Case Title: Lewis v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 041390

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
BRANDON LAVON LEWIS 
 
v.  Record No. 041390   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  March 3, 2005 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in approving the circuit court’s denial of a defendant’s 
mistrial motion.  The defendant alleged in the motion that his 
right to a fair trial was prejudiced because the prosecutor, in 
cross-examining a witness, implied that the witness and the 
defendant had engaged in criminal activity unrelated to the 
charged offenses. 
 
Brandon Lavon Lewis was indicted by a grand jury on charges 
including murder in the commission of attempted robbery, use of 
a firearm while committing murder, and four counts of attempted 
robbery.  A jury convicted Lewis of the attempted robbery 
charges and acquitted him of the remaining charges.  The jury 
fixed his punishment at five years’ imprisonment for each of the 
four attempted robbery counts.  The circuit court sentenced 
Lewis in accordance with the jury verdict and set the sentences 
to run consecutively with each other. 
 
Lewis appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
which reversed and dismissed one of the attempted robbery 
convictions and affirmed the remaining convictions.  Lewis v. 
Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 126, 137, 596 S.E.2d 542, 547 (2004).  
As relevant to the case before us, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the circuit court did not err in refusing to 
grant a mistrial because the prosecutor’s cross-examination of 
Lewis’ alibi witness was proper impeachment and Lewis was not 
prejudiced.  Id. at 133, 596 S.E.2d at 545.  Lewis appeals. 
 
We will state the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  
Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 492, 604 S.E.2d 66, 67 
(2004); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 
836, 837 (2002).  The evidence showed that in August 2002, Luis 
Felipe Hernandez Sanchez was shot and killed during an attempted 
armed robbery at his house.  Also present were his brother, 
Reymundo Hernandez Sanchez (Reymundo), and two friends, Fernando 
Alvarado Vasquez and Reymundo Hernandez Acosta.  The three 
surviving witnesses told the police that the gunman and two 
companions had entered the house and demanded money from all the 
occupants.  Sanchez was shot and killed by one of the three 
assailants, who immediately fled from the scene. 
 
After searching the crime scene, the police brought 
Vasquez, Reymundo, and Acosta back to the police station.  All 
three men identified Tramaine “Stump” Stith from a photographic 
“lineup” as one of the men who had been in the house.  Stith 
 
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initially denied any participation in the crimes, but later 
admitted his involvement and identified Lewis and Travis Hester 
as the other two assailants.  The police later questioned 
Hester, who also admitted his involvement and identified Lewis 
as a participant in the offenses.  Lewis was arrested the next 
morning. 
 
At trial, Lewis presented an alibi defense.  He testified 
that at the time the murder and attempted robberies took place, 
he was at his grandmother’s house with two friends, El Hajj 
Jones and Jason Carol.  Lewis stated that he, Jones, and Carol 
left the house and walked down the street to Sanchez’s house 
after they observed flashing lights and ambulances nearby. 
Jones testified as an alibi witness.  On direct 
examination, he stated that he and Lewis were “good friends” and 
were “pretty tight.”  Jones confirmed that he and Lewis were at 
Lewis’ grandmother’s house when the crimes allegedly occurred. 
On cross-examination, Jones admitted that he had been 
convicted of distribution of cocaine.  The prosecutor then asked 
Jones, “Is that your connection [to Lewis]?”  Defense counsel 
objected to this last question, stating, “I hope it [does not] 
mean what I think it means.”  The circuit court overruled the 
objection and allowed the prosecutor to proceed with the 
question.  The prosecutor asked again, “Is that the connection 
with you and him?”  Jones replied, “No, it isn’t.”  The 
 
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prosecutor then repeated, “He’s not tied into that with you at 
all?”  Jones responded, “No, he isn’t.” 
Defense counsel renewed his objection on the ground that 
the prosecutor was attempting to imply that Lewis was involved 
in a “drug case.”  The circuit court again overruled the 
objection, stating that because Jones admitted that he and Lewis 
were good friends, the prosecutor could inquire about “what they 
do together.”  Defense counsel indicated to the court that he 
intended to make a motion for a mistrial, and the court directed 
counsel to “argue it later.” 
At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel argued 
the mistrial motion, asserting that the jury had been tainted by 
the prosecutor’s implication in his cross-examination of Jones 
that Lewis was involved in illegal drug-related activities.  
Defense counsel noted that the prosecutor had not introduced 
evidence regarding a motive for the attempted robberies, and 
argued that it was improper for the prosecutor to suggest such a 
motive by questioning Jones about other illegal activities.  The 
circuit court denied Lewis’ motion, ruling that the prosecutor’s 
questions legitimately explored the extent of Jones’ 
relationship with Lewis. 
Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that the 
circuit court did not err in denying the mistrial motion.  43 
Va. App. at 133, 596 S.E.2d at 545.  The Court reasoned that the 
 
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challenged line of inquiry was permissible to show bias.  Id. at 
132-33, 596 S.E.2d at 545.  The Court concluded: 
[T]he cross-examination of Jones, based on the 
relationship between him and appellant, was proper 
impeachment.  Thus, the trial court did not err in 
failing to sustain appellant’s objection to this line 
of cross-examination or in failing to grant a 
mistrial.  Additionally, as Jones denied that his 
relationship with appellant was based on the 
distribution of cocaine, we cannot find as a matter of 
law that appellant was “indelibly prejudiced.” 
 
Id. at 133, 596 S.E.2d at 545  (citation omitted). 
 
On appeal to this Court, Lewis argues that the circuit 
court erred in denying his mistrial motion.  He concedes that 
the prosecutor was entitled to ask Jones if he had been 
convicted of a felony, and the nature of any felony conviction, 
but asserts that it was improper to allow without any foundation 
questions concerning a connection between Lewis and Jones’ 
illegal activities.  Lewis also contends that this line of 
questioning prejudiced him. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the prosecutor 
did not elicit improper evidence because Jones denied that there 
was any connection between his illegal activities and Lewis.  
The Commonwealth also contends that because Jones denied any 
relationship with Lewis other than their personal friendship, 
Lewis was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s questions and the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the 
mistrial motion.  We disagree with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
 
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We review a challenge to a circuit court’s denial of a 
mistrial motion under established principles.  The decision 
whether to grant a mistrial motion is a matter submitted to the 
circuit court’s sound discretion.  Lowe v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 
268, 272, 601 S.E.2d 628, 630 (2004); Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 307, 341, 541 S.E.2d 872, 894 (2001); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 
240 Va. 26, 40, 393 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1990). 
In a criminal case, when defense counsel makes a motion for 
a mistrial based on an allegedly prejudicial remark or question 
by the prosecutor, the circuit court must make a factual 
determination whether a defendant’s right to a fair trial has 
been prejudiced, thereby requiring a new trial.  Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619 (1990); 
LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 
(1983).  This determination must be made in light of all the 
circumstances in the case, including whether the jury was given 
a cautionary instruction regarding any improper remark or 
question.  See Spencer, 204 Va. at 95, 393 S.E.2d at 619; 
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 657. 
In cases in which the jury was not given a cautionary 
instruction, such as the present case, we apply an established 
standard of review.  When a circuit court has determined that a 
defendant’s rights have not been prejudiced and has denied his 
motion for a mistrial, our appellate review is confined to an 
 
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inquiry whether the circuit court abused its discretion and, 
thus, was wrong as a matter of law.  Burns, 261 Va. at 342, 541 
S.E.2d at 895; Cheng, 240 Va. at 40, 393 S.E.2d at 607; Thomas 
v. Wingold, 206 Va. 967, 975, 147 S.E.2d 116, 122 (1966). 
In his mistrial motion, defense counsel argued that Lewis 
was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s questions, which implied that 
Lewis was involved in illegal drug-related activities without 
any factual support for that proposition.  The prosecutor 
responded that because Jones admitted his conviction for cocaine 
distribution and also stated that he and Lewis were very good 
friends, “it’s reasonable to ask him if his bias includes the 
fact that they were dealing drugs together.  We have a murder 
for money, that’s uncontradicted by anyone.  One of the most 
frequent motives for murder under those circumstances is to get 
money for drugs . . . .” 
This Court has often stated that the right to cross-examine 
a witness to show bias or motivation to falsify, when not 
abused, is absolute.  See Brown v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 460, 
464, 437 S.E.2d 563, 564-65 (1993); Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 
Va. 370, 376, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733-34 (1985); Hewitt v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 621, 623, 311 S.E.2d 112, 114 (1984); see 
also Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 78, 563 S.E.2d 748, 754 
(2002).  Although this right is broadly applied, it may not be 
employed as a device to confuse the issues before the jury or to 
 
