Case Title: State v. Gideon

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6961

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Gideon, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6961.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6961 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. JAMES A. GIDEON, 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Gideon, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6961.] 
Medical license is a property right and threatened loss of the license is a form of 
coercion—R.C. 4731.22(B)—Coercion is not sufficient to warrant the 
suppression of statements made during a medical-board investigative 
interview unless defendant’s belief that he would lose his license if he failed 
to participate in the medical-board interview and answer questions 
truthfully is both subjectively believed and objectively reasonable—Court 
of appeals erred by finding that assignment of error relating to the 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was moot under App.R. 12(A)(1)(c)—
Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
(No. 2019-1104—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided December 15, 2020—
Reconsideration Granted and Slip Opinion Reissued December 31, 2020.1) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, 
Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, and 1-18-29, 2019-Ohio-2482. 
__________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In Ohio, a medical doctor has a statutory duty to answer truthfully 
questions posed by an investigator of the state medical board.  The question 
presented in this appeal is whether the state may use incriminating answers given 
by a doctor during a medical-board investigation in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that doctor.  We conclude that a medical license is a property right 
and that the threatened loss of the license is a form of coercion that can compromise 
the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  That said, in order for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the 
suppression of statements made during a medical-board investigative interview, 
first, the person making the statements must subjectively believe that asserting the 
privilege against self-incrimination could cause the loss of the person’s medical 
                                          
 
1. On December 15, 2020, this court issued its judgment and original opinion in this case.  Appellee 
and cross-appellant, James Gideon, filed a motion for reconsideration asserting as follows: 
 
(1) 
This court incorrectly deferred to the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding both prongs of 
the Graham test (for adjudicating Garrity claims), see State v. Graham, 136 Ohio St.3d 125, 
2013-Ohio-2114, 991 N.E.2d 1116; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 
L.Ed.2d 562 (1967); and 
(2) 
This court should clarify its remand order to require the Third District Court of Appeals to 
adjudicate Gideon’s other assignments of error because this court’s decision “un mooted” his 
remaining assignments of error. 
 
We grant Gideon’s motion to reconsider.  This reissued opinion clarifies that this court 
conducted an independent review when we reached the conclusion that Gideon did not satisfy the 
Graham test.  In addition, the opinion clarifies our previous remand language to instruct the court 
of appeals to consider Gideon’s other assignments of error that were deemed moot. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
license, and second, that belief must be objectively reasonable.  In this case, the 
doctor’s belief that he could lose his medical license if he refused to answer 
truthfully questions posed by the medical-board investigator was not objectively 
reasonable.  Because the court of appeals reached a contrary conclusion and held 
that statements made by the doctor were inadmissible at trial, we reverse. 
{¶ 2} We also conclude that the court of appeals erred by determining that 
its remand order mooted an assignment of error relating to the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  An assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is 
potentially dispositive of a defendant’s conviction and may not be rendered moot 
by a remand on any other assignment of error. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 3} Appellee and cross-appellant, James Gideon, was licensed as a 
physician by the State Medical Board of Ohio and maintained a practice in 
rheumatology.  In 2017, three of his patients accused him of inappropriately 
touching them during office visits.  Two investigations were opened: one by the 
local police and one by an investigator working for the state medical board.  
Although Gideon told the police that he did not inappropriately touch any patients, 
the investigator told the police that Gideon admitted to misconduct.  The 
investigator shared that information with the police as the medical board is 
authorized to do under R.C. 4731.22(F)(5). 
{¶ 4} The state charged Gideon with three third-degree misdemeanor 
counts of sexual imposition in three separate cases that were consolidated for trial.  
Gideon moved to suppress the statements that he had made to the investigator as 
having been illegally compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  He argued that because he believed he was required to submit 
to the interview by the medical board and answer the investigator’s questions or 
risk losing his medical license, the medical-board investigator coerced his 
admissions with the threat of losing his medical license.  The trial judge denied the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
motion to suppress, concluding that Gideon “made voluntary statements during a 
noncustodial interview.”  A jury found Gideon guilty in all three cases.  The trial 
court imposed a jail term of 60 days in each case and ordered the sentences to run 
consecutively to each other. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals reversed the 
convictions.  The court of appeals determined that the trial court should have 
granted Gideon’s motion to suppress consistent with Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 
U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), which held that statements obtained 
from a public employee under threat of job loss are unconstitutionally coerced and 
inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings.  The court noted that Gideon had 
a statutory duty to answer truthfully all questions posed by the medical-board 
investigator and that the investigator “created an impression that Gideon’s refusal 
to cooperate with his investigation would result in the type of penalty prohibited 
under Garrity,” 2019-Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, ¶ 51. 
{¶ 6} Both the state and Gideon appealed the appellate court’s judgment.  
The state offers this proposition of law:  
 
When a non-government employee gives a statement to an 
administrative board/licensing agency governed by the state, and 
when there is no threat of loss of employment or removal from 
office, that statement is not subject to Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 
U.S. 493 (1967). 
 
{¶ 7} Gideon offers two cross-propositions of law:  
 
(1) A licensing board investigator’s intent to assist law 
enforcement in obtaining a criminal conviction for the purpose of 
influencing the outcome of an administrative-sanction proceeding 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
against a licensee is a factor strongly weighing in favor of a finding 
that the licensee had an objectively reasonable belief that assertion 
of his Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination would 
expose him to revocation of his license and loss of his livelihood. 
(2) Under App.R. 12(A)(C), a court of appeals has a duty to 
adjudicate any assignment of error that raises a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction or that 
involves a claim of error that is likely to again become an issue 
during proceedings upon remand. 
 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
{¶ 8} We will first address the state’s proposition of law together with 
Gideon’s first cross-proposition of law.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.”  Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides 
the same protection: “No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a 
witness against himself * * *.”  “The Amendment not only protects the individual 
against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal 
prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in 
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”  Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 
U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). 
{¶ 9} Because a witness may voluntarily testify to matters which may be 
incriminating, the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing.  The 
witness seeking the privilege must “claim it.”  United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 
424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943).  If the witness answers a question, the 
answer will be considered voluntary.  See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).  Gideon did not assert the privilege against 
self-incrimination during his interview with the medical-board investigator. 
{¶ 10} At times, when it is necessary to “safeguard the core constitutional 
right protected by the Self-incrimination Clause,” an assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination is not required.  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770, 
123 S.Ct. 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003) (plurality opinion).  An exception to 
asserting the privilege exists for statements made during custodial interrogations in 
which the state undermines the privilege by physically or psychologically coercing 
a suspect.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-450, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
{¶ 11} The right to remain silent can also be infringed by coercion when 
there is a penalty for asserting the right.  In Garrity, the attorney general 
investigated police officers for fixing traffic tickets.  Although advised of their right 
to remain silent, the officers also were told that refusing to answer questions would 
lead to the termination of their employment.  The officers answered questions and 
the state used some of their answers against them in a subsequent criminal case.  
The U.S. Supreme Court observed that “[t]he option to lose their means of 
livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice 
to speak out or to remain silent.”  Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 
562.  The court thus held that the confessions were not voluntary but coerced and 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the use of the statements in subsequent 
criminal proceedings.  Id. at 497-498, 500. 
{¶ 12} Unlike the officers in Garrity, Gideon is not a public employee.  He 
was a medical doctor in private practice.  As a practicing physician, he was subject 
to licensure by the state medical board.  See R.C. 4731.17(B) (state medical board 
shall issue licenses to practice medicine).  Gideon’s medical license constitutes a 
liberty and property interest subject to due-process protections.  Watts v. Burkhart, 
854 F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir.1988) (“the freedom to pursue a career is a protected 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
liberty interest, and * * * state regulation of occupations through a licensing process 
gives rise to protected property interests”); see also Flynn v. State Med. Bd., 2016-
Ohio-5903, 62 N.E.3d 212, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). 
{¶ 13} The medical board has disciplinary authority over medical doctors 
and may “limit, revoke, or suspend a license or certificate to practice or certificate 
to recommend, refuse to issue a license or certificate, refuse to renew a license or 
certificate, refuse to reinstate a license or certificate, or reprimand or place on 
probation the holder of a license or certificate * * *.”  R.C. 4731.22(B).  Among 
the reasons listed for exercising the authority to impose such sanctions is the 
“[f]ailure to cooperate in an investigation” and the “failure to answer truthfully a 
question presented by the board in an investigative interview * * *.”  R.C. 
4731.22(B)(34). 
{¶ 14} The state’s threat to impose a legal penalty for the failure to give 
truthful responses in a state-medical-board investigation is coercive.  This threat 
puts a medical doctor in the position of having to choose between two rights: the 
property right in the medical license or the privilege against self-incrimination.  See 
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 512, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967) (private-
practice lawyer could not be disbarred for refusing to testify at a judicial inquiry 
into professional misconduct). 
{¶ 15} A different approach is required when, as here, the person under 
investigation has not been “expressly confronted * * * with the inescapable choice 
of either making an incriminatory statement or being fired,” State v. Graham, 136 
Ohio St.3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, 991 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 23.  When incriminating 
statements are not coerced by the direct threat of job termination, we apply an 
“objectively reasonable” “subjective belief” test.  Id.  Under that test, statements 
are compelled by threat of discharge if (1) a person subjectively believed that 
asserting the privilege would lead to discharge and (2) that belief was objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 16} Applying the Graham test, the trial court found that while Gideon 
testified that he subjectively believed that he would “be penalized” with the loss of 
