Case Title: Hart v. Swaroop

Citation: 385 Md. 514

Docket Number: 89/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jonathan D. Hart, et ux. v. Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc.
No. 89, September Term, 2004
Headnote:
Firefighter who sustained injuries when responding to a motel fire after falling
into an open stairwell that was imperceptible due to smoke from the fire
cannot recover damages against the motel owner because of the fireman’s
rule.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case #3C006658
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 89
September Term, 2004
Jonathan D. Hart, et ux.
v.
Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc.
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: March 14, 2005
1 We described the fireman’s rule as it exists in this State in Tucker v. Shoemake,
354 Md. 413, 419, 731 A.2d 884, 887 (1999):
“Under Maryland common law, the Fireman’s Rule provides that
‘firemen and police officers generally cannot recover for injuries
attributable to the negligence that requires their assistance.’  Flowers v.
Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 308 Md. 432, 447, 520 A.2d 361,
368 (1987).
‘A fireman or police officer may not recover if injured by the
negligently created risk that was the very reason for his
presence on the scene in his occupational capacity.  Someone
who negligently creates the need for a public safety officer
will not be liable to a fireman or policeman for injuries
caused by this negligence.’
Id. at 447-48, 520 A.2d at 368.  This public-policy grounded doctrine ‘is
based on a relationship between firemen and policemen and the public that
calls on these safety officers specifically to confront certain hazards on
behalf of the public.’  Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.”
This case arises from a claim sounding in tort brought by firefighter Jonathan D. Hart
and his wife, Sarina Hart, petitioners, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, against
Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc., respondent, the owner and operator of the Regal Inn on
Pulaski Highway in Baltimore County.  The impetus of petitioners’ claim, which was filed
on June 30, 2000, was an injurious fall Hart suffered on January 25, 2000, while responding
to a fire at the Regal Inn.
On August 20, 2001, subsequent to the completion of discovery, respondent filed a
motion for summary judgment, claiming that the petitioners, as a matter of law, were
precluded from bringing the action pursuant to the fireman’s rule.1  On November 5, 2001,
following a hearing, the circuit court denied respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
The case was tried before a jury beginning on March 10, 2003.  At the close of
petitioners’ case, respondent moved for judgment.  The circuit court denied respondent’s
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motion.  At the close of the evidence, respondent renewed its motion but it was again denied
by the circuit court.  On March 12, 2003, the jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioners
as against respondent and awarded damages in the amount of $454,396.43.  The judgment
was entered on March 13, 2003.
Respondent thereafter filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  On July 19,
2004, the intermediate appellate court issued its opinion, Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc. v.
Hart, 158 Md.App. 63, 854 A.2d 269 (2004), holding that the fireman’s rule was applicable
to petitioners’ claim and “the circuit court therefore erred in denying [respondent’s] motion
for summary judgment and motions for judgment . . . .”  Id. at 66, 854 A.2d at 271
(alteration added).  
On September 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court.
On November 12, 2004, we granted the petition.  Hart v. Swaroop, 383 Md. 569, 861 A.2d
60 (2004).  Petitioners present a sole question for our review, which we rephrase for the sake
of clarity as follows:
Does the fireman’s rule prevent a firefighter from recovering damages
from a property owner for injuries suffered when the firefighter fell into an
open stairwell while performing his firefighting duties? 
We hold that the fireman’s rule is applicable to the circumstances surrounding Hart’s
injury and, therefore, the fireman’s rule bars petitioners’ tort claim against the respondent
motel owner.  As we shall discuss, Hart’s injuries, which he sustained while in the
performance of his occupational duties, were the direct result of a fall occasioned by his
2 For organizational purposes at the Regal Inn fire scene, and most fire scenes in
general, the fire department designates the address side of the building as “Alpha” with
the remaining sides of the building designated, in a clockwise fashion, as “Bravo,”
“Charlie” and “Delta.” 
-3-
inability to perceive his surroundings due to the voluminous amount of smoke emanating
from the motel fire. 
Facts
In the early morning hours of January 25, 2000, a fire broke out at the Regal Inn, a
motel located at 8005 Pulaski Highway in Baltimore County and owned and operated by
respondent.  Upon being alerted that smoke was coming from one of the motel rooms, the
motel’s night manager promptly pulled the motel’s fire alarm and called 911.
At the time of the January 25th fire at the Regal Inn, Hart was employed as a
Lieutenant with the Baltimore County Fire Department and assigned to Station Number 15,
Eastview.  Hart was one of many firefighters of the Baltimore County Fire Department that
responded to the call received at approximately 4:30 a.m. concerning the fire at the Regal
Inn.  His assigned functions at the scene of the fire were search and rescue, and ventilation.
Upon arrival at the Regal Inn, the firefighters encountered a “heavy volume of fire
on the second floor extending onto the roof” and heavy smoke conditions making visibility
minimal.  Hart was immediately ordered to perform search and rescue efforts on the “Delta”
side of the building.2  After gathering his necessary firefighting equipment, including a
3 As described in petitioner’s brief:
“A thermal imaging camera is a device that detects differences in
temperature [and] is used to search for victims and to determine the
location of the fire.  The operator of the camera looks through a small
screen similar to a three inch black and white television screen and can see
a silhouette with any temperature change within one tenth of a degree from
up to 500 feet away.  The operator views an area in a stationary position,
then lowers the camera and moves in the direction viewed.” [Alteration
added.]
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thermal imaging camera,3 Hart proceeded to the “Delta” side of the Regal Inn.  
After making his way to a parking lot on the “Delta” side of the Regal Inn, Hart
sought a way to access the second floor of the motel to search for any trapped occupants.
In order to see better through the smoke, which by that time had enveloped the area in a
shroud of darkness, he activated his thermal imaging camera and through it viewed the
immediate areas of the building.  Hart saw that heat from the fire was venting from the
second floor but that there appeared to be no fire on the first floor of the motel.  He then
searched for a stairway to the second floor and saw through the thermal imaging camera
what he believed to be a stairway to the second floor.  Moving toward the perceived
stairway, Hart removed his thermal imaging camera and used a railing on the side of the
building to guide his way through the dense smoke.  Hart admittedly was moving very
slowly at the time because of the poor visibility and his concerns over tripping over a curb
in the parking lot.  As he continued to walk alongside the railing, Hart suddenly found
himself stepping into an open space and, unable to prevent his descent, fell several feet into
the well of an open and unguarded stairwell.  Hart suffered severe injuries as a result of the
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fall.
Discussion
Hart asks this Court to decide whether he can recover against respondent for the
injuries he suffered as a result of his fall while performing his duties as a firefighter.  The
answer to this question is to be arrived at by an examination of what has come to be known
as the “fireman’s rule” and whether this common-law rule, which generally prevents
firefighters from “recovering tort based damages inflicted by a negligently created risk that
required their presence on the scene in their professional capacity,” applies. Crews v.
Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 642, 751 A.2d 481, 489 (2000). 
The fireman’s rule was first formulated in 1892 by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182 (Ill. 1892).  The Illinois Supreme Court was faced with a
situation where, while firefighters were on the scene of a fire, a rope on a freight elevator
in the burning building snapped, dropping a heavy counterweight, which then fell on a
firefighter’s leg, causing so substantial an injury to the firefighter’s leg that it had to be
amputated above the knee.  Utilizing the theory of premises liability and finding that the
injured firefighter was to be classified as a mere licensee and not an invitee, the court barred
the firefighter’s action against the landowner, stating that “the general rule is that the
licensor assumes no duty to the licensee, except the duty to refrain from affirmative or
willful acts that work an injury.”  Id. at 184.  As this Court has recognized, “[o]ne
explanation . . . for classifying firemen . . . as licensees upon premises, rather than invitees,
4 As this Court noted in Steinwedel, a member of the salvage corps was “charged
with the duty of saving property endangered by fire.”  Steinwedel, 149 Md. at 122, 131
A. at 45. 
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is because they are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of the premises,
and under circumstances of emergency, where care in preparing for the visit cannot be
expected and a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for them at all times would
constitute a severe burden.”  Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 242-43, 384
A.2d 76, 79 (1978).
Maryland courts first adopted the fireman’s rule in 1925 in the case of Steinwedel v.
Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).  In Steinwedel, a member of a “fire insurance
salvage corps,”4 who this Court determined was “in no more favorable a position, under
common law principles, than a fireman,” id. at 124, 131 A. at 45, was called to the scene of
a fire and was injured when he fell into an open elevator shaft on the premises that he
claimed was “negligently left open and unguarded.”  Id. at 122, 131 A. at 45.  In its
discussion as to whether the firefighter’s negligence claim could proceed as against the
owners and occupants of the premises, this Court initially stated that:
“according to the great weight of authorities the general rule of common law
is that a fireman entering premises to put out fire is a licensee only, and not an
invitee, and that the owner or occupant of the premises is not under any duty
of care to keep his premises prepared and safe for a fireman. . . .  ‘He must
take the property as he finds it, and is entitled only not to be led into danger,
“something like fraud.”’” 
Id. at 123-24, 131 A. at 45 (citations omitted).  Observing that “there is no allegation that
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the elevator shaft was opened in or near a way prepared and set apart as a passage way, and
the case is not rested upon any such concealment or deceptive appearance, ‘something like
fraud,’ put in the path of the plaintiff, as would render the danger a trap,” this Court held that
the firefighter’s claim was thus barred by the fireman’s rule.  Id. at 125, 131 A. at 46.  This
Court based its adoption of the fireman’s rule by classifying firefighters according to
entrant-based categories of premises liability first recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Gibson and finding that firefighters at the scene of a fire are to be considered licensees
on the premises.
Forty years later, in Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965), we
once again had an opportunity to examine the basis and application of the fireman’s rule in
Maryland.  In that case, Aravanis, a firefighter who had responded to a fire at Eisenberg’s
home, was severely burned by a sudden flash while he was fighting the fire.   The fire started
when Eisenberg, while working in his basement, knocked a tool off a work bench, causing
the tool to fall down onto a jug containing acetone.  The jug then burst and the acetone
spilled over the basement floor, coming into contact with the pilot light of a hot-water heater
nearby and igniting.  Later, after Aravanis and other firefighters were on the scene fighting
the fire, an explosion ensued that injured Aravanis as he was attempting to extinguish the
fire with a water hose.  Aravanis argued that “he was injured not because of the fire itself
but because the failure of the [Eisenbergs] to keep the acetone in a proper container was
negligence operative apart from the fire, and that this negligence caused the injury.”  Id. at
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253-54, 206 A.2d at 154 (alteration added).
In our discussion as to whether Aravanis could recover damages against the
Eisenbergs, notwithstanding the fireman’s rule, we first noted the entrant-based
classification of firefighters set forth in Steinwedel, i.e., “[i]n general, the fireman has been
held to be only a licensee.”  Aravanis, 237 Md. at 248, 206 A.2d at 151.  We did, however,
acknowledge a growing undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the fireman’s rule being based
on a premises liability theory, observing that: 
“In some jurisdictions there has been a change in the legal principles held
applicable . . . .  The subject is one in which the law is developing by way of
intensive analysis and modification of the applications of rigid concepts in the
light of the particular circumstances involved.  The criticism of what was
formerly the almost universal rule is based essentially upon making the
determination of what is justice between the parties depend upon cramming
firemen into the inflexible legal category of licensee.  Property owners owe
licensees only the duties of abstaining from wilful or wanton injury and
entrapment.  If a fireman is to be regarded as an invitee, the property owner
owes him a duty to see that the premises are reasonably safe and to warn him
of any dangerous condition known, or which reasonably should have been
known to the property owner but not to the fireman.
. . .
“It is when the fireman sustains injuries after the initial period of his
anticipated occupational risk, or from perils not reasonably foreseeable as part
of that risk, that the justice of continuing to regard him as a licensee only is
questioned.”
Id. at 248-52, 206 A.2d at 151-54 (citations omitted).  Thus, we recognized that not every
injury visited upon firefighters while they are performing their firefighting duties shall be
noncompensable in an action for damages against the property owner or occupant.   
In Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361
5 The Court had examined several cases pertaining to the fireman’s rule in
Maryland, including both Steinwedel and Aravanis.
6 The fireman’s rule has also been held to be applicable to police officers.  See
(continued...)
