Case Title: Robert Lee Catrett et al. v. Baldwin County Electric Membership Corporation et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061538

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
After 
we 
issued an earlier 
decision 
in 
this action, David
1
Harms and George P. Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed as
plaintiffs. See Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp. v.
REL: 5/23/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061538
____________________
Robert Lee Catrett et al.
v.
Baldwin County Electric Membership Corporation et al.
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-04-1320)
SEE, Justice.
Robert Lee Catrett, Wesley Grant, John Gregg, Davida
Hastie, 
Willard 
Penry, 
Henry 
Vick, 
and 
Cecil 
Ward1
1061538
Catrett, 942 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 2006).
2
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "Catrett") seek a
reversal of a summary judgment in favor of defendant Baldwin
County 
Electric 
Membership 
Corporation 
("the 
Cooperative") 
and
J. Thomas Bradley, Jr., Tommie Werneth, John D. Taylor, Jr.,
Peggy R. Hanover, and Aubury L. Fuller, in their individual
capacities as trustees of the Cooperative (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "BCEMC").  We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from a dispute between BCEMC and various
members of the Cooperative over the procedures for the
nomination and election of trustees and the approval of
minutes taken at the annual meeting of the members of the
Cooperative.  The Cooperative is an electric cooperative that
supplies electric services to customers in Baldwin and Monroe
Counties.  Members of the Cooperative elect a seven-member
board of trustees at an annual meeting.  The president of the
board of trustees appoints a nominating committee to nominate
candidates for available trustee positions.  According to the
Cooperative's bylaws, nominations may also be made from the
floor by the members at the annual meeting.  In July 1999, the
1061538
3
bylaws were amended to allow members to vote either by mailing
in their ballots before the annual meeting or by voting at the
annual meeting.  However, because mail-in ballots have to be
returned before the annual meeting, there was no provision for
mail-in voters to vote for candidates nominated from the
floor. 
Before the 2004 annual meeting convened, Catrett filed a
two-count complaint against BCEMC.  Count I sought a judgment
declaring, among other things, that BCEMC must "comply with
the By-laws of [the Cooperative] by following Robert's Rules
of Order in the election process of the trustees" and amend
the bylaws to provide for special or regular meetings at which
the 
membership 
could 
receive 
and 
make 
nominations 
for 
trustees
before the time that any voting would take place.  Count II of
the complaint sought preliminary and permanent injunctions,
first, prohibiting the Cooperative from holding the annual
meeting 
scheduled 
for 
December 
9, 
2004; 
second, 
compelling 
the
Cooperative to amend its bylaws to allow for a special
nomination meeting before the annual meeting; and, third,
prohibiting the Cooperative from submitting the minutes from
1061538
4
the March 28, 2003, annual meeting to the membership for
approval without allowing for corrections.  
On November 24, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on
the preliminary injunction.  At the hearing, Catrett offered
his first amended complaint, which sought a preliminary
injunction 
enjoining 
the 
Cooperative 
from 
tabulating 
any 
votes
at the annual meeting until after all nominations had been
received and submitted to the membership for a vote.  The
first amended complaint did not allege any new facts.
Following the hearing, the trial court granted the injunctive
relief in part: the annual meeting could proceed on the
scheduled date, but the chairperson of the meeting would have
to allow nominations for the office of trustee to be made from
the floor; if nominations were made from the floor, then new
ballots would be printed and mailed to members of the
Cooperative; and the chairperson was required to accept
motions from the floor for corrections or additions to the
minutes of the 2003 annual meeting.  BCEMC petitioned this
Court for the writ of mandamus directing the trial court to
set aside its order (case no. 1040362), and, two days later,
also appealed the trial court's order to this Court (case no.
1061538
On the same day that BCEMC appealed the trial court's
2
order, the trial court amended that order to delay, until this
Court has ruled on the appeal, the Cooperative's obligation to
print and mail new ballots to the membership.
5
1040371).   This Court consolidated the appeal and the
2
petition for the writ of mandamus for the purpose of writing
one opinion. 
The annual meeting was held on December 9, 2004.
Nominations were received for additional trustee candidates,
and there was a motion to amend the minutes of the 2003
meeting.  However, in the absence of a quorum, the motion was
continued until the next annual meeting.
In May 2006, this Court denied BCEMC's petition for the
writ of mandamus and affirmed the preliminary injunction
entered by the trial court. Baldwin County Elec. Membership
Corp. v. Catrett, 942 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 2006) ("Catrett I").
In June 2006, Catrett moved the trial court for leave to amend
his complaint.  The trial court granted Catrett's motion.
Catrett's second amended complaint added a count seeking a
declaration that BCEMC had committed a breach of contract and
had violated the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 by "impairing
1061538
The Constitution of Alabama of 1901, § 22, provides:
3
"That no ex post facto law, nor any law,
impairing the obligations of contracts, or making
any irrevocable or exclusive grants of special
privileges or immunities, shall be passed by the
legislature; 
and 
every 
grant 
or 
franchise,
privilege, or immunity shall forever remain subject
to revocation, alteration, or amendment."
Catrett apparently bases his argument of a constitutional
violation on the fact that when the 1999 amendment to the
bylaws was proposed, the board of trustees adopted a
resolution authorizing voting on the proposed amendment by
mail-in ballot, pursuant to § 37-6-9(b), Ala. Code 1975, which
governs the 
operation of electric 
cooperatives. 
 Section 
37-6-
9(b) provides, in pertinent part:
"Voting shall be in person, but, if the bylaws so
provide, may also be by proxy or by mail, or both;
provided, however, notwithstanding any contrary
provision in the bylaws of the cooperative, the
board of trustees, by resolution, may authorize
voting by mail on bylaw adoption, amendment, or
repeal and, in such event, the board of trustees
shall also specify the procedures to be followed in
such mail voting.  If the bylaws provide for voting
by proxy or by mail, they shall also prescribe the
conditions under which proxy or mail voting shall be
exercised."
6
the obligations of contracts"  when it amended the bylaws to
3
allow for mail-in voting.  In February 2007, BCEMC moved for
a summary judgment arguing, 
among 
other 
things, that Catrett's
second amended complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations and by the doctrine of res judicata.  The trial
1061538
7
court granted BCEMC's motion on both grounds; Catrett now
appeals.
Issues
Catrett raises three issues on appeal.  First, he argues
that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in
favor of BCEMC on the ground that Catrett's second amended
complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  Second,
he argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary
judgment in favor of BCEMC on the ground that Catrett's second
amended complaint did not relate back to the original
complaint, and, therefore, was barred by the statute of
limitations.  Third, he argues that the trial court erred "in
not 
addressing 
the 
issue 
presented 
regarding 
continuing 
breach
of contract for each new mail-in vote." Catrett's brief at 4.
Standard of Review
"On appeal, this Court reviews a summary judgment de
novo."  DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., [Ms.
1060848, Jan. 10, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008)
(citing Ex parte Essary, [Ms. 1060458, Nov. 2, 2007] ___ So.
2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007)).  In order to uphold a summary
judgment, we must determine that "there is no genuine issue as
1061538
8
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ.
P.  "When the movant makes a prima facie showing that those
two conditions have been satisfied, the burden then shifts to
the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952 (Ala. 2004).
Substantial evidence is "evidence of such weight and quality
that 
fair-minded 
persons 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment
can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547
So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989); see also § 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code
1975.  In reviewing a summary judgment, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.  Johnny
Ray Sports, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, [Ms. 1060306, August 17,
2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007).  "Finally, this Court
does not afford any presumption of correctness to the trial
court's ruling on questions of law or its conclusion as to the
appropriate legal standard to be applied." DiBiasi, ___ So. 2d
at ___.
Analysis
1061538
9
As a threshold issue, we first address Catrett's argument
that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in
favor of BCEMC on the ground that Catrett's amended complaint
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations because it
did not relate back to the original complaint.  The trial
court's order states that the original complaint
"never raised the constitutionality of the statute
which authorized the bylaw change to allow mail in
voting.  The original complaint only related to the
application of [the Cooperative's] bylaws with
respect to nominations from the floor [at the 2004
annual 
meeting] 
and 
the 
placement 
of 
those
nominations before the entire membership for voting.
Therefore, the Court determines that the [second]
amended complaint cannot relate back to the filing
of the complaint in this case."
Although the trial court refers to Catrett's claim as a
constitutional challenge, Catrett does not, in the second
amended complaint, ask the court to invalidate any statute.
Rather, Catrett requests a judgment declaring that an
amendment to the Cooperative's bylaws, enacted pursuant to
statutory authority, is "invalid."  
In Catrett I, this Court noted that "[t]he right to vote
is granted to all members of the Cooperative under the bylaws
and by statute.  Thus, each member of the Cooperative had a
contractual right to vote." 942 So. 2d at 345-46 (footnote
1061538
Alabama Code 1975, § 6-2-34, provides:
4
"The following must be commenced within six
years:
"....
"(4) Actions founded on promises in writing
not under seal;
"....
10
omitted).  Therefore, Catrett's claim appears to be a breach-
of-contract claim based on his allegation that the amendment
to the bylaws violates his contractual right to vote.  Neither
Catrett nor the trial court in its order granting BCEMC's
summary-judgment motion states the applicable statute of
limitations; however, it is undisputed that unless the second
amended complaint relates back to the original complaint, it
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  
Catrett avers that the claim in the second amended
complaint should relate back to the original complaint
because, he says, it is "an alternate theory of recovery for
the breach of contract and deprivation of voting rights."
Catrett's brief at 37.  BCEMC argues that because Catrett has
alleged a cause of action for breach of contract, the six-year
statute of limitations applies.    Our review of the law
4
1061538
"(9) Actions upon any simple contract or
specialty not specifically enumerated in this
section."
11
indicates that subsections (4) and (9) of § 6-2-34, Ala. Code
1975, appear to supply the correct statute of limitations to
be applied in this case, and Catrett has made no argument to
the contrary.  The second amended complaint specifically
requests a court order invalidating the Cooperative's
amendment of the bylaws that occurred on July 15, 1999.  As
noted previously, this is a contract claim, and Catrett's
second amended complaint was not filed until July 5, 2006,
more than six years after the alleged breach of contract.
Therefore, unless Catrett's second amended complaint relates
back to the date of his original complaint, November 18, 2004,
those claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part,
that "[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of
the original pleading when ... (2) the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading."  Catrett cites two of this
1061538
12
Court's previous decisions for the general proposition that
when an amendment "adds a new theory of liability ... based
upon the same facts as the original theory and those facts
have been brought to the attention of the opposite party by a
previous pleading, no prejudice is worked by allowing the
amendment." 
Catrett's brief 
at 
37-38 
(citing Money v. Willings
Detroit Diesel, Inc., 551 So. 2d 926, 929 (Ala. 1989)
("'Where, as here, the proffered amendment would "merely
change the legal theory of a case or add an additional theory,
but the new or additional theory is based upon the same set of
facts and those facts have been brought to the attention of
the other party by a previous pleading, no prejudice is worked
upon the other party."'" (quoting Whitfield v. Murphy, 475 So.
2d 480, 483 (Ala. 1985), citing in turn Bracy v. Sippial Elec.
Co., 379 So. 2d 582, 583 (Ala. 1980)))); see also McClendon v.
City of Boaz, 395 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 1981) ("When a new
theory of liability is based upon the same facts and those
facts have been brought to the attention of the opposite party
by previous pleading, no prejudice is worked by allowing the
amendment."). 
 Catrett 
argues 
that 
his 
original 
pleading 
deals
with voting rights, the election process for trustees of the
1061538
13
Cooperative, and violations of the bylaws of the Cooperative.
He argues that his second amended complaint, dealing with
similar issues, relates back to the claims and issues of the
initial pleading because, he says, "[t]he initial complaint
requested the restoration of the contract rights of the
members [of 
the 
Cooperative] 
and [sic] force [the 
Cooperative]
to restore the voting back in the hands of the members at the
annual meeting." Catrett's brief at 38-39.
"However, this Court has also held that where the
plaintiff, in an amendment filed beyond the statutory
limitations period, alleges facts that were not alleged in the
original complaint or attempts to state a cause of action that
was not stated in the original complaint, the amendment is
time-barred." ConAgra, Inc. v. Adams, 638 So. 2d 752, 754
(Ala. 1994).  In this case, the factual allegations in the
second amended complaint are different from those in the
original complaint.  Although both the original complaint and
the second amended complaint quote extensively from the
Cooperative's bylaws, no section of the bylaws appears in
both.  Moreover, the original complaint presents facts
confined to the period between the Cooperative's annual
1061538
14
meeting held on March 28, 2003, and the annual meeting
scheduled for December 9, 2004.  Based on these initial facts,
Catrett sought to enforce compliance with the bylaws that
existed at that time and to compel the amendment of the bylaws
to allow for a special nomination meeting to be held before
the annual meeting.  In contrast, the second amended complaint
alleges facts confined to a period between the Cooperative's
annual meeting held on October 31, 1998, and the adoption of
the amended bylaws in July 1999.  Based on these additional
facts, Catrett's second amended complaint seeks to invalidate
an amendment to the bylaws that occurred almost four years
before the occurrence of the facts that are the basis of his
allegations in the original complaint.
Also, the second amended complaint alleges a cause of
action that is at odds with the averments of the original
complaint.  Rather than seeking to invalidate the amendment to
the Cooperative's bylaws that allows for mail-in voting, the
original complaint implicitly accepts the mail-in voting
amendment and demands that the Cooperative "be required to
follow the By-laws of the [Cooperative] in the election
process for trustees." Amendment to complaint at ¶6.  Although
1061538
15
the original complaint calls for an amendment to the bylaws
"to provide for a special meeting of the membership to receive
the nominating committee's report for nominations of the
trustees and to allow nominations from the floor prior to the
vote of the membership for trustees at the annual meeting," it
does not contest, or even mention, the bylaw that provides for
mail-in voting on those nominations.  Indeed, one may argue
that 
a 
prior 
nominating 
meeting 
is 
important 
precisely 
because
it permits mail-in voters to vote on nominations from the
floor.
In contrast, the second amended complaint rejects any
notion of voting by mail-in ballots, arguing that the
Cooperative bylaw provision that allows for it constitutes a
breach of contract and an impairment of contracts in violation
of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.  Thus, the second
amended complaint does not merely allege "a new theory of
liability ... based upon the same facts [that] have been
brought to the attention of the opposite party by previous
pleading." McClendon, 395 So. 2d at 26.  Instead, the second
amended complaint relies on a set of facts that are different
from and unrelated to the facts supplied in the original
1061538
16
complaint and seeks relief that differs from the relief sought
in the original complaint.  Because the second amendment to
the complaint "alleges facts that were not alleged in the
original complaint [and] attempts to state a cause of action
that was not stated in the original complaint, the amendment
is time-barred," ConAgra, Inc., 638 So. 2d at 754, and we,
therefore, affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of BCEMC. 
Catrett invites this Court to adopt a "continuing-
contract" doctrine for determining when a breach of contract
occurs, tolling the statute of limitations "until the last
time BCEMC breach[ed] the contractual relationship with its
members and denied them their voting rights as set forth in
the by-laws." Catrett's brief at 40.  However, even if we were
inclined 
to 
accept Catrett's invitation, 
an 
application 
of 
the
continuing-contract doctrine would not affect the outcome of
this case.  Catrett's second amended complaint alleges that
"[a] justiciable controversy exists between [Catrett] and
[BCEMC] as to the proper method to amend the by-laws of [the
Cooperative]."  Based on this allegation, Catrett's second
amended complaint requested two declarations: (1) that "[t]he
1061538
17
amendment to the by-laws of [the Cooperative] in July, 1999,
allowing for mail-in voting is invalid" and (2) "[t]hat any
amendment to the by-laws of [the Cooperative] must be approved
by the members at any annual or special meeting of the
members."  The second amendment to the complaint makes no
mention of any alleged continuing breach committed by BCEMC.
Based on these averments, it is clear that the breach
complained of is the July 1999 amendment of the bylaws, not
the subsequent instances of mail-in voting conducted in
compliance with the amended bylaws.  We therefore decline to
adopt 
and apply the continuing-contract 
doctrine 
in 
this case.
Because we hold that Catrett's second amended complaint
does not relate back to the original complaint and is
therefore barred by the six-year statute of limitations, we
pretermit discussion of Catrett's allegation that the trial
court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata. See
DeFriece v. McCorquodale, [Ms. 1061825, April 11, 2008] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (citing Smith v. Equifax Servs.,
Inc., 537 So. 2d 463, 465 (Ala. 1988) ("In any event, we will
affirm a summary judgment if that judgment is proper for any
reason supported by the record ....")).
1061538
18
Conclusion  
Even when the evidence is viewed, as it must be, in the
light most favorable to Catrett, Catrett's second amended
complaint alleges facts and argues grounds for relief that
were not presented in the original complaint.  We, therefore,
hold that the second amended complaint does not relate back to
the original complaint and, is, therefore, time-barred.  For
this reason, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of BCEMC.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.