Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 2005-Ohio-5981

Docket Number: 20021604

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981.] 
 
 
The STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. JACKSON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — One sentence of death upheld and one 
sentence of death vacated and cause remanded for resentencing — In a 
death-penalty case involving the murder of a young child, the defendant 
is entitled, upon request, to have prospective jurors informed of that fact 
and to ask questions aimed at revealing bias. 
(No. 2002-1604 — Submitted March 30, 2005 — Decided November 23, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, No. CR2002-0011. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C. J. 
{¶ 1} On January 3, 2002, in Lima, Ohio, defendant-appellant, Cleveland 
Jackson Jr., and his half-brother, Jeronique Cunningham, robbed a group of eight 
people and then fired their weapons into the group from close range.  Three-year-
old Jayla Grant and 17-year-old Leneshia Williams both died as a result of 
gunshot wounds.  A jury convicted appellant of the aggravated murders of Jayla 
and Leneshia and sentenced him to death. 
I. Facts and Case History 
{¶ 2} On the afternoon of January 3, 2002, Tara Cunningham, 
appellant’s half-sister and Jeronique’s sister, saw appellant and Jeronique in her 
bedroom with a gun.  According to Tara, Jeronique was wiping off the gun and 
appellant was wiping off the clip, which had bullets in it.  Tara heard appellant 
tell Jeronique that he was going to rob somebody and heard appellant mention 
LaShane (“Shane”) Liles.  Earlier that afternoon, Shane had sold Jeronique crack 
cocaine at Shane’s apartment. 
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{¶ 3} In the evening of January 3, appellant and Jeronique went to 
Shane’s apartment in Lima, Ohio.  When appellant and Jeronique arrived, Shane 
was not home, but several of his relatives and friends were there.  Shane returned 
to his apartment shortly thereafter, and he and appellant discussed a drug 
transaction.  While Shane and appellant talked on the staircase near the living 
room, Jeronique sat in the living room and watched a movie with teenagers Coron 
Liles, Dwight Goodloe Jr., and Leneshia Williams. 
{¶ 4} As Shane and appellant continued to talk, Jeronique stood up and 
ordered Coron, Dwight, and Leneshia into the kitchen.  When they did not 
immediately obey, Jeronique pulled out a gun and struck Coron in the face with 
the barrel, breaking his jaw.  When Jeronique hit Coron, appellant drew his gun 
and aimed it at Shane. 
{¶ 5} Appellant forced Shane upstairs and robbed him of money and 
drugs.  Appellant then tied Shane’s hands behind his back and forced him into the 
kitchen at gunpoint.  In the kitchen, Jeronique was holding at gunpoint Coron, 
Dwight, Leneshia, Armetta Robinson, Tomeaka and James Grant, and James’s 
three-year-old daughter, Jayla. 
{¶ 6} After appellant forced Shane into the kitchen, he asked Shane for 
the rest of the money.  When Shane said that he had given him all he had, 
appellant shot him in the back.  Appellant and Jeronique then fired their weapons 
at the others.  Once the shooting stopped, the victims heard clicking sounds, as 
appellant and Jeronique continued pulling the triggers even after they were out of 
bullets.  Appellant and Jeronique left the kitchen, and James Grant heard appellant 
say, “We have to make sure nobody in there is moving.” 
{¶ 7} The deputy coroner determined that Jayla and Leneshia had both 
been killed by gunshot wounds to the head.  Jayla was shot twice in the head: 
once above the right ear and once behind the right ear.  Both bullets exited Jayla’s 
head.  Leneshia suffered a gunshot wound to the back of her head, and she died 
January Term, 2005 
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almost instantly.  The coroner recovered no bullets or bullet fragments from the 
victims during the autopsies and could not determine the caliber of the bullets that 
had caused the deaths. 
{¶ 8} The surviving victims all suffered gunshot injuries as well.  Shane 
had been shot in the back, and the bullet had exited through the left side of his 
chest.  Armetta had been shot in the head and was in a coma for several weeks.  
James had been shot five times and had sustained injuries to his head, arm, and 
hand.  Tomeaka had been shot in the head and arm and had lost her left eye.  
Coron had been shot in the face, which knocked out some of his teeth and caused 
other injuries to his mouth.  A bullet had grazed Dwight’s side, fracturing a rib. 
{¶ 9} Police found eight spent shell casings, five spent bullets, and one 
fragment of lead core from a full-metal-jacketed bullet at the scene.  When 
Tomeaka testified at trial, one bullet was still lodged in her arm.  Coron testified 
that he had spat a bullet from his mouth outside the apartment, but police never 
found that bullet. 
{¶ 10} John Heile, a firearms expert for the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation, tested the casings and bullets and identified all 
but one shell casing as .380-caliber automatic-weapon ammunition.  Thus, Heile 
established that one of the weapons used in the shootings was a .380 automatic 
pistol.  Heile also determined that state’s exhibits 10 through 17 (shell casings) 
and 18, 19, 21, and 23 (spent bullets), were all fired from the same .380 automatic 
pistol.  One spent bullet and the core fragment did not have enough markings on 
them to determine whether they had been fired from the same weapon as the other 
bullets and casings.  No guns were recovered, but the victims testified that 
appellant had fired a black automatic handgun with a clip and that Jeronique had 
fired a larger, silver revolver. 
{¶ 11} Appellant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder.  
Count One charged appellant with purposely causing the death of Jayla Grant 
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during an aggravated robbery.  R.C. 2903.01(B).  Count Two charged appellant 
with purposely causing the death of Leneshia Williams during an aggravated 
robbery.  R.C. 2903.01(B).  Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery (R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1)) in Count Three and with six counts of attempted aggravated 
murder (R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2903.01(B)) in Counts Four through Nine. 
{¶ 12} The aggravated-murder counts each contained two death-penalty 
specifications.  The first specification charged aggravated murder as part of a 
course of conduct to kill or attempt to kill two or more persons.  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5).  The second specification charged aggravated murder during an 
aggravated robbery and alleged that the murder was committed with prior 
calculation and design.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Firearm specifications were 
attached to all counts. 
{¶ 13} At trial, Officer David Parker testified as a defense witness.  
Parker, who had assisted in photographing and videotaping the crime scene, 
identified defense’s exhibit CC, a videotape of the crime scene.  The defense then 
played the videotape for the jury. 
{¶ 14} Appellant also testified at trial.  According to appellant, on January 
3, 2002, he and Jeronique had planned to rob a drug dealer (not Shane), but their 
plan had not been carried out. 
{¶ 15} Appellant said that he later took Jeronique to pick up a gun.  After 
another discussion about robbing the drug dealer, Jeronique suggested that he and 
appellant go to Shane’s apartment so appellant could pick up some crack cocaine 
for their sister, Tara.  When appellant and Jeronique arrived, Shane was not home.  
Appellant told Jeronique that they should leave, but Jeronique insisted that they 
wait for Shane.  According to appellant, he and Jeronique had not discussed 
robbing Shane. 
{¶ 16} Appellant testified that after Shane came home, Shane gave 
appellant a bag of crack cocaine for Tara.  Shane tried to sell more drugs to 
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appellant, but appellant was not interested.  At that point, Jeronique pulled out a 
gun and ordered Coron, Dwight, and Leneshia into the kitchen.  Dwight and 
Leneshia immediately ran into the kitchen, but when Coron did not move fast 
enough, Jeronique hit him in the mouth with his gun. 
{¶ 17} Appellant said that when Jeronique struck Coron, Shane jumped up 
from the stairs and appellant “got scared” and pulled his gun out.  After Jeronique 
went into the kitchen, appellant talked with Shane on the stairs.  At trial, appellant 
denied that he had pointed his gun at Shane while they talked on the stairs.  
Appellant said that Jeronique had then come out of the kitchen and robbed Shane 
of money that Shane had hidden in his sock.  Jeronique then returned to the 
kitchen, and appellant remained at the bottom of the stairs while Shane went 
upstairs alone.  When Jeronique found out that appellant was not with Shane, 
Jeronique pointed his gun at appellant and ordered him to go after Shane. 
{¶ 18} Appellant went upstairs, where Shane offered him an ounce of 
cocaine to get Jeronique out of the house.  Appellant agreed to get Jeronique out 
of the house for three ounces of cocaine.  Shane gave appellant the drugs, and he 
and Shane went downstairs.  At trial, appellant denied that he had forced Shane 
downstairs and said that Shane had agreed to have his hands tied together so that 
Jeronique would think that appellant had robbed Shane. 
{¶ 19} According to appellant, when appellant and Shane went into the 
kitchen, Jeronique asked appellant how much money Shane had.  Appellant told 
Jeronique that Shane did not have any more money but that appellant had Shane’s 
drugs.  James Grant then called appellant and Jeronique punks and told them to 
leave.  Jeronique pointed his gun at James’s head and pulled the trigger, but the 
gun did not fire.  Appellant said that after the third click of Jeronique’s gun, 
appellant’s own gun accidentally went off, shooting Shane.  Appellant then 
allegedly suggested to Jeronique that they leave, but Jeronique said that he was 
not going to leave any witnesses.  Appellant said that as he had turned to leave, 
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Jeronique “put his hand politely around the barrel of [appellant’s] three-eighty,” 
and appellant let Jeronique have the gun and ran out the front door. 
{¶ 20} Appellant said that he had heard one gunshot as he ran down an 
alley near Shane’s apartment.  Eventually, appellant met up with Jeronique at 
their car, and they fled the scene together.  Appellant testified that Shane was the 
only person he shot and that he did not find out until later that others had been 
shot. 
{¶ 21} The jury convicted appellant of all charges and specifications.  
After a penalty hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to death on both 
Counts One and Two, consistent with the jury’s recommendation.  The trial court 
imposed consecutive sentences of ten years each for appellant’s convictions for 
aggravated robbery and six counts of attempted aggravated murder, plus a three-
year consecutive sentence for the firearm specifications. 
{¶ 22} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 23} Appellant has raised 12 propositions of law.  We have reviewed 
each and determined that none justifies reversal of appellant’s convictions and 
therefore affirm his convictions. 
{¶ 24} We find, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying appellant’s request to inform prospective jurors that one of the murder 
victims was a young child.  Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s death sentence for 
Count One (murder of Jayla Grant) and remand the cause to the trial court for 
resentencing on that count only. 
{¶ 25} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A), we have independently weighed the 
aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors and have reviewed the 
death penalty for the aggravated murder of Leneshia Williams for appropriateness 
and proportionality.  We find that the aggravating circumstance in Count Two 
outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we 
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affirm appellant’s sentence of death for the aggravated murder of Leneshia 
Williams. 
II. Pretrial/Voir Dire Issues 
{¶ 26} In his revised first proposition of law, appellant claims that several 
errors occurred during jury selection. 
