Case Title: Ex parte Andrew Hugine, Jr., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130428

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 03/17/2017 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1130428
____________________
Ex parte Andrew Hugine, Jr., et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Regina Colston
v.
Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University et al.)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-11-901604)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Andrew Hugine, Jr., Ph.D., Daniel Wims, Ph.D., and Mattie
Thomas, Ph.D., petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
1130428
directing the Madison Circuit Court to vacate its December 11,
2013, order that denied their requests for qualified immunity
and State-agent immunity from all claims filed against them in
their individual capacities by Regina Colston in an action
stemming from the termination of Colston's employment at
Alabama 
Agricultural 
and 
Mechanical 
University 
("the
University") and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. 
We grant the petition and issue the writ.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
In 1979, Colston was hired as an instructor at the
University to teach telecommunications for the School of Arts
and Sciences in the Department of English, Foreign Languages,
and Telecommunications.  She taught broadcast journalism and
other similar classes  at the University continuously for the
next 32 years.  Colston holds a bachelor of arts degree in
journalism and a master of arts degree in broadcast, film, and
communication, both of which she earned from the University of
Alabama.  Colston has served multiple terms as an officer, and
two terms as president, of the University's chapter of the
Alabama Education Association ("the AEA").  L. Shefton
Riggins, Ph.D., who served two terms on the University's Board
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of Trustees ("the Board"), stated in an affidavit that, in her
representative capacity with the AEA, "Ms. Colston was well-
known among the Board members as a strong advocate for the
faculty and staff." 
The University first hired Thomas as an English
instructor in 1964.  She was promoted to full professor in
1984. From 1978 until her retirement in July 2010, Thomas
served as the chairperson of the University's Department of
English, Foreign Languages, and Telecommunications.  As the
chairperson of the department, Thomas was responsible for
planning and directing the work of her department, which
included evaluating faculty within the department.  
Thomas was
Colston's immediate supervisor during Colston's entire career
at the University, with the exception of Colston's last year
of employment with the University.
Hugine began his term as president of the University in
July 2009.  It is undisputed that, at the time Colston's
employment was terminated, the president had the authority to
make personnel decisions concerning University employees.
Wims was hired as provost and vice president for academic
affairs of the University in April 2010.  In that position,
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Wims has responsibility for administrative oversight of the
divisions of Academic Affairs and Research at the University. 
Such oversight includes participation in decisions related to
hiring, tenure, and termination of employment of University
faculty.
In December 1991, Colston submitted to Thomas an
application for promotion to associate professor.  In a
December 3, 1991, letter signed by Bessie Jones, Ph.D., the
then interim vice president for academic affairs, the
University's Office of Academic Affairs confirmed receiving
Colston's application for promotion.  On May 12, 1992, the
Promotion and Tenure Committee recommended Colston for
promotion to associate professor.  A June 15, 1992, letter
from Jones to Colston stated that Colston's "application for
promotion to the rank of assistant professor has been
approved."1
Colston alleges that in the fall of 1992 she submitted a
similar application seeking tenure.  Colston testified that in
1993 Jones told Colston that she "was receiving tenure in
1The 
terms 
"associate 
professor" 
and 
"assistant 
professor"
appear to be used interchangeably in the record.
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conjunction with her promotion."2  Riggins testified that he
recalled "learning when I first joined the Board [in 1994]
that Ms. Regina Colston's tenure had been approved by the
Board on the recommendation of Dr. Bessie Jones.  I recall
this, in part, because I was surprised that someone with only
a Masters Degree would be approved for tenure."3  Colston
notes that an "Office of Academic Affairs Faculty-Unit Rank
Report" dated January 7, 1994, from Virginia Caples, then
2Jones died before the underlying action was filed.
3In his affidavit, Riggins testified:
"5. In the year 2009, Dr. Hugine and I had a
specific discussion about Ms. Colston shortly after
he was hired.  I told him that Ms. Colston was the
President of the University chapter of the AEA and
a vocal advocate for the faculty and the staff at
the University.  I told him that Ms. Colston was
tenured, and if he wanted to terminate her he would
have to build a strong case in the files around her
job performance.
"6. I did not instruct Dr. Hugine to terminate Ms.
Colston. I told him that if he wanted to fire her,
he would have to do so based on well-documented
performance problems because she was tenured and
because she was President of the University chapter
of the AEA.  
"7. Dr. Hugine and I specifically discussed the
presence of the AEA chapter at the University and
the nuisance that the AEA would likely be to him. 
We also discussed Ms. Colston's active leadership
role in the AEA."
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vice president for academic affairs, indicated that Colston
was tenured.  A faculty-evaluation form dated May 15, 2002,
signed by Thomas as Colston's supervisor, marked Colston as
tenured.
Colston submitted 10 years of faculty-evaluation forms
that she contends indicate that she was tenured.  Thomas's
assistant, Loretta Townsend, testified by affidavit, however,
that the markings on those faculty-evaluation forms actually
meant to convey that Colston held a "tenure-track" position,
not that she was, in fact, tenured.  Thomas testified in her
deposition that she did not notice that the forms showed
Colston as being tenured. 
An October 25, 2006, letter from Beverly Edmond, Ph.D.,
the then provost and vice president for academic affairs, to
Colston stated that Colston was "a tenured member of the
faculty."  In her deposition, Thomas admitted that she had
received a copy of that letter.  Attached to that letter was
a 2006 employment contract for Colston indicating that she was
tenured.  Colston submitted as evidence a copy of that
contract signed by Colston, Edmond, and then president of the
University Robert Jennings, Ph.D.  A January 18, 2008, self-
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study report of Colston's department stated that Colston was
a tenured assistant professor at the University.  Similarly,
an "Academic Program Review Self Study Report" on the
department dated February 21, 2011, listed Colston as a
tenured professor.  
Conversely, the petitioners note that the 1988 Faculty
Handbook spelled out procedures for obtaining tenure that
required review and approval of the Promotion and Tenure
Committee's recommendations for tenure by the vice president
for academic affairs and the president of the University.
Those recommendations were then to be submitted to the Board
for review and final approval of tenure.4  The petitioners
assert that the University has no record of Colston's filing
an application for tenure, no record of the Promotion and
Tenure Committee recommending Colston for tenure, no 
record of
the vice president for academic affairs or the president
approving a recommendation for Colston's tenure, and,
notwithstanding Riggins's testimony, no record of the Board
voting to grant Colston tenure.  Colston produced no
4An update of the faculty handbook in 1993 modified the
procedure to provide that the "final decision" on promotions
and tenure was made by the president of the University.
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University records to the contrary.  A note dated May 11,
2010, Thomas placed in Colston's employment file stated that
"Colston is non-tenured."
In the 2007-2008 academic year, Thomas started rating
Colston poorly in her faculty-evaluation forms.  (Previous to
that year, Thomas had written positive evaluations of
Colston's performance each year she had been chair of the
department.)  Faculty-evaluation forms pertaining to Colston
and signed by Thomas for the 2007-2008 academic year and
subsequent years stated that Colston was non-tenured.  Also,
Colston refused to sign her faculty-evaluation forms from 2007
through 2010 on the basis that, she said, they incorrectly
stated that she was not tenured.
In the fall of 2009, undertaking to act in her capacity
as president of the University's chapter of the AEA, Colston
organized and invited all faculty, staff, and administration
to attend a presentation to be held on October 20, 2009,
titled "Cut Waste, Redundancy -- Not Jobs, Not Pay" ("the
presentation").  Colston sent the invitation through the
University's e-mail system.  Kenneth Hairston of the
University's office of general counsel sent Colston a letter
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on October 15, 2009, regarding "the email you sent through
campus email notifying the university family of an all-campus
meeting."  Hairston stated that, 
"[a]lthough [the University] AEA may call meetings
on campus, only the president has the authority to
call an 'all-campus' meeting.  An 'all-campus'
meeting implies that employees are authorized to
take time away from their positions to attend the
meeting.  In this case, that is not true since the
president did not call the 'all-campus' meeting."  
The letter was copied to Hugine.  In her deposition testimony,
Colston asserted that she had called such meetings in the past
and had not received any complaints from the administration
for those invitations.  
The presentation was given by University Professor
Haresha Khanna.  Colston helped prepare the slides for the
presentation.  The presentation complained that, despite
increased revenues, the University had cut the budget for
instruction; it had required faculty members to 
increase their
teaching loads; and it was "contemplating outsourcing
custodial and ground services functions of the University."
The presentation also complained that the University was
"continuing to spend more on administration and non-value
adding activities."  It expressed displeasure with the
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University's 
administration 
for 
implementing 
furlough 
programs
that resulted in cutting salaries of faculty and staff.  In
this regard, the presentation charged that "[t]he furlough
program implemented by the administration is grossly unfair,
inequitable and down right regressive.  It is, clearly a pay
cut for the faculty."  The presentation summarized the
grievances as follows:  "Something is seriously wrong here;
what have we done to be punished?  Faculty and staff should
not have to sacrifice for gross negligence and sheer
incompetence of the management."  
The presentation called for solutions such as:  "Cut
waste and redundancy, improve operational efficiency, by
better management and accountability"; "Divest from non-value
added activities"; and "build reserves."  The presentation
asserted that the University's "organization structure was
built to deal with different challenges from a different era.
Too often, the result is wasteful spending, bloated
bureaucracy and programs producing less than the desirable
results."  The presentation claimed to offer proposals "to
reduce/manage costs and grow revenues which are concrete and
quantifiable," which included "proposing ways that [the
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University] should be organized to operate efficiently by
cutting waste and redundancy" and to build reserves.  Among
other things, the presentation called for the University to
"[r]estructure, realign and consolidate functions of the top
administration." 
Undertaking to act in her capacity as president of the
University's chapter of the AEA, Colston submitted a request
to make the presentation before the Board.  When the Board
declined to hear the presentation, Colston sent copies of the
presentation to the editorial board of The Huntsville Times
and other media outlets in communications in which she
identified herself as president of the University's chapter of
the AEA.  On October 20, 2009, a Huntsville television station
ran a news story about the presentation in which Colston was
identified as the president of the University's chapter of the
AEA. 
On December 1, 2009, again undertaking to act in her
capacity as president of the University's chapter of the AEA,
Colston sent a copy of the presentation and a letter to then
Governor Bob Riley.  The letter provided:
"We 
respectfully 
request 
your 
immediate
intervention on behalf of the citizens of this great
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state and employees of Alabama A&M University [AAMU]
to rescind the recent employment-related decisions
made by the administration of Dr. Andrew Hugine,
Jr., the president of the university.  
"We request that AAMU, a state instrumentality,
observe and follow the rule of law, longstanding
practices and traditions, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights and privileges of fellow citizens,
and above all respect the dignity of all who are
affected by the decisions made.
"The recent decisions made by Dr. Hugine
directly 
affect 
our 
livelihood, 
the 
academic
integrity of the institution and have enormous
impact on the local and regional economies of north
Alabama.  Financial and economic stress we are all
experiencing was not precipitated by the common
faculty or staff members of the university. 
Declining state support is not unique to AAMU.  It
is clear, however, AAMU administration was ill-
prepared in dealing with the situation and opted for
furloughs and pay reduction, and cutting jobs, while
other public universities implemented alternative
methods of dealing with the situation.
"We 
appreciate 
and 
applaud 
your 
executive 
orders
and subsequent actions promoting the openness,
honesty, and accountability in state government.  We
respectfully ask that you instruct Dr. Hugine to
open the financial records of the university for the
last five years and moving forward so that we the
taxpayers can analyze and assess the situation.
"We look forward to your immediate response and
intervention on our behalf.  Time is of the
essence."
The Governor responded to Colston's letter in a letter
dated December 11, 2009, in which he thanked Colston for
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"taking the time to contact my office regarding your concerns
with recent decisions made by the administration of Alabama
A&M University."  The letter informed Colston that the
Governor had forwarded her submission to President Hugine for
his 
"review 
and 
consideration." 
 
The 
Governor 
also
"encourage[d]" Colston "to follow up with Dr. Hugine and his
administration to discuss your concerns."
On December 9, 2009, Colston issued a press release
referencing the fact that the University recently had 
regained
accreditation from the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools ("SACS") after SACS had placed the University on
probation for 12 months.  The press release stated, in
pertinent part: 
"The AAMU-AEA Chapter cautions 
the 
AAMU Board of
Trustees to be more responsible in protecting the
hard work, scholarship, research, teaching and
extension done by the faculty and staff and which is
accredited under the Southern Association of Schools
and Colleges.  
"The behavior of the BOT has been embarrassing
and seriously damaged the good work of the people
who really matter: students, faculty, and staff.  
"We also caution the administration under the
leadership of Dr. Andrew Hugine, Jr., to not punish
the people who have built this great University.
Recent communications give cause for concern that it
is his intention to collapse and dismantle important
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programs 
that 
will 
ultimately 
jeopardize 
our
University status and may land us on probation again
but for different reasons.  This action is a veiled
attempt to remove faculty and staff to save money.
"We urge Dr. Hugine to rethink the use of the
stimulus money to save faculty and staff positions
which affect programs rather than using the money
for dorms.  The stimulus money was to be used to
save jobs and reduce the impact of student tuition
increases.  Restoring academic buildings and not
dorms are lower on the hierarchy.  The use of the
stimulus money for buildings is punitive to the
faculty and staff and reflects a laziness and lack
of vision on the part of the Administration to raise
badly needed funds for deferred maintenance.  We
urge the President to begin work fundraising to
address the dorm issues and where appropriate seek
redress through the State of Alabama.
"We also urge the President to begin meeting
with the faculty and staff in the various schools to
shore up morale and seek input directly from these
constituencies in a spirit of unity."
The following day, December 10, 2009, The Huntsville Times
reported that Colston, "A&M's AEA Chapter President ... handed
out a Press Release ... urging the Administration to not
punish people who have built this great University."
Martha Sherrod, a member of the Board, subsequently sent
an e-mail to the other members of the Board, which was copied
to Hugine, with the subject heading "Release from Regina
Colston."  In the e-mail, Sherrod stated:  "Ms. Colston's
release is replete with misinformation.  I resent her
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statement that 'The behavior of the BOT has been embarrassing
and seriously damages the good work of the people who really
matter,' and recognize that her behavior has been allowed to
go unchecked for a number of years." 
On March 10, 2010, Professor Khanna was terminated from
his position, which he had held for more than 30 years. On May
27, 2010, Colston, again undertaking to act as president of
the University's chapter of the AEA, sent Wims an e-mail in
which she "respectfully request[ed] that you please insure
proper procedure is followed by Dr. Barbara Cady and the
Faculty Senate regarding the grievance hearings and the
forwarding of the rulings" for faculty members who had been
terminated, including Professor Khanna.  The e-mail stated
that the AEA was particularly concerned that a ruling on
Professor Khanna's grievance might be delayed given the
"particular interest" that "[t]he University administration
has taken ... in Dr. Khanna's hearing."  
Colston testified at Professor Khanna's grievance
hearing. In her testimony, she accused Hugine and others in
the University's administration of conspiring to deny
Professor Khanna due process, and she asserted that he was
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unfairly 
fired. 
 
Colston 
also 
testified 
that 
the
administration systematically was not applying the grievance
procedures fairly and in accordance with its own policies and
procedures as demonstrated by the way Professor Khanna's
hearing was conducted.  This testimony was recorded and
reported to the Board in October 2010.
Colston alleges that sometime during the 2009-2010 school
year, the dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, Matthew
Edwards ("Dean Edwards"), and the chair of the Department of
English, Foreign Languages, and Telecommunications, Thomas,
tried to get Colston to change the grades of students who,
according to Colston, had not earned the grades Thomas and
Dean Edwards were suggesting.  Colston represented to some of
her colleagues and to some members of the administration that
the request for grade changes was unethical behavior.  
On September 15, 2010, several exchanges occurred between
Dean Edwards, the new chair of Colston's department, Gatisinzi
Basaninyenzi, Ph.D., and Colston in which Colston noted what
she termed "unethical" behavior of the administration.  The
behavior 
referenced 
by 
Colston 
concerned an 
Internet
television project she had personally developed that had been
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taken over by Dean Edwards and the coordinator of the
department without providing Colston with academic credit for
the project.
Thomas retired from her position on July 1, 2010.  On
August 12, 2010, Thomas wrote a letter addressed to Wims that
was placed in Colston's file.  Basaninyenzi, as the new chair
of the department, also received a copy of the letter.  In the
letter, Thomas stated that the chairperson prepares the
faculty evaluations and that Colston had failed to sign or
return her evaluation forms for the past three years.  Thomas
stated that "[t]he major point of contention on the
[2007–2008] evaluation was [Colston's] tenure status."  The
letter noted that Colston had refused to sign recent
evaluations because they indicated that she was not tenured. 
Thomas concluded the letter with the assertion that Colston's
"failure to respond adequately to the evaluation
process during the past three years reveals the
evasive, defiant and dishonest patterns of her
behavior and her refusal to follow required
procedures.  She has circumvented all of my efforts
to discuss her performance while the quality of her
work continues to decline.  Her 2009-2010 evaluation
clearly reveals her unsatisfactory performance.  It
is obvious that she has no intentions of improving.
I recommended her dismissal."
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In his deposition, Wims admitted that he received
Thomas's letter, but he stated that it did not constitute a
basis for his recommendation that Colston's employment be
terminated.  Likewise, Basaninyenzi testified that he did not
act on Thomas's recommendation because he "had not supervised
[Colston]" at that point in time.  
It is undisputed that the University was facing budget
problems when Hugine was hired as president in 2009.  As part
of its 2009-2010 budget, the University raised tuition and
fees, reduced personnel, implemented faculty furloughs, and
outsourced facilities management.  The presentation organized
and disseminated by Colston criticized those measures.  
The University's budget shortfalls continued through the
2010-2011 fiscal year and the 2011-2012 fiscal year. 
According to Hugine's testimony, in order to address the
problem, he tasked the vice presidents of the University,
including Wims, with "the responsibility of compiling
recommendations to address these issues."  Wims recommended
the dismissal of a large number of  University employees. 
Accordingly, he met with the Dean's Council of the University
concerning this recommendation.  
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Pursuant to Wims's instructions, Dean Edwards began
reviewing the files of faculty members for the purpose of
evaluating faculty for dismissal.  In the course of developing
a list of potential dismissals, Dean Edwards reviewed the
tenure status of each candidate for dismissal.  In the case of
Colston, Dean Edwards stated that he took into account the
May 11, 2010, note from Thomas stating that Colston was not
tenured and the fact that he did not see anything in Colston's
personnel filed indicating that she was tenured.  Dean Edwards
testified 
that 
he 
placed 
Colston 
on 
his 
list 
of
recommendations for 
dismissal 
because 
he 
"wanted 
the 
strongest
faculty I can, most capable faculty for both teaching and
scholarly productivity," which meant keeping those "who are
publishing, who are about their profession, and who are
engaged in academic process for it."  In total, Dean Edwards
recommended seven faculty members in the School of Arts and
Sciences for dismissal.
Dean Edwards submitted his recommendations to Wims.  Wims
then investigated Colston's tenure status before making his
recommendation for dismissal.  The investigation included a
review of Colston's personnel file, as well as directives to
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Dean Edwards and Basaninyenzi to search for any helpful
documents.  Wims admitted that in the course of his
investigation he saw in Colston's file the October 25, 2006,
letter from Edmond to Colston that stated that Colston was
tenured, but he stated that he concluded that Edmond must have
been mistaken based on the lack of evidence that Colston had
obtained tenure through the normal procedures.  According to
Wims, following his investigation he concluded that there was
no evidence indicating that Colston had ever been awarded
tenure through the ordinary approval process.
Thereafter, Wims, Dean Edwards, and Basaninyenzi met to
discuss the dismissal of employees within the Department of
English, 
Foreign 
Languages, 
and 
Telecommunications. 
Basaninyenzi testified that Colston was not specifically
discussed during the meeting.  Basaninyenzi stated, however,
that he was aware that Colston was one of the highest paid
non-tenured faculty in his department.  At the conclusion of
the meeting, Wims, Dean Edwards, and Basaninyenzi executed
memoranda dated June 22, 2011, recommending Colston and six
other faculty members within the School of Arts and Sciences
for dismissal.
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After receiving the memorandum recommending Colston's
dismissal, Hugine approved her dismissal.  Hugine testified
that the recommendation from Basaninyenzi, Dean Edwards, and
Wims constituted all that he considered in 
approving Colston's
dismissal.  In correspondence dated June 24, 2011, Hugine
informed Colston that "based on the recommendation of your
Chair, [Basaninyenzi] and approval by Dean [Edwards] and
[Wims,] Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs, ...
your employment ... will end effective July 31, 2011."  The
correspondence did not list a reason for the termination.  Its
subject heading read:  "No Cause Termination of Your
Employment at Alabama A&M University."5
James D. Montgomery, Sr., a member of the Board of
Trustees at the time Colston filed the present action,
testified in his deposition as to the reason he believed
Colston's employment was terminated:
"I believed then, as I do now, that she was
terminated because of her outspokenness, because she
was 
challenging. 
 
And, 
in 
my 
opinion, 
the
5In 
2011, 
the 
Alabama 
Legislature amended 
§ 
16-49-23, Ala.
Code 1975, placing in the office of the president of the
University certain powers previously held by the Board.  Of
particular note is the fact that the amended statute empowered
the president, rather than the board of trustees, to terminate
the employment of University faculty.
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University, 
or 
President 
Hugine 
and 
his
administrative staff ... seem to have it in for you
if you cross them in any way. 
"And I say that because that's not based on
hearsay or based -- it's based on my own personal
experience with them.  So, I believe that she was
terminated and fired from her job because she spoke 
up, where she testified at [Professor] Khanna's
hearing, if that would have been considered going
against the administration.  And I believe that's
why they fired her.  I don't think it was because
she wasn't tenured.  I don't think it was because
she wasn't doing a good job.  It was because she was
stirring up trouble."
Montgomery also testified that he thought "there was animus
toward [Colston] from [Wims] and Dr. Hugine."
Colston filed a grievance upon being fired.  The
Grievance Committee held a hearing concerning Colston's
dismissal on September 8, 2011.  In the hearing, the
University 
reiterated 
that 
Colston's 
was 
a 
so-called
"no-cause" termination.  After the hearing, on September 26,
2011, the chair of the Grievance Committee, Patricia Young,
sent Colston a letter stating that a majority of the committee
members found that certain exhibits submitted by Colston
"suggest that you are Tenured."  The Grievance Committee sent
the administration a letter recommending that it 
consider some
of the evidence indicating that Colston was tenured before
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finalizing 
the 
termination 
of 
her 
employment. 
 
The
administration had the vice president for academic affairs
consider the matter, and he notified Colston that her
dismissal was final.
Colston filed this action on November 30, 2011, in the
Madison Circuit Court against the University; the Board; the
members of the Board and Hugine in their official capacities;
and Hugine in his individual capacity.  The University filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint, and, in response, Colston
filed her first amended complaint on February 22, 2012.  The
University renewed its motion to dismiss in a filing submitted
March 7, 2012.
On May 1, 2012, the trial court entered an order on the
pending motions to dismiss in which it, in pertinent part,
dismissed all state-law claims that sought recovery of
monetary damages against the University.
On November 2, 2012, Colston filed a second amended
complaint that contained 11 counts and that added as
defendants Wims in both his official capacity and his
individual capacity and Thomas in her individual capacity. 
Relevant to the present petition are six counts of the second
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amended complaint:  counts 2 and 4, which alleged violations
of Colston's First Amendment rights, and counts 7 through 10,
which alleged violations of state law.  
Count 2 asserted that Colston "engaged in speech by
opposing 
and 
criticizing 
the 
financial 
practices, the 
handling
of administrative appointments, the unethical changing of
grades and usurpation of academic pursuits, the business
practices, and other important matters of public concern
relating to [the University]."  It alleged that Hugine and
Wims improperly terminated Colston's employment because she
exercised her First Amendment right to free speech by
discussing the above-listed matters.  Colston requested
damages against Hugine and Wims in their individual capacities
for violating Colston's constitutional right to free speech by
terminating her employment.
Count 4 alleged that Hugine and Wims terminated Colston's
employment because of her association with the AEA, an
association protected by the First Amendment.  Colston
requested damages against Hugine and Wims in their individual
capacities for violating Colston's constitutional right to
free association by terminating her employment.
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Count 7 alleged that Hugine and Wims wrongfully
terminated Colston's employment because they dismissed her
without providing her a pretermination hearing.6 Colston
alleged that she was entitled to a pretermination hearing
because, she says, she was a tenured employee.  The complaint
stated that "Dr. Hugine (in his individual capacity) and
Dr. Wims (in his individual capacity) acted wilfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority or under a mistaken interpretation of law in
terminating Regina Colston's employment without a pre-
termination hearing."
Count 8 alleged that Hugine and Wims committed fraud or
misrepresentation by allowing Colston to believe that she was
tenured and "[w]ithout disclosing to her their belief that she
was obligated to take further actions under the policies" in
order to obtain tenure.  Colston alleged that she "reasonably
relied on these material omissions and/or misrepresentations
regarding her tenured status and ... reasonably expected
continued employment as a tenured assistant professor." 
6Colston also asserted this claim against the members of
the Board in their official capacities, but that aspect of
count 7 is not before us in the present mandamus petition.
25
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Colston further alleged that "[t]hese misrepresentations
and/or omissions" were to her detriment when she was dismissed
without 
a 
pretermination hearing. 
Colston 
asserted 
that 
Hugine
and Wims should be held individually responsible for
"terminating Regina Colston's employment without cause and
without a pre-termination hearing on the basis that she was
not tenured."
In counts 9 and 10, Colston alleged that Thomas and Wims
tortiously interfered with Colston's contractual relationship
with the University.  With regard to Thomas, Colston alleged
that she committed a series of acts intended to undermine
Colston's tenured status.  With regard to Wims, Colston
alleged that he was aware that Colston had tenure but that he
"conspired with Thomas and instructed her to place a
memorandum in the file [stating] that Regina Colston was not
tenured in order to terminate her not for cause and avoid her
being available for an interview by SACS, for which he was
responsible."  
On November 16, 2012, the University filed a "Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment"
concerning the second amended complaint.  The parties engaged
26
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in extensive discovery that included deposing 19 
witnesses and
producing nearly 23,000 pages of documentation.  On July 26,
2013, all the defendants filed a "Supplemental Motion for
Summary Judgment."  In that motion and the memorandum of law
that accompanied it, the defendants argued that Hugine and
Wims were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual
capacities for Colston's First Amendment retaliation claims
(counts 2 and 4) and that Hugine, Wims, and Thomas were
entitled 
to State-agent 
immunity 
in 
their 
individual
capacities as to Colston's state-law claims (counts 7 through
10).  
On December 11, 2013, the trial court entered an order
addressing 
various 
motions 
for 
a 
summary 
judgment. 
Specifically, the trial court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant as to all claims by Colston seeking
compensatory and/or punitive damages against any defendant in
the defendant's official capacity.   The trial court denied
summary judgment as to all other claims asserted by Colston.
Subsequently, Hugine, Wims, and Thomas filed the present
petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court in which they
asked this Court to vacate the trial court's December 11,
27
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2013, order to the extent that it denied Hugine and Wims
qualified immunity from Colston's First Amendment retaliation
claims against them in their individual capacities and to the
extent that it denied Hugine, Wims, and Thomas State-agent
immunity from Colston's state-law claims against them in 
their
individual capacities and to enter a summary judgment in their
favor as to Colston's claims against them.
II.  Standard of Review
"This Court has stated:
"'"While the general rule is
that the denial of a motion for
summary 
judgment 
is 
not
reviewable, the exception is that
the denial of a motion grounded
on 
a 
claim 
of 
immunity 
is
reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689
So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1996) ....
"'"Summary 
judgment 
is
appropriate only when 'there is
no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving
party is entitled to a judgment
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law.' 
Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young
v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.
2d 402 (Ala. 1996). A court
considering a motion for summary
judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama
Power Co., 675 So. 2d 397 (Ala.
28
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1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991);
will accord the nonmoving party
all 
reasonable 
favorable
inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley
Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d
981 (Ala. 1992); and will resolve
all reasonable doubts against the
moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185
(Ala. 1998).
"'"An 
appellate 
court
reviewing a ruling on a motion
for summary judgment will, de
novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court.
Fuqua, supra, Brislin, supra.
Likewise, the appellate court
will consider only that factual
material available of record to
the 
trial 
court 
for 
its
consideration in deciding the
motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha
Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278
(Ala. 
