Case Title: State v. Curavoo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-204


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Edward Curavoo                               Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

                                             September Term, 1990



Edward J. Cashman, J.

William H. Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington, and
   Rosemary Hull and Gary Kessler, Department of State's Attorneys,
   Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
   Defender, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   Defendant Edward Curavoo appeals from his conviction of
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2).
He argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into
evidence his refusals to take a preliminary breath-alcohol-screening test
(alco-sensor) and field dexterity tests.  We affirm.
     On August 27, 1987, at about 7:00 p.m., defendant left work from the
Sears parking lot on Shelburne Road in South Burlington.  Sometime there-
after, he pulled into the Green Mountain Hardware parking lot, which also is
located on Shelburne Road.  At approximately 9:00 p.m., police officer James
Snyder responded to a report that there was a vehicle, with someone inside,
parked in the parking lot with its headlights on.
     Snyder testified that he found defendant in the driver's seat, slumped
over, with his head hanging down.  The vehicle's headlights were on, the
keys were in the ignition, and a strong odor of alcohol was noticeable on
defendant's breath and from the car's interior.  Snyder testified that
defendant did not wake up easily, but that when he finally did, he was
groggy and had watery, bloodshot eyes.  Defendant admitted to drinking a few
beers at "Greenie's," which is located about two and one-half miles from the
parking lot.  Snyder noticed a number of beer cans in the car and asked
defendant how he got to the parking lot.  Defendant said he walked.  Upon
being asked how the car got there, defendant said he walked the car there.
When defendant got out of his car, he staggered to a nearby vehicle, and
nearly fell over when he attempted to lean against it.  Over defendant's
objection, Snyder testified that defendant refused to take an alco-sensor
test or perform field dexterity tests.  The trial court ruled that the
testimony was not barred by statute or constitution and was relevant to
show defendant's state of mind.  The evidence was not, however, referred to
again during the trial.
     Defendant's testimony, which his girlfriend corroborated, presents a
somewhat different story.  A good friend of defendant's, "Charlie," had
died recently in an automobile accident.  When driving by Charlie's former
place of employment, defendant became despondent and turned into the Green
Mountain Hardware parking lot.  After parking, he discovered in the car,
which he had just purchased from Charlie's estate, a partly full bottle of
Jack Daniels and some empty beer cans.  While parked, he drank three or four
"swigs" of Jack Daniels.  He later walked a short distance to a pay phone,
where he called his girlfriend and asked her to pick him up, a drive of some
forty-five minutes.  He agreed to leave his headlights on as a signal to
help her locate him, as she was not very familiar with the area.  Defendant
then went back to his car, sat in the driver's seat, put the keys on the
dashboard, turned on the headlights, and, because he was tired from a long
day's work and lack of sleep, fell into a slumber.
     On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing into
evidence his refusal to perform field dexterity tests.  Defendant does not
argue that this evidence violates his Fifth Amendment or Vermont Constitu-
tional rights.  Instead, he contends that, in the absence of positive
statutory authorization for a police request, he had the "natural and
inherent right to refuse" taking the tests. (FN1)
     "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as limited by
constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by statute or by these
[rules of evidence] or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court."
V.R.E. 402.  As defendant does not cite any rule requiring a refusal to
perform the field dexterity tests to be excluded, (FN2) we reject his argument.
See State v. Hoenscheid,