Case Title: Steven Joel Sharp v. Case Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP002559

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2559 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Steven Joel Sharp, a minor, by Corey L. Gordon, 
his Guardian ad Litem, and Randolph Sharp and 
Betty Sharp, individually,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Case Corporation, a Delaware corporation,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  216 Wis. 2d 113, 573 N.W.2d 899) 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 23, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 1, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Wilcox, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Ralph A. Weber, Sandra L. Botcher and Reinhart, 
Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee; Brian 
G. Cahill, Racine; Andrew L. Frey and Mayer, Brown & Platt, New 
York, NY; James C. Schroeder and Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, 
IL and oral argument by Andrew L. Frey. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by Daniel W. Hildebrand and DeWitt, Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison 
and William H. Manning, David W. McKenna, Howard R. Orenstein and 
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P, Minneapolis, MN and oral 
argument by William H. Manning. 
 
No. 96-2559 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2559 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven Joel Sharp, a minor, by Corey L.  
Gordon, his Guardian ad Litem, and  
Randolph Sharp and Betty Sharp,  
individually,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Case Corporation, a Delaware corporation,  
 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE.   Case 
Corporation seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, Sharp v. Case Corporation, No. 96-2559, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1997), which affirmed a 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Emily S. 
Mueller, Judge.  
¶2 
The jury awarded $6,309,611.80 in damages to Steven 
Joel Sharp, a minor residing and working in the state of Oregon, 
for injuries he suffered while clearing hay from a baler that 
was attached to a tractor manufactured in Wisconsin in 1972 by 
Case Corporation.  The jury awarded Steven Sharp $2 million for 
punitive damages and awarded his parents, Randolph and Betty 
No. 96-2559 
 
2 
Sharp, $22,490 damages for parental loss of society and 
companionship.  After taking into account Steven Sharp's 
contributory negligence, the circuit court entered judgment in 
accordance with the jury verdict.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court judgment. 
¶3 
Case Corporation challenges the court of appeals 
decision on four grounds.  First, it argues that the court of 
appeals erred in refusing to apply the products liability 
statute of repose of the state of Oregon, which Case Corporation 
asserts would bar this action as untimely.  After reviewing the 
Oregon case law, we conclude that Oregon's product liability 
statute of repose is not applicable to a post-sale warning claim 
such as the one involved in the present case.  Under Wisconsin 
law this action is timely. 
¶4 
Second, Case Corporation argues that the court of 
appeals erred in refusing to apply the law of the state of 
Oregon that Case Corporation asserts limits an award of non-
economic damages to $500,000.  We conclude that because Oregon 
courts are not applying the statutory limits on non-economic 
damages, this court should not apply the Oregon statutory limits 
in this case, even if we were to decide, which we do not, that 
this law is applicable in this case.  
¶5 
Third, Case Corporation contends that the court of 
appeals erred in refusing to invalidate the jury verdict on the 
grounds that it contains inherent and fatal inconsistencies.  We 
conclude that the verdict is valid under Greiten v. LaDow, 70 
Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975), which allows recovery for 
the negligent design of a product even though the product is not 
No. 96-2559 
 
3 
unreasonably dangerous in a strict product liability sense.  We 
decline Case Corporation's invitation to overrule Greiten.  We 
further conclude that the jury finding that the product was not 
unreasonably dangerous is consistent with the jury finding that 
after manufacture and sale of the product Case Corporation 
learned of a defect posing a serious hazard, which originated 
and was unforeseeable at the time of manufacture, and yet it 
failed to exercise due care in warning customers of the danger. 
  
¶6 
Fourth, Case Corporation argues that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
justify submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury. 
 We conclude, as a matter of law, that the evidence presented 
warranted a conclusion to a reasonable certainty that Case 
Corporation acted with the requisite "outrageous" conduct and 
that therefore the question of punitive damages was properly 
submitted to the jury. 
I 
¶7 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review. 
 Additional facts pertinent to particular issues will be set 
forth later in the opinion.   
¶8 
On August 22, 1992, 17-year-old Steven Sharp, a 
resident of the state of Oregon, was injured while working on a 
farm in Richland, Oregon.  At the time of his injury, Sharp was 
operating a Hesston Model 5800 hay baler attached to a Case 
International 970 diesel tractor and operated by the tractor's 
power takeoff ("PTO") drive shaft, which is run directly from 
the tractor's diesel engine by hydraulically operated clutches. 
No. 96-2559 
 
4 
 The lever controls for operating the PTO drive shaft are 
located in the cab of the tractor. 
¶9 
As Sharp was driving the tractor and baling hay, he 
could hear that the hay was not feeding properly into the baler. 
 Because he assumed that loose hay was jamming the baler and 
needed to be cleared, he powered down the tractor engine and 
pushed the tractor's PTO control lever rearward, stopping the 
PTO drive shaft and shutting off the baler.  Sharp got down from 
the tractor, walked back to the baler and began clearing the 
loose hay that had gathered in front of the rollers.  As he 
reached in to pull out some of the hay, the baler suddenly self-
started, drawing in Sharp's hands and slowly amputating both of 
his arms just below the elbow. 
¶10 At the time of Sharp's injury, the tractor was owned 
by his employer, Dwight Saunders, who had purchased the tractor 
in 1979 secondhand from a farm implement dealer in the state of 
Oregon.  The tractor had been manufactured in 1972 in Wisconsin 
by Case Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its principal 
place of business located in Racine, Wisconsin. 
¶11 On February 12, 1993, Steven Sharp and his parents, 
Randolph and Betty Sharp, filed a complaint against Case 
Corporation in Wisconsin alleging several theories of liability. 
 They claimed that Case Corporation should be found liable 
because the tractor was defective and unreasonably dangerous at 
the time it left the manufacturing plant; that the tractor was 
negligently designed, tested, manufactured and assembled; that 
Case Corporation negligently failed to issue adequate warnings; 
that Case Corporation negligently failed to recall the defective 
No. 96-2559 
 
5 
tractor; and that Case Corporation failed to issue warnings 
after it was put on notice of the self-start defect.  
¶12 On April 19, 1995, Case Corporation filed a motion for 
summary judgment contending that the Oregon eight-year statute 
of repose for products liability should be applied to bar the 
Wisconsin suit.  The circuit court denied the motion for summary 
judgment, citing Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 
158 Wis. 2d 64, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990), for the 
proposition that the timeliness of the action is governed by the 
borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.07, and that the borrowing 
statute does not borrow another state's statute of repose.   
¶13 On February 20, 1996, a jury trial was commenced.  
Among other facts, it was established at trial that Case 
Corporation had on at least one prior occasion received notice 
of an injury caused by the tractor's self-start defect.  That 
similar injury was sustained in 1985 by a Tennessee farmer whose 
arm was horribly mangled in a hay baler being run off of a Case 
970 tractor by way of a PTO drive shaft.  The accident report 
received by Case for that injury stated that the PTO drive shaft 
had suddenly and without warning become engaged. 
¶14 The 
jury 
found 
that 
Case 
Corporation 
had 
been 
negligent in issuing the warnings accompanying the tractor at 
the time of sale and that Case Corporation had breached its duty 
to issue post-sale warnings, thereby causing Sharp's injuries.1  
In response to a special verdict question, the jury answered 
that Case Corporation's conduct was outrageous and assessed 
                     
1 The jury apportioned 50% of the fault to Case Corporation, 
15% to Dwight Saunders and 35% to Steven Sharp.  
No. 96-2559 
 
6 
punitive damages against Case Corporation in the amount of $2 
million.   
¶15 Both Case Corporation and the plaintiffs brought post-
verdict motions.  In its ruling on the post-verdict motions, the 
circuit court granted entry of judgment consistent with the jury 
verdict, and Case Corporation appealed.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court judgment in its entirety.   
II 
¶16 The first issue presented by Case Corporation is 
whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to apply the 
Oregon statute of repose applicable to products liability 
actions,2 which Case Corporation asserts would bar the action as 
untimely.  
¶17 The choice of applicable law is a question of law, 
which this court determines independent of but benefiting from 
the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals.  Wis. 
Stat. § 902.02(3) (1997-98).  The threshold determination in a 
conflict of laws case is whether a genuine conflict exists 
between Wisconsin law and the law of the other state.  Gavers v. 
Federal Life Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 113, 115, 345 N.W.2d 900 (Ct. 
App. 1984).  If the laws of the two states are the same, we 
apply Wisconsin law.   
¶18 Case Corporation contends that because the tractor in 
issue was first sold in 1972, any liability on its part for 
Sharp's 1992 injuries was precluded by the eight-year limitation 
in the Oregon statute of repose.  The Oregon statute of repose 
provides that "a product liability civil action shall be 
                     
2 Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905(1) (1997).  
No. 96-2559 
 
7 
commenced not later than eight years after the date on which the 
product was first purchased for use or consumption."  Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 30.905(1) (1997).3  Wisconsin has no statute of repose in 
product liability cases. 
¶19 The Sharps argue that Oregon's statute of repose would 
not bar 
their claims 
in 
the present 
case 
because 
Case 
Corporation's 
negligent post-sale acts 
and 
omissions 
fall 
outside the Oregon statute of repose.  They rely on Erickson 
Air-Crane v. United Tech. Corp., 735 P.2d 614, 618 (Or. 1987), 
in which the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the legislative 
history of the statute of repose.  The Erickson court held that 
the Oregon legislature did not intend the statute to immunize 
defendants for claims of product liability based upon negligent 
acts or omissions committed after the sale of a product.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court stated its conclusion in Erickson as 
follows: 
 
We conclude from the foregoing legislative history 
that 
the 
legislature, 
in 
enacting 
ORS 
30.905, 
contemplated placing limits only on a defendant's 
exposure to liability for acts or omissions taking 
place before or at the time that the defendant places 
a product in the stream of commerce.  Nothing in ORS 
                     
3 Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.900 (1997) defines "product liability 
civil action" as follows:  
[A] civil action brought against a manufacturer, 
distributor, seller or lessor of a product for damages 
for personal injury, death or property damage arising 
out of: 
 
(1) Any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing or 
other defect in a product; 
 
(2) Any failure to warn regarding a product; or  
 
(3) Any failure to properly instruct in the use of a 
product.  
No. 96-2559 
 
8 
30.905 or its legislative history indicates that the 
legislative intent was to allow a manufacturer to 
retreat to the date of "first purchase for use or 
consumption" and raise the defense of ORS 30.905 for 
negligent acts committed after the date of the first 
purchase for use or consumption. 
Id. at 618; see also Jamison v. Spencer R.V. Center, Inc., 779 
P.2d 1091, 1093 (Or. App. 1989).  
¶20 Citing to a footnote in Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435, 
441 n.14 (Or.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 819 (1990), Case 
Corporation claims that the Oregon Supreme Court explicitly left 
open the question of whether post-sale failures to warn fall 
outside the statute of repose.  In Sealey the plaintiffs argued 
that the complaint alleged a negligent, continuing failure to 
warn of a motor vehicle's defects and that a two-year negligence 
statute of limitations governed.  The Sealey court concluded 
that the only reasonable reading of the allegations was that 
they referred to an initial failure to warn prior to the first 
sale of the vehicle.  The Sealey court went on to state in 
footnote 14: "We express no opinion as to whether a properly 
pleaded continuing failure to warn would actually state a cause 
of action independent of the statutory product liability claim." 
 Sealey, 788 P.2d at 441 n.14.  Case Corporation relies on this 
footnote to cast doubt on the continued viability of Erickson.   
¶21 We are unconvinced by the argument advanced by Case 
Corporation about footnote 14 in Sealey.  Neither that footnote 
nor the accompanying text calls into question the Oregon Supreme 
Court's Erickson decision.  The Sealey court does not cite or 
No. 96-2559 
 
9 
discuss Erickson anywhere in its opinion,4 and was addressing an 
entirely different issue from the one addressed in Erickson.  
The present case is an Erickson type case, and Sealey has no 
bearing on Erickson or this case. 
¶22 After 
studying 
the 
applicable 
Oregon 
cases, 
we 
conclude that Oregon's statute of repose is not applicable to 
the post-sale warning claim involved in the present case.5  
Because Wisconsin law contains no such statute of repose, we 
hold that no genuine conflict exists between the laws of 
Wisconsin and Oregon on this issue and we conclude that the 
Sharps' action is timely under Wisconsin law. 
III 
¶23 The second issue presented by Case Corporation is 
whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to apply an 
Oregon law that Case Corporation asserts limits Steven Sharp's 
recovery of non-economic damages to $500,000.  
¶24 The Oregon statutory provision limiting non-economic 
damages to $500,000, Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560 (1997), provides as 
follows: 
 
                     
4 See Jay M. Zitter, Validity and Construction of Statute 
Terminating Right of Action for Product-Caused Injury at Fixed 
Period After Manufacture, Sale or Delivery of Product, 30 A.L.R. 
5th 1, 74 (1995), discussing the rule in Erickson without 
mentioning Sealey. 
5 The court of appeals held on a different basis that the 
Oregon statute of repose could not be borrowed to bar the suit 
because the question of the timeliness of an action was governed 
by Wis. Stat. § 893.07 and Leverence v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty, 158 Wis. 2d 64, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990), which 
held that § 893.07 did not provide for the borrowing foreign 
statutes of repose.  We need not address this issue. 
No. 96-2559 
 
10
Except for claims 
subject to [certain 
statutory 
provisions not at issue here], in any civil action 
seeking 
damages 
arising 
out 
of 
bodily 
injury, 
including emotional injury or distress, death or 
property damage of any one person . . . , the amount 
awarded for non-economic damages shall not exceed 
$500,000. 
This limitation on non-economic damages was enacted by the 
Oregon legislature in 1987.  Since then, the Oregon courts have 
reviewed the constitutionality of this statute several times, 
and the matter is now pending before the Oregon Supreme Court. 
¶25 In Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413, 421 (Or. 
App. 1994), review dismissed, 901 P.2d 859 (Or. 1995), the court 
of appeals held that the statute limiting non-economic damages 
violated Article VII, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, 
which provides that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any court of this state, unless the court can 
affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict." 
 See Or. Const. art. VII, § 3.  Specifically, the Tenold court 
explained that the statutory limitation on non-economic damages 
was unconstitutional because it "requires the court to apply the 
monetary standard in every case, whether or not the evidence 
supports the jury's higher damage award."  Tenold, 873 P.2d at 
421. 
¶26 A year later, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the 
statutory limitation on non-economic damages but only in the 
limited context of a statutory wrongful death suit.  See Greist 
v. Nicky Don Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995).  Carefully 
rendering a decision limited to the issue presented in the case, 
the Oregon Supreme Court in Greist held that the statutory 
limitation on non-economic damages was not unconstitutional in 
No. 96-2559 
 
11
the context of its application to the Oregon wrongful death 
statute 
because 
Article 
VII, 
section 
3, 
of 
the 
Oregon 
Constitution did not restrict the legislature's authority to set 
a maximum recovery in statutory wrongful death actions.  Greist, 
906 P.2d at 798.  In other words, in Greist, the Oregon Supreme 
Court took pains to leave the Tenold rule undisturbed. 
¶27 In 1996, in Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 925 P.2d 
107, 122-23 (Or. App. 1996), review granted, 939 P.2d 621 
(1997), the Oregon court of appeals applied the Tenold rule to 
reinstate a jury damages award in a products liability suit and 
declared 
the 
statutory 
limitation 
on 
non-economic damages 
unconstitutional.  The Lakin court held that Greist was 
inapplicable because it pertained only to legislatively created 
claims, explaining that "Greist, by its terms, applies only to 
wholly statutory actions 
without 
common law 
underpinnings 
 . . . ."  Lakin, 925 P.2d at 123.  The Oregon Supreme Court 
subsequently granted review of the Lakin decision.  This review 
is still pending in that court.  
¶28 During oral arguments, counsel for Case Corporation 
informed this court that trial courts in Oregon are currently 
not applying the statutory limitation on non-economic damages.  
Our own research found that the Oregon court of appeals 
continues to apply the Tenold rule and reinstates jury awards 
that have been reduced under the statute.  See, e.g., Davidson 
v. Brown, 963 P.2d 87 (Or. App. 1998); Lawrence v. Equipments 
Denis, Inc., 880 P.2d 973, 974 (Or. App. 1994). 
¶29 Because Oregon courts are not applying the Oregon 
statutory limits on non-economic damages, this court should not 
No. 96-2559 
 
12
apply the Oregon statutory limits in this case, even if we were 
to decide, which we do not, that this Oregon law is applicable 
in this case.  We therefore apply Wisconsin law.  No Wisconsin 
law limits non-economic damages in products liability cases. 
IV 
¶30 The third issue presented by Case Corporation for 
review is whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to 
strike down the jury verdict on the grounds of inherent and 
fatal inconsistencies in the jury's responses to the special 
verdict questions.  Case Corporation argues two points.  First, 
Case Corporation asserts that it is inconsistent for a jury to 
find that the product was not unreasonably dangerous in a strict 
product liability sense but that the product was negligently 
designed.  Second, Case Corporation argues that the verdict was 
factually inconsistent. 
A 
¶31 Regarding 
recovery 
for negligence 
when 
the 
jury 
rejects a strict product liability claim, Case Corporation asks 
us to overrule Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 
(1975).  More than 20 years ago, the Greiten court held that a 
jury finding that a product is not unreasonably dangerous does 
not preclude a jury finding of negligent design.  Later cases 
have applied the Greiten rule.  Case Corporation contends that 
the Greiten rule is unsound and should be overruled.  We do not 
accept Case Corporation's invitation to overrule Greiten. 
No. 96-2559 
 
13
¶32 In Greiten, Justice Heffernan wrote a controlling 
concurring opinion6 that explained the legal distinction between 
a claim for the negligent design of a product and a strict 
liability claim for an unreasonably dangerous product as 
follows: 
 
There may be recovery for the negligent design of a 
product even though it is not unreasonably dangerous 
in the 402A[7] sense.  All that it is necessary to 
prove is that the product is designed with a lack of 
ordinary care and that lack of care resulted in 
injury.  No test of negligence has been called to the 
attention of this writer that requires that the 
product 
be 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
in 
order 
to 
predicate liability. 
 
. . . . 
 
It is obviously desirable to attempt to do what the 
majority strives for--to have some uniformity of rules 
between 
the 
Dippel 
concept[8] 
and 
the 
ordinary 
negligence concept.  I believe, however, it is a 
matter of comparing apples and oranges, for Dippel is 
based upon the public-policy premise that a seller is 
socially responsible for what he puts into the stream 
of commerce irrespective of his degree of care. . . . 
 On the other hand, negligence is based upon a theory 
of fault.  We look in the ordinary negligence case not 
only to the result of the defendant's action, but 
rather to his conduct in attaining that result.  q 
Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 603-04. 
                     
6 As explained in Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 
238 N.W.2d 76 (1976), Justice Heffernan's concurring opinion in 
Greiten represents the majority opinion of the court.  
7 Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A summarizes the elements 
of a manufacturer's strict liability for placing an unreasonably 
dangerous product into the stream of commerce.  
8 In Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967), this court adopted the formulation of the test for 
strict liability set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A.  
No. 96-2559 
 
14
¶33 In cases subsequent to Greiten, this court repeatedly 
rejected the contention that a jury's findings were inconsistent 
when the jury found that a manufacturer's conduct was negligent 
with regard to a product but that the product defect was not 
unreasonably dangerous in the strict products liability sense.  
See Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 413-14, 331 
N.W.2d 585 (1983); Fischer v. Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co., 
91 Wis. 2d at 98-99; Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 
238 N.W.2d 76 (1976). 
¶34 Immediately after Greiten was decided, and up until 
now, courts in other jurisdictions and commentators have been 
critical of Greiten and its progeny.9  These courts and 
commentators reason as follows: negligence requires a jury to 
find that the product creates an unreasonable risk of harm to 
the consumer; if the jury finds that the product does not 
present an unreasonable danger or defect in the strict products 
liability sense, then the jury cannot find the manufacturer 
negligent because the jury cannot logically find an unreasonable 
risk of harm to the consumer created by the manufacturer's 
conduct.  In other words, both strict liability and negligent 
design depend on the existence of a defective product; if a 
factfinder finds that a product is not defective under the 
                     
9 See, e.g., Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co., 101 F.3d 1145, 
1150 (6th Cir. 1996); Garrett v. Hamilton Standard Controls, 
Inc., 850 F.2d 253, 257, n.8 (5th Cir. 1988); Restatement (Third) 
of Torts § 2, Comment n at 35, Reporters' Notes, Comment n at 
108 (1998); Aaron 
D. 
Twerski, 
From 
Defect 
to 
Cause to 
Comparative Fault—Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 
Marq. L. Rev. 297, 331-35 (1977); Note, Products Liability in 
Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 227, 236-43 (1977).  
No. 96-2559 
 
15
strict products liability claim, then how can a negligence claim 
succeed?  
¶35 Others have supported the Greiten case and explained 
that the Greiten court may have been fearful that the term 
unreasonably dangerous used in strict products liability law 
sounds as if the requisite proof for a product defect is some 
form 
of 
extraordinary 
danger, 
more 
than 
is 
required 
in 
negligence.  Under this reasoning, a jury's finding that a 
defect did not create a quantum of danger reaching the 
"unreasonable" level in deciding a strict liability claim does 
not preclude a finding that a defect existed that could have 
been discovered and that failure to discover the defect 
constituted a breach of a defendant's duty of ordinary care, 
thereby causing a plaintiff's injuries.10 
¶36 Case Corporation does not present new arguments in the 
debate about Greiten.  We recognize that Restatement (Third) of 
Torts was published in 1998 and may offer new insights into 
products liability law, but we decline at this time to 
reconsider and overrule the long-standing precedent of Greiten. 
B 
¶37 In 
addition 
to 
its 
challenge 
to 
Greiten, 
Case 
Corporation challenges the jury verdict on the grounds that two 
of the jury's answers to special verdict questions are factually 
inconsistent.  According to Case Corporation, the jury's finding 
                     
10 See, e.g., Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., Hirsch-Weis Div., 
677 F.2d 1226, 1231-32 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982); Hansen v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 578 F.2d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir. 1978); Aaron D. 
Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault—Rethinking 
Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 297, 331-35 
(1977).  
No. 96-2559 
 
16
that the product was not unreasonably dangerous is inconsistent 
with the jury's finding that after manufacture and sale of the 
product, Case Corporation learned of a defect posing a serious 
hazard that originated at and was unforeseeable at the time of 
manufacture and that Case Corporation did not use due care in 
warning about the danger.  
¶38 When reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether it 
is fatally inconsistent, this court will uphold the verdict when 
the record is such that the jury could have made both of the 
findings that are claimed to be inconsistent.  See Fischer, 91 
Wis. 2d at 99.  We do not see any inconsistency between the two 
findings complained of in this case.  A defect imposing a 
serious hazard may not be unreasonably dangerous.  We agree with 
the circuit court that "the jury could have found that some or 
all of the defects pointed out by plaintiffs' experts were not 
foreseeable at the point of sale, but became apparent later."  
Accordingly, we hold that the special verdict findings are not 
fatally inconsistent. 
V 
¶39 The 
fourth 
and 
final 
issue 
presented 
by 
Case 
Corporation is whether the circuit court erred, as a matter of 
law, in submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury. 
 Before the question of punitive damages can be submitted to a 
jury, the circuit court must determine, as a matter of law, that 
evidence was presented at trial that would support an award of 
punitive damages.11  The circuit court should not submit the 
                     
11 Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 155 Wis. 2d 724, 735, 456 
N.W.2d 585 (1990). 
No. 96-2559 
 
17
issue of punitive damages to the jury in the absence of evidence 
warranting a conclusion to a reasonable certainty that the party 
against whom punitive damages may be awarded acted with the 
requisite "outrageous" conduct.12  The word "outrageous" is "an 
abbreviation for the type of conduct which justifies the 
imposition of punitive damages."13  
¶40 A person's conduct is outrageous if the person acts 
either maliciously or in wanton, willful and in reckless 
disregard of the plaintiff's rights.  A person's conduct is 
wanton, willful and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's 
rights when it demonstrates an indifference on the person's part 
to the consequences of his or her actions, even though he or she 
may not intend insult or injury.  
¶41 The allegation in the present case is that Case 
Corporation acted with reckless disregard of rights of others.  
Punitive damages may be awarded in product liability suits if 
the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
harm suffered was the result of the manufacturer's reckless 
disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others 
who might be harmed by the product.14 
¶42 To determine whether, as a matter of law, the question 
of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury, the 
                     
12 Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298, 294 N.W.2d 
437 (1980); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 
614, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997); Bank of Sun Prairie, 155 Wis. 2d at 
735. 
13 Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 268. 
14 Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 300 n.23. 
No. 96-2559 
 
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reviewing court independently reviews the record.15  The circuit 
court in this case considered the issue of submitting the 
punitive damages question to the jury on the record and 
determined that there was sufficient evidence to do so.  The 
focus of the circuit court's inquiry, and of our inquiry, is 
whether the evidence warranted a conclusion to a reasonable 
certainty that Case Corporation acted with the requisite 
outrageous conduct. 
¶43 Case Corporation argues that the question of punitive 
damages should not have been submitted to the jury because in 
the years preceding Steven Sharp's injury, Case Corporation had 
notice of only two alleged malfunctions, which were 12 years 
apart, and it had sold 87,000 tractors over that 20-year period. 
 Two instances of injury out of 87,000 tractors sold, Case 
Corporation argues, are insufficient to warrant the imposition 
of punitive damages even if they involved clear incidents of PTO 
lever malfunctions.  Case Corporation asserts that a jury cannot 
be asked to infer from this evidence that it was aware of a 
dangerous defect in the PTO lever system, that it realized it 
had a duty to issue new warnings of this defect or that it had 
consciously declined to take remedial action. 
¶44 We agree with Case Corporation that the frame of mind 
of the alleged wrongdoer is a necessary consideration in 
determining whether punitive damages may be imposed.  Some type 
of knowledge is a necessary component to the imposition of 
punitive damages because an alleged wrongdoer who is unaware of 
                     
15 Steenberg Homes, 209 Wis. 2d at 614; Bank of Sun Prairie, 
155 Wis. 2d at 736; Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 344, 459 
N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No. 96-2559 
 
19
a product's defect cannot be recklessly disregarding the rights 
of another person.  Walter v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 121 Wis. 2d 
221, 227 n.2, 358 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1984).  "Of course, if a 
manufacturer studiously avoids gaining any knowledge of the 
defect and the specific harm it may cause, it will not have 
knowledge in the literal sense.  However it would be liable 
anyway because of its fraudulent misconduct."  Walter, 121 
Wis. 2d at 227 n.2.  
¶45 In a products liability case, a manufacturer may be 
found to have acted in reckless disregard if, after having 
gained specific knowledge of a product's defect and its 
potential harm, the manufacturer fails to take some action that 
the defect demands, such as adequate testing procedures, 
effective quality control, sufficient warnings or adequate 
remedial procedures such as product recalls or post-sale 
warnings.  Walter, 121 Wis. 2d at 227-28. 
¶46 We agree with the circuit court's conclusion that the 
evidence was sufficient to send the question of punitive damages 
to the jury.  The jury could have found from the evidence that 
the design of the tractor's PTO lever was inadequate from the 
beginning, was defective and had not been adequately tested; 
that Case Corporation had notice of the multiple clutch problems 
with the lack of full engagement; that Case Corporation had 
received complaints that "off" was not really "off," that the 
PTO drive would suddenly self-start without warning and expose 
users of the tractor to potentially catastrophic injury, and 
that Case Corporation had failed to adequately investigate 
complaints; that the pre-sale warnings were inadequate and 
No. 96-2559 
 
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misleading; and that despite its knowledge of the defect and 
potential harm to users of the product, Case Corporation failed 
to implement adequate remedial measures, such as post-sale 
warnings, that were available and inexpensive.  
¶47 Therefore, a reasonable jury could, as the circuit 
court reasoned, conclude that Case Corporation was indifferent 
to the consequences of its conduct.  If the jury accepted the 
Sharps' "see no evil" version of Case Corporation's conduct, a 
jury could believe based on the evidence presented that improper 
conduct by Case Corporation had extended for a long time and 
amounted to reckless disregard for the safety of the users of 
the equipment. 
¶48 Although 
Case 
Corporation 
presented 
evidence 
to 
support its position that it did not have sufficient knowledge 
or notice of the defect, the evidence adduced at trial permitted 
a reasonable jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that 
Case Corporation's conduct constituted a reckless disregard for 
the safety of others.16  We briefly examine the evidence. 
¶49 First, the jury was presented with evidence from which 
it could find inadequate or defective design or pre-sale 
testing.  The record demonstrates that the designer of the PTO 
system had no mechanical or design engineering education and was 
inexperienced in operating tractors.  The designer did not 
consult on a regular basis with the chief engineer of the Case 
Corporation to determine how the controls he was designing would 
interact with the hydraulic system.  The designer mistakenly 
                     
16 See Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 433, 369 N.W.2d 677 
(1985); Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 300 n.23; Fahrenberg, 96 Wis. 2d 
at 221. 
No. 96-2559 
 
21
thought there was a dead zone that would keep the PTO from 
operating when the lever was in a position somewhere between 
fully forward and fully rearward. 
¶50 Second, evidence was presented from which a jury could 
find that Case Corporation had notice of the multiple clutch 
problems with the lack of full engagement.  Soon after the first 
of these tractors were sold in 1969, Case Corporation began 
getting warranty claims for clutch replacements.  It learned 
that farmers were leaving the PTO lever short of fully forward 
after engagement, which resulted in clutch warpage and burnout. 
 The Case Corporation designer was asked to devise a solution 
that would result in the lever staying in the "on" position.  He 
devised a "top hat" and then a sloped ramp with a spring to 
assure that operators would get the lever forward enough to stop 
clutch warpage.  The designer, however, did not analyze the 
slope ramp from a safety perspective.  Sharps' expert called the 
spring design defective.  
¶51 Third, a jury could find from the evidence presented 
that Case Corporation had received complaints that "off" was not 
really "off," that the PTO drive would suddenly self-start 
without warning, exposing users of the tractor to potentially 
catastrophic injury, and that Case Corporation had failed to 
adequately investigate these complaints.  Case Corporation was 
informed that the PTO would actually start when set a quarter 
inch from the back rather than fully forward in the slot.  
Furthermore, Case Corporation knew that an operator could 
mistakenly believe the PTO was on when the PTO shaft was turning 
No. 96-2559 
 
22
and would mistakenly believe that the PTO was off when the shaft 
stopped turning. 
¶52 In 1985, Case Corporation investigated a complaint of 
a delayed and unexpected self-start that resulted in a farmer's 
arm being horribly mangled.  The jury could believe that the 
investigator from Case Corporation did not attempt to simulate 
the conditions of the accident and that Case Corporation did not 
adequately explore the cause of the accident.  In 1973, a 
Minnesota farmer told a Case factory representative about self-
starts he had experienced.  The jury could find that Case 
Corporation failed to properly test the PTO lever design after 
receiving these two notices of defects.  
¶53 Fourth, evidence was presented from which a jury could 
find that Case Corporation's pre-sale warnings were inadequate 
and misleading.  For instance, there was testimony that the pre-
sale warnings and manual did not address the PTO system's 
propensity to engage somewhere approximately a quarter inch out 
of the disengaged position and that Case Corporation did not 
consider changing the instructions after learning that farmers 
were burning out clutches by not getting the PTO lever into the 
fully "on" position.  A Case Corporation engineer admitted that 
the instructions did not warn the operator that even if the 
lever was all the way back to where the PTO stopped turning, the 
system 
was 
not 
necessarily 
totally 
off, 
and 
that 
Case 
Corporation knew about this situation in 1969 but failed to 
include information about it in the warnings or operator's 
manual it distributed. 
No. 96-2559 
 
23
¶54 Fifth, evidence was presented from which a jury could 
find that despite its knowledge of the defect and potential harm 
to users of the product, Case Corporation failed to take 
adequate remedial measures, such as post-sale warnings, that 
were available and inexpensive.  For instance, the jury could 
have believed that Case Corporation failed to issue post-sale 
warnings even though such warnings could have been issued simply 
and without great expense.  Witnesses testified that Case 
Corporation had issued post-sale warnings about other problems 
and that it was feasible and inexpensive to distribute warnings 
or decals to dealers.  There was testimony that dealers were 
able to reach about 50 percent of tractor owners and that 
advertisements in national magazines could reach additional 
owners.   
¶55 Therefore, we agree with the circuit court's review of 
the evidence before and after the verdict.  The evidence 
presented warranted a conclusion to a reasonable certainty that 
Case Corporation acted with the requisite "outrageous" conduct 
and that therefore the question of punitive damages was properly 
submitted to the jury.   
¶56 In summary, we hold that we do not apply the laws of 
Oregon on the issues of the statute of repose and the statutory 
limits on non-economic damages.  Further, we decline to overrule 
Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, we conclude there are no fatal 
inconsistencies in the jury verdict, and we uphold the jury 
award of punitive damages.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
No. 96-2559 
 
24
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶57 Justice Jon P. Wilcox did not participate. 
No. 96-2559 
 
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