Case Title: The People v. Jeremy Almeter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 84  
The People &c.,
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Jeremy Almeter, 
            Appellant.
Bridget L. Field, for appellant.
Robert R. Zickl, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Based upon an incident occurring at complainant's home,
defendant Jeremy Almeter was charged, by distinct accusatory
instruments, with assault in the third degree and trespass.  The
trespass charge, a violation, was based upon the allegation that,
at approximately 2:00 am on October 18, 2005, defendant refused
to leave complainant's property after complainant had asked him
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to do so.  The assault charge, a misdemeanor, was based upon the
allegation that, at the same time and place, defendant struck
complainant under the chin with a soft-drink bottle, causing
complainant to sustain a laceration requiring four stitches.
Notwithstanding the separate accusatory instruments,
the matter[s] proceeded, to all appearances, as one prosecution:
the charges were listed together on several documents, including
the police incident report, the arrest report, the appearance
ticket and the order of protection.  And, although consolidation
was not specifically requested, the charges were prosecuted under
a single docket number.  To say that the defendant might
reasonably have expected the charges to be tried together before
a single fact finder, would not seem to venture too much.
However, after the parties had selected a jury and
proceeded to trial, and, indeed, after the defense case had
nearly concluded, the prosecutor, while discussing the jury
charge, raised the issue of whether the trial court intended to
render a decision as to the trespass charge.  The court
responded: "Yes.  Yes.  [Defense counsel], my practice, if I have
violation charges as well as misdemeanor charges, is to have the
jury handle statutorily their duty, which is misdemeanor verdict,
and have the violation charge handled by this Court, decided by
this Court."  Defense counsel then indicated that he had been
unaware of the court's practice, never having tried a case before
this particular judge.
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The court permitted defense counsel to consider the
issue overnight.  The following day, defense counsel reiterated
that he had not been cognizant of the court's procedure and
observed that "no one ever brought that up to me for months while
we had this case that this was going to be a separate matter, and
I think that's unfair for Mr. Almeter."  He also noted that he
had made reference to an additional charge in front of the jury. 
Defense counsel did not specifically mention trespass in his
opening statement but, when asking the jury not to form an
opinion before hearing all of the evidence, stated that "the law
is very specific [as] to each of the charges."  The court
rejected defendant's arguments and, although the jury ultimately
acquitted defendant of assault, the court convicted him of
trespass.
County Court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding
that a joint bench and jury trial was permissible under these
circumstances, where there were two separate accusatory
instruments.  The court also found that there was no prejudice to
defendant, since he had been acquitted of the assault charge.  A
Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal (11 NY3d
784 [2008]) and we now reverse.
Section 340.40 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law
provides that a defendant who is entitled to a jury trial because
he or she has pleaded not guilty to a misdemeanor, "shall be so
entitled even though the information also charges an offense for
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which he is otherwise not entitled to a jury trial" (CPL 340.40
[3]).  We need not reach defendant's contention that even though
the charges were preferred by separate informations he was
entitled under this provision to have the jury decide both
charges.  It would appear to us evident that if, contrary to
reasonable expectation, two trials were to be simultaneously held
before different fact-finders, the court was obliged to inform
defendant and his counsel of this unique mode of proceeding from
the outset.
Defendant was unaware that each of his offenses was
being tried to a separate fact finder until the trial was nearly
over.  The charges were all along treated as if they had been
consolidated and, until the prosecutor raised the issue, nothing
happened to disabuse defendant of that notion.  It would seem
fundamental that a defendant should not be required to guess who
the fact finder is at his or her trial.  As there was every
indication that both charges were being tried by the jury,
defendant should have been given notice that that in fact would
not be the case, and, since there would be more than one fact-
finder, of which fact finder would be deciding which charge. 
This is so, at least in part, because counsel may well determine
that a different trial strategy is warranted based upon whether a
particular charge is being presented to a judge or to a jury.
While the court may have deemed this particular
procedure economical, the economy was a false one where the
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defendant was not timely advised that his charges were to be
tried by separate fact finders.
Accordingly, the order of the County Court should be
reversed and the case should be remitted to Batavia City Court
for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and case remitted to Batavia City Court for
further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.
Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman. Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read,
Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided June 24, 2009