Case Title: State v. Philip M. Canon

Citation: 2001 WI 11

Docket Number: 1998AP003519-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Philip M. Canon,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 512, 602 N.W.2d 316 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 21, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Taylor 
 
JUDGE: 
Douglas T. Fox 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Alan D. Eisenberg and Law Offices of Alan D. Eisenberg, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alan D. Eisenberg. 
 
2001 WI 11 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3519-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Philip M. Canon,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The question presented in this 
case is whether the doctrine of issue preclusion bars the State 
from prosecuting a defendant under Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1)(a) 
(1997-98)1 for allegedly committing perjury at a criminal trial 
where the defendant was tried and acquitted on a single issue, 
but where the State claims to have discovered new evidence 
suggesting that the defendant falsely testified regarding that 
issue.  We conclude that it does not. 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
FEB 21, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The State charged the defendant, Philip M. Canon 
(Canon), with perjury under Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1)(a) for lying 
at his criminal traffic trial on the issue of whether he was 
driving his pickup truck immediately prior to being arrested for 
drunk driving.  Canon moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
grounds of "collateral estoppel," or issue preclusion, and the 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Taylor 
County, 
Judge 
Douglas 
T. 
Fox, 
presiding, granted Canon's motion.2  The court of appeals, in a 
split decision, affirmed the order of the circuit court.  
I 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed for the purposes of this 
review.  The State charged Canon with intentionally making a 
false statement under oath at his criminal traffic trial for 
operating a vehicle while intoxicated.  That criminal traffic 
trial in March of 1998 arose from an incident on July 4, 1996, 
when Canon and his companion, Cary S. Pergande, were travelling 
through Taylor County in Canon's pickup truck and they stopped 
to urinate alongside the road.  A Taylor County police officer 
approached the two men to inquire whether they were having 
difficulty with Canon's truck.  After talking with them, the 
officer concluded that Canon had been drinking and driving.  As 
a result, the State charged Canon with operating a vehicle while 
intoxicated, operating after revocation, and driving with a 
                     
2 In Wisconsin, the term "collateral estoppel" has been 
replaced 
by 
the 
less 
confusing 
term 
"issue 
preclusion."  
Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 
N.W.2d 723 (1995). 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
3 
prohibited blood alcohol level.3  At the subsequent criminal 
traffic trial, the sole issue was whether Canon had been the 
driver of the truck.  Canon testified that he had not been 
driving his pickup truck, implicating Pergande instead.  The 
jury acquitted Canon of all charges.   
¶4 
One month after the trial, a man named Antonio Que 
Sada sent a letter to the Taylor County authorities alleging 
that Canon had "boast[ed] about their recent trip up north" and 
that Canon told him that he, not Pergande, had been driving his 
truck at the time.  The State then filed the present complaint 
charging Canon with perjury.  Canon countered with a motion to 
dismiss, contending that the charge was barred by issue 
preclusion.  The circuit court reasoned that because the sole 
contested issue at the criminal traffic trial was whether Canon 
had been driving and the acquittal by the jury established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Canon had not been driving, the 
State was barred by Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), from 
charging Canon with lying about whether he had been driving his 
truck.  The circuit court acknowledged that in Ashe, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of issue preclusion 
as one of the protections in the Double Jeopardy Clause, which 
prevents the State from trying a defendant twice for the same 
offense.  Id. at 443.  Therefore, the circuit court granted 
Canon's motion to dismiss the criminal complaint on the grounds 
                     
3 This was Canon’s sixth charge for operating a vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
and 
third 
charge 
for 
operating 
after 
revocation. 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
4 
of issue preclusion.  The State appealed the circuit court's 
dismissal. 
¶5 
In a published opinion, the court of appeals concluded 
that because who was driving on July 4, 1996, had "necessarily 
and actually been determined in a previous litigation," the 
doctrine of issue preclusion applied; to allow the State to 
proceed would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the federal 
and Wisconsin constitutions.  State v. Canon, 230 Wis. 2d 512, 
522, 602 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1999).  The State's argument that 
a fraudulently obtained judgment "does not carry its full 
preclusive weight" was rejected by the court of appeals as 
incongruous with Ashe.  Id. at 520.  Consequently, the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's order dismissing the 
State's complaint.  Id. at 523. 
¶6 
This court subsequently granted the State's petition 
for review.  
II 
¶7 
The application of issue preclusion to a set of facts 
is a question of law, which this court reviews without deference 
to the lower courts.  Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 515 
N.W.2d 458 (1994).  This case involves competing policies, which 
must be balanced in order to preserve the central principle that 
undergirds the Double Jeopardy Clause on one hand and the 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
5 
integrity of our judicial system on the other hand.4  Therefore, 
before applying the law to the facts in the present case, it is 
appropriate to examine these competing policies. 
¶8 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,5 
provides that no "person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.6  
This clause prevents a prosecutor from harassing a criminal 
defendant with multiple prosecutions.  The United States Supreme 
Court recognized this central principle when it wrote that:  
 
The 
underlying 
idea 
[of 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
prohibition], one that is deeply ingrained in at least 
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that 
                     
