Case Title: Lee v. Puamana Community Association .

Citation: 109 Haw. 561

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
17 ORARY

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'I

 

o0o--

 

 

ALLAN LEE, BARBARA LEE, SHIRLEY WETZEL and SCOTT DONOVAN,
Plaintiffs /Counterclaim Defendants-Appellees

 

PUAMANA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
PUAMANA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Defendants-Appellants

and

JOHN DOES 1-100, JANE DOES 1-100 DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100, DOE
CORPORATIONS -100, DOE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1-100,
‘and DOE PUAMANA COMMITTEE MEMBERS 1-100, Defendants

No. 24265 iz

 

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No, 99-0656)

Gams

OS:8 HY €2 434

FEBRUARY 23, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendant-appellants, Puanana Community Association and
Board of Directors of the Puanana Community Association
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Appellants”], appeal
from the second circuit court's April 19, 2001 judgment in favor
of plaintitf-appeliees, Allan Lee, Barbara Lee, Shirley Wetzel,
and Scott Donovan [hereinafter collectively referred to as

“appellees”], filed pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure
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[hereinafter “HRCP”] Rule 54(b) (2001).
On appeal, Appellants contend that the circuit court
erred by granting Allan and Barbara Lee's (hereinafter the
“zees”]? April 7, 2000 “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Transfer of Common Elenents to Private Use,” inasmuch
ast (1) the circuit court improperly applied condominium law and
concepts to Puamana, @ planned community association governed by
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (hereinafter “HRS”] chapter 4210; (2)
planned comunity associations have the right to amend their
documents; (3) there is no evidence that the amendment to the
governing documents would adversely affect individual unit
owners; and (4) courts uphold amendments to governing documents,
including anendnents which affect the ownership rights of the
individual unit owners. Appellants also assezt that the circuit
court erred by denying their motion for reconsideration.
Finally, Appellants contend that if this court should determine

RCP Rule 54(b) provides:
)
wien nore then one claim for relief 1s presented in an action,
nether as a claim, countercleim, cross-claim, or third-party
Giles of when multiple parties are involved, ‘the court may direct
the entey of a Final Sudgrent ae to one or more but fever than all
Of the clains of parties only upon an express determination thet
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination
355 eirection, any order or other form of decision, however,
Gesignates, which adjudicates fewer than oll the clains or the
Fights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
femminate the action as to any of the clains or parties, and the
Sider cr other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
Before the entry of Judgment adjudicating all the clains and the
Fights and liabliities of all the parties.

  

 

 

 

 

 

2 Shirley Wetze? [hereinafter “Wetzel"] and Scott Donovan
[hereinafter "Donovan"| did not become parties to the action until
approximately Janvary 16, 2001. Sag infta, at n.7.

2

 
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that the circuit court did not err by granting Appellees’ notion
for partial summary judgment, the circuit court's July 5, 2000
order requires clarification inasmuch as (1) the order is unclear
as to whether or not it grants injunctive relief, and (2) if the
circuit court's order is construed as awarding injunctive relief,
the order is procedurally defective insofar as it violates the
requirements set forth in HRCP Rule 65 (2000).

Based on the following analysis, we vacate the circuit
court’s April 19, 2001 judgment, inasmuch as the Lees failed to
demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material fact for
trial and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of lew.

1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

Puamana was established in 1968 as a Hawai'i non-profit
corporation governed by the April 29, 1968 “Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions” (hereinafter “CCsRs”],
recorded in the Bureau of Conveyances of the State of Hawai'i
(hereinafter “B0C"] on May 8, 1968, Puamana occupied
approximately thirty acres of land and consisted of approximately
two-hunded and thirty subdivided units, in addition to conmon
areas owned by Puamana. Each individual unit owner was 2 menber
of Puamana, and each owner's interest was subject to the
Yeasenents, restrictions, covenants, conditions, charges and
liens . . . set forth in [the] (CCéRs)." (Ellipses added.)
(Brackets added.)

Although the CC&Rs contemplated that owners shall
 

* FOR PUBLICATION
construct their private residences within the boundaries of their
respective units, several owners constructed “pop outs” that
encroached onto the common areas owned by Puamana. The term “pop
out” refers to an expansion of the dwelling by which the exterior
walls are pushed out toward the area beneath the eaves of the
building structure. The Board of Directors of Puamana
[hereinafter “Board’) initially assumed that the “pop outs”
remained within the boundaries of the respective units because
they did not protrude beyond the drip lines of the eaves.
However, the Board subsequently discovered that the unit
boundaries coincided with the original position of the exterior
walls of the dwellings and that the “pop outs” encroached onto
the common areas even though they remained under the eaves.

Dale W. Hillman [hereinafter “Hillman”) was one of the
unit owners desiring to construct a “pop out,” and he proposed to
extend nearly all of his sixty-six-foot exterior wall two and

one-half feet outward towards the eaves, creating an additional

 

one-hundred and sixty-five square-feet of floor space. The Board
rejected Hillman’s proposal unless and until the CCsRs could be
amended to expressly permit encroachments onto the common areas.
Subsequently, Puamana Community Association [hereinafter
sassociation”] and Hillman agreed to jointly submit cross-notions
to the circuit court for a declaratory ruling as to whether the
goard had the authority, without amending the existing CCéRs, to
allow such encroachments. On October 6, 1999, the court filed an

order granting the Aesociation’s motion for declaratory relief,
 

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ruling that the CCéRs, as written, did not authorize the Board to
permit encroachments onto the common areas. As a result, on
october 19, 1999, the Board recorded a document entitled
~amendment of Puamana Declaration, Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions” [hereinafter “anended CCsRs”] in the BOC. The
anended CCéRs purported to authorize the Board to approve “minor
encroachments" of up to two-hundred square-feet per unit. The
record indicates that the amendent was validly executed pursuant
to the amendment procedure set forth in the CCéRs.

Procedural Background

 

‘The present proceedings arise from an October 28, 1999
complaint, filed by the Lees in response to the amended CC&Rs.
The Lees alleged, among other things, that Appellants “wrongfully
and deliberately attempted to transfer and in fact have
transferred portions of the connon elements or interest of the

Puamana to individual unit owners in violation of Hawai(*]i law

 

and the project documents(.]"? (Brackets added.) The Lee:
prayed for, inter alia, injunctive relief as well as general,
special, and punitive damages, Appellants filed their answer to
the Lees’ complaint on Decenber 27, 1999.

Subsequently, on April 7, 2000, the Lees filed a

“motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Transfer of Connon

 

% the Lees algo clained that they enjoyed @ scenic view of
Keho'clawe from their third-flocr loft, which wae blocked when their neighbor,
Hark Cleburel, smpermiesibly constructed his own thira-floor loft. The Lees
faverred that Appellants wrongfully approved Ciaburri's construction of the
ICEL “nowevers these clains are not relevant in the present appeal inasmuch
as the April 19, 1999 judgment pereained only to tne lees’ claim regaraing
encroachments onte the common areas.

 

 

 

 
 

‘OR PUBLICATION
Elements to Private Use.” The Lees specifically alleged that
they were entitled to partial summary judgment insofar as: (1)
the Board could not rely on the amended CCéRs to transfer common
elements to individual ouners because such action violated county
requirenents; (2) the Board could not divest property rights in
the common areas that were expressly conveyed by deed; (3)
appellants were judicially estopped from asserting that they were
permitted to “give away” the Lees’ property interests (4)
Appellants essentially conveyed portions of the common area to
individual owners for private use and thus violated the
principles set forth in Renney v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of
Kaanapali, 70 Haw. 469, 776 F.2d 393 (1989); and (5) the effect
of the amended CC&Rs was not “minor” because the amended CCsRS
authorized the Board to “convey” up to forty-six-thousand square
feet (nearly one acre) of the common area.

In response, on May 11, 2000, Appellants filed @
memorandum in opposition to the Lees’ motion for partial sunmary
judgment. Appellants contended that the Lees were not entitled
to partial summary judgment insofar as: (1) the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction because HRS § 421J-13(a) (Supp. 1997)*
required that the matter be first submitted to mediation; (2) in
the prior proceeding between the Association and Hillman, the

© RS § 4213-1312) provides that:
Mediation of disputes, (a) At the request of any party, any
dispute concerning or invelving one or more members and an
seUiscions its boerd of directors, managing agent, manager, oF
Bes nore other menbers relating to the interpretation,
SSerisaticn, “or entorcanent of this chapter or the association
BElnentes shell eirst be submitted to mediation.

6
 

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Honorable E. John McConnell ordered the Association to make
good faith effort to anend the CCéRs so as to permit
encroachments onte the common areas; (3) the Lees had no
admissible evidence in support of their allegation that
Appellants’ actions violated county requirements; (4) the Lees
misconstrued the Association's argunents in the prior proceeding
between the Association and Hillman (hereinafter “the Hillman
action}, and thus the Lees’ invocation of the construct of
judicial estoppel vas without merits and (5) the unit owners’
interests in the common areas were clearly subject to the CC&Rs
and the anended CCeRS.

on May 18, 2000, the circuit court held a hearing on
the Lees’ motion for partial summary judgment. without
specifying any particular basis for its decision, the circuit
court orally granted the Lees’ motion. On July 5, 2000, the
cdrcuit court filed an order granting the Lees’ motion for
partial sunmary judgment.

on duly 18, 2000, Appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration. Appellants argued that they were entitled to
relief inasmuch as: (1) the order violated HRS § 4219-13; (2)
the order directly contradicted Judge McConnell’s oxdez; (3) the
Lees’ warranty deed was subject to the CCéRs and amended CC&Rs:
(4) the Association properly amended the CC&Rs so as to permit

minor encroachments onto the common areas; (5) courts have upheld

+ on May 15, 2000, the Lees filed a reply mesorandun in response to
Appellants’ nenorandon in opposition.
+" FOR PUBLICATION ***

amendments to governing documents, including amendnents which
affect ownership rights of the individual unit owners; (6)
complete and correct copies of the declaration and amended
declaration were not subsitted with Appellants’ memorandum in
oppositions‘ (7) the Lees failed to provide any evidence that the
encroachnents violated the Maui County Code (hereinafter "MCC");
(8) Puamana was not @ condominium property regime and therefore
Penney did not apply: and (9) the July 5, 2000 order was invalid
insofar as (a) the order bound persons who were not parties to
the action, (b) the order failed to set forth any basis for the
decision, and (c) the order was not sufficiently detailed and

ned. The Lees

 

failed to specify the acts sought to be rest
filed @ memorandum in opposition to Appellants’ motion for
reconsideration on August 7, 2000. Appellants thereafter filed a
reply memorandum on August 11, 2000.

on December 4, 2000, the circuit court filed an order
denying Appellants’ motion for reconsideration. On February 15,
2001, appellants filed a motion for certification of the order
granting the Lees’ motion for partial summary judgment, as well
as the order denying Appellants’ motion for reconsideration,
pursuant to HRCP Rule $4(b). On April 19, 2001, the circuit
court granted Appellants’ motion for certification. The circuit
court also filed 2 “Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Allan

Lee, Barbara Lee, Shirley Wetzel and Scott Donovan and Against

 

© pppetiants argued that they inadvertently attached faulty copies
ofthe CcsRs and ananded CCéRs, some pages of which were out of order oF
missing.
   

FOR PUBLICATION
Defendants Puamana Community Association and the Board of
pirectors of the Puamana Community Association With Respect to
Plaintiffs’ Claim Regarding the Transfer of Common Elements to
private Use.”” Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on May
14, 2001.

IZ, STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Kay v. City § County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 468,

92 P.3d 477 (2004), we explained that the following principles

 

guide our review of a circuit court's grant of summary judgment

We review the circuit court’e grant or denial of sunmary
judgment Se ugvo.” Hawaii) _Comunisy Feder: ‘olen
Hein 84 Hevari 233, 221, 11 Psd 1, 9 (2000), The standaré for
Granting a motion for sunmary Judgnent {2 settled:

TEhunmary juagnent is appropriate if the pleedings,

Gepositicns, answers to anterrogatories, and admissions on

sich eogether with the afficavits, if any, show that there

[pine genuine issue a2 to any material fact end that the

Riving’perty is entivied to judgment as a natter of lew. A

Fact is'aaterial if proof of that fact would have the effect

EF establishing of refuting one of the essential elenents of

BSSte of action of defense assertea by the parties. The

Gvidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

Roncsoving party. in ther words, we must view all of the

Solgence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the Light

Rist favorable to the party opposing the motion.

TEL” (Cieations and internal quotation marks omitted).

nv itt Se hawar't 253, 280-45, 47 P30
Sir Sés-e0 T2002) (second alteration in original).

 

 

 

 

   

Id at 473-474, 92 8.3d at 462-483 (some brackets added, sone in
original). Subsequently, in French v. Hawaii Pizza Hi
105 Hawai'i 462, 99 P.3d 1086 (2004), we discussed the particular
burdens of production and persuasion as follows:

‘The burden is on the party moving for sumary Judgment

(moving party) to show the sbsence of any genuine isaue as to all
hateriai’facte, which, under applicable principles of substantive

 

Hetzel and Donovan fist appesred as parties in an amended
complaint filed on January 16, 2002
we" FOR PUBLICATION ***

low, entities the moving party to judgnent as a matter of Law.
‘This burden has two components

 

 

er patna at is Jed £9 st
a a a teen ante to the ne

Efet present a genvine issue worthy of trial.
‘Second, the moving party bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion. This burden sivajs renains with the moving perty and
Fequires the noving party to convince the court that no genuine
[Sue cf material fact exists and that the soving part [sic] =

entitied to sunnary Judgment asa matter of law.

Ide at 470, 99 P.3¢ at 1054 (citing GECC Fin, Com, v. Jaffarian,
79 Hawai'i 516, 521, 904 P.2d 530, 535 (App. 1995) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted))-

IEE. DISCUSSION

 

 

Initially, we note that the circuit court’s failure to
iterate a basis for its decision is problematic. However,
following a careful review of the record, the arguments raised
before the circuit court, and the arguments raised on appeal, it
ie clear that all of the Lees’ arguments before the circuit court
were without merit and that the circuit court therefore had no

tenable position upon which to grant summary judgment.*

+ pppeliees's answering brief reiterates ali of the argunents that
the Lees presented to the circuit court in support of their motion for partial
Scmmary jeagment. Accordingly, @ finding that Appellees" argunents have no
herlt haa the concomitant effect of invalidating the argunents presented by
The Lees in support of their notion for partial summary judgment before the
Efreuit court

 

 

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FOR PUBLICATION 998

A. The Lees failed to meet their burden of producing admissible
evidence demonstrating that the amenduent to the CCGRS
Violated county requirements and was therefore invalid.

‘The Lees obtained ownership of their unit, as well as
an easement over and upon the common elements, via warranty deed.
of particular importance is the fact that the warranty deed

expressly subjected any interest conveyed thereby to the terms of

the CC&Rs, as follow:

 

SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the following:

Ti RESERVING Unto the State of Hawaii all mineral and metallic
Bines of every cescription
2, COVENANTS, CONDITIONS and RESTRICTIONS in DECLARATION,

SAEED Aprin 29, 1368

RECORDED: May 8, 1968

ETBER 6052, FAGE 293, a® supplemented by instrument cated

Sanuary 30; 2969 recorded February 5, 1969 in Liber €399,

Page 126,, and further supplenented by instrument dated

Delenber'S, 1962, recorded Deconber 30, 1969 in Liber 6826,

Page 248

Although our jurisprudence with respect to restrictive

covenants is, as of yet, in a comparatively pubescent state of
development, we have long held that where 2 deed makes a specific
reference to a restrictive covenant, the grantee is on notice
that his interest is subject to the terms of that restrictive
covenant. See Pelosi v, Wailea Ranch Estates, 92 Hawas'l 478,
489, 985 P.2d 1045, 1056 (1999) ("The individual defendants in
the present matter had constructive notice, by virtue of their
deeds, of the [] covenants.”) (emphasis in original); Rawlins ve
Izumo Taisha Kvo Misson of Hawaii, 36 Haw. 721, 726 (1944)
(xeferring to the concept that equity will enforce 2 contract
“containing restrictive covenants which create equitable

easements, such as restrictive covenants in a deed or lease

a
   

FOR PUBLICATION

Limiting the use of the land in a particular manner or

prescribing a particular use which creates equitable

 

servitudes.”).

‘The CC&Rs placed further restrictions upon the Lees’

easement over and upon the conmon elements, as follows:

Section 3. Extent of Members’ Eapements. The rights
end easenente of enjoyment crested hereby shalt be subject to the
following

(a) the eight of the Associetion to take such
steps_as are reasonably necessary to protect the sbov
Geseribed properties against foreclosure; and

b) the right of the Assccietion, as provided in
ste Articles and By-laws, to suspena the voting rights and
the enjoyment rights of any Member for any perioa during
Which any sesesmnent Fenaine unpaid, and for any period not
fo exceed thirty (30) days for any infraction of its
Published rules and regulations; and

(e) the eight of the Association, in accordance
with its articles and By-laws, te Borrow money for the
Purpose of improving the Common froperties and facilities
Snd in aid therest to mectgage said property, and the rights
Of such mortgagee in said properties shail be subordinate to
fhe rights of the Omers hereunder:

{a} the right of individual Members to the
exclusive use of parking spaces as provided in Section 4

hereof? and

 

 

 

 

 

le) the eight of the Association to dedicate oF
transfer all or any part of the Common Properties to any
public agency, authority, or utility for such purposes and
Eubject to such conditicns ae may be agreed to by the
Members, provided that no such dedication or transfer,
Seterninetion as to the purposes or as to the conditions
thereof, shell be effective unless on instrument signed by
Henbers entitled to cast tworthizds (2/3) of the votes of
Gach class of nesbership has been recorded, agreeing to such
Sedication, transfer, purpose oF condition, and unless
Written notice of the proposed agreement and action
thereunder is sent to every Menber at least ninety (90) days
{n advance of any action taken; provided further, ‘chat
notwithstanding any provision in this Declaration to the
Contrary, the Declarant and/or the Association reserves. the
Eight (1) to'dedicate portions of the Common Properties in
fea simple and/or to dedicate rights in the nature of
Gasenente to the government ox utility company for electric
Efaneniseson lines and poles and water, gas, sewer and
Greinage pipe lines and all related facilities ana (2) to
Sedicate or grant rights in the nature of easements and
access rights to any government entity or party over and
2crsss the Conon Properties for che purpowe of performing

 

 

 

 

 

12
 

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Jervices which shall be deened by Declarant or the
Assvclation to be necessary or advisable

{£) the right of the Association to govern by
rules and regulations, ‘the use of the Comon Properties by
the Menbers 20 a2 te provide the enjoyment of the Common
Eroperties by every Nenber in a naniter consistent with the
preservation of quiet enjoyment of the Lot and Living Unit
By every Owner.

{gi the right of the Association to suspend the
voting rights and right to use of the recreationel
Facilities by a aenber for any period during whicn any
assessment against his Let renains unpaid; and for 2 period
fot to exceed thirty. (30) days for any infraction of ite
Published roles snd regulations.

 

Although the foregoing passage did not contemplate
encroachments onto the unit ovners’ easements over and upon the
common elements, the CCéRs contained a general anendnent
provision by which the Association amended section 3 of the CC&Rs
to read as follows:

Section 3. Extent of Owmers’ Easements, The rights and

eosenents of enjoyment crested hereby shail De subject to the
following:

 

(a) the right of the Association to take such steps
as are ceasonably necessary to protect the above-described
Properties against foreclosure; and.

Tb) che right of the Association, as provided in its
Aeticles and By-Laws, to suspend the voting rights and the
Snjoyment rights ef any Owner for any period during which any
aesesenent rensine unpaid, and for any period not to excees thirty
(30) says for any snfraction of ite published roles and
fegulations and/or provisions of this Declaration, che Articles or
the By-Laws of the Association? and.

{e). the right of the Association, in accordance with
its Articles ond By-Laws and upon the written consent of @
majority of its Osners, to borrow money for the purpose of
improving the Conon Properties ang facilities and in aid thereof
to mortgage said property:

(a). "the right of individual Owners to the exclusive
lise of parking spaces ar provided in Section ¢ hereof and

(2). the Fight of the Association to dedicate or
tranefer ell or any part of the Common Properties to any public
agency, authority, of utility for such purposes and subject to
such conditions as nay be agreed to by the Owners, provides that
ho auch dedication or transfer, determination aa to the purposes
br as co the conditions thereof, shall be effective unless an
Gnstrunent signed by Omers entitled to cest sixty-five percent
(658) of the votes has been recorded, agreeing to such dedication,
transfer, purpose of condition, and Unless written notice of the

 

 

 

 

13
(Emphasis

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

proposed agreement and action thereunder is sent to every Omer at
PeeeetSinedy (go! days in advance of any action taken; provided
focther; that notwithstanding any provision in this Declaration to
Eke Contrary, the Declarant and/or the Association reserves the
Sine thi £2 dedicate portions of the Common Properties in fee
Tiiple and/or to dedicate rights in the nature of easenents to the
Government or utility company for electric transmission lines and
Beles ond water, gaa, sewer and drainage pipe lines and all
Pelsted facilicies and (2) to dedicate or grant rights in the
Hitare of sasenents and access rights to any government entity oF
party over ang across, the Connon Properties for the purpose of
Berelesing services which shell be deened by Declerant or the
KStociatien te be necessary or advisable

TE)" the right of the Association to govern by rules
and regulations, the use of the Connon Properties by the Omers so
atveo Erovide rhe enjoyment of the Connon Froperties by every
Smet ins manner consistent with the preservation of the quiet
CSjeynent cf the Lot and Living Unit by every Ouner,

 

 

 

 

 

Sr ‘the giaht of the Asscciation to permit Minor
dncroschment One SMO TE StS the Common Probenties subsec
cont of such compansetia auch other conditions
soa he ssc oa a ees a erates riage mean th
Hotei oe ie
n rr Ba 200 tee!
sBhanted eee eneisachnenss shail not -create any caahe of
ze fee he Ouners of the Livine Unie ape shall

added.)

Appellants thus argue that the amendment, permitting

minor encroachments onto the common areas, was valid inasmuch as

the CcaRs

stated, in relevant part, the following:

the covenants and restrictions of this Declaration may be snended
SRESS’ne eiese enisty 130) year period by an instrument signed
Eyinet less than ninety per cent (908) of the Owners, and
Thereafter by an instrument signed by not less than seventy-five
fer cent (758) Of the Omer. Any anendnents must be properly
Fecorded

As averred by Appellants, the incorporation of @

general amendment provision within the CCéRs is foundational to

our analysis. Ordinarily, amendments made pursuant to a general

amendment

provision will be upheld.

a4
s** FOR PUBLICATION ***
615 §.£.24 182, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) “Accordingly, the
investors, acting as more than 90 percent of the lot owners, were
entitled to enforce the clear written provisions of the
declaration binding all the lot owners, and to use the amendment
provision in any manner not contrary to law or public policy.”);
Meyerland Cnty. Imi nt Ass'n y, Temple, 700 S.W.2d 263, 266
(tex. App. 1985) (*[Alppellante acquired their title to the
property in the subdivision subject to the provision that the
general plan of a residential subdivision might be altered by
amendment of the original restrictions which established such
plan. They may not successfully complain of its alteration in
the manner so provided.”) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); Ardmore Park Subdivision Ass’ v. Simon, 323
W.W.2d 591, 594 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) ("We hold that where a deed

restriction properly allows a majority, or a gr

 

eer percentage,
of owners within a particular subdivision to change, modify or
alter given restrictions, other owners are bound by properly
passed and recorded changes in the same manner as those contained
+ of. Wise v. Harrington
ve st , $84 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. 2003)

 

in any original grant and restriction.

(Therefore, under the common lew, developers and lot purchasers
were free to create almost any permutation of homeowners
association the parties desired.”).

However, the meze fact that an amendment is made
pursuant to a general amendnent provision does not render it

valid per ge. Although the members of a common interest

15
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FOR PUBLICATION °°"

community have the right to amend the governing documents, we

 

also recognize the following countervailing interest:

4m addition to the right to anend the declaration, .. . those
buying real property in a conmon-interest residential community

Bocein a protected interest in the uniform schene set forth in
ing fecorced Seciaration for development of the community. .
[himenaing the decloretion ina manner destructive of the uniform
EEXtees Sten Sf cone sn accordance ith terms of the declaration,
may inpair the protected interests of lot owners who do not
Consent to the smendnent

 

Brockway, 615 $.£.2d at 184 (ellipses added) (brackets added).
Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion that an amendment must be
upheld simply because it was made pursuant to a general amendment
provision.

For example, an amendment is nevertheless invalid if it
(1) impairs the enjoyment of the estate, (2) violates the law, or
(3) 4s otherwise subversive of the public interest. See
Brockway, 615 S.E.2d at 164 (stating that “investors, acting as
more than 90 percent of the lot owners, were entitled to enforce
the clear written provisions of the declaration binding all the
Jot owners, and to use the amendment provision in any manner not
contrary to law or public policv.”) (emphasis added); Wise, 584
S.E.2d at 735 (“As a general rule, ‘{rlestrictive covenants are
valid so long as they do not impair the enjoyment of the estate
andare not contrary to the public interest.”) (citing Karner vw
Roy lhite flowers, Inc., 527 $.£.2d 40, 42 (N.C. 2000))
(alteration in original) (emphasis added); Houston Petroleum Co.
v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, Inc., 87 A.2d 319, 323 (NJ.
1952) ("The attempt to contravene the policy of a public statute

 

is illegal... 1 + We therefore conclude that the

16
 

¥* FOR PUBLICATION *
restrictive covenants in question, being violative of the public
policy of this State implicit in our zoning laws, are illegal.”)
(citation omitted) (ellipses added).

Furthermore, other courts have stated that nonuniform
amendments and amendments that breach any fiduciary duties owed
by an association to its members are invalid unless approved by
every member whose interest is adversely affected. See Brockway,
615 $.5.2d at 185 ("With respect to nonuniform amendments to the
declaration and other amendments that violate the conmunity’s
duties to its menbers under § 6.13 of the restatement, the
restatement provides that those amendments ‘are not effective
without the approval of members whose interests would be
adversely affected unless the declaration fairly apprises
purchasers that such amendments may be made.’) (citing

Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.10); Licker v

Hackleroad, 55@ S.£.2d 31, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (**Amendnents
that do not apply uniformly to similar lots or units . . . are
not effective without the approval of members whose interests

apprises purchasers that such amenduents may be made.”) (citing

Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.10(2) (2000))
(ellipses in original) (emphasis in original); Montoya vw.
Rarreras, 473 P-2d 363, 365 (N.M, 1970) ("The original
restrictions were clearly imposed on all of the described
property, and though the restrictions thenselves may be changed
in whole or in part, the change or changes which might be nade

7
   

FOR PUBLICATION
must affect all of the described property.”).

Before the circuit court, the Lees argued that the
Association may not do by amendment that which is contrary to
applicable county requirements. However, the Lees were
thereafter required to produce admissible evidence of @ county
violation. See Exench, 105 Hawai'i at 470-471, 99 P.3d at 1054~
1055 ("Thus, it was Pizza Hut’s burden, as the moving party, to
produce admissible evidence that the average person in the
general population cannot Lift more than twenty-five pounds.

This it failed to do.)

the record indicates that the Lees failed to meet their burden of

 

mphasis added), A careful review of

production. In their motion for partial summary judgment, and
again on appeal, the Lees alleged the following two potential
county violations: (1) the encroachments would violate the open
space requirements set forth in MCC § 19.32.030(8);* and (2) the
encroachments would contradict language in a letter from the
planning director to the Puamana property manager.

Mec § 19.32.030(B) states, in relevant part, the
following:

Not less than twenty percent of the total area of the

tract shell be common protected open space, integrated with the

She payout end street system in order £0 maximize its park-Like

effect’ Connon protected open space shall mean open space to be

Genes in Conmon by the individual owners within the development
Gnd maintained in open space for their common use and enjoyment.

   

 

 

However, the Lees failed to provide any evidence demonstrating
that the encroachments would reduce the total area of common

+ wee § 19.32.0308) wes previously codified as The Permanent
ordinances of the County of Maul § 6-1.17(e} (2) (1973).

18
 

** FOR PUBLICATION
protected open space such that less than twenty percent of the
planned community association would consist of common protected
open space. Accordingly, there remained a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the amendment would have the effect
of reducing the existing common protected open space below the
requisite threshold.

The Lees also attached a letter from the Maui County
planning director, addressed to Nr. Craig D. Edwards, the
property manager for Puamana, which stated, in relevant part, a5

follows:

te addition, units are not to bevond
nit’: designated tootpeine ad Inte the cesmon area. For most
SRSARISTSNES edge of the roof eve (sic) and the original
header bean on the patio side of each unit.

 

Should the Puamana Associaticn wish construction
improvenents Geoned inconsistent with the original plans,
Jmunaments to. tnie plan covla be requested fron the Meu!’ Planning
Zenitsion. “The Department WILL NOT process individual amendnents
fron individual owners. A comprehensive plan which conforms with
Chapter 19.32 of the Maui County Code will be required

(Emphasis added.) However, the foregoing letter cannot serve as
the basis for the circuit court's grant of summary judgment
inasmuch as the letter fails to meet the requirements set forth
in HRCP Rule 56(e).
In Nakato vy. Macharg, 80 Hawai'i 79, 969 P.2d 624 (App.

1998), the Intermediate Court of Appeals [hereinafter “ICA”]
stated the following:

nce Rule S6(e) provides, in pertinent part

(e) Fern of Afficavite) further Testimony? Defense Required.

Shporting end opposing affidavits shall be sade on personal

Enowiedge, shell set forth facts as would be admissible in

Gvidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiont is

Einpetent tc testify to the matters stated therein. sworn
Se Eereified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred

19
 

** FOR PUBLICATION ***

FOR PUBLICATION #97

to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewien. =

 

Appeliee's attorney's declaration is insufficient under HRCP S6(e)
terestabiish 2 foundation as to the admissibility of the attached
Ginibics. ore be adqiesible, dosunents must be authenticated by
Shu attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of
(redersi fules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)] Rule 56(e) [(sone as
ARCP Se (e))) end the affiant mst be a person through whom the
Gunibits could be admittes into evidence.” 108 Charles Alen
Weight, Archur Miller, & Mery Kay Fane, Gederal Practice and

tesure; iss 2d § 2722 at 382-8¢ (footnotes omitted)? see alae

Te hawaid at 224, 691 F.2d at 311 (mere statenents in

Eifisevits do not authenticete exhibits referred to unless these
tanibits are sworn to or certified).

 

Ids, 80 Hawai'i at 88, 969 P.2d at 834. The ICA further held

that an attorney may not authenticate letters attached as

exhibits by simply attaching a signed declaration that states as

follows:

similar declaration which stated as follows

1. Tam (appeliees’ attorney]. . . - Tam competent to testify
£5 the matters contained herein ond make this declaration on my
oun personal Anowledge

BT ERS ethipies which are atteched hereto and marked Exhibits
Through I, respectively, aze true and correct copies of what on

thelr face they eppear to be.
Shine factus! statenents in the foregoing menorendun are true

and correct

In the present case, the Lees’ attorney attached a

 

1, Jam the attorney for the Plaintiffs herein and make
this declaration on the basis of personnel (sic) knowledge and
Onder penalty of periury,

reeSfal exhibits attached hereto are true and correct
copies of what they purport to be. Except for those authenticated
Ey. fees all others have beon copied from the records
Skposition in this matter of the Fusmana’s managing agent and/or

are public record.
Se ‘We Fespectfully request that the Court take judiciel
notice of the pleadings filed in Puauana vy. Hillman case discusses
Th the menorandun in support of thie motion:
STSEGLARE UNGER PENALTY OF LAW THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE

‘wo CORRECT.

 

20
   

FOR PUBLICATION *

Accordingly, the letter vas not properly authenticated and failed
to meet the requirenents set forth in HRCP Rule 56(e).

‘The Lees have thus failed to produce any admissible
evidence to support their allegation that the amendment would
violate county requirements.

B. The amendment does not divest property rights conveyed by
deed.

 

Rppellees also argue that the Association essentially
“gave away” their property in direct violation of their warranty
deed. For support, Appellees quote the following passage from
our prior decision in Fong v. Hashinoto, 92 Hawai'i $68, 576, 994
P.2d 500, $08 (2000):

It would be absurd to allow 2 vendor to alter the nature of
property rights, where property has been sold via an [agreement of
Bele], co the detriment of the vendee during the

Likewise, we cannot allow a vendor to sit

Fighte sold pursuant co an (agreerent of
the vende, Guring the executory period. Either result would be
unjust.

     

However, the foregoing language was meant to prohibit a vendor
from creating @ restrictive covenant that either conveyed &
benefit or imposed a burden on property to which the vendor
retained “bare legal title." Id, To put it mildly, that rule
has no bearing on the present matter.

Furthermore, the Lees’ warranty deed did not convey
absolute title. The plain language of the deed subjected any
interest conveyed thereby to the terms of the CC&Rs. The CcéRs

 

 

© The phrase “bare legal title” referred to a vendor who, having
executed on agreenent of ssle, neld the property solely as security for
peyment. Zong, 92 Hawai'i at S76, 99¢ P.20 at S08.

 

21
** FOR PUBLICATION ***
contained a general amendment provision by which its terms could
be amended, provided that the requisite number of votes were
obtained. Accordingly, any interest conveyed by the Lees’
warranty deed was subject to the amendment process set forth in
the CCéRe. Appellees cannot now claim that the valid exercise of
such an amendment procedure divested property interests, inasmuch
as their deed expressly subjected those property interests to the
amendment procedures, See discussion supra.

c. Appellants’ argunents are not precluded by their prior
Judicial admissions.

Appellees also attempt to foreclose Appellants’

argurent

 

that they nay authorize minor encroachments onto the
common areas -- by asserting that Appellants ere bound by their
prior judicial admissions. We disagree.

A judicial admission is “a formal statement, either by
[a] party of his or her attorney, in [the] course of [a] judicial
proceeding [that] removes an adnitted fact from (the field of
controversy. tt is @ voluntary concession of fact by @ party or
a party's attorney during judicial proceedings.” Han v. Yang, 64
Hawai'i 162, 174 n-18, 991 P.2d 604, 616 n.18 (App. 1997) (citing
Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 770, at 137 (2994) (footnotes omitted).
wore specifically, we have previously stated that [i]t is well
established that a party's factual allegation in a complaint or
other pleading is 2 judicial admission which binds the party.
Int'l Bhd, of i 68
Haw. 316, 320 n.2, 723 P.2d 943, 949 n.2 (1986).

Appellees specifically argue that Appellants are bound

22
 

FOR PUBLICATION
by the following statements set forth in the Association's notion
for decleratory relief in the Hillman action: (1) “(t)he
Governing Documents, of course, contemplate that owners shall
construct their private residences within the boundaries of their
respective lots and not on the conmon properties or on other
owners’ lots"; (2) “[t]he Association owns the Common Properties
as separate parcels but evezy menber has a ‘right and easement of
enjoyment in and to the Conmon Properties’"; (3) “(1Jn the
present case, all of the Members are, in essence, tenants in
common as to the easements in the Common Properties, even though
title is held in the name of the Association for purposes of
convenience”; and (4) “{iln fact, certain courts have concluded
that even though a homeowners association may hold title to
conmon areas, if members have nonexclusive easements to use those
areas, the association’s ownership rights are very limited.”
(Brackets added.) (Emphasis in original.)

‘the only two facts that the foregoing statements remove
from controversy are that at the time the motion for declaratory
relief was filed (1) the governing documents contemplated that
the owners were not permitted to construct improvements on the
common elements, and (2) each individual unit owner had an
easement over and upon the common elements. Appellants’ present
position is not inconsistent with respect to the first statement

inasmuch as Appellants do not contend that they were authorized

to permit encroachments onto the common elements at the time the
motion for declaratory relief was filed. Rather, Appellants

23
 

 

'* FOR PUBLICATION ***

assert that the CCsRs were amended and that therefore they are
currently authorized to permit encroachments onto the common
elements. With respect to the second statement, Appellants
continue to openly admit that each individual unit owner holds an
easement over and upon the common elements." Appellants’
argument is that they may nox, pursuant to the amended CC&Rs,
permit minor encroachments onto the common elements.

‘he third statement is not binding as a judicial
admission inasmuch as it is not a statement of fact. Rather it
is more accurately described as a legal position, insofar as it
analogizes the interests owned by the individual unit owners to
the property interests held by tenants in common. Accordingly,
if Appellees desired to preclude Appellants from asserting
inconsistent positions, the appropriate method would have been to
invoke the construct of judicial estoppel. Appellees’ failure to
go so waives the argument on appeal." See Hawai'i Rules of
Appellate Procedure [hereinafter “HRAP") Rule 26(b) (7) (2001)

In thedy opening brief, Appellants state that “(t]he Common
properties in Puanana are owned by the Association aubiect te nenbers’
fasesents of exiownent.”” (Emphesis added.)

Of course, this court is vested with the discretion to, gua
anonte, invors the construct of judicial estoppel. See, sd, Hest Varainia
oe Transos, Div, of By 616 S-6.24 $06, S12-513. Me
Peri Generaliy recognized that ‘a court, even an appellate
‘toppel on ita own notion in an appropriate
iteration in original). However, we decline te

Ye, 200s) (Fir
court, may reise (Judicial)
Seee.tr) (citations emitted)
Serso besed upon the record provided, gee Mew Hampshire v. Maine, 932 0.5.
seetSasoets: 12001) (First, a party's later position must be *clearly
[iSoneistont’ with ite earlier position.”) (citations omitted) (quotation
marke omitted): sr beyd, G8 Col vappsath 245, 108 Cal-Rptr-2d 749, 770
T2001) [eke ere unwilling Fo invoke the doctrine [sua sponte] on this
fecord.”) (brackets added) «

 

 

      

24
   

* FOR PUBLICATION
(Points not argued may be deemed waived.”).

A similar line of reasoning applies to the fourth
statement -- that “certain courts have concluded that even though
a homeowners association may hold title to common areas, if
members have nonexclusive easements to use those areas, the
association’s ownership rights are very limited.” It is
inapposite to contend that the foregoing statement is binding on
Appellants as 2 judicial admission. Rather, as with the previous
statement, the appropriate argument would have been to contend
that Appellants are judicially estopped from taking @ contrary
position. Thus, inasmuch as Appellees failed to raise the
argument on appeal, it has been waived. See HRAP Rule 26(b) (7).

Accordingly, we conclude that the content of
Appellants’ motion for declaratory relief filed in the Hillman
action does not preclude Appellants from asserting that they may
permit minor encroachnents onto the common areas, pursuant to the
amended CCURS.

D. The principles set forth in Penney do not govern the present
matter.

a. Ben nai .

appellees also argue on appeal that our decision in
Penney governs the present matter, and therefore Appellants were
required to obtain the approval of all of the individual unit
owners prior to permitting the conversion of the conmon elements
to the private, exclusive use of individual owners. Appellees’
argument, however, igneres a fundamental distinction between
condominium property regimes and planned conmunity associations -

25
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

= that condominium property regimes are creatures of statute,
whereas planned community associations are primarily creatures of

common law." See Coon v. City é County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i
233, 252 n.30, 47 P.3d 348, 367 n.30 (2002) (**The condominium,

 

or horizontal property regime, [vas] a. . . creature of statute’
that was given its initial formal recognition in Hawai'i in
1962.") (citing State Sav, & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Dev. Co,
Inca, 50 Haw. 540, S41, 546, 445 P.2d 109, 112, 115 (2968)
{alteration in original) (ellipses in original). This
distinction renders Zenney inapposite.

In Benney we held that “converting a common element to
2 limited common element diminishes the common interest
appurtenant to each epartment(,]" and that “such conversion
requires the consent of all the apartment owners.” Penney, 70
Haw. at 471, 776 P.2d at 395. However, our holding was
inextricably based upon HRS § 514A-13(b) (1985), which stated

that “[t)he commen interest appurtenant to each apartment as

 

© Ae compared to the comprehensive statutory provisions set forth in
ins chapter 5188, governing condominium property regimes, the legislature has
enacted only ¢ basic franework With respect to planned community associations.
See HRS $6 4219-1 to -14. (Supp. 1997); House Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2188, in
TSbr "House Journal, at 1345 ("his bill provides for the basic framework and
owner rights of self-governance.”) (exphasis added). It is well settled
thats inthe absence of legislative intent to supersede the commen law, such
Elanén low principles apply. See Casueana v. ILMU Loval 142, 108 Hawai'i
Sry dai, 28), P.38 391, 401 (2008) {reading WAS § 308-3 3m the context of the
entice statute and in Liane of che common Lau): int Sec Serve, Ine,

: ; 66 Haw, 607, G11, G7 Fiza $46, 449 (1983) [ramere it
Shee not appear there was legislative purpose in superseding the common len,
the concn law will be followed."); State v. Taylor, 49 Haw. 624, 626-629, 425
Pr2q i01¢, 1018 (1967) {stating that "a court shoutd not, merely’ by
Gplication of the maxim supressio unise gxclusie alteriuc, find taat the
Connon lew hae been supersedes in the ares not mentioned by statute, where it
Goer not appest that if was the Legislative purpose to supersede the comon
fawerhs

 

 

 

 

 

 

26
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

FOR PUBLICATION P97

expressed in the declaration shall have a permanent character and

ouners affected(
(citing HRS § 514A-13(b)) (emphasis added) (alteration in

Penney, 70 Haw. at 470, 776 P.2d at 395

 

original). We reasoned that converting a common element to a
limited common element altered the permanent character of the
conmon interest appurtenant to each apartment and thus fell
within the purview of HRS § S14A-13(b). Id, at 470-471, 776 P.2d
at 395.

With respect to planned community associations, the
legislature has not enacted an equivalent provision requiring
unanimous approval prior to the alteration of the unit owners’
interests in the common areas. In light of the legislature's
intent to merely create 2 “basic framework,” we have no doubt
that the legislative omission was purposeful. Accordingly, we
may not, by judicial fiat, apply a unanimous approval requirement
that is derived from a statutory provision governing condominium
property regimes in order to fill a purposeful omission in the
statutory framework governing planned community associations.
‘thus, Appellees’ invocation of Penney is misplaced.

2. dudicia) estoppel

Appellees also argue that Appellants are judicially
estopped from arguing that Eennev does not apply. In the Hillman
action, the Association argued that although Penney involved @
condominium property regime, its principles applied with equal

force to planned community associations.

 

In the present ca

 

27
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Appellants now argue that “Zenney . . . dealt with the express
provisions of the condominium statute and the concept of
ounership in a condominium, neither of which have any application
here.” Accordingly, Appellants have clearly taken an

Ancensistent position in the case at bar.
Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel,

(a) party will not be permitted to maintain
[ntchsistent positiens or to take @ position in regard
toa matter which is directly contrary to, oF
Uncensistent with, ene previously sssuned by him, at
least where ne had, oF was chargeable with, ful]
knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced

by his action

 

igosa ve ore, Lida, 4 Haw. App. 210, 228, 664
bead 745,731 {19831) (quoting 28 An. Jur. 20

fulver "8, at 694-95. (1966) (indentation omittes))
Sedicial estoppel *partak bf positive rules of
procedure bases on monifest justice ani, to a greater or
Mes [er] degree, on considerations of the erderliness,

 

 

 

 

regularity, and expesition of Litigation.’” dds at 213, 664
Pidd ot 121 (quoting rask v. Tam see, 42 aw. 324, 323
(i950). This doctrine prevents parties from “playing ‘fa

   

and loose’ with the court or blowing ‘hot and cold’ during
the course of litigation.” dae letting Godoy e. Hawads
Eoanty, af Haw. S12, 2548.20 78 (1960); g98 g1a5 Yuen vs,

© 40 Baws 213 (1953); allen

Tandon Guar. i Accident Cou Ltda,
peneeentast Gee cet fetd tied (deh cir. 1902); Edwards.
ckeing Liteine’ cos, 690 F.2d 595 (eth Cir. 1962))

Roxas v. Marcos, 69 Hawai'i $1, 124, 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998)
(some brackets and ellipses in original).
While we have not distilled the doctrine beyond these

general rules, the United States Supreme Court has more recently

stated:

(sleveral factors typically inform the decision whether to
Sgply' [judicie! estoppel] ina particular case: First, @
party's later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with

 

[ts earlier position. Second, er
= magensis ain 0

28
 

'*** FOR PUBLICATION *

FOR PUBLICATION "PP

would cissri is nisied(.| Absent success ina eric
Thea Bthira consiceration
jitilersbies forty seeking to assert an inconsistent
Boeition would Serive an unfair advantage or impose an
porstr detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.

 

 

w Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-751 (2001) (citations
land quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (brackets added) -
because New Hampshire brings structure and clarity to the basic
principles enunciated in Roxas, we enpley the analysis here.

tn light of the foregoing construct, we decline to
apply the preclusive effects of judicial estoppel inasmuch as the
Agsociation clearly did not succeed in persuading the Hillman
court to accept its earlier position. In an October 6, 1997
sorder (1) Granting Plaintiff Puamana Community Association’ s

and (2) Denying Defendants Dale W.

 

Notion for Declaratory Relie:
yitiman and Patricia A. Hillman’s Motion for Declaratory Relief,”
the cirevit court ruled that the CCéRs, as written, could not be
seonstrued to grant to the Board of Directors of the Puamans
coamunity Association or an architectural committee comprised of
members thereof . . . the power to grant encroachments onto the
common Properties . . . for the benefit of a single homeowner.”
Accordingly, the circuit court neither accepted nor rejected the
Association's position that the principles set forth in Penney
applied to planned community associations. Neither was Penney
foundational to Appellants’ position in the Hillman action.
necordingly, Appellants’ present position, though inconsistent,

does not create the risk of inconsistent court determinations end

29
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

poses little threat to judicial integrity.

E. Whether or not the encroachments are classified as “minor”
is inapposite.

Finally, Appellees assert that the encroachments onto
the common elenents are not “minor.” According to Appellees’
calculations, the amendment authorizes the potential conversion
of forty-six thousand square-feet of the common elenents to
private use.'! However, whether or not the encroachments are

deemed “minor” is a question of semantics and not dispositive.

 

The relevant inguiry is whether the amendment permits
encroachments of such a magnitude as to render it invalid for the
reasons discussed supra at Part III.A. The record is devoid of
any admissible evidence that would support an affirmative
response to the foregoing inquiry. Accordingly, the circuit
court should not have awarded sunmary judgment based upon this
contention.
IV. conciuszoN

Having carefully reviewed the record, as well as the
argunents presented to the circuit court, we conclude that the
circuit court had no sustainable ground upon which to grant the
Lees’ motion for partial summary judgment inasmuch as it had no
viable arguments before it on the motion for summary judgnent.

Furthermore, Appellees have failed to raise, nor can we find, any

 

the anendnent persits the Soard to authorize an encroschment onto
the common elements of up £0 two-hundred equare-fect per unit. Fuanans
Consists of twochundred and thirty individual unies, ond therefore. Appell
SShelude that the Soard is authorized to permit encfoachments totaling forty-
Six thousand square-feet

 

30
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

independent ground upon which to sustain the circuit court's
grant of summary judgment. See Waianae Mode] Neichborheod Arce
Ass'n. Inc, v. City § County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 40, 43, 514

p.2d 861, 864 (1973) ("An appellate court may affirm summary

judgment on any ground which appears in the record, regardless of

whether the circuit court relied on it.”); Helena Rubinstein,
Inc. v. Bau, 433 F.2d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir, 1970) (“First it is

proper for this court to affirm a summary judgment on any ground

that appears from the record, whether or not the trial court

relied on it.”).

Accordingly we vacate the circuit court's April 19,

2001 judgment granting the Lees’ motion for partial summary

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. It is therefore unnecessary to address the circuit

court's denial of Appellants’ motion for reconsideration and the

circuit court’s compliance with HRCP Rule 65.

on the briefs:

Lissa H. Andrews and
Eric T. Krening of

Andrews & Yamamoto

for defendants~appellants
Puamana Community Association
and Board of Directors of the
Puamana Community Association

Myles T. Yamamoto and Terrance M.
Revere of Motooke Yamamoto &

Revere for plaintiffs, counterclaim
defendants-appellees Allan Lee,
Barbara Lee, Shirley Wetzel and
Scott Donovan

3

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