1991), 
Boland v. 
Fort
Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So. 2d 595
(Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599
So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1992)."'
"Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (Ala.
2000)). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy available only when the petitioner can
demonstrate: '"(1) a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent
to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."'
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003)
29
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(quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270,
1272 (Ala. 2001))."
Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 291-92 (Ala.
2012).
"We review the validity of a qualified immunity defense
de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S.Ct. 1019,
127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994)."  Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084,
1089 (7th Cir. 2013).  We are also mindful of the fact that,
"[a]s a general rule, 'summary judgment is particularly
inappropriate in first amendment cases.'"  Hatcher v. Board of
Pub. Educ. & Orphanage for Bibb Cty., 809 F.2d 1546, 1558
(11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508,
1515 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
III.  Analysis
A. Colston's First Amendment Claims and Qualified Immunity
As we noted in Part I of this opinion, Colston asserts
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Hugine and Wims
violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and free
association when they terminated her employment with the
University.  Hugine and Wims assert that they are protected
from Colston's claims by 
qualified immunity because, they say,
they were acting within their discretionary authority when
30
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they terminated Colston's employment and they did so for
budgetary reasons, not because of Colston's First Amendment
activities.
"Qualified immunity offers complete protection for
individual 
public 
officials 
performing 
discretionary 
functions
'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.'"  Sherrod v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359,
1363 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).  
"In Saucier [v. Katz,] 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct.
2151 [(2001)], this Court mandated a two-step
sequence 
for 
resolving 
government 
officials'
qualified immunity claims.  First, a court must
decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has
alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), ©)) or
shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a
constitutional right. 533 U.S., at 201, 121 S.Ct.
2151.  Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this
first step, the court must decide whether the right
at issue was 'clearly established' at the time of
defendant's alleged misconduct.  Ibid.  Qualified
immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct
violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Anderson [v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,] 640, 107
S.Ct. 3034 [(1987)]."
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Before we evaluate the two prongs of the test for
qualified immunity, however, we must examine the threshold
31
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issue of discretionary function.  "To even be potentially
eligible for summary judgment due to qualified immunity, the
official must have been engaged in a 'discretionary function'
when he performed the acts of which the plaintiff complains."
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2004). 
In this regard, "[o]ur inquiry is two-fold. We ask whether the
government 
employee 
was 
(a) 
performing 
a 
legitimate
job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal),
(b) through means that were within his power to utilize."  Id.
at 1265.7
7
"In many areas other than qualified immunity, a
'discretionary function' is defined as an activity
requiring the exercise of independent judgment, and
is the opposite of a 'ministerial task.'  See, e.g.,
Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
In the qualified immunity context, however, we
appear 
to 
have 
abandoned 
this 
'discretionary
function/ministerial task' dichotomy.  In McCoy v.
Webster, 47 F.3d 404, 407 (11th Cir. 1995), we
interpreted 'the term "discretionary authority" to
include actions that do not necessarily involve an
element of choice,' and emphasized that, for
purposes of qualified immunity, a governmental actor
engaged 
in 
purely 
ministerial 
activities 
can
nevertheless 
be 
performing 
a 
discretionary
function."
Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265.
32
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Colston contends that Hugine and Wims were not engaged in
a discretionary function because they allegedly violated
requirements of the University handbook in terminating
Colston's employment.  In making this argument, however,
Colston misunderstands the nature of the initial inquiry
concerning the applicability of qualified immunity. 8
"Instead of focusing on whether the acts in
question involved the exercise of actual discretion,
we assess whether they are of a type that fell
within the employee's job responsibilities.  ...
"....
"Consider the first prong of the test -- whether
the official is engaged in a legitimate job-related
function.  In Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972
F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1992), 'we did not ask whether
it was within the defendant's authority to suspend
an employee for an improper reason; instead, we
asked whether [the defendant's] discretionary duties
included the administration of discipline.'  Harbert
[Int'l., Inc.  v.  James], 157 F.3d [1271] at 1282
[(11th Cir.  1998)].  ...  Put another way, to pass
the first step of the discretionary function test
for qualified immunity, the defendant must have been
performing a function that, but for the alleged
constitutional infirmity, would have fallen with his
legitimate job description.
8In misunderstanding a portion of the qualified-immunity
analysis, Colston is far from alone. See, e.g., Ex parte
Madison Cty. Bd. of Educ., 1 So. 3d 980, 994 (Ala. 2008)
(Murdock, J., concurring in 
the 
result) (suggesting that there
may be "'no area of the law which is more confusing than
qualified immunity ....'" (quoting Flowers v. Bennett, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 595, 601 (N.D. Ala. 2000))). 
33
1130428
"....
"After determining that an official is engaged
in a legitimate job-related function, it is then
necessary to turn to the second prong of the test
and 
determine 
whether 
he 
is 
executing 
that
job-related function -- that is, pursuing his
job-related goals -- in an authorized manner.  ... 
Each government employee is given only a certain
'arsenal' of powers with which to accomplish her
goals. For example, it is not within a teacher's
official powers to sign her students up for the Army
to promote patriotism or civic virtue, or to compel
them 
to 
bring 
their 
property 
to 
school 
to
redistribute their wealth to the poor so that they
can have firsthand experience with altruism."
370 F.3d at 1265, 1266-67 (some emphasis added).  
Employment 
decisions 
are 
clearly 
within 
the 
job
description of the president of the University, and the
provost is specifically designated to help the president in
making such decisions.  See § 16-49-23, Ala. Code 1975.
Likewise, dismissal is among the tools available to the
president in making employment decisions.  See id.  Therefore,
when they terminated Colston's employment, Hugine and Wims
were engaged in a "discretionary function" as that concept is
understood for purposes of 
the doctrine of qualified immunity.
"[O]nce a defendant establishes that he was engaged
in a discretionary function at the time of the acts
in question, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. To do so,
34
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the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable
jury could interpret the evidence in the record as
showing that the defendant violated a constitutional
right that was clearly established at the time of
the acts in question."
Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1267.
Colston has alleged that Hugine and Wims should be
personally liable for money damages because, she contends,
they violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and
free association.  Evaluating whether a government official 
violated the free-speech rights of a government employee --
Colston was employed by a state-sponsored university --
involves its own special test grounded in the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  In
Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1342 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
explained:
"Following 
Pickering, 
our 
analysis 
of
retaliation against an employee by a government
employer for alleged constitutionally protected
speech has been comprised of four parts:
"'To prevail under this analysis, an
employee must show that:  (1) the speech
involved a matter of public concern;
(2) the employee's free speech interests
outweighed the employer's interest in
35
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effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities; and 
(3) 
the 
speech 
played
a 
substantial 
part 
in 
the 
adverse
employment 
action. 
If 
an 
employee 
satisfies
her burden on the first three steps,
[(4)] the burden then shifts to the
employer to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same
decision even in the absence of the
protected speech.'"
(Quoting Cook v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1318
(11th Cir. 2005).)
"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record."  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). 
"[T]he Connick test requires us to look at the point of the
speech in question: Was it the employee's point to bring
wrongdoing to light? Or to raise issues of public concern? Or
was the point to further some purely private interest?"  Hesse
v. Board of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211, Cook Cty.,
Ill., 848 F.2d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 1988).  "[P]ublic concern is
something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public at the time of publication."  City of San Diego,
Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004). "[Because] '[a]n
36
1130428
employee's speech will rarely be entirely private or entirely
public,' the 'main thrust' of the employee's speech must be
determined."  Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir.
1993)).
The petitioners contend that "the 'main thrust' of
[Colston's] 
'speech' 
concerned 
quintessential 
internal 
college
affairs and items of personal, rather than public, concern."
(Quoting Mayles v. Richmond Cty. Bd.  of Educ., 267 F. App'x
898, 900 (11th Cir. 2008) (not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter).)  Colston disagrees.  Indeed, the parties
disagree as to the application of each of the Pickering
factors.
Courts use the same general test for evaluating whether
defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to
qualified immunity from free-association claims as they do 
for
free-speech claims, i.e., whether the defendants' conduct
violated a constitutional right and whether that right was
"clearly established" at the time of the defendants' action.
One difference between a free-speech analysis and a free-
association analysis is that, "unlike speech or petitions by
37
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public employees, associational activity by public employees
need not be on matters of public concern to be protected under
the First Amendment."  D'Angelo v. School Bd. of Polk Cty.,
Fla., 497 F.3d 1203, 1212 (11th Cir. 2007).  Courts do apply
the remainder of the Pickering test, however, in evaluating
whether a defendant violated a public-employee plaintiff's
right to free association.  See, e.g., Ross v. Clayton Cty.,
Ga., 173 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that
"Pickering requires the district court to balance the 
interest
of the public employee in exercising his right of free speech
or association against the 'interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees.'"  (quoting Pickering, 391
U.S. at 568)).  Again, the parties disagree as to the proper
application of essentially all the elements of the law
applicable to Colston's associational claims.
In this case we need not determine whether Colston's
speech addressed matters of public concern, how to balance
Colston's free-speech interests against the public employer's
interest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities, 
whether 
Colston's 
speech 
played 
a
38
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substantial motivating factor in her dismissal, or whether
other aspects of the Pickering test are met as to Colston's
free-speech claims.  Nor must we resolve similar disputes over
application of the Pickering test to Colston's associational
claims.  Those issues may be pretermitted because, even if
Colston presented substantial evidence in her favor on all of
these matters, the record reflects a separate, objectively
lawful basis for terminating Colston's employment.
In Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
explained the applicable law in so-called "mixed-motive
cases":
"That state officials 
can 
act 
lawfully even when
motivated by a dislike or hostility to certain
protected behavior by a citizen is well established.
See Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct.
568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1979).  ...  For example, state
officials act lawfully despite having discriminatory
intent, where the record shows they would have acted
as they, in fact, did act even if they had lacked
discriminatory intent.  Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at
286–87, 97 S.Ct. at 576.
"....
"One trigger to the doctrine's application
depends upon whether the record establishes that the
defendant, in fact, did possess a substantial lawful
motive for acting as he did act.  At least when an
adequate lawful motive 
is present, that [an
39
1130428
unlawful] motive might also exist does not sweep
qualified immunity from the field even at the
summary judgment stage.  Unless it, as a legal
matter, is plain under the specific facts and
circumstances of the case that the defendant's
conduct -- despite his having adequate lawful
reasons to support the act -- was the result of his
unlawful motive, the defendant is entitled to
immunity.  Where the facts assumed for summary
judgment purposes in a case involving qualified
immunity show mixed motives (lawful and unlawful
motivations) and pre-existing law does not dictate
that the merits of the case must be decided in
plaintiff's favor, the defendant is entitled to
immunity."
94 F.3d at 1534-35 (some emphasis added).
It is not plain as a legal matter, under the specific
facts and circumstances of this case, that the defendants'
conduct -- despite adequate lawful reasons therefor -- was the
result of their unlawful motive.  It is undisputed that there
were budgetary constraints in existence at the University at
the time of Colston's dismissal.  In June 2011, the University
administration reported to the Board of Trustees that the
University would experience a $10.6 million reduction in 
state
funding for the 2011-2012 fiscal year. The administration
simultaneously announced that a significant number of
University personnel would be dismissed in an effort to
address the funding shortfall.  The petitioners note that even
40
1130428
Professor Khanna in his presentation conceded that the
University 
was 
overstaffed and 
that 
this 
overstaffing 
included
faculty.  Perhaps most significantly, it is undisputed that,
as a result of the budget shortfall, the University
subsequently dismissed 33 employees, including 7 faculty
members in the School of Arts and Sciences, and that Colston
was among those let go. Consequently, there was an adequate
lawful basis for terminating Colston's employment. 9
It also is undisputed that Dean Edwards initially
compiled the list of seven faculty members from the School of
Arts and Sciences who would be recommended for dismissal, and
Colston was on the list.  Dean Edwards testified without
contradiction that he did not consult with anyone else in
developing the criteria for placement of a faculty member on
the list or in producing his initial list.  He stated that he
formulated the list as he did because he "wanted the strongest
faculty ..., most capable faculty for both teaching and
scholarly productivity," which meant keeping those "who are
9Any claim that termination of Colston's employment was
improper because she was tenured is not part of Colston's
First Amendment claims.  Notwithstanding Colston's focus on
the "facts" regarding the issue of her tenure, this particular
case concerns Colston's First Amendment rights, not 
her rights
as an allegedly tenured faculty member.
41
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publishing, who are about their profession, and who are
engaged in academic process for it."10  Dean Edwards testified
that he was unaware of Colston's position with the AEA or with
her speaking activities performed in that role.  Of particular
note, it is undisputed that neither Hugine nor Wims suggested
to Dean Edwards that he should put Colston on his list.  
After he compiled his list, Dean Edwards met with Wims
and Basaninyenzi.  According to Dean Edwards, Basaninyenzi
requested that one faculty member on the list (not Colston) be
substituted for another, but the three men did not discuss
Colston.  Basaninyenzi also confirmed that they did not
discuss Colston.  At the conclusion of the meeting, Wims, Dean
Edwards, and Basaninyenzi executed memoranda recommending the
termination of the employment of Colston and six other faculty
members within the School of Arts and Sciences.  Hugine
testified that he approved the dismissals based solely on the
recommendations from those officials.  Both Hugine and Wims
testified that budget shortfalls were the driving force behind
all the dismissals.
10Dean Edwards also stated that Colston was the highest
paid non-tenured professor in the School of Arts and Sciences. 
42
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Colston argues that the budgetary shortfall was a pretext
for firing her for impermissible reasons. She points to
evidence indicating that the petitioners did not raise the
budget concerns as a defense until 14 months into the action
and the fact that the University sought a replacement to teach
Colston's courses.  This, however, does not constitute
substantial evidence that, but for the allegedly protected
speech and associations, Hugine and Wims would have ignored
the recommendations on the list, a list that was not
influenced in any way by suggestions from Hugine or Wims.  In
addition, there is evidence indicating that the budget
concerns were not raised earlier in the action because the
relevant persons involved in the decision-making process were
not deposed by Colston until that time.  Although it is true
that the University advertised for another communications
faculty position, this simply represented the University's
effort to find professors to teach some of the courses Colston
taught; the University did not fill Colston's full-time
position.11
11Colston also cites James Montgomery's testimony as to
his belief that Colston was fired for "stirring up trouble."
Yet, Montgomery did not talk to Hugine or Wims about Colston's
dismissal.  His statements merely reflected his opinion as to
43
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As was the case in Foy, "the record makes it clear that
the Defendants' acts" -- which in this case followed
approximately a year and a half after the activity at issue --
"were actually motivated by lawful considerations without
which they would not have acted."  Foy, 94 F.3d at 1535.  In
discussing its own facts as well as those in Foy, Johnson v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 126 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1997),
and Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2000), the court in Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d
1269 (11th Cir. 2008), provides a helpful discussion: 
"We now turn to Appellees' defense of qualified
immunity, interposed in the individual capacity
claims for money damages.  '[Q]ualified immunity
protects 
government 
officials 
performing
discretionary functions from the burdens of civil
trials and from liability,' McMillian v. Johnson, 88
F.3d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Lassiter v.
Alabama A&M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.
1994) (en banc)), '[i]n all but exceptional cases.'
Id.  It is only 'when an official's conduct violates
"clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have
known"' that 'the official is not protected by
the reason for the termination of Colston's employment. 
Importantly, Montgomery's testimony does not dispute that
there was a cost-cutting effort at the University, nor does it
cast any doubt on the legitimacy of the creation of the list
used to achieve the necessary cost-cutting.  Montgomery's
conclusory testimony did not meet the particulars of the
objectively lawful motive otherwise shown for the termination
of Colston's employment.
44
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qualified immunity.'  Id. (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73
L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).
"....
"Rioux's claims, if believed, would establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, which
ensures the right to be free from intentional
discrimination based on race.  Williams v. Consol.
City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir.
2003); see also Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc.,
956 F.2d 1056, 1064 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
intentional discrimination in hiring and firing
practices violated Equal Protection Clause).  If the
trier of fact believed Rioux's showing of pretext,
and disbelieved Appellees' proffered legitimate
reason, then a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause would be shown.  The 'other' evidence from
which a jury might infer discriminatory animus on
the part of Rubin and COO Young, which we have
summarized above, constitutes that showing by Rioux,
at the summary judgment stage, of the violation of
a constitutional right.
"....
"We 
therefore turn to 
an 
examination of 
'whether
the defendant's conduct was nonetheless "objectively
reasonable" in light of that [Equal Protection]
right.'  Johnson [v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.],
126 F.3d [1372] at 1378 [(11th Cir.  1997)] (citing
Anderson [v.  Creighton], 483 U.S. [635] at 638, 107
S.Ct. 3034 [(1987)]).  Rioux must demonstrate at
this step in the qualified immunity analysis that a
reasonable fire chief and a reasonable chief
operating officer of a city would know that demoting
a high-ranking, subordinate, discretionary officer
in the factual circumstances presented here violated
clearly established law.  See Stanley v. City of
Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000)
45
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(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73
L.Ed.2d 396).  And it is this that he cannot show.
"Clearly established law provides that state
officials 'can be motivated, in part, by a dislike
or hostility toward a certain protected class to
which a citizen belongs and still act lawfully ....'
Foy, 94 F.3d at 1534 (citing Vil. of Arlington Hts.
v. Metro. Housing Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 269-71 n. 21,
97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)); see also
Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87, 97 S.Ct.
568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).  Thus, 'state officials
act lawfully despite having discriminatory intent,
where the record shows they would have acted as
they, in fact, did act even if they had lacked
discriminatory intent.'  Id. (citing Mt. Healthy,
429 U.S. at 286-87, 97 S.Ct. 568). ...
"Foy explained:
"'At least when an adequate lawful motive
is present, that a discriminatory motive
might also exist does not sweep qualified
immunity from the field even at the summary
judgment stage.  Unless it, as a legal
matter, is plain under the specific facts
and circumstances of the case that the
defendant's conduct--despite his having
adequate lawful reasons to support the
act--was the result of his unlawful motive,
the defendant is entitled to immunity.
Where the facts assumed 
for summary
judgment purposes in a case involving
qualified immunity show  mixed motives
(lawful and unlawful motivations) and
pre-existing law does not dictate that the
merits of the case must be decided in
plaintiff's 
favor, 
the 
defendant 
is
entitled to immunity.'
"94 F.3d at 1534-35.
46
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"Tracking the reasoning used in Foy to reverse
the denial of summary judgment where qualified
immunity was interposed as a defense, here no jury
could find that it would have been unlawful for a
fire chief and the city's chief operating officer to
do 
as 
Appellees 
did 
if 
they 
had 
lacked
discriminatory intent.  Id. at 1535.  No jury could
find that a reasonable fire chief and chief
operating officer would never have demoted Rioux but
for a discriminatory intent.  Id.  The record here,
as in Foy, undisputably establishes that Appellees
were 
motivated 
at 
least 
in 
part 
by 
lawful
justifications, 
supported 
by 
the 
independent
investigations 
conducted 
by 
OPS 
[Office 
of
Professional Standards] and the Law Department,
investigations which these two decisionmakers were
not a part of and which there is no evidence they
manipulated.  Id. at 1535 n.9. Cf. McMillian, 88
F.3d 1554 (affirming trial court denial of summary
judgment where genuine issues of fact existed as to
reasons officials placed plaintiff on death row, in
part, due to issue of whether officers lied
concerning their reasons).
"....
"The 
objective 
reasonableness 
inquiry 
in 
Stanley
proceeded in the following manner.  Chadwick, the
chief of police, had cause to resent Stanley, a
police officer who had years before named Chadwick
as a suspect in an investigation.  Years after
Stanley's 
remarks, 
and 
following 
several
disciplinary 
incidents, 
Chadwick 
terminated 
Stanley,
and Stanley brought a section 1983 action for
violation of his first amendment rights.  The
reversal of the denial of a motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity rested on two
undisputed facts.  First, the record undisputably
established that objectively valid reasons existed
for the step Chadwick took, because the incidents
underlying 
the 
discipline 
that 
led 
to 
the
termination did in fact take place.  Thus, 'no jury
47
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could find that it would have been unlawful to
terminate Stanley as Chadwick did absent retaliatory
motive.'  Id. at 1296.
"Second, summary judgment was appropriate
because the record undisputably established that
Chadwick was motivated, at least in part, by the
lawful considerations of the disciplinary incidents.
A four-year time gap existed between Stanley's
initial protected speech naming Chadwick as a
suspect, and in those four years, Stanley had
engaged in actions that resulted in discipline.
'Even if a reasonable police chief acted with
retaliatory motive, the law in 1997 did not clearly
establish that a reasonable police chief--faced with
the same undisputed evidence of Stanley's misconduct
and undisputably acting at least in part because of
Stanley's misconduct--should not have terminated
Stanley in the same manner.'  Id. at 1297 (citing
Johnson, 126 F.3d at 1379).
"Similarly, Johnson reversed the denial of a
summary judgment motion raising qualified immunity
on the ground that the demotion and discharge of the
plaintiff-firefighter was based on indisputable and
adequate 
lawful 
motives, 
specifically, 
the
firefighter's failure to obey a direct order and
repeated lies at his disciplinary hearing. 126 F.3d
at 1379.  In Johnson, '[e]ven assuming that the
defendants 
acted 
with 
some 
discriminatory 
or
retaliatory motives in demoting and discharging
Johnson, the law did not clearly establish that a
reasonable official faced with the same evidence of
disobedience 
and 
deception 
should 
not 
have
disciplined Johnson in the same manner.'  Id. at
1379. Cf. Bogle [v.  McClure], 332 F.3d [1347] at
1356 [(11th Cir. 2003)] (affirming denial of renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law following
jury verdict where evidence suggested defendants'
evidence of reorganization plan was a sham designed
to cover-up race-based transfers and jury squarely
found appellants intentionally discriminated on
48
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account 
of 
race, 
rejecting 
proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons).
"Here, the record shows Appellees were in fact
motivated, at least in part, by objectively valid
reasons in demoting Rioux.  Notwithstanding the
evidence of pretext, which is sufficient to sustain
Rioux's burden of showing that his demotion was the
result of discrimination, there is no evidence that
Rubin or COO Young influenced two independent
investigations concerning the May 2, 2004 incident.
There is no evidence that the May 2, 2004 incident
did not in fact take place, or that the incident did
not involve some violation of one or more work rules
by the second-highest ranking member of the AFD.  No
evidence was presented that Appellees' decisions to
demote Rioux were not motivated, at least in part,
by the lawful consideration of the OPS and Law
Department's concluded investigations and findings.
We cannot say that, even assuming Appellees were
acting with improper race-based animus or a desire
to 
address 
race-balancing 
in 
the 
workplace,
reasonable officials faced with the same evidence of
Rioux's violations of work rules would have known
that demoting Rioux violated clearly established
federal law.
"Because pre-existing law did not provide fair
warning to Appellees that demoting Rioux under these
circumstances would violate clearly established
federal law, Appellees are entitled to qualified
immunity." 
Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1282–85 (some emphasis added).  As was the
case in Foy, Rouix, Stanley, and Johnson, there is no genuine
issue as to whether the defendants in the present case "were
motivated at least in 
part by lawful justifications, supported
by 
independent 
[recommendations] 
... 
which 
these 
...
49
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decisionmakers were not a part of and which there is no
evidence they manipulated." Rioux, 520 F. 3d at 1284. 
 "When public officials do their jobs, it is a
good thing. Qualified immunity is a real-world
doctrine designed to allow local officials to act
(without always erring on the side of caution) when
action is required to discharge the duties of public
office.  See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196,
104 S.Ct. 3012, 3020, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)
('[O]fficials should not always err on the side of
caution.').  For many public servants, a failure to
act can have severe consequences for the citizenry. 
...
"As we decide this case, we cannot forget the
purpose of qualified immunity.  The qualified
immunity 
defense 
functions 
to 
prevent 
public
officials from being intimidated -- by the threat of
lawsuits which jeopardize the official and his
family's welfare personally -- from doing their
jobs.  Qualified immunity can be a muscular doctrine
that impacts on the reality of the workaday world as
long as judges remember that the central idea is
this pragmatic one:  officials can act without fear
of 
harassing 
litigation 
only 
when 
they 
can
reasonably anticipate -- before they act or do not
act -- if their conduct will give rise to damage
liability for them."
Foy, 94 F.3d at 1534. 
Ultimately, Foy instructs that "whenever a public officer
is sued for money damages in his individual capacity for
violating federal law, the basic qualified immunity question
looms unchanged:  Could a reasonable officer have believed
that what the defendant did might be lawful in the
50
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circumstances and in the light of the clearly established
law?"  Id.  The clear answer to that question in this case is
yes.  Budgetary constraints are a common and entirely legal
reason for dismissing employees.  The evidence indicates that
Hugine and Wims were motivated, at least in part, by the
University's financial situation in deciding to terminate
Colston's employment.  There is also no evidence indicating
that the unconstitutional motive advanced by Colston for her
dismissal was a factor in her name being placed on the
original list of faculty members Dean Edwards offered as
candidates for dismissals.  In short, under the test
enunciated in Foy, Hugine and Wims established as a matter of
law that they would have made the same decision concerning
Colston's employment with the University even in the absence
of her speech and associational activities.  
Therefore, Hugine
and Wims are entitled to qualified immunity from Colston's
federal constitutional claims, and the trial court erred in
concluding otherwise.
B. Colston's State-law Claims and State-agent Immunity
Colston also asserts claims against Hugine, Wims, and
Thomas under state law related to the termination of her
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employment.  Specifically, Colston alleged claims of wrongful
termination and fraud against Wims and Hugine; she alleged
claims 
of 
tortious 
interference 
with 
a 
contractual
relationship against Wims and Thomas.  The 
petitioners contend
that they are entitled to State-agent immunity from those
claims and that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
failing to dismiss those claims on that basis.
"This Court, in [Ex parte] Cranman[, 792 So. 2d
392 (Ala. 2000)], stated the test for State-agent
immunity as follows:
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"'(2) exercising his or her judgment
in the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"'(a) making administrative
adjudications;
"'(b) allocating resources;
"'©) negotiating contracts;
"'(d) 
hiring, 
firing,
transferring, 
assigning, 
or
supervising personnel; or
52
1130428
"'(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"'(4) exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"'(5) exercising judgment in the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, 
or 
regulation 
in 
releasing 
prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
"'Notwithstanding 
anything 
to the
contrary in the foregoing statement of the
rule, a State agent shall not be immune
from civil liability in his or her personal
capacity
"'(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a 
governmental 
agency 
require 
otherwise; 
or
"'(2) when the State agent acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.'
"Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405."
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Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292-93 (Ala.
2012).
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a 
"burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.'  Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.'  946 So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories
of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable."
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Ala. 2008).
Before we analyze the elements of State-agent immunity
for each of Colston's claims, we note at the outset that
Colston 
has 
argued 
that 
the 
University 
is 
not 
an
instrumentality of the State and, therefore, that its
officials are not eligible for State-agent immunity.  Colston
reaches this conclusion first by observing that one of the
factors this Court has articulated for determining whether an
entity is an instrumentality of the State is the "'degree of
control the State maintains over the entity.'"  Ex parte
Madison Cty. Bd. of Educ., 1 So. 3d 980, 987 (Ala. 2008)
(quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.
2003)).  Colston then contends that after the enactment of the
54
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amended version of § 16-49-23, Ala. Code 1975, the University
"has insulated itself from State control and the State has
virtually zero degree of control over [the University]."
We note with some curiosity that Colston essentially
argues that the means by which the University allegedly gained
autonomy from State control came about through an enactment of
the legislature.  The inherent contradictions of the argument
aside, we wholly reject it.  This Court has repeatedly stated
that "'Alabama A & M University is an instrumentality of the
State of Alabama and, thus, is absolutely immune from suit
under § 14.'"  Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895
So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Matthews v. Alabama
Agric. & Mech. Univ., 787 So. 2d 691, 696 (Ala. 2000)). 
Section 16-49-23 merely shifted to the University's president
some powers previously assigned to its Board of Trustees.  It
does not purport to state or imply that the University itself
is no longer under the State's control.  The University is an
instrumentality of the State, and, therefore, the petitioners
are eligible for State-agent immunity.
There is no dispute that the claims Colston asserts
against the petitioners arise from functions that would
55
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entitle them to State-agent immunity.  Wims and Hugine
exercised their judgment in the administration of the
University on an issue of firing personnel, and Thomas
exercised her judgment in supervising Colston.  Colston
contends, however, that the exception for actions that are
willful, 
malicious, 
fraudulent, 
in 
bad 
faith, 
beyond
authority, or taken under a mistaken interpretation of the law
applies to her state-law claims.  It is Colston's burden to
present 
substantial 
evidence 
demonstrating 
that 
this 
exception
applies to her claims.  
First, Colston asserted in her second amended complaint
a claim 
alleging wrongful termination against Wims and Hugine.
Colston noted that our courts have stated that "'[t]he
dismissal of a public employee who is entitled to a
pretermination hearing, without such a hearing, is a wrongful
act constituting a tort under Alabama law.'"  Hardric v. City
of Stevenson, 843 So. 2d 206, 210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)
(quoting City of Gadsden v. Harbin, 398 So. 2d 707, 708 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1981)).  Colston alleged that she was tenured but
that Wims recommended that Colston's employment be terminated
and 
Hugine 
terminated her 
employment without 
providing 
Colston
56
1130428
with a pretermination hearing, a procedure to which she says
she was entitled based on her tenured status.  Specifically,
the complaint stated:  "Dr. Hugine (in his individual
capacity) and Dr. Wims (in his individual capacity) acted
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
their authority or under a mistaken interpretation of law in
terminating 
Regina 
Colston's 
employment 
without 
a
pre-termination hearing." 
The submissions before us do not contain evidence
indicating that Wims and Hugine acted in bad faith or beyond
their authority by terminating Colston's employment without a
pretermination hearing.  Although Colston presented evidence
indicating that Hugine was told shortly after he was hired
that Colston was tenured, it is undisputed that Wims later
undertook an investigation to determine Colston's tenure
status.  Wims admitted that in the course of that
investigation he encountered the October 25, 2006, letter from
Beverly Edmond, Ph.D, the then provost and vice president for
academic affairs, to Colston that stated that Colston was "a
tenured member of the faculty."  He concluded, however, based
on the totality of the evidence in Colston's file, that she
57
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was not tenured, and he recommended to Hugine, after reaching
that conclusion, that Colston's employment be terminated.  The
parties agree, because of the conflict in the evidence on the
question, that Colston's tenure status is a jury question. 
And Colston cites no evidence indicating that either Wims or
Hugine knew or believed that Colston was tenured at the time
they made the decision to terminate her employment.  Indeed,
in her fraud allegations against Wims and Hugine, Colston
asserted:
"Dr. Hugine ..., Dr. Wims ... and the Trustees ...
were aware or should have been aware of Regina
Colston's understanding and belief that she was
tenured.  Without disclosing to her their belief
that she was obligated to take further actions under
the 
policies 
[to 
become 
tenured], 
defendants
continued to utilize the services of Regina
Colston."
(Emphasis added.)  Without evidence indicating that Wims or
Hugine knew or believed that Colston was tenured at the time
they terminated her employment without a pretermination
hearing, it cannot be said that they acted willfully or in bad
faith by doing so.  
Colston argues that, "[a]t a minimum, th[e] evidence
shows Hugine and Wims acted beyond their authority" when they
terminated 
Colston's 
employment 
without 
complying 
with 
policy-
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manual procedures applicable to tenured employees.  It is true
that our cases hold that an employee may be deemed to act
"beyond authority and therefore not be immune when he or she
'fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.'"  Giambrone
v.  Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.  2003) (quoting
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).  See also,
e.g., Ex parte Watson, 37 So. 3d 752 (Ala. 2009).  But the
question that must be asked in this case is whether it fell to
Hugine and Wims in the first place -- i.e, was it part of
their job -- to make a judgment call as to whether Colston was
tenured so as to trigger Colston's entitlement to the
"guidelines" or "checklist" of procedures to which she claims
to have been entitled.
The complaint alleges that Colston was a tenured employee
and therefore that Hugine and Wims acted beyond their
authority by, for example, terminating Colston's employment
without a pretermination hearing.  Colston might well be
correct if this was a typical tenure case in which the
plaintiff's tenured status was a given and the only issue to
be resolved was 
whether proper termination procedures had been
59
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employed.  If that were the circumstance here, then it might
well be concluded that, because the individual defendants
proceeded without granting Colston a pretermination hearing,
they violated the "guidelines" or "checklist" applicable to
the termination of a tenured employee.12  
But that is the unique thing about this case.  We cannot
and do not start with the premise, as do most tenure cases,
that the plaintiff was in fact tenured.  Instead, it is the
administrative decision as to that issue that is the true
point of contention in this case.  That is, before the
defendants were required to provide Colston with the very
hearing to which she says the University's "guidelines" and
"checklist" entitled her, they first had to make the
administrative decision whether she was in fact tenured.  If
she was not, then she was not entitled to such a hearing; the
claimed "guidelines" or "checklist" would not be applicable. 
Hugine and Wims fulfilled their responsibility to make
the administrative decision whether Colston was or was not
tenured; they concluded that she was not.  Colston does not
12We do not mean to imply that, in such a circumstance,
the plaintiff necessarily would be entitled to an award of
monetary 
damages 
against 
the 
individual 
defendants 
personally. 
 
60
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allege that in reaching that judgment, Hugine and Wims failed
to follow some "checklist" of procedures applicable to that
decision.  They therefore cannot be deemed to have acted
beyond their authority on the ground that they failed to
follow a set of detailed guidelines or a detailed checklist.
Of course, once Hugine and Wims decided that Colston was
not tenured, that decision dictated a different  procedural
path for subsequent personnel decisions regarding Colston.  
If
they made a good-faith decision as to this historical fact,
but just happened to get it wrong based on their review of
conflicting records in the plaintiff's file, then the
plaintiff could not sue them personally.  The plaintiff may
well be entitled to seek relief from them in their official
capacities in that circumstance (and thereby get reinstated
and/or obtain the benefit of a required hearing or other
procedures applicable to tenured employees), but if all these
individuals 
did 
was 
fulfill 
their 
administrative
responsibility to make a judgment call as to whether the
plaintiff was tenured and they made a mistake in that judgment
call, then the plaintiff is not entitled to pursue those
individual defendants' personal bank accounts under the
61
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"beyond-authority" exception to State-agent immunity.  They
were doing their jobs as state-school officials, and it is the
protection of officials engaged in such discretionary
activities that is the purpose of State-agent immunity. 
Compare Ex parte Ingram, [Ms.  1131228, Feb.  24, 2017] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2017); see generally Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).
Colston also asserted fraud claims against Wims and
Hugine in their individual capacities.  The gist of those
claims is that Wims and Hugine knew that Colston believed she
was tenured, and they allowed her to work for the University
under that assumption without informing her that they did not
believe that she was tenured.  Colston asserted that Wims knew
Colston believed she was tenured because Thomas had written
Wims a letter in which she had stated that "[t]he major point
of contention on [Colston's 2007–2008 faculty] evaluation was
[Colston's] tenure status."  The letter also had noted that
Colston had refused to sign recent evaluations because they
indicated that she was not tenured. Colston alleged that
Hugine knew that Colston believed she was tenured because
Riggins had told Hugine that Colston was tenured shortly after
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1130428
Hugine was hired as president of the University in 2009. 
Colston alleged that "[t]hese misrepresentations and/or
omissions" were to her detriment when her employment was
terminated without a pretermination hearing. 
Colston's complaint in essence alleges fraudulent
suppression against Wims and Hugine. 
"In order to establish a prima facie claim of
fraudulent suppression, a plaintiff must produce
substantial evidence establishing the following
elements:
"'"(1) that the defendant had a
duty to disclose an existing
material 
fact; 
(2) 
that 
the
defendant 
suppressed 
that
existing material fact; (3) that
the 
defendant 
had 
actual
knowledge of the fact; (4) that
the defendant's suppression of
the fact induced the plaintiff to
act or to refrain from acting;
and 
(5) 
that 
the 
plaintiff
suffered 
actual 
damage 
as a
proximate result."'"
Johnson v. Sorensen, 914 So. 2d 830, 837 (Ala. 2005) (quoting
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1161 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 323-24 (Ala. 1999)). 
The first problem with Colston's fraud claim is that
Colston simply assumes that Wims and Hugine had a duty to
63
1130428
disclose their belief that she was not tenured.  "A duty to
communicate can 
arise 
from 
a 
confidential relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant, from the particular
circumstances of the case, or from a request for information,
but mere silence in the absence of a duty to disclose is not
fraudulent."  Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So. 2d 951, 954
(Ala. 1995).  Colston cites no authority to establish the
existence of a duty on the part of Wims and Hugine to
disclose,13 nor does she explain why Wims or Hugine would have
a duty to disclose their beliefs about Colston's tenure status
to Colston other than stating that they were both given
information at one time or another that indicated that Colston
13Colston cites two cases in a footnote in her brief that
address the duty issue, Rigby v. Auburn University, 448 So. 2d
345 (Ala. 1984), and Johnson v. Waters, 970 F. Supp. 991 (M.D.
Ala. 1997), but neither is on point.  The portion of Rigby
Colston cites simply notes that a university employee could
bring a fraud claim against a supervisor for allegedly
altering the terms of a plaintiff's employment.  See Rigby,
448 So. 2d at 347.  That is not the nature of Colston's fraud
claim against Wims and Hugine.  The portion of Johnson Colston
cites discusses the fact that a county commission's refusal to
intervene when the plaintiff's supervisor discharged the
plaintiff 
in 
violation 
of 
her 
constitutional 
rights
constituted a claim against the county commission.  Again, the
situation described in Johnson is not what Colston alleges
occurred in her case. Neither case addresses a duty to
disclose a material fact.
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was tenured.  As we already have noted, however, Wims and
Hugine did not conclude that Colston was not tenured until
after Wims investigated the issue during the process of
deciding whether to terminate her employment. Before that
point, neither Wims nor Hugine had any reason to disclose
anything to 
Colston about her tenure status because, according
to Colston's facts, the information they had been given
indicated that she was tenured.  Moreover, Wims and Hugine
were not directly supervising Colston, so they did not have a
relationship to her that would require communication on such
a subject.  In short, Colston does not establish that Wims or
Hugine had a duty to disclose the fact that they believed she
was not tenured.  
The second problem with Colston's fraud claim is that she
did not establish that she acted or refrained from acting in
some way based on the alleged suppression of the fact that she
was not tenured.  Starting in 2007, Colston was in fact told
by Thomas several times that she was not tenured.  Despite
receiving this communication, Colston did nothing to assert
her position, other than refusing to sign faculty-evaluation
forms that indicated that she was not tenured.  There is no
65
1130428
evidence indicating that, at any time before her employment
was terminated, Colston asked the dean of the School of Arts
and Sciences or Wims or Hugine to confirm her tenured status. 
Likewise, Colston does not state, and there is no evidence to
suggest, that, before her employment was terminated, Colston
would have submitted herself to the regular procedure for
obtaining tenure rather than simply continuing to insist, as
she did, that she was tenured.
Finally, even if Colston relied on the previous
representations of other University administration officials
that she was tenured such that she did not attempt to do
anything to gain tenured status, the alleged omissions by Wims
and Hugine were not the proximate cause of the harm Colston
claims.  Under her fraud claim in her complaint, Colston
stated:  "Dr. Hugine (in his individual capacity) and Dr. Wims
(in 
his 
individual 
capacity) 
acted 
willfully, 
fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond their authority or under a mistaken
interpretation fo law in terminating Regina Colston's
employment without 
cause 
and 
without 
a 
pre-termination hearing
on the basis that she was not tenured."  Colston was fired
without a pretermination hearing because Wims and Hugine
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believed Colston was not tenured, not because they suppressed
that belief.  There is no evidence to suggest that Colston's
employment would not have been terminated had she been told
that she was not tenured.  In reality, Colston's claim of
injury under her fraud claim mirrors her claim of injury for
her wrongful-termination claim.  In other words, she states as
a fraud claim what is, in fact, a breach-of-contract claim. 
A breach of contract, alone, does not constitute fraud.  See
Heisz v. Galt Indus., Inc., 93 So. 3d 918, 925 (Ala. 2012)
(noting that a "'failure to perform alone is not sufficient
evidence to show a present intent not to perform.  If it were,
then every breach of contract would be "tantamount to
fraud."'"  (quoting Gadsden Paper & Supply Co. v. Washburn,
554 So. 2d 983, 987 (Ala. 1989), quoting in turn Purcell Co.
v. Spriggs Enters., Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 1983))).
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Colston failed
to present substantial evidence that Wims or Hugine acted
fraudulently; therefore, Wims and Hugine are entitled to
State-agent immunity as to Colston's fraud claims against
them.
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The last state-law claims contained in Colston's second
amended complaint that are before us in this mandamus petition
are claims alleging tortious interference with a contractual
relationship against Wims and Thomas.  With regard to Thomas,
Colston alleged that Thomas knew that Colston was tenured and
that, in fact, she told Colston for 10 years that she was
tenured.  Colston asserted that after she accused Thomas of
unethical behavior related to changing the grade of one of
Colston's students, Thomas started noting on Colston's
faculty-evaluation forms that she was not tenured, "with the
intent of ensuring [Colston] would lose her job."  Colston
alleged that after Colston recommended to Dean Edwards that
Thomas should be replaced as chair of Department of English,
Foreign Languages, and Telecommunications, Thomas's "malice
against Regina Colston grew and she further attempted to
create an opportunity to deprive Regina Colston of her
property right of tenure."  Those further actions included
writing the memorandum of May 11, 2010, which went in
Colston's personnel file and which stated that "Colston is
non-tenured," and writing the August 12, 2010, letter a month
after she retired that was placed in Colston's personnel file
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in which Thomas recommended that Colston's employment be
terminated because of "the evasive, defiant and dishonest
patterns of her behavior and her refusal to follow required
procedures."  With regard to Wims, Colston alleged that Wims
knew that Colston was tenured but that he "maliciously
conspired with Thomas and instructed her to place a memorandum
in [Colston's personnel] file that Regina Colston was not
tenured in order to terminate her not for cause."
The essential elements of the tort of intentional
interference with contractual or business relations are:
"(1) the existence of a protectible business relationship;
(2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to which the defendant
was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally
interfered; and (5) damage."  White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v.
PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009).  Our courts also
have stated:
"An employee who desires to maintain a suit against
a coworker for intentional interference with the
employee's employment contract must also '"show that
the [coworker] acted outside [his or her] scope of
employment and did so maliciously."'  Hanson v. New
Technology, Inc., 594 So. 2d 96, 103 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508
So. 2d 237, 241 (Ala. 1987) (Adams, J., concurring
specially)).  Further, in order to show malice the
plaintiff must '"make a strong showing of a pattern
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of interference."'  Perlman v. Shurett, 567 So. 2d
1296, 1299 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Hickman, 508 So.2d
at 241 (Adams, J., concurring specially))."
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Goff, 864 So. 2d 1068, 1077 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002).
Colston's tortious-interference claim against Wims is
problematic for at least three reasons.  First, Colston failed
to present any evidence supporting her accusation that Wims
told Thomas to write the May 11, 2010, memorandum that stated
that Colston was non-tenured.  Thomas testified that Dean
Edwards instructed her to write the memorandum.  Wims stated
that he had never seen the memorandum before the initiation of
Colston's lawsuit.  The memorandum itself was addressed to
"Dr. Matthew Edwards, Dean School of Arts and Sciences."  In
fact, Thomas testified that she never talked to Wims about
Colston, and Wims testified that he never consulted Thomas
about Colston.  In short, there is simply no evidence of a
conspiracy between Wims and Thomas. 
The second problem with Colston's claim against Wims is
that, aside from her allegation of a conspiracy with Thomas,
Colston made no showing of a pattern of interference by Wims. 
Finally, even if Wims had told Thomas to write the May 11,
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2010, memorandum, it was within the line and scope of his
position to do so as Thomas's superior and as the
vice president for academic affairs at the University. 
In sum, Colston failed to produce evidence indicating
that Wims interfered with Colston's contractual relationship
with the University and failed to demonstrate that Wims acted
willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, or beyond his authority
in this regard.  Therefore, Wims is entitled to State-agent
immunity as to Colston's claim of tortious interference
against him in his individual capacity.
Colston's tortious-interference claim against Thomas in
her individual capacity fares no better than Colston's similar
claim against Wims.  Colston presented evidence indicating
that Thomas knew Colston was tenured and told her as much over
a long period, but that, in the 2007-2008 school year, Thomas
began noting otherwise on Colston's faculty-evaluation forms
without providing any explanation for the change.  Around the
same time, Thomas started to give Colston poor marks on her
faculty evaluations, which followed several years of more
favorable evaluations.  Thomas wrote the May 11, 2010,
memorandum, which stated that Colston was non-tenured and
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which Dean Edwards testified he took into account when he
evaluated Colston's tenure status in the course of considering
which faculty members to place on a list for employment
termination.  Thomas also wrote the August 12, 2010, letter
recommending that Colston's employment be terminated based on
insubordination and poor performance, which was addressed to
Wims and which was copied to Basaninyenzi.  
We see here no substantial evidence of bad faith or
malice on Thomas's part.  Colston makes much of the conflict
between herself and Thomas that occurred in the 2009-2010
school year when, according to Colston, Colston refused to
alter certain students' grades at Thomas's urging.  In an
evaluation of Colston, Thomas stated that the grade-change
situation was one that required the involvement of herself,
the dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, the associate
provost, the provost, and an ad hoc committee, when it should
have been handled by Colston if she had maintained proper
records.  
Regardless of this conflict of evidence, it was well
before this, namely in the 2007-2008 academic year, that
Thomas 
started 
rating 
Colston 
poorly 
in 
her 
faculty-evaluation
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forms.  That was also the same year Colston's faculty-
evaluation forms started being marked as "Non-Tenured."  (In
response, 
Colston 
refused 
to 
sign 
her 
faculty-evaluation forms
from 2007 through 2010 on the ground that they incorrectly
stated that she was not tenured.) 
In an evaluation of Colston, Thomas stated that during
the 2009-2010 academic year Colston set up office hours in the
School of Business library, away from the rest of the
professors 
in 
her 
department, 
which 
caused 
logistical problems
for faculty and for students seeking Colston's help.  Thomas
also stated that in the spring semester of the same year
students complained that Colston often did not show up for her
"Discussion for TV" class.  Thomas also stated that several of
Colston's courses were not being conducted in accordance with
the syllabuses she had submitted to Thomas at the beginning of
the academic year.  Thomas further stated that for three years
Colston was asked by colleagues to provide data from her
Writing Broadcasting class but that she failed to present
anything.
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In short, several legitimate reasons existed for Thomas's
negative evaluations of Colston and her recommendation that
Colston's employment should be terminated.
IV.  Conclusion
We grant the petition for a writ of mandamus.  We
conclude that the trial court erred in not holding that Wims
and Hugine were entitled to qualified immunity from Colston's
retaliation claims based on alleged violations of her free-
speech and free-association rights.  We likewise conclude that
Hugine, Wims, and 
Thomas were entitled to State-agent immunity
with respect to Colston's state-law claims against them
individually alleging wrongful termination, fraud, and
tortious interference with a contractual relationship.  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
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PARKER, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur in the result as to Part III.B. of the opinion;
I concur in the remaining aspects of the opinion.
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