Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 2009-Ohio-787

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Smith, 121 Ohio St.3d 409, 2009-Ohio-787.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Smith, 121 Ohio St.3d 409, 2009-Ohio-787.] 
Because theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, an indictment for robbery 
necessarily includes all the elements of all lesser included offenses, 
together with any of the special, statutory findings dictated by the evidence 
produced in the case — When an indictment charges a defendant with 
robbery, the defendant may be convicted of theft as a lesser included 
offense of robbery, and the degree of the offense will depend on the special 
finding of the value of the property stolen. 
(No. 2007-0268 — Submitted November 18, 2008 — Decided March 4, 2009.) 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Danielle Smith seeks reconsideration of our decision to affirm her 
conviction for fifth-degree felony theft in State v. Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 447, 
2008-Ohio-1260, 884 N.E.2d 595, asserting that the value of the stolen property is 
an essential element that must be charged in the indictment.  In our decision, 
however, we stated that “the elements of theft do not include value.  Rather, value 
is a special finding to determine the degree of the offense, but is not part of the 
definition of the crime.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 2} Smith contends that she cannot be convicted of fifth-degree felony 
theft, because her original indictment did not specify that the value of the property 
allegedly stolen was between $500 and $5,000.  She argues that value constitutes 
an essential element and that the omission of this element from the indictment 
means that she can be convicted of only the least degree of the offense, pursuant 
to R.C. 2945.75(A). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} But Smith was not indicted for theft.  Rather, the indictment 
charged her with robbery, and the trial court convicted her of the lesser included 
offense of theft, an offense of the fifth degree based on its finding of the value of 
the goods stolen.  Smith’s indictment for robbery necessarily put her on notice of 
the possibility that she could be found guilty of a lesser included offense.  The 
state had no obligation to seek separate indictments for each of those lesser 
included offenses. 
{¶ 4} In State v. Childs (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 564-565, 728 N.E.2d 
379, we explained that “[t]he sufficiency of an indictment is subject to the 
requirements of Crim.R. 7 and the constitutional protections of the Ohio and 
federal Constitutions.  Under Crim.R. 7(B), an indictment ‘may be made in 
ordinary and concise language without technical averments or allegations not 
essential to be proved.  The statement may be in the words of the applicable 
section of the statute, provided the words of that statute charge an offense, or in 
words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all the elements of the offense 
with which the defendant is charged.’ ” 
{¶ 5} We emphasized in State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 134-
135, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, that “[t]he General Assembly has the 
power to define criminal offenses in any manner it chooses, so long as it does not 
violate pertinent constitutional provisions.” 
{¶ 6} R.C. 2913.02(A) defines theft without reference to value and sets 
forth all that the state must prove to secure a conviction.  Subsection (B)(2) of the 
statute classifies theft as a misdemeanor of the first degree but also states, “If the 
value of the property or services stolen is five hundred dollars or more and is less 
than five thousand dollars or if the property stolen is any of the property listed in 
section 2913.71 of the Revised Code, a violation of this section is theft, a felony 
of the fifth degree.” 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 7} While the special findings identified in R.C. 2913.02(B)(2) affect 
the punishment available upon conviction for the offense, they are not part of the 
definition of the crime of theft set forth in R.C. 2913.02(A). 
{¶ 8} We recently considered a jury’s special enhancement finding in 
State v. Fairbanks, 117 Ohio St.3d 543, 2008-Ohio-1470, 885 N.E.2d 888, which 
concerned an enhancement to the offense of failing to comply with an order or 
signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B).  This statute’s structure 
parallels that of the theft statute in that R.C. 2921.331(B) defines the offense as 
follows, “No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a 
police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to 
bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop,” while R.C. 2921.331(C)(3) classifies 
the offense as “a misdemeanor of the first degree.” Moreover, R.C. 
2921.331(C)(4) and (5) identify special findings that enhance the degree of the 
offense.  For example, R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a) provides:  
{¶ 9} “A violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third 
degree if the jury or judge as trier of fact finds any of the following by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
{¶ 10} “* * * 
{¶ 11} “(ii) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a 
substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.” 
{¶ 12} We stated, “If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property actually resulted 
from defendant's conduct, then the enhancement is established.  This is purely a 
question of fact concerning the consequences flowing from the defendant's failure 
to comply. * * * It is analogous to determining whether the offense occurred in 
daylight or in darkness or whether the place where it occurred was dusty or wet.  
It is simply a finding of the presence or absence of a condition.”  117 Ohio St.3d 
543, 2008-Ohio-1470, 885 N.E.2d 888, ¶ 11. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 13} Similarly, we hold that the value of stolen property is not an 
essential element of the offense of theft but, rather, is a finding that enhances the 
penalty of the offense.  As such, it is submitted to a fact-finder for a special 
finding in order to determine the degree of the offense. 
{¶ 14} Of course, had the grand jury returned an indictment against Smith 
for theft, due process would require that the indictment contain notice of the value 
of the property involved or the degree of the offense alleged.  See R.C. 
2945.75(A)(1).  Value, together with other relevant enhancements contained in 
R.C. 2913.02, would then become the subject of a special finding by a fact-finder. 
{¶ 15} However, in this case, the grand jury indicted Smith for robbery, 
not theft.  As we emphasized in State v. Lytle (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 154, 157, 551 
N.E.2d 950, when an indictment charges a greater offense, “the indictment or 
count necessarily and simultaneously charges the defendant with lesser included 
offenses as well.”  Thus, because theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, the 
indictment for robbery necessarily included all of the elements of all lesser 
included offenses, together with any of the special, statutory findings dictated by 
the evidence produced in the case. 
{¶ 16} Because Smith waived a jury, the court conducted a bench trial and 
found her not guilty of robbery but guilty of the lesser included offense of theft, a 
felony of the fifth degree.  The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the value 
of the stolen property was more than $500 and less than $5,000.  Accordingly, the 
trial court properly convicted her in conformity with the evidence and the law. 
{¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, we adhere to our earlier decision affirming 
Smith’s conviction for theft, a felony of the fifth degree. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
January Term, 2009 
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__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 18} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the value 
of stolen property is a “special finding” instead of an element of a theft offense. 
{¶ 19} Here, the trial court convicted Smith of fifth-degree felony theft as 
a lesser included offense of second-degree felony robbery, even though the 
indictment for robbery did not include the value of the property allegedly taken. 
{¶ 20} The majority opinion states that “R.C. 2913.02(A) defines theft 
without reference to value and sets forth all that the state must prove to secure a 
conviction.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 6.  This is an incorrect statement.  R.C. 
2913.02(B)(2) defines the levels of theft offenses and sets forth an additional 
element, that of the value of the stolen goods, that the state must prove to convict 
a defendant of any theft offense greater than first-degree misdemeanor petty theft.  
That subsection begins, “Except as otherwise provided * * *, a violation of this 
section is petty theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree.”  R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). 
{¶ 21} As felony theft is defined, the value of the stolen property is an 
essential element.  R.C. 2913.02(B)(2) categorizes the levels of felony theft 
offenses on the basis of the value of the property stolen: if the property is worth 
$500 or more but less than $5,000, the theft is a felony of the fifth degree; if it is 
worth $5,000 or more but less than $100,000, the theft is a felony of the fourth 
degree; $100,000 or more but less than $500,000, the crime is aggravated theft 
and is a felony of the third degree; $500,000 or more but less than one million 
dollars, the crime is aggravated theft and is a felony of the second degree; one 
million dollars or more, the crime is aggravated theft of one million dollars or 
more and is a felony of the first degree.  Because the value of the property stolen 
affects the degree of the offense and not just the punishment available upon 
conviction for the offense, it is an essential element of theft.  See State v. Allen 
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(1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 29 OBR 436, 506 N.E.2d 199 (an element elevates 
the degree of the offense; an enhancement provision increases only the penalty). 
{¶ 22} No statute or case is offered to support the majority’s conclusion 
that the value element, which is part of the definition of the offense itself and 
affects the level of the offense and potential punishment, is a “special finding.”  
We have, in fact, held to the contrary.  State v. Edmondson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
393, 398, 750 N.E.2d 587, citing State v. Henderson (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 
173-174, 12 O.O.3d 177, 389 N.E.2d 494 (a factor that enhances the degree of the 
theft offense is an element that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt). 
{¶ 23} The indictment in this case did allege robbery rather than theft, as 
the majority points out.  But this did not place Smith on notice that she could be 
convicted of more than petty theft as a lesser included offense, because the 
indictment did not allege the value of the property that was stolen.  Unless the 
charging document states a specific degree of the offense or alleges additional 
elements that would raise the level of the offense, the charging document charges 
only the least degree of the offense.  R.C. 2945.75(A)(1).  The least degree of 
theft is petty theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree.  My analysis of this case 
would be different if the robbery indictment had alleged a property value of $500 
or more.  In that event, depending on the amount specified, Smith would have 
been on notice that she could be convicted of a lesser included offense of felony 
theft. 
{¶ 24} Therefore, upon reconsideration of this case, I would hold that 
theft is a lesser included offense of robbery but that unless the charging document 
alleges the additional element of the value of the property stolen, the theft 
conviction may be for only the least level of the offense, that being a 
misdemeanor of the first degree. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2009 
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Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith 
Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Michaela M. Stagnaro, for appellant. 
______________________