Case Title: In re A. H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95669

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 95669-Agenda 20-September 2003.
In re A.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, 							Appellant, v. Tracy H. et al.,
Appellees).

Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal arises out of the trial court's denial of the State's
petition to terminate the parental rights of Tracy H. and Stacey S. The
appellate court declined to entertain the State's appeal of the order
denying the petition because the order was not a final order, and also
declined to consider the appeal under its discretionary authority. 335
Ill. App. 3d 1009. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the
decision of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	The natural father, Tracy H., and the natural mother, Stacey S.,
had two children, J.H., born June 24, 1988, and A.H., born February
26, 1990. In 1996, the father reported to the Department of Children
and Family Services that the mother, who had custody of the children,
was taking the children with her when she purchased and used illegal
narcotics. In March 1997, the children were adjudicated neglected and
removed from the mother's custody and placed with the father.
	The trial court, however, removed the children from the father's
custody in July 1998 because he had violated a court order prohibiting
contact between the mother and the children. The court placed the
children in foster care with their paternal aunt and uncle in DeKalb,
Illinois. On June 2, 2000, the trial court changed the permanency goal
for the mother from "return home" to "substitute care" pending a
court determination on the State's petition for the termination of
parental rights. The trial court changed the permanency goal for the
father from "return home" to "subsidized guardianship" with the
paternal aunt and uncle. The trial court further ordered that there be
no contact between the mother and the children. The parents appealed
this determination, which is not at issue here, and the appellate court
did not disturb these rulings in a decision filed on May 18, 2001. Nos.
2-00-0710, 2-00-0711, 2-00-0872, 2-00-0873 cons. (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	During the pendency of that appeal, the State filed petitions
seeking the termination of the mother's parental rights as to both
children. On October 17, 2000, the State filed separate amended
petitions for each child seeking the termination of the mother's
parental rights and the additional relief of the termination of the
father's parental rights. The State further requested that the court
"enter such further orders as may be appropriate."
	During the unfitness stage of the proceedings, the trial court
heard testimony from 20 witnesses called by the State, six witnesses
called by the parents, and stipulations to the parents' drug screens and
criminal convictions. On August 14, 2001, the trial court found both
parents unfit. The parents do not challenge this finding.
	During the best-interests stage, the trial court heard testimony
from six witnesses, a tape of an interview by counsel with the children,
and argument. On October 5, 2001, the trial court held it was not in
the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of
either parent. The trial court ordered "subsidized guardianship" as the
permanency goal for the children and continued the cases for a
permanency hearing scheduled for February 5, 2002. The trial court
further orally admonished the parents that "you still risk possible
termination of your parental rights. Because that has not been granted
at this time does not mean it could not be granted in the future." The
State appealed the trial court's denial of its petition to terminate
parental rights.
	On appeal, the appellate court considered its jurisdiction sua
sponte and held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter because
the October 5, 2001, order was not final or appealable. 335 Ill. App.
3d at 1013. The court also declined to hear the appeal under its
discretionary authority. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, citing 166 Ill. 2d R.
306(a)(5). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315) and also allowed the Cook County public guardian leave
to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State (155 Ill. 2d R.
345).
ANALYSIS
	The State asserts that the appellate court improperly dismissed
the appeal because the order was final and appealable under Supreme
Court Rules 301 and 303 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303). The parents
argue that the order appealed from was not final and, therefore, the
appellate court properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Because this appeal presents only issues of law, our review is de novo.
In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 321 (2001).
	Except for appeals from delinquency judgments, "[i]n all other
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act [705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
(West 2002)], appeals from final judgments shall be governed by the
rules applicable to civil cases." (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R.
660(b). Rule 301 allows appeals from final judgments of a circuit
court in a civil case as a matter of right, and Rule 303 sets the time
frame for the filing of the notice of appeal after entry of the final
judgment. 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303. "A judgment is considered final 'if
it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or
disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy
or a separate part thereof.' " In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 59 (2002),
quoting R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153,
159 (1998). "A final order is one which sets or fixes the rights of a
party." Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d  at 59.
	Under section 2-13 of the Act, a petition seeking the termination
of parental rights and appointment of a guardian with power to
consent to adoption may be filed "at any time after the entry of a
dispositional order under Section 2-22" (705 ILCS 405/2-13(4)
(West 2002)) and "before final closing and discharge under Section
2-31" (705 ILCS 405/2-13(6) (West 2002)). Section 2-13 further
provides that "one or more motions in the best interests of the minor
may be filed." 705 ILCS 405/2-13(6) (West 2002). Thus, the Act
contemplates the filing of more than one petition to terminate parental
rights.
	Accordingly, the October 5, 2001, order is not final because it did
not end the litigation of the parties on the issue of termination of
parental rights and did not "set or fix" the rights of the parties on
either side of the controversy. Although the order decided the
important issue of whether to terminate the parental rights at that
point in time, such does not, in itself, render the order final. "[T]he
fact that an order resolves important issues does not necessarily render
it final." In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d  at 59. As stated by the trial court,
the possibility still exists that the parental rights of the parents could
be terminated in the future.
	We find inapposite the cases cited by the State in support of its
argument that the denial of a petition to terminate is a final order. The
State directs our attention to In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382 (2003), and In
re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002), cases involving the entry of an order
terminating parental rights. An order terminating parental rights and
appointing a guardian to consent to adoption is a final order because
the specific permanency goal is achieved and there is no need for the
issue of termination to be reevaluated under the Act. Indeed, under
the Act, "[a]n order so empowering the guardian to consent to
adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights as
respects the minor and relieves them of all parental responsibility for
him or her, and frees the minor from all obligations of maintenance
and obedience to his or her natural parents." 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2)
(West 2002). It therefore sets the rights of the parent, who may then
appeal. This does not address the situation here, where a petition to
terminate parental rights was denied such that the issue could be
revisited and the parents retain legal rights with respect to the minors.
	We also reject the assertion that an appeal of a denial of a
termination petition is necessary to avoid unreasonable delay in the
potential adoption of the children causing the children "to remain in
limbo for an extended period of time," and contrary to a "prompt, just,
and final resolution of their status." In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13
(2000). Such an argument has no bearing on whether the order is
"final" for purposes of Rules 301 and 303. The force of the State's
argument on this point is also lessened by the State's own prayer for
relief in its petition, which lacks a specific request for an order
appointing a guardian with the power to consent to adoption. See 705
ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2002) ("[i]f termination of parental rights
and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to
adoption of the minor under Section 2-29 is sought, the petition shall
so state"). The extent of the "delay" of the resolution of the children's
potential adoption also depends, therefore, on further petitions for
termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the
person to consent to adoption.
	We lastly note that the appellate court retains the discretion to
review an appeal from the denial of a termination petition under Rule
306(a)(5), which permits appeals "from interlocutory orders affecting
the care and custody of unemancipated minors, if the appeal of such
orders is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in these
rules." 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5). We therefore disagree with amicus
that "like dispositional orders, if not immediately appealable, an order
denying a termination petition could never be reviewed, a result that
would be manifestly unfair and dangerous for children." As we stated
in Curtis B., "Rule 306(a)(5) maintains the best balance between
protecting parental rights and ensuring expeditious resolution of the
child's placement status." In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d  at 63. Like the
review of permanency orders in Curtis B., orders denying petitions for
termination of parental rights "which need examination can, and will,
be reviewed by the appellate court. The majority of cases, by not
being subject to immediate interlocutory review, can proceed in a
more timely fashion to determine the permanent placement status of
the child." In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d  at 63. Here, the State does not
appeal the appellate court's denial to take this case under Rule
306(a)(5), and we therefore do not address it.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

	Affirmed.