Case Title: Westgate Condo Ass'n v. Philip Richardson Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050388

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
WESTGATE AT WILLIAMSBURG CONDOMINIUM  
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 050388 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 4, 2005 
PHILIP RICHARDSON CO., INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 
 AND JAMES CITY COUNTY 
Samuel T. Powell, III, Judge 
Westgate at Williamsburg Condominium Association, Inc. 
("the Association") appeals from the judgment of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Williamsburg and James City County which 
held that the inclusion of a parcel of real estate within a 
property description submitted pursuant to a recorded 
Declaration of Condominium ("the Condominium Declaration") was a 
scrivener's error subject to unilateral amendment by the 
condominium declarant under Code § 55-79.71(F).  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On August 19, 1997, Kotarides Builders/Developers, Inc. 
("Kotarides, Inc.") entered into a contract to purchase an 
11.913 acre parcel ("the property") from Philip Richardson Co., 
Inc. ("Richardson") in the City of Williamsburg ("the City").  
The property was not subdivided, but consisted of two contiguous 
tracts with different zoning classifications.  A nearly 11-acre 
 
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tract was zoned residential ("residential parcel"), and a .978 
acre tract ("Parcel 1A") was zoned commercial.  Kotarides, Inc. 
intended to develop a residential condominium development, 
Westgate at Williamsburg ("Westgate"), on the residential 
parcel. 
 
The evidence at trial established that Richardson intended 
to keep Parcel 1A to facilitate a hotel it owned on adjoining 
property.  However, neither Richardson nor Kotarides, Inc. 
wanted to delay the closing while a subdivision application was 
submitted and processed by the City to formally subdivide the 
property into the residential parcel and Parcel 1A.  Therefore, 
Richardson intentionally conveyed the entire property to 752, 
LLC ("the LLC"),1 the assignee of Kotarides, Inc., which was 
fully cognizant that the property acquired consisted of both the 
residential parcel and Parcel 1A. 
Pete Alex Kotarides, project manager for the development, 
testified that Kotarides, Inc. and Richardson had always agreed 
that Parcel 1A "needed to end up back with . . . Richardson." To 
that end, the parties agreed that Kotarides, Inc. would lease 
                                                          
 
1 Kotarides, Inc. formed 752, LLC solely for the purpose of 
purchasing the residential property and developing Westgate.  
752, LLC was the successor in interest to Kotarides, Inc.'s 
interest in the property.  Pete Alex Kotarides was the project 
manager in charge of Westgate for 752, LLC and designated by the 
LLC to act for it. 
 
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that parcel back to Richardson, and the purchase agreement gave 
Richardson a six-year option to reacquire Parcel 1A.2 
 
Prior to closing, Kotarides, Inc. hired AES Consulting 
Engineers ("AES") to prepare site plans for the development of 
Westgate. The site plans described Parcel 1A as the "Lease 
Parcel," and showed no part of the condominium project actually 
being built on Parcel 1A.  After closing in March 1998, the LLC 
directed AES to prepare a metes and bounds property description 
and plat of the condominium property for purposes of the 
Condominium Declaration.  Although the site plans described 
Parcel 1A as a "Lease Parcel," AES included the entire property 
the LLC acquired from Richardson, Parcel 1A and the residential 
parcel, in both the metes and bounds description and the plat of 
the condominium property. 
George T. Wilson, Jr., a land surveyor for AES, testified 
that the LLC never instructed AES to include or exclude Parcel 
1A as part of the metes and bounds description or the plat.  He 
testified that the LLC asked AES to prepare a property 
description and plat for the property owned by the LLC.  AES 
                                                          
 
 
2 This arrangement allowed the parties to complete the sale 
without waiting for the property to be subdivided.  The parties 
later shortened the option to 30 days from the date of the sale, 
but Kotarides, Inc.'s successor in interest, 752, LLC, agreed to 
the sale in May 2002 even though that option period had expired. 
 
