Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 2022-Ohio-274

Docket Number: 2019-1813

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Smith, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-274.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-274 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Smith, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-274.] 
A finding of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite under R.C. 2152.12 to 
transferring a child to adult court for prosecution of an act charged—A 
juvenile court may transfer a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult 
court’s jurisdiction is limited to the acts charged for which probable cause 
was found. 
(No. 2019-1813—Submitted March 31, 2021—Decided February 3, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 107899, 2019-Ohio-4671. 
_______________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J. 
{¶ 1} Ohio juvenile law is organized around the tenet that children who are 
charged with acts that would be felonies if committed by adults must be recognized 
by courts as children when adjudicating and determining the consequences to be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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imposed on them if they are found to have committed those acts.  In the statutory 
scheme for juvenile justice, “[i]nstead of ‘defendants,’ children are ‘respondents’ 
or simply ‘juveniles’; instead of a trial, children receive ‘hearings’; children are not 
found guilty, they are ‘adjudicated delinquent’; and instead of sentencing, 
children’s cases are terminated through ‘disposition.’ ”  State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio 
St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000).  Legislatures and courts, including this court, 
have recognized that the special interests involved in juvenile cases cannot be 
adequately addressed by the adult-criminal-justice system, but they have also 
recognized that juveniles accused of crimes must be afforded the same procedural-
due-process protections as adult criminal defendants, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 
13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (establishing that “neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone”), abrogated on other grounds 
as recognized by Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 
(1986). 
{¶ 2} This court has also noted that “[j]uvenile law and criminal law are not 
synonymous,” State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, 
¶ 13, and that “the very purpose of the state juvenile code is ‘to avoid treatment of 
youngsters as criminals and insulate them from the reputation and answerability of 
criminals,’ ” id. at ¶ 19, quoting In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 80, 249 N.E.2d 808 
(1969).  Stated another way, the juvenile-justice system must provide for 
accountability; yet it must also meet society’s need to secure its future through its 
youth.  Thus, the juvenile-justice system must hold juveniles accountable for their 
actions and, whenever possible, provide them with opportunities for learning and 
growth toward a better path.  The juvenile court was created by statute, and 
consequently, its authority is determined by that which is conferred on it by the 
legislature.  In re Z.R., 144 Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio-3306, 44 N.E.3d 239, ¶ 14.  
Today, this court is tasked with determining the legal effect of a juvenile court’s 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
order transferring (“binding over”) charges filed in juvenile court to the jurisdiction 
of the general division of the court of common pleas (“adult court”). 
 
Juvenile courts hold a “unique place in our legal system.”  
In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, 
¶ 65.  They are legislative creatures that “eschewed traditional, 
objective criminal standards and retributive notions of justice.”  Id. 
at ¶ 66.  The overriding purposes for juvenile dispositions “are to 
provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to [R.C. Chapter 2152], protect the 
public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the 
offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.”  
R.C. 2152.01(A).  In contrast, the purposes of felony sentencing “are 
to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others 
and to punish the offender.”  R.C. 2929.11(A).[1]  In summary, 
juvenile adjudication differs from criminal sentencing—one is civil 
and rehabilitative, the other is criminal and punitive. 
 
(First brackets sic.)  Hand at ¶ 14.  We should respect those stated statutory 
purposes when examining, applying, and, when necessary, interpreting the statutes 
for juvenile bindovers for prosecution in adult court.  This bindover process is based 
first on the juvenile court’s finding of “probable cause to believe that the child 
committed the act charged,” R.C. 2152.12.  A juvenile court’s finding of probable 
cause and subsequent bindover of the child are not an open invitation for the adult 
 
1.  This version of R.C. 2929.11(A) was in effect at the time of Smith’s alleged acts, but this section 
of the Revised Code was amended on October 29, 2018, to add “promote the effective rehabilitation 
of the offender” to the purposes of felony sentencing.  2018 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 66. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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court to treat the child as if his or her bindover to adult court is the child’s first 
encounter with a tribunal for the acts named in the bindover order—there are 
limitations.  Juvenile bindover does not open the door to prosecution in adult court 
for any charge the state might later seek in an indictment.  Rather, because a 
juvenile court’s finding of probable cause as to any particular “act charged” is what 
triggers a possible transfer to adult court, when a juvenile court determines that 
there is no probable cause for an act charged, the adult court has no jurisdiction 
over that charge. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Facts 
{¶ 3} Appellant, Nicholas Smith, was 16 years old when he was charged, in 
an eight-count complaint filed in the juvenile court, with committing acts that 
occurred on August 18, 2017.  Smith and another juvenile, R.H., were alleged to 
have confronted two women who were about to enter a car parked in front of the 
women’s home on West 65th Street in Cleveland.  R.H. was alleged to have told 
the woman who had the keys to the car, “Give me your keys or I’ll shoot you in the 
f* * *ing head.”  That woman surrendered her keys, and the other woman said, “Do 
you want my purse?” and she threw her purse on the ground.  Smith allegedly 
grabbed the purse, which contained the woman’s cellphone, and Smith and R.H. 
drove away in the other woman’s car.  The women called the police.  By tracking 
the cellphone, the police were able to locate it, along with Smith and R.H. 
{¶ 4} Smith and R.H. were taken into custody by police within minutes.  
The tracked cellphone was found in Smith’s pocket at the time of his arrest. 
B.  Juvenile-court proceedings 
{¶ 5} The juvenile complaint against Smith alleged in Counts 1 and 2 that 
Smith committed the category-two offense of aggravated robbery (with predicate 
theft offenses), one count as to each woman, while possessing a deadly weapon and 
either displaying it, brandishing it, or indicating that he possessed it or was using 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
it.  See R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1) (defining “category two offense” as including the 
offense set forth in R.C. 2911.01, aggravated robbery).  Because firearm 
specifications were attached to the category-two offenses and Smith was alleged to 
have committed the offenses when he was 16 years old, binding him over to adult 
court would have been mandatory for Counts 1 and 2 upon a finding of probable 
cause.  R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b). 
{¶ 6} Count 3 alleged grand theft, a fourth-degree felony, for stealing the 
vehicle of one of the women.  Count 4 alleged a fifth-degree felony, for theft of the 
credit cards of one of the women.  Counts 3 and 4 were both alleged to have been 
committed with a firearm. 
{¶ 7} Count 5 alleged a first-degree misdemeanor, for taking the purse 
and/or cellphone of one of the women, and Count 6 alleged a fourth-degree felony 
for failure to comply with a signal of a police officer—for operating a motor vehicle 
so as to willfully elude or flee from a police officer while fleeing after committing 
a felony.  Count   alleged a third-degree felony for failure to comply with a signal 
of a police officer—for operating a motor vehicle so as to elude or flee from a police 
officer and causing a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or 
property.  Count 8 alleged a third-degree felony for having a weapon while under 
disability, for possessing a firearm after being adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
that would have been a felony offense of violence if committed by an adult. 
{¶ 8} On February 9, 2018, the juvenile court conducted a joint probable-
cause hearing regarding Smith and R.H. pursuant to R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 and 
Juv.R. 30.  The two women and three police officers testified. 
{¶ 9} In a March 14, 2018 entry, the juvenile court concluded that Smith 
was 16 years old at the time of the charged conduct and that there was probable 
cause to believe that Smith had committed acts that if committed by an adult would 
be felonies.  The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Smith had 
committed the acts that would be aggravated robberies in violation of R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
2911.01(A)(1), first-degree felonies, if committed by an adult (Counts 1 and 2) and 
grand theft in violation of R.C. 2912.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony, if committed 
by an adult (Count 3). 
{¶ 10} The juvenile court did not find probable cause with respect to the 
remaining felony counts—theft (Count 4), failure to comply (Counts 6 and  ), and 
having a weapon while under disability (Count 8).  The juvenile court also found 
that there was not probable cause to believe that Smith had had a firearm on or 
about his person or under his control at the time of the acts charged or that he had 
indicated that he possessed a firearm.  The juvenile court ordered the matter to be 
“continued for amenability hearing * * * upon the State of Ohio’s motion for order 
to relinquish jurisdiction for purposes of criminal prosecution pursuant to R.C. 
2152.12.” 
{¶ 11} On April 9, 2018, the juvenile court conducted a hearing to 
determine whether Smith was amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile 
system and concluded that he was not.  Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B), the juvenile 
court transferred the matter to the adult court on June 1, 2018, finding that “the 
safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.”  
Having found no probable cause for Counts 4 and 6 through 8 and no probable 
cause for the firearm specifications relating to Counts 1 through 4, the juvenile 
court transferred Smith’s case to the adult court for Smith’s prosecution as an adult 
for the acts for which the juvenile court had found probable cause—Counts 1, 2, 
and 3, with no firearm specifications, and Count 5—the misdemeanor.  Smith 
alleges that because the juvenile court did not determine his amenability to care or 
rehabilitation within the juvenile system as to Counts 4 and 6 through 8 and the 
firearm specifications as to Counts 1 through 4, the adult court was authorized to 
prosecute him only as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the juvenile-court complaint, with 
no firearm specifications. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
C.  Adult-court proceedings 
{¶ 12} After the case was transferred to the adult court, the state obtained a 
grand-jury indictment against Smith on eight counts that were identical to those that 
had been alleged in the original juvenile complaint, including those for which the 
juvenile court had found no probable cause and including firearm specifications on 
the aggravated-burglary counts and the grand-theft and theft counts.  The state also 
obtained an additional charge against Smith, a second-degree-felony count of 
escape, which had been transferred to the adult court in a separate juvenile-court 
proceeding.  The escape count alleged that Smith had left a detention facility and 
committed a felony.  In total, Smith, who was by this time 17 years old, was facing 
the possibility of serving over 50 years in adult prison on the charges. 
{¶ 13} In September 2018, Smith entered into an agreement with the state 
and pled guilty to one amended count of aggravated robbery, with a one-year 
firearm specification, and one amended count of grand theft, with no firearm 
specification.  He also pled guilty to the third-degree-felony count of failure to 
comply and to the escape charge.  The remaining counts and specifications were 
dismissed.  The adult court sentenced Smith to an aggregate term of nine years in 
prison, and it ordered the sentences for grand theft and escape to be served 
concurrently with the other sentences. 
D.  Appellate-court proceedings 
{¶ 14} On appeal, Smith argued that his “statutory and constitutional rights 
were violated when he was indicted and convicted on charges that were never 
transferred to the [adult court].”  See 2019-Ohio-4671, ¶ 11.  Specifically, he argued 
that the adult court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider charges related to 
acts for which the juvenile court had found no probable cause, i.e., Counts 4 and 6 
through 8, and the firearm specifications.  Smith argued that a juvenile court may 
not transfer subject-matter jurisdiction to an adult court without conducting an 
amenability hearing and that an amenability hearing may not be conducted without 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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first making a finding of probable cause.  Smith relied on State v. Rosser, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 104624, 2017-Ohio-5572, in which the court stated:  
 
In this case, the juvenile court, prior to transferring Rosser pursuant 
to R.C. 2151.12(B) [sic, R.C. 2152.12(B), discretionary bindover], 
concluded that Rosser was over the age of 14 at the time of the 
offense, and there was probable cause to believe he committed the 
act charged.  However, it failed to conduct an amenability hearing 
as required.  While the amenability hearing may have been a futile 
act, the failure to conduct such hearing was a jurisdictional 
impediment that deprived the general division of jurisdiction over 
the case.  Absent a proper bindover proceeding in the juvenile court, 
the common pleas court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
case and any conviction obtained there is void ab initio. 
 
Id. at ¶ 28, citing State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 
{¶ 15} The Eighth District rejected Smith’s assertion that Rosser was 
controlling law and upheld the adult court’s holding that it had jurisdiction over all 
the charges that were originally heard by the juvenile court, some of which the 
juvenile court had found were not supported by probable cause.  The Eighth District 
instead applied its holding in State v. Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 106772 and 
106773, 2019-Ohio-1433, that the adult court had jurisdiction over “all counts 
transferred by the juvenile court, including the counts the juvenile court had found 
lacked probable cause.”  2019-Ohio-4671 at ¶ 26, 29.  The appellate court’s 
rationale was that all the counts against Smith arose out of the same course of 
conduct and were based on acts that were part of a single crime spree, and “[a]s a 
result, the [adult court] had jurisdiction over all the counts in the indictment, 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
including Counts 4 [theft], 6 [failure to comply],   [failure to comply], and 8 [having 
a weapon while under disability].”  Id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 16} We accepted Smith’s discretionary appeal from that judgment.  
Smith asserts two propositions of law:   
 
(1) For discretionary bindovers, a juvenile court cannot hold 
an amenability hearing on charges upon which a finding of no 
probable cause was made. 
(2) For cases that involve both mandatory and discretionary 
bindovers, R.C. 2152.12(I) does not allow the transfer of charges 
where a no probable cause finding was made, regardless of whether 
there was an amenability hearing. 
 
{¶ 17} Together, these two propositions of law assert that the adult court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the charges for which the juvenile court found no 
probable cause.  We discuss and analyze that assertion below. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  History of the juvenile-justice system and transfer proceedings 
{¶ 18} One of the primary reasons for establishing juvenile courts, which 
began to be established in the United States at the end of the 19th century, was to 
provide protection for those unable to care for themselves.  See Hanning, 89 Ohio 
St.3d at 88, 728 N.E.2d 1059.  Since 2002, R.C. 2152.01(A) has explicitly described 
the purpose of juvenile-court dispositions: 
 
The overriding purposes for dispositions under this chapter 
are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s 
actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.  These 
purposes shall be achieved by a system of graduated sanctions and 
services. 
 
{¶ 19} Within the statutes governing juveniles, R.C. 2151.01 specifically 
provides that the sections of R.C. Chapter 2151 are to be “liberally interpreted and 
construed so as to” 
 
provide judicial procedures through which Chapters 2151. and 2152. 
of the Revised Code are executed and enforced, and in which the 
parties are assured of a fair hearing, and their constitutional and 
other legal rights are recognized and enforced. 
 
