Case Title: Brangan v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12232

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12232 
 
JAHMAL BRANGAN  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 2, 2017. - August 25, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Bail.  Indigent.  Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 26, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Lenk, J. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the petitioner. 
 
Amal Bala, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Shira Diner & Ryan M. Schiff, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
HINES, J.  The practice of releasing a defendant on bail 
prior to trial has been part of Massachusetts law since its 
beginnings as a colony.  See Commonwealth v. Baker, 343 Mass. 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
162, 165 (1961).  The Body of Liberties (1641), the oldest known 
compilation of Massachusetts Colonial law, provided that: 
"18.  No mans person shall be restrained or imprisoned by 
any Authority whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him 
thereto, If he can put in sufficient securitie, bayle or 
mainprise, for his appearance, and good behaviour in the 
meane time, unlesse it be in Crimes Capital, and Contempts 
in open Court, and in such cases where some expresse act of 
Court doth allow it." 
 
See Baker, supra. 
 
This statement, although nearly four centuries old, 
summarizes well the dual functions of bail.  On the one hand, 
release on bail preserves the liberty of the accused until he or 
she has been afforded the full measure of due process in a 
criminal trial.  "This traditional right to freedom before 
conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and 
serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to 
conviction. . . .  Unless this right to bail before trial is 
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after 
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning" (citation 
omitted).  Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).2  On the other 
                     
 
2 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) ("The practice of admission to bail, as it has 
evolved in Anglo-American law, is not a device for keeping 
persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found 
convenient to give them a trial.  On the contrary, the spirit of 
the procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail until a 
trial has found them guilty.  Without this conditional 
privilege, even those wrongly accused are punished by a period 
of imprisonment while awaiting trial and are handicapped in 
 
3 
 
 
hand, the giving of security serves to assure that the defendant 
will appear in court when called to do so.  "The right to 
release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving 
adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to 
sentence if found guilty."  Id.  Where, as in this case, the 
defendant is unable to give the necessary security for his 
appearance at trial because of his indigence, the purpose of 
bail is frustrated.  The cost to the defendant is the loss of 
liberty and all the benefits that ordinarily would accrue to one 
awaiting a trial to determine his guilt or innocence. 
The petitioner in this case, Jahmal Brangan, has been held 
at the Hampden County jail since January 17, 2014 -- more than 
three and one-half years -- because he has been unable to post 
bail in the amounts ordered by a Superior Court judge following 
his arrest and indictment for armed robbery while masked.  In 
this appeal from a judgment of a single justice denying his 
petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, Brangan contends 
that the single justice's denial of his bail review request 
should be reversed because the Superior Court judge's bail order 
is unconstitutional.  In particular, he argues that the bail 
order violated his right to due process because the judge failed 
to give adequate consideration to his financial resources, and 
                                                                  
consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and 
preparing a defense"). 
4 
 
 
set bail in an amount so far beyond his financial means that it 
resulted in his long-term detention pending resolution of his 
case. 
In resolving the issues Brangan raises, we address the 
extent to which a judge must consider a criminal defendant's 
financial resources in setting bail, whether such a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to an affordable bail, and the due 
process requirements that apply if the judge settles on a bail 
amount that is more than the defendant can pay, resulting in 
pretrial detention.  For the reasons explained below, we 
conclude that in setting the amount of bail, whether under G. L. 
c. 276, § 57 or § 58, a judge3 must consider a defendant's 
financial resources, but is not required to set bail in an 
amount the defendant can afford if other relevant considerations 
weigh more heavily than the defendant's ability to provide the 
necessary security for his appearance at trial.  Where, based on 
the judge's consideration of all the circumstances, including 
the record of defaults and other factors relevant to the 
likelihood of the defendant's appearance for trial, neither 
alternative nonfinancial conditions nor a bail amount the 
defendant can afford will adequately assure his appearance for 
                     
 
3 We use the term "judge" here as a shorthand reference to 
the entire range of judicial officers who are authorized to set 
bail under G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 and 58. 
5 
 
 
trial, the judge may set bail at a higher amount, but no higher 
than necessary to ensure the defendant's appearance for trial.  
We conclude further that where it appears that a defendant lacks 
the financial resources to post the amount of bail set, such 
that his indigency likely will result in a long-term pretrial 
detention,4 the judge must provide written or orally recorded 
findings of fact and a statement of reasons for the bail 
decision.  Based on the record before us, it does not appear 
that the judge here considered Brangan's financial resources in 
setting the bail.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the 
single justice and remand this matter to the county court to 
direct the Superior Court judge to conduct a new bail hearing 
for Brangan as soon as possible in accord with the standards set 
out in this opinion.5 
 
Background.  On January 17, 2014, a man wearing a cap, 
scarf, and sunglasses robbed a bank in Springfield by passing a 
note to the bank teller demanding money and stating that he had 
a weapon.  The teller handed over less than $1,000 to the 
                     
 
4 We use the phrase "long-term pretrial detention" to mean 
detention for a period of time longer than the defendant might 
need to collect cash or collateral to post bail. 
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services in support of Jahmal Brangan's 
appeal. 
6 
 
 
robber, who then fled.  The police arrested Brangan later that 
same day after finding his thumbprint on the robbery note.6 
 
At the time, Brangan was on probation following a prison 
sentence of from eight to twelve years for rape of a child and 
related charges.7  Consequently, the probation department filed a 
notice of surrender, and when Brangan appeared on February 10, 
2014, a judge of the Superior Court set bail at $20,000 cash or 
$200,000 surety based on the probation violation notice.  A 
grand jury subsequently indicted Brangan for armed robbery while 
masked under G. L. c. 265, § 17.  On March 10, 2014, at 
Brangan's arraignment on the robbery charge, the judge set bail 
in the amount of $50,000 cash or $500,000 surety.  Brangan 
remained in custody pending his trial. 
 
In March, 2015, Brangan was tried and convicted on the 
armed robbery charge, after which the judge revoked his bail.  
Shortly after the entry of a guilty verdict, however, the trial 
judge declared a mistrial due to certain statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and ordered Brangan to be 
                     
 
6 At trial, Brangan did not contest that the thumbprint on 
the robbery note was his. 
 
 
7 In 2001, Brangan pleaded guilty to indictments charging 
three counts of rape of a child with force and four counts of 
indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 
fourteen.  He was sentenced to from eight to twelve years in 
prison with five years of probation from and after the prison 
sentence. 
7 
 
 
retried;8 the Commonwealth then appealed from the mistrial order.  
In the wake of the mistrial ruling, the judge held another bail 
hearing on April 10, 2015, and reinstated the original bail at 
$50,000 cash or $500,000 surety.  Brangan unsuccessfully sought 
reduction of the bail in the Superior Court on July 15, 2015, 
and December 28, 2015. 
 
In January, 2016, this court granted Brangan's application 
for direct appellate review of the Commonwealth's appeal from 
the trial judge's mistrial order.  We subsequently held that the 
Commonwealth had no right to appeal from the mistrial order, 
leaving the armed robbery charge to stand for retrial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143, 148, 149 (2016) (Brangan 
I).9 
                     
 
8 Brangan orally moved for a mistrial at the end of the 
Commonwealth's closing argument.  After the jury verdict, the 
trial judge accepted briefing and heard additional argument on 
the motion, which he ultimately granted. 
 
 
9 In Commonwealth v. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143 (2016) (Brangan 
I), Brangan also argued that a retrial of the armed robbery 
charge was barred by double jeopardy, but we concluded that this 
argument was not properly before us at that time because he had 
failed to timely appeal from the trial judge's ruling that 
double jeopardy would not bar a retrial.  See id. at 148-149.  
We subsequently denied Brangan's petition for rehearing on that 
issue, without prejudice to his filing a motion to dismiss in 
the trial court and, if that motion was denied, seeking relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  In November, 2016, Brangan filed a 
motion in the trial court to dismiss the armed robbery 
indictment on double jeopardy grounds and, after the judge 
denied that motion, filed a petition for relief in the county 
court, which also was denied.  We allowed Brangan's appeal from 
 
8 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, Brangan followed a long and tortuous path to 
seek relief from his pretrial detention, filing four successive 
petitions in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
The single justice denied Brangan's first petition without 
prejudice due his failure to file the record materials necessary 
to support his claims. 
 
On considering Brangan's second petition, the single 
justice observed that the judge who had denied Brangan's motion 
for reduction of bail on December 28, 2015, had not made any 
oral or written findings or otherwise explained his decision.  
Accordingly, the single justice remanded the matter for a 
hearing to determine bail based on the factors set forth in 
G. L. c. 276, § 58.  A judge of the Superior Court then 
conducted a bail hearing and issued a written decision retaining 
the original bail in the amount of $50,000 cash or $500,000 
surety for the armed robbery charge and $20,000 cash or $200,000 
surety for the probation violation. 
 
After Brangan filed a third petition, the single justice 
remanded the matter to the Superior Court for consideration in 
light of this court's decision in Brangan I, which had been 
issued in the interim.  A Superior Court judge then conducted 
                                                                  
that denial to proceed in light of the special consideration we 
have given to double jeopardy claims.  That appeal is scheduled 
to be heard by this court in the coming term. 
9 
 
 
another hearing and entered an order, dated September 19, 2016, 
that reduced the defendant's bail to $20,000 cash or $200,000 
surety for the armed robbery indictment and retained the 
original bail in the amount of $20,000 cash or $200,000 surety 
for the probation violation. 
 
Using a District Court form captioned "Reasons for Ordering 
Bail, G. L. c. 276, § 58," the judge checked off the following 
boxes as grounds for denying Brangan's release on personal 
recognizance without surety:  the nature and circumstances of 
the offense charged; the potential penalty he faced; his history 
of mental illness; his record of convictions; the fact that his 
alleged acts involved "abuse" as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1; 
his history of orders issued against him under G. L. c. 209A; 
and his status of being on probation.  In additional notes on 
the form, the judge stated that he had considered the matter in 
light of Brangan I in accord with the single justice's remand 
order and heard oral argument and reviewed the parties' 
submissions.  As further grounds for the bail determination, he 
cited Brangan's prior sentence to State prison for multiple 
counts of rape of a child; the fact that he faced a substantial 
penalty if convicted of armed robbery; his history of c. 209A 
orders; and the fact that he was on probation at the time he 
allegedly committed the armed robbery.  The judge also ordered 
that, if Brangan posted bail, his release would be on condition 
10 
 
 
that he wear a global positioning system (GPS) bracelet, observe 
a curfew, and stay away from the alleged victims. 
Brangan then filed a fourth petition with the county court, 
arguing that the Superior Court judge had failed to give 
meaningful consideration to his inability to make the bail, to 
the equities in the case, and to his alternative proposal to 
post $5,000 cash bail and wear a GPS bracelet.  Brangan further 
asked the single justice to conduct a bail hearing de novo.  In 
support of this petition, Brangan filed an affidavit stating 
that the Superior Court judge had found him to be indigent when 
he was first charged in January, 2014; that he had been 
represented at trial and on appeal by court-appointed attorneys; 
that his financial condition was far worse than when he was 
first charged, since he had been incarcerated and unable to 
work; and that there was no way he could hope to post the 
$40,000 bail that the judge had set. 
The single justice denied the fourth petition, ruling that 
Brangan's inability to make a particular bail amount did not 
render the Superior Court judge's order a functional denial of 
bail, and did not establish, without more, that Brangan was 
entitled to extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The 
defendant appealed from the single justice's order pursuant to 
S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  This court 
ordered the appeal to proceed with briefing and argument.  We 
11 
 
 
noted that filing a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
the proper means for seeking relief from bail determinations in 
the Superior Court, see Commesso v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 
372 (1975), and that Brangan had no other means of obtaining 
adequate appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  When a party appeals 
from an adverse judgment by the single justice under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, we review the single justice's order for clear 
error of law or abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Chism, 
476 Mass. 171, 176 (2017); Leo v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1025, 
1026 (2004).  We must also consider the propriety of the 
Superior Court judge's underlying bail order.  See Chism, 476 
Mass. at 176-179 (evaluating underlying trial court order in 
appeal from single justice judgment concerning that order).  In 
reviewing both the single justice's judgment and the bail 
judge's order, we must consider the legal rights at issue and 
independently determine and apply the law, without deference to 
their respective legal rulings.  See The Boston Herald, Inc. v. 
Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 603 (2000). 
2.  Consideration of criminal defendant's financial 
resources in setting bail.  The parties dispute whether the 
Superior Court judge was obliged to consider Brangan's financial 
resources in setting bail.  Based on our review of the 
applicable statute and relevant decisions, we are persuaded that 
12 
 
 
a judge must consider a criminal defendant's financial resources 
in setting bail. 
We have held that G. L. c. 276, § 57, rather than § 58, is 
the applicable statute governing bail proceedings in the 
Superior Court.  See Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 
111 (2003); Serna v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2002).  
We reached that conclusion because § 57 specifically authorizes 
judges of the Superior Court, among others, to admit a prisoner 
to bail, whereas § 58 does not.10  See Serna, 437 Mass. at 1003.  
And as the Commonwealth pointed out at oral argument, unlike 
§ 58, § 57 does not specifically reference a defendant's 
financial resources as a factor to be considered in setting 
bail.11,12 
                     
 
10 General Laws c. 276, § 57, applies to "[a] justice of the 
supreme judicial or superior court, a clerk of courts or the 
clerk of the superior court for criminal business in the county 
of Suffolk, a standing or special commissioner appointed by 
either of said courts or, in the county of Suffolk, by the 
sheriff of said county with the approval of the superior court, 
a justice or clerk of a district court, [or] a master in 
chancery."  General Laws c. 276, § 58, applies to "[a] justice 
or a clerk or assistant clerk of the district court, a bail 
commissioner or master in chancery." 
 
 
11 Although § 57 contains a list of factors to be considered 
in setting bail that is similar to the list in § 58, § 57 omits 
a defendant's financial resources as a factor, and it only 
references these factors in the context of a case where a 
defendant has been charged with certain acts involving abuse, 
domestic violence, assault, or violations of abuse prevention 
orders.  See G. L. c. 276, § 57, second par. 
13 
 
 
A Superior Court judge, however, must still consider a 
defendant's financial resources when setting bail as a matter of 
common law.  We have said that, under § 57, 
"the factors that a judge is to consider when conducting a 
bail hearing are '(1) the nature and circumstances of the 
offense charged, (2) the accused's family ties, (3) his 
financial resources, (4) his length of residence in the 
community, (5) his character and mental condition, (6) his 
record of convictions and appearances at court proceedings 
or of any previous flight to avoid prosecution or (7) any 
failure to appear at any court proceedings'" (emphasis 
added). 
 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 504 (2004), quoting 
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 115 n.6.  These are common-law historical 
                                                                  
 
12 As noted above, the Superior Court judge set Brangan's 
bail using a District Court form that referenced G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58, and in its briefs for the single justice and for us, the 
Commonwealth argued that the Superior Court judge properly 
exercised his discretion by considering the necessary factors 
under § 58.  Thus, the Commonwealth arguably waived its § 57 
argument by omitting it from its briefs for the single justice 
and for us.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 
Mass. 921 (1975).  We nevertheless address this argument in 
light of the limitations on briefing in proceedings under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, and S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 
(2001), and the principle that a reviewing court may affirm a 
lower court ruling on any ground supported by the record, 
including legal theories not argued by the Commonwealth or 
considered by the judge in the proceedings below.  See Clair v. 
Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 214 (2013); Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 
425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997).  We also consider the Commonwealth's 
argument because it presents "an important public question whose 
resolution will affect more persons than the parties to the case 
. . . [and which] is primarily a matter of statutory 
interpretation, not dependent on the facts of the particular 
case."  Department of Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State 
College Bldg. Auth., 378 Mass. 418, 424 (1979), quoting Lahey 
Clinic Found., Inc. v. Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 376 Mass. 
359, 372 (1978). 
14 
 
 
factors for bail, see Querubin, 440 Mass. at 115 n.6, 120, which 
must be reviewed by a Superior Court judge in setting bail in 
all cases, even though § 57 does not explicitly list them all.13 
 
In addition to the common law, constitutional principles 
also mandate consideration of a defendant's financial resources 
in setting bail.  Both the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights prohibit excessive bail.14  The United States Supreme 
Court has said that bail is "excessive" when it is "set at a 
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill" 
the purpose of assuring the presence of the accused at future 
proceedings.  Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.  To be reasonable, that 
calculation must be based on the individual character and 
circumstances of each defendant, including his or her financial 
circumstances.  "[T]he fixing of bail for any individual 
defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose 
of assuring the presence of that defendant" (emphasis added).  
                     
 
13 Because these "common-law considerations are among the 
same as those contained in G. L. c. 276, § 58," Querubin, 440 
Mass. at 120, it is not surprising that Superior Court judges 
sometimes rely on § 58 in their bail orders, as the bail judge 
did in this case, even though they are proceeding under § 57. 
 
 
14 The United States Supreme Court has said that the 
restrictions in the Eighth Amendment apply to the States by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, see Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014), 
although the Court has not specifically so held in a case 
concerning excessive bail. 
15 
 
 
Id. at 5.  These standards, which include "the financial ability 
of the defendant to give bail," "are to be applied in each case 
to each defendant."  Id. at 5 & n.3, citing former Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 46(c).  "Each defendant stands before the bar of justice as 
an individual. . . .  The question when application for bail is 
made relates to each one's trustworthiness to appear for trial 
and what security will supply reasonable assurance of his 
appearance."  Id. at 9 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 
Each eligible defendant's right to an individualized bail 
determination that takes his or her financial resources into 
account is further supported by the constitutional principles of 
due process and equal protection.  For this reason, courts have 
opined that it is unconstitutional to use master bail bond 
schedules to set the same bail amount for everyone for a 
particular offense, without regard to individual financial 
circumstances or alternative conditions of release.  See, e.g., 
Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The 
incarceration of those who cannot" meet master bond schedule, 
"without meaningful consideration of other possible 
alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection 
requirements"); Walker vs. Calhoun, U.S. Dist. Ct., C.A. No. 
4:15-CV-0170-HLM, slip op. at 49 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), 
vacated on other grounds by Walker v. Calhoun, 682 Fed. Appx. 
721 (2017) ("Any bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of 
16 
 
 
pre-fixed amounts for different offenses to obtain pretrial 
release, without any consideration of indigence or other 
factors, violates the Equal Protection Clause" [citing cases]). 
 
A bail that is set without any regard to whether a 
defendant is a pauper or a plutocrat runs the risk of being 
excessive and unfair.  A $250 cash bail will have little impact 
on the well-to-do, for whom it is less than the cost of a 
night's stay in a downtown Boston hotel, but it will probably 
result in detention for a homeless person whose entire earthly 
belongings can be carried in a cart.  "What would be a 
reasonable bail in the case of one defendant may be excessive in 
the case of another."  Bennett v. United States, 36 F.2d 475, 
477 (5th Cir. 1929).  In setting bail, a judge must always keep 
in mind the question once posed by United States Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas:  "Can an indigent be denied freedom, 
where a wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to 
have enough property to pledge for his freedom? [citation 
omitted]"  Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 
1977), vacated on rehearing en banc, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
 
In this case, nothing in the bail judge's September 19, 
2016, order or in the record establishes that he considered 
Brangan's financial resources in setting bail at $40,000.  We 
cannot say for sure whether he did or did not.  But as we 
17 
 
 
explain below, the judge must address this issue in writing or 
orally on the record in every case where bail is set in an 
amount that is likely to result in a defendant's long-term 
pretrial detention because he or she cannot afford it. 
 
3.  Whether bail must be affordable.  The arguments that 
Brangan and the amicus present also raise the question whether 
unaffordable bail is unconstitutional per se.  We conclude that 
it is not, but in doing so, we recognize that the imposition of 
unaffordable bail is subject to certain due process 
requirements. 
We previously have stated that an "amount of bail [is] not 
excessive merely because [a defendant] could not post it."  Leo 
v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. at 1026.  Other courts have similarly 
concluded that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a 
bail that is affordable.  See, e.g., United States v. McConnell, 
842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) ("a bail setting is not 
constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is 
financially unable to satisfy the requirement"); White v. 
Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The mere fact that 
petitioner may not have been able to pay the bail does not make 
it excessive."); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 
(8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967) (same); 
State v. Pratt, 2017 VT 9, ¶15 (2017) ("the Constitution does 
not require that a defendant have the ability to pay the 
18 
 
 
required bail if it is otherwise reasonable").  Even Justice 
Jackson, in arguing for the importance of an individualized bail 
determination in Stack, qualified his point by noting that 
"[t]his is not to say that every defendant is entitled to such 
bail as he can provide."  Stack, 342 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  Although the judge must take a defendant's 
financial resources into account in setting bail, that is only 
one of the factors to be considered, and it should not override 
all the others.  Bail that is beyond a defendant's reach is not 
prohibited.  Where, based on the judge's consideration of all 
the relevant circumstances, neither alternative nonfinancial 
conditions nor an amount the defendant can afford will 
adequately assure his appearance for trial, it is permissible to 
set bail at a higher amount, but no higher than necessary to 
ensure the defendant's appearance. 
This conclusion is also supported by our previous decisions 
upholding the constitutionality of pretrial detention in 
Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771 (1996), and Querubin, 
440 Mass. 108.  In Mendonza, which upheld pretrial detention of 
a demonstrably dangerous defendant where it is necessary to 
ensure the safety of other persons or the community pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, we noted that although the statute 
precludes a judge "from imposing a financial condition that 
results in pretrial detention in order to assure the safety of 
19 
 
 
other persons, . . . financial conditions having that effect are 
not precluded for the purpose of assuring [the defendant's] 
appearance before the court."  Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 774.15  In 
Querubin, we upheld the constitutionality of pretrial detention 
without bail of a defendant who poses a serious flight risk to 
ensure that they will appear at future court proceedings.  See 
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 116, 118-119.  If it is permissible 
within the bounds of due process for a judge to hold a defendant 
without any bail to assure his future appearance before the 
court, as we held in Querubin, then it must also be permissible 
                     
 
15 General Laws c. 276, § 58A (3), provides that "[a] 
justice may not impose a financial condition under this section" 
-- i.e., due to the defendant's dangerousness -- "that results 
in the pretrial detention of the person," but "[n]othing in this 
section shall be interpreted as limiting the imposition of a 
financial condition upon the person to reasonably assure his 
appearance before the courts."  Brangan cites language in the 
Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012), which 
simply states that "[t]he judicial officer may not impose a 
financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of 
the person," without the qualification that appears in G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (3).  But the Senate report accompanying the 
Federal Bail Reform Act makes it clear that "[t]he purpose of 
this provision is to preclude the sub rosa use of money bond to 
detain dangerous defendants," and that "its application does not 
necessarily require the release of a person who says he is 
unable to meet a financial condition of release which the judge 
has determined is the only form of conditional release that will 
assure the person's future appearance."  Sen. Rep. No. 98-225, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News (1984) 3182, 3199.  In light of this commentary, 
Federal courts have rejected the argument that this statutory 
provision means that a defendant's "relative penury entitles him 
to a lower bond."  United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 
548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991). 
20 
 
 
for a judge to hold a defendant on an unaffordable bail for that 
same purpose.16 
But having concluded that a defendant is not 
constitutionally entitled to an affordable bail, it is important 
for us to be clear about the strict standards that due process 
                     
 
16 Brangan and the amicus cite decisions by this court and 
by the United States Supreme Court recognizing the general 
principle that the constitutional rights of equal protection and 
due process prohibit punishment of indigent persons solely for 
their poverty, unless there is no other adequate alternative to 
serve the State's interests in punishment and deterrence.  See, 
e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-673 (1983) 
(imprisonment of probationer for failure to pay fine or 
restitution, "simply because, through no fault of his own, he 
cannot pay . . . would be contrary to the fundamental fairness 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Commonwealth v. Henry, 
475 Mass. 117, 122 (2016) ("imposing restitution that the 
defendant will be unable to pay violates the fundamental 
principle that a criminal defendant should not face additional 
punishment solely because of his or her poverty"); Commonwealth 
v. Gomes, 407 Mass. 206, 212 (1990), quoting Tate v. Short, 401 
U.S. 395, 398 (1971) ("Generally, 'the Constitution prohibits 
the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then 
automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the 
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in 
full'").  Pretrial detention, however, is not a form of 
punishment; it is regulatory in character, because it is 
intended to serve the governmental goals of protecting the 
public and assuring the presence of the accused at future 
proceedings.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-
747 (1987); Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 677-678 (1993), 
citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-537 (1979).  Holding a 
defendant on bail beyond his or her ability to pay is not, 
therefore, tantamount to punishing the defendant for his or her 
poverty.  See Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d at 550, quoting United 
States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388-389 (1st Cir. 1985) ("when 
faced with a risk of flight, judge is entitled to set bail at 
level he finds reasonably necessary; if defendant cannot afford 
bail, and must be detained pending trial, it is 'not because he 
cannot raise the money, but because without the money the risk 
of flight is too great'"). 
21 
 
 
imposes when a defendant is held on an unaffordable bail.  We 
turn to that subject next. 
4.  Due process requirements.  We begin by reviewing basic 
constitutional due process principles and our previous decisions 
applying these principles to pretrial detention.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and arts. 1, 10, and 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights establish a 
fundamental right to liberty and freedom from physical restraint 
that cannot be curtailed without due process of law.  See 
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 
228, 234 (2004); Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112; Mendonza, 423 Mass. 
at 778-779; Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 676-677 (1993).  
Pretrial detention encroaches on that fundamental right insofar 
as it subjects a defendant to governmental restraint without 
having received the full measure of due process to which the 
defendant is entitled before he or she can be punished under the 
criminal law.  See Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 778-779. 
In our previous decisions analyzing the constitutionality 
of pretrial detention, we have considered two aspects of due 
process -- substantive and procedural -- following Supreme Court 
precedents.  Under the test of substantive due process, "[w]here 
a right deemed to be 'fundamental' is involved, courts 'must 
examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests 
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the 
22 
 
 
challenged regulation,' Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
499 (1977), and typically will uphold only those statutes that 
are narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and compelling 
governmental interest."  Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112, quoting 
Aime, 414 Mass. at 673.  "When government action depriving a 
person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due 
process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  This requirement 
traditionally has been referred to as 'procedural' due process."  
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 116, quoting United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
Applying these standards, we have held that in certain 
limited circumstances a judge may properly detain a defendant 
before trial, where such detention is demonstrably necessary to 
ensure the defendant's appearance at future proceedings or to 
protect public safety.  In Querubin, we affirmed a Superior 
Court judge's order denying bail under G. L. c. 276, § 57, to a 
defendant indicted for drug trafficking who plainly posed a 
serious flight risk:  he had fled from police who sought to 
arrest him on a default warrant; had used an alias; had failed 
to appear in court in response to a summons; and had been 
apprehended by border patrol officers as he attempted to flee 
into Mexico.  See Querubin, 440 Mass. at 109-110, 119.  After 
reviewing the statutory procedures and common-law standards for 
23 
 
 
determining whether a defendant should be held without bail 
because he is likely to flee, we concluded that these procedures 
are "narrowly tailored to the State's legitimate and compelling 
interest in assuring the defendant's presence at trial," id. at 
116, and that the hearing requirement afforded the defendant 
sufficient procedural protection, see id. at 117-119. 
In Mendonza, we upheld the statutory scheme in G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, which was enacted in 1994 to authorize temporary 
preventive pretrial detention of a defendant charged with 
certain violent or dangerous crimes due to his or her 
dangerousness.  We noted that the statute's application is 
limited to cases where probable cause has been found to charge a 
defendant with certain serious offenses (such as crimes 
involving force, the risk of force, abuse, or violation of 
domestic violence protection orders); that the judge must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant has the 
right to testify, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses; 
and that the judge may order pretrial detention only where the 
judge finds, based on based on clear and convincing evidence, 
that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety 
of any other person or the community.  See Mendonza, 423 Mass. 
at 774, 780-781, 792; G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1), (3), and (4).  We 
also pointed out that these safeguards were similar to those 
contained in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
24 
 
 
§ 3142, on which § 58A was modeled, and we relied extensively on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, which 
upheld a similar preventive detention scheme in that statute.  
See Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 780-781, 786-788. 
Conversely, in Aime we invalidated earlier 1992 amendments 
to the bail statutes that would have allowed a judge to detain a 
defendant on high bail due to his or her perceived 
dangerousness, without adequate due process safeguards to ensure 
the accuracy of that determination.  In that case, a District 
Court judge ordered an alleged drug dealer to be held on bail of 
$100,000 cash or $1 million surety because he was a danger to 
the community.  See Aime, 414 Mass. at 669 & n.2.  The judge 
relied on amendments to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that authorized 
judicial officers, in setting bail, to take into account the 
"seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that 
would be posed by the prisoner's release."  Aime, supra at 671, 
quoting St. 1992, c. 201, § 4.  We determined that these 
amendments did not meet the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because they "essentially grant[ed] the 
judicial officer unbridled discretion to determine whether an 
arrested individual is dangerous" and lacked "procedures 
'designed to further the accuracy' of the judicial officer's 
determination."  Aime, supra at 682, quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. 
at 751.  See Aime, supra at 683. 
25 
 
 
In sum, "in our society liberty is the norm, and detention 
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception."  Aime, 414 Mass. at 677, quoting Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).  Although the Federal 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights do not 
prohibit pretrial detention, they permit it only "in carefully 
circumscribed circumstances and subject to quite demanding 
procedures."  Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 790. 
With this background, we now turn to the present case.  In 
her judgment denying Brangan's most recent petition, the single 
justice ruled:  "That [Brangan] is unable to pay a particular 
amount of bail does not, contrary to [his] assertion, 
necessarily render it a functional denial of bail.  Nor does it 
establish, without more, that [he] is entitled to the 
extraordinary relief available under G. L. c. 211, § 3."  We 
disagree. 
It is certainly true that "a defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to be released on bail prior to trial."  
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112.  Still less does a defendant have a 
constitutional right to an affordable bail, as we discussed 
above.  But where a judge sets bail in an amount so far beyond a 
defendant's ability to pay that it is likely to result in long-
term pretrial detention, it is the functional equivalent of an 
order for pretrial detention, and the judge's decision must be 
26 
 
 
evaluated in light of the same due process requirements 
applicable to such a deprivation of liberty.  See Aime, 414 
Mass. at 676.17 
Here, the record shows that Brangan is indigent and that 
bail has been set in an amount that is unattainable for him, 
resulting in his long-term pretrial detention.  Accordingly, we 
must analyze the bail judge's order and the record below in 
light of the requirements of due process applicable to pretrial 
detention.  Based on that review, we discern three particular 
areas of concern, for which we articulate three corresponding 
due process standards applicable to such cases. 
First, a judge may not consider a defendant's alleged 
dangerousness in setting the amount of bail, although a 
defendant's dangerousness may be considered as a factor in 
setting other conditions of release.  Using unattainable bail to 
detain a defendant because he is dangerous is improper.  If the 
                     
 
17 In Aime, the Commonwealth argued that the 1992 amendments 
allowing a judge to consider a defendant's dangerousness in 
setting a bail amount "merely added an additional, unremarkable 
factor to the bail statute" and did not enact a preventive 
detention scheme.  Aime, 414 Mass. at 676.  We rejected that 
argument.  We reasoned that, even though the amendments did "not 
explicitly provide for preventive detention," they effectively 
sought "to accomplish this goal through the use of the surety 
which an arrestee must post in order to be admitted to bail," by 
"setting unattainable surety in order to secure the detention of 
an arrestee."  Id. at 676 & n.12.  We therefore concluded that 
"[t]he amendments infringe[d] on the individual interest in 
freedom from detention" and must be analyzed on that basis.  Id. 
at 676. 
27 
 
 
Commonwealth wishes to have a defendant held pretrial because he 
poses a danger to another person or the community, it must 
proceed under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and comply with that 
statute's procedural requirements. 
We emphasize this point because the Commonwealth's briefs 
submitted to us and to the single justice repeatedly present 
arguments concerning Brangan's dangerousness, stating for 
example that he "fails to acknowledge the danger that he poses 
to the community," "created a public safety risk," "endangered 
the public," and "poses a threat to public safety" and "a 
security risk," while citing his rape convictions, the abuse 
prevention orders issued against him, and his alleged failure to 
register as a sex offender.  These would be proper arguments if 
the Commonwealth had sought to detain Brangan under § 58A, but 
it never did so.  The use of dangerousness as a discretionary 
factor in setting bail without the kind of procedural safeguards 
found in § 58A and in the Federal Bail Reform Act is precisely 
what Aime prohibits.  See Aime, 414 Mass. at 680 ("State may not 
enact detention schemes without providing safeguards similar to 
those which Congress incorporated into the Bail Reform Act"); 
see also Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 774 (under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, 
"judge is precluded from imposing a financial condition that 
results in pretrial detention in order to assure the safety of 
other persons," which "should end any tendency to require high 
28 
 
 
bail as a device for effecting preventive detention").  We 
recognize the importance of protecting public safety by 
providing "preliminary relief for the government in 
incapacitating persons who pose a particular danger to the 
public."  Id. at 781.  But this relief must be obtained through 
the constitutionally appropriate process in § 58A. 
We might be less concerned about the Commonwealth's 
dangerousness arguments if it were clear from the record that 
the bail judge's determination was based solely on Brangan's 
risk of flight.  But the bail order does not specifically weigh 
that risk.  We also note that the evidence that Brangan posed a 
serious flight risk seems relatively equivocal, taking into 
account his voluntary appearance when the police sought to talk 
with him after the robbery and the evidence that he never missed 
a court appearance. 
Second, where, based on a defendant's credible 
representations and any other evidence before the judge, it 
appears that the defendant lacks the financial resources to post 
the amount of bail set by the judge, such that it will likely 
result in the defendant's long-term pretrial detention, the 
judge must provide findings of fact and a statement of reasons 
for the bail decision, either in writing or orally on the 
29 
 
 
record.18  The statement must confirm the judge's consideration 
of the defendant's financial resources,19 explain how the bail 
amount was calculated, and state why, notwithstanding the fact 
that the bail amount will likely result in the defendant's 
detention,  the defendant's risk of flight is so great that no 
alternative, less restrictive financial or nonfinancial 
conditions will suffice to assure his or her presence at future 
court proceedings.20 
                     
 
18 Judges in the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, and 
Juvenile Court routinely make findings, based on the factors in  
G. L. c. 276, § 58, in support of their bail decisions.  Thus, a 
requirement of written or oral findings on the record does not 
impose an undue hardship in the setting of bail.  In setting 
bail under G. L. c. 276, § 57, a judge may rely on the factors 
set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 58, to demonstrate that a 
defendant's right to due process has been given appropriate 
consideration.  Although the District Court form, captioned 
"Reasons for Ordering Bail, G. L. c. 276, § 58," may be useful 
in making the findings required in this opinion, we caution that 
further elaboration of the findings may be prudent where the 
bail is likely to result in a defendant's long-term detention. 
 
 
19 As the amicus suggests, consideration of a defendant's 
financial resources may be facilitated by reviewing the report 
prepared by the probation department to determine whether a 
defendant qualifies as indigent for court-appointed counsel.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 7 (a) (3) and 7 (b) (2), as appearing in 
461 Mass. 1501 (2012); S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 5 (a), as appearing 
in 475 Mass. 1301 (2016); G. L. c. 211D, § 2A (a)-(c). 
 
 
20 For example, where a judge imposes a bail amount that is 
greater than what a defendant represents that he can pay, that 
amount might be justified where the judge states on the record 
that she has considered alternative nonfinancial conditions and 
a lesser bail amount, but has concluded that they would not be 
sufficient to assure the defendant's appearance at future 
proceedings given the defendant's record of defaults or other 
 
30 
 
 
We borrow these requirements, with some modifications, from 
United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1991), 
which addressed a comparable situation where the bail imposed by 
the Federal District Court judge exceeded the defendant's means, 
resulting in his pretrial detention.  In that case, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the 
District Court judge could properly insist on a financial 
condition that the defendant could not afford to pay, resulting 
in his detention, provided that the judge complied with the 
procedural requirements for a valid detention order, including 
written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for 
determining that the financial condition imposed was an 
indispensable condition for release.  See id. at 550-551.  In 
particular, the First Circuit found the District Court judge's 
bail order to be deficient because it gave "no indication of the 
reasons underlying the district court's calculation of the 
bond," and did not explain "why the district court thought a 
$200,000 bond was necessary in the face of the defendant's 
representation that he could not afford such a bond."  Id. at 
551. 
                                                                  
indications that the defendant poses a flight risk.  The judge 
also is not bound by a defendant's representation as to what 
bail he can reasonably afford, and may indicate that she is not 
convinced, based on the record, that the defendant cannot post 
bail in the amount set by the judge. 
31 
 
 
Although the rulings in Mantecon-Zayas were based on the 
language and legislative history of the Federal Bail Reform Act, 
the same requirements are also dictated by the constitutional 
demands of due process.  A statement of findings and reasons, 
either in writing or orally on the record, is a minimum 
requirement where a defendant faces a loss of liberty.21  See 
Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016) ("Due 
process requires that a judge issue a written statement 
regarding the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking 
probation"); id. at 484 n.8 (due process requirement is 
satisfied where judge makes oral statements on record and 
transcript is available); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 
86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 539 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 113 (1990) ("The minimum requirements of 
due process include 'a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking . . . 
parole'").  Requiring a particularized statement as to why no 
less restrictive condition will suffice to assure the 
                     
21 We recognize the practical difficulty in determining 
whether a particular bail amount will result in the defendant's 
pretrial detention and whether, in that case, the judge must 
make findings in accordance with due process justifying the bail 
order.  Therefore, to ensure that findings are made, the better 
practice is to make findings in every case where the defendant 
is not released on personal recognizance and the defendant 
represents in good faith to the judge that he or she is unable 
to make the bail set by the judge. 
32 
 
 
defendant's presence at future court proceedings is appropriate 
in light of the applicable standard of substantive due process, 
that the procedure be "narrowly tailored to the State's 
legitimate and compelling interest in assuring the defendant's 
presence at trial."  Querubin, 440 Mass. at 116.  It also is 
important because holding a defendant on an unaffordable bail 
amount defeats bail's purpose of securing pretrial liberty.22 
Measured against these requirements, the bail order here is 
deficient.  The order lists the factors the judge considered in 
ordering bail and cites Brangan's previous sentence for rape of 
a child, the potential penalty he faced if convicted of armed 
                     
 
22 There are also practical reasons why it is sensible to 
avoid detaining a defendant on unaffordable bail unless it is 
truly necessary.  Pretrial detention disrupts a defendant's 
employment and family relationships, with often tragic 
consequences.  See Pinto, The Bail Trap, The New York Times 
Magazine (Aug. 13, 2015).  Pretrial detention disproportionately 
affects ethnic and racial minority groups.  See Jones & Forman, 
Exploring the Potential for Pretrial Innovation in 
Massachusetts, The Massachusetts Institute for a New 
Commonwealth, Justice Reinvestment Policy Brief Series, at 3-4, 
5 (Sept. 2015); Bail Fail:  Why the U.S. Should End the Practice 
of Using Money for Bail, Justice Policy Institute, at 15-16 
(Sept. 2012) (Bail Fail).  And funds expended on pretrial 
detention might be better spent on treatment and supervision.  
See Jones & Forman, supra at 5-6.  Research indicates that 
alternatives to cash bail and secured bonds, such as unsecured 
bonds, pretrial supervision, and court notification systems, may 
be just as effective in assuring that a defendant appears at 
future court proceedings.  See Jones, Unsecured Bonds:  The As 
Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option, Pretrial 
Justice Institute (Oct. 2013); Bail Fail, supra at 27-35; Moving 
Beyond Money:  A Primer on Bail Reform, Harvard Law School 
Criminal Justice Policy Program, at 14-18 (Oct. 2016). 
33 
 
 
robbery, the previous orders issued against him under G. L. 
c. 209A, and the fact that he was on probation when he allegedly 
committed the robbery.  Although these are appropriate matters 
to take into account in setting bail, the order does not 
evidence any consideration of Brangan's financial resources, and 
does not explain how the judge calculated the bail amount, how 
Brangan's criminal history demonstrated that he posed a serious 
flight risk, or why that risk was so great that it necessitated 
a bail amount beyond his means.  Furthermore, the order does not 
explain why the judge rejected Brangan's alternative proposal 
that he be released on $5,000 cash with the condition that he 
wear a GPS tracking bracelet. 
Third, when a bail order comes before a judge for 
reconsideration or review and a defendant has been detained due 
to his inability to post bail, the judge must consider the 
length of the defendant's pretrial detention and the equities of 
the case.  In upholding pretrial detention of a defendant to 
assure his or her future presence in court or safeguard other 
persons or the community, we have emphasized the temporary 
nature of this detention.  See Querubin, 440 Mass. at 118 ("If a 
defendant is held pending trial, the consequences to him, 
although significant, are temporary"); Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 
781, 790 ("the conclusion of the trial itself provides an 
inevitable end point to the State's preventive authority," and 
34 
 
 
detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, is "temporary and 
provisional").  That justification for pretrial detention erodes 
the longer a defendant has been held. 
In this case, Brangan has been held for more than three and 
one-half years.  In their briefs the parties exchange 
accusations as to the underlying reasons for the delay in 
bringing Brangan to trial, and we do not purport to assess where 
the fault, if any, lies.23  We only note that the delay is an 
additional factor to be considered in determining whether 
Brangan's continued pretrial detention is justified. 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we reverse the 
order of the single justice and remand this case to the county 
court for entry of an order directing the Superior Court judge 
to conduct a new bail hearing for Brangan as soon as possible in 
accord with the standards set out in this opinion. 
                     
 
23 Much of the delay appears to have resulted from the 
mistrial that the trial judge ordered based on the prosecutor's 
closing statement, and by the Commonwealth's interlocutory 
appeal from that order, which we rejected in Brangan I on the 
ground that the judge's order was not appealable.  Brangan I, 
475 Mass. at 145-146, 148, 149.  In the context of determining 
whether a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated, 
the United States Supreme Court has observed that "an 
interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid 
reason that justifies delay," but "a delay resulting from an 
appeal would weigh heavily against the Government if the issue 
were clearly tangential or frivolous."  United States v. Loud 
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315-316 (1986).  Brangan's pending appeal on 
double jeopardy grounds, which we declined to consider as part 
of Brangan I, supra at 148-149, also appears to have delayed his 
retrial. 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.