Case Title: People v. Kitchen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83654

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 83654-Agenda 2-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								RONALD KITCHEN, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 18, 1999.-Modified on denial of 
rehearing April 3, 2000.  
   
	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Following a trial in the circuit court of Cook County, a jury
convicted defendant, Ronald Kitchen, of five counts of murder. 
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1). The jury found
defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(3)) and further concluded, after hearing the evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. This
court affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence on
direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1 (1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1020, 130 L. Ed. 2d 500, 115 S. Ct. 586 (1994).
	Defendant thereafter filed a timely petition for relief pursuant
to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
1994). The circuit court denied relief, and this appeal followed. 
134 Ill. 2d R. 651. We now vacate the circuit court's order denying
relief and remand the matter for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
	Our opinion on direct appeal sets forth the details surrounding
defendant's convictions, and we will not repeat them here. 
Defendant stands convicted of the July 27, 1988, murders of
Deborah Sepulveda, Rose Marie Rodriguez, Sepulveda's two
children, Peter Jr., and Rebecca, and Rodriguez's son, Daniel.
	Following the completion of direct review proceedings,
defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit
court. The petition contained eight claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel, two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, and one claim of cumulative error as a result of the
alleged ineffectiveness of counsel. All but one of the claims
asserted against trial counsel concerned what counsel did not do,
but ought to have done, in the course of his representation of
defendant.  These claims consisted of allegations concerning
counsel's failure to investigate, discover, and present certain
evidence at both the pretrial and trial phases of the proceedings.
The petition also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to object to alleged hearsay testimony. In conjunction with
this claim, defendant asserted the ineffectiveness of his appellate
counsel for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Defendant
further claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective because
counsel failed to argue on direct appeal the fact that defendant's
right to counsel was not scrupulously honored by police during his
interrogation.  Attached to the petition were the affidavits of both
members of defendant's trial counsel team and various documents
obtained from the trial counsel's file, including police and medical
reports.  The gist of the contentions raised in defendant's petition
is that trial counsel's decisions not to investigate the circumstances
of defendant's arrest and interrogation fell below objective
professional standards and that defendant suffered prejudice as a
result. The petition's prayer for relief included a request that
defendant be granted sufficient time and leave to amend and
supplement the petition in order to include additional claims, 
supporting affidavits, and factual material "as [defendant's]
investigation continues."
	On September 7, 1995, the circuit court conducted a status
hearing on the petition. The assistant State's Attorney informed
the court that the State would "be filing [a] motion to dismiss" and
would serve defendant's counsel with it.(1) Defendant's attorney
then indicated to the court that defendant was under capital
sentence and that defendant would be "asking for time to file an
amended petition." Counsel explained that he still had "some
extensive investigation to do in this matter" and that the assistant
State's Attorney had indicated that he had no objection to this
procedure. The circuit court, thereafter, continued the cause until
December 7, 1995 at the agreement of the parties.
	On November 7, 1995, defense counsel caused several
subpoenas to be issued, including subpoenas for files from the
Chicago Police Department's Office of Professional Standards and
Internal Affairs Division. Specifically, defense counsel requested
the disciplinary records and files of six of the officers who had
been involved in defendant's arrest and interrogation. The State,
along with the City of Chicago,  moved to quash the subpoenas,
arguing that the request was overly broad and that the information
requested would prove arduous to amass and produce. At a status
hearing on December 7, 1995, defendant's attorney tendered to the
court an additional affidavit that counsel stated would support one
of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Defense counsel also indicated that he would like time to respond
to the State's motion to quash in writing. The circuit court
continued the matter.
	At a hearing on March 7, 1996, the parties agreed in open
court that the defense subpoenas were overly broad. Defense
counsel stated that he would be willing to narrow the request so
that the State could more easily comply with it. Accordingly, the
circuit court ruled that the subpoenas, as drafted, were too broad. 
The court further indicated that it would entertain future discovery
requests on June 6, 1996, a date agreed upon by the parties. On
May 30, 1996, defendant filed a motion for discovery seeking the
issuance of subpoenas in five areas in order to support his claims
of constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
According to counsel, these records would establish that trial
counsel's  decision not to investigate and discover the records
constituted ineffectiveness because the material was readily
available at the time of trial. At the  June 6, hearing, the assistant
State's Attorney indicated that the State was not ready to proceed,
and the court granted a continuance to September 5, 1996, to hear
defendant's motion for discovery. On that date, the assistant
State's Attorney served defense counsel with the State's objections
to the defendant's motion for discovery. The matter was then
continued to November 7, 1996.
	When the parties reconvened in court on November 7, both
attorneys presented arguments on the motion for discovery and the
objections thereto. The court indicated that it would be prepared
to rule on the motion after it had conducted an in camera review
of certain Department of Corrections records that defendant had
requested. The case was continued by agreement of the parties to
November 19, 1996 for a final ruling as to the discovery requests.
	On November 19, the court inquired if either defense counsel
or the assistant State's Attorney had additional arguments to make
with respect to the discovery issue. Both parties indicated that they
did not. The court then stated that it had reviewed defendant's
petition, along with the supporting affidavits and documents
attached to it and that "detailed oral arguments were heard *** on
this post-conviction petition on November 7, 1996." The court
then denied all of the discovery requests and further found that
"defendant's post conviction petition for relief sets out no valid or
just reasons why relief should be granted by this trial Judge. 
Therefore, defendant's petition is hereby denied."
	At the conclusion of the court's rulings, defense counsel
immediately pointed out that the matter was before the court solely
on a motion for discovery. Counsel explained that his arguments,
up until that point in time, had only pertained to the discovery
issue and had not been directed at the substantive claims made in
the petition. Specifically, counsel noted that:
		"[t]he arguments that we argued [last week] were not
addressing [sic] actually the claims that we had made in
the post conviction petition initially. The arguments were
going to discovery concerning some of those issues and
some other issues we have yet to raise.
			And we're taken completely by surprise that the ruling
today is on the merits of the post-conviction petition. We
did not address the merits in our argument.
* * *
			I would ask the Court to reconsider the fact that we're
totally caught by surprise here. We thought we were going
to have time to amend this petition and then to have full
arguments of [sic] the Court."
Notwithstanding defense counsel's contentions, the trial judge
complimented the defense team on what he characterized as "an
exhaustive petition." The judge noted, however, that he had
reviewed the petition and its accompanying affidavits and
supporting documents "in great length" and that his actions would
constitute "a final order from this Court." The judge further
stressed that he did not
		"wish to deny or delay  *** to participate actively in a
delay [sic] that the Supreme Court has ruled on a number
of years ago. And I feel that I'm dragging my feet and I
don't like to do that."
Defense counsel then noted that the defense had appeared in court
on every date set by the court and had not been dilatory in any
way. Counsel further noted that the defense team
		"had no opportunity to know that [a dismissal] was
coming. [The defense has] had no opportunity to know
that. ***  No idea at all."
The trial judge then asked the State for its position on the matter. 
The assistant State's Attorney replied that the court had an
"adequate basis to rule." The judge then ordered that
"[d]efendant's post-conviction relief petition will be denied on its
merits.  Obviously an appealable order."
	Defendant thereafter sought reconsideration and vacatur of
the November 19, 1996, order. The circuit court denied the
motion, and this appeal followed. During the pendency of this
appeal, defendant filed a motion in this court seeking a limited
remand for a new suppression hearing. We have taken the motion
with the case.


ANALYSIS


	We begin our analysis with a review of the basic principles
associated with proceedings under the Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (the Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994). The
Act  provides a mechanism by which those under criminal
sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the
result of a substantial denial of their rights under federal and/or
state constitutional law. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). 
Proceedings under the Act are commenced by the filing of a
petition in the circuit court in which the original proceeding took
place. The petition must clearly allege how the petitioner's rights
were violated. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 1994). The scope of the
proceedings is limited to constitutional matters that have not been,
nor could have been, previously adjudicated. Any issues which
could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are
procedurally defaulted (People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989)),
and any issues which have previously been decided by a reviewing
court are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. People v. Silagy,
116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987). In cases where the death penalty has
been imposed, section 122-5 of the Act directs that the State shall
either answer or move to dismiss the petition. In the event that a
motion to dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an answer
within 20 days after such denial. See 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West
1994).  Under section 122-6, the court may receive proof by
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or other evidence. See 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 1994).
	Although a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing as a matter of right, this court has repeatedly
stressed that a hearing is required whenever the allegations set
forth in the petition, as supported by the trial record or
accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381
(1998); People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 91-92 (1984). In making
that determination, all well-pleaded facts in the petition are to be
taken as true. Nonfactual and nonspecific assertions which merely
amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require a hearing under
the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381. The requirement for
accompanying affidavits arises from the need to furnish
information dehors the record that the petitioner did not have
available to him or her at the time of the original trial. See People
v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 559-60 (1952). The dismissal of a post-conviction petition is warranted only when the petition's
allegations of fact-liberally construed in favor of the petitioner and
in light of the original trial record-fail to make a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382.
We note that if the allegations contained in the petition are based
upon matters of record, no extrinsic evidence may be required. See
People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 157 (1977) (noting that a court
may properly dismiss a post-conviction petition if the record of
proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious). On
the other hand, when a petitioner's claims are based upon matters
outside the record, this court has emphasized that "it is not the
intent of the [A]ct that [such] claims be adjudicated on the
pleadings." People v. Airmers, 34 Ill. 2d 222, 226 (1966); See also
People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 216 (1967) (same). Factual
disputes raise issues that should be resolved at a hearing before the
trial court and "should be raised by answer rather than by motion
to dismiss, assuming substantial constitutional questions are
raised." Reeves, 412 Ill.  at 559.
	In view of the foregoing, we presume that, by its actions, the
circuit court dismissed defendant's petition without an evidentiary
hearing because defendant's allegations, even if taken as true,
were insufficient as a matter of law to warrant relief under the Act.
Such a decision is afforded plenary review on appeal. See
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 387-88. Before we begin such a review,
however, we must address defendant's challenge to the manner in
which the circuit court heard and ruled upon his petition. Relying
on this court's decision in People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1 (1998),
defendant contends that the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief without notice deprived him of procedural due
process.
	In Bounds, we reversed a circuit court's order dismissing a
post-conviction petition because the circuit court, at a status
hearing and without prior notice, granted the State's motion to
dismiss. This court noted that the "trial court's discretion in
resolving post-conviction petitions does not allow the court to
convert a status call to a hearing on the merits without notice to
the parties." Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d  at 5. We, therefore, concluded that
the procedure followed by the circuit court violated defendant's
right to procedural due process. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d  at 5.
	Bounds compels the vacatur of the circuit court's order in this
case. As noted above, at the time of the November 19, 1996,
hearing, the parties were embroiled in a debate, not over the
sufficiency of defendant's petition, but over the breadth and
necessity of his discovery requests. The November 19, 1996, court
date was set so that the parties could learn of the circuit court's
resolution of the matter.(2) Nevertheless, after denying all of
defendant's discovery requests, the court went on to consider the
merits of the petition and to deny all relief on a substantive basis. 
As in Bounds, defense counsel went to court prepared for one type
of proceeding, only to be surprised when the trial court, without
prior notice, reached the merits of the petition and denied all post-conviction relief. The decision to deny the petition was made
without notice to the parties and without the benefit of argument
from either defendant or the State. We, therefore, vacate the circuit
court's order denying post-conviction relief and remand the cause
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the Act.
	This court, long ago, acknowledged that the Act should not be
so strictly construed that a fair hearing be denied and the purpose
of the Act, i.e., the vindication of constitutional rights, be defeated. 
See Reeves, 412 Ill.  at 560. In vacating the circuit court's
judgment, we today, as in Bounds, mean to send a clear message
to both bench and bar that the protection of a defendant's right to
procedural due process in post-conviction proceedings is of critical
importance. We trust that such violations will not soon be repeated
in our courtrooms.
	In light of our disposition of this appeal, we deny defendant's
motion for a limited remand without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
	The circuit court's order denying defendant post-conviction
relief is vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings consonant with this opinion.
	Order vacated;
cause remanded.
	 
1.     1The motion was apparently filed on that same day.

2.      2In this regard, we note that the circuit court incorrectly stated that
it had heard "detailed arguments" on defendant's post-conviction
petition at the prior hearing. Our review of the transcripts from that
hearing indicates that those "detailed arguments" concerned the nature
and scope of defendant's discovery requests. Any reference to the merits
of the petition was directed solely to the discovery question upon which
the parties disagreed.