Case Title: State ex rel Engweiler v. Cook

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52169

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: April 13, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
State ex rel CONRAD R. ENGWEILER,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DAVE COOK,
Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections;
and CHARLES KLIEWER,
Administrator at the Offender Information and Sentence Computation
Agency of the Oregon Department of Corrections,
Respondents on Review.
(CC 01C19211; CA 117264; SC S52169)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 8, 2005.
Andy Simrin, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed. 
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Joseph C. Guimond, Judge. 197 Or App 32, 103 P3d 1205 (2005). 
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Chief Justice when decision was issued. 
GILLETTE, J.
This is one of two cases, both decided this date,
relating to the life sentence for murder that petitioner
presently is serving.  The life sentence is for an aggravated
murder that petitioner committed as a teenager.  In this case, he
seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Corrections
(DOC) to permit him to earn credit under ORS 421.121 against his
prison term for good prison behavior.  A trial judge dismissed
the writ, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  State ex rel
Engweiler v. Cook, 197 Or App 32, 103 P3d 1205 (2005) (Engweiler
III).  We allowed petitioner's petition for review and, for the
reasons that follow, now affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.  
In 1990, when petitioner was 15 years old, he raped,
sodomized, and killed a 16-year-old female acquaintance.  He was
tried as an adult and convicted of aggravated murder, for which
the trial court ultimately imposed an indeterminate sentence of
life imprisonment. (1)  In June 1999, the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision (the board) held a prison term hearing. 
At the conclusion of that hearing, the board issued Board Action
Form (BAF) #1, which established, among other things, a 480-month
"prison term" for petitioner.  That term was based on a matrix
that the board had created in May 1999 to deal with juveniles who
had been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. (2)  After unsuccessfully seeking administrative
review of BAF #1, petitioner petitioned for judicial review in
the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed
the petition, (3) Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 197 Or App 43,
103 P3d 1201 (2005) (Engweiler IV).  In Engweiler v. Board of
Parole, 340 Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (2006) (Engweiler V), decided
this date, we affirm that decision, holding that BAF #1 was not
subject to judicial review under ORS 144.335 (1999), amended by
Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 661, section 1; Oregon Laws 2003,
chapter 352, section 1.  
The present case presents an alternative approach to
petitioner's effort to obtain judicial review in Engweiler IV.
Here, as noted, petitioner contends that he is entitled under ORS
421.121 to earn "credits" (known as "earned-time credits")
against the 480-month prison term that the board set in BAF #1,
because he has complied with DOC's rules for appropriate
institutional behavior. (4)  ORS 421.121(1) provides, in part: 
"Except as provided in ORS 137.635 [concerning
certain repeat offenders, not applicable here], each
inmate sentenced to the custody of the Department of
Corrections for felonies committed on or after November
1, 1989, shall be eligible for a reduction in the term
of incarceration for appropriate institutional
behavior, as defined by rule of the Department of
Corrections * * *."
(Emphasis added.)  Petitioner requested that DOC make reductions
in petitioner's 480-month prison term in accordance with ORS
421.121 and, when DOC refused, he filed the present mandamus
proceeding to compel DOC to make the reductions.  The trial court
issued an alternative writ of mandamus.  DOC then moved to
dismiss the writ on the grounds that (1) DOC may not deduct
earned-time credits from minimum sentences; (2) the sentencing
court did not commit petitioner to DOC custody under the
sentencing guidelines; and (3) earned-time credits do not apply
to inmates serving life sentences.  The trial court agreed with
DOC with respect to all three arguments and dismissed the writ. 
