Case Title: Barrett v. Rosenthal

Citation: 

Docket Number: S122953

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 11/20/06 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
STEPHEN J. BARRETT et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S122953 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/2 A096451 
ILENA ROSENTHAL, 
) 
 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 833021-5 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
In the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Congress declared:  “No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”  
(47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).)1  “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may 
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  
(§ 230(e)(3).) 
 
These provisions have been widely and consistently interpreted to confer 
broad immunity against defamation liability for those who use the Internet to 
publish information that originated from another source.  The immunity has been 
applied regardless of the traditional distinction between “publishers” and 
“distributors.”  Under the common law, “distributors” like newspaper vendors and 
book sellers are liable only if they had notice of a defamatory statement in their 
merchandise.  The publisher of the newspaper or book where the statement 
originally appeared, however, may be held liable even without notice.   
                                              
 
1  Public Law No. 104-104 (Feb. 8, 1996) 110 Statutes at Large 56.  
Hereafter, we refer to 47 United States Code section 230 as section 230, and to the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 as the CDA. 
 
2
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal diverged from the prevailing interpretation 
of section 230.  It decided that common law “distributor” liability survived the 
congressional grant of immunity, so that Internet service providers and users are 
exposed to liability if they republish a statement with notice of its defamatory 
character. 
 
We granted review to decide whether section 230 confers immunity on 
“distributors.”  Because this case involves the liability of an individual rather than 
a service provider, we asked the parties to address the definition of the statutory 
term “user.”  We also requested briefing on whether the immunity analysis is 
affected if a user engages in active rather than passive conduct.  We conclude that  
section 230 prohibits “distributor” liability for Internet publications.  We further 
hold that section 230(c)(1) immunizes individual “users” of interactive computer 
services, and that no practical or principled distinction can be drawn between 
active and passive use.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
 
We acknowledge that recognizing broad immunity for defamatory 
republications on the Internet has some troubling consequences.  Until Congress 
chooses to revise the settled law in this area, however, plaintiffs who contend they 
were defamed in an Internet posting may only seek recovery from the original 
source of the statement. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Plaintiffs, Dr. Stephen J. Barrett and Dr. Timothy Polevoy, operated Web 
sites devoted to exposing health frauds.  Defendant Ilena Rosenthal directed the 
Humantics Foundation for Women and operated an Internet discussion group.  
Plaintiffs alleged that Rosenthal and others committed libel by maliciously 
distributing defamatory statements in e-mails and Internet postings, impugning 
plaintiffs’ character and competence and disparaging their efforts to combat 
 
3
fraud.2  They alleged that Rosenthal republished various messages even after Dr. 
Barrett warned her they contained false and defamatory information. 
 
Rosenthal moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against 
public participation.)  She claimed her statements were protected speech, and 
argued that plaintiffs could not establish a probability of prevailing because she 
was immune under section 230.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b); 
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)  She also 
contended her statements were not actionable. 
 
The court granted the motion, finding that Rosenthal’s statements 
concerned an issue of public interest within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, 
and were, for the most part, not actionable because they contained no provably 
false assertions of fact.  Plaintiffs do not challenge that ruling.  The court 
determined that the only actionable statement appeared in an article Rosenthal 
received via e-mail from her codefendant Tim Bolen.  This article, subtitled 
“Opinion by Tim Bolen,” accused Dr. Polevoy of stalking a Canadian radio 
producer.  Rosenthal posted a copy of this article on the Web sites of two 
newsgroups devoted to alternative health issues and the politics of medicine, not 
on the site of her own discussion group.  According to Rosenthal, these 
newsgroups were part of “the wild west of the Internet,” with “no administrators 
                                              
 
2  The complaint summarizes the defamatory statements as follows: 
 
“Dr. Barrett is arrogant, bizarre, closed-minded; emotionally disturbed, 
professionally incompetent, intellectually dishonest, a dishonest journalist, sleazy, 
unethical, a quack, a thug, a bully, a Nazi, a hired gun for vested interests, the 
leader of a subversive organization, and engaged in criminal activity (conspiracy, 
extortion, filing a false police report, and other unspecified acts.)” 
 
“Dr. Polevoy is dishonest, closed-minded; emotionally disturbed, 
professionally incompetent, unethical, a quack, a fanatic, a Nazi, a hired gun for 
vested interests, the leader of a subversive organization, and engaged in criminal 
activity (conspiracy, stalking of females, and other unspecified acts) and has made 
anti-Semitic remarks.” 
 
4
and no one to enforce rules of conduct.” 3  The trial court ruled that this 
republication was immunized by section 230(c)(1). 
 
The Court of Appeal vacated the order granting the motion to strike insofar 
as it applied to Dr. Polevoy.  It held that section 230 did not protect Rosenthal 
from liability as a “distributor” under the common law of defamation.  We granted 
Rosenthal’s petition for review.4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
The leading case on section 230 immunity rejected the “distributor” 
liability theory adopted by the Court of Appeal here.  (Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 331-333 (Zeran).)  We first discuss the Zeran 
holding and rationale, then the Court of Appeal’s contrary analysis.5  Recognizing 
“distributor” liability would have a dramatic impact on Internet service providers.  
                                              
 
3 For a description of Internet newsgroups, see Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 851. 
 
4  Before reaching the immunity issue, the Court of Appeal rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that Rosenthal’s speech was not protected by the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  Plaintiffs contended the free speech clause of the California Constitution 
did not apply because no state action was involved in Rosenthal’s Internet 
publications.  In their answer to the petition for review, plaintiffs asked us to 
review and reverse that part of the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
 
The Court of Appeal properly rejected plaintiffs’ claim.  Web sites 
accessible to the public, like the “newsgroups” where Rosenthal posted Bolen’s  
statement, are “public forums” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.  
(Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. 
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1247; Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 
883, 895; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1007; 
MCSi, Inc. v. Woods (N.D.Cal 2003) 290 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1033; see also New.Net, 
Inc. v. Lavasoft (C.D.Cal 2004) 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1107 [statements made in 
software available free of charge].) 
 
Plaintiffs argue that Barrett, as well as Polevoy, was defamed in the Bolen 
article.  We need not address this claim, given our conclusion that Rosenthal is 
immune from liability under section 230. 
 
5  In his reply brief, plaintiff Polevoy adopts the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning.  We address the arguments for “distributor” liability as they are framed 
in its opinion. 
 
5
We agree with the Zeran court that Congress did not intend to create such an 
exception to section 230 immunity.6 
                                              
 
6  Section 230 includes the following provisions relevant to our discussion: 
“(a) Findings.  The Congress finds the following: 
“(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer 
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in 
the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens. 
“(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that 
they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as 
technology develops. 
“(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
“(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the 
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. 
“(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
“(b) Policy.  It is the policy of the United States— 
“(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media; 
“(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation; 
“(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control 
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use 
the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
“(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
“(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 
“(c) Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material. 
“(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker.  No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider. 
“(2) Civil liability.  No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be held liable on account of— 
“(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability 
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or 
 
6
 
Rosenthal, however, is not a service provider, at least with respect to the 
newsgroups where she posted the Bolen article.  This appears to be the first 
published case in which section 230 immunity has been invoked by an individual 
who had no supervisory role in the operation of the Internet site where allegedly 
defamatory material appeared, and who thus was clearly not a provider of an 
“interactive computer service” under the broad definition provided in the CDA.  
(§ 230(f)(2); see fn. 7, ante.)  Accordingly, we asked the parties to brief the 
meaning of the term “user” in section 230, and whether any distinction might be 
drawn between active and passive use under the statute.  In part C of our 
discussion, we conclude that Congress employed the term “user” to refer simply to 
anyone using an interactive computer service, without distinguishing between 
active and passive use.     
                                                                                                                                      
 
“(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers 
or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph 
[(A)]. 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
“(e) Effect on other laws. 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
“(3) State law.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State 
from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local 
law that is inconsistent with this section. 
[¶] . . . [¶] 
“(f) Definitions.  As used in this section: 
“(1) Internet.  The term ‘Internet’ means the international computer network of 
both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
“(2) Interactive computer service.  The term ‘interactive computer service’ means 
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
“(3) Information content provider.  The term ‘information content provider’ means 
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service. . . .”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
7
A.  Zeran 
 
Kenneth Zeran was bombarded with angry and derogatory telephone calls, 
including death threats, after an unidentified person posted a message on an 
America Online, Inc. (AOL) bulletin board.  The message advertised t-shirts with 
offensive slogans referring to the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building, and instructed prospective purchasers to call Zeran’s home 
telephone number.  Zeran notified AOL of the problem, and the posting was 
eventually removed.  However, similar postings appeared, and an Oklahoma radio 
announcer aired the contents of the first message.  Zeran was again inundated with 
threatening phone calls.  He sued AOL for unreasonable delay in removing the 
defamatory messages, refusing to post retractions, and failing to screen for similar 
postings.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 328-329.) 
 
AOL successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings, relying on section 
230.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 329-330.)  The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language of section 230 “creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the service.  Specifically, § 230 
precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service 
provider in a publisher’s role.  Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider 
liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”  
(Zeran, at p. 330.) 
 
Referring to the congressional finding that the Internet has flourished “with 
a minimum of government regulation” (§ 230(a)(4)), and the policy statement 
favoring a free market for interactive computer services “unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation” (§ 230(b)(2)), the Zeran court reasoned that Congress viewed 
“[t]he imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communications of 
others” as “simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech.”  
(Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330.)  While original posters of defamatory speech 
 
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do not escape accountability, Congress “made a policy choice . . . not to deter 
harmful online speech [by] imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”  (Id. at pp. 330-
331.)  This policy reflects a concern that if service providers faced tort liability for 
republished messages on the Internet, they “might choose to severely restrict the 
number and type of messages posted.”  (Id. at p. 331.) 
 
  The court noted that another important purpose of section 230 was “to 
encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive 
material over their services.”  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.)  The legislative 
history indicates that section 230 was enacted in response to an unreported New 
York trial court case.  (Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995) 1995 WL 323710, 23 Media L.Rep. 1794 (Stratton 
Oakmont).) 7  There, a service provider was held liable for defamatory comments 
posted on one of its bulletin boards, based on a finding that the provider had 
adopted the role of “publisher” by actively screening and editing postings.  
“Fearing that the specter of liability would . . . deter service providers from 
blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230’s broad 
immunity,” which “forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service 
provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.”  (Zeran, 
supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.) 
 
Zeran made the same argument adopted by the Court of Appeal here:  that 
Congress intended to distinguish between “publishers” and  “distributors,” 
                                              
 
7  See Senate Report Number 104-230, Second Session, page 194 (1996) 
[“One of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. 
Prodigy and any other similar decisions”]; House of Representatives Conference 
Report Number 104-458, Second Session, page 194 (1996) [“The conferees 
believe that [decisions like Stratton Oakmont] create serious obstacles to the 
important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the content of 
communications their children receive through interactive computer services”]; 
141 Congressional Record H8469-H8470 (daily ed., June 14, 1995) [statement of 
Rep. Cox, referring to disincentives created by Stratton Oakmont decision]. 
 
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immunizing publishers but leaving distributors exposed to liability.  At common 
law, “primary publishers,” such as book, newspaper, or magazine publishers, are 
liable for defamation on the same basis as authors.  Book sellers, news vendors, or 
other “distributors,” however, may only be held liable if they knew or had reason 
to know of a publication’s defamatory content.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331; 
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed.1984) § 113, pp. 810-811; Rest.2d 
Torts, § 581, subd. (1), & coms. c, d, & e, pp. 232-234; see also Osmond v. EWAP, 
Inc. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 842, 852-854.) 8  Zeran contended that because 
Congress mentioned only the term “publisher” in section 230, it intended to leave 
“distributors” unprotected.  He claimed that once he gave AOL notice that it was 
posting defamatory statements on its bulletin board, AOL became liable as a 
“distributor.”  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 331-332.) 
 
The Zeran court held that the publisher/distributor distinction makes no 
difference for purposes of section 230 immunity.  Publication is a necessary 
element of all defamation claims, and includes every repetition and distribution of 
a defamatory statement.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 332, citing Prosser & 
Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, pp. 799, 802, 803, and Rest.2d Torts, §§ 
558, subd. (b) & 577.)  Although “distributors” become liable only upon notice, 
they are nevertheless included in “the larger publisher category.”  (Zeran, supra, 
129 F.3d at p. 332.)  “Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence 
of the distinct notice element in distributor liability. . . .  [O]nce a computer 
service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust 
into the role of a traditional publisher.  The computer service provider must decide 
whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting.  In this respect, Zeran seeks to 
                                              
 
8   The distinction is a practical one.  Publishers are ordinarily aware of the 
content of their copy.  It is not reasonable, however, to expect distributors to be 
familiar with the particulars of every publication they offer for sale.  Therefore, 
only a distributor who is aware of defamatory content shares liability with the 
publisher. 
 
10
impose liability on AOL for assuming the role for which § 230 specifically 
proscribes liability—the publisher role.”  (Id. at pp. 332-333.) 
 
Subjecting service providers to notice liability would defeat “the dual 
purposes” of section 230, by encouraging providers to restrict speech and abstain 
from self-regulation.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333.)  A provider would be at 
risk for liability each time it received notice of a potentially defamatory statement 
in any Internet message, requiring an investigation of the circumstances, a legal 
judgment about the defamatory character of the information, and an editorial 
decision on whether to continue the publication.  “Although this might be feasible 
for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive 
computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet context.”  
(Ibid.) 
 
“Similarly, notice-based liability would deter service providers from 
regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own services.  Any 
efforts by a service provider to investigate and screen material posted on its 
service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more 
frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for liability.  Instead of subjecting 
themselves to further possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any 
attempts at self-regulation. 
 
“More generally, notice-based liability for interactive computer service 
providers would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for 
future lawsuits.  Whenever one was displeased with the speech of another party 
conducted over an interactive computer service, the offended party could simply 
‘notify’ the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be legally 
defamatory. . . .  Because the probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor 
of Internet speech and on service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 
230’s statutory purposes, we will not assume that Congress intended to leave 
liability upon notice intact.”  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333.) 
 
11
 
In support of his argument for notice-based liabilty, Zeran invoked the rule 
against abrogation of common law principles unless Congress speaks directly to 
the question.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 333-334; United States v. Texas 
(1993) 507 U.S. 529, 534.)  However, the court reasoned that Congress had 
spoken directly by employing the term “publisher,” and that preserving 
“distributor” liability would defeat the primary purposes of section 230.  The 
policy of strictly construing statutes in derogation of the common law does not 
require a literal interpretation conflicting with the obvious legislative purpose.  
(Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 334, citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson (1952) 343 
U.S. 779, 783.) 
 
The Zeran court’s views have been broadly accepted, in both federal and 
state courts.9  Before the Court of Appeal issued its opinion below, two other 
California Courts of Appeal had followed Zeran.  In Kathleen R. v. City of 
Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, a taxpayer sued after her son obtained 
sexually explicit photographs through an Internet connection at a public library.  
She sought injunctive relief on various theories of liability.  (Id. at pp. 690-691.)  
The Kathleen R. court held that the state law causes of action were barred by 
section 230.  (Kathleen R., at p. 692.)  It cited Zeran for the rule that section 
                                              
 
9  E.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge (D.D.C. 1998) 992 F.Supp. 44, 51; Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. America Online, Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 980, 
986; Morrison v. America Online, Inc. (N.D.Ind. 2001) 153 F.Supp.2d 930, 933-
934; PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc. (D.S.D. 2001) 163 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071; 
Green v. America Online (3rd Cir. 2003) 318 F.3d 465, 470-471; Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-1124; Doe One v. 
Oliver (Conn.Super.Ct. 2000) 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-1004; Doe v. America Online, 
Inc. (Fla. 2001) 783 So.2d 1010, 1013-1017; Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
(Wn.App. 2001) 31 P.3d 37, 40-42; Barrett v. Fonorow (Ill.App.Ct. 2003) 799 
N.E.2d 916, 923-925 [a suit against a Web site operator by Dr. Barrett, plaintiff in 
this case]; Donato v. Moldow (N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div. 2005) 865 A.2d 711, 720-
727; Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting (Ariz.App. 2005) 125 P.3d 389, 392-394. 
 
But see Doe v. GTE Corp. (7th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 655, 659-660, in which 
the court questioned Zeran’s rationale but ultimately did not reach the section 230 
issue. 
 
12
230(c)(1) immunizes both “publisher[s]” and “distributor[s].”  (Kathleen R., at p. 
695, fn. 3.)  It also agreed with the Zeran court’s analysis of congressional intent.  
(Id. at p. 697.) 
 
In Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, the plaintiffs used 
eBay’s on-line marketing services to purchase sports memorabilia.  Claiming the 
items bore forged autographs, they sued eBay for negligence, unfair trade 
practices, and violation of Civil Code section 1739.7, which regulates the sale of 
such collectibles.  (Gentry, at p. 820.)  The Gentry court ruled that section 230 
immunized eBay from liability on all the plaintiffs’ claims.  It noted the broad 
scope given to section 230 immunity by the Zeran court and others, and reasoned 
that the plaintiffs were trying to hold eBay responsible for disseminating 
information provided by the individual sellers who used its service.  (Gentry, at 
pp. 828-831.)  Regarding the allegation that eBay knew or should have known 
about the sellers’ illegal conduct but failed to prevent it by withdrawing or altering 
the fraudulent content, the Gentry court stated:  “This is the classic kind of claim 
that Zeran found to be preempted by section 230, . . . one that seeks to hold eBay 
liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions.”  (Id. at p. 
835.) 
B.  The Court of Appeal Analysis 
 
Swimming against the jurisprudential tide, the Court of Appeal in this case 
disputed the ruling in Zeran, contending it confers a more expansive immunity 
than is necessary to preserve freedom of online speech, and would actually defeat 
the goal of encouraging self-regulation.  The Court of Appeal focussed on three 
factors:  (1) the Zeran court’s interpretation of the statutory term “publisher;” (2) 
the legislative history of section 230; and (3) the practical implications of notice 
liability in the Internet environment.  We reject the Court of Appeal’s analysis on 
each of these points. 
 
13
 
1.  The Meaning of “Publisher” 
 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that publication is an element of 
defamation, and that “distributors” are sometimes referred to as “secondary 
publishers.”  (See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (D.C.Wyo. 1985) 611 
F.Supp. 781, 785; Hart v. Bennet (Wis.Ct.App. 2003) 672 N.W.2d 306, 318, fn. 
14; Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, at p. 803; Smolla, The Law 
of Defamation (2d ed. 2005) § 4:92, p. 4-140.15.)  However, the court pronounced 
it “reasonable to assume” that Congress had in mind the different standards of 
common law liability imposed on “primary publishers,” who have control over 
content, and “distributors,” who do not.  Thus, the omission of any reference to 
“distributors” in section 230(c)(1) was arguably intentional. 
 
The Court of Appeal noted that the goal of discouraging excessive self-
censorship by immunizing publishers is at odds with the rights of individuals to 
recover for defamatory falsehood.  It deemed the term “publisher” ambiguous, 
because it might refer to primary publishers only or to both primary publishers and 
distributors.  According to the Court of Appeal, such a “legally uncertain word” 
could not support the broad immunity the Zeran court derived from the statute.  It 
found nothing in the statutory findings and declarations to indicate that Congress 
considered online speech in need of blanket protection.  Indeed, it detected a 
contrary intent in the terms of section 230(c)(2), which immunizes providers and 
users against liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be . . . 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected” or to 
provide others with “the technical means to restrict access to [such] material.”  
The Court of Appeal reasoned that section 230(c)(2) would be superfluous if all 
“publishers” enjoyed absolute immunity under section 230(c)(1). 
 
The Court of Appeal sought further support for limiting the scope of the 
term “publisher” to primary publishers by comparing the immunity provisions of 
the CDA with those of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, enacted in 1998 
 
14
(DMCA; 17 U.S.C. § 512).10  The DMCA immunizes Internet service providers 
from liability for copyright infringement if the provider is unaware of the 
infringement and acts expeditiously to remove the copyrighted material upon 
notice.  It includes detailed notice requirements, and procedures for replacement of 
the disputed material upon sufficient counter-notification.  (17 U.S.C. § 512(c) & 
(g).)  Because Congress did not include such specific regulation of notice liability 
in the CDA, the Court of Appeal decided it had failed to “speak directly” to the 
issue, thus preserving common law distributor liability.  (See United States v. 
Texas, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 534.) 
 
We conclude the Zeran court’s construction of the term “publisher” is 
sound.  The terms of section 230(c)(1) are broad and direct:  “No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”  Given that 
“distributors” are also known as “secondary publishers,” there is little reason to 
believe Congress felt it necessary to address them separately.  There is even less 
reason to suppose that Congress intended to immunize “publishers” but leave 
“distributors” open to liability, when the responsibility of publishers for offensive 
content is greater than that of mere distributors.  The Court of Appeal failed to 
respond to the Zeran court’s point that once online distributors are notified of 
defamatory content, they are placed in a position traditionally occupied by 
publishers, and must make an editorial decision on how to treat the posted 
material.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 332.)  This is a persuasive justification for 
giving the term “publisher”an inclusive interpretation.   (See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, 
Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 835; Green v. America Online, supra, 318 F.3d at 
p. 471; Donato v. Moldow, supra,  865 A.2d at pp. 725-726; Schneider v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., supra, 31 P.3d at pp. 41-42.) 
                                              
 
10  Public Law 105-304, Title II, section 202(a) (Oct. 28, 1998) 112 Statutes 
at Large 2877. 
 
15
 
 We are not convinced by the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that a broad 
reading of section 230(c)(1) would make section 230(c)(2) unnecessary.  These 
provisions address different concerns.  Section 230(c)(1) is concerned with 
liability arising from information provided online.  Section 230(c)(2) is directed at 
actions taken by Internet service providers or users to restrict access to online 
information.11  Liability for censoring content is not ordinarily associated with the 
defendant’s status as “publisher” or “speaker.”  Those terms, employed in section 
230(c)(1), are drawn from the law of defamation.  (See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, 
The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, at p. 803; Rest.2d Torts, § 568.)  Section 
230(c)(1) provides immunity from claims by those offended by an online 
publication, while section 230(c)(2) protects against claims by those who might 
object to the restriction of access to an online publication. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s reference to the DMCA does not support its 
conclusion that Congress’s use of the term “publisher” was insufficient to abrogate 
“distributor” liability.  To the contrary, the DMCA shows that Congress has 
crafted a limited immunity in a closely related context, with specific provision for 
notice liability.  (17 U.S.C. § 512(c).)  The fact that it did not do so in the CDA, 
and has not amended section 230 to add a similar provision in the 10 years since it 
was enacted, or in the eight years since the example of the DMCA has been in 
                                              
 
11   Section 230(c)(2) provides:  “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of— 
“(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability 
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or 
“(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers 
or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph 
[(A)].” 
 
16
existence, strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to permit 
notice liability under the CDA.12 
 
We note that it is far from clear how the distinction between traditional 
print publishers and distributors would apply in the Internet environment, with its 
many and various forms of discourse.  (See Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, supra, 521 U.S. 844, 850-853.)  As the high court noted, “[a]ny person or 
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.”  
(Id. at p. 853.)  Whenever such information is copied from another source, its 
publication might also be described as a “distribution.”  The distinction proposed 
by the Court of Appeal, based on rules developed in the post-Gutenberg, pre-
cyberspace world, would foster disputes over which category the defendant should 
occupy.  The common law of defamation would provide little guidance. 
 
In this case, for example, Rosenthal could claim that her active role in 
selecting and posting material disparaging plaintiffs qualified her as a primary 
publisher.  Her participation in the dissemination of the Bolen article, particularly 
considered in light of her other alleged verbal attacks on plaintiffs, arguably went 
beyond mere distribution.  (See Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, 
§ 113, at p. 803; Smolla, The Law of Defamation, supra, § 4:92, p. 4-140.15; 
Rest.2d Torts, § 568.)  The Court of Appeal provided no analysis justifying its 
conclusion that Rosenthal could be held liable as a “distributor,” noting only that 
she alleged no facts preventing her from being so characterized.  We need not 
decide the question, but certainly the argument could be made that plaintiffs’ 
allegations cast Rosenthal in the role of a “publisher.” 
                                              
 
12  One court has suggested that Congress might provide notice, “take-
down,” and “put-back” procedures similar to those in the DMCA as a way of 
limiting the broad scope of section 230 immunity, which currently gives service 
providers little incentive to remove defamatory postings.  (Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 
2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1031-1032, fn. 19.)  Congress has not responded. 
 
17
 
2.  The Legislative History 
 
The Court of Appeal noted that section 230 was enacted along with other 
CDA provisions that prohibited the knowing transmission of “obscene or 
indecent” or “patently offensive” messages to persons under the age of 18.13  It 
reasoned that immunizing Internet service providers and users from “primary 
publisher” liability advanced a similar purpose by protecting those providers and 
users who try but fail to identify and remove offensive material.  However, 
according to the Court of Appeal, immunization from “distributor” liability would 
be inconsistent with this goal because it would protect providers and users who 
make no effort to screen for offensive material, along with those who refuse to 
take action once on notice. 
 
The Court of Appeal claimed support for this view in the legislative history 
of section 230, though it conceded that the history is “meager.”  (See Sheridan, 
Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet (1997) 61 Alb. L.Rev. 147, 168 
(hereafter Sheridan).)  The court recognized that section 230 was enacted to 
remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont case, 
in which a service provider was held liable as a primary publisher because it 
actively screened and edited messages posted on its bulletin boards.  (Stratton 
Oakmont, supra, 1995 WL 323710, 23 Media L.Rep. 1794; see Zeran, supra, 129 
F.3d at p. 331; fn. 7, ante.)  However, the Court of Appeal considered an earlier 
Internet defamation case to be equally important in ascertaining the purpose of 
section 230. 
 
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 776 F.Supp. 135, a 
journalist claimed he was defamed by a competitor’s remarks posted on an 
Internet forum provided by CompuServe.  (Id. at pp. 137-138.)  The court applied 
                                              
 
13  Title 47 United States Code, section 223(a) & (d).  These provisions 
were held  unconstitutional in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, supra, 521 
U.S. at pp. 849, 858-860. 
 
18
the common law “distributor” standard of liability, concluding the forum was 
essentially an electronic library over which CompuServe exercised little or no 
editorial control.  (Id. at pp. 139-140.)  Because there was no evidence 
CompuServe knew or had reason to know of the statements, the court granted it 
summary judgment.  (Id. at p. 141.) 
 
The Court of Appeal noted that Cubby was distinguished in Stratton 
Oakmont, and also in comments by the sponsors of section 230.  As related in a 
law review article relied on by the court, “Representative Cox, one of two 
sponsors of the immunity provision, characterized the imposition of distributor 
liability in Cubby as holding that CompuServe ‘was not the publisher or editor’ of 
the material.  He clearly used the term ‘publisher’ to exclude parties held to the 
distributor liability standard applied to CompuServe in that case.  141 Cong. Rec. 
H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  The provision’s sponsors 
summarized both the Cubby and Stratton [Oakmont] decisions, and then 
repeatedly discussed the need to overrule Stratton [Oakmont], without again 
mentioning Cubby.  See [141 Cong.Rec. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) 
(statements of Rep. Cox and Rep. Wyden]; see also 141 Cong.Rec. S8345 (daily 
ed. June 14, 1995) (statements of Sen. Coats) (distinguishing between publisher 
and distributor liability and noting that the [CDA] was not intended to hold 
intermediaries to publisher liability).”  (Freiwald, Comparative Institutional 
Analysis in Cyberspace:  The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation 
(2001) 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 569, 632, fn. 259 (hereafter Freiwald).) 
 
From these sources, the Court of Appeal discerned a congressional intent to 
preserve “distributor” liability.  It cited several academic commentators for the 
view that immunizing Internet service providers from “distributor” liability would 
actually frustrate the objective of self-regulation, because no liability would flow 
from failing to screen for defamatory content.  (McManus, Rethinking Defamation 
Liability for Internet Service Providers (2001) 35 Suffolk U. L.Rev. 647, 668 
(hereafter McManus); Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers From Third 
 
19
Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go? (2002) 55 Vand. 
L.Rev. 647, 684; see also Sheridan, supra, 61 Alb. L.Rev. at pp. 169-170.) 
 
The Court of Appeal and the commentators on which it relied read too 
much into the legislative record.  We note that the comments of Senator Coats, 
summarized by Professor Freiwald as quoted above, pertained not to section 230 
but to a separate provision of the CDA, codified at 47 United States Code section 
223(f)(4).  (141 Cong.Rec. S8328, S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 1995).)  The 
comments of Representative Cox, a sponsor of section 230, are pertinent but do 
not indicate that distributors were meant to be excluded from statutory 
protection.14 
                                              
 
14  The relevant portions of Representative Cox’s comments are as follows:  
“I will give you two quick examples:  A Federal court in New York, in a case 
involving CompuServe, one of our on-line service providers, held that 
CompuServe would not be liable in a defamation case because it was not the 
publisher or editor of the material.  It just let everything come onto your computer 
without, in any way, trying to screen it or control it. 
 
“But another New York court, the New York Supreme Court, held that 
Prodigy, CompuServe’s competitor, could be held liable in a $200 million 
defamation case because someone had posted on one of their bulletin boards, a 
financial bulletin board, some remarks that apparently were untrue about an 
investment bank, that the investment bank would go out of business and was run 
by crooks. 
 
“Prodigy said, ‘No, no; just like CompuServe, we did not control or edit 
that information, nor could we, frankly.  We have over 60,000 of these messages 
each day, we have over 2 million subscribers, and so you cannot proceed with this 
kind of a case against us.’ 
 
“The court said, ‘No, no, no, no, you are different; you are different than 
CompuServe because you are a family-friendly network.  You advertise yourself 
as such. You employ screening and blocking software that keeps obscenity off of 
your network. You have people who are hired to exercise an emergency delete 
function to keep that kind of material away from your subscribers. You don’t 
permit nudity on your system. You have content guidelines. You, therefore, are 
going to face higher, stric[t]er liability because you tried to exercise some control 
over offensive material.’ 
 
“Mr. Chairman, that is backward.  We want to encourage people like 
Prodigy, like CompuServe, like America Online, like the new Microsoft network, 
to do everything possible for us, the customer, to help us control, at the portals of 
 
20
 
Representative Cox said section 230 was intended to “encourage people 
like . . . CompuServe . . . by . . . protect[ing] them from taking on liability such as 
occurred in the [Stratton Oakmont] case in New York that they should not face for 
helping us [] solve this problem.”  (141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 
1995).)  Thus, he meant that “distributors” like CompuServe would be protected 
from rather than threatened with liability, to encourage responsible screening of 
the content provided on their services.  Under the Court of Appeal’s interpretation 
of section 230, a “distributor” could be sued if it deleted material after receiving 
notice of offensive content, but did not act quickly or thoroughly enough to suit 
the offended party.  Primary “publishers” who decide not to remove offensive 
postings would be immunized, while “distributors” making the same decision 
would be unprotected.  It is unlikely that Congress intended such incongruous 
results. 
 
Both the terms of section 230(c)(1) and the comments of Representative 
Cox reflect the intent to promote active screening by service providers of online 
content provided by others.  Congress implemented its intent not by maintaining 
the common law distinction between “publishers” and “distributors,” but by 
broadly shielding all providers from liability for “publishing” information 
                                                                                                                                      
 
our computer, at the front door of our house, what comes in and what our children 
see.  This technology is very quickly becoming available, and in fact every one of 
us will be able to tailor what we see to our own tastes. . . . 
 
“Mr. Chairman, our amendment will do two basic things:  First, it will 
protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who provides 
a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes steps to screen indecency and 
offensive material for their customers.  It will protect them from taking on liability 
such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New York that they should not face for 
helping us and for helping us solve this problem.  Second, it will establish as the 
policy of the United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the 
Federal Government of what is on the Internet . . . .”  (141 Cong. Rec. H8469-
H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).)  
 
 
21
received from third parties.15  Congress contemplated self-regulation, rather than 
regulation compelled at the sword point of tort liability.  It chose to protect even 
the most active Internet publishers, those who take an aggressive role in 
republishing third party content.  It would be anomalous to hold less active 
“distributors” liable upon notice.  Thus, the immunity conferred by section 230 
applies even when self-regulation is unsuccessful, or completely unattempted.  
(Blumenthal v. Drudge, supra, 992 F.Supp. at p. 52; Schneider v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., supra, 31 P.3d at p. 43; Donato v. Moldow, supra, 865 A.2d at p. 726.) 
 
As Rosenthal and amici curiae point out, subsequent legislative history 
contains explicit support for the Zeran court’s interpretation.  In 2002, Congress 
enacted the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act.16  A House committee 
report notes that the purpose of this legislation was “to facilitate the creation of a 
new, second-level Internet domain within the United States country code domain 
                                              
 
15  The impracticality of imposing liability on any Internet service provider 
for failing to exert control over third party content was touched upon by 
Representative Goodlatte:  “There is no way that any of those entities, like 
Prodigy, can take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be 
coming in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin board.  We are 
talking about something that is far larger than our daily newspaper.  We are 
talking about something that is going to be thousands of pages of information 
every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is wrong.  This will cure 
that problem, and I urge the Members to support the amendment.”  The 
Congressman clearly had civil liability in mind.  He subsequently noted:  
“Currently . . . there is a tremendous disincentive for online service providers to 
create family friendly services by detecting and removing objectionable content. 
These providers face the risk of increased liability where they take reasonable 
steps to police their systems.  A New York judge recently sent the online services 
the message to stop policing by ruling that Prodigy was subject to a $200 million 
libel suit simply because it did exercise some control over profanity and indecent 
material. [¶]  The Cox-Wyden amendment removes the liability of providers such 
as Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort to edit the smut from their 
systems.”  (141 Cong. Rec. H8471-H8472.) 
 
 
16  Public Law 107-317, section 2 (Dec. 4, 2002) 116 Statutes at Large 
2766, codified at 47 United States Code section 941. 
 
22
that will be a haven for material that promotes positive experiences for children 
and families using the Internet.”  (H.R. Rep. 107-449 (2002) p. 5)  The legislation 
includes a provision that the new registry it created, and related entities, “are 
deemed to be interactive computer services for purposes of section 230(c) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(c)).”  (47 U.S.C. § 941(e)(1).)  The 
committee report explains that this provision was “intended to shield the ‘.kids.us’ 
registry, registrars, and parties who contract with the registry, from liability based 
on self-policing efforts to intercept and take down material that is not ‘suitable for 
minors’ or is ‘harmful to minors.’   The Committee notes that ISPs [Internet 
service providers] have successfully defended many lawsuits using section 230(c).  
The courts have correctly interpreted section 230(c), which was aimed at 
protecting against liability for such claims as negligence[.]  (See, e.g., Doe v. 
America Online, 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001)) and defamation (Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (2000); Zeran v. America 
Online, 129 F.3d 327 (1997)).  The Committee intends these interpretations of 
section 230(c) to be equally applicable to those entities covered by H.R. 3833.”17  
(H.R. Rep. 107-449, p. 13.) 
                                              
 
17  Ordinarily, subsequent legislative history is given little weight in 
statutory interpretation.  (U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc. (1994) 513 U.S. 64, 77, 
fn. 6.)  Nevertheless, it is “sometimes considered relevant.”  (Consumer Product 
Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania (1980) 447 U.S. 102, 118, fn. 13; see also, e.g., 
Heckler v. Turner (1985) 470 U.S. 184, 209.)  In this unusual case we deem the 
Committee Report instructive.  It pertains to a provision expressly incorporating 
section 230(c), and does not opine directly on the intent of an earlier Congress, but 
on the interpretation uniformly given to the statute by intervening court decisions.  
The Report reflects the Committee’s intent that the existing statutory construction 
be maintained in a new legislative context.  We note that the membership of the 
2002 House Energy and Commerce Committee, which produced the Report, 
included Representative Cox, the cosponsor of section 230.  (Cong. Directory, 
107th Congress (2001-2002) p. 403.) 
 
23
 
3.  Practical Implications of Notice Liability 
 
The Zeran court identified three deleterious effects that would flow from 
reading section 230 to permit liability upon notice.  First, service providers who 
received notification of a defamatory message would be subject to liability only 
for maintaining the message, not for removing it.  This fact, together with the 
burdens involved in evaluating the defamatory character of a great number of 
protested messages, would provide a natural incentive to simply remove messages 
upon notification, chilling the freedom of Internet speech.  Second, notice-based 
liability would deter service providers from actively screening the content of 
material posted on its service, because discovering potentially defamatory material 
would only increase the provider’s liability.  Finally, notice-based liability would 
give third parties a cost-free means of manufacturing claims, imposing on 
providers “ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech or sustaining 
prohibitive liability.”  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333.) 
 
The Court of Appeal expressed doubt that a statute encouraging service 
providers to restrict access to offensive material was intended to promote free 
speech over the Internet.  It also questioned the “speculative conclusion” that 
notice-based liability would significantly chill online speech, though it refrained 
from taking a definitive position on this point.  Noting the absence of any evidence 
in the record regarding the burdens such liability would create, the Court of 
Appeal referred to the views of commentators critical of Zeran as a way to explore 
the contours of the debate without attempting its resolution.  (See Intel Corp. v. 
Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1363.) 
 
Some critics have suggested that market forces would restrain service 
providers from removing postings without investigation, because any provider 
engaging in that practice would acquire a bad reputation in the Internet 
community.  (Sheridan, supra, 61 Alb. L.Rev. at pp. 176; Freiwald, supra, 14 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. at p. 622; Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to 
Cyberspace:  Towards a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation 
 
24
for Internet Service Providers (1999-2000) 6 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech.L.Rev. 
247, 264.)  It has also been argued that the difficulty of prevailing on a defamation 
claim would attenuate the burden of notice-based liability on providers.  
Moreover, because “distributor” liability would only arise upon notice, and would 
not require service providers to review postings in advance, defamation damages 
would be limited to those accruing after the provider became aware of the 
defamatory character of a message.  (Sheridan, supra, 61 Alb. L.Rev. at p. 173.) 
 
Citing McManus, supra, 35 Suffolk U. L.Rev. at page 661, the Court of 
Appeal asserted that Zeran has been criticized for failing to account for the many 
different ways defamation may be transmitted over the Internet, and the different 
levels of control an Internet intermediary may exercise over the content of 
messages.  Most fundamentally, however, the Court of Appeal noted that critics 
have condemned Zeran for giving insufficient consideration to the interests of 
defamation victims.  American courts have striven to develop rules that balance 
the legitimate protections of defamation liability with the constitutional right to 
free speech.  The Court of Appeal resisted the notion that a blanket immunity 
derived from section 230(c)(1) should disturb that balance.  It concluded that 
preserving “distributor” liability was consistent with the immunity provisions of 
section 230. 
 
The Court of Appeal gave insufficient consideration to the burden its rule 
would impose on Internet speech.  It is inaccurate to suggest that Congress was 
indifferent to free speech protection when it enacted section 230.  The statute 
includes findings welcoming the “extraordinary advance in the availability of 
educational and informational resources” on the Internet, and applauding the 
Internet as a “forum for a true diversity of political discourse” that offers “myriad 
avenues for intellectual activity” and provides “a variety of political, educational, 
cultural, and entertainment services.”  (§ 230(a)(1), (3), & (5).)  Congress sought 
to “promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services.”  (§ 230(b)(1).)  The provisions of section 230(c)(1), 
 
25
conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are themselves a strong 
demonstration of legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free market 
for online expression. 
 
 The fact that Congress also meant to restrict access to certain Internet 
content does not compel a contrary conclusion.  As the court aptly observed in 
Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d 1018:  “[T]here is an apparent tension between 
Congress’s goals of promoting free speech while at the same time giving parents 
the tools to limit the material their children can access over the Internet.  As a 
result of this apparent tension, some commentators have suggested that the Fourth 
Circuit in Zeran imposed . . . First Amendment goals on legislation that was 
actually adopted for the speech-restrictive purpose of controlling the dissemination 
of content over the Internet.  [Citation.]  These critics fail to recognize that laws 
often have more than one goal in mind, and that it is not uncommon for these 
purposes to look in opposite directions.  The need to balance competing values is a 
primary impetus for enacting legislation.  Tension within statutes is often not a 
defect but an indication that the legislature was doing its job.”  (Id. at p. 1028; see 
also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at pp. 1122-1123.) 
 
We agree with the Zeran court, and others considering the question, that 
subjecting Internet service providers and users to defamation liability would tend 
to chill online speech.  (See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at 
pp. 1123-1124; Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d at pp. 1027-1028; Noah v. AOL 
Time Warner, Inc. (E.D. Va. 2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532, 538; Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, supra, 992 F.Supp. at p. 52; Donato v. Moldow, supra, 865 A.2d at p. 
726.)  Certainly, that conclusion is no more speculative than the surmise that 
market forces might deter providers from removing postings without investigating 
their defamatory character. 
 
  We reject the argument that the difficulty of prevailing on a defamation 
claim mitigates the deterrent effect of potential liability.  Defamation law is 
complex, requiring consideration of multiple factors.  These include whether the 
 
26
statement at issue is true or false, factual or figurative, privileged or unpriviliged, 
whether the matter is of public or private concern, and whether the plaintiff is a 
public or private figure.  (See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) 
Torts, §§ 529, 556 et seq., pp. 782, 814 et seq.)  Any investigation of a potentially 
defamatory Internet posting is thus a daunting and expensive challenge.  For that 
reason, we have observed that even when a defamation claim is “clearly 
nonmeritorious,” the threat of liability “ultimately chills the free exercise of 
expression.”  (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 268; 
see also Time, Inc. v. Hill (1967) 385 U.S. 374, 389.) 
 
 Nor are we convinced by the observation that a “distributor” faces no 
liability without notice.  Distributors are liable not merely upon receiving notice 
from a third party, but also if they independently “knew or had reason to know” of 
the defamatory statement.  (Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 842, 
854; Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, pp. 811; Rest.2d Torts, 
§ 581, subd. (1).)  Thus, as the Zeran court pointed out, this aspect of distributor 
liability would discourage active monitoring of Internet postings.  (Zeran, supra, 
129 F.3d at p. 333.)  It could also motivate providers to insulate themselves from 
receiving complaints.  Such responses would frustrate the goal of self-regulation. 
 
The third practical implication noted in Zeran is no less compelling, and 
went unaddressed by the Court of Appeal.  Notice-based liability for service 
providers would allow complaining parties to impose substantial burdens on the 
freedom of Internet speech by lodging complaints whenever they were displeased 
by an online posting.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333.)  The volume and range 
of Internet communications make the “heckler’s veto” a real threat under the Court 
of Appeal’s holding.  The United States Supreme Court has cautioned against 
reading the CDA to confer such a broad power of censorship on those offended by 
Internet speech.  (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 
880.) 
 
27
 
The great variety of Internet publications, and the different levels of content 
control that may be exercised by service providers and users, do not undermine the 
conclusion that Congress intended to create a blanket immunity from tort liability 
for online republication of third party content.  Requiring providers, users, and 
courts to account for the nuances of common law defamation, and all the various 
ways they might play out in the Internet environment, is a Herculean assignment 
that we are reluctant to impose.  We conclude the Zeran court accurately 
diagnosed the problems that would attend notice-based liability for service 
providers. 
 
Finally, we cannot ignore another practical implication raised by Rosenthal 
and amicus curiae eBay Inc.  Adopting a rule of liability under section 230 that 
diverges from the rule announced in Zeran and followed in all other jurisdictions 
would be an open invitation to forum shopping by defamation plaintiffs.  (Cf. 
Webb v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 990, 1000.)  This consideration 
provides strong justification for following the approach we endorsed in Etcheverry 
v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 316, 320-321:  “While we are not bound 
by decisions of the lower federal courts, even on federal questions, they are 
persuasive and entitled to great weight.  [Citation.]  Where lower federal 
precedents are divided or lacking, state courts must necessarily make an 
independent determination of federal law [citation], but where the decisions of the 
lower federal courts on a federal question are ‘both numerous and consistent,’ we 
should hesitate to reject their authority [citation].”18 
                                              
 
18  In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, ___ [125 S.Ct. 
1788, 1794, 1803], the United States Supreme Court disagreed with the pre-
emption rule we adopted in Etcheverry, and followed instead what had been the 
minority view.  However, our general observations on the persuasive effect of a 
consensus among the lower federal courts on a question of federal law were 
unaffected by the ruling in Bates. 
 
28
C.  “User” Liability 
 
The “distributor” liability theory endorsed by the Court of Appeal 
recognizes no distinction between Internet service providers and individuals.  
Individual Internet “users” like Rosenthal, however, are situated differently from 
institutional service providers with regard to some of the principal policy 
considerations discussed by the Zeran court and reflected in the Congressional 
Record.  In particular, individuals do not face the massive volume of third-party 
postings that providers encounter.  Self-regulation is a far less challenging 
enterprise for them.  Furthermore, service providers, no matter how active or 
passive a role they take in screening the content posted by users of their services, 
typically bear less responsibility for that content than do the users.  Users are more 
likely than service providers to actively engage in malicious propagation of 
defamatory or other offensive material.  These considerations bring into question 
the scope of the term “user” in section 230, and whether it matters if a user is 
engaged in active or passive conduct for purposes of the statutory immunity. 
 
“User” is not defined in the statute, and the limited legislative record does 
not indicate why Congress included users as well as service providers under the 
umbrella of immunity granted by section 230(c)(1).  The standard rules of 
statutory construction, however, yield an unambiguous result.  We must begin 
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that its ordinary 
meaning expresses the legislative purpose.  (Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air 
Quality Management Dist. (2004) 541 U.S. 246, 252; see also Hassan v. Mercy 
American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715.)  “User” plainly refers to 
someone who uses something, and the statutory context makes it clear that 
Congress simply meant someone who uses an interactive computer service. 
 
 Section 230(c)(1) refers directly to the “user of an interactive computer 
service.”  Section 230(f)(2) defines “interactive computer service” as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
 
29
service or system that provides access to the Internet . . . .”  Section 230(a)(2) 
notes that such services “offer users a great degree of control over the information 
that they receive,” and section 230(b)(3) expresses Congress’s intent “to 
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over 
what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the 
Internet and other interactive computer services.”  Thus, Congress consistently 
referred to “users” of interactive computer services, specifically including 
“individuals” in section 230(b)(3). 
 
There is no reason to suppose that Congress attached a different meaning to 
the term “user” in section 230(c)(1).  (See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. (1995) 
513 U.S. 561, 570; Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 716.)  Rosenthal used the Internet to gain access to newsgroups where she 
posted Bolen’s article about Polevoy.  She was therefore a “user” under the CDA,  
as the parties conceded below.  Nor is there any basis for concluding that Congress 
intended to treat service providers and users differently when it declared that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as [a] publisher 
or speaker . . . .”  (§ 230(c)(1).)  We cannot construe the statute so as to render the 
term “user” inoperative.  (Duncan v. Walker (2001) 533 U.S. 167, 174; Hassan v. 
Mercy American River Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 715-716.)  We note that 
in cases where an individual’s role as operator of a Web site raised a question as to 
whether he was a “service provider” or a “user,” the courts found it unnecessary to 
resolve the issue because the statute confers immunity on both.  (Batzel v. Smith, 
supra, 333 F.3d at p. 1030; Donato v. Moldow, supra,  865 A.2d at p. 719; see also 
Barrett v. Fonorow, supra, 799 N.E.2d at pp. 919, 922.) 
 
Polevoy urges us to distinguish between “active” and “passive” Internet 
use, and to restrict the statutory term “user” to those who engage in passive use.  
He notes that subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(3) of section 230 refer to information 
“received” by users.  He also observes that the caption of subdivision (c) is 
“Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”  
 
30
From these premises, Polevoy reasons that the term “user” must be construed to 
refer only to those who receive offensive information, and those who screen and 
remove such information from an Internet site.  He argues that those who actively 
post or republish information on the Internet are “information content providers” 
unprotected by the statutory immunity.  “Information content provider” is defined 
as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service. . . .”  (§ 230(f)(3).)  
 
Polevoy’s view fails to account for the statutory provision at the center of 
our inquiry:  the prohibition in section 230(c)(1) against treating any “user” as “the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  A user who merely receives information on a computer without 
making it available to anyone else would be neither a “publisher” nor a “speaker.”  
Congress obviously had a broader meaning in mind.  Nor is it clear how a user 
who removes a posting may be deemed “passive” while one who merely allows a 
posting to remain online is “active.”  Furthermore, Congress plainly did not intend 
to deprive all “information content providers” of immunity, because the reference 
to “another” such provider in section 230(c)(1) presumes that the immunized 
publisher or speaker is also an information content provider.  (See Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at p. 1125; Donato v. Moldow, supra, 865 
A.2d at p. 720.)19 
                                              
 
19  At some point, active involvement in the creation of a defamatory 
Internet posting would expose a defendant to liability as an original source.  
Because Rosenthal made no changes in the article she republished on the 
newsgroups, we need not consider when that line is crossed.  We note, however, 
that many courts have reasoned that participation going no further than the 
traditional editorial functions of a publisher cannot deprive a defendant of section 
230 immunity.  (See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d at pp. 1031; Green v. 
America Online, supra, 318 F.3d at p. 471; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. 
America Online, Inc., supra, 206 F.3d at pp. 985-986; Donato v. Moldow, supra,  
 
31
 
The distinction between “active” and “passive” use was explored in Batzel 
v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d 1018.  Smith sent an e-mail to the operator of a Web site 
devoted to museum security and stolen art, accusing Batzel of possessing paintings 
that may have been stolen by the Nazis during World War II.  The operator posted 
the message on the Web site, with some changes, and distributed it to the 
subscribers of his e-mail newsletter.  Batzel sued Smith and the operator for 
defamation.  The trial court denied the operator’s motion to strike the complaint 
under the California anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).  (Batzel, at 
pp. 1020-1023.) 
 
The court of appeals vacated the order denying the motion, remanded, and 
directed the trial court to determine whether the operator should reasonably have 
known Smith intended his e-mail to be published on the Internet.  If not, the court 
reasoned the message was not “provided” by another “information content 
provider” under section 230, and the operator would not be immune from 
liability.20  (Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d at p. 1035.)  The relevant discussion 
for our purposes arose from the dissent expressed in a concurring and dissenting 
opinion. 
 
The Batzel dissent criticized the majority for adopting a rule that provides 
Internet intermediaries with immunity to spread information intended for 
republication, “licens[ing] professional rumor-mongers and gossip-hounds to 
spread false and hurtful information with impunity.”  (Batzel v. Smith, supra, at p. 
1038 (conc. & dis. opn. of Gould, J.).)  The dissent proposed a rule based on the 
defendant’s actions instead of the author’s intent.  It would “hold that the CDA 
immunizes a defendant only when the defendant took no active role in selecting 
the questionable information for publication.  If the defendant took an active role 
                                                                                                                                      
 
865 A.2d at pp. 720-726 [reviewing cases]; Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., supra, 
31 P.3d at pp. 42-43.) 
  
20  Polevoy does not argue that Rosenthal might be liable under this theory. 
 
32
in selecting information for publication, the information is no longer ‘information 
provided by another’ within the meaning of § 230.”  (Ibid.) 
 
The dissent reasoned that information actively selected for republication 
has been “transformed . . . bolstered, [and] strengthened to do more harm if it is 
wrongful.”  (Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d at p. 1038 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Gould, J.).)  It acknowledged that service providers cannot be expected to screen 
the millions of messages sent over their networks for offensive content.  However, 
it argued that a person who does actively screen communications to select some 
for republication is able to detect defamatory content and should not be 
immunized.  The dissent would grant immunity to bulletin board moderators and 
the like if they did not actively select among messages for publication, but would 
expose them to liability if they made a conscious decision to disseminate a 
particular defamatory communication.  Congress’s goal of encouraging self-
regulation would be furthered, according to the dissent, because those who remove 
all or part of an offensive message would be immune.  The dissenting justice did 
not believe Congress intended to immunize those who select defamatory 
information for distribution on the Internet.  (Id. at pp. 1039-1040.) 21 
 
The Batzel majority responded that no logical distinction can be drawn 
between a defendant who actively selects information for publication and one who 
screens submitted material, removing offensive content.  “The scope of the 
immunity cannot turn on whether the publisher approaches the selection process as 
                                              
 
21 A more elaborate reconstruction of the statute, proceeding from the same 
premise that Congress did not intend to immunize Internet users who maliciously 
republish libelous content, may be found in Jenal, When Is a User Not a “User”?  
Finding the Proper Role for Republication Liability on the Internet (2004) 24 
Loy.L.A. Ent. L.Rev. 453.  The author posits four categories of “users,” Readers, 
Posters, Moderators, and Administrators, and would deprive Posters of immunity.  
(Id. at pp. 477-480.)  No court has attempted such an adventurous reading of 
section 230.  “The provision has received a narrow, textual construction, not one 
that has welcomed creative theories or exhibited judicial creativity.”  (Donato v. 
Moldow, supra, 865 A.2d at p. 725.) 
 
33
one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method or degree, not 
substance.”  (Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d at p. 1032.)  We agree with this 
reasoning.  Furthermore, we reject the dissent’s view that actively selected and 
republished information is no longer “information provided by another 
information content provider” under section 230(c)(1).  All republications involve 
a “transformation” in some sense.  A user who actively selects and posts material 
based on its content fits well within the traditional role of “publisher.”  Congress 
has exempted that role from liability. 
 
As Rosenthal points out, the congressional purpose of fostering free speech 
on the Internet supports the extension of section 230 immunity to active individual 
“users.”  It is they who provide much of the “diversity of political discourse,” the 
pursuit of “opportunities for cultural development,” and the exploration of 
“myriad avenues for intellectual activity” that the statute was meant to protect.  
(§ 230(a)(3).)  The approach taken by the Batzel dissent would tend to chill the 
free exercise of Internet expression, and could frustrate the goal of providing an 
incentive for self-regulation.  A user who removed some offensive content might 
face liability for “actively selecting” the remaining material.  Users in this 
position, no less than the service providers discussed by the Zeran court, would be 
motivated to delete marginally offensive material, restricting the scope of online 
discussion.  Some users, at least those like Rosenthal who engage in high-volume 
Internet posting, might be discouraged from screening third party content.  
Although individual users may face the threat of liability less frequently than 
institutional service providers, their lack of comparable financial and legal 
resources makes that threat no less intimidating. 
 
We conclude there is no basis for deriving a special meaning for the term 
“user” in section 230(c)(1), or any operative distinction between “active” and 
“passive” Internet use.  By declaring that no “user” may be treated as a 
“publisher” of third party content, Congress has comprehensively immunized 
republication by individual Internet users. 
 
34
D.  Conclusion 
 
We share the concerns of those who have expressed reservations about the 
Zeran court’s broad interpretation of section 230 immunity.  The prospect of 
blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements 
on the Internet has disturbing implications.  Nevertheless, by its terms section 230 
exempts Internet intermediaries from defamation liability for republication.  The 
statutory immunity serves to protect online freedom of expression and to 
encourage self-regulation, as Congress intended.  Section 230 has been interpreted 
literally.  It does not permit Internet service providers or users to be sued as 
“distributors,” nor does it expose “active users” to liability. 
 
Plaintiffs are free under section 230 to pursue the originator of a 
defamatory Internet publication.  Any further expansion of liability must await 
Congressional action. 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion.  Although there may be a considerable gap 
between the specific wrongs Congress was intending to right in enacting the 
immunity at issue here and the broad statutory language of that immunity, that gap 
is ultimately for Congress, rather than the courts, to bridge.  I write separately to 
express the view that publishers that conspire with original content providers to 
defame would not be covered by the immunity provided by title 47 United States 
Code section 230(c)(1) and (e)(3) (hereafter section 230).  I further explain why 
there is no prima facie showing of conspiracy in the present case. 
Section 230(c)(1) states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”  Section 230(e)(3) states in part: “No cause 
of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local 
law that is inconsistent with this section.”  The majority correctly concludes that 
this immunity statute does not distinguish between publishers and distributors or 
between active and passive users.  But in my view, this immunity would not apply 
if the “user” is in a conspiracy with the “information content provider” providing 
the information.   
My interpretation is based first on the language of the statute.  Section 
230(c)(1) applies only to information provided by “another content provider.”  
(Italics added.)  A fair reading of this language suggests that the statute was 
 
 
2
contemplating an authentic transfer of information between two independent 
parties.  But this transfer does not really occur in a conspiracy to defame, nor are 
the parties themselves authentically independent.  In a conspiracy “ ‘ “ ‘[T]here 
must be a preconceived plan and unity of design and purpose, for the common 
design is of the essence of the conspiracy.’ ” ’ ”  (Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 492, 510, italics omitted.)  
When, for example, two parties conspire to defame someone, agreeing that one 
party will play the role of “user” and the other, judgment proof, party will play the 
role of original “content provider,” then the transfer of information that occurs 
between the two is a sham, a mere vehicle for the defamation.  I do not believe the 
statutory immunity is intended to apply in such circumstances. 
My conclusion is also supported by the legislative history.  As the majority 
states, quoting the seminal case of Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 
129 F.3d 327: “the Zeran court reasoned that Congress viewed ‘[t]he imposition of 
tort liability on service providers for the communications of others’ as ‘simply 
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech.’  (Zeran, supra, 129 
F.3d at p. 330.)  While original posters of defamatory speech do not escape 
accountability, Congress ‘made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online 
speech [by] imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for 
other parties’ potentially injurious messages.’  (Id. at pp. 330-331.)  . . .  [¶]  The 
court noted that another important purpose of section 230 was ‘to encourage 
service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their 
services.’  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.)  . . .  ‘Fearing that the specter of 
liability would . . . deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive 
material, Congress enacted § 230’s broad immunity,’ which forbids the imposition 
of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-
 
 
3
regulatory functions.’  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
7-8.) 
Unlike the Internet service provider, or even the typical user of an 
interactive computer service, one engaged in a tortious conspiracy with the 
original information content provider is hardly one of the neutral “intermediaries” 
that Congress intended to absolve of liability.  Imposing liability on such 
conspirators would not cause service providers to curtail the robust Internet 
communication they facilitate nor inhibit them from engaging in self-regulation of 
offensive material.  Rather, imposition of liability on those who conspire to 
defame on the Internet supports Congress’s intent to impose liability on “original 
posters of defamatory speech” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7), discouraging collusive 
arrangements that are designed to maximize the original poster’s impact and/or 
minimize his or her liability. 
The question then is whether there is a sufficient showing of conspiracy to 
defame in this case.  In order to defeat a motion to strike made pursuant to the 
anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, when it has 
been determined that the cause of action against the defendants arises from acts in 
furtherance of the exercise of free speech or other protected activity under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 425.16, “ ‘the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the 
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie 
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the 
plaintiff is credited.” ’ ”  (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88-89.)  
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Rosenthal, Tim Bolen, and other 
defendants conspired to defame them.  Because the trial court concluded that the 
only potentially defamatory statement was made against Dr. Timothy Polevoy, and 
because it is uncontroverted that Bolen was the originator of that statement, 
 
 
4
plaintiffs can only prevail if they make a prima facie showing that Rosenthal and 
Bolen conspired to defame Dr. Polevoy. 
I conclude that plaintiffs have failed to make that showing.  The 
uncontroverted evidence is that Rosenthal did not know of Dr. Polevoy until she 
read Bolen’s e-mail containing the alleged defamatory statement that Polevoy 
stalked Canadian radio producer Christine McPhee.  Rosenthal called McPhee, 
who confirmed Bolen’s statement.  Her republication of the defamation occurred 
after that call. 
It is true that Rosenthal and Bolen knew each other before the alleged 
defamatory e-mail was posted and reposted and that they shared some similar 
views about alternative medicine.  It also may well be true that Rosenthal’s 
investigation of Dr. Polevoy’s incident with McPhee fell considerably short of the 
type of investigation a reasonable person would undertake before republishing 
potentially defamatory material, inasmuch as she did not contact the appropriate 
law enforcement authorities to corroborate McPhee’s story.  But these facts are not 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy to defame Dr. Polevoy, i.e., 
a preconceived plan and unity of design and purpose on the part of Rosenthal and 
Bolen to defame.1 
It is a closer question whether plaintiffs could have shown a prima facie 
case of conspiracy by Bolen and Rosenthal against Dr. Stephen Barrett, since 
Bolen and Rosenthal appeared to have shared a history of hostility toward Dr. 
                                              
1  
Moreover, even assuming plaintiffs are correct that the trial court wrongly 
denied them the ability to depose Rosenthal, Bolen and McPhee, as the Court of 
Appeal concluded, their stated reason for taking such depositions was to inquire 
into whether a defendants’ defamatory statements were made with reckless 
disregard for the truth.  Even if a deposition established such reckless disregard on 
Rosenthal’s part, this would not show a preexisting conspiracy to defame Dr. 
Polevoy, nor negate the fact that Rosenthal was unacquainted with him before 
receiving the alleged defamatory e-mail. 
 
 
5
Barrett.  As the lower courts correctly concluded, however, none of the hostile 
comments against Dr. Barrett alleged in the complaint are defamatory. 
I therefore conclude the majority is correct in reversing the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Barrett v. Rosenthal 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 114 Cal.App.4th 1379 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S122953 
Date Filed: November 20, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: James A. Richman 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Christopher E. Grell, Christopher E. Grell, Richard R. Rescho and Ian P. Dillon for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Mark Goldowitz, Jesper Rasmussen; Piper Rudnick, Roger Myers, Lisa Sitkin and Katherine Keating for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Lee Tien and Kurt Opsahl for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Ann Brick for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Cooley Godward, Michael G. Rhodes, Lori R.E. Ploeger, and Laura C. Pirri for eBay Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.   
 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Patrick J. Carome, Samir Jain, and C. Colin Rushing for 
Amazon.com, Inc., America Online, Inc., eBay Inc., Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., 
ABC, Inc., Ask Jeeves, Inc., Cable News Network LP, LLLP, Compuserve Interactive Services, Inc., 
Earthlink, Inc., ESPN, Inc., Netscape Communications Corporation, SBC Internet Services, Time Warner 
Cable Inc., The Washington Post Company, Association for Competitive Technology, California 
Newspaper Publishers Association, Information Technology Association of America, Internet Alliance, 
Internet Commerce Coalition, National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Netchoice, Netcoalition 
Newspaper Association of America, Online News Association, Online Publishers Association, TechNet 
and United States Internet Service Provider Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Deidre K. Mulligan for Law Professors with Expertise in Internet Law as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Christopher E. Grell 
Law Offices of Christopher E. Grell 
The Broadlake Plaza 
360 22nd Street, Suite 320 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 832-2980 
 
Mark Goldowitz 
2903 Sacramento Street 
Berkeley, CA  94702 
(510) 486-9123 
 
Ann Brick 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California 
39 Drum Street 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 621-2493