4 For a thorough analysis of issues raised by these 
competing 
policies, 
see 
James 
A. 
Shellenberger, 
Perjury 
Prosecutions After Acquittals:  The Evils of False Testimony 
Balanced Against the Sanctity of Determinations of Innocence, 71 
Marq. L. Rev. 703 (1988). 
The legislature has expressed the importance of guarding 
the integrity of our judicial system through several criminal 
law provisions.  See Wis. Stat. § 946.61 (Bribery of witnesses); 
Wis. Stat. § 946.64 (Communicating with jurors); Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.65 (Obstructing justice); Wis. Stat. § 940.201 (Battery or 
threat to witnesses); Wis. Stat. § 940.203 (Battery or threat to 
judge).  Such laws bolster the principles of honesty and fair 
play in our judicial system. 
5 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
6 See George C. Thomas III, Double Jeopardy:  The History, 
The Law (New York University Press 1998) (tracing the history of 
double jeopardy and noting the difficulty the United States 
Supreme Court has had in fashioning a clear interpretation of 
the seemingly unambiguous language of the clause). 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
6 
the State with all its resources and power should not 
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
him 
to 
embarrassment, 
expense 
and 
ordeal 
and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).  Based on 
the 
above 
principle, 
this 
court 
has 
recognized 
three 
constitutional protections provided by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause:  (1) protection against a subsequent prosecution for the 
same 
offense 
after 
acquittal; 
(2) 
protection 
against 
a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction; 
and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same 
offense.  State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 341, 579 N.W.2d 35 
(1998).  Consequently, each double jeopardy claim necessitates a 
fact-specific analysis to determine if any of these protections 
are implicated. 
¶9 
On the other hand, the crime of perjury erodes the 
integrity of our judicial system.7  As the United States Supreme 
Court declared in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 
(1976), "[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront 
                     
7 See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81-May A.B.A. 
J. 68, 69-71 (1995) (noting that "[j]udges, lawyers and experts 
on the court system worry that perjury is being committed with 
greater frequency and impunity than ever before"); Comment, 
Perjury:  The Forgotten Offense, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
361 (1974) (asserting that "[i]t is undenied that perjury is 
both a frequent and substantial threat to the effective 
administration of justice"); Cate Gillen et al., Perjury, 28 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 619 (1991) (discussing the role of the federal 
offense of perjury in preserving the integrity of the federal 
judicial system). 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
7 
to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings.  Effective 
restraints against this type of egregious offense are therefore 
imperative."  Because perjury is an egregious offense, the 
Wisconsin legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1)(a) to 
punish lying in court, making it a Class D felony.  Criminal 
defendants must not be allowed to stretch the Double Jeopardy 
Clause in order to shelter themselves from perjury prosecutions. 
 Such a result would undermine the intent of the legislature and 
engender more untruthful testimony in court.  See ABF Freight 
Sys. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994) ("False testimony in a 
formal proceeding is intolerable.  We must neither reward nor 
condone such a 'flagrant affront' to the truth-seeking function 
of adversary proceedings.").  To allow the crime of perjury to 
go unchecked would diminish the truth-seeking function of our 
judicial system.  As the United States Supreme Court noted, 
"[a]ll perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since 
it may produce a judgment not resting on truth. . . . [I]t 
cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate 
objective of a trial."  In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). 
¶10 Echoing the United States Supreme Court, we previously 
have declared: 
 
[i]t 
is 
fundamental 
to 
the 
American 
system 
of 
jurisprudence 
that 
a 
witness 
testify 
truthfully.  
Without truthful testimony, it is nigh onto impossible 
to achieve the primary goal of our judicial system, 
justice.  It is because the search for the truth is 
central to our legal proceedings that we require each 
witness to take an oath of truthfulness prior to 
testifying. 
 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
8 
State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 416-17, 316 N.W.2d 395 
(1982).  The oath that each witness is required to take 
prior to testifying in court is set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.03.  We have observed that the purpose of this oath 
"is to impress the person who takes the oath with a due 
sense of obligation, so as to secure the purity and truth 
of his or her words under the influence of the oath's 
sanctity."  Kellner v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 539 
N.W.2d 685 (1995).  Perjury, by definition, violates this 
solemn oath.  Consequently, we need to balance the State's 
efforts to eradicate perjury from our judicial system with 
the 
fundamental 
principle 
that 
underlies 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
III 
¶11 Canon urges this court to protect him from the 
consequences of his alleged offense by ruling that Ashe bars the 
State from prosecuting him for any perjury he may have committed 
at his criminal traffic trial.  In Ashe, three or four masked 
men broke into a dwelling and robbed six poker players.  397 
U.S. at 437.  After the robbery, three men were arrested nearby 
and a fourth man, Ashe, was arrested some distance away.  Id.  
Ashe was charged with robbing one of the six poker players, but 
he was acquitted when some of the witnesses were unclear whether 
there was a fourth man, and those witnesses that thought there 
was a fourth man were unsure that he was Ashe.  Id. at 438.  Six 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
9 
weeks after his acquittal, Ashe was brought to trial again, this 
time for robbing a second player.  Id. at 439.  At the second 
trial, the same witnesses gave much stronger testimony and the 
state "refined its case . . . by declining to call one of the 
participants in the poker game whose identification testimony at 
the first trial had been conspicuously negative."  Id. at 440.  
This time, the jury found Ashe guilty and he was sentenced to 35 
years in the state penitentiary.  Id. 
¶12 In reviewing Ashe's conviction, the United States 
Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of issue preclusion.  Id. 
at 443-47.  The Court recognized the doctrine as part of the 
Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy, explaining 
that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by 
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated 
between the same parties in any future lawsuit."  Id. at 442-43. 
 The Court recounted that it previously had not recognized issue 
preclusion because under common law, "offense categories were 
relatively few and distinct" and "[a] single course of criminal 
conduct was likely to yield but a single offense."  Id. at 445 
n.10.  But, the Court noted, "with the advent of specificity in 
draftsmanship and the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping 
and 
related 
statutory 
offenses, 
it 
became 
possible 
for 
prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous series of 
offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction."  Id.  
Hence, the Court determined that the civil doctrine of issue 
preclusion could be applied to combat the consequences of the 
manifold increase in statutory offenses.  Id. at 443-44. 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
10
¶13 Before analyzing the particular facts in Ashe, the 
Court cautioned that issue preclusion "is not to be applied with 
the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century 
pleading book, but with realism and rationality."  Id. at 444.  
The Court then rejected the state's attempt to prosecute Ashe 
for the same robbery because the issue to be determined was 
whether Ashe was one of the robbers, which already had been 
decided at his previous criminal trial.  Id. at 446.  Moreover, 
the Court concluded that the state "ha[d] frankly conceded that 
following the petitioner's acquittal, it treated the first trial 
as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution."  Id. at 
447.  Thus, issue preclusion, as explained by the United States 
Supreme Court, is a doctrine to prevent prosecutorial misconduct 
and give finality to judicial determinations made in one 
criminal transaction; it is not a technicality that allows a 
criminal 
defendant 
to 
escape 
the 
consequences 
of 
false 
testimony.  That is, issue preclusion prevents prosecutors from 
throwing a smorgasbord of charges at a criminal defendant, all 
stemming 
from 
a 
single 
criminal 
transaction, 
and 
hoping 
something will stick after several test runs.  See Bolden v. 
Warden, West Tenn. High Sec. Fac., 194 F.3d 579, 585 n.20 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (noting that "[a] primary concern of the Supreme 
Court in Ashe was the prosecution's use of the first trial as a 
'dry run' for the second prosecution"). 
¶14 Turning to the case at hand, we find it clearly 
distinguishable from Ashe.  In Ashe, the defendant was being 
tried again based on the testimony of the same witnesses for the 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
11
same criminal transaction.  By contrast, in the present case, 
Canon is not being charged for anything that he allegedly did on 
July 4, 1996, on a Taylor County highway.  Instead, he is being 
charged with what he may have done in March of 1998 in a Taylor 
County courtroom:  he allegedly lied under oath about a material 
fact.  The perjury charge stems from a criminal transaction 
distinct from the operating while intoxicated, operating after 
revocation, and driving with a prohibited blood alcohol level 
charges.  See Ashe 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J. concurring) 
(asserting that "same offence" is best defined by whether the 
crime arose from "a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or 
transaction").  Furthermore, new evidencethe letter from Que 
Sadahas come to light in the present case, which was allegedly 
not available prior to Canon's criminal traffic trial.8  This 
case does not raise the specter of a wayward prosecutor charging 
a criminal defendant with a startling number of offenses for the 
same 
criminal 
transaction, 
a 
scenario 
the 
Ashe 
Court 
emphatically condemned.  See id. at 445 n.10.  
¶15 Canon urges this court to affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals because the same issue for which he was 
                     
