Case Title: State v. Bassham

Citation: 2002-Ohio-797

Docket Number: 20001517

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Bassham, 94 Ohio St.3d 269, 2002-Ohio-797.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BASSHAM, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Bassham (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 269.] 
Appellate procedure — Motion for clarification of a final order does not affect 
the time requirements for filing a notice of appeal. 
(No. 00-1517 — Submitted October 17, 2001 at the Greene County Session — 
Decided February 27, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 2000CA29. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A motion for clarification of a final order does not affect the time requirements 
for filing a notice of appeal. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  At about 1:45 a.m. on September 3, 1999, 
Officer Joseph Topiah of the Beavercreek Police Department observed appellant, 
Brian J. Bassham, commit a traffic offense.  After stopping appellant’s vehicle, 
Officer Topiah detected a slight odor of alcohol coming from appellant’s mouth 
and noted that appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot.  Based on these initial 
observations, he gave appellant a series of field sobriety tests.  After the officer 
observed appellant fail one of these tests, he decided to arrest appellant.  At the 
station, appellant was given a breath-alcohol-content test (“BAC”).  Appellant 
was later charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and with a prohibited breath-alcohol content in violation of R.C. 4511.19 and with 
failure to yield when entering a road from a private drive in violation of R.C. 
4511.44. 
 
On October 5, 1999, appellant moved to suppress evidence.  After a 
hearing on the motion, a magistrate determined that the officer was justified in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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making the stop but did not have probable cause to arrest appellant for a D.U.I. 
offense.  Based on these findings, the magistrate suppressed “the officer’s 
observations” and the results of the BAC test.  On February 1, 2000, the trial court 
overruled the state’s objections to the magistrate’s findings and affirmed the 
magistrate’s decision.  On March 6, 2000, the state, appellee, filed a “motion for 
clarification” requesting a clarification as to what observations were suppressed.  
The trial court granted the motion, and in its March 15, 2000 judgment entry 
clarified that only the officer’s observations prior to the stop were admissible; the 
observations made after the stop were inadmissible.  Thereafter, the state filed its 
former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), certification and appealed this 
judgment within seven days of the entry.  The court of appeals reversed the trial 
court’s judgment and remanded the cause.  In its decision, the appellate court 
overruled appellant’s request to dismiss the appeal, finding that the appeal was 
timely filed under former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K).  This cause is now 
before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
The issue is whether the state’s appeal was timely filed.  We find that the 
appeal was untimely and that the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear 
it.  Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and dismiss the 
cause. 
 
The parties dispute which order should have been appealed.  Appellant 
argues that the appeal should have been taken from the February 1 order.  Since 
the state neglected to file a notice of appeal within seven days of this order, 
appellant maintains that the court was without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.  
However, the state asserts that there was no final appealable order until the state 
certified that it was one pursuant to former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K).  In 
this case, the state contends that it could not make this certification until the 
suppression order was clarified.  Thus, it was only after the order was clarified on 
March 15 that the decision became a final appealable order. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
Both R.C. 2945.67 and former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), 
establish the state’s right to appeal from the granting of a pretrial motion to 
suppress. R.C. 2945.67 states: 
 
“(A) A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of right any 
decision of a trial court in a criminal case * * * which decision grants * * * a 
motion to suppress evidence * * *.” 
 
Former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), defines the procedure for the 
state’s appeal: 
 
“(J) Appeal by state.  When the state takes an appeal as provided by law 
from an order suppressing or excluding evidence, the prosecuting attorney shall 
certify that:  (1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (2) the ruling 
on the motion or motions has rendered the state’s proof with respect to the 
pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective 
prosecution has been destroyed.” 
 
A final order is any order that in effect determines the case.  State v. 
Davidson (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 17 OBR 277, 279, 477 N.E.2d 1141, 
1144. In State v. Malinovsky (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 20, 22, 573 N.E.2d 22, 24, we 
recognized that where an evidentiary ruling destroys the state’s case, the ruling is 
in essence a final order from which the state may appeal.  Former Crim.R. 12(J), 
now Crim.R. 12(K), and App.R. 4(B)(4)1 further provide that the state must file 
its notice of appeal within seven days of the final order granting the motion to 
suppress. 
                                                          
 
1. 
Former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), further provides: 
 
“The appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence shall not be allowed unless 
the notice of appeal and the certification by the prosecuting attorney are filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within seven days after the date of the entry of the judgment or order granting the 
motion.  Any appeal taken under this rule shall be prosecuted diligently.” 
 
App.R. 4(B)(4) states:  “Appeal by prosecution.  In an appeal by the prosecution under 
Crim.R. 12(J) * * *, the prosecution shall file a notice of appeal within seven days of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The state’s position that the appeal time did not start running until the state 
certified the case would impermissibly allow the state to determine the time limits 
for its appeal and is contrary to the intended scope of former Crim.R. 12(J), now 
Crim.R. 12(K).  The rule provides the state with only a limited right of appeal.  It 
is an exception to the general rule prohibiting appeals by the state in criminal 
prosecutions and thus must be strictly construed.  State v. Caltrider (1975), 43 
Ohio St.2d 157, 72 O.O.2d 88, 331 N.E.2d 710, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
The February 1 order clearly states that the observations of the officer and 
the BAC results were suppressed.  This broad and unequivocal language 
destroyed the state’s ability to prosecute the case.  Without the only eyewitness’s 
observations and the test results, there was nothing left to try.  Because the state 
failed to timely avail itself of its limited appeal rights after the judgment was 
entered, the court below lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  See State v. 
Buckingham (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 14, 16, 16 O.O.3d 8, 10, 402 N.E.2d 536, 538. 
 
However, in an apparent attempt to circumvent the mandatory language of 
former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), the state, after waiting thirty-four days 
after the order, moved for clarification as to what observations of the officer were 
suppressed. 
 
Appellant argues that such a motion is a nullity and does not affect the 
time limit for an appeal.  For support, appellant cites Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of 
Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 21 O.O.3d 238, 423 N.E.2d 1105, and the 
appellate court’s own decision in State v. Flynn (Mar. 6, 1987), Montgomery 
App. No. CA10152, unreported, 1987 WL 7502. 
 
In Pitts, this court held that under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure there 
was no provision for a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment in the 
trial court.  We also determined that such a motion is a nullity, the filing of which 
does not affect the time requirements for filing a notice of appeal. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
In Flynn, the same court of appeals as in the case at bar applied Pitts and 
found that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal challenging a trial court’s ruling 
on a motion for reconsideration of a suppression order.  The appellate court 
should have followed its own decision and ruled that the motion for clarification 
did not toll the time within which the prosecution should have filed its appeal. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that a motion for clarification of a final order does 
not affect the time requirements for filing a notice of appeal.  Thus, the appellate 
court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  If the state believed that the 
original suppression order was a misapplication of the law or needed further 
refinement, it was still obligated to file its notice of appeal within seven days of 
that order.  A motion for clarification, filed thirty-four days out of time, cannot 
extend that time.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause is dismissed. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in judgment.  Each appeal 
certified by the state pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and former Crim.R. 12(J), now 
Crim.R. 12(K), is unique.  As a result, I am unable to join the syllabus or opinion, 
since the majority generalizes these appeals and fails to distinguish instances 
when an appeal may be timely even though filed outside what would normally be 
the allowable time limits. 
 
When a trial court issues an order suppressing evidence in a criminal case, 
the onus is on the prosecutor to determine whether the remaining evidence is 
enough for effective prosecution.  If the prosecutor determines that effective 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prosecution is no longer possible, the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s 
ruling within seven days.  When filing this appeal, the prosecutor must certify that 
“the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay” and that the trial court’s ruling 
has destroyed “any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution.”  Former 
Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K). 
 
The majority opinion, in equating an order to suppress evidence that is 
subject to appeal under former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), with the 
typical final appealable order at issue in Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 
Ohio St.2d 378, 21 O.O.3d 238, 423 N.E.2d 1105, fails to appreciate the nuances 
of an appeal under former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K). 
 
In State v. Bertram (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 281, 283-284, 685 N.E.2d 1239, 
1241, this court recognized the significance of the word “certify” in former 
Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K).  The rule places a good faith obligation on the 
prosecutor in the exercise of discretion when complying with the rule’s 
requirements.  The decision whether to file such an appeal is the prosecutor’s 
alone.  It is not for the trial court to make the choice required by the rule.  State v. 
Fraternal Order of Eagles Aerie 0337 Buckeye (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 166, 169, 
569 N.E.2d 478, 481.  Furthermore, it is not for the court of appeals to second-
guess the reasonableness of the prosecutor’s decision.  State v. Bertram, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
In this case, there is no question that the trial court’s ruling of February 1, 
2000, destroyed the state’s ability to effectively prosecute.  It is clear that this 
original suppression order was broader than was the order of March 15, 2000, on 
the state’s motion for clarification.  If the ruling of March 15 destroyed the state’s 
ability to prosecute, as the prosecution certified after that ruling, the order of 
February 1 destroyed the ability to prosecute to an even greater extent.  For this 
reason, I agree with the majority that based upon the facts of this case, the 
February 1 order triggered the seven-day period provided in former Crim.R. 12(J), 
January Term, 2002 
7 
now Crim.R. 12(K), and App.R. 4(B)(4).2  Therefore, I agree with the judgment 
of the majority that the state’s appeal is untimely. 
 
In this case there is no question that the prosecutor could have made the 
certification required by former Crim.R. 12(J), now Crim.R. 12(K), in good faith 
after the February 1 order without violating the rule’s certification requirement.  
However, there are some instances when a prosecutor can be placed in a dilemma 
by a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress.  A prosecutor who is faced with 
an unclear trial order cannot reasonably be expected to certify that the chance for 
effective prosecution has been destroyed until the decision of the court is 
clarified.  If the prosecutor is forced to file an appeal from an unclear order, as the 
majority’s syllabus seems to require, the prosecutor may be certifying something 
that in actuality does not destroy “any reasonable possibility of effective 
prosecution.”  In that situation, the prosecutor faces a dilemma—if the prosecutor 
does choose to file a certified appeal it may appear in hindsight that he or she did 
not act in good faith if the trial court’s order as clarified does not destroy the 
chance to prosecute, but if the prosecutor chooses not to appeal, he or she may 
lose the opportunity to appeal if the trial court’s ruling as later clarified does 
destroy the chance to prosecute. 
 
In most cases involving an appeal from an order whose finality is in 
question, an appeal can be filed as a provisional safeguard.  In those typical cases, 
the appeal that turns out to have been premature or unnecessary is simply dropped 
and the case continues in the trial court.  However, a Crim.R. 12(K) appeal is 
different, because of the rule’s certification requirement and the ethical 
implications of the rule.  A prosecutor trying to decide whether to appeal under 
                                                          
 
2. 
App.R. 4(B)(4) provides, “In an appeal by the prosecution under Crim.R. 12(J) or Juv.R. 
22(F), the prosecution shall file a notice of appeal within seven days of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed.”  App.R. 4(B)(4) thus continues to refer to Crim.R. 12(J) although it should have 
been amended to refer to Crim.R. 12(K) when Crim.R. 12 was amended and renumbered effective 
July 1, 2001. 
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Crim.R. 12(K) cannot in good faith file such a provisional appeal if he or she does 
not reasonably believe that the chance for effective prosecution has been 
destroyed—and if the trial court’s ruling is unclear, it is sometimes impossible for 
the prosecutor to make the required decision. 
 
Consequently, I believe that there are situations in which a motion for 
clarification of an order suppressing evidence should extend the time for filing a 
notice of appeal.  The seven-day period for filing an appeal pursuant to Crim.R. 
12(K) cannot begin to run when an order is so ambiguous that it does not allow 
the prosecutor to make a reasoned decision whether an appeal is appropriate.  In 
such a situation, the appeal time should begin to run only when the ambiguous 
order has been clarified. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph W. Stadnicar, Beavercreek Prosecutor, for appellee. 
 
Michael A. Buckwalter, for appellant. 
 
W. Andrew Hasselbach, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________