Case Title: Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-28

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp.1983 WY 93669 P.2d 522Case Number: 83-28Case Number: 83-28Decided: 09/14/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CLAIM FOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION. MILTON D. SCHEPANOVICH, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

UNITED STATES STEEL 
CORPORATION, APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, W.J. Nicholas, 
J.

Bradley L. 
Booke, Jackson, 
for appellant.

Catherine L. 
Dirck of Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, Rawlins, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE, and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983. 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question brought 
before the court in this case calls in its resolution for a refinement of the 
rule relating to the shifting of the burden of proof from an employee to an 
employer under the "odd-lot doctrine" in a worker's compensation case. The 
district court held that the employee had failed to sustain his burden of proof 
in this instance. In effect this was a holding that the burden of proof was not 
shifted to the employer. We are in accord with this ruling by the district 
court, and we shall affirm the judgment.

[¶2.]     The parties have agreed 
that the issue in the case is appropriately stated in the brief of the 
appellant. It there is set forth as follows:

"Did the Trial Court err 
in finding that Appellant failed to sustain his burden of proof in establishing 
his permanent total disability as defined by W.S. § 
27-12-405(a)?"

Section 
27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977, is a definition of permanent total disability, and 
reads as follows:

"(a) Permanent total 
disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, 
paralysis or other conditions permanently incapacitating the employee from 
performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited 
by experience or training."

As will appear 
from the facts, the claim of appellant that he is totally disabled is presented 
under the phrase relating to "other conditions permanently incapacitating the 
employee from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is 
reasonably suited by experience or training."

[¶3.]     In our opinion in Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862 (1979), this court adopted a definition of the "odd-lot doctrine" as 
follows:

"* * * The `odd-lot 
doctrine' is described in 2 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51 at p. 
10-109 (1976), as providing that permanent total disability "`may be found in 
the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so 
handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of 
the labor market.'" 603 P.2d  at 863-864.

An injured 
workman who comes within the "odd-lot doctrine" need not show that he is totally 
incapable of doing any work at all in order to be entitled to an award for 
permanent total disability. E.R. Moore 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ill. 2d 353, 17 Ill. Dec. 207, 376 N.E.2d 206 (1978); Wilson v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 30 Or. App. 403, 567 P.2d 567 
(1977); and 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.51, at 10-164.21 (1982). 
This court has stated the proposition in this fashion:

"* * * The theory of 
counsel for the employer appears to be that the workman must go further than to 
show that he cannot do any hard work; that he must also show that he cannot do 
light work. Of course, it would almost be impossible, in many instances, for a 
man educated only to do hard work, to show that at some time or other some good 
Samaritan might not turn up and offer him some light work which he might be able 
to do. The law does not require impossibilities. It is stated in 71 C.J. 1071 
that `where it is found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled so 
far as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light work of a 
special nature not generally available, the burden is on the employer to show 
that such special work is available to the employee.' * *" In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 452, 110 P.2d 826 (1941).

[¶4.]     In this case the 
appellant contends that the district court erred in holding that he had failed 
to sustain his burden of proof on the issue of total disability as defined by § 
27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977. He argues vigorously that the uncontradicted and 
unimpeached testimony in the record establishes that he is permanently 
incapacitated from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he 
was reasonably suited by experience and training. His position is that the 
appellee, his employer, United States Steel Corporation, failed to present any 
evidence that some special work of a light or sedentary nature was available to 
him so that he could not qualify as a permanently disabled worker under the 
"odd-lot doctrine."

[¶5.]     The appellant was 
injured on June 3, 1976, when he stepped off a Caterpillar tractor onto a bolt 
and twisted his right knee. His injury originally was diagnosed as a sprained 
knee, and he was treated with a brace and painkillers. On November 8, 1976, 
however, the appellant's injury was rediagnosed as a torn medial cartilage by 
the orthopedic surgeon who testified at the hearing on appellant's application 
for permanent total disability. This condition failed to respond to treatment in 
an adequate manner, and on August 11, 1977, surgery was performed to remove the 
torn meniscus. In the course of this surgery the appellant also was found to be 
suffering from severe degenerative arthritis.

