Case Title: RANDY FARMER, d/b/a RANDY FARMER CONSTRUCTION, a sole proprietorship V. EDWIN R. RICKARD and ELIZABETH A. RICKARD, Trustees under the Elizabeth A. Rickard Living Trust

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
RANDY FARMER, d/b/a RANDY FARMER CONSTRUCTION,  a sole proprietorship V. EDWIN R. RICKARD and ELIZABETH A. RICKARD, Trustees under the Elizabeth A. Rickard Living Trust2007 WY 19150 P.3d 1185Case Number: 06-132Decided: 01/31/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RANDY 
FARMER, d/b/a RANDY FARMER CONSTRUCTION,  
a sole proprietorship,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
EDWIN R. 
RICKARD and ELIZABETH A. RICKARD, Trustees under the Elizabeth A. Rickard Living 
Trust,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge (Retired)

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jay A. 
Gilbertz and Michael K. Davis of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Gilbertz.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Laurence 
W. Stinson and Bradley D. Bonner of Bonner Stinson P.C., Powell, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Stinson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Randy 
Farmer, dba Randy Farmer Construction, a sole proprietorship (Farmer), seeks 
review of an appealable order of the district court awarding Appellees, Edwin 
and Elizabeth Rickard, Trustees under the Elizabeth A. Rickard Living Trust 
(Rickards), damages in the amount of $220,000.00.  Farmer built a home and detached 
garage/bus barn near Cody, for the Rickards.  Before trial, the district court granted 
the Rickards' motion for a partial summary judgment which had the effect of 
assigning Farmer the duty to guarantee the adequacy of the Rickards' house plan 
for the soil conditions present on a lot they purchased from a third party, 
prior to entering into their construction contract with Farmer.  As a result, the trial phase of this 
case addressed only the issue of damages.  
We will reverse and remand because the contract between Farmer and the 
Rickards is unambiguous that Farmer did not specifically agree to be responsible 
for subsurface soil conditions at the work site, and his duty to the Rickards 
with respect to soil conditions, if any, cannot rest upon their written 
contract.  However, the Rickards' 
complaint and the defenses interposed by Farmer preclude summary judgment 
because they have generated genuine issues of material fact that must be sorted 
out by the fact finder.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Farmer raises 
these issues:

 
 
            
1.  Did the trial court err in denying Farmer summary judgment 
and in granting a partial summary judgment for the Rickards establishing a duty 
on the part of Farmer to guarantee the adequacy of the blueprints chosen by the 
Rickards for unknown soil conditions on a lot selected by the 
Rickards?

 
 
            
2.  Did the trial court err in extending its partial summary 
judgment to strike Farmer's defense that the Rickards breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which was based on the fact that the 
Rickards had been warned about the soil conditions on their lot and withheld 
these warnings from Farmer?

 
 
            
3.  Should this case be reversed with instructions to the trial 
court to grant summary judgment to Farmer?

 
 
The 
Rickards' statement of the issues is similar enough to that provided by Farmer 
that we need not set it out in detail here.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      In July of 1999, 
the Rickards purchased the land upon which the home in dispute in this case was 
built.  Farmer was not a party to 
that transaction.  In a "Contract to 
Buy and Sell Real Estate (Farm & Ranch) (VacantLand)," dated July 17, 1999, the Rickards 
agreed to buy 5.23 acres of unimproved land near Cody.  The purchase price was $35,000.  The contract provided the Rickards the 
right to have any inspections performed on or before August 3, 1999.  In an addendum to the real estate 
contract, the parties to that contract agreed:

 
 
Exhibit 
A noted as additional provisions in that purchase offer dated July 17, 1999 by 
and between Edwin Ray Rickard and Elizabeth Ann Rickard as buyers, and 
Tableworks Inc. as seller.

 
 
1.  This 
offer is contingent upon the buyers['] approval of a soil stability test to be 
performed on the subject property within the inspection period stated previously 
in the offer.  Any and all costs for 
said testing shall be paid for by buyer.

 
 
2.  This 
offer is contingent upon the buyers['] approval of a percolation test to be 
performed on the subject [property].  
[Buyers reserve] the right to approve, or disapprove said test results at 
buyers['] sole discretion.  Should 
buyer[s] disapprove of said testing as noted for soil stability or percolation, 
buyer[s] may terminate this offer to purchase and have all earnest monies 
returned in a timely manner.

 
 
[¶4]      The Rickards 
wanted to have soil testing done because they anticipated the need for a septic 
system for their home, i.e., the soil needed to percolate.  In addition, the Rickards were informed 
by the seller that there was the potential for bentonite (expansive clay soil) 
in the soil, in the general area of their proposed home.  The Rickards had an expert, Fred Kunz, 
check the soil for bentonite.  He 
dug four test holes and said the soil "looked fine to me," based on visual 
observation of the soil.  An offer 
of proof made by Farmer established that such soils often cannot be ascertained 
solely by visual inspection.

 
 
[¶5]      Next, the 
Rickards picked out a house plan from a book provided to them by a contractor 
other than Farmer.  Mr. Rickard 
approached Farmer at a construction site near the Rickards' lot and asked him if 
he would like to bid on constructing their home.  Farmer and two other contractors 
submitted bids based on a drawing of the proposed house, which included a 
statement of the materials required for the project (the house plans were not 
obtained until later).  The Rickards 
conceded that at the time they contracted with Farmer, they were not concerned 
about soil problems and Mr. Rickard never discussed potential soil problems with 
him.  It was only after Farmer had 
begun excavation for the foundation of the home that Mr. Rickard broached the 
subject "because the hole was so much deeper than what Fred's original backhoe 
would go."  Mr. Rickard asked 
Farmer if the soil looked "okay" to him and Framer replied, "It looks fine to 
me."  In an offer of proof placed on 
the record, Farmer asserted that at that time he specifically told Mr. Rickard 
that soil testing could be done but it might cause delay, and Rickard declined 
to have any testing done.  Mr. 
Rickard agreed that when he was negotiating with Farmer, he was not concerned 
about soils or soil testing because he had already been assured that the soil on 
his lot was not problematic.  Mr. 
Rickard never discussed Fred Kunz's soil testing results with 
Farmer.

 
 
[¶6]      The rather 
informal contract that Farmer and the Rickards entered into on September 2, 
1999, was this:

 
 
CONTRACTOR 
AGREEMENT

 
 
This 
Agreement made the 2nd day of September 1999 
by and between Randy Farmer dba Randy Farmer Construction, hereinafter called 
the Contractor and Ed and Betsy Rickard, hereinafter called the 
Owner.

 
 
Witnesseth, 
that the Contractor and the Owner for the consideration named agree as 
follows:

 
 
1.  The 
Contractor shall furnish all of the materials and perform all of the work to 
build home according to plans and specifications agreed to by Contractor and 
Owner.

 
 
2.  The 
work to be performed under this Contract shall begin at or near September 3, 
1999 and end approximately March 15, 2000.

 
 
3.  The 
Owner shall pay the Contractor for the material and labor performed under the 
Contract in monthly installments as billed for work completed.  Payments of the Contract Price shall be 
paid monthly by the tenth day of the month as requested by Contractor.  Any extras or additions will be brought 
to Owners attention and agreed upon before said work is begun.  Said extras or additions will be billed 
in addition to Contract price.

 
 
4.  Agreements 
between Contractor and Owner are as follows:

            
Contractor to provide:

·     
Excavation 
of hole, water, electric, and gas trenches and rough 
grading.

·      
Concrete 
as specified on plan including footings, crawl space, garage changed to finished 
basement, and added basement storage room.

·      
Framing, 
finish work, painting, shingles, siding, metal facia and soffit, gutter, masonry 
wainscoat on walkout basement, two gas fireplaces, plumbing, electrical, windows 
and skylights as shown on plans.

 
 
Owner to 
provide:

·      
Electricity 
and conduit, water, and gas hook ups to house.

 
 
Allowances:

·   
Flooring 
$11,000.00

·   
Light 
Fixtures and Doorknobs $2,400.00

·   
Cabinets 
and Tops $7,000.00

 
 
Total 
price including allowances $186,000.00

 
 
The 
record on appeal does not reflect which of the parties is the scrivener of this 
contract, and that may or may not be of importance to the eventual resolution of 
this case.

 
 
[¶7]      The Rickards 
provided Farmer with a set of building plans that they had purchased from L.M. 
Bruinier & Associates, Inc., Designers A.I.S.D., 
1304 SW Bertha Blvd., Portland, Oregon97219
 (Plan No. 
9600).  On each page of those plans 
the following information was displayed:

 
 
These 
plans are limited to one construction only by the purchaser.  The reuse, or reproduction, by any means 
of these plans, ideas, designs or drafted works, without the express permission 
from L.M. Bruinier & Assoc. Inc, an Oregon Corporation, is strictly 
prohibited by law under the FEDERAL COPYRIGHT ACT TITLE 
XVII.

 
 
WRITTEN 
DIMENSIONS ON THESE DRAWINGS SHALL HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER SCALED DIMENSIONS; 
CONTRACTORS SHALL VERIFY, AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DIMENSIONS AND CONDITIONS 
ON THE JOB AND THIS OFFICE MUST BE NOTIFIED OF ANY VARIATIONS FROM THE 
DIMENSIONS AND CONDITIONS SHOWN BY THESE DRAWINGS.

 
 
In the 
briefs, the house plans are referred to as blueprints, and the source of those 
house plans is occasionally referred to as an architect.  However, from the papers included in the 
record on appeal, the house plans do not appear to be "blueprints," and there is 
nothing on the face of the house plans to suggest that the source was an 
"architect."

 
 
[¶8]      In an "Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" entered on January 4, 2006, the 
district court made the following determinations:

 
 
            
1.  The Court recognizes some difficulty with the initial 
breach of contract case which resulted in subsequent amendments to the Complaint 
filed by Plaintiffs.  The Court 
finds that such amendments are not abnormal in complex 
litigation.

            
2.  The Court has reviewed the cases cited by counsel and finds 
that the law contained within them is not inconsistent and that both a negligent 
[sic] cause of action and breach of contract cause of action exist under the 
circumstances of this case.

            
3.  The Court [is] persuaded that the plans and blueprints are 
among the contract documents and the conditions contained therein impose an 
express warranty and condition on the builder to handle soil conditions on the 
site.

            
4.  The Court finds express warranty and express duty in the 
contract for the contactor to be responsible for conditions on the 
job.

            
5.  The Court further finds that there are issues of material 
fact, with regard to the negligence action, as to whether Defendant knew, or 
should have known, about soil conditions in the area and questions the material 
fact with regard to the weight of soil tests by Mr. Kunz.

            
6.  The Court further finds that based on Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 
1979), Reiman Constr. Co. v. Jerry Hiller 
Co., 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1985) and Alpine Climate Control, Inc. v. DJ's, 
Inc., 78 P.3d 685, 689 (Wyo. 2003), the contractor has [an] implied duty to 
deal with soils on site under the circumstances of this 
case.

            
7.  The Court further finds that with regard to the holding in 
Reiman, the Wyoming Supreme Court did 
not intend to apply that circumstance to every single case and the circumstances 
in this case are different than those set forth in Reiman.

 
 
[¶9]      The conclusion of 
that order was that Farmer's motion for summary judgment was denied.  However, as the time for trial neared, 
there was some confusion as to the effect of that order.  After considerable discussion at the 
pretrial conference, the district court determined that it would grant a partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Rickards (although the Rickards had not filed a 
motion for summary judgment at any point in the proceedings) and the trial would 
be concerned only with the issue of damages.  That order contained the following 
determinations:

 
 
            
1.  Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and 56(d) allows a 
trial court to enter a partial order of summary judgment if there is no genuine 
dispute regarding certain material facts and a party is entitled to judgment on 
those issues as a matter of law.

            
2.  Duty is a matter of law.

            
3.  The Contractor's Agreement incorporates by reference the 
blueprints delivered by Plaintiffs to Defendant.  Together these documents create a 
contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, which contract obligates the 
Defendant to build a house for Plaintiffs.

            
4.  The Court finds that the language in the contract between 
the parties is clear and unambiguous.

            
5.  The Court previously found that the plans and blueprints 
are among the contract documents and the conditions contained therein impose an 
express warranty and condition on the builder to handle soil conditions on the 
site.

            
6.  The Court previously found an express warranty and express 
duty in the contract for the contractor to be responsible for conditions on the 
job.

            
7.  Soil conditions and soil issues relative to construction of 
the structures constitute a condition of the job.

            
8.  It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs' home and bus barn are 
suffering structural distress as a result of the movement (including expansion 
and contraction) of expansive soils on site and located in and around the 
foundation footprint of the home and bus barn.

            
9.  No genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the 
Court's determination of the legal duties, and Plaintiffs are entitled to 
summary judgment thereon.

            
10.  At the pretrial conference, defense counsel admitted that 
if the Court was determining, as a matter of law, that Defendant was responsible 
for the soil conditions on the site, that the Defendant did not have a defense 
to the "breach" element as the Defendant had not built the structures to account 
for the expansive soils conditions at the site.  However, Defense counsel expressly 
denied that this was the correct construction of the contract, and denied that 
there had been a breach of any implied contractual duty or any implied 
warranty.

            
11.  Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant has admitted 
a breach of the express warranty and contractual duty to identify the soil 
conditions that have been established by this Court's ruling as set forth 
above.

 
 
[¶10]   Later still in the proceedings, the 
district court refused to allow Farmer to admit any testimony that supported his 
contention that Mr. Rickard violated the implied contract term that the Rickards 
would act with good faith and fair dealing.  This theory of Farmer's was based upon 
the circumstance that Rickard never informed Farmer of the warning he received 
about expansive soils or of the testing he had had done.  Farmer contends that this amounted to a 
second grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of the 
Rickards.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   When we review a summary judgment, 
we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow 
the same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an 
asserted cause of action or defense.  
We, of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to 
the party who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.  Questions of law are reviewed de 
novo.  Lawrence v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2006 WY 56, ¶ 11, 133 P.3d 976, 979-80 (Wyo. 
2006)

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
District 
Court's Construction of the Contract

 
 
[¶12]   The district court concluded that 
the contract between the parties unambiguously contained an express provision 
assigning a duty to Farmer to take account of the soil in which the Rickards' 
house was to be built.  The 
governing rules of contract construction are these:

 
 
In 
contract litigation, when the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, the 
interpretation is a question of law.... Examination Management Services, Inc. v. 
Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo.1996); Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 218-19 (Wyo.1994).  
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the reviewing 
court.  Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J 
Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo.1993).  We review questions of law de novo 
without affording deference to the decision of the district court.  Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo.1997);  Griess v. Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of 
Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo.1997).

 
 
According 
to our established standards for interpretation of contracts, the words used in 
the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable person would give 
to them.  Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 
(Wyo.1993).  When the provisions in 
the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four 
corners" of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties.  Union Pacific Resources Co., 882 P.2d at 
220;  Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.   In the absence 
of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its terms because 
no construction is appropriate.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 
929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo.1996);  Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.

 
 

Roney v. 
B.B.C. Corp., 2004 
WY 113, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 196, 200 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership 
Co., 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000)); and see Castleberry v. Phelan, 2004 WY 151, 
¶¶ 11-12, 101 P.3d 460, 463-64 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶13]   While we agree with the district 
court that the contract is not ambiguous, we conclude that the contract itself, 
as well as the language from the house plans about "conditions," is silent as to 
the matter of who will be responsible for whether soil testing is 
necessary.  This is too important a 
responsibility/duty to be inferred from silence and/or the use of the word 
"conditions."  Moreover, the 
language from the house plans clearly suggests that it relates to the 
"conditions shown by these drawings."  
The drawings do not purport to account for soil conditions, whatever they 
might happen to be where the plans are utilized.

