Case Title: Miller v. Gupta

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80273

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion 
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at 
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the 
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, 
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official 
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
                 Docket No. 80273--Agenda 22--May 1996. 
      CINDY MILLER, Appellee, v. DR. NARENDRA K. GUPTA et al. (Dr. 
                     Narendra K. Gupta, Appellant). 
                     Opinion filed October 24, 1996. 
 
     JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
     Plaintiff, Cindy Miller, filed an action in the circuit court 
of Marion County against Dr. Narendra K. Gupta alleging in two 
counts medical malpractice and spoliation of evidence. The trial 
court dismissed Miller's first-amended complaint in its entirety 
with prejudice. The appellate court reversed, finding that the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the medical 
malpractice count, and remanded so that Miller could amend her 
pleadings regarding spoliation of evidence. 275 Ill. App. 3d 539. 
We granted Gupta's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 
315). 
     In both counts of her first-amended complaint, Miller alleges 
that in February 1989, Gupta performed a surgical procedure on her 
left foot. In March of 1991, she contacted a podiatrist, Dr. 
William Hess, because of additional problems with her left foot, 
including stumbling, loss of balance and misalignment of one of her 
toes. Hess told Miller that she suffered from a transfer wound and 
misalignment of her toe and that these conditions may have resulted 
from medical malpractice committed by Gupta. Hess informed Miller 
that he would need to see the X rays taken prior to and after the 
surgery performed by Gupta to determine if Gupta had committed 
malpractice. 
     In August of 1991, Miller's attorney requested her medical 
records from Gupta. On October 30, 1991, Gupta informed the 
attorney that Miller's X rays had been inadvertently destroyed by 
the St. Mary's Hospital housekeeping department. 
     Understanding the above facts is not complete without 
mentioning two discovery depositions appearing in the record. In 
the first, Gupta stated that he took X rays of Miller's foot on an 
X-ray machine in his office at the time of her surgery, that the X 
rays were obtained from his files in October 1991 in response to 
the attorney's request, and that he placed the X rays on the floor 
against the wall and behind his chair so that he could take them to 
St. Mary's for copying. Gupta admitted that his wastebasket was 
approximately three feet from where he placed the X rays. Gupta 
stated that his office is located in a building separate from but 
adjacent to St. Mary's and that he contracted with St. Mary's for 
his office to be cleaned. In the second deposition, Cathy Joliff, 
an employee of St. Mary's housekeeping department, testified that 
she was assigned to clean Gupta's office and that she regularly 
disposed of X-ray jackets which were in the trash or located near 
the trash. She believed that Miller's X rays were thrown out when 
she cleaned Gupta's office and later destroyed in the hospital's 
incinerator. 
     In the first count (hereinafter, medical malpractice count) of 
her first-amended complaint, Miller further alleges that Gupta 
performed a procedure on her foot that was not required by 
preoperative observations, failed to perform the procedure with 
ordinary skill, failed to perform a medically preferred procedure, 
and failed to obtain her consent. Miller did not attach a 
certificate of merit and written report of a health professional to 
her complaint, as required by statute in medical malpractice 
actions (735 ILCS 5/2--622 (West 1994)). Rather, Miller's attorney 
attached an affidavit to the complaint stating that he had 
requested Miller's medical records, that 60 days had passed since 
his request, and that Gupta had informed him that the subject 
records had been destroyed. See 735 ILCS 5/2--622(a)(3) (West 
1994). 
     In the second count (hereinafter, spoliation of evidence 
count), Miller alleges spoliation of evidence in that Gupta 
destroyed her X rays in violation of the X-Ray Retention Act and in 
that Gupta negligently or intentionally caused or permitted the 
destruction of her X rays. Miller then alleges that she was unable 
to obtain a certificate of merit and written report because her X 
rays had been destroyed, thereby depriving her of any remedy 
obtainable under the medical malpractice count. 
     The trial court granted Gupta's motion to dismiss both counts, 
finding that Miller failed to attach the required certificate of 
merit and written report and that Gupta did not have a duty to 
preserve and maintain the X rays. The appellate court reversed in 
part, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the medical malpractice count for Miller's failure to 
file a section 2--622 certificate of merit. In so ruling, the 
appellate court stated that as a substitute for the section 2--622 
written report, Miller should attach to her complaint a physician's 
certificate confirming that the missing X rays are necessary to the 
determination of whether Gupta committed malpractice. Regarding the 
spoliation of evidence count, the appellate court found that while 
Miller could not state a cause of action against Gupta for a 
violation of the X-Ray Retention Act, she should have the 
opportunity to amend this count to conform with this court's 
decision in Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co.,  166 Ill. 2d 188 
(1995), which was issued while the instant cause was on appeal. 
