Case Title: Wilkinson v. Rowe

Citation: 98 So. 2d 435

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1957-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
98 So. 2d 435 (1957)
George C. WILKINSON et al.
v.
F. W. ROWE, d/b/a Rowe Surveying Company.
1 Div. 704.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 22, 1957.
Rehearing Denied November 21, 1957.
Edmund R. Cannon, Jr., Hand, Arendall & Bedsole, Mobile, for appellants.
Rae M. Crowe, Gaillard & Gaillard, Mobile, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Appellee filed his bill in equity against appellants to enforce an alleged mechanic's lien claimed by appellee against certain lands owned by appellants. Demurrer *436 to the bill of complaint as amended was overruled, and respondents appeal to this court to review the ruling on demurrer.
Appellee states the question in the case as follows:
The bill of complaint describes the services for which appellee claims a lien as follows:
Appellants and appellee both agree that the precise question in this case has not been heretofore answered in Alabama.
The right to a mechanic's lien as claimed here did not exist at common law. Appellee's right, if any, to such a lien must be conferred on him by statute.
Section 37, Title 33, Code 1940, provides that every person "* * * who shall do or perform any work, or labor upon, or furnish any material, fixture, engine, boiler, or machinery for any building or improvement on land, or for repairing, altering, or beautifying the same, * * * shall have a lien therefor on such building or improvements and on the land on which the same is situated, * * *" etc. (Emphasis supplied.)
By its language, the statute gives the lien first on the building or improvement, then on the land. Unless the improvement on which the lien can be fastened exists, the lien never attaches to the land. The statute gives a lien for work on an improvement on *437 land, but does not give a lien for work on land in the absence of an improvement or building thereon.
This court has construed the word "improvement," as used in the statute, to embrace more than the word "building," and, in holding "that a well designed and made for a permanent supply of water" constitutes an improvement under our mechanic's lien statute, this court said:
The question here before us is: Does the thing on or for which the surveyor furnished labor, as averred in the bill, constitute an improvement within the meaning of § 37 of Title 33?
In considering mechanic's liens, Somerville, J., writing for this court, had the following to say:
Can it be said from the averments of the bill in this case that anything has attached to and become a part of the realty, as a result of the surveyor's work?
We recognize that in construing a similar lien statute, this court has said:
In Montandon & Co. v. Deas, supra, however, it appears that the improvement was a "brick house," which is unquestionably an improvement of the character for which the lien was provided.
In Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101, 106, 33 So. 2d 360, 364, the court said:
In the last cited case, however, the lien was sought for labor done and material furnished in installing a heating system in a dwelling house. The heating system was a visible, tangible thing.
Appellee argues that he is entitled to a lien in this case by analogy to our holding that an architect is entitled to a lien for his services in preparing plans for a building. This court has held that an architect who prepares the drawings, plans, and specifications for a building, and superintends the erection thereof, is entitled to a lien under our statutes. Hughes v. Torgerson, 96 Ala. 346, 11 So. 209, 16 L.R.A. 600. Beyond that holding, so far as we are advised, this court has not extended the coverage of the mechanic's lien statute with respect to architects.
While it does not appear to have been controlling, the opinion in Hughes v. Torgerson, supra, noted that, "By the judgment a lien was declared only on the building, and not on the lot." For a collection of authorities dealing with the right of architects to a lien, see 60 A.L.R. 1252.
The rationale for allowing a lien for preparing plans which are actually used appears to be that when the plans are used they become a part of the building and the labor expended in preparing the plans is performed on the building in the same sense as the labor of the carpenter or brickmason.
We have not been cited to nor have we found any case in this jurisdiction where a lien has been granted when there was no tangible improvement constructed on the land on which the lien was claimed.
In the instant case, from the averments of the bill, we do not understand that anything tangible or visible has been added to the land as a result of appellee's services, except perhaps stakes or markers placed on the land by the surveyor. We do not think it will be seriously contended that such stakes or markers constitute an "improvement" within the meaning of that word as it is employed in the statute.
We do not think that a surveyor who stakes out a subdivision and draws maps thereof is in the same position as an architect who prepares plans for a building or other tangible improvement.
The architect's plans which are actually used become a part of the building. The most that can be said of the surveyor's plat and stakes is that they designate the boundaries of the area within which some building or improvement may or may not be later constructed. We are of opinion that the work of pointing out the place where an improvement may afterwards be constructed is not and does not become a part of the improvement under the statute as it presently appears in the Code.
While we recognize that the right to a lien in any case depends on the particular *439 statute involved, for authorities from other jurisdictions supportive of the foregoing views, see the following cases:
In Armitage v. Bernheim, 32 Idaho 594, 600, 187 P. 938, 939, it was said:
Syllabus 4, by the court, in Buckingham v. Flummerfelt, 15 N.D. 112, 106 N.W. 403, recites:
In Daugherty v. Gunther, 88 Wash. 378, 153 P. 336, the court said:
We have not found any case where a mechanic's lien has been allowed for surveying services.
Here, we are concerned with a remedy given by statute for work done on an improvement on land. If the "improvement" contemplated by the statute does not exist, the remedy given by the statute does not apply.
The legislature has power to extend the right to a lien to cover surveyors' services, but this court does not.
Grounds 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11 of the demurrer are to the effect that the bill fails to aver that appellee has performed services which entitle him to the lien claimed. These grounds are well taken and the decree overruling the demurrer is in error.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.
GOODWYN, J., concurs specially.
GOODWYN, Justice (specially concurring).
I agree with the opinion to the extent that it holds the demurrer to the bill should have been sustained.
*440 As I read the bill, there is no allegation that the land was actually subdivided and that the services rendered by appellee were actually used in establishing the subdivision. In this situation there is no question presented as to whether the actual use of such services would give to the surveyor a lien. However, as I read the opinion it contains statements which might be construed as excluding the right to a lien even though the plans prepared by the surveyor are actually used in subdividing the land into lots, including the construction of such things as streets, sidewalks, and sanitary and storm drainage lines.
On Rehearing
COLEMAN, Justice.
Appellee requests clarification "for the purpose of clearing up some ambiguity which may arise" from the opinion and for guidance in other cases where surveyors and "engineers" claim a lien.
We have not found the word "engineer" in the transcript in this case. The word "engineer" appears in the opinion in a direct quotation from a cited case. In any event, the right to a lien depends, not on the title or classification of the person who furnishes the labor, but on the nature of the services rendered.
The decision in this case, as in all cases, is based on the record of the proceedings in the court below as set out in the transcript filed in this court. We cannot anticipate what circumstances may appear hereafter in other cases.
If we were to express an opinion based on facts not shown by the record in this case, that opinion would be dicta and would not be binding in subsequent cases. This court has quoted with approval the following statement of this rule:
When another case involving different facts comes before us, it will be our duty to decide that case according to the law applicable to the facts then presented.
We answered in the negative the question in this case as that question was stated in brief by the appellee. The question so stated is set out in the original opinion.
The allegations of the bill of complaint are that the services rendered by appellee included:
From these allegations, we understand that the boundaries of the lots of the subdivision were actually staked out and marked on the ground, and that the center line of Road No. 1 was actually staked out and marked on the ground, all according to the plan or map prepared by appellee.
Our holding is that preparing such maps and placing stakes on the ground to mark the boundary lines of lots and streets according *441 to such maps is not labor on an improvement within the meaning of the mechanics' lien statute.
Opinion modified and extended. Application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON, GOODWYN and MERRILL, JJ., concur.
GOODWYN, Justice (concurring).
In view of the modification of the original opinion I now concur in the original opinion as modified, and also in the foregoing opinion overruling the application for rehearing.