Case Title: Felske v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Felske v. State1985 WY 137706 P.2d 257Case Number: 83-230Decided: 09/12/1985BARRY BRIAN FELSKE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
BARRY BRIAN FELSKE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Thomas J. Fagan 
and Michael J. Krampner of Fagan & Fagan, Casper, for appellant 
(defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Margaret M. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN, and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary issue in 
this case is whether the State must establish the voluntary driving of the 
vehicle and the voluntary consumption of alcoholic beverages in prosecuting a 
charge of aggravated vehicular homicide under § 31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977, 1982 
Cum.Supp.1 The constitutionality of the 
statute also is attacked for reasons similar to those argued in Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864 
(1984), and Hodgins v. State, Wyo., 
(No. 83-143 decided 9/11/85). We affirm the judgment of the district court 
because the constitutionality of the statute has been established in Armijo v. State and Hodgins v. State, and because the State 
did not fail to meet its burden of establishing the elements of the 
offense.

[¶2.]     Appellant stated the 
issues on appeal in his brief as:

"I. Whether the statute under which the appellant was 
charged, W.S. § 31-5-1117(a), 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 50, § 1, is 
unconstitutional.

"II. Whether the evidence 
presented by the State established beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant was 
guilty of Aggravated Homicide by Vehicle."

Appellant stated 
the second issue more concretely in his supplemental brief. Relying on language 
in Armijo v. State, he contends that 
the State must prove that the consumption of intoxicating beverages and the 
operation of the vehicle were voluntary and that the State failed to carry its 
burden.

[¶3.]     By information filed 
July 23, 1982, appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated vehicular 
homicide in violation of § 31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp. Appellant 
pled not guilty to both counts.

[¶4.]     A bench trial was held 
on May 18, 1983, and upon stipulation of counsel, the trial judge dismissed one 
of the counts. The trial court found appellant guilty of the remaining count of 
aggravated vehicular homicide, and imposed a sentence of not less than 18 months 
nor more than 24 months incarceration. 

FACTUAL 
BACKGROUND

[¶5.]     On June 20, 1982, at 
8:45 p.m., appellant was traveling west on Geary Dome Road, a dirt road which 
intersects Cole Circle Road in Natrona 
County, Wyoming. This 
intersection is controlled by a stop sign directing traffic on Geary Dome Road to 
stop. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the appellant failed to 
stop at the Geary Dome 
Road stop sign, as a consequence of which he struck a 
vehicle carrying Bobby and Veronica Vang who died as a result of the collision. 
Appellant's blood alcohol content was later found to be 0.19% and an eyewitness 
testified that he was traveling 70 miles per hour when he struck the vehicle in 
which the deceased persons were riding.

[¶6.]     The evidence in this 
case is scanty. The parties stipulated to the following pertinent 
facts:

"3. That the accident 
upon which this action is based occurred in NatronaCounty, State of Wyoming, on 6/20/82.

"4. That the defendant 
was driving the automobile involved in the accident upon which this action is 
based.

"5. That Bobby Vang and 
Veronica Vang were killed as a result of the injuries they received in the 
accident upon which this action is based.

"6. That the blood 
alcohol test of the defendant's blood indicated a concentration of 0.19 ethyl 
alcohol, and the written findings of that test may be introduced into evidence 
without foundation proof."

In addition, the 
State produced Gary Myers, who testified that he saw defendant speed along the 
road prior to the accident. Mr. Myers also testified:

"* * * He [the appellant] 
kept repeating over and over, don't tell them I was driving, and I told him, I 
said, there is nobody, I can't tell them that because you are the only one in 
the car."

[¶7.]     The State also produced 
Thomas Chatt, the highway patrolman who investigated the accident scene. Officer 
Chatt testified that appellant had a clear view of the intersection for 2,600 
feet, and that appellant's brakes were in good condition. The officer also 
testified that he found cans of beer in the appellant's car and noticed the 
smell of alcohol when he approached the appellant. Officer Chatt also testified 
to the results of the appellant's blood test.

[¶8.]     Appellant presented no 
evidence. At the close of the State's case, he moved the court for an order 
dismissing the information, or in the alternative to reduce the charge to a 
violation of § 31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp.2 The grounds for his motion were 
that there was a lack of substantial evidence to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that § 31-5-1117(a) was 
unconstitutional.

THE 
LAW

Vagueness

[¶9.]     Appellant claims the 
statute is void for vagueness, in that it gives no notice of the proscribed 
behavior. In Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d  at 868, we said:

"* * * Due process does 
require that a criminal statute set forth with reasonable certainty the acts or 
conduct required or forbidden in a manner that furnishes fair notice to a person 
of ordinary intelligence that certain conduct is proscribed by the 
statute."

We held that the 
statute which is also at issue in this case, § 31-5-1117(a), was not 
unconstitutionally vague. Accord Hodgins 
v. State, supra. We noted that Armijo's 
flight from the scene left him in an awkward position in claiming that the 
statute gave no notice of the proscribed conduct. Likewise, appellant Felske 
indicated he understood the hazard of criminal sanction for his behavior when he 
repeatedly asked Mr. Myers not to tell the authorities that he had been driving 
the vehicle.

