Case Title: SHANE SANDERSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHANE SANDERSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 127165 P.3d 83Case Number: 06-14Decided: 08/06/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
SHANE 
SANDERSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Michael J. Krampner, of Krampner, 
Fuller & Hambrick, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; David Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Delicath.        

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Appellant, Shane Sanderson, appeals 
his conviction for one count of immodest, immoral, or indecent acts with a child 
("indecent liberties"), and two counts of felony child abuse.  He argues that the trial court 
improperly admitted character evidence against him, that the indecent liberties 
statute is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct, that prosecutorial 
misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, and that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain his child abuse convictions.  We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]           
We 
rephrase the issues as follows:

1.      
Was improper character evidence 
admitted in violation of W.R.E. 
404(a)?

2.      
Is the 
indecent liberties with a minor statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) 
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Sanderson's conduct?

3.      
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct during closing and rebuttal 
arguments?

4.      
Was there 
sufficient evidence of "physical injury" to sustain the felony child abuse 
convictions?

FACTS

[¶3]           
On 
February 13, 2005, while the rest of the family was upstairs, Mr. Sanderson took 
one of his children, AS, downstairs and gave her a tube of K-Y Jelly.  AS was fourteen at the time.  He said that it would help relieve her 
constipation, and that he would tell her how to use it later.  He did not mention this to anyone else 
in the family, including Mrs. Sanderson.  
Two days later, AS told her mother that Mr. Sanderson had rubbed her anal 
area with K-Y Jelly for about ten minutes in the bathroom the previous 
night.  AS also told her mother 
that, after the incident in the bathroom, Mr. Sanderson had taken her into her 
bedroom and massaged her back while "inching down her pants and underwear."  Mrs. Sanderson became angry that 
Mr. Sanderson had given K-Y Jelly to AS without Mrs. Sanderson's knowledge.  She was also angry about the incidents 
in the bathroom and bedroom.  She 
said that AS was too old for Mr. Sanderson to be engaging in that kind of 
behavior with her. 

[¶4]           
After AS 
disclosed these events, Mrs. Sanderson took her children to her mother's 
house.  Mrs. Sanderson's mother 
called the county prosecutor and reported that AS may have been sexually 
abused.  The prosecutor then asked 
the Johnson County Sheriff's Department and the Department of Family Services 
(DFS) to investigate.

[¶5]           
Sheriff's 
deputies and the DFS caseworker interviewed Mrs. Sanderson, who told them what 
AS had said about the incidents in the bathroom and bedroom.  The investigators also interviewed the 
children.  AS described the 
incidents of the previous evening.  
She also related that Mr. Sanderson had once put automotive starting 
fluid on a rag and forced her to inhale the fumes to the point that she became 
ill, and that he later did the same thing to her sister, TS.  TS, who was twelve years old at the 
time, confirmed that her father had exposed her to starting fluid, and said that 
he put the fluid-saturated cloth in a plastic bag before forcing her to inhale 
the fumes.  TS reported that she 
became ill, vomited, and missed school that day.  AS and TS also told the officers about a 
number of Mr. Sanderson's other behaviors, such as inspecting AS's genitalia, 
purportedly to look for ticks, but in such a way as to make AS 
uncomfortable.  They also said that 
he routinely walked into the bathroom when AS was occupying it, became angry if 
she locked the bathroom door, and often demanded that AS remove her shirt and 
show him the bra she was wearing.

[¶6]           
Three 
and a half weeks after the initial report, AS and TS were separately interviewed 
and evaluated by a counselor at the DFS caseworker's request.  In addition to the free-form interviews, 
the counselor administered several standardized psychological tests.  Those tests indicated that both AS and 
TS tended to conform to others' expectations and were submissive.  The tests also revealed that the two 
sisters both feared rejection and were insecure.

[¶7]           
Approximately 
two months after the initial report, officers arrested Mr. Sanderson and charged 
him with two counts of felony indecent liberties with a child in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a)1 and two counts 
of felony child abuse in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b).2 The indecent liberties charges were 
based on the bathroom incident and the bedroom incident.  The child abuse charges were based on the 
starting fluid incidents.

[¶8]           
At 
trial, the prosecutor first called TS and AS to the stand and, after two other 
witnesses, Mrs. Sanderson.  All 
three testified that they had lied, overreacted, or exaggerated in their earlier 
statements to investigators.  In an 
effort to mitigate possible damage to the State's case because of the 
recantations, the prosecutor asked other witnesses, including Mrs. Sanderson's 
mother, two sheriff's officers, the DFS caseworker, and the counselor who had 
evaluated AS and TS, to describe their recollections of the prior statements of 
AS, TS, and Mrs. Sanderson.  The 
counselor also testified about dynamics of incestuous families and, more 
specifically, about recanting behavior in child victims of sexual abuse.  The State also presented audio 
recordings of AS's and TS's interviews with the deputies and the DFS 
caseworker.  Those interviews took 
place during the first few days after the initial report.

[¶9]           
Mr. 
Sanderson did not dispute that the bathroom incident with AS had occurred.  His defense theory was that his actions 
were for the health-related purpose of helping to relieve her constipation.  He claimed that AS and TS asked him if 
they could smell the starting fluid, and he contended that any ill effects were 
short-lived and harmless, and so did not meet the statutory definition of 
"physical injury" stated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-202(a)(ii)(B).

[¶10]       
The jury 
convicted Mr. Sanderson of one count of indecent liberties, corresponding to the 
bathroom incident, and both counts of felony child abuse.  It acquitted him on the second indecent 
liberties count, corresponding to the bedroom incident.  The trial court sentenced Mr. Sanderson 
to 13-18 months imprisonment for each child abuse conviction, and 6-8 years 
imprisonment for the indecent liberties conviction.  The court ordered that all prison terms 
be served concurrently, and suspended all imprisonment in favor of 4-6 years of 
intensive supervised probation.  Mr. 
Sanderson now appeals his convictions.

[¶11]       
Mr. 
Sanderson asserts that the counselor's descriptions of the victims as 
"compliant," their mother as "sickly," and Mr. Sanderson as "domineering," as 
well as the counselor's testimony about typical patterns of incestuous families, 
constituted impermissible character evidence.  W.R.E. 404(a) provides that "[e]vidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion."  Mr. Sanderson argues 
that the counselor's testimony should have been excluded under W.R.E. 404(a) 
because it was "irrelevant for any purpose other than showing that [he] was 
. . . the kind of dad who would molest his 
daughter."

[¶12]       
The 
parties dispute the proper standard of review.  Mr. Sanderson contends that he made a 
proper objection to the relevant testimony.  The State argues that while Mr. 
Sanderson made some objections, he did not object to the specific testimony he 
now contends was error, and further, that the objections he did make were not on 
the same basis that he presents on appeal.  
Under Mr. Sanderson's view, we review admission of evidence for abuse of 
discretion.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).  Under 
the State's argument, we review for plain error.  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  

[¶13]       
Where 
"the objection was not originally made on the ground now urged, the argument is 
without force . . . .  The objector 
should lay his finger on the particular point intended to be raised so that the 
trial court will have notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged error."  Valerio v. State, Wyo., 429 P.2d 317, 319 (1967) (quoting Murdock v. State, Wyo., 351 P.2d 674, 679 
(1960)).  "[I]t is incumbent upon 
the complaining party to point out with definiteness and particularity the error 
of which he complains, so that the trial court may pass upon the exact question" 
to be later reviewed.  Valerio, 429 P.2d  at 319.  As a result, we must determine whether 
Mr. Sanderson objected to the contested testimony in a way that put the improper 
character evidence issue before the trial court.

[¶14]       
The 
defense made many objections to the counselor's expected trial testimony 
throughout the pretrial process, but none were based on W.R.E. 404(a).  The primary argument, among others also 
not asserted on appeal, was that "what really we are ending up into is a Daubert 
motion."  The reference is 
apparently to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), a seminal case involving the proper scientific foundation of expert 
testimony.  At trial, Mr. Sanderson 
also contended that a portion of the counselor's testimony was impermissible 
vouching.  In support of his 
objection at trial, defense counsel heavily relied on our decisions in Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, 84 P.3d 320 
(Wyo. 2004), and Seward v. State, 
2003 WY 116, 76 P.3d 805 (Wyo. 2003).  
These cases do not involve character evidence and are not relevant to the 
issue presented on appeal.

[¶15]       
At 
trial, defense counsel did not object to the counselor's testimony regarding the 
standardized tests and the results.  
The results supported the counselor's opinion that AS and TS were 
submissive and passive.  Defense 
counsel did object, however, to testimony about how AS and TS perceived their 
father.  The trial court initially 
sustained an objection to the testimony based on lack of foundation.  When questioning resumed, defense 
counsel continued to object as the prosecutor laid the foundation and 
successfully elicited an answer, then asked about dynamics of a typical 
incestuous family.  Defense counsel 
founded each objection on some combination of "continuing objection" and lack of 
foundation.  While the context makes 
it difficult to determine what precisely the "continuing objection" was, it is 
apparent that Mr. Sanderson never articulated any improper character evidence 
basis for his objections.  It is 
also apparent that the court's rulings were based on whether there was proper 
foundation for the testimony.

[¶16]       
Our 
careful review of the record, including what we have set out above, shows that 
Mr. Sanderson made no argument, and did not give the trial court notice, that 
his objection to the counselor's testimony was on the basis that it was 
inadmissible character evidence.  
The trial court had no opportunity to cure any error, much less rule on 
the exact question Mr. Sanderson now brings.  As a result, we review his claim for 
plain error.  This standard requires 
the alleged error 1) be clearly reflected in the record, 2) be a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal, not merely arguable, rule of law, and 3) deny an 
appellant a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 22, 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo. 2007).

[¶17]       
We note 
that the counselor never testified that Mrs. Sanderson was "sickly."  The record reveals that it was the 
prosecutor, in closing argument, who described Mrs. Sanderson as sickly.  Because Mr. Sanderson's argument 
here incorrectly treats the prosecution's argument as evidence, we will not 
further analyze this particular point.  
For the remaining allegations of error, there is no dispute that the 
record clearly reflects the testimony at issue, so our analysis begins with 
whether Mr. Sanderson has demonstrated a violation of an unequivocal rule of 
law.

[¶18]       
Mr. 
Sanderson argues that the trial court improperly admitted testimony he considers 
inadmissible character evidence.  
Character evidence "is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion."  W.R.E. 404(a).  We have previously said that "character 
evidence means proof relating to commonly-recognized human qualities that might 
be called innate or essential to the person being described."  Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1176 
(Wyo. 
1998).  It is impermissible to use 
that quality as evidence that a defendant "acted in conformity therewith."  W.R.E. 404(a); e.g., Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 53-57 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Character evidence is not 
admissible "when the only relevance of the testimony is to show a defendant's 
bad character."  Brown, 953 P.2d  at 1177.  We have previously recognized, however, 
that expert testimony, in certain circumstances, is admissible to explain victim 
behavior.  E.g., Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 54.  As such, we have held that it does not 
implicate the proscription against character evidence.  Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 748 
(Wyo. 1993); 
Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 55 ("Expert 
testimony [that] relates to the victim is entirely proper.").  

[¶19]       
Applying 
the basic principles in the area of child sexual abuse, we have previously held 
that "[Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome] evidence is relevant and 
admissible to dispel myths the public might hold concerning a child sexual abuse 
victim's post-abuse behavior if that behavior is an issue in the case."  Frenzel, 849 P.2d  at 749.  "For example, if the facts of a 
particular case show that the victim . . . recanted the allegations, . . . then 
testimony about that particular characteristic of CSAAS would be admissible to 
dispel any myths the jury may hold concerning that behavior."  Id.  

[¶20]       
Our 
cases are not limited to those in which experts have attached the label of a 
"syndrome" to the victim's behavior.  
In Triplett v. State, 802 P.2d 162 (Wyo. 
1990), we affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  The victim in the case had 
recanted her previous accusation, so the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  Id. at 163.  The prosecutor presented the testimony 
of a professional counselor who had worked with victims of child sexual abuse in 
the motion hearing.  The expert 
explained, among other things, "the dynamics of recantation of accusations of 
sexual abuse by victims."  
Id. at 165.  We held the testimony was proper.  See also Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 
938-939 (Wyo. 
1992) (several witnesses, including a clinical psychologist, discussed typical 
sexual assault victim behavior).  

[¶21]       
Here, 
the record demonstrates that the victims' recantation of prior statements was a 
prominent issue at trial.  TS was 
the first witness in the State's case in chief.  When the prosecutor asked about her 
response to investigators when asked whether Mr. Sanderson was acting 
inappropriately with her, TS's reply was, "I said yes, but I was lying."  When asked whether she reported that her 
father had made her smell starting fluid, TS replied, "Yes, but I wasI was 
extending the truth."  When asked 
about her statements to investigators concerning the starting fluid, she said 
that she was "pretty sure [she] was just trying to make it sound worse than it 
really was."  TS even admitted that 
her testimony was suspect: "I know it looks really bad because my stories have 
changed."

[¶22]       
The 
recantation issue arose again during cross examination.  TS, when asked if she was changing her 
story because she wanted to please her father, replied, "No, because I actually 
learned the truth about everything."  Later, she said that "[at the time of the 
initial investigation] I wasn't quite sure what all happened, and right now I've 
heard all of the stories, and I'm sure that my answers now are true."  At the end of her redirect examination, 
TS admitted that she had heard her father's side of the story from her 
mother.

[¶23]       
AS 
testified next, and also discussed her prior statements.  She claimed that she had lied in her 
initial report to investigators.  
When asked why, she said, "I was scared ofI don't know.  I was angry at myself, and I guess I 
didn't want to make myself look bad, so I made it look worse than it really 
was."  When asked why she lied then 
changed her mind, she said, "Because I had my mind set on what I said and then 
afterward, after I thought about what I was getting myself into, it wasn't worth 
lying over.  I could just tell the 
truth."  She also testified she had 
decided to tell the truth only days after she initially lied to 
investigators.  In spite of this 
decision, she admitted repeating her purportedly false story to the counselor 
several weeks after the initial report.  
Throughout her testimony, she variously claimed that she "over 
exaggerated," because "I didn't want to look bad," and "to make myself look 
better."

[¶24]       
Mrs. 
Sanderson testified several times that she had lied in her prior statements to 
investigators and the counselor, and that the reason was "[t]o save my pride, I 
guess."  Furthermore, Mrs. Sanderson 
admitted talking to Mr. Sanderson after the initial reports and, when learning 
his side of the starting fluid story, discussing it with the children, who then 
"remembered" events in a way that matched that story.  Her testimony prompted the trial court 
to remark, out of the jury's presence, that "[t]his witness has got the worst 
credibility problem of anybody I have ever seen."

[¶25]       
The 
counselor's testimony describing AS and TS as "compliant" does not violate 
W.R.E. 404(a).  The testimony 
related directly to the victims, not Mr. Sanderson.  Similarly, the counselor's testimony 
regarding the victims' perception of Mr. Sanderson does not implicate his 
character.  The prosecutor asked the 
counselor several prefatory questions that clarified in no uncertain terms that 
she had not seen or spoken with Mr. Sanderson, nor did she have any particular 
opinion of him.  The victims' 
perception of their father was important in explaining their behavior, not 
his.  Under the circumstances, the 
testimony about AS and TS does not violate W.R.E. 404(a).

[¶26]       
The 
statement regarding typical incestuous families is a more difficult 
question.  The challenged testimony 
was as follows:

Q.  [By the Prosecution]  And is there infrom your training and 
experience and research, is thereare there I guess, what I will call 
inarticulately, stereotypical dynamics for families where there is molestation 
of the children?

. . 
.

A.  Oft times there is a dominant abuser who 
may use intimidation, threats, perhaps even violence to command family 
obedience.  It's possible that he 
physically abuses children.  Perhaps 
batters his wife.  His family may 
keep such abusive behavior secretive.  
They may fear the consequences of exposing him, and they fear what the 
ramifications of outside intervention might be, even more than they fear the 
continuation of the behavior itself.  
He himself may be very charming, outgoing, well received by peers, and so 
there might be a sharp contrast to his public fa§ade that is quite engaging 
where at home he has a reign of terror.

Also 
it's common that there are instances where the mother in such a family might 
have been a victim of sexual abuse herself.  Oftentimes the children will recant that 
any abuse took place, and sometimes we will see it in cases where there is an 
illness within the spouse or the partner leading to less emotional availability 
of her to deal with the children. 

[¶27]    
After 
this answer, the prosecutor asked more detailed questions about recantation in 
particular:

Q.  Let me ask you aboutyou said the word 
recant.  What does that word mean to 
you?

A.  To make allegations initially, and then 
retract them and say that the abuse did not occur.

. . 
.

Q.  Have you done any research into 
frequency of recantation in children who initially allege that they have been 
sexual[ly] abused?

A.  Yes.

Q.  Can you tell what that research 
is?

A.  Yes, in a book by John Meyers 
(phonetic), he cites a study conducted by Sorenson and Snow.  They studied 116 cases of confirmed 
abuse; 22 percent recanted or later retracted those allegations, and of those 22 
percent who recanted, 92 percent reaffirmed the allegation over 
time.

Q.  Okay, what does that mean, reaffirm the 
allegation over time?

A.  That means that after further study, 
those 22 percent who said no, no, no, it did not happen, came back and said, you 
know, what, I was telling the truth to begin with; it really did 
happen.

. . 
.

Q.  In your experience with Blanchard and 
Associates, have you worked with children who recanted?

A.  Yes.

Q.  And have any of those children later 
reaffirmed the allegation?

A.  Yes.

[¶28]       
One 
inference to be drawn from the challenged testimony is that it was about Mr. 
Sanderson and was used for impermissible purposes, violating our rule in Ryan.  On the other hand, the context also 
indicates that the testimony, as in Frenzel and Triplett, simply explained why the 
victims and their mother changed their stories and ultimately recanted.  If so, the information was potentially 
useful to help the jury decide what to make of the various excuses for the 
changing stories, and to give background to help the jurors decide whether the 
courtroom version was the truth.  
This is distinguishable from the situation in Ryan, where we held that there was no 
other purpose for the testimony at issue.  
988 P.2d  at 55; see also Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 30, 33 P.3d 758, 768 (Wyo. 2001) (no other purpose for testimony describing typical 
domestic violence abuser).

[¶29]       
In light 
of the recantations at issue in Mr. Sanderson's trial, the testimony that put 
those recantations squarely before the jury, and the expert's value to the jury 
in explaining the victims' behavior, Mr. Sanderson has not convinced us that the 
testimony was impermissible character evidence presented solely to establish 
that he was "the kind of dad who would molest his daughter."  As there was a permissible purpose for 
the evidence, we cannot say that its admission was a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.

[¶30]       
Mr. 
Sanderson asserts that the indecent liberties statute is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to his conduct.  
The statute in question prohibits any person from "knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a).  To survive constitutional challenge, a 
penal statute like this must define the offense so that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited.  
Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 
975 (Wyo. 
1988).  "It is well settled that the 
indecent liberties statute is not facially unconstitutional."  Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 15, 129 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2006).  In 
considering Mr. Sanderson's challenge that the statute is unconstitutional as 
applied, we focus on his specific conduct, and answer the basic question of 
"whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence" that this specific conduct was illegal.  Id., ¶ 16, 129 P.3d  at 865 
(quoting Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 
1995)).

[¶31]       
We begin 
with a strong presumption that the statute is constitutional.  Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004).  As a 
purely legal question, this constitutional issue is considered de novo.  Rabuck, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d  at 864.  However, we defer to the jury's guilty 
verdict, and give the State every factual inference in its favor that may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  
Id.  Again, in considering whether a statute 
is vague as applied, we evaluate the statute "solely in light of the 
complainant's specific conduct."  Giles, 96 P.3d  at 1031 
n.2.

[¶32]       
The 
specific conduct at issue here was Mr. Sanderson's massaging of AS's anal 
area with KY jelly.  He did this, he 
claims, to help relieve AS's constipation.  
He asserts that this conduct was health-related, and not for sexual 
purposes.  Accordingly, he argues 
that the statutory prohibition against "immodest, immoral or indecent liberties" 
did not provide sufficient notice that his conduct was 
criminal.

[¶33]       
The 
fundamental flaw in Mr. Sanderson's argument is that he asserts only those facts 
favorable to his defense, and only the evidence suggesting a health-related 
purpose for his conduct.  The 
applicable standard of review, as set forth above, requires us to consider the 
facts and inferences most favorable to the prosecution.  In finding Mr. Sanderson guilty, the 
jury apparently rejected Mr. Sanderson's explanation.  There is ample evidence in the record to 
support that decision.  

[¶34]       
Additionally, 
the record includes evidence that Mr. Sanderson did, in fact, understand that 
his conduct was prohibited.  We have 
recognized that a defendant's consciousness of guilt indicates knowledge that 
the conduct was prohibited.  See, e.g., Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 1035 
(1979) (defendant asked the twelve-year-old girl, "you won't tell anybody, will 
you?"); Rabuck, ¶ 20, 129 P.3d  at 866 
(defendant disposed of video receiver when he learned that the camera had been 
discovered).  In this case, when Mr. 
Sanderson gave the K-Y Jelly to AS, he took her downstairs, away from the rest 
of the family.  He did not tell Mrs. 
Sanderson of the gift, nor of his conduct with AS.  It was fair for the jury to infer from 
the evidence that Mr. Sanderson deliberately tried to keep his conduct 
secret.  His "efforts to conceal his 
conduct indicate his understanding that his conduct was unlawful."  Id.  

[¶35]       
Mr. 
Sanderson argues that our prior decisions applying this statute failed to 
provide sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited.  Mr. Sanderson is correct that none of 
our prior cases have involved conduct identical to his.  However,

 
 
the lack 
of prior cases discussing similar conduct is not determinative. . . . [T]he 
indecent liberties statute should not be subject to challenge by virtue of the 
fact that it is broad enough to capture even innovative forms of sexual 
imposition on minors.  The indecent 
liberties statute has been a part of Wyoming law for nearly five decades and we 
have uniformly given it broad application. Schmidt [v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 27, 29 P.3d 76, 
84-85 (Wyo. 2001)].

Rabuck, ¶ 19, 
129 P.3d  at 866 (quotation marks omitted).  
We have previously defined the term "indecent liberties" as actions "the 
common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper."  Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, it is impossible not to conclude that the 
common sense of society would regard Mr. Sanderson's conduct as "immodest, 
immoral or indecent," and therefore prohibited under the statute.  Mr. Sanderson's arguments do not 
overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality, and we conclude that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) is not unconstitutional as applied to Mr. 
Sanderson.

[¶36]       
Mr. 
Sanderson argues that the prosecutor's statement that the victims' stories "held 
up with law enforcement under detailed analysis" was reversible error because 
the statement is improper vouching for witnesses' credibility.  He also argues that the prosecutor's 
statement, "[i]f you're acting appropriately with your child, then you don't 
have to defend yourself," improperly shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant.  The State argues that 
the statements were not improper in context.  After carefully reviewing the record, we 
agree with the State.

[¶37]       
When 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we first evaluate the 
prosecutor's actions within the context of the entire record and the argument as 
a whole.  E.g., Talley, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d  at 260.  In Mr. Sanderson's case, he did not 
object to the two comments he now alleges were misconduct.  He must therefore demonstrate plain 
error.  In general, we are reluctant 
to find plain error in closing arguments lest "the trial court become[] charged 
with an adversary responsibility to control argument even when objection is not 
taken by the opposing attorney."  Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 26, 124 P.3d 699, 709 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Harper 
v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 (Wyo. 1998)).

[¶38]       
Several 
of our prior cases are instructive for our analysis of the first statement, that 
the victims' initial stories "held up with law enforcement under detailed 
analysis."  In Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 911-12 
(Wyo. 2000), the prosecutor argued that the parents of a child victim believed 
their daughter's story.  The 
defense's theory was that the mother had forced her daughter to make up 
allegations of sexual abuse.  
Id.  We held that "the argument, in context, 
[was] a fair response to the defense's theory of the case," and did not 
inappropriately vouch for the veracity of the daughter.  Id. 
at 912.  In Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 18, 110 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Wyo. 2005), the prosecutor made statements that superficially seemed 
improper: "Clearly, I think there is tons of evidence that an indecent liberty 
occurred here.  Everybody agrees 
that it's an indecent liberty."  We 
held that this and other statements were not misconduct because "[t]he 
prosecutor did not directly state that it was his opinion that the witnesses 
were credible nor did he give that impression or suggest that the jurors still 
did not have that determination to make.  
No personal guarantees were made about the prosecutor's personal beliefs 
concerning the facts."  Id., ¶ 22, 110 P.3d  at 1215.

[¶39]       
Mr. 
Sanderson's argument is based on several other cases in which we have held 
admission of vouching testimony to be reversible error.  In Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 16-19, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo. 2003), for example, we held that there was reversible 
error where several people testified in depth that they believed the child 
victim's story.  This testimony was 
extensive, comprising three witnessestwo of them expertswho were squarely 
asked if they believed the child.  
Id.

[¶40]       
In Mr. 
Sanderson's case, after examining the prosecutor's statement in context, we 
conclude that his comment about the victims' stories withstanding law 
enforcement scrutiny was not misconduct.  
Mr. Sanderson's defense relied heavily on the proposition that his wife 
and daughters had previously exaggerated or lied to the authorities, but finally 
told the truth at trial.  The 
State's case, on the other hand, depended on the proposition that the trial 
testimony was both coerced and, being later in time, more likely to be a 
lie.  The full context of the 
prosecution argument is as follows:

. . . I 
submit to you that unlike another criminal case where you getwhere you get a 
person on the stand and it appears that there are issues about their 
testimonyto put it politelyunlike those cases, we are dealing with kids.  And you have got to think in your heart, 
in your mind, why these poor girls would have to get up there and tell these 
lies.  Why do they have to do 
that?  Because it's no big deal to 
their mom.  And their dad is not 
going to protect them, and their mother told them, look, I'm going to die if we 
don't have dad's insurance.  I'm 
going to die if I can't get money from dad to get medical insurance, and [TS] 
told thatexcuse me.  [TS] told that 
in a tearful fashion to [the counselor].  
She really believed that, and she believed it when she got up here to 
testify on Tuesday.  And somehow the 
defense has to deal with that.  
Somehow they have to deal with why these girls would have told these 
stories to law enforcement.  Why 
these stories would have held up with law enforcement under detailed 
analysis.  Why they would have told 
the same thing to a counselor they went to.  Why would they have done that?  They have to say it's because somebody 
had an agenda.

The 
prosecutor's statement was simply part of his argument that the children's 
initial statements were more credible than those at trial.  He was pointing out that the stories 
remained consistent through several retellings to law enforcement and, weeks 
later, to the counselor.  The 
prosecutor never said that he believed the girls' earlier stories and not their 
later testimony.  "No personal 
guarantees were made about the prosecutor's personal beliefs concerning the 
facts."  Moe, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d  at 1215.   Viewed in this 
contextparticularly given the defense theory of the casethe prosecutor's 
argument did not constitute misconduct.

[¶41]       
Next we 
turn to the prosecutor's statement that "[i]f you're acting appropriately with 
your child, then you don't have to defend yourself."  In Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶¶ 9, 
16-18, 100 P.3d 386, 389, 390-91 (Wyo. 2004), on which Mr. Sanderson relies 
heavily, we reversed Mr. Condra's conviction in part because the prosecutor 
stated in closing arguments that "[i]f what Mr. Condra did wasn't wrong, then we 
wouldn't be here today."  (Emphasis 
omitted.)  We found this statement 
to be improper because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant.  Id., ¶ 17, 100 P.3d  at 390-391.  The State argues 
that its statement here is distinguishable from that in Condra because the context shows the 
prosecutor was referring to defending oneself from one's spouse, and not against 
the pending criminal charges.  The 
prosecutor's argument was as follows:

And I 
just ask you to consider the evidence that you have heard.  Consider what the motives of the 
defendant are.  If these motives are 
pure and you are conducting legitimate health-related things with your children, 
you don't do them in privacy.  You 
don't do them late at night.  You 
don't do them behind your spouse's back.  
If you're acting appropriately with your child, then you don't have to 
defend yourself. 

[¶42]       
Mr. 
Sanderson's interpretationthat the prosecutor meant "you don't have to defend 
yourself [against criminal charges]"is plausible based on the transcript.  So is the State's interpretation that 
the statement should read as, "If you're acting appropriately with your child, 
then you don't have to defend yourself [against your wife]."  By using the phrase "here today," the 
prosecutor in Condra left no room for 
interpretation that his remarks applied to anything other than the ongoing 
criminal proceedings.  Id., ¶ 9, 100 P.3d  at 389.  Here, however, we are 
presented with two plausible interpretations, one of which supports a finding of 
no prosecutorial misconduct.  
Accordingly, we are unable to find plain error.  

[¶43]       
Finally, 
Mr. Sanderson asserts that there was insufficient evidence of "physical injury" 
to support the two child abuse convictions.  He claims that any injury was too minor 
or transitory to qualify as "physical injury" as defined by the statute.  As with any challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence, "we view the evidence, and any applicable inferences based on 
the evidence, in a light most favorable to the State."  Rawle v. State, 2007 WY 59, ¶ 21, 155 P.3d 1024, 1030 (Wyo. 2007).  Rather 
than substitute our judgment for that of the jury, we instead "determine whether 
a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found 
the essential elements of [the crime] were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id.

[¶44]       
The 
statute defines "physical injury" as "any harm to a child including but not 
limited to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising if 
greater in magnitude than minor bruising associated with reasonable corporal 
punishment, bleeding, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or 
substantial malnutrition."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B).  We 
have seldom been required to consider the scope of the physical injury 
definition under the child abuse statute.  
Indeed, when previously confronted with whether abuse has occurred under 
the statute, the magnitude of the injury has never been a serious question.  E.g., Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 8, 
56 P.3d 626, 630 (Wyo. 2002) (bloodied and broken nose and being forced to put 
hand in acetylene torch sufficient for child abuse conviction); RM v. Department of Family Servs., 953 P.2d 477, 479, 481 (Wyo. 1998) (head bruises from slamming head on floor while 
doing pushups as discipline, rough and red looking hands from doing dishes for 
long periods, and gash from being hit with spatula were substantial evidence to 
support Department's abuse substantiation). 

[¶45]       
Because 
the statute's structure is that of a list and a catch-all description ("any 
harm"), we apply the principle of ejusdem 
generis, or of the "same general kind or class."  RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyoming Dept. of 
Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 46, 150 P.3d 673, 690 (Wyo. 2007); Black's Law Dictionary 556 
(8th ed. 2004).  This 
rule requires that "general words, [associated with] an enumeration of words 
with specific meanings, should be construed to apply to the same general kind or 
class as those specifically listed."  
RME, ¶ 46, 150 P.3d  at 689-90 
(quoting Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 423, 429-30 (Wyo. 
2002)); Liberty v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 148 P.3d 909, 913 (Or. 2006).  The State's broad reading of the phrase 
"any harm" to encompass any harm, no matter how small, fails under this 
rule.  Still, the question remains 
whether the State introduced sufficient evidence of harm as contemplated by the 
statute.

[¶46]       
Taken in 
the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that 
Mr. Sanderson first approached AS with a starting-fluid-saturated cloth and 
put it up to her face.  He told her 
to breathe very hard.  He also 
prevented her from looking away when she tried to breathe fresh air.  This resulted in AS feeling sick.  She reported impaired vision or 
perception, dizziness, nausea, and head pain.  At this point, she made her way to her 
bed and passed out.3  The 
evidence further reflected that after his experience with AS, Mr. Sanderson 
adjusted his technique and concentrated the starting fluid by placing the 
saturated cloth in a plastic bag.  
He put the bag up to TS's face and told her to "sniff it really, really 
hard."  Like her sister, TS tried to 
turn away from the noxious smell, but Mr. Sanderson kept the bag to her face. 
 TS's symptoms were even more severe 
than AS's.  TS threw up, seemed to 
have disordered thought, was light-headed and dizzy, and also passed out.  Because of her physical reaction to the 
fumes, TS was unable to go to school that day.

[¶47]       
Additionally, 
the State's medical expert described the potential harm of each component of the 
starting fluid.  He testified that 
the chemicals could cause a variety of problems, including central nervous 
system depression leading to respiratory depression.  He testified that they could cause a 
person to stop breathing, and lead to death in a variety of ways.  According to the doctor, the symptoms 
the victims reported were consistent with central nervous system 
depression.  Finally, he testified 
that central nervous system depression changed the function of the brain, a 
bodily organ: "It prevents the brain from cognition and prevents the brain from 
thinking clearly, puts the brain to sleep.  
High enough dose, prevents the sensation of pain."  The doctor was very clear that all 
effects from inhaling the starting fluid would depend on the dose.  But the jury was certainly able to come 
to the conclusion that Mr. Sanderson exposed both daughters to enough starting 
fluid to cause "impairment of [a] bodily organ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-202(a)(ii)(B).

[¶48]       
Finally, 
Mr. Sanderson argues thatin his viewany harm AS and TS suffered from inhaling 
starting fluid was temporary and minor.  
But the nature of the harms articulated in the statute illustrates that 
the legislature did not intend only permanent injury to be unlawful.  While the phrase "disfigurement" implies 
permanent or long-lasting effect, the terms "bruising . . . bleeding, burns, 
[or] fracture of any bone" show that the statute also includes injuries that may 
heal over time.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-202(a)(ii)(B).  Several of the 
injuries listed, notably bleeding or bruising, may later be completely 
undetectable.  The State presented 
the jury with sufficient evidence to establish "physical 
injury."

[¶49]       
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003):

Except 
under circumstance[s] constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third 
degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony. . . .

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b) (LexisNexis 2003): 

Except 
under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502 [aggravated 
assault], a person is guilty of child abuse, a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than five (5) years, if a person responsible for a child's welfare 
as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(i) intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a 
child under the age of eighteen (18) years: 

(i) 
Physical injury as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B), excluding reasonable 
corporal punishment[.]

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis 2003): "Physical injury' means any 
harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, impairment of any 
bodily organ, skin bruising if greater in magnitude than minor bruising 
associated with reasonable corporal punishment, bleeding, burns, fracture of any 
bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition[.]"

3While 
witnesses generally used the phrase "fell asleep" rather than "passed out," AS 
herself described her experience as passing out in one of her recorded 
interviews.  "Passed out" is more 
appropriate given our mandate to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
jury's verdict.