Case Title: People v. Waldon

Citation: 

Docket Number: S025520

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BILLY RAY WALDON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S025520 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
CR 82986 
 
 
January 23, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Cantil-Sakauye* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
S025520 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
A jury convicted Billy Ray Waldon of three counts of first 
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; all undesignated statutory 
references are to this code) and several other crimes:  attempted 
murder (§§ 187, 664); arson (§ 451); forcible oral copulation and 
sexual penetration (former §§ 288a, 289, subd. (a)); rape (§ 261); 
two counts of burglary (§ 459); vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, 
subd. (a)); seven counts of robbery (§ 211); carrying a loaded 
firearm, an illegal switchblade knife, and a concealed dirk or 
dagger (former §§ 12031, subd. (a), 653k, 12020, subd. (a)); and 
two counts of animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (a)).  The jury found 
true the special circumstances of multiple murders (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(3)), murder during the commission of burglary and 
robbery (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i), (vii)) and murder to 
avoid arrest (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5)), and it returned a verdict of 
death.  Waldon’s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
 
Because of errors in granting Waldon’s request to 
represent himself, we must reverse Waldon’s conviction and 
sentence.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution case   
 
The 
prosecutor 
presented 
evidence 
that 
Waldon 
committed a series of crimes in the San Diego area over a two-
week period in December 1985.   
 
Dawn Ellerman and her daughter Erin Ellerman were 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
killed in their home, which had been burned by an intense fire.  
Autopsies showed that the mother died of a gunshot wound 
before the fire and the daughter died of smoke inhalation.  
Investigators concluded the fire was set intentionally, and a 
relative testified that the Ellerman’s computer was missing.  A 
witness testified that she saw a man running out of the 
Ellerman house as it was burning and identified Waldon as the 
man she had seen.  
 
Erin Lab testified that a man carrying a gun and wearing 
a dark ski mask broke into her apartment, ransacked the 
apartment, and raped her.  At a lineup after his arrest the 
following summer, Lab identified Waldon as her assailant.  
 
Four women testified about being robbed by a man in a 
dark ski mask:  Carol Franklin, Nancy Ross, Diane Thomas, and 
Julia Meredith each had her purse stolen in the separate 
incidents.  Thomas and Meredith later identified Waldon as the 
man who robbed them.  
 
Responding to the last of these crimes, the Meredith 
robbery, police pursued a man in a blue Honda who drove over 
medians and onto the wrong side of the road as he sped away 
from them.  Stopping with a flat tire, the man ran from his car 
and evaded the police.  One of the officers later identified 
Waldon in a lineup as the driver who fled.  In the Honda, which 
was registered to Waldon, police found a box of bullets as well 
as identification and other documents bearing Waldon’s name.  
Police also found the Ellermans’ computer in the car, along with 
other items belonging to the Ellermans, to Erin Lab, and to 
Franklin, Ross, Thomas, and Meredith.    
 
Nearby, just after the police chase, a man in a ski mask 
confronted Gordon Wells as he was working on a car.  The man 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
shot and killed Wells, and shot and wounded John Copeland, a 
neighbor who heard shots and went to assist Wells.  At a lineup, 
Copeland tentatively identified Waldon as the shooter.  
 
A ballistics expert testified that bullet fragments retrieved 
from Dawn Ellerman and Gordon Wells were fired from the 
same gun and were consistent with the ammunition found in 
Waldon’s car.   
 
One morning in June of the following year, Daniel Roman 
discovered that his 1965 Mustang was missing.  Later that day, 
a driver in a car matching the description of Roman’s sped away 
from police and fled on foot when they tried to stop him for a 
Vehicle Code infraction.  Police apprehended and arrested the 
man, who gave his name as “Stephen Midas” but was later 
identified as Waldon.     
2. Defense case   
 
Waldon represented himself at trial.  His defense was that 
federal agents framed him for the charged crimes to thwart his 
efforts to promote world peace, spread new languages, and 
advance Cherokee autonomy.   
 
Waldon testified that his grandfather was part Cherokee.  
After Waldon’s discharge from the Navy in 1984, he founded 
several organizations:  the World Humanitarian Church; the 
World 
Esperanto 
Organization; 
the 
World 
Poliespo 
Organization; the United Nations of Autonomous People; and 
the Exiled Government of the Cherokee Nation.  Waldon 
claimed that Poliespo was a “rapid thinking” language that he 
invented by combining Esperanto, an international language, 
and Cherokee.  Waldon also founded the Cherokee Bicycle 
Company to market a special bicycle to benefit Cherokee people.  
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
 
Waldon claimed that he met a man named Mark Williams 
who kept appearing in various locations in Italy, Germany, and 
California, where Waldon was pursuing his education and 
activism.  Waldon believed that Williams and another man were 
CIA agents who were monitoring him.  Waldon testified that he 
tape-recorded some of his conversations with Williams but the 
tapes and other evidence proving Waldon’s innocence had been 
in a storage unit and were destroyed after he stopped paying the 
rental fee.   
 
Waldon testified that in late December 1985, he went to 
Imperial Beach to meet with Williams, who expressed interest 
in purchasing a bicycle from Waldon.  Men wearing ski masks 
and shirts that said “Federal Agent” joined Williams in beating 
Waldon; they cursed Poliespo and Waldon’s promotion of Indian 
autonomy.  The men bound Waldon, took him away in their van, 
and kept him chained to a chair with a plastic hood over his 
head.  Waldon managed to escape but learned from a news 
article that he was wanted for murder.  He lived as a fugitive in 
a crawl space under a house in Imperial Beach, fearing that he 
would be convicted despite his innocence if he turned himself in.       
 
According to Waldon’s testimony, in June 1986, Williams 
and two other men found Waldon in his crawl space and 
kidnapped him again.  Later, as the men were forcing him into 
a Mustang, Waldon was able to drive away and escape.  When 
police tried to pull him over, Waldon drove away and then got 
out of the car and ran.  As he ran, he threw down a gun he 
claimed Williams put in his clothing.  Waldon denied any 
involvement in the charged crimes.   
 
An inmate from the San Diego jail, Erwin Spruth, testified 
that he met Waldon in December 1985, before either had been 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
arrested.  Spruth noticed there was very little in the back of 
Waldon’s Honda; he did not see the computer or suitcase that 
police later recovered from the car and identified as belonging to 
the Ellermans.  A few days after Christmas, Spruth received a 
call from Mark Williams, who was looking for Waldon.   
 
Birgitta Holenstein Sequoyah testified that she was 
Waldon’s wife.  She met him in San Francisco in July 1985 after 
overhearing a conversation between Waldon and Williams about 
American Indian autonomy.  She was with Waldon when he 
went to meet with Williams.  Holenstein stayed in the car at first 
but then followed Waldon and saw him being beaten by Williams 
and two other men in dark ski masks and shirts indicating they 
were federal agents.  She heard one of the agents curse Waldon’s 
involvement in Cherokee autonomy and Poliespo.  She ran away 
but later saw Williams take Waldon’s car and drive away in it.  
She never saw a computer, suitcase, purses, or a gun in 
Waldon’s car.   
 
 
Answering similar questions about his honesty and 
nonviolence, Holenstein and Spruth testified to Waldon’s good 
character, as did Waldon’s second wife, aunt, childhood friend, 
another inmate from the San Diego jail, and several people who 
knew Waldon from his attendance at Esperanto conferences.   
 
An eyewitness to the police pursuit of Waldon’s vehicle 
testified to the position of officers when the suspect fled, 
indicating that the suspect may have been out of sight of the 
officers.  A city employee testified about the location of stop signs 
on the route of the chase, contradicting the description of a 
pursuing officer.  And an expert explained factors that 
diminished the accuracy of eyewitness identification, including 
observing a person when he is running, during periods of high 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
stress or danger, and when distinctive features are obscured, for 
example, by a ski mask. 
3. Prosecution rebuttal   
 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor presented testimony from 
additional officers, who described the pursuit of Waldon’s 
vehicle, and from Waldon’s first wife, who testified that Waldon 
stole and lied when it suited him and made a game of trying to 
get away with it.  
B. Penalty Phase  
 
The prosecutor presented evidence connecting Waldon to 
crimes committed in Oklahoma between November 15 and 23, 
1985:  a man in a dark ski mask stole Cynthia Tankersley’s 
purse and shot her in the head; a male assailant shot Anna 
Richman, whose purse was missing from the scene; and a man 
in a ski mask accosted Tammy Tvedt and Frank Hensley as they 
exited their car and shot them when they did not comply with 
his demand for money.  Richman died from her wounds, but the 
other victims survived.  Three ballistics experts testified that 
shell casings and bullets recovered from each of the Oklahoma 
crimes were fired from the same gun used to kill Ellerman and 
Wells in San Diego.   
 
Waldon presented several witnesses who testified about 
his good character and humanitarian work promoting Poliespo, 
Esperanto, and Native American activities.  He also presented 
a witness who explained the Esperanto language and its 
utilities, and a correctional expert who testified that if sentenced 
to life without parole, Waldon would be able to write and engage 
in religious activities and would likely adjust well to prison.     
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
II.  WALDON’S SELF-REPRESENTATION 
 
Waldon contends the trial judge erred when he granted 
Waldon’s request to represent himself after a different judge had 
previously denied the request.  We agree. 
 
Before the start of his criminal trial, Waldon moved to 
exercise his right of self-representation under Faretta v. 
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).  Judge Zumwalt heard 
the motion and denied it, finding that Waldon had a mental 
disorder that prevented him from rationally perceiving his 
circumstances, appreciating the risks and consequences of self-
representation, and appropriately formulating and presenting a 
defense.  A little over a year later, Waldon filed a second Faretta 
motion before a different judge, Judge Boyle.  Judge Boyle 
granted the motion without considering Judge Zumwalt’s 
Faretta denial or the evidence on which it was based.  As we 
explain, this was an abuse of discretion that deprived Waldon of 
the assistance of counsel throughout his criminal trial.   
A. Background 
 
Before trial, Waldon submitted a request to the court to 
dismiss his lawyers and represent himself.  Judge Zumwalt 
ordered a psychiatric examination to assess Waldon’s capacity 
to waive counsel.  The psychiatrist who conducted the 
examination, Dr. Kalish, concluded that Waldon did not 
appreciate the ramifications of waiving counsel and likely had a 
delusional thought disorder.  After Dr. Kalish testified that he 
also doubted Waldon’s ability to rationally understand the 
proceedings or assist counsel, Judge Zumwalt suspended the 
criminal proceedings to determine Waldon’s competence to 
stand trial.  A different judge presided over the competency trial.   
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
1. Competency trial 
 
Defense counsel presented evidence that Waldon was not 
competent to stand trial.  Two military doctors described 
Waldon’s treatment for severe depression with psychotic 
features while he was in the Navy.  A battery of psychological 
tests from that time reflected severe symptoms and treating 
staff concluded that Waldon was very ill; he was later 
discharged from service.  Dr. Kalish testified that Waldon had a 
mood disorder, paranoia, and a thought disorder that impaired 
his ability to relate to his attorney and to think clearly and 
assess the proceedings against him.  Waldon’s mental illness 
also caused him to focus on issues unrelated or only marginally 
related to his trial; although Waldon’s stated goal was to be 
found competent, his behavior reflected incompetence, a factor 
indicating his impairment was genuine.  
 
Two experts testified for the prosecution, disputing the 
significance of Waldon’s condition in the military and 
disagreeing with the conclusions of the defense experts.  The 
prosecution experts concluded that Waldon was competent to 
stand trial and was likely feigning mental illness.  The defense 
presented testimony from another expert to rebut the 
prosecution experts, but the jury found Waldon competent.   
 