8 But cf. Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971) 
(overturning state court ruling that defendant could be retried 
because the judge erroneously excluded evidence of identity).  
Harris is distinguishable from the present case because there 
the prosecutor sought to retry the defendant for the same 
criminal transaction.  Id. at 56-57.  Here, the State seeks to 
charge Canon with a new crime committed at a different time and 
place with new evidence that allegedly came to light after his 
criminal traffic trial.  
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
12
acquitted in his criminal traffic trialwho was driving the 
pickup truck on July 4, 1996necessarily will be determined at 
his perjury trial.  We do not read Ashe so broadly to give 
criminal 
defendants 
an 
unfettered 
prerogative 
to 
perjure 
themselves at a criminal trial where there is a single issue.  
Such a ruling would materially weaken our judicial system's 
primary truth-finding purpose.  See Brogan v. United States, 522 
U.S. 398, 402 (1998) (expressing that "[w]e cannot imagine how 
it could be true that falsely denying guilt in a Government 
investigation does not pervert a governmental function").  As 
Chief Judge R. Thomas Cane noted in his court of appeals 
dissent, "[t]o accept Canon's argument would be to allow the 
concept of [issue preclusion], which is designed to protect an 
accused from prosecutorial harassment, to be used as a shield to 
insulate a defendant from his own wrongdoing in fraudulently 
obtaining a favorable result in a criminal case."  State v. 
Canon, 230 Wis. 2d at 527.  We agree.  Analyzing the facts in 
this case with realism and rationality leads us to conclude that 
the State may proceed with its complaint in order to address the 
problem of perjury in our judicial system.  Thus, we reject 
Canon's argument. 
¶16 Other courts likewise have observed that Ashe does not 
give defendants a license to perjure themselves.  In State v. 
Redinger, 312 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reached a similar result.  There, two defendants were tried 
separately for the same reckless driving offense.  Id. at 130.  
The first defendant, whose license previously had been revoked 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
13
for traffic offenses, was acquitted on the charge of reckless 
driving based on his defense that he was not driving at the time 
of the offense.  Id. at 130-31.  The second defendant, who did 
not have a record, subsequently was charged with reckless 
driving and he pled guilty to the offense.  Id. at 131.  The 
trial judge "stated that he wanted the story under oath" and the 
second defendant testifiedin accordance with the testimony of 
the first defendantthat he was driving at the time of the 
incident.  Id.  The state, however, had two witnesses who 
contradicted the testimony of the two defendants.  Id.  The two 
witnesses stated that the first defendant, not the second 
defendant, was driving at the time of the incident.  Id.  
Consequently, the state charged the second defendant with 
perjury.  Id. 
¶17 In its reasoning, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
scrutinized Ashe and asserted that there, "the criminal episode 
was single and since [Ashe] had been adjudicated not a party to 
[the criminal episode] at the first trial, he could not be 
subjected to a contrary verdict at another trial."  Id. at 134. 
 The court concluded:  
 
[t]he 
Fifth 
Amendment 
prohibition 
against 
twice 
putting a person in jeopardy "for the same offense" 
does not apply where the "offenses" involved are as 
different as a substantive crime on the one hand, and 
perjury (or other related charge) committed at the 
trial of the charge of commission of that crime, on 
the other. 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
14
Id.  Therefore, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that Ashe 
would not bar the perjury prosecution.9 
¶18 The Louisiana Supreme Court followed this reasoning in 
State v. Bolden, 639 So. 2d 721, 726 (La. 1994), and adopted a 
newly discovered evidence exception for such situations.  There, 
the court ruled that the state may proceed with a perjury 
prosecution on an issue adjudicated at a previous trial if the 
prosecutor presents newly discovered evidence.  Id.  The Fifth 
Circuit approved of this exception in Bolden's subsequent 
federal habeas proceeding because it balances "the concern that 
the prosecution will get a 'second shot' at the defendant with 
the concern that the defendant will have an 'uncontrollable 
license' to testify falsely at the first trial, without fear of 
repercussions."  Bolden, 194 F.3d at 585 n.20.10   
                     
9 The New Jersey Supreme Court did not require the evidence 
of perjury to be "newly discovered."  In fact, the state had the 
statements of the two witnesses prior to the second defendant’s 
testimony.  State v. Redinger, 312 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1973).  
The trial judge probably knew of the statements of the witnesses 
for "[h]e did not accept [the second defendant’s] plea of guilty 
without first putting [him] under oath and having him testify 
that he was driving the car.  He also reminded [him] of the 
perjury laws of [New Jersey]."  Id.  
10 Although the Fifth Circuit recognized that it was not 
required to review the "Louisiana Supreme Court's alternative 
adoption of the 'new and additional evidence' exception to later 
perjury prosecutions," the court decided "to address this issue 
for the sake of completeness."  Bolden v. Warden, West Tenn. 
High Sec. Fac., 194 F.3d 579, 585 n.20 (5th Cir. 1999).  In 
reviewing the exception, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
"[w]ere we to decide this issue, we would find that this 
exception is not 'contrary to' federal law as established by the 
Supreme Court."  Id. 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
15
¶19 Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted this newly 
discovered evidence exception in a perjury case where the 
defendant was acquitted of a speeding charge but subsequently 
convicted of committing perjury at his speeding trial.  The 
court observed that the newly discovered evidence exception was 
one of five different possibilities for resolving the difficult 
question of "when acquittal of a crime will bar the defendant's 
subsequent prosecution for perjury for testimony given in his 
own behalf at trial."  State v. DeSchepper, 231 N.W.2d 294, 297 
(Minn. 1975).  The DeSchepper court further recognized that 
there is a: 
 
respectable body of authority which concludes that the 
concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel do 
not apply to a judgment procured by fraud or perjury. 
 Some suggest that Ashe does not require a state to 
give 
collateral-estoppel 
effect 
to 
a 
verdict of 
acquittal if the defendant committed perjury to obtain 
it. 
Id. at 299.  The court, however, did not have to rule on whether 
the newly discovered evidence exception applied in the case 
before it because the jury could have found the defendant's 
testimony unbelievable and still acquitted him of the speeding 
charge.  Id. at 303.  As a result, the court upheld the perjury 
conviction.  Id. 
¶20 Although there are no relevant Wisconsin cases, Canon 
presses this court to look to federal case law where Ashe has 
been invoked to bar a second prosecution.  See United States v. 
Stoddard, 111 F.3d 1450 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
16
547 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 
1382 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Robinson, 418 F. Supp. 
121 (Md. 1976); United States v. Barnes, 386 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1973); United States v. Drevetzki, 338 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972).  However, in none of the federal cases upon which 
Canon relies did the government assert it had uncovered new 
evidence that would support a perjury complaint. 
¶21 The only federal case cited by Canon that is somewhat 
analogous to the present facts is United States v. Nash, 447 
F.2d 1382.  In Nash, the government alleged that the defendant 
lied at her trial for stealing from a mailbox.  Id. at 1383.  
The defendant appealed her conviction of perjury.  Id.  Because 
a jury acquitted the defendant at the mail theft trial, the 
Fourth 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reasoned 
that 
the 
jury 
necessarily decided that the defendant was credible.  Id. at 
1385.  Therefore, under Ashe, the court held that the subsequent 
prosecution was barred because the jury in the perjury case 
determined that the defendant was not credible on the same 
issue.  Id.   
¶22 The majority's opinion in Nash did not indicate that 
the government presented new evidence at the perjury trial and 
Judge Winter, in a concurrence, asserted that his comparison of 
the 
mail 
theft 
trial 
transcript 
with 
the 
perjury 
trial 
transcript "discloses that, at the trial for perjury, the 
evidence was a mere rehash of the evidence adduced at the first 
trial."  Id. at 1387.  But while accepting the holding, the 
concurrence rejected the notion implicit in the majority's 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
17
opinion that every time a jury finds a defendant credible, the 
"government is forever foreclosed from prosecuting her for 
perjury."  Id.  Judge Winter then observed:  "In almost every 
criminal prosecution resulting in acquittal where the defendant 
has testified, it may be said that the jury passed on the 
defendant's credibility and found him truthful.  Yet we should 
not encourage prevarication by saying that necessarily such a 
defendant is immune from prosecution for perjury."  Id.  Judge 
Winter further advocated the rule that if "the government 
produces new and additional evidence that defendant lied under 
oath at his first trial sufficient to permit the trier of fact 
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that perjury had been 
committed," the government should be able to try the defendant 
for perjury.  Id.  Such an exception, which balances the need to 
preserve the statutory offense of perjury with double jeopardy 
protections, is what we adopt today.  
IV 
¶23 A narrow newly discovered evidence exception to issue 
preclusion comports with the competing policy interests at stake 
in the present case.  See Bolden, 639 So. 2d at 726; Bolden, 194 
F.3d at 585 n.20; DeSchepper, 231 N.W.2d at 299; Note, Perjury 
by Defendants:  The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral 
Estoppel, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 752, 763 (1961) (recommending that 
courts balance the policy considerations embedded in the Double 
Jeopardy Clause with concern about perjury by employing a newly 
discovered evidence exception).  We are convinced that the 
appropriate balance between the competing policy interests can 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
18
be struck with the following narrow newly discovered evidence 
exception.11  The State must establish by clear and convincing 
evidence12 that:  (1) the evidence came to the State's attention 
after a trial; (2) the State was not negligent in failing to 
discover the new evidence; (3) the new evidence must be material 
to the issue; and (4) the evidence must not be merely cumulative 
to 
the 
evidence 
which 
was 
introduced 
at 
trial. 
These 
requirements are based on the longstanding rule governing the 
granting of a new trial because of newly discovered evidence in 
a criminal case.  See Lock v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 142 
N.W.2d 183 (1966).  This court, in Birdsall v. Fraenzel, 154 
Wis. 48, 52, 142 N.W. 274 (1913), outlined this exception for a 
new trial and rejected its application where the appellant 
sought to introduce new evidence that allegedly impeached the 
other party's testimony.  In doing so, this court noted that 
evidence "only impeaching in character" is not ordinarily 
                     
