Case Title: People v. Olender

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98932

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 98932-Agenda 7-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
VALDY OLENDER et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed December 15, 2005.
	CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether the General Assembly violated the
single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, §8(d)) when it enacted Public Act 88-669 (Pub. Act
88-669, eff. November 29, 1994). The legislation in Public Act
88-669, entitled "An Act in relation to government regulation,"
amended, among other statutes, section 1301 of the Illinois Income
Tax Act (35 ILCS 5/1301 (West 1994)), to state that a first violation
of that section is a Class 4 felony and each subsequent violation is a
Class 3 felony. The defendants, Valdy and Malgorzata Olender, had
been charged under the amended version of section 1301. Defendants
moved to dismiss the indictments against them on the ground that
section 1301 had been unconstitutionally amended by Public Act
88-669 in violation of the single subject clause. The circuit court of
Cook County granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The State
appealed directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a)
(134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court and hold that Public Act 88-669 violates
the single subject clause.
BACKGROUND
	On March 25, 2002, defendants were charged by indictment with
two counts of filing a fraudulent income tax return in violation of
section 1301 (35 ILCS 5/1301 (West 2002)). Count I charged that
defendants had willfully filed a fraudulent Illinois income tax return for
the year 1998. The indictment alleged that defendants listed $0 on the
line for adjusted gross income when they knew that their adjusted
gross income for 1998 was in excess of that amount. Count II charged
that defendants had willfully filed a fraudulent Illinois income tax
return for the year 1999. Count II charged that defendants listed $0 on
the line for adjusted gross income when they knew that their adjusted
gross income for 1999 was in excess of that amount.
	As noted, defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictments on
the ground that Public Act 88-669, which amended the version of
section 1301 at issue, was enacted in violation of the single subject
clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
§8(d)). Defendants argued that the provisions of Public Act 88-669
had no natural and logical connection to a single subject. Following
argument, the circuit court, without stating the basis for its decision,
entered an order granting defendants' motions to dismiss, discharging
defendants, and releasing defendants from all conditions of their
previous bonds.
ANALYSIS
	On appeal, the State first argues that the defendants lack standing
to challenge the Act based upon the single subject clause given the
nine-year delay between the passage of Public Act 88-669 (the Act)
on November 29, 1994, and defendants' challenge to the Act in
October 2003. In support of its argument, the State cites this court's
decision in Meister v. Carbaugh, 310 Ill. 486 (1923), and the
appellate court's decision in Durjak v. Thompson, 144 Ill. App. 3d
594 (1986).
	In Meister, the plaintiff sought a declaration that " 'An act
relating to civil service in park systems' " be declared unconstitutional
and void and sought an injunction restraining the Civil Service Board
of the South Park Commissioners from proceeding thereunder.
Meister, 310 Ill.  at 487. The plaintiff challenged the act on the ground
that the act was passed in violation of section 13 of article IV of the
Illinois Constitution of 1870 (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, §13), which
required that "the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed
before the vote is taken on its final passage." Meister, 310 Ill.  at 487.
The dispute concerned section 11 of the Park Civil Service Act, which
contained exemptions. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 488. A Senate amendment
to section 11 of the bill provided for exemptions including " 'All
elective officers, the general superintendent, the attorneys, the chief
of police and one confidential clerk or secretary.' " Meister, 310 Ill. 
at 488. A conference committee report recommended that the words
"chief of police" be stricken from section 11. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 487.
However, the conference committee report was not printed in either
house before the houses voted on the version of the bill that omitted
the words "chief of police." Meister, 310 Ill.  at 487.
	In addressing the plaintiff's argument, this court noted that a
material consideration of the two houses in enacting the law was the
deletion of the words "chief of police." Meister, 310 Ill.  at 488. Thus,
if the constitutional objections were properly taken, this court could
not hold section 11 constitutional, nor could section 11 of the act be
held invalid and the remainder of the act sustained. Meister, 310 Ill. 
at 488. This court noted, however, that the act at issue had been
passed by the General Assembly 12 years earlier and had been acted
upon since that time. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 488. In addition, the act had
been amended by the General Assembly at a succeeding session and
had constituted a part of the state's legislative policy for a number of
years. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 488. This court therefore concluded that the
plaintiff lacked standing to contest the validity of the act. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 489.
	In so holding, this court noted that the constitutional provision at
issue had been adopted to prevent surprise in the enactment of
legislation. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 489. Although there had been no prior
decisions upon the constitutionality of the act, the act had gone into
operation and had been applied for substantially 12 years without
contest. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 489. This court stated that:
		"We do not lay down a principle that constitutional
provisions of this character regarding legislative procedure
must be availed of promptly, but we do regard it as improper
for us to upset, on a basis such as this, a law long applied
without constitutional question. We are of the opinion that
under facts such as these, parties seeking to contest the
validity of a law have lost by some eleven or twelve years'
delay any standing that they might otherwise have in this
court." Meister, 310 Ill.  at 489.
	In Durjak, the plaintiff sought to challenge the procedure under
which the Income Tax Act had been enacted. Durjak v. Thompson,
144 Ill. App. 3d 594 (1986). As in Meister, the plaintiff claimed that
the Income Tax Act had not been enacted in accordance with section
13 of article IV of the 1870 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1870, art.
IV, §13), which required that a bill be read at large on three different
days in each house and that the bill and its amendments be printed
before the vote on its final passage. Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 595.
The circuit court denied plaintiff leave to file a complaint and the
appellate court affirmed. Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 595.
	The appellate court found that the Meister decision controlled.
Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 596. The appellate court noted that the
Illinois Income Tax Act had been enacted 16 years prior to plaintiff's
challenge and had been repeatedly amended by the General Assembly
since its original enactment. Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 596-97. As in
Meister, the constitutional defect alleged was "simply that the bill and
the amendments to it were not printed before the vote was taken on
its final passage." Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 597. Moreover, the
constitutionality of the Income Tax Act had been passed upon by the
courts. Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 597. The appellate court therefore
concluded that under the circumstances, the plaintiff lacked standing
to maintain his constitutional challenge. Durjak, 144 Ill. App. 3d at
597.
	The State argues that the instant case presents the same situation
and concerns as those present in Meister and Durjak. The State notes
that Public Act 88-669 was enacted nine years prior to defendants'
challenge to the Act. During that time, the provisions of the Act have
been subsequently amended, and it is reasonable to presume that in the
past nine years, the provisions of the Act had been relied upon by
every branch of the Illinois government. The State argues that the
constitutional challenge in this case is similar to the challenges in
Meister and Durjak, because the challenge in this case is based upon
the constitutional requirement for the passage of legislation rather than
a substantive defect in the provisions of the statute. The single subject
requirement is contained in the same subsection of the constitution as
the printing requirement and is intended to ensure that legislation is
not passed without adequate consideration by the legislature and to
prevent passage of a bill containing unrelated subjects. The State
maintains that Meister controls, so that the circuit court's order
granting defendants' motions to dismiss must be reversed.
	In response, defendants argue that the State has failed to consider
this court's precedent concerning the standing of a defendant in a
criminal case to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute.
Defendants cite the principle that a court will not consider the validity
of a statutory provision unless the person challenging the statutory
provision is directly affected by it or the unconstitutional feature is so
pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid. See, e.g., People v.
Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d 472, 480-81 (1972). Moreover, this court has
recognized that a person has standing to challenge the validity of a
statute if he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the statute. People v.
Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1976). Defendants note that, under the
current version of section 1301, they were charged with two Class 4
felonies. However, under the prior version of section 1301, a first
violation of section 1301 was a Class A misdemeanor. Because Public
Act 88-669 significantly increased the penalty for a violation of
section 1301 from a misdemeanor to a felony, defendants contend that
they clearly are within the class of persons directly affected by the
unconstitutional enactment of Public Act 88-669. Further, because
defendants are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of enforcement of the statute, they clearly have standing to
challenge the validity of the statute, so that Meister does not apply.
	We agree with defendants that Meister and Durjak are
distinguishable from the instant case. The acts at issue in Meister and
Durjak were civil, and the facts of those cases suggest that the
challenges brought by the plaintiffs in those cases could have been
brought at any time after the acts at issue were enacted. Given that
fact, this court in Meister concluded that the plaintiff had "lost by
some eleven or twelve years' delay any standing they might otherwise
have in this court." Meister, 310 Ill.  at 489. This court expressly
stated that it was not holding that constitutional challenges to
legislative procedure must be availed of promptly, but instead was
holding that under the circumstances of the case before it, it would
not allow the plaintiff to contest the validity of the statute at such a
late date. Meister, 310 Ill.  at 489.
	Here, in contrast, defendants' challenge is to a criminal statute.
Consequently, defendants did not have standing to challenge the
statute until they were indicted and charged with violating the statute
in March 2002. It is well settled that a party who challenges a statute
as unconstitutional must bring himself within the class aggrieved by
the alleged unconstitutionality. Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d  at 6. A party has
standing to challenge the validity of a statute if he has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
enforcement of the statute. Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d  at 8. Defendants did
not sustain, nor were they in immediate danger of sustaining, some
direct injury as a result of enforcement of the statute at issue until they
were indicted. See Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d  at 8 ("Once [defendant] was
indicted, he was in immediate danger of being convicted of a Class 3
felony pursuant to the enforcement of the Cannabis Control Act").
This court has recognized that it is our duty to strike down legislation
that violates the constitution, especially when the legislation at issue
affects an individual's liberty or constitutional due process rights.
People v. Purcell, 201 Ill. 2d 542, 546-47 (2002). For these reasons,
we find this case to be distinguishable from our decision in Meister,
and hold that defendants have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of Public Act 88-669.
	Having found that defendants have standing to challenge Public
Act 88-669, we next consider whether Public Act 88-669 violated the
single subject rule. A circuit court's holding that a statute is
unconstitutional is reviewed de novo. People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). The single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 provides, in relevant part: "Bills, except bills for
appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of
laws, shall be confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d).
	The single subject rule regulates the process by which legislation
is enacted. People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 83 (1999). As this
court has stated:
		" 'The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are
too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands.
The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects
diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection,
with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and
thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which
could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive
of the legislator and dangerous to the State.' " Fuehrmeyer
v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 193, 202 (1974), quoting
People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494-95
(1865).
The single subject rule is designed to prevent the passage of legislation
that, if standing alone, could not muster the necessary votes for
enactment. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d  at 338. The practice of bundling less
popular legislation with more palatable bills so that the well-received
bills would carry the unpopular ones to passage is known as
"logrolling." Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d  at 98. In addition to preventing
logrolling, the single subject rule also facilitates the enactment of bills
through an orderly and informed legislative process. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d  at 83-84. By limiting a bill to a single subject, legislators can
better understand and more intelligently debate the issues presented
by a bill. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1999). The single subject
clause thus promotes direct confrontation and informed discussion of
legislative issues submitted for enactment. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 14. In
addition, "the single subject rule ensures that the legislature addresses
the difficult decisions it faces directly and subject to public scrutiny,
rather than passing unpopular measures on the backs of popular
ones." Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997).
	In determining whether a violation of the single subject clause
exists, the term "subject" generally is construed liberally in favor of
the legislature. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 8-9. Moreover, legislative acts are
afforded a considerable presumption of constitutionality. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 9. The presumption of constitutionality, however, is not
without limits. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 9. The subject of a bill may be as
broad as the legislature chooses, as long as the bill's provisions have
a natural and logical connection. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 9. Accordingly,
"the General Assembly violates the single subject rule when it includes
within one bill unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation have
any legitimate relation to one another." Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 9.
	With the foregoing provisions in mind, we must examine the
procedural history and the substance of Public Act 88-669 in order to
determine whether Public Act 88-669 violates the single subject rule.
Public Act 88-669 began as Senate Bill 1369. Senate Bill 1369 was
introduced on March 2, 1994. In its original form, Senate Bill 1369
amended three statutes. First, the Cannabis and Controlled Substances
Tax Act was amended to allow State's Attorneys to request
authorization from the Attorney General to enforce any tax or penalty
under the Act and to provide that 30% of any tax or penalty collected
in an action or proceeding brought by the State's Attorney would be
remitted to the collecting county by the Department of Revenue (35
ILCS 520/14.1 (West 1994)). Second, Senate Bill 1369 amended the
Criminal Code of 1961 to provide for the seizure and forfeiture of a
vehicle, vessel, or aircraft used with the knowledge and consent of the
owner in the commission of, or in the attempted commission of,
stalking or aggravated stalking (720 ILCS 5/36-1 (West 1994)).
Third, Senate Bill 1369 in its original form amended a Unified Code
of Corrections provision concerning reimbursement by convicted
persons to the Department of Corrections for expenses incurred due
to the convicted person's incarceration (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6, 3-1-2,
3-12-5, 5-8-1 (West 1994)).
	On March 25, 1994, the Senate added an amendment to Senate
Bill 1369. Senate Amendment 1 further amended the Cannabis and
Controlled Substances Tax Act to provide that a drug dealer who is
guilty of violating the act is subject to a penalty two times the amount
of the tax, in addition to the tax. 35 ILCS 520/10 (West 1994). Senate
Amendment 1 also amended the Unified Code of Corrections to
provide that an asset owned by a prisoner at the time of his transfer to
a receiving facility designated by the Department of Corrections is
subject to provisions requiring inmates to reimburse the Department
for the expenses of incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 1994). In
addition, the Unified Code of Corrections was amended to provide
that the Attorney General could bring a claim against the estate of a
dead prisoner within the time period for filing claims against the estate
under the Probate Act. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 1994). Finally,
Senate Amendment 1 deleted an amendatory provision in the original
version of Senate Bill 1369 concerning entry of judgments against
individuals at the time of their sentencing for their incarceration costs.
Senate Bill 1369 was passed by the Senate on April 13, 1994.
	Senate Bill 1369 was introduced in the House of Representatives
on April 14, 1994, as a bill for "an Act in relation to criminal law."
Senate Bill 1369 experienced considerable growth in the House of
Representatives through a series of eight amendments. The House
passed Senate Bill 1369 with the amendments on July 12, 1994, and
the bill was returned to the Senate for further approval. The Senate
concurred in the amendments to Senate Bill 1369 and passed the bill
on July 12, 1994.
	After Senate Bill 1369 was passed by the House and the Senate,
it was sent to then Governor Edgar for signature on July 21, 1994. At
this point, Senate Bill 1369 was no longer titled "an Act in relation to
criminal law," but instead had been renamed "An Act in relation to
government regulation." On August 19, 1994, then Governor Edgar
vetoed Senate Bill 1369.
	Following Governor Edgar's veto, Senate Bill 1369 returned to
the Senate, where a motion was made to pass the bill notwithstanding
the veto. On November 16, 1994, the Senate voted to override the
Governor's veto of Senate Bill 1369. Senate Bill 1369 next returned
to the House of Representatives, where the House of Representatives
also voted to override the Governor's veto. Public Act 88-669
became effective on November 29, 1994.
	As enacted, Public Act 88-669 addresses a wide range of topics
and is more than 100 pages long. In addition to the three statutes
amended in the original version of Senate Bill 1369, Public Act
88-669 as enacted created two new statutes and amended provisions
of 21 other statutes. For example, article I of the Act created the
"Illinois Research Park Authority Act" (20 ILCS 3850/1-1 et seq.
(West 1994)) and created the Illinois Research Park Authority. The
Illinois Research Park Authority Act grants the Authority the power
to support and develop university related research parks and the
authority to issue bonds. Article 5 of the Act created the "Geographic
Information Council Act" (20 ILCS 1128/5-1 et seq. (West 1994))
and created the Illinois Geographic Information Council within the
Department of Energy and National Resources. The Geographic
Information Council was created to study issues relating to geographic
information management technology.
	Article 90 of the Act amended numerous statutory provisions.
Section 90-1 amended the Casual Deficit Act (30 ILCS 340/0.01 et
seq. (West 1992)) by renaming the act the "Short Term Borrowing
Act" and authorized the Governor, Comptroller and Treasurer to
borrow an amount not exceeding 5% of fiscal year appropriations for
cash flow purposes and an amount not exceeding 15% upon failures
in revenue. Section 90-1 also provided that cash-flow borrowing must
be repaid in the fiscal year and that failures in revenue borrowing must
be preceded by notice to the General Assembly and the Secretary of
State and must be repaid within one year.
	Section 90-1.1 amended the State Mandates Act (30 ILCS
805/8.18) to provide that no reimbursement of local government is
required for implementation of any mandates created by Public Act
88-669. Section 90-1.3 amended six provisions of the Illinois Income
Tax Act, including the amendment at issue in this case, which made a
first violation of the Income Tax Act a Class 4 felony and a
subsequent violation a Class 3 felony (35 ILCS 5/1301 (West 1994)).
In addition, the Income Tax Code was amended to: (1) create a
deduction for one year in an amount equal to the amount of income
tax paid on grants received under the Nursing Home Grant Assistance
Act (35 ILCS 5/203(a)(2)(U) (West 1994)); (2) redefine gross income
in the case of a life insurance company (35 ILCS 5/203(b)(3) (West
1994)); (3) set forth the rule for determining whether an innocent
spouse abatement will apply (35 ILCS 5/502(c)(4) (West 1994)); (4)
provide that in the case of a taxpayer filing a return based on a
substitute W-2 form provided by the Internal Revenue Service, it shall
be presumed that the Illinois income tax was withheld in an
appropriate amount if the substitute W-2 shows the appropriate
amount was withheld from taxes for federal income tax purposes (35
ILCS 5/506.5 (West 1994)); and (5) provide that administrative
decisions shall be made available for public inspection (35 ILCS
5/917(d) (West 1994)).
	Section 90-1.7 and section 90-2.7 amended the Use Tax Act (35
ILCS 105/2, 9 (West 1994)) and the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act
(35 ILCS 120/3 (West 1994)), respectively, to define watercraft as a
Class 2, Class 3, or Class 4 watercraft, personal watercraft, or boats
with inboard motors only, and to provide that if a period of
demonstration use is more than one year for watercraft or aircraft, the
retailer shall pay tax on the cost price. Section 90-1.7 also amended
the Use Tax Act by removing the penalty due on a use tax return (35
ILCS 105/9 (West 1994)) and allowing inclusion of other reasonable
information on a use tax return (35 ILCS 105/9 (West 1994)).
	Section 90-2 amended the Service Use Tax Act by removing the
penalty due on a service use tax return (35 ILCS 110/9 (West 1994))
and allowing the inclusion of other reasonable information on a service
use tax return (35 ILCS 110/9 (West 1994)). Section 90-2.3 amended
the Service Occupation Tax Act by removing the penalty due on a
service occupation tax return (35 ILCS 115/9 (West 1994)) and
allowed inclusion of other reasonable information on a service
occupation tax return (35 ILCS 115/9 (West 1994)). Section 90-2.7
amended the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act by setting forth rules for
the public inspection of administrative decisions (35 ILCS 120/11
(West 1994)).
	Section 90-3 amended the Cigarette Tax Act by setting rules for
the public inspection of administrative decisions (35 ILCS 130/10b
(West 1994)), and section 90-3.3 amended the Cigarette Use Tax Act
to allow the sharing of tax information between the Department of
Revenue and home rule units that have adopted a similar tax, and by
setting forth rules for the public inspection of administrative decisions
(35 ILCS 135/20 (West 1994)).
	Section 90-3.5 amended the Property Tax Code to add the
Senior Citizens Tax Freeze Homestead Exemption (35 ILCS
200/15-172 (West 1994)). Section 90-3.7 amended the Longtime
Owner-Occupant Property Tax Relief Act to allow the corporate
authorities of a county to establish additional criteria to qualify for a
property tax deferral or exemption (35 ILCS 250/20 (West 1994)).
	Section 90-4 amended the Motor Fuel Tax Law by making
changes to the terminology used, by changing the requirements for
display of a motor fuel tax license, by making it a Class A
misdemeanor to fail or refuse to keep required books and records, and
by making it a criminal offense to file a fraudulent application or order
form (35 ILCS 505/1.16, 13 A. 3, 13 A. 4, 13 A. 5, 13 A. 6, 15, 16 (West
1994)). Sections 90-4.5 and 90-5 further amended the Cannabis and
Controlled Substances Tax Act (35 ILCS 520/9, 10, 14.1, 15, 16, 19,
23 (West 1994)).
	The following sections amended the enumerated statutes by
setting forth rules for the public inspection of administrative decisions:
(1) section 90-5.5 amended the Messages Tax Act (35 ILCS 610/11
(West 1994)); (2) section 90-6 amended the Gas Revenue Tax Act
(35 ILCS 615/11 (West 1994)); (3) section 90-6.5 amended the
Public Utilities Revenue Act (35 ILCS 620/11 (West 1994)); and (4)
section 90-7 amended the Telecommunications Excise Tax Act (35
ILCS 630/15 (West 1994)).
	Section 90-7.5 amended the Downstate Forest Preserve District
Act by exempting certain land from a provision of the Property Tax
Code (70 ILCS 805/18.6d (West 1994)). Section 90-8 amended the
Charitable Games Act by setting forth definitions (230 ILCS 30/2
(West 1994)), setting forth additional rules for an application for a
license (230 ILCS 30/4, 5 (West 1994)), setting forth limitations on
the number of game nights and game events (230 ILCS 30/4, 5, 5.1
(West 1994)), and setting forth other provisions on licensing and the
conduct of charitable games and enforcement by the Department of
Revenue (230 ILCS 30/6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 (West 1994)).
	Section 90-8.5 amended the Liquor Control Act of 1934 by
extending confidentiality provisions to financial information provided
to certain home rule units (235 ILCS 5/8-9 (West 1994)). Section
90-9 amended the Communicable Disease Prevention Act by changing
the amount of grants made from the Ryan White Pediatric and Adult
AIDS Fund from a set percentage of funds to a competitive selection
process, and by removing research as a purpose of grants (410 ILCS
315/2c (West 1994)).
	Finally, section 90-9.5 amended the Illinois Vehicle Code by
amending the offense related to failure to display a valid single trip
permit (625 ILCS 5/11-1419.01 (West 1994)), the offense related to
failure to display a valid motor fuel use tax license (625 ILCS
5/11-1419.02 (West 1994)) and adding an offense related to the
failure to display valid external motor fuel use tax decals (625 ILCS
5/11-1419.03 (West 1994)).
	Our review of the history and content of Public Act 88-669
establishes that, even construing the single subject requirement
liberally in favor of the legislature, Public Act 88-669 was passed in
violation of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. As
noted, the Act originally was entitled "An Act in relation to criminal
law" and amended three statutes: the Cannabis and Controlled
Substances Tax Act, the Criminal Code of 1961, and the Unified Code
of Corrections. Following the addition of eight amendments in the
House of Representatives, the Act became "An Act in relation to
governmental regulation," and created two new statutes while
amending numerous provisions in 24 other statutes.
	The fact that the varied provisions in Public Act 88-669 might fit
within the broad category of governmental regulation does not defeat
defendants' single subject challenge. Indeed it is likely that any
legislative action could fit within the broad category of governmental
regulation. This court previously has cautioned that the use of such a
sweeping and vague category to unite unrelated measures would
render the single subject clause of our constitution meaningless. For
example, in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 517-18 (1997), this
court rejected the argument that the discordant provisions of a public
act entitled "An Act in relation to public safety" were related "because
of a tortured connection to a vague notion of public safety." Likewise,
this court in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1999), found a single
subject violation in the enactment of a public act entitled "An Act in
relation to governmental matters, amending named Acts." The Reedy
court held that the act encompassed at least two unrelated subjects,
observing "that these topics might fit within the broad subject of
'governmental matters' is not compelling." Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 12.
	Perhaps recognizing that this court would reject such a sweeping
category as "governmental regulation," the State notes that an act's
title is not necessarily dispositive of its content. The State argues that
although Public Act 88-669 is entitled "An Act in relation to
governmental regulation," the Act actually involves the legitimate
single subject of revenue to the state and its subdivisions.
	The State is correct that this court has held that "an act's title is
not necessarily dispositive of its content or its relationship to a single
subject." People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 109 (2002). Nonetheless,
even looking beyond the title of Public Act 88-669 to the subject of
revenue to the state and its subdivisions, we find that the Act violates
the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. The State claims
that each of the provisions of the Act are related to the single subject
of revenue because most of the provisions relate directly to taxation.
With regard to the remaining provisions, the State contends that those
provisions involve raising revenue through licensing and forfeiture,
provide for the creation and/or management of private or special
funds, thereby reducing the state's burden and its revenue needs, or
are designed to spur the Illinois economy and thereby create a greater
revenue base.
	We disagree with the State's characterization concerning the
subject of revenue to the state and its subdivisions. The State's
characterization of revenue to the state and its subdivisions is as broad
as the subjects of governmental regulation, governmental matters and
public safety. Indeed under the State's interpretation of revenue,
almost any statute would have a natural and logical connection to the
subject of revenue to the state as long as the statute had any tangential
impact on the state's economy. In contrast to the State's all-encompassing interpretation of revenue, Black's Law Dictionary
defines "revenue" as "[g]ross income or receipts" and defines "general
revenue" as "[t]he income stream from which a state or municipality
pays its obligations unless a law calls for payment from a special
fund." Black's Law Dictionary 1344 (8th ed. 2004).
	In light of the preceding definition of revenue, it is clear that not
all of the provisions of Public Act 88-669 have a natural and logical
connection to the single subject of revenue to the state. For example,
we discern no natural and logical connection between the subject of
revenue to the state and its subdivisions and the creation of the Illinois
Research Park Authority Act or the creation of the Illinois Geographic
Information Council Act. That these acts might "spur the state's
economy" does not establish a natural and logical connection to the
subject of revenue.
	Likewise, there is no natural and logical connection between
revenue and the amendments to the Communicable Disease
Prevention Act. As amended, the Communicable Disease Prevention
Act provides:
			"§2c. Ryan White Pediatric and Adult AIDS Fund. From
funds appropriated from the Ryan White Pediatric and Adult
AIDS Fund, a special fund created in the State treasury, the
Illinois Department of Public Health shall make grants to
public and private agencies, by a competitive selection
process, for patient care, counselling [sic], and assistance for
children and adults who are victims of acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) or acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome related complex (ARC)." 410
ILCS 315/2c (West 1994).
This amendment has no relation to "[g]ross income or receipts" or
"[t]he income stream from which a state or municipality pays its
obligations." The State argues, however, that this section relates to
revenue to the state because the creation of a competitive selection
process affects the grant amounts generated by a flat percentage
payout and because removing research as a grant purpose reduces the
amount of funds paid to research groups, thereby increasing the
monies available to the fund. We disagree. To sanction such a strained
connection between this statute and the subject of revenue to the state
and its subdivisions would render the single subject clause a nullity.
	Our finding that Public Act 88-669 as enacted violates the single
subject clause is supported by both the Governor's comments in
vetoing Senate Bill 1369 and a review of the legislative debates
regarding Senate Bill 1369. In vetoing the bill, then Governor Edgar
stated:
			"It would be good politics for me to sign this legislation,
but I believe it would be bad public policy.
			Senate Bill 1369 is a typical 'Christmas tree' bill. It was
approved in the closing hours of the legislative session and
includes numerous, wide-ranging and totally unrelated
measures. Some of its provisions would have received my
approval if they had reached my desk separately. Other
provisions, however, are either technically flawed or not in
the best interests of all the people of Illinois even though they
have appeal to politically potent groups." 88th Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Bill 1369, 1994 Sess., Governor's Veto, at
7532.
	In discussing passing the bill despite the Governor's veto,
Senator Rauschenberger made the following comments:
		"I would like to rise and ask the Members of this Body to
think carefully before they cast a vote on this bill. If we can
be frank and honest-and if last Tuesday didn't tell us that
that's what the voters want-if we can be frank and honest
with ourselves and take a look at this bill, what we're-what
we're about to do is vote on a short title, not on a good piece
of legislation. There aren't a handfull [sic] of people in this
Chamber who think this is good legislation, but we're afraid
of the short title. If last Tuesday didn't tell us that-that the
public wants change, that the public wants reform, that the
public is tired of-of pork stuffed inside short-titled bills, then
what message was last Tuesday? Last Tuesday was the
largest electoral turnover in the history of the United States,
and the first action we take should not be to advance a
flawed, omnibus bill which includes an industrial park
financing in it that doesn't belong there. I urge a No vote."
88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 16,
1994, at 18 (statements of Senator Rauschenberger).
Senator Lauzen, in encouraging the other senators to vote for Senate
Bill 1369, nonetheless stated that "it is regrettable that the bonding
capacity has been added to this bill, because certainly those two things
don't go together." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
November 16, 1994, at 20 (statements of Senator Lauzen).
	The following exchange then took place in the House of
Representatives:
			"Representative Mulligan: Can you tell me how many
Amendments are on this Bill that had nothing to do with the
senior citizens [sic] property tax? Would it be fair to say a
good number?" 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
November 29, 1994, at 22 (statements of Representative
Mulligan).
			"Representative Schoenberg: There are ... there are seven
or eight depending on how you interpret it. I think it's a fair
characterization to say that this Bill is a [sic] omnibus Bill. It
does incorporate a number of different areas, not just relating
to property taxes, but other revenue related matters." 88th Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November 29, 1994, at 22
(statements of Representative Schoenberg).
			"Mulligan: An omnibus Bill because, obviously it's very
difficult to vote against a tax break for senior citizens, so
we're discussing the senior citizens, but we're not discussing
really in depth a lot of the other issues that were tacked onto
the Bill?" 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
November 29, 1994, at 22 (statements of Representative
Mulligan).
			"Schoenberg: Well a number ... I don't think that that's
necessarily a fair characterization. I think that if we look at
the success ratio that existed within this past Session of the
Legislature, the ... those measures which passed, were those
measures which were able to accommodate the various
interests of people on both sides of the aisle. *** I view this,
not like a christmas [sic] tree, beside the obvious reasons, but
rather because, unfortunately, last time, the only way we
could get things done sometimes, was to appeal to
everyone's mutuality of interest in putting together a
bipartisan omnibus package, and that's really what this Bill
represents." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
November 29, 1994, at 22-23 (statements of Representative
Schoenberg).
	It is clear, then, that the Governor and certain legislators
recognized that Public Act 88-669 was an example of the "disfavored
practice of 'logrolling,' wherein less popular legislation was bundled
with more palatable bills, so that the well-received bills would carry
the unpopular ones to passage." Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d  at 98. The
history and content of Public Act 88-669 confirms that the Act was
passed in violation of the single subject clause of the Illinois
Constitution. For that reason, we find that the circuit court did not err
in granting defendants' motions to dismiss the indictments against
them.
	The State then argues in the alternative that even if certain
provisions of Public Act 88-669 violate the single subject rule, this
court should sever and declare invalid only those sections that are not
related to the single subject of revenue to the state. The State
acknowledges that in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997), this
court held that when an act is found to violate the single subject rule,
the act must be struck in its entirety. The State argues, however, that
Johnson considered the issue of severability with regard to a claim of
mootness, and did not consider the issue of severability in the context
of single subject violations. The State then notes that the Illinois
Constitution of 1870 by its language required the severance of
provisions passed in violation of its single subject requirement. The
State concedes that the Illinois Constitution of 1970 removed the
severability language from the single subject provision, but argues that
the elimination of the severability provision was not intended to
preclude application of the severability principle to single subject
violations.
	There is no merit to the State's claim that the severability
provision from the 1870 Constitution applies to the 1970 Constitution.
Article IV, section 13, of the Constitution of 1870 provided that:
		"No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any
subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so
much thereof as shall not be so expressed[.]" Ill. Const. 1870,
art. IV, §13.
In contrast, the single subject clause of the Constitution of 1970
provides that:
			"Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the
codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be
confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d).
Clearly, the 1970 Constitution removed the severability provision that
existed in the 1870 Constitution. We therefore reject the State's
invitation to construe the two provisions as if they were the same.
	We also decline the State's invitation to reconsider our holding
in Johnson that an act will be struck down in its entirety when the act
violates the single subject rule. Initially, we note that the State is
incorrect that this court in Johnson considered severability with regard
to a claim of mootness rather than in the context of a single subject
challenge. In fact, this court discussed severability with regard to
single subject challenges in stating why defendants' claim of mootness
did not apply in that case. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 511-12. This court
stated:
		"As we discuss in detail later in this opinion, the single
subject rule prohibits the enactment of bills that encompass
more than one subject. Thus, a challenge that an act violates
the single subject rule is, by definition, directed at the act in
its entirety. There is no one provision or feature of the act
that is challenged as unconstitutional, such that the defect
could be remedied by a subsequent amendment which simply
deleted or altered that provision or feature. In fact, a single
subject challenge does not address the substantive
constitutionality of the act's provisions at all. Rather, a single
subject challenge goes to the very structure of the act, and
the process by which it was enacted. If we determine that
Public Act 89-428 in its structure is invalid, the Act may not
be permitted to stand. The legislature is, of course, free to
revisit the provisions contained in the Act in other legislation.
Subsequent legislation, however, will not remedy the
constitutional defect in Public Act 89-428 if it was passed in
violation of the single subject rule." (Emphasis in original.)
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 511-12.
	Johnson, thus, considered the issue of severability in the context
of a single subject challenge. Our analysis in Johnson is equally
applicable in this case. Allowing for severability with regard to single
subject violations would be contrary the purposes behind the single
subject rule. This court previously has noted the "seriousness with
which this court regards single subject clause violations." Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 13. We therefore decline the State's invitation to sever those
provisions in Public Act 88-669 that violate the single subject clause.
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendants have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of Public Act 88-669. We find that
Public Act 88-669 violates the single subject clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8), and therefore hold that
Public Act 88-669 is void in its entirety. The judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County is affirmed.
Circuit court judgment affirmed.