Case Title: McGraw v. Weeks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Terry McGRAW v. Dalton WEEKS, Jr.

95-1220                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 21, 1996


1.   Torts -- joint and several liability -- how determined. -- It
     is not necessary that the parties be acting in concert in
     order to be jointly and severally liable; joint and several
     liability is measured by impact, and where there is a single
     injury, it does not matter whether the individual acts alone
     would not have caused the entire result; there is joint
     liability where the different acts of negligence concur as to
     time and place and unite in setting in operation the force
     that causes the injury; here, the damage to appellee's cotton
     crop was the result of the acts of both appellant and the
     pilot in negligently applying the herbicide, and the trial
     court ruled that it was impossible to determine in what
     proportion each contributed to the damages.  

2.   Damages -- damages not clearly divisible -- trial court
     correctly applied law. -- Where the evidence was that the
     drifts overlapped, the trial court's finding necessarily
     implied that the damage was indivisible, and that finding was
     affirmed because it was not clearly erroneous; the trial court
     correctly applied the law of joint and several liability.

3.   Evidence -- testimony not harmful -- testimony not the basis
     for jury's award. -- Even though appellee was allowed to 
     testify that, except for the damage, he would have booked his
     cotton in June at 68 cents per pound, the jury's award was
     clearly based on a price of 53.6 cents per pound, the price
     appellee received in the fall on the open market for cotton
     grown and harvested on a nearby undamaged field; thus, the
     testimony about the futures contract, even if erroneously
     admitted, could not have harmed appellant.

4.   Damages -- measure of damage to crops -- Model Instructions
     properly followed. -- When a crop is damaged but nonetheless
     grows to maturity, the damages are the difference between the
     market value at the time of harvest, of the crop actually
     produced and the crop that would have been produced without
     the damage, less the costs of production; the Model
     Instructions recognize that the open market determines the
     price and that the time of harvest is the critical date for
     valuation of a marketable but damaged crop; here, all parties
     agreed that appellee's cotton crop was damaged but marketable,
     and the Model Instructions provided that "fair market value"
     meant the difference between "the price that the cotton of
     appellee would bring on the open market" and the "fair market
     value...[of] the crop actually produced" less the costs "to
     produce, harvest, and market the crop"; obviously, the jury
     understood these instructions to mean that the open market at
     the time of harvest was the critical price and date for
     valuation because the award was based on 53.6 cents per pound,
     the price appellee received on the open market after harvest
     for cotton from an undamaged and adjoining field.   

5.   Evidence -- testimony not allowed as measure of damages -- no
     error in allowing testimony. -- Appellant's contention that
     the trial court erred in allowing appellee to testify about
     his yields per acre in years subsequent to the year of loss
     was without merit where the trial court allowed the evidence,
     not as a measure of damages, but to rebut appellant's claims
     that the field was not suited to the growing of cotton; it was
     not error to allow the testimony. 

6.   Evidence -- invocation of "the rule" -- exception to excluded
     witness rule. -- Rule 615 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence
     provides that the trial court "shall" exclude witnesses from
     the courtroom when requested, but the rule also provides three
     exceptions, one of which is for "a person whose presence is
     shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his
     cause"; under this exception, a party must show that the
     witness would be unable to present essential testimony without
     hearing the actual testimony of other witnesses or that the
     witness has such specialized expertise or intimate knowledge
     of the facts of the case that a party's attorney could not
     effectively function without the presence and aid of the
     witness.

7.   Evidence -- trial court allowed witness to remain in court
     under exception to rule -- no abuse of discretion found. -- 
     Where appellant asked that "the rule" be invoked, notice was
     given that the expert witness's opinion would be partially
     based upon trial testimony, and the trial court ruled that a
     sufficient showing had been made that the expert would be
     unable to present essential testimony without hearing the
     testimony of other witnesses, no abuse of discretion was
     found; the standard of appellate review is whether the trial
     court abused its discretion.   

8.   Evidence -- jury allowed to view fields where a material fact
     of the trial occurred -- no abuse of discretion found. --   
     The trial court may allow the jury to visit the place where
     the material fact of a trial occurred, and jury visits to a
     relevant site are within the discretion of the trial court;
     here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
     the jury to visit the place where the material facts took
     place.

9.   Motions -- question of fact existed as to proximate cause --
     motion for directed verdict properly denied. -- When it can be
     shown that an individual employed by a corporation is
     personally involved in the events surrounding an injury, the
     individual may be sued; here, there was sufficient evidence to
     show that drifting chemicals caused the damage and that
     appellant ordered the spraying without knowing how close the
     cotton was; the existence of other evidence, and all the
     reasonable inferences therefrom, created a question for the
     jury and the trial court properly denied appellant's motion
     for directed verdict; proximate cause is usually an issue for
     the jury to decide, and when there is evidence to establish a
     causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and
     the damage, it is proper for the case to go to the jury. 

10.   Jury -- instructions made issues clear -- verdict not sought
     against appellant under doctrine of respondeat superior. --  
     Appellant's contention that the instruction misled the jury
     into thinking that he, as supervisor, was responsible as a
     matter of law for the negligence of the employee was without
     merit since no one sought a verdict against appellant under
     the doctrine of respondeat superior; there was no basis for
     the jury to find that appellant was liable under the doctrine
     of respondeat superior; instructions are not to be viewed in
     isolation, but are to be considered as a whole to determine
     whether the law applicable to a case is correctly declared;
     the other instructions made the issue clear.


     Appeal from St. Francis Circuit Court; Harvey Yates, Judge;
affirmed.
     Butler, Hicky & Long, for appellant.
     W. Frank Morledge, P.A., for appellant Dalton Weeks, Jr..
     Easley, Hicky, Cline & Hudson, for appellee Billy Joe Stewmon.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice. 
     Dalton Weeks, Jr., appellee, filed this tort action for damage
to his cotton crop as the result of drifting of the chemical 2,4-D
after it was applied to nearby rice fields.  A hormone herbicide,
2,4-D is suitable for use in rice fields, but it has a propensity
to damage cotton; consequently, its use is restricted by the
Arkansas State Plant Board.  In 1991, when appellant Terry McGraw
and Billy Jayroe applied 2,4-D to the rice fields, the Plant Board
regulations prohibited the application of 2,4-D within one mile of
cotton.  Appellant McGraw, a farm manager, directed the ground
application of 2,4-D to the levies of a rice field that was only
one-quarter mile from Weeks's cotton crop. 
     The State Plant Board's regulations in 1991 additionally
restricted the aerial application of 2,4-D to licensed aerial
applicators.  The Board's licensing process required both testing
of the pilot and inspection of the airplane, including checks for
leaks within the application system.  Jayroe employed Billy Joe
Stewmon to make an aerial application of 2,4-D on his rice crop. 
Neither Stewmon nor his plane were tested or examined by the State
Plant Board, and Stewmon was not licensed to apply 2,4-D.  In
addition, a nozzle on Stewmon's plane leaked during the application
for Jayroe.   
     Weeks brought this suit against McGraw, Jayroe, and Stewmon. 
Each denied liability, and each filed cross-claims against the
other for indemnity and contribution.  After a four-day trial, the
jury returned a unanimous verdict of $55,000 in damages to Weeks,
unanimously apportioned 75% of the fault for the damage to Stewmon,
the aerial applicator, and unanimously apportioned 25% to McGraw,
who directed the ground application.  By a majority verdict, the
jury found no fault on the part of Jayroe, the rice farmer who
employed the aerial applicator.  The trial court subsequently
entered judgment against McGraw and Stewmon jointly and severally. 
McGraw appeals.  There is no reversible error, and we affirm.
     McGraw's first assignment is that the trial court erred in
ruling that he and Stewmon were jointly and severally liable.
He argued to the trial court that the jury's conclusion that he was
25% responsible and Stewmon was 75% responsible was not supported
by substantial evidence because the proof showed that he caused
injury to slightly less than fifty acres, while Stewmon damaged the
remaining 150 acres.  The trial court found that, even though each
tortfeasor's act or negligence might not have caused all of the
damage, they combined to produce, for the most part, a single
injury, and each was responsible for the entire result.
     Much of McGraw's argument on appeal is premised on the theory
that joint tortfeasors must act in concert for joint and several
liability to attach, but that is not the law in Arkansas.
Consequently, McGraw's citations to numerous cases from other
jurisdictions do not afford him relief.  We have long said that it
is not necessary that the parties be acting in concert in order to
be jointly and severally liable.  Applegate v. Riggal, 229 Ark.
773,