Case Title: People v. Espinoza

Citation: 

Docket Number: S269647

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUVENTINO ESPINOZA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S269647 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F079209 
 
Tulare County Superior Court 
VCF109133 
 
 
 
 
 
January 26, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Cantil-Sakauye* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
S269647 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Penal Code section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have 
served their sentences to vacate a conviction if they can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their 
conviction is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging 
[their] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or 
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration 
consequences of a conviction or sentence.”  (Pen. Code, § 1473.7, 
subd. (a)(1); id., subd. (e)(1); all undesignated statutory 
references are to this code.)  To establish prejudicial error, a 
defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that the 
defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had 
correctly understood its actual or potential immigration 
consequences” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529 
(Vivar)) and must corroborate any assertions with “ ‘ “objective 
evidence” ’ ” (id. at p. 530).  We note that a motion to vacate a 
conviction, in contrast to a direct appellate challenge to the plea 
itself, is generally filed, as here, after “the individual filing the 
motion is no longer in criminal custody.”  (§ 1473.7, subd. (b)(1).) 
Defendant Juventino Espinoza accepted a plea bargain in 
2004 and served one year in jail.  He argues that he first learned 
that the plea put him at risk of losing his permanent resident 
status and being deported in 2015, when he was detained by 
federal immigration authorities at the airport after a return 
flight to the United States.  He then sought to vacate his 
conviction three separate times.  He asserts counsel never 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
informed him of the immigration consequences of his plea and 
that he would not have accepted the terms of the plea bargain if 
he had been so informed.  In support of his third motion, before 
us now, Espinoza attached a declaration describing his 
biographical history, which includes more than 20 years living 
in the United States prior to conviction; a declaration from an 
immigration attorney explaining that Espinoza’s convictions 
place him in danger of losing his permanent residence, being 
deported, and being barred from reentering the United States, 
and that there were immigration-safe alternatives his counsel 
could have pursued; and 30 letters from family, friends, 
community members, clients, and employers documenting his 
family ties, community connections, and work history.  The trial 
court denied his motion, as it had his previous two.  The Court 
of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Espinoza had not 
adequately 
corroborated 
his 
claim 
that 
immigration 
consequences were a paramount concern at the time of his plea.  
We granted review to consider what constitutes a 
sufficient showing of prejudicial error within the meaning of 
section 1473.7.  We limited the issue before us to the following:  
“Did the Court of Appeal err in ruling that defendant failed to 
adequately 
corroborate 
his 
claim 
that 
immigration 
consequences were a paramount concern and thus that he could 
not demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Penal Code 
section 1473.7?”  We hold that Espinoza has made the requisite 
showing and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
I. 
Espinoza migrated from Mexico to Northern California in 
1981, when he was 13 years old.  After arriving in Oroville, he 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
earned wages as a farmworker to support his parents and 
siblings.  In 1986, when Espinoza turned 18, he became a lawful 
permanent resident.  When Espinoza was 22 years old, he 
married Sandra Rose.  The couple had six children together.  
Espinoza’s wife and children are United States citizens and 
have resided in California for their entire lives.  Espinoza’s 
elderly parents, eight siblings, grandchildren, and sons-in-law 
also live in the United States and are either United States 
citizens or lawful permanent residents.  Espinoza has now lived 
in the United States for over four decades.   
Espinoza and his wife created a family and a home 
together in California.  The couple bought a home in Cutler, 
where they raised their children.  Their first-born child, 
Juventino Espinoza, Jr., graduated from Sierra Nevada College 
with a bachelor’s degree in psychology and has plans to join the 
army to serve as a behavioral therapist for struggling soldiers.  
Their eldest daughter, Marisol Espinoza, graduated from Milan 
Institute in Fresno as a beautician.  Their second daughter 
attended La Sierra Military Academy.  One of their sons, Juan 
Carlos Espinoza, died a few months after birth.   
Espinoza is the primary caregiver to his parents, who 
suffer from Parkinson’s disease and diabetes.  Espinoza’s 
parents live with him in Cutler and rely on him for assistance 
with their daily activities, including cooking, shopping, doing 
laundry, administering medication, and driving to medical 
appointments.   
Espinoza is the main financial provider for his family.  
After several years as a farmworker, Espinoza relocated with 
his wife in 1991 to the Central Valley, where he worked for 
Schellenberg Farms in Reedley as a farm manager.  Beginning 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
in 1994, Espinoza worked for eight years as a supervisor at Abe-
El Produce in Orosi before starting his own business.   
In 2003, Espinoza and several others were arrested 
following an investigation into suspected methamphetamine 
manufacturing.  During the proceedings, it was undisputed that 
Espinoza had no prior criminal history.  Eventually, Espinoza 
pleaded no contest to conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), felony 
child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)), controlling property to 
manufacture a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11366.5, subd. (a)), and possession of a controlled substance 
(id., § 11350, subd. (a)).  
At the time, Espinoza did not speak English; his attorney 
used a Spanish-speaking assistant to communicate with him 
before his plea.  The assistant told Espinoza to plead no contest 
and “everything was going to be fine.”  Espinoza never discussed 
the immigration consequences of the plea with his attorney, who 
did not advise him that pleading to these charges would put him 
in danger of losing his permanent resident status, being 
deported, and being barred from reentering the United States.  
It appears he relied on the reassurance of his attorney’s 
assistant that, if he pleaded no contest, “everything was going 
to be fine.” 
When Espinoza’s plea was taken, the court provided him 
with the following advisement, pursuant to section 1016.5: “If 
you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of 
the offense for which you have been charged may have the 
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws 
of the United States.”  Espinoza explained in his declaration:  “I 
took the warning to be a general one that the court had to give 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
everyone who pleads guilty.  I did not understand it to have 
applied to me as a legal permanent resident who was in the 
United States legally, my attorney at the time did not mention 
to me that my plea would have immigration consequences.”  It 
appears the court made no further inquiry into Espinoza’s 
understanding or offer to answer any questions he might have 
had.  He asserts that if he had known, he would not have 
accepted the plea and would instead have taken the case to trial 
or agreed to a longer sentence in exchange for an immigration-
safe plea.   
Following Espinoza’s plea, he was placed on five years of 
probation and ordered to serve 365 days in jail.  According to 
Espinoza, he was not informed by his attorney that his plea 
agreement included jail time.  Nevertheless, he served the jail 
term called for by the plea bargain.  Upon release, Espinoza 
returned to being the family’s main financial provider.  He 
started his own lawn services and gardening business.  He was 
well-known and involved in the community.  He volunteered, 
went to church, and took part in numerous community 
organizations.  His wife, five children, two sons-in-law, several 
grandchildren, and his parents and siblings continue to reside 
in the United States.   
In 2015, more than a decade after his convictions and the 
service of his jail term, Espinoza left the country for a trip.  
When he returned to the United States, he was questioned by 
immigration officials, and they seized his permanent residence 
card.  He asserts it was during that encounter that he became 
aware of the immigration consequences of his plea.  
In 2017, Espinoza filed a nonstatutory motion to vacate 
his conviction.  He filed additional motions under section 1473.7 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
in 2018 and 2019.  In each motion, Espinoza maintained that he 
had not been aware of the immigration consequences of his plea 
and that had he been aware, he would have sought a plea with 
lesser immigration consequences or taken his case to trial.  The 
trial court denied all three motions, each time without an 
evidentiary hearing.  Espinoza appealed the third denial, and 
the Court of Appeal affirmed.  We granted review. 
II. 
 
