Case Title: Longwell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Longwell v. State1985 WY 126705 P.2d 336Case Number: 84-224Decided: 08/28/1985DANIEL LEROY LONGWELL AKA DANNY LONGWELL, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
DANIEL LEROY LONGWELL AKA 
DANNY LONGWELL, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot SpringsCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, and John 
Randolf Kniss, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and John Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, BROWN, CARDINE and ROONEY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Daniel Longwell, the 
appellant, articulates the sole issue presented to the court in this case in 
this way:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in revoking Daniel Longwell's 
probation?"

In the light of 
well established precedent in Wyoming with respect to this issue, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation 
in the circumstances of this case. We affirm the judgment of the trial 
court.

[¶2.]     Daniel Longwell was 
convicted upon his pleas of guilty of three counts of forgery as defined in § 
6-3-602(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 (1983 Cum.Supp.). He was sentenced to the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary for a period of not less than three nor more than six years 
for these offenses. The trial court then suspended the execution of Longwell's 
sentence and placed him on probation for a period of four years. Longwell's 
probation was subject to certain conditions, among which were that he should 
consume no alcoholic beverages whatsoever during the term of his probation nor 
enter or remain in any establishments serving alcoholic beverages. Longwell also 
was required to contact his probation officer at least once a week during the 
term of his probation. This sentence was pronounced in open court on May 3, 
1984, and formalized by a judgment and sentence entered on May 16, 
1984.

[¶3.]     On July 20, 1984, a 
petition for revocation of Longwell's probation was filed, and a bench warrant 
was issued for his arrest to be brought before the court to answer the 
allegations of the petition for revocation of probation. The petition to revoke 
Longwell's probation was premised upon his failure to report to the probation 
officer who had been actively searching for him and making repeated attempts to 
contact him during the period from late May until late July. Ultimately the 
probation officer sent a letter to Longwell's last known address stating that a 
revocation of his probation would be requested if he did not report by June 20, 
1984.

[¶4.]     The evidence at the 
revocation hearing was uncontroverted that Longwell never had reported to the 
probation officer. Longwell claimed that he did not receive the last letter 
until about July 1, 1984, but even then he made no effort to contact the 
probation officer. Longwell also asserted that he had been told he would receive 
copies of the judgment and sentence and the terms of probation and the receipt 
of those documents would initiate his obligation to contact the probation 
officer on a weekly basis. There also was testimony from police officers at the 
revocation hearing that Longwell either was drinking or appeared drunk on two 
separate occasions. Furthermore, when Longwell was arrested upon the bench 
warrant issued in response to the petition for revocation of probation, he 
admitted that he had been drinking and he had a blood alcohol content of .144%. 
These instances constituted a direct violation of one of the conditions of his 
probation. 

[¶5.]     In Gronski v. State, Wyo., 700 P.2d 777, 778 
(1985), this court stated:

"The imposition as well 
as the revocation of probation lies within the sound discretion of the district 
court, and we will not reverse the actions of the district court unless that 
discretion is abused."

We also there 
noted that it is well established that all that is required to revoke probation 
is the court's conscientious judgment, after hearing the facts, that a violation 
has occurred. To the same effect are Minchew v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 30 (1984); State v. Reisch, Wyo., 491 P.2d 1254 (1971); and Ketcham v. State, 
Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356 (1980); see also Buck v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 878 (1979); and Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130 
(1979).

[¶6.]     In Minchew v. State, supra, 685 P.2d  at 
32-33, the definition of abuse of discretion which pertains to revocation of 
probation was reiterated:

"`"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980). * * *'"

The standard of 
proof and the rule with respect to the nature of the evidence in cases involving 
probation revocation appear in Gronski v. 
State, supra, 700 P.2d at 778:

"* * * The evidence 
utilized by the district court in making the decision to revoke probation need 
not establish the violation of the conditions of probation beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the usual rules of evidence need not be 
applied."

[¶7.]     Our examination of the 
record in this case reveals no support for Longwell's position that the district 
court abused its discretion in this instance. There is ample evidence to support 
the conclusion that Longwell violated the conditions of his probation. His 
excuse that he thought he was to receive a copy of the judgment and sentence 
before his obligation to report commenced is simply that. He knew of that 
obligation at the time the sentence was pronounced in open court. The conditions 
of the probation were made known to him at that time. He did not offer any 
justification for the drinking episodes.

[¶8.]     Longwell also contends, 
however, that an abuse of discretion can be found because the reasons underlying 
the revocation were subjective rather than objective. He claims that the trial 
court was more "miffed" at him because he had not complied with the conditions 
of probation than concerned with the real cause for those probation violations. 
The record discloses, however, that the court considered Longwell's testimony 
and his explanations. He had none to offer for the drinking of alcoholic 
beverages on the day that he was arrested.

[¶9.]     The evidence of record 
amply supports a conclusion that Longwell failed to comply with the conditions 
of his probation. We discern nothing which would indicate that the court did not 
exercise conscientious judgment after hearing the evidence presented by both 
Longwell and the state. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the 
district court in revoking Longwell's probation. Therefore, the Order Revoking 
Probation and the reimposition of Longwell's initial sentence must be 
affirmed.