Case Title: ESTATE OF MORRISON MILLER V MERCY MEMORIAL HOSPITA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118701

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 4, 2002  
EDWARD MILLER, Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE 
OF MORRISON MILLER, deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 118701  
MERCY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION, 
MANOO BOONSIRI, M.D., MANOO BOONSIRI, 
M.D., P.C., and NORMA A. FLORES, 
M.D.,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
AKBAR ATTARY, M.D.,  
Defendant.  
PER CURIAM  
This case presents the issue whether the six-month  
discovery 
provision 
in 
MCL 
600.5838a(2), 
applicable 
to 
medical  
malpractice claims, is incorporated in the wrongful death  
saving statute as a “period of limitation.” 
MCL 600.5852.  
Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action on the basis of  
medical malpractice, alleging in part that defendants failed  
to timely diagnose cancer, which resulted in the death of  
plaintiff's 
decedent.  The trial court dismissed the complaint  
on 
statute 
of 
limitations 
grounds, 
pursuant 
to 
MCR  
2.116(C)(7).
 The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on  
Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1; 568 NW2d 131 (1997),  
and held that the six-month discovery rule for medical  
malpractice 
actions 
was not incorporated by the wrongful death  
saving statute.1  We reverse the judgments of the trial court  
and Court of Appeals and overrule Poffenbarger to the extent  
that it held that MCL 600.5852 does not incorporate the six­
month discovery rule.  
I  
We borrow the Court of Appeals statement of facts:  
Decedent went to see his internist, Dr.  
Attary, in 1993 because he had a chronic cough and 
had been spitting up blood (hemoptysis).  Dr.  
Attary referred decedent to Dr. Boonsiri, who 
performed a bronchoscopy on decedent's right lung 
on August 23, 1993.  The biopsy results from the  
procedure 
were 
interpreted 
as 
showing 
no  
malignancy. Decedent then underwent a CAT scan on  
August 27, 1993.  Plaintiff alleged that Dr.  
Flores misinterpreted the CAT scan, failing to 
identify a suspicious mass in decedent's upper 
hemithorax.  
Plaintiff alleged that decedent's cough and 
hemoptysis continued after August 1993.  Another  
CAT scan was performed at Mercy Memorial Hospital 
in December 1995. This scan revealed the presence 
of a mass in decedent's right lung that was noted 
to be suspicious for carcinoma.  A needle biopsy of 
the lung was performed in January 1996 at St.  
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 30, 2001 
(Docket No. 217500).  
2  
 
Vincent's Hospital, and decedent was diagnosed with 
lung cancer on January 10, 1996. Decedent died on  
January 24, 1996.  Plaintiff was appointed personal 
representative and letters of authority were issued 
on February 22, 1996. Plaintiff filed his wrongful 
death claim on October 23, 1997.  
The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of  
defendants Flores and Boonsiri under MCR 2.116(C)(7).  The  
trial court subsequently granted summary disposition in favor  
of Mercy Memorial Hospital because plaintiff alleged it was  
vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Flores and  
Boonsiri.  Plaintiff appealed as of right, and the Court of  
Appeals affirmed.  Plaintiff has applied for leave to appeal.  
II  
The Legislature has prescribed the periods of limitation  
for medical malpractice actions.  The general period of  
limitation for a malpractice action is two years. 
MCL  
600.5805(5).
 There are additional provisions specifically  
relating to medical malpractice actions.  The pertinent  
provisions are in a portion of MCL 600.5838a(2):  
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
in 
this  
subsection, an action involving a claim based on 
medical malpractice may be commenced at any time 
within the applicable period prescribed in section 
5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months 
after the plaintiff discovers or should have  
discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is 
later. . . .  
and MCL 600.5852:  
If a person dies before the period of  
limitations has run or within 30 days after the 
period of limitations has run, an action which 
survives by law may be commenced by the personal 
representative of the deceased person at any time 
within 2 years after letters of authority are  
3  
issued although the period of limitations has run. 
But an action shall not be brought under this 
provision 
unless 
the 
personal 
representative 
commences it within 3 years after the period of 
limitations has run.  
Interpretation of these statutes is at the heart of this  
matter.
 The Court of Appeals in this case interpreted  
Poffenbarger as standing for the proposition that the six­
month discovery provision under § 5838a(2) does not apply in  
a cause of action brought by a personal representative under  
§ 5852.  This reading had the effect of making the only  
“period of limitation” applicable to a medical malpractice  
cause of action brought by the personal representative under  
§ 5852, the two-year period of limitation under § 5805(5).  We  
respectfully disagree with this conclusion.  
In Poffenbarger, it was alleged that certain defendants  
failed to diagnose lung cancer in plaintiff’s decedent.  
Plaintiff’s decedent died within two years of the date of  
accrual of the alleged malpractice, i.e., within the period of  
limitation set out in § 5805(5).  Suit against the relevant  
defendants was not filed within three years from the  
expiration of the two-year period of limitation. Defendants  
argued the claim was therefore time-barred.  Plaintiff, the  
personal representative of the estate, argued that she could  
avail herself of the six-month discovery provision in  
§ 5838a(2).  Under this scenario, however, the suit would have  
been timely filed within three years of the expiration of this  
4  
  
  
 
six-month discovery period.2  The Court stated that the issue  
was “whether the three-year period mentioned in the wrongful  
death saving provision of MCL 600.5852 commences after the  
six-month statutory discovery period provided for in MCL  
600.5838a.” Poffenbarger, supra at 3.3  However, the Court  
went on to state that the six-month discovery provision was  
not incorporated by the wrongful death saving statute.  Id. at  
10.  
2 In Poffenbarger, unlike this case, there was no claim 
that 
the 
alleged 
medical malpractice victim had discovered the 
malpractice after the two-year period of limitation had 
expired.  The alleged malpractice in Poffenbarger occurred in  
May of 1989, and the malpractice claimant died in January of 
1991.  Thus, the applicable period of limitation for the 
purpose of that case was the two-year period in § 5805.  
3 In addressing the personal representative’s claim that 
the six-month discovery period applied to her discovery of 
malpractice, rather than to the discovery by the decedent, and 
her effort to amend the complaint to add new defendants in May 
of 1994 (a period after the maximum three-year cutoff for 
personal representatives to bring a surviving cause of action 
under § 5852), Poffenbarger disagreed that the three-year 
period that allowed a personal representative to bring a cause 
of action after the applicable limitation period could be 
further extended by the later “discovery” of a cause of action 
by the personal representative under the six-month discovery 
provision. Id. at 9.  However, the Court proceeded to analyze 
whether the personal representative had actually “discovered” 
a cause of action against the defendants she sought to add to 
the complaint.  We do not purport to address whether a 
personal representative may use the six-month discovery 
provision in § 5838a(2), because the facts in this case are 
clearly distinguishable from Poffenbarger.  In this case, the  
six-month discovery provision applied to the decedent’s 
discovery of the alleged acts of malpractice, and the issue is 
whether the personal representative may avail the estate of a 
cause of action under this provision within the time  
prescribed by § 5852. Accordingly, we overrule Poffenbarger  
to the extent that it states that the six-month discovery 
period contemplated by § 5838a(2) is not a “period of 
limitation” within the meaning of § 5852, the saving statute.  
5  
The Court of Appeals here relied on this statement from  
Poffenbarger and likewise held that the saving provision did  
not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in this  
case.  
III  
As we review the interpretation and application of a  
statute, it is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Lincoln v General Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d  
73 (2000).  We first review the language of the statute  
itself. If it is clear, no further analysis is necessary or  
allowed to expand what the Legislature clearly intended to  
cover. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596  
NW2d 164 (1999).  
Following these principles of statutory construction, we  
conclude that the six-month discovery rule is a “period of  
limitation” within the meaning of the saving statute.  The  
plain language of § 5838a(2) provides two distinct periods of  
limitation: two years after the accrual of the cause of  
action, and six months after the existence of the claim was or  
should have been discovered by the medical malpractice  
claimant.
 MCL 600.5852, simply refers to “the” period of  
limitation.  The provision does not limit or qualify which  
period of limitation applies, the two-year period of  
limitation rooted in § 5805(5), or the six-month discovery  
period found in § 5838a(2).  As a saving statute, § 5852  
applies to whatever period of limitation is or may be  
6  
 
applicable in a given case, be it a professional malpractice  
claim or a breach of contract action.  Indeed, Poffenbarger  
acknowledged that “[t]he period of limitation in a wrongful  
death action is governed by the statute of limitations  
applicable to the underlying claim.”  Id. at 6. As the trial  
court acknowledged in this case, the underlying claim here was  
a medical malpractice action brought under the six-month  
discovery period.  Thus, it is the latter period of limitation  
that the wrongful death saving statute incorporates here.  
Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the six-month discovery  
rule is a distinct period of limitation.  It is a statutory  
provision that requires a person who has a cause of action to  
bring suit within a specified time.4  As an alternative to the  
other periods of limitation, it is itself a period of  
limitation.  
Section 5852 is a saving statute, not a statute of  
limitations. In Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 66; 564  
NW2d 861 (1997), we stated that the purpose of § 5852 was “to  
preserve actions that survive death in order that the  
representative of the estate may have a reasonable time to  
pursue such actions.”  That purpose is fulfilled by our  
decision today. Had plaintiff’s decedent not died, he would  
have been able to bring suit for six months, or until July  
1996. Suit would have been timely, not under § 5805(5), but  
4 O’Brien v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1, 15; 299 NW2d 336 
(1980).  
7  
 
 
 
 
under § 5838a(2), not as an exception to the two-year statute,  
but as an additional period of limitation. While we said in  
Lindsey that § 5852 is to be narrowly construed as an  
exception to the statute of limitations, giving effect to its  
plain meaning does not violate that edict. Here, letters of  
authority were issued on February 26, 1996.  Plaintiff  
therefore had two years from that date, or until February 26,  
1998, to commence suit as long as suit was commenced within  
three years of July 1996, the date signifying the end of the  
applicable six-month limitation period.  Because suit was  
commenced on October 23, 1997, it was timely.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit  
court and Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit  
court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
8