Case Title: SHANNON BLAKELY v. BRANDON BLAKELY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0020

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHANNON BLAKELY v. BRANDON BLAKELY2009 WY 127218 P.3d 253Case Number: No. S-09-0020Decided: 10/20/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
SHANNON 
BLAKELY,Appellant(Plainitff),v.BRANDON 
BLAKELY,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Christopher 
M. Wages of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Rick 
Erb of Richard A. Erb Jr., P.C., Gillette, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Shannon 
Blakely (Mother) appeals from her divorce decree, contending that the district 
court abused its discretion when it awarded Brandon Blakely (Father) primary 
residential custody of the parties' two sons, while the half-brother remained in 
Mother's custody.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mother states the 
single issue as follows:

 
 
Whether 
the District Court erred when it awarded primary residential custody of the 
parties' two minor children to [Father]?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties to 
this action married on January 7, 2003.  
Mother brought a son, CS, into the marriage, and at the time of the 
marriage, Mother was pregnant with the couple's first son, CB, who was born in 
May of 2003.  The couple's second 
son, EB, was born in August of 2005.  
During the relationship, the family lived in Buffalo, but Father often 
worked out of town.

 
 
[¶4]      The couple 
separated in October of 2005, with Mother leaving the home and taking all three 
boys with her.  In June of 2007, 
Mother officially moved to Gillette with the three boys  by this time Mother 
was engaged to another man and expecting her fourth son, who was born in 
September of 2007.  Father, 
meanwhile, continued to exercise visitation with his two 
sons.

 
 
[¶5]      Mother filed for 
divorce in August of 2007, and both parties requested temporary custody, which 
the district court awarded to Father on January 25, 2008.  The case was tried on July 11, 2008, and 
at the close of evidence, the court made findings on the record.  Ultimately, the court awarded primary 
residential custody to Father, with visitation to Mother.  Mother appeals that 
decision.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We have 
stated before that "[c]ustody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court."  Reavis v. Reavis,  955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 

This 
Court has consistently recognized 
the broad discretion enjoyed by a district court in child custody 
matters.  We will not interfere with 
the district court's custody 
determination absent procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  In determining whether an abuse of 
discretion has occurred, our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the 
district court's decision in light of the evidence presented.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination, affording every favorable 
inference to the prevailing party and omitting from our consideration the 
conflicting evidence. 

 
 

Durfee 
v. Durfee, 2009 
WY 7, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1087, 1089 (Wyo. 2009) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶7]      
Furthermore,

 
 
   It has been our consistent 
principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to 
be given paramount consideration.  
The determination of the best interests of the child is a question for 
the trier of fact.  We do not 
overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of 
discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal principle. Resor v. 
Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 1999), quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998).

Testerman 
v. Testerman, 
2008 WY 112, P 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 2008). 

   A court does not abuse its 
discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under 
the circumstances.  Our review 
entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district 
court's decision. . . . Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary 
to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence cannot be 
sustained. Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present when a material factor 
deserving significant weight is ignored.

Eickbush 
v. Eickbush, 
2007 WY 179, ¶ 9, 171 P.3d 509, 511 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

Buttle 
v. Buttle, 
2008 WY 135, ¶ 15, 196 P.3d 174, 178 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

Parris 
v. Parris, 2009 
WY 44, ¶ 15, 204 P.3d 298, 303 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Mother claims on 
appeal that in its decision giving primary residential custody to Father, the 
district court did not "give the welfare and needs of the children paramount 
consideration."  Mother insists that 
the evidence presented at trial indicated that she was the more appropriate 
party to have primary residential custody.  
Essentially, Mother asks us to reweigh the evidence considered by the 
district court when she points to, and analyzes in detail, each of the statutory 
factors that guide a custody determination under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶9]      Father contends 
that the court's decision is supported by the evidence and was a proper exercise 
of discretion  and, as evidenced by the court's oral ruling, the court 
thoroughly evaluated the evidence along with the statutory 
factors.

 
 
[¶10]   As we have consistently 
articulated, "This Court  does not reweigh evidence. Instead, we view the facts 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party."  Hayzlett v. Hayzlett, 2007 WY 147, 
¶ 8, 167 P.3d 639, 642 (Wyo. 2007).  
In child custody determinations, the district court must base its 
decision on the factors articulated in § 20-2-201(a), which 
provides:

 
 

(a)  In 
granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the 
establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-401 through 14-2-907, the court 
may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most 
expedient and in the best interests of the children. In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:

(i) The 
quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

(ii) The 
ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each 
period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as 
needed;

(iii) The 
relative competency and fitness of each parent;

(iv) Each 
parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a 
willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish 
care to the other parent at specified times;

(v) How 
the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with 
each other;

(vi) How 
the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such 
interaction and communication may be improved;

(vii) The 
ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care 
without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, 
including the right to privacy;

(viii) Geographic 
distance between the parents' residences;

(ix) The 
current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each 
child;

(x) Any 
other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

 
 
[¶11]   No single factor is 
determinative.  Hayzlett, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d  at 642.  
In fact, depending on the case, different factors will present a 
greater need for emphasis.  The one 
constant is that the resolution must be in the best interests of the children in 
that particular family.  Id.

 
 
[¶12]   With these principles in mind, we 
turn to the facts of the instant case.  
The record is clear that each parent had a good relationship with the 
children.  The court stated in its 
oral findings, "  these are two good parents.  They both love their children and want 
the best for their children."  
Indeed, each party appears to be more than able to handle the care of the 
children, and the record contains evidence favorable to each party.  For instance, Mother lives in a 
four-bedroom, two-bath home on two and a half acres, and is a stay-at-home 
mom.  And even though Father works 
full-time, he is very responsible regarding daycare and has that "all lined 
out," according to the district court.  
The court found both parents to be on equal footing regarding maintaining 
and strengthening relationships with each other.  The court also found to be a positive 
feature of both parents "the support of their extended families."  The phrase "equal footing" was also 
applied regarding how the parents and each child interact and communicate with 
each other, as well as the ability and willingness of each parent to allow the 
other to provide care without intrusion, respecting the other parent's rights 
and responsibilities, including the right to privacy.  By and large, the court found the 
parents to be on "equal footing" on most of the factors it considered.  

 
 
[¶13]   Nevertheless, Mother points to a 
factor in particular that she believes weighs in her favor  that giving custody 
of EB and CB to Father splits up the four brothers.  This Court has addressed the issue of 
separating siblings:

 
 
[G]enerally 
speaking the separating of siblings through custody awards to different parents 
is not preferred. Keeping siblings together in the same household is considered 
the better practice.  However, this 
court clarified that the effect of separating siblings from 
each other is just one of several factors courts consider in 
determining the primary issue-the best interests of the 
children.

 
 

Aragon 
v. Aragon, 2005 
WY 5, ¶ 24, 104 P.3d 756, 763 (Wyo. 2005) (emphasis in 
original).

 
 
[¶14]   The district court addressed this 
very issue at length on the record:

 
 
            
All right.  Another factor I 
want to take up, under factor 10, which is the general factor that may influence 
the Court decision is the subject of the half siblings, because it is very 
important.

 
 
Certainly, 
in an ideal world, all siblings, be half or whole, be brought up under the same 
roof, that is probably preferred the avenue [sic] but other factors must be 
taken into account there.  I want 
the record to reflect I have taken into account the value of half-siblings being 
raised under the same roof, and I recognize that value.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
I 
am also going to note that right at this moment, that dad has indicated that he 
has no problem in affording access of these two boys, [CB] and [EB] to their 
half siblings, and I take that representation at face 
value.

 
 
I 
want you to know, sir, that if that does not happen, that this Court is going to 
consider that to be a material and substantial change in circumstances, that 
could conceivably justify a change in custody later on so that should influence 
you in the right direction here.  
These boys need to have a full, deep, and long relationship with their 
half-siblings.  And there is no 
reason why you and their mother cannot arrange that, particularly when you have 
the support of your extended families behind you.

 
 
[¶15]   The court concluded that it was in 
the children's overall best interests that Father be awarded custody.  Furthermore, the court's oral findings 
were sufficiently detailed so as to provide an adequate basis for its ultimate 
determination awarding Father custody of the two boys, effectively separating 
them from their brothers for much of the time.

 
 
[¶16]   Because this was such a close case, 
we would like to again emphasize:

 
 
"The 
law affords wide discretion to the district court when fashioning custody and 
visitation provisions for the best interests of the children."  [Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428 
(Wyo. 1998)] at 431.  We recognize 
such discretion encompasses one of the most difficult and demanding tasks 
assigned to a trial judge.  
Id. Ultimately, the "goal to be achieved is a reasonable balance 
of the rights and affections of each of the parents, with paramount 
consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the children."  Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965); see also Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 
(Wyo. 1993).

 
 

Aragon, 
¶ 30, 
104 P.3d  at 764, 765.

 
 
[¶17]   Certainly, reasonable minds could 
reach different conclusions about which parent's custody would be in the best 
interests of the children.  Hayzlett, ¶ 13, 167 P.3d  at 
643.

 
 

Seldom 
if ever does a divorce court have a choice between a parent who is all good on 
one side and a parent who is all bad on the other side.  The matter of awarding custody is a 
comparative proposition wherein the court exercises its best judgment and 
discretion and awards custody to one parent or to the other, according to what 
the court thinks is for the best interest and welfare of the 
children.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 473 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo. 1970)).  Here, even the district court admitted 
this was a close, tough case.  This 
Court will accede to the district court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless the court clearly abused its discretion.  Aragon, ¶ 21, 104 P.3d  at 762.  The burden is on the party asserting an 
abuse of discretion to establish such an abuse.  Id.  In this instance, Mother has failed to 
meet the applicable burden and because the record includes sufficient evidence 
to support the district court's decision, we can find no abuse of discretion in 
the district court's award of custody to Father.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶18]   The district court did not err when 
it awarded Father primary residential custody of his two sons.  This Court can find no abuse of 
discretion by the district court, and, accordingly, we affirm its 
decision.