Case Title: RINO v. MEAD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-108

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
RINO v. MEAD2002 WY 14455 P.3d 13Case Number: 01-108, 01-165Decided: 09/27/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

THERESA 
McCALLA RINO,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

KATHERINE 
L. MEAD, MEAD & MEAD,

ATTORNEYS 
AT LAW; and

JAMES 
T. SORENSEN,

                                                                                                

Appellees(Defendants).

 

THERESA 
McCALLA RINO,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

                                                                                                

KATHERINE 
L. MEAD,

MEAD 
& MEAD, ATTORNEYS AT

LAW, 
and JAMES T. SORENSEN,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
C.M. Aron of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 

Representing Appellee Katherine L. Mead and Mead & 
Mead, Attorneys at Law:

 

            
Richard E. Day and Susan Chapin Stubson of Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing Appellee James T. Sorensen:

 

            
Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* and VOIGT, 
JJ., and DONNELL, D.J.

 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      These consolidated 
appeals are challenges to the district court's grant of summary judgment to an 
attorney and an accountant in a professional malpractice case and the district 
court's further denial by inaction of a subsequent motion to reconsider.  We affirm the 
summary judgment in favor of the accountant because there are no genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether he made any professional representations that 
were relied upon by the appellant, and he is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.  
However, we reverse the summary judgment granted to the attorney because 
she did not establish a prima facie case entitling her to summary judgment.

 

FACTS

 

[¶2]      In October 1996, J. 
Douglas McCalla (McCalla) filed for divorce from Theresa McCalla, now Theresa 
Rino (Rino).  
McCalla was represented by attorney John Stark (Stark).  Rino hired 
Katherine L. Mead (Mead) to represent her.  With the assistance of a mediator, McCalla 
and Rino settled child custody and support issues, leaving for trial only the 
issue of property and debt division.

 

[¶3]      Shortly before the 
date set for trial, McCalla, Rino, Stark, and Mead met to attempt to work out 
the property and debt issues.  Also in attendance was appellee James T. 
Sorensen (Sorensen), who had acted as the McCallas' accountant during their 
marriage.  
Sorensen brought with him to the meeting a compiled financial statement 
he recently had prepared for the McCallas to enable them to extend a bank credit 
line.  That 
compiled financial statement was used at the meeting as the basis for a division 
of the marital assets and debts between McCalla and Rino.  A settlement was 
reached and Stark advised the district court to cancel the trial.

 

[¶4]      After the settlement 
meeting, a written settlement agreement was prepared.  Rino refused to 
sign the agreement, terminated Mead's employment, and obtained new counsel.  McCalla then filed 
a motion to enforce the agreement.  After a hearing, an order was entered 
enforcing the settlement.  The terms of the agreement were incorporated 
into the Decree of Divorce filed May 1, 1998.

 

[¶5]      On September 23, 
1999, Rino filed a professional malpractice complaint against Mead and 
Sorensen.  
Specifically, the complaint alleged that Mead had violated the following 
professional duties owed to Rino:

 

            
1.         A 
duty of loyalty to her interests.

 

2.         A 
duty to be truthful to her, and to honestly and in good faith keep her fully 
advised of the facts and law applicable to her legal situation in the divorce 
case, and of the preparations the attorneys had made for the trial set to 
commence on September 29, 1997.

 

3.         A 
duty to investigate the applicable facts, particularly the valuation of the 
husband's interest in his law firm, and to evaluate the effect of those facts on 
the legal proceedings.

 

4.         A 
duty to prepare for the trial set to commence on September 29, 1997, including 
but not limited to the duty to prepare the expert witnesses she allegedly had 
retained.

 

5.         A 
duty to prepare for, advise Rino with regard to, and participate in, the 
mediation conducted on September 24, 1997, including but not limited to the duty 
to be conversant with the relevant financial facts which were in dispute between 
the parties, and a duty to negotiate zealously on behalf of Rino.

 

[¶6]      The complaint alleged 
that Sorensen had violated the following professional duties owed to Rino:

 

            
1.         A 
duty of loyalty to her interests when he purported to act on her behalf.

 

2.         A 
duty to be truthful and unbiased with respect to the valuation of the husband's 
interest in his law firm.

 

            
3.         A 
duty to provide accounting information that was truthful and represented 
accurately what it purported to show about the parties' assets and 
liabilities.

 

[¶7]      Finally, Rino's 
complaint alleged that, as a result of the malpractice of Mead and Sorensen, 
Rino received more than $400,000.00 less than she should have received in the 
property division.

 

[¶8]      Sorensen and Mead 
separately filed motions for summary judgment.  Mead argued that the district court's 
enforcement of the settlement agreement collaterally estopped Rino from later 
contending that she had not agreed to the settlement.  Sorensen's primary 
argument was that Rino knew the compiled financial statement was never intended 
by Sorensen as a representation of the value of the properties listed.  The district court 
granted both motions and these appeals followed.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶9]      The parties do not 
agree as to what issues are before this Court.  To more fully present the parties' 
viewpoints, we will set forth the issues as they have been stated by them.  Rino lists the 
issues as follows:

 

1.         
Whether it is error to grant summary judgment in favor of a lawyer sued 
for malpractice when there is [a] dispute of fact as to the following errors by 
the attorney:

 

a.         
Failure to hire an expert accountant for trial as promised.

b.         
Failure to provide advice or explanation of misleading financial 
documents with regard to the client's husband's law firm, showing the husband's 
interest in the law firm to have virtually zero value.

c.         
Failure to hire an attorney expert for trial to testify to the value of 
the husband's work in progress, as the attorney had promised.

d.         
Failure to obtain information about the client's husband's law firm 
financials and work in progress.

e.         
Failure to assert a claim for alimony as promised.

f.          
Failure to be prepared to try the case.

g.         
Settlement of the case without the client's authority.

h.         
Incorrect legal advice concerning the client's right to a share of her 
husband's retirement account accumulated during the marriage.

 

2.         
Whether the court can disregard the opinions of the client's expert 
because they are based on assuming the hypothetical facts of the client's 
allegations of malpractice.

 

3.         
Whether the court can disregard the deposition testimony of the client's 
experts because the transcripts were filed of record by the opposing parties 
rather than the client.

 

4.         
Whether a court can rely on an expert opinion that there was no legal 
malpractice in a divorce case, when the expert considered only material from the 
divorce case while failing to consider any of the disputed facts in the 
malpractice claim itself.

 

5.         
Whether a client has to offer contradictory expert testimony when the 
lawyer's expert has given no opinion that there was an absence of 
malpractice.

 

            
* * *

 

6.         
Where both parties' experts agree it is accountant malpractice to present 
and use false and misleading financial information, whether the court can grant 
summary [judgment] on the factual issue of whether the financial information was 
misleading.

 

            
* * *

 

7.         
Whether it is error for the trial court to deny [W.R.C.P.] 60 relief when 
the court was incorrect with regard to the timely filing of the plaintiff's 
expert information in opposition to summary judgment.

 

[¶10]   Mead contends that the sole issue 
before this Court is whether the district court properly entered summary 
judgment in favor of Mead when Rino failed to submit appropriate expert 
affidavits or other testimony to establish a genuine issue of material fact to 
counter the affidavit of Mead's expert that Mead acted in a reasonable, careful 
and prudent manner with respect to her representation of Rino and did not fall 
below the applicable standard of care.

 

[¶11]   Sorensen presents the accountant 
malpractice issue as being whether summary judgment was appropriate where Rino 
failed to submit expert testimony to counter the testimony of Sorensen's expert 
that Sorensen complied in all respects with the applicable standard of care, 
where there was uncontroverted evidence that Sorensen effectively disclaimed any 
representation regarding the accuracy of the information presented in the 
compiled financial statement, and where Rino admitted that she did not rely upon 
the financial statement compiled by Sorensen.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶12]   Rulings on summary judgment motions are 
governed by the following language found in W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.

 

Our standard for the appellate review of a summary judgment 
was recently reiterated in Hasvold v. Park County School 
Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 635, 637-38 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Unicorn 
Drilling, Inc. v. Heart Mountain Irr. Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo. 
2000)):

 

            
"Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  . . 
.  We review a 
summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same 
materials and following the same standards.  We examine the record from the vantage point 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record.'  . . 
.  Summary 
judgment serves the purpose of eliminating formal trials where only questions of 
law are involved.  
. . .  
We review a grant of summary judgment by deciding a question of law de 
novo and afford no deference to the district court's ruling on that 
question.  . . 
.

 

            
. . .  A 
material fact is any fact that, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by a party.  . . ."

 

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy because it denies a 
trial to the non-moving party.  Coones v. 
F.D.I.C., 848 P.2d 783, 795 (Wyo. 1993).  The initial burden is on the movant to make a 
prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and 
that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Hozian v. Weathermon, 821 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Wyo. 1991) 
(quoting Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987)).  If the movant makes such a showing, the 
burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts 
showing the existence of genuine issues of material fact.  Hozian, 821 P.2d  at 1298 (quoting Boehm, 748 P.2d at 710).

 

[¶13]   Over the years, this Court has 
repeatedly stated that summary judgments are not favored, especially in 
negligence actions.  
See, for example, Roitz v. Kidman, 913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo. 1996); Hozian, 821 P.2d  at 
1298; and Dubus v. Dresser 
Industries, 649 P.2d 198, 201 (Wyo. 1982). This rule is particularly true in malpractice 
actions.  DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, 590 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting Holl v. 
Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 1966), cert. 
denied, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969)). The mixed questions of law and fact 
usually involved in a negligence action concerning the existence of a duty, the 
standard of care and proximate cause "are ordinarily not susceptible to summary 
adjudication.'"  
Hozian, 821 P.2d  at 1298 (quoting Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559, 560 (Wyo. 
1985)).  Whether a particular defendant's actions have 
violated the required duty is generally a question for the jury.  Bancroft v. Jagusch, 611 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 
1980).  The existence of a duty is, however, a 
question of law, "making an absence of duty the surest route to summary 
judgment in negligence actions.'"  Schuler v. Community 
First Nat. Bank, 999 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 
1995)); Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, 
Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 408 (Wyo. 1997).  One consequence of the fact that summary 
judgments are not favored in negligence actions is that, once granted, they are 
subject to "more exacting scrutiny" on appeal.  Woodard v. Cook Ford 
Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶14]   Expert opinion evidence is not usually 
sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment because the weight to be 
given such testimony is generally an issue for the trier of fact.  Western Sur. Co. v. Town of Evansville, 675 P.2d 258, 
262 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting Castleberry v. Collierville 
Medical Associates, Inc., 92 F.R.D. 492, 493 (W.D.Tenn. 1981)).  That is especially true of an affidavit that 
contains opinions and conclusions.  Western Sur. Co., 
675 P.2d  at 262.  
The movant cannot prevail "merely by asserting a position on an ultimate 
fact in the supporting affidavit."  Greenwood v. 
Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1987).  On the other hand, a summary judgment based 
upon expert opinion affidavits may be appropriate "when the showing made by the 
movant is sufficient and uncontroverted."  Conway v. Guernsey 
Cable TV, 713 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting 
Mealey v. City of Laramie, 472 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1970)).  The most likely scenario for that to occur is 
where the only issue is one requiring expert opinion because the case is of a 
highly technical nature, such that laypersons could not understand it.  Western Sur. Co., 675 P.2d  at 263.  In such case, if the expert opinion testimony 
is not controverted, summary judgment may be appropriate.  Id.  While it is true that in a malpractice case 
the standard of care and any violation thereof generally must be established 
through expert testimony, "the nonmoving plaintiff has no obligation to present 
expert testimony at the pretrial stage, unless the movant establishes that no 
material questions of fact exist with respect to the allegations in the 
complaint."  Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 422 (Wyo. 
1985).

 

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE

 

[¶15]   Much of Wyoming's professional 
malpractice law has developed in the arena of medical malpractice.

 

[¶16]   This Court has imported that law into 
the field of legal malpractice:

 

After establishing a duty, the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice case

 

""has the obligation to establish (1) the accepted 
standard of medical care or practice, (2) that the doctor's conduct departed 
from the standard, and (3) that his conduct was the legal cause of the injuries 
suffered."  . . 
.'

 

 

. . .  We conclude that the test applicable in our 
medical malpractice cases should also apply in the analogous situation of a 
legal malpractice claim."

 

Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Metzger, 
709 P.2d at 421 and Harris v. 
Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 751 (Wyo. 1981)).1

 

[¶17]   The general standard of care for 
lawyers in Wyoming is "that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge 
commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in 
the practice of law in this jurisdiction.'"  Moore, 855 P.2d  
at 1248.  As with medical malpractice, establishment of 
the actual standard adhered to by a "reasonable, careful and prudent" lawyer 
must typically be accomplished through expert testimony.  Peterson v. Scorsine, 898 P.2d 382, 388 (Wyo. 
1995); Moore, 855 P.2d  at 
1249.  However, expert testimony is not required 
where the common sense and experience of a layperson are sufficient to establish 
the standard of care.  
Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 516 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting Moore, 855 P.2d at 1248).

 

[¶18]   This Court has not previously been 
called upon to say whether these same principles apply to allegations of 
accountant malpractice.  We cannot see why they should not.

 

            
As in the case of lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, and others 
engaged in rendering professional services for compensation, it is implied in 
all contracts for the employment of public accountants that they will render 
their services with that degree of skill, care, knowledge, and judgment usually 
possessed and exercised by members of that profession in the particular 
locality, in accordance with accepted professional standards and in good faith 
without fraud or collusion.  While not insurers against damage, it is 
generally recognized that accountants may be held liable to clients for damages 
resulting from fraud, misconduct, or negligence in their professional 
undertaking.

 

1 Am.Jur.2d Accountants § 19 at 
543 (1994) (footnote omitted);2 see also Hydroculture, 
Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 174 Ariz. 277, 848 P.2d 856, 860 
(1992).

 

[¶19]   Just as with other professionals, a 
question has been raised as to whether an allegation of accountant malpractice 
sounds in tort or in contract.

 

            
Since a client's malpractice action against an accountant is necessarily 
based to some degree on a violation of the parties' contract, either by 
malfeasance or nonfeasance, some jurisdictions adhere to the view that an action 
for accountant malpractice is maintainable only on a breach of contract 
theory.  
However, the courts have more frequently recognized that accountants may 
be held liable to clients for malpractice in actions founded both on contract 
and tort.

 

1 Am.Jur.2d Accountants, supra, § 20 (footnote omitted).  Some courts consider the action to be one in 
contract if the allegation is a violation of a specific contract term, but in 
tort if the allegation is a violation of a duty imposed by law as a result of 
the contractual relationship.  See, for example, 
Thomas v. Cleary, 768 P.2d 1090, 1092 n.6 (Alaska 1989); Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick 
Main & Co., 244 Mont. 324, 797 P.2d 899, 908 (1990); and DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross 
& Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841-42 (Utah 1996).  When the cause of action for professional 
negligence sounds in tort, the elements are "(1) the duty of the professional to 
use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession 
commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal 
connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) 
actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence."  Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173 n.4 
(Alaska 1983).

 

[¶20]   We conclude that the standards as to 
professional malpractice that we have formerly adopted for medical malpractice, 
and have extended to legal malpractice, should apply equally in regard to 
allegations of accountant malpractice.  Nothing has been shown to this Court to 
suggest that the practice of accounting, or the relationship between accountant 
and client, requires a different standard.  After establishing a duty based on the 
accountant-client contract, the plaintiff in an accounting malpractice case has 
the obligation to establish (1) the accepted standard of accounting care or 
practice, (2) that the accountant's conduct departed from that standard, and (3) 
that the accountant's conduct was the legal cause of the injuries suffered.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Legal Malpractice

 

[¶21]   In its decision letter, the district 
court concluded that summary judgment in Mead's favor was appropriate because 
(1) Mead's submittals established a prima facie case that she was not negligent; 
(2) the issues were such that expert testimony was required to establish the 
standard of care and any violation thereof; and (3) Rino had not countered 
Mead's expert's testimony.  We reverse because we find that Mead's 
submittals, including the affidavit of Mead's expert, did not establish that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact, and, thus, the burden did not 
shift to Rino to produce expert testimony.  Havens v. Hoffman, 
902 P.2d 219, 222-23 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Roybal v. 
Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112-14 (Wyo. 1989)).

 

[¶22]   The affidavit of Mead's expert does 
contain some facts in substantiation of its conclusion that Mead's conduct did 
not fall below the standard of care.  For instance, the affidavit cites to 
correspondence that shows Mead had considered the value of McCalla's law 
practice, as well as the issue of alimony.  Beyond that, however, the affidavit does not 
counter Rino's other factual allegations that Mead failed to hire accountant and 
attorney experts as promised, failed to prepare for the mediation session, 
failed to prepare for the trial, and failed to give correct advice as to the 
treatment of McCalla's retirement account in the property division.  With these issues 
of material fact remaining, Mead's expert's opinion that Mead "acted in a 
reasonable, careful and prudent manner with respect to her representation of" 
Rino is simply premature.

 

[¶23]   The first rule for the entry of a 
summary judgment is that there must not remain any genuine issues as to any 
material facts.  
Indeed, the non-moving party's obligation to counter a motion for summary 
judgment with materials beyond the pleadings does not arise until the movant has 
made a prima facie showing that there are no such issues.  Hozian, 821 P.2d  at 1298 (quoting Boehm, 748 P.2d at 710).  That showing was not made in this case.  It cannot be said, 
as a matter of law, that Mead's conduct did not violate the standard of care 
when what Mead may or may not have done remains controverted.

 

[¶24]   Before advancing to the malpractice 
allegations against Sorensen, we must address another substantial issue that was 
raised in Mead's summary judgment motion, was ruled upon in the district court's 
decision letter, was mentioned in the final order, but has not been addressed in 
this appeal.  
Mead contended in her motion that, under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, Rino was barred from relitigating issues in this case that had been 
decided when the district court enforced the settlement agreement.  The collateral 
estoppel doctrine prohibits the relitigation of issues that were actually and 
necessarily involved in a prior action between the same parties.  Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County School Dist. 
No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995).  Courts are to consider four factors in 
deciding whether the doctrine applies:

 

"(1)  whether the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present 
action; (2)  
whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; 
(3)  whether 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the prior proceeding."

 

Id. (quoting Slavens v. Board of 
County Com'rs for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 1993)) (emphasis in 
original).

 

[¶25]   In its decision letter, the district 
court concluded that collateral estoppel applied as to some issues, but not 
others:

 

Collateral estoppel, then, precludes [Rino's] claims that 
Mead agreed to the settlement without Rino's consent, and that she entered into 
the settlement under duress because Rino was unprepared for trial.  Collateral estoppel 
does not pre[v]ent Rino from claiming that Mead gave her bad advice about 
alimony, property values and retirement because those claims made no difference 
at the settlement enforcement hearing.

 

[¶26]   The decision letter was dated December 
7, 2000, and was filed on December 11, 2000.  Some wrangling over the form of the order 
followed.  On 
February 20, 2001, the district court judge signed the Order Granting Defendant 
Mead's Motion for Summary Judgment.  That order contains the following "finding 
and conclusion:"

 

            
4.         
Judge Guthrie of the Ninth Judicial District heard the motion to enforce 
settlement and found that a settlement was reached on September 24, 1997, that 
the settlement terms were "inherently fair and equitable," that there was no 
evidence of fraud or undue influence in reaching the settlement, and that [Rino] 
assented to the settlement.  [Rino] did not appeal Judge Guthrie's 
decision.

 

The order then granted summary judgment to Mead "as to all 
claims."

 

[¶27]   We presume that the intent of the cited 
portion of the order was to grant summary judgment to Mead on the issue of 
collateral estoppel as outlined in the decision letter.  Inasmuch as Judge 
Guthrie's decision was not appealed, and inasmuch as neither Mead nor Rino have 
in this appeal presented argument for or against the district court's 
application of collateral estoppel, the district court's ruling on that issue 
remains the law of the case.3

 

[¶28]   Reversal of the summary judgment 
granted to Mead on the grounds set forth above forecloses any need to discuss 
Rino's appeal of the denial by inaction of her W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion raised as 
her seventh issue on appeal.

 

            
Accountant Malpractice

 

[¶29]   In response to interrogatories 
propounded by Sorensen, Rino identified Sorensen's alleged acts of professional 
negligence as:

 

(1)  At the settlement conference he presented a 
financial statement of . . . McCalla's purported net worth that was knowingly 
false, or which he should have known was false.  Among other things it reflected a net 
negative value of [McCalla's] partnership interest in his law firm, and 
generally misrepresented [McCalla's] assets and liabilities.  (2)  He had a conflict 
of interest in that he purported to act in [Rino's] interest as his client, when 
he apparently was acting in [McCalla's] interest and the interest of [McCalla's] 
law firm.  
(3)  He 
misrepresented values of assets and the tax effects and valuations for divorce 
property division purposes, and in doing so he gave legal advice for which he 
was not qualified.

 

[¶30]   The undisputed facts developed in the 
material supporting and opposing Sorensen's motion for summary judgment include 
the following:

 

1.         
During September 1997, Sorensen prepared a compiled financial statement 
for the McCallas' use in extending a bank credit line.

 

2.         
Prior to issuing the compiled financial statement, Sorensen delivered to 
Rino a client representation letter that indicated in part that the McCallas 
were "responsible for the fair presentation of the statements of financial 
condition . . .."  
McCalla signed the letter, but Rino refused.

 

3.         
Prior to issuing the compiled financial statement, Sorensen delivered to 
Rino an engagement letter that provided, in part, as follows:

 

We will perform the following service(s):

 

1.         We 
will compile, from information you provide, the statement of financial condition 
of J. Douglas & Theresa McCalla as of September 5, 1997 in accordance with 
Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services issued by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  We will not audit 
or review such financial statements.  Our report on the financial statements is 
presently expected to read as follows:

 

We have compiled the accompanying statement of financial 
condition of J. Douglas & Theresa McCalla as of September 5, 1997, in 
accordance with Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services 
issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

 

A compilation is limited to presenting in the form of 
financial statements information that is the representation of the individuals 
whose financial statements are presented.  We have not audited or reviewed the 
accompanying statement of financial condition and, accordingly, do not express 
an opinion or any other form of assurance on it.

 

* * *

 

Our engagement cannot be relied upon to disclose errors, 
irregularities, or illegal acts, including fraud or defalcations, that might 
exist.  
However, we will inform you of any such matters that come to our 
attention unless they are clearly inconsequential.

 

4.         
Rino signed the engagement letter, acknowledging that it was in 
accordance with her understanding.

 

5.         
During the mediation session, Sorensen reminded McCalla and Rino that 
they each had their own valuation expert.

 

6.         In 
her deposition testimony, Rino admitted that, at the mediation session, she did 
not rely on the valuation of McCalla's interest in his law firm contained in the 
compiled financial statement because she believed it to be "very 
inaccurate."

 

7.         
Rino was aware that she needed her own valuation expert and had 
designated such an expert as a witness.

 

8.         
Rino was aware that, after her separation from McCalla, Sorensen had 
continued to act as McCalla's accountant.

 

[¶31]   It is clear that Rino knew that 
Sorensen had prepared the compiled financial statement in the limited fashion 
described in the disclaimers.  Sorensen's expert established that, in doing 
so, Sorensen had not violated the professional standard of care.  Rino did not 
counter that opinion with an expert opinion to the contrary.  In fact, Rino's 
expert testified during his deposition that he had not formed an opinion as to 
whether or not Sorensen had complied with the applicable standard of care.

 

[¶32]   The compiled financial statement plus 
the accompanying client representation letter and engagement letter effectively 
disclaimed any representation by Sorensen as to the accuracy of the values 
contained therein.  
Any reliance by Rino on the values set forth in the compiled financial 
statement would have been unreasonable.  Davis v. Wyoming 
Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 
(Wyo. 1994)).  Further, Rino admitted in her deposition 
testimony that she did not rely on those values.  At the mediation session, Sorensen reminded 
both McCalla and Rino that each needed his or her own valuation expert.  Rino testified that 
she knew she needed her own valuation expert and that she believed the value of 
McCalla's interest in his law firm to be much more than the value shown in the 
compiled financial statement.  Indeed, Rino had designated an expert to 
testify as to the value of the marital estate.

 

[¶33]   In her appellate brief, Rino contends 
that, by granting summary judgment to Sorensen, the district court was, in 
effect, deciding the fact question of whether the information in the compiled 
financial statement was misleading.  That is not the case.  Whether or not that 
information was misleading does not matter; the undisputed facts show that Rino 
knew that Sorensen was not representing the information as being accurate, and 
Rino did not rely on its accuracy.  In other words, the accuracy of the 
information was not a material fact as it relates to the summary judgment 
motion.

 

[¶34]   The district court was correct in 
granting Sorensen's motion for summary judgment.  There are no genuine issues of material fact 
and Sorensen is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Sorensen's expert 
established the professional standard of care and gave an opinion based on the 
undisputed facts that Sorensen did not breach that standard.  Rino did not 
counter those opinions with a contrary expert opinion.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶35]   Summary judgment should not have been 
granted to attorney Mead because there remain genuine issues of material fact as 
to Mead's conduct.  
Because those issues of material fact remain, the burden did not shift to 
Rino to produce expert testimony to counter Mead's expert.  Summary judgment 
was, however, properly granted to accountant Sorensen because no genuine issues 
of material fact remain, Sorensen established through expert opinion testimony 
that he did not breach the professional standard of care, and Rino presented no 
expert evidence to the contrary.

 

[¶36]   The summary judgment in favor of Mead 
is reversed, the summary judgment in favor of Sorensen is affirmed, and the case 
is remanded to the district court.  Such remand does not include those issues 
determined by the district court to be barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1This focus on the tort principles of negligence 
should not detract from the continued recognition that the attorney-client 
relationship is a contractual one.  In Jackson State Bank 
v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (Wyo. 1993), we declined to extend the 
comparative negligence statute to a legal malpractice claim because such a claim 
is based on contract.  
Similarly, in Long-Russell v. Hampe, 2002 WY 
16 ¶ 11, 39 P.3d 1015, 1020 (Wyo. 2002), we held that a plaintiff in a legal 
malpractice case based on allegations of negligence is not entitled to present a 
claim for emotional distress damages, which is a tort remedy.  In addition, a 
cause of action against an attorney may sound in contract where the allegation 
is the violation of a specific contract term, rather than the violation of a 
professional duty imposed by law.  See the related 
discussion as to accountant malpractice.

  
2By quoting this source, we are not adopting a 
locality rule for testing accountant malpractice.

  
3"Under the law of the case' doctrine, a court's 
decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding 
precedent to be followed in successive stages of the same litigation."  Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 
(Wyo. 1993).