Case Title: STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, a Texas corporation V. SAMUEL J. TILDEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0208

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, a Texas corporation V. SAMUEL J. TILDEN2008 WY 46181 P.3d 94Case Number: S-07-0208Decided: 04/16/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
STEWART 
TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, a Texas 
corporation,Appellant(Defendant),v.SAMUEL J. 
TILDEN,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Andrea 
L. Richard and Erika M. Nash of The Richard Law Firm, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Richard.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jessica 
Rutzick of Jessica Rutzick Attorney at Law, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming; and John R. 
Vincent of Vincent Law Office, Riverton, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Rutzick.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J.; HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ; and PERRY, 
DJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On its third trip 
to this Court in this same case, Stewart Title Guaranty Company (Stewart Title) 
appeals the district court's award of statutory attorney's fees and interest to 
Samuel J. Tilden (Tilden).  The 
underlying claim, based upon a land title defect, has ventured through 
arbitration, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, and 
the Fifth Judicial District Court of the State of Wyoming.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law in concluding that the filing deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) did 
not apply to Tilden's application for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
26-15-124(c)?

 
 
2.   Whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law in concluding that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar an award of 
attorney's fees to Tilden?

 
 
3.   Whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law in including in the award of attorney's fees contingent fees 
that have not been paid?

 
 
4.   Whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law in including in the award of attorney's fees amounts billed in 
violation of Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(g)?

 
 
5.   Whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law in including in the award of attorney's fees prejudgment 
interest on those fees?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The essential 
facts of this dispute have been detailed in our previous opinions and will not 
be repeated here.  In Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. 
Tilden, 2003 WY 31, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 739, 742 (Wyo. 2003) (Stewart Title I), we held that the 
doctrine of mootness prohibits a district court from entering a judgment 
confirming an arbitration award when that award has already been satisfied.  In Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. 
Tilden, 2005 WY 53, ¶¶ 7, 20, 21, 27, 110 P.3d 865, 870, 873, 874 (Wyo. 
2005) (Stewart Title II), we 
converted the appeal of a non-appealable interlocutory partial summary judgment 
order to a petition for writ of review, and then held in pertinent part that (1) 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) (LexisNexis 2007) created a private right of action in 
Tilden against Stewart Title under these circumstances; and (2) partial summary 
judgment against Stewart Title on the issue of its unreasonable refusal to pay 
damages or cure Tilden's claim was appropriate because that determination had 
already been made by the arbitrator.1  The case was remanded to the district 
court for determination of the amount of statutory attorney's fees.  The present case, Stewart Title III, arises out of that 
remand.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the filing 
deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) did not apply to Tilden's application for 
attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-15-124(c)?

 
 
[¶4]      On April 5, 2004, 
the district court entered its Order Granting [Tilden's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  That Order directed that 
Tilden "shall submit an application for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-15-124(c) and serve the same upon [Stewart Title]."  On April 19, 2004, Tilden's attorney 
sent the application to the district court via overnight express mail.  It was received the following morning by 
the district judge's administrative assistant, who apparently placed it upon the 
judge's desk instead of filing it.  
Upon inquiry by Tilden's attorney on April 29, 2004, the application was 
located and filed.

 
 
[¶5]      On April 30, 
2004, Stewart Title filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Application for 
Attorney's Fees as Untimely.  It 
appears that this motion was not heard at that time because of Stewart Title's 
nearly concurrent appeal from the summary judgment order.  After the opinion in Stewart Title II was published, Stewart 
Title renewed the motion to strike.  The motion was heard on March 8, 2007, as 
part of the hearing on the substantive issues.  The motion was decided in favor of Tilden 
in the district court's decision letter filed April 26, 2007, and judgment filed 
June 11, 2007.  The present appeal 
followed.

 
 
[¶6]      Stewart Title 
contends that Tilden's attorney fee application was untimely under W.R.C.P. 
54(d)(2)(A) and (B), which provide as follows:

 
 
(A)     When allowed by law, 
claims for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made by 
motion unless the substantive law governing the action provides for the recovery 
of such fees as an element of damages to be proven at 
trial.

 
 
(B)     Unless otherwise 
provided by statute or order of the court, the motion must be filed and served 
no later than 14 days after entry of judgment; must specify the judgment and the 
statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving party to the award; and 
must state the amount or provide a fair estimate of the amount sought.  If directed by the court, the motion 
shall also disclose the terms of any agreement with respect to fees to be paid 
for the services for which claim is made.

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court ruled that, because attorney's fees are an element of damages to be proven 
at trial under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c), Subsection (A), rather than 
Subsection (B), of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) applies in this case, meaning that there 
was no 14-day filing deadline that Tilden missed.  That determination, which involves the 
construction of a court rule, is a question of law that we review de novo.  Andersen v. Hernandez, 2005 WY 142, ¶ 7, 
122 P.3d 950, 951 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶8]      We have little to 
add in affirming the rationale and conclusion of the district court.  The unambiguous language of W.R.C.P. 
54(d)(2) does not place a 14-day filing deadline upon an application for fees in 
a case where the cause of action is for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-15-124(c).  The court rule 
clearly contemplates the filing of a motion for attorney's fees in situations 
where judgment has been rendered on a separate substantive cause of action, with 
attorney's fees being awarded as an adjunct to that judgment.  In the instant case, the only reason any 
additional filing was required was that a partial summary judgment had been 
granted, resolving the fact that statutory attorney's fees were due, but not 
establishing the amount thereof.  In 
short, there is no reason to require the filing of a motion for attorney's fees 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c).

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the doctrine of 
res judicata does not bar an award of attorney's fees to 
Tilden?

 
 
[¶9]      Stewart Title 
contends that Tilden's present claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, based upon the following 
language contained in the arbitrator's Interim Order:

 
 
2.    Mr. Tilden's claim for 
attorneys fees is denied.  As stated 
at the August 1, 2000 hearing, an award of attorneys fees is outside the scope 
of the arbitrator's powers under paragraph 14 of the policy and rule 42 of the 
Title Insurance Arbitration Rules.   
These provisions, construed together, provide that the arbitrator may 
award attorneys fees only if the laws of the state where the property is located 
permit a court to award attorneys fees to a prevailing party.  Wyoming law does not permit such an award, 
either in court proceedings or in an arbitration.  Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124 is not a 
"prevailing party" type of fee shifting statute, since it permits an award of 
fees to only one party, the insured.

 
 
[¶10]   "Res judicata bars the relitigation 
of previously litigated claims or causes of action."  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2007 WY 10, ¶ 22, 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Eklund v. PRI Envtl., Inc., 2001 WY 55, 
¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, 517 (Wyo. 2001)) (emphasis in original).  Application of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law that 
we review de novo.  Wilson, 2007 WY 55, ¶ 23, 25 P.3d  at 
662.

 
 
[¶11]   Stewart Title argues that the 
language quoted from the Interim Order effectively denied Tilden's claim for 
attorney's fees.  The district court 
disagreed, finding instead that the arbitrator denied the attorney's fees claim 
on the ground that he had no authority to decide it.  Specifically, the arbitrator held that an 
award of attorney's fees was outside the scope of his powers, both under the 
title insurance policy and under the insurance arbitration rules governing the 
proceedings.  The key to the 
arbitrator's holding was that an insurance arbitrator may consider attorney's 
fees under a state statute that allows recovery of such fees by the prevailing 
party, but not under a statute such as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124, which 
creates a right of recovery in only one party, the 
insured.

 
 
[¶12]   The language and intent of the 
Interim Order could hardly be more clear.  The arbitrator did not address and decide 
Tilden's claim for statutory attorney's fees, and therefore, the issue is not 
now barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  Had there been any 
residual doubt about that intent, the Final Award of Arbitrator again rejected 
Tilden's attempt to have the arbitrator address the attorney's fees claim.  The arbitrator concluded that no Wyoming 
precedent existed similar to the case relied upon by Tilden, Hedgecock v. Stewart Title Guaranty 
Company, 676 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), wherein the court, 
seemingly as a matter of policy, held that an insurer who "guessed wrong" as to 
its duty to defend an insured, should be liable for the insured's attorney's 
fees in the resultant declaratory judgment action.2

 
 
[¶13]   The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of 
claims that were litigated or could have been litigated in another 
proceeding.  Cermak v. Great West Cas. Co., 2 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Wyo. 2000).  Its 
purpose is to avoid piecemeal litigation.  
Martinez v. State, 2007 WY 164, ¶ 18, 169 P.3d 89, 93 (Wyo. 2007).  That purpose is 
hardly fulfilled by giving a litigant no opportunity to present a 
claim.  We affirm the district 
court's conclusion that Tilden's statutory attorney's fees claim was not 
litigated in the arbitration, and that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar its litigation 
in the instant proceeding.

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law in including in the award of 
attorney's fees contingent fees that have not been 
paid?

 
 
[¶14]   It is nearly impossible to make 
sense of, or even to identify, Stewart Title's grievance in regard to this 
issue.  From the wording of the 
issue, one might suspect that Stewart Title contends that attorney's fees cannot 
be recovered under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) if they are based upon a 
contingent fee agreement.  Yet, in 
its brief, Stewart Title does not even mention the existence or effect of 
contingent fees.  Instead, Stewart 
Title cites Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 561 (Wyo. 1998), for the proposition that, to be a 
"prevailing party" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) (LexisNexis 2007) and W.R.C.P. 54(d), one must improve 
his or her position in the litigation.3  Stewart Title then argues that fees 
should be reduced to account for "limited success achieved in the 
litigation."

 
 
[¶15]   Aside from the fact that this 
argument has nothing to do with contingent fees, neither does it have anything 
to do with the cause of action for statutory attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 26-15-124(c).  Perhaps we 
should not say that it has nothing to do with that statute 
because, whether ordered as fees and costs under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-14-126(b) and W.R.C.P. 54(d), or ordered as statutory attorney's fees 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c), attorney's fees must be proven to be 
reasonable.  Murphy v. Holman, 945 P.2d 1193, 1196 
(Wyo. 1997); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 835 (Wyo. 1994).  In either case, the results obtained 
should be considered by the court in granting or denying 
fees.

 
 
[¶16]   We could simply affirm the district 
court on this issue for lack of cogent argument or citation to pertinent 
authority in Stewart Title's brief.  
In the interest of thoroughness, however, we perused the record to be 
sure we were not "missing the point."  
This is what we found:  On 
March 2, 2007, Tilden filed a supplemental application for attorney's fees. 
 Detailed billing statements from 
each attorney who represented him throughout the arbitration and court 
proceedings, plus a computation of interest on the amounts billed, were attached 
to the application as exhibits.  The 
total amount of attorney's fees and costs billed was $174,419.72, with interest 
thereon calculated at $80,417.49, for a total of $254,837.21.  Although he gave no specifics in regard 
to amounts, Tilden testified at the hearing that he did have a contingent fee 
agreement with one of his attorneys, who had yet to be paid any fees, and that 
after the spring of 2001, all three of his attorneys had billed him on a 
contingent basis.4

 
 
[¶17]   Whether or not attorney's fees are 
"fixed" or "contingent" is one factor a district court is to consider in 
determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees under the federal "lodestar" 
test that we have adopted.  Burd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
&  Comp. Div., 2004 WY 108, 
¶ 25, 97 P.3d 802, 808-09 (Wyo. 2004); Shrader, 882 P.2d  at 835.  It is notable that, in its decision 
letter in the instant case, the district court listed and considered the 
required lodestar factors, including the contingent nature of some of the fees. 
 No error, of law or otherwise, was 
committed.5

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law in including in the award of 
attorney's fees amounts billed in violation of Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 
8.4(g)?

 
 
 
 
[¶18]   Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 provides 
in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
(g)  knowingly employ or continue to employ 
or contract with any person in the practice of law who has been disbarred or is 
under suspension from the practice of law by any jurisdiction, or is on 
disability inactive status by any jurisdiction.  The prohibition of this rule extends to 
the employment of or contracting for the services of such disbarred or suspended 
person in any position or capacity (including but not limited to as an employee, 
independent contractor, paralegal, secretary, investigator or consultant) which 
is directly or indirectly related to the practice of law as defined by Rule 
11(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Wyoming Providing for the 
Organization and Government of the Bar Association and Attorneys at Law of the 
State of Wyoming, whether or not compensation is paid.

 
 
[¶19]   Stewart Title contends that one of 
Tilden's lawyers violated this rule by hiring and charging Tilden for the 
services of a certain paralegal.  We 
will not further consider this issue, and will summarily affirm the district 
court's rejection of Stewart Title's objection to inclusion in the attorney's 
fees award of amounts paid to the paralegal.  We do so for several reasons.  First, in Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 2000), a case involving the same attorney and the same paralegal, 
we declined to deduct from an attorney's fees award amounts paid to the 
paralegal, determining that the status of the paralegal was more properly a 
matter for the Wyoming State Bar and that "[t]he issue concerning the correct 
interpretation of the disciplinary rule is not before this Court."  Second, if we were to consider the issue 
on its merits, we would note that the only evidence in the record is the 
testimony of the attorney employing the paralegal that the paralegal has neither 
been disbarred nor suspended from the practice of law in another 
jurisdiction.  Third, the appellant, 
in failing to file the designation of record required by W.R.A.P. 3.05(b), also 
failed to include in the record the paralegal's California State Bar records, 
which were introduced into evidence at the district court hearing, leaving us 
only to assume that nothing in those records should have led the district court 
to make a different determination.  Smith v. Smith, 2003 WY 87, ¶ 15, 72 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Wyo. 2003) (absence of record to refute district court's 
findings left this Court with no choice but to sustain them); Orcutt v. Shober Invs., Inc., 2003 WY 
60, ¶ 10, 69 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo. 2003) (trial court decisions assumed to be in 
accord with law when no record designated to show 
otherwise).

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law in including in the award of 
attorney's fees prejudgment interest on those 
fees?

 
 
[¶20]   The district court awarded Tilden 
$174,419.72 for attorney's fees and costs, plus $65,987.36 for prejudgment 
interest thereon, for a total judgment of $240,407.08.  Stewart Title appeals the award of 
interest on two grounds.  First, 
Stewart Title contends that the arbitrator denied Tilden's request for 
attorney's fees and Tilden did not appeal from that ruling.  Second, Stewart Title argues that 
prejudgment interest is only recoverable upon liquidated claims, and that the 
amount of Tilden's claim for attorney's fees was not capable of determination 
until judgment was entered.

 
 
[¶21]   Stewart Title's brief addresses 
standards of review in a separate section, rather than in relation to each 
issue, so it is difficult to determine whether Stewart Title believes this issue 
should be reviewed de novo or for an 
abuse of discretion.  Tilden cites 
two federal cases for the rule that the award of prejudgment interest is 
discretionary, with that discretion to be informed, in part, by the court's 
assessment of "the equities."  See Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 1554 (10th Cir. 1992)).  It is our conclusion that the question 
of whether a judge is entitled to award prejudgment interest upon an award of 
attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) is a question of law that 
we review de novo, while the question 
of whether interest should be awarded is discretionary, with that determination 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

 
 
[¶22]   We will begin this discussion by 
quoting the pertinent language of the statute:

 
 
[A]ny 
court in which judgment is rendered for a claimant may also award a reasonable 
sum as an attorney's fee and interest at ten percent (10%) per 
year.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 26-15-124(c).  Use of the 
word "may" suggests that the award of both attorney's fees and the award of 
interest are discretionary.  
See State ex rel. Dep't of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶ 17, 18 P.3d 1182, 
1187 (Wyo. 2001); Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999); In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1373 
(Wyo. 
1990).  That conclusion leads to the 
further conclusion that the "interest" mentioned in the statute is prejudgment 
interest, rather than interest on the judgment, because post-judgment interest 
at 10%, being mandated by law, is not discretionary.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102(a) (LexisNexis 
2007); Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Wyo. 1976).

 
 
[¶23]   These observations, unfortunately, 
do not fully answer the question before us because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-15-124(c) does not clearly indicate whether such prejudgment interest is 
available only upon the underlying claim or loss that the insurer refused to 
pay, or also upon the attorney's fees incurred both in vindicating that claim 
and in pursuing the attorney's fee claim under the statute.  Because the statute is ambiguous, we 
must determine its intent by applying the standard rules of statutory 
construction, pertinent portions thereof having recently been set forth in Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 162-63 (Wyo. 2005):

 
 
"This 
court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature's intent. . . 
.  We begin by making an inquiry 
relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection. . . .  
We give effect to every word, clause, and sentence and construe together 
all components of a statute in pari 
materia. . . .  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law. . . .  
We review questions of law de novo without affording deference to the 
district court's decision."

 
 

Worcester v. 
State, 2001 
WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 2001).  
If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we simply give effect to its plain 
meaning. . . .  Only when we find a 
statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of statutory 
construction. . . .  An ambiguous 
statute is one whose meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible to more than 
one interpretation. . . .

 
 
"It is a 
basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine 
legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what 
the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects 
and purposes to be accomplished. . . .  
Furthermore, when we are confronted with two possible but conflicting 
conclusions, we will choose the one most logically designed to cure the mischief 
or inequity that the legislature was attempting to 
accomplish."

 
 

In re 
Collicott, 2001 
WY 35, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶24]   To reiterate, the specific question 
is whether the legislature intended to give the district courts discretion to 
award prejudgment interest upon an award of attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 26-15-124(c).  In gleaning 
this intent from the words of the statute, we return to what we previously have 
said as to the policy and purpose behind it:

 
 
            
First, we are in disagreement with State Surety's contention that this is 
a penal statute which requires narrow construction.  The policy behind this statute is not to 
penalize insurance companies but to encourage claim [settlements] and to chill 
any tendencies upon the part of insurance companies to unreasonably reject 
claims.  See, e.g., Heis v. Allstate Insurance Company, 248 
Or. 636, 436 P.2d 550, 553 (1968).  
It has been held that such statutes are compensatory, not penal in 
nature.  Hagey v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. 
Co., 169 Or. 132, 127 P.2d 346, 347 (1942); Wolf v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident 
Ass'n, 188 Kan. 694, 366 P.2d 219, 226 (1961).  In Schweigert v. Beneficial Standard Life 
Insurance Co., 204 Or. 294, 282 P.2d 621, 626-627 (1955), it is said that 
the purpose of such statutes is to "protect an insured who has suffered a loss 
from annoying and expensive litigation . . ."  But even a narrow construction of § 
26-15-126, supra, would not help State Surety.

 
 

State 
Sur. Co. v. Lamb Constr. Co., 625 P.2d 184, 188 (Wyo. 1981).  See also Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc'y, 614 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1980) ("These statutes seek to prevent 
insurance benefits from unjustly being consumed by litigation costs and are 
designed to make the beneficiary whole").

 
 
[¶25]   Before we address the substantive 
issue of this award of prejudgment interest, we must first briefly discuss 
Stewart Title's contention that Tilden waived his interest argument by not 
appealing the arbitrator's denial of attorney's fees.  In large part, this issue was resolved 
against Stewart Title when we rejected the argument that Tilden's claim was 
barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  See supra ¶ 13.  The arbitrator did not decide and deny 
Tilden's right to attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c).  To the contrary, the arbitrator declined 
to decide the attorney's fees issue because he concluded that he lacked the 
jurisdiction to make such a determination under applicable arbitration rules, 
and there was no "prevailing party" statute for him to apply.  No appeal of those twin decisions would 
be required before Tilden could pursue this statutory 
action.

 
 
[¶26]   Prejudgment interest is an accepted 
form of relief in Wyoming, where the claim is "liquidated."  ANR Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 893 P.2d 698, 704 (Wyo. 1995); Belle Fourche 
Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 515 n.8 (Wyo. 1983); Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., 
624 P.2d 1192, 1198 (Wyo. 1981).  A 
liquidated claim is "one that is readily computable by basic mathematical 
calculation."  ANR Prod., 893 P.2d  at 704 (quoting Dunn v. Rescon Tech. Corp., 884 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 
1994)).

 
 
[¶27]   While it may be true that the exact 
judgment amount could not be known in this case until such time as the judgment 
was rendered, it is not true that the attorney's fees owed at any given time 
could not be "readily computed by basic mathematical calculation."  In fact, precise hourly billing records 
were available throughout the years of litigation.  By simply asking for the amount, Stewart 
Title could have cut off the accrual of both fees and interest.  Furthermore, if no judgment was 
considered liquidated until such time as it was rendered, there would be no such 
thing as a liquidated claim, and prejudgment interest could never be 
imposed.

 
 
[¶28]   We have said that parties are 
entitled to the use of money owed them, that "the use of money has real economic 
value," and that "[p]rejudgment interest should have been awarded as an attempt 
to compensate for that loss."  Goodwin, 624 P.2d  at 
1198.

 
 
            
Prejudgment interest is allowed on the theory that an injured party 
should be fully compensated for his or her loss.  It is the compensation allowed by law as 
additional damages for lost use of money due as damages during the lapse of time 
between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.  It is appropriate when the underlying 
recovery is compensatory in nature and when the amount at issue is easily 
ascertainable and one upon which interest can be easily 
computed.

 
 
44B Am. 
Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 39 
(2007).  The sentiment underlying 
this general rule has been recognized by this Court, and we cannot see why it 
would not apply to attorney's fees belatedly obtained via a judgment forced upon 
a recalcitrant insurer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c).  An insured, wronged by the dilatory 
tactics of an insurer, cannot be made whole if he or she loses more in 
attorney's fees and interest than he or she obtains in an underlying damage 
award.  We affirm the order of the 
district court awarding prejudgment interest as part of the final judgment 
award.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   
The filing deadline of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) does not apply to an 
application for fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c).  The present action was not barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata because it 
was not raised, and could not be raised, in the arbitration.  The district court did not err by 
including in the final judgment attorney's fees that might have been contingent, 
or attorney's fees paid to a certain paralegal, or prejudgment interest on the 
fees awarded in the judgment.  We 
affirm.

  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 26-15-124(c) provides as follows:

 
 
(c)     In any actions or 
proceedings commenced against any insurance company on any insurance policy or 
certificate of any type or kind of insurance, or in any case where an insurer is 
obligated by a liability insurance policy to defend any suit or claim or pay any 
judgment on behalf of a named insured, if it is determined that the company 
refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by the policy and that the 
refusal is unreasonable or without cause, any court in which judgment is 
rendered for a claimant may also award a reasonable sum as an attorney's fee and 
interest at ten percent (10%) per year.

 
 

2The 
arbitrator and the district court were correct in not applying the logic of Hedgecock to this case.  Even Colorado has abandoned Hedgecock's allowance of attorney's fees 
in this setting, where those fees are based upon equitable policies, rather than 
the insurance contract.  See Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Heritage Estates 
Mut. Hous. Ass'n, 77 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2003).

 
 

3W.R.C.P. 
54(d) is quoted in part above.  See supra ¶ 6.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) provides 
as follows:

 
 
. . . 
.

(b)    In civil actions for which an 
award of attorney's fees is authorized, the court in its discretion may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party without requiring expert 
testimony.  In exercising its 
discretion the court may consider the following factors:

(i)       The time 
and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(ii)      The likelihood 
that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other employment by 
the lawyer;

(iii)     The fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(iv)     The amount involved and 
the results obtained;

(v)      The time 
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(vi)     The nature and length 
of the professional relationship with the client;

(vii)    The experience, reputation 
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
and

(viii)    Whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent.

 
 

4While 
this arrangement is not explained in the briefs, we assume from the record and 
from the district court's decision that, rather than a standard percentage 
contingency fee, these attorneys were to be paid for all of their billed hours 
upon success in the litigation, or to be paid nothing upon 
failure.

 
 

5We state 
our conclusion in this fashion because the parties have not given us clear 
guidance on what they believe should be the standard of review on this 
issue.  Given that this hearing was, 
in effect, a bench trial upon a statutory cause of action, rather than a hearing 
upon a motion for fees and costs, we are not convinced that our review is simply 
for an abuse of discretion.  
Instead, review of the district court's factual findings is under a 
clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law under a de novo 
standard.