Case Title: Washington v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 694, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHRISTIAN K. WASHINGTON,
§
No. 694, 2002
§
    
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr. ID. No. 0104011899
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
§
Submitted: September 3, 2003
Decided: 
November 3, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Edmund M. Hillis, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee.
VEASEY, Chief Justice :
In this appeal we consider whether a defendant’s convictions for two counts of
first degree robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony were multiplicitous and therefore constituted double jeopardy on the
ground that they related to a single course of criminal conduct.  Although the
defendant’s actions were in close proximity temporally and spatially, we have
determined on this record that the defendant engaged in separate, distinct acts and
formed separate intents to commit each crime.  Because the defendant’s actions did
not constitute a single, continuous course of conduct, principles of multiplicity and
double jeopardy are not implicated.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.  
Facts
On the evening of April 18, 2001, the victim, Jamal Miller, decided to visit a
friend, Latisha Seals.  Miller drove to Seals’ house, parked his car near the house, and
knocked on the door.  When an unidentified female answered the door, Miller
observed Seals and the defendant, Christian Washington, descending the steps with
a pit bull dog.  Seals had a cast on her arm.  When Miller asked what had happened,
Washington pushed Seals back and stepped outside, questioning Miller about why he
had come to the house.  Miller replied that he had come to visit Seals.  Washington
then pulled out a gun, holding it within a few inches of Miller’s face.  Miller backed
away and pleaded with Washington not to shoot him.  Washington repeatedly told
2
Miller to leave, which Miller attempted to do, but Washington’s dog pursued him each
time he moved away.
Washington continued pointing his gun at Miller.  When Miller was
approximately twenty to forty feet away from Seals’ house, Washington demanded
that Miller give him a silver chain that Miller had around his neck.  Miller complied.
Washington donned the chain and then again ordered Miller to leave.  Miller again
tried to flee, but each time he did, Washington’s dog pursued him.  Washington then
commanded the dog to “hit” Miller, and the dog latched onto Miller’s leather jacket.
Still holding the gun near Miller’s face, Washington ordered Miller to give him the
jacket.  Miller complied.  Washington again told Miller to leave.  When Miller
attempted to run to his car, Washington demanded that Miller give him the keys to the
car.  By this time, Washington and Miller were approximately fifty or sixty feet from
where Washington had taken Miller’s silver chain.  Approximately ten or twenty
seconds had passed since Washington had taken Miller’s jacket.
Washington was indicted on two counts of Robbery First Degree.  Count I was
for taking Miller’s chain and Count III was for taking the keys.  Washington was also
indicted on two counts (Counts II and IV) of Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony in connection with the two robbery charges.  Before trial,
Washington filed a motion to dismiss Counts III and IV because they duplicated
1See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb. . . .”); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[N]o person shall be for the same offense twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb. . . .”).
2Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 362 (Del. 1998).
3
Counts I and II and therefore violated Washington’s right against double jeopardy.
The Superior Court denied the motion.  A jury convicted Washington of Counts I
through IV, and he received the minimum mandatory sentence for each count, to be
served consecutively.
Issue on Appeal
Washington argues that the second count of Robbery First Degree and the
second count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (and the
minimum mandatory sentences imposed for each) are multiple charges for the same
offense and are therefore multiplicitous and violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States and Delaware Constitutions.1  He contends that his actions constituted
one continuous course of criminal conduct because they occurred in close spatial and
temporal proximity to one another and because the crime involved only one victim,
one weapon, and one perpetrator.  This Court reviews de novo a claim of infringement
of constitutional rights.2
3Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Del. 2002).
4Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288 (Del. 1989).
5Handy v. State, 803 A.2d 937, 940 (Del. 2002).
4
Multiplicity and Double Jeopardy
We reject Washington’s claim that his actions constituted a single course of
criminal conduct.  His acts were sufficiently separated in location and time to
constitute distinct acts.  Moreover, he formed distinct intents to take each different
item of property.  We therefore hold that Washington’s acts may be treated as separate
and distinct crimes.  Accordingly, his convictions and sentencing did not violate his
constitutional rights.
The constitutional principle of double jeopardy protects a defendant against (1)
successive prosecutions; (2) multiple charges under separate statutes requiring proof
of the same factual elements; and (3) multiple charges under the same statute.3
Washington’s claim relates to the third type of protection, known as the “multiplicity”
doctrine.  Dividing one offense into multiple counts of an indictment violates a
defendant’s right against double jeopardy.4  This may occur when “[p]rosecutors...
manufacture additional counts of a particular crime by the ‘simple expedient of
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.’”5 Washington
contends that his convictions and sentencing implicate the multiplicity doctrine
6See Williams, 796 A.2d at 1286-87 (considering separation in time and space and the formation of distinct
intents as factors in determining whether a defendant has committed two violations of the same statute).
7No. IN-82-03-1964, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 1098, at * 1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1982).  
8Id. at *1-2.  The court noted the special importance of a correct resolution of the issue because of the
mandatory minimum sentence imposed for first degree robbery.  Id. at *3.
5
because his conduct constituted a single, continuous act for which he may properly be
convicted only once.
First Degree Robbery
Washington’s argument that his conduct constituted a single, continuous act
fails because he made distinct threats, separated in both time and space, against Miller,
each intended to compel Miller to surrender different items of property.  In addition,
the record indicates that Washington formed the intent to take Miller’s car keys
separately from forming the intent to take Miller’s silver chain.6  The separation in
time and space were small, but when considered along with the evidence indicating
Washington’s formation of a distinct intent, they are sufficient to support multiple
convictions without implicating the multiplicity doctrine.
In State v. Roderick,7 the defendant challenged his conviction for two counts of
robbery in connection with a robbery of a Radio Shack store.  The State had charged
the defendant with robbery of the store and robbery of the store’s salesclerk.  The
defendant contended that the charges were multiplicitous because the robbery
constituted a single, continuous criminal act.8  The Superior Court held that the two
9519 A.2d 649 (Del. 1986).
10Id. at 652.
11Id.
6
charges were for separate offenses because the robber separately threatened the clerk
to compel him to deliver the store’s property and the clerk’s own property.  Similarly,
Washington ordered Miller to turn over his keys after Miller had already relinquished
his silver chain.
In Wyant v. State,9 this Court upheld a defendant’s conviction for two counts
of rape and one count of attempted rape where the sexual acts were committed against
a single victim within a single residence and a relatively short time period.  While on
the first floor of the residence, the defendant attempted to rape the victim by anal
intercourse and then raped her vaginally.10  The defendant then forced the victim
upstairs, where he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him again.11  The Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that his actions constituted one continuous criminal
12The defendant did not argue that the multiple convictions and sentences violated any constitutional right.
Instead, he asserted that they violated DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 206(a)(2), which prohibits conviction for a lesser
included offense or an attempt to commit an offense if the defendant is convicted of the completed offense.  Wyant, 519
A.2d at 661. In Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288 (Del. 1989), however, this Court upheld the defendant’s
convictions for eight counts of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree as not violating the multiplicity doctrine.
The defendant kidnapped his victim and then raped her in various places throughout Sussex County over the course of
approximately six hours.  Id. at 280-81.  The Court upheld the convictions as not multiplicitous because
“[a] person who commits multiple sexual assaults upon the same victim may be held responsible for,
and punished for, each separate and distinct act,” albeit a violation of the same statute.  One is not
allowed to “take advantage of the fact that he has already committed one sexual assault on the victim
and thereby be permitted to commit further assaults on the same person with no risk of further
punishment for each assault committed.  Each act is a further denigration of the victim’s integrity and
a further danger to the victim.”
Id. at 289 (citation omitted).  The Court considered the timing and physical movement between the sexual acts and
decided that the defendant’s actions constituted separate violations of the statute for which he properly could be
convicted.  Id.
13Wyant, 519 A.2d at 661.
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act.12  Considering the timing and physical movement of the victim between the sexual
acts, the Court held that the defendant properly could be convicted of both attempted
rape and rape.13  As in the present case, the facts in Wyant do not indicate any
significant passage of time between the separate acts other than the time required to
move from one area of the home to another.  In addition, the spatial distance in Wyant
was only that space separating the second floor from the first floor of the same
residence.  Here, Washington and Miller had moved approximately fifty or sixty feet
from where Washington took Miller’s chain to where he took the car keys.
In addition to Washington’s making distinct, spatially and temporally separated
threats to Miller, the evidence indicates that he formed the intent to take Miller’s keys
after he had already taken the chain and the leather jacket.  After Washington took
14796 A.2d 1281 (Del. 2002).
15Id. at 1286-87 (quoting Rashad v. Burt, 108 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 1997)).
16For some reason, Washington was not charged with robbery of Miller’s jacket.
8
Miller’s jacket, he told Miller to leave.  As Miller started to run toward his car,
Washington said “No.  F*** that.  Give me your keys.”  This statement, immediately
following an order for Miller to leave, indicates that Washington changed his mind
and then formed, for the first time, an intent to take Miller’s keys.
In Williams v. State,14 this Court held that the multiplicity doctrine barred a
defendant’s conviction for two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver
drugs that were found in his car near his apartment and drugs that were found in his
apartment.  The Court based its decision on several factors: (1) all the drugs were
discovered during the same police confrontation, (2) all the drugs were found in the
same general location, and (3) Williams “‘displayed only a single intent and goal
—distribution.’”15  One scheme to distribute drugs may be complex and may occur
over an extended period of time but still involve only one intent to distribute.  In the
present case, however, the evidence indicates that Washington had completed one
robbery—the taking of the silver chain—before he formed a separate intent to take the
car keys.16  The separate convictions for two counts of robbery are therefore proper.
Robbery is a violent crime against the person of the victim.  Therefore, the
multiplicity doctrine implications applicable to robbery are more akin to those arising
17Handy v. State, 803 A.2d 937, 939 (Del. 2002).  The Court stated:
Because the basis of the crime of arson is directed to the property, the existence of inhabitants is one
element in fixing the degree of arson.  If the State wishes to prosecute a defendant in connection with
an arson in which the defendant intended to harm, or actually did harm, multiple victims in a single
fire, only one charge of arson is permissible.  Other charges may be appropriate for multiple crimes
of harm to persons such as attempted murder . . . or murder, depending on the facts.
18Id.
19Id. at 943.
20Id.
9
in sexual assault cases than in cases involving property-oriented crimes.  In a recent
arson case, this Court held that multiple convictions relating to the same course of
conduct violated the multiplicity doctrine because arson, as defined by the General
Assembly, is primarily a crime against property.17  The State charged the defendant
with two counts of arson because the defendant had known when he set a single fire
in a mobile home that two other people were inside.18  The Court analyzed the
legislative purpose underlying the arson statute and decided that the General
Assembly had intended that arson would be a “single crime regardless of how many
human victims it threatens or claims.”19  Thus, arson is primarily a property crime,
with first degree arson increasing the severity of the charges and punishment because
of the arsonist’s creating a general risk to human life.20
In contrast to arson, the language of the robbery statute demonstrates that
robbery is primarily a crime of physical violence against a person.  Although robbery
involves the taking of property, the legislature’s concern in enacting the robbery
21See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 831 (2001) (“A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in the
course of committing theft, the person uses or threatens the immediate use of force upon another person . . . .”).  The
General Assembly’s definition of other crimes involving the taking of property, such as theft, without reference to the
use or threat of force against a person further demonstrates robbery’s focus on the violence and intimidation involved
when a human victim is present during an unlawful taking of property.  Cf., e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 841(a) (“A
person is guilty of theft when the person takes, exercises control over or obtains property of another person intending
to deprive that person of it or appropriate it.”). 
22See  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 832 (increasing robbery to a class B felony when the robber, among other
things,  (1) “Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime”; (2) “Displays what appears to
be a deadly weapon”; or (3) “Is armed with and uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument”).
23516 A.2d 898 (Del. 1986).
10
statute was with violence and intimidation.  Even second degree robbery is defined by
the use or threat of force against a victim.21  The severity of the crime increases to first
degree robbery when that threat or use of force carries a greater risk of actual harm to
a victim because of the display of what appears to be a deadly weapon.22
In Le Compte v. State,23 this Court held that imposition of consecutive sentences
for a defendant’s convictions for first degree robbery and for possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, where both charges related to the same conduct
by the defendant, did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Court decided that
the legislative purposes behind the two statutes differed and that the statutes addressed
separate crimes for which the State was required to prove different elements.  In the
Court’s view, the General Assembly enacted the weapons statute to attempt to deter
the availability of a weapon during the commission of a serious crime, in order to
decrease the danger to victims.  That is, the statute attempts to address the increase in
24Id. at 902.
25Id. at 903 (emphasis added).
26But cf. Gregory v. State, No. 278, 2000, 2001 Del. LEXIS 316 (Del. July 25, 2001) (ORDER).  In Gregory,
the defendant was convicted, among other things, of assault and attempted murder.  The defendant hit his victim in the
head with a baseball bat, demanding return of some of defendant’s property that he suspected the victim had stolen.
When the victim asserted that she had not taken the property, the defendant shot her in the head and neck.  The
defendant argued that “his continuous course of conduct, spanning only a few minutes, constituted one offense and that
his assault conviction should have been merged into the attempted murder conviction.”  Id. at *2-3.  The Court rejected
11
the actual risk to victims.24  The first degree robbery statute, on the other hand, targets
the victims’ experience of intimidation and violence: “The first degree robbery statute
covers the interaction between the aggravating circumstances created by the
defendant's conduct and the perceptions of the victim.”25  Thus, the robbery statute
seeks to address the personal well-being of the victim, rather than simply the
protection of property.  
Cases involving violent crimes have held that a defendant may be convicted of
more than one count of a crime if the defendant’s acts are sufficiently separated in
time and space.  Courts  also consider whether a defendant formed separate intents to
commit the acts for which he was convicted.  Washington’s actions were separated by
at least fifty or sixty feet, similar to the distance between the defendant’s acts in
Wyant, where the Court upheld a defendant’s separate convictions for raping his
victim on the first and second floors of a residence.  Less than one minute elapsed
between Washington’s actions, so the timing factor does not give great weight to the
conclusion that the acts were distinct.26  The evidence indicates, however, that
this argument:
Gregory beat [the victim] with a baseball bat while demanding that she return his drugs and money.
When that approach did not work, Gregory put down the bat and put a gun to [the victim’s] head and
shot her.  Gregory engaged in two distinct acts and the short time span between those acts does not
change the fact that they were different acts punishable as separate offenses.
Id. at *3.
27 E.g., Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 287-89 (Del. 1989); Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 959 (Del. 1988).
12
Washington formed separate intents to take Miller’s car keys and Miller’s silver chain.
Even if we discount the temporal factor, the spatial and intent factors together support
the separate convictions.  Washington’s conviction for two counts of first degree
robbery was therefore proper and did not infringe his double jeopardy protection.
Washington contended that his convictions were multiplicitous because they
related to a single course of criminal conduct.  Washington raised this issue in a post-
trial motion that asserted his double jeopardy rights.  In deciding that issue, this Court
and the trial judge had to consider whether there are facts in the record that would
support independent convictions by a rational jury.  The inquiry is similar to the
analysis used by this Court and trial judges in considering whether to allow a jury to
consider multiple counts of unlawful sexual conduct or multiple counts of crimes that
involve restraint.27  The better practice is for defense counsel to raise such contentions
in a motion before the case is submitted to the jury.  If the trial judge makes an
independent determination that sufficient evidence has been submitted to support
28Feddiman, 558 A.2d at 290; Weber, 547 A.2d at 959.
13
separate convictions, defense counsel can ask for a jury instruction on those factual
issues or the trial judge may sua sponte decide to give such an instruction.28
Firearm Possession
Washington’s conviction for two counts of possession of a firearm during
commission of a felony was also proper.  If Washington properly could be convicted
of two counts of robbery, then two distinct felonies occurred, during each of which
Washington possessed a firearm.  We therefore uphold those convictions as well.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.