Case Title: Luther Douglas v. State of Florida (Revised Opinion; and)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-318 
____________ 
 
LUTHER DOUGLAS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1725 
____________ 
 
LUTHER DOUGLAS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH S. TUCKER, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[January 5, 2012] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Luther Douglas, who was twenty-five years old at the time of the crime, was 
convicted of the 1999 sexual battery and first-degree murder of eighteen-year-old 
 
 
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Mary Ann Hobgood and sentenced to death.  On direct appeal, we affirmed his 
convictions and sentences.  See Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2004).  
Douglas now appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and simultaneously petitions 
this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const. 
The crux of Douglas’s instant appeal is that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in failing to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase, and more 
specifically, in failing to secure and present to the jury mental health mitigation 
that existed at the time of trial.  The postconviction court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on this claim, during which Douglas’s previously undiscovered school 
records and testimony from two mental health professionals were received into 
evidence.  The court subsequently denied relief.  After a thorough review of both 
the trial and postconviction records, we agree with Douglas that trial counsel’s 
performance in preparation for the penalty phase was deficient.  We nevertheless 
affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief because we conclude that Douglas 
did not demonstrate prejudice. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This Court summarized the pertinent facts underlying this crime on direct 
appeal as follows: 
 
 
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On the evening of December 25, 1999, Hobgood left her 
parents’ house in Jacksonville, Florida, with her friend, Misty Jones.  
Douglas, who was Jones’s boyfriend at the time and who had not 
previously met Hobgood, drove Jones to Hobgood’s house and drove 
away with both women in his vehicle.  The vehicle Douglas was 
driving that night was a red Ford Escort, which belonged to Jimela 
Dozier, the mother of one of Douglas’s children.  Jones later 
described the condition of the vehicle that night as dirty with trash 
inside and pollen and dirt on the exterior.  After leaving Hobgood’s, 
the three first stopped at a liquor store and bought a bottle of rum and 
soda, which Douglas and Hobgood drank.  They then went to several 
bars in the Jacksonville area.  Around midnight, Jones indicated that 
she was not feeling well and Douglas drove her home.  Douglas then 
left Jones’s house in the Escort with Hobgood. 
Approximately two hours later, Douglas arrived at the 
apartment where he was living and asked a teenage occupant to go 
with him to “take care of some business.”  When Douglas’s request 
was refused he left the apartment. 
Jones testified that Douglas called her in the early morning 
hours of December 26, first telling her that he had dropped Hobgood 
off at a bar and then stating that he had taken Hobgood home.  When 
Jones saw Douglas that morning she noticed scratch marks on his 
neck that had not been there the previous evening.  In Douglas’s 
presence, Jones called Hobgood’s home, and after speaking with 
Hobgood’s mother, learned that Hobgood had not returned home.  
When Hobgood’s sister called Jones sometime later that day, Jones 
told her that they had been out the night before with Timothy 
Hightower, Jones’s ex-boyfriend.  Jones testified that she lied to 
Hobgood’s sister because Douglas was with her and she figured that 
something was wrong. 
Jones then confronted Douglas regarding Hobgood’s 
whereabouts.  The two went for a drive in the red Escort, which Jones 
noticed was newly clean inside and out.  During the drive, Douglas 
admitted to Jones that he had beaten Hobgood and thrown her out of 
the car, leaving her for dead.  Jones recalled that when she asked 
Douglas if he beat Hobgood because “she didn’t have sex with black 
boys,” Douglas just smiled.  Douglas also told Jones that if she was 
questioned she should point the blame toward Hightower or she would 
end up like Hobgood.  When police officers questioned Jones later 
that night she told them the same story she relayed to Hobgood’s 
 
 
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sister—that she and Hobgood had gone out with Hightower.  Jones 
also gave a sworn statement to that effect.  Jones subsequently 
recanted those statements when the officers questioned her again in 
January 2000 and told her that they knew she had lied. 
On the afternoon of December 26, 1999, Hobgood’s body was 
found along a set of railroad tracks.  She was positioned on her back 
in a shrub line with her legs stretched out in front of her.  Hobgood’s 
body was nude from the waist down, except for her black socks.  Her 
knit top and black bra were torn and pushed up to her shoulders, 
exposing her breasts.  A few feet from Hobgood’s body, the police 
found a tire lug wrench, a rubber car part and a blood soaked maroon 
jacket.  The maroon jacket was later identified by Jones as the one 
worn by Douglas on December 25.  A Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office 
detective testified that the rubber car part looked identical to a part 
recovered from the red Ford Escort. 
Associate medical examiner Dr. Matthew Areford, who went to 
the scene on December 26 and performed the autopsy on Hobgood on 
December 27, noted that Hobgood had suffered extensive injury, 
particularly to her head.  Dr. Areford concluded that she died of blunt 
head trauma.  Dr. Areford testified that while Hobgood was alive she 
received at least ten separate blows to her face, seven blows to the 
back of her head and seven to ten blows to her hands and arms.  Her 
jaw and nose were broken, several of her teeth had been knocked out 
and her right shoulder was dislocated.  Dr. Areford indicated that 
these injuries could have been inflicted by another person’s fist or by 
a hard object such as the lug wrench found at the scene.  Several of 
the wounds on Hobgood’s arms and hands were consistent with 
defensive wounds. 
Although Dr. Areford could not determine the sequence of the 
injuries inflicted on Hobgood while she was alive, he opined that it 
was unlikely that Hobgood was struck from behind, fell to the ground 
and was hit a number of times while unconscious.  Dr. Areford 
explained that such a scenario was inconsistent with the defensive 
type injuries found on Hobgood’s hands and forearm as well as with 
the fact that there were injuries to all sides of her head, which 
indicated that she was rolling from side to side. 
The autopsy also disclosed extensive injuries to Hobgood’s 
body, in addition to those described above, which were inflicted after 
her death.  Dr. Areford testified that these injuries were consistent 
with her body having been run over by the undercarriage of a car. 
 
 
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During the autopsy, Dr. Areford collected a rape kit, which 
included a set of vaginal swabs.  Further analysis of the rape kit was 
conducted by David George, a serology analyst employed by the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE).  George testified 
that the vaginal swabs tested positive for the presence of semen. 
Subsequent DNA testing matched the semen collected from 
Hobgood to Douglas. . . . 
. . . . 
While in jail awaiting trial, Douglas talked to fellow inmate 
Thomas Brown about Hobgood’s murder.  During their first 
conversation about the murder, Douglas told Brown that he was 
charged with the murder of a girl and that he had run over her with a 
car because she would not move.  However, in a later conversation 
Douglas stated that he ran over the girl because he had beaten her to 
death but wanted to make it look like a vehicular homicide.  Douglas 
also told Brown that the State had a lot of evidence against him 
because he “took the pussy.”  Brown testified that he understood 
Douglas’s statement “took the pussy” to mean that Douglas raped the 
girl. 
 
Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1250-53 (footnotes omitted).  Based on this evidence, the 
jury found Douglas guilty, by special verdict, of first-degree felony murder and a 
separate count of sexual battery.  Id. at 1253.  The jury did not find Hobgood’s 
murder to be premeditated.  Id.  
During the penalty phase, trial counsel presented the testimony of twelve lay 
witnesses to establish mitigation.  These witnesses consisted solely of Douglas’s 
family and friends;1 no mental health professionals were called to testify on 
                                         
 
1.  These twelve witnesses included: (1) Charlie McCloud, Douglas’s 
brother-in-law; (2) Janice Williams, Douglas’s maternal aunt; (3) John Williams, 
Douglas’s uncle by marriage; (4) Tammy Wright, a close friend of Douglas’s; (5) 
Joyce Douglas, Douglas’s sister-in-law; (6) Sandra Wright, a friend of the family; 
(7) Lavern Montgomery, Douglas’s brother-in-law; (8) Matthew McKever, 
 
 
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Douglas’s behalf.  After hearing the evidence, the jury recommended a sentence of 
death by a vote of eleven to one.  Id.  Trial counsel did not offer any additional 
mitigation evidence during a subsequent Spencer2 hearing. 
In sentencing Douglas to death, the trial court found two aggravating 
circumstances, which were assigned great weight: (1) the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (2) the murder was committed in the 
course of a sexual battery.  Id.  The trial court found one statutory mitigator—that 
Douglas had no significant history of prior criminal activity in that he did not have 
a prior felony conviction—but assigned “little weight” to this mitigating 
circumstance because Douglas had previously engaged in illegal drug activity that 
did not lead to arrests or convictions.  Id.  The trial court also considered thirty 
nonstatutory mitigators Douglas proposed and found that sixteen were proven,3 but 
                                                                                                                                   
Douglas’s stepfather; (9) James Douglas, Douglas’s brother; (10) Lavonia 
Montgomery, Douglas’s sister; (11) Roy Smith, Douglas’s maternal uncle; and 
(12) Sheryl McKever, Douglas’s mother. 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
3.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigation: 
(1) Douglas has a close-knit, religious family (little weight); (2) 
Douglas’s family supports him even after his conviction (little 
weight); (3) Douglas was abused by his father both psychologically 
and physically (little weight); (4) Douglas witnessed his father 
commit acts of domestic violence against his mother (little weight); 
(5) Douglas and his siblings were afraid of their father when they 
were children (little weight); (6) Douglas’s father was arrested for 
child abuse after beating Douglas with a belt (little weight); (7) 
 
 
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rejected the remaining mitigating circumstances as either unproven or not 
mitigating in nature.4  Finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
                                                                                                                                   
Douglas’s father sexually abused Douglas’s oldest sister for seven 
years and was eventually arrested for the crime (little weight); (8) the 
revelation of the sexual abuse of Douglas’s oldest sister had a 
devastating impact on Douglas and the rest of his family (little 
weight); (9) Douglas has an interest in the scriptures (little weight); 
(10) Douglas was helpful to his father around the house (little weight); 
(11) Douglas was diagnosed with learning disabilities in the second 
grade (very little weight); (12) Douglas never finished high school 
(very little weight); (13) Douglas has made plans for self-
improvement since his incarceration, including obtaining his GED 
(little weight); (14) Douglas can be rehabilitated (moderate weight); 
(15) Douglas can be a productive inmate in prison (moderate weight); 
and (16) Douglas exhibited appropriate behavior during the trial (little 
weight).   
 
Id. at 1254. 
 
4.  The trial court rejected the following mitigating circumstances as either 
unproven or not mitigating in nature: 
(1) Douglas’s father left the home when Douglas was nine years old 
(not mitigating); (2) Douglas’s father did not spend a significant 
amount of time with Douglas after he left the home (not mitigating); 
(3) Douglas loves his children (not proven); (4) Douglas is a good 
father to his children (not proven); (5) Douglas supports his children 
by buying food, diapers and other items (not proven); (6) Douglas is a 
positive, upbeat person (not proven); (7) Douglas has worked at 
several different jobs (not mitigating); (8) Douglas has an outgoing, 
friendly personality (not proven); (9) Douglas is and always has been 
respectful to his elders (not proven); (10) Douglas has been a good 
son to his mother and is protective of her (not proven); (11) Douglas 
has been a good brother to his siblings (not proven); (12) Douglas was 
impaired by alcohol at the time of the crime (not mitigating); (13) 
Douglas has been courteous and pleasant to the courtroom personnel 
(not proven); and (14) codefendant Misty Jones entered a guilty plea 
 
 
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mitigating circumstances, the trial court agreed with the jury’s recommendation 
and imposed a sentence of death.  The trial court also sentenced Douglas to life 
imprisonment for the separate sexual battery offense.  Id. at 1254 & n.9. 
On direct appeal,5 this Court held that the trial court erred in rejecting the 
mitigating circumstances that Douglas was a positive, upbeat person and that he 
has an outgoing, friendly personality, yet concluded that this error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed his convictions and sentences.  Id. at 
1258.  In December 2005, Douglas filed an amended motion for postconviction 
relief, in which he raised thirty-two claims.6  Following a Huff7 hearing, the 
                                                                                                                                   
to the charge of accessory after the fact and will receive a maximum 
sentence of seven years’ imprisonment (not proven). 
Id. at 1254 n.8. 
 
5.  Douglas raised the following claims on direct appeal: 
(1) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of enlarged crime 
scene and autopsy photographs; (2) the trial court erred in rejecting 
several proposed mitigating circumstances and in assigning little 
weight to the mitigating circumstances related to Douglas’s abusive 
childhood; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on and in 
finding HAC; (4) Douglas’s death sentence is not proportionate; and 
(5) Florida’s capital sentencing procedure is unconstitutional under 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
Id. at 1254. 
 
6.  Although Douglas lists his postconviction claims numerically from one to 
thirty-five, there are actually only thirty-two claims because he misnumbers several 
of the claims.  The postconviction claims Douglas raised below were as follows: 
(1) Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 is unconstitutional because it 
 
 
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requires that Douglas file a motion one year after his conviction becomes final and 
denies Douglas effective assistance of counsel, access to the courts, and the right to 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus; (2) the HAC aggravator was improperly found; 
(3) Florida’s statutory scheme regarding aggravating circumstances is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied; (4) Douglas is innocent of first-degree 
murder and was denied an adversarial testing because he was not at the murder 
scene; (5) newly discovered evidence of mitigation establishes that Douglas’s 
capital conviction and sentence are constitutionally unreliable; (6) Douglas is 
innocent of the crime and his conviction and sentence should be reversed due to 
inadequate aggravating circumstance instructions and a disproportionate sentence; 
(7) the prosecutor impermissibly suggested to the prospective jury during voir dire 
that the law required that it recommend a sentence of death, and trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object or move for a mistrial; (8) 
Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional; (9) the trial 
court’s jury instruction implied that the trial court believed Douglas was guilty and 
violated his rights; (10) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the 
penalty phase in failing to present the testimony of “star penalty phase witnesses,” 
including Dr. Harry Krop, who requested a follow-up conference with Douglas, 
which was never granted; (11) Florida’s capital sentencing statute and death by 
electrocution or lethal injection are unconstitutional; (12) Douglas’s constitutional 
rights were violated because no reliable transcript of his capital trial was produced 
and therefore appellate review was impossible; (13) the State introduced gruesome 
and shocking photographs in violation of Douglas’s constitutional rights; (14) trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to adequately question potential 
jurors about their views on the death penalty, to ensure an impartial jury, to 
discover and remove biased jurors, and to preserve this issue for appeal; (15) the 
trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the standard by which to assess expert 
testimony in violation of Douglas’s constitutional rights; (16) the trial court 
improperly rejected nonstatutory mitigation; (17) the State improperly argued 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; (18)(A) the jury was improperly informed 
of its role in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (18)(B) 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present mental health 
mitigation evidence, including Douglas’s substance abuse and the child abuse he 
suffered, organic dysfunction, and mental disability, in failing to provide 
background information to and ask relevant questions of the expert who was 
available, in failing to object to leading questions by the State on direct, and in 
failing to challenge a critical State witness; (19) trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in failing to adequately employ the services of the available mental 
health expert, Dr. Krop, for possible brain damage defenses; (20) the jury was 
 
 
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postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on a portion of claim 10 
(ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate available mitigation 
evidence and present the testimony of Dr. Harry Krop during the penalty phase) 
and claim 18(B) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present available 
mental health mitigation through Dr. Krop during the penalty phase).  After a two-
day evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief on all thirty-two 
claims. 
This appeal follows, and Douglas simultaneously petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
ANALYSIS 
                                                                                                                                   
unconstitutionally instructed on aggravating circumstances; (21) the jury 
improperly considered victim impact information; (22)(A) the trial court 
improperly shifted to Douglas the burden of proving whether he should receive a 
death sentence; (22)(B) the jury was misled and incorrectly informed about its role 
at capital sentencing in violation of Douglas’s constitutional rights; (23) the trial 
court erred in permitting the State to argue lack of remorse; (24) the State withheld 
material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963); (25) cumulative error occurred in this case; (26) counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to allow the mental health expert, Dr. Krop, to 
conduct additional testing of Douglas and to testify about mental health mitigation; 
(27) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance throughout the trial; (28) the State 
violated Brady by withholding evidence from the defense; (29) Florida’s capital 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional under Ring and counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance per se under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), in failing to 
present mental health evidence through Dr. Krop; and (30) Douglas’s death 
sentence was disproportionate. 
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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I.  RULE 3.851 CLAIMS 
In Douglas’s appeal to this Court, he raises three claims.  He first alleges 
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and 
provide sufficient background information to the retained mental health expert and 
in failing to conduct an adequate mental health investigation and present the results 
of that investigation to the jury and sentencing court for the purposes of mitigation.  
Second, Douglas argues that rule 3.851, which imposes a one-year time limit for 
filing motions for postconviction relief, is unconstitutional.  Lastly, he contends 
that Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional.  We address each claim 
in turn, beginning with Douglas’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Ineffective Assistance of Penalty-Phase Counsel  
In his first claim, Douglas raises an ineffectiveness challenge focusing on 
trial counsel’s performance in preparation for and during the penalty phase.  He 
essentially contends that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate and 
provide sufficient background information to the retained mental health expert, Dr. 
Krop, who conducted a preliminary psychological examination of Douglas prior to 
trial, and in failing to conduct an adequate investigation and present additional 
mitigation evidence to the jury regarding Douglas’s mental health.8  Douglas 
                                         
 
8.  Douglas does not argue that he was denied a competent mental health 
evaluation in violation of the principles enunciated in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68, 83 (1985).  Even if he did, such a claim would be procedurally barred because 
 
 
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argues that if trial counsel had conducted a reasonable investigation, then counsel 
would have discovered a wealth of mental health mitigation, including evidence of 
the statutory mitigator that Douglas suffered from an extreme emotional 
disturbance at the time of the crime.  In addition, Douglas asserts that his trial 
counsel were ineffective in failing to present nonstatutory mitigation evidence, 
including that he suffered from chronic depression since childhood, that he was 
functioning within a borderline range of intelligence and had a poor school record, 
that he abused drugs and alcohol, and that he has frontal lobe dysfunction likely 
caused by organic brain damage.9  Absent such evidence, Douglas argues, his trial 
counsel were unable to draw a correlation between his mental health and Douglas’s 
commission of the crime. 
Following an evidentiary hearing on this claim, the postconviction court 
denied relief on prejudice grounds alone, finding that the newly discovered mental 
health mitigation was more harmful than helpful and that even if presented, there 
                                                                                                                                   
it could and should have been presented on direct appeal.  See Davis v. State, 928 
So. 2d 1089, 1122 (Fla. 2005) (holding Ake claim procedurally barred because it 
could have been raised on direct appeal). 
 
9.  Doulas also asserts that had counsel presented the testimony that Douglas 
has an IQ score of 75 and suffers from frontal lobe impairment, it is likely that the 
court would have found that the statutory mitigator that his mental, emotional, or 
intellectual age at the time of the crime was far below his chronological age.  
However, no testimony to this effect was offered during the postconviction 
proceedings. 
 
 
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was no reasonable probability that the balance of aggravators and mitigators would 
have been any different or resulted in a life sentence.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we agree with Douglas that trial counsel rendered deficient performance.  
However, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief because Douglas 
has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To establish the deficiency 
prong under Strickland, the defendant must prove that “counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id.  The defendant carries the burden to “overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  “Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that ‘counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary.’ ”  Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1008 (Fla. 
2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
“Penalty phase prejudice under the Strickland standard is measured by 
whether the error of trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence in the 
 
 
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sentence of death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and 
the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.”  Id. at 1013.  That standard 
does not “require a defendant to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely 
than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish 
‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.’ ”  Porter v. 
McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455-56 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).  “To assess that probability, [the Court] 
consider[s] ‘the totality of the available mitigation evidence . . .’ and ‘reweigh[s] it 
against the evidence in aggravation.’ ”  Id. at 453-54 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)). 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, in reviewing a trial court’s ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court employs a mixed standard of 
review, deferring to the postconviction court’s factual findings that are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the postconviction court’s 
application of the law to the facts de novo.  Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 998 
(Fla. 2006).  With this standard in mind, we review Douglas’s ineffectiveness 
claim. 
The record establishes that almost two years before the commencement of 
Douglas’s guilt-phase proceeding, trial counsel contacted Dr. Krop, a licensed 
 
 
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psychologist, to aid in addressing Douglas’s mental state at the time of the offense 
and to uncover possible mitigating factors.  In May 2000, Dr. Krop conducted a 
clinical interview with Douglas, during which he administered a battery of 
psychological tests.  Following this evaluation, Dr. Krop issued a June 2000 report 
to trial counsel indicating that Douglas was competent to proceed and requesting 
from counsel the opportunity to review depositions, school records, police reports, 
prior presentence investigation reports, and any other relevant materials that might 
pertain to possible mitigation.  The report further requested that trial counsel 
schedule a follow-up evaluation so that Dr. Krop could discuss the crime with 
Douglas and coordinate interviews with relevant family members.  According to 
Dr. Krop’s files, he never received any of these materials from trial counsel.  Dr. 
Krop also did not have an independent recollection of discussing this report with 
trial counsel over the phone, and such a discussion was never recorded in Dr. 
Krop’s notes. 
Douglas’s two-day penalty phase began on April 4, 2002.  During that 
proceeding, trial counsel did not present testimony from Dr. Krop or any other 
mental health professional, and counsel did not introduce into evidence any records 
relating to Douglas’s mental health, such as school or medical records.  Instead, 
counsel presented the testimony of twelve lay witnesses, consisting of Douglas’s 
family and friends, to establish that Douglas was a good person who could be a 
 
 
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productive inmate.  Collectively, these witnesses testified to the following 
information: Douglas came from a religious, close-knit, and supportive family; 
Douglas’s father was strict, controlling, and physically and emotionally abusive, 
and he sexually molested Douglas’s older sister; Douglas’s father was forced to 
leave the family home when Douglas was nine or ten years old; Douglas had 
difficulties in school; Douglas loves and cares for his four children, one of whom is 
not his biological child; Douglas worked at various jobs; Douglas is a good brother 
and son; and Douglas is a positive, upbeat, and friendly person. 
When asked about his intellectual capacity, and more specifically, his 
learning disabilities, Douglas’s mother, Sheryl McKever, provided the most 
extensive testimony.  She testified that as a child, Douglas attended special 
education programs, which assisted him with a reading disability and improving 
his math skills.  Douglas entered one such program at the age of ten.  McKever 
also explained that Douglas dropped out of school in the seventh grade due to his 
learning disability and that because of this disability, he did not wish to return to 
school.  She acknowledged, however, that since dropping out of school, Douglas 
had taught himself to read, had begun to enjoy reading while incarcerated, and had 
become determined to go back to school.  Aside from acknowledging his difficulty 
with reading, the other witnesses called on Douglas’s behalf were unaware of 
whether Douglas had any physical or mental disabilities and even described him as 
 
 
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smart.10 
At the evidentiary hearing, postconviction counsel focused on trial counsel’s 
failure to follow up with Dr. Krop and offer additional mitigation evidence 
regarding Douglas’s mental health.  Douglas’s school records indicated the 
following: he did poorly in school; while in the fourth grade, Douglas had good 
attendance but was of borderline intelligence with academic and behavioral 
problems, which appeared to be related to feelings of anxiety and poor self-
concept; he repeated the second and fourth grades; he was a participant in the 
Exceptional Student Education program in Duval County; and he dropped out of 
school after apparently repeating the seventh grade several times. 
Dr. Krop, who conducted neuropsychological testing on Douglas in 
connection with postconviction proceedings, testified that he met with Douglas and 
reviewed his school records, which showed that Douglas had a full-scale IQ score 
of 75 when he was ten years old—a score consistent with IQ testing Dr. Krop 
                                         
10.  Douglas’s brother, James Douglas, testified that although Douglas did 
not have any learning difficulties as a child, he could not read and write as well as 
he should have been able to.  James was unaware of any learning difficulties that 
would prevent Douglas from finishing school, but did acknowledge that because of 
Douglas’s educational level, Douglas did not have many employment 
opportunities.  Douglas also expressed to James a desire to finish his education and 
pursue a career after earning his diploma or GED.  Douglas’s sister, Lavonia 
Montgomery, agreed with the prosecutor that Douglas was very smart.  She also 
agreed that if Douglas had chosen to pursue his education he would have done so, 
but she acknowledged that it would have been more difficult for Douglas to do so 
in light of his reading and writing problems. 
 
 
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conducted on Douglas in 2000 and similar to the IQ score of 77 Douglas had 
recently received.  Dr. Krop opined that Douglas showed impairment consistent 
with frontal lobe deficits, which would typically result from some type of brain 
damage, and that Douglas would have presented with a serious emotional or 
psychological disturbance due to his self-reported alcohol abuse and ongoing 
conflict with his girlfriend around the time of the offense.  Dr. Krop was unable to 
recall why neuropsychological testing was not conducted on Douglas prior to trial. 
Dr. Ernest Miller, a forensic psychiatrist who examined Douglas in 
connection with postconviction proceedings and relied on self-reporting and 
“sparse” jail clinic records, testified to the following mitigation: Douglas was the 
product of a dysfunctional home that included extreme violence and a father who 
was a strict disciplinarian; his lifestyle was characterized by intermittent violent 
behavior and the sale of drugs, which led to his incarceration; his behavior 
interfered with his ability to do well in school; Douglas attempted to earn his GED, 
but his intellectual capacity may have been a factor in his failing to do so; he 
suffered from alcohol and drug dependency, depression, and a personality disorder 
not otherwise specified; and he suffered from an extreme mental and emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offense due to his violent childhood and drug use. 
Trial counsel Refik Eler and Ruth Ann Hepler had no independent 
recollection of their preparation for the penalty phase, and during the evidentiary 
 
 
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hearing, they noted that their files on this case were missing pertinent records.  Eler 
testified that at the time of trial, Douglas seemed very bright and intelligent, but 
Eler could not recall whether he received school records showing that Douglas had 
an IQ of 75.  Likewise, Hepler did not recall if anyone had indicated whether 
Douglas had cognitive difficulties or did not do well in school, vaguely 
remembered that Douglas never graduated, stated that it would “shock” her to learn 
that Douglas had an IQ of 75, and could not remember finding any history of 
alcohol or substance abuse.  As to Dr. Krop’s pretrial evaluation, Eler believed that 
he had one, or possibly more, telephone conferences with Dr. Krop and recalled a 
letter or memorandum and a request for additional records.  However, Eler was 
unable to remember the substance of those conversations, and his billing records 
only reflected that he had conducted one review of Dr. Krop’s June 2000 report.  In 
addition, when questioned about whether the defense considered conferring with 
another expert other than Dr. Krop, Eler responded, “I don’t think I did.” 
Due to the lack of records or an independent recollection, trial counsel 
speculated as to the defense strategy for failing to obtain evidence regarding 
Douglas’s mental health.  According to Eler, if Dr. Krop indicated that Douglas 
had antisocial personality disorder or any other sociopathic history, he probably 
would have recommended that Hepler not put on that evidence of mental health 
mitigation because of its negative implications.  On this issue, Eler specifically 
 
 
- 20 - 
explained: 
[B]ased on the fact that nothing else was done regarding Dr. Krop, it 
seems to me to suggest, and once again I have no independent 
recollections in writing here but it seems to me that antisocial 
personality disorder came up.  That is a red herring to me having been 
doing this for 20 years.  I believe I conveyed my concerns to Ms. 
Hepler and I think based on that, we chose not to pursue school 
records or anything after that for that reason because to me having a 
jury hear about the antisocial personality disorder along with—in the 
guilt phase, that the facts and circumstances surrounding Ms. 
Hobgood’s death, or actions right before her death, that concerned me 
with the antisocial just from the get-go. 
 
Along similar lines, Hepler agreed that hypothetically, presenting Douglas’s 
criminal history and antisocial personality traits, although coupled with Dr. Krop’s 
beneficial testimony, would have been inconsistent with the defense strategy to 
portray Douglas as a “good guy” and thought that it would be ill-advised to present 
evidence inconsistent with that strategy.  Despite counsel’s speculation, nothing in 
the trial record or counsel’s records show that counsel were aware of the negative 
implications associated with the expert testimony or if Dr. Krop relayed such 
concerns to them beforehand. 
 
It appears that counsel, at a minimum, performed a background investigation 
into Douglas’s social history in preparation for the penalty phase.  However, it is 
undisputed that the pretrial report Dr. Krop issued to counsel requested the 
opportunity to review additional information from counsel, as well as to schedule a 
follow-up evaluation to discuss the crime with Douglas and coordinate interviews 
 
 
- 21 - 
with his family members.  Other than billing records, which reflect only one 
review by counsel of Dr. Krop’s preliminary report, nothing in the record shows 
that counsel followed up with Dr. Krop’s requests, investigated whether Dr. Krop 
could testify to the existence of any mental health mitigation, were informed by Dr. 
Krop of information that would be harmful to the defense, or attempted to secure 
another mental health expert to conduct an evaluation of Douglas.  Nor did trial 
counsel introduce any records concerning Douglas’s mental health during the 
penalty phase. 
 
