Case Title: State ex rel. Hoffman v. Rexam Beverage Can Co.

Citation: 2013-Ohio-4538

Docket Number: 2012-1109

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Hoffman v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4538.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4538 
THE STATE EX REL. HOFFMAN, APPELLANT, v. REXAM BEVERAGE CAN 
COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 
it may be cited as State ex rel. Hoffman v. Rexam Beverage Can Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4538.] 
Workers’ compensation—Temporary total disability compensation—Voluntary 
retirement—Abandonment of the work force—Court of appeals’ judgment 
denying benefits affirmed. 
(No. 2012-1109—Submitted July 9, 2013—Decided October 16, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 11AP-533, 
2012-Ohio-2469. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} The Industrial Commission determined that appellant, Gerald E. 
Hoffman, was not eligible for temporary total disability compensation because he 
had voluntarily retired and had abandoned the workforce. 
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{¶ 2} The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Hoffman’s request for 
a writ of mandamus.  The court determined that there was some evidence in the 
record that Hoffman’s retirement was voluntary; thus, the commission had not 
abused its discretion when it denied Hoffman compensation based on his 
ineligibility. 
{¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
{¶ 4} Hoffman was a mechanic for Rexam Beverage Can Company; he 
injured his knee while working on February 11, 2003.  He had knee surgery on 
July 3, 2003, and returned to work without restrictions on October 6, 2003. 
{¶ 5} In 2008, Hoffman began to see Dr. Nabil Ebraheim for continuing 
knee problems.  On March 13, 2008, Dr. Ebraheim administered an injection into 
Hoffman’s right knee and released him to work with climbing and walking 
restrictions.  Hoffman’s employer was unable to accommodate those restrictions, 
so Hoffman did not return to work.  In May 2008, he was awarded temporary total 
disability compensation as of February 13, 2008.  And in October 2008, he was 
awarded Social Security disability as of August 2008. 
{¶ 6} On October 17, 2008, Hoffman’s wife informed his employer that 
Hoffman intended to retire effective November 1, 2008.  Charlotte V. Reilly, vice 
president of benefits, sent Hoffman a letter with information regarding his 
retirement package.  Reilly notified Hoffman that he was eligible for early 
retirement based on his age (63) and years of service (more than 30).  Reilly also 
informed Hoffman that because of his workers’ compensation status, he could not 
“elect to retire and begin [his] pension benefit unless [he did] not intend to return 
to work following the completion of Workers’ Compensation.”  [Underlining sic.] 
{¶ 7} Hoffman elected not to retire at that time, and he continued to 
receive temporary total disability compensation. 
{¶ 8} On January 23, 2009, Hoffman underwent surgery for a total knee 
replacement.  Dr. Ebraheim later reported that Hoffman had reached maximum 
January Term, 2013 
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medical improvement (“MMI”) on May 1, 2009.  Consequently, the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation notified Hoffman that his temporary total disability 
compensation was terminated effective April 30, 2009. 
{¶ 9} Hoffman retired from Rexam on August 1, 2009, at age 64. 
{¶ 10} On December 21, 2010, Hoffman again underwent knee surgery.  
He filed for temporary total disability compensation from the date of the surgery.  
A staff hearing officer denied the application on the basis that Hoffman had 
voluntarily retired and abandoned the workforce and thus was ineligible for 
temporary total disability compensation. 
{¶ 11} Hoffman filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals alleging that the commission’s decision was not 
supported by evidence in the record and constituted an abuse of discretion.  The 
court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 12} This cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus, Hoffman 
must establish a clear legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the 
part of the commission to provide the relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. 
Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9.  Thus, if 
Hoffman demonstrates that the commission abused its discretion when it 
concluded that he was ineligible for compensation, a writ of mandamus may be an 
available remedy.  Id.  “[I]n this context, abuse of discretion has been repeatedly 
defined as a showing that the commission’s decision was rendered without some 
evidence to support it.”  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 
18, 20, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987). 
{¶ 14} The purpose of temporary total disability compensation is to 
compensate an injured employee for lost earnings during a period of disability 
while an injury heals.  State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio 
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St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35;  State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. 
Comm., 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987).  If the claimant leaves the 
workforce for reasons unrelated to the industrial injury, there is no loss of 
earnings due to the injury, and the claimant is not eligible for temporary total 
disability compensation.  State ex rel. Pierron v. Indus. Comm., 120 Ohio St.3d 
40, 2008-Ohio-5245, 896 N.E.2d 140, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 15} Whether a claimant voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce 
after his injury is a question of fact for the commission to determine.  Id. at ¶ 10.  
This court has described the question of abandonment as “ ‘primarily * * * [one] 
of intent * * * [that] may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other 
objective facts.’ ”  State ex rel. Diversitech Gen. Plastic Film Div. v. Indus. 
Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 544 N.E.2d 677 (1989), quoting State v. 
Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 297, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980).  Accordingly, the 
commission must consider all relevant circumstances, including evidence of the 
claimant’s medical condition at or near the time of departure from the workforce, 
if submitted, and any other evidence that would substantiate a connection between 
the injury and retirement.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d); State ex rel. 
Cinergy Corp./Duke Energy v. Heber, 130 Ohio St.3d 194, 2011-Ohio-5027, 957 
N.E.2d 1, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals concluded that there was some evidence in 
the record to support the commission’s decision that Hoffman had voluntarily 
retired.  The commission relied on employer records, which stated that Hoffman’s 
retirement was based on years of service, not disability.  The commission also had 
medical reports that Hoffman had reached MMI when he decided to retire.  The 
commission pointed to Hoffman’s receipt of Social Security disability benefits as 
an indication that he did not intend to return to employment, and other than 
Hoffman’s own testimony that he had applied for a job as a greeter at Wal-Mart, 
January Term, 2013 
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there was no evidence that Hoffman had looked for other employment after he 
retired. 
{¶ 17} Hoffman also contends that in addition to having the burden to 
prove that he was temporarily and totally disabled, the court of appeals 
improperly placed an additional burden on him to produce evidence that he did 
not abandon the workforce. 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals also rejected this argument.  Hoffman’s 
burden was to demonstrate that he was medically entitled to the benefits and that 
he had remained in the workforce and sustained a loss of earnings.  See Ashcraft, 
34 Ohio St.3d 42, 517 N.E.2d 533.  He did not produce evidence that his 
retirement was injury-induced, and he also did not produce credible evidence that 
he had made an attempt to find other employment after his retirement.  Instead, 
the record contained evidence that once Hoffman learned that his temporary total 
disability compensation had been terminated, he chose to permanently retire from 
Rexam. 
{¶ 19} The commission is exclusively responsible for evaluating the 
weight and credibility of the evidence.  State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 
Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-Ohio-6036, 958 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 11; Burley, 31 Ohio St.3d at 
21, 508 N.E.2d 936.  It is within the commission’s discretion to rely on the 
evidence that Hoffman had voluntarily retired from the workforce and was no 
longer eligible for temporary total disability compensation. 
{¶ 20} Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., not participating. 
____________________ 
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Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. 
Bowman, for appellant. 
________________________