Case Title: Villeneuve v. Town of Essex

Citation: 167 Vt. 618, 713 A.2d 815

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Villeneuve v. Town of Essex  (97-093); 167 Vt. 618; 713 A.2d 815

[Filed 18-Mar-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-093

                             DECEMBER TERM, 1997

Richard Villeneuve, et al.	}	APPEALED FROM:
                            	}
                        	}
     v.	                        }	Chittenden Superior Court
                         	}	
Town of Essex	                }
	                        }	DOCKET NO. S1482-96CnC	

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff, one of three landowners who petitioned defendant Town of
  Essex to repair the last  one-half mile of a town highway adjoining their
  land, appeals the superior court's dismissal of the  property owners'
  complaint alleging that the Town had failed to respond to their petition as 
  required under 19 V.S.A. § 971.  We reverse the dismissal and remand the
  matter for further  proceedings.

       On October 18, 1996, upon receiving the petition for repair of the
  highway, the Town's  Director of Public Works investigated the condition of
  the road and concluded that it was not in  need of repair, except for one
  location that had been disturbed by plaintiff's development of his 
  property.  Letters to that effect were personally served on the landowners
  within three days.  On  October 29, the landowners filed a complaint in
  superior court stating that the Town had not  responded to their petition
  within the time limits set forth in § 971 and requesting that the county 
  road commissioners examine the road, hold a hearing, and order the Town to
  make the necessary  repairs.

       The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, and the court granted the
  motion following a  hearing, ruling that it had no jurisdiction to
  adjudicate the dispute because the Town had responded  to the landowners'
  petition within seventy-two hours by sending them a letter refusing their
  request  to repair the road.  After the court rendered its decision, a
  county commissioner who attended the  hearing informed the court that he
  had received a letter from the attorney of one of the landowners  stating
  that the dispute should be considered by the road commissioners before
  being heard in  superior court.  The court responded that the letter had
  not been submitted into evidence and thus  could not be considered, and
  that, in any case, dismissal of the complaint filed in superior court  was
  not contrary to jurisdiction being vested with the road commissioners.

       On appeal, plaintiff does not dispute that the Town responded by
  letter to the petition within  the seventy-two-hour statutory period;
  rather, he argues that the superior court did not have subject  matter
  jurisdiction to hear the motion to dismiss because the complaint was
  pending before the  county road commissioners.  Further, he contends that §
  971 confers upon the road commissioners  authority to hear a complaint when
  the town has refused to make the requested repair, even if the  town timely
  informs the petitioners of its intention not to act.

       Under § 971, three citizens may notify town selectmen that a highway
  or bridge is out  of repair.

 

       If the town neglects for seventy-two hours to respond by either 
  denying the allegation or to commence work upon the highway or  bridge, or
  fails to continue the work in good faith . . ., the citizens  may file with
  one of the county road commissioners or the superior  court for the county
  in which the highway or bridge is situated, a  written complaint . . .
  setting forth . . . the nature of the  insufficiency.

       19 V.S.A. § 971.  The parties disagree about whether the statute
  authorizes the citizens to file a  complaint with the county road
  commissioners in the event that the town denies their allegation  within
  seventy-two hours.  The quoted sentence is ungrammatical and nonsensical as
  written.  We  can assume only that the Legislature either inadvertently
  omitted the word "failing" before the  infinitive "to commence" or intended
  to use the word "commencing" instead of "to commence."   Plaintiff suggests
  the former construction, arguing that the statute defines two ways in which
  the  town may neglect to respond, by either denying the petition or
  "failing" to commence repair work.  Thus, if the town denies a petition or
  fails to commence repairs, the statute permits the petitioning  citizens to
  file a complaint.  The Town argues, on the other hand, that the statute
  defines two ways  in which the town may respond within the statutory time
  period, by either denying the petition or  "commencing" repair work.  Under
  this interpretation, the citizens would be precluded from filing  a
  complaint if the town denied the petition within seventy-two hours.

       Upon consideration of the language of § 971 within the context of the
  entire statutory  scheme, we conclude that the superior court erred in
  dismissing plaintiff's complaint.  Under the  subchapter entitled
  "Enforcing Repairs," 19 V.S.A. §§ 970-979, if a town denies a request to
  repair  a road, the petitioning citizens may file a complaint with either
  the superior court or one of the  county road commissioners, who are
  appointed by the superior court.  See id. §§ 970-971.  In  either case, the
  complainants give the commissioners a security deposit for the cost of the 
  proceedings under the complaint.  See id. § 971.  After receiving the
  complaint and deposit, the  commissioners are required to examine the
  highway in question and conduct a hearing on the  matter.  See id. § 972. 
  Following the hearing, the commissioners must file a written report either 
  stating that the highway is not out of repair or ordering the town to make
  specified repairs.  See id.  §§ 973-974.  The report is final and
  conclusive unless the aggrieved party appeals to the superior  court within
  twenty-one days after the county clerk has filed the report and entered a
  judgment.   See id. §§ 974, 976.  If the report orders the town to make
  repairs and the town fails to complete  the repairs within the allotted
  amount of time, the commissioners must appoint an agent to spend  sums to
  make the repairs, and judgment in that amount will be entered against the
  town.  See id. §  975.

       It is plain from this statutory scheme that although the initial
  complaint may be filed either  with a single county road commissioner or
  the superior court, the road commissioners consider the  complaint in the
  first instance.  If the complaint is filed in the superior court, as
  opposed to with  one of the individual road commissioners, the superior
  court merely refers it to the county body it  appointed, which takes the
  security deposit, examines the road, holds a hearing, and files a report.  
  Only then, assuming there is an appeal, does the superior court adjudicate
  the dispute.

       Given this statutory scheme, aimed at allowing citizens to obtain
  county review of a town's  decision not to repair a road or bridge, the
  Town's interpretation of the statute -- that citizens are  precluded from
  direct review of a town's decision not to repair a road as long as the town
  sends a  letter within seventy-two hours denying the request for repairs --
  is neither

 

  reasonable nor required  by the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
  See In re R.S. Audley, Inc., 151 Vt. 513, 519,  562 A.2d 1046, 1049 (1989)
  (intent of statute should be gathered from consideration of every part  of
  statute, its subject matter, its effects and consequences, and reason and
  spirit of law); In re A.C.,  144 Vt. 37, 42,