     The issues before this court are whether the appellate court 
erred in (1) finding that the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the medical malpractice count and (2) allowing Miller 
the opportunity to amend the spoliation of evidence count to 
conform with this court's decision in Boyd. 
 
                                 ANALYSIS 
     Section 2--622(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires 
that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action attach an 
affidavit to the complaint stating that a health professional has 
been consulted and that the health professional has determined 
"that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause" for filing the 
action. Further, a copy of the health professional's written 
report, indicating the basis for the "meritorious" determination, 
must be attached to the affidavit. 735 ILCS 2--622(a)(1) (West 
1994). Section 2--622(a)(3) provides that a plaintiff can file an 
affidavit stating that a request for the examination and copying of 
medical records has been made and that the party responsible for 
complying with the request has failed to produce the requested 
medical records within 60 days. Section 2--622(a)(3) allows a 
plaintiff 90 days from the receipt of the requested medical records 
to file the certificate and written report required by section 2-- 
622(a)(1). The Code further provides that the failure to file a 
certificate of merit "shall be grounds for dismissal." 735 ILCS 
5/2--622(g) (West 1994). 
     In the instant cause, Gupta asserts that a trial court's 
decision to dismiss an action for the plaintiff's failure to file 
a section 2--622 certificate of merit should not be overturned 
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See Winters v. Podzamsky, 
252 Ill. App. 3d 821, 827 (1993); Peterson v. Hinsdale Hospital, 
233 Ill. App. 3d 327, 330 (1992). Gupta argues that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the instant medical 
malpractice count because section 2--622 requires a certificate of 
merit and Miller failed to attach one. Gupta further argues that 
the appellate court's decision effectively allows Miller to proceed 
with her medical malpractice claim without requiring her to show 
that the action is meritorious as contemplated by section 2--622. 
Miller counters that a pleading requirement, such as the filing of 
a 2--622 certificate of merit, should not be turned into a 
substantive defense which forever bars a decision on the merits. 
     In spite of Miller's argument, the legislature has made the 
filing of a section 2--622 certificate of merit a condition of 
proceeding with a meritorious medical malpractice action. 735 ILCS 
5/2--622 (West 1994). Here, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the medical malpractice count for Miller's 
failure to file a certificate of merit. In her complaint, Miller 
specifically alleges that "the accuracy of Dr. Gupta's observations 
and an assessment of his judgment and skill could not be determined 
with certainty absent review of the subject x-rays." In addition, 
in her brief before this court Miller concedes that she will never 
be able to comply with the section 2--622 certificate of merit 
requirement without the destroyed X rays and that the allegations 
of medical malpractice "cannot be established with certainty 
without the x-rays." 
     From Miller's admissions and the specific facts of this case, 
we conclude that Miller will never be able to file a certificate of 
merit as contemplated and required by section 2--622 and may not be 
able to prove her medical malpractice claim without the missing X 
rays. In fact, the appellate court acknowledged as much when it 
stated that Miller should attach to her complaint a physician's 
certificate stating that the X rays are necessary to a 
determination of whether malpractice was committed. What the 
appellate court failed to acknowledge, however, is that without the 
X rays Miller cannot assert a "meritorious" cause of action. Since 
Miller did not and will never be able to comply with section 2-- 
622, Miller cannot proceed with her medical malpractice claim. The 
particular facts and circumstances of this case show that the trial 
court properly dismissed the medical malpractice count. 735 ILCS 
5/2--622(g) (West 1994). Thus, the appellate court erred in ruling 
that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this 
count. 
     Miller suggests that this court apply principles of equity and 
allow her to pursue the medical malpractice action, notwithstanding 
her inability to comply with section 2--622, because she did not 
destroy the X rays. While we acknowledge that Miller was not at 
fault for the X rays' destruction, the simple fact remains that 
without the X rays, Miller cannot file a certificate of merit and 
written report and may not be able to prove the medical malpractice 
claim in a court of law. The appropriate remedy in this cause is 
not for Miller to pursue a medical malpractice action, but rather 
for Miller to pursue a cause of action against Gupta for spoliation 
of evidence. 
     Further, we observe that in enacting section 2--622, the 
legislature did provide plaintiffs an extension of time within 
which to file a certificate of merit and written report when 
medical personnel fail to timely provide requested medical records. 
735 ILCS 5/2--622(a)(3) (West 1994). However, the legislature did 
not provide an exception for those occasions when medical personnel 
are incapable of turning over all relevant and necessary medical 
records. It is the legislature's, and not this court's, 
responsibility to create exceptions to the section 2--622 
requirements. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's finding 
that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the 
medical malpractice count. 
     Turning to the spoliation of evidence count of Miller's first- 
amended complaint, we initially observe that the count is 
inartfully drafted. Miller alleges spoliation of evidence both in 
that Gupta destroyed her X rays in violation of the X-Ray Retention 
Act and in that Gupta "negligently and/or intentionally caused or 
permitted the destruction of plaintiff's x-rays." 
     Gupta first argues that Miller cannot state a cause of action 
against him for the violation of the X-Ray Retention Act because he 
does not come under the terms of the Act. We agree. The X-Ray 
Retention Act applies only to "[h]ospitals which produce 
photographs of the human anatomy." 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994). As 
Gupta is a physician, the Act does not apply to him. Thus, the 
appellate court did not err in concluding that Miller could not 
state a cause of action against Gupta for a violation of the X-Ray 
Retention Act. 
     Next, Gupta argues that the appellate court acted beyond its 
authority in allowing Miller the opportunity to amend her pleadings 
to conform with this court's decision in Boyd. Boyd was issued 
while the instant cause was before the appellate court. Generally, 
this court's decisions apply retroactively to causes pending at the 
time the decision was announced (Lannom v. Kosco,  158 Ill. 2d 535 , 
539 (1994)), including those causes on direct review in the 
appellate court (Moore v. Centreville Township Hospital,  158 Ill. 2d 543 , 547 (1994)). Thus, Boyd applies to the instant cause of 
action. 
     In Boyd, this court held that an action for negligent 
spoliation of evidence can be stated under existing negligence law. 
Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d  at 194. A plaintiff claiming negligent spoliation 
of evidence must plead the existence of a duty owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, an injury 
proximately caused by the breach, and damages. Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d  at 
194-95. This court acknowledged for the first time in Boyd that a 
duty to preserve evidence can arise only through an agreement, a 
contract, a statute, or another special circumstance or the 
defendant's affirmative conduct. Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d  at 195. 
     Miller alleges that Gupta negligently destroyed or permitted 
the destruction of the X rays, resulting in her failure to obtain 
a section 2--622 certificate of merit, which in turn deprived her 
of a remedy under the medical malpractice count. As Boyd was the 
first decision of this court to specifically delineate that a claim 
of spoliation of evidence exists under negligence law, Miller 
should be allowed the opportunity to amend her spoliation of 
evidence count to conform with Boyd. 
     In allowing Miller the opportunity to amend, we are cognizant 
of Gupta's arguments that Miller did not seek leave to amend in the 
trial court and that she failed to allege a duty by Gupta to 
preserve the X rays independent of the X-Ray Retention Act. As the 
trial court ruled that Gupta did not have a duty to preserve the X 
rays, Miller could not seek leave to amend the spoliation of 
evidence count in the trial court. In addition, since Boyd for the 
first time delineated those instances which give rise to a duty to 
preserve evidence, Miller should not be penalized for failing to 
allege facts which, under Boyd, can give rise to a duty to preserve 
evidence. Accordingly, we find that the appellate court did not err 
in allowing Miller the opportunity to amend the spoliation of 
evidence count of her first-amended complaint to conform with this 
court's decision in Boyd. 
     For the above stated reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in 
part the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts, and remand 
this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part 
                                                    and reversed in part; 
                                  circuit court judgment affirmed in part 
                                                    and reversed in part; 
                                                          cause remanded. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring: 
     I agree with the majority's conclusion that the medical 
malpractice count must be dismissed because the plaintiff, Cindy 
Miller, failed to file a certificate of merit as required by 
statute (735 ILCS 5/2--622 (West 1994)). I also agree with the 
majority's holding that this cause be remanded to give Miller the 
opportunity to state a spoliation claim under Boyd v. Travelers 
Insurance Co.,  166 Ill. 2d 188  (1995). 
     I write separately, however, to clarify that this court is not 
suggesting that anytime a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action 
fails to file a certificate of merit while claiming that certain 
evidence has been lost or destroyed, then, ipso facto, the 
plaintiff has a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. Rather, 
the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim for failure to file a 
certificate of merit establishes only that the plaintiff has failed 
to file the required certificate of merit. It does not satisfy the 
causation element of an action for negligent spoliation of 
evidence. 
     A majority of this court set forth the elements of a cause of 
action for negligent spoliation of evidence in Boyd. We explained 
there that to establish causation in such an action, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant's loss or destruction of the evidence 
caused the plaintiff to be unable to prove an underlying lawsuit. 
Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d  at 196. We further explained that a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that, but for the loss or destruction of the 
evidence, the plaintiff had a reasonable probability of succeeding 
in the underlying suit. Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d  at 196 n.2. As elaborated 
on in Boyd, the causation element requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate how the missing evidence is critical to the plaintiff's 
inability to prove the underlying suit, and it prevents a plaintiff 
from recovering where the underlying suit is meritless. Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d  at 196 n.2, 200. Boyd's discussions concerning the 
causation element represent a careful balancing of the rights of 
plaintiffs and defendants. The causation element is intended to 
ensure that plaintiffs do not wrongfully benefit from the 
spoliation of evidence. In particular, courts must guard against 
plaintiffs who may be tempted to manufacture a spoliation claim out 
of an insignificant piece of missing evidence because they know 
that they cannot win their underlying suit. 
     The record in this case reveals that Miller filed a two-count 
complaint against Dr. Narendra K. Gupta, charging him with medical 
malpractice and spoliation of evidence. Among other things, 
Miller's first-amended complaint alleged that a podiatrist named 
Dr. William Hess told Miller that her foot problems may have 
resulted from medical malpractice committed by Gupta, and that he 
would need to see the X rays taken before and after her earlier 
surgery to determine if Gupta had committed malpractice. Miller's 
complaint further alleged that she was not able to obtain a 
certificate of merit for her medical malpractice action because the 
subject X rays had been destroyed. She therefore asserted that the 
destruction of the X rays had deprived her of any remedy obtainable 
under the medical malpractice count. 
     Gupta moved to dismiss the malpractice count pursuant to 
section 2--619 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2--619 (West 
1994)) because Miller failed to attach the required certificate of 
merit. Gupta also moved to dismiss the spoliation count under 
section 2--615 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 
1994)), claiming that he owed no duty to preserve the X rays. The 
trial court granted both motions, and this appeal followed. This 
concurrence addresses only the section 2--619 motion. 
     One of the enumerated grounds for a section 2--619 motion to 
dismiss is that the claim is barred by affirmative matter which 
avoids the legal effect of or defeats the claim (Illinois Graphics 
Co. v. Nickum,  159 Ill. 2d 469 , 485-86 (1994)), such as for the 
failure to file a certificate of merit in a medical malpractice 
action (see 735 ILCS 5/2--622(g) (West 1994)). For purposes of 
deciding a section 2--619 motion, the court must accept as true all 
well-pleaded facts in the complaint and may consider all pleadings, 
depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties. See Zedella 
v. Gibson,  165 Ill. 2d 181 , 185 (1995). 
     Although the majority opinion does not clarify this point, for 
purposes of this appeal, we accepted as true all well-pleaded facts 
in Miller's complaint. It is important to note, however, that the 
allegations in Miller's complaint have never been subjected to 
adversarial testing and have never been adjudicated on the merits. 
As a result, in any subsequent action for negligent spoliation of 
evidence, Miller still bears the burden of establishing all the 
elements of that cause of action, including causation, and Gupta 
remains entitled to present relevant arguments and evidence in 
response. 
     In this appeal, Gupta mentions arguments that he may raise in 
a spoliation action against him. For example, Gupta suggests that 
other X rays of Miller's foot are available from another physician 
who treated Miller shortly before Gupta did. If this is indeed 
true, and those X rays can substitute for those taken by Gupta 
himself, then the destruction of the subject X rays has not caused 
Miller to be unable to prove her underlying malpractice suit 
against Gupta. Gupta further submits that some of Miller's claims, 
e.g., that Gupta failed to obtain Miller's consent to perform a 
certain medical procedure, have no relevance to the missing X rays. 
As noted above, Gupta is entitled to raise relevant arguments such 
as these in an action for negligent spoliation of evidence. 
     In summary, proof that a plaintiff's underlying medical 
malpractice claim was dismissed for failure to file a certificate 
of merit, standing alone, is simply not sufficient to fulfill the 
causation element of a negligent spoliation claim. This is because 
the issue of whether the defendant's loss or destruction of the 
evidence actually caused the plaintiff to be unable to prove the 
underlying malpractice suit remains to be determined on its merits.