Case Title: McCabe v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061909

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
TERRI HACKLEY MCCABE 
 
v.  Record No. 061909                OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
                                          ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
           September 14, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
 
Terri Hackley McCabe was convicted in 1997 of a violation 
of Code § 18.2-370.1.  Because of this conviction, she was 
required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the 
provisions of former Code § 19.2-298.1 (1995 & Supp. 1997).  
In 2001, that Code section was amended reclassifying a 
violation of Code § 18.2-370.1 as a "sexually violent offense" 
and changing the reregistration requirements.  McCabe 
initiated this litigation asserting that application of the 
changed reregistration requirements to her violated her rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  For the reasons stated below, we conclude that 
requiring McCabe to comply with the altered reregistration 
requirements does not violate her substantive due process or 
procedural due process rights and that her equal protection 
                                                 
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
 
2
claim is moot.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court dismissing her complaint. 
FACTS 
 
On December 19, 1997, McCabe pled guilty to taking 
indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or 
supervisory relationship in violation of Code § 18.2-370.1.  
At the time of McCabe's conviction, former Code § 19.2-298.1 
required her to register with the State Police as a "sex 
offender" and to reregister annually for a period of 10 years.  
Former Code §§ 19.2-298.1, -298.2 (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
 
In 2001, the General Assembly amended former Code § 19.2-
298.1 and reclassified a violation of Code § 18.2-370.1 as a 
"sexually violent offense."  2001 Acts ch. 840.  Because 
McCabe had been convicted of an offense that the amendment 
defined as a "sexually violent offense," she was required to 
reregister as a sex offender every 90 days for the rest of her 
life.  Former Code §§ 19.2-298.1 (2000 & Supp. 2001), -298.2 
(2000).2 
                                                 
2 In 2003, the General Assembly repealed the existing sex 
offender registration requirements, including Code §§ 19.2-
298.1 and –298.2, and replaced them with the Sex Offender and 
Crimes Against Minors Registry Act (the Act), Code § 9.1-900 
et seq.  2003 Acts ch. 584.  Former Code §§ 19.2-298.1 and –
298.2 were recodified in Code §§ 9.1-902 and -908.  The Act 
has been subsequently amended.  References to sections of the 
Act are to the current provisions unless otherwise stated. 
 
3
 
In January 2006, McCabe filed a complaint in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County asserting that she should not be 
classified as a "violent sex offender" for purposes of the 
reregistration requirements.  McCabe argued that the 
reclassification of her offense violated her substantive due 
process, procedural due process, and equal protection rights 
under the United States Constitution.  The Commonwealth filed 
a demurrer asserting that McCabe failed to state a cause of 
action because the reclassification did not interfere with any 
liberty interest or fundamental right, did not violate any due 
process or equal protection rights, and the legislation was 
rationally related to legitimate state interests.  The circuit 
court granted the Commonwealth's demurrer and entered an order 
dismissing the complaint. 
We awarded McCabe an appeal on five assignments of error 
which collectively raise the same arguments made in the 
circuit court:  that the legislation reclassifying her 
criminal conviction as a "sexually violent offense" and 
requiring her to register quarterly as a sex offender for life 
rather than annually for the ten-year period imposed under the 
prior statute, violated her substantive and procedural due 
process rights and her right to equal protection granted under 
the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 
4
DISCUSSION 
1.  Substantive Due Process 
 
McCabe contends that the statutory reclassification of a 
violation of Code § 18.2-370.1 affected two of her fundamental 
constitutional rights.  First, she claims that the "compelled 
personal appearance of registrants constitutes a deprivation 
of [her] liberty interest."  Second, she asserts that she has 
a fundamental right to rely on the statutory registration 
scheme in existence at the time of her guilty plea, which 
required only annual registration for a ten-year period. 
The principles applicable to claims asserting a denial of 
substantive due process rights are well established.  First, 
the claimant must clearly describe and establish that the 
interest asserted is a fundamental right or liberty interest 
specially protected under the Due Process Clause.  Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  To qualify for that 
designation, the right asserted must be a right "deeply rooted 
in this Nation's history and tradition" or " 'implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.' "  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Legislation interfering with a fundamental right or 
liberty interest survives constitutional scrutiny only if it 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  
Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).  If the 
 
5
asserted right is not a fundamental right or liberty interest 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause, the legislation 
will survive constitutional scrutiny if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest.  Id. at 728 
(citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)); Flores, 
507 U.S. at 305; Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 427-28, 
497 S.E.2d 869, 872-73 (1998).   
 