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imply the existence of evidence that the jury is not permitted 
to consider. 
Here, by the prosecutor’s own admission, he was attempting 
to establish that Lewis was involved in illegal drug-related 
activities and, thus, was more likely to have committed the 
crimes charged in the indictments in order to obtain money to 
buy drugs.  Because on the present facts such a connection to 
the offenses being tried would have been purely speculative, the 
prosecutor’s questions amounted to nothing more than an attempt 
to elicit inadmissible evidence of other crimes that were 
unrelated to the crimes charged.  See Commonwealth v. Minor, 267 
Va. 166, 171-72, 591 S.E.2d 61, 65 (2004); Guill v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998); 
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 
805 (1970).  This questioning was an abuse of the prosecutor’s 
right of cross-examination to show bias because the prosecutor 
already had established that Lewis and Jones were close friends, 
and the questions at issue merely served to imply to the jury 
the existence of evidence of other unrelated crimes committed by 
Lewis.  See Minor, 267 Va. at 172, 591 S.E.2d at 65; Guill, 255 
Va. at 138, 495 S.E.2d at 491. 
Because the prosecutor’s conduct was improper, we next 
consider whether the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying Lewis’ mistrial motion.  This question turns on our 
 
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determination whether the record shows as a matter of law that 
Lewis’ right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s 
actions.  See Burns, 261 Va. at 342, 541 S.E.2d at 894-95; 
Spencer, 240 Va. at 95, 393 S.E.2d at 619; LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 
589, 304 S.E.2d at 657. 
We first observe that after being asked the questions at 
issue, Jones denied that his relationship with Lewis was 
connected to illegal drug-related activity.  Thus, the jury 
received evidence that Lewis was not involved with Jones in such 
illegal activities. 
We also must consider, however, the fact that the 
prosecutor repeated the improper question, although Jones had 
already answered it the first time by denying that Lewis was 
associated with him in illegal activities.  In addition, we are 
required to acknowledge that we live in a “time of widespread 
revulsion against the [illegal] use of controlled drugs.”  King 
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 912, 915, 234 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1977).  In 
light of this fact, we cannot avoid the conclusion that, as a 
matter of law, Lewis’ right to a fair trial was prejudiced by 
the prosecutor’s repeated and unfounded implication that Lewis 
was engaged in illegal activity for which he was not on trial.  
See id.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit court abused its 
discretion as a matter of law in denying Lewis’ mistrial motion, 
 
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and that the Court of Appeals erred in approving the circuit 
court’s judgment. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the part of the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment that is before us.  We will remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals for further remand to the circuit court for 
a new trial on the three remaining attempted robbery charges if 
the Commonwealth so elects. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE LACY AND JUSTICE KINSER join, 
dissenting. 
 
 
As the majority correctly notes, we review a trial court’s 
denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 341-42, 541 S.E.2d 872, 894-
95 (2001).  We may overturn the judgment of the trial court only 
if its denial of a mistrial motion was wrong as a matter of law.  
Id. at 342, 541 S.E.2d at 895. The majority's conclusion is 
based on two factors: that the line of questioning at issue was 
improper1 and that such questioning "indelibly prejudiced" Lewis' 
right to a fair trial as a matter of law. Based on the record in 
this case, I disagree with the majority opinion because I find 
that the prosecution's line of questioning was proper 
 
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impeachment under the circumstances and did not prejudice Lewis' 
right to a fair trial as a matter of law.  Therefore, I conclude 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Lewis' motion for a mistrial.  
 
The prosecutor questioned Lewis’ alibi witness, El Hajj 
Jones, about his prior conviction for selling cocaine and asked 
whether Jones’ relationship with Lewis was connected to Jones’ 
illegal activity.  Jones denied that his relationship with Lewis 
was based on the distribution of cocaine. 
Determining the truthfulness of an alibi witness is in the 
province of the jury.  See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 602, 
606, 166 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1969).  As such, “information as to 
[the alibi witness’] bias can be of great assistance in making 
such determinations.” Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 
2001) (citing United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 85 (1st Cir. 
2000)).  Bias can be defined, broadly speaking, as "the 
relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the 
witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in 
favor of or against a party.”  United States v. McNatt, 931 F.2d 
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
                                                                  
1 Lewis refers to the questions at issue as "improper 
impeachment" but did not assign error to the trial court's 
failure to strike the objectionable  question and answer. Error 
was assigned only to the trial court's denial of the mistrial. 
Nevertheless, I address the issue in light of the majority 
opinion. 
 
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In this case, the prosecutor asked whether Jones’ 
relationship with Lewis was connected to Jones’ cocaine 
distribution business.  The majority concludes that 
[t]his questioning was an abuse of the prosecutor’s 
right of cross-examination to show bias because the 
prosecutor already had established that Lewis and 
Jones were close friends, and the questions at issue 
merely served to imply to the jury the existence of 
evidence of other unrelated crimes committed by Lewis. 
 
This Court, however, has allowed cross-examination of a defense 
witness about other crimes with which the defendant may have 
been involved if such evidence is “related to the credibility of 
[the witness] and the weight which should be given [his] 
testimony.”  Adams v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 321, 326, 111 S.E.2d 
396, 399-400 (1959).  See also Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 
Va. 653, 663, 283 S.E.2d 212, 218 (1981) (the testimony of a 
witness which referred to prior unrelated crimes of the 
defendant was admissible because it bore on the witness’ 
credibility); Largin v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 318, 319, 208 
S.E.2d 775, 776 (1974) (exposing defense witness as mother of 
defendant’s illegitimate child did not have the effect of 
accusing the defendant of the misdemeanor of fornication, but 
was evidence of the witness’ bias in favor of the defendant). 
 
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See also People v. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278, 289-90 (Cal. 1990).2  
 
Jones’ testimony provided a complete alibi for Lewis.  In 
that circumstance, the trial court was not wrong, as a matter of 
law, to permit limited questioning by the prosecutor to test 
Jones for bias in the formulation of his testimony.  The trial 
court accurately observed that 
when the Defense calls a witness, that is an alibi 
witness, a convicted felony [sic], acknowledged that 
he had been convicted of selling drugs, stated that 
he’s good friends with the Defendant, I certainly 
think it’s absolutely legitimate for him, the cross-
examiner, to go into that to find out the extent of 
their relationship or bias. 
 
Are you in business together?  Do you work 
together? Do you do anything together?  What is your 
relationship?  What is your association?  And explore 
that all for bias. 
 
Thus, I conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the 
"improper impeachment" of which Lewis complains, was not 
improper. Because this impeachment evidence was not improper, 
there was no basis to grant the motion for mistrial. 
                     
2 In People v. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278, 289-90 (Cal. 1990), 
the Supreme Court of California found that a “prosecutor’s 
comments during closing argument on defendant’s drug dealing 
were not misconduct [because they were admitted] for the 
legitimate purpose of discrediting the testimony of [the 
defendant’s alibi witness].”  The alibi witness testified that 
he saw the defendant leave the victim’s house before the murder 
took place.  Id. at 290.  The Court found that “[t]he 
prosecution was attempting to show that [the alibi witness], 
defendant, and their mutual friend . . . had been involved in a 
drug-dealing operation, and that this involvement gave [the 
alibi witness] a motive to lie.”  Id.
 
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Further, the allegedly prejudicial event did not as a 
matter of law "indelibly prejudice[]" Lewis.3  The majority 
opinion does not appear to attach indelible prejudice to the 
prosecutor’s initial question: “Is that the connection with you 
and him?”  However, when the subsequent question, “He’s not tied 
into that with you at all?” is asked, the indelible prejudice 
arises. In the context of a multi-faceted trial, particularly 
where the witness’ immediate and unequivocal denial is 
uncontested, an appellate finding of indelible prejudice should 
not be axiomatic.  There should be a clear nexus to “indelible 
prejudice” which is not demonstrated in this case.  “When a 
motion for mistrial is made, based upon an allegedly prejudicial 
event, the trial court must make an initial factual 
determination, in light of all the circumstances of the case, 
whether the defendant’s rights are so ‘indelibly prejudiced’ as 
to necessitate a new trial.”  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 
78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619 (1990) (citation omitted).  Accord 
Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 102, 580 S.E.2d 834,846 
(2003). 
                     
3 As the Court of Appeals noted, Lewis may have been 
entitled to a cautionary instruction.  Lewis v. Commonwealth, 43 
Va. App. 126, 129 n.1, 596 S.E.2d 542, 544 n.1 (2004).  This 
Court has noted, however, that when a party “[makes] no request 
for a cautionary instruction, its omission does not constitute 
reversible error.”  Largin v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 318, 321, 
208 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1974).  Lewis did not request a cautionary 
instruction. 
 
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I conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion as 
a matter of law and there is insufficient ground to find 
indelible prejudice.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and 
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
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