Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF SJJ and ERJ, II: SLJ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-04-9

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF SJJ and ERJ, II: SLJ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2005 WY 3104 P.3d 74Case Number: C-04-9Decided: 01/11/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF SJJ and ERJ, II,

minor 
children:

 
 
SLJ,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY 
SERVICES, ALBANY COUNTY FIELD

OFFICE,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Matthew F.G. Castano of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie , Wyoming . 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy 
Attorney

            
General; and Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by

            
Ms. Kucera.

 
 

            
Devon O'Connell Coleman of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and JAMES, 
DJ.

 
 
 
 
 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In 2001, the 
Department of Family Services (DFS) took SJJ and ERJ, II, ages seven and six, 
from the home of their paternal grandmother where they had been living since 
1996 and placed them in protective custody.  Just over a year later, DFS filed a 
petition for termination of parental rights against the mother, SLJ, and the 
father, ERJ.  After a three day 
trial, the district court determined that SLJ's parental rights1 should be terminated pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003), authorizing termination 
where a child has been left in the care of another without support or 
communication from the absent parent for at least a year, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2003), authorizing termination where a child has been 
in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and a showing 
that the parent is unfit.  SLJ 
appeals the order terminating her parental rights.  We affirm.    

 
 
 
 

[¶2]      SLJ presents the 
following issues:

 
 
1.         
Whether the State of Wyoming put forth sufficient evidence to 
establish that SLJ's conduct violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309 (a)(i) and 
(a)(v) by clear and convincing evidence.

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the State was required to show reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional had been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment 
before terminating SLJ's parental rights.

 
 
            
3.         
Whether the district court erred when it allowed confidential records to 
be admitted into evidence.

 
 
DFS 
phrases the issues as:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court properly found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that appellant's parental rights to SJJ and ERJ, [II], should be 
terminated pursuant to Wyo. Stats. §§ 14-2-309(a)(i) and 
(v)?

 
 
II.          
Whether the district court properly admitted into evidence records from 
the juvenile proceedings?

 
 

            
I.          
Did the State of Wyoming present clear and convincing evidence 
to support the termination of appellant's parental rights?

 
 
            
II.          
Is the State of Wyoming required pursuant to Wyoming Statutes 
§ 14-2-309(a)(i) or § 14-2-309(a)(iv) to show reasonable efforts to rehabilitate 
appellant?

 
 
            
III.         
Were records presented pursuant to the attendant juvenile action properly 
admitted into evidence?

 
 
 

[¶3]      SLJ and ERJ are 
the biological parents of SJJ and ERJ, II.  
In October of 1996, when SJJ and ERJ, II were eighteen months and six 
months old respectively, SLJ asked the children's paternal grandmother, who 
resided in Laramie, Wyoming, to come to Arizona where she and the children were 
living, and take the children back to Laramie to live with her until SLJ could 
find employment and was able to care for them.  ERJ was then serving time in an 
Arizona 
prison.   

 
 
[¶4]      In March of 1997, 
ERJ signed a document giving his mother, the children's paternal grandmother, 
temporary custody of the children.  
The following September, he filed a complaint for divorce in the district 
court, Albany County, Wyoming, where he was then residing after his release from 
prison in Arizona.  In addition to a 
divorce from SLJ, he sought full custody of the children.  SLJ was served with notice of the 
complaint by publication pursuant to W.R.C.P. 4(c), and she failed to 
respond.  ERJ filed a motion for 
entry of default and, after a hearing, the district court entered a judgment and 
decree of divorce on February 23, 1998.  
ERJ was awarded full custody of the children and SLJ was ordered to pay 
child support.  One month later, in 
March of 1998, paternal grandmother filed petitions for appointment of herself 
as guardian of the children along with forms executed by ERJ consenting to the 
guardianship.2  The district court entered orders 
appointing paternal grandmother as temporary guardian. 

 
 
[¶5]      Meanwhile, SLJ 
filed motions to modify the divorce decree and rescind the custody order.  The district court set the motions for 
hearing, notified SLJ of the hearing date and made arrangements for her to 
participate by telephone.  SLJ 
failed to appear as arranged and the district court on June 17, 1998, entered a 
child custody and visitation order confirming the divorce and the custody award 
to ERJ.  SLJ subsequently filed a 
motion for new trial based upon procedural errors,3 which the district court granted, 
and on June 14, 2000, the district court entered a new decree granting the 
divorce and awarding custody of the children to paternal grandmother as 
guardian.     

 
 
[¶6]      From October of 
1996 until August of 2001, the children remained in paternal grandmother's care 
in Wyoming while SLJ lived in Arizona.  On June 15, 2000, as part of the divorce 
proceedings, ERJ and SLJ filed stipulations for the indefinite appointment of 
paternal grandmother as the children's guardian and the maternal grandparents as 
alternate guardians.  In their 
stipulations, SLJ and ERJ each stated they were unable to care for the children 
and did not expect to be able to do so in the foreseeable future.  

 
 
[¶7]      In August of 
2001, DFS received a report that paternal grandmother was abusing SJJ and ERJ, 
II.  DFS investigated, and on August 
14, 2001, moved for placement of the children in temporary protective 
custody.  Following a hearing, the 
district court ordered the children be placed in protective custody.  Once the children were in protective 
custody, the district court entered another order authorizing DFS to create a 
multi-disciplinary team (MDT) to develop a case plan for the children.  The district court set the matter for 
hearing in September of 2001 and provided notice to SLJ.  SLJ responded with pro se motions to 
terminate paternal grandmother's appointment as guardian, to allow SLJ to appear 
at the hearing by telephone and to terminate ERJ's parental rights. 

 
 
[¶8]      The MDT met on 
October 21, 2001.  SLJ was part of 
the MDT and participated in part of the meeting by telephone.  The recommendation of the majority of 
the MDT members was for the children to remain in the custody of DFS with the 
goal of permanent placement with their maternal grandparents, the alternate 
guardians.  The DFS child protection 
case manager assigned to the case testified that termination of parental rights 
was mentioned as a consideration at the MDT meeting.  The DFS contact log concerning the case 
contains an entry stating the majority of the MDT members "agreed that [SLJ]'s 
parental rights should be terminated" and that SLJ dissented.  On November 2, 2001, a majority of the 
MDT filed written recommendations with the district court, recommending 
continued custody with DFS with eventual permanent placement with the maternal 
grandparents.  A written summary 
included with the recommendations states that SLJ "withdrew her participation 
from the meeting" and would be sending a letter objecting to the MDT 
recommendations. 

 
 
[¶9]      On November 7, 
2001, SLJ sent a letter to the district court objecting to the MDT's 
recommendations and suggesting that a home study be conducted cooperatively by 
DFS and the Arizona Department of Child Protection Services to determine her 
competency and fitness as a parent.  
"Upon the positive results of the home study," SLJ wrote, "[she] should 
be granted full legal and physical custody of her children."    

 
 
[¶10]   A review hearing was held on 
December 11, 2001.  SLJ again 
appeared by telephone and asked for a home study to investigate her abilities to 
care for her children. At that time, SLJ informed the court she had not seen the 
children since January of 2000 nor had she paid any child support.  On January 3, 2002, the district court 
entered a final disposition order finding that paternal grandmother pleaded nolo 
contendere to the allegations of abuse, removal of the children from her home 
was in their best interest, reasonable efforts had been made to prevent removal 
of the children from the home, and the children should be moved to the maternal 
grandparents' home.  The district 
court also ordered DFS to conduct a home study of SLJ in Arizona.   

 
 
[¶11]   On March 19, 2002, the Arizona home study was 
completed.  The study recommended 
that SLJ was not an appropriate placement resource for SJJ and ERJ, II.  The district court held a review hearing 
on May 13, 2002, and SLJ appeared by telephone.  At the commencement of the hearing, DFS 
informed the court that the Arizona home study recommended against placing 
the children in SLJ's home.  DFS 
also informed the court and those participating in the hearing, including SLJ, 
that it was recommending termination of both parents' parental rights.  

 
 
[¶12]   On June 4, 2002, DFS mailed a copy 
of its May 2002 case plan to SLJ.  
The case plan informed SLJ that DFS would be pursuing termination of her 
parental rights with adoption as the ultimate goal for the children and 
placement in a therapeutic foster care home in the meantime.  On July 2, 2002, the district court 
entered an order continuing custody of the children with DFS with placement at 
the maternal grandparents' home.  
The district court found in relevant part that the "home study showed 
that placement with the mother is not appropriate", "DFS recommends termination 
of parental rights for both biological mother and father", "a petition for 
termination of parental rights is appropriate as the father is in prison for a 
felony, not due for release until March 2003, and the mother has not had custody 
or control of the children for many years, has not provided support and has had 
irregular and incidental contact."  
A copy of the order was sent to SLJ. 

 
 
[¶13]   By letter dated August 26, 2002, 
DFS notified SLJ that it intended to pursue termination of her parental rights 
and raised the question whether she would be willing to relinquish those 
rights.  The letter informed SLJ 
that if she chose not to relinquish her parental rights, DFS would file a 
termination action within ten days.  
SLJ responded with a letter to the district court stating that she would 
not relinquish her parental rights and requesting the appointment of 
counsel.    

 
 
[¶14]   On October 21, 2002, DFS filed a 
petition for termination of parental rights against SLJ and ERJ.  As grounds for termination of SLJ's 
parental rights, DFS alleged that, except for a one to two week period in 1997, 
SLJ did not physically visit or have anything more than incidental telephone 
contact with the children between 1996 and 2001 and contributed only $20 to the 
support of the children during that time.  
DFS asked the district court to terminate SLJ's parental rights pursuant 
to § 14-2-309(a)(i) on the grounds that the children were left in the care of 
another without provision for support or communication from their mother for a 
period of at least a year.  On 
December 19, 2002, DFS filed a motion to amend the petition for termination of 
parental rights to further allege that the children had been in the protective 
custody of DFS for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, SLJ was unfit to have 
custody of the children and, pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(v), her parental rights 
should be terminated. 

 
 
[¶15]   Following another review hearing 
and prior to trial on the termination petition, the district court on April 1, 
2003, entered an order continuing custody of the children with DFS.  At that time, the district court found 
in relevant part that "reasonable efforts have been made to reunify the family," 
"termination of parental rights and adoption of the children is the recommended 
goal in this case," "the home study in record shows that the mother of the minor 
children is not an appropriate placement option," and "the mother of the minor 
children has yet to appear before this Court at anytime during these 
proceedings."  

 
 
[¶16]   In preparation for trial on the 
termination petition, DFS filed a motion for an order requiring SLJ to undergo a 
mental examination for the purpose of assessing her parenting abilities.  Over SLJ's objection, the district court 
entered an order requiring her to participate in a mental examination by a 
specified psychologist at a specified date and time.  SLJ failed to appear for the examination 
and the district court entered another order requiring her to appear at a new 
date and time.  SLJ again failed to 
appear. 

 
 
[¶17]   Trial on the termination petition 
was conducted October 13 through 15, 2003.  
The district court heard testimony from the paternal grandmother; ERJ's 
federal probation officer; SLJ's father; the children's therapist and 
therapeutic foster care coordinator; two therapeutic foster care case managers; 
SLJ's sister; the children's temporary and current foster mothers; a clinical 
psychologist retained by DFS to perform a psychological evaluation of the 
children; a DFS child protection case worker; and ERJ.  The court did not hear testimony from 
SLJ because she did not appear in person or by telephone.  On the morning of trial, counsel for SLJ 
made an oral motion to allow SLJ to appear by telephone. The district court 
denied the motion for two reasons: 

 
 
Number 
one, it wasn't timely made; but perhaps more importantly is [SLJ] has been 
involved in a number of cases in this court, both juvenile and in this 
particular case, over a period of years. She has never appeared in this court. 
And this is one of those situations where, quite frankly, she needs to be 
here.

 
 
            
I note for the record that she didn't appear here either when she was 
ordered to appear in connection with some discovery examinations, and that was 
when the State offered to pay her way. She still didn't make it. So quite 
frankly, I don't think that economics has anything to do with the 
situation.

 

The 
district court allowed SLJ's counsel to cross-examine and present evidence such 
as he could without his client being present.  At the close of the trial, the district 
court asked the parties to submit briefs if they wished on the issue of whether 
DFS was required under the circumstances of this case to attempt to reunify the 
family prior to seeking to terminate the parents' rights.  From the record before us, it appears 
none of the parties submitted a brief. 

 
 
[¶18]   On November 10, 2003, the district 
court issued a twenty-one page decision letter in which it concluded 
preliminarily that DFS had no "statutory obligation to demonstrate that 
rehabilitation and reunification attempts were unsuccessful when pursuing an 
action for termination of parental rights under W.S. §§§ 14-2-309(a)(i), (a)(iv) 
and (a)(v)."  The district court 
further concluded DFS demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that SLJ's 
parental rights should be terminated pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(i) and 
(a)(v).  On February 12, 2004, 
consistent with its decision letter, the district court entered an order 
terminating SLJ's parental rights.                        

 
 
                        
 

[¶19]   We review decisions terminating 
parental rights pursuant to the following standards:

 
 
            
Due to the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial 
association and the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of 
children, application of statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter 
for strict scrutiny. As part of this strict scrutiny standard, a case for 
termination of parental rights must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would 
persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable. 
Rigorous though this standard may be, we apply our traditional principles of 
evidentiary review when a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting termination. Thus, we examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable evidence to be 
true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party.

 
 

MN v. Dept. of Family Services, 2003 WY 135, ¶5, 78 P.3d 232, ¶5 (Wyo. 2003) 
(citations omitted).

            
 

[¶20]   
Resolution of the issues SLJ presents also requires application of our 
standards for interpreting statutory language:

 
 
[W]e 
look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the 
statute is ambiguous.  A statute is 
clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to 
agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  

 
 
When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction. Instead, our inquiry revolves around the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. 
 In doing so, we view the statute as 
a whole in order to ascertain its intent and general purpose and also the 
meaning of each part.  We give 
effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe all components of a 
statute in pari materia.

 
 
We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. When 
examining a statute, we presume that the legislature enacts legislation with 
full knowledge of existing law and with reference to other statutes and 
decisions of the courts.  Such 
legislation should, therefore, be construed in a way that creates a consistency 
and harmony within the existing law.

 
 

Yeager 
v. Forbes, 2003 
WY 134, ¶13, 78 P.3d 241, ¶13 (Wyo. 2003) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
            

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶21]   In her first issue, SLJ claims 
clear and convincing evidence was not presented to support the district court's 
order terminating her parental rights on the basis of § 14-2-309(a)(i) 
and § 14-2-309(a)(v).  That 
is, she claims the evidence was not sufficient to show that she left her 
children in another's care without communication or support for at least one 
year, as provided in § 14-2-309(a)(i), and the children were under the 
care of DFS for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and she was unfit 
to have custody, as provided in § 14-2-309(a)(v).  These subsections of § 14-2-309 of the 
Termination of Parental Rights Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-319 
(LexisNexis 2003)), which the district court relied upon in terminating her 
rights, provide as follows:

 
 
   (a)  The parent-child legal relationship may 
be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by 
clear and convincing evidence:

 
 
  (i)  The child has been left in the care of 
another person without provision for the child's support and without 
communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In 
making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications;

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(v)  The child has been in foster care under 
the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the most recent 
twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody 
and control of the child;  

 
 
[¶22]   In responding to the issue as 
phrased by SLJ, we note first that § 14-2-309(a) does not require clear and 
convincing proof of both (a)(i) and (a)(v) as SLJ's statement of the 
issue suggests.  Rather, the 
provision by its express terms requires clear and convincing evidence of "any 
one (1) or more" of the stated facts.  
Thus, to support the district court's ruling, the record must contain 
clear and convincing evidence that SLJ left her children in the care of another 
without communication or provision of support for a year or more, or that 
the children were under the care of DFS for at least a year and SLJ was 
unfit.  

 
 
[¶23]   With this clarification in mind, we 
turn to SLJ's argument, the focus of which is § 14-2-309(a)(i).  She does not contest, nor did she ever 
contest, the fact that the children were under the care of DFS for fifteen of 
the most recent twenty-two months as provided in subsection (a)(v).  She also presents no argument in her 
brief pertaining to her fitness as a parent, the second showing required under 
subsection (a)(v).  Because she 
limits her argument to (a)(i), and because we find clear and convincing evidence 
supporting the termination on the basis of that one factor, which is all that § 
14-2-309(a)(i) requires, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support termination under (a)(v).4

 
 
[¶24]   Addressing the sufficiency of the 
evidence under § 14-2-309(a)(i), SLJ asserts the district court relied for its 
decision that termination was warranted primarily on the testimony of the 
children's paternal grandmother who, by her own admission, was unable to recall 
events clearly and had difficulty remembering dates and details of SLJ's contact 
with the children.  Given that 
fundamental rights were at stake, SLJ contends the district court should have 
given greater consideration to her father's more reliable 
testimony.

 
 
[¶25]   DFS responds that the grandmother's 
difficulty remembering some dates does not negate the remainder of her 
testimony, which was to the effect that SLJ rarely contacted the children.  DFS asserts that the maternal 
grandfather's testimony did not help SLJ's case because he merely confirmed that 
her contact with the children was sporadic and limited. DFS cites the rule that 
the trial court is in the best position to assess witness credibility and weigh 
the testimony.  Giving the district 
court the proper deference, DFS contends, its determination was supported by 
sufficient evidence.  We find 
sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the district court's ruling. 

 
 
[¶26]   The paternal grandmother testified 
that the children lived with her for five years.  They came to live with her initially 
because SLJ did not have a job or a place to stay and asked if the children 
could stay with her until SLJ had a job and was able to take care of them.  The paternal grandmother agreed, drove 
to Arizona, picked up the children and brought 
them back to Laramie, 
Wyoming to live with her. 

 
 
[¶27]   The paternal grandmother testified 
that during the first year the children lived with her SLJ called them perhaps 
two or three times.  She testified 
that during the entire five years the children lived with her, SLJ visited them 
only once for approximately forty-five minutes.5  She also testified SLJ asked her to 
bring the children to Arizona to visit her only 
one time in the five years they lived with her in Wyoming.  On that occasion, SLJ asked her to bring 
the children to a park to meet her, and when she and the children showed up, she 
was confronted by law enforcement officials who said SLJ told them she had taken 
the children and would not give them back.  
She ended up leaving the children in Arizona with their mother and returning to Wyoming.  Two weeks later, SLJ called and asked 
paternal grandmother to come back to Arizona, get the children and take them back 
to live with her.  According to 
paternal grandmother, SLJ provided no monetary support for the children during 
the five years they lived with her.

 
 
[¶28]   SLJ's father, the children's 
maternal grandfather, testified the children lived with him for six months in 
late 2001 and early 2002.  He 
testified that during that time, SLJ contacted the children maybe three or four 
times.  He characterized her contact 
with the children as "very intermittent, sporadic." 

 
 
[¶29]   
We find the district court's conclusion that SLJ had very limited, 
sporadic contact with the children from 1996 until 2001 was supported by 
sufficient evidence.                          
From the record before us, we have no difficulty concluding the evidence 
was sufficient to persuade the fact finder as to the truth of DFS's contention 
that the children were left in their grandmother's care for over a year without 
provision for support and without more than incidental communication from 
SLJ.  Examining the evidence in the 
light most favorable to DFS, assuming that evidence to be true and discounting 
conflicting evidence presented by SLJ, we hold sufficient evidence was presented 
to support the district court's ruling. 

 
 
 
 
Reasonable 
Efforts to Rehabilitate

 
 
[¶30]   SLJ asserts her parental rights 
were improperly terminated because the state failed to show that reasonable 
efforts to rehabilitate her were unsuccessful.  She cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-204(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003) of the Child Protection Services statutes, 
which requires DFS to investigate alleged child abuse or neglect, and where the 
investigation discloses abuse or neglect, initiate services with the family to 
help resolve the problem.  She also 
cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440 (LexisNexis 2003) of the Child Protection Act, 
which requires, with specified exceptions, reasonable efforts to preserve the 
family before placing a child outside the home in a neglect proceeding.  She argues that these provisions 
required DFS to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify her family 
prior to attempting to terminate her parental rights.

 
 
[¶31]   DFS contends § 14-2-309(a)(i) and 
(a)(v) do not require reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent or reunite 
the family prior to termination of parental rights.  DFS contends the only factor under § 
14-2-309(a) that requires efforts to rehabilitate is subsection (a)(iii), which 
concerns termination of parental rights where a child has been abused or 
neglected by the parent.  Because 
that was not the provision the district court relied on for terminating SLJ's 
rights, DFS argues, the rehabilitation requirement found in subsection (a)(iii) 
does not apply.  Addressing SLJ's 
argument under § 14-3-440, DFS asserts the provision does not apply because this 
case did not involve a DFS placement "outside the home."  At the time the state became involved, 
DFS argues, the children were already placed "outside the home" because years 
earlier SLJ voluntarily turned them over to the care of their paternal 
grandmother and then formalized that arrangement in her divorce action by 
stipulating to the paternal grandmother having full custody and an indefinite 
guardianship. 

 
 
[¶32]   We hold that DFS was not required 
under the circumstances of this case to make reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family prior to terminating SLJ's parental rights.  Section 14-2-309 sets forth seven facts 
supporting termination of parental rights.  
Proof of any one of those facts by clear and convincing evidence supports 
the termination of parental rights. Only one of those seven facts requires 
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family prior to terminating parental 
rights.  Section § 14-2-309(a)(iii) 
provides:

 
 
  (a)  The parent-child legal relationship may 
be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by 
clear and convincing evidence:

 
 
. . 
.

      (iii) The child 
has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative 
treatment, and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent.

 
 
The 
remaining six subsections of § 14-2-309(a) do not require DFS to make 
rehabilitation efforts.  Giving the 
plain language of the provision its ordinary meaning, only subsection (a)(iii) 
addressing abuse and neglect by a parent requires reasonable efforts to 
rehabilitate the family.  DFS did 
not file termination proceedings on the basis of abuse or neglect by a parent 
nor did the district court enter its order on that basis.  Rather, DFS filed termination 
proceedings, and the district court granted the petition, on the basis that the 
children were left in the care of another for at least a year under subsection 
(a)(i) and had been in foster care with the state for over fifteen of the last 
twenty-months and the parents were unfit under subsection (a)(v).  Neither of these subsections requires 
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family.          

 
 
[¶33]   We turn to consideration of § 
14-3-440, the other provision that SLJ relies upon to support her claim that DFS 
was required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Section 14-3-440, 
currently the last provision of the Child Protection Act, provides in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
(a) 
Except as provided in W.S. 14-2-309(b) or (c), reasonable efforts shall be made 
to preserve and reunify the family:

            
(i) Prior to placement of the child outside the home, to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removing the child from the child's home;  and

            
(ii) To make it possible for the child to safely return to the child's 
home.

(b) In 
determining what reasonable efforts shall be made with respect to a child and in 
making those reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety shall be the 
paramount concern.

(c) 
Reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian may be 
made concurrently with the reasonable efforts described in subsection (a) of 
this section.

(d) If 
continuation of reasonable efforts described in subsection (a) of this section 
is determined to be inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, 
reasonable efforts shall be made for placement of the child in a timely manner 
in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete the steps necessary to 
finalize the permanent placement of the child.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
 (f) The court shall make the reasonable 
efforts determinations required under this section at every court hearing.  The reasonable efforts determinations 
shall be documented in the court's orders.

(g) If 
the court determines as provided in W.S. 14-2-309(a)(vi), (b) or (c) that 
reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family are not 
required:

            
(i) A permanency hearing as described in W.S. 14-3-431(c) shall be held 
for the child within thirty (30) days after the determination;  and

            
(ii) Reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely 
manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps 
are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the 
child.

(h) A 
petition to terminate parental rights shall be filed within sixty (60) days of a 
judicial determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the child and parent 
are not required pursuant to W.S. 14-2-309(a)(vi), (b) or 
(c).

 
 
 [¶34]  We find this section inapplicable to the 
termination of parental rights proceeding at issue here.  Section 14-3-440 is part of the Child 
Protection Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-440 (LexisNexis 
2003)).  Although the two enactments 
are in some cases closely intertwined, the Child Protection Act and the 
termination of parental rights statutes (§§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-319) are 
separate statutory enactments.  The 
Child Protection Act applies to proceedings concerning a minor alleged to be 
neglected.  Contained within the act 
are the procedures the legislature has determined must be followed upon an 
allegation that a person has neglected a child in his custody.  The Act allows a neglected child to be 
taken into custody and placed in shelter care while the neglect allegation is 
investigated and a determination is made as to the truth of the allegation.  If it is determined that a child was 
neglected, the Act then provides procedures for making proper disposition of the 
child.  Among the requirements of 
the Act is that, in neglect proceedings, reasonable efforts shall be made to 
preserve and reunify the family before a child is placed outside the home. 

 
 
[¶35]   Here, the neglect proceeding was 
filed against the custodian, the paternal grandmother.  In the neglect proceeding against the 
paternal grandmother DFS was required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family prior to placing the children outside the home.  The neglect proceeding, however, is not 
before us -- paternal grandmother did not appeal from the juvenile court neglect 
determination claiming that DFS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family in accordance with § 14-3-440. Instead, what is before us is the 
termination action filed against SLJ pursuant to § 14-2-309.  Section 14-2-309 does not require a 
showing of reasonable efforts to reunify the family prior to terminating 
parental rights.  While subsection 
(a)(iii) does require a showing of reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family 
prior to termination on the basis of abuse or neglect, there is no such 
requirement where termination is sought on the grounds stated in subsections 
(a)(i), (ii) and (iv) through (vii).  
SLJ's parental rights were terminated pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(i) and 
(v) and DFS was not required to show reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family.       

       

 
 
Juvenile 
Records

 
 
[¶36]   SLJ claims the district court erred 
in allowing introduction of evidence in the form of witness testimony and 
documents from the juvenile court neglect proceeding.  In support of her claim that such 
records were confidential and improperly used as evidence in the termination 
proceeding, she cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-214 (LexisNexis 2003) of the Child 
Protection Act, which provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
(a) All 
records concerning reports and investigations of child abuse or neglect are 
confidential except as provided by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215.  

(b) 
Applications for access to records concerning child abuse or neglect contained 
in the state agency or local child protective agency shall be made in the manner 
and form prescribed by the state agency.  
Upon appropriate application, the state agency shall give access to any 
of the following persons or agencies for purposes directly related with the 
administration of W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215.

 
 
[¶37]   DFS responds that the district 
court did not err in allowing use of the juvenile court records in the 
termination proceedings.  DFS 
asserts that use of such records is entirely proper and in accord with the Child 
Protection Services statutes' purpose of protecting the best interests of the 
child.  DFS also claims SLJ 
stipulated to the use of the records and for that reason cannot now claim error 
in their introduction at trial. 

 
 
[¶38]   We hold that use of the juvenile 
court records in the termination proceedings was entirely appropriate.  Section 14-3-214(b)(vi) authorizes the 
use of records concerning child abuse or neglect investigations by courts upon a 
showing that access to the records is necessary for determination of an 
issue.  The juvenile court records 
concerning the children in this case were directly related to the termination of 
parental rights proceeding and were necessary for determining the issue of 
whether parental rights should be terminated. The two proceedings were closely 
intertwined and both are confidential. There was no error in use of the 
records.  

             

 [¶39]  Affirmed.

 
 
 

  
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1The district court also terminated the 
father's parental rights, however, he did not appeal that determination. 

2ERJ was in and out of jail. Apparently, 
he was in jail at the time his mother filed the guardianship 
petitions.

3The procedural errors giving rise to a 
new trial were:  1) failure to join 
paternal grandmother, the person having physical custody of the children, as 
required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-302; 2) failure to require the parties to 
file financial affidavits as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-302; and 3) 
failure to impose a visitation schedule, provide which party will bear the 
transportation costs and impose a remedy in the event the parties disagree on 
the meaning of "reasonable" visitation. 

4We note, however, that as of December 
19, 2002, the date DFS filed its amended complaint alleging (a)(v) as additional 
grounds for termination, the children had been in the care of DFS for sixteen of 
the most recent twenty-two months. Additionally, the Arizona home study 
concluded SLJ was not an appropriate placement for the 
children.

5The forty-five minute visit with SJJ and 
ERJ, II was incidental to a trip SLJ made to Wyoming to contest a guardianship proceeding filed by her 
parents in district court in Torrington, Wyoming.  
In that action, SLJ's parents sought appointment as guardians for SLJ's 
other three children born from an earlier marriage.  At the time SLJ's parents filed the 
guardianship petition in 2001, the three children had lived with them and been 
under their full custody and control since 1999.  The district court granted the petition, 
SLJ's parents were appointed guardian of the three children and they have lived 
with their grandparents ever since.