Case Title: Passadumkeag Mountain Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014 ME 116

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2014 ME 116 
Docket: 
BEP-13-413 
Argued: 
September 4, 2014 
 
Decided: 
October 21, 2014 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
PASSADUMKEAG MOUNTAIN FRIENDS et al. 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION et al. 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Passadumkeag Mountain Friends (PMF), a Maine nonprofit 
corporation, Alexander F. Cuprak, and Rhonda Cuprak appeal from a decision by 
the Board of Environmental Protection (the Board) granting Passadumkeag 
Windpark, LLC, (PW) a permit to develop a wind farm on property owned by 
Penobscot Forest, LLC, (PF) located on Passadumkeag Ridge in Grand Falls 
Township.  The Board’s decision followed PW and PF’s appeal from the decision 
of the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department) denying the 
requested permit.  PMF and the Cupraks contend that we should treat the decision 
of the Department, rather than the decision of the Board, as operative for purposes 
of appellate review.  The Cupraks also contend that, even if the Board’s decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the record does not support that decision, and that they were 
denied due process because of ex parte communications between the Board, PW, 
 
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and PF during the application process.  We disagree with these contentions and 
affirm the Board’s decision.    
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
[¶2]  In February 2012, PW applied to the Department for an expedited wind 
energy development permit pursuant to the Natural Resources Protection Act, 38 
M.R.S. §§ 480-A to 480-HH (2012).  See 35-A M.R.S. § 3451(4) (2013); 38 
M.R.S. § 480-C.  It also applied for the Department’s approval of the project 
pursuant to the site location of development statute.  See 38 M.R.S. §§ 482(2)(A), 
483-A (2013).  Through these applications, PW sought approval to construct a 
wind farm on Passadumkeag Ridge in Grand Falls Township.  The project features 
fourteen 140-meter-high turbines, access roads, a crane path, a meteorological 
tower, and electrical collection infrastructure including an electrical substation, an 
operations and maintenance building in Greenbush, and a 17-mile transmission 
line.   
[¶3]  While considering PW’s application, the Department’s staff made two 
site visits and held two public meetings.  The Department did not hold a public 
hearing, concluding that there was insufficient “credible conflicting technical 
information” that would warrant a public hearing.  See 38 M.R.S. § 345-A(1-A) 
(2013); 2 C.M.R. 06 096 002-3 § 7(B) (2013).  During the meetings, the 
Department heard concerns from numerous members of the public, whom it 
 
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labeled “interested persons,” including the Cupraks, and several individual 
members of PMF.  See 2 C.M.R. 06 096 002-1 § 1(J) (2013). 
 
[¶4]  The Department ultimately denied the application, finding that 
construction on Passadumkeag Ridge would dramatically change the undeveloped 
view of Passadumkeag Mountain from Saponac Pond, and concluding that the 
project would have an unreasonable adverse impact on the scenic character and 
existing uses related to the scenic character of Saponac Pond, a scenic resource of 
state or national significance (SRSNS).  The Department also concluded that, with 
the exception of an unreasonable adverse impact on the scenic character and 
existing uses of Saponac Pond, the applicant had met all permit criteria.  After 
denial of the application, PW, the applicant, and PF, the owner of the land on 
which the wind park would be built, both filed timely notices of appeal to the 
Board.  See 38 M.R.S. § 344(2-A) (2013).  The Cupraks then filed a letter with the 
Board stating their objections to the application and the appeal.  
 
[¶5]  While it was reviewing the Department’s decision, the Board sent 
several letters to PW regarding the issues and evidence that it would consider, 
without sending copies to the Cupraks or other interested parties.  At its March 21, 
2013, meeting, the Board heard arguments from PW, PF, the Department’s staff, 
and the Cupraks, but it did not take any additional evidence or augment the 
administrative record.   
 
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[¶6]  On August 20, 2013, the Board issued “Findings of Fact and Order on 
Appeal.”  In it, the Board stated that the scenic consultants hired by PW and the 
Department “agree that the project will not have an unreasonable adverse impact 
on the scenic character of Saponac Pond,” and that it found these assessments 
credible.  Based on this determination, the Board granted the permit.  Both PMF 
and the Cupraks timely appealed.  See 38 M.R.S. § 346(4) (2013); M.R. App. P. 
2(b)(3). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  Appellants raise three fundamental issues on appeal: (1) whether the 
decision of the Department, rather than the Board, is the operative decision on 
appeal; (2) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s decision; 
and (3) whether the Cupraks were denied due process as a result of ex parte 
communications between the Board, PW, and PF during the application process.1 
A. 
Operative Decision 
 
[¶8]  PMF and the Cupraks argue that the Board erred in reviewing the 
Department’s decision de novo, and that the Department, as fact-finder, issues the 
operative decision for appellate review.  Appellants base their arguments on the 
language of 38 M.R.S. § 341-D (2013), which details the Board’s responsibilities 
                                         
1  Although PF challenges PMF’s standing to seek review of the Board’s decision, we decline to 
address this issue because PMF has not raised any issues that were not raised by the Cupraks, for whom 
standing is uncontested.  
 
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and duties in reviewing permit applications.  Pursuant to section 341-D(4)(D), 
which applies specifically to “[l]icense or permit decisions regarding an expedited 
wind energy development,” the Board may supplement the record with additional 
information at its discretion.  Section 341-D(4)(D) does not expressly provide that 
the Board is not bound by the Department’s findings, unlike section 341-D(4)(A), 
which pertains to other permit and license appeals.  PMF and the Cupraks argue 
that this omission is an indication of the Legislature’s intent to have the Board give 
deference to the Department’s findings.   
[¶9]  However, in Concerned Citizens to Save Roxbury v. Board of 
Environmental Protection, we determined that the Board had engaged in an 
independent review of the record, which included not only the administrative 
record before the Department, but also some supplemental evidence presented by 
the parties.  2011 ME 39 ¶ 17, 15 A.3d 1263.  Based on that determination, we 
concluded that the Board’s decision was the operative decision for our appellate 
review.  Id.  In our discussion, we noted that the Department’s rules for processing 
appeals provided that the Board, “is not bound by the [Department’s] findings of 
fact or conclusions of law.”  Id. ¶ 16 (quoting 2 C.M.R. 06 096 002-12 § 24(B)(7) 
(2003)).  
[¶10]  Although the Board in this case did not supplement the administrative 
record in the course of its review, it engaged in an independent analysis of the 
 
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record, made factual findings regarding the credibility of various experts, and 
concluded that the proposed development would not have an unreasonable adverse 
impact on Saponac Pond.  See 2 C.M.R. 06 096 002-12 § 24(G) (2013) (providing 
that the “Board is not bound by the [Department’s] findings of fact or conclusions 
of law”).  The Board acted as both fact-finder and decision-maker pursuant to 
agency rules, and did not err in so doing.  The Board’s decision is the operative 
decision for purposes of this appeal. 
B. 
The Board’s Findings and Conclusions 
 
[¶11]  The Cupraks argue that the Board’s findings regarding the visual 
impact of the proposed project were based upon “statistically flawed” evidence.  
They also contend that the Board erred as a matter of law in weighing the relevant 
criteria for determining whether the proposed project would have an unreasonable 
adverse impact on the scenic character and related uses of Saponac Pond.       
[¶12]  Our review of administrative agency decisions is “deferential and 
limited.”  Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2010 ME 18, ¶ 12,  
989 A.2d 1128.  When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it 
administers, we defer to the agency’s construction unless the statute plainly 
compels a contrary result.  FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
2007 ME 97, ¶ 11, 926 A.2d 1197.  When reviewing an agency’s factual findings, 
we examine the record in its entirety.  Concerned Citizens to Save Roxbury, 2011 
 
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ME 39, ¶ 24, 15 A.3d 1263.  “‘We must affirm findings of fact if they are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, even if the record contains 
inconsistent evidence . . . .’”  Id. (quoting Friends of Lincoln Lakes, 2010 ME 18, ¶ 
13, 989 A.2d 1128).  We will vacate an agency’s factual findings only if the record 
contains no competent evidence to support them.  Id.   
  
[¶13]  The statute guiding the Board’s determination of a grid-scale wind 
project’s impact on the character and uses of a SRSNS requires the Board to 
consider six criteria but does not require it to assign more or less weight to any one 
criterion.  35-A M.R.S. § 3452(3) (2013).  Because this statute does not compel a 
result contrary to that reached by the Board, we defer to the Board’s evaluation. 
[¶14]  Although the Cupraks challenge the credibility and significance of 
some of the evidence in the record, the Board was free to make its own credibility 
determinations with respect to the conflicting evidence before it.  See Stewart v. 
Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 7, 757 A.2d 773 (explaining that a  
decision-maker makes its own credibility determinations when conducting a de 
novo review).  Its findings regarding the project’s visual impact are supported by 
evidence that Saponac Pond is lightly used, that the surrounding area is developed, 
and that the project would not have an unreasonable adverse impact on the 
viewshed of the pond.  The Board’s findings and conclusion are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.  We therefore uphold the Board’s decision.                  
 
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C. 
Ex Parte Communications 
[¶15]  Finally, the Cupraks contend that the Board violated their due process 
rights by communicating with PW and PF without including them or giving them 
an opportunity to comment on the materials communicated.  The Board counters 
that 5 M.R.S. § 9055 (2013) prohibits ex parte communications only in an 
“adjudicatory proceeding,” which is defined as “any proceeding before an agency 
in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific persons are required by 
constitutional law or statute to be determined after an opportunity for hearing,” 5 
M.R.S. § 8002(1) (2013).  Because the decision to hold an adjudicatory hearing 
was within the Board’s discretion pursuant to 38 M.R.S. § 341-D(4), the Board 
argues that the opportunity for a hearing in this case was not a matter of 
constitutional or statutory law, and that 5 M.R.S. § 9055 therefore does not prohibit 
ex parte communications. 
[¶16]  Although section 9055 provides that “[i]n any adjudicatory 
proceeding, no agency members . . . may communicate directly or indirectly in 
connection with any issue of fact, law or procedure, with any party or other 
persons legally interested in the outcome of the proceeding, except upon notice and 
opportunity for all parties to participate,” 5 M.R.S. § 9055(1) (emphasis added), we 
have not held that there is a bright-line rule that permits ex parte communications 
in all nonadjudicatory proceedings.  We have instead concluded that the contours 
 
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of due process in an administrative proceeding, particularly a nonadjudicatory,  
fact-gathering proceeding, depend upon the nature of the proceeding, the nature of 
the alleged right involved, and the possible burden that additional procedures 
would place on the proceeding.  Cunningham v. Kittery Planning Bd., 400 A.2d 
1070, 1079 (Me. 1979); Duffy v. Town of Berwick, 2013 ME 105, ¶ 16, 82 A.3d 
148.  Other factors that we take into account include  
the gravity of the ex parte communications; whether the contacts may 
have influenced the . . . ultimate decision; whether the party making 
the improper contacts benefited from the . . . ultimate decision; 
whether the contents of the communications were unknown to 
opposing parties, who therefore had no opportunity to respond; and 
whether vacation of the . . . decision and remand for new proceedings 
would serve a useful purpose. 
 
Duffy, 2013 ME 105, ¶ 19, 82 A.3d 148 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶17]  The Cupraks have challenged as ex parte the following 
communications: (1) a letter sent from PW to the Board chair seeking to exclude 
the Cupraks’ responses to PW and PF’s notice of appeal; (2) materials sent by PF 
to the Board in preparation for the March 21, 2013, public meeting; and (3) three 
letters from the Board to PW, all of which advised PW that it could not supplement 
the administrative record with the additional evidence that it sought to proffer on 
 
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appeal.2  The Cupraks have not argued that these communications between PF, 
PW, and the Board harmed them in any substantial way, and there is no evidence 
suggesting that the communications resulted in “‘procedural unfairness.’”  Id. ¶ 18 
(quoting Lane Constr. Corp. v. Town of Washington, 2008 ME 45, ¶ 32, 942 A.2d 
1202).   
[¶18]  Although the Board did not hold a formal hearing, it gave the Cupraks 
the opportunity to participate and the Cupraks have not argued that the proceedings 
before the Board were fundamentally unfair.  See id. ¶¶ 20-21; Cunningham, 400 
A.2d at 1079.  We therefore conclude that the communications at issue did not 
affect the Cupraks’ due process rights.3   
[¶19]  For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the Board. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
2  The Cupraks also refer to “numerous other communications” occurring ex parte between the Board 
and the PW.  However, of the approximately ten separate communications referred to in the Cupraks’ 
appellate brief, only the three letters are actually included in the administrative record that the parties 
provided to us.   
3  Although it may be good practice for state agencies to send copies of all correspondence to all 
parties involved in the application process, it is up to the Legislature to mandate that such practice be 
undertaken during the application process.  
 
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On the briefs: 
 
 
Alexander F. Cuprak and Rhonda Cuprak, pro se appellants 
 
Rufus E. Brown, Esq., Brown & Burke, for appellants 
Passadumkeag Mountain Friends et al. 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Margaret A. Bensinger, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellee Board of Environmental Protection  
 
P. Andrew Hamilton, Esq., Jonathan A. Pottle, Esq., and Ryan 
P. Dumais, Esq., Eaton Peabody, for appellee Penobscot Forest, 
LLC 
 
Katherine A. Joyce, Esq., and Mary E. Costigan, Esq., 
Bernstein Shur, for appellee Passadumkeag Windpark LLC 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
 
Alexander F. Cuprak and Rhonda Cuprak, pro se appellants 
 
Rufus E. Brown, Esq., for appellants Passadumkeag Mountain 
Friends et al. 
 
Margaret A. Bensinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Board of 
Environmental Protection 
 
Katherine A. Joyce, Esq., for appellee Passadumkeag Windpark 
LLC 
 
 
 
Board of Environmental Protection number BEP L-25597 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY