Case Title: Estate of Brandon Narleski v. Gomes

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-9-10-19

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not
have been summarized.

   Estate of Brandon Tyler Narleski v. Nicholas Gomes (A-9/10-19) (083169)

Argued March 30, 2020 -- Decided September 17, 2020

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

       The issue before the Court is whether the common law imposes a duty on
underage adults -- over the age of eighteen but under twenty-one -- to refrain from
making their homes a safe haven for underage guests to consume alcoholic
beverages and, if so, the standard for liability if an underage guest, who becomes
intoxicated, afterwards drives a motor vehicle and injures or kills a third party.

       Nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski permitted underage adult friends to
consume alcoholic beverages in his home. Nineteen-year-old Brandon Tyler
Narleski and twenty-year-old Nicholas Gomes left the home severely intoxicated.
Shortly afterwards, Gomes lost control of his vehicle and crashed. Narleski died at
the scene. Gomes’s blood alcohol concentration was twice the legal limit.

       Narleski’s parents filed a wrongful death action against Gomes, Gomes’s
parents, and Amboy Food Liquor and News (Amboy), where the underage Narleski
purchased the alcohol. In turn, Amboy filed a third-party complaint against
Zwierzynski. The trial court granted Zwierzynski’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that he did not have a duty to supervise his friends. The Appellate Division
affirmed,  459 N.J. Super. 377, 399 (App. Div. 2019), but set forth a new rule of law
to apply purely prospectively that an underage adult “shall owe a common law duty
to injured parties to desist from facilitating the drinking of alcohol by underage
adults in his place of residence, regardless of whether he owns, rents, or manages the
premises.” Id. at 398. The Court granted Zwierzynski’s petition for certification
and Amboy’s cross-petition.  239 N.J. 493-94 (2019).

HELD: An underage adult defendant may be held civilly liable to a third-party
drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use of alcohol by making his
home available as a venue for underage drinking, regardless of whether he is a
leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if the guest causing the crash became
visibly intoxicated in the defendant’s home; and if it was reasonably foreseeable that
the visibly intoxicated guest would leave the residence to operate a motor vehicle
                                          1
and cause injury to another. The duty the Court recognizes today was foreshadowed
by precedent and therefore will apply in the case of Zwierzynski.

1. Six decades ago, in Rappaport v. Nichols, the Court recognized a common law
cause of action against licensed tavern owners who knowingly serve alcohol to
minors or intoxicated patrons who then negligently drive vehicles causing injury to
third-party victims.  31 N.J. 188, 202-05 (1959). The Appellate Division in Linn v.
Rand extended the rationale of Rappaport to homeowner social hosts.  140 N.J.
Super. 212 (App. Div. 1976). The Linn court held that the social host could be held
liable in negligence for the injuries suffered by a third-party victim if the host served
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest, knowing that the guest was unfit and
about to drive and that an accident was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 217, 219. In
the seminal case of Kelly v. Gwinnell, this Court expressly approved of Linn and
expanded the doctrine of social host liability to a private residence where an adult
host “serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is
intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle.”  96 N.J. 538, 547-48
(1984). In that circumstance, the Court held, the social host will be “liable for
injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication.” Id.
at 548. (pp. 17-21)

2. The Legislature largely codified Kelly in enacting the Social Host Liability Act,
 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8. The Act’s text and legislative history refute any
argument that the Act was intended to replace or stunt the development of the
common law of social host liability in cases where alcohol is provided to intoxicated
minors and underage adults. The Court rejects any interpretation of the Act that
would lead to the absurd conclusion that the Legislature intended to create a
liability-free zone for underage social hosts who knowingly provide alcohol to
visibly intoxicated minors and underage adults who negligently cause injury to third
parties as a result of their intoxication. (pp. 21-24)

3. The Legislature has expressed the State’s strong public policy against underage
drinking by adding to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice a law punishing
those who supply alcohol to minors and those who make property available for
underage consumption of alcohol. Although  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(a) and (b) create
penal sanctions, not tort liability standards, those statutes underscore the policy steps
the State has taken to deter those who might be tempted to accommodate or supply
alcoholic beverages for underage drinking. The Court reviews cases in which the
Appellate Division touched on the potential relevance of criminal statutes in setting
the standard of care for an underage social host who serves alcohol to underage
social guests and the continuing development of social host liability law. The Court
also notes that statistics show drunk driving remains a significant public health
threat. (pp. 25-32)
                                           2
4. In determining whether to recognize a duty to refrain from conduct that poses an
unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to others, the Court considers four factors:
“the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and
ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v.
Fox & Lazo Realtors,  132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993). Weighing those factors, the Court
concludes that an underage social host, who makes his residence available and
facilitates underage drinking, has a duty not to knowingly provide or allow self-
service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest and, if a guest becomes visibly
intoxicated, to take reasonable steps to prevent the guest from operating a motor
vehicle. (pp. 32-39)

5. The Court accordingly establishes the following rule. A plaintiff injured by an
intoxicated underage social guest may succeed in a cause of action against an
underage social host if the plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the following: (1) The social host knowingly permitted and facilitated the
consumption of alcoholic beverages to underage guests in a residence under his
control. This element does not require that the social host be a leaseholder or
titleholder to the property. It is enough that the social host has the ability and
apparent authority to give others access to the property; (2) The social host
knowingly provided alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest or knowingly
permitted the visibly intoxicated underage guest to serve himself or be served by
others. It is no defense that the underage guests bought and brought the alcoholic
beverages that they or others consumed; (3) The social host knew or reasonably
should have known that the visibly intoxicated social guest would leave the premises
and operate a motor vehicle and therefore would foreseeably endanger the lives and
property of others; (4) The social host did not take any reasonable steps to prevent
the intoxicated guest from getting behind the wheel of the vehicle; and (5) The
social guest, as a result of intoxication facilitated by the social host, negligently
operated a vehicle and proximately caused injury to a third party. (pp. 39-40)

6. That rule was foreshadowed and is the logical extension of the Court’s common
law jurisprudence and legislative enactments aimed at combatting drunk driving and
providing fair compensation for its victims. Applying the duty here is also
consistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party who brings a claim that
advances the common law should receive the benefit of his efforts. Based on the
record before the Court, Zwierzynski is not entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. There are material issues of disputed fact that can be resolved only
by a jury. (pp. 40-41)

      REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.
                                           3
      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
           A-9/
10 September Term 2019
                      083169

         Estate of Brandon Tyler Narleski,
   deceased by Administrator ad Prosequendum,
   John A. Narleski and Lori Anniello-Narleski,
        and John A. Narleski, individually,

                     Plaintiffs,

                          v.

       Nicholas Gomes, Orquivanes Gomes,
                and Sergio Gomes,

                    Defendants,

                        and

       Amboy Food Liquor and News Inc.,
     a/k/a Krauszers, and Krauszers Food and
 Liquor, Inc., a/k/a Krauszers Food & Liquor, Inc.,

               Defendants/Third-Party
     Plaintiffs/Respondents/Cross-Appellants,

                         v.

   Mercedes Apraez and Zdzislaw Zwierzynski,

             Third-Party Defendants,

                        and

                Mark Zwierzynski,

Third-Party Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

                         1
                    On certification to the Superior Court,
                 Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
                   at  459 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2019).

                   Argued                        Decided
                March 30, 2020              September 17, 2020

            Russell Macnow argued the cause for appellant/cross-
            respondent (Russell Macnow, on the briefs).

            Mark R. Scirocco argued the cause for respondents/cross-
            appellants (Law Offices of Robert A. Scirocco, attorneys;
            Mark R. Scirocco and Robert A. Scirocco, on the briefs).

            Jeffrey S. Jacobson argued the cause for amici curiae
            New Jersey Civil Justice Institute and American Property
            Casualty Insurance Association (Faegre Drinker Biddle &
            Reath, attorneys; Jeffrey S. Jacobson on the brief).

             JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

      The deterrence of drunk driving has been a preeminent policy goal of

legislative enactments and our common law for many decades. Nonetheless,

drunk driving remains one of the major causes of carnage on our highways and

roadways. To address this seemingly intractable societal problem, statutory

schemes and the common law generally impose civil liability on taverns and

social hosts who serve or facilitate the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated

customers and guests who then get into their vehicles and maim or kill others.

                                        2
      Under our statutes and case law, a social host over the age of twenty-one

has a duty not to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, either an adult or

a minor, if it is reasonably foreseeable the guest is about to drive. This case

presents a variation on that theme. Does a young adult, over the age of

eighteen but under the age of twenty-one -- an adult under the lawful drinking

age -- have a duty not to facilitate the service of alcohol to a visibly

intoxicated underage guest in his home if the guest is expected to operate a

motor vehicle?

      In this wrongful death case, nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski -- a

third-party defendant -- permitted underage adult friends to bring into his

home alcoholic beverages, which they consumed while his parents were not

there. Based on the summary judgment record before us, two of Zwierzynski’s

friends, nineteen-year-old Brandon Tyler Narleski and twenty-year-old

Nicholas Gomes, left the home severely intoxicated and got into Gomes’s car.

Gomes drove away and, shortly afterwards, lost control of the vehicle and

crashed into a concrete road divider. Narleski was ejected from the vehicle

and died at the scene.

      The trial court determined that Zwierzynski -- despite providing his

home as a drinking venue and arguably facilitating the excessive use of alcohol

-- owed no legal duty to Narleski because of Gomes’s intoxication.

                                         3
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the third-party action against

Zwierzynski.

      The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against

Zwierzynski. Estate of Narleski v. Gomes,  459 N.J. Super. 377, 399 (App.

Div. 2019). It nevertheless declared that, going forward, an underage adult

“shall owe a common law duty to injured parties to desist from facilitating the

drinking of alcohol by underage adults in his place of residence, regardless of

whether he owns, rents, or manages the premises.” Id. at 398.

      We now hold that an underage adult defendant may be held civilly liable

to a third-party drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use of

alcohol by making his home available as a venue for underage drinking,

regardless of whether he is a leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if the

guest causing the crash became visibly intoxicated in the defendant’s home;

and if it was reasonably foreseeable that the visibly intoxicated guest would

leave the residence to operate a motor vehicle and cause injury to another. An

underage adult, by law, may sue and be sued, may drive a motor vehicle, and

has the same civil obligations as any other citizen. He too is bound by the

social compact. His age does not make him immune from legal responsibility

for the violation of an established duty that is intended to protect others from

foreseeable harm.

                                        4
      The duty we recognize today was foreshadowed by our precedents and

therefore will apply in the case of Zwierzynski. Applying the duty here is also

consistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party who brings a claim that

advances the common law should receive the benefit of his efforts.

      We therefore reverse the Appellate Division, vacate the order of

summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim against Zwierzynski, and

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                        I.

                                       A.

      Narleski’s parents, individually and on behalf of his estate, filed a

wrongful death action in the Superior Court, Law Division. They named as

defendants Nicholas Gomes, Gomes’s parents, and Amboy Food Liquor and

News (Amboy), also known as Krauszers Food & Liquor Store, where the

underage Narleski purchased the alcohol consumed in Zwierzynski’s home. In

turn, Amboy filed a third-party complaint against Zwierzynski and his parents

seeking contribution pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act. The

third-party complaint alleged that Zwierzynski and his parents, as social hosts,

negligently supervised their guests, particularly Narleski and Gomes.

                                        5
      Narleski’s parents settled their claims against Gomes, his parents, and

Amboy. Third-party defendants Zwierzynski and his parents moved for

summary judgment against third-party plaintiff Amboy.

      This appeal comes to us from a grant of summary judgment in favor of

Zwierzynski and his parents. When reviewing a motion for summary

judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court: we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Harz v. Borough of

Spring Lake,  234 N.J. 317, 329 (2018). In reviewing the summary judgment

record, we must give Amboy “the benefit of the most favorable evidence and

most favorable inferences drawn from that evidence.” Gormley v. Wood-El,

 218 N.J. 72, 86 (2014); see also R. 4:46-2(c).

      In that light, we present the relevant portions of the summary judgment

record -- deposition testimony and police reports generated during the criminal

investigation of the crash.

                                       B.

      In the late afternoon of November 9, 2014, Zwierzynski, Narleski,

nineteen-year-old Xavier Pinto, and twenty-year-old Zachary Johnson drove in

Johnson’s car to Krauszers Food & Liquor Store in South Amboy to purchase

alcoholic beverages. Zwierzynski and Narleski left the car and entered the

store, where Narleski -- who sported a beard and looked older than his friends

                                       6
-- paid for three twenty-four-ounce cans of beer, a 1.75-liter bottle of vodka,

and a two-liter bottle of Sprite. The store clerk did not ask Narleski for

identification. 1 The sale of alcohol to underage adults is prohibited by law,

 N.J.S.A. 33:1-77; N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a), and the consumption of alcohol by

underage adults is prohibited as well,  N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1(b);  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15.

      The four underage friends then travelled to Zwierzynski’s house in

Sayreville, arriving at approximately 7:00 p.m. Zwierzynski lived there with

his mother, but she was not home at the time, and his father lived elsewhere.

The home was jointly owned by Zwierzynski’s father and mother, who were

separated.

      Zwierzynski brought his friends to his upstairs bedroom, where they

began drinking, playing video games, and watching television. Pinto and

Narleski each drank two to three cups of vodka. Pinto became tired , went

downstairs, and fell asleep on a couch. That evening, Narleski texted his

friend Gomes and told him to come over to Zwierzynski’s house, where they

were drinking. Gomes arrived in his 1997 Mercedes-Benz at approximately

9:00 p.m. Pinto was already laid out on the downstairs couch when Gomes

entered the house.

1
  Zwierzynski and Narleski had successfully purchased liquor at that store a
number of times before.
                                     7
       In the upstairs bedroom, Zwierzynski handed Gomes a cup. Gomes

poured himself approximately two inches of vodka and orange juice and

downed the cup. Then, Gomes poured himself another two inches of vodka

and orange juice and downed that cup. 2 The drinking occurred in the presence

of Zwierzynski.3 At some point, Narleski and Gomes decided to leave and go

to the home of a mutual friend. By the time they left, Gomes had spent about

fifty minutes at Zwierzynski’s home. According to Gomes’s testimony, at that

point, he had a “buzz” and Narleski was “fairly drunk” and “slurring his

words.”4

       Narleski got into the passenger seat of Gomes’s Mercedes without

strapping on his seat belt, and Gomes drove away. En route to their friend’s

home, Gomes sped past a vehicle on U.S. Route 9 and lost control of his

Mercedes. The car crossed multiple lanes of traffic, crashed into the

2
    Gomes also admitted to smoking marijuana earlier in the evening.
3
   Zachary Johnson told the police that he left Zwierzynski’s home about
fifteen minutes after Gomes’s arrival and did not observe Gomes consume
alcohol.
4
   Zwierzynski’s mother arrived home around 10:00 p.m. with Zwierzynski’s
infant daughter. The daughter, who lived with her mother, apparently was
staying over that evening. Zwierzynski’s mother stated in her deposition that
she did not see anyone in the house or know that Zwierzynski’s friends had
been in his room. Pinto, however, according to his deposition testimony, was
still sprawled out on the couch downstairs and did not awake until 2:00 a.m.
                                       8
roadway’s concrete center divider, and went airborne. Narleski was ejected

from the vehicle, which flipped over several times and landed on top of him.

Paramedics pronounced Narleski dead at the scene.

      A responding police officer detected the odor of alcohol emanating from

Gomes. A blood sample was taken from Gomes pursuant to a search warrant .

      The records of the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office indicate that

Gomes’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was approximately .16% at the

time of the crash -- a point that Gomes conceded. That BAC is twice the

permissible legal limit for an adult of legal drinking age. See  N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50(a) (making it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle “with a blood alcohol

concentration of 0.08% or more”). According to the report of John Brick,

PhD, an expert in neuropharmacology, at a .15% BAC, “[m]ost drinkers

display classic signs of visible intoxication”; at .10% BAC, “the relative risk

for a fatal motor vehicle accident is 82 times greater than compared with sober

controls; and at .17% [BAC], that risk is increased to 1,772 times greater as

compared with controls.” (emphasis added).

      Gomes pled guilty to second-degree vehicular homicide,  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

5. At his plea hearing, Gomes admitted that he drove under the influence of

alcohol and that his intoxicated state, along with his speeding and weaving in

                                        9
and out of traffic, caused the deadly crash. Gomes was sentenced to a seven-

year term in state prison.

                                       C.

      In granting summary judgment in favor of Zwierzynski’s parents, the

trial court explained that any duty that “parents [have] to supervise the conduct

of their children ends when” they become adults and therefore Zwierzynski’s

parents had no duty to supervise Zwierzynski.5 In the case of Zwierzynski’s

father, the court also noted that he was estranged from his wife, did not live in

the Sayreville residence, and “was not in any tangible form related with the

present action.” In finding that Zwierzynski also was entitled to summary

judgment, the court looked to  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(b), which states that a person

commits a disorderly persons offense if he “makes real property owned, leased

or managed by him available to” underage adults or minors for the purpose of

consuming alcoholic beverages. The court reasoned that Zwierzynski did not

own, lease, or manage the property and that, although he “provided his friends

with a place to consume alcohol, he did not have a duty to supervise his adult

friends during their consumption.”

5
  The trial court gave its reasons for granting summary judgment, first orally
on the record and again in a written opinion when denying a motion for
reconsideration. The recitation and quotations here are from the written
opinion.
                                        10
      The court denied Amboy’s motion for reconsideration and entered final

judgment, dismissing both the settled claims and Amboy’s third-party claims

against Zwierzynski and his parents.

                                       D.

      The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment

dismissal of Amboy’s third-party complaint. Narleski,  459 N.J. Super. at 399.

The Appellate Division held that, given the lack of evidence that

Zwierzynski’s parents knew of or consented to their son’s activities on the

evening in question, they “had no statutory or common law duty to prevent

their adult underage son from allowing his adult underage friends to drink

alcohol in their home.” Id. at 382. It also held that “no established precedent

in New Jersey” imposed on Zwierzynski a duty to prevent his underage friends

-- the ones he invited into his home -- from drinking or drinking excessively

while in his parents’ house. Id. at 382, 397. Thus, under current law, the

Appellate Division exonerated Zwierzynski from civil liability for the death of

Narleski. Ibid.

      The court, nevertheless, determined that exposing a young adult, such as

Zwierzynski, to civil liability in the circumstances of this case “would be a

logical extension of case law” and “consistent with sound public policy.” Id.

at 397-98. It refrained from doing so in this case, however, because “imposing

                                       11
upon [Zwierzynski] a novel rule of liability that he might not have reasonably

anticipated” would not be equitable. Id. at 398.

      The Appellate Division concluded by setting forth a new rule of law to

apply purely prospectively -- a new rule that was “a logical extension” of

common law precedents on social host liability and “consistent with the policy

objectives of related statutes.” Ibid. The Appellate Division held that, going

forward, “an adult such as Mark Zwierzynski who is under the legal drinking

age shall owe a common law duty to injured parties to desist from facilitating

the drinking of alcohol by underage adults in his place of residence, regardless

of whether he owns, rents, or manages the premises.” Ibid. The court deferred

the effective date of its “prospective holding for 180 days to enable possible

further judicial review or responsive legislation.” Id. at 398-99.

      We granted Zwierzynski’s petition for certification and Amboy’s cross-

petition.  239 N.J. 493-94 (2019). We also granted the motion of the New

Jersey Civil Justice Institute and American Property Casualty Insurance

Association to appear as amici curiae.

                                         12
                                         II.

                                         A.

                                         1.

      Zwierzynski argues that the Appellate Division erred in imposing a new

common law duty on underage adults to refrain from facilitating the

consumption of alcoholic beverages in their homes by other underage adults

who may foreseeably operate motor vehicles and injure third parties.6 That

new rule, he maintains, does not advance public policy and “effectively

imposes strict liability [on the underage facilitator] if a third party is injured as

the result of” alcohol consumption by an underage adult in the home.

Zwierzynski challenges the assumption that a new common law duty will deter

alcohol consumption by underage adults. Instead, he posits that such a rule

will have the untoward effect of driving underage alcoholic “get-togethers”

from a secure residence to less desirable environments, such as parks and

abandoned buildings.

6
  It may seem odd that Zwierzynski appeals from a decision that dismissed the
action against him. Nevertheless, because of his status as a party in this case,
he is the only person in a position to challenge what he claims is the erroneous
imposition of a duty on similarly situated future litigants. Zwierzynski’s
challenge is permissible because “[u]nlike the Federal Constitution, there is no
express language in New Jersey’s Constitution which confines the exercise of
our judicial power to actual cases and controversies.” Crescent Park Tenants
Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y.,  58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971).
                                        13
      Zwierzynski asserts that nothing in the penal statute referred to by the

Appellate Division,  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17, which makes it unlawful to provide

alcohol to underage drinkers under defined circumstances, suggests that the

Legislature intended to create a tort duty. He claims, moreover, that the

appellate court’s reliance on Thomas v. Romeis is misplaced because that case

upheld the principle that social host liability will attach when alcoholic

beverages are provided to a visibly intoxicated minor who injures a third party,

citing  234 N.J. Super. 364, 365-66 (App. Div. 1989), whereas here the

Appellate Division’s tort duty is triggered by the service of any alcohol to an

underage adult.

      Following the approach in Thomas, Zwierzynski alternatively argues

that if a new duty is to be imposed on underage adults, it should be limited to

barring the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated individuals.

      Finally, he submits that the Appellate Division correctly determined that

any new legal duty imposed on underage adults should be applied purely

prospectively.

                                        2.

      Amici Curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute and American Property

Casualty Insurance Association filed a joint brief that echoes many of the

themes in Zwierzynski’s arguments. Amici principally argue that the

                                        14
Appellate Division fashioned a new legal duty by imposing liability on an

underage adult social host where the host does not serve alcohol but makes his

home available for underage drinking and where an underage intoxicated adult

guest ultimately drives drunk and causes injuries. According to amici, “[t]he

Legislature indisputably has not imposed liability” on underage adults in

circumstances as presented in this case, and “the judiciary should respect the

Legislature’s policy choices.”

                                         B.

      Amboy argues that the Appellate Division erred by not applying to this

case the new duty -- the duty that an underage adult not facilitate alcohol

consumption by other underage adults by making his residence a venue for

drinking. Amboy claims that the Appellate Division’s failure to give Amboy

the benefit of that ruling is inconsistent with the court’s “clear articulation of

the duty” and its finding that the source of the duty is rooted in the common

law, legislative enactments, and public policy. Amboy further contends that

the purely prospective application of the new rule “was made without citation

to any legal authority” and conflicts with this Court’s imposition of the social

host liability rule established in Kelly v. Gwinnell,  96 N.J. 538, 548 (1984),

which was applied to the parties in that case on the basis that to “deprive the

plaintiff of any benefit resulting from her own efforts” would discourage other

                                        15
individuals from seeking to establish new common law rights that are just,

quoting id. at 551.

      According to Amboy, Zwierzynski’s conduct falls squarely within the

proscribed ambit of  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17 and within the reasoning of Dower v.

Gamba,  276 N.J. Super. 319, 326-28 (App. Div. 1994), which held that under

the Social Host Liability Act,  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(b), liability may attach to a

social host who throws a party and allows guests to serve themselves and drink

to the point of visible intoxication. In addition, Amboy asserts that the

Legislature has not fully occupied the field of social host liability and th at

courts still play a vital role in recognizing the existence of a duty in common

law negligence cases.

      Finally, Amboy argues that if the common law duty to refrain from

making one’s home available and facilitating the excessive use of alcohol does

not apply here, then the law has carved out a liability-free zone for underage

adult hosts who throw parties, permit their underage adult friends to become

intoxicated, and allow them to drive and negligently injure and kill third

parties.

                                         16
                                       III.

                                       A.

      The primary issue before the Court is whether the common law imposes

a duty on underage adults to refrain from making their homes a safe haven for

underage guests to consume alcoholic beverages and, if so, the standard for

liability if an underage guest, who becomes intoxicated, afterwards drives a

motor vehicle and injures or kills a third party. See Acuna v. Turkish,  192 N.J.
 399, 413 (2007) (“The recognition or establishment of a legal duty in tort law

is generally a matter for a court to decide.”). In construing the common law,

our standard of review is de novo. Qian v. Toll Bros. Inc.,  223 N.J. 124, 135

(2015). We therefore owe no deference to the interpretative analysis of either

the trial court or Appellate Division, unless we are persuaded by the reasoning

of those courts. See ibid.

                                       B.

      Any common law duty imposed by this Court must “satisf[y] an abiding

sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations

of public policy.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors,  132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993).

In addressing whether a new duty meets the basic fairness test and advances an

enlightened public policy, Justice Holmes’s reminder that “a page of history is

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worth a volume of logic,” N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner,