Case Title: The Florida Bar v. WHP

Citation: 384 So. 2d 28

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1980-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
384 So. 2d 28 (1980)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner,
v.
W.H.P., Respondent/Petitioner.
No. 55588.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 15, 1980.
*29 Leon B. Cheek, Bar Counsel, Altamonte Springs, David G. McGunegle, Branch Staff Counsel, Orlando, and John A. Boggs, Asst. Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
W.H.P., in pro. per.
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner, W.H.P., respondent before the referee, asks us to review a report of the referee in grievance proceedings recommending that petitioner be privately reprimanded by the board of governors and that petitioner make restitution to his client in the amount of $200 plus the interest from November 1, 1976. The report of the referee contains the following findings of fact:
Petitioner asserts that he has a personal right to attorney's fees. In support of this assertion he cites section 61.16 of Florida *30 Statutes (1977). This statute does give an attorney a personal (in his own name) enforceable action for fees, but only after a court has entered a discretionary order which directs payment directly to the attorney. There was no such order issued here. It follows that petitioner has no statutory personal right to attorney's fees in the dissolution case.
The referral letter from the Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Inc., by which petitioner was appointed counsel for his clients stated that he should not charge the client a fee for his services. This did not preclude him from seeking a fee from the opposing party. Under the Legal Aid Society's guidelines and according to directions contained in the referral letter, any deviation from non-fee status was to be by written request and waiver. Petitioner admittedly did not comply with these guidelines. By failing to secure a waiver of the Society's guidelines, petitioner was precluded from asserting any fee claim against his client.
Petitioner accepted representation of an indigent Legal Aid client on a non-fee basis. He had no legal or personal basis for charging his client a fee. By charging his client a fee without seeking a waiver as prescribed in the guidelines, petitioner violated Florida Bar Integration Rule, article 11, Rule 11.02(3)(a) and Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary rule 2-106(C) and 7-101(A)(2).
We approve the findings of guilt recommended by the referee. Petitioner shall submit personally to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar to receive the recommended private reprimand.
Costs in the amount of $587.55 are taxed against petitioner.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion, with which BOYD, J., concurs.
ADKINS, Justice, dissenting.
Admittedly petitioner had a right to seek attorney's fees against the husband. However, during the negotiations which resulted in L.M. acquiring full title to the house, she agreed to withdraw her claim for attorney's fees against the husband. Petitioner says that L.M. agreed to pay his fee in lieu of trying to collect the attorney's fee from her husband so as not to endanger the settlement which she thought highly advantageous to her. This was denied by L.M.
Although petitioner should have followed the better course and secured a waiver from the Legal Aid Society, I do not believe that his securing the $200 fee was in any way unethical. Under the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the property settlement, I do not believe that the failure to secure the waiver is a sufficient ground upon which to base grievance procedures.
In my opinion the grievance proceedings should be dismissed and costs should be taxed against the Florida Bar.
BOYD, J., concurs.