requisite nexus between the crime 
and CSLI.11  See Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 870 (no mention of 
                                                 
 
11 Indeed, a request for CSLI without a direct observation 
of a suspect's use of the cell phone during the commission of 
the crime does not raise the same nexus concerns raised in other 
contexts.  For example, in Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 
591-592 (2016), we held that when police seek access to the 
contents of a cell phone, it is not enough for the averring 
officer to state that "given the type of crime under 
investigation, the [cell phone] likely would contain evidence" 
of the crime.  Rather, we held that "even where there is 
probable cause to suspect the defendant of a crime, police may 
not seize or search his or her [cell phone] to look for evidence 
unless they have information establishing the existence of 
particularized evidence likely to be found there."  Id. at 590-
591.  Critical to our decision, however, was that the search 
that law enforcement seeks to conduct is of a "computer-like" 
device.  Id. at 589.  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 
524 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 502 
(2016) ("We have cautioned that 'given the properties that 
render [a modern cell phone] distinct from the closed containers 
regularly seen in the physical world, a search of its many files 
must be done with special care and satisfy a more narrow and 
demanding standard'").  In these circumstances, without a 
particularized showing of facts demonstrating that the device 
17 
 
 
defendant's cell phone use in affidavit, but concluding 
affidavit established probable cause that CSLI would produce 
evidence of crime by indicating "whether [defendant's cell 
phone] . . . was located near the victim's home on the night of 
the shooting and, therefore, whether [defendant] was in the area 
of the shooting when it occurred").  See also United States v. 
Hunt, 718 Fed. Appx. 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2017) (probable cause 
and requisite nexus for CSLI where affidavit demonstrated that 
location of defendant's cell phone would corroborate informant's 
assertions that defendant owned cell phone and frequently 
traveled to Chicago to purchase drugs); United States v. Gibbs, 
547 Fed. Appx. 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 573 U.S. 949 (2014) (probable cause established where 
affidavit established existence of criminal activity, link 
between person whose cell phone was to be tracked and that 
criminal activity, and whether location information would likely 
reveal evidence of crime); United States vs. Christian, U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 1:16-cr-207 (LMB) (E.D. Va. May 24, 2017), aff'd, 
737 Fed. Appx. 165 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 1204 (2019) (no requirement that affidavit 
                                                 
contains evidence of a crime, law enforcement would be permitted 
to review vast amounts of sensitive and private data without 
establishing the necessary nexus between the cell phone and the 
crime.  White, supra at 589-592.  These same concerns are not 
present in the context of CSLI, where the cell phone's location, 
and not its contents, is sought. 
18 
 
 
demonstrate cell phone itself was used to conduct criminal 
activity because, "[i]n the context of a [cell phone location] 
warrant, the place to be searched is the subject [cell] phone, 
and the item to be seized is location data.  Therefore, the 
nexus requirement is satisfied by an inference that the subject 
[cell] phone will be a source of location information regarding 
criminal activity").  See generally Alexis, 481 Mass. at 102 
("There must be probable cause to conclude not only that an 
individual committed a crime, but also that there is a nexus 
between the crime and the items sought, and the location to be 
searched"). 
 
In the instant case, the affidavit demonstrated probable 
cause that the defendant committed the killing, and also 
established that he possessed a cell phone.  After the footage 
of the suspect was released to the public, a man called police 
and positively identified the suspect in the footage as being 
his brother, the defendant.  The defendant's brother also gave 
police a telephone number that he claimed was the telephone 
number for the defendant's cell phone.  The defendant's 
association with the telephone number was thereafter 
corroborated by the defendant's former girlfriend.  These facts 
demonstrated the requisite nexus between the CSLI and the 
killing.  Cf. Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 870. 
19 
 
 
b.  Overbreadth.  The defendant next argues that the 
application's request for three and one-half months of 
historical CSLI was unconstitutionally overbroad because the 
affidavit did not establish probable cause for the entire amount 
of data.12  In effect, the defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's affidavit failed to furnish the requisite nexus 
between the full three and one-half months of CSLI and the 
crimes that occurred.  Accordingly, he argues, the search was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. 
Such an extended collection of CSLI, both before and after 
the killing, raises significant constitutional questions.  See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (noting that review of extended 
amounts of CSLI can "provide[] an intimate window into a 
person's life, revealing not only his [or her] particular 
movements, but through them his [or her] familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations" [quotation and 
citation omitted]); Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 248-249.  Indeed, 
the sensitive and private nature of this type of data is 
                                                 
