Case Title: Mills v. Baldwin

Citation: 362 So. 2d 2

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1978-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
362 So. 2d 2 (1978)
Craig MILLS and H. Savely McQuagge, Trustees of the Presbytery of Florida, Frank L. Elvery, Richard L. Scoggins, C. Franklin Beall, Louise Eyster, Reeves Bowen and Fred McGehee, As and Constituting the Administrative Commission of the Presbytery of Florida of the Presbyterian Church in the United States; Henry Ragans and Oscar Beck, Jr., As and Constituting the Session of the Madison Presbyterian Church in Madison, Florida, Petitioners,
v.
John P. BALDWIN, Individually and Claiming to Be Moderator of the Session of the Madison Presbyterian Church in Madison, Florida, Bruce M. Bryan, Julian DuRant, Julian Gibson, Theodore Gibson, A.L. Hughes, and Kirby Reichmann, Individually and Claiming to Be Members of the Church Session of the Madison Presbyterian Church in Madison, Florida, Respondents.
No. 51588.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 20, 1978.
Rehearing Denied September 28, 1978.
C. Graham Carothers of Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor, Tallahassee, for petitioners.
F.E. Steinmeyer, III, of Folsom & Steinmeyer, Tallahassee, for respondents.
Raymer F. Maguire, Jr., of Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, for James E. Andrews, Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, amicus curiae.
Edward D. Foreman and James W. Martin of Brickley & Martin, St. Petersburg, for William P. Thompson, Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of The United Presbyterian Church in The United States of America, and for Robert L. Thompson, Executive Presbyter of The Presbytery of West Florida, Synod of The South, of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, amicus curiae.
*3 SUNDBERG, Justice.
This cause is a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 344 So. 2d 259, which is alleged to be in conflict with St. John's Presbytery v. Central Presbyterian Church, 102 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1958) and Froelich v. Rowley, 102 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1958). On petition for rehearing of our prior denial of writ of certiorari in this cause, we have concluded that this Court is possessed of jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution.
Essentially this case involves a dispute over the ownership of property of the Madison Presbyterian Church in Madison, Florida, or stated more accurately, a controversy as to who constitutes the Madison Presbyterian Church in Madison, Florida. The dispute is occasioned by the withdrawal of a majority of the congregation from the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS) and its claim of title to the church property as against the claim of the minority of the congregation who did not withdraw but remained faithful to the parent church. Applying "neutral principles of law" the majority of the district court concluded that there was no implied trust in favor of the mother church as was found to exist in Central Presbyterian Church, supra, and, accordingly, held the property of the church to be vested in the withdrawing members. The factual background of the controversy is stated in the district court opinion thus:
344 So. 2d  at 260-62 (footnotes omitted).
The majority below determined that the structure of the Presbyterian Church, being hierarchical as opposed to congregational, was immaterial to its resolution of the case because, through application of "neutral principles of law" to the facts, neither form of accepted implied trust (constructive or resulting) could be recognized. This conclusion of the district court was based primarily upon its finding that no funds were provided by either the Presbytery of Florida *5 or PCUS with which any of the property of the Madison Church was acquired. Consequently, the necessary ingredient for a constructive trust was absent. Likewise, there was no evidence at trial that any of the properties conveyed to the Madison Church "were intended to be conveyed for the benefit of any entity other than the congregation of the Madison Presbyterian Church" and therefore, no resulting trust could arise. Its position with respect to the absence of a resulting trust was bolstered by the fact that PCUS did not come into existence until some 21 years after the Madison Church was organized. St. John's Presbytery v. Central Presbyterian Church and Froelich v. Rowley, supra, were distinguished by the district court on the premise that the facts in those cases demonstrated the existence of elements necessary to support a constructive trust.
Most respectfully we must disagree with the analysis of the majority of the district court. This Court subscribes to the reasoning and conclusion of Judge Smith's dissent below, and it would be of little benefit to restate what was so ably put by him. However, since it bears upon the jurisdiction of this Court as well as the merits of the controversy, we deem it appropriate to elucidate why we believe Central Presbyterian Church and Froelich are controlling here.
The salient facts as found by the chancellor in Central Presbyterian Church were:
102 So. 2d  at 715.
Based upon his comparison of Chapter 27, paragraphs 9 and 10, Constitution of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America (PCUSA) with paragraph 163, Book of Church Order of the Presbyterian Church of the United States (PCUS), the chancellor concluded that while the government of PCUSA was hierarchical in nature, that of PCUS was congregational. In reversing the chancellor, this Court stated:
102 So. 2d  at 716.
After reviewing the substance of the documents creating title in the "Central Presbyterian Church of St. Petersburg" (a nonprofit corporation), including the original conveyance to the "Trustees of West Central Presbyterian Church and their successors in office," the Court applied the doctrine of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872), and held that the property *6 in question should not be diverted from the parent church by the withdrawing members. Consequently, the faithful minority were awarded the use of the property as the rightful representatives of the original church as it existed before the schism.
The district court opinion herein places great emphasis upon the fact that the affected church in Central Presbyterian Church had been organized and established by an existing Presbyterian church in St. Petersburg from which it received financial assistance and a gift of the disputed property. This, together with the language of the original conveyance of the disputed property, was persuasive to the court as distinguishing the case at bar from Central Presbyterian Church. The district court was bolstered in its conclusion by the reference of Justice Terrell in Central Presbyterian Church to Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846 (1927). However, we can draw no such inference from Justice Terrell's discussion of Reid v. Barry. He simply distinguished the latter case from Central Presbyterian Church on the premise that on the face of the deed in Reid there was no reference to a trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, whereas in Central Presbyterian Church the root deed ran to "Trustees of West Central Presbyterian Church of St. Petersburg and their successors in office." As stated by Justice Terrell:
102 So. 2d  at 719.
The conveyances here under consideration run to the "Trustees of the Presbyterian Church at Madison" and the "Trustees of the Madison Presbyterian Church of Madison." In the Reid case the conveyance was absolute on its face with no intimation of beneficial enjoyment in others except the reference to the grantee's office. As the Court pointed out in Reid:
112 So.  at 857.
Justice Terrell simply sought to distinguish Reid on the obvious basis that the deed therein contained no language to imply a trust, whereas the deed in Central Presbyterian Church connoted a trust relationship and the object thereof.
The basis for the decision in Central Presbyterian Church is indicated by two excerpts from the opinion. After citing numerous authorities in accord with Watson v. Jones, supra, the Central Presbyterian Church Court said:
102 So. 2d  at 718 (emphasis supplied).
That the real basis for the decision in Central Presbyterian Church was the principle of church structure, and not neutral principles of trust law, is borne out by the judgment therein:
102 So. 2d  at 719-20 (emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, Froelich v. Rowley, supra, decided the same day as Central Presbyterian Church, is even more instructive on this point. In Froelich, another church schism case, where neither the source of the property nor whether it was acquired before or after the congregation's affiliation with the parent church is indicated, Justice Terrell described the substantive issue and its resolution:
102 So. 2d  at 721.
In short, a careful reading of the cases makes clear that the issue in a case such as this is not who owns the property. The Madison Presbyterian Church of Madison, Florida, owns the property. The true issue is  who represents the Madison Presbyterian Church? The authorities from Watson v. Jones forward clearly respond that petitioners represent that church because of the structure and government of PCUS. As pointed out in Judge Smith's dissent, the fact that PCUS was formed by the secession of Presbyterian churches in the Confederacy a generation after organization of the Madison Church affects not at all the commitment of the Madison Presbyterian Church to PCUS in 1861 and continuously for generations thereafter.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, is quashed and the dissenting opinion is adopted as the opinion of this Court.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON and ALDERMEN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion, with which HATCHETT, J., concurs.
BOYD, Justice, dissenting.
I would discharge the writ of certiorari because I do not believe there is conflict. As the majority acknowledges, the court below decided the church property dispute based on trust law, while the alleged conflicting decisions, just as the majority's, find the disputes over church property to turn on which group constitutes the church. The questions, one legal, the other, at least partially ecclesiastical, are wholly dissimilar. Nor do I see a misapplication of St. John's Presbytery v. Central Presbyterian Church, 102 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1958) and Froelich v. Rowley, 102 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1958), since principles of trust law were applied in those two cases to factual situations that are, as detailed in the opinion now quashed, *8 dissimilar to the factual situation in this case.
Moreover, I am distressed, Central Presbyterian Church and Froelich notwithstanding, that the Court is so willing to step into a dispute over church property that it believes should be resolved under a "principle of church structure" rather than "neutral principles of ... law," opinion of the Court, before, at 7, when the decision of the court below can stand on the legal principles alone. While a civil[1] court may open its doors to a dispute over church property, the court has no role in settling the matter through a determination on the basis of whether one group departed from church doctrine. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969). To assume such a role involves the civil courts in an ecclesiastical question solely within the purview of the church contrary to the Freedom of Religion clauses in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.[2] The Court today treads dangerously close to the boundary of territory of religious freedom protected constitutionally from civil court interference. It may be that a determination of church structure is properly within a civil court when church property is at stake, especially in a case in which another forum, such as an ecclesiastical court, will be partial or is unavailable. But the Court in this case need not take the risk of impinging on religious freedom since the case is clearly litigable under trust law.
HATCHETT, J., concurs.
[1]  It should be noted that the trial judge in the instant case made the identical finding that PCUS is hierarchical and not congregational in structure.
[1]  To be distinguished from ecclesiastical and military courts rather than criminal courts.
[2]  Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... .