his medical license if he did not answer questions posed by the medical-board 
investigator, his belief was not objectively reasonable. 
{¶ 17} In Graham, we explained that the objective reasonableness of a 
defendant’s belief that disciplinary action will result unless the defendant 
cooperates requires a showing of “some demonstrable coercive action by the state 
beyond ‘[t]he general directive to cooperate.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Graham at ¶ 23, 
quoting United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir.2002).  We 
further explained that “ ‘ordinary job pressures, such as the possibility of discipline 
or discharge for insubordination, are not sufficient to support an objectively 
reasonable expectation of discharge.’ ”  Id., quoting People v. Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367, 
1372 (Colo.1997). 
{¶ 18} Gideon did not establish through evidence that coercive action by 
the medical-board investigator had occurred.  The trial court found no evidence that 
the medical-board investigator informed Gideon that “he must waive his rights 
against self-incrimination or subject himself to discharge or revocation of his 
license.”  And neither Gideon nor the investigator mentioned during the interview 
anything that suggested Gideon could lose his medical license if he refused to 
comply with the investigator’s questioning. 
{¶ 19} Besides the lack of evidence showing that Gideon had an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that he could lose his medical license, the trial court 
correctly found that R.C. 4731.22(B), which requires a doctor’s cooperation in an 
investigation, does not subject that doctor “to an automatic suspension or 
revocation” of a license should the doctor exercise the right to remain silent.  
Although that section speaks in mandatory terms about discipline for certain 
violations (the board “shall” impose one of the listed sanctions), discipline is not 
automatic.  It requires the affirmative vote of “not fewer than six” medical-board 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
members to impose discipline for one of the reasons listed in R.C. 4731.22(B).  And 
even when the medical board determines that a doctor has committed a violation, 
revocation of a medical license is not a required sanction—it is one of several 
sanctions available to the board.  See R.C. 4731.22(B).  In Gideon’s case, there was 
no direct threat of discipline for failure to cooperate; he faced only the possibility 
of discipline. 
{¶ 20} The Third District disagreed: “the trial court did not capture the 
concept of [R.C. 4731.22] and, more importantly, failed to consider the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding Gideon’s interview * * *.”  (Emphasis sic.)  2019-
Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 21} Yet the trial court did consider the circumstances surrounding the 
interview.  In its findings of fact, the trial court observed that Gideon sounded 
“eager to speak” with the investigator despite having no notice of the investigator’s 
visit.  Gideon declined the investigator’s offer to reschedule the interview.  Because 
the interview occurred in Gideon’s office, the investigator told Gideon that he 
would pause the interview so that Gideon could see waiting patients.  The trial court 
found that Gideon “took the lead initially in the interview and described his 
techniques with his patients prior to any substantive questions being posed by the 
investigator.”  Although Gideon testified during the suppression hearing that the 
surprise nature of the interview denied him the ability to refresh his memory of the 
specific patients, the trial court determined that Gideon “was able to give a very 
detailed account of the treatments provided” and that only 18 minutes into the 
interview, Gideon “admitted to touching certain areas on the patients and 
succumbing to temptation.” 
{¶ 22} Appellate review of a suppression ruling involves a mixed question 
of law and fact.  State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 
N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.  “An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if 
they are supported by competent, credible evidence.”  State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 16.  “[T]he appellate court must then 
independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, 
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”  Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State 
v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997). 
{¶ 23} The court of appeals did not dispute the trial court’s factual findings.  
It believed, however, that the investigator acted as a “straw man” for the state.  
2019-Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, at ¶ 42.  While the board may share with law-
enforcement agencies any information it receives in an investigation, see R.C. 
4731.22(F)(5), cooperation with law-enforcement officials does not necessarily 
convert a medical-board investigation into a law-enforcement mission.  See State 
v. Jackson, 154 Ohio St. 3d 542, 2018-Ohio-2169, 116 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 21, citing 
Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 249, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015).  The 
investigator admitted that he agreed to share information with the police, but that 
does not mean that he acted for the primary purpose of furthering a criminal 
prosecution by the state.  The investigator interviewed Gideon for the primary 
purpose of determining whether Gideon was subject to disciplinary action by the 
medical board for engaging in the misconduct alleged by his patients. 
{¶ 24} We conclude that Gideon’s medical license is a property right and 
that the threatened loss of the license is a form of coercion that can compromise the 
United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  
That said, in order for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the suppression of 
statements Gideon made during a medical-board investigative interview, his belief 
that he would lose his license if he failed to participate in the medical-board 
interview and answer questions truthfully must be both subjectively believed and 
objectively reasonable.  In this case, based on our independent, de novo review of 
the facts and circumstances under which the investigator interviewed Gideon, we 
conclude that Gideon’s belief that a refusal to answer truthfully questions posed by 
the medical-board investigator could lead to the loss of his medical license was not 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
objectively reasonable.  We find, therefore, that Gideon has failed to satisfy the 
legal standard established in Graham. 
Duty to Adjudicate Assignments of Error 
{¶ 25} In his second cross-proposition of law, Gideon claims that the court 
of appeals erred by finding that his assignment of error relating to the sufficiency 
of the evidence on one count of sexual imposition was moot.  He argues that the 
appellate court’s remand on the suppression issue did not moot this assignment of 
error.  We agree. 
{¶ 26} App.R. 12(A)(1)(c) states that “[u]nless an assignment of error is 
made moot by a ruling on another assignment of error,” a court of appeals shall 
“decide each assignment of error and give reasons in writing for its decision.”  An 
assignment of error is moot when it cannot have “ ‘any practical legal effect upon 
a then-existing controversy.’ ”  Culver v. Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 393, 83 
N.E.2d 82 (7th Dist.1948), quoting Ex parte Steele, 162 F. 694, 701 
(N.D.Ala.1908).  Put differently, an assignment of error is moot when an appellant 
presents issues that are no longer live as a result of some other decision rendered 
by the appellate court. 
{¶ 27} An assignment of error going to the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a criminal count is always potentially dispositive of that count.  While 
a reversal based on weight of the evidence does not preclude a retrial, a reversal 
based on insufficient evidence leads to an acquittal that bars a retrial.  See State v. 
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), citing Tibbs v. Florida, 
457 U.S. 31, 47, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).  “Because ‘the state is not 
entitled to retry a criminal defendant after reversal for trial court error if the state 
failed in the first instance to present sufficient evidence * * * a defendant’s assigned 
error that the conviction is based on insufficient evidence is not moot under these 
circumstances.’ ”  (Ellipsis added in Mathis.)  State v. Mathis, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 
L-18-1192, 2020-Ohio-3068, ¶ 78, quoting State v. Vanni, 182 Ohio App.3d 505, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
2009-Ohio-2295, 913 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.); see also State v. Croskey, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107772, 2019-Ohio-2444, ¶ 9 (errors which could result in an 
acquittal must be separately addressed). 
{¶ 28} In State v. Brewer, 113 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-2079, 865 
N.E.2d 900, we determined that the court of appeals erred by refusing to consider 
an assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence after it had 
determined trial error warranted reversal of the defendant’s conviction.  A jury had 
found Brewer guilty of gross sexual imposition.  On direct appeal, he raised nine 
assignments of error, including that hearsay testimony was improperly allowed by 
the court and that the state failed to offer sufficient evidence.  State v. Brewer, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87701, 2006-Ohio-6029, ¶ 1.  The court of appeals determined 
that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony into evidence and ordered a 
new trial.  Id. at ¶ 13.  That finding led it to conclude that the remaining assignments 
of error were moot.  Id.  We summarily reversed that decision: “[t]he judgment of 
the court of appeals holding that the assignment of error in which appellant 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence was moot is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of that assignment of error.”  
Brewer, 113 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-2079, 865 N.E.2d 900, at ¶ 2. 
{¶ 29} When a conviction is based on evidence that does not establish a 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court of appeals must vacate the 
conviction and double-jeopardy protection bars the defendant’s retrial for the same 
offense.  An assignment of error raising the sufficiency of the evidence is thus 
potentially dispositive of a particular count and cannot be moot.  When evaluating 
an  assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing 
court must consider all evidence admitted at trial, including the improperly 
admitted evidence that was the source of the reversal for trial error.  See State v. 
Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 24-26.  The court 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
of appeals erred by finding that Gideon’s assignment of error relating to the 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was moot under App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the Third 
District Court of Appeals.  We also remand the cause to that court to consider 
Gideon’s assignment of error relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, and 
because we reverse its judgment on the motion to suppress, the appellate court will 
now need to consider Gideon’s other assignments of error that were deemed moot. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., 
concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} The majority opinion states that the medical board can “ ‘limit, 
revoke, or suspend’ ” a license to practice medicine if the licensee fails to 
“ ‘cooperate in an investigation’ ” or “ ‘answer truthfully a question presented by 
the board in an investigative interview.’ ”  Majority opinion at ¶ 13, quoting R.C. 
4731.22(B).  The majority opinion concludes that appellee and cross-appellant, 
James Gideon, subjectively believed that he could lose his license if he failed to 
cooperate or to answer questions truthfully.  I agree.  See R.C. 4731.22(B)(34).  
Based on the language of R.C. 4731.22(B), Gideon’s subjective belief that he could 
lose his license was well-founded.  But the majority opinion further concludes that 
Gideon’s subjective belief was not objectively reasonable because he did not 
demonstrate “ ‘coercive action by the state beyond “[t]he general directive to 
cooperate.” ’  (Brackets sic.)  [State v. Graham, 136 Ohio St.3d 125, 2013-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
2114, 991 N.E.2d 1116,] ¶ 23, quoting United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315, 
1324 (11th Cir.2002).”  Majority opinion at ¶ 17.  I disagree. 
{¶ 32} The majority concludes that the “investigator interviewed Gideon 
for the primary purpose of determining whether Gideon was subject to disciplinary 
action by the medical board for engaging in the misconduct alleged by his patients,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 23.  The well-written and unanimous opinion of the court of 
appeals thoroughly explicates why the majority’s characterization of the 
investigator’s interview of Gideon is untenable: 
 
 
 
The evidence in the record reflects that the circumstances 
surrounding the administrative investigation at issue in this case 
show some demonstrable, coercive action by the state beyond the 
general directive to cooperate.  Indeed, the combination of Gideon’s 
duty to cooperate under R.C. 4731.22(B)(34) and Investigator 
Yoakam’s process in this case exceeded an ordinary job pressure to 
cooperate.  As we have noted, R.C. 4731.22(B)(34) requires 
licensees to cooperate with investigations of the board.[2 (originally fn.8)]  
                                          
 
2. The following language appears as footnote 8 in the court of appeals’ opinion: 
 
It appears that the State contends that R.C. 4731.22(B)(34)’s duty to 
cooperate requires only that a subject answer truthfully questions posed by an 
investigator of the board during an interview.  Compare United States v. 
Goodpaster, 65 F.Supp.3d 1016, 1029 (D.Or.2014) (noting that “[a]n order to 
‘cooperate’ demands more of the reasonable employee than an order merely to be 
‘truthful’ ”), citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 
L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (observing that “Murphy’s probation condition [to be 
truthful] proscribed only false statements”). That is, the State argues that “[t]elling 
falsehoods * * * is different than remaining silent, and the Fifth Amendment is 
not implicated.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 6).  However, the text of that subsection of 
the statute states that a subject must cooperate in investigations of the board.  R.C. 
4731.22(B)(34) proceeds to provide a non-exhaustive list of ways in which a 
subject must cooperate with an investigation of the board—only one of which is 
to provide truthful answers to questions presented by the board in an investigative 
interview.  See In re Hartman, 2 Ohio St.3d 154, 155-156, 443 N.E.2d 516 (1983) 
(noting that the word “ ‘including’ implies that that which follows is a partial, not 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
Compare [United States v. Goodpaster, 65 F.Supp.3d 1016, 1029 
(D.Or.2014)] (noting that “Goodpaster was subject to a regulation 
* * * requiring that he ‘cooperate with all audits, reviews, and 
investigations conducted by the Office of Inspector General’ ”), 
quoting 39 C.F.R. 230.3(a).  R.C. 4731.22(B) puts licensees on 
notice that their failure to cooperate, amongst other reasons, will 
penalize their license (by a vote of no fewer than six members of the 
board).  Compare id. (“The same regulation provides that ‘failing to 
cooperate [* * *] may be grounds for disciplinary or other legal 
action.’ ”), quoting 39 C.F.R. 230.3(a). 
 
