Case Title: WYOMING COMMUNITY COLLEGE COMMISSION v. CASPER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
WYOMING COMMUNITY COLLEGE COMMISSION v. CASPER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT2001 WY 8631 P.3d 1242Case Number: 99-292, 99-293Decided: 09/18/2001

April Term, A.D. 2001

THE 
WYOMING COMMUNITY COLLEGE                        

COMMISSION; 
CYNTHIA LUMMIS,

WYOMING 
STATE TREASURER, IN HER

OFFICIAL 
CAPACITY; and MAX MAXFIELD,

WYOMING 
STATE AUDITOR, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY,

Appellants(Defendants),

v.

CASPER 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,

STATE 
OF WYOMING; LARAMIE COUNTY

COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE DISTRICT, STATE

OF 
WYOMING; NORTHERN WYOMING

COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE DISTRICT, STATE

OF 
WYOMING; NORTHWEST COMMUNITY

COLLEGE 
DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING;

and 
WESTERN WYOMING COMMUNITY

COLLEGE 
DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

FREMONT 
COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE    

DISTRICT, 
STATE OF WYOMING; and

DISTRICT, 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellants(Intervenors),

v.

            
                                                                                    

CASPER 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,

STATE 
OF WYOMING; LARAMIE COUNTY

COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE DISTRICT, STATE

OF 
WYOMING; NORTHERN WYOMING

COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE DISTRICT, STATE

OF 
WYOMING; NORTHWEST COMMUNITY

COLLEGE 
DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING;

and 
WESTERN WYOMING COMMUNITY

COLLEGE 
DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County:

The Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

Representing Appellants:

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General, and Rowena L. Heckert, 
Deputy Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Heckert.

Representing Appellants (Intervenors):

John M. Walker of Hickey, Mackey, Evans & Walker, 
Cheyenne, WY, and Wesley A. Roberts of Roberts & Watkins, Riverton, WY. 
 Argument by 
Messrs. Walker and Roberts.

 Representing Appellees:

Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, 
Powell, WY; Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, West, Rossetti, Piaia & Tyler, Rock 
Springs; Wallace L. Stock of Bailey & Stock, Cheyenne, WY; Houston Williams 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, WY; and Hayden F. Heaphy, Jr. of 
Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, WY.  Argu­ment by Messrs. Copenhaver and 
Bussart.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS,* MACY,** and GOLDEN, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J., Ret.

Lehman, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.  Spangler, D.J., Ret., filed a dissenting opinion.

*Concurred prior to retirement.

**Retired June 2, 2000.

  

LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellants, Wyoming Community College Commission et al. 
(Commission) and Inter­venor Community Colleges seek reversal of the 
district court's grant of declaratory judgment in favor of appellee Community 
Colleges.  The 
district court ruled the defendant Commission had violated its governing 
statutes and its own rules by distributing funds appropriated for salary 
increases outside of the general distribution formula established pursu­ant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) (Lexis 1999). The district court then 
granted summary judgment to the appellee Community Colleges and ordered the 
Commission to dis­tribute the funds through the formula.  We conclude the 
district court erred in its interpreta­tion of the applicable statutes and 
reverse and remand with instructions to enter an order consistent with this 
opinion. 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant Commission 
presents the following issues for review:

I.  Does the Court have subject matter 
jurisdiction when a de­claratory judgment action has been used as a 
substitute for a petition for review of a final agency action?

II.  In administering the state support for the 
community college system, may the Wyoming Community College Commission 
distribute money appropriated to raise salaries to a specific level in the 
manner which best effectuates the legislative intent for making the 
appropriation?

III.  Is a reasonable harmonization by the 
Commission of the statutes it implements entitled to judicial deference?

IV.  Was the Commission required to promulgate the 
funding formula as a rule, and can a statement of Commission policy be­come 
a rule without having been promulgated in substantial compliance with the 
W.A.P.A.?

V.  Is the Commission practice of effectuating 
the intent of the Legislature appropriate and lawful?

Appellee Community Colleges state the issues thus:

A.  The trial court and this court have subject 
matter jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action.

B.  The trial court properly interpreted Wyoming 
statutes and properly ruled that the Wyoming Community College Commis­sion 
violated those statutes.

C.  The Wyoming Community College Commission 
violated its own rules.

D.  The Wyoming Community College Commission 
violated its own policy and procedures.

Appellant-Intervenor Community Colleges presents this 
additional issue:

I.  Did the trial court commit error when it 
failed to take into consideration the Wyoming Legislature's acquiescence in the 
final decision of the WCCC?

FACTS

[¶3]      
The Wyoming Community College Commission is an agency charged with, among 
other duties, the operation and maintenance of the state's community college 
system as well as the administration and distribution of state support 
authorized by the legislature for Wyoming's seven community college districts.1   In 1996, in recognition of the effect of 
wage levels on the retention of quality staff within the community college 
system, the Com­mission and community colleges cooperatively adopted a 
"salary comparator policy."  This policy expressed the Commission's goal 
that faculty, non-teaching professional, and admin­istrator salaries reach 
100% of the mean salary for each category of 
employee as reported in the Mountain States' Association of Community Colleges 
(MSACC) annual salary survey.  Stated more simply, the goal was to match the 
region's average salary for each category of employee.  The policy also 
outlined the goal that support staff salaries reach 100% of local, in-state, 
market salary surveys for comparable positions.  The MSACC salary survey's mean and local, 
in-state, market surveys were the two "comparator groups" to which Wyoming 
salaries of each category were to be compared. 

[¶4]      In 1997, the 
Commission determined that as part of its 1999-2000 biennium standard budget 
request to the legislature it would ask for funding to allow the colleges to 
achieve the state policy salary goal of reaching 90% of comparator group 
levels.  The 
Commission later determined that as part of its 1999-2000 biennium exception 
budget request it would ask for additional funds to allow the colleges to 
achieve the Commission's own salary goal of reaching 100% (the mean) of 
comparator group levels.  To that end, the Commission re­quested 
that each of the state's seven community colleges calculate and report the 
funding it would need to achieve both the 90% and 100% target salary levels as 
compared to the appli­cable comparator groups.  The Commission 
neither specified a uniform method to be utilized by the community colleges in 
calculating their salary and benefits needs nor analyzed the colleges' 
submissions to determine whether comparable methods were used.  The figures 
submitted by each community college for the biennium are outlined below as Table 
1:

College

90% funding level request

100% funding level request 

Casper College

$69,909

$776,394

Central Wyoming College

$673, 490

$1,696,942

Eastern Wyoming College

$403,722

$1,104,390

Laramie Cty. Comm. College

$0

$1,055,238

Northwest College

$150,458

$1,494,074

Northern Wy. Comm. College

$87, 597

$1,083,072

Western Wy. Comm. College

$0

$590,602

Totals

$ 1,385,176

$7,800,712

[¶5]      
The 90% level total of $1,385,176 was incorporated into the Commission's 
standard budget request, presented with specific reference to the legislature's 
Joint Appropriations Committee, and ultimately included in the legislature's 
appropriation to the Commission.  However, the $1,385,176 for salary 
enhancement was not separately earmarked but was rather included in the general 
fund state aid appropriation of $88,567,228.  See 1998 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 30, § 057.   

[¶6]      
Before distributing the appropriated funds to the colleges, the 
Commission examined four distribution options. Option (1) proposed distribution 
of all funds through the Commis­sion's general distribution formula.  The distribution 
formula, established pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) is a 
detailed model developed by the Commission, with input from the community 
colleges, that distributes funds to the colleges based upon various 
fac­tors, chief among them, full time equivalency enrollment and square 
footage.  
Option (2) proposed distribution of the block grant through the general 
formula excepting the $1,385,176 for salary enhancement, which would instead be 
distributed to each college ac­cording to the sum previously submitted to 
the Commission as the college's salary need.2  Option (3) proposed 
distribution of the block grant through the general formula excepting the salary 
enhancement funds and equipment replacement funds. Option (4) proposed 
distribu­tion of all funding through the general formula with a caveat to 
colleges that they use the funds available to bring salaries to 90% of market 
comparator for all employee classifica­tions.  Table 2 below outlines the amounts each 
college would receive under options (1) and (2):

College

Total by Straight 
      Formula

Option (1)

Block Grant by Formula

Salary by Need

Option (2)

Difference

Casper

$31,517,585

$31,277,006

- $240,579

Central Wyo.

$12,941,777

$13, 487,774

+ $545,997

Eastern Wyo.

$10,295,216

$10,597,517

+ $302,301

LCCC

$26,980,742

$26,714,948

- $265,794

Northwest

$19,008,832

$18,972,029

- $   36,803

Northern Wyo.

$18,946,999

$18,847,944

- $   99,055

Western Wyo.

$20,917,854

$20,711,787

- $206,067

[¶7]      
Not surprisingly, Central and Eastern Community Colleges 
(Appellant-Intervenors) favored Option (2) while the five remaining colleges 
(appellees) favored Option (1).  The Administrative Services Council, 
comprised of the seven business managers for the community colleges, citing the 
stability and reliability it provides, unanimously voted to recommend that all 
funding be distributed through the formula [Option (1)].  On April 3, 1998, 
after lengthy discussion of the subject, the Commission voted 4-2 to distribute 
$1,385,176 of the state aid appropriation outside the formula as proposed by 
Option (2).  
Subsequently, a legislative member of the Joint Appropriations Committee 
asked the Commission to provide the meth­odologies used by each community 
college in calculating its original salary needs projections which were later 
included in the Commission's budget request.   It was only then discovered that each 
college had used a different method in calculating its salary projections, thus 
con­tributing to the disparate results in requested funds. 

[¶8]      
For example, Laramie County Community College averaged its faculty 
salaries, determined that its average was greater than 90% of the MSACC survey 
mean (the com­parator group), and thus concluded that it needed $0 to 
achieve the 90% salary level goal.  Likewise, Casper College calculated its 
faculty need in the same manner and requested $0 for faculty salary increases. 
The college later explained in its response to the legislator that 52% of its 
faculty were paid less than the 90% level of the comparator group, a statistic 
its method failed to accurately reflect. 

[¶9]      
In contrast, Eastern Wyoming College did not average its faculty 
salaries; rather it compared each individual salary to the MSACC mean and 
requested funding to bring all salaries up to the 90% level.  Central Wyoming 
College included part-time benefited employees in its calculations and split 
employees into two groups: those with four years or more in their positions and 
those with three years or less in their positions.  These 
high­lighted differences among colleges in calculating faculty salary were 
reflected throughout all four employee categories and were more pronounced in 
calculating salaries for positions not included in the MSACC annual salary 
survey.   

[¶10]   On June 25, 
1998, the appellee community colleges (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for 
declaratory relief in district court against the Wyoming Community College 
Commission, the State Treasurer and State Auditor (hereinafter state 
defendants).  
The plaintiffs alleged that distributing the salary enhancement funds 
other than through the distribution formula was in contravention of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) (Lexis 1999).  On July 15, 1998, the district court granted 
Eastern and Central Wyoming Colleges' motion to intervene.  On August 11, 1998, 
the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction was granted enjoining the 
state defendants from distributing the funds at issue.  In July 1998, the 
state defendants and intervenors filed motions to dismiss alleging the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim as it was not a proper 
declaratory judgment action.  The district court denied the motions to 
dismiss on December 2, 1998.  On July 6, 1999, a hearing was held on all 
parties' motions and cross-motions for summary judgment.  The district 
court's order of August 16, 1999, granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment finding that the Commission's distribution of the salary enhancement 
funds violated the mandate contained within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-18-202(a)(xiv).  
The court further ordered that the remaining balance of the disputed 
funds should be distributed in accordance with the distribution formula in place 
in April of 1998.  
The state defendants moved for a continuance of the preliminary 
injunction which was granted on August 16, 1999.  This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11]   When this 
court reviews a grant of summary judgment entered in response to a peti­tion 
for declaratory judgment, we invoke our usual standard for review of summary 
judg­ments.  
Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 892 (Wyo. 
2000); Board of County Comm'rs v. Geringer, 941 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo. 
1997); Kunard v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 869 P.2d 132, 134 (Wyo. 
1994).  The 
summary judgment can be sustained only when no genuine issues of material fact 
are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 
56(c); Fontaine, 4 P.3d  at 892; Kirby v. NMC/Continue Care, 993 P.2d 951, 952 (Wyo. 
1999); Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, Ltd., 990 P.2d 491, 494 (Wyo. 
1999); Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 
1999).  In this 
instance, there is no contention that any genuine issue of material fact exists, 
and our concern is strictly with the application of the law.  An issue of 
statutory interpretation presents a question of law.  Fontaine, P.3d at 894; Butts v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996); Parker Land & Cattle Co. 
v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993).  We accord no deference to the district court 
on issues of law and may affirm the summary judgment on any legal grounds 
appearing in the record.  Hirschfield v. Board 
of County Comm'rs, 944 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Wyo. 1997).  

Availability of Declaratory 
Judgment

[¶12]   Appellant 
Commission first contends that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
because appellee colleges' claim is not properly brought under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act but is more accurately characterized as an untimely 
petition for review of final agency action.  We have reiterated on many occasions that 
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.  Hirschfield v. Board 
of County Comm'rs, 944 P.2d  at 1141 (citing Cotton 
v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo. 
1995) and Brunsvold v. State, 864 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1993)).  "The 
first and fundamental question on every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this 
question cannot be waived; it is open for consideration by the reviewing court 
whenever it is raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of its own 
motion."  Hirschfield, 944 P.2d  at 1141 (quoting Gookin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 
1992)).  This 
court can have no greater jurisdiction of the subject matter than the 
dis­trict court.  
Where the district court is without jurisdiction in an administrative 
appeal from an agency, this court must dismiss the appeal.  Sheridan Retirement Partners v. City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 556 (Wyo. 
1997) (citing Scanlon v. Schrinar, 759 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 
1988)). 

[¶13]   Wyoming's 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act3 states that it is remedial and should be 
liberally construed and administered.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-114 (LexisNexis 
2001).  "We do 
not interpret it in a narrow or technical sense, and there remains the 
prerequisite that the party seeking declaratory relief present the court with an 
actual controversy."  
Hirschfield, 944 P.2d  at 1142 (citing Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wyo. 
1982)).  This 
court determined in Rocky Mountain Oil, at 1168:

Ordinarily, a declaratory judgment action is not a 
substitute for an appeal [from administrative decisions.] . . . If, however, 
such desired relief concerns the validity and construction of agency 
regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or interpreta­tion of a 
statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be, based, it should 
be entertained.

The court's conclusion in Rocky Mountain Oil was based in multiple sources:  the plain 
lan­guage of the act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-102 and -114); W.R.C.P. 57, 
which provides in pertinent part, "[t]he existence of another adequate remedy 
does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is 
appropriate;" as well as W.R.A.P. 12.12, which pro­vides: 

The 
relief, review, or redress available in suits for injunction against agency 
action or enforcement, in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory 
judgment based on agency action or inaction, 
in actions seeking any common law writ to compel, review or restrain agency 
action shall be available by 
independent action notwithstanding any petition for review. 

(Emphasis added.)  The Rocky Mountain Oil court ultimately held:  "Inasmuch as a 
declara­tory judgment act is available to appellees as an independent 
action, separate and apart from a petition for review, the time in which a 
petition for review must be filed is immaterial."  Id. at 1169.

[¶14]   Following our 
decision in Rocky Mountain Oil, as directed by the 
statute, we have continued to liberally construe the availability of an action 
for declaratory judgment to con­sider issues arising from agencies' 
interpretations of statutes.  See Campbell County 
Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275 (Wyo. 2000); Hirschfield v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 944 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1997); 
Board of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 737 P.2d 350 (Wyo.) modified on other grounds, 745 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1987); 
State v. Kraus, 706 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶15]   In the instant 
case, the district court in accepting jurisdiction concluded that: 

Defendants have argued that the basis for WCCC's funding 
decision lies in Wyoming Statutes. Specifically, Defendant WCCC has directed the 
Court's attention to Wyoming Statute § 21-18-202(a)(vii) and (xiv) and § 
21-18-205(c)(i).  
Plaintiffs contend that the interpretation of Wyoming Statutes § 
21-18-202(a)(vii) requires the distribution of all funds through the funding 
formula. . . . The interpretation of these statutes is an issue appropriate for 
this Court, and appropriate for a declara­tory judgment.

We agree.  Resolution of the 
case before us necessarily requires more than incidental statu­tory 
interpretation and construction; therefore, an independent action for 
declaratory judg­ment was available to the plaintiffs below.  Consequently, any 
failure to file a timely petition for review under W.A.P.A. is immaterial and 
neither deprived the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction nor this court 
of appellate jurisdiction.

Statutes Governing Distribution 
of State Aid to Community Colleges

[¶16]   We turn, 
therefore, to the statutes that are the focus of dispute.  We review a 
district court's statutory interpretation on a de 
novo basis. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 
6 P.3d 1275, 1285 (Wyo. 2000); Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 440 (Wyo. 
1998).  In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  
Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 
2000); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 
1983).  
Legislative intent must be ascertained initially and primarily from the 
words used in the statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. 
v. State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 
1991).  When 
the words are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution 
of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the legisla­ture if 
any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the 
language invoked by the legislature.  Allied-Signal, 
813 P.2d  at 219.  
Moreover, "[a]ll statutes must be construed in 
pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes 
relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be 
considered and construed in harmony."  Fontaine, 4 P.3d  
at 894 (citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. 
Holtz, 674 P.2d at 735).  

[¶17]   Therefore, in 
performing our review, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  Olheiser v. State ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Parker Land & 
Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 
(Wyo. 1993)).  
A statute is clear and unam­biguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and 
predictability.  
Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043.  Conversely, a 
statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations.  Id.  We have said that 
divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence 
of ambiguity.  
Basin Electric Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of 
Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 
1978).  
However, the fact that opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is 
not conclusive of ambiguity.  Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is 
a matter of law to be determined by the court.  Allied-Signal, 
813 P.2d  at 219.  

[¶18]   If we 
determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent.  Petroleum Inc. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Parker Land & 
Cattle Co., 845 P.2d at 1044).  

[I]n 
ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute . . . the court . . . 
must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the 
law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would 
enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmak­ing 
body. 

Parker Land & Cattle Co. at 1044 
(quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 
279, 131 P.2d 297, 299 
(1942)).  In 
addition, if a statute is ambiguous, we will give some defer­ence to an 
interpretation by the agency charged with execution of the stat­ute unless 
its inter­pretation is clearly erroneous.  Parker Land & 
Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1045; Mowry v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Retirement Bd., 866 P.2d 729, 731 (Wyo. 1993).  However, we are not bound by an agency's 
interpretation; the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a 
ques­tion for the court.  Parker Land & 
Cattle Co., at 1045.

[¶19]   The district 
court determined that the Commission's action in distributing $1,385,176 of 
state aid other than through the distribution formula was a violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) (Lexis 1999) which it found mandates that 
all appropriated state assis­tance to community colleges be distributed 
through the Commission's distribution formula established pursuant to the 
section.  The 
subsection on which the district court relied is found under the title "Power and duties of the commission" and provides:

(a)       The commission 
shall:

. . 
.

(xiv)  On or before January 2, 1991, establish a 
formula for distribution of state assistance to community colleges which is 
approved by a majority of commission members and which provides that no 
institution solely as a conse­quence of its implementation, shall have its 
total budget reduced by more than two percent (2%) in any fiscal year from the 
preceding approved total budget[.]

[¶20]   In response, 
the Commission and appellant community colleges contend that the 
Com­mission's action in distributing the $1,385,176 in salary enhancement 
funds outside the distribution formula is authorized by statutes that grant it 
discretion in the distribution of funds appropriated by the legislature.  Moreover, they 
justify any departure from the formula as a good faith attempt to effectuate the 
legislative objective which formed the basis for the appropriation: that staff 
salaries at each community college reach 90% of the comparator groups.  In particular, 
appellants point to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(vii), similarly found under 
the title, "Powers and duties of the 
commission."  
This subsection provides:

(a)       The commission 
shall:

. . 
.

(vii)  Administer the program of state support 
for the community college system including distribution of amounts authorized by 
the legislature.  
Budgets filed with the commission under W.S. 16-4-111 shall be open for 
public review.

[¶21]   Appellants 
further rely upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-205 (Lexis 1999) entitled, "Appropriation and distribution of state funds; 
restrictions; budget authority."  The statute in pertinent part provides:

(c)        State 
funding for the assistance of community colleges shall be appropriated to the 
community college commission unless otherwise specified by law.  Funds appropriated 
for each biennium shall be distributed as follows:

(i)  Distribution shall be made by the commission 
to the community colleges at times and in amounts to be determined by the 
commission based upon the amount determined to be necessary to maintain services 
for the particular college[.]

[¶22]   This court's 
responsibility in interpreting the above statutes is to follow the rule that 
statutes in pari materia should be compared and 
harmonized, if possible, and, "if not suscep­tible of a construction which 
will make all of their provisions harmonize, they are made to operate together 
so far as possible consistently with the evident intent of the latest 
enact­ment."   Huber v. 
Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Wyo. 1933) (quoting Burton v. Union 
Pacific Coal Co., 18 Wyo. 362, 107 P. 391, 397 (Wyo. 1910)).  

[¶23]   First, we find 
that the three statutory subsections are in pari materia 
because all con­cern the distribution of state assistance to the 
community colleges by the Commission.    Clearly, the plain language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-18-202(a)(vii) and 21-18-205(c)(i) grant broad discretion 
to the Commission to distribute appropriated funds at times and in amounts to be determined by the commission based upon the amount 
determined to be necessary to maintain services for the particular 
college.  These sections were enacted as part of 
"the Wyoming Community College Code of 1985," a comprehensive amendment 
responsible for creating the modern-day community college system.  1985 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 208, § 1.  
Were these the only applicable sections, we might agree with the 
Commission that so long as its actions in distributing state assistance to 
community colleges were not an abuse of discretion they would almost certainly 
be upheld.  
However, four years later, in 1989, the legislature enacted Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv). 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 2.  The plain language 
of this section states that the Commission shall "on or before January 2, 1991, establish a 
formula for distribution of state assistance to community colleges which is 
approved by a majority of commission members . . . ."  This court stated 
nearly 72 years ago:  
"It is a familiar and elementary rule of statutory construction that if 
it is not possible to reconcile inconsistent statutes, the dates of their 
enactment will be consulted in determining the legislative meaning and effect 
given to the later one."  Marsh v. Aljoe, 
41 Wyo. 119, 282 P. 1055, 1057 (Wyo. 
1929).  "[I]f 
the conflict cannot be reconciled so that the provisions can stand together, 
then the later provision will prevail over the prior one, and the prior law is 
considered amended by implication only to the extent of the conflict."  Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 568 P.2d 908, 913 (Wyo. 
1977). 

[¶24]   Reading the 
applicable statutes in pari materia, we conclude 
that the Commission's discretion in distributing state assistance to Community 
Colleges is abrogated solely to the extent that the Commission must establish a 
formula for the distribution of state assistance that is approved by a majority 
of the Commission which ensures that no institution's budget is reduced by more 
than 2% of the preceding fiscal year's total budget.4  

[¶25]   Since the 
formula's implementation, this has consistently been the reading given to the 
statute by the Commission and the community colleges.  The Commission 
generally allo­cates funds through its detailed formula pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) and distributes them at times and in amounts it 
determines pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-205(c)(i).  However, in 1998 
the Commission faced a decision that is the true crux of this case.  The Commission, 
with the cooperation of the community colleges, had approached the governor and 
the legislature with a specific budget request for a salary enhancement 
appro­priation of $1,385,176 which would ensure that each college could 
reach the agreed-upon salary goal.  The legislature's Joint Appropriation 
Committee, after much discussion, appro­priated exactly that amount for 
salary enhancement funding.  Unfortunately, in the final appropriation the 
funds were not separated or earmarked in any way but were rather included within 
the Commission's general appropriation.  The Commission was then left with a 
diffi­cult choice: distribute funds according to each college's requested 
need in order to effectuate the legislative salary enhancement objective, or 
distribute funds through the formula and most likely thwart the very purpose for 
which the funds were granted.  The Commission ultimately determined that 
utilization of the distribution formula was inadequate to effectuate the 
legislative purpose behind the appropriation of the salary enhancement funds of 
$1,385,176.  It 
then used the discretion granted to it as the agency charged with 
administer­ing state support to community colleges to distribute the special 
purpose funds outside of the distribution formula.5  

[¶26]   Reading the 
statutes in pari materia under the specific facts of 
this case, where ample evidence exists in the record to support the undeniable 
conclusion that the legislature appro­priated funds for a specific purpose, 
we believe Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-18-202(a)(vii) and 21-18-205(c)(i) give the 
Commission the discretion to determine that its general distribution formula is 
inadequate to effectuate the precise legislative purpose behind the particular 
appropriation.  
Thus, the Commission could determine to distribute the $1,385,176 other 
than through the Commission's detailed general distribution formula and 
according to each col­lege's individualized need.  

