Case Title: STATE ex rel. WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION v. CONNER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE ex rel. WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION v. CONNER2000 WY 19712 P.3d 707Case Number: 00-61Decided: 10/27/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant (Petitioner), 
v.LANCE A. CONNER, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Nicholas Kalokathis, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:Gay Woodhouse, 
Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General.Representing 
Appellee:George Santini, Cheyenne, WY.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] The Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) challenges an award of 
benefits in favor of the Appellee-worker, Lance A. Conner. The Division asserts 
that because Conner suffered a compensible injury in 1994 and received benefits 
for loss of earning capacity as a result of that injury, he may not receive such 
benefits for a second compensible injury that occurred in 1998. We affirm the 
order awarding benefits.

ISSUES

[¶2] The 
Division states these issues:

I. Was the Hearing 
Examiner's award of a second permanent partial disability for the same wage loss 
contrary to law and an abuse of discretion?

II. Was the Hearing 
Examiner's failure to offset the first permanent partial disability award 
against the second contrary to law and an abuse of 
discretion?

[¶3] Conner 
states these issues:

1. Was the award of 
permanent partial disability benefits supported by substantial 
evidence?

2. Does the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act allow for successive awards for permanent partial 
disability awards for separate injuries?

FACTS

[¶4] On October 
16, 1998, Conner suffered an injury to his left shoulder while in the course and 
scope of his employment with Rocking K Construction. Conner worked as a 
carpenter, earning $9.00 an hour. He was on top of a wall, spider walking 
between the rafters and, upon turning to change directions, something "popped" 
inside his shoulder. Conner underwent surgery to have the injury repaired on 
November 18, 1998. As a result of that injury, Conner was restricted to lifting 
no more than 25 pounds with his left shoulder. As we shall encounter in more 
detail later, Conner previously had suffered an injury to his right shoulder in 
1994 and, as a result, had been restricted to lifting no more than 25 pounds 
with his right shoulder. Conner was off work from the date of his 1998 injury 
until January 22 or 23, 1999. At that time, he was released to return to work 
and called his employer to see about returning to work. Conner claimed that he 
had called Rocking K Construction three times, but his calls were not returned. 
Conner accepted employment with another company at $7.00 an 
hour.

[¶5] By letter 
dated April 13, 1999, the Division informed Conner that he might be eligible for 
additional worker's compensation benefits. The letter offered him the option of 
applying for vocational rehabilitation benefits or a permanent partial 
disability award. Conner submitted an application for a permanent partial 
disability award. By letter dated July 12, 1999, the Division informed Conner 
that his claim was not approved because:

Your employer Rocking K 
Construction has stated on the Vocational Evaluation report, they are willing to 
accommodate your restrictions at the same salary you were earning at the time of 
your work incident. Based on the employers [sic] statement you have not suffered 
an income loss and are not eligible for Permanent Partial Disability 
benefits.

[¶6] On July 12, 
1999, Conner filed an objection to that determination, and a hearing was set for 
October 28, 1999. The Division's disclosure statement was filed on October 14, 
1999, and summarized the issues as follows: Conner had the burden of proving his 
claim, and the application for benefits did not include information regarding an 
employment search1. The Division contended that for 
that reason alone, the claim should be denied, and that failure to do so would 
increase the costs to the system and cause the hearing examiner to be "acting as 
a claims analyst." No mention was made of the fact that work was available at 
Rocking K Construction at Conner's previous hourly rate of $9.00 an hour. On 
October 20, 1999, the Division filed an amended disclosure statement, coupled 
with a "petition for modification." In that document, the Division contended 
that work might have been available at Rocking K at $9.00 an hour. In addition, 
the Division asserted that Conner was getting a duplicate award because he had 
suffered a previous, similar injury in 1994. We will set out that assertion in 
detail because it is difficult to summarize:

Additionally, it has come 
to the Division's attention that the Employee-Claimant has previously received a 
permanent partial disability award for an injury to his shoulder from a 1994 
accident, which was, apparently, awarded in 1996, based upon the 
Employee-Claimant's representation at that time that he was incapable of 
returning to work at a comparable wage, which was, at that time, also $9.00 per 
hour. A breakdown of the Employee-Claimant's previous awards . . . is attached 
hereto as defendant's exhibit S-F. Several issues, therefore, are also raised. 
Should the Employee-Claimant be twice awarded a permanent partial disability 
award for the inability to return to work at $9.00 per hour? Since the 
Employee-Claimant has previously received and accepted the benefit of an award 
for permanently being unable to return to work at $9.00 per hour, should the 
Employee-Claimant be estopped from pursuing this matter? Did the legislature 
intend that the Employee-Claimant should receive two awards for permanent 
partial disability under these circumstances? Does res judicata or issue 
preclusion prevent the Employee-Claimant from receiving two awards for permanent 
partial disability in a three-year period for the permanent inability to return 
to work at $9.00 per hour or a comparable wage? Does the Employee-Claimant have 
a pre-existing condition that prevented him from returning to work at $9.00 per 
hour?

[¶7] The 
Division hereby also (in the alternative) petitions the Office of Administrative 
Hearings for a modification of the 1996 award of permanent partial disability 
(based upon the apparent mistake regarding the Employee-Claimant's inability to 
return to work at a wage comparable to $9.00 per hour) and to order offset of 
that previous award if the Hearing Examiner orders payment of permanent partial 
disability in the present case.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8] Our 
standard of review is somewhat different in the instance where the 
administrative agency challenges the decision of the hearing examiner. The 
burden of persuasion usually assigned to claimants is now on the agency, here, 
the Division. See W.R.A.P. 12.01. Of course, a claimant for worker's 
compensation benefits has the burden of proving all of the essential elements of 
a claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing. Lunde 
v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 6 P.3d 1256, 
1258 (Wyo. 2000). We review assertions of error raised by the Division under the 
standard described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 
1999):

16-3-114. Judicial review 
of agency actions; district courts.

. . . 
.

(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶9] In 
addition, the agency, as the trier of fact, is charged with weighing the 
evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the record does not 
establish the irrationality of the ruling, but we do examine conflicting 
evidence to determine if the agency reasonably could have made its finding and 
order based upon all of the evidence before it. Lunde, 6 P.3d  at 1259 (internal 
citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶10] So that 
the path ahead is clear, the Division's initial basis for denying Conner's claim 
(that he had not completed a work search) and all other later justifications 
invoked to deny Conner's claim have been abandoned by the Division in this 
appeal, with the exception of the charge that it was error for the hearing 
examiner to have awarded a second permanent partial disability benefit or to 
have failed to offset the award based on the 1994 injury against the award for 
the 1998 injury.

[¶11] As the 
first step in the resolution of this case, we must determine if any matter 
relating to Conner's 1994 injury was even before the hearing examiner for 
consideration. The only claim that was before the hearing examiner for 
adjudication was Conner's 1998 left shoulder injury. Except to the extent 
permitted by statute, the resolution of Conner's 1994 claim was final and not 
open to modification. See Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 668 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Wyo. 1983), and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 (LEXIS 1999). Section 
27-14-605 requires that an application for modification be submitted to the 
Division, identifying the grounds for a modification. Once such an application 
is submitted to the Division, the Division would then make a determination, and 
if a party were dissatisfied with that determination, the issues would be 
referred to a hearing examiner for a contested case hearing. That, of course, 
did not occur. Here, the only form of "pleading" was a notice in an amended 
disclosure statement that was filed with the hearing examiner in a different 
claim file. In addition, there are no materials from the case file associated 
with the 1994 injury in this record (with the exception of a "summary" of the 
costs of that claim, largely in handwritten form, and of no apparent relevance 
to a claim of mistake or other ground for modification of the 1994 claim. The 
only relevance that handwritten summary of the earlier benefits paid to Conner 
could have is to guide the hearing examiner in reducing the instant claim by the 
amount paid under the earlier claim.).

