Case Title: Owens v. State

Citation: 352 Md. 663

Docket Number: 129/97

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Timothy R. Owens v. State of Maryland - No. 129, 1997 Term
CRIMINAL LAW — Statutory Rape — Maryland’s statutory rape law, Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 463(a)(3), is not in violation of the State or Federal
Constitutions, even though it is not a defense that the defendant reasonably believed the
victim was over 13 years of age.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case # 97 CR 2003
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 1997
________________________________________
TIMOTHY R. OWENS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
 
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
 Eldridge, J., concurs in the result only; 
Bell, C.J. and  Cathell, J. dissent.
________________________________________
      Filed:  February 12, 1999
Unless otherwise indicated, hereinafter all statutory references are to Maryland Code
1
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27.
We are called upon in this case to examine the constitutionality of Maryland’s
statutory rape law, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 463(a)(3),  as
1
interpreted by this Court in Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993), to be a
strict liability offense.   For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Appellant’s rights to
due process under the Maryland and United States Constitutions were not violated when,
upon being charged with statutory rape, the trial court prevented Appellant from presenting
his defense that he reasonably believed the victim was above 13 years of age. 
I.
A.
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  According to the agreed statement of facts,
on April 11, 1997, a police officer conducting a routine nighttime patrol discovered Timothy
Owens and Ariel Correta Johnson in the rear seat of a parked car, dressing.  When asked,
Johnson told the police officer that she was 16 years old.  After calling Johnson’s residence,
he discovered that her correct date of birth was October 16, 1983, making her 13 years old
at the time of the incident.  Owens was born April 27, 1978, making him 18 years old at the
time.  After compiling evidence that the two had just engaged in sexual intercourse, Owens
was charged with second degree rape in violation of §  463(a), which states in pertinent part:
“A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse
with another person: *** (3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act
-2-
is at least four years older than the victim.” Owens elected to proceed by way of a not guilty
agreed statement of facts, which the prosecutor recited into the record.  It was not disputed
that “[t]he victim, if asked, would also testify that she had told the Defendant that she was
16 years of age.” 
Owens’ counsel made a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional in that it violated Owens’ due process rights under the United States
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Owens also argued that,
notwithstanding this Court’s decision in Garnett, the trial court should find that there was
a reasonable mistake of fact that negates Owens’ guilt.  The trial judge denied that motion
and also denied a subsequent motion for judgment of acquittal noting that, under Garnett,
mistake of age could only be used as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing. The judge
then found Owens guilty of second degree rape and sentenced him to 18 months of
imprisonment, with all but time served (12 days) suspended, and 18 months of probation.
Owens was also ordered to register as a child sex offender, as required by § 792, and to
submit to DNA testing.  In sentencing Owens, the court specifically considered mistake of
age as a mitigating factor.  Owens appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and this Court,
on its own motion, granted certiorari before review by that court.
B.
In Garnett, we addressed whether Maryland’s statutory rape law required the State
to prove whether the defendant knew the female victim was younger than 14 years of age and
whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence “that he had been told, and believed, that
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she was 16 years old.”  Garnett, 332 Md. at 574, 632 A.2d at 798.  In ruling that the
defendant in Garnett could not present evidence that he was told and believed that the
defendant had reached 16 years of age, the trial judge ruled that § 463(a)(3) requires proof
of only three elements:  (1) that there was vaginal intercourse; (2) that the complaining
witness was, in fact, under 14 years of age; and (3) the defendant was at least four years
older than the complaining witness with whom he had sexual intercourse.  332 Md. at 575,
632 A.2d at 799.  The trial court concluded that statutory rape was a strict liability offense
and, therefore, mistake of age could not be a defense.  On appeal, the defendant argued that
§ 463(a)(3), which has no express mens rea requirement, should be judicially interpreted to
allow a defense of a reasonable mistake of age.  After reviewing the legislative history of
Maryland sex crimes statutes, Garnett, 332 Md. at 576, 632 A.2d at 799-800, we concluded:
“[T]he Legislature explicitly raised, considered, and then
explicitly jettisoned any notion of a mens rea element with
respect to the complainant’s age in enacting the law that formed
the basis of current  §  463(a)(3).  In the light of such legislative
action, we must inevitably conclude that the current law
imposes strict liability on its violators.”
Garnett, 332 Md. at 587, 632 A.2d at 805.  Thus, we held that the trial court had not erred
in refusing to allow Garnett to present evidence that he had been told, and in fact believed,
that the complaining witness was 16 years old.  Garnett, 332 Md. at 584-86, 632 A.2d at
803-05.  Our holding that the statute did not afford defendant a mistake-of-age defense was
consistent with the majority rule in that “a defendant’s knowledge of the age of a victim is
not an essential element of statutory rape” and that “[p]roof of a statutory rape requires
-4-
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, § 1,  provides that
2
“[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law....”
The Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 20, states:  “That the trial of facts,
3
where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the
People.”  Article 24 declares “[t]hat no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of
his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of
the land.”  The phrase “Law of the Land” has been held to be equivalent to “due process of
law,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Matter of Easton, Incompetent, 214 Md. 176,
187- 89, 133 A.2d 441, 447-48 (1957).  United States Supreme Court cases on the subject
therefore are “practically direct authorit[y]” for the meaning of the Maryland provision.
Northampton Corp. v. Wash. S. S. Comm’n, 278 Md. 677, 686, 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976).
We therefore address both provisions together.
merely proof of an act of sexual intercourse and proof that the victim is below the prohibited
age.”  Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim’s Age as
Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499, 508 (1997).  We did not, however, address the
constitutionality of § 463(a)(3).
Although we did not address the constitutional question in Garnett, we noted that
“[t]he requirement that an accused have acted with a culpable mental state is an axiom of
criminal jurisprudence.”  332 Md. at 578, 632 A.2d at 800.   In the instant case, we consider
whether the “axiom” we noted in Garnett is of constitutional dimensions with respect to
Maryland’s statutory rape law.  In particular, we must determine whether the legislature
exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution  and
2
Articles 20 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights  by precluding Appellant from
3
raising his mistake-of-age defense. 
-5-
II.
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of denying
a defendant the ability to present a mistake-of-age defense to the crime of statutory rape.  On
a number of occasions, however, the Supreme Court has articulated its strong preference for
finding within a criminal statute a mens rea element where none has been expressly included.
Appellant cites Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952),
for the proposition that “in order to convict a defendant of a criminal offense, the State must
prove a culpable mental state.”  Morissette had been charged with “unlawfully, wilfully and
knowingly steal[ing] and convert[ing]” U.S. government property when he took bomb
casings from an Air Force practice bombing range.  Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247-48, 72 S.Ct.
at 241-42, 96 L.Ed. at 292.  He challenged his conviction on the ground that he should have
been able to present the defense that he reasonably believed that the shell cases had been
abandoned.  Morissette, 342 U.S. at  248-49, 72 S.Ct. at 242-43, 96 L.Ed. at 292-93.  In
assessing whether the federal larceny statute dispensed with a criminal intent requirement,
the Court discussed its “universal and persistent” policy favoring some mental element to
justify punishment.  Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-51, 72 S.Ct. at  243, 96 L.Ed. at 293-94.
In light of the common law’s requirement of intent for the crime of theft, the Court reversed
the defendant’s conviction.  
Similarly, in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608
(1994), the Court interpreted the National Firearms Act to include a mens rea requirement,
reversing a criminal conviction.  The trial court had ruled that the prosecution did not have
-6-
to prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a weapon with characteristics that brought
it within the prohibitions of the Act.  Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court
accepted the defendant’s argument that the government should have been required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the weapon he possessed was an
automatic weapon required to be registered under the Act. Staples, 511 U.S. at 619-20, 114
S.Ct. at 1804, 128 L.Ed.2d at 624-25.  See also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 78, 115 S.Ct. 464, 472, 130 L.Ed.2d 372, 385 (1994)(holding that the term
“knowingly” in an obscenity statute required knowledge that the materials included sexual
depictions of minors).  We have similarly been reluctant to read into criminal statutes an
intent of the legislature to forego a mens rea requirement.  See State v. McCallum, 321 Md.
451, 456-57, 583 A.2d 250, 252-53 (1991)(interpreting statute prohibiting driving with a
suspended license to include a mental element); Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 649, 547
A.2d 1041, 1046 (1988)(observing that the “statutory scheme strongly indicates an intention
on the part of the General Assembly to require scienter as an element of the [possession of
controlled substances and controlled paraphernalia] offenses”). 
Appellant finds perhaps his strongest support that the absence of a mens rea
requirement in a criminal statute is violative of due process in Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), reh’g denied, 355 U.S. 937, 78 S.Ct. 410, 2
L.Ed.2d 419 (1958).  The defendant in Lambert was convicted of violating a Los Angeles
felon registration ordinance. The Supreme Court addressed whether due process was violated
when the ordinance was “applied to a person who ha[d] no actual knowledge of his duty to
-7-
register, and where no showing [was] made of the probability of such knowledge.”  Lambert,
355 U.S. at 227, 78 S.Ct. at 242, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231.  In finding that the defendant’s due
process rights were violated, the Court emphasized that the conduct made illegal [was]
“wholly passive.”  Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. at 243, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231.  “It is unlike
the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer
to the consequences of his deed.”  Id.
Despite its preference for a mens rea requirement when interpreting criminal statutes
and its holding in Lambert, the “[Supreme] Court has never articulated a general
constitutional doctrine of mens rea.”  Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535, 88 S.Ct. 2145,
2155-56, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 1269 (1968).  Rather, within certain constitutional limits, states
may “create strict criminal liabilities by defining criminal offenses without any element of
scienter.”  Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 209
(1959), reh’g denied, 361 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 399, 4 L.Ed.2d 383 (1960).  Several of the cases
upholding strict liability statutes involve “public welfare” statutes, “whereby penalties serve
as [an] effective means of regulation.”  United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81,
284-85, 64 S.Ct. 134, 136, 138, 88 L.Ed. 48, 51, 53 (1943)(approving criminal sanction for
misbranding of drugs “though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting”); United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609-10, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 1117-18, 28 L.Ed.2d 356, 362-63
(1971), reh’g denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 2201, 29 L.Ed.2d 690 (1971)(holding that the
National Firearms Act imposes criminal liability on a person possessing hand grenades
despite one’s ignorance of illegality of such possession); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
-8-
Resolving a conflict among the circuits as to the mental element necessary to bring
4
a conspiracy charge, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected Judge Learned Hand’s “traffic
light” analogy, which declared that “‘one cannot be guilty of conspiring to run past [a traffic
light of whose existence one is ignorant], for one cannot agree to run past a light unless one
supposes that there is a light to run past.’”  United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 689, 95
S.Ct. 1255, 1266, 43 L.Ed.2d 541, 555 (1975)(quoting United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d
271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941)).
250, 252-54, 42 S.Ct. 301, 302-03, 66 L.Ed. 604, 606 (1922)(similar holding).  
The Supreme Court, however, has never suggested that strict criminal liability may
be imposed only for regulatory offenses.  For example, in United States v. Feola, 420 U.S.
671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975), the Court interpreted a federal assault statute to
not include a mens rea requirement as to the identity of the victim of a conspiracy.  The
Court held a criminal defendant liable for conspiracy to assault a federal officer when the
defendant had no knowledge that the individual was a federal officer who would subject him
to federal criminal jurisdiction.   Feola, 420 U.S. at 694-95, 95 S.Ct. at 1261-62, 43 L.Ed.2d
at 558-59.   The Court also has upheld convictions and imprisonment for the strict liability
4
crime of bigamy, even when the defendants reasonably believed they had a valid divorce that
would have made the second marriage lawful.  Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
238, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1099, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 1586 (1945), reh’g denied, 325 U.S. 895, 65 S.Ct.
1560, 89 L.Ed. 2006 (1945). 
Finally, this Court and the Supreme Court have held that under certain circumstances
statutes that create conclusive, irrebuttable presumptions may violate due process.
“[P]ermanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process
-9-
Clause.”  Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2233, 37 L.Ed.2d 63,  68
(1973).  In Vlandis, the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that created an
irrebuttable presumption affecting tuition rates at a state university.  Under the statute, a
student who applied to a Connecticut school while a non-resident or who was a non-resident
in the year before applying remained a non-resident for tuition rate purposes for as long as
he or she remained a student.  Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 443, 93 S.Ct. at  2232, 37 L.Ed.2d at 66.
The Court said that the Due Process Clause forbids a state from 
“deny[ing] an individual the resident rates on the basis of a
permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when
that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact,
and when the State has a reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination.”
Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452, 93 S.Ct. at  2236, 37 L.Ed.2d at 71.  See also Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647, 94 S.Ct. 791, 799, 39 L.Ed.2d 52, 64 (1974)(public
school policies presumed that pregnant women were physically unfit for classroom teaching);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-50, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 557-58
(1972)(statute presumed that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their children).
Applying a similar test in Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 48 A.2d 600 (1946), this
Court struck down a rule promulgated by the Maryland Racing Commission as violative of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The rule, designed to penalize horse trainers for
drugging horses within the 48 hours prior to racing, prohibited persons from “knowingly or
carelessly” permitting the administering of a drug.  Mahoney, 187 Md. at 83, 48 A.2d at 602.
The rule then provided that a positive test of horse saliva or urine on the day of the race
-10-
The following cases specifically reject the contention that constitutional due process
5
requires admitting evidence as to a defendant’s reasonable mistake of age in a statutory rape
“shall be conclusive evidence either that there was knowledge of the fact ... or that he was
guilty of carelessness.”  Mahoney, 187 Md. at 84, 48 A.2d at 602.  We observed that,
because there was no rule requiring trainers to keep watch over their horses day and night
in the 48 hours prior to the start of a race, the presumption in the rule arose “out of the thin
air,” and thus, we held the conclusive presumption invalid. Mahoney, 187 Md. at 88, 48 A.2d
at 604.
III.
At the outset, we note that our decision here is not concerned with the wisdom of
Maryland’s policy of imposing strict criminal liability on those who engage in sexual
intercourse with children under age 14.  Absent any constitutional prohibition, it is within
the “legislative power to define crimes and to fix their punishment.”  Scarlett v. State, 201
Md. 310, 320, 93 A.2d 753, 757 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 955, 73 S.Ct. 937, 97 L.Ed.
1377 (1953).  Our only consideration is whether due process requires that Owens be allowed
to defend the charge of statutory rape on the grounds that he reasonably believed that the
victim was above the age of 13.
An overwhelming majority of courts confronted with a constitutional challenge to
statutory rape laws have held that denying a defendant a mistake-of-age defense in a
statutory rape case does not deprive him of his due process rights.   We are aware of only
5
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prosecution: State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1992)(en banc); United States v. Ransom,
942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1042, 112 S.Ct. 897, 116 L.Ed.2d 799
(1992); State v. Campbell, 473 N.W.2d 420 (Neb. 1991); United States v. Brooks, 841 F.2d
268 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1227, 108 S.Ct. 2887, 101 L.Ed.2d 922 (1988);
People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. 1984); Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 N.E.2d 463
(Mass. 1982); State v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1981); Goodrow v. Perrin, 403 A.2d
864 (N.H. 1979); Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034 (1st Cir. 1973).
The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted its state constitution more expansively
6
than the federal constitution.  State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 112 (Alaska 1981)(discussing the
court’s “concomitant duty to develop constitutional rights under the Alaska Constitution”).
As one commentator has observed, this interpretation of the state constitution “enables
Alaska to interpret its own due process clause to require a mens rea element for second
degree sexual abuse [statutory rape], notwithstanding the uncertainty concerning the
demands of the United States Constitution.” Benjamin L. Reiss, Alaska’s Mens Rea
Requirements for Statutory Rape, 9:2 ALASKA L. REV. 377, 389 (1992)(footnotes omitted).
one court which has held that due process mandates a mistake-of-age defense to statutory
rape, and that holding appears to be based on state, and not federal, constitutional analysis.
See State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).   We decline to deviate from the majority
6
rule and uphold the legislature’s intent, as determined in Garnett, to make statutory rape a
strict liability crime. While due process concerns undoubtedly place some limitations on the
legislature’s ability to create strict liability crimes, for the reasons set forth below, we find
that § 463(a)(3) falls within those limits.
  
A.
Appellant finds little support in any Court of Appeals or United States Supreme Court
decision for the proposition that a mental element is constitutionally required for criminal
liability, even when substantial penalties are involved.   In support of his argument that the
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defense of mistake of age is constitutionally required, Appellant contends that the Supreme
Court, in its Morissette and X-Citement Video decisions, and this Court, in our decision in
Garnett, misinterpreted the common law, which, appellant argues, did allow for a reasonable
mistake-of-age defense to statutory rape.  Authorities are apparently divided as to whether,
at common law, a mistake-of-age defense to statutory rape was permitted.  A number of
courts have stated, for example, that “statutory rape was universally regarded as a strict
liability offense until well into the twentieth century.” United States v. Brooks, 841 F.2d 268,
270 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1227, 108 S.Ct. 2887, 101 L.Ed.2d 922 (1988).
See also Garnett, 332 Md. at 587, 632 A.2d at 805 (noting the “traditional view of statutory
rape as a strict liability crime”).  Conversely, other authorities have explained that, under the
early common law and English statutes, mistake of age was a permissible defense to statutory
rape.  See Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory
Rape, 64 MICH. L. REV. 105, 109-10 (1965); Garnett, 332 Md. at 605-06 n.14, 632 A.2d at
814 n.14 (Bell, J., dissenting).  As Appellant’s brief states, Blackstone’s Commentaries,
widely accepted as authoritative on English criminal law, explain that “to constitute a crime
against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such vicious will.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 21 (1769).
