Case Title: State v. Hoyle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP001876-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1876-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 402 Wis. 2d 308, 974 N.W.2d 893 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 31, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa   
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Isaacson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which 
ROGGENSACK, 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
HAGEDORN, 
and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  DALLET, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. 
There was an oral argument by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant 
attorney general.  
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Thomas B. Aquino, assistant state public defender. There was an 
oral argument by Thomas B. Aquino, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 24 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1876-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF1159) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 31, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which 
ROGGENSACK, 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
HAGEDORN, 
and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  DALLET, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Hoyle, 
No. 2020AP1876-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 
2022), reversing the Chippewa County circuit court's1 judgment of 
conviction against Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle for two counts each 
of second-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault 
                                                 
1 The Honorable James M. Isaacson presided. 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
2 
 
of a child, and also reversing the circuit court's order denying 
Hoyle's motion for postconviction relief.  We reverse.   
¶2 
Hoyle argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the prosecutor at Hoyle's trial violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination under Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), by adversely commenting on his 
decision not to testify.  According to Hoyle, the prosecutor 
argued "that Hoyle should be convicted because the alleged 
victim's testimony was 'uncontroverted'" and that this was a 
comment on Hoyle's decision not to testify because "[o]nly Hoyle 
could have contradicted [the alleged victim's] sexual assault 
allegations." 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
Hoyle 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
postconviction relief.  The prosecutor at Hoyle's criminal trial 
did not violate Hoyle's Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin 
because the prosecutor did not comment on Hoyle's silence.  The 
prosecutor 
instead 
described 
the 
State's 
evidence 
as 
"uncontroverted" to remind the jury that they could evaluate 
only the evidence presented at trial and not speculate about 
other possible evidence.  Additionally, the jury likely would 
not have thought only Hoyle could have controverted the State's 
evidence because defense counsel explicitly identified other 
kinds of evidence not presented at trial.  In context, the 
prosecutor's 
remarks 
that 
the 
State's 
evidence 
was 
"uncontroverted" were neither "manifestly intended to be" nor 
"of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily 
take [them] to be" adverse comments on Hoyle's silence.  
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
3 
 
Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 1925).  The 
prosecutor therefore did not comment on Hoyle's silence, and the 
circuit 
court 
was 
correct 
to 
deny 
Hoyle's 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  We reverse the court of appeals.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On March 14, 2017, Hannah,2 then a 15-year-old minor, 
disclosed to her school resource officer, Officer Joseph Nelson 
of the Chippewa Falls Police Department, that she was sexually 
assaulted in February 2017.  Officer Nelson emailed Investigator 
Kari Szotkowski, Chippewa County Sheriff's Department, that same 
day reporting the sexual assault.  Investigator Szotkowski 
interviewed Hannah at Hannah's school on March 15, during which 
Hannah reported her account of the sexual assault but did not 
say who assaulted her.  Hannah later disclosed to Officer Nelson 
in May 2017 that she was assaulted by Hoyle, who was a 
stepbrother to one of Hannah's friends and 20 years old at the 
time of the alleged assault.  Hoyle was subsequently arrested 
and charged with two counts each of second-degree sexual assault 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2) (2021-22)3 and second-degree 
sexual assault of a child less than 16 years of age contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).   
¶5 
The trial took place over two days in December, 2018.  
According to pretrial filings, Hoyle did not plan to call any 
                                                 
2 "Hannah" is a pseudonym used in place of the victim's 
name.  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.86(4). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
4 
 
witnesses during trial.  Prior to the start of Hoyle's trial 
while discussing motions in limine, the prosecutor asked the 
circuit court if he would be permitted to refer to the State's 
case as "uncontroverted" during his closing argument should 
Hoyle invoke his right not to testify.  The prosecutor argued,  
So should the defendant not testify, I think the State 
is 
allowed 
to 
argue 
that 
the 
evidence 
is 
uncontroverted, meaning that you only have heard from 
[Hannah].  That's not commenting upon the defense's 
right to silence but commenting upon the evidence in 
front of the jurors at that time.  I can't say it's 
uncontroverted because the defendant didn't testify, 
but I can say that her testimony is uncontroverted and 
that you haven't heard any testimony to the contrary.  
The 
court 
granted 
the 
prosecutor's 
request 
over 
defense 
counsel's objection.  
¶6 
The State presented two witnesses at trial:  Hannah 
and Investigator Szotkowski.  Hannah testified that the day of 
the assault she "had taken some Vicodin and drank some alcohol" 
and that she "obviously was high" but "still had a sense of what 
was going on."  Hoyle drove up to Hannah while she was walking 
to a friend's house and asked if she "wanted to hang out," to 
which Hannah agreed.  Hannah said that Hoyle "kept poking [her] 
legs" during the drive.  At one point, Hoyle drove down a dead-
end road and stopped in the middle of the road.  Hannah exited 
the car, and Hoyle "told [her] to get back into the car."  
Hannah got into the "back seat passenger side" because she "was 
scared" and "didn't want [Hoyle] touching [her] any more."   
Hoyle then climbed into the back seat, pulled down Hannah's 
pants and underwear, and sexually assaulted her.  Hoyle drove 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
5 
 
Hannah back home, dropped her off at "the bar across the 
street," and said to Hannah, "if anyone finds out about this, 
someone is going to end up dead." 
¶7 
Investigator Szotkowski testified that she determined 
the 
location 
of 
the 
sexual 
assault 
based 
on 
Hannah's 
description.  She otherwise had difficulty investigating because 
she "didn't know who the suspect was" at the time.   
¶8 
Hoyle exercised his right under the Fifth Amendment 
not to testify.  The defense did not present any other 
witnesses.  
¶9 
Before closing arguments, the court read instructions 
to the jury.  As relevant to this case, the court gave the 
following standard jury instructions: 
The burden of establishing every fact necessary 
to constitute guilt is upon the State.  Before you can 
return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty.  If you can reconcile the evidence upon any 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's 
innocence, you should do so and return a verdict of 
not guilty.  [Wis. JI——Criminal 140 (2019).] 
. . . . 
A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based 
upon mere guesswork or speculation. . . .  While it is 
your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every 
reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt.  
You are to search for the truth.  [Id.] 
. . . . 
. . . [E]vidence 
is 
the 
sworn 
testimony 
of 
witnesses 
both 
on 
direct 
and 
cross-examination 
regardless of who called that witness. . . .  [T]he 
evidence in this case to be considered is the 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
6 
 
testimony of witnesses only.  [Wis. JI——Criminal 103 
(2000).]  
. . . . 
. . . In weighing the evidence, you may take into 
account matters of your own common knowledge and your 
observations and experiences in the affairs of life.  
[Wis. JI——Criminal 195 (2000).] 
. . . . 
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to 
weigh the testimony of witnesses and determine the 
effect of the evidence as a whole.  You are the sole 
judges of the credibility, that is, the believability 
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 
testimony.  In determining the credibility of each 
witness and the weight you give to the testimony of 
each witness, consider these factors:  
Whether the witness has an interest or lack of 
interest in the result of the trial; the witness' 
conduct, appearance, and demeanor on the witness 
stand; the clearness or lack of clearness of the 
witness' recollections; the opportunity the witness 
had for observing and for knowing the matters about 
which she testified about; the reasonableness of the 
witness' testimony; the apparent intelligence of the 
witness; bias or prejudice, if any has been shown; 
possible motives for falsifying testimony, and all 
other facts and circumstances during a trial which 
tend either to support or to discredit the testimony.  
Then give to the testimony of each witness the weight 
you believe it should receive.  [Wis. JI——Criminal 300 
(2000).] 
. . . . 
In this case the defendant has elected not to 
testify.  In a criminal case, he has the absolute 
constitutional right not to testify.  The defendant's 
decision not to testify must not be considered by you 
in any way and must not influence your verdict in any 
manner.  [Wis. JI——Criminal 315 (2001).] 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
7 
 
¶10 The prosecutor began his closing argument immediately 
after the court finished reading the jury instructions.  He 
began by restating and emphasizing certain instructions: 
[Y]ou are to decide this case solely, solely on the 
evidence offered and received at the trial.  What that 
means is you're only to base it upon what you heard 
yesterday when the evidence was coming in at trial.  
You're not to speculate about other things that may be 
out there.  You're not to think about other things.  
You're to focus solely on the evidence that was 
presented to you yesterday in this trial. 
 
In fact, in order to reemphasize that, it's 
mentioned again in another instruction where it says, 
you are to consider only the evidence received during 
the trial.  Once again, not to consider anything else.  
You're supposed to just focus on what you heard 
yesterday with the testimony.  [Hannah's] testimony 
that she gave here yesterday is uncontroverted.  You 
have heard no evidence disputing her account of that 
sexual assault.  You heard nothing. . . .  You heard 
her testify[, and] . . . [t]hat is what the testimony 
is. 
The prosecutor summarized Hannah's testimony and described it as 
"uncontroverted" because "[t]here is absolutely no evidence 
disputing her account of what occurred."  He further explained 
that the jury could not "speculate":  
I can pretty much guarantee that the defense is going 
to get up here and say, what about this?  What about 
this in the investigation? What about that in the 
investigation?  Why didn't they do this?  Why didn't 
they do that?  Once again, the Judge instructed you, 
and you need to read that in the jury instructions, 
that you're not to base your decision, you're not to 
base doubt on guesswork or speculation.  In fact, the 
Judge instructed you, you are not to search for doubt.  
You are to search for the truth. 
 
You are not to sit there and say, what if I had 
this information, what if I had that information, what 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
8 
 
if this was different, what if that was different?  
You're not to speculate.  You're not to guess.  You're 
to focus on what you heard yesterday, and what you 
heard yesterday was this young lady testifying about 
how she was assaulted by this defendant. . . .  
 
. . . None of that was controverted, meaning it 
was all uncontroverted, meaning there was nothing 
controverting 
her 
statements 
about 
what 
had 
occurred . . . . 
 
They will want you to speculate about what you 
could know, what they think you should have known, but 
it's not about speculation.  It's about what you 
heard.  In this case, because you only heard from 
[Hannah] about it, you didn't hear from any of her 
friends or anyone else testifying about it, it all 
comes down to her credibility. 
He then argued that the jury should evaluate Hannah's testimony 
based on their "common experiences of life" and that Hannah was 
a credible witness based on her demeanor, lack of testimony 
establishing 
a 
motive 
to 
lie, 
and 
the 
clarity 
of 
her 
recollections.  On rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury,  
You 
need 
to 
make 
the 
decision 
based 
upon 
the 
uncontroverted testimony of what she says occurred.  
They don't disagree it's uncontroverted.  They just 
say you should ask for more.  It's not my job to give 
you information I don't have.  I'm not going to argue 
and say this is why you don't have it or that is why 
you don't have it.  You don't have it.  I will agree 
to that, you don't have that additional information, 
but the jury instruction says you are not to speculate 
about that.  
¶11 The jury found Hoyle guilty on all counts.  The court 
sentenced Hoyle to eight years of initial confinement and 10 
years of extended supervision.  
¶12 Hoyle filed a motion for postconviction relief on 
August 11, 2020, arguing, among other things, that he should 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
9 
 
receive a new trial because "the [S]tate repeatedly stated in 
its closing argument that the evidence is 'uncontroverted'" in 
violation of Hoyle's right not to testify.4  The circuit court 
orally denied Hoyle's motion during a hearing, concluding, "I 
don't think that was a comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify" because the prosecutor was arguing, "the only result 
that could be reached from what the testimony was, if you 
believed [Hannah], was that the defendant raped her."  The 
circuit court later issued a written order denying Hoyle's 
motion for postconviction relief.    
¶13 Hoyle appealed the circuit court's order, and the 
court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals concluded, 
"[T]he 
State's 
repeated 
argument 
that 
the 
evidence 
was 
'uncontroverted' was improper under the circumstances of this 
case, where the only person who could controvert the alleged 
victim's testimony was Hoyle" and "thus violated Hoyle's Fifth 
Amendment 
right 
not 
to 
testify 
at 
trial." 
 
Hoyle, 
No. 2020AP1876-CR, ¶2. 
¶14 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
"determine 
whether 
a 
defendant's 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
compulsory 
incrimination [has been] violated."  State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 
                                                 
4 Hoyle raised six additional bases for postconviction 
relief.  None of these additional claims were raised before this 
court.  
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
10 
 
107, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.  This involves "the 
application of constitutional principles to facts," which we 
review de novo as questions of law.  State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 
95, ¶30, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 819 N.W.2d 769. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 We begin with an overview of United States Supreme 
Court cases developing the right against adverse comment on a 
defendant's decision not to testify.  We then proceed by 
reviewing how the federal circuit courts of appeals and 
Wisconsin courts have applied the Supreme Court's precedent in 
the area of indirect comment on a defendant's silence.  Finally, 
we analyze Hoyle's claim that the prosecutor violated his rights 
under 
Griffin 
by 
referring 
to 
the 
State's 
evidence 
as 
"uncontroverted" and conclude that the prosecutor did not 
comment on Hoyle's silence.  
A.  Text And United States Supreme Court Cases 
¶17 Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, 
"No 
person . . . shall 
be 
compelled 
in 
any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."  U.S. Const. 
amend. 
V; 
accord 
Malloy 
v. 
Hogan, 
378 
U.S. 
1 
(1964) 
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment against the states).  
¶18 In Griffin, 380 U.S. 609, the United States Supreme 
Court 
interpreted 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
as 
providing 
a 
constitutional right for defendants to remain silent at trial 
without the jury drawing an adverse inference from that silence.  
The defendant in Griffin was on trial for first-degree murder 
and invoked his right not to testify.  Id. at 609-10.  The court 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
11 
 
instructed the jury, "As to any evidence or facts against him 
which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or 
explain . . . if he does not testify . . . the jury may take 
that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth 
of such evidence . . . ."  Id. at 610.  The prosecutor acted 
accordingly in closing argument:  "These things he has not seen 
fit to take the stand and deny or explain"; "[the victim] is 
dead, she can't tell you her side of the story.  The defendant 
won't."  Id. at 611.   
¶19 The Supreme Court concluded both the court's and the 
prosecutor's actions were unconstitutional, holding the Fifth 
Amendment "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the 
accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence 
is evidence of guilt."  Id. at 614.  In reaching this 
conclusion, 
the 
Court 
first 
noted 
the 
federal 
statutory 
prohibition 
against 
drawing 
an 
adverse 
inference 
from 
a 
defendant's silence.  Id. at 612-13.  It then reasoned,  
If the words "fifth Amendment" are substituted for 
"act" and for "statute" [in Wilson, which held that 
adverse comment on silence was statutorily prohibited] 
the 
spirit 
of 
the 
Self-Incrimination 
Clause 
is 
reflected.  For comment on the refusal to testify is a 
remnant of the "inquisitorial system of criminal 
justice," which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.  It is a 
penalty 
imposed 
by 
courts 
for 
exercising 
a 
constitutional privilege.  It cuts down on the 
privilege by making its assertion costly.    
Id. at 614 (citation and footnote omitted).     
¶20 The Court clarified the rule against adverse comment 
on a defendant's silence in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
12 
 
(1978).  There, the Court held a trial court could instruct a 
jury, 
over 
a 
defendant's 
objection, 
not 
to 
consider 
a 
defendant's silence.  Id. at 338.  Examining its decision in 
Griffin, the Court observed, "It is clear from even a cursory 
review of the facts and the square holding of the Griffin case 
that the Court was there concerned only with adverse comment," 
which is comment "that such silence is evidence of guilt."  Id. 
at 338–39 (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615). 
¶21 Accordingly, "[a]lthough 
Griffin can be read to 
prohibit any direct reference to a defendant's failure to 
testify," the Supreme Court "has declined to adopt such a broad 
reading of Griffin."  United States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986, 990 
(7th Cir. 1997) (citing Lakeside, 435 U.S. 333).  The Griffin 
rule is concerned only with adverse comment——that is, comment on 
"the evil to which Griffin addressed itself:  the invitation to 
infer guilt from a defendant's decision not to take the stand."  
Id. 
¶22 The case before us does not involve a direct comment 
on a defendant's silence but rather an alleged indirect comment.  
"[T]he Supreme Court has never clearly established that a 
prosecutor may not comment on the evidence in a way that 
indirectly refers to the defendant's silence."  Edwards v. 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
13 
 
Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 460 (8th Cir. 2012).  However, it has come 
close.5  
¶23 In United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), a 
prosecutor stated during closing argument, "Let's look at the 
evidence the defendant[s] put on here for you so that we can put 
that in perspective.  I'm going to tell you what the 
defendant[s] did not do. . . .  The defendants at no time ever 
challenged any of the rapes . . . ."  Id. at 502.  Resolving the 
case on harmless error, the Court did not decide whether the 
prosecutor's 
remarks 
constituted 
adverse 
comments 
on 
the 
defendant's silence.  Id. at 509.  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens took the view that there was no constitutional 
error because, "[i]n reviewing the evidence adduced at the 5-day 
trial, 
the 
prosecutor 
identified 
the 
weaknesses 
in 
the 
defendants' presentations and invited inferences from the main 
focus of the evidence presented by the five defendants."  Id. at 
514 (Stevens, J., concurring).  In other words, Justice Stevens 
explained that the prosecutor's comments were not improper 
because "the protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should 
                                                 
5 The Supreme Court addressed a factual scenario similar to 
this case in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).  In Lockett, 
the Court "quickly dismissed the argument that the prosecutor 
had violated the defendant's right to remain silent when he 
repeatedly remarked that the evidence was uncontradicted."  
United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988) (citing 
Lockett, 438 U.S. 586).  However, the Court "did not need to 
decide whether such comment was generally improper, because in 
that case 'Lockett's own counsel had clearly focused the jury's 
attention on her silence.'"  Id. (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 
595).  Hoyle's trial counsel did not make any similar statement 
in this case.   
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
14 
 
[not] be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of 
legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the 
defense case."6  Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
¶24 Though these cases make clear that the Griffin rule 
prohibits adverse comment on a defendant's silence, the Supreme 
Court has not established a framework for deciding if a 
statement is a comment on a defendant's silence and whether such 
comment is adverse.  
B.  Federal Circuit Courts Of Appeals And Wisconsin Cases 
¶25 The prevailing standard among the federal circuit 
courts of appeals for determining whether a prosecutor violates 
the Fifth Amendment by adversely commenting on a defendant's 
silence first appeared in the Eighth Circuit's decision in 
Morrison, 6 F.2d 809.  Morrison did not analyze the Fifth 
Amendment but rather the federal statutory prohibition against 
adverse comment on a defendant's silence.  See id. at 811 
(citing Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 3481)).  The prosecutor made the following comments 
to the jury in closing argument:  
                                                 
6 The Supreme Court later favorably cited Justice Stevens' 
Hastings concurrence in Robinson, 485 U.S. 25.  That case 
involved a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's silence in 
response to defense counsel's assertion that the government did 
not permit the defendant to explain his side of the story.  485 
U.S. at 27-28.  The Court held that the prosecutor's comments 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment, explaining that in some 
cases "the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's opportunity 
to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or 
his counsel."  Id. at 32.  
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
15 
 
While you are the sole judges of the facts in the 
case, you would not be at liberty, of course, to 
arbitrarily disregard or reject testimony in the case, 
and especially where it is not contradicted, unless in 
the consideration of that testimony in some way you 
find it necessary in the performance of your duty to 
discredit or reject it.  Then, of course, you should 
give it the weight and consideration you think it 
should receive at your hands.  
Id. (emphasis added).  The Eighth Circuit first concluded, "It 
is clear that this language contained no direct comment on the 
failure of accused to testify."  Id.  The court then considered 
whether it was an "indirect comment" using the following 
test:  "Was the language used manifestly intended to be, or was 
it of such character that the jury would naturally and 
necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the 
accused to testify?"  Id. (emphases added).  Employing this 
test, the court concluded the prosecutor did not comment on the 
defendant's silence because "[t]estimony by the defendant was 
not the only method of contradicting the story told by the 
government's witnesses, if untrue."  Id.  The court also noted, 
"Comment by court and counsel that certain testimony is 
uncontradicted is common, oftentimes helpful, and very generally 
held to be without error."  Id. (collecting sources). 
¶26 Since the Eighth Circuit's decision in Morrison, every 
federal circuit court has applied a substantially similar 
version of this test in Fifth Amendment comment-on-silence 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
16 
 
cases.7  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals likewise has applied the 
Morrison test.  It first did so in State v. Johnson, 121 
Wis. 2d 237, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984), where a pro se 
defendant delivered an opening statement to the jury but did not 
testify.  Id. at 242.  The prosecutor cautioned the jury that 
the defendant's "statements were not evidence and were not given 
under oath or subject to cross-examination."  Id.  The court of 
appeals cited the Morrison formulation as the "test for 
determining whether remarks are directed to a defendant's 
failure to testify."  Id. at 246 (quoting Bontempo v. Fenton, 
692 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1982)).  The court concluded the 
prosecutor did not indirectly comment on the defendant's failure 
to testify, reasoning,  
While 
the 
prosecutor's 
remarks 
might 
have 
prompted the jury to recall and reflect upon [the 
defendant's] failure to testify, we do not conclude 
that the remarks highlighted such a failure to 
testify.  The remarks were directed at the manner in 
which the jury should consider the opening statement 
and did not address [the defendant's] failure to take 
the stand. . . . [T]hese remarks were not manifestly 
intended or of such a character that the jury would 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Medeiros, 983 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir. 
2020); United States v. Daugerdas, 837 F.3d 212, 227 (2d Cir. 
2016); United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217, 308 (3d Cir. 
2020); United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 466 (4th Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 341 (5th Cir. 2022); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 512 F.3d 285, 292-93 (6th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Phillips, 745 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. LaFontaine, 847 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1060 (9th Cir. 2018); 
United States v. Christy, 916 F.3d 814, 830 (10th Cir. 2019); 
United States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019); 
United States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
17 
 
naturally and necessarily take them to be a comment on 
the failure of the accused to testify.   
Id. at 248. 
¶27 The court of appeals later applied the Morrison test 
again in State v. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715 
N.W.2d 669.  There, a prosecutor commented that other alleged 
collaborators were not "going to walk into court . . . and waive 
[their] Fifth Amendment rights . . . .  My God, they have the 
same rights that [the defendant] does."  Id., ¶22.  The court of 
appeals, based on United States Supreme Court precedent, 
identified three factors which "must be present" to demonstrate 
a Griffin violation:  "(1) the comment must constitute a 
reference to the defendant's failure to testify; (2) the comment 
must propose that the failure to testify demonstrates guilt; and 
(3) the comment must not be a fair response to a defense 
argument."  Id., ¶21.  The court first concluded under the 
Morrison test that this was a comment on the defendant's 
decision not to testify, but it nonetheless concluded the 
prosecutor's statement was not improper because it was not 
"adverse"——"the prosecutor did not state or intimate that [the 
defendant's] failure to testify indicated guilt."8  Id., ¶23.  
Though it is possible that the jury could have interpreted the 
prosecutor's comment in an adverse manner, the court of appeals 
recognized that mere possibility is not enough:  "[A] court 
                                                 
8 The court of appeals also concluded that the prosecutor's 
comment was "a fair response to a defense argument" regarding 
why the alleged collaborators did not testify.  State v. Jaimes, 
2006 WI App 93, ¶24, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715 N.W.2d 669. 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
18 
 
should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous 
remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting 
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the 
plethora of less damaging interpretations."  Id., ¶23 (quoting 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).   
¶28 Accordingly, the mere possibility that a jury could 
understand a prosecutor as adversely commenting on a defendant's 
silence does not demonstrate a violation of Griffin.  See id.  
Rather, the prosecutor's language must have been "manifestly 
intended to be" or was "of such character that the jury would 
naturally and necessarily take it to be" an adverse comment on 
the defendant's silence for there to be a Griffin violation.  
Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811 (emphases added); see also Clark v. 
Lashbrook, 906 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the 
argument 
that 
a 
prosecutor 
violated 
Griffin 
because 
it 
"assumes . . . that 
the 
prosecution's 
statement 
is 
only 
susceptible to one meaning"); United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 
451, 466 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding there was no Griffin violation 
because, though the jury could understand the prosecutor as 
commenting on the defendant's silence, this was not "the 
'necessar[y]' conclusion the jury would draw"); United States v. 
LaFontaine, 847 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) 
(holding "the jury would not have necessarily understood the 
government's statement as an attempt to call attention to [the 
defendant's] failure to testify").  
¶29 Based on the Supreme Court's precedent and the test 
from Morrison, unanimously adopted by all federal circuits and 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
19 
 
applied by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, we hold that three 
elements 
must 
be 
present 
for 
a 
prosecutor 
to 
violate 
Griffin:  First, the prosecutor's language must have been 
"manifestly intended to be" or was "of such character that the 
jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be" a "comment 
on the failure of the [defendant] to testify."  Morrison, 6 F.2d 
at 811; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611.  Second, the prosecutor's 
language must also have been "manifestly intended to be" or was 
"of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily 
take it to be" "adverse," meaning comment "that such silence is 
evidence of guilt."  Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811; Lakeside, 435 U.S. 
at 338–39 (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615); Donnelly, 416 U.S. 
at 647.  Finally, the prosecutor's comments must not have been 
"a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel."  
United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988).  
C.  Comments That Evidence Is "Uncontroverted." 
¶30 Hoyle claims that the prosecutor in this case violated 
Griffin by repeatedly describing the State's evidence as 
"uncontroverted"9 during closing argument.  We conclude that the 
prosecutor's comments, taken in context, were not comments on 
Hoyle's silence and therefore did not violate Griffin.  Because 
                                                 
9 The prosecutor in this case used the term "uncontroverted" 
during his closing arguments.  Though most cases have reviewed 
prosecutors' 
use 
of 
"uncontradicted" 
instead, 
the 
terms 
"'uncontradicted,' 
'undenied,' 
'unrebutted,' 
'undisputed,' 
'unchallenged,' [and] 'uncontroverted'" are often treated the 
same.  United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 548 (7th Cir. 
1999).  
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
20 
 
we conclude that the prosecutor did not comment on Hoyle's 
silence, there is no need for us to analyze whether such comment 
was adverse or a fair response to a defense argument.   
¶31 We first note that there is no per se rule that a 
prosecutor's description of evidence as "uncontroverted" is a 
comment on a defendant's silence.  "Generally, it is not 
improper for the prosecuting attorney to remark that testimony 
for the prosecution is unexplained or uncontradicted, especially 
[as here] where the jury is instructed to disregard such comment 
as bearing on the accused's failure to testify."  23A C.J.S. 
Criminal Procedure & Rights of the Accused § 1762 (2022) 
(footnote omitted).  It is notable that the Eighth Circuit in 
Morrison——the case that first announced the test for an indirect 
comment on a defendant's failure to testify——approved of a 
prosecutor's comment that testimony was "not contradicted."  
Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.  It reasoned that the "[t]estimony by 
the defendant was not the only method of contradicting the story 
told by the government's witnesses, if untrue," and noted, 
"[c]omment by court and counsel that certain testimony is 
uncontradicted is common, oftentimes helpful, and very generally 
held to be without error."  Id.  Similarly, we recognized in 
Bies v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 322, 48-49, 193 N.W.2d 47 (1972), 
"that it is proper for the district attorney to point out 
generally that no evidence has been introduced to show the 
innocence of the defendant."  A prosecutor may refer to evidence 
as "uncontroverted" when the comment was neither "manifestly 
intended to be" nor was "of such character that the jury would 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
21 
 
naturally and necessarily take it to be" a comment on the 
defendant's silence.  Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.  
¶32 Some courts have held that a prosecutor's statement 
that evidence is "uncontroverted" is a comment on a defendant's 
silence "if the only person who could have contradicted, denied, 
rebutted or disputed the government's evidence was the defendant 
himself."  United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 
1996).  For example, the Seventh Circuit in Cotnam concluded 
that a prosecutor's description of testimony as "uncontroverted" 
was manifestly intended as a comment on the defendant's silence 
because the prosecutor focused attention on the defendant by 
asking a witness, "When these discussions were taking place 
between the defendant and yourself, did you keep the discussions 
basically to yourself or were other people around the house?"  
Id. at 499.  Similarly, in United States v. Triplett, 195 F.3d 
990 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit concluded a prosecutor's 
statement, "What you didn't hear was evidence that the defendant 
didn't possess the drugs," was a comment on the defendant's 
silence "because, according to the government's own theory of 
the case, no one other than Triplett himself could have 
testified about his possession of the drugs.  Triplett 'alone 
had the information to do so.'"  Id. at 995 (quoting Sidebottom 
v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 759 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
¶33 Analyzing the prosecutor's remarks during Hoyle's 
trial in context reveals that his statements that the State's 
evidence was "uncontroverted" were neither "manifestly intended 
to be" nor "of such character that the jury would naturally and 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
22 
 
necessarily take [them] to be" comments on the defendant's 
silence.  Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.   
¶34 The main issue at Hoyle's trial was the credibility of 
the State's witnesses.  Defense counsel began his opening 
statement by noting, "There is no burden on the defense to put 
witnesses up.  There is no burden on the defense to provide 
testimony.  The State has to provide you with every single thing 
that they're alleging."  He told the jury, "you will not be 
given any scientific, physical, or medical evidence that 
connects Mr. Hoyle to [Hannah] whatsoever.  You will not be 
given any corroborating witnesses in this case. . . .  What that 
comes down to is you have to determine [Hannah's] credibility." 
¶35 During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor 
anticipated defense counsel would argue reasonable doubt based 
on a lack of corroborating evidence and chose to lean on the 
jury instructions.  The prosecutor made all statements that 
Hannah's testimony was "uncontroverted" in the context of 
explaining to the jury what evidence it was permitted to 
consider.  The prosecutor reminded the jury, "the judge 
instructed you that you are to decide this case solely, solely 
on the evidence offered and received at the trial. . . .  You're 
not to speculate about other things that may be out there."  
"You're supposed to just focus on what you heard yesterday with 
the testimony.  [Hannah's] testimony that she gave here 
yesterday is uncontroverted."  The prosecutor then recounted 
Hannah's testimony and said, "All of that is uncontroverted."  
He further explained, "There is absolutely no evidence disputing 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
23 
 
her account of what occurred.  I can pretty much guarantee that 
the defense is going to get up here and say, what about 
this? . . .  You're not to speculate.  You're not to guess.  
You're to focus on what you heard yesterday . . . ."  One 
portion summarizes his argument particularly well:  
They will want you to speculate about what you 
could know, what they think you should have known, but 
it's not about speculation.  It's about what you 
heard.  In this case, because you only heard from 
[Hannah] about it, you didn't hear from any of her 
friends or anyone else testifying about it, it all 
comes down to her credibility.   
¶36 This 
context 
makes 
clear 
that 
the 
prosecutor's 
description of Hannah's testimony as "uncontroverted" was 
entirely meant to focus the jury's attention on what evidence it 
was permitted to consider.  The jury could consider only whether 
the evidence presented by the State was credible, and that 
evidence was "uncontroverted," meaning there was no contrary 
evidence for the jury to also evaluate.  The jury could not 
"speculate" that there was some other evidence not presented 
that might exonerate Hoyle.  They were to focus solely on 
whether the State's witnesses were credible.  The prosecutor 
never argued that the lack of a defense case made the State's 
witnesses more credible.  He instead walked through the court's 
instruction on credibility and told the jury to evaluate the 
testimony they heard based on their "own experiences in life"; 
"the victim's conduct, appearance, and demeanor"; "the clearness 
or lack of clearness of her recollection"; "[t]he reasonableness 
of her testimony"; "[t]he apparent intelligence of the witness"; 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
24 
 
and 
"possible 
motives 
for 
falsifying 
testimony." 
 
The 
prosecutor's description of the evidence as "uncontroverted" 
was, in context, comment on the evidence the jury was permitted 
to consider, not on Hoyle's silence. 
¶37 It is also not the case that "the only person who 
could have contradicted, denied, rebutted or disputed the 
government's evidence was the defendant himself" and, therefore, 
the jury would have "naturally and necessarily" understood the 
prosecutor as commenting on Hoyle's silence.  Cotnam, 88 F.3d at 
497.  It is possible that other evidence might exist that would 
controvert the State's witnesses.  In fact, defense counsel 
identified several types of evidence that, if presented, might 
controvert them.  Defense counsel told the jury:  "We heard from 
the investigator yesterday.  She did not go talk to [Hannah's] 
mother at all.  That's important. . . . What was her demeanor 
when she came back?"  "We heard that [Hannah] also lived with 
her stepfather and her two sisters."  "[Hannah] tells us that 
she was going to go and see a friend. . . .  That avenue is 
ignored."  "We heard that the police never went to canvas the 
neighborhood."  "We heard from [Hannah] that she was dropped off 
at this gas station or bar.  The investigator says she had never 
went to those to find out if they had surveillance . . . ."  "I 
think we all agree when two people engage in sex, their bodies 
are touching.  There is going to be some sort of physical 
evidence . . . .  We know that she didn't go through a medical 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
25 
 
evaluation or physical evaluation."  It is possible that some of 
this evidence could have controverted the State's witnesses.10    
¶38 Read in context, the prosecutor described the evidence 
as "uncontroverted" in order to keep the jury from speculating 
about any other evidence, including the evidence defense counsel 
mentioned in his opening statement and closing argument, and to 
instead focus on whether the State's witnesses were credible.  
He argued that defense counsel was asking the jury to speculate 
about other evidence, which the jury could not do.  Even if it 
is possible that the jury could have understood the prosecutor 
as commenting on Hoyle's decision not to testify, the jury would 
not have "necessarily" done so, and we "should not lightly 
infer" that the jury would have drawn the "most damaging 
meaning" from the prosecutor's statements.11  Jaimes, 292 
Wis. 2d 656, ¶23 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647). 
                                                 
10 We consider defense counsel's argument in this case only 
because it provides context as to how the jury would understand 
the prosecutor's argument, not because the prosecutor's argument 
was a "fair response to a defense argument."  Jaimes, 292 
Wis. 2d 656, ¶21. 
11 Assuming arguendo that the jury would have naturally and 
necessarily understood the prosecutor to be commenting on 
Hoyle's silence, there would still be no error.  The argument 
was never adverse because the prosecutor never asked or 
intimated that the jury should interpret Hoyle's silence as an 
admission of guilt.  Had the prosecutor commented on Hoyle's 
silence——which he did not——such comment only directed the jury 
away from speculation regarding the evidence they did not hear 
and toward the evidence they did hear.  Any mere possibility 
that the jury could instead have made the prohibited inference 
is insufficient.  
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
26 
 
¶39 We therefore conclude the prosecutor did not violate 
Griffin because, taking the prosecutor's remarks in context, the 
description of the State's evidence as "uncontroverted" was 
neither "manifestly intended to be" nor "of such character that 
the jury would naturally and necessarily take [them] to be" a 
comment on Hoyle's silence.  Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.  Because 
we conclude the prosecutor did not comment at all on Hoyle's 
silence, it is unnecessary for us to analyze whether such 
comment "propose[d] that the failure to testify demonstrates 
guilt" or whether it was a "fair response to a defense 
argument."  Jaimes, 292 Wis. 2d 656, ¶21. 
¶40 Because we conclude the prosecution's description of 
the evidence as "uncontroverted" was not an error under Griffin, 
there is no need for us to engage in a harmless error analysis.  
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 Hoyle argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the prosecutor at Hoyle's trial violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination under Griffin by 
adversely commenting on his decision not to testify.  According 
to Hoyle, the prosecutor argued "that Hoyle should be convicted 
because the alleged victim's testimony was 'uncontroverted'" and 
that this was a comment on Hoyle's decision not to testify 
because "[o]nly Hoyle could have contradicted [the alleged 
victim's] sexual assault allegations." 
¶42 We 
conclude 
that 
Hoyle 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
postconviction relief.  The prosecutor at Hoyle's criminal trial 
No. 
2020AP1876-CR   
 
27 
 
did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin because 
the prosecutor did not comment on Hoyle's silence.  The 
prosecutor 
instead 
described 
the 
State's 
evidence 
as 
"uncontroverted" to remind the jury that they could evaluate 
only the evidence presented at trial and not speculate about 
other possible evidence.  Additionally, the jury likely would 
not have thought only Hoyle could have controverted the State's 
evidence because defense counsel explicitly identified other 
kinds of evidence not presented at trial.  In context, the 
prosecutor's 
remarks 
that 
the 
State's 
evidence 
was 
"uncontroverted" were neither "manifestly intended to be" nor 
"of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily 
take [them] to be" adverse comments on Hoyle's silence.  
Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.  The prosecutor therefore did not 
comment on Hoyle's silence, and the circuit court was correct to 
deny Hoyle's motion for postconviction relief.  We reverse the 
court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶43 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No person 
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself."   U.S. Const. amend. V.  In Griffin v. 
California, the United States Supreme Court arguably went beyond 
the original meaning of this clause and held that it forbids 
"comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence."  380 
U.S. 609, 615 (1965).  Hoyle's claim before us is premised on 
the Fifth Amendment alone; no argument is made under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  We are therefore duty-bound to apply 
the precedent of the United States Supreme Court.  The majority 
opinion does so, and I join it.   
¶44 I write separately, however, to discuss the original 
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
and to consider how that meaning might inform our approach in 
cases such as this.  The short story is that the right to not 
accuse oneself was widely understood to be one of our natural, 
God-given, inalienable rights.  And our founders were cognizant 
of the historical abuse of this right during the Inquisition and 
later by ecclesiastical and English prerogative courts.  Little 
to nothing in the historical record suggests that this right 
protected those accused of crimes——who were not even allowed to 
testify in their own defense at the time——against comments on 
and adverse inferences from their decision not to testify.   
¶45 So how did Griffin arise?  In brief, criminal trials 
in America evolved to give those accused of crimes the statutory 
right to testify.  And as jurisdictions moved in this direction, 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
some states and the federal government enacted laws that 
protected 
defendants 
against 
adverse 
inferences 
from 
the 
decision not to testify——although this policy choice was not 
universal.  Soon enough, a body of cases interpreting and 
applying these principles arose, yielding Griffin-type rules 
rooted in both statute and common law.  As we shall see, Griffin 
then incorporated this body of law at least in part and rooted 
it in the Fifth Amendment.   
¶46 This history reveals, at the very least, strong 
arguments that Griffin and its progeny go beyond the original 
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
Given this, how should courts that must apply Griffin respond 
when faced with cases asking us to extend precedent that has a 
weak foundation in the original meaning of the Constitution?  In 
my view, we should tread cautiously.  Where possible, we should 
aim to "resolve questions about the scope of those precedents in 
light of and in the direction of the constitutional text and 
constitutional history."  Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. 
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting).  Being mindful of the text and history of the 
Fifth Amendment provides further support to the majority's 
decision not to extend Griffin to the facts of the case before 
us.  For these reasons, I join the majority opinion and 
respectfully concur.    
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
I.  GRIFFIN & THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE   
A.  Nemo Tenetur & the Ex Officio Oath 
¶47 In 
the 
twelfth 
century, 
Bolognese 
monk 
Gratian 
authored the Decretum——a compilation of the body of Catholic 
rules and pronouncements that had circulated in collections of 
"canons."  J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 
110 (2d ed. 1979).  The Decretum systematized these canons "in 
accordance with a hierarchical scheme of authority with the pope 
at the earthly summit."  Id.  Study of "Canon law became all the 
rage" as European universities picked it up, and a new system of 
courts applying these canons——known as ecclesiastical courts——
soon developed.  Id.   
¶48 We begin the story of the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause here because one of the enduring maxims 
recognized in canon law was known in Latin as nemo tenetur 
prodere seipsum——that is, "No one is bound to betray oneself."  
Richard H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege against Self-
Incrimination:  The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 962, 962 (1990).  The maxim's origins are a bit of a 
mystery, but by the Middle Ages it was widely referenced and 
widely accepted.1  Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth 
                                                 
1 A 
prominent 
fourth-century 
Church 
Father, 
St. 
John 
Chrysostom, referenced the idea when discussing St. Paul's 
letter to the Hebrews.  Richard H. Helmholz, Origins of the 
Privilege against Self-Incrimination:  The Role of the European 
Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 982 (1990).  St. Augustine 
did as well around the same time.  Leonard W. Levy, Origins of 
the Fifth Amendment and its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821, 831 
(1997) [hereinafter Levy, Critics].  The maxim made more 
concrete appearances as a legal concept during the Middle Ages, 
first in Gratian's Decretum (twelfth century) and then in the 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
Amendment and its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821, 831 (1997).  
The theological driver behind this principle was that "men and 
women should confess their sins to God, but they should not be 
compelled to make their crimes known to anyone else."  Helmholz, 
supra at 982.  Eventually, the maxim would mean much more as 
government power was seen as transgressing its command. 
¶49 That brings us to the Inquisition——a period during 
early medieval times in which the Catholic Church sought to 
protect itself from widespread heresy.  Leonard W. Levy, Origins 
of the Fifth Amendment 20-21 (Oxford University Press 1968) 
[hereinafter Levy, Origins].  While the ancient maxim against 
self-betrayal was accepted as such, it had its limits.  St. 
Thomas Aquinas reflected and reinforced the thinking at the time 
that in order to protect the theological purity of the church, 
"truthful answers to incriminating questions" must be demanded, 
and those embracing heresy should be put to death.  Id. at 21.  
Even torture was an authorized tool to root out heresy.  Id.   
¶50 In 1215, Pope Innocent III remodeled the criminal 
procedures of canon law, permitting three modes of prosecution.  
Id. at 22.  The first was accusatio——accusation from a private 
person.  Id.  This mode came with a catch; it exposed the 
accuser to punishment if his prosecution failed.  Id.  The 
second was denunciatio——a private accusation allowing "the 
private accuser to avoid the danger and burden of accusatio."  
Id. at 22-23.  In denunciatio the judge proceeded "ex officio"——
                                                                                                                                                             
glossa ordinaria to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX (thirteenth 
century).  Helmholz, supra at 967; Levy, Critics, supra at 831.   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
"by virtue of his office"——and became a party to the suit, 
conducting the prosecution for the secret accuser.  Id. at 23.  
The third was inquisitio——a mode "by which the judge combined in 
his person all roles."  Id.  He sat as accuser, prosecutor, 
judge, and jury.  Id. 
¶51 The 
common 
procedure 
employed 
by 
ecclesiastical 
courts, by which they implemented these types of prosecution, 
was the oath de veritate dicenda.  Id.  This oath required a 
party to swear to tell the truth to all questions that might be 
asked.  Id.  The oath, however, could become an "an inescapable 
trap" because an accused had to either take the oath (and risk 
being condemned for perjury if the court didn't believe the 
answers) or be condemned as guilty for refusing to answer.  
Id. at 23-24.  As such, it operated in all respects as a self-
incriminatory oath.  Id. at 24.  And because the oath took place 
during inquisitorial procedures in which the judge operated ex 
officio, the oath became known as the ex officio oath.  Id. 
¶52 By the early fourteenth century, English monarchs had 
created the king's council, a political body made up of the most 
powerful state officers, nobles, bishops, and judges.  Id. at 
49.  This council eventually "developed into the House of Lords 
and the central courts of the common law"——"the Court of Common 
Pleas (civil) and the Court of King's Bench (criminal)."  Id.  
But it also spun off what were called conciliar or prerogative 
courts, supplementing the general jurisdiction of the other 
courts at the time.  Baker, supra at 101.  The original 
justification for the creation of these courts "was that 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
6 
 
extraordinary action by the king and his magnates offered the 
only escape from the kind of undue influence which could corrupt 
sheriffs and juries."  Id. 
¶53 Because many of the chancellors serving on the king's 
council were assisted by bishops and doctors of canon law, its 
procedures largely emulated those used in the ecclesiastical 
courts.  Levy, Origins, supra at 50.  For example, they had no 
juries.  Id.  The common criminal procedure involved secret 
accusations 
by 
informers 
(called 
an 
"information" 
or 
"suggestion") instead of the typical grand jury process of the 
common law.  Id.  After the court commanded attendance of a 
person through a writ of citation, it would require them to take 
the ex officio oath.  Id.  "The defendant was required to swear 
the 
oath 
and 
then 
was 
confronted 
with 
a 
series 
of 
interrogatories which were based on the information obtained by 
suggestions and the examination of witnesses."  Id. at 51.  "Any 
discrepancies or contradictions in his answers were used against 
him in an effort to break him down and force a confession of 
guilt."  Id. 
¶54 The prerogative courts changed dramatically during the 
Elizabethan (1558-1603) and early Stuart (1603-1640s) periods.  
John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047, 
1073 (1994).  As those monarchies began imposing Anglican forms 
of worship on the British people, they enlarged the jurisdiction 
of the prerogative courts to "suppress religious and political 
heterodoxy."  United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1436 (11th 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
7 
 
Cir. 1997).  The oath became "especially problematic for 
religious dissenters, as they were 'typically guilty of the 
nonconformist religious practices for which they were being 
investigated.'"  In re Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th 176, 214 (6th 
Cir. 2022) (Thapar, J., concurring in part) (quoting another 
source).  "Anyone who refused this 'inquisitional oath' could be 
held in contempt, imprisoned, and even tortured."  Id. (quoting 
another source); Langbein, supra at 1073.   
¶55 So, by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both 
the prerogative courts and ecclesiastical courts used the ex 
officio oath to impose their political and religious will upon 
the people.  Many pushed back and resented what they saw as a 
grand abuse of power.  Levy, Origins, supra at 268-69.  The ex 
officio oath, they argued, violated the laws of God, drawing 
upon the ancient principle that no one should be forced to 
accuse oneself.2  Helmholz, supra at 967-68. 
¶56 In 1637, tensions boiled over.  Levy, Origins, supra 
at 271-72.  That year, the Star Chamber, probably the most well-
known of the prerogative courts, brought charges against English 
activist John Lilburne for shipping seditious books into England 
from Holland (among other charges).  Id. at 273.  The Star 
Chamber found him guilty of contempt for refusing to take the 
oath.  Lilburne's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (Star Chamber 1637).  
He condemned the oath as "against the law of God; for that law 
                                                 
2 In addition to the nemo tenetur maxim, some historians 
also point to the "rights of conscience" as an additional basis 
for rejecting forced self-accusations.  Levy, Critics, supra at 
836.   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
requires no man to accuse himself."  Levy, Origins, supra at 
277.  Lilburne's trial was likely the final nail in the coffin 
for 
England's 
prerogative 
courts. 
 
Reflecting 
popular 
objections, Parliament abolished the Star Chamber in 1641, and 
forbade use of the ex officio oath procedure in the English 
ecclesiastical courts.  Langbein, supra at 1073-74. 
B.  Impact on Founders & Ratification of Fifth Amendment 
¶57 The experience of our English forebears in their fight 
against the inquisition-style persecutions had a profound effect 
on the founders.  In 1735, a Presbyterian special commission in 
Philadelphia investigated the unorthodox beliefs of local 
minister Samuel Hemphill because of his deistic ideas.  Levy, 
Origins, supra at 382-83.  Hemphill reportedly refused a demand 
to give the commission his sermons because it was "contrary to 
the common Rights of Mankind, no Man being obligated to furnish 
Matter of Accusation against himself."  Id. at 383.  The 
commission took his refusal as a "virtual confession of guilt," 
and suspended him for "Unsound and Dangerous" beliefs.  Id.  But 
a young Benjamin Franklin came to Hemphill's defense, writing 
that the commission resembled "that hellish Tribunal the 
Inquisition."  Id. 
¶58 In 1788, during the debate in Massachusetts over 
ratifying the newly proposed federal Constitution, one delegate 
objected to the charter because nothing prevented "Congress from 
passing laws which shall compel a man, who is accused or 
suspected of a crime, to furnish evidence against himself."  
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
9 
 
Remarks by Abraham Holmes in the Massachusetts Debates, in 2 The 
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).  He warned 
that the Constitution as proposed gave Congress the power to 
create judicial bodies resembling "that diabolical institution, 
the Inquisition."  Id.   
¶59 This widespread acceptance of the ancient right to not 
accuse oneself was reflected in the first constitutions in the 
new American states.  Virginia led the way, establishing that no 
one may "be compelled to give evidence against himself."  
Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776).  Seven other states 
included similar provisions, granting rights against compulsion 
"to give evidence" or "to furnish evidence" against oneself.  
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 52 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th at 215 (Thapar, J., 
concurring).    
¶60 And when James Madison drafted the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, he used language similar to that 
in state constitutions and wrote, "No person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."3  
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring); U.S. Const. 
amend. V.  Historians generally believe Madison's use of the 
phrase "to be a witness" was synonymous with the "giving" or 
                                                 
3 The Wisconsin Constitution uses substantially the same 
language.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1) ("No person . . . may 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself or herself."). 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
10 
 
"furnishing" of evidence as phrased in many state constitutions.  
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
¶61 In sum, although scholars debate the precise weight 
different historical practices may have had in forming their 
convictions, the general consensus is that the people who 
adopted our Constitution had in mind the inquisitorial practices 
of the ecclesiastical and prerogative courts along with their 
forerunners.  Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S 422, 446 (1956) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th at 215 
(Thapar, J., concurring in part); Sharon R. Gromer, Fifth 
Amendment——The 
Right 
to 
a 
no 
"Adverse 
Inference" 
Jury 
Instruction, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1307, 1307-08 (1981).  
Moreover, they believed that this kind of violation of the basic 
rights of mankind should be protected against, and did so in 
their constitutions.   
¶62 The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, therefore, invokes the pre-existing God-given right 
of all persons to not be compelled to be a witness against 
themselves.  The word "compelled" at the time the amendment was 
ratified meant forced or constrained.  Compelled, New and 
Complete Dictionary of the English Language (Edward & Charles 
Dilly, eds. 1775).  And the amendment gives this protection to 
all persons "in any criminal case."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The 
text of the amendment does not say anything about what a jury 
might permissibly infer from a failure to testify, or whether 
attorneys may comment upon the failure to testify.  And as the 
next part of the story reveals, our founders would not have had 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
11 
 
the testimony of criminal defendants in mind when enshrining the 
right against self-incrimination in the Constitution.  
C.  The Common Law Rule of Disqualification 
¶63 During the Founding Era, common law rules disqualified 
criminal defendants from testifying under oath in their own 
trials.  Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1961).  
While 
this 
may 
seem 
foreign 
to 
us 
today, 
the 
central 
justification for this rule at the time was that a party to a 
case could not be trusted.  Id. at 573.  The theory was that the 
witness stand should be open only to "those presumably honest, 
appreciating the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by 
the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest."  
Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892).   
¶64 To be sure, defendants still often spoke at trial.  
But they did so pro se in their own defense since legal 
representation for the accused was uncommon (and in earlier 
times, not even permitted).  John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the 
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including the 
Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdictions of the 
United States 697 (1904).  Thus, defendants often had to argue 
their own case and on occasion give their account of what 
happened.  Id.  But their unsworn statements were not considered 
testimony, and therefore were not viewed as evidence for the 
jury to consider.  Id. 
¶65 Moreover, the historical record supports the notion 
that juries could draw adverse inferences from a defendant's 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
12 
 
silence even though his statements weren't technically evidence.  
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 333-34 (1999) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  If a defendant did not defend himself, the 
assumption was "that could only be because he was unable to deny 
the truth of the evidence."  Id. at 334 (quoting J. Beattie, 
Crime and the Courts in England: 1660–1800 348–349 (1986)).  
Fact finders "did not hesitate to draw inferences of guilt when 
defendants remained silent."  Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar 
Privilege in Historical Perspective:  The Right to Remain 
Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2631 (1996).   
¶66 Some evidence also suggests that a defendant's silence 
was directly commented upon.  A typical process was that a 
magistrate would examine a defendant pre-trial, getting the 
defendant's story.4  And while the defendant was unable to 
testify himself, the magistrate could and would report the 
defendant's answers to the jury as testimonial evidence.  John 
H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure:  
the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in The Privilege 
Against Self–Incrimination:  Its Origins and Development 92 
(1997).  If a defendant refused to answer the magistrate's 
questions, the magistrate would report as much to the jury.  Id.  
Therefore, in this way, a defendant's decision not to answer 
questions would be commented on to the jury, with negative 
inferences from that front and center.  
                                                 
4 This process was dictated by the Marian Committal Statute.  
John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal 
Procedure:  The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in The 
Privilege 
Against 
Self–Incrimination: 
 
Its 
Origins 
and 
Development 91-92 (1997). 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
13 
 
¶67 When the Fifth Amendment was adopted, the rule 
disqualifying 
parties 
from 
testifying——including 
criminal 
defendants——was ubiquitous.  Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 574; Richard 
A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 1063, 1113 (1999).  Thus, the historical record 
strongly weighs against any notion that the Fifth Amendment at 
the time of its adoption was meant to prohibit comment upon or 
adverse inferences regarding the failure of a criminal defendant 
to testify in his trial——because that kind of testimony did not 
happen, and comment upon and inferences from a defendant's 
refusal to defend himself was commonplace.  
D.  Abolition of the Common Law Rule of Disqualification    
¶68 This approach to criminal prosecutions, however, did 
not hold.  By the turn of the nineteenth century, some 
dissenters began to voice concern with the status quo.  John 
Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth:  The Constitutionalization of 
American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 
825, 864 (1999).  In 1805, a passionate Philadelphian circulated 
a pamphlet calling the practice of disqualifying parties from 
testifying (including criminal defendants) the "prodigious evil 
of our jurisprudence."  Id.  Serious public debate about these 
rules began to take place in the 1830s, starting in England.  
Id.; Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 575.  Englishman Jeremy Bentham 
assailed the practice of excluding a party from testifying 
because, he argued, it effectively excluded truth.  Witt, supra 
at 863-64.  He insisted that evidence "is the basis of justice; 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
14 
 
exclude evidence, you exclude justice."  Id. (quoting 5 Jeremy 
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 1 (London, Hunt & Clarke 
1827)).  Bentham's arguments caught on across the Atlantic, with 
American contemporaries similarly maintaining that exclusion of 
relevant witnesses "obstructed the 'discovery of the truth.'"  
Id.  at 865 (quoting another source); id. at 864 n. 147 
(collecting sources).   
¶69 By the dawn of the Civil War, the stage was set for 
change.  Maine led the way in 1859 by permitting defendants to 
testify in some circumstances.  Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577.  When 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, nine states had 
followed suit.5  Mitchell, 526 U.S at 335-36 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  In 1869, Wisconsin joined in and qualified 
defendants for all trials.  § 1, ch. 72, Laws of 1869.  And the 
federal government passed its own qualification statute in 1878.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3481.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
                                                 
5 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment as rendering the Fifth Amendment applicable 
against the states.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).  
Thus, some scholars believe that the period surrounding the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment should also be examined 
when a state action is challenged.  See, e.g., New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2138 
(2022) (describing the debate).  Here, the evidence from either 
time period cuts the same way.  By the time Congress adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, only nine states qualified 
defendants to testify.  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 
335-36 & n.1 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Of those nine, 
six prohibited adverse inferences while three didn't.  Id. at 
335-36.  Thus, since so few states prohibited adverse inferences 
in 1868, it cannot "reasonably be argued that the new statutes 
somehow created a 'revised' understanding of the Fifth Amendment 
that was incorporated into . . . the Fourteenth Amendment."  
Id. at 335.   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
15 
 
nearly every state made provision for criminal defendants to 
testify in their own defense.  See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 & 
n.6.   
¶70 This change naturally led to new policy debates.  If a 
defendant could testify, how should prosecutors and juries be 
permitted to characterize this decision?  Id. at 579-80; Gromer, 
supra at 1308.  The answer was not uniform.  But many 
jurisdictions enacted laws along the lines of that adopted by 
the 
federal 
government 
in 
1878, 
which 
provided 
that 
a 
defendant's 
"failure 
to 
[testify] 
shall 
not 
create 
any 
presumption against him."  18 U.S.C. § 3481.   
¶71 In 1893, the United States Supreme Court was asked 
whether a prosecutor's reference to a defendant's failure to 
testify violated the no-presumption proscription in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3481.  In Wilson v. United States, the Court said yes.  149 
U.S. 60, 66-67 (1893).  It reasoned that the prosecutor's 
comment induced the jury "to disregard entirely the presumption 
of innocence to which by the law he was entitled."  Id. at 66.  
The thinking reflected in Wilson——rooted in a mix of statutory 
and common law——began to proliferate around the country and 
embed itself into American law over the next half century.  See 
J. Evans, Comment or Argument by Court or Counsel that 
Prosecution Evidence is Uncontradicted as Amounting to Improper 
Reference to Accused's Failure to Testify, 14 A.L.R.3d 723 
(originally published in 1967) (collecting pre-Griffin cases). 
¶72 With time, courts built out analytical frameworks for 
how to analyze whether a prosecutor actually commented on a 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
16 
 
defendant's failure to testify.  The most well-known and oft-
cited of these cases is the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Morrison 
v. United States, which is discussed extensively in the court's 
opinion today.  6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1925).  In Morrison, the 
court was asked to interpret and apply the same federal law 
interpreted in Wilson (18 U.S.C. § 3481).  Id. at 811.  The 
Eighth Circuit framed the following test for analyzing whether a 
prosecutor crossed over the line:  whether "the language used 
manifestly intended to be, or was it of such character that the 
jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on 
the failure of the accused to testify?"  Id.   
¶73 It is important to emphasize that even well into the 
twentieth century, however, not every jurisdiction adopted this 
approach or even forbade comments on an accused's silence.  For 
example, in 1934, California adopted a constitutional provision 
that made entirely the opposite policy choice:  
No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal 
case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law; but in any criminal case, whether the defendant 
testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by 
his testimony any evidence or facts in the case 
against him may be commented upon by the court and by 
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the 
jury. 
Cal. Const. art. I, § 13 (1938); see 1934 Enacted Proposition 5 
(amending Art. I, § 13 of the California Constitution).   
¶74 Therefore, before the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Griffin in 1965, most jurisdictions, including the 
federal government, had a legal framework rooted in statutes and 
cases that protected defendants from comments upon or adverse 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
17 
 
inferences based on a criminal defendant's decision not to 
testify.  But this was not a universally shared approach.  
D.  Griffin & Its Aftermath 
¶75 After initially rejecting the incorporation of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause via the Fourteenth Amendment in 1908,6 
the Supreme Court reversed course in 1964.7  That paved the way 
for Griffin, decided the very next year.  In Griffin, the State 
of California tried the defendant for first degree murder.  380 
U.S. at 609.  When the trial court instructed the jury on the 
issue of guilt, it told them that they could infer guilt from 
the defendant's failure to testify.  Id. at 609-10.  The 
prosecutor made hay, telling the jury that the defendant "has 
not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain."  Id. at 
611.  The jury convicted the defendant and he appealed.  Id. 
¶76 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
Wilson decision——which forbade comment by the prosecution on a 
defendant's failure to take the stand——"rested not on the Fifth 
Amendment, but on an Act of Congress, now 18 U.S.C. [§] 3481."  
Id. at 612.  But the court nonetheless concluded that the 
"comment rule" approved by California violated the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id. at 613. 
¶77 The Court quoted the following excerpt from Wilson, 
which described the reasoning behind 18 U.S.C. § 3481: 
                                                 
6 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
7 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11. 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
18 
 
[T]he act was framed with a due regard also to those 
who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of 
innocence which the law gives to everyone . . . .  The 
statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who 
from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a 
witness . . . declares that the failure of a defendant 
in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall 
not create any presumption against him. 
Id. at 
613 
(quoting 
Wilson, 
149 
U.S. at 
66). 
 
Griffin 
extrapolated 
that 
if 
"the 
words 
'fifth 
Amendment' 
are 
substituted for 'act' and for 'statute' the spirit of the Self-
Incrimination Clause is reflected" because "comment on the 
refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of 
criminal justice.'"  Id. at 613-14.  Accordingly, the Court held 
that the Fifth Amendment forbids "either comment by the 
prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the 
court that such silence is evidence of guilt."  Id. at 615. 
¶78 This constitutional rule has not been without its 
critics.  In Mitchell, the Supreme Court was asked whether 
Griffin prohibits a trial court from drawing an adverse 
inference from a defendant's silence during a sentencing 
hearing.  Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 316-17, 327-28.  The Court said 
it did.  Id. at 328-29.  Justice Scalia dissented, observing 
that "Griffin is out of sync with the historical understanding 
of the Fifth Amendment."  Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
However, he cautioned that he would not overrule Griffin because 
of the rule's widespread acceptance.  Id.  Justice Thomas agreed 
with Justice Scalia that Griffin lacked "foundation in the 
Constitution's text, history, or logic."  Id. at 341 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  But he wrote that he would reconsider Griffin 
in the appropriate case.  Id. at 343. 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
19 
 
¶79 Critiques aside, much of the application of Griffin 
has been left to lower courts.  If a prosecutor made an explicit 
comment about the defendant's failure to testify, then a court 
easily found a Griffin violation.  But what if a prosecutor made 
an indirect or implicit comment?  This gave "lower federal 
courts problems."  Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1170 (6th Cir. 
1982) (en banc).  All lower federal courts——and most states——
eventually responded by adopting the test created by the Eighth 
Circuit in Morrison.  Id. at 1170 & n.6 (collecting cases); 
Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. 1996) (collecting 
cases).  Even though Morrison was premised on interpretation of 
the federal statute, Griffin has been understood as largely 
incorporating this preexisting body of law into the Fifth 
Amendment.     
E.  Historical Summary 
¶80 The 
bottom 
line 
is 
this. 
 
Griffin 
holds 
that 
commenting on a criminal defendant's failure to testify violates 
the Fifth Amendment.  There is precious little evidence, 
however, that the original meaning of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment extends this far.  The text does 
not say this, and the history does not bear this out.  Rather, 
Griffin appears aimed at fulfilling the "spirit" of the Fifth 
Amendment by adding an additional layer of protection for 
defendants above and beyond the text.  It enshrines the right to 
remain silent enumerated in the text, and functionally prohibits 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
20 
 
improper 
inferences 
against 
defendants 
who 
exercise 
this 
constitutional right.   
II.  ORIGINAL MEANING & BINDING PRECEDENT 
¶81 In this case, our obligation as a lower court is to 
faithfully apply United States Supreme Court precedent.  State 
v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142; 
United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 1001 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(en banc).  But Hoyle asks us to protect defendants even further 
by applying Griffin in a more robust way to cover the comments 
made by the prosecutor here.  I do not believe Griffin or its 
progeny require us to do so for the reasons explained in the 
majority opinion, and I therefore join it.  But the original 
meaning and historical record provide additional support for the 
decision not to extend Griffin further.   
¶82 Justice Thomas has remarked that when there is little 
evidence suggesting a legal doctrine is grounded in the original 
meaning of the Constitution, "the Court should tread carefully 
before 
extending 
our 
precedents." 
 
Garza 
v. 
Idaho, 
139 
S. Ct. 738, 756 (2019) (Thomas, dissenting).  I agree.  When 
faced 
with 
the 
choice 
to 
extend 
precedent 
in 
these 
circumstances, we should "resolve questions about the scope of 
those precedents in light of and in the direction of the 
constitutional text and constitutional history."  Free Enter. 
Fund, 537 F.3d at 698 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).8 
                                                 
8 See also Josh Blackman, Originalism and Stare Decisis in 
the Lower Courts, 13 NYU J. L. & Liberty 44 (2019). 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
21 
 
¶83 The dissent rejects this approach, largely because it 
rejects originalism as a methodology.  Several reasons underlie 
its objections.  First, the dissent proclaims originalism 
insufficiently determinate.  In the dissent's view, originalism 
wrongly "assumes that each constitutional provision had a 
single, 
accepted 
original 
understanding." 
 
Dissent, 
¶106 
(quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse Than Nothing:  The Dangerous 
Fallacy of Originalism 56 (2022)).  And in a case like this, 
reasonable judges will disagree about what constitutes extending 
precedent and what constitutes faithfully applying it.  Id., 
¶105.  Therefore, my approach, as the dissent sees it, is 
susceptible to judges using originalism selectively to achieve 
their preferred results.  Second, the dissent says that 
originalism will lead to unacceptable results, potentially 
undermining certain currently-accepted constitutional principles 
it thinks should not be up for debate.  Id., ¶106.  Finally, the 
dissent suggests the original meaning is just one tool among 
many in the task of interpreting legal texts.  Id., ¶109.   
¶84 I will not endeavor in this concurrence to provide a 
comprehensive response to these arguments, but I offer several 
brief points.  First, in the abstract, the dissent is not wrong 
that originalism fails to give clear answers to every question, 
and is therefore vulnerable to manipulation.  But originalism is 
not preferable simply for its clarity or ability to restrain 
judges (although in the main I believe it offers these virtues 
as well).  The foremost reason judges must discern and follow 
the original meaning is because a written constitution is the 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
22 
 
law, and all written laws should be construed to mean what they 
meant when they were written.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 188 (1824); Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 
WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35; State v. Roundtree, 
2021 WI 1, ¶112, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 (Hagedorn, J., 
dissenting).  Originalism, like textualism, flows from the 
conviction that the text is the law, and our obligation is to be 
faithful to the meaning of the text.  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶28; 
State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 1849).   
¶85 It is true that other considerations may impact how we 
decide cases.  Precedent, for example, has an important role to 
play in disputes over legal issues that have already been 
decided. 
 
It 
is 
also 
true 
that 
sometimes 
fidelity 
to 
constitutional 
commands 
calls 
for 
judicial 
judgment——for 
example, upholding the right of the people against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 11.  The dissent's objections on these grounds mistake 
originalism as a methodology for discerning the meaning of the 
Constitution with originalism as the only component of case 
adjudication.  The divergent approaches of Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas on how they would respond to a hypothetical 
request to overrule Griffin are a prime example of this.   
¶86 Yes, constitutional language can be hard to interpret 
in the first instance, and even harder to apply in practice.  
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
23 
 
The same is true for statutes.9  But difficult cases do not 
change our obligation or goal.  A textual puzzle is not a 
license to impose our own take on what the law should be.  Our 
job when facing an unclear law is still to get as close as we 
can to what the text actually means.  The dissent points to the 
competing history-filled opinions in Heller as a reason to doubt 
the utility of originalism.  Dissent, ¶106 n.4.  On the 
contrary, Heller is a fine example of what judges should do when 
confronted with a hard-to-understand law:  comb the evidence, 
debate it, and try to get it right.  Smart judges doing this 
well will disagree sometimes.  That's okay.  Indeterminacy is an 
inherent feature of law written by people.  Thus, the dissent's 
criticism "isn't an attack against originalism so much as it is 
an attack on written law."  Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can 
Keep It 113 (2019).  And yes, some judges may exploit legal 
uncertainty or be inconsistent in their professed methodology.  
But 
the 
judiciary 
is 
filled 
with 
imperfect 
people 
who 
nonetheless swear an oath to faithfully read and apply the law 
impartially in every case.  The fallibility of judges is the 
price we must pay for an independent judiciary.  This reality 
says nothing about how judges should endeavor to carry out their 
                                                 
9  See e.g., Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI 63, ¶¶9-22, 403 
Wis. 2d 424, 
977 
N.W.2d 390 
(interpreting 
the 
meaning 
of 
"reasonable and necessary" in Wis. Stat. § 252.03); Friends of 
Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶¶13-25, 403 
Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263 (lead op.) (interpreting the meaning 
of "prevails in whole or in substantial part" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a)); State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, ¶¶15-60, 244 
Wis. 2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820 (interpreting the meaning of "a 
crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b)).   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
24 
 
responsibility to say what the law is, not what they wish the 
law to be.   
¶87 Finally, the dissent fails to offer a competing vision 
for how to read the law accurately.  Rather, the dissent lists a 
series of legal tools judges can consider:  text, history, 
precedent, context, historical practice and tradition, and the 
"need to balance 'the majority's values against the values that 
should be protected from society's majorities.'"  Dissent, ¶109 
(quoting Chemerinsky, supra at 207).  What the dissent misses is 
the end goal of these legal tools.  They are not an a la carte 
menu from which judges can cherry-pick their preferred legal 
rationale. 
 
Rather, 
legal 
evidence 
and 
authority 
are 
legitimately and appropriately deployed when used in service of 
getting the law right.  Several of these——text, history, 
context, historical practice, and even some precedent——can be 
relevant to discerning the original meaning of the Constitution.  
But where the meaning of the law comes into view, as it usually 
does even in hard cases, we do not have a license to override it 
by balancing competing values or any other outcome-focused 
concern.       
¶88 At the end of the day, the dissent's method of picking 
the legal tools you like——what the text meant when written being 
merely one data point to consider——is a subtle invitation for 
judges to decide what the Constitution should mean, rather than 
to keep the focus on what it does mean.  This must not be.  Our 
founders did not establish a system of government where judges 
in our highest courts are unconstrained by the meaning of the 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.bh 
 
25 
 
law the people have enacted, free to import their own values 
into the Constitution.  Originalism may not answer every 
question.  Originalist judges may not always be consistent.  But 
we can be sure of this:  A choose-your-own-adventure judicial 
methodology poses an even greater danger because it offers no 
rubric to grade one's fidelity to the law.   
¶89 As I see it, where United States Supreme Court 
precedent is on point, we must apply it faithfully.  But where 
we are asked to extend the logic of precedent into new areas, 
the original meaning ought to serve as the North Star toward 
which 
unresolved 
questions 
regarding 
the 
scope 
of 
those 
precedents should aim.  In this case, I believe Griffin does not 
prohibit the prosecutor's comments.  Furthermore, not extending 
Griffin to this factual scenario appropriately resolves this 
case 
in 
the 
direction 
of 
the 
original 
meaning 
of 
the 
constitutional text as best as I can discern.  For these 
reasons, I respectfully concur.   
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶91 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The Fifth 
Amendment provides that no one "shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."  U.S. Const. am. 
V.  For that constitutional privilege to be meaningful, it must 
also prohibit the prosecutor or the court from telling the jury 
that the defendant's decision not to testify is evidence of 
guilt.  See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).  
Otherwise, such direct commentary on the defendant's exercise of 
his constitutional rights would "cut[] down on the privilege by 
making its assertion costly" and allow the prosecution or the 
court to penalize the defendant for holding the government to 
its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id. 
at 613-14.     
¶92 But a defendant can also be penalized by an indirect 
comment on the failure to testify.  That is because an oblique 
reference to the defendant's decision not to take the stand 
might nevertheless invite the jury to draw the natural, but 
impermissible 
inference 
that 
the 
defendant's 
silence 
demonstrates guilt.  See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if jurors try faithfully 
to obey their instructions, the connection between silence and 
guilt is often too direct and too natural to be resisted.").  
For that reason, federal and state courts across the country 
have held that even an indirect comment on the defendant's 
decision not to testify violates the Fifth Amendment if it is 
"manifestly intended to be or [is] of such a character that the 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on 
the failure of the accused to testify."  See Butler v. Rose, 686 
F.2d 1163, 1170 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc); see also United 
States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We have 
repeatedly recognized that indirect commentary on a defendant's 
failure to take the stand can also constitute a violation of the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify."); State 
v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 248, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 
1984).    
¶93 One type of indirect comment that juries would 
"naturally and necessarily" understand as a reference to the 
decision not to testify occurs when the prosecutor repeatedly 
characterizes evidence as "undisputed" or "uncontradicted" and 
the only person who could reasonably have contradicted that 
evidence is the defendant.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 
1252, 1254-55, 1261 (7th Cir. 1992) (repeated statements that 
evidence only the defendant could dispute was "unrebutted" and 
"uncontradicted" violated the Fifth Amendment); Lent v. Wells, 
861 F.2d 972, 974-77 (6th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor's comments in a 
sexual assault case that evidence only the defendant could rebut 
was "uncontradicted," and "unrebutted" were improper commentary 
on the defendant's decision not to testify).  Statements like 
these "naturally and necessarily" refer to the decision not to 
testify because they "'can only cause the jury to naturally look 
to the only other evidence there is——the defendant.'"  See 
United States v. Preston, 873 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987)).   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
¶94 Applying these cases, it is clear that the prosecutor 
violated 
Hoyle's 
Fifth 
Amendment 
rights 
by 
repeatedly 
characterizing as "uncontroverted" evidence only Hoyle could 
dispute.  Hoyle was prosecuted for a sexual assault that 
occurred when he and the victim were alone in a car on a dead-
end road in a rural area.  There was no physical evidence, and 
accordingly, just Hoyle and the victim could have testified to 
what happened in that car.  And because the jury heard only from 
the 
victim, 
her 
testimony 
about 
the 
sexual 
assault 
was 
uncontroverted.   
¶95 Rather than focusing solely on the credibility of the 
victim's testimony, the prosecutor made the fact that her 
statements 
were 
uncontroverted 
the 
theme 
of 
his 
closing 
argument.  In fact, this theme was so important that the 
prosecutor asked the circuit court to rule before trial that it 
was permissible.1  In his closing argument, the prosecutor 
hammered his point relentlessly, repeatedly telling the jury 
that the victim's testimony was uncontroverted.  In just nine 
pages of transcript, he described the victim's testimony as 
uncontroverted four times, and twice told the jury there was "no 
evidence disputing" her account.  On rebuttal, he returned to 
that same theme, telling the jury "[y]ou need to make the 
decision based on the uncontroverted testimony of what she says 
                                                 
1 In support of his motion, the prosecutor stated "I can't 
say [the evidence] is uncontroverted because the defendant 
didn't 
testify, 
but 
I 
can 
say 
that 
her 
testimony 
is 
uncontroverted and that [the jury] ha[sn't] heard any testimony 
to the contrary."  The circuit court granted the motion.   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
occurred. 
 
They 
[the 
defense] 
don't 
disagree 
it's 
uncontroverted."  But only Hoyle could have controverted the 
victim's testimony about what happened in his car that day.  And 
for that reason, the jury would naturally and necessarily have 
taken the prosecutor's repeated characterization of the victim's 
testimony as "uncontroverted" as a comment on Hoyle's decision 
to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial.  
See Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Only 
[the defendant] could possibly have rebutted both [the victim's] 
version of what happened after he pulled his car over . . . and 
her testimony that she did not consent.").   
¶96 According to the majority, that is not enough to 
establish a Fifth Amendment violation, since the prosecutor's 
comments weren't "adverse" to Hoyle.  See majority op., ¶38, 
n.11.  In other words, the prosecutor did not "ask[] or 
intimate[] that the jury should interpret Hoyle's silence as an 
admission of guilt."  Id.  The majority cites no authority for 
the supposed requirement, but it appears to be drawing on State 
v. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, ¶22, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715 N.W.2d 669, 
which said that a "comment must propose that the failure to 
testify demonstrates guilt" in order to violate the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id.  The problem is that none of the other federal 
cases discussed earlier contain such a requirement, and the case 
Jaimes cites as support, United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
34 (1988), doesn't say that either.2  That makes sense.  "Given 
the prosecutor's institutional role, when the prosecutor merely 
'comments' on the failure of an accused to testify, the 
reference is in all likelihood calculated to encourage the jury 
to equate silence with guilt."  United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 
1522, 1534 (11th Cir. 1989).  And that is especially true when 
the comment references the defendant's failure to dispute 
evidence that only he could rebut.  Indeed, I can't imagine how 
such a comment could be taken as anything but "adverse" or 
"intimat[ing] that the jury should interpret Hoyle's silence as 
an admission of guilt."  See majority op., ¶38 n.11.      
¶97 Setting aside the majority's supposed requirement that 
the prosecutor's comments be "adverse," it concedes that 
repeatedly calling evidence only the defendant could dispute 
"uncontroverted" violates the Fifth Amendment.  See majority 
op., ¶37.  Nevertheless, the majority asserts that Hoyle's Fifth 
Amendment rights weren't violated here because "other evidence 
might exist that would controvert the State's witnesses."  See 
id.  In support, the majority points to defense counsel's 
statements in his closing argument about hypothetical evidence 
the police did not gather, namely statements from the victim's 
family members that they did not interview, physical evidence 
                                                 
2 Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338 (1978) does suggest 
that Griffin is "concerned only with adverse comment" on the 
defendant's decision not to testify.  Nevertheless, Lakeside is 
distinguishable because it dealt with an instruction to the jury 
that it could not infer guilt from the defendant's failure to 
testify.  See id.  By contrast, the prosecutor's comments in 
this case drew negative attention to Hoyle's decision not to 
testify.      
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
they did not collect, and surveillance footage from the place 
where the victim was dropped off after the assault that they did 
not obtain.  See id.  But the prosecutor's refrain throughout 
his closing argument was that the victim's account of what 
happened in Hoyle's car was undisputed.  None of this other 
evidence, even if it existed, could have contradicted that 
account——only Hoyle could have done so.  See Freeman, 962 F.2d 
at 1261 ("The only witness to this crime who was available to 
testify was [the victim], who identified [the defendant] as his 
assailant. 
 
Realistically, 
the 
only 
person 
who 
could 
satisfactorily 
rebut 
this 
testimony 
was 
[the 
defendant] 
himself." (citing Williams, 826 F.2d at 665)).  Moreover, "[a] 
speculative possibility that some third party could have 
testified for the defense is not enough" to demonstrate that 
someone "'other than the defendant could rebut the evidence.'"  
United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 899 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Freeman, 962 F.2d at 1260).  Despite the majority's 
speculation about other possible evidence, the jury knew that 
only the victim and Hoyle could testify as to what happened in 
his car.  For that reason, repeatedly calling the victim's 
testimony uncontroverted "impermissibly focus[ed] attention on 
the defendant's decision not to testify," and violated Hoyle's 
Fifth Amendment rights.  See Freeman, 962 F.2d at 1260; see also 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 431 S.W.3d 430, 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2013) (concluding that comments in closing argument about the 
victims' "un-refuted" testimony were improper where "only one 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
person possessed the knowledge to conclusively rebut the 
testimony of the [victims]," the defendant).   
¶98 The 
majority's 
alternative 
argument——that 
the 
prosecutor's comments were simply references to the jury 
instructions, which properly told jurors to evaluate only the 
evidence in reaching its verdict——is similarly unavailing.  See 
majority op., ¶¶34-36.  To begin with, only a few of the 
prosecutor's comments can fairly be read as references to the 
jury instructions, rather than Hoyle's decision not to testify.  
Before closing arguments began, the circuit court correctly 
instructed the jury that its job was to weigh the evidence, 
including the credibility of witnesses, and not to engage in 
speculation or to consider "in any manner" Hoyle's decision not 
to testify.  And the prosecutor began his closing argument by 
referring back to those same instructions, noting that the jury 
was "supposed to just focus on what you heard yesterday with the 
testimony.  [The victim's] testimony that she gave here 
yesterday is uncontroverted."    Likewise, after summarizing the 
victim's testimony, the prosecutor again returned to the jury 
instructions, reminding jurors "[y]ou are not to sit there and 
say, what if I had this information, what if this was different, 
what if that was different?  You're not to speculate . . . .  
You're to focus on what you heard yesterday . . . about how [the 
victim] was assaulted by this defendant."  If the prosecutor had 
stopped there, I might agree with the majority that his comments 
did not cross the line.  After all, the majority is right that 
there is no categorical prohibition on characterizing evidence 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
as uncontroverted, especially in the context of reminding jurors 
that their verdict must be based on the evidence presented at 
trial and not on speculation.  See id., ¶31 
¶99 But the prosecutor didn't stop there, or merely "lean 
on the jury instructions."  Id., ¶35.  Instead, he all but told 
the jury that it had to convict Hoyle because "[t]here is 
absolutely no evidence disputing" the victim's account of the 
sexual assault.  The prosecutor emphasized that the victim's 
statements 
to 
law 
enforcement 
were 
"uncontroverted," 
her 
testimony at trial was "uncontroverted," the jury "heard no 
evidence disputing her account of that sexual assault,"  "You 
heard nothing," and most troublingly, that they "didn't hear 
from . . . anyone else testifying about" the assault.  Then, on 
rebuttal, he tied the victim's undisputed testimony even more 
directly to the Hoyle's failure to testify, telling jurors that 
the defense did not "disagree [that the victim's testimony was] 
uncontroverted."  His point, which he reiterated again and 
again, was that the victim's testimony about the sexual assault 
was uncontroverted, not that the jury should focus on the 
evidence and the court's instructions.   
¶100 As many other courts have concluded, the more a 
prosecutor repeats statements like these, the more likely they 
are to be perceived by the jury as comments on the defendant's 
decision not to testify.  See, e.g., Rodriguez-Sandoval v. 
United States, 409 F.2d 529, 531 (1st Cir. 1969); State v. 
McMurry, 143 P.3d 400, 404 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); People v. 
Johnson, 429 N.E.2d 905, 910-11 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981).  And that 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
is particularly true when, as here, those repeated comments 
occurred during a short closing argument and referred to the 
defense directly.  Compare Rodriguez-Sandoval, 409 F.2d at 531 
(describing a prosecutor's five references to uncontradicted 
testimony in his closing argument as "extremely aggravated from 
the quantitative standpoint"), with Webb v. Mitchell, 586 F.3d 
383, 397 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that an isolated comment did 
not "establish an extensive pattern in the context of the 
prosecutor's summation, which spanned ninety-four pages.").  
Accordingly, the jury in this case would not have perceived the 
prosecutor's 
statements 
as 
mere 
commentary 
on 
the 
jury 
instructions or the evidence the jury should consider.  Rather, 
the jury would "naturally and necessarily" understand them as a 
repeated reminder that Hoyle——the only person who could have 
disputed the victim's account of what happened——did not testify.  
See Butler, 686 F.2d at 1170.   
¶101 Additionally, the circuit court's decision to allow 
these comments was not a harmless error.  An error is harmless 
if the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  The State did 
not argue that allowing the prosecutor's comments was harmless.  
But even if it had, such an argument would be unavailing.  
Although the evidence presented at trial was certainly enough to 
support a guilty verdict, the prosecutor's repeated statements 
might have led the jury to give the victim's testimony too much 
weight or, worse yet, to treat Hoyle's decision not to testify 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
as a reason to find him guilty.  The State therefore cannot 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation of 
Hoyle's Fifth Amendment rights was harmless.  See id.   
¶102 In sum, a faithful application of Griffin and the 
principles it announced leads to just one conclusion:  The 
prosecutor's comments violated Hoyle's Fifth Amendment rights.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.      
¶103 In closing, I want to address several points made by 
the concurrence about the supposed original public meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment and the role that meaning should play in 
this case and others.  For starters, it's not clear what——if 
anything——the history of the Fifth Amendment can tell us about 
how its protections should apply today.  If, as the concurrence 
asserts, defendants were not permitted to testify at the time of 
the founding,3 then of course the framers of the Fifth Amendment 
weren't concerned with prosecutors commenting on the defendant's 
failure to testify.  There would be no point in making such a 
comment since all defendants were required to remain silent.  
And for that reason, a jury obviously wouldn't draw any negative 
inferences from a defendant's silence either.  But our courts 
have thankfully moved a long way from the practices of the Star 
Chamber and its ex officio oath, and legislatures across the 
country eliminated most prohibitions on defendants testifying 
                                                 
3 State laws enacted shortly after the founding also 
prohibited slaves or people of color from testifying at trial if 
a white person was a party.  See, e.g., Amanda Carlin, Comment, 
The 
Courtroom 
As 
White 
Space: 
Racial 
Performance 
As 
Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 450, 454-58 (2016).    
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
more than a century ago.  See concurrence, ¶¶57-74.  Yet the 
concurrence simply assumes that, because the Fifth Amendment was 
adopted 
in 
a 
radically 
different 
context 
than 
today, 
contemporary courts must stand silent when prosecutors use a 
defendant's decision not to testify against him.   
¶104 I disagree.  Griffin and the cases addressing indirect 
commentary on a defendant's decision not to testify all 
recognize that comments suggesting that a defendant's silence is 
indicative of guilt are the functional equivalent of compelling 
a defendant to testify.  See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15; 
Butler, 686 F.2d at 1170.  Such comments penalize the defendant 
for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent——little 
different than the Star Chamber holding Lilburne in contempt for 
his silence.  See concurrence, ¶56.  If the Fifth Amendment's 
privilege against self-incrimination is to mean anything today, 
it must protect against prosecutors who invite the jury——
directly or indirectly——to penalize the defendant for exercising 
his constitutional right to remain silent.   
¶105 More fundamentally though, there are at least two 
reasons to reject the concurrence's proposal that "when there is 
little evidence suggesting a legal doctrine is grounded in the 
original meaning of the Constitution, '[we] should tread 
carefully before extending [that] precedent[].'"  Concurrence 
¶82 (quoting Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2019) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting)).  First, we are bound by all United States 
Supreme Court decisions——not just the ones any individual 
justice feels are "grounded in the original meaning of the 
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
12 
 
Constitution."  Concurrence, ¶82.  And although the concurrence 
concedes this point, it fails to acknowledge that reasonable 
judges 
can 
disagree 
about 
whether 
a 
particular 
decision 
"extends" or merely faithfully applies existing precedent to 
different facts or circumstances.  See United States v. Johnson, 
921 F.3d 991, 1001 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) ("[W]e must apply 
Supreme Court precedent neither narrowly nor liberally——only 
faithfully.").  There is no objective test for deciding whether 
or not we are "extending" a prior precedent.  Accordingly, a 
results-oriented judge could use the concurrence's approach to 
distinguish existing precedent on superficial grounds, and then 
decline to "extend" that precedent in order to achieve their 
desired result.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic 
Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 54 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
617, 618 (2018) (describing the United States Supreme Court's 
use of originalism as "opportunistic because sometimes the Court 
relies on it, and sometimes it does not.").    
¶106 Second, but more importantly, I disagree with the 
concurrence's 
conclusion 
that 
constitutional 
interpretation 
should always be guided by the original public meaning of the 
provision at issue.  "[T]he search for 'original meaning' 
assumes that each constitutional provision had a single, 
accepted original understanding."  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse 
Than Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of Originalism 56 (2022).  
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
13 
 
But in reality, that consensus often didn't exist.4  See id.  
Given that originalism bills itself as a determinate and value-
neutral 
alternative 
to 
other 
methods 
of 
constitutional 
interpretation, this is a problem.  See Frank B. Cross, The 
Failed Promises of Originalism 13 (2013) ("The best functional 
case for originalism lies in its claimed objectivity and 
neutrality.")  Because a single, objective original public 
meaning often doesn't exist, originalism cannot deliver the 
objective answers that it promises, let alone constrain judges 
who might want to decide cases in ways that fit with their 
preferences.  See Chermerinsky, supra at 56-58.  And in that 
respect, originalism is no different than any other interpretive 
methodology, only it allows its adherents to hide their lack of 
constraints behind a false patina of objectivity.  Worse yet, if 
originalism is taken to its logical conclusion, it would result 
in 
the 
radical 
rejection 
of 
long-settled 
constitutional 
principles.  Indeed, one of the opinions the concurrence cites 
argues that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants is at odds with the Constitution's 
original public meaning.  See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 757 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  That's not all though.  Brown v. Board of 
                                                 
4 This point is illustrated by the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008).  Justice Scalia's majority opinion argued that the text 
and history of the Second Amendment supported a constitutional 
right to possess a gun for self-defense in the home.  See id. at 
595.  But Justice Stevens' dissent contended that text and 
history supported the opposite result.  See id. at 640   
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  In short, history is often in the 
eye of the beholder.   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
14 
 
Education,5 same sex marriage, virtually all rights of women6 and 
racial minorities, and any number of other fundamental rights 
are difficult, if not impossible, to justify on originalist 
grounds.  See Chemerinsky, supra at 92-114.  As one scholar put 
it, 
"[t]he 
only 
kind 
of 
originalism 
that 
is 
reasonably 
determinate leads to conclusions that practically no one 
accepts.  But less determinate forms of originalism can be 
enlisted to support pretty much anything."   David A. Strauss, 
Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2012).    
¶107 The concurrence concedes that "originalism fails to 
give 
clear 
answers 
to 
every 
question, 
and 
is 
therefore 
vulnerable to manipulation," but nonetheless argues that we must 
adopt it because "a written constitution is the law, and all 
written laws should be construed to mean what they meant when 
they were written."  Concurrence, ¶84.  But this argument for 
originalism is circular.  It simply defines "interpretation"  
"as synonymous with originalist interpretation" and then uses 
that definition as evidence that only originalist interpretation 
is permissible.  See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of 
Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
                                                 
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
6 Indeed, just last year, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that "history and tradition" led to the "clear 
answer . . . that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the 
right to an abortion."  Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 
142 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2022).  But as in Heller, the history on 
which the majority relied is contested.  See id. at 2324 
(Breyer, 
Sotomayor, 
and 
Kagan, 
JJ., 
dissenting) 
("[E]mbarrassingly for the majority . . . early law in fact does 
provide some support for abortion rights.").   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
15 
 
1025, 
1030 
(2010); 
see 
also 
Cherminsky, 
supra 
at 
26 
("[A]rguments from definition aren't arguments at all; they do 
not defend their conclusion but assume it.").  There are, 
however, any number of non-originalist ways of interpreting the 
Constitution that nevertheless give effect to its text.  See 
Coan, supra at 1047 (identifying, for example, an approach that 
treats the text as "one of many legitimate ingredients in a 
pluralistic practice of constitutional adjudication.").  Simply 
observing that the Constitution was written down isn't enough to 
demonstrate that originalism is required.    
¶108 No matter our approach, however, it is important to 
emphasize that constitutional interpretation is rarely as simple 
as merely reading the words and applying them.  Most of the 
Constitution's key provisions, like the guarantees of "equal 
protection of the laws" and "due process," or the protections 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" or "cruel and 
unusual punishment" are vague——and deliberately so.  See 
generally U.S. Const. am. IV, V, VIII, XIV.  In writing these 
open-ended clauses, the Framers weren't trying to settle every 
legal question that might arise under these provisions for all 
time.7  They were instead trying to create a document that would 
                                                 
7 Moreover, even when the Constitution uses more precise 
language, like the First Amendment's statement that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . 
or abridging the freedom of speech," it often doesn't mean what 
it says.  See U.S. Const. am. I.  Nobody would say, for example, 
that "[b]oth the President and the federal courts could abridge 
the freedom of speech and prohibit the free exercise of 
religion, because the First Amendment, by its terms, applies 
only to 'Congress.'"  See David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the 
Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015).   
No.  2020AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
16 
 
endure by "provid[ing] a political platform wide enough to allow 
for considerable latitude within which future generations could 
make their own decisions."  Joseph J. Ellis, The Quartet: 
Orchestrating the Second American Revolution, 1783-1789, at 219 
(2015); see also Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 27 (2011) 
("[C]onstitutional framers and ratifiers very often use open-
ended 
language 
that 
deliberately 
delegates 
questions 
of 
application 
to 
future 
interpreters."). 
 
In 
making 
those 
decisions, the Framers did not expect their views would govern 
over those of future generations either.  Indeed, James Madison 
himself said that his notes from the Constitutional Convention 
"could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the 
Constitution."  Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: 
Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 9, 32 (1995) (quoting 5 Annals of Cong. 
776 
(1796)). 
 
And 
Thomas 
Jefferson 
cautioned 
that 
a 
"sanctimonious 
reverence" 
for 
the 
Framers 
was 
akin 
to 
"requir[ing] a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when 
a boy."  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 
12, 1816), in 10 Paul Leicester Ford, Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson 42-43 (1899). 
¶109 In sum, constitutional interpretation nearly always 
requires more than merely construing the text "to mean what [it] 
meant when [it] w[as] written."  See concurrence, ¶84.  And that 
is true whether one is an originalist or not.  No method of 
constitutional interpretation can provide objective, value-
neutral decisions in all cases.  But that doesn't mean that we 
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are engaged in a "choose-your-own-adventure" exercise, deciding 
cases based on what we think "the Constitution should mean, 
rather than . . . what it does mean."  See concurrence, ¶88.  In 
my view, interpreting the Constitution faithfully requires us to 
read its text and history carefully, but also to consider 
precedent, context, historical practice and tradition, and the 
need to balance "the majority's values against the values that 
should be protected from society's majorities."  Chemerinsky, 
supra, at 207.  That, after all, is what the Constitution is all 
about.  
¶110 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
 
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