R.C. 2151.01(B).  We analyze Smith’s propositions of law according to these 
statutory principles calling for fairness and constitutionality of process for youths 
accused of crimes, beginning with a review of the recent history of the juvenile-
bindover statutes. 
{¶ 20} Beginning in the 1970s, the United States began instituting policies 
purporting to be “tough on crime” and welcomed in an era of mass incarceration.2  
The Brennan Center for Justice estimated in 2016 that there were “2.3 million 
 
2.  Ohio Wesleyan University: From Our Perspective, Shari Stone-Mediatore, Ph.D., Tough 
Questions 
for 
Tough-on-Crime 
Policies, 
https://www.owu.edu/news-media/from-our-
perspective/tough-questions-for-tough-on-crime-policies/ 
(accessed 
July 
9, 
2021) 
[https://perma.cc/7M85-TVR7] (“Since the 1970s, public safety in America has been pursued 
through ‘tough-on-crime’ policies: stiff criminal codes, long prison sentences, laws that facilitate 
police search and seizure, laws that make it more difficult to challenge a wrongful conviction, and 
stringent parole boards.  As a result, more than 2 million Americans are now warehoused in U.S. 
jails and prisons.  Nearly 160,000 of them are sentenced to spend their entire lives behind bars, some 
for crimes committed (or allegedly committed) when they were under 18”).  
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
people in the nation’s prisons and jails,” which it said was “a 500 percent increase 
over the [previous] forty years.”  Brennan Center for Justice, Update: Changes in 
State Imprisonment Rates (June 7, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/update-changes-state-imprisonment-rates (accessed July 2, 
2021) [https://perma.cc/KFT3-WNDS].  It has been reported that the United States 
has incarcerated its citizens at a rate roughly five times higher than most other 
nations.  Prison Policy Initiative, States of Incarceration: The Global Context, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/ 
(accessed 
July 
12, 
2021) 
[https://perma.cc/4BUG-V3Q4].  “Compared to the rest of the world, every U.S. 
state relies too heavily on prisons and jails to respond to crime.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Prison Policy Initiative, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018 (June 
2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html (accessed July 12, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/3PU2-GJWU]. 
{¶ 21} In this context, punishment began to eclipse the care and protection 
elements that are intrinsic to juvenile justice and was seen as the preferred tool to 
address juvenile crime.  Statutory avenues were created from juvenile to adult court 
that led to harsher punishment for juveniles.  As states across the nation began to 
change their approaches to juvenile justice, Ohio’s juvenile-justice system began 
its own transformation: 
 
State legislators were keenly aware of the ramifications of a 
juvenile’s transfer from juvenile court and its therapeutic milieu to 
adult court, in which punishment and deterrence are integral.  In fact, 
transfer hearings were at the core of the “get tough” legislative 
response to the perceived epidemic of juvenile violence in this 
country, including here in Ohio.  Hanning [89 Ohio St.3d at 89, 728 
N.E.2d 1059]; Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 
Utah L.Rev. 709, 710-715 (1997). 
This “transformation of transfer policy has been quick and 
dramatic.”  Bishop [Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice 
System], 27 Crime & Just. [81,] 84 [2000].  Between 1992 and 1997, 
at least 44 states and the District of Columbia enacted provisions to 
expediently facilitate the transfer of young offenders to adult court 
by 
establishing 
“offense-based, 
categorical, 
and 
absolute 
alternatives to individualized, offender-oriented waiver proceedings 
in the juvenile court” that streamlined the transfer process.  Id.  “As 
a result, in many states transfer implicates a broad range of offenders 
who are neither particularly serious nor particularly chronic, some 
of whom are not yet in their teens.”  Id. at 84-85. 
In Ohio, the mandatory-transfer provision was one of the 
hallmarks of the state’s “get-tough approach” to crimes committed 
by juveniles, creating a transfer provision wholly different from the 
discretionary transfers that previously were the sine qua non of 
juvenile transfers.  Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d at 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059.  
In this new regime, it is not the child’s status as a juvenile that 
governs sentencing but, rather, the forum in which the child offender 
is adjudicated, so that the sentence ultimately imposed is one that is 
harsher than what a juvenile court would impose.  The transfer 
hearing implicates far more significant issues than the venue or 
forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is 
deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile-
justice system. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
(Footnote deleted.)  State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 
N.E.3d 883, ¶ 71-73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
B.  Juvenile-bindover laws as applied to Smith 
{¶ 22} Today in Ohio a juvenile may be transferred to adult court for 
criminal prosecution by way of R.C. 2152.12, under which some transfers are 
mandatory and some are discretionary: 
 
“Mandatory transfer removes discretion from judges in the transfer 
decision in certain situations.”  State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 
[90], 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000); R.C. 2152.12(A).  “Discretionary 
transfer, as its name implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer 
or bind over to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be 
amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or 
appear to be a threat to public safety.”  Id.; R.C. 2152.12(B). 
 
State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 23} In this case, the juvenile court found no probable cause for the 
charges that would have required Smith to be bound over.  It was then required to 
determine whether Smith was eligible for discretionary transfer according to the 
following factors: 
 
(1) The child was fourteen years of age or older at the time 
of the act charged. 
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child 
committed the act charged. 
(3) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within 
the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require 
that the child be subject to adult sanctions.  In making its decision 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
under this division, the court shall consider whether the applicable 
factors under division (D) of this section indicating that the case 
should be transferred outweigh the applicable factors under division 
(E) of this section indicating that the case should not be transferred.  
The record shall indicate the specific factors that were applicable 
and that the court weighed. 
 
R.C. 2152.12(B).3  After finding that Smith should be transferred, the juvenile court 
exercised its authority under R.C. 2152.12(B) and transferred Smith’s case to adult 
court for prosecution. 
{¶ 24} The question we address today is, what specifically transfers when a 
juvenile court exercises its discretion and binds over a juvenile, such as Smith, to 
an adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12?   
{¶ 25} Smith argues here, as he did in the appellate court, that the language 
in the statute requires a finding of probable cause as to an act charged before that 
charge may be transferred to adult court.  Smith generally asserts that any other 
outcome would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of his statutory and 
constitutional rights.  The state urges us to look at the use of the term “the case” 
within the bindover statutes and to interpret it to mean something different from the 
term “the act charged” within the statutes, see R.C. 2152.12 (using both terms).  
Thus, the state argues that once a juvenile court has made a determination that 
 
3. In addition, R.C. 2152.12(C) provides: 
 
Before considering a transfer under division (B) of this section, the 
juvenile court shall order an investigation into the child’s social history, 
education, family situation, and any other factor bearing on whether the child is 
amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental examination of the child 
by a public or private agency or a person qualified to make the examination. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
probable cause exists for any charge in a juvenile-court complaint (and after finding 
that the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile-justice system, 
if such finding is required under R.C. 2152.12(B)), the state is free to seek and a 
grand jury is free to return an indictment against the juvenile on any charge, even 
those for which no probable cause was found by the juvenile court. 
{¶ 26} In light of the statutory language and framework, the history of 
juvenile-bindover procedure, and the practical and constitutional constraints on the 
process, we hold that a juvenile court’s amenability determination with regard to 
an act that is charged in the juvenile court is first subject to a finding that there is 
probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged and that a transfer 
of the acts charged to adult court confers jurisdiction to adjudicate only the acts 
charged for which probable cause has been found by the juvenile court. 
C.  The juvenile-bindover statutes authorize transfer of “the act or acts” that 
are supported by probable cause 
{¶ 27} By giving juvenile courts bindover authority, the General Assembly 
created an exception to the juvenile courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile 
offenders.  See R.C. 2152.03.  One of the first and most critical determinations a 
juvenile court must make in evaluating whether to relinquish jurisdiction to an adult 
court—in both mandatory- and discretionary-bindover cases—is whether probable 
cause exists to believe that the child committed the act charged.  R.C. 2152.12(A) 
and (B)(2) (both require for bindover that “[t]here is probable cause to believe that 
the child committed the act charged” [emphasis added]): R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) 
(“The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the act charged and 
there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged” 
[emphasis added]); R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(ii) (“The child was fourteen or fifteen 
years of age at the time of the act charged, section 2152.10 of the Revised Code 
provides that the child is eligible for mandatory transfer, and there is probable cause 
to believe that the child committed the act charged” [emphasis added]); R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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2152.12(A)(1)(b)(i) (“Division (A)(2)(a) of section 2152.10 of the Revised Code 
requires the mandatory transfer of the case, and there is probable cause to believe 
that the child committed the act charged” [emphasis added]); R.C. 
2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii) (“Division (A)(2)(b) of section 2152.10 of the Revised Code 
requires the mandatory transfer of the case, and there is probable cause to believe 
that the child committed the act charged” [emphasis added]); and R.C. 
2152.12(B)(2) (“There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act 
charged [emphasis added]).  R.C. 2152.02(A) defines “act charged” as “the act that 
is identified in a complaint, indictment, or information alleging that a child is a 
delinquent child.”  We note that the word repeatedly used in the statute, “act,” is 
singular; “act” does not connote a group of acts or a course of conduct, and it is 
beyond our authority to read words into a statute that were not put there by the 
legislature, Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 53, 524 
N.E.2d 441 (1988). 
{¶ 28} Additionally instructive is the meaning of the term “transfer,” which, 
for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2152, is defined in R.C. 2152.02(Z) as “the transfer 
for criminal prosecution of a case involving the alleged commission by a child of 
an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult from the juvenile court to 
the appropriate court that has jurisdiction of the offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  While 
the state argues that what transfers is “the case,” not “an act,” we note that “act 
charged” is defined in R.C. 2152.02(A) and that in R.C. 2152.12, “act” is modified 
by the word that precedes it: “an.”  Because “case” is undefined, it takes on its 
ordinary and plain meaning.  R.C. 1.42; Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 
661 N.E.2d 706 (1996).  Here, “case” simply means the “proceeding, action, suit, 
or controversy,” i.e., the matter before the court or the legal claims to be considered 
by the court.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 266 (11th Ed.2019).  In Smith’s situation, 
the “case” was composed of the acts that transferred, i.e., the acts that the juvenile 
court found were supported by probable cause. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
{¶ 29} Had the legislature intended the term “case” to have as consequential 
a meaning as the state suggests, it would have made clear that intention by explicitly 
defining the term.  But “case” is not defined, and “act” is.  Therefore, a juvenile 
court may transfer a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult court’s jurisdiction 
is limited to the acts charged for which probable cause was found. 
1. The bindover statutes must be read in pari materia, and we 
may not add language to the statutes in order to reconcile them 
{¶ 30} The statutory-construction canon of in pari materia instructs that 
statutes relating to the same subject “be construed together, so that inconsistencies 
in one statute may be resolved by looking at [the] other statute on the same subject.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 911 (10th Ed.2014); see also State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, 
¶ 17 (lead opinion) (the in pari materia rule of statutory construction applies when 
the wording of a statute is in doubt or ambiguous, i.e., capable of bearing more than 
one meaning).  Because the juvenile-transfer process involves the application of 
different sections within R.C. Title 21, this canon should be followed. 
{¶ 31} Focusing on “the act” rather than “the case” when determining 
probable cause and when determining what is transferred to adult court results in a 
cohesive reading of the bindover statutes.  For example, R.C. 2152.12(F) sets forth 
the juvenile court’s procedure when analyzing a case that involves a request to 
transfer acts under both R.C. 2152.12(A) and 2152.12(B), and it specifically 
requires the court to consider the transfer under division (A) first, R.C. 
2152.12(F)(1).  Even if the court transfers the case under division (A), when a 
discretionary-bindover offense is charged, the court still must “decide, in 
accordance with division (B) * * * whether to grant the motion requesting that the 
case or cases involving one or more of the acts charged be transferred pursuant to 
that division.”  R.C. 2152.12(F)(2).  Because juvenile complaints may contain both 
mandatory- and discretionary-bindover offenses, as Smith’s originally did, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
statute requires that each act charged be considered separately.  If the General 
Assembly intended the entire “case” to be bound over upon the finding of probable 
cause with respect to one act charged, then discretionary-bindover offenses would 
automatically be bound over on a finding of probable cause on a mandatory-
bindover offense and division (B) would be of no effect. 
{¶ 32} The state and the Eighth District rely on R.C. 2152.12(I) to extend 
the adult court’s jurisdiction over any other offense arising out of “the same course 
of conduct” as the act that transferred.  See 2019-Ohio-4671 at ¶ 33.  And even 
though R.C. 2152.12(I) divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction once a transfer is 
made, it must be read in pari materia with the other provisions of the bindover 
statutes, and the adult court’s jurisdiction is over only the specific act or acts that 
transferred, i.e., those acts supported by probable cause. 
{¶ 33} Once an act is transferred, R.C. 2152.12(I) specifically states, the 
juvenile court must discontinue “all further proceedings pertaining to the act 
charged * * *, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which 
it is transferred as described in division (H) of section 2151.23 of the Revised 
Code.”  When the case is finally adjudicated by the adult court, under R.C. 
2151.23(H) there are three situations in which a child may be convicted of a crime 
that is different from the offense transferred by the juvenile court: the child may be 
convicted (1) of an offense that is the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense 
that was the basis of the transfer, (2) of an offense that is a lesser included offense 
of the offense that was the basis of the transfer, or (3) “for the commission of 
another offense that is different from the offense charged.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2151.23(H). 
{¶ 34} R.C. 2151.23(H) thus sets forth the jurisdiction of the adult court by 
describing the adult court’s “jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer.”  It does not 
authorize jurisdiction over whatever charges the adult court independently 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
determines should arise from the underlying course of criminal conduct that was 
the basis for the complaint in the juvenile court.  R.C. 2151.23(H). 
{¶ 35} The phrase “another offense that is different from the offense 
charged” is but one of three parts of the statutory scheme of R.C. 2151.23(H) 
modifying the phrase “offense that was the basis of the transfer.”  This language 
gives adult courts flexibility in resolving cases by allowing them to accept a plea to 
or convict the defendant of an offense that is either a lesser degree of, a lesser 
included offense of, or an offense different from the offense charged that was rooted 
in the offense that was the basis of the transfer.4 
{¶ 36} Finally, as part of this contextual analysis, we must “ ‘giv[e] such 
interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in a statute,’ ” treating no 
part “ ‘as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and * * * avoid[ing] that 
construction which renders a provision meaningless or inoperative.’ ”  (First 
brackets sic.)  Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-
Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. 
Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917).  We can 
give full effect to R.C. 2151.23(H), by reading its phrases within their context and 
by fulfilling our duty to read it so as to give it full effect.  And given its full effect, 
this statute does not authorize a conviction for a charge that has effectively been 
dismissed by a juvenile court.  We cannot attempt to fit the statutes together by 
adding a “course of conduct” determination to the transfer process.  Again, this 
would necessitate adding language to the statutes, which is something courts are 
not permitted to do.  See Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 37 Ohio St.3d at 53, 524 
N.E.2d 441. 
 
