Case Title: ALLAN DEON WEASE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-187

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALLAN DEON WEASE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 176170 P.3d 94Case Number: 06-187Decided: 11/05/2007Modified: 11/07/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ALLAN 
DEON WEASE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, Acting Wyoming Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos and Tina N. Kerin, 
Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender; Diane E. Courselle, Director, 
Defender Aid Program; Thomas Justice, Student Intern; and William Elliott, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Courselle.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellant, 
Allan Deon Wease (Wease), seeks review of his twelve convictions for various sex 
crimes, including second degree sexual assault, third degree sexual assault, and 
immoral or indecent acts with a child.  
Wease contends that with respect to Count V of his convictions, he was 
sentenced under a statute that did not take effect until after the crime was 
committed.  The State concedes this 
error and agrees that the case must be remanded to the district court for 
resentencing on that matter.

 
 
[¶2]      With respect to 
Count VII, Wease contends that the State failed to prove the temporal element of 
that crime (that the crime occurred within the time limits specified in the 
instructions given to the jury by the district court, based on the third amended 
Information).  At trial, the State 
conceded that it had failed to prove that element of the crime and told the jury 
it should acquit.  However, the jury 
convicted anyway.  On appeal, the 
State propounds an argument that the evidence of the temporal element of the 
crime was adequate.  We do not agree 
with that argument, and we will reverse that conviction and direct that Count 
VII be dismissed on remand.

 
 
[¶3]      Wease also 
contends that the State overwhelmed the jury with literally hundreds of 
instances of prior bad acts in violation of W.R.E. 404(b) and our jurisprudence 
with respect to that rule.  We will 
conclude that this contention does not require the reversal of Wease's other 
eleven convictions.

 
 
[¶4]      Finally, Wease 
contends that his defense attorney was ineffective because he failed to develop 
any sort of strategy to limit the wholesale admission of W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  We will conclude that 
defense counsel's performance was adequate and did not prejudice Wease's 
case.

 
 
[¶5]      We will reverse 
in part, affirm in part, and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶6]      Wease articulates 
these issues:

 
 
            
I.          
Did the district court impose an illegal sentence when it sentenced Mr. 
Wease in accordance with the post-amendment sexual assault statute despite the 
fact that the State established the criminal offense occurred before the statute 
was amended in 1997?

 
 
            
II.         
Was the evidence convicting Mr. Wease of the criminal act charged in 
Count VII insufficient because the State failed to establish that the criminal 
offense occurred within the time period charged in the third amended 
information?

 
 
            
III.        Did 
plain error occur when the State overwhelmed the jury with substantial uncharged 
misconduct evidence which was unduly prejudicial or beyond the scope of the 
parties' 404(b) stipulation and the trial court failed to take adequate measures 
to limit the problems with its reckless approach to its evidentiary 
presentation?

 
 
            
IV.       
Did trial counsel's failure to develop any meaningful strategy to address 
the uncharged misconduct and notice issues amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel because it led to the virtually unrestricted admission of so much 
uncharged misconduct that the jury's determination of the issues had to be 
adversely affected?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues somewhat:

 
 
            
I.          
[Wease's] sentence on Count V exceeded the statutory limits in effect at 
the time of the offense; thus, [his] sentence on that Count is 
illegal.

 
 
            
II.         
Was there sufficient evidence to find [Wease] guilty of Count 
[VII]?

 
 
            
III.        Did 
the district court err in admitting stipulated uncharged misconduct evidence and 
was [Wease] prejudiced by the same?  
Moreover, did the State unnecessarily complicate the presentation of 
evidence and fail to give proper notice of the sexual intrusion charged in Count 
III?

 
 
            
IV.       
Was [Wease's] trial counsel ineffective?

 
 
In his 
reply brief, Wease asserts that the State raised these new 
issues:

 
 
            
I.          
In response to Mr. Wease's claim that the evidence was legally 
insufficient to support conviction on Count VII, the State makes the new 
argument that the testimony regarding when the alleged offense occurred was only 
a few months, rather than over one year, from the time period 
charged.

 
 
            
II.         
The State makes the new argument that, because Mr. Wease entered a 
stipulation regarding what evidence could be introduced pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b), he cannot object to any of the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, because the 
stipulation makes any error "invited."

 
 
            
III.        The 
State makes the new argument that because Mr. Wease did not file a request for 
notice of the State's intent to introduce W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, he has waived 
any objection to the State's introduction of other bad acts evidence which may 
have departed from the reasonably anticipated scope of the 
stipulation?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶7]      The first 
Information was filed in this case in 
the district court on July 14, 2005.  It alleged twelve distinct crimes that 
occurred between the years 1994 and 2005.  
The Information was amended many times.  The Information which enumerated the 
crimes considered by the jury at trial was filed of record on February 8, 2006 
(the trial began on February 6, 2006).  
It also alleged twelve distinct crimes that occurred between 1993 and 
2005, and it is those twelve counts that we will describe in more detail later 
in our discussion.  The trial in 
this case took place from February 6, 2006, through February 9, 2006, so it is 
readily evident that the elements of the crimes (especially as to dates) did not 
become solidified until much of the testimony was in.

 
 
[¶8]      The record also 
reflects that the State filed a Notice of Intent to Use Evidence Pursuant to 
W.R.E. 404(b) on October 28, 2005.  
At a hearing held on November 2, 2005, the defense asked for additional 
time to respond to that notice, and the district court indicated that it would 
be taken up at a future date.  The 
matter was again broached at a motion hearing held on January 17, 2006.  Eventually, the parties reached a 
general sort of agreement/stipulation and established a so-called "road map" to 
the 404(b) evidence that the State intended to introduce.  In many ways, that road map mirrored the 
affidavit of the investigating police officers, which summarized the statements 
given by each of the victims.

 
 
[¶9]      The matters that 
became the subject of this criminal prosecution first came to light when Wease 
made salacious overtures to a co-worker in October of 2004.  The co-worker complained of a headache, 
and Wease suggested a cure for that would be for Wease to rub the co-worker's 
genitals.  The co-worker declined 
that offer.  Wease also asked the 
co-worker to pose nude for him, but that offer was also declined.  The co-worker reported this conduct to 
his supervisor (because he felt he was "violated").  The co-worker also told Charles Brown 
about it on May 18, 2005.  The 
co-worker said that Brown became very angry about it.  The co-worker admitted in 
cross-examination that he knew that Brown had a father/son-like relationship 
with two of Wease's potential victims (although they had not yet been identified 
as victims), and that Brown would get angry when he was told about Wease's 
behavior (because Wease also had considerable contact with those children).  On the night of May 18-19, 2005, Wease 
was stabbed and Wease believed it was Brown who did it.  At the conclusion of this testimony, the 
district court gave this limiting instruction with defense counsel's 
acquiescence:

 
 
You are 
instructed that the testimony of the last witness was provided solely to put 
into context the testimony of the next witness to show why the next witness 
reported to the police.  You're not 
to consider the evidence as a showing of character of the Defendant or that he 
acted in conformity with that character trait.

 
 
[¶10]   Charles Brown testified that Wease 
was a neighbor of his in Mountain View and that in May of 2005 he had a discussion about 
Wease with the witness described immediately above.  The behavior of Wease described above 
was not repeated, but Brown related that its content "made me sick to my 
stomach."  Brown went on to describe 
his close relationship with two boys, JS and BG, who were the children of a 
former girlfriend.  Brown reached BG 
by phone and asked him if "anything had happened" between him and Wease.  After a few moments of pausing, BG said, 
"Yes."  Brown then set out to find 
Wease, but another friend talked him into going to the police instead.  Brown happened upon a police officer in 
Lyman and reported what BG had told him.  
Although Brown was still in a fury, he eventually went home and did not 
go out again that night.  On 
cross-examination, Brown admitted he knew that JS and BG had been investigated 
for child sexual abuse incidents perpetrated by them on other 
children.

 
 
[¶11]   Sheriff's Deputy Jensen Odde 
undertook an investigation of BG's allegations of sexual assault against Wease 
on May 19, 2005.  On that same date, 
Odde was called to the scene of an incident where it was reported that Wease had 
fallen on a knife.  Odde was very 
skeptical that that could have occurred, based on his examination of the crime 
scene, and he also observed that Wease had cuts on his wrists that may have 
connoted a suicide attempt.  Odde 
also found an empty pill bottle that augmented the suicide angle, and so he 
looked for a suicide note at the scene.  
Some writing was found on a bathroom wall to 
this effect:  
"I can't take the lies any more, you bastards.  Meet you in 
hell.  
Cass."  
It appeared that Wease had written that note (suicide note?).  A black Sharpie 
marker was found near the note that was written on the wall.  Two empty pill 
bottles that had contained Lexapro were also found in the bathroom (Wease was 
taking Lexapro).  
It appeared that Wease had vomited on the floor in that area of his 
residence (but that material was not examined forensically to tie it to the 
Lexapro).

 
 
[¶12]   Lyman Police Officer Aaron Roberts 
testified about the investigation he conducted at Wease's home on May 19, 
2005.  He 
ascertained that one of Wease's sons had called for an ambulance because he 
thought his father had had a heart attack and had fallen on the knife when he 
had the heart attack.  
Wease stated that he had passed out and fallen on the knife.  Roberts' 
investigation of the scene led him to believe that Wease had attempted 
suicide.

 
 
[¶13]   All of the information set out above was 
viewed by the parties as background information that explained why the subsequent 
investigation into Wease's sexual abuse of children was initiated.  In other words, it 
served to introduce the first part of the larger "story," which was then 
followed by the testimony of victims of Wease's abuse and how he lured them into 
those activities.

 
 

The Victims - [BG]

 
 
[¶14]   BG was the first victim to testify (dob 
June 26, 1990).  
Counts III and IV of the twelve counts involved BG.  We set them out 
below as they appeared in the instructions to the jury:

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19

 
 
The elements of the crime of Sexual Assault in the Third 
Degree, as charged in Count III of this case are: 

 
 
1.  Between January 1, 1999 and June 26, 2001

2.  In Uinta County, 
Wyoming

3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

4.  Inflicted sexual intrusion upon [BG]

5.  The Defendant was at least four years older 
than [BG]; and 

6.  [BG] was under the age of sixteen years.

 
 
During the time frame alleged in the instruction, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 (LexisNexis 2001) provided:

 
 
§ 6-2-304. Sexual assault in the third degree.

 
 
            
(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the third 
degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or 
second degree:

                        
(i)  The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim 
and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of (16) 
years; or

(ii)  The actor is an adult and subjects a victim 
under the age of fourteen (14) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual 
intrusion on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim;

            
(iii)  The actor subjects a victim to sexual contact under any 
of the circumstances of  W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 
6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and 
without causing serious bodily injury to the victim.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
"Sexual intrusion" was defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-301(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2001) as:

 
 
(vii)  "Sexual intrusion" means:

            
(A)  Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part 
of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital or anal 
opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be 
construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; 
or

            
(B)  Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or 
anal intercourse with or without emission.

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 20

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with a Child, as 
charged in Count 
IV of this case are:

 
 
            
1.  Between January 1, 1999 and June 2, 2001

            
2.  In Uinta County, Wyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

            
4.  Knowingly took indecent liberties with [BG], a child.

 
 
At the time the crime was alleged to have been committed, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001) provided:

 
 
§ 14-3-105.  Immoral or Indecent acts; penalty.1

 
 
            
(a)  Except under circumstances constituting sexual assault in 
the first, second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 
any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any 
child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage 
another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a 
felony.

 
 
[¶15]   With respect to Count IV, the jury was 
also instructed:

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21(a)

 
 
            
You are instructed that in Count IV the State offers two alternative theories on 
which it asks you to convict the defendant of Indecent Liberties With a 
Child.  The 
first theory the State propounds is that the defendant provided pornographic 
magazines to [BG] and promoted [BG's] viewing of those photographic images.  The second theory 
the State propounds is that the defendant manually manipulated [BG's] penis 
after making [BG] disrobe in his presence.

            
Because you are being asked to consider these alternative theories 
propounded by the State, it is a requirement of the law that to convict the 
defendant you must agree unanimously on the basis for a conviction.  A conviction cannot 
be returned based on some jurors being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
one theory has been proven, and all the rest of the jurors believing another 
theory has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

            
Therefore, as to your verdict on Count IV, if you decide unanimously that one theory, or 
the other, or all have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should mark 
the line for the appropriate theory on Count IV.  [304]

 
 
[¶16]   In his testimony, BG related that his 
best friend was Wease's son, JW, and that he frequently visited Wease's home to 
play with JW.  
In 2000 or 2001, BG recalled an incident that took place in Wease's 
garage.  Wease 
asked BG to go to the garage with him where he showed BG a magazine with 
pictures of naked men and women.  Wease also rubbed his hand over BG's clothed 
penis.  BG 
resisted and tried to leave, but Wease pulled down his pants and underwear and 
tried to get BG to rub his penis or to suck his penis.  BG still resisted 
and proceeded to leave the garage.  Wease told BG he should not tell or they 
would both get into trouble.

 
 
[¶17]   A week or two after that, BG was 
playing with JW at the Wease home and Wease asked them both to come into his 
bedroom.  Wease 
locked the bedroom door from the inside (with a slide type lock).  He showed them a 
collection of pornographic magazines (naked men, naked men and women together, 
etc.).  The 
boys wanted to look at the magazines, but Wease said there was something they 
had to do first:  
"you have to let me touch you and you have to touch me."  At first Wease 
touched the boys' penises while they were clothed, but eventually it led to 
Wease performing fellatio on BG, while JW did the same thing to Wease.  This activity 
continued for about forty-five minutes, until Wease ejaculated.  BG testified that 
neither he nor JW left (which is what they wanted to do) because Wease impressed 
upon them that they would be in trouble if they left or if they told about what 
happened.  When 
asked by the prosecutor how many times these sorts of things happened, BG 
responded "too many to count," and that it went on from the time he was nine 
or ten years old until he was thirteen or fourteen (2000-2005).  The prosecutor 
continued questioning, and BG related that it happened " about three to five 
times a month, if not more."  The same testimony was repeated yet again 
with additional details.  BG also related an incident that occurred in 
Utah, while they were there camping, wherein 
the same threesome engaged in oral sex.  The incidents were reviewed yet again, and 
some additional ones mentioned by BG during the course of that review.  Also during the 
course of this lengthy testimony, BG related that Wease bribed both him and JW 
with a variety of items including baseball cards, use of a dune buggy, camping 
and hunting trips, etc.  In addition, Wease threatened them with 
getting in "trouble," not being allowed to play together (they were like 
brothers), and he even threatened both himself (i.e., suicide), and them, with a 
gun on several occasions.

 
 
[¶18]   At this point in the testimony, the 
district court called a recess and invited counsel into his chambers.  This discussion 
followed:

 
 
THE COURT:  During the course of this testimony, 
there's been testimony of I don't know how many acts of sexual relations with 
this young man that have been testified to.  I don't know and I'm sure as heck the jury, 
unless its covered, would know which one is charged and which one is 404.  Maybe that will 
come out.  But 
I am going to give a limiting instruction at the conclusion of the direct 
evidence.  Mr. 
Peterson and Mr. Skog, you can go out and discuss this, but I want the 
instruction to first tell that the testimony of this witness involved evidence 
of incidents on such and such, which is the charged offense.  All of the rest is 
being offered to prove  and, again, you can state since this is a stipulated 
matter between the Defense and State as to why it comes in, what the proper 
purpose is; and I'll instruct them that they're not to consider these other acts 
for any other purpose.

Now, I'll let you do that because as I'm going through and 
hearing all of this, I'm greatly concerned, quite frankly, about the prejudicial 
effect that all of these things are going to have.  But I'm going to do 
my best to limit it to that.  That's basically where we're at.  So please get that 
done before the recess is over.

 
 
[¶19]   Counsel apparently discussed this 
matter amongst themselves and then the prosecutor came back into the judge's 
chambers to explain why he could not do what the district court had asked.  The district court 
then enlarged upon his concerns:

 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  Well, first of all, 
I think you've addressed a fundamental problem in this case.  I realize that you 
get these things that involve allegations of multiple bad acts.  The problem here 
goes to the very fundamentals behind Rule 404(b).  And I don't know.  I'm a little 
incredulous as to what you're saying.  I hope you're not saying, "Judge, we don't 
know which one we're charging this Defendant with.  The Jury can pick 
whichever one they want."  Now, that's all I'm trying to do, is get some 
order out of this.  
But whether they ask for one or notI, quite frankly, don't know whether 
it's a tactic of the Defense, if they're not asking for one, to simply create 
plain error.  
And you ought to understand that, also.

This Court has a duty not to act as the Defense attorney, 
to make sure that everyone here gets a fair trial.  So I'm going to try 
to instruct the Jury so that they can weigh the evidence and what it's for as to 
which one is the charged count and which one is being brought in.  But the purpose of 
404(b), when you have other wrongs or bad acts, it can be done for a purpose and 
a proper purpose.  
I'm going to instruct the Jury that they can consider it for that proper 
purpose.  My 
point in doing so is to eliminate, as best I can, the possibility that this 
evidence will be considered for an improper purpose.

So if you want to object about that, Mr. Peterson, consider 
where you're going because the next step is you are on the verge of a 
mistrial.

 
 
[¶20]   This recess continued for some 
considerable more time, and it was determined that the parties would reserve 
further addressing the trial court's concerns until the end of BG's 
testimony.  At 
the end of the recess, the district court returned to the courtroom and 
addressed the jury as follows:

 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  Ladies and 
Gentlemen, this has been an hour long recess and I apologize for that.  During the course 
of the case, there are legal issues that come up that we need to, sometimes, 
resolve as we're going.  I guess we're kind of doing this on the 
fly.  That was 
what had occurred during this last recess.  I know it's difficult.  I tell you that you 
can't talk about the case and I just hope that you either have a lot of fishing 
stories or something else when these breaks occur.  We'll try to keep 
things moving along but you have to understand, this happens sometimes and we're 
doing our best.

 
 
[¶21]   BG resumed the stand as a witness and 
again summarized the many pages of his earlier testimony, essentially repeating 
most all of Wease's bad acts again, and then testifying about several other 
instances of oral sex that occurred at various places throughout LincolnCounty.  BG also related that he engaged in sexual 
touching with one of his friends who was several years younger than BG.  He testified that 
Wease had encouraged him to do that and then to get those friends to come over 
and they all would do it together.  It is this incident that sparked an 
investigation into BG's behavior with his young friend (it was reported by the 
friend's mother).  
BG was contacted by the authorities about it and underwent some 
counseling.  
During that counseling, he did not reveal what he was doing with Wease 
because he was afraid to.

 
 
[¶22]   At the end of the direct examination of 
BG, it was agreed that the parties and the district court would work on a 
limiting instruction that could be given to the jury at the end of the 
cross-examination of BG.  That was done as follows:

 
 
THE COURT:    Ladies and Gentlemen, I've got what's called 
a limiting instruction to give you.  This last witness has testified about several 
instances of alleged misconduct on the part of the Defendant involving this 
witness over a period of years.  The evidence has been allowed to come to you 
by stipulation of the parties for two separate purposes.  The first is to 
prove the specific crimes charged in Counts III and IV of the Information.  These counts 
involve the first incident that the witness testified to that occurred in the 
Defendant's bedroom involving the Defendant, the Witness, [BG], and [JW].  All other alleged 
incidents are offered solely for a second purpose, that is to provide evidence 
of the natural progression of the facts, course of conduct and to show the 
Defendant's conduct with [BG].  Under the rules of evidence, these other 
instances of alleged misconduct may not be received into evidence to prove that 
the Defendant had a certain character trait and that he acted in conformity with 
that character trait.  
You are instructed that you shall not consider any uncharged acts of 
misconduct as proof that the defendant had a particular character trait or that 
he acted in conformity with that character trait.

 
 
The Victims  [JW]

 
 
[¶23]   The second victim to testify was JW 
(dob  August 26, 1989).  BG was JW's best friend during the years that 
the crimes at issue in this case were committed.  Wease was JW's adoptive father and he lived 
with Wease from the time he was three-years-old until October 2003.  JW was the subject 
of Counts I and II of the complaint:2

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 16

            
The elements of the crime of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, as 
charged in Count 
I of this case are:

 
 
1.  Between October 1, 2002 and October 17, 
2003

2.  In Uinta County, 
Wyoming.

3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

4.  Inflicted sexual intrusion upon [JW]

5.  The Defendant was at least four years older 
than [JW]

6.  [JW] was under the age of sixteen years.

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 17

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with a Child, as 
charged in Count 
II of this case are:

 
 
            
1.  Between October 1, 2002 and October 17, 2003

            
2.  In Uinta County, Wyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

            
4.  Knowingly took indecent liberties with [JW], a child.

 
 
[¶24]   JW related that, when he was eight or 
nine years old, Wease called JW into Wease's bedroom and put his hand on JW's 
upper leg several times over the course of a few weeks.  On each occasion, 
JW felt uncomfortable and left.  Not long after that, Wease called JW into the 
bedroom, and he found Wease naked and laying face-down on the bed.  He asked JW to rub 
his back and while JW was doing so, Wease suddenly turned over and grabbed 
JW.  JW left 
the room without further incident.  A day or two later, Wease called JW into the 
bedroom again.  
Wease was naked on this occasion also and was touching his "private 
parts."  This 
happened several times and, at Wease's request, JW stayed longer and longer on 
each occasion and watched Wease masturbate.  This escalated to JW also masturbating while 
Wease did so, and eventually led to JW permitting Wease to perform fellatio on 
him while Wease masturbated.  JW was encouraged to do these things by 
promises of no chores and gifts, etc.

 
 
[¶25]   Defense counsel objected to all of this 
testimony as being W.R.E. 404(b) evidence that was not a part of the stipulation 
to which the parties agreed.  A portion of the objection was done in front 
of the jury, but the matter was then adjourned to chambers.  The district court 
commented in chambers that "I'm not going to try a case like this because at 
least the Defendant needs to know what he's charged with.  I'm sitting here as 
the judge trying to figure out what it is."  The proceedings in chambers went on for some 
time with the district court admonishing counsel for not doing their respective 
jobs within the Wyoming Supreme Court's guidance on handling W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  The 
district court perceived that the stipulation they had agreed to was not up to 
the task and had been put in place as a way of avoiding the difficult work 
required by Gleason 
v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002), 
its predecessors, and the even more recent cases that followed on its 
heels.  The 
district court denied Wease's motion for a mistrial and concluded that day of 
trial with this admonition to the jury:

 
 
THE COURT:  Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm going to 
try to give you a little context for the instruction I'm going to give you.  I've given you 
other limiting instructions.  Evidence of alleged wrongful acts can be 
received for two purposes:  One, to prove the crime charged; and the 
other, it can also be admitted for a limited purpose.  I'll instruct you 
on what the limited purpose is. 

Just so that you know what is going on here, one of the 
reasons why we have breaks is the parties have stipulated on events of other bad 
acts that you may hear about.  There's no stipulation that they are 
true.  That's 
for you to decide.  
This last witness, [JW], has testified about an event where the Defendant 
allegedly encouraged the witness to masturbate.  This is not proper evidence and is 
stricken.  
You're instructed to disregard that evidence and not consider it in your 
deliberations.

Now, I'm hopeful  I've discussed with Counsel some of the 
problems that keep coming up; and, hopefully, we've arrived at a process where 
we may not be having so many of these recesses and delays over these issues.

 
 
[¶26]   On the next day of trial, JW's 
testimony resumed.  
He testified that Wease was arrested and moved out of the house in late 
October of 2003.  
Based on that recollection, JW could recall that in mid-September Wease 
asked JW to come into his bedroom.  Wease asked JW to lock the door and to take 
his clothes off.  
Wease was lying naked on the bed and watching a video that showed men 
having sexual relations.  Wease grasped JW's genitals with his hand for 
a time, but then rolled over into a face-down position and asked JW to lie on 
top of his back.  
JW further related that Wease continued to move up and down until he 
ejaculated.  JW 
also related an event that occurred on August 27 or 28, 2003, wherein he 
performed oral sex on Wease.  While he simultaneously masturbated, Wease 
then performed oral sex on JW until Wease ejaculated.  In further 
questioning, JW testified that there were other times that he did oral sex with 
Wease and that BG was a participant "three or four times a month."  In succeeding 
testimony, the prosecutor asked JW to summarize how each of the many events 
generally went over the period of several years (locked door, clothes off, 
homosexual oriented pornography, oral sex and/or masturbation).  Further, JW 
testified he did not report them because he was afraid for his life and for 
Wease's life.  
Wease threatened to kill himself or to have others kill both JW and BG if 
they told about what was going on.  During cross-examination by the defense, JW 
again acknowledged that the sexual activity with Wease occurred "hundreds" of 
times.

 
 
[¶27]   At the conclusion of JW's testimony, 
the district court gave this limiting instruction:

 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, this last witness has testified about 
several instances of alleged misconduct on the part of this Defendant over a 
period of years.  
The evidence has been allowed to come to you by stipulation of the 
parties for two separate purposes.  The first is to prove the specific crimes 
charged in Counts I and II of the information.  All other alleged incidents are offered 
solely for a second purpose.  That is to provide evidence of the natural 
progression of the facts, course of conduct and to show the Defendant's conduct 
with [JW].  
Under the rules of evidence, these other alleged instances of alleged 
misconduct may not be received into evidence to prove that the Defendant had a 
certain character trait and that he acted in conformity with that character 
trait.  You are 
instructed that you shall not consider any uncharged acts of misconduct as proof 
that the Defendant had a particular character trait or that he acted in 
conformity with that character trait.

 
 
The Victims  [CW]

 
 
[¶28]   CW (dob July 15, 1990) was the subject 
of Counts X and XI of the complaint:

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28

            
The elements of the crime of Third Degree Sexual Assault, as charged in 
Count X of this 
case are:

 
 
1.  Between April 1, 2004 and July 12, 2004

2.  In Uinta County, 
Wyoming.

3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

4.  Was at least 18 years of age; and 

5.  Defendant subjected [CW] to sexual contact, 
and

6.  [CW] was under the age of 14 years.

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 29

 
 
The elements of the crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with 
a Child, as charged in Count XI of this case, are:

1.  Between April 1, 2004 and May 19, 2005

2.  In Uinta County, 
Wyoming

3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

4.  Knowingly took indecent liberties with [CW], 
a child.

 
 
[¶29]   Wease is CW's biologic father.  CW related that 
when he was thirteen years old, Wease stuck his hand down CW's boxer shorts and 
touched his penis for period of twenty minutes.  This same thing happened ten to twenty 
times.  During 
some of these occasions, there was pornography present (men and women doing 
sexual stuff) playing on the TV in the bedroom when the incidents occurred.  CW testified that 
he did not tell anyone about these things because he "didn't want to be in 
trouble."  It 
was agreed that no objectionable W.R.E. 404(b) evidence was admitted during CW's 
testimony, and the jury was not admonished on that subject.

 
 
The Victims  [BJ]

 
 
[¶30]   BJ (dob October 9, 1990) was the 
subject of Count VII of the complaint.  The jury convicted Wease of Count VII, even 
though the prosecutor conceded that the State had failed to prove all the 
elements of the crime as alleged in Count VII and that the jury should find 
Wease not guilty on that Count (did not prove that the crime occurred within the 
dates specified in the jury instruction on Count VII).  The element not 
proven was the range of dates set out as part of the instruction.  Nonetheless, the 
jury did convict, although it asked a question of the district court in an 
effort to clarify that situation.  In response to that jury question, the 
district court informed the jury that arguments of counsel were not 
evidence.  In 
its brief on appeal, the State proposes a theory upon which the conviction on 
Count VII can be affirmed, even in the light of the State's admission at trial 
that it did not prove that element of the crime.  However, that theory is not supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority and, more importantly, the evidence in 
the record, taken as a whole, is not sufficient to sustain that conviction.  Therefore, we will 
reverse the conviction on Count VII and direct that the Count be dismissed upon 
remand.

 
 
[¶31]   At the conclusion of BJ's testimony, 
the district court once again admonished the jury about the proper use of the 
W.R.E. 404(b) evidence that had been included in BJ's testimony.

 
 
The Victims  (GR)

 
 
[¶32]   No birth date is given in the record 
for GR, but on February 9, 2006, she was 22 years of age.  GR is not a 
biologic child of Wease, but Wease was married to GR's mother for a time.  GR was the subject 
of Counts VIII and IX:

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 25

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree, as 
charged in Count 
VIII of this case are:

            
1.  Between January 1, 1993 and October 1, 1995

            
2.  In Uinta County, Wyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

            
4.  Inflicted sexual Intrusion on [GR], and

            
5.  At the time of that sexual intrusion, [GR] was less than 
twelve years of age, and

            
6.  The Defendant was at least four years older than [GR].3

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 26

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with a Child, as 
charged in Count 
IX of this case are:

            
1.  Between January 1, 1993 and October 1, 1995

            
2.  In UintaCountyWyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

            
4.  Knowingly took indecent liberties with [GR], a child.

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 27

 
 
            
You are instructed that in Count IX the State offers two alternative theories on 
which it asks you to convict the defendant of Indecent Liberties With a 
Child.  The 
first theory the State propounds is that the defendant manipulated [GR's] 
breasts.  The 
second theory the State propounds is that the defendant placed [GR's] hand over 
Allen Deon Wease's penis and then had [GR] manually masturbate him.

            
Because you are being asked to consider these alternative theories 
propounded by the State, it is a requirement of the law that to convict the 
defendant you must agree unanimously on the basis for a conviction.  A conviction cannot 
be returned based on some jurors being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
one theory has been proven, and all the rest of the jurors believing another 
theory has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
[¶33]   In her testimony, GR related that just 
before Christmas in 1993, Wease asked her to come into his bedroom and lie down 
on the bed with him because he was lonely.  GR was clad in a longish nightgown and had 
panties on underneath.  She laid there for 30-45 minutes and then got 
up because she had to go to school.  This same scenario played out several times a 
week for over a month.  In the months following these episodes, Wease 
began asking GR to lie on top of him.  At first he would be under the covers, but 
eventually he would be on top of the covers, clad only in a tiger striped 
Speedo.  This 
escalated to GR sitting on top of Wease, straddling him, and he rubbing her 
breasts, legs, thighs and vaginal area over her nightgown (not touching her 
skin).  On 
subsequent occasions, Wease began touching those same areas underneath her 
clothing.  
These incidents happened many times and escalated further to Wease 
removing GR's clothing altogether and him kissing her on her neck, breasts, 
stomach and vaginal area.  Eventually Wease began sticking a finger into 
GR's vagina and he did this several times a week for several months.  Finally, Wease 
began placing GR's hand on his penis and he would guide her hand with his in an 
up and down motion.  
This continued over a period of  many months and perhaps years, until she 
moved away from Wease's home to live with her father.  The subject of 
child molestation came up in a discussion with her siblings, and GR said it was 
no "laughing matter" and that it had happened to her.  The siblings told 
GR's step-mother and the step-mother took GR to see her uncle who is an 
attorney.  
These events occurred when she was eleven years old.  GR never went back 
to live with Wease again.  At the conclusion of GR's testimony, the 
district court gave another limiting instruction similar to those given earlier 
in the proceedings.

 
 
The Victims -- [JS]

 
 
[¶34]   JS (dob August 4, 1983) was the subject 
of Counts V and VI of the complaint:

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 22

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, as 
charged in Count 
V of this case are:

 
 
1.  Between April 1, 1994 and October 1, 1996

2.  In Uinta County, 
Wyoming.

3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

4.  Inflicted sexual intrusion upon [JS] 

5.  The Defendant was at least four years older 
than [JS]; and

6.  [JS] was under the age of sixteen years.

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 23

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with a Child, as 
charged in Count 
VI of this case are:

            
1.  Between April 1, 1994 and October 1, 1996

            
2.  In UintaCountyWyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

            
4.  Knowingly took indecent liberties with [JS], a child.

 
 
[¶35]   JS testified that his brother is BG 
discussed above (¶¶ 14-22, supra).  He is seven years older than BG.  He would visit the 
Wease household three to five times a week during his childhood.  In response to the 
question how often did Wease make you feel uncomfortable, JS responded, "It was 
a lot"  up to 20 times a month.  The first time such an incident occurred was 
when he was 12, in about 1995.  While on a camping trip with Wease, JS slept 
on the floor between the beds that were used by Wease and his wife.  During the night, 
Wease reached down and grabbed JS's penis.  A couple of days later when JS was at Wease's 
house, Wease was cleaning out that same camper.  He asked JS to come into the camper.  Wease asked if he 
had told anyone what had happened in the camper a couple days before, and JS 
responded, "No."  
Wease then pulled down JS's pants and performed fellatio on him for about 
five minutes.  
When JS left the camper, Wease reminded him not tell anybody.  A few days after 
that incident, Wease called JS into his bedroom and once he was in there, Wease 
took JS's pants off and performed fellatio on him for about five minutes.  This happened many 
times after that in the bedroom ("99% of all things" thereafter occurred in that 
bedroom).  
Eventually, this escalated to both JS and Wease getting naked on the bed 
and performing fellatio on each other.  They also looked at pornographic magazines 
and movies that Wease kept in a brief case.  JS also testified about sexual acts he 
engaged in with a somewhat younger friend that eventually was reported to the 
authorities.  
That testimony indicated that Wease encouraged him to "try to bring 
somebody down to the house  or should try to get them to do different things at 
their house."  
At the conclusion of JS's testimony, another limiting instruction was 
given to the jury.

 
 
The Victims  [Jm.W]

 
 
[¶36]   Jm.W (dob November 28, 1984) was the 
last victim to testify.  He was the biologic child of Wease.  He was the subject 
of Count XII:

 
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No. 30

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with a Child, as 
charged in Count 
XII of this case are:

            
1.  Between August 1, 2000 and November 28, 2002

            
2.  In UintaCountyWyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, Allan Deon Wease

            
4.  Knowingly took indecent liberties with [Jm.W], a child.

 
 
[¶37]   Jm.W testified that when he was sixteen 
or seventeen years old, he was at a restaurant owned by Wease and his family 
making cotton candy for the Fourth of July parade.  Wease brought out a 
black briefcase that contained, inter alia, homosexual pornography.  During this 
testimony, another act of sexual misconduct was called to the attention of the 
jury that was not admissible evidence.  The district court directed that the material 
be stricken and that the jury disregard it.  A couple of months after the Fourth of July 
incident, Wease asked Jm.W to come into his bedroom and rub his shoulder and 
when Jm.W began to do so, Wease reached out and touched his penis.

 
 
[¶38]   The final specific incident described 
by Jm.W occurred when he was seventeen.  He had just finished his shower and was 
dressed only with a towel around his waist.  Wease reached up under the towel and fondled 
Jm.W's penis for a duration of approximately five minutes.  Jm.W called his 
friend JD for help, and Jm.W stated that Wease tried to get JD also to do sexual 
things with him.  
Jm.W testified that Wease tried to bribe him to get his friends to come 
over and hang out so that Wease could try to engage in sexual activities with 
them.  Jm.W 
also narrated the events that led up to Wease leaving the family home.  After a fight Wease 
had with his wife, he went into the bedroom.  There were a lot of banging noises and then 
Wease broke through the bedroom door with a baseball bat, brandishing a 
shotgun.  He 
held the shotgun to his wife's head.  Jm.W struggled with Wease and someone called 
911 and, eventually, the police came and arrested Wease.  The final phase of 
Jm.W's testimony brought the story back to Jm.W being concerned about Wease 
having talked about suicide and that he went to check on him and found him on 
the bedroom floor stabbed in the chest.  This more or less brought the story full 
circle  and how Wease's advances to a co-worker set in motion the discovery of 
his multitude of sex crimes.

 
 
[¶39]   After Wease was beginning to recover 
from his wounds, etc., Wease called Jm.W and told him that he was in trouble for 
molesting children and asked him to dispose of the briefcase that Jm.W had once 
seen at the caf©, as well as some other totes he had not previously been aware 
of.  Wease 
called back a second time to check to make sure Jm.W had disposed of the 
pornography, and Jm.W told him he had but, in fact, he did not dispose of that 
material.  At 
the conclusion of Jm.W's testimony, the district court gave this limiting 
instruction:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Ladies and Gentlemen, I have a limiting 
instruction.  
The last witness testified about several instances of alleged misconduct 
on the part of the Defendant involving this witness.  I'm going to change 
what I'd told you before so that it can be kind of clarified.  The testimony 
involving this witness  or at least the charge surrounds an event that occurred 
in the home  or allegedly occurred in the home of the Defendant where there was 
sexual contact, attempting to touch the witness' penis and then manually 
manipulating the penis.  There was other evidence involving the 
pornography and so forth that was offered for a limited purpose, to get rid of 
the briefcase, and that did not come in for a limited purpose.  So this first 
category that I talked about, the touching, was to prove the specific crimes 
charged in Count XII of the Information.  All of the other alleged incidents are 
offered solely for a second purpose and that is to provide evidence of a natural 
progression of the course of conduct and to show the Defendant's conduct with 
this witness.  
Under the Rules of Evidence, these other instances of alleged misconduct 
may not be received into evidence to prove the Defendant had a certain character 
trait and that he acted in conformity with that character trait.  You're instructed 
that you shall not consider any uncharged acts of misconduct as proof that the 
Defendant had a particular character trait or he acted in conformity with that 
trait.

 
 
[¶40]   The State's final witness was Kirby 
Lamb, a patrol sergeant with the Uinta County Sheriff.  Sergeant Lamb 
obtained two search warrants to search locations that were inhabited by 
Wease.  At one 
location they found "a pistol pump penis pump."  He also seized a tote filed with 34 VHS 
tapes.  Some of 
the tapes were removed from the container in which they were stored and their 
titles read to the jury:  Kinky Bi-Sex; Hot Buddies; It's No Accident; and Gay for the 
Weekend.  
The Sergeant indicated that he had watched brief portions of the tapes to 
see if they comported with their labeling ("turned them on, saw that it  you 
know, it appeared to be porn, turned it off.  So the parts I saw, yes, did conform to 
that.").  A 
briefcase containing pornographic magazines was introduced into evidence, as was 
the Weases' decree of divorce, and the paperwork relating to Wease's conviction 
for reckless endangerment.  Finally, the shotgun used in the reckless 
endangerment incident was introduced into evidence.

 
 
[¶41]   In the instructions to the jury, the 
trial court included this:

 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8

 
 
            
The Court has admitted the testimony of the alleged victims and one 
additional witness that the Defendant committed uncharged improper acts upon 
them for the limited purpose of establishing the natural progression of the 
events, the course of conduct and to show the Defendant's conduct with the 
alleged victim.  
The Court had admitted Exhibits 16 and 17 [reckless endangerment 
conviction] for the limited purpose of corroborating another witness' testimony 
of an event that occurred in the Defendant's home.

            
You are not to consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited 
purpose for which it was admitted.

 
 
[¶42]   The State's closing argument consisted 
of a terse review of the evidence that supported each of the twelve counts, with 
the exception of Count VII, as noted above, wherein the State conceded that it 
had failed to prove its case.  Not  a single mention was made of any of the 
W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Illegal Sentence

 
 
[¶43]   Wease contends that Count V (sexual 
assault in the third degree), of which he was convicted, was alleged to have 
occurred between April 1, 1994, and October 1, 1996.  At the time he 
committed the crime at issue, the sentence for third degree sexual assault was 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 (Michie 1977).  In 1997, the 
maximum penalty was increased to fifteen years.  (1997 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 135 § 1).  Wease was sentenced to not less than ten nor 
more than fifteen years on that Count.  A sentence in excess of that authorized by the 
legislature is illegal and is a matter that we review de novo.  Spencer v. State, 
2005 WY 105, ¶ 11, 118 P.3d 978, 982 (Wyo. 
2005); also see Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 135-36 
(Wyo. 1989).  The State agrees that the sentence imposed is 
illegal because it exceeds that authorized by the legislature, that the sentence 
imposed on Count V must be vacated, and that this matter must be remanded to the 
district court for a new sentencing proceeding on that matter.  We will so 
direct.

 
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence Count VII

 
 
[¶44]   This issue arises because Count VII 
included as one of its elements that Wease performed fellatio on BJ sometime 
between August 1, 2004, and September 30, 2004.  The State concedes that the closest BJ came 
to giving testimony that fit within that element of the crime, was that it 
occurred in April or May of 2004 (although his direct testimony was that it 
occurred in April or May of 2003).  However, the State's argument continues, if 
BJ's testimony is read very carefully and with the assumption that he merely 
misspoke about which year he completed the seventh grade, then his testimony is 
only a few months off.  For this proposition, the State relies on 
this holding we made in a similar case:

 
 
One of the central problems encountered in this case was 
the inability of either DC or WC to recall with much specificity dates, or even 
general time frames, for the occurrences of the various sexual encounters with 
Alicea.  The 
prosecutor seemed to have difficulty in phrasing her questions; to the extent 
the questions were satisfactory, the trial court frequently interjected himself, 
and the children seem to have been frightened and ill at ease testifying in the 
courtroom.  
Instruction Nos. 2-6 listed the elements of each of the six counts 
charged.  
Included among those elements were dates.  Most of the "time" elements of those 
instructions were stated as being between a period of months, e.g. "between the 
time period of October 1990, through May 1991," "February 1992 through March 
1992," and "during the summer of 1993."  That portion of those instructions was 
modified by Instruction No. 10:

 
 
      Even though you have 
been instructed that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime 
was committed within a specified time frame, the failure to establish with 
precision that the crime occurred within that time frame is not fatal, 
especially in the case of alleged abuse to children.  A witness's [sic] 
inability to recall specific time frames may be taken into account in weighing 
the credibility of any witness, along with those factors mentioned in the last 
paragraph of instruction No. 1.

      

            
We have held that where the specific date is not a required element of 
the crime, then alleging a general time period, in lieu of a specific date, is 
sufficient to give a defendant notice and allow him to adequately prepare a 
defense.  Vernier v. State, 
909 P.2d 1344, 1350-52 
(Wyo.1996);  
Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70, 75 
(Wyo.1995).  
Indeed, we have even held that it is sufficient for a finding of guilt 
that the prosecution establish the transaction rather than the exact dates in 
question.  Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 437-38 
(Wyo.1991).  
However, we are unable to stretch the spirit, as well as the letter, of 
those cases to fit the use of Instruction No. 10 as it was employed in this 
case.  The 
instruction makes it impossible to differentiate between Count I and Count II, 
between Count III and Count IV, or between Count V and Count VI, because the 
elements of each of those pairs became exactly the same as a result of the 
challenged instruction.  It is as likely as not that the jury may have 
found Alicea guilty twice for the exact same act.  Therefore, we disapprove of the instruction 
and find that its use in this case necessitates that we reverse the Judgment and 
Sentence to the extent Alicea was found guilty of Count II, Count IV, and Count 
VI.

 
 

Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 699-700 (Wyo. 2000)

 
 
[¶45]   In this case, an instruction like that 
described in Alicea was not given to this jury, nor was the jury 
given additional directions along the lines of those contained in Alicea's 
Instruction 10.

 
 
[¶46]   In addressing a claim of insufficiency 
of the evidence, we must determine whether or not any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  When 
considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence 
with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard 
the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We 
will not re-weigh the evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the 
witnesses.  Williams v. State, 
2006 WY 131, ¶ 45, 143 P.3d 924, 935 (Wyo. 
2006); Perritt v. 
State, 2005 WY 121, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 181, 186 
(Wyo.2005) (and cases cited therein).

 
 
[¶47]   After careful consideration of this 
issue, we conclude that in light of the instructions given to the jury, there 
was not sufficient evidence to sustain Wease's conviction on Count VII.  Therefore, that 
conviction is vacated and on remand, the district court shall dismiss Count 
VII.

 
 
Overwhelming and Prejudicial W.R.E. 404(b) Evidence

 
 
[¶48]   We embark on our discussion of this 
subject taking note that hundreds of incidents of other misconduct, bad acts, 
crimes, and other examples of reprehensible behavior were called to the 
attention of the jury during the course of the witnesses' testimony.  It is safe to say 
that every witness who appeared recited one or more prior bad act.

 
 
[¶49]   W.R.E. 404(b) provides:

 
 
(b)  Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. -- Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
[¶50]   The basis for the prosecution's 
introduction of this evidence was articulated, albeit somewhat differently from 
time to time, in the limiting instructions given to the jury by the district 
court.  The 
prosecutor's goal was to tell, as briefly as possible, the story of Wease's 
interaction with each of the victims, for the limited purposes, inter alia: (1) of 
establishing the natural progression of the events; (2) the course of conduct; 
and (3) to show Wease's patterns of conduct with the alleged victims.  With respect to 
each individual victim, it was then the prosecutor's strategy to focus the 
jury's attention on one or two particular occurrences that constituted the 
crimes charged in the various counts.  The defense did not file a pretrial demand 
for notice of the State's intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but the State 
filed a notice of its intent to do so.  This notice was a fairly detailed statement 
of what sorts of evidence the State intended to produce and the witnesses they 
expected to use in that regard.  As a consequence, Wease made no pretrial 
demand concerning such evidence, and under these circumstances, none would have 
been required.  
No formal hearing was held, as is contemplated by our governing case law, 
but the matter was a subject of frequent and lengthy discussions as the trial 
progressed.  In 
place of the hearing we have mandated in our case law, the parties appeared to 
have agreed/stipulated to what W.R.E. 404(b) evidence was fair game, and what 
was not, under the circumstances of this case.

 
 
[¶51]   As the trial progressed, it became 
clear that this agreement/stipulation was not very well defined and the district 
court was called upon, on several occasions, to provide the structure and 
discipline that our construction of Rule 404(b) demands.  Thus, we continue 
our discussion by setting out once again our prevailing jurisprudence with 
respect to the admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  We turn to our 
decision in Gleason, ¶¶ 16-20, 57 P.3d  at 339-41, for that 
purpose:

 
 
The structure of W.R.E. 404 is significant in the analysis 
of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.  First, subsection 
(a) forbids use of evidence of a person's character to prove that he acted in 
conformity with that character at a particular time.  For instance, in a 
prosecution for battery, the prosecutor cannot introduce evidence that the 
defendant has a violent temper for the purpose of proving that, given his 
violent temper, the defendant must have committed the battery.  W.R.E. 404(a) goes 
on to provide, however, that there are circumstances in which evidence of a 
person's character may be admitted to prove that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion.  In the specific situations enumerated, 
character evidence is admissible in direct contravention of the general 
principle that character evidence is not admissible to prove conduct.

 
 
The pattern of W.R.E. 404(b) is not the same.  The general 
principle that character evidence may not be admitted to prove conduct remains 
intact in the first sentence.  But "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts," which logically may or may not be character evidence, is admissible to 
prove things other than character.  Consequently, the exceptions to the rule 
found in subsection (a) are not of the same nature as those found in subsection 
(b).  The 
former allow evidence of character to prove conduct;  the latter allow 
evidence of specific instances of conduct to prove "consequential facts" such as 
intent or knowledge.  
Virgilio v. 
State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 
(Wyo.1992); Grabill 
v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 808 (Wyo.1980).  Under neither subsection is evidence 
admissible if the thrust of the evidence is only to demonstrate that the 
defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.  Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 733 
(Wyo.1996) (quoting Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 606 
(Wyo.1993), abrogated and modified on other grounds by Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 
(Wyo.1996)).

 
 
Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is not limited to the 
purposes set forth in the rule, and we have adopted a liberal approach toward 
admitting uncharged misconduct evidence.  Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596 
(Wyo.1993);  Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 245 
(Wyo.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985), abrogated on other grounds by Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 356-57.  The listed 
exceptions are illustrative rather than exclusive. Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974 
(Wyo.1989).  
Nevertheless, because uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent 
danger for prejudice, we have also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its 
admissibility:  
(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose;  (2) the evidence 
must be relevant;  
(3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice;  and (4) upon request, the trial court must 
instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for 
the proper purpose for which it was admitted.  Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 357 (quoting United States v. 
Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir.1992)).  We do not apply 
this test on appeal;  
rather, it is intended to be conducted by the trial court.  Beintema v. State, 
936 P.2d 1221, 1224 
(Wyo.1997).  
Our role is to determine whether admission of the evidence was 
error.  
Id.; Spencer v. State, 925 P.2d 994, 997 
(Wyo.1996).  
Generally, the standard for review of rulings under W.R.E. 404(b) is 
abuse of discretion.  
Johnson v. 
State, 936 P.2d 458, 462 
(Wyo.1997) (quoting Sturgis v. State, 932 P.2d 199, 201 
(Wyo.1997)).  
However, where no trial objection occurred, the plain error standard 
applies.  Beintema, 936 P.2d 
at 1224;  Spencer, 925 P.2d  
at 997.  To 
prove plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that the record clearly shows 
an error that has transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law and has 
adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.  Weidt v. State, 2002 WY 74, ¶ 8, 46 P.3d 846, 851 
(Wyo.2002).

 
 
The trial court's determination that evidence of similar 
sexual misconduct is admissible in a child sexual abuse case to prove such 
purposes as motive and intent, where a defendant denies any wrongdoing, is 
certainly not unprecedented.  See, for example, Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1214 
(Wyo.2000) (in trial for indecent liberties with a minor, testimony of victim's 
sister as to similar misconduct by defendant with her admissible to prove 
motive);  Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 738 
(Wyo.1997) (in child sexual abuse case, evidence of similar previous misconduct 
with different victim admissible to prove modus operandi, preparation, plan, 
intent, and credibility of victim);  Daniel, 923 P.2d  at 734-35 (in prosecution for indecent 
liberties, testimony of six other children about sexual activities with 
defendant admissible to prove course of conduct);  Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70, 75-76 
(Wyo.1995) (victim's testimony of prior sexual acts by defendant step-father 
admissible in indecent liberties case as proof of motive, course of conduct, and 
credibility of victim);  Johnson v. State, 872 P.2d 93, 95-98 
(Wyo.1994) (in indecent liberties case, testimony of social worker that 
defendant had admitted previous sexual molestation of a ten-year-old girl 
admissible to prove motive, intent, and identity);  Mitchell, 865 P.2d  
at 598-99 (in trial for second-degree sexual assault of a ten-year-old girl, 
defendant's admission of sexual arousal during prior sexual activity with a 
three-year-old niece, for which the defendant was convicted, admissible to prove 
motive);  Gezzi, 780 P.2d  at 
977-78 (in prosecution for indecent liberties with daughter, testimony of older 
daughter as to similar misconduct with her admissible to prove defendant's 
motive and victim's credibility);  Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1113 
(Wyo.1987) (in prosecution for incest, testimony by victim and her half-sister 
implicating defendant in prior sexual abuse admissible because aberrant sexual 
behavior is probative of motive);  and Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 
(Wyo.1979) (in trial for second-degree sexual assault, testimony of victim's 
older sister as to similar misconduct by defendant with her admissible to prove 
motive based on pedophilia).  The evidence of uncharged misconduct alleged 
in the instant case is similar to that admitted in these many cases.

 
 
With one exception, the uncharged misconduct evidence 
admitted in this case was subjected to an appropriate Vigil 
analysis.  
M.F.'s testimony, for instance, was substantially as it had been outlined 
in the State's notice of uncharged misconduct evidence and as it had been 
described during the first motion hearing.  The trial court and counsel discussed and 
debated the testimony in the context of W.R.E. 404(b) and the Vigil test, and 
during the final hearing, the trial court made the necessary Vigil 
findings.  
Gleason has not shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
admitting M.F.'s testimony.  To the contrary, the record reflects the 
trial court's careful pretrial attention to this issue.  The trial court's 
analysis included the consideration of prejudice required by W.R.E. 403 and 
Vigil.   
The trial court articulated a consistent and legitimate basis for its 
rulings, in which case we do not reverse.  Johnson, 936 P.2d  at 462 (quoting Sturgis, 932 P.2d 
at 201).  And 
finally, the trial court gave an appropriate instruction, limiting the jury's 
consideration of the uncharged misconduct evidence to the proper purposes for 
which it had been offered.

 
 
[¶52]   As can be readily discerned from our 
description of the testimony of the victims as set out more fully above, the 
W.R.E. 404(b) testimony was admitted for a proper purpose, and most importantly, 
largely was merely a recitation that told the story of the interactions between 
Wease and his victims  the history of their relationships, warts and all.  Much as we did in 
Gleason, we 
conclude that the uncharged misconduct evidence was admitted for one or more 
purposes proper under Rule 404(b).  And see Lemus v. State, 2007 WY 111, 
¶¶ 45-46, 162 P.3d 497, 509 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
[¶53]   Here, the district court did not 
formally perform the pretrial analysis made mandatory by Vigil to test its 
admissibility.4  Rather, he left the parties to their own 
devices in that regard, which they appear to have performed adequately, although 
just barely so.  
The trial court did balance the probative value of the evidence against 
its potential for unfair prejudice.  Although these are less than ideal 
circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence.

 
 
[¶54]   We conclude this section of the opinion 
with an iteration of what we viewed as a preferred (although not necessarily 
exclusive) method for fully testing the admissibility of such evidence in this 
very difficult genre of criminal activity:

 
 
Despite the resolution of this issue, we feel compelled to 
address in more detail the difficulties encountered in the appellate review of 
the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  The primary step in 
propounding uncharged misconduct evidence is identification of a proper purpose 
for its admission.  
In that regard, we have previously held that the State need not pinpoint 
but one purpose for admission of such evidence.  Sturgis, 932 P.2d  at 203.  Nevertheless, it is 
incumbent upon the proponent to identify such purpose or purposes with 
specificity because, without such specificity, the balance of the Vigil test cannot 
be applied.  
For evidence to be relevant, we must know the fact question to which it 
is relevant.  
For evidence to be probative, we must know what it is meant to prove.

 
 
For proper appellate review of the admissibility of 
evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the record must reflect that the trial court 
required the State not only to identify the proper purpose for which uncharged 
misconduct evidence is being offered, but also to explain how or why it is 
probative, and why it is more probative than prejudicial.  In that regard, we 
have twice set out in a footnote the process that should be followed by the 
trial court in making that analysis.  To make sure there is no doubt in the future 
that this is a required process, we will repeat it now, in the body of this 
opinion:

 
 
In determining the probative value of prior bad acts 
evidence, the trial court should consider the following factors:

1.  How clear is it that the defendant committed 
the prior bad act?  

2.  Does the defendant dispute the issue on which 
the state is offering the prior bad acts evidence?  

3.  Is other evidence available?  

4.  Is the evidence unnecessarily 
cumulative?  

5.  How much time has elapsed between the charged 
crime and the prior bad act?  

 
 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to 
decide the case on an improper basis.  In balancing against its probative value the 
unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court should consider the 
extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the central question 
whether the defendant committed the charged crime.  The trial court 
should weigh these additional factors against the probative value of the 
evidence:

 
 
1.  The reprehensible nature of the prior bad 
act.  The more 
reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the 
defendant for the prior act.  

2.  The sympathetic character of the alleged 
victim of the prior bad act.  Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the 
defendant for the prior act if the victim was especially vulnerable.  

3.  The similarity between the charged crime and 
the prior bad act.  
The more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood that the jury 
will draw the improper inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably 
did it again.

4.  The comparative enormity of the charged crime 
and the prior bad act.  When the prior act is a more serious offense 
than the charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place the 
defendant in a different and unfavorable light.  

5.  The comparable relevance of the prior bad act 
to the proper and forbidden inferences.  Evidence of the prior bad act may be much 
more probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted 
by Rule 404(b).  

6.  Whether the prior act resulted in a 
conviction.  
The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he 
escaped punishment for the prior bad act.  

 
 

Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 737 n.1 (citing Dean, 865 P.2d  at 609-10 n. 2).  

 
 
In Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 737-38, we held that, so long as 
the record revealed that the trial court had subjected proposed uncharged 
misconduct evidence to the appropriate test of its probative value and 
prejudicial effect, the trial court need not make express findings on the record 
on each of these factors.  Since that opinion was published, however, we 
have repeatedly been called upon to assess a trial court's exercise of 
discretion on such rulings, and we now remind the trial courts that, while 
express findings on each factor are not necessary, abuse of discretion, or the 
lack thereof, cannot be determined by reviewing a record that contains no 
information as to how that discretion was exercised.

 
 
We have a well-established standard for analyzing claims 
for abuse of discretion:

 
 
We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as 
reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Griswold v. State, 
2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id. "In the absence of an abuse 
of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination."  Id. The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such abuse.  Trujillo [v. State], 2 P.3d 
[567] at 571 [(Wyo.2000)].  

 
 

 Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 
(Wyo.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477 
(2002).  In 
applying that standard, we cannot determine whether conclusions were drawn from 
objective criteria if we do not know what criteria were applied.  We cannot determine 
whether sound judgment was exercised under the circumstances if we do not know 
what circumstances were considered.  We cannot determine whether the trial court 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously if we do not know what the trial court did in 
reaching its decision.

 
 
In future cases involving the admissibility of evidence 
under W.R.E. 404(b), the record shall reflect the trial court's identification 
of the purpose or purposes for admission of the evidence, the findings and 
conclusions establishing relevance and probative value, and the factors 
considered in balancing probative value against the potential for unfair 
prejudice.  The 
"shotgun approach" of listing every conceivable purpose for admissibility, 
followed by a bald statement that probative value outweighs prejudicial effect 
will no longer be sufficient.  While the trial court need not make an 
express finding on every factor from Dean and Rigler, the record must contain 
sufficient findings to support the trial court's conclusions.  The burden, of 
course, will be upon the proponent of the evidence to supply the foundation for 
its admission.

 
 
The question of what must be shown to prove relevancy is 
not now directly before this Court.  Nevertheless, because we intend by this 
opinion to "tighten up" the procedures for the admission of uncharged misconduct 
evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), we will address the point.  Often, for example, 
the prosecutor simply states that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is 
relevant to prove motive or intent, and the trial court simply agrees, with 
nothing in the record substantiating either the prosecutor's declaration or the 
trial court's conclusion.  In Brown, 736 P.2d  at 1111-14, and  Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1047-48, we approved of this approach, largely on the ground of 
precedent in other states:

 
 
We note that in cases involving sexual assaults, such as 
incest, and statutory rape with family members as the victims, the courts in 
recent years have almost uniformly admitted such testimony.

  

Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1048.  We made the further statement in Elliott that "[o]ne 
who is a paraphiliac, whose preference or addiction for unusual sexual practices 
occurs in the form of pedophilia, could well be recognized as having a motive to 
commit the acts complained of by the victim."  Id. at 1049.   Similarly, in 
Brown, 736 P.2d  
at 1113, we opined that "[i]f the accused had a predilection to deviant sexual 
practices with young female relatives, it would not be unreasonable for the 
trier of fact to determine that he had a motive to commit the acts complained of 
by the victim in this case."

 
 
The question is whether the inference of such a motive is 
something that can be drawn by the jury, without some level of evidence that 
would suggest the inference is appropriate.  An illustrative case may be helpful.  In Arizona, the courts have recognized a special 
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility whereby prior acts involving 
"sexual aberration" are admissible to prove the defendant's propensity to commit 
a similar crime.  
State v. 
Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 910 P.2d 635, 642, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 854, 117 S. Ct. 150, 136 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1996).  The admission of such evidence, however, 
requires sufficient foundation:

 
 
The admissibility of the prior act depends initially upon 
its relevancy, which involves complicated questions of sexual deviancy in a 
sophisticated area of medical and scientific knowledge.  [We are] not 
prepared to resolve such questions in the absence of such expert knowledge.  

 
 

State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061, 
1065 (1977).  
In other words, it is not appropriate to draw an inference without 
adequate basis.  
It would seem that this would apply to any inference, not just the 
inference of propensity.

 
 
Not all inferences, needless to say, will require proof by 
expert testimony.  
The inference of identity that may follow from evidence of a signature 
crime, for instance, is something that can be drawn without expert help.  The point remains, 
however, that, for purposes of appellate review, the record should contain such 
information as was relied upon by the trial court in determining to allow the 
jury to draw an inference from the evidence admitted under W.R.E. 404(b)

 
 

Gleason, ¶¶ 26-33, 57 P.3d  at 342-44.

 
 
[¶55]   We have described the general pattern 
of our customary usage with respect to child molestation cases about as 
definitively as we are able to do, given the complexities of the application of 
W.R.E. 404(b) and the infinite variations that continue to appear on a case by 
case basis.  Mitchell v. State, 
865 P.2d 591, 595-600 
(Wyo. 1993).  We have continued to follow that pattern 
during the years since Mitchell's publication, although that adherence might 
not always have been absolutely consistent in every case.  However, we apply 
that pattern in the instant case.  Although we have not adopted F.R.E. 414, our 
jurisprudence is not inconsistent with the approach the federal courts have 
taken in this same area.  Certainly, reference to the rule and its 
accompanying interpretative case law can serve as a helpful guide in such 
cases.

 
 
Federal Rule 414

 
 
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases

(a)  In a criminal case in which the defendant is 
accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's 
commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, 
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.

(b)  In a case in which the Government intends to 
offer evidence under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall disclose 
the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of 
the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen 
days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may 
allow for good cause.

(c)  This rule shall not be construed to limit 
the admission or consideration of evidence under any other rule.

 
 
See generally, 2 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence, §§ 4:84 through 4:86, at 335- 385 (3rd ed. 2007); 23 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. 
Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Evidence §§ 5411A, 5412A, 5414A, 5415A, 5416A, 5417A 
(Supp. 2007).

 
 
[¶56]   In many respects, in this case the 
proverbial train was off the track from the very outset, in terms of compliance 
with both the antecedents of Vigil and Gleason, as well as the cases that have followed after 
them.  To its 
credit, the district court repeatedly endeavored to get the train righted as the 
trial progressed.  
A saving grace here is that the vast majority of the 404(b) evidence was 
so interwoven with the "grooming" process that Wease used to entice his victims 
into the specific illegal acts that were the subject of the eleven convictions 
that we intend to affirm, that it is difficult to even categorize much of the 
testimony as 404(b) evidence.  Although the process used in this case was 
far from perfect and did not conform with our guiding precedents, we are able to 
comfortably conclude that the error, if any, was harmless.  W.R.A.P.  9.04 ("Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded by the reviewing court.").  We also take some comfort in the circumstance 
that the evidence against Wease was overwhelming.  His only apparent defense was that the 
victims were lying to cover up their own immoral conduct, a defense that was not 
supported by a single shred of evidence.

 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶57]   Wease contends that his defense counsel 
was ineffective in presenting a meaningful defense for Wease.  Wease argues, 
"Defense counsel agreed to the admission of hundreds of acts of uncharged 
misconduct, and then  until prodded to do so by the trial court  made no 
effort to ensure (1) that either he or the jury could distinguish the charged 
from the uncharged conduct, and (2) that the jury would use the uncharged 
conduct only for the limited purpose for which the parties had stipulated it was 
admissible.  In 
other words, it is apparent that defense counsel had devised no strategy for 
dealing with the extensive uncharged misconduct evidence which he knew was going 
to come in at trial."  
Wease contends that defense counsel was deficient because he entered into 
an ill-defined, open-ended stipulation that gave the State carte blanche to 
introduce evidence of prior bad acts.  Wease contends that his attorney failed to 
ask for limiting instructions at times they were needed.  He also asserts 
that defense counsel failed to address the lack of more specific notice when the 
State did file a notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  Finally, Wease 
contends that defense counsel failed to object to erroneous, confusing, and/or 
otherwise inadequate limiting instructions that the district court gave with 
some considerable liberality and frequency.  All of this added together, Wease contends, 
prejudiced his right to a fair trial and the judgment and sentence must be 
reversed.

 
 
[¶58]   The applicable standard of review is 
well-known to Wyoming litigants:

 
 
      In reviewing claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, our paramount consideration is whether, in 
light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 44, 57 P.3d 332, [346-47] 
(Wyo.2002).  An 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient.  Id. 
(citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  
Ordinarily, he must also demonstrate that prejudice resulted.  Under this test, 
the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the assistance a reasonably 
competent attorney would have offered and, if not, whether his failure to do so 
prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id. This two-part test, the 
Strickland test, is the test we normally apply in reviewing ineffectiveness 
claims....

 
 
      We examine the 
conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining 
whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case. Dickeson v. State, 
843 P.2d 606, 609 
(Wyo.1992).  
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result.  Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332.   We do not 
evaluate the efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to 
reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate 
the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  
at 609.  We 
invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable 
assistance making all decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional 
judgment.  
Id. The burden is on the 
defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the 
challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy.  
Id.

 
 

 Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 19, 106 P.3d 873, 878 
(Wyo.2005) (quoting CLC v. State, 2004 WY 2, ¶ 11, 82 P.3d 1235, 1238-39 (Wyo.2004).  We have also stated that an appellant 
assailing counsel's assistance must provide more than mere speculation or 
equivocal inferences.  
Duke v. 
State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 
(Wyo.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (2005).

 
 

Magallanes v. State, 2006 WY 119, ¶ 18, 142 P.3d 1147, 1152-53 
(Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶59]   Wease's contention that his attorney 
was not effective turns almost exclusively on the admission of prior bad acts  
the general category of evidence described in W.R.E. 404(b).  This has been, and 
continues to be, one of the thorniest and most elusive rules of evidence that we 
face.  It 
arises with regularity in this Court, and, no doubt, even more often in many 
trial courts.  
The general rule is, of course, that such evidence is not admissible, and 
for good reason:

 
 

§ 4:21.  Background and purpose.

            
. . . .

            
Especially in criminal cases, what may be called the basic rule of 
exclusion is a rule of fundamental importance in American law.  It implements the 
philosophy that a defendant should not be convicted because he is an unsavory 
person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the 
particular crime charged.  In practical effect, the Rule limits use of 
prior crimes, calling for exclusions where the evidence tends only to show 
propensity.  As 
the Supreme Court has stated emphatically, such evidence is excluded not because it is 
irrelevant, but because "practical experience" teaches that exclusion "tends to 
prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice."

 
 
1 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 
4:21, at 691-92, and § 4:22, at 697-99(3rd ed. 2007).

 
 
[¶60]   We have examined defense counsel's 
performance in this case, especially with regard to the admission of evidence of 
Wease's many prior bad acts.  As we concluded above, much of that evidence 
was not 404(b) evidence so much as it was a description of the grooming process 
used by many child molesters and the recitation of the "story" of each victim's 
life as it interacted with Wease's.  Moreover, we have recognized a relaxed 
standard with respect to this sort of evidence in child molestation cases.  In light of the 
standards we have established, we are unable to conclude that defense counsel 
was ineffective or that his overall performance was prejudicial to Wease's 
case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶61]   We hold that the sentence imposed as to 
Count V is in error.  
That sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court 
for imposition of a lawful sentence.  We also hold that the evidence with respect 
to Count VII was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt.  The remand shall 
include the district court's dismissal of Count VII.  We conclude that 
the district court did not commit reversible error in allowing the admission of 
prior bad acts evidence, and that defense counsel was not ineffective in 
advocating for his client with respect to that evidence.  The remainder of 
the judgment and sentence is affirmed in all respects.  However, we caution 
that the procedures followed in this case were at best marginal and we do not, 
by affirming the bulk of Wease's convictions, recommend that any procedures 
followed here be used in other similar cases, nor do we recommend the use of the 
sort of limiting instructions that the district court and the parties agreed to 
in this case.  
While defense counsel performed adequately in these circumstances, this 
case is principally one that should be used by defense attorneys as a method not to utilize in such a case.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This statute was repealed 
in 2007 and is now included within Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-314 through 6-2-319 
(LexisNexis 2007).

 
 

2The statutes in effect 
during this time period were the same ones applicable to the Counts involving 
BG.

 
 

3The elements stated in 
this Count track with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303 as it appeared from 1993 to 
1995.

 
 

4(1) The evidence must be 
offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the 
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its 
potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must 
instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for 
the purpose for which it was admitted.  Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 
(Wyo. 1996).