As support for her contention that compelled in-person 
quarterly registration violates her protected liberty 
interest, McCabe cites Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 
(1910).  Weems involved a Philippine law that subjected the 
criminal defendant to post-release government surveillance 
including compliance with the "rules of inspection" and 
required permission from the authorities prior to a change of 
domicile.  Id. at 364.  The Supreme Court held that the 
criminal sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Id. at 365.  From this holding, McCabe derives 
the principle that "compelled personal appearance by a 
registrant before law enforcement personnel . . . is 
constitutionally defective when incorporated into a criminal 
sentence," and argues that the same rationale should be 
applied to the civil registration provisions at issue in this 
case. 
 
6
 
We first note that nothing in the statute or regulations 
suggests that a personal appearance is required for the 
periodic reregistration.  In-person registration is 
specifically required for the initial registration and changes 
in residence, name, owned vehicle registration, and 
employment.  See Code §§ 9.1-903.  The regulations enacted 
pursuant to the statute specifically provide a mailing address 
for the submission of registration and reregistration forms.  
See 19 VAC § 30-170-15.  Code § 9.1-904(A) defines 
reregistration as meaning that "the person has notified the 
State Police" and confirmed certain information.  (Emphasis 
added).  Therefore, the imposition upon McCabe's claimed 
liberty interest cannot be defined as an in-person 
registration requirement.  Furthermore, although McCabe 
asserts that she is now required to reregister in person every 
90 days, Code § 9.1-909(A) allows her to file a petition for 
relief from the 90-day reregistration requirement.3 
 
Accordingly, in considering McCabe's claimed liberty 
interest, we limit our consideration to whether a lifetime 
quarterly reregistration requirement, which can be reduced to 
an annual reregistration requirement, violates McCabe's 
                                                 
3 Code § 9.1-909(A) allows such petitions to be filed 
three years after the duty to register was imposed. 
 
7
substantive due process rights.  This is a question of first 
impression in this Court. 
 
The Virginia sex offender registration legislation is 
similar to legislation enacted by all other states in response 
to the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children & Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, 
enacted by Congress in 1994.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 
(2003).4  The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet 
considered any case in which a violation involving substantive 
due process rights has been raised.  See Connecticut Dep't of 
Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (no opinion expressed 
because issue of substantive due process not properly before 
court).  Substantive due process claims have been raised in 
other states and federal courts, but we have found only one 
case in which the fundamental right or liberty interest 
asserted was similar to that raised by McCabe here.5  In Doe v. 
Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 817 
                                                 
4 The federal legislation contained guidelines for state 
programs requiring persons convicted of certain sexual 
offenses to register with state law enforcement officials.  
Failure to timely enact appropriate programs subjected the 
states to the loss of certain federal funding.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071(g)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
5 Substantive due process claims based on a liberty 
interest in non-disclosure of personal information because of 
its impact on employment, reputation, or family relationships 
have been rejected.  See e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 
1344-46 (11th Cir. 2005); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 
479-81 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 
8
(2004), the court rejected the offender's claim that the 
Alaska sex offender registration requirements violated his 
right to substantive due process by infringing on fundamental 
interests of life, liberty, and property.  Applying Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the court concluded that 
"persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do 
not have a fundamental right to be free from the registration 
and notification requirements set forth in the Alaska 
statute."  Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597.  The court then applied 
the rational basis test and held that the Supreme Court's 
determination in Smith v. Doe, that the Alaska statute served 
a " 'legitimate nonpunitive purpose,' " and that the 
categories of crimes and " 'corresponding length of the 
reporting requirement' " were " 'reasonably related to the 
danger of recidivism' " and were " 'consistent with the 
regulatory objective,' " compelled the conclusion that the 
reporting requirement was valid, although the petitioners did 
"possess liberty interests that are indeed important."  
Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03). 
 
Like the court in Tandeske, we find no history or 
tradition in our jurisprudence elevating a convicted felon's 
right to be free from post-incarceration registration to a 
fundamental or specially protected due process right.  To the 
contrary, we have recognized that liberty rights of convicted 
 
9
felons may be curtailed more than those of the general 
populace.  See e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 
672-73, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779-80 (2000) (procuring blood sample 
for DNA analysis from convicted felon does not violate 
Constitution); see also Va. Const. Art. II, § 1 ("No person 
who has been convicted of a felony shall be qualified to vote 
unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or 
other appropriate authority."); Code § 18.2-308.2 
(criminalizing possession or transportation of weapons by 
convicted felons).  Therefore, we hold that McCabe's right to 
be free from lifetime quarterly reregistration as a sex 
offender does not qualify as a liberty interest specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause for purposes of a 
substantive due process claim. 
 
McCabe also asserts a protected fundamental right to rely 
on the statutory scheme in existence at the time of her guilty 
plea and conviction which she claims afforded her an "absolute 
right to liberty after the period of 10 years re-registration, 
absent subsequent violation."  In support of this right, 
McCabe cites language in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 
(2005), in which the United States Supreme Court stated, "A 
liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by 
reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty,' or it may 
arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or 
 
10
policies."  Id. at 221 (citations omitted).  McCabe argues 
that as a result of the 2001 amendment, "her liberty has now 
been completely curtailed by the retroactive reclassification 
of the offense." 
 
McCabe's reliance on Wilkinson is misplaced.  Wilkinson 
involved an Ohio inmate's procedural due process challenge to 
the procedures used in assigning inmates to "supermax" prison 
facilities.  Id. at 213.  The Supreme Court explained that the 
"question of what process is due [arises] only if the inmates 
establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest" and 
then went on to explain that a liberty interest invoking 
procedural due process protections could "arise from an 
expectation or interest created by state laws or policies."  
Id. at 221.  The Supreme Court did not hold that state laws or 
policies could form the basis of a fundamental right or 
liberty interest invoking substantive due process protections, 
as asserted by McCabe. 
 
McCabe posits no other basis for her claim that her 
statutorily-based expectation of only a ten year 
reregistration requirement is a fundamental right.6  Our review 
                                                 
6 McCabe does not claim that the application of the new 
registration requirements violated constitutional protections 
against ex post facto laws.  See Kitze v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. 
App. 213, 220, 475 S.E.2d 830, 834 (1996) (holding sex 
offender registration requirement does not violate 
constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws). 
 
11
failed to reveal any recognized fundamental right to rely on 
the civil legislative scheme in existence at the time of 
McCabe's guilty plea.  To the contrary, as a general 
proposition, there is no right to rely on the continued 
existence of civil statutes.  See Allen v. Mottley Constr. 
Co., 160 Va. 875, 888, 170 S.E. 412, 417 (1933) (citing 
Crawford v. Halsted and Putnam, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 211, 220 
(1871)) ("Inchoate rights derived under a statute are lost by 
a repeal of the statute before they are perfected unless they 
are saved by express words in the repealing statute."); see 
also Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc., 256 Va. 
206, 210, 501 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998) ("Generally, landowners 
have no property right in anticipated uses of their land since 
they have no vested property right in the continuation of the 
land's existing zoning status.").  McCabe's substantive due 
process claim based on this alleged fundamental right fails 
because it is not a right "deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition" or " 'implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if [it was] sacrificed.' "  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 
(citations omitted). 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the circuit court's holding 
that McCabe "failed to demonstrate that the reclassification 
affected some fundamental constitutional right."  Because 
 
12
McCabe challenged only this holding of the circuit court, we 
need not consider the court's holding that the legislation met 
the rational basis test for purposes of substantive due 
process.  
2.  Procedural Due Process 
 
McCabe next argues that her "automatic" reclassification 
violated her procedural due process rights because the focus 
of the Act is to protect the public against repeat sex 
offenders and the legislation failed to provide "any 
procedures by which a judicial officer could evaluate the 
likelihood of future recidivist tendencies of sex offenders 
and there were no statutory guidelines which could be the 
basis for such a reclassification."  McCabe asserts that a 
hearing would have enabled her to establish that "she was not 
a repeat sex offender and never exhibited any recidivist 
tendencies" and therefore should not be classified as a 
sexually violent offender.     
 
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed whether the Connecticut 
sexual offender registration statute violated procedural due 
process by failing to allow convicted sex offenders a hearing 
on current dangerousness before registry information was 
disclosed to the public.  538 U.S. at 4.  Because the 
registration requirement was based solely on the fact of a 
 
13
prior conviction, not a determination of current 
dangerousness, the Court concluded that "due process does not 
require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material 
to the State's statutory scheme."  Id. 
 
Classification of a crime as a "sexually violent offense" 
under the Virginia statute is based solely on the nature of 
the crime, not on a determination of current dangerousness.  
As with the Connecticut sex offender statute, no process is 
necessary to prove a fact not material to the classification 
determination.  Id. 
McCabe also argues that the terms of the Act provide that 
"[e]very person convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . 
shall reregister with the State Police every 90 days from the 
date of initial registration," Code § 9.1-904(A) (emphasis 
added), and that she was never convicted of a "sexually 
violent offense."  McCabe argues she was merely convicted of a 
"sexual offense" and the General Assembly could not reclassify 
her conviction absent procedural due process.  This claim is 
without merit. 
 
Code § 9.1-902 specifically defines the term "sexually 
violent offense" for purposes of the civil registry scheme.  
Code § 18.2-370.1 does not incorporate the term "sexually 
violent offense," nor did it incorporate any other descriptive 
term, such as "sexual offense," before or after 2001.  Thus, 
 
14
it is inaccurate for McCabe to claim she was convicted of only 
a "sexual offense."  She was convicted of a violation of Code 
§ 18.2-370.1 and that conviction is the only fact relevant to 
the classification determination. 
 
In sum, the change in classification of a prior 
conviction in a civil registration scheme does not necessitate 
any additional process for McCabe because, as the trial court 
properly held, McCabe "failed to allege that a hearing on the 
reclassification would have established facts relevant to the 
legislature's statutory scheme." 
3.  Equal Protection 
 
McCabe claims that the reclassification violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because she, like others convicted of 
a violation of Code § 18.2-370.1 since July 1, 1997, was 
required to follow the more stringent reregistration 
obligation imposed upon "sexually violent" offenders, while 
those convicted of a violation of Code § 18.2-370.1 after July 
1, 1994, but prior to July 1, 1997, remained subject to the 
requirement of annual reregistration for ten years.  McCabe 
asserts that there is no rational basis for the distinction 
based on the timing of the convictions. 
 
Although not raised by the Commonwealth or the circuit 
court, the current statute, Code § 9.1-901(A), provides that 
the registration requirements apply to all persons convicted 
 
15
of an offense set out in Code § 9.1-902 "on or after July 1, 
1994."  Therefore, the registration distinction based on the 
timing of the conviction asserted by McCabe does not exist and 
her equal protection claim based on such a distinction is 
moot. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, McCabe's substantive due process claim fails 
because she has not established a fundamental right or liberty 
interest impacted by the 2001 amendments.  McCabe's procedural 
due process claim fails because a hearing on the 
reclassification of her offense would not have established any 
facts relevant to her reclassification, and McCabe's equal 
protection claim is moot because no distinction is currently 
made between convictions for violations of Code § 18.2-370.1 
before and after July 1, 1997. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court dismissing McCabe's complaint. 
Affirmed.