-9-
(1987), growing increasingly uncomfortable with the theory of premises liability as the
underlying basis for the fireman’s rule, this Court broke from our previous reliance on a
premises liability theory and established that the proper basis for the rule is public policy.
In Flowers, David Flowers, a firefighter, suffered severe injuries when he fell twelve stories
down an open elevator shaft while responding to a fire in an apartment building.  Flowers
apparently did not realize the dangerous open elevator shaft because the lobby area on the
twelfth floor had become “filled with smoke making it nearly impossible to see.”  Id. at 436,
520 A.2d at 363.  He thereafter filed a negligence suit against the owner of the apartment
building, the company hired to provide security services for the apartment building and the
manufacturer of the elevator.
In considering whether the fireman’s rule barred Flowers’s claim for damages, we
stated:
“In sum . . . the owner or occupant of the premises is not under a duty
of care to keep the premises prepared and safe for a fireman.  The owner or
occupant of the premises must, however, abstain from willful or wanton
misconduct or entrapment.  This encompasses a duty to warn of hidden
dangers, where there was knowledge of such danger and an opportunity to
warn.  Additionally, in some circumstances, when a fireman is outside of the
anticipated occupational risk of fighting a fire he may be entitled to ordinary
due care.
“The above-cited Maryland cases,[5] in our opinion, applied the proper
standard of care owed to firemen and policemen,[6] and the decisions were
6(...continued)
Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Flood v. Attsgood
Realty Co., 92 Md.App. 520, 608 A.2d 1297 (1992).
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correct.  Nevertheless, the use of a premises liability rationale would not seem
to be entirely appropriate for resolving the issues in cases like this. . . .
[A]lthough prior cases sounding in premises liability law had begun to define
the extent to which firemen are deemed to anticipate certain occupational
risks, the premises liability rationale itself does not provide a basis for
delimiting the duties owed to firemen.  Instead, it is an analysis of the
relationship between firemen and the public whom they serve which best
explains the fireman’s rule.
. . .
“With few exceptions, courts elsewhere have retained the fireman’s
rule but have based the rule on public policy considerations.  Some of these
courts emphasize a public policy somewhat analogous to the assumption of
risk doctrine applied in negligence cases.  Firemen are engaged by the public
to encounter risks inherent in firefighting; they assume those risks, and
therefore they should not recover for fire-related injuries. . . .
. . .
“In addition, some courts have pointed out that firemen receive
compensation, such as salary, workers’ compensation, and special injury
compensation, to fight fires for the public, and that taxpayers should not have
to pay such moneys for the firefighting service and then be subject to liability
if they call upon the service. . . .
“We agree that the fireman’s rule is best explained by public policy.
As pointed out in Aravanis . . . it is the nature of the firefighting occupation
that limits a fireman’s ability to recover in tort for work-related injuries.
Instead of continuing to use a rationale based on the law of premises liability,
we hold that, as a matter of public policy, firemen and police officers
generally cannot recover for injuries attributable to the negligence that
requires their assistance. . . .
“We reiterate, however, that firemen and policemen are not barred from
recovery for all improper conduct.  Negligent acts not protected by the
fireman’s rule may include failure to warn the firemen of pre-existing hidden
dangers where there was knowledge of the danger and an opportunity to
warn.  They also may include acts which occur subsequent to the safety
officer’s arrival on the scene and which are outside of his anticipated
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occupational hazards.  As indicated by this Court in Aravanis, the fireman’s
rule should not apply ‘when the fireman sustains injuries after the initial
period of his anticipated occupational risk, or from perils not reasonably
foreseeable as part of that risk[.]’ In these situations a fireman or policeman
is owed a duty of due care. . . .” 
Flowers, 308 Md. at 443-48, 520 A.2d at 366-69 (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
(footnotes added) (footnotes omitted).
