Case Title: State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council

Citation: 2001-Ohio-130

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council, 92 Ohio St.3d 54, 2001-
Ohio-130.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LONG v. COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF CARDINGTON ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
54.] 
Public records — Mandamus sought to compel respondents Cardington, Ohio, 
et al. to prepare, file and maintain full and accurate minutes and to 
conduct all meetings in public, except for properly called executive 
sessions — Writ granted — Attorney fees and costs awarded. 
(No. 00-857 — Submitted March 13, 2001 — Decided June 13, 2001.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Respondent Council of the Village of Cardington, Ohio, and 
its members, respondents Robert Doolin, Cecil Maxwell, Laurie Plotner, David 
Sheets, Joel Sherman, and Vicki Wise, conduct public business of the village 
through prearranged discussions by a majority of the village council members.  
The village council characterizes these prearranged discussions as regular 
sessions, special sessions, work sessions, joint sessions, personnel committee 
meetings, and finance committee meetings.  Respondent Cardington Mayor 
William Christian attends and presides over village council meetings, and 
respondent Cardington Clerk/Treasurer Belva Bowers prepares minutes for the 
meetings. 
 
On May 9, 2000, after becoming dissatisfied with respondents’ responses 
to her request for certain public records and to her claims that respondents had 
violated Ohio’s Sunshine Law, R.C. 121.22, relator, Mary Long, a village resident 
and former village council member, filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in 
this court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
In her complaint, Long claimed that village council minutes for meetings 
held by respondents were inadequate and incorrect.  More specifically, Long 
objected to the council minutes of the January 3, 2000 work session, the January 
3, 2000 joint session, the January 13, 2000 work session, the January 17, 2000 
regular session, the January 17, 2000 finance committee meeting, the January 24, 
2000 personnel committee meeting, the January 25, 2000 personnel committee 
meeting, the January 26, 2000 special session, the February 22, 2000 finance 
committee meeting, the March 20, 2000 regular session, and the March 20, 2000 
finance committee meeting. 
 
For example, the minutes of the January 3 council meetings erroneously 
included Long’s name in the roll call, but she was not a member of the village 
council at that time.  In addition, the January 3 council work session included the 
following generalized statements: 
 
“The Mayor discussed the plans for this meeting.  The Mayor’s belief in 
how committee chairs will operate.  * * * There was a discussion regarding the 
wet retention area at Bantry Farms.  Future Developers must not have the same 
engineer as the village.” 
 
Long further claimed that minutes for the January 13 work session, the 
January 17 regular session, the January 26 special session, and the March 20 
regular session failed to state with the requisite specificity the purpose or purposes 
of convening executive sessions (i.e., meetings closed to the public) during the 
council’s sessions.  Instead, the minutes for these meetings referred to executive 
sessions for the purposes of “personnel and finances,” “personnel,” and 
“personnel matters.” 
 
In addition, Long asserted that minutes of the January 17 finance 
committee meeting, the January 24 personnel committee meeting, the January 25 
personnel committee meeting, the February 22 finance committee meeting, and 
the March 20 finance committee meeting did not record motions or votes. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
Long requested a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to prepare, 
file, and maintain full and accurate meeting minutes for all meetings and 
executive sessions, including those meetings specified in her complaint, and to 
compel respondents to conduct all meetings in public except for those meetings 
that properly constitute executive sessions.  Long also requested an award of costs 
and attorney fees under R.C. 121.22(I) and 149.43(C). 
 
Respondents Bowers, Christian, Doolin, and Maxwell filed an answer and 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  In the motion, they claimed that this 
court lacks original jurisdiction over an action for a mandatory injunction in 
common pleas court under R.C. 121.22(I) and that Long has, in fact, brought such 
an action in the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas.  Respondents 
Cardington Village Council, Plotner, Sheets, Sherman, and Wise failed to file a 
timely response to Long’s complaint, and Long moved for a default judgment 
against them. 
 
After mediation failed to resolve the parties’ dispute, this case was 
returned to the regular docket.  We denied the motions for judgment on the 
pleadings and for default judgment and granted an alternative writ.  90 Ohio St.3d 
1415, 735 N.E.2d 455. 
 
The parties then filed evidence and briefs.  Respondents’ evidence 
included an affidavit of respondent Plotner in which she stated that council 
meetings, with the exception of executive sessions, are audiotaped, that the tapes 
are available to the public, and that the minutes are prepared from the tapes and 
notes of the meetings.  Respondents subsequently filed audiotapes and transcripts 
of audiotapes of the following council meetings:  the January 3 joint session, the 
January 17 regular session, the January 26 special session, and the March 20 
regular session. 
 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Long requests a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to prepare, file, 
and maintain full and accurate minutes for all meetings and to conduct all 
meetings in public except for properly called executive sessions. 
 
Ohio’s Sunshine Law, R.C. 121.22, requires the preparation, filing, and 
maintenance of a public body’s minutes.  White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 423, 667 N.E.2d 1223, 1229; R.C. 121.22(C).  Once 
these minutes are prepared, Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, requires the 
public body to permit public access to the minutes upon request.  State ex rel. 
Fairfield Leader v. Ricketts (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 97, 101, 564 N.E.2d 486, 491; 
see, also, R.C. 121.22(C).  Finally, R.C. 733.27(A) provides that the village clerk 
“shall attend all meetings of the legislative authority of the village, and keep a 
record of its proceedings.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Construing R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 733.27 in pari materia, respondents, 
the Cardington Village Council, its members, the village clerk, as well as the 
mayor, who presides over the village council meetings, have a duty to prepare, 
file, and maintain full and accurate minutes for council meetings, and to make 
them available for public inspection.  See State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 620, 622, 716 N.E.2d 204, 207 (“Under the applicable rule of statutory 
construction, all statutes relating to the same general subject matter must be read 
in pari materia”); cf. White, 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 667 N.E.2d 1223, at paragraph 
one of the syllabus (“R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 305.10, when read together, 
impose a duty on all boards of county commissioners to maintain a full and 
accurate record of their proceedings”). 
 
Respondents contend that they fully complied with these duties to prepare 
and make available minutes by audiotaping council meetings and making the 
audiotapes of the meetings available to the public.  In White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 
424, 667 N.E.2d at 1229, we observed that audio recordings could be a 
“legitimate means of satisfying the requirements of R.C. 121.22 * * *.”  
January Term, 2001 
5 
Nevertheless, for the following reasons, respondents’ contention that their 
audiotapes complied with R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 733.27 is meritless. 
 
First, respondents never treated these audiotapes as the official minutes  of 
their meetings.  Instead, the typewritten minutes are prepared from the tapes as 
well as from notes taken during the meetings.  At the beginning of regular council 
meetings, the council reviews and approves the written minutes, not the tapes, of 
prior meetings. 
 
Second, respondents did not tape all of their meetings.  For example, 
respondents have not introduced tapes of any of the village council’s finance or 
personnel committee meetings, or for that matter, any council meetings other than 
the four filed in this proceeding. 
 
Third, at the April 17, 2000 village council meeting, the council 
unanimously voted to erase tapes of council meetings after the written minutes 
had been approved.  If the tapes were truly the minutes required by R.C. 121.22, 
149.43, and 733.27, they would be maintained, not quickly destroyed.  See R.C. 
121.22(C) (“The minutes of a regular or special meeting of any public body shall 
be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be open to public 
inspection”). 
 
Finally, even if the few tapes and accompanying transcripts provided by 
respondents could be considered minutes, they contain too many inaudible 
portions to satisfy the requirement of a full and accurate record.  For example, the 
tape of the January 3 joint session contains approximately thirteen instances in 
which the tape cannot be understood, and the tape of the January 17 regular 
session contains approximately twenty-six inaudible portions.  Notably, absent a 
transcript of each audiotape, a member of the public might not know the identities 
of the speakers. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Therefore, in determining whether respondents complied with their 
statutory duties, we consider the written minutes provided to Long rather than the 
audiotapes. 
 
In analyzing these minutes, it is apparent that they do not provide a full 
and accurate record of council proceedings.  The challenged minutes contain 
admitted inaccuracies that have never been corrected.  For example, the minutes 
for the January 3 council meetings erroneously include Long’s name in the roll 
call of council members even though she was no longer a council member on that 
date. 
 
In addition, the minutes do not include sufficient facts to understand and 
appreciate the rationale behind some of the village council’s decisions.  “[F]ull 
and accurate minutes must contain sufficient facts and information to permit the 
public to understand and appreciate the rationale behind the relevant public 
body’s decision.”  White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 424, 667 N.E.2d at 1229.  The minutes 
of the January 3 work session, for example, state that future developers “must not 
have the same engineer as the village,” but there is no recorded vote ordering this, 
nor is there any rationale offered to support this apparent council decision.  And 
the minutes of the January 26 special session indicate that respondent Sherman 
was appointed council member but include no rationale for the appointment or a 
properly scheduled executive session under R.C. 121.22(G)(1). 
 
