Case Title: City of North Little Rock and North Little Rock Airport Commission v. Pulaski County, Arkansas and B. A. McIntosh, Pulaski County Assessor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
CITY of NORTH LITTLE ROCK and North Little
Rock Airport Commission v. PULASKI COUNTY,
Arkansas and B.A. McIntosh, Pulaski County
Assessor

97-714                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 16, 1998


1.   Statutes -- presumption of constitutional validity -- when
     struck down. -- In reviewing the constitutionality of
     legislative acts, the supreme court starts with a presumption
     of constitutional validity; statutes will not be struck down
     unless they clearly and unmistakably conflict with the
     constitution.

2.   Taxation -- property exempt from ad valorem taxes -- term
     "public purpose" not easily defined. -- The Arkansas
     Constitution specifically exempts from ad valorem taxes public
     property used exclusively for public purposes; the meaning of
     the phrase "public purpose" is not exact, nor is it prone to
     a static definition; the supreme court looks to legislative
     language for such pronouncements.

3.   Statutes -- legislative public-purpose declaration -- when
     reversed. -- An act must prevail unless there is something in
     the Arkansas Constitution that restrains the legislature from
     saying that a designated course of conduct or a policy is for
     the public welfare, or unless the thing authorized is so
     demonstrably wrong that reasonable people would not believe
     that this was the legislative intent; a legislative public-
     purpose declaration will be reversed only if the legislature
     acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.  

4.   Statutes -- part of act invalid -- determination as to whether
     entire act must fail. -- In determining whether the invalidity
     of part of an act is fatal to the entire legislation, the
     supreme court looks to (1) whether a single purpose is meant
     to be accomplished by the act, and (2) whether the sections of
     the act are interrelated and dependent upon each other.

5.   Statutes -- severability clause included in act -- clause not
     determinative as to whether act can stand. -- Although a
     severability clause is included in an act, that factor alone
     is not determinative as to whether the act can stand, despite
     the invalidity of part of it. 

6.   Statutes -- clear purpose of Act 438 was to undertake 
     function reserved to judiciary -- Act struck in its entirety.
     -- The clear purpose of Act 438 of 1995 was to undertake a
     function which is reserved to the judiciary, that is, the
     declaration of property exempt from ad valorem taxes because
     of its exclusive use for public purposes; the provisions of
     the act were dependent upon each other and interrelated and
     evinced the General Assembly's intent to pass the act as a
     whole or not at all; the supreme court found a clear
     distinction between the General Assembly's legitimate
     declaration of what is a public purpose and a per se
     determination by the General Assembly that certain private
     property is actually used exclusively for public purposes, and
     thus exempt from tax; the latter is a judicial function
     performed only after appropriate fact-finding by the trial
     court; therefore, Act 438 was struck in its entirety.

7.   Statutes -- Hogue case emphasized by dissent -- case
     inapplicable. -- The dissent emphasized the court's holding in
     Hogue v. Housing Authority of North Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263,
     144 S.W.2d 49 (1940), where it was held that the Housing
     Authorities Act was constitutional; absent in the analysis in
     Hogue was any discussion of separation of powers or any
     consideration of whether the General Assembly had overstepped
     its bounds in declaring a tax exemption; accordingly, because
     the separation-of-powers issue was not reached or even
     considered in Hogue, it was not governing authority for the
     case at hand.


8.   Statutes -- allegation concerning appraisal and assessment
     unsupported by proof -- no basis for reversal. --  Where
     appellants' allegation of an untimely assessment was made
     using only the "Notice of Property Revaluation" as proof, the
     appellant failed to satisfy its burden of proving when the
     appraisal and assessment occurred; notice of assessment is not
     proof of when the assessment actually occurred; the date of a
     notice of revaluation is not conclusive proof of when the
     assessment actually took place; because the appellants did not
     meet their burden in this regard, there was no basis for
     reversal.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John Ward, Judge; affirmed.
     Timothy Davis Fox, for appellants.
     Karla M. Burnett, Ass't County Att'y and Amanda Mankin, Staff
Att'y, for appellees.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellants City of North Little Rock and the North Little Rock
Airport Commission (jointly referred to in this opinion as North
Little Rock) filed an amended appeal in circuit court from a
decision of the Pulaski County Court that affirmed the assessment
for ad valorem tax purposes of eleven parcels of real property
located within the domain of the North Little Rock Municipal
Airport.  North Little Rock claimed that Act 438 of 1995 designated
the eleven parcels as public property and, thus, the parcels should
be exempt from taxation under Ark. Const. art. 16,  5, and removed
from the County tax rolls.  North Little Rock also requested that
the property tax assessments for the years 1992 through 1995 be
declared null and void.
     Appellees, Pulaski County and the County Assessor (County),
answered and moved for a declaratory judgment on the grounds (1)
that Act 438 of 1995 should not be given retroactive effect; and
(2) that Act 438 violated Ark. Const. art. 16,  6, which renders
void any law exempting property from taxation other than as
provided in the Arkansas Constitution. 
     The circuit court agreed with the County and entered an order
declaring that the General Assembly had violated the separation-of-
powers doctrine when it enacted Act 438 of 1995.  See Ark. Const.
art. 4,  2.  It did so, according to the court, by usurping the
judicial fact-finding function and by declaring through legislation
that airport property is acquired and held exclusively for public
purposes.  The circuit court further determined that because Act
438 established that certain airport property was per se exempt as
being used exclusively for public purposes under Ark. Const. art.
16,  5(b), this violated the proscription against laws exempting
property from taxation other than as provided in the Arkansas
Constitution.  See Ark. Const. art. 16,  6.  The matter then went
to hearing before the court on the issues of whether the eleven
parcels were exempt after this court's opinion in City of Little
Rock v. McIntosh, 319 Ark. 423,