Case Title: People v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90137

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90137-Agenda 8-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.							ELTON WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed March 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Petitioner, Elton Williams, was convicted following a jury trial of the
first degree murder of police officer Timothy Simenson and sentenced to
death. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297 (1998). After his petition for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied (Williams
v. Illinois, 525 U.S. 882, 142 L. Ed. 2d 157, 119 S. Ct. 192 (1998)),
he filed a timely petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)). The State filed a motion
to dismiss, which the circuit court granted. Because petitioner was
sentenced to death for the underlying convictions, his appeal lies directly
to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	In this appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing
three of his postconviction claims: (1) that juror misconduct deprived him
of a fair trial; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
expert testimony at the aggravation/mitigation stage of the sentencing
hearing that would have linked his childhood history of abuse to his adult
behavior; and (3) that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
a claim pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69,
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), on direct appeal. With regard to the first claim,
he also argues that the circuit court erred in limiting discovery and by
ordering his attorney and investigator not to contact jurors directly.
	Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, but after this court heard oral
argument and took the matter under advisement, the Governor commuted
petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole or mandatory supervised release. Commutation removes the
judicially imposed sentence and replaces it with a lesser, executively
imposed sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566
(1913); Black's Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, because
circumstances have changed during the pendency of the appeal that
prevent this court from rendering effectual relief (People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002)), the sentencing issue is rendered moot. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325
(1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964).
We, therefore, address only the nonsentencing issues.
	This court has previously described the facts underlying petitioner's
conviction in our opinion on his direct appeal. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297.
Thus, we will refer to those facts only as necessary in the discussion of the
remaining issues raised in petitioner's postconviction petition.

ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy to a criminal
defendant whose federal or state constitutional rights were substantially
violated in his original trial or sentencing hearing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A petition for postconviction relief is not an
appeal of the underlying judgment. Rather, it is a collateral proceeding
and, as such, permits inquiry only into constitutional issues that were not,
and could not have been, adjudicated on direct appeal. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502. Thus, issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are
barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata; issues that
could have been raised, but were not, are considered waived. Towns,
182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03. The doctrines of res judicata and waiver will,
however, be relaxed in three circumstances: where fundamental fairness
so requires, where the waiver stems from the ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, or where the facts relating to the claim do not appear
on the face of the original appellate record. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371-72 (1996).
	Postconviction proceedings in capital cases are governed by section
122-2.1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 1998)), which requires
the circuit court to determine initially "whether the petitioner, if indigent,
wants to be represented by counsel. After the petitioner makes that
choice, the matter is then docketed for further proceedings." People v.
Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d 37, 40 (2001). The State must then either answer the
petition or move to dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1998); Thomas,
195 Ill. 2d  at 40. If the State moves to dismiss the petition, the circuit
court must examine and rule on the legal sufficiency of each of defendant's
claims, taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1999). If the allegations of the postconviction petition,
supported by the trial record and any accompanying affidavits, do not
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the petition may
be dismissed. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 448 (2001). If the
petition does make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the
matter proceeds to a hearing on the merits of petitioner's claims. People
v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998).
	This court acquired jurisdiction over the present case because
petitioner was under a sentence of death at the time he file his notice of
appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition. Oral arguments were
heard in September 2002, and the matter was taken under advisement.
After petitioner's sentence was commuted, this court issued an order
retaining jurisdiction. Although petitioner is now serving a life sentence, we
continue to have jurisdiction. In the interest of judicial economy, we
choose to dispose of this matter, rather than transfer it to the appellate
court.
	Because the circuit court dismissed petitioner's claims without a
hearing on the basis that he failed to make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation, our review of the issues raised in this appeal is de
novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389 (1998). As to the
additional claim that the circuit court erred by limiting discovery, we
review the circuit court's decisions regarding discovery for abuse of
discretion. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 265 (2000).

