Case Title: Commonwealth v. Cousin

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12840

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12840 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH COUSIN. 
 
 
May 14, 2020. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, Disqualification of 
judge.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior 
courts. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Joseph Cousin, appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court granting the Commonwealth's 
petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and ordering that a certain 
judge of the Superior Court be recused from acting on Cousin's 
postjudgment motion to dismiss the indictments against him or 
for a new trial in his underlying criminal case.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  A grand jury indicted Cousin in 2002 on 
several charges including murder in the first degree.  He and a 
codefendant were tried together; his codefendant was acquitted 
and a mistrial was declared as to Cousin.  After this court 
concluded that double jeopardy did not bar retrial, see 
Commonwealth v. Cousin, 449 Mass. 809 (2007), the Commonwealth 
retried him, and a jury convicted him of murder in the second 
degree.  See Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 609 (2018).  
In 2013, Cousin moved for a new trial on the basis that his 
trial counsel was ineffective because he "was burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest."  A judge in the Superior Court 
allowed the motion.  Id.  On the Commonwealth's appeal, we 
vacated the decision allowing the motion for a new trial but 
remanded the case to the Superior Court for consideration 
whether Cousin "was prejudiced by potential conflicts of 
interest."  Id. at 629. 
 
 
Subsequent proceedings then took place in the trial court, 
including Cousin's attempts to expand the record and his claim 
2 
 
 
 
that the Commonwealth had withheld discovery.  More 
specifically, he claimed, apparently for the first time, that 
the trial prosecutor had failed to disclose certain exculpatory 
evidence before trial.1  On that basis, Cousin moved to dismiss 
the indictments against him or for a new trial (the so-called 
"Brady motion").  At a hearing on the motion, the motion judge 
raised the question whether she could be impartial because the 
prosecutor had since been appointed as a judge of the Superior 
Court and was now her judicial colleague.2  She noted that "it 
seems . . . that there is a key factual question here which is 
whether [the prosecutor] turned over certain evidence to the 
defense," and that the issues involved in Cousin's motion "would 
essentially require [her] to pass on [the prosecutor's] 
credibility." 
 
 
The judge initially expressed strong reservations as to 
whether she could be impartial in the circumstances.  She noted 
that the prosecutor "is ... my colleague.  I am not friends with 
[him], I am friendly with [him]. . . . I have a conflict of 
interest here that no matter how much I might try to be 
objective and fair and impartial, there is this thing, this 
reality out there, which is that [he] is my colleague . . . ."  
She further stated, on the issue whether she could make an 
independent judgment and remain impartial, that 
 
"I would hope that I could, but I'll tell you I just feel 
like there is too much pull internally that -- that I 
wouldn't -- no matter how much I might try, I would still 
have the [] possibility that I would be influenced by the 
fact that this is a colleague of mine. . . .  [I]t just 
seems not only is there the [] danger that it would not be 
fair and impartial, but there would be the danger that it 
would not appear to be a fair and impartial decision if for 
example I were to determine that [he] was credible, you 
know, how would that appear?" 
 
The judge took the matter under advisement, and the Commonwealth 
subsequently filed a motion in support of recusal. 
                                                 
 
1 The same prosecutor handled both the first and second 
trials. 
 
 
2 The motion judge had allowed the motion for a new trial 
that the court vacated in Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478 Mass. 608 
(2018), and that preceded the current motions in the trial 
court, but she did not preside over either of the defendant's 
two trials. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
At a second hearing on the matter, the judge indicated that 
she was reconsidering her decision to recuse herself.  She 
indicated that there was not, as she had previously thought, an 
inherent conflict that disqualified her per se, and that she 
therefore needed to consider whether, subjectively, she could be 
fair and impartial.  She noted that, 
 
"before the [previous] hearing there was certainly no 
reason for anybody to question my ability to be fair and 
impartial. . . . I went into the hearing on the last date 
with a key assumption on which my decision was then based.  
I was of the belief that there was an inherent conflict of 
interest for a Superior Court judge to be a finder of fact 
at an evidentiary hearing where an important witness was 
another Superior Court judge, and that the only way to 
eliminate that conflict was to have a judge assigned to the 
case that did not sit in the Superior Court. . . . I was 
wrong.  First of all, that is not -- there is no inherent 
conflict; that is not the policy or protocol. . . .  What I 
did not do, because I had that erroneous assumption, is I 
did not then inquire whether I could, quite apart, in light 
of that reality that this was a colleague, could I search 
in my own heart [and] still be fair and impartial." 
 
 
At the final, and full, hearing on the issue, the judge 
reiterated that her initial thinking that she should recuse 
herself was based on the presumption "that there would be an 
inherent conflict of interest for a Superior Court judge to be 
the finder of fact at an evidentiary hearing where an important 
witness was a colleague and the credibility of that testimony 
was going to be important."  She stated that, thereafter, she 
 
"started to think.  Well, the fact is, we, as judges, are 
regularly called upon to make credibility determinations 
regarding people we know.  Police officers testify 
regularly in court.  I know these people, at least in 
passing.  Defense lawyers are witnesses at evidentiary 
hearings. . . .  So that I know the witness or even though 
I work in the same Trial Court Department as a witness, 
cannot be the end of the inquiry.  Rather, the question is 
whether having searched my heart and conscience that I 
believe that I could be fair." 
 
Ultimately, she concluded that she believed she could be fair 
and impartial.  She noted that her contact with the prosecutor 
since he had been appointed to the bench was limited and that 
4 
 
 
 
none of her contact with him would cause her to have any 
"preconceived notions" about him. 
 
 
The judge then finally addressed the question whether, even 
if she thought she could be fair and impartial, there would be 
an appearance of partiality.  On that point, she stated that if 
the circumstances like those presented in this case constituted 
an appearance of partiality that required recusal, then judges 
would routinely be required to recuse from hearings and cases, 
and that whatever appearance existed here was not such that the 
public could not be confident that she would be fair and 
impartial. 
 
 
After the judge denied the Commonwealth's motion for 
recusal, the Commonwealth filed its G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition 
seeking review of the judge's ruling.  In particular, the 
Commonwealth asked the court to order the trial court judge to 
recuse "at a minimum" from deciding the entirety of the Brady 
motion.  After a hearing, a single justice allowed the 
Commonwealth's petition.3, 4 
 
 
Discussion.  Cousin first argues that the Commonwealth's 
petition did not warrant the single justice's use of the court's 
extraordinary superintendence power pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, and that the single justice therefore abused her discretion 
in considering the substantive merits of the petition.  He 
correctly notes, as we have said more than once, that "[t]he 
                                                 
 
3 At the time the Commonwealth filed its petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3, it also sought and received, from the 
single justice, an order staying further proceedings in the 
trial court while the petition was pending.  The single justice 
subsequently vacated the stay when she allowed the 
Commonwealth's petition.  It does not appear that any further 
proceedings have taken place in the trial court during the 
pendency of this appeal. 
 
 
4 In its appeal to this court, the Commonwealth argues that 
we should affirm the single justice's judgment and order that 
the Superior Court judge be recused "from further proceedings in 
this case."  In other words, the Commonwealth appears to be 
seeking a broader result (recusal from the entirety of the case) 
than it had originally sought in its petition (recusal from the 
Brady motion).  The single justice, in her decision, focused 
essentially on the Brady motion, and, as we explain in the text, 
we hold that recusal is only required with respect to that 
motion. 
5 
 
 
 
fact that the Commonwealth has no other remedy does not make 
[G. L.] c. 211, § 3, review automatic."  Commonwealth v. Cook, 
380 Mass. 314, 319 (1980).  See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 
Mass. 22, 25 (2019), and cases cited.  That said, we have also 
held that a single justice has considerable discretion when 
determining whether a petition presents the type of subject 
matter and factual circumstances that warrant an exercise of the 
court's extraordinary power of general superintendence.  Id. at 
24-26.  We do not reverse a single justice's decision not to 
reach the substantive merits of a challenged trial court order 
unless the single justice has abused his or her discretion in 
making that decision, id., and likewise we do not reverse a 
single justice's decision to reach the substantive merits, as 
the single justice in this case did, unless there has been an 
abuse of discretion in doing so, Commonwealth v. Narea, 454 
Mass. 1003, 1004 n.1 (2009).  The single justice was within her 
discretion to reach the merits in this case. 
 
 
Cousin's second argument, then, is that the single justice 
"further abused her discretion" in allowing the Commonwealth's 
petition.  The single justice carefully considered what occurred 
in the trial court relevant to the motion judge's decision not 
to recuse herself.  As the motion judge understood, determining 
whether a judge can act fairly and impartially requires a two-
step inquiry that has both subjective and objective components. 
 
 
"Faced, then, with a question of [her] capacity to rule 
fairly, the judge was to consult first [her] own emotions and 
conscience."  Lena v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 571, 575 (1976).  
That is the subjective evaluation a judge must make -- does she 
believe that she can be impartial in the circumstances?  "If 
[she] passed the internal test of freedom from disabling 
prejudice, [she] must next attempt an objective appraisal of 
whether this was a proceeding in which [her] impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  
That is the objective evaluation to be made -- would a 
disinterested observer, informed of all the circumstances, 
reasonably believe that the judge's impartiality may have been 
compromised?  "[A]ctual impartiality alone is not enough . . . . 
In order to preserve and protect the integrity of the judiciary 
and the judicial process, and the necessary public confidence in 
both, even the appearance of partiality must be avoided."  
Commonwealth v. Morgan RV Resorts, LLC, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 
(2013), and cases cited.  See also S.J.C. Rule 3.09, Canon 2, 
Rule 2.11 (2016) ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
in any proceeding in which the judge cannot be impartial or the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . ."). 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
The single justice reasonably accepted (as do we) the 
judge's subjective determination that she could act impartially 
on Cousin's Brady motion, even though it called into question 
the propriety of the prosecutor's (her current colleague's) 
conduct.  The concern arises, however, as the single justice 
noted, with the second step -- that is, whether there is an 
objective appearance of partiality.  In the circumstances, given 
the judge's various observations and strong statements from the 
bench made while considering the recusal issue, there is a 
legitimate question whether her continued presiding over the 
defendant's Brady motion objectively gives the appearance of 
partiality. 
 
 
We recognize that, by the judge's own account, when she 
initially indicated that she thought she should recuse herself, 
she did so on the basis of a mistaken belief of an inherent 
conflict.  After she determined that there was not an inherent 
conflict, she changed her mind.  Nonetheless, and assuming 
without deciding that she is correct that there is no inherent 
conflict, and that her first impression of the issue was 
therefore incorrect, her statements to the effect that she might 
be influenced by the fact that the prosecutor is now a judicial 
colleague cannot be overlooked.  Notwithstanding Cousin's 
suggestion to the contrary, her statements were not "fleeting."  
They were strong, repeated, and, at the time they were made, of 
real concern to the judge.  In the circumstances, we agree with 
the single justice that those statements cannot now be dismissed 
or disregarded, and that an objective appearance of partiality 
(more precisely, an appearance of the lack of impartiality) 
cannot be avoided if the judge were to continue to preside over 
the Brady motion that was before her.  We therefore agree with 
the single justice that the prudent and legally correct result 
in these circumstances is for the judge to recuse herself from 
ruling on that motion.5 
 
 
Conclusion.  The single justice did not err or abuse her 
discretion in allowing the Commonwealth's petition seeking 
recusal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
                                                 
 
5 Our decision does not extend beyond the Brady motion.  The 
judge shall recuse herself from ruling on that motion, but she 
may otherwise continue to preside over the case as it proceeds 
in the trial court. 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.