Case Title: Ross v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 133, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MAURICE D. ROSS, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 133, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. 0401019910 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  February 14, 2007 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  May 9, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.   
 
 
Robert M. Goff, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice, for the majority: 
 
2
 
This is an appeal from final judgments that were entered in a criminal 
proceeding, following a bench trial in the Superior Court.  The defendant-
appellant, Maurice D. Ross, was convicted of Trafficking Cocaine, 
Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver and several other related drug 
felonies.  Ross was sentenced to the minimum mandatory term of 
incarceration for two years, followed by probation. 
 
In this direct appeal, the sole issue raised by Ross relates to the 
Superior Court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence.  Ross 
argues that his rights under Article I § 6 of the Delaware Constitution were 
violated because “an anonymous tip provided to police officers that a male 
wearing gray pants was dealing drugs at a specific location did not create a 
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify his detention and that he was 
stopped when officers approached him and repeatedly asked for an interview 
even after they were ignored.”  In response, the State argues the trial judge 
applied proper legal principles to the facts of this case in denying Ross’ 
motion to suppress the drug evidence recovered by the police.  According to 
the State, although the tip received by the police was anonymous, the police 
corroborated it before seizing Ross and discovering the drugs.   
 
We have concluded that the seizure of Ross did not violate Article I § 
6 of the Delaware Constitution.  Therefore, the motion to suppress the drug 
 
3
evidence was properly denied.  Accordingly, the judgments of the Superior 
Court are affirmed. 
Facts 
On January 28, 2004, Wilmington Police Officer Heather Brown 
received a 911 dispatch report from an anonymous source that a male 
wearing gray pants was dealing drugs on the 2900 block of Washington 
Street.  The report did not mention the male’s race or size.1  After receiving 
that information, Officer Brown and her partner, Officer Chris Villaverde, 
drove down Washington Street and crossed 29th Street in their marked car. 
Both police officers saw several black males on the east side of the 
2900 block.  Most of the men were wearing black pants and black t-shirts.  
Only one of these men, Ross, was wearing gray pants.  The police officers 
slowed their car and rode along beside Ross.  As they slowed, Ross turned 
and walked south, away from the officers, at an unhurried pace.  Ross 
seemed to notice them and stopped to look at them.   
The officers then stopped their car and got out.  Ross appeared to be 
nervous.  Upon exiting the patrol car, Officer Villaverde immediately began 
requesting an interview, asking repeatedly, “Can we talk to you?”  Ross, 
                                                 
1 Although Officer Brown testified that the anonymous tip referred to a black male, her 
notes did not reflect this.  
 
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however, continued to head south as the police followed, all the while asking 
Ross to speak with them.2   
Ross approached an older man and began speaking to the man in a 
low voice.3  Ross then reached out to the man with a cupped hand.  As he 
was doing so, the older man backed away and shook his head.  Although 
Officer Brown could not see what was in Ross’s hand, she suspected that he 
was trying to pass off illegal drugs.  Brown said “stop” and grabbed Ross’ 
right hand or arm.  The officers then subdued Ross and found cocaine on the 
ground near Ross’ hand.  
Constitutional Seizure Protections  
In this appeal, Ross asserts that the trial judge erred in ruling that Ross 
was not “seized” until Officer Brown said stop and simultaneously grabbed 
his right hand.  To support that argument, Ross cites Jones v. State for the 
proposition that a seizure has taken place, pursuant to Article I § 6 of the 
Delaware Constitution, when “a reasonable person would have believed that 
he is not free to ignore the police presence.”4  Ross contends that a seizure 
occurred when the police officers exited the vehicle and started following 
him while asking to speak with him, because at that time, a reasonable 
                                                 
2 Brown testified that Villaverde was repeating his request “the whole time.”  
3 The officers testified that they could not discern what Ross was saying to the older man.  
4 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del. 1999).  
 
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person would have believed that he was not free to ignore the police 
presence. 
This Court has previously addressed the protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures that are afforded by both the Delaware 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
We recently reviewed and contrasted those protections in Flonnory v. State: 
The right of individuals to be free from unlawful searches and 
seizures is secured in Delaware by both the guarantee of an 
individual's right under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution to be “secure in their persons, house, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and the 
nearly identical language of Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware 
Constitution. We have held that the Delaware Constitution 
provides a greater protection for the individual than the United 
States Constitution in the determination of whether a seizure by 
the State has occurred. In Terry, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained 
the liberty” of an individual.  That Court clarified this standard 
in Michigan v. Chesternut when it declared that a seizure occurs 
whenever the conduct of a police officer would “communicate 
to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the 
police presence and go about his business.” Although the 
United States Supreme Court carved a significant exception to 
Chesternut in California v. Hodari D., 5 we determined in Jones 
                                                 
5 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621. In Hodari D., the Supreme Court held that a 
show of authority by itself, even where a reasonable person would believe that he or she 
was not free to leave, does not give rise to a seizure of a person within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Although the police officers in that case lacked the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to detain the suspect in that case, even after Hodari D. fled at the 
officers' approach, the Court found that the resulting pursuit was not sufficient to 
communicate to the suspected individuals that they were not free to leave. The police did 
not seize the individuals for Fourth Amendment purposes until the officers used physical 
 
6
v. State that Article I, Section 6 of Delaware Constitution 
offered greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, 
requiring the Delaware courts to continue to apply a standard 
similar to that set forth in Chesternut.6 
 
In Michigan v. Chesternut,7 the United States Supreme Court elaborated 
upon the “reasonable person” standard that was first adopted in Terry v. 
Ohio8: 
While the test is flexible enough to be applied to the whole 
range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it 
calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the 
next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the 
actions of the police. The test's objective standard-looking to 
the reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct in question-
allows the police to determine in advance whether the conduct 
contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment. This 
“reasonable person” standard also ensures that the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of 
mind of the particular individual being approached.9  
 
Both Ross and the State agree that the issue raised in this appeal are 
controlled by this Court’s interpretation of Delaware Constitution Article I,  
§ 6 in Jones v. State.10 
                                                                                                                                                 
restraint. Thus, evidence discarded during the chase was not discovered as the result of 
an illegal search and the trial judge properly admitted it. 
6 Flonnory v. State, 805 A.2d 854, 857 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
7 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 574 (1988). 
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
9 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 574 (1988) (internal citations omitted). 
10 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del. 1999). 
 
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Jones v. State 
 
In Jones v. State, an anonymous caller reported a man in a blue coat to 
be engaging in suspicious activity in a known high crime area.  The police 
pulled up in a marked vehicle, and without further investigation, ordered 
Jones to stop and remove his hands from his pockets.  This order was 
repeated three times without effect.  Jones was eventually physically 
restrained.  The officers involved, testified that they were attempting to 
effectuate a pedestrian stop and that they did not feel that Jones was free to 
leave.  Under the facts in Jones, this Court held that the police did not have a 
reasonable and articulable basis to suspect criminal activity that justified the 
seizure.   
Jones Distinguished 
 
 In this case, an anonymous caller reported a man in gray pants 
dealing drugs in an area that was not known as a high crime area.  The police 
exited their vehicle and requested to speak with Ross.  There was no 
testimony that the police were attempting a pedestrian stop, or that Ross was 
not free to leave.  While walking away from the police, Ross approached an 
older gentleman, spoke to him and reached out toward him with a cupped 
hand.  The gentleman shook his head and backed away, as Ross continued to 
push his hand towards him.  The officers testified that they were aware that 
 
8
people often cup their hands in the same manner when trying to hide the 
passing of illegal drugs.  It was at this point that the police grabbed Ross by 
the arm and ordered him to stop.   
 
Ross correctly asserts that the standard to determine a seizure, as set 
forth in Jones, is when “a reasonable person would have believed that he is 
not free to ignore the police presence.”11  In Jones, however, this Court 
followed the above definition with the ruling that, “under that analysis, Jones 
was seized within the meaning of Section 1902 and Article I, § 6 when 
Patrolman Echevarria first ordered him to stop and remove his hands from 
his pockets.”12  Similarly, in this case, the trial judge ruled that a seizure had 
occurred when Officer Brown ordered Ross to stop and physically restrained 
him.13 
 
Jones is distinguishable from this case in that Officers Brown and 
Villaverde initially approached Ross and merely asked to speak with him as 
he was walking away.   As the United States Supreme Court noted in Terry 
v. Ohio: 
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and 
citizens involves “seizures” of persons. Only when the officer, 
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some 
                                                 
11 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del. 1999). 
12 Id. 
13 The trial court does not differentiate between these two actions, as they occurred 
almost simultaneously, nor does it elaborate on which of the two, if any, would have 
constituted a seizure independent of the other.   
 
