Case Title: Animal Legal Defense Fund v. IACUC UVM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well
 as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are
 requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
 corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 91-324


 Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc.              Supreme Court
 and People For Animal Rights, Inc.
                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 The Institutional Animal Care and            May Term, 1992
 Use Committee of the University of
 Vermont and University of Vermont


 John P. Meaker, J.

 Timothy Moran, Colchester, and Steven M. Wise of Fraser & Wise, P.C.,
   Boston, Massachusetts, for plaintiffs-appellees

 Frederick S. Lane III and Ritchie E. Berger of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, and
   Francine Bazluke, Associate General Counsel, University of Vermont, for
   defendants-appellants


 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
     Specially Assigned



      GIBSON, J.   Defendants the University of Vermont (UVM) and the
 Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) appeal from the entry of
 summary judgment for the Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., and People for
 Animal Rights, Inc.  The court declared that the IACUC is subject to
 Vermont's Open Meeting Law and Public Records Act and enjoined the IACUC
 from violating these acts.  Following entry of the court's order, plaintiffs
 filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting attorney's fees under the
 Public Records Act.  The court granted the motion and awarded plaintiffs
 $3,713.  We affirm.
      The IACUC is a committee mandated by the federal Animal Welfare Act, 7
 U.S.C. { 2143(b)(1), and the Health and Research Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. {
 289d(b).  The chief executive officer of each research institution must
 appoint such a committee as a condition of receiving federal funding.  Id. {
 289d(b)(1).  The IACUC is charged with the duty of overseeing the
 institution's research practices with respect to pain to animals and the
 condition of animals within the institution, to ensure compliance with
 federal standards of care.  7 U.S.C. { 2143(b)(1).
      Since 1985, plaintiffs have requested that the University of Vermont
 and the IACUC comply with the requirements of Vermont's Open Meeting Law, 1
 V.S.A. {{ 310-314, and Public Records Act, 1 V.S.A. {{ 315-320.  Plaintiffs
 assert that the IACUC has refused to announce its meetings properly, has
 refused the public access to its meetings, and has not made available the
 minutes of its meetings.  Further, plaintiffs assert that the IACUC went
 into executive session without indicating the reason when a member of People
 for Animals Rights, Inc. appeared at a meeting.
      Defendants argue that it was error for the trial court to conclude as a
 matter of law that (1) the Open Meeting Law applies to the University, (2)
 the IACUC is a "committee of" the University with policymaking influence,
 and (3) the University is subject to the Public Records Act.  Defendants
 also assert that it was an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees in
 this case.
                                     I.
      We consider first defendants' contention that the trial court erred in
 granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on their claim that defendants
 violated the state's Open Meeting Law.  To prevail on a motion for summary
 judgment, the moving party must establish that no genuine issue of material
 fact exists and that the motion rests on a theory that entitles the moving
 party to judgment as a matter of law.  Kelly v. Town of Barnard, 155 Vt.
 296, 299, 583 A.2d 614, 616 (1990).  The parties agree that there is no
 dispute of material fact; therefore, the case will turn on questions of law.
      In 1957, the Vermont Legislature enacted the Open Meeting Law.  The
 Legislature's purpose was to "give meaning to Chapter I, Article 6 of the
 Vermont Constitution."  Rowe v. Brown,    Vt.    ,    , 599 A.2d 333, 336
 (1991).  In a statement of guiding principles, the Legislature declared that
 public bodies "exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business and are
 accountable to them pursuant to Article VI of the Vermont constitution." 1
 V.S.A. { 311(a).  To effect that purpose, the Legislature announced that
 "[a]ll meetings of a public body are . . . open to the public at all times,
 except as provided in section 313 of this title."  Id. { 312(a).  Under the
 Open Meeting Law, a public body is defined as including "any board, council
 or commission of any . . . instrumentality of the state . . . or any
 committee" of a board, council or commission of an instrumentality of the
 state.  Id. { 310(3).
      In 1955, the Legislature amended the University's corporate charter
 and defined the University "as an instrumentality of the state [for the
 purpose of] providing public higher education."  1955, No. 66, { 1.  As an
 instrumentality of the state, the University falls within the plain meaning
 of the term "public body" under 1 V.S.A. { 310(3).  Defendants argue,
 however, that the Legislature exceeded its constitutional authority by
 bringing the University of Vermont within the scope of the Open Meeting Law.
 Relying on this Court's opinion in Doria v. University of Vermont, 156 Vt.
 114, 120, 589 A.2d 317, 320 (1991), defendants argue that UVM employees are
 not "officers of government" as provided by Chapter I, Article 6 (FN1) of the
 Vermont Constitution and cannot be made accountable to the mandates of the
 Open Meeting Law because it seeks to give effect to Article 6.  See 1 V.S.A.
 { 311(a).
      In Doria, a political candidate appealed from the dismissal of his suit
 against the University, alleging that a poll conducted by one of its profes-
 sors and his students violated his rights under Chapter I, Articles 6, 7 and
 8 of the Vermont Constitution.  We held that the appeal was moot but also
 stated that "[n]either the University nor its employees or officers are the
 'officers of the government whether legislative or executive,' as provided
 by Article 6."  156 Vt. at 120, 589 A.2d  at 320.  Aside from the factual
 distinctions between Doria and the present case, the quoted language does
 not prevent us from concluding that the University and its committees are
 subject to the Open Meeting Law.
      While Article 6 specifically refers to officers of government, this
 does not prevent the Legislature from holding public bodies, under the
 authority of officers of government, subject to the mandates of the Open
 Meeting Law.  The University is a creation of the Legislature and utilizes
 substantial public funds appropriated annually by the Legislature.  1955,
 No. 66 { 1.  Its trustees are identified and empowered by statute, and more
 than half the trustees are either elected by the Legislature or appointed by
 the Governor.  Id. { 2.  Its accounts are audited annually by the state
 auditor, 16 V.S.A. { 2281, and its land is exempt from taxation.  1955, No.
 66, { 7.  Further, the trustees must report annually to the Governor and
 General Assembly about work done in all departments of the University, and
 submit a complete financial report.  16 V.S.A. { 2536.  There is ample
 evidence to support the district court's conclusion that the officials of
 the University are "state-connected officials" and that their actions
 constitute "governmental actions."  Sprague v. University of Vermont,