A. Prejudicial Publicity 
{¶ 27} Appellant claims that due to the trial court’s restrictions, the voir 
dire inadequately addressed the impact of pretrial publicity on prospective jurors.  
Appellant argues that the extent of pretrial publicity and the number of 
prospective jurors who knew about the crime demanded that a comprehensive 
voir dire examination be conducted.  Appellant filed a motion for a change of 
venue before trial.  The trial court denied the motion after voir dire was 
completed. 
{¶ 28} “The manner in which voir dire is to be conducted lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge.”  State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 
418, 613 N.E.2d 212.  A trial court has “ ‘great latitude in deciding what 
questions should be asked on voir dire.’ ”  State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
381, 386, 659 N.E.2d 292, quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991), 500 U.S. 415, 424, 
111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493.  Crim.R. 24(A) requires that counsel be given 
an opportunity to question prospective jurors or to supplement the court’s voir 
dire examination.  Accord R.C. 2945.27.  But restrictions on voir dire have 
generally been upheld.  Absent a clear abuse of discretion, prejudicial error cannot 
be assigned to the examination of the venire.  State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 
86, 89, 568 N.Ed.2d 674; State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 39, 526 N.E.2d 
274. 
{¶ 29} Despite appellant’s assertions to the contrary, the portion of the 
voir dire focusing on pretrial publicity was adequate.  The voir dire in this case 
was not cursory:  it lasted five days and covered nearly 1,300 pages of transcript.  
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Prospective jurors also completed an extensive juror questionnaire, and the trial 
court repeatedly advised jurors to avoid media coverage about the case. 
{¶ 30} The trial court individually questioned prospective jurors in 
sequestered sessions and asked each prospective juror whether he or she knew 
about the case from either media coverage or other sources.  Nearly every 
prospective juror acknowledged some familiarity with the case.  The court, as 
well as counsel, also individually questioned prospective jurors regarding the 
source of their knowledge of the case, whether they had formed any fixed 
opinions regarding appellant’s guilt or innocence because of their exposure to 
pretrial publicity, whether they could decide the case solely on the evidence 
presented at trial, and whether they could deliberate in a fair and impartial 
manner.  Following thorough questioning, the trial court readily excused members 
of the venire who had formed fixed opinions due to pretrial publicity or were 
otherwise unsuitable. 
{¶ 31} Appellant, however, complains that he was unfairly prohibited 
from inquiring into the content of what prospective jurors had heard from media 
accounts of his case, as well as media coverage of the trial of appellant’s 
accomplice, Jeronique Cunningham.  But a criminal defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to question prospective jurors about the contents of media 
reports that they have been exposed to.  Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 111 
S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493.  The voir dire is sufficient if it shows that jurors will 
be able to set aside any impression they have formed because of pretrial publicity 
and decide the case solely on the law and evidence presented at trial.  State v. 
Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1, 23-24, 570 N.E.2d 229; Patton v. Yount (1984), 
467 U.S. 1025, 1035, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847.  Here, every empaneled 
juror stated either that he or she had formed no opinions based on pretrial 
publicity or that, if he or she had, he or she could set aside those opinions and 
render a fair and impartial verdict.  See, e.g., State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 
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2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 30.  Thus, the trial court took effective 
steps to protect appellant’s rights, and appellant has not proven that his jury was 
impaired by pretrial publicity.  See, e.g., State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 
21, 693 N.E.2d 772; State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 
N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 30-31. 
{¶ 32} Finally, defense counsel waived any potential error by failing to 
challenge any seated juror about prejudicial publicity.  See State v. Smith (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 105, 684 N.E.2d 668, citing State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio 
St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus, vacated 
in part on other grounds by Williams v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 
57 L.Ed.2d 1156.  A juror who is not challenged for cause is presumed to be 
impartial.  State v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 288, 533 N.E.2d 682. 
B. Standard for Excusing Jurors 
{¶ 33} Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in applying the 
standard set forth in Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 
L.Ed.2d 841, instead of the standard in R.C. 2945.25(C), in excusing prospective 
jurors who expressed reservations about capital punishment.  However, the Witt 
standard is the correct standard for determining when a prospective juror may be 
excluded for cause based on his or her opposition to the death penalty.  See State 
v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph 
three of the syllabus, vacated on other grounds by Rogers v. Ohio (1985), 474 
U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 518, 88 L.Ed.2d 452; State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d at 38, 
526 N.E.2d 274. 
C. Examination of Death-Penalty-Opposed Jurors 
{¶ 34} Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied defense 
counsel an opportunity to rehabilitate prospective jurors who said that they 
opposed the death penalty.  The trial court dismissed prospective jurors Nos. 222, 
228, 300, and 301 without giving defense counsel an opportunity to inquire into 
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their views on capital punishment.  Although it might have been preferable for the 
trial court to permit defense counsel to question these jurors, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion.  Each juror unequivocally stated that he or she could not 
fairly consider imposing the death penalty.  Thus, in each instance, there was a 
sufficient basis to support the trial court’s decision.  See State v. Spirko, 59 Ohio 
St.3d at 22, 570 N.E.2d 229; State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 29-30, 
553 N.E.2d 1058. 
D. Voir Dire of “Automatic”-Death-Penalty Jurors 
{¶ 35} Appellant contends that the trial court refused to allow defense 
counsel to fully examine prospective jurors who said that they were willing to 
impose the death penalty regarding their ability to fairly consider mitigating 
evidence and all available sentencing options.  As a result, he claims, his jury may 
have contained jurors who automatically voted for the death penalty upon his 
conviction for aggravated murder. 
{¶ 36} Appellant’s claim is not supported by the record.  Defense counsel 
were given extensive leeway to examine prospective jurors regarding their 
willingness to consider mitigating evidence and impose a life sentence.  Defense 
counsel were permitted to ask questions aimed at gauging each prospective juror’s 
receptiveness to potentially mitigating evidence (e.g., evidence of appellant’s 
deprived childhood and psychiatric testimony). In addition to questioning whether 
jurors would follow the court’s instructions and fairly consider all sentencing 
options, defense counsel were also permitted to ask jurors about their views on 
capital punishment, including their best arguments for and against the death 
penalty.  Defense counsel were also allowed to question prospective jurors on 
other topics, including jurors’ views about race, religion, illegal drugs, and the 
criminal-justice system. 
{¶ 37} Notwithstanding the leeway given his counsel, appellant argues 
that the trial court’s limitations prevented him from successfully challenging for 
January Term, 2005 
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cause those jurors who were inclined to impose the death penalty in every murder 
case.  He identifies prospective jurors Nos. 230, 263, 291 and prospective juror 
No. 299 (who actually sat on his jury) and claims that if the trial court had 
excused these prospective jurors for cause, he would have been able to use his 
peremptory challenges differently. 
{¶ 38} A prospective juror in a capital case may be excused for cause if 
his views on capital punishment would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.’ ”  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 
quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581.  
A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not be overturned on appeal 
“unless it is manifestly arbitrary and unsupported by substantial testimony, so as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 
679 N.E.2d 646; accord State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 
O.O.2d 409, 280 N.E.2d 915. 
{¶ 39} Appellant failed to challenge prospective juror No. 263 and waived 
any alleged error in regard to this prospective juror.  See State v. Smith, 80 Ohio 
St.3d at 105, 684 N.E.2d 668, citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus.  In addition, 
appellant exercised peremptory challenges as to prospective jurors Nos. 230, 263, 
and 291.  Thus, only prospective juror No. 299 actually sat on appellant’s jury. 
{¶ 40} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not excusing these 
prospective jurors for cause.  All four prospective jurors stated that they would 
not automatically vote for the death penalty, that they could follow the court’s 
instructions, and that they would fairly consider mitigating evidence.  A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in denying a challenge for cause if a juror, even one 
predisposed in favor of imposing death, states that he or she will follow the law 
and the court’s instructions.  State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 510, 653 
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N.E.2d 329; State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 468, 739 N.E.2d 749.  
Deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.  
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; State v. 
Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at 8, 679 N.E.2d 646. 
{¶ 41} Appellant also contends that the trial court unduly restricted voir 
dire by precluding defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors 
concerning their views about imposing the death penalty on a person who is 
convicted of killing a three-year-old child.  Appellant bases this claim on the 
following events. 
{¶ 42} During individual voir dire, after six prospective jurors had been 
questioned, including four who eventually were seated as jurors, defense counsel 
requested that the trial court inform prospective jurors that one murder victim was 
three years old and allow the defense to question prospective jurors about that fact 
to reveal any bias toward imposing the death penalty.  At the time this issue was 
raised, the trial court had not informed the venire that one murder victim was 
three years old.  Nor did the court inform any of the remaining prospective jurors 
of this fact. 
{¶ 43} The trial court rejected defense counsel’s request and would not 
permit counsel to discuss the ages of the murder victims with the venire.  The 
judge believed that “the death penalty qualification process should be in the 
abstract” and that voir dire concerned only whether prospective jurors, “without 
knowing the specifics of the case, * * * can keep an open mind on penalty 
determinations.” 
{¶ 44} After another 15 prospective jurors had been individually 
questioned, including three who eventually became jurors, defense counsel again 
asked to examine prospective jurors about their views on imposing the death 
penalty on child murderers. 
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13 
{¶ 45} The trial court denied defense counsel’s second request, ruling that 
a defendant is not entitled to question prospective jurors on the specifics of the 
case.  The trial court reiterated that voir dire should be conducted in the abstract 
and further noted that it viewed defense counsel’s request to question prospective 
jurors about specific facts as an attempt “ ‘to predispose jurors to react a certain 
way to anticipated evidence,’ ” quoting Missouri v. Clark (Mo.1998), 981 S.W.2d 
143, 147. 
{¶ 46} Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial on the basis that they 
had been precluded from making an inquiry on this subject.  The trial court denied 
the motion. 
{¶ 47} On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court’s refusal to tell 
prospective jurors that one of the murder victims was three years old prevented 
him from discovering a bias on the part of prospective jurors.  Due to this 
restriction, appellant argues that he was unable to develop and exercise challenges 
for cause and peremptory strikes against prospective jurors who could not fairly 
consider mitigation or a life sentence. 
{¶ 48} Crim.R. 24 and R.C. 2945.27 afford both the prosecution and 
defense the opportunity to conduct reasonable voir dire of prospective jurors.  
Nevertheless, the scope of voir dire falls within the trial court’s sound discretion 
and varies depending on the circumstances of a given case.  State v. LaMar, 95 
Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶ 40, citing State v. 
Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 481, 653 N.E.2d 304.  While restrictions on 
voir dire have generally been upheld, any limits on voir dire must be reasonable.  
State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913; State v. Gross, 
97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 31.  We will not find 
prejudicial error in a trial court’s qualification of venirepersons as fair and 
impartial jurors unless appellant can show a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 565, 715 N.E.2d 1144.  A trial court abuses 
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its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably.  State v. 
Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144; State v. 
LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶ 40. 
{¶ 49} We conclude that the trial court’s limitation on voir dire in this 
case was an abuse of discretion.  The trial court erred when it held that appellant 
was not entitled to have prospective jurors informed that one of the murder 
victims was three years old.  While fairness requires that jurors be impartial, 
prospective jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved to 
be qualified as jurors.  State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 
N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 38, citing State v. Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 235, 
703 N.E.2d 286; Murphy v. Florida (1975), 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S.Ct. 
2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589. 
{¶ 50} The trial court cited State v. Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 653 
N.E.2d 304, for the principle that voir dire should be conducted in the abstract.  
Lundgren, however, does not stand for this broad proposition.  In Lundgren, the 
defense counsel wanted to ask prospective jurors whether they would consider 
specifically identified mitigating factors.  Id. at 481, 653 N.E.2d 304.  The trial 
court denied the request, ruling that “such questions constituted juror 
‘indoctrination,’ ” but did allow counsel to ask prospective jurors generally 
whether they would consider mitigating factors as instructed.  Id.  We held that 
the trial court had exercised appropriate discretion.  Id. 
{¶ 51} Moreover, in State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 553 N.E.2d 
576, we rejected the argument that it was improper to outline the facts of the case 
during voir dire.  In Tyler, the prosecutor told several veniremen that the victim 
was an elderly man who sold fruits and vegetables, the location of his produce 
stand, and that he had been robbed and shot to death.  We held that in examining 
prospective jurors the state had the right to state the nature of the alleged offense 
January Term, 2005 
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in order to determine whether the jurors had read about the crime.  Tyler, 50 Ohio 
St.3d at 32, 553 N.E.2d 576. 
{¶ 52} In this case, the trial judge misconstrued defense counsel’s request 
to inform the prospective jurors of Jayla’s age as an attempt “ ‘to predispose 
jurors to react a certain way to anticipated evidence,’ ” quoting Missouri v. Clark, 
981 S.W.2d 143, 147.  Counsel were merely attempting to discover whether 
prospective jurors could fairly consider imposition of a life sentence in a case 
involving a three-year-old murder victim.  While it is improper for counsel to seek 
a commitment from prospective jurors on whether they would find specific 
evidence mitigating, State v. Bedford, 39 Ohio St.3d at 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 
counsel should be permitted to present uncontested facts to the venire directed at 
revealing prospective jurors’ biases.  Turner v. Murray (1986), 476 U.S. 28, 36-
37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27. 
{¶ 53} Even without being informed that one of the victims in this case 
was a child, some members of the venire indicated a possible bias in favor of 
imposing the death penalty on murderers of children.  For example, prospective 
juror No. 257 stated on her juror questionnaire that she had “conflicting feelings” 
regarding capital punishment: “Catholicism teaches that I shouldn’t sit in 
judgment.  However, many violent criminals probably deserve to die, especially 
those who commit crimes against children.”  During voir dire, she confirmed that 
her opinion had not changed. 
{¶ 54} Prospective juror No. 282 stated that she considered crimes against 
children and the elderly to be the most serious crimes because persons in those 
groups are “closer to my heart than anybody.”  She also explained that in her 
opinion, people convicted of crimes against children and the elderly are not 
punished as severely as they ought to be. 
{¶ 55} Prospective juror No. 288 stated on her questionnaire and during 
voir dire that she believed that the death penalty is a proper remedy when a 
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murder is premeditated, when the defendant showed no remorse, or when the 
victim was a child. 
{¶ 56} “The Constitution * * * does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, 
but only that the defendant be afforded a fair and impartial jury.  Even so, part of 
the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to 
identify unqualified jurors.”  Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 
S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.E.2d 492; State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 386, 659 N.E.2d 
292.  “Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove 
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s 
instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.”  Rosales-Lopez v. 
United States (1981), 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22.  
Accordingly, the exercise of the trial court’s discretion to restrict inquiry by 
counsel is subject to the essential demands of fairness.  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 730, 
112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, citing Aldridge v. United States (1931), 283 
U.S. 308, 310, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054. 
{¶ 57} Questions on voir dire must be sufficient to identify prospective 
jurors who hold views that would prevent or substantially impair them from 
performing the duties required of jurors.  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 734-735, 112 S.Ct. 
2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492.  Moreover, the fact that defendant bears the burden of 
establishing juror partiality, see Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423, 105 S.Ct. 
844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, makes it all the more imperative that a defendant be entitled 
to meaningful examination at voir dire in order to elicit potential biases held by 
prospective jurors.  Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. at 441, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 
L.Ed.2d 493 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 58} The trial court here was on notice that some prospective jurors 
harbored a strong bias in favor of imposing death for murderers of children.  If an 
issue of bias surfaces before trial, it is the trial court’s responsibility to conduct an 
adequate inquiry.  Oswald v. Bertrand (C.A.7, 2004), 374 F.3d 475, 484.  See, 
January Term, 2005 
17 
also, United States v. Barber (C.A.4, 1996), 80 F.3d 964, 968 (an inquiry is 
required during voir dire to eliminate prejudice that threatens the fairness of the 
process or the result).  The greater the probability of bias, “the more searching the 
inquiry needed to make reasonably sure that an unbiased jury is impaneled.”  
Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d at 480. 
{¶ 59} At a minimum, the trial court should have granted defense 
counsel’s request to inform the venire that one murder victim was a three-year-old 
child.  If the prospective jurors had been aware of this fact when they were asked 
general questions of fairness and impartiality, they may well have been prompted 
to admit to a predisposition to recommend the death penalty for those who murder 
children.  However, without knowledge of this fact, prospective jurors could 
respond truthfully to general questions of fairness and impartiality while the 
specific concern was left unprobed. 
{¶ 60} In this case, appellant was charged with killing a three-year-old 
child.  “[I]t is in just these circumstances, when the crime itself is likely to 
inflame the passions of jurors, that courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the 
demands of due process are met.”  McKenzie v. Smith (C.A.6, 2003), 326 F.3d 
721, 727-728 (case involving brutal assault on three-year-old child).  Protecting 
children from harm is a common human characteristic, and many people harbor 
strong feelings and emotions whenever a child is a victim of a violent crime.  
Some prospective jurors, when presented with this fact, may have been unable to 
remain dispassionate and impartial when deciding whether the death sentence 
should be imposed.  The possibility that one juror might not have fairly 
considered sentencing options and may have voted for the death penalty solely 
because appellant murdered a three-year-old child is a risk too great to ignore.  “If 
even one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is 
disentitled to execute the sentence.”  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 
119 L.Ed.2d 492.  Therefore, we find that due process required that defense 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
counsel be allowed to determine whether any members of the venire harbored 
prejudices regarding this fact in order to exercise their challenges intelligently. 
{¶ 61} We hold that in a death-penalty case involving the murder of a 
young child the defendant is entitled, upon request, to have the prospective jurors 
informed of that fact and to ask questions that seek to reveal bias.  The trial court 
retains its discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject, 
including whether to question the prospective jurors individually or collectively.  
See State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 386, 659 N.E.2d 292; Ham v. South 
Carolina, 409 U.S. at 527, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46. 
{¶ 62} The trial court abused its discretion by refusing defense counsel’s 
requests to advise prospective jurors that one of the murdered victims was a three-
year-old child and by refusing to allow voir dire on that fact.  Therefore, the death 
sentence imposed on appellant in Count I for the aggravated murder of Jayla 
Grant is vacated.  The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing 
consistent with R.C. 2929.06.  Our disposition of this issue does not affect the 
separate death sentence imposed on Jackson for the death of Leneshia Williams. 
E. Improper Selection of Venire 
{¶ 63} Appellant asserts that his convictions and death sentence are infirm 
because the petit-jury venire, grand-jury venire, and grand-jury foreperson were 
improperly selected.  He argues that the use of voter-registration lists for jury 
selection resulted in a significant underrepresentation of African-Americans. 
{¶ 64} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not 
require that petit juries “mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive 
groups in the population.”  Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 
S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690.  However, the method employed for selecting the 
groups from which juries are drawn “must not systematically exclude distinctive 
groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.”  
Id. 
January Term, 2005 
19 
{¶ 65} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) 
that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; 
(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected 
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of 
the group in the jury-selection process.”  Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357, 
364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579.  Accord State v. Fulton (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 
120, 566 N.E.2d 1195, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 66} For purposes of fair-cross-section analysis, African-Americans are 
a distinctive group.  State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 340, 744 N.E.2d 
1163.  However, with respect to the second prong of the Duren test, appellant has 
not proven that African-Americans in Allen County are unfairly represented in 
venires relative to their numbers in the community.  In fact, appellant’s trial 
counsel conceded that they had no evidence to support their claim that Allen 
County juries have traditionally been void of African-Americans. 
{¶ 67} Appellant also cannot satisfy the third prong of Duren, because he 
has not presented any evidence of systematic exclusion of African-Americans.  
Before trial, defense counsel extensively questioned employees of the Allen 
County Board of Elections and two county jury commissioners on the process 
used to compile the voter-registration list from which prospective jurors are 
drawn.  The defense also entered into evidence the voter-registration list used in 
this case.  None of the data used by the board of elections identifies the race of 
prospective jurors.  Appellant simply has not shown that voter-registration 
qualifications are suspect or that the jury-selection procedure employed by Allen 
County is administered in a discriminatory manner.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Ireland (C.A.8, 1995), 62 F.3d 227, 231. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 68} Based on the foregoing, we sustain in part appellant’s revised first 
proposition of law. 
III. Guilt-Phase Issues 
A. Irrelevant/Inflammatory Evidence 
{¶ 69} In his second proposition of law, appellant contends that the state 
improperly introduced irrelevant and inflammatory evidence at trial.  Appellant 
takes issue with three physical exhibits admitted into evidence: a tooth fragment 
and the pants and shirt worn by Jayla Grant.  The defense objected to the 
admission of the tooth and the clothing at the close of the state’s case. 
{¶ 70} Appellant’s challenge to the admission of the tooth fragment on 
grounds of relevancy and lack of foundation is without merit.  Defense counsel 
did not object to the admission of the tooth on grounds of relevancy and has 
waived that issue.  See State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 160-161, 749 
N.E.2d 226.  In any event, the tooth fragment recovered from the crime scene was 
relevant.  Coron Liles testified that he was shot in the mouth and lost two teeth as 
a result.  Obviously, the discovery of a tooth fragment at the crime scene 
corroborates Coron’s testimony and makes it more probable that his testimony 
was truthful.  See Evid.R. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).  
Moreover, appellant’s argument that the tooth fragment was not properly 
identified as Coron’s tooth relates to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility.  See, e.g., State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 84, 656 N.E.2d 
643; State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 50-51, 630 N.E.2d 339. 
{¶ 71} The trial court’s admission of Jayla Grant’s bloodstained clothes, 
however, was an error.  Jayla was shot twice in the head, but no evidence was 
introduced to show that she had sustained injuries to any other part of her body.  
Nor was there any testimony that the blood on the clothing was hers.  Her father 
January Term, 2005 
21 
merely identified these items as the clothing Jayla had been wearing when she 
was shot.  Thus, the clothes were not relevant to any fact of consequence.  See 
Evid.R. 401 and 402.  Nevertheless, because the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming, we find no basis to conclude that appellant’s substantial rights 
were affected by the admission of this evidence.  Evid.R. 103 and Crim.R. 52(A); 
see, e.g., State v. Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d at 486, 653 N.E.2d 304.  Thus, any 
error in this regard was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 72} Appellant also raises issues regarding the testimony of the police 
officer who identified the tooth fragment at trial and testimony from James Grant 
about Jayla’s plea for help.  Appellant failed to object in both instances and 
thereby waived these issues.  See Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus.  There 
was no error, plain or otherwise. 
{¶ 73} Appellant complains that Officer Hammond was not qualified as 
an expert in identifying tooth fragments.  But Hammond’s testimony was 
admissible as opinion testimony of a lay witness under Evid.R. 701.  Evid.R. 701 
permits lay-witness opinion testimony if the opinion is “(1) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” 
{¶ 74} Hammond had recovered the tooth fragment from the scene, so his 
opinion was based on his firsthand perception.  His opinion testimony was also 
helpful in understanding his testimony about the evidence he had gathered at the 
scene.  See, e.g., State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 29, 559 N.E.2d 464 
(permitting lay opinion testimony that is more in the nature of a description by 
example than the expression of a conclusion).  Even if we were to hold otherwise, 
the lack of scientific authentication of the tooth would not have affected the 
outcome of appellant’s trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 75} In addition, no error occurred regarding James Grant’s testimony 
about his daughter’s plea for help.  James testified that after the shooting ended, 
he laid his daughter on the floor to see if she was injured.  When James attempted 
to go for help, Jayla put up her arms and asked James to help her.  Appellant 
describes this testimony as hearsay and contends that it should not have been 
admitted because it was inflammatory victim-impact evidence. 
{¶ 76} First, Jayla’s plea for help after she was shot was admissible under 
the excited-utterance exception of Evid.R. 803(2).  See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 
104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 94.  Second, the 
statement was relevant to the circumstances surrounding the shooting and the 
victim’s death.  Therefore, we reject appellant’s second proposition of law. 
{¶ 77} In his third proposition of law, appellant contends that the state 
introduced impermissible victim-impact evidence when the prosecutor elicited 
irrelevant and inflammatory testimony from the surviving victims.  However, 
defense counsel failed to object to the admission of this allegedly irrelevant and 
inflammatory testimony and waived all but plain error.  State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 160-161, 749 N.E.2d 226. 
{¶ 78} Appellant complains about guilt-phase testimony from the 
surviving victims describing where they had been shot, the extent of their injuries, 
and, in some cases, the lingering effects of their injuries.  However, we have 
previously held that evidence that depicts the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the commission of an offense and the impact of the offense on the victims is 
admissible during the guilt phase.  See State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
435, 440, 650 N.E.2d 878; State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 82-83, 641 
N.E.2d 1082. 
{¶ 79} Appellant was charged with six counts of attempted aggravated 
murder, and testimony of the surviving victims regarding the nature and extent of 
their injuries was relevant to prove the elements of these offenses, including 
January Term, 2005 
23 
intent.  Other testimony describing where the bullets entered the victims’ bodies 
and the resulting wounds is probative of intent to cause death.  See, e.g., State v. 
Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768.  This 
testimony was also probative of the firearm specifications, the aggravated-robbery 
charge and specification, and the course-of-conduct specification.  See, e.g., State 
v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 499-500, 663 N.E.2d 1277 (victim-impact 
evidence is permissible if it relates to the facts attendant to the offenses).  
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third proposition. 
B. Photographic Evidence 
{¶ 80} In his fourth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence cumulative and gruesome photographs of the 
victims.  However, appellant fails to identify by exhibit number or otherwise 
which photographs are objectionable.  Instead he refers only generally to autopsy 
photographs and photos of dead bodies but offers little more than a conclusory 
argument for why these photographs were inadmissible. 
{¶ 81} In capital cases, nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are 
admissible if relevant, as long as the probative value of each photograph 
outweighs the danger of material prejudice to the accused.  State v. Maurer, 15 
Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus.  
Decisions on the admissibility of photographs are “left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court.”  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 82} During the guilt phase, defense counsel stipulated to the admission 
of all photographic exhibits except one: a photograph of Leneshia Williams taken 
prior to her death.  Thus, appellant has waived all but plain error as to state’s 
exhibits 30 through 63.  See State v. Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 358, 763 
N.E.2d 122.  We find that no plain error occurred. 
{¶ 83} A total of eight autopsy photographs were admitted at trial.  
Exhibits 30 through 33 are autopsy photos of Jayla Grant.  These photos 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
illustrated the coroner’s testimony on cause of death and were probative of issues 
of intent and lack of accident or mistake.  See State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 331, 342, 703 N.E.2d 1251.  Although gruesome, these photos were not 
duplicative or cumulative, and the value of each photograph outweighed any 
prejudicial impact.  See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-
6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 88. 
{¶ 84} State’s exhibits 34 through 37 are autopsy photographs of Leneshia 
Williams, each depicting the gunshot wound to her head.  State’s exhibits 34 and 
35 are photos of the same wound, but state’s exhibit 35 was taken from a wider 
angle.  State’s exhibits 34 and 35 are repetitive, and only one of these photos 
should have been admitted.  Similarly, state’s exhibit 36 is a close-up version of 
state’s exhibit 37, and only one of these photos should have been admitted.  
Nevertheless, these photos illustrated the testimony of the coroner and were 
relevant to show the shooter’s intent and the cause of death.  See, e.g., State v. 
Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d at 50, 630 N.E.2d 339; State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 
27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, at ¶ 96-97.  Accordingly, no plain error 
occurred from their admission. 
{¶ 85} Three crime-scene photographs depicting the body of Leneshia 
Williams were also properly admitted at trial.  State’s exhibit 42 is a crime-scene 
photo of Leneshia lying in a pool of blood.  This photo depicts how the body was 
positioned in the apartment, and, although gruesome, it is probative of the 
shooter’s intent and the manner and circumstances of Leneshia’s death.  State’s 
exhibit 43 shows Leneshia’s hand in a pool of blood.  This photo helped explain 
the testimony of police officers who discovered and processed the crime scene.  It 
is not duplicative or cumulative.  The impact of state’s exhibit 53, which depicts 
the body of Leneshia Williams, is minimal.  The body is covered by a jacket and 
partially obscured by a table, and only her hand is visible in the photo. 
January Term, 2005 
25 
{¶ 86} As to the remaining photographs admitted at trial, none are 
gruesome.  Those depicting the victims are relevant to show the injuries the 
surviving victims sustained and are probative of appellant’s intent and lack of 
accident or mistake.  See State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 265, 15 OBR 379, 473 
N.E.2d 768.  Several photographs show bloodstained areas and splatters, but no 
bodies are depicted, and the photos are not gruesome.  State v. DePew (1988), 38 
Ohio St.3d 275, 281, 528 N.E.2d 542; State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 108, 684 
N.E.2d 668.  The photo exhibits illustrated the testimony of police officers and 
victims who described the crime scene and evidence discovered there and were 
relevant to the nature and circumstances of the crime.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, at ¶ 72; State 
v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 676-677, 687 N.E.2d 1358. 
{¶ 87} Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in admitting 
gruesome photos during the penalty phase.  Again, appellant fails to specify 
which photos were prejudicial.  Defense counsel did object to the admission of 
state’s exhibits 30 through 41 in the penalty phase.  However, a trial court may 
properly allow repetition of much or all that occurred in the guilt phase, pursuant 
to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).  State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 282-283, 528 N.E.2d 
542.  As we previously indicated, state’s exhibits 34 and 35 were repetitive of 
each other, as were state’s exhibits 36 and 37.  But the error in admitting them 
was harmless.  Thus, we deny appellant’s fourth proposition of law. 
C. Guilt-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 88} In his fifth proposition of law, appellant takes issue with the 
instructions the trial court provided to the jury.  Aside from the reasonable-doubt 
instruction, appellant did not object at trial to the instructions that he now 
challenges.  We find no error, plain or otherwise. 
{¶ 89} The trial court’s purpose instruction accurately reflects the law.  
See, e.g., State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 291, 731 N.E.2d 159, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d at 81, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (two cases with purpose 
instructions similar to that used in this case).  In addition, contrary to appellant’s 
challenge, the reasonable-doubt instruction in the guilt phase was in accord with 
R.C. 2901.05(D).  We have previously rejected similar complaints against the 
statutory definition.  See, e.g., State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 
594 N.E.2d 604; State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 202, 702 N.E.2d 866. 
{¶ 90} Appellant also contends that the trial court’s instructions defining 
causation and foreseeability were incompatible with the requirement that the state 
prove a specific intent to cause death.  Nevertheless, the use of these instructions 
is not plain error when the instructions as a whole make clear that the jury is 
required to find purpose to kill in order to convict.  State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 
at 100, 656 N.E.2d 643.  Here, the trial court instructed the jury that purpose to 
cause the death of another is an essential element of the offenses of aggravated 
murder and attempted aggravated murder and further instructed that “if there was 
no purpose to cause the death of anyone, the defendant cannot be found guilty of 
Aggravated Murder or Attempted Aggravated Murder.”  Thus, plain error is 
absent.  Therefore, appellant’s fifth proposition of law is rejected. 
IV. Penalty-Phase Issues 
A. Readmission of Guilt-Phase Evidence 
{¶ 91} Appellant argues in his sixth proposition of law that the trial court 
erred when it readmitted guilt-phase testimony from the surviving victims in the 
penalty phase.  Appellant contends that the vast majority of guilt-phase testimony 
constituted improper victim-impact evidence. 
{¶ 92} At the beginning of the penalty phase, the trial court merged the 
two capital specifications that appellant had been found guilty of committing, 
leaving only the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance 
for the jury’s consideration.  Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court told 
January Term, 2005 
27 
the jurors that they could consider any of the guilt-phase testimony that related to 
the course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance. 
{¶ 93} R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) requires the jury to consider “any evidence 
raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was 
found guilty of committing * * * [and] hear testimony and other evidence that is 
relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the 
offender was found guilty of committing.”  See, also, State v. Gumm (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus; State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 352-353, 662 N.E.2d 311.  Contrary to appellant’s argument, testimony 
from the surviving victims regarding the nature and extent of their injuries was 
directly relevant to the course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance and to the 
nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstance. 
{¶ 94} Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in readmitting 
certain photos during the penalty phase, but we rejected this same argument 
regarding appellant’s fourth proposition of law.  For the foregoing reasons, we 
overrule appellant’s sixth proposition. 
B. Presence of Surviving Victims during Penalty Phase 
{¶ 95} Appellant argues in his seventh proposition of law that his right to 
a fair sentencing proceeding was violated when the trial court permitted the 
surviving victims to be present in the courtroom throughout the penalty phase.  
R.C. 2930.09 provides that a victim in a case may be present whenever the 
defendant is present during any stage of the case that is conducted on the record, 
other than a grand-jury proceeding, unless the court determines that exclusion of 
the victim is necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
{¶ 96} Appellant contends that the trial court failed to make a 
determination that the presence of these victims would not violate his right to a 
fair sentencing determination.  Although R.C. 2930.09 provides that a defendant’s 
fair-trial rights are superior to a victim’s right to be present, the statute clearly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
gives the trial court discretion to make the determination whether the victim’s 
presence will prejudice the defendant.  See State v. Martin, 151 Ohio App.3d 605, 
2003-Ohio-735, 784 N.E.2d 1237, at ¶ 66.  Here, nothing in the record supports 
appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider whether his rights would be 
jeopardized by the presence of the surviving victims.  In fact, the trial court 
excluded these witnesses from the courtroom during the guilt phase in order to 
protect appellant’s fair-trial rights. 
{¶ 97} Moreover, appellant offers no evidence or argument beyond pure 
speculation that the presence of the surviving victims at the penalty-phase 
proceedings was prejudicial.  None of the surviving victims testified during the 
penalty phase, and it is not clear which victims, if any, were present in the 
courtroom.  Thus, appellant has not demonstrated that his right to a fair trial was 
compromised in any way.  Therefore, we deny appellant’s seventh proposition. 
C. Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 98} In his eighth proposition of law, appellant raises several claims 
against the trial court’s penalty-phase instructions to the jury.  We find that none 
of appellant’s arguments has merit. 
{¶ 99} First, appellant challenges the trial court’s instructions regarding 
the guilt-phase testimony that was relevant to the penalty-phase weighing process.  
Appellant’s argument here is really a challenge to the admission of guilt-phase 
testimony in the penalty phase.  However, we considered and rejected that same 
argument under appellant’s sixth proposition of law.  To the extent that 
appellant’s argument can be construed as a challenge to the court’s jury 
instructions on relevant guilt-phase testimony, no error occurred.  Viewing the 
penalty instructions as a whole, we hold that the trial court adequately guided the 
jury as to the evidence to consider in the penalty phase.  Moreover, much of the 
guilt-phase testimony was relevant in the penalty phase because it related to the 
course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance, the nature and circumstances of the 
January Term, 2005 
29 
offense, and the asserted mitigating factors.  See, e.g., State v. Jones (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 335, 349-350, 744 N.E.2d 1163. 
{¶ 100} Appellant next argues that the trial court’s penalty-phase 
instructions “relieved the state of its mandated burden of proof.”  However, the 
trial court properly instructed the jury that the state had the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the 
mitigating factors.  Additionally, appellant’s challenge to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), 
which puts the burden of going forward with mitigating evidence on the 
defendant, lacks merit because appellant presented evidence in mitigation.  See 
State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 16, 564 N.E.2d 408. 
{¶ 101} Appellant also challenges the trial court’s reasonable-doubt 
instruction in the penalty phase.  But the reasonable-doubt instruction given 
followed the suggested instruction in State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 132, 
694 N.E.2d 916.  In addition, the trial court need not instruct on residual doubt.  
State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112; State v. Green 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 360, 738 N.E.2d 1208. 
{¶ 102} Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on the true meaning of parole eligibility.  The trial court 
instructed the jury that if the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors, then it would be 
the jurors’ “duty to decide which of the following life sentence alternatives should 
be imposed – (A), the sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility 
until twenty-five full years of imprisonment have been served; or, (B) the 
sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility until thirty full years of 
imprisonment have been served; or, (C) life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.” 
{¶ 103} The trial court’s instruction clearly indicated that if the jury 
chose life without parole, appellant would never be eligible for parole.  In 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
addition, the instruction made clear that if the jury recommended one of the other 
life sentences, appellant would serve a full 25 or 30 years before being eligible for 
parole.  See State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 375, 582 N.E.2d 972.  
Moreover, while the trial court declined to include in its instructions appellant’s 
proposed explanation of parole eligibility, defense counsel were given leeway to 
explain during closing argument that a person is not automatically paroled once 
he or she is eligible for parole.  Accordingly, appellant’s eighth proposition is 
overruled. 
V. Sentencing Opinion 
{¶ 104} Appellant contends in his 11th proposition of law that the trial 
court’s sentencing opinion does not comply with the requirements of R.C. 
2929.03(F).  R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the trial court, in imposing a sentence of 
death, to state in a separate opinion “its specific findings as to the existence of any 
of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised 
Code, the existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating circumstances 
the offender was found guilty of committing, and the reasons why the aggravating 
circumstances * * * were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.” 
{¶ 105} Appellant first argues that the trial court virtually ignored 
substantial mitigating factors and erred in assigning little or no weight to 
mitigating factors. 
{¶ 106} We have long held that in imposing sentence, the assessment of 
and weight given to mitigating evidence are within the trial court’s discretion.  
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 171, 555 N.E.2d 293.  “The fact that 
mitigation evidence is admissible ‘does not automatically mean that it must be 
given any weight.’  State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 
N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the syllabus.”  State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
223, 235, 690 N.E.2d 522.  “[T]he weight, if any, to assign a given factor is a 
January Term, 2005 
31 
matter for the discretion of the individual decisionmaker.”  State v. Fox (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 183, 193, 631 N.E.2d 124. 
{¶ 107} Appellant further contends that the trial court failed to explain 
why the sole aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  But the trial court’s opinion contradicts appellant’s claim.  
The trial court discussed in detail the mitigating evidence that had been presented, 
including appellant’s history, character, and background.  It also discussed its 
determination that the nature and circumstances of the offenses provided little 
mitigating weight.  The court also set forth the statutory mitigating factors 
established by the evidence, R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), (5), (6), and (7).  The trial court 
then indicated what weight, if any, it assigned to the mitigating factors.  
Thereafter, the trial court concluded that appellant’s acting in a course of conduct 
that involved the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill eight people, and the 
actual killing of two people, “places him in a narrow class of murderers that 
deserve society’s ultimate punishment.”  Accordingly, we reject appellant’s 11th 
proposition of law. 
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
{¶ 108} In his ninth proposition of law, appellant contends that he was 
denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.  Whether a prosecutor’s 
remarks at trial require a reversal of conviction requires an analysis as to (1) 
whether the remarks were improper and (2) if so, whether the remarks 
prejudicially affected the accused’s substantial rights.  State v. Smith (1984), 14 
Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  The touchstone of the analysis 
“is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips 
(1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. 
{¶ 109} Guilt-phase closing argument.  First, appellant argues that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the guilt-phase closing argument, when 
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the prosecutor focused on the pain and suffering of the victims and presented 
graphic photographs that appealed to the jurors’ passions and prejudices. 
{¶ 110} “Prosecutors are entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has 
shown and what inferences can be drawn therefrom.”  State v. Richey (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915, overruled on other grounds, State v. 
McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d at 402-404, 686 N.E.2d 1112.  Most of the comments 
complained of here reflected evidence that had been presented at trial and were 
not improper.  The prosecutor merely stressed the strength of the evidence that 
appellant had committed the charged offenses.  See, e.g., State v. Hicks (1989), 43 
Ohio St.3d 72, 76, 538 N.E.2d 1030. 
{¶ 111} Appellant urges that the prosecutor exceeded the scope of proper 
argument when he displayed and commented on photographs depicting the 
deceased victims.  The prosecutor first identified a photo of Leneshia Williams 
and stated:  “Leneshia was just seventeen years old.  She can’t tell us what 
happened.  The reason she can’t tell us is because he and his brother shot her and 
she died.”  The prosecutor then displayed an autopsy photo of Jayla Grant, and 
commented:  “Then there’s Jayla, who even in death is a beautiful little girl.  The 
last thing she did is reach up to her dad and say, ‘Help me, daddy.  Help me.’  * * 
* He (appellant) and his brother * * * turned this, this young girl, and he turned 
her into that. * * * He turned that beautiful little three year old girl into a 
specimen on the Lucas County Coroner’s Table.” 
{¶ 112} There was no objection to either comment, and, therefore, the 
prosecutor’s remarks cannot be grounds for error unless they served to deny 
appellant a fair trial.  State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 
N.E.2d 1244, paragraph one of the syllabus, death penalty vacated on other 
grounds, Wade v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3138, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157. 
{¶ 113} We find that the prosecutor’s comments do not rise to the level 
of plain error.  Evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming, and the 
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33 
statements in this case were not so inflammatory that appellant’s convictions were 
the product of passion and prejudice rather than proof of guilt.  See State v. 
Williams (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 23 OBR 13, 490 N.E.2d 906.  Cf. State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 613 N.E.2d 203.  In addition, a prosecutor’s argument 
must be viewed in its entirety to determine prejudice.  State v. Hill (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068.  In this case, the prosecutor’s remarks did 
not materially prejudice appellant.  Finally, the trial court instructed the jurors that 
they must not be influenced by any consideration of sympathy or prejudice. 
{¶ 114} The prosecutor also gave his personal opinion when, apparently 
referring to a photograph depicting an injured Armetta Robinson, he stated, 
“Maybe Armetta is the luckiest of all.  She doesn’t look so lucky there.  But, 
today, she really has no independent memory of what happened that terrible day 
in that kitchen.”  (Emphasis added.)  Defense counsel failed to object, and we find 
that this statement did not affect the outcome of appellant’s trial.  See State v. 
Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶ 115} Penalty-phase closing argument.  Appellant next contends that 
the prosecutor misled the jury by equating his mitigation evidence with an attempt 
to avoid moral culpability.  Appellant, however, did not object to the comments 
he now complains of and has waived all but plain error.  State v. Lundgren, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 492, 653 N.E.2d 304. 
{¶ 116} Several times during rebuttal closing argument, the state 
questioned whether appellant’s mitigating evidence “lessen[ed] his moral 
culpability or diminish[ed] the appropriateness of the death sentence.”  Although 
the prosecutor’s comments did stray from the definition of “mitigating evidence” 
approved in State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 527 N.E.2d 831, the 
trial court properly defined “mitigating factors,” and the jury was not limited in its 
consideration of mitigating evidence, State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 200-201, 
702 N.E.2d 866.  Moreover, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the 
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appropriate weighing of mitigating factors, and the jury was advised that the issue 
before them in the penalty phase was punishment and not an assessment of 
culpability.  Therefore, plain error did not occur. 
{¶ 117} Improper vouching.  Appellant argues that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by improperly vouching for the credibility of Tara 
Cunningham, appellant’s half-sister.  It is improper for an attorney to express a 
personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness.  State v. Williams, 79 
Ohio St.3d at 12, 679 N.E.2d 646.  In order to vouch for the witness, the 
prosecutor must imply knowledge of facts outside the record or place the 
prosecutor’s personal credibility in issue.  See State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 646, 666, 693 N.E.2d 246. 
{¶ 118} Appellant claims that the following comment made during the 
state’s guilt-phase rebuttal closing argument constituted improper vouching: 
{¶ 119} “Then, Tara.  Tara has become just such a horrible witch who 
didn’t like her brother much.  Well, it’s amazing.  Just hours before [the murder] 
they’re [appellant and Jeronique] over to her house.  They’re upstairs and they’re 
using her shirt to wipe off the gun and to wipe off the bullets.  Now, you know, 
they’re [defense counsel] vilifying her.  She was badgered.  They were 
belligerent.  She had a brutal cross-examination.  She stood up.  You know, it’s 
not easy for someone to come in and testify against their brothers.  But, 
apparently she has – she may lead a different life style than most of us, but she 
has a sense of decency.  She knows a little bit of what’s right and what’s wrong 
and what’s just.  She had no motive to lie.  No motive.  None whatsoever.” 
{¶ 120} The prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Tara’s credibility as 
a witness.  The prosecutor merely argued that Tara was a reliable witness and that 
she lacked any motive to lie.  This type of argument is not improper vouching 
when, as here, the prosecutor is responding to defense counsel’s attacks on a 
witness’s credibility and refers to facts in evidence that tend to make the witness 
January Term, 2005 
35 
more credible.  See State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d at 373-374, 738 N.E.2d 1208.  
Moreover, defense counsel did not object, and there was no plain error.  When 
viewed in its entirety, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument neither materially 
prejudiced appellant nor denied him a fair trial.  See State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 
at 78, 641 N.E.2d 1082. 
{¶ 121} Opposing theories.  Appellant contends that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by relying on opposing theories during the trials of 
appellant and Jeronique.  Appellant argues that the state presented evidence and 
argument at his trial that he was the person primarily responsible for committing 
these crimes but that during Jeronique’s trial, the prosecutor had argued that 
Jeronique was the primary planner and actor.  For the following reasons, 
appellant’s claim is without merit. 
{¶ 122} First, appellant offers only a conclusory argument that the state 
relied on inconsistent theories in appellant’s and Jeronique’s trials.  The record 
indicates that appellant’s counsel received complete transcripts of the testimony 
that Tara Cunningham and the surviving victims gave in Jeronique’s trial.  Yet 
appellant fails to identify any portions of the record that would support his claim 
that the prosecutor pursued conflicting theories. 
{¶ 123} Second, a comparison of the record in this case with this court’s 
decision in Jeronique’s direct appeal shows that the prosecutor’s theory was the 
same in both cases.  See State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 2004-Ohio-
7007, 824 N.E.2d 504.  Both appellant and Jeronique were indicted on identical 
charges of aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder.  Neither was 
charged as a principal offender in the aggravated murders, and the prosecutor 
argued in both cases that appellant and Jeronique had acted in concert.  Moreover, 
appellant has not shown that the prosecutor acted in bad faith and deliberately 
presented false or conflicting evidence in his and Jeronique’s trials.  In fact, the 
state’s evidence in both trials was substantially identical.  Thus, appellant has not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
presented any argument or evidence that the state advanced factually inconsistent 
theories to secure convictions against appellant and Jeronique.  Cf. Stumpf v. 
Mitchell (C.A.6, 2004), 367 F.3d 594, certiorari granted, Mitchell v. Stumpf (Jan. 
7, 2005), ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 824, 160 L.Ed.2d 610. 
{¶ 124} Failure to provide exculpatory evidence.  Finally, appellant 
contends that the state failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence to defense 
counsel prior to trial.  During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Coron Liles, 
it was discovered that the state had failed to disclose to the defense that detectives 
had shown Coron a photo array containing a photo of appellant.  During a sidebar, 
the trial court ordered the state to produce the photo array and a list of witnesses 
who were shown the array. 
{¶ 125} The next day, the trial court held a hearing on this issue outside 
the presence of the jury.  During the hearing, the prosecution acknowledged that it 
had located two photo arrays, one with appellant’s photo and another that 
included a photo of Jeronique.  Both arrays were provided to defense counsel.  
Detective Leland then testified that he had shown the arrays to Coron and James 
Grant.  Coron had been able to identify both appellant and Jeronique as the 
shooters.  James Grant had identified Jeronique but had not been able to identify 
appellant from the array. 
{¶ 126} The prosecutor then proffered a professional statement for the 
record that his failure to disclose the photo arrays to the defense was due to 
inadvertence and not bad faith.  The prosecutor explained that he did not believe 
that the identification of the assailants was an issue, because one of the victims 
knew the assailants by name and both appellant and Jeronique had given 
statements to police about their involvement.  Because it never occurred to the 
prosecutor that identification would become an issue in this case, the photo arrays 
had been overlooked. 
January Term, 2005 
37 
{¶ 127} Defense counsel moved for sanctions and a mistrial.  The trial 
court denied both motions.  The trial court found that the prosecutor had violated 
Crim.R. 16(E)(3) by failing to timely disclose the photo arrays but that the 
violation was not willful or prejudicial.  The trial court also determined that the 
photo arrays and the procedure that Detective Leland had used to show them to 
the victims were not impermissibly suggestive. 
{¶ 128} Appellant complains on appeal that James Grant’s failure to 
identify appellant in the array was exculpatory and that he was prejudiced by the 
state’s failure to disclose this evidence prior to trial.  He also contends that 
defense counsel were unable to have an expert review the array for suggestibility.  
For the following reasons, appellant’s arguments are not well taken. 
{¶ 129} First, James Grant’s failure to identify appellant in the photo 
array is not material evidence.  Under Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 87, 
83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, the prosecutor is obligated to disclose all material 
evidence favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt or punishment.  But 
“evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 682, 
105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481. 
{¶ 130} At trial, five witnesses, including James Grant, identified 
appellant as one of the shooters in this case.  In addition, Shane Liles, Coron 
Liles, and Tomeaka Grant knew appellant prior to the shootings.  Moreover, 
appellant admitted during trial that he had been at the scene and that he had shot 
Shane Liles in the back.  Therefore, while Grant’s failure to identify appellant 
from the photo array may arguably be favorable evidence, in light of the 
substantial testimony identifying appellant, it is not material evidence, as 
explained in Brady v. Maryland.  The state’s failure to disclose this evidence does 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  See, e.g., State v. Waddy 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 432-434, 588 N.E.2d 819. 
{¶ 131} Furthermore, prosecutorial violations of Crim.R. 16 result in 
reversible error only when there is a showing that (1) the prosecution’s failure to 
disclose was willful, (2) disclosure of the information prior to trial would have 
aided the accused’s defense, and (3) the accused suffered prejudice.  State v. 
Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 445, 6 OBR 485, 453 N.E.2d 689.  Here, the 
trial court found that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose was not a willful 
violation of the rule, and we can find no reason to overturn that determination on 
appeal. 
{¶ 132} Moreover, defense counsel were provided with the photo array 
prior to James Grant’s being called as a witness.  Defense counsel had the 
opportunity but never attempted to impeach Grant’s in-court identification of 
appellant based on Grant’s inability to identify appellant in the photo array.  
Defense counsel also declined an opportunity to cross-examine Coron Liles on 
this issue.  Thus, appellant cannot now claim that he was prejudiced regarding the 
photo array.  See State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458, 653 N.E.2d 285.  
Based on the foregoing, we overrule appellant’s ninth proposition of law. 
VII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶ 133} In his tenth proposition of law, appellant makes various claims 
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction or sentence 
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel requires satisfying the two-pronged 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  Strickland requires that the defendant show, first, that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient and, second, that his counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  In order to show deficient performance, defendant 
must prove that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of 
January Term, 2005 
39 
reasonable representation.  To show prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.  Strickland v. Washington; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 134} Expert and Investigative Assistance.  Appellant first contends 
that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request or demonstrate the 
need for expert or investigative assistance in order to present an effective penalty-
phase defense.  But appellant’s trial counsel did request funds for a defense 
psychologist and a defense investigator.  The trial court granted both requests, and 
defense counsel employed a psychologist and an investigator to prepare 
appellant’s mitigation defense.  Thus, appellant’s claim is not supported by the 
record. 
{¶ 135} Motions to Suppress Statements.  Appellant claims that his trial 
counsel failed to investigate the circumstances surrounding his statements to 
police and to effectively prepare and litigate the motion to suppress those 
statements.  However, even if this were true, appellant cannot show that he 
suffered prejudice.  The state did not introduce any evidence at trial of appellant’s 
statements to police. 
{¶ 136} Pretrial-Motion Practice.  Appellant claims that his trial counsel 
did not adequately support legal arguments contained in their pretrial motions.  
But appellant fails to show how his counsel’s performance was deficient or 
prejudicial in regard to any particular motion.  Therefore, we find that no basis 
exists to find deficient performance or prejudice.  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Strickland, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 137} Inadequate voir dire.  Appellant contends that his counsel’s voir 
dire performance was deficient.  Appellant argues that his counsel did not 
zealously demand the right to fully examine jurors.  Appellant also claims that his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
trial counsel failed to consistently and effectively question prospective jurors on 
their racial attitudes and their ability to put aside such attitudes. 
{¶ 138} Trial counsel, who saw and heard the jurors, were in the best 
position to determine the extent to which prospective jurors should be questioned.  
State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 539, 747 N.E.2d 765; State v. Braden, 
98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, at ¶ 108.  As we discussed 
regarding appellant’s revised first proposition of law, his trial counsel thoroughly 
examined prospective jurors regarding their exposure to pretrial publicity, their 
views concerning capital punishment, their ability to consider potentially 
mitigating evidence, and their opinions on race and religion, as well as other 
topics. 
{¶ 139} Moreover, defense counsel did vigorously contest the trial 
court’s rulings restricting voir dire.  Defense counsel placed several objections on 
the record and also moved for a mistrial on the basis that the trial court was 
unduly restricting the voir dire.  Defense counsel also raised an objection claiming 
that death-penalty-opposed jurors were being systematically excluded.  Thus, we 
conclude that appellant’s counsel’s performance during voir dire reflected 
reasonable professional assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 140} Failure to inquire into witness consideration.  Appellant claims 
that his trial counsel were deficient for failing to cross-examine Tara Cunningham 
on whether she had received consideration from the state in exchange for her 
testimony.  However, appellant’s argument is based on pure speculation and is 
rejected. 
{¶ 141} There is no evidence in the record that the state offered anything 
to Tara for her testimony.  Had the state made a deal with Tara in exchange for 
her testimony, this information would have been discoverable under Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(f).  See, e.g., State v. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d at 458, 653 N.E.2d 285.  
January Term, 2005 
41 
Under Evid.R. 607(B), “[a] questioner must have a reasonable basis for asking 
any question pertaining to impeachment that implies the existence of an 
impeaching fact.”  See, also, State v. Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 533 
N.E.2d 272, paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds by State v. 
McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112.  Because there is no reasonable 
basis for believing that a deal existed, defense counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to question Tara about whether she received a deal for her 
testimony. 
{¶ 142} Counsel’s failure to interview expert witness.  Appellant next 
claims that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview 
the coroner before cross-examining her, which resulted in an unsuccessful attempt 
to elicit favorable testimony on the trajectory of the bullets that killed Jayla Grant 
and injured others.  Alternatively, appellant contends that defense counsel should 
have sought the assistance of an independent ballistics expert. 
{¶ 143} However, appellant overstates the importance of the ballistics 
evidence.  Appellant was charged and tried as an accomplice in the aggravated 
murders and not as a principal offender.  Thus, whether the bullets that killed 
Jayla Grant and Leneshia Williams came from his gun or Jeronique’s was not 
critical to establishing appellant’s guilt of the aggravated murders. 
{¶ 144} Moreover, we find that substantial evidence, both testimonial and 
physical, linked appellant to these murders.  Several victims testified that 
appellant had been shooting a black, automatic handgun, and all of the ballistics 
evidence recovered from the scene, except one bullet fragment, was identified as 
ammunition typically fired from an automatic handgun.  In contrast, the victims 
recalled that Jeronique had been shooting a revolver.  Therefore, appellant cannot 
prove that he suffered any prejudice from his counsel’s failure to interview the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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coroner.  Similarly, appellant has not shown that his counsel’s failure to employ a 
ballistics expert deprived him of a fair trial.1 
{¶ 145} Failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct.  Appellant also 
claims deficient performance in his trial counsel’s failure to object to various 
instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  But as mentioned in our discussion 
of appellant’s ninth proposition of law, none of the alleged instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct prejudicially affected appellant’s substantial rights.  
Thus, appellant’s trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor’s alleged misconduct. 
{¶ 146} Failure to present mitigating evidence.  Appellant’s final claim 
is that his counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial because 
they failed to fully investigate appellant’s background and present “compelling 
mitigating evidence arising from [appellant’s] psychosocial history and 
elsewhere.”  However, the record does not support appellant’s claim.  See State v. 
Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 59-62.  See, 
also, Wiggins v. Smith (2003), 539 U.S. 510, 534-538, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 
L.Ed.2d 471 (a case in which the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s death 
sentence because defense counsel had failed to pursue and present migrating 
evidence that it was clear from the record should have been pursued and 
presented).  Therefore, appellant’s tenth proposition of law is overruled. 
VIII. Constitutionality 
{¶ 147} We reject appellant’s various constitutional challenges to Ohio’s 
death-penalty statutes in his 12th proposition of law.  Ohio’s capital-sentencing 
scheme is constitutional.  See, e.g., State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 
454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668; State v. 
Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d at 253-254, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  In addition, we reject 
                                                 
1.  The trial court did grant defense counsel’s motion for funds to hire a ballistics expert, but 
apparently defense counsel decided that such an expert would not aid appellant’s defense. 
January Term, 2005 
43 
appellant’s international-law claims.  See State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
56, 70, 706 N.E.2d 1231, and State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 103-104, 656 
N.E.2d 643. 
IX. Independent Sentence Evaluation 
A. Penalty Phase 
{¶ 148} During the penalty phase, appellant called four mitigation 
witnesses. 
{¶ 149} Joyce McNeal, appellant’s aunt, testified that appellant was three 
or four years old when his mother killed his father with a knife.  She also testified 
that appellant’s mother, Betty Cunningham, had been a heavy drinker, had 
physically abused her children, and had attempted suicide.  She said that at times, 
there had been no food in the house and no furniture because Betty had sold it to 
buy drugs. 
{¶ 150} Throughout childhood, appellant was intermittently placed in his 
grandmother’s care and in foster homes.  Despite Betty’s problems, the children’s 
services agency often returned appellant to her care.  Appellant loved his 
grandmother, and after she died in 1999, no one was there to care for appellant. 
{¶ 151} During appellant’s early childhood, he suffered from asthma 
attacks.  According to McNeal, appellant’s half-brother Jeronique Cunningham 
had a negative influence over him, and she blamed Jeronique for appellant’s 
current situation. 
{¶ 152} Denise Cage, another aunt, also testified that Betty had not been 
a good mother and that her children had suffered as a result.  She said that Betty 
had mental health problems and had made several suicide attempts.  Both Betty 
and appellant’s father had abused drugs and alcohol, and their relationship was 
violent.  Cage said that appellant had often witnessed his parents arguing and 
fighting and that during one altercation, Betty killed appellant’s father with a 
knife.  After that, appellant lived with his grandmother and was in and out of 
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44 
foster homes.  Cage said that appellant had reported that he had been raped while 
in foster care, but she did not know the details of the crime. 
{¶ 153} Cage testified that appellant’s grandmother had been the only 
person who loved appellant unconditionally.  Because of Betty’s problems with 
drugs, appellant’s grandmother tried to provide him with a stable home and 
proper guidance.  Betty did have periods of sobriety during which she was a good 
mother, and during these times, the children’s services agency would return 
appellant and the other children to Betty’s care.  However, Betty’s sobriety was 
usually short-lived, and only when appellant lived with his grandmother did his 
life have security and structure. 
{¶ 154} Betty Cunningham testified that appellant was the fourth of her 
five children.  She said that appellant’s father, Cleveland Jackson Sr., had often 
turned violent when he drank, and during one fight, Betty killed him in self-
defense.  Betty claimed that all of her children saw this happen. 
{¶ 155} Betty testified that after appellant’s father’s death, appellant had 
no positive male role model in his life.  She said that she had continued to drink 
heavily and started using cocaine.  She also attempted suicide.  Because of her 
substance abuse, Betty frequently lost custody of her children.  Betty’s mother 
would care for the children on some of these occasions, and at other times, a 
children’s services agency took custody of them. 
{¶ 156} Betty testified that her mother had been more of a mother to 
appellant than Betty had been.  She said that after his grandmother became 
seriously ill, appellant was very depressed and seemed lost.  After his 
grandmother’s funeral, Betty had to plead with appellant to get him to leave the 
funeral home. 
{¶ 157} Dr. Kathleen Burch, a psychologist, interviewed appellant, 
administered psychological tests, conducted a mental-status examination, and 
consulted with another psychologist.  Burch also examined various records 
January Term, 2005 
45 
relating to appellant, including children’s services records, and interviewed his 
aunt Denise Cage. 
{¶ 158} Burch concluded that appellant had suffered through a 
dysfunctional, chaotic childhood.  She said that appellant’s witnessing his mother 
kill his father had instilled in appellant at a very early age a belief that “the world 
is a very unsafe, dangerous, and violent place.” 
{¶ 159} Burch determined that appellant’s mother had been a chronic 
abuser of drugs and alcohol and had not adequately cared for her children.  Betty 
also had a history of mental instability and suicide attempts.  Betty had sometimes 
left her children unsupervised for long periods of time.  Children’s services’ 
records from the 1980s described appellant’s home environment as filthy, with 
garbage and dirty clothes on the floor.  Appellant and his siblings had played on 
floors littered with broken glass.  At times, there were no beds for the children to 
sleep in, no furniture, and no refrigerator.  Betty had sold furniture to get money 
to purchase drugs.  Sometimes, appellant and his siblings would get only one 
meal a day, which consisted of bread and honey for breakfast.  The children’s 
services records also indicated that there had been some physical abuse of the 
children.  And appellant told Burch that his mother would smoke crack cocaine 
and blow the smoke in his face. 
{¶ 160} Burch testified that her review of the children’s services records 
also showed that on several occasions, the children were removed from the home 
and placed with their maternal grandmother or in foster care.  In addition, 
appellant spent time in a number of juvenile institutions.  Appellant did spend a 
lot of time with his grandmother, and she was a positive influence.  But when his 
grandmother developed Alzheimer’s disease in 1990, appellant “began to run the 
streets.” 
{¶ 161} Burch identified several contributing factors to appellant’s 
criminal behavior.  First, Burch indicated that appellant had not been provided 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
with the love, affection, and basic necessities that most parents provide to their 
children and that a lack of nurturing in young children is often related to later 
criminal activity.  Second, she noted that appellant had lacked a positive male role 
model and that this is also associated with increased risks of criminal activity.  
Third, Burch noted that appellant’s parents had been chronic substance abusers 
and had been involved in criminal activity.  As a result, they had failed to provide 
appellant with models of normal, prosocial, and lawful behavior.  Fourth, she 
noted that appellant had grown up in a poor neighborhood, where there are higher 
rates of crime and deviant, antisocial behavior. 
{¶ 162} Dr. Burch testified that she believes that the way appellant 
“thinks about himself and the way he looks at the world makes him feel like he’s 
pretty messed up and * * * can’t trust anybody, and the world is dangerous.”  
Burch also found that appellant is “more inclined than most people to deal with 
feelings on an intellectual level.”  He does not effectively deal with his emotions.  
She also determined that appellant is extremely self-centered and narcissistic, 
possessing a sense of entitlement that “the world owes him a living; and [he has] a 
tendency to blame other people for his problems.” He also has “negative and 
unfavorable attitudes towards his body,” and questions his own worth and 
adequacy. 
{¶ 163} Dr. Burch concluded that appellant does not have a formal 
thought disorder, such as schizophrenia. He can think logically.  But he is 
paranoid and likely to misinterpret other people’s views of him.  Burch diagnosed 
appellant with an antisocial-personality disorder.  This disorder formed very early 
in appellant, perhaps when he witnessed his father’s death, and he never received 
therapy to deal with this tragedy.  She explained that because of appellant’s 
upbringing, he developed a pessimistic view of the world that severely limits his 
ability to trust others.  Burch, however, noted that not everyone who is labeled 
January Term, 2005 
47 
with a personality disorder ends up in jail and that his disorder did not excuse his 
conduct. 
{¶ 164} On cross-examination, Burch testified that appellant has a 
tendency to disregard the rights and welfare of others and to blame others for his 
behavior.  She also admitted that appellant had been provided with many 
treatments over the past ten years, without any apparent improvement. 
B. Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 165} The jury convicted appellant of two death-penalty specifications:  
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), aggravated murder as part of a course of conduct to kill or 
attempt to kill two or more persons, and R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), aggravated murder 
with prior calculation and design, during an aggravated robbery.  For the penalty 
phase, the trial court merged the two aggravating circumstances and submitted 
only the course-of-conduct specification for the jury’s consideration. 
{¶ 166} Upon independent assessment, we hold that the evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) aggravating 
circumstance charged against appellant.  As to Count Two, the murder of 
Leneshia Williams, the offense was part of a course of conduct involving the 
purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons. 
{¶ 167} Nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offenses is 
mitigating.  Appellant and Jeronique formulated a plan to rob Shane Liles.  
During the course of the robbery, appellant forced Shane into an upstairs bedroom 
at gunpoint, where he robbed him of money and drugs.  Appellant then tied 
Shane’s hands behind his back and forced him into the kitchen, where Jeronique 
was holding Dwight Goodloe, Coron Liles, Armetta Robinson, Leneshia 
Williams, and Tomeaka, James, and Jayla Grant at gunpoint.  Appellant shot 
Shane in the back, and appellant and Jeronique then opened fire on the rest of the 
group, killing Jayla and Leneshia. 
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{¶ 168} Appellant’s history and background provide some mitigating 
features.  Appellant had a dysfunctional, chaotic upbringing.  Aside from his 
maternal grandmother’s care, appellant was given little moral guidance, support, 
or affection.  At a young age, appellant watched his mother kill his father.  
Appellant had no positive male role model, and his parents abused drugs and 
alcohol and engaged in criminal activity.  His mother has a lengthy history of 
mental-health problems in addition to her substance-abuse problems.  Most of the 
time, Betty was unable to properly care for appellant, and he was often neglected.  
There is also evidence in the children’s services records that appellant was abused 
physically.  On several occasions, children’s services removed appellant and his 
siblings from Betty’s custody.  Appellant was at times cared for by his 
grandmother, who provided a secure and stable environment for appellant.  
However, appellant’s time with her was not enough to have any lasting, positive 
effect. 
{¶ 169} Upon review of the mitigating evidence, appellant clearly had a 
troubled and neglected childhood.  However, we have upheld the death sentences 
of other defendants who had backgrounds similar to and worse than appellant’s.  
See, e.g., State v. Campbell (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 48, 50-54, 765 N.E.2d 334; 
State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 455-457, 678 N.E.2d 891.  In this case, 
we determine that appellant’s history and background are entitled to only some 
weight in mitigation, just as we have determined in other capital cases in which 
the defendants had similar backgrounds.  See, e.g., State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 465, 486, 620 N.E.2d 50; State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-
2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶ 186-195. 
{¶ 170} We find, however, that appellant’s character is entitled to no 
weight in mitigation.  There was no evidence presented that appellant possessed 
any specific redeeming qualities. 
January Term, 2005 
49 
{¶ 171} No evidence was presented in regard to R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) 
(victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong provocation), or (B)(3) 
(mental disease or defect). 
{¶ 172} The trial court did assign weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) to 
appellant’s apparent lack of a significant criminal history.  However, our review 
of the record indicates that appellant never presented any evidence to prove the 
existence of this factor.  See R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) (defendant shall have the burden 
of going forward with evidence of mitigating factors).  Instead, it appears that the 
trial court found the existence of this factor based on a lack of evidence from the 
state that appellant had ever been convicted of a crime as an adult.  Moreover, 
appellant was adjudicated a delinquent child under R.C. Chapter 2151.  Because 
appellant has not carried his burden under R.C. 2929.03, we conclude that the 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor is inapplicable. 
{¶ 173} In contrast, appellant’s age of 23 years at the time of the offenses 
qualifies as a mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) (youth of offender).  
However, we accord this factor only modest weight.  See, e.g., State v. Fears 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 349, 715 N.E.2d 136; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 308, 319, 652 N.E.2d 988.  In addition, R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) (accomplice 
only) directly applies as a mitigating factor because appellant was indicted, tried, 
and convicted as an accomplice, not as a principal offender. 
{¶ 174} Nevertheless, after reviewing the facts of this case, we assign no 
weight to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) mitigating factor.  Appellant was a crucial 
participant in the murders.  See State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 71, 752 
N.E.2d 904. 
{¶ 175} As to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors,” appellant’s 
antisocial-personality disorder deserves some weight in mitigation.  Appellant’s 
personality disorder was likely the result of his troubled and dysfunctional 
upbringing.  Nevertheless, we accord little weight to this disorder, as it did not 
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50 
inhibit his ability to control his actions.  See, e.g., State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 
358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, at ¶ 119; Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 401, 659 
N.E.2d 292. 
{¶ 176} In summary, appellant’s collective mitigation evidence is modest 
when compared with the aggravating circumstance.  Upon independent weighing, 
we hold that the course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance in Count Two, the 
murder of Leneshia Williams, outweighs appellant’s combined mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we find that the sentence of death for 
Leneshia’s murder is appropriate in this case. 
{¶ 177} Finally, the sentence imposed here is proportionate to death 
sentences we approved in other cases of murder as a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing of two or more persons.  See, e.g., State v. Keith (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47; State v. Frazier (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 574 
N.E.2d 483; State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895; State v. 
Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 552 N.E.2d 894. 
{¶ 178} Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions and his sentence 
of death for the murder of Leneshia Williams.  We vacate his death sentence for 
the murder of Jayla Grant and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing 
consistent with R.C. 2929.06.  All other sentences are affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
January Term, 2005 
51 
{¶ 179} I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm appellant’s 
convictions.  I also concur in the majority’s decision to affirm appellant’s death 
sentence for the aggravated murder of Leneshia Williams, as charged in Count 
Two.  However, I dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the death 
sentence as to Count One, the aggravated murder of Jayla Grant.  Believing that 
the trial court’s denial of appellant’s request to inform the prospective jurors of 
Jayla Grant’s age did not fundamentally impair appellant’s right to an impartial 
jury, I would affirm the death sentence as to Count One as well. 
{¶ 180} A criminal defendant is not always constitutionally entitled “to 
have questions posed during voir dire specifically directed to matters that 
conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him.”  Ristaino v. Ross (1976), 
424 U.S. 589, 594, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258, citing Ham v. South Carolina 
(1973), 409 U.S. 524, 527-528, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46.  Even when the 
criminal conduct at issue involves allegations of racial or ethnic bias, the United 
States Supreme Court has declined to adopt a rule requiring trial courts to inquire 
into such bias in every case.  Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981), 451 U.S. 
182, 190, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22, citing Ristaino.  See, also, United States 
v. Lancaster (C.A.4, 1996), 96 F.3d 734, 742 (holding that a per se rule requiring 
courts to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they would be 
biased in favor of law-enforcement witnesses offends the deference traditionally 
accorded the trial court’s conduct of voir dire).  Cf. Turner v. Murray (1986), 476 
U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (holding that a “capital defendant 
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of 
the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias”). 
{¶ 181} Furthermore, as the majority recognizes, this court accords 
considerable deference to a trial court’s decisions regarding the scope of voir dire, 
which rests within the discretion of the trial judge and varies in each case.  State v. 
LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶ 40, citing State 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 481, 653 N.E.2d 304.  Unless a defendant 
can establish a clear abuse of discretion, no prejudicial error will be found in a 
trial court’s qualification of venirepersons.  Id.; State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio 
St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 674; State v. Ellis (1918), 98 Ohio St. 21, 120 N.E.2d 
218, paragraph one of the syllabus.  An abuse of discretion “connotes more than 
an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 
arbitrary or unconscionable.”  State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 
O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144. 
{¶ 182} As the Supreme Court explained in Ristaino, because voir dire is 
conducted under the supervision of the trial court, a great deal must, of necessity, 
be left to its sound discretion.  Id. at 594, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258.  “This is 
so because the ‘determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an 
important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge.’ ”  Id. at 594-
595, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258, quoting Rideau v. Louisiana (1963), 373 U.S. 
723, 733, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 183} A specific voir dire question is constitutionally required only 
when the trial court’s refusal to allow the question would render the defendant’s 
trial fundamentally unfair.  Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991), 500 U.S. 415, 425-426, 
111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493.  A claim such as the one appellant makes 
asserting that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat.  
State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 564, 715 N.E.2d 1144, citing Ross v. 
Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80; State v. 
Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 288, 533 N.E.2d 682. 
{¶ 184} I would find that the trial court took effective steps to qualify the 
jurors.  The trial court conducted an extensive, sequestered voir dire, during 
which prospective jurors were individually questioned about their views on the 
death penalty and their exposure to pretrial publicity.  Defense counsel were given 
extensive leeway to question prospective jurors on a variety of topics. 
January Term, 2005 
53 
{¶ 185} Furthermore, the trial court did not merely permit defense 
counsel to ask generalized questions of fairness and impartiality.  Cf. Morgan v. 
Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (in which the 
United States Supreme Court reversed a death sentence because the trial court had 
refused to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically impose a 
death sentence if they found the defendant guilty).  The trial court in this case 
allowed questions covering specific topics aimed at determining prospective 
jurors’ views on imposing the death penalty and exposing those jurors who would 
automatically choose death upon a conviction of a capital offense.  Morgan 
requires nothing more.  See State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 386, 659 
N.E.2d 292 (construing Morgan). 
{¶ 186} My review of the record convinces me that appellant’s voir dire 
of the jury was not unduly limited and that voir dire resulted in a fair and 
impartial jury.  Every juror seated indicated that he or she would not 
automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of guilt, that he or she 
would fairly consider mitigating evidence and life-sentencing options, and that he 
or she would follow the court’s instructions on the law. 
{¶ 187} I believe that these considerations outweigh any possible 
prejudice that may have occurred from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s 
request that voir dire focus specifically on the age of Jayla Grant.  I would find 
that appellant has not shown that he was deprived of his right to an unbiased jury.  
Accordingly, I dissent in part and would affirm the convictions and sentences in 
all respects. 
__________________ 
 
David E. Bowers, Allen County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jana E. 
Gutman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David C. Stebbins and Angela Miller, for appellant. 
______________________