Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF KP v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-04-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF KP v. STATE2004 WY 165102 P.3d 217Case Number: C-04-6Decided: 12/16/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF:

KP, 
a  minor,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion 
Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Ms. 
Yoder.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J. 
(Retired)

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]          
KP 
appeals from an order adjudicating him delinquent and the corresponding order of 
disposition.  Finding that KP's 
adjudication was based upon one allegation that was determined pursuant to an 
inaccurate application of a statute, we remand the case for the entry of a new 
order of adjudication.  Because the 
current order of adjudication must be vacated, the current order of disposition 
also is vacated.  We remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]          
KP 
presents four issues for review by this Court:

 
 
I.  Was there sufficient competent evidence 
adduced to prove appellant's delinquency beyond a reasonable 
doubt?

 
 
II.  Was the value of the destroyed property 
assessed correctly to determine restitution?

 
 
III.  Was there sufficient evidence to prove 
the destroyed property's value, a statutory prerequisite of the offense 
alleged?

 
 
IV.  Were the procedural requirements of the 
Juvenile Justice Act met in the court's adjudication and disposition of 
appellant's case?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues:

 
 
I.  Was plain error injected into the 
proceedings when appellant's confederates admitted they were previously 
adjudicated delinquent for acts stemming from the same circumstances as those 
leading to the delinquency action against appellant?

 
 
II.  Was there sufficient evidence to support 
the juvenile court's findings concerning the amount of property damage for the 
purposes of both its delinquency adjudication and its award of 
restitution?

 
 
III.  Did the juvenile court abuse its 
discretion when it calculated the amount of restitution owed by 
appellant?

 
 
IV.  Did the proceedings against appellant 
comply with the Juvenile Justice Act?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]          
While 
there are many inconsistencies in detail, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State, testimony at the adjudicatory hearing generally revealed 
that, on the night of February 18, 2003, juveniles BE, DC, and KP were cruising 
around Casper in a Trans Am owned by DC's father.  Eventually, the juveniles headed up 
CasperMountain to smoke 
marihuana.  After pulling over and 
smoking the marihuana, the juveniles continued up CasperMountain.  The juveniles saw a white Dodge Shadow 
abandoned on the side of the road and proceeded to break the windows and 
exterior lights of the vehicle.  
They then entered the vehicle and possibly took some items from the 
interior of the Dodge.  

 
 

[¶4]          
Law 
enforcement investigated the vandalism and interviewed BE and DC.   Law enforcement did not interview 
KP.  Both BE and DC gave varying 
accounts of what happened the evening of the 18th in their initial 
interviews with law enforcement but eventually gave approximately the above 
story, both implicating KP from the beginning.  A petition alleging KP delinquent was 
filed in juvenile court.  The 
petition alleged two specific acts of delinquency: first, the petition alleged 
that KP violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(iii)1 by causing damage of more than $500 
to the Dodge Shadow (hereinafter referred to as "felony property destruction" 
for the sake of simplicity); and second, the petition alleged that KP violated 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (b)2 by entering the Dodge Shadow with 
the intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. 

 
 

[¶5]          
At the 
adjudicatory hearing, each of the juveniles testified.  DC specifically testified that, as the 
juveniles were driving on CasperMountain, they passed a 1990 Dodge Shadow 
abandoned on the side of the road.  
DC testified that the exterior of the vehicle looked to be "in pretty 
decent shape," with the possible exception of a crack in the front 
windshield.  DC was driving and 
testified that he stopped the Trans Am when he saw the Dodge Shadow because he 
wanted to check to see if there was anything interesting in the Dodge.  The Dodge was locked, and DC could not 
see inside, so he retrieved three tire irons or crowbars from the trunk of the 
Trans Am and handed one each to BE and KP, while keeping one for himself.  The three juveniles proceeded to smash 
out the windows and exterior lights of the Dodge.  DC then reached inside, unlocked the 
Dodge and entered the Dodge to see if there was anything interesting 
inside.  DC testified that neither 
of the other juveniles entered the Dodge.  
After finishing with the Dodge, the juveniles returned to the Trans Am to 
leave but the Trans Am promptly got stuck in the snow.  Attempts by the juveniles to free the 
Trans Am eventually proved futile, and DC and KP hiked down the mountain, 
eventually getting a ride from a passerby, and went to their respective 
houses.  DC testified that BE stayed 
with the Trans Am because BE wanted to continue to try to free the Trans Am. 

 
 

[¶6]          
BE 
testified that the Trans Am became stuck in the snow near the Dodge Shadow.   After attempts to free the Trans 
Am failed, the juveniles turned their attention to the Dodge Shadow.  BE testified that DC retrieved three 
tire irons or crowbars from the trunk of the Trans Am, and the three juveniles 
proceeded to break the windows and exterior lights of the Dodge.  BE testified that he saw KP get into the 
Dodge after it had been unlocked but he did not see KP take anything from inside 
the Dodge.  The juveniles, finished 
with the Dodge, tried again to free the Trans Am, without success.  DC and KP walked down the mountain.  BE testified he stayed behind to 
continue to try to free the Trans Am. 

 
 

[¶7]          
KP 
testified that he was not with BE and DC when they went up CasperMountain and was not involved in any way 
in vandalizing the Dodge.  KP's 
mother testified that she was certain that KP was home in bed on the night in 
question.  She testified that KP 
went to bed a little after ten o'clock p.m. and that she would have heard him if 
he had left the house at any point during the night. 

 
 

[¶8]          
At the 
adjudicatory hearing the owner of the Dodge Shadow testified.  The owner stated that he bought the car 
within a month before its vandalism for approximately $300 and that he still 
owned the Dodge.  He also stated 
that he was able to drive the Dodge off the mountain to his house.  The owner did not testify about the 
condition of the automobile before its vandalism.  The owner never testified that the 
vehicle had been repaired so no actual costs of repair were ever introduced into 
evidence.  The owner stated that, 
after the vandalism, he called one auto glass repair shop and told a person over 
the phone that he needed to replace all the glass on the Dodge Shadow.  The auto glass repair shop sent him an 
estimate for the cost of glass replacement in the total amount of 
$1,684.87.  The owner also contacted 
one repair shop seeking an estimate to replace the exterior lights and fix 
damage he alleged was done to the interior instrument console.  He received an estimate to repair that 
damage in the total amount of $723.68.  
Neither repair shop saw the Dodge before submitting its estimate.  The written estimates, both dated August 
20, 2003, were submitted into evidence through the owner.  No representative of either repair shop 
supplying the estimates testified. No testimony was offered explaining the 
individualized labor and parts entries of the estimates.  The defense did not challenge the 
introduction of the hearsay repair estimates nor is it challenged in this 
appeal.  

 
 

[¶9]          
After 
the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated KP delinquent, finding 
that the State carried its burden of proof as to the felony property destruction 
claim.  The juvenile court found 
that the State did not prove the burglary claim but did prove the 
lesser-included offense of criminal entry in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-302.3  The juvenile court appointed a 
Multidisciplinary Team (MDT) in its adjudicatory order.  The MDT met once and recommended 
probation as the appropriate disposition for KP, noting that KP was maintaining 
stable employment and his employer was willing to supervise KP and allow KP to 
live with him. 

 
 

[¶10]      
In its 
order of disposition, the juvenile court found the amount of damage to the Dodge 
to be $2,408.56 (it is unclear where the extra penny came from) and ordered KP 
to pay one third of the damage costs as restitution.  The juvenile court further placed KP at 
the Jeffery C. Wardell Academy in Cheyenne indefinitely and imposed indefinite 
supervised probation on KP under the supervision of the Department of Family 
Services.  The order does not 
contain any written reasons why the juvenile court did not accept the 
recommendation of the MDT, although the juvenile court did orally pronounce 
limited reasoning why it was not accepting the MDT's proposed disposition. The 
order of disposition does not contain any reference to a statutory sanction 
level.   

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Issues I 
& III.  Sufficiency of evidence 
of delinquency

 
 

[¶11]      
The 
basic argument presented by KP in his first issue is not a sufficiency of the 
evidence argument.  KP argues it was 
error to allow the introduction of evidence that both BE and DC pled guilty to 
allegations stemming from the same incident as the one for which KP was being 
adjudicated.  Rather than an 
insufficiency of evidence argument, this issue concerns only the admissibility 
of evidence.  

