Case Title: STENBURG v NEEL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 79-94 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 ANDREW J. STENBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS . TODD WILLIAM NEEL, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula. Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Goldman and Goldman, Missoula, Montana Jon Oldenburg argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Candace Fetcher argued and Gary Graham argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: May 29, 1980 Decided: July 14, 1980 J()L 14 19% M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f brought t h i s a c t i o n t o recover damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s sustained i n an automobile accident. P l a i n t i f f appeals from a judgment on jury v e r d i c t and t h e d e n i a l of a motion f o r a new t r i a l . This a c t i o n arose o u t of an April 1 4 , 1975, t r a f f i c accident a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of North Orange S t r e e t and W e s t Broadway i n Missoula, Montana. Stenberg, t h e p l a i n t i f f and a p p e l l a n t , was a policeman operating a p o l i c e p a t r o l c a r a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident. P r i o r t o t h e accident Stenberg had been w r i t i n g a park- i n g t i c k e t a t a l o c a t i o n south of where t h e c o l l i s i o n occurred. A t t h a t t i m e he received a c a l l informing him of a disturbance a t a l o c a l secondhand s t o r e . During t r i a l t h e p l a i n t i f f described what happened next, a s follows: "When I received t h e c a l l , I l e f t t h e a r e a of Second and Hickory and I turned on m y p u r s u i t l i g h t s and m y overhead l i g h t s and m y s i r e n . I turned northbound on Orange S t r e e t o f f of Second S t r e e t and proceeded across t h e bridge. The t r a f f i c w a s q u i t e heavy during t h e lunch hour and I was p r e t t y much i n t h e flow of t r a f f i c going across t h e bridge. I g o t t o t h e north end of t h e Orange S t r e e t bridge and t h e t r a f f i c was heavy a t a l l t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n s and on the s t r e e t s , s o I had t o go on across t h e c e n t e r l i n e t o g e t i n t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . I entered t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , t h e l i g h t was red b u t a l l t h e v e h i c l e s w e r e stopped. I g o t about half-way through t h e next block, t r a f f i c was stopped a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and again I had t o go t o t h e l e f t because of t h e c a r s t h a t w e r e stopped. A t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n I entered t h e i n t e r - s e c t i o n and t h a t ' s when 1 was involved i n t h e accident." N e e l , t h e defendant, was d r i v i n g h i s automobile e a s t on Broadway when t h e accident occurred. H e had the green l i g h t i n h i s favor. H i s testimony i n d i c a t e s t h a t he d i d not hear t h e s i r e n o r see t h e emergency l i g h t s on t h e p a t r o l c a r . Other eyewitnesses gave c o n f l i c t i n g testimony a s t o t h e a u d i b i l i t y and v i s i b i l i t y of t h e p a t r o l c a r ' s emergency equipment. A s t h e N e e 1 automobile entered t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n it was h i t midway on t h e passenger s i d e by t h e f r o n t of t h e p a t r o l c a r . A s a r e s u l t o f t h e accident Stenberg s u f f e r e d a pinched nerve i n t h e neck. This has r e s u l t e d i n severe, i n c a p a c i t a t i n g , i n t e r m i t t e n t pain. Stenberg brought t h i s s u i t t o recover h i s damages a r i s i n g from t h e accident. The jury returned a v e r d i c t i n defendant's favor . Stenberg raises f o u r i s s u e s on appeal: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on t h e standard of c a r e applicable t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury t o apply t h e law of contributory negligence r a t h e r than t h e law of comparative negligence? 3 . Whether the D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n refusing t o give two of p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s ? 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n not granting t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l ? Stenberg contends t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by giving c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 which i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o standard of c a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o both p a r t i e s . This i n s t r u c t i o n reads : "The l e g a l standard of c a r e governing t h e conduct of motor v e h i c l e operators i s unvarying, and rests a l i k e upon a l l d r i v e r s a t a l l t i m e s . The standard of c a r e is t h e conduct of an o r d i n a r i l y prudent ---- -- person i n t h e same o r s i m i l a r circumstances; i n ---- o t h e r words, ordinary care. Ordinary c a r e , a s t h e t e r m is used i n t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s means t h a t degree of c a r e which a reasonable prudent person would use -- - - - - o r e x e r c i s e unaer t h e same o r s i m i l a r circumstances, - --- i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e same o r s i m i l a r matters t o avoid i n j u r y , and it implies the use of such c a r e a s i s f a i r l y commensurate with t h e danger t o be avoided when measured by t h e standards of common prudence and experience. "And, generally speaking, negligence is, t h e r e f o r e , t h e want of ordinary care, t h e f a i l u r e t o do what - - -- a reasonable and prudent person would o r d i n a r i l y have done under - t h e circumstances of t h e s i t u a t i o n , -- o r t h e doing what such a person under t h e e x i s t i n g circumstances would n o t have done. "Negligence may a l s o c o n s i s t i n t h e doing of some a c t which t h e law f o r b i d s , o r i n t h e f a i l u r e t o do t h a t which t h e law commands. " I n t h i s a c t i o n any negligence is of no consequence unless it was a proximate cause of t h e i n j u r i e s and damages complained by t h e p l a i n t i f f ." (Emphasis added. ) Stenberg contends t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was i n c o r r e c t , because of c e r t a i n language which appears i n s e c t i o n 61-8-107, MCA. This s t a t u t e g r a n t s c e r t a i n p r i v i l e g e s t o t h e o p e r a t o r s of authorized emergency vehicles. Section 61-8-107, MCA, w a s set f o r t h i n s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t i n t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 16. The i n s t r u c t i o n reads i n p a r t : " ( b ) The d r i v e r of an authorized emergency v e h i c l e may : "1. Park o r stand, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e provisions of t h i s a c t ; " 2 . Proceed p a s t a red o r s t o p s i g n a l o r s t o p s i g n , b u t only a f t e r slowing down a s may be necessary f o r s a f e operation; " 3 . Exceed t h e speed l i m i t s s o long a s he does n o t endanger l i f e o r property; " 4 . Disregard regulations governing d i r e c t i o n of movement o r turning i n s p e c i f i e d d i r e c t i o n s . " ( c ) The exemptions herein granted t o an authorized emergency v e h i c l e s h a l l apply only when such v e h i c l e i s making use of audible and v i s u a l s i g n a l s meeting t h e requirements of 532-21-132, except t h a t an authorized emergency v e h i c l e operated a s a p o l i c e v e h i c l e need n o t be equipped with o r d i s p l a y a red l i g h t v i s i b l e from i n f r o n t of t h e vehicle. " ( d ) The foregoing provisions s h a l l not r e l i e v e t h e d r i v e r of an authorized emergency v e h i c l e from t h e -- duty t o d r i v e with -- due regard f o r t h e s a f e t y of a l l Persons, nor s h a l l such provisions p r o t e c t t h e d r i v e r from. t h e consequences- of h i s r e c k l e s s d i s - regard f o r t h e s a f e t y of o t h e r s . " (Emphasis added.) Stenberg contends t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e l i e v e s t h e d r i v e r of an authorized emergency v e h i c l e from t h e duty of e x e r c i s i n g ordinary c a r e , and, i n s t e a d , imposes a lesser duty. Therefore, Stenberg argues, i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r , because it imposes a duty of ordinary c a r e upon both p a r t i e s . Section 61-8-107, MCA, has n o t been construed by t h i s Court. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have, however, had occasion t o construe and apply n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l s t a t u t e s . Schatz v. C u t l e r (D. V t 1 9 7 5 ) , 395 F.Supp. 271. Shawnee T.P. F i r e D i s t . No. 1 v. Morgan (1977), 2 2 1 Kan. 271, 559 P.2d 1 1 4 1 . I n Shawnee t h e c o u r t was faced with a f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n very much l i k e t h a t presented by t h e i n s t a n t case. The c o u r t had t o determine t h e duty imposed by a Kansas s t a t u t e which is i d e n t i c a l t o s e c t i o n 61-8-107(4), MCA, i n a l l m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t s . The c o u r t s a i d : "Even though t h e use o f t h e word ' r e c k l e s s ' suggests an element of wantonness, w e b e l i e v e --- it w a s t h e i n t e n t of -- t h e l e g i s l a t u r e to charge - t h e d r i v e r of an emergency v e h i c l e with due c a r e under t h e e x s t - - --- i n g f a c t s and circumstances. The f a c t s and circumstances include t h e p r i v i l e g e s and immunities granted by s t a t u t e . The test f o r due c a r e ( o r due regard a s ----- used i n t h e s t a t u t e ) , - a s applied -- t o t h e d r i v e r of an emergency v e h i c l e , i s whether with t h e p r i v i l e g e s - -- and immunities p r o v i d e d b y s t a t u t e he acted a s a -- reasonably c a r e f u l driver." 559 P.2d a t 1 1 4 7 . - (Emphasis added.) W e agree. The d r i v e r of an authorized emergency v e h i c l e is charged with a duty of due c a r e under t h e circumstances, and t h e circumstances include t h e p r i v i l e g e s granted by s e c t i o n 61-8-107(2), MCA. In t h e present case, i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 s t a t e d , i n essence, t h a t a l l d r i v e r s must use ordinary c a r e under t h e circumstances. I n s t r u c t i o n no. 16 gave t h e p r i v i l e g e s provided t o Stenberg under t h e terms of s e c t i o n 61-8-107. Consequently, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s c o r r e c t l y presented t h e law t o t h e jury. The s t a t u t e may w e l l have been intended t o p r o t e c t t h e d r i v e r of an emergency vehicle, b u t it does -5- not r e l i e v e him of exercising ordinary care. N o e r r o r was committed by giving i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15. Stenberg next contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury t o apply t h e law of contributory negligence r a t h e r than t h e law of comparative negligence. Section 27-1-702, MCA, sets f o r t h Montana's law of comparative negligence. The e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h i s s t a t u t e was J u l y 1, 1975, although it was passed by the l e g i s l a t u r e on March 17, 1975. Section 1-2-201(1), MCA, provides t h a t "Every s t a t u t e , unless a d i f f e r e n t time is prescribed t h e r e i n , takes e f f e c t on t h e f i r s t day of J u l y following i t s passage and approval." A d i f f e r e n t t i m e is n o t prescribed by s e c t i o n 27-1-702, MCA. I n Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), L 3 g.3 169 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d M , t h i s Court affirmed a D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s g r a n t of summary judgment i n defendant's favor. The holding was based on t h e defendant's lack of duty t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . This Court went on, however, t o consider whether t h e new comparative negligence s t a t u t e was t o be r e t r o a c t i v e l y applied. This Court s a i d : "The o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granting summary judqment i s affirmed, a s is t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t t h e Montana comparative negligence l a w Section 58-607.1. R.C.M. 1947 [now 527-1-702, - - - . . .- - - - - ~. m] , s h a l l not apply - - - - t o a cause of a c t i o n a r i s i n g p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1975." 169 Mont. a t 475-76. - - - - - (Emphasis added. ) These observations from t h e Dunham case c o n t r o l t h e present case. The D i s t r i c t Court d i d not e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury t o apply t h e law of contributory negligence r a t h e r than t h e law of comparative negligence. Stenberg next contends t h a t t h e t r i a l court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g r a n t p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 12. This i n s t r u c t i o n read, "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t when i n t e r p r e t i n g -6- s t a t u t e s p a r t i c u l a r expressions q u a l i f y those which are general." This was taken from s e c t i o n 1-3-225, MCA. According t o p l a i n t i f f ' s contention, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was necessary i n order t h a t t h e jury could properly i n t e r p r e t t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 1 6 and no. 18, which were both taken from two o t h e r Montana s t a t u t e s . Section 26-1-201, MCA, s t a t e s t h a t a l l questions of l a w , including t h e construction of s t a t u t e s , are t o be decided by t h e court. Section 26-1-202, MCA, s t a t e s t h a t questions of f a c t a r e t o be decided by t h e jury, where t h e t r i a l is by jury. Consequently, it was not t h e j u r y ' s function t o i n t e r p r e t any s t a t u t e s , and it was n o t e r r o r t o r e f u s e p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 12. Stenberg a l s o contends t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g r a n t p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 22. This proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e d : "You are i n s t r u c t e d i f you f i n d f o r t h e P l a i n t i f f ----- on t h e question of l i a b i l i t y you may then consider -- what damages, i f a n y , t h e P l a i n t i f f has sustained i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e enjoyment of hobbies; t o what e x t e n t , i f any h i s s a i d i n j u r i e s disabled t h e P l a i n t i f f and prevented him from engaging i n h i s usual hobbies such as f i s h i n g , playing b a s e b a l l , hunting, and any o t h e r r e c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . " (Emphasis added. ) The f a i l u r e t o give t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . "Reversible e r r o r is e r r o r m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e aggrieved party. Rule 1 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P," Ehni v. N.P. and White Pine Co. (1969), 152 Mont. 373, 381, 450 P.2d 882. I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e jury found i n favor of t h e defendant. The jury d i d not reach t h e i s s u e of damages. Consequently, no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r can be predicated on damage i n s t r u c t i o n s . Stenberg's f i n a l contention is t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i s s u e s which have been discussed above, Stenberg a l l e g e d i n h i s motion f o r new t r i a l t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f - i c i e n t evidence t o support a determination by t h e jury t h a t he was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent. Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P. permits t h e t r i a l judge t o order a new t r i a l pursuant t o motion. This is a matter within t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n i f t h e r e is an i n s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence t o support a jury v e r d i c t . Campeau v. Lewis (1965), 1 4 4 Mont. 543, 547, 398 P.2d 960. However, a new t r i a l may not be granted by t h e t r i a l c o u r t when t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t . "The c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is exhausted when it f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e v e r d i c t . " Hinton v. Peterson (1946), 118 Mont. 574, 578, 169 P.2d 3 3 3 . I n t h e p r e s e n t case, various witnesses estimated t h a t Stenberg ' s speed immediately p r i o r t o t h e accident w a s between 25 m i l e s per hour and 50 miles per hour. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was busy, t h a t Stenberg had t o d r i v e t h e p o l i c e c a r a c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e t o g e t i n t o t h e i n t e r - s e c t i o n , and t h a t Stenberg entered t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a g a i n s t a red l i g h t . While t h e s e a c t i o n s a r e authorized f o r d r i v e r s of authorized emergency v e h i c l e s by s e c t i o n 61-8-107, MCA, Stenberg was still required t o e x e r c i s e ". . . due regard f o r t h e s a f e t y of a l l persons . . ." There was s u f f i c i e n t evidence from which a jury could f i n d t h a t Stenberg f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e t h e required standard of c a r e . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l . Af f irmed. Chief J u s t i c e We Concur: Justices