Case Title: Byrd v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and 
Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
MARQUIS DEVON BYRD 
 
 
 
            OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 101289        SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
 
                                 April 21, 2011 
GENE M. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF THE 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Nolan B. Dawkins, Judge 
 
 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for 
habeas corpus.  It presents questions whether the petitioner 
was prejudiced because (a) his trial counsel failed to renew 
his motion to strike the evidence at the conclusion of all the 
evidence, and (b) his counsel at sentencing failed to obtain a 
ruling on his motion to set aside the verdict.  We decide both 
questions in the light of the second (“prejudice”) prong of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697 (1984). 
Proceedings 
 
Marquis Devon Byrd (the petitioner) was indicted for the 
first-degree murder of Al-Rahn Powell, aggravated malicious 
wounding of Dennis Wise and use of a firearm in both offenses.  
On November 13-15, 2006, at a jury trial in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Alexandria he was convicted of the second-
degree murder of Powell, the unlawful wounding of Wise and use 
of a firearm in the murder case.  He was acquitted of the 
firearm charge in the wounding case. 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, defense 
counsel made a motion to strike, which the court denied.  At 
the close of all the evidence, defense counsel failed to renew 
the motion to strike.  Petitioner’s trial counsel was given 
leave to withdraw from the case and the petitioner retained 
substitute counsel to represent him with respect to 
sentencing.  Substitute counsel filed a motion to set aside 
the verdict but did not argue that motion before the court and 
never obtained a ruling on it.  In accordance with the jury’s 
verdict, the court sentenced the petitioner to 33 years' 
imprisonment for the three offenses of which he had been 
convicted, with 13 years suspended. 
 
The Court of Appeals, citing McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 20 
Va. App. 753, 757, 460 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1995), and McGee v. 
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 321, 357 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 
(1987), and pursuant to Rule 5A:18, dismissed petitioner's 
appeal on the ground that the issue of the sufficiency of the 
evidence had not been preserved by either a renewal of the 
motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence or by a 
motion to set aside the verdict.  Byrd v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 1766-07-4, slip op. at 1 (December 28, 2007).  The 
petitioner did not request a review by a panel but filed a 
petition for appeal in this Court, which was denied by an 
order entered on May 7, 2008. 
 
2
 
On May 6, 2009, petitioner filed this petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging that he had 
been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at 
both trial and sentencing.  The Attorney General filed a 
motion to dismiss the petition.  The court determined that 
recorded matters furnished a sufficient basis to decide the 
issues without an evidentiary hearing.  By letter opinion 
entered on February 18, 2010, the court held that petitioner 
had met the requirements of the first (“performance”) prong of 
Strickland by showing that the performance of both attorneys 
was defective, resulting in the denial of his direct appeal.  
The court then turned to consideration of the second 
(“prejudice”) prong of Strickland and concluded that the 
petitioner had not shown that he suffered prejudice by reason 
of counsels' defective performance because the record 
demonstrated that, within a reasonable degree of probability, 
the outcome of the case would not have been different in the 
absence of the defective performance by counsel.  We awarded 
petitioner an appeal, limited to the circuit court’s 
application of the second prong of Strickland. 
The Criminal Trial 
 
The question whether, within a reasonable degree of 
probability, the outcome of the case would have been different 
in the absence of counsels’ defective performance can only be 
 
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answered, in the procedural posture of this case, by 
determining whether the petitioner would have had a reasonable 
prospect of success on appeal if the appellate courts had been 
able to reach and consider his contention that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the verdict, that being the sole 
question presented on direct appeal.1  To answer that question 
we must consider the record in the underlying criminal trial.  
The evidence was in sharp conflict.  In accordance with 
familiar principles, we will state its pertinent parts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party 
at trial.  See, e.g., Preston v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 52, 57, 
704 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2011). 
 
The petitioner was 17 years old at the time of trial.   
He had a history of suspensions from school for fighting.  He 
testified that he had been bullied and had begun to carry 
firearms for self-protection, although he knew it was unlawful 
to do so.  He testified that on one prior occasion, when two 
individuals approached him intending to assault him, he 
                     
1 In this appeal, the petitioner presents only the 
question whether he was prejudiced by counsels' defective 
performance in failing to preserve the issue of the 
sufficiency of the evidence for his direct appeal.  We 
therefore confine our consideration to that issue.  Cf. 
Elliott v. Warden, 274 Va. 598, 614, 652 S.E.2d 465, 480 
(2007) (both the "performance" and "prejudice" prongs of 
Strickland were in issue and the petitioner contended that 
counsel's errors were prejudicial at trial as well as on 
appeal). 
 
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brandished a Glock pistol, and fired it into the air.  He 
served 21 days in juvenile detention for that offense. 
 
About two years before the present offense, the 
petitioner had an altercation with Dennis Wise, one of the 
victims in the present case.  Without any explanation, the 
petitioner pointed a BB gun at Wise, who then punched him.   
Because of the petitioner’s fights at school, his mother moved 
the family out of Alexandria to Fairfax County.  Nevertheless, 
the petitioner admitted that he continued to return to 
Alexandria, making repeated visits to the Cora Kelly 
Recreation Center. 
 
On July 29, 2006, Mrs. Byrd drove her sons Marquis, the 
petitioner, and his 14-year-old brother, Malik Byrd (Malik), 
to Alexandria.  She dropped them off at a Metro station where 
they could catch a bus to take them to the recreation center 
where, they told her, they intended to play basketball.  The 
petitioner was carrying in his waistband, concealed from his 
mother, two loaded firearms, a .45 caliber auto-loading pistol 
and a .32 caliber revolver that the petitioner had just 
obtained that morning.  At the Metro station, the petitioner 
surreptitiously handed the .32 caliber revolver to Malik and 
told him "I'll get it back later when we get to where we [are] 
going."  The petitioner testified that he carried his guns 
that day "because anything could happen." 
 
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As the brothers walked along Mount Vernon Avenue, Dennis 
Wise, then 18 years of age, and 19-year-old Al-Rahn Powell, 
were riding their bicycles, traveling the same street in the 
same direction.  Neither of the Byrds knew Powell but the 
petitioner knew Wise from their previous encounter, although 
they had had no contact for two years.  As the bicyclists 
approached the Byrds, the petitioner silently raised his shirt 
to display the handle of his pistol.  Wise didn’t think it was 
a real gun.  Both bicyclists were unarmed.  The petitioner 
“jogged” across the street and entered a barbershop.  Mailk 
followed him but remained in the doorway of the shop.  Wise 
followed slowly and dismounted.  The petitioner reappeared at 
the door of the shop, pointing his pistol straight ahead.  
Without speaking, the petitioner fired one shot.  Wise seized 
the petitioner from behind, pinning his arms to keep him from 
firing any more shots.  The two fell to the street, struggling 
for possession of the gun.  During the struggle, the 
petitioner shot Wise in both legs, severely injuring him.  
While this was taking place, Malik shot Powell in the side of 
the head with the .32 caliber revolver.  Surgeons later 
removed a .32 caliber projectile from Powell’s brain, but he 
died of his wound 11 days later.  The parties stipulate that 
Malik fired the fatal shot. 
 
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After the shootings, the brothers fled the scene 
together, running through an alley.  Malik threw the .32 
caliber revolver into a trash can but he was seen by a witness 
who led the police to it.  Several witnesses observed these 
events and testified.  One of them was a customer in a dry-
cleaning establishment adjacent to the barbershop.  He saw two 
young men “tussling” on the street and heard shots.  He looked 
out and saw two individuals holding two guns, both “pointed in 
the same general direction, going up the street.”  He 
described the guns, one as a revolver, the other as a 
“squarish, more modern type weapon.”  After the shootings, the 
witness went outside and saw the two victims lying in the 
street but the shooters had fled the scene.  Another witness, 
however, knew both Byrd brothers and identified them. 
Analysis 
 
As noted above, the jury convicted the petitioner of 
second-degree murder as to Powell, not the first-degree murder 
with which he had been charged.  The jury convicted the 
petitioner of the use of a firearm in Powell’s murder, but 
acquitted him of the firearm count with respect to the 
wounding of Wise.  The jury convicted him of the unlawful 
wounding, not the malicious wounding of Wise.  Those verdicts 
are consistent with conclusions by a unanimous jury that (1) 
Powell’s killing was malicious but had not been premeditated, 
 
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and (2) that the petitioner and Malik had acted in concert 
with regard to Powell’s murder or that the petitioner had 
participated in some way in bringing it about.2  
 
The jury was entitled to conclude from the evidence that 
the petitioner and his brother were returning to the area of 
the petitioner’s earlier fights “looking for trouble;” that 
the petitioner and his brother acted in concert with a shared 
intent; that the petitioner armed his younger brother to 
further their purpose; that the petitioner recognized Wise as 
an enemy and that the two brothers shared an intent to harm or 
at least intimidate him; and that the petitioner, while not 
necessarily intending to kill Powell, nevertheless 
participated in bringing the murder about by arming his 
brother with a deadly weapon, initiating the fight and firing 
the first shot.  Those conclusions would comport with the 
following instructions given to the jury:  
 
In order to find Marquis Byrd guilty of second 
degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the following elements of 
that crime.  One, that Al-Rahn Powell was killed; 
and two that the killing was malicious; and three 
that Marquis Byrd was a principal in the second 
degree to the killing.  If you find from the 
evidence the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the 
                     
2 The petitioner does not contend that counsel were 
ineffective in representing him on the wounding and firearms 
charges.  Our consideration is therefore confined to the 
murder charge. 
 
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offense as charged, then you shall find Marquis Byrd 
guilty of second degree murder . . . . 
 
 
A principal in the first degree is a person who 
actually commits the crime.  A principal in the 
second degree is a person who is present and assists 
by helping in the commission of the crime.  It must 
be shown that he intended by his word, gestures, 
signals, or action to encourage, advise, urge, or 
help the person who actually committed the crime, or 
he shares a criminal intent of the person who 
actually committed the crime.  
 
 
Presen[ce] and consent alone are not sufficient 
to make a person a principal in the second degree.  
A principal in the second degree is liable for the 
same punishment as the person who actually commits 
the crime. 
 
. . . . 
 
If there is a concert of action with a resulting 
crime one of its incidental probable consequences, 
then whether such crime was originally contemplated 
or not, all who participated in any way in bringing 
it about are equally answerable and bound by the 
acts of every other person connected with the 
consummation of such resulting crime.  You may infer 
that every person intends the natural and probable 
consequences of his acts. 
 
 
The second prong of Strickland requires a habeas corpus 
petitioner to "affirmatively prove prejudice" and to show that 
counsel's defective performance "actually had an adverse 
effect on the defense."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  The 
Supreme Court has characterized that requirement as "highly 
demanding," and we have similarly described it as a "heavy 
burden."  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986); 
Strickler v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 128-29, 452 S.E.2d 648, 652 
 
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(1995).  That burden requires the petitioner to establish a 
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Conclusion 
 
The jury was entitled to accept the Commonwealth's 
evidence and to reject the version of events presented by the 
defendant at trial.  The version of events presented to the 
jury by the Commonwealth's evidence, considered in the light 
of the instructions given by the court, fully supports the 
verdict.  If counsel had performed without any professional 
errors and the petitioner's direct appeal had been available 
for review in the appellate courts free of any procedural bar, 
there is no reasonable probability that a different result 
would have been reached.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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