[¶12]      
We 
review a trial court's determination regarding the introduction of evidence for 
abuse of discretion.  The burden of 
establishing the trial court abused its discretion is on the defendant.  Willis v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶16, 
46 P.3d 890, ¶16 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Wyoming Rules of Evidence apply to 
the adjudicatory phase of juvenile delinquency cases to the extent the rules do 
not conflict with any provision of the Juvenile Justice Act.4 

 
 

[¶13]      
KP did 
not object to the introduction of testimony regarding the guilty pleas at his 
adjudicatory hearing so any objection is considered waived.  Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 9.05, however, this 
Court may still determine if reversal is appropriate based upon a plain error 
analysis.5  Plain error exists if the record clearly 
reflects the alleged error; a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
transgressed; the transgression resulted in a substantial right being denied the 
defendant; and the denial of the substantial right materially prejudiced the 
defendant.  Porth v. State, 
868 P.2d 236, 242 (Wyo. 1994).  In other words, to reverse for plain 
error, we must find not only that there is error and that it is plain but also 
that it affected substantial rights and meets the discretionary test of 
seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.  Manes v. State, 
2004 WY 33, ¶8, 86 P.3d 1274, ¶8 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

[¶14]      
KP finds 
his clear and unequivocal rule of law in Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531 
(Wyo. 2000), and Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979).  The evidentiary rule from Mazurek 
and Kwallek upon which KP relies states that "when two persons are 
indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstance, the fact 
that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other when offered by 
the State in its case-in-chief."  
Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 1979) (citing 
Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1375).  
"The rationale is that evidence of a witness' guilt for an offense which 
arose out of a circumstance leading to the defendant's trial implies that the 
defendant is also guilty.  Such an 
implication violates a defendant's right to have a trial on its own 
merits."  Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 595 (Wyo. 1992).  See Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1375 
("For a prosecutor to argue or elicit testimony disclosing that another has 
pleaded guilty is to argue from facts either not in evidence or facts which are 
inadmissible in evidence.").

 
 

[¶15]      
The 
record is clear that BE and DC testified that they pled guilty to allegations of 
delinquency stemming from the vandalism of the Dodge.  We do not find, however, that the rule 
from Kwallek and its progeny was transgressed.  Instead, we find that the Kwallek 
rule is inapplicable under the particular facts and circumstances of this 
case.  KP's defense was that BE and 
DC vandalized the Dodge, but he was not with them at the time.  In his opening statement, KP's defense 
counsel remarked that BE and DC "apparently are involved and have admitted 
responsibility" in the vandalism of the Dodge, but that KP was not with 
them.  KP made the fact that BE and 
DC had pled guilty to vandalizing the Dodge a key component of his defense.  The theory of defense was that BE and DC 
were lying about KP's involvement in the vandalism of the Dodge in part so that 
their respective shares of restitution would be decreased.  In short, it was the defense that 
initially introduced and stressed BE and DC's guilty pleas in order to impeach 
their testimony against KP.

 
 

[¶16]      
BE was 
the first of the juveniles to testify for the State.  On direct examination by the State, BE 
only testified to events of February 18 and 19.  It was the defense attorney, on 
cross-examination, who questioned BE about BE's obligation to pay 
restitution.  The defense presented, 
through questioning on cross-examination of BE, the possibility that BE was 
falsely implicating KP in the vandalism because BE could thereby lower his share 
of restitution.  The State merely 
followed up on this line of questioning in its redirect of BE.  On redirect, the State elicited that BE 
had pled guilty to vandalism of the Dodge and was ordered to pay 
restitution.  The State also 
elicited that BE had appeared before a court when he pled guilty to that charge 
and he told the court the same facts on that occasion as he was telling at KP's 
adjudicatory hearing.  The State 
thus presented BE's guilty plea to put in context BE's obligation to pay 
restitution and to rehabilitate his credibility.  Porth, 868 P.2d  at 241 ("Where 
the defense has invited the guilty plea testimony by its own introduction, there 
will only be reversible error if the prosecutor's use was not for the 
permissible limited evidentiary purpose of impeaching trial testimony or to 
reflect on a witness's credibility.").

 
 

[¶17]      
The 
State did elicit testimony in its direct examination of DC that DC pled guilty 
to vandalizing the Dodge.  However, 
the theory of defense was already apparent from opening statements and had been 
applied by the defense in its cross-examination of BE.  On direct examination, the prosecutor 
elicited testimony from DC that he had lied on several occasions when asked by 
various people about the accounts of the evening of February 18.  DC testified that he lied because he did 
not want to get in trouble.  The 
prosecutor followed with a line of questioning presumably intended to bolster 
DC's credibility by eliciting the fact that DC did get in trouble when he 
finally told the "truth"  the story he was testifying to in court that 
day.  Ultimately DC testified on 
direct examination by the State that he pled guilty to vandalizing the 
Dodge.  The testimony, however, was 
not elicited as substantive evidence of KP's guilt by association but rather to 
bolster DC's credibility in anticipation of the impending attempt at impeachment 
by the defense.  "[T]his court has 
recognized the principle that the State may properly introduce evidence of a 
witness' prior felony conviction on direct examination to lessen the sting of 
such an attack on cross-examination by the defense."  Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶32, 
79 P.3d 526, ¶32 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1272 
(Wyo. 
1991)).

 
 

[¶18]      
The 
Kwallek rule precludes the State from presenting evidence of guilty pleas 
of accomplices in its case-in-chief under circumstances that might tend to 
implicate the defendant's guilt by association.  In the case sub judice, the prosecutor 
never introduced evidence of guilty pleas of BE and DC for any reason other than 
to counter KP's claim of bias and his attacks on the credibility of BE and 
DC.  The prosecutor never mentioned 
BE and DC's guilty pleas in her opening or closing statements and never argued 
that their guilty pleas in any manner reflected upon KP's guilt or 
innocence.  The Kwallek rule 
was not violated.

 
 

[¶19]      
Even if 
we were to find that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was transgressed, there 
is no prejudice to KP.  KP used the 
guilty pleas and the resulting restitution requirements of BE and DC as the 
basis of his defense.  Further, as a 
practical matter, as an integral part of their testimony both BE and DC 
testified that they vandalized the Dodge.  
In light of their full factual disclosure of their participation in the 
vandalism, the further disclosure that they had confessed to the criminal 
activity was not unduly prejudicial to KP.  This is especially true since KP's 
defense was that BE and DC did vandalize the Dodge, but he was not with them 
when they did it.  We are satisfied 
that any error did not have the clear capacity to produce an unjust result and 
that it had a minimal effect on the outcome of the hearing.  See generally Adams,6 ¶29.7

 
 

[¶20]      
KP's 
third issue also is not a sufficiency of the evidence argument.  The argument presented by KP consists of 
only one sentence: "The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
actual pecuniary value of a 1990 Dodge Shadow, purchased . . .  for $300, met the statutory minimum of 
$500."  The fundamental argument of 
the defense on this issue is that the $300 value of the car was the value upon 
which the State should have relied when making its allegations against KP in its 
delinquency petition.  The elements 
of felony property destruction are contained within § 6-3-201(b)(iii).  The pertinent parts of the statute 
read:

 
 
(b) 
Property destruction and defacement is:

(i) A 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine 
of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if the cost of 
restoring injured property or the value of the property if destroyed is less 
than five hundred dollars ($500.00).

* * * 
*

(iii) A 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the cost of 
restoring injured property or the value of the property if destroyed is five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) or more.

 
 
Pursuant 
to the statute, the classification of the criminal offense depends upon the 
amount of damage; and the amount of damage potentially differs depending upon 
whether the property at issue was only "injured" or whether it was 
"destroyed."  

 
 

[¶21]      
In this 
case, the amount of damage differs substantially depending upon whether the 
Dodge is determined to be injured or destroyed.  The owner of the Dodge testified at the 
adjudicatory hearing that he had purchased the Dodge for $300.  The owner also introduced estimates to 
repair the vehicle that exceeded $2,400.  
KP questions which amount should be used in determining the 
classification of the offense.8  On appeal, KP contends that the Dodge 
was destroyed, and the amount of damage suffered by the owner of the Dodge is 
the price he paid when he purchased the vehicle.  The State, of course, claims the Dodge 
was only injured, since it was still drivable, and thus the damage must be 
measured by the cost to repair9 the Dodge.  

 
 

[¶22]      
Instead 
of a sufficiency of the evidence issue, this Court is actually presented with a 
question of statutory interpretation and application of the facts to the 
statute.  This Court reviews 
questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  The rules of statutory construction are 
well-established:  

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we 
must abide by the plain meaning of the statute.  Adobe Oil & Gas Corporation v. 
Getter Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984).  If a statute is ambiguous, however, we 
will resort to general principles of statutory construction in the effort to 
ascertain legislative intent.   
State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 
686 P.2d 521 (1984).  A statute 
which is uncertain and susceptible of more than one meaning is ambiguous.   McArtor v. State, 
Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 (1985).  In addition, we have 
said that "[s]tatutes should be given a reasonable, practical construction." 
State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805, 809 
(1980).  Further, "all portions of 
an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it 
must be considered so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous," 
Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 (1985), and a statute 
should not be construed to render any portion of it meaningless, Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 766 (1986), or in a manner 
producing absurd results, State v. Sodergren, supra.  Also, ambiguity in a criminal statute 
should be resolved in favor of lenity.   Capwell v. State, 
Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 (1984).

 
 

Story v. 
State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988).  See also Odhinn v. State, 2003 WY 
169, ¶¶13, 14, 82 P.3d 715, ¶¶13, 14 (Wyo. 2003); McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Wyo. 1995).  

 
 

[¶23]      
If this 
Court were to accept the State's argument, then simply because the Dodge could 
still be driven, it would be considered only injured and the damage amount would 
be over eight times the value of the car and the vandalism would constitute 
felony property destruction.  The 
juveniles would have been in a much better position legally if they had 
completely destroyed the Dodge by damaging all of its component parts.  The damage would then be the value of 
the Dodge  the $300 the owner paid for the vehicle.  Their actions also would constitute 
misdemeanor property destruction instead of felony property destruction.  As stated above, this Court will not 
interpret a statute in a manner producing absurd results.  

 
 

[¶24]      
The 
statute lists "injury" and "damage" in the disjunctive.  The statute does not define either term 
nor suggest under what circumstances one or the other should be relied upon by 
the State when charging a defendant.  
Under the peculiar facts of the case sub judice, this absence of 
legislative direction creates an ambiguity.  Under the rule of lenity criminal 
defendants must receive the benefit of any ambiguity.  We determine, therefore, that the 
classification of offense under this statute shall be determined by the cost to 
restore the injured property unless that determination exceeds the determination 
of the value of the property, had it been destroyed, in which case the property 
shall be deemed destroyed for purposes of this statute.  In other words, where the total value of 
the entire item of property involved is less than $500 (now $1,000), but the 
cost to restore the property would be $500 (now $1,000) or more, the maximum 
damage chargeable is to be determined by the overall value of the entire item of 
property before the damage occurred.10  See generally People v. 
Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890, 894-95 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) ("Value is relevant to 
the damage element because an offender cannot cause an economic loss that 
surpasses the actual value of the property damaged. Thus, where the cost of 
repair or restoration exceeds the actual value of an object, the victim's 
economic loss will be limited to the actual value of the 
object.").

 
 

[¶25]      
In this 
case, since the cost of repair to the Dodge is significantly higher than the 
value of the Dodge, the Dodge is deemed destroyed.  The State should have used the value of 
the Dodge when determining which classification to charge.  Since the evidence supported a value of 
$300 for the Dodge, KP's conduct, as a matter of law, did not violate the 
statutory classification of felony property destruction.  The finding of the juvenile court in the 
order of adjudication that KP committed felony property destruction is hereby 
vacated.

 
 
 
 
Issues 
II and IV.  Restitution and 
Procedure

 
 

[¶26]      
Because 
the order of adjudication must be vacated and a new order consistent with this 
opinion entered, a new dispositional hearing must be held.  Thus, the issues brought by KP 
concerning restitution and alleged procedural errors during the dispositional 
phase are technically moot.  Since 
some issues will potentially recur, however, this Court will briefly address the 
most salient issues raised by KP.  

 
 

[¶27]      
With 
regard to restitution, both parties present argument based upon Title 7, Chapter 
Nine of the Wyoming Statutes.  This 
chapter, however, does not apply to a juvenile delinquency action.  The juvenile court has authority to 
order restitution pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-247(a)(v) (LexisNexis 
2003), which states: 

 
 
(a) For 
a child at any sanction level, the juvenile court may:

            
* * * *

(v) 
Require the child and his parents or guardian to make restitution for any damage 
or loss caused by the child's wrongful act, . . . .

 
 
With 
specific regard to restitution in a delinquency case, this Court has previously 
provided the following guidance:

 
 
[P]roceedings 
under the Juvenile Justice Act are not criminal, but are special 
proceedings.  [In re] 
BW, 12 P.3d [675] at 677 [(Wyo. 2000)].  The proceedings are equitable and not 
punitive to accomplish the purpose of providing "treatment, training and 
rehabilitation" for children, and to "provide for the care, the protection and 
the wholesome moral, mental and physical development of children coming within 
its provisions."  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 14-6-201(c)(ii)(C) and (c)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001); see also [In re] WJH, [2001 WY 54, 24 P.3d 1147] ¶¶9, 10.   Accordingly, 
statutes providing for the care and discipline of juvenile delinquents are 
generally entitled to a liberal effect and a practical construction in favor of 
the child's welfare.  WJH, 
¶¶7, 8. The plain language of the statute, however, still controls our search 
for the legislative intent when it used the term "restitution for any damage or 
loss caused by the child's wrongful act."  
Id.

 
 
Plainly, 
the statute limits the amount of restitution to the damages or losses caused by 
the juvenile's wrongful act . . . .  
In Alcaraz [v. State, 2002 WY 57, 44 P.3d 68 (Wyo. 2002)], 
we determined that restitution should be ordered to compensate for legally 
recognized losses that directly resulted from the criminal act.  Alcaraz, ¶14.   To comply with this rule in that 
case, the district court was required to distinguish between those damages that 
would compensate the victim for monetary losses and the benefits that would 
continue to inure to the victim and, thus, could not be subject to restitution 
lest the victim gain a windfall.  
Id.

 
 

TPJ v. 
State, 2003 
WY 49, ¶¶25, 26, 66 P.3d 710, ¶¶25, 26 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis omitted).  Thus, at the very least, any order of 
restitution in a juvenile delinquency case must be the result of a direct causal 
connection between the juvenile's delinquent act and the damages or losses 
incurred.  Restitution cannot 
present a windfall to the victim.  

 
 

[¶28]      
Of the 
procedural issues raised by KP in his fourth issue, under the circumstances only 
a few merit discussion.  Because a 
new disposition must be entered, all procedures of the dispositional phase must 
be followed.  The record does not 
disclose that a predisposition report was ever ordered, nor is there a 
predisposition report in the record.  
A predisposition report is required pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-227(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  
Contrary to the argument of the State that the contents of a 
predisposition report are close enough to those required in an MDT report and 
thus the statutory requirement for a predisposition report may be disposed of, 
the two reports are different and serve different purposes.  The statute is very clear that both 
reports are required.  Upon remand, 
the juvenile court must order a predisposition report pursuant to 
statute.

 
 

[¶29]      
Further, 
upon remand an MDT must meet and fulfill its statutory duties, accounting for 
all new circumstances.  Pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), the juvenile court 
shall review the predisposition report and the MDT report and must state on the 
record what materials it reviewed in reaching its disposition.  If the juvenile court decides not to 
follow the recommendations of the predisposition report or the MDT, it "shall 
enter on the record specific findings of fact relied upon to support its 
decision to deviate from the recommended disposition[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

 
 

[¶30]      
With 
regard to the juvenile court's reaching disposition, while this Court has held 
that imposing a specific statutory sanction level is not mandatory, neither can 
the sanction levels be ignored with impunity.  "The sole qualification to the juvenile 
court's broad sanction authority is, in the event of deviation from the 
guidelines (§§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252), the court must state its reasons in 
writing and enter the statement into the record.  Section 14-6-246(d)."  In re WJH, 2001 WY 54, ¶17, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶17 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
juvenile court is thus required to select a sanction level11 and then either follow it or 
explain, in writing, why it is deviating from the statutorily defined sanctions 
applicable to the selected sanction level.  
WJH, ¶19 ("[S]anctions imposed which are different from any 
provided at any sanction level . . . constitute a deviation and require written 
explanation.  It also seems apparent 
that an adequate explanation of deviation from the guidelines would necessarily 
entail clarification of sanctions imposed that are different from any provided 
at any sanction level.").  "The 
requirement for a written explanation to be made part of the record is eminently 
reasonable.  It ensures the juvenile 
court has carefully considered the relevant circumstances, has set forth its 
rationale, and has provided a basis for appellate review."  WJH, ¶18 (specifically 
delineating a non-exclusive list of relevant factors for a juvenile court to 
consider, in writing and placed on the record, in reaching its determination of 
disposition).  We trust the juvenile 
court will comply with this requirement in its new order of 
disposition.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶31]      
When 
charging KP with felony property destruction under § 6-3-201, the State, by 
statute, was required to use the $300 value of the property, not the $2,400 cost 
of repairing the property.  Because 
the value of the Dodge was less than $500, the appropriate charge was 
misdemeanor property destruction.  
Because the juvenile court incorrectly found that KP committed felony 
property destruction, the order of adjudication is vacated.  The case is remanded with directions for 
a new order adjudicating KP delinquent based upon only criminal entry in 
violation of § 6-3-302.  Given the 
difference in the adjudicated delinquent activity, a new disposition must be 
ordered.  The current dispositional 
order is vacated.  This case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1§ 6-3-201. Property destruction and 
defacement; grading; penalties; aggregated costs or 
values.

            
(a) A person is guilty of property destruction and defacement if he 
knowingly defaces, injures or destroys property of another without the owner's 
consent.

            
(b) Property destruction and defacement is:

            
(i) A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) 
months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, 
if the cost of restoring injured property or the value of the property if 
destroyed is less than five hundred dollars 
($500.00);

            
* * * *

            
(iii) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if 
the cost of restoring injured property or the value of the property if destroyed 
is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more.

 
 

2§ 6-3-301. Burglary; aggravated 
burglary; penalties.

            
(a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or 
remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

            
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.

3§ 6-3-302. Criminal entry; penalties; 
affirmative defenses.

            
(a) A person is guilty of criminal entry if, without authority, he 
knowingly enters a building, occupied structure, vehicle or cargo portion of a 
truck or trailer, or a separately secured or occupied portion of those 
enclosures.

4W.R.Cr.P. 1(a), "Scope and definitions," 
states:  

(a) Scope. -- Except as provided in Rule 
54, these rules govern the procedures to be followed in all criminal proceedings 
in all Wyoming 
courts.  When not inconsistent with 
the Juvenile Court Act, these rules shall also apply in delinquency 
proceedings.  In the event that a 
procedure is not established by these rules, the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure shall govern.

 
 
W.R.E. 1101(b)(3) states that the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence do not apply to "juvenile proceedings other than 
adjudicatory hearings."

 
 

5Rule 9.05 Plain error.  

Plain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 
attention of the trial court.

6Please note, Adams did find a transgression of the rule but no 
prejudice.  We have relied upon the 
reason for the rule to find no transgression, even if the letter of the rule was 
violated.  Adams offered no analysis and very few facts except 
the prosecutor made some objectionable remarks in 
closing.

 
 

7At the end of KP's argument on Issue I, 
KP's brief also mentions "related reasons" requiring reversal, such as possible 
ineffectiveness of counsel and other alleged erroneous evidentiary rulings.  None of these other issues are supported 
by appropriate cogent argument or pertinent authority. This Court does not 
condone the "shot-gun" method of briefing and will not consider these 
arguments.

8KP does not challenge the sufficiency of 
this evidence regarding damage amount.

 
 

9We note in passing that no argument has 
been made as to whether the statutory phrase "cost of restoring injured 
property" is synonymous with repair and replacement.  We are able to reach our decision 
without addressing any possible distinction. We also need not ponder the 
statutory definition of "value" because the only evidence submitted regarding 
the value of the Dodge was the testimony of the owner that he paid $300 for the 
car.

10Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201 was amended in 2004 to increase 
the dollar amount distinguishing misdemeanor property destruction from felony 
property destruction to $1,000. 2004 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 126, § 
1.

11The juvenile court did mention the 
potential sanction levels corresponding to the conduct alleged in the petition 
for adjudication of delinquency at KP's initial appearance.  The actual sanction level, however, 
obviously cannot be selected until after adjudication, when the full nature of 
the delinquent activity has been judicially determined.  Selecting a sanction level based upon 
adjudicated conduct is a critical component of 
disposition.