Case Title: Bowers v. Hawkey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bowers v. Hawkey1992 WY 99837 P.2d 78Case Number: 91-198Decided: 08/20/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
George R. BOWERS and 
Delores Bowers, d/b/a Lasalle Land and Cattle, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Walter Leon 
HAWKEY,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Sheridan County, James N. Wolfe, J.

Bruce P. Badley 
of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellants.

Virgil G. 
Kinnaird of Law Office of Healy & Kinnaird, Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ., and GRANT, District 
Judge.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument. 

GRANT, District 
Judge.

[¶1]      We affirm the 
trial court's cancellation of a thirty-year lease which gave George R. Bowers 
and Delores Bowers the use of their neighbor's 760 acres with fifty annual acre 
feet of water and all hunting and fishing rights for about $50, net, per month 
for the first ten years and only slightly more in the ensuing twenty years. We 
conclude that the evidence before the trial court satisfied all the elements for 
a finding of undue influence by the Bowerses over the owner of the land, Walter 
Leon Hawkey, a marginally competent chronic alcoholic who had come to repose 
special trust and confidence in the Bowerses after they apparently befriended 
him and helped him in his business and legal matters, including the dissolution 
of a family ranching corporation which was the source of Hawkey's property 
title. Before exposition of the facts and law underlying our decision, we should 
note the history of the case in the trial court.

[¶2]      Hawkey sued the 
Bowerses for cancellation of the lease, alleging facts which constituted the 
parties' relationship and the terms of the lease and demanding that the lease be 
canceled on the basis of unconscionability. The Bowerses answered, relying 
principally on the proposition that, by definition, contracts are agreements 
between parties which will be enforced by the court and, in that respect, this 
contract was no different than others. After discovery, the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Hawkey's 
motion.

[¶3]      In affirming the 
trial court's judgment for Hawkey, we note that it was not, strictly speaking, a 
summary judgment. Although the trial court's judgment did not specify its 
underlying legal theory, our basis differs somewhat from that urged by Hawkey 
and presumably adopted by the trial court. Essentially, the parties presented 
the evidence by deposition and affidavit, and the court determined the facts and 
applied the law. We hold that the evidence established that the lease resulted 
from undue influence by the Bowerses over Hawkey and do not reach the issue of 
unconscionability.

[¶4]      The Bowerses urge 
here that, in reviewing a summary judgment, we must apply the standard which 
views the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving that party all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the record. 
But given the manner in which this case was presented, the trial court did not 
make a determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Rather, 
the parties submitted to the court, during argument on the motions, all the 
discovery materials, mostly depositions, and stipulated on the record that such 
materials constituted all the evidence in the case and that trial would produce 
no additional or different evidence. The court decided the case on the parties' 
stipulation that the materials presented constituted all the evidence in the 
case. The trial court was left to draw its inferences from the evidence and 
apply the law to the facts.

[¶5]      Although the 
parties pleaded and argued the law of unconscionability in the trial court and 
in this Court, it appears that a more appropriate selection of applicable law 
would be that pertaining to undue influence. We have long held that this Court 
may properly affirm the trial court's judgment, if the result is appropriate, 
under any theory of the law appearing in the record. Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273, 1278 (Wyo. 1990); Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 310 (Wyo. 1989); Ely v. 
Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶6]      The ranch 
property owned by the Bowerses, who were residents primarily of Illinois, was 
adjacent to Hawkey's property, and, as neighbors, the Bowerses and Hawkey became 
close friends. During periods when the Bowerses were staying on their property, 
they and Hawkey visited almost daily, often sharing meals, card games, shopping 
excursions, and hunting and camping trips. The Bowerses gave gifts of money, 
food, boots, guns, and other personal property to Hawkey. They employed him and 
from time to time entered into agreements with him for grazing their cattle on 
his land and on their land under his supervision with Hawkey sharing in the 
profits or being otherwise paid on the sale of the cattle. The Bowerses wanted 
to buy Hawkey's land.

[¶7]      The relationship 
was more than social. Hawkey's condition and situation were such that he needed 
guidance, direction, and advice on business and legal matters. The Bowerses 
recognized this and, in fact, provided such assistance. During the dissolution 
of a family corporation, which was the source of Hawkey's title to his property, 
the Bowerses accompanied Hawkey on trips to the attorney's office and helped 
counsel and advise him in the course of the proceedings. They were aware of the 
concern on the part of Hawkey's family that he was highly susceptible to the 
influence of others and their worry that he might be talked into "signing away 
the property." This concern was such that there was included in the dissolution 
agreement a provision which gave family members a ten-year right of first 
refusal for the purchase of Hawkey's portion of the property should he sell it. 
During all this, the Bowerses made it clear that they were interested in "what's 
best for Leon."

[¶8]      After the 
liquidation/dissolution, the Bowerses and Hawkey discussed with Hawkey's 
attorney their interest in entering into another cattle grazing agreement, but 
such an agreement was not made, and the Bowerses sought out other counsel. 
Hawkey believed that the lease would be the same as the previous agreements, 
i.e., cattle grazing with profit sharing, but the instrument, in fact, was the 
lease which became the subject of the litigation. Another attorney was consulted 
by the Bowerses about the lease which was adapted from other leases and typed by 
Mrs. Bowers. That attorney was not representing Hawkey's interest and testified 
that he would not have advised Hawkey to sign the lease. The perception of 
Hawkey's family and the Bowerses that Hawkey was vulnerable was 
correct.

[¶9]      Hawkey was 
dependent upon others for his care and well being, and he suffered from the 
effects of chronic alcohol abuse. He suffered mental limitations and was not 
able to make responsible decisions concerning his own well being, let alone 
decisions concerning legal matters such as those involved here. Hawkey was 
honest and unusually trusting of others; he trusted the Bowerses and believed 
that they were looking out for his best interest. The result was the lease 
described above.

[¶10]   The elements of undue influence 
necessary for cancellation are: "`(1) opportunity to control; (2) a condition 
permitting subversion; and (3) activity on the part of the person charged.'" 
Short v. Hall, 785 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Macaraeg v. Wilson 
(Estate of Obra), 749 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1988)). Further, Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1981), teaches that:

The law of Wyoming is 
that when a transaction occurs between parties who are in a confidential 
relationship to each other, the courts will zealously scrutinize it. Bergren [v. 
Berggren, 77 Wyo. 438, 317 P.2d 1101 (1957)]. Accordingly, once a confidential 
relationship has been demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the recipient of 
the property to establish that the transaction was fair and conducted in good 
faith. Brug v. Case, Wyo. 1979, 600 P.2d 710; Baldwin v. Birchby, Wyo. 1959, 346 P.2d 278.

624 P.2d  at 
783.

[¶11]   The Bowerses' close and 
confidential relationship with Hawkey provided them an opportunity to exert 
influence and control, and Hawkey's mental condition and alcoholism certainly 
were such as to permit subversion. There was activity on the part of the 
Bowerses. They guided Hawkey through business and legal matters and then into 
execution of the subject lease. The facts clearly demonstrate a confidential 
relationship, and the Bowerses were unable to meet their burden to establish 
that the transaction was fair and conducted in good faith. The trial court was 
correct in canceling the lease.

[¶12]   Affirmed.