Case Title: State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Rardin

Citation: 

Docket Number: S53061

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: April 27, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the matter of
Jennifer Jeanette Rardin, a Minor Child,
STATE ex rel DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CHRIS ALLEN RARDIN,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 2590J; CA A125045; SC S53061)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 2, 2006.
James A. Palmer, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
petition for petitioner on review. 
Laura S. Anderson, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on
review.
Karen S. Torry, Forest Grove, argued the cause for the minor
child.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Tillamook County Circuit Court, Rick W. Roll, Judge. 202 Or App 603, 123 P3d 362 (2005).
BALMER, J.
The trial court in this case terminated father's
parental rights respecting child on the grounds that father was
unfit, ORS 419B.504, and that father had neglected child, ORS
419B.506. (1)  The trial court reached those conclusions based
on father's alleged failure to provide and implement a plan for
integrating child into his home.  The Court of Appeals initially
dismissed father's appeal in an unpublished order on the grounds
that it was untimely and that it failed to raise a colorable
claim of error.  This court reversed that decision and remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to address
father's appeal on its merits.  State ex rel Dept. of Human
Services v. Rardin, 338 Or 399, 110 P3d 580 (2005) (Rardin I). 
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
judgment, concluding that father was unfit because of his
previous absence from child's life.  State ex rel Dept. of Human
Services v. Rardin, 202 Or App 603, 123 P3d 362 (2005) (Rardin
II).  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.
This court may review a termination of parental rights
under a de novo standard, or it may choose to limit review to
questions of law.  ORS 19.415(4); see State ex rel SOSCF v.
Stillman, 333 Or 135, 138, 36 P3d 490 (2001) (so stating).  Here,
we limit our review to questions of law and rely on the factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals (which are
consistent with each other) as well as on facts in the record
that are undisputed and that are not inconsistent with the lower
courts' factual findings.  
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In January 1995, while parents were living together,
mother gave birth to the child that is the focus of this
proceeding.  Father signed the birth certificate as child's
father.  Mother and father separated when child was about 18
months old, and child remained with mother.  Father moved to
Washington.  At some point, mother told father that child was not
his. (2)  Mother was abusing drugs during this period of time. 
Because of mother's drug abuse, incarceration, and other
problems, the Department of Human Services (DHS) temporarily
removed child from mother's custody several times between 1997
and 2001.  
DHS located father in 1999 to discuss child's future
and the development of a relationship between father and child. 
Father, however, did not want to exercise his parental rights
until he could confirm his paternity through a DNA test.  Father
could not afford the $1,250 to $2,500 that he was told a DNA test
would cost, and DHS would not pay for the test.  Father also
contacted child services officials in Washington, but they, too,
would not help to pay for the test.  From 1999 until 2001, father
and DHS continued to correspond from time to time.
Father was particularly interested in confirming his
paternity through a DNA test because he had substantial doubts
about his paternity.  In addition to mother's statement to him
that he was not child's father, several of father's male
acquaintances had told father that they had had sex with mother
when father and mother were living together.  Moreover, state
officials had contacted father earlier in connection with another
woman's paternity allegation against him, and a DNA test had
disproved that claim.      
In December 2001, DHS informed father that it had
removed child from mother's custody again.  Father began
participating in court proceedings involving child and obtained
court-appointed counsel, although he continued to insist on
confirming his paternity before assuming parental
responsibilities.  On April 15, 2002, DHS wrote to father,
stating that it would provide him services to help him develop a
relationship with child and to assist with possible placement of
child in his home.  The letter requested that father contact DHS
by May 10, 2002.  However, and despite the statements in its
April 15, 2002, letter to father, DHS wrote to the court on April
29, 2002, indicating that it intended to seek to terminate the
parental rights of both father and mother. (3)  On May 13,
2002, DHS wrote to father, stating that it had decided to seek to
terminate his parental rights.  On May 14, 2002, (4) father had
a DNA test taken at a hospital lab in Dayton, Washington, and he
informed DHS of that fact in a letter dated that same day. (5) 
In that letter, father stated that, if the test was positive, he
wanted to develop a relationship with child.  
Father's May 2002 DNA test was positive, and father's
attorney so informed DHS that month.  Nevertheless, as noted, 
DHS already had determined in April, before it had heard from
father, that it would seek to terminate father's parental rights.
DHS refused to permit father to have contact with child but
encouraged him to send presents, cards, and letters to child
through DHS.  Father did so.  Later, DHS blocked the cards and
letters that father sent to child, although it eventually
forwarded them to her.
In October 2002, DHS filed a petition for termination
of father's parental rights.  DHS alleged that father was unfit
under ORS 419B.504 because he had failed to present a viable plan
for the return of child to his care and custody and because he
had abandoned child.  The petition also sought termination of
father's parental rights on the grounds of neglect, ORS 419B.506,
and abandonment, ORS 419B.508.
The trial court held a hearing and issued an opinion.  
The trial court found that father could provide a stable
environment for child's upbringing and that he had a plan for
child's schooling.  It found no problems with father's physical
or mental health, his living arrangements, or his parenting
abilities.  The trial court noted that DHS's "only concern about
[father] is his lack of a relationship with [child]."  That
concern also became the basis for the trial court's decision. 
The trial court credited a psychologist's observation that too
much time had passed for father to renew a relationship with
child.  The trial court stated, "[T]he evidence is uncontradicted
that a biological father should be integrated into a child's life
not later than the child's third birthday."  Based on that
testimony, the trial court concluded that father's "contact [with
child] came so late that [child] is not psychologically able to
accept him as a parent[.]"  That lack of contact with child –-
much of which, according to the trial court, was attributable to
choices that father had made –- meant that father had no
relationship with child and that therefore, in the court's view,
father was unable to present a viable plan for child's return to
him.
Based on that determination, the trial court reached
the following conclusion regarding the state's argument that
father was unfit under ORS 419B.504:
"[F]ather is unfit by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child and integration of
the child into the father's home is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change, including the following:  failure to present
a viable plan for the return of the child to the
parent's care and custody."
Similarly, the trial court agreed with the state that father's
parental rights should be terminated based on his neglect of
child under ORS 419B.506: (6)
"[F]ather has failed and neglected without reasonable
and lawful cause to provide for the basic physical and
psychological needs of the child for six months prior
to the filing of the petition as shown by his:  failure
to implement a plan designed to lead to the integration
of the child into the father's home."
As noted, father filed an untimely appeal, but he
sought to show that he had a colorable claim of error under ORS
419A.200(5)(a) that would excuse the late filing.  In an
unpublished order, the Court of Appeals rejected father's
argument and dismissed the appeal.  In Rardin I, this court
reversed the dismissal of father's appeal and remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals.  
On remand, the Court of Appeals, reviewing the evidence
in the record de novo, affirmed the trial court's judgment
terminating father's parental rights under ORS 419B.504.  The
Court of Appeals determined that father's "voluntary" absence
from child's life between 1996 and 2002 had had a seriously
detrimental effect on child; that father's absence had prevented
the formation of any relationship with child; and that "father's
conduct [had] allowed [child] to languish in an unsafe and
unstable environment with mother for years."  Rardin II, 202 Or
App at 609.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that
father was "unfit" and that his conduct was seriously detrimental
to child.  Id. at 609-10.  The Court of Appeals also found that
"integration of [child] into father's home within a reasonable
time would not be feasible."  Id. at 611.  Finally, the Court of
Appeals determined that it was in the best interests of child
that father's parental rights be terminated.  Id. at 612. (7) 
Father sought review, which we allowed.
TERMINATION FOR UNFITNESS UNDER ORS 419B.504
Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals both
concluded that father's parental rights should be terminated,
each court applied the statutes somewhat differently. 
Considering both the trial court decision and the decision on
appeal will illuminate our discussion of the statutes regarding
termination of parental rights.  We now turn to that task.
In justifying termination in this case, the courts
below relied first on ORS 419B.504, which provides:  
"The rights of the parent * * * may be terminated
* * * if the court finds that the parent [is] unfit by
reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to
the child * * * and integration of the child * * * into
the home of the parent * * * is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change."
ORS 419B.504 imposes two separate requirements before a
trial court may terminate a parent's rights:  parental unfitness
and the inability to reintegrate within a reasonable time.  In
Stillman, this court described those requirements as follows:
"First, the court must address a parent's fitness:  The
court must find that the parent is 'unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the
child.'  That, in turn, requires a two-part inquiry: 
The court must find that: (1) the parent has engaged in
some conduct or is characterized by some condition; 
and (2) the conduct or condition is 'seriously
detrimental' to the child.  Second -- and only if the
parent has met the foregoing criteria -- the court also
must find that the 'integration of the child into the
home of the parent or parents is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change.'  That second part of the test for
termination requires the court to evaluate the relative
probability that, given particular parental conduct or
conditions, the child will become integrated into the
parental home 'within a reasonable time.'"
Stillman, 333 Or at 145-46.  ORS 419B.504 also lists several
nonexclusive considerations that a court may use in determining
the "conduct" or "conditions" that constitute the basis for
finding unfitness. (8)
Here, the trial court concluded that the conduct or
condition demonstrating father's unfitness was that father "had
fail[ed] to present a viable plan for the return of the child to
[his] care and custody."  In the trial court's view, that
conclusion encompassed both of the requirements set out in ORS
419B.504.  In other words, the trial court concluded that,
because father had failed to present a viable plan, the state had
proved by clear and convincing evidence both statutory
requirements:  (1) that the parent is unfit because the parent
has engaged in conduct or is characterized by a condition that is
"seriously detrimental" to the child, and (2) that the
"integration of the child * * * into the home of the parent * * *
is improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or
conditions not likely to change."  In the court's view, "[a]s a
result of the delayed contact between [father] and [child], it is
not emotionally viable for [child] to be incorporated into
[father's] home within a reasonable time."  
We are sympathetic to the trial court's dilemma in
ruling on a petition to terminate parental rights in these
circumstances.  Father here did not exhibit any of the usual
indicia of unfitness that are listed in ORS 419B.504; yet father
also -- in part by his own choice -- had had no relationship with
child for seven years at the time of the hearing and almost eight
years at the time of the trial court decision. (9)  
However, the court may terminate parental rights only
when the statutory requirements have been met.  Here, the basis
on which the trial court grounded its termination of father's
parental rights is inconsistent with ORS 419B.504, which requires
that the inquiry first must focus on the parent's "unfitness,"
rather than the lack of a "viable plan."  See Stillman, 333 Or at
145 ("First, the court must address a parent's fitness[.]").  As
this court made clear in Stillman, termination of parental rights
under ORS 419B.504 requires that the state demonstrate both that
the parent is unfit and that the child cannot be integrated into
the parent's home within a reasonable time.  If the parent is not
"unfit," then the parent's rights may not be terminated.  The
trial court, however, appears to have used the asserted
difficulty of integration into father's home –- the second part
of the statutory test –- to conclude that father was unfit.  To
the extent that the trial court conflated those two distinct
requirements, it committed legal error.  Alternatively, to the
extent that the trial court maintained the distinction between
those legal requirements and instead simply found that the
testimony regarding parent-child bonding and father's lack of
contact with child made father "unfit," the trial court erred in
concluding that those facts can constitute "unfitness," as we
describe in greater detail below.
On de novo review, the Court of Appeals similarly
concluded that father was unfit because he had been absent from
child's life for six years.  Father's absence, in that court's
view, was seriously detrimental to child and rendered impossible
the integration of child into father's home within a reasonable
period of time.  Rardin II, 202 Or App at 609-11.  The Court of
Appeals, however, like the trial court, erred when it concluded
that father was "unfit" for purposes of ORS 419B.504 solely
because he declined to take responsibility for a child that he
had reason to believe (and, the trial court found, did believe)
was not his.  That behavior is not of the same type as the
directly harmful or threatening behaviors described in the non-exclusive list of considerations that the statute provides to
determine whether specific "conduct" or "conditions" render a
parent unfit.  The statutory list includes conduct such as abuse
of any child, ORS 419B.504(2), and "[c]riminal conduct that
impairs the parent's ability to provide adequate care for the
child."  ORS 419B.504(6).  It identifies conditions such as drug
or alcohol addiction that substantially impairs parental ability,
ORS 419B.504(3), and mental illness that renders the parent
unable to care for the child, ORS 419B.504(1).  Neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals found that father had engaged in
any such conduct or suffered from any such condition. 
Rather, both courts focused on father's lack of a
relationship with child as the basis for determining that father
was unfit.  The Court of Appeals, like the trial court,
emphasized testimony by a psychologist that child was confused
because father had been absent from her life for an extended
period and later had attempted to re-establish contact with her. 
Rardin II, 202 Or App at 609.  The Court of Appeals also found it
significant that father had allowed child to remain in an "unsafe
and unstable environment with mother for years[,] * * * despite
being her father[,]" although it noted that father may not have
been aware of child's situation until 1999.  Id.  For those
reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded that "although father may
finally be ready, willing, and able to be a father to [child],
father's current desire does not overcome his past indifference
to [child]'s welfare * * *."  Id. at 610.  On that basis, the
Court of Appeals concluded that father was unfit for purposes of
ORS 419B.504.
We do not agree that the facts described above prove by
clear and convincing evidence that father was unfit.  First,
although father became aware at some point in 1999 that child had
temporarily been removed from mother's custody, father's
awareness of the details of child's circumstances is unclear.  It
is undisputed that father was living in another state at the
time, and that, during some of the time when child was not in
mother's custody, child was with maternal grandparents or
stepfather.  Child undoubtedly would have been better off if
father had been involved in her life at that period, but, given
father's uncertain knowledge of the circumstances of child's
living situation, that evidence does not show that his conduct,
as opposed to mother's, was "seriously detrimental" to child. 
Second, as described above, during that time father reasonably
believed that he might not be child's biological father and
wanted to confirm his paternity before exercising his parental
rights.  Third, for the two years between father's DNA test and
the entry of the judgment terminating his rights, father was
unable to establish any relationship with child because DHS would
not permit it.  
Encompassing the considerations just discussed, and of
overriding significance in its own right, is the wording of ORS
419B.504, which requires the court to find "that the parent or
parents are unfit" before it may terminate parental rights under
that statute.  (Emphasis added.)  This court has held that the
legislature's use of the present tense in that part of ORS
419B.504 compels a court to consider whether a parent is "unfit
at the time of the termination hearing," not whether a parent was
unfit at some time in the past.  Stillman, 333 Or at 148
(emphasis in original).  In Stillman, for example, this court
concluded that father's past drug problems did not constitute
"conduct" or a "condition" that rendered him unfit at the time of
the termination hearing, given father's serious efforts to
address his drug problem.  Id. at 148-49.  Similarly, in State ex
rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 83, 106 P3d 627
(2005), this court held that a family's prior relationship with
three sex offenders did not constitute present unfitness, since
two of the offenders had died and the third had long since moved
out of the home.
It is clear from the wording of ORS 419B.504 and from
Stillman and Smith that the legislature assumes that parents can
change their conduct and that, if the change is both genuine and
lasting, the state may not terminate their parental rights for
unfitness.  At least, that appears to us to be the necessary
linguistic consequence of a statute that permits the termination
of parental rights only on grounds of present unfitness.  Here,
the record affirmatively demonstrates that father's conduct, even
if it had been detrimental to child earlier in child's life, had
changed.  Father wanted to become part of child's life, once he
knew that he was the biological father.  In addition, father
might have become part of child's life at a time that was more
beneficial to the child had DHS not barred him from directly
contacting child and decided to seek to terminate his parental
rights the very same month that father confirmed his paternity. 
The state responds that, even if father is not
presently "unfit" in the abstract and is not unfit to be the
parent of a different child, his lack of a relationship with
child for six years means that father never can be a fit parent
for this child.  The state relies, as did the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, on the testimony of a psychologist who told the
trial court that, to "'reintegrat[e] father into [child's] life,
the stable period * * * would have been before the age of three
for her to be able to have a security base and trust with him.'" 
Rardin II, 202 Or App at 610 (quoting psychologist's testimony). 
The psychologist seemed to opine -– and the courts below seemed
to have accepted -– that, even though father helped to raise
child for approximately 18 months, because he had been absent
from her life for the next 18 months (at which point she would
have been 3 years old) father never would have been able
successfully to reintegrate into her life.  Putting to one side
the validity of the psychologist's opinion, as to which we have
serious doubt, that opinion is flatly inconsistent with Oregon's
statutory scheme for terminating parental rights on the basis of
unfitness.  As noted, ORS 419B.504 assumes that parents can
change and allows a court to terminate parental rights for
unfitness, not when the parent's conduct or condition may have
made the parent "unfit" in the past, but only when the parent
presently is unfit.  A parent may be absent from the life of a
child for part or all of the child's first three years for
reasons as various as military service, overseas employment, or,
as here, separation from the parent with whom the child remains.  
ORS 419B.504 does not permit a court to conclude that a parent is
presently "unfit" by reason of conduct or condition seriously
detrimental to the child simply because the parent was not
integrated into the life of the child by the time that the child
was 3 years old.    
The state points out that, in some circumstances, a
parent's past conduct may be so egregious that parental rights
should be terminated, even if the court determines that the
conduct will not recur.  We agree, and we observe that a specific
statute provides for termination in just such circumstances.  ORS
419B.502 permits the termination of parental rights based on a
single (or recurrent) incident of "extreme conduct towards any
child," and it provides a non-exclusive list of factors for the
court to consider in determining extreme conduct, including sex
abuse of any child, abuse or neglect of any child resulting in
death or serious physical injury, and similar egregious conduct. 
See ORS 419B.502(1)-(7) (listing considerations for determination
of "extreme conduct").  The legislature thus provided a procedure
for terminating parental rights based upon past conduct, even
when the parent might be a "fit" parent at the time of the
termination proceeding.  However, under ORS 419B.504, the statute
at issue in this case, the parent's present fitness is
controlling.  For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that
the state failed to demonstrate the unfitness required to
terminate father's parental rights under ORS 419B.504. (10)  
OTHER GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
We turn now to the state's alternative grounds for
seeking termination of father's parental rights.  The trial court
concluded that the state also had proved "neglect" under ORS
419B.506, which authorizes termination when a parent has
"neglected without reasonable and lawful cause to provide for the
basic physical and psychological needs of the child * * * for six
months prior to the filing of a petition." (11)  However, the
only basis that the trial court judgment identified for its
finding of neglect was essentially the same as for its finding of
unfitness: father's "failure to implement a plan designed to lead
to the integration of the child into the father's home."  We fail
to see how the trial court's factual finding can meet the
statutory standard for neglect just quoted.  Moreover, until May
2002, father had reason to believe that he was not the biological
father of child.  When he finally received an ultimatum from DHS,
he obtained a DNA test within a month and sought to reestablish a
relationship with child.  In the same month, the state decided to
prevent father from exercising his parental rights, and then in
October 2002 it filed the petition to terminate those rights. 
Thus, to the extent that father failed to provide for child's
needs "for six months prior to the filing of [the] petition,"
that failure was "reasonable and lawful" within the meaning of
ORS 419B.506, because the state actively prevented father from
providing for child's needs.  There was no neglect.
The trial court, as noted, concluded that father's
conduct did not constitute "abandonment" under ORS 419B.508,
which provides for termination of parental rights when a child is
abandoned and the identity of the parent cannot be determined. 
The state does not contest that conclusion.  However, the state
argues that father effectively "abandoned" child through the
conduct -- including his prolonged lack of contact with child --
described above.  That abandonment, the state argues, constitutes
"unfitness" under ORS 419B.504. (12)  
We are sympathetic to the state's interest in requiring
parents to meet their parental obligations and in quickly
securing stable alternative arrangements when parents fail to do
so.  However, in our view, the structure of ORS 419B.504 is not
amenable to the state's argument.  As discussed in detail above,
that statute focuses first on whether a parent is presently
"unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to
the child."  A parent's past failure to establish or maintain a
relationship with child, standing alone, will not ordinarily be,
and on the facts here is not, sufficient to demonstrate that the
parent is presently unfit.  Moreover, the legal concept of
abandonment of a person's right or interest generally requires
proof of intent to abandon.  See De Haven & Son Hardware Co. v.
Schultz, 122 Or 493, 497, 259 P 778 (1927) ("Abandonment is a
matter of intention and is to be determined in the light of all
of the facts and circumstances.")  Here, father unfortunately
failed to play an active role in child's life when he should
have.  However, from the time that DHS contacted him in 1999
regarding mother's inadequacy, father consistently maintained
that, if his paternity could be confirmed, he would assume his
parental responsibilities.  Neither the trial court nor the Court
of Appeals found that father had abandoned child by intentionally
relinquishing his parental rights, and nothing in the record
supports that conclusion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The trial court also terminated mother's parental
rights.  Mother did not appeal, and the judgment terminating
mother's rights became final.
2. The trial court found that mother made that statement
to father around July 1995, when child would have been six months
old.  The Court of Appeals, however, found that mother had made
that statement sometime after father and mother had separated, 
Rardin II, 202 Or App at 605, which father testified was in
September or October 1996.  The Court of Appeals' finding is
consistent with father's trial testimony.  The discrepancy
between the trial court and Court of Appeals findings, however,
is not material to the legal issues here.
3. The trial court stated that DHS decided to seek
termination of father's parental rights in May 2002.  It is
indisputable, however, that the April 29, 2002, letter from DHS
to the court states that DHS recommends that it "be relieved of
efforts working toward re-unification [of child] with [father]
and [be allowed to] implement [a] plan of adoption[.]"
4. The trial court found that the DNA test had occurred on
May 14, but father's letter stated that it had occurred on May
13.  That difference is irrelevant to our analysis.
5. In Rardin I, this court mistakenly stated that father
had not obtained the DNA test until August 2002.  Rardin I, 338
Or at 402.  
6. The trial court rejected the state's third theory,
holding that the state had not proved that father had "abandoned"
child within the meaning of ORS 419B.508. 
7. Because the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination
of father's parental rights on unfitness grounds, it did not
address whether the trial court was correct in terminating those
rights because of neglect.  Rardin II, 202 Or App at 605.  As to
the state's abandonment claim, which the trial court had
rejected, the Court of Appeals stated that the state had not
cross-assigned error from that holding and concluded that it was
not an issue in the case.  Id. at 607 n 3.  We discuss that issue
below.  ___ Or at ___ n 12 (slip op at 20 n 12).
8. The statutory considerations under ORS 419B.504 are: 
"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as
to render the parent incapable of providing proper care
for the child or ward for extended periods of time.
"(2) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel
or sexual nature.
"(3) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating
liquors or controlled substances to the extent that
parental ability has been substantially impaired.
"(4) Physical neglect of the child or ward.
"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the
circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to
make it possible for the child or ward to safely return
home within a reasonable time or failure of the parent
to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts
by available social agencies for such extended duration
of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting
adjustment can be effected.
"(6) Criminal conduct that impairs the parent's
ability to provide adequate care for the child or
ward."
9. As father points out, however, DHS prohibited father
from any direct contact with child after May 2002.
10. Father states that his present fitness as a parent does
not require that child be returned to his custody immediately,
and, indeed, he asserts that his understanding of child's current
needs and "transition" issues demonstrate his present fitness. 
Father's point is well taken.  This proceeding does not involve
custody issues or the rights of grandparents or other persons who
have developed a child-parent relationship with child.  See
O'Donnell-Lamont and Lamont, 337 Or 86, 97, 91 P3d 721 (2004),
cert den, 125 S Ct 867 (2005) (distinguishing third-party custody
disputes from proceedings to terminate parental rights).  The
only issue here is whether father's parental rights should be
terminated, not whether immediate placement in father's home is
warranted.
11. As noted, because the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's termination on "unfitness" grounds, it did not
address neglect.
12. As noted previously, the Court of Appeals concluded
that abandonment no longer was an issue in this case because the
trial court had rejected the state's abandonment claim and the
state had not cross-assigned error from that holding. ___ Or at
___ n 7 (slip op at 8 n 7).  The Court of Appeals was correct
that the state did not cross-assign as error the trial court's
holding that the state had failed to prove abandonment under ORS
419B.508.  The state did, however, cross-assign as error the
trial court's rejection of its "abandonment-as-unfitness" claim.