Case Title: State v. Cuny

Citation: 534 N.W.2d 52

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
534 N.W.2d 52 (1995) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert W. CUNY, Defendant and Appellant. No. 18884. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs March 23, 1995. Decided June 28, 1995. *53 Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Patricia J. Froning, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee. Mark W. Grosshans, Office of Public Defender, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant. PER CURIAM. Following a court trial, Robert W. Cuny (Cuny) was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol. SDCL 32-23-1, SDCL 32-23-2. On appeal he contends that there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the stop of his automobile. We affirm. At 3:24 a.m. on January 22, 1994, Rapid City police dispatch received a 911 call. Dispatch heard a man and woman verbally fighting before the calling party hung up. Dispatch tried to call back, but no one answered. Dispatch directed two officers to the calling home where the hang-up-call came from. One minute later, at 3:25 a.m., dispatch received another 911 call from the same address. A female said, "I just had someone leave my house and he was threatening me." She related, "in [a] orange pickup, he's driving it. His name is Robert Cuny. He doesn't have a driver's license." The caller said, "He's leaving right now. He just left from the office at Lakota Homes. He's going up the street on Wambli, up toward (inaudible)." When asked whether he assaulted her, the female replied, "No. He just came to my house and he made verbal threats." After being told that officers were on the way, she said, "I want him to stop him and, because he's driving without a license." She also told the dispatcher that he was intoxicated. Dispatch immediately reported this information to the officers who were already enroute. "Moments later" the officers spotted an orange pickup within a few blocks of the origin of the 911 call. They called in the license plate number and found that it was registered to Susanna Cuny. Although the officers did not observe any violations or inappropriate operation of the pickup, they elected to stop the vehicle. Less than four minutes had elapsed between the first 911 call and the stop. DID THE POLICE HAVE A SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF A VIOLATION THAT JUSTIFIED THE STOP OF ROBERT CUNY'S AUTOMOBILE? In Graf v. Dept. of Commerce & Regulation, 508 N.W.2d 1, 2 (S.D.1993), the standards for automobile stops were rearticulated: Anderson, 331 N.W.2d at 570, (quoting People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44 (1975)). In Graf, 508 N.W.2d at 3-4, this Court found that the requirement of specific and articulable facts had not been met: In his brief to this Court Cuny contends that his case is similar factually to Graf. However, Cuny argues a selective view of the facts. When viewed collectively, the facts show that there was a reasonable basis for the stop. This case began with the receipt of a 911 call at 3:24 a.m. The caller did not directly speak to the 911 operator, but the operator heard a heated argument between a male and female before the caller hung up. The operator determined the location of the call and alerted the police officers who immediately began traveling to the scene. Within a minute, the female called back and gave the following information: The 911 operator relayed this information to the responding officers, who, within moments spotted the orange pickup, ran a license plate check and found that the car was registered to Susanna Cuny, and stopped the vehicle. Four minutes had elapsed between the first call and the stop. The orange pickup was stopped within a few blocks of the home where the 911 calls originated. Thus, the police received the following very specific information: a) suspected law violations (the verbal assault which the 911 operator actually heard and driving under the influence), b) a description of the vehicle and the name of the driver, c) the location of the vehicle and its direction of travel. Within moments of receiving this information, the police saw the vehicle in the area the call described. After running a license plate check and finding that it, too, corresponded within the caller's information, Cuny was stopped. The total time frame between *55 the 911 call and the stop was less than four minutes. Thus, the police did have sufficient information to create a reasonable suspicion of a violation. Graf, supra; State v. Kissner, 390 N.W.2d 58 (S.D.1986); State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D.1986); State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896 (S.D.1993). The judgment is affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., participating. KONENKAMP, J., disqualified. GILBERTSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was submitted did not participate.