11 The deep roots of the newly discovered evidence exception 
in perjury prosecutions are evinced by two federal cases 
asserting that the government can proceed on a perjury charge 
where the defendant committed the alleged offense at a prior 
criminal trial.  See Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241, 242 
(10th Cir. 1929); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664, 667 (4th 
Cir. 1912) (dicta). 
12 The clear and convincing standard is the same burden that 
a criminal defendant must meet in order to obtain a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence.  See State v. Carnemolla, 
229 Wis. 2d 648, 
656, 600 
N.W.2d 
236 (Ct. 
App. 
1999).  
Furthermore, it is the same standard that a criminal defendant 
must meet in order to withdraw a plea following sentencing when 
his or her motion was supported with new evidence.  See State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473-74, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997). 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
19
"ground[s] for a new trial," but "[i]t may well be that newly 
discovered evidence impeaching in character might be produced so 
strong as to constitute ground[s] for a new trial; as for 
example where it is shown that the verdict is based upon 
perjured testimony."  Id. 
¶24 Today, we rule only that newly discovered evidence may 
allow the State, after meeting the test set out above, to 
proceed with a charge of perjury.13  Such a narrowly tailored 
exception will enable the State to pursue some of the perjury in 
our judicial system without running afoul of a criminal 
defendant's Double Jeopardy Clause protections.  As the United 
States Supreme Court recognized in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 226 (1971), constitutional protections cannot be misused to 
the benefit of a perjurer.  There, the Supreme Court ruled that 
a defendant's statements—made without a Miranda warning—could be 
used for impeachment purposes.  Id.  The Court asserted that 
"[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a 
license to use perjury by way of a defense."  Id.  We similarly 
hold that issue preclusion cannot be perverted into a license to 
perpetrate perjury in our courts.  However, the newly discovered 
                     
13 The newly discovered evidence requirement is at the core 
of this limited exception for it is this factor which protects 
criminal defendants from having to run the gauntlet of a 
criminal trial a second time.  See United States v. Sarno, 596 
F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that "unless the 
subsequent perjury indictment is based upon evidence which was 
not available at the first trial . . . the government would be 
merely trying to recover from its initial failure to convince 
the trier of fact of the falsity of defendant’s testimony at the 
first trial"). 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
20
evidence exception preserves the protections of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause by preventing a prosecutor from trying an 
individual twice for the same offense.  This exception will 
alleviate some of the discomfort other courts have had in 
mechanically applying Ashe to preclude perjury prosecutions.  
See United States v. Robinson, 418 F. Supp. at 126 ("This Court 
is concerned that allowing an acquittal to afford any sort of 
insulation 
for 
perjury 
will 
be 
giving 
defendants 
an 
uncontrollable license to testify falsely."). 
¶25 We stress that this holding does not determine whether 
the "new evidence" alleged in the State's perjury complaint 
against Canon meets the newly discovered evidence test set forth 
above.  We determine only that the doctrine of issue preclusion 
does not constitutionally bar the State from pursuing perjury 
charges against Canon.  The State still has the burden to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that its alleged newly 
discovered evidence passes muster under each of the four prongs 
to the newly discovered evidence test.  For this reason, Canon 
is entitled on remand to a separate hearing at which he can put 
the State to its proof.14 
                     
14 We fully agree with Justice Bablitch's dissent insofar as 
it provides that under certain circumstances, a newly discovered 
evidence exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion is 
necessary to best balance the competing interests of finality of 
previously litigated issues and the truth-seeking function of 
our justice system.  We further agree that "[t]he State should 
only 
be 
able 
to 
retry 
a 
defendant 
in 
very 
limited 
circumstances . . . ."  However, unlike Justice Bablitch, we do 
not believe that the record is sufficiently developed for us to 
determine whether the State can meet the test set forth above. 
No. 
98-3519-CR 
 
 
21
V 
¶26 In conclusion, we hold that the State can proceed with 
the charge of perjury against Canon if the circuit judge finds 
that the new evidence proffered by the State satisfies the 
requirements set forth above.  We therefore reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶27 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  I 
agree with the result reached by the circuit court and court of 
appeals, not the result reached in the majority opinion.  I 
dissent from the majority opinion because it does not adequately 
assist litigants or the courts in resolving this troublesome 
issue: when does acquittal of a crime bar the State from 
prosecuting a defendant for perjury for testimony the defendant 
gave at trial on his own behalf? 
¶28 Courts and commentators take different approaches to a 
defendant's 
suspected 
perjured 
testimony 
because 
of 
the 
difficulty of balancing the competing legal policies of truth 
seeking and protection against prosecutorial harassment.15  The 
                     
15 See, e.g., State v. DeSchepper, 231 N.W.2d 294, 297 
(Minn. 
1975), 
in 
which 
the 
Minnesota 
Supreme 
Court 
summarized the following five approaches proposed by courts 
and 
commentators 
concerning 
perjury-after-acquittal 
prosecutions: 
 
1. A person acquitted of an offense is wholly 
immunized from subsequent prosecution for perjury 
based upon testimony given in his own behalf at the 
first trial. 
 
2. A person acquitted of an offense may always be 
prosecuted for perjury based upon testimony given in 
his own defense, without regard to the nature of the 
testimony even though the two verdicts are logically 
inconsistent. 
 
3. A person acquitted of an offense may not be 
prosecuted for perjury based upon testimony given in 
his own defense if a conviction of perjury would 
necessarily import a contradiction of the acquittal. 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
2 
majority opinion attempts to balance the competing interests by 
adopting a "narrow newly discovered evidence exception to issue 
preclusion."16  The majority opinion concludes that the State 
"can proceed with the charge of perjury . . . if the circuit 
judge finds that the new evidence proffered by the State 
satisfies"17 the newly created narrow newly discovered evidence 
rule "based on the longstanding rule governing the granting of a 
new trial because of newly discovered evidence in a criminal 
case."18  The majority opinion would require the State to 
                                                                  
 
4. A person acquitted of an offense may not be 
prosecuted for perjury based upon testimony given in 
his own defense if it appears from the record that the 
fact finder probably passed upon the credibility of 
the testimony in question in order to reach its 
verdict of acquittal. 
 
5. A person acquitted of an offense may not be 
prosecuted for perjury based upon testimony given in 
his own defense unless the state introduces evidence 
at the perjury trial which was not available to the 
fact finder at the first trial and which independently 
tends to establish that defendant committed perjury 
while testifying in his own behalf. 
 
16 Majority op. at ¶23.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.15 (1999-2000) 
governing motions for new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence. 
17 Majority op. at ¶26. 
18 Majority op. at ¶23.  These requirements are set forth in 
Lock v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 142 N.W.2d 183 (1966), as 
follows: 
 
(1) The evidence must have come to the moving party's 
knowledge after a trial; (2) the moving party must not 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
3 
establish before the circuit court the elements of the narrow 
newly discovered evidence rule before proceeding with the 
perjury charge. 
¶29 Although I agree with the majority opinion that 
resolving the double jeopardy and truthful testimony interests 
in the present case and similar perjury-after-acquittal cases is 
difficult, I cannot join the majority opinion because it does 
not adequately assist litigants or the courts in resolving this 
troublesome issue and does not reach the correct result in the 
present case. 
¶30 First, the majority opinion does not tell us when its 
narrow newly discovered evidence rule comes into play.  Although 
the majority opinion characterizes its narrow newly discovered 
evidence rule as an exception to issue preclusion, the majority 
opinion does not discuss issue preclusion in the context of the 
present case.  Does the narrow newly discovered evidence rule 
come into play in all cases in which an acquitted defendant is 
charged with perjury, or only in those cases in which issue 
preclusion exists?  The State proposes the newly discovered 
evidence rule to "only apply after the court has determined that 
                                                                  
have been negligent in seeking to discover it; (3) the 
evidence must be material to the issue; (4) the 
testimony must not be merely cumulative to the 
testimony which was introduced at the trial[;] and (5) 
it must be reasonably probable that a different result 
would be reached on a new trial. 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
4 
collateral estoppel would normally bar a subsequent perjury 
prosecution."19  For purposes of applying the newly created 
narrow newly discovered evidence exception to issue preclusion 
in the present case, the State assumes that the "perjury 
prosecution would require relitigation of a factual issue 
decided in his first trial; namely whether he was the driver of 
his pickup truck . . . ."20 
¶31 The majority opinion is silent about this question of 
issue preclusion, even though both parties have identified it as 
a central question for this court.  The majority opinion does 
not identify the issues involved in the perjury prosecution or 
address whether these issues were litigated and determined by 
the fact finder in rendering the acquittal in the initial trial. 
 The doctrine of issue preclusion in perjury-after-acquittal 
cases may often be difficult for lower courts to apply, 
                                                                  
 
19 State's Brief at 12. 
20 The State also argues in the alternative that the circuit 
court in this case should review the entire record of the prior 
criminal traffic prosecution to determine whether the perjury 
claim is barred by issue preclusion.  The State argues that the 
jury did not necessarily find that the defendant was telling the 
truth when he testified.  The jury could have disbelieved the 
defendant but found that the State did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving the vehicle.  
The State concludes: "Since the issue to be litigated at the 
perjury trial is whether [the defendant] told the truth at his 
drunk driving trial, his perjury prosecution should not be 
barred by collateral estoppel [that is, issue preclusion]."  
State's Brief at 39.  
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
5 
especially since the majority opinion offers no guidance on this 
score.  
¶32 Second, the narrow newly discovered evidence exception 
needs to be explained more fully.  It appears that the 
majority's "narrow" new evidence test means that the test will 
be applied "narrowly" to protect acquitted defendants from 
subsequent perjury prosecutions.  The majority opinion expressly 
says that the State should only be able to try a defendant for 
perjury in very limited circumstances.21 
¶33 Less clear is what the majority opinion means when it 
states, as a prong of the narrow newly discovered evidence 
exception, that "the new evidence must be material to the 
issue".22  Material to what issue?  An issue at the first trial 
for 
the 
substantive 
offense? 
 
That 
the 
false 
testimony 
necessarily constituted a material basis for the acquittal?  An 
issue at the second trial for perjury?  How does this prong in 
the 
narrow 
newly 
discovered 
evidence 
exception 
to 
issue 
                     
21 Majority op. at n.14. 
22 Majority op. at ¶23.  Material facts are those that are 
of consequence to the merits of the litigation.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01 (1999-2000); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615, 635, 
545 N.W.2d 495 (1996).  
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
6 
preclusion fit with the fifth element of the substantive offense 
of perjury that requires that the false statement be material?23 
¶34 The majority opinion also does not explain why it has 
omitted the fifth and last prong of the narrow newly discovered 
evidence rule applicable to a defendant's motion for a new 
trial.  The fifth prong requires that the new evidence would 
probably change the result of the first trial.  In advocating 
this new evidence test, the State's brief asserts, without 
explanation, that this fifth prong is not applicable.  Instead 
the State seems to substitute for the fifth prong a probable 
cause standard.  The State's brief contends that "in order for 
the perjury complaint to state probable cause, the new and pre-
existing evidence stated in the perjury complaint must provide 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed perjury 
at his or her prior trial."24  However, the majority opinion is 
                     
23 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.31 
(1999-2000); 
see 
also 
Wis 
JICriminal 1750: Perjury (1995) ("A material statement is one 
which tends to prove or disprove any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the proceeding in which the statement 
was made."). 
For a discussion of the issue of materiality in perjury 
prosecutions, see James A. Schellenberger, Perjury Prosecutions 
After Acquittals, The Evils of False Testimony Balanced Against 
the Sanctity of Determinations of Innocence, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 
703, 744-45 (1988).  
24 State's Brief at 34. 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
7 
silent about both the omitted fifth prong and the probable cause 
prong suggested by the State. 
¶35 I would not permit the perjury charge to proceed in 
the present case even if I were to apply the "narrow newly 
discovered evidence rule" the majority opinion adopts, as best I 
understand it.  The State's perjury complaint sets forth the 
defendant's testimony at trial that he was not the driver.  It 
also has as an attachment an unsworn statement by a witness 
asserting that before the defendant's trial the defendant 
admitted at a local tavern that he was driving the vehicle.  
¶36 At trial the State attempted to introduce an unsworn 
statement by the other occupant of the vehicle (who did not 
appear at trial) that the defendant was driving the vehicle.  
When the trial court ruled this evidence inadmissible, the State 
opted to go forward with its prosecution despite being left with 
almost no evidence of the defendant's guilt. 
¶37 Now it appears that the prosecution is trying to 
recover from its initial failure to convince the trier of fact 
at the first trial of the falsity of the defendant's testimony 
by relying on evidence similar to evidence it was unable to 
introduce at trial.  The new unsworn statement is cumulative 
evidence; it is the same type of evidence the State attempted to 
introduce at trial.  This rehashing of the evidence on an issue 
that was apparently decided in the first trial is, I think, 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
8 
prohibited by issue preclusion and does not fall within the 
narrow newly discovered evidence exception.25 
¶38 In cases such as this one involving the constitutional 
issue of double jeopardy, I would, adhering to the majority 
opinion's repeated expression of its narrow exception to issue 
preclusion and the view expressed in Justice Bablitch's dissent, 
impose a heavy burden on the State at this initial stage of the 
proceeding to justify its right to proceed with the perjury 
prosecution.  Under the circumstances of this case I would 
conclude, as a matter of law, that the written complaint, 
resting on yet another unsworn statement, does not provide 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed perjury 
at the prior trial.  Probable cause in a perjury prosecution 
after acquittal should be a high hurdle for the State.  As we 
all know, probable cause is not a single defined standard; there 
are degrees of probable cause.26 
¶39 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
                     
25 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 
(1980) (stating that one of the express purposes of double 
jeopardy protection is to prevent the prosecution from having 
"another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to 
muster in the first proceeding") (quoting Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1977)). 
26 See County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 321, 
603 N.W.2d 541 (1999) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (diagram 
showing different degrees of probable cause). 
No.98-3519-CR.ssa 
 
9 
¶40 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
1 
 
¶41 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (dissenting).  The majority 
adopts a rule that allows the State to try an acquitted 
defendant for perjury if the State produces "newly discovered 
evidence" consisting of nothing more than some third person 
saying, in essence, "The acquitted defendant told me that he 
lied under oath."  This type of evidence does not contain a 
sufficient degree of reliability to overcome the interest of 
finality that underlies issue preclusion and double jeopardy.  I 
would allow the trial of an acquitted defendant for perjury in 
cases where the issue of fact central to the prosecution was 
necessarily determined in the former trial, but only when the 
"newly 
discovered 
evidence" 
contains 
a 
high 
indicia 
of 
reliability.  This evidence does not.  
¶42 In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970), the 
United States Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of issue 
preclusion as an "extremely important principle in our adversary 
system of justice."  This doctrine provides that "when an issue 
of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same 
parties in any future lawsuit."  Id.  However, "[i]n the context 
of a perjury indictment relating to testimony given at a former 
trial 
on 
a 
substantive 
charge, 
the 
doctrine 
of 
[issue 
preclusion] does not bar the perjury prosecution unless the 
issues of fact central to that prosecution were necessarily 
determined in the former trial."  United States v. Haines, 485 
F.2d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Williams, 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
2 
341 U.S. 58 (1951); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th 
Cir. 1971); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 
1961)).  Thus, in some cases, the doctrine serves as a limit on 
the State's ability to take a "second shot" at a defendant.  See 
Nash, 447 F.2d at 1385-86.  In this respect, the doctrine of 
issue preclusion serves the same purpose as the Double Jeopardy 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
See 
United 
States 
v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980) (noting that the 
underlying idea of a constitutional prohibition against double 
jeopardy is that "'the State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in 
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be 
found guilty.'") (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 
187-88 (1957)).   
¶43 The doctrine of issue preclusion serves an important 
function 
in limiting subsequent prosecutions 
of 
acquitted 
defendants in some cases.  The importance of this doctrine is 
demonstrated in cases where it may serve to limit a subsequent 
prosecution brought in bad faith by a prosecutor.  Equally 
significant, the doctrine may also limit subsequent prosecutions 
brought about by meritless "newly discovered evidence" submitted 
by a disgruntled victim or another person seeking revenge 
against the acquitted defendant for any number of motives.  
Certainly, the majority opinion recognizes that harassment may, 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
3 
to a certain extent, exist.  However, my concern is that the 
majority's 
"newly 
discovered 
evidence" 
exception 
does not 
adequately protect an acquitted defendant's interest in finality 
recognized in the principles of issue preclusion and double 
jeopardy, particularly in cases involving the type of evidence 
presented here. 
¶44 Despite the importance of the doctrine of issue 
preclusion, I also acknowledge that perjury is detrimental to 
the truth-seeking function of our system of justice and should 
not be tolerated in our pursuit of reliable verdicts.  As a 
result, I would not conclude, as some courts have, that a person 
acquitted of an offense may not be prosecuted for perjury based 
on testimony that he provided in his own defense, even though a 
conviction of perjury would necessarily implicate the issue 
tried at the first trial.  See Nash, 447 F.2d at 1385-86; United 
States v. Plaster, 16 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672 (W.D. Vir. 1998).  
Instead, I conclude, as the majority has, that a "newly 
discovered 
evidence" 
exception 
to 
the 
doctrine 
of 
issue 
preclusion 
is 
necessary 
to 
serve 
these 
competing 
policy 
interests. 
¶45 However, the majority adopts a "newly discovered 
evidence" test that is similar to cases where a defendant, 
subsequent to his conviction, may seek a new trial based on his 
discovery of new evidence calling his conviction into doubt.  
See State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473-74, 561 N.W.2d 707 
(1997); State v. Carnemolla, 229 Wis. 2d 648, 656, 600 N.W.2d 
236 (Ct. App. 1999).  Certainly, this test provides adequate 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
4 
parameters for allowing defendants to challenge their own 
convictions.  This test, however, is inadequate to protect a 
defendant who has been acquitted of a crime from being 
prosecuted again based on an issue that was already determined 
at the first trial.  The State should only be able to retry a 
defendant in very limited circumstances, and therefore, a test 
should be adopted with more stringent requirements than the test 
that is used by the majority. 
¶46 Under the majority's test, a prosecutor may be able to 
pursue a perjury claim in instances where the "newly discovered 
evidence" amounts to nothing more than testimony from a 
disgruntled party or an ill-motivated person whose testimony 
merely contradicts the defendant's testimony at his first trial. 
 Unless there is something more, and the State here does not 
suggest that there is anything more, any subsequent perjury 
prosecution will amount to nothing more than a swearing contest 
between the State's witness and the defendant, which requires 
another determination of credibility by the jury.  As a result, 
defendants are not secure with an acquittal; they have no sense 
of finality.  Under this test, anyone can make a damning 
statement against an acquitted defendant, and the acquitted 
defendant is once again subjected to prosecution.  As a result, 
an acquitted defendant who has testified at his own trial will 
live in daily fear of further prosecution. 
¶47 In short, I conclude that the "newly discovered 
evidence" presented here does not present a high enough degree 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
5 
of reliability to offset the competing policy concern of 
finality. 
¶48 The majority primarily relies on State v. Bolden, 639 
So. 2d 721 (La. 1994), in concluding that a new evidence 
exception should be adopted.  In Bolden, the defendant was 
prosecuted and acquitted in a Louisiana state court of second 
degree murder in March of 1987.  Bolden, 639 So. 2d at 721-22.  
Approximately five years later, the defendant confessed to the 
murder during prosecutorial questioning on another matter in New 
Jersey.  Id. at 722.  As a result of this statement, the 
defendant was charged in Louisiana for perjury based on his 
statements denying guilt in the 1987 murder trial.  Id. at 722-
23.  The Bolden court concluded: 
[T]he state in good faith has obtained new and 
additional evidence that was not previously available 
to it indicating that defendant testified falsely 
under oath during the former trial.  Under these 
circumstances, 
applying 
the 
doctrine 
of 
[issue 
preclusion] with 'realism and rationality' as required 
by Ashe, we believe that the state should not be 
barred from prosecuting defendant for perjury. 
Id. at 726.  The Bolden court adopted this new evidence 
exception based on dicta from other courts and did not provide 
any further detail or guidance on how to determine whether 
evidence was "new or additional evidence."  Id. at 725-26. 
¶49 The "new and additional evidence" at issue in Bolden 
is much different than the "newly discovered evidence" at issue 
in Canon's case.  Such a direct admission of guilt by the 
defendant in Bolden is highly reliable.  Here, however, the 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
6 
evidence presented involves hearsay testimony that is being 
presented to once again impeach the defendant's testimony from 
his first trial.  The State should not be allowed to proceed 
with a perjury trial based on such testimony when the issue was 
adjudicated in a former trial.  Instead, the majority's test for 
"newly discovered evidence" should specifically exclude such 
evidence.  Only highly reliable evidence, such as recorded 
admissions of guilt from a defendant or, alternatively, reliable 
tangible evidence that was not available at trial should allow 
the State to proceed with a perjury prosecution.  Such tangible 
evidence may include items such as a document or weapon that 
provides clear evidence to show that the defendant committed 
perjury.  The evidence may also include tangible evidence 
brought about by a recent technological advance, such as DNA 
evidence that directly contradicts a defendant's denial of 
guilt.  Limiting our "newly discovered evidence" exception in 
this respect will protect a defendant's interest in finality, 
while at the same time permitting a prosecution for perjury on a 
previously determined issue. 
¶50 Thus, under any "newly discovered evidence" exception 
that I would adopt, the testimony from Que Sada would not 
qualify as "newly discovered evidence."  Testimony alone would 
never qualify because it would lead to nothing more than a 
swearing contest between the defendant and the witness on the 
same issue decided at the first trial.  In this case, the State 
has not presented any other evidence in support of the perjury 
complaint.  As a result, under such an exception, this court 
No. 98-3519-CR.wab 
 
7 
could conclude as a matter of law that Que Sada's testimony 
would not qualify as "newly discovered evidence."  Remand to the 
circuit court would be futile because the exception would 
specifically exclude such testimony.  Dismissal of the complaint 
would then be appropriate if issue preclusion applied.  
¶51 In this case, I believe that the circuit court may 
have been correct in concluding that the issue was decided at 
the first trial, but I am troubled by the circuit court's 
failure to review the entire trial transcript in making its 
decision.  Such a difficult decision must be made in view of the 
entire 
transcript. 
 
Unfortunately, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
neglected to provide any guidance to future courts to aid in 
their determination of whether an issue, which forms the basis 
for a criminal perjury complaint, was previously determined at 
trial.  In her dissent, Chief Justice Abrahamson appropriately 
addressed this as a real problem with the majority's opinion.  I 
share her concern. 
¶52 In the end, however, I agree with the result reached 
by Chief Justice Abrahamson in her dissent.  In short, the 
perjury complaint against Canon lacks probable cause because it 
is based on the unsworn testimony of Que Sada.  Therefore, the 
complaint should be dismissed, and the court of appeals' 
decision should be affirmed.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion.