Case Title: Hurlbut v. Scarbrough

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hurlbut v. Scarbrough1998 WY 59957 P.2d 839Case Number: 97-213Decided: 04/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Samuel Finley HURLBUT, Jr., Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Doris Jean SCARBROUGH, f/k/a Doris 
Jean Hurlbut, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Platte County, Barton R. Voigt, J.

 

Thomas E. Campbell of Thomas 
E. Campbell, P.C., Douglas, for Appellant.

James A. Hardee, Douglas, 
for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 

[¶1] Appellant Samuel 
Hurlbut, Jr. (the father) appeals from the judgment which was entered in favor 
of Appellee Doris Scarbrough (the mother) for unpaid child support and 
accumulated interest.

 

[¶2] We affirm as modified 
and remand.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The father presents 
these issues for our analysis:

 

          
1. Whether the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over [the 
father]?

 

2. Whether [the mother's] failure to list her claim 
for past due child support as an asset on the schedules in her 1985 bankruptcy 
estops her from now seeking to collect the sums due?

 

3. Whether [the mother's] breach of the 1984 
agreement coupled with her delay in bringing the proceedings estops her from 
seeking to collect the sums due?

 

4. Whether the Court erred in adding pre-judgment 
interest to the amounts claimed?

 

                                      
        FACTS

 

[¶4] The parties married on 
July 16, 1976, and lived in Platte County during their marriage. The mother had 
three children whom the father subsequently adopted, and a fourth child was born 
to the parties. The parties were granted a divorce on June 17, 1982, in Platte 
County. The district court gave the mother custody of the four children and 
ordered the father to pay child support in the amount of $116.80 per month per 
child. Both parties later moved away from the state. On June 2, 1984, a Utah 
court terminated the father's parental rights to his adopted children, and on 
April 24, 1985, the father's parental rights to his biological child were 
terminated.

 

[¶5] The mother filed a 
petition on August 30, 1995, in the Platte County district court, requesting 
that a judgment be entered against the father for the child support which he 
owed when his parental rights were terminated. The father was personally served 
in Nebraska with a copy of the petition. He filed a motion to dismiss, and the 
trial court denied his motion. The case proceeded to trial, and a judgment was 
entered in favor of the mother. A corrected judgment nunc pro tunc followed. The 
father appeals to this Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

A. In Personam Jurisdiction

 

[¶6] The father contends 
that personal service made outside Wyoming is not sufficient to give Wyoming 
courts personal jurisdiction over him. He also claims that Wyoming courts lost 
continuing and exclusive jurisdiction when the Utah court exercised its 
jurisdiction in terminating his parental rights.

 

[¶7] We considered this 
jurisdictional issue in Graham v. Fenno, 734 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1987). In that case, 
the parties were granted a divorce on November 3, 1971, in Wyoming. 734 P.2d  at 
984. The divorce decree required the husband to pay child support for the 
parties' three children. Id. In 1986, the wife petitioned a Wyoming district 
court for an order to show cause why the husband should not be held in contempt 
for failing to pay child support. Id. The district court issued an order to show 
cause, and the order was personally served on the husband in Fort Collins, 
Colorado. Id. The husband filed a motion to dismiss the district court's order, 
claiming that the district court lacked in personam jurisdiction over him. 
Id.

 

[¶8] This Court acknowledged 
that the existence of personal jurisdiction " 'depends upon the presence of 
reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought, and a 
sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair 
to require defense of the action in the forum.' " 734 P.2d  at 984 (quoting Kulko 
v. Superior Court of California in and for City and County of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978) (citation omitted)). We 
explained that, if this contempt proceeding had been an original action, the 
minimum contacts precedent might have applied, but, because the order to show 
cause stemmed from an earlier proceeding, the jurisdictional principle that a 
defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state so that maintaining a 
suit would not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice was not applicable. Id. That principle applied only to the district 
court's jurisdiction in the original divorce proceeding. 734 P.2d  at 
985.

 

[¶9] We have the same 
situation in the case at bar. We reiterate our rule of law that a court which 
obtains proper jurisdiction over a divorce action retains jurisdiction to modify 
or enforce the support provisions of the decree. Id. "Once jurisdiction 
attaches, the district court's power over [the father's] person continues until 
all matters arising out of that litigation are resolved." 734 P.2d  at 985-86. 
The father, therefore, is still subject to this state's jurisdiction in matters 
which pertain to the original divorce action.

 

B. Failure to List Support as Asset in 
Bankruptcy

 

[¶10] The mother filed a 
bankruptcy petition in 1985 in Utah and did not list past-due child support as 
an asset. The father contends that the mother's failure to list the past-due 
child support as an asset judicially estops her from asserting a claim to the 
arrearages in Wyoming.

 

[¶11] The father relies on 
Zwemer v. Production Credit Association of Midlands, 792 P.2d 245 (Wyo. 1990), 
to support his argument.  The 
father's reliance on this case is misplaced. Although a person who is filing for 
bankruptcy must list all her assets, she is not required to include child 
support arrearages. 792 P.2d  at 247; Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 
(Wyo. 1994). Unpaid child support is not an asset of the parent but is the 
children's money which the parent  
administers in trust for the children's benefit.  Cranston, 879 P.2d  at 
349.

 

[¶12] The mother's decision 
not to list this claim as an asset in her bankruptcy proceeding was appropriate 
given that it was not an asset of her estate. She is, therefore, not judicially 
estopped from asserting her current claim for the child support 
arrearages.

 

C. 1984 Agreement

 

[¶13] The father claims that 
the mother violated the terms of an agreement which they entered into in 1984 
and that the mother, therefore, cannot now assert a claim for unpaid child 
support. The father also complains that, because the mother waited so long to 
advance this claim, he was unable to locate witnesses who could prove that she 
harassed him and absolve him of any responsibility for unpaid child support 
under the 1984 agreement. He insists that this delay prejudiced him and that the 
mother should, therefore, be estopped from trying to collect the 
arrearages.

 

[¶14] The parties entered 
into a stipulation agreement in Utah on October 19, 1984, which provided in 
part:

 

2. [The mother] agrees to reduce her claim against 
[the father] for unpaid child support to the amount of $3,000.00 payable as 
follows: $50.00 a month to Recovery Services beginning on the 10th day of 
November 1984 and payable on the tenth of each month thereafter until the sum of 
$3,000.00 is paid in full. As long as payments are current she will stop all 
proceedings to collect for the unpaid child support. If at any time the monthly 
payments are not paid on time then she may continue proceedings through Recovery 
Services to collect the entire amount of unpaid back child 
support.

 

3. [The mother] agrees to having a restraining order 
placed against her restraining her from ha[]rassing [the father,] his employer, 
fellow employees, wife or other friends and/or family members and restraining 
her from in any way ha[]rassing or bothering [the father]. If she violates the 
conditions of the restraining order it is agreed that she will drop all claims 
for unpaid back child support and not pursue them further and the same will be 
considered paid in full.

 

[¶15] The father's argument 
rests upon his assertions that the mother violated this agreement by harassing 
his employer and that, as a result of this harassment, the employer did not 
renew his employment contract. The father did not demonstrate that a restraining 
order had been obtained against the mother. Without this critical piece of 
evidence, we cannot determine that the mother violated the conditions of the 
restraining order.

 

[¶16] More importantly, 
because a child support obligation does not belong to the custodial parent, that 
parent does not have the authority to bargain it away. Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 
865 P.2d 50, 54 (Wyo. 1993). " 'A mother cannot, by contract, bargain away the 
right of her minor child to adequate support from the father, regardless of the 
validity of the agreement as between the parents themselves.' " Miesen v. Frank, 
361 Pa. Super. 204, 522 A.2d 85, 87, appeal discontinued, 516 Pa. 641, 533 A.2d 713 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Bortz v. Norris, 184 Pa. Super. 594, 
135 A.2d 771, 773 (1957)). Accordingly, we hold that the part of the agreement 
which pertains to the forgiveness of the father's obligation to pay the back 
child support is void and unenforceable because it is against public policy. 
Combs, 865 P.2d  at 54.

 

D. Interest

 

[¶17] The father asserts 
that the district court's award of seven percent prejudgment interest was 
erroneous under our decision in Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104 
(Wyo. 1997). He maintains that either this is a new action to collect past-due 
child support or it is a case to collect on the judgments by operation of law. 
He contends that, if this is a new action, the ten-year statute of limitations 
applies and that, if it is an action to collect on the judgments by operation of 
law, a prejudgment interest award is inappropriate. He adds that, because none 
of the child support obligations accrued after July 1, 1990, interest should not 
be assessed at all pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-16-102(c) (1997). The mother 
agrees that prejudgment interest is not appropriate in this case because the 
child support payments became judgments by operation of law when they were not 
paid on their due dates, but she argues that interest should be assessed on the 
existing judgments at the rate of ten percent per year under WYO. STAT. § 
1-16-102(a) (1997).

 

[¶18] In Hollingshead, this 
Court held with regard to child support payments which became due prior to 1989: 
"Our consideration of the applicable authorities persuades us that the 
legislature, in adopting the statutory provision in 1989, simply codified the 
common law principle that periodic child support payments are judgments arising 
by operation of law."1 942 P.2d  at 1107. Section 
1-16-102(a) provides in pertinent part: "[A]ll decrees and judgments for the 
payment of money shall bear interest at ten percent (10%) per year from the date 
of rendition until paid."

 

[¶19] The father relies on § 
1-16-102(c) which states: "A periodic payment or installment for child support 
or maintenance which is unpaid on the date due and which on or after July 1, 
1990, becomes a judgment by operation of law . . . shall not bear 
interest."  Because the child 
support obligations in this case accrued before July 1, 1990, § 1-16-102(c) is 
not an exception to § 1-16-102(a).  
The judgments by operation of law, therefore, carry with them a ten 
percent per year interest rate.

 

[¶20] In O's Gold Seed 
Company v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 677 
(Wyo. 1988), we quoted from our earlier decision in Robert W. Anderson 
Housewrecking and Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 25, 
Fremont County, 681 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo. 1984): "[W]here the judgment does not 
result from passion or prejudice and any error may be ascertained by 
mathematical calculations, the supreme court may modify without reversing.' " 
Accordingly, we remand, without reversing, the district court's judgment in this 
case, directing the district court to modify its award so that it reflects the 
ten percent per year interest rate and to calculate the interest on each 
obligation from the time that the obligation became a judgment by operation of 
law.

 

[¶21] Affirmed as modified 
and remanded.

 

FOOTNOTES

1At this 
point, we mention that, because the mother did not try to execute on these 
judgments within five years, the judgments became dormant. WYO. STAT. § 1-17-307 
(1997). The party entitled to bring an action to revive a dormant judgment has 
twenty-one years from the date that the judgment became dormant to bring such an 
action according to WYO. STAT. § 1-16-503 (1997). The mother has revived the 
judgments in a timely manner and is entitled to recover on all of 
them.