To prevail under section 1473.7, a defendant must 
demonstrate that his conviction is “legally invalid due to 
prejudicial error damaging [his or her] ability to meaningfully 
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or 
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or 
sentence.”  (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)  The defendant must first 
show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration 
consequences of his plea.  Next, the defendant must show that 
his 
misunderstanding 
constituted 
prejudicial 
error.  
“[P]rejudical error . . . means demonstrating a reasonable 
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if 
the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential 
immigration consequences.”  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)   
We apply independent review to evaluate whether a 
defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he 
would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its 
immigration consequences.  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.)  
“ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its 
independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy 
the rule of law.’ ”  (Ibid.)  When courts engage in independent 
review, they must give deference to the trial court’s factual 
determinations if they are based on “ ‘ “the credibility of 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  
But when the trial court’s findings “derive entirely from written 
declarations and other documents,” the trial court and the 
reviewing court “ ‘are in the same position,’ ” and no deference 
is owed.  (Id. at p. 528.)  Because the trial court here conducted 
no evidentiary hearing, there is no basis for deference, and “it is 
for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent 
judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under section 
1473.7.”  (Ibid.) 
The record establishes that Espinoza did not meaningfully 
understand the immigration consequences of his plea.  Although 
the trial court provided a general advisement under section 
1016.5 that his conviction may have immigration consequences, 
Espinoza’s attorney never advised him that pleading no contest 
to the charges at issue would result in his deportation.  After his 
conviction, rather than living in hiding, Espinoza started his 
own business, joined community organizations, and became 
well-known in his local community.  Moreover, he took an 
international commercial flight to the United States, which 
predictably required subjecting himself to the scrutiny of United 
States immigration officials, which is not consistent with the 
behavior of a person who understood that his convictions 
effectively ended his lawful resident status.  (See People v. 
Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 770 [“It goes without saying 
that someone who understood his criminal conviction made him 
automatically deportable would not voluntarily contact 
immigration authorities and advise them of his presence in the 
country.”].)  The remaining question is whether Espinoza 
established prejudicial error. 
To determine whether there is a reasonable probability a 
defendant would have rejected a plea offer if he had understood 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
its immigration consequences, courts must “consider the totality 
of the circumstances.”  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)  
“Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the 
defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the 
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s 
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant 
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated 
disposition was possible.”  (Id. at pp. 529–530, citing Lee v. 
United States (2017) 582 U.S. __, __–__ [137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967–
1969] (Lee); see People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 872–
873 (Mejia).)  Also relevant are the defendant’s probability of 
obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea, 
as well as the difference between the bargained-for term and the 
likely term if he were convicted at trial.  (See People v. Martinez 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 564 (Martinez).)  These factors are not 
exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to 
relief.   
A defendant must provide “ ‘objective evidence’ ” to 
corroborate factual assertions.  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 530.)  Objective evidence includes facts provided by 
declarations, 
contemporaneous 
documentation 
of 
the 
defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, 
and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.  (See Vivar, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531; Lee, supra, 582 U.S. at p. __ 
[137 S.Ct. at p. 1961].) 
Espinoza supported his section 1473.7 claim with evidence 
regarding his biographical history and ties to the United States; 
his lack of a criminal record; his community involvement 
following his conviction; and a declaration from an immigration 
law expert explaining that he could have pleaded to alternative, 
immigration-safe dispositions.  In the proceedings below, the 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
district attorney and the Attorney General opposed Espinoza’s 
motions to vacate his convictions.  The Attorney General has 
since reversed his position and now agrees that Espinoza’s 
evidentiary showing establishes prejudicial error within the 
meaning of section 1473.7.  Applying our independent judgment, 
we weigh all relevant circumstances, with no single factor being 
dispositive in our consideration of the totality, and reach the 
same conclusion.   
A.  
Ties to the United States are an important factor in 
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they 
shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities.  (Vivar, 
supra, 11 Cal. 5th at p. 530.)  “[W]hen long-standing noncitizen 
residents of this country are accused of committing a crime, the 
most devastating consequence may not be a prison sentence, but 
their removal and exclusion from the United States.”  (Id. at 
p. 516.)  Depending on the strength of a defendant’s community 
ties, “the prospect of deportation” may be “ ‘an integral part’ ” or 
“ ‘the most important part’ ” of the defendant’s “calculus in 
responding to certain criminal charges.”  (Ibid.)  Community ties 
may be established by length of residence; immigration status; 
lack of connection to the country of origin; connections to family, 
friends, or the community; work history or financial ties; or 
other forms of attachment.  (Id. at p. 530; see People v. 
Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324–325 (Rodriguez); 
People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 581 (Lopez); People 
v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610 (Soto).)   
Objective evidence of a defendant’s community ties 
includes facts provided by a defendant’s declaration or 
declarations 
from 
family 
members, 
friends, 
colleagues, 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
community members, or other acquaintances.  (Vivar, supra, 11 
Cal. 5th at p. 530; see Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 581; 
People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 73; Soto, supra, 
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 610; Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 324–325.)  The Court of Appeal erred by disregarding 
Espinoza’s declaration on the basis that it did not constitute 
objective evidence.  We made clear in Vivar that a defendant’s 
declaration is one form of objective evidence relevant to a 
prejudicial error inquiry.  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) 
 
In Vivar, we held that a defendant’s substantial ties to the 
United States were an important factor in support of granting 
relief.  Vivar “was brought to this country at age six . . . , and he 
attended schools, formed a family, and remained here for 40 
years.”  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.)  “At the time of his 
plea, he had two children, two grandchildren, and a wife, all of 
whom are citizens and all of whom resided in California. . . .  
Vivar had virtually no ties to Mexico, spoke Spanish ‘like an 
American,’ and found it ‘difficult to function in Mexican society 
because people treat [him] like an outsider.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We 
concluded that these facts provided objective evidence of “Vivar’s 
concern about the immigration consequences of his plea 
options,” supporting a finding of prejudicial error.  (Ibid.)  
Similarly, the Courts of Appeal have found a defendant’s 
strong community ties to provide compelling evidence in support 
of a finding of prejudicial error.  (See People v. Lopez (2022) 83 
Cal.App.5th 698, 708 [prejudice established where the 
defendant moved to the United States at the age of 13, his entire 
family lived here, and he lacked meaningful ties to his country 
of origin]; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [compelling 
evidence of prejudice where the defendant lived in the United 
States since he was 14 years old, and his wife and child lived 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
here, as well as his mother and siblings]; see also People v. 
Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011; Soto, supra, 79 
Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) 
The facts here are no less compelling.  Espinoza has spent 
most of his life in the United States.  He came to California when 
he was 13 years old.  At the time of the plea, Espinoza had lived 
in California for 23 years.  His wife and five children were 
United States citizens.  His parents and siblings lived in the 
United States.  He was the financial provider for his family.  As 
Espinoza puts it, “[e]verything important in his life” at the time 
he entered his plea “was in the United States.”  (Cf. People v. 
Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 209 [“a 
deported alien who cannot return ‘loses his job, his friends, his 
home, and maybe even his children’ ”].)  Espinoza’s deep and 
long-standing ties are undisputed and weigh in favor of finding 
that he would have considered immigration consequences to be 
of paramount concern in deciding whether to accept a plea 
agreement. 
After Espinoza accepted the plea and served jail time, he 
returned home to care for his family and community.  He became 
the caregiver for his elderly parents who suffer from severe 
medical conditions.  He ran his own business to provide for his 
family.  He volunteered, went to church, and took part in 
numerous community organizations.  These facts lend credence 
to Espinoza’s assertion that his community ties were important 
to him at the time of his plea. 
Espinoza’s case is unlike instances where courts have 
found insufficient community ties to support a finding of 
prejudicial error.  In People v. Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 
1077, for example, the Court of Appeal concluded that a 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
defendant’s connection to the United States was too tenuous to 
support an inference that he might not have knowingly accepted 
a plea deal with immigration consequences.  The defendant, 
Bravo, moved to the United States at age 18.  (Id. at p. 1076.)  
At the time of his plea, he had lived here for four and a half 
years.  (Ibid.)  Although Bravo had a girlfriend and a baby in the 
United States, the court found those relationships insufficient 
to establish a probability that Bravo would have rejected his 
plea deal.  (Id. at pp. 1075–1076.)  “[T]he offenses making 
[Bravo] a candidate for mandatory deportation were domestic 
violence and child cruelty against [his girlfriend and baby, 
respectively],” which undermined the argument that Bravo 
would have rejected his plea offer based on those relationships.  
(Id. at p. 1076; see People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 
654, 665 [finding no prejudice where defendant “had just 
arrived” in the United States].)  
In sum, a defendant’s deep and long-standing ties to the 
United States are among the totality of circumstances that can 
support an inference that immigration consequences were of 
paramount concern at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea.  
Espinoza has demonstrated his ties to the United States, and 
those ties weigh in favor of a finding of prejudicial error.   
B. 
Another 
consideration 
is 
whether 
alternative, 
immigration-safe dispositions were available at the time of the 
defendant’s plea.  Factors relevant to this inquiry include the 
defendant’s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution’s 
case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes 
involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging policies 
with respect to immigration consequences, and the existence of 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
comparable offenses without immigration consequences.  (See 
Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 325; Mejia, supra, 36 
Cal.App.5th at p. 873; Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564.)  
These matters can be placed in the record by either party.   
Espinoza had no prior criminal history at the time of his 
plea.  This fact is relevant because a defendant without an 
extensive criminal record may persuasively contend that the 
prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea 
without immigration consequences.  (See Rodriguez, supra, 
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 325 [“The record does not indicate that in 
2005 Rodriguez extensively trafficked in methamphetamine or 
had such a serious criminal record that the prosecution would 
