Case Title: Commonwealth v. Norris

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-08998

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-08998 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES NORRIS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 10, 2019. - December 20, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Evidence, 
Exculpatory, Third-party culprit, Alibi.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Required finding, New trial, 
Assistance of counsel, Preservation of evidence, 
Disqualification of judge. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 7, 2000. 
 
 
The case was tried before Tina S. Page, J.; a motion for a 
new trial, filed on November 12, 2003, was considered by her; 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on June 23, 2016, was heard 
by her. 
 
 
 
David H. Erickson for the defendant. 
 
Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On November 7, 2001, the defendant, James 
Norris, was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories 
of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in the stabbing 
2 
 
 
death of the victim, Aaron "Chad" Scott.  The defendant's direct 
appeal was consolidated with his appeals from the denials of his 
two motions for a new trial.  The defendant raises various 
arguments on appeal.  He asserts that his motion for a required 
finding of not guilty should have been granted; that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the trial judge 
erred in admitting improper and misleading evidence, failing to 
sanction the Commonwealth appropriately for destroying 
exculpatory evidence, and failing to recuse herself.  Finally, 
the defendant argues that the cumulative errors made during the 
trial amount to a violation of due process and his right to a 
fair trial. 
 
After careful consideration of the defendant's arguments on 
appeal from his conviction and from the denials of his two 
motions for a new trial, we affirm his conviction and the 
denials of the motions, and we decline to grant extraordinary 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, while reserving certain details for later 
discussion. 
 
The defendant lived with a relative on Wilbraham Road in 
Springfield.  The defendant sold drugs for the victim and his 
brother, who sublet a home on Brickett Street in Springfield 
3 
 
 
from the defendant.  The victim's body was found in the early 
morning hours of January 18, 2000, in the Brickett Street home 
(house) after four anonymous 911 calls directed police to the 
residence. 
 
The previous evening, at approximately 10:30 P.M., the 
defendant telephoned Dan Brunelle, a casual associate, to ask 
for a ride to the house.  Brunelle had driven the defendant to 
the house many times before because Brunelle occasionally 
purchased "crack" cocaine from the defendant or the victim. 
 
When Brunelle arrived to pick up the defendant twenty 
minutes later, the defendant got into Brunelle's van and said, 
"I'm going to do Chad."  After convincing Brunelle that he was 
joking, the defendant asked Brunelle to stop a few doors away 
from the house to pick up David Johnson, whom the defendant had 
invited along to smoke marijuana.1  During the drive, Brunelle 
complied with the defendant's request to lend Johnson his 
gloves, but once they arrived at the house Brunelle became 
nervous about the defendant's earlier "joke."  He got out of the 
van, stood by the front bumper, and demanded his gloves back. 
 
Brunelle remained in the van while the defendant and 
Johnson approached the house.  Brunelle saw the pair enter the 
                     
 
1 The defendant and David Johnson previously sold drugs 
together, became friends, and resumed a drug business when 
Johnson was released from prison. 
4 
 
 
home, and a silhouette of a third person in the kitchen.  
Brunelle testified that a moment later, Johnson "burst out" 
through the storm door, turned around, and put his full weight 
against the door, "containing what was clearly a struggle on the 
inside."  In a panic, Brunelle drove away to the home of Charles 
Varner, whom Brunelle considered a brother-in-law. 
 
Johnson testified that when he entered the home behind the 
defendant, the defendant and victim had already begun to fight.  
During that fight, the two men fell against the storm door, 
which swung open and hit Johnson in the face.  After pushing the 
door shut, Johnson heard the victim say, "Are you going to leave 
me for dead?  Are you going to leave me for dead?  I got kids . 
. . I got little boys," but all Johnson could see was the 
defendant's arm making "up and down" movements.  As Johnson 
backed away from the door, it "flew open," and the defendant 
called out to Johnson for help with the victim's body.  Shocked 
and believing the defendant had a knife on him, Johnson remained 
at the scene, where he witnessed the defendant try to push the 
victim's body down a flight of stairs before taking a pot of 
water that was on the stove and splashing it throughout the 
kitchen and the exterior of the home. 
 
Once Johnson left the scene, the defendant followed.  
Johnson testified that after going to a bar to get change, the 
defendant used a pay telephone to call someone to help him 
5 
 
 
dispose of the body and clean up.  As Johnson and the defendant 
returned to the scene, Johnson saw a vehicle in the driveway. 
 
Inside the vehicle were Varner and his friend, Keith 
Freeman, who had arrived at the house after Brunelle had told 
the men what he had witnessed.  Varner testified that when he 
and Freeman initially arrived at the scene, Varner knocked on 
the door, but no one answered.  As he turned to get back into 
his vehicle, he saw the defendant, who told him to leave.  When 
Varner informed the defendant that Brunelle had been to his 
house and that he was there to see "what was going on," the 
defendant told Varner that Brunelle was a liar, that there had 
been "a little beef," and that the police had already been 
there. 
 
Varner and Freeman began to drive away but then turned 
around after deciding that things did not "seem right."2  When 
they returned, Varner demanded to know where the victim was.  
The defendant claimed that the victim was not there.  Despite 
the defendant's protests, Varner and Freeman entered the home 
and saw the victim's jacket in the kitchen.  Again, Varner 
                     
 
2 Johnson testified that he watched this interaction between 
the defendant and a man in a vehicle.  Once Johnson observed the 
vehicle leave and return, he fled the scene and went to his 
mother's house.  A short time later, the defendant arrived 
again, asking Johnson to help him dispose of the body.  After 
Johnson refused, he and the defendant had no further 
communication that evening. 
6 
 
 
demanded to know where the victim could have gone without a 
jacket, and Varner and Freeman began to go from room to room, 
"yelling" the victim's name.  While they searched the house, the 
defendant followed closely behind, pleading with them to leave. 
 
As they again passed through the kitchen, Varner noticed 
for the first time what he believed to be a bloody fingerprint 
on the wall.  At some point, Varner and Freeman walked past the 
door to the basement stairs.  When they looked down, they 
discovered the bloody body of the victim.  Varner told the 
defendant that he was calling the police before he and Freeman 
left the scene.  Varner placed his first telephone call to 911 
at 11:42 P.M. 
 
At approximately 3 A.M. on Tuesday, January 18, 2000, the 
defendant contacted a friend, Bernard Williams, and asked him to 
come over to his house.  The defendant confessed to Williams 
that he had stabbed the victim to death and had thrown his body 
down the stairs.  Williams testified that the defendant killed 
the victim because "things had built up for a long time . . . 
[t]hey weren't treating him right . . . it was over money and 
disrespect." 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant's 
motion for a required finding of not guilty due to insufficient 
evidence was denied.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
7 
 
 
murder in the first degree on theories of premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and the defendant appealed. 
 
After entry of the defendant's appeal in this court, he 
filed a motion for a new trial asserting that his trial counsel 
had been ineffective for failing to investigate and use an alibi 
defense and forensic evidence, and for failing to impeach a key 
witness for the Commonwealth.3  The motion judge, who also was 
the trial judge, denied that motion without a hearing, and she 
also denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration without a 
hearing.  The defendant appealed from the denial. 
 
After filing a motion for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing, which was granted, the defendant filed a second motion 
for a new trial.  After an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's 
motion was denied.  He appealed, and that appeal was 
consolidated in this court with the appeal from his conviction 
and with the appeal from the denial of his first motion for a 
new trial. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Denial of motion for a required finding of 
not guilty.  The defendant argues he was entitled to a not 
guilty verdict as a matter of law because there was legally 
                     
 
3 The defendant's motion contained a request for funds to 
investigate and locate individuals supporting his alibi defense, 
to obtain a criminalist to review photographic and shoeprint 
evidence, and to test any material found under the victim's 
fingernails. 
8 
 
 
insufficient evidence connecting him to the crime.  
Specifically, he argues that the lack of forensic evidence -- no 
murder weapon was found, no DNA linked the defendant to the 
crime, and there was no definitive shoe print match -- 
"vindicate[s]" him in the face of "the testimony of professed 
crack cocaine addicts or others with a motive to lie." 
 
This court must determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to satisfy a rational trier of fact of each element 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  "The relevant question 
is whether the evidence would permit a jury to find guilt, not 
whether the evidence requires such a finding."  Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988).  The evidence against the 
defendant was substantial.  Two witnesses placed the defendant 
at the scene of the crime, one of whom effectively witnessed the 
defendant murder the victim.  Two other witnesses arrived on the 
scene as the defendant was attempting to dispose of the body or 
otherwise cover up the crime.  A fifth witness testified that 
the defendant confessed to committing the murder a few hours 
after the crime took place. 
 
"Once sufficient evidence is presented to warrant 
submission of the charges to the jury, it is for the jury alone 
to determine what weight will be accorded to the evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Ruci, 409 Mass. 94, 97 (1991), quoting 
9 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Hill, 387 Mass. 619, 624 (1982).  While the 
defendant portrays these witnesses as untrustworthy addicts, 
"[c]redibility is a question for the jury to decide; they may 
accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony presented 
to them."  Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 411 
(1978).  The defendant's claim that the testimony of the 
witnesses at his trial "was inherently unreliable is nothing 
more than an issue of credibility, an issue that is solely 
within the province of the jury."   Commonwealth v. James, 424 
Mass. 770, 785 (1997).  There was no error. 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In this 
consolidated appeal, the defendant raises the same ineffective 
assistance of counsel arguments asserted in his motions for a 
new trial.  We review the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under G. L. c. 278, § 33E,4 which provides 
a standard of review more favorable than the constitutional 
standard of review of such claims.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  
Accordingly, we determine "whether there was an error in the 
course of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the 
judge) and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
                     
 
4 The defendant incorrectly states that his motions for a 
new trial were entitled to plenary review by the motion judge 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  This is inaccurate.  However, 
the defendant is entitled to plenary review by this court. 
10 
 
 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Wright, supra.  "Where, as 
here, the trial judge also considered the motion for a new 
trial, we extend 'special deference' to the judge's action on 
the motion" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Barnett, 482 
Mass. 632, 638 (2019). 
 
a.  Failure to impeach the Commonwealth's theory or 
timeline of events.  The defendant argues that trial counsel 
failed to impeach the Commonwealth's theory of events using two 
key pieces of evidence:  photographs of a dresser with bloody 
handprints located at the scene and Johnson's testimony that he 
was watching the third quarter of a televised professional 
basketball game when the defendant arrived to pick him up. 
 
The defendant suggests that the photographs of the dresser 
demonstrate that "the house was searched, and that whoever did 
this appears to have left the property with great dispatch," 
thereby contradicting the Commonwealth's theory that the 
defendant killed the victim and remained at the scene for some 
time afterward.  Further, the defendant asserts that this 
evidence contradicts the Commonwealth's "strong inference . . . 
that Norris was wearing gloves." 
 
As the motion judge noted, "[t]his argument is purely 
speculative, as the defendant offers no support for his 
contention that evidence of the handprints would actually be 
inconsistent with [the defendant] having committed the crime."  
11 
 
 
The first 911 call reporting a disturbance occurred at 11:42 
P.M.  Police did not secure the crime scene until after the 
third 911 call was made after 3:30 A.M.  Therefore, the victim 
was immobile in his home for over three hours.  The possibility 
that an unknown third party could have entered and ransacked the 
home during that time does not preclude the jury from finding 
that the defendant committed the murder.  This evidence is 
unlikely to have influenced the jury's conclusion in any way. 
 
