Case Title: Harris v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5587

Docket Number: 20061247

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Harris v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 116 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5587.] 
 
 
HARRIS, GDN., APPELLEE, v. MT. SINAI MEDICAL CENTER ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Harris v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 116 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5587.] 
Appellate review – Motions for new trial – Excessive verdict given under 
influence of passion or prejudice and misconduct of counsel – Reviewing 
court must affirm order granting new trial when competent, credible 
evidence supports the order. 
(No. 2006-1247 – Submitted May 23, 2007 – Decided October 25, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 85286, 
85574, and 85605, 166 Ohio App.3d 647, 2006-Ohio-2206. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding of an 
excessive verdict given under passion or prejudice or misconduct of 
counsel, the order granting a new trial is not an abuse of discretion and 
should remain undisturbed. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Mt. Sinai Medical Center, Ronald Jordan, M.D., and Northeast 
Ohio Neighborhood Health Services, Inc. (“Northeast”) appeal from a decision of 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court’s order 
awarding them a new trial and remanded the cause to the trial court to consider 
motions for remittitur of damages and for prejudgment interest.  The appeal 
resulted from a $30 million jury verdict arising out of claimed medical 
malpractice during the birth of Walter Hollins in 1987. 
{¶ 2} The major focus of this appeal concerns the standard of review by 
an appellate court in considering a motion for new trial granted pursuant to Civ.R. 
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59.  Because the appellate court here applied a correct standard but did so 
improperly, we are constrained to reverse that decision and reinstate the judgment 
of the trial court ordering a new trial. 
{¶ 3} In 1998, Mark McLeod, Walter Hollins’s guardian,1 filed this 
action seeking damages from Mt. Sinai, Northeast, and Jordan, alleging 
negligence against Dr. Jordan, who delivered Walter by Cesarean section (“C-
section”), and his employer, Northeast, and further alleging negligence against 
agents and employees of Mt. Sinai Hospital, where the birth occurred.  
Specifically, the complaint asserted that a delay in conducting the procedure 
resulted in Walter’s mental retardation and other severe and permanent injuries.  
To the contrary, appellants maintained that intrauterine growth retardation, 
evidenced by fused joints, a grossly underweight placenta, and birth asphyxia, i.e., 
oxygen deprivation, precipitated Walter’s condition. 
{¶ 4} After a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
McLeod for $30 million:  $15 million in economic damages and $15 million in 
noneconomic damages. 
{¶ 5} In response to the verdict, Mt. Sinai, Northeast, and Jordan moved 
alternatively for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and Mt. 
Sinai moved in the alternative for remittitur.  The trial court granted the motions 
for a new trial and denied the other motions as moot.  In its written opinion, the 
trial court articulated several bases supporting its decision. 
{¶ 6} The first of these grounds was an excessive verdict appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.  Civ.R. 59(A)(4).  
The court reviewed the economic and noneconomic damages awards, finding the 
economic-damages award excessive and the noneconomic-damages award to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
                                                          
 
1.  While this case was pending in the court of appeals, McLeod was replaced as guardian by 
Regina Harris, who was formally substituted as a party by motion.   
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3 
{¶ 7} With regard to the economic-damages award, Dr. Harvey S. 
Rosen, McLeod’s economic expert on the cost of health care during Walter’s life 
expectancy, prepared a report in which he detailed that the potential cost of caring 
for Walter ranged between $4,390,992 and $6,501,443, and did not include any 
RN or LPN care.  At trial, however, McLeod’s counsel asked Rosen what the cost 
would be figuring in both RN and LPN care, despite the omission of any such 
evidence in Rosen’s expert report.  Appellants objected, but the trial court 
permitted Rosen to testify that such care would cost $13,042,026 for LPN care 
and $14,295,993 for RN care, a total that reflected more than double the highest 
estimate for all other expenses, including medical care, therapy, attendant care, 
housing, and transportation needs.  Moreover, the trial court indicated that the 
evidence adduced at trial revealed the total cost of Walter’s care for the previous 
17 years to be $107,000.  The court admitted that its ruling allowing Rosen to 
testify about these costs was error and that it violated Loc.R. 21.1(B) and cases 
interpreting that rule.  It concluded that this evidence had a strong influence on 
the jury and that “there was no medical basis for this testimony.” 
{¶ 8} As to the noneconomic-damages award, the court noted that 
“[t]here was no evidence that Walter suffers regular, continuing pain,” and it 
further stated that “when called upon to award non-economic damages, the jury 
simply matched the $15,000,000 it had already awarded for economic damages, 
as [appellee’s counsel] had essentially asked them to do.”  The court concluded 
that “[t]he award of $15,000,000 for non-economic damages in this case is so out-
of-line and unjustified that it must have been the result of passion or prejudice.” 
{¶ 9} In addition to the excessive damages given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice, the trial court detailed the misconduct of McLeod’s counsel.  
Civ.R. 59(A)(2).  The court described counsel’s conduct as “discourteous” and 
“theatrical,” including “constant interruption of opposing counsel without 
bothering to object and obtain a ruling” so that he could “convey to the jury his 
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own idea of what the witness should be saying, thus testifying for the witness, 
rather then [sic] making a genuine and valid objection to the question.”  These 
interruptions, for example, included statements such as “This is all made up,” and 
“where did he come up with that, Judge?” and were asserted with no 
accompanying objection.  This type of conduct became so prevalent that the trial 
judge admonished counsel during a conference outside the presence of the jury. 
{¶ 10} Moreover, the trial court found that counsel intentionally and 
repeatedly mischaracterized testimony in an attempt to mislead or confuse the 
jury.  Although not specified by the trial court, McLeod’s counsel repeatedly 
confused the difference between a “stat” C-section procedure and an “emergency” 
C-section procedure, despite clarification by multiple witnesses and the court.  As 
an attending nurse testified, “a stat C section is done immediately.  Emergency 
means it’s not scheduled.”  The terms had materially different meanings, and 
counsel repeatedly blurred this distinction in order to manipulate the jury into 
believing that Walter’s “emergency” C-section was more urgent than that term 
actually implied. 
{¶ 11} Also, counsel engaged in improper questioning of his own expert 
witness, Dr. Rosen.  During the direct examination of Rosen, counsel asked Rosen 
to confirm that his economic cost figures did not reflect attorney fees for pursuing 
this action.  Appellants objected to the question, and the court gave a curative 
instruction.  But the trial judge, in the order granting a new trial, determined that 
the question “raised the matter of attorney fees in the minds of the jurors” and that 
the curative instruction did not remedy that effect. 
{¶ 12} The trial court also found that counsel exceeded the bounds of 
zealous advocacy by accusing the witnesses for the defense of “prevarication” and 
making this a theme for his entire case despite having no evidence of a cover-up.  
The extent of this theme is evidenced by counsel’s closing argument, in which he 
referred repeatedly to a spoliation-of-evidence claim that the trial court had 
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5 
previously dismissed via directed verdict.  Counsel’s closing argument ignored 
this ruling and referred to the alleged cover-up several times.  Without any 
evidence supporting the claim that any of the appellants intentionally acted to 
destroy evidence of negligence, counsel’s statements bore no relevance to the case 
and appealed only to the jury’s passion or prejudice. 
{¶ 13} Counsel also injected race and economic status into his closing 
argument, emphasizing that Walter was a poor, black child, while the health-care 
providers were powerful, wealthy corporations and doctors.  These considerations 
have no place in evidence during trial and have no purpose in final argument, as 
they are extraneous to the evidence and the law and are designed to inflame the 
prejudice of the jury. 
{¶ 14} As additional grounds for awarding a new trial, the trial court 
found that its failure to permit voir dire of the jury panel regarding a front-page 
article published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer about the trial just prior to their 
deliberation prevented counsel from determining whether any juror should have 
been excused and constituted an irregularity in the proceeding.  Civ.R. 59(A)(1).  
Instead of conducting or permitting a voir dire on the record, the trial court simply 
instructed the jury, off the record in the hallway outside of the courtroom, to 
disregard the article.  Several jurors admitted to reading the article, and the trial 
court found, based on the contents of the article, that “some jurors may have 
found that the opportunity to return a record verdict in this County was 
irresistible.” 
{¶ 15} Following the trial court’s order, McLeod filed a motion for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and an affidavit seeking disqualification 
of the trial court judge.  In response, the trial judge voluntarily recused himself 
from further proceedings. 
{¶ 16} While the motion for relief from judgment remained pending in the 
trial court, McLeod filed a notice of appeal with the Cuyahoga County Court of 
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Appeals.  Mt. Sinai cross-appealed, maintaining that the trial court’s order 
granting a new trial did not moot its motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (“JNOV”) because a favorable ruling on the JNOV would preclude the 
need for a new trial.  The appellate court remanded the matter for a ruling on the 
motion for relief from judgment. 
{¶ 17} Due to the trial judge’s recusal, a different judge granted the 
motion for relief from judgment and reinstated the jury’s original $30 million 
verdict.  Mt. Sinai, Northeast, and Jordan appealed that judgment to the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 18} The appellate court consolidated McLeod’s appeal challenging the 
trial court’s order granting a new trial with Mt. Sinai’s appeal from the order 
granting relief from judgment and Northeast and Jordan’s appeal from the same 
order.  The other matters before the court of appeals were Mt. Sinai’s cross-appeal 
of the trial court’s denial of its motion for JNOV regarding the application of 
agency by estoppel and McLeod’s appeal from the trial court’s order directing a 
verdict on the spoliation-of-evidence claim. 
{¶ 19} The appellate court first determined the motion for relief from 
judgment to be an improper attempt at an appeal, and it therefore held it to be a 
nullity.  McLeod v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 166 Ohio App.3d 647, 2006-Ohio-2206, 
852 N.E.2d 1235, ¶ 16.  It further affirmed the trial court’s denial of Mt. Sinai’s 
motions for directed verdict and JNOV, and it affirmed the directed verdict 
regarding McLeod’s spoliation claim.  Id. at ¶ 50 and 55.  Finally, it reversed the 
trial court order granting a new trial and remanded the matter for consideration of 
the motion for remittitur of damages.  The court held that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in awarding a new trial, reasoning that “so long as the verdict 
is supported by substantial competent credible evidence, the jury verdict is 
presumed to be correct and the trial court must refrain from granting a new trial.”  
Id. at ¶ 28.  One member of the court of appeals panel filed a separate opinion 
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dissenting in part, urging that the trial court had a reasonable basis to award a new 
trial on the grounds of counsel’s misconduct and the excessive verdict given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
{¶ 20} We accepted the discretionary appeal of Mt. Sinai, Northeast, and 
Dr. Jordan with respect to the narrow issue regarding appellate review of an order 
granting a motion for new trial.  We will further address Mt. Sinai’s argument 
regarding the application of agency by estoppel. 
Grounds for New Trial 
{¶ 21} Mt. Sinai, Northeast, and Dr. Jordan argue that the appellate court 
employed an incorrect standard of review because, in their view, the weight and 
competency of the evidence supporting a verdict are irrelevant when considering 
whether a trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial.  McLeod 
contends that the appellate court used the correct standard and that the evidence 
supports the jury verdict regardless of his counsel’s conduct, the size of the 
damages award, or any trial irregularities. 
{¶ 22} Civ.R. 59(A), which establishes the grounds for a new trial, 
provides: 
{¶ 23} “(A) A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues upon any of the following grounds: 
{¶ 24} “(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, magistrate, or 
prevailing party, or any order of the court or magistrate, or abuse of discretion, by 
which an aggrieved party was prevented from having a fair trial; 
{¶ 25} “(2) Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party; 
{¶ 26} “(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against; 
{¶ 27} “(4) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice; 
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{¶ 28} “(5) Error in the amount of recovery, whether too large or too 
small, when the action is upon a contract or for the injury or detention of property; 
{¶ 29} “(6) The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence; 
however, only one new trial may be granted on the weight of the evidence in the 
same case; 
{¶ 30} “(7) The judgment is contrary to law; 
{¶ 31} “(8) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, 
which with reasonable diligence he could not have discovered and produced at 
trial; 
{¶ 32} “(9) Error of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention 
of the trial court by the party making the application. 
{¶ 33} “In addition to the above grounds, a new trial may also be granted 
in the sound discretion of the court for good cause shown. 
{¶ 34} “When a new trial is granted, the court shall specify in writing the 
grounds upon which such new trial is granted.” 
{¶ 35} This court has previously held that “[w]here a trial court is 
authorized to grant a new trial for a reason which requires the exercise of a sound 
discretion, the order granting a new trial may be reversed only upon a showing of 
abuse of discretion by the trial court.”  Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 
52 O.O.2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685, paragraph one of the syllabus.  An abuse of 
discretion “ ‘connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the 
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’ ”  Blakemore v. 
Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140, quoting 
State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144. 
{¶ 36} Here, Mt. Sinai, Northeast, and Dr. Jordan asserted that the jury 
verdict was excessive and given under the influence of passion or prejudice 
pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(4), and, in conformity with Civ.R. 59(A)(2), that 
misconduct by McLeod’s counsel tainted the verdict. The important consideration 
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9 
for trial judges considering a motion on either of these bases is the evidence 
establishing grounds for a new trial, not the evidence supporting the jury’s 
verdict.  Thus, where competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial 
court’s finding of an excessive verdict given under passion or prejudice or 
misconduct of counsel, the order granting a new trial is not an abuse of discretion 
and should remain undisturbed.  As we stated in Pesek v. Univ. Neurologists 
Assn., Inc. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 495, 721 N.E.2d 1011, “if ‘there is room for 
doubt whether the verdict was rendered upon the evidence, or may have been 
influenced by improper remarks of counsel, that doubt should be resolved in favor 
of the defeated party.’ ”  Id. at 502, 721 N.E.2d 1011, quoting Warder, Bushnell 
& Glessner Co. v. Jacobs (1898), 58 Ohio St. 77, 85, 50 N.E. 97.  In situations 
such as this one, appellate courts should defer to trial judges, who witnessed the 
trial firsthand and relied upon more than a cold record to justify a decision.  
Mannion v. Sandel (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 318, 322, 744 N.E.2d 759. 
{¶ 37} In ordering a new trial, the court admitted error in permitting 
Rosen to testify as to the costs of providing RN or LPN care for Walter, which 
went beyond his report.  This resulted in testimony of economic damages more 
than twice the amount contained in Rosen’s written report, which the jury 
apparently relied on when considering noneconomic damages.  Thus, competent, 
credible evidence supports the trial court’s decision to award a new trial on this 
basis. 
{¶ 38} Competent, credible evidence, as illustrated above, also supports 
the granting of a new trial on the basis of misconduct of a prevailing party.  
Civ.R. 59(A)(2) applies to both a party and to counsel.  See Stephens v. Vick 
Express, Inc., Butler App. Nos. CA2002-03-066 and CA2002-03-074, 2003-Ohio-
1611, ¶ 31.  As the court in Stephens noted, “The determination of whether 
alleged misconduct of counsel was sufficient to taint the verdict with passion or 
prejudice ordinarily lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  Id., citing 
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Lance v. Leohr (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 297, 298, 9 OBR 544, 459 N.E.2d 1315.  
In exercising this discretion, trial courts have a “ ‘duty in the executive control of 
the trial to see that counsel do not create an atmosphere which is surcharged with 
passion or prejudice and in which the fair and impartial administration of justice 
cannot be accomplished.’ ”  Pesek, 87 Ohio St.3d at 501, 721 N.E.2d 1011, 
quoting Jones v. Macedonia-Northfield Banking Co. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 341, 
351, 8 O.O. 108, 7 N.E.2d 544.  This duty includes ordering a new trial when 
misconduct of counsel affected the outcome, and we find sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court’s decision in that regard. 
{¶ 39} Having established these grounds, we turn to the appellate court’s 
decision to remand the case for a remittitur of damages.  In Wightman v. Consol. 
Rail Corp. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 444, 715 N.E.2d 546, we indicated the 
factors that a trial court must find before ordering a remittitur:  “(1) unliquidated 
damages are assessed by a jury, (2) the verdict is not influenced by passion or 
prejudice, (3) the award is excessive, and (4) the plaintiff agrees to the reduction 
in damages.”  (Emphasis added.)  According to the trial court’s order granting a 
new trial, counsel’s conduct represented an “effort[] to appeal to the jury’s natural 
sympathy through passion and prejudice.”  In addition, the trial court admitted its 
error regarding Dr. Rosen’s testimony, which finds no support in his pretrial 
report.  Both the improper expert testimony and the alleged misconduct 
functioned to taint more than just the amount of the verdict; indeed, they tainted 
the jury’s finding of liability itself.  Therefore, a remittitur would not be a proper 
remedy pursuant to Wightman. 
{¶ 40} In this case, then, competent, credible evidence supports the trial 
court’s decision to award a new trial, and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in making such an order.  And because the case involves a verdict 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice and tainted by misconduct of 
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counsel, remittitur is not the proper remedy.  Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121, ¶ 184-185. 
Agency By Estoppel 
{¶ 41} Mt. Sinai further argues that the trial court erred by denying its 
motion for JNOV regarding the application of agency by estoppel.  Specifically, 
the hospital urges that the trial court should have precluded evidence as to any 
possible negligence on the part of anesthesiologist Dr. Bechara Hatoum because 
McLeod did not join him as a party, and it relies on our decision in Comer v. 
Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, in support. 
{¶ 42} Walter’s guardian maintains that Comer does not apply, because 
the jury never found any negligence on the part of Dr. Hatoum, thus mooting any 
question of agency by estoppel. 
{¶ 43} In Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 435, 628 N.E.2d 46, syllabus, this court held that “[a] hospital may be held 
liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the negligence of independent 
medical practitioners practicing in the hospital when: (1) it holds itself out to the 
public as a provider of medical services; and (2) in the absence of notice or 
knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to the 
individual practitioner, to provide competent medical care.” 
{¶ 44} We limited the application of Clark in Comer, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 
2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 28, where we held that “agency by estoppel 
is a derivative claim of vicarious liability whereby the liability of the hospital 
must flow through the independent-contractor physician.  Consequently, there can 
be no viable claim for agency by estoppel if the statute of limitations against the 
independent contractor physician has expired.”  Reasoning that “a direct claim 
against a hospital premised solely upon the negligence of an agent who cannot be 
found liable” would be contrary to basic agency principles, id. at ¶ 25, Comer 
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precluded application of the agency-by-estoppel doctrine in cases where the 
agent’s potential liability had been extinguished by operation of law. 
{¶ 45} In this instance, McLeod failed to join Hatoum as a party to the 
action, but this failure does not render the doctrine of agency by estoppel 
inapplicable.  As the court of appeals notes, the doctrine can also apply based 
upon the allegedly negligent actions of the nurses attending Walter’s birth.  
Because there is substantial competent evidence to support the party against 
whom the motion for JNOV was made (i.e., McLeod), upon which evidence 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, Estate of Cowling v. Estate 
of Cowling, 109 Ohio St.3d 276, 2006-Ohio-2418, 847 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 31, the trial 
court did not err in denying this motion.  Any questions regarding the 
admissibility of evidence establishing Dr. Hatoum’s alleged negligence are 
properly left to the trial court on remand of this matter. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 46} When in the exercise of discretion a trial court decides to grant a 
new trial and that decision is supported by competent, credible evidence, a 
reviewing court must defer to the trial court.  In such a case, the reviewing court 
may not independently assess whether the verdict was supported by the evidence, 
because the issue is not whether the verdict is supported by competent, credible 
evidence, but rather whether the court’s decision to grant the new trial is 
supported by competent, credible evidence.  And in this instance, a remittitur of 
damages is not the proper remedy, because the verdict was given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice and tainted by misconduct of counsel.  
Therefore, a new trial must be ordered. 
{¶ 47} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
reinstate the trial court’s order granting a new trial; however, we affirm the 
appellate court with respect to its ruling regarding the application of agency by 
estoppel. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 48} I dissent because I agree with the appellate court’s determination 
that a retrial is not appropriate in this case but that a remittitur is appropriate.  The 
jury’s finding on damages, not on liability, is the only issue here.  The 
excessiveness of the jury’s verdict on economic damages resulted not from 
passion and prejudice but from unsupported testimony from one of the appellee’s 
experts as to the cost of nursing care.  To order a retrial because of the obnoxious 
behavior of an attorney does our system of justice no favors – such behavior must 
be dealt with as it occurs, not after a judge decides that a party may have 
benefited from it.  Such a reversal does not reflect the effective administration of 
justice. 
{¶ 49} Since all the parties in this case, which was filed nearly a decade 
ago, deserve a resolution, and because the power to order a remittitur is not 
limited to trial courts, Shaffer v. Maier (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 416, 627 N.E.2d 
986, this court should order a $20 million remittitur in this case, reducing the jury 
verdict to $10 million.  That amount has a more realistic connection to the 
evidence as to economic damages – the $6.5 million testified to by the plaintiff’s 
expert for the cost of Walter’s care plan — than did the jury’s verdict.  Should the 
plaintiff refuse the remittitur, he would be entitled to a new trial.  Before that trial, 
it would be wise for the trial judge to deny any motion for admission pro hac vice 
filed on behalf of Mr. Fieger. 
__________________ 
Beam & Raymond Associates and Jack Beam, for appellee. 
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Tucker, Ellis & West L.L.P., and Irene C. Keyse-Walker; and Reminger & 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Marc W. Groedel, and Marilena DiSilvio, for appellant Mt. 
Sinai Medical Center. 
Jones Day, Mark Herrmann, and Pearson N. Bownas; and Sutter, 
O’Connell & Farchione, Joseph A. Farchione Jr., and Thomas H. Terry III, for 
appellants Ronald Jordan, M.D., and Northeast Ohio Neighborhood Health 
Services, Inc. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Catherine Ballard, Anne Marie Sferra, and 
Bobbie S. Sprader, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Hospital Association, 
Ohio State Medical Association, and American Medical Association. 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., and Loriann E. Fuhrer, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Community Health Centers. 
Wood & Berliner, P.L.L.C., Brett M. Wood, and Deborah E. Berliner, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Life Legal Defense Foundation. 
______________________