Case Title: Bowen v. Smith

Citation: 342 Md. 449

Docket Number: 61/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 61
September Term, 1995
___________________________________
ROLAND H. BOWEN
v.
A. H. SMITH
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
   Filed:  June 4, 1996
2
     
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-413(b), the parties presented
1
a statement of the case in lieu of pleadings and evidence.  The
statement does not reveal the reason for claimant's incarceration.
This is a workers' compensation case.  The issue presented in
this appeal is whether the employer improperly terminated
claimant's temporary total disability benefits while he was
incarcerated in a penal institution in this state.  We shall
reverse the summary judgment of the circuit court entered in favor
of the employer and hold that under the Workers' Compensation Act,
an employer may not terminate or suspend temporary total disability
benefits based solely on the incarceration of the worker.   
I.
On December 4, 1989, Roland H. Bowen, the claimant, sustained
a compensable accidental injury to his back arising out of and in
the course of his employment with A.H. Smith, the employer.  He
filed 
a 
claim 
with 
the 
Workers' 
Compensation 
Commission
(hereinafter the "Commission") and, following a finding by the
Commission that he qualified for temporary total disability
benefits (hereinafter "TTD" benefits), he received compensation
from December 13, 1989, through July 11, 1991.
Claimant was incarcerated in the Maryland Department of
Corrections from July 23, 1991, through December 9, 1991.   The
1
employer terminated payment of claimant's TTD benefits from July
12, 1991 through January 14, 1992.  The claimant filed issues and
requested a hearing on the issue of the employer's decision to
- 2 -
     
The Workers' Compensation Act was recodified in 1991 as
2
Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol.) Title 9 of the Labor and Employment
Article.  Because the claimant's accident occurred in 1989, his
rights are governed by Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990
Cum. Supp.) Art. 101, the statute in effect at the time of his
injury.  Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 432 n.1, 635 A.2d
977, 978 n.1 (1994); Mutual, Etc. Company v. Pinckney, 205 Md. 107,
113, 106 A.2d 488, 491 (1954).  We note, however, that the relevant
provisions of Art. 101 were not substantively changed by the
recodification.  All further references will be to the 1990 edition
of Art. 101.
terminate the TTD payments and requested the Commission to
determine whether he was entitled to receive TTD benefits while he
was incarcerated.  Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum.
Supp.) Art. 101, § 36(2)(ii)(3)(A).2
The Commission held a hearing and, on February 22, 1993,
denied claimant's demand for benefits while he was incarcerated but
reinstated his TTD benefits from December 10, 1991, through January
12, 1992.  Claimant appealed to the Circuit Court for Calvert
County, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that he was
not temporarily totally disabled from July 12, 1991, through
December 9, 1991.  The trial court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment.  In affirming the Commission's decision, the
court stated:
Claimant's 
inability 
to 
secure 
gainful
employment during the five months in question
stemmed not from his injury, but from his
imprisonment. 
 
In 
effect, 
Claimant's
incarceration constituted a superseding cause
of his inability to work.
- 3 -
Claimant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  We granted a
writ of certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration by that
court.
- 4 -
II.
Summary judgment may be granted on the ground that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Maryland Rule 2-501(e);
Dobbins v. Washington Suburban, 338 Md. 341, 344-45, 658 A.2d 675,
676-77 (1995).  We shall review the order granting summary judgment
to determine whether the trial court was legally correct.  Decoster
v. Westinghouse, 333 Md. 245, 261, 634 A.2d 1330, 1338 (1994).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the legislature.  Shah v. Howard
County, 337 Md. 248, 254, 653 A.2d 425, 427 (1995); Soper v.
Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335, 449 A.2d 1158 (1982).  The
primary source from which to determine the intent of the
legislature is the language of the statute itself.  Lovellette v.
City of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d 1141, 1147 (1983).
We have repeatedly noted that the Maryland Workers' Compensation
Act (hereinafter the "Act") should be construed as liberally in
favor of injured workers as its provisions will permit in order to
effectuate its broad remedial purpose.  Para v. Richards Group, 339
Md. 241, 251, 661 A.2d 737, 742 (1995).  Any uncertainty in the law
should be resolved in favor of the claimant.  Baltimore v. Cassidy,
338 Md. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757, 761-62 (1995).  Moreover, as we said
in Victor v. Proctor & Gamble, 318 Md. 624, 628-29, 569 A.2d 697,
700 (1990), "in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for
- 5 -
compensation under the Act, there is, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, a presumption by legislative command that
the claim comes within the provisions of the Act."  We look,
therefore, to the language of the statute to determine whether the
legislature intended to allow employers to suspend TTD payments
based on post-accident incarceration.
III.
The Act provides disability benefits to workers who suffer
either an occupational disease or an accidental personal injury
that arises out of and in the course of employment.  Art. 101, §§
15, 22; see State v. Richardson, 233 Md. 534, 541, 197 A.2d 428,
431 (1964) (right to compensation established by statute).  This
case requires us to determine whether, under the Act, an employer
may suspend payment of TTD benefits to a claimant solely because
the claimant becomes incarcerated.
The general purpose of the Act is to provide compensation to
injured workers and their families for the worker's loss of earning
capacity resulting from a work-related injury.  Victor, 318 Md. at
628, 569 A.2d at 699.  There are four categories of benefits under
the Act: medical benefits, disability benefits, death benefits, and
vocational rehabilitation benefits.  Art. 101, §§ 36, 37.   We are
concerned in this case only with disability benefits.
- 6 -
     
Disability benefits are not paid in lieu of lost wages,
3
even though the measure of the amount of disability benefits the
injured worker receives takes into account the worker's average
weekly wage for the period preceding the accident.  Victor v.
Proctor & Gamble, 318 Md. 624, 632, 569 A.2d 697, 701 (1990);
Miller v. Western Electric Co., 310 Md. 173, 187-88, 528 A.2d 486,
493-94 (1987) ("[O]ne who claims compensation for permanent partial
disability . . . need not show actual wage loss as a prerequisite
to recovery.").
Disability benefits are paid to an injured worker to
compensate for the injured worker's loss of earning capacity, not
to compensate merely for the worker's injury.  Belcher v. T. Rowe
Price, 329 Md. 709, 737, 621 A.2d 872, 886 (1993) ("More than
merely indemnifying workers for injuries sustained on the job, the
system embodied in the Act provides compensation when earning power
is lost as a result of work-related disabilities.").  Thus,
disability benefits compensate for the worker's inability to secure
or retain employment resulting from the worker's work-related
injury.   
3
There are four types of disability benefits that an eligible
injured worker can receive:  temporary total disability, permanent
total disability, temporary partial disability, and permanent
partial disability.  Art. 101, § 36; Jackson v. Beth.-Fair.
Shipyard, 185 Md. 335, 338, 44 A.2d 811, 812 (1945).  We are
concerned in this case with temporary total disability benefits.
An injured worker who becomes temporarily totally disabled
because of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of
his employment is entitled to receive TTD benefits.  Art. 101, §
- 7 -
     
The Act specifically provides for only one circumstance
4
whereby TTD benefits may be suspended -- that is, where the
claimant unreasonably refuses to submit to or obstructs reasonable
medical examination of his or her injuries.  Article 101, § 42
provides:
Any employee entitled to receive compensation
under this article is required, if requested
by the Commission to submit himself for
medical examination at a time and from time to
(continued...)
15, § 36(2).  The period of temporary total disability "is the
healing period, or the time during which the workman is wholly
disabled and unable by reason of his injury to work."  Gorman v.
Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 178 Md. 71, 78, 12 A.2d 525, 529 (1940).
Temporary disability exists "until the injured workman is as far
restored as the permanent character of the injuries will permit."
Jackson, 185 Md. at 339, 44 A.2d at 812.  "Total" disability means
that a worker is only "able to perform services so limited in
quality, dependability, or quantity, that a reasonably stable
market for them does not exist."  Cassidy, 338 Md. at 98, 656 A.2d
at 762.
Article 101 does not address the issue of whether temporary
total disability benefits may be suspended or terminated when a
claimant is incarcerated.  We find nothing in the provisions of the
statute to indicate that the legislature intended to permit an
employer to suspend or terminate TTD benefits awarded to an injured
worker for a pre-incarceration injury while an injured worker is
incarcerated.4
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     (...continued)
4
time at a place reasonably convenient for the
employee and as may be provided by the rules
of the Commission.  If the employee refuses to
submit to any such examination, or obstructs
the same, his right to compensation shall be
suspended until such examination has taken
place, and no compensation shall be payable
during or for account of such period.
There is no evidence or suggestion that claimant obstructed or
refused to submit to any medical examination.  Therefore, this
section does not justify suspension of his right to compensation.
     
Where the General Assembly wanted to limit the
5
applicability of the Act to injuries sustained by prisoners, it has
done so.  See Art. 101, § 35.  Under this section, prisoners who
suffer injuries arising out of and in the course of qualifying
prison employment are not entitled to receive temporary disability
benefits and are prohibited from receiving permanent disability
benefits to which they may be entitled until after their release
from prison.  Art. 101, § 35(b).
A plain reading of the language of the Act does not justify
the exclusion of claimant's right to compensation based on his
incarceration.   See State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Campbell, 109 Nev.
5
997, 862 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1993) (reasoning that "[t]he general rule
of liberal construction of the workers' compensation statutes does
not justify the inclusion or exclusion `of a substantive right that
cannot be supported by any fair reading of the statutory scheme'").
The Act does not provide for the suspension of disability benefits
while a claimant is incarcerated, and we will not create such an
exclusion.
The employer argues that claimant's incarceration terminates
the obligation to pay compensation.  The employer relies upon
- 9 -
Victor as authority to suspend benefits in this case.  In Victor,
the issue before the Court was whether a claimant who voluntarily
retired was entitled to temporary total disability benefits after
he had retired.  We concluded that "[d]uring the healing period,
and until he reached maximum improvement, he was deemed under the
Act to be unable to work, even if he desired to do so, because he
was totally disabled.  His earning capacity during that period was
nil."  318 Md. at 633, 569 A.2d at 702.  The Court held that "[i]t
was not his retirement that impeded his earning capacity, but the
total disability resulting from his accidental injury."  Id.  The
Court found, therefore, that Victor was entitled to the
compensation.  The employer in this case, both distinguishing and
relying on Victor, argues that the claimant here was unable to re-
enter the work force because of his incarceration and not by reason
of his injury.  The employer argues that the claimant herein,
unlike the claimant in Victor, could not re-enter the work force at
any time, and in fact, could not re-enter the work force until
December 9, 1991, his release date from incarceration.
We 
find, 
however, 
that 
like 
voluntary 
retirement,
incarceration does not cause a claimant's injury nor cause the
claimant to become disabled.  The award of compensation, based on
a finding of total disability, is not affected by claimant's
subsequent incarceration.  Claimant's incarceration could hardly
increase his already total disability.  When a claimant is
- 10 -
     
Many states have responded by changing their workers'
6
(continued...)
temporarily totally disabled and has been awarded benefits, the
determinative question should not be whether the claimant, while in
jail, could or could not have worked.  The claimant is entitled to
continue receiving benefits so long as the disability and the loss
of wage earning capacity on which the award was bottomed still
continues.  The relevant factual question should be whether the
disability continues to impair wage earning capacity.  If the
claimant is no longer disabled, the claimant is, of course, no
longer entitled to benefits.
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue
have reached the same conclusion.  See United Riggers Erectors v.
Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 131 Ariz. 258, 640 P.2d 189, 191 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1981); Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co., 517 So. 2d 918, 923-
924 (La. Ct. App. 1987); DeMars v. Roadway Express, Inc., 99 Mich.
App. 842, 298 N.W.2d 645, 646-47 (Ct. App. 1980); State Indus. Ins.
Sys. v. Campbell, 109 Nev. 997, 862 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1993); Forshee
& Langley Logging v. Peckham, 100 Or. App. 717, 788 P.2d 487, 488
(Ct. App. 1990); Last v. MSI Constr. Co., 409 S.E.2d 334, 336-37
(S.C. 1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 850 P. 2d 1281,
1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); In re Spera, 713 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo.
1986); see also Annot., Workers Comp for Prisoner, 54 A.L.R.4th 241
(1987).6
- 11 -
     (...continued)
6
compensation statutes to restrict prisoners' rights to receive
disability benefits.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(9) (West
1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.361 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §
656.160 (1995).
The statutes restricting the right of incarcerated individuals
to receive disability benefits reflect policy determinations, and
the states' approaches have not been uniform.  For example, in
Florida, the statute provides that no compensation shall be paid an
inmate of a public institution unless that individual "has
dependent upon him for support a person or persons defined as
dependents elsewhere in this chapter, whose dependency shall be
determined as if the employee were deceased and to whom
compensation would be paid in case of death; and such compensation
as is due such employee shall be paid such dependents during the
time he remains such inmate."  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(9) (West
1996).  In Arkansas, the statute provides that the spouse, and if
no spouse, the inmate's minor dependent children, may petition the
Commission for receipt of the inmate's workers' compensation
disability benefits for the period of the worker's incarceration.
If the inmate has no surviving spouse or minor dependent children,
the State Department of Corrections may petition for receipt of the
benefits as reimbursement for the cost of incarcerating the inmate.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-812 (Michie 1996).  In Oklahoma, the statute
provides that workers' compensation benefits shall be placed into
an inmate account, from which the State Board of Corrections may
charge up to 50% of any deposits to cover costs of incarceration.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 549(B) (West 1996).  In Michigan, the
statute provides that an employer is not liable for compensation
during the period of time that the claimant "is unable to obtain or
perform work because of imprisonment or commission of a crime."
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.361 (West 1996).  In Oregon, the statute
provides that an incarcerated worker is ineligible to receive
disability 
compensation 
during 
the 
period 
the 
worker 
is
incarcerated for the commission of a crime.  OR. REV. STAT. § 656.160
(1995).  We believe that this policy determination, if the Maryland
Act is to be changed, is best left to the Legislature.  Cf.
Harrison v. Mont. Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 462-63, 456 A.2d
894, 904-05 (1983).
As we previously discussed, the right to disability benefits
is established by the Act.  It is, therefore, the province of the
General Assembly to restrict the right of incarcerated individuals
- 12 -
to receive temporary total disability benefits.  Cf. Enterprise v.
Allstate, 341 Md. 541, 552, 671 A.2d 509, 515 (1996); Frye v. Frye,
305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986).  This view that any
policy change should be made by the legislature and not the court
was expressed by the Nevada Supreme Court in In re Spera, 713 P.2d
at 1158:
Because there is no statutory exception which
eliminates benefits when a worker is jailed,
the benefits are due the worker even if his
needs are fulfilled from another governmental
source.  The state legislature can change our
statute to suspend payments during periods of
incarceration, much like a private insurer
might place conditions on his coverage.  But
in the absence of legislation, we decline the
State's invitation to make that policy shift
ourselves.  In Matter of Johner, Wyo., 643
P.2d 932, 934 (1982), we explicitly stated
that "worker's compensation is a statutory
responsibility and any change or addition to
the law is a function of the legislature and
not the courts." (footnote omitted).
Finally, the employer argues that even if TTD benefits cannot
be suspended based solely on a claimant's incarceration, the
benefits may be suspended because he unreasonably interfered with
medical treatment of his disability.  This argument is meritless.
There is no evidence that claimant refused to undergo reasonable
medical treatment while he was incarcerated.  Cf. Watts v. Young
Company, 245 Md. 277, 280, 225 A.2d 865, 867 (1967).
 Accordingly, we hold that an employer may not suspend payment
of TTD benefits based solely on a claimant's incarceration.
- 13 -
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
CALVERT COUNTY REVERSED.  CASE
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
WITH
DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND TO REMAND TO THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLEE.