Case Title: Joshua Garcia v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joshua GARCIA v. STATE of Arkansas

97-765                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 30, 1998


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile criminal case -- factors on review. --In
     reviewing a juvenile criminal case, the supreme court looks at
     the record in the light most favorable to the State and
     sustains the conviction if there is any substantial evidence
     to support it.

2.   Statutes -- statutory presumptions -- limitations. -- Even in
     criminal prosecutions, Congress or a state Legislature may
     with certain limitations enact that when certain facts have
     been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the
     existence of the main fact in question; the limitations are
     these: there must be some rational connection between the fact
     proved and the ultimate fact presumed; the inference of the
     existence of the ultimate fact from proof of the other fact
     must not be so unreasonable or unnatural as to be a purely
     arbitrary mandate; and the accused must not be deprived of a
     proper opportunity to present his defense to the main fact so
     presumed and have the case submitted upon all the evidence to
     the jury for its decision.

3.   Statutes -- limits of presumptions in criminal cases --
     permissive inference discussed. -- The United States Supreme
     Court, in discussing the limits of presumptions in criminal
     cases, found that the most common evidentiary device is the
     entirely permissive inference or presumption that allows, but
     does not require, the trier of fact to infer the elemental
     fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and that
     places no burden of any kind on the defendant; in that
     situation, the basic fact may constitute prima facie evidence
     of the elemental fact; when reviewing this type of device, the
     Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate its
     invalidity as applied to him; because this permissive
     presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject
     the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it
     affects the application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
     standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no
     rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by
     the inference; only in that situation is there any risk that
     an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its
     use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational fact-
     finder to make an erroneous factual determination.

4.   Statutes -- presumptions -- mandatory and permissive
     distinguished. -- A mandatory presumption instructs the jury
     that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves
     certain predicate facts; a permissive inference suggests to
     the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves
     predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that
     conclusion; if the presumption is permissive, it usually will
     not be viewed as relieving the State's burden of persuasion to
     prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; a
     permissive inference will violate due process only if the
     suggested conclusion is one that reason and common sense will
     not justify in the light of the proven facts before the jury;
     as long as the presumption is permissive, and there is a
     "rational connection" between the fact proved and the fact
     presumed, there is no merit to the accused's contention that
     the burden of coming forward was impermissibly shifted to him. 
     
4.   Constitutional law -- application of statutory presumption did
     not violate due process rights -- case affirmed. -- The
     juvenile court did not err in its finding of delinquency where
     appellant had the presumptively violative knife, which under
     Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-121 was a knife with a three-and-one-
     half-inch blade, in the front pocket of his pants, at junior
     high school, during school hours; there was a rational
     connection between appellant's carrying the knife to school
     and the intent to carry it as a weapon; appellant himself did
     not make any claim to innocuous uses; the application of the
     statutory presumption to appellant under these facts did not
     violate his due process rights. 


     Appeal from Pope Juvenile Court; Benny E. Swindell, Juvenile
Judge; affirmed.
     Young & Finley, by:  Dale W. Finley, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     On February 20, 1997, an amended delinquency petition was
filed in Pope County Chancery Court, Juvenile Division, charging
appellant Joshua Garcia with  carrying a knife as a weapon in
violation of Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-121 (Repl. 1993).  He was
fourteen at the time of the charged offense.  After a hearing on
the matter, the juvenile court entered an amended order and
adjudged Garcia delinquent.  The juvenile court concluded that
Garcia carried the three-and-one-half-inch blade with the intent to
use it as a weapon and placed him on six months' probation.
     Garcia was initially charged with carrying a knife with the
purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person in violation of
Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-120 (Supp. 1995), in addition to an unrelated
third-degree battery charge.  He pled guilty to the  5-73-120
violation, but later was allowed to withdraw his plea. The
unrelated battery charge was nolle prossed.  On February 20, 1997,
the State filed the amended petition charging Garcia under a
separate statute,  5-73-121, for having a knife three-and-one-half
inches long for use with the purpose to employ the weapon against
a person.
     At the delinquency hearing for violation of  5-73-121, Rudy
Parks, the principal of Gardner Junior High School in Russellville,
testified that on September 20, 1996, the school was having trouble
with students spraying an undisclosed substance around the school
building.  He explained that Garcia was identified as carrying a
spray can, and, as a result, he was brought to his office and
searched.  Parks testified that he found a large knife in the front
pocket of his jeans.  He also related to the court that Garcia told
him he was going to give the knife to a friend.  On cross-
examination, the principal admitted that it "could have been
possible" that the knife was recovered from Garcia's book bag.  He
further agreed that no one suggested that Garcia intended to use
the knife to injure another student.  Bryce Davenport, the school's
resource officer and a member of the Russellville Police
Department, next testified that the knifeþs blade measured three-
and-one-half inches in length.
     Garcia did not call any witnesses on his behalf, and his
attorney moved for a dismissal of the charge, arguing that the
State was required to prove that he carried the knife with the
intent to use it as a weapon and that the State's evidence failed
in this respect.  The juvenile court found as follows:
     I'm basing my finding on the basis of a knife with a
     blade three and [one] half inches or longer in his
     possession and the statute makes that fact a prima facie
     case.  And there is nothing to rebut that.
The amended order which was entered stated in part:
          The defendant is guilty of the offense as charged in
     that he had in his possession a knife having a blade
     three and one-half inches in length.  Giving effect to
     the relevant statues (sic) it appears that the knife was
     carried with the intent to use it as a weapon against a
     person.
     Garcia now claims on appeal that the juvenile court erred in
not requiring proof of intent to possess the knife as a weapon.  He
points out that the amended delinquency petition asserted that he
violated Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-121 (Repl. 1993).  Section 5-73-121
reads in relevant part:
          (a) A person who carries a knife as a weapon, except
     when upon a journey or upon his own premises, shall be
     punished as provided by  5-73-121(b).
          (b) If a person carries a knife with a blade three
     and one-half inches (3«") long or longer, this fact shall
     be prima facie proof that the knife is carried as a
     weapon.
Id.
     Violation of  5-73-121 is punishable by a fine of not less
than $50 nor more than $200 or by imprisonment in the county jail
for not less than thirty days nor more than three months, or by
both a fine and imprisonment.  Ark. Code Ann.  5-73-123(b) (Repl.
1993).  Section 5-73-121, which has not been amended, was enacted
in 1961 under the following title: "AN ACT to Prohibit Carrying a
Knife as a Weapon and to Create a Presumption That a Person
Carrying a Knife With a Blade Three and a Half Inches (31/2") Long
or Longer Is Carrying It as a Weapon."  1961 Ark. Acts 457. 
     Since its enactment, this court has had few occasions to
discuss the application of  5-73-121.  In Rowland v. State, 255
Ark. 215, 499 S.W.2d 623 (1973), we recognized that conduct falling
under the former  5-73-121 was a separate crime from conduct
proscribed under the former  5-73-120.  In Smith v. State, 241
Ark. 958,