Case Title: Adkins v. BARRETT

Citation: 196 Or. 597, 250 P.2d 387

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1952-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed November 26, 1952.
*598 William R. Thomas argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Morley & Thomas, of Lebanon.
Orval N. Thompson argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Weatherford & Thompson, of Albany.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE, WARNER and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action brought by Francis O. Adkins, as plaintiff, against Raymond J. Barrett, John J. Barrett, and E.L. Barrett, dba Barrett Brothers, as defendants, to recover damages for injuries to and loss of use of a logging truck and trailer, alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence. The case was tried to a jury. A verdict was returned in favor of defendants, and judgment was accordingly entered. Plaintiff appeals.
Defendants conduct a motor truck establishment at Albany, in Linn county, Oregon. They sell and rent motor trucks, including logging trucks and trailers. They also conduct a general motor truck repair business and sell parts.
Plaintiff is engaged in the logging business in the Coast range of mountains, in Polk county, Oregon. Logs are hauled from the logging site by motor trucks and trailers. The road leading from the logging site to the public highway is narrow and crooked and has steep grades.
One of the motor trucks used by plaintiff in transporting logs is an M5 International, which he purchased from defendants. Originally this vehicle was a 2 1/2-ton military truck. Before its purchase by plaintiff, *599 the truck had been converted into a logging truck. The original front axle assembly on this truck was one manufactured for that type of vehicle by Eaton, and was in every way suitable for all military purposes.
On or about July 15, 1948, the front axle on this motor truck broke. On July 16, 1948, the truck, at the request of plaintiff, was towed by defendants to their garage in Albany for the purpose of installing a new front axle assembly. It was decided to replace the original type of axle, referred to as a G.I. axle, with a conventional type.
Defendants procured and placed upon said truck a used front axle assembly of the conventional kind, manufactured by Timken. The spindle on this axle assembly was a three-fourths-inch spindle, with a corresponding three-fourths-inch nut.
On July 19, 1948, this motor truck and trailer fully loaded with logs was being driven along the road above-mentioned. This was its first trip with logs after the repairs had been completed. A short distance from the logging site, and after it had proceeded around a sharp curve in the road and down a steep grade, the truck's left front wheel came off, causing the loaded truck and trailer to be thrown off the road and down a steep bank, wrecking the equipment. Examination of the spindle and nut after the accident disclosed that the threads thereof had sheared off completely.
Plaintiff brought action against defendants for the damages sustained, charging defendants with negligence in making the repairs as described. Plaintiff alleged: "that the spindle placed on the said axle was a three-fourths inch spindle whereas that said truck required for its normal duties and safe operation a spindle of one and one-fourth inches or greater."
*600 Upon the trial, as an important part of their defense, defendants produced evidence to the effect that in the repairs they made, they followed an established and common practice as to the size and type of axle, spindle, and nut used by them. Their contention in that respect is well illustrated by the testimony of Edward L. (Bob) Barrett, who testified as follows on direct examination:
1, 2. Plaintiff assigns as error on this appeal the giving of the following instruction to the jury:
To the giving of this instruction, plaintiff duly excepted as follows:
The effect of the instruction as given was to tell the jury that if defendants followed a common practice or usage as to the type and size of axle installed by them, they exercised due care as a matter of law.
Evidence that one charged with negligence followed a common practice or usage is admissible for consideration by the jury in determining whether, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, he exercised due care. In other words, it is evidence of due care, but is not conclusive as a matter of law that due care was in fact exercised. This is the law not only in this jurisdiction, but in practically every other jurisdiction. This court has repeatedly subscribed to that principle. Robertson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., ___ Or ___, 247 P2d 217, 223; Barnes v. Davidson et al., 190 Or 508, 527, 226 P2d 289; Shaver Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 172 Or 91, 109, 139 P2d 769; Silver Falls Co. v. E. & W. Lbr. Co., 149 Or 126, 174, 40 P2d 703; Hise v. City of North Bend, 138 Or 150, 164, 6 P2d 30; Myrtle Point T. Co. v. Port of Coquille River, 86 Or 311, 318, 168 *607 P 625; Richardson v. Klamath S.S. Co., 62 Or 490, 498, 126 P 24.
This rule is fully discussed in two exhaustive notes to be found in ALR: 137 ALR 611; 68 ALR 1400. Also see 38 Am Jur, Negligence, 679, § 34.
The court erred in giving the quoted instruction to the jury. Inasmuch as this instruction was addressed to one of the principal contentions of the defendants, it is obvious that it was prejudicial and its giving constitutes reversible error.
3. We note two other assignments of error very briefly, as the same questions might arise upon another trial. Plaintiff excepted to the court instructing the jury respecting defective brakes upon the motor truck as a part of defendants' affirmative defense of contributory negligence. The giving of this instruction constituted error because there was no substantial evidence in the record to warrant the submission of that specification of contributory negligence to the jury. This also is true respecting an instruction given by the court to the jury on the matter of speed of the motor truck, to which instruction plaintiff also excepted. Neither defective brakes nor speed had anything to do with the proximate cause of the accident.
Judgment reversed.