Case Title: Murray v. State ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-76

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Murray v. State ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 184993 P.2d 327Case Number: 99-76Decided: 12/29/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

DONALD DAVID MURRAY, 
Appellant (Petitioner/Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Respondent/Objector-Defendant).

 

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
Certification from the District Court of Uinta County Honorable John D. 
Troughton, Judge.

Sharon M. Rose 
of Beppler, Lavery & Rose, P.C., Evanston, WY. Argument presented by Ms. 
Rose, representing appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General. Argument presented by Mr. Haggerty, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Donald 
Murray's wrists broke out in hives shortly after he drew a sample of raw gas as 
part of his job activities. When the Workers' Compensation Division denied 
Murray's claim for benefits, a contested case hearing was held to determine 
whether his injury was work-related. The hearing examiner held that Murray's 
inability to identify the precise chemical which caused his skin problem 
constituted failure to prove a compensable injury as a matter of law. We find 
that Murray's inability to identify the specific source of his rash does not 
preclude a finding of causation as a matter of law, and therefore, reverse and 
remand.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant Murray 
phrases the issues as follows:

A. Did the 
Hearing Examiner err in applying the burden of proof for occupational 
disease/injuries which occur over a substantial period of time, § 27-14-603 
W.S.A. (1997 Ed), to Appellant's case[?]

B. Did the 
hearing examiner impose a greater burden of proof than a preponderance of the 
evidence, (sic) in requiring the Appellant to identify a specific chemical 
causing injury[?]

C. Was the 
Hearing Examiner's decision that Appellant had not met his burden of proof on 
causation an abuse of discretion[?]

Appellee Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division phrases the issues as:

The Hearing 
Examiner denied benefits for the Employee's skin disease for several alternative 
reasons.

A. Was any one 
of the Hearing Examiner's alternative reasons supported by substantial evidence, 
within his discretion and in accordance with law?

FACTS

[¶3]      In 1982, Murray 
began work as a plant operator at the Chevron USA, Inc. Carter Creek Gas Plant. 
His position required daily contact with a number of chemicals including raw 
gas, raw sulfur, treated gas, and gas stream products. Toward the end of his 
shift, on the morning of March 6, 1997, Murray drew a routine sample of raw gas. 
Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, he suffered an outbreak of severe 
urticaria (hives) on his wrists appearing at the point where his gloves had been 
rolled down.

[¶4]      Later that day, 
Murray went to the emergency room when the urticaria became more severe and had 
spread over his entire body. There, he saw Dr. French, who speculated that the 
cause of the rash could have been a reaction to the medication he had recently 
taken for a sinus condition. As his condition persisted, Murray consulted 
several other medical practitioners to determine the cause and treatment for his 
condition. He eventually saw Dr. John Zone, a board certified dermatologist and 
immunologist, who conducted tests which returned negative for allergies to 
latex, food, and the medication which Murray was taking prior to his outbreak. 

[¶5]      While under the 
care of Dr. Zone, Murray had another severe outbreak while handling Glad garbage 
bags. After he reported this event to Dr. Zone, the doctor performed a "scratch 
test" with Glad bags which caused a life-threatening reaction. Dr. Zone then 
surmised that Murray was allergic to petroleum products because the bags are 
coated with various substances including hydrocarbons.

[¶6]      Murray filed a 
claim for benefits with the Division, and two days later, the Division issued a 
final determination denying benefits because the employee had not suffered an 
injury as defined by the Workers' Compensation Act. A hearing to determine 
Murray's claim was held on October 22, 1998. The parties agreed that the issue 
was whether the injury was work-related, but differed as to whether Murray was 
required to prove the elements of a single incident injury or an injury 
occurring over a substantial period of time. Finding that Murray failed to meet 
his burden of proof, the hearing examiner's conclusions of law included the 
following:

7. To prove that 
an injury arises out of or in the course of employment, a claimant must show a 
causal connection between the injury and the employment 
exist.

. . . 
.

9. To find a 
nexus, the Office must determine if the injury occurred during the period of 
employment, at the place of employment while the Employee was fulfilling the 
duties of his employment and the (sic) under what conditions the duties were 
performed.

. . . 
.

12. Proximate 
cause is such cause which in direct, unbroken sequence produces an injury or 
directly brings about an injury either immediately or through happenings which 
follow one after another.

. . . 
.

17. The employee 
has not met his burden of proof in demonstrating any connection between his work 
and his condition.

18. The employee 
has not demonstrated what his injury is. Without determining what the "injury" 
is, it is impossible, as a matter of law, to attribute it to a condition of 
employment.

19. The medical 
evidence presented does not identify a source or cause of the Employee's 
urticaria. If no cause can be identified, the Employee cannot meet his burden of 
proof. . . .

20. No evidence 
was presented that indicates any illness occurred at the Employer's 
premises.

21. The Office 
concludes [that] the Employee suffers from an illness and that the risk of the 
illness was not increased by the Employee's employment because no cause of his 
illness was identified by the medical testimony and 
evidence.

22. If the 
Employee's injury is one which occurs over a substantial period, the Employee 
has failed to prove a direct causal connection in his condition and work, that 
the injury follows as a natural incident of his work or the proximate cause of 
his condition.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      Our process for 
reviewing a hearing examiner's decision that the injured worker has failed to 
meet the burden of proof assigned to him has been expressed as 
follows:

A claimant for 
worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential 
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case 
hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the 
burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" language of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (ii) (1990). City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant * * * has the 
burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight v. Environmental 
Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. 
Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 
78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of fact, is 
charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. 
Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally accorded 
to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative 
agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless 
it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). Demonstrating 
evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish the irrationality of 
the ruling, but we do examine conflicting evidence to determine if the agency 
reasonably could have made its finding and order based upon all of the evidence 
before it. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996); Knight, 805 P.2d  at 
274; Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County School Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 623 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. 
Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1992).

Morgan v. Olsten 
Temporary Services, 975 P.2d 12, 13-14 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Pederson v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997)). 
When reviewing an administrative decision, we will not defer to the agency's 
conclusions of law. Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 979 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1999). Conversely, we will defer 
to an agency's findings of fact as long as the agency's findings of fact comport 
with the evidence. 979 P.2d 959.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Murray raises two 
points in his argument that the hearing examiner's decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. First, he contends that 
his claim results from a single injury incident, but the hearing examiner 
erroneously applied the higher burden of proof required to establish an injury 
occurring over a period of time. Murray also maintains that the hearing examiner 
erroneously required him to definitively prove the specific cause of his 
allergy, thus raising his burden of proof to a clear and convincing 
standard.

1. 
Characterization of the Injury.

[¶9]      Murray contends 
that the hearing examiner considered his claim solely as an injury occurring 
over a substantial period of time pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-6031. We disagree. Wyo. 
Stat.

Ann. § 
27-14-102(a) (xi) (LEXIS 1999) defines "injury" as:

any harmful 
change in the human organism other than normal aging . . . arising out of and in 
the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used 
or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence. . . . "Injury" does not 
include:

(A) Any illness 
or communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the illness or disease is 
increased by the nature of the employment[.]

The hearing 
examiner specifically found that Murray's injury was an "illness," and that he 
failed to show that the nature of his employment increased his risk of 
contracting the disease. The hearing examiner went on to say that if the injury 
was controlled by § 27-14-603, Murray failed to meet his burden of proof under 
that section.

[¶10]   We agree with the hearing 
examiner's finding that Murray's injury is controlled by § 27-14-102. The 
evidence before the hearing examiner was that Murray drew a sample of raw gas 
while wearing gloves supplied by his employer and shortly thereafter developed 
severe urticaria. Both parties agree that the determination of whether the 
injury was a single occurrence injury or an injury which appeared over time is 
one of fact. See, e.g., Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 555 
(Wyo. 1991) (determination that injury occurred over a substantial period of 
time not supported by substantial evidence); In re Pero, 49 Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690, 699 (1935) (whether an incident is determined to be accidental or an 
occupational disease "must to some extent be determined in accordance with its 
own facts"; and Active Transportation Company v. Wylie, 976 P.2d 94, 96 (Or. 
1999) (substantial evidence supports determination that claim should be regarded 
as injury rather than occupational disease). We defer to the agency's finding 
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence.

[¶11]   While it is true that Dr. Zone, 
Murray's expert and treating physician, testified that "all immune reactions of 
this nature develop over a period of time," he also testified that the reaction 
itself is triggered by a single event. Dr. Straight, the expert who testified on 
behalf of the Division, also referred to the onset of the urticaria as caused by 
an "event." Thus, there is substantial evidence supporting the hearing 
examiner's determination that Murray's claim was governed by § 27-14-102 rather 
than the statute relating to an injury that incurred over a substantial period 
of time.

2. 
Identification of a Specific Cause

[¶12]   In essence, the hearing examiner 
determined that because the medical evidence did not identify the source of 
Murray's urticaria, he did not "demonstrate what his injury is," and, therefore, 
could not show causation as a matter of law. This answer to a question of law is 
the foundation for the hearing examiner's finding that "no evidence was 
presented that indicates any illness occurred at the Employer's premises." 
However, causation must be considered in light of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident. Therefore, we find that the hearing examiner erred in 
failing to weigh all the relevant evidence and in requiring Murray to show the 
specific source of his urticaria as a matter of law.

[¶13]   To prove an injury under § 
27-14-102, Murray must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
urticaria arose "out of and in the course of his employment." If the injury is 
deemed an "illness," the claimant must also show that the risk of contracting 
the illness is increased by the nature of the employment. In this case, medical 
evidence was presented by two doctors: Dr. Zone testifying for Murray and Dr. 
Straight testifying for the Division. Dr. Zone began treating Murray several 
weeks after his initial outbreak. Based on Murray's history, the tests 
performed, and Murray's severe reaction to the Glad bag scratch test, Dr. Zone 
concluded that Murray's condition was contact urticaria, probably caused by the 
exposure to the chemicals in the gloves he wore while taking the sample at work. 
He opined that further testing would be unavailing and would put Murray at an 
unnecessary risk.

[¶14]   Dr. Straight examined Murray 
several months after he was being treated for his condition. By the time Murray 
saw Dr. Straight, the urticaria was not immediately apparent, although he 
conducted a skin test which indicated the presence of urticaria. Dr. Straight 
conceded that his ability to make a diagnosis may have been easier had he seen 
Murray when his condition was acute. Dr. Straight agreed that "something 
happened that day" and "[Murray] had contact with something, obviously, that 
touched his skin." However, Dr. Straight opined that "all of these tests that 
have been done so far have really not answered the question satisfactorily as to 
whether or not it was hydrocarbon or not." Dr. Straight's ultimate diagnosis was 
delayed pressure urticaria, but he also stated that the causes of delayed 
urticaria "are typically not found." He further testified:

Delayed pressure 
urticaria may last for six months to a few years and then may just go away. The 
cause is often mysterious and nobody knows, in most cases, why it comes. It's 
not very common, but I've had several patients who have had it, some acquired it 
in the workplace, some acquired it out of the blue. . . . 
.

. . . I see 
people in the emergency room every day, I (sic) seen two today who had an onset 
of urticaria at work or at home and they don't know why it happened, and, you 
know, they were doing any number of things that they think is related, but do we 
really know for sure? No, we never do. Sometimes we do, they have taken a pill 
or they ate something, but in the majority of cases we don't have a reason why 
they had hives in the first place. And that's the common, everyday experience of 
every doctor in this country who sees patients, that hives occur and we often 
are unable to figure out why. The problem is did Mr. Murray's problems just 
happen to start when he was at work or did the work environment cause his 
problems and, you know, I don't have an answer for you. . . . And science so far 
hasn't helped Mr. Murray much being able to say yes or no, that is or is not the 
case.

Dr. Straight 
agreed with Dr. Zone that Murray should not return to work without further 
testing, and that he did not "blame" Murray for not wanting to continue with 
testing.

[¶15]   Since 1936, in the context of 
determining when an injury becomes compensable, this Court has recognized the 
limitations of medical testimony. Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 
539 (1936); Little America Refining Company v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 57 (Wyo. 
1993). In Baldwin, we observed that "[m]edical science and diagnosis have 
advanced with well-nigh miraculous strides in the last decade or two, yet they 
cannot at this time, and probably never will be able to foretell accurately the 
reaction of every particular human body to every particular hurt it may sustain 
in industrial employment." 62 P.2d  at 539. With this in 
mind:

We have held 
that medical testimony is not required if it is not essential to establish a 
causal connection between the accident and the injury. Hansen v. Mr. D's Food 
Center, 827 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1992). We also have held that the finder of fact is 
not necessarily bound by the medical evidence. McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium 
Co., 694 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1985). On the other hand, we have acknowledged that where 
a medical question is complex, and the fact finding must be done in a realm that 
appropriately relies upon technical medical knowledge and expertise, medical 
testimony should not be ignored. Ludlow v. Wortham Machinery Co., 71 Wyo. 331, 
257 P.2d 358 (1953).

Forni v. 
Pathfinder Mines, 834 P.2d 688, 693 (Wyo. 1992); see also Jackson v. J.W. 
Williams, Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 603, 604 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Padilla v. Lovern's, 
Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1994)).

[¶16]   The medical experts in this case 
agreed that something happened while Murray was at work that triggered the 
urticaria, and that the tests performed so far were not conclusive. They also 
agreed that it was not uncommon that the specific cause of Murray's condition 
could not be identified. Thus, the usefulness of the medical testimony was 
clearly limited by the state of the science.

[¶17]   Rather than recognizing this 
limitation, the hearing examiner required Murray, as a matter of law, to 
demonstrate a cause that typically can not be shown through medical testimony. 
In so doing, the hearing examiner failed to weigh the circumstantial evidence 
which tended to show that the urticaria was causally related to Murray's 
employment. "Proof of prior good health and change immediately following and 
continuing after an injury may establish that an impaired condition was due to 
the injury." Waldorf Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 708 N.E.2d 476, 480 
(Ill.App.)1st Dist. 1999 ; see also Davis v. General Electric Company, 991 S.W.2d 699, 706-707(Mo.App.S.D. 1999). "[E]vidence of the timing of symptoms has 
been specifically recognized as a competent way of studying causation; `the 
manner in which the disease developed, with reference to the claimant's medical 
and work history' is entirely appropriate for the court to consider." Kiczula v. 
American National Can Company, 708 A.2d 742, 746 (N.J. App. 1998) (quoting Fiore 
Consolidated Freightways, 140 N.J. 452, 659 A.2d 436 (1995 considering 
occupational disease). Indeed, we have recognized that when a single incident 
injury is so "[immediate] and directly or naturally and probably the result of 
an accident, . . . medical evidence is not essential to find a causal 
connection." Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
913 P.2d 863, 867 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Hansen, 827 P.2d 371 at 373 (Wyo. 
1992)).

[¶18]   In this case, Murray's claimed 
injury was an outbreak of urticaria. The uncontested evidence demonstrated that 
Murray had previously suffered only minor allergies diagnosed in 1973 or 1974. 
The outbreak began while he was at work, within 15 to 20 minutes after drawing a 
raw sample of gas while wearing gloves. It is also uncontested that the 
urticaria continued to grow in severity throughout the day. There was no 
evidence challenging the veracity of Murray's version of the circumstances of 
his outbreak or the history given to his doctors. In fact, Dr. Straight 
testified that he believed Murray "completely." Considering these factors, Dr. 
Zone testified that the urticaria was caused by something in the gloves being 
worn by Murray immediately before the outbreak. Dr. Straight did not disagree, 
but stated that he could not offer the same opinion to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty due to the limitations of the present science in identifying a 
specific cause.

[¶19]   Murray is required to show the 
causal nexus between his injury and some condition, activity, environment, or 
requirement of his employment by a preponderance of the evidence, not medical 
certainty. The uncontradicted evidence points to the fact that Murray's injury 
occurred on the work premises, and that it was triggered by his routine 
collection of the sample of raw gas. The premises rule, adopted by this Court in 
Archuleta v. Carbon County School District No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 93 (Wyo. 1990) 
establishes a rebuttable presumption of causation when an employee, having fixed 
hours and place of work, suffers an injury on the premises while at work. This 
presumption was not rebutted by Dr. Straight's testimony regarding the 
limitations of medical science.

[¶20]   As to the second element, that the 
risk of an illness be increased by the nature of the employment, both medical 
experts agreed that it would be unsafe for Murray to return to the employment 
environment. Therefore, he has established that his work environment would 
increase the risk of his contracting or aggravating his injury by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The hearing examiner's error of law prevented him 
from considering the evidence presented by the claimant. Had the hearing 
examiner considered all of the uncontradicted evidence before him, the only 
reasonable conclusion would be that Murray had demonstrated a compensable injury 
by a preponderance of the evidence.

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   A claimant seeking workers' 
compensation benefits is not precluded from meeting his burden of proof merely 
because the state of medical science cannot identify the specific cause of his 
injury. In such a case, the hearing examiner must consider all of the evidence 
relevant to the issue of causation. In this case, Murray presented 
uncontradicted testimony that his injury occurred while he was at work, and that 
his return to that environment would endanger his health. Therefore, he proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury was compensable. We, 
therefore, reverse the order of the hearing examiner denying benefits and remand 
this case for disposition in accordance with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-603 (LEXIS 1999) requires the petitioner to prove by competent 
medical authority that:

(i) 
There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under 
which the work is performed and the injury;

(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the 
work as a result of the employment;

(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which [the employee] would 
have been equally exposed outside of the employment; 
and

(v) 
The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of 
the relation of employer and employee.