Case Title: Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5680

Docket Number: 2011-2096

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 
2012-Ohio-5680.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5680 
COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, v . 
FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5680.] 
(No. 2011-2096—Submitted October 23, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2008-Q-2457. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the Columbus City 
School District Board of Education (“school board”) challenges a decision of the 
Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) that affirmed the Franklin County Board of 
Revision’s (“BOR’s”) adoption of a sale price as the value of the property at issue 
for tax year 2007.  The school board argues that the BOR lacked jurisdiction 
because the valuation complaint had been signed and submitted by the property 
owner’s spouse, who was not a lawyer.  Even though R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) 
explicitly authorizes a spouse to file on behalf of the other spouse, the school 
board argues that the filing of the complaint did not invoke the BOR’s 
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jurisdiction.  See Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio 
St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932 (1997).  We disagree with the school board.  The 
school board also argues that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in 
affirming the use of a sale price.  They argue that the sale was a “short sale” and 
that duress in the sale prevented it from being an arm’s-length transaction.  See 
R.C. 5713.03.  We conclude that the record furnishes a sufficient basis to support 
the BTA’s finding.  Accordingly, we affirm its decision. 
Background 
{¶ 2} On March 26, 2008, the owner of the property at issue, Susanne 
Novak, apparently acting through her husband, Kurt Novak, filed a complaint 
challenging the auditor’s valuation of the property for tax year 2007.  (Although 
no testimony or document directly establishes the marital relationship of Kurt and 
Susanne Novak, the record raises the strong inference that the two are married, 
and the school board does not contend otherwise.)  The complaint asserted that 
the sale price of $179,000 should be adopted as the value of the property, rather 
than $295,100, the value as determined by the auditor.  The school board filed a 
countercomplaint on May 21, 2008, asserting that the auditor’s valuation should 
be retained. 
{¶ 3} Susanne Novak purchased the property from Paul and Dianna 
Patterson in August 2007 for $179,000.  Subsequently, the property was assigned 
by Susanne Novak to Parkland Investment Group, L.L.C., in May 2008 for no 
consideration. 
{¶ 4} On August 21, 2008, the BOR held a hearing at which Kurt Novak 
testified that “we purchased [the property at issue] on a short sale” because the 
previous owners “were behind on their payments.”  Novak presented listings and 
sale prices of allegedly similar properties in the same subdivision over the 
preceding six months.  Novak’s exhibit showed three sales over the period, the 
highest sale price was $48.82 per square foot, the lowest $16.49 per square foot, 
January Term, 2012 
3 
and the median was $30.33 per square foot.  There were 14 listings; the average 
was $69 per square foot.  Novak claimed that his exhibit showed that properties in 
the area were overvalued for assessment.  His argument appeared to be that the 
price-per-square-foot numbers established the propriety of the sale price because 
that price was $58.80 per square foot.  But Novak made no adjustments for 
differing features of the properties—in particular, there were no indications of, or 
adjustments for, the circumstances of sale of the alleged comparables. 
{¶ 5} At the time of the BOR hearing, the property at issue was being 
rented for $2,200 per month, with an option to purchase for $230,000.  Novak 
also testified that the property was in “good” condition when purchased, but 
stated that it “probably needs some work to get it retail sold at the high end” of 
$230,000.  On cross-examination, Novak testified that the property had been 
acquired as part of a course of business in which Novak’s company actively 
solicited owners who were “behind on their mortgage payments.”  Novak 
admitted that “it was certainly a distress sale” from the owner-seller’s standpoint.  
Novak asserted that the sale was at arm’s length because there was no relationship 
between the seller and the buyer, and because the bank negotiated for the highest 
possible price in its own best interest. 
{¶ 6} On December 5, 2008, the BOR issued a decision adopting the sale 
price of $179,000 as the value of the property.  The school board appealed to the 
BTA, and the BTA held a hearing on April 13, 2011, at which the school board 
and the county appeared.  The owner did not appear. 
{¶ 7} The school board argued that the BOR lacked jurisdiction because 
the complaint was presented by someone who was not Susanne Novak herself or a 
lawyer.  Additionally, the school board argued that the sale should not be 
considered an arm’s-length transaction.  On November 15, 2011, the BTA issued 
its decision.  The BTA compared signatures in the record and found that “the 
signature on the complaint is consistent with the signature of Kurt Novak, not 
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Susanne Novak.”  Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, BTA No. 2008-Q-2457, 2011 WL 5924473, *2 (Nov. 15, 2011).  