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sent the draft documents to Mr. Kotarides and Elizabeth L. 
White, the LLC's attorney, for review. 
Mr. Kotarides testified that he reviewed the plat and 
concluded "that the lease parcel was not included."  He did not 
review the metes and bounds description.  Ms. White reviewed 
both drafts and suggested a number of changes, none of which 
questioned the accuracy of including Parcel 1A in the plat or 
metes and bounds description.  Mr. Kotarides admitted that he 
"didn't look at [the drafts] carefully enough."3 
By Declaration of Condominium under Code § 55-79.54, dated 
May 28, 1999, and recorded June 3, 1999, the LLC created "a 
condominium regime by submitting the real estate in Exhibit A-1" 
attached to the Declaration to the applicable provisions of the 
Condominium Act, Code § 55-79.39, et seq.  Exhibit A-1 was the 
metes and bounds description of the property which included both 
the residential parcel and Parcel 1A.  Exhibit A-2, a plat of 
survey prepared by AES, was also attached to the Declaration 
which identified Exhibit A-2 as "showing the location and 
dimensions of the real estate comprising the Condominium 
. . . ." 
                                                          
 
3 The LLC also used the AES plat and metes and bounds 
description to prepare a marketing brochure and a public 
offering statement, both of which indicated Parcel 1A was part 
of the condominium property.  Mr. Kotarides testified that he 
reviewed the brochure and the statement before they were printed 
and did not point out any mistakes. 
 
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The LLC also established the Association, and its members 
controlled the Association's Board of Directors.  On June 14, 
1999, the LLC sold the first unit of Westgate. 
In January 2001, Richardson notified the LLC of its intent 
to repurchase Parcel 1A.  Mr. Kotarides then learned that Parcel 
1A had been included in the Westgate condominium property when 
he began to draw up the documents to complete the transfer of 
that parcel to Richardson.  To facilitate the transfer to 
Richardson, the LLC recorded a Correction Amendment to the 
Condominium Declaration on March 16, 2001, which stated that 
"the legal description and the plat for Phase One erroneously 
included .978 acres of land that was never intended to be 
subjected to the Condominium."  The Correction Amendment recited 
that "§ 55-79.71(F) of the Act allows the Declarant to 
unilaterally correct any scrivener's error in the condominium 
instrument" as the basis for the LLC's action.  On May 1, 2002, 
the LLC conveyed Parcel 1A to Richardson and executed a 
reciprocal deed of easement and maintenance agreement between 
the LLC, the Association, and Richardson.4  That afternoon, the 
LLC transferred control of the Association to the unit owners. 
                                                          
 
4 The reciprocal deed obligated the Association to maintain 
the access road on Parcel 1A.  Mr. Kotarides' father, Alex Pete 
Kotarides, signed it as Manager of the LLC and as the Vice 
President of the Association. 
 
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On November 20, 2002, the Association, representing the 
unit owners, filed a bill of complaint to quiet title against 
the LLC and Richardson, alleging the attempt to remove Parcel 1A 
from the condominium property by unilateral action in the 
Correction Amendment was unlawful.  The Association asked the 
trial court to declare the Correction Amendment, the deed 
transferring Parcel 1A to Richardson, and the reciprocal deed of 
easement and maintenance agreement "null, void, and of no 
effect."  The Association also requested attorneys' fees under 
Code § 55-79.53(A).5  By final decree dated November 22, 2004, 
incorporating a letter opinion of August 11, 2004, the trial 
court entered judgment for the LLC and Richardson and awarded 
the LLC attorneys’ fees of $51,264.71.  In so doing the trial 
court agreed with the LLC and Richardson that a scrivener's 
error had occurred.  The trial court made these findings in its 
letter opinion: 
                                                          
 
5 Richardson filed an answer to the Association's bill of 
complaint and cross-bills against the LLC and Kotarides, Inc.  
The LLC filed a demurrer, answer and affirmative defenses to the 
Association's bill of complaint, a demurrer and answer to 
Richardson's cross-bill.  Kotarides, Inc. demurred to 
Richardson's cross-bill.  The trial court overruled both the 
LLC's demurrer to the Association's bill of complaint and the 
LLC's and Kotarides, Inc.'s demurrers to Richardson's cross-
bill.  Thereupon, Kotarides, Inc. filed an answer and 
affirmative defenses to Richardson's cross-bill.  The trial 
court dismissed Richardson's cross-bills as moot upon entering 
the final judgment.  The cross-bills are not the subject of this 
appeal. 
 
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The Court finds that Richardson sold a parcel of 
land to Kotarides, which consisted of 11.913 acres.  
The parcel contained two zoning designations, a .978 
acre parcel was zoned B-2 and the balance zoned RM-2.  
That Richardson did not intend to convey the .978 acre 
parcel to Kotarides, but rather intended to use the 
.978 acre parcel for a parking lot for his planned 
expansion of his hotel, which is adjacent to the .978 
acre parcel.  Richardson did convey the entire parcel 
to Kotarides to expedite Kotarides' plan to develop 
condominiums on the property zoned RM-2.  That 
Kotarides granted Richardson an option to purchase the 
.978-acre parcel back for a nominal amount.  That 
Kotarides (now 752 LLC) had land development plans 
created for the condominium project, which included a 
description of the entire parcel purchased from 
Richardson, including the .978-acre parcel zoned B-2.  
That 752 LLC subjected the entire parcel to the 
condominium declaration.  That the plat which 
describes the parcel to be subjected to the 
condominium project is detailed and difficult to 
follow.  That 752 LLC did not intend to subject the 
.978-acre parcel to the condominium regime.  The Court 
finds based upon the facts set forth that the .978 
acre parcel was included in the condominium 
declaration by error. 
 
The Court further finds that error of including 
the .978-acre parcel in the condominium description 
was contrary to the intent of 752 LLC.  The error was 
not in the creation of the plat by the surveyor, but 
rather its[] use in the description of the property to 
be subjected to the condominium declaration.  The 
error was in making the [Declaration] contrary to the 
intent of 752 LLC. 
 
 
The Association makes four assignments of error to the 
judgment of the trial court.  The Association contends the 
trial court erred in (1) finding that the inclusion of 
Parcel 1A in the Condominium Declaration property 
description and plat was a scrivener's error, (2) 
disregarding the property ownership interest of the unit 
 
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owners, (3) treating the Condominium Declaration as a deed 
and concluding that the association and unit owners were 
one and the same, and (4) awarding attorneys' fees to the 
LLC. 
We agree with the Association that the trial court 
erred in holding that the inclusion of Parcel 1A in the 
Condominium Declaration property description was a 
scrivener's error under Code § 55-79.71(F). 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Standard of Review 
 
The LLC and Richardson assert that our standard of review 
in this case is that of "plain error."  "When the chancellor 
hears evidence ore tenus, his decree is entitled to the same 
weight as a jury verdict, and [the Court is] bound by the 
chancellor's findings of fact unless they are plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support them."  Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. 
Mill Two Associates P'ship, 259 Va. 685, 696, 529 S.E.2d 318, 
325 (2000).  They contend that whether a scrivener's error 
occurred is solely a question of fact, citing Marsteller v. 
Warden, 115 Va. 353, 79 S.E. 332 (1913).  In their view, the 
chancellor's findings of fact as to what occurred concerning 
Parcel 1A results in a finding of a scrivener's error as a 
conclusion only of fact.  We disagree. 
 
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While the trial court's findings of actual factual 
occurrences such as that Parcel 1A was included in the 
property description and plat contrary to the intent of the 
LLC and Richardson, is entitled to deference, the ultimate 
conclusion whether that mistake is a scrivener's error 
under Code § 55-79.71(F) is a question of law.  We review 
questions of law de novo, including those situations where 
there is a mixed question of law and fact.  See Barter 
Found., Inc. v. Widener, 267 Va. 80, 90, 592 S.E.2d 56, 61 
(2004) (We review the trial court’s "application of the law 
de novo, while giving deference to [its] factual 
findings.").  Our decision in Marsteller did not establish 
a rule that the question of a scrivener's error is solely 
an issue of fact.  That case dealt with the parol evidence 
rule and made only a passing reference to whether a 
scrivener had in fact omitted a provision from a contract 
by inadvertence.  Marsteller, 115 Va. at 356, 79 S.E. at 
333. 
B. Scrivener's Error 
 
A condominium is created when a declarant records a 
condominium instrument.  Code § 55-79.45.  A declaration of 
condominium must include, among other things, a legal 
description by metes and bounds of the land submitted to the 
condominium regime and a plat showing the location and dimension 
 
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of submitted lands.  Code §§ 55-79.54(a), -79.58(A).  "If there 
is no unit owner other than the declarant, the declarant may 
unilaterally amend the condominium instruments," but if "there 
is any unit owner other than the declarant, the condominium 
instruments shall be amended only by agreement of unit owners"  
as set forth in Code § 55-79.71(A),(B).  The declarant may, 
however, "unilaterally execute and record a corrective amendment 
or supplement to the condominium instruments to correct . . . a 
scrivener's error," among other things.  Code § 55-79.71(F). 
 
The LLC argues on appeal that the inclusion of Parcel 1A in 
the property description and plats incorporated in the 
condominium instruments was a scrivener's error and thus, it was 
entitled to amend the Condominium Declaration to correct that 
error.  The Association differentiates between a scrivener's 
error and other mistakes, contending that Code § 55-79.71(F), 
allowing declarants to unilaterally correct scriveners' errors, 
does not apply because the record reflects no cognizable 
scrivener's error. 
 
The correction of a scrivener's error is a court- 
sanctioned action reforming a contract or other document.  We 
note, however, that a court's role in "correcting" documents is 
limited.  The rule is well-settled that a court is not permitted 
to rewrite a document or add terms not included by the parties.  
See, e.g., Bentley Funding Group, L.L.C. v. SK&R Group, L.L.C., 
 
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269 Va. 315, 330, 609 S.E.2d 49, 56 (2005) (court cannot alter 
the provisions of or add to the plain language of a contract);  
Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 310, 608 S.E.2d 
901, 904 (2005) (court determines the intent of the testator 
from the plain language of the will and cannot add words to the 
will).  A scrivener's error presents an exception to this 
general rule, because as the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit has observed, scrivener's errors "are 
difficult to prevent, and . . . no useful social purpose is 
served by enforcing . . . mistaken term[s]." S.T.S. Transport 
Service, Inc. v. Volvo White Truck Corp., 766 F.2d 1089, 1093 
(7th Cir. 1985).  Thus, a change to a document because of a 
scrivener's error presents a significant exception to a well-
established rule, so we must construe that term narrowly.  See, 
e.g., Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 149, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 
(1996) (A court's authority to correct a clerical error under 
Code § 8.01-428(B) should be narrowly construed and applied.). 
 
Although we have not previously had occasion to examine 
what constitutes a scrivener’s error under Code § 55-79.71(F), 
we have examined the term and related terms in other contexts.  
For example, "clerical mistakes" under Code § 8.01-428(B) may be 
scrivener's errors.  Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp., 
264 Va. 279, 283, 568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002). 
 
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In Wellmore Coal, we adopted the language of the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, noting that scrivener's errors are those 
which are "demonstrably contradicted by all other documents."  
Id. (citing Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va. App. 126, 133, 562 S.E.2d 336, 
339 (2002)).  Examples of such errors include  
a typographical mistake made by a court reporter in 
transcribing a trial transcript, counsel's failure to 
prepare an order for entry by the trial court, and a 
misstatement on the record by the trial court 
regarding the length of incarceration a defendant was 
ordered to serve. 
 
Zhou, 38 Va. App. at 133-34, 562 S.E.2d at 339 (citations 
omitted). 
 
Our description of scriveners' errors in Wellmore Coal 
parallels that of the Illinois Court of Appeals, which defined 
such errors as those evidenced in the writing that can be proven 
without parol evidence. Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life 
Assurance Co., 640 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994).  
Scrivener's errors tend to occur singularly; they are not 
"continuous, ongoing, and repeated."  Id.  The scrivener's error 
in our recent decision in State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Remley, 270 Va. 209, 221, 618 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2005), fits this 
description.  In Remley, we found that a default judgment 
against the defendant tortfeasor which listed him as both the 
plaintiff and the defendant was a scrivener's error as "[a] 
review of the default judgment order . . . compels the reader to 
 
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conclude" which of the parties was the plaintiff.  Id.  See also 
State v. Rosario, 680 A.2d 237, 239-41 (Conn. 1996) (date of 
events specified in search warrant affidavit were scrivener's 
errors where the date of the affiant's signature and a police 
case file number clearly indicated that the operative facts 
occurred in the current rather than a prior year); Dunton v. 
Tanigoshi, 190 P. 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920) (notice of hearing 
which listed the wrong weekday was sufficient because it 
contained the correct date). 
In Morgan v. Russrand Triangle Assocs., Inc., 270 Va. 
21, 26, 613 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2005), we reversed the trial 
court's judgment that its entry of a final order was a 
scrivener's error because it actually intended to grant a 
party's motion to reconsider instead.  We noted that  
[c]haracterizing the signing of the order by the 
trial judge, and by counsel for both parties, as 
an "oversight" or an "inadvertent error" is 
inconsistent with the affirmative acts of the 
trial court and counsel. Not only were all 
signatories aware that they were signing an order 
disposing of the merits of the case consistent 
with the trial court's previous opinion letter, 
all signatories are charged with the knowledge 
that an order is entered when signed by the trial 
judge. 
 
Id.  Similarly, in Wellmore Coal, 264 Va. at 283, 568 
S.E.2d at 673, we held that an attorney’s failure to timely 
sign a document before submitting it to the Court did not 
 
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constitute a clerical error, which, in that context, was 
synonymous with a scrivener's error. 
 
In M'Mahon v. Spangler, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 51, 51-52 
(1826), a buyer of real estate alleged he agreed to 
purchase a certain number of acres at a certain price, and 
that the contract which conveyed to him the seller's 
"right, title, interest and claim" in a tract of land in 
gross, without further specificity, was a scrivener's 
error.  Relying on the contract drafter's testimony that 
"he first made a rough draft of the contract, altering it 
to suit the views of the parties: that then he wrote it 
over fair, and read it to them distinctly more than once: 
that they seemed perfectly satisfied, and executed it[,]" 
this Court held that despite the buyer's attested 
intention, there was no error by the scrivener in preparing 
the contract.  Id. at 57. 
The complaint in M'Mahon is very similar to that made 
here, and the resolution of that case is instructive.  As 
in M'Mahon, a rough draft of the condominium transfer 
documents including the plat and metes and bounds 
description was made and tendered to the LLC, whose 
representative, Mr. Kotarides, and attorney, Ms. White, 
examined it.  Suggestions for corrections were made by them 
to AES and adopted as changes before a final version was 
 
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submitted for review, executed and recorded.  None of those 
suggested changes involved removing Parcel 1A from the 
property submitted to the condominium regime for Westgate.  
The preparation, review, revision and adoption of the 
Westgate real estate documents were analogous to those in 
M'Mahon: the drafter "made a rough draft . . . , altering 
it to suit the views of the parties: . . . wrote it over 
fair, . . . that they seemed perfectly satisfied, and 
executed it."  25 Va. at 57. 
 
In light of the forgoing, we cannot agree with the trial 
court's determination that a scrivener's error occurred in this 
case.  The alleged error was neither typographical nor clerical.  
There was no finding that AES, the scrivener, had transposed a 
call in the metes and bounds description, recited an erroneous 
deed book reference or similar error commonly recognized as a 
scrivener's error.  Instead, the trial court specifically found 
that there was no drafting error, but instead, based its 
judgment only on the LLC's intent that Parcel 1A should not have 
been included in the condominium property. 
 
The Court further finds that error of including 
the .978-acre parcel in the condominium description 
was contrary to the intent of 752 LLC.  The error was 
not in the creation of the plat by the surveyor, but 
rather its[] use in the description of the property to 
be subjected to the condominium declaration.  The 
error was in making the [Declaration] contrary to the 
intent of 752 LLC. 
 
 
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(Emphasis added). 
 
The trial court's factual finding, to which we accord 
deference, is that the transaction failed to accurately 
express the intent of the LLC as declarant of the 
Condominium Declaration.  However, that finding of a 
factual occurrence does not support a conclusion of law 
that the occurrence was a scrivener's error cognizable 
under Code § 55-79.71(F).  The trial court found no error 
in AES' preparation of the real estate descriptions 
attached to the Condominium Declaration.  "The error was 
not in the creation of the plat by the surveyor."  Further, 
there was no finding that the scrivener was directed to 
exclude Parcel 1A, but nonetheless erroneously wrote it 
into the property description. 
Like the real estate contract in M'Mahon, which was 
submitted, revised with the parties' changes, reviewed 
again and executed, the fact that a party's intent was not 
fully reflected cannot be attributed to an error of the 
scrivener.  Instead, the error lies with the party's 
inattention to the detail before him.  Mr. Kotarides, 
himself, admitted: "[He] didn't look at [the property 
description and plat] carefully enough." 
The inclusion of Parcel 1A in the condominium was not 
an inadvertent, singular mistake, easily understood with 
 
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reference to the remainder of the Condominium Declaration.  
Rather, all the documents describing the property submitted 
to the condominium regime showed Parcel 1A as part of that 
property.  Further, the mistake was borne out in successive 
documents.  The marketing brochures and the public offering 
statement contained the same information, went through the 
same review process and were also approved by Mr. 
Kotarides. 
The error in this case was not that of the scrivener's 
transcription of the real estate description, but in the 
review process of the parties.  Construing the term 
narrowly, as we must, we find there was no error by the 
scrivener, AES, in the transcription of the document.  
Accordingly, there was no scrivener's error under Code 
§ 55-79.71(F), which permitted the LLC to record the 
Correction Amendment.  The trial court thus erred in 
concluding otherwise and awarding judgment for the LLC and 
Richardson. 
C. Attorneys' Fees 
 
Failure to comply with the Condominium Act entitles a 
prevailing party to attorneys' fees under Code § 55-
79.53(A) which the trial court awarded against the 
Association.  However, since the trial court erred in 
granting judgment to the LLC and Richardson, those parties 
 
18
are not prevailing parties entitled to the statutory award.  
The Association, not the LLC or Richardson, is the 
prevailing party "entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs expended in the matter" under Code § 55-
79.53(A).  See, e.g., Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 
Va. 544, 548-49, 587 S.E.2d 521, 523 (2003) (equating 
"prevailing party" with "successful party").  Accordingly, 
the trial court's award of attorneys' fees against the 
Association cannot stand. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of Parcel 1A in the property description and 
plat of the Condominium Declaration was not a scrivener's error.  
Therefore, the LLC was not entitled to remove that parcel from 
the condominium unilaterally by the Correction Amendment under 
Code § 55-79.71(F).  Further, because the trial court erred in 
granting judgment to the LLC and Richardson, those parties are 
not entitled to attorneys' fees under Code § 55-79.53(A).6  We 
will therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                          
 
6 As we reverse the trial court's judgment under the first 
assignment of error, we do not address the Association's second 
and third assignments of error.