Case Title: CORAY MILNES, Personal Representative of the Estate of Shirley M. Milnes, Probate No. 2005-22, Eighth Judicial District, Platte County, Wyoming and CORAY MILNES, personally V. JESSE J. MILNES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0123

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
CORAY MILNES, Personal Representative of the Estate of Shirley M. Milnes, Probate No. 2005-22, Eighth Judicial District, Platte County, Wyoming and CORAY MILNES, personally V. JESSE J. MILNES2008 WY 11175 P.3d 1164Case Number: S-07-0123Decided: 02/01/2008Modified: 02/04/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CORAY MILNES, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Shirley M. Milnes, Probate No. 2005-22, Eighth Judicial District,Platte 
County, Wyoming and CORAY MILNES, 
personally,Appellants(Defendants),v.JESSE J. 
MILNES,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Douglas 
Fowler, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Don W. 
Riske and Sean C. Chambers of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, P.C.  Argument by Mr. 
Chambers.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Coray 
Milnes (Coray), seeks review of the district court's order that settled several 
disputes which arose over the estate of Shirley M. Milnes (Mother), largely in 
favor of Appellee, Jesse J. Milnes (Jesse).  Coray and Jesse are brothers and Shirley 
Milnes was their Mother.  Coray 
asserts that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the 
Mother's manufactured home was real property, rather than personal property that 
was an asset of her estate.  He also 
contends that Jesse did not present sufficient evidence so that the district 
court could find that his AT&T Credit Card bill (hereafter, "credit card") 
was a legitimate creditor's claim against his Mother's estate.  Finally, Coray contends that the 
district court erred by concluding that the remaining $2,500.00 balance of a 
"gift" made to him by his Mother was actually a "loan" and, therefore, an asset 
of her estate.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Coray Milnes 
states his issues as follows:

 
 
            
A.  After the review of evidence, did the district court commit 
an error of law by concluding that the manufactured home of Shirley M. Milnes 
was real property and not an asset of her estate?

 
 
            
B.  Was sufficient evidence presented by [Jesse] to allow the 
district court to include [his] AT&T Universal Credit Card statement to be a 
creditor's claim against the estate?

 
 
            
C.  Did the district court err in its fact-finding to include 
the $2,500 debt of [Coray] as an asset of Shirley M. Milnes's 
estate?

 
 
Jesse 
Milnes's statement of the issues readily corresponds with that presented by 
Coray.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother died on 
April 30, 2005, and Coray was appointed as the personal representative of 
Mother's estate.  The parties 
essentially agree to the basic facts.  
The disagreements between Coray and Jesse result from the manner in which 
the district court applied the law to those facts.

 
 
[¶4]      The big item in 
this case is the real property that Mother owned.  That 80-acre parcel of property 
straddled the border of Platte and AlbanyCounties (half of it in AlbanyCounty, and the other half in Platte).  On 
August 4, 2004, Mother signed a quitclaim deed transferring the real property to 
herself and Jesse, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.  That deed made no special mention of the 
manufactured home.  Mother had moved 
a double-wide manufactured home onto that property in 2000.  There is no question but that Jesse now 
owns the ground upon which that manufactured home is located.  The issue is whether or not it is real 
property and is included within the intendment of the quitclaim deed Mother gave 
to Jesse, or if it is personal property that should be considered an asset of 
Mother's estate and, hence, be equally divided among her heirs.  Jesse's evidence included 21 photographs 
that depict the manufactured home as it looked shortly after Mother's 
passing.  Jesse testified to his 
view that the home was intended to be affixed to the acreage and, hence, should 
be found to be real estate.  Coray, 
on the other hand, testified that the manufactured home was not so affixed to 
the property as to have lost its identity as personal property and, hence, was 
an asset of Mother's estate.  
Coray's theory also relied heavily on the circumstance that it had been 
taxed by PlatteCounty as personal property 
for all the years that it was in place.

 
 
[¶5]      The second issue 
arose because Jesse obtained a credit card so as to consolidate his Mother's 
credit card debt onto one credit card that was going to be interest free for the 
first year.  The card was issued in 
both Mother's name and Jesse's name, although all of the debt associated with 
that card was from the consolidation of Mother's old credit cards or purchases 
she made once the new credit card was issued.  None of the debt on the card was 
incurred by Jesse.  Thus, Jesse 
submitted it as a creditor's claim, but Coray denied that claim in his capacity 
as personal representative.

 
 
[¶6]      The third issue 
arose because Coray claimed that on February 1, 2001, his Mother  made a gift to him of $6,000.00, so that 
he could pay his taxes.  A ledger 
was kept showing that Coray made payments to Mother, from time to time but not 
with regularity, associated with that "gift."  Coray testified that he considered those 
payments as gifts he made to his Mother in return for her gift, but were not 
payments on a "loan".  Jesse 
contended it was a loan and asked the district court to include it as an asset 
of Mother's estate.  The evidence to 
support Jesse's view was just the ledger that was kept, as well as Coray's 
course of conduct.  Coray's evidence 
was his own testimony to the effect that it was a gift and not a 
loan.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Manufactured 
Home  Real Estate or Personal Property?

 
 
[¶7]      When a matter has 
been tried before the district court without a jury, the Supreme Court's review 
of the district court's findings of fact is conducted under the clearly 
erroneous standard, but conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Kimble v. Ellis, 2004 WY 161, ¶ 7, 
101 P.3d 950, 953 (Wyo. 2004).  A 
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Nickle v. Board of County Com'rs of Platte 
County, 2007 WY 115, ¶ 16, 162 P.3d 1208, 1213 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court concluded that the manufactured home was real property that went with the 
land on which it was located.  That 
conclusion was based upon these findings:

 
 
            
a.  [N]o Certificate of Title for the Home was introduced by 
[Coray], but [he] did introduce a certificate of origin for a manufactured 
home;

            
b.  the Home has been taxed as a mobile home by the Platte 
County Treasurer separate from the tax assessments of the real property, Exhibits N-1 to N-5, Exhibit 
K.

            
c.  there are no axles, wheels, or a hitch attached to the 
Home;

            
d.  the Home is set on concrete blocks sitting upon poured 
concrete slabs in the crawl space placed on the real property for such purpose, 
Exhibit 6-1; 6-2; 6-3; 6-4 and 
6-6;

            
e.  there are cables attached to the home [which] are bolted 
into 6" thick concrete slabs in the crawl space.  Exhibits 6-5, 6-6, 6-8, 6-9.  Witness Jim Parks testified that such 
manner of attaching tie-down cables was more permanent tha[n] normal mobile home 
installation required by insurance carriers in the State of 
Wyoming;

            
f.  the Home has a landscaped yard with trees and fencing 
around [the] house, Exhibits 6-12, 6-13, 
6-14, 6-17, 6-18, 6-19, 6-20, and 6-21;

            
g.  there is a permanent, stick-built garage (the "Garage") 
located with ten (10) ft. from Home, which, it is not disputed, is part of the 
real property.  The Garage was 
constructed by the decedent within a few months after installation of the Home 
and used by her during her occupancy of the home.  Exhibits 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-16, and 
6-18.

            
h.  the Home and the permanent Garage appear to be a single 
living unit;

            
i.  the Home has wood skirting with interior framing and 
exterior siding to the ground.  Exhibits 6-6, 6-7, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 6-17, 
6-18, and 6-19;

            
j.  there are permanent underground utility services installed 
to the Home;

            
k.  the Home has a permanent exterior rear deck that was 
constructed and attached to the Home after its delivery and installation, Exhibit 6-13;

            
l.  the Home has a permanent rear covered porch that was 
constructed and attached to the Home after its delivery and installation, Exhibit 6-10; 

            
m.  the Home has an air conditioning unit permanently installed 
near the rear covered porch that was constructed next to the Home after its 
delivery and installation, Exhibit 
6-10;

            
n.  the Home has permanent gutters and drain spouts installed 
after the delivery and installation of the Home on the property, Exhibits 6-10, 6-14 and 
6-15;

            
o.  the Home is located upon an eighty (80) acre parcel of real 
estate with no other residential structures located upon such parcel; that tract 
was zoned for placement of cement pads to set a mobile home 
on;

            
p.  the decedent, Shirley Milnes, resided in the Home from the 
date of its installation to the date of her final hospitalization, a period of 
approximately five (5) years;

            
q.  no evidence was introduced indicating that the decedent 
treated the Home as anything other than her permanent 
residence;

            
r.  that the insurance coverage for the Home purchased by the 
decedent included coverage for the permanent Garage.  Exhibit J, Page 3.

            
s.  in totality, although the Home could have been made 
moveable, it was permanently attached to the real estate.  The evidence as a whole indicates that 
Shirley intended that the house be a permanent part of the real 
estate.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court went on to conclude that its factual determination was supported by 
pertinent law.  For example, 
although Mother had not done so, Wyoming statutes provide that a transportable 
or mobile home can be converted to real property.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-502(b) (LexisNexis 
2007).  Ordinarily "mobile homes" 
like the one at issue are taxed as personal property, and that was true of 
Shirley's.  While this Court has not 
dealt with the specific issue raised in this dispute, we have recognized a 
general rule that a chattel, or moveable, may become a fixture that becomes a 
part of the real estate on which it is affixed.  In Wyoming State Farm Loan Board v. FCSCC, 
759 P.2d 1230, 1234 (Wyo. 1988) we opined:

 
 
This 
court has not had occasion to discuss this aspect of the law of fixtures for 
nearly forty-eight years.  
SeeSchool 
District 
No. II,   Laramie  County v. Donahue, 55 Wyo. 220, 97 P.2d 663, 
664 (1940).  When presented with 
this issue, however, we still rely on the three-part test first set forth in the 
landmark case of Teaf v. Hewitt, 1 
Ohio St. 511, 525 (1853):

 
 
"It has 
been said upon abundant authority that, generally speaking, the proper criterion 
of an irremovable fixture consists in the united application of three tests, 
viz:

 
 
" 
1st.  Real or constructive 
annexation of the article in question to the realty.  

 
 
" 2d. 
Appropriation or adaptation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty 
with which it is connected.

 
 
" 3d. 
The intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent 
accession to the freehold, this intention being inferred from the nature of the 
article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation 
and policy of the law in relation thereto, the structure and mode of the 
annexation and the purpose or use of which the annexation has been made.'  [Citations.] * * *."  Holland Furnace Co. v. Bird, 45 
Wyo. 471, 21 P.2d 825, 827-828 (1933).

 
 
Also see 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-101(a)(xv) (LexisNexis 2007) (defining "real property" 
as "land and appurtenances, including structures, affixed thereto, and any 
intangible characteristic which contributes to the fair market value thereof"); 
Amoco Production Co. v. Wyoming State 
Board of Equalization, 2001 WY 1, ¶ 9, 15 P.3d 728, 732-33 (Wyo. 2001); 
In re Claxson, 239 B.R. 598, 34 
Bankr.Ct.Dec. 1323 (U.S. Bankr., Ct. N.D. OK 1999) (mobile home treated as real 
estate subject to mortgage); 2 Powell on Real Property § 18B.04 (Michael Allan 
Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender & Co. 2000) ("if the mobile home has 
substantially lost its identity as a mobile home by virtue of its being 
permanently affixed to the land, it would be taxed as 
realty.").

 
 
[¶10]   We hold that the district court's 
factual findings with respect to the manufactured home are not clearly erroneous 
and its conclusions of law are correct.  
More specifically, we do not view the fact that the manufactured home 
had, historically, been taxed as personal property as determinative of the 
issue.  The district court properly 
included all relevant facts and circumstances in reaching its 
decision.

 
 
The 
Credit Card

 
 
[¶11]   The district court's factual 
findings with respect to the credit card are brief.  The record consists of Jesse's testimony 
that the credit card was obtained by him, on his Mother's behalf, and that, 
although he recognized that he bore responsibility for the credit card as well, 
that responsibility was in addition to the primary responsibility that was his 
Mother's.  The evidence at trial was 
to the effect that the card was used only for payment of Mother's debts.  As personal representative for Mother's 
estate, Coray denied Jesse's claim in this regard.

 
 
[¶12]   The district court accepted Jesse's 
testimony as true and ordered that Coray pay that claim.  We conclude that the district court's 
factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that Jesse's testimony, combined 
with the exhibits that corroborated his testimony, is sufficient to sustain the 
district court's fact findings.  In 
addition, the district court's application of the law to those facts was not 
erroneous.

 
 
Coray's 
Debt to the Estate

 
 
[¶13]   The district court made these 
findings with respect to the debt:

 
 
            
[Jesse] included in his Claims Against Estate, a claim that [Coray] had 
failed to include in the Estate Inventory a debt owing to the decedent from 
Coray Milnes.  Exhibit 1, Page 2.  Received into evidence as Exhibit 14-1 was a check register 
reflecting payments made to the decedent by "Cor[a]y and Diane" and pages from 
the check register (Exhibits 14-2 to 
14-5) showing deposits into the decedent's checking account in the amounts 
and on the dates shown on Exhibit 14-1.  
Coray Milnes testified that he received $6,000 from the decedent in 
February, 2001, to pay his taxes.  
Coray Milnes claimed that such amount received from the decedent was a 
gift.  Coray Milnes also testified 
that he had made the payments reflected in Exhibits 14-1 to 14-5 to the decedent 
to "repay the gift."  Coray Milnes 
admitted that there was $2,500 remaining of the $6,000 received by him from the 
decedent that had not been repaid as of the date of her death.  Based upon the "repayments of the gift" 
testified to by Coray Milnes, the Court finds that the installment repayments of 
the "gift" by Coray Milnes are inconsistent with his claim that the amounts 
received were a gift.  The Court, 
therefore, finds that such transaction was not a gift; that the remainder of 
such amount of $2,500 is to be considered and treated an asset of the estate for 
which [Coray] is required to collect and include in the Estate 
Inventory.

 
 
[¶14]   A valid gift consists of three 
elements:  (1) a present intention 
to make an immediate gift; (2) actual or constructive delivery of the gift that 
divests the donor of dominion and control; and (3) acceptance of the gift by the 
donee.  Kenyon v. Abel, 2001 WY 135, ¶ 10, 
36 P.3d 1161, 1165 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Rose v. Rose, 849 P.2d 1321, 1324 
(Wyo.1993)).          Based 
upon our review of the record, we are compelled to conclude that the district 
court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous.  The district court's application of the 
law to those facts is sound in all respects.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   We conclude that the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law challenged by Coray are sound and that the district 
court's Order and Judgment should be affirmed.