Case Title: BITZ v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
BITZ v. STATE2003 WY 14078 P.3d 257Case Number: 02-169Decided: 10/31/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

DELVIN 
LEE BITZ,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender; and James N. Wolfe, Assistant 
Public Defender.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. 
Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a conviction for taking indecent liberties with a minor, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (Michie 1994).  We reverse and remand for re-sentencing 
because the district court improperly considered at sentencing uncharged crimes 
and victim impact testimony from those crimes.

 

 

[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion and violate the appellant's right to due process of 
law when imposing sentence by considering, over the appellant's objection, 
unproven and denied charges, and by considering the victim impact statement of a 
person who was not the victim of the charged crime, without making specific 
findings as required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) and in conformity with Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-21-103 (LexisNexis 2003)?

 

 

[¶3]      On March 23, 
2001, an Information was filed in the circuit court in Uinta County, Wyoming, 
charging Delvin Lee Bitz (the appellant) with seven counts of first-degree 
sexual assault and one count of third-degree sexual assault.  An Amended Information filed on April 6, 
2001, charged the same offenses, with slight changes in the dates of some of the 
alleged offenses.  After a 
preliminary examination in the circuit court, five of the first-degree sexual 
assault counts and the third-degree sexual assault count were bound over for 
trial in the district court.  A 
"District Court Information" was filed on April 9, 2001, containing the six 
counts that had been bound over and noting the two counts that had been 
dismissed.  Subsequently, the two 
dismissed counts were re-filed, bound over to district court, and joined with 
the others.  Four of the 
first-degree sexual assault counts named the appellant's step-daughter, CS, as 
the victim.  The three remaining 
first-degree sexual assault counts and the third-degree sexual assault count 
named the appellant's daughter, CB, as the victim.

 

[¶4]      After 
considerable pre-trial wrangling, the case went to jury trial on February 19, 
2002.  Prior to any witness 
testimony, counsel informed the district court that a plea agreement had been 
reached.  The terms of the agreement 
were:  (1) the appellant would plead 
guilty to a single amended count of taking indecent liberties with his 
step-daughter; (2) the State would move to dismiss and would not re-file the 
other charges; and (3) the parties would argue sentencing.  A change-of-plea hearing immediately was 
held.  The appellant pled guilty as 
agreed, and for a factual basis admitted that, sometime in August 1995 he had 
touched his thirteen- or fourteen-year-old step-daughter's breasts "by going up 
under her nightgown."  The district 
court accepted the plea agreement and the plea and entered an order for a 
presentence investigation.

 

[¶5]      The subsequently 
filed Amended District Court Information alleged a single count of indecent 
liberties with a child, but did not name or otherwise identify the child.1  In the Presentence Investigation Report 
(PSI) filed thereafter, the "official version" of the offense contained this 
single allegation, but it also contained a deputy sheriff's probable cause 
narration as to all of the originally charged offenses involving the 
step-daughter.  Appended to the PSI 
were victim impact statements from both the appellant's step-daughter and 
daughter.

 

[¶6]      At the sentencing 
hearing held on May 23, 2002, the appellant objected to inclusion of the 
dismissed charges in the PSI and objected to the district court's consideration 
of those charges, which he denied.  
The district court, however, noted that there was probable cause to 
believe those crimes were committed or they would not have been bound over for 
trial.  In addition, the district 
court indicated that it also had considered the victim impact statements 
appended to the PSI, including the statement of the appellant's daughter, who 
was not the victim of the crime to which the appellant had pled guilty.  Finally, after citing Mehring v. 
State, 860 P.2d 1101 (Wyo. 1993), 
as authority for consideration of information beyond the charged crime, the 
district court informed the appellant that it simply did not believe his 
denials.  The appellant was then 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five to eight 
years.

 

 

[¶7]      We review 
sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion.

 

            
"Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo.1997).  A 
sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the 
defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.'  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo.1997).  An error warrants 
reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.  The party who is appealing 
bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial.'  Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted); see also, Robinson v. Hamblin, 
914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo.1996)."

 

Lee 
v. State, 2001 
WY 129, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 13 (Wyo. 2000)).  In imposing sentence, trial courts have 
broad discretion to consider a wide range of factors about the defendant and the 
crime.  Halbleib v. State, 7 P.3d 45, 47 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 968 (2000) (quoting Jones 
v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 (Wyo. 1989)); 
Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1115.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(C)

 

[¶8]      The appellant's 
complaints are related, but distinct.  
First, he faults the district court for considering controverted material 
contained in the PSI.  Second, he 
contends that the district court should not have considered victim impact 
testimony from someone who was not the victim of the crime to which he pled 
guilty.  Assessment of these claims 
must begin with a review of relevant statutes and court 
rules.

 

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-407(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) directs state probation and parole agents to 
investigate cases referred by any court and to report to the court in 
writing.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) implements 
this directive in regard to PSI's.  
At issue in the instant case is W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C), which establishes 
the procedure that is to be followed when a defendant contests matters contained 
in the PSI:

 

If 
the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other 
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court 
shall, as to each matter controverted, make:

 

                        
(i)         
A finding as to the allegation; or

 

(ii)        A 
determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted 
will not be taken into account in sentencing.  A written record of such findings and 
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence 
investigation report thereafter made available to penal 
institutions.

 

[¶10]   As indicated above, the district 
court explicitly relied upon the contested charges that were dismissed as part 
of the plea agreement.  The 
appellant's primary grievance is that the district court did so without making 
the findings required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C)(i).  The appellant contends that this case is 
distinguishable from Blankinship v. State, 974 P.2d 377, 380 (Wyo. 
1999) (district court did not rely on the 
contested information); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 823 (Wyo. 
1996) (disputed matters either not factual or 
not crucial to sentencing); Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117-18 (district court either did not rely on 
the contested matters or resolved them against the defendant on the record); and 
Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo. 1987) (defendant did not deny or object to the 
PSI information).  See also Van 
Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646, 648-49 (Wyo. 2000) (due process not violated where district 
court considered defendant's corrections and noted them in writing on the 
PSI).

 

[¶11]   The basis of the appellant's 
argument is not that the district court took into account crimes other than the 
one to which he pled guilty.  
Indeed, he concedes that we have previously recognized that W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a) authorizes the admission at sentencing of criminal history and character 
evidence.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  
at 1116.  The appellant's argument is, instead, 
that by considering "other crime" evidence without making the findings required 
by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C), the district court has violated his due process right 
to be sentenced only on accurate information.  See Swingholm v. State, 910 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Wyo. 1996); 
Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1117; 
and Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶12]   The State counters the appellant's 
arguments by citing to several cases where, despite a technical violation of 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C), this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence because 
no prejudice had been shown or because the appellant had not proved that the 
sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper premises.  See Blankinship, 974 P.2d  at 
379; 
Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 1996); 
Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990); 
and Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 1989).  In addition, the State contends that the 
district court complied with W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) by making the finding that it 
did not believe the appellant's denials.

 

[¶13]   Before we can determine whether the 
district court abused its discretion, we must evaluate how W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) 
is supposed to work.  In particular, 
we need to know what obligation or burden a defendant carries and, in turn, what 
is to guide the exercise of the court's discretion.  The cases relied upon by the parties and 
cited previously herein reflect Wyoming's developing jurisprudence in that 
regard.

 

[¶14]   In Christy, 731 P.2d  at 
1207-08, 
we determined that the trial court may consider "filed reports and information" 
at sentencing, so long as the defendant is given the opportunity "to deny, 
dispute, or disprove."  Two years 
later, in Smallwood, 771 P.2d  at 802, 
we described this as "an opportunity to rebut pre-sentence information which is 
materially false or which furnishes invalid premises for the sentence which the 
judge is imposing."  In Clouse, 
776 P.2d  at 1015, 
we made clear that it is the defendant's obligation to object to any sentencing 
information he contends is inaccurate.  
And in Johnson, 790 P.2d  at 236 (quoting Christy, 731 P.2d 
at 1208), 
we stated that objecting is not alone sufficient and we reiterated that a 
defendant must challenge the accuracy of the information and has the duty to 
"deny, dispute, or disprove" it.

 

[¶15]   Although these cases all declare 
that it is the defendant's burden to contest what he considers inaccurate 
information in the PSI, none of the cases directly addresses the issue of the 
specific burden of proof or, for that matter, the appropriate procedure for 
"disproving" such information.  In 
Smallwood, 771 P.2d  at 802 n.2, 
we noted some "interesting articles" concerning this problem, but we made no 
attempt to resolve it.  In the 
instant case, neither party has suggested an appropriate 
resolution.

 

[¶16]   How contested PSI information 
issues are handled in the trial court will affect their disposition on 
appeal.  We have identified the 
appellant's burden in this Court as follows:

 

            
Having demonstrated procedural error, however, Wayt remains obliged to 
show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play."  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 
232 (Wyo.1990) (quoted with approval in Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 
1115 (Wyo.1993)).  Further, it is 
his burden to "establish that the sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence 
on false or improper premises."  
Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo.1989).  Johnson and Smallwood, 
although decided prior to adoption of the current Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, apply to review of due process challenges brought under the current 
W.R.Cr.P. 32.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1115.

 

Wayt, 
912 P.2d  at 1109.  See also Van Riper, 999 P.2d  at 
649.  It goes without saying that there must 
be some evidentiary basis for the district court's findings under W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(C)(i).  Logically, that 
evidence must be developed in the district court, before the findings are 
made.  How that is to be 
accomplished is beyond the scope of this opinion inasmuch as it has not been 
addressed by the parties.2

 

[¶17]   Once a defendant has alleged a 
factual inaccuracy in the PSI, the district court must either make a finding as 
to the contested matter or make a determination that no finding is necessary 
because the matter will not be considered for sentencing.  In the instant case, the district court 
clearly did not follow the latter route because he specifically relied upon the 
dismissed charges in sentencing the appellant.  Consequently, before relying on that 
information, the district court was obligated to make a finding based on 
sufficient evidence that the information was reliable, to develop a written 
record supporting that finding, and to append that record to the PSI.  None of that was done in this 
case.

 

[¶18]   This is not a case where the 
district court either disregarded the contested matters or simply failed to 
append the findings to the PSI.  In 
this case, the district court relied upon the contested matter in sentencing 
without making a record or a finding as to the reliability of the 
information.  Further, the contested 
matter, being the charges dismissed in the plea agreement, was particularly 
relevant to sentencing.  Neither the 
fact that the charges were bound over for trial after a probable cause hearing 
nor the fact that the district court did not believe the appellant is a 
sufficient finding that the appellant committed the contested offenses.  This is particularly so because the plea 
agreement was reached before any trial testimony was heard.  Simply put, there was no evidentiary 
basis for the district court's determination, meaning such was an abuse of 
discretion.

 

            
Victim Impact 
Statements

 

[¶19]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 
provides:

 

(a)       Prior to 
imposition of sentence or any correction or reduction of sentence in a felony 
case, an identifiable victim of the crime may submit a victim impact statement 
to the court:

 

(i)         
By appearing, with or without counsel, to present an oral victim impact 
statement at the sentencing hearing or at any subsequent hearing for correction 
or reduction of sentence; or

 

(ii)        By 
submitting a written victim impact statement to the department of corrections, 
which shall be appended to the presentence report of the defendant, or by 
submitting a written statement to the court in the case of any subsequent 
hearing for correction or reduction of sentence.

 

            
(b)       
Any victim impact statement submitted to the court pursuant to this 
section shall be among the factors considered by the court in determining the 
sentence to be imposed upon the defendant or in determining whether there should 
be a correction or reduction of sentence.

 

            
(c)        Any 
failure to comply with the terms of this chapter shall not create a cause for 
appeal or reduction of sentence for the defendant, or a civil cause of action 
against any person by the defendant.

 

[¶20]   The purpose of this statute is "to 
permit the sentencing court to consider information about the harm caused by the 
defendant during the commission of the particular crime for which sentence is 
about to be imposed."  Mehring, 
860 P.2d  at 1116.  The particular status accorded by the 
statute is restricted only to the victim of the charged crime.  Id.

 

[¶21]   Appended to the PSI in the instant 
case was a document entitled "Victim Witness Statement," which consisted of two 
lettersone from the appellant's step-daughter and one from the appellant's 
daughter.  At issue is the 
daughter's letter, which read as follows:

 

            
Thank you for giving me a chance to let you and the court know how I feel 
about what has happened in my life.  
Delvin really messed up my life by his actions.  He had no right to touch me, I'm his 
daughter, [C.S.] was his step-child, this is sick.  The things that he did to my mom was 
also hard for us kids to have to see, he use [sic] to slap my mom and hit mom if 
he didn't have his bad drugs or mom didn't do something just his way.  We all helped mom so he won't yell and 
hurt us.  I was scared because he 
said he'd hurt mom if I told anyone.  I just got real depressed and felt like a 
failier [sic].  So I just got bad 
grades started to hate school.  Then 
droped [sic] out went to work full-time for a while then headed to Job Corps 
hoping to start over there.  It also 
failed there so now I am attempting to get my "Ged".  Hopefully I can be the most successfull 
[sic] I have ever been, because I really want to start over this year.  I really don't wish to see Delvin ever 
again he trashed my successful life.  
I just want to be happy again so think real hard about this matter I just 
don't want any other girls life to be like mine.

 

Not 
only is this letter appended to the PSI as the testimony of a victim, presumably 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103(a)(ii), but the district court quoted 
directly from it just before imposing sentence.  We cannot help but conclude that 
inclusion of a statutory victim impact statement from someone who, statutorily, 
was not a victim, was error under the circumstances of this case.  Furthermore, the error was prejudicial 
because it contributed directly to the sentence imposed.  This case is distinguishable from 
Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1117, where we found no due process violation in a 
similar situation.  Mehring failed 
on appeal "to show a manifest injustice from the inclusion of the statements and 
[failed] to demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in 
sentencing . . .."  Id.  The finding in Mehring of no due 
process violation does not negate its specific holding that Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
7-21-103 creates a "special status" for the victim of the charged crime.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1116.

 

[¶22]   During the past few decades, our 
legislature has paid considerable attention to crime victims.  See, for example, the Victim 
Restitution Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-9-101  7-9-115 (LexisNexis 2003); the 
Crime Victims Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-40-101  1-40-119 
(LexisNexis 2003); the Victims Bill of Rights Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-40-201  
1-40-210 (LexisNexis 2003); the Victims of Delinquent Acts Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 14-6-501  14-6-509 (LexisNexis 2003); and the Division of Victim Services 
Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-1-636 - 9-1-638 (LexisNexis 2003).  No doubt, the Victim Impact Statements 
Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-21-101  7-21-103, which is the subject of this 
opinion, is a part of this statutory scheme, and, no doubt, the general intent 
of the legislation is to protect the rights of crime victims.  Nevertheless, we cannot ignore our 
standard rules of statutory construction in appraising Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-21-103.  As we recognized in 
Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1116, the statute creates a special status for 
"impact statements" rendered by victims of the particular charged crime or 
crimes involved.  If we judicially 
extend the reach of that statute to allow admission of impact statements from 
the victims of any crime that the defendant may have committed, we will violate 
one of our cardinal principles of statutory constructionexpressio unius est 
exclusio alterius:  "[w]here a 
statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the 
persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding 
from its effect all those not expressly mentioned . . ..'"  Felix v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 986 P.2d 161, 164 (Wyo. 1999) 
(quoting City of  Cheyenne v. 
Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993)).  See also Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 
866 P.2d 756, 759-60 (Wyo. 1993); Huitt, 844 P.2d  at 1104; and 
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 461 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting In re West 
Highway Sanitary and Imp. Dist., 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495, 504 (1957)) 
(Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting).  The 
legislature has clearly limited the admissibility of victim impact statements, 
as such are defined in the statute, to the victims of the particular crime or 
crimes for which the defendant is being sentenced.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   At sentencing, the district court 
may consider uncharged crimes and other evidence from the PSI so long as the 
defendant is allowed the opportunity to deny, dispute, or disprove such evidence 
and so long as the district court complies with W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C).  Further, victim impact testimony at 
sentencing is limited to those victims intended by 
statute.

 

[¶24]   Reversed and remanded for 
re-sentencing.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1There is no dispute that the victim 
of the admitted crime was the appellant's step-daughter.

 

  2See 3 Charles Alan Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d §§ 522, 524, and 526 (1982 
and 2003 Supp.) for cases discussing allocation of the 
burden of proof, methods of evidentiary development, and the adequacy of the 
trial court's findings.