Case Title: Brenda Armstead v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-1094

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC01-1094
____________
BRENDA  ARMSTEAD,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[May 9, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Brenda Armstead petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we
dismiss the instant petition and sanction Armstead for her abuse of the judicial
system.
Armstead has filed a compilation of various letters and other documents that
we treat collectively as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  The petition consists of
various rambling letters, newspaper clippings, a cartoon, and other pleadings that
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are either incomprehensible or seek relief this Court is unable to provide.  Since
June 2000, Armstead has filed twenty petitions.  See Armstead v. State, No. SC00-
1202 (Fla. June 21, 2000); Armstead v. Feurenstein, No. SC00-1574 (Fla. Aug. 8,
2000); Armstead v. State, No. SC00-1961 (Fla. Nov. 8, 2000); Armstead v. State,
780 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC00-2070); Armstead v. State, No. SC00-
2644 (Fla. Mar. 16, 2001); Armstead v. State, 790 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2001) (Case
No. SC01-802); Armstead v. State, No. SC01-798 (Fla. petition filed Jan. 8, 2000)
(pending); Armstead v. United States, 791 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2001) (Case No.
SC01-957); Armstead v. State, 791 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC01-958);
Armstead v. State, 791 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC01-959); Armstead v.
State, 791 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC01-996); Armstead v. State, 791
So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC01-1024); Armstead v. State, No. SC01-1094
(Fla. petition filed May 1, 2001) (this case); Armstead v. State, 794 So. 2d 603 (Fla.
2001) (Case No. SC01-1307); Armstead v. Florida State Hosp., 791 So. 2d 1094
(Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC01-1336); Armstead v. State, No. SC01-1337 (Fla.
petition filed Jun. 8, 2001) (pending); Armstead v. Barry Univ. Sch. of Law, 794 So.
2d 603 (Fla. 2001) (Case No. SC01-1394); Armstead v. State, 794 So. 2d 603 (Fla.
2001) (Case No. SC01-1672); Armstead v. State, 796 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2001) (Case
No. SC01-1675); Armstead v. State, No. SC01-1749 (Fla. petition filed Aug. 3,
1. By the time this opinion is issued, additional cases may have been filed and
some of the above-referenced cases may have been disposed of.
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2001) (pending).1  Even though this number is not as great as those filed by some of
this Court’s other active pro se litigants, it does not accurately reflect the amount of
this Court’s time which has been consumed by Armstead’s filings.  In addition to
these twenty cases, a host of filings never became cases because they were
incomprehensible.  Because it appeared that Armstead had abused the judicial
system, we concluded that we were forced to limit her ability to monopolize this
Court’s time.  Thus, we issued an order requiring Armstead to show cause why this
Court should not limit her filings. 
Armstead has technically not filed a response to the order to show cause. 
Instead, she has returned her original copy of the order to show cause with
scribblings in the margins.  Most of these comments are similar to her other
pleadings—incomprehensible.  Further, since the order to show cause was issued,
Armstead has continued to file numerous, incomprehensible pleadings.
We must conclude that Armstead’s “response” provides no reason
whatsoever why this Court should not sanction her as proposed in the order to show
cause.  We have previously noted that this Court has the inherent power to regulate
and sanction a litigant who disrupts its proceedings when such litigation becomes so
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disruptive that it threatens to deny other litigants their rights.  See Jackson v. Florida
Dep’t of Corrections, 790 So. 2d 398, 400-01 (Fla. 2001); see generally Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (concerning a court's inherent power to
sanction a litigant who employs bad faith in filing frivolous pleadings despite any
lack of specific statutory or rule authority); United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); Patsy v. Patsy, 666 So. 2d 1045
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (same).  As in Jackson, we are conscious of a litigant's right of
access to the courts.  Nevertheless, we also are mindful that failure to limit
Armstead’s filings could hamper this Court's ability to timely review the many other
petitions filed by petitioners who have not abused the system.  The United States
Supreme Court itself has restrained pro se  petitioners who have abused the system
in order to allocate the resources of the Court "in a way that promotes the interests
of justice."  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). 
Like this Court, the Supreme Court has had to confront the bitter realization
that significant restraints must be placed on some of its pro se litigants in order to
ensure access to the courts in general.  See id.  The Supreme Court stated:
A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are
allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice. The continual
processing of petitioner's frivolous requests for extraordinary writs
does not promote that end.
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Id.  We have previously recognized that "[t]he resources of our court system are
finite and must be reserved for the resolution of genuine disputes."  Rivera v. State,
728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998).  Further, as the Fifth District Court of Appeal
noted many years ago in Platel v. Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla.
5th DCA 1983), in reference to another litigant:
The consequence of Mr. Platel's litigious disposition and apparent lack
of legal training is that this court has been inundated with voluminous
and, for the most part, incomprehensible documents from him.  This
court has spent an unreasonable amount of time and effort attempting
to decipher his pleadings, often with no success.  
This court recognizes the constitutional mandate that courts be
open to all persons under Article I, § 21, Florida Constitution. Because
the judicial process is the recognized dispute-settlement method,
access to courts should not be placed beyond the reach of any citizen. 
However, when one person, by his activities, upsets the normal
procedure of the court so as to interfere with the causes of other
litigants, it is necessary to exercise restraint upon that 
person . . . . 
Likewise, we conclude that Armstead’s activities have sufficiently upset the
normal procedures of this Court such that we find it necessary to exercise restraint
upon her ability to file petitions in this Court.  Therefore, at this time, we hereby
dismiss the instant petition for habeas corpus as facially insufficient.  Henceforth,
this Court will not accept for filing any pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or
other filings from Armstead that are facially insufficient or incomprehensible.  All
such filings will be placed in an inactive file with no further action or response. 
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Pleadings will neither be acknowledged nor returned.  Upon this case becoming
final, all of Armstead’s other pending cases also will be dismissed because they are
facially insufficient.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Brenda Armstead, pro se, Galveston, Texas,
for Petitioner
No Appearance,
for Respondent