Case Title: Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2550

Docket Number: 20090542

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2550.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2550 
BOLEY, EXR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, 
APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2550.] 
R.C. 2307.941 — Asbestos claims — A premises owner is not liable in tort for 
claims arising from asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the 
owner’s property, unless the exposure occurred at the owner’s property. 
(No. 2009-0542 — Submitted December 15, 2009 — Decided June 10, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 91404, 2009-Ohio-491. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure 
originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, unless the exposure 
occurred at the owner’s property. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Cheryl Boley, executor of the estate of Mary Adams, and Mary’s 
husband, Clayton Adams, appeal from a decision of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals which affirmed summary judgment in favor of Clayton’s former 
employer, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, in connection with their claims for 
negligence, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranties, loss of 
consortium, 
statutory 
products 
liability, 
fraudulent 
concealment 
and 
representation, wrongful death, and punitive damages allegedly arising from 
Mary’s exposure to asbestos when she laundered Clayton’s work clothes in their 
home.  The central issue presented for consideration in this appeal is whether R.C. 
2307.941(A) bars all tort liability against a premises owner for asbestos exposure 
originating from asbestos on the owner’s property where the exposure occurred 
away from the owner’s property or whether R.C. 2307.941(A) is inapplicable in 
such instances, thus permitting recovery against a premises owner. 
{¶ 2} Upon review, we conclude that pursuant to R.C. 2307.941(A), a 
premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure 
originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, unless the exposure occurred 
at the owner’s property.  Accordingly, the decision of the appellate court is 
affirmed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Goodyear employed Clayton Adams as a pipefitter from 1973 to 
1983 at its St. Marys, Ohio facility.  His employment caused him to work with 
asbestos-containing materials, and he brought asbestos dust home on his clothing.  
Mary Adams allegedly breathed in the dust when she shook out his work clothes 
prior to laundering them. 
{¶ 4} In March 2007, Andrea Arrossi, M.D., diagnosed Mary with 
malignant mesothelioma.  Following this diagnosis, Clayton and Mary filed suit 
against more than 200 defendants, including Goodyear, alleging that asbestos 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
exposure caused Mary’s condition and resulted from Goodyear’s negligence in 
allowing asbestos to be carried off its property.  Mary died of mesothelioma in 
July 2007.  Thereafter, the trial court substituted the executor of Mary’s estate, 
Cheryl Boley, as a party to this case. 
{¶ 5} Goodyear then moved for summary judgment in accordance with 
R.C. 2307.941(A)(1), which provides that premises owners are “not liable for any 
injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s 
alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises owner’s 
property.”  Appellants opposed the motion, arguing that R.C. 2307.941(A) applies 
only to premises-liability claims and therefore subdivision (A)(1) should not 
prevent their negligence claim.  After review, the trial court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Goodyear. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals affirmed, holding that R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) 
precluded liability with respect to the alleged claims because Mary’s exposure to 
asbestos did not occur at Goodyear’s property.  See Adams v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 91404, 2009-Ohio-491, ¶ 18, 24. 
{¶ 7} Clayton and Cheryl Boley appealed to this court, and we agreed to 
address the following proposition of law: 
{¶ 8} “Revised Code Section 2307.941(A) does not apply to ‘take home 
exposure’ asbestos cases against a family member’s employer who exposed the 
employee to asbestos and that family member brought asbestos home on their 
clothing causing other family members to become exposed to asbestos, and 
develop an asbestos related disease.” 
{¶ 9} On appeal, Clayton and Boley contend that R.C. 2307.941(A), 
which provides that subdivisions (A)(1), (2), and (3) are applicable only to tort 
actions for asbestos claims against a premises owner for “exposure to asbestos on 
the premises owner’s property” (emphasis added), does not apply to their claims 
because Mary’s “exposure to asbestos” occurred at her home rather than on 
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Goodyear’s property.  Therefore, they assert that R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) does not 
bar Goodyear’s liability, and they urge that a contrary interpretation would violate 
their rights to due process. 
{¶ 10} In response, Goodyear maintains that the phrase “on the premises 
owner’s property” in R.C. 2307.941(A) modifies “asbestos” rather than 
“exposure,” and therefore, subdivision (A) applies to all claims for exposure to 
“asbestos on the premises owner’s property” without regard to where the 
exposure occurred.  Goodyear further argues that because the claim seeks liability 
for Mary’s exposure to asbestos originating from its property, R.C. 
2307.941(A)(1) expressly precludes liability.  Moreover, Goodyear also contends 
that the interpretation of R.C. 2307.941(A) offered by Boley and Clayton would 
render subdivision (A)(1) meaningless, because the event that would preclude 
liability pursuant to subdivision (A)(1) – exposure somewhere other than the 
premises owner’s property – would also render division (A) inapplicable.  
Goodyear argues that pursuant to this interpretation, subdivision (A)(1) would 
never apply to bar claims when the exposure to asbestos occurred away from the 
premises owner’s property. Consequently, Goodyear asks this court to hold that 
R.C. 2307.941(A) applies to all tort actions filed against it for asbestos exposure 
originating from asbestos on its property, without any limitation to where the 
exposure occurred, and as such, subdivision (A)(1) precludes all claims for 
asbestos exposure occurring away from its property as a matter of law. 
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we are called upon to consider whether R.C. 
2307.941(A) applies to all claims by individuals seeking to recover from premises 
owners for asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, 
thereby prohibiting liability for exposure that did not occur at the owner’s 
property. 
R.C. 2307.941 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 12} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2307.941 as part of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970, which revised state law 
governing asbestos litigation in response to a legislative finding that “[t]he current 
asbestos personal injury litigation system is unfair and inefficient, imposing a 
severe burden on litigants and taxpayers alike.”  Id. at 3988. 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2307.941 provides: 
{¶ 14} “(A) The following apply to all tort actions for asbestos claims 
brought against a premises owner to recover damages or other relief for exposure 
to asbestos on the premises owner’s property: 
{¶ 15} “(1) A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual 
resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged exposure 
occurred while the individual was at the premises owner’s property. 
{¶ 16} “(2) If exposure to asbestos is alleged to have occurred before 
January 1, 1972, it is presumed that a premises owner knew that this state had 
adopted safe levels of exposure for asbestos and that products containing asbestos 
were used on its property only at levels below those safe levels of exposure. * * * 
{¶ 17} “(3)(a) A premises owner is presumed to be not liable for any 
injury to any invitee who was engaged to work with, install, or remove asbestos 
products on the premises owner’s property if the invitee’s employer held itself out 
as qualified to perform the work. * * *  
{¶ 18} “(b) A premises owner that hired a contractor before January 1, 
1972, to perform the type of work at the premises owner’s property that the 
contractor was qualified to perform cannot be liable for any injury to any 
individual resulting from asbestos exposure caused by any of the contractor’s 
employees or agents on the premises owner’s property * * *. 
{¶ 19} “(c) If exposure to asbestos is alleged to have occurred on or after 
January 1, 1972, a premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual 
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resulting from that exposure caused by a contractor’s employee or agent on the 
premises owner’s property * * *.” 
{¶ 20} As we explained in State v. Buehler, 113 Ohio St.3d 114, 2007-
Ohio-1246, 863 N.E.2d 124, “[I]n cases of statutory construction ‘our paramount 
concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 29, quoting 
State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 
N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21.  To determine intent, we look to the language of the statute 
and the purpose that is to be accomplished by the statute, see Rice v. CertainTeed 
Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 704 N.E.2d 1217, and, “when its meaning 
is clear and unambiguous,” we apply the statute “as written.”  Cheap Escape Co., 
Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 
9. 
{¶ 21} Our role, as this court recognized in State ex rel. Myers v. Bd. of 
Edn. of Rural School Dist. of Spencer Twp., Lucas County (1917), 95 Ohio St. 
367, 373, 116 N.E. 516, is to evaluate a statute “as a whole and giv[e] such 
interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it.  No part should be 
treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and the court should 
avoid that construction which renders a provision meaningless or inoperative.”  
Indeed, as we determined in Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 
2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, statutes “ ‘may not be restricted, constricted, 
qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged; significance and effect should, if 
possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.’ ” Id. at ¶ 
13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 36 O.O. 554, 78 
N.E.2d 370, paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} When the statute is read in its entirety, the legislative intent behind 
R.C. 2307.941(A) is apparent – R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) bars tort liability for 
asbestos claims stemming from exposure that does not occur at the premises 
owner’s property.  We acknowledge the view in the dissenting opinion but hasten 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
to point out that the term “asbestos claim” as used in R.C. 2307.941(A) is defined 
as “any claim for damages, losses, indemnification, contribution, or other relief 
arising out of, based on, or in any way related to asbestos,” not just a premises-
liability claim.  (Emphasis added.)  See R.C. 2307.91(C).  Thus, it is not simply 
the location of the individual that determines whether R.C. 2307.941 applies.  
Rather, the broad definition promulgated by the General Assembly includes both 
negligence and premises-liability claims.  Accordingly, the position of the dissent 
is not well taken. 
{¶ 23} Were we to apply the interpretation offered by Clayton and Boley, 
which is to read the phrase “exposure to asbestos” in R.C. 2307.941(A) as 
modifying “on the premises owner’s property,” we would be giving no meaning 
to subdivision (A)(1).  Specifically, the event that would prohibit liability 
pursuant to subdivision (A)(1) – asbestos exposure away from the premises 
owner’s property – would also preclude R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) from barring such 
claims.  The better view is to read the statute to give effect to all of its parts.  See 
Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Med. Application of Ohio, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 488, 2009-
Ohio-1525, 905 N.E.2d 635, ¶ 18 (holding that the statute of limitations in a tort-
liability statute could not be construed to bar a claim where only one of two 
qualifiers was met because such a construction would ignore an express provision 
in the statute).  The only interpretation of R.C. 2307.941 that gives effect to the 
language employed by the General Assembly in subdivision (A)(1) is that which 
interprets the phrase “on the premises owner’s property” to modify the word 
“asbestos.” 
{¶ 24} Moreover, when read together, R.C. 2307.941(A)(1), (2), and (3) 
further reveal the General Assembly’s intent to limit the liability of a premises 
owner to instances where the exposure occurred at its property.  Specifically, 
subdivisions (A)(1), (2), and (3) each restrict the owner’s liability to exposure that 
occurred at the premises owner’s property.  Subdivision (A)(1) provides a general 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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exception from liability for a premises owner when the asbestos exposure does 
not occur at the owner’s property; subdivisions (2) and (3) further limit that 
liability by precluding liability in certain circumstances when exposure occurred 
at the owner’s property.  Thus, the General Assembly has manifested its intent to 
preclude liability for premises owners from claims for asbestos exposure that 
occurs away from the owner’s premises. 
{¶ 25} When the provisions of R.C. 2307.941 are read in their entirety, it 
is evident that the General Assembly intended the phrase “exposure to asbestos on 
the premises owner’s property,” as used in R.C. 2307.941(A), to refer to the 
location of the asbestos to which an individual is exposed, not the location of the 
exposure.  Thus, R.C. 2307.941(A) applies to all tort actions for asbestos claims 
brought against premises owners relating to exposure originating from asbestos 
on the premises owner’s property, and R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) applies to preclude a 
premises owner’s liability for any asbestos exposure that does not occur at the 
owner’s property.  Because Mary’s exposure did not occur at Goodyear’s 
property, R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) precludes Goodyear’s liability as to this claim. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 26} Pursuant to R.C. 2307.941(A), a premises owner is not liable in 
tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the 
owner’s property, unless the exposure occurred at the owner’s property.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring. 
{¶ 27} Because the General Assembly, in R.C. 2307.941, plainly 
precluded recovery from Goodyear for Mary Adams’s exposure to asbestos, I 
concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the appellate court.  I 
write separately, however, to address appellants’ argument that application of the 
statute leaves them without legal recourse against Goodyear. 
{¶ 28} 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292 (“H.B. 292”) “[e]xtensively revised 
state laws governing asbestos litigation and was in response to the legislative 
finding that ‘[t]he current asbestos personal injury litigation system is unfair and 
inefficient, imposing a severe burden on litigants and taxpayers alike.’ ”  Ackison 
v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228, 2008-Ohio-5243, 897 N.E.2d 1118, ¶ 
3, quoting Section 3(A)(2), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970, 3988. 
{¶ 29} H.B. 292 enacted R.C. 2307.91 though 2307.98.  The General 
Assembly stated that its intent in enacting the legislation was to “(1) give priority 
to those asbestos claimants who can demonstrate actual physical harm or illness 
caused by exposure to asbestos; (2) fully preserve the rights of claimants who 
were exposed to asbestos to pursue compensation should those claimants become 
impaired in the future as a result of such exposure; (3) enhance the ability of the 
state’s judicial systems and federal judicial systems to supervise and control 
litigation and asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings; and (4) conserve the 
scarce resources of the defendants to allow compensation of cancer victims and 
others who are physically impaired by exposure to asbestos while securing the 
right to similar compensation for those who may suffer physical impairment in the 
future.”  Section 3(B), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, at 3988. 
{¶ 30} As the majority holds, R.C. 2307.941 unambiguously prohibits 
take-home asbestos claimants such as Mary Adams from recovering from the 
owner of premises where the asbestos dust originated.  Appellants contend that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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this application of R.C. 2307.941 effectively slams shut the courthouse door on 
take-home exposure cases against a family member’s employer, thereby violating 
due process protections.  It is more than understandable why appellants believe 
that the application of the statute leads to inequitable results, but the law compels 
us to reject their argument for two reasons. 
{¶ 31} First, appellants were not left entirely without a remedy because of 
R.C. 2307.941.  Although the legislature barred appellants from recovering from 
Goodyear, H.B. 292 does not prevent them from recovering from defendants other 
than premises owners, including the manufacturers or suppliers of the asbestos 
that caused Mary Adams’s illness and death.  In fact, R.C. 2307.92(D)(2) clearly 
contemplates take-home asbestos-exposure claims against defendants other than 
the premises owners: 
{¶ 32} “If a person files a tort action that alleges an asbestos claim based 
on a wrongful death, as described in section 2125.01 of the Revised Code, of an 
exposed person, alleges that the death of the exposed person was the result of 
living with another person who, if the tort action had been filed by the other 
person, would have met the requirements specified in division (D)(1)(c) of this 
section, and alleges that the exposed person lived with the other person for the 
period of time specified in division (GG) of section 2307.91 of the Revised Code 
in order to qualify as a substantial occupational exposure to asbestos, the exposed 
person is considered as having satisfied the requirements specified in division 
(D)(1)(c) of this section.” 
{¶ 33} And Clayton and Boley took advantage of their rights to seek 
remedies against other defendants.  Indeed, they pursued the remedies afforded 
them in H.B. 292 by filing a complaint that asserted multiple claims against more 
than 200 named defendants and 100 John Doe defendants.  And according to 
counsel’s representations during oral argument, appellants proceeded to trial 
against at least one defendant, Mahoning Valley Supply Company, ultimately 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
settling with that defendant before the conclusion of trial.  Counsel further 
indicated that appellants have resolved and/or settled their claims against the 
remaining parties. 
{¶ 34} Second, the proposition of law posited by appellants only asks this 
court to determine whether R.C. 2307.941 applies to their claims against 
Goodyear, not whether the statute is legally or constitutionally sound.  Because 
appellants did not present a facial challenge to the statute in the lower courts, this 
court is constrained to the limited issue that is properly before us.  Niskanen v. 
Giant Eagle, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 912 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 35} I am not without compassion for appellants’ position that R.C. 
2307.941 serves as an outright bar to their recovery from Goodyear.  But this 
court would invade the province of the legislature and violate the separation-of-
powers doctrine if we were to adopt their position.  As judges, we are not to 
impose our views as to the best policies to address asbestos claims.  Rather, we 
must leave it to the General Assembly to rewrite the statute if it deems it 
necessary.  Just as appellants followed the dictates of R.C. 2307.91 through 
2307.98 in pursuit of their claims against other defendants, this court must also 
follow the clear directive of the General Assembly with respect to the premises 
owner, Goodyear.  Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s judgment. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} R.C. 2307.941 states, "The following apply to all tort actions for 
asbestos claims brought against a premises owner to recover damages or other 
relief for exposure to asbestos on the premises owner's property * * *."  Boley 
does not claim that Mary Adams was exposed to asbestos on Goodyear's property.  
To the contrary, in her brief, Boley states that Adams was never on Goodyear's 
property.  It is abundantly clear that R.C. 2307.941 is inapplicable to the claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 37} Boley does not claim that Adams was exposed to asbestos on 
Goodyear's property, and yet she is being told by this court that she can't bring a 
claim for "exposure to asbestos on [Goodyear's] property."  The majority opinion 
waxes poetic about its duty to read the statute and nothing but the statute, neither 
adding words to, nor subtracting words from, the statute, but then adds words to 
the statute.  In syllabus law, the majority opinion states that "[a] premises owner 
is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure originating from 
asbestos on the owner's property, unless the exposure occurred at the owner's 
property."  But the statute doesn't refer to where the asbestos "originates."  The 
statute states merely that a claim for "exposure to asbestos on the premises 
owner's property" must comply with certain requirements.  By its plain words, the 
statute applies only to plaintiffs who claim they were exposed to asbestos on a 
premises owner's property. 
{¶ 38} Boley has a completely different claim.  She claims that Adams 
was exposed to asbestos in Adams’s own home, not on Goodyear's property.  She 
claims that the asbestos Adams was exposed to was brought to the home by 
Adams’s husband, who worked at Goodyear.  Boley is not seeking relief pursuant 
to R.C 2307.941.  She cannot because she never entered upon Goodyear's 
property.  It seems mean-spirited to deny her claim while so obviously 
misconstruing it. 
{¶ 39} Whether the claim has merit is not for me to decide.  Boley may 
have a claim based on R.C. 2307.92, which, in certain circumstances, allows a 
person exposed to asbestos through living with a person who worked with 
asbestos to file an asbestos claim.  At the very least, Boley should have a chance 
to establish the claim she is making instead of the unprovable claim that the 
majority insists, or pretends, she is making.  The majority opinion misses the 
forest because it cannot see around one really big tree.  R.C. 2307.841 does not 
subsume the entire body of negligence law.  I dissent. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
__________________ 
 
Bevan & Associates, L.P.A., Inc., Thomas W. Bevan, Patrick M. Walsh, 
and John D. Mismas, for appellants. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, Nina I. 
Webb-Lawton, Matthew M. Daiker, and Michael J. Hendershot, for appellee. 
 
Brzytwa, Quick & McCrystal, L.L.C., James L. McCrystal Jr., and 
Matthew L. Snyder, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., Thomas I. Michals, Matthew M. 
Mendoza, and Laura C. McBride, urging affirmance for amici curiae Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Toledo Edison 
Company. 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, and Mark A. Behrens, 
urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce, American 
Insurance Association, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., NFIB Small Business 
Legal Center, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American 
Tort Reform Association, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, 
American Petroleum Institute, and American Chemistry Council. 
______________________