A. Juror Misconduct and Denial of Discovery
	The investigator employed by postconviction counsel was able to
identify 7 of the 14 jurors (12 jurors and 2 alternates) who were present
for petitioner's trial. He spoke to several of them and left his card with
others with a request that they contact him for an interview. One juror,
John Sinadinos, provided the affidavit that is the basis for the claim of juror
misconduct. In his sworn statement, Sinadinos described an exchange that
he had with another juror during the trial. The other juror mentioned that
she "had a conversation" with her husband about one of the issues in the
case. When a third juror commented that they had been instructed not to
discuss the case with others, she responded that it was "hard not to."
	The circuit court denied petitioner's motion for discovery of the
names and addresses of unidentified jurors. In addition, the circuit court
ordered defense counsel and his investigator to cease their efforts to
contact jurors directly, based in part on an assertion by the State that
several jurors had contacted the State's Attorney's office because they
were upset by the investigator's request for an interview.
	In response to a suggestion by the State, the circuit court ordered the
jury commission to send a letter to the jurors explaining that petitioner's
attorney wished to speak to them. The letter further stated that the jurors
had a right to speak to the attorney as well as "the right to be left alone."
The jurors were instructed to call a certain telephone number if they were
willing to be interviewed. They were also told to call the chief judge's
office "immediately" if they were "contacted by any attorneys involved in
the current proceedings." If they were not willing to be interviewed, the
jurors did not need to respond to the letter. "The choice is yours," the
letter emphasized. The letter was reviewed and approved by the circuit
court before mailing.
	Petitioner objected to the use of the letter, arguing that the wording
sent an implied message that the jurors should not respond. This court
denied his petition for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the mailing of the letters, as well as his motion to issue a
supervisory order to vacate the circuit court's order banning any further
contact with the jurors. The letters were sent; none of the jurors
responded.
	Because none of the jurors came forward voluntarily and because
counsel and the investigator were prohibited from making any further
efforts to contact the jurors directly, petitioner filed a motion to depose the
jurors. The circuit court denied this motion.
	Neither the discovery rules for civil cases nor the rules for criminal
cases apply to proceedings under the Act. People ex rel. Daley v.
Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 181-83 (1988). However, the circuit court
has the inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in
postconviction proceedings. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 264. This authority must
be exercised with caution, because of the potential for abuse of the
discovery process and because of the limited scope of postconviction
proceedings. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 264. Thus, discovery should be allowed
only after the moving party demonstrates good cause for the request.
Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 264-65, citing Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183.
	Petitioner asserts that the Sinadinos affidavit demonstrates that at
least one juror failed to follow the trial court's instruction that she not
discuss the case with anyone. This information, he claims, is sufficient to
demonstrate good cause, specifically, the possibility of an improper
outside influence on the juror in question, who has not yet been identified.
He argues that a finding of good cause is implicit in the circuit court's
order that the jurors be contacted by letter. As such, he argues that it was
error to deny his request to discover the names and addresses of the
jurors. The error was compounded, he asserts, by the limitation placed on
his ability to make any additional efforts to identify and contact the jurors
on his own.
	The State argues that the circuit court's decision to send the letters
was not an indication that it found good cause and that the order
prohibiting further contact with jurors was justified. Finally, the State
asserts that the Sinadinos affidavit, standing alone, does not demonstrate
good cause to allow discovery of the identities of the jurors.
	Our review of the record does not reveal either an explicit or an
implicit finding of good cause. The circuit court, after denying numerous
other discovery motions and agreeing to an in camera inspection of
certain records to determine whether they should be made available to
petitioner, said:
			"Now, that leaves me with the motion for jury records. Before
I get to that, I should say with regards to all of the motions that
I have denied thus far, there have not been sufficient showings in
the Court's mind, to satisfy the Court that discovery sought and
denied should be entered into.
			Discovery is not meant to be a fishing expedition. Where
legitimate issues can be investigated and developed, that's fine.
But where no basis is provided to show the existence of
legitimate issues we are not going to engage in Monday morning
quarterbacking ***.
			That's not the purpose of post-conviction petitions. Mere
allegations of abuse or improper conduct are insufficient to
constitute a basis for discovery."
	The circuit court then announced its intention to order the jury
commission to send a certified letter to the jurors, informing them that
petitioner's attorney wanted to talk to them. We do not find anything in
these comments to suggest a finding of good cause. Indeed, the circuit
court explained that its intention in sending the letters was to protect the
jurors from unwanted intrusion, not to facilitate discovery of the juror's
identities.
	Further, our review of the transcript reveals that the reasons offered
by counsel for discovery of the identities of the jurors included not only the
conversation described in the Sinadinos affidavit, but also the allegation
that a witness had seen unnamed jurors reading newspapers during a
recess in the trial. In addition, counsel mentioned "outbursts in the
courtroom," comments made from the gallery, incidents in which
spectators made comments to petitioner, and spectators wearing police
uniforms or buttons in memory of the victim. Counsel argued that
"[w]ithout talking to each one of the jurors" he would be unable to
determine what they noticed: "Did they see it, hear it, things like that?"
Further, "We do have information that there was [sic] things going on in
the gallery and in the courthouse that could have affected the jurors."
"[W]ithout talking to them," he argued, "[w]e have no way of knowing."
	Counsel admitted that the identities of the jurors were being sought
so that they could be asked what they read, whom they talked to, and
what they observed during the trial that might have influenced their
deliberations. Thus, petitioner's effort to discover the identity of the jurors
was precisely the type of "fishing expedition" that our rule in Fair was
designed to avoid. We, therefore, conclude that the circuit court's denial
of the request for discovery of juror names and addresses was not an
abuse of discretion.
	We further conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
by restricting further efforts by counsel and the investigator to contact the
jurors directly. The investigator had already identified and contacted seven
of the jurors. According to petitioner's brief, a few of these individuals
spoke to the investigator. Of those who did not, several called the State's
Attorney's office seeking advice and were told that they did not have to
talk to the investigator. Their unwillingness to discuss the details of their
jury service was made clear by their lack of response to both the
investigator's inquiry and the jury commission letter. Further contact with
these individuals would have been intrusive and unjustified. The circuit
court did not abuse its discretion by acting to protect them from further
unwanted contacts.
	As to the other jurors, the investigator was unable to identify them by
name or to obtain their addresses. Therefore, an order that the investigator
and counsel not contact these individuals cannot have affected petitioner's
ability to present his claim of juror misconduct.
	Discovery issues aside, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred
by dismissing his claim of juror misconduct without an evidentiary hearing.
He relies on our decision in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404 (1998), to
argue the Sinadinos affidavit, which must be taken as true (Ward, 187 Ill.
2d at 255), is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on his claim that the juror
misconduct resulted in the deliberations being subject to an improper
extraneous influence and that, as a result, he was denied a fair trial.
	In Hobley, we acknowledged the long-standing rule that a jury
verdict is not subject to impeachment by the testimony of a juror. Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d  at 457. Strong public policy considerations underlie this rule,
which prevents the admission of a juror's affidavit to show the " 'motive,
method or process by which the jury reached its verdict.' " Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 457, quoting People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 511 (1978). As
the United States Supreme Court has noted:
		" '[If it is] established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly
returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the
testimony of those who took part in their publication [then] all
verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in
the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the
finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated
party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which
might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If
evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to
make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the
constant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.' " Tanner
v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-20, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90,
105-06, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 (1987), quoting McDonald v.
Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68, 59 L. Ed. 1300, 1302, 35 S. Ct. 783, 784 (1915).
This rule, which prevents admission of juror testimony to impeach the
verdict, does not preclude admission of juror testimony offered as proof
of improper extraneous influences on the jury. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 458.
	The distinction between "motive, method or process" and an
improper extraneous influence was illustrated in Hobley. We determined
that Hobley was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he
was prejudiced by the conduct of the jury foreperson during deliberations,
despite allegations that he intimidated the other jurors. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 463. We found this claim properly dismissed by the circuit court as an
attempt to impeach the method or process by which the jury reached its
verdict. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 465.
	We did, however, determine that Hobley was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that jurors were affected by an incident
that occurred in the dining room of the hotel where the jury was
sequestered. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 462. The affidavits of three jurors
described an incident in which several other diners recognized the jury and
shouted at them, using vulgar and intimidating language, that Hobley was
guilty and should be executed. One affidavit stated that the incident "upset
quite a few of the jurors" and that the affiant "was scared" and felt that her
life was in danger. Another juror's affidavit stated that although he was not
present for the incident, he observed that several of the jurors who had
been present were "extremely shaken." Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 458-59.
	Because this incident involved "prejudicial outside influences" on the
jury, an evidentiary hearing was warranted. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 459. In
reaching this conclusion, we stated:
			" ' "It is well settled in Illinois that any communication with a
juror during trial about a matter pending before the jury is
deemed presumptively prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair
trial. Although this presumption of prejudice is not conclusive, the
burden rests upon the State to establish that such contact with
the jurors was harmless to defendant." ' " Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at
460, quoting People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 341 (1992),
quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 132 (1988).
	We rejected the State's contention that Hobley was required to
submit juror affidavits stating that the incident in the hotel actually
prejudiced one or more jurors against defendant. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at
462. Such a requirement, we observed, would violate the rule that
"although jurors may testify as to communications and outside influences,
'evidence relating to the effect of such influences on the mental processes
of jury members is inadmissible.' " Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 462, quoting
People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1978) (distinguishing "actual
evidence of the nature of outside influences exerted on the jury," which
will be considered, from "evidence relating to the effect of such influences
on the mental processes of jury members," which is inadmissible
(emphases added)).
	Petitioner likens the conversation recounted in the Sinadinos affidavit
to the incident in the dining room involving the Hobley jurors. He argues
that the unidentified juror's conversation with her husband about an issue
in the case, in violation of the judge's instructions, is a similar improper
extraneous contact. He asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because, according to Hobley and Mitchell, the contact must be deemed
presumptively prejudicial.
	We disagree. The lesson of Hobley is that a juror affidavit alleging
exposure to "prejudicial outside influences" (emphasis added) (Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d at 459), is sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice and to
shift the burden to the State to establish that such contacts were harmless.
See also Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), quoted with approval in Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d  at 516 (juror testimony is admissible to prove " 'whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror' ").
	The Sinadinos affidavit contains nothing more than the mere assertion
that an improper conversation occurred. The affidavit contains no
information about the nature of the conversation. That is, it offers no
evidence that the alleged conversation was prejudicial in any respect.
Indeed, the juror may have been the one doing the talking while her
husband simply listened. The husband may have made remarks that were
critical of the judge or of the prosecution. The "issue" discussed may have
been the decision not to sequester the jury or how long the proceedings
should go on each day. In sum, the Sinadinos affidavit establishes only that
a member of the jury was having difficulty overcoming the temptation to
discuss the case with her husband. It does not establish that the improper
conversation was prejudicial in nature.
	In considering this issue, we must also keep in mind that the case is
before us on appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition. In this
proceeding, the petitioner has the initial burden of making a showing of a
substantial violation of his constitutional rights. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d  at 448.
The Sinadinos affidavit is readily distinguishable from the affidavits that
justified an evidentiary hearing in Hobley and in Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d  at 510
(defendant's motion for a new trial was supported by an affidavit of one
of defendant's attorneys describing an independent investigation of an item
of physical evidence undertaken by members of the jury). In both of these
cases, the petitioners met their burden by providing affidavits alleging that
jurors were exposed to extraneous information or influences of a
prejudicial nature. The Sinadinos affidavit merely alleges that a single juror
may have been exposed to extraneous information of an unknown nature.
	Construing the allegations in the petition and the affidavit in favor of
petitioner, and taking all well-pleaded facts as true (Ward, 187 Ill. 2d at
255), we find the allegations in the Sinadinos affidavit insufficient to make
a substantial showing of a constitutional deprivation. We, therefore, affirm
the circuit court's dismissal of the claim of juror misconduct.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel-Batson Violation
	 Of the five African-American venirepersons, four were excused for
cause. Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a Batson claim as to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to
remove the only remaining African-American member of the venire,
Warren King. The postconviction petition was accompanied by an
affidavit of appellate counsel, in which counsel acknowledged that he was
aware petitioner wanted him to raise the Batson issue on direct appeal,
but that he had refused to do so. Counsel did not explain the basis for his
decision.
	The circuit court dismissed this claim, concluding that after a thorough
investigation of the law and the facts, appellate counsel made a strategic
decision not to raise the Batson claim and that such a decision is virtually
unchallengeable on appeal. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
	Appellate counsel is not required to argue every conceivable issue on
appeal. Rather, counsel must exercise professional judgment to select from
the many potential claims of error that might be asserted on appeal. See
People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 387-88 (1997). Therefore, we judge
a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue a
particular issue, not on the basis of what the defendant might have
preferred, but under the standard set forth in Strickland. To succeed on
this claim, petitioner must show that appellate counsel's failure to raise the
Batson claim was objectively unreasonable and that, absent this failure, his
conviction or sentence would have been reversed on direct appeal.
People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (2000). See also People v.
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 159 (1997) (stating that counsel's decision as to
what issues to raise on direct appeal will not be questioned unless
"patently erroneous"). Thus, if the Batson claim is completely without
merit, appellate counsel's refusal to raise the issue, despite petitioner's
instructions to the contrary, was reasonable.
	Batson established a three-step procedure to determine whether the
State's use of peremptory challenges resulted in the removal of
venirepersons on the basis of race. First, the defendant must make a
prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges on the basis of race. People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 174
(1996). Second, once such a showing has been made, the burden shifts
to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for excluding each of the
venirepersons in question. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 174-75. Defense
counsel may rebut the proffered explanations as pretextual. People v.
Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 288 (1992). Finally, the trial court determines
whether the defendant has met his burden of demonstrating purposeful
discrimination. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 174.
	In the present case, defense counsel objected to the State's use of
a peremptory challenge to excuse King. Without waiving its objection that
defense counsel had failed to establish a prima facie case, the State
offered six reasons for excluding King from the jury: (1) he did not list his
birthdate in the space provided on the juror questionnaire, (2) he did not
appear to be paying attention during voir dire, (3) he seemed to avoid eye
contact with the court and either attorney, (4) the prosecutor did not like
his demeanor or "body language," (5) he had "an exceptionally hard time
understanding the Witherspoon questions" (see Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968)), and (6) his
father died during the course of jury selection and the prosecutor had
concerns about his emotional state as a result of this loss. Defense counsel
argued pretext. The trial court found the reasons offered by the State to
be race-neutral and nonpretextual.
	Petitioner argues that only two of these reasons, the confusion
regarding the Witherspoon questions and the death of King's father, are
objective factors. The rest are subjective assessments that should be given
close scrutiny because such perceptions may easily be used as a pretext
for discrimination. See People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 274-75 (1995).
He also argues that the two objective reasons offered for King's exclusion
from the jury were pretextual. Specifically, he notes that King's answers
to the Witherspoon questions revealed no bias for or against the death
penalty and that several other jurors had at least as much difficulty
understanding the questions as he did. In fact, all but one of the
venirepersons who were selected to serve on the jury required the court
to repeat one or more of the Witherspoon questions.
	In addition, King was not the only member of the venire to suffer the
death of a family member during jury selection. A white female
venireperson also asked to be excused for half a day to attend the funeral
of a family member. She was not questioned by the State about her
relationship to the deceased or about any effect the death might have had
on her ability to deliberate. The State did not use one of its peremptory
challenges to remove her. King, however, was asked about his emotional
state following the death of his father, and he stated that his ability to serve
as a juror would not be affected.
	We have previously held that the State's exclusion of a minority
venireperson based on a certain characteristic, while accepting a white
venireperson who shares the same characteristic, does not necessarily
show that the State's explanation is pretextual. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1989). In Wiley, we explained:
		"The State's purposeful discrimination is not automatically
established by the mere coincidence that an excluded juror
shared a characteristic with a juror who was not challenged. The
excluded juror may possess an additional trait that caused the
State to find him unacceptable, while the juror who was not
challenged may possess an additional characteristic that
prompted the State to find him acceptable to serve as a juror.
[Citation.] '[A] peremptory challenge is based on a combination
of traits, and a juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be
accepted while another juror possessing that same negative trait,
but also possessing other negative traits, may be challenged.' "
Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 282-83, quoting Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at
295.
	In People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307 (2000), for example, the State
offered three reasons for its peremptory challenge of an African-American
venireperson. First, the prosecutor believed that the individual lied when
he stated that he did not know that two of his adult children had recently
been convicted of crimes and sentenced to probation. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 
at 325. Second, the prosecutor excluded the individual because he lived
in a neighborhood that experienced street gang activity. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 325-26. Third, the prosecutor excluded the individual because he
"vacillated" and "hestitated" in his answers to questions about the death
penalty. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 326-27.
	The defendant argued that each of these reasons was a mere pretext
for racial discrimination. The individual had explained during voir dire that
he did not know of his childrens' convictions because they had not lived
with him for 20 years. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 325. The prosecutor did not
ask any additional questions to clarify this matter. We held that the
prosecutor's conclusion that the individual was lying, without exploring the
subject further by asking supplemental questions, did not lead to the
conclusion that this reason was pretextual. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 325.
	As to the gang activity in the individual's neighborhood, we noted that
using this fact as a basis for excluding venirepersons could result in a
disproportionate impact on minority jurors. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 326.
However, unless the prosecutor adopted this criterion with the intent of
excluding minority jurors, the disproportionate impact itself would not
compel a finding of pretext. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 326. Because the
State's theory of the case involved gang violence and retaliation, a
potential juror's experience or exposure to an environment of gang activity
was particularly relevant as a criterion for jury selection. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 326.
	With regard to the prosecutor's concern with the individual's
demeanor, we noted that although demeanor is a legitimate race-neutral
reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, such explanations must be
closely scrutinized. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 327. The defendant argued that
the demeanor explanation was pretextual because the prosecutor
accepted three white venirepersons who were equally tentative about their
support for the death penalty. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 327. We rejected this
argument, noting that the peremptory challenge of this individual was
"based on a combination of traits" and that, although he shared this trait
with three accepted jurors, they were not similarly situated because he
possessed two additional undesirable traits. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 327.
	In the present case, King and one of the accepted jurors shared the
single trait that each experienced the death of a family member while jury
selection was taking place. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the family
relationships were equally close and that both individuals were equally
likely to be affected by their loss, King and the female juror were not
similarly situated. He required that four of the Witherspoon questions be
repeated; she asked for one question to be repeated. Nor was King
similarly situated to the other jurors who asked that questions be repeated.
None of them had just experienced the death of a parent. In addition,
King was distinguished from the accepted jurors by the fact that he did not
completely fill out his juror questionnaire.
	In sum, we conclude that appellate counsel's decision not to raise the
Batson claim on direct appeal was reasonable. This claim was properly
dismissed by the circuit court.

CONCLUSION
	We affirm the judgment of the circuit court with respect to the issues
that were not rendered moot by the commutation of petitioner's death
sentence.
Affirmed.