Case Title: Hines v. Kuplinski

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022678

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia Held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 16th day of January, 
2004. 
 
Daniel E. Hines, 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
  Against  
Record No. 022678 
 
 
 
Circuit Court No. 00-7969 
 
John R. Kuplinski, Administrator 
 of Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail,  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit 
Court of York County. 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the 
judgment of the circuit court dismissing Daniel E. Hines' petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus because it was not filed within the 
limitations period established by Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). 
 
On December 5, 1994, the Circuit Court of York County entered 
final judgment convicting Hines of rape in violation of Code § 18.2-
61 and imposing a ten-year suspended sentence. Hines did not appeal 
that judgment.  On June 15, 2000, Hines filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus claiming that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel because his trial attorneys erroneously told him that he 
could challenge his conviction on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence at any time in the future.  The Commonwealth filed a motion 
to dismiss the petition because it was not filed within the two-year 
limitations period established in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  The 
circuit court sustained the Commonwealth's motion and dismissed the 
petition. 
 
Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) provides in relevant part: 
 
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A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal 
conviction or sentence . . . shall be filed within 
two years from the date of final judgment in the 
trial court or within one year from either final 
disposition of the direct appeal in state court or 
the time for filing such appeal has expired, 
whichever is later. 
 
The statute contains no exception allowing a petition to be filed 
after the expiration of these limitations periods.  Hines contends 
that, if applied to him, this section violates the bar against 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Art. I, § 9 of the 
Constitution of Virginia, because he was not able to discover the 
basis for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel within 
the time period provided for filing a petition.1
 
Hines' argument fails in this case because the record does not 
support the predicate for his claimed right to a late filed 
petition:  that he was unable to discover the basis for his claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel within the period provided by 
Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). 
 
Hines' ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on his 
allegation that counsel advised him that his criminal conviction 
could be challenged at any time on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence.  Hines asserts that he learned that his counsels' advice 
was wrong only when he attempted to file a motion for a new trial 
                     
 
1 Article I, § 9 states:  "[T]he privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of 
invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require." 
 
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in 1999.2  However, Hines was aware of the information he 
characterizes as newly discovered evidence within two years of his 
conviction.  The delay in filing Hines' petition for habeas corpus 
occurred because he did not seek to take any action on that 
information until 1999. 
 
During his criminal trial, Hines admitted having sex with the 
victim but maintained that the sex was consensual.  The "newly 
discovered evidence" upon which Hines relied as the basis for a new 
trial consisted of the testimony of two persons, Jennifer Pearson 
and T.J. Tuck.  Pearson and Tuck allegedly would testify that 
shortly after the July 1993 incident, the victim told Pearson and 
Tuck that "she had engaged in consensual sex that evening" with 
Hines.  Hines was aware of these witnesses and their potential 
testimony well before 1999. 
During preparation for trial in 1994, Hines' mother was 
informed that Pearson and Tuck "had information that could help" 
Hines.  Mrs. Hines' attempt to set up a meeting with Pearson was 
unsuccessful but she told Hines' counsel of the potential 
witnesses.  Neither Pearson nor Tuck was contacted.  In May 1995, 
less than a year after Hines' conviction, Pearson contacted Mrs. 
Hines and told her of the victim's alleged statement of consensual 
sex.  Mrs. Hines contacted Hines' attorney and, although counsel 
 
 
2 Rule 1:1 requires that a challenge to a final judgment be 
 
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told her she needed a second witness, neither Hines nor Mrs. Hines 
attempted to locate Tuck at that time.  Finding Tuck "became a 
priority" for Mrs. Hines when Hines was arrested for forgery in 
1997.  At that point, Mrs. Hines was concerned that Hines' ten-year 
suspended sentence for rape would be revoked because of the new 
charges and that he would be sent to prison.  Mrs. Hines did locate 
Tuck in March 1999, two days before the hearing in which Hines' 
suspended sentence for the rape was indeed revoked and he was 
incarcerated. 
 
This record shows that Hines could have discovered the basis 
for his habeas claim well within the limitations period established 
by Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  Hines knew of the witnesses and the 
substance of their testimony no later than May 1995.  Had Hines 
taken any action to seek to establish his innocence in a new trial 
based on this information at that time, he would have discovered 
his trial counsels' alleged error well within two years of his 
December 5, 1994 conviction for rape.  Counsels' allegedly 
erroneous advice cannot serve to excuse Hines' delay in seeking 
exoneration when the basis for such exoneration was known to him. 
 
Because the record does not support Hines' assertion that he 
could not have discovered the grounds for his claim of habeas 
                                                                     
brought within 21 days after the entry of the judgment. 
 
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corpus within the period established by Code § 8.01-654(A)(2), we 
need not address Hines' constitutional argument. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the 
petition for habeas corpus is affirmed.  The appellant shall pay to 
the appellee thirty dollars damages. 
 
This order shall be certified to the said circuit court and 
shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
A Copy, 
Teste: 
Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk