Case Title: State v. Griep

Citation: 2015 WI 40

Docket Number: 2009AP003073-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP3073-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael R. Griep, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 353 Wis. 2d 252, 845 N.W.2d 24 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 25 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 23, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 12, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gritton 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., concur. (Opinion 
Filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Tricia J. Bushnell, Kansas City, MO. The briefs were 
filed by Tricia J. Bushnell. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith Findley on behalf 
of The Innocence Network, Madison.  
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, 
state public defender, and Jefren E. Olson, assistant state 
public defender, on behalf of the Office of the State Public 
Defender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 40
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP3073-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CT1130) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael R. Griep, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 23, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the circuit court's2 
ruling 
that 
admitted 
an 
expert 
witness's 
testimony 
that 
established the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of Michael R. 
Griep while he was operating his vehicle.  The expert witness, 
Patrick Harding, based his opinion in part on forensic tests 
conducted by an analyst at the Wisconsin State Laboratory of 
                                                 
1 State v. Griep, 2014 WI App 25, 353 Wis. 2d 252, 845 
N.W.2d 24. 
2 The Honorable Thomas J. Gritton of Winnebago County, 
presided. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
2 
 
Hygiene (Wisconsin State Laboratory) who was unavailable for 
trial.  Based on Harding's testimony, Griep was convicted of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (third offense).   
¶2 
Griep 
appealed, 
contending 
that 
his 
right 
of 
confrontation was violated when the circuit court allowed 
Harding to rely in part on the analyst's forensic test results.  
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Griep's right of 
confrontation was not violated because Harding reviewed the 
analyst's forensic test results and other records and formed an 
independent opinion of Griep's BAC, as approved in State v. 
Williams,3 2002 WI 58, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919 and State 
v. Barton, 2006 WI App 18, 289 Wis. 2d 206, 709 N.W.2d 93.  
State v. Griep, 2014 WI App 25, ¶¶19, 22, 353 Wis. 2d 252, 845 
N.W.2d 24.   
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
Harding's 
review 
of 
Griep's 
laboratory file, including the forensic test results of an 
analyst who was unavailable for trial, to form an independent 
opinion to which he testified did not violate Griep's right of 
confrontation.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶26; Barton, 289 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶20.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
decision 
that 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
admission 
of 
Harding's testimony. 
                                                 
3 We refer to all subsequent references to State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI 58, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919, as 
Williams.  We refer to Williams v. Illinois, __ U.S. __, 132 
S. Ct. 2221 (2012), a different case, as Williams v. Illinois. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
This review involves Griep's claimed violation of his 
right of confrontation regarding Harding's expert testimony that 
was based in part on results of forensic tests conducted by an 
analyst who was unavailable for trial.  The historic facts are 
not in dispute. 
¶5 
On Saturday, August 25, 2007, at approximately 12:48 
a.m., a Winneconne Police Department officer stopped Griep for 
speeding, for which he planned to issue a warning ticket.  
However, while talking with Griep, the officer smelled the odor 
of alcohol and observed Griep's bloodshot and glassy eyes.   
¶6 
In response to the officer's question about alcohol 
consumption, Griep stated that he drank a couple of beers at a 
local bar.  When the officer asked Griep to perform field 
sobriety tests, Griep agreed.  Griep's performance on the field 
sobriety tests indicated that he was intoxicated.  After further 
discussion, Griep admitted he had four beers.  Griep agreed to 
perform 
a 
preliminary 
breath 
test 
that 
also 
indicated 
intoxication.  The officer reviewed Griep's record, which showed 
two prior convictions for OWI.  The officer transported Griep to 
a nearby hospital for a blood draw.  At the officer's request, 
hospital staff conducted the blood draw without Griep's consent.4 
                                                 
4 The warrantless, nonconsensual search is not an issue in 
our review.  Griep has not claimed that his blood draw was 
unconstitutional before the circuit court, court of appeals, or 
during our review.  See  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __, 133 
S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013), abrogating our decision in State v. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 547, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993); see also 
(continued) 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The officer observed a phlebotomist draw Griep's blood 
and place it in closed vials.  The blood kit was properly 
sealed.  The blood kit was secured at the Winneconne Police 
Department 
before 
it 
was 
mailed 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Laboratory.   
¶8 
Wisconsin State Laboratory analyst Diane Kalscheur 
received and analyzed Griep's blood sample.  Kalscheur authored 
a concise report stating:  (1) she received Griep's labeled and 
sealed blood sample, and (2) Griep's blood was tested for 
ethanol 
and 
that 
testing 
revealed 
a 
certain 
ethanol 
concentration.  Thomas Ecker, an Advanced Chemist at the 
laboratory, conducted a peer review of Kalscheur's report and 
signed the laboratory report under the statement "As designee of 
the Director, I do hereby certify this document to be a true and 
correct report of the findings of the Wisconsin State Laboratory 
of Hygiene." 
¶9 
At 
Griep's 
trial 
for 
third-offense 
OWI, 
the 
phlebotomist testified about instructions for collecting blood, 
using the kit provided by a police officer, and her role in 
inspecting the blood kit before its use.   
¶10 Kalscheur was unavailable at the time of trial.5  
Instead, the State called Patrick Harding, section chief of the 
toxicology section of the Wisconsin State Laboratory, as an 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ¶6, __ Wis. 2d __, 856 N.W.2d 847; 
State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶33, __ Wis. 2d __, 856 N.W.2d 
834.  
5 Kalscheur was on leave at the time of trial. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
5 
 
expert witness.  Harding testified that he had reviewed 
Kalscheur's work and examined the data produced by Kalscheur's 
testing, specifically the chromatograms, as well as other 
records associated with the tests Kalscheur performed.  Harding 
said that he was familiar with the process of obtaining blood 
samples for ethanol testing, shipping them to the laboratory, 
processing them for analysis, and the analysis of the samples.   
¶11 When the State asked Harding's opinion on whether 
Kalscheur 
tested 
Griep's 
blood 
sample 
consistently 
with 
laboratory procedures, defense counsel objected on Confrontation 
Clause grounds.  Harding testified that all indications were 
that Kalscheur followed the laboratory procedures and that the 
instrument was working properly.  Harding said that the 
machine's proper function was evident from the results of 
calibration checks run throughout the course of the tests of 
Griep's samples.  Harding concluded that the results of those 
calibration 
checks, 
in 
particular 
those 
Kalscheur 
ran 
immediately before and after the Griep samples, showed the 
reliability of the machine's results.  Harding opined that 
correctly running the sample through the calibrated instrument 
resulted in a reliable blood alcohol reading.  Harding concluded 
that after reviewing all of the available data, he came to an 
independent opinion that the alcohol concentration in Griep's 
blood was 0.152 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood.  
Harding also testified as to laboratory procedures and that if 
there had been irregularities with the sample, they would have 
been noted on a form by the analyst.  None were noted.  
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 During cross-examination, Harding acknowledged that an 
analyst could commit misdeeds, possibly without detection.  
Harding also acknowledged that it is important that the analyst 
be competent and honest.  Harding testified that when he 
testifies about forensic tests that he has personally completed, 
he relies on the paperwork and notes he completed at the time of 
testing because analysts at the laboratory conduct so many tests 
that no one can remember details about each particular sample 
without reviewing the notes that were made contemporaneously 
with the tests.   
¶13 Griep's motion in limine and objection at trial that 
sought to preclude Harding's testimony were grounded in the 
Confrontation 
Clause. 
 
He 
relied 
on 
Melendez-Diaz 
v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004); and their relationship to Williams and Barton.  
The circuit court considered the Confrontation Clause issue 
after conclusion of the presentation of evidence at the bench 
trial.  The circuit court denied Griep's motion; heard closing 
arguments; adjudged Griep guilty; convicted and sentenced him.   
¶14 Griep appealed.  Before the court of appeals issued 
its decision, the United States Supreme Court accepted a 
petition in State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010).  See 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 561 U.S. 1058 (2010) (granting 
certiorari).  The court of appeals held Griep's case in abeyance 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
7 
 
pending the outcome in Bullcoming because the question presented 
in that case6 was similar to the question in Griep's appeal. 
¶15 As the court of appeals was again about to undertake 
Griep's appeal, the court learned that the United States Supreme 
Court had granted certiorari in another relevant case, People v. 
Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010).  See Williams v. Illinois, 
__ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (granting certiorari).  The 
court of appeals once again held Griep's case to await the 
outcome in Williams v. Illinois because the decision on the 
question presented7 may have had an effect on Griep's appeal. 
¶16 On May 15, 2013, the court of appeals certified the 
appeal to us.8  On June 14, 2013, we held the certification in 
                                                 