 
 
[¶14]   In Reiman Const. Co. v. Jerry Hiller Co., 
709 P.2d 1271, 1275-76 (Wyo. 1985), we considered a case wherein the building 
team included a soils engineer, an architect, a civil engineering firm, as well 
as a builder.  In that case we 
said:

 
 
It is 
generally recognized that a contractor who follows the building plans and 
specifications is not liable for the resultant defects in a building due to a 
faulty design.  

 
 
" * * * 
In the absence of special provisions in the contract, the contractor's 
obligation is ended upon the completion of the structure in accordance with the 
terms of the contract.  Therefore, 
he is not liable in case the structure is subsequently damaged or is destroyed 
by some accident or calamity, or falls from some defect or weakness in the 
structure or fault of the 
soil, inasmuch as he does not guarantee the sufficiency of the 
specification, but only the skill with which he performs his work and the 
soundness of the materials used therein.

 
 
  * * *

 
 
" * * * 
[T]he rule has become well settled in practically every American jurisdiction in 
which the matter has been involved, that a construction contractor who has 
followed plans or specifications furnished by the owner, and the architect or 
engineer, and which have proved to be defective or insufficient, will not be 
responsible to the owner for loss or damage which results, at least after the 
work is completed, solely from the defective or insufficient plans or 
specifications, in the absence of any negligence on the contractor's part, or 
any express warranty by him as to their being sufficient or free from 
defects.  * * *"   13 Am.Jur.2d Building and 
Construction Contracts, §§ 27, 28, pp. 29-30 (1964).

 
 
            
Hiller claims Reiman was negligent by failing to notify Hiller of the soils 
condition encountered.  Such 
argument is faulty since Hiller's architect, Deines, as well as the engineering 
firm of Volk & Harrison, had 
already been apprised of the soils condition from Chen's soils report and had 
made their plans and specifications accordingly.  Therefore, there was no need to inform 
Deines and Volk & Harrison of the soils condition when they already knew 
such from the soils report.

 
 
            
In this case, there is no evidence which shows Reiman did anything but 
perform all work properly under the design given for the building.  Carrel McClain, architect for the Deines 
firm, testified the building was constructed in accordance with the plans and 
specifications.  To the same effect 
is the testimony of Michael Apostolos, designer for Deines, who also concluded 
the building was completed in accordance with the specified 
design.

 
 
            
In the case of Gaybis v. Palm, 
201 Md. 78, 92 A.2d 269 (1952), the court held the contractor of a home which 
was subsequently damaged after construction due to faulty soil could recover for 
the cost of construction from the owner.  
The contractor built the home according to the owner's plans and 
specifications and was absolved of any liability:

 
 
" * * * 
If a building contractor does his work in accordance with the plans and 
specifications and without negligence, he will not be liable to the owner where 
the building is subsequently damaged by reason of some defect in the building or some fault of the soil, in 
the absence of an express warranty that the plans and specifications are 
sufficient, inasmuch as he does not warrant their sufficiency but only the skill 
and care with which he performs his work and the soundness of the materials used 
therein."  Id., 93 A.2d  at 
272.

 
 
            
In Ridley Investment Company v. 
Croll, Del.Super., 192 A.2d 925, 6 A.L.R.3d 1389 (1963), an owner sought 
recovery from a contractor for damages to a post office building due to 
substantial settling after installation of the floor.  The contractor notified the owner of the 
soft soil conditions.  An outside 
expert was called in who recommended additional piling be placed beneath the 
exterior walls.  The owner concurred 
and the contractor followed the expert's recommendations.  Shortly thereafter, the expert again 
recommended that additional piling was needed, but the owner disagreed and no 
further piling was added.  After 
installation of the floor, substantial settling occurred in the foundation of 
the building.  Additional expense 
was required to remedy the settling, and the owner sought to recover this 
expense from the contractor.  The 
court found the contractor not liable for damages to the building due to 
defective design:

 
 
"The 
lower court held that defendant was exonerated from liability because the 
damages resulted from a defect in the plans and specifications prepared by the 
owner and which were followed by defendant in a workmanlike manner.  Plaintiff contends here that the court 
below failed to distinguish between defects inherent in the plans and 
specifications and defects extrinsic to such specifications, such as a latent defect in the 
soil.  This argument is 
untenable, since plans and specifications do not exist in a vacuum;  they are made for a particular building 
at a particular place.  The defect 
in the plans and specifications for the building in question was the failure to 
make provision for adequate pilings and other support for the floor;  the fact that these plans and 
specifications might provide for an adequate building in some other place does 
not render the plans and specifications less defective for the location in 
question."  Id., at 
926-927.

 
 
See also 
the annotation at 6 A.L.R.3d 1394 (1966), and the cases cited therein.  [Emphases added.]

 
 
[¶15]   The district court deemed the Reiman case not applicable to the 
circumstances of this case.  We, 
however, conclude that it must be a part of the discussion even though it may 
not be dispositive of the issue presented here.  An important factor in Reiman is most certainly the fact that 
the architect and the engineers knew they were dealing with soil problems when 
they assembled the plan that Reiman constructed.

 
 
[¶16]   In an annotation devoted to this 
particular subject, it is stated that "a contractor who knows, or should know, 
of a defect in a particular subsoil does not perform his contractual obligations 
in a workmanlike manner if he fails to notify the owner of the existence of the 
condition."  Annotation, Duty of Contractor to Warn Owner of Defects 
in Subsurface Conditions, 73 A.L.R.3d 1213 (1976 and Supp. 2006).  That annotation goes on to suggest 
that:

 
 
"[T]he 
courts frequently distinguished between latent soil conditions and apparent 
defects in the soil, absolving the contractor from blame for the consequences of 
the former, but holding him responsible for failing to notify the property owner 
of the later.  Counsel representing 
property owner in such cases should not discount the importance of expert 
testimony in establishing whether a soil condition is one that should be 
apparent to the builder, and thus one of which the builder has a duty to inform 
the householder."

 
 
73 ALR3d 
at 1216-17.

 
 
[¶17]   The prevailing law appears to be 
different in those circumstances where a home is purchased from a builder-vendor 
(one who builds houses on lands he owns).  
Mark S. Dennison, Builder-Vendor's 
Liability to Purchaser of New Dwelling for Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness 
or Habitability, 50 POF3d 543, § 13 (Defects in building site) (1999 and 
Supp. 2006).  In a nutshell, a 
builder-vendor may be liable for soil conditions under the theory of an implied 
warranty of fitness and/or habitability.

 
 
[¶18]   On a similar note, a legal 
encyclopedia states this as the prevailing law:

 
 
A 
contractor or builder who has complied with the requirements of a construction 
contract normally is not responsible for defects caused by the nature of the 
soil or the action of the elements.  
Moreover, in the absence of a statute or contractual provision to the 
contrary, a contractor who agrees to follow plans and specifications is not 
required to examine the soil for hidden subterranean conditions therein which 
may affect its suitability for the purpose intended or to perform such an 
examination to determine whether all parts of the structure will be watertight 
if the contractor follows the plans and specifications.  Furthermore, a builder is not 
responsible where, by the fault of the owner, he or she is unable to overcome 
defects in the soil.

 
 
17B 
C.J.S. Contracts § 592(d) at 289 
(1999).

 
 
[¶19]   Of course, because of the 
disposition below, inadequate fact gathering and no fact finding has been done 
in this regard.  What we do know is 
that the seller of the lot, which was designed to be used for residential 
purposes, knew of the potential of unfavorable soil conditions and warned the 
Rickards of them.  We know that Mr. 
Rickard sought an opinion on the condition of the soil.  That opinion was given without benefit 
of a written agreement, was not in a written form, and Rickard was not required 
to pay for it.  Rickard claims that 
he asked Farmer about the condition of the soil, and Farmer agrees with that 
claim, but counters that his suggestion that more formal soil testing be done 
was disregarded by the Rickards.  In 
sum, we conclude there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary 
judgment at this juncture.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The appealable order, as well as 
the partial summary judgment in favor of the Rickards, are reversed, and this 
matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.