Case Title: State v. Bomar

Citation: 381 S.W.2d 280

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1964-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
381 S.W.2d 280 (1964) STATE of Tennessee ex rel. Charles BYRD, Plaintiff in Error, v. Lynn BOMAR, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary, Defendant in Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 15, 1964. Charles Byrd, pro se. George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., and Walker T. Tipton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendant in error. HOLMES, Justice. The plaintiff in error, who is confined in the State Penitentiary, pursuant to a judgment rendered in the Criminal Court of Davidson County, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court of Davidson County, seeking his release from the State Penitentiary. The petition for habeas corpus alleges that on the 19th day of January, 1962 plaintiff in error was tried and convicted of the offense of burglary in the 3rd degree and of the offense of an attempt to commit larceny. He was sentenced to serve a term of three years. This petition further states: The petition for habeas corpus further avers: The Trial Judge dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and the case has been duly appealed to this Court. The essence of the petition for habeas corpus is that the judgment in the criminal case against plaintiff in error is void because: As to the first contention made by plaintiff in error, Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution of Tennessee gives to one accused of crime the right to meet the witnesses face to face, which is the same right guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In Eason v. State, 65 Tenn. 431, 436, 437, this Court stated: This statement in the Eason case is in accord with the well recognized rule stated, as follows, in 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 999, page 1047: The right of confrontation was a common law right having recognized exceptions. The purpose of the provision contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was to preserve that right, but not to broaden it or to remove the exceptions. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548, 47 S. Ct. 173, 175, 71 L. Ed. 398. The petition for writ of habeas corpus does not contend that plaintiff in error was denied the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" who actually testified at the trial. This petition, therefore, does not allege facts constituting a denial of any right guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution of Tennessee. If it is true, as stated in the petition for habeas corpus, that the plaintiff in error was sentenced "to a term of three (3) years for the offense of burglary 3rd degree and attempt at larceny", then the plaintiff in error has only received the minimum punishment for the offense of burglary in the third degree. T.C.A. § 39-904 provides that every person convicted of burglary in the third degree shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years. In Hayes v. State, 83 Tenn. 64, this Court held that an indictment for attempt to commit larceny does not require the same particularity as an indictment for the offense of larceny itself. In so holding, the Court, at 67 and 68 of 83 Tenn., stated: In the recent case of Dupuy v. State, 204 Tenn. 624, 325 S.W.2d 238, this Court referred to the Hayes case and others dealing with the offense of attempt to commit larceny. At page 627 of 204 Tenn., at page 239 of 325 S.W.2d, the Court stated: *283 Since one may be guilty of the offense of attempt to commit larceny from a cash drawer which proved to be entirely empty, the alleged failure of the indictment in the case in which plaintiff in error was convicted to specify whether he attempted grand or petit larceny can be of no consequence. Certainly the judgment is not void. This Court has ruled many times that a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release of one imprisoned under a judgment is a collateral attack upon such judgment, and not a direct attack, and cannot prevail unless the judgment is void. In State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243, 364 S.W.2d 887, the Court, at 247 of 211 Tenn., at 889 of 364 S.W.2d stated: The present appeal is before the Court on the technical record in the habeas corpus proceeding only. No part of the record in the case in which plaintiff in error was convicted is before the Court. T.C.A. § 23-1809 states: In the instant case the Trial Judge was entirely correct in dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.