Case Title: State v. Kinney

Citation: 1998-Ohio-425

Docket Number: 19971175

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KINNEY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Kinney (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 85.] 
Criminal law — Search and seizure — Search warrant authorizing the search of 
“all persons” on a particular premises does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of particularity, when. 
A search warrant authorizing the search of “all persons” on a particular premises 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity if the 
supporting affidavit shows probable cause that every individual on the 
subject premises will be in possession of, at the time of the search, evidence 
of the kind sought in the warrant. 
(Nos. 97-1175 and 97-1176 — Submitted June 9, 1998 — Decided September 2, 
1998.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
71353. 
 
On February 22, 1996, Detective Ronald Ehrbar of the Cleveland Police 
Narcotics Unit obtained a search warrant for an apartment located at 673 East 92nd 
Street, Upstairs-North, number 3, in Cleveland.  In the affidavit supporting his 
request, Detective Ehrbar informed the issuing court of the following matters 
giving probable cause for the search.  Ehrbar had been a Cleveland police officer 
for seventeen years and a detective for over three years.  Ehrbar had experience 
and training giving him knowledge of the methods used by those trafficking in 
narcotics.  Ehrbar had received information that the premises in question was being 
used to sell cocaine.  He, therefore, conducted surveillance of the apartment for 
seventy-two hours and noticed frequent visitors who would park their cars, go 
upstairs, and stay less than five minutes.  This pattern occurred both day and night 
and, in Ehrbar’s experience, indicated narcotics trafficking. 
 
2
 
Within the seventy-two hours prior to the issuance of the search warrant, 
police used a Confidential Reliable Informant (“CRI”) to make a controlled 
purchase of cocaine at the premises under surveillance.  The CRI purchased 
cocaine at the apartment and identified the seller as a man known as “Big Nate,” a 
short, heavy-set black male, approximately forty years old. 
 
In his affidavit, Detective Ehrbar maintained that drugs were frequently 
carried on the persons of those present at locations where drugs were used, kept, or 
sold, and that persons who traffic in drugs frequently kept weapons on their person 
or within their possession.  Further, Ehrbar asserted the necessity of conducting a 
search at night to prevent evidence from being concealed and for the safety of the 
officers.  Based upon this affidavit, the reviewing court issued a warrant 
authorizing a search of the “premises, its curtilage, common and storage areas and 
any person present therein.” 
 
On February 23, 1996, police executed the February 22, 1996 search 
warrant, seized contraband, and arrested “Big Nate.”  Five days later on February 
28, 1996, Detective Ehrbar’s partner, Detective Thomas B. Parkinson of the 
Cleveland Police Narcotics Unit, obtained a second search warrant for the same 
apartment.  In his supporting affidavit, Detective Parkinson informed the issuing 
court of the following matters giving probable cause for the search.  Parkinson had 
twenty-eight years’ experience with the Cleveland Police Department, including 
fifteen years as a detective assigned to the narcotics unit.  Parkinson stated that on 
or about February 23, 1996, a search warrant was executed at the above-described 
premises.  Further, Parkinson averred that cocaine and contraband were seized and 
one individual (“Big Nate,” a.k.a. Nathaniel Braxton) was arrested.  In addition, 
Parkinson stated that within the past twenty-four hours, he was contacted by a CRI 
who had always proven to be reliable in the past; the CRI told him that within the 
past forty-eight hours, “Big Nate” had contacted the CRI and indicated that he 
 
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wanted to sell cocaine. Based upon this affidavit, the reviewing court issued a 
second search warrant for the same apartment, authorizing a search of the 
“premises, common areas, curtilage, persons, and containers therein.” 
 
Police executed the second warrant later that night.  Appellant, Earnest J. 
Kinney (defendant), was among those present at the time of the execution of the 
search warrant.  Police searched defendant and, after finding fourteen “rocks” of 
crack cocaine on his person, arrested him.  Defendant was indicted on April 25, 
1996 for possession of cocaine, with a specification of a prior drug conviction, and 
for possession of criminal tools. 
 
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress the evidence against him, 
maintaining that police had conducted a general exploratory search, violating his 
constitutional rights.  On September 10, 1996, the trial court held a hearing on the 
motion.  At the hearing, Detective Ehrbar testified that defendant was searched on 
the authority of the warrant.  The trial court granted the motion to suppress, 
accepting the analysis of the Sixth Appellate District in State v. Tucker (1994), 98 
Ohio App.3d 308, 648 N.E.2d 557.  In Tucker, the court held that “a person who 
just happens to be present in a house that is the subject of a search warrant cannot 
be made subject to a search solely by the inclusion of [a] ‘blanket’ phrase in the 
search warrant, without that person being in any way named or described in the 
warrant.”  Id. at 310-311, 648 N.E.2d at 558. 
 
The state appealed from the trial court’s judgment, and the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals reversed.  Thereafter, the court, finding its judgment to 
be in conflict with the judgment of the Sixth Appellate District in State v. Tucker, 
supra, entered an order certifying a conflict.  Case No. 97-1176 is now before this 
court upon our determination that a conflict exists.  Case No. 97-1175 is before this 
court upon the allowance of a motion for a discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
4
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, George J. 
Sadd and L. Christopher Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Wesley A. Dumas, Sr., for appellant. 
 
Darin Thompson, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  The appellate court certified the following issue 
to this court:  “whether [a] search warrant is invalid, as to [a] provision authorizing 
search of ‘all persons’ that were at [a] residence during execution of [the] search 
warrant, as it did not name or particularly describe any person or place.”  For the 
reasons stated below, we find that the search warrant was valid. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is nearly identical in its 
language, and its protections are coextensive with its federal counterpart.  State v. 
Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766.  The issue 
certified for review in this case touches upon two separate requirements within the 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment: (1) places to be searched and people 
and things to be seized must be described with particularity in the warrant, and (2) 
probable cause is needed to support the issuance of the warrant. 
 
Constitutional jurisprudence has long recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment was drafted, in part, to bar the use of general warrants under federal 
power.  See Stanford v. Texas (1965), 379 U.S. 476, 482-486, 85 S.Ct. 506, 510-
512, 13 L.Ed.2d 431, 435-437;  Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 319, 
 
5
325, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 2323-2324, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, 927-928.  The Constitution’s 
framers, from experience with the use of general warrants by colonial authorities 
and from the long history of their use in England, viewed the devices as inimical to 
the principles of liberty.  See Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for 
History (1996), 63 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1707, 1724-1728. 
 
One of the chief grievances of the American colonists against England was 
the use of “writs of assistance” by the King’s customs officers.  Writs of assistance 
gave customs officials unbounded authority to seek out violations of the despised 
colonial tax laws.  James Otis’s celebrated denunciation of these instruments in 
1761 was credited by John Adams himself as sowing one of the first seeds of 
American independence.  See Stanford, 379 U.S. at 481-482, 85 S.Ct. at 509-510, 
13 L.Ed.2d at 434-435. 
 
The Fourth Amendment not only reflected the colonists’ struggle against 
these oppressive devices, but also was the product of a centuries-long legal 
struggle in England against the use of general warrants.  The English Common 
Pleas Court’s judgment in Wilkes v. Wood (C.P.1763), 19 How.St.Tr. 1153, Lofft 
1, 98 Eng.Rep. 489, provides one often-cited precedent for the Fourth 
Amendment’s ban against general warrants.  See Stanford, 379 U.S. at 483, 85 
S.Ct. at 510, 13 L.Ed.2d at 436.  The warrant at issue in that case authorized the 
King’s officers to search for unknown individuals responsible for publishing a 
“seditious and treasonable paper, entitled, The North Briton, No. 45,”  to 
apprehend them and seize them and their papers.  Id. at 483, 85 S.Ct. at 510-511, 
13 L.Ed.2d at 436, quoting Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) 43.  Because the warrant 
named neither the individuals suspected nor a particular location where they could 
be found, the warrant, in effect, subjected the whole nation to possible search.  The 
 
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Wilkes court held that the warrant was illegal and awarded damages to Wilkes 
against the Secretary of State, Lord Hallifax, who had issued the warrant. 
 
The warrant against Wilkes subjected any residence that the King’s officers 
chose to a search.  Indeed, it is not clear that abhorrence of the general warrant 
extended historically to warrants that authorized searches of unnamed people if the 
particular location was specified.  A search confined to a single residence was 
undoubtedly a vast improvement over the unfettered search of entire towns or 
whole nations.  See Cloud, 63 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 1726, fn. 61, quoting Cuddihy, The 
Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791 (1990) 1558 (“ 
‘Why debate probable cause for a specific warrant to search one house when a 
general warrant laid entire towns open to government purview?’ ”).  The historical 
current against general warrants did, however, require specificity in a search of 
papers and effects within a single house, so no warrant could  justify a general 
exploratory search for incriminating documents.  See Entick v. Carrington 
(C.P.1765), 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 2 Wils.K.B. 275, 95 Eng.Rep. 807; Stanford, 379 
U.S. at 483-485, 85 S.Ct. at 510-512, 13 L.Ed.2d at 436-437. 
 
Although historical understanding of the need for specificity is more easily 
shown concerning places searched and objects searched for, courts have reasoned 
that the requirement extends to the search of individuals as well.  See 2 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (3 Ed.1996) 542-543, 
Section 4.5(e); Ybarra v. Illinois (1980), 444 U.S. 85, 91-92, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 
62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245-246 (“Each patron * * * was clothed with constitutional 
protection against an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. * * * 
Although the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers 
authority to search the premises and to search [someone named in the warrant], it 
gave them no authority to invade the constitutional protections possessed 
individually by the tavern’s customers.”).  See, also, Grumon v. Raymond (1814), 1 
 
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Conn. 40, 43 (invalidating a warrant commanding the search of “all persons who 
are suspected of having stolen” certain items).  Courts have differed, however, over 
how specific a description is required to authorize the search of an individual.  See, 
generally, Annotation, Sufficiency of Description in Warrant of Person to be 
Searched (1996), 43 A.L.R.5th 1.  Likewise, courts have disagreed whether a 
warrant authorizing search of “all persons” in a particular location violates the 
constitutional requirement of particularity. 
 
In Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91-92, 100 S.Ct. at 342, 62 L.Ed.2d at 245-246, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a warrant authorizing the search of a public 
tavern did not authorize police to search individuals not mentioned within the 
warrant.  The court also held that, although police had probable cause to search the 
establishment and the individual who was named in the warrant, the defendant’s 
“mere propinquity” to those suspected of crime did not independently create 
probable cause to search him.  Id. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342, 62 L.Ed.2d at 245.  Thus, 
the decision in Ybarra was grounded upon a lack of probable cause, not upon the 
failure to describe the defendant with particularity.  The court expressly left for 
another day the consideration of “situations where the warrant itself authorizes the 
search of unnamed persons in a place and is supported by probable cause to believe 
that persons who will be in the place at the time of the search will be in possession 
of illegal drugs.”  Id., 444 U.S. at 92, 100 S.Ct. at 342, 62 L.Ed.2d at 246, fn. 4.  
Doing so, the court noted that such a warrant might be constitutionally prohibited 
as an “open-ended” or “general” warrant.  Id.  In the instant case, unlike Ybarra, 
the warrant explicitly included “any person” on the premises within its scope.  
Thus, the question left unaddressed by the Ybarra court is now squarely before this 
court. 
 
The Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“Association”), as 
amicus curiae, contends that the warrant used to search defendant was just such a 
 
8
“general warrant.”  Thus, the Association urges us to invalidate the warrant as 
violating the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  It argues that the 
warrant was invalid, regardless of whether the police showed, in the supporting 
affidavit, that probable cause existed for every unnamed person who might be 
present in the apartment.  Even if issued upon probable cause, the Association 
contends, a general warrant would still violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Drug Trafficking Residences 
 
“Illicit drug trafficking” is “now of epidemic proportion.”  People v. 
Thurman (1989), 209 Cal.App.3d 817, 822, 257 Cal.Rptr. 517, 519.  Individuals 
who are present in a drug trafficking residence raise special concerns for law 
enforcement.  A drug trafficking residence often has more than one person on the 
premises.  Individuals may be present for the preparation and packaging of the 
drugs.  Some are present to collect cash, others to protect drug dealers.  Some have 
come to purchase drugs.  Most occupants are armed and dangerous.  Combined, 
these concerns involve the safety of all individuals on the premises, since drugs 
and concealed weapons are involved.  This is far different from a general 
exploratory search. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Smith (1976), 370 Mass. 335, 348 N.E.2d 101, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a warrant authorizing the search of  
“any person present” was valid where the affidavit showed that heroin was being 
sold from an apartment subjected to search under warrant.  Id., 370 Mass. at 344, 
348 N.E.2d at 106.  In that case, as here, both information from an informant and 
police surveillance indicated a steady flow of narcotics purchasers in and out of the 
apartment.  Id., 370 Mass. at 343, 348 N.E.2d at 106.  The Massachusetts court 
reasoned that “the insidious nature of the contraband (heroin) was such as to render 
it more likely than not that the participants would act in secret and to the exclusion 
of innocent persons and possible informants.”  Id. at 343-344, 348 N.E.2d at 106.  
 
9
Thus, the court  concluded that the issuing magistrate could reasonably have 
inferred that no innocent parties would be present during the search.  Id. at 346, 
348 N.E.2d at 107, fn. 12. 
 
We find the logic of the Smith opinion compelling.  A “crack house” is used 
primarily, or even exclusively, for the sale and consumption of crack.  In addition, 
we find it significant that this same residence was searched and cocaine and other 
contraband were found just five days prior to the search in question.  Clearly, even 
the first search did not deter further drug activity on the premises.  Therefore, there 
was an overwhelming probability that anyone present possessed crack/cocaine or 
other contraband. 
Probable Cause 
 
There is some authority for the proposition, adopted in Tucker and  advanced 
by amicus curiae, that an “all persons” provision is, of itself, too general in its 
scope and, therefore, violates the Fourth Amendment.  The prevailing view, 
however, is that such a warrant provision may be upheld under limited 
circumstances.  See 1 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions (1988) 
5-28, Section 5.6(e); 2 LaFave at 545-546.  Where there is probable cause to 
support the search of every person within the warrant’s scope, it will not be held 
invalid.  We believe that the prevailing view is the correct one.  Unless the location 
named in a warrant is too large or inhabited by a multitude of people, a warrant 
confined to individuals in that location should be particular enough to avoid the 
unfettered and arbitrary power contemplated in the ban against general warrants.  
As the New Jersey Supreme Court remarked, “[T]here is none of the vice of a 
general warrant if the individual is thus identified by physical nexus to the on-
going criminal event itself.”  State v. DeSimone (1972), 60 N.J. 319, 322, 288 A.2d 
849, 850.  See, also, State v. Reid (1994), 319 Ore. 65, 71, 872 P.2d 416, 419 (“ 
‘Persons present’ is definite and unambiguous.”). 
 
10
 
Clearly, probable cause will more likely exist to support the search of all 
persons within a private residence than it will for a search of all persons in a place 
open to the public.  In public places, the substantial likelihood that a person with 
no connection to criminal wrongdoing might be subjected to search makes most 
claims of probable cause unsustainable.  Accordingly, courts have tended to follow 
the rule, “The more public a place, the less likely a search of all persons will be 
sustained.”  1 Ringel at 5-48. 
 
Similarly, a search for illegal drugs is more likely to support a search of all 
persons than a search for evidence of many other crimes.  As Presiding Judge 
James D. Sweeney recognized in his concurring opinion, probable cause would not 
likely support the search of all persons on a premises if police were looking for 
stolen objects that were not easily concealed or transported. 
Particularity 
 
Nonetheless, a warrant should still be considered too general if it subjects to 
search or seizure individuals against whom no probable cause exists.  In this 
regard, the purposes of the particularity requirement and the probable cause 
requirement intersect.  The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[b]y 
limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there 
is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be 
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-
ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.”  Maryland v. 
Garrison (1987), 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1016, 94 L.Ed.2d 72, 80.  Thus, 
the requirement of specificity tailors the authority of a warrant so that those against 
whom no suspicion lies will remain outside its scope. 
 
Accordingly, an “all persons” clause may still be “carefully tailored to its 
justifications” if probable cause to search exists against each individual who fits 
within the class of persons described in the warrant.  The controlling inquiry is 
 
11
whether the requesting authority has shown probable cause that every individual on 
the subject premises will be in possession of, at the time of the search, evidence of 
the kind sought in the warrant.  If such probable cause is shown, an “all persons” 
provision does not violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  
Conversely, if the supporting affidavit does not show probable cause to search 
every person on a premises, an “all persons” authorization would violate both the 
particularity and probable cause requirements of the Warrant Clause. 
 
This interpretation of the particularity requirement coincides with an 
understanding that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit only 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Circumstances may not always permit police 
to name or otherwise describe persons whom they, nevertheless, have ample cause 
to suspect of criminal wrongdoing because of those persons’ presence in a 
particular place.  Granting the government a means of investigating crime under 
these circumstances does not offend our understanding of what is reasonable.  
There may be some suggestion of unreasonableness if innocent people, who are not 
properly suspected of wrongdoing, are unfairly caught in the dragnet.  
Nevertheless, with any warrant, some danger always exists that innocent people 
will be subject to search for probable cause.  This is so simply because probable 
cause does not require absolute certainty.  See State v. Halczyszak (1986), 25 Ohio 
St.3d 301, 309, 25 OBR 360, 367, 496 N.E.2d 925, 935. 
 
The Constitution has established the test of probable cause as the fulcrum 
upon which the interests of  individual liberty and the legitimate aims of law 
enforcement will balance.  When a magistrate has determined that every person at 
a particular location is, upon the evidence, properly suspected of wrongdoing or of 
holding important evidence, the same standard has been applied.  Thus, the danger 
of reaching innocent parties does not, in this regard, render an “all persons” 
provision in a warrant unreasonable. 
 
12
 
For these reasons, we reject the contention that the warrant through which 
defendant was searched was invalid, as a general warrant, without regard to any 
question of probable cause. 
“All Persons” Provision 
 
We must now turn to the question of whether probable cause supported the 
“all persons” provision in this instance.  The state argues that a per se rule should 
permit the use of “all persons” provisions when applied against residences where 
illegal drugs are being sold.  Because an individual can so easily conceal illegal 
drugs on his or her person, circumstances involving illegal drugs will more likely 
give rise to probable cause for the search of people. 
 
The court of appeals certified this case as being in conflict with State v. 
Tucker (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 308, 648 N.E.2d 557.  However, we find that 
Tucker is distinguishable.  The only facts in Tucker supporting the issuance of the 
search warrant were (1) a detective with unknown experience signed a request for a 
search warrant to search a suspected drug trafficking residence; (2) the search 
warrant was for the residence, a particular person, and for “all persons [who] are at 
the residence during the execution of the search warrant”; and (3) Tucker was 
present during the execution of the search warrant.  Id., 98 Ohio App.3d at 309, 
648 N.E.2d at 557-558. 
 
Unlike this case, the Tucker facts do not show that the private residence was 
very likely a drug trafficking house and persons within could be armed and 
dangerous.  The facts did not establish the law enforcement experience, especially 
the narcotics experience of the detective, behind the affidavit.  Further, the facts in 
Tucker did not show whether a controlled purchase had been made, or whether an 
informant had been used, and, if so, the reliability of the informant.  In addition, 
Tucker did not demonstrate that the police had performed surveillance of the drug 
trafficking residence, or that police had ever searched the residence before, or that 
 
13
police knew the defendant prior to the search.  Therefore, we find that Tucker is 
clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. 
 
We note that because two pages were omitted in the transmittal of the record 
from the trial court to the court of appeals, the court of appeals relied on the 
incorrect supporting affidavit when it referred to Detective Ehrbar’s affidavit.  We 
have since obtained the missing pages directly from the trial court and find that in 
referring to the proper supporting affidavit, our conclusion is even stronger.  
Detective Ehrbar’s affidavit supported the first search warrant which was obtained 
on February 22, 1996 and executed on February 23, 1996, with an arrest made.  
The search warrant at issue in this case was obtained on February 28, 1996 and 
executed that same day.  The supporting affidavit for the February 28, 1996 search 
warrant was attested to by Detective Parkinson. 
 
For the most part, the facts presented in Detective Parkinson’s affidavit tend 
to support the “all persons” provision in the warrant at issue.  His affidavit showed 
that the place to be searched was a private residence, not a public place.  
Furthermore, the magistrate could sensibly infer that the residence was of modest 
size from information within the affidavit — such as the facts that it was an 
apartment, its neighborhood address, and its location on the second floor.  See 
Commonwealth v. Smith (1976), 370 Mass. 335, 343, 348 N.E.2d 101, 106.  The 
small, private nature of the premises lends support to a determination of probable 
cause.  See id. at 344, 348 N.E.2d at 106.  Moreover, because the affidavit showed 
a pattern of people coming to the apartment for short periods, during daytime and 
nighttime hours, it appeared probable on the face of the affidavit that anyone 
within the apartment would have been aware that drug sales were occurring. 
 
The affidavit gave clear indication, also, of the nature of illegal activity 
occurring within the apartment, by providing information about the controlled 
purchase of cocaine through an informant.  The nature of the traffic described, with 
 
14
purchasers staying in the apartment for short intervals, reinforced the need for an 
“all persons” warrant.  Further evidence of the necessity of an “all persons” 
warrant is Detective Parkinson’s reference to the February 22, 1996 search warrant 
that was executed at the same apartment where police seized cocaine and other 
contraband and made an arrest.  Based on these facts, police could not identify who 
would be in the apartment at the time of the search, but they could be fairly certain 
that individuals coming to the apartment were somehow involved in the trafficking 
of cocaine. 
 
The fact that police sought to execute the warrant at night also tends to 
support the form of the warrant.  The possibility of innocent parties being present, 
either social visitors or work people, was comparatively less at night than it would 
be during daylight hours.  Compare State v. Wynne (Minn.1996), 552 N.W.2d 218, 
221 (“During the day, relatives, guests or hired workpeople could have been 
present on the residential premises to be searched.”). 
 
Nevertheless, although drug sales from a residence are more likely to create 
probable cause for a search of all persons within, we reject the per se rule that 
would find probable cause in all such cases.  It is not particularly difficult to 
conceive of residential settings in which drugs are being sold, but within which 
probable cause does not extend to all the persons present.  Indeed, many courts 
reviewing “all persons” warrants have found no probable cause in particular 
settings fitting that description.  Moreover, aside from the inherent risk of 
overgeneralization, a per se rule would prevent the individualized determination of 
probable cause by “neutral and detached magistrates.”  Without such a 
determination, the resulting warrant would not satisfy the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 449-
450, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2029,  29 L.Ed.2d 564, 573 (Determination of probable cause 
must be by a “neutral and detached magistrate.”); cf. Richards v. Wisconsin (1997), 
 
15
520 U.S. 385, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421, 137 L.Ed.2d 615, 623 (“[A] blanket rule 
impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial review.”). 
Standard for Issuance of Warrant 
 
Having rejected a per se rule that would support the command of the warrant 
to search all persons, we must address whether the particular facts described in 
Detective Parkinson’s affidavit supported the form of the warrant used.  As already 
explained, the proper standard for determining this question is whether police 
demonstrated probable cause to the magistrate that every individual on the subject 
premises would be in possession of, at the time of the search, evidence of criminal 
misconduct.  Nevertheless, having announced this standard, we believe that further 
guidelines may be necessary to aid in its application.  Overly elementary 
determinations of probable cause in issuing “all persons” warrants may jeopardize 
the constitutional principle set forth in Ybarra, that “mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to 
probable cause to search [a] person.” 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 
at 245.  Furthermore, issuing magistrates should recognize that probable cause 
must exist as to any person with a substantial possibility of being on the premises 
being searched.  Otherwise, the “all persons” provision will constitute an invalid 
general warrant. 
 
We find that the guidelines set forth by the New York Court of Appeals in 
People v. Nieves (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 396, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50, 330 N.E.2d 26, are well 
considered and helpful for making probable cause determinations on an “all 
persons” warrant.  See Smith, 370 Mass. at 345, 348 N.E.2d at 107 (adopting the 
Nieves guidelines).  In Nieves, the New York court expressed the following: 
 
“An application for this type of warrant must be subjected to rigid scrutiny 
by the independent Magistrate.  It must carefully delineate the character of the 
premises, for example, its location, size, the particular area to be searched, means 
 
16
of access, neighborhood, its public or private character and any other relevant fact.  
It must specifically describe the nature of the illegal activity believed to be 
conducted at the location, the number and behavior of persons observed to have 
been present during the times of day or night when the warrant is sought to be 
executed. 
 
“The application should also state whether any person apparently 
unconnected with the illegal activity has been seen at the premises.  The warrant 
itself must limit the locus of the search to the area in which the criminal activity is 
believed to be confined and, according to the circumstances, may also specify the 
time for the search. 
 
“In determining the reasonableness of a particular warrant application, it is 
appropriate to consider the necessity for this type of search, that is, the nature and 
importance of the crime suspected, the purpose of the search and the difficulty of a 
more specific description of the persons to be searched.  The risk that an innocent 
person may be swept up in a dragnet and searched must be carefully weighed.”  
Id., 36 N.Y.2d at 404-405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61, 330 N.E.2d at 34. 
 
Using these principles, magistrates may issue warrants authorizing the 
search of all persons without violating the particularity and probable cause 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  In adopting these guidelines, however, 
we do not intend to make the process of determining the sufficiency of an affidavit 
a hypertechnical one.  When an “all persons” warrant is requested, determination 
of probable cause will still require practical, common-sense decisionmaking by 
magistrates.  See State v. George (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
What makes the existence of probable cause in this case such a close 
question is the absence of any language in the affidavit indicating “whether any 
person apparently unconnected with the illegal activity has been seen at the 
 
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premises.”  Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 60, 330 N.E.2d at 34.  
Different jurisdictions have reached contrary judgments upon relatively similar 
facts, depending largely on how courts viewed the evidence touching on this 
factor. 
 
Some express indication in the affidavit of whether police had evidence of 
innocent activity occurring in the apartment would have made a determination of 
probable cause significantly easier in this case.  Evidence, for example, that the 
apartment provided a residence for children would likely preclude a finding of 
probable cause as to all persons on the premises.  See Marks v. Clarke (C.A.9, 
1996), 102 F.3d 1012, 1029.  Nevertheless, even where there is no express 
indication that innocent people would not likely be on the search premises, 
magistrates ought to be permitted to make common-sense inferences supported by 
other evidence in the affidavits. 
 
In the instant case, given the evidence in the affidavit that (1) the premises 
was small and private, (2) despite a search and seizure of cocaine and other 
contraband and an arrest five days earlier, crack cocaine sales were ongoing, and 
(3) the search was going to be conducted at night, the magistrate could have 
logically concluded that there was no significant possibility that innocent people 
would be present in the apartment at the time of the search.  Thus, there was a 
substantial basis for the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.  Because a 
reviewing court should give deference to the probable cause determination of the 
issuing magistrate, see State v. George, paragraph two of the syllabus, we find that 
the warrant in this case and the search conducted under its authority did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed 
 
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and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, BROGAN, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
JAMES A. BROGAN, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J.