Case Title: Christensen v. Lightbourne

Citation: 

Docket Number: S245395

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ANGIE CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WILL LIGHTBOURNE, as Director, etc., et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S245395 
 
First Appellate District, Division Two 
A144254 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
CFP-12-512070 
 
 
July 8, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
S245395 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
We granted review to decide whether a household 
member’s income that is used to pay child support for a child 
living in another household counts as income “reasonably 
anticipated” to be “received” by the paying household within the 
meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11265.2 for 
purposes of determining eligibility for state welfare benefits.  
The California Department of Social Services determined that it 
does, and we conclude that its determination was reasonable 
and therefore valid.  We must also decide whether the policy of 
the California Department of Social Services treating court-
ordered child support as “income” violates Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 11005.5 by counting the same funds as 
income twice:  once to the paying household and once to the 
receiving household.  We conclude that it does not.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I. 
 
We begin with an overview of the relevant federal and 
state statutes governing the provision of cash assistance to 
needy households and then describe the dispute in this case. 
A. 
For many years, the federal Assistance to Family with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program provided cash aid to 
needy families.  (42 U.S.C. § 601, as in effect before Aug. 22, 
1996; Sneed v. Saenz (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
(Sneed).)  “The AFDC program [wa]s one of three major 
categorical public assistance programs established by the Social 
Security Act of 1935.”  (King v. Smith (1968) 392 U.S. 309, 313.)  
AFDC provided states with federal funds “on a matching funds 
basis to aid the ‘needy child . . . who has been deprived of 
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued 
absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a 
parent, and who is living with’ any of the several listed 
relatives.”  (Van Lare v. Hurley (1975) 421 U.S. 338, 340, quoting 
former 42 U.S.C. § 606(a).)  To qualify for federal funding under 
the AFDC program, states were required to operate a program 
consistent with the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.).  
(Townsend v. Swank (1971) 404 U.S. 282, 285–286.)  Doing so 
required state agencies to comply with federal requirements 
governing how to calculate an individual’s income as well as 
what sources of income should be “disregard[ed]” in calculating 
income.  (42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).) 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which replaced the AFDC 
program with a program called Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (TANF).  (Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; Sneed, 
supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231.)  In place of AFDC’s system 
of federal matching funds, TANF provides states with block 
funding to distribute to poor families while requiring state plans 
to “limit the receipt of aid to a specified number of months” and 
“include certain elements such as requiring aid recipients to 
engage in specified work activities.”  (Sneed, at p. 1231, citing 
42 U.S.C. §§ 607, 608.)  Congress’s purpose in enacting TANF 
was to “increase the flexibility of States” in operating programs 
designed to “provide assistance to needy families so that 
children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
relatives” and to “end the dependence of needy parents on 
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and 
marriage.”  (42 U.S.C. § 601(a).)  
 
To implement TANF, our Legislature undertook a 
“comprehensive review and overhaul of [the state’s] welfare 
system” and enacted the California Work Opportunity and 
Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) program.  (Sneed, supra, 
120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231.)  The Legislature observed that 
“[e]ach family unit has the right and responsibility to provide 
for its own economic security by full participation in the work 
force to the extent possible.  Each family has the right and 
responsibility to provide sufficient support and protection of its 
children, to raise them according to its values and to provide 
every opportunity for educational and social progress.”  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 11205; all undesignated statutory references are to 
this code.)  CalWORKs implemented a new aid calculation 
methodology designed to increase the work effort of aid 
recipients and to encourage recipients to seek and obtain more 
employment income.  (Sneed, at p. 1232.)  
 
To qualify for CalWORKs, a household’s “reasonably 
anticipated income, less exempt income,” must fall below the 
“maximum aid payment” for a household (sometimes called an 
“assistance unit”) of its size.  (§ 11450.12, subd. (b); Cal. Dept. of 
Social Services, Manual of Policy and Procedures § 44-207 
(MPP).)  The CalWORKs statute specifies that income is 
“ ‘reasonably anticipated’ if the county is reasonably certain of 
the amount of income and that the income will be received” 
during 
the 
prospective, 
semiannual 
reporting 
period.  
(§ 11265.2, subd. (b).)  Eligible applicants receive a cash grant 
equal to the difference between the family’s income and the 
maximum aid payment.  (§ 11450.) 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
The 
California 
Department 
of 
Social 
Services 
(Department) is vested with “full power to supervise every phase 
of the administration of public social services.”  (§ 10600.)  The 
Department promulgates rules and standards for the 
implementation of the statutes it enforces.  These rules and 
standards are adopted in compliance with the procedures, 
including notice and comment requirements, set forth in the 
California Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code § 11340 et 
seq.), and they are published in the MPP.  (§§ 10554, 11209; see 
Smith v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 
104 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1109.)  The Legislature also authorized 
the Department to “implement, interpret, or make specific the 
amendments to this division . . . by means of all-county letters 
or similar instructions from the department until regulations 
are adopted.”  (§ 10606.2, subd. (a).)  The interpretations of the 
CalWORKs statute in the MPP and all-county letters “come[] 
from authoritative legal and policymaking levels of the agency.”  
(Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417, 436 (Sharon 
S.).)  
Eligibility determinations for CalWORKs aid are made by 
county 
welfare 
departments 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
Department’s rules and regulations.  (§§ 10800, 11209.)  The 
Department’s implementing regulations direct counties to 
consider only income that the county is “reasonably certain that 
the recipient will receive” during the six-month budgeting 
period.  (MPP § 44-101(c); see also MPP § 44-102.)  From this 
amount, counties subtract income deemed “exempt” by statute 
or regulation.  (§§ 11450.12, subd. (b), 11451.5; see MPP § 44-
111.)  Under the AFDC program, a family could exempt from its 
gross monthly income the first $30 of income and one-third of 
each additional dollar of earned income.  CalWORKs replaced 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
the AFDC exemption with a new income disregard of the first 
$225 of earned income or disability-based unearned income, 
plus 50 percent of each additional dollar of gross earnings.  
(§ 11451.5.)  The greater income disregard under CalWORKs 
permits individuals to earn more income than was possible 
under the former AFDC program without risking a reduction in 
aid or becoming ineligible for aid, thereby effectuating the 
Legislature’s purpose of promoting work and achieving “the 
greatest possible reduction of dependency.”  (§ 11207.)  The 
CalWORKs statute does not specifically exempt any income that 
is garnished from a recipient’s paycheck, nor does the statute’s 
definition of income exclude debts that must immediately be 
paid. 
Before the enactment of CalWORKs, a Department 
regulation allowed counties, “in [d]etermining [n]et [i]ncome,” to 
“deduct[]” from gross income “actual payments made in support 
of a child or spouse not in the home, paid pursuant to a court 
order.”  (Cal. Dept. of Social Services, Manual Letter No. EAS-
92-02: Standards of Assistance Income, former MPP § 44-113.9 
(Mar. 1, 1992) p. 480 (Manual Letter No. EAS-92-02).)  On 
October 14, 1997, two months after CalWORKs became law, the 
Department published a new All County Letter providing 
“counties with the instructions they requested for implementing 
the new grant structure and aid payment provisions of 
[Assembly Bill] 1542.”  (Cal. Dept. of Social Services, All County 
Letter No. 97-59: Implementation of Grant Structure and Aid 
Payment Provisions (Oct. 14, 1997) p. 1 (All County Letter 
No. 97–59).)  In the letter, the Department concluded that the 
CalWORKs 
statute 
“eliminate[ed] 
the 
existing 
income 
disregards and replac[ed] them with new income disregards.”  
(Id. at p. 3.)  Among the income disregards that CalWORKs 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
eliminated in favor of the new exemption of the first $225 of 
income plus 50 percent of any remaining earned income was 
“court-ordered child/spousal support paid by family members to 
persons outside the home.”  (Ibid.)  Consistent with its 
understanding of the changes in the law, the Department 
repealed the regulation that provided a deduction from income 
of court-ordered child support paid to a child not in the home.  
(Manual Letter No. EAS-92-02, supra, at p. 480.)  During the 
rulemaking process, the Department explained that the former 
child and spousal support disregards “that were allowed 
previously under federal and state law have been replaced with 
disregards of $225 of disability based unearned income and/or 
earned income and then 50% of the remaining earned income as 
set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11451.5.”  
(Cal. Dept. of Social Services, internal rulemaking file for 
CalWORKs Grant Structure and Aid Payment Regulations, 
Agency ORD No. 0498-11, Final Statement of Reasons for 
rulemaking under Assem. Bill 1542 (Stats. 1997, ch. 270) p. 10.)  
The Department has maintained this position for over 20 years. 
B. 
Angie Christensen (Christensen) lived with her husband, 
Bruce, their three children, and her three children from a prior 
marriage.  She was ineligible for CalWORKs aid because she 
was receiving Supplemental Security Income benefits.  (§ 11203, 
subd. (a).)  Her three children with Bruce were ineligible for aid 
under the former “Maximum Family Grant Rule” statute, which 
provided that “the number of needy persons in the same family 
shall not be increased for any child born into a family that has 
received aid under this chapter continuously for the 10 months 
prior to the birth of the child.”  (Former § 11450.04, subd. (a), 
added Stats. 1994, ch. 196, § 1 and repealed Jan. 1, 2017, by 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
Stats. 2016, ch. 25, § 18.)  Bruce had three other children who 
did not live in the home and to whom he paid child support:  one 
who received CalWORKs aid and lived with the child’s mother, 
one who was an adult for whom child support was being paid for 
arrearages, and one who was not receiving CalWORKs aid.  
Bruce was employed part time and also received unemployment 
insurance benefits.  Child support payments were garnished 
from Bruce’s income to support his three noncustodial children.   
In October 2010, Christensen applied for CalWORKs aid 
to support herself and her family.  San Mateo County concluded 
that her assistance unit for the purposes of calculating 
CalWORKs aid consisted of four people:  Bruce plus 
Christensen’s three children from her prior marriage.  The 
county 
denied 
Christensen’s 
application 
because 
her 
household’s non-exempt income, including the amount deducted 
from Bruce’s paychecks for child support for his noncustodial 
children, exceeded the maximum aid payment of $828 per 
month for a family of four.  Had the garnished child support been 
excluded from Bruce’s income, Christensen would have been 
eligible to receive CalWORKs aid.   
Christensen 
requested 
an 
administrative 
hearing, 
arguing that the amounts garnished from her husband’s wages 
and unemployment benefits as child support “could not be 
considered as ‘reasonably anticipated to be received’ and 
therefore should not be counted in either the eligibility or grant 
determination process.”  The administrative law judge agreed 
and instructed the county to recompute the family’s eligibility 
for CalWORKs aid, omitting those amounts from Bruce’s 
income.   
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
The Director of the California Department of Social 
Services reversed and denied Christensen’s claim.  The Director 
reasoned that “no regulation . . . exempts child support 
payments paid by or garnished from an [assistance unit] 
member’s earned or unearned income.”  Citing to All County 
Letter No. 97-59, the Director concluded that “the child support 
payments garnished from the claimant’s husband’s earned 
income and [unemployment insurance benefits] was correctly 
included as nonexempt available income in determining [the 
assistance unit’s] eligibility for CalWORKs benefits.”   
Christensen filed a combined petition for writ of mandate 
and administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1085, 1094.5) 
as well as a complaint for declaratory relief in the superior court.  
The court ruled that the Department’s policy of counting court-
ordered child support payments as available income of 
CalWORKs applicants was contrary to the Department’s own 
definition of income, which required that income be “currently 
available” to needy members of the family, and contravened 
section 11005.5 because it resulted in double-counting of aid.  
Accordingly, the court issued a writ of administrative mandate 
and declared the Department’s policy invalid.  The court denied 
the writ of mandate, and Christensen did not appeal that ruling.   
The Court of Appeal reversed.  It observed that “the 
CalWORKs statutes and regulations do not specifically 
prescribe how to treat child support paid by a noncustodial 
parent in determining the nonexempt income of the paying 
parent’s assistance unit.”  (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 
15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1252 (Christensen).)  The court concluded 
that under Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of 
Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 (Yamaha), the Department’s 
interpretation of the law, which it has consistently maintained 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
over the 20 years since the inception of the CalWORKs program, 
was entitled to “great weight.”  (Christensen, at p. 1252.)  
Specifically, the court concluded that the Department’s 
interpretation of “ ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” income as “gross 
income before any potential exemptions or deductions are 
subtracted” was “reasonable and worthy of deference” in light of 
the statute’s legislative history.  (Id. at p. 1255.)  The court 
rejected Christensen’s argument that because court-ordered 
child support paid by a noncustodial parent is not “ ‘available’ ” 
to meet the needs of the paying household, it must be excluded 
from the paying household’s income.  (Id. at p. 1256.) 
The Court of Appeal also rejected Christensen’s argument 
that the Department’s policy of counting garnished child 
support as income resulted in double-counting of income in 
violation of section 11005.5.  The court observed that 
“Christensen does not claim that any family’s CalWORKs cash 
aid is being considered to deny another person or family 
CalWORKs aid.”  (Christensen, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1258.)  And the court explained that “child support paid to 
benefit a child living in a family receiving CalWORKs aid is not 
generally counted as income to that child’s family” because, with 
exceptions not applicable here, “[f]ederal and state law require 
that CalWORKs applicants assign their rights to any child 
support payments to the county and state in order to receive 
CalWORKs aid.”  (Id. at p. 1259.)  
We granted review. 
II. 
The issue here is the validity of the Department’s 
interpretation of the CalWORKs statutes.  We review questions 
of statutory interpretation de novo.  (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
50 
Cal.4th 
512, 
527.) 
 
“Deference 
to 
administrative 
interpretations always is ‘situational’ and depends on ‘a complex 
of factors’ [citation], but where the agency has special expertise 
and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, 
that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight.”  
(Sharon S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 436.)  Where an agency’s 
action is “quasi-legislative” or “the substantive product of a 
delegated legislative power conferred on the agency,” the scope 
of our review is “limited to determining whether the regulation 
(1) is ‘within the scope of the authority conferred’ [citation] and 
(2) is ‘reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute’ [citation].”  (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 8, 11.)  By 
contrast, where an agency’s action is interpretive or merely 
“represents the agency’s view of the statute’s legal meaning and 
effect,” the agency’s “interpretation of the meaning and legal 
effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect,” but 
“commands a commensurably lesser degree of judicial 
deference.”  (Id. at pp. 7, 11.) 
Although the classification of an agency’s action as quasi-
legislative or interpretive often guides our analysis, we have 
observed that “some rules defy easy categorization.”  (Assn. of 
Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones (2017) 2 Cal.5th 376, 397.)  At times, it is 
“helpful . . . to imagine ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘interpretive’ as 
the outer boundaries of a continuum measuring the breadth of 
the authority delegated by the Legislature.  [Citation.]  Thus, in 
certain circumstances, a regulation may have both quasi-
legislative and interpretive characteristics — ‘as when an 
administrative agency exercises a legislatively delegated power 
to interpret key statutory terms.’ ”  (Id. at p. 397.) 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
A. 
Section 11451.5 directs the Department to calculate “the 
income of the family” for the purposes of determining 
CalWORKs eligibility by calculating the sum of the applicant 
family’s “earned income,” meaning “gross income received as 
wages, 
salary, 
employer-provided 
sick 
leave 
benefits, 
commissions, or profits from activities such as a business 
enterprise or farming in which the recipient is engaged as a self-
employed individual or as an employee,” disability-based 
unearned income such as disability insurance benefits, and the 
family’s “unearned income,” which is any income that does not 
fall within the meaning of “earned” or “[d]isability-based 
unearned” 
income. 
 
(§ 
11451.5, 
subds. 
(a), (b)(1)–(3).)  
CalWORKs aid is to be calculated as follows:  “In determining 
the amount of aid paid . . . , the family’s income, exclusive of any 
amounts considered exempt as income . . . , determined for the 
prospective semiannual period . . . , and then calculated 
pursuant to Section 11451.5, shall be deducted from the sum 
specified in [a table provided in the statute], as adjusted for cost-
of-living increases . . . .  In no case shall the amount of aid paid 
for each month exceed the sum specified” in a table provided in 
the statute.  (§ 11450, subd. (a)(1)(A).)   
The CalWORKs statute excludes from income the first 
$225 of income plus 50 percent of each additional dollar of gross 
earnings.  (§ 11451.5.)  The statute further provides that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this part, . . . ‘income’ shall be 
deemed to be the same as applied under the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children [AFDC] program on August 21, 1996,” with 
several additional exemptions for income that is “received too 
infrequently to be reasonably anticipated,” for income “from 
college 
work-study 
programs,” 
and 
for 
academic 
or 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
extracurricular awards or scholarships.  (§ 11157, subd. (b).)  
Court-ordered child support is not among these statutory 
exemptions from income.  The Department repealed its 
regulation providing for a deduction for “actual payments made 
in support of a child . . . not in the home” (Manual Letter No. 
EAS-92-02, supra, at p. 480), and its Manual of Policies and 
Procedures now specifies that “[p]ayments which do not fall 
within the limitations specified in the foregoing subsections, 
represent nonexempt income to be considered in determining 
the recipient’s grant” (MPP § 44-111.5).   
Christensen argues that the funds used to pay Bruce’s 
child support obligations cannot constitute “income” to her 
household because her family can never actually receive or 
benefit from those funds, and therefore the funds are not 
“reasonably anticipated” to be “received” within the meaning of 
section 11265.2.  Because the money used to pay child support 
is not actually available to her household, Christensen contends, 
that money cannot be counted as part of “the family’s income” 
for purposes of calculating CalWORKs aid.  (§ 11450, 
subd. (a)(1)(A).)  We find this argument unpersuasive. 
In Heckler v. Turner (1985) 470 U.S. 184 (Heckler), the 
high court explained that the principle of actual availability 
“traces its origins to congressional consideration of the 1939 
amendments” to the Social Security Act, during which 
legislators expressed concern that state agencies might assume 
financial assistance from potential sources (e.g., a recipient’s 
children) who might not actually contribute.  (Heckler, at p. 200.)  
The requirement that income be actually available prohibits 
states from “conjuring fictional sources of income and resources 
by imputing financial support from persons who have no 
obligation to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
attributes nonexistent resources to recipients.”  (Ibid.)  This 
policy was endorsed by federal agencies administering the 
former AFDC program.  (Id. at pp. 200–201.) 
We recognized a comparable principle in Cooper v. Swoap 
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 856 (Cooper), where we held that treating 
“ ‘noncash economic benefits,’ ” such as shared housing, as 
“ ‘income’ ” under the former AFDC program was invalid.  (Id. 
at p. 859.)  We explained that “under the governing provisions 
of the federal Social Security Act only a recipient’s actual 
available income may be deducted from his basic welfare 
benefit; arbitrary or constructive ‘presumptions’ of income are 
not permissible.”  (Id. at p. 870; see Waits v. Swoap (1974) 
11 Cal.3d 887, 894–895 (Waits) [only the “ ‘actual value of 
housing and utility benefits received could possibly constitute 
income to the recipient’ ” (citing Cooper, at p. 870)]; Mooney v. 
Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 680 [concluding that a county 
regulation denying general assistance to “employable” single 
men was invalid because “theoretical employability is a barren 
resource; it is inedible; it provides neither shelter nor any other 
necessity of life”].)   
The agency in Cooper and Waits assigned “a fictional 
value” to benefits received by a recipient rather than attempting 
to measure the “actual value of the benefits received.”  (Cooper, 
supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 870; Waits, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 890.)  
Here, by contrast, the child support payments garnished from 
Bruce’s income were not “fictional,” “theoretical,” or merely 
“ ‘imputed.’ ”  (Heckler, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 200; Cooper, supra, 
11 Cal.3d at p. 870; Mooney, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 680.)  Bruce 
received actual income — his wages plus his unemployment 
insurance benefits — from which child support payments were 
deducted.  The circumstances here do not involve “imputing 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
financial support from persons who have no obligation to furnish 
it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that attributes 
nonexistent resources to recipients.”  (Heckler, supra, 470 U.S. 
at p. 200.)   
Furthermore, section 11265.2, subdivision (b), which 
defines “ ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” income, is concerned not with 
whether income is actually or only theoretically available, but 
rather with an issue of timing, i.e., when income can be expected 
to be received.  Specifically, the statute provides that “income 
shall be considered to be ‘reasonably anticipated’ if the county is 
reasonably certain of the amount of income and that the income 
will be received during the semiannual reporting period.”  
(§ 11265.2, subd. (b).)  This language was added to the 
CalWORKs statute in 2002, when the Legislature replaced 
counties’ eligibility determinations, which were previously 
based on a monthly system, with a prospective budgeting 
system.  Section 11265.2, subdivision (b) instructs the 
Department to count as gross income the amounts that it can 
expect an applicant will earn within a designated temporal 
period.  The text of this provision, understood in light of its 
enactment history, does not set forth a requirement that funds 
be actually available to the applicant household in order to count 
as income. 
Christensen further argues that the CalWORKs scheme 
did not displace the Department’s earlier regulation excluding 
child support payments from income.  She reads section 11157, 
subdivision (b)’s directive that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
. . . , ‘income’ shall be deemed to be the same as applied under 
the [AFDC] program on August 21, 1996” to preserve the 
Department’s former policy (under AFDC) of deducting child 
support payments from income.  In a related argument, amicus 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
curiae Harriett Buhai Center for Family Law argues that the 
Legislature’s decision to exempt a certain amount of earnings 
from income when calculating CalWORKs aid (§ 11451.5) was 
not intended to abrogate the Department’s “child support 
allocation” policy under AFDC, which existed independently of 
the earned income exemption revised by CalWORKs.  
Section 11451.5, subdivision (a), specifies that “for 
purposes of subdivision (a) of section 11450” — that is, for 
purposes of calculating CalWORKs aid — certain income shall 
be treated as exempt, including the first $225 of earned income 
or disability-based unearned income, plus 50 percent of each 
additional dollar of gross earnings.  As noted, subdivision (b) of 
the same section defines earned income “[f]or the purposes of 
this section” (i.e., for the purposes of section 11451.5) as “gross 
income received as wages, salary, employer-provided sick leave 
benefits, commissions, or profits from activities such as a 
business enterprise or farming in which the recipient is engaged 
as a self-employed individual or as an employee.”  This 
definition expressly applies to the determination of “the income 
of the family” under section 11450 for the purposes of calculating 
CalWORKs aid.  Whatever aspects of the AFDC definition of 
income were preserved by section 11157, subdivision (b), the 
Legislature made clear in section 11451.5 that the definition of 
income and exemptions articulated in that section comprised a 
new scheme for calculating CalWORKs aid.  (See § 11157, 
subd. (b) [retaining AFDC’s definition of income “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided” (italics added)].) 
Furthermore, the Department’s former policy treated the 
sums used to pay child support as part of the gross income of the 
noncustodial parent, subject to an income deduction.  (See MPP, 
former §§ 44-113.9, 44-113.24, 44-113.241; see also Cal. Dept. of 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
Social Services, MPP, former § 44-113.242, eff. July 1, 1968 
[providing that a “[d]eduction is made from income for” “support 
payments actually made to or for his dependents living 
elsewhere”].)  Amicus’s labeling of child support under the 
former policy as an “allocation” rather than an “exemption” 
appears inaccurate and in any event has no bearing on the 
meaning of the statutory text, which indicates that the 
definition of income and exemptions in section 11451.5 
comprehensively replaced the former system of exemptions and 
deductions. 
In sum, nothing in the text of the CalWORKs statute 
exempts or excludes funds used to pay child support from the 
definition of income.  And the statute does not indicate that the 
Legislature intended to preserve the Department’s prior policy 
of deducting such payments from income. 
B. 
Christensen’s principal argument is that including child 
support paid by a noncustodial parent as part of the paying 
household’s income “thwarts the primary purpose of both 
CalWORKs and child support.”  California’s child support 
guideline “takes into account each parent’s actual income and 
level of responsibility for the children,” with the goal of placing 
“the interests of children as the state’s top priority.”  (Fam. Code, 
§ 4053, subds. (c), (e).)  The aim of the CalWORKs program is 
similarly to allow families “to provide sufficient support and 
protection of [their] children.”  (§ 11205.)  According to 
Christensen, counting money paid under the child support 
scheme as income to the paying family under CalWORKs, 
thereby rendering children in the paying family ineligible for 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
CalWORKs aid, risks undermining the programs’ shared goals 
of supporting and prioritizing all children. 
Christensen further argues that counting child support as 
income could create a perverse incentive for families like 
Christensen’s to live separately in order to obtain the 
CalWORKs aid they need to support their children.  (See Amicus 
Br. of Alliance for Children’s Rights at p. 12 [“Requiring parents 
to choose between feeding their children and living together as 
a family simply cannot be part of a system designed to protect 
an institution that the Legislature declared is ‘of fundamental 
importance to society in nurturing its members, passing on 
values, averting potential social problems, and providing the 
secure 
structure 
in 
which 
citizens 
live 
out 
their 
lives . . . .’ ” (citing § 11205)]; McCormick v. County of Alameda 
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 201, 218 [forcing families to live 
separately to preserve eligibility for CalWORKs “cannot be 
deemed to have been authorized by the Legislature”].)  Counting 
child support as income for determining CalWORKs eligibility 
could have the additional effect of encouraging “deliberate 
attempt[s] to avoid . . . support obligations” by reducing 
earnings (In re Marriage of Ilas (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1630, 
1638), thereby undermining the program’s express goal of 
encouraging work efforts.  
Christensen’s arguments are not without force, and the 
exclusion she urges may have merit as a matter of policy.  But 
the Legislature charged the Department with “full power to 
supervise every phase of the administration of public social 
services” (§ 10600), and this supervisory authority includes fact-
specific determinations of eligibility for aid and application of 
the agency’s judgment about how best to effectuate the purposes 
of the CalWORKs statute.  (See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(C) 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
[“States may have policies which provide for allocating an 
individual’s income . . . for the support of other individuals living 
in another household.  Such other individuals are those who are 
or could be claimed by the individual as dependents for 
determining Federal personal income tax liability, or those he 
or she is legally obligated to support.”].)  The Legislature also 
expressly authorized the Department to “implement, interpret, 
or make specific” the provisions of the statute “by means of all-
county letters or similar instructions from the department until 
regulations are adopted.”  (§ 10606.2, subd. (a).)  Pursuant to 
this authority, the Department initially articulated its 
determination that CalWORKs “amends the method of 
determining net nonexempt income (NNI) in the grant 
computation by eliminating the existing income disregards and 
replacing them with new income disregards” in an All County 
Letter.  (See Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 7 [an agency’s 
statutory interpretation is entitled to respect “whether 
embodied in a formal rule or less formal representation”].)  In 
its briefing and at oral argument, the Department asserted that 
its decision that child support payments were no longer 
deductible as income was “discretionary” in nature and designed 
to “track the legislative intent” in enacting CalWORKs.  We 
understand the Department to argue that its decision was, at 
least in part, an exercise of lawmaking authority delegated by 
the Legislature to fill gaps in the statutory scheme.  (Yamaha, 
at pp. 10–11.) 
Given the lack of any indication in the statute compelling 
or prohibiting the deduction of child support payments from 
income, we agree that the Department’s decision to include child 
support payments as income is properly characterized as quasi-
legislative.  We must therefore decide whether the Department 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
acted “within the scope of the authority conferred” and whether 
its action was “ ‘reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose 
of the statute.’ ”  (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 11.)  
Christensen argues that the Department’s decision was not 
reasonable because it conflicts with the Legislature’s overriding 
policy goal of ensuring adequate support for all children.  The 
Department counters that its interpretation of the Legislature’s 
intent in passing CalWORKs — specifically, its understanding 
that the earned-income disregard was intended to encourage 
work and to replace AFDC-era disregards with a simpler grant 
calculation method in lieu of a patchwork of disregards — was 
reasonable.   
We think the Department has the better argument.  It is 
a fair inference that, in enacting CalWORKs and its expanded 
earned-income disregard, the Legislature sought a more 
streamlined approach to grant calculation as a means of 
improving the program’s administrability.  Moreover, although 
the elimination of the child support disregard might not directly 
advance the Legislative purpose of encouraging families to work 
more, it may operate to do so indirectly.  For example, families 
paying court-ordered child support whose earned income is 
insufficient to make ends meet may ultimately decide to seek 
more earned income.  Thus, the replacement of the child-support 
disregard with an earned-income disregard may function as an 
incentive for families to increase their earned income.  
We therefore conclude the Department’s interpretation 
was “reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of the 
statute.”  (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 11.)  This is especially 
so where the Legislature has “left untouched” the Department’s 
interpretation of the statute, despite making other amendments 
to the CalWORKs scheme over the years.  (Sara M. v. Superior 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1015; see, e.g., Sen. Bill No. 1041 
(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) [amending exemption amounts by 
changing the calculation of eligibility for benefits]; Assem. Bill 
No. 1233 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) [clarifying that on-the-job 
training wages are not excluded from income].)  The Legislature 
considered restoring the child support disregard in 1999, but the 
proposal was not enacted.  (See Assem. Bill No. 1233 (1999–2000 
Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 26, 1999, § 6.)  Indeed, the 
legislative history of this failed proposal provides some support 
for the Department’s view that CalWORKs eliminated the 
previously 
existing 
child-support 
disregard, 
albeit 
inadvertently.  (See Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 1233 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 
26, 1999 [“Prior to welfare reform, a family was entitled to 
disregard from any countable income the amount of child or 
spousal support paid to a person outside of the household . . . .  
The author indicates this provision was inadvertently repealed 
by the new disregard provision.  The bill restores previous 
law.”].) 
Christensen does not contend that the CalWORKs statute 
must be construed to provide exclusions from income for 
garnishments to pay other debts.  Instead, she argues that 
court-ordered child support obligations are distinguishable from 
other debts because CalWORKs and child support obligations 
“operate together to implement the legislative intent that all 
children . . . receive sufficient support”; because child support is 
a debt that has priority over debts owed to other creditors and 
cannot be modified without the consent of the local child support 
agency and the court (Fam. Code, §§ 4011, 4065); because child 
support obligations cannot be discharged in bankruptcy (11 
U.S.C. §§ 523, subds. (a)(5), (a)(15); 42 U.S.C. § 656); and 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
because child support that is garnished for the benefit of 
children living in a different household, unlike other types of 
debt (e.g., car payments, furniture payments), does not even 
incidentally benefit the children living in the payor’s household.   
We agree that the law in many ways treats child support 
obligations differently from other debts.  But we do not agree 
that the conclusion to be drawn from this special treatment is 
that the Department’s policy frustrates the statute’s purpose.  
As discussed, no exclusion for child support appears in the 
statute’s text.  And although the absence of a statutory exclusion 
may render some households ineligible for CalWORKs or reduce 
the amount of aid, the Legislature in enacting CalWORKs 
declared that “[e]ach family unit has the right and responsibility 
to provide for its own economic security by full participation in 
the work force to the extent possible.”  (§ 11205.)  The statute 
makes clear that the Legislature sought not only to provide aid 
to needy families but also to encourage greater work effort by 
those families. 
In sum, we hold that the Department’s determination that 
funds garnished to pay child support for the benefit of a child 
living in another household are not exempt from the paying 
household’s income for purposes of determining its eligibility for 
or amount of CalWORKs aid was a reasonable exercise of its 
delegated lawmaking authority and was therefore valid. 
III. 
