Case Title: 20 Thames Street LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017 LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021 ME 33

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2021 ME 33 
Docket: 
 Cum-20-184 
Argued: 
 February 10, 2021 
Decided: 
 June 24, 2021 
 
Panel: 
 MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CONNORS, JJ. 
Majority: 
 MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CONNORS, JJ. 
Concurrence: 
 CONNORS, J. 
 
 
20 THAMES STREET LLC et al. 
 
v. 
 
OCEAN STATE JOB LOT OF MAINE 2017 LLC 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  20 Thames Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC (collectively, 20 Thames) 
appeal from a decision of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Stewart, J.) 
affirming the judgment of the District Court entered in the Business and 
Consumer Docket (Portland, Duddy, J.) in favor of Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 
2017 LLC.  20 Thames asserts that the District Court erred when it granted 
Ocean State’s motion to dismiss and determined that 20 Thames’s complaint 
for forcible entry and detainer (FED) was barred by the claim preclusion branch 
of res judicata.  We agree and vacate the judgment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following substantive facts are taken from the allegations in the 
complaint and are viewed as if they were admitted, see Ramsey v. Baxter Title 
Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 2, 54 A.3d 710, and the procedural facts are drawn from 
the record. 
[¶3]  20 Thames is the landlord and Ocean State is the tenant pursuant to 
a commercial lease for property in Falmouth.  On April 25, 2018, 20 Thames 
provided a “Notice of Default and Termination” to Ocean State enumerating 
four events of default:   
1. 
Failure to sign and return the Subordination Non 
 
Disturbance Agreement as required by Section 27 of the 
 
Lease;  
2. 
Failure to sign and return the Estoppel Certificate within 
 
10  days after request as required by Section 29 of the Lease;  
3. 
Failure to provide evidence of insurance naming the 
 
Landlord as an additional insured as required by Section 9 of 
 
the Lease; and 
4. 
Failure to comply with Section 3 of the Lease by allowing a 
 
trailer to remain at the loading dock for a period of time in 
 
excess of overnight or as otherwise may be permitted by the 
 
Lease. 
 
The notice further provided: “There is no way to cure the default enumerated 
in item 2 above and Section 29 provides that the Lease may be terminated 
immediately.  The additional defaults are not in waiver of the Landlord’s right 
to immediately terminate the Lease for failure to provide the Estoppel 
 
 
3 
Agreement.”  It directed Ocean State to surrender the premises.  Ocean State 
responded by letter dated May 3, 2018, in which it asserted, among other 
things, that its trailer-parking practices did not violate the lease.   
 
[¶4]  After Ocean State refused to vacate, 20 Thames filed an FED 
complaint on May 7, 2018, in the District Court.  The complaint asserted one 
count for possession of the property, and paragraph twenty-one specifically 
provided: 
By reason of a Notice of Termination of Lease for failure to: 
a. 
sign and return the SNDA and sign and return the 
Estoppel as required by the Lease; 
b. 
provide evidence of insurance naming the Plaintiff as an 
additional insured as required by the Lease; and 
c. 
comply with Section 3 of the Lease by allowing a trailer 
to remain at the loading dock for a period of time in 
excess of overnight or as otherwise may be permitted 
by the Lease, 
Defendant’s tenancy has been terminated.  See [the 2018 
termination notice], Defendant’s refusal to execute the estoppel. 
 
The matter was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, and after a 
three-day trial, the court (Mulhern, J.) entered judgment in favor of Ocean State.  
The judgment addressed only 20 Thames’s assertion of default and termination 
based on Section 29 of the lease.  20 Thames appealed, and the Superior Court 
(Warren, J.) affirmed the judgment on the merits but vacated an award of 
attorney fees.  Ocean State appealed the attorney fees decision, and we affirmed 
 
 
4 
the Superior Court’s decision.  See 20 Thames St. LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of 
Me. 2017, LLC, 2020 ME 55, ¶ 1, 231 A.3d 426. 
[¶5]  Meanwhile, on September 25, 2019, 20 Thames sent another “Notice 
of Termination” to Ocean State.  It stated:  
The purpose of this letter is to provide Tenant with notice of the 
immediate termination of the Lease due to Tenant’s ongoing and 
continuous violation, since April 2018, of Section 3 of the Lease 
pursuant to which Tenant is prohibited from storing trailers on the 
Premises other than during times when those trailers are being 
unloaded and, in any event, no longer than overnight.  Tenant has 
regularly stored trailers on the Premises for between 2 and 5 days 
at a time. 
 
Tenant received a Notice of Default regarding this Lease violation 
dated April 25, 2018.  By letter dated November 19, 2018 Tenant’s 
legal counsel argued that Tenant’s trailer parking practices were 
“consistent with Section 3 of the Lease.”  By letter dated 
December 10, 2018, Landlord’s legal counsel explained why that 
statement is incorrect, and warned Tenant that its “current 
practice of storing trailers [on the Premises] for days at a time is an 
ongoing default and must stop immediately.” 
 
Despite the Notice of Default and the subsequent warning, Tenant 
continues to park trailers on the Premises for multiple days at a 
time and has stated in an email . . . dated June 26, 2019 that it does 
not intend to change that practice.  Accordingly, Landlord hereby 
exercises its right under the Lease to terminate the Lease effective 
immediately. 
 
The letter directed Ocean State to surrender the premises.  After Ocean State 
again refused to surrender possession, 20 Thames filed a new FED complaint 
in the District Court on October 21, 2019.   
 
 
5 
 
[¶6]  The complaint alleged that 20 Thames had provided Ocean State 
with a notice of default in April 2018 based on its trailer-parking practices and 
that Ocean State had thereafter “admitted in an email . . . that ‘[a] trailer is 
currently delivered 3 times a week, is unloaded and remains until the next truck 
delivery, at which time the trailer is removed and a new full one replaced and 
subsequently unloaded.’”  The complaint further asserted that Ocean State 
“always ha[d] at least one trailer parked on the Premises,” had denied that its 
conduct violated the lease, and had failed to modify its conduct.  Finally, the 
complaint asserted that, because Ocean State failed and refused to cure the 
default, the lease was terminated.  20 Thames attached to the complaint a copy 
of (1) the lease, (2) the 2018 termination notice, and (3) the 2019 termination 
notice.  The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. 
[¶7]  Ocean State moved to dismiss the 2019 action on res judicata 
grounds, arguing that both claim and issue preclusion barred the action.  On 
December 20, 2019, after oral arguments from both parties, the District Court 
(Duddy, J.) granted Ocean State’s motion to dismiss and entered judgment in 
favor of Ocean State.1 
 
1  The District Court took judicial notice of the pleadings and other filings in the 2018 action.  
Although the court considered “materials outside the [2019] pleadings, the proceeding was not 
transformed into a summary judgment proceeding because [the 2018] materials were public records 
 
 
6 
[¶8]  The court determined that issue preclusion did not apply but that 
20 Thames’s action was barred by claim preclusion.  It found that the same 
parties were involved in both actions and there was a valid, final judgment in 
the prior action.  The court then determined that the claim in the 2019 action 
based on Section 3 of the lease arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts 
as the defaults raised in the 2018 action.  Next, the court examined whether it 
should apply claim preclusion to bar 20 Thames’s 2019 action and noted that a 
subsequent FED action by a landlord should not be precluded where “new and 
different conduct occurs.”  However, it determined that new and different 
conduct had not occurred because 20 Thames’s allegations referred to Ocean 
State’s conduct as ongoing and continuous and that conduct predated the 2018 
complaint. 
[¶9]  20 Thames appealed, and on June 15, 2020, the Superior Court 
(Stewart, J.) affirmed the District Court’s judgment.  See 14 M.R.S. §§ 6008(1), 
6017(2) (2021).  It concluded that 20 Thames’s Section 3 claim in the 2019 
action was raised in the 2018 action and might have been litigated at that time.  
20 Thames timely appealed from that decision.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2021); 
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1); M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(1). 
 
and their authenticity was not challenged.”  Estate of Treworgy v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Health and Hum. 
Servs., 2017 ME 179, ¶ 7 n.2, 169 A.3d 416.   
 
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION  
 
[¶10]  20 Thames argues that the trial court erred in granting Ocean 
State’s motion to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds because the Section 3 
claim was not and could not have been litigated in the 2018 action, particularly 
because only Section 29 was at issue in that action.  Ocean State contends that 
20 Thames asserted a claim based on Section 3 in its 2018 complaint but chose 
to focus its case on Section 29 and, thus, the claim was or could have been 
litigated in the prior action. 
A. 
FED Actions 
 
 
[¶11]  We begin with a brief overview of the characteristics of FED cases.  
FED actions are unusual in that they are intended to be narrow.  See, e.g., 
35A Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Entry and Detainer § 5 (2021) (“A forcible entry and 
detainer action is a limited or summary proceeding, and the remedy of forced 
entry and unlawful detainer is summary in character.” (footnotes omitted)).  
Such actions are limited in scope because they are “summary proceeding[s] to 
decide who is entitled to the immediate possession of land.”  Town of Blue Hill 
v. Leighton, 2011 ME 103, ¶ 8, 30 A.3d 848 (quotation marks omitted).  
Consequently, the application of claim preclusion to bar subsequent claims is 
necessarily narrower than in other civil actions.  See, e.g., Bureau v. Gendron, 
 
 
8 
2001 ME 157, ¶¶ 6, 8, 9, 6 n.2, 783 A.2d 643 (concluding that claims in 
subsequent tort and contract action were not barred because they “were not, 
and could not have been, adjudicated in the” FED action). 
 
[¶12]  Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that claim preclusion may apply 
in FED actions as a general matter.  See, e.g., 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1162, Westlaw 
(database updated June 2021) (“The doctrine of claim preclusion applies to 
actions of forcible entry and detainer.  A judgment in an action of forcible entry 
and detainer is conclusive and bars further litigation between the parties as to 
matters which could and should have been adjudicated as well as to matters 
put in issue and determined, and, generally such judgment may be pleaded in 
bar to another action of forcible entry and detainer.” (footnotes omitted)).  With 
that context in mind, we turn to the question presented in this appeal. 
B. 
Claim Preclusion2 
 
[¶13]  “When . . . the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate 
court . . . we review directly the District Court’s judgment for errors of law.”  
Town of Blue Hill, 2011 ME 103, ¶ 7, 30 A.3d 848 (citation omitted).  “We review 
 
2  The concurrence asserts that this case should be analyzed pursuant to issue preclusion 
principles.  Concurring Opinion ¶ 37.  We disagree.  The parties’ arguments and the court’s decision 
by their very terms clearly do not assert or address issue preclusion, and we decline to recharacterize 
their arguments.  However, we agree with the concurrence’s ultimate conclusion that it is impossible 
to discern definitively from the record before us whether the parties actually litigated or the trial 
court actually decided the trailer issue in the 2018 action.  Concurring Opinion ¶ 44. 
 
 
9 
the court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo for errors of law,” Lawson v. 
Willis, 2019 ME 36, ¶ 7, 204 A.3d 133 (quotation marks omitted), and 
specifically, “[w]e review de novo a trial court’s determination that claim 
preclusion bars a particular litigation,” Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 11, 
990 A.2d 538. 
 
[¶14]  A court deciding a motion to dismiss does not adjudicate facts but 
must evaluate the complaint’s allegations.  Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 
902 A.2d 830.  Consequently, when we review a judgment granting a motion to 
dismiss, “we consider the facts stated in the complaint as if they were admitted” 
and “examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to 
determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts 
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Although the general preference is for cases to be 
resolved on the merits, Thomas v. Thompson, 653 A.2d 417, 420 (Me. 1995), a 
motion to dismiss should be granted “when it appears beyond a doubt that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in 
support of his claim.”  Saunders, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
 
10 
 
[¶15]  The claim preclusion branch of res judicata prevents parties from 
relitigating claims “if[] (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both 
actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the 
matters presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been, 
litigated in the first action.”  Wilmington Tr. Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne, 2013 ME 94, 
¶ 7, 81 A.3d 371 (quotation marks omitted).  The purposes of claim preclusion 
are well established: 
Claim preclusion is grounded on concerns for judicial economy and 
efficiency, the stability of final judgments, and fairness to litigants.  
The doctrine promotes those goals by preventing a party from 
splintering his or her claim and pursuing it in a piecemeal fashion 
by asserting in a subsequent lawsuit other grounds of recovery for 
the same claim that the litigant had a reasonable opportunity to 
argue in the prior action. 
 
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, ¶ 19, 170 A.3d 230 (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶16]  The parties here do not dispute that the first two elements of claim 
preclusion are met; the same parties were involved in both actions, and there 
was a valid final judgment in the 2018 action.  See Wilmington Tr. Co., 
2013 ME 94, ¶ 7, 81 A.3d 371.  Accordingly, we focus our attention on the third 
element—whether the Section 3 claim raised in the 2019 action was or might 
have been litigated in the 2018 action.  See id.  Critically, the parties disagree as 
 
 
11 
to whether the trailer issue that is central to the Section 3 claim was, in fact, 
raised or presented in the 2018 action.   
 
[¶17]  When considering the third element of claim preclusion, “we 
examine whether the same cause of action was before the court in the prior 
case.”  Id. ¶ 8 (quotation marks omitted).  In analyzing the cause of action, “we 
apply a transactional test, examining the aggregate of connected operative facts 
that can be handled together conveniently for purposes of trial to determine if 
they were founded upon the same transaction, arose out of the same nucleus of 
operative facts, and sought redress for essentially the same basic wrong.”  
Sebra, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 12, 990 A.2d 538 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶18]  Complicating this matter is the phrasing of the pertinent 
documents.  The 2018 termination notice enumerated four events of default 
pursuant to the lease but purported to seek termination on only one.  The 
2018 complaint listed the same four defaults—referring back to the 
termination notice—and asserted that, based on those four defaults, the 
“tenancy ha[d] been terminated.”3  Indeed, 20 Thames conceded before the 
District Court, in its appellant’s brief, and at oral argument that the 2018 
 
3  Said differently, although the 2018 termination notice stated four grounds of default and 
potential termination of the lease, 20 Thames asserted in that 2018 notice only one reason why the 
lease was, in fact, terminated.  To reiterate, for this reason we cannot say on this record that 
20 Thames distinctly raised the trailer issue in the 2018 action. 
 
 
12 
complaint was ambiguously worded.  There is a distinction between asserted 
defaults and bases for termination; an FED action is brought only after 
termination of a lease.  Cf. 14 M.R.S. § 6017(2)(A) (“After termination of a 
commercial lease, and after a complaint for forcible entry and detainer is filed, 
the defendants shall . . . appear on the return day to pay the agreed-upon rent, 
including all arrears.” (emphasis added)). 
 
[¶19]  The pivotal question in this case is whether 20 Thames terminated 
the lease in 2018 based upon Ocean State’s trailer-parking practices.  However, 
this is a factual issue that was never addressed by the trial court—
appropriately so on a motion to dismiss where facts are not adjudicated.  See 
Saunders, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830.  In this situation, whether or not the 
lease was terminated in 2018 based upon Ocean State’s trailer-parking 
practices must be addressed to determine whether the claim was or could have 
been litigated.  But because the standard on a motion to dismiss requires courts 
to treat the facts as admitted and view the complaint in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, id., such findings were not made.  Likewise, we cannot and do 
not make such factual findings.  Fissmer v. Smith, 2019 ME 130, ¶ 26, 
214 A.3d 1054. 
 
 
13 
 
[¶20]  Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to 20 Thames, 
see Saunders, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in granting Ocean State’s motion to dismiss because the factual 
allegations in the 2019 complaint are sufficient to support a new claim.  The 
facts alleged could support a new claim for a default and termination pursuant 
to Section 3 of the lease that was not or could not have been litigated in the 
2018 action.  See Wilmington Tr. Co., 2013 ME 94, ¶ 7, 81 A.3d 371; Saunders, 
2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830. 
 
[¶21]  The District Court’s analysis painted with too broad a brush in 
considering the similarity of the claims in the two actions when it determined 
that the transactional test was met because (1) both cases were commercial 
FED actions, (2) both involved the same property and lease, (3) both sought 
eviction for defaults under the lease, and (4) the Section 3 issue was “related in 
time, space, origin, and motivation” to the other previously alleged defaults.  
Given their summary nature, see Town of Blue Hill, 2011 ME 103, ¶ 8, 
30 A.3d 848, many FED cases would be subject to dismissal on claim preclusion 
grounds if we were to conclude that similarity at this level of generality was 
sufficient to meet the transactional test.  That is, successive FED actions will 
always address the same property and the same lease and seek eviction for 
 
 
14 
defaults, because that is the singular purpose of FED actions.  See id.  Without 
more, such similarities are not a strong enough basis to apply claim preclusion.  
See Wilmington Tr. Co., 2013 ME 94, ¶ 7, 81 A.3d 371; Sebra, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 12, 
990 A.2d 538. 
 
[¶22]  Furthermore, similarity of conduct alone is insufficient to establish 
that a subsequent claim is the same as a prior claim for purposes of claim 
preclusion.  For example, in In re Kaleb D., we concluded that a mother’s actions 
after an earlier child protection proceeding was dismissed were “not immune 
from subsequent [Department of Human Services] proceedings merely because 
they [were] similar in nature to the allegations DHS made against the mother 
in the prior dismissed petition.”  2001 ME 55, ¶ 11, 769 A.2d 179.  We explained 
that the mother’s “post-dismissal actions constitute[d] new, independent 
events that [were] actionable in and of themselves.”  Id. 
 
[¶23]  New conduct, although similar to prior conduct, may support a 
new action in an appropriate case.  See id.  This principle is of particular 
consequence in FED actions where the purpose of the action and the remedies 
are limited.  See Bureau, 2001 ME 157, ¶¶ 8-9, 783 A.2d 643.  Applied to these 
facts, Kaleb D. supports the conclusion that Ocean State’s trailer-parking 
practices as alleged in the 2019 complaint could amount to new conduct, 
 
 
15 
notwithstanding the fact that 20 Thames listed an earlier default in the 2018 
action based on the same lease provision. 
 
[¶24]  Much ado is made about 20 Thames’s characterization of Ocean 
State’s conduct as ongoing and continuous.  But that alone does not compel a 
conclusion that the conduct alleged in 2018 constituted the same basis for 
termination in 2019, particularly given the lingering uncertainty as to whether 
the lease was in fact terminated in 2018 on the basis of Section 3.4  Plainly put, 
this record is not sufficiently developed.  The complaint alleged ongoing and 
continuous conduct, but viewing the complaint in 20 Thames’s favor, the 
allegations may still support a new claim.  See Saunders, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 
902 A.2d 830; see also Wilmington Tr. Co., 2013 ME 94, ¶ 12, 81 A.3d 371 
(concluding that a subsequent lawsuit was not barred because, although the 
party in the first lawsuit alleged a breach of the same note and mortgage that 
was being foreclosed on in the subsequent action, the second action alleged a 
breach of a different mortgage term and was based on separate conduct). 
 
[¶25]  On the record before us, we cannot say that the Section 3 claim in 
the 2019 action satisfies the transactional test with respect to the 2018 action.  
See Sebra, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 12, 990 A.2d 538.  We are not convinced that 
 
4  As noted above, if the lease had not been terminated, no action for forcible entry and detainer 
would be permissible.  See 14 M.R.S. § 6017(2) (2021). 
 
 
16 
20 Thames would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts it might prove 
in support of its claim.  See Saunders, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830.  
Additionally, the goal of fairness to litigants would not be served under the 
circumstances by concluding that 20 Thames’s Section 3 claim was or might 
have been litigated in the 2018 action.  See Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, ¶ 19, 
170 A.3d 230.  FED cases are not entirely insulated from the application of claim 
preclusion, and in an appropriate case it may very well apply.  See 
50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1162.  But on the record before us, we conclude that the 
District Court erred when it granted Ocean State’s motion to dismiss 
20 Thames’s 2019 complaint on claim preclusion grounds.  We cannot and do 
not purport to itemize the factual issues to be resolved on remand. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court with directions to remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
______________________________ 
 
CONNORS, J. concurring. 
 
 
[¶26]  I agree that 20 Thames should not be precluded from pursuing this 
action, but I take a different path from the Court in arriving at this result.  I 
conclude that claim preclusion does not apply because of the continuous nature 
 
 
17 
of the alleged section 3 trailer violation; that we must address the question of 
issue preclusion given the substance of the parties’ arguments; and that issue 
preclusion does not apply because the trailer issue was not “actually litigated.” 
[¶27]  I arrive at this conclusion by relying on the facts reflected in the 
proceedings of the first FED action, which are essentially undisputed: 
20 Thames raised the trailer issue in the first FED action; Ocean State 
apparently said something about this issue in its defense at trial; and the trial 
court did not expressly address the issue in its written decision entering 
judgment for Ocean State. 
I.  CLAIM PRECLUSION 
[¶28]  Claim preclusion applies when “the matters presented for decision 
in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action.”  
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, ¶ 15, 170 A.3d 230 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Given that the trailer issue was at least initially raised in the 
first FED action, it appears indisputable that this issue “might have been” 
litigated in that action.  So why does claim preclusion not apply? 
 
[¶29]  The Court properly notes that the nature of an FED action should 
be considered when applying preclusion principles.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 11.  
I agree, but beyond that, our analyses diverge.  The Court remands for further 
 
 
18 
factual development to determine whether the lease was “in fact terminated” 
on the basis of the trailer issue, without identifying what additional facts could 
be relevant beyond the existing record evidence from the first FED action.  
Court’s Opinion ¶ 24.  The Court also at least suggests that a continuous lease 
violation would not ordinarily overcome a preclusion defense.  Id.  I am unclear 
as to what additional facts could illuminate the claim preclusion issue beyond 
the existing record, and I believe that the continuous nature of the alleged 
violation is the key to defeating Ocean State’s claim preclusion defense. 
[¶30]  Application of the “might have been litigated” prong of claim 
preclusion in an FED action poses difficulties given the summary nature of such 
proceedings.  See Tozier v. Tozier, 437 A.2d 645, 649 & n.7 (Me. 1981) 
(describing an FED action as a “summary proceeding” that performs a “limited 
function”).  “Preclusive doctrines promote judicial economy, but they do so by 
relying upon the opportunity for a full, complete and fair adjudication on the 
merits.  Forcible entry and detainer actions, by contrast, sacrifice a full, fair 
proceeding in favor of a quick, but provisional, resolution between the parties.”  
Kimberly E. O’Leary, The Inadvisability of Applying Preclusive Doctrines to 
Summary Evictions, 30 U. Tol. L. Rev. 49, 72 (1998); see also Rosemary Smith, 
Locked Out: The Hidden Threat of Claim Preclusion for Tenants in Summary 
 
 
19 
Process, 15 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 25 (2010) (“[T]he very purpose of 
an expedited proceeding would be undermined if lawyers felt obliged to 
append a multitude of related claims, lest they be barred by claim preclusion 
from raising them in a separate action.”).  It is counterproductive to require a 
landlord to raise every possible ground for terminating a lease in an FED action 
or forego the opportunity to evict on that ground later; conversely, it is 
inefficient to allow a landlord to proceed in a second FED action based on 
conduct that occurred before the first FED action. 
[¶31]  There is, however, a middle ground.  A second FED action may go 
forward based on conduct violative of the lease that began prior to the first FED 
proceeding and sufficiently continued thereafter to independently support 
further action. 
[¶32]  “[C]ourts have long abided by the unremarkable principle that 
claims arising subsequent to a prior action . . . are not barred by res judicata 
regardless of whether they are premised on facts representing a continuance of 
the same course of conduct.”  Darney v. Dragon Prods. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 180, 
184 (D. Me. 2009) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see also Keenan v. 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 937 F. Supp. 2d 93, 108 
(D. Me. 2013).  In Singh v. Quadri, No. 1-17-2719, 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
 
 
20 
2265 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 19, 2018), the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of 
FED relief after two unsuccessful FED proceedings, concluding that the third 
proceeding was not barred by res judicata.  The court’s reasoning is instructive: 
[E]ven [were we] to accept the defendant’s position that the 
plaintiff was aware that the defendant was violating his lease in 
2015 and 2016 in the same manner in which he is currently 
violating the lease, the defendant’s ongoing violations constitute 
separate causes of action, which are not barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata.  See Altair Corp. v. Grand Premier Trust & Investment, 
Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63, 742 N.E.2d 351, 252 Ill. Dec. 101 (2000) 
(Res judicata does not apply where “the wrong suffered by the 
plaintiff is of a recurrent or ongoing nature.”); see also D’Last Corp. 
v. Ugent, 288 Ill. App. 3d 216, 222, 681 N.E.2d 12, 224 Ill. Dec. 30 
(1997) (“[A] defendant’s continuing course of conduct, even if 
related to conduct complained of in an earlier action, creates a 
separate cause of action. . . . The doctrine of res judicata does not 
bar claims for continuing conduct complained of in the [latter] 
lawsuit that occur after judgment has been entered in the first 
lawsuit. . . .”); see also Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 848 F. Supp. 
2d 864, 868 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that if res judicata applied to 
bar claims occurring after judgment was entered in the previous 
lawsuit “defendants who repeatedly cause injury through 
continuing nuisances would effectively have immunity from 
liability for future violations if a plaintiff did not successfully obtain 
injunctive relief in the initial suit”)[.] 
Id. at 20-21. 
 
[¶33]  “Application of this unremarkable principle is complicated by the 
at-times-difficult determination of what degree of conduct is necessary to give 
rise to a new ‘claim,’ particularly where ongoing conduct is involved.”  Storey v. 
Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 383-84 (2d Cir. 2003).  But “[w]here the 
 
 
21 
facts that have accumulated after the first action are enough on their own to 
sustain the second action,” the second claim is not barred.  Id. at 384. 
 
[¶34]  Here, the ground for termination asserted in the second FED 
action—the alleged section 3 trailer violation—was continuous such that, 
irrespective of 20 Thames’s claim that Ocean State violated the same lease term 
in the first FED action, it can independently form the basis of a ground to 
terminate in the second FED action.  Hence, claim preclusion does not apply. 
II.  ISSUE PRECLUSION 
 
[¶35]  The parties have devoted a substantial portion of their arguments, 
both before the Superior Court and on appeal, to debating whether the trailer 
issue was in fact litigated in the first FED action.  As noted, claim preclusion bars 
litigating a claim when “the matters presented for decision in the second action 
were, or might have been, litigated in the first action.”  Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, 
¶ 15, 170 A.3d 230 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted).  Issue 
preclusion bars relitigation of issues that were “actually litigated” in the first 
action.  State v. Moulton, 481 A.2d 155, 161 (Me. 1984).  What is the difference 
between matters that “were . . . litigated” for purposes of claim preclusion and 
matters that were “actually litigated” for purposes of issue preclusion? 
 
 
22 
 
[¶36]  We have said that “[t]o determine whether the matters presented 
for decision in the instant action were or might have been litigated in the prior 
action, we examine whether the same cause of action was before the court in 
the prior case.”  Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp., 1997 ME 220, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 866 
(quotation marks omitted).  In other words, as a practical matter, there is no 
separate analysis in the claim preclusion context as to whether a matter was 
litigated versus might have been litigated.  The totality of the defense focuses 
on whether the second action relates to the same transaction or a different 
transaction than the one at issue in the first action. 
[¶37]  Thus, whether a specific matter—like the alleged section 3 trailer 
violation—has been previously litigated raises a question of issue preclusion.  
The Court treats 20 Thames’s appeal as not asserting issue preclusion.  Court’s 
Opinion n.2.  But, as noted, the parties have disputed at length whether the 
alleged trailer issue was in fact litigated in the first FED action, not just whether 
the alleged violation could be viewed as part of the same transaction previously 
litigated.  However this argument is labeled, it is properly analyzed pursuant to 
issue preclusion principles. 
[¶38]  Furthermore, the Superior Court appears to have assumed that 
issue preclusion could not apply because the trial court’s written decision in the 
 
 
23 
first FED action did not expressly dispose of the trailer issue in rejecting the 
lease termination.  But this is not necessarily the case.  Issue preclusion does 
not always require an explicit ruling by the court. 
 
[¶39]  An issue was “actually litigated” when it was raised, contested by 
the parties, and submitted to the court for determination.  See 18 James W. 
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03 (3d ed. 2021); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d (Am. L. Inst. 1982).  The mere 
fact that an issue was raised in a pleading does not establish that the issue was 
actually litigated.  And if an issue is raised but abandoned before the final 
disposition, then issue preclusion does not apply.  18 Moore et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 132.03[2][e]; see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Comm’r, 
519 F.2d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 1975). 
[¶40]  On the other hand, actual litigation does not require thorough 
litigation.  See Cont’l Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(concluding that an issue “was actually litigated despite the imbalance in the 
quantity of evidence introduced”).  Rather, there must be evidence that the 
parties “distinctly” presented the issue to the trial court.  Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
24 
 
[¶41]  In addition to meeting the actual litigation requirement, an issue 
must have been actually decided for it to be given preclusive effect.  An explicit 
ruling, however, is not required.  See Stoehr v. Mohamed, 244 F.3d 206, 208 
(1st Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“‘An issue may be “actually” decided even if it is 
not explicitly decided, for it may have constituted, logically or practically, a 
necessary component of the decision reached in the prior litigation.’” (quoting 
Grella v. Salem Five Cent Sav. Bank, 42 F.3d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1994))).  Issue 
preclusion arises when the identical issue was necessarily decided by the prior 
judgment.  See Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 39, 2 A.3d 301; see also 
Button v. Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank, 666 A.2d 120, 122 (Me. 1995); Morton v. 
Schneider, 612 A.2d 1285, 1286 (Me. 1992).  “If several issues are litigated in an 
action, and a judgment cannot properly be rendered in favor of one party unless 
all of the issues are decided in his favor, and judgment is given for him, the 
judgment is conclusive with respect to all the issues.”  Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 27 cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1982). 
 
[¶42]  In sum, “[t]he appropriate question, then, is whether the issue was 
actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier as necessary to 
the first judgment.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. j (Am. L. Inst. 
1982). 
 
 
25 
[¶43]  Applying these principles, 20 Thames distinctly raised the trailer 
issue in its complaint in the first FED action, and Ocean State mounted a 
defense, however briefly.  This suggests that the parties recognized the issue 
and that it was actually litigated.  On the other hand, although 20 Thames raised 
the trailer issue in its pleadings, it apparently offered no evidence at trial and 
argues on appeal, essentially, that it abandoned the issue before disposition.  
Regarding whether the issue was decided in the first FED action, the trial court 
did not mention the trailer issue in its written decision, which could support a 
conclusion that the issue was abandoned and therefore the trier did not 
recognize the issue as necessary to its disposition.  But in the absence of an 
express abandonment of the issue on the record and the submission of a 
defense to that basis for termination, the trial court’s denial of the termination 
could be viewed as including an implicit rejection of an issue that, while minor 
or cursorily treated by the parties, was necessary to dispose completely of the 
action. 
 
[¶44]  On this record, it is impossible to discern definitively whether the 
parties actually litigated—or the trial court actually decided—the trailer issue 
in the first FED action.  “When a court cannot ascertain what was litigated and 
decided, issue preclusion cannot operate.”  18 Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 
 
 
26 
Practice § 132.03[2][g]; see Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 808-09 (Minn. 
1978) (declining to preclude the relitigation of issues previously determined 
when there was more than one possible basis for the court’s decision).  
Therefore, issue preclusion should not foreclose an inquiry into the merits, and 
the second FED action should proceed.  See United States v. Int’l Bldg. Co., 
345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953); Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME 121, 
¶ 25, 834 A.2d 131. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glenn Israel, Esq. (orally), Bernstein Shur, Portland, for appellants 20 Thames 
Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC 
 
Seth W. Brewster, Esq. (orally), and Micah A. Smart, Esq., Eaton Peabody, 
Portland, for appellee Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017 LLC 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2020-02 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY