Case Title: Burbank v. State Water etc. Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S119248

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 4/4/05  
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
CITY OF BURBANK, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S119248 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B150912 
STATE WATER RESOURCES  
) 
CONTROL BOARD et al., 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BS060960 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
) 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
B151175/B152562 
 
 
) 
 
STATE WATER RESOURCES  
) 
Super. Ct. No. BS060957 
CONTROL BOARD et al., 
) 
 
) 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Federal law establishes national water quality standards but allows the 
states to enforce their own water quality laws so long as they comply with federal 
standards.  Operating within this federal-state framework, California’s nine 
Regional Water Quality Control Boards establish water quality policy.  They also 
issue permits for the discharge of treated wastewater; these permits specify the 
maximum allowable concentration of chemical pollutants in the discharged 
wastewater.   
 
 
2 
The question here is this:  When a regional board issues a permit to a 
wastewater treatment facility, must the board take into account the facility’s costs 
of complying with the board’s restrictions on pollutants in the wastewater to be 
discharged?  The trial court ruled that California law required a regional board to 
weigh the economic burden on the facility against the expected environmental 
benefits of reducing pollutants in the wastewater discharge.  The Court of Appeal 
disagreed.  On petitions by the municipal operators of three wastewater treatment 
facilities, we granted review.   
We reach the following conclusions:  Because both California law and 
federal law require regional boards to comply with federal clean water standards, 
and because the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution requires state 
law to yield to federal law, a regional board, when issuing a wastewater discharge 
permit, may not consider economic factors to justify imposing pollutant 
restrictions that are less stringent than the applicable federal standards require.  
When, however, a regional board is considering whether to make the pollutant 
restrictions in a wastewater discharge permit more stringent than federal law 
requires, California law allows the board to take into account economic factors, 
including the wastewater discharger’s cost of compliance.  We remand this case 
for further proceedings to determine whether the pollutant limitations in the 
permits challenged here meet or exceed federal standards.   
I.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
The quality of our nation’s waters is governed by a “complex statutory and 
regulatory scheme . . . that implicates both federal and state administrative 
responsibilities.”  (PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology (1994) 511 U.S. 700, 704.)  We first discuss California law, then federal 
law. 
 
3 
A.  California Law 
 
In California, the controlling law is the Porter-Cologne Water Quality 
Control Act (Porter-Cologne Act), which was enacted in 1969.  (Wat. Code, 
§ 13000 et seq., added by Stats. 1969, ch. 482, § 18, p. 1051.)1  Its goal is “to 
attain the highest water quality which is reasonable, considering all demands being 
made and to be made on those waters and the total values involved, beneficial and 
detrimental, economic and social, tangible and intangible.”  (§ 13000.)  The task 
of accomplishing this belongs to the State Water Resources Control Board (State 
Board) and the nine Regional Water Quality Control Boards; together the State 
Board and the regional boards comprise “the principal state agencies with primary 
responsibility for the coordination and control of water quality.”  (§ 13001.)  As 
relevant here, one of those regional boards oversees the Los Angeles region (the 
Los Angeles Regional Board).2   
 
Whereas the State Board establishes statewide policy for water quality 
control (§ 13140), the regional boards “formulate and adopt water quality control 
plans for all areas within [a] region” (§ 13240).  The regional boards’ water 
quality plans, called “basin plans,” must address the beneficial uses to be protected 
as well as water quality objectives, and they must establish a program of 
implementation.  (§ 13050, subd. (j).)  Basin plans must be consistent with “state 
policy for water quality control.”  (§ 13240.)   
                                             
 
1   
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Water Code. 
2   
The Los Angeles water region “comprises all basins draining into the 
Pacific Ocean between the southeasterly boundary, located in the westerly part of 
Ventura County, of the watershed of Rincon Creek and a line which coincides 
with the southeasterly boundary of Los Angeles County from the ocean to San 
Antonio Peak and follows thence the divide between San Gabriel River and Lytle 
Creek drainages to the divide between Sheep Creek and San Gabriel River 
drainages.”  (§ 13200, subd. (d).) 
 
4 
B.  Federal Law 
 
In 1972, Congress enacted amendments (Pub.L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972) 
86 Stat. 816) to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et 
seq.), which, as amended in 1977, is commonly known as the Clean Water Act.  
The Clean Water Act is a “comprehensive water quality statute designed ‘to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.’ ”  (PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of 
Ecology, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 704, quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).)  The Act’s 
national goal was to eliminate by the year 1985 “the discharge of pollutants into 
the navigable waters” of the United States.  (33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).)  To 
accomplish this goal, the Act established “effluent limitations,” which are 
restrictions on the “quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, 
biological, and other constituents”; these effluent limitations allow the discharge 
of pollutants only when the water has been satisfactorily treated to conform with 
federal water quality standards.  (33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(11).)   
 
Under the federal Clean Water Act, each state is free to enforce its own 
water quality laws so long as its effluent limitations are not “less stringent” than 
those set out in the Clean Water Act.  (33 U.S.C. § 1370.)  This led the California 
Legislature in 1972 to amend the state’s Porter-Cologne Act “to ensure 
consistency with the requirements for state programs implementing the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act.”  (§ 13372.) 
 
Roughly a dozen years ago, the United States Supreme Court, in Arkansas 
v. Oklahoma (1992) 503 U.S. 91, described the distinct roles of the state and 
federal agencies in enforcing water quality:  “The Clean Water Act anticipates a 
partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared 
objective:  ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters.’  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  Toward this end, [the Clean Water 
 
5 
Act] provides for two sets of water quality measures.  ‘Effluent limitations’ are 
promulgated by the [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] and restrict the 
quantities, rates, and concentrations of specified substances which are discharged 
from point sources.[3]  See §§ 1311, 1314.  ‘[W]ater quality standards’ are, in 
general, promulgated by the States and establish the desired condition of a 
waterway.  See § 1313.  These standards supplement effluent limitations ‘so that 
numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, 
may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable 
levels.’  EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 
200, 205, n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 2025, n. 12, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976). 
 
“The EPA provides States with substantial guidance in the drafting of water 
quality standards.  See generally 40 CFR pt. 131 (1991) (setting forth model water 
quality standards).  Moreover, [the Clean Water Act] requires, inter alia, that state 
authorities periodically review water quality standards and secure the EPA’s 
approval of any revisions in the standards.  If the EPA recommends changes to the 
standards and the State fails to comply with that recommendation, the Act 
authorizes the EPA to promulgate water quality standards for the State.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(c).”  (Arkansas v. Oklahoma, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 101.) 
 
Part of the federal Clean Water Act is the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), “[t]he primary means” for enforcing effluent 
limitations and standards under the Clean Water Act.  (Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 
supra, 503 U.S. at p. 101.)  The NPDES sets out the conditions under which the 
federal EPA or a state with an approved water quality control program can issue 
                                             
 
3   
A “point source” is “any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance” 
and includes “any pipe, ditch, channel . . . from which pollutants . . . may be 
discharged.”  (33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14).)  
 
6 
permits for the discharge of pollutants in wastewater.  (33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) & (b).)  
In California, wastewater discharge requirements established by the regional 
boards are the equivalent of the NPDES permits required by federal law.  
(§ 13374.)   
 
With this federal and state statutory framework in mind, we now turn to the 
facts of this case. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
This case involves three publicly owned treatment plants that discharge 
wastewater under NPDES permits issued by the Los Angeles Regional Board. 
 
The City of Los Angeles owns and operates the Donald C. Tillman Water 
Reclamation Plant (Tillman Plant), which serves the San Fernando Valley.  The 
City of Los Angeles also owns and operates the Los Angeles-Glendale Water 
Reclamation Plant (Los Angeles-Glendale Plant), which processes wastewater 
from areas within the City of Los Angeles and the independent cities of Glendale 
and Burbank.  Both the Tillman Plant and the Los Angeles-Glendale Plant 
discharge wastewater directly into the Los Angeles River, now a concrete-lined 
flood control channel that runs through the City of Los Angeles, ending at the 
Pacific Ocean.  The State Board and the Los Angeles Regional Board consider the 
Los Angeles River to be a navigable water of the United States for purposes of the 
federal Clean Water Act.  
 
The third plant, the Burbank Water Reclamation Plant (Burbank Plant), is 
owned and operated by the City of Burbank, serving residents and businesses 
within that city.  The Burbank Plant discharges wastewater into the Burbank 
Western Wash, which drains into the Los Angeles River.   
 
All three plants, which together process hundreds of millions of gallons of 
sewage each day, are tertiary treatment facilities; that is, the treated wastewater 
they release is processed sufficiently to be safe not only for use in watering food 
 
7 
crops, parks, and playgrounds, but also for human body contact during recreational 
water activities such as swimming.   
 
In 1998, the Los Angeles Regional Board issued renewed NPDES permits 
to the three wastewater treatment facilities under a basin plan it had adopted four 
years earlier for the Los Angeles River and its estuary.  That 1994 basin plan 
contained general narrative criteria pertaining to the existing and potential future 
beneficial uses and water quality objectives for the river and estuary.4  The 
narrative criteria included municipal and domestic water supply, swimming and 
other recreational water uses, and fresh water habitat.  The plan further provided:  
“All waters shall be maintained free of toxic substances in concentrations that are 
toxic to, or that produce detrimental physiological responses in human, plant, 
animal, or aquatic life.”  The 1998 permits sought to reduce these narrative criteria 
to specific numeric requirements setting daily maximum limitations for more than 
30 pollutants present in the treated wastewater, measured in milligrams or 
micrograms per liter of effluent.5   
 
The Cities of Los Angeles and Burbank (Cities) filed appeals with the State 
Board, contending that achievement of the numeric requirements would be too 
costly when considered in light of the potential benefit to water quality, and that 
the pollutant restrictions in the NPDES permits were unnecessary to meet the 
                                             
 
4  
This opinion uses the terms “narrative criteria” or descriptions, and 
“numeric criteria” or effluent limitations.  Narrative criteria are broad statements 
of desirable water quality goals in a water quality plan.  For example, “no toxic 
pollutants in toxic amounts” would be a narrative description.  This contrasts with 
numeric criteria, which detail specific pollutant concentrations, such as parts per 
million of a particular substance.  
5   
For example, the permits for the Tillman and Los Angeles-Glendale Plants 
limited the amount of fluoride in the discharged wastewater to 2 milligrams per 
liter and the amount of mercury to 2.1 micrograms per liter. 
 
8 
narrative criteria described in the basin plan.  The State Board summarily denied 
the Cities’ appeals.   
 
Thereafter, the Cities filed petitions for writs of administrative mandate in 
the superior court.  They alleged, among other things, that the Los Angeles 
Regional Board failed to comply with sections 13241 and 13263, part of 
California’s Porter-Cologne Act, because it did not consider the economic burden 
on the Cities in having to reduce substantially the pollutant content of their 
discharged wastewater.  They also alleged that compliance with the pollutant 
restrictions set out in the NPDES permits issued by the regional board would 
greatly increase their costs of treating the wastewater to be discharged into the Los 
Angeles River.  According to the City of Los Angeles, its compliance costs would 
exceed $50 million annually, representing more than 40 percent of its entire 
budget for operating its four wastewater treatment plants and its sewer system; the 
City of Burbank estimated its added costs at over $9 million annually, a nearly 100 
percent increase above its $9.7 million annual budget for wastewater treatment.   
 
The State Board and the Los Angeles Regional Board responded that 
sections 13241 and 13263 do not require consideration of costs of compliance 
when a regional board issues a NPDES permit that restricts the pollutant content 
of discharged wastewater.   
 
The trial court stayed the contested pollutant restrictions for each of the 
three wastewater treatment plants.  It then ruled that sections 13241 and 13263 of 
California’s Porter-Cologne Act required a regional board to consider costs of 
compliance not only when it adopts a basin or water quality plan but also when, as 
here, it issues an NPDES permit setting the allowable pollutant content of a 
treatment plant’s discharged wastewater.  The court found no evidence that the 
Los Angeles Regional Board had considered economic factors at either stage.  
Accordingly, the trial court granted the Cities’ petitions for writs of mandate, and 
 
9 
it ordered the Los Angeles Regional Board to vacate the contested restrictions on 
pollutants in the wastewater discharge permits issued to the three municipal plants 
here and to conduct hearings to consider the Cities’ costs of compliance before the 
board’s issuance of new permits.  The Los Angeles Regional Board and the State 
Board filed appeals in both the Los Angeles and Burbank cases.6   
 
The Court of Appeal, after consolidating the cases, reversed the trial court.  
It concluded that sections 13241 and 13263 require a regional board to take into 
account “economic considerations” when it adopts water quality standards in a 
basin plan but not when, as here, the regional board sets specific pollutant 
restrictions in wastewater discharge permits intended to satisfy those standards.  
We granted the Cities’ petition for review.   
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Relevant State Statutes 
 
The California statute governing the issuance of wastewater permits by a 
regional board is section 13263, which was enacted in 1969 as part of the Porter-
Cologne Act.  (See pp. 3-4, ante.)  Section 13263 provides in relevant part:  “The 
regional board, after any necessary hearing, shall prescribe requirements as to the 
nature of any proposed discharge [of wastewater].  The requirements shall 
implement any relevant water quality control plans that have been adopted, and 
shall take into consideration the beneficial uses to be protected, the water quality 
                                             
 
6   
Unchallenged on appeal and thus not affected by our decision are the trial 
court’s rulings that (1) the Los Angeles Regional Board failed to show how it 
derived from the narrative criteria in the governing basin plan the specific numeric 
pollutant limitations included in the permits; (2) the administrative record failed to 
support the specific effluent limitations; (3) the permits improperly imposed daily 
maximum limits rather than weekly or monthly averages; and (4) the permits 
improperly specified the manner of compliance.   
 
10 
objectives reasonably required for that purpose, other waste discharges, the need 
to prevent nuisance, and the provisions of Section 13241.”  (§ 13263, subd. (a), 
italics added.)   
 
Section 13241 states:  “Each regional board shall establish such water 
quality objectives in water quality control plans as in its judgment will ensure the 
reasonable protection of beneficial uses and the prevention of nuisance; however, 
it is recognized that it may be possible for the quality of water to be changed to 
some degree without unreasonably affecting beneficial uses.  Factors to be 
considered by a regional board in establishing water quality objectives shall 
include, but not necessarily be limited to, all of the following:  
 
“(a) Past, present, and probable future beneficial uses of water. 
 
“(b) Environmental characteristics of the hydrographic unit under 
consideration, including the quality of water available thereto.  
 
“(c) Water quality conditions that could reasonably be achieved through the 
coordinated control of all factors which affect water quality in the area.  
 
“(d) Economic considerations.  
 
“(e) The need for developing housing within the region. 
 
“(f) The need to develop and use recycled water.”  (Italics added.) 
 
The Cities here argue that section 13263’s express reference to section 
13241 requires the Los Angeles Regional Board to consider section 13241’s listed 
factors, notably “[e]conomic considerations,” before issuing NPDES permits 
requiring specific pollutant reductions in discharged effluent or treated 
wastewater.   
 
Thus, at issue is language in section 13263 stating that when a regional 
board “prescribe[s] requirements as to the nature of any proposed discharge” of 
treated wastewater it must “take into consideration” certain factors including “the 
provisions of Section 13241.”  According to the Cities, this statutory language 
 
11 
requires that a regional board make an independent evaluation of the section 
13241 factors, including “economic considerations,” before restricting the 
pollutant content in an NPDES permit.  This was the view expressed in the trial 
court’s ruling.  The Court of Appeal rejected that view.  It held that a regional 
board need consider the section 13241 factors only when it adopts a basin or water 
quality plan, but not when, as in this case, it issues a wastewater discharge permit 
that sets specific numeric limitations on the various chemical pollutants in the 
wastewater to be discharged.  As explained below, the Court of Appeal was partly 
correct.   
B.  Statutory Construction 
 
When construing any statute, our task is to determine the Legislature’s 
intent when it enacted the statute “so that we may adopt the construction that best 
effectuates the purpose of the law.”  (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715; Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 268.)  
In doing this, we look to the statutory language, which ordinarily is “the most 
reliable indicator of legislative intent.”  (Hassan, supra, at p. 715.)   
 
As mentioned earlier, our Legislature’s 1969 enactment of the Porter-
Cologne Act, which sought to ensure the high quality of water in this state, 
predated the 1972 enactment by Congress of the precursor to the federal Clean 
Water Act.  Included in California’s original Porter-Cologne Act were sections 
13263 and 13241.  Section 13263 directs regional boards, when issuing 
wastewater discharge permits, to take into account various factors including those 
set out in section 13241.  Listed among the section 13241 factors is “[e]conomic 
considerations.”  (§ 13241, subd. (d).)  The plain language of sections 13263 and 
13241 indicates the Legislature’s intent in 1969, when these statutes were enacted, 
that a regional board consider the cost of compliance when setting effluent 
limitations in a wastewater discharge permit.    
 
12 
 
Our construction of sections 13263 and 13241 does not end with their plain 
statutory language, however.  We must also analyze them in the context of the 
statutory scheme of which they are a part.  (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043.)  Like sections 13263 and 13241, 
section 13377 is part of the Porter-Cologne Act.  But unlike the former two 
statutes, section 13377 was not enacted until 1972, shortly after Congress, through 
adoption of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, established a 
comprehensive water quality policy for the nation.   
 
Section 13377 specifies that wastewater discharge permits issued by 
California’s regional boards must meet the federal standards set by federal law.  In 
effect, section 13377 forbids a regional board’s consideration of any economic 
hardship on the part of the permit holder if doing so would result in the dilution of 
the requirements set by Congress in the Clean Water Act.  That act prohibits the 
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States unless there 
is compliance with federal law (33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)), and publicly operated 
wastewater treatment plants such as those before us here must comply with the 
act’s clean water standards, regardless of cost (see id.. §§ 1311(a), (b)(1)(B) & 
(C), 1342(a)(1) & (3)).  Because section 13263 cannot authorize what federal law 
forbids, it cannot authorize a regional board, when issuing a wastewater discharge 
permit, to use compliance costs to justify pollutant restrictions that do not comply 
with federal clean water standards.7  Such a construction of section 13263 would 
                                             
 
7   
The concurring opinion misconstrues both state and federal clean water law 
when it describes the issue here as “whether the Clean Water Act prevents or 
prohibits the regional water board from considering economic factors to justify 
pollutant restrictions that meet the clean water standards in more cost-effective 
and economically efficient ways.”  (Conc. Opn. of Brown, J., post, p. 1, some 
italics added.)  This case has nothing to do with meeting federal standards in more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fn. continued on next page) 
 
13 
not only be inconsistent with federal law, it would also be inconsistent with the 
Legislature’s declaration in section 13377 that all discharged wastewater must 
satisfy federal standards.8  This was also the conclusion of the Court of Appeal.  
Moreover, under the federal Constitution’s supremacy clause (art. VI), a state law 
that conflicts with federal law is “ ‘without effect.’ ”  (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516; Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer 
Healthcare (2004) 32 Cal.4th 910, 923.)  To comport with the principles of federal 
supremacy, California law cannot authorize this state’s regional boards to allow 
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States in 
concentrations that would exceed the mandates of federal law.   
 
Thus, in this case, whether the Los Angeles Regional Board should have 
complied with sections 13263 and 13241 of California’s Porter-Cologne Act by 
taking into account “economic considerations,” such as the costs the permit holder 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Fn. continued from previous page) 
 
cost effective and economically efficient ways.  State law, as we have said, allows 
a regional board to consider a permit holder’s compliance cost to relax pollutant 
concentrations, as measured by numeric standards, for pollutants in a wastewater 
discharge permit.  (§§ 13241 & 13263.)  Federal law, by contrast, as stated above 
in the text, “prohibits the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the 
United States unless there is compliance with federal law (33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)), 
and publicly operated wastewater treatment plants such as those before us here 
must comply with the [federal] act’s clean water standards, regardless of cost (see 
id.. §§ 1311(a), (b)(1)(B) & (C), 1342(a)(1) & (3)).”  (Italics added.)   
8   
As amended in 1978, section 13377 provides for the issuance of waste 
discharge permits that comply with federal clean water law “together with any 
more stringent effluent standards or limitations necessary to implement water 
quality control plans, or for the protection of beneficial uses, or to prevent 
nuisance.”  We do not here decide how this provision would affect the cost-
consideration requirements of sections 13241 and 13263 when more stringent 
effluent standards or limitations in a permit are justified for some reason 
independent of compliance with federal law.    
 
14 
will incur to comply with the numeric pollutant restrictions set out in the permits 
depends on whether those restrictions meet or exceed the requirements of the 
federal Clean Water Act.  We therefore remand this matter for the trial court to 
resolve that issue.  
C.  Other Contentions 
 
The Cities argue that requiring a regional board at the wastewater discharge 
permit stage to consider the permit holder’s cost of complying with the board’s 
restrictions on pollutant content in the water is consistent with federal law.  In 
support, the Cities point to certain provisions of the federal Clean Water Act.  
They cite section 1251(a)(2) of title 33 United States Code, which sets as a 
national goal “wherever attainable,” an interim goal for water quality that protects 
fish and wildlife, and section 1313(c)(2)(A) of the same title, which requires 
consideration, among other things, of waters’ “use and value for navigation” when 
revising or adopting a “water quality standard.”  (Italics added.)  These two federal 
statutes, however, pertain not to permits for wastewater discharge, at issue here, 
but to establishing water quality standards, not at issue here.  Nothing in the 
federal Clean Water Act suggests that a state is free to disregard or to weaken the 
federal requirements for clean water when an NPDES permit holder alleges that 
compliance with those requirements will be too costly.   
 
At oral argument, counsel for amicus curiae National Resources Defense 
Council, which argued on behalf of California’s State Board and regional water 
boards, asserted that the federal Clean Water Act incorporates state water policy 
into federal law, and that therefore a regional board’s consideration of economic 
factors to justify greater pollutant concentration in discharged wastewater would 
conflict with the federal act even if the specified pollutant restrictions were not 
less stringent than those required under federal law.  We are not persuaded.  The 
federal Clean Water Act reserves to the states significant aspects of water quality 
 
15 
policy (33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)), and it specifically grants the states authority to 
“enforce any effluent limitation” that is not “less stringent” than the federal 
standard (id. § 1370, italics added).  It does not prescribe or restrict the factors that 
a state may consider when exercising this reserved authority, and thus it does not 
prohibit a state—when imposing effluent limitations that are more stringent than 
required by federal law—from taking into account the economic effects of doing 
so.   
 
Also at oral argument, counsel for the Cities asserted that if the three 
municipal wastewater treatment facilities ceased releasing their treated wastewater 
into the concrete channel that makes up the Los Angeles River, it would (other 
than during the rainy season) contain no water at all, and thus would not be a 
“navigable water” of the United States subject to the Clean Water Act.  (See Solid 
Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (2001) 531 U.S. 159, 172 
[“The term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in 
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA:  its traditional jurisdiction over waters 
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”].)  
It is unclear when the Cities first raised this issue.  The Court of Appeal did not 
discuss it in its opinion, and the Cities did not seek rehearing on this ground.  (See 
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28(c)(2).)  Concluding that the issue is outside our grant 
of review, we do not address it. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Through the federal Clean Water Act, Congress has regulated the release of 
pollutants into our national waterways.  The states are free to manage their own 
water quality programs so long as they do not compromise the federal clean water 
standards.  When enacted in 1972, the goal of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments was to eliminate by the year 1985 the discharge of pollutants 
into the nation’s navigable waters.  In furtherance of that goal, the Los Angeles 
 
16 
Regional Board indicated in its 1994 basin plan on water quality the intent, insofar 
as possible, to remove from the water in the Los Angeles River toxic substances in 
amounts harmful to humans, plants, and aquatic life.  What is not clear from the 
record before us is whether, in limiting the chemical pollutant content of 
wastewater to be discharged by the Tillman, Los Angeles-Glendale, and Burbank 
wastewater treatment facilities, the Los Angeles Regional Board acted only to 
implement requirements of the federal Clean Water Act or instead imposed 
pollutant limitations that exceeded the federal requirements.  This is an issue of 
fact to be resolved by the trial court. 
DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal reinstating the wastewater 
discharge permits to the extent that the specified numeric limitations on chemical 
pollutants are necessary to satisfy federal Clean Water Act requirements for 
treated wastewater.  The Court of Appeal is directed to remand this matter to the 
trial court to decide whether any numeric limitations, as described in the permits, 
are “more stringent” than required under federal law and thus should have been 
subject to “economic considerations” by the Los Angeles Regional Board before 
inclusion in the permits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I write separately to express my frustration with the apparent inability of 
the government officials involved here to answer a simple question:  How do the 
federal clean water standards (which, as near as I can determine, are the state 
standards) prevent the state from considering economic factors?  The majority 
concludes that because “the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 
requires state law to yield to federal law, a regional board, when issuing a 
wastewater discharge permit, may not consider economic factors to justify 
imposing pollutant restrictions that are less stringent than applicable federal 
standards require.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  That seems a pretty self-evident 
proposition, but not a useful one.  The real question, in my view, is whether the 
Clean Water Act prevents or prohibits the regional water board from considering 
economic factors to justify pollutant restrictions that meet the clean water 
standards in more cost-effective and economically efficient ways.  I can see no 
reason why a federal law—which purports to be an example of cooperative 
federalism—would decree such a result.  I do not think the majority’s reasoning is 
at fault here.  Rather, the agencies involved seemed to have worked hard to make 
this simple question impenetrably obscure.   
 
A brief review of the statutory framework at issue is necessary to 
understand my concerns.   
 
 
2
I.  Federal Law 
 
“In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.), commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
[Citation.] . . .  [¶]  Generally, the CWA ‘prohibits the discharge of any pollutant 
except in compliance with one of several statutory exceptions.  [Citation.]’ . . .  
The most important of those exceptions is pollution discharge under a valid 
NPDES [(National Pollution Discharge Elimination System)] permit, which can be 
issued either by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or by an EPA- 
approved state permit program such as California’s.  [Citations.]  NPDES permits 
are valid for five years.  [Citation.]  [¶]  Under the CWA’s NPDES permit 
program, the states are required to develop water quality standards.  [Citations.]  
A water quality standard ‘establish[es] the desired condition of a waterway.’  
[Citation.]  A water quality standard for any given waterway, or ‘water body,’ has 
two components:  (1) the designated beneficial uses of the water body and (2) the 
water quality criteria sufficient to protect those uses.  [Citations.]  [¶]  Water 
quality criteria can be either narrative or numeric.  [Citation.]”  (Communities for 
a Better Environment v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2003) 109 
Cal.App.4th 1089, 1092-1093.) 
 
With respect to satisfying water quality standards, “a polluter must comply 
with effluent limitations. The CWA defines an effluent limitation as ‘any 
restriction established by a State or the [EPA] Administrator on quantities, rates, 
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which 
are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the 
contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance.’  [Citation.]  
‘Effluent limitations are a means of achieving water quality standards.’  [Citation.]  
[¶]  NPDES permits establish effluent limitations for the polluter.  [Citations.]  
CWA’s NPDES permit system provides for a two-step process for the establishing 
 
 
3
of effluent limitations.  First, the polluter must comply with technology-based 
effluent limitations, which are limitations based on the best available or practical 
technology for the reduction of water pollution.  [Citations.]  [¶]  Second, the 
polluter must also comply with more stringent water quality-based effluent 
limitations (WQBEL’s) where applicable.  In the CWA, Congress ‘supplemented 
the “technology-based” effluent limitations with “water quality-based” limitations 
“so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent 
limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below 
acceptable levels.” ’  [Citation.]  [¶]  The CWA makes WQBEL’s applicable to a 
given polluter whenever WQBEL’s are ‘necessary to meet water quality standards, 
treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State 
law or regulations . . . .’  [Citations.]  Generally, NPDES permits must conform to 
state water quality laws insofar as the state laws impose more stringent pollution 
controls than the CWA.  [Citations.]  Simply put, WQBEL’s implement water 
quality standards.”  (Communities for a Better Environment v. State Water 
Resources Control Bd., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1093-1094, fns. omitted.)  
 
This case involves water quality-based effluent limitations.  As set forth 
above, “[u]nder the CWA, states have the primary role in promulgating water 
quality standards.”  (Piney Run Preservation Ass’n v. Commrs. of Carroll Co. (4th 
Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 255, 265, fn. 9.)  “Under the CWA, the water quality 
standards referred to in section 301 [see 33 U.S.C. § 1311] are primarily the states’ 
handiwork.”  (American Paper Institute, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) 996 F.2d 346, 349 (American Paper).)  In fact, upon the 1972 
passage of the CWA, “[s]tate water quality standards in effect at the time . . . were 
deemed to be the initial water quality benchmarks for CWA purposes . . . .  The 
states were to revisit and, if necessary, revise those initial standards at least once 
every three years.”  (American Paper, at p. 349.)  Therefore, “once a water quality 
 
 
4
standard has been promulgated, section 301 of the CWA requires all NPDES 
permits for point sources to incorporate discharge limitations necessary to satisfy 
that standard.”  (American Paper, at p. 350.)  Accordingly, it appears that in most 
instances, state water quality standards are identical to the federal requirements for 
NPDES permits.   
II.  State Law 
 
In California, pursuant to the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act 
(Wat. Code, § 13000 et seq.; Stats. 1969, ch. 482, § 18, p. 1051; hereafter Porter-
Cologne Act), the regional water quality control boards establish water quality 
standards—and therefore federal requirements for NPDES permits—through the 
adoption of water quality control plans (basin plans).  The basin plans establish 
water quality objectives using enumerated factors—including economic factors—
set forth in Water Code section 13241.   
 
In addition, as one court observed:  “The Porter-Cologne Act . . . 
established nine regional boards to prepare water quality plans (known as basin 
plans) and issue permits governing the discharge of waste.  (Wat. Code, §§ 13100, 
13140, 13200, 13201, 13240, 13241, 13243.)  The Porter-Cologne Act identified 
these permits as ‘waste discharge requirements,’ and provided that the waste 
discharge requirements must mandate compliance with the applicable regional 
water quality control plan.  (Wat. Code, §§ 13263, subd. (a), 13377, 13374.)  [¶]  
Shortly after Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972, the California 
Legislature added Chapter 5.5 to the Porter-Cologne Act, for the purpose of 
adopting the necessary federal requirements to ensure it would obtain EPA 
approval to issue NPDES permits.  (Wat. Code, § 13370, subd. (c).)  As part of 
these amendments, the Legislature provided that the state and regional water 
boards ‘shall, as required or authorized by the [Clean Water Act], issue waste 
discharge requirements . . . which apply and ensure compliance with all applicable 
 
 
5
provisions [of the Clean Water Act], together with any more stringent effluent 
standards or limitations necessary to implement water quality control plans, or for 
the protection of beneficial uses, or to prevent nuisance.’  (Wat. Code, § 13377.)  
Water Code section 13374 provides that ‘[t]he term “waste discharge 
requirements” as referred to in this division is the equivalent of the term “permits” 
as used in the [Clean Water Act].’  [¶]  California subsequently obtained the 
required approval to issue NPDES permits.  [Citation.]  Thus, the waste discharge 
requirements issued by the regional water boards ordinarily also serve as NPDES 
permits under federal law.  (Wat. Code, § 13374.)”  (Building Industry Assn. of 
San Diego County v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 
866, 875.)   
 
Applying this federal-state statutory scheme, it appears that throughout this 
entire process, the Cities of Burbank and Los Angeles (Cities) were unable to have 
economic factors considered because the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality 
Control Board (Board)—the body responsible to enforce the statutory 
framework —failed to comply with its statutory mandate.   
 
For example, as the trial court found, the Board did not consider costs of 
compliance when it initially established its basin plan, and hence the water quality 
standards.  The Board thus failed to abide by the statutory requirement set forth in 
Water Code section 13241 in establishing its basin plan.  Moreover, the Cities 
claim that the initial narrative standards were so vague as to make a serious 
economic analysis impracticable.  Because the Board does not allow the Cities to 
raise their economic factors in the permit approval stage, they are effectively 
precluded from doing so.  As a result, the Board appears to be playing a game of 
“gotcha” by allowing the Cities to raise economic considerations when it is not 
practical, but precluding them when they have the ability to do so.  
 
 
6
 
Moreover, the Board acknowledges that it has neglected other statutory 
provisions that might have provided an additional opportunity to air these 
concerns.  As set forth above, pursuant to the CWA, “[t]he states were to revisit 
and, if necessary, revise those initial standards at least once every three years—a 
process commonly known as triennial review.  [Citation.]  Triennial reviews 
consist of public hearings in which current water quality standards are examined to 
assure that they ‘protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water 
and serve the purposes’ of the Act.  [Citation.]  Additionally, the CWA directs 
states to consider a variety of competing policy concerns during these reviews, 
including a waterway’s ‘use and value for public water supplies, propagation of 
fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other 
purposes.’ ”  (American Paper, supra, 996 F.2d at p. 349.)  
 
According to the Cities, “[t]he last time that the narrative water quality 
objective for toxicity contained in the Basin Plan was reviewed and modified was 
1994.”  The Board does not deny this claim.  Accordingly, the Board has failed its 
duty to allow public discussion—including economic considerations—at the 
required intervals when making its determination of proper water quality 
standards. 
 
What is unclear is why this process should be viewed as a contest.  State 
and local agencies are presumably on the same side.  The costs will be paid by 
taxpayers and the Board should have as much interest as any other agency in 
fiscally responsible environmental solutions. 
 
Our decision today arguably allows the Board to continue to shirk its 
statutory duties.  The majority holds that when read together, Water Code sections 
13241, 13263, and 13377 do not allow the Board to consider economic factors 
when issuing NPDES permits to satisfy federal CWA requirements.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 12-13.)  The majority then bifurcates the issue when it orders the Court 
 
 
7
of Appeal “to remand this matter to the trial court to decide whether any numeric 
limitations, as described in the permits are ‘more stringent’ than required under 
federal law and thus should have been subject to ‘economic considerations’ by the 
Los Angeles Regional Board before inclusion in the permits.”  (Id. at p. 16.) 
 
The majority overlooks the feedback loop established by the CWA, under 
which federal standards are linked to state-established water quality standards, 
including narrative water quality criteria.  (See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C); 40 
C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1) (2004).)  Under the CWA, NPDES permit requirements 
include the state narrative criteria, which are incorporated into the Board’s basin 
plan under the description of “no toxins in toxic amounts.”  As far as I can 
determine, NPDES permits designed to achieve this narrative criteria (as well as 
designated beneficial uses) will usually implement the state’s basin plan, while 
satisfying federal requirements as well. 
 
If federal water quality standards are typically identical to state standards, it 
will be a rare instance that a state exceeds its own requirements and economic 
factors are taken into consideration.1  In light of the Board’s initial failure to 
consider costs of compliance and its repeated failure to conduct required triennial 
reviews, the result here is an unseemly bureaucratic bait-and-switch that we should 
not endorse.  The likely outcome of the majority’s decision is the Cities will be 
economically burdened to meet standards imposed on them in a highly 
questionable manner.2  In these times of tight fiscal budgets, it is difficult to 
                                             
 
1  
(But see In the Matter of the Petition of City and County of San Francisco, 
San Francisco Baykeeper et al. (Order No. WQ 95-4, Sept. 21, 1995) 1995 WL 
576920.) 
2  
Indeed, given the fact “water quality standards” in this case are composed 
of broadly worded components (i.e., a narrative criteria and “designated beneficial 
uses of the water body”), the Board possessed a high degree of discretion in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fn. continued on next page) 
 
 
8
imagine imposing additional financial burdens on municipalities without at least 
allowing them to present alternative views.   
 
Based on the facts of this case, our opinion today appears to largely retain 
the status quo for the Board.  If the Board can actually demonstrate that only the 
precise limitations at issue here, implemented in only one way, will achieve the 
desired water standards, perhaps its obduracy is justified.  That case has yet to be 
made.   
 
Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the majority’s decision is wrong.  The 
analysis may provide a reasonable accommodation of conflicting provisions.  
However, since the Board’s actions “make me wanna holler and throw up both my 
hands,”3 I write separately to set forth my concerns and concur in the judgment—
dubitante.4   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Fn. continued from previous page) 
 
setting NPDES permit requirements.  Based on the Board’s past performance, a 
proper exercise of this discretion is uncertain.   
3  
Marvin Gaye (1971) “Inner City Blues.” 
4  
I am indebted to Judge Berzon for this useful term.  (See Credit Suisse First 
Boston Corp. v. Grunwald (9th Cir., Mar. 1, 2005, No. 03-15695) __ F.3d __ 
[2005 WL 466202] (conc. opn. of Berzon, J.).) 
 
 
9
 
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of Burbank v. State Water Resources Control Board 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 111 Cal.App.4th 245 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S119248 
Date Filed: April 4, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Dzintra I. Janavs 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank and Tom 
Greene, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, Marilyn H. 
Levin, Gregory J. Newmark and David S. Beckman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant: 
 
Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Downey Brand, Melissa A. Thorme, Jeffrey S. Galvin, Nicole E. 
Granquist and Cassandra M. Ferrannini for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Dennis A. Barlow, City Attorney, and Carolyn A. Barnes, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and 
Appellant City of Burbank. 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, and Christopher M. Westhoff, Assistant City Attorney, for Plaintiff 
and Appellant City of Los Angeles. 
 
Ruttan & Tucker and Richard Montevideo for Cities of Baldwin Park, Bell, Cerritos, Diamond Bar, 
Downey, Gardena, Montebello, Monterey Park, Paramount, Pico Rivera, Rosemead, San Gabriel, San 
Marino, Santa Fe Springs, Sierra Madre, Signal Hill, Temple City and West Covina, The California 
Building Industry Association and The Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Stoel Rives and Lawrence S. Bazel  for Western Coalition of Arid States as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 - S119248 - counsel continued 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant: 
 
Richards, Watson & Gershon and John J. Harris for The League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
David S. Beckman and Dan L. Gildor for National Resources Defense Counsel, Butte Environmental 
Council, California Coastkeeper Alliance, CalTrout, Clean Water Action, Clean Water Fund, Coalition on 
the Environment and Jewish Life of Southern California, Coast Action Group, Defend the Bay, Ecological 
Rights Foundation, Environment in the Public Interest, Environmental Defense Center, Heal the Bay, Los 
Angeles Interfaith Environment Council, Ocean Conservancy, Orange County Coastkeeper, San Diego 
Baykeeper, Santa Barbara Channelkeeper, Santa Monica Baykeeper, Southern California Watershed 
Alliance, Ventura Coastkeeper, Waterkeeper Alliance, Waterkeepers Northern California, Westside 
Aquatics, Inc., and Wishtoyo Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Joseph A. Meckes; David W. Burchmore; and Alexandra Dapolito Dunn for 
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith and B. Richard Marsh for County Sanitation Districts of Los Angeles 
County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Fulbright & Jaworski, Colin Lennard, Patricia Chen; Archer Norris and Peter W. McGaw for California 
Association of Sanitation Agencies as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gregory J. Newmark 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 500 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2641 
 
David S. Beckman 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 500 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2641 
 
Melissa A. Thorme 
Downey Brand 
555 Capitol Mall, Tenth Floor 
Sacramento, CA  95814-4686 
(916) 444-1000