Case Title: Commonwealth v. Fulton (Dissenting Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-144-2001] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee, v. CURTIS FULTON. Appellant. : : : : : : : : : : : No. 8 EAP 2001 Appeal from the order of the Superior Court entered July 10, 2000, at Docket No. 790 EDA 1999, affirming the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas entered February 11, 1999, at Docket No. 9112-2781-2804. SUBMITTED: August 31, 2001 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: August 19, 2003 I respectfully differ with the conclusion set forth in the opinion announcing the Court’s judgment that a criminal defendant may introduce evidence of his character for truthfulness only in situations where the trait of truthfulness is relevant to the crime with which he has been charged or when his reputation for truthfulness has first been attacked by the prosecution. See Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, slip op. at 8-9.1 In my view, the difficulty with such an approach is that a trial court is 1 Although Appellant has not argued that he should have been permitted to introduce evidence of his character for truthfulness, because the trait of truthfulness is relevant to the robbery charge, I note that this Court has held that a robbery conviction involves an element of dishonesty and constitutes a crimen falsi that may be used to impeach a defendant’s veracity. See Commonwealth v. Strong, 522 Pa. 445, 451-52, 563 A.2d 479, 482 (1989) (concluding that a defendant’s robbery conviction involved an element of dishonesty tending to discredit him as untruthful and was properly admitted by the trial court for impeachment purposes); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 35- (continued...) [J-144-2001] - 2 foreclosed from exercising its discretion to permit character evidence where a defendant’s veracity has been challenged by means other than through reputation evidence. Indeed, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 608(a)(2) recognizes this concern by permitting evidence of truthful character where the witness’s veracity “has been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.” Pa.R.E. 608(a)(2). Other jurisdictions have acknowledged that the phrase “or otherwise” may include situations where the witness’s character is attacked by questions that are directed at an issue in the case, but nevertheless have the actual effect of assailing the witness’s veracity. See, e.g., Pierson v. Brooks, 768 P.2d 792, 795 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a vigorous cross-examination can trigger rehabilitation where the evidence amounts to an indirect attack on the witness’s character for truthfulness); United States v. Everage, 19 M.J. 189, 192-93 (C.M.A. 1985); see also JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §47 at 191 (5th ed. 1999) (“[A] slashing cross-examination may carry strong accusations of misconduct and bad character, which even the witness’s denial will not remove from the jury’s mind[;] [i]f the judge considers that fairness requires it, he may permit evidence of good character, a mild palliative for the insinuation of a combative cross-examination.”); cf. State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 647-49 (Wis. 1998) (concluding that statements made in an opening statement that challenged the truthful character of a potential witness was included within the term “otherwise,” and therefore, the trial court properly admitted rehabilitative evidence). Thus, I would favor a more (...continued) 37, 438 A.2d 951, 957-58 (1981) (holding that the trial court properly determined that defendant’s prior convictions for theft and robbery were admissible to impeach his credibility in a rape case, because the convictions were recent and were highly pertinent to the defendant’s veracity and credibility). I recognize, however, that such issue is not presently before the Court. [J-144-2001] - 3 flexible approach, which would allow the trial court to permit rehabilitative evidence in limited situations where it believes that the witness’s character for veracity has been impugned. As the lead opinion notes, Appellant presented an alibi defense that he was at Titus Lawnhorn’s home on the evening when the attacks occurred. See Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court, slip op. at 2-3. In support of this defense, Appellant offered the testimony of three witnesses, who testified that they were with Appellant at Lawnhorn’s home, and that Appellant had mentioned that he planned on going on a fishing trip the following day. The three witnesses further stated that, after Appellant returned from the outing, he informed them that he had been cited for fishing without a license. Appellant also presented the testimony of Anthony Williams, who stated that he had met with Appellant on the night in question to discuss plans for the fishing trip, and that he was with Appellant when he received the citation on the following day. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned these witnesses about the fishing trip and, more specifically, asked three of the alibi witnesses if Appellant had given a false name when he was initially approached by the gaming officials. See N.T. at 800-01, 810, 850. Two of the witnesses denied any knowledge, see N.T. at 801, 810, but the third, Renee Washington, testified that Appellant had told her that he had given a false name. See N.T. at 850. Appellant’s counsel did not object to any of these questions. Appellant then took the stand and admitted on direct examination that he had initially told the officials that his name was Edward Ford, because he did not want to pay the fifty-dollar fishing fine. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Appellant about the incident: [Prosecutor]: At that time, when you knew you were going to get a fine, you lied about your name, correct? [J-144-2001] - 4 [Appellant]: Yes, I did. [Prosecutor]: The reason that you lied about your name to these gaming officials was to get out of paying a fine, correct? [Appellant]: Yes. I didn’t want to pay a fine. . . . [Prosecutor]: So you lied to get out of that; is that correct? [Appellant]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: At that point, when you lied about your name, where was Anthony Williams? [Appellant]: Standing over to the side. Standing over to the side. [Prosecutor]: What happened to you when you lied about your name? [Appellant]: They put handcuffs on me after they found out. They found out Curtis Fulton. N.T. at 894-95.2 In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated: [Prosecutor]: No, [the defendant] doesn’t have to prove anything. I have the burden of proof. But when he puts on evidence, and you believe that evidence to be false, you make the decision why. Closing now. No fishing gives you 2 I would note that Pennsylvania law prohibits the use of specific instances of a witness’s own misconduct for the purpose of attacking the witness’s character for truthfulness, and, thus, an objection on that basis might have foreclosed the prosecutor from pursing this matter. See Pa.R.E. 608(b)(1). Rule 608(b)(1) differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), as the federal analogue gives the court discretion to permit the cross-examination of a witness concerning specific instances of misconduct when the incidents are probative of the witness’s own character for truthfulness. See Pa.R.E. 608 cmt; F.R.E. 608(b). [J-144-2001] - 5 a clue, gives you a window into the character of the defendant. A window which says -- [Counsel for Fulton]: Objected to. The window into the character of the defendant -- [The court]: Overruled. [Prosecutor]: -- gives you a clue. If he would lie to get out of a fishing ticket, what would he do to get out of getting caught in a rape, a robbery? Get his neighbors together, say you remember I was here on October 4th, don’t you . . . . [Prosecutor]: If you would lie about a fishing ticket, what would he do to get out of rape? Prance around, take the DNA test, turn himself in. Best offense is a good defense. N.T. 1049-50. Although the prosecutor did not present specific character witnesses to comment on Appellant’s bad reputation in the community for untruthfulness, the prosecutor used a specific instance of untruthfulness, with limited relevance to the crime to which Appellant had been charged, to establish Appellant’s character for untruthfulness. Given the net effect of these statements, I cannot conclude that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable merit, especially as the central issue in this case was one of credibility which turned on whether to believe the victims’ testimony or that of Appellant and his alibi witnesses. Therefore, I would remand in order for the PCRA court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant has established the requisite prejudice to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim, particularly since the PCRA judge did not preside over Appellant’s trial. Mr. Chief Justice Cappy and Mr. Justice Nigro join this dissenting opinion.