The defendant also cites his trial counsel's failure to 
impeach a key prosecution witness, Johnson, who testified that 
he was watching a basketball game when the defendant picked him 
up to go to the victim's home.  When asked if he remembered what 
time the defendant picked him up, Johnson testified, "It was at 
night, about -- I know it was a double basketball game that day, 
but I don't remember what time it was.  It was the Spurs they 
were playing, I know that much."  When asked if he remembered at 
approximately what part of the basketball game the defendant 
arrived, Johnson responded, "Yes, almost the end of the third 
quarter."  The defendant argues that after trial, it was 
determined that the basketball game Johnson referred to "began 
at 9:30 P.M. San Antonio time, later Springfield time, and ran 
two hours and 14 minutes."  Thus, Johnson could not have been 
watching this game until the end of the third quarter and been 
with the defendant at the time of the killing. 
12 
 
 
 
"Generally, failure to impeach a witness does not amount to 
ineffective assistance of counsel."  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 
Mass. 340, 357 (2001).  Even using the more favorable standard 
of review under § 33E, a claim of ineffective assistance based 
on failure to use particular impeachment methods is difficult to 
establish.  Id.  "Trial counsel does not necessarily provide 
ineffective assistance by 'not prob[ing] every inconsistency" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 363 
(2004).  "[A]bsent counsel's failure to pursue some obviously 
powerful form of impeachment available at trial, it is 
speculative to conclude that a different approach to impeachment 
would likely have affected the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth 
v. Hudson, 446 Mass. 709, 715 (2006), quoting Fisher, supra.  
Here, impeachment as to the timing of the basketball game was 
unlikely to have influenced the jury, given that Brunelle 
testified that he brought the defendant and Johnson to the 
victim's house sometime after 10:30 P.M.5 
                     
 
5 The defendant argued in his first motion for a new trial 
that "trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching Commonwealth 
witnesses with prior convictions."  This claim has no merit.  
The defendant fails to identify which witness he is referring to 
or the nature of the convictions.  Additionally, the 
Commonwealth's key witnesses all testified to current or former 
drug use, and the defendant has failed to establish how the 
introduction of a prior conviction would have influenced the 
jury. 
13 
 
 
 
b.  Failure to properly investigate forensic evidence.  The 
defendant argues that trial counsel failed to properly 
investigate and use two significant pieces of forensic evidence:  
the defendant's alleged footprint at the scene of the crime and 
DNA material found under the victim's fingernails. 
 
At trial, a State trooper testified about numerous 
footprints that were found at the crime scene.  She stated that 
a footprint that was found outside the house where the defendant 
was living was "consistent in tread pattern and overall physical 
size and shape" to footprints found at the Brickett Street 
house, allowing an inference that the footprints at the scene 
belonged to the defendant.  The defendant maintains that if 
trial counsel had sought and obtained an expert in footprint 
evidence, he would have discovered that the footprint "was very 
far from a match."  Such evidence was unlikely to have 
influenced the jury.  First, numerous witnesses placed the 
defendant at the house and at least one saw the defendant in a 
struggle with the victim.  Second, through cross-examination, 
trial counsel made the point that no footprints from anywhere 
matched a pair of sneakers that police had taken from the 
defendant.  Finally, this footprint evidence was not a 
substantial component of the Commonwealth's case.6  In closing 
                     
 
6 The Commonwealth made no mention of the footprints in its 
opening statement.  In closing argument, the Commonwealth 
14 
 
 
argument, the prosecutor cautioned the jury, "So, the footwear 
evidence in this case is not evidence that you should rely upon 
exclusively to reach some finding of guilt, but it is 
consistent, it is corroborative of the remainder of the 
evidence."7 
 
The defendant also argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not testing the material found under the 
victim's fingernails.  As presented during the evidentiary 
hearing on the second motion for a new trial, the testing 
revealed that the only DNA present under the victim's 
fingernails belonged to the victim himself.  There was no DNA 
detected that could be attributed to a known or unknown third 
party.  Had these results been presented at trial, they would 
not have influenced the jury's verdict.  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Cameron, 473 Mass. 100, 102 (2015) ("the newly available DNA 
evidence that conclusively excludes the defendant as a possible 
                     
devotes only two sentences to this footprint:  "There is another 
set of prints outside the [Brickett Street] house.  They are 
consistent with a print found at the defendant's home, outside 
of the defendant's home . . . ." 
 
 
7 In his first motion for a new trial, the defendant also 
argues that an expert should have been used to examine 
photographs of cuts on his hands, which he claimed resulted from 
removing Christmas lights.  The defendant has not shown that 
this would have helped him at trial where four witnesses put him 
at the scene of the murder. 
15 
 
 
donor likely would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations"). 
 
c.  Failure to investigate alternative theories or 
suspects.  The defendant alleges trial counsel failed to 
investigate a variety of alternative theories and suspects.  
First, he argues that trial counsel did not offer evidence that 
police responded to the house to a report of a disturbance 
before the response when the victim was discovered and that, at 
that time, they found no blood or evidence of violence.  At the 
hearing on the defendant's second motion for a new trial one of 
the police officers who had responded to the earlier call about 
this disturbance testified to details of what he and his partner 
did (i.e., checked the doors, walked around the house). 
 
We begin by noting that, at trial, a police officer who had 
responded to the house when the victim was found testified that 
there had been an earlier call to which officers had responded 
but had found nothing.  Thus, this information was before the 
jury.  In any event, it is unclear how this evidence casts doubt 
on the Commonwealth's theory of the crime.  As the motion judge 
observed, "Had such testimony been introduced, the jury could 
have inferred from the evidence at trial that the defendant 
committed the crime and left the scene only to return to the 
scene later and transfer the blood to the door and snow at that 
time." 
16 
 
 
 
Second, the defendant asserts that trial counsel did not 
introduce evidence of other parties with possible motives to 
kill the victim, including unknown drug associates from New York 
City and the victim's own brother, Rico, who apparently 
disappeared after the murder.  Third, the defendant asserts that 
trial counsel failed to address the additional vehicles parked 
at the home on the night of the crime, as well as a tire track 
found then. 
 
Defense counsel did present a third-party killer theory at 
trial by attempting to implicate two of the Commonwealth's key 
witnesses -- Brunelle and Johnson.  However, typically, we do 
not characterize strategic decisions as ineffective assistance 
merely because they prove unsuccessful.  See Commonwealth v. 
White, 409 Mass. 266, 272 (1991).  We agree with the judge that 
the defendant has failed to identify any material evidence trial 
counsel would have discovered had he pursued these additional 
suspects; that there is nothing to indicate the outcome of trial 
would have been different had counsel advanced these other 
third-party culprits, who were "even more attenuated from the 
scenario than Brunelle and Johnson[; and that t]he evidence that 
other cars were parked at the house also would not likely have 
changed the outcome of the trial, for the same reasons."  It was 
hardly unreasonable for trial counsel to focus on the witnesses 
who identified the defendant as the murderer, rather than 
17 
 
 
unidentified individuals or vehicles, in formulating a third-
party culprit defense. 
 
d.  Failure to explore an alibi defense.  The defendant 
argues that trial counsel "abandoned a possible alibi defense by 
not investigating the matter."  In support of his first motion 
for a new trial, the defendant provided an affidavit from the 
grandmother of his children, who was prepared to testify that, 
on the night of the murder, she was at home watching the nightly 
news with the defendant and her daughter.  The defendant also 
submitted an affidavit asserting the same thing and naming two 
persons, "Keith" and "Sue" (no last names provided), who "could 
have been located" at the time of trial to testify to his 
whereabouts on the night of the murder.8 
 
The decision of defense counsel regarding the best defense 
to pursue at trial is a tactical one and will not be deemed 
ineffective unless manifestly unreasonable when made.  
Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 435 Mass. 743, 758 (2002).  "A strategy 
is manifestly unreasonable if 'lawyers of ordinary training and 
skill in the criminal law would [not] consider [it] competent.'"  
Commonwealth v. Velez, 479 Mass. 506, 512 (2018), quoting 
                     
 
8 In his affidavit, the defendant identifies "Keith" only as 
someone "who drove a white van" and "Sue" as someone who "lived 
on State Street in Springfield, Massachusetts, next to the Getty 
gas station and worked . . . at Springfield Technical Community 
College for the dean or registrar." 
18 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017). 
 
According to an investigative report submitted with the 
defendant's first motion for a new trial, the grandmother told a 
police officer that she had not seen the defendant for from one 
week to ten days prior to the crime, "as he had moved out and 
was no longer staying with her."  However, at trial, Brunelle 
testified that he picked up the defendant from the grandmother's 
home.  Given these inconsistencies, it was not unreasonable for 
trial counsel to decline to rely on the grandmother's testimony 
to establish an alibi defense.9  Nor was it unreasonable for 
trial counsel to decline to investigate "Keith" or "Sue" when 
the defendant could not provide a last name or other relevant 
information about these unknown parties.10 
 
3.  Admission of alleged unduly prejudicial evidence.  At 
trial, the Commonwealth presented the results of preliminary 
orthotolidine testing, which indicated the presence of blood in 
                     
 
9 At an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's second motion 
for a new trial, trial counsel could not recall much about the 
case.  He did recall that in preparing for trial, he relied on 
the defendant's girlfriend as a witness to establish an alibi.  
However, when the time came to call her at trial, the defendant 
insisted that she not be called to testify. 
 
 
10 The defendant did not provide any additional information 
about "Sue" or "Keith" in his second motion for a new trial; nor 
did he provide affidavits from them indicating what they would 
have testified to had they been called. 
19 
 
 
the vehicle that the defendant used to leave the crime scene.  
Subsequent testing did not show the presence of blood.  The 
defendant argues that these results were irrelevant and unduly 
prejudicial, and that the jury were left with the impression 
that there was evidence of blood in the vehicle.  The 
Commonwealth concedes that there was no overt relevance to the 
presence of stains in the vehicle as presented by an expert, but 
argues that "the evidence is relevant to show steps taken in the 
investigation." 
 
The defendant did not object at trial to the admission of 
the preliminary testing.  Thus, we review the issue to determine 
whether there was an error, and if so, whether it resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 287 (2019). 
 
This court already has held that the results of 
orthotolidine testing is permissible without the need for 
further confirmatory evidence.  Commonwealth v. Duguay, 430 
Mass. 397, 401-402 (1999).  In Duguay, the court stated that 
there was no undue prejudice because the chemist informed the 
jury that the test was presumptive, and she "acknowledged a long 
list of substances other than human blood that could yield a 
positive result."  Id. at 402.  Additionally, "[d]efense counsel 
20 
 
 
freely and repeatedly pointed out the limitations of the test."  
Id.11 
 
Here, trial counsel elicited on cross-examination that the 
test was an initial screening test requiring further 
confirmation for accuracy; that it could yield false positives, 
which can result from metals, vegetable products, or rust; and 
that all four wheel wells on the vehicle were rusted.  The 
expert also confirmed that subsequent testing was negative and 
that no further tests were performed.  In closing, defense 
counsel emphasized the significance of this testimony, arguing, 
"And when he takes that swab of what he thinks is the blood, 
there may be false positives.  As I have already said, it comes 
up negative for blood.  It wasn't blood.  And if it was blood or 
if they didn't trust the confirmatory test which came up 
                     
 
11 Moreover, although subsequent testing revealed that there 
was no blood present, the preliminary results are still relevant 
-- albeit limited, given defense counsel's repeated attempts to 
challenge the adequacy of the police investigation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  
"'Evidence does not have to be conclusive of an issue to be 
admissible'; admissible evidence may simply make [the] 
Commonwealth's contention more probable than it would be without 
that evidence."  Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 288 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 851 
(2011).  The fact and manner in which the preliminary testing 
was done provided the jury with information from which they 
could have inferred that it was more likely that the criminal 
investigation was adequate, despite defense counsel's closing 
argument to the contrary.  See Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 
744, 753 (2009) (Commonwealth has right to rebut Bowden 
defense). 
21 
 
 
negative for blood, they would have done a third test.  But they 
didn't."  The Commonwealth did not reference the testing done on 
the vehicle in its closing. 
 
We conclude that there was no error, but even if there was, 
given trial counsel's effective cross-examination and closing 
argument,12 the admission of the orthotolidine testing did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
4.  Commonwealth's alleged destruction of exculpatory 
evidence.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in failing 
to sanction the Commonwealth for the alleged destruction of two 
pieces of exculpatory evidence.  The defendant asserts that 
Johnson initially made a handwritten statement to police, which 
the "police refused to take . . . saying it was not true, and 
that the statement should be ripped up."  The second piece of 
evidence is a statement by Williams, the witness who testified 
                     
 
12 We note that defense counsel requested a jury instruction 
on the Commonwealth's failure to conduct tests, pursuant to 
Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486, which the judge denied.  "As we have 
stated many times . . . a judge is not required to instruct on 
the claimed inadequacy of a police investigation.  'Bowden 
simply holds that a judge may not remove the issue from the 
jury's consideration.'"  Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 
678, 687 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Boateng, 438 Mass. 498, 
506-507 (2003).  Where, as here, the defendant alleges multiple 
investigatory failures, specifically the subsequent testing of 
potential blood evidence and the destruction of an exculpatory 
statement, see discussion infra, a Bowden instruction may be 
warranted. In this case, because the judge explicitly allowed 
the defense to "argue to the jury what the police should have 
done or failed to do" during closing argument, we find no error. 
22 
 
 
that the defendant confessed to him, which was ripped up by a 
detective. 
 
Prior to jury empanelment, defense counsel filed a motion 
for sanctions, and the judge held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the police had destroyed exculpatory evidence; 
she made findings of fact for each statement, as detailed infra. 
Defense counsel's motion for sanctions should be read as a 
motion to suppress, given that counsel explained he "could have 
entitled it a motion to suppress, but [he was] not sure what the 
appropriate sanction [was]."  In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, we "accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of his 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth v. 
Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 543 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 
475 Mass. 583, 587 (2016). 
 
a.  Johnson's statement.  The judge found that although 
Johnson may have made an oral or verbal statement, he did not 
produce a handwritten statement.  She also found that the 
defendant had not demonstrated that there was any material that 
would have been exculpatory to the defendant. 
 
The judge did not commit error in finding that Johnson did 
not produce a handwritten statement.  Defense counsel did not 
call Johnson to testify during the evidentiary hearing.  
Although Johnson's mother initially testified that she was 
23 
 
 
unsure whether a handwritten statement was produced, she then 
remembered that he did produce one.  On cross-examination, his 
mother again stated that she was unsure whether Johnson had 
produced a handwritten statement.  On redirect, she testified 
she was "a little confused" about the handwritten statement.  In 
contrast, the detective who had conducted the interview with 
Johnson testified that he never allowed suspects or witnesses to 
make handwritten statements, Johnson never provided a 
handwritten statement, and no such statement was torn up or 
destroyed. 
 
Given the mother's wavering testimony and the detective's 
unequivocal assertion that no handwritten statement was made, 
the judge's findings were not clearly erroneous. 
 
b.  Williams's statement.  The judge found that after the 
murder, Williams spoke with a detective who began taking his 
statement.  Williams initially told the detective that he did 
not know anything about the murder and that the defendant did 
not say anything to Williams about the murder.  The detective 
printed out Williams's statement and gave it to him.  Williams 
affirmed the statement but did not sign it.  The detective then 
indicated that he was privy to additional evidence about the 
murder and he knew Williams was lying.  Upon hearing this, 
Williams stated that he was willing to tell the truth about what 
happened, and the detective ripped up Williams's unsigned 
24 
 
 
statement.  Although the judge noted that she "frowned upon" the 
handling of the statement and found the police "quite culpable" 
in its destruction, she ultimately concluded that the 
destruction of the statement "was not done intentionally to 
deprive the defendant of any evidence."  The judge further found 
that Williams's initial statement was exculpatory insofar as it 
could be used to impeach Williams's testimony at trial, but that 
it was not otherwise material to the defendant.  In light of 
this conclusion, the judge ruled that defense counsel could 
explore the circumstances surrounding the destruction of 
Williams's initial statements and its purported content, 
including by cross-examining Williams and the detective who took 
his statement.  The defendant argues that this remedy was 
inadequate. 
 
"When a defendant makes a claim that the government has 
lost or destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence," he bears an 
initial burden of demonstrating a "reasonable possibility, based 
on concrete evidence" (citation omitted), that the lost or 
destroyed evidence was exculpatory in nature.  Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 718 (2010).  If the defendant makes 
such a showing, the judge "must proceed to balance the 
Commonwealth's culpability, the materiality of the evidence, and 
the prejudice to the defendant in order to determine whether the 
defendant is entitled to relief.".  Id.  "In reviewing the 
25 
 
 
denial of a motion based on the Commonwealth's loss [or 
destruction] of allegedly exculpatory evidence, we do not 
disturb the judge's decision absent a clear abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 554 (2007). 
 
Williams's initial statement indicated that the defendant 
had not said anything about the murder.  In light of Williams's 
subsequent statement and testimony at trial, there was a 
reasonable possibility that his initial statement was 
exculpatory as impeachment material.  The defendant has not 
shown, however, that the judge's remedy was inadequate, or that 
dismissal of the indictment was warranted.  "Dismissal of an 
indictment is a remedy that infringes 'severely on the public 
interest in bringing guilty persons to justice.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 717 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
835 (1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 210, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). 
 
Defense counsel engaged in a thorough cross-examination of 
Williams about his initial statement and its contents.  The 
defendant has failed to show that anything contained within 
Williams's initial statement would have created a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt, where defense counsel's 
cross-examination of Williams did not.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 421 (2000). 
26 
 
 
 
5.  Recusal of judge.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erroneously failed to recuse herself when she discovered she had 
previously served as an attorney for the sister of a key 
Commonwealth witness. 
 
Prior to the start of trial, the judge realized that, as a 
defense attorney, she had represented Johnson's sister in 
approximately 1985.  During a sidebar, the judge informed both 
parties that she had "some familiarity" with the witness's 
family, including Johnson himself and his mother, who testified 
for the defense in this trial during an evidentiary hearing on 
the motion for sanctions.  Regarding how this might affect her 
judgment, the judge emphasized that she was just "playing it 
safe":  "I don't see where this will interfere with my ability 
to be an impartial jurist, but I wanted to put it on the 
record."  Defense counsel was provided an opportunity to consult 
with his client, and reported that the defendant "[did] not see 
a problem" with the judge's prior representation. 
 
"Because the defendant did not ask the judge to recuse 
herself prior to or during trial, we consider this claim to 
determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Deconinck, 480 Mass. 
254, 267 (2018).  Here, the judge's decision not to recuse 
herself does not meet the standard.  The judge represented the 
witness's sister in a drug case sixteen years earlier, far 
27 
 
 
removed from the crime at issue.  The judge also explicitly 
stated on the record that she had considered her relationship 
with the witness's sister and did not think it would interfere 
with her ability to be impartial.  See Commonwealth v. Daye, 435 
Mass. 463, 470 (2001) ("Here, the judge properly weighed his 
conscience and determined that he could discharge his duties 
fairly and without prejudice to the defendant"). 
 
6.  Cumulative error and relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
As there was no error, there could not be any substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage flowing from allegations of 
unpreserved cumulative error.  We decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to 
order a new trial. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction.  Furthermore, we have reviewed the 
record in its entirety and conclude there is no basis on which 
to grant extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The 
denials of the defendant's motions for a new trial are also 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.