Case Title: State v. Denny

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91-219

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-219


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit
 Robert A. Denny
                                              June Term, 1992


 Joseph J. Wolchik, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 E. M. Allen, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      GIBSON, J.    Defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct
 with a child.  He argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting testi-
 mony by relatives of the victim and by an expert in child sexual abuse, and
 (2) the State's closing argument was unfairly prejudicial.  We affirm.
      Defendant lived in an apartment downstairs from the victim and her
 mother.  The victim, who was six years old, frequently visited defendant.
 During a visit in May 1990, defendant allegedly inserted his finger into her
 vagina and caused her to rub his penis.  The victim promptly reported the
 incident, and defendant was charged with sexual assault, 13 V.S.A. {
 3252(a)(3), and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, 13 V.S.A. { 2602.
      Before trial, the court denied defendant's motion to bar testimony
 from the victim's grandmother and great-grandmother regarding her behavior
 after the alleged abuse.  Defendant also challenged testimony by an expert
 witness describing common traits of children with post-traumatic stress
 disorder (PTSD).  Defendant conceded that the evidence was relevant, but
 argued that the testimony would violate V.R.E. 403 because it was
 cumulative and would be substantially more prejudicial than probative.  The
 court allowed the testimony, concluding that it was not cumulative and that
 effective cross-examination would protect defendant from unfair prejudice.
      At trial, defendant denied committing any offense.  In videotaped
 testimony, however, the victim specifically described the alleged conduct,
 although her testimony under cross-examination was unclear regarding whether
 defendant had inserted his finger into her vagina.
      The victim's mother testified that, after the alleged abuse, the victim
 talked like a baby, wet her pants and the bed, did not want to be left
 alone, and was "mouthy."  The mother also testified that, after moving
 residences, the victim frequently said that she did not want to be driven
 past their former apartment building because defendant still lived there.
 The victim's grandmother and great-grandmother testified that they too had
 observed changes in her behavior, including disobedience, bedwetting,
 nightmares, and refusing to approach her former home.
     Finally, the expert, a children's therapist, testified that children may
 suffer PTSD after experiencing a traumatic event such as sexual abuse.  She
 also testified that sexually abused children may have nightmares, regress
 developmentally, seek to avoid the situation or persons associated with the
 event, act out, and experience disassociation and amnesia.
      The jury found defendant not guilty of sexual assault, but guilty of
 lewd and lascivious conduct with a child.  In related arguments, defendant
 claims he was denied a fair trial because (1) the testimony of the victim's
 grandmother and great-grandmother was unfairly prejudicial, (2) the expert's
 testimony should have been excluded because it was elicited for the improper
 purpose of bolstering the victim's credibility, and (3) the State improperly
 enhanced the credibility of the victim in closing and rebuttal arguments.
      Defendant's first argument overlooks this Court's ruling in State v.
 Shaw, 149 Vt. 275, 279,