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way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 
‘seizure’ has occurred.14 
 
More recently, in Muehler v. Mena, the United States Supreme Court stated:  
We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not 
constitute a seizure. Even when officers have no basis for 
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask 
questions of that individual.15 
 
Ross Seized Lawfully 
We hold that the presence of uniformed police officers following a 
walking pedestrian and requesting to speak with him, without doing 
anything more, does not constitute a seizure under Article I, § 6 of the 
Delaware Constitution.16  The Superior Court properly concluded that Ross 
was not seized until he was ordered to stop and restrained by the police.  
When the police exercised that show of verbal authority and physical force, 
they had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity based upon 
the furtive cupped hand movements by Ross, which corroborated the 
veracity of the anonymous tip.  Accordingly, the drug evidence the police 
discovered after lawfully seizing Ross was properly admitted into evidence 
against him. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                                 
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). 
15 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
16 Accord Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del. 1999). 
 
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STEELE, Chief Justice, dissenting: 
I agree with the majority that, by the time Ross extended a cupped 
hand toward a reticent older man in an apparent attempt to pass off the 
drugs, the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Ross.  I 
disagree with the majority, however, with regard to when the seizure 
occurred.  Because I believe that the seizure occurred before Ross 
approached the older man, I do not believe that the police had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to seize Ross based on the anonymous tip and their 
observations.  Therefore, I believe the Superior Court judge should have 
granted Ross’s motion to suppress the evidence derived from the seizure and 
would reverse Ross’s conviction. 
Following the United State Supreme Court’s holding in Michigan v. 
Chesternut,17 we held, in Jones v. State,18 that a seizure takes place when “a 
reasonable person would have believed that he or she is not free to ignore 
the police presence.”19   
Relying on Jones, Ross claims that no reasonable person would have 
believed that he was free to ignore the police presence under the 
                                                 
17 486 U.S. 574 (1988) (holding that a seizure occurs whenever the conduct of a police 
office would “communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore 
the police presence and go about his business.”). 
18 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999). 
19 Jones, 745 A.2d at 868. 
 
 
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circumstances.  He submits that a reasonable person in his position would 
have known that the police officers’ repeated requests for an interview 
would end only when he stopped and submitted.20  Even though Officers 
Brown and Villaverde never used the command “stop” (until they grabbed 
him), nor testified, as the majority deems important, that they “were 
attempting a pedestrian stop,” as they did in Jones, Ross claims that the 
police clearly intended to stop him from the beginning and that their intent 
became clearer each time Villaverde made the request and Ross ignored him 
during the police’s slow pursuit. 
The rationale of Jones applies here: by the officers’ continued 
questioning and slow pursuit, any reasonable person would have believed 
that the police had communicated that Ross was not free to walk away.  
Indeed, the police did not let Ross ignore them.  Officers Brown and 
Villaverde did not “merely ask[] to speak with [Ross] as he was walking 
away,” as the majority suggests.  Instead, the officers made eye contact with 
Ross and followed him a short distance in their marked police car, then, 
dressed in their uniforms and carrying batons, left their car and followed 
Ross on foot in slow pursuit, closing the distance between Ross and 
themselves, all the while “requesting” that he submit to an interview.  I 
                                                 
20 Brown testified that Villaverde repeated the request for an interview “the whole time.” 
 
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cannot imagine a reasonable person believing, under those circumstances, 
that he or she was free to continue ignoring the police.  I read Jones to 
require a focus on what a reasonable person would believe the police intent 
to be, not what the police testify it to be in a later hearing.  Thus, I believe 
that the police seized Ross before Ross approached the older man.  Because 
there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to support the seizure before 
Ross approached the older man, I respectfully dissent.