Case Title: REECE v PIERCE FLOORING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-463

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-463 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 MICHAEL L. REECE, Plaintiff and Appellant, PIERCE FLOORING, a Montana Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Charles E . Snyder, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: June 17, 1981 B)CT 1 3 1981 Decided: -. QG7 J Filed : - M r . Chief ~ u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . I n an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e District Court of Yellowstone County g r a n t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f . p l a i n t i f f Michael Reece a p p e a l s . Reece, a b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r working under t h e b u s i n e s s name of M & R E n t e r p r i s e s , had been a customer of P i e r c e F l o o r i n g s i n c e 1972. On August 16 , 1977, Reece owed P i e r c e F l o o r i n g $ l r 2 0 1 . 2 0 f o r c a r p e t i n s t a l l e d a t 807 Saddle rive and $1,372.80 f o r c a r p e t i n g i n s t a l l e d a t 134 Lantana Drive. Reece owed P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a total of $2,744.56 on t h e two a c c o u n t s , i n c l u d i n g i n t e r e s t . Before Reece l e f t f o r v a c a t i o n on August 1 6 , 1977, he wrote a check to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g and asked h i s mother to d e l i v e r it f o r him. I n t e n d i n g t o pay o n l y t h e amount owed on t h e Saddle Drive a c c o u n t b u t n o t r e c a l l i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r amount, he wrote o u t a b l a n k check to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , n o t i n g as a memo "807 Saddle Drive." H e t h e n asked h i s mother to f i n d o u t t h e amount owed on t h e Saddle Drive a c c o u n t , f i l l i n t h a t amount on t h e c h e c k , and g i v e it t o p i e r c e Flooring. When R e e c e ' s mother went to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , she t a l k e d t o a n employee a t t h e f r o n t desk and asked how much was owed on t h e Saddle Drive account. According to t h e t e s t i m o n y of Reece's m o t h e r , she was t h e n t o l d t h a t she would have to pay t h e e n t i r e amount f o r both t h e Saddle Drive and t h e Lantana Drive a c c o u n t s or else P i e r c e F l o o r i n g would p l a c e l i e n s on t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s . Concerned about t h e p o s s i b l e l i e n s , Reece's mother made t h e check o u t f o r $2,744.56 t h e e n t i r e amount owed on both a c c o u n t s to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e amount owed on t h e Saddle Drive a c c o u n t . The check was r e t u r n e d f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t funds. Reece's mother t o l d h e r son a b o u t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s surrounding h e r d e l i - v e r y of t h e check when he r e t u r n e d from v a c a t i o n i n e a r l y September. H e knew t h a t t h e check had n o t c l e a r e d when he r e c e i v e d h i s bank s t a t e m e n t i n mid-September . From mid-September t o h i s arrest on November 27, 1977, Reece made no f u r t h e r c o n t a c t w i t h P i e r c e F l o o r i n g and took no a c t i o n to pay h i s a c c o u n t . On September 1 2 , 1977, P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f i l e d l i e n s on both t h e Saddle Drive and t h e Lantana Drive p r o p e r t i e s . In e a r l y October t h e check was run through a second t i m e and r e t u r n e d a g a i n f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t funds. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g made s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s to c o n t a c t Reece b u t f a i l e d . R e e c e l s b u s i n e s s phone was d i s c o n n e c t e d i n mid-October and h i s home phone was u n l i s t e d . P i e r c e F l o o r i n g t h e n mailed to Reecels home a d d r e s s a c e r t i f i e d l e t t e r n o t i f y i n g Reece t h a t c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n may be i n i t i a t e d b y P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i f t h e check w a s n o t made good w i t h i n f i v e d a y s , as provided i n s e c t i o n 45-6-316, MCA. The r e g i s t e r e d l e t t e r was r e t u r n e d to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g marked "refused." Reece t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had n o t r e c e i v e d t h e r e g i s t e r e d letter s i n c e he d i d n o t r e c e i v e h i s m a i l a t h i s house a d d r e s s b u t a t h i s p o s t o f f ice box. On October 25, Ron P i e r c e , g e n e r a l manager of P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , signed an " ~ n v e s t i g a t i v e Form f o r Bad Checks and F o r g e r i e s " which was t h e s t a n d a r d form used by t h e Yellowstone County a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e to d e c i d e whether or n o t t o p r o s e c u t e a bad check c h a r g e . One q u e s t i o n asked whether t h e check was g i v e n i n payment f o r an e x i s t i n g d e b t , to which P i e r c e F l o o r i n g r e p l i e d " y e s . " The d e p u t y county a t t o r n e y who s u b s e q u e n t l y decided to p r o s e c u t e t h e case, t e s t i f i e d a t t h e t r i a l t h a t he would have r e j e c t e d and p r o b a b l y d i d reject t h e case a t t h a t t i m e because of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e answer to t h e e x i s t i n g d e b t q u e s t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , on November 1, a c o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d i n t h e J u s t i c e Court of Yellowstone County on t h e charge of i s s u i n g a bad check ( f e l o n y ) i n t h a t Michael Reece "with t h e purpose to s e c u r e p r o p e r t y , to w i t : l i e n waivers on real estate and f i x t u r e s " i s s u e d t h e check. The record is u n c l e a r as to how t h e d e p u t y county a t t o r n e y came to t h e b e l i e f t h a t l i e n waivers had been g i v e n i n exchange f o r f u l l payment. The deputy county a t t o r n e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t such i n f o r m a t i o n could have come from e i t h e r l a w enforcement p e r s o n n e l o r from an employee of p i e r c e F l o o r i n g , b u t he could n o t remember why he thought l i e n waivers had been g i v e n to Reece. On Sunday, November 27, 1977, Reece w a s a r r e s t e d i n h i s home. H e w a s booked and k e p t i n t h e Yellowstone County j a i l u n t i l he a r r a n g e d b a i l of $2,800. On December 1, 1977, t h e c o m p l a i n t was d i s m i s s e d by t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y on t h e grounds t h a t new e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t it was not i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e to p r o s e c u t e . T h e r e a f t e r Reece f i l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s prose- c u t i o n a g a i n s t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g . It came on f o r t r i a l on O c t o b e r 6 , 1980. A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief t h e District Court g r a n t e d P i e r c e F l o o r i n g ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t as f o l l o w s : "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . W e l l , g e n t l e m e n , on t h e a u t h o r i t y t h a t ' s been c i t e d to m e , t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of l a c k of p r o b a b l e cause is a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t o be determined by t h e Court--and t h a t s p e c i f i c a l l y is Wendel vs. M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company, 8 3 Montana 252--I t h i n k t h e C o u r t is compelled to g r a n t t h e motion and d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t i n t h i s c a u s e , and it is SO o r d e r e d . " P l a i n t i f f Reece a p p e a l s p r e s e n t i n g e s s e n t i a l l y t w o i s s u e s f o r review: (1) Is p r o b a b l e c a u s e a q u e s t i o n of l a w to be determined b y t h e Court? ( 2 ) I f n o t , is t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t to create a j u r y i s s u e on p r o b a b l e c a u s e ? I n a c i v i l a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e p l a i n t i f f must a l l e g e and prove (1) t h a t a j u d i c i a l proceeding w a s com- menced and p r o s e c u t e d a g a i n s t him, ( 2 ) t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n s t i g a t i n g , p r o s e c u t i n g o r c o n t i n u i n g such p r o c e e d i n g , ( 3 ) t h a t t h e r e w a s l a c k of p r o b a b l e cause for d e f e n d a n t ' s acts, ( 4 ) t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c t u a t e d by malice, ( 5 ) t h a t t h e j u d i c i a l proceeding t e r m i n a t e d f a v o r a b l y f o r p l a i n t i f f , and ( 6 ) t h a t p l a i n t i f f s u f f e r e d damage and t h e amount t h e r e o f . McGuire v. Armitage (1979) , Mon t . I 603 P.2d 253, 36 St.Rep. 2142; Stephens v. Conley ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. 352, 138 P. 189. The i s s u e s i n t h i s a p p e a l concern t h e t h i r d element l i s t e d above. I n t h i s case t h e District Court r u l e d t h a t l a c k of pro- b a b l e c a u s e was a q u e s t i o n of law to be determined by t h e c o u r t on t h e b a s i s of o u r 1928 o p i n i o n i n Wendel v. M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e Co., 8 3 Mont. 252, 272 P. 245. T h i s was error. W e acknowledge t h e e x i s t e n c e of an i s o l a t e d g e n e r a l state- ment i n Wendel to t h a t e f f e c t : " T h e r e f o r e , i n a c t i o n s f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n s , t h e real c o n t r o v e r s y is, g e n e r a l l y , upon t h e q u e s t i o n of malice and want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e . The burden of proving t h e s e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s rests upon t h e p l a i n t i f f , and whether t h e r e was a want of p r o b a b l e cause is p u r e l y a q u e s t i o n of law." Wendel involved a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n by a d i s c h a r g e d employee a g a i n s t h i s former employer f o l l o w i n g d i s m i s s a l of a l a r c e n y p r o s e c u t i o n i n s t i g a t e d by h i s former employer. A j u r y v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e d i s c h a r g e d employee was r e v e r s e d on a p p e a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e uncontroverted f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e as a matter of law. I n t h a t c o n t e x t where t h e f a c t s of t h e l a r c e n y were undisputed and t h e c r i m i n a l c h a r g e was d i s m i s s e d f o r f a i l u r e of t h e state to d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e t h e same, t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o b a b l e cause became a q u e s t i o n of l a w f o r t h e c o u r t . W e e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e g e n e r a l l y to a c t i o n s f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n holding t h e r u l e p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e o n l y where t h e r e is no c o n f l i c t i n t h e e v i - d e n c e on t h e i s s u e of p r o b a b l e cause and such u n c o n t r o v e r t e d e v i d e n c e a d m i t s of o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n on t h a t i s s u e . The c a s e s of Orser v. S t a t e of Montana ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 126, 582 P.2d 1227, and 3-D Lumber C o . v . Belgrade S t a t e ~ a n k ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 481, 487 P.2d 1136, are similar to Wendel. I n b o t h cases t h e e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g to t h e p r e s e n c e or absence of p r o b a b l e c a u s e was undisputed and admitted of o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n . Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e i s s u e of p r o b a b l e cause became a q u e s t i o n of l a w f o r t h e c o u r t . Any a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t p r i n c i p l e t o cases i n v o l v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e on t h e i s s u e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e is e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d . P u u t i o v. Roman ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 105, 245 P. 523 e x p r e s s e s t h e c o r r e c t r u l e i n m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n cases. There t h i s Court r e v e r s e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w i n t h i s language: " I t is s e t t l e d i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n , and e l s e w h e r e g e n e r a l l y , t h a t a cause should never b e withdrawn from t h e j u r y , u n l e s s t h e conclu- s i o n n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s , as a matter of l a w , t h a t a r e c o v e r y c a n n o t be had upon any view which can r e a s o n a b l y be taken of t h e f a c t s which t h e e v i d e n c e t e n d s t o e s t a b l i s h . A motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e d e f e n d a n t is i n e f f e c t a demurrer to t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence; it a d m i t s as t r u e a l l m a t e r i a l f a c t s i n e v i d e n c e which tend to e s t a b l i s h p l a i n t i f f ' s cause of a c t i o n , whether such f a c t s be produced by t h e p l a i n t i f f or t h e d e f e n d a n t . Such f a c t s , w i t h e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e t h a t may be drawn from them, a r e to be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p l a i n t i f f . The f a c t t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y i n b e h a l f of t h e d e f e n s e pleaded is u n c o n t r a d i c t e d w i l l n o t j u s t i f y a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e d e f e n d a n t , i f t h e i n f e r e n c e s to be drawn from it a r e open to d i f - f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s by r e a s o n a b l e men ." ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e judge and j u r y f u n c t i o n was r e c e n t l y s u c c i n c t l y e x p r e s s e d by t h e Georgia Court of Appeals i n t h i s manner: "Want of p r o b a b l e c a u s e is an e s s e n t i a l element o f a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n cause of a c t i o n . O r d i n a r i l y , t h e e x i s t e n c e of p r o b a b l e cause is a q u e s t i o n of fact f o r j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Only where t h e m a t e r i a l f a c t s are n o t i n d i s p u t e , o r when o n l y r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e can be drawn from t h e e v i d e n c e , d o e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e become an i s s u e of l a w f o r t h e c o u r t to r e s o l v e . " Kviten v. Nash ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 150 Ga.App. 589, 258 S.E.2d 271. W e h o l d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n is e r r o r where t h e e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g reaso- n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s , is s u s c e p t i b l e to d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s by r e a s o n a b l e men when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p a r t y opposing t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . W e f u r t h e r hold t h a t under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e i s s u e of p r o b a b l e cause must be submitted t o t h e j u r y f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n and n o t be decided by t h e c o u r t as a matter o f law. W e now examine t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p l a i n t i f f to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h a j u r y i s s u e on probable c a u s e . Probable cause means " r e a s o n a b l e grounds f o r s u s p i c i o n , supported by c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e a s o n a b l y s t r o n g i n themselves to w a r r a n t a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t and c a u t i o u s man i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e accused is g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e w i t h which he is charged." Cornner v. Hamilton ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 62 Mont. 239, 204 P. 489, quoted w i t h a p p r o v a l i n Orser v. S t a t e of Montana, s u p r a . Moreover, s i n c e an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s prosecu- t i o n r u n s c o u n t e r to i m p o r t a n t l e g a l and social p o l i c i e s , such as encouraging c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t t h o s e who a p p e a r g u i l t y o f a crime, it is n o t favored by t h e l a w and t h e burden on t h e p l a i n t i f f is heavy. Wendel, s u p r a ; Orser, s u p r a . The undisputed e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f Reece w a s charged on t h e b a s i s of a r e p o r t signed by p i e r c e who i n s t i g a t e d t h e c r i m i n a l proceeding. There was no f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e check to t h e p r o s e c u t o r t h e n or t h e r e a f t e r . P i e r c e d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : (1) t h a t R e e s e t s mother passed t h e check to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i n t h e i n c r e a s e d amount a f t e r being a d v i s e d t h a t l i e n s would be f i l e d a g a i n s t both pro- p e r t i e s i f t h e check were n o t made o u t f o r t h e f u l l amount, ( 2 ) t h a t l i e n s had been f i l e d a g a i n s t both p r o p e r t i e s , ( 3 ) t h a t t h e r e p o r t w a s turned o v e r t o t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t a f t e r P i e r c e determined t h a t Reece was n o t going to come i n and work o u t something on t h e check. A d d i t i o n a l l y an employee of P i e r c e Flooring t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n t h a t she k e p t P i e r c e informed of anything on t h e c a s e t h a t came to h e r a t t e n t i o n and d i s p u t e d many of P i e r c e ' s s t a t e - ments i n d i c a t i n g h i s l a c k of knowledge on developments concerning t h e p r o g r e s s of p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e c a s e . The b a s i s of t h e cri- m i n a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t Reece was t h a t t h e check was g i v e n to s e c u r e l i e n waivers from p i e r c e on t h e two p r o p e r t i e s . When t h e p r o s e c u t o r c o n t a c t e d P i e r c e Flooring f o r c o p i e s of t h e l i e n w a i v e r s , t h i s employee d i d n o t t e l l him t h e r e were no l i e n w a i v e r s b u t i n s t e a d wrote him a memo s t a t i n g : " I c a n 9 t f i n d a copy of t h e l i e n waiver. The g i r l t h a t was h e r e b e f o r e m e would n o t always t a k e c o p i e s of t h e l i e n waivers." T h i s memorandum was dated November 4 , 1977, almost two months a f t e r l i e n s had been f i l e d by p i e r c e Flooring a g a i n s t both p r o p e r t i e s . W e hold t h a t t h e foregoing evidence is s u f f i c i e n t to pre- s e n t a j u r y i s s u e on t h e presence or absence of probable cause f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Reece . The total e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t s a b a s i s f o r d i f f e r i n g c o n c l u s i o n s concerning whether P i e r c e F l o o r i n g 9 s a c t i o n s were those t h a t would w a r r a n t a reaso- n a b l y c a u t i o u s and p r u d e n t man to b e l i e v e t h a t Reece was g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e of which he was charged; whether t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i s s u a n c e and d e l i v e r y of t h e check were f a i r l y p r e s e n t e d t o law enforcement o f f i c e r s ; whether t h e charge was f i l e d to collect a p r e e x i s t i n g d e b t with nothing of v a l u e g i v e n t o Reece; and whether P i e r c e Flooring f a b r i c a t e d f a c t s to moti- v a t e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Reece. These a r e i s s u e s f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n by a j u r y , n o t q u e s t i o n s of law to be decided by t h e Court. W e e x p r e s s no o p i n i o n concerning t h e u l t i m a t e d e t e r - m i n a t i o n of t h e s e i s s u e s , o n l y t h a t t h e y are p r o p e r l y to be r e s o l v e d by a jury. The d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and judgment a r e v a c a t e d . T h i s cause is remanded to t h e District Court f o r a new t r i a l . Chief ~ u s t i c e W e concur: Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority here has allowed themselves the luxury of becoming involved in a morass of Red Herrings about lien waivers, etc., and uncontroverted evidence, and has totally disregarded the authority that pertains when a citizen proceeds through the county attorney rather than directly, i.e., a justice court complaint. On October 25, 1977, Ron Pierce, general manager of Pierce Flooring, signed an "Investigative Form for Bad Checks and Forgeries," the standard form used by the Yellow- stone County Attorney's office to decide whether to prosecute a bad check charge. The form was filled out ----- properly, including -- one question - which asked whether the check was given in payment for an existinq -- debt, to which ---- Pierce Floorinq replied "yes." The deputy county attorney who subsequently decided to prosecute the case testified - at the trial that he would have rejected, and probably did ------- - -- - - - reject the case, at - that time because of the affirmative -- answer to the existinq debt question. Nevertheless, on November 1, a complaint was filed in the Justice Court of Yellowstone County on the charge of issuing a bad check (felony) in that Michael Reece "with the purpose to secure property, to wit: lien waivers on real estate and fixtures" issued the check. The record is unclear as to how the deputy county attorney came to the belief that lien waivers had been qiven in exchange for f u l l ~ 9 m e n t . The deputy ---- county - attorney testified that such information could have come from either law ---- enforcement personnel -- or from an e m ~ l o y e e o f Pierce Flooring, but he could not ---------- -- ------------------ - - - remember why h e t h o u q h t l i e n w a i v e r s h a d b e e n g i v e n t o - - - -- - ----------- ------- Reece. The county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e r e c e i v e d a n o t e from P i e r c e F l o o r i n g on November 8, 1977, s t a t i n g t h a t c o p i e s of a l i e n w a i v e r c o u l d n o t b e f o u n d . The d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y who s w o r e o u t t h e a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t o f t h e ------- ----------- - - - - complaint a g a i n s t Reece t e s t i f i e d t h a t had h e n o t b e e n -- s o busy, he would have d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e a t t h a t t i m e o r would have confirmed t h a t l i e n waivers could n o t be found and t h e n would have d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e . On Sunday, November 27, 1977, Reece was a r r e s t e d i n h i s home. He was booked and kept i n t h e Yellowstone County j a i l u n t i l he arranged b a i l of $2,800. On December 1, 1977, t h e complaint was dismissed by t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y on t h e grounds t h a t new evidence i n d i c a t e d t h a t it was n o t i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e t o p r o s e c u t e . Reece p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y o n e i s s u e f o r r e v i e w : Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by g r a n t i n g P i e r c e F l o o r i n g ' s motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e grounds t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o show want of p r o b a b l e c a u s e on t h e p a r t of P i e r c e F l o o r i n g . Reece a r g u e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of want of p r o b a b l e c a u s e should n o t have been decided by t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s a m a t t e r of l a w because t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s s u f f i c i e n t proof of probable cause t o submit t h i s i s s u e t o t h e j u r y . H e a r g u e s s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t when t h e evidence he p r e s e n t e d is viewed i n its most f a v o r a b l e l i g h t it shows: 1. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g ' s a c t i o n s were n o t t h o s e of a p r u d e n t , c a u t i o u s and r e a s o n a b l e man; 2. A l l f a c t s surrounding t h e check were n o t f a i r l y and f u l l y r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e law enforcement o f f i c e r s ; 3. The charge was f i l e d t o c o l l e c t a p r e e x i s t i n g d e b t and nothing of v a l u e was g i v e n t o Reece; 4. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f a i l e d t o make s u f f i c i e n t i n q u i r y i n t o t h e circumstances under which t h e check was i s s u e d ; and 5. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i n t e n t i o n a l l y misled t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r and f a b r i c a t e d f a c t s t o m o t i v a t e c r i m i n a l proceedings a g a i n s t Reece. I t is t r u e t h a t upon a motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t by a p a r t y , t h e evidence i n t r o d u c e d by t h e opposing p a r t y must be viewed i n its most f a v o r a b l e l i g h t . See S i s t o c k v. Northwestern Telephone Systems, I n c . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 615 P.2d 176, 178, 37 St.Rep. 1247, 1249, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , such a r u l e does n o t mean t h a t t h i s Court can make numerous f a c t u a l i n f e r e n c e s which a r e n o t supported by t h e r e c o r d . Considering t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o Reece, I c a n n o t say t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its v e r d i c t . F u r t h e r , it is a w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t it is t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t o determine whether p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t s i n a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c a s e ; it is a q u e s t i o n of law t o be determined by t h e c o u r t . Orser v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 126, 582 P.2d 1227; 3-D Lumber Co. v. Belgrade S t a t e Bank ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 481, 488-489, 487 P.2d 1136, 1140; Wendel v. M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s . Co. ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 83 Mont. 252, 263, 272 P. 245, 249. The D i s t r i c t Court was t h e r e f o r e a c t i n g w i t h i n i t s p r e r o g a t i v e t o d e c i d e t h i s c a s e on a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , a s a m a t t e r of law, i f t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t s i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t h i s p r i m a --- f a c i e c a s e o f m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o show t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a c t e d w i t h o u t probable cause by going t o t h e Yellowstone County Attorney and f i l l i n g o u t an i n f o r m a t i o n s h e e t on bad checks . There is no q u e s t i o n t h a t want of p r o b a b l e c a u s e is t h e g i s t of an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n . McGuire v . Armitage ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 603 P.2d 253, 36 St.Rep. 2142; Wilson v. Gehring ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 221, 448 P.2d 678; Fauver v. Wilkoske ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 123 Mont. 228, 211 P.2d 420; Cornner v. Hamilton ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 62 Mont. 239, 204 P. 489. P r o b a b l e c a u s e means " r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d f o r s u s p i c i o n , supported by circumstances s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g i n themselves t o w a r r a n t a reasonably prudent and c a u t i o u s man i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e accused is g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e w i t h which he is charged." Cornner, 62 Mont. a t 243, 204 P. a t 491, a s quoted i n O r s e r , 178 Mont. a t 137, 582 P.2d a t 1233. More- o v e r , s i n c e an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n r u n s c o u n t e r t o important l e g a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , such a s encouraging c r i m i n a l proceedings a g a i n s t t h o s e who appear g u i l t y of a crime, it is n o t favored by t h e law and t h e burden on t h e p l a i n t i f f is heavy. See Wendel, 83 Mont. a t 262-263, 272 P. a t 248; a c c o r d , O r s e r , 178 Mont. a t 135, 582 P.2d a t 1232. Reece, t h e r e f o r e , had a heavy burden t o show t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a c t e d w i t h o u t probable c a u s e , and c l e a r l y he c a n n o t meet t h a t heavy burden by a r g u i n g o n l y tenuous i n f e r e n c e s . Although t h e r e may be some q u e s t i o n a s t o a f u l l d i s - c l o s u r e of a l l of t h e f a c t s surrounding t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e check, it is c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g was r e l y i n g - upon t h e d e c i s i o n s made a t t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s - - - - office concerniny what information was important and what --- - - - - . ------ information was not important. Pierce Flooring truthfully ------- and accurately filled out the county attorney's information - - - sheet on which the decision to prosecute was based. Any confusion over the existence of lien waivers was eradicated on November 8, when the county attorney's off ice received the note from Pierce Flooring tnat there was no record of any lien waivers. From November 8, 1977 to November 27, when Reece was arrested, according to the testimony of the deputy county attorney in charge of the case, there was sufficient disclosure of information by Pierce Flooring to warrant dismissal of the case. As this Court noted in Halladay v. State Bank of Fairfield et al. (1923), 66 Mont. 111, 117-118, 212 P. 861, ". . .The rule is that, where the prosecutinq officer starts -- a criminal proceedinq upon a full and fair statement o f the facts from the accuser, he acts for the state; and so he --------- --- does when he proceeds - upon - - his own personal - knowledqe . . . "Generally, it may be said that a prosecuting officer is charged with the duty of deter- mining when to commence a particular prosecu- tion, and when to discontinue it. He stands upon a different footinq --- from a defendant, who goes to a T u r n o f the peace, swears - - -- out a warrant, -------- and directs the prosecutinq officer - to see to its execution. The county attorney in this state, not only directs ------------- -------- under what conditions a criminal action shall be commenced, but from the time it begins ----- --- until it ends his supervision and control is ------ complete, limited only by such - restrictions as the law imposes. . . ". . . If, therefore, a prosecuting officer incorrectly determines that certain facts given to him constitute a crime and proceeds to set on foot necessary action, - the informant is not liable, because the fault is not his, but that of the officer. . ." B - - - - (Emphasis supplied.) In light of Pierce Flooring's reliance on the expertise of the county attorney's office in terms of what information was important and what was not, it cannot be said that Pierce Flooring was not acting prudently and cautiously and without probable cause. I would affirm the District Court's directed verdict for Pierce Flooring. Justice