Case Title: King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97263, 97761

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 97263, 97761 cons.-Agenda 26-September 2004.
WILLARD J. KING, JR., et al., Appellants, v. FIRST CAPITAL

FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, d/b/a FCF Funding,

Appellee.-RICKY JENKINS et al., Appellants, v. CONCORDE 							
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed April 21, 2005.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In these consolidated appeals from Cook County and Rock Island
County, plaintiff mortgagors brought actions against defendant
mortgagees alleging that defendants had engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had prepared notes,
mortgages, and other documents in connection with plaintiffs'
mortgage loan transactions and had unlawfully charged plaintiffs fees
for those services. Plaintiffs also alleged claims for money had and
received and for violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) ( 815 ILCS 505/2
(West 2002)). The circuit court in the King case granted First
Capital's section 2-615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West
2002)) the claim for unauthorized practice of law, but denied the
motion as to the other counts of the complaint. Defendants in the
consolidated cases (hereafter, the Jenkins case) filed motions to
dismiss under sections 2-615 and section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619
(West 2002)). The motions were heard by one judge, who dismissed
the complaints after hearing on the motions.

BACKGROUND
	In No. 97263, the King case, all but one of the four counts of the
complaint contained class action claims. Count I, the individual claim,
alleged that First Capital violated the federal Truth in Lending Act (15
U.S.C. §1638 (2000)) and regulations thereunder by failing to
accurately disclose the finance charge and amount financed. Count I
prayed for statutory damages, attorney fees and costs. Count II
alleged a cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law based
upon First Capital's preparation of the loan documents for a fee.
Count III alleged that First Capital had violated the Consumer Fraud
Act by failing to disclose to the Kings and the class members the
material fact that the document preparation services for which it
charged a fee constituted the practice of law, but were not performed
by an attorney. Count IV alleged a claim for money had and received.
It alleged that First Capital had obtained money through inequitable
conduct in charging the document preparation fees and was obligated
to make restitution. Counts II and III prayed for compensatory and
punitive damages, in addition to attorney fees and costs. Count IV
prayed for restitution and costs.
	First Capital moved to dismiss counts II, III, and IV of the
complaint. The motion alleged that there is no private right of action
for the unauthorized practice of law absent allegations of negligence
or misrepresentation, allegations not made by the Kings in their
complaint. In addition, the motion alleged that because First Capital's
preparation of the loan documents was incidental to its business, it did
not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. With regard to the
complaint's claims under the Consumer Fraud Act and for money had
and received, the motion alleged that these claims were insufficient
because they relied on the unauthorized practice of law claim.
	The circuit court of Rock Island County granted First Capital's
motion to dismiss count II of the complaint, but denied the motion as
to counts III and IV. The court granted First Capital's request for a
finding under Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)). The
court certified the following questions: (1) whether a lender that
prepares documents for use in loan transactions in which the lender is
involved and charges the borrower for the preparation of those
documents is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and (2)
assuming arguendo that the answer to the first issue is "yes," whether
a private cause of action exists for the lender's unauthorized practice
of law. The appellate court concluded that First Capital's preparation
of documents and the charging of a fee to the Kings did not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, the court did not reach
the second certified question. 343 Ill. App. 3d 404. We granted
plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	No. 97761, the Jenkins case, involved 37 class action cases
consolidated for appeal. The allegations in 35 of the 37 Jenkins
complaints were similar to those in the King case. They alleged
unauthorized practice of law and violations of the Consumer Fraud
Act, and included claims for money had and received. In two of the
consolidated cases, the defendant lending institutions were alleged to
have used the services of an independent document preparation
service in preparing the loan documents. In addition to restitution, the
complaints contained prayers for compensatory and punitive damages,
and recovery of attorney fees and costs. Defendants filed section
2-615 motions to dismiss the complaints, alleging that (1) plaintiffs
did not have a private right of action to sue for damages for the
unauthorized practice of law, (2) defendants had not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, (3) plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
voluntary payment doctrine, (4) the Consumer Fraud Act does not
allow claims for the unauthorized practice of law, and (5) plaintiffs
could not allege the elements of a Consumer Fraud Act claim. Several
defendants are federal savings associations and one defendant is a
national bank. Those defendants filed section 2-619 motions to
dismiss the complaints on the ground that plaintiffs' claims were
preempted by federal law. The cases were consolidated for decision
and the circuit court of Cook County granted the motions to dismiss. 	On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's
decision on the sole basis that the voluntary payment doctrine barred
plaintiffs' claims. 345 Ill. App. 3d 669. We granted plaintiffs' petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	We allowed the motions of the following amici to file briefs in
this case: Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA); Halt, Inc.; Illinois
Bankers Association/American Bankers Association; Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency; and Office of Thrift Supervision,
Department of the Treasury. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

ANALYSIS
	The parties have identified several issues for our review: (1)
whether a mortgage lender that uses nonlawyers to prepare loan
documents for the lender's loans engages in the unauthorized practice
of law when the lender charges the borrower a fee for preparation of
the documents; (2) whether a private right of action to recover money
damages exists under the Attorney Act (705 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq.
(West 2002)); (3) whether plaintiffs' complaints stated a cause of
action under the Consumer Fraud Act; (4) whether a private right of
action for money had and received due to fees charged in this case
exists and whether the voluntary payment doctrine bars plaintiffs from
seeking restitution; and (5) whether federal law preempts plaintiffs'
state law claims against defendant national bank and federal savings
associations.
	We find it unnecessary to address some of these issues. Our
discussion is divided between two groups of cases. As to the first
group, which includes the King case and 35 of the 37 consolidated
Jenkins cases, we have found it necessary to address only the first
issue identified above. Although we might have resolved the first issue
on the basis of standing (the second issue identified above), doing so
would make it necessary to address plaintiffs' claims under the
Consumer Fraud Act. This would require us to resolve the first issue
in any event. The second group of cases, consisting of two of the
Jenkins cases, requires a separate discussion because the allegations
of those complaints differ from the allegations of the complaints in the
first group.

A. Standard of Review
	When the legal sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by a
section 2-615 motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint are taken as true and a reviewing court must determine
whether the allegations of the complaint, construed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1996). A motion to dismiss under section 2-619
admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, but asserts
affirmative matter that defeats the claim. Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (2002). Review under either section is de novo. Wallace,
203 Ill. 2d  at 447.

B. Whether Defendants Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of
Law By Charging a Fee Where Their Employees Prepared the Loan
Documents
	The following discussion relates to the King case and to all those
cases consolidated in the Jenkins case, except Jackson v. Harbor
Financial Group, Ltd., and Porter v. Smith-Rothchild Financial Co. &
Docu-Tech, Inc.
	The State requires minimum levels of education, training, and
character before granting a license to practice law. The purpose of
doing so is to protect the public from potential injury resulting from
laypersons performing acts that require the training, knowledge, and
responsibility of a licensed attorney. Herman v. Prudence Mutual
Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 479-80 (1969). The power to regulate
and define the practice of law is a prerogative of this court under the
Illinois Constitution. Although the legislature may pass laws declaring
the unauthorized practice of law illegal and may prescribe the
punishment therefor, such statutes are merely in aid of the power of
this court to control the practice of law. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349 (1937).
	All parties agree, and we concur, that defendants' preparation of
the notes and mortgages in this case constitutes the practice of law.
See People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 53-54 (1949) (real estate broker who prepared deeds, contracts, and
mortgages in connection with real estate transactions was practicing
law).
	Citing our decision in Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson,
Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 116 (1966), plaintiffs argue that defendants engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law by charging plaintiffs a document
preparation fee for preparing the notes, mortgages, and related
documents for plaintiffs' loan transactions. In Quinlan, the defendant
was a real estate brokerage firm that employed a number of brokers.
The brokers customarily prepared offers to purchase real estate,
contracts of sale, deeds, and other documents in connection with
transactions for the sale and purchase of real estate in which the
brokers were involved. The firm did not charge a fee for these
services. The forms used were standardized forms which the brokers
would complete by inserting relevant facts and striking provisions that
did not apply. The plaintiff bar association alleged that these activities
constituted the unauthorized practice of law and sought an injunction
to stop the practice. The brokerage firm argued that completion of the
documents required only ordinary business intelligence, that the
practice had become an established custom, and that no harm had
been shown to result. The firm also pointed out that no compensation
was charged for the service. Noting that the case was very similar to
the Schafer case, this court rejected the firm's arguments:
		"It is not decisive that defendant is compensated only by its
commission, making no special charge for the services in
question; nor is it relevant that the services are customarily
provided by real-estate men and that no identifiable harm is
proved to have ensued. As the appellate court pointed out, it
is the character of the acts themselves that determines the
issue. If by their nature they require a lawyer's training for
their proper performance it does not matter that there may
have been a widespread disregard of the requirement or that
considerations of business expediency would be better served
by a different rule." Quinlan, 34 Ill. 2d  at 120.
	We held that the brokerage firm could prepare the preliminary
contract or offer to purchase real estate where this required only the
filling in of blanks with simple factual data. Preparation of this
document coincides with the job the broker was hired to perform and
which he or she is licensed to perform. However, the drawing or
filling in of blanks on deeds, mortgages, and other legal instruments
is not incidental to the performance of brokerage services. Preparation
of these instruments requires the skill of an attorney and constitutes
the practice of law. Quinlan, 34 Ill. 2d  at 121-22.
	The exception recognized by this court in Quinlan to what would
otherwise be the unauthorized practice of law has become known as
the "pro se exception." It applies to the preparation of documents in
situations where the party preparing the legal documents does so for
his or her own benefit in a transaction to which the preparer is a party.
Defendants acknowledge that their preparation of the notes and
mortgages in these cases constitutes the practice of law. For their part,
plaintiffs acknowledge that the lenders prepared the notes and
mortgages for their own use in transactions to which they were
parties. The question that we must answer is whether the charging of
the document preparation fees by defendants here takes this case out
of the pro se exception. Plaintiffs argue that the charging for the
preparation of the documents, as a matter of law, constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law, regardless of whether the pro se
exception would otherwise apply. Defendants counter that the
charging of a fee is irrelevant because the unlicensed practice of law
is unlawful even if it is pro bono.
	The fees charged to plaintiffs in the mortgage transactions were
disclosed on Form HUD-1 closing statements attached as exhibits to
plaintiffs' complaints. The fees were designated as document
preparation fees. There was a separate place on the form to disclose
any attorney's fees. Plaintiffs do not claim that they received legal
services from defendants. They do not claim that defendants held
themselves out as providing legal services in connection with the loan
transactions. Their sole claim is that the charging of these document
preparation fees transformed otherwise legal conduct into illegal
conduct. In doing so, they do not claim that they have suffered any
harm as a result of defendants' preparation of the mortgages and
notes. They do not claim that defendants improperly prepared the
mortgages and notes nor do they argue that the fees were not fully
disclosed to them. They do not argue that they believed defendants
were acting as their attorneys or were advising them on legal matters
in any way.
	This is an issue of first impression. No Illinois case, prior to the
appellate court in King below, has addressed the question presented.
The appellate court in King held that First Capital's preparation of the
mortgage and note fell within the pro se exception to the unauthorized
practice of law despite the fact that First Capital charged a fee to
recoup the cost of preparing the documents. The court rejected the
Kings' argument that the charging of a fee made First Capital's
conduct illegal, noting that this court in Quinlan held that it is the
character of the acts that determine whether they constitute the
unauthorized practice of law. The appellate court concluded that the
charging of the fee did not change the essential nature of First
Capital's conduct. It did not hold itself out to be a legal advisor and
did not prevent the Kings from obtaining legal advice concerning the
documents. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 407-08. Justice Lytton, in a special
concurrence, concluded that the charging of the fee changed the
nature of the transaction because, when the Kings were required to
pay the fee or forgo the mortgage, the transaction was no longer only
incidentally beneficial to them. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 408 (Lytton, J.,
specially concurring).
	Plaintiffs argue that the appellate court's conclusion in King is
inconsistent with this court's decisions in Quinlan, Schafer and
People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462 (1931). They maintain that the decision in Quinlan
held that the pro se exception to the unauthorized practice of law does
not permit the receipt of a fee, citing the following quotation from that
case:
		" ' "Any one who wants to pay the price may purchase a set
of form books and read and copy them. He may use them in
his own business if he so desires. But when he advises others
for a consideration, that this or that is the law, or that this
form or that is the proper form to be used in a certain
transaction, then he is doing all that a lawyer does when a
client seeks his advice." ' " (Emphasis added.) Quinlan, 34 Ill. 2d  at 122, quoting Schafer, 404 Ill.  at 52.
	While the court mentioned the charging of a fee, the overriding
concern was about the giving of legal advice to others, as illustrated
by the italicized portions of the quote. In fact, the question of
compensation was not presented in Quinlan. The court focused on the
nature of the conduct alleged to have occurred in that case.
	Neither do this court's decisions in Schafer and Peoples Stock
Yards State Bank support plaintiffs' argument. Schafer involved a real
estate broker who prepared deeds, mortgages, and contracts in
transactions in which he was the broker. He charged no fee for these
services. He also prepared these same documents for use in
transactions in which he was not involved. For these services, he did
charge a fee. In addition, he advised a woman concerning the
disposition of her estate and prepared deeds and other instruments for
her for a fee. The question before the court was whether the broker's
activities constituted the practice of law. In answering that question,
this court focused, not on whether a fee was charged, but on the
nature of the conduct. It noted that "practicing law" had been defined
as " 'the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any
person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.' " Schafer, 404 Ill.  at 50-51, quoting Peoples
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.  at 475.
	The Peoples Stock Yards State Bank case involved a bank that
represented customers in various legal transactions, both in and out of
court, and charged fees for its services. The question there was
whether the bank had practiced law. In holding that it had done so,
this court focused, not on the fees charged, but on the acts performed
by the bank. As the bank was not and could not be licensed to practice
law, we held that the bank was engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.  at 477-78.
	Plaintiffs also cite cases from other jurisdictions. In Miller v.
Vance, 463 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1984), employees of a bank who were
not attorneys prepared two mortgages. No fees were charged for this
service. In a foreclosure action, the holder of a third mortgage sought
a ruling that the two other mortgages were void and unenforceable
because the preparers were not attorneys and that the completion of
the mortgages constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Referring
to an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Indiana noted that it had
previously held that the filling in of blanks in legal instruments that
were prepared by attorneys and require only the use of common
knowledge regarding the information to be inserted in the blanks does
not constitute the practice of law. The court noted that preparation of
the mortgages in the present case was incidental to and directly
connected with the bank's regular business of making loans, and
therefore did not constitute the practice of law. The court went on to
state that the bank employees could not give advice or legal opinions,
nor could the bank make any separate charge for the preparation of
the mortgage. Miller, 463 N.E.2d  at 253.
	We note that the Miller court did not give any reason for its
statement that no separate charge could be made for preparation of a
mortgage by a bank's employees. Its holding prohibiting the making
of a charge was taken from an earlier case, State ex rel. Indiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 224, 191 N.E.2d 711, 716-17 (1963). In that case, the court held that certain
specified legal documents could be prepared by real estate brokers in
transactions in which they were involved, but that no separate charge
could be made by the broker for the preparation of the documents. In
its holding, the court cited a Missouri Supreme Court case with
approval, Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 45-46, 247 S.W.2d 855, 862
(1952). That case held that no document preparation charge could be
made by a real estate broker:
		"However, he cannot properly make separate charges, in
addition to his commission, for preparing any instruments or
engage in the field of conveyancing and drafting contracts or
other legal instruments for the public generally, with or
without separate charge. Such conduct would not be any part
of his business as a real estate broker but would be placing
the emphasis upon conveyancing as a practice of law instead
of on his services as a broker ***." Hulse, 363 Mo. at 44,
247 S.W.2d  at 861.
The Missouri court also noted that making a separate charge for the
document preparation would violate Missouri statutory law. The
citation of Miller by plaintiffs here is of dubious assistance, since the
activities there were not considered to be the practice of law.
	Plaintiffs also cite a decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 109 N.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1961), involving the validity of a rule adopted by the
defendant real estate brokers board (board). The issues before the
court were whether the completion by real estate brokers of
standardized forms to transfer title to real estate belonging to their
clients was the practice of law, and, if so, whether the board could
authorize the practice by its licensed brokers. Plaintiffs assert the
Wisconsin court held that real estate brokers could fill out standard
form notes and mortgages where the documents are "incident to
transactions in which they act as licensed brokers, provided that said
brokers receive no extra compensation for filling in or completing
such forms." However, the passage quoted by plaintiffs regarding the
prohibition against receipt of compensation was not a holding of the
court, but rather was contained in the rule of the board that the court
was reviewing. Accordingly, this case does not support plaintiffs'
position.
	In Cain v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 66
N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936), also cited by plaintiffs, the court
stated that a person who is not a lawyer may draw instruments such
as simple deeds, mortgages, notes, and bills of sale when they are
related to transactions in which the person is interested, provided no
charge is made for the preparation of the instruments. However, the
court's statement was dicta because the case before the court involved
a bank that rendered services to third parties.
	Likewise, Pulse v. North American Land Title Co. of Montana,
218 Mont. 275, 282, 707 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1985), citing Cain, 66
N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719, held that a party may complete preprinted
forms, such as simple deeds, notes, and mortgages, provided that the
instruments are incident to real estate transactions in which the party
is involved and no separate charge is made for their preparation.
	Insofar as plaintiffs' cited cases do not discuss why receipt of
compensation is prohibited, they are of marginal assistance. Only in
the Hulse case did the court explain why the making of a charge for
preparing the instruments transformed lawful conduct into the
unauthorized practice of law.
	Plaintiffs argue that once defendants charged the fee for
document preparation, they could no longer assert that they were
acting on their own behalf because a pro se litigant does not receive
payment from another for its legal services. Plaintiffs acknowledge
that a layperson is entitled to represent herself in court and is
protected by the pro se exception if she does. However, they argue
that if she receives a fee for those legal services, her receipt of that
money suggests that she is acting, not on her own behalf, but on
behalf of the person paying the fee. Plaintiffs cite this court's decision
in People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282 (1948) in
support of this contention. There, a disbarred attorney purported to
represent himself in court in a matter in which he had procured the
assignment of the interests of others in the litigation to himself as
guardian for his minor son. His agreement with the true parties in
interest provided that certain costs, including the costs of his handling
the suit, should be deducted prior to dividing the net proceeds of the
suit. This court rejected the attorney's argument that he was merely
acting pro se in the litigation, finding that the assignments were a
subterfuge used to deceive the court as to the real parties in interest
and to effectively nullify the order disbarring the attorney. Tinkoff,
399 Ill.  at 290.
	Tinkoff is inapplicable to the case at bar. There, it was clear that
the true parties in interest were persons other than the purported pro
se litigant and that he was in fact representing them and not himself.
Here, the documents prepared for use in the closing transactions were
for the benefit of defendants. The notes evidenced plaintiffs'
indebtedness to defendants and the mortgages secured that
indebtedness. Although the documents provided an incidental benefit
to plaintiffs in the sense that their preparation was necessary to the
completion of their transactions, it cannot be said that the primary
benefit went to plaintiffs.
	Finally, plaintiffs rely on section 1 of the Attorney Act (705 ILCS
205/1 (West 2002)) as decisive proof that the receipt of a fee for
services that would otherwise come within the pro se exception turns
such conduct into the unauthorized practice of law. That section
provides in pertinent part:
			"No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or
counselor at law within this State without having previously
obtained a license for that purpose from the Supreme Court
of this State.
			No person shall receive any compensation directly or
indirectly for any legal services other than a regularly licensed
attorney.
			***
			Any person practicing, charging or receiving fees for
legal services within this State, either directly or indirectly,
without being licensed to practice as herein required, is guilty
of contempt of court and shall be punished accordingly, upon
complaint being filed in any Circuit Court of this State. Such
proceedings shall be conducted in the Courts of the
respective counties where the alleged contempt has been
committed in the same manner as in cases of indirect
contempt and with the right of review by the parties thereto."
(Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 205/1 (West 2002).
	The Attorney Act was first enacted in 1874. The italicized
language plaintiffs rely on has been in the statute since 1917. This
court's Quinlan decision, in which we first recognized the pro se
exception to the unauthorized practice of law, was issued in 1966.
Section 1 of the Attorney Act simply does not address the pro se
exception. We note that section 11 of the Attorney Act allows persons
to prosecute and defend actions in court on a pro se basis and allows
corporations to represent themselves, through their managerial
employees, in small claims actions. 705 ILCS 205/11 (West 2002).
However, section 1, despite being amended on several occasions since
it was enacted, does not explicitly address the pro se exception
recognized in Quinlan. Accordingly, plaintiffs' reliance on the
Attorney Act is misplaced.
	For these reasons, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs' arguments
that the mere charging of a fee for document preparation, when the
conduct is otherwise within the pro se exception, changes the nature
of the transaction to one that becomes the unauthorized practice of
law. Accordingly, we hold that the charging of a fee, without more,
for the preparation of the loan documents by the lenders' employees
did not transform their conduct into the unauthorized practice of law.

C. Allegations of Unauthorized Practice of Law in the Jackson and
Porter Cases
	In the first group of cases, it was alleged that defendant lenders
prepared the loan documents. However, in the Jackson and Porter
cases, plaintiffs have alleged in their complaints that the document
preparation fees were paid to Docu-Tech, an independent document
preparation service. In the Porter case, Docu-Tech was made a party
defendant. However, the plaintiff there later filed a motion to dismiss
Docu-Tech from the action on the ground that Docu-Tech was not the
corporation that handled the plaintiff's loan transaction. The trial court
granted the motion. In both cases, the closing statements indicate that
the document preparation fees were paid to Docu-Tech. Each of the
complaints contains two counts. Count I alleges the unauthorized
practice of law and count II alleges a cause of action for money had
and received.
	We have already held that where the mortgage lenders actually
prepared loan documents, through their employees, for transactions
to which the lenders were parties, the charging of a fee did not take
the transactions out of the pro se exception to the unauthorized
practice of law. A different situation is presented, however, where a
person or entity that is not a licensed attorney and not a party to the
transaction prepares the loan documents. In such a case, the pro se
exception is not available and the preparation of the documents
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. We emphasize, however,
that it is the preparation of the documents-the filling in of blanks with
the relevant information and the tailoring of the document to fit the
particular transaction for which it is to be used-not the mere
furnishing of legal forms for use by another, that makes the activity
the unauthorized practice of law. As we have said, it is the character
of the acts involved that determine whether one engages in the
unauthorized practice of law. Quinlan, 34 Ill. 2d  at 120; In re
Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 523 (1994). A contrary holding would deter
the provision of a legitimate service to those who use such forms in
transactions to which they are parties.
	The allegations of count I of the Jackson complaint state that (1)
defendant lender, Harbor Financial Group, originates mortgage loans;
(2) in connection with plaintiff's loan transaction, the lender charged
plaintiff a document preparation fee of $60 for filling out the note and
mortgage and related documents; (3) the fee was paid to Docu-Tech;
(4) the document preparation services were not performed by an
attorney; (5) neither the lender nor Docu-Tech is a professional
corporation consisting of attorneys licensed to practice law; and (6)
it is the standard practice of the lender to charge a document
preparation fee when it makes or arranges a loan. The complaint
further alleges that the lender engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law by performing document preparation services for a fee. Attached
to the complaint is a copy of the closing statement, which contains an
itemization of the settlement charges and shows application of the
loan proceeds. It shows a charge of $60 to Docu-Tech for document
preparation.
	In count I of her complaint, the plaintiff in the Porter case alleges
that (1) defendant lender, Smith-Rothchild Financial Co., originates
mortgage loans; (2) [now-dismissed defendant] Docu-Tech prepares
and sells documents for use in making mortgage loans; (3) the lender
charged plaintiff a document preparation fee of $70 for filling out the
note and mortgage and related documents; (4) the lender in turn paid
the fee to Docu-Tech; (5) the document preparation services were not
performed by an attorney; (6) neither the lender nor Docu-Tech is a
professional corporation consisting of attorneys authorized to practice
law; (7) it is the standard practice of the lender to charge a document
preparation fee when it makes or arranges a loan; and (8) it is the
standard practice of Docu-Tech to prepare loan documents for a fee.
The complaint further alleges that the lender and Docu-Tech engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law by performing document
preparation services for a fee.
	We need not decide in these cases whether the lenders may be
held vicariously liable for the unauthorized practice of law engaged in
by Docu-Tech because we hold that no private right of action for
damages exists under the Attorney Act for the unauthorized practice
of law.

D. Private Right of Action for Damages for the Unauthorized
Practice of Law
	One of the lenders' arguments is that no private right of action
for damages for the unauthorized practice of law exists in Illinois,
absent allegations of otherwise actionable conduct. Although this
court has not heretofore addressed this issue, the appellate court has
had occasion to do so. Those cases have discussed the issue in the
context of the Attorney Act.
	In Rathke v. Lidisky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 560 (1978), the plaintiff was
the buyer in a real estate transaction. The contract with the sellers was
contingent on putting a new roof on the garage. The plaintiff filed suit
against the sellers and the real estate agents, alleging that the
defendants had fraudulently misrepresented the structural soundness
of the residence. She also alleged that one or more of the real estate
agents had inserted the contingency provision in the printed sales
contract and that this constituted the unauthorized practice of law and
a violation of the Attorney Act. She did not allege negligence or that
the defendants represented themselves to be attorneys. She sought
actual and punitive damages. The appellate court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the licensing provisions of the Attorney Act
provide a basis for an actionable tort for the unauthorized practice of
law because the statute had been enacted for her protection. The court
concluded that the statute was intended to prevent the practice of a
profession by those who are not licensed, rather than an attempt to
legislate a standard of conduct. Rathke, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 562.
	In Torres v. Fiol, 110 Ill. App. 3d 9 (1982), the plaintiffs filed
suit against a non-attorney for the unauthorized practice of law. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, citing the Rathke case for the
proposition that no private cause of action for damages for the
unauthorized practice of law is recognized in Illinois. The appellate
court reversed and remanded, noting that the language of the Attorney
Act explicitly provides that it does not preclude other theories of
recovery against one who engages in the unauthorized practice of law
and mishandles the matter. Since the plaintiffs alleged negligence on
the part of the defendant in the handling of the legal services he
undertook to render, they could proceed upon a negligence theory for
the defendant's improper activities. Torres, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 11.
	Plaintiffs cite Richard F. Mallen & Associates, Ltd. v.
Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 329 Ill. App. 3d 953 (2002) for the
position that a private right of action for the unauthorized practice of
law exists under the Attorney Act. The Mallen case, however, does
not stand for that proposition. There, a law firm brought a class action
lawsuit on behalf of all Illinois personal injury attorneys for an
injunction against the defendant, an unlicensed business that operated
a web site advising people injured in automobile accidents concerning
their legal rights. Count I of the complaint, alleging unauthorized
practice of law, was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that
plaintiff lacked standing to bring the cause of action. The appellate
court reversed, finding that an attorney is a proper party to bring such
an action because the practice of law by unlicensed persons constitutes
an infringement upon the rights of those who are properly licensed.
Mallen, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 956. The difference between the Mallen
case and this case is that, here, plaintiffs seek compensatory and
punitive damages in the counts of their complaints alleging a violation
of the Attorney Act. The law firm in Mallen was not seeking damages,
but rather an injunction, which is explicitly permitted by the Attorney
Act.
	The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give
effect to the intent of the legislature. Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 22 (2002). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language
used in the statute itself and that language must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000). "Under
the guise of construction, a court may not supply omissions, remedy
defects, annex new provisions, substitute different provisions, add
exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law so
as to depart from the plain meaning of language employed in the
statute. [Citation.] If the language of the statute is clear, its plain and
ordinary meaning must be given effect without resorting to other aids
of construction." In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309-10 (2001).
	Section 1 of the Attorney Act provides that any person
practicing, charging or receiving fees for legal services without being
licensed to practice law by this court is guilty of contempt of court
and shall be punished accordingly upon a complaint being filed against
that person. The statute goes on to provide that the contempt
proceedings shall be conducted in the same manner as in cases of
indirect contempt in the county in which the alleged contempt was
committed. Thus, the statute permits a contempt sanction for the
unauthorized practice of law. Its plain language does not provide for
any other remedy for a violation of the statute, although it does say
that the contempt remedy is "in addition to other remedies permitted
by law." Thus, any remedies provided in other statutes or by the
common law are not foreclosed by the existence of the contempt
remedy in the Attorney Act. Had the legislature intended to provide
a cause of action for damages for violation of the Attorney Act, it
could have easily done so. Accordingly, we hold that there exists no
private right of action under the Attorney Act for damages.

E. Restitution and the Voluntary Payment Doctrine
	Citing the "other remedies permitted by law" language of the
Attorney Act, plaintiffs argue that the statute presents no barrier to
their claim for restitution. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' restitution
claim is merely an attempt to restate their unauthorized practice of law
claim by placing a restitution label on it. They also allege that plaintiffs
have failed to properly allege a cause of action for restitution, and that
plaintiffs may not maintain an action for restitution where a specific
contract governs the parties' relationship. We need not address these
arguments because we agree with defendants that the voluntary
payment doctrine bars plaintiffs' claim for restitution.
	" 'It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily
paid under a claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the
facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on
the ground that the claim was illegal. It has been deemed necessary
not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that
the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which
amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence
of such compulsion.' " Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49
(1981), quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 541 (1908); Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469,
497 (1994).
	The appellate court in Jenkins held that the voluntary payment
doctrine barred the claims of all plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that the
appellate court's decision took an "extremely harsh" view of the
voluntary payment doctrine, one that is at odds with this court's
decision in Illinois Graphics. In that case, an employer and its
workers' compensation insurance carrier brought suit to recover
payments made to the defendant employee who was later determined
to be ineligible for benefits. The temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits were paid while the claim was pending. At the arbitration
hearing on the defendant's claim, it was determined that the
defendant's medical records failed to show any causal connection
between her work and her injury. The arbitrator denied her claim and
the Industrial Commission affirmed that decision. No appeal was
taken. The insurance carrier, State Farm, demanded that the defendant
reimburse it for the TTD payments. The defendant refused and State
Farm sued. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the appellate
court affirmed. One of the grounds of the defendant's motion to
dismiss was that recovery of the payments was precluded by the
voluntary payment doctrine. On that issue, this court determined that
the complaint stated a claim based on the theory that the payments
were made under a mistake of fact. Although the complaint did not
state that the payment was based upon a mistake of fact, it could
reasonably be inferred that the payments were made on incorrect and
incomplete information regarding the nature of the claimed injury.
Under such circumstances, the voluntary payment doctrine did not
completely negate the claim. Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at 497.
	Plaintiffs argue that this court has lowered the standard
enunciated in prior cases for determining when the voluntary payment
doctrine will apply. They note that in Illinois Graphics, this court
allowed a sophisticated insurance company to recover money
voluntarily paid, even though the company must have known there
was some chance that the defendant employee would not prevail on
her claim. Unlike State Farm, plaintiffs argue, they proceeded with
their loan transactions without full knowledge of the "critical fact"
that no lawyer was involved in drafting the loan documents. We
disagree that any standard has been lowered. We must point out that
this court, in Illinois Graphics, did not allow the recovery of
payments by State Farm. We merely held that the defendant's
argument that the payments were voluntary did not completely negate
State Farm's claim for reimbursement because the claim was based on
a mistake-of-fact theory. There were other issues not related to the
voluntary payment issue and the case was remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings.
	Plaintiffs also argue that the appellate court in Jenkins gave no
weight to the superior bargaining position of the defendant lenders,
contrary to Illinois Graphics. Plaintiffs refer to the following
statement from this court's opinion:
		"In allowing the recovery, the court addressed the common
law rule, known as the voluntary payments doctrine, that
neither money paid under a claim of right with full knowledge
of the underlying facts and absent coercion, fraud or a
superior bargaining position by the transferee nor money
paid under a mistake of law is recoverable." (Emphasis
added.) Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at 491.
	As is evident from the quoted statement, this court was referring
to a previous case that was being discussed at that point, Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Zambole, 141 Ill. App. 3d 803 (1986). Later
on in the opinion, this court clearly stated the well-established rule:
		"The rule is that in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation,
or mistake of fact money voluntarily paid under a claim of
right to the payment, with full knowledge of the facts by the
person making the payment, cannot be recovered unless the
payment was made under circumstances amounting to
compulsion." Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d  at 497.
	Prior cases illustrate the application of the doctrine. In Ross v.
City of Geneva, 71 Ill. 2d 27, 34-35 (1978), this court held that the
plaintiff was not barred from recovering payments made to the
defendant for a surcharge on electrical service required under an
ordinance that was determined to be invalid. The record showed that
the defendant had a policy of terminating service for nonpayment of
charges and that the defendant had done so on several occasions.
Thus, confronted with the choice of paying the surcharge or
termination of service, the plaintiff was not barred from recovery of
the sums paid.
	In Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 49-50 (1981), the
plaintiffs were not barred by the voluntary payment doctrine from
recovering payments made by them in excess of the amount owed
under a municipal message tax. This court found that plaintiffs did not
have full knowledge of the amounts they were paying and could not
have made a proper statutory protest because the bills they received
did not sufficiently itemize the charges being made. Getto, 86 Ill. 2d 
at 49-50. Further, the court held that telephone service had become a
necessity and that the implicit and real threat that telephone service
would be terminated for nonpayment of the charges amounted to
compulsion that would preclude application of the voluntary payment
doctrine. Getto, 86 Ill. 2d  at 51.
	In Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 129 Ill. 2d 389
(1989), plaintiffs sued to recover sales taxes they had paid on tampons
and sanitary napkins. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had
not sufficiently pleaded duress under the voluntary payment doctrine
when they alleged that tampons and sanitary napkins were necessities.
This court reversed. In discussing the voluntary payment doctrine as
applied to the payment of taxes, this court noted that taxes voluntarily
paid may not be recovered even if the taxes were imposed illegally,
absent a statutory right of protest. However, taxes are not voluntarily
paid where either the taxpayer lacked knowledge of the facts upon
which to protest the taxes at the time they were paid, or the taxpayer
paid the taxes under duress. This court found that tampons and
sanitary napkins are necessities of life and that no reasonable
alternative products exist. The plaintiffs could not have obtained the
products without paying the tax. The court rejected the defendants'
argument that the plaintiffs were required to plead that they could not
purchase the products without paying the taxes or that the defendants
threatened to or had an established policy of refusing to sell the
products if a customer refused to pay the taxes. The court noted that
State law required every retail store in Illinois to pay a state tax on
receipts collected from the sale of their products. Chicago also
imposed a city sales tax. Retail stores simply do not sell a product if
the purchaser refuses to pay the tax on it. The court declined to
require the plaintiffs to plead or perform a useless act. Courts have
found coercion to be implied in certain circumstances. Thus, an actual
threat is not necessary; implied duress is sufficient. Geary, 129 Ill. 2d 
at 402-03.
	Plaintiffs in the instant cases complain that the appellate court
gave no weight to the economic consequences of not paying the
document preparation fees. They argue that had they discovered at the
closing that a nonlawyer prepared the loan documents and refused to
pay the fees, they would have either have been in breach of their
contracts of sale in cases involving a purchase money mortgage or, in
cases of a refinancing, they would have likely incurred costs at least
equal to the amount of the document preparation fees. They argue
that they were operating under a mistake of fact because the defendant
lenders did not inform them that the loan documents were prepared by
nonlawyers. However, the exhibits attached to plaintiffs' complaints
demonstrate that the lenders fully disclosed that the document
preparation fees were separate from any attorney fees. The closing
statements contain separate places for the itemization of attorney fees
and document preparation fees. Two lines below the space for the
document preparation fee is a space to itemize any attorney fees,
including the name of the attorney to whom the fee is paid.
Accordingly, plaintiffs could not have mistakenly believed that the
loan documents were prepared by attorneys. Both the Jackson and
Porter closing statements show that no attorney fees were paid.
Plaintiffs do not allege in their complaints or argue in their briefs that
the lenders represented that attorneys prepared the documents, nor do
they allege that they believed that attorneys prepared the documents.
If they looked at their closing statements, any such belief would have
been unreasonable. Therefore, we reject plaintiffs' argument that they
were operating under a mistake of fact regarding who prepared the
loan documents. Plaintiffs further argue that where document
preparation fees of $300 or $400 are charged, borrowers are likely to
assume that the documents were prepared by lawyers and are thus
discouraged from retaining their own legal counsel. Even if that might
be true where such large sums are charged for document preparation,
no such conclusion can be drawn here, where the document
preparation fees charged in the Jackson and Porter cases amounted to
$60 and $70, respectively.
	Further, we note that plaintiffs do not plead any facts in their
complaints that might demonstrate that they were compelled to either
pay the fee or forego their loan transactions. Unlike the plaintiffs in
Geary, where the retail defendants were required by law to collect
taxes on the products plaintiffs purchased, it is not clear that all
mortgage lenders prepare their own documents or utilize the services
of a document preparation service. In fact, the complaint in the
Jackson case contains the following statement: "A document
preparation fee is 'a separate fee that some lenders or title companies
charge to cover their costs of preparation of final legal papers, such
as a mortgage, deed of trust, note or deed.' " (Emphasis added.) This
statement is attributed to a publication of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. Thus, it is not certain, as it was in Geary,
that plaintiffs here had no choice but to pay the fees charged by their
lenders. For instance, plaintiffs do not allege that they were precluded
by the lenders from having the documents prepared by their own
attorneys. Reduced to its essence, plaintiffs' argument is that the
preparation of loan documents by nonlawyers is illegal. However, the
voluntary payment doctrine applies in the very circumstance where the
payment sought to be recovered was illegally obtained by the
defendant. Plaintiffs cannot avoid application of the doctrine by merely
alleging that defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
	Plaintiffs argue that the voluntary payment doctrine should not be
applied to them because that doctrine cannot be used to defeat public
policy. They argue that where parties are not in pari delicto and the
prohibition violated was intended to protect one of them, that party
can recover money paid. The phrase "in pari delicto" means
"[e]qually at fault." Black's Law Dictionary 806 (8th ed. 2004). The
doctrine of in pari delicto embodies the principle that "a plaintiff who
has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting
from the wrongdoing." Black's Law Dictionary 806 (8th ed. 2004).
	Plaintiffs cite cases in support of their public policy argument. In
Evans v. Funk, 151 Ill. 650 (1894), a probate judge acted as an
attorney in obtaining a settlement of a dispute among heirs that was
before his court. He obtained fees for this service. The heir who paid
the money brought suit to recover it on the basis that it had been made
to secure a settlement and not as attorney fees. This court allowed the
recovery on the basis of the judge's power over the heir and the estate
at issue and to protect the public from " 'fraudulent practice and
artifices.' " Evans, 151 Ill.  at 661, quoting Baehr v. Wolf, 59 Ill. 470,
474 (1871).
	Plaintiffs also cite Ransburg v. Haase, 224 Ill. App. 3d 681, 687
(1992), where the plaintiffs sued to recover money paid to an
architect, alleging that their contract was void because the architect
misrepresented himself to be licensed in Illinois. The appellate court
analyzed the Illinois Architecture Act in holding that the architect had
violated the statute by holding himself out to the plaintiffs as an
architect in Illinois. The purpose of the statute was to protect the
public. The court distinguished cases cited by the architect, noting that
there were no allegations that the plaintiffs knew that the architect was
not licensed in Illinois. Rather, the architect represented himself to be
so licensed.
	Plaintiffs cite other cases where courts refused to permit an
unlicensed party to recover fees for services or to otherwise enforce
a contract. See Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 66 Ill. 2d 398 (1977)
(attorney licensed in Wisconsin but not licensed in Illinois and who
represented clients in Illinois with respect to a out-of court matter not
allowed to recover fees); Tovar v. Paxton Community Memorial
Hospital, 29 Ill. App. 3d 218 (1975) (physician not licensed in Illinois
could not enforce employment contract with hospital); Kaplan v.
Tabb Associates, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 3d 320 (1995) (building contract
was void where corporate architect was not licensed in Illinois).
	The cited cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In
Evans, the probate judge misapplied funds meant for another purpose.
In Ransburg, the architect misrepresented himself to be a licensed
architect. In Lozoff, Tovar, and Kaplan, the unlicensed parties were
seeking to enforce contracts that the courts determined were void and
unenforceable. As was stated in Tovar, the courts will not aid a
plaintiff who bases his cause of action on an illegal act. Tovar, 29 Ill.
App. 3d at 221. Here, however, no misrepresentation was involved
and the lenders are not seeking to enforce void contracts. Rather,
plaintiffs seek to recover payments voluntarily made with full
knowledge as to the nature of the services rendered. Thus, we reject
plaintiffs' public policy argument as it applies to their cases.
	Finally, plaintiffs argue that the voluntary payment doctrine
cannot apply here because they did not actually pay any amounts out
of pocket for the document preparation fees. Rather, they allege in
their brief that the fees were generally deducted by the lenders from
the loan proceeds and then paid over to Docu-Tech.
	"Restitution" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "[T]he set
of remedies associated with that body of law, in which the measure of
recovery is [usually] based not on the plaintiff's loss, but on the
defendant's gain," and "[r]eturn or restoration of some specific thing
to its rightful owner or status." Black's Law Dictionary 1339 (8th ed.
2004). The doctrine of restitution contemplates, therefore, that some
benefit has passed from the plaintiff to the defendant. Plaintiffs
obviously believe that they are entitled to a return of that benefit.
Whether it comes in the form of cash, a check, or a credit to plaintiffs'
loan balances matters not. Plaintiffs cannot make a claim for
restitution for money they claim to have paid, while simultaneously
arguing that the voluntary payment doctrine cannot be applied because
they did not make a payment. If the document fee that was paid in
these cases was paid out of plaintiffs' loan proceeds, it nonetheless
came out of plaintiffs' pocket in the end. They do not argue that the
fees were paid by anyone but themselves. Under these circumstances,
the voluntary payment doctrine applies.

CONCLUSION
	In summary, we hold that where the defendant lenders prepared
the subject loan documents, through their employees, they did not
engage in the unauthorized practice of law by charging a fee. We also
hold that no private right of action exists under the Attorney Act for
damages for the unauthorized practice of law. We further hold that
plaintiffs' restitution claims in the Jackson and Porter cases are barred
by the voluntary payment doctrine. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated, we affirm the judgments of the appellate court.

Appellate court judgments affirmed.

	JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.