Causation

[¶10.]  Appellant also claims the statute is 
unconstitutional because it contains no causation requirement. We did not 
address ourselves to that question in Armijo v. State because Armijo admitted in both the trial court and this court 
that his conduct caused the death of his victim. 678 P.2d  at 
867.

[¶11.]  The question of whether the statute 
contained a causation requirement was, however, answered in Hodgins v. State, supra. We found that 
the element of causation is encompassed in the statute. The statute 
said:

"Whoever, while driving 
any vehicle under the influence * * * to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another person shall be guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle * * *."

[¶12.]  We made it clear in Hodgins v. State that the statute 
requires that the death be caused by the proscribed conduct of driving while 
under the influence:

"* * * [T]here cannot be 
a violation of the statute unless the proximate cause of death was drinking and 
driving while under the influence to a degree which renders the defendant 
incapable of safely operating the vehicle. The death of the victim of a drunk 
driver will not, therefore, furnish adequate grounds to support a conviction 
unless it can also be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was 
in fact proximately caused by the proscribed conduct."

General Intent 
Required

[¶13.]  Appellant also argues that the statute 
under which he was convicted is void for vagueness because it does not specify a 
criminal intent.

[¶14.]  The same question was raised in Armijo v. State, and our response 
was:

"* * * We conclude that 
the legislature of the State of Wyoming by failing to encompass a statement of 
intent in § 31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977 (May 1982 Cum.Supp.), did not intend to 
eliminate the element of a culpable mental state." 678 P.2d  at 
869.

We explained 
further that aggravated vehicular homicide was a general-intent 
crime.

[¶15.]  Appellant also urges that the State 
failed to establish the requisite intent. In Armijo, there was no question but that 
intent had been established, because Armijo 
pled guilty, thus admitting every element of the crime with which he was 
charged. Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d  at 870. In the case 
at bar, the defendant did not plead guilty. He claims that he did not admit any 
evil intent and that the State has proved none, and so his conviction must be 
reversed. Specifically, he contends that the two elements of the offense going 
to intent were not established by the State and that there is no evidence at all 
that appellant voluntarily drove the vehicle or knowingly or voluntarily 
consumed alcoholic beverages.

[¶16.]  We will hold that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that appellant voluntarily drove the vehicle. See 
discussion, infra. We need not address the question of whether there was 
sufficient evidence to find that appellant voluntarily consumed alcoholic 
beverages because voluntary intoxication is not an element of the crime of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle under § 31-5-1117(a).

[¶17.]  Appellant contends that voluntary 
intoxication is an element which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
He supports his contention by quoting the following from Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d at 
870:

"* * * It follows that to 
prove a violation of this statute the only intent which must be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt is that the acts which establish the offense were 
committed voluntarily. [Citations.] In this case [Armijo v. State] the appellant admitted 
in establishing the factual basis for his plea of guilty that he voluntarily 
became intoxicated to the extent that he was rendered incapable of safely 
driving his vehicle, and while so driving it he collided with the victim, 
causing the victim's death."

It is conceded 
that language from Armijo carries with it some 
indication that voluntary intoxication is an element which the State must prove 
under § 31-5-1117(a). Other language in Armijo, however, indicates that voluntary 
intoxication is not an element of the offense. For example, at one point we 
spoke of "the driving-while-intoxicated element." 678 P.2d  at 869-870. In any 
event, what we said there was dicta since, in Armijo v. State, we were not required to 
decide whether voluntary intoxication was an element since Armijo admitted his intoxication and that it was 
voluntary. 678 P.2d  at 870.

[¶18.]  Now that the issue is squarely before us, 
we hold that voluntary intoxication is not an element which the State must prove 
under § 31-5-1117(a). We hold firm to our conclusion in Armijo v. State that aggravated 
vehicular homicide is a general-intent crime under § 31-5-1117(a). The 
prohibited conduct, however, is not the act of becoming intoxicated; rather it 
is the act of operating a vehicle when so intoxicated as to be unable to do it 
safely. The act which the State must prove was voluntary is the operation of the 
vehicle.

[¶19.]  Section 31-5-1117(a) 
provided:

"(a) Whoever, while 
driving any vehicle under the influence of either intoxicating liquor or a 
controlled substance, or a combination of both, to a degree which renders him 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another person shall 
be guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle, and upon conviction thereof, shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) 
years."

The statute does 
not indicate that the intoxication must be voluntary. We have previously noted 
that the purpose of such a statute is to reduce the carnage on the highways by 
the drunk driver. Small v. State, 
Wyo., 689 P.2d 420, 426, cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1215, 84 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1984). The statute would best achieve its purpose by deterring everyone who 
is intoxicated from driving their vehicles. Whether a driver became intoxicated 
voluntarily or involuntarily, he presents a great danger to others. Therefore, 
we believe that the legislature intended to deter all intoxicated persons from 
driving their vehicles, regardless of how that condition came 
about.

[¶20.]  Other jurisdictions have also reached the 
conclusion that the act with which the legislatures are concerned is the driving 
of the vehicle while intoxicated. In reaching our decision in Armijo v. State, we found that People v. Rostad, Colo., 
669 P.2d 126 (1983), was particularly helpful. In that case, the Colorado 
Supreme Court, in holding that their vehicular homicide statute required general 
intent, stated that the prosecution must prove voluntary conduct in the 
operation or driving of a motor vehicle. That court did not conclude that the 
prosecution must also prove voluntary intoxication. The Colorado court had 
earlier held, in a prosecution for driving while under the influence, that it 
was "not necessary to prove the process, often a secret one, by which he [the 
defendant] got intoxicated." Bauer v. People, 103 Colo. 449, 86 P.2d 1088 
(1939). That court followed their holding in Bauer v. People when a defendant was 
prosecuted for causing the death of another while driving under the influence. 
McRae v. People, 131 Colo. 492, 286 P.2d 618 
(1955).

[¶21.]  We agree that the process of becoming 
intoxicated is not something which the State must prove under § 31-5-1117(a). 
That section is intended to proscribe the driving of a vehicle when intoxicated, 
it is not aimed at preventing intoxication.

[¶22.]  Our conclusion is well stated by the 
following:

"If one should become 
intoxicated as a result of an innocent mistake, force or fraud, but after 
becoming drunk was still sufficiently in possession of his faculties to know 
what he was doing, and to understand the character of his acts and with such 
knowledge * * * should voluntarily * * * drive a motor vehicle on a public 
highway, the involuntariness of the intoxication would not excuse him because 
the prohibited act itself was done voluntarily." Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law 
(3rd ed. 1982), p. 999.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶23.]  Appellant argues that the State must 
prove that he operated his vehicle voluntarily. He contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish voluntary operation. Appellant also contends 
that there was no evidence at all of the causal connection between his actions 
and the death of another. We find that there was sufficient evidence on both 
issues.

"`"The oft-repeated rule 
by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is 
that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out 
of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, 
and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way - it is not 
whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but 
rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State. * * *"' Harries v. State, Wyo., 650 P.2d 273, 274 
(1982)." Cutbirth v. State, 
Wyo., 663 P.2d 888, 889 (1983).

[¶24.]  For general-intent crimes it must be 
found that the prohibited act was done voluntarily. Slaughter v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 481 
(1981). But it is unnecessary to prove intent by direct, positive and 
independent evidence. Bryant v. 
State, 7 Wyo. 311, 51 P. 879 (1898). Intent may be 
inferred from the conduct of a defendant and from circumstantial evidence upon 
which reasonable inferences may be based. Stuebgen v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870 
(1976).

[¶25.]  Here appellant stipulated that he was 
driving the vehicle. At the accident scene, he repeatedly asked an eyewitness 
not to tell anyone that he was driving the vehicle. The patrolman who 
investigated testified that the brakes were in good working condition. This 
evidence, along with the inferences that the trial judge could have drawn 
therefrom, is sufficient to establish that appellant was voluntarily driving his 
vehicle.

[¶26.]  Appellant also contends that there was no 
evidence of a causal connection between his actions and the death of another. 
Appellant admits that he drove his vehicle when his blood alcohol level was 
0.19%. Section 31-5-233(b)(iii), W.S. 1977, states that if there is more than 
0.10% alcohol in the blood, then there is a presumption that the person is 
incapable of driving safely. The evidence showed that the appellant was 
traveling approximately 70 miles per hour, that he ran a stop sign, and that he 
crashed into a vehicle which had the right of way. The evidence also showed that 
appellant's brakes were working. Appellant stipulated that he was driving and 
that two people were killed as a result of injuries from the 
accident.

[¶27.]  We stated in Hodgins v. State that there must be a 
causal connection between the doing of the prohibited act and the death of 
another. Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
with all of the inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the State clearly met 
its burden of establishing that the death of another was caused by appellant 
driving his vehicle while so intoxicated that he could not safely do 
so.

[¶28.]  Because the statute is not 
constitutionally infirm, and because the State presented evidence, together with 
the stipulation, from which the trier of fact could find each element of the 
crime of aggravated vehicular homicide, including an intentional operation of 
the vehicle, appellant's conviction must be upheld.

[¶29.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 31-5-1117(a), 
W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum. Supp., provided:

"(a) Whoever, while 
driving any vehicle under the influence of either intoxicating liquor or a 
controlled substance, or a combination of both, to a degree which renders him 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another person shall 
be guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle, and upon conviction thereof, shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) 
years."

2 Section 31-5-1117(b), 
W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum. Supp., provided:

"Whoever, except when the 
violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, unlawfully 
and unintentionally, but with a conscious disregard of the safety of others, 
causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any state 
law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
regulation of traffic, except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section, is guilty of homicide by vehicle when 
the violation is the proximate cause of death and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in 
the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both."