Case Title: State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture v. Forchione

Citation: 2016-Ohio-3049

Docket Number: 2016-0729

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3049.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-3049 
THE STATE EX REL. DIR., OHIO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, v. 
FORCHIONE, JUDGE; HUNTSMAN ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione,  
Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3049.] 
Prohibition—R.C. Chapter 935—Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes 
Act—Director of Ohio Department of Agriculture has exclusive authority to 
implement and enforce R.C. Chapter 935, including the removal of 
dangerous wild animals—R.C. 935.20(D) allows an owner of dangerous 
wild animals that were removed by the director to request an adjudication 
in accordance with R.C. Chapter 119—Judge patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction over owner’s action seeking a temporary restraining 
order and an injunction—Writ granted. 
(No. 2016-0729—Submitted May 10, 2016—Decided May 18, 2016.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In 2012, the Ohio legislature enacted the Ohio Dangerous Wild 
Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, R.C. Chapter 935, to regulate the acquisition, 
possession, care, sale, and transfer of “dangerous wild animals.”  Under that 
statutory scheme, no person may possess a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 
2014, without a permit from the Ohio Department of Agriculture, unless the owner 
falls under one of the statute’s exemptions.  R.C. 935.02(A) and (B), 935.05(A), 
935.07(A), and 935.101(A). 
{¶ 2} Intervening respondent Cynthia Huntsman is an owner of multiple 
species of wild animals that are regulated by the act.  Huntsman has no permit and 
has not submitted an application to obtain one.  After obtaining a warrant to search 
her premises, relator, the Ohio Department of Agriculture (“ODA”), executed an 
administrative order under R.C. 935.20, and ordered the transfer of multiple 
dangerous wild animals found in her facility to a temporary holding facility 
established by the ODA.  The next day, respondent, Stark County Common Pleas 
Court Judge Frank G. Forchione, granted Huntsman a temporary restraining order 
against the ODA, ordered the ODA to return the seized animals to Huntsman by 
May 19, 2016, and scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing for the same day. 
{¶ 3} Relator, David Daniels, in his capacity as the director of the ODA, 
seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Forchione from continuing to exercise 
jurisdiction over the case in which he granted the restraining order, In re Huntsman 
Transfer of Dangerous Wild Animals, Stark County C.P. case No. 2016 MI 138.  
Judge Forchione opposes this request on the merits.  Intervening respondents, 
Cynthia M. Huntsman and the farm she operates, Stump Hill Farm, Inc., have filed 
a motion to dismiss and also oppose this request on the merits.  We grant a 
peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Forchione from proceeding in the 
underlying case and order him to vacate his previous orders. 
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Background 
The Act 
{¶ 4} In 2011, in Zanesville, Ohio, authorities were forced to kill numerous 
dangerous animals that had been released from a private preserve by an owner who 
later committed suicide.  In response, the General Assembly passed the Dangerous 
Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, R.C. Chapter 935, which became 
effective on September 5, 2012.  The act tasks the ODA with implementing and 
enforcing a comprehensive statutory scheme regarding the registration and control 
of dangerous wild animals. 
{¶ 5} Under R.C. 935.20(A), the ODA has the authority to initiate an 
investigation if it has reason to believe that a person possesses a dangerous wild 
animal without a permit.  If the ODA believes that an owner of dangerous wild 
animals has violated the statute, it may quarantine the animals on site and restrict 
any movement on and off the property.  R.C. 935.20(A).  Alternatively, the ODA 
may order the immediate transfer of the animals under an administrative transfer 
order.  Id.  If transfer is needed, the ODA may house the animals at any facility 
approved for this purpose.  R.C. 935.20(A) and (K).  The act vests these powers 
exclusively in the director of the ODA. 
{¶ 6} The owner may request a hearing to dispute either a quarantine or 
transfer action, and the administrative review includes a hearing, objections, and 
judicial review under R.C. 119.12.  R.C. 935.20(D).  Only after the remedies are 
exhausted may the director initiate proceedings for the permanent seizure of the 
animals.  R.C. 935.20(H). 
{¶ 7} As part of his investigatory powers, the director or his designee may 
enter at reasonable times onto property where dangerous wild animals are located.  
R.C. 935.19(A)(1).  To enter such property, the director must obtain the owner’s 
consent.  However, if the owner refuses to grant consent, the director may obtain a 
search warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction to enter and search the 
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premises for evidence of any violation of the act, upon a showing of probable cause.  
R.C. 935.19(A)(2) and (3). 
Facts 
{¶ 8} Under R.C. 935.04, Huntsman, in 2012, registered with the ODA two 
Syrian brown bears, two baboons, six black bears, one bobcat, one chimpanzee, 
two North American cougars, one black panther, two albino Burmese pythons, two 
Siberian tigers, eight Bengal tigers, one serval, two American alligators, two 
African lions, and two gray timber wolves.  All of these animals are regulated by 
the act.  R.C. 935.01.  Under the act, all owners of dangerous wild animals were 
required to obtain a permit to possess them by January 1, 2014.  R.C. 935.05(A), 
935.07(A), and 935.101(A). 
{¶ 9} Huntsman did not apply for any type of wild-animal permit.  Rather, 
she claimed that she was in the process of obtaining accreditation from the 
Zoological Association of America (“ZAA”) and therefore that she was exempt 
from the permit requirements.  R.C. 935.03(B)(1) states that the permit 
requirements do not apply to facilities that are accredited members of the ZAA and 
licensed under the United States Department of Agriculture. 
{¶ 10} The ODA notified Huntsman in early February 2014 that she had 
failed to submit an application for a dangerous-wild-animal permit.  Huntsman 
claimed that she was exempt from the permitting requirement because she had a 
permit for a bald eagle issued by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources under 
R.C. 1533.08.  Under R.C. 935.03(B)(10), the permit requirement does not apply 
to an owner who has been issued a permit under R.C. 1533.08, provided that the 
permit lists each specimen of wild animal that is a dangerous wild animal or 
restricted snake in the owner’s possession.  The ODA notified Huntsman that her 
bald-eagle permit did not cover any of the dangerous wild animals in her possession 
and that she was therefore not exempt from the permit requirements of R.C. Chapter 
935. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 11} The ODA learned that in early 2014 and continuing into the spring 
of 2015, Huntsman had transferred from her farm dangerous wild animals that she 
had never registered with the ODA.  The animals that the ODA learned Huntsman 
had transferred included a spotted leopard, transferred to a park in Calvert, Texas, 
on December 18, 2014, a crested macaque, transferred to Smalley Exotic Farm, 
L.L.C., in Silver Lake, Indiana, on February 4, 2015, and a tiger cub transferred to 
Wild Acres Ranch in Sandusky, Ohio, on February 23, 2015. 
{¶ 12} On March 5, 2015, Huntsman again claimed that she was in the 
process of obtaining accreditation from the ZAA and was exempt from the permit 
requirements of the act.  She provided the ODA with documentation of the steps 
that she intended to take in order to obtain ZAA accreditation, including a reduction 
in the number of animals in her possession.  She also voluntarily relinquished some 
of her dangerous wild animals to the ODA, including four black bears in July 2015, 
four alligators in September 2015, and two black and two Syrian brown bears in 
December 2015.  However, Huntsman maintained possession of the rest of her 
dangerous wild animals. 
{¶ 13} A brown bear relinquished by Huntsman to the ODA in December 
2015 gave birth to cubs while in the ODA’s custody.  At an unknown time, 
Huntsman apparently acquired two American alligators in addition to the two she 
previously registered.  In January 2015, Huntsman transported a third Syrian brown 
bear to Sandusky, Ohio, even though she had previously registered only two of 
these animals.  In November 2015, she transported an unregistered Bengal tiger cub 
to New York City.  And on January 7, 2016, an inspector for the United States 
Department of Agriculture observed that Huntsman possessed one chimpanzee, two 
Hamadryas baboons, two pumas, and five tigers, even though she did not have a 
dangerous-wild-animal permit as of January 7, 2016, had never applied for a permit 
as of that date, and had not been granted an exemption.  The assistant chief of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Division of Animal Health of the ODA also visited Huntsman’s premises and 
observed the same ten dangerous animals. 
{¶ 14} In March 2016, because she had not established that she was exempt 
from the permit requirements, the ODA delivered to Huntsman a quarantine order 
it issued under R.C. 935.20.  The quarantine order prohibited her from acquiring or 
removing dangerous wild animals from her premises without approval from the 
ODA.  Huntsman requested an administrative hearing on the quarantine order as 
allowed under R.C. 935.20 and R.C. Chapter 119; the hearing is currently scheduled 
for August 22 and 23, 2016. 
{¶ 15} On April 1, 2016, the ODA sent Huntsman a letter asking her to 
provide documentation of her ZAA accreditation status by May 2.  On May 2, 
Huntsman’s counsel faxed a letter from Kristi de Spain, executive administrator of 
the ZAA, denying Huntsman professional membership in that organization.  
Professional membership is required in order to get the accreditation needed for the 
exemption. 
{¶ 16} On May 4, 2016, the ODA asked Huntsman for permission to enter 
and search her premises under R.C. 935.19, and Huntsman refused.  The ODA then 
requested and obtained a search warrant from Judge Forchione.  During the search, 
the ODA found a number of animals for which no permits had been issued, and it 
exercised the director’s authority under R.C. 935.20 to implement a transfer order 
of the dangerous wild animals.  The ODA transferred five tigers, two pumas, two 
baboons, and one chimpanzee from Huntsman’s premises.  The animals have been 
in the ODA’s legal custody since that time.  The chimpanzee is housed in an 
approved out-of-state facility, and the other animals are housed in the ODA’s 
temporary holding facility and are being maintained according to veterinary 
standards of care.  These animals are defined as dangerous wild animals under R.C. 
935.01.  One of the tigers gave birth to four cubs while in the ODA holding facility. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 17} On the day the animals were taken, Huntsman filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the Stark County Court 
of Common Pleas.  Judge Forchione set a hearing on the motion for the next day, 
May 5, at 8:30 a.m.  Counsel for the ODA and Huntsman appeared at the hearing, 
but no sworn testimony was presented.  However, an ODA veterinarian informed 
the court that the animals would need to be sedated again if they were to be 
transferred back to Huntsman and that, for medical reasons, that should not happen 
for two weeks. 
{¶ 18} Judge Forchione ordered the ODA to return the dangerous wild 
animals to Huntsman by May 19, 2016, even though the ODA has never issued her 
a permit to possess them or determined that she was exempt from obtaining permits 
under the act. 
{¶ 19} The ODA then filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition.  It 
asserts that Judge Forchione has improperly exercised judicial power over the 
underlying action and that his exercise of that power is unauthorized by law.  
Further, the ODA asserts that he patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over 
transfer orders authorized under R.C. 935.20.  The ODA asserts that it has no 
adequate remedy at law if it is forced to defend its decision to transfer Huntsman’s 
animals.  The ODA requests a peremptory writ, or if necessary, an alternative writ, 
to prohibit Judge Forchione from further exercising jurisdiction over In re 
Huntsman Transfer of Dangerous Wild Animals, case No. 2016 MI 138, and an 
order declaring that Judge Forchione has no jurisdiction over the underlying matter. 
{¶ 20} In an amended emergency motion, the ODA has requested that this 
court issue a ruling by Wednesday, May 18, 2016.  Huntsman and Stump Hill Farm 
filed an emergency motion to intervene, which we granted on May 12, 2016.  Judge 
Forchione and Huntsman and Stump Hill Farm filed their responses to the ODA’s 
amended emergency motion on Friday, May 13, 2016. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Discussion 
{¶ 21} “A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is granted in 
limited circumstances with great caution and restraint.”  State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 
90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001).  To be entitled to the requested 
writ of prohibition, the ODA must demonstrate that (1) Judge Forchione is about to 
exercise or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Bell v. 
Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18; State ex rel. 
Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 
N.E.2d 379, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 22} However, the last requirement need not be established if the lack of 
jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous.  Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & 
Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶ 11.  We have 
found a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction and have granted writs of 
prohibition in previous cases in which courts attempted to bypass special statutory 
proceedings by agencies that have exclusive jurisdiction over a particular subject 
matter.  See State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 60 
Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 572 N.E.2d 1387 (1991) (exclusive jurisdiction to consider 
annexation matters is in county in which hearing on annexation petition takes 
place); State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court. of Common Pleas, 
83 Ohio St.3d 487, 488-489, 700 N.E.2d 1232 (1998) (complaints regarding 
election-law violations must be filed with the Ohio Elections Commission); State 
ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203,  
¶ 16, 18, 21 (unfair-labor-practices actions are the exclusive jurisdiction of the State 
Employment Relations Board). 
{¶ 23} It is undisputed that Judge Forchione has exercised and intends to 
further exercise judicial power in the underlying case.  So the next issue we need 
January Term, 2016 
 
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to resolve is whether the exercise of that power is authorized by law.  For the 
reasons explained below, we hold that it is not.  We further find that Judge 
Forchione patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction in the underlying case. 
{¶ 24} Judge Forchione argues that he has jurisdiction to grant injunctive 
relief in this case.  He argues that the act uses mandatory language only in some 
areas and that when permissive language is used, the act does not vest exclusive 
authority in the director.  Specifically, he argues that because R.C. 935.20(A) states 
that the director or his designee “may” order a quarantine or transfer, the director 
lacks exclusive authority over the power to quarantine or transfer dangerous wild 
animals.  This argument is without merit. 
{¶ 25} The “may” language in R.C. 935.20(A) gives the director discretion 
to issue quarantine or transfer orders.  It does not vest authority to do so in the 
common pleas courts or in any other entity.  No other agency of government, 
including the courts, has been given authority by the General Assembly to order the 
quarantine or transfer of dangerous wild animals.  R.C. Chapter 935 is a 
comprehensive statutory scheme regarding the regulation of dangerous wild 
animals, which vests exclusive authority over such matters to the director of the 
ODA. 
{¶ 26} Huntsman and Stump Hill Farm argue that Judge Forchione has 
jurisdiction to order the animals returned to them because he is merely reversing 
his own order.  They claim that Judge Forchione has jurisdiction “to order the return 
of the animals seized pursuant to the search warrant he issued on May 4, 2016.”  
But the animals were not seized pursuant to the search warrant; rather, they were 
seized under the director’s exclusive authority to transfer dangerous wild animals.  
Huntsman and Stump Hill Farm do not contest that the director has that authority. 
{¶ 27} Judge Forchione issued the search warrant allowing the ODA on the 
premises of Stump Hill Farm.  But he did not issue the warrant to seize the animals 
or to take any other action regarding the treatment of the animals, and indeed, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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face of the warrant makes this clear.  The warrant states that it is exclusively for the 
purpose of entering the Stump Hill Farm property, to search for evidence of a 
violation of R.C. Chapter 935, including specifically, possession of dangerous wild 
animals.  Additionally, the warrant explicitly states: “Nothing in this warrant shall 
limit your authority to order the quarantine and/or transfer of any such animals 
under R.C. 935.20(A).”  It is clear from the face of the warrant that it merely 
authorizes the ODA to enter and search the property and that the ODA retained its 
authority to quarantine or transfer any dangerous wild animals.  Thus, the warrant 
itself belies the argument that Judge Forchione exercised jurisdiction over the 
seizure of Huntsman’s animals by issuing the warrant and that he may therefore 
order their return by quashing it. 
{¶ 28} In issuing the warrant, Judge Forchione exercised his limited 
authority to allow the ODA on the premises to search.  He had no authority to allow 
or require the ODA to seize the animals.  The discretion whether to seize the 
animals is conferred by R.C. Chapter 935 exclusively on the director of the ODA.  
Judge Forchione therefore patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to order 
the animals’ return. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} We hold that Judge Forchione patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Cynthia 
Huntsman and Stump Hill Farm.  Daniels, as director of the ODA, has exclusive 
authority to implement and enforce R.C. Chapter 935, including the exclusive 
authority to order the removal and quarantine of dangerous wild animals being held 
by an owner without a permit to do so. 
{¶ 30} Accordingly, we hereby grant a peremptory writ of prohibition 
preventing Judge Forchione from exercising any further jurisdiction over In re 
Huntsman Transfer of Dangerous Wild Animals, Stark County C.P. case No. 2016 
MI 138.  We also order him to vacate his previous orders in the case. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., not participating. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would grant an alternative writ. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents with an opinion. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} Respectfully, I must dissent. 
{¶ 32} Neither this court nor the trial court have sufficient evidence to 
determine what exactly is happening in this case.  For that reason, I would grant 
only an alternative writ so that this court can make an informed decision. 
{¶ 33} But one thing is eminently clear.  The Ohio Department of 
Agriculture (“ODA”) sought a search warrant from the court of common pleas.  
After Cynthia Huntsman asked the same court to intervene and order the return of 
property seized during the execution of that warrant, the ODA showed up in this 
court arguing that the court of common pleas “patently and unambiguously” lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.  The majority holds that the animals 
were seized under the exclusive statutory authority granted solely to the ODA.  But 
the statute’s inclusion of the court of common pleas in the statutory scheme for 
intruding onto Huntsman’s property belies that position.  R.C. 935.19(A)(2) and 
(3). 
{¶ 34} Respectfully, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Peter 
T. Reed, Deputy Solicitor, and James R. Patterson and Lydia M. Arko, Assistant 
Attorneys General, for relator. 
Kevin R. L’Hommedieu, Special Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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John L. Juergensen Co. L.P.A., and John L. Juergensen, for intervening 
respondents. 
_________________