6 The question presented in Bullcoming was "[w]hether the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
permits 
the 
prosecution 
to 
introduce 
testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst 
through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person 
who did not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described 
in the statements."  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) 
(No. 09-10876), 2010 WL 3761875. 
7 The question presented in Williams v. Illinois was 
"[w]hether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness 
to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by non-
testifying analysts, where the defendant has no opportunity to 
confront 
the 
actual 
analysts, 
violates 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause."  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Williams v. 
Illinois, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (No. 10-8505), 2010 WL 
6817830. 
8 The court of appeals, in its certification, defined the 
issue as "Is an OWI defendant's right to confront the witnesses 
against him violated when a supervisor of the state crime lab 
testifies that a lab report prepared and certified by another, 
but unavailable, lab analyst establishes the defendant's illegal 
blood alcohol concentration?  Does it make a difference that the 
(continued) 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
8 
 
abeyance pending our disposition of State v. Deadwiller.  See 
State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362 
(decided July 16, 2013).  On November 20, 2013, we refused 
certification.  The court of appeals issued its opinion 
February 19, 2014, and held that Barton remained good law.  
Griep, 353 Wis. 2d 252, ¶22.  The court held that "the 
availability of a well qualified expert, testifying as to his 
independent conclusion about the ethanol testing of Griep's 
blood as evidenced by a report from another state lab analyst, 
was sufficient to protect Griep's right to confrontation."  Id. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 We review whether Harding's testimony, particularly 
his reliance on testing conducted by Kalscheur, violated Griep's 
right of confrontation.  While "a circuit court's decision to 
admit 
evidence 
is 
ordinarily 
a 
matter 
for 
the 
court's 
discretion, whether the admission of evidence violates a 
defendant's right of confrontation is a question of law subject 
to independent appellate review."  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 
¶17 (quoting Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶7). 
                                                                                                                                                             
lab supervisor said it was 'his' opinion even though he did not 
perform any of the testing himself and simply noted that the 
unavailable analyst followed the proper protocol?"  Petition for 
Certification at 1, Griep, 353 Wis. 2d 252 (No. 2009AP3073-CR), 
2013 WL 1978568 (Petition denied). 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
9 
 
B.  Confrontation Clause 
¶18 Griep argues that Harding's testimony violated his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause.  The Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause provides "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him."  We begin by recognizing that the Sixth 
Amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against 
him is a fundamental right, as made applicable to and obligatory 
on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment 
right to confront witnesses against the accused is a fundamental 
right).   
¶19 In Williams, we first examined whether a laboratory 
unit leader's trial testimony, based in part on a report 
authored and tests conducted by an analyst who did not testify 
at trial, violated the Confrontation Clause.  Williams was on 
trial for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.  
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶3-4.  A crime laboratory unit leader 
testified as to her expert opinion based in part on a state 
crime laboratory report that showed a substance in Williams' 
possession was cocaine base.  Williams argued his right of 
confrontation was violated when the crime laboratory unit leader 
testified rather than requiring the analyst who performed the 
laboratory tests to testify and also when the circuit court 
admitted the state crime laboratory report.  Id., ¶4.   
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
10 
 
¶20 We held that the unit leader's testimony did not 
violate Williams' right of confrontation.  Id., ¶¶20, 26.  We 
stated: 
[T]he presence and availability for cross-examination 
of a highly qualified witness, who is familiar with 
the procedures at hand, supervises or reviews the work 
of the testing analyst, and renders her own expert 
opinion is sufficient to protect a defendant's right 
to confrontation, despite the fact that the expert was 
not the person who performed the mechanics of the 
original tests. 
Id., ¶20.  Regarding the independent expert's opinion, we opined 
that "an expert who forms an opinion based in part on the work 
of others and an expert who merely summarizes the work of 
others" are quite different because in that later instance, the 
expert would be "a mere conduit for the opinion of another."  
Id., ¶19.   
¶21 We concluded that the expert witness in Williams was 
highly qualified to render an expert opinion and was closely 
connected to the tests and procedures involved in the actual 
tests.  Id., ¶¶21-22.  The expert witness was a unit leader at 
the Wisconsin State Laboratory with nine years of experience, a 
bachelor's degree in chemistry with some graduate courses, who 
had substantial experience analyzing for the presence of 
controlled substances.  Id., ¶21.  The witness also was familiar 
with the various tests and had performed peer review on the 
tests.  Id., ¶22.  The expert's peer review involved comparing 
the notes with the evidence and the conclusions, and conducting 
an overall examination of the data "making sure that all the 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
11 
 
notes coincide with the evidence, [and] that the data coincides 
with [the] conclusion."  Id.  Additionally, we determined that 
the witness was "not merely a conduit" for another's opinion, 
but rather, she testified as to her independent opinion based in 
part on facts and data gathered by someone else.9  Id., ¶25. 
¶22 We 
also 
considered 
whether 
a 
laboratory 
report 
authored by the non-testifying analyst violated the defendant's 
right of confrontation when it was admitted into evidence.  Id., 
¶32.  We analyzed the admissibility of the report and the expert 
witness's testimony as two separate issues.  Id.  First, we held 
that the laboratory report was not properly admitted as a 
business record under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6) (1997-98), in part 
because it was prepared for litigation.  Id., ¶49.  However, we 
concluded that the report's admission was harmless error.  Id., 
¶50.  Second, we evaluated the expert witness's testimony.  In 
reaching our conclusion that admission of the report was 
harmless error, we regarded the expert witness's testimony as 
compelling and credible evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded the substance at issue was cocaine.  Id., ¶52.  Stated 
otherwise, the witness's opinion was constitutional, and that 
                                                 
9 Stated otherwise, Williams permits a "substitute expert" 
to testify when "the original test was documented in a thorough 
way that permits the substitute expert to evaluate, assess, and 
interpret it."  David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein, & Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, The New Wigmore:  Expert Evidence, § 4.10.2, p. 204 (2d 
ed. 2010).  Furthermore, "the surrogate can be meaningfully 
cross-examined about the tests that were conducted (and those 
that were not), and questioned about the legitimacy of the 
original analyst's conclusions and interpretations."  Id. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
12 
 
conclusion was unrelated to whether the admission of the report 
violated the Confrontation Clause. 
¶23 Griep's contention appears to be addressed by the rule 
we set out in Williams.  However, before proceeding to apply 
Williams to his claimed Confrontation Clause violation, we 
consider whether federal opinions issued subsequent to Williams, 
including Crawford, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, __ U.S. __, 131 
S. Ct. 2705 (2011), and Williams v. Illinois, __ U.S. __, 132 
S. Ct. 2221 (2012), affect our conclusions in Williams. 
1.  Relevant federal opinions 
¶24 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court took up the 
Confrontation Clause in Crawford.  At Crawford's trial for 
assault 
and 
attempted 
murder, 
he 
claimed 
self-defense.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  The defendant's wife did not testify 
"because of the state marital privilege, which generally 
[barred] a spouse from testifying without the other spouse's 
consent."  Id.  "[The] privilege [did] not extend to a spouse's 
out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception."  
Id.  The state sought to admit the wife's statement to police as 
a statement against penal interest.  Id.  On review, the Supreme 
Court held that admission of out-of-court testimonial statements 
violated the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.  Id. at 59.   
¶25 Crawford's discussion of testimonial statements of an 
unavailable 
declarant 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
Williams 
requirement that in order to be permitted to testify an expert 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
13 
 
must form an independent opinion when the expert's opinion is 
based in part on tests performed by another analyst.10  See 
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶19, 25.  This Williams' requirement 
prevents a Crawford violation of the Confrontation Clause 
because out-of-court statements are not admitted as evidence, 
but rather, they are replaced by independent opinions based both 
on data collected by others and on the expert's own analysis. 
¶26 Subsequent 
to 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision 
in 
Crawford, the court of appeals applied Williams.  Barton, 289 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶9, 20.  In Barton, the court of appeals' 
discussion focused on whether a unit leader at the state crime 
laboratory could testify based in part on tests performed by 
another analyst.  The unit leader at the state crime laboratory 
testified about chemical tests performed by an analyst who was 
unavailable at trial.  Id., ¶4.  The expert witness conducted 
peer review of the analyst's tests and testified as to his 
independent expert opinion.  Id., ¶¶4, 16.  The State did not 
seek to admit the laboratory report that detailed the analyst's 
test results.  Id., ¶4. 
                                                 
10 The instant case does not present the same issues as 
Crawford as the testimonial statements of an unavailable 
declarant were not admitted into evidence in this case.  Cf. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).  Stated 
otherwise, because neither Kalscheur's report nor the report's 
conclusion was admitted into evidence, the Crawford holding is 
not at issue. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 The court of appeals applied Williams and held the 
testimony did not violate Barton's right of confrontation.11  
Id., ¶¶9-13, 16, 20.  The court concluded that the expert 
witness was a highly qualified expert who presented his 
independent opinion.  Id., ¶13.  The court noted that the 
witness held a supervisory position, had an academic background 
in the area, and had significant experience with the crime 
laboratory, all of which were similar to the expert in Williams.  
Id.  The witness testified that he had reviewed the case file, 
including the gas chromatography tests, as a formal peer review.  
He explained the uniform procedures employed by the crime 
laboratory for the tests at issue.  He said that based in part 
on his review of the case file, the analyst had followed the 
required procedures in the tests.  Id., ¶14.  The court 
concluded that the expert's testimony was an independent opinion 
based on his own experience and his own analysis of the testing.  
Id., ¶¶14-16.  The court of appeals held that under Williams, 
the witness's testimony did not violate Barton's right of 
confrontation and was admissible.  Id., ¶16. 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals also referred to cases decided after 
Crawford from other jurisdictions, holding similar testimony did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause.  State v. Barton, 2006 WI 
App 18, ¶¶21-22, 289 Wis. 2d 206, 709 N.W.2d 93 (citing State v. 
Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); People v. 
Thomas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582, 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), 
abrogated by People v. Archuleta, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2014)). 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
15 
 
¶28 The court of appeals also clarified the effect of 
Crawford on Williams:  "The holding in Crawford does not 
undermine our supreme court's decision in Williams.  Williams is 
clear:  A defendant's confrontation right is satisfied if a 
qualified expert testifies as to his or her independent opinion, 
even if the opinion is based in part on the work of another."  
Id., ¶20.   
¶29 In Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court 
again took up the admissibility of forensic reports created by a 
non-testifying laboratory analyst.  At issue was whether 
affidavits 
reporting 
forensic 
analyses 
were 
testimonial, 
"rendering the affiants 'witnesses' subject to the defendant's 
right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment."  Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307.  Those affidavits showed a substance 
connected to the defendant was cocaine, and were created 
specifically to serve as evidence at a criminal trial.  Id. at 
324.  The Supreme Court held that the forensic laboratory 
reports were testimonial statements subject to the Confrontation 
Clause, and therefore, defendants have a right to confront the 
authoring analyst at trial.  Id. at 311.  The Court recognized 
that Melendez-Diaz falls within the Crawford line of cases:  
"This case involves little more than the application of our 
holding in Crawford v. Washington . . . .  The Sixth Amendment 
does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte 
out-of-court affidavits."  Id. at 329.  Melendez-Diaz's holding 
regarding the testimonial nature of laboratory reports does not 
alter our conclusion in Williams that a defendant's right to 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
16 
 
confront witnesses against him is not violated when a testifying 
expert reviews the case file and comes to an independent 
conclusion, even though the expert's opinion is based in part on 
tests performed by another analyst.12  See Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 
99, ¶¶19, 25. 
¶30 In its 2011 decision in Bullcoming, the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
next 
revisited 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause's 
applicability to forensic laboratory reports.  At Bullcoming's 
trial on charges of driving while intoxicated, the trial court 
admitted 
a 
forensic 
laboratory 
report 
certifying 
that 
Bullcoming's BAC was above the BAC threshold for driving under 
the influence.  Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.  The analyst who 
certified the laboratory report did not testify.  Instead, the 
prosecution called a different analyst as a witness.  Id.  The 
witness was familiar with the laboratory's testing procedures, 
but did not participate in, observe, or review the testing of 
the defendant's blood sample.  Id. at 2709, 2712.  The Court 
focused on whether the prosecution could admit a laboratory 
                                                 
12 Likewise, Griep's contention does not present the same 
issues as Melendez-Diaz because the non-testifying analyst's 
written report and other records were not admitted into 
evidence.  See United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1190 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (concluding that a case involving testimony based in 
part on another analyst's forensic tests did not present a 
Melendez-Diaz problem).  Therefore, whether the laboratory 
report here was created specifically to serve as evidence in a 
criminal proceeding, or introduced to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, is not relevant to our review.  See Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009) (introducing 
drug analysis report to prove substance was cocaine). 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
17 
 
report containing a testimonial certification through the in-
court testimony of a witness that did not certify the report or 
perform or observe the test that was the subject of the report.  
Id. at 2710.  The Court held that admission of the report 
violated the defendant's right of confrontation and reiterated 
the rule in Crawford.  Id. at 2713. 
Our answer is in line with controlling precedent:  As 
a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in 
nature, it may not be introduced against the accused 
at trial unless the witness who made the statement is 
unavailable 
and 
the 
accused 
has 
had 
a 
prior 
opportunity to confront that witness. 
Id.   
¶31 The Supreme Court's discussion in Bullcoming differs 
from the section of our Williams decision that is relevant to 
Griep's contention of a Confrontation Clause violation.  In 
Bullcoming, the prosecution admitted the forensic report as a 
business record in violation of the Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
at 2712.  Williams also concludes that the forensic report 
cannot properly be admitted as a business record.  Williams, 253 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶49.  However, in Williams, the expert witness 
reviewed the work of the testing analyst, was familiar with the 
procedures at hand, and rendered an independent opinion.  Id., 
¶¶21-22.  The testimony in Bullcoming is not the independent 
opinion of an expert.  See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712, 2716 
(stating that the witness did not review the test results and 
prosecution never asserted that the witness had an independent 
opinion concerning the defendant's BAC).  Therefore, when an 
expert witness reviews data yielded by laboratory tests and 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
18 
 
reaches his or her own independent opinion based on that data 
and his or her own knowledge, Williams applies and Bullcoming 
provides no guidance. 
¶32 Justice Sotomayor emphasized the limited reach of 
Bullcoming in her concurrence.  Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  She wrote separately to highlight her view that 
the laboratory report was testimonial because its primary 
purpose was evidentiary, but she also wrote "to emphasize the 
limited reach of the Court's opinion."  Id. at 2719.  Justice 
Sotomayor distinguished Bullcoming from other cases where the 
trial witness "is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a 
personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at 
issue."  Id. at 2722.  She also distinguished cases where the 
expert witness was asked for and gave an independent opinion 
about underlying testimonial reports that were not admitted into 
evidence.  Id.  She noted that in Bullcoming, the prosecution 
acknowledged that the witness offered no opinion about the BAC.  
Justice Sotomayor concluded:  "We would face a different 
question if asked to determine the constitutionality of allowing 
an expert witness to discuss others' testimonial statements if 
the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as 
evidence."  Id.  Justice Sotomayor's concurrence reinforces our 
conclusion that Bullcoming does not guide our decision when the 
issue is the independent opinion of an expert witness who has 
reviewed 
the 
forensic 
test 
results, 
rather 
than 
the 
admissibility of an underlying forensic report. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
19 
 
¶33 The Supreme Court provided guidance on when out-of-
court testimonial statements are admissible, when statements are 
testimonial, and under what circumstances testimonial laboratory 
reports 
are 
admissible 
in 
Crawford, 
Melendez-Diaz, 
and 
Bullcoming.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 
at 311; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713.  Wisconsin cases, 
Williams and Barton, go a step further and address situations 
where the State does not offer the laboratory report into 
evidence, but instead offers the independent opinion of an 
analyst who did not perform the tests.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 
99, ¶20; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶16.  Stated otherwise, 
federal Confrontation Clause opinions predating Williams v. 
Illinois do not affect our rule in Williams, or the court of 
appeals' application in Barton.  We now examine whether Williams 
v. Illinois affects Williams and Barton. 
¶34 Williams v. Illinois, the Supreme Court's most recent 
Confrontation Clause opinion that examines presentation of 
expert opinion, involved Williams' bench trial for rape.  There, 
the prosecutor called a forensic specialist at the Illinois 
State Police laboratory who testified that according to the 
police laboratory's business records, the victim's vaginal swabs 
were sent to Cellmark, an outside, accredited laboratory.  
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.  Cellmark returned the 
swabs to the police laboratory, and set out a male DNA profile 
derived from the semen on the swabs.  Id.  Upon receipt of the 
report and profile, a police laboratory analyst conducted a 
search of the Illinois State DNA database, revealing that 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
20 
 
Williams' DNA matched the DNA profile obtained from the swabs 
processed by Cellmark.  Id.  The police laboratory analyst 
testified 
about 
standard 
procedures, 
about 
Cellmark's 
accreditation, and that her comparison of the DNA profiles on 
the Illinois database with the Cellmark profile resulted in a 
match.  Id. at 2229-30.  The Cellmark DNA profile was not 
admitted into evidence.  Id. at 2230.  The defendant objected to 
the expert's testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds.  Id. at 
2231.  The trial court ruled against Williams.  Id.   
¶35 Williams v. Illinois is a plurality opinion with 
Justice Thomas concurring in judgment.13  Id. at 2227.  A 
plurality of the Supreme Court held the expert's testimony did 
not violate Williams' right of confrontation.  However, the 
Court's four-one-four division "left no clear guidance about how 
exactly an expert must phrase [his] testimony [that concerns] 
the results of testing performed by another analyst in order for 
the [expert's] testimony to be admissible."  United States v. 
Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting); id. at 
2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in the result, but with no portion 
of the plurality's reasoning).   
¶36 In determining what effect a plurality opinion has on 
our review, we apply Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
                                                 
13 Justice Breyer also wrote a concurrence in Williams v. 
Illinois, but in contrast to Justice Thomas, he joined the 
plurality's opinion in full.  See Williams v. Illinois, 132 
S. Ct. at 2244–45, 2252 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
21 
 
(1977).  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶30; see also Vincent v. 
Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶46 n.18, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388; 
Lounge Mgmt., Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 21-22, 
580 N.W.2d 156 (1998).  "When a fragmented [Supreme] Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may 
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred 
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."  Marks, 430 U.S. at 
193 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The Marks 
narrowest grounds rule is applicable only when one opinion is 
narrower than the other or is a logical subset of another, 
broader opinion.  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶30 (citing Evan 
H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:  The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 33 
n.120 (1994)); King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
 
If 
no 
"theoretical 
overlap" 
exists 
between 
the 
rationales of the plurality and the concurrence, it is binding 
only as to its "specific result."  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 
¶30 (citing Berwind Corp. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 307 F.3d 222, 
234 (3d Cir. 2002)).14  A plurality opinion without overlapping 
                                                 
14 See also Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel,  
156 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (agreeing that when 
Marks does not apply for lack of a "narrowest opinion," the only 
binding aspect of a particular fractured opinion was its 
specific result); Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 185 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (stating that the only binding aspect of a fragmented 
decision without a narrower ground is the specific result); Lair 
v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that if 
no opinion of the Court is narrow, the splintered decision is 
binding only as to its specific result); Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid 
(continued) 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
22 
 
rationales requires a specific result only when the parties are 
in a "substantially identical position."  Id. 
¶37 Williams v. Illinois does not contain a "narrowest 
opinion."  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2228, 2244-45 
(Breyer, 
J., 
concurring), 
2255 
(Thomas, 
J., 
concurring); 
Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶32.  Five justices of the United 
States Supreme Court concluded in Williams v. Illinois that, in 
certain circumstances, the Confrontation Clause does not bar an 
expert witness from basing his or her testimony on a forensic 
laboratory report prepared by another analyst when the defendant 
was never given an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst who 
prepared the report or conducted the forensic testing.  Williams 
v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2228.  However, no opinion gathered a 
majority of the Court.  Id. at 2244, 2252 (Breyer, J., 
concurring), 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The four justices 
of the plurality concluded that the testimony did not violate 
the Confrontation Clause because the report was not used to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted and its primary purpose 
was not to accuse a targeted individual of a crime.  Id. at 
2243.  While a fifth justice agreed with the disposition of the 
case, he concluded that the report was non-testimonial because 
                                                                                                                                                             
Co., 760 F.3d 600, 615, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging a 
fractured opinion produced only its specific result as binding 
precedent because no opinion was narrowest); State v. Michaels, 
95 A.3d 648, 665-66 (N.J. 2014) (citing Deadwiller and noting 
that the Marks approach works only when the narrowest opinion 
represents a common denominator and when no overlap exists, a 
fragmented decision is binding only as to its specific result). 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
23 
 
it "lacked the requisite 'formality and solemnity' to be 
considered 
'testimonial.'"15 
 
Id. 
at 
2255 
(Thomas, 
J., 
concurring).  Four justices rejected both the plurality's 
primary purpose test and Justice Thomas' solemnity-based test 
and 
instead 
concluded 
that 
the 
expert 
testimony 
was 
"functionally 
identical 
to 
the 
'surrogate 
testimony'" 
in 
Bullcoming and that Bullcoming controlled the outcome.16  Id. at 
2267 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  As no opinion overlaps with 
another, the Marks narrowest grounds rule does not apply to 
Williams v. Illinois.  Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; Deadwiller, 350 
Wis. 2d 138, ¶30; King, 950 F.2d at 781. 
¶38 Therefore, Williams v. Illinois is binding only as to 
its "specific result."  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶30 (citing 
Berwind Corp., 307 F.3d at 234).  A plurality opinion without a 
narrowest grounds concurrence requires a specific result when 
                                                 
15 Justice Thomas' concurrence in Williams v. Illinois also 
explicitly 
rejected 
the 
plurality's 
"flawed 
analysis" 
and 
asserted 
that 
"there 
was 
no 
plausible 
reason 
for 
the 
introduction of Cellmark's statements other than to establish 
their truth."  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2255-56 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
16 Under Marks, the positions of the justices who dissented 
from the judgment are not counted in examining the divided 
opinions for holdings.  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
193 (1977).  Rather, Marks instructs that the holding is the 
narrowest position "taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgment[]."  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Therefore, Marks rejects any contention that the 
holding of Williams v. Illinois is Justice Thomas' and the 
dissent's 
rejection 
of 
the 
plurality's 
not-for-the-truth 
rationale.  Cf. Leading Cases, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 266, 276 (Nov. 
2012). 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
24 
 
the parties are in a substantially identical position.  Berwind, 
307 F.3d at 234.  Griep is not in a substantially identical 
position to the parties in Williams v. Illinois.  The difference 
between Griep's circumstances and those in Williams v. Illinois 
is illustrated by our recent opinion in Deadwiller. 
¶39 Deadwiller is our sole Confrontation Clause case since 
Williams v. Illinois.  In Deadwiller, the defendant was 
identified as a suspect in a sexual assault through a DNA 
profile derived at an out-of-state laboratory from the victim's 
vaginal and cervical swabs, which matched Deadwiller's profile 
in Wisconsin's DNA database.  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶5.  
We 
considered 
application 
of 
the 
Marks 
narrowest 
ground 
principle to Williams v. Illinois, but concluded that no 
Williams v. Illinois concurring opinion fit the narrowest 
grounds rule.  Id., ¶¶30-32.  We recognized that Williams v. 
Illinois would still be binding as to its specific result when 
the parties are in a substantially identical position.  Id., ¶30 
(citing Berwind, 307 F.3d at 234).  We compared the facts of 
each case and concluded that Deadwiller and Williams were in 
substantially identical positions, and therefore we were bound 
by the specific result in Williams v. Illinois.  Id., ¶32.  In 
concluding we were so bound, we noted similarities in the cases.  
Id. 
In both cases, the victim reported the crime and 
underwent a sexual assault examination, which produced 
vaginal swabs containing DNA of the perpetrator. In 
both cases, police officers picked up the evidence, 
inventoried the evidence, and sent the evidence to the 
state crime lab, which then sent the evidence to an 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
25 
 
out-of-state laboratory for DNA testing. Further, the 
out-of-state laboratory in both cases sent back the 
genetic material and a DNA profile of the perpetrator 
produced from the vaginal swabs. In both cases, state 
crime lab analysts entered the DNA profile into a DNA 
database, which resulted in a match to the defendant. 
When called to testify, the state crime lab analyst in 
both cases reported that the DNA profile sent by the 
out-of-state lab matched the DNA profile resulting 
from the database. The DNA profile was not introduced 
into evidence in either case. Prosecutors in both 
cases introduced inventory reports, evidence receipts, 
and testimony to prove a chain of custody, i.e. that 
the DNA profile was produced from swabs taken from the 
victims. 
Id.   
¶40 Deadwiller concludes the lines of relevant state and 
federal Confrontation Clause cases.  In review, Williams and 
Barton establish that an expert witness does not violate the 
Confrontation Clause when his or her opinion is based in part on 
data created by a non-testifying analyst if the witness "was not 
merely a conduit."  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶20, 25; accord 
Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13-14.  In other words, if the expert 
witness reviewed data created by the non-testifying analyst and 
formed an independent opinion, the expert's testimony does not 
violate the Confrontation Clause.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶20; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13-14.  No federal decision 
addresses this type of expert testimony.  In Crawford, admission 
of testimonial statements of an unavailable declarant violated 
the Confrontation Clause if the declarant was unavailable and 
the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.  Melendez-Diaz applied Crawford to 
conclude that testimonial statements made in a forensic report 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
26 
 
that was admitted into evidence, but was created by a non-
testifying 
analyst, 
violated 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause.  
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.  The facts of Bullcoming go one 
step further, involving both the admission of a testimonial 
forensic report and testimony of an expert witness who did not 
conduct the tests or offer an independent opinion.  Bullcoming, 
131 S. Ct. at 2712, 2716.  However, Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and 
Bullcoming do not address a situation where a non-testifying 
analyst's testimonial statements do not come into evidence, 
i.e., where the testimonial forensic report is not admitted and 
the expert witness who testifies at trial gives his or her 
independent opinion after review of laboratory data created 
another analyst.  Stated otherwise, when a non-testifying 
analyst documents the original tests "with sufficient detail for 
another expert to understand, interpret, and evaluate the 
results," 
that 
expert's 
testimony 
does 
not 
violate 
the 
Confrontation Clause.  David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein, & 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The New Wigmore:  Expert Evidence, 
§ 4.10.2, pp. 204-05 (2d ed. 2010); accord Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 
99, ¶20; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13-14.  Williams v. Illinois 
has not altered Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, which we 
confirmed in Deadwiller.  See Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶30. 
2.  Griep's circumstances 
¶41 In the case now before us, we compare the parties' 
positions in Griep to that of the parties' positions in Williams 
v. Illinois and conclude that they are not in substantially 
identical positions.  First, this is not a sexual assault case.  
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
27 
 
Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.  Here, analysts 
used a laboratory test, gas chromatography, to determine Griep's 
BAC, which differs from the creation of a DNA profile and the 
process of matching DNA profiles that was used in Williams v. 
Illinois.  Cf. id.  Second, the analyst conducted all of the 
laboratory work here in the same laboratory that employed the 
expert witness, rather than utilizing work provided by an 
outside laboratory.  Cf. id. at 2229-30.  The only similarity 
between this case and Williams v. Illinois is that the 
prosecution did not introduce the forensic reports into evidence 
in either case.  Id. at 2230.   
¶42 We conclude Griep is not in a substantially identical 
position to Williams.  Therefore, the specific result of 
Williams v. Illinois is not binding in this case as it was in 
Deadwiller.  Cf. Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶32.  For that 
reason, we need not further discuss the various rationales of 
Williams v. Illinois as we did in Deadwiller.  See id., ¶¶33-36. 
¶43 Aside from its discussion of the Williams v. Illinois 
rationales, Deadwiller also provides our only post-Williams v. 
Illinois analysis of Williams and Barton.  Id., ¶¶37-40.  We 
concluded that Williams and Barton are consistent with our 
application of the specific result of Williams v. Illinois.  
Id., ¶37.  We applied Williams and Barton to the facts in 
Deadwiller and determined that the expert witness reviewed the 
out-of-state laboratory's procedures and offered his independent 
conclusion, and therefore did not violate the defendant's right 
of confrontation.  Id., ¶40.   
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
28 
 
¶44 As we tacitly recognized in Deadwiller, nothing in 
Williams v. Illinois affects our decision in Williams and its 
application by the court of appeals in Barton.17  See id., ¶¶37-
40.  In addition, Williams v. Illinois is not otherwise useful 
to our analysis here because Marks does not apply18 and Griep is 
not in a substantially identical position to the convicted 
perpetrator.19  As Williams v. Illinois does not affect our 
conclusion in Williams or the court of appeals' application in 
Barton, our remaining task is to apply Williams and Barton to 
this case. 
C.  Admission of Patrick Harding's Testimony 
¶45 We rely on pre-Williams v. Illinois opinions, as well 
as our only Confrontation Clause decision after Williams v. 
Illinois, Deadwiller, to determine whether the State's witness, 
Patrick Harding, testified in violation of Griep's right of 
                                                 
17 Other courts have also held Williams v. Illinois is 
"confined to the particular set of facts presented in that 
case."  United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(applying pre-Williams v. Illinois opinions); accord Jenkins v. 
United States, 75 A.3d 174, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (agreeing 
Williams v. Illinois is confined to its facts and applying pre-
Williams v. Illinois opinions in the Supreme Court and its own 
jurisdiction). 
18 Marks does not apply when no concurring opinion is 
narrower than the others.  See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; State v. 
Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶30, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362; 
King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   
19 Cf. 
Deadwiller, 
350 
Wis. 2d 
138, 
¶32 
(concluding 
Deadwiller was in a substantially identical position in a case 
with different facts).   
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
29 
 
confrontation.20  Harding served as the State's expert witness 
for Griep's BAC and testified in place of Kalscheur, who was not 
available at the time of trial.  While Harding was not an 
official peer reviewer of Kalscheur's forensic tests, Harding 
testified that he examined the data "available the day after the 
analysis for the person that reviewed the report when it went 
out."  His review included chromatograms and results of the 
entire analytical run that Kalscheur conducted, which described 
the calibration checks that were used to assess whether the 
machine was performing properly and whether the test was run 
correctly.21   
¶46 Harding testified that all indications were that 
Kalscheur followed the laboratory procedures, and the instrument 
was working properly.  Harding testified that the machine's 
proper function was evident from the results of calibration 
                                                 
20 However, we note that Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and 
Bullcoming are not helpful to our analysis because they focus on 
when out-of-court testimonial statements may be entered into 
evidence and what statements are testimonial.  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 59; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; Bullcoming, 131 
S. Ct. at 2713.  As our focus here is on the witness's in-court 
testimony, Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming do not guide 
our analysis. 
21 It is significant that the laboratory file included not 
only Kalscheur's report but also raw data, gas chromatograms.  
This provided "adequate detail for an expert to do his own 
analysis and reach his own conclusions."  See Kaye, et al., 
supra note 9, p. 201.  In this case, "the expert is exercising a 
degree of independent judgment using his own substantive 
expertise rather than relying entirely on the expertise of 
others."  Id. at p. 202; accord Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶20; 
Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13-14. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
30 
 
checks run throughout the course of the tests.  Harding said, 
"[t]he calibration checks that are analyzed throughout the 
course of the analytical run read correctly, specifically and 
importantly, the two known samples that bracketed Mr. Griep's 
sample read within their accepted range."  Harding opined that 
correctly running the sample through the testing instrument 
resulted in a reliable blood alcohol reading.  Harding also 
opined that after reviewing the data, he came to an independent 
opinion that Griep's BAC was 0.152.22  And finally, it was 
Harding's opinion that laboratory procedures required notation 
of any irregularities with the sample, and there had been no 
such notation by the analyst.   
¶47 Consistent with Williams and Barton, the pre-Williams 
v. Illinois law of this jurisdiction, Harding's testimony did 
not violate Griep's right of confrontation; accordingly, his 
testimony was properly admitted.23  Our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence begins with Williams.  Williams set out a two-part 
framework to analyze the testimony of an expert witness, relying 
                                                 
22 That Harding arrived at and testified to the same 
conclusion as Kalscheur's report, that Griep's BAC was 0.152, 
does not require us to conclude that Harding's testimony 
introduced Kalscheur's report.  Harding's review of Griep's 
laboratory file and his opinion formed by interpretation of raw 
data using his expertise merely yielded the same independent 
opinion reached by Kalscheur. 
23 United States Supreme Court opinions prior to Williams v. 
Illinois do not assist in our analysis or affect the value of 
Williams and Barton, as previously discussed.  Additionally, 
Williams v. Illinois does not affect the value of those two 
cases.  See Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶¶37-40. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
31 
 
on forensic tests conducted by a non-testifying analyst, for 
Confrontation Clause violations.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶26.  
Williams provides that expert testimony based in part on tests 
conducted by a non-testifying analyst satisfies a defendant's 
right of confrontation if the expert witness:  (1) reviewed the 
analyst's tests, and (2) formed an independent opinion to which 
he testified at trial.  Id.  We address each requirement of 
Williams' framework in turn. 
1.  Review 
¶48 In both Williams and Barton, the analyst who conducted 
the testing was unavailable to testify at trial.  Instead, the 
analysts' supervisors testified as expert witnesses about the 
independent opinions they formed.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶22; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶15.  In both Williams and Barton, 
the supervisors conducted reviews in the ordinary course of 
laboratory procedures.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶22; see 
Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶14.   
¶49 Peer review generally involves examining the notes 
taken and data collected in the case to make sure the 
conclusions written in the report are correct.  Williams, 253 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶22.  In Williams, the expert witness testified how 
peer review operates when testing for a controlled substance:  
she compared the graphical data yielded by the tests and graphs 
reflecting standard, known, values.  Id., ¶23.  The expert's 
comparison allowed her to conclude the sample being tested was a 
controlled substance.  Id.  In Barton, an arson case, the expert 
used graphical data called chromatograms from different stages 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
32 
 
of gasoline evaporation to conclude gasoline was present in 
charred wood samples.  Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶15.  The expert 
in Barton compared the chromatograms of control samples with 
chromatograms of the samples from the arson case, similar to the 
expert's comparison in Williams.  See id.   
¶50 Here, Harding did not conduct a formal peer review of 
Kalscheur's tests.  Instead, peer review was completed by Thomas 
Ecker, an advanced chemist at the laboratory.  However, Harding 
completed the same examination as occurs in the formal peer 
review.  Harding examined "[t]he same data that is available the 
day after the analysis for the person that reviewed the report 
when it went out and that is the chromatograms and the paperwork 
associated with the whole analytical run that Diane did on the 
30th of August, 2007."  In short, Harding reviewed the same data 
as the peer reviewer.  
¶51 Our decisions indicate that the review necessary to 
protect a defendant's right of confrontation need not be formal 
peer review.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶20; Deadwiller, 350 
Wis. 2d 138, ¶40.  In Williams, we reasoned:  "the presence and 
availability 
for 
cross-examination 
of 
a 
highly 
qualified 
witness, who is familiar with the procedures at hand, supervises 
or reviews the work of the testing analyst, and renders her own 
expert opinion is sufficient to protect a defendant's right to 
confrontation."  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶20.  Similarly, in 
Deadwiller, the expert witness's review of the out-of-state 
laboratory's 
DNA 
profile, 
procedures, 
and 
quality 
control 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
33 
 
measures was sufficient to protect the defendant's right of 
confrontation.   
¶52 Harding's review of Kalscheur's report, data, and 
notes fulfills the Williams review requirement because he 
reexamined the data.  See Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶22-23.  
Therefore, Harding's review was sufficient to protect Griep's 
right of confrontation, when combined with Harding's independent 
opinion. 
2.  Independent opinion 
¶53 In both Williams and Barton, the expert witness 
offered his or her independent opinion based in part on the data 
provided by the non-testifying analyst and the expert witness's 
own expertise.  See Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶25-26; Barton, 
289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶16.  Williams and Barton also discussed the 
expert witnesses' qualifications and noted they were qualified 
to give an expert opinion based on the information before them.  
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶21; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13, 
16.  We discussed the role of an independent opinion most 
thoroughly in Williams, where we stated that "one expert cannot 
act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another."  Williams, 
253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶19.  However, we recognized that an expert may 
form an independent opinion based in part on the work of others 
without acting as a "conduit."  Id., ¶25. 
¶54 In Williams, the expert witness reviewed the tests 
done by another analyst, including the data and notes, and then 
formed her own opinion.  Id.  We concluded that the testifying 
expert's opinion was sufficiently independent to protect the 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
34 
 
defendant's 
right 
of 
confrontation, 
and 
was 
not 
a 
mere 
recitation of another analyst's conclusions.  Id., ¶¶25-26.  In 
Barton, the expert offered his opinion based on his review of 
the entire file, including data similar to the chromatograms in 
this case.  Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13-14.  The court of 
appeals concluded the expert's testimony was his independent 
opinion.  Id., ¶13.   
¶55 Here, Harding was qualified to present testimony on 
the laboratory procedures and come to an independent opinion 
regarding Griep's BAC.  To arrive at his conclusion, Harding 
relied on his review of data collected by Kalscheur, other 
records compiled at the laboratory, and his own expertise.  
Pointing to Harding's lack of personal knowledge of Kalscheur's 
testing of Griep's blood sample, Griep argues that Harding's 
opinion could not have been independent.  However, we held in 
Williams, and the court of appeals held in Barton, that it was 
acceptable that the analyst's report, data, and notes were the 
factual bases of the expert witness's opinion, in addition to 
the witness's own professional expertise.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 
99, ¶25; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶13.  Williams and Barton 
conclude that an expert witness need not have personal knowledge 
of the forensic tests, as long as the witness's opinion is 
reached independently and is not merely a recitation of 
another's conclusions.  See Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶25; 
Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13, 16.  In each case, the expert 
witness rendered an independent opinion by reviewing data and 
notes from the analyst and the expert testified as to the 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
35 
 
general 
procedures 
for 
preparing 
and 
testing 
samples.24  
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶25; Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶14.  
Harding conducted the same type of review and based his opinion 
on the same type of records and personal expertise as the expert 
witness did in Williams and Barton, and his opinion is similarly 
independent. 
¶56 Harding reviewed Kalscheur's test results and other 
relevant 
laboratory 
records 
and 
he 
testified 
as 
to 
his 
independent opinion.  In accordance with Williams and Barton, 
Harding's 
testimony 
did 
not 
violate 
Griep's 
right 
of 
confrontation.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶26; Barton, 289 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶20. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 We 
conclude 
that 
Harding's 
review 
of 
Griep's 
laboratory file, including the forensic test results of an 
analyst who was unavailable for trial, to form an independent 
opinion to which he testified did not violate Griep's right of 
confrontation.  Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶26; Barton, 289 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶20.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
                                                 
24 In Barton, the expert testified as to both the general 
laboratory procedures and, after review of the data and notes, 
that the analyst seemed to have followed the general procedures.  
Barton, 289 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶13-14.  Here, Harding stated that 
"all indications are that the procedures were followed, the 
instrument was operating properly, properly calibrated."  This 
statement is within the bounds of an accepted assessment of the 
analyst's procedures as in Barton. 
No. 
2009AP3073-CR   
 
36 
 
decision 
that 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
admission 
of 
Harding's testimony. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶58 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
United States Supreme Court has not yet defined the contours of 
the limitations imposed by the Confrontation Clause on forensic 
evidence and expert testimony.  The fractured decisions of the 
Court in this field may be an omen of changes to come in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.1 
¶60 In the meantime, however, federal and state courts 
must determine how the Confrontation Clause applies to forensic 
evidence and expert testimony.2  At present, federal and state 
cases are all over the map in their attempts to apply the 
Court's Confrontation Clause decisions. 
¶61 As courts develop and apply this evolving body of law, 
the "ultimate goal" of the Confrontation Clause must be 
remembered: To ensure that the reliability of evidence is 
"assessed in a particular manner," namely "by testing in the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 
(2012), in which four opinions were filed but none received a 
majority vote.  "The persistent ambiguities in the Court's 
approach are symptomatic of a rule not amenable to sensible 
applications."  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 
(2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See also People v. Lopez, 286 
P.3d 469, 483 (Cal. 2013) (Liu, J., dissenting) ("Given the 
array of possible doctrinal approaches left open by Williams, 
one can only surmise that the high court will soon weigh in 
again."). 
2 See State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶47, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 
834 N.W.2d 362 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he majority 
opinion does not help answer the recurring significant central 
constitutional/evidentiary question presented, namely, 'How does 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
apply 
to 
the 
panoply 
of 
crime 
laboratory reports and underlying technical statements written 
by (or otherwise made by) laboratory technicians?'"). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
crucible of cross-examination."3  The majority opinion seems to 
lose sight of this goal.  I write separately to bring the goal 
of the Confrontation Clause back into focus. 
¶62 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004), the 
United States Supreme Court declared that the Confrontation 
Clause 
bars 
the 
introduction 
of 
out-of-court 
testimonial 
statements unless the declarant is unavailable for trial and the 
declarant has previously been cross-examined by the defendant.  
The 
application 
of 
this 
fundamental 
Confrontation 
Clause 
principle in the context of forensic evidence and expert 
testimony has been the subject of much debate and litigation in 
state and federal courts. 
¶63 In Wisconsin, a forensic report regarding a particular 
defendant 
that 
is 
created 
for 
prosecutorial 
purposes 
is 
considered an out-of-court testimonial statement.4  It is clear 
under Crawford that such a report cannot be introduced into 
evidence without testimony from the analyst who prepared it 
unless the analyst is unavailable and was previously cross-
examined by the defendant. 
¶64 Ambiguity remains regarding the precise circumstances 
under which the Confrontation Clause permits the introduction of 
substitute expert testimony about forensic test results when the 
forensic report itself is not introduced. 
                                                 
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
4 State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶¶48-49, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 
644 N.W.2d 919. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶65 In State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, 153 Wis. 2d 99, 644 
N.W.2d 919, this court established that the Confrontation Clause 
does not allow the State to call a surrogate expert to the 
witness stand simply to have the expert read or summarize a 
forensic report authored by someone else.  The court held that 
"one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of 
another" without violating the defendant's constitutional right 
to confront the State's witnesses.5 
¶66 Similarly, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011), in which the certified results of a blood alcohol 
test were introduced with testimony from "a scientist who did 
not sign the certification or perform or observe the test 
reported in the certification," the United States Supreme Court 
"bluntly held that such 'surrogate' expert testimony violates 
the confrontation right.  The accused's right is to confront the 
lab analyst who performed the test, unless the state can show 
that [the lab analyst] is unavailable and that [the] defendant 
had an opportunity pretrial to cross-examine him."6 
¶67 In the present case, the State obtained a testimonial 
forensic report that concludes the defendant's blood alcohol 
content was 0.152 percent.  The analyst who prepared the 
forensic report was unavailable for trial.  The analyst had not, 
                                                 
5 Id., ¶19. 
6 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin 
Evidence § 802.303, at 142 (3d ed., 2014 Pocket Part). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
however, been cross-examined by the defendant previously.  Thus, 
the forensic report itself could not be introduced. 
¶68 The State did not introduce the forensic report.  
Instead, the State called Patrick Harding, an employee in the 
same laboratory in which the forensic analysis was conducted, as 
a substitute expert witness to testify in lieu of the analyst 
who prepared the report. 
¶69 Harding had no personal connection with the forensic 
report at issue.  He had not observed the defendant's blood 
sample and had not participated in its testing.  Harding 
nevertheless testified about the subject matter of the forensic 
report and testified that in his opinion, the defendant's blood 
alcohol content was 0.152 percent. 
¶70 The majority opinion distinguishes the instant case 
from prior United States Supreme Court cases in which the 
Confrontation Clause was held to have been violated on the 
ground that the State in the instant case did not introduce an 
out-of-court testimonial statement.  According to the majority 
opinion, although Harding's opinion was based on the analyst's 
out-of-court testimonial statement, it nevertheless qualifies as 
independent. 
¶71 Crawford does not govern the introduction of testimony 
based on an out-of-court testimonial statement; it governs the 
introduction of the out-of-court testimonial statement itself.  
Thus, the majority opinion reasons, there was no Confrontation 
Clause violation in the instant case. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶72 I disagree with the majority opinion's analysis.  It 
is a stretch, in my view, to call Harding's opinion independent.  
I conclude that Harding served as a conduit for the opinion of 
the analyst who performed the forensic testing at issue.  In my 
opinion, the analyst's out-of-court testimonial statement was 
introduced——albeit indirectly——through Harding's testimony. 
¶73 Under 
a 
strict 
reading 
of 
Crawford, 
Harding's 
testimony violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights 
because the analyst whose out-of-court testimonial statement 
Harding indirectly introduced had not previously been cross-
examined by the defendant.  I conclude, however, that such a 
narrow reading of Crawford and its progeny improperly ignores 
the values underlying the Confrontation Clause and the practical 
realities the State and the courts face in cases that rely on 
forensic evidence.  It also fails to take into account the 
reliability of forensic evidence and fails to give proper weight 
to the goal of enabling the State to prosecute a crime when a 
fair trial is possible. 
¶74 In 
my 
opinion, 
courts 
should 
search 
for 
fair, 
practical, and workable evidentiary rules and should not deem 
the Confrontation Clause violated whenever the prosecution fails 
to call to the witness stand all whose testimony may be relevant 
to the accuracy of the forensic testing at issue in a particular 
case. 
¶75 Keeping the majority, plurality, and minority writings 
of the justices of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford 
and its progeny in mind, and seeking the best interpretation of 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
the law available in light of the authorities binding upon this 
court, I conclude that the substitute expert testimony at issue 
in the instant case satisfies the Confrontation Clause. 
I 
¶76 I 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
determination that Harding testified to an independent opinion 
and was not merely a conduit for the opinion of the analyst who 
performed the forensic testing at issue.7 
¶77 State 
v. 
Williams, 
2002 
WI 
58, 
¶¶25-26, 
253 
Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919, held that an expert witness other 
than the analyst who performed the forensic testing at issue can 
testify to "an independent expert opinion" without violating the 
Confrontation Clause, even when that opinion is based in part 
"on facts and data gathered by someone else."  Whether the 
opinion provided by such a substitute expert witness is an 
independent one must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
¶78 Independence is a question of degree.  Williams does 
not reveal the precise degree of independent judgment that must 
undergird an expert's opinion for a court to characterize the 
opinion as independent for Confrontation Clause purposes.   
¶79 It is clear, however, that for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, a substitute expert witness must do more 
than 
merely 
recite 
or 
summarize 
the 
work 
of 
another.8  
Consequently, the fact that the forensic report itself was not 
                                                 
7 See majority op., ¶¶3, 46-47, 52, 55-57. 
8 Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶19. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
introduced in the present case is not dispositive.  "The 
question is not whether [the forensic report] is disclosed in 
documentary form, or orally recapitulated by a testifying 
expert.  Rather, the appropriate question is whether the 
substance of the testimonial materials is shared with the fact-
finder to suggest its truth, without the report's author being 
available for cross-examination."9 
¶80 In the present case, Harding testified that he was 
offering an independent opinion.  Harding's characterization of 
his testimony is not binding on the court and is not supported 
by the record. 
¶81 Harding stated at trial that he reviewed the analyst's 
"report when it went out and that is the chromatograms and the 
paperwork associated with the whole analytical run that [the 
analyst] did." 
¶82 Harding was familiar with the policies and procedures 
of the laboratory in which the forensic analysis took place.  He 
testified that all indications were that standard laboratory 
procedures were followed and that the chromatograph machine was 
properly calibrated. 
¶83 Harding 
did 
not, 
however, 
have 
any 
first-hand 
knowledge that the procedures were followed in the present case.  
Harding was unable to testify about the handling of the 
defendant's blood sample or the steps that preceded the 
chromatograph machine's analysis of that sample.  Harding had no 
                                                 
9 David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence, 
§ 4.10.2, at 200 (2d ed. 2010). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
knowledge of the labeling or loading of the defendant's blood 
sample and had no knowledge of the sample's appearance or odor 
upon arrival at the laboratory.  Harding made no direct 
observations of the sample or its testing.  Harding could not 
testify about whether there was human error in the process of 
testing the defendant's blood sample. 
¶84 In sum, Harding was unable to say whether the blood 
sample was received intact or whether the blood alcohol content 
testing was performed according to protocol.  "These are the 
kinds of facts that mattered to the Bullcoming Court."10 
¶85 Harding's only basis for determining the defendant's 
blood alcohol content was the analyst's report and supporting 
documentation.  Harding did not, and could not, offer any 
different or additional analysis beyond that contained in the 
forensic report and attached materials.  Harding had no greater 
connection with the specific forensic testing at issue than any 
other qualified forensic analyst from Harding's lab would have 
had. 
¶86 The documents and information Harding reviewed were 
not, in my view, sufficient to enable Harding to independently 
"understand, 
interpret, 
and 
evaluate 
the 
[forensic 
test] 
results."11  I conclude that for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause, Harding lacked sufficient information to provide an 
                                                 
10 Kaye et al., supra note 9, § 4.12.4, at 69 (Cumulative 
Supp. 2015). 
11 Kaye et al., supra note 9, § 4.10.2, at 205. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
independent opinion about the defendant's blood alcohol content.  
Harding was, in essence, a conduit through which the State 
entered another analyst's otherwise inadmissible opinion into 
evidence. 
¶87 My 
position 
that 
Harding 
failed 
to 
provide 
an 
independent opinion is supported by the United States Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 
(2011), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
¶88 In 
Bullcoming, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
debunked the notion that an analyst who performs a blood alcohol 
content test is a "mere scrivener," cross-examination of whom 
serves no legitimate purpose.  Bullcoming makes clear that the 
analyst who tested the defendant's blood sample has valuable 
information about the test results beyond the information set 
forth in the materials produced by the gas chromatograph 
machine.  Thus, the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst is 
important. 
¶89 The Bullcoming Court explained that "[s]everal steps 
are involved in the gas chromatograph process, and human error 
can occur at each step."12  According to the Court, the results 
produced by the gas chromatograph process are determined in part 
by "past events and human actions," which are not "revealed in 
                                                 
12 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
raw, machine-produced data," and which constitute "me[a]t for 
cross-examination."13   
¶90 In other words, according to the Bullcoming Court, an 
analyst's testifying and submitting to cross-examination at 
trial are not hollow formalities.  The Court recognized that a 
substitute expert witness cannot convey all that the analyst who 
performed the forensic testing knows or observed and cannot 
expose any lapses on the analyst's part.14  Thus, the analyst 
should be subject to confrontation even "if all analysts always 
possessed the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity 
of Mother Theresa."15 
¶91 Similarly, Melendez-Diaz stresses that a substitute 
expert witness who testifies based solely on the results of the 
gas chromatograph process will have little to no knowledge of 
the past events and human actions that helped determine those 
results.  As a result, cross-examination of the substitute 
expert witness cannot effectively uncover mistakes or misconduct 
by the analyst, which can render the results of the gas 
chromatograph process unreliable. 
¶92 In 
Melendez-Diaz, 
the 
Court 
acknowledged 
that 
"[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of 
                                                 
13 Id. at 2714.  By contrast, the dissent in Bullcoming 
emphasized the mechanical nature of the gas chromatograph.  See 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
14 Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715-16. 
15 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (2009).  See also 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
manipulation."16  Mistake or misconduct can influence forensic 
test results.17  "A forensic analyst responding to a request from 
a law enforcement official may feel pressure——or have an 
incentive——to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the 
prosecution."18 
¶93 Harding appears to have recognized the dangers posed 
by admitting his testimony in lieu of testimony by the analyst 
who performed the forensic testing in question.  On cross-
examination, defense counsel asked Harding whether the analyst 
who tested the defendant's blood sample could have tampered with 
the sample had she "had a mind to do it."  Harding responded: 
"[I]f an analyst wanted to do something nefarious, sure, that's 
correct, that could happen."  Defense counsel then asked whether 
an analyst's tampering with a blood sample "could possibly 
escape your detection when you review the written reports and 
materials."  Harding replied: "Sure." 
¶94 This colloquy demonstrates the inherent limits to what 
an expert can know about gas chromatography testing performed by 
someone else.  Because of these limits, a substitute expert 
witness can do little more than summarize the work and parrot 
                                                 
16 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. 
17 Indeed, according to an amicus brief submitted in the 
instant case by the Innocence Network, "[u]nvalidated or 
improper forensic science is a leading cause of wrongful 
convictions, playing a role in the cases of almost half of the 
321 wrongfully convicted people in the United States who have 
been exonerated by DNA testing." 
18 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
the findings of the analyst who performed the testing.  Harding 
was no different; he summarized the work and parroted the 
findings of the analyst who performed the forensic testing at 
issue. 
¶95 In sum, a careful reading of case law and of Harding's 
testimony reveals that Harding was unable to testify about the 
gas chromatograph process at issue other than by relying on, and 
disclosing the substance of, materials generated by another 
analyst's use of the gas chromatograph machine. 
¶96 The State called Harding as a witness in order to 
introduce the otherwise inadmissible conclusion of a testimonial 
forensic report prepared by someone else.  Harding could not 
provide 
insight 
into 
the 
testing 
process 
other 
than 
by 
disclosing the substance of the report itself.  Under the 
circumstances of the present case, Harding did not provide an 
independent opinion. The values underlying the Confrontation 
Clause would be better protected by testimony from, and cross-
examination of, the analyst who prepared the report. 
II 
¶97 In my view, a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights 
must be balanced against the practical reality that cross-
examining the forensic analyst who performed the testing at 
issue will not always be possible or necessary.  Courts should 
not——and need not under current United States Supreme Court 
precedent——exclude 
forensic 
evidence 
that 
has 
indicia 
of 
reliability when the analyst who performed the testing is 
unavailable but a substitute expert witness is available to 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
provide useful and significant information about that evidence 
and to submit to cross-examination.19 
¶98 Thus, although I conclude that Harding's testimony 
indirectly introduced an out-of-court testimonial statement made 
by an unavailable analyst who had not previously been cross-
examined, and although I conclude that the Confrontation Clause 
would be better protected by testimony from, and cross-
examination of, the analyst who conducted the forensic testing 
at issue, my analysis does not end there. 
¶99 As Justice Kennedy's dissent in Bullcoming explains, 
the United States Supreme Court lacks the experience and 
familiarity with state trial processes necessary to make it 
well-suited for the role of a national tribunal for rules of 
evidence.20  Accordingly, this court should contribute to the 
development 
of 
evidentiary 
rules 
that 
pay 
heed 
to 
the 
constitutional and practical concerns of state courts, the 
State, and defendants.  The instant case presents the court with 
the opportunity to do just that. 
¶100 When an analyst becomes unavailable without first 
submitting to cross-examination by the subject of the analyst's 
forensic testing, what happens to the results produced by that 
                                                 
19 "Thus, when there is both unavailability and a meaningful 
but imperfect substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination, 
the Constitution, according to Crawford, does not require 
wholesale exclusion. . . .  [N]ecessity ought to permit a 
second-best solution."  Kaye et al., supra note 9, § 4.12.2, at 
66-67 (Cumulative Supp. 2015). 
20 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2727 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
testing?  If Crawford imposes a rigid, wholesale ban on non-
independent substitute expert testimony about forensic test 
results when an unavailable forensic analyst has not previously 
been cross-examined, how could the results be introduced?  In 
short, they could not. 
¶101 It seems to me, however, that Crawford does not 
dictate such rigidity.  I reach this conclusion based on 
Crawford itself (which recognizes that the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness at trial is not always possible or necessary21) 
and on Crawford's progeny. 
¶102 The 
separate 
writings 
issued 
in 
Bullcoming 
are 
particularly instructive. 
¶103 Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Bullcoming makes 
clear that the Court "would face a different question [than 
faced in Bullcoming and prior cases] if asked to determine the 
constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss 
others' testimonial statements if the testimonial statements 
                                                 
21 Under Crawford, a prior opportunity to cross-examine an 
unavailable 
witness 
provides 
a 
constitutionally 
adequate 
alternative to cross-examination of the witness at trial. 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
were not themselves admitted as evidence."22  That is the very 
question presented in the instant case.23 
¶104 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that Bullcoming should be 
read narrowly.  Justice Sotomayor wrote that Bullcoming and 
prior cases would not control future cases in which "the person 
testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a 
personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at 
issue."24 
¶105 Justice Sotomayor did not explain the level of 
involvement a substitute witness must have with the "scientific 
test at issue" to render the witness's testimony permissible 
under the Confrontation Clause.  However, the implication of 
Justice 
Sotomayor's 
Bullcoming 
concurrence 
is 
that 
if 
a 
substitute expert witness testifies who has even a limited 
connection to the testing at issue, there might not be any 
Confrontation Clause violation: 
[In 
Bullcoming, 
the 
analyst] 
conceded 
on 
cross-
examination that he played no role in producing the 
                                                 
22 Bullcoming, 
131 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2722 
(Sotomayor, 
J., 
concurring). 
23 Justice Sotomayor discusses Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 
explaining that facts and data upon which experts in a given 
field would reasonably rely in forming an opinion need not be 
admissible in order for an expert opinion based on such facts 
and data to be admitted.  There is, however, an argument to be 
made that despite Rule 703, evidence that is excluded from trial 
on constitutional grounds ought not to be permitted to serve as 
part of the basis for an expert's conclusion.  See Kaye et al., 
supra note 9, § 4.5, at 158. 
24 Bullcoming, 
131 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2722 
(Sotomayor, 
J., 
concurring). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
BAC report and did not observe any portion . . . of 
the testing. . . .  It would be a different case if, 
for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst 
conducting a test testified about the result or a 
report about such results.  We need not address what 
degree of involvement is sufficient because here [the 
analyst] had no involvement whatsoever in the relevant 
teat and report.25 
¶106 The four dissenting justices in Bullcoming objected to 
the Bullcoming majority's extension of Melendez-Diaz.  According 
to 
the 
dissenters, 
Melendez-Diaz 
does 
not 
prohibit 
the 
introduction 
of 
a 
testimonial 
forensic 
report 
when 
a 
knowledgeable representative of a laboratory is "present to 
testify and to explain the lab's processes and the details of 
the report."26  Nor, in the dissenters' view, does the 
Confrontation Clause. 
¶107 The dissent reasons that a blood alcohol content 
analysis "is mechanically performed by the gas chromatograph, 
which may operate . . . after all the laboratory employees leave 
for 
the 
day."27 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
the 
dissent 
concludes, the introduction of a forensic report along with the 
testimony of a knowledgeable laboratory representative who is 
available for cross-examination is "fully consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause and with well-established principles for 
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted in full accord with 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
requirements 
of 
fairness 
and 
reliability 
and 
with 
the 
confrontation guarantee."28 
¶108 Keeping these and other post-Crawford writings of the 
justices of the United States Supreme Court in mind, and seeking 
the best interpretation of the law available in light of the 
authorities binding upon this court, I conclude that the 
substitute expert testimony at issue in the instant case 
satisfies the Confrontation Clause. 
¶109 More specifically, I conclude that in the instant 
case, cross-examination of a substitute expert witness who fails 
to provide an independent opinion constitutes a permissible 
alternative to cross-examination of the analyst who performed 
the forensic testing at issue when the following conditions are 
met: 
1. 
The analyst is unavailable for cross-examination, 
through no fault of the parties; 
2. 
Re-testing is not possible; 
3. 
The analyst recorded the forensic test results at 
or near the time of testing in the course of a 
regularly conducted activity and would be unlikely to 
have an independent memory of the test performed 
(because, for example, the analyst processed many such 
tests within a short period); 
                                                 
28 Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
4. 
The analyst recorded the results in a way that 
another expert in the field could understand and 
interpret; and 
5. 
The substitute expert witness is qualified to 
discuss and interpret the original results and is 
subject to cross-examination. 
¶110 Because these conditions appear to have been met in 
the present case, I conclude that Harding's substitute expert 
testimony fulfills the minimum requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Thus, like the majority opinion, I would allow it. 
¶111 I note, finally, that in determining that Harding's 
testimony is permissible under the Confrontation Clause, I am 
cognizant of "the fundamental doctrinal dilemma" underlying the 
relationship between the Confrontation Clause and forensic 
evidence: 
[T]here 
is 
a 
fundamental 
mismatch 
between 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause's 
focus 
on 
the 
individual 
testifying 
expert 
and 
the 
nature 
of 
scientific 
knowledge production, which is, more often than not, a 
collective rather than an individual enterprise.  
Science often depends on a certain degree of epistemic 
deference 
to 
the 
conclusions 
and 
findings 
of 
others . . . and 
scientists 
are 
often 
engaged 
in 
"distributed cognition" in which [] the knowledge 
relevant to a [particular] question . . . stretches 
across a network of humans and machines. . . .  [W]hen 
a witness uses only a modicum of independent judgment 
to evaluate and opine on tests done by others, this 
problem of distributed knowledge and the Confrontation 
Clause rears its head.29 
¶112 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                                                 
29 Kaye et al., supra note 9, § 4.12.11, at 100 (Cumulative 
Supp. 2015) (footnotes omitted). 
No.  2009AP3073-CR.ssa 
 
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¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
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