Case Title: State v. Poole

Citation: 2010-Ohio-4988

Docket Number: 20092110

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Poole, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4988.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4988 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. POOLE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Poole, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4988.] 
(No. 2009-2110 — Submitted September 14, 2010 — Decided October 20, 2010.) 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashtabula County, No. 2009-A-0010, 
185 Ohio App.3d 38, 2009-Ohio-5634. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} By dismissing this appeal as having been improvidently accepted, 
the majority expresses its belief that that this case presents no substantial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
constitutional question or question of public or great general interest.  The 
majority is wrong. 
{¶ 3} This case presents the court with the opportunity to clarify its 
jurisprudence regarding the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 
particularly as the privilege relates to codefendant testimony. 
{¶ 4} Poole and her boyfriend, Robert Coffman, were each charged with 
crimes arising out of the same traffic stop.  Poole pleaded guilty to one of the 
charges against her and the other pending charges against her were dismissed.  
Poole was advised that by entering a guilty plea, she was waiving her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Poole was sentenced, and that 
case was concluded. 
{¶ 5} Poole then was subpoenaed—compelled by law—to appear and 
testify at Coffman’s trial by Coffman’s counsel.  She was placed under oath under 
penalty of perjury by the trial court.  Coffman’s counsel questioned Poole 
regarding the traffic stop, including questions regarding the offenses for which 
she previously had been told she had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege.  The 
trial court did not advise Poole of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  Poole was not afforded the opportunity before or during the course 
of her testimony to consult with a lawyer regarding her Fifth Amendment rights.  
In the course of her testimony, Poole incriminated herself by admitting that the 
drugs that had been found in Coffman’s pocket belonged to her.  Based on this 
admission, the state later charged Poole with possession of methamphetamine. 
{¶ 6} In a criminal case, a trial court has a duty to protect the 
constitutional rights of a witness as well as to ensure the defendant a fair trial.  
State v. Schaub (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 25, 27-28, 75 O.O.2d 94, 346 N.E.2d 295.  
Ohio appellate courts have held that this duty includes an affirmative obligation to 
safeguard a codefendant’s constitutional rights by informing him or her of the 
right against self-incrimination when testifying at the trial of a codefendant.  State 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
v. Oden (July 21, 1977), Cuyahoga App. No. 36241; State v. Carter, Pickaway 
App. No. 07CA1, 2007-Ohio-2532, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals in this case recognized these duties, but 
applied a narrow definition of “codefendant.”  The court of appeals limited the 
definition of “codefendant” to a person who has a pending criminal case arising 
out of the same criminal transaction as the defendant on trial.  State v. Poole, 185 
Ohio App.3d 38, 2009-Ohio-5634, 923 N.E.2d 167, ¶ 32.  Because Poole had 
pleaded guilty to a charge arising out of the traffic stop and had been sentenced 
before she testified at Coffman’s trial, the court of appeals concluded that she was 
no longer a codefendant.  The court of appeals reasoned that the trial court had no 
more reason to anticipate that Poole might incriminate herself than it had to 
believe that any other witness might incriminate himself. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals’ narrow definition of “codefendant” appears 
to be based upon two assumptions.  First, a defendant who has pleaded guilty and 
been sentenced has waived his or her Fifth Amendment privilege and generally is 
no longer subject to jeopardy.  Second, such a defendant is no more likely to be 
subject to additional charges for events arising out of the underlying criminal 
activity than any other witness.  These assumptions are wrong. 
{¶ 9} A plea of guilty to an offense waives the privilege only as to those 
offenses for which the plea was entered, the defendant was sentenced, and the 
judgment has become final.  Mitchell v. United States (1999), 526 U.S. 314, 325-
326, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424.  A guilty plea does not waive the 
defendant’s privilege as to testimony that might form the basis of additional 
charges.  Id.; see also United States v. Seavers (C.A.6, 1973), 472 F.2d 607, 611.  
Furthermore, the state remains free to charge a defendant with additional offenses 
arising out of the criminal transaction when these additional offenses were not 
encompassed by the charges in the initial case. State v. Tolbert (1991), 60 Ohio 
St.3d 89, 573 N.E.2d 617. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals’ definition of “codefendant” ignores the 
significant potential for a witness who has been charged with crimes arising out of 
the same incident that gave rise to the charges against the defendant on trial to 
make incriminating statements and to incur additional criminal charges.  The 
court of appeals’ reasoning further ignores the likelihood that such a witness will 
not know that he or she can assert his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.  The 
facts of the case before the court clearly illustrate the shortcomings in the court of 
appeals’ refusal to acknowledge the inherent risk of self-incrimination to a 
witness when that witness was charged with crimes arising out of the same 
incident that gave rise to the charges against the defendant on trial. 
{¶ 11} The trial court was aware that Poole’s presence and testimony in 
court was not voluntary and that it was Coffman who had compelled her presence 
and testimony, presumably with the intent to elicit exculpatory testimony.  The 
trial court was aware that Poole had been charged with criminal offenses arising 
out of the same incident that gave rise to the charges for which Coffman was on 
trial.  The trial court was aware that Poole had entered into a plea agreement 
regarding the charges against her and had been told that she had waived her 
privilege against self-incrimination regarding those charges.  The trial court was 
also aware that Poole did not have counsel present at Coffman’s trial with whom 
she could consult regarding her testimony.  Given all of these circumstances, the 
trial court should have recognized the likelihood that Poole was confused 
regarding her Fifth Amendment rights and might incriminate herself.  The trial 
court’s recognition of the need to advise Poole of her Fifth Amendment rights 
should only have increased as her testimony progressed and her answers 
increasingly indicated that she likely was going to testify that the drugs that had 
been found on Coffman belonged to her. 
{¶ 12} A witness who has been charged with criminal offenses arising out 
of the same incident that gave rise to the charges against the defendant on trial is 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
not just another witness.  A trial court is on notice before such a witness even 
takes the stand that there is a greater risk of self-incriminating testimony being 
elicited, and a trial court should be ready to advise such a witness of his or her 
Fifth Amendment rights.  Therefore, I would hold that when a witness has been 
charged with criminal offenses arising out of the same events as the defendant on 
trial, regardless of whether those charges remain pending or not, a trial court has a 
duty to advise the witness of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  I note that, alternatively, the trial court could have protected 
Poole’s constitutional rights by affording her the opportunity to consult with an 
attorney regarding her rights either before or during her testimony at trial. 
{¶ 13} For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and I dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss this case as 
having been improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley 
M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Ashtabula County Public Defender, Inc., and Richard R. Danolfo, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., and Jon W. Oebker, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
______________________