Drawing the inference from the entire record that Kurt and Susanne were married 
to each other, the BTA held that under Dayton Supply & Tool Co., Inc.  v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006-Ohio-5852, 856 
N.E.2d 926, “ ‘a complaint executed and signed by a non-attorney husband/wife 
when the property which is the subject of the complaint is owned by the spouse is 
executed with the requisite fiduciary interests.’ ”  Id. 
{¶ 8} Addressing the valuation issue, the BTA stated that in a short sale, 
the purchase price is less than the amount owed to the lender.  The BTA 
characterized the school board’s position as “ ‘constru[ing] the bank’s 
consideration of the amount remaining on the mortgage as an indication of the 
“forced” or “involuntary” nature of the sale.’ ”  Id., *3, quoting Cincinnati School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2008-A-1788 (July 
12, 2011) (“Cincinnati School Dist. I”).  In rejecting the school board’s position, 
the BTA opined that “ ‘the only party that could have felt “forced” in the sale was 
the property owner, who had no role in the negotiation of the sale.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Cincinnati School Dist. I.  According to the BTA, the bank “ ‘acted freely in 
negotiating the ultimate sale price, basing its position on the amount of money it 
needed to get out of the sale, not unlike any other seller’s typical motivation.’ ”  
Id., quoting Cincinnati School Dist. I.  On this basis, the BTA concluded that “the 
best evidence of the subject’s value as of the effective tax lien date [was] the 
amount for which it transferred in August 2007.”  Id., *4. 
{¶ 9} The school board appealed, and we now affirm. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
5 
Analysis 
A. In authorizing an owner’s spouse to file a complaint, R.C. 5715.19(A) 
does not substantially interfere with regulating the practice of law 
{¶ 10} We first turn to an issue of the jurisdiction of the boards of 
revision.  On the basis of Sharon Village, 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, and 
its progeny, the school board asserts that the valuation complaint filed on behalf 
of Susanne Novak, the property owner, by her husband, Kurt Novak, is invalid 
because Kurt Novak was not a lawyer. 
{¶ 11} Because the General Assembly, through a 1999 amendment to R.C. 
5715.19(A), Sub.H.B. No. 694 (“H.B. 694”), 147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5373, 
5375, has specifically empowered a spouse to file a valuation complaint on behalf 
of the spouse who owns property, the school board’s argument requires 
considering whether the legislative enactment can constitutionally be enforced in 
light of the duty to regulate the practice of law that the Ohio Constitution vests in 
this court.  Ohio Constitution, Section 1, Article II, confers general legislative 
authority on the General Assembly, pursuant to which the legislature has acted in 
creating the boards of revision and defining their authority.  Ohio Constitution, 
Section 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV, confers upon this court original jurisdiction 
regarding “[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so 
admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law.” 
{¶ 12} “ ‘The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in 
court.  It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to 
actions and special proceedings and the management of such actions and 
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts * * *.”  Dayton Supply 
& Tool, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006-Ohio-5852, 856 N.E.2d 926, ¶ 7, quoting Land 
Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Consistent with this general doctrine, preparing 
and submitting a valuation complaint on behalf of a corporation or another natural 
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person are understood to constitute the practice of law.  Sharon Village at 481-
482. 
1. In Sharon Village, the pertinent statutes prohibited a nonattorney agent of 
the corporate property owner from filing a valuation complaint 
{¶ 13} The school board relies on Sharon Village to support its argument 
that the valuation complaint filed by Kurt Novak on behalf of his wife, the 
property owner, is invalid.  At the time Sharon Village was decided, R.C. 
5715.19(A) provided that an owner of property in the county could file a 
valuation complaint, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 603, 142 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4583, 4589, 
and R.C. 5715.13 provided that either the owner itself or an “agent” could 
perform the filing, 1953 Am.H.B. No. 1.  Also at that time, R.C. 4705.01 stated:  
 
 
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and 
counselor at law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any action or 
proceeding in which he is not a party concerned, either by suing or 
subscribing his own name, or the name of another person, unless 
he has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in 
compliance with its prescribed and published rules. 
 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 219, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 662, 680-681. 
{¶ 14} Based on our reading of the interplay of R.C. 4505.01, 5715.13, 
and 5715.19, we concluded that when a nonattorney signed a valuation complaint 
on behalf of a corporation, that person engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law.  Sharon Village, 78 Ohio St.3d at 483, 678 N.E.2d 932.  We concluded, 
therefore, that the complaint did not invoke the jurisdiction of the board of 
revision.  Id. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
7 
2. The enactment of H.B. 694 in 1998 creates the potential for an 
interference with this court’s regulation of the practice of law 
{¶ 15} Subsequently, the General Assembly amended R.C. 5715.19(A) to 
specify persons who may file on behalf of an owner.  H.B. 694, 147 Ohio Laws, 
at 5375.  R.C. 5715.19(A) now expressly authorizes a property owner’s spouse to 
file a complaint on behalf of a property owner.  This amendment creates a tension 
between the statute and this court’s power to regulate the practice of law. 