4. For example, under this statutory language, an adult court could accept a plea to reckless 
homicide, R.C. 2903.041, on a transferred felony-murder charge, R.C. 2903.02(B).  Reckless 
homicide is not a lesser included offense of felony murder, State v. Owens, 162 Ohio St.3d 596, 
2020-Ohio-4616, 166 N.E.3d 1142, ¶ 1, and thus, it is an offense different from felony murder.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
{¶ 37} Our interpretation today is also consistent with the purposes for the 
juvenile-justice system, which are set forth in the Ohio Revised Code: “to provide 
for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject 
to [R.C. Chapter 2152], protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender 
accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the 
offender.”  R.C. 2152.01(A).  And any other statutory analysis would ignore the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court that is afforded under R.C. Title 21. 
2. Effects of the juvenile court’s transfer of jurisdiction to adult court 
{¶ 38} To hold that a finding of probable cause on any one transferable 
offense permits the transfer of the entire “case,” including offenses for which no 
probable cause was found, runs counter to the protections afforded to juveniles in 
the juvenile-bindover statutes.  In Smith’s case, the juvenile court specifically found 
(and the state conceded) that the firearm specifications in the complaint were not 
supported by the evidence presented at Smith’s bindover hearing.  Regardless, the 
state was later able to obtain an indictment in adult court containing the firearm 
specifications that had been found not to be supported by probable cause by the 
juvenile court.  The state was then able to use the additional one- and three-year 
mandatory prison terms that the specifications require in its plea negotiations with 
Smith. 
{¶ 39} For juveniles who are subject to being bound over to adult court for 
criminal prosecution, the state must present to the juvenile court “credible evidence 
of every element of an offense to support a finding that probable cause exists to 
believe that the juvenile committed the offense before ordering mandatory waiver 
of juvenile court jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2151.26(B) [now R.C. 
2152.12(A)].”5  State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001), at 
 
5. In 2002, R.C. 2151.26 was amended and recodified as R.C. 2152.12.  See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, 
148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, 9548. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  And “[i]n meeting this standard the state must 
produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not 
provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 93 (lead 
opinion).  To hold that the state may seek criminal charges against a juvenile in 
adult court for acts that the court with exclusive, original jurisdiction found to be 
unsupported by probable cause would be noxious to fundamental fairness.  
Moreover, it would be contrary to law. 
{¶ 40} In D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, we 
held that under the 1996 amendments to the bindover statutes, “a juvenile court 
cannot bind over a juvenile on the sole basis that the juvenile has been previously 
bound over.”  Id. at ¶ 45-47 (announcing that this court’s ruling in State v. Adams, 
69 Ohio St.2d 120, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1982), was explicitly overruled by the statutory 
amendments).  To hold that a finding of probable cause on any bindover offense 
permits the juvenile to be bound over on any other offense would ignore this 
precedent.  It would also render R.C. 2152.12 meaningless by ignoring the 
statutorily required finding of probable cause by the juvenile court for each act 
charged, including specifications. 
{¶ 41} “Absent a proper bindover procedure * * *, the juvenile court has 
the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is 
alleged to be a delinquent.”  Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196, at paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  Unless the juvenile court finds probable cause to believe that 
the child committed an act charged, it does not consider amenability, and thus, not 
all the conditions for a discretionary bindover are satisfied to permit the 
discretionary transfer of a child’s case to adult court.  See R.C. 2152.12(B)(2) and 
(3). 
{¶ 42} It is only the juvenile court that has jurisdiction to determine 
amenability.  R.C. 2152.12.  Adult courts have no jurisdiction to determine whether 
a child is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.  R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
2152.03 (“The case relating to the child * * * shall be within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, subject to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code”).  
Accordingly, adult courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict (1) a juvenile 
offender for any acts charged for which no probable cause has been found by a 
juvenile court and (2) with regard to discretionary-bindover offenses, a juvenile 
who has not been determined by a juvenile court to be unamenable to care or 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system, which is a determination within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
{¶ 43} We hold that that the General Division of the Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Counts 4, 6,  , and 8 
and the firearm specifications because the juvenile court found that the acts related 
to those counts and specifications were not supported by probable cause and thus 
the juvenile court could not have made an amenability determination with regard 
to those acts.  There was thus a jurisdictional defect in the bindover process. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 44} A finding of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite under 
R.C. 2152.12 to transferring a child to adult court for prosecution of an act charged.  
When no probable cause has been found by a juvenile court for an act charged, 
there is no cause for conducting an amenability determination in relation to the act 
charged.  In the absence of a juvenile court’s finding probable cause or making a 
finding that the child is unamenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile 
system, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound 
over by the juvenile court.  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, 
Smith’s conviction is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed, 
conviction vacated, 
and cause remanded. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
23 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} Today’s decision by the majority is unmoored from the plain and 
unambiguous language of Ohio’s discretionary-bindover statute and from the actual 
legal consequences of a finding of no probable cause.  To achieve its result, the 
majority falsely equates a finding of no probable cause with a dismissal.  The 
majority’s decision puts asunder the orderly transfer of a juvenile and his or her 
case from a juvenile court to an adult court and results in a judgment that has no 
basis in law.  Because the plain and unambiguous language of Ohio’s discretionary-
bindover statute contemplates the transfer of a juvenile and his or her case and not 
just those acts charged in the complaint for which the juvenile-court judge has 
found probable cause, I would affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals. 
{¶ 46} Former United States Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter once 
said: 
 