Further, in addition to R.C. 4731.22(B)(34)‘s directive to 
cooperate with the board’s investigation, the record reflects “some 
demonstrable action of the state” supporting Gideon’s subjective 
belief.  See [People v. ]Sapp[, 934 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Colo.1997)]; 
[United States v. ]Camacho[, 739 F.Supp 1504, 1518 (S.D.Fla.)].  In 
this case, the demonstrable action of the State lies with Investigator 
Yoakam’s conduct and his intent underlying that conduct.  Compare 
Camacho, 739 F.Supp. at 1518-1519 (construing the evidence in the 
record reflecting the “actions of the investigators” to determine 
whether there was “demonstrable state conduct” and, thus, whether 
the defendants’ beliefs that they would penalized for asserting their 
Fifth Amendment rights were objectively reasonable). 
 
At the suppression hearing, Investigator Yoakam testified to 
the extent that he collaborated with law enforcement as part of his 
                                          
 
an exhaustive listing of all that is subsumed within the stated category.  
‘Including’ is a word of expansion rather than one of limitation or restriction.”). 
 
(Emphases, brackets, and ellipses sic.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
investigation—that is, he specifically stated that the investigation of 
Gideon “turned into a joint investigation.”  (Aug. 22, 2017 Tr. at 4); 
(Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 7, 20-21).  Indeed, Sergeant Hochstetler 
concurred that he and Investigator Yoakam agreed “to cooperate 
with each other” during the course of their investigations.  (Oct. 13, 
2017 Tr. at 51-52).  By cooperating, Sergeant Hochstetler clarified 
that meant that he and Investigator Yoakam would share 
information.  Investigator Yoakam elaborated that the Revised Code 
permits him to share information obtained as part of his 
investigations with law enforcement and that he will share such 
information if there is “a shared interest.”  (Id. at 19-20).  
Investigator Yoakam further testified that he shared the information 
he collected (regarding Gideon) with the Bluffton Police 
Department. 
 
Undeniably, R.C. 4731.22(F) provides, in relevant part, the 
following: 
“(3) In investigating a possible violation of this chapter or 
any rule adopted under this chapter, * * * the board may question 
witnesses, conduct interviews, administer oaths, order the taking of 
depositions, inspect and copy any books, accounts, papers, records, 
or documents, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance of 
witnesses and production of books, accounts, papers, records, 
documents, and testimony, except that a subpoena for patient record 
information shall not be issued without consultation with the 
attorney general’s office and approval of the secretary and 
supervising member of the board. 
“* * * 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
“(4) All * * * investigations * * * of the board shall be 
considered civil actions for the purposes of section 2305.252 of the 
Revised Code. 
“(5) * * * 
The board may share any information it receives pursuant to 
an investigation * * * with law enforcement agencies, other 
licensing boards, and other governmental agencies that are 
prosecuting, adjudicating, or investigating alleged violations of 
statutes or administrative rules.” 
R.C. 4731.22(F)(3)-(5) (Apr. 6, 2017) (current version at R.C. 
4731.22(F)(3)-(5) (Mar. 20, 2019)).[3 (originally fn.9)]  
 
Thus, while there is nothing inherently wrong with 
Investigator Yoakam and law enforcement’s agreement to share 
information, the evidence in the record reveals that Investigator 
Yoakam exceeded statutorily permissible collaboration by taking 
demonstrable steps to coerce Gideon to provide him an 
incriminating, oral and written statement in reliance on Gideon’s 
duty to cooperate.  In other words, Investigator Yoakam was posing 
                                          
 
3. The following language appears as footnote 9 in the court of appeals’ opinion: 
 
R.C. 2305.252 applies to peer-review privilege.  See, e.g., Cousino v. 
Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 6th Dist. Lucas, 2018-Ohio-1550, 111 N.E.3d 529, 
¶ 15 (“The purpose of this statute is to protect the integrity and confidentiality of 
the peer review process so that health care entities have the freedom to 
meaningfully review and critique—and thereby improve—the overall quality of 
the healthcare services they provide.”).  The statute also applies the peer-review 
privilege to only the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”); however, the 
statute excepts the BWC to “share proceedings and records within the scope of 
the peer review committee * * * with law enforcement agencies, licensing boards, 
and other governmental agencies that are prosecuting, adjudicating, or 
investigating alleged violations of applicable statutes or administrative rules.”  
R.C. 2305.252(B). 
 
(Emphasis and ellipsis sic.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
as a “straw man” to effectuate law enforcement’s criminal 
investigation.  See State v. Gradisher, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24716, 
2009-Ohio-6433, 2009 WL 4647378, ¶ 23 (Belfance, J., dissenting) 
(approving the “concern that government agents should not pose as 
‘straw men’ in order to effectuate police investigations”).  
Specifically, Investigator Yoakam contacted Sergeant Hochstetler 
prior to interviewing Gideon, and “discussed that [he] was going to 
hold off on the administrative investigation until [law enforcement 
determined] that [Investigator Yoakam] could interview [Gideon].”  
(Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 7-8).  Investigator Yoakam’s intention for 
sharing his investigative plan with law enforcement was to 
“determine how [law enforcement] was going to proceed with the 
criminal case” because proving an administrative-sanction case is 
easier “from a criminal conviction” as opposed to “through witness 
testimony.”  (Id. at 15-16).  That is, he elaborated that his method is 
“what they call a bootstrap on a criminal case that’s where a 
physician * * * is criminally charged, and the Board takes action on 
that criminal disposition, and the other [is] based on information 
gathered in the course of an investigation. Action that’s taken based 
on that.”  (Id. at 15). 
 
Prior to Investigator Yoakam’s interview of Gideon, 
Sergeant Hochstetler told Investigator Yoakam that Gideon “denied 
any improprieties during [law enforcement’s] interview” of Gideon.  
(Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 21, 55).  And, after discussing Gideon’s denials 
to law enforcement with Sergeant Hochstetler, Investigator Yoakam 
informed Sergeant Hochstetler that it would not be “appropriate” for 
law enforcement to jointly interview Gideon with Investigator 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
Yoakam.  (Id. at 28, 55-56).  Specifically, Investigator Yoakam 
testified that  
“doctor’s [sic] are obligated to cooperate in our investigation.  So 
[he] did not want that to * * * impede in * * * any of the criminal 
proceedings...And [he] didn’t want * * * there to be an issue that the 
doctor provided a statement with law enforcement present because 
the provider is obligated to cooperate in our investigations.” 
(Emphasis added.)  (Id. at 29).  (See also Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 55); 
(Defendant’s Ex. 4).  In other words, Investigator Yoakam’s method 
was to avoid a scenario in which his interview (of Gideon) could not 
be used as part of the criminal case because (as indicated by 
Investigator Yoakam) the lack of a criminal conviction would make 
his administrative-sanction case more cumbersome.  Compare 
Gradisher at ¶ 23 (Belfance, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that 
“government overreaching could easily occur by pushing off 
criminal investigations to state agents so as to bypass protection 
against the abridgement of an individual’s Fifth Amendment 
rights”); Camacho, 739 F.Supp. at 1519 (noting that the 
investigator’s action in purposely omitting “his preamble regarding 
voluntariness and compulsion * * * in order to avoid flagging the 
issue of voluntariness” “speaks louder” than any belief that the 
statements were voluntary and concluding that “the investigators’ 
central aim was to take a statement first and litigate its admissibility 
later”). 
 
Moreover, based on our review of the record, Investigator 
Yoakam’s intent for the investigation reflects the demonstrable state 
action necessary to support Gideon’s subjective belief that his 
medical license would be penalized if he failed to cooperate with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
Investigator Yoakam’s investigation.  Specifically, Investigator 
Yoakam’s interview of Gideon reflects his intent to assist law 
enforcement in obtaining a criminal conviction of Gideon for 
purposes of influencing the outcome the administrative-sanction 
case against Gideon. 
 
Even though he is not a law enforcement officer, Investigator 
Yoakam testified that he had law enforcement training and is 
familiar with the elements of offenses under the Revised Code, 
including sexual imposition.  Keeping his training in mind, 
Investigator Yoakam arrived unannounced to Gideon’s medical 
office to conduct his interview to catch him “off guard” “to get the 
truth out of [him].”  (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 5, 32-33).  Despite Gideon 
having patient appointments at the time of the visit, Investigator 
Yoakam did not advise Gideon that he did not have to speak with 
him that day or otherwise offer to reschedule—he merely asked 
Gideon “if he would have a few minutes to chat with” him.  (Id. at 
5).  (See also State’s Ex. A).  In other words, Investigator Yoakam 
did nothing to dissuade Gideon’s belief that he was statutorily 
obligated to cooperate with his investigation, which included 
consenting to Investigator Yoakam’s request to “chat.”  Compare 
Camacho at 1511 (“At no time during the interview or after did 
either Sergeant Green or Assistant State Attorney DiGregory make 
any effort to dissuade Sinclair of his view that he was compelled to 
give a statement or answer his question.”). 
 
