Case Title: Maryland Board of Physicians v. Geier

Citation: 

Docket Number: 11/16

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Maryland Board of Physicians, et al. v. Mark Geier, Personal Representative of Anne 
Geier, et al., No. 11, September Term, 2016. Opinion by Hotten, J. 
 
APPEAL AND ERROR — NATURE AND SCOPE OF DECISION 
Court of Appeals held that none of the orders appealed by Petitioner constituted final 
judgments as defined by the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 12-101(f). 
 
APPEAL AND ERROR — AFFECTING COLLATERAL MATTERS AND 
PROCEEDINGS — COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE 
Court of Appeals held that the order granting Respondents sixth motion for sanctions 
satisfied the collateral order doctrine; the order denying Petitioners motion for 
reconsideration of default order was not properly appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine because the order was not “collateral” to the underlying merits of the action; the 
order denying Petitioner’s motion for a protective order was not properly appealable under 
the express language in Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 376 Md. 53, 827 A.2d 115 
(2003), which denies appellate consideration of interlocutory orders brought by agencies  
asserting absolute quasi-judicial immunity. 
 
APPEAL AND ERROR — PRELIMINARY OR INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS IN 
GENERAL 
Court of Appeals held that appealability of one interlocutory order based on the collateral 
order doctrine does not give the Court the authority to hear “piggybacking” interlocutory 
orders that are not independently appealable under the Court’s prior holdings and the 
collateral order doctrine.  
 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS AND CONFIDENTIALITY — WAIVER OF 
PRIVILEGE 
Court of Appeals held that Petitioners’ claim of deliberative process (executive) privilege 
was not waived because the record reflects the existence of the audiotapes was not 
discovered until July 29, 2014, and therefore, could not have been subject to Respondents 
First Request for Production of Documents, served in August 2013, or the circuit court’s 
order from November 25, 2013 denying Petitioners’ their deliberative process (executive) 
privilege over the documents subject to Respondents’ First Request for Production of 
Documents.  Additionally, the circuit court erred in concluding Petitioners’ assertion of the 
deliberative process (executive) privilege over the audiotapes in their Opposition to 
Respondents’ Sixth Motion for Sanctions was improper because the assertion complied 
with Maryland Rule 2-402(e)(1) and there is no requirement under the Maryland Rules that 
a party asserting a privilege must do so exclusively in a privilege log. 
 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS AND CONFIDENTIALITY — EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE — DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE 
Court of Appeals held that under the Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 
(1980) balancing process, Petitioners asserted a valid claim for deliberative process 
(executive) privilege for the audiotapes; Respondents failed to assert any specific necessity 
for the audiotapes, and the nondisclosure of the audiotapes on the basis of the deliberative 
process (executive) privilege will not impact the fair administration of justice. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 371761V 
Argued: September 9, 2016  
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 11 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
__________________________________ 
 
MARYLAND BOARD OF 
PHYSICIANS, et al. 
 
 
v. 
MARK R. GEIER, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF ANNE GEIER, et al. 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Battaglia, Lynne A.  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
McDonald, J., concurs and dissents. 
Adkins, J., dissents. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: January 23, 2017 
We consider whether a party asserting the absolute quasi-judicial privilege and the 
deliberative process (executive) privilege may properly appeal three orders from the circuit 
court prior to a final judgment, and whether those privileges prevent the admissibility of 
certain discovery.  Respondents, Dr. Mark Geier (“Dr. Geier”), David Geier (“Mr. Geier”) 
and Anne Geier (“Ms. Geier”),1 filed a complaint against Petitioners2”), in the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County, alleging that Petitioners invaded their privacy by publicizing their 
private medical information in a cease and desist order that was issued during disciplinary 
proceedings brought by Petitioners against Dr. Geier and Mr. Geier. 
 
During discovery, the circuit court entered three separate orders that: (1) granted 
Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions against Petitioners regarding the disclosure of 
audiotapes of Petitioners’ deliberations; (2) denied Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration 
of a default order on liability for a series of discovery failures; and (3) denied Petitioners’ 
motion for a protective order from Respondents’ sixth motion to compel documents, which 
required Petitioners to disclose their personal financial information to Respondents. 
Petitioners appealed all three interlocutory orders, and this Court granted certiorari.    
For the reasons that follow, we grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss as it relates to 
the orders denying Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration and for a protective order; deny 
                                              
1 This opinion will refer to all three individuals collectively as “Respondents” or 
individually where needed. 
 
2 References to “Petitioners” include the Maryland Board of Physicians (the 
“Board”), and the individual Board members, staff, and the administrative prosecutor who 
make up the twenty-five co-defendants in this case.  The parties will be referenced 
individually where appropriate. 
 
2 
 
Respondents’ motion to dismiss as it relates to the order granting Respondents’ sixth 
motion for sanctions; reverse and vacate the order granting Respondents’ sixth motion for 
sanctions; and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
I. 
Board’s Administrative Proceedings Against Respondents Mark R. Geier 
and David Geier 
 
a. Mark Geier 
 
On October 3, 2006, the Board notified Dr. Geier  that it had received a complaint 
against him regarding his use of the drug Lupron3 to treat autistic children.  The complaint 
alleged that Dr. Geier was: (1) practicing outside of the scope of his expertise and the 
prevailing standard of care for autism; (2) experimenting on children without a rational 
scientific theory or the supervision of a qualified review board; and (3) failing to provide 
appropriate informed consent regarding the potential side effects of Lupron and similar 
drugs. 
 
On April 27, 2011, the Board summarily suspended Dr. Geier’s right to practice 
medicine, asserting that the “public health, safety or welfare imperatively required 
                                              
3 Lupron is an FDA-approved drug used for the treatment of precocious puberty, a 
condition where girls under the age of eight have changes in breast development or pubic 
hair and boys under the age of nine have penile and scrotal changes and pubic hair.  Lupron 
can reduce the symptoms of puberty in children with higher than normal levels of 
testosterone.  The reduction of testosterone can decrease aggressive, hyperactive and 
hypersexual behaviors.  See Geier v.  Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 223 Md. App. 404, 413 
n. 3, 116 A.3d 1026, 1031 n. 3 (2015). 
3 
 
emergency action” due to certain medical practices engaged in by Dr. Geier.4  On May 16, 
2011, the Board formally charged Dr. Geier with violations of the Medical Practice Act, 
Md. Code (Repl. Vol. 2014), §§14-401 et seq. of the Health Occupations Article (“Health 
Occ.”).  
 
On September 15, 2011 the Board issued amended charges against Dr. Geier for 
prescribing medicine to family members while his license was suspended.   After amending 
its complaint, the Board charged Dr. Geier with: (1) unprofessional conduct in the practice 
of medicine; (2) willfully making or filing a false report or record in the practice of 
medicine; (3) willfully failing to file or record any medical record as required under law; 
(4) practicing medicine with an unauthorized person or aiding an unauthorized person in 
the practice of medicine; (5) gross overutilization of health care services; (6) failing to meet 
standards, as determined by peer review, for the delivery of quality medical care; and (7) 
failing to keep adequate medical records. 
 
On September 26, 2011, after six days of hearings,5 an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) issued a proposed decision upholding the summary suspension of Dr. Geier’s 
                                              
4 In addition to prescribing Lupron, Dr. Geier also prescribed chelation therapy to 
patients, a treatment that involves the use of certain chemicals to remove heavy metals 
from the body.  In medicine, chelation has been used for the treatment of metal poisoning, 
among other conditions.  See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON UNAPPROVED CHELATION 
PRODUCTS, https://perma.cc/C25M-269H (last accessed November 18, 2016).  Dr. Geier 
prescribed two types of drugs in his chelation therapy, DMSA (dimercaptosuccinic acid), 
which is approved by the FDA for removing severe levels of heavy metals from the body, 
and DMPS (2, 3–dimercapto–1–propane–sulfonic acid), which is not approved by the FDA 
for any purpose.  See Geier, 223 Md. App. at 420, 116 A.3d at 1036.  
 
5  The ALJ did not consider Petitioners’ amended charges during the hearing 
because the charges were amended subsequently. 
4 
 
license.  On March 13, 2012, following an additional five days of hearings, the ALJ issued 
a 126-page proposed decision, recommending that the charges against Dr. Geier be 
upheld,6 and that his license be revoked.   
 
Dr. Geier took exception to the ALJ’s findings, but on August 22, 2012, the Board 
issued a final decision revoking his license.  Dr. Geier petitioned for judicial review, and 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed the Board’s revocation on April 9, 
2014.  Dr. Geier moved to alter or amend the court’s ruling, but the motion was denied.  
Dr. Geier then noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and that Court, in a reported 
opinion, affirmed the Board’s decision.  See Geier v.  Md. State Bd. Of Physicians, 223 
Md. App. 404, 116 A.3d 1026 (2015). 
b. David Geier 
 
On May 16, 2011, the Board also charged Dr. Geier’s son, Mr. Geier, for practicing 
medicine without a license in violation of Health Occ. §14-601.7  On March 7, 2012, an 
ALJ recommended that the charges against Mr. Geier be dismissed.  On July 30, 2012, 
however, the Board rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and many of the judge’s findings, 
concluding that Mr. Geier had practiced medicine without a license because he diagnosed 
a patient, determined which blood tests the patient required, and ordered those tests.  The 
Board imposed a $10,000 fine.   
                                              
6 Specifically, Health Occ. §14-404(a)(3)(ii), §14-404(a)(11), §14-404(a)(22), and 
§14-404(a)(40).  The ALG dismissed Health Occ. §14-404(a)(12), §14-404(a)(18), and 
§14-404(a)(19).  
 
7 The record does not reflect that Mr. Geier has ever been a physician. 
5 
 
 
Mr. Geier petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for judicial review 
of the Board’s findings, and the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision on April 25, 
2014.  Mr. Geier then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and that Court, in an 
unreported opinion dated July 31, 2015, also affirmed the Board.   
c. The Disclosure of the Respondents  Personal Medical Information 
 
On January 25, 2012, during the pendency of both disciplinary proceedings, the 
Board issued a cease and desist order against Dr. Geier, accusing him of practicing 
medicine while his license had been summarily suspended.  The order, posted to the 
Board’s website and viewable by the public, specifically alleged that Dr. Geier had written 
prescriptions for all three Respondents.  The order also detailed the Respondents’ 
confidential medical information, identified the specific medications that Dr. Geier 
allegedly prescribed to each person, and described the medical conditions that each 
medication treated.8   
 
Petitioners promptly removed the confidential information from the cease and desist 
order in response to Respondents’ protest.  Petitioners also issued an amended cease and 
desist order that deleted the references to the patients and the medications that Dr. Geier 
allegedly prescribed for them.  In the interim between the initial publication and the 
Petitioners’ remedial actions, other persons viewed and commented about the 
                                              
8 This Court declines to reproduce the confidential medical information that was 
included in the cease and desist letter.  Rather, we simply note that the information was 
highly personal, and not information that a reasonable person would want disseminated to 
the public. 
6 
 
Respondents’ confidential medical information, and those comments are still accessible on 
the internet. 
 
 Ultimately, an ALJ rejected the charge that Dr. Geier had written any prescriptions 
in violation of the summary suspension order issued by Petitioners. 
II. Respondents’ Civil Action Against Petitioners 
a. The Complaint 
 
On December 12, 2012, while Dr. Geier and Mr. Geier were pursuing judicial 
review of the Board’s adverse rulings, Respondents filed a three-count complaint in the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Petitioners.  The complaint alleged that by 
publicizing the January 25th cease and desist order that contained the Respondents’ 
confidential medical information, Petitioners deprived them of their constitutional right to 
privacy; violated the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, Md. Code (1982, 
2009 Repl. Vol.), §§4-301 et seq. of the Health General Article; and invaded their privacy 
by giving unreasonable publicity to private facts.  The complaint also alleged that 
Petitioners “acted with ill will and with the intent to injure [Respondents] by exposing Dr. 
Geier’s personal medical information and that of his wife and son.”  Respondents requested 
compensatory damages, as well as three million dollars in punitive damages. 
 
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, asserting they had absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit under 
Ostrzenski v. Siegel, 177 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 1999).  Following a hearing on July 10, 2013, 
the circuit court dismissed the Confidentiality of Medical Records Act claim, finding that 
the statute did not create a private cause of action.  The circuit court allowed the 
7 
 
constitutional and invasion of privacy claims to proceed, finding that the record was 
inadequate to evaluate the applicability of any immunities at such an early stage of the 
proceedings. 
b. Discovery 
 
Following the circuit court’s ruling that allowed two of Respondents’ claims to 
proceed, Respondents sought extensive discovery, attempting to uncover evidence 
demonstrating Petitioners acted out of animosity in publishing the cease and desist letter.  
Respondents sought information regarding the specific circumstances immediately 
surrounding the Petitioners’ disclosure of their confidential medical information, as well 
as documents and testimony that revealed Petitioners’ decisional process in the 
administrative proceedings against them.  Respondents also sought communications 
between Petitioners and their counsel that related to these proceedings.  Following an 
unsatisfactory response to discovery requests, Respondents filed multiple motions to 
compel and motions for discovery sanctions against Petitioners between the months of 
November 2013 and February 2016, which led to numerous hearings in the circuit court, 
and concurrent interlocutory appeals by Petitioners. 
 
Of import to the issues before this Court are the events that occurred during and 
after Petitioners’ filed their first interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s June 17, 2014 
8 
 
discovery order.9  On August 15, 2014,10 Respondents filed their fifth motion for sanctions 
seeking a default judgment as to liability, alleging primarily that Petitioners failed to 
produce an adequately prepared organizational representative noted as a prepared designee 
for a 167-topic deposition.  Respondents subsequently requested a hearing regarding the 
fifth motion for sanctions.  Also on August 15th, the Court of Special Appeals issued an 
order staying all discovery in the circuit court pending the outcome of the first interlocutory 
appeal.    
 
In opposition to Respondents’ fifth motion for sanctions, Petitioners alleged that 
most of the deposition topics covered information in Respondents’ possession or were not 
discoverable because they involved issues pending on appeal.  Petitioners also noted they 
appealed the circuit court’s June 17th discovery order denying Petitioners assertions of 
various privileges, and that Petitioners “should not be sanctioned for declining to allow 
these protections and privileges to be eviscerated in other discovery proceedings” and 
                                              
9 On May 1, 2014, Respondents filed their third motion to compel seeking two 
classes of documents: (1)  the Board’s administrative investigatory file in its disciplinary 
proceedings against Dr. Geier’s partner, John L. Young, M.D., and (2) communications 
between  the Board’s attorneys and Petitioner Shafer, an investigator for the Board.  
Respondents argued that Petitioners proceeded against Dr. Young as part of their campaign 
to discredit Dr. Geier’s research.  Petitioners opposed the production of the deliberations 
regarding Dr. Young  based on deliberative privilege, attorney-client privilege, attorney 
work-product protection, and Health Occ. §14-410(a)(1), which states that generally, “[t]he 
proceedings, records, or files of , the Board a disciplinary panel, or any of its other 
investigatory bodies are not discoverable and are not admissible in evidence[.]”  Following 
a hearing on June 17, 2014, the circuit court granted Respondents motion and compelled 
disclosure of the requested documents. On June 26, 2014, Petitioners noted an appeal. 
 
10 Respondents’ fifth motion for sanctions was received by the circuit court on 
August 8, 2014, but due to a clerical omission, was not filed with the court until August 
15th. 
9 
 
allowing Respondents to “frustrate the appellate court’s ability to provide meaningful relief 
in its resolution” of the issues before it.  
 
Following a hearing on November 13, 2014, the circuit court granted Respondents’ 
fifth motion for sanctions.  On December 16, 2014, the circuit court issued a memorandum 
opinion that detailed Petitioners’ culpable conduct during discovery, and thereafter, entered 
a default judgment of liability against Petitioners.  The circuit court noted that a trial on 
damages would be scheduled after Petitioners’ first interlocutory appeal had been resolved.   
 
On December 24, 2014, Petitioners noted a second interlocutory appeal based on 
the circuit court’s default judgment, which the Court of Special Appeals consolidated with 
Petitioners’ initial appeal filed on June 26.  See Md. Bd. Of Physicians v. Geier, 225 Md. 
App. 114, 123 A.3d 601 (2015). 
c. The Court of Special Appeals’ Decision 
 
 
The Court of Special Appeals first held that neither order appealed by Petitioners 
constituted a final judgment.  The Court concluded that the collateral order doctrine applied 
to the June 17th discovery order, allowing the Court to hear Petitioners’ claims regarding 
that discovery order.  See Geier, 225 Md. App. at 129-38; 123 A.3d at 610-16.  The 
collateral order doctrine did not apply to the December 16th order of default on liability, 
corresponding to Respondents’ fifth motion for sanctions, because the Court concluded 
that the issues that order addressed were not “collateral” to the merits of the case.  Id. at 
139-43, 123 A.3d at 616-19.   
10 
 
 
In considering the merits of Petitioners’ claims regarding the June 17th order, the 
Court held that under Health Occ. §14-41011 Dr. John L. Young’s (“Dr. Young”)12 
disciplinary files were not discoverable by Respondents.  The Court noted that, under 
Health Occ. §14-410, both  the Board and Dr. Young had to expressly consent to the 
discoverability of Dr. Young’s proceedings as parties to the action.  Because the Board 
objected to releasing Dr. Young’s proceedings, they were not discoverable by Respondents 
in the present action.  Id. at 144-47, 123 A.3d 619-21.  The Court also concluded that the 
circuit court erred in rejecting Petitioners’ claim of executive privilege, because it failed to 
expressly balance Petitioners’ need for confidentiality against Respondents’ need for 
disclosure, and the impact of nondisclosure on a fair administration of justice.  Id. at 147-
52; 123 A.3d 621-24.  
                                              
11 Health Occ. §14-410 provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Except by the express stipulation and consent of all parties to a proceeding 
before the Board, a disciplinary panel, or any of its other investigatory bodies, 
in a civil or criminal action: 
 
(1) The proceedings, records, or files of the Board, or a disciplinary panel, or 
any of its other investigatory bodies are not discoverable and are not 
admissible evidence; and 
 
(2)  Any order passed by the Board or disciplinary panel is not admissible 
evidence[.] 
 
(b) This section does not apply to a civil action brought by a party to a proceeding 
before the Board or a disciplinary panel who claims to be aggrieved by the 
decision of the Board or the disciplinary panel. 
 
12 Dr. Young was a partner in Dr. Geier’s medical practice. 
11 
 
 
Finally, the Court considered the merits of Petitioners’ claims regarding the 
allegedly privileged communications between the Board and Joshua Shafer, an investigator 
for the Board.  Although the Court noted that generally an appellate court does not have 
jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal from a discovery ruling that rejects a claim 
of attorney-client privilege, the Court still considered the merits because it formed a part 
of a ruling that the Court had jurisdiction to review.  Id. at 153, 123 A.3d at 624 (citing 
Kurstin v. Bromberg Rosenthal LLP, 420 Md. 466, 480, 24 A.3d 88, 96 (2011)).  The Court 
noted that the Guidelines for Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings (“Guidelines”) 
have no effect on the confidentiality of communications between Board employees, like 
Shaffer, and the Board’s attorneys.   Id. at 154, 123 A.3d at 625.  The Court concluded that 
the circuit court erred in rejecting Petitioners’ claim of privilege on the ground that the 
Guidelines rendered Shafer a “stranger” to the attorney-client relationship between the 
Board and its attorneys. Id. at 154, 123 A.3d at 625.  
 
The Court remanded the case back to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.  
d. The Post-Remand Proceeding in the Circuit Court  
On remand, Respondents sought a hearing on their sixth motion for sanctions filed 
on August 8, 2014,13 involving Petitioners’ audio recordings on internal deliberations 
regarding Dr. Geier’s and Mr. Geier’s disciplinary proceedings.   
                                              
13 Respondents also filed a fourth motion for sanctions on the same date.  
12 
 
On November 5, 2014, Respondents served their sixth request for production of 
documents, seeking a variety of financial information from Petitioners, which prompted 
Petitioners to pursue a protective order, based in substantial part, on their claim of absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity from suit.   
On December 28, 2015, Petitioners also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
default liability order and for summary judgment in Petitioners’ favor.  Petitioners asserted 
that in the order of default on liability, the circuit court found the Board, but not the 
individual Petitioners, had engaged in discovery violations.  Petitioners also argued that 
the Court of Special Appeals narrowed the scope of what discovery should be permitted.  
Respondents disagreed, and on February 10, 2016, filed a seventh motion for sanctions 
alleging that Petitioners’ motion for a protective order raising the immunity defense was in 
bad faith.    
On March 24, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ respective 
motions, and subsequently denied Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, motion for 
reconsideration on the default judgment of liability, and motion for a protective order from 
Respondents’ sixth request for documents.  The circuit court found that the General 
Assembly had enacted a detailed statutory scheme addressing Petitioners’ immunity from 
suit in 1976 that has not been repealed.14  The circuit court concluded that because the 
statutory scheme remains in effect, Petitioners’ claim of a common law absolute quasi-
                                              
14 The circuit court noted the statutory scheme remained in full effect even after this 
Court established an absolute quasi-judicial privilege in Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 
434 A.2d 547 (1981). 
13 
 
judicial immunity claim did not apply.  On that basis, the circuit court denied Petitioners’ 
motion for summary judgment.   
The circuit court also denied Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because the 
circuit court found that, even under the Court of Special Appeals’ mandate, Petitioners 
failed to provide specific evidence that their deponent was responsive, sufficient for the 
circuit court to reverse its order.  The circuit court also noted that, even after adhering to 
the Court of Special Appeals’ mandate, Petitioners’ conduct remained “abysmal, 
abominable, [and] sanctionable.”   
Finally, the circuit court granted Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions.  The 
circuit court found that Petitioners did not assert any privilege in their initial responses to 
Respondents’ requests for the audiotapes, and the tapes were not included on Petitioners’ 
privilege logs, so the assertion of privilege was waived.  The circuit court also ordered that 
all of Respondents’ outstanding discovery requests were due by April 22, 2016.   
On April 1, 2016, Petitioners noted an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals, seeking review of the circuit court’s March 24th orders denying their motions for 
reconsideration and request for a protective order, and granting Respondents’ sixth motion 
for sanctions. This Court, sua sponte, granted certiorari, and on April 22, 2016 ordered a 
stay of the proceedings pending further review.  
Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in 
addressing the issues presented. 
 
 
14 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 
With respect to discovery rules, it is long settled that circuit court judges “are vested 
with a reasonable, sound discretion in applying them, which discretion will not be disturbed 
in the absence of a showing of its abuse.”  Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 560, 914 A 2.d 
783, 790 (2007) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 
396, 405, 718 A.2d 1129, 1133–34 (1998)).  Thus, the resolution of discovery disputes and 
the imposition of discovery sanctions are within the circuit court’s sound discretion, and 
reviewed by this Court only for abuse of discretion. See id.   
An abuse of discretion occurs “where no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the [trial] court” or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding 
principles or rules[,]” or when the ruling under consideration is “clearly against the logic 
and effect of facts and inferences before the court[]” or when the ruling is “violative of fact 
and logic.”  Gallagher Evelius & Jones, LLP v. Joppa Drive-Thru, Inc., 195 Md. App. 583, 
597, 7 A.3d 160, 168 (2010) (quoting Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 198–99, 
867 A.2d 1077 (2005)).  “Generally, the standard is that absent a showing that a court acted 
in a harsh, unjust, capricious and arbitrary way, [this Court] will not find an abuse of 
discretion.”  Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 561, 914 A 2.d at 790 (quoting Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 
Md. 149, 178, 913 A.2d 10, 26 (2006)). 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. 
Respondents Motion to Dismiss  
 
In conjunction with filing their brief in this Court, Respondents’ also filed a motion 
to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction arguing that none of the three orders 
15 
 
before this Court are immediately appealable. We conclude that the orders denying 
Petitioners’ respective motions for reconsideration and for a protective order are not 
properly appealable, and therefore, grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss as it relates to 
those orders. Because we conclude, however, the order granting Respondents’ sixth motion 
for sanction is immediately reviewable by this Court under the collateral order doctrine, 
we deny Respondents’ motion to dismiss as it relates to that order. 
a. Final Judgment 
 
None of the appealed circuit court’s orders qualify as a final judgment that would 
grant this Court automatic review of the circuit court’s decisions.  Section 12-101(f) of the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines a final judgment as a “judgment, decree, 
sentence, order, determination, decision or other action by a court … from which an appeal, 
application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.”  To constitute a 
final judgment, a trial court’s ruling “must either decide and conclude the rights of the 
parties involved or deny a party the means to prosecute or defend rights and interests in the 
subject matter of the proceeding.”  Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 312, 22 A.3d 886, 893 
(2011) (quoting Schuele v. Case Handyman, 412 Md. 555, 565, 989 A.2d 210, 216 (2010)).  
 Additionally, for a judgment to be final, the ruling must also contain the following 
three attributes: “(1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of 
the matter in controversy[;] (2) unless the court acts pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b) 
to direct the entry of a final judgment as to less than all the claims or all the parties, it must 
adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties; [and] (3) it must 
be set forth and recorded in accordance with [Maryland] Rule 2-601.”  Metro Maint. Sys. 
16 
 
S., Inc. v. Milburn, 442 Md. 289, 298, 112 A.3d 429, 436 (2015) (citing Rohrbeck v. 
Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989).   
The record reflects that the circuit court did not intend for any of its orders to be 
considered a “final disposition of the matter in controversy[.]”  See Metro Maint. Sys. S., 
Inc., 442 Md. at 298, 112 A.3d at 435.  The circuit court, after denying Petitioners’ motion 
for a protective order, ordered that Petitioners had until April 1, 2016 to provide an updated 
privilege log, and until April 22, 2016 to respond to all of Respondents’ outstanding 
discovery requests.  The circuit court’s scheduling of additional discovery matters clearly 
indicates that there was no “unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[.]”  
Id. 
In the absence of a final judgment, appellate review is limited to three exceptions: 
(1) appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; (2) immediate appeals 
permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; and (3) appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed 
under the common law collateral order doctrine.  See Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615, 
881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005).  The first two exceptions are not implicated in this case. 
b. Common Law Collateral Order Doctrine 
 
The common law collateral order doctrine is a well-established but narrow 
exception to the general rule that appellate review must ordinarily await the entry of a final 
judgment disposing of all claims against the parties.  See Dawkins v. Balt. City Police 
Dep’t., 376 Md. 53, 58, 827 A.2d 115, 118 (2003).  The doctrine is “based upon a judicially 
created fiction, under which, certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final 
judgments, even though such orders are clearly not final judgments.”  Id. at 64, 827 A.2d 
17 
 
at 121.  For the doctrine to apply, the interlocutory order must satisfy the following four 
requirements: (1) the order must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) the 
order must resolve an important issue; (3) the order must resolve an issue that is completely 
separate from the merits of the action; and (4) the issue would be effectively unreviewable 
if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.  Id. at 58, 827 A.2d at 118.  These 
four requirements are strictly applied, and appeals under the doctrine may be entertained 
only in extraordinary circumstances.  Id. at 59, 827 A.2d at 118. 
In Dawkins this Court made clear that, as “a general rule, interlocutory [] orders 
rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, public 
official immunity, statutory immunity, or any other type of immunity are not appealable 
under the [] collateral order doctrine.”  Id. at 65, 827 A.2d at 122.  Specifically, we held, 
[w]hether, and under what circumstances, interlocutory orders overruling 
immunity defenses asserted by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Comptroller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Speaker of the House, President 
of the Senate, or judges as defined in Article IV, §2, of the Maryland 
Constitution, are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine 
will have to be determined in any future cases that might arise. Interlocutory 
trial court orders overruling immunity claims by other government officials, 
employees, departments, agencies, entities, units, or subdivisions, or by 
private persons or entities, are not appealable under this doctrine. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  After Dawkins, this Court and the Court of Special Appeals 
clarified that interlocutory orders denying absolute judicial immunity and interlocutory 
orders denying executive privilege to “high level decision makers” are immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  See, e.g., Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 572, 914 
A.2d at 797 (concluding that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate under the 
18 
 
“extraordinary circumstances involving discovery orders directed to a high government 
official.”); State v. Keller-Bee, 224 Md. App. 1, 6, 119 A.2d 80, 83 (2015), aff’d, 448 Md. 
300, 138 A.3d 1253 (2016) (concluding that, under Dawkins,  the trial court’s denial of 
the State’s motion to dismiss was immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine because Article IV judges, and their clerks, are entitled to immediate appellate 
review of the denial of their judicial immunity). 
1. Order Granting Respondents’ Sixth Motion for Sanctions 
We hold that the circuit court’s order granting Respondents’ sixth motion for 
sanctions is properly appealable because it satisfies the narrow exception allowing 
discovery orders denying “high level decision makers” their executive privilege to be 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 
i. 
Order Granting Motion for Discovery Sanctions is a “Discovery Order” 
An order granting discovery sanctions qualifies as a “discovery order” for the 
purposes of determining the appealability of an order denying executive privilege under 
the collateral order doctrine.  Maryland Rule 2-433 governs a trial judge’s ability to enter 
orders when there are failures of discovery by one or both of the parties.  Specifically, 
Maryland Rule 2-433(a)(3) authorizes a trial judge to enter “a judgment by default that 
includes a determination as to liability and all relief sought by the moving party against 
the failing party if the court is satisfied that it has personal jurisdiction over that party.” 
 Respondents argue that “courts have consistently held that orders granting 
discovery sanctions against a party are not immediately appealable under the collateral 
order doctrine.”  Respondents rely solely on Newman v. Reilly, a case that did not address 
19 
 
sanctions within the discovery context. 314 Md. 364, 550 A.2d 959 (1988).  Rather, the 
Newman court considered sanctions authorized by Cts. & Jud. Proc. §3-2A-07(a) and 
Maryland Rule 1-341.  See id. at 376-82, 550 A.2d at 965-68.15  In Newman, this Court 
held that “a sanctions order against a party to the underlying litigation is not immediately 
appealable, in advance of final judgment on the merits of the underlying action, under the 
collateral order doctrine.”  Newman, 314 Md. at 385, 550 A.2d at 969 (citing Yamaner v. 
Orkin, 310 Md. 321, 326, 529 A.2d 361, 364 (1987)).  This Court determined that the third 
prong for the collateral order doctrine test was not satisfied because “an application for 
sanctions” is not “a claim so distinct from the underlying lawsuit that the parties would be 
realigned depending on who is claiming, and who is defending against, sanctions.”  Id.  In 
the context of discovery sanctions, the issues the circuit court determines in deciding 
whether sanctions are appropriate are sufficiently separate from the merits of the 
underlying action.  We conclude therefore, that Newman is not controlling in this case, 
and that an order for discovery sanctions is considered a “discovery order” for the purposes 
of denying a “high level decision maker” his or her executive privilege. 
                                              
15 Cts. & Jud. Proc. §3-2A-07(a) authorizes an arbitration panel, upon a finding that 
the conduct of any party was in bad faith or without substantial justification, to require 
“the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the 
adverse party the costs of the proceeding and reasonable expenses, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it.”  Maryland Rule 1-341 states 
that “if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any 
proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification the court, [on motion by 
an adverse party,] may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or 
both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the reasonable 
expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing 
it.”   
 
20 
 
ii. 
Order Granting Respondents’ Sixth Motion for Sanctions is 
Immediately Appealable 
 
This Court has consistently held that discovery orders, ordinarily, are not appealable 
prior to a final judgment terminating the case in the trial court.  Montgomery County. v. 
Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 477, 654 A.2d 877, 880 (1995) (citing Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Stein, 
328 Md. 1, 7, 18, 612 A.2d 880, 883, 888 (1992); Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 
300 Md. 200, 207, 477 A.2d 759, 763 (1984)).  A narrow exception exists when a “high 
level decision maker” appeals a discovery order that denies their assertion of executive 
privilege.  See Stevens, 337 Md. at 477, 654 A.2d at 880; see also Patuxent Valley, 300 
Md. at 210, 477 A.2d at 764 (“[D]iscovery orders, directed at other than high level 
government decision makers, are ordinarily not appealable ….”).  In both Stevens and 
Patuxent Valley, we determined that the discovery orders compelling a state actor to appear 
for a deposition were immediately appealable.  In both cases, the four-part collateral order 
doctrine test was satisfied because: (1) the orders conclusively required the appellant to 
take a deposition; (2) the orders resolved an important issue because they dealt with the 
potentially great harm to the public by the “disruption of the governmental process” that 
can be caused by discovery into the decision making processes of a high level government 
official; (3) the issue as to whether the depositions were appropriate was distinct from the 
merits of the action for judicial review; and (4) the issue would become effectively 
unreviewable later because the harm would occur when the depositions were taken, and 
there would be no effective remedy available thereafter.  Stevens, 337 Md. at 479-80, 654 
A.2d at 881; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07, 477 A.2d at 762-73.  
21 
 
Additionally, despite the narrowing language contained in Dawkins, supra, this 
Court, relying on our decisions in Stevens and Patuxent Valley, continues to recognize that 
discovery orders may be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine when 
those orders seek to probe the individual thought processes of a high level government 
official acting in an administrative or investigatory decisional capacity.  See Hudson v. 
Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 402 Md. 18, 25, 935 A.2d 395, 399 (2007); see also Ehrlich, 
396 Md. at 572, 914 A.2d at 797 (recognizing that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate 
under the “extraordinary circumstances involving discovery orders directed to a high 
government official.”).  While the Hudson Court ultimately concluded that the collateral 
order doctrine did not apply under the facts presented, we acknowledged that if the four 
requirements for the collateral order doctrine are satisfied, then a discovery order that 
seeks to probe a high level government official’s mental processes acting in his or her 
administrative or decisional capacity, is immediately appealable.  Hudson, 402 Md. at 24-
27, 935 A.2d at 398-400.   
We conclude that Petitioners are considered “high level decision makers” and the 
denial of their assertion of executive privilege through the circuit court’s grant of 
Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions is immediately reviewable by this Court.  In 
considering what constitutes a “high level decision maker” for the appealability of orders 
denying executive privilege, this Court has held that executive decision making bodies 
have the ability to appeal orders denying their executive privilege.   See Stevens, 337 Md. 
at 479-80, 654 A.2d at 881 (holding that a discovery order requiring the Chief of Police 
for Montgomery County to be deposed was immediately appealable under the collateral 
22 
 
order doctrine because the Chief was a “high level government decision-maker.”); 
Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07, 477 A.2d at 762-63 (determining that a discovery 
order requiring individual commissioners at the Public Service Commission to be deposed 
satisfied the collateral order doctrine because the members were “high level government 
decision-makers.”); Stein, 328 Md. at 23, 612 A.2d at 891 (1992) (concluding that 
“[a]lthough the director of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services is not so high 
an official as the President of the United States, he or she is nevertheless on a par with the 
individual Public Service Commissioners” who were the Petitioners in Patuxent Valley).   
Petitioners fall within this category of high level executive decision makers because 
members of the Board are appointed by the Governor, with the advice of the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”), and the advice and consent of 
the Senate, similarly to commissioners in the Public Service Commission.   Cf. Health 
Occ. §14-202(a)(1), with Public Utilities Article  §2-102(a) (“The [Public Service] 
Commission consists of five commissioners, appointed by the Governor with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”).  The General Assembly has also delegated to the Board a 
variety of powers that make it the functional equivalent of a high level executive body.  
See, e.g., Health Occ. §14-205(a)(1) (granting the Board the power to “[e]nforce [Title 14] 
and Title 15 in [the Health Occupations Article.]”); Health Occ. §14-205(a)(5) (The Board 
“[o]versee[s:] (i) [t]he licensing requirements for physicians and the allied health 
professionals; and (ii) [t]he issuance and renewal of licenses[.]”); and Health Occ. §14-
205(a)(8) (“[d]evelop[ing] and implement[ing] methods to: (i) [a]ssess and improve 
licensee practices; and (ii) [e]nsure the ongoing competence of licensees[.]”).    
23 
 
This case is closely analogous to the facts in both Stevens and Patuxent Valley. 
Respondents are seeking to obtain discovery that delves into the Board’s decision making 
process.  As in both Stevens and Patuxent Valley, we conclude that this case also satisfies 
the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.  First, the circuit court’s order 
conclusively determined that Petitioners must disclose their pre-decisional deliberations by 
submitting the audiotapes to Respondents by April 22, 2016.  Second, like in Stevens and 
Patuxent Valley, this issue is important because of the “potentially great harm to the public 
by the ‘disruption of the governmental process’ that can be caused by discovery into the 
decision making process[]” of a high level executive decision maker.  Stevens, 337 Md. at 
479, 654 A.2d at 881; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07, 477 A.2d at 762.  Third, the 
issue in this case concerning Petitioners’ deliberative process (executive) privilege is 
distinct from the merits of Respondents’ action seeking damages for an alleged invasion of 
their privacy.  See, e.g., Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 572, 914 A.2d at 797 (concluding that “the 
propriety of a potential intrusion on [executive] privilege[] has nothing to do with the 
merits of [the plaintiff’s] wrongful termination claim.”).  Fourth, the discovery order will 
be effectively unreviewable on an appeal from a final judgment because the privilege’s 
protection would be irretrievably lost once Respondents’ gain access to the individual 
decisional thought processes of the Petitioners.  See Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 207, 477 
A.2d at 763.  Additionally, as this Court noted in Patuxent Valley, “[r]egardless of the 
outcome of the trial, the disruption to the administrative process, caused by placing the 
officials under pretrial scrutiny, is incurred at the first instance. … [I]t would be impossible 
to cure the harm done” to Petitioners once the audiotapes are given to Respondents.  Id.   
24 
 
The order granting Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions is a discovery order 
denying a high level executive decision maker their executive privilege.  Accordingly, this 
Court has the authority to consider the merits of Petitioners’ assertion of executive privilege 
as applied to the audiotapes of their pre-decisional process.  
2. Orders Denying Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration as to Default 
Liability and Motion for Protective Order 
 
The circuit court’s order denying Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration and for 
a protective order are not immediately appealable to this Court. While we may have 
jurisdiction over one interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine, it does not 
give us the authority to consider other interlocutory orders that are not independently 
appealable. 
Petitioners conceded before the Court of Special Appeals that a party cannot 
immediately appeal from an order of default on liability.  See Geier, 225 Md. App. at 140, 
123 A.3d at 616.  Petitioners advance the same argument to this Court– that because we 
have standing to hear their appeal regarding the denial of their executive privilege, this 
Court has supplementary standing to consider their claims regarding the denial of their 
quasi-judicial immunity in the orders denying their motions for reconsideration and for a 
protective order.  
 
As the Court of Special Appeals noted, Maryland Rule 8-131(d) states that “[o]n 
appeal from a final judgment, an interlocutory order previously entered in the action is 
open to review by the Court unless an appeal has previously been taken from that order 
and decided on the merits by the Court.”  (emphasis added).  As Judge Charles E. Moylan, 
25 
 
Jr. observed in Banashak v. Wittstadt, “[t]here is scant authority on the question of 
appellate piggybacking[.]”  167 Md. App. 627, 670, 893 A.2d 1236, 1261 (2006).  We 
have not precisely addressed the issue of whether an order that is appealable as a final 
judgment allows other orders, otherwise not appealable, to be heard by an appellate court.  
As Judge Moylan noted, the Court of Special Appeals has repeatedly held that “the 
appealability of each separate issue must be analyzed in a vacuum and that there are no 
two-for-the-price-of-one bargains on the appellate docket.”  Id. at 671, 893 A.2d at 1261; 
see also Williams v. State, 17 Md. App. 110, 299 A.2d 878 (1973), overruled on other 
grounds by Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 386 A.2d 1206 (1978) (holding that an order 
denying a challenge to an array cannot be converted into an appealable order simply 
because it is joined with an appeal of an interlocutory order that is appealable). 
We concluded, supra, that none of the orders appealed by Petitioners constitute a 
final order as defined in Cts. & Jud. Proc. §12-101(f).  Instead, we determined that the 
order granting Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions is immediately appealable because 
it satisfied the four-part collateral order doctrine test.  An order that satisfies the collateral 
order doctrine is not a final judgment, but rather a legal fiction that, under narrow 
circumstances, allows this Court to consider orders that would otherwise not be appealable 
at the time they are entered.  See Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 562, 914 A.2d at 791 (quoting 
Dawkins, 376 Md. at 63, 827 A.2d at 121); see also Snowden v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 
300 Md. 555, 560 n.  2, 479 A.2d 1329, 1331 n.  2 (1984).  The collateral order doctrine 
is only applicable in narrow and extraordinary circumstances.  See Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 
562, 914 A.2d at 791 (referring to collateral doctrine orders as a “narrow class of orders[,]” 
26 
 
and as a doctrine that is applicable only “in a very few … extraordinary situations”); see 
also Dawkins, 376 Md. at 58-59, 827 A.2d at 118 (noting that the collateral order doctrine 
“is a very limited exception to the principle that only final judgments terminating the case 
in the trial court are appealable,” and that the requirements for the collateral order doctrine 
are “strictly applied” and “entertained only in extraordinary circumstances.”) (citations 
omitted);  Stevens, 337 Md. at 477, 654 A.2d at 880 (recognizing that the collateral order 
doctrine applies to “a narrow class of orders … which are offshoots of the principal 
litigation in which they are issued and which are immediately appealable as ‘final 
judgments’ without regard to the posture of the case.”) (citations omitted).  
As the Court of Special Appeals explained, “in a permissible, interlocutory appeal 
under the collateral order doctrine, it would make no sense to allow the parties to contest 
every other order in the case as though there had been a conventional final judgment.”  
Geier, 225 Md. App. at 141, 123 A.2d at 617.  Further, the Court concluded that it “would 
be absurd to say that, in an appeal that is permissible only if the subject matter is 
‘completely separate from the merits of the action,’ the appellate court may proceed to 
consider and decide every interlocutory ruling pertaining to the merits of the case.”  Id.  
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ assessment that due to the narrow purpose 
of the collateral order doctrine, orders that do not independently satisfy the four-part test 
may not be appealed by “piggybacking” onto another interlocutory order that does satisfy 
the test.  Therefore, the two additional orders are not properly before this Court. 
 
27 
 
i. 
Order denying Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration for Default as 
to Liability is Not Immediately Appealable 
 
It is well-established that an order of default is not an “unqualified, final disposition 
of the matter” because an assessment of damages is still required.  Franklin Credit Mgmt.  
Corp. v. Nefflen, 436 Md. 300, 321, 81 A.3d 441, 453 (2013) see also Curry v. Hillcrest 
Clinic, Inc., 337 Md. 412, 425-27, 653 A.2d 934, 940-41 (1995) (holding this Court’s 
decision in Banegura v. Taylor, see infra, was dispositive in concluding that there is no 
final judgment in an order for default until damages have been assessed); Banegura v. 
Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 618, 541 A.2d 969, 973 (1988) (holding that an entry of an order of 
default, leaving damages open for a future trial, was not a final judgment, and could not 
be immediately appealed); Adams v. Mallory, 308 Md. 453, 461, 520 A.2d. 371, 375 
(1987) (concluding that an order entering a judgment default of liability that did not 
determine any relief was not a final judgment).  Additionally, this Court in Banegura 
concluded that the denial of the defendant’s motion to strike the default order was 
interlocutory and not appealable because it did not dispose of the entire claim.  Banegura, 
312 Md. at 618, 541 A.2d at 973-74.  The order denying Petitioners’ motion for 
reconsideration for default liability is central to the merits of the action, and therefore, 
fails the third factor of the collateral order doctrine test. 
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to review the order because it is neither a 
final judgment nor does it satisfy the collateral order doctrine. 
 
 
28 
 
ii. 
Order Denying Petitioners’ Motion for Protective Order is Not 
Immediately Appealable 
 
The circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ motion for a protective order from 
Respondent’s sixth motion to compel documents is not properly appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine.  
After creating the general rule in Dawkins, see supra, we declined to determine 
“[w]hether, and under what circumstances, interlocutory orders overruling immunity 
defenses asserted by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Comptroller, Treasurer, 
Attorney General, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, or judges as defined in 
Article IV §2, of the Maryland Constitution, are immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine….”  Dawkins, 376 Md. at 65, 827 A.2d at 122 (emphasis added).  
This Court purposefully left open the possibility that in cases where privilege is denied to 
one of the specified positions above, an appellate court may have the authority to consider 
the interlocutory order denying the privilege under the collateral order doctrine.  
As Dawkins made clear “[i]nterlocutory trial orders overruling immunity claims 
by… agencies … are not appealable under this doctrine.”  Id. at 65, 827 A.2d at 122.  
Additionally, this Court concluded that only judges defined by Article IV, §2 in the 
Maryland Constitution are eligible for the exception to the rule.  Article IV, §2 states: 
The Judges of all of the said Courts shall be citizens of the State of Maryland, 
and qualified voters under this Constitution, and shall have resided therein 
not less than five years, and not less than six months next preceding their 
election, or appointment, as the case may be, in the city, county, district, 
judicial circuit, intermediate appellate judicial circuit or appellate circuit for 
which they may be, respectively, elected or appointed.  They shall be not less 
than thirty years of age at the time of their election or appointment, and shall 
be selected from those who have been admitted to practice Law in this State, 
29 
 
and who are most distinguished for integrity, wisdom and sound legal 
knowledge. 
 
 Md. Const. Art. IV, §2.  The Health Occupations Article states, “[t]he Board [of 
Physicians] shall consist of 22 members appointed by the Governor with the advice of the 
Secretary [of DHMH] and the advice and consent of the Senate.”  Health Occ. §14-
202(a)(1).  The General Assembly did not intend for Petitioners to be considered Article 
IV judges, but rather as a quasi-judicial body within an administrative agency that has 
powers independent of the Maryland judiciary.  The language in Dawkins is dispositive as 
it relates to the absolute judicial privilege, and we therefore decline to consider the four 
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.16 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to review the order because it is neither a final 
judgment nor does it satisfy the collateral order doctrine. 
c. Waiver  
 
As noted, supra, we review discovery matters under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 560, 914 A.2d at 790 (quoting E.I. du Pont de. Nemours & Co., 
351 Md. at 405, 718 A.2d at 1133-34).  Specifically, we review a trial court’s decision 
regarding discovery disputes 
                                              
16 Petitioners, in their response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss, rely on Gill v. 
Ripley as evidence that this Court has recognized that absolute quasi-judicial privilege 
applies to Executive Branch officials engaged in quasi-judicial acts “because their 
judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges– that is, because they, too 
‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as part of their function.”  352 Md. 754, 762, 724 A.2d 
88, 92 (1999).  The case that Petitioners cite pre-dated our holding in Dawkins. Because 
this Court finds that Dawkins’ limitation on appealing orders denying judicial immunity 
claims from agencies is controlling, we decline to consider the holding in Gill v. Ripley in 
the context of this case. 
30 
 
[f]or the soundness and reasonableness with which the discretion was 
exercised. In making that evaluation, the reviewing court must defer to 
the trial court. The necessity for doing so is inherent in the nature of 
judicial discretion. The exercise of judicial discretion ordinarily involves 
a series of judgment calls, not simply the ultimate one, but also those on 
which the ultimate one depends. Where it is alleged that there has been a 
failure of discovery, in exercising its discretion and as a predicated to 
determining the propriety of imposing a sanction and, if so, which one, 
the trial court must find facts. Until it has determined what the 
significance of the offending party’s actions is and their impact under the 
circumstances, the court is not in a position to make any decision 
concerning sanctions. Because it will not have defined, and, so, will not 
have explored the available choices, the court simply could not exercise 
any discretion. 
N. River Ins. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 343 Md. 34, 87-88, 680 A.2d 480, 507 
(1996).  Additionally, “[i]t is now well-settled that, consistent with the notion that the 
decision to impose sanctions is within its sound discretion, the power of trial courts to 
impose sanctions is not dependent on any requirement that they find that the defaulting 
party acted willfully or contumaciously.”  Id. at 86, 680 A.2d at 506. 
 
In the case at bar, the following colloquy took place during the trial court’s 
consideration of Respondents’ Sixth Motion for Sanctions:  
[RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the last thing on my list is 
the plaintiffs’ sixth motion for sanctions which has been pending since 
August 8, 2014, and that’s going way back. But the Court will remember 
that we asked for basically documents reflecting communications among 
the Board, Board members about the [Respondents]. That was the seventh 
request set out in the first set of document requests that was served on the 
[Petitioners] on August 1, 2013. That matter went to hearing. The Court 
took up the objections that were asserted by the defendants in November 
of 2013 and ruled essentially that the document responses should be 
produced, especially the request we’re concerned about here in No. 7. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
31 
 
 
[RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL]: Somewhat fortuitously, on a couple of 
other occasions we sent out document requests, notably the third and fifth 
request, that also contained requests that would have consumed and 
brought to the [Petitioners’] attention these audiotapes where they record 
your deliberations. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
 
[RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL]: There was no objection asserted based 
on deliberate privilege in response to Request No. 7 way back in 
September of 2013. The Court ordered them to produce responsive 
documents, and we got some documents eventually by, by June of 2014. 
I got a call from Mr. [Gozdor] telling me I finally had all the documents 
responsive to our August 2013 request, but it wasn’t until we took Ms. 
Hurley’s deposition in July of 2014 that we found out about the audio 
tapes.  
 
 
And so it was, it came to our surprise to learn that these tapes recorded 
deliberations where the Geiers were discussed. We asked for those 
immediately, moved for sanctions. That motion got filed in August 2014. 
And then because of the pendency of the interlocutory appeal, we, this 
was never heard. But it’s a pretty simple issue. The, any objection that 
may have been asserted about those tapes is waived. There was no 
objection. These tapes were hidden and, by the way, it’s important to 
know that after I found out about the existence of the tapes, I began to ask 
individual Board members at their depositions, did you know about the 
tapes? I knew about the tapes. Invariably, they knew about the tapes. It’s 
just no one went to get the tapes to produce them in response to our 1-
year-old discovery. And so that’s the basis for the sixth motion for 
sanctions. 
 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Counsel.  
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the plaintiffs are seeking 
audio recordings of the deliberative privilege of the Board. 
 
THE COURT: You didn’t lodge a timely objection. Not you, but your 
predecessors. There’s no timely objection. 
 
32 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: Well, the, the – 
 
THE COURT: They asked for the information, you didn’t make an 
objection based on any of this privileged stuff, I granted the motion. How 
many do overs does the Attorney General think it gets? You didn’t – did 
you make a privilege objection – 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: Well – 
 
THE COURT: – at the time? 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: – they didn’t know they had them at the 
time that the discovery was served. 
 
THE COURT: Well, when you – 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: It was found according to Kristin – 
 
THE COURT: – learned, when they sort of popped up, did you promptly 
make an objection? Did you amend your response and say, oops, we need 
to include the objection and here’s the log? Did you do that? In other 
words, at any time after you say you learned about the tapes, did you 
amend your prior objections to object based on any relevant privilege? 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: I’m not sure if it was, if it was, if the 
discovery response was amended. 
 
THE COURT: So you didn’t raise the objections? Waived. What’s 
complicated about that? It may very well be that this stuff is privileged – 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: It’s in the – 
 
THE COURT: – to a fair thee well, but if your office doesn’t assert the 
objection timely or in some reasonable amendment – 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: Well, it’s asserted in the opposition to 
plaintiffs’ motion– 
 
THE COURT: That’s not how you do it. 
 
33 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: – for sanctions. 
 
THE COURT: You can’t do it that way. 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: So it was raised at, at that time, Your 
Honor, and – 
 
THE COURT: Show me where it was asserted in your discovery response 
and response to the specific discovery request 
 
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: I don’t have that in front of me, Your 
Honor. 
 
THE COURT: It’s not there. It’s not there. I know it’s not there. Your 
office never raised it. You never amended it, never amended it. Motion 
granted. 
* 
* 
* 
 
The colloquy raises two issues regarding Petitioners’ assertion of the deliberative 
process (executive) privilege over the audio recordings of the Board’s predecisional 
deliberations and whether the issue is waived.  First, the circuit court concluded Petitioners 
did not raise the deliberative process (executive) privilege over the audiotapes in their 
response to Respondents’ First Request for Production of Documents, No. 7.  The record 
indicates that, although Petitioners did not raise the deliberative process (executive) 
privilege specifically over the audiotapes, they did assert in their response to Request No. 
7 that “the communications are also being withheld from [Respondents] pursuant to the 
deliberative privilege since disclosing them would reveal [Petitioners] deliberative, 
predecisional thoughts.”  That assertion of the deliberative process (executive) privilege 
was denied by the circuit court on November 25, 2013 after the court analyzed the parties’ 
claims pursuant to the Hamilton v. Verdow balancing test, see infra.   
34 
 
 
Respondents argue that because Petitioners did not include the audiotapes in their 
response to Request No. 7 and did not produce the audiotapes after the First Motion to 
Compel was granted on November 25th, the assertion of privilege over the tapes was 
waived and Petitioners’ should be sanctioned for failing to comply with the November 25th 
discovery order.17  This view ignores evidence in the record indicating that the existence 
of the audiotapes was not discovered until July 29, 2014 when Christine Farrelly testified, 
during her organizational deposition, that the confidential Board proceedings were 
recorded.  Absent evidence to the contrary, Petitioners could not have raised the 
deliberative (executive) process privilege over the audiotapes prior to the discovery of their 
existence in July 2014, and therefore, no abuse of discovery for failing to assert the 
deliberative process (executive) privilege or produce the audiotapes could have occurred 
prior to July 2014.  
                                              
17  Respondents also argue that they made subsequent discovery requests that also 
covered the disclosure of the audiotapes.  Specifically, Respondents note that in their Third 
Request for Production of Documents, they sought production of “documents constituting 
written/or electronic communication between any members of [the Board] and regarding 
Mary Geier and/or David Geier.”  Additionally, in their Fifth Request for Production of 
Documents, Respondents sought production of: (1) “[a]ny documents or communications 
(including electronic data) pertaining to the Cease and Desist Order and/or Amended Cease 
and Desist Order (that have not already been produced)[;]” and (2) “[d]ocuments, notes, or 
communications (including electronic data) of any [Board] Staff or [Petitioner] concerning 
or referencing any information in the Cease and Desist Order, or the medications, and 
medical conditions of the Geiers (that have not already been produced).”  The record 
indicates the Third Request for Production of Documents was served on December 27, 
2013 and the Fifth Request for Production of Documents was served on February 27, 2014, 
but the audiotapes were not discovered until July 2014, meaning they could not have been 
subject to these other discovery requests until their existence was discovered. 
35 
 
 
Second, the circuit court acknowledged the possibility the audiotapes were not 
discovered until after the First Request for Production of Documents was served in August 
2013, but concluded that Petitioners failed to timely assert the deliberative process 
(executive) privilege upon the discovery of the audiotapes.  Petitioners argued that they did 
timely assert the deliberative process (executive) privilege over the audiotapes in their 
Opposition to Respondents’ Sixth Motion for Sanctions, which was filed on August 22, 
2014.  The circuit court held that Petitioners’ assertion of the deliberative process 
(executive) privilege in an opposition to sanctions was improper, and because Petitioners 
did not assert their privilege in a specific discovery response, the issue was waived.  The 
circuit court did not cite any support for its conclusion that the assertion of a privilege in 
an opposition to a motion for sanctions is improper.    
 
Maryland Rule 2-402 governs the scope of discovery and explains the process for 
asserting a privilege against a discovery request.  Maryland Rule 2-402(a) states, in relevant 
part, that “[a] party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged …[.]” 
Subsection (e) governs the process for claiming a privilege against discovery, and requires 
that 
[a] party who withholds information on the ground that it is privileged or 
subject to protection shall describe the nature of the documents, 
electronically stored information, communications, or things not produced 
or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing the privileged or protected 
information, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the 
privilege or protection. 
 
36 
 
Maryland Rule 2-402(e)(1).  The Rule does not prescribe any specific method for the party 
asserting a privilege against discovery to convey the required information to the party 
requesting the discovery.   
 
Respondents acknowledged in their Reply Memorandum to their Sixth Motion for 
Sanctions that “Maryland courts have not addressed whether the failure to produce a 
privilege log results in the waiver of an asserted privilege.”  Respondents argue, however, 
that because Maryland Rule 2-402(e)(1) is similar to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5)(A),18 and there are federal cases that hold the failure to assert a privilege in a 
privilege log results in a waiver of that privilege, that we should adopt the same rule.  This 
argument ignores the plain language in the very cases relied on by Respondents.  In Mezu 
v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565 (D. Md. 2010) the federal District Court of 
Maryland concluded that  
[a]bsent consent of the adverse party, or a Court order, a privilege log (or 
other communication of sufficient information for the parties to be able 
to determine whether the privilege applies) must accompany a written 
response to a [FRCP] 34[19] document production request, and a failure to 
do so may constitute a forfeiture of any claims of privilege. 
                                              
18    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A) states:  
 
(A) Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise 
discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to 
protection as trial-preparation material, the party must: 
(i) Expressly make the claim; and 
(ii) Describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things 
not produced or disclosued – and do so in a manner that, without revealing 
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to 
assess the claim. 
* 
* 
* 
19 FRCP 34 states: 
37 
 
                                              
(a) In General. A party may serve on any other party a request within the 
scope of Rule 26(b): 
(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to 
inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding 
party’s possession, custody, or control: 
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information – 
including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound 
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations – stored 
in any medium from which information can be obtained either 
directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party 
into a reasonably usable form; or 
(B) 
 any designated tangible things; or 
(2) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or 
controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may 
inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or 
any designated object or operation on it. 
(b) Procedure. 
(1) Contents of the Request. The request: 
(A) must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category 
of items to be inspected; 
(B) must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the 
inspection and for performing the related acts; and 
(C) 
 May specify the form or forms in which electronically stored 
information is to be produced. 
(2) Responses and Objections. 
(A) Time to Respond. The party to whom the request is directed must 
respond in writing within 30 days after being served or – if the 
request was delivered under Rule 26(d)(2) – within 30 days after 
the parties’ first Rule 26(f) conference. A shorter or longer time 
may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court. 
(B) 
 Responding to Each Item. For each item or category, the response 
must either state that inspection and related activities will be 
permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for 
objecting to the request, including the reasons. The responding 
party may state that it will produce copies of documents or of 
electronically stored information instead of permitting inspection. 
The production must then be completed no later than the time for 
inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time 
specified in the response. 
(C) 
 Objections. An objection must state whether any responsive 
materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An 
38 
 
 
Id. at 577 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Additionally, in Burlington N. & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that 
[FRCP] 26 clarifies that a proper assertion of privilege must be more 
specific than a generalized, boilerplate objection. However, it does not 
specifically correlate this requirement with [FRCP] 34’s bright-line rule 
for timeliness, nor does it explicitly articulate a waiver rule. 
 
The advisory committee notes accompanying the addition of the relevant 
paragraph to Rule 26(b)(5) do suggest a temporal framework for asserting 
privilege, and also suggest waiver as a possible result of failure to 
properly provide [FRCP] 26(b)(5) notice. “To withhold materials without 
such notice is contrary to the rule, subjects the party to sanctions under 
Rule 37(b)(2),[20] and may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege or 
                                              
objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit 
inspection of the rest. 
(D) Responding to a Request for Production of Electronically Stored 
Information. The response may state an objection to a requested 
form for producing electronically stored information. If the 
responding party objects to a requested form – or if no form was 
specified in the request – the party must state the form or forms it 
intends to use. 
(E) 
Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored Information. 
Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, these 
procedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored 
information: 
(i) 
A party must produce documents as they are kept in the 
usual course of business or must organize and label them to 
correspond to the categories in the request;  
(ii) 
If a request does not specify a form for producing 
electronically stored information, a party must produce it in 
a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a 
reasonably usable form or forms; and 
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored 
information in more than one form. 
(c) Nonparties. As provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to 
produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection. 
20 FRCP 37(b)(2) states:  
39 
 
protection.” [FRCP] 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note (1993 
Amendments). However, the nature of this notice is explicitly left 
indeterminate.  
 
* 
* 
* 
 
No Circuit has explicitly weighed in on the precise content of [FRCP] 
26(b)(5)’s notice requirement, nor on its relationship to [FRCP] 34’s 
deadline. This circuit has held that a privilege log is sufficient to properly 
                                              
(2) Sanctions Sought in the District Where the Action Is Pending. 
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order. If a party or a party’s 
officer, director, or managing agent – or a witness designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4) – fails to obey an order to provide 
or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 
37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just 
orders. They may include the following: 
(i) 
directing that the matters embraced in the order or other 
designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the 
action, as the prevailing party claims; 
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or 
opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; 
(iv) staying proceedings until the order is obeyed; 
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; 
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; 
or 
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental 
examination. 
(B) 
 For Not Producing a Person for Examination. If a party fails to 
comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring it to produce 
another person for examination, the court may issue any of the 
orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), unless the disobedient 
party shows that it cannot produce the other person. 
(C) 
 Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders above, 
the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising 
that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was 
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
40 
 
assert the privilege, without explicitly holding that it is necessary to meet 
those requirements. 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
Id. at 1147-48 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  The Ninth Circuit also held that 
“boilerplate objections or blanket refusals inserted into a response to a [FRCP] 34 request 
for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege.”  Id. at 1149.  Neither 
Court held that a privilege log is the exclusive means for asserting a privilege.  Rather, in 
both cases, the central concern was providing sufficient notice of the privilege to the party 
seeking the discovery, and that a privilege log satisfied the requirements contained in Rule 
26(b)(5).  See Mezu, 269 F.R.D. at 577; Burlington N. & Santa Fey Ry. Co., 408 F.3d at 
1148.   
 
In the case at bar, Petitioners, in their Opposition to Respondents’ Sixth Motion for 
Sanctions, stated the “digital recordings of the Board’s closed-session deliberations on 
adjudicative matters are protected by the deliberative process privilege, the executive 
privilege, and the attorney-client privilege, as well as §14-410 of the Health Occupations 
Article. Contrary to [Respondents’] claims, such recordings are not discoverable.”  We 
conclude this assertion of privilege was sufficient to provide Respondents with notice of 
the documents and communications that were subject to the deliberative process 
(executive) privilege and enabled Respondents to assess whether the privilege should apply 
to those communications.  Maryland Rule 2-402(e)(1) requires nothing more.  Because 
Petitioners’ timely asserted their deliberative process (executive) privilege over the 
41 
 
audiotapes of their predecisional deliberations on August 22, 2014, we conclude the circuit 
court erred in holding Petitioners’ privilege was waived. 
II. 
Deliberative Process (Executive) Privilege 
In Hamilton v. Verdow, this Court considered whether the deliberative process 
(executive) privilege applied to an investigative report written by Judge Wilner for the 
Governor’s Office that plaintiffs sought to obtain through discovery.  287 Md. 544, 414 
A.2d 914 (1980).  This Court determined: 
There are two reasons for preserving the confidentiality of intragovernmental 
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations 
comprising parts of the process by which governmental decisions and 
policies are formulated: (1) to encourage aides and colleagues to give 
completely candid advice by reducing the risk that they will be subject to 
public disclosure, criticism and reprisals; (2) to give the President or other 
officer the freedom ‘to think out loud,’ which enables him to test ideas and 
debate policy and personalities uninhibited by the danger that his tentative 
but rejected thoughts will become subjects of public discussion.  
 
287 Md. at 558, 414 A.2d at 922 (citing Archibald Cox, The Executive Privilege, 122 
U.PA.L.REV. 1383, 1410 (1974)).  We noted that the executive privilege “gives a measure 
of protection to the deliberative and mental process of decision-makers[,]” id. at 561, 414 
A.2d at 924, but that the privilege differs from other evidentiary privileges because “[i]t is 
for the benefit of the public and not the government officials who claim the privilege …. 
[It] attempts to accommodate the competing interests of a just resolution of legal disputes 
with the need to protect certain confidential communications.”  Id. at 565, 924-25 (citations 
omitted).  
Where there has been an allegation of government misconduct, we have held a 
balancing process must be utilized, “weighing the need for confidentiality against the 
42 
 
litigant’s need for disclosure and the impact of nondisclosure upon the fair administration 
of justice.”  Id. at 563, 925; see also Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 568, 914 A.3d at 794 (quoting 
Hamilton for the proposition that “courts have engaged in a balancing process, weighing 
the need for confidentiality against the litigant’s need for disclosure and the impact of 
nondisclosure upon the fair administration of justice.”); Office of Governor v. Wash. Post 
Co., 360 Md. 520, 558, 759 A.2d 249, 270 (2000) (quoting the balancing process espoused 
in Hamilton).  Additionally, this Court has held that when a government official makes a 
formal claim of executive privilege for confidential communications “of an advisory or 
deliberative nature, there is a presumptive privilege, with the burden upon those seeking to 
compel disclosure[]” to overcome the presumption.  Hamilton, 287 Md. at 563, 414 A.2d 
at 925 (citations omitted); see also Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 567-68, 914 A.3d at 794 (quoting 
Hamilton); Office of Governor, 360 Md. at 558, 759 A.2d at 270 (quoting Hamilton); 
Prince George’s County. v. The Wash. Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 319, 815 A.2d 859, 
876 (2003) (quoting Hamilton). 
In weighing Petitioners’ need for confidentiality, we conclude that preventing the 
disclosure of Petitioners’ pre-decisional deliberations greatly benefits the public by 
allowing Petitioners to undertake their core public protection function without the constant 
threat of harassment and intimidation by aggrieved parties.  As noted in Hamilton, “it is 
apparent from the very nature of government that a legitimate necessity exists for the 
protection from public disclosure of certain types of official information.”  287 Md. at 556, 
414 A.2d at 921.  The Hamilton Court concluded that “[t]he necessity for some protection 
from disclosure clearly extends to confidential advisory and deliberative communications 
43 
 
between officials and those who assist them in formulating and deciding upon future 
governmental action.  A fundamental part of the decisional process is the analysis of 
different options and alternatives.”  Id. at 558, 414 A.2d at 922. 
Petitioners were empowered by the General Assembly to, among other things: 
enforce Title 14 and Title 15 in the Health Occupations Article; oversee the licensing 
requirements for physicians and allied health professionals; review and preliminarily 
investigate complaints; develop and implement methods to assess and improve licensee 
practices and ensure the ongoing competence of licensees; and make recommendations that 
benefit the health, safety, and welfare of the public.  Health Occ. §14-
205(a)(1)(5)(7)(8)(13).  The General Assembly also explicitly authorized Petitioners to 
“issue a cease and desist order or obtain injunctive relief against an individual for … 
[p]racticing medicine without a license ….”  Health Occ. §14-206(e)(1).21  The General 
Assembly clearly intended to afford Petitioners considerable discretion in carrying out their 
duties under the Health Occupations Article, including the express authority to issue cease 
and desist orders.  We conclude that Petitioners raised a valid claim of executive privilege 
that weighs against the disclosure of the audiotapes to Respondents.  Respondents, 
therefore, bear the burden of overcoming the presumption of executive privilege.  
Respondents, however, failed to provide any substantive argument that states their basis 
                                              
21 COMAR 10.32.02.06 (B)(2) (as effectuated at the time Petitioners published the 
cease and desist order) states, “[d]uring the course of the investigation of the complaint,  
the Board may issue a nonpublic cease and desist order. At the conclusion of an evidentiary 
hearing, the administrative law judge may recommend a public cease and desist order in 
addition to a penalty.”  
44 
 
for seeking the disclosure of the audiotapes in litigating their claims of invasion of privacy 
against Petitioners. 
The last consideration of the Hamilton balancing process requires is an analysis of 
the impact that nondisclosure will have on the “fair administration of justice.”  287 Md. at 
563, 414 A.2d at 925.  Because Respondents have not articulated any specific necessity for 
access to the audiotapes, the nondisclosure will not impact the fair administration of justice. 
Therefore, we hold that the audiotapes are protected under the executive privilege and are 
not discoverable by Respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, this Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over Petitioners’ appeal 
regarding the interlocutory orders denying Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and 
motion for a protective order, because neither order independently satisfies the collateral 
order doctrine.  However, we do have appellate jurisdiction over the order granting 
Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions because it is a discovery order that denied the 
assertion of executive privilege to a “high level decision maker.”  
We conclude that Petitioners’ assertion of the deliberative process (executive) 
privilege was not waived because the record indicates the existence of the audiotapes were 
not discovered until July 2014 and Petitioners timely asserted the deliberative process 
(executive) privilege over the audiotapes in their Opposition to Respondents Sixth Motion 
for Sanctions in compliance with the requirements contained in Maryland Rule 2-
402(e)(1). 
45 
 
Finally, we hold that because Respondents failed to assert any basis for seeking 
discovery of the audiotapes, and this Court determined that strong public policy concerns 
support protecting Petitioners’ deliberative process, the circuit court abused its discretion 
in granting Respondents sixth motion for sanctions. 
MOTION TO DISMISS RELATIVE TO 
THE 
DENIAL 
OF 
PETITIONERS’ 
MOTIONS 
FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
AND 
FOR 
PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
GRANTED. ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
GRANTING 
RESPONDENTS’ 
SIXTH 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS REVERSED. 
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. 
COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY 
BETWEEN 
PETITIONERS 
AND 
RESPONDENTS. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 371761V 
Argued: September 9, 2016 
  
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 11 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
__________________________________ 
 
MARYLAND BOARD OF 
PHYSICIANS, et al. 
 
 
v. 
MARK R. GEIER, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF ANNE GEIER, et al. 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Battaglia, Lynne A.  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion  
by McDonald, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed:      January 23,  2017
 
I agree with the Majority opinion to the extent that it addresses the merits of this 
appeal.  I would, however, go farther and address the question of immunity.  This Court 
has adopted from federal practice the collateral order doctrine – a doctrine that provides 
for consideration of certain interlocutory appeals.  Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams Football 
Co., 284 Md. 86, 91-92 (1978); State v. Hogg, 311 Md. 446, 455-57 (1988).  However, this 
Court later deviated from the federal version of that doctrine when it overruled Hogg and 
declined to consider an appeal of an order denying official immunity, except in certain 
instances (which the Court did not well define).  Compare Dawkins v. Baltimore City 
Police Dep’t., 376 Md. 53 (2003) with Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) and 
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996).  The Court of Special Appeals has applied an 
exception to allow an appeal of an adverse ruling on immunity relating to the alleged 
actions of a court clerk – an official with less decision-making authority than the Board 
members in this case.  See State v. Keller-Bee, 224 Md. App. 1, 5-7 (2015), aff’d, 448 Md. 
300 (2016).  In my view, Dawkins should be reconsidered. 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 11 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARYLAND BOARD OF 
PHYSICIANS, et al. 
 
v. 
MARK R. GEIER, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE  
OF ANNE GEIER, et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Battaglia, Lynne A.  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: January 23, 2017
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No.: 371761V  
Argued: September 9, 2016 
 
Respectfully, I dissent.  This appeal is a premature, interlocutory appeal from an 
order imposing sanctions for the failure to produce discovery documents.  The Majority is 
wrong to treat this sanctions order as an appeal from the denial of a properly asserted 
deliberative process privilege.  An appeal from an order for sanctions is generally not an 
allowable interlocutory appeal.  See Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 385 (1988); Yamaner 
v. Orkin, 310 Md. 321, 326–27 (1987).  In Yamaner, we denied a party’s attempted appeal 
of a sanctions order because it did not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.  
Yamaner, 310 Md. at 326–27.  This attempted appeal of the trial court’s sanctions order 
should be similarly denied.  
 
Maryland Rule 2-422(c) requires the following response to a request for discovery 
of documents:  
The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, 
that (1) inspection and related activities will be permitted as 
requested, (2) the request is refused, or (3) the request for 
production in a particular form is refused. The grounds for 
each refusal shall be fully stated. If the refusal relates to 
part of an item or category, the part shall be specified. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Applying an earlier version of Rule 2-422, we have explained: 
When under an appropriate Maryland Rule a party demands of 
another discovery of a document or other tangible thing, the 
adversary, even though resisting the demand, should 
nonetheless be required to specifically answer whether it 
has in its possession or under its control such an item or 
items. 
 
Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 228 (1980) (emphasis added).   
The use of privilege logs is a customary practice in Maryland, and complies with 
the Rule 2-422(c) requirement that the “grounds for each refusal shall be fully stated” and 
2 
that “[i]f the refusal relates to part of an item or category, the part shall be specified.”  So, 
the Board was required to identify what it claimed was privileged and what it did not.  Md. 
Rule 2-422.  We have explained that “the application of sanctions under the discovery rules 
is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”  Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329, 336 
(1972) (citation omitted); see Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 560 (2007) (discovery 
matters are within the discretion of the trial court).  Thus, the trial court was well within its 
rights to find a waiver of the privilege, order the production of the audio recordings, and 
impose a sanction on the Board.   
The Majority resurrects the deliberative process privilege waived by Petitioners, 
both ignoring the abuse of discretion standard of review for discovery decisions and 
creating a new rule that merges orders for production with orders for sanctions after a 
failure to produce.  The Majority holds, with no cited authority, that “[a]n order granting 
discovery sanctions qualifies as a ‘discovery order’ for the purposes of determining the 
appealability of an order denying executive privilege under the collateral order doctrine.”  
Maj. Slip Op. at 18.  In so holding, the Majority disregards—and tells government 
litigants to disregard—the Rule 2-422 requirements for identifying specifically which 
parts of a discovery request are sheltered from discovery and for what reason.  
We have recognized that when a government is a party to litigation, “a question of 
unfair litigation advantage may arise.”  Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 564 n.8 (1980).  
Here, rather than protecting against such unfair advantage, the Majority leans the opposite 
way, sending the message that a governmental party may, with impunity, ignore discovery 
requests for months at a time and wait until the eleventh hour to identify what items fall 
3 
within its claimed privilege.  The Board did exactly that, and the Majority enables its 
behavior by permitting this interlocutory appeal, and then overturning the trial court’s 
discretionary determination that Petitioners had waived the privilege.   
The Board’s conduct at issue on this appeal is merely one example of their discovery 
abuses.  In December 2014, the trial court described the Board’s foot-dragging thus far, 
saying: “The deadlines in this case have been moved repeatedly because of discovery 
problems, due to the conduct of the Board and its inability, or in some cases outright 
refusal, to produce documents or accurate privilege logs in a timely fashion.” 
(Emphasis added.)  It concluded that the Board delayed document production for seven 
months after an order that it do so: 
To say that discovery in this case has not proceeded 
smoothly would be an understatement.  [Respondents’] first 
motion for sanctions, which the court granted, was the result of 
the Board’s production of fourteen boxes of documents many 
months after the court ordered their production on November 
25, 2013.  Although the original request for production was 
issued on August 1, 2013, the Board did not make its final 
production of responsive documents until June 2, 2014.  
 
It also found that the Board’s designated representative “fail[ed] to appear for a properly 
noticed organizational deposition,” and that, on a rescheduled date, she was present but 
entirely unprepared.   
What is at stake here is more than a meaningless discovery slug-fest.  The audio 
recordings in question are highly relevant to Respondents’ claim for invasion of privacy.  
In order to prevail, they must show malice to defeat the immunity given to the Board 
members and their agents by statute.  Md. Code (1990, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5-715(b) of the 
4 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  The internet publication of highly sensitive 
medical information about a physician and his family is sufficiently unusual and 
unnecessary that one might wonder why a professional oversight agency did not know 
better.  What went on behind the scenes of the decision to publish is exactly what 
Respondents need to know.  If they are denied this information they are severely hampered 
in pursuit of their claim.  If the audio recordings are protected by a valid deliberative 
process privilege, then Petitioners should have identified them specifically, and claimed 
the privilege on a timely basis.  It is not up to this Court to protect the Board and its 
members from their discovery abuses.