It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to 
prevail, to disregard one’s own strongly held view of what is wise 
in the conduct of affairs.  But it is not the business of this Court to 
pronounce policy.  It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations 
on its own power, and this precludes the Court’s giving effect to its 
own notions of what is wise or politic.  That self-restraint is of the 
essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution 
has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of 
what [the Legislative Branch] and the Executive Branch do. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting).  That statement is as true for this court as it is for the United States 
Supreme Court.  Today the majority loses sight of this court’s limited power. 
Statutory Construction 
{¶ 47} In construing the plain meaning of a statute, we adhere to a set of 
discrete rules.  When properly applied, these principled guideposts establish a 
protective barrier, ensuring that our duty to interpret the meaning of the law from 
only its text is not overridden by a desire for a particular outcome. 
{¶ 48} In interpreting the text of the statute at issue here, the majority states 
that it took into account the “statutory language and framework, the history of 
juvenile-bindover procedure, and the practical and constitutional constraints on the 
process.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 26.  The majority then reasons that because the 
General Assembly defined the word “act” but not the word “case,” courts should 
assign more importance to the word “act” when interpreting the meaning of the 
statute.  Id. at ¶ 28.  After all, the majority reasons, “[h]ad the legislature intended 
the term ‘case’ to have as consequential a meaning as the state suggests, it would 
have made clear that intention by explicitly defining the term.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  But the 
majority’s reliance on “the history of juvenile-bindover procedure,” “the practical 
and constitutional constraints on the process,” and the majority’s newly created 
consequential-definition rule is improper, because those are not discrete rules of 
statutory interpretation that we are bound to apply.  Instead, they are means to an 
end. 
{¶ 49} “[W]e are not at liberty to regard anything but the express 
declarations of the legislature.”  Burgett’s Lessee v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469, 472 
(1824).  “It is admitted that if the will of the legislature be clearly ascertained, a 
court of law [is] bound to carry it into effect, however inexpedient or injudicious 
[it] may deem it.”  Id. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
25 
{¶ 50} “The primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the 
legislature’s intention.”  Cline v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 
N.E.2d 77 (1991), citing Carter v. Youngstown Div. of Water, 146 Ohio St. 203, 65 
N.E.2d 63 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus.  That intent is determined 
primarily by looking at the language of the statute.  Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973).  And when the statute 
“conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly 
has said.”  Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-
1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio 
St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).  “Where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous * * * there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory 
interpretation.  An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.”  Sears v. 
Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 51} When interpreting a statutory provision, we have no authority to 
elevate the importance of some words in the statute over other words in the statute, 
because the court must give effect to all the words used, making neither additions 
nor deletions.  Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-
Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 19, citing Cline at 97.  “We ‘do not have the authority’ 
to dig deeper than the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute ‘under the guise of 
either statutory interpretation or liberal construction.’ ”  Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 
Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8, quoting Morgan v. Adult 
Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 N.E.2d 939 (1994). 
{¶ 52} An application of these rules of statutory construction to R.C. 
2152.12(B), establishes that the statute is plain and unambiguous and should be 
applied as written. 
R.C. 2152.12(B) Is Plain and Unambiguous 
R.C. 2152.12(B) provides: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
[A]fter a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a 
delinquent child for committing an act that would be a felony if 
committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing may transfer 
the case if the court finds all of the following: 
(1) The child was fourteen years of age or older at the time 
of the act charged. 
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child 
committed the act charged. 
(3) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within 
the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require 
that the child be subject to adult sanctions. 
 
{¶ 53} We give meaning to all the words used by the General Assembly 
when interpreting a statute and read all words and phrases in context and in 
harmony with the rules of grammar and common usage.  State ex rel. Steele v. 
Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21.  And 
when the statutory language is unambiguous, our review “starts and stops” with the 
statutory language.  Johnson v. Montgomery, 151 Ohio St.3d 75, 2017-Ohio-7445, 
86 N.E.3d 279, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 54} The opening language of R.C. 2152.12(B) establishes five things.  
First, the General Assembly grants the juvenile court discretionary authority to 
transfer a matter to the adult court. 
{¶ 55} Second, the legislature limits the exercise of that authority by 
allowing a discretionary transfer only after the juvenile court determines that certain 
conditions exist.  The conditions set forth by the legislature in R.C. 2152.12(B) 
follow a colon and are subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of that division.  Each of the 
subdivisions is a complete, independent sentence that ends with a period and does 
not require looking back to the opening language of division (B) for interpretation. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
27 
{¶ 56} Third, in deciding whether to transfer a matter to the adult court, the 
juvenile court is required to hold a hearing. 
{¶ 57} Fourth, the juvenile court’s discretionary authority is triggered by 
the filing of a complaint in juvenile court that alleges that a child has committed an 
act that would be a felony if committed by an adult. 
{¶ 58} Lastly, the General Assembly establishes what the juvenile court 
may transfer to the adult court: the case. 
{¶ 59} Contrary to the majority’s determination, the fact that the General 
Assembly did not define the word “case” is of no consequence.  There are an untold 
number of words used by the legislature in the Revised Code that are undefined.  
However, the legislature has enacted a statutory provision instructing that 
undefined words should be construed according to “common usage.”  R.C. 1.42.  
And “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, 
whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”  Id. 
{¶ 60} I agree with the majority’s definition of the word “case.”  “Case” 
means the “ ‘proceeding, action, suit, or controversy.’ ”  Majority opinion at ¶ 28, 
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 266 (11th Ed.2019).  See also 1A Corpus Juris 
Secundum, Actions, Section 17 (2021) (“The term ‘case’ has been defined or 
treated as synonymous with the terms ‘action,’ ‘cause,’ and ‘lawsuit’ ” [footnotes 
omitted]). 
{¶ 61} “The word ‘action’ has typically been understood to refer to the 
entire legal proceeding, regardless of how many claims or charges are included in 
the proceeding.  * * *  This understanding is consistent with common parlance.  
When we say that someone pursued a legal action, we are talking about the entire 
proceeding, not some discrete part of the proceeding.”  State v. Craig, 159 Ohio 
St.3d 398, 2020-Ohio-455, 151 N.E.3d 574, ¶ 13.  Similarly, in common parlance, 
a criminal “case” means all the charges emanating from a series of related events. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 62} A plain reading of R.C. 2152.12(B) also tells us that the juvenile 
court’s authority to transfer a matter to the adult court is triggered by the filing of a 
complaint with certain allegations, but what is transferred is not the complaint—it 
is the case.  So, the filing of a complaint creates a case.  And filing of complaints is 
an ordinary, everyday occurrence in courthouses across Ohio. 
{¶ 63} A complaint is just a complaint until it is filed in a court.  At that 
point, the complaint becomes a case pending before the court.  Therefore, the case 
is the filed complaint and all the acts charged in it. 
{¶ 64} In this case, based on a series of related acts, a county prosecuting 
attorney drafted and signed a juvenile complaint against Smith charging numerous 
acts.  The prosecutor filed the complaint in juvenile court, and it was assigned case 
No. DL17114773.  Therefore, the case at issue here includes all the acts charged in 
that original juvenile complaint. 
{¶ 65} This determination is not only consistent with the plain language of 
the statute but is also supported by our recent interpretation of a different provision 
of R.C. 2152.12—the mandatory-transfer provision.  In State v. D.B., 150 Ohio 
St.3d 452, 2017-Ohio-6952, 82 N.E.3d 1162, we rejected an argument that asked 
us to narrow the definition of “the case” to something less than all acts charged in 
a complaint.  In that case, which was before us as a certified conflict between 
judgments of the Second District Court of Appeals and the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals, the focus of our inquiry was the plain meaning of the reverse-transfer 
statute, R.C. 2152.121.  D.B. at ¶ 10.  Specifically, we were asked whether an adult 
court had the authority to sentence a juvenile pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2929 on all 
charges that had been transferred to it from juvenile court when only one charge for 
which the juvenile was actually convicted would have been subject to mandatory 
transfer under R.C. 2152.12(A).  Id. at ¶  -9.  Therefore, our decision turned on the 
meaning of the phrase “the case.”  In reaching our conclusion, we held that “[i]f a 
juvenile court determines in a delinquency case that there is probable cause to 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
29 
support a single charge of aggravated robbery with an attached firearm 
specification, the case is subject to mandatory transfer.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at  
¶ 14.  The meaning of the term “case” does not change from one section of the 
juvenile-bindover statutory scheme to another.  “In ascertaining the plain meaning 
of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as 
well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”  Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). 
{¶ 66} And when the statutory scheme is looked at as a whole, R.C. 
2152.12(I) leaves no doubt that the word “case” means all “the delinquent acts 
alleged in the complaint.”  R.C. 2152.12(I) provides that a “transfer abates the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the 
complaint, and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act 
charged shall be discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within 
the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred as described in division (H) of 
section 2151.23 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 67} R.C. 2152.12(I) is important in three respects.  First, the plain 
language of the statutory provision establishes that the case is the filed complaint.  
Second, the provision permits more than one delinquent act to be alleged in the 
complaint.  And lastly, the provision categorically severs the juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction over any of “the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint.”  R.C. 
2152.12(I).  The statute does not say, as the majority holds, that the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court abates only as to the acts charged for which probable cause was 
found.  Instead, the statute provides that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court abates 
regarding the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint. 
{¶ 68} The probable-cause requirement in R.C. 2152.12(B)(2) is just one of 
three findings that the juvenile court must make before it may exercise its authority 
to transfer a case to the adult court.  R.C. 2152.12(B)(2) is a complete, independent 
sentence and does not explicitly or implicitly relate back to the opening language 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
in R.C. 2152.12(B) or to the word “case.”  A finding by the juvenile court of no 
probable cause as to one of the acts charged in the case does not, as the majority 
concludes, mean that the act charged “has effectively been dismissed,” majority 
opinion at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 69} The majority agrees with Smith that the determination whether an 
act charged is transferred to the adult court turns on whether the juvenile-court 
judge finds probable cause for the act.  Majority opinion at ¶ 2.  The majority 
reaches this determination by focusing on the General Assembly’s use of the 
singular “an act charged” in R.C. 2152.12(B)(2) and by asserting that the term “act” 
has more significance than the term “case.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 29.  Therefore, 
the majority concludes that what is transferred to the adult court is the single act 
charged.  But this conclusion leads to an absurd result.  Under that analysis, a 
complaint charging numerous acts would generate as many cases as there are 
charges to transfer. 
{¶ 70} “We have avoided making fine distinctions about the meaning of a 
statute based upon its use of the singular form of a word.  See Wingate v. Hordge, 
60 Ohio St.2d 55, 57-59, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979); State ex rel. United States Steel 
Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 14-19.”  
D.B., 150 Ohio St.3d 452, 2017-Ohio-6952, 82 N.E.3d 1162, at ¶ 16.  And “the 
General Assembly has specifically instructed us to read statutes so that ‘[t]he 
singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.’ ”  Id., quoting 
R.C. 1.43(A). 
{¶ 71} The discretionary-transfer statute, R.C. 2152.12(B), provides: 
“[T]he juvenile court at a hearing may transfer the case if the court finds all of the 
following.”  The provision ends with a colon followed by numbered subdivisions.  
Each subpart ends with a period.  “[When] [e]ach clause is distinct and ends with a 
period, [it] strongly suggest[s] that each may be understood completely without 
reading any further.”  Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
31 
344, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005).  Subdivision (2) of R.C. 2152.12(B) 
(the probable-cause requirement) is clearly a distinct, complete, independent 
sentence.  The subdivision can be readily understood without any further reading.  
Therefore, the subdivision’s reference to “the act charged” adds no interpretive 
value to the meaning of the word “case” in the opening language of subdivision 
(B). 
Consequences of the Majority’s Decision 
{¶ 72} The consequences of the majority’s decision are far-reaching.  The 
decision does violence to more than just the plain and unambiguous language of 
R.C. 2152.12(B), it also does violence to other statutory provisions establishing and 
limiting the jurisdiction of juvenile and adult courts and to the Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure promulgated by this court. 
{¶ 73} The majority does not explain what it means by its conclusion that a 
finding of no probable cause by the juvenile court means that the charge has 
“effectively been dismissed,” majority opinion at ¶ 36.  Does it mean that the charge 
remains pending under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, awaiting further 
evidence from the state?  Or does it mean that the charge is dismissed without 
prejudice or dismissed with prejudice?  Regardless, none of these results finds 
support in the law. 
Dual jurisdiction of juvenile court and adult court 
over a case or any portion of a case is strictly prohibited 
{¶ 74} The jurisdictions of juvenile courts and adult courts are set by the 
General Assembly.  R.C. 2151.23; R.C. 2931.03 (common-pleas-court jurisdiction 
with regard to criminal cases).  There is no language in the Revised Code that 
creates dual jurisdiction over certain cases and forces a juvenile to stand 
simultaneously before two courts to answer to acts charged that relate to one 
operative set of facts. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 75} As explained above, R.C. 2152.12(I) categorically severs the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over any of the delinquent acts charged in a 
complaint when the case is transferred.  The language is unequivocal.  The 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court abates regarding the delinquent acts alleged in the 
complaint.  Id. 
{¶ 76} Moreover, we have previously held that “[w]hen a minor is 
transferred from the Juvenile Court to [an adult court] on a charge which would 
constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the grand jury is empowered to return 
any indictment under the facts submitted to it and is not confined to returning 
indictments only on charges originally filed in the Juvenile Court.”  State v. Adams, 
69 Ohio St.2d 120, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1982), paragraph two of the syllabus.  Adams 
has been superseded by statute in part, see Section 3(B), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 96, (“H.B. 1”), but as we explained in D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 
434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 46, the part that was superseded was 
the portion of the opinion that held that once a juvenile has had a case bound over 
to an adult court, any future case brought in a juvenile court alleging that the 
juvenile committed an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult would 
automatically be bound over.  This court wrote in D.W.: “[I]n the wake of Adams, 
the General Assembly prohibited juvenile courts from holding that once a juvenile 
has been bound over to adult court, the juvenile will be bound over in all future 
felonies.”  D.W. at ¶ 46.  The portion of Adams regarding the power of the grand 
jury when a case is transferred to an adult court was not touched by the General 
Assembly’s statutory changes.  The only statutes amended were R.C. 2151.011 and 
former R.C. 2151.26, and none of the amendments addressed grand jury 
procedures.  See Section 3(B), H.B. 1. 
{¶ 77} R.C. 2152.12(I) refers to R.C. 2151.23(H) in describing the 
jurisdiction of the adult court upon transfer.  R.C. 2151.23(H) also makes clear that 
transferring the case removes the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the case: “except 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
33 
as provided in section 2152.121 of the Revised Code [which is not at issue here], 
the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine the case 
subsequent to the transfer.”  In essence, R.C. 2151.23(H) establishes that the case 
restarts in the adult court after a transfer: 
 
The court to which the case is transferred for criminal prosecution 
* * * has jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and 
determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally had 
been commenced in that court, subject to section 2152.121 of the 
Revised Code, including, but not limited to, * * * jurisdiction to 
accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction * * * against 
the child for the commission of the offense that was the basis of the 
transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the conviction 
is for the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for 
the commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the commission 
of another offense that is different from the offense charged. 
 
{¶ 78} R.C. 2151.23(H) plainly establishes that the adult court has 
jurisdiction to consider any charge arising out of the commission of the offense that 
led to the transfer.  The court may enter a judgment of conviction for “the 
commission of another offense that is different from the offense charged.”  Id.  
Therefore, the adult court is not held to the probable-cause determinations of the 
juvenile court.  Once the juvenile and his or her case is transferred to the adult court, 
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction abates and the adult court’s jurisdiction begins.  
R.C. 2152.12(I). 
{¶ 79} Like Ohio juvenile and adult courts, the position of county 
prosecutor and the grand jury have separate enumerated powers established by 
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34 
statute.  Through these separate enumerated powers, Ohio’s transfer scheme 
ensures that a juvenile offender does not face two parallel tracks of adjudication. 
{¶ 80} A county prosecutor has the authority to “inquire into the 
commission of crimes within the county.”  R.C. 309.08(A).  And considering the 
broad powers granted to grand juries, any determination made by juvenile-court 
judges as to probable cause has no role in a grand jury’s decision-making process.  
“After the charge of the court of common pleas, the grand jury shall retire with the 
officer appointed to attend it, and proceed to inquire of and present all offenses 
committed within the county.”  R.C. 2939.08.  A grand jury considers the case 
pursuant to its own authority under the Revised Code.  For courts performing 
preliminary hearings, their role “ ‘is not to hear all the evidence and determine the 
guilt or innocence of the accused but rather to determine whether sufficient 
evidence exists to warrant binding the accused over to the grand jury, where, after 
a more thorough investigation of the evidence, it is then determined whether a 
formal charge shall be made against the accused.’ ”  State v. Minamyer, 12 Ohio 
St.2d 67, 69, 232 N.E.2d 401 (1967), quoting White v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 186, 
188, 187 N.E.2d 878 (1963).  R.C. 2152.12(B) does not place a limitation on the 
separate and independent powers of county prosecutors or grand juries.  And the 
statutes defining their powers and duties do not relate back to R.C. 2152.12(B). 
A probable-cause determination is not an adjudication 
{¶ 81} Even if the majority’s conclusion—that a finding of no probable 
cause by a juvenile court means that the charge has “effectively been dismissed”—
does not result in concurrent jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the adult court, 
the juvenile court’s no-probable-cause finding cannot mean that the act charged is 
dismissed.  This is because a probable-cause determination does not have the same 
legal effect as a dismissal with prejudice. 
{¶ 82} A finding of no probable cause is not an adjudication.  Juv.R. 30(A) 
provides that a probable-cause hearing is a “preliminary hearing to determine if 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
35 
there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged and that 
the act would be an offense if committed by an adult.”  A Juv.R. 30(A) hearing is 
conducted “[i]n any proceeding where the court considers the transfer of a case for 
criminal prosecution.”  To satisfy the probable-cause standard, “the state must 
produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not 
provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis added.)  
State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 93, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001) (lead opinion).  “The 
juvenile court has the duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to determine 
whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the 
charged offense, but it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover 
hearing or to assume the role of the fact-finder at trial.  In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 
185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 44.”  (Emphasis added.)  In re D.M., 140 
Ohio St.3d 309, 2014-Ohio-3628, 18 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 10.  If the juvenile court retains 
jurisdiction after the probable-cause hearing, “it shall set the proceeding for hearing 
on the merits.”  Juv.R. 30(E). 
{¶ 83} A proceeding on the merits in juvenile court is controlled by Juv.R. 
29.  Under that rule, “[u]pon the determination of the issues,” the court must dismiss 
the complaint if the allegations in the complaint were not proved, and if the 
allegations were proved, it must enter an adjudication, postpone an adjudication, or 
dismiss the complaint if dismissal is in the best interest of the child and the 
community.  Juv.R. 29(F).  Once the juvenile court orders the transfer of the case 
pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B), there can be no further procedure in the juvenile court.  
Its jurisdiction is abated pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(I).  It is powerless to hold the 
Juv.R. 29 hearing to actually dismiss charges. 
{¶ 84} The transfer procedure set forth in R.C. 2152.12(B) merely allows 
the juvenile court to determine in which court—juvenile or adult—the child will be 
adjudicated for the acts charged in the case.  Ohio’s juvenile-bindover statutory 
scheme is written such that a juvenile’s case will be handled as a whole, and it 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
establishes reverse-transfer procedures if the child is not found guilty of the crimes 
charged in the complaint that resulted in the transfer to the adult court, see R.C. 
2152.121. 
{¶ 85} A no-probable-cause finding cannot result in the dismissal of the acts 
charged, because, as explained above, a dismissal can occur only after an 
adjudication.  Juv.R. 29(F).  The probable-cause hearing is not an adjudicatory 
hearing, it is patently something else.  Juv.R. 30.  During the probable-cause 
proceeding, the state has no burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and jeopardy does not attach until the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency 
proceedings commences, A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 
629, at ¶ 28. 
The Facts of this Case Are Not What the Majority 
Represents Them To Be 
{¶ 86} Lastly, the facts of this case are not what the majority represents 
them to be.  At the outset of the juvenile-court proceedings, the judge had to decide 
whether this was a mandatory-transfer case or a discretionary-transfer case.  That 
decision turned on the acts charged in the complaint and whether the trial court 
found probable cause to believe that Smith had committed them. 
{¶ 87} The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Smith had 
committed aggravated robbery.  The aggravated-robbery statute, R.C. 2911.01, 
states that “[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft offense * * * shall 
* * *[h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the 
offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the 
offender possesses it, or use it.”  Therefore, the juvenile court found probable cause 
to believe that at the very least, one of the offenders indicated that he possessed a 
firearm during the commission of the crimes.  But while an offender may be found 
guilty of aggravated robbery by being complicit in an aggravated robbery, see R.C. 
2923.03(F), R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) requires that for a juvenile court to order a 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
37 
juvenile bound over to adult court under the mandatory-bindover provisions 
because the juvenile committed a crime with a firearm, the charged juvenile had to 
have actually had possession of the firearm.  The statute provides that a child is 
eligible for mandatory bindover when “[t]he child is alleged to have had a firearm 
on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control while committing the act 
charged and to have displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated 
possession of the firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act 
charged.”  R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b).  Therefore, the statute requires that to be eligible 
for mandatory bindover based on an aggravated robbery, a juvenile must have 
himself possessed the firearm. 
{¶ 88} In State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000), 
paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that the complicity statute does not 
apply to the juvenile-bindover criteria set forth in former R.C. 2151.26 (now R.C. 
2152.12, see Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, 9549).  That is, 
in the context of a bindover proceeding, the element of controlling a firearm cannot 
be satisfied by the activity of an accomplice. 
{¶ 89} But the determination by the juvenile court in this case that there was 
no probable cause to believe that Smith had the firearm himself did not end the 
inquiry as to whether he and the case should be transferred to the adult court.  That 
finding meant only that Smith was not subject to a mandatory transfer.  The juvenile 
court then had to decide whether transferring Smith and his case to the adult court 
was proper based on the statutory requirements of discretionary bindover. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 90} Today the majority creates an outcome by inserting its own policy-
making preferences into the language of the statute.  The majority therefore elevates 
its policy preferences over the will of the people and the people they elected to 
serve in the General Assembly who are entrusted on behalf of all Ohioans to make 
policy decisions through the enactment of laws. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
 
[T]he courts are not at large. * * * They are under the 
constraints imposed the judicial function in our democratic society.  
As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that 
the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of 
words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power 
which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. * * * A 
judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. 
Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might 
wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and 
evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. He must not 
read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction. 
 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527, 
533 (1947).  “[T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between 
adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it 
and instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do so.”  Id. at 535. 
{¶ 91} Because the plain unambiguous language of R.C. 2152.12(B) 
contemplates the transfer of a juvenile and his or her case and not just those charges 
that the juvenile court judge found probable cause for, I dissent.  I would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
39 
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. Cunliffe 
and Leah Winsberg, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Attorney General Dave Yost. 
___________________