[¶27]   However, we 
believe the legislative intent behind the requirement of a distribution formula, 
i.e. to ensure equitable distribution of state assistance among the seven 
community colleges, necessarily maintains its validity even when the Commission 
exercises its discre­tion to distribute funds other than through the general 
distribution formula.  
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
(1991) defines "formula" as "a prescribed or set form or method."  Id. at 485.  Indeed, the Commission itself recognized this 
responsibility when it stated in its budget narrative request for the biennium 
at issue that one of its objectives is "[t]o ensure the equitable distribution 
of, and accountability for, state aid dollars utilized in community college 
instructional and support programs."  To even greater effect, the plain language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(ix) mandates that "the Commission shall . . . 
insure uni­form accounting of full-time equivalency and financial data of the community colleges." 
(Emphasis added.)  
Consequently, the Commission violated Wyoming statute when it 
dis­tributed the funds according to budget requests that were not generated 
by a uniform meth­odology thus insuring a uniform accounting of the 
community colleges' salary enhancement data.  No two colleges calculated their need for 
salary enhancement in precisely the same manner.  Striking disparities in requested funds are 
found among those colleges that aver­aged their own salaries and compared 
those salaries to the comparator groups, and those colleges which did not 
average salaries.  
It would appear to this court to be a fundamental tenet of the concept of 
"equitable distribution" that while individual need may vary, the method used to 
calculate that need may not.  

CONCLUSION

[¶28]   We find that 
the district court erred in interpreting the governing statutes to require the 
Commission to distribute specially appropriated funds through its general 
distribution formula; however, we also find that the Commission's distribution 
of funds according to the community colleges' wildly varying budget request 
methods was a violation of Wyoming statute.  We reverse and remand to the district court 
to enter an order that the Wyoming Community College Commission establish a 
uniform accounting method or "formula" which is approved by a majority of 
Commission members to determine each college's need for the salary enhancement 
funds and to then distribute the remaining funds pro-rata according to the 
uniformly calculated salary requests.

  
            
SPANGLER, District Judge, Retired, 
dissenting.

 [¶29]   Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) requires the Community College Commission to distribute 
state assistance in accordance with a formula.  The statutes are unambiguous.  The amount in 
question here was not distributed in accordance with that formula.  There is no 
legislative direction to the contrary, though the legislature easily could have 
provided otherwise.  
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial judge that the funds 
must be distributed as required by the statute.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-18-202(a)(ii) & (vii) (Lexis 1999). 

2See Table 1 supra.

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-37-102 (LexisNexis 2001) provides:

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may 
declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief 
is or could be claimed. No proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.  The declaration may be either affirmative or 
negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the effect of a 
final judgment. 

4By its plain 
language, the statute does not require the Commission implement the formula 
through rulemaking.

5Following the 
onset of litigation in this case, the applicable statutes were amended. See 2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 33, § 1 & 2.  The amended 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-18-205(c) & (e), provides:

(c)  State funding for the assistance of 
community colleges shall be appropriated to the community college commission 
unless otherwise specified by law.  Subject to the provisions of this section, 
funds appropriated for each biennium shall be distributed by the commission to 
community colleges in amounts determined by a funding allocation model adopted 
by rule of the commission. The commission may maintain a contingency reserve 
account utilizing any revenue derived under W.S. 9-4-601(b)(iv)(A) to be 
distributed as a component of the funding allocation model for specific use by 
the colleges for emergency repairs and preventive maintenance.

. . .

(e)  The commission may request additional state 
funding to be designated as special purpose funding, accounted for and 
distributed separately from distributions under the funding allocation model. 
Funds appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed in amounts 
and at times determined by the commission.