Case Title: Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div1988 WY 30750 P.2d 1329Case Number: 87-255Decided: 03/09/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
LARRY J. DELOGES, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-PETITIONER),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-RESPONDENT), DELTA ENGINEERING, 
(EMPLOYER-RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Sharon M. Rose 
of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C., Kemmerer, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Susan Maher Overeem, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order denying appellant Larry J. Deloges' application under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act for additional benefits or modification of award 
subsequent to an award of permanent total disability benefits. The dispositive 
issue presented is whether, under the act, a permanent total disability award 
may be modified to provide additional benefits.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant sustained a 
work-related back injury on February 12, 1982. After two surgical procedures, 
the initial diagnosis of a herniated disc was elevated to a disc space 
infection. On May 23, 1985, appellant's attending physician assigned him a 
rating of 100% permanent total disability, finding that appellant was in daily 
pain, could walk only with hand crutches, and had developed a neurogenic 
bladder.

[¶4.]     On October 21, 1985, 
appellant was awarded 100% permanent total disability benefits of $71,219.84, 
payable by a lump sum payment of $25,000 with the remaining $46,219.84 to be 
paid in 25 monthly installments of $1,801.19 and a final payment of $1,190.09. 
If appellant had not received the $25,000 lump sum payment, he would have 
received monthly payments of $1,801.19 through January 31, 1989. However, in 
accordance with the pay-out schedule, the benefit payments terminated November 
30, 1987.

[¶5.]     Since the initial award 
of permanent total disability, appellant's physical condition has deteriorated. 
Testimony in the record reveals that he has totally lost the use of his legs, 
which has confined him to a wheelchair, and additionally that he is beginning to 
"lose control" in the upper part of his body, including arm movement. 
Unfortunately, a letter to appellant from the deputy clerk of the district court 
mistakenly led appellant to believe that, upon completion of the payments as 
scheduled, he would be immediately eligible for additional benefits, despite the 
up-front lump sum payment.

[¶6.]     Appellant, upon 
learning that he would not be immediately eligible for additional benefits upon 
payout of the initial award, filed a motion for additional benefits on June 16, 
1987. As grounds for the motion, appellant asserted continued impairment of his 
earning capacity pursuant to § 27-12-405(d), W.S. 1977.1 Thereafter, appellant filed an 
amended motion for additional benefits or modification of award asserting a 
change in condition and an increase in incapacity pursuant to §§ 27-12-405(b) 
and 27-12-606, W.S. 1977.

[¶7.]     Appellee objected to 
the application for additional benefits, maintaining that the only provision for 
additional benefits to a permanently totally disabled claimant was § 
27-12-405(d) and that, under the time limitation imposed by that section, 
appellant would not be eligible for further benefits until the initial award 
would have been paid out, if paid at the monthly rate fixed by law; i.e., 
January 31, 1989. The district court agreed and entered an order denying 
additional benefits.

[¶8.]     Appellant's primary 
contention on appeal is that the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, as it 
existed in relation to his claim, authorized benefits to a permanently totally 
disabled worker over and above both the initial award provided in § 27-12-405(b) 
and the provision for additional benefits for continuing impairment of earning 
power found in § 27-12-405(d). Appellant urges us to find authority for 
additional benefits or an increase in the initial award on the basis of the 
language in § 27-12-405(b) that "[t]he court may modify the amount of award to 
conform to any change in the condition of the employee" and also on the basis of 
§ 27-12-606, the general reopening or modification statute in the act. We are 
unable to agree with appellant's interpretation of these 
statutes.

[¶9.]     Resolution of this 
issue requires that we apply our general rules of statutory construction and 
also apply certain specific rules of construction which have evolved in relation 
to the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. We have consistently held that 
worker's compensation law should be liberally construed if rationally possible 
so that industry rather than the injured worker will bear the burden of 
industrial injuries. City of Buffalo v. 
Van Buskirk, Wyo., 741 P.2d 120 (1987). However, under the 
guise of liberal construction, we cannot extend the beneficent purpose of 
compensation law to injuries which do not reasonably fall within the language of 
the statute. Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction 
Company, Wyo., 
668 P.2d 649 (1983).

[¶10.]  Our general rules of statutory 
construction are well settled. If the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we must abide by the plain meaning of the statute, Adobe Oil & 
Gas Corporation v. Getter Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984), but where a 
statute is ambiguous, the court will resort to general principles of statutory 
construction in an attempt to ascertain legislative intent. State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 686 P.2d 521 (1984). Furthermore, it is 
a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must 
be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be construed 
so that no part is inoperative or superfluous. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 
Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139 (1985). Additionally, we have held that this Court must assume that the 
legislature did not intend futile things, id., and that statutes should not be 
interpreted in a manner producing absurd results. State v. Sodergren, 
supra.

[¶11.]  With these rules of construction in mind, 
we look to the statutes involved in this case. The relevant provisions of § 
27-12-405 were as follows:

"(a) Permanent total 
disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, 
paralysis or other conditions permanently incapacitating the employee from 
performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited 
by experience or training.

"(b) If permanent total 
disability results from the injury, the employee shall receive for two hundred 
fifty-seven (257) weeks, an award equal to two-thirds (2/3) of the state's 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury, less any previous awards for 
permanent partial disability, payable in monthly installments at the rate of the 
state's average weekly wage rate as determined quarterly. The court may modify 
the amount of award to conform to any change in the condition of the employee, 
or in cases of exceptional necessity the court may order payment of any portion 
of the award in a lump sum at any time before the award is fully paid. If the 
employee dies leaving an unpaid balance of the award and no further award is 
made on account of the death, the unpaid balance shall be paid or held as 
provided by W.S. 27-12-404.

* * * * * 
*

"(d) Upon the expiration 
of the period of time in which the amount awarded to the employee for permanent 
total disability would be paid in its entirety at the monthly rates fixed by 
law, the district court may award additional compensation to the injured 
employee for any continuing impairment of his earning power resulting from the 
original injury * * *."

Section 
27-12-606 provided:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be 
made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the 
date of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an 
award are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

[¶12.]  Our reading of these statutes convinces 
us that appellant is not presently entitled to additional benefits. Subsection 
(a) of § 27-12-405 defined permanent total disability. The first sentence of 
subsection (b), using the mandatory term "shall," prescribed the award to be 
given in a case of permanent total disability and provided for the method of 
payment. Provision for additional benefits for the totally disabled worker was 
provided in subsection (d) of § 27-12-405. Subsection (d) specifically provided 
that additional benefits may be awarded at the expiration of the time period in 
which the initial award as provided in subsection (b) would have been paid in 
its entirety if it had been paid at the monthly rate.

[¶13.]  The language in subsection (b), relied 
upon by appellant, that "[t]he court may modify the amount of the award to 
conform to any change in the condition of the employee," when read with the 
previous sentence specifically describing the award to be given, is susceptible 
to more than one meaning and thus is ambiguous. An ambiguous statute exists when 
a word or phrase is susceptible to more than one meaning. McArtor v. State, 
Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 (1985). The words used could suggest that a permanent total disability award 
may be modified upward. When read in conjunction with the other provisions of 
the statute, however, the language can only reasonably be interpreted to mean 
that the court may decrease an award where there has been a decrease from 100% 
total disability. Total disability is the maximum possible disability under the 
act. Parnell v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 735 P.2d 1367 
(1987). The interpretation of the statute as urged by appellant would lead to 
the result of an employee receiving a disability award of greater than 100%, and 
we cannot construe the statute in such a manner. Under our construction of the 
statute, a 100% permanently totally disabled employee is entitled to a specified 
award to be paid by monthly payments or, in exceptional circumstances, by a lump 
sum payment. Upon expiration of the period of time in which the award would have 
been paid if paid monthly, and if the employee's earning power continues to be 
impaired, he then is eligible for additional benefits.

[¶14.]  We are equally unpersuaded, for 
essentially the same reasons, that § 27-12-606 provided additional benefits to a 
permanently totally disabled worker beyond those provided in § 27-12-405. 
Section 27-12-606, the general reopening and modification statute, provided 
that, when an employee has received an award, he may, within a certain time 
including any time during which monthly payments are being paid, apply for 
"additional benefits of any type or nature or for a modification of the amount 
of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to 
the injury." Regarding this statute, we have said:

"We interpret the 
language of this statute to the end that a timely application for benefits may 
be made by an injured workman subject only to the requirement of showing an 
increase or decrease in incapacity due solely to the injury, or mistake, or 
fraud.

"* * * An award, being 
characterized as a judicial determination, is subject to the concept of 
finality. Given this proposition, § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, represents an attempt 
by the legislature to balance the concept of finality as applied to worker's 
compensation awards with the need to assure that injured workmen receive the 
full amount of any benefits to which they are entitled under the law." 
Conn v. Ed 
Wederski Construction Company, 668 P.2d  at 652-53 (emphasis 
added).

[¶15.]  Appellant, having been awarded 100% 
permanent total disability, has received the full amount of benefits to which he 
is entitled pursuant to § 27-12-405. This is the maximum disability award 
possible for the specified time period, and appellant cannot look to § 27-12-606 
for additional benefits. This interpretation is also consistent with the rule 
that, where a general provision of a statute is inconsistent with a specific 
provision pertaining to the same subject, the specific provision controls. 
Hot Springs County School District No. 1 v. 
Strube Construction Company, Wyo., 715 P.2d 540 (1986). Section 27-12-606 
is a general provision statute applying to all the various benefit provisions in 
the act. Section 27-12-405 is a specific statute dealing exclusively with 
permanent total disability.

[¶16.]  Appellant's contention that he is 
entitled to additional benefits under §§ 27-12-405(b) and 27-12-606 is in 
essence an argument that, even though appellant was awarded 100% disability, his 
deteriorated physical condition amounts to an increase in incapacity entitling 
him to further compensation. This position reflects a misunderstanding of 
worker's compensation law, particularly as it exists in Wyoming. We have held 
that worker's compensation in Wyoming "is in the nature of accident 
insurance and is not intended to give compensation as damages." Markle v. 
Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621, 624 (1974); Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 
Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333 (1942). We have further said that disability in worker's compensation 
law means an impairment in earning capacity and that such impairment is the 
theoretical basis for an award of compensation. McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium 
Company, Wyo., 
694 P.2d 93 (1985). In this respect, we are in accord with this observation by 
Professor Larson:

"It has been stressed 
repeatedly that the distinctive feature of the compensation system, by contrast 
with tort liability, is that its awards (apart from medical benefits), and apart 
from certain permanent partial awards in four or five states, are made not for 
physical injury as such, but for `disability' produced by such injury." 2 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 57.11 at 10-2 
(1987).

Appellant was 
awarded 100% permanent total disability benefits on the basis of the total 
impairment of his earning capacity. Even though appellant has experienced 
further physical deterioration, his earning capacity has not been further 
impaired. Thus, as we have said, "total disability is the maximum disability 
possible under the Act." Parnell v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Division, 735 P.2d  at 1369.

[¶17.]  We observe that the hardship to appellant 
in this case is a result of the partial lump sum payment given at the time of 
the initial award. Section 27-12-405(b) provided that any portion of an award 
may be paid in a lump sum in cases of "exceptional necessity." The order 
awarding appellant permanent total disability benefits is not in the record on 
appeal, nor is there any other indication of why a lump sum payment was made. 
Nevertheless, this case is illustrative of the perils of lump sum awards as 
described by Professor Larson:

"In some jurisdictions, 
the excessive and indiscriminate use of the lump-summing device has reached a 
point at which it threatens to undermine the real purposes of the compensation 
system. Since compensation is a segment of a total income insurance system, it 
ordinarily does its share of the job only if it can be depended on to supply 
periodic income benefits replacing a portion of lost earnings. If a partially or 
totally disabled worker gives up these reliable periodic payments in exchange 
for a large sum of cash immediately in hand, experience has shown that in many 
cases the lump sum is soon dissipated and the workman is right back where he 
would have been if worker's compensation had never existed." 3 Larson, The Law 
of Workmen's Compensation § 82.71 at 15-594-95 (1983).

[¶18.]  Appellant was awarded total disability 
benefits to compensate his loss of earning power through January 1989. The fact 
that a portion of the award was paid in a lump sum does not affect the covered 
period of wage loss. Upon the expiration of that period, appellant may apply for 
additional benefits for any continuing impairment of his earning power pursuant 
to § 27-12-405(d). Having received the maximum award available under the act on 
the basis of total incapacity to earn, appellant cannot obtain additional 
benefits under the provisions for modification of an award found in §§ 
27-12-405(b) and 27-12-606.

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Chapter 12 of Title 27 
(worker's compensation - §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-805, W.S. 1977) was repealed 
in 1986 and recreated as our present Chapter 14 (§§ 27-14-101 through 27-14-804, 
W.S. 1977), effective July 1, 1987. This case arose under the prior statutory 
scheme. Claims under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are governed by laws 
in effect at the time of injury. Shapiro v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Division, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1079 
(1985).