Defense counsel filed a petition for writ of mandate to 
challenge the competency verdict.  After the Court of Appeal 
denied the petition, counsel filed a petition for review in our 
court, raising several claims of error and seeking a new 
competency trial.  We granted review and ordered the Court of 
Appeal to issue an alternative writ to consider the claims. 
2. First Faretta hearing 
 
In February 1988, while the competency petition was 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
pending, the parties returned to Judge Zumwalt’s courtroom to 
continue addressing Waldon’s motion to dismiss counsel and 
represent himself — the original Faretta motion that was 
interrupted when Judge Zumwalt declared a doubt about 
Waldon’s competence to stand trial.  Judge Zumwalt appointed 
Ben Sanchez to serve as Waldon’s advisory counsel, and she 
agreed to allow Waldon to call witnesses in support of his motion 
and to question the experts defense counsel presented to show 
that Waldon lacked the mental capacity to waive counsel.   
 
Dr. Kalish, the court’s expert, offered examples of 
Waldon’s inability to understand the nature of the proceedings 
and gave his opinion that Waldon had a psychotic disorder and 
was not competent to waive counsel.  On cross-examination by 
the prosecutor, Dr. Kalish explained that Waldon’s intelligence 
was normal but his paranoia affected his ability to decide 
whether to waive counsel:  “[I]t clouds and distorts his 
perceptions” and leaves him “so inundated by neurotic and other 
input” that he is not able to make “decisions clearly, reasoned, 
with eyes wide open.”  Dr. Kalish also noted that Waldon 
expressed contradictory goals simultaneously, which was 
indicative “of mental disease, of the confusion, the lack of 
appreciation of what’s going on.”   
 
Asked more specifically about Waldon’s understanding of 
self-representation, Dr. Kalish said that he was particularly 
concerned that Waldon did not understand the responsibilities 
of self-representation and did not “appreciate that distinction 
between the advisory attorney and the attorney representing 
him.”  Dr. Kalish explained that normal intelligence can co-exist 
with mental illness and dysfunction; he observed that Waldon 
was generally able to portray a “veneer” of competence but 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
lacked any meaningful understanding of his circumstances and 
had no insight into his mental impairment.  Dr. Kalish 
concluded, based on his conversations with Waldon, that 
Waldon was not capable of mounting a rational, coherent 
defense.  These factors were relevant to whether Waldon was 
able to make a reasoned decision to waive counsel; Dr. Kalish 
stated that the fact that “he may not do a good job is not the 
issue here, as I understand it.”     
 
Waldon sought to call lay witnesses who knew him before 
he was arrested and an expert who had been consulting with the 
defense, Dr. Koshkarian.  Waldon explained that Dr. 
Koshkarian “has examined me extensively in the jail, and I have 
answered his numerous questions.  He is the only psychiatrist 
with whom I have cooperated.”  The court allowed Waldon to 
present five lay witnesses who testified about their background 
and interactions with Waldon.  Answering identical questions 
from Waldon, four of the lay witnesses testified that they 
believed Waldon was mentally competent and was able to 
“knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” waive counsel.  The 
fifth, Joan Williams, testified that Waldon appeared competent 
“[f]rom what I’ve seen today.”   
 
Gloria Fern Renas, one of the five lay witnesses, taught a 
community college class that Waldon was attending just before 
his arrest.  She testified that it was difficult to know about 
Waldon’s abilities beyond the scope of the classroom but 
nonetheless believed he was able to waive counsel.  Joan 
Williams taught Waldon in a section related to Renas’s course.  
She testified that Waldon was never “rambling or incoherent,” 
was not overly loud or boisterous, and was not disruptive in 
class.  
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
 
Bernice Garrett met Waldon at a meeting of the Esperanto 
Association, and he joined her Toastmasters club, a group that 
taught public speaking.  She had some phone contact with 
Waldon after his arrest and visited him once in jail.  Garrett said 
that Waldon told her he was willing to die for the principle of 
defending himself.  Responding to questioning from the court, 
Garrett testified that she felt Waldon could defend himself 
because he was intelligent, able to read and understand legal 
material, and able to understand and follow the advice of 
counsel. 
 
George Max Brande knew Waldon from the Toastmasters 
club and regularly spoke to him on the phone after his arrest.  
Brande taught English as a second language and considered 
language competence indicative of mental competence.  He 
noted that Waldon was a competent English and Esperanto 
speaker.  Brande’s opinion that Waldon was able to represent 
himself was based on Waldon’s ability to speak rationally and to 
handle “his own affairs.”  Brande stated that Waldon felt his 
“individual rights” were more important than “life itself.”  He 
believed that Waldon’s life would not be jeopardized by self-
representation because “he will always have the right to have 
co-counsel.”    
 
William Bernard Schwartz knew Waldon from an 
Esperanto club.  They had seen each other at meetings several 
years prior to Waldon’s arrest, and Schwartz had some phone 
contact with Waldon after his arrest and visited him once in jail.  
The court acknowledged that there was “very little foundation” 
for Schwartz’s opinion but rejected defense counsel’s request to 
strike the testimony.   
 
Waldon decided not to present testimony from Dr. 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
Koshkarian and stated his intent to call M.A. Rose, a 
psychologist from Oklahoma instead.  Defense counsel noted 
that Rose was Waldon’s sister and questioned her professional 
credentials.  Waldon ultimately did not call Rose or additional 
witnesses. 
 
Defense counsel called Dr. Koshkarian to testify.  Counsel 
had retained Dr. Koshkarian to address mental state defenses 
to the criminal charges and potential penalty phase mitigation.  
When 
Dr. 
Koshkarian 
talked 
to 
Waldon 
about 
self-
representation, Waldon believed that he would have counsel to 
advise him and he would not have to speak in court.  Dr. 
Koshkarian testified that Waldon’s judgment was too impaired 
to adequately prepare a proper defense.  His opinion was based 
on 10 or more hours of meeting with Waldon in eight visits, 
including two in the past week, and his review of police reports 
and Waldon’s psychiatric records.  On cross-examination by 
Waldon, Dr. Koshkarian stated that in “the strict intellectual 
sense,” if presented with a list of the implications, Waldon knew 
what it meant to waive counsel.  Because Waldon was not 
capable of preparing a defense, however, Dr. Koshkarian found 
that Waldon was not able to make a knowing and intelligent 
decision to waive counsel with a full understanding of the 
implications.  Dr. Koshkarian testified that Waldon was “not in 
any way aware of issues” related to his own defense.  When 
cross-examining Dr. Koshkarian, Waldon clarified that when he 
said that he would not have to speak in court, he was talking 
about representing himself “with full counsel.”   
 