In fact, respondents’ minutes of finance and personnel committee 
meetings do not include motions and votes, much less the detail to meet the 
comprehensive requirements of R.C. 121.22.  See White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 423, 
667 N.E.2d at 1229 (Minutes of any meeting of a public body besides properly 
called executive sessions “certainly should not be limited to a mere recounting of 
the body’s roll call votes”).  For example, the minutes for the January 17 finance 
committee meeting state merely that “[a] brief meeting was held to sign off on all 
accounts” without specifying motions, votes, or details concerning the accounts.  
January Term, 2001 
7 
Similarly, the minutes of the February 22 finance committee meeting state that the 
committee “went over the budget page by page for the final reading at the next 
scheduled Council Meeting,” without mentioning the budget items or any motions 
or votes. 
 
Respondents counter that they need not provide full and accurate minutes 
of any committee meetings because the village council does not conduct official 
business at these meetings, and they do not constitute council meetings.  
Respondents’ assertion is meritless.  R.C. 121.22(C) mandates that public 
officials, when meeting to consider official business, conduct those meetings in 
public.  The R.C. 121.22(B)(2) definition of “meeting,” which is required by R.C. 
121.22(A) to be “liberally construed” in favor of open meetings, requires (1) a 
prearranged discussion, (2) a discussion of the public business of the public body, 
and (3) the presence at the discussion of a majority of the members of the public 
body.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 540, 543, 
668 N.E.2d 903, 906.  Liberally construing these requirements, committee 
meetings are meetings for purposes of R.C. 121.22 because they are prearranged 
discussions of the public business of a public body by a majority of the public 
body’s members.  See R.C. 121.22(A).  In fact, respondents conceded this in their 
pleading.  And as they further admitted, R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(b) includes any 
committee or subcommittee of a legislative authority of a political subdivision, 
e.g., a village council, as a “public body” for purposes of the Sunshine Law, so 
that the council’s personnel and finance committees constitute public bodies in 
that context. 
 
“ ‘[W]here, as here, the members of a public body agree to attend, in their 
official capacity, a meeting where public business is to be discussed and a 
majority of the members do attend, R.C. 121.22(C) necessitates that minutes of 
the meeting be recorded.’ ”  Cincinnati Post, 76 Ohio St.3d at 543, 668 N.E.2d at 
905, quoting Fairfield Leader, 56 Ohio St.3d at 102, 564 N.E.2d at 491. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Furthermore, the minutes reflect that respondents often failed to specify 
the appropriate statutory purpose or purposes before conducting private, i.e., 
executive sessions.  If a public body decides to conduct an executive session for 
the purpose of considering one or more of the matters listed in R.C. 121.22(G)(1) 
concerning personnel, the public body must specify in its motion and vote those 
listed matters that it will discuss in the executive session.  R.C. 121.22(G)(1)1;  
1988 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 88-029, 2-120 to 2-121, fn. 1. 
 
By using general terms like “personnel” and “personnel and finances” 
instead of one or more of the specified statutory purposes, respondents violated 
R.C. 121.22(G)(1).  See, e.g., Jones v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees (June 30, 1995), 
Trumbull App. No. 92-T-4692, unreported, 1995 WL 411842 (“a reference to 
‘police personnel issues’ does not technically satisfy [the R.C. 121.22(G)(1)] 
requirement because it does not specify which of the approved purposes was 
applicable in this instance”). 
 
In fact, even if we were to accept respondents’ invitation to consider the 
provided tapes and transcripts in order to “fill in the blanks” of their official 
minutes, no tapes were provided of the January 13 regular session, the tape of the 
January 17 council meeting indicates that the motion to go into executive session 
that was approved by council only generally referred to an executive session for 
“personnel,” and the tape of the January 26 motion merely reiterated the laundry 
list of possible matters from R.C. 121.22(G)(1) without specifying which of those 
purposes would be discussed in executive session. 
 
Therefore, respondents have not complied with R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 
733.27. 
 
Respondents finally contend that Long is precluded from seeking 
extraordinary relief in mandamus because she has an adequate legal remedy by 
way of her R.C. 121.22(I)2 action in the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas 
for a mandatory injunction to enforce Ohio’s Sunshine Law provisions. 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
An action for a mandatory injunction, however, is an extraordinary 
remedy that does not preclude a writ of mandamus to enforce R.C. 121.22 and 
149.43.  See Fairfield Leader, 56 Ohio St.3d at 102, 564 N.E.2d at 492 (“R.C. 
121.22[I] * * * provides The Leader no adequate alternative to the writ”); cf. 
Hardesty v. River View Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1993), 63 Ohio Misc.2d 
145, 149, 620 N.E.2d 272, 274 (R.C. 121.22[I] does not provide the exclusive 
remedy for a person adversely affected by the failure of a governmental body to 
comply with the Sunshine Law); see, also, State ex rel. Levin v. Schremp (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 733, 735, 654 N.E.2d 1258, 1259 (mandatory injunction is not an 
adequate legal remedy precluding extraordinary relief in mandamus); State ex rel. 
Findlay Publishing Co. v. Schroeder (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 582, 669 N.E.2d 
835, 838 (“[P]ersons seeking public records pursuant to R.C. 149.43[C] need not 
establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law in order to be entitled to a writ of 
mandamus”). 
 
Based on the foregoing, Long has established her entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  She is also entitled to an award of 
attorney fees and costs.  R.C. 149.43(C); cf. R.C. 121.22(I)(2).  Despite 
respondents’ attempt to portray Long as an embittered ex-council member who 
condoned a comparable lack of detail in meeting minutes during her tenure, it 
remains evident that these facts do not excuse respondents’ continued 
noncompliance with the applicable statutes.  A contrary holding would constitute 
a disservice to the public, not simply Long.  This action has consequently resulted 
in a public benefit, and respondents failed to comply with R.C. 121.22, 149.43, 
and 733.27 even when inaccuracies and insufficiencies in the minutes were 
manifest.  See White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 424, 667 N.E.2d at 1229; cf. R.C. 121.22.  
We consequently order Long to submit a bill and documentation in support of her 
request for attorney fees and costs, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in 
DR 2-106(B). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
As we observed in White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 419, 667 N.E.2d at 1226, “One 
of the strengths of American government is the right of the public to know and 
understand the actions of their elected representatives.  This includes not merely 
the right to know a government body’s final decision on a matter, but the ways 
and means by which those decisions were reached.”  Respondents have 
circumvented these crucial rights by preparing and maintaining insufficient and 
inaccurate minutes. 
 
Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to prepare, 
file, and maintain full and accurate minutes and to conduct all meetings in public, 
except for properly called executive sessions.  Cf. State ex rel. Inskeep v. Staten 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 676, 678, 660 N.E.2d 1207, 1209, where we granted 
similarly expansive relief in an open-meetings case, and R.C. 121.22(I), which 
permits a broad mandatory injunction to compel violators of the Sunshine Law to 
comply with its provisions. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  I believe 
that R.C. 121.22(I)(1) provides the relator with an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law; therefore, I would deny the writ. 
 
Mandamus may not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  R.C. 2731.05.  Mandamus is intended for use 
when other remedies are incapable of affording relief.  State ex rel. Phelps v. 
Gearheart (1922), 104 Ohio St. 422, 135 N.E. 606.  It is to be used when there is 
no other legal remedy; it is not to be used instead of, or in addition to, other 
available remedies. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
This court has held that in order to foreclose relief in mandamus, an 
alternative remedy to mandamus must be complete, beneficial, and speedy.   State 
ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 699 N.E.2d 64, 67;  State ex rel. Walker v. 
Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 216, 218, 680 
N.E.2d 993, 995.  The remedy must be appropriate to the circumstances and 
secure relief for the complaining party.  See State ex rel. Phelps v. Gearheart, 104 
Ohio St. 422, 135 N.E. 606. 
 
R.C. 121.22(I) was enacted specifically to provide a remedy for violations 
of R.C. 121.22.  It allows any person to bring an action in common pleas court 
within two years of an alleged or threatened violation of Ohio’s Sunshine Law.  If 
the complaining party proves a violation or a threat thereof, the court shall issue 
an injunction to force compliance.  This remedy is specifically tailored to the 
circumstances alleged by relator and designed to afford the relief she seeks.  R.C. 
121.22(I)(1) affords a complete, beneficial, and speedy remedy.  Therefore, it 
satisfies the objective of a plain and adequate remedy at law and constitutes an 
alternative remedy to mandamus relief in this action.  In fact, relator has 
concurrently filed an R.C. 121.22(I) action in common pleas court.  Therefore, 
she is not without an adequate legal remedy. 
 