It is not necessary for us to resolve the apparent dispute as to whether, at common
law, a mistake-of-age defense to statutory rape was permissible.  Regardless of the status of
the defense at common law, we have determined that our statute does not include a mistake-
of-age defense, and the cases simply do not support the proposition that due process
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mandates that the mistake-of-age defense be allowed.  Significantly, our own cases and the
Supreme Court cases that articulate the “universal and persistent” policy favoring a mens rea
component for criminal liability, Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250, 72 S.Ct. at 243, 96 L.Ed.2d at
293, involve interpretations of state or federal criminal statutes, not interpretations of the Due
Process Clause.  See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 604, 114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at 615
(noting that its decision turned upon “a question of statutory construction”); McCallum, 321
Md. at 455-57, 583 A.2d at 252-53 (interpreting a driving with suspended license statute).
In contrast to its policy of favoring inclusion of a mens rea element when interpreting
a statute, when interpreting the Due Process Clause the Supreme Court has often endorsed
the concept of strict criminal liability.  In Lambert, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
Blackstone’s view that a vicious will “is necessary to constitute a crime, for conduct alone
without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient.  There is wide latitude in the
lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from
its definition.”  Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. at 242, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231 (citation
omitted).  In concluding that the defendant need not have knowledge that the assault victim
was a federal agent in Feola, the court observed that laws imposing strict liability “embody
the social judgment that it is fair to punish one who intentionally engages in conduct that
creates a risk to others, even though no risk is intended or the actor, through no fault of his
own, is completely unaware of the existence of any risk.” 420 U.S. at 690-91, 95 S.Ct. at
1267, 43 L.Ed.2d at 556.  In rejecting the defendant’s due process challenge to the bigamy
-14-
We note that in addition to upholding the strict liability statutes cited above, the
7
Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288
(1952), in dicta, apparently accepted the validity of strict liability statutory rape laws when
it observed that, as the common law has developed, “[e]xceptions [to the requirement of a
guilty mind] came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim’s actual age was
determinative despite defendant’s reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent.”
342 U.S. at 251 n.8, 72 S.Ct. at 244 n.8, 96 L.Ed. at 294 n.8. See also United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2, 115 S.Ct. 464, 469 n.2, 130 L.Ed.2d 372, 381
n.2 (1994)(quoting footnote 8 from Morissette).
In this decision, we do not reach the issue of whether, had the trial judge in this case
8
sentenced Owens to the maximum of 20 years of imprisonment, such a sentence would
violate Owens’ due process or Eighth Amendment rights.
statute in Williams, the Court concluded:
“The objection that punishment of a person for an act as a crime
when ignorant of the facts making it so, involves a denial of due
process of law has more than once been overruled.  In
vindicating its public policy and particulary one so important as
that bearing upon the integrity of family life, a State in
punishing particular acts may provide that ‘he who shall do
them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in
defense good faith or ignorance.’ United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 252, [42 S.Ct. 301, 302, 66 L.Ed. 604, 605 (1922)],
quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69,
70, [30 S.Ct. 663, 666, 667, 54 L.Ed. 930, 935, 936 (1910)].”
325 U.S. at 238, 65 S.Ct. at 1099, 89 L.Ed. at 1586.7
Nor do we believe that the risk of 20 years of imprisonment or the trial court’s
requirement that the defendant register as a “child sex offender” renders unconstitutional
Maryland’s statutory rape law.   While courts have considered the substantiality of the
8
penalty imposed by a statute in determining whether a statute includes a mens rea element,
they have done so for purposes of statutory construction and not for purposes of
-15-
Indeed, even though a violation constituted a felony with the possible sentence of 10
9
years of incarceration, in his dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, disagreed
with the majority’s interpretation of the statute as requiring a mens rea component, arguing
that the National Firearms Act was a public welfare statute imposing strict liability. Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 630, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1810, 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 632
(1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
constitutional analysis.   For example, in McCallum, 321 Md. at 457, 583 A.2d at 253, we
stated that “the nature of the penalty ... give[s] some indication that the Legislature did not
intend this to be a ‘public welfare’ [strict liability] offense.”   Likewise, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Staples, which discusses the severity of the penalty at length, considered the
penalty only as a factor in interpreting legislative intent.  The Court noted that “a severe
penalty is a ... factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea
requirement.”  Staples, 511 U.S. at 618-19, 114 S.Ct. at 1804, 128 L.Ed.2d at 624. Moreover,
the Court gave no indication that Congress would have exceeded any constitutional limits
had it made the National Firearms Act a strict liability statute.9
Having explained that constitutional due process does not impose a universal
requirement that criminal laws, such as Maryland’s statutory rape law, include a mens rea
element, we turn now to more specific requirements of the Due Process Clause. 
B.
A fundamental tenet of due process is that persons of ordinary intelligence and
experience have a reasonable opportunity to know what actions are prohibited so that they
may conform their conduct according to the law. Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 120, 389
-16-
A.2d 341, 345 (1978). We believe that Maryland’s statutory rape law provides
constitutionally sufficient notice. 
The action for which Owens has been convicted, sexual intercourse with a child under
age 14, involves conduct for which Owens was reasonably on notice might run afoul of the
law and, therefore, conduct that he could have avoided.  Thus, § 463(a)(3) shares little in
common with the city ordinance the Supreme Court invalidated in Lambert.  The ordinance
struck down in Lambert made it a crime for any convicted person to remain in Los Angeles
for more than five days without registering.  Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226, 78 S.Ct. at 242, 2
L.Ed.2d at 230.  In striking down the ordinance, the Court emphasized the defendant’s lack
of notice and the “wholly passive” nature of the conduct.  Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct.
at 243, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231. The Court said,
“[Failure to register] is unlike the commission of acts, or the
failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to
the consequences of his deed. *** Violation of [the municipal
code’s] provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever,
mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover,
circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the
necessity of registration are completely lacking.”
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228-29, 78 S.Ct. at 243, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231-32.
Unlike the ordinance in Lambert, the sexual intercourse proscribed by § 463(a)(3) can
hardly be characterized as passive; it involves conscious activity which gives rise to
circumstances that place a reasonable person on notice of potential illegality.  See State v.
Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1981)(concluding in statutory rape case that “[o]bviously
[defendant’s] conduct was active in nature and he was alerted to the possible criminal
-17-
See, e.g., § 553 (prohibiting sodomy and authorizing sentences of up to ten years
10
upon conviction); § 554 (prohibiting unnatural or perverted sexual practices and authorizing
a potential sentence of ten years upon conviction).
consequences of his acts.”). Our 1993 decision in Garnett, the state’s longstanding
prohibition on sexual intercourse with minors, and Maryland laws proscribing other sexual
behavior  put defendant on notice of the potential risks of miscalculating the victim’s age.
10
Garnett, 332 Md. at 591, 632 A.2d at 807 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)(“[T]he ordinary
defendant in [a statutory rape prosecution] is or ought to be aware that there is a risk that the
young person is not above the age of consent.”).  See also State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77,
81 (Mo. 1992)(en banc)(“[Statutory rape law] clearly notifies potential offenders that mistake
concerning a victim’s age is not a valid defense and will not be considered by a court.”);
Freed, 401 U.S. at 609, 91 S.Ct. at 1118, 28 L.Ed.2d at 362 (observing that “one would
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act”).
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has observed, in the case of statutory rape, “the perpetrator
confronts the underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that
victim’s age.”  X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2, 115 S.Ct. at 469 n.2, 130 L.Ed.2d at
381 n.2 (dictum).  Indeed, it is hard to imagine when a defendant, necessarily four years
older than the victim under § 463(a)(3), would be “morally blameless” when he or she
engages in sexual intercourse with a child as young as age 13.  Tague, 310 N.W.2d at 211.
C.
-18-
Because we find that the interest served by the statutory rape statute -- the protection
11
of children -- is a compelling interest, we need not decide whether this or any other strict
liability statute could be upheld if the state interest is less than compelling. 
We next consider Maryland’s interest in enacting its statutory rape law and whether
the law is suited to that interest.  We conclude that the state’s purpose in promoting the
physical and mental health of children is a compelling one and that the statute is properly
designed to accomplish this purpose.
1.
 Legislators generally have broader discretion in enacting laws to promote the health
and welfare of children than they have for adults.  “The Court long has recognized that the
status of minors under the law is unique in many respects.”  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662,
633, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3043, 61 L.Ed.2d 797, 807, reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 185,
62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has “sustained legislation aimed at
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated
in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.”  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3354, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113, 1122 (1982).
The state’s compelling interest in promoting the welfare of children provides a
powerful justification for disallowing a mistake-of-age defense to statutory rape.   “The
11
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective
of surpassing importance.”  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. at 3355, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1123.
-19-
We observed in Garnett that the traditional view of statutory rape as a strict liability
12
crime is that such laws are designed to “protect young persons from the dangers of sexual
exploitation by adults, loss of chastity, physical injury, and, in the case of girls, pregnancy.”
332 Md. at 587, 632 A.3d at 805.  This observation is consistent with that of other courts
which have considered the state’s interest in holding those who engage in sexual conduct
with minors strictly liable. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084, 1086 (Fla.
1994)(“‘[A]ny type of sexual conduct involving a child constitutes an intrusion upon the
rights of that child, whether or not the child consents ... [S]ociety has a compelling interest
in intervening to stop such misconduct.’”)(quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 410-11
(Fla. 1991), cert. denied,  503 U.S. 964, 112 S.Ct. 1572, 118 L.Ed.2d 216 (1992)); Ransom,
942 F.2d at 777 (“[The statutory rape law] protects children from sexual abuse by placing
the risk of mistake as to a child’s age on an older, more mature person who chooses to
engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute’s
purview.”)(Citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 438 A.2d 964, 966 (Pa. 1981),
appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 2898, 73 L.Ed.2d 1310 (1982)(“The primary
consideration in prohibiting unlawful, consensual intercourse with an underage female has
been traditionally attributed to the legislative desire to protect those who are too
unsophisticated to protect themselves.”); People v. Gonzales, 561 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361-62 (Co.
Ct. 1990)(“[I]t is proper for the state to consider the prospects of transmission of venereal
disease, especially the HIV virus, trauma and permanent damage which may be caused to
physical structures such as the anus, and the exploitation and sexual abuse of our youth.”).
 The case law testing the constitutionality of strict liability statutory rape laws is unanimous
in recognizing the significance of the potential harm caused by sexual activity involving
children, even with their consent.   These risks involve potential physical harm, including
12
the risk of venereal diseases, especially the HIV virus,  trauma, and even permanent damage
to a child’s organs.  Statutory rape laws may help prevent pregnancies, which carry
“significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child,
and the State.”  Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470, 101 S.Ct.
1200, 1205, 67 L.Ed.2d 437, 443 (1981)(footnote omitted). 
Perhaps most significantly, an adult who engages in sexual activity with a child may
-20-
cause the child serious psychological damage, regardless of the child’s maturity or lack of
chastity.  Since the adult will almost always be more physically mature and experienced in
sexual matters, the risk of sexual exploitation is significant.  Moreover, the effects on
children of sexual exploitation often follow the child into adulthood, with societal
consequences as well.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized:
“Sexual assault takes a heavy toll on its victims, particularly on
children.  Recent research indicates that a number of
psychosocial problems -- including chronic depression and
anxiety, isolation and poor social adjustment, substance abuse,
suicidal behavior, and involvement in physically or sexually
abusive relationships as either aggressor or victim -- are more
common among adults molested as children than among those
with no such childhood experiences.  Victims of sexual abuse
can suffer an impaired ability to critically evaluate the motives
and behavior of others, making them more vulnerable to
revictimization.  An especially disturbing finding about child
sexual abuse is its strong intergenerational pattern; in particular,
due to the psychological impact of their own abuse, sexually
abused boys have been found to be more likely than non-abused
boys to turn into offenders against the  next generation of
children, and sexually abused girls are more likely to become
mothers of children who are abused.  And studies show that
adult male aggressive behavior, particularly sexual aggression,
is associated with the trauma of childhood sexual abuse.  Thus,
apart from the substantial personal trauma caused to the victims
of such crimes, sexual crimes against children exact heavy
social costs as well.”
Doe v. Poritz,  662 A.2d 367, 375 (N.J. 1995)(quoting Brief for the United States at 5-8
(citations omitted)).
The state’s overwhelming interest in protecting children from these risks outweighs
any interest that the individual may have in engaging in sexual relations with children near
-21-
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1002 (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1996);
13
IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT., chapter 720 ¶ 5/11-8 (Smith-Hurd 1993);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West
1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1992).
The Maryland legislature has enacted other laws to further the policy goals of Art.
14
27, § 463.  See § 416B (prohibiting the selling or the offering to sell to minors sexually
explicit materials); § 416C (criminalizing the act of exhibiting sexually explicit motion
pictures to minors).
the age of consent.  Although we need not reach the issue, it has been held that a person has
no constitutional right to engage in sexual intercourse, at least outside of marriage, and
sexual conduct frequently is subject to state regulation.  Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), reh’g denied, 478 U.S. 1039, 107 S.Ct. 29, 92
L.Ed.2d 779 (1986)(upholding Georgia statute criminalizing the act of sodomy).  Many states
still criminalize fornication  and other sexual behavior.   Furthermore, given the substantial
13
14
risks of sexual abuse and exploitation of children, the public policies behind statutory rape
laws appear to be significantly stronger than, to take one example, the public policy of
promoting “the integrity of family life” through the crime of bigamy, for which the
defendants in Williams were constitutionally imprisoned despite the absence of any criminal
intent.  Williams, 325 U.S. at 238, 65 S.Ct. at 1099, 89 L.Ed. at 1586.  Statutory rape laws
may be deemed necessary by legislators to protect those whose “immaturity and innocence
prevents them from appreciating the full magnitude and consequences of their conduct.”
People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Mich. 1984).
-22-
The crime of statutory rape also does not implicate other constitutional rights that
heighten our level of inquiry.  If, for example, First Amendment rights are implicated by a
strict liability statute, we may be more likely to find the statute in violation of due process
requirements.  See Smith, 361 U.S. at 153, 80 S.Ct. at 218, 4 L.Ed.2d at 211 (interpreting an
obscenity statute to include a mens rea requirement in order to avoid “impos[ing] a restriction
upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature”); X-Citement
Video, 513 U.S. at 78, 115 S.Ct. at 472, 130 L.Ed.2d at 385 (interpreting the term
“knowingly” in a federal statute regulating child pornography to include knowledge that the
materials involve minors).  The instant case does not implicate the First Amendment; rather,
the statute at issue involves constitutionally permissible regulation of sexual conduct.
2.
The legislature’s decision to disallow a mistake-of-age defense to statutory rape
furthers its interest in protecting children in ways that may not be accomplished if the law
were to allow such a defense.  Precisely because § 463(a)(1) eliminates the need for the state
to prove that the potential offender knew or was unreasonable in the failure to recognize that
the victim was under age 14, the statute “may reasonably be expected to have some deterrent
effect.” United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1042, 112
S.Ct. 897, 116 L.Ed.2d 799 (1992); see also People v. Gonzales, 561 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Co.
Ct. 1990)(“[T]he criminal consequences of violating the statutory age limit under present law
deter sexual contact between older, more sophisticated adults, and often naive minors.”). 
-23-
Maryland’s statutory rape law is less likely than a number of other state statutes to
15
reach noncriminal sexual conduct since the victim in Maryland must be under 14 years of
age, while other states have adopted older ages of consent.  These other statutes have
withstood constitutional challenges despite their greater potential to affect noncriminal
sexual conduct.  See, e.g., State v. Barlow, 630 A.2d 1299 (Vt. 1993)(under age 16);
Campbell, 473 N.W.2d 420 (under age 16); Brooks, 841 F.2d 268 (under age 16); Miller,
432 N.E.2d 463 (under age 16); Goodrow, 403 A.2d 864 (under age 16); State v. Drake, 219
N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1974) (male over 25 and female under 17); Nelson, 484 F.2d 1034 (under
age 16).
Deterrence is accomplished by placing the risk of an error in judgment as to a
potential sex partner’s age with the potential offender.  Moreover, even though a criminal
statute that dispenses with any mens rea requirement could unconstitutionally infringe upon
innocent conduct, cf. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,  426, 105 S.Ct. 2084,  2088,
85 L.Ed.2d 434, 440 (1985)(construing statute to include mens rea element “is particularly
appropriate where ... to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range
of apparently innocent conduct”), we believe that the statute in question here does not
intrude upon innocent conduct to the extent of outweighing the state’s interest.   Where
15
doubt exists as to a potential sexual partner’s age, abstention from intercourse is a readily
available solution: 
“The defendant in a statutory rape case does not lack the ability
to comply with the law; he must simply abstain from sexual
intercourse when there is even the remotest possibility that his
partner is below the statutory age.  Moreover, unlike the
defendant who reasonably believes his wife to be dead,
remarries, and is convicted of bigamy, the man who
contemplates intercourse with a partner of indeterminate age can
resolve doubts in favor of compliance with the law without
sacrificing behavior that society considers desirable.... [T]he
maximization of deterrence for socially undesirable behavior
-24-
may sometimes require the deterrence of socially neutral
conduct as well.”  
Recent Cases, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1258-59 (1965).
The state’s interest in protecting children would be significantly undermined if we
were to find the statute unconstitutional. We have previously recognized that the state
legislature’s interest in furthering its objective most effectively helps to justify a strict
liability statute.  In Ford vs. State, 85 Md. 465, 473, 37 A. 172, 173 (1897), we considered
a former Maryland statute that made it a crime for one to possess “any book, list, slip or
record of the numbers drawn in any lottery.”  The statute provided for a fine of $1000 and/or
up to one year of imprisonment.  The defendant argued that his conviction under the statute
was unconstitutional because it did not allow him to present evidence showing that he had
no knowledge that the papers in his possession were subject to the statute.  We
acknowledged that the papers, which we deemed “utterly unintelligible to any one not
learned in the business,” Ford, 85 Md. at 477, 37 A. at 174, may not give notice to an
innocent person of their illegal character, but we rejected the constitutional argument,
concluding that the statute’s lack of a mens rea requirement was consistent with the Due
Process Clause. We noted the state’s strong interest in thwarting the growth of the (then)
illegal lottery business, and observed that “the statute has made the mere possession of the
articles a crime because that is the most effectual way to break up the lottery business.”
Ford, 85 Md. at 480, 37 A. at 175. 
Similarly, the statutory rape statute effectively furthers a significant state interest.
-25-
Aside from deterring sexual activity with children, by disallowing a mistake-of-age defense,
the state avoids the risk that the inevitably emotional statutory rape trial will focus
unjustifiably on the child’s appearance and level of maturity.  “The obvious problem is that
because early adolescents tend to grow at a rapid rate, by the time of trial a relatively
undeveloped young girl or boy may have transformed into a young woman or man.”  Cash,
351 N.W.2d at 828.  Defendant’s assertion that he had made a reasonable mistake regarding
the victim’s age is best considered as a mitigating circumstance at sentencing, which is what
occurred in this case.  See id.
D.
Appellant contends that § 463(a)(3) unconstitutionally creates an irrebuttable
presumption that the victim’s mental state is irrelevant and that children under age 14 are
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse.  We disagree.
First, we note that § 463(a)(3) simply prohibits sexual intercourse with one who is
“under 14 years of age” when the person “performing the act is at least four years older than
the victim.”  Intent is simply not relevant to the charges.  As the Iowa Supreme Court has
concluded, “[h]ere we are not dealing with a presumption (or, more correctly, inference) at
all.  The statute is not concerned with presumptions or inferences.  Rather it flatly prohibits
the act defendant committed.”  State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1974).  See also
State v. Hill, 406 A.2d 1334, 1336 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)(“Presumption does not
play any part in the violation of the statute.”).  For the reasons stated above, the legislature
-26-
may constitutionally prohibit sexual intercourse with a child below age 14 in order to protect
the child’s physical and mental health and welfare.  Since Maryland’s statutory rape statute
directly prohibits vaginal intercourse with children below age 14 without regard to the
minor’s ability to consent, it does not utilize any presumption that unconstitutionally burdens
the criminal defendant.
Second and relatedly, under the statutory scheme of § 463(a)(3), age is not used to
determine any element of the crime beyond the age itself.  Thus, it is distinguishable from
the Supreme Court’s decisions in LaFleur, Vlandis, and Stanley, as well as our decision in
Mahoney.  See Part II, supra.  In each of these cases, the provision held to violate due
process took one fact and used it to justify a separate, factual conclusion, and, moreover, the
fact presumed bore little or no relation to the objective of the law.  In LaFleur, the public
school policies took the fact of pregnancy and presumed that pregnancy made women
physically unfit for classroom teaching.  414 U.S. at 647, 94 S.Ct. at 799, 39 L.Ed.2d at 64.
The statute in question in Vlandis presumed that one who applied to a state school while
living out-of-state was a non-resident regardless of facts suggesting otherwise, for as long
as that individual remained a student.  412 U.S. at 449-50, 93 S.Ct. at 2235, 37 L.Ed.2d at
70. In Stanley, the statute conclusively presumed that all unmarried fathers are unqualified
to raise their children.  405 U.S. at 650, 92 S.Ct. at 1214, 31 L.Ed.2d at 558.  In Mahoney,
the regulation invalidated specifically stated that presence of drugs in saliva or urine “shall
be conclusive evidence” that the trainer had knowledge or was careless in allowing the horse
to be drugged. 187 Md. at 83-84, 48 A.2d at 602.
-27-
New York’s statutory rape law explicitly incorporates an irrebuttable presumption,
16
which was nevertheless upheld in People v. Gonzales, supra. The statute declared that it “is
an element ... that the sexual act was committed without consent of the victim,” and it further
provided that “[a] person is deemed incapable of consent when he is: (a) less than seventeen
years old.” 561 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60. The defendant argued that the irrebuttable presumption
that children under age 17 cannot consent “unconstitutionally presumes an element of the
In sharp contrast, § 463(a)(3) does not presume that anyone engaging in sexual
intercourse with one under the age of 14 intended to do so, or that the victim is incapable of
consenting; rather, the statute protects children from sexual conduct, regardless of whether
the defendant intended to engage in the prohibited conduct with one under age 14 and
whether the victim purported to consent.  Unlike the statutes stricken down as
unconstitutional, § 463(a)(3) does not take as one fact (pregnancy, an application for
admission when living out-of-state, the unmarried father, or a positive drug test) and use that
fact to arrive at a separate conclusion (fitness for classroom teaching, resident status, fitness
for raising children, or the administering of drugs to horses with knowledge or carelessness).
In other words, § 463(a)(3) does not require intent to engage in intercourse with one under
14 years old and then presume that intent simply because of the victim’s age; nor does it
prohibit sexual intercourse without consent and then presume that children under age 14 are
incapable of consenting.  As a result, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine does not apply.
Finally, even if we were to agree that the statute creates an irrebuttable presumption
that children age 13 and under are incapable of making an informed decision about whether
to consent to sexual intercourse, the nexus between the presumption and the state’s interest
in protecting children is sufficient enough to ameliorate any due process concerns.   See Rita
16
-28-
crime which the People would otherwise be under an obligation to prove by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.”  561 N.Y.S.2d at 360. The court determined that the presumption
created by the statute “is equivalent to a substantive rule of law expressed in terms of rules
of evidence.... Lack of true consent of those under seventeen is not an element of the
substantive crime.”  561 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citations omitted).
Eidson, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 757, 811
(concluding that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine may apply only to statutory rape laws
“with a high age of consent,” i.e., age 16).  Basing one’s ability to consent to sexual
intercourse on the individual’s meeting the age of 14 is not “wholly unrelated” to the state’s
objective of protecting minor children, and it is hard to imagine when the presumption would
not “operate to effectuate the State’s asserted interest” in protecting children from sexual
abuse, exploitation and early pregnancy.  Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 449, 93 S.Ct. at 2235, 37
L.Ed.2d at 69-70.  Therefore, even if the irrebuttable presumption doctrine would apply, we
could not conclude that § 463(a)(3) is “so arbitrary as to constitute a denial of due process
of law.” Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 450, 93 S.Ct. at 2235, 37 L.Ed.2d at 70.  
IV.
In sum, we find no constitutional barriers to placing on individuals engaging in sexual
intercourse the risk that their sexual partner is below age 14, regardless of the reasonableness
of their belief otherwise.  The state has an unparalleled interest in protecting children from
the potentially devastating effects of sexual abuse and exploitation, and the statutory rape
statute furthers that interest.  Though it is not without limits, establishing the age at which
-29-
See Robinson, 438 A.2d at 967 n.5 (concluding that, although the Model Penal Code
17
allows a mistake-of-age defense if the victim is ten or older, “certainly the legislature may,
consistently with considerations of due process, determine as a matter of public policy that
the still tender age of fourteen is appropriate.”); In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786,
792 (Mo. 1973) (“The selection of the female age factor in a statutory rape statute is
basically a legislative function.”); Drake, 219 N.W.2d at 495 (same).
the statutory rape law applies is a task for the legislature, not the courts.    If the legislature
17
so decides, it can amend § 463(a)(3) to allow for a mistake-of-age defense or it may lower
the age at which the statute applies the strict liability standard. 
JUDGMENT 
OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.
Eldridge, J., concurring.
Although I concur with the Court’s result, I do not join the majority opinion.
In Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 584-585, 632 A.2d 797, 803-804 (1993), this
Court held “that Maryland’s second degree rape statute defines a strict liability offense that
does not require the State to prove mens rea . . . .”  The Garnett Court went on to state that
Art. 27, § 463(a)(3), “makes no reference to the actor’s knowledge, belief, or other state of
mind” and that the General Assembly intended “this silence as to mens rea . . . .”  332 Md.
at 585, 632 A.2d at 804.  The Garnett opinion concluded that “an[y] element of mens rea”
-30-
would have to be enacted by the General Assembly.  332 Md. at 588, 632 A.2d at 805.
In a dissenting opinion in Garnett, 332 Md. at 588-592, 632 A.2d at 805-807,
I disagreed with the Court’s view “that the statute contains no mens rea requirement at all.”
332 Md. at 589, 632 A.2d at 806.  Although I agreed “that an ordinary defendant’s mistake
about the age of his or her sexual partner is not a defense to a prosecution under
§ 463(a)(3),” I disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that § 463(a)(3) enacted a “strict
liability” offense “where criminal ‘liability is imposed regardless of the defendant’s state of
mind.’”  Ibid., quoting Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 645, 547 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1988).
I went on to set forth my view of the mens rea requirement in § 463(a)(3) as follows (332
Md. at 590-592, 632 A.2d at 806-807):
“In the typical situation involving an older
person’s engaging in consensual sexual activities
with a teenager below the age of consent, and the
scenario which the General Assembly likely
contemplated when it enacted §§ 463(a)(3),
464A(a)(3), 
464B(a)(3), 
464C(a)(2), 
and
464C(a)(3), the defendant knows and intends that
he or she is engaging in sexual activity with a
young person.  In addition, the defendant knows
that the activity is regarded as immoral and/or
-31-
improper 
by large segments of society.
Moreover, the defendant is aware that ‘consent’
by persons who are too young is ineffective.
Although in a particular case the defendant may
honestly but mistakenly believe, because of
representations or appearances, that the other
person is above the age of consent, the ordinary
defendant in such case is or ought to be aware
that there is a risk that the young person is not
above the age of consent.  As the majority opinion
points out, ‘the traditional view [is] that those
who engage in sex with young persons do so at
their peril, assuming the risk that their partners
are underage . . . .’  It seems to me that the above-
mentioned knowledge factors, and particularly the
mental ability to appreciate that one is taking a
risk, constitute the mens rea of the offenses
defined by §§ 463(a)(3), 464A(a)(3), 464B(a)(3),
464C(a)(2) and 464C(a)(3).  In enacting these
provisions, the General Assembly assumed that a
defendant is able to appreciate the risk involved
-32-
by intentionally and knowingly engaging in
sexual activities with a young person.  There is no
indication that the General Assembly intended
that criminal liability attach to one who, because
of his or her mental impairment, was unable to
appreciate that risk.
“It is unreasonable to assume that the
Legislature intended for one to be convicted under
§ 463(a)(3), or under any of the other statutes
proscribing sexual activity with underage persons,
regardless of his or her mental state.  Suppose, for
example, that Raymond Garnett had not had an
I.Q. of 52, but rather, had been more severely
mentally retarded as was the young woman
involved in Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp.,
293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1147, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 995 (1983).
The mentally retarded person in Wentzel had an
I.Q. of 25-30, was physiologically capable of
bearing a child, but was unable to comprehend the
-33-
act of sexual intercourse, or even to understand
the difference between the sexes.  If someone so
disabled, having reached Raymond’s chronolog-
ical age, then had ‘consensual’ sexual intercourse
with a person younger than fourteen years of age,
I do not believe that he or she would have
violated Art. 27, § 463(a)(3).  Under the view that
§§ 463(a)(3), 464A(a)(3), 464B(a)(3), etc., define
pure strict liability offenses without any regard
for the defendant’s mental state, presumably a 20
year old, who passes out because of drinking too
many alcoholic beverages, would be guilty of a
sexual offense if a 13 year old engages in various
sexual activities with the 20 year old while the
latter is unconscious.  I cannot imagine that the
General Assembly intended any such result.”
I find the majority’s opinion today somewhat confusing.  Thus, in some
portions of the opinion, the majority seems to be reaffirming the Court’s holding in Garnett.
The majority refers to § 463(a)(3) as a “strict liability” offense (___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___, slip opinion at 19), and indicates that the statute “dispenses with any mens rea
-34-
requirement . . .” (___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___, slip opinion at 23).  Other portions of
the majority opinion, however, appear to reflect the views set forth in my dissenting opinion
in the Garnett case.  For example, the majority states that “the sexual intercourse proscribed
by § 463(a)(3) . . . involves conscious activity which gives rise to circumstances that place
a reasonable person on notice of potential illegality.”  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___, slip
opinion at 17.  The majority refers to the defendant being “on notice of the potential risks of
miscalculating the victim’s age.”  Ibid.  The majority also suggests that a defendant violating
§ 463(a)(3) would not be “‘morally blameless.’”  __ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___, slip
opinion at 18.
If the majority today is modifying the strict liability holding of Garnett, then
I applaud the majority’s action.  If, on the other hand, the majority is reaffirming the holding
in Garnett, I continue to disagree. 
I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting opinion in Garnett.
Dissenting opinion by Bell, C.J.; Cathell joins:
In Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993), this Court held that  Maryland
That provision reads:
18
“(a) Elements of offense.--A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
***
(3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least
four years older than the victim.
-2-
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 463 (a) (3),  the statutory rape law, is a strict
18
liability statute.   The majority of the Court stated in that regard:
“ We think it sufficiently clear, however, that Maryland's second degree rape
statute defines a strict liability offense that does not require the State to prove
mens rea;  it makes no allowance for a mistake-of-age defense.  The plain
language of § 463, viewed in its entirety, and the legislative history of its
creation lead to this conclusion.”
Id. At  584-85, 632 A.2d at 803-04.   I dissented from that decision, concluding:
“I do not believe, however, that the General Assembly, in every case, whatever
the nature of the crime and no matter how harsh the potential penalty, can
subject a defendant to strict criminal liability.  To hold, as a matter of law, that
section 463(a)(3)  does not require the State to prove that a defendant
possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crime, i.e. knowingly
engaged in sexual relations with a female under 14, or that the defendant may
not litigate that issue in defense, ‘offends a principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions of conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ and is,
therefore, inconsistent with due process.  See United States v. Ransom, 942
F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1042, 112 S. Ct. 897,
116 L. Ed.2d 799 (1992), quoting  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105,
54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78 L. Ed. 674, 677 (1934).”
Id. at 593-94, 632 A.2d at 808 (Bell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
I also expressed, at some length, the reasons I reached that conclusion, namely, that a
culpable mental state, often referred to as mens rea,  or intent, is, and continues to be, as it
long has been, an essential element of a criminal offense,  id. at 595-98, 632 A.2d 808-10
-3-
(Bell, J., dissenting), that statutory rape, not being a public welfare offense, can not be
justified as a strict liability offense on the basis of either of the two theories, “lesser legal
wrong” or “moral wrong,” that historically has underlain such treatment, id. at 601-5, 632
A.2d at 812-14 (Bell, J., dissenting), and that mistake of fact negates the mental state
required to establish the crime of statutory rape. Id. at 605-11, 632 A.2d at 814-17 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).  And, although the constitutional issue was not presented in that case, I
addressed, again at some length, what I perceived to be the constitutional limitations on strict
criminal liability. See id. at 611-26, 632 A.2d at 817-414 U.S. 51, 58-9, 24 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).  After discussing  State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alaska, 1978), in which the
Supreme Court of Alaska recognized mistake of fact as a defense in statutory rape and
opined,  “where the particular statute is not a public welfare type of offense, either a
requirement of criminal intent must be read into the statute or it must be found
unconstitutional,” I concluded:
“the prosecution of statutory rape in Maryland necessarily brings into conflict
the State's interests in protecting minors and defendants' due process rights
because  section 463(a)(3) operates " 'to exclude elements of knowledge and
diligence from its definition,'" Ransom, 942 F.2d at 776, quoting  Lambert,
355 U.S. at 228, 78 S. Ct. at 242, 2 L. Ed.2d at 231, and, thus, removes
reasonable ignorance of the girl's age and consequent lack of criminal intent
as a defense.  The failure of  section 463(a)(3) to require proof of a culpable
mental state conflicts both with the substantive due process ideal requiring that
defendants possess some level of fault for a criminal conviction of statutory
rape and the procedural due process ideal requiring that the prosecution
overcome the presumption of innocence by proof of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Notwithstanding the maxim that criminal statutes
dispensing with the intent requirement and criminal offenses requiring no
mens rea have a "generally disfavored status," the rationale of parts V and VI
of the majority opinion is that the legislature has absolute authority to create
-4-
strict liability crimes.  For the reasons reviewed, I do not agree.  On the
contrary, I believe that due process both under the Fourteenth Amendment and
under the Declaration of Rights, precludes strict criminal liability for statutory
rape.  Interpreting  section 463(a)(3) as the majority does has the effect of
largely relieving the State of its burden of proof and burden of persuasion.  By
making the defendant's intent, and, hence, blameworthiness, irrelevant, the
Legislature has made inevitable, the petitioner's conviction. Moreover, upon
conviction of the felony offense of statutory rape  under  section 463(a)(3), in
addition to a substantial penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment, a defendant's
reputation will be gravely besmirched.  Where there is no issue as to sexual
contact, which is more likely than not to be the case in statutory rape
prosecutions, proof of the prosecutrix's age is not only proof of the defendant's
guilt, it is absolutely dispositive of it and, at the same time, it is fatal to the
only defense the defendant would otherwise have.  So interpreted,  section
463(a)(3) not only destroys absolutely the concept of fault, but it renders
meaningless, in the statutory rape context, the presumption of innocence and
the right to due process.”
See id. at 625-26, 632 A.2d at 824 (Bell, J., dissenting).
Today, the majority holds, “Appellant’s rights to due process under the Maryland and
United States Constitutions were not violated when, upon being charged with statutory rape,
the trial court prevented Appellant from presenting his defense that he reasonably believed
the victim was above 13 years of age.” ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1998) [slip
op. at 1].   Thus, the Court answers the question that I anticipated in Garnett.  And, as I did
in Garnett, I dissent.   Accordingly, what I said in my dissenting opinion, in Garnett, is
directly relevant to the case sub judice, and I commend and urge its reading and
consideration.   To it, I also add the following.
I.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Maryland
Declaration of Rights guarantee each individual due process of law.  Due Process  “protects
-5-
those liberties that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78
L. Ed. 674, 677 (1934).  As Justice Chase observed more than 100 years ago:
“There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legi[s]lature cannot do, without
exceeding their authority.  There are certain vital principles in our free
Republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and
flagrant abuse of legislative power, as to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private
property, for the protection whereof the government was established.”
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388, 1 L. Ed. 648, 649 (1798).  Due process rights, which are
integral to our republican form of government, protect all citizens, including the criminal
accused, from unfair procedures and from deprivations of substantive rights.
a.  
The requisites of procedural due process are satisfied only when the accused is
afforded both notice and a fair opportunity  to be heard. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
577, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738,  42 L. Ed.2d 725, 737 (1974); (quoting Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950));  Reed v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 323 Md. 175, 183-84, 592 A.2d 173, 177 (1991); Pitsenberger
v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 30, 410 A.2d 1052, 1058 (1980).  In addition, a court must
ponder three competing  interests:
“[F]irst the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 
Firearm is defined in §5845 (a) as “(1) a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less
19
than 18 inches in length; (2) a weapon made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has
an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.
* * *
“(b) Machinegun.  The term ‘machinegun’ means any weapon which shoots, is designed to
shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual
reloading, by a single function of the trigger.  The term shall also include the frame or
receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or
combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a
machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if
-6-
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976);
Hare v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 326 Md. 296, 303, 604 A.2d  914, 917 (1992);
Broson v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662, 671-72, 516 A.2d 970, 975 (1986). 
In this case, the majority concludes the mandates of procedural due process were
satisfied, because the appellant was given sufficient notice of what actions constitute
statutory rape.  See         Md.        ,       ,       , A.2d         ,            (1998)[slip op. at 16-18].
The majority ignores the real issue.   Even if the appellant were on notice that having sexual
relations with someone below the consensual age constitutes statutory  rape, this does not
mean, and there is no evidence to suggest,  that the appellant knew that the particular female
with whom he was having sexual relations was underage.  As the United States Supreme
Court observed in Staples v. United States,  511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608
(1994), notice means more than simply cursory knowledge of the law.      
 At issue in Staples was Art. 26, U.S.C. §5861 (d), of the National Firearms Act,
which criminalizes possession of an unregistered firearm,  imposing a sentence of up to ten
19
such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.”
This gun is the civilian equivalent of the military M-16 rifle, but unless it has been
20
modified it has a metal stop, which prevents it from firing repeatedly.  The metal stop on the
defendants’ gun had been filed away and the gun could be fired repeatedly. See Staples, 424
U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at 614-15.
-7-
years in prison, but is silent as to mens rea. See  424 U.S. at 603-6, 114 S. Ct. at 1795-97,
128 L. Ed.2d at 614-16.   The defendant in Staples, had possession of an AR-15 assault rifle,
when his home was searched by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms.   Id. at  603,
20
114 S. Ct. at 1795-96, 128 L. Ed.2d at 614.  The defendant testified that the gun had never
fired automatically, when in his possession. Id. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at
614-15.   He requested a jury instruction that the Government had to prove ‘ “he knew that
the gun would fire fully automatically,” ’ but that request was denied by the district court,
and he was convicted and sentenced to 5 years probation and a $5,000 fine. See id. at 603-4,
114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at 615.  Reversing the district court, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the government bore the burden of proving a defendant’s
knowledge as to the nature of the weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 619, 114 S. Ct.
at 1804, 128 L. Ed.2d at 624, stating that it was “reluctant to impute [strict liability] to
Congress where, as here, it would mean easing the path to convicting persons whose conduct
would not even alert them to the probability of strict regulation ….” See id.  at 615-16, 114
S. Ct. at 1802, 128 L. Ed.2d at 622-23.  The Court also noted that “punishing a violation as
a felony is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense,” Id. at 618,
114 S.Ct. at 1804, 128 L.Ed.2d at 623-24, and reiterated  its long line of cases holding that
-8-
a defendant must have a guilty mind before  being  found guilty. See 511 U.S. at 604-8, 114
S. Ct. at 1796-98, 128 L. Ed.2d at 615-18.   
I addressed the same issue and drew the same conclusion in my dissenting opinion in
Garnett:
“A defendant who has knowledge that a victim has consented, in fact, to
sexual relations, whether the consent is effective or not, is not thereby placed
on notice as to the victim's age.  Knowledge of consent simply does not equate
with knowledge of age, just as intent to engage in sexual relations does not
reveal, without more, with whom.  Moreover, it is not a crime to engage in
sexual relations with a minor who is at least 16 years old;  it may be morally
wrong, in the minds of most Americans, but it is not a crime.  It is only a crime
if the defendant engages in such relations with a minor under a specified age,
i.e., 14, as in section 463(a)(3), or 14 or 15, as in section 464C.  But even
when the act engaged in is necessarily a crime, e.g. possession of contraband,
knowledge of the illegality--that the contraband is knowingly possessed--is
still required.  See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988).
Consequently, where the activity would be legal or, at least, not illegal, but for
the ages of the participants, at the very least, the defendant's knowledge of  the
victim's age must be proven.  Otherwise, a defendant who does not know he
is acting illegally could be convicted.”
332 Md. at 622-23, 632 A.2d at 822-23 (Bell, J., dissenting).   This observation is most
relevant to the case sub judice, where even  the trial court recognized that the defendant’s
knowledge of his partner’s age was not at all clear:
 “[I]n many  instances…[a] 13 year old can look like a 13 year old or 12 year
old; in other instances, a 13 year old can look like an 18 year old.  So, I have
no way of knowing whether this victim appeared to be older than she actually
was.  But I can only go by her statement to the police and to the Defendant
that she was 16 years old.” 
 
The majority also overlooks  the second prong of the procedural due process test.  
See         Md. at         ,            A.2d at            [slip op. at 16-18].   The  appellant was not
As I pointed out in Garnett, fornication is not a crime in Maryland. See  332 Md. at
21
602-3, 632 A.2d at 812 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
For a discussion of  irrebuttable presumptions, as violative of due process, see
22
Garnett, 332 Md. at 616-20, 632 A.2d at 819-21 (Bell, J., dissenting).  
-9-
given an opportunity to present a defense.  By ignoring this fact, the Court apparently forgets
that “ ‘[t]he critical issue in a statutory rape case is ‘the age of the rape victim…,’ which
serves two related, but distinct purposes: (1) it establishes the victim’s capacity to consent
and (2) it represents notice to a defendant of proscribed conduct.” See Garnett, 332 Md. at
621, 632 A.2d at 822 (Bell, J., dissenting).  As one court has astutely observed, where as
here,  the “outcome is determined not only by the child’s age, but by the relative age of the
defendant …[and] [w]hen the law requires a mathematical formula for its application, [one]
cannot say that being provided the wrong numbers is immaterial.” Perez v. State, 803 P.2d
249, 251 (N.M. 1990).  In fact, it is the child’s age and the defendant’s age, which lead to
prosecution for actions that would otherwise go unpunished.   
21
 By denying the appellant a fair opportunity to present his defense of lack of
knowledge,  and construing the statutory rape statute as a strict liability statute, the Court
has permitted, and made the appellant the victim of, an  irrebuttable presumption.      This
22
can not pass constitutional scrutiny.
b.  
Substantive due process functions to limit both the state’s substantive power to
regulate citizens’ lives and to restrict  the state from  unconstitutionally  denying  liberty. See
-10-
generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law  §15, at 1302-1435 (2d ed. 1988).
When the state deprives a person of life, liberty, or property it must have at least a rational
basis, but when it infringes upon a fundamental right, it must demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest and a narrowly tailored means of protecting only that interest. See
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S. Ct. 673, 682, 54 L. Ed.2d 618, 631 (1978);
Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 701, 501 A.2d 27, 33 (1985); Attorney General v.  Johnson,
282 Md. 274, 310, 385 A.2d 57, 78 (1978).  
  Assessing whether the State’s  interest outweighs the appellant’s rights involves  two
competing considerations.   The first is the nature of the interests involved.  In other words,
with respect to the defendant, it must be determined whether the right being infringed upon
is “rooted so deep in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674,
677 (1934), and as to the State, whether its interest is compelling.  Second, the appellant’s
interests must be balanced  against the relevant State interests.   See Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2461, 73 L. Ed.2d 28, 40-41 (1982).  
Here, the interest the appellant seeks to vindicate is his fundamental due process right
to present a defense, a right guaranteed to every criminal defendant.  See White v. State, 324
Md. 626, 640, 598 A.2d 187, 194 (1991); Mitchell v. State, 320 Md. 756, 761, 580 A.2d 196,
199 (1990).   This right is, “in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State’s accusations … .” Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 403, 456 A.2d 29, 44 (1983)
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). 
-11-
Much like the rights of defendants protected by the Sixth Amendment,  the right to present
a defense is fundamental, in that it gives the appellant the opportunity  “to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [which] is in plain terms
the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well
as the prosecutions to the jury… .” Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S. Ct. 351, 353, 35
L. Ed.2d 330, 333 (1972) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920,
1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).   It is clear, therefore, that the appellant’s interest is deep
rooted and serious.   Indeed, the right is  similar to other interests, of the defendant, that the
United States Supreme Court has found to be fundamental in the criminal process. See
Douglass v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed.2d. 811 (1963) (concerning right
to counsel on first appeal); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct. 410, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372
(1971) (concerning right to transcript in misdemeanor appeals); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed.2d. 72 (1977) (concerning right to legal materials and access
to courts).
The majority lists the state’s interests  as: promoting the physical and mental health
of children, preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children, and preventing venereal
disease and pregnancy.  See           Md. at           ,            A.2d at             [slip op. at 18-22].
To be sure, these interests  are compelling.  Even so, this does not vitiate the appellant’s due
process rights and, in any event, must be narrowly tailored.   
Aside from the fact that, rather than an exploitation or abuse of one of the parties, the
facts of this case reveal only two teenagers engaged in a fully consensual act, see State v.
Although it does not address the due process issue, this case contains an excellent
23
and detailed discussion of why the State must prove  mens rea in a statutory rape case. 
The statute at issue in Bowers, stated:
24
“Georgia Code Ann.§16-6-2 (1984):
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another…
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years…”
-12-
Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 772 (R.I. 1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting) , Maryland’s statutory rape
23
law, as currently formulated is not  the most narrowly tailored method for addressing those
concerns.
To bolster its position, the majority cites Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.
Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed.2d 140 (1985).  Hardwick  was charged with violating a Georgia penal
statute, which criminalized sodomy.   See 478 U.S. at 187-88, 106 S. Ct. at 2842, 92 L. Ed.
24
2d at 144.  He brought an action in federal court, alleging: (1) the statute was
unconstitutional in criminalizing consensual sodomy, (2) as a practicing homosexual the
Georgia law placed him in imminent danger of arrest, (3) he had a fundamental
Constitutional right to privacy in his own home, which encompassed the right to engage in
sodomy, and (4) there was no rational basis for the law even if it did not infringe on his
fundamental rights. See id. at 188, 195-96, 106 S. Ct. at 2842, 2846, 92 L. Ed.2d at 144, 148-
9.  Rejecting each argument, the Court declined to extend its fundamental rights
jurisprudence as Hardwick  proposed . See id. at 190-6, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-47, 92 L. Ed.2d
at 145-49.  The Court concluded that sodomy does not fall within one of the protected
-13-
liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights. See id.  at 191-92, 106 S. Ct. at 2844-45, 92 L.
Ed.2d at 146-47.  The Court also determined that  the Georgia law survived a rational
relations review, even if it was  based on the Georgia electorate’s view that homosexual
sodomy is “immoral and unacceptable.” See id.  at 196, 106 S. Ct. at 2846, 92  L. Ed 2d at
149.  
From Bowers, the majority distills the following,  “[t]he state’s overwhelming interest
in protecting children from these risks outweighs any interest the individual may have in
engaging in sexual relations with children near the age of consent.”  See       Md. at        , 
     A.2d at          [slip  op. at 21].  Once again the majority has confused the analysis.  The
issue this case presents is not whether the appellant  has a constitutional right to engage in
sexual relations with a teenager younger than he is.  I agree with the majority,  appellant  has
no such constitutional right.   Rather, the issue is the appellant’s  due process right to present
a defense, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,  Bowers is inapposite to the
present case.   
Finally, the State cannot demonstrate, nor has it even attempted to show, that
Maryland’s statutory rape law  is the most narrowly tailored means to achieve the state’s
interest in protecting children, while infringing upon as few due process rights as possible.
 And, when the state has open to it less drastic ways of satisfying its legitimate interests, it
may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles fundamental liberties. See Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-9, 94 S. Ct. 303, 308, 38 L. Ed.2d 260, 267 (1973) (citing Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003).  While some children may require  the
That section provides:
25
“(a)Elements of offense.--A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the
person engages in a sexual act with another person: 
     
* * *
(3) Under 14 years of age and the person performing the sexual act is four or more years
older than the victim….”
§464B reads:
26
“(a)Elements of offense.--A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the third degree if the
person engages in:
    
* * *
(3) Sexual contact with another person who is under 14 years of age and the person
performing the sexual contact is four or more years older than the victim….”
That section reads:
27
“(a) Elements of the offense.--A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the fourth degree if
the person engages:
-14-
protection of strict liability,  many others do not.  There are  reasonable options available to
the State.   Recognizing  “the increased maturity and independence of today’s  teenagers…,”
see Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (1990),  the Model Penal Code has developed an
approach that limits strict liability to those cases of sexual relations involving children under
ten years of age.  See Garnett, 332 Md. at 610-11, 632 A.2d at 816-17 (Bell, J., dissenting).
 There are, in addition, other options utilized by other States, such as allowing the defendant
to present a defense whenever the “victim” lies about his or her age. See id. at 606-11, 632
A.2d at 815-17 (Bell, J., dissenting).
  Maryland’s sexual offense statutes protect some, but by no means all, children and
punish only a few alleged perpetrators.  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§
463 and  464A    punish the defendant who is 17 years old or older and engages in sexual
25
activity with a 13-year-old .  Likewise, §§ 464B  and 464C  punish defendants who engage
26
27
  
* * *
(3) Except as provided in §464B (a)(5) of this subheading, in vaginal intercourse with
another person who is 14 or 15 years of age and the person performing the act is four or more
years older than the other person….”
Justice Flanders of the Rhode Island Supreme Court reports that, “[w]ith [People v.]
28
Hernandez [, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964)] and [the Model Penal Code of 1962] taking the lead,
twenty three American jurisdictions, nearly half, now explicitly recognize some form of
mistake of age defense.” State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 784 (1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting).
-15-
in sexual relations with a 14 or 15-year-old, when the defendant is four or more years older
than his partner.  These are the only statutes the Legislature has enacted to punish persons
who engage in consensual sexual acts with underage partners.  This statutory scheme
demonstrates  the following.  First, the State is not as concerned  about the sexual exploits
of  all children as it is those who are considered so  immature that there can be little doubt
that they are too young to give consent.  In those cases, strict liability may well be
appropriate.  Second, the State has made arbitrary distinctions between persons engaging in
sexual intercourse.  The 18-year-old who has consensual sexual relations with a 14-year-old,
reasonably believing him or her to be older,  faces 20 years in prison, while the person  who
is 17 3/4  years of age, who engages in the exact same conduct is guilty of no crime and,
therefore, will face no punishment.   The protection of those truly in need of strict liability
protection certainly can be achieved short of putting at risk a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The fact that a majority of the States  hold that  a defendant’s due process rights may
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be  ignored when the charge is  statutory rape, is not a compelling reason for this Court to
do likewise; whatever other courts may do does not provide a justification for us to sanction
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the infringement upon a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.  Due process simply is
not determined by reference to the number of courts ruling a particular way.  It is of little
consequence to the appellant that he was not sentenced to 20 years in prison, see       Md. at
      ,        A.2d at           [ slip op. at 15], because he will be forever branded with the stigma
of being a child sex offender.  Moreover, the applicable inquiry is not whether the appellant
spent one day in jail or 20 years; if he did not receive a fair trial, his conviction should not
be allowed to stand.  Because, §463 (a)(3) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the applicable provisions of the  Maryland Declaration of Rights, the
appellant’s conviction should be reversed.