Case Title: Whitehead v. State

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev., Advance Opinion 24-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JONATHON WHITEHEAD, A/K/A No. 55865
JONATHAN WHITEHEAD,

Appellant, | FI L E D
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent. | War 312012

 

 

Petition for en banc reconsideration of an appeal from an order
dismissing a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. Fifth
Judicial District Court, Nye County; Robert W. Lane, Judge.

unted; revi ind remanded.

Mario D. Valencia, Henderson,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Brian T. Kunzi,
District Attorney, and Kirk Darren Vitto, Deputy District Attorney, Nye
County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION:

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:
Petitioner Jonathon Whitehead pleaded guilty to DUI causing
death and DUI causing substantial bodily harm and subsequently filed a
post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. A panel of this court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of his petition as untimely.

 

ss J4-1 1049
hitehead filed a petition for rehearing, which the panel denied, and now
hitehead petitions for en bane reconsideration.
Whitehead contends that the panel overlooked NRS 176.105(1)

    
  
   
   
  
  
   
   
  
   
  

ind whether a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but leaves
the amount of restitution to be determined is final for purposes of
‘iggering the one-year period under NRS 34.726 for filing a post:
nnvietion petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Having reviewed the
tition and the State's answer, we conclude that reconsideration is
jarranted, See NRAP 40A(a)

When a district court determines that restitution is

 

ippropriate, the judgment of conviction must set forth the amount and
jerms of restitution. NRS 176.105(1); see also NRS 176.033(1)(e). We

 

conclude that a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does
jot set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada statutes, is not
final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a
sst-convietion petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As Whitehead’s post
nnviction petition is timely under this analysis, we reverse and remand
1 further proceedings on the merits of the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘On September 20, 2006, law enforcement personnel were
led to an accident scene in Pahrump, Nevada, where they encountered
hitehead’s vehicle overturned on the roadway. Investigators determined
that Whitehead had been driving with seven friends packed into his
hhicle and at a high rate of speed. At some point, Whitchead veered off
he road and overcorrected, causing the vehicle to roll over several times
ind several occupants to be ejected onto the highway. Seventeen year-old
jrandy Fuller, who had been riding on another occupant’s lap, died at the

 

 
scene, and four other occupants were gravely wounded. A subsequent test
of Whitehead’s blood taken just after the accident showed that it contained
various concentrations of alcohol, marijuana, and marijuana metabolite.
After plea negotiations with the State, Whitchead pleaded
guilty to DUI causing death and DUI causing substantial bodily harm.
The parties agreed that Whitehead would enter a regimental discipline
program and that the State would recommend concurrent sentences, The

 

istrict court accepted the plea agreement.
After Whitehead completed the regimental discipline program,
the distriet court imposed consecutive terms of 96 to 240 months for DUI
causing death and 48 to 120 months for DUI causing substantial bodily
harm, The district court entered a judgment of conviction on May 7, 2008,
that set forth the sentence for each offense, the credit for time served, and
the specific amounts of the fines and assessments imposed but stated
“{thhat restitution shall be determined by stipulation or hearing.” An
amended judgment of conviction filed on May 16, 2008, included the same
substantive sentencing provisions but stated “[t}hat restitution shall be
determined by stipulation or hearing.” The district court ultimately held a
restitution hearing and entered a “Second Amended Judgment of
Conviction” on January 27, 2009, stating the same sentencing terms and
ordering Whitehead to pay $1,390,647 in restitution.
Whitehead did not directly appeal but filed a post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 13, 2009, listing May 16, 2008,
as the date of his conviction. In that petition, Whitehead raised 45 claims
of constitutional error, none of which related to the amount of restitution.
The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that because the date
of convietion was May 7, 2008, the petition was untimely and therefore

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by NRS 84.726(1).! On appeal from the district court's order,
hhitehead argued, inter alia, that a judgment of conviction that imposed
stitution in an unspecified amount is not final until an amount of
stitution is determined and that in his case the final judgment of
mnvietion was not entered until January 27, 2009, making his petition
imely.
DISCUSSION

NRS 34.726(1) states in relevant part that “a petition that
hhallenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1
year after entry of the judgment of conviction.” Both the district court and
his court determined that the judgment of conviction that this section
fors to was, in Whitehead'’s case, the judgment of conviction filed on May
, 2008. In support of that conclusion, this court relied on Sullivan v,
ate, 120 Nev. 587, 540, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004), for the proposition that
lling the one-year time limit every time the district court amended a
judgment of conviction to correct an error would “frustrate the purpose
ind spirit of NRS 34,726."
Upon reconsideration, however, we conclude that Sullivan

 

listinguishable. In that case, the judgment of conviction was amended to
rect a clerical error. ‘The court noted that NRS 176.565 permits the
istrict court to amend a judgment of conviction to correct such an error
rears, even decades, after the entry of the original judgment of
nvietion.” Sullivan, 120 Nev. at 540, 96 P.3d at 764. Setting the amount

1Whitehead never conceded that his post-conviction petition was
juntimely, and therefore never alleged that good cause existed to excuse
:he untimely filing. See NRS 34.726(1).

  

 
 

of restitution after an evidentiary hearing is not analogous to correcting
an error; rather, it is an integral part of the sentence. 'To that end, NRS
176.105(1) states that “the judgment of conviction must set forth . . . any
term of imprisonment, the amount and terms of any fine, restitution or
administrative assessment.” Another provision, NRS_ 176.033(1\c),
requires the district court to “set an amount of restitution” when it
determines that restitution “is appropriate” as part of a sentence. We
have held that this statute “contemplates that the district court will set a
specific dollar amount of restitution” and therefore “does not allow the
district court to award restitution in uncertain terms.” Botts v, State, 109
Nev. 567, 569, 854 P.2d 856, 857 (1993).

Given the requirements in NRS 176.105(1) (that restitution, if
appropriate, be included in the judgment of conviction and in a specific
dollar amount), we conclude that a judgment of conviction that imposes a
restitution obligation but does not specify its terms is not a final
judgment? In those cireumstances, the intermediate judgment is not
sufficient to trigger the one-year period under NRS 34.726 for filing a post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. To hold otherwise would
lead to piecemeal post-conviction litigation, in direct conflict with NRS
34.726, which came out of legislative action whose “overall spirit was one
of limiting habeas petitioners to one time through the system absent
extraordinary circumstances” and “evinces intolerance toward perpetual

2We observe that if the district court concludes that no restitution is,
required or warranted as part of a defendant's sentence, a judgment of
conviction need not address restitution to be final. Only a judgment of

conviction that imposes restitution in an unspecified amount is not final
under our decision today.

 
fling of petitions for relief as they “clog ] the court system and
jundermine| J the finality of convictions,” Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860,
75, 34 P.8d 519, 529 (2001).

Here, the district court determined that restitution was
lappropriate, but the May 7, 2008, and May 16, 2008, judgments left

 

Jamount and terms to be determined at a later hearing. The final
judgment was not entered until January 27, 2009, when the district court
fled a judgment of conviction that set forth a specific dollar amount of
restitution. Whitehead filed his proper person post-conviction petition for
la writ of habeas corpus on May 13, 2009, within one year after entry of the
{final judgment of conviction. It was therefore timely filed, NRS 34.726(1),
jand the district court erred in dismissing it as procedurally barred.
|Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion,

Hardesty