Applying the fireman’s rule, which now had as its basis public policy, to Flowers’s
negligence claim relating to the danger of the elevator system, we stated that:
“Although these are not allegations of negligence in the creation of the fire
that originally brought the firemen to the apartment building, an accident
involving an open elevator shaft nevertheless is within the range of the
anticipated risks of firefighting.  It is common knowledge that stairwells are
to be used instead of elevators in case of fires; trained firemen must know of
the risk that a fire may cause an elevator to malfunction.  Moreover, an open
elevator shaft is not a ‘hidden danger’ of which firemen must be warned.  In
Flowers’s declaration, he alleged that he was evacuating tenants from a
‘hallway of a building where there was heavy smoke.’  An open elevator shaft
concealed by the smoke of the fire is not a hidden danger in the sense of an
unreasonable danger that a fireman could not anticipate upon attempting to
perform his firefighting duties.” 
Flowers, 308 Md. at 451-52, 520 A.2d 370-71 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, it is obvious that Hart was in the midst of his firefighting
duties at the moment he fell and was injured; he was making his way through heavy smoke
to attempt to find a path to the second floor of the motel in order to locate any trapped
occupants.  Therefore, Hart can only escape the barring effect of the fireman’s rule if he can
show that his injury occurred “after the initial period of his anticipated occupational risk”
or because of a “pre-existing hidden danger[] where there was knowledge of the danger and
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an opportunity to warn.”  Flowers, 308 Md. at 448, 520 A.2d at 369.
We can quickly dispose of any argument that Hart’s injury occurred after the initial
period of his anticipated occupational risk while he was attempting his search and rescue
efforts.  When Hart was making his way through the thick smoke in an attempt to gain
access to the second floor of the motel, he was unquestionably in the process of performing
the duty for which he was ordered – to rescue any motel patrons trapped by the fire.  Thus,
Hart’s injury occurred “during the period of anticipated occupational risk.”  As we stated in
Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 751 A.2d 481 (2000):
“In our more contemporary fireman’s rule cases, a secondary rationale
for the existence of the rule is found . . . .  It focuses not on the public policy
considerations of a firefighter as a public servant, but on firefighting as an
inherently dangerous occupation.  The fireman’s rule is based in part on the
notion that when an occupation exists wholly or partially for the purpose of
confronting dangers posed to the public, it is inappropriate to allow the
worker to recover for injuries resulting from the very purpose for which he or
she is employed.  Stated differently, a firefighter who is injured by a risk
inherent in the task of firefighting may be barred from asserting claims for
those injuries because it is the firefighter’s duty to deal with fires and he or
she cannot recover damages caused by the reason that made his or her
employment necessary.  The assumption of the risk analysis intrinsic in the
fireman’s rule cases focuses on the reasonably identifiable and inherent risks
assumed by firefighters when they accept employment in an ostensibly
dangerous occupation.”
Crews, 358 Md. at 653-54, 751 A.2d at 495 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Hart’s
own memorandum in support of his response to respondent’s motion for summary judgment
evidences the fact that he was performing his firefighting duties at the time of his injury and
admits that his visual perception of his surroundings was greatly diminished by the smoky
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conditions:
“Upon arrival at the Regal Inn, the firefighters encountered heavy fire
and smoke conditions.  The building was not visible upon arrival due to the
heavy smoke. . . .
. . . 
“Mr. Hart, standing in the parking lot on the side of the building,
sought access to the second floor of the motel to search for trapped victims.
Mr. Hart, as he could not otherwise see because of darkness and smoke,
viewed the building through the thermal imaging camera and determined that
there was no fire below the second floor.  He then looked for a stairway to
access the second floor.  He saw what he believed to be a stairway and walked
towards the building.  He did not look into the thermal imaging camera once
he began walking.  A railing extended along the walkway on the side of the
building.  Mr. Hart used the railing as a guide into an otherwise blind path
as he walked with his equipment.” [Emphasis added.]
We must next consider whether the open stairwell existed as a “pre-existing hidden
danger” to Hart at the time of his injury.  As stated, a pre-existing hidden danger in the
context of the fireman’s rule suggests a danger that exists because of “concealment or
deceptive appearance, ‘something like fraud,’ put in the path of the [firefighter], as would
render the danger a trap.”  Steinwedel, 149 Md. at 125, 131 A. at 46 (alteration added).  Hart
claims that the open stairwell at issue “was a dangerous condition that pre-existed[] and was
independent of the fire,” thus barring respondent’s reliance on the fireman’s rule.  We
disagree.
The duty to warn of a pre-existing hidden danger presupposes knowledge of that
danger by the property owner or occupant.  While it is undisputed that the manager of the
Regal Inn was on the premises at the time the firefighters arrived and the firefighters were
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at no time warned about the existence of the stairwell, there apparently was no reason for
the manager to know or have reason to know that the stairwell constituted a hidden danger.
The record indicates that respondent had never been cited for any violations relating to the
stairwell existing in a dangerous condition prior to January 25, 2000.  In fact, it was only
after Hart had been injured while performing his firefighting duties that the Baltimore
County Fire Department posted a complaint, dated January 31, 2000, about the stairwell at
issue and conducted an inspection, the report of which was dated February 9, 2000, resulting
in a finding that respondent needed “to place and maintain a guardrail on top of steps so as
to protect any person from falling into stairwell.”  Such an after-the-fact notice to
respondent, without more, is not enough to show that respondent had knowledge that the
stairwell existed as a “pre-existing hidden danger” on the motel property.  If it was indeed
such an obvious danger to anyone on the motel property, it likely would have been observed
and cited during one of several earlier inspections.
Furthermore, the existence of the stairwell was made apparent during normal
nighttime conditions by a series of flourescent lights.  Those lights, however, were not bright
enough to penetrate the thick buildup of smoke that had accumulated during the early
morning hours of January 25, 2000.  In fact, Captain John P. Ryan, another firefighter at the
scene, testified at trial that the heavy smoke conditions at the motel made for “poor
visibility,” so much so that the quartz lights used by the firefighters to shine toward the
motel to provide for better visibility were unable to penetrate the curtain of smoke.
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Therefore, it was only under the conditions existing during the early morning hours of
January 25, 2000, when voluminous amounts of smoke from the conflagration had inhibited
Hart’s ability to be aware of the stairwell before him, that the stairwell could be said to have
been hidden from him.  This, however, does not mean that it existed as a hidden danger,
thus making the fireman’s rule inapplicable.  There was no active concealment or deceptive
appearance of the stairwell effectuated by respondent.  The concealment of the stairwell was
a direct result of the secondary effects of the fire itself, i.e., the smoke.  As we stated in
Flowers, in the case of a firefighter’s fall into an elevator shaft concealed by smoke, “an
open elevator shaft is not a ‘hidden danger’ of which firemen must be warned. . . .  An open
elevator shaft concealed by the smoke of the fire is not a hidden danger in the sense of an
unreasonable danger that a fireman could not anticipate upon attempting to perform his
firefighting duties.”  Flowers, 308 Md. at 451-52, 520 A.2d at 451 (emphasis added).  We
find there to be no appreciable difference for the purpose of applying the fireman’s rule to
the situation involved in Flowers and the one now before us.  Both cases involve dangers
that were made imperceptible by the very reason the firefighters were in the area of the
dangers – the fire and its resultant smoke.  As with the open elevator shaft in Flowers, we
do not find that an open stairwell made imperceptible by smoke constitutes a pre-existing
hidden danger on the motel property, nor was it a danger that a firefighter could not
reasonably anticipate.
Hart contends, however, that Flowers is inapposite from the situation in the case sub
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judice, in that “[a] trained fireman inside an apartment building on fire could reasonably
anticipate an elevator malfunctioning as a result of a fire [] leaving an open shaft.  A fireman
not yet inside a motel building fire could not reasonably anticipate an open and unguarded
stairwell positioned adjacent to the parking lot of the motel.  Especially when the stairwell
. . . had absolutely nothing to do with the fire.”  Contrary to Hart’s assertion, the fire played
a key part in bringing about the fall causing him injury – the smoke from the fire inhibited
his ability to notice that the stairwell was in his path.  When a firefighter enters upon
property for the purposes of fighting a fire, he or she must generally bear the risk of being
injured by causes relating to or arising out of the fire.  Hart’s inability to perceive an open
stairwell before him as he made his way to the motel building was directly related to smoky
conditions from the fire itself. 