The majority rejects this argument on the basis that injunction is an 
“extraordinary” remedy.  In State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 
Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, Chief Justice Taft disagreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that a mandatory injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy that cannot be an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  He 
believed that a mandatory injunction would be sufficient reason for the court to 
deny a writ of mandamus.  Id. at 165-170, 40 O.O.2d at 156-159, 228 N.E.2d at 
649-653.  In cases decided prior to 1967, this court had denied a writ of 
mandamus because the relator had an adequate remedy by way of mandatory 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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injunction.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Cent. Serv. Station v. Masheter (1966), 7 Ohio 
St.2d 1, 36 O.O.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 177; State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell (1957), 
167 Ohio St. 15, 3 O.O.2d 433, 145 N.E.2d 665.  Likewise, this court affirmed or 
reversed judgments of courts of appeals because the lower courts had or should 
have denied a writ of mandamus when the relator had an adequate remedy by way 
of mandatory injunction.  State ex rel. Danford v. Karl (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 79, 
38 O.O.2d 203, 223 N.E.2d 602;  State ex rel. Durek v. Masheter (1967), 9 Ohio 
St.2d 76, 38 O.O.2d 202, 223 N.E.2d 601. 
 
I believe that Pressley was wrongly decided when it, in effect, overruled 
these cases.  The rationale of Pressley is illogical when injunctive relief is, in fact, 
an adequate legal remedy as in this case.  I would adopt the reasoning of Chief 
Justice Taft’s dissenting opinion as to why a statutory mandatory injunction is an 
adequate legal remedy and correct the path where Pressley has led us.  Where the 
General Assembly has expressly provided for injunctive relief for a violation or 
alleged violation of R.C. 121.22, I believe that a writ of mandamus is not 
warranted. 
 
R.C. 121.22(C) requires public officials to conduct official business at 
meetings open to the public, and to prepare and maintain minutes of public 
meetings.  R.C. 121.22(I)(1) authorizes any person to bring an action to enforce 
the provisions of R.C. 121.22.  I believe that the General Assembly intended for 
courts at the local level to adjudicate violations of R.C. 121.22(C).  This is more 
efficient, reliable, and fair.  A case in which there is an alleged violation of R.C. 
121.22 is very fact-oriented.  I believe that a local tribunal would be more familiar 
with and have a greater understanding of local reporting procedures, and thus 
would be able to provide a more thorough and equitable remedy under R.C. 
121.22(I).  Unlike cases where a relator is seeking an order for a public body to 
produce records, here the relator is merely asking that respondents be required to 
prepare, file, and maintain minutes of meetings, and to hold all meetings in public 
January Term, 2001 
13 
except for executive sessions.  While I do not minimize the importance of 
recordkeeping and of the mandates of R.C. 121.22, if we accept jurisdiction of 
this mandamus action, then we will be asked to review every dispute, no matter 
how minuscule, that arises about the adequacy of minutes.  These issues are very 
fact-driven and much more suited to the fact-finding role that the trial court plays.  
I do not believe that this court should become a referee over the details and 
accuracy of city council minutes. 
 
The General Assembly had a purpose for enacting R.C. 121.22(I).  If we 
grant jurisdiction in every mandamus action that seeks relief under R.C. 
121.22(I), then we are rendering meaningless the remedy afforded by R.C. 
121.22(I) and allowing the parties to bypass the statutory remedy.  The 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus may not be utilized as a substitute or to 
supplant another remedy where there is available to the relator an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 
 
I believe that mandamus, an extraordinary remedy, should be available 
only when other procedures are incapable of affording relief.  Here, relator has an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that is complete, beneficial, and 
speedy.   Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Alden, Taylor & Durkin, LLC, Randolph W. Alden and James R. Taylor, 
for relator. 
 
Manos, Martin, Pergram & Deitz Co., L.P.A., Dennis L. Pergram and 
James M. Deitz, for respondents. 
__________________ 
                                                          
 
1. 
R.C. 121.22(G) provides: 
“* * * [T]he members of a public body may hold an executive session only after a majority of 
a quorum of the public body determines, by a roll call vote, to hold an executive session and only 
at a regular or special meeting for the sole purpose of the consideration of any of the following 
matters: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“(1) To consider the appointment, employment, dismissal, discipline, promotion, demotion, or 
compensation of a public employee or official * * *.  * * *  If a public body holds an executive 
session pursuant to division (G)(1) of this section, the motion and vote to hold that executive 
session shall state which one or more of the approved purposes listed in division (G)(1) of this 
section are the purposes for which the executive session is to be held, but need not include the 
name of any person to be considered at the meeting.” 
2. 
R.C. 121.22(I)(1) provides: 
 
“Any person may bring an action to enforce this section.  An action under division (I)(1) 
of this section shall be brought within two years after the date of the alleged violation or 
threatened violation.  Upon proof of a violation or threatened violation of this section in an action 
brought by any person, the court of common pleas shall issue an injunction to compel the 
members of the public body to comply with its provisions.”