Case Title: STATE v SEADIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14573 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF MIIWANA 19 7 9 STATE: O F M)NTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, ERNEST SEADIN, ~efendant and Appellant. Appeal f m : District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Fbbert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Byron Boggs argued, Anaconda, Wntana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Mntana Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General, H e l e n a , Wntana Ted L. Mizner argued, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Wntana Subnitted: March 12, 1979 _. _ \ . . .. s i . - . Filed : 4 - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. On September 14, 1978, defendant moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Powell County, f o r an o r d e r dismissing t h e Information f i l e d a g a i n s t him because of t h e f a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e of Montana t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on Detainers. Sec- t i o n s 95-3131 through 95-3132, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 46- 31-101 through 46-31-102 MCA. The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e motion. O n October 2 , 1978, defendant was found g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e of escape. H e appeals. On A p r i l 15, 1977, defendant escaped from t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n while s e r v i n g concurrent t e r m s of f i v e and seven y e a r s imposed i n January 1975. H e was a r r e s t e d i n Colorado on another charge i n August 1977 and subsequently convicted. While a t t h e Denver County j a i l awaiting d i s - p o s i t i o n of t h e Colorado charge, defendant was served w i t h a d e t a i n e r charging him w i t h escape from t h e Montana S t a t e Prison. H e was subsequently t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e Colorado S t a t e P r i s o n a t Canyon C i t y b u t apparently t h e p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s w e r e n o t n o t i f i e d of t h e outstanding d e t a i n e r . Because t h e d e t a i n e r was n o t forwarded t o t h e p r i s o n , t h e p r i s o n o f f i - c i a l s would n o t a i d defendant i n processing t h e d e t a i n e r . Defendant then sought t h e a i d of another inmate a t t h e Colorado i n s t i t u t i o n . A motion f o r quick and speedy t r i a l was d r a f t e d and, on February 23, 1978, defendant s e n t c o p i e s of t h e motion t o t h e Clerk of t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r Powell County, t h e Warden of t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , and t h e County Attorney f o r Powell County. ilolores Munden, s u p e r v i s o r of r e c o r d s a t t h e I~Iontana S t a t e p r i s o n , subsequently t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e received a copy of t h e motion along with a copy of d e f e n d a n t ' s Colorado commitment on March 2, 1978. Defendant was r e t u r n e d t o Montana on Friday, 3larch 25, 1978, and an Information charg- i n g him w i t h escape was f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h e following Thursday. The m a t t e r was scheduled f o r t r i a l on May 15. The t r i a l was rescheduled f o r J u l y 17, and then rescheduled again f o r September 19. N o r e a s o n f o r t h e continuances appears i n t h e record. On September 6, counsel were n o t i f i e d t h a t t h e Septem- b e r 19 t r i a l s e t t i n g had been vacated. Defendant responded by moving t o dismiss t h e Information on t h e grounds t h a t he had n o t received a prompt d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e charge a s r e q u i r e d by t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on Detainers. The motion was denied. Defendant was t r i e d on October 2, 1978, approximately 210 days o r seven months a f t e r defendant had n o t i f i e d t h e o f f i c i a l s of h i s d e s i r e t o be t r i e d on t h e escape charge. The i s s u e presented f o r review i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o dismiss t h e Information charging him w i t h escape pursuant t o t h e pro- v i s i o n s of t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on Detainers. Defendant argues t h a t he should have been t r i e d w i t h i n t h e n e x t "term of c o u r t " a f t e r h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e S t a t e of Montana. H e argues t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o b r i n g him t o t r i a l w i t h i n t h r e e months v i o l a t e s t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on ~ e t a i n e r s as adopted i n Montana. The S t a t e contends t h a t t h e Agreement on ~ e t a i n e r s does n o t apply where a p r i s o n e r ' s t r a n s f e r t o t h e r e c e i v i n g s t a t e i s n o t f o r t h e purpose of e f f e c t i n g a prompt d i s p o s i t i o n of u n t r i e d charges t h e r e and i s not t o be followed by t h e p r i s o n e r ' s r e t u r n t o t h e sending s t a t e . The S t a t e goes on t o argue t h a t defendant's r e q u e s t d i d n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply with t h e Agreement's requirements because it d i d n o t include a c e r t i f i c a t e from Colorado a u t h o r i t i e s s t a t i n g " t h e term of [ h i s ] commitment, t h e time served and t h e time remaining t o be served, t h e amount of good t i m e defendant may have earned, and defendant's p a r o l e s t a t u s . " F i n a l l y , t h e S t a t e argues t h a t t h i s c a s e involves a speedy t r i a l question and t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e , t h e r e was no d e p r i v a t i o n of defendant's r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court r e c e n t l y addressed t h e provisions of t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on Detainers i n United S t a t e s v. Mauro (1978), 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L Ed 2d 329. Noting t h a t t h e agreement has been adopted by 46 s t a t e s , t h e Court went on t o s t a t e t h e following: "The Agreement . . . i s designed ' t o encourage t h e expeditious and o r d e r l y d i s p o s i t i o n of . . . charges [outstanding a g a i n s t a p r i s o n e r ] and de- termination of t h e proper s t a t u s of any and a l l d e t a i n e r s based on u n t r i e d indictments, informa- t i o n s , o r complaints.' A r t . I. I t p r e s c r i b e s procedures by which a member S t a t e may o b t a i n f o r t r i a l a prisoner i n c a r c e r a t e d i n another mem- ber j u r i s d i c t i o n and by which t h e p r i s o n e r may demand t h e speedy d i s p o s i t i o n of c e r t a i n charges pending a g a i n s t him i n another j u r i s d i c t i o n . I n e i t h e r case, however, t h e provisions of -- t h e Agree- ment a r e t r i g g e r e d only when a ' d e t a i n e r ' i s -- - - f i l e d with -- t h e c u s t o d i a l (sending) S t a t e b y y another S t a t e (receiving) having u n t r i e d charges pending a g a i n s t t h e prisoner; t o o b t a i n temporary custody, t h e receiving S t a t e must a l s o f i l e an appropriate ' r e q u e s t ' with t h e sending S t a t e . " (Emphasis added.) 436 U.S. a t 343-44, 98 S . C t . a t 1838, 56 L Ed 2d a t 336. The provisions of t h e agreement, t h e r e f o r e , bind t h e r e - ceiving s t a t e when t h e d e t a i n e r i s f i l e d . Two q u e s t i o n s arise a t t h i s p o i n t . The f i r s t i s whe- t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r speedy t r i a l s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied w i t h t h e requirements of t h e A c t . W e f i n d t h a t it d i d . I n Rockmore v. S t a t e (1974), 21 Ariz.App. 388, 519 P.2d 877, t h e Arizona Supreme Court addressed a similar i s s u e . The s t a t e had argued t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p e t i t i o n was incomplete because it was n o t accompanied by a c e r t i f i c a t e a s r e q u i r e d by A r t i c l e I11 and t h a t t h e defendant had n o t had t h e sending state, C a l i f o r n i a , o f f e r t o d e l i v e r t e m - porary custody a s r e q u i r e d by A r t i c l e V. The c o u r t found no m e r i t i n t h e s e arguments because t h e o f f i c i a l s of t h e sending state a r e r e q u i r e d t o send t h e c e r t i f i c a t e and an o f f e r of custody. Relief should n o t be denied a defendant when o f f i c i a l s of t h e sending s t a t e f a i l t o comply with t h e p r o v i s i o n s t o which they a r e bound. Rockmore, 519 P.2d a t 879. I n s o f i n d i n g , t h e c o u r t c i t e d ~ r t i c l e I X of t h e Agreement which provides t h a t " [ t l h i s agreement s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y construed s o a s t o e f f e c t u a t e i t s purposes." I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e it appears t h a t defendant d i d a l l t h a t he could do t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Agree- ment. The S t a t e invoked t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Agreement by lodging t h e d e t a i n e r and by o b t a i n i n g custody of defendant i n accordance w i t h t h e Agreement's p r o v i s i o n s . W e f i n d , then, t h a t under t h e circumstances of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t ' s s u b s t a n t i a l compliance w i t h t h e Agreement's procedure invoked t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Agreement. The second q u e s t i o n w e must address concerns t h e mean- i n g of t h e phrase " n e x t t e r m of c o u r t " a s it appears i n A r t i c l e I11 of Montana's v e r s i o n of t h e Agreement. The Agreement a s adopted i n most s t a t e s provides: ". . . h e s h a l l be brousht t o t r i a l w i t h i n one - - - - - - - - - - hundred e i g h t y days a f t e r h e s h a l l have cause t o be d e l i v e r e d t o t h e prosecuting o f f i c e r and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o u r t of t h e prosecuting o f f i c e r s j u r i s d i c t i o n w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e p l a c e of h i s imprisonment and h i s r e q u e s t f o r a f i n a l dispos- i t i o n t o be made of t h e indictment, information o r complaint . . ." (Emphasis added.) A r t . 111, I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on Detainers. Montana's v e r s i o n s u b s t i t u t e s t h e phrase " a t t h e n e x t t e r m of c o u r t " f o r t h e uniform act's phrase " w i t h i n one hundred e i g h t y days." This s u b s t i t u t e d phrase has never been con- s t r u e d by t h i s Court. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 93-315, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 3-5-401 MCA, d e f i n e s t h i s phrase: "The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of each county which i s a judi- c i a l d i s t r i c t by i t s e l f has no terms, and must be always open f o r t h e t r a n s a c t i o n of b u s i n e s s , except on l e g a l holidays and n o n j u d i c i a l days. J u r i e s f o r t h e t r i a l of causes must be c a l l e d by t h e judge a s o f t e n as t h e p u b l i c business r e q u i r e s . -- I n each d i s t r i c t where two o r more c o u n t i e s are u n i t e d t h e --- judge thereof must f i x t h e t e r m of c o u r t i n each ----- -- county i n h i s d i s t r i c t , and t h e r e must b e a t least - --- f o u r t e r m s a y e a r i n each county. Any o r d e r of t h e ---- judge of such d i s t r i c t f i x i n g t e r m s of c o u r t s h a l l be f i l e d i n t h e o f f i c e of t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n each county of h i s d i s t r i c t , and s h a l l remain i n e f f e c t u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e judge; provided, t h a t nothing i n t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be construed t o p r e v e n t t h e c a l l i n g of a s p e c i a l t e r m of c o u r t , w i t h o r without a jury, when i n t h e opin- i o n of t h e p r e s i d i n g judge t h e same i s necessary. The d i s t r i c t judge may adjourn a t e r m of d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n one county t o a f u t u r e day c e r t a i n , and i n t h e meantime hold c o u r t i n another county." (Emphasis added. ) Defendant contends t h a t s i n c e " t h e r e must be a t least f o u r t e r m s a year" each t e r m must be t h r e e months i n l e n g t h . The S t a t e argues t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t e r m s of c o u r t does n o t r e q u i r e t e r m s t o be of equal l e n g t h . Thus, t h e requirement of f o u r t e r m s could conceivably be s a t i s f i e d i n a d i s t r i c t w i t h t h r e e t e r m s of one day and one t e r m of 362 days. A problem would a r i s e i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s phrase a s applied t o a county which i s a j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t by i t s e l f i n t h a t , according t o t h e s t a t u t e , such a d i s t r i c t "has - no terms." But i n t h e i n s t a n t case, counsel f o r t h e S t a t e admitted during o r a l argument t h a t t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s - t r i c t comprises more than one county and has terms, though t h e length of t h e t e r m s i s not c o n s i s t e n t . The S t a t e a l s o admitted t h a t defendant was not t r i e d within t h e next term of c o u r t a f t e r he had submitted h i s request f o r d i s p o s i t i o n . A r t i c l e V(c) of t h e Agreement provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ". . . i n t h e event t h a t an a c t i o n on t h e . . . information . . . on t h e b a s i s of which t h e de- t a i n e r has been lodged i s not brought t o t r i a l within t h e periods provided by t h i s a c t , t h e appropriate c o u r t of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e . . . information . . . has been pending s h a l l e n t e r an order dismissing t h e same with prejudice and any d e t a i n e r based thereon s h a l l cease t o be of any force o r e f f e c t . " Therefore, defendant's conviction i s reversed. The D i s t r i c t Court i s i n s t r u c t e d t o e n t e r an order dismissing with preju- d i c e t h e information charging defendant with escape. W e concur: s h i e f Justice,, Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring: I concur in the result on the ground that institutional delay chargeable to the state denied defendant his right to a speedy trial. Chief Justice