Case Title: Linardon v. Boston Housing Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13037

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13037 
 
KELECHI LINARDON  vs.  BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY.1 
 
 
March 10, 2021. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
The petitioner, Kelechi Linardon, appeals from a judgment 
of a single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
This is not the first time that the petitioner has sought 
relief from this court.  In February of 2020, she filed a 
complaint in the county court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief and damages against the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the 
Boston Housing Authority, which a single justice transferred to 
the Superior Court.  See Linardon v. United States Dep't of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 485 Mass. 1005, 1005 (2020).  As detailed 
in that opinion, HUD thereafter removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.  That 
court dismissed the claims against HUD and remanded the matter 
to the Superior Court.  See id. at 1005-1006.  The Superior 
Court subsequently transferred the case to the Housing Court.2 
 
 
1 Although the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development was also named as a respondent, the claims against 
it in the underlying proceeding have been dismissed, and it is 
no longer a party in the case. 
 
 
2 In addition to the complaint that the petitioner filed in 
the county court in the earlier case, she also filed, in 
February 2020, a complaint directly in the Superior Court.  That 
case was transferred to the Housing Court before both cases were 
 
 
2 
 
As best we can tell from the limited material before us, it 
appears that the petitioner contested the order transferring her 
case to the Housing Court and then appealed from that order.  In 
connection with that appeal, which is currently pending in the 
Appeals Court, she sought a stay or an injunction, pursuant to 
Mass. R. A. P. 6 (a), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1601 (2009), 
seeking to restore her Federal housing benefits pending her 
appeal.  A judge in the Superior Court denied the motion, as 
did, subsequently, a single justice of the Appeals Court.  The 
petitioner then filed her G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, in which 
she appears to be seeking the same relief. 
 
In the petition, she asked a single justice of this 
court "to order the [respondent] to keep [her] approved 
federal . . . rental voucher [under the [Massachusetts 
rental voucher program (MRVP)] in an active status."  She 
stated that the respondent has "purposely in retaliation 
kept [her] federal approved HUD MRVP rental voucher 'The 
Housing Choice Voucher Program' on inactive status since the 
month that [her] civil tort suit was filed against [the 
respondent] at [the] Superior Court."  Noting that the 
relief that the petitioner sought in her G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition -- keeping her Federal rental voucher in "active 
status" -- already had been denied by both the trial court 
and the Appeals Court, the single justice of this court 
concluded that the matter did not warrant the exercise of 
this court's extraordinary power pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, and denied the petition. 
 
In her appeal to this court, the petitioner has 
refiled, in lieu of a brief, the exact same document that 
she had filed in the county court, i.e., the G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, petition.  She makes no argument that the single 
justice erred or abused his discretion in denying her 
petition, nor does she make any effort to demonstrate the 
absence of alternative means by which to seek relief.  See 
Lasher v. Leslie-Lasher, 474 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2016), 
citing Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2001) ("It 
is incumbent on a party seeking exercise of this court's 
extraordinary power of general superintendence under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of 
alternative means of redress").  This alone is a reason to 
deny her appeal. 
 
removed to the Federal District Court and thereafter remanded to 
the State courts. 
 
3 
 
Indeed, the petitioner does have an alternative means by 
which to seek relief, which she has already pursued, in the 
trial court, with a single justice of the Appeals Court, and 
before a panel of the Appeals Court.  That she did not 
receive a stay or an injunction from the trial court or from 
the single justice of the Appeals Court does not entitle her 
as of right to have a single justice of this court consider 
the same pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Moreover, it appears 
from the Appeals Court docket that the petitioner has 
appealed to a panel of the Appeals Court from the single 
justice's order, as was her right.  See Mass. R. A. P. 6 (a), 
15 (c), 365 Mass. 859 (1974).  See also Kordis v. Appeals 
Court, 434 Mass. 662, 664-665 (2001).  The single justice of 
this court was well within his authority in declining to 
employ this court's extraordinary power of general 
superintendence in this situation. 
 
Furthermore, the petition itself includes no record of 
any kind.  It was the petitioner's burden "to create a 
record -- not merely to allege but to demonstrate, i.e., to 
provide copies of the lower court docket entries and any 
relevant pleadings, motions, orders, recordings, transcripts, 
or other parts of the lower court record necessary to 
substantiate [her] allegations -- showing both a substantial 
claim of violation of a substantive right and that the 
violation could not have been remedied in the normal course 
of a trial and appeal or by other available means."  Gorod v. 
Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied sub nom. Davis 
v. Tabachnick, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), and cases cited.  
Neither a single justice nor the full court is required to 
rely on the bare, unsupported allegations of a petition.  
Matthews v. D'Arcy, 425 Mass. 1021, 1022 (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Kelechi Lindardon, pro se.