(Emphases and ellipses sic; brackets added in citations and footnote numbers; 
remaining brackets sic.)  2019-Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, at ¶ 38-45. 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
{¶ 33} This analysis amply supports a conclusion that Yoakam’s 
investigation was improperly coercive under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 
87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967).  Although there is nothing wrong with 
Yoakam and the Bluffton Police Department sharing information, their approach 
suggests that Yoakam was strategically attempting to elicit information to benefit 
the Bluffton Police Department investigation.  This is tantamount to 
collaborating—not merely sharing information that was collected independently.  
If Yoakam had appeared at Gideon’s office with an officer from the Bluffton Police 
Department, the coercive nature of the investigation would have been manifest.  It 
is no less so here.  Yoakam was all but deputized to act for the benefit of the 
Bluffton Police Department.  Moreover, the court of appeals examined another way 
in which the interview demonstrates that Gideon had an objectively reasonable 
belief that his medical license was at risk if he did not cooperate: 
 
Investigator Yoakam advised Gideon at multiple points to “to go 
back to [law enforcement] and change his statement” to avoid facing 
possible falsification charges.  (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 22).  Investigator 
Yoakam’s insistence that Gideon return to law enforcement to 
change his statement is also evidence supporting Gideon’s belief 
that a refusal to give a statement will be met with a licensure penalty.  
That is, Investigator Yoakam’s insistence that Gideon provide law 
enforcement with a statement reflects an intent to coerce Gideon to 
cooperate with the investigation.  Indeed, (as raised during cross-
examination) if Investigator Yoakam was “just concerned about 
[the] medical investigation there would be no need to tell [Gideon] 
to go back to the police department and change his statement * * *.”  
(Id. at 22). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
(Brackets and ellipsis sic.)  2019-Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 34} The court of appeals also had appropriate concern that Yoakam’s 
conduct after the interview reflects his understanding that he and the Bluffton 
Police were engaged in a joint investigation, not a mere sharing of information: 
 
 
At the conclusion of the interview, instead of reporting back 
to the board, Investigator Yoakam immediately went to the Bluffton 
Police Department to report Gideon’s confessions to law 
enforcement.  (See Defendant’s Ex. 2).  Despite his employment 
responsibilities with the State Medical Board, Investigator Yoakam 
chose to immediately share Gideon’s confessions with law 
enforcement “because the doctor had [ ] an interview with [law 
enforcement] where he denied any impropriety so [he] wanted to tell 
[law enforcement] what happened during [his] interview.”  (Oct. 13, 
2017 Tr. at 26-27).  Moreover, Investigator Yoakam agreed that he 
“wanted to assist [law enforcement] in that criminal investigation by 
providing [law enforcement] with statements made by Dr. Gideon 
during an interview that same day * * *[.]” (Id. at 27). 
 
(Emphasis, brackets, and ellipsis sic.)  2019-Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, at ¶ 50. 
{¶ 35} I agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that  
 
based on the facts and circumstances presented by this case, 
Investigator Yoakam’s actions created an impression that Gideon’s 
refusal to cooperate with his investigation would result in the type 
of penalty prohibited under Garrity.  See Camacho at 1520 
(concluding “that the actions of the State were directly implicated in 
creating [the] belief” that the defendants’ subjective belief “that 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
failure to answer would result in termination”).  Therefore, Gideon’s 
belief that his medical license would be penalized if he did not 
cooperate with Investigator Yoakam’s investigation was objectively 
reasonable.  See id.  Thus, Gideon’s statements were not voluntary 
within the meaning of Garrity.  Accord Graham, 136 Ohio St.3d 
125, 2013-Ohio-2114, 991 N.E.2d 1116, at ¶ 30 (“Statements 
extracted under these circumstances cannot be considered voluntary 
within the meaning of Garrity.”) 
 
2019-Ohio-2482, 130 N.E.3d 357, at ¶ 51. 
{¶ 36} The circumstances of Yoakum’s interview demonstrate that it was 
coercive and therefore that Gideon’s subjective belief that he could lose his medical 
license if he did not answer was objectively reasonable.  Accordingly, I conclude 
that the trial court erred when it denied Gideon’s motion to suppress statements he 
made to Yoakam.  I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the court of appeals.  
I dissent. 
_________________ 
Nicole M. Smith, Lima Assistant City Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony 
M. DiPietro, Deputy Law Director, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
Dennis C. Belli, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
_________________