Defense counsel also called a clinical psychologist, Dr. Di 
Francesca, to testify.  Counsel had retained Dr. Di Francesca to 
work with the defense and administer psychological tests to 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
Waldon.  Dr. Di Francesca interviewed Waldon several times 
and, based on those interactions and her review of other expert 
testimony, Dr. Di Francesca testified that Waldon was not 
competent to waive counsel or represent himself.  Dr. Di 
Francesca acknowledged that some of Waldon’s behaviors were 
manipulative and that there was likely a “component of 
malingering.”  Taking account of those factors, Dr. Di Francesca 
nonetheless concluded that Waldon had a mental disorder and 
was “deeply disturbed.”  Waldon was unable to think clearly 
about his criminal case or concentrate on anything related to it; 
instead, he focused on “nonrelevant side issues.”  It was unclear 
to Dr. Di Francesca whether Waldon even understood the 
charges against him; he told her he understood them but did not 
articulate what they were.    
 
The prosecution and defense also stipulated to Judge 
Zumwalt’s consideration of all the expert testimony from the 
competency trial.    
 
In a March 1988 ruling, Judge Zumwalt denied Waldon’s 
Faretta request.  She found that Waldon had a mental disorder 
that impaired his free will “to such a degree that his decision to 
request to represent himself is not voluntary.”  The judge found 
that Waldon “does not rationally perceive his situation,” that his 
mental disorder affected his “powers of reason, judgment and 
communication,” and that Waldon did not “realize the probable 
risks and consequences of his action. . . .  While Waldon has the 
cognitive ability to understand the proceedings, he cannot 
formulate and present his defense with an appropriate 
awareness of all ramifications.”   
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
 
3. Removal of trial counsel 
 
After denying Waldon’s Faretta motion, Judge Zumwalt 
also denied defense counsel’s motion to be relieved from 
Waldon’s case, finding that counsel’s representation was not 
impaired by potential conflicts.  In a petition for writ of 
mandate, counsel sought to be relieved as trial counsel but to 
continue representing Waldon on challenges to the competency 
trial that were still pending in the Court of Appeal.  
 
In September 1988, the Court of Appeal granted counsel’s 
request to be relieved as trial counsel and denied her request to 
continue representing Waldon in the competency proceedings. 
The appellate court stated that replacement trial counsel would 
be “free to raise any existing or new argument he or she deems 
appropriate in the mental health proceeding.”  The appellate 
court also noted that although “section 1368 subdivision (c) 
would deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to prosecute Waldon” 
until his competence was “finally determined,” it did not 
prohibit the trial court from relieving Waldon’s attorney and 
“appointing substitute counsel to assure Waldon’s adequate 
defense.”  The Court of Appeal directed the superior court “to 
appoint substitute lead counsel forthwith.  Substitute counsel 
shall have thirty days following appointment to consult with his 
or her client and to file whatever additional briefing he or she 
deems necessary in [the section 1368] writ proceedings . . . 
pending before this court.”   
 
Once the remittitur issued, the trial judge sent the parties 
to the master calendar court to carry out the change in 
representation.  Although the court relieved trial counsel, the 
appointment of replacement counsel was delayed several times 
because the master calendar judge recused himself, the case was 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
 
assigned to two other judges, and the first appointed counsel 
declared a conflict and inability to work with Waldon.   
4. Interim filings and proceedings 
 
In a December 1988 petition filed in propria persona, 
Waldon asked to represent himself “with full assistance of 
counsel” required to “obey” him.  He stated that if his request 
were denied, he would seek to waive counsel and represent 
himself.  In the nearly 100-page petition, Waldon complained of 
the “rampant sexual promiscuity” of his “omnivaginal” former 
trial counsel, alleging that counsel engaged in domineering 
sexual practices; sexual relations with inmates, judges, and 
prosecutors; drug dealing and Mafia involvement; and efforts to 
have a hit man kill him, among other menacing, unlawful, and 
sexually motivated conduct.  Waldon claimed that counsel was 
“a brilliant and extremely dominating man, trapped in a 
woman’s body,” and that she tried to seduce him out of self-
representation by exposing her breasts to him.   
 
In the petition, Waldon explained that his “defense 
strategy” involved representing himself and insisting on a 
speedy trial that would take the prosecutor by surprise.  Waldon 
stated that “to cooperate with any attorney at trial with the 
petitioner not in ‘pro per’ status would be in violation of the 
petitioner’s religion.”  After reviewing the petition, the Court of 
Appeal ordered that any claims not mooted by its September 
1988 ruling could be presented to the superior court “by new 
counsel appointed pursuant to our decision.”   
 
During an appearance before Judge Malkus, the newly-
assigned trial judge, advisory counsel Sanchez stated that 
Waldon wanted to renew his Faretta motion and that the 
appellate court order indicated that Waldon should present it in 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
 
the superior court through his new trial attorney.  Judge Malkus 
set a hearing for the motion later in the month.   
 
In February 1989, Waldon again appeared in court for the 
appointment of counsel.  Mark Wolf was present and prepared 
to accept appointment as lead trial counsel for all purposes.  
Alan Bloom was also present.  Bloom stated that he was not 
willing to take on full representation but suggested that he could 
serve a limited role of helping Waldon pursue self-
representation.  Advisory attorney Sanchez informed the court 
that Judge Malkus had agreed to reconsider Waldon’s Faretta 
motion and had set it for hearing.  The prosecutor interjected to 
explain that the case was under an order from the Court of 
Appeal to appoint trial counsel for all purposes.   
 
The court ordered Sanchez to continue as advisory counsel 
and appointed Bloom for the limited purpose of assisting 
Sanchez with Waldon’s second Faretta motion.  The court did 
not appoint Wolf, explaining that Wolf would only be needed if 
Waldon’s Faretta motion were unsuccessful.  The prosecutor 
emphasized the pending appellate review of the competency 
trial, stating that the court needed to resolve Waldon’s 
competency before addressing Waldon’s request to represent 
himself.  Rejecting the prosecutor’s argument, the court 
reasoned that if Waldon’s Faretta motion were successful, he 
could act as his own counsel in deciding how to address the 
pending competency challenges.   
 
In subsequent proceedings, the parties made clear the 
limited role of attorneys Bloom and Sanchez.  Bloom explained 
to one judge that he was “appearing for the specialized purpose” 
of assisting Waldon “so that he may be named his own counsel.”  
After hearing Bloom’s limited role, a different judge remarked, 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
 
“I don’t understand, Mr. Bloom, for the purposes of the record, 
your presence here.  Who represents Mr. Waldon?”  Before a 
motions judge who also expressed confusion about Waldon’s 
representation, the prosecutor stated that Sanchez and Bloom 
had been appointed to help Waldon achieve propria persona 
status; there was no disagreement with the prosecutor’s 
statement that Waldon “at this point stands unrepresented in 
the matter.”   
5. Second Faretta hearing 
 
Waldon filed another Faretta motion in June 1989, 
making two distinct requests.  The first was “a request to 
proceed ‘in propria persona’ with full assistance of two counsel 
with the restriction that counsel be prohibited from acting or 
speaking against the wishes of the defendant and that counsel 
be required to follow the directions of the defendant.”  The 
second request, to be addressed only if the first were denied, was 
for Waldon to be named “lead counsel” with the appointment of 
“second chair counsel” who would “follow his direction and assist 
him in his case.”  The accompanying written waiver 
acknowledged Waldon’s rights to the assistance of counsel, 
speedy trial, and other trial rights; it also listed the 
responsibilities of a “lead attorney,” such as selecting a jury and 
questioning witnesses, and it indicated that “I understand that 
if I am named lead counsel I will not have the benefit of a lead 
counsel to do all the forementioned things.”   
 
The June 1989 Faretta motion was initially assigned to 
Judge Langford, who denied the first part of Waldon’s request, 
the appointment of counsel who would take direction from 
Waldon.  Turning to the second part of Waldon’s request, to 
represent himself with the assistance of “second counsel,” the 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
judge observed that it was a problem to let Waldon make a 
Faretta request when there was still a pending appeal regarding 
his competency.  At the urging of advisory counsel Bloom, Judge 
Langford nonetheless agreed to proceed.  Informed that Waldon 
sought to present witnesses to support his motion, the judge 
ordered witness statements to be submitted in writing and 
continued the hearing.            
 
The case was later assigned for trial to Judge Boyle, who 
took up the Faretta hearing where Judge Langford left off.  
Appearing before Judge Boyle for the first time, Bloom 
explained that he was not appearing as “full-purpose counsel, 
but just for the purpose of assisting [Waldon] in his efforts to 
become pro per.”  The first issue Waldon raised was a 
peremptory challenge against Judge Boyle and a challenge for 
cause.  Denying the challenge, the judge observed that there was 
“some 1368 history” that was still pending.  Bloom responded 
that the competency issues were “very remotely” pending in 
“some sorts of writs” but were not currently before the trial 
court.   
Waldon next sought to have Judge Boyle address problems 
Waldon was having obtaining his prior defense counsel’s case 
file.  In response, the prosecutor summarized the problem in 
transferring the case materials:  prior counsel had been relieved; 
there was no lead counsel appointed to whom prior counsel could 
send her file; Bloom was “only an advisory attorney for purposes 
of pro per”; and Waldon could not receive the file because he was 
not yet representing himself.  Judge Boyle responded that 
although Bloom and Sanchez had been appointed for a limited 
purpose, “it is for a limited purpose in the sense of mission.  As 
far as I am concerned, both of you are the attorneys for the 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
defendant completely and 100 percent at this point in time and 
would certainly be a correct repository of any files or information 
if you were to request it the next time.”   
 
As the parties went on to discuss scheduling, the 
prosecutor noted that there was a “voluminous” case file.  He 
explained that there had already been one Faretta motion and 
that the court might want to review the proceedings related to 
it.  Bloom responded that Waldon was requesting “that the 
Court limit its review to the pending motion.  The review of prior 
materials, he thinks, we believe, could possibly be prejudicial.”  
The court asked Bloom if he joined in Waldon’s request; after 
Bloom’s affirmative response, the court granted the request 
without discussion.  In a later hearing to discuss the status of 
the Faretta motion, Judge Boyle stated, “I have — I hate to say 
this on the record, but — intentionally kept myself ignorant of 
the history of this case.  So don’t assume that I have been 
following this case along and understand what has happened 
before, because I don’t know anything about what’s happened 
before.”   
 
Waldon ultimately submitted affidavits from several lay 
witnesses who attested to Waldon’s competence and their belief 
that he should be allowed to waive his right to counsel.  Some of 
the witnesses met Waldon at Esperanto meetings or conferences 
in 1984 and 1985, and they described interacting with him 
during one or two such events; others knew Waldon when he 
was taking Esperanto courses in 1983 and 1984; and one witness 
met Waldon in 1984 through his younger sister.  Bernice Garrett 
and Max Brande, who testified in the first Faretta hearing, 
again declared their belief that Waldon was competent to waive 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
 
his right to counsel.  They both noted that Waldon said he was 
willing to die for the principle of defending himself.    
 
Waldon also submitted reports from two experts:  Dr. 
Giraldi, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Weinstein, a clinical 
psychologist.  Neither doctor referred to reviewing case or 
background material, and both doctors referred to Waldon as 
“Steven Midas,” the alias Waldon was using when he was 
arrested.      
 
Dr. Giraldi performed a mental status examination of 
Waldon in June 1989.  Waldon would only answer questions 
related to the past year and claimed that he was in good physical 
and mental health.  Dr. Giraldi stated that Waldon did not 
appear to have a thought disorder or psychosis, concluded that 
Waldon was competent to waive counsel, and noted that “Mr. 
Midas stated he felt he understood his attorney and the nature 
of his case.”   
 
Dr. Weinstein met with Waldon in April 1989 and 
administered portions of an intelligence test and a test to assess 
brain damage.  Dr. Weinstein acknowledged that Waldon was 
only willing to disclose information he felt was relevant to his 
capacity to defend himself; Waldon had not revealed, for 
example, the reason he was in custody or the crimes he was 
facing.  Dr. Weinstein reported that Waldon’s intelligence was 
above average and found no indication of psychosis or brain 
damage that would prevent Waldon from representing himself.  
Dr. Weinstein described Waldon as “an intelligent man who is 
clearly aware of the consequences of his choice.”  He stated that 
Waldon “expressed a clear awareness that even though his 
choice to defend himself might not be the best possible 
alternative, it is his preference, ultimately stating ‘I’ve always 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
 
been like that . . . if you want something done right, do it 
yourself.’ ”    
 
At the hearing on Waldon’s second Faretta motion, the 
trial judge characterized Waldon’s affidavits as presenting “in 
summary fashion, a testament to [Waldon’s] intelligence and 
competence.”  The judge noted that it was “a remarkable group 
of documents by people of various professions in support of Mr. 
Waldon.”  The judge then advised Waldon of some of the 
disadvantages of self-representation:  Waldon’s ignorance of the 
law or procedural difficulties would not be an excuse for delay; 
he would be subject to the same rules as any lawyer; he would 
be required to cooperate with the court and accept its rulings; 
and he would be facing prosecutors who were far more 
experienced in the law.  The judge stated, “It’s very clear —
everybody in the business knows it — that self-representation is 
consistently, if not always, a detriment to the defendant’s 
preparation of his own defense.  [¶] Do you understand that 
that’s our opinion Mr. Waldon?”  To each of the court’s 
admonitions, Waldon responded, “Yes, your Honor.”  The judge 
then noted, “There is no question in this Court’s mind of the 
defendant’s ability to read and write, listen, be polite, and 
cooperate if he chooses to do so.”  After a brief discussion to 
ensure that Waldon’s June 1989 waiver was on file, the judge 
granted Waldon’s request to represent himself.   
B. Discussion 
1. Waiver 
 
 
The Attorney General contends that Waldon waived his 
claim by inviting any error in the reconsideration of Judge 
Zumwalt’s Faretta denial.  “ ‘The doctrine of invited error is 
designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
 
appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest.  
If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the 
appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal. . . .  [I]t also 
must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out 
of ignorance or mistake.’ ”  (People v. Coffman and Marlow 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49.)  To evaluate the question of invited 
error, we first consider the nature of Waldon’s representation in 
the second Faretta proceeding.   
As noted, Sanchez served as advisory counsel, and the 
trial court later appointed Bloom to assist him.  Both attorneys 
made clear that their role was to carry out Waldon’s wishes as 
he pursued self-representation.  The Attorney General suggests 
that because the attorneys made appearances for Waldon and 
filed motions on his behalf, they represented Waldon in his 
renewed Faretta motion.  But attorneys serving in an advisory 
capacity “do not ‘represent’ the defendant.”  (People v. Lightsey 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 692.)  Our precedent has “loosely used” a 
variety of terms to describe the assistance counsel may provide 
to a defendant who is directing the defense.  (People v. Hamilton 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14.)  In some circumstances, the 
attorney advises the defendant and does not participate in the 
proceedings; in others, the “attorney shares responsibilities with 
the defendant and actively participates in both the preparation 
of the defense case and its presentation to a degree acceptable 
to both the defendant and the attorney and permitted by the 
court.”  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1119, fn. 7.)  
Ultimately, however, “there are only two basic categories of 
representation”:  one in which the defendant is represented by 
counsel who “is at all times in charge of the case” and one in 
which the defendant “assumes primary control” of the defense.  
(Hamilton, at p. 1164, fn. 14.)  Tactical decisions to invite error 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
 
cannot be assigned to Sanchez and Bloom when their role was 
to raise issues and requests at Waldon’s direction.  In other 
words, Sanchez and Bloom were not in charge of the second 
Faretta motion; Waldon was.  Without an attorney appointed for 
all purposes, there was no counsel to ensure, for example, that 
pending claims of error regarding Waldon’s competence to stand 
trial were fairly resolved before any reconsideration of his 
Faretta motion. 
The question then becomes whether we attribute invited 
error to Waldon’s efforts, while his competence was still in 
question, to have the trial court disregard the prior Faretta 
denial.  Before Waldon’s second Faretta motion, we had directed 
the Court of Appeal to issue an alternative writ regarding errors 
in Waldon’s competency trial.  The issuance of our order 
“necessarily indicated that [defendant] had made a prima facie 
showing of [error], or a possible [error].”  (Coy v. Superior Court 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 221; see also Gomez v. Superior Court 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 293, 301.)  In response to the alternative writ, 
the trial court was required to provide Waldon with a new 
competency trial or to show cause why a new trial was not 
warranted.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1087.)  An additional order 
from the Court of Appeal mandated the appointment of counsel 
for all purposes to address the pending competency issues.  None 
of those actions had taken place at the time Waldon pursued his 
second Faretta motion and urged the trial court to ignore the 
prior competency and Faretta proceedings.  Defendants do not 
waive a claim of error when they have been permitted to control 
the defense while the question of their competence is still 
pending.  (People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 696.)  When 
the “ ‘evidence indicates that the defendant may be [mentally ill] 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
it should be assumed that he is unable to act in his own best 
interests.’ ”  (Id. at p. 697.)   
Further, it is questionable whether waiver principles 
apply to a court’s inquiry into a defendant’s knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.  (Cf. People v. Palmer 
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 116 [it is inappropriate to apply waiver 
and forfeiture principles to a requirement whose purpose is to 
ensure that constitutional standards of voluntariness and 
intelligence are met].)  Despite Waldon urging the trial court to 
ignore the prior competency and Faretta proceedings, the court 
had a duty to protect Waldon’s right to counsel and to “satisfy 
itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights [was] knowing 
and voluntary.”  (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400 
(Moran); see also People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069 
[“ ‘the federal Constitution requires assiduous protection of the 
right to counsel’ ”].)  “This protecting duty imposes the serious 
and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining 
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the 
accused.”  (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465.) 
In sum, requests that Waldon made when his competence 
was in question, when he did not have counsel appointed to 
protect his interests, and when the trial court was obligated to 
ensure his knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, could not 
have waived and did not waive his claim that the trial court 
erred in overturning Judge Zumwalt’s Faretta denial.   
2. Authority to reconsider the Faretta denial  
 
 A trial judge ordinarily may reconsider his or her own 
“ ‘prejudgment’ ” rulings.  (People v. Konow (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
995, 1020 (Konow).)  Code of Civil Procedure section 128, 
subdivision (a)(8) authorizes a court to “amend and control its 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
 
process and orders so as to make them conform to law and 
justice.”  This provision applies to criminal cases as well.  (See 
People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1205.)  There are 
limits, however, on the authority of one superior court judge to 
set aside the order of another judge of the same court.  “[U]nder 
article VI, section 4, of the California Constitution, ‘one [judge 
or] department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or 
otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another [judge or] 
department of the superior court.’ ”  (Konow, at p. 1019.)  This 
rule prevents a trial court judge from acting as a “ ‘one-judge 
appellate court’ over another judge.”  (Id. at p. 1021.)  There are 
some exceptions (see Konow, at p. 1021; People v. Mattson (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 826, 849), but none apply here. 
 
 
Citing People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 993, the 
Attorney General contends the trial court properly considered 
Waldon’s second Faretta motion because of a change in 
circumstances.  The court in Riva held that pretrial rulings on 
the admissibility of evidence could be reviewed by another judge 
following a mistrial if there was a “highly persuasive reason for 
doing so.”  (Riva, at p. 992.)  Among the factors the Riva court 
identified as relevant to reconsideration was “whether there has 
been a change in circumstances since the previous order was 
made.”  (Id. at p. 993, fn. omitted.)  Authority for this factor 
included, by way of analogy, Code of Civil Procedure section 
1008, subdivision (b), which provides for reconsideration “upon 
new or different facts, circumstances, or law.”  (See Riva, at 
p. 993, fn. 33.) 
 
According to the Attorney General, the change in 
circumstances justifying reconsideration here was the Court of 
Appeal issuing orders that (1) relieved trial counsel and (2) 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
 
stated that other issues regarding representation should be 
addressed in the trial court by new counsel appointed for all 
purposes.  These orders do not represent a relevant change in 
circumstances because they had no bearing on the issue to be 
reconsidered — whether Waldon was competent to validly waive 
his right to counsel and represent himself.  Moreover, when 
Waldon presented his second Faretta request, he did not claim 
there was any change in circumstances; he simply asked Judge 
Boyle to ignore the prior proceedings. 
 
Even if we assume that a second judge could exercise 
discretion to reconsider the denial of Waldon’s Faretta motion 
under some circumstances, we need not decide the precise 
standard governing that authority, whether by analogy to Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1008 or otherwise.  Judge Boyle knew 
that a prior Faretta ruling by another judge posed a conflict with 
his ruling, but he did not consider the basis of the prior decision 
and ignored the underlying record.  It is sufficient for purposes 
of this case to state the obvious:  When a trial court exercises its 
authority to reconsider another judge’s ruling, the trial court 
must, at minimum, consider the basis for the prior ruling.  (See 
Konow, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1019 [“ ‘ “ ‘An order made in one 
department during the progress of a cause can neither be 
ignored nor overlooked in another department.’ ” ’ ”].)     
 
Judge Boyle abused his discretion by overturning Judge 
Zumwalt’s Faretta denial while intentionally ignoring her 
findings and the bases for her decision, and by ignoring relevant 
evidence, including testimony from three mental health experts 
that caused Judge Zumwalt to conclude that Waldon was not 
competent to validly waive counsel or represent himself.  To 
overturn the Faretta denial in this manner — without regard for 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
 
key facts, findings, and legal principles — was “arbitrary or 
irrational.”  (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470.)  Waldon 
claims that the trial court’s arbitrary reversal also violates due 
process, but we do not reach that constitutional question.  (See 
Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1102 [“we avoid 
resolving constitutional questions if the issue may be resolved 
on narrower grounds”].)  
3. Effect of the error 
 
The Attorney General asserts that the decision to overturn 
Judge Zumwalt’s Faretta denial was harmless because it was 
based on Waldon’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of 
counsel.  Even if we were to assume that a proper Faretta 
hearing could remedy the error here, the record does not support 
the assertion that Judge Boyle conducted such a hearing.   
 
A two-part inquiry determines whether a defendant may 
waive the right to counsel:  (1) The defendant must be competent 
to stand trial, and (2) the trial court must “satisfy itself” that the 
waiver of “constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”  
(Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 400–401.)  In Moran, the high 
court explained that “the purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ 
inquiry . . . is to determine whether the defendant actually does 
understand the significance and consequences of a particular 
decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.”  (Id. at p. 401, 
fn. 12; accord, People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1069–
1070.)  When there is reason to doubt a defendant’s mental 
capacity to waive counsel, the court’s determination should be 
made after a careful inquiry into the defendant’s competence, 
including consideration of psychiatric evidence.  (People v. 
Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 90; People v. Teron (1978) 23 Cal.3d 
103, 113–114.)  
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
 
The Attorney General argues that nothing in the record 
suggested 
that 
Waldon 
was 
mentally 
incapable 
of 
understanding the rights he asked to waive.  We are not 
persuaded.  Dr. Kalish testified that Waldon was not able to 
make rational decisions or focus on coherent objectives because 
he was inundated with paranoid thoughts.  Drs. Kalish, Di 
Francesca, and Koshkarian each testified that Waldon was 
unable to contemplate potential defenses or the implications of 
proceeding without counsel.  Expert reports that found Waldon 
competent to waive counsel did not address the contrary 
findings or resolve them in any way.  At the very least, these 
conflicting expert reports warranted further inquiry into 
Waldon’s capacity to appreciate the risks of waiving his right to 
counsel.   
The Attorney General contends that reports and 
testimony from Drs. Kalish, Di Francesca, and Koshkarian had 
limited relevance because “[m]ore than two years had passed 
since the earlier psychological evaluations, and Waldon had 
refused to cooperate with the appointed evaluators.”  But 
Waldon did cooperate with each of the experts, particularly with 
Dr. Koshkarian, who met with Waldon several times in 1987 
and twice in March 1988.  The record does not show that this 
evidence lacked relevance in 1989, when the trial court 
considered Waldon’s second Faretta motion.  At any rate, the 
trial judge could not consider the relevance of prior evaluations 
because he did not look at them or even know they existed.   
The scope of a trial court’s inquiry into a defendant’s 
ability to validly waive counsel “depends on the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case.”  (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 231, 242.)  In People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, as 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
 
here, a judge initially denied the defendant’s Faretta request, 
finding that he was not competent to waive counsel.  (Taylor, at 
p. 859.)  After competency proceedings and a determination that 
the defendant was competent to stand trial, a different judge 
granted the defendant’s renewed Faretta request, considering 
the previous ruling, expert reports, and an extended colloquy 
with the defendant.  (Taylor, at pp. 878–879.)  Finding that the 
record supported the ruling, we noted that the trial court 
“elaborated 
at 
length” 
on 
the 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation, considered particular difficulties the defendant 
might have, such as presenting mitigation evidence, and 
reached a conclusion that did not contradict the expert findings.  
(Id. at p. 879.)  Furthermore, the defendant “did not simply reply 
to the court passively or monosyllabically” but engaged with the 
court, asked questions, and demonstrated his understanding of 
the risks and consequences of his decision.  (Id. at p. 878.)   
Here, the reasons Waldon gave for wanting to represent 
himself offered no indication that he “actually” appreciated the 
“significance and consequences” of that decision.  (Moran, supra, 
509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12.)  He explained in a public filing that 
his trial strategy consisted of surprising the prosecutor by 
insisting on a speedy trial; he said he needed to bring criminal 
charges against his former trial counsel; he told others he was 
prepared to die for the principle of self-representation; he 
claimed that the assistance of counsel violated his religion.  
Further, Waldon’s behavior — including his preoccupation with 
alleged conspiracies and wrongdoing unrelated to the criminal 
trial, and his inability or unwillingness to focus on potential 
defenses — did not signal an appreciation of the dangers and 
disadvantages he faced. 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
 
Notably, three experts who examined Waldon and 
reviewed background and case material testified about Waldon’s 
mental impairment and inability to grasp the significance of 
waiving counsel.  Although two new experts concluded that 
Waldon was competent to waive counsel, both acknowledged 
that Waldon limited the information he was willing to provide, 
and neither doctor considered the prior expert opinions, 
Waldon’s psychiatric history and filings in propria persona, or 
other case information.  (Cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 970, 1048 [court could properly discount expert 
opinion regarding defendant’s competence when the expert did 
not consider the defendant’s psychiatric history and filings in 
propria persona and did not address contrary opinions and facts 
presented by other experts].)   
Despite significant questions about Waldon’s mental 
capacity, and unlike the extended colloquy in Taylor, Judge 
Boyle spoke only briefly to Waldon, comprising just two pages of 
transcript.  In response to standard advisements — that his 
propria persona status would not be an excuse for delay, that he 
would be subject to the same rules as any lawyer, that opposing 
counsel was more experienced, and that self-representation is 
usually detrimental to preparing a defense — Waldon’s only 
response was “Yes, your Honor.”  Then, without reviewing any 
portion of the record, the judge granted Waldon’s Faretta 
request, stating, “There is no question in this Court’s mind of 
the defendant’s ability to read and write, listen, be polite, and 
cooperate if he chooses to do so.”  Given the circumstances we 
have recounted, Judge Boyle’s inquiry was “plainly insufficient” 
to establish Waldon’s “understanding of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation” and his knowing and 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
 
voluntary waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel.  
(People v. Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 241–242.)  
 
By overturning Judge Zumwalt’s Faretta denial, the trial 
court deprived Waldon of two distinct protections afforded by 
her ruling:  (1) protection of Waldon’s constitutional right to 
counsel after finding that Waldon had a mental disorder that 
prevented him from understanding the significance and 
consequences of waiving that right (see People v. Koontz, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 1069); and (2) protection of Waldon’s right to a 
fair trial after a finding that he was unable to present a defense 
because of his mental impairment, a basis for denying self-
representation within the judge’s discretion (Indiana v. 
Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 176–177; People v. Johnson (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 519, 533; People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 
878).  Judge Boyle did not establish Waldon’s valid waiver of 
counsel before overturning Judge Zumwalt’s ruling, nor did he 
consider or address Waldon’s competence to present a defense.  
The proceeding on Waldon’s second Faretta request therefore 
did not remedy the deprivation of counsel as the Attorney 
General suggests. 
The effect of the trial court’s error, the “total deprivation 
of the right to counsel at trial,” is among the errors “which defy 
analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”  (Arizona v. Fulminante 
(1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309.)  “Whether a violation of state law or 
federal constitutional law, structural error results in per se 
reversal.”  (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196; see also 
People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 554.)  Because this 
error requires reversal of the judgment, we do not consider 
Waldon’s remaining claims of error. 
PEOPLE v. WALDON 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment in its entirety and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.* 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Waldon 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S025520 
Date Filed:  January 23, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  David M. Gill 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, 
Karen Hamilton and Hassan Gorguinpour, Deputy State Public 
Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Dane R. Gillette, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland and James William 
Bilderback II, Assistant Attorneys General, Holly D. Wilkens, Arlene 
A. Sevidal, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Hassan Gorguinpour 
Deputy State Public Defender 
770 L Street, Suite 1000 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Collette C. Cavalier 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9201