Case Title: Medveskas v. Karparis

Citation: 161 Vt. 387, 640 A.2d 543

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
MEDVESKAS_V_KARPARIS.92-157; 161 Vt. 387; 640 A.2d 543

[Filed 28-Feb-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-157


 Zafa Medveskas                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Charles Karparis                             November Term, 1992



 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Patrick L. Biggam of Biggam, Fox & Skinner, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
    appellant

 Robert Halpert, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      JOHNSON, J.    Plaintiff-wife appeals from a superior court order
 dismissing her suit to recover on a money judgment obtained by her in the
 Massachusetts courts against defendant-husband for child support arrearages
 due pursuant to a Massachusetts child custody and support decree.  The issue
 on appeal is whether wife can recover on a Massachusetts contempt judgment
 based on a Massachusetts custody and support decree that modified a prior a
 Vermont custody and support decree without a finding of substantial change
 of circumstances.  We affirm.
      The parties were divorced by an order of the Washington Superior Court
 in 1974.  Originally, the court ordered joint custody of the three minor
 children, Charles, Jr., Andrew, and Zafa.  During the ensuing years, the

 

 parties filed several modification petitions.  As a result of one of these
 petitions, husband obtained physical custody of Charles, Jr.  In March 1977,
 husband brought a petition for modification in Washington Superior Court in
 which he sought custody of Andrew.  Wife obtained counsel and entered an
 appearance in this proceeding.  The court declined to resolve the petition,
 however, until after Andrew was evaluated by Washington County Mental Health
 Services.  In August 1977, the counselor recommended that Andrew live with
 husband.
      Subsequently, wife moved to Massachusetts with her new husband, Andrew,
 and Zafa.  On September 10, 1977, wife instituted an action in Massachusetts
 seeking custody of Andrew and Zafa.  On September 15, 1977, the
 Massachusetts court awarded wife temporary custody of Andrew and Zafa.
 Husband obtained counsel and appeared in the Massachusetts custody action.
      The two custody actions proceeded simultaneously, and Vermont
 pronounced judgment first.  On November 7, 1977, the Vermont court
 transferred custody of Andrew from wife to husband, and ordered that husband
 would be relieved of paying wife support payments of $25 per month for
 Andrew "[w]hen [he] obtain[ed] physical custody of Andrew."  Nevertheless,
 wife refused to relinquish custody of Andrew and he ultimately continued to
 reside with wife until his emancipation.  The court made no modification of
 support regarding Zafa, which continued at $25 per month.  Zafa also resided
 with wife until her emancipation.
      Following entry of the Vermont custody order, husband's Massachusetts
 counsel moved to dismiss the proceedings in that state, arguing res judicata
 and comity.  The Massachusetts court acknowledged that a Vermont court had
 given custody of Andrew to husband, but found that it was in the best

 

 interests of Andrew and Zafa to remain with wife.  On June 30, 1978, the
 Massachusetts court granted custody of Andrew to wife and ordered husband to
 make support payments of $25 per child per week.  The court also granted
 visitation rights to husband.
      In 1985, wife sought a contempt order in Massachusetts seeking support
 arrearages for both children under the June 30, 1978 Massachusetts custody
 order.  Husband failed to appear, and wife obtained a default contempt
 judgment for $18,952 on October 17, 1985.  Six years later, on July 3, 1991,
 wife filed a complaint in the Washington Superior Court seeking enforcement
 of the Massachusetts default judgment and requesting interest from October
 17, 1985 to July 3, 1991 in the amount of $12,887.36 and interest from the
 date of her complaint.  It is this suit on the Massachusetts contempt
 judgment that is the subject of this current Vermont action.
      The trial court dismissed plaintiff's suit.  The court found that
 normally, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
 Constitution,(FN1) the judgment that is last in time controls.  In this case,
 however, the court ruled that the last-in-time rule should yield because:
 (1) wife approached the court with unclean hands in that she was in contempt
 of court for refusing to comply with the November 7, 1977 Vermont custody
 order, and (2) the Massachusetts custody order was not based on a
 substantial change in circumstances, and thus was unenforceable.
 Consequently, the court found that the subsequent contempt proceeding based
 on the Massachusetts order was equally unenforceable.  This appeal followed.

 

      Essentially, the parties are advancing two inconsistent and competing
 custody orders that differ in two ways.  The Vermont order awards custody of
 Andrew to husband, while the Massachusetts order awards custody of Andrew to
 wife.  The Vermont order also obligates husband to pay support payments of
 $25 per month per child, whereas the Massachusetts order imposes that amount
 on a weekly basis.
      Ordinarily, we would turn to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. { 1738A, to resolve this dispute.  Shute v. Shute, 158 Vt.
 242, 245, 607 A.2d 890, 893 (1992).  When it was enacted in 1980, the PKPA
 established national standards for the enforcement and modification of child
 custody determinations.  The PKPA prohibits a state from exercising
 jurisdiction in any proceeding to determine custody when the action is filed
 during the pendency of a custody proceeding in the courts of another state,
 as long as the other state is acting consistently with the PKPA.  Id. {
 1738A(g).  It also prevents a second state, which would otherwise have
 jurisdiction over the matter, from modifying a foreign custody determination
 unless the original state no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to
 exercise its jurisdiction.  Id. { 1738A(f).  Otherwise, the PKPA requires
 states to enforce a foreign custody determination made consistently with the
 PKPA.  Id. { 1738A(a).
      If we were to apply the PKPA to this case, we could not enforce the
 Massachusetts custody order.  Vermont was the children's home state (FN2) at 

 

 the time of the divorce and Vermont would have had continuing jurisdiction to
 modify its custody order.  See id. { 1738A(c), (d).  Therefore,
 Massachusetts could not have modified that order absent exigent
 circumstances.  See id.  Moreover, Massachusetts exercised jurisdiction
 while a custody determination was pending in another state that was
 exercising jurisdiction consistently with the PKPA, which would have
 violated the PKPA.  See id. { 1738A(g).  The conflicting judgments, however,
 were entered prior to the enactment of the PKPA.  Thus, we must look to the
 law as it existed before the PKPA.
      Prior to the enactment of the PKPA, courts applied general conflict-
 of-laws principles to determine which of two conflicting judgments to
 enforce.  Wife argues that the Massachusetts judgment awarding her custody
 of Andrew and setting the child support level for Andrew and Zafa at $50 per
 week was valid and enforceable because it was later in time than the Vermont
 custody order and therefore superior under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
 of the United States Constitution, art. IV, { 1, and 28 U.S.C. { 1738.
 Husband counters that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not mandate
 recognition of a foreign judgment in the forum state when the forum state
 issued a prior, conflicting judgment binding the same parties with respect
 to the same subject matter.  Wife responds that husband's argument is
 without merit because Vermont custody orders are subject to modification,
 and thus are not entitled to full faith and credit.  Therefore, wife argues,
 the Massachusetts court was not required to grant full faith and credit to
 the prior Vermont custody order.

 

      Before addressing the parties' arguments, it is important to define the
 limits of this case.  As previously noted, all of the relevant judgments
 occurred prior to the passage of the PKPA.  Moreover, Andrew and Zafa are
 now emancipated.  This case is not about who should have custody of the
 children or whether they are being adequately supported.  Rather, the sole
 issue is child support arrearages.  Thus, we focus solely on the provisions
 for support in the Vermont and Massachusetts orders, and not on the findings
 or provisions regarding custody of Andrew.
      Wife is correct that Vermont custody orders are modifiable.  Vermont
 permits modification of a custody order if the petitioning party
 demonstrates a substantial change in material circumstances from the earlier
 decree.  Valeo v. Valeo, 132 Vt. 526, 527,