Case Title: State v. Katon

Citation: 168 Vt. 274, 719 A.2d 430

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Katon  (96-359); 168 Vt. 274; 719 A.2d 430

[Filed 4-Sep-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-359

State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Philip J. Katon                              December Term, 1997

Dean B. Pineles, J.

       Lauren Bowerman, Chittenden County Acting State's Attorney, Pamela
  Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, and Michael Whipple, Law Clerk (On
  the Brief), Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William Nelson and Henry Hinton,
  Appellate Attorneys, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Defendant Philip J. Katon, who pleaded nolo contendere
  to a charge of domestic assault, appeals from the order of the district
  court revoking his probation and imposing the underlying sentence. 
  Defendant contends that his right to due process of the law was abridged
  when his probation was revoked after he was found ineligible to participate
  in a program required as part of his probation.  We affirm.

       In February 1995, based on an agreement with the prosecution,
  defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of domestic assault.  The
  charge was supported by the arresting officer's affidavit of probable
  cause, which stated that defendant "slapped [the woman with whom he was
  living] in the area of her upper chest, causing her pain."  The affidavit
  also included allegations that defendant was intoxicated at the time, that
  he had grabbed the victim, and that he had pushed the victim several times.

       As part of the V.R.Cr.P. 11(c) colloquy, the court informed defendant
  that by pleading

 

  nolo contendere he was giving up his right to have the State prove beyond a
  reasonable doubt each of the elements of the domestic assault charge. 
  Further, the court read the charge to defendant: "the charge is that on
  November 21, 1994, you were a person who recklessly caused bodily injury to
  a household member, to wit (the victim), by slapping her in violation of 13
  V.S.A. § 1042."   Defendant pleaded no contest to this charge.

       After accepting defendant's plea, the court issued a suspended
  sentence and placed defendant on probation.  One of defendant's conditions
  of probation was that he participate fully in any program to which he was
  referred by the court or his probation officer.  In addition, the court
  imposed a special condition that defendant complete the Domestic Abuse
  Education Program (DAEP).

       In May 1996, at the intake interview for DAEP, defendant refused to
  admit the assaultive behavior to the program counselor.  In addition,
  defendant refused to admit to other incidents and allegations contained in
  the affidavit of probable cause.  Consequently, he was refused entrance
  into the program.(FN1) Subsequently, defendant's probation officer filed a
  violation-of-probation (VOP) complaint alleging that defendant violated
  the condition of his probation requiring that he complete DAEP.

       At the VOP hearing, the court was informed by the State that it was
  willing to give defendant another opportunity to participate in DAEP if, at
  the VOP hearing, he would admit the essential facts of the domestic abuse
  conviction that were contained in the arresting officer's affidavit.  On
  the stand, defendant stated that he had "pushed [the victim], slapped her
  hand out of my face before she hit me.  And I swore at her, and I left." 
  On cross-examination, defendant confirmed that he was unwilling to admit to
  other events set forth in the charging affidavit:

     [The State]: And you're not willing to admit pushing her down,
     correct?

 

     [Defendant]: No, I didn't do that.

     [The State]: Okay, And you're not willing to admit pushing her in
     the bedroom, correct.
  
     [Defendant]: Well, we didn't even make it into the bedroom.

     [The State]: All right.  And you're not willing to admit grabbing
     and slapping her, correct.

     [Defendant]: Correct.

  Defendant also disputed allegations of alcohol use contained in the
  affidavit.  In light of defendant's denials, both the probation officer and
  the DAEP manager informed the court that defendant's statements failed to
  satisfy DAEP's admission requirements.  At the conclusion of the hearing,
  the court summarized the evidence observing that defendant had been willing
  to:

     state only that he pushed the victim's hand away from his face or
     slapped her hand away from his face.  He steadfastly denied all of
     the other allegations in the affidavit including those which formed
     the basis of the charge.

  In ruling, the court noted that the facts and the law were clear:

     [Defendant] simply did not, and does not today, admit to the facts
     underlying this charge.  He admits to only some minimal physical
     interaction with [the victim], and describes that as sort of a
     defensive effort . . . .  He's denying the essential facts underlying
     the charge, so in my opinion the facts are clear.  There is a
     violation of probation.

  Thus, the court reinstated defendant's original sentence of four-to-twelve
  months.  The present appeal follows.

       On appeal, defendant asserts that due process requires clear and
  convincing evidence that the allegations in the probable-cause affidavit
  are true before probation can be revoked on the basis of a refusal to admit
  to them.  He therefore claims that revocation of his probation on the basis
  of unproven allegations in the probable-cause affidavit constituted error. 
  We need not address this contention, however, because revocation of
  defendant's probation was properly based on defendant's failure to admit
  his culpability for the crime to which he pleaded nolo contendere.  As the
  trial court found, he only acknowledged deflecting a blow, but refused to

 

  admit to the facts underlying the domestic assault charge, i.e., to admit
  he recklessly caused the victim bodily harm by slapping her.  Hence, we
  consider his due process claim only in the context of the conduct on which
  he was convicted.

       The loss of liberty involved in the revocation of probation is a
  serious deprivation requiring the defendant to be accorded due process. 
  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli,