Case Title: THOMAS R. WILLIAMS v. DANIEL L. JOHNSON AND JENNIFER JOHNSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-31

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS R. WILLIAMS v. DANIEL L. JOHNSON AND JENNIFER JOHNSON1989 WY 195781 P.2d 922Case Number: 89-31Decided: 10/31/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
THOMAS R. WILLIAMS, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

DANIEL L. JOHNSON AND 
JENNIFER JOHNSON, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

James H. 
Barrett, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Julie Nye 
Tiedeken of McDaniel and Tiedeken, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Thomas 
Williams, was delivering mail in a Cheyenne neighborhood when he was attacked by 
two dogs owned by appellees, Daniel and Jennifer Johnson. The dogs attacked 
appellant while he was standing on the porch of a house next door to appellees' 
house. Although the dogs inflicted no direct injury on appellant, they 
frightened him and he injured his knee in an attempt to avoid the attack. 
Williams sued to recover compensation for his injury. The trial court entered 
summary judgment in favor of the Johnsons. Williams now appeals, asserting that 
the district court erred in its determination that, in order to defeat the 
summary judgment motion, he must raise an issue of fact concerning Johnsons' 
knowledge of the dangerous propensities of their dogs.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The only issue raised 
by appellant is this:

"The court below erred in 
ruling that as a matter of law, appellants must have had notice of the dangerous 
propensities of their dogs."

[¶4.]     Appellant's complaint, 
filed in June 19, 1987, generally alleged appellees' liability based on the 
facts outlined above, but omitted reference to any particular theory of 
recovery. His "Pre-trial Memorandum," however, limited the factual and legal 
issues which he considered material to appellees' liability to the 
following:

1. Was appellant attacked 
by dogs owned by appellee?

2. Was such an attack the 
proximate cause of his injury?

3. Could appellees be 
held liable for that injury if they had no notice of the vicious nature of their 
dogs?

4. Could appellant obtain 
compensation for injury sustained as a result of a dog attack, during which 
there was no physical contact by the attacking dogs?

In opposition to 
the summary judgment motion, appellant argued that he need not prove appellees' 
knowledge of the vicious propensities of their dogs. That contention was 
consistent with the position he advanced at the pretrial conference, at which 
time appellant considered himself entitled to recover upon proof of: (1) injury, 
(2) proximately caused, (3) by attacking dogs owned by appellees. Appellees' 
summary judgment motion asserts that because of absence of any knowledge of 
dangerous propensities, appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
We agree.

[¶5.]     This court has 
recognized three distinct theories of recovery under which appellant could have 
argued the particular facts of this case. The first is the common law theory of 
strict liability of an owner who keeps an animal knowing of its dangerous 
propensities as articulated in Restatement, Second, Torts § 509 (1977); Abelseth 
v. City of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430, 433-34 (Wyo. 1988). The second is also a 
common law cause of action, for negligence in the care and control of domestic 
animals. Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219, 1221-22 (Wyo. 1978). Finally, we 
have recognized a theory of negligence premised on duties created by state 
statutes or municipal ordinances which alter the duties imposed by common law by 
making it unlawful for owners of domestic animals to permit them to run at 
large. Id. at 1222-25; see also Nylen v. 
Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶6.]     Under the common law, 
the owner of a vicious dog, if he had knowledge of a dangerous propensity, was 
held strictly liable for any harm proximately caused by the animal's vicious 
behavior. Such liability attached despite the owner's exercise of utmost care to 
control the animal. Restatement, Second, Torts § 509 (1977); Abelseth, 752 P.2d 
at 433-34; Larsen v. City of Cheyenne, 626 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo. 
1981). The common law also provided that the owner of an animal which was not 
vicious or not known to be vicious, but which was prone to some other 
potentially harmful behavior, could be held liable under a theory of negligence 
for any injury proximately caused by such behavior. In such cases the owner was 
only liable if, having knowledge of the particular propensities which created a 
foreseeable risk of harm, he failed to exercise reasonable care in his control 
of the animal. Thus, if the owner of a dog knew of its proclivity for leaping 
fences and chasing cars, he could be held liable for failure to take reasonable 
measures to confine the animal should it escape from his property and cause an 
accident. Restatement, Second, Torts § 518 (1977); Endresen, 574 P.2d  at 
1221-22. 

[¶7.]     Common to both of these 
causes of action are certain facts which must be put in issue to defeat 
defendant's summary judgment motion, i.e., (1) the owner, (2) of an animal with 
a propensity for potentially harmful behavior, (3) must know of that propensity, 
and (4) such behavior must be the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. In 
this case, appellees denied knowledge of harmful propensities. Appellant claimed 
knowledge of dangerous propensities was unnecessary to a common law cause of 
action. Appellant therefore failed to assert facts, by affidavit or otherwise, 
which would place in issue appellees' knowledge of the vicious nature of their 
dogs. This was fatal to his maintaining a cause of action under these common law 
theories. His suit was premised on these theories, and the district court, 
therefore, correctly granted appellees' summary judgment 
motion.

[¶8.]     Appellant's argument on 
appeal, however, characterizes his suit as one based on appellees' duties under 
Cheyenne's 
municipal ordinances. He asserts that these ordinances alter the elements 
necessary to the common law actions and render appellees liable, despite their 
lack of knowledge concerning the dangerous propensities of their animals. 
Appellant bases that argument on our discussion in Endresen v. Allen, in which 
we explained that a dog owner's common law duty may be altered by a municipal 
ordinance that prohibits owners from permitting animals to run at large. We 
noted that, while the unconditional prohibition of such an ordinance creates a 
duty to restrain animals from running at large without reference to the owner's 
knowledge of their propensities to escape or cause harm, the ordinance does not 
relieve a plaintiff from the obligation of establishing that a failure to 
restrain was a result of the owner's negligence. Thus, we rejected the notion 
that a prima facie case of negligence could result from the mere fact that an 
animal was at large. Endresen, 574 P.2d  at 1222-25. See also Nylen, 770 P.2d  at 
1116; Hinkle v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37, 40-41 (Wyo. 1961).

[¶9.]     Appellant presented his 
claim of a cause of action under the ordinances for the first time on appeal. 
Parties seeking reversal of a summary judgment may not, on appeal, assert issues 
or theories of recovery which were not presented to the trial court. This court 
will not consider such issues or theories unless it is apparent or reasonably 
discernable from the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits that they were raised 
below. Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, LaramieCountySchool 
District No. One, 763 P.2d 843, 848 (Wyo. 1988); Minnehoma Financial Company v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835, 838-39 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶10.]  We conclude from our examination of the 
record that appellant never presented the trial court with a theory of recovery 
grounded in the duty which may have been created by the "running at large" 
ordinance. Instead, he proceeded solely upon a common law cause of action, 
arguing merely that the animal control ordinances taken as a whole created a 
presumption that the Johnsons' dogs were vicious.

[¶11.]  Nowhere in his pleadings, affidavits, 
exhibits, or in his pretrial memorandum does appellant so much as mention any of 
these city ordinances. Appellees called this fact to the attention of the trial 
court in a brief supporting their summary judgment motion, which 
noted:

"The Plaintiff has not 
alleged that a state statute or city ordinance posed a duty upon the Defendants 
and the complaint basically alleges a negligence cause of 
action.

"Clearly, the Plaintiff 
is required to show that the Defendants had knowledge of the dangerous 
propensities of the animals or they are barred from 
recovery."

Appellant first 
mentioned the ordinances in his memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment 
motion, where he briefly quotes from a number of definitional provisions and the 
section prohibiting owners from permitting animals to run at large, and then 
relied upon the provisions to establish that the Johnsons' dogs, running at 
large, were presumed vicious because of the attack. Appellant summarizes his 
position with respect to the ordinances by stating, "It is clear, however, that 
the Cheyenne Municipal Ordinance has by definition abrogated the Common Law Rule 
and has created a presumption that an animal is vicious if it engages in an 
unprovoked attack."

[¶12.]  The district court correctly concluded 
that Cheyenne's 
animal control ordinances did not provide appellant with presumptive proof that 
the Johnson's knew of the vicious nature of their dogs. The district court 
correctly determined that, under the common law theory of recovery advanced, 
appellant was required to present as an issue the fact appellees had knowledge 
of the dangerous propensities of their dogs. Accordingly, the summary judgment 
is affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶13.]  In December 1985, two dogs allegedly 
owned by appellees,1 being where they should not have 
been and doing what they should not have done, caused injury to appellant Thomas 
R. Williams, the local postal carrier, while he was engaged in mail delivery at 
an adjoining house. Upon return from the grocery store, while unloading her 
purchases in the garage, appellee Jennifer Johnson released the family's two 
golden retrievers "from the garage area of the home into the front yard." 
Appellees had a prior "dogs running at large" city ordinance charge against 
them.

[¶14.]  As the postman was delivering mail at the 
neighbor's home, he alleges that the dogs "leaped upon the porch" and attacked 
him, and while in the act of evading the attacking animals, he twisted and 
seriously injured his knee. This suit followed, claiming recovery for that 
injury. Appellees were renting and the owner was also originally named as a 
defendant and subsequently dismissed by stipulation.

[¶15.]  Following a course of discovery and 
submission of pretrial memoranda, the order on pretrial conference vacated a 
trial setting and found

that another hearing is 
necessary on Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issues of whether 
Plaintiff must show that Defendants were aware of the vicious propensities of 
their dogs in order to recover in this matter and whether Plaintiff can recover 
in this matter even though he was not actually bitten by Defendants['] dogs but 
was just frightened by their dogs, * * *.

Following 
briefing on both issues, summary judgment was granted to appellees by 
finding:

1. The Plaintiff does 
have a cause of action for being frightened by Defendants' dogs and does not 
have to prove under the law that he was actually bitten during the alleged 
attack,[2] however, Plaintiff must show that 
Defendants had knowledge of the dangerous propensities of their 
dogs;

2. The Defendants did not 
have knowledge of the dangerous propensities of their 
dogs;

3. There is no material 
question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact and Defendants are entitled 
to Summary Judgment[.]

[¶16.]  I would certainly concur with the 
majority that this case was casually pleaded. See DeRobertis by DeRobertis v. 
Randazzo, 94 N.J. 144, 462 A.2d 1260, 1262 (1983), where it was perceived that 
an air of casualness permeated the proceedings. But even so, I dissent in 
concluding that a claim was properly stated which was not suitable for 
disposition by summary judgment on this record.

[¶17.]  This majority correctly recognizes that 
there are three different legal bases for recovery for dog caused injuries. The 
first is found in strict liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 at 
15 (1977), where caused by a dog with known dangerous 
propensities:

(1) A possessor of a 
domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities 
abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal to 
another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the 
harm.

(2) This liability is 
limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous propensity of which 
the possessor knows or has reason to know.

This is the 
strict liability claim.

[¶18.]  The second basis of recovery is ordinary 
negligence in failure of maintenance or control within Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra, § 518 at 30:

Except for animal 
trespass, one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does not know 
or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for 
harm done by the animal if, but only if,

* * * * * 
*

(b) he is negligent in 
failing to prevent the harm.

This is the 
ordinary negligence claim.

[¶19.]  The third basis of recovery arises from 
contended violation of statutory or ordinance prohibitions creating "animals 
running at large" control requirements. This is the statutory violation 
claim.

[¶20.]  I would also concur with the majority 
that summary judgment could have been properly granted within the pleading and 
text of this case if confined to either the first or third theories of recovery. 
Unfortunately, the majority then intermixes criteria of the strict liability and 
the violated "dog running at large" ordinance concepts in resolution of the 
second cause of action, which is ordinary negligence. In this regard, error 
resulted in trial court decision and is now perpetuated by confusion created by 
this majority's confirming decision.

[¶21.]  Directly stated, neither knowledge of 
dangerous propensity nor alleged violation of an ordinance is necessarily 
required to present a negligence claim in maintenance and control cases 
resulting from dog inflicted injuries. The issue is whether this theory of 
recovery is negligence in maintenance or release of the animal, proximate cause, 
and consequent injury with resulting damage, personal or property. The operative 
claims of appellant's complaint include:

5. That on or about 
December 18, 1985, Defendant Jennifer Johnson arrived at the residence that she 
and Defendant Daniel L. Johnson were renting at 5017 Windmill Road and released 
the parties two large dogs from the garage area of the home into the front yard. 
A short time later Plaintiff was on the front porch of the residence located at 
5013 Windmill Road, the home next door, delivering mail when the two animals 
above-mentioned, leaped upon the porch of 5013 Windmill Road and attacked 
Plaintiff. While in the act of trying to evade the attacking animals, Plaintiff 
twisted and seriously injured his knee.

6. That as a direct and 
proximate result of the above-mentioned knee injury Plaintiff was admitted to 
Memorial Hospital of Laramie County and on or about December 19, 1985, he 
under-went surgery to repair damage to his knee. As a result medical bills were 
incurred and the possibility of future medical bills from this knee injury 
exist.

7. That Plaintiff Thomas 
R. Williams has as a direct and proximate result of this vicious attack 
sustained injuries and has had to undergo extreme pain and suffering and will 
continue to suffer such, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of wages and 
medical expense, for all of which Plaintiff should be compensated in the amount 
of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00).

It is apparent 
that which theory or all of these three theories were to be contended is less 
than clearly defined.3 However, the actual motion for 
summary judgment filed by appellees recited as a factual basis and issue 
contention:

 

1. The Plaintiff contends 
that he was attacked by two large dogs on December 18, 1985 and has alleged that 
the Defendants are the owners of the dogs in questions 
[sic].

2. In his deposition, the 
Plaintiff describes the dogs which attacked him as being "a golden lab and an 
irish setter."

3. The Defendants, Daniel 
L. Johnson and Jennifer Johnson, are the owners of two dogs which are golden 
retrievers. The Defendants moved from the neighborhood in question on January 
28, 1986 and since that time, neighbors of the Johnsons who reside in close 
proximity where the incident in question occurred, have noticed that there is a 
yellow lab and irish setter which run loose in that 
neighborhood.

4. There is no question 
that the dogs in question were not owned by the Defendants and that they should 
be dismissed from this suit.

[¶22.]  Appellees moved for summary judgment on 
mistaken identity and only later did appellant first raise, in pretrial 
memorandum, issues which should be briefed before trial:4

SPECIAL 
ISSUES

Special issues that 
should be briefed and argued prior to Trial are as 
follows:

1. Need the Johnsons have 
had notice of the vicious nature of their dogs in order to incur 
liability?

2. Is a dog attack that 
produces injury without contact subject to compensation?

The trial court 
in response by pretrial conference order vacated the trial date and further 
stated:

[I]t further appearing 
that another hearing is necessary on Defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
the issues of whether Plaintiff must show that Defendants were aware of the 
vicious propensities of their dogs in order to recover in this matter and 
whether Plaintiff can recover in this matter even though he was not actually 
bitten by Defendants['] dogs but was just frightened by their dogs, * * 
*.

[¶23.]  Appellees argued as dispository in their 
following brief:

With regard to an animal 
not naturally vicious, the general rule, in the absence of a statute, is that 
the owner of the animal is not answerable for injuries done by it unless it was 
in fact and to the owner's knowledge, vicious or 
dangerous.

[¶24.]  In response, appellant argued that under 
the Cheyenne 
city ordinance, which he quoted, proscribing defendants' 
conduct:

"7-8. RUNNING AT LARGE 
PROHIBITED. It shall be unlawful for any owner to allow or permit any animal 
. . . to be at large as defined in 7-1 upon the streets, alleys, sidewalks, 
public grounds or private property, other than property owned or occupied by the 
owner and not normally frequented by the general public . . . If an animal is 
found to be at large within the meaning of this article, the owner shall be presumed to have violated this article . 
. ." [Emphasis in original.]

[¶25.]  Unfortunately, appellant's trial brief 
did not clarify claimed theories of recovery by definition and factual 
attribution. Similarly, and also unfortunately, we do not now clarify in this 
appeal that the requirement of knowledge of propensity is confined to a strict 
liability basis for asserted recovery. Likewise, the necessity of pleading the 
violation of the ordinance relating to the dogs running at large is specifically 
confined to that theory of recovery which admittedly was not pleaded for 
presentation by the appellant. See W.R.C.P. 9(i). The ordinance violation claim 
was argued on appeal, but neither pleaded nor argued before the trial court.5

[¶26.]  An interesting argument could have been 
made in trial court to be reviewed here that summary judgment might have been 
proper lacking any actual evidence of 
negligence. That theory of defense was not presented and like the ordinance 
violation claim, should not now be made the subject of this decision. May it 
suffice to say on this record that at least one prior running at large ordinance 
violation problem had existed. Then later, from what is admitted, these dogs 
were released from the garage to the apparently unfenced front yard. The issues 
of whether that release constituted negligence under the circumstances and the 
constraint of known ordinance limitations should have at least been argued if 
not submitted for jury resolution.

[¶27.]  Prior Wyoming cases are consistent with the view I take 
including the principal case of Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1978). Endresen 
involved a dog with a proclivity to escape from the yard and chase motor 
vehicles up and down the street. In that case, these characteristics resulted in 
an injured motorcyclist who sued for his resulting injuries by advancing 
theories for recovery of both negligence and a violation of the duty under the 
city ordinance to keep the dogs out of the public street.

[¶28.]  The decision in Endresen made clear the 
violent propensity of the dogs was not a concern since the theory for recovery 
was negligence, not strict liability. A further significant subject of the 
discussion was the third theory of recovery, violation of an ordinance and its 
attributes as evidence of negligence or negligence per se. The court observed as 
dispository for a negligent claim:

We think that there was 
sufficient evidence of negligence to justify submission to the finder of the 
facts the question whether defendants should reasonably have anticipated that 
injury would result from their failure properly to secure the dog and whether 
they negligently failed properly to secure the dog.[6]

Id. at 
1222.

[¶29.]  Larsen v. City of Cheyenne, 626 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1981), if relevant at all, is considered 
an ordinance attribution claim. Actually controverted was the duty of the city 
pound under city ordinance for any release of impounded dogs. Abelseth v. City 
of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430 (Wyo. 1988) to the 
contrary, was a strict liability case raising the effect of a strict liability 
theory on the Wyoming Tort Claims Act. McCarthy v. Croker, 549 P.2d 323 
(Wyo. 1976) 
was pleaded as a propensity case for which the required scienter was found 
lacking to escape a motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence. 
McCarthy did not present a running at large issue since the dog was at home and 
the case was not pleaded in a negligence concept; thus, not factually 
comparable.

[¶30.]  This thrice faceted recovery in dog 
injury cases is identified by a course of cases from other jurisdictions. The 
appellate issues presented in Westberry v. Blackwell, 282 Or. 129, 577 P.2d 75 
(1978) involved sufficiency of the evidence on two charges, strict liability or 
negligence. The dog accorded a superficial bite on the hand to plaintiff on her 
way into the defendant's house and then the victim, comforted with the owner's 
assurance of docility, was discouraged with a severe bite when she departed. 
That court found evidence upon which the strict liability propensity case could 
have been presented to the jury, and then by reference to Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, supra, § 518, also found a trial basis for a negligence claim.7

Plaintiff's second cause 
of action alleged defendants were negligent in failing to confine the dog. 
Failure to confine or control such a domestic animal can give rise to a cause of 
action in negligence. * * *

* * * * * 
*

Here, the evidence 
indicates that Mrs. Blackwell could have controlled or confined the dog when she 
knew plaintiff was leaving the premises. She knew the dog had bitten plaintiff 
on her way into the house. Whether a reasonable person in the exercise of 
ordinary care would have restrained the dog is properly a question for the 
jury.

The defendants' motion 
for a judgment of involuntary nonsuit should not have been granted. Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a legitimate question of 
fact for the jury was presented, both as to the charge in strict lability and 
the charge in negligence.

Westberry, 577 P.2d  at 76-77.

[¶31.]  The California court was presented with the 
ordinance violation case in Garson v. Juarique, 99 Cal. App. 3d 769, 160 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1979), where a defendant's judgment was reversed in factual review of a dog 
permitted to sit on the lawn in front of the house which then bolted into the 
plaintiff as she and her dog passed by. As a key to the case, the sitting on the lawn was considered to be 
running at 
large.

We therefore hold that 
the trial court erred when it concluded that defendant's dog was not "at large" 
in violation of the statute during the time that it apparently submitted to its 
master's command to sit on the lawn. On the contrary, the dog was at large as 
soon as the defendant brought the dog onto his unenclosed front yard without any 
physical restraints.

Id. 160 Cal. Rptr.  at 
464.

[¶32.]  In Rickrode v. Wistinghausen, 128 
Mich. App. 
240, 340 N.W.2d 83 (1983), it was Maynard the cat that came into the plaintiff's 
back yard and severely clawed a child. The trial court favored defendant with a 
directed verdict and the appellate court reversed. That court considered both 
strict liability and negligence theories of recovery in review. The scienter 
requirement for strict liability was found from a prior history of events to 
exist and evidence of non-exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances to 
contain or restrain required a jury trial for the negligent 
claim.

We note that, on remand 
and retrial, the trial court should instruct the jury that negligence on the 
part of plaintiff Dawn Rickrode, or for that matter any fault, is not at issue 
if they should find defendant knew that Maynard had violent propensities. * * * 
Only the defenses of willful provocation or gross negligence by Dawn would 
preclude recovery. * * * However, should the jury find that defendant lacked the 
scienter necessary for strict liability, i.e., that defendant knew or had 
reasons to know that Maynard had dangerous propensities, then the jury is to 
decide whether defendant was negligent in her control of Maynard. When 
considering whether defendant was negligent, the jury may also consider whether 
Dawn was negligent or at fault, and if so, apply the doctrine of comparative 
negligence.

Id. 340 N.W.2d  
at 87 (emphasis in original).

[¶33.]  A third case showing exposure in decision 
to a dog bite injury as comprehensively discussed presents the tale of Pollo in 
DeRobertis by DeRobertis, 94 N.J. 144, 462 A.2d 1260. A significant verdict had 
been obtained in behalf of the bitten five-year-old child and the case was 
reversed and remanded for retrial on the contested issue of the child's trespass 
to the location where Pollo was chained. Answering both theories of strict 
liability and negligence, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
wrote:

In summary, to recover 
under [the New 
Jersey statute], a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant owned the dog, that the dog bit the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff 
was in a public place or lawfully on the owner's property. If a plaintiff is 
unable to recover under the statute for failure to prove any of these three 
elements, he still may have a cause of action based on common-law principles. If 
a plaintiff proves scienter, a dog-owner is absolutely liable for injuries 
caused by the dangerous characteristic of the dog, unless the owner can prove 
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In that event, the 
determination of liability is governed by the Comparative Negligence Act. * * * 
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff is unable to prove that the owner knew or 
should have known of the dog's dangerous characteristics, then the owner is 
liable only if the plaintiff is able to prove that the owner acted negligently 
in keeping the dog. Once again, the negligence of the plaintiff would be 
relevant to determining the liability of the owner. Finally, the owner of an 
abnormally dangerous dog owes a duty of ordinary care to an infant 
trespasser.

Id. 462 A.2d  at 1267.8

[¶34.]  The court concluded that the owner with 
scienter is subject to absolute liability as the majority rule in other 
jurisdictions and further noted:

If either the dog is not 
vicious or the owner does not know of its vicious propensities, then negligence, 
not absolute liability, applies. Because absolute liability is premised on the 
notion that a greater responsibility is owed to the public by those who 
knowingly harbor dangerous animals, the rationale for absolute liability 
disappears in the absence of scienter.[9]

Id. at 
1266.

[¶35.]  Similar cases of current review include 
Slack v. Villari, 59 Md. App. 462, 476 A.2d 227, cert. denied 301 Md. 177, 482 A.2d 502 (1984), where Gideon, in an isolated incident, snarled from the yard, 
but did not bite the plaintiff, causing her to catch her heel and twist her back 
without falling. This case provided no basis for liability in either strict 
liability or negligence. In Kathren v. Olenik, 46 Or. App. 713, 613 P.2d 69 
(1980), Mordecai bit one of the children who was bringing him home in a 
circumstance where there was no testimony of prior occurrences of a vicious 
propensity nature. The case presented an ordinance violation, a Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, § 509 claim in strict liability, and a negligence 
charge under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 518. That court ruled in 
favor of Mordecai and his owner on all three claims. Negligence and strict 
liability were also raised in another Oregon case, Medlyn v. Armstrong, 49 Or. App. 
829, 621 P.2d 81 (1980), discerning that Hoover was more aggressive when he was eating, 
and as a mixture of St. Bernard and either Mastiff or golden labrador, raised a 
jury question whether the dog should have been confined or the owner should have 
taken other action to prevent the attack on the small child. Compare Newport v. Moran, 80 Or. 
App. 71, 721 P.2d 465 (1986) when Rowdy ran into plaintiff and the court 
perceived that it was unforeseen for the dog to "charge and knock someone down, 
causing an injury." Id. 721 P.2d  at 466.

Reviewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find no evidence that would put 
defendant on notice that Rowdy had a potentially dangerous propensity to run 
into people. Dogs, as a class, are not considered dangerous to humans, and 
defendant is not charged with any general knowledge that dogs will bite - or, in 
this case, run into - a person. Kathren v. Olenik, supra, 46 Or. App. at 720, 
613 P.2d 69. In Rowdy's particular case, no evidence was presented that the dog 
would, or had, ever purposely run into a person. At most, the evidence showed 
that Rowdy was friendly and playful and that he engaged in rough play with other 
dogs while near human beings.

Id. at 
466-67.

[¶36.]  The Washington Supreme Court in Arnold v. 
Laird, 94 Wn.2d 867, 621 P.2d 138 (1980) reviewed two theories of recovery under 
the Restatement of Torts to determine whether the owners of Blanket, the Great 
Dane, should be held liable for damage to the neighbor's child that climbed on 
the yard-separating cyclone fence. The court recognized both theories and found 
that no separate evidence of negligence was presented to justify an instruction 
on that claim and on the issue of the dog's vicious propensities that the 
negative jury verdict was dispositive. In a footnote of interest, that court 
recognized that there could be a difference between vicious propensities and 
dangerous tendencies, but did not define the difference. What was significant 
was footnote recognition after litigant failure to properly present the theory 
of ordinary negligence at any time prior to midtrial processing, that he as 
plaintiff was foreclosed from its addition for recovery since it afforded 
defendant no adequate opportunity to defend. Id. 621 P.2d  at 141 n. 
4.

[¶37.]  Known propensity of dangerous or vicious 
characteristics and disposition of the animal as a criteria for strict liability 
is clearly not applied to the negligence claim where the responsibility of the 
owner is only tested to exercise suitable custody and control over the animal. 
In review for the negligence theory, the degree of care of the animal is 
dependent upon the kind and character of that particular animal, the 
circumstances in which it is placed and the purposes for which it is employed or 
kept. 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals § 89 at 337 (1962). Here to be found are the pit bull 
cases currently receiving significant legislative and litigative 
attention.

[¶38.]  Finding a concept in negligence which 
could be considered to have been presented in this case, I would find summary 
judgment improvidently granted and would reverse for trial development and 
evidentiary decision.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellees denied their 
dogs were involved with the postal carrier. A summary judgment motion was 
determined adverse to appellees by trial court ruling that there was "a material 
issue of facts" as to the identity of the dogs.

2 The no bite, just 
frightened inquiry for claimed recovery is not carried forward into appellate 
review. See Annotation, Liability of Dog Owner for Injuries Sustained by Person 
Frightened by Dog, 30 A.L.R.4th 986 (1984).

3 I could more nearly 
agree with the majority if the decision was determined by insufficiency of the 
pleadings, but this defensive posture was not really 
asserted.

4 Attached to the pretrial 
memorandum were copies of the City of Cheyenne dog ordinance violations which 
included a November 20, 1985 complaint against one of the two golden retrievers 
owned by appellees; namely Bo, along with a number of other citations for which 
relevancy is somewhat unclear. Also attached were the medical bills, which 
define the scope of injury, totaling over $2,800.

5 What appellant did argue 
in memorandum to the trial court was that the scienter requirement of strict 
liability had been "abrogated or modified" by the city ordinance. A presumptive 
rule of evidence is suggested. The brief now filed on appeal more nearly fits a 
third category claim founded in ordinance violation as a basis for 
liability.

6 It is apparent that had 
the ordinance been pleaded in this case, the culpability criteria of Endresen 
for an ordinance violation theory of recovery could have been found in the 
admitted voluntary release of the dogs to the front yard and uncontrolled as 
they left the yard, if they did, to go to the adjoining house where appellant 
was standing.

7 Another rule evidenced 
in these cases is if the name of the dog is given in the opinion, the decision 
for defendant dog owner is more likely, e.g., Gideon in Slack v. Villari, 59 Md. 
App. 462, 476 A.2d 227, cert. denied 301 Md. 177, 482 A.2d 502 (1984); Rowdy in 
Newport v. Moran, 80 Or. App. 71, 721 P.2d 465 (1986); and Mordecai in Kathren 
v. Olenik, 46 Or. App. 713, 613 P.2d 69 (1980). Compare the female doberman 
called Tyke in Garson v. Juarique, 99 Cal. App. 3d 769, 160 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1979). 
We only know that one of the animals in this case was named 
Bo.

8 The cited New Jersey statute 
imposes absolute liability for a person "lawfully" on the premises which became 
the issue for reversal because of a faulty instruction.

9 Absolute liability and 
strict liability are applied as synonymous terms in these dog-caused injury 
cases. Cf. Abelseth, 752 P.2d 430, a Wyoming case, with DeRobertis by DeRobertis, 
462 A.2d 1260.