Hart contends that two relatively recent opinions, one by this Court and one from the
Court of Special Appeals, lend support to his claim that the open stairwell existed as a pre-
existing hidden danger at the time of his injurious fall.  He first points to our opinion in
Tucker v. Shoemake, 354 Md. 413, 731 A.2d 884 (1999), which concerned a police officer
who sustained injuries when he fell through an improperly seated manhole cover as he
approached a trailer home during the nighttime in response to a domestic dispute.  We noted
in our opinion that the police officer “said that the lighting in the area was ‘minimal.’  He
was carrying his flashlight, but he did not turn it on for his own protection.”  Id. at 415, 731
A.2d at 885.  The injured officer thereafter sued the owner of the trailer park for his injuries.
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The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the trailer park owner, ostensibly
because of the fireman’s rule.  Prior to consideration on appeal by the Court of Special
Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion to consider the following
question: “‘Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment on the ground that the
Fireman’s Rule precluded [the police officer’s] recovery?’”  Id. at 418, 731 A.2d at 887
(alteration added).
We began our discussion in Tucker by explaining the fireman’s rule as it exists in
Maryland, citing our decision in Flowers and its move toward a public-policy basis for the
rule.  We held, however, that:
“This case is not one in which the Fireman’s Rule applies to preclude
recovery.  Officer Tucker was not injured by the negligently-created risk that
occasioned his presence at the trailer park.  He was at the trailer park in
response to a domestic dispute call, whereas he was injured as a result of
stepping on the allegedly improperly seated metal cover to the underground
valve compartment.  Thus, the negligence alleged to have caused Officer
Tucker’s injuries was independent and not related to the situation requiring
his services as a police officer. 
 . . .
“Conversely, had Officer Tucker suffered some injury due to a
negligent condition in the trailer where the domestic dispute was or had been
in progress, the Fireman’s Rule likely would apply.”
Tucker, 354 Md. at 419-21, 731 A.2d at 887-88 (emphasis added).
Hart claims that Tucker applies because, in both the case sub judice and in Tucker,
“[b]oth men stepped into a dangerous opening maintained by the owner of the premises and
were injured.  Both dangerous openings were completely independent of the reason that each
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was called to the scene.  Both dangerous conditions were hazards that could not reasonably
be anticipated as part of each man’s occupation.”  This contention is wrong.  The basis for
our holding the fireman’s rule inapplicable in Tucker was that the police officer’s injury was
“independent and not related” to the purposes for which he was at the trailer park.  In other
words, the officer’s fall through the manhole cover was not directly caused in any way by
the domestic dispute allegedly occurring in the trailer home he was approaching.  In Hart’s
case, however, the fire, with its resultant smoke, was the reason that he was unable to
perceive the open stairwell as he approached the motel in furtherance of his firefighting
duties.
Hart’s reliance on the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Rivas v. Oxon Hill Joint
Venture, 130 Md.App. 101, 744 A.2d 1076, cert. denied, 358 Md. 610, 751 A.2d 471
(2000), is also unavailing.  That case involved a situation where a deputy sheriff slipped and
fell on a patch of ice as he was en route to serving a subpoena to a witness in a landlord-
tenant case.  Recognizing our holding in Tucker, the intermediate appellate court found that
the police officer’s personal injury action against the owner of the apartment complex was
not barred by the fireman’s rule.  As the Court of Special Appeals stated:
“In the case sub judice, as in Tucker, the Fireman’s Rule did not apply.
To be sure, as a deputy sheriff for Prince George’s County, Rivas was a law
enforcement officer . . . and his duties as such required him to confront certain
risks on behalf of the public.  Under the Fireman’s Rule, he was deemed to
have accepted the risks inherent in those duties by accepting the position of
deputy sheriff and the compensation of his office.  The purpose for Rivas’s
visit to the Oxon Hill Apartments was to perform the duty of serving a
subpoena.  The negligence that allegedly caused his injury, however, was
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unrelated to the situation that required his services.  Rivas was injured on
account of an allegedly defective condition of the common area parking lot of
the apartment complex, across which he walked on his approach to the
apartment unit in which he intended to serve the subpoena.  He was not in the
process of serving the subpoena when he was injured and his injuries were
not brought about by the activity of subpoena serving.  Because Rivas’s
injuries did not arise out of the very occasion for his employment, i.e., the
serving of the subpoena, the Fireman’s Rule was inapplicable.”
