Case Title: S & G INVESTORS v. BLACKLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-61

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
S & G INVESTORS v. BLACKLEY2000 WY 3994 P.2d 941Case Number: 99-61Decided: 01/11/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
S & G INVESTORS, LLC; and TOM MORENO, Appellants 
(Defendants), v.FAYE L. BLACKLEY, f/k/a FAYE L. BURZYNSKI, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court of 
Natrona County, Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge.          
 
Steven F. Freudenthal of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Zerga, 
P.C., Cheyenne, WY. Argument presented by Mr. Freudenthal, representing 
appellant.Charles S. Chapin of Crowell & Chapin, P.C., Casper, WY. 
Argument presented by Mr. Chapin, representing appellee.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, 
and HILL, JJ.         

Hill, Justice.
[¶1] S & G Investors appeals from a summary judgment order granting title 
in Appellee Faye L. Blackley on the basis of adverse possession. 
[¶2] We affirm. 
ISSUES
[¶3] S & G Investors present two issues for review:
A. In light of genuine issues of material fact, whether the District Court 
erroneously granted summary judgment quieting title to real property in the 
Appellee.
B. Whether the District Court erroneously failed to consider or rule on 
Appellants' Motion for Continuance Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56(f).
[¶4] Appellee Blackley rephrases the issues as follows:
A. Did the trial court, in reviewing Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Affidavits, and documents presented in support of and in opposition thereto, 
correctly determine that there were no issues of material fact and that the 
Appellee was entitled to judgment quieting title to the at issue real property 
in Appellee, as a matter of law, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56(c)[?]
B. Did the trial court correctly refused [sic] to consider or rule on 
appellant's motion for continuance pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56(f), as Appellants 
failed to establish the requisite elements entitling them to the relief 
sought?
FACTS
[¶5] Appellee Faye L. Blackley is the former wife of Larry Burzynski (a/k/a 
Larry Burns). The property in dispute is Lot 17, Block 74, of Paradise Valley 
Country Club Estates near Casper in Natrona County, Wyoming. This property was 
formerly owned by Burzynski's company, which, in 1980, quitclaimed the property, 
along with other lots, to his stepdaughter, Appellee's child, R. F. Crotteau. In 
a subsequent lawsuit in 1986, the quitclaim deed was determined to be a 
fraudulent conveyance.
[¶6] In 1987, Appellee divorced Burzynski "alleging that the parties owned no 
property jointly" and requested that she be granted "all rights to remain living 
at her current residence," which is the property in dispute. On May 29, 1987, R. 
F. Crotteau conveyed the property to Blackley by quitclaim deed. Four days 
later, on June 2, 1987, the divorce was final and the decree was signed and 
filed granting Appellee all rights to remain living at "her residence." The 1987 
quitclaim deed, however, was not filed until January 1991 when Appellee also 
conveyed the property to herself in her current married name.
[¶7] In 1993, Appellee's new husband successfully intervened in the 1986 
order ruling the conveyances of property in 1983 to be fraudulent. Mr. Blackley 
established that the judgment on which the order was based had been satisfied by 
the sale of certain lots. The remaining lots, of which the property in dispute 
was one, were declared to be the subject of good conveyances to Crotteau in an 
amended judgment.
[¶8] In November 1997, Burzynski offered the property in question to 
Appellants S & G Investors as security in exchange for a ten percent 
interest in a mining venture in Mexico. When Burzynski failed to pay for his 
share of the venture in a timely manner, Burzynski's Company, Burzynski, and 
Crotteau conveyed the property to Appellants.
[¶9] In 1997, after S & G Investors asserted ownership in the property, 
Appellee filed a complaint to quiet title claiming superior title by virtue of 
the 1987 quitclaim deed, or in the alternative, adverse possession based on a 
combination of the 1987 quitclaim deed from the divorce decree and her 
subsequent use of the property for ten years before Burzynski conveyed it to 
Appellants in November 1997. The district court granted Appellant's motion for 
summary judgment. This timely appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶10] The general rule is that summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and when the prevailing party is entitled 
to have a judgment as a matter of law. Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Wyo. 1998). We review the record from the vantage point most 
beneficial to the nonmoving party, awarding that party all favorable inferences 
which may be drawn from the facts. Austin v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo. 
1997). When a dispute does not exist with regard to the material facts, the 
question presented for our review is one of law. Rist v. Taylor, 955 P.2d 436, 437 (Wyo. 
1998). We do not accord special deference to the district court's decisions on 
matters of law. Id.
DISCUSSION
[¶11] At issue in this case is whether the quitclaim deed for the property 
conveyed by Crotteau to Appellee Blackley was sufficient to give Blackley title. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-107 (LEXIS 1999) states, "[a] deed of quitclaim and 
release shall be sufficient to pass all the estate which the grantor could 
lawfully convey by deed of bargain and sale." Here, Appellant contends that 
because the conveyance from Burzynski to Crotteau was determined to be 
fraudulent in 1983, Crotteau had no legal title to convey to Appellee and, 
therefore, the title remained with Burzynski. This argument, however, ignores 
the court's nunc pro tunc judgment in 1993 that the conveyance of the subject 
property was not fraudulent. Thus, the conveyance from Crotteau to Appellee was 
valid. Moreover, there is no question that the Appellee's quitclaim deed was 
recorded in 1991, and the court's judgment validating title was rendered in 
1993. Consequently, the undisputed facts establish that Appellee's title had 
been recorded and validated four years prior to the time Burzynski purportedly 
conveyed title to S & G Investors. Therefore, the district court did not err 
in granting summary judgment to quiet title in Appellee.
[¶12] Because we find that Appellee had superior title to that claimed by 
Appellants S & G Investors, we need not reach the question of adverse 
possession. In addition, because the facts necessary to establish title in 
Appellee are sufficient and undisputed, we need not address S & G Investors' 
procedural claims.
CONCLUSION
[¶13] The district court did not err in granting summary judgment, as there 
was no issue of material fact presented. Additionally, the district court was 
correct in the use of its discretion to deny the Appellant's motion for 
continuance. Affirmed.