12 The Commonwealth argues, and the motion judge concluded, 
that in light of the evidence of the defendant's involvement in 
the crimes, as well as his having escaped apprehension and his 
itinerancy in the months following the shooting, the affidavit 
demonstrated probable cause that the full three and one-half 
months of CSLI "[would] aid in the apprehension of a person who 
the applicant has probable cause to believe has committed . . . 
such offense" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 453 (2015). 
20 
 
 
precisely why both this court and the United States Supreme 
Court have held that the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 require a 
warrant based on probable cause before this data may be obtained 
by the government.  See Carpenter, supra; Augustine I, supra.  
We recognize, however, that defining the permissible parameters 
of time for CSLI searches that are justified by probable cause 
is difficult.  This is a "fact-intensive inquiry, and must be 
resolved based on the particular facts of each case."  Holley, 
478 Mass. at 522, quoting Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 
426 (2017). 
The affidavit in this case clearly demonstrated a 
substantial basis to believe that historical CSLI from the 
defendant's cell phone would provide relevant evidence related 
to the crimes and his flight from the crime scene.  The 
affidavit therefore established, at a minimum, the requisite 
nexus for the CSLI for the date of the killing, December 16, 
2010.  As we have noted, however, the Commonwealth sought CSLI 
for a far greater period of time than the day of the killing; 
they sought and received three and one-half months of CSLI.  
This extended request was in part the result of the failure to 
identify the defendant as a suspect for nearly two and one-half 
months, and the absence of any evidence of his current location 
once he was identified as a suspect.  Although the delay in 
identifying the defendant as a suspect and the difficulty in 
21 
 
 
apprehending him made it difficult to define the permissible 
scope of the CSLI request, we assume, without deciding, that at 
least some of this three and one-half month period of time was 
unnecessary to either the investigation or apprehension of the 
defendant. 
The question then presented is what a court should suppress 
when the requisite nexus exists for historical CSLI spanning a 
shorter period of time than that authorized by the search 
warrant -- or in this case, the § 2703 order.  More 
specifically, does either the Fourth Amendment or art. 14 
require total suppression of the entire amount of CSLI 
collected, or is the proper remedy to suppress only the CSLI for 
which there is not the requisite nexus to the crime?  Given the 
uncertainty in the case law regarding overbroad requests for 
CSLI, and the limited briefing before the court on the issue 
presented, we proceed cautiously on this issue.  We conclude 
that, in these circumstances, where the requisite nexus for 
probable cause clearly exists for a reasonable period of time 
encompassing the commission of and flight from the crime, as 
well as the defendant's immediate apprehension,13 the CSLI for 
                                                 
 
13 We once again emphasize the significant constitutional 
issues raised by the collection of extended amounts of 
historical CSLI, and the importance of limiting the requests 
accordingly.  See Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 248-249.  As we have 
noted, law enforcement may have other available alternatives to 
22 
 
 
this period of time need not be suppressed so long as the CSLI 
for which there is not the requisite nexus to the crime is not 
relied on or otherwise exploited by the Commonwealth at trial. 
Our decision in Holley is instructive in this regard.  
There, the defendant challenged a search warrant authorizing the 
search of a cell phone for seventeen days' worth of broad 
categories of electronic records, including text messages.  
Holley, 478 Mass. at 524.  At trial, however, the Commonwealth 
only introduced two days' worth of text messages, which had been 
redacted such that only text messages relevant to the crimes 
were put before the jury.  Id. at 525.  Having already concluded 
that the requisite nexus existed between the text messages and 
the crimes, id. at 522-524, and that therefore the Commonwealth 
had probable cause to search the text messages, we held that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the broad scope of the warrant, 
as the text messages were "sufficiently limited in content and 
scope such that the Commonwealth did not capitalize on the lack 
of particularity in the warrant."  Id. at 525. 
The case here is analogous to Holley.  Although the § 2703 
order in this case should have been much more limited in its 
scope based on facts set forth in the affidavit, the trial 
                                                 
aid in the apprehension of suspects, such as a warrant for the 
real-time location data of the suspect's cell phone.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35 (2019). 
23 
 
 
record reveals that the only CSLI that was meaningfully used and 
relied on by the Commonwealth at trial was from the date of the 
killing.14  To that end, maps showing the approximate locations 
of the defendant's cell phone on December 16, 2010, were 
introduced in evidence and were the subject of the testimony 
from several witnesses.  Additionally, references to CSLI during 
the Commonwealth's opening statement and closing argument were 
limited to CSLI from the date of the killing.  As in Holley, 478 
Mass. at 525, on this record, the CSLI relied on at trial was 
limited in content and scope such that the Commonwealth did not 
capitalize on the overbreadth of the § 2703 order.  The 
defendant therefore suffered no prejudice from the broad scope 
of the warrant.15  See id.  See also United States v. Abboud, 438 
                                                 
14 Although CSLI and other cell phone information from the 
arguably overbroad aspects of the § 2703 order were introduced 
in evidence at various other points at trial, this evidence was 
never discussed by the witnesses or relied on by the 
Commonwealth.  Indeed, this evidence was not incriminating, and 
the defendant has not identified how its admission prejudiced 
him in any way.  There was also ample other evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, including the eyewitness testimony, the 
surveillance recording, and the identifications by his brother 
and his friend's wife.  The improperly admitted evidence 
therefore had no effect on the jury or their findings.  
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the admission of this 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
15 We note that our approach here is also consistent with 
the principles underlying the severance doctrine, a remedy which 
has traditionally been applied when a "search warrant is issued 
to search a certain place for several items, but is later 
determined that some but not all of those items are described 
24 
 
 
F.3d 554, 576 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 976 (2006) 
(where probable cause existed only for defendant's business 
                                                 
with sufficient particularity, or that probable cause had been 
established as to some but not all of the items described."  2 
W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(f), at 814 (5th ed. 2012).  
In these circumstances, we have held that "the infirmity of part 
of a warrant requires the suppression of evidence seized 
pursuant to that part of the warrant . . . but does not require 
the suppression of anything described in the valid portions of 
the warrant."  Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141, 144–145 
(1984).  See Aday v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 55 Cal. 
2d 789, 796-799 (1961) (seminal decision on severance).  We 
have, in this context, been "persuaded that 'it would be harsh 
medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause 
and which did particularly describe certain items were to be 
invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and magistrate 
erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as 
well.'"  Lett, supra at 145, quoting 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.6(f), at 111–112 (1978 & Supp. 1984). 
 
 
In determining whether the severance doctrine applies, 
courts have been careful to consider whether total suppression 
of the evidence seized as a result of the search would 
effectuate the purposes of the exclusionary rule.  Lett, 393 
Mass. at 145.  See United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 735 (5th 
Cir. 1981).  These purposes include "the deterrence of unlawful 
police conduct, the dissociation of the courts from such 
misconduct, and the preclusion of the benefit to the prosecution 
from unconstitutional police activity."  Lett, supra.  See 
United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 757 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Cook, supra.  "Where none of these purposes will be served, 
rigid adherence to the exclusionary rule only can frustrate the 
public interest in admitting the evidence obtained."  Lett, 
supra.  See United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 636 (8th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984) ("In deciding 
whether particular evidence should be suppressed in any given 
case, then, courts properly weigh the deterrent effect of the 
suppression against its societal costs").  In these 
circumstances, severance and partial, rather than total, 
suppression can "effect[] a pragmatic balance" between the "cost 
to society of excluding probative evidence" and the deterrent 
effect of suppression.  Lett, supra.  See Christine, supra at 
758. 
25 
 
 
records covering three-month period in 1999, no prejudice 
suffered from overbroad search warrant authorizing search of 
records from January 1996 through May 2002 because records from 
overbroad portion of warrant were not relied on by government at 
trial). 
In sum, we conclude as a matter of law that the requisite 
nexus for probable cause existed to support the collection and 
review of CSLI from the defendant's cell phone for a reasonable 
period of time encompassing the commission of, and flight from, 
the killing in this case.  The search of and use of this CSLI 
evidence was thus justified and separable from the overbroad 
portions of the CSLI authorized by the § 2703 order for which 
there was no nexus articulated by the Commonwealth between the 
CSLI and the crimes, as there was no attempt to exploit the 
overbroad portions of the CSLI evidence at trial.  Cf. Holley, 
478 Mass. at 525.  We therefore cannot say that the motion judge 
erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the CSLI in 
this case. 
 
We turn now to the alleged errors at trial. 
 
2.  Admission of detective's testimony.  Shortly before 
trial, the Commonwealth disclosed its intention to admit prison 
surveillance video footage (prison video) that had recently been 
captured and that purported to show that the defendant had a 
distinctive gait while he was incarcerated.  The Commonwealth 
26 
 
 
offered that this evidence would allow the jurors to compare the 
defendant's gait with the gait of the suspect in the 
surveillance video footage from the day of the shooting that 
would be admitted in evidence.  The defense objected, arguing 
that the new evidence was not timely disclosed to the defense 
and that the prejudicial effect of admitting video footage of 
the defendant in a prison setting years after the shooting in 
this case substantially outweighed its probative value.  The 
trial judge agreed with the defense as to the latter argument, 
and precluded the Commonwealth from admitting the prison video.  
The trial judge did, however, permit the lead detective in the 
case to testify about his observations of the defendant's gait 
in the prison video without making reference to the fact that 
the video footage he reviewed was of the defendant in prison.  
Further, the trial judge did not allow the detective to opine as 
to whether he believed the defendant was the same man as the 
suspect in the surveillance footage. 
 
At trial, the detective provided the following description 
of the defendant's gait as seen in the prison video: 
"[The defendant] had a distinctive walk. It appeared that 
he had a limp with his left leg going out to the side a 
little bit.  Again, not again, he was clearly pigeon-toed 
to me with his left leg pointing inward.  He seemed to have 
something with his right foot where it appeared at times 
that he was walking on the inside of his foot, pointing 
[his] right foot outwards." 
 
27 
 
 
Following this testimony, the Commonwealth asked the detective 
to describe the gait of the suspect in the surveillance footage 
from the day of the shooting.  He described the suspect's gait 
as follows: 
"I observed what I believe to be a limp with his left leg 
coming out a little bit.  I believe I observed that [the 
suspect] appears to be pigeon-toed with his left foot 
pointing inwards, and I also observed what I believe to be, 
it appears as [if] he's walking on the inside of his foot 
pointing his right foot outwards." 
 
The detective went on to comment on the appearance of the 
suspect in the video recording, describing that he observed that 
the suspect was wearing "dark-colored jeans, a black coat with a 
fur collar," along with "black sneakers, which appeared to have 
some red on them, and he appeared to be wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt with perhaps white stripes or white designs on the 
hood of the sweatshirt."  This testimony concluded without the 
detective ever offering an opinion as to whether he thought the 
defendant was the suspect in the surveillance video footage. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge abused 
her discretion in admitting this testimony and that this error 
warrants a reversal of his convictions.  We disagree. 
 
First, the defendant argues that the detective's testimony 
describing his observations about the defendant's gait as seen 
in the prison video was error because the Commonwealth did not 
timely disclose its intention to admit this evidence at trial.  
28 
 
 
We discern no error.  A trial judge "possesse[s] considerable 
discretion in dealing with the problem created by the 
prosecution's late disclosure" of evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Hamilton, 426 Mass. 67, 70 (1997).  When the ground for the 
exclusion of evidence involves late disclosure by the 
prosecution, "without any showing of bad faith on [the 
prosecution's] part . . . a defendant is required to show 
material prejudice from the disclosure before a new trial can be 
considered."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 
432 (2015).  The defendant has demonstrated neither that the 
Commonwealth acted in bad faith nor that he was materially 
prejudiced by the late disclosure of this evidence.  The prison 
video was turned over to the defense on May 23, 2015, but the 
detective did not testify until more than two weeks later on 
June 10, 2015.  As the trial judge noted, defense counsel had a 
full and fair opportunity to consult with his expert and to 
prepare to cross-examine the Commonwealth's witness on this 
issue.  The trial judge therefore did not abuse her discretion 
in allowing the detective to testify on this basis. 
 
Next, the defendant argues that even if this evidence was 
timely, the detective's testimony was improper because he 
effectively identified the defendant as the suspect in the 
surveillance footage.  Because the defendant did not object to 
the testimony on these grounds at trial, we review any error for 
29 
 
 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 Mass. 562, 568 (2018) (where 
"grounds for objection" made at trial differ from those raised 
on appeal, "the standard of review that applies to [the] claim 
is whether there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice").  Where the jury are capable of "viewing [a] 
videotape and drawing their own conclusions regarding whether 
the [individual] in the videotape was the defendant," opinion 
testimony from a police officer as to the identity of the 
individual in the recording is ordinarily not admissible.  
Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 366 (1995).  See 
Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429-430 (2019) (noting that 
"testimony of a police officer, with its possibly greater 
imprint of authority as to identification of a defendant . . . 
is not permissible absent some compelling reason that the police 
officer is in a better position than the jury to identify the 
defendant").  See also Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 
454, 476 (2019).  Here, however, although the detective 
described the defendant's gait and the gait of the suspect in 
the surveillance video recording in nearly identical terms, he 
did not directly offer his opinion as to whether he believed 
that the two gaits were similar or that he believed the 
defendant was the suspect in the surveillance video footage.  
Rather, the officer merely described his observations of the 
30 
 
 
defendant's gait in both of the video recordings he observed.  
The jury were free to determine whether they believed the 
detective's description of the defendant's gait was similar to 
the gait of the suspect in the surveillance video footage -- a 
video recording that they had the repeated opportunity to see.  
There was no identification made by the detective, and there was 
therefore no error.16 
 
Finally, the defendant argues that notwithstanding the 
detective's description of the defendant's gait in the prison 
video, his description of the gait and the appearance of the 
suspect in the surveillance video footage from the day of the 
shooting improperly invaded the province of the jury to draw 
their own conclusions as to the suspect's appearance and gait.  
This is a closer question, as the officer could have been 
limited to describing the defendant's gait in the prison video 
and the jury left to make its own comparison.  Because the 
defendant did not object to this specific testimony, we review 
any error to determine whether it created a substantial 
                                                 
 
16 Even were we to assume that this testimony amounted to 
impermissible lay opinion as to the identity of the suspect in 
the surveillance footage, the error did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as it was cumulative of 
other identifications made by his brother and Robinson.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429-430 (2019) (no 
prejudicial error where police officer's opinion that defendant 
was suspect in surveillance video recording was cumulative of 
other identification evidence properly admitted); Commonwealth 
v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441-442 (2014). 
31 
 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Barry, 
481 Mass. 388, 407 (2019). 
 
Even if it was error to admit this testimony, it is clear 
that it did not likely influence the jury's conclusion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 586 (2016) (no substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice where erroneously admitted 
evidence did not likely influence jury's conclusion).  The 
amount of evidence regarding the appearance of the suspect in 
the surveillance video footage was substantial.  In addition to 
the fact that the jury were able to view the footage themselves, 
several witnesses from the scene of the shooting testified that 
the suspect was wearing a large black coat with a fur collar, 
dark jeans, and dark shoes.  Several others also testified that 
the suspect walked with what appeared to be a limp.  
Additionally, each of the witnesses who was shown the 
surveillance video recording of the suspect identified the 
suspect in the recording as the man they had seen at the crime 
scene.  The detective's testimony describing the gait and 
appearance of the suspect in the surveillance video footage was 
therefore cumulative of other evidence at trial.  We are 
satisfied that his testimony did not likely influence the jury, 
32 
 
 
and therefore did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.17 
 
3.  Right to confront witnesses.  During the detective's 
testimony, the Commonwealth introduced call logs listing 
telephone numbers with which the defendant's cell phone had 
connected with at various times.  The Commonwealth questioned 
the detective about a particular telephone number with which the 
defendant's cell phone had connected several times on the date 
of the killing.  In the course of the questioning, the detective 
testified that this telephone number belonged to Swain-Price.  
Earlier trial testimony showed that Swain-Price and the 
defendant were friends, and that the defendant had been living 
with Swain-Price at or around the time of the shooting.  
Although the detective testified that the number belonged to 
Swain-Price, no evidence was offered demonstrating how he had 
learned this information.  At sidebar, the Commonwealth 
disclosed that Swain-Price himself had told the detective that 
                                                 
17 In his motion for a new trial, the defendant also argues 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the introduction of this evidence on this basis.  As explained 
supra, even assuming error, the admission of this evidence did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object 
to this testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 
326, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 (2015) (claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel reviewed to determine whether there 
"exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice"). 
33 
 
 
it was his telephone number during a police interview.  Swain-
Price did not testify at trial. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that because the 
detective's knowledge of Swain-Price's connection to the 
telephone number was based on testimonial hearsay and because 
Swain-Price did not testify, the admission of this testimony 
violated the defendant's confrontational rights under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The Commonwealth concedes 
that the admission of this testimony was error, and we agree.  
Defense counsel objected to this testimony, although not on the 
constitutional grounds argued before us on appeal.  We therefore 
review to determine whether its admission constituted 
prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 
579 (2018); Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 720 (2016). 
 
Although the admission of this testimony was error, we 
conclude that it was not prejudicial, because there is no doubt 
that it "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 
589, 591 (2005).  Indeed, the defendant has not identified, and 
we cannot find, how the introduction of this testimony 
prejudiced him in any way.  The defendant asserts that this 
evidence provided a critical link between the defendant and the 
murder weapon because there was testimony that Swain-Price owned 
34 
 
 
a .45 caliber handgun that looked similar to the murder weapon.  
We are not persuaded that a call log purporting to show that the 
defendant called Swain-Price on the date of the killing linked 
the defendant to the murder weapon.  At most, the call log 
established that the defendant knew Swain-Price.  This fact, 
however, had already been established by other evidence at 
trial, including the fact that the defendant lived with Swain-
Price for a period of time.  We are therefore confident that 
that evidence had no influence on the jury.  Cruz, supra. 
 
4.  Hearsay testimony of defendant's sister.  One of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, Robinson, testified to a conversation 
between the defendant and Swain-Price that she overheard on the 
day the police released surveillance footage of the shooting 
suspect to the public.  Specifically, Robinson testified that 
she heard the defendant tell her husband that the defendant's 
sister, Nicole, had called him earlier that day and told him 
that she had "seen him on [television]."  Defense counsel lodged 
an objection to this testimony, arguing that it was 
impermissible hearsay.  In response, the trial judge prohibited 
the prosecutor from inquiring further on Nicole's identification 
of the defendant and then instructed the jury on the general 
definition and parameters of hearsay.  The judge did not, 
however, explicitly strike the testimony or give a limiting 
instruction. 
35 
 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that Robinson's testimony 
amounted to reversible error due to its potential prejudice.  As 
defense counsel objected to this testimony, we review for 
prejudicial error.  See Imbert, 479 Mass. at 579. 
 
The testimony at issue contained hearsay within hearsay -- 
or, "totem pole" hearsay.  The first layer of hearsay was the 
defendant's out-of-court statement to Swain-Price.  The second 
layer of hearsay was Nicole's out-of-court statement to the 
defendant.  Totem pole hearsay is admissible only if each of the 
multiple hearsay statements falls within an exception to the 
hearsay rule.  Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 623 
(2017).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 805 (2019) ("Hearsay within 
hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part 
of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the 
rule . . ."). 
 
The defendant's out-of-court statement to Swain-Price was 
clearly admissible as a statement of a party opponent.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 278 (2018); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(a) (statement not hearsay where "statement is 
offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the 
party").  Nicole's out-of-court statement to the defendant that 
she had seen him on television, however, was, if offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted, hearsay that does not fit within 
36 
 
 
any recognized exception.18  The Commonwealth argues that 
Nicole's statement and the defendant's response fit within the 
adoptive admission exception to the rule against hearsay.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(B).  We disagree.  An adoptive 
admission by silence can be imputed to a defendant only where it 
is "apparent that the [defendant] has heard and understood the 
statement, that he [or she] had an opportunity to respond, and 
that the context was one in which he [or she] would have been 
expected to respond to an accusation."  Commonwealth v. 
Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 719 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 
(1994).  See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 658 
(2019).  The Commonwealth argues that the exception applies here 
because after the defendant's sister told him she had seen him 
on television, "he did not deny that he was involved with the 
murder."  It was not "apparent" from the challenged testimony, 
however, that the defendant responded to his sister's statement 
with silence.  Indeed, there was no testimony at all about what, 
                                                 
 
18 Although the Commonwealth arguably had the opportunity to 
admit Nicole's statement as a prior out-of-court identification, 
see Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C) (2019), it chose not to call 
her as a witness in its case-in-chief.  Instead, the 
Commonwealth sought to circumvent the need for her direct 
testimony by admitting her prior identification through a third 
party without making her available for cross-examination.  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 130 (2012) ("A witness's 
pretrial identification is admissible for substantive purposes, 
even in the absence of an in-court identification, provided the 
identifying witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-
examination"). 
37 
 
 
if any, response the defendant gave, as the trial judge ended 
the line of questioning as soon as Robinson testified regarding 
the statement.  The Commonwealth has therefore failed to show 
that the defendant either understood the statement or had an 
opportunity to respond.  Accordingly, this exchange does not fit 
within the adoptive admission exception to the rule against 
hearsay.  See Olszewski, supra.  See also DePina, 476 Mass. at 
624 ("We have cautioned . . . against the use of adoptive 
admissions by silence . . .").  Its admission thus constituted 
an error.  We conclude, however, that the error was harmless, as 
it did not influence the jury in any way.  Cruz, 445 Mass. at 
591. 
 
Although Nicole's statement that she had seen the defendant 
on television was admitted in error, the testimony was 
cumulative of other evidence at trial and was therefore 
harmless.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 191, cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 923 and 540 U.S. 973 (2003) (no prejudice where 
hearsay involving prior identification evidence was cumulative 
of other properly admitted evidence).  The evidence showed that 
both Robinson and the defendant's brother, Michael -- both of 
whom knew the defendant well -- also stated that they had seen 
him on television in the surveillance footage that was released 
to the public.  Although Michael recanted this identification on 
direct examination at trial, the Commonwealth introduced 
38 
 
 
evidence that he had identified the defendant as the suspect in 
the surveillance video footage several times, including in a 
telephone call to police soon after the footage had been 
released, again several months later during an in-person 
interview with police, and again under oath before a grand jury.  
Moreover, the trial judge terminated the Commonwealth's line of 
questioning on Nicole's purported identification immediately 
after it was referenced, and the Commonwealth refrained from 
mentioning it at any other point during the trial.  We therefore 
find "with fair assurance" that the jury in this case were "not 
substantially swayed by the error" (citation omitted).  Cruz, 
445 Mass. at 591.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 471 
(2014); Evans, supra. 
 
5.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  Near the end of trial, the 
defense discussed with its expert witness a photograph of the 
defendant that was taken during his booking.  While cross-
examining the expert, the prosecutor characterized the 
photograph as a "booking photo."  The defendant did not object 
to this statement at trial, but the trial judge nevertheless 
immediately instructed the prosecutor to avoid characterizing 
the photograph as a "booking photo" in the future.  The 
defendant argues that this characterization amounted to 
prosecutorial misconduct and therefore constituted an error.  
Because the defense did not object to this statement when it was 
39 
 
 
made, we review any error to determine if it gave rise to a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  DePina, 476 
Mass. at 624-625. 
 
The defendant does not argue that this alleged error, 
standing alone, warrants reversal.  He only argues that it 
should be considered in his final argument that reversal is 
required due to cumulative error.  Even assuming, without 
deciding, that the prosecutor's characterization of the 
photograph constituted error, such an error certainly did not 
give rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice in this case.  The photograph was labeled "booking 
photo" by the defense expert and was seen by the jury.  Although 
the parties agreed to redact the reference to "booking" from the 
photograph before the case was submitted to the jury, the jury 
were well aware that the photograph purportedly had been taken 
at the defendant's booking.  The prosecutor's characterization 
of the photograph therefore likely did not influence the jury's 
conclusion. 
 
6.  Cumulative error and G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that even if no one specific error argued supra 
requires that he be granted a new trial, the combined effect of 
the mistakes was so prejudicial as to create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We disagree.  The 
cumulative error was no more prejudicial than the individual 
40 
 
 
errors, which, as explained supra, had minimal, if any, impact 
on the verdicts in this case.  See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 421 
Mass. 400, 410-414 (1995). 
 
Additionally, after a thorough review of the record, we 
find no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to grant a new trial or to either reduce or set aside the 
verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.