Case Title: BRIAN K. HOLLOMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRIAN K. HOLLOMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 25106 P.3d 879Case Number: 03-160Decided: 02/28/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                
   

 
 
BRIAN K. 
HOLLOMAN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Koski, Wyoming Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. 
Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; and Jeff Stanbury, Antoine Tissot, 
and Sean C. Chambers, Student Interns.  
Argument by Mr. Chambers.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Tibbetts.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, DJ., 
retired.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Brian 
K. Holloman (Holloman), was convicted of murder in the first degree and 
sentenced to life in prison.  He 
claims that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding from the 
evidence the criminal records of both the victim of his crime, as well as that 
of a third person present at the scene of the crime.  Holloman also contends that the trial 
court committed reversible error in allowing prejudicial character evidence to 
be called to the attention of the jury.  
We will affirm. 

 
 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Holloman advances 
these issues:

 
 
1.  Did 
the trial court commit reversible error by improperly excluding the criminal 
records of both Doug Johnson and Herman Thunder Hawk[?]  Did the exclusion of the criminal 
records violate Mr. Holloman's constitutional right to present a defense of 
self-defense?

 
 
2.  In 
violation of W.R.E. 404(b) and Mr. Holloman's due process rights, did the trial 
court erroneously permit the State to use inadmissible character evidence to 
portray Brian Holloman as a liar, a spiteful person, a vigilante and, therefore, 
a murderer?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues only slightly:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court commit reversible error by excluding evidence 
concerning the victim's and Herman Thunder Hawk's prior criminal 
conduct?

 
 
II.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion in not preventing the State 
from introducing allegedly inadmissible W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence?

 
 
In his 
reply brief, Holloman addresses these additional issues spawned by the State's 
brief:

 
 
1.  Thunder 
Hawk was not a victim of the crime for which Mr. Holloman was on trial, however 
his criminal record should be admissible under W.R.E. 404(a)(2) and 
alternatively if Thunder Hawk's testimony is found inadmissible under 404(a)(2), 
Mr. Holloman's right to present a defense supercedes a rule of evidence 
(responding to new argument in brief of appellee).

 
 
2.  The 
trial court did not rule that the proof of Thunder Hawk and Johnson's criminal 
history was insufficient.

 
 
3.  In 
addressing the harmlessness of excluding the criminal records of Thunder Hawk 
and Johnson, the [State] ignores the testimony of Thunder Hawk and the testimony 
of several witnesses to Johnson's death.

 
 
4.  Mr. 
Holloman's pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under 
W.R.E. 404(b) operates as a timely objection under this Court's decision in 
Howard v. State [2002 WY 40, 42 P.3d 483 (Wyo. 
2002)].

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Holloman was 
previously convicted of this same crime, and we reversed that conviction on the 
basis that the trial court failed to give requested self-defense 
instructions.  Holloman v. 
State, 2002 WY 117, 51 P.3d 214 (Wyo. 2002) (Holloman I).  Although there were some slight 
variations in the evidence at the second trial, we refer our readers to the 
statement of the facts contained in our earlier opinion, and we set out below 
only those facts most pertinent to this appeal.  Holloman I, at 
¶¶4-14.

 
 
[¶4]      The State's 
theory of the case, in essence, was that Holloman, the victim Douglas Johnson, 
and a third man, Herman Thunder Hawk, were all in a hotel room on the third 
story of the Idelman Hotel in downtown Cheyenne, on July 25, 1999.  Thunder Hawk was the tenant in the 
residential hotel, Johnson was a homeless individual who visited Thunder Hawk 
regularly over the weeks preceding the crime, and Holloman was a transient who 
had come to Cheyenne on July 24, 1999, on a freight 
train.  The three men had been 
drinking heavily that day, and both Thunder Hawk and Holloman were self-admitted 
alcoholics who drank significant quantities of alcohol on a daily basis.  The evidence was conclusive that all 
three men were very intoxicated (Johnson .36 BAC, Holloman .33 BAC, and Thunder 
Hawk .27 BAC).

 
 
[¶5]      The crime 
occurred during daylight hours and the streets of Cheyenne were busy because the annual Frontier 
Days celebration was in progress.  
The State's evidence demonstrated that, although there was no apparent 
motive for the crime, Holloman first dangled the victim of his crime from a 
third-story hotel window for several minutes and then either dropped him, or 
forcibly pushed him, out of the window.  
Johnson fell to his death on the sidewalk below.  Many witnesses were situated on the 
street below, or immediately across the street from the hotel, and they 
testified that they saw Holloman do this, and that he frustrated the efforts of 
Thunder Hawk to come to Johnson's rescue.1

 
 
[¶6]      Thunder Hawk 
testified that he was in the bathroom of the hotel room and heard no commotion 
in the living area of the room.  
However, when he came out into that area, he found Holloman attempting to 
push Johnson out a window.  Thunder 
Hawk related that he attempted to assist Johnson to get back inside the room but 
that Holloman punched him and prevented him from helping Johnson.  Thunder Hawk's testimony was very clear 
that Holloman pushed Johnson out the window.

 
 
[¶7]      Holloman, on the 
other hand, contended that when he attempted to turn down blaringly loud music 
being played on a radio/cassette recorder, he was punched in the side of his 
face ("blindsided") by someone he could not see.  Holloman had a large wound on the side 
of his face that he had suffered in an alley fight the day before,2 and the blow to that area of his 
face was excruciatingly painful causing him to become disoriented.  The wound was inflicted by a broken beer 
bottle and required many stitches to suture it shut.  Photographic evidence demonstrated the 
size and severity of the injury as it appeared shortly after Holloman was 
arrested for this crime.  He did not 
know for sure who delivered the punch, although in his testimony he agreed that 
only Thunder Hawk and Johnson were in the hotel room with him.  His theory of the case was that 
Johnson's death was a tragic accident and that Johnson simply fell out the open 
window in the tumult that followed the punch to Holloman's 
face.

 
 

 
 
[¶8]      Holloman 
challenges the district court's rulings on the admission or exclusion of 
evidence in two respects.  First, he 
contends that the district court erred in making a liminal ruling that Holloman 
would not be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the prior criminal 
records of both Johnson and Thunder Hawk under W.R.E. 404(a)(2).3  Second, Holloman contends that the 
district court erred in allowing the admission of evidence of prior bad acts 
committed by Holloman.

 
 

 
 
[¶9]      Holloman contends 
that by prohibiting him from making any reference to the past crimes committed 
by Johnson and Thunder Hawk, he was deprived of his constitutional right to 
present a defense.  "Mr. Holloman 
sought to introduce the criminal records of Mr. Johnson and Thunder Hawk to show 
that both had a propensity towards violence.  This would serve as evidence that one or 
both of these men was the first aggressor and that Mr. Holloman responded in 
self-defense.  By not being allowed 
to present such evidence, Mr. Holloman was prevented from effectively 
demonstrating to the jury that he acted in self defense."

 
 
[¶10]   Evidentiary rulings are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy 
of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the 
evidence.  This Court will generally 
accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence 
unless that court clearly abused its discretion.  We have described the standard of an 
abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial 
court's choice.  Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria.  It also means exercising 
sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without 
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  
In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial 
court's determination.  The burden 
is on the defendant to establish such abuse.  Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶13, 
74 P.3d 699, 707, ¶13 (Wyo. 2003); and see Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 
45-47 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
[¶11]   Holloman asserts that we must 
evaluate this issue as a violation of due process of law.  We are convinced that the standard of 
review recited above is the appropriate standard in these circumstances and 
decline to address the "constitutional" argument propounded in Holloman's 
brief.

 
 
[¶12]   We have recognized that there are 
circumstances where the character of the victim of a crime may be relevant, 
especially in those instances where the defendant contends that an assault or a 
homicide was justified because the victim was the first aggressor and was known 
to be of a violent character.  Such 
evidence is not offered for the sake of proving the victim's bad character, but 
rather to explain defendant's motive and what he might have reasonably 
apprehended as to the danger he faced.  
See, e.g., Edwards, 973 P.3d at 45-47; Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1067-69 (Wyo. 1987); State v. 
Velsir, 159 P.2d 371,373-74, (Wyo. 1945) 
(principle recognized, but exclusion of such evidence not error where offer of 
proof inadequate); and Mortimore v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 474-75, 161 P. 766, 772 (Wyo. 1916).  Although we will not discuss them in 
detail here, the authorities we will set out below explain that character 
evidence relating to the victim of a homicide, as well as other third parties 
present, may be admissible if the offered evidence is competent, relevant, 
material, foundation is adequate, and remoteness of the evidence does not 
counsel against its admission. 

 
 
[¶13]   We decline to apply that general 
evidentiary principle here because Holloman's offer of proof with regard to all 
such evidence was inadequate.4   The only proof offered was a 
laundry list of prior offenses for both men, without regard to such matters as 
the adequacy of foundation, relevancy, competency, materiality, or remoteness of 
the evidence.

 
 
[¶14]   With respect to Johnson, a notice 
of intent to introduce his prior violent criminal history was submitted for the 
trial court's consideration.  It 
contained 13 paragraphs.  Seven of 
those paragraphs listed arrests and charges that had either been dismissed, or 
the disposition of the crime was unknown.  
No details of the exact nature of any of those crimes was submitted for 
the district court's consideration (although they were categorized, e.g., as 
assault, robbery, and fighting).  
Two items related to what was apparently one event that occurred on April 
13, 1989, in New 
Mexico.  The 
crimes were aggravated assault and robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and 
Johnson was convicted of both crimes.  
No details about those incidents were provided to the district court and 
the only "proof" proposed by the defense was to offer certified copies of 
judgments.  The list also included a 
conviction for obstructing a police officer in Montana in 1996, but again no additional 
information was offered to show the relevancy of that offense.  Johnson was convicted in Oregon, in 1980, of 
carrying a concealed weapon, but once again no details were made available for 
the district court's consideration.  
The twelfth item on the list was an assertion (according to Holloman, 
without more) that Johnson was a member of the Freight Train Riders of America, 
an organization of transient train riders reputed to be violent people.  The thirteenth paragraph suggested that 
more items might be added to the list later, but none were.  Holloman did not propose to have any 
witness testify to Johnson's reputation for violence, or as to specific acts of 
which the witness had personal knowledge.  
See W.R.E. 405.5

 
 
[¶15]   With respect to Thunder Hawk, 
Holloman offered a much shorter list that included 1975 convictions for robbery, 
assault, and failure to appear in California, fraudulent use of a credit card in 
1978, third degree sexual assault in 1990, and providing false information in 
1993.  Holloman did not propose to 
have any witness testify to Thunder Hawk's reputation for violence or for 
truthfulness.

 
 
[¶16]   We need not discuss these asserted 
errors more dispositively because Holloman's offer of proof, as well as his 
proposed method of proof, simply did not require the district court to take any 
other action than that which it did take.  
The district court tentatively granted the State's liminal motion to 
prevent that evidence from coming before the jury, but did not prohibit Holloman 
from raising the issue again if the district court's legitimate concerns were 
assuaged by further development of the proposed proof.6  Holloman was not denied the opportunity 
to "develop" this evidence; he simply failed to do so.  See generally Person v. State, 
2004 WY 149, ¶¶19-21, 100 P.3d 1270, ¶¶19-21 (Wyo. 2004).  Although our resolution of this issue 
does not call upon us to employ it here, for a more complete and scholarly 
discussion of the more subtle nuances of F.R.E. 404(a)(2) (and thus W.R.E. 
404(a)(2) as well), see 1 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 103 (Character of Victim:  Initial Proof and Rebuttal), at 566-73, 
§ 104 (Character of Witness), at 573-74, and § 105 (Character as Element of 
Charge or Defense (Insanity and Other Issues)), at 574-81 (1994 2nd 
ed. and Supp. 2004); and H. H. Henry, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence 
as to Other's Character or Reputation for Turbulence on Question of Self-Defense 
by One Charged with Assault or Homicide, 1 A.L.R.3d 571 (1965 and Supp. 
2004) (With respect to Thunder Hawk see § 9, "Evidence as to character of third 
persons.").

 
 
[¶17]   We hold that the district court's 
liminal ruling that the offered evidence was not admissible was not erroneous in 
these circumstances.

 
 

 
 
[¶18]   
Holloman filed a demand for notice of the State's intent to introduce 
W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  The State 
gave such a notice and indicated it would offer these items of evidence that 
were in the nature of 404(b) evidence:  
(1)  That Holloman was 
involved in a fight over a dog that resulted in the injury to his face on July 
24, 1999; (2)  that Holloman used an 
alias in the course of his contact with police and health care personnel when 
they responded to his call for assistance after the July 24, 1999, injury; and 
(3) that Holloman indicated he would seek retribution against the person who 
injured him on July 24, 1999.  It is 
apparent from the record that no hearing was held on this matter as required by 
our governing precedents.

 
 
[¶19]   Holloman first asserts that the 
prosecutor erred by including in his opening argument an item of 404(b) evidence 
that was not included in the State's notice.  That incident involved Holloman punching 
out a third person, for no apparent reason, just hours before the killing of 
Johnson.  Defense counsel objected, 
but the trial court overruled the objection.  At Holloman's previous trial, the 
district court determined that that evidence was not admissible.  Of course, we must presume that the 
prosecutor was aware of that ruling and acted in disregard of it.  Nonetheless, the trial court eventually 
held that the evidence was not admissible and the jury did not hear anything 
further about it.  The jury was 
instructed that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.  Although the prosecutor clearly acted 
improperly, and seemingly deliberately, after considering the totality of the 
circumstances, as well as the overwhelming evidence of Holloman's guilt, we deem 
the error harmless. W.R.A.P.  
9.04.

 
 
[¶20]   Holloman contends that the district 
court erred in admitting other evidence in violation of W.R.E. 404(b).7  Much of this evidence related to 
Holloman's conduct on the day preceding the murder, when he was attacked by a 
third party who was a stranger to the events of July 25, 1999.  We recently set out a comprehensive 
statement of the standard of review applicable when an issue such as this is 
raised.  We will not iterate that 
standard in detail here.  
Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶¶8-13, 99 P.3d 432, ¶¶8-13 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶21]   Holloman asserts the prosecution 
made improper use of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence in several respects.  First, he contends that the prosecutor 
employed Holloman's use of an alias in a prejudicial manner that impugned his 
character and amounted to bad acts evidence.  We agree that a portion of the 
prosecutor's use of that evidence, as well as portions of his argument in that 
regard, were erroneous because it is evident that it was used (both in argument 
and in the State's case-in-chief) for the sole purpose of demonstrating bad 
character and a criminal mindset.  
See United States 
v. Williams, 739 F.2d 297, 299-300 (7th 
Cir. 1984); and Commonwealth v. Martin, 809 N.E.2d 536, 537-38 
(Mass. 
2004).   However, that evidence 
was admissible once Holloman took the stand and testified in his own 
defense.  Such evidence is 
admissible to impeach a defendant's credibility, as well as for some other 
limited purposes.  See, e.g., 
State v. Martinez, 621 N.W.2d 689, 695-96 (Iowa App. 2000); State v. 
Elmore, 985 P.2d 289, 310 (Wash. 1999); State v. Johnson, 950 P.2d 981, 990 (Wash.App. Div. 2 1998); and State v. Bergeron, 470 N.W.2d 322, 
324-26 (Wisc.App. 1991).  Thus, the 
fact that Holloman did use an alias, indeed the record indicates he used two of 
them, was properly called to the attention of the jury in order to test his 
credibility.  Given that 
circumstance, as well as the overwhelming evidence of Holloman's guilt in the 
death of Johnson, we conclude that the evidence did not affect a substantial 
right belonging to Holloman, and we consider any error in this respect 
harmless.  W.R.A.P.  9.04.

 
 
[¶22]   Second, Holloman contends that the 
testimony of two witnesses who had contact with him the day before the crime 
constituted W.R.E. 404(b) evidence that was admitted without compliance with the 
standards we have placed in force.  
Cheyenne Police Officer Debra Stowe was called to the scene of a downtown 
convenience store after Holloman called for medical assistance when his face was 
slashed on July 24, 1999.  She 
testified that Holloman used an alias, was "angry," "combative," "changed his 
story" several times about the incident that occurred that day, and interpreted 
a comment he made about the incident to mean that he wanted to "take care" of 
the individual himself if "he ever saw that individual again."  Of course, the record is clear that 
Johnson had nothing to do with the July 24, 1999, attack on Holloman.  The defense objected to some of this 
testimony, but the objections were not ruled on definitively, nor did the 
defense ask for a limiting instruction or other remedial action at the 
time.

 
 
[¶23]   Colleen Capson, an employee of the 
Cheyenne Radiology Group, was called to testify about her contact with Holloman 
on July 24, 1999, when he appeared at her place of employment for an x-ray.  She characterized Holloman as "solemn," 
"concentrating," and "a little mad."  
In response to a question to him about the person who had injured him so 
severely, she related that Holloman said "he was going to take care of it."  After that she did not speak with 
Holloman further because of her subjective sense that he gave her the 
"creeps."  The defense lodged no 
objections to this testimony.

 
 
[¶24]   At best, it is quite difficult to 
pinpoint the competence or relevance of much of the above-described 
testimony.  As suggested by 
Holloman, it does appear to be directed solely at a tendency on his part to be 
angry and violent, and having a desire for vigilante justice against whoever 
might cross his path.  In contrast, 
other witnesses who saw Holloman on July 24, 1999, characterized him as 
intoxicated and confused, but not hostile, and "pleasant" and 
"cooperative."

 
 
[¶25]   Our analysis of this asserted 
W.R.E. 404(b) testimony suggests that none of it was admissible.  The State provided the court with no 
explanation about how Mr. Holloman's reaction to the events of July 24 were 
relevant to the issues at trial.  
Instead, the State blatantly used character evidence to prove conduct, 
and did so without coming close to justifying it under the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence and the dictates of Williams, ¶¶8-14; Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶¶16-18, 26-30, 57 P.3d 332, ¶¶16-18, 26-30 (Wyo. 2002), and 
the long line of cases cited therein.  
We clearly stated the following rule in Gleason, at 
¶30:

 
 
            
In future cases involving the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b), the record shall reflect the trial court's identification of the purpose 
or purposes for admission of the evidence, the findings and conclusions 
establishing relevance and probative value, and the factors considered in 
balancing probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice.  The "shotgun approach" of listing every 
conceivable purpose for admissibility, followed by a bald statement that 
probative value outweighs prejudicial effect will no longer be sufficient.  While the trial court need not make an 
express finding on every factor from Dean [v. State, 865 P.2d 601 
(Wyo. 1993)] and Rigler [v. State, 
941 P.2d 734 (Wyo. 1997)], the record must contain 
sufficient findings to support the trial court's conclusions.  The burden, of course, will be upon the 
proponent of the evidence to supply the foundation for its 
admission.

 
 
[¶26]   What did the evidence of the 
previous day's events prove, other than Holloman's character?  Where is the showing that this evidence 
was more probative on a point at issue, than it was unfairly prejudicial?  In effect, the jury was told that 
Holloman was a vengeful thug.  However, other properly admitted evidence, 
particularly the fact that Mr. Holloman held the struggling victim out of the 
window for an extended period of time before dropping him to his death, 
supported the jury's finding of first-degree murder.  Under the circumstances present here, we 
find the error of admitting improper 404(b) evidence to be harmless.  W.R.A.P. 
904.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   We conclude that any errors in the 
admission or exclusion of evidence in this case were harmless.  The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 

   1In his brief, Holloman argues in his 
recitation of the facts that these witnesses' stories confused rather than 
clarified the situation.  In 
Holloman I, we held that Holloman established a theory of self-defense 
that he was entitled to have presented to the jury as his theory of the 
case.  However, we take note that a 
jury could well have concluded that his story was, at best, implausible given 
the volume of eyewitness accounts of what happened that day.  It is readily apparent that the 
variations from witness to witness reflected that each was in a slightly 
different location and, thus, their respective abilities to see and hear all 
that went on varied accordingly.   
In our prior opinion, we did describe the testimony of those witnesses as 
being in conflict.  However, whether 
they are characterized as conflicting or merely varying in the details, that 
circumstance does not serve to advance Holloman's contention that the prior 
criminal offense records of Johnson and Thunder Hawk should be 
admissible.

 
 
   2Holloman concedes that Johnson took 
no part in the July 24, 1999, assault upon him.

 
 
   3W.R.E. 404 (emphasis added) 
provides:

 
 
            
(a)  Character evidence generally. -- Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except:

(1)  Character 
of Accused. -- Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;

(2)  Character 
of Victim. -- Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor;

(3)  Character 
of Witness. -- Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608, and 609.

 
 
W.R.E. 
609 provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(a)  General 
rule. -- For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness,

(1)  evidence 
that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall 
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused;  and

(2)  evidence 
that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment.

(b)  Time 
limit. -- Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a 
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of 
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.  However, evidence of a conviction more 
than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent 
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use 
such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest 
the use of such evidence.

 
 
   4Holloman contends that the trial 
court did not reject the offered evidence on this specific basis.  While the record is not crystal clear in 
this regard, we may, nonetheless, uphold the general ruling of the court below 
if supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.  State v. Williams, 2004 WY 53, 
¶12, 90 P.3d 85, ¶12 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
   5W.R.E. 405 
provides:

 
 
            
(a) Reputation or opinion. -- In all cases in which evidence of 
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made 
by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination, inquiry is 
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

            
(b) Specific instances of conduct. -- In cases in which character 
or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, 
or defense, or is in issue under Rule 404(a)(2), proof may also be made of 
specific instances of his conduct.

 
 
 
 
   6The record suggests there may have 
been a tactical reason for not further pursuing the admission of this 
evidence.  Pursuant to a motion to 
exclude W.R.E. 404(b) evidence made by the defense, the district court had 
tentatively excluded evidence of Holloman's prior manslaughter conviction.  A part of the discussion on those 
matters included the possibility that the admission of Johnson's and Thunder 
Hawk's reputations for violent conduct may have served to open the door for the 
admission of Holloman's prior bad acts as well.

 
 

7W.R.E. 
404(b) states:

 
 
(b) 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -- Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith.  
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.