Case Title: Chung v. McCabe Hamilton & Renny Company, Ltd. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 02/21/2006 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 03/01/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 109 Haw. 520

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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ee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIT

~--000---

DEAN KANATLANI CHUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant

MCCABE HAMILTON & RENNY COMPANY, LTD., a Hawai'i
corporation, KYLE SOARES, an individual, JOHN A. DIAS, an
individual, HENRY R.K. LEE, an individual, DWIGHT SHAW,
an individual, KRAIG M. KENNEDY, an individual, BOB M. BEE,
an individual, and MATT B. GUARD, an individual, KINI
KALAIWA'A, an individual, ANDREW L.’ PEPPER, an individual,
MARR HIPP JONES & PEPPER, a Hawai'i partnership,
Defendants-Appellees

and

DOES 1-50, Defendants

 
 
 
 

 

1 834 9002

and Related Counterclaims

Wo, 25458

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NOS. 00-1-0444 & 00-21-1771)

FEBRUARY 17, 2006
NOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, JJ. AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE" AUGUST, IN PLACE OF DUFFY, 'J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Wie hold that (1) Defendants-Appellees Marr, Hipp,
Jones, & Pepper (NHJP) and Andrew L. Pepper [collectively
Appellees], as attorneys for earlier and dismissed employer-

defendants, may raise, as agents of their employers, the doctrine

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of preemption under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on a
summary judgment motion; (2) the claims of Plaintiff-Appellant
Dean Kawailani Chung (Appellant) against Appellees for abuse of
process and malicious prosecution, as well as the derivative
claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting related to these
torts, are preempted under this court's holding in Gouveia v.
Napili-Kei, Ltd., 65 Haw. 189, 649 P.2d 1119 (1982);

(3) Appellant's claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) and false light invasion of privacy are not
preempted under this court’s holding in Bricas v. Hote] Corp. of
the Pac. Inc., 73 Haw. 276, 831 P.2d 1335 (1992) and Gouveiar
(4) Appellant's claim against Appellees for defamation and the
derivative claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting for this
tort are not preempted under Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers:
of Am, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); and (5) Appellant's
argument that the application of the preemption doctrine violates
his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not properly
raised and is therefore waived. Applying these holdings, we
affirm in part and and vacate in part the October 23, 2002 final
Judgment of the circuit court of the first circuit! (the court)
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing
Appellant's consolidated amended complaint (the CAC) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction (the order), and remand this case for

further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

‘the Honorable Gary ". 8. Chang presided.

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I.

‘he decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the
ICA), McCabe Hamilton ¢ Renny Co, v. Chung, 98 Hawai'i 107, 43
P.3d 244 (App. 2002) [hereinafter McCabe], provides @ detailed
description of the underlying dispute between Appellant and his
co-workers at McCabe Hamilton & Renny, Co. (McCabe). Only the
following condensed statement of the factual background is
pertinent to this appeal.

A.

‘on January 7, 2000, following a confrontation between
Appellant and co-workers Kyle Soares (Soares) and John Dias
(Dias), McCabe, Soares, and Dias (collectively, the first TRO
petitioners] filed an ex parte motion for a TRO in a special
proceeding, $.P. No, 00-1-0010 (first TRO action). The first TRO
petitioners were represented by Appellees. The court issued four
‘TROs against Appellant and converted the special proceeding into
a regular civil case, While the first TRO action was pending,
McCabe fired Appellant.

on February 8, 2000, Appellant filed a complaint in
Civil No. 00-01-0464 (case 0444) against McCabe, four of its

executives

 

Robert T. Guard, Kraig M. Kennedy, Bob M. Bee, and

Matt B. Guard

 

and four of Appellant's co-workers -- Soares,
Dias, Henry R.K. Lee, and Dwight Shaw (collectively, the first
McCabe defendants], claiming, inter alia, abuse of process and

defamation.
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Se

on March 14, 2000, McCabe, Soares, Dias, and Earl Kini
Kalaiva'a (Kalaiwa'a) (collectively, the second TRO petitioners)
filed a complaint and a renewed ex parte motion for TRO (second
TRO action) against Appellant, the latter being granted by the
court. On March 23, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was held on the
second TRO action and the second 7RO petitioners’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion and
dismissed the action without prejudice on March 29, 2000.

on June 2, 2000, Appellant filed a second lawsuit in
Civil No. 00-01-1771 (case 1771) against McCabe, Soares, Dias,
and Kalaiwa's [collectively, the second McCabe defendants],
asserting wrongful termination in violation of Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 378-2 (Supp. 1999), malicious prosecution of the
second TRO action, abuse of process, and related claims.

on June 6, 2000, the International Longshore and
Warehouse Union, Local 142, AFL-CIO (the ILWU) filed, on behalf
of Appellant, a charge against McCabe with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).

‘The NLRB charge alleged that the state court actions
brought against Appellant violated Section 8(a) (1),? 29 U.S.C.
§ 158, of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because McCabe
filed two lawsuits in retaliation for a labor dispute initiated

by Appellant while he was engaged in activities protected by

 

2 Section (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) st:
that “[i]t shail be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to 1
with, restrain, of coerce employees in the exercise of the rights gual
In section 157 of this titiel.J”

 
   
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Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157, of the NLRA. Because McCabe lost
Sts complaint on the merits and voluntarily sought a dismissal,
the ILWU requested that the NLRB find that the filing of the
lawsuits against Appellant constituted an unfair labor practice.
‘The ILHU also requested that McCabe be required to reimburse the
Union’s and Appellant’s attorneys their fees and costs incurred
as a result of the two lawsuits. It appears that the NLRB charge

was withdrawn.*

 

‘The defendants removed both of Appellant's state cases,
case 0444 and case 1771, to federal court, asserting federal
Jurisdiction pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (MRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).? By order dated
April 5, 2001, the United States District Court for the District
of Hawai'i (the district court)‘ granted, in part, the first and

» Section 7 of the NLRA states:

i sass SSEPISETTS treet
5 activ roost .
= arr ‘and shall also have

 

the Fight to refrain from any Of ail of such activities
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
Fequiring menbership in a labor organization as a condition of
Employment ae suthorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.

 

cept to

«on August 18, 2005, this court ordered the parties to file
supplenentel briefs indicating the status of any proceedings before the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concerning the instant case. Appellant
Tesponced that he was unaware of any related proceedings before the NLRB.
Appellees provided a similar respons!

 

 

 

* united states oLetrict Court for the District of Ha
Judge Bere consolidates the cases due to “commen questions of law and fact.”

 

+ the Honorable Helen Gillmor presided.

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second McCabe defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Both
cases were decided under LMRA section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185,
referred to as “section 301 preemption.”

According to the district court, LMRA section 301
“preenpt[s] state lew claims between an employee and employer
when those claims require the court to interpret the terms of
collective bargaining agreements.” It was ruled that Appellant’s
claim for tortious interference with contractual relations was
preempted under section 301. Consequently, the district court
dismissed the claim. The district court determined that the
claims for IJED, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting were
preempted in part, and dismissed the claims with some
reservation. However, it was decided that Appellant's claims for
abuse of process, defamation, false light invasion of privacy,
violation of public policy in connection with a wrongful
termination, and punitive damages were not preempted under
section 301. These claims were remanded to state court.

‘The district court's decision was based entirely upon
section 301 preemption. According to the district court, the
McCabe defendants’ alternative argument, that is, that
Appellant’s claims were preempted under the doctrine announced in
San Diego Bldg, Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 vw.
Garmon, 259 U.S. 236 (1959), was not addressed because Garmon did

“not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the
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federal courts."” Accordingly, the district court deferred to
the “state court [to] properly address [d]efendants’ arguments
with respect to. . - Gazmon preemption."
1

upon remand to the state court, Appellant filed a
motion to file the CAC. The court granted the motion and on
vay 8, 2001, Appellant filed the CAC, asserting abuse of process,
malicious prosecution, defamation, false light invasion of
privacy, ITED, conspiracy, aiding and abetting one another in the
aforesaid causes of action, violations of HRS § 378-2, negligent
supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
negligence. Appellant also joined Appellees as new parties.

on June 5, 2001, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss
the CAC for lack of Jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for
sunmary judgment, arguing that (1) Appellant's anti-union theory
involved protected rights under section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157, and unfair labor practices under section 8 of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 188, (2) because Appellant alleged Appellees committed

an unfair labor practice, his remedies lay with the NLRB and not

> ge district court relied on Ethridse v. Harbor House Best, 861
F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988)

 

+ onder San Diecs Bide, trades CounciL, Milimen’s Union Local 2020
, 388 bs 'Bae, 21 (9001, when s state seeks to regulete activities
scther protected under $ ?/or constitute an unfair labor practice
eesE the tana, ‘state Jurisdiction must yield. To allow the states to

‘chis conduct’ is likely to result in a conflict between Congress's
Sry peer and state imposed regulation end could potentially frustrate
s's purposes. Ide

  
 

 

7
 

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the court, and (3) Garmon preemption applied to Appellees as

“agents” of Appellant’s employer, McCabe.
At the July 20, 2001 hearing on the motion,? the court
asked Appellant's attorney if “union busting [was] behind the
entire series of transactions and actions brought against
Appellant] that gave rise to this particular lawsuit(.]*
Counsel for Appellant responded that on February 8, 2000, the
date of Appellant's original conplaint, Appellant was unaware of
incidents that would suggest that something other than “union

busting” was behind the transactions:

[Appellant] did not know that Andy Pepper had talked to
Unuercover cops on the waterfront about something so 8
Concerning [Appellant] that Mr. Pepper is more afraid
Tionolsla Police Department (H®D) than he is of (Appellant).
[ngpellant] dia not know that Me- Pepper was gonna accuse
his of destroying his vtility box and of stalking him, 50
GLI of these things cone to fruition afterwards,” We don’t
Get any discovery ontil we're back in this court, when we
fhow a: (siel about Mr. Pepper's conversations with
lindereover cope, when we know about now [sic] Me. Guard
hiring Matt Levi.

    

 

 

    

ii mean, 1 guess they're trying to say that we can’t
anend, ‘that we are nox judicially estopped, because on
Fepruary Eth’ we believe that this was tne notive on
Intoreaticn and bellef, Your Honor, we only allege that on
[ntormation anc belief. And now, Of course, with every
Iittle inch of discovery T can squeeze out, the story

becomes more apparent shat it didn’: have anything to oo
with the union at al. st had something to-do with ay

pdt had s0met! sith knowine about

 

 

axiest and court record and trving to roncfully exploit
hat, Now, why? Only HeCabe, only MF. Pepper, Knows why.
T'don'e know why. But now it’s clear that the union had

nothing to do with it, but it had everything to do with my
Client, and it had everything to do with his arrest record,
that ie clear, and that is the state interest, Your Honor.

 

 

 

+ tn addition to Appellees’ notion, the hearing addressed McCabe's
notion for summary jusgnent, Shaw's motion for summery judament, and
Gefendante/counterclainants’ Soares, Dias, Shaw, Lee, and Kalaimaa’s motion for
summary judgment

 

  
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a

Appellant’

(Emphases

Following arguments by counsel, the court ruled that
3 union activities motivated the defendants’ conduct:

THE COURT: Okay. This motion the Court, struggled
with greatiy, and I think part of the problem is the
Thheedne cottaice between the federal interest, which, if st
Suiste, ie paranount versus the state interest, that is to
Shotect iteveleizens against certain conduct that viola
EGencn laws here in Hawail.

'mhe court took some time to comb through the record in
this master to try to ascertain what is really going on in
ERIS Gntire matter, and the one conclusion the Court could
hot escape, ang it always came back to, (Appellant! s)
Resociation with the union, He

sate sould se £53 2
Sia ieee eae ee
‘firbe execureds a1) designed to orosecute various claims

Txppellees’ counsel] is correct, and the Court dié
note that the burden of proof is such that if there 18 an
Reguable claim chat ‘the [NLA] applies, that the state court

Sovikisty, it disturbs this court a bit, but this

foie the ant tests mith
‘Shaanisation and union activities, and itis for_that reason
‘court raius sonciudes tha a
efere the Court wilt he
added.)

‘on August 22, 2001, the court granted Appellees’ motion

to dismiss the CAC for lack of jurisdiction or, in the

alternative, summary judgment. The court ruled that Appellant’s

claims were preempted and dismissed them with prejudice:

(a)i2 clains, allesetions, accusations and averments that
Aare "oF could have been Drought against [Appellees] in the
Teac), including but not limited to the First, Second,
Thard, Fourth, Fifth, sixth, Seventh, and Eighth causes of
Tetion, shall be, and hereby are, dlonissed with prejudice,
Given that the court does not have subject matter
Jurinaiceion over those elaine because they are subject to
federal preenprion pursuant to the doctrine promulgated in
e+ Gagwan (1
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The court did not render any findings of fact or conclusions of
lew.
m1.

Both the first and second McCabe defendants eventually
settled with Appellant and the court approved the settlenent on
May 20, 2002. On June 3, 2002, Appellant moved for
reconsideration of the August 22, 2001 order granting Appellees’
motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, summary judgment,
citing new evidence that Appellees had brought the first TRO
action against him “without the knowledge or authorization of the
persons for whom [Appellees] sought relief." The court denied
the motion on August 27, 2002, and entered final judgment on
october 23, 2002. On November 8, 2002, Appellant appealed.

Ww.

Appellant presents three issues on appeal. First, he
contends that the predicate “fact” of Appellees’ anti-union
theory was not, and could not be, alleged on a Hawai'i Rules of
Civil Procedure (RCP) Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Second, he
argues that even if Appellant’s anti-union theory implicated the
NLRA, Garon does not preempt state jurisdiction over serious
torts or matters peripheral to federal labor law. Finally,
Appellant maintains that preempting his claims would result in a
violation of his constitutional rights, specifically his right to

a trial by jury.

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i

In response, Appellees argue that (1) Appellant is
bound by his allegations of anti-union conspiracy under the
doctrine of judicial estoppel because the courts have relied upon
and accepted Appellant’s position, (2) Appellant's allegations
and repeated representations of anti-union conspiracy to the
federal, state, and appellate courts, and the NLRB, involve
protected rights under NLRA section 7 and unfair labor practices
under NLRA section 8 (3) Garmon requires the dismissal of
Appellant’s claims because they “actually, arguably or
potentially conflict with federal lew,” (4) any limitation of
Rppellant's monetary remedies does not invalidate preemption,
(5) in connection with Appellant’s preemption arguments, the
court did not err in dismissing alleged violations of HRS 378-
2, (6) Appellant improperly raises constitutional argunents for
the first tine on appeal, and assuming their consideration, the
arguments are wholly without merit.
v.
We address, first, Appellant's contention that his

purported anti-union theory against Appellees could not be

 

% RS § 378-2. (Supp. 1999) proscribes certain conduct with regard to
‘exploynent practices, In nis reply brief, Appellant requests leave to asené
cone 1% of his complaint in order to assert his claine under chapter 378 of
the Honail Revised Statutes. the clains were brought against the earli
Necabe defendants and subsequently dismissed, against Appellees. Appellees
Correctly contend in their fifth argument, that Appellant did not assert a
Claim agsinst Appellees for violations of chapter. 378 and thus, said issue was
Rot raised in the proceedings below. See Bitney v, Honolulu Police Dent, 96
Hewoil 263, 251, 30 P.3d 257, 265 (2001) (holaing that “(alppeliate courts
Mill not consider an issue not raised below unless justice so requires”)
Recordingly, we do not resch this issue

 

 

 

u
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established on Appellees’ HRCP Rule 12 motion to dismiss. To the

extent that Appellees’ motion contained documents related to
matters outside the pleadings, we treat the motion as a motion
for sunmary judgment under HRCP Rules 12(c)" and 56." “Unlike
other appellate matters, in reviewing summary judsment decisions
an appellate court steps into the shoes of the trial court and
applies the sane legal standard as the trial court applied.”
Beamer v. Nishiki, 66 Haw. $72, $77, 670 P.2d 1264, 1270 (2983)
(quoting Fernandes v, Tenbruuencate, 65 Haw. 226, 228, 649 P.2d
1144, 1147 (1962)). This court reviews a circuit court’s grant
or denial of summary judoent de nove. French v. Hawaii Pizza
fiut, Ines, 105 Hawai'i 462, 466, 99 P.34 1046, 1050 (2004). The
standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is well
settled:

[s)unmary judgnent is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
{eno genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
oving party ie entitled to juagnent asa matter of lav. A
fact is material sf proof of that fact would have the effect
Of establishing of refuting one of the essential elements of

 

 

% Rule 12(c) of the Hawais Roles of Civil Procedure (HRCP) stati
relevant part?

 

If, on @ motion for judgnent on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shali be treated as one for sunnary
Josanent and cispoced of as provides in Rule 56, and all
sonable opportunity to present all

 

 

    

parties shall be given F
Raterial nede pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
8 rcp Rule 56 states in relevant part:
(©) Yotion and proceedings thereon. . . . The judgment

sought shail be Fendered forthwith if the pleadings,
Gepositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affiaavies, if eny, show that there
fe no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party 1s entitled toa judgnent as 8 matter of law.

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oo

fa cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. The
Gvidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
Ronmoving party. Invether words, we must view all of the
Goidence end the inferences drawn’ therefrom in the Light
ost favorable to the party opposing the motion

 

Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai‘ 43, 51, 85 P-3d 150, 158 (2004).

Ae to preemption, “[t]he burden of establishing pre-
enption rests with the party seeking the benefit of pre-emption.”
Casumpana vs ILWU, Local 142, 94 Hawai'i 330, 340, 13 P.3d 1235,
1245 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This “burden is a considerable one, which requires overcoming the
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

vn.

With regard to Appellees’ first argument, although
Appellees assert that Appellant is bound by his allegations of
anti-union conspiracy under the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
the inquiry as to whether Appellant is judicially estopped from
now asserting that Appellees were motivated by reasons other than
union animosity is not dispositive of the instant case." We
conclude that even assuming that Appellant is bound by his

earlier assertion that Appellees acted because of Appellant's

© This court has previously stated that “[plursuent to the doctrine
of judiciet estoppel, [a] party wil not be pernitted to maintain inconsistent
Positions or to tete a position in regard toa matter which is directly
EEntrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by hin, at least
here Ae had, or wes chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and enother
Mill be prejucices by Ris action.” Roxas v, Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 124, 968
F.2d 1200, 1242 11998). The purpose of Judicias estoppel is to prevent ‘parties
from “playing tfast and loose’ with the court or Blowing ‘hot and cold” during
the course. of Litigation.” Jd. (quoting Besa ¥. 1 A Howe
foe. 210, 219, 664 P.20 745, 751 (1983) (other citations omitted)

 

 

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union activities, application of the preemption doctrine is not
precluded.

For example, in Linn, 2 case involving a civil action
for libel made in the course of a union organizing campaign, and
therefore concerning @ labor dispute, the Court ruled that the
state court “does have jurisdiction to apply state remedies if
the complainant pleads and proves that the statements were made
with malice and injured him.” 363 U.S. at 55. In Farmer v.
United Bhd, of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 293 (1977), the
underlying complaint alleged that the defendants engaged in
outrageous conduct arising from a disagreement between the
parties over union policies. Despite reversal by the state

the Court held that the NLRA did

 

appellate court in that case,
not preempt the action for IED. Id, at 302, It was noted that
the allegations made by the complainant in that case “might form
the basis for unfair labor practice charges before the (NLRB, 1”
ids, and that “a rigid application of the Gazmon doctrine might
support the conclusion of the California courts that (the
complainant's} entire action wae preempted by federal law.” Ide
However, the Court concluded that “inflexible
application of the doctrine is to be avoided, especially where
the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct
at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten
undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme.” Id.

‘Therefore, in considering the motion for summary judgment herein,

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oo

the court was required to engage in a weighing of the “federal
interest in uniform regulation of labor relations with the
traditional concern and responsibility of the State to protect
its citizens”, Linn, 363 U.S. at 57, against tortious conduct.
Thus, even if Appellant is held to his earlier position that
Appellees harbored anti-union animus in committing the alleged
tortious conduct, the court is not absolved from deciding whether
the clains at issue were subject to exceptions to the preemption
doctrine.
vir.

‘This court has epplied the Garmon preemption doctrine

on two occasions. In Gouveia, the following frequently quoted

passages from Garmon were declared the controlling principles:

acts wk ZI EE are
retested by isection| 7 of the WRAL or constizute
nfsiz labor Be der 2 a
Sai = veto allow the states to

Zontrel conduct which is the Subject of national
Fegulation would create potential frustration of
Sational perposes-

‘At Limes it has not been clear whether the
particular activity regulated by the States was
Governed by [section] 7 or [section] B or wes,
Rorheps, outside both these sections, But courts are
ESt primacy tribunals to adjudicate cuch issues. It

 

 

 

Hess cetera fit to
See when wity is pub

a

ni iNLE nger oj :

(Genmog, 359 0-8. ae] 204-45
Gouveia, 65 Haw. at 193-94, 649 P.2d at 1123 (brackets omitted)

(some emphasis in original and some added). It was said that
“[t]he governing consideration is that to allow the States to

15
 

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control activities that are potentially subject to federal

regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national

 

labor policy.” Id. at 194, 649 P.2d at 1123. Gouveia went on to
recognize exceptions to Garmon preemption, explaining that
“concurrent state-court jurisdiction” is permitted where (1) “the
challenged conduct has been marked by violence and inminent
threats to the public order,” id. at 194, 649 P.2d at 1124
(internal quotation marks omitted), (2) “the activity regulated
[is] a merely peripheral concern of the [NLRA],” id. at 195, 649
P.2d at 1124, (3) “the regulated conduct touches] interests so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the
absence of compelling congressional direction, . . . it could not
[be] infer{red} that Congress ha[s] deprived the States of power
to act[,]” ida, or (4) a “state's interest in protecting the
health and well-being of its citizens . . . overr[i}de[s} the
federal interest in a national labor policyl,)” id, inte, the
harm “involve(s] ‘outrageous conduct, threats, intimidation, and
words’ which caused the plaintiff to suffer ‘grievous mental and
emotional distress as well as great physical damage[,]‘” id.
(quoting Farmer, 430 U.S. at 301).

‘This court further expounded on the Garnon preemption
doctrine in Brioas. In their complaint, the plaintiffs in Briggs
“complained merely of unfair labor practices which resulted in

emotional and physical distress.” 73 Haw. at 286, 831 P.2d at

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SS

1341. ‘Therefore, it was held that dismissal was proper. Id.
Brigas established the rule that “in order for a tort claim based
on outrageous conduct to survive pre-emption, the outrageous
conduct must be either 1) unrelated to governed labor practices
or 2) . . « accomplished in such an abusive manner that the
manner itself becomes the basis for the claim.” Id, at 285, 831
P.2d at 1341 (emphasis in original).

viii.

As to Appellant's second argument that the claims in
his CAC are not preempted, and Appellees’ second and third
counter-arguments, we examine each claim in light of the precepts
established in Gouveia and Briggs.

a.

To begin, Appellant's first and second claims for
relief, sounding in abuse of process, as alleged in paragraphs 81
to 87 and 8@ to 94 of the CAC, respectively, were based on the
first and second TRO actions brought against him by Appellees.

‘The elenents of the tort of abuse of process are “(1) an ulterior

 

purpose and (2) @ wilful act in the use of the process which is
not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Wong vs
Banis, 7 Haw. App. 414, 420, 772 P.2d 695, 699-700 (1989),
abrogated in part by Hac v. Univ. of Hawaii, 102 Hawai'i 92, 73
P.3d 46 (2003). “Liability for abuse of process is imposed when
the putative tortfeasor uses legal process ‘primarily’ for an

ulterior motive.” Id, (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §

 

682 (1977)) (hereinafter, Restatement].
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Appellant alleged the following in paragraphs 83

 

+ (a) anterfering with his probation; and
fel harassing and intimidating Plaintiff emotionally and
Hinaneialiy.

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Appellant further averred, in paragraphs 84
and 91, that “[t}he use of the court processes for such purposes
are purposes other than those for which the processes were
designed and intended{]” and, in response, Appellees argue that
“{w]hile [Appellant] mentions his abuse of process claims in
passing, virtually all of his arguments in his brief pertain to
his malicious prosecution claim.” Proffering no discussion as to
any failure of Appellant to sufficiently allege abuse of process,
Appellees simply contend that “courts routinely dismiss abuse of
process clains where plaintiffs have acknowledged that a
defendant’s motive involved a labor-related animus.”

Accordingly, we do not reach the question of whether Appellant
sufficiently pled the abuse of process claims. See Tacnae v.
Lingle, 108 Hawai'i 245, 257, 118 P.3d 1188, 1200 (2005) (stating
that “[t)his court may ‘disregard [a] particular contention’ if
[a party] ‘makes no discernible argument in support of that
position’ (quoting Norton v, Adzin. Dir, of the Court, 80

Hawas's 197, 200, 908 P.2d 545, 548 (1995))).

18
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
B.

However, based on @ review of the record, we conclude
that Appellant's clains for abuse of process are preempted by the
NIRA. Appellant alleged retaliation, prevention of his ability
to work, and the blemishing of his work history and character as
several of the ulterior and improper purposes attributed to
Appellees." ‘These relate to his employment and the exercise of
his duties as shop steward for his union.

Having determined that the conduct may arguably be
protected, Gouveia requires further analysis. Appellant argues
that causes of action for abuse of process are “‘deeply rooted’
in local responsibility[,]” that the state has an interest “in
protecting its citizens from abusive use of the courts{,]” and
that the state has “ a substantial interest in policing its own
court systen”. However, given the circumstances of this case, we
believe that such interests are insufficient to override the
federal Labor schene.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Local 926, Int'l Union

ves , 460 U.S. 669 (1983), is
instructive. In Jones, @ former employee brought an action in

state court for tortious interference alleging that after he

 

 

Mas earlier stated, Section 7 of the MLAA sets forth the rights of
exployces including the Fight to “engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or ether sutual aid or protection{.J" 29
Bister ¢°is).. Furthermore, Section 6 states that *[1]t shall be an unfair
Vabor practice for an employer . . - to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
enployees. in the exercise of the rights guarant yetion’7-)" 29
Ors.c's 158.

  

18
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

resigned his union membership, the union coerced his employer

into firing him, thereby breaching his employment contract. Id.
at 672-73.

‘The Court concluded that the cause of action alleging
the union's interference with an employment contract was
preempted by the NLRA’s prohibition against coercive
interference. Id, at 681-82. It explained that “a fundamental
part of such a claim is that the union actually caused the
discharge and hence was responsible for the employer's breach of
contract. Of course, this same crucial element must be proved to
make out a... case [under the NLRA.]” Id, at 682. Hence, the
Court decided that “the federal and state claims are thus the
same in a fundanental respect{.]” Id, The Court accordingly
concluded that the state cause of action was preempted. See also
Iumbex Prod, Indus, Workers Local No. 1054 v, Wl. Coast Indus.,
775 F.2d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Jones for the

 

proposition that a “state-law claim is preempted” “*if the
conduct relied on to prove a crucial element in the state action
is conduct that ie arguably covered by the NLRA’” (quoting 460
u.s. at 682)).

In the instant case, inasmuch as Appellant alleges
retaliation, prevention of his ability to work, and injury to his
work history as the ulterior motives for Appellees’ alleged
conduct, proving such allegations would be crucial elements of

his abuse of process claims. A fundamental part of Appellant's

20
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
OO

Clains is that Appellees acted after Appellant exercised his
rights and duties as @ union shop steward in voicing his concerns
about alleged violations by McCabe of the union contract. Such
rights and duties are encompassed by the mutual aid or protection
clause of section 7 of the NLA, interference with which is
prohibited under section 8 of the Act. See e.g., MALRB. vs
c sal Inc., 465 U.S. 622, 633 (1984) (explaining
that @ single employee's invocation of rights set forth in 2
[collective bargaining agreement (CBA)) is presumed to be
concerted activity because the CBA was put into effect by group
action) «

With respect to the danger of interference with the
NIRA, the Fourth Circuit stated in Richardson v, Kruchko & Fries,
966 F.2d 153 (ath Cir. 1992), as follows:

Adjudication of the claims would require a court to pass on
tha'fegality onder the NLRA of precisely the same conduct
that iz presently before the NAB, and would risk
frustration of national labor policy through inconsistent
Stateciaw judgaente ~ precisely the evils that Gazmon
freenption seeks to avoid. "in a case where, ss here, the
EGbstance of the dispute ie the sane under both state and
federal law, the state law must yield to the jurisdiction of
the NLRB.”

 

 

 

Ad. at 158 (quoting Barker v, Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510,
1516 (1ith Cir. 1988)), See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Dist, Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 202
(1978) (stating that, “when the same controversy may be presented
to the state court or the NLRB, it must be presented to the
Board”). Therefore, we hold that Appellant's claims for abuse of

process, as well as the derivative claims relating to them, are

2
+*4F0R PUBLICATION*#*

 

preempted, See Richard B. LeVine, Inc, vs Higashi, 32 Cal. Rptr.
3d 244, 253-54 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2005) (holding that aiding and
abetting and conspiracy are derivative tort claims).

1x,

Similar to Appellant's claims for abuse of process, we
hold that Appellant’s claim for relief of malicious prosecution"*
under paragraphs 95 to 102 of the CAC, as well as the derivative
claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting as to this clain,
are preenpted.

A

‘The basis for the malicious prosecution claim arises
from the second TRO action wherein Appellees apparently alleged
that Appellant was violent, had committed violence in the
workplace, and presented an inminent danger of bodily harm in the
workplace. On March 28, 2000, following an evidentiary hearing,
‘the TRO court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order in favor of Appellant. McCabe filed a notice of
dismissal on the sane day, without prejudice.

Appellant maintained that an order was entered in his
favor, that the second TRO action was initiated without probable
cause, and that the action was filed in a “malicious” manner. In

paragraph 95, Appellant “repeats, re-avers, and incorporates

4 mnis court has established that the tort of malicious prosecution
requires 712) that the price proceedings Were terminated in the piaintiéf'
favor; (2) that the prior proceedings were initiated without probable cause:
ana. (3) ‘that the prior proceedings were Initisted with malice.” =

76 Hawal's 219, 230, 673 P.2d 98, 109 (1994) (emphasis

   

in original).

22
+*#POR PUBLICATION***

paragraphs 1 through 94” of the CAC.

 

paragraphs 63 and 90 of the CAC allege that the court processe!

 

ues, the first and second TRO actions, were instigated for
ulterior purposes having to do with retaliation and employment
related matters. Appellant further declared, under paragraph 102
of the CAC, that the conduct was “done with the intent to deprive
[Appellant] of legal rights or otherwise to cause (Appellant)
injury” and that such conduct wes made “in conscious disregard of
his rights[.J”"

on appeal, Appellant again contends that his claim is
not preempted because claims for malicious prosecution ere
“deeply rooted in local responsibility” under Garmon, and cites
Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001). In Radcliffe, union
representatives were subjected to citizen's arrest for trespass
and prosecution for their refusal to leave job sites. Id. at
776. The union representatives brought civil rights and state
tort claims for, among others, false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution against the defendants. Id, at 776-77.
The United States district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants dismissing the plaintiffs state tort claims.

The Ninth Circuit court reversed as to the dismissal of
the state-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution, concluding that these claims were not
preempted by the NLRA. In doing so, that court stated that the

freedom of citizens from these torts

23
‘+*#POR PUBLICATION*#*

touch interests 20 deeply rooted in local feeling and
Fesponsubiiity thet, in the absence of compelling
Congressional direction, we could not infer that Congres

 

 

Rec’deprived the States of power toact.. -. snus false
of thes 2 ditional
rule eves solve conduct

Azsuabiy protected of prohibited by the Nisa.
Ida at 785 (emphasis added and in original) (internal citations
omitted). The Radcliffe court further explained that the fact
that such claims might constitute an unfair labor practice “does
not inevitably cause preemption of the state claim.” Id.

Appellees contend that Radcliffe is inapposite to the
instant case because that court's holding was premised on an
issue not before this court, namely trespass, that clearly
implicated property rights traditionally protected by states.
central to the Radcliffe court’s decision was that California’s
general trespass statute did not apply to “Lawful union activity”
fon the enployer’s premises. Id. at 777. That court reasoned
that “the property right underlying the law of trespass, of

course, is a matter of state law.” Id. at 784.

 

As earlier stated, this court in Gouveia recognized, as
hppellant argues, that state regulation is permitted where the
regulated conduct touches deeply rooted interests and “in the
absence of compelling congressional direction,” it cannot be said
that Congress intended to deprive states of jurisdiction. 65
Haw. at 195, 649 P.2d at 1124 (citing Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244).

Gouveia, however, cautioned that concurrent state-court

24
+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*
a
Jurisdiction is not permissible “where a realistic thre:

 

 

interference with the federal regulatory scheme exist |
at 196, 649 P.2d at 1125.

We observe that certain state interests are implicated
in a suit for malicious prosecution, including maintaining the
integrity of the judicial system, providing injured persons with
some form of redress, and preserving an individual's right to
petition the court and to a jury trial. Malicious prosecution
may also result in substantial damages, including punitive
damages, which the NLRB could not provide to an injured party in
an unfair labor practice proceeding." Linn, 383 U.S. at 63-64.

However, similar to the claims for abuse of process,
the malicious prosecution claim in this case presents @
wrealistic risk of interference with the [NLRE‘s) primary
jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair
labor practices.” Sears, 436 U.S. at 198. In his CAC, Appellant
attributes Appellees’ conduct as motivated by a desire to
retaliate against him for his exercise of union duties, and to
interfere with his employment. These allegations directly
implicate factual conduct covered under sections 7 and 6 of the
NERA. See Richardson, 966 F.2d at 158. We hold, then, that

Appellant’s claim for malicious prosecution is pri

 

mpted, and the

derivative claims relating to this tort are similarly preempted.

tn these fourth argument, Appellees contend thet “any Limitation
of Appellant’ s monetary renedies does not invalidate preenption[.]" In any

rents the cases indicate that the availability of monetary danages can be
(Stor in determining whether @ state-tort claim is preempted.

25

     
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
x.

While Appellant's clains for abuse of process and
malicious prosecution are preempted, Appellant’s remaining clains
for IIED, false light invasion of privacy, and defamation are not
preempted inasmuch as these claims, as alleged, do not present 4
realistic danger of interfering with the national labor policy
and fit within the exceptions to Gazmon as set forth in Gouveia
and Brigas.

xr.

le hold that Appellant's sixth claim for relief, ITED,
although arguably protected under the NLRA, is not preempted.
Under paragraphs 117 to 123 of the CAC, Appellant maintains that
he was retaliated against for his union activity, thus causing
him emotional distress. Paragraphs 118 to 120 of his CAC alleged
the acts giving rise to Appellant's ITED claim, including
allegations of filing multiple TROs, transmitting false
information to other persons with the intent of causing statewide
republication, and falsely accusing Appellant of wrongful acts
such as witness intimidation, property destruction, drug use, and
the terrorizing of witnesses.

This court has addressed the issue of preenption on

state-law claims for ITED." In Briggs, it was said that

 

During the course of the underlying proceedings, the elements
required for the tort of intentional infliction of enotional distress (ITED)
Were (1) that the act causing the harm was intentional, (2) that the act was
Unreasonable, and (3) that the actor should have recognized the likelihood of
harm. Wong'Y. Panis, 7 Haw. App. €14, 421, 772 2.24 695, 700 (1989)
Subsequently, we have abrogated that test and established that in a claim for
TIED, ‘the elements required are "(1) that the act allegedly causing harm was
(continued. -.)

 

 

 

 

26
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

rn
“soutrageous conduct, threats, intimidation, and words’ which

cause a plaintiff to suffer ‘grievous mental and emotional
distress as well as great physical damage’ may also fall within
an exception to the federal interest in the national labor policy
and therefore permit state law recovery.” 73 Haw. at 264, 831
P.2d 1341 (quoting Zazmer, 430 U.S. at 301). As noted above,
this court held that allegations of such conduct may survive
preenption provided that certain requirements are met:

[nin order for a tort claim based on outrageous conduct to
Hurvive presenpeion, the outrageous conduct must be either
i) "unrelated to governed labor practices, or 2) be
Accomplished in such an abusive manner that the manner
TESel? becomes the basis for the claim.

Ida at 265, 631 P.2d 1335 (emphasis added).

Briggs relied on the Suprene Court decision in Farmer.
In Earner, the Supreme Court permitted a state-law claim for TIED
to proceed despite the broad application given to NLRA preemption
pursuant to Garon. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
union officials discriminated against him in referrals to
employers following a disagreement over union policies. 430 U.S.
at 292. In holding that the ITED claim survived preemption under
Garmon, the Court said:

If the charges in [the plaintiff's) complaint were filed
With the [NLRB], the focus of any unfair labor practice
Proceeding would be on whether the statements or conduct on
The part ef fulnien officials discriminated or threatened
Giscrimination against him in employment referrals for
feasons other than failure co pay [u]nion dues. Whether the
Eeatenents of conduct of the respondents also caused (the
pisintifil severe emotional distress and physical injury

 

(continued)
Antenticnsi or reckless, (2) that the act was outrageous, and (3) that the act
causes (4) extreme emotional distress to another.” -

102 Hawai'i $2, 106-07, 73 P.38 46, 60-61 (2003).
2
‘+#*F0R PUBLICATION***

 

would play no role in the (NLRB 4) disposition of the c
nd the (NLRB) could not evard (the pleintifr) damages for
ain, suffering, or medical expanses. Conversely, the
Btate-coure tort ection ean be adjudicated without
Fesolution of the “merits” of the underlying labor dispute.
Recovery for the tort of enotional distress under California
lew requires proof thet the defendant intentionally engaged
in outrageous conduct causing the plaintiff to sustain

rental distress. sr oneider, much

 

 

 

‘Senta,
Id, at 304 (omphasis added) (citations omitted).

‘This court in Briggs, citing to Farmer, recognized that

 

claims for IIED are not automatically preempt

[Winton discrimination in employment opportunities (conduct
Wolating the NLRA) cannot itself form the underlying
“outrageous” conduct on which the state-court tort action is
based; to hold otherwise would undermine the pre-esption
principle. Nor can threats of such discrimination suffice
Eo sustain statercourt Juriadiction. it nay weil be that
the threat, or actuality, of employment discrimination will
Gauge a union enber considerable enotional distress and
Snelety.” But sonething nore is required before concurrent
State-court jurisdiction can be permitted. Simply stated,
Seis essential that the state tort be either unrelated to
employment discrimination or 2 function of the particularly
abusive manner in which the diserisination ts accomplished
‘Gr threatened rather than s function of the actusl or
Shreatened discrinination staelf.

 

 

 

Briggs, 73 Haw. at 285, 831 P.2d at 1341 (citing Farmer, 430 U.S.
in order for Appellant to

 

at 305) (emphases in original). Henc

 

proceed with his claim for IIED, the claim must either be
(2) unrelated to employment discrimination or (2) “a function of
the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is
accomplished or threatened rather then a function of the actual
or threatened discrimination itself.” Id. A review of the

record in this appeal indicates that Appellant cannot succeed

under the first prong since the claim for IIED, as alleged,

28
*#*FOR PUBLICATION***

a
Grises in part, from union-related activity. The alleged conduct
imputed by Appellant to the original defendants and Appellees
occurred shortly after the disagreement over the terms of the
union contract and work rules. Based on the record and the
allegations contained in the CAC, it cannot be said that
hppellant’s claim is unrelated to employment discrimination.
however, Appellant satisfies the pleading requirenents
under the second prong. Appellant alleges that Appellees and
defendants (1) took steps in procuring multiple TROs and “causing
[2] subpoena duces tecum to be served on the Probation office in
order to threaten (i) the revocation of [Appellant's] deferred
acceptance of guilty plea, (ii) the entry of @ guilty plea
against [Appellant], (444) the sentencing of [Appellant] to
prison, or (iv) otherwise to cause [Appellant] to have
aifesculties with the Probation office": (2) “directly or
indirectly transmitted false information to other persons «
with the intent of causing statewide republication of said false
information”; and (3) “embarked on @ campaign to falsely accuse
{appellant} of various acts including witness intimidation,
property destruction, drug use, and terrorizing of ‘key
witnesses." As a matter of law, engaging in conduct designed to
threaten a person’s Liberty and reputation in the manner alleged
may constitute particularly abusive behavior. Moreover, such
conduct cannot be characterized as simply a function of

employment discrimination for, under the allegations, the conduct

23
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

goes beyond meze “threat, or actuality, of employment

discrimination[,]", ids, stemming from a union-related dispute.

 

To the extent that Appellant can show that these acts were done
in a particularly abusive manner, they are outside the purview of
preemption.

xr.

Appellant’s fifth claim for false light invasion of
privacy" in paragraphs 110 to 116 of the CAC, sets forth factual
allegations similar to those of his claim for defamation. See
infra. However, a cause of action for false light differs fron
defamation in that “[i]t is enough that [a plaintiff] is given
unreasonable and highly cbjectionable publicity that attributes
to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and so
is placed before the public in a false position.” Restatement
§ 6525, comment b.

In paragraph 112, Appellant alleges that Appellees
“publicized matters” relating to him, placing him “in a false
light before the public,” and “with reckless disregard as to the

truth of the matters.” Appellant further alleges in paragraph

 

\ the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6528 (1997) defines the tort
of false Light invasion of privacy as follows:

lone who gives publicity tos matter concerning another
that places the other before the public ina felge iight is
subject to Liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
{b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
Gieregara as to the faleiey of the publicizes matter
Tight in which the other would be

 

 

30
 

*FOR PUBLICATION***
OO

114 that Appellees knew that the statements “were false or acted
in reckless disregard of the truth of the statements which were
made{,]” and, under paragraph 116, that the making of the
statements was “intentional, wilful, wanton, fraudulent,
malicious and/or oppressivel.]”

‘The Supreme Court has not decided the question of
whether the tort of false light invasion of privacy is preempted
by the NERA. In order to establish a claim for false light
invasion of privacy, the plaintiff must show that defendant had
wknowledge of . . . of reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which [the
plaintiff] would be placed{,]” Restatement § 6526, which would be
whighly offensive to a reasonable person[,]” id.

We observe that the issues to be decided by the NLRB in
an unfair labor practice proceeding would differ from the issues
to be decided by a court in a tort action for false light
invasion of privacy. The NLRB vould focus on the effect of such
alleged acts on Appellant's association with the labor union
while a state court would focus on infringement of Appellant's
right to privacy. Thus, a claim for false light invasion of
privacy would merely be a “peripheral concern” of the NLAA.
Gouveia, 65 Haw. at 195, 649 P.2d at 1124. As such, this cause
of action will not unduly interfere with debate in the labor
context.

Moreover, we believe the interests of an individual in

securing his or her privacy is a primary state concern and that a

31
‘**9FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

claim for false Light invasion of privacy is “deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility(.J” Id. Cf. State v, Lester,
64 Haw. 659, 667, 649 P.2d 346, 353 (1982) (emphasizing the scope
of the right to privacy by stating that “(t]he right-to-privacy
provision of [Article I, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution]
relates to privacy in the informational and personal autonomy
sense,” which encompasses “the common law right to privacy or
tort privacy, and the ability of @ person to control the privacy
of information about himself such as unauthorized public
disclosure of embarrassing or personal facts about himself” and
that “Lilt concerns the possible abuses in the use of hichly
ion vernnen
private parties” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
We therefore hold that Appellant’s claims of false light invasion
of privacy is not preempted by the NLRA, and was sufficiently
pled.
xrir.

With respect to his fourth claim of defamation, alleged
in paragraphs 103 to 109 of the CAC, Appellant in paragraph 105
avers such harm as follows:

fe untrue and Defendants knew they ¥
‘nade said representations. The:
accusations were false and defamatory on their face, inputed

     
    

fn Plaintift an unfitness to perform the duties of his
ot

Eotentialiy seak, it was readily foreseeable that these
False and defenstory accusations caused injury to Plaintiff,
including in hie profession, calling, or trade.

 

(Emphasis added.) Appellant further asserted in paragraph 109
that Appellees’ conduct was “malicious.”
32
#**FOR PUBLICATION***
a

The harm alleged predominantly relates to Appellant’
employment, ‘This cause of action may require the court to
adjudicate issues related to union animosity. Thus, Appellant’ s
claim for defamation arguably involves activity protected under
section 7 of the NLRA. However, the Supreme Court’s examination
of preemption of defamation in Linn is illuminative.

In Ling, the plaintiff company manager brought an
action against the union for false and defamatory statenents made
in the course of the union's organizing campaign. 383 U.S. at
55. The United States district court dismissed the complaint on
the basis of preemption. Id, The plaintiff appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which affirmed. Id, The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that concurrent jurisdiction was proper:

[n}xercise of state jurisdiction here would be @ “nerely
Beviad iol lieited to redressing 1ibel issued with
Rrowledge of ite falaity, or with reckless disregard of

whether it was true or false. wer (ove that“
tei is shal ze if
‘eixcumstances.

Ida at 61 (emphases added). According to the Court, in Linn, “a
State's concern with redressing malicious libel is ‘so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility’ that it fits within
the exception specifically carved out by Gazmon.” Id, at 62.
The Court recognized that a potential conflict between state
court actions for defamation and the NLRA should be resolved in
favor of state jurisdiction:

Waite the INLRB) might find that an employer or union
Moleted § 8 by deliberately making false statenents, or
that the issuance of malicious statements during an
Srganising campaign had such 2 profound effect on the

 

33
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

flection as to require that it be set aside, it looks only
tothe coercive of misleading nature of the statements
Father than their defamatory quality,

eign 2 indivi) * ation

 

 

Hound's Zonetion, The Board can award no canagea,
[npose no penalty, of give any cther relief to the defaned

individual. On the contrerv, state remedies have been
ss 7 abl:
rhe iniuey 6 cious ii =

sea nary oF eesanst
Id, at 63 (emphases added). However, concerned with the
perceived danger that state suits would be utilized as “weapons
of economic coercion”, id. at 64, and the potential “threat to
stability of labor unions and smaller employees," id., the Court
directed that state remedies be limited to instances where a
complainant can establish that the defamatory statements were
made with malice, i,e., that Appellees knew the statements were
false or had a reckless disregard for their truth, see New York
Times v, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-90 (1964), and caused actual

damage." Linn, 383 U.S. at 64-65.

 

‘The Court allowed recovery if a complainant adduces
evidence as to the extent of the resulting harm which may include
“general injury to reputation, consequent mental suffering,

alienation of associat

  

cific items of pecuniary loss, or

whatever form of harm would be recognized by state tort law{,]"”

 

% tn contrast to this court's holding in Beanery. Wishiki, 66 Hew.
872, $78-79, 670 P.2d 1264, 1272, (1963), in order for # defamation ciain to be
exempt from preemption, a plaintiff is fequired to show nalice on the part of
the party sttributed with the defamatory statement, without regard to the
plaintiff’: status ae 2 public Figur

 

   

% the United States Suprene Court in Linn v, United Plant cused

Markers of An, Local 114, 303 U.S. 53 (1966), noted that the complaint in

that cave Talled to aliege these requirenenta, ‘Nevertheless, the Court
‘continued. ..)

34
+*+FOR PUBLICATION*#*
—_
id. at 65, and as to “some sort of compensable harm as a

   

prerequisite to the recovery of additional punitive damai

 

Ads at 66.

Wie note that Appellant has pled, under paragraph 104,
that Appellees allegedly published falsities including (1) that
Appellant is a violent and dangerous individual, (2) that he is
similar to a person who murdered seven people in an event of
workplace violence in Honolulu in the recent past, (3) that he is
similar to a person who murdered three workers, (4) that he is
similar to @ person who “massacred” his workplace supervisor in a
Connecticut incident, (5) that he “became angry” and started an
altercation with Soares, (6) that Soares did not provoke the
dispute with Appellant, (7) that Appellant is associated and
affiliated with, and is therefore responsible for, wrongful acts
by other persons, (8) that Appellant physically attacked Lee,

(9) that Appellant caused a physical altercation with police at a
night club, (10) that Appellant was taking steroids, (11) that

Appellant destroyed property, and (12) that Appellant physically

 

attacked Kalaiwa
Ae required by Linn, Appellant has pled, under

paragraph 107, that the statements “impugned [Appellant's]

reputation” and “held him up to scorn and ridicule and feelings

of contempt and execration in the community at large[,]” and

9, . continued)

granted (the ‘pleinift leave te amend his complaint and imposed on him the
Eirden of supporting the allegations. dd, at 66.

 

35
**4FOR PUBLICATION*#*

under paragraphs 105 and 109 of the CAC, that “(t]he statements
were untrue and [Appellees] knew they were untrue at the time”
and that the statements were made with malice. Therefore, based
on the allegations, Appellant’s defamation claim cannot be
Gismissed at this point. Inasmuch as Appellant's claims for
conspiracy and aiding and abetting are derivative claims, such
claims are not preempted insofar as the underlying tort is not.
xiv.

As discussed supra, the court approved a settlement
between the first and second McCabe defendants and Appellant,
leaving only Appellees as defendants in this appeal. The fact
that Appellees are attorneys, as opposed to enployers, does not
conflict with preemption. We note that the definition of
“employer” in the NRA “includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly.” 29 U.S.C. $ 152(2)-

Appellant has alleged in the CAC that Appellees were
agents of the defendants. This agency relationship is set forth
in the CAC at paragraph 14:

Plaintife 2 informed and believes and alleges
aiternatively, thet at relevant tines mentioned herein, all
mere: nts of each of
‘tier Defendants, ond the acts of one were taken on Denalf
Of the other Defendants herein, and/or (b) acting as ot
Conspirators of each of the other Defendants, and the acts
cf one were taken in furtherance of the conspiracy among the
Defendants herein, and/or {e) aiding and abetting each o
the other Defendants in the comission of the wrongs all
herein; and/or (a) were principale in 2 princissl-acen
Helaticnship with wip and Pepper as asante,

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) Similarly, in their motion to dismiss,

Appellees acknowledged that Garmon preemption applies to

36
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OO
attorneys of employers accused of unfair labor practices. As

stated supra, the definition of “employer” in the NLRA includes
agents of the employer. Hence, Appellees may raise preemption in
defense to Appellant's claims. See Richardson, 966 F.2d at 187
(stating that “third parties such as attorneys do typically act
‘as agente of the employer, and are thus, in such cases, clearly
subject to the NLRAY (internal citations omitted) ).
xv

Finally, in his third issue on appeal, Appellant argues
that preemption would violate his right to a trial by jury under
the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Appellees, in their sixth argument, contend that this issue was
improperly raised. Appellant does not direct this court to an
instance where this argument was directed to the court.
Accordingly, we do not consider it. “As a general rule, if 2

party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be

 

deemed to have been waived on appeal; this rule applies in both
criminal and civil cases.” State v, Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456,
77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003). See, e.g, State v, Hoglund, 71 Haw.
147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) (stating that, “[glenerally,
the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level
precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal”).
xvE.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part and vacate in

part the October 23, 2002 final judgment of the court granting

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Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's

CAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs:

Dane L. Miller and Wilma
Sur (Miller Tokuyama
Kralik & Sur LLP) for
plaintiff-appellant.

John T. Komeiji, Michael A.
Lorusso and Brian A. King
(Watanabe Ing Kawashina &
Komeiji LLP) for defendants~
appellees.

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