Case Title: State v. Ninh

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122782

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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No. 122,782 
           
                
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
STATE OF KANSAS,  
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DZUNG N. NINH,  
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
  
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A), the statute defining rape when the victim is 
overcome by force or fear, is not rendered unconstitutionally vague by inclusion of 
language prohibiting a defendant from asserting that they "did not know or have reason to 
know that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse, that the victim was 
overcome by force or fear, or that the victim was unconscious or physically powerless." 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(e). The statute gives fair warning of what is prohibited 
conduct and avoids arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement by leaving intact the State's 
burden to prove a victim was overcome by force or fear. 
 
2. 
 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(b)(3)(A), the statute defining aggravated criminal 
sodomy when the victim is overcome by force or fear, is not rendered unconstitutionally 
vague by inclusion of language prohibiting a defendant from asserting that they "did not 
know or have reason to know that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse, 
that the victim was overcome by force or fear, or that the victim was unconscious or 
physically powerless." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5504(f). The statute gives fair warning of 
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what is prohibited conduct and avoids arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement by leaving 
intact the State's burden to prove a victim was overcome by force or fear. 
 
3. 
 
A victim's expressed fear that their family stability or structure would be harmed if 
they did not submit to being raped or sodomized is sufficient for a rational fact-finder to 
find the victim was overcome by force or fear to sustain a defendant's conviction for rape 
or aggravated criminal sodomy.  
 
4. 
 
The State is not required to prove the defendant made explicit threats of physical 
force or violence in order to prove the victim of rape or aggravated criminal sodomy was 
overcome by force or fear.  
 
5. 
 
In convicting a defendant for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy, a rational 
fact-finder may find that a victim was sufficiently overcome by an expressed fear of 
specific harm even when no evidence is presented that the defendant ever made verbal 
threats of that same specific harm.  
 
6. 
 
It is error for a prosecutor to misstate the law by characterizing "grooming" as a 
form of force sufficient to sustain a defendant's conviction for rape or aggravated 
criminal sodomy in violation of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A) and K.S.A. 2021 
Supp. 21-5504(b)(3)(A).  
 
7. 
 
The prosecutor's reference to the defendant as a rapist during closing argument 
was not error when arguing that the evidence presented demonstrates the defendant 
committed rape.   
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8. 
 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in federal criminal cases is incorporated, 
via the Fourteenth Amendment, to state criminal prosecutions thus extending the Sixth 
Amendment right to a unanimous verdict in federal criminal proceedings to state court 
criminal defendants.  
 
9. 
 
The defendant's claim that the State both submitted evidence of multiple acts but 
failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could unanimously agree on the 
underlying act supporting each conviction, and that the unanimity instruction did not cure 
the multiple acts issue, is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and 
not a constitutional challenge to the unanimity of the verdict.  
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFFREY SYRIOS, judge. Opinion filed February 10, 2023. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
Jennifer C. Roth, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. 
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 
attorney general, for appellee. 
 
Before HURST, P.J., GARDNER, J., and PATRICK D. MCANANY, S.J. 
 
HURST, J.:  Dzung N. Ninh appeals what amounts to a life sentence in prison 
resulting from his multiple convictions including rape, indecent liberties with a child, and 
aggravated criminal sodomy related to allegations that over the course of more than four 
years he sexually assaulted, raped, and sodomized his victim. Ninh challenges his 
convictions on multiple grounds and claims specifically:   
 
 
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(1) the Kansas rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes are unconstitutional; 
(2) the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for rape and 
aggravated criminal sodomy;  
(3) the State committed reversible error in the opening and closing statements; and 
(4) the State violated his right to a unanimous verdict.  
 
While this court does agree that the prosecutor misstated the law in closing 
arguments, such misstatement did not prejudice Ninh considering the totality and 
abundance of the State's evidence and Ninh's asserted defense. This court finds none of 
Ninh's claims availing. Ninh's asserted ambiguity does not make the Kansas rape and 
aggravated criminal sodomy statutes unconstitutional; the State presented sufficient 
evidence to support Ninh's convictions; Ninh's asserted prosecutorial errors do not 
constitute reversible error; and the State did not violate Ninh's right to a unanimous 
verdict. The jury's verdict is affirmed.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The underlying facts of this case are important to this court's analysis and as such, 
are included in some detail. In October 2017 the State charged Ninh with numerous sex 
crimes against the victim that allegedly occurred between August 15, 2013, and 
September 7, 2017. The facts supporting Ninh's charges are reviewed herein 
chronologically to assist with this court's analysis.  
 
1. The Victim's Trial Testimony About Incidents in 2013 
 
The victim turned 13 years old shortly after moving to the United States in the 
summer of 2013 and she started spending more time with Ninh. She said their 
relationship began to make her feel uncomfortable because Ninh started touching her and 
grabbing parts of her body "to the point where [she] didn't like it." She said the touching 
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escalated into Ninh grabbing her breasts. The victim explained that she would sit on 
Ninh's lap while he showed her things on his computer, and he would grab her breasts 
over her clothing. Later that summer, before school had started, Ninh started putting his 
hands under her bra or removing her bra and touching, playing with, and grabbing her 
bare breasts. 
 
After school started in 2013, the victim testified that she would be home alone 
with Ninh for two to three hours in the evening, and he continued to touch her breasts 
during that time. Over the course of the 2013-2014 school year, she estimated Ninh 
touched her breasts 15 or 20 times. There were times where she pushed Ninh's hand off 
her breast or told him to stop; sometimes Ninh would stop and other times he would try 
to put his hand back on her breast. 
 
The victim testified that during this same time, Ninh also began touching her 
vagina on the outside of her clothes while they were sitting in the computer area. The 
victim said that type of touching occurred five or six times during that school year. She 
explained that she would try to move Ninh's hand by grabbing it and pulling it away and 
asking Ninh to please stop. During that same school year, Ninh also began touching her 
vaginal area underneath her clothing, and she estimated that occurred five or six times 
during that school year.  
 
At some point during that school year, Ninh made the victim promise not to tell 
anybody about how he touched her. At that time, the only person she had told about the 
touching was her younger sister because she believed her sister would not tell anyone. 
During this time, the victim felt like Ninh was monitoring her behavior and who she was 
talking to in order to make sure she did not tell anyone, and that monitoring made her 
fearful or concerned that Ninh would find out if she told anyone.  
 
 
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2. The Victim's Trial Testimony About Incidents from 2014 to 2015 
 
The victim testified that Ninh's molesting touches continued into the next school 
year, and that he began coming to her bedroom at night. The victim explained that Ninh 
would come into her room around 12:30 or 1 a.m. and come to her bed, lift the comforter 
and grab her breast, and would pull down her pants and touch her vagina—running his 
finger "in between" her vagina and massaging it.  
 
The victim confirmed that during this time, when she was about 14 years old, she 
never asked Ninh to touch her, she did not consent to the touching, and she did not want 
it to continue. The victim said she did not know how many times Ninh touched her in this 
way during that school year—there were two- to three-day gaps of Ninh not touching her, 
"[a]nd then there are times where it would be two weeks, maybe three, and then it 
happened again." The victim considered telling her mother about what Ninh was doing 
but decided not to because she was worried it would hurt her family. "It was just 
constantly me thinking, well, should I tell my mom and entirely break up my family or 
should I let this happen so that my siblings actually grew up with a father."  
 
3. The Victim's Trial Testimony About Incidents from 2015 to 2016  
 
The victim testified that Ninh continued touching her like he had the prior year—
by putting his hand under her comforter, grabbing her breasts, pulling her pants down to 
put his finger "inside those flaps" of her vagina, and to massage her vagina. She said she 
started wearing a bra to bed at night to try to deter Ninh from touching her breasts and 
signal that she "didn't want this anymore."  
 
The victim testified that Ninh's molestation progressed and that around January 
2016, Ninh began using his mouth on her breasts. She explained that she would keep her 
comforter over her head to avoid seeing what Ninh was doing to her. She described her 
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shared bedroom as having enough space for a person to sit on the floor or rest on their 
knees over her bed without disturbing her sister's bed and she believed that is how Ninh 
positioned himself while she hid. She testified that Ninh would lift her shirt to her 
armpits, move or remove her bra, and he "sucked on [her] breast" while he would also 
touch her vagina. When asked how many times Ninh sucked her breasts during this time, 
the victim testified, "It's like once he gets access to this he starts doing it more often." She 
also testified that Ninh began using his mouth on her vagina at some point between 2015 
and 2016.  
 
4. The Victim's Trial Testimony About Incidents from 2016 to 2017 
 
The victim testified that Ninh continued touching her breasts and vagina and using 
his mouth on her breasts and vagina during 2016 and 2017. She testified specifically 
about how Ninh would enter her bedroom when she was already in bed and, leaning over 
her bed, he would use his mouth on her breasts and then pull her pants down to her knees 
and move her legs open. He would use his mouth on her breasts and begin "licking" and 
using his mouth on her vagina. She testified that Ninh used his mouth on her vagina 
"once or twice" during 2016 and 2017, but he stopped coming into her room when she 
began dating someone. The victim was 16 when Ninh stopped coming into her room at 
night to sexually assault her. She testified that she "constantly" thought about telling her 
mom, but when Ninh stopped, she decided not to tell her mom to avoid something "big" 
happening to harm her family.  
 
5. The Victim's Trial Testimony About Incidents from 2017 to 2018 
 
In 2017, the victim was still dating the person that she dated in 2016. During the 
course of their relationship, she testified that her boyfriend "somehow knew that there 
was stuff happening," and asked her about it. The victim eventually told her boyfriend 
generally about how Ninh had been touching her and had "used his mouth on" her. Her 
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boyfriend said that she needed to tell her mother about the abuse, but she did not want to 
"destroy [her] family." Her boyfriend eventually convinced her, and she wrote her mother 
a letter stating that Ninh had been touching her, that she understood she should have told 
her mother sooner, but that she was scared. She testified that she was "afraid that this 
would do something to our family." She talked to her mother about the note the next day 
on the drive to school but did not discuss all the details of how Ninh had been touching 
her. She testified that she wanted to talk to her mom about the note on another occasion, 
but her mother seemed tired, and she did not want to bother her mother.  
 
On September 7, 2017, the last incident occurred between Ninh and the victim. 
She testified that at approximately 11 p.m. she was doing her homework in the computer 
area while simultaneously on a video call with her boyfriend. Ninh came up to her and 
"grabbed [her] hand" and "pulled [her] over to [another] room." She said Ninh started 
doing "his routine"—the types of touching he had done with her before—except this time 
he penetrated her vagina with his penis. She testified that she left her laptop open while 
on the video chat with her boyfriend, which allowed him to see and hear most of the 
encounter. The next day, her boyfriend told the victim's mother that he witnessed the 
sexual encounter between the victim and Ninh the prior evening. Her mother then called 
the police. 
 
6. The Police Investigation 
 
On September 8, 2017, in response to the victim's mother's report, local police 
officer D.K. went to the family's home to investigate. Officer D.K. took various photos of 
the rooms and items inside the home and talked to the victim in her front yard. Officer 
D.K.'s Axon body camera recorded the conversation with her, and that footage was 
played for the jury. The body camera footage showed the victim briefly recount the 
escalating series of touching she said she experienced between 2013 and 2017. She said 
that "[Ninh] has violated [her] body." She explained that the abuse "started when [she] 
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was 13. . . . That was when [she] first came over here" from another country. She stated 
that she had never had a father figure before Ninh, and when he started touching her, she 
"did not" have any knowledge of whatever that is. "Like I don't know much because 
before I came over here the teachers in my country they don't teach that stuff." She 
explained that she did not understand that Ninh was doing something wrong until he 
made her promise she would not tell anyone what he was doing.  
 
The victim told Officer D.K. that she "was freaked out" and that she "didn't know 
what to do" but she could not bring herself to tell her mom. While explaining the 
incidents to Officer D.K., she said, "[I]t was getting so bad to the point where I was 
scared to go to sleep, like I stayed up until 1 or 2 in the morning." When Officer D.K. 
asked her why she had not told her mom about the incidents, she said she was "scared, 
[she] felt ashamed," and she also "wanted to do anything [she] could to protect the 
family." 
 
Later that evening, local Detective C.Z. with the Exploited and Missing Children's 
Unit (EMCU) interviewed the victim, and that interview was recorded and played for the 
jury. During that interview, she again recounted the various ways Ninh had touched her 
from 2013 to 2017. The allegations she made to Detective C.Z. tracked the allegations 
she made in her trial testimony, though the amount of touching and the timeline she told 
Detective C.Z. varied slightly from her trial testimony.  
 
The victim told Detective C.Z. that Ninh began grabbing her breasts in July 2013. 
She told Detective C.Z. that she knew she needed to tell her mother about the touching, 
but she was scared because she had not lived with her mother for so long. Early in the 
abuse, Ninh was touching her and asked her to promise not to tell anyone what he was 
doing. She stated she did not know what to do after that request, so she promised him that 
she would not tell anyone about the abuse. As she got older, Ninh was busier and "wasn't 
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touching [her] that much" but he was still doing it occasionally, and she believed he 
touched her breasts and vagina "100 or more" times during 2013.  
 
She told Detective C.Z. that from 2014 to 2015, Ninh started coming into her 
room at night and would touch her breasts under her shirt and he "started trying to put his 
finger inside my vagina," but it would hurt and she would pull away. She said Ninh came 
into her room to touch her breasts and vagina "50 or so" times from 2014 to 2015. She 
said from 2015 to 2016, Ninh continued touching her breasts and vagina with his hands, 
but also started using his mouth on her breasts and vagina. She estimated Ninh did this 30 
or 40 times during this timeframe. She said Ninh continued coming into her bedroom 
around the time she started school in 2016 and would touch her breasts and vagina with 
his hands and mouth. When she started talking to her boyfriend in October 2016, Ninh 
stopped coming into her bedroom.  
 
During that interview, she told Detective C.Z. that Ninh did not touch her again 
until September 7, 2017, when Ninh penetrated her vagina with his penis. She did not tell 
Detective C.Z. that she and her boyfriend had planned for him to see the encounter on 
their video call but did say that her boyfriend was on a video call during the encounter 
and likely saw or heard what happened. She said that day after school, her boyfriend told 
her mother what happened, and her mother called the police.  
 
A sexual assault nurse examiner conducted an examination on the victim late in 
the evening on September 8, 2017, to note any injuries and collect swabs for potential 
DNA testing. The nurse said the victim recounted what happened with Ninh the previous 
night, and then told her about the history between her and Ninh. The swabs were sent to 
the County Regional Forensic Science Center and were tested for DNA evidence. A 
forensic scientist with the County Regional Forensic Science Center testified that the 
DNA profile obtained from a swab of the victim's right breast was consistent with Ninh's 
DNA profile, meaning Ninh could not be excluded as the source of that DNA. 
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7. Jury Trial and Sentencing 
 
The State charged Ninh with the following seven counts: 
 
(1) Aggravated indecent liberties with a child in violation of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 
21-5506(b)(3)(A), (c)(2)(C), (c)(3), for actions that occurred between August 
15, 2013, and May 30, 2014; 
(2) Rape in violation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A), for actions that 
occurred between August 15, 2014, and May 30, 2015; 
(3) Rape in violation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A), for actions that 
occurred between August 15, 2014, and May 30, 2015; 
(4) Rape in violation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A), for actions that 
occurred between August 15, 2015, and May 30, 2016; 
(5) Aggravated criminal sodomy in violation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
5504(b)(3)(A), for actions that occurred between August 15, 2015, and May 
30, 2016; 
(6) Aggravated criminal sodomy in violation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-
5504(b)(3)(A), (c)(2)(A), for actions that occurred between August 15, 2016, 
and May 30, 2017; and 
(7) Rape in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A), for 
actions that occurred on September 7, 2017.  
 
After a five-day trial in January 2020, a jury found Ninh guilty of Counts 1-6 but 
acquitted Ninh on Count 7. The district court sentenced Ninh to a hard 25 life sentence, 
running consecutive to five concurrent 165-month prison sentences. Ninh appeals.  
 
 
 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Ninh appeals his convictions on four separate grounds, alleging: (1) the Kansas 
rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes are unconstitutional; (2) there was 
insufficient evidence to support his convictions for rape and criminal sodomy; (3) the 
State committed reversible prosecutorial error in its opening and closing statements; and 
(4) the State violated his right to a unanimous verdict.  
 
I. THE KANSAS RAPE AND AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL SODOMY STATUTES AT K.S.A. 21-
5503(a)(1)(A) AND K.S.A. 21-5504(b)(3)(A) ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
 
Ninh argues that the Kansas rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes are 
unconstitutionally vague, and thus his convictions for those crimes must be reversed. The 
jury convicted Ninh of three counts of rape, which is defined as "(1) Knowingly engaging 
in sexual intercourse with a victim who does not consent to the sexual intercourse under 
any of the following circumstances:  (A) When the victim is overcome by force or fear." 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A). 
 
The jury also convicted Ninh of two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, which 
is defined as "(3) sodomy with a victim who does not consent to the sodomy or causing a 
victim, without the victim's consent, to engage in sodomy with any person or an animal 
under any of the following circumstances:  (A) When the victim is overcome by force or 
fear." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5504(b)(3)(A). 
 
The rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes under which the jury convicted 
Ninh contain substantially similar subsections limiting the defendant's ability to use a 
lack of knowledge as a defense. Those subsections provide that:  
 
"[I]t shall not be a defense that the offender did not know or have reason to know that the 
victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse, that the victim was overcome by force or 
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fear, or that the victim was unconscious or physically powerless." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-
5503(e). 
 
"[I]t shall not be a defense that the offender did not know or have reason to know that the 
victim did not consent to the sodomy, that the victim was overcome by force or fear, or 
that the victim was unconscious or physically powerless." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5504(f). 
 
Ninh argues that these subsections render both the rape and aggravated criminal sodomy 
statutes unconstitutional. Specifically, he claims that these subsections deny him, and any 
accused, notice that their actions could be criminal, and fail to provide explicit standards 
for statutory enforcement. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(e); K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-
5504(f). 
 
Ninh preserved this issue for appeal by objecting to the inclusion of the "it is not a 
defense" language in the jury instructions, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague. He 
also raised this vagueness argument in his motion for a new trial and at the sentencing 
hearing. In any event, Ninh's constitutional challenge satisfies exceptions to the general 
prohibition against raising constitutional challenges for the first time on appeal because it 
involves only a question of law and will be determinative of the case, and review of the 
claim is necessary to preserve Ninh's fundamental rights. See State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 
992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019) (outlining the exceptions permitting appellate review of 
constitutional challenges brought for the first time on appeal).  
 
1. Standard of Review  
 
This court exercises unlimited review to interpret a statute in response to a 
challenge that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39, 52, 
455 P.3d 779 (2020). Appellate courts use a two-prong test to determine whether a statute 
is unconstitutionally vague, first asking whether the statute gives fair warning to those 
potentially subject to it, and second, whether the statute sufficiently guards against 
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arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement. In doing so, this court must determine whether a 
person of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the 
challenged statutory language. 311 Kan. at 53. Kansas courts have long held that a statute 
will not be declared unconstitutionally vague where "it employs words commonly used, 
previously judicially defined or having a settled meaning in law." In re Brooks, 228 Kan. 
541, 544, 618 P.2d 814 (1980). Moreover, this court presumes statutes are constitutional 
and resolves all doubts in favor of the statute's validity. Ninh, as the party challenging 
these statutes' constitutionality, bears the burden to overcome this presumption. Jenkins, 
311 Kan. at 53.  
 
It appears that Ninh's specific argument has not yet been addressed by the Kansas 
Supreme Court, and whether the challenged language makes the statute vague presents a 
question of first impression.    
 
2. Vagueness Analysis  
 
Ninh couches his argument as one alleging statutory vagueness—but in reality, he 
objects to these criminal statutes creating strict liability offenses. He also does not argue 
that the statutory language defining the criminal, prohibited conduct uses uncommon, 
vague, or unclear words such that a person of ordinary intelligence would not understand 
the prohibited conduct. Instead, he appears to argue the statutes permit arbitrary or 
unreasonable enforcement because an accused is not permitted to claim lack of notice of 
"what was in [the victim's] mind" as a defense. Ninh asserts that because the Kansas 
Supreme Court assumes the rape statute creates a strict liability crime that does not 
require mens rea, the Legislature's inclusion of the "it shall not be a defense" subsection 
makes the entire rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes unconstitutionally vague. 
See State v. Thomas, 313 Kan. 660, 663-64, 488, P.3d 517 (2021) (finding that the statute 
criminalizing rape was not required to have a mens rea component, and the Legislature is 
not prohibited from creating strict liability criminal offenses with lengthy or harsh 
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sentences). This court sees no difference in Ninh's argument than the one made by the 
defendant in Thomas, which the Kansas Supreme Court rejected. 
 
In Thomas, a defendant convicted of rape argued that the "it is not a defense" 
subsection of the Kansas rape statute effectively made rape a strict liability crime, 
eliminating the crime's mens rea element and thus violating his due process right to 
notice. The court rejected Thomas' argument, finding that it was not unconstitutional for 
the Legislature to adopt strict liability criminal offenses, even when the statute carried a 
lengthy potential sentence, and the statutes did not violate the defendant's constitutional 
due process rights. 313 Kan. at 663-64. This court is bound by the precedent in Thomas. 
See Snider v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 297 Kan. 157, 168, 298 P.3d 1120 (2013) 
("Court of Appeals is duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent, absent 
some indication this court is departing from its previous position"). 
 
While Ninh's constitutional objection is not exactly the same as that in Thomas, he 
objects to the same subsections of the rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes, 
claiming they unconstitutionally permit arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement of the 
crimes. Ninh contends the subsections permit charging someone with rape or aggravated 
criminal sodomy even if the accused was unaware their sexual partner was overcome by 
force or fear, thus prosecutors can charge defendants "knowing they do not have to prove 
the accused knowingly did anything other than have sex or sodomy." This argument 
holds no merit.  
 
The police may only arrest, and the prosecutors may only charge, a defendant 
when evidence exists demonstrating the defendant committed the charged crime. The 
statutes require the State to prove more than the accused merely engaged in sexual 
intercourse or sodomy with the victim. That is, when the victim did "not consent to the" 
sexual intercourse or sodomy, and when that "victim is overcome by force or fear." 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A); K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5504(b)(3)(A). While the 
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prosecutor is not required to prove the accused knew the victim did not consent and knew 
the victim was overcome by force or fear, the statute still requires proof that the victim in 
fact did not consent and was overcome by force or fear. The accused's inability to claim 
ignorance of the victim's nonconsent or being overcome by force or fear does not relieve 
the State from having to prove every material element of the crime, including that the 
victim did not consent and was overcome by force or fear.  
 
The Kansas rape and aggravated criminal sodomy statutes use words commonly 
known and understood by persons of ordinary intelligence to provide fair warning to 
those subject to its provisions, and Ninh does not argue otherwise. Rather, he seems to 
argue that by not permitting a defendant to claim ignorance as to the victim's nonconsent 
or being overcome by force or fear, permits arbitrary or unreasonable enforcement—but 
that is a fallacy. To take Ninh's argument to its logical conclusion would prohibit the 
Legislature from creating strict liability offenses. The statutory language prohibiting the 
defendant from using ignorance of whether the victim consented or was overcome by 
force or fear does not negate any of the State's obligations to prove the essential elements 
of the crime—which Ninh does not object to as being vague—and thus does not permit 
arbitrary or unreasonable enforcement. This court presumes statutory validity, and Ninh 
has failed to overcome that presumption.  
 
II. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED FOR A RATIONAL FACT-FINDER TO CONVICT NINH OF 
RAPE AND AGGRAVATED SODOMY 
 
Ninh's second claim is that the State presented insufficient evidence that the victim 
was "overcome" by force or fear because her only expressed fears related to 
consequences to her family or losing privileges—but not for her own safety. Ninh also 
argues that none of her alleged fears were reasonable because she never suffered any of 
the feared harm.  
 
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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must review the evidence 
available to the fact-finder in the light most favorable to the State "to determine whether a 
rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021). In performing this review, the 
court does not reweigh the evidence or make witness credibility determinations. 313 Kan. 
at 209.  
 
In a rape case, the court looks to the record as a whole and considers the individual 
circumstances of each case in determining whether a rational fact-finder could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that an alleged victim was overcome by force or fear. 
State v. Borthwick, 255 Kan. 899, 911, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994). The Kansas Supreme Court 
has "refused to define in absolute terms the degree of fear required to sustain a rape 
conviction" because "'fear is inherently subjective.'" State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 685, 
317 P.3d 54 (2014) (quoting Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 913). A rape victim is not required to 
demonstrate a particularly high likelihood that the feared outcome would or could result. 
In other words, the reasonableness of the rape victim's fear is a credibility determination 
for the fact-finder—not a question of law for this court. See Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 904-
05. 
 
1. The Victim's Fear of Physical Harm 
 
First, the record demonstrates that a rational fact-finder could find that the victim 
experienced fear, rendering Ninh's argument factually and legally inaccurate. The victim 
testified that she experienced fear for her safety, or that she would be hurt or injured if 
she refused Ninh's sexual contact. She testified that she was not more forceful in fighting 
back because "what usually would go through my head if I were to tell him off or 
something" is that "something might happen to me or my siblings." She also testified that 
if she told him to stop, she thought he was "going to try to do other things, like force me 
to do certain things or he'll just—I guess forcefully just do the things that he does to me." 
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She also agreed that if Ninh did become more forceful, she was concerned she might get 
hurt or injured. While her physical safety was not her expressed primary or main concern, 
the law does not require a rape victim to prove they were in constant fear of physical 
harm, or to demonstrate fear of a particular gravity of physical harm. See Borthwick, 255 
Kan. at 911 (finding no requirement that a rape victim endure a certain degree of physical 
violence or "endure a beating or be threatened with a deadly weapon" to show they were 
overcome by force or fear). Her testimony, although minimal, that she feared if she more 
aggressively tried to stop Ninh from touching her he would just "forcefully" do it anyway 
or she would be hurt or injured, was sufficient for a rational fact-finder to determine she 
was overcome by fear.  
 
2. The Victim's Fear of Harm to Her Family Stability 
 
Not only did the State present evidence that the victim experienced fear for her 
physical safety, she testified extensively that she feared potential consequences to her 
social and family stability if she stopped Ninh from abusing her. Specifically, during 
August 2014 to May 2015, she testified that "[i]t was just constantly me thinking, well, 
should I tell my mom and entirely break up my family or should I let this happen so that 
my siblings actually grew up with a father." When she was 16, she explained that the 
abuse subsided and she thought, "I'm not going to tell mom and nothing big is going to 
have to happen to my family in that sense at all."  
 
When asked the consequences she feared if she "demanded that those sexual 
contacts stop happening," she explained: 
 
"You know, in my mind, if I don't do these things, I was scared or afraid that he was 
gonna either—like, I would just lose my Internet access completely. It was the only thing 
that was honestly the problem. Like, I guess I wanted to be able to, you know, not just sit 
in the house and read a book because, you know, I wanted to go on the Internet and watch 
19 
 
movies or YouTube or whatnot. And so that's—I guess it's what I feared that would 
happen. Like, I would lose my phone, lose my Internet, lose, like, just access to going out 
to friends or just doing, like, extracurricular activity at school or something like that." 
 
And when asked why she did not fight back, she said, "[I]f I do . . . fight back or 
say something about it, something might happen to me or my siblings or that was, like, 
what would—what usually would go through my head if I were to tell him off or 
something like that."   
 
The victim first moved to the United States when she was almost 13 years old and 
could not yet speak English. Less than six months after her arrival Ninh began sexually 
assaulting her. She and her sister reunited with their mother after living in another 
country with their aunt for the preceding seven years. The victim testified that she 
previously did not have a father figure and moving in with her mom and Ninh was "a 
different change" and she "wasn't used to having somebody, like, a father figure in my 
life just to tell me, you know, this is what you're supposed to do or whatnot." She 
explained that moving to the United States "there's just entirely different traditions" and 
"what my family actually do here is different from what we do in [my birth country] and 
all that stuff, and so it was just odd, I guess." Because fear is subjective, it was not 
unreasonable under the circumstances, which included the victim's age, length of time 
she had lived without her mother in her birth country, the amount of time she had been 
part of her new family structure, the family dynamics, her lack of fluency in English, her 
lack of experience having a father figure, and her inexperience in the United States, for 
the jury to find that she feared consequences to her family structure for herself, her 
siblings, and her social life if she did not permit Ninh to sexually assault, sodomize, and 
rape her. 
 
 
 
20 
 
3. The State's Evidence that the Victim Was Overcome by Fear 
 
Having found that the State presented sufficient evidence that the victim 
experienced fear while being raped and sodomized, the State must also demonstrate she 
was "overcome" by those fears. Ninh argues there was insufficient evidence the victim 
was "overcome" because she did not testify that Ninh "held [her] down," "blocked her 
from leaving," or threatened her with consequences for noncompliance. Ninh also claims 
that there was no evidence she was "emotionally distraught before, during, or after the 
incidents," and thus there is no evidence she was "overcome." Ninh claims that even if 
the victim felt fear, the evidence did not establish she was "overcome" by fear but rather 
that she "acquiesc[ed]."  
 
Ninh's argument that the victim acquiesced to his sexual acts—rather than being 
overcome by fear—is unavailing. As a panel of this court noted in State v. Bishop, No. 
118,896, 2019 WL 2398044 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion), to acquiesce is 
different than being overcome by fear and means "'to agree or consent quietly without 
protest, but without enthusiasm.'" 2019 WL 2398044, at *8 (quoting Webster's New 
World College Dictionary 12 [5th ed. 2014]). Acquiescing to a sexual encounter 
necessarily requires the acquiescing party to consent—and that consent cannot occur or 
result from fear or coercion. The victim testified that when Ninh started sexually 
assaulting her at age 13—within months of moving to the United States to live with her 
mother and new family after 7 years apart—she feared the familial and social 
consequences if she stopped or prevented Ninh's acts.  
 
The victim's testimony was sufficient for a rational fact-finder to determine that 
she was overcome by fear for her safety, family stability, and social interactions because 
her fear "'[got] the better of'" her or her fear "'overpower[ed],' 'conquer[ed],' and 
'subdue[d]'" her. See Brooks, 298 Kan. at 691-92 (defining "overcome" in the context of 
rape charges citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary definition of 
21 
 
"overcome"). Where the victim's testimony that they were overcome by fear is not "'so 
incredible as to defy belief,'" sufficient evidence exists to present the ultimate 
determination to the jury. Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 913-14.  
 
The jury is permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, and it is 
important to consider the victim's testimony in the context of the evidence presented to 
the jury. See Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 913-14 (fear is subjective and the reasonableness of 
that fear may impact the jury's assessment of the victim's credibility). The jury had ample 
evidence to examine the reasonableness of the victim's fear. It watched multiple video-
taped investigatory interviews where her responses were consistent with her trial 
testimony. Moreover, the police interviews showed a very quiet, young girl who did not 
speak English as a first language, and who repeatedly expressed fear that if she stopped 
or prevented Ninh's sexual assaults her family would be broken up, hurt, or destroyed. 
The jury could reasonably infer from her youth, inexperience having a father figure, 
inexperience living in the United States, lack of English fluency, recent move into her 
mother's and Ninh's home after seven years of being away from her mother, and 
introduction into a new family structure could have made her fear the consequences to 
her family if she stopped or prevented Ninh from raping and sodomizing her.  
 
Explicit threats of physical harm are unnecessary for a rational fact-finder to 
determine that a victim was overcome by force or fear sufficient to convict a defendant of 
rape or aggravated criminal sodomy. In Brooks, a jury convicted the defendant of raping 
J.P., his ex-wife. Brooks went to J.P.'s house that evening and demanded sex. Brooks 
threatened J.P. that if she did not have sex with him, he would disclose e-mails to her 
work that she was having an affair with a married coworker. J.P. did not comply at first 
but eventually let Brooks have sex with her while she hid her face behind her hands and 
closed her eyes. The Kansas Supreme Court held that this was sufficient evidence J.P. 
was overcome by force or fear, stating that a "rational factfinder could infer from the 
facts presented at trial that J.P. clearly feared Brooks would publicize the e-mails if she 
22 
 
did not submit to having sex with him. And because of this fear, she ultimately submitted 
to having nonconsensual sex with Brooks." 298 Kan. at 690.  
 
A rational fact-finder could determine under the facts of this case that the victim 
feared for her family, social stability, or physical safety if she refused to submit to 
nonconsensual sexual contact from Ninh, even without evidence that he made explicit 
threats to reinforce those fears.  
 
In Bishop, the defendant was convicted of four counts of sex crimes against his 
girlfriend's 16-year-old child, H.C. Bishop argued there was insufficient evidence H.C. 
was overcome by force or fear because H.C. merely testified that she feared Bishop 
would leave the family if she did not comply. Similar to Ninh's argument, Bishop 
claimed this could not constitute reasonable fear because he had never actually physically 
harmed H.C. or threatened her safety or family stability. 2019 WL 2398044, at *7-8. But 
a victim does not need to be threatened to be overcome by fear. Moreover, 
reasonableness of a victim's fear is not a question for this court but rather a consideration 
for the jury when making credibility determinations. See Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 914. 
Thus, here, the victim's testimony and statements about her family and her fear provides a 
sufficient basis upon which the jury could find that she was overcome by fear under the 
circumstances.  
 
Sufficient evidence existed for a rational fact-finder to find that the victim was 
overcome by fear while Ninh raped and sodomized her. Because the rape and aggravated 
criminal sodomy statutes requiring the victim to be "overcome by force or fear" do not 
create alternative means of the crimes, that finding is sufficient to sustain Ninh's 
convictions for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. Therefore, even assuming without 
deciding that the State failed to show the victim was overcome by force, sufficient 
evidence still exists to sustain his convictions for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy.  
 
23 
 
III. THE STATE COMMITTED ERROR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS BUT THE ERROR IS 
HARMLESS 
 
Ninh claims the State committed reversible prosecutorial error in its opening 
statement and closing argument by misstating the law, misstating the evidence, stating 
facts not in evidence, and making inflammatory and distracting statements to the jury.  
 
1. Preservation and Standard of Review for Prosecutorial Error 
 
Ninh was not required to object at the district court to preserve his claim for 
reversible prosecutorial error resulting from statements made during opening statements 
and closing arguments. However, this court may consider the absence of an objection in 
its analysis of the alleged error. See State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406, 486 P.3d 551 
(2021).  
 
Appellate courts use a two-step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial error, 
first determining whether an error has occurred, and second, weighing any prejudice to 
the defendant resulting from the error. Prosecutors commit an error when their comments 
during opening statements or closing arguments fall outside the wide latitude afforded to 
prosecutors in discussing the evidence and the law. State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 
378 P.3d 1060 (2016). Prosecutors' comments fall outside this wide latitude if they 
misstate the applicable law, misstate the facts in evidence, inflame the prejudices of the 
jury, or improperly divert the jury's attention. See State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 1183, 1208-
09, 427 P.3d 865 (2018) ("'A prosecutor should not make statements intended to inflame 
the passions or prejudices of the jury or to divert the jury from its duty to decide the case 
based on the evidence and the controlling law.'"); State v. Davis, 306 Kan. 400, 413-14, 
394 P.3d 817 (2017) ("A prosecutor 'cross[es] the line by misstating the law,'" and "'a 
prosecutor's arguments must remain consistent with the evidence.'").  
 
24 
 
If an error is found, this court must determine whether the error prejudiced the 
defendant's due process rights to a fair trial—asking whether the State has shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial, in light of the 
whole record. Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109.  
 
2. Error Analysis 
 
Ninh asserts that the State committed five different prosecutorial errors during its 
opening statement and closing argument:   
(1) the State inflamed the jury's prejudices and distracted the jury by discussing 
what "some rapists" do;  
(2) the State's discussion of what other rapists do was a discussion of things not 
admitted into evidence;  
(3) the prosecutor inflamed the jury by referring to Ninh as a "rapist";  
(4) the prosecutor misstated the evidence when she asserted that the jury would 
hear evidence that Ninh put his finger inside of the victim's vagina and that she 
thought it hurt; and 
(5) the prosecutor misstated the law in her closing argument when she said that 
Ninh's "form of force was grooming."  
 
a. The Prosecutor's Reference to the Types of Force Used by "Some 
Rapists" Was Not Error  
 
In the State's closing argument, Ninh claims the prosecutor committed reversible 
error when she said:  
 
"He's treating her like she's special. She described how that type of touching he would 
engage in all through her teenage years, it wasn't the type of touching where—you know, 
some rapists are sadists. Some of them cause pain. Some rapists use alcohol so a victim 
25 
 
doesn't know or is incapacitated and can't respond back. His form of force was 
grooming." (Emphases added.) 
 
Ninh argues that what "some rapists" do to overcome a victim by force or fear was 
irrelevant to his case.  
 
Pointing out what "some rapists" do was not wholly irrelevant to remind the jury 
there are many ways the crime of rape may be accomplished. Kansas law does not require 
the victim to be "physically overcome by force" through violence or physical restraint—it 
requires that the victim did not consent and was overcome by force or fear. Borthwick, 
255 Kan. 899, Syl. ¶ 7. In this case, the victim was not physically overpowered, injured, 
or restrained. Therefore, the prosecutor's statements about "some rapists" illustrates the 
applicable law that those methods are not the only means for committing rape in Kansas. 
The statements may not have been relevant to Ninh's actions, but they were not irrelevant 
under Kansas law to demonstrate the range of actions that could satisfy the material 
elements of Ninh's charges. 
 
Additionally, the prosecutor's statement about the types of force "some rapists" use 
were all referenced by Detective C.Z. in his trial testimony, where he stated: 
 
"Q: Okay. Force can come in many different styles, many different types? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: Grooming behavior, is that one type of force that you've seen used? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: You've seen other types of force that include incapacitating someone with 
alcohol or drugs? 
"A: Several times. 
"Q: Other types of force may be excessive types of force to the point where the 
victim of the sexual assault requires genital reconstructive surgery? 
"A: I've seen that, yes. 
26 
 
"Q: Okay. So in your training, your experience and your years as a detective with 
EMCU, you've seen force be applied through many different mechanisms? 
"A: Yes."  
 
Ninh did not object to Detective C.Z.'s direct testimony regarding the different types of 
force used by some rapists. Therefore, Ninh's second claim that the prosecutor's 
statements about "some rapists" were not admitted into evidence also fails.  
 
b. The Prosecutor Did Not Repeatedly Refer to Ninh as a Rapist and Did 
Not Err in Her Comments Regarding Rapists  
 
Ninh claims that the State erred by "repeatedly calling [him] a rapist," because it 
was inflammatory and improper. See State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 114, 21 P.3d 516 
(2001) (the court found it was improper to call the accused a "killer"). While Ninh alleges 
the State "repeatedly" referred to him as a rapist, the record reveals just one instance 
where this arguably occurred—in the State's closing argument. 
 
 During closing argument, when discussing the DNA evidence found on the 
victim's right breast, the prosecutor said:  
 
"And when they get investigated, the evidence that is found is the evidence that 
the defendant, the suspect, leaves behind. It is the evidence that the rapist leaves behind. 
He did away with the evidence by wiping it off of [the victim]. He may not have even 
ejaculated fully, but ultimately he wiped away whatever evidence was going to be on his 
body. He wiped away the evidence he thought he had left behind on her body. He  
forgot . . . he didn't wipe away her breast. He didn't wipe his saliva off of her breast, and 
ultimately that saliva was preserved and it was intact because [the victim] was wearing 
the same bra that she had worn prior to the attack . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
 
27 
 
Not only was this a single reference to a "rapist," and not "repeatedly" as alleged by 
Ninh, but it was done in the context of an evidentiary discussion and not as a way to 
name, identify, or refer to Ninh. 
 
The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's statements referring to a 
defendant as a murderer based on something other than the evidence presented are 
improper. See State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 80-82, 183 P.3d 801 (2008), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). Thus, "a prosecutor 
may refer to the defendant as a murderer or killer in the course of arguing the evidence 
shows the defendant committed the murder." Scott, 286 Kan. at 81. The court further 
explained:  
 
"However, where such statements imply the prosecutor believes something other than the 
evidence shows the defendant to be a murderer, such as the prosecutor's belief the 
defendant 'looks like a murderer' or has 'cold-blooded killing eyes,' or the statements do 
not relate to the evidence but are simply made to inflame the jury, such as a comment 
telling the jurors they are 'eight feet from a killer,' the argument will be held improper." 
286 Kan. at 81-82.  
 
To date, it does not appear that the Kansas Supreme Court has analyzed this issue in the 
context of the term "rapist," but panels of this court have addressed the issue. See State v. 
Ahmedin, No. 105,378, 2012 WL 1919925, at *4-5 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished 
opinion) (finding no error when the prosecutor called the defendant a rapist in closing 
argument because the statement was made in the context of arguing the evidence showed 
Ahmedin committed the rape); State v. Moore, No. 100,090, 2009 WL 3630897, at *2-4 
(Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (finding error when the prosecutor called the 
defendant a rapist in closing argument because the defendant was charged with attempted 
rape, not rape, and thus the statement was not based on the evidence).  
 
28 
 
In Scott, the prosecutor during closing argument said, "'[Y]ou have about eight 
feet separating you from the hands of a killer right here.'" 271 Kan. at 114. There, the 
prosecutor specifically named, identified, and referred to the defendant as a "killer." And 
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the comment was inflammatory and improper, 
especially considering Scott was asserting a theory of self-defense and did not deny he 
caused the victim's death. 271 Kan. at 114.  
 
Here, Ninh was charged with multiple counts of rape. In her closing argument, the 
prosecutor said that when investigating a crime, the police look at "the evidence that the 
rapist leaves behind." She then noted that Ninh used a towel to wipe evidence away from 
his penis and the victim's vagina, but he failed to wipe away DNA evidence from her 
breast. During trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence that DNA was found on her 
breast and Ninh could not be excluded as the source of that DNA. The prosecutor's 
statement in her closing argument was clearly referring to the specific evidence in the 
case, the DNA found on the victim's breast, and arguing that evidence showed Ninh's 
guilt. The prosecutor's statement also went to refute Ninh's general denial of all of the 
victim's allegations. Had Ninh put forth a defense giving a reasonable explanation for 
why his DNA might be found on her breast, this would be a closer call. But given the 
evidence and defense, the prosecutor's statement was not improper or inflammatory and 
Ninh's third claim of error fails.  
 
c. The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate the Evidence 
 
 
In Ninh's fourth claim of prosecutorial error, he alleges that the prosecutor 
misstated the evidence in both her opening statement and closing argument when she said 
that the jury would hear evidence that Ninh put his finger inside the victim's vagina and 
she thought it hurt. Specifically, Ninh alleges the prosecutor's following statements 
misstated the evidence: 
 
29 
 
"She'll describe that he will, when she's 14 years of age, start coming into her room when 
she's sleeping. He'll put a finger inside of her vagina. She'll describe that it hurt." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
"We then move to Count 2 and Count 3. . . . Those are both for when she is 14 
years of age . . . and that specific conduct that is described in those two counts is the 
defendant's finger being inserted into her vagina." (Emphasis added.)  
 
"Again, this Count 2 is for rape. . . . He puts his finger in her vagina. When she 
describes this action, she describes that it's in between my labia, massaging with his 
fingertips. . . . She also described that it would hurt so she usually pulled away." 
(Emphases added.) 
 
Ninh contends that the victim did not testify that Ninh penetrated her vagina with 
his fingers but that he only put his finger "between the skin flaps, i.e. her labia." He also 
argues that because she testified that the sexual contact was "not ever honestly painful," 
the prosecutor's statements about her describing Ninh's actions as "hurting" misstated the 
evidence. Although the testimony could be more clear or consistent, there is some 
evidence to support the prosecutor's statements.  
 
When describing what Ninh would do with his hands underneath her underwear, 
the victim testified that Ninh's "finger would go between my vagina and he would try to, 
I guess, massage it." (Emphasis added.) She also testified that "he would just undo my 
bra and he would start grabbing my breast, and for a couple minutes he'll pull down my 
pants and he'll start to massage my vagina." At another point, she testified that Ninh 
would pull ". . . down my pants and start touching my vagina" with his hands and he 
would "cup around my vagina and then start to run his finger in between and then he 
started massaging it." When the prosecutor tried to clarify and said, "I want to make sure 
we're all very clear. When you say finger in between, he would actually insert his 
finger—" then the victim said, "No" before the prosecutor finished the question. The 
prosecutor then said, "[I]n between—at least in between the labia?" and she said, "Yes." 
30 
 
Later, the prosecutor again asked, "[H]is finger would go inside those flaps of skin" and 
she replied, "Yes." The prosecutor then said, "[O]n your—in your vagina?" and she 
replied, "Yeah." She described how he touched her vagina at this time as "a circular 
motion, up and down my vagina, not around it." While her testimony might have some 
inconsistencies, taken as a whole, her testimony sufficiently supports the prosecutor's 
claims in her opening statement and closing argument that Ninh penetrated the victim's 
vagina with his fingers.   
 
Ninh argues that the victim's testimony that "[i]t was not painful. It was not ever 
honestly painful. It was just—I guess it was just buildup in tension and sensation as 
that—that's what I would feel," demonstrates that the prosecutor's statements that the 
victim would say it hurt was error. However, Ninh fails to acknowledge the contradictory 
evidence. The jury saw the victim's interview with Detective C.Z. where she said that 
between August 2014 and May 2015 when Ninh tried to put his finger in her vagina "it 
was uncomfortable for me, it was hurting me. So, I usually just pull [sic] away when I 
feel like he's going to do that." There is a difference between nonexistent evidence and 
contradictory evidence. Where there is evidence that could lead a reasonable fact-finder 
to conclude something did or did not happen, it is up to that fact-finder—the jury—to 
weigh the evidence and make that credibility determination. Here, the prosecutor's 
statements could not be considered a misstatement of evidence in the record because 
there was evidence in the record that the victim said Ninh's attempts to penetrate her 
vagina and touching her vagina hurt. Therefore, Ninh's fourth claim of error fails.  
 
d. The Prosecutor Misstated the Law in Her Closing Argument 
 
In his final claim of prosecutorial error, Ninh argues that the prosecutor misstated 
the law in her closing argument when she said that Ninh's "form of force was grooming." 
Ninh argues that grooming is something that takes place before an offense, while force is 
something that must be present at the same time as the other elements of the offense—
31 
 
essentially at the same time as the nonconsensual sexual intercourse or sodomy. Ninh 
relies on State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, 606, 315 P.3d 868 (2014), for the proposition that 
the force must occur at the same time as the sexual intercourse or sodomy. But, as Ninh 
acknowledges, the error in Akins was different than that alleged here. In Akins, the 
prosecutor implied that the defendant's grooming satisfied the specific intent element of 
his charge of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Here, the prosecutor argued that 
Ninh's grooming satisfied the element of "force" in the context of Ninh's general intent 
crimes of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. However, the State has failed to provide 
any legal authority supporting the prosecutor's statement that grooming can constitute a 
form of force sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape or aggravated criminal sodomy in 
Kansas.  
 
This court has also found no authority supporting the prosecutor's statement of the 
law, and as such, the prosecutor's statement that Ninh's "form of force was grooming" 
was a misstatement of the law and constitutes prosecutorial error. This court must next 
determine whether this error prejudiced Ninh's right to a fair trial.  
 
3. Prejudice Analysis and Reversibility  
 
When error is found, this court must next determine whether that error prejudiced 
the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. To determine if Ninh was prejudiced in 
his right to a fair trial, this court considers all alleged indicators of prejudice and 
determines whether the State has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the trial. Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109. The "prosecutorial error is 
harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire 
record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
verdict.'" 305 Kan. at 109 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 
[2011], cert. denied 565 U.S. 1221 [2012]).  
32 
 
Ninh claims the prosecutor's statement about grooming as force prejudiced him 
because it was one of the last statements she made in her closing argument. The State 
cannot show the jury did not rely on "grooming" as force for its verdict. While it is true 
that the prosecutor made the grooming statement toward the end of her rebuttal closing 
argument, that was her only reference to grooming as a form of force and it came after 
she made arguments about Ninh's other forms of force and fear.  
 
In her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed multiple other types of "fear or 
force" that supported the charges. In the State's initial closing argument, the prosecutor 
identified evidence demonstrating the victim felt "force or fear," such as when "[s]he 
grabs his hands and moves them off of her body," or when "[s]he pushes his hand down 
off of her breast," or when she "moved away . . . stood up . . . walked away." The 
prosecutor said "[t]hese are all actions that are communicating . . . describing and she is 
showing the defendant that she's not okay with this form of contact." The prosecutor also 
discussed the victim's testimony and interviews where she expressed fear of not 
submitting would break up her family, would harm her siblings, or cause her to lose 
social access to her peers. The prosecutor also suggested that Ninh's measure of force was 
"playing on her fears of a broken family" and his "parental authority." The primary 
evidence of the victim being overcome by force or fear related to her fear of her family 
breaking up or suffering, her siblings suffering, facing social consequences, Ninh's 
persistence in his physical actions, and her fear that Ninh would "forcefully just do the 
things that he does to me" if she resisted more. 
 
Reviewing the record as a whole, the amount of the nongrooming force or fear 
evidence shows that there is no reasonable doubt that the State's error did not affect the 
outcome of Ninh's trial, and thus such error was harmless.  
 
 
33 
 
IV. 
THE STATE DID NOT VIOLATE NINH'S CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
A UNANIMOUS VERDICT 
 
Ninh's final claim asserts that he was denied his right to a unanimous verdict in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, his section 5 rights under the Kansas 
Constitution, and K.S.A. 22-3421. He argues that the State did not provide sufficient 
evidence for the jury to agree to a unanimous verdict on any of his convictions such that 
he is entitled to reversal on all six convictions.  
 
1. Preservation and Standard of Review for Unanimity Challenges 
 
This court generally does not review claims seeking reversal on constitutional 
grounds that are brought up for the first time on appeal. State v. Daniel, 307 Kan. 428, 
430, 410 P.3d 877 (2018). Ninh raised the unanimity challenge in his motion for a new 
trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and K.S.A. 22-3421 
but did not argue a violation of section 5 of the Kansas Constitution below. This court 
recognizes several exceptions to the general prohibition that, when applicable, can be 
asserted to permit review of a constitutional objection for the first time on appeal. Those 
exceptions include circumstances when the claim involves only questions of law and is 
finally determinative of the case, or when resolution of the claim is necessary to prevent 
the denial of fundamental rights. See Johnson, 309 Kan. at 995. Ninh argues that his 
section 5 argument should be heard for the first time on appeal under both exceptions. 
This court agrees and will address Ninh's unanimity challenge under the Sixth 
Amendment, K.S.A. 22-3421, and under section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights.      
 
Ninh had a statutory right to a unanimous jury verdict. K.S.A. 22-3421; see State 
v. Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. 11, 18, 321 P.3d 1 (2014). Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in federal criminal 
34 
 
cases should be incorporated, via the Fourteenth Amendment, to state criminal 
prosecutions thus extending the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict in federal 
criminal proceedings to state court criminal defendants. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 
U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1396-97, 206 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2020). While the Kansas 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the Kansas Constitution provides similar 
protections post-Ramos, prior panels of this court have presumed so, and this court finds 
no reason to disagree. See State v. Spackman, No. 122,021, 2021 WL 4929156, at *4 
(Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion) ("[T]here is a right to unanimous jury verdicts in 
criminal cases grounded in [section] 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and, 
perhaps, in [section] 5.").  
 
When a defendant asserts a violation of their right to a unanimous jury verdict, an 
appellate court must first determine whether it is presented with a case involving multiple 
acts. This determination presents a question of law over which appellate courts exercise 
unlimited review. Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 18. If the case involves multiple acts,  
 
"the appellate court must then determine whether error was committed because either the 
State must have informed the jury which act to rely upon for each charge during its 
deliberations or the district court must have instructed the jury to agree on the specific 
criminal act for each charge in order to convict. The failure to elect or instruct is error." 
299 Kan. at 18. 
 
If the appellate court finds an error, it then determines whether the error was harmless or 
requires reversal, using the constitutional harmlessness standard for constitutional claims 
and the statutory harmlessness standard for statutory claims. See Lowery, 308 Kan. at 
1235; Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109; Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 18.  
 
 
 
 
35 
 
2. Unanimity Analysis 
 
The facts are clear, and the State concedes that it presented evidence of multiple 
acts for each of Ninh's six convictions. So, this is a multiple-acts case, and this court 
moves to the next step of the analysis—whether an error occurred in instructing the jury 
about what to rely upon for each charge.  
 
The district court issued a multiple acts instruction for each of Ninh's six 
convictions that the jury "must unanimously agree upon the same underlying act" for 
each of Counts 1-6. This court must presume the jury followed these instructions. See 
State v. Gray, 311 Kan. 164, 172, 459 P.3d 165 (2020) ("[W]e presume jury members 
follow instructions."). Because the district court "instructed the jury to agree on the 
specific criminal act for each charge in order to convict," Ninh cannot show error arose 
from the district court's actions. See Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 18.  
 
Next, Ninh claims that despite the multiple-acts instruction, the State violated his 
right to a unanimous verdict because of "the way in which the State chose to present its 
case." Ninh asserts that even with the unanimity jury instructions, the State did not 
provide enough evidence of each encounter between the victim and Ninh for the jury to 
unanimously agree on the underlying acts for each conviction. This is essentially a 
recitation of Ninh's claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 
 
A panel of this court addressed a similar argument in State v. Hunt, 61 Kan. App. 
2d 435, 503 P.3d 1067 (2021). In Hunt, the defendant was convicted of two counts of 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Hunt appealed, asserting the State violated his 
right to a unanimous verdict under the Sixth Amendment, section 5 of the Kansas 
Constitution, and K.S.A. 22-3421 because one count dealt with multiple-acts evidence—
the victim testified about a specific sex act and alleged it occurred on six different 
occasions within a certain time span. Just as Ninh asserts, Hunt argued that the State did 
36 
 
not provide any evidence for the jury to differentiate between the alleged instances of 
misconduct, such that the jury could not have unanimously agreed on any given incident. 
The Hunt panel addressed this argument as follows: 
 
"Hunt's case is typical of many cases alleging the defendant committed a sex act against a 
child. The child can often describe the sex act but is unsure of the time frame or how 
many times the act occurred. Unless the State presents evidence of separate and distinct 
acts that could cause jurors to disagree on which act supports the charge, there is no jury 
unanimity issue. 
 
"But even if count two can somehow be analyzed as a multiple acts crime, the 
district court instructed the jurors that they 'must unanimously agree upon the same 
underlying act.' Hunt cannot have it both ways. If the State's evidence did not separate 
and distinguish the acts supporting count two, then there is no jury unanimity issue. But if 
the State's evidence was presented in a way that could have caused jurors to disagree on 
which act supported the charge, then the jurors were instructed to unanimously agree on 
the act. . . . Either way, the State's prosecution of count two did not violate Hunt's 
constitutional and statutory rights to a unanimous verdict." 61 Kan. App. 2d at 446. 
 
Like the defendant in Hunt, Ninh cannot have it both ways. If this court accepts 
Ninh's argument that the State did not provide enough evidence to separate and 
distinguish the victim's multiple allegations supporting each of Ninh's individual 
convictions, then a true multiple-acts issue did not exist and there was no violation of 
Ninh's right to a unanimous verdict. However, if this court accepts Ninh's assertion that 
the State's evidence was presented in a way that the jurors could disagree as to which of 
the multiple acts supported each charge, then the multiple-acts instruction attached to 
Counts 1-6 cured any potential unanimity issues.  
 
Ninh's unanimity argument is less rooted in a traditional multiple acts challenge 
and is more akin to a challenge of the sufficiency of the testimony supporting his 
convictions for Counts 1-6. He argues that the victim's testimony regarding the dozens 
37 
 
and dozens of sexual assaults was not specific enough for the jury to have unanimously 
agreed on the underlying acts supporting each conviction. A panel of this court addressed 
a similar argument in State v. Spackman, No. 122,021, 2021 WL 4929156, at *4 (Kan. 
App. 2021) (unpublished opinion). In Spackman, the defendant was convicted of six 
felony sex crimes against a child but argued on appeal that the victim's testimony "was so 
nonspecific the jurors could not have reached a constitutionally permissible unanimous 
verdict." 2021 WL 4929156, at *2. Similar to Ninh, Spackman's defense at trial was that 
the incidents did not occur and the child was making the allegations up. The Spackman 
panel addressed the argument as follows: 
 
"We feel adrift in navigating Spackman's constitutional argument. The jurors had 
to resolve a credibility contest between L.S. and Spackman and did so in favor of L.S. If 
believed, L.S.'s testimony established physical acts on Spackman's part that entailed 
sexual contact proscribed under the applicable statutes. L.S. described where the acts 
took place and identified Spackman as her abuser. Although the abuse involved repeated 
instances of the same sort of conduct, that does not amount to a constitutional defect in 
the State's proof. Spackman has not satisfactorily explained why we should treat it that 
way. A putative victim's unusually generic testimony about the charged criminal conduct 
might open a line of attack on [their] credibility and a closing argument urging the jurors 
to find a reasonable doubt about what really happened. But that's far different from a 
constitutional defect requiring reversal of a conviction for lack of jury unanimity. 
Spackman hasn't crossed that threshold." 2021 WL 4929156, at *4.  
 
As in Spackman, the jury in this matter had to resolve a credibility determination 
between Ninh and the victim, and clearly did so in favor of the victim. While her 
testimony lacked some specificity, it was clearly sufficient to establish that Ninh engaged 
in physical acts with her that were prohibited under each applicable statute and which 
occurred during the timespans alleged by the State for each individual count. The victim 
described the numerous sexual acts, testified where the acts took place, estimated how 
many times the acts occurred, and identified Ninh as the abuser each time. At trial, Ninh 
had the opportunity to question the reliability of those statements, and effectively did so 
38 
 
as to the count for which the jury did not convict him. Ninh cannot now rely on a claim of 
unspecific testimony to create a unanimity issue requiring reversal. Ninh's final claim of 
error fails. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
A jury convicted Ninh of one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, 
three counts of rape, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy stemming from his 
abuse of the victim over the course of four years—and this court finds no reversible error 
with the charged statutes, sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial error, or unanimity of 
the verdict. Ninh's convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
Affirmed.