Case Title: R. L. Newton, Individually and in his Official Capacity as an Officer with the Arkansas State Police et al. v. Louis A. Etoch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
R.L. NEWTON, Individually and In His Official
Capacity as an Officer with the Arkansas
State Police; and T. David Carruth,
Individually and In His Official Capacity as
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the First
Judicial District, Monroe County v. 
Louis A. ETOCH

97-325                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 19, 1998


1.   Appeal & error -- interlocutory appeal may be taken from order denying
     motion to dismiss -- rationale. -- An appeal may be taken from an
     order denying a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. App. P. Civ.
     2(a)(2), based on the movant's assertion that he is immune
     from suit; the rationale justifying an interlocutory appeal is
     that the right to immunity from suit is effectively lost if
     the case is permitted to go to trial.

2.   Appeal & error -- denial of motion to dismiss on immunity grounds was
     appealable order. -- Where appellants contended that they were
     immune from suit, as opposed to being immune solely from
     liability, the denial of the motion to dismiss on immunity
     grounds was an appealable order.

3.   Appeal & error -- adverse ruling on Ark. R. Civ. P. 12 motion -- standard
     of review. -- When a party appeals an adverse ruling on a motion
     brought under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12, the supreme court treats the
     facts alleged in the complaint as true and views them in the
     light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint.

4.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- subject-matter jurisdiction
     distinguished. -- Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity
     from suit, though the immunity has not been couched in terms
     of subject-matter jurisdiction; one reason for this
     distinction is that sovereign immunity may be waived by the
     State, while subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived.

5.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- doctrine set forth. --
     Article 5, Section 20, of the Arkansas Constitution provides
     that the State "shall never be made a defendant in any of her
     courts."  

6.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- test for whether suit is one
     brought against State. -- While a suit against State officials or
     agencies is not necessarily a suit against the State, the
     general rule that a State cannot be sued without its consent
     cannot be evaded by making an action nominally one against the
     servants or agents of a State when the real claim is against
     the State itself, and it is the party vitally interested;
     accordingly, it is well settled as a general proposition that
     where a suit is brought against an officer or agency with
     relation to some matter in which defendant represents the
     state in action and liability, and the State, while not a
     party to the record, is the real party against which relief is
     sought so that a judgment for plaintiff, although nominally
     against the named defendant as an individual or entity
     distinct from the State, will operate to control the action of
     the state or subject it to liability, the suit is in effect
     one against the State and cannot be maintained without its
     consent.

7.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- tapping treasury for damages
     will render State defendant. -- The end result of tapping the
     State's treasury for payment of damages will render the State
     a defendant.

8.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- statutory obligation to pay
     damages renders State real party in interest. -- Under Ark. Code Ann.
      21-9-203(a) (Repl. 1996), the General Assembly has mandated
     the State to pay actual damages based on judgments obtained
     against its officers and employees, so long as the action by
     the officer or employee was "without malice and in good faith
     within the course and scope of his employment and in the
     performance of his official duties"; thus, to the extent the
     State will be obligated to pay damages under this provision,
     it is the real party in interest, and sovereign immunity comes
     into play.

9.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- statutory waiver. -- Under
     Ark. Code Ann.  19-10-305(a) (Repl. 1994), an officer or
     employee of the State is immune from an award of damages if
     that officer or employee acted without malice and within the
     scope of his employment; conversely, an officer or employee
     who acts maliciously or outside the scope of his employment is
     not protected by section 19-10-305(a); by the law's enactment,
     the General Assembly clearly waived the State's sovereign
     immunity for certain actions taken by its officers and
     employees.

10.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- 42 U.S.C.  1983 action --
     suits against persons in official capacities do not qualify as suits
     against persons. -- The United States Supreme Court has held that
     states are not "persons," the status required for 42 U.S.C. 
     1983 lawsuits, and that a suit against a state official in his
     or her official capacity is not a suit against that person but
     a suit against that official's office; thus, suits against
     persons in their official capacities do not qualify as suits
     against persons for  1983 purposes.

11.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- 42 U.S.C.  1983 action --
     claim of state immunity must yield. -- A 42 U.S.C.  1983 suit is
     one brought pursuant to an act of Congress for a deprivation
     of civil rights against persons operating under color of state
     law; it establishes a federal cause of action to be enforced
     in either federal or state courts; as such, it is the supreme
     law of the land, and any state claim of immunity must yield to
     it.

12.  Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- appellants not immune from
     federal civil-rights or state tort claims. -- The supreme court held
     that appellants were not immune under the doctrine of
     sovereign immunity from either appellee's 42 U.S.C.  1983
     cause of action or his state-law tort claims.

13.  Torts -- prosecutorial immunity -- qualified and absolute distinguished. -
     - The United States Supreme Court has distinguished qualified
     immunity and absolute immunity by stating that qualified
     immunity depends on the circumstances and the prosecutor's
     motives, as established by the evidence; absolute immunity, on
     the other hand, defeats a suit at the outset so long as the
     official's actions were within the scope of his or her duties;
     malicious conduct will still be protected by absolute
     immunity; malice, however, can defeat a claim of qualified
     immunity.

14.  Torts -- prosecutorial immunity -- decision to file charges protected by
     absolute immunity. -- The decision of a prosecutor to file
     criminal charges is within the set of core functions that are
     protected by absolute immunity; this is so even if the
     prosecutor makes that decision in a consciously malicious
     manner, vindictively, without adequate investigation, or in
     excess of his jurisdiction.

15.  Torts -- prosecutorial immunity -- relevant question. -- With respect
     to prosecutorial immunity, the relevant question is whether
     the wrong complained of was committed by the prosecutor within
     the scope of his official duties.

16.  Torts -- prosecutorial immunity -- absolute immunity not available for
     appellee's allegations relating to materially false affidavit and
     slanderous statements. -- A line of United States Supreme Court
     cases appeared to foreclose absolute immunity for appellant
     prosecutor for appellee's allegations relating to (1) his
     knowing direction and supervision of appellant police officer
     in drafting a materially false affidavit and his conspiracy
     with the officer to accomplish that end outside of his
     jurisdiction as a prosecutor, and (2) his slanderous
     statements made to the press and others concerning the arrest.

17.  Torts -- prosecutorial immunity -- appellant prosecutor failed to meet
     absolute-immunity burden on all causes of action. -- The United States
     Supreme Court has employed a presumption that qualified
     immunity initially applies to the conduct of a prosecutor,
     with the burden placed on that prosecutor seeking absolute
     immunity to establish that it is justified for the particular
     function in question; appellant prosecutor failed to provide
     a rationale for why absolute immunity should have applied to
     appellee's allegations, and, thus, he failed to meet his
     burden on all causes of action.

18.  Torts -- prosecutorial immunity -- appellant prosecutor did not have
     absolute immunity for conduct alleged in appellee's complaint. --
     Ordinarily, the supreme court would deem a prosecutor to be
     immune absolutely from claims of malicious prosecution or
     abuse of process; where appellant prosecutor's alleged conduct
     fell outside traditional prosecutorial functions and partly
     outside his jurisdiction as a prosecutor, the court concluded
     that appellant did not have absolute immunity for the conduct
     alleged in appellee's complaint, noting, however, that
     absolute immunity would attach should it subsequently develop
     that he was engaged in conduct intimately connected to his
     role as prosecutor.


     Appeal from Phillips Circuit Court; L. Ashley Higgins, Judge;
affirmed.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Rick D. Hogan, Deputy Att'y
Gen., for appellants.
     Charles E. Halbert, Jr., and Ryals & Soffer, P.C., by: Stephen
Ryals, for appellee.
     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to
dismiss filed by appellants R.L. Newton and T. David Carruth on
immunity grounds.  Appellee Louis A. Etoch, an attorney licensed to
practice in Arkansas since 1989, filed a complaint in Phillips
County Circuit Court against Newton, individually and in his
official capacity as an officer with the Arkansas State Police, and
T. David Carruth, individually and in his official capacity as
deputy prosecuting attorney for the First Judicial District, Monroe
County.  In his complaint, Etoch alleged:
     Newton either acting under the direction and supervision
     of Carruth or conspiring with Carruth, drafted a
     materially false affidavit for warrant of arrest alleging
     therein that Etoch had given conflicting incriminating
     statements to Newton with regards to two automobiles
     owned by an alleged criminal defendant.  The material
     statements in the affidavit were in accurate (sic),
     incomplete, and drafted in an effort to mislead the
     magistrate.
He further asserted that "Newton knew the allegations to be
materially false [and] inaccurate, and Newton intentionally misled
the Municipal Court Judge for the City of Hazen[.]"  This resulted
in the Municipal Judge's issuing an arrest warrant for Etoch.  He
again alleged that this was done at Carruth's "urging, direction
and supervision" or "pursuant to the conspiracy."
     Etoch further asserted that on June 22, 1995, as a result of
that arrest warrant, while appearing on behalf of numerous clients
in West Helena Municipal Court, Phillips County, he was arrested,
handcuffed, and shackled by Newton without probable cause in a
place, time, and manner "calculated and effectuated in an attempt
to purposely embarrass, humiliate, and damage Etoch's business and
personal reputation."  He was then transported by car from West
Helena to Hazen in Prairie County.
     Upon his arrival in handcuffs and shackles at Hazen Municipal
Court, Etoch alleged that he was met by a large number of people,
including members of the media and Carruth, and added:
     Carruth, acting alone or with others, completely and
     totally outside his jurisdiction and without any
     authority under the law, orchestrated the public display
     of Plaintiff in custody, in handcuffs and shackles, as he
     appeared in court and alerted [media] sources to assure
     that the arrival and presentment of Etoch in court in
     Hazen be given maximum coverage and exposure, all for the
     malicious purpose of causing Plaintiff humiliation,
     embarrassment, harm and damage to his personal and
     professional reputation and to detrimentally effect (sic)
     his law practice.
According to the complaint, Carruth also made statements to the
media at that time that Carruth knew or reasonably should have
known were false, all for the purpose of injuring him.
     In addition, Etoch alleged in the complaint that Newton and
Carruth undertook their activities with the expectation that Etoch
would never be prosecuted and adds that a criminal information was
never filed prior to the expiration of the speedy-trial period
under Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.  Etoch asserted causes of action against
Newton and Carruth for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
under 42 U.S.C.  1983 and for the state-law torts of false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and outrage. 
Etoch also sought damages against Carruth for slanderous statements
made to members of the media and to others in connection with his
arrest.   Newton and Carruth moved to dismiss Etoch's complaint for
lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction pursuant to Ark.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (2).  They stated in their motion that the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to sovereign
immunity under Ark. Const. art. 5,  20, and that personal
jurisdiction was absent due to the immunity provisions for public
employees and officials set out in Ark. Code Ann.  19-10-305
(Repl. 1994).  They further asked to dismiss the false imprisonment
and slander counts due to the one-year statute of limitation found
at Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-104 (1987).  Carruth asserted generally
that he was not subject to suit due to prosecutorial immunity,
which is absolute.
     After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss
and entered an order, which concluded: (1) accepting as true the
allegations in the complaint, the false imprisonment and slander
counts were not time-barred; (2) sovereign immunity did not protect
officers and employees of the state from their malicious actions;
and (3) Carruth was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity
because the complaint alleged that he was acting outside of the
scope of his duties.

                      I. Sovereign Immunity
     On appeal, Newton and Carruth make the same immunity points
argued before the trial court.  We first consider the question,
however, of whether this is an appealable order and answer in the
affirmative.
     This court has held that an appeal may be taken from an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 2(a)(2)
based on the movant's assertion that he is immune from suit.  See
Virden v. Roper, 302 Ark. 125,