[¶6.]     This condition was 
reported to the court by a letter dated August 11, 1978, from the physician, and 
it contained the doctor's opinion that this condition had progressed to the 
point that appellant physically was unable to perform his current occupation. 
The doctor stated:

"I feel he should be 
medically retired from his current job, and feel he is totally disabled for this 
type of work. I would say he is 50% disabled for any type of 
employment."

Upon inquiry by 
the clerk of court, the physician redefined the disability from the degenerative 
arthritis as being post-traumatic in nature, and he then gave his opinion that 
the appellant's right leg was 50 percent disabled.

[¶7.]     Acting upon this 
information, the appellant filed a claim for a 50 percent permanent partial 
disability of the right leg on August 28, 1978. This claim was acquiesced in by 
the employer, and it was awarded by the court on September 14, 1978. The 
following day appellant was medically retired by the appellee over his protests. 
He testified that he was told by representatives of the appellee that he was 
permanently totally disabled. On October 4, 1978, the appellant then applied for 
an award of permanent total disability, and this application was disapproved by 
the employer on October 12, 1978. Nothing further happened with respect to this 
application for an award of permanent total disability until February 9, 1982, 
when the appellant petitioned the court for a hearing on his application.1

[¶8.]     After the appellant 
requested the hearing, the appellee moved for an order granting it the right to 
have the employee examined by a physician of its choice in accordance with § 
27-12-611(a), W.S. 1977, and Rule 35, W.R.C.P. At the same time the employer 
filed a Petition of Protest to the claim for permanent total disability. Then, 
on May 6, 1982, the appellant by motion requested that the court enter an order 
declaring that he was 100 percent permanently totally disabled, and he requested 
that attorneys fees be awarded which were incurred by him in endeavoring to 
collect his disability benefits. He also renewed his request for a hearing on 
the matter by a separate motion filed on the same day. The case was set for 
hearing on July 6, 1982.

[¶9.]     The only testimony in 
the record came from the orthopedic surgeon who had performed the knee surgery 
in 1977 and the appellant. The doctor testified with respect to his diagnosis 
and treatment of the appellant's injury. He explained to the court that the 
appellant was suffering from severe degenerative post-traumatic arthritis at the 
time he had written his August 11, 1978, letter to the court. He said it was his 
opinion that the arthritic condition predated the work-related injury, but that 
the trauma associated with the accident accelerated the progression of the 
disease. He testified that persons in the appellant's condition would have 
specific problems with the types of activities, such as standing for long hours, 
climbing up on machinery, lifting heavy objects, and the like, which are 
required of diesel mechanics and manual laborers. His conclusion was that it 
would be almost an impossibility for one in the appellant's situation to carry 
out his required duties at work as a result of the condition of his knee. During 
cross-examination, the doctor did agree that given adequate training and ability 
a person in the appellant's condition was capable of other work of a light or 
sedentary nature. Inquiry from the court disclosed that the appellant suffered 
from degenerative arthritis in both knees. The doctor stated that both knees 
clinically appeared to be in approximately the same state of degeneration as a 
result of the arthritis. He agreed with a conclusional statement of the court 
that whatever acceleration occurred with respect to the condition of the right 
knee as a result of the accident in 1976 was not a significant factor with 
respect to the condition of that knee at the time of 
hearing.

[¶10.]  The appellant testified that he attended 
high school in Thermopolis through the eleventh grade, when he went into the Air 
Force. In the armed services he worked as an automotive truck mechanic. Upon his 
discharge from the armed forces he worked in the oil fields, moving up from the 
job of floorhand to the position of driller. He began to work for the appellee 
as a diesel mechanic in 1964, and he held that position until his disability 
retirement in 1978. The appellant said that prior to the injury on June 3, 1976, 
he never experienced any problems with his knees at any time. He had been able 
to conduct his usual work and activities without any pain or difficulty. He then 
described how the accident occurred resulting in the injury to his knee, and the 
effect of that injury upon his ability to perform the job. Before he was 
operated upon the primary effect was a great deal of pain for which he was 
taking daily medication. After the operation, his condition worsened, and it 
became increasingly difficult for him to do the kinds of activities which his 
job required.

[¶11.]  Following the injury and the award of the 
permanent partial disability, the appellant was not offered any position which 
was less physically demanding by the appellee. He was rejected for vocational 
rehabilitation because of his age, past employment, physical condition, and the 
length of time the retraining required. The record demonstrates that from the 
time of his injury until his retirement the appellant continued to work as a 
diesel mechanic except for approximately three months during which he was 
undergoing therapy following the operation. The appellant had experienced no 
difficulty with his left knee until about a year prior to the hearing on his 
permanent total disability claim. Perhaps critical to the disposition of this 
case is his testimony on redirect examination:

"Q. Go looking for any 
other job?

"A. No, because I knew I 
couldn't do anything. I couldn't make a `hand' out of it."

[¶12.]  After receiving arguments by counsel for 
the parties, the district court made findings and conclusions orally. At that 
time the court first noted that it would be necessary for the appellant, after 
the award of the permanent partial disability had been adjudicated, to show a 
change or a fraud or an overreaching of some type in order to later claim the 
permanent total disability. The court rejected the evidence that the employer 
had retired him following the award as not convincing on any of the issues, 
pointing out that given the comments of the physician the employer would almost 
be compelled to retire him. The court stated that the appellant is a qualified 
artisan, a highly skilled person, and a decent mechanic. The court stated that 
the fact that he was unable to apply that skill working in the company shop on 
the repair of equipment which it used from day to day did not mean that he was 
incapable of applying his training and skills. The court also commented that the 
simple fact that because of education and experience the appellant had a greater 
skill than most other people who have not had a higher education did not mean 
that he was not reasonably suited by experience and training for the performance 
of work involving lesser skills. The court also pointed out that the record fell 
short of demonstrating that the disabilities were the result of the industrial 
injury. In this latter regard the court noted that the disability resulted from 
a condition which the appellant would have if he had not suffered any industrial 
injury.

[¶13.]  The adjudicative portion of the Order 
which was entered in the record by the court is perhaps more definitive with 
respect to the issue as presented by the parties. It there is provided as 
follows:

"The employee, Milton D. 
Schepanovich, failed to present evidence that factually sustained the burden of 
proof required in order to establish permanent total disability under § 
27-12-405(a) W.S. (1977 Repub. Ed.), in that the employee is a highly skilled 
mechanic and possesses skills by education and training, all of which could be 
applied by him, and in fact is applied by him from time to time, gainfully 
-

"THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

"That the employee has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof that he is permanently totally disabled as 
defined in § 27-12-405(a), W.S. (1977 Repub. Ed.)."

[¶14.]  It is to this record that we apply the 
rules with respect to burden of proof in the context of the "odd-lot doctrine." 
The burden of proof initially is assigned to the injured workman who is seeking 
to qualify as permanently totally disabled under the "odd-lot doctrine" to 
demonstrate that he is incapacitated "from performing any work at any gainful 
occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience and training." 
Section 27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977; Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, supra. The test to 
be invoked is whether the workman is so disabled that the services which he is 
reasonably equipped to perform by his experience and training are not marketable 
in a well-known branch of the labor market in the community so as to provide a 
steady and continuous source of income rather than sporadic or intermittent 
employment. See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.51 (1982). If that 
showing is made, the burden of proof is then shifted to the employer to show 
that light work of a special nature which the employee could perform but which 
is not generally available in fact is available to the employee. In re Iles, 
supra; Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 
supra.

[¶15.]  It is true that in this case the 
appellant presented uncontradicted evidence that he no longer could perform the 
tasks required in his employment as a diesel mechanic and manual laborer because 
of the degenerative arthritic condition in his right knee resulting from the 
injury. A showing that the injured workman no longer can work in his current 
employment is not adequate to demonstrate that there is no suitable employment 
available for which the workman reasonably is suited by experience and training. 
We adopt the following rule formulated in 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§ 57.61, at 10-164.95 to 1-164.114 (1982):

"* * * If the evidence of 
degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts such as the 
claimant's mental capacity, education, training, or age, places claimant prima facie in the odd-lot category, the 
burden should be on the employer to show that some kind of suitable work is 
regularly and continuously available to the claimant. Certainly in such a case 
it should not be enough to show that claimant is physically capable of 
performing light work, and then round out the case for noncompensability by 
adding a presumption that light work is available. * * *

"The corollary of the 
general-purpose principle just stated would be this: If the claimant's medical 
impairment is so limited or specialized in nature that he is not obviously 
unemployable or relegated to the odd-lot category, it is not unreasonable to 
place the burden of proof on him to establish unavailability of work to a person 
in his circumstances, which normally would require a showing that he has made 
reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment. * * *"

 

[¶16.]  Other jurisdictions in this context have 
held that an employee in circumstances similar to those of the appellant must 
show that reasonable efforts have been made to obtain suitable employment in 
order to meet their burden of proof and shift the burden of proof to the 
employer. Wiedmaier v. Industrial 
Commission, 121 Ariz. 127, 589 P.2d 1 (1978); Oliver v. Wyandotte Industries 
Corporation, Me., 360 A.2d 144 (1976); Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, 
93 N.M. 9, 597 P.2d 1178 (1978) (Sutin, J., specially concurring); Haines v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 
27 Or. App. 793, 558 P.2d 367 (1976); Shealy v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 250 S.C. 
106, 156 S.E.2d 646 (1967). See also cases cited in 2 Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, § 57.61 at 10-164.114, n. 29 (1982).

[¶17.]  In the instant case the appellant 
presented evidence that his employer did not offer him employment in a position 
which he was physically able to fill. He also demonstrated that the Worker's 
Compensation Division of the Office of the State Treasurer withdrew his referral 
to vocational rehabilitation based upon his age, past employment, physical 
condition and the length of time it took to train him. He testified himself that 
he had not sought other employment because of his subjective determination that 
he could not do the work. He did not present evidence that he was so disabled by 
virtue of his injuries that any such efforts would have been futile. While the 
refusal by the workman's employer to continue his employment in a suitable 
position is strong evidence that the employer considered him to be 
incapacitated, see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.61 at 10-164.90 
(1982), this does not mandate a finding by the district court of permanent total 
disability where there is conflicting evidence, as in the present case. 
Certainly we are unable to say that the ruling of the district court was without 
a rational basis in the record.

[¶18.]  A conclusion that the evidence of degree 
of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts such as the claimant's 
mental capacity, education, training, or age, places claimant prima facie in 
that situation in which he was incapacitated from performing any work at any 
gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience and training 
depends upon a factual determination. In the context of our review, the 
applicable rule then is that if there is substantial evidence to support the 
factual determination by the trial court this court will not invade the province 
of the trier of fact by reaching a different conclusion on appeal. Matter of Creek, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 
(1983); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 
566 P.2d 219 (1977); and Rocky Mountain 
Tank & Steel Co. v. Rager, Wyo., 423 P.2d 645 (1967). The trial judge in 
this case made the following oral findings at the conclusion of the 
trial:

"Factually, I am not able 
to find that he sustained his burden; otherwise, the claim just seems to ignore 
several of the legal propositions which are essentially involved and reduce the 
argumentation to that over simplification which does have an emotional aspect to 
it: `If I am not one hundred percent disabled, why did they fire me?' Over 
simplification, however argumentatively it might be persuading to him does not 
meet the obligation or the showing that he was so disabled as to be unable to do 
other work for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training. For 
example, he is a qualified artisan - counsel did say manual laborer and the 
Court doesn't find that to be the fact at all - he is a highly skilled person, a 
diesel mechanic. He has the skill that even I envy for myself, and he has a 
skill which is in demand; and merely because he is unable to apply that skill 
working for this company shop on the repair of equipment which is in use from 
day to day and time and time, working on heavy equipment that involves the 
removal of the pieces and parts and things such as that, doesn't mean at all 
that he is not capable of applying his training or skills. And merely because by 
education and experience he has that greater skill than most any other people 
have who haven't had higher education doesn't mean that he is not reasonably 
suited by experience and training for the performing of work which involves 
lesser skills.

"There is nothing in the 
statutes that says, for example, if I as a district judge, that I am traveling, 
if I happened to be injured while I am traveling, this statute doesn't mean that 
therefore since I am not able to be a judge any more, therefore I am totally 
disabled. I would have to look at all the lesser skills that I have accumulated 
during a lifetime, and there are literally dozens and dozens of employments 
which are included in that. Many of which, I am sure, that Mr. Schepanovich 
could perform were he motivated to do so."

The evidence in 
this record is sufficient to support the factual determinations encompassed in 
the remarks of the court leading to the conclusion that the appellant had not 
placed himself prima facie in the odd-lot category in order to shift to the 
appellee the burden of demonstrating the availability of light work of a special 
nature.

[¶19.]  We affirm the conclusion of the district 
court that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proof as outlined in In re 
Iles, supra, and Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, supra, sufficiently to shift the 
burden of proof to his employer under the "odd-lot doctrine." Specifically we 
hold that in an instance such as this in which the attending physician testifies 
that his diagnosis is a 50 percent disability of one leg, even though he opines 
that the injured workman cannot continue in his previous employment, the burden 
is upon the workman to show efforts to obtain suitable employment which are 
reasonable under the circumstances. This the appellant did not do in this 
case.

[¶20.]  While it is not necessary to our 
disposition, we find that the matter of applications for modifications is 
troublesome in worker's compensation cases. Having achieved the award of a 
permanent partial disability, the appellant was applying for additional 
benefits, i.e., the permanent total disability award, pursuant to § 27-12-606, 
W.S. 1977. By virtue of the statutory language, such an application is submitted 
"on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, 
or upon grounds of mistake or fraud." Reference earlier was made to the oral 
findings of the district court with respect to this proposition. Our view of the 
record is that the physician testified that the incapacity of the appellant was 
the same when he applied for the modification of the amount of his award as it 
had been when the award of permanent partial disability was made. Furthermore, 
the record is susceptible to the interpretation that the physician testified 
that his condition also was the same at the time of the hearing, and no 
contention was made of either mistake or fraud. Consequently, if it had been 
necessary, it is our view that the judgment of the district court could have 
been upheld upon the ground that the appellant did not qualify under the statute 
to seek a modification of the amount of his award.

[¶21.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The appellant has not 
urged as error the failure of the district court to set the matter for hearing 
at the earliest possible date as required by statute. See § 27-12-602(a), W.S. 
1977; and Herring v. Welltech, Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361 (1982). The record does 
reflect, however, that additional benefits were applied for and approved after 
the employer disapproved the appellant's application for an award of permanent 
total disability.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶22.]  I do not disagree with the majority's 
statement of the odd-lot doctrine, nor with the test they 
apply:

"* * * [W]hether the 
workman is so disabled that the services which he is reasonably equipped to 
perform by his experience and training are not marketable in a well-known branch 
of the labor market in the community so as to provide a steady and continuous 
source of income * * *." 669 P.2d  at 528.

I do, however, 
disagree with the majority's application of this doctrine to the facts of this 
case.

[¶23.]  The question in this case is whether the 
employee has met his burden of proving that he falls within the odd-lot 
doctrine. The employee has two methods available to prove odd-lot coverage, only 
one of which requires him to prove the unavailability of suitable work. The 
difficulty in this case is determining if the employee has the burden of proof 
on unavailability of regular, suitable work. The majority adopt the rule for 
allocating the burden of proof as set out in 2 Larson Workmen's Compensation 
Law, § 57.61 at 10-164.95 to 1-164.114 (1982):

"* * * If the evidence of 
degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts such as the 
claimant's mental capacity, education, training, or age, places claimant prima facie in the odd-lot category, the 
burden should be on the employer to show that some kind of suitable work is 
regularly and continuously available to the claimant. Certainly in such a case 
it should not be enough to show that claimant is physically capable of 
performing light work, and then round out the case for noncompensability by 
adding a presumption that light work is available. * * *

"The corollary of the 
general-purpose principle just stated would be this: If the claimant's medical 
impairment is so limited or specialized in nature that he is not obviously 
unemployable or relegated to the odd-lot category, it is not unreasonable to 
place the burden of proof on him to establish unavailability of work to a person 
in his circumstances, which normally would require a showing that he has made 
reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment."

[¶24.]  The first paragraph states this general 
rule: An employee must show that his obvious physical impairment coupled with 
other factors, such as education, training or age, mandate placement in the 
odd-lot category. The obviously impaired employee need not show unavailability 
of work; the burden shifts to the employer to show that suitable light work of a 
regular nature is available. If the employer does not do that, then the employee 
prevails.

[¶25.]  However, not all partially disabled 
employees will be able to make this showing. The second paragraph describes 
those who will not: those with a limited or specialized impairment who are not obviously unemployable. The 
corollary would not preclude those employees with specialized impairments from 
showing odd-lot coverage. However, they must make an additional showing, not 
required of the obviously unemployable employees, that suitable work is 
unavailable - and this ordinarily requires a showing that reasonable efforts 
have been made to find suitable work. Once the unavailability of work is proved 
by showing reasonable efforts, then the burden shifts to the employer to show 
that special work is in fact available. If the employer does not do that, then 
the employee prevails.

[¶26.]  Thus, the odd-lot doctrine is available 
to those who are not obviously unemployable as well as those who are. However, 
the threshold showing differs: those with less obvious injuries have a greater 
showing to make. The essential question in this case is whether the employee met 
his burden of proof. Before that question can be answered, it must be determined 
what his burden of proof is, and to decide that requires a determination of 
whether he is obviously unemployable or has a specialized 
impairment.

[¶27.]  This employee is a 56-year-old man with 
an eleventh-grade education whose entire adult life prior to his medical 
retirement had been devoted to physical work. He had worked a total of 19 years 
as a mechanic (14 of those years as a diesel mechanic with this employer) and 19 
years in the oil fields. Whether we classify a mechanic as a manual laborer or 
as a highly skilled artisan, this employee was reasonably equipped by his 
experience to perform only physical labor.

[¶28.]  The evidence was clear that the employee 
could no longer work as a mechanic because his injury would not allow him to do 
the standing, stooping, kneeling, crawling and lifting required of a mechanic. 
In fact, he was discharged from his position because of his medical inability to 
perform these tasks. The showing that the employee cannot continue in his 
current employment generally is not adequate to demonstrate that there is no 
suitable employment available for him. However, because this employee was 
reasonably suited by experience and training to be a mechanic only, and because 
all mechanic jobs require the same physical maneuverability as the position he 
held, in this particular case the fact that he was discharged from his current 
job for inability to perform constitutes a clear showing that he could not take 
any other mechanic position. As to the oil-field work, it is equally apparent 
that he would be unable to perform the tasks required by that type of physical 
labor. The employee made the requisite showing that he obviously falls within 
the odd-lot category - he demonstrated that he was incapacitated from performing 
any work at any gainful occupation for which he was reasonably suited by 
experience and training, as required by § 27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977. That is 
enough to meet the requirements of the law of this state. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 829 (1941); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862, 864 (1979); Gifford v. Cook-McCann Concrete, Inc., 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 1197, 1199 (1974). Professor Larson's rule, which the majority today adopts, 
does not require that all employees show reasonable efforts to obtain other 
employment to merit odd-lot coverage. Nor has this court ever so 
held:

"* * * It appears that 
all his life he has been accustomed to do hard work. The theory of counsel for 
the employer appears to be that the workman must go further than to show that he 
cannot do any hard work; that he must also show that he cannot do light work. Of 
course, it would almost be impossible, in many instances, for a man educated 
only to do hard work, to show that at some time or other some good Samaritan 
might not turn up and offer him some light work which he might be able to do. 
The law does not require impossibilities. It is stated in 71 C.J. 1071 that 
`where it is found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled so far 
as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light work of a 
special nature not generally available, the burden is on the employer to show 
that such special work is available to the employee.' In Lunardello v. Republic Coal Co., 101 
Mont. 94, 53 P.2d 87, 90, the court stated: `There is no merit, however, in the 
suggestion that the burden was on plaintiff to prove not only that he could not 
work at his former occupation, but that he was totally incapacitated from 
obtaining remunerative employment of any kind. * * This we think is the proper 
rule. * *'" In re Iles, supra, 110 P.2d  at 829.

Most recently 
this court said:

"Before the burden of 
which In re Iles, supra, speaks 
shifts to the employer, the employee must prove that he or she is so disabled 
that he or she will not be capable of employment in any well-known branch of the 
labor market. Since the evidence in this case is that Cardin is capable of light 
or sedentary work, we think the court below was justified in holding that the 
facts do not serve to make the `odd-lot' doctrine available to this worker and 
the court was, therefore, justified in finding the worker not to be permanently 
totally disabled." Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen, supra, 603 P.2d  at 864.

The Cardin case differs from this one 
because there the employer's safety engineer testified there were jobs suitable 
for the worker, given his restriction on activity and movement. Cardin, supra, 603 P.2d  at 864. 
Therefore, in Cardin the employee 
made the requisite showing which was in fact countered by the employer's 
evidence that special work was available. This court has constantly reiterated 
the proper rule:

"The burden is upon the 
claimant to show that he is entitled to an award of compensation. [Citations.] 
Here, although there was not substantial evidence to support the order entered, 
claimant did present evidence of some 
disability. If that disability were attributable to the work injury and was 
total so far as hard or manual work was concerned but he could do light or 
mental work, the burden was upon the employer to show that such special work was 
available. [Citation.]" Gifford v. 
Cook-McCann Concrete, Inc., supra, 526 P.2d  at 1199.

The trial judge 
erred in deciding that the employee had failed to meet his burden of proof, and 
I would reverse.

[¶29.]  The majority cite an alternate ground for 
affirmance: that the application for modification of the award was improper in 
that it failed to show 

"the ground of increase 
or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake 
or fraud,"

as required by § 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977. I would point out, however, that the statutory requirement 
of mistake or fraud - the overreaching to which the trial judge referred - may 
be indicated in this case by the way this employee was led down the primrose 
path - retained as an employee until after the permanent-partial-disability 
claim had been settled, and then almost immediately summarily dismissed on the 
basis of his employer's admission that he was totally permanently disabled. The 
majority also note that there had apparently been no increase in the injury but 
do not address the meaning of "incapacity due solely to the injury" as used in 
the statute. The statutory definitions are silent and I am inclined to favor the 
position that, at least in the odd-lot doctrine, incapacity means injury plus 
inability to work at gainful employment, not simply physical 
injury.

"Inability to get work, 
traceable directly to a compensable injury, may be as effective in establishing 
disability as inability to perform work. * * * Even without total medical 
disability, the two essentials are present: wage loss, and causation of the wage 
loss by work-connected injury. The fact that the wage loss comes about through 
refusal or unavailability of employment rather than through incapacity to 
perform the work does not change the result." 2 Larson, supra, § 57.61 at 
10-164.83 to 10-164.90.

An increase in 
inability to work, as evidenced by subsequent loss of employment, might well 
constitute an increase in incapacity in odd-lot cases.