While “Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable 
line of mitigating evidence . . . [or] present mitigating evidence at sentencing in 
every case,” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003), “an attorney has a strict 
duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant’s background for 
possible mitigating evidence,” State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 
2000).  “Among the topics that counsel should consider presenting in mitigation 
are the defendant’s medical history, educational history, employment and training 
history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, 
and religious and cultural influences.”  Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974, 985 (Fla. 
2009).  As to counsel’s duty of securing evidence of mental health mitigation, this 
Court has recognized that “[w]here available information indicates that the 
defendant could have mental health problems, ‘such an evaluation is fundamental 
 
 
- 22 - 
in defending against the death penalty.’ ”  Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 583 (Fla. 
2008) (quoting Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 34 (Fla. 2005)).  In light of its 
significance, “a reasonable investigation into mental mitigation is part of defense 
counsel’s obligation where there is any indication that the defendant may have 
mental deficits.”  Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1010 (emphasis added). 
The testimony of Douglas’s penalty-phase witnesses demonstrates counsel 
must have known, at the very least, that Douglas had difficulty reading, was placed 
in a special academic program, dropped out of school in the seventh grade due to a 
learning disability, and had a father who was physically and emotionally abusive.  
Despite having access to this information, there is no evidence that counsel sought 
to further investigate Douglas’s mental health either by seeking background 
records or by consulting with a mental health expert.  In fact, even after Dr. Krop’s 
request for additional materials, the record does not disclose that counsel made any 
effort to provide Dr. Krop with readily available evidence.  Certainly, counsel 
should not have considered Dr. Krop’s competency evaluation as “a reliable 
substitute for a thorough mitigation evaluation.”  Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 
1073, 1096 n.24 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 34); id. at 1095-96 
(noting that counsel should not have considered a mental health expert’s fifteen-
minute competency evaluation conducted prior to trial as a reliable substitute for a 
thorough mitigation evaluation).  We conclude that there were sufficient facts in 
 
 
- 23 - 
this case to place counsel on notice that further investigation of mental health 
mitigation was necessary.  Consequently, counsel’s failure to investigate this line 
of defense was not reasonable under prevailing professional norms. 
The State contends that counsel’s failure to present mental health mitigation 
evidence to the jury was “a sound strategic decision made after investigation by 
two very experienced trial counsel” and that “after investigation, trial counsel 
decided to put on family background testimony that would put Douglas in the best 
light possible.”  According to the State, trial counsel made a reasonable, strategic 
decision to not put on mental health testimony because if they had, the jury would 
have also heard evidence of Douglas’s antisocial personality traits, including a life 
of lawlessness, indifference to the rights of others, illegal drugs, and violence.  
This position, however, is unsupported by the record. 
This Court has indeed recognized that “[t]rial counsel is not deficient where 
he makes a reasonable strategic decision to not present mental mitigation testimony 
during the penalty phase because it could open the door to other damaging 
testimony.”  Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 57 (Fla. 2005) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2003)).  However, “[c]ase law 
rejects the notion that a ‘strategic’ decision can be reasonable when the attorney 
has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.”  
Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 573 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 
 
 
- 24 - 
1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991)).  The United States Supreme Court has also “rejected 
any suggestion that a decision to focus on one potentially reasonable trial strategy 
 . . . [is] ‘justified by a tactical decision’ when ‘counsel [does] not fulfill their 
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”  
Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3265 (2010) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396). 
Although counsel lacked an independent recollection of their investigation in 
preparation for the penalty phase, there is no evidence, aside from billing records 
denoting the receipt of Dr. Krop’s preliminary report, to support the State’s 
contention that trial counsel conducted any type of investigation into Douglas’s 
mental health or made a reasonable strategic decision based upon that 
investigation.  This is not a case where the record discloses that trial counsel was 
aware of, but rejected, possible mitigation in favor of a more beneficial strategy.  
Cf. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404-06 (2011) (holding that even 
though trial counsel had “no recollection” of his preparation for the penalty phase, 
the record supported the idea that counsel acted strategically due to counsel’s 
statements in the trial record, billing records showing that counsel spent 
considerable time investigating mitigating evidence, and counsel’s pretrial 
consultation with the defendant’s mother and a psychiatrist, who provided 
unhelpful or unfavorable information).  Furthermore, we can find no strategic basis 
for failing to submit into evidence Douglas’s school records.  We therefore 
 
 
- 25 - 
conclude that counsel rendered deficient performance under the first prong of 
Strickland. 
Having made this determination, we must next decide whether Douglas has 
demonstrated that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.  “That showing 
requires [Douglas] to establish ‘a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, 
aware of [the available mitigating evidence], would have introduced it at 
sentencing,’ ” Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 386 (2009) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535), and that had the jury been confronted 
with this mitigating evidence, it would establish a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome, see Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455-56. 
We accept Douglas’s argument that the admission of his school records, 
denoting his educational and emotional problems and low IQ score, could have 
prevented the State from arguing in its closing that he was an individual who 
“chose not to finish school” and “made no effort to go back and get his education 
even though he could have.”11  We also accept his claim that the expert testimony 
                                         
 
11.  The State, in its closing, argued as follows: Douglas’s siblings grew up 
in the same house and did not choose a criminal lifestyle; his abusive father left 
when he was nine years old and after his father left, Douglas was surrounded by 
positive male role models thereby giving him a second chance; and although he 
was smart, Douglas chose not to finish school.  While Douglas contends that in 
light of the new mitigation evidence, the State would have been prevented from 
arguing in its closing that Douglas had all the tools for success but simply chose 
the path of murder without physical or mental limitations, the record makes clear 
that Douglas’s characterization of the State’s closing is inaccurate. 
 
 
- 26 - 
offered during postconviction, if presented at trial, could have assisted counsel in 
providing a reason why Douglas’s mental health played a role in his decision to 
commit the crime.  We therefore agree with Douglas that the testimony offered by 
Drs. Miller and Krop could have supported the existence of statutory mitigation 
and additional nonstatutory mitigation regarding his mental health.  It is clear that 
the new mitigation evidence addressed Douglas’s mental state, sought to explain 
his behavior, and placed his criminal conduct in some favorable context. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has instructed that under 
Strickland, “the reviewing court must consider all the evidence—the good and the 
bad—when evaluating prejudice.”  Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 390.  Therefore, in 
evaluating prejudice, “it is necessary to consider all the relevant evidence that the 
jury would have had before it if [counsel] had pursued the different path—not just 
the mitigation evidence [counsel] could have presented, but also the . . . evidence 
that almost certainly would have come in with it.”  Id. at 386.  In other words, the 
likelihood of the proposed mitigating evidence opening the door to damaging 
evidence is an important factor to consider in assessing whether confidence in the 
                                                                                                                                   
The State did allege in its memorandum in support of death that “[t]he 
testimony demonstrated that had [Douglas] wanted to continue his education, he 
could have.  He simply chose not to” and that “the evidence showed that [Douglas] 
has worked only sporadically throughout his adult life, despite the fact that he has 
no physical or mental limitations.”  However, this memorandum was never 
presented to the jury. 
 
 
- 27 - 
outcome is undermined.  See id. at 389-90. 
Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, we have previously held that the 
failure to present mental health mitigation evidence coupled with damaging or 
harmful information does not necessarily result in prejudice.  See, e.g., Jones, 998 
So. 2d at 585 (finding no prejudice where available mental health mitigation, 
which included information that defendant suffered from antisocial personality 
disorder and negative character traits, proved to be a “double-edged sword” that 
was “more harmful than helpful”); Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004) 
(“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present 
mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.”). 
Relying on this precedent, the postconviction court found in this case that 
the mitigation evidence presented during postconviction would have been more 
harmful than helpful.  This finding is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  Dr. Miller, who testified at the evidentiary hearing, diagnosed Douglas 
with a personality disorder characterized by self-centeredness, a lack of empathy, 
problems with restraint and inhibitions, and violent behavior with little regard for 
the well-being of others.  Further, Dr. Miller detected antisocial personality traits in 
Douglas and described him as a “dangerous man” who was prone to act 
excessively and violently in response to minor incidents.  See Jones, 998 So. 2d at 
585 (“This Court has acknowledged that antisocial personality disorder ‘is a trait 
 
 
- 28 - 
most jurors tend to look disfavorably upon.’ ” (quoting Freeman v. State, 858 So. 
2d 319, 327 (Fla. 2003))). 
Dr. Miller also testified that a person with the characteristics that Douglas 
exhibits could overreact and get exceptionally angry if rejected sexually.  The 
postconviction court found this last fact “particularly significant in light of Misty 
Jones’ testimony at trial that [Douglas] told her that he beat the victim because she 
‘disrespected him’ and that when she asked him if he did it because the victim 
wouldn’t have sex with ‘black boys’ he just smiled at her.”12  Like Dr. Miller, Dr. 
Krop also explained at the evidentiary hearing that although he was unsure if 
Douglas met the full criteria for antisocial personality disorder, he probably would 
have diagnosed Douglas with some type of personality disorder with antisocial and 
psychopathic traits.  See Looney v. State, 941 So. 2d 1017, 1028-29 (Fla. 2006) 
(“This Court has noted that a diagnosis as a psychopath is a mental health factor 
viewed negatively by jurors and is not really considered mitigation.”). 
In addition to these negative characteristics, the inclusion of this expert 
testimony during the penalty phase would have also opened the door to evidence of 
Douglas’s involvement in the sale of drugs, his history of violence, including an 
incident where he pulled a gun on the mother of one of his children because she 
had “nagged him,” and his criminal history, including a rape charge that had been 
                                         
 
12.  Douglas is African-American, and Hobgood was Caucasian. 
 
 
- 29 - 
dropped, two domestic violence convictions, a drive-by shooting charge that had 
been dropped, and drug charges.  See Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. 2006) 
(finding that the defendant failed to establish prejudice where the mental health 
evidence would have opened the door to evidence of a long history of behavior 
problems and escalating violence).  Douglas’s additional history of crime and 
violence, which seemed to be characterized by violence towards women, is 
especially damaging considering that the jury had already convicted Douglas of 
sexual battery during the guilt phase.  As the postconviction court concluded, 
“[s]uch evidence would not have been mitigating in nature and would have 
contradicted the evidence of [Douglas’s] good character presented by the defense.”  
Thus, the new testimony would have triggered the admission of highly unfavorable 
evidence in rebuttal and would serve to undercut the mitigation value of the 
testimony already presented during the penalty phase; it was a virtual certainty that 
Douglas’s “good” mitigation evidence would have led to the introduction of “bad” 
evidence.  Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 390.  As the Supreme Court observed in Wong, 
“[t]his evidence would have made a difference, but in the wrong direction.”  Id. at 
388. 
Further, there was significant aggravation.  The trial court found and gave 
great weight to two statutory aggravators, HAC and commission during a sexual 
battery, which were left undisturbed by this Court on direct appeal.  The trial court 
 
 
- 30 - 
also found one statutory mitigator and sixteen nonstatutory mitigators.  Of 
relevance, the trial court found that the penalty-phase evidence established the 
following: Douglas was abused by his father both psychologically and physically; 
he witnessed his father commit acts of domestic violence upon his mother; his 
father was arrested for child abuse after beating him with a belt; his father sexually 
abused his oldest sister for seven years and was eventually arrested for the crime; 
the revelation of the sexual abuse of Douglas’s oldest sister had a devastating 
impact on Douglas; he was diagnosed with learning disabilities in the second 
grade; and he never finished high school.  In turn, the postconviction court found 
that had trial counsel presented the postconviction mental health mitigation 
evidence during the penalty phase, it would have been entitled to “little weight.”  
We agree. 
During the postconviction proceedings, Douglas’s mental health experts did 
not provide compelling testimony.  Dr. Miller’s diagnosis of Douglas was based on 
Douglas’s own self-report, a review of “rather sparse” jail clinic records, and a 
two-hour interview that took place a day before the evidentiary hearing; he 
admitted that this time-frame was not enough for him to make any in-depth 
findings and that his “impression” was “subject to change.”  Dr. Miller conceded 
that he did not review the testimony of Douglas’s twelve penalty-phase witnesses 
and did not receive from Douglas any real details of his involvement in the actual 
 
 
- 31 - 
crime, but he nevertheless opined that Douglas suffered from an extreme mental 
and emotional disturbance at the time of the offense.  Moreover, one basis for Dr. 
Miller’s opinion was the abuse that Douglas suffered at the hands of his father—a 
fact that was cumulative to information related to the jury during the penalty 
phase.13  See Dufour, 905 So. 2d at 61 (holding that defendant failed to 
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland where additional mitigating evidence “did 
not substantially differ from that presented during the penalty phase”). 
Like Dr. Miller, Dr. Krop also did not review the penalty-phase testimony.  
Dr. Krop testified that he could not definitively say whether Douglas had brain 
damage and actually acknowledged that Douglas was not mentally retarded, did 
not suffer from any major mental illness, and did not meet the statutory mitigator 
that Douglas’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 
As to Douglas’s school records, although they were more explicit than his 
mother’s testimony, we find that most of the information contained therein was 
merely cumulative to the facts to which his mother testified during the penalty 
                                         
 
13.  During the penalty phase, Douglas’s brother James testified that their 
father was abusive, both physically and mentally.  James relayed the abuse 
Douglas suffered at the hands of their father, including excessive punishments, 
multiple spankings, and being hit in the mouth for something he said.  Douglas’s 
mother also explained that Douglas’s father was physically abusive towards her 
children.  She testified that during one such incident, the father struck Douglas so 
hard that charges were filed against him. 
 
 
- 32 - 
phase.  In other words, the jury had already heard evidence from which it could 
arrive at a rough estimate of Douglas’s low intelligence.  See Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d 
at 36-37 (acknowledging that expert testimony relating to Arbelaez’s low 
intelligence would have been “vastly preferable and that counsel was deficient in 
failing to arrange for such testimony,” but nevertheless concluding that there was 
no prejudice by discounting, in part, Arbelaez’s uncontested evidence of his low 
intelligence since the jury had already heard evidence from which to conclude that 
defendant had a low intelligence level).  We also note that the jury heard 
conflicting testimony on this issue from Douglas’s family and friends who testified 
that Douglas was smart, had started to enjoy reading in prison, and hoped to obtain 
his GED.  Douglas did not put on any evidence to suggest that such testimony 
would have been different following a more thorough investigation by trial 
counsel. 
In sum, while we agree with Douglas that there clearly was mental health 
mitigation available that went uncovered, the noncumulative evidence Douglas 
contends counsel should have investigated and presented in this case falls short of 
the type of evidence that has been previously held to be sufficient to satisfy the 
prejudice prong.  For example, the new mitigation in this case is distinguishable 
from that discussed in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Porter, where 
evidence introduced during postconviction proceedings showed that if Porter’s 
 
 
- 33 - 
counsel had conducted any type of investigation and presentation of mitigating 
evidence, the judge and jury would have learned of “(1) Porter’s heroic military 
service in two of the most critical—and horrific—battles of the Korean War, (2) 
his struggles to regain normality upon his return from war, (3) his childhood 
history of physical abuse, and (4) his brain abnormality, difficulty reading and 
writing, and limited schooling.”  Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 454.  This evidence stood in 
contrast to the mitigation presented during Porter’s original penalty phase through 
the testimony of only one witness and the reading of a deposition excerpt, which 
revealed inconsistent testimony about Porter’s behavior when intoxicated and that 
Porter had a good relationship with his son.  Id. at 449.  The Court noted that the 
“judge and jury . . . heard almost nothing that would humanize Porter or allow 
them to accurately gauge his moral culpability,” and the sentencing court found no 
mitigation.  Id. at 454. 
This case is likewise distinguishable from Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 
390-93 (2005), where Rompilla’s counsel failed to discover or present evidence 
that Rompilla (1) had test results pointing to schizophrenia, fetal alcohol syndrome, 
and mental development problems, (2) was beaten by his father with fists, leather 
straps, belts, and sticks, (3) was locked in a small wire mesh dog pen filled with 
excrement, (4) was not allowed to visit other children or speak on the phone, and 
(5) lived without indoor plumbing, slept in an unheated attic, and attended school 
 
 
- 34 - 
in rags, id. at 390-93, all of which “add[ed] up to a mitigation case that [bore] no 
relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury,” id. at 393.  
This case also does not compare to Wiggins, where at sentencing, trial counsel 
offered no evidence of Wiggins’s life history, which included (1) being left alone 
for days at a time with no food, forcing him to beg for food and eat paint chips and 
garbage, (2) beatings for breaking into the locked kitchen, and (3) being passed 
among various foster homes, where he was physically abused and also suffered 
repeated molestations, rapes, and gang-rapes.  539 U.S. at 516-17, 534-35. 
In contrast to the above cases, when we examine all of the evidence in 
mitigation in this case, both that presented at the penalty phase and during 
postconviction proceedings, together with the aggravating evidence, we conclude 
that Douglas has not carried his burden of demonstrating prejudice.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
One-Year Time Limit 
In his next claim, Douglas asserts that the one-year filing requirement for 
postconviction relief in capital cases is unconstitutional because it violates his 
rights of due process, equal protection, effective assistance of postconviction 
counsel, access to courts, and to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.14  This Court 
                                         
 
14.  To support his claims that the one-year time limit violates his rights of 
effective assistance of postconviction counsel, access to courts, and to petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, Douglas merely “reincorporates the argument provided in 
 
 
- 35 - 
has on prior occasions rejected claims similar to those raised here.  See, e.g., 
Seibert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 84 (Fla. 2010) (rejecting claim that one-year time 
limit imposed under rule 3.851 is unconstitutional); Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 
201, 215 (Fla. 2002) (denying claim that one-year time limit to file a motion to 
vacate judgment and sentence is unconstitutional because it violated the 
defendant’s rights of due process, equal protection, and to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus; noting that a claim of ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel 
based on the one-year deadline does not present a valid basis for relief); Arbelaez 
v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 919 (Fla. 2000) (denying claim that one-year time limit 
imposed on capital defendants under rule 3.851 is unconstitutional).  We therefore 
deny relief on this claim. 
Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme 
In his next claim, Douglas argues that Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional for a variety of reasons.15  Without raising any novel issues 
                                                                                                                                   
his Amended 3.851 [motion].”  These arguments are insufficiently pled and 
therefore waived for purposes of appeal.  See Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 968 
n.6 (Fla. 2010) (denying relief on postconviction claims raised on appeal where 
defendant merely “incorporate[d] the arguments in his postconviction motion by 
reference”); see also Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 n.12 (Fla. 2006) 
(denying defendant’s claim as waived because “counsel did not properly brief this 
issue for appeal”). 
 
15.  Specifically, Douglas claims that the statute fails to prevent the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty because it (1) does not provide a standard for 
determining that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors; (2) fails 
 
 
- 36 - 
regarding lethal injection, Douglas also contends that execution by electrocution or 
lethal injection imposes unnecessary physical and psychological torture and 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  However, 
he is procedurally barred from raising these substantive claims because he could 
and should have raised them on direct appeal, but he failed to do so.  See, e.g., 
Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178, 1182 n.5 (Fla. 2006) (holding that similar claims 
challenging Florida’s death penalty statute are procedurally barred because they 
should have been raised on direct appeal).     
Additionally, Douglas asserts that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional pursuant to Ring and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000).  This claim is also procedurally barred because it was raised and decided 
adversely to Douglas on direct appeal.  See Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1263-64.   
To the extent that Douglas argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because trial counsel failed to properly preserve these issues, a defendant 
may not attempt to circumvent the procedural bar to his claims by raising 
                                                                                                                                   
to define “sufficient aggravating circumstances” and fails to define each 
aggravating circumstance; (3) does not have an independent reweighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (4) provides for aggravating 
circumstances that have been applied in a vague and inconsistent manner, with 
juries receiving unconstitutionally vague instructions; and (5) creates a 
presumption of death once an aggravating factor is found.  He also asserts that the 
statute violates the Florida Constitution by regulating matters of practice and 
procedure, which are within the province of this Court. 
 
 
- 37 - 
conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Miller v. State, 926 
So. 2d 1243, 1260-61 (Fla. 2006).  As to the remainder of the issues Douglas raises 
regarding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme,16 he failed to raise those claims in 
the postconviction court below, and they are therefore procedurally barred.  See 
Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1104 (Fla. 2008) (rejecting claim raised on appeal 
because “it was neither raised in [the defendant’s] 3.851 motion nor addressed by 
the trial court”).  
Finally, with respect to Douglas’s various claims regarding the 
constitutionality of Florida’s lethal-injection process and protocol, we previously 
rejected similar contentions in Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 349-53 
(Fla. 2007), and Douglas has not made any additional allegations that would call 
into question the State’s current principal method of execution. 
 Accordingly, we deny relief on all aspects of this claim. 
II.  HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
                                         
 
16.  Douglas raised for the first time in this Court the following claims: (1) 
the capital sentencing statute creates a presumption of death in felony-murder 
cases; (2) the Legislature has vested in the Department of Corrections (DOC) the 
authority to create public records exemptions absent narrowing guidelines, which 
is an unlawful delegation of power, and failed to state with specificity the public 
necessity justifying certain exemptions; (3) the Legislature engaged in 
constitutional interpretation; (4) the sentencing statute is a prohibited “special 
law”; (5) the statute unlawfully overrules case law regarding a defendant’s 
knowing and voluntary waiver of fundamental rights; (6) it is a prohibited ex post 
facto law; and (7) the statute vests in the DOC the authority to determine lethal 
injection procedures and protocol. 
 
 
- 38 - 
In his habeas corpus petition, Douglas argues that certain omissions by his 
appellate counsel on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 
213 (Fla. 2009).  To grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel, this Court must resolve the following two issues: 
[W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)).  Under this standard, “[t]he 
defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon 
which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Anderson v. 
State, 18 So. 3d 501, 520 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 
1069 (Fla. 2000)).  Importantly, “[i]f a legal issue ‘would in all probability have 
been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the 
failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate 
counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1175-76 (Fla. 
2006) (quoting Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000)). 
Use of Demonstrative Aids During Jury Deliberations 
 
 
- 39 - 
With his first habeas claim, Douglas argues that appellate counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to challenge on appeal the trial court’s error in 
allowing the jury, over Douglas’s objection, to take demonstrative aids into the 
jury room, which listed and defined in an enlarged format the two proposed 
aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove—HAC and commission 
during a sexual battery.  Douglas contends that these “blow-ups” placed an 
improper emphasis on the State’s proposed aggravators, especially in light of the 
fact that a curative instruction announcing that these aids were not evidence was 
never issued and that a similar aid reflecting the defense’s proposed mitigators was 
never offered.17  This claim is without merit. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.400 limits the items that a trial judge 
may send back to a jury retiring for deliberations.18  Under its plain language, rule 
                                         
 
17.  Douglas also points to the size of these demonstrative aids to support his 
argument that they were prejudicial.  However, neither he nor the record discloses 
the actual size of these aids. 
18.  At the time of Douglas’s trial in 2002, rule 3.400 provided in its 
entirety: 
 
(a) Discretionary Materials.  The court may permit the jury, 
upon retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room: 
(1) a copy of the charges against the defendant; 
(2) forms of verdict approved by the court, after being first 
submitted to counsel; 
(3) in noncapital cases, any instructions given, but if any 
instruction is taken all the instructions shall be taken; 
(4) all things received in evidence other than depositions.  If the 
 
 
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3.400 lists the items the jury is permitted to have in the jury room, and it fails to 
include demonstrative aids not entered into evidence.  However, even if we were to 
assume that it was error for the trial court to submit the State’s demonstrative aids 
to the jury during its deliberations, we would nevertheless conclude that this was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Barnes v. State, 970 So. 2d 332, 339-41 
(Fla. 2007) (applying harmless error standard to trial court’s erroneous submission 
of inadmissible transcript of defendant’s statement to the jury during 
deliberations).  Before granting the jury’s request to review such aids, the trial 
court ensured that the wording on each item mirrored verbatim the instructions to 
which the jury already had access.  In addition to these aids, the jury was provided 
with a copy of the complete instructions.  The common-sense conclusion is that the 
jury requested these aids to make it easier for all the jurors to review the 
aggravating circumstances simultaneously.  In light of these circumstances, any 
error was harmless, and therefore appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
                                                                                                                                   
thing received in evidence is a public record or a private document 
which, in the opinion of the court, ought not to be taken from the 
person having it in custody, a copy shall be taken or sent instead of 
the original. 
(b) Mandatory Materials.  In capital cases, the court must 
provide the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, with a written copy of 
all instructions given to take to the jury room. 
 
Rule 3.400 now requires that in all criminal cases, the jury be provided with a 
written copy of all instructions given.  See In re Amends. to the Fla. Rules of Civil 
Proc., Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 967 So. 2d 178, 187 (Fla. 2007). 
 
 
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for failing to raise this meritless issue on appeal.19 
State’s Guilt-Phase Closing Argument 
 
In his second and final habeas claim, Douglas argues that appellate counsel 
was ineffective in failing to challenge twenty comments the prosecutor made 
during his guilt-phase closing argument.  He essentially contends that the 
prosecutor’s guilt-phase closing was improper because at various times, it 
questioned the competency of defense counsel, sarcastically derided the defendant 
and the defense’s theory, and expressed personal opinions on the merits of the 
defendant’s case.  This claim is without merit.  During the prosecutor’s closing, 
trial counsel did not contemporaneously object to any of the allegedly improper 
comments and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.  Appellate 
counsel could not be successful on appeal unless the arguments were improper and 
constituted fundamental error.  See Derrick v. State, 983 So. 2d 443, 463 (Fla. 
2008).  In this case, however, because the prosecutor’s comments were either 
proper or did not rise to the level of fundamental error, appellate counsel was not 
                                         
 
19.  Douglas contends that the trial court failed to issue a curative instruction 
explaining to the jury that these items were not in evidence and did not give 
defense counsel an opportunity to have the mitigating factors “blown up” as a 
demonstrative aid for the jury to use in its deliberations.  This substantive claim is 
procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal.  See Green, 
975 So. 2d at 1115 (“Habeas corpus is not to be used for additional appeals of 
issues that could have been or were raised on appeal . . . .”).  It is also without 
merit because trial counsel never made either request and the issue was not 
preserved for appellate review. 
 
 
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ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal.  We therefore deny relief on this 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief, 
and we also deny Douglas’s habeas petition. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring in result only. 
 
I am concerned with whether we have properly and adequately addressed 
this defendant’s background and the failure of trial counsel to investigate and 
disclose to the jury during the penalty phase mitigation evidence with regard to the 
defendant’s mental health status, cognitive and intellectual impairments, school 
performance, and drug and alcohol abuse.  I am concerned that this evidence may 
undermine confidence in the outcome of that proceeding.  I am particularly 
concerned with the school records and the school psychology service unit records.   
At the postconviction hearing, it was established that trial counsel totally 
failed to investigate and present testimony of any mental health expert, and did not 
 
 
- 43 - 
introduce into evidence any school or medical records of the defendant.  Based 
upon trial counsel’s failure to investigate, it was not disclosed that the defendant 
had a low IQ score of seventy-five; that he functioned in the borderline range of 
intelligence with academic and behavioral problems; that he performed so poorly 
academically that he repeated the second and fourth grades; that he withdrew from 
school after repeating the seventh grade several times; that he had a learning 
disability; and, importantly, that he was enrolled in the special learning program 
titled Exceptional Student Education.  The testimony at the postconviction hearing 
also established that trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence that the 
defendant experienced chronic depression since childhood; that he abused drugs 
and alcohol; that he suffered from an extreme psychological or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the crime, including depression; and that he had a frontal 
lobe dysfunction likely caused by organic brain damage.  I am concerned with 
whether the failure of trial counsel to investigate and present this evidence in 
support of mitigation undermines confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase 
because it failed to permit the jury to weigh and consider “any relevant mitigating 
factor.”  Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 454-55 (2009) (quoting Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).   
In Porter, the United States Supreme Court held that the failure of trial 
counsel to conduct a thorough investigation into potential mitigation evidence for 
 
 
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the penalty phase was prejudicial to the defendant.  See id.  The High Court held 
that the failure of trial counsel to investigate certain mitigation evidence 
undermined the outcome of the penalty phase proceedings because the absence of 
that evidence deprived the jury of the opportunity to consider any relevant 
mitigating evidence when it determined its recommended sentence.  See id.  The 
evidence trial counsel failed to investigate and present during the penalty phase in 
Porter was similar to the evidence carelessly omitted by trial counsel in this case.  
In this case, as in Porter, the evidence included the possible existence of a brain 
abnormality and cognitive defects, substance abuse, and impairments to the 
defendant’s mental health.   See id. at 450-51.  Thus, as in Porter, trial counsel’s 
failure in this case to present the evidence of mitigation impacted the outcome of 
the penalty phase and may have prejudiced the defendant.    
Further, in a case analogous to Porter, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present 
evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t 
of Corr., 646 F.3d 1328, 1350-57 (11th Cir. 2011).  More specifically, the Eleventh 
Circuit stated that the failure of trial counsel to investigate and present possible 
evidence of physical and emotional abuse inflicted upon the defendant, the 
defendant’s history of drug and alcohol abuse, abandonment of the defendant by 
his mother, as well as the learning deficits and depression of the defendant, 
 
 
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prejudiced the defendant and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id. 
at 1352-57.  The court held that there was a reasonable probability that had trial 
counsel investigated and presented such evidence, the trial court would have found 
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant death.   See 
id. at 1356-57.  Similar to Cooper, the evidence in this case that trial counsel failed 
to investigate and present included impairments in intellectual and cognitive 
functions, as well as evidence of mental health problems and substance abuse.  
Thus, as in Cooper, trial counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence impacts 
confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase.  
As in both Porter and Cooper, the evidence that trial counsel failed to 
investigate and present in this case was pertinent to mitigation because it would 
have painted a fuller picture of the cognitive and intellectual functions and 
impairments of the defendant and the status of his poor mental health at the time of 
the homicide.  The school records alone would have had a significant impact.  The 
failure of trial counsel to investigate and present this information at the penalty 
phase deprived the jury of the opportunity to evaluate and weigh it as part of their 
recommended sentence.  See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 454 (“Under Florida law, mental 
health evidence that does not rise to the level of establishing a statutory mitigating 
circumstance may nonetheless be considered by the sentencing judge and jury as 
mitigating.”); see also Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 913 (Fla. 2002) (“Under 
 
 
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our death penalty system, trial courts are required to consider all mitigating 
evidence presented by the defendant and supported by the record.”  (emphasis 
added)).   
The evolving standards with regard to attorney performance have, in my 
view, certainly progressed to the point that all of this background information 
should have been presented.  The jury should have known that this defendant was 
an ESE student at the elementary school level and failed every subject multiple 
times as he attempted seventh grade material.  This defendant may not have been a 
military hero as was the defendant in Porter, but the jury should have known that 
this defendant was under stress and suffered severe problems not of his own 
creation from his early elementary school days.  Juries need to know “who” the 
defendant is as they return the verdict in a capital case.  My colleagues have 
worked long and hard to properly analyze this case, but my concerns remain.   
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Henry Elisha Davis, Judge - Case No. 16-2000-CF-001549-AX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Frank John Tassone, Jr. and Richard Adam Sichta, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
 
 
- 47 - 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent