Case Title: MELISSA HELTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2008-SC-000141-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
MELISSA HELTON V. TO BE PUBLISHED %UvUr, OT jUrUTUrRU 2008--SC-000141-MR ON APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE C . HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE NO . 06-CR-00275 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE VACATING AND REMANDING APPELLANT Appellant Melissa Helton was convicted of multiple counts of wanton murder and several other charges stemming from a car accident in which she was driving under the influence of alcohol. The evidence that she challenges is a blood sample, which the police took at the hospital while she was unconscious or nearly so after the accident . She claims that this practice violates KRS 189A . 105(2)(b), which requires a warrant to test blood in a fatality accident, and which she argues controls over the "implied consent" statute, KRS 189A.103 . She also claims that even if the statutes are not in conflict, then the consent statute and the practice of taking a blood sample from unconscious DUI suspects in general are unconstitutional . AS MODIFIED : JANUARY 26, 2010 AS CORRECTED : JANUARY 21, 2010 RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009 1 . Background On August 26, 2006, Appellant Melissa I Icltc>r~ drove hc,r c .l1il(ircil, Nicholas Helton ;ind Madison I-leltc~n, leer friend I,()n I,<'tt hn)p, ,reel two~ ether children, Emily Preston and Caleb I-lildebrandt, 1()a locld creek t.() swim] . Appellant. and Lathrop drank alcohol while the chlldl-ell swam and played . That evening, Appellant packed Lathr-op and the (I)ilciren into leer v;rrn to drive home . Appellant drove the van off the road and sirr_ick sonic trees and shRabs . Nicholas Helton, Emily Preston and Caleb Hildebrandt were killed by the impact . Madison Helton suffered a broken arm and lacerations . Lori Lathrop sustained injuries that required hospitalization ; she later died from her injuries . Appellant suffered an ankle fuact tire cant severe head lacerat IMls . The crash victims were all transported to t he University of Kentucky Hospital . Appellant was admitted to the hospital . Sometime later, two~ Jessamine County Sheriff's Deputies visited Appellant, who was unconscious . Despite having no search warrant, the deputies took a blood sample, which, when tested, showed Appellant had a blood alcohol content of .16% . Appellant was indicted for four counts of wanton murder, one count of wanton endangerment, and one count of first-offense driving under the influence . She moved to suppress the evidence of her blood alcohol level, arguing that the sample was taken without her consent and in violation of KRS 189A . 105(2)(b) . The trial court denied the motion, finding that Appellant "was unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering her incapable of refusal," and thus there was "[s]tatutory consent under KRS 189A .103 ." 2 Appc1lant sul)seducntly entercd d, breath, or urine testing unless the testing has already been done by consent.."' She ;trgues that this statute, r KRS 189A . 105(2)(b) reads in its entirety : Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction from issuing a search warrant or other court order requiring a blood or urine test, or a combination thereof, of a defendant charged with a violation of KRS 189A .010, or other statutory violation arising from the incident, when a person is killed or suffers physical injury, as defined in KRS 500 .080, as a result of the incident in which the defendant has been charged . However, if the incident involves a motor vehicle accident in which there was a fatality, the investigating peace officer shall seek such a search warrant for blood, breath, or urine testing unless the testing has already been done by consent . If testing done pursuant to a warrant reveals the presence of alcohol or any other substance that impaired the driving ability of a person who is charged with and convicted of an offense arising from the accident, the sentencing court shall require, in addition to any other sentencing provision, that the defendant make restitution to the state for the cost of the testing . conflicts with 1{RS 189A.103(3)(ii), presmrt~rbly rrwf lier blood ." This argument attempts to invert the default_ rules for consent as established by KRS 189A.103 . The default, as noted above, is statutorily implied consent. . The question is not whether Appellant consented (car was in a posit-MI) to bC able to consent), but whether she wit=hdrew lie- consent . Cle"irly she slid not refuse to submit to the test ; in fact, she w,rs unable to do so because she- was unconscious or nearly so. More importantly, the fact that Appellant was unconscious at the time did not nullify her statutory implied consent . KRS 189A .103 focurses on whether the suspect affirmatively withdraws consent by refusing to submit to testing . The statute specifically addresses the continuing consent of one who is unconscious, effectively nullifying the right to refuse the test in cases of incapacity to refuse. This is a public policy judgment call that is solely within the province of the legislature, provided no constitutional rights are violated . This statutory aspect of Appellant's argument, therefore, is fairly simple to resolve . Appellant consented to testing by operating a vehicle in Kentucky . She did not thereafter refuse to submit to testing and therefore did not 6 withdraw her consent . Becfmse AppellaW "cortscrlted," t)re c4i`iccr- (lid r1ol violate KRS 1_89A . 105(2)(b) in failing to~ g0 () c'tacrgetic-filly ." lcf ., at 17'2 . The Court concluded that "[tIhis is cmidcu,t that slac~cks the cm] scicIrWC, . . [and] is bound to c>fl-end cvcti hardened sensibilitics . Thcy'm -c methods 1()o close to the rack mid the screw to pc-1-11111 Of COttstitrttiOrlal tli11creritNatic»a ." lc_. Thus, the Court held that such a practice violated the due process guarmltee of the Fourteenth Amendment . Obviously, the de(Cricimit had riot, been allowed to choose . Conduct like that involved here, the taking of a blood sample, while admittedly invasive, falls quite short of the veritable assault committed by the officers in Roch in . Thus, the Court in Breithf _ti1~t_v. .,Abram , 352 U .S . 432 (1957), held that the taking of a blood sample by fa elector from ara uncm-isciorzs DUI suspect was but a "slight. . . . intrusion" cornpat -ed to that in Rochirl acid did not violate due process . Id . at 4.39 . However, the Court declined to c,ngage in a search-and-seizure analysis because at that time the federal exclusionary rule was not applicable to the states and the state in question, New Mexico, had not adopted the rule . Id . at 409-10 . Appellant, however, has raised the Fourth Amendment specter M this case . The closest U .S . Supreme Court case to address this issue is Schmerber v. California , 384 U .S . 757 (1966) . There, the defendant refused to consent to a blood test while at the hospital following a car accident . Nevertheless, a police officer had a doctor take a blood sample, which later showed the defendant had been drinking alcohol . The Court rejected claims under due process, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel . 8 The Court also addressc-d i hourf h Arnel-ldl-icr -It c+iinr, the c,xcfu :;i()rz, .cry rule having been held applicable to) thc slaws icl Mal)_~ .v .y ()laic , U . :~ . F>4:3 (1961) . The Court framed its h'c)clrtli Arttcrldrricift a>mlysis by statitrg : [O]nce the privilege against sc "if-itrcrinrirv)tic)i1 has, L)cerl f(Atrld rlc)1 to bar compelled intrusions lilt() i lre NAY for- blood to be mlut,t warrant, where the lx>licle officer was Justified in requiring the test. (Ind m(mrwr in which the test was performed was reasonable") ; Holbrook_y . Knopf, 847 S .W .2d 52 (Ky . 1992) (noting that "Sc hmerber was, of course,  trr implied ccmlserat stfit tite only applies in situations where "an officer 11~rs re"Isonabl ep"rotinds to bc1ICvC that a violation of KRS 189A .010(1) ()r 189 .520(l) la .r.s OCcurrec," I{RS 189A .103(l) (emphasis added), which is t cf ~;;ry, wlterl the officer hers "reasonable grounds" to believe the staslae-cil was driving under the ir~fltrer~c~c~ . Kentucky's statute does not include a provision like that in Georgia allownag testing for any sufficiently serious accidetit . Nothing in the Kentucky ir7al~lic=d consent statute allows it to be invoked riwr-cly because a person is involved in a serious accident . In Kentucky, there rmrst be some suspicion of driving under the influence before implied consent: c~nr he invoked . That Cooper is inapplicable is t.indcrscorcd by the fact t hat t hc, (1corgilt court expressly declined to address that fxrrt of the implied consent start tits that allowed testing when there was an -allegation of a violation of the st-ate's DUI statute. Id . at 607 n.3 . In fact, the court later upheld that portion of t he statute, distinguishing Cooper in the process : Cooper makes it clear that [the implied consent statute] is unconstitutional to the extent that it could be interpreted to require an individual to submit to chemical testing solely because that individual was involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities . On the other hand, where an individual has been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities and the investigating law enforcement officer has-probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, the constitutional infirmities at play in Cooper are no longer present, and the ensuing search is both warranted and constitutional . Due to the existence of probable cause, the individual being subjected to a search is, in fact, a "suspect" as contemplated by the statute . Hough v . State , 620 S .E.2d 380, 383-84 (Ga . 2005) . 1 2 KRS 189A.103(1) requires "reasonable grounds" to believe that a violation of the DUI statute has occurred . To pass constitutional muster, "reasonable grounds" must equate at least. to probable cause . The Kentucky consent statute is clearly far more similar to that part of the Georgia statute addressed in Hough than that addressed in Cooper.5 The Georgia court's concerns about requiring probable cause could be satisfied in this case if the facts known to the officer at the time the blood test was done would support a probable cause belief that the Appellant had violated state DUI law. But in fact, at the suppression hearing, no testimony was taken. Instead, the Commonwealth summarized what occurred at the hospital in the 5 KRS 189A.103 provides in part : The following provisions shall apply to any person who operates or is in physical control of a motor vehicle or a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth : (1) He or she has given his or her consent to one (1) or more tests of his or her blood, breath, and urine, or combination thereof, for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or presence of a substance which may impair one's driving ability, if an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) [operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other substance which impairs driving ability prohibited] or 189.520(1) [operating a vehicle not a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other substance which impairs driving ability prohibited] has occurred[ .] (3) The breath, blood, and urine tests administered pursuant to this section shall be administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed a violation of KRS 189A.010(l) or 189.520(1) . (5) When the preliminary breath tests, breath tests, or other evidence gives the officer reasonable grounds to believe there is impairment by a substance which is not subject to testing by a breath test, then blood or urine tests, or both, may be required . . . . (Emphasis added.) 1 3 course of responding orally to~ AppcI1,111t's slippressMn r11c>IMII . '111c Commonwea_ld'i ii-Jorrned the trial cmirt that at III(,. ImSI)Ital 111c told Helton about implied consent, ~-md sllc didn't rc.1 ,t1sc, even 01migh she did not exactly consent either . The Commonwealth also iic>t.c-( ,l (liat slle "sort ()I' passed out" and closed her eyes when she was ;,.isked tc) giv(I ('c)tltietlt. to~ a test. (she was being prepared for surgery on her skull and IOcial frNCIcIr-CS) . 'f11C Commonwealth argued that by the plain reading ()l' t lw Skit ut.c, slIc had consented by virtue of having operated a vehicle within the Commonwealth, and that the test was done "kind of on the heels calf the blood test the hospital was doing anyways," and it did not involve any additionA intrusion . Finally, the Commonwealth concluded its argument by saying it. (lid Ilea believe this was a KRS 189A . 105(2)(b) situation where a warrant would 11e required because she did not refuse and she was not under  regIIirc- a blood test_ . T1IC 1a -1ugli 1 cc)rlcrlr mi , ill other grounds, 1 respectfully dissew from my esteeirled crl)i>>ioir il1flt  jristif;y testing Ms . Heltc~ri's blood alc~~hol level . 1 disscid hec<rrrsc Appellant: concedes in her brief th,,-it "Italic (_'ornmonwecilth ecrkiirily had belief tli<rt alcohol had been involved irr tlic icciderlt. on August 26111, 200) ." A jhpcjlan t's Brief , at- pt; () . Thus, Appellant's <itfack pit trial and on appeal mis can constitutional and statutory grounds, not factual ones . Trial courts need the leeway to perfOrrn those trial tasks that they and counsel consider ~rppropriWe under the pertinent facts of each case . Hearings can matters conceded by counsel unduly interfere with this valuable discretion . The record shows that. AppelLint took her- cliildrcrr, (irr ~,idult: friend, and two other children swirriming . She consumed alcohol, resumcd driving, and drove her vehicle off the road . Her son and his young friends were killed ,ind the adult friend died later from her injuries . Appellant was accompanied to the hospital by the police who informed her of the effect of her refusal under KRS 189A . 105(a) . The officers perceived Appellant . to be in a stupor incapable of refusal and took a blood test under the implied consent of KRS 189A.103(2) . The reasonable grounds of drunk driving required by 189A .103(1) would appear satisfied by Appellant's concession as well as the circumstances that the police accompanied Appellant from the driver's seat of a horrific accident to the hospital where she was effectively uncommunicative ; not to mention that at the suppression hearing the Commonwealth informed the trial court that at the time the blood test was taken the officers informed Helton about implied 17 consent and t}mt slice (lid not refuse, bill .PISI of passed ()III" <IIIcl c~lc~sc~ri her eyes . I, therefore, respectfully c isscrlt . COUNSEL r Edward E . Dove 201 Vilest . Short . St rcet 310 Lexington 13iiilding Lexingtc:~rl, Kcn t Lrc'l{y 40507 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Jack Conway Attorney Caeneral Joshua D. Farley Assistant Attorney General Attorney (general's Office Office of Criminal Appeals 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204 MELISSA HELTON V C~aurf of )firufurh~ 2008-SC-000141--MR ON APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE C . HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUD(]E NO. 06-CR- 00275 ORDER APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE The Commonwealth's petition for rehearing of the Opinion of the Court, rendered August 27, 2009, is hereby DENIED . On the Court's own motion, the opinion is hereby corrected on its face by substitution of the attached pages 1 and 13 in lieu of the original pages 1 and 13 . The purpose of this Order of Correction is to correct a typographical error and does not affect the holding of the original Opinion of the Court . All sitting. All concur . ENTERED: January 21, 2010. MELISSA HELTON '~axyrrmQ (~aurf of ~iQxrfixxhv 2008-SC-0001 .41 .-MR ON APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE NO. 06-CR-00275 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE ORDER OF CORRECTION APPELLANT On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the. Court rendered August 27, 2009, as corrected on January 21, 2010, is hereby modified by substituting pages 1 and 13 of the opinion as attached hereto, in lieu of pages 1 and 13 of the opinion as originally rendered. Said modification corrects the number of the footnote on page 13 and does not affect the holding. ENTERED : January 26,2010 .