Case Title: Bynum v. Sands, Inc.

Citation: 264 P.2d 846

Docket Number: 3761

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 1953-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
264 P.2d 846 (1953) BYNUM v. SANDS, Inc. No. 3761. Supreme Court of Nevada. December 18, 1953. *847 Dotson & Earl, R. Dale Cook, George E. Marshall, Las Vegas, for appellant. Harry E. Claiborne, Las Vegas, for respondent. EATHER, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, based upon undisputed facts and the construction of a written instrument in an action brought by the appellant, Harvey A. Bynum, to recover possession of an undivided one-fifth interest in and to certain lands located in Clark County, Nevada, occupied by respondent, and for rents and profits received by the respondent from the use and occupancy of said premises. The trial court's judgment denied all relief asked by plaintiff. The facts are substantially these: On the 21st day of November, 1945, a copartnership consisting of George W. Frisby and Dave Anderson leased certain lands located in Clark County, Nevada, for a term of ten years. On April 1, 1946, the said Frisby and Anderson, copartners doing business under the name of "Club Kit Carson," entered into the following agreement with appellant, Harvey A. Bynum: In November, 1949, the copartnership was terminated and dissolved by a written agreement under the terms of which Anderson, for and in consideration of the sum of $10,000, sold all of his interest in and to the assets and property of said partnership unto Frisby, the said Frisby assuming all the outstanding liabilities and obligations of the said partnership. On the 12th day of August, 1950, Frisby and his wife leased said property to respondent for a period of five years and three months. Appellant strongly urges that the instrument in writing here under consideration was misconstrued by the lower court. He contends here, as he did in the lower court, that by the terms of the agreement he became vested with an undivided 20 percent interest in the leasehold held by the partnership, and that since he has never released or conveyed such interest, he is a tenant in common with respondent here in the leasehold heretofore assigned by Frisby, one of the cotenants. Such is not the effect of the agreement under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, secs. 5028, et seq., N.C.L. Supp. 1931-1941. As to the property rights of a partner, sec. 5028.23 provides: "The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific partnership property, (2) his interest in the partnership, and (3) his right to participate in the management." It is to be noted that the assignment to appellant was of an interest in the partnership, the second property right specified by the quoted section. Sec. 5028.25 defines this right as follows: With reference to an assignment of this right, sec. 5028.26 provides: The similarity in phraseology between this last quoted section and the agreement itself makes it quite clear that this was the extent of the assignment intended. With reference to rights upon dissolution, sec. 5028.37 provides in part: "When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners." It is clear, then, that by the agreement appellant received a right upon dissolution limited to one-fifth of the partnership profits. See State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430, 169 A.L.R. 364. No showing is made by him as to the winding up of the partnership or payment of partnership obligations. Specifically, it does not appear that the $62,500 obligation provided by paragraph three of the agreement has been received by the surviving partner. Not only has appellant failed to establish any right to specific property of the partnership but he has failed to establish the existence of any surplus in which he is entitled to share. Appellant strongly relies upon the case of Johnston v. De Lay, 63 Nev. 1, 158 P.2d 547, 161 P.2d 350. In that case it was conceded that Johnston and Ward were owners and tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest in the land in question. As we have pointed out, such is not the case here. The appellant strongly urges that the ruling of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, in the case of Roberts v. Roberts, 113 Colo. 128, 155 P.2d 155, and upon rehearing, 118 Colo. 524, 198 P.2d 453, is here applicable. In our opinion, the two cases are not analogous. In the above case, the court held that the agreement embodied every element necessary for the formation and creation of a partnership, and that James E. Roberts, by virtue of said agreement, was a partner in said business, and upon dissolution entitled to an accounting. Appellant concedes that he was not a partner of Frisby and Anderson, and the agreement conclusively establishes that he was not a partner. We do not deem it necessary for us to consider here the rights appellant may have against Frisby and Anderson. Whatever these rights may be, if any, they in no wise involve the respondent. For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed with costs. MERRILL and BADT, JJ., concur.