necessarily have been unwilling to enter an immigration-
neutral plea.”].) 
Additionally, Espinoza presented evidence from an 
immigration attorney that there were alternatives the 
prosecution could have offered that would not have resulted in 
mandatory deportation.  Espinoza pleaded no contest to 
conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), felony child abuse (§ 273a, 
subd. (a)), 
controlling 
property 
to 
manufacture 
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5) and to 
possessing cocaine (id., § 11350).  The immigration attorney’s 
declaration identified alternative offenses without deportation 
consequences to which Espinoza might have been able to plead.   
The Court of Appeal said “[w]e need not pass upon the 
practical likelihood” that Espinoza could have bargained for an 
immigration-safe plea because “the focus is on whether 
Espinoza would have pursued such an alternative resolution 
notwithstanding its viability.”  (People v. Espinoza (May 28, 
2021, F079209) [nonpub. opn.] (Espinoza).)  While it is true that 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
the key question under section 1473.7 is “ ‘what the defendant 
would have done’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 528), a 
relevant consideration is the probability of obtaining a more 
favorable outcome (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564), and 
that inquiry is informed by whether the defendant would have 
had reason “to expect or hope” that a plea deal without 
immigration consequences “would or could have been 
negotiated” (id. at p. 567).  Espinoza’s lack of a criminal record, 
combined with the declaration of the immigration attorney, 
support his assertion that he had reason to expect or hope for a 
plea bargain without immigration consequences.  This enhances 
the “credibility of [the] defendant’s claim” that he “would have 
rejected the plea bargain” had he been properly advised.  (Id. at 
p. 568.) 
C. 
In denying relief, the Court of Appeal observed that 
Espinoza did not express contemporaneous confusion, as Vivar 
did.  (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531.)  But unlike 
Vivar, who was aware of the immigration consequences of his 
plea “at or near the time of his plea” (id. at p. 530), Espinoza has 
declared that he did not discover those consequences until more 
than a decade after his plea (ante, at p. 5).  The Court of Appeal 
also questioned Espinoza’s credibility because he did not submit 
evidence from his plea counsel, as Vivar did.  (Vivar, at pp. 530–
531.)  But by the time Espinoza filed the motion at issue in this 
appeal, it had been 15 years since the plea.  Both the district 
attorney and Espinoza’s counsel represented to the court that 
they tried, without success, to contact the attorney who 
represented Espinoza at the time his plea was entered.  As the 
Attorney General observes, “the robust evidence introduced in 
Vivar will not be available in most cases — especially where 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
defendants do not learn about the immigration consequences of 
their pleas until years or decades later.” 
Vivar did not suggest that the circumstances of that case 
constitute minimum requirements for establishing prejudicial 
error.  A party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required 
to provide the declaration of plea counsel.  (People v. Manzanilla 
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 909.)  Nor is a defendant required to 
submit contemporaneous documentation from the time of the 
plea.  Rather, the inquiry under section 1473.7 requires 
consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,” which 
necessarily involves case-by-case examination of the record 
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–530), and no specific kind 
of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.  As noted, the burden rests 
with the defendant to establish entitlement to relief.  In addition 
to submitting declarations, both parties are entitled to request 
an evidentiary hearing.  (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).)  The more robust 
and inclusive a record, the greater the opportunity for effective 
persuasion and meaningful judicial review.  And the inquiry into 
a defendant’s state of mind may often involve the weighing of 
credibility and circumstantial evidence. 
Having considered the totality of the circumstances here, 
we conclude that Espinoza has shown a reasonable probability 
that he would have rejected the plea and either gone to trial or 
sought a different, immigration-safe bargain if he had 
understood the consequences of the plea.  Espinoza’s deep and 
longstanding ties to the United States, along with those to his 
family and community, support the conclusion that immigration 
concerns would have been paramount to him at the time of his 
plea.  (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 516–517.)  In addition, 
Espinoza’s lack of criminal history at the time of his plea and 
the immigration attorney’s declaration identifying alternative 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
immigration-safe dispositions suggest that he had reason to 
expect or hope for a different plea agreement without 
immigration consequences.  (See Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 
p. 567; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 873.) 
We also find it significant that the Attorney General 
agrees Espinoza is entitled to relief.  Although we are not 
required to accept this concession, it suggests that any remand 
for further development of the record will serve only to delay the 
relief to which both parties now agree Espinoza is entitled.  
While a remand for reconsideration and the development of the 
record may be advisable in other cases, we are satisfied that the 
evidence here establishes a reasonable probability that 
Espinoza would have rejected the plea if he had understood its 
immigration consequences. 
 
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeal with directions to remand the case to the trial 
court for entry of an order granting Espinoza’s section 1473.7 
motion to vacate his conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J.  
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.* 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Espinoza 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 5/28/21 – 5th Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S269647 
Date Filed:  January 26, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Tulare 
Judge:  Steven D. Barnes 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle, Stephen K. Dunkle and Sarah S. Sanger for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Kahn A. Scolnick, Daniel R. Adler, Emily R. 
Sauer, Patrick J. Fuster and Matt Aidan Getz for Alyssa Bell, Reuven 
Cohen, Ingrid V. Eagly, Gilbert Garcetti, Meline Mkrtichian, Ronald J. 
Nessim, Gabriel Pardo and Jennifer Resnik as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Stanford Law School Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Jayashri Srikantiah 
and Yulie Landan for Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Asian Law 
Caucus, Alameda County Public Defender’s Office, American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Northern California, California Collaborative for 
Immigrant Justice, Centro Legal de la Raza, Community Legal 
Services in East Palo Alto, Dolores Street Community Services, 
Dreamer Fund, Immigrant Alliance for Justice and Equity, Immigrant 
Legal Defense, Jewish Family & Community Services East Bay, 
 
 
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Open 
Immigration Legal Services, Organization for the Legal Advancement 
of Raza, Public Counsel, San Francisco Office of the Public Defender, 
San Joaquin College of Law New American Legal Clinic, Santa 
Barbara County Immigrant Legal Defense Center, Silicon Valley De-
Bug, Stand Together Contra Costa, Tahirih Justice Center, University 
of California Davis Immigration Law Clinic, University of California 
Irvine Criminal Justice Clinic and University of California Irvine 
Immigrant Rights Clinic as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan, 
State Solicitor General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel P. 
Siegel, Deputy State Solicitor General, Darren K. Indermill, David 
Andrew Eldredge and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, 
and Kimberly M. Castle, Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Stephen K. Dunkle 
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle 
222 East Carrillo Street, Suite 300 
Santa Barbara, CA 93101 
(805) 962-4887 
 
Samuel P. Siegel 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3917