Case Title: State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts

Citation: 2000-Ohio-345

Docket Number: 19990316

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts, 88 Ohio St.3d 365, 2000-Ohio-345.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MCCLEARY, APPELLEE, v. ROBERTS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 365.] 
Public records — Personal information of private citizens, obtained by a “public 
office,” reduced to writing and placed in record form and used by the 
public office in implementing some lawful regulatory policy, is not a 
“public record” as contemplated by R.C. 149.43. 
Personal information of private citizens, obtained by a “public office,” reduced to 
writing and placed in record form and used by the public office in 
implementing some lawful regulatory policy, is not a “public record” as 
contemplated by R.C. 149.43. 
(No. 99-316 — Submitted December 1, 1999 — Decided April 12, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-224. 
__________________ 
 
In May 1996, the city of Columbus (“City”) implemented a photo 
identification program for its Recreation and Parks Department (“Department”).  
The program was instituted primarily to combat the increased incidence of violent 
behavior and vandalism at City swimming pools.  The photo identification 
program requires parents of children who use City pools and other recreation 
facilities to provide certain personal information regarding their children.  Parents 
provide the Department with the names, home addresses, family information, 
emergency contact information, and medical history information of participating 
children and, in return, each child is provided a photographic identification card to 
present when using pools and recreation centers.  Apparently, as a result of the 
implementation of the identification system, the Department experienced a marked 
decrease in violence and unruliness at City pools. 
 
 
2
 
In November 1996, appellee, Cornell McCleary, requested a copy of the 
Department’s electronic database, which contained the personal, identifying 
information regarding those children who were participating in the photo 
identification program.  Wayne A. Roberts, Assistant Director of Recreation for 
the Department and appellant herein, refused to release the database and provide 
appellee with the requested information. 
 
On January 24, 1997, appellee filed a complaint in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Franklin County, seeking a writ of mandamus.  The complaint sought, 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Law, to compel appellant to 
provide appellee a copy of the photo identification program database.  The trial 
court granted summary judgment to appellant.  The trial court held that the 
information requested by appellee did not qualify as a public record.  Specifically, 
the trial court determined that the information sought, although in the custody of a 
public office, was not a “record” as defined by R.C. 149.011(G).  Further, the trial 
court concluded that certain portions of the requested information included 
“medical records” and thus were exempt from disclosure pursuant to R.C. 
149.43(A)(3), now (A)(1)(a). 
 
Appellee appealed to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court 
of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment and 
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant appellee’s 
requested writ of mandamus. 
 
The matter is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Cornell H. McCleary, pro se. 
 
Janet E. Jackson, Columbus City Attorney, and Daniel W. Drake, Chief 
Counsel, for appellant. 
 
 
3
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Mark R. Weaver, Special Counsel, 
and Lisa Wu Fate, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Attorney General of Ohio. 
 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The issue presented for our review is whether the 
Department’s database containing certain personal, identifying information 
regarding children who use the City’s recreational facilities is a public record 
subject to disclosure pursuant to R.C. Chapter 149, Ohio’s Public Records Act.  
Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, a “public record” is defined by R.C. 
149.43(A)(1) as “any record that is kept by any public office, including, but not 
limited to, state, county, city, village, township, and school district units * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 149.43(B) provides that “[a]ll public records shall be 
promptly prepared and made available for inspection to any person at all 
reasonable times during regular business hours.” 
 
There is no dispute that the requested information is under the custody and 
control of a public office.  The City’s Recreation and Parks Department clearly 
falls under the statutory definition of “public office” as set forth in R.C. 
149.011(A).1  Nonetheless, in order to resolve the issue under consideration, we 
must determine whether the information sought is a “record” as that term is defined 
by R.C. 149.011(G).  If we conclude that the information is a “record,” and the 
information does not fit within one of the exceptions in R.C. 149.43, then appellee 
would be entitled to the requested information. 
 
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred when it concluded that the 
information sought by appellee did not constitute a “record” pursuant to R.C. 
149.011(G).  R.C. 149.011 provides: 
 
 
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“(G) ‘Records’ includes any document, device, or item, regardless of 
physical form or characteristic, created or received by or coming under the 
jurisdiction of any public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which 
serves to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
operations, or other activities of the office.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The contention that the information requested in this matter does not fall 
under the statutory definition of “record” in R.C. 149.011(G) is well taken.  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that the information requested by appellee is not a 
“record” as that term is contemplated by Ohio’s Public Records Act. 
 
In State ex rel. Fant v. Enright (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 186, 188, 610 N.E.2d 
997, 999, we emphasized that “not all items in a personnel file may be considered 
public records.  A ‘public record’ is ‘any record that is kept by any public office * 
* *.’  R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  However, a ‘record’ is something that is ‘created or 
received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any public office * * * which 
serves to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
operations, or other activities of the office.’  R.C. 149.011(G).  To the extent that 
any item contained in a personnel file is not a ‘record,’ i.e., does not serve to 
document the organization, etc., of the public office, it is not a public record and 
need not be disclosed.  To the extent that an item is not a public record and is 
‘personal information,’ as defined in R.C. 1347.01(E), a public office ‘would be 
under an affirmative duty, pursuant to R.C. 1347.05(G), to prevent its disclosure.’ 
”  (Footnotes omitted.)  In this regard, R.C. 1347.05(G) provides that all 
government agencies that maintain personal information systems shall “[t]ake 
reasonable precautions to protect personal information in the system from 
unauthorized modification, destruction, use, or disclosure.”2 
 
The information sought by appellee was created by and is under the custody 
of a public office, the Department.  However, the specific information requested 
 
 
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consists of certain personal information regarding children who participate in the 
Department’s photo identification program.  Standing alone, that information, i.e., 
names of children, home addresses, names of parents and guardians, and medical 
information, does nothing to document any aspect of the City’s Recreation and 
Parks Department. 
 
In United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Commt. for Freedom of the 
Press (1989), 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774, the United States 
Supreme Court held that “as a categorical matter * * * a third party’s request for 
law enforcement records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be 
expected to invade that citizen’s privacy * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 780, 109 
S.Ct. at 1485, 103 L.Ed.2d at 800.  In addressing the statutory purpose of the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), Section 552(b)(7)(C), Title 5, U.S.Code, 
the federal counterpart to R.C. Chapter 149, the Supreme Court stated that the 
basic purpose of the FOIA is “ ‘to open agency action to the light of public 
scrutiny.’ ”  Id. at 772, 109 S.Ct. at 1481, 103 L.Ed.2d at 795, quoting Dept. of Air 
Force v. Rose (1976), 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11, 27.  
In that regard, the court reasoned that “[o]fficial information that sheds light on an 
agency’s performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory 
purpose.  That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about 
private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals 
little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.  In this case—and presumably in 
the typical case in which one private citizen is seeking information about 
another—the requester does not intend to discover anything about the conduct of 
the agency that has possession of the requested records.  Indeed, response to this 
request would not shed any light on the conduct of any Government agency or 
official.”  Reporters Commt. at 773, 109 S.Ct. at 1481, 103 L.Ed.2d at 795-796.  
The Supreme Court thus concluded in Reporters Commt. that “when the request 
 
 
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seeks no ‘official information’ about a Government agency, but merely records 
what the Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is 
‘unwarranted.’ ”  Id. at 780, 109 S.Ct. at 1485, 103 L.Ed.2d at 800. 
 
In Kallstrom v. Columbus (C.A.6, 1998), 136 F.3d 1055, 1064-1065, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals used similar reasoning to exempt from disclosure 
certain personal information contained in the personnel files of law enforcement 
officers.  In State ex rel. Keller v. Cox (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 707 N.E.2d 
931, 934, we relied on Kallstrom and exempted essentially identical information 
from disclosure.  In Kallstrom, the federal court determined that disclosure of the 
information sought would do nothing to further the public’s knowledge of the 
internal workings of governmental agencies.  Thus, the Kallstrom court concluded 
that the release of the information to any member of the public did not serve the 
important public interest of ensuring government accountability.  Id. at 1065. 
 
The rationale espoused in the above-referenced cases is equally applicable to 
the instant action.  The existence of the Department’s photo identification program 
has been well documented.  It is no secret as to when the program was initiated, the 
purpose of the program, how the program operates, and the effect it has had in 
making the City’s recreational facilities safer and more manageable.  It is also no 
secret that the Department possesses certain personal information, voluntarily 
provided, of those children who use the City’s swimming pools and recreational 
facilities.  We fail to see how release of the requested information to appellee, or 
anyone else, would provide any further insight into the operation of the 
Department’s photo identification program than that already available. 
 
We recognize that “[o]ne of the salutary purposes of the Public Records Law 
is to ensure accountability of government to those being governed.”  State ex rel. 
Strothers v. Wertheim (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 155, 158, 684 N.E.2d 1239, 1242.  
Inherent in Ohio’s Public Records Law is the public’s right to monitor the conduct 
 
 
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of government.  However, in the instant matter, disclosing the requested 
information would do nothing to further the purposes of the Act. 
 
Moreover, the personal information requested is not contained in a personnel 
file.  At issue here is information regarding children who use the City’s swimming 
pools and recreational facilities.  The subjects of appellee’s public records request 
are not employees of the government entity having custody of the information.  
They are children—private citizens of a government, which has, as a matter of 
public policy, determined that it is necessary to compile private information on 
these citizens.3   It seems to us that there is a clear distinction between public 
employees and their public employment personnel files and files on private citizens 
created by government.4  To that extent the personal information requested by 
appellee is clearly outside the scope of R.C. 149.43 and not subject to disclosure.  
See State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 385, 18 
OBR 437, 439, 481 N.E.2d 632, 634-635. 
 
Because the information sought herein is not a “record,” as defined by R.C. 
149.011(G), it follows that it cannot be a “public record” as that term is 
contemplated by R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  We, therefore, find that personal information 
of private citizens, obtained by a “public office,” reduced to writing and placed in 
record form and used by the public office in implementing some lawful, regulatory 
policy is not a “public record” as contemplated by R.C. 149.43. 
 
However, even if we were to conclude that the requested information is a 
“record” for purposes R.C. Chapter 149, appellee still would not be entitled to the 
requested writ of mandamus. 
 
Appellant contends that the information sought is exempt under R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(p), now (q).  This section of the Public Records Act specifically 
excepts from disclosure any record “the release of which is prohibited by state or 
federal law.”  Specifically, appellant urges that the records in contention are 
 
 
8
protected by the fundamental right to privacy founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  In State ex rel. 
Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, we held that “[a] governmental body refusing to 
release records has the burden of proving that the records are excepted from 
disclosure by R.C. 149.43.”  See, also, State ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ. 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 169, 637 N.E.2d 911, 912.  Assuming, arguendo, that 
the information requested herein is a public record pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1), 
we conclude that the Department has met its burden of proving that the information 
is exempt from disclosure. 
 
In State ex rel. Keller v. Cox, supra, we recognized a constitutional right of 
privacy in certain personal information contained in the personnel files of law 
enforcement officers.  Keller involved a public records request whereby an 
Assistant Federal Public Defender sought access to all personnel and internal 
affairs records relating to a Miami County Sheriff’s Detective.  We noted in Keller 
that this information should be protected not only by the constitutional right of 
privacy, but, also, that there should be a “good sense” rule when such information 
is sought.  In reaching our conclusion, we reasoned that personnel files containing 
the names of police officers’ children, spouses, parents, home addresses, telephone 
numbers, medical information, and similar information should not be available to 
anyone “who might use the information to achieve nefarious ends.”  Id., 85 Ohio 
St.3d at 282, 707 N.E.2d at 934. 
 
Our decision in Keller was based on the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals case of Kallstrom v. Columbus, supra.  Kallstrom involved a factual 
situation essentially identical to Keller.  The federal court of appeals held in 
Kallstrom that the police officers’ privacy interest in the personal information 
contained in their personnel records implicated a fundamental liberty interest in 
 
 
9
preserving their lives and the lives of their family members, as well as preserving 
their personal security and bodily integrity.  Id., 136 F.3d at 1062. 
 
The information sought in the case at bar is no different from that 
information prohibited from disclosure in Keller and Kallstrom, supra.  The 
officers’ personnel files in Keller and Kallstrom contained essentially the same 
type of information, i.e., home addresses, phone numbers, names of family 
members, and medical records, as that contained in the Department’s database.  As 
did the situations in Keller and Kallstrom, a release of the requested information by 
the Department in this matter places those who are the subject of the records 
request at risk of irreparable harm, albeit not necessarily by appellee. 
 
Furthermore, any perceived threat that would likely follow the release of 
such information, no matter how attenuated, cannot be discounted.  We live in a 
time that has commonly been referred to as The Information Age.  Technological 
advances have made many aspects of our lives easier and more enjoyable but have 
also made it possible to generate and collect vast amounts of personal, identifying 
information through everyday transactions such as credit card purchases and 
cellular telephone use.  The advent of the Internet and its proliferation of users has 
dramatically increased, almost beyond comprehension, our ability to collect, 
analyze, exchange, and transmit data, including personal information. 
 
In that regard, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the 
information at issue herein might be posted on the Internet and transmitted to 
millions of people.  Access to the Internet presents no difficulty.  Anyone with a 
personal computer can transmit and receive information on line via the Internet.  
This court has long recognized that children possess certain fundamental rights, 
among which are the right “to be free from physical, sexual and other abuses.”  In 
re Schmidt (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 335, 25 OBR 386, 390, 496 N.E.2d 952, 
956.  Because, unfortunately, we live in a society where children all too often fall 
 
 
10
victim to abuse, it is necessary to take precautions to prevent, or at least limit, any 
opportunities for victimization. 
 
We do not suggest that appellee poses any threat to the safety of the children 
who are the subject of the records sought.  There is nothing in the record before 
this court, or otherwise, that indicates that appellee intends any harm to these 
children.  However, in Kallstrom the court noted that disclosure of personal 
information, even to a benevolent organization posing no apparent threat to the 
safety of the officers or their families, increases the risk that the information will 
fall into the wrong hands.  Id., 136 F.3d at 1064. 
 
Moreover, this court in Keller and the federal court in Kallstrom were not 
unmindful that the release of such personal information could increase the potential 
for harm to those least able to protect themselves.  Those decisions sought not only 
to protect police officers but the officers’ family members as well. 
 
The case now before us is no different.  Because of the inherent vulnerability 
of children, release of personal information of this nature creates an unacceptable 
risk that a child could be victimized.  We cannot in good conscience take that 
chance. 
 
We therefore hold that appellant is under no obligation, statutory or 
otherwise, to make available the information sought by appellee in this matter.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny appellee’s 
requested writ of mandamus. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
 
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FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
R.C. 149.011 provides: 
 
“(A) ‘Public office’ includes any state agency, public institution, political 
subdivision, or any other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity 
established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of 
government.” 
 
2. 
Note that R.C. 1347.08(A) provides that “[e]very state or local agency 
that maintains a personal information system, upon the request and the proper 
identification of any person who is the subject of the personal information in the 
system, shall: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(2) * * * permit the person, the person’s legal guardian, or an attorney who 
presents a signed written authorization made by the person, to inspect all personal 
information in the system of which the person is the subject.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
3. 
Whether this is or is not a proper function of government (to acquire, 
compile, and create a private file on individual citizens) is a question not now 
before us. 
 
4. 
It is conceivable that a police agency, or any other public office 
agency, could create a “private” file on any citizen and that the file could contain 
fiction as well as fact, untruth as well as truth.  Once the information in any such 
file is released as a “public record,” the argument would go, of course, that all the 
information must be fact and truthful because, after all, it comes directly from an 
“official” file.  Once the information is disseminated and published, the damage is 
done. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  I fully agree with the majority opinion that the 
database at issue in this case is not a record, and that if it were a record it would 
 
 
12
not be public because of the children’s right to privacy. State ex rel. Beacon 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 605, 640 N.E.2d 164. 
 
It merits mention that according to McCleary, he originally sought access to 
the database in an attempt to recruit urban youngsters for the Boy Scouts.  But, as 
McCleary later said during oral argument, he became concerned that the parks 
department might be sharing its database with Columbus police to target unruly 
children.  Whether that is a valid concern is undeveloped in the record, but I would 
caution that the children’s privacy rights to the information they provided the parks 
department extends not just to private citizens but to other city agencies as well. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  The majority 
opinion consists of two main parts.  First, the majority decides that the information 
sought by the relator does not meet the definition of “record” in R.C. 149.011(G) 
and that for this reason it cannot be a “public record” under R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  
The majority’s syllabus stems from this first step.  Second, the majority decides 
that even if the requested information constitutes a “public record,” the information 
is nonetheless exempt from disclosure under former R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p), now 
(q).  Though I agree that the decisional law of this court leads to the conclusion 
that the names, addresses, telephone numbers, family information, and medical 
records of the children enrolled in the city’s database are exempt from disclosure in 
this case, I write to address concerns raised by both steps of the majority’s 
analysis. 
 
The majority could have resolved this case solely on the basis of its second 
step, by applying the R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(q) exemption for records protected from 
public disclosure by state or federal law.  Instead, the majority takes its first step, 
and creates new syllabus law that arguably restricts the definition of “public 
record” in a manner that could undermine the disclosure-oriented purpose of the 
 
 
13
Public Records Act in future cases.  See State ex rel. The Miami Student v. Miami 
Univ. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 680 N.E.2d 956, 959 (“inherent in R.C. 
149.43 is the fundamental policy of promoting open government, not restricting 
it”). 
 
I do not find that the applicable precedent warrants this potentially 
restrictive step.  Though the majority relies on this court’s decision in State ex rel. 
Keller v. Cox and the Sixth Circuit case Kallstrom v. Columbus, both of these cases 
were decided on the basis of the privacy exemption to the Public Records Act.  
Neither case went so far as to say that the requested information could never fit the 
definition of a “public record.”  See State ex rel. Keller v. Cox (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 279, 282, 707 N.E.2d 931, 934; Kallstrom v. Columbus (C.A.6, 1998), 136 
F.3d 1055, 1059.  Kallstrom, especially, calls into question the breadth of the 
majority’s syllabus.  There, the Sixth Circuit expressly found that “there may be 
situations in which the release of * * *  personal information might further the 
public’s understanding of the workings of its * * * agencies.”  Id. at 1065.  The 
majority’s syllabus contradicts this aspect of Kallstrom by declaring that “personal 
information” can never meet the definition of “public record.” 
 
I also question the scope of the majority’s second step, where the majority 
applies the exemption from R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(q).  I have voiced a similar concern 
before.  See Keller, 85 Ohio St.3d at 282-284, 707 N.E.2d at 934-935 (Cook, J., 
dissenting).  In Keller, I concluded that the constitutional right to privacy did not 
necessarily exempt from disclosure the entire contents of the requested personnel 
files and investigative reports.  Id. at 283, 707 N.E.2d at 935.  Here again, I am 
unpersuaded that the entire contents of the city’s electronic database necessarily 
comes within the applicable exemption.  For example, the database likely includes 
a template upon which the appropriate data is entered.  It would seem that the 
questions asked by the agency on such a template, unadorned by personal 
 
 
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responses, would fit the definition of “record”—but not the constitutional privacy 
exemption in R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(q)—and would, therefore, be subject to 
disclosure.  This court has previously held that exempt information can be redacted 
from nonexempt records so that the nonexempt portions remain subject to 
disclosure.  See, e.g., State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 
673 N.E.2d 1365; Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1992), 
63 Ohio St.3d 498, 589 N.E.2d 24, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Though I agree with the majority that the names, addresses, phone numbers, 
family information, and medical information of the children registered in the city’s 
identification database are exempt from disclosure under this court’s decisional 
law in Keller v. Cox, I do not join the syllabus, and I am not convinced that the 
entire contents of the city’s electronic database are exempt from disclosure under 
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(q).