Case Title: DUNKIN v. INSTAFF PERSONNEL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102580

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUNKIN v. INSTAFF PERSONNEL  DUNKIN v. INSTAFF PERSONNEL 2007 OK 51 164 P.3d 1057 Case Number: 102580 Decided: 06/19/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Craig E. Dunkin, Petitioner, v. Instaff Personnel, American Home Assurance Company, and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents. CERTIORARI TO COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS Division I ¶0 A worker sought workers' compensation benefits claiming to have suffered a work-related injury. The trial judge, Honorable Cherri Farrar, denied the claim and a divided three-judge panel sustained that decision. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the order of the three-judge panel and remanded the matter to the Worker's Compensation Court. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. John R. Colbert, COLBERT & COLBERT, Ardmore, Oklahoma, and Robert Highsaw, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner. Catherine C. Taylor, Kelly M. Greenough, PERRINE, MCGIVERN, REDEMANN, REID, BERRY & TAYLOR, P.L.L.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Respondents. COLBERT, J. ¶1 The issue in this matter is whether the three-judge review panel of the Workers' Compensation Court was presented with an order from the trial tribunal that was sufficient to afford meaningful review of the determination that Claimant, Craig E. Dunkin, "did not sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of [his] employment." This Court holds that the Workers' Compensation Court's finding lacked the requisite definiteness and certainty for there to have been meaningful judicial review by the three-judge panel when it determined that the trial tribunal's determination "was not against the clear weight of the evidence." The order of the three-judge panel and the order of the trial tribunal are vacated, as is the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. This matter is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Claimant worked for Instaff Personnel (Employer) as a temporary worker assigned to the Dollar General Distribution Center. He filed a workers' compensation claim seeking medical benefits and an award of temporary total disability for an injury to his head, neck, and back. The Form 3 alleged that he "was loading [a] trailer [when a] box fell hitting claimant in [the] head and neck." ¶3 At trial, Claimant testified that it was his job to load truck trailers on the night shift at the Dollar General warehouse. He further testified that while he was stacking boxes, a fifty-pound case of detergent fell and injured him. According to Claimant, he looked for a supervisor and could not find one. He told a security guard that he was going to the emergency room and the security guard said he would pass that information on to a supervisor. Claimant was treated at the emergency room and was given pain medication. He testified that when he attempted to speak with his supervisor by phone the next day, he was told that he had been fired for walking off the job. ¶4 Claimant also presented a report from his medical expert, which was admitted without objection. The doctor opined that Claimant had suffered a work-related injury resulting in temporary total disability. ¶5 Employer's cross-examination of Claimant involved a two-prong attack on the claim, causation and Claimant's credibility. Claimant was questioned about a prior work-related injury from 1998. That injury was the subject of a joint-petition settlement in January 2001. The settlement was for injury to Claimant's "back, neck, feet, arms, and [settled] all claims to all parts of the body, known or unknown, arising out of the 8/3/98 incident." Claimant was also questioned concerning other injuries in 2001, 2002, and 2003, which required emergency room visits but that apparently did not result in workers' compensation claims. ¶6 Employer then sought to impeach Claimant's testimony with inconsistencies between Claimant's deposition and his testimony at trial. ¶7 Employer's evidence consisted of the medical reports and an order approving a joint settlement from the prior compensable injury along with its expert's medical report concerning this claim for compensation. No objection was offered to these. The current medical expert found no permanent partial impairment to Claimant's spine and he noted that any period of temporary disability had passed. The expert did not state that Claimant had not suffered an injury. ¶8 The trial tribunal denied the claim for compensation. The order recited the statutory language and concluded that Claimant "did not sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment with the above named respondent, as alleged in the claim for compensation filed herein." A divided three-judge panel sustained the trial tribunal's order stating that it "was not against the clear weight of evidence nor contrary to law." ¶9 The Court of Civil Appeals was also divided when it reversed the decision of the three-judge panel. The majority opinion vacated the decision finding no competent evidence to refute Claimant's evidence. It remanded the matter for the Workers' Compensation Court to "consider the amount of Claimant's temporary disability, if any, and medical treatment." The dissenting opinion reminded the majority that the Workers' Compensation Court "is the sole arbiter of [the] credibility of witness[es] and [the] weight given their testimony," quoting this Court's decision in Pearl v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶10 This Court pronounced the standard applicable to appellate review of an order of the Workers' Compensation Court in Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, ¶11 Parks noted that under section 3.6(A) of the Workers' Compensation Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §§ 1 through 211 (2001 & Supp. 2006), intra-court review by a three-judge panel "is limited by the clear-weight-of-the-evidence standard, [and therefore] a panel may reverse or modify the trial judge's findings only after these findings have been determined to be lacking in the requisite evidentiary foundation." Parks, ¶12 Under the two-tiered review process described in Parks, only issues of law receive appellate review. Questions of fact made by the trial tribunal receive review only by a three-judge panel under the clear weight of the evidence standard. Thus, the three-judge panel is equivalent to an appellate court of last resort when it comes to actually weighing the evidence to determine whether the trial tribunal has correctly determined an issue of fact. Therefore, a thorough and accurate review of issues of fact by that panel is required. ¶13 The dissent in Parks recognized that a three-judge panel might choose some competent evidence on which to reverse the trial tribunal despite the fact that the tribunal's decision was supported overwhelmingly by the evidence. Id. ¶ 2, ¶14 As early as 1945, this Court embraced the rule that "[i]t is the duty of the State Industrial Commission [now the Workers' Compensation Court] to make specific findings of the ultimate facts responsive to the issues as well as the conclusions of law upon which an order is made granting or denying an award of compensation to a claimant." Corzine v. Compress, MEANINGFUL REVIEW BY THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL ¶15 Meaningful review is facilitated by an order from the trial tribunal from which the specific basis for its decision to grant or deny a claim can be determined. This requirement is not a mere technicality. "[O]n-the-record findings of ultimate facts responsive to the issues shaped by the evidence as well as conclusions of law . . . are an indispensable prerequisite for judicial review." Jobe v. Am. Legion # 7, ¶16 This requirement is implicit in the Rules of the Workers' Compensation Court. Okla. Stat. tit. 85, ch. 4, app. ( 2001 & Supp. 2006). Rule 60(A)(3) requires that a party's request for review before a three-judge panel include "[a] specific statement of each conclusion of law and finding of fact urged as error. General allegations will not be accepted. General allegations of error include statements that the decision of the trial judge is 'against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law.'" This rule clearly contemplates that the trial tribunal will have provided specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order granting or denying a claim for compensation. Pursuant to Rule 60, an aggrieved party must then specify each error it asserts for review by the three-judge panel. ¶17 Meaningful review is furthered by requiring a party to make specific allegations of factual and legal error, but such a requirement depends upon the presence of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the trial tribunal's order. An order that merely recites the statutory language and concludes that a claimant "did not sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment" does not provide litigants the information needed to meet the "specific allegations" requirement. Further, it does not inform the three-judge panel, or the litigants, as to which facts and evidence informed the trial tribunal's decision. An order that merely recites the statutory language does no more to facilitate meaningful judicial review than an order that merely states "claim denied." ¶18 This Court has observed the frequent pattern of such boilerplate orders from the Workers' Compensation Court. That court is duty bound to insure that the three-judge panel, the final arbiter of questions of fact, is presented with an order from which the panel may meaningfully assess the legal and factual basis for the decision. The Workers' Compensation Court is required to make specific on-the-record findings of fact responsive to the issues formed by the evidence. All orders of the Workers' Compensation Court must meet "the law's standards of a judicially reviewable decision." Jobe, THE ORDER IN THIS MATTER ¶19 The order memorializing the decision in this matter does not provide the necessary elements for meaningful judicial review. The transcript of the proceedings before the trial tribunal reveals that Employer attacked the claim for compensation on two bases, credibility and causation. ¶20 The trial tribunal may have believed that Claimant's testimony was simply not true and that no injury occurred. That would have been within its right because the Workers' Compensation Court "is the sole arbiter of [the] credibility of witness[es] and [the] weight given their testimony." Pearl v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., ¶21 The trial tribunal was obligated to make specific findings as to the basis for its decision. Only then could a three-judge panel review meaningfully the tribunal's factual determinations and legal conclusions. On remand the Workers' Compensation Court is directed to memorialize its decision in an order that complies with this opinion. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION CONCUR: Winchester, C.J., Edmondson, V.C.J., Opala, Kauger, Watt, Colbert, JJ. DISSENT: Lavender, Hargrave, Taylor, JJ. Taylor, J. Dissenting: I would affirm the trial judge's decision to deny this claim. The trial judge heard all of the evidence and legal arguments and then determined all of the factual and legal issues in favor of the employer. The trial judge specifically found that the employee "did not sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment " The employee simply failed to prove his case. The employee's credibility was clearly and properly at issue. The trial judge's Order was clear and definite and it should be affirmed. There is no need for a remand. FOOT