Rivas, 130 Md.App. at 108-09, 744 A.2d at 1080 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Thus, in Rivas, the intermediate appellate court allegedly followed our ruling in
Tucker, allowing for a suit in tort to proceed notwithstanding the fireman’s rule where the
police officer sustained injuries independent and not related to his professional purpose for
being at the apartment complex.  As we stated, Hart’s injury occurred during the time when
he was performing his job duties as a firefighter and occurred as a result of the fire and
smoke.  Therefore, Rivas, like Tucker, is dissimilar to the case sub judice.  Neither case is
contrary to our holding here.
Our holding is bolstered by other states’ factually-similar cases concerning injuries
to firefighters and application of the fireman’s rule.  In Baxley v. Williams Construction Co.,
106 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958), the Georgia appellate court considered whether a
firefighter could bring a claim for personal injuries suffered when he fell into an unlighted
and open excavation for a sewer at a construction site where a fire had broken out.  The
court initially noted, with the basis of the fireman’s rule then being premises liability, that:
“The basic reason for the [fireman’s] rule is that it is impossible to forecast the
precise place where or time when the fireman’s duties may call him, and to
require an owner or occupier of premises to exercise at all times the high
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degree of care owed to an invitee in order to guard against so remote and
unpredictable an injury would be an intolerable burden which it is not in the
best interest of society to impose.”  
Id. at 805 (alteration added).  The appellate court then stated that:
“There was no duty on the defendants to keep the premises up to any
given standard of safety except that they must not contain pitfalls, mantraps
and things of that kind. . . .  The opening in the manhole was not alleged to
have been concealed by the concrete blocks, ripped boards and other building
debris lying about it.  The petition shows that the excavation and manhole was
concealed from sight solely by the darkness of the night.  This is not wanton
conduct nor a mantrap.”
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
In the case sub judice, Hart’s perception of his surroundings while at the Regal Inn
was not only inhibited by the smoke enveloping the area but also due to the fact that it was
still dark outside when the firefighters arrived at the scene.  This darkness, coupled with the
thick smoke, made the open stairwell that Hart fell into at least as imperceptible as the open
excavation in Baxley.  Even under regular nighttime conditions, it does not appear that the
open stairwell would have been concealed from Hart; the use of lights in the parking lot
area, the raised brick embankment surrounding the sides of the stairwell, as well as the
aforementioned lights particular to the open stairwell, would reasonably have alerted an
ordinary person to the stairwell’s existence.
In Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 79 N.Y.S. 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903), the New York
appellate court had before it a case involving a firefighter seeking to recover damages for
injuries sustained when he fell into an open elevator shaft while performing his firefighting
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duties.  Bearing a striking resemblance to the facts now before us, the court explained the
reason for the firefighter’s fall:
“The [building] was filled with smoke, and the [firefighter] says he could just
see a streak of light from the vicinity of the freight elevator where he fell, and
while he was thus proceeding, with what he says he thought was great care,
he stepped into the elevator well and fell a distance of several feet, sustaining
the injuries for which he seeks recovery.  The elevator was used for carrying
freight, and it appears that while there was a guard rail on one and perhaps on
three sides of the same there was none at the side where the [firefighter] was
approaching, and the contention of the [firefighter] is that the defendant owed
him a duty of protecting this elevator well.”
Id. at 664 (alterations added) (emphasis added).  The appellate court upheld the trial court’s
dismissal of the case, stating that:
“[I]t cannot be the rule of law in this state that every manufacturer is bound
to leave his factory at night in such a condition that no one entering it for the
purpose of putting out a fire in the darkness will be liable to encounter
dangers. . . . [I]t would be a harsh rule to hold that a manufacturer owed the
duty to a fireman to anticipate and guard against any possible accident by a
fall through a hole in the floor . . . .” 
Id.  
In conclusion, the accumulation of smoke during a fire and the resulting limitation
of visibility for a responding firefighter is a type of hazard faced by firefighters in their
ordinary duties.  Hart was present at the scene of the fire in order to fulfill his duty to the
public as a firefighter.  It was during the performance of his inherently dangerous occupation
that he was injured after falling into a stairwell that he could not see on account of the
smoke.  This is the kind of injury that the fireman’s rule is meant to bar. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL
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APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONERS.