Case Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stewart

Citation: 2013-Ohio-795

Docket Number: 2012-1338

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stewart, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-795.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-795 
TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. STEWART. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stewart, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-795.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, 
failure to maintain separate account and to keep complete records of trust 
account, and failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation—Two-
year suspension, 12 months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2012-1338—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided March 12, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-014. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John C. Stewart of Lambertville, Michigan, Attorney 
Registration No. 0042580, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.  
He is also licensed to practice law in Michigan.  In a second amended complaint, 
relator, Toledo Bar Association, has charged Stewart with professional 
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misconduct in his handling of five separate client matters.1  The alleged 
misconduct consists mainly of accepting retainers from clients and then failing to 
perform the contracted work, failing to reasonably communicate with the clients, 
failing to return client files and the unearned portion of their fees on termination 
of his representation, and failing to cooperate in several of the resulting 
disciplinary investigations. 
{¶ 2} At the hearing before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Character and Fitness, the parties submitted 47 exhibits, including several 
stipulations of fact, and presented testimony from seven witnesses, including 
Stewart.  The panel found that relator had proven a number of violations by clear 
and convincing evidence but, in the absence of testimony from certain grievants, 
recommended that Count One and certain alleged violations in Counts Two, Four, 
and Five be dismissed.  Having considered the proven misconduct, the applicable 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions we have imposed for 
comparable misconduct, the panel recommended that Stewart be suspended from 
the practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on conditions.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, as well as its recommended 
sanction, and there are no objections. 
{¶ 3} We adopt certain of the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
suspend Stewart from the practice of law for two years, and stay the second year 
on the conditions recommended by the board. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before and 
after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which supersede 
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although both the former and 
current rules are cited for the same acts, the allegations comprise a single continuing ethical 
violation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 
31, ¶ 1, fn. 1. 
 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 4} The first count of relator’s complaint alleges that Stewart failed to 
act with reasonable diligence in handling a client’s divorce matter and that he 
failed to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.  The 
client was not subpoenaed and did not appear at the hearing.  Consequently, 
relator withdrew his allegation that Stewart had failed to reasonably communicate 
with the client. 
{¶ 5} The stipulations and Stewart’s testimony demonstrate that the delays 
in the client’s divorce proceedings were caused by Stewart’s and the divorcing 
parties’ relocation, as well as the wife’s multiple pregnancies during the pendency 
of the action and the resultant need for genetic testing after the births to determine 
parentage.  Because relator did not present any evidence contradicting Stewart’s 
testimony, the board recommends that we dismiss Count One of relator’s 
complaint.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and dismiss this count. 
Count Two 
{¶ 6} The second count of relator’s complaint arises from Stewart’s 
representation of Brian and Lisa Heaton for damages arising from a Kroger 
pharmacy error that caused their infant son to receive an overdose of a 
prescription medication.  The Heatons believed that their claim was worth 
$250,000, and when their first attorney valued their claim at no more than 
$20,000 to $30,000, they terminated his representation and retained Stewart.  
Stewart did not evaluate their claims, but filed a civil suit against Kroger in 
September 2002. 
{¶ 7} Knowing that he would need a medical expert to establish causation, 
Stewart discussed the Heatons’ claim with one of the child’s treating physicians.  
The doctor reported that the pharmacist’s improper dosage instructions 
proximately caused the child to have an elevated enzyme level in blood tests.  
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Because the elevation was minimal, the doctor explained that it could not have 
caused permanent injury.  Nonetheless, medical protocol required reporting of the 
error and testing for possible adverse effects.  The doctor stated that the damages 
were limited to the numerous needle pricks necessary to perform the blood tests 
and the inconvenience of having the tests done.  He required a $2,500 retainer for 
his expert testimony.  The Heatons did not pay this retainer. 
{¶ 8} Stewart failed to respond to Kroger’s requests for discovery, despite 
the fact that Kroger sought and obtained an order to compel discovery, and failed 
to comply with a pretrial order to furnish proof of causation.  On February 23, 
2005, with Kroger’s motion for summary judgment pending, Stewart voluntarily 
dismissed the case.  He refiled the case on February 22, 2006, but again failed to 
furnish requested discovery even after the court granted Kroger’s motion to 
compel. 
{¶ 9} At this time, Mr. and Mrs. Heaton had separated and were in the 
process of divorcing.  Kroger’s counsel made a one-time offer to settle the case 
for $5,000.  The board found that at that time, Stewart was communicating only 
with Mr. Heaton and that he failed to advise Mrs. Heaton, either orally or in 
writing, of the settlement offer or to obtain her consent to the settlement.  This 
finding, however, is inconsistent with (1) Stewart’s uncontroverted testimony that 
he did obtain Ms. Heaton’s consent to the settlement, (2) Mr. Heaton’s 
uncontroverted testimony that Stewart communicated the offer to him and Ms. 
Heaton, that they were both fully aware of the settlement offer, and that the 
settlement offer was discussed with their respective counsel in their divorce 
proceedings, and (3) the board’s recommendation that we dismiss alleged 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter) and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a 
lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information 
from the client) with respect to this count.  Therefore, we reject this finding. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 10} On August 14, 2007, Stewart advised Kroger’s counsel that his 
clients had accepted the settlement offer.  He waited almost one year before 
responding to counsel’s request for information regarding the apportionment of 
the settlement.  Because Stewart had taken no action to obtain probate court 
approval of the minor’s settlement, Kroger’s counsel prepared and filed the 
necessary documents in April 2008.  Stewart then failed to appear at the probate 
court hearing.  He did, however, submit an entry of dismissal with prejudice in the 
civil action before the probate court had approved the settlement. 
{¶ 11} The board found that Kroger’s counsel mailed separate checks for 
Stewart’s fee and the minor’s portion of the settlement in October 2008 and that 
Stewart cashed his check.  The board also found that he made no effort to 
distribute the minor’s portion of the settlement or to deposit it into his client trust 
account, having apparently lost or mislaid the check.  In August 2009, Ms. Heaton 
called Kroger’s counsel to inquire about the status of the settlement.  Kroger’s 
counsel then reissued the check and, with consent of the probate court, deposited 
it into a trust account for the minor. 
{¶ 12} Relator made numerous attempts to communicate with Stewart 
regarding Ms. Heaton’s grievance.  His only response was one voicemail message 
promising to send a response, which was never provided. 
{¶ 13} Based upon these facts, the board found that Stewart violated DR 
6-101(A)(1) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 
representation to a client), DR 6-101(A)(3) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a 
lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), and Prof.Cond.R. 
1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-bearing client 
trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(d) (requiring a 
lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other property that the client is entitled to 
receive), and 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a 
demand for information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation).  
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Because Ms. Heaton did not testify and because the nature and extent of Stewart’s 
communications are not clear from the record, the board recommends that we 
dismiss the alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) and (4) with respect to 
this count.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, except with 
respect to Ms. Heaton’s knowledge of the settlement, and hereby dismiss the 
alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) and (4) with respect to this count. 
Count Four 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found that in July 2009, Victor 
Neubert hired Stewart to represent him and his son with regard to injuries the son 
had suffered in a dirt bike accident earlier that month.  Stewart met with the 
Neuberts in August 2009, interviewed the son in early 2010, and promised to 
provide Neubert with an update.  Stewart testified that he wrote a letter to the 
owners of the land where the accident had occurred but did not follow up when 
they failed to respond.  Although relator’s complaint alleges that Neubert called 
Stewart no fewer than 20 times and that his calls were not returned, Neubert was 
not subpoenaed and did not testify at the panel hearing. 
{¶ 15} Stewart did not respond to any of relator’s communications 
regarding the Neubert grievance.  He did, however, testify that he returned some 
of Neubert’s calls and that he knew that “there weren’t 20 calls without me 
responding to them.”  He also admitted that he did not carry professional-liability 
insurance from April 2009 until September 2011 and that he had failed to advise 
his clients, including Neubert, of that fact. 
{¶ 16} With respect to this count, the board found that Stewart violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does 
not maintain professional-liability insurance), and 8.1(b).  Citing the absence of 
Neubert’s testimony, however, the board recommends that we dismiss alleged 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 1.4(a)(3).  We adopt these findings of fact and 
January Term, 2013 
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misconduct and hereby dismiss the alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 
1.4(a)(3) with respect to this count. 
Count Five 
{¶ 17} In August 2010, Patricia Chase retained Stewart and paid him $640 
to draft and file a consent order granting her shared custody of her two children.  
On March 1, 2011, Stewart submitted a consent judgment and shared-parenting 
plan to the domestic relations court.  The court approved the shared-parenting 
plan but instructed Stewart to modify certain aspects of the order and resubmit it.  
Stewart never submitted a modified order, and at the time of the panel hearing, the 
matter remained unresolved. 
{¶ 18} In August 2011, relator sent Stewart a letter of inquiry asking him 
to respond to Chase’s grievance.  At some point, Stewart left a voicemail message 
for relator stating that he had moved and that there had been a delay in the 
forwarding of his mail, and asking if it was too late to submit a written response 
to the grievance.  He did not, however, submit a response. 
{¶ 19} The board found that Stewart violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 
1.4(a)(3), and 8.1(b) but recommends that we dismiss an alleged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with 
respect to Count Five and hereby dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(d). 
Sanction 
{¶ 20} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
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{¶ 21} As aggravating factors, the board found that Stewart has engaged in 
a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary process in three of the four counts in which we have found 
misconduct, and failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), (e), and (g).  In addition, the board found that 
Stewart has attempted to downplay the gravity of his misconduct, claiming that 
his clients lost nothing as a result of his neglect—(1) the  Heatons eventually 
received their portion of the settlement funds, (2) Johnston lost nothing because 
the $43,000 judgment in favor of the defendant on its counterclaim is not against 
Johnston personally, but against his insolvent company, and (3) Neubert obtained 
new counsel and was able to pursue his son’s personal-injury claim.  He also 
maintains that the delays in Chase’s case were not caused by his inaction, but 
were the result of her ex-husband’s failure to cooperate.  For these reasons, the 
board found that Stewart does not appreciate the true nature of his professional 
responsibility to his clients.  Moreover, the board found that Stewart had 
demonstrated an unwillingness to obey court orders in Counts Two and Five and 
failed to obey the prehearing orders of the panel chair, requiring the exchange of 
exhibits and the timely exchange and filing of witness and exhibit lists in advance 
of the hearing. 
{¶ 22} As mitigating factors, the board found that Stewart did not have a 
prior disciplinary record and that there was no evidence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (b).  The board noted that Stewart 
claimed that he and his wife were divorcing when he neglected Neubert’s case 
and that his father’s illness and death distracted him during the pendency of the 
Chase matter, but nonetheless it found that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors present in this case. 
{¶ 23} Relator noted that we have indefinitely suspended lawyers who 
have engaged in a pattern of neglect and failed to cooperate in the resulting 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
disciplinary investigation.  See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Davis, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-764, 904 N.E.2d 517.  However, relator recommends that 
Stewart be suspended from the practice of law for two years with one year stayed 
on the conditions that he immediately submit to an evaluation by the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), enter into an OLAP contract, comply 
with OLAP’s treatment recommendations, and serve a one-year period of 
monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9). 
{¶ 24} The board believed that Stewart’s conduct falls somewhere 
between the conduct of the attorneys in Toledo Bar Assn. v. Gregory, 132 Ohio 
St.3d 110, 2012-Ohio-2365, 969 N.E.2d 1182 (imposing a six-month stayed 
suspension for an attorney who failed to hold property of clients in an interest-
bearing client trust account separate from the lawyer’s own property and failed to 
maintain required records of client funds held by the lawyer), and Toledo Bar 
Assn. v. Woodley, 132 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-2458, 969 N.E.2d 1192 
(imposing an indefinite suspension for an attorney who failed to provide 
competent representation, neglected several client matters, engaged in the practice 
of law while under a registration suspension, and failed to cooperate in the 
ensuing disciplinary investigation).  The board recommends that we suspend 
Stewart from the practice of law for a period of two years, but stay the second 
year of that suspension on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct, 
complete six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) in law-office 
management and practice by a sole practitioner in addition to the requirements of 
Gov.Bar R. X, and serve one year of monitored probation in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(9).2  No objections have been filed. 
                                                 
2 Noting that the record contains no evidence suggesting that Stewart suffers from any chemical 
dependency or mental disability, the board rejected relator’s recommendation that Stewart be 
required to submit to an OLAP evaluation.      
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{¶ 25} Having considered Stewart’s misconduct and the aggravating and 
mitigating factors present, as well as the sanctions we have imposed for 
comparable misconduct, we agree that a two-year suspension, with the second 
year stayed on conditions, is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, we suspend Stewart from the practice of law for a 
period of two years but stay the second year of that suspension on the conditions 
that he engage in no further misconduct, complete six hours of CLE in law-office 
management and practice by a sole practitioner in addition to the requirements of 
Gov.Bar R. X, and that upon reinstatement, he serve one year of monitored 
probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9). 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Paul D. Giha, James P. Silk Jr., and Michael A. Bonfiglio, Bar Counsel, 
for relator. 
John C. Stewart, pro se. 
______________________