[¶12] We are 
compelled to conclude that no issue with respect to the 1994 claim was before 
the hearing examiner for adjudication. The only issue to be decided at the 
hearing, therefore, was the benefit available to Conner if he proved his 1998 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, to the extent the subject 
was broached with the hearing examiner, it was presented in the context of a 
"mistake." However, no mistake in the 1994 proceedings is ever described by the 
Division. Since the matter of the 1994 award was not before the hearing examiner 
for consideration, the determination made in the instant case cannot be contrary 
to law and an abuse of discretion for a failure to take it into account in the 
adjudication of the 1998 claim.

[¶13] The 
Division also contends that the hearing examiner's decision is contrary to law 
and an abuse of discretion because he did not offset the award resulting from 
the 1994 injury against the 1998 injury. The Division does not point to any 
statute or other law that allows or commands such a resolution. Our independent 
search has revealed no statute or law which would permit, much less require, 
such an offset, especially in the absence of a petition to modify the award 
based on the 1994 injury. The statute, as written, is clear and suffers from no 
ambiguity - Conner is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits if he 
meets the statutory requirements. The Division does not challenge that Conner 
has met his burden. If there is a flaw in the statute, that is a question to be 
resolved by the legislature, not the courts.

[¶14] We find it 
appropriate to tarry a few minutes with the Division's assertion that the 
governing statute permits only one award for each wage loss. The Division 
characterizes successive awards for successive injuries as "absurd" and contrary 
to the purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act. This characterization is 
premised on the following sequence of events. Prior to the 1994 injury, Conner 
could use both of his shoulders in the construction industry, which demands of 
its workers considerable physical strength. Prior to the injury, Conner could 
carry as much as he could lift with his right shoulder, and, commensurately, he 
earned $9.00 an hour for his labor. After the 1994 injury, Conner could only 
carry 25 pounds on his right shoulder, and he was only able to earn about $7.00 
an hour (though the precise amount is established through a study that may be 
commissioned by the Division). For that loss of earning capacity, he received a 
monetary benefit from worker's compensation. Between 1994 and 1998, Conner 
increased his earning capacity from $7.00 an hour to $9.00 an hour (No evidence 
was offered as to why this was so because the statute does not require such a 
showing. Some speculation might include an observation that there was a $.90 
increase in the minimum wage during that period of time; that the record shows 
Conner to have been a pleasant and hard-working fellow, likely to receive 
increases in his rate of pay over a period of four years; and that there may 
have been an increase in demand for workers because of a robust economy that 
drove up wage rates in 1997-98.). In 1998 Conner suffered an injury to his left 
shoulder. Prior to the injury, he could carry as much as he could lift on that 
shoulder, and he earned $9.00 an hour at the time of that injury. After the 
injury, he was only able to earn $7.00 an hour doing lighter duty work (and 
eventually found that he could no longer do that). The conclusion the Division 
asks us to reach is that an employee cannot receive benefits for loss of earning 
capacity from $9.00 an hour to $7.00 an hour twice in a four-year period because 
that is a double recovery; indeed, the argument appears to go so far as to say 
that once an injured worker's earning capacity is pegged at, e.g., $7.00 an 
hour, the worker can not be permitted to earn more than that unless the 
permanent partial disability benefit is returned to the Division. We see no 
sense in such an argument. More importantly, we can find nothing in the 
governing statutes which supports such a position.

[¶15] The 
Division does not otherwise challenge the findings and conclusions of the 
hearing examiner, and so we affirm the award of benefits 
ordered.

Footnotes

1 We will 
briefly mention here that the employment search information turned out to be 
irrelevant because Conner went out and found a job almost immediately upon being 
released to return to work.