{¶ 16} We have already considered a case that lies at this intersection of 
legislative and judicial power.  In Dayton Supply & Tool, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 
2006-Ohio-5852, 856 N.E.2d 926, a nonattorney corporate officer filed a 
valuation complaint on behalf of the corporation, which owned the property at 
issue.  We stated that even though R.C. 5715.19(A) specifically authorizes a 
corporate officer to file on behalf of the corporation, “[b]ecause we are solely 
responsible for regulating the practice of law, we are not compelled to accept this 
legislative amendment.”  Id., ¶ 20.  We then examined a number of factors to 
determine whether we would apply the statute as written. 
{¶ 17} We stated that unlike the representatives who filed the complaints 
at issue in Sharon Village, a corporate officer has fiduciary duties to the 
corporation by which the corporation would hold the officer accountable for 
properly filing the complaint.  Id., ¶ 21-22.  We stated that the particular dispute 
in Dayton Supply & Tool did not involve legal issues that called for an attorney’s 
expertise.  Id., ¶ 24-25.  We applied a recent holding that permitted corporate 
officers to file complaints in small-claims court to the filing of valuation 
complaints.  Id., ¶ 28.  Finally, we considered public-interest factors.  Id., ¶ 30.  
We concluded that “a corporate officer does not engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law by preparing and filing a complaint with the board of revision and 
by presenting the claimed value of the property before the board of revision on 
behalf of his or her corporation, as long as the officer does not make legal 
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arguments, examine witnesses, or undertake any other tasks that can be performed 
only by an attorney.”  Id., ¶ 32. 
{¶ 18} In Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 63, 2010-Ohio-4907, 936 N.E.2d 489 (“Cincinnati 
School Dist. II”), we addressed whether a corporate officer’s conduct at a hearing 
before the BTA could retroactively divest that tribunal of jurisdiction.  In that 
context, we stated that “the only jurisdictional issue actually presented in [Dayton 
Supply & Tool] was ‘whether a nonattorney corporate officer who prepares and 
files a complaint with a board of revision on behalf of the corporation engages in 
the unauthorized practice of law.’ ”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Id., ¶ 16, quoting 
Dayton Supply & Tool, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006-Ohio-5852, 856 N.E.2d 926, 
¶ 1.  We held that “[o]nce jurisdiction has been vested in an administrative 
tribunal by the proper filing of a complaint or notice of appeal, a later act 
constituting the unauthorized practice of law will not retroactively divest that 
tribunal of jurisdiction.”  Id. 
3. The legislature did not intend the courts to decide whether to apply H.B. 
694 case-by-case based on a judicially crafted multifactor test 
{¶ 19} Having determined in Dayton Supply & Tool and Cincinnati School 
Dist. II that a corporate officer may file on behalf of the corporation, we now 
address whether a property owner’s spouse may file on his or her behalf.  
Although our original mode of analysis in Dayton Supply & Tool invites us to 
apply a multifactor test in determining this issue, we decline to do so.  In 
particular, we decline to consider whether the filing spouse has fiduciary duties to 
the property-owning spouse with regard to the filing.  Nor will we undertake an 
examination of whether, in this particular case, the complaint sets forth any 
difficult legal issues calling for an attorney’s expertise. 
{¶ 20} We decline to pursue this case-by-case mode of analysis because it 
is not appropriate for the BOR’s jurisdiction to depend on the specific facts of the 
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9 
particular case.  Litigants and agencies should be able to rely on the statute at all 
times or, alternatively, know that they may never rely on it.  Furthermore, it is 
obvious that the General Assembly intended H.B. 694 to permit a spouse to file 
on behalf of the other spouse without regard to a multifactor test that the 
legislature did not prescribe. 
4. The filing of a valuation complaint by the owner’s spouse validly invokes 
the BOR’s jurisdiction 
{¶ 21} The issue for our review is not the degree to which the filing of the 
valuation complaint in this particular case constitutes the practice of law.  Instead, 
we more broadly inquire into the constitutionality of the General Assembly 
authorizing a nonattorney spouse to file on behalf of the other spouse, given that 
the Ohio Constitution assigns to this court the regulation of the practice of law. 
{¶ 22} The General Assembly has the authority to determine how the 
jurisdiction of an administrative board may be invoked.  Zier v. Bur. of 
Unemployment Comp., 151 Ohio St. 123, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949), paragraph one of 
the syllabus; Akron Std. Div. of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.  v. Lindley, 11 Ohio 
St.3d 10, 11, 462 N.E.2d 419 (1984).  Accordingly, we should defer to the 
General Assembly’s decision regarding who may file a valuation complaint unless 
that provision substantially interferes with the regulation of the practice of law. 
{¶ 23} The act of filling out and filing a complaint does not call for 
specific legal expertise.  We so concluded in Dayton Supply & Tool.  Moreover, 
the preparation of a complaint form calls for the most basic information:  
identifying the complainant and its relationship to the property at issue and setting 
forth the true value found by the county and the taxable value sought by the 
taxpayer.  Preparing the complaint does not require exposition of legal arguments, 
which may be advanced later through the hearing and a brief.  And complaints 
can be and routinely are amended—or deemed to be amended—during the course 
of the proceedings to reflect evidence presented and the arguments advanced. 
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{¶ 24} The General Assembly has not thrown open the door to allow any 
person to serve as another’s agent.  Instead, R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) sets forth a few 
specific relationships that tend to involve an ongoing relationship between the 
owner and the filer and that allow the owner to hold the filer accountable for his 
or her actions.  The spousal relationship is one such relationship.  Although 
spouses do not generally owe business-fiduciary duties to one another, they are 
bound together in an ongoing relationship of mutual support. 
{¶ 25} It is sensible as a practical matter to allow a spouse to file on behalf 
of the other spouse.  Moreover, even if there are some situations where the filing 
spouse gets in over his or her head or makes a mistake that legal expertise would 
have avoided, denying jurisdiction to the board of revision is not the appropriate 
remedy.  And finally, many mistakes can be avoided or corrected by hiring an 
attorney to prosecute the complaint after it has been filed. 
{¶ 26} For these reasons, we conclude that a BOR’s jurisdiction may 
validly be invoked when, in accordance with R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), a property 
owner’s spouse files a valuation complaint on behalf of the owner. 
B. Whether the price obtained through a “short sale” equates with true 
value depends on a factual finding of how distress affected the sale 
{¶ 27} “The fair market value of property for tax purposes is a question of 
fact, the determination of which is primarily within the province of the taxing 
authorities, and this court will not disturb a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 
with respect to such valuation unless it affirmatively appears from the record that 
such decision is unreasonable or unlawful.”   Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision v. 
Fodor, 15 Ohio St.2d 52, 239 N.E.2d 25 (1968), syllabus.  Although the BTA is 
responsible for determining factual issues, we “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a 
BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ”  Satullo v. Wilkins, 
111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Gahanna-
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11 
Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 
N.E.2d 789 (2001). 
1. A short sale may be  voluntary if the evidence shows that the lender acted 
as a typically motivated seller would 
{¶ 28} When this case arose, R.C. 5713.03 required the county auditor, 
“[i]n determining the true value of any tract, lot, or parcel of real estate,” to 
“consider the sale price of such tract, lot, or parcel to be the true value for taxation 
purposes” if the sale was one at “arm’s length between a willing seller and a 
willing buyer” and if that sale occurred “within a reasonable length of time, either 
before or after the tax lien date.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 260, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2665, 2722.  It is well-established that an arm’s-length sale is one that is 
voluntary, that is, “ ‘without compulsion or duress.’ ”  Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 
540, ¶ 13, quoting Walters v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Revision, 47 Ohio St.3d 23, 25, 546 
N.E.2d 932 (1989).  Thus, a key consideration in this case is whether the seller 
and buyer were both willing. 
{¶ 29} A sale price from a short sale raises suspicion about the voluntary 
character of the sale because a short sale is a transaction in which the sale 
generates less than the amount owed on the mortgage note.  See Cattel v. Lake 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-161, 2010-Ohio-4426, ¶ 23.  A short 
sale often occurs in the context of a mortgage-loan default, which is a distressed 
situation. 
{¶ 30} In this case, it is clear that the property owner was under duress.  
At the BOR, Novak testified that his company solicited the sale because the 
owner was deeply in default on his mortgage loan.  We regard such atypical 
pressure to sell as a kind of duress that negates the arm’s-length character of the 
transaction.  Strongsville Bd. of Edn. at ¶ 13-18.  Moreover, a mortgage default 
raises the specter of imminent foreclosure, which is evidence that the seller is not 
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a typically motivated participant.  See Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 
222, ¶ 30-31.  See also R.C. 5713.04 (“The price for which such real property 
would sell at auction or forced sale shall not be taken as the criterion of its 
value”). 
{¶ 31} Although a short sale naturally raises the inference of distress and 
duress, the ultimate character of a sale as voluntary or involuntary is a factual 
matter to be resolved by the finder of fact based on the entire record before it.  
Compare Lakeside Ave. Ltd. Partnership v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 75 
Ohio St.3d 540, 664 N.E.2d 913 (1996), with Cleveland Mun. School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 107 Ohio St.3d 250, 2005-Ohio-6434, 838 
N.E.2d 647.  The standard for duress is whether compelling circumstances lead to 
the parties consummating a transaction whose terms would likely be unacceptable 
to a typically motivated seller or buyer.  Strongsville Bd. of Ed., 112 Ohio St.3d 
309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 16.  A finding of duress lies within the 
province of the fact-finder, whose determination we will uphold as long as the 
record contains sufficient support.  Id., ¶ 15. 
2. The BOR and the BTA found that the lender in this case acted to obtain 
the highest price it could, and the record supports that finding 
{¶ 32} In the present case, the BOR and the BTA concluded that sale price 
qualified as the criterion of value under R.C. 5713.03 because, although the 
property owner experienced distress, its lender “ ‘acted freely in negotiating the 
ultimate sale price, basing its position on the amount of money it needed to get 
out of the sale, not unlike any other seller’s typical motivation.’ ”  BTA No. 2008-
Q-2457, 2011 WL 5924473, *3, quoting Cincinnati School Dist. I.  That finding 
relates to Kurt Novak’s testimony before the BOR that the bank, in seeking a sale 
price high enough to pay off as much of the loan as possible, was acting like a 
typically motivated seller.  It lay within the BTA’s discretion as a fact-finder to 
January Term, 2012 
13 
decide the credibility of this evidence and the weight to accord it.  See 
HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa, 132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, 969 N.E.2d 232, 
¶ 10, 25. 
{¶ 33} The school board argues that the BTA erred by focusing on the 
motivations of the lender without considering the circumstances of the property 
owner.  But the school board cites no authority for the proposition that the tax 
assessor should always view the motivations of the property owner as having 
more importance than those of a third party who is exercising control over the 
sale.  Because the ultimate issue is whether the sale reflects the market, we 
construe the term “willing seller” in R.C. 5713.03 to encompass those persons 
controlling and influencing the sale on the seller’s side of the transaction. 
{¶ 34} In light of the foregoing discussion, the school board’s reliance on 
Cincinnati School Dist. II, 127 Ohio St.3d 63, 2010-Ohio-4907, 936 N.E.2d 489, 
is unavailing.  In that case, the majority concluded that the record contained no 
support for finding the sale voluntary, rendering the BTA’s finding unreasonable 
and unlawful.  Id. at ¶ 24.  Accord HealthSouth Corp., ¶ 14 (BTA findings to be 
reversed “only when there is a total absence of evidence to support a particular 
finding”).  In this case, it is clear that there is evidence to support the BTA’s 
decision; we therefore cannot conclude that the BTA acted unreasonably or 
unlawfully in upholding the use of the sale price under these circumstances.  See 
Strongsville, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, the school board did not present an affirmative case to 
reverse the BOR’s determination at the BTA.  Instead, the school board advocated 
for a presumption that it continues to advance here.  According to the school 
board, just as the basic documentation of a sale usually raises a presumption at 
both the BOR and the BTA that the sale is one that is recent and at arm’s length, 
the fact that the sale price is less than the amount owed in connection with the 
mortgage should raise a contrary presumption that the sale does not reflect market 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
value.  We disagree.  The significance of the relationship between sale price and 
the amount owed pertains primarily to the voluntary character of the sale.  
Although the proponent of a short sale does bear an initial burden to offer 
evidence that the sale is voluntary, that burden may be satisfied when the 
proponent presents specific testimony supporting the conclusion that the lender 
acted as a typically motivated seller.  Another mode of proof, as the school board 
points out, would be to show that the property was actively and openly marketed 
for sale for a reasonable period of time.  See Brashnyk v. Lane Cty. Assessor, 
Or.Tax Ct.-Mag.Div. No. TC-MD 110308, 2011 WL 6182028 (Dec. 12, 2011) 
(bank-owned property’s extensive exposure to the market demonstrated that the 
transaction reflected market value). 
{¶ 36} For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the BTA did not act 
unreasonably or unlawfully in using the August 2007 sale price as the value of the 
property for tax year 2007. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} The BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it permitted the 
filing of the complaint by Kurt Novak that challenged the valuation of Susanne 
Novak’s property.  Given the record before it, the BTA was justified in finding 
that the bank acted as a typically motivated seller.  We affirm the decision of the 
BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
____________________ 
 
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, and Karol C. Fox, for 
appellant. 
________________________