Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Holben

Citation: 2018-Ohio-5097

Docket Number: 2018-0816

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Holben, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5097.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5097 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HOLBEN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Holben, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-5097.] 
Judges—Misconduct—Jud.Cond.R. 
2.11(A)(7)(b)—Failure 
to 
recuse 
from 
proceedings in which impartiality might be questioned—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2018-0816—Submitted July 18, 2018—Decided December 20, 2018.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2017-062. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Marla R. Holben, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0041198, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.  
Holben serves as a magistrate for the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Division. 
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{¶ 2} In November 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Holben with 
judicial misconduct for failing to disqualify herself from three cases in which she 
had participated as a government lawyer prior to becoming a magistrate.  Holben 
stipulated to the charged misconduct.  After a hearing, a three-member panel of the 
Board of Professional Conduct dismissed one of the stipulated rule violations, 
found that Holben engaged in the remaining charged misconduct, and 
recommended that we publicly reprimand her.  The board issued a report adopting 
the panel’s findings and recommended sanction, and neither party has objected to 
the board’s report. 
{¶ 3} Based on our independent review of the record, we adopt the board’s 
findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} The Code of Judicial Conduct applies to magistrates as well as judges.  
See Application, Section I(B), Code of Judicial Conduct.  Jud.Cond.R. 
2.11(A)(7)(b) requires a judge or magistrate who formerly served as a government 
lawyer to disqualify himself or herself from any particular matter in which he or 
she personally and substantially participated as a governmental attorney.  A judge 
or magistrate subject to this rule “may disclose on the record the basis of the judge’s 
disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the 
presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification.”  
Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(C).  If the parties and lawyers agree, “without participation by 
the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge 
may participate in the proceeding,” and the parties’ agreement “shall be 
incorporated into the record of the proceeding.”  Id. 
{¶ 5} Prior to becoming a magistrate in December 2015, Holben served for 
nine years as an attorney for Franklin County Children Services.  She has stipulated 
that in March and April 2016—less than six months into her new position as a 
juvenile-court magistrate—she presided over three cases in which she had 
January Term, 2018 
 
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previously participated personally and substantially as a lawyer for the agency.  
Holben also stipulated that she failed to properly seek the parties’ and attorneys’ 
waiver of disqualification. 
{¶ 6} For example, in one of those cases, Holben had represented children 
services for over two years in juvenile-court proceedings involving a mother with 
chronic drug-dependency issues.  Holben had personally and substantially 
participated in the case by filing multiple motions regarding the custody of the 
mother’s two minor children, including a request to place the children in the 
custody of their maternal grandparents, and by appearing and arguing positions 
adverse to the mother in eight hearings, including an annual review hearing that 
resulted in the grandparents obtaining legal custody of one of the children. 
{¶ 7} In April 2016, children services suspected that the same mother was 
again using drugs and requested the juvenile court to grant the agency a temporary 
order of protective supervision for one of the children.  Children services also filed 
a new complaint regarding the mother’s third child, who was only one year old.  By 
that time, Holben had commenced her employment as a juvenile-court magistrate.  
Although Holben was not initially assigned to the case, the magistrate scheduled to 
preside over an April 29, 2016 preliminary hearing requested that she cover for him 
because he had formerly represented the father in the same proceeding.  Despite 
Holben’s prior involvement in the case—and despite the fact that the juvenile court 
employed seven magistrates to handle these cases—Holben agreed to hear the 
matter. 
{¶ 8} When Holben commenced the preliminary hearing, the mother had 
not yet arrived.  Holben disclosed to counsel that she had represented the agency 
on a different aspect of the case, but she did not request that the parties or counsel 
consider waiving her disqualification.  Children services requested a temporary 
order of protective supervision regarding both children, which would have 
authorized the agency to investigate and monitor the circumstances of the home 
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without removing custody from the mother.  The attorney for children services 
specifically argued that the agency “would like to work with Mother” and noted 
that the mother had submitted to a drug screen, with negative results, since the filing 
of the new allegations. 
{¶ 9} The mother arrived late for the hearing, and Holben immediately 
recognized her.  After the mother requested an attorney, Holben appointed the same 
attorney who had previously represented the mother in the case, although the 
attorney had not attended the hearing.  Holben advised the mother that if she wanted 
her attorney present, she could request a continuance after counsel for the other 
parties had the opportunity to state their requests for temporary orders.  But after 
hearing from the attorneys, Holben failed to give the mother an opportunity to 
request a continuance or respond to their arguments.  Instead, Holben issued a 
temporary order placing custody of the one-year-old child with children services, 
which was contrary to the agency’s position at the hearing.  According to the 
parties’ stipulations, Holben’s decision caused the mother to become extremely 
upset in the courtroom, and less than two weeks later, a different magistrate vacated 
Holben’s order and entered the order requested by the agency, which reunited the 
mother and child. 
{¶ 10} At her disciplinary hearing, Holben explained that she issued the 
temporary order of custody based on the allegations in the complaint and her 
concern for the safety and well-being of the one-year-old child—not based on any 
knowledge from her prior involvement in the case.  Holben also testified that she 
believed any other magistrate would have reached the same decision.  Nonetheless, 
Holben acknowledged that she should not have presided over the preliminary 
hearing and that she similarly failed to recuse herself from two other cases in which 
she had participated personally and substantially as an attorney for children 
services.  In addition, Holben admitted that although she had disclosed to the parties 
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and counsel her prior involvement in those matters, she failed to follow the waiver 
procedures set forth in Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(C). 
{¶ 11} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that 
Holben violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge to act at all times in a manner 
that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of 
the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety) and 
2.11(A)(7)(b).  We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 13} As aggravating factors, the board found that Holben committed 
multiple offenses and that her conduct caused harm to a vulnerable individual—the 
mother in the case noted above, who was effectively denied counsel and the 
opportunity to challenge the allegations made against her at the preliminary 
hearing.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4) and (8). 
{¶ 14} In mitigation, the board determined that Holben has a clean 
disciplinary record, lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, cooperated in the 
disciplinary process, and submitted evidence of good character and reputation.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5).  The board noted that in the case detailed 
above, Holben seemed primarily motivated by safety concerns for the one-year-old 
child and that the record included multiple letters, including from two juvenile-
court judges, attesting to Holben’s honesty, integrity, compassion, fairness, and 
judicial temperament.  The board also noted that Holben accepted responsibility for 
her actions and has implemented procedures to prevent this issue from recurring in 
the future.  Specifically, Holben testified that she spends at least one hour per day 
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researching cases on her docket to determine whether she had any prior 
involvement and if she finds any participation, she automatically disqualifies 
herself from the matter. 
Applicable precedent 
{¶ 15} To support its recommended sanction, the board cited Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Oldfield, 140 Ohio St.3d 123, 2014-Ohio-2963, 16 N.E.3d 581, and 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Goldie, 119 Ohio St.3d 428, 2008-Ohio-4606, 894 N.E.2d 
1226.  In Oldfield, we publicly reprimanded a judge who violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 
and 2.11(A) for failing to recuse herself from 53 cases assigned to a public defender 
who was then temporarily living with the judge and riding with the judge to the 
courthouse each day.  In addition, the judge was a potential witness in a criminal 
case pending against the public defender.  In Goldie, we publicly remanded a 
former judge who denied three defendants due process by flagrantly disregarding 
the law in sentencing matters. 
{¶ 16} The board concluded that Holben’s actions were no more egregious 
than the judicial misconduct in Oldfield and Goldie and therefore a public 
reprimand is also warranted here.  We agree.  By not disqualifying herself from 
cases in which she had participated personally and substantially as a government 
lawyer, Holben failed to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary.  But she has since acknowledged the wrongfulness 
of her misconduct and appears dedicated to ensuring that it is not repeated.  The 
board’s recommended sanction is appropriate in this case.  See also Ohio State Bar 
Assn. v. Vukelic, 102 Ohio St.3d 421, 2004-Ohio-3651, 811 N.E.2d 1127 (publicly 
reprimanding a part-time magistrate who failed to immediately recuse himself 
when one of his clients appeared before him on two misdemeanor charges). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 17} Marla R. Holben is hereby publicly reprimanded for violating 
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.11(A)(7)(b).  Costs are taxed to Holben. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and 
DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Jennifer Bondurant, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, L.P.A., and George D. Jonson, for 
respondent. 
_________________