Case Title: New Jersey v. Fuqua

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                         State v. Danyell Fuqua (A-4-17) (079034)

Argued April 10, 2018 -- Decided August 9, 2018

TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.

       In this case, the Court considers whether the State must prove actual harm to a child
to convict a defendant under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), endangering the welfare of children.

        In September 2011, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office opened a narcotics
investigation into Tyrell Johnson that later swept in defendant Danyell Fuqua. In the early
morning hours of December 10, 2011, after obtaining a search warrant, officers entered a
motel room. There, the officers found defendant, Johnson, and six children between the ages
of one and thirteen -- three were defendant’s children, one was Johnson’s child, and two
were defendant’s relatives. The small room had a kitchenette, two beds, and a bathroom. On
the kitchen table, officers found marijuana, a grinder containing marijuana residue, an open
box of clear plastic bags, and a white, unlabeled pill bottle holding various, multicolored
pills. Between the two beds, officers discovered three loose packets of heroin, a separate
plastic orange bag holding 653 packets of heroin, and one large bag of cocaine. Below the
rear wall window, officers found an exposed black plastic bag holding 201 packets of heroin
and fourteen plastic bags containing cocaine next to children’s shoes and a toy. Officers also
discovered a digital scale covered in white cocaine residue on a nearby windowsill. Johnson
subsequently pled guilty to drug distribution charges, and a jury convicted defendant of
endangering the welfare of children, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

       The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, finding that the
State need not prove actual harm to children to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The
Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted certification. 
230 N.J. 560 (2017).

HELD: The trial court and Appellate Division correctly determined that a conviction under

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be sustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm.

1. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: “[a]ny person having a legal duty for the
care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who causes the child
harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child as defined in [
N.J.S.A.] 9:6-1,
[
N.J.S.A.] 9:6-3 and . . . [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21] is guilty of a crime of the second degree.” 
N.J.S.A.
9:6-3 delineates, in relevant part, that “[a]ny parent, guardian or person having the care, custody
or control of any child, who shall abuse, abandon, be cruel to or neglectful of such child, or any
person who shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any child shall be deemed to be guilty of a
                                                 1
crime of the fourth degree.” (emphasis added). 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, in pertinent part, defines
“[a]bused or neglected child” as including: “a child whose physical, mental, or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the
failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the
child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be
inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof . . . or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature
requiring the aid of the court.” (emphases added). (pp. 8-9)

2. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) is clearly and readily capable of comprehension. The Court sees no
ambiguity in the Legislature incorporating a “substantial risk” of harm from 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21
into 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), so the appellate panel here properly concluded that “[a]pplying this
rule of construction would seemingly result in an uncomplicated interpretation of the statutory
offense.” 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) defines “harm” by expressly incorporating 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21,
which proscribes exposing a child to a substantial risk of harm. No extrinsic evidence is
necessary, nor is resort to the doctrine of lenity which is only pertinent if an analysis of
statutory language fails to resolve a statutory ambiguity. (pp. 10-11)

3. New Jersey appellate courts for decades have unanimously held that the State is not required
to prove actual harm to a child to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Instead, they have
concluded that proof of a child’s exposure to a substantial risk of harm is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. See, e.g., State v. N.A., 
355 N.J. Super. 143, 150–51 (App. Div. 2002); State v.
M.L., 
253 N.J. Super. 13, 31 (App. Div. 1991) (collecting cases). Not one published appellate
opinion holds otherwise. The Court finds no reason to disturb that decades-old sound precedent
predicated on the plain language of the statute and notes that the legislative branch is presumed
to be aware of judicial constructions of statutory provisions. Had the Legislature chosen to
insist on proof of actual harm to a child to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), it was free to
amend the statute, as it did in other aspects of the statute, in the nearly three decades since M.L.
The statute expressly subsumes the Title 9 provisions signaling a legislative intent to broaden
the statutory definition of “harm.” It would show little respect for the legislature were courts to
suppose that the lawmakers meant to enact an irrational scheme. (pp. 11-14)

4. In this case the State successfully proved that defendant exposed the children in her care to
imminent danger and a substantial risk of harm pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Six underage
children, ranging in age from one to thirteen, were housed in a confined space. Drugs
hauntingly surrounded children’s toys and clothing. The ease of access to cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana, and the attraction of brightly colored pills, all created a potentially lethal trap for the
children that could have been easily sprung at any moment. (pp. 14-15)

5. The Court considers the concerns of giving prosecutors too much discretion in choosing to
charge under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), a second-degree crime, over Title 9, a fourth-degree
offense. Criminal statutes can overlap in prohibiting the same basic act, and in those situations
the proper prosecuting authority in the sound exercise of the discretion committed to him or her
may proceed under either act. Prosecutorial discretion, however, is not unlimited, and judicial
oversight is mandated to protect against arbitrary and capricious prosecutorial decisions. A
defendant who proves that a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion was arbitrary and capricious
                                               2
would be entitled to relief. Here, there is no evidence that the prosecutor abused her discretion
in choosing to charge defendant under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) instead of Title 9. Defendant
bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor acted arbitrarily and capriciously but provided
no reasonable justification as to why the prosecutor should have charged her under Title 9
instead of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Rather, defendant claims generally that prosecutors retain
too much discretion in choosing whether to charge defendants under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) or
Title 9. That contention, however, is directly contrary to precedent that provides prosecutors
such discretion. Defendant has similarly not provided any evidence that the prosecutor’s
decision to charge under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) was discriminatory or predicated on prejudice.
Indeed, the record here provided the prosecutor ample justification for her decision to charge
defendant under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). (pp. 15-18)

       AFFIRMED.

        JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that a sensible textual construction
of the endangering statute -- consistent with its language and legislative intent -- would be to
require harm as a precondition to the examples given in the abuse-and-neglect statutes.
Justice Albin adds that the majority’s position is at odds with the legislative history of the
endangering statute; that even if N.A. and M.L. were “sound” precedent, they are factually
distinguishable; that legislative acquiescence is a slender reed on which to justify a mistaken
Appellate Division interpretation of a statute; and that when two reasonable interpretations
can be given to a statute riddled with ambiguity, the doctrine of lenity instructs that the
interpretation favoring the defendant must prevail. According to Justice Albin, by removing
the harm requirement from the endangering statute, the majority has criminalized the civil
abuse-and-neglect statute.

       CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting, is of the view that the meaning of the
endangering law is ambiguous and should therefore be read narrowly. Chief Justice Rabner
notes the State’s strong argument that the phrase “causes the child harm” cannot be read
separately from the words that follow, and that defendant sensibly emphasizes that “harm”
means “harm” -- not “risk” of harm. Observing that the legislative history does not resolve
the debate and that, in this case, the trial court noted “the absence of any direct evidence of
actual harm to the children,” Chief Justice Rabner reasons that, because defendant’s
conviction is based on the more expansive reading of the statute, it should not stand.

JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE
TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE
LaVECCHIA joins. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent.

                                               3
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                         A-
4 September Term 2017
                                                 079034

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

         v.

DANYELL FUQUA,

    Defendant-Appellant.

         Argued April 10, 2018 – Decided August 9, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Matthew Astore, Deputy Public Defender,
         argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
         Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Matthew
         Astore, of counsel and on the briefs, and
         John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the
         brief).

         Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor,
         argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C.
         Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
         attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on
         the briefs).

         Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
         General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal,
         Attorney General, attorney; Sarah D.
         Brigham, of counsel and on the brief).

    JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In this case, the Court considers whether the State must

prove actual harm to a child to convict a defendant under

                                
1 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), endangering the welfare of children.

Because the trial court and Appellate Division correctly

determined that a conviction under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be

sustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm, we

affirm their denial of defendant Danyell Fuqua’s motion for a

judgment of acquittal.

                                   I.

       We marshal these facts from the record.

       In September 2011, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office

opened a narcotics investigation into Tyrell Johnson that later

swept in defendant Fuqua.    Defendant checked into a Studio Motel

6 in late September 2011.    That December, in conjunction with

the ongoing investigation, a task force began surveillance of

the Studio Motel 6.     In the early morning hours of December 10,

2011, after obtaining a search warrant, officers entered room

205.    There, the officers found defendant, Johnson, and six

children between the ages of one and thirteen -- three were

defendant’s children, one was Johnson’s child, and two were

defendant’s relatives.    The small room had a kitchenette, two

beds, and a bathroom.    Upon their entry, officers smelled the

lingering odor of raw and burnt marijuana.

       On the kitchen table, officers found marijuana, a grinder

containing marijuana residue, an open box of clear plastic bags,

and a white, unlabeled pill bottle holding various, multicolored

                                  2
pills.    Between the two beds, officers discovered a lockbox with

key inserted containing several items of jewelry, three loose

packets of heroin, a separate plastic orange bag holding 653

packets of heroin, and one large bag of cocaine.    Below the rear

wall window, officers found an exposed black plastic bag holding

201 packets of heroin and fourteen plastic bags containing

cocaine.    To the immediate left and right of the drug-laden

black plastic bag were children’s shoes and a “little puppy dog”

toy.     Officers also discovered a digital scale covered in white

cocaine residue on a nearby windowsill.     In addition to the

narcotics and related paraphernalia, officers came upon five

cell phones, more than $2000 in cash located in a purse on the

kitchen table, and around $1700 belonging to Johnson.

       Johnson subsequently pled guilty to drug distribution

charges, and a jury convicted defendant of endangering the

welfare of children, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

       The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of

acquittal, finding that the State need not prove actual harm to

children to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).     Rather, relying

on ample appellate precedent, the court held that the State

needed only prove, and did prove, that a child faced a “risk” of

harm sufficient to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

       The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the phrase

“causes harm” in 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) refers not only to one who

                                   3
causes actual harm, but also to one who “unreasonably allows a

substantial risk of harm.”   The panel concluded that the

children here were in “imminent danger” and exposed to a

“substantial risk of harm” given the small motel room, the

number of children present, and the large quantity of accessible

drugs to which they were exposed and which they could easily

have ingested.

    We granted certification.    
230 N.J. 560 (2017).   We also

granted amicus curiae status to the Attorney General of New

Jersey.

                                II.

                                A.

    Defendant urges us to reverse the Appellate Division’s

conclusion that exposing a child to a substantial risk of harm

is sufficient to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

    Defendant maintains that under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)’s plain

language a conviction may be based only on evidence establishing

actual harm, and that the statute also includes the requisite

elements for a finding of abuse or neglect under Title 9.

Defendant proposes that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)’s reference to Title

9 is convoluted, resulting in the Appellate Division’s erroneous

conclusion that “risk of harm” equals “harm.”

    Defendant also raises fears that if the Appellate

Division’s holding is left undisturbed, prosecutors will retain

                                4
unbridled discretion in choosing between a second-degree

prosecution under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) and a fourth-degree

prosecution under Title 9.

                                B.

    The State stresses that we should affirm the Appellate

Division’s conclusion that a conviction under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a) can be sustained by proving a risk of harm to a child

without proof of actual harm.

    The State notes that its proposition is bolstered by

numerous appellate opinions, all holding that 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a), in all its incarnations, subsumed exposing a child to a

substantial risk of harm into the statute through Title 9.     The

State maintains that “risk of harm” is apparent from the plain

language of the statute.

    The State reasons that if conduct violates more than one

statute, prosecutors retain discretion in deciding which charge

to pursue provided that they do not discriminate against any

class of defendants and that their choice is not arbitrary,

capricious, or a patent or gross abuse of discretion.

                                C.

    The Attorney General also argues that both the plain

language and legislative history of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) indicate

the Legislature’s intent to include “risk of harm.”     The

Attorney General notes that the title of the statute --

                                5
Endangering Welfare of Children -- connotes legislative intent

to include the risk of harm.   The Attorney General counters with

specific references defendant’s notion of linguistic gymnastics

by the Appellate Division, with respect to its finding that

“causes harm” equals “risk of harm.”    The Attorney General notes

that “endanger” is defined as “put[ting] (someone or something)

at risk or in danger.”   (quoting New Oxford American Dictionary

561 (1st ed. 2001)).   The Attorney General cites numerous

appellate cases that interpret 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) to

encompass a substantial risk of harm.    Taking the precedent and

common definitional usage together, the Attorney General

maintains that defendant knowingly subjected the six children in

her care to a substantial risk of harm because the children had

easy access to a large quantity and variety of drugs

intermingled among their toys and clothing.    The Attorney

General underscores the likely physical danger to the children

of unwittingly ingesting the openly displayed drugs and the

potential emotional damage stemming from a child’s exposure to

drugs and drug trafficking.

    Lastly, the Attorney General maintains that prosecutors

historically retain broad prosecutorial discretion when a

defendant’s action violates more than one statute.     With the

defendant having proffered no proofs that the prosecutor abused

her discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the

                                 6
Attorney General argues that the Appellate Division decision

should be affirmed.

                              III.

                                A.

    In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for a judgment

of acquittal, we apply the same standard as the trial court.

State v. Sugar, 
240 N.J. Super. 148, 153 (App. Div. 1990)

(citing State v. Moffa, 
42 N.J. 258, 263 (1964)).   That standard

is the same whether the motion is made at the close of the

State’s case, at the end of the entire case, or after a jury

returns a guilty verdict under Rule 3:18-2.   State v. Kluber,

130 N.J. Super. 336, 341 (App. Div. 1974).    We will deny a

motion for a judgment of acquittal if

         the evidence, viewed in its entirety, be it
         direct or circumstantial, and giving the State
         the benefit of all of its favorable testimony
         as well as all of the favorable inferences
         which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is
         sufficient to enable a jury to find that the
         State’s charge has been established beyond a
         reasonable doubt.

         [Id. at 341–42 (citing State v. Mayberry, 52
         N.J. 413, 436–37 (1968); State v. Reyes, 50
         N.J. 454, 458–59 (1967)).]

    Questions pertaining to statutory interpretation are legal

in nature, State v. S.B., 
230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (citing State

v. Revie, 
220 N.J. 126, 132 (2014)), so “[w]e review such

decisions de novo, 'unconstrained by deference to the decisions

                                7
of the trial court or the appellate panel,’” ibid. (quoting

State v. Grate, 
220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015)).

    In interpreting a statute, we “give words 'their ordinary

meaning and significance,’” acknowledging that the “statutory

language is 'the best indicator of [the Legislature’s] intent.’”

Tumpson v. Farina, 
218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (alteration in

original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 
183 N.J. 477, 492

(2005)).   At the same time, “[w]e will not presume that the

Legislature intended a result different from what is indicated

by the plain language or add a qualification to a statute that

the Legislature chose to omit.”       Id. at 467-68.   We only resort

to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history and committee

reports, in the event that the statutory language at issue is

ambiguous.   Id. at 468.

                                  B.

    
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:

           [a]ny person having a legal duty for the care
           of a child or who has assumed responsibility
           for the care of a child who causes the child
           harm that would make the child an abused or
           neglected child as defined in [
N.J.S.A.] 9:6-
           1, [
N.J.S.A.] 9:6-3 and . . . [
N.J.S.A. 9:6-
           8.21] is guilty of a crime of the second
           degree.

    The three subsections of Title 9 incorporated by the

Legislature into 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) are linchpins to the

statute’s applicability to the facts before us.

                                  8
     
N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 includes eight actions that constitute child

abuse, none of which are germane here.

     
N.J.S.A. 9:6-3 delineates, in relevant part, that

          [a]ny parent, guardian or person having the
          care, custody or control of any child, who
          shall abuse, abandon, be cruel to or
          neglectful of such child, or any person who
          shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any
          child shall be deemed to be guilty of a crime
          of the fourth degree.

          [(emphasis added).]

See also the second dissent,1 post at ___ (slip op. at 4) (Rabner,

C.J., dissenting) (“[N.J.S.A. 9:6-3] also covers behavior that

places a child at substantial risk of harm.”).

     
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, in pertinent part, defines “[a]bused or

neglected child” as including:

          a child whose physical, mental, or emotional
          condition has been impaired or is in imminent
          danger of becoming impaired as the result of
          the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to
          exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in
          providing the child with proper supervision or
          guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or
          allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial
          risk thereof . . . or by any other acts of a
          similarly serious nature requiring the aid of
          the court.

          [(emphases added).]

1  For convenience, we refer to Justice Albin’s dissenting
opinion as “the first dissent” and Chief Justice Rabner’s
dissenting opinion as “the second dissent.”
                                 9
    As a consequence, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) “is clearly and

readily capable of comprehension.”      State v. M.L., 
253 N.J.

Super. 13, 30 (App. Div. 1991).     We see no ambiguity in the

Legislature incorporating a “substantial risk” of harm from

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 into 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), so the appellate

panel here properly concluded that “[a]pplying this rule of

construction would seemingly result in an uncomplicated

interpretation of the statutory offense.”      
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a)(2), plainly, does not delineate two distinct elements –-

proof of actual harm and harm qualifying as abuse or neglect

under Title 9.   Rather, the statute defines “harm” by expressly

incorporating 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, which proscribes exposing a

child to a substantial risk of harm.

    We agree with the first dissent that “[w]ords make a

difference,” post at ___ (slip op. at 5) (Albin, J.,

dissenting), and as such, we are bound to uphold the

Legislature’s express incorporation of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 into

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, prohibiting the exposure of children to a

substantial risk of harm.   Those principal purposes then become

the statute’s principal commands.      No extrinsic evidence is

necessary, rendering the first dissent’s analysis of legislative

history unnecessary.   Since the plain language of the statute is

clear in its incorporation of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, we similarly

need not resort to the “doctrine of lenity” which is only

                                  10
pertinent “if an analysis of statutory language . . . fails to

resolve a statutory ambiguity.”    State v. McDonald, 
211 N.J. 4,

18 (2012) (citing State v. Gelman, 
195 N.J. 475, 482 (2008)).

                                  C.

    In light of the statute’s plain language, our appellate

courts for decades have unanimously held that the State is not

required to prove actual harm to a child to convict under

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2).    Instead, they have concluded that proof

of a child’s exposure to a substantial risk of harm is

sufficient to sustain a conviction.       See, e.g., State v. N.A.,

355 N.J. Super. 143, 150–51 (App. Div. 2002); M.L., 
253 N.J.

Super. at 31 (collecting cases).

    In M.L., after police arrested the defendant for

shoplifting, she conveyed that her fifteen-month-old child,

C.L., was with a babysitter.    
253 N.J. Super. at 17.     Police

later entered the defendant’s apartment and discovered C.L.

asleep, unattended in a playpen.       Id. at 18.   C.L. was sweating

in the ninety-degree heat, and the apartment was littered with

dirty diapers and laundry, plates of spoiled food, and dog

feces.   Ibid.   A jury later found the defendant guilty of

endangering the welfare of children under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a)(2).   Ibid.   On appeal, the defendant argued that “the trial

court misinterpreted the statute as not requiring the State to

show that the child suffered physical harm.”        Id. at 29.   The

                                  11
Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed, concluding that “[w]e

do not read [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)] as calling for a demonstration

of actual physical harm.”     Id. at 31.

       Over ten years later, in N.A., a jury convicted the

defendant under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) for having severely beaten

her two-year-old son (actual harm).      
355 N.J. Super. at 145,

146.     The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding

that 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) and the Title 9 offense of cruelty

and neglect of children each “criminalizes the same harm or risk

of harm to the child.”     Id. at 153.     Specifically, the Appellate

Division concluded that the incorporation by reference of

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 in 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), “does not require

that any act or omission of the parent result in specific harm

to the child.     The focus is on the conduct of the parent which

exposes the child to a 'substantial risk’ of death or physical

harm.”    Id. at 150–51.

       As is apparent, our appellate courts have been unanimous

over several decades in interpreting 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2),

through all its iterations, as not requiring proof of actual

harm to the child.     N.A., 
355 N.J. Super. at 150–51; M.L., 
253 N.J. Super. at 31.    Not one published appellate opinion holds

otherwise.     We find no reason to disturb that decades-old sound

precedent predicated on the plain language of the statute.

                                  12
    In conjunction we note, “the legislative branch is presumed

to be aware of judicial constructions of statutory provisions.”

State v. Singleton, 
211 N.J. 157, 180 (2012) (citing White v.

Township of North Bergen, 
77 N.J. 538, 556 (1978)).    It is

eminently fair to observe that “where a statute has been

judicially construed, the failure of the Legislature to

subsequently act thereon evidences legislative acquiescence in

the construction given the statute.”     White, 
77 N.J. at 556.

    Had the Legislature chosen to insist on proof of actual

harm to a child to convict under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), it was

free to amend the statute, as it did in other aspects of the

statute, in the nearly three decades since M.L.    In 1992, the

Legislature amended 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) to elevate the offense

of child endangerment from a third- and fourth-degree crime to a

second- and third-degree crime, but it conspicuously did not

amend the statute to require proof of actual harm.    L. 1992, c.

6, § 1; State v. Galloway, 
133 N.J. 631, 657–58 (1993) (noting

1992 amendment elevating offense levels).    After that amendment,

an Appellate Division panel once again upheld the precedent of

interpreting 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) as including the exposure of a

child to a substantial risk of harm.     N.A., 
355 N.J. Super. at
 150-51.   In 2013, the Legislature broadened the scope of

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) by raising the age of statutorily protected

children from sixteen to eighteen.     L. 2013, c. 51, § 13.   And

                                13
again, the Legislature chose not to add language that could

undercut precedent by requiring the State to prove actual harm

in order to convict under the statute.

    The first dissent insists that “[a] sensible textual

construction of the endangering statute” would “require harm as

a precondition to the examples given in the abuse-and-neglect

statutes.”   Post at ___ (slip op. at 5) (Albin, J., dissenting).

The statute, however, delineates nothing about the use of

preconditions, but instead expressly subsumes the Title 9

provisions signaling a legislative intent to broaden the

statutory definition of “harm.”    “It would show little respect

for the legislature were courts to suppose that the lawmakers

meant to enact an irrational scheme.”    State v. Livingston, 
172 N.J. 209, 228 (2002) (Long, J., dissenting) (quoting Things

Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,