Case Title: Mendicoa v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mendicoa v. State1989 WY 87771 P.2d 1240Case Number: 88-223Decided: 04/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

MODESTO MENDICOA, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
Richard H. Honaker of 
Honaker & Hampton, Rock Springs, and Ronald J. Yengich of Yengich, Rich, 
Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
GRANT, District Judge.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Modesto 
Mendicoa appeals from his convictions on four felony counts of cattle rustling 
in contravention of Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-402(e) (1977) and four misdemeanor counts 
of transporting livestock across state lines without a brand inspection as 
proscribed by Wyo. Stat. §§ 11-20-203(a) and (b), 11-20-229, and 11-1-103 
(1977).

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
     (I.) DID THE STATE 
FAIL TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED A LARCENY, AND 
THEREFORE LIVESTOCK RUSTLING, PURSUANT TO WYOMING STATUTES SECTION 6-3-402(a) 
AND (e), 1977 AS AMENDED?

 
 
     (II.) DID THE STATE 
FAIL TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT UNLAWFULLY TRANSPORTED 
LIVESTOCK IN VIOLATION OF WYOMING STATUTES SECTION 11-20-203(a) AND (b), 
11-20-103, 1977 AS AMENDED?

 
 
     (III.) ASSUMING THAT 
THE ALLEGED OFFENSES WERE COMMITTED, DID THE STATE FAIL TO PROVE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT, OR BY ANY STANDARD, THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED SAID OFFENSES IN 
THE STATE OF WYOMING?

 
 
     (IV.) DID THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GAVE INSTRUCTION NUMBER FIVE, WHICH DEALT 
WITH POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY?

 
 
     (V.) WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT MADE A PRELIMINARY RULING REGARDING THE STATE'S RIGHT TO IMPEACH APPELLANT 
ON CROSS EXAMINATION UNDER RULE 608(b) OF THE WYOMING RULES OF EVIDENCE, DID IT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY NOT PROPERLY WEIGHING THE RISK OF PREJUDICE AGAINST THE 
PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH EVIDENCE?

 
 
     (VI.) DID THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF A SUBSEQUENT "BAD 
ACT" PURSUANT TO WYOMING RULES OF EVIDENCE SECTION 
404(b)?

 
 
     (VII.) DID THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMIT ERROR BY REFUSING TO DISCHARGE A WITNESS WHO ADMITTED THAT HE AND 
OTHER WITNESSES HAD VIOLATED THE COURT'S RULE PROHIBITING DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE 
BY WITNESSES?

 
 
(VIII.) WERE THE REMARKS 
OF THE PROSECUTOR IN CLOSING ARGUMENT IMPROPER?

 
 
The 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues are dispositive for purposes of this appeal. 
Appellant's issues regarding the contested jury instruction (issue IV) and the 
jurisdiction of the trial court (issue III) are collateral to the 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence question and will be discussed in connection 
therewith. The other issues need not be addressed.

 
 

[¶4.]     By initial complaint 
filed October 9, 1986, appellant was charged with sixteen counts of cattle 
rustling, sixteen counts of illegal transport of livestock, and one count of 
perjury. After a preliminary hearing, appellant was bound over to the district 
court on five counts each of rustling and illegal transport involving five cows 
allegedly stolen in Sweetwater County, Wyoming, and transported to the state of Utah. An information was 
filed on October 16, 1986. Charges regarding one of the cows were subsequently 
dismissed; i.e., one count of rustling and one count of illegal transport. After 
various pretrial proceedings, a five-and-one-half-day trial commenced on April 
11, 1988, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
all counts charged. Appellant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of not 
less than three years nor more than five years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
on the four rustling charges and a term of six months in the SweetwaterCounty jail for each of the four 
misdemeanor counts, with the county jail time to be served concurrently with the 
prison sentences. Appellant was also fined $10,000, assessed a $10,000 surcharge 
to the Crime Victims' Compensation Account, and ordered to pay 
restitution.

 
 

[¶5.]     The evidence presented 
at trial disclosed the following facts and sequence of events. Birdie Jolley is 
a rancher in Sweetwater 
County, Wyoming. In 1982 
or 1983 Ms. Jolley purchased one of the subject cows (the Jolley cow) from a 
North Dakota rancher. This particular cow was 
distinctly recognizable because of its short crooked horn and was used by Ms. 
Jolley as a "marker" cow in keeping track of her cattle. In the fall of 1984 Ms. 
Jolley discovered that a number of her cattle, including the Jolley cow, were 
missing from her ranchlands. Although some of the missing cows were found or 
returned on their own by the following spring branding, several cows were not 
recovered, including the Jolley cow. Ms. Jolley reported the missing cattle to 
Larry Paine, Sweetwater County Undersheriff, in November of 1985. Neither Ms. 
Jolley nor anyone in her family had ever sold cattle to 
appellant.

 
 

[¶6.]     Howard Routh is also a 
SweetwaterCounty rancher. In early 
January 1986 he discovered that ten to fifteen of his cattle were missing from 
his herd pastured near Rock 
Springs, Wyoming. Mr. 
Routh determined these cattle were missing by driving in his car around his herd 
of approximately 500 cattle. Mr. Routh never reported the missing cattle. Mr. 
Routh's brand and earmark were on three of the subject cows in this case (the 
Routh cows). Mr. Routh had never directly sold cattle to appellant, although 
appellant purchased seven of Routh's cows at an auction in Riverton, Wyoming, in 1984. Testimony at trial indicated 
that the subject Routh cows were too young to have been among the cows appellant 
purchased in 1984.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant is a cattle 
broker and rancher with various ranch holdings in eastern Utah. Testimony at trial 
indicated that he bought and sold several thousand cattle per year during the 
time frame involved in this case. In February of 1986, H.E. Graham, a Texas rancher, negotiated 
a purchase of approximately 550 cows from appellant. Mr. Graham had leased 
pasture land in Utah for the cattle. In mid-February 1986 
appellant delivered the cattle to Mr. Graham in several truck loads over a 
period of about ten days. Some of the deliveries were made after dark. Although 
under the terms of the sale agreement the cattle were to be blood tested and 
branded with Mr. Graham's brand prior to delivery, many of the cattle were 
delivered without that brand. The final total of cattle delivered to Mr. Graham 
was 487 cows and 117 calves. Appellant provided Mr. Graham with a proper brand 
inspection on the first delivery consisting of forty-seven cows and eight 
calves. The remaining cattle were delivered with simply a change-of-pasture 
permit or a transport-to-market permit, neither of which indicates a change of 
ownership or suffices as a proper brand inspection.

 
 

[¶8.]     Boyd Pallesen, a brand 
inspector for the State of Utah, performed the change-of-pasture 
inspections of the cattle upon appellant's representation that he needed to move 
the cattle to another pasture. Appellant did not inform Mr. Pallesen that the 
cattle had been sold. Mr. Pallesen testified that for a change-of-pasture permit 
he conducts a less thorough inspection than that which is required for a 
change-of-ownership permit. On one of the inspections Mr. Pallesen noticed that 
some of the cattle had been freshly branded with a 2G brand, a brand with which 
he was not familiar. Upon inquiry, appellant attempted to persuade Mr. Pallesen 
that the 2G brand belonged to the BLM or to the State of Utah, to which Mr. 
Pallesen replied that neither of those entities owned brands. Appellant never 
would tell Mr. Pallesen whose brand it was, and Mr. Pallesen suspected something 
was amiss. Mr. Pallesen thereafter learned that the 2G brand belonged to Mr. 
Graham.

 
 

[¶9.]     Eventually, on March 
25, 1986, Mr. Pallesen and his supervisor conducted a brand inspection of the 
cattle Mr. Graham had purchased from appellant since the prior inspections were 
insufficient for a change-of-ownership permit. In the course of this inspection, 
they cut out four strays and impounded them for return to their rightful owners. 
Although he was not satisfied with the quality of the brand inspection conducted 
- many of the cattle were not inspected - Mr. Pallesen, at the express direction 
of his supervisor, wrote out a brand inspection for 456 of the 487 cattle 
purchased by Mr. Graham.

 
 

[¶10.]  In early March 1986, Undersheriff Paine 
had informed Mr. Pallesen of the missing Jolley cattle and described their 
brand. On March 29, 1986, Mr. Pallesen contacted Undersheriff Paine and informed 
him that one of the missing cattle had turned up among the strays culled from 
the Graham herd in Utah. Undersheriff Paine and Ms. Jolley 
subsequently identified the cow as the subject Jolley cow. Thereafter, in April 
1986, various law enforcement personnel, including Undersheriff Paine and Mr. 
Pallesen, reinspected the Graham herd and discovered the three subject Routh 
cows.1 Appellant was unable to produce any 
proof of ownership for the Jolley cow or the Routh cows. The suspect cattle were 
transported to Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, to be held as 
evidence.

 
 

[¶11.]  In addition to that already mentioned, 
other evidence was produced at trial demonstrating appellant's attempts to evade 
a proper brand inspection and to conceal his lack of ownership of the subject 
cattle. This evidence included alteration of documents and an attempt to bribe a 
former brand inspector into issuing a phony brand inspection covering the Routh 
cattle. Additional evidence will be discussed as it pertains to specific aspects 
of the legal analysis.

 
 

[¶12.]  Our standard of review to a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge in a criminal case is well settled. We 
examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine 
if the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988); Jozen v. State, 746 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 
[I]t is not whether the 
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether 
it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     It is not our function 
to weigh the evidence for a determination as to whether or not it is sufficient 
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have consistently held that 
even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, 
it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence.

 
 
Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 
1985) (citations omitted), quoted in Roose, 759 P.2d  at 
487.

 
 

[¶13.]  We first look at the sufficiency of the 
evidence in relation to the cattle rustling charges. Livestock rustling is 
specifically proscribed in the Wyoming larceny statute, Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-402 
(1977), which provides in material part:

 
 
     (a) A person who 
steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent 
to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
      (e) A person who 
steals any horse, mule, sheep, cattle, buffalo or swine is guilty of livestock 
rustling which is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.2

 
 
Livestock rustling is a 
specific type of larceny. In order to prove larceny, the State was required to 
establish the following elements: (1) that the crimes occurred in Sweetwater 
County within the time frame alleged; (2) that appellant stole or took and 
carried away; (3) with intent to steal; (4) the cattle which were the property 
of another. See Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201, 202 (Wyo. 1980); and Repkie v. State, 583 P.2d 1272, 1273 
(Wyo. 1978). 
In Murdock v. State, 351 P.2d 674 (Wyo. 1960), the defendant was charged with 
stealing sheep. We stated in Murdock that, in order to support a conviction, 
"there must be a definite showing that defendant performed some act of taking, 
an asportation, or that he caused or procured [an accomplice] to perform such 
act; and that he must have done so with the intent to steal." Id. at 678. See also 3 C. 
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 369 (14th ed. 1980) (larceny requires a taking 
or caption and carrying away or asportation of the property of 
another).

 
 

[¶14.]  In the instant case, there is 
considerable evidence that the cattle disappeared from their Wyoming owners' property within a reasonably ascertainable 
time frame; that they were found in Utah some months later when appellant sold 
them to Mr. Graham; and that appellant attempted to conceal his lack of 
ownership. The record is devoid, however, of any evidence linking appellant to 
the disappearance of these cattle from their owners' premises. This evidentiary 
failure is aptly demonstrated by excerpts from the cross-examination of key 
prosecution witnesses at trial. In the cross-examination of Undersheriff Paine 
regarding the Jolley cow, the following exchange occurred:

 
 
Q. You have absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever that Mr. Mendicoa was present or transported that cow from 
AspenMountain [Birdie Jolley's 
pasture land]; is that correct?

 
 
A. No, 
sir.

 
 
Q. That is not correct or 
you have no idea?

 
 
A. That is correct. I 
don't have any information.

 
 
Q. You have absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever that Mr. Mendicoa hired someone or instructed someone to 
take that cow from AspenMountain area, whoever took 
it?

 
 
A. I don't have 
that.

 
 
Similarly, in the 
cross-examination of Paul Breed, the Chief Enforcement Officer of the Wyoming 
Livestock Board, this exchange occurred with respect to both the Jolley cow and 
the Routh cows:

 
 
Q. And it's true, is it 
not, during the course of your investigation, you have not turned up any 
evidence, whatsoever, to indicate that Mr. Mendicoa or any of his agents 
transported the cattle from the Sand Creek area or from the Aspen Mountain area, 
Point of Rocks area down to his ranch; isn't that correct?

 
 
A. That's 
correct.

 
 

[¶15.]  The State argues, nevertheless, that, 
although mere possession of recently stolen or lost property is insufficient to 
support a conviction of larceny, possession in conjunction with other 
incriminating circumstances such as misstatement and concealment will support 
such a conviction. See Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 753 (Wyo. 1987); McFetridge v. State, 32 Wyo. 185, 231 P. 405 
(1924); and 3 Wharton's Criminal Law, supra, § 361 at 321. We have no quarrel 
with this general principle. Under the circumstances of this case, however, and 
in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we must 
agree with appellant that the inference required for the jury to find that 
appellant or his agents actually stole or took and carried away these cattle 
exceeds the bounds of permissible inference.

 
 

[¶16.]  The inference to be derived from 
possession of recently stolen property depends upon the key term "recently." We 
have emphasized that term in prior decisions. See, e.g., Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610, 615 (Wyo. 1978) (most condemning fact was possession of recently 
stolen property); Orcutt v. State, 366 P.2d 690, 692 (Wyo. 1961) (possession of 
recently stolen property is evidence of guilt of larceny); State v. Costin, 46 
Wyo. 463, 28 P.2d 782, 783 (1934) (recent possession of stolen property is 
material factor in larceny case); Kinney v. State, 36 Wyo. 466, 256 P. 1040 
(1927) (possession must be recent in relation to the time of theft to be a 
material factor in determining guilt or innocence).

 
 

[¶17.]  With respect to the recency requirement, 
appellant directs our attention to the case of State v. Ellestad, 88 S.D. 595, 
225 N.W.2d 879 (1975). In that case, the owner of certain cattle drove them to a 
barn on another farmstead for feeding and watering. On January 6, 1972, the barn 
where the cattle were being kept burned and, upon arrival at the scene, the 
owner discovered, in addition to dead cattle, that sixteen cows were missing. No 
trace of the missing cattle was found, although there was some evidence of entry 
and tampering with the barn. On March 8, 1973, the owner observed one of his 
missing cows at a livestock auction. The cow had been consigned for sale by the 
defendant. Testimony at trial established that the defendant was a frequent 
buyer and seller of livestock. The owner and his son testified that, several 
times prior to the fire, they had observed the defendant driving past the 
farmstead where the fire occurred, but they acknowledged that the defendant's 
in-laws lived nearby. There were indications that the defendant might have 
doctored some of the documents relating to ownership. The defendant testified 
that either he must have purchased the cow or it must have somehow strayed onto 
his farm. In reversing the defendant's conviction for grand larceny, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court observed:

 
 
     There was no evidence 
linking defendant to the disappearance of the cow other than the fact of his 
possession some fourteen months after the date of the fire and disappearance of 
the sixteen cows.

 
 

Id. 225 N.W.2d  at 881. In 
finding a lack of sufficient evidence, the Ellestad court also noted that the 
trial court had correctly refused to give the prosecution's requested 
instruction concerning the effect of the unexplained possession of recently 
stolen property. The court went on to say in that case:

 
 
Although the unexplained 
possession of recently stolen property is a sufficient circumstance upon which 
to base a conviction, * * * it is the element of recency that gives the 
circumstance of unexplained possession its probative value and justifies an 
inference of guilt on the part of the possessor. The test of recency is whether 
the interval between the date of the alleged theft and the date of possession is 
so short as to render it morally or reasonably certain that there could have 
been no intermediate change of possession.

 
 

Id. at 882 (citations 
omitted). See also State v. Smith, 617 P.2d 232 (Okla. Cr. 1980) (insufficient 
evidence of horse theft where defendant found in possession twenty-three days 
after alleged theft - to infer larceny from possession, the possession must 
closely follow the alleged theft); and Annotation, What Constitutes "Recently" 
Stolen Property within Rule Inferring Guilt from Unexplained Possession of Such 
Property, 89 A.L.R.3d 1202 at § 16 (1979) (collecting cases in which possession 
of stolen livestock within a few hours to one month after theft was held 
sufficient to support the inference and cases in which possession within sixteen 
days to four years after theft was held not sufficient to support the 
inference).

 
 

[¶18.]  We find the reasoning in the Ellestad 
case persuasive and applicable to the instant case. Here, the Jolley cow was 
missing in the fall of 1984 and was discovered in March 1986 among the cattle 
appellant sold to Mr. Graham in February 1986. Mr. Routh discovered some of his 
cattle were missing by driving around his large herd in early January 1986. The 
Routh cows were discovered in the Graham herd in April 1986, although evidence 
was presented indicating the Routh cows were on appellant's Utah ranch in February 
1986. To a greater extent than in Ellestad, the evidence in the instant case 
established that appellant was actively involved in large scale buying and 
selling of cattle. Here, as opposed to Ellestad, there was no evidence placing 
appellant, or anyone connected with him, in the vicinity of the cattle 
disappearances. The lapse in time between the disappearances of the cattle in 
this case and their discovery in the Graham herd ranges from a minimum of over 
one month to one and one-half years. There is no evidence linking appellant to 
the disappearances of the cattle from the Wyoming ranches, and the time period between 
the alleged thefts and appellant's later possession of the cattle was not so 
short as to render it reasonably certain that there could have not been an 
intermediate change of possession. See Ellestad, 225 N.W.2d  at 
882.

 
 

[¶19.]  The jury was instructed, over appellant's 
objection, regarding the permissible inference of theft from the unexplained 
possession of recently stolen property. The instruction should not have been 
given. The predicate fact of recency upon which the inference depends was not 
established by the evidence. See Harley, 737 P.2d  at 755. The inference was 
impermissible under the facts of this case, and, without the inference, there 
was no evidence of stealing or a taking and carrying away. Accordingly, the 
cattle rustling convictions must fall.3

 
 

[¶20.]  The foregoing analysis with respect to 
appellant's larceny convictions applies equally to appellant's misdemeanor 
convictions pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 11-20-203 (1977).4 That statute 
provides:

 
 
(a) Except as hereafter 
provided, it is unlawful for any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or 
association to sell and deliver, or to remove or cause to be removed in any way 
from any county in Wyoming to any other county, state or country, any livestock 
unless each animal has been inspected for brands and ownership at the time of 
delivery or removal by an authorized Wyoming brand inspector and a proper 
certificate of inspection or clearance has been issued.

 
 
(b) Transporting 
livestock across state lines without first having had such inspection and having 
obtained such certificates is prima facie evidence of intent to avoid inspection 
and to steal, take and carry away the animals and is punishable as provided in 
W.S. 6-7-301 [now § 6-3-402].

 
 
We agree with appellant 
that there is no evidence that he possessed the subject cows in Wyoming or that he 
transported them across state lines. Appellant's convictions under this statute 
cannot be sustained.

 
 

[¶21.]  As a final matter we briefly comment on 
appellant's contention that, because there was no evidence that appellant 
committed the alleged crimes in Wyoming, the 
State of Wyoming had no jurisdiction over the charged 
offenses. If appellant's assertion were correct, it would be dispositive of this 
case and that would be the end of the matter. Appellant, however, misapprehends 
the nature of the problem. The State of Wyoming 
has jurisdiction over criminal conduct occurring in Wyoming. Rios v. State, 
733 P.2d 242, 245 (Wyo.), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 108, 98 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1987); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 100 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). Subject matter jurisdiction 
over the offense charged is fundamental and indispensable to a prosecution. 
Rios, 733 P.2d  at 244. Under the circumstances of the instant case, if the 
offenses charged occurred, they occurred in Wyoming.5 See Rios, 733 P.2d  at 243. 
Wyoming had 
subject matter jurisdiction with respect to these alleged crimes. The State 
simply failed to prove its case against appellant.

 
 

[¶22.]  Reversed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Charges regarding other Routh cows 
discovered in the course of the investigation were dismissed at the preliminary 
hearing because these cows were older and could have been among the Routh cows 
appellant purchased at the Riverton auction in 1984. As mentioned, the three 
subject Routh cows were determined to be too young to have been included in that 
purchase.

 
 

2 The statute specifically makes 
livestock rustling a felony, whereas larceny is otherwise a felony only if the 
value of the stolen property is $500 or more. See Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-402(c) 
(1977).

 
 

3 We note that the evidence presented 
in this case possibly would have been sufficient to establish the guilty 
knowledge required for a conviction of receiving stolen property pursuant to a 
statute such as Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-403 (1977). See, e.g., Smith, 617 P.2d  at 234 
(recency not established for larceny charge but strong possibility that evidence 
would have been sufficient for charge of receiving stolen property). See also 
Harley, 737 P.2d 750, and Tageant v. State, 673 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1983) (cases 
affirming convictions for receiving stolen property premised on inference from 
possession). Consistent with the evidence presented in this case, however, such 
a charge could only have been prosecuted in Utah under the laws of that 
state.

 
 

4 Wyo. Stat. §§ 11-20-229 and 
11-1-103 (1977) are the applicable penalty provisions.

 
 

5 This case is not in the posture of 
Hopkinson, 632 P.2d 79, in which it was unsuccessfully argued that the 
accessorial acts underlying the charge of accessory before the fact occurred 
outside of Wyoming, thereby depriving Wyoming of 
jurisdiction.