Petitioner appealed the trial court's ruling to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the plain words of ORS 421.121(1)
make his eligibility for earned-time credits mandatory and that
none of the three bases for the trial court's ruling was
meritorious.  Specifically, petitioner argued that (1) he was not
serving a mandatory minimum sentence (indeed, the Court of
Appeals in Engweiler I had vacated the mandatory minimum sentence
that the trial court first had imposed); (2) whether or not he
was serving a guidelines sentence was immaterial under ORS
421.121(1); and (3) ORS 421.121(1) does not make an exception for
inmates serving life sentences.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling,
but on another ground.  In that court's view, ORS 421.121(1)
provides for eligibility for earned-time credits against an
inmate's "term of incarceration," and that phrase, the court
held, refers only to the term of incarceration that a sentencing
court imposes, not to a prison term that the board may impose. 
Engweiler III, 197 Or App at 40.  The Court of Appeals observed
that petitioner had confined his arguments to his eligibility
under ORS 421.121(1) for earned-time credits against the 480-month prison term that the board had set in BAF #1.  Indeed, the
Court of Appeals observed, petitioner specifically had disavowed
any duty on DOC's part to reduce his life sentence, acknowledging
that "no mortal can predict with precision the length of his
life." (5)  Id. at 41.  Accordingly, the court held, petitioner
was not entitled to earned-time credits under ORS 421.121(1) for
any of the reasons that he had advanced.  Engweiler III, 197 Or
App at 42.  We address the issue of the Court of Appeals'
rationale first.  
The operative words of ORS 421.121(1) provide that
"each inmate sentenced to the custody of the Department of
Corrections for felonies committed on or after November 1, 1989,
shall be eligible for a reduction in the term of incarceration
for appropriate institutional behavior."  (Emphasis added.)  As a
preliminary matter, we observe that there is no dispute
concerning the following: (1) petitioner was "sentenced to the
custody of the Department of Corrections" for a felony committed
after November 1, 1989; (2) ORS 421.121(1) applies to "each
inmate" so sentenced, subject only to an exception not applicable
here; (3) ORS 421.121 contains no explicit exception for inmates
convicted of any particular crimes, including aggravated murder,
for inmates not sentenced under the sentencing guidelines, or for
inmates sentenced to life imprisonment; and (4) the phrase "each
inmate * * * shall be eligible for a reduction in the term of
incarceration" (emphasis added) indicates that DOC's duty to
reduce the "term of incarceration" is mandatory for each inmate
who meets the criteria for such reductions elsewhere described in
ORS 421.121.  In light of the foregoing, we conclude, as did the
Court of Appeals, that the answer to the question presented by
this case turns on the meaning of the phrase "term of
incarceration."  
Under this court's statutory interpretation paradigm,
our task is to discern the intent of the legislature.  In so
doing, we first consider the text of the statute, in context.  If
the legislature's intent is clear at that level of analysis,
further inquiry is unnecessary.   
As the Court of Appeals noted, the phrase "term of
incarceration" is not defined in the statutes.  At first blush,
however, the phrase "term of incarceration" does not appear to be
ambiguous or in need of definition or interpretation.  The plain
and natural reading of the phrase would seem to refer simply to
the amount of time that a prisoner must spend in prison before
being eligible for parole.  That would make a "term of
incarceration" unlike a "sentence," the latter being something
that is uniquely within a court's province to impose and that can
include more than the amount of time that a prisoner must serve
before being eligible for parole.  
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals,
after an analysis of the context of ORS 421.121, concluded that
the phrase "term of incarceration" essentially is a term of art
that refers to a prison term imposed by a sentencing court and
not to a prison term set by the board.  In other words, in the
view of that court, "term of incarceration" in ORS 421.121(1)
means "sentence."  The court reached that conclusion first by
demonstrating that the phrase "term of incarceration" is used
interchangeably in the sentencing and parole statutes with the
phrase "term of imprisonment" and, then, by explaining that its
review of those statutes led it to the observation that, when the
statutes use either of those phrases, they "typically refer to
one of two closely related concepts: (1) the amount of time that
a sentencing court is authorized to impose for particular
offense; or (2) the amount of prison time that a sentencing court
actually imposes as part of a sentence for a particular
offender."  Engweiler III, 197 Or App at 37-38 (emphasis in
original).  
The court's conclusion that the phrase "term of
incarceration" is a term of art does not follow from those
premises, however.  The unremarkable fact that the sentencing and
parole statutes routinely refer to a sentencing court's authority
to impose a sentence that includes some period, some "term," of
incarceration is not, in our view, persuasive evidence that the
phrase "term of incarceration" necessarily refers only to (or is
coextensive with) a sentence imposed by a court.  Indeed, the
multiplicity of usages just as convincingly demonstrates the
opposite:  The phrase is not a term of art; the words merely mean
what they say in each of the contexts in which they are used.  To
illustrate, statutes providing that a court may impose a sentence
that includes a "term of incarceration" merely reflect the fact
that there are various ways in which an offender may be punished,
including serving a period of time in prison, as opposed to being
placed (for example) on probation. 
The Court of Appeals found further support for its
conclusion that the phrase "term of incarceration" in ORS 421.121
means the prison term imposed by a sentencing court in the fact
that ORS 144.108(3)(a) specifically exempts from ORS 421.121
those "terms of incarceration" that the board imposes as a
sanction for post-prison supervision violations. (6)  However,
we think that the existence of that statute cuts the other way: 
If "term of incarceration" were a term of art referring
specifically to the amount of prison time that a sentencing court
imposes, then it would have been unnecessary for the legislature
to exempt board-imposed terms of incarceration from ORS 421.121.  
To summarize the foregoing, there is nothing that we
perceive in the phrase "term of incarceration" or in the context
in which that phrase is used in ORS 421.121(1) or in other
related statutes that suggests to us that the phrase means
anything other than simply the amount of time that an inmate must
spend in prison before he is eligible to be paroled.  The
alternative approach taken by the Court of Appeals --
interpreting the phrase to mean only those terms of incarceration
imposed by a court as part of a sentence -- is not consistent
with the statutory wording.  
Our conclusion that the phrase "term of incarceration"
refers to the amount of time that an inmate must spend in prison
before the inmate is eligible for parole does not, however, fully
answer the question presented in this case, i.e., the question
whether petitioner presently is serving an identifiable "term of
incarceration" for purposes of computing earned-time credits
under ORS 421.121.  That question arises because, unlike most
other inmates, petitioner is serving a life sentence.  
ORS 421.121 was enacted in 1989 as part of a larger
legislative enactment, Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 790, which,
among other things, substantially changed the way courts
sentenced felony offenders.  Before 1989, Oregon used a "parole
matrix system" for sentencing offenders convicted of certain
felonies.  Hamel v. Johnson, 330 Or 180, 186, 998 P2d 661 (2000). 
As this court explained in Hamel:
"Under that system, a trial court imposed an
indeterminate sentence of a specified duration on a
defendant who had been convicted of a crime.  An
indeterminate sentence stated only a maximum term to be
served under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections.  Such a sentence did not establish the
length of time that a defendant was to be incarcerated. 
Harris v. Board of Parole, 288 Or 495, 503, 605 P2d
1181 (1980).  Regardless of the length of an
indeterminate sentence, under ORS 144.780 and ORS
144.785, 'it is the [Board] that determines the actual
duration of imprisonment.'  Id.  In other words, for
prisoners sentenced under the matrix system, the Board,
not the court, determines the actual duration of
imprisonment.  Price [v. Board of Parole], 300 Or [283]
at 288[, 709 P2d 1075 (1985)].  See also OAR
213-002-0001(3)(b) ('Although many citizens believe the
indeterminate sentence sets the length of imprisonment,
that sentence only sets an offender's maximum period of
incarceration and the matrix controls actual length of
stay.')."
In 1989, the legislature adopted a new system.  That
system required judges to use defined presumptive punishments for
felony convictions, subject to some judicial discretion to
deviate from those presumptive sentences.  Those defined
presumptive sentences were set out in sentencing "guidelines"
created by the State Sentencing Guidelines Board and later
approved by the state legislature in Oregon Laws 1989, chapter
790, section 87.  The new system applied to offenders who
committed felonies after November 1, 1989; offenders who had
committed crimes before that date still were to be sentenced
under the old parole matrix system.  See ORS 137.120 (so
providing).  Thus, under the guidelines system, courts no longer
merely set an outermost limit on the length of an inmate's stay
in prison.  Instead, in almost all cases for criminals convicted
after November 1, 1989, sentencing courts impose what actually
would be the offender's "term of incarceration." (7)  
However, that is not the case in every instance.  For a
few years after November 1, 1989, there remained a small class of
inmates who continued to receive indeterminate sentences -- those
inmates who, like petitioner, committed aggravated murder but who
were juveniles at the time of their crimes.  As we shall explain,
for them, the board set the "term of incarceration," as it had
for virtually all offenders before the guidelines were adopted. 
As noted, the sentencing guidelines define presumptive
sentences for almost all felonies.  They do so by creating a grid
for establishing the sentence in light of the offender's criminal
history and the seriousness of the offense.  The vertical axis of
the grid is the Crime Seriousness Scale, which classifies the
crime of conviction according to its seriousness in relation to
other crimes.  OAR 213-004-0001(1).  The horizontal axis of the
grid is the Criminal History Scale, which classifies the
offender's personal criminal history.  Id.  Each block on the
grid provides the presumptive sentencing range for offenders
whose crime and criminal history places them in that block.  OAR
213-004-0001(2). 
Certain offenses are "unranked," i.e., not assigned a
block within the grid.  That is true for various reasons, among
them the fact that the offenses rarely are prosecuted or they
encompass such a broad spectrum of criminal conduct that a single
classification is impractical.  OAR 213-004-0004; Commentary to
OAR 253-04-004 (1989).  For most of those crimes, the sentencing
court retains the authority to determine the appropriate crime
category.  Id.  The crime of aggravated murder also is unranked,
but the reason in that case is that the sentencing court does not
have discretion to determine the appropriate punishment. 
Instead, the applicable regulation provides, "The offense of
Aggravated Murder is not ranked in the Crime Seriousness Scale
because the sentence is set by statute * * *."  OAR 213-004-0003. 

When petitioner committed his offense, ORS 163.105
provided that the trial court had to sentence a person convicted
of aggravated murder either to death, to life in prison without
the possibility of release or parole, or to life in prison with a
30-year mandatory minimum before becoming eligible for parole. 
Also at that time, however, ORS 161.620 (1989) provided that, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a
sentence imposed upon any person remanded from the
juvenile court under ORS 419.533 shall not include any
sentence of death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of release or parole nor imposition of any
mandatory minimum sentence, except that a mandatory
minimum sentence under ORS 163.105(1)(c) shall be
imposed where the person was 17 years of age at the
time of the offense."  
Accordingly, the only sentencing option available to the
sentencing court in petitioner's case was life imprisonment with
the possibility of release or parole, and that is the sentence
that the court imposed on him on remand from the Court of Appeals
following Engweiler I.  Having been sentenced to an indeterminate
life sentence for a felony committed after November 1, 1989,
petitioner was and is in the same position as an inmate sentenced
before the adoption of the guidelines.  As a consequence,
however, petitioner's sentence stated only the maximum term that
he could serve under DOC's jurisdiction; it did not establish the
actual length of time that he was to be incarcerated.  For him,
as for any inmate sentenced to an indeterminate sentence before
the adoption of the guidelines, regardless of the length of that
sentence, the board is responsible for determining the actual
duration of his imprisonment.  
But has the board made that determination?  Thus far,
it has not.  Instead, in petitioner's case, the board, in BAF #1,
set a 480-month "prison term."  That means that, after 480
months, petitioner will be eligible for consideration for parole
and, if he is considered an appropriate candidate, the board will
set a release date.  (If he is not given a release date,
petitioner will be given a concrete date on which he will be
further considered for parole.)  Thus, petitioner does not at
present have a "term of incarceration" that he is serving.  And,
as discussed, ORS 421.121 provides only that "each inmate
sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections for
felonies committed on or after November 1, 1989, shall be
eligible for a reduction in the term of incarceration for
appropriate institutional behavior."  Nothing in that statutory
wording creates any basis for crediting earned-time credits
against any other date, including the date on which the board may
-- or may not -- set petitioner's parole release date.  If the
board does set petitioner's parole release date, it also will
have defined his "term of incarceration."  It follows that
petitioner is not eligible for a reduction in the prison term
that the board imposed in BAF #1, because petitioner is not yet
serving a "term of incarceration."  The Court of Appeals was
correct in so holding, although the reasons given by that court
were incorrect.
We recognize that, in so holding, we leave petitioner
unable to obtain a term of incarceration -- and, therefore,
unable as yet to make use of earned-time credits -- when
virtually all other convicted felons can obtain and apply earned-time credits.  But petitioner confined the present mandamus case
to the theory that he was entitled to have the credits deducted
from his next hearing date and, as we have explained, that theory
cannot be sustained under the wording of ORS 421.121.  Petitioner
now may be able, based on this opinion and our opinion in
Engweiler V, to predicate a further mandamus proceeding on a
theory that accepts the statutory scheme but points to other
sources of law -- e.g., the state and federal constitutions -- as
a basis for relief.  However, petitioner is not entitled to the
relief that he seeks in this proceeding.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.  
1. Petitioner originally was sentenced to a life sentence
with a 30-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under ORS
163.105(1)(c) (1989), amended by Oregon Laws 1991, chapter 126,
section 8; Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 421, section 2; Oregon Laws
1999, chapter 59, section 31; Oregon Laws 1999, chapter 782,
section 5.  The Court of Appeals vacated that sentence on appeal
and remanded for resentencing, because the trial court was
prohibited under ORS 161.620 (1989), amended by Oregon Laws 1993,
chapter 33, section 306; Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 546, section
119; Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 422, section 131y; Oregon Laws
1999, chapter 951, section 2, from imposing a mandatory minimum
sentence on any person remanded from the juvenile court who had
been under the age of 17 when he committed his crime.  State v.
Engweiler, 118 Or App 132, 846 P2d 1163 (1993) (Engweiler I). 
The legislature thereafter amended ORS 161.120 to permit
imposition of a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence on persons in
petitioners' circumstances.  1995 Or Laws, ch 422, § 131y.
2. BAF #1 also set a "murder review date" of February 22,
2030, and provided that a "murder review hearing" would be
scheduled in December 2029.  
3. The Court of Appeals initially denied the Board of
Parole's motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review and
allowed the case to go forward.  Engweiler v. Board of Parole,
170 Or App 653, 13 P3d 1009 (2000) (Engweiler II).
4. In his petition for a writ of mandamus, petitioner
alleged that he had been in full compliance with DOC rules
defining appropriate institutional behavior since he first was
confined to prison.  DOC has not disputed that assertion.  
5. Petitioner now disputes that he disavowed any argument
that he is entitled to earned-time credits against his life
sentence.  We need not resolve that question, however, in light
of our conclusion that ORS 421.121(1), does not, in petitioner's
case, apply to the sentence the trial court imposed, but,
instead, to any "term of incarceration" that the board eventually
may impose on petitioner's behalf. 
6. ORS 144.108(3) provides, in part:
"A person who is ordered to serve a term of
incarceration in a jail or state correctional facility
as a sanction for a post-prison supervision violation
in not eligible for:
"(a) earned credit time as described in ORS
169.110 or 421.121."  
ORS 144.108(3) has been amended several times in minor respects
since it was enacted in 1989, but not in ways that affect the
analysis of this case.  
7. As the legislature stated in the Statement of Purposes
and Principles for the guidelines, Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 790,
section 96, after the adoption of the guidelines, "[s]entences of
imprisonment should represent the time the offender will actually
serve, subject only to any reduction authorized by law."