We now address Christensen’s argument that the 
Department’s policy of counting garnished child support as 
income to the paying household results in counting the same 
income twice in violation of section 11005.5. 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
Section 11005.5 says:  “All money paid to a recipient or 
recipient group as aid is intended to help the recipient meet his 
individual needs or, in the case of a recipient group, the needs of 
the recipient group, and is not for the benefit of any other 
person.  Aid granted under [Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, which now includes the CalWORKs 
program] . . . to a recipient or recipient group and the income or 
resources of such recipient or recipient group shall not be 
considered in determining eligibility for or the amount of aid of 
any other recipient or recipient group.”  The Legislature enacted 
this statute in 1973 “to insure that aid paid (1) is for the 
individual needs of its recipient, (2) is not for the benefit of any 
other person, and (3) shall not be viewed or treated as income 
available to any other person.  To treat one person’s aid as a 
reason to deny eligibility or to reduce assistance to which 
another is entitled amounts to defiance of the legislative 
proscription.”  (Rogers v. Detrich (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 90, 101, 
fn. omitted; see id. at pp. 99–101 [discussing history of section 
11005.5]; id. at p. 101 [holding that Supplemental Security 
Income received by one household member should not be 
considered in calculating eligibility for General Assistance for 
any other household member].) 
 
Christensen points to the second sentence of section 
11005.5 and argues that the child support payment garnished 
from Bruce’s “income or resources” is used to determine her 
household’s CalWORKs aid eligibility as well as the receiving 
family’s aid eligibility or amount.  “Under the Department’s 
policy,” Christensen contends, “the garnished child support 
‘income’ received by the custodial family is ‘considered in 
determining eligibility or the amount of aid’ to the paying 
family, in violation of §11005.5.”  According to Christensen, the 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
policy “results in counting the same income twice” because the 
same funds are “counted as available to the paying family when 
the paying family applies for or receives CalWORKs” and 
“counted as available to the receiving family when that family 
also receives CalWORKs.”   
But 
Christensen’s 
“double 
counting” 
argument 
misapprehends the character of the child support payment.  As 
the Attorney General explains, “there is a distinction between 
the child support received by Bruce’s noncustodial child, and the 
funds used to pay that support obligation.”  The Attorney 
General illustrates this distinction by observing that if one 
CalWORKs recipient buys a car from another CalWORKs 
recipient and agrees to pay monthly installments, it is not 
double counting to treat the funds used by the buyer to make car 
payments as the buyer’s income while treating the payments 
received by the seller as the seller’s income.  Similarly here, the 
funds used to pay child support are counted as part of Bruce’s 
income; as such, the funds are considered in determining 
Christensen’s aid eligibility.  The child support payment is an 
expenditure by Bruce for the benefit of the receiving family; it is 
considered in determining the receiving family’s aid eligibility.  
(§ 11454.5, subd. (a)(3).)  It is Bruce’s expenditure, not his 
“income or resources” (§ 11005.5), that is considered in 
determining the receiving family’s eligibility for aid.  This does 
not run afoul of section 11005.5.  (Cf. Cervantez v. Sullivan (9th 
Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 229, 234, fn. 10 [rejecting plaintiffs’ 
argument that because garnished child support payments count 
as income to the recipient for determining Supplemental 
Security Income eligibility, they cannot also be counted as 
income to the payor as “based on a flawed premise”; “[t]he 
garnishment regulation does not count child support income to 
CHRISTENSEN v. LIGHTBOURNE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
the payor; it counts as income the funds used by the payor to 
make the child support payments”].) 
IV. 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Christensen v. Lightbourne 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 15 Cal.App.5th 1239 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S245395 
Date Filed: July 8, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Ernest H. Goldsmith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Jonathan L. Wolff, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant 
Attorney General, Geoffrey H. Wright, Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, Susan M. Carson, 
Jennifer A. Bunshoft and Michael J. Mongan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County, Hope G. Nakamura, Trinh Phan; Western Center on Law & 
Poverty, Richard A. Rothschild, Alexander Prieto, Rebecca C. Miller; Legal Aid of Marin and Stephanie E. 
Haffner for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Betty Nordwind, Patrick Lynch, David Ettinger and Rebecca Fischer for Harriett Buhai Center for Family 
Law as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer Braun, Angela Schwartz, Elise Weinberg, Nisha Kashyap, Rachel Stein; Remcho, Johansen & 
Purcell and Robin B. Johansen for Alliance for Children’s Rights as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael J. Mongan 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3377 
 
Richard A. Rothschild 
Western Center on Law & Poverty 
3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 208 
Los Angeles, CA  90010 
(213) 487-7211