Case Title: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY v. LOWERY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98361

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY v. LOWERY  BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY v. LOWERY 2006 OK 31 136 P.3d 639 Case Number: 98361 Decided: 05/09/2006 (Companion with Case Numbers 98362; 98363; 98531) THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. EDWARD L. LOWERY and MARY L. LOWERY, Husband and Wife, Defendants/Appellants and RURAL WATER DISTRICT NO. 5, and THE MUSKOGEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. JACK E. WHITTEN and DORIS M. WHITTEN, Husband and Wife, Defendants/Appellants and RURAL WATER DISTRICT NO. 5, and THE MUSKOGEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. RICHARD HYSLOPE Defendant/Appellant and THE FARM CREDIT BANK OF WICHITA RURAL WATER DISTRICT NO. 5, and THE MUSKOGEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PAUL HOBBS and DIANN HOBBS, Husband and Wife, Defendants/Appellants and MARY MURL BARRETT, BANK OF CHEROKEE COUNTY, RURAL WATER DISTRICT NO. 5, and THE MUSKOGEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY HONORABLE MIKE NORMAN, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Muskogee County, through The Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County (hereinafter "The County"), brought condemnation proceedings against Defendant Landowners (hereinafter "Landowners") in the District Court of Muskogee County for the purpose of acquiring right-of-way easements for placement of three water pipelines, two of which would solely service Energetix, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Energetix") a private electric generation plant proposed for construction and operation in the county. Upon the condition precedent of success in attainment of that easement, Energetix was contractually obligated to construct the third pipeline on behalf of the Muskogee County Rural Water District No. 5, which would provide water service to rural residents of the county. Landowners filed an answer and counterclaim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, objecting to the unlawful and unconstitutional taking of Landowners' private property for the private use of Energetix in violation of Article 2, §§ 23 & 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The County argued the economic development of Muskogee County constituted a valid public purpose to support the County's exercise of eminent domain in accordance with the Oklahoma Constitution and THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT; APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL- RELATED ATTORNEYS' FEES IS GRANTED; APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL-RELATED COSTS IS GRANTED IN PART. C. Bart Fite of Wright, Stout, Fite & Wilburn, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee, County. Mark James Caywood of Mark James Caywood, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee, County. Harlan Hentges of Mulinix, Ogden, Hall, Andrews, & Ludlum, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants, Landowners. Stephen J. Scherer of Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants, Landowners Edward L. Lowery and Mary L. Lowery. Jo Nan Allen of Tahlequah, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants, Landowners Paul Hobbs and Diann Hobbs. Tina Jordan of Tahlequah, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants, Landowners Paul Hobbs and Diann Hobbs. Eric J. Groves of Groves & Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for The Institute for Justice, Amicus Curiae. Dana Berliner of The Institute for Justice, Washington, D.C., admitted pro hac vice, for The Institute for Justice, Amicus Curiae. Daniel P. Muino of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California, admitted pro hac vice, for The Institute for Justice, Amicus Curiae. Lavender, J. ¶1 The issues in the present cause are as follows: (1) whether the County's exercise of eminent domain in the instant cases is for public use in accordance with Article 2, § 23 and Article 2, § 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution and (2) whether the County's taking for purposes of economic development of Muskogee County constitutes "public purposes" within the meaning of I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Plaintiff/Appellee County initiated condemnation proceedings against Defendant/Landowners ¶3 Energetix proposed to build the third water pipeline (hereinafter "the Water District Pipeline") on behalf of the Rural Water District No. 5 (hereinafter "Water District") ¶4 Landowners filed an answer and counterclaim in each case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the County's proposed taking was an unlawful taking of private property for private use and private purpose of the private company, Energetix, in violation of ¶5 County filed a motion to strike Landowners' answer and counterclaim on the basis that Landowners failed to comply with the statutory procedure applicable to condemnation proceedings. The Report of Commissioners ¶6 The trial court ultimately agreed with the County and entered an Order confirming the takings in these cases. The trial court's order further provided the County properly exercised the power of eminent domain pursuant to ¶7 Landowners appealed, and the COCA reversed and remanded the trial court's determination with instructions to enter a judgment sustaining Landowners' Exceptions to the Commissioners' Report on the basis that the takings in the instant cases were unlawful in that they were for the direct benefit of a private company and not for "public purposes" as required for the County's exercise of condemnation pursuant to ¶8 County filed its Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the COCA incorrectly determined that the County's exercise of eminent domain for the purpose of economic development does not constitute "public purpose" under Art. 2, § 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Landowners' Answer to the Petition for Certiorari urged the correctness of the COCA opinion, noting the COCA reached its determination solely on statutory grounds. Upon Landowners' showing of good cause for the filing of additional briefs on certiorari, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on certiorari. II THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING The Oklahoma General Eminent Domain Statute and Constitutional Eminent Domain Provisions ¶9 The County sought to condemn Landowners' private property pursuant to its general eminent domain power granted by Any county, city, town, township, school district, or board of education, or any board or official having charge of cemeteries created and existing under the laws of this state, shall have power to condemn lands in like manner as railroad companies, for highways, rights-of-way, building sites, cemeteries, public parks and other public purposes. Id. No private property shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, or for drains and ditches across lands of others for agricultural, mining, or sanitary purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23. Our Constitution further generally provides "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 24. That constitutional provision additionally states "[in] all cases of condemnation of private property for public or private use, the determination of the character of the use shall be a judicial question." Id. The law is clear that "[p]rivate property may not be taken or damaged by the condemning agency unless the taking or damage is necessary for the accomplishment of a lawful public purpose." Luccock v. City of Norman, The Constitutional Limitations and the Framers' Intent ¶10 It is settled law that the constitutional eminent domain provisions "are not grants of power, but limitations placed upon the exercise of government power." City of Pryor Creek v. Pub. Serv. Co., "Public Purpose" in the Context of Eminent Domain ¶11 In determining whether economic development alone III AS A MATTER OF OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ALONE IS NOT A PUBLIC PURPOSE TO JUSTIFY THE EXERCISE OF COUNTY'S POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. ¶12 The County's primary argument is that the general eminent domain statute, ¶13 In arguing the term "public purposes" in § 5 includes the purpose of economic development of the community, the County urges our adoption of the more expansive definition of the term "public purpose" as provided in State ex. rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres, ¶14 We recognize the general rule that where legal relief is available on alternative, non-constitutional grounds, we avoid reaching a determination on the constitutional basis. See State ex. rel. Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Water Res. Bd., ¶15 Considering the fact that the proposed Eagle Pipeline would be solely dedicated to the purpose of serving a private entity to enable its construction and operation in energy production, it is clear that the County in this case urges a broad interpretation of "public purposes." While arguing the construction of the plant will serve a public purpose by significantly enhancing the economic development of Muskogee County through increased taxes, jobs and public and private investment, County urges our adoption of a rule, which has been applied in other jurisdictions that the exercise of eminent domain for purposes of economic development alone (in the absence of blight) satisfies the constitutional "public use" or "public purpose" requirement. ¶16 In Kelo, the city of New London, Connecticut, a city that had experienced "decades of economic decline," ¶17 The U.S. Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Kelo as follows: "[t]his Court's authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed condemnations are for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution." Id. Notably, the Court in Kelo additionally expressly provided as follows: We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many states already impose "public use" requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised. Id. ¶18 Contrary to the Connecticut statute applicable in Kelo, which expressly authorized eminent domain for the purpose of economic development, we note the absence of such express Oklahoma statutory authority for the exercise of eminent domain in furtherance of economic development in the absence of blight. The statute at issue in the instant cases is a general grant of power that permits condemnation "in like manner as railroad companies, for highways, rights-of-way, building sites, cemeteries, public parks and other public purposes." ¶19 To the extent that our determination may be interpreted as inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Kelo v. City of New London, today's pronouncement is reached on the basis of Oklahoma's own special constitutional eminent domain provisions, Art. 2, §§ 23 & 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which we conclude provide private property protection to Oklahoma citizens beyond that which is afforded them by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In other words, we determine that our state constitutional eminent domain provisions place more stringent limitation on governmental eminent domain power than the limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. IV LANDOWNERS' MOTION FOR APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ¶21 Landowners in each of the four instant cases seek an award of their appeal-related attorney fees and costs pursuant to Okla.Sup.Ct.R. 1.14(a) and (b), ¶22 The general rule is "[a]ppeal-related attorney fees are recoverable if statutory authority exists for their award in the trial court." Casey v. Casey, ¶23 Landowners' Motion for Appeal-Related Costs was "separately filed and labeled" and included an attached verification including taxable cost items ¶24 Landowners seek recovery of the $100.00 fee for designation of the record, which is a fee paid to the district court and is not recoverable in this court. See Spears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., V SUMMARY ¶25 Although we recognize the COCA correctly determined that economic development alone did not constitute "public purpose" within the meaning of ¶26 Upon certiorari previously granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT; APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEYS' FEES IS GRANTED; APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL-RELATED COSTS IS GRANTED IN PART. ¶27 LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, J.J., and CHAPEL, S.J. (sitting by designation in lieu of COLBERT, J.), concur. ¶28 TAYLOR, J., concurring in result. ¶29 WATT, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part. ¶30 WINCHESTER, V.C.J., and EDMONDSON, J., dissent. ¶31 COLBERT, J., disqualified. FOOT