Case Title: People v. Lindsey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89138

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89138-Agenda 4-January 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								WILLIE E. LINDSEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Willie Lindsey, was charged by indictment with
one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(cocaine) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West
1996)) and one count of unlawful possession of cannabis with the
intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 1996)). Following a
bench trial in the circuit court of Kankakee County, defendant was
found guilty of the charged offenses and later sentenced to
concurrent terms of imprisonment for periods of 10 years and 4
years, respectively.
	Direct appeal was taken to the appellate court. There
defendant argued, for the first time, that his appearances in the trial
court via closed circuit television at the time of arraignment and
jury waiver violated his constitutional and statutory right to be
present. The appellate court rejected defendant's arguments and
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. 309 Ill. App. 3d
1031.
	We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On October 8, 1997, at about 9 p.m., Kankakee police officers
executed a search warrant at the home of defendant's girlfriend,
Nikeya Hairston. In the course of the search, police recovered
drugs and drug paraphernalia. Both Hairston and defendant were
present during the search and both were arrested.
	The record shows that, on October 9, 1997, an information
containing the charges against defendant was filed with the court
and a copy furnished to defendant. A hearing was held, at which
time defendant was advised of the minimum and maximum
penalties, the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel. The
court, at defendant's request, appointed the public defender's
office to represent defendant. It is unclear from the record whether
defendant appeared in person or by closed circuit television for
this hearing.
	On October 17, 1997, the grand jury returned a bill of
indictment against defendant and on October 23, 1997, defendant
was arraigned. At the arraignment, defendant was represented by
counsel, who was present in the courtroom. Defendant, however,
appeared via closed circuit television from the jail. Defense
counsel acknowledged receipt of the indictment, waived its formal
reading, requested statutory discovery, and demanded a jury trial.
	Immediately following arraignment, the court held a hearing
on defendant's bond-reduction motion. Defendant testified via
closed circuit television in support of the motion. After hearing the
testimony, the court denied the motion and defendant remained in
custody.
	The record shows that, between arraignment and trial, the
circuit court conducted eight pretrial hearings regarding
defendant's case. Defendant was not physically present in the
courtroom at any of these hearings. Instead, defendant "appeared"
at the hearings via closed circuit television from a room within the
county jail. Defense counsel, however, appeared in the courtroom.
Defendant and counsel had no opportunity for immediate
communication with each other, unless it was done through the
closed circuit system, which meant that the judge and other
attorneys could hear their conversation. To speak privately with
defendant, defense counsel had to leave the courtroom and contact
defendant by telephone. The record does not disclose whether
separate, secure telephone lines were set aside for this purpose.
	One of the pretrial hearings occurred on February 4, 1998.
Although the case had been set for trial on that date, the State
moved for a continuance because certain witnesses were
unavailable. After the court granted the continuance, defendant,
who was present via closed circuit television, asked to speak to his
attorney. The case was recessed so that defense counsel could
telephone defendant. When the case was recalled, the court was
advised by counsel that defendant wanted to waive his right to a
jury trial. The court, speaking to defendant across the closed
circuit system, admonished defendant regarding his right to a jury
trial. Finding that defendant understood his right to trial by jury
and was voluntarily giving up that right, the court accepted
defendant's jury waiver. A jury waiver form was then signed by
defendant at the jail and later transmitted to the court.
	After the jury waiver was accepted, the court inquired about
possible stipulations. Defense counsel conferred publicly with
defendant across the closed circuit system. The following colloquy
took place:
			"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge I think-Mr. Lindsey
the Judge is asking you about the lab.
			DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Yeah.
			[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Since our defense does not
involve saying that this is not-that the materials were
found [sic] were not-I believe it's alleged to be cocaine,
but rather they were not our materials, do you have any
objection to stipulating that what the substance of the
police [sic] found was in fact cocaine?
			DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Well, your Honor, I have a-
			THE COURT: Do you understand your lawyer's-
			DEFENDANT LINDSEY: That report right here.
			[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, but it makes a
difference in scheduling if they need to bring the lab
personnel down here to testify that they tested the
materials and it tested positive for the presence of
cocaine. If we agree that testing was done and it returned
as positive for cocaine, then they don't need to bring in
those lab personnel down here.
			DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Right. Well according to
these documents they tested it already.
			[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, but what I'm asking
you is if you will agree and will enter into what is called
a stipulation for the Court and for the record we say,
Judge, we don't dispute that they tested it and it tested
positive for cocaine. In other words, rather than having
the lab person who tested it come down here and testify as
to the test performed and the results of those tests that it
was positive for cocaine, that would just be introduced to
the Court by way of agreement.
			THE COURT: It shortens up the trial if you're not
fighting about whether or not it was cocaine Mr. Lindsey.
Do you understand that?
			DEFENDANT LINDSEY: Yes."
	Defendant agreed to stipulate to the lab evidence and the trial
date was continued to February 9, 1998. On that date, the State
requested another continuance because fingerprint evidence was
not yet available. Before granting the motion, the court discussed
the possibility of proceeding to the trial, with the fingerprint
evidence to be presented at a later date. This colloquy followed:
			"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Lindsey, do you
understand what the judge is asking about? It would be a
bifurcated proceeding. We'd start today. They would put
on any evidence except evidence relating to fingerprints
that might or might not have been found on these baggies.
Do you understand?
			DEFENDANT *** LINDSEY: Yes, sir.
			[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So we'd be starting without
the results of whether there is any fingerprints on there.
Do you have any objection to that?
			THE COURT: You want to talk to him privately?
			[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure, Judge.
			THE COURT: Why don't you go to the phone, Mr.
Lindsey. You and your lawyer can confer privately on
that.
			DEFENDANT *** LINDSEY: Okay."
	Counsel then left the courtroom to telephone defendant. When
court reconvened, defense counsel informed the court that
defendant would not proceed to trial without knowing all of the
evidence against him. The court granted the continuance over
defendant's objection and a new trial date was set.
	Defendant's bench trial commenced on April 10, 1998.
Defendant appeared in court with counsel for his trial. The State
presented evidence linking defendant to the drugs and drug
paraphernalia recovered from Hairston's home. After hearing all
of the evidence, the circuit court found defendant guilty of
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to
deliver and possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver.
Defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence
presented against him.
	Defendant appealed and, for the first time, challenged his
closed circuit television appearances at arraignment and jury
waiver. Defendant argued that arraignment and jury waiver are
"critical stages" of the criminal proceedings against him and that,
in the absence of an express waiver, he had a constitutional right
to be physically present at these hearings.
	Defendant also maintained that his statutory right to be
present in the trial court at the time of his arraignment and jury
waiver was violated. Section 113-1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) provides:
			"Before any person is tried for the commission of an
offense he shall be called into open court, informed of the
charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto. If
the defendant so requests the formal charge shall be read
to him before he is required to plead." (Emphasis added.)
725 ILCS 5/113-1 (West1998).
	Similarly, section 103-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides:
			"Every person accused of an offense shall have the right
to a trial by jury unless (i) understandingly waived by
defendant in open court ***." (Emphasis added.) 725
ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1998).
	Defendant argued that his appearances via closed circuit
television at the time of his arraignment and jury waiver did not
satisfy the statutory requirement that he be present in "open court"
at these proceedings.
	Finally, defendant maintained that the circuit court had no
authority to hold any pretrial proceedings via closed circuit
television because the court had not adopted rules regarding the
use of closed circuit television, as required by section 106D-1 of
the Code. Section 106D-1 provides:
			"When a defendant's personal appearance is not
required by the Constitution of the United States or
Illinois Constitution, the court may allow the defendant to
personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding
by way of closed circuit television when:
				(a) the court has authorized the use of closed circuit
television and has by rule or order set out the type of
proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit
television; and
				(b) the defendant is incarcerated; and
				(c) the Director of Corrections, sheriff or other
authority has certified that facilities are available for
this purpose." 725 ILCS 5/106D-1 (West 1998).
	The appellate court rejected defendant's claims, finding that
the alleged errors were procedurally defaulted because defendant
failed to object to his closed circuit television appearances at the
time of the hearings and failed to allege the error in a post-trial
motion. After reviewing the claims for plain error, the appellate
court concluded that the procedural default should not be excused
because the evidence was not closely balanced and defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35.
Additionally, the appellate court found no statutory violations. The
court assumed that the circuit court had complied with its statutory
duty to promulgate rules concerning the use of closed circuit
television because defendant had not presented any clear  evidence
to the contrary. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the
appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences.(1)
309 Ill. App. 3d at 1036.
	We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	Before this court, defendant maintains that his closed circuit
television appearance at his arraignment and jury waiver violated
his constitutional right to be present in court at every "critical
stage" of the proceedings against him (U.S. Const., amends. VI,
XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8), causing his right to counsel to be
impaired. Defendant also maintains that his statutory right to be
present in open court at his arraignment (725 ILCS 5/113-1 (West
1998)) and jury waiver hearing (725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1998))
was violated because he was not physically present in court for
these hearings. Finally, defendant maintains that the trial court was
not authorized to conduct hearings via closed circuit television
because the court failed to adopt rules regulating the use of closed
circuit television, as required by state law. 725 ILCS 5/106D-1
(West 1998). Defendant contends that his claims regarding the
validity of his arraignment and jury waiver should be reviewed
substantively because he never expressly waived the right to be
physically present at these hearings. In the alternative, defendant
asks that the error be considered as plain error.
	The State asks this court to affirm the appellate court's
judgment, finding that the errors alleged by defendant have been
procedurally defaulted and that the plain error doctrine does not
apply. As the State correctly points out, defendant never objected
to his appearances via closed circuit television or requested to be
physically present in the courtroom. Further, defendant did not
allege this error in his post-trial motion. Thus, it is clear that
defendant has failed to properly preserve the alleged errors for
review. People v. Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d 461, 491 (2000) (to preserve
an issue for review a defendant must both object at trial and
specifically include the objection in a post-trial motion); People v.
Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 225 (2000); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).
	Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides that "notice may
be taken of '[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance' which
affects 'substantial rights' though such was not 'brought to the
attention of the trial court.' " People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17
(1995), quoting 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Thus, errors affecting
substantial rights, or plain errors, may be reviewed pursuant to
Rule 615(a), even when those errors have not been objected to
during trial or presented in a post-trial motion. In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358, 362-63 (2001). "[T]o determine whether a purported
error is 'plain' requires a substantive look at it. But if, in the end,
the error is found not to rise to the level of a plain error as
contemplated by Rule 615(a), the procedural default must be
honored." Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17.
	In criminal cases, the plain error rule may be invoked in two
limited circumstances: "(1) where the evidence is closely
balanced; or (2) when the errors are of such magnitude that
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial and remedying the
error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process."
People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2000), citing People v.
Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996). In the case at bar, defendant
does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence or claim that the
evidence of his guilt was closely balanced. Rather, defendant
contends that he was denied due process because he was not
physically present in the courtroom during his arraignment and
jury waiver. Thus, our review is restricted to considering whether
the second limited circumstance justifying application of the plain
error doctrine is present. Furthermore, we shall consider only
whether defendant's appearance via closed circuit television at the
arraignment and jury waiver proceedings constitutes error since
defendant argues that it is at these critical stages that his right to be
present attached.
A. Constitutional Violation
	Defendant's first claim is that his appearance via closed
circuit television for his arraignment and jury waiver violated his
federal and state constitutional right to be present at all critical
stages of trial. We disagree.
	The right to be present is not an express right under the
United States Constitution, but is implied, arising from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amend.
XIV, §1; Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631,
647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484
(1985); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 78 L. Ed. 674, 678, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1934). Article I, section 8, of the
Illinois Constitution grants criminal defendants the express right
"to appear and defend in person and by counsel." Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §8. Accordingly, both the federal constitution and our state
constitution afford criminal defendants the general right to be
present, not only at trial, but at all critical stages of the
proceedings, from arraignment to sentencing. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970);
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998); People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 80-83 (1990); People v. Martine, 106 Ill. 2d 429, 439 (1985).
	Defendant argues that he had a right to be physically present
at his arraignment and jury waiver because they are "critical"
stages of the proceedings against him. This court and the United
States Supreme Court have long recognized that arraignment is a
critical stage of the criminal proceedings. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 77 L. Ed. 158, 164, 53 S. Ct. 55, 59 (1932); People v.
Hessenauer, 45 Ill. 2d 63, 67-68 (1970). Arraignment is the first
step in the criminal prosecution and, as such, "far from a mere
formalism." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411,
418, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1972). Due to the significance of
arraignment, a defendant's right to counsel attaches at this time.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961); Powell, 287 U.S.  at 57, 77 L. Ed. 
at 164, 53 S. Ct.  at 59-60.
	Although this court is unaware of any case which defines a
jury waiver as a "critical stage"of the proceedings, it has been
recognized that any proceeding where a defendant asserts or
waives constitutional rights may be deemed "critical." People v.
Young, 201 Ill. App. 3d 521, 533 (1990). Moreover, this court held
in People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283 (1999), that a written jury
waiver is insufficient to prove a valid waiver of the right to trial by
jury. We stated,
			"We have never found a valid jury waiver where the
defendant was not present in open court when a jury
waiver, written or otherwise, was at least discussed."
Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at 285.
	Because we found it necessary in Scott for a defendant to
acknowledge "in open court" his knowing and understanding
waiver of his right to trial by jury, the proceeding is "critical," at
least to the extent that defendant's constitutional right to be
present attaches.
	Finding that arraignment and jury waiver are "critical" stages
of trial does not end our inquiry, however. The right to be present,
even at a critical stage of the proceedings, is not absolute. See
Allen, 397 U.S.  at 343, 25 L. Ed. 2d  at 359, 90 S. Ct.  at 1060-61
(defendant may waive the right to be present at trial by consent or,
as in that case, by misconduct); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934); United States v. Veatch,
674 F.2d 1217, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1981); Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 80. In
Stincer, the United States Supreme Court explained the scope of
a defendant's right of presence under the federal constitution:
		"The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the
defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or
evidence against him, he has a due process right 'to be
present in his own person whenever his presence has a
relationship, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his
opportunity to defend against the charge.' [Citation.]
Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of
presence is not guaranteed 'when presence would be
useless, or the benefit but a shadow' [citation], due
process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be
present 'to the extent a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence' [citation]. Thus, a defendant is
guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his
presence would contribute to the fairness of the
procedure." (Emphasis added.) Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 745,
96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647, 107 S. Ct.  at 2667.
	The right to be present, as guaranteed by our state
constitution, was defined in Bean. In Bean, we said:
		"[The right to be present] is a lesser right the observance
of which is a means to securing the substantial rights of a
defendant. Thus a defendant is not denied a constitutional
right every time he is not present during his trial, but only
when his absence results in a denial of an underlying
substantial right, in other words, a constitutional right;
and it is only in such a case that plain error is committed.
[Citations.] Some of these substantial rights are the right
to confront witnesses, the right to present a defense, and
the right to an impartial jury." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 81.
	Based on Stincer and Bean, we conclude that, even where a
defendant has the general right to be present because the
proceeding is a "critical" stage, a defendant's absence is not a per
se constitutional violation. Rather, a defendant's absence from
such a proceeding will violate his constitutional rights only if the
record demonstrates that defendant's absence caused the
proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted in a denial of an
underlying substantial right.(2) As stated in Bean, a defendant cannot
rely on "broad principles [which are] not adapted to the specifics
of this case." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 84. Rather, "[w]hether the benefit
[of defendant's presence] would have been 'but a shadow' because
the fairness of the trial was not affected by the defendant's absence
from a portion of his trial 'must be determined in the light of the
whole record.' " Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 84 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. 
at 106-07, 115, 78 L. Ed.  at 678, 683, 54 S. Ct.  at 332, 336, and
Gagnon, 470 U.S.  at 527, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 490-91, 105 S. Ct. at
1484-85).
	In the case at bar, defendant "appeared" and was represented
by counsel at both the arraignment and jury waiver. He contends,
however, that his appearance was defective and his right to
counsel impaired because he was not physically present in court,
by counsel's side. However, we find that the record does not
demonstrate that defendant's physical absence from the courtroom
contributed to the unfairness of the proceedings or caused him to
be denied any underlying constitutional right.
	While defendant was not physically present in the courtroom
for his arraignment and jury waiver, neither was he entirely absent
from these proceedings. Defendant participated in the proceedings
through audio-visual transmission. The record indicates that the
closed circuit system provided defendant with the ability to hear
and see the proceedings taking place in the courtroom and, at the
same time, allowed the judge and other persons in the courtroom
to hear and see defendant. The record demonstrates that defendant
was able to interact with the court with relative ease. It also
appears from the record that defendant was aware of the nature
and significance of the proceedings and the overall solemnity of
the proceedings was preserved.
	It is true that, at arraignment, counsel waived formal reading
of the indictment. However, defendant does not contend that he
was unaware of the charges against him and the record shows that
defendant had already received a copy of the information at a
preliminary hearing and had consulted with counsel prior to
arraignment. Furthermore, at the arraignment, counsel simply
entered a not-guilty plea and demanded trial. When accepting the
plea, the court did not need to assess defendant's demeanor.
Defendant's ability to defend against the charges was unaffected
by his physical absence from the courtroom during the
arraignment.
	As for the jury waiver hearing, it was defendant who initiated
the proceeding after he had consulted with counsel by telephone.
Defendant was then called upon to address the court and state his
intention to waive trial by jury. His voluntary and knowing waiver
was clearly conveyed. Defendant does not contend otherwise. Nor
does defendant demonstrate how his right to a fair and just hearing
was thwarted by his absence from the courtroom. Finding no
inherent unfairness stemming from the fact that defendant was not
physically present in the courtroom when he waived trial by jury,
we conclude that defendant was not denied due process simply
because he waived his right to a jury trial via closed circuit
television.
	 Moreover, the record does not establish that defendant's
underlying constitutional rights were violated by the fact that he
was not physically present at his arraignment and jury waiver.
Defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses was not
implicated because there were no witnesses to confront at the
proceedings. We acknowledge that defendant's absence from the
courtroom had some impact on defendant's access to counsel.
Because defendant and his attorney appeared at separate locations
during the arraignment and jury waiver, defendant's ability to
communicate freely with counsel was impaired-communication
through the closed circuit system could not be done privately and,
to speak privately, counsel was required to leave the courtroom to
contact defendant by telephone. See People v. Guttendorf, 309 Ill.
App. 3d 1044 (2000) (defendant's inability to consult freely with
counsel contributed to the unconstitutionality of defendant's
closed circuit television appearance when entering a guilty plea).
Nevertheless, we cannot say that, in the context of the arraignment
and jury waiver involved here, defendant's right to counsel was so
impaired by his physical absence from the courtroom that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel. As noted above, at the
arraignment, counsel merely entered defendant's not-guilty plea.
The fact that defendant was not physically present in the
courtroom, by counsel's side, had no prejudicial effect on
defendant's plea. We note, too, that prior to waiving trial by jury,
defendant had the opportunity to consult privately with counsel.
We conclude that the record does not support a finding that, as a
result of his physical absence from the courtroom, defendant was
denied adequate representation with regard to his arraignment and
jury waiver.
	 In sum, we hold that defendant's appearances via closed
circuit television at arraignment and jury waiver did not render
those proceedings unconstitutional. To show a constitutional
violation of the right to be present, there must be evidence that
defendant's due process rights were violated by his absence from
the courtroom, i.e., that defendant's physical absence from the
proceedings caused the proceedings to be unfair or that his
physical absence from the proceedings resulted in the denial of an
underlying constitutional right. There has been no such showing
on this record. Consequently, we find no constitutional violation.(3)
	We note that our holding today is in line with the holdings of
other state supreme courts which have considered the matter. See
Commonwealth v. Ingram, 46 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2001) (properly
functioning video arraignment is the constitutional equivalent of
in-court arraignment if the video procedure is properly
safeguarded and no specific constitutional right has been violated);
Larose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough County Correction
Administration, 142 N.H. 364, 702 A.2d 326 (1997) (conducting
arraignment and bail hearings via teleconferencing system does
not violate due process); State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio 3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995) (arraignment via closed circuit television is
constitutionally adequate when the procedure is functionally
equivalent to live, in-person arraignment); In re Rule 3.160(a),
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 528 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1988)
(appearance at arraignment by audio-visual device approved
because due process does not require the personal presence of a
defendant in a courtroom when, through mechanical means,
defendant can see and hear the judge and the judge can see and
hear the defendant); Commonwealth v. Terenbieniec, 268 Pa.
Super. 511, 408 A.2d 1120 (1979) (no unconstitutional prejudice
inherent in appellant's arraignment via closed circuit television).

B. Statutory Violation
	We next consider whether defendant's closed circuit
television appearances at arraignment and jury waiver violated
defendant's statutory rights. Illinois law provides that "[b]efore
any person is tried for the commission of an offense he shall be
called into open court, informed of the charge against him, and
called upon to plead thereto." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
5/113-1 (West 1998). In addition, "[e]very person accused of an
offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i)
understandingly waived by defendant in open court ***."
(Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1998). Defendant
argues in favor of a strict construction of the "open court"
language contained in these statutes. He contends that the
legislature, by requiring the pretrial proceeding to take place in
"open court," intended that defendant be physically present in the
courtroom and that the presence requirement may not be satisfied
by a closed circuit television appearance. As support, defendant
relies on Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, 915 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990), in which
the court held that Rules 10 and 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides a defendant with a right of presence
that is broader than the constitutional right. Rule 10 provides that
"Arraignment shall be conducted in open court," and Rule 43,
entitled "Presence of the Defendant," provides that "defendant
shall be present at the arraignment." The court held that the plain
language of the rules requires a defendant's physical presence at
arraignment and that an appearance via closed circuit television is
not an authorized substitute for physical presence. However, the
strict construction of the rules by the Valenzuela-Gonzalez court
was premised on the fact that Congress had not spoken on whether
closed circuit television could satisfy the presence requirement.
Absent legislative authority, the Valenzuela-Gonzalez court did
not feel "free to ignore the clear instructions of Rules 10 and 43."
Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d  at 1281.
	In contrast, the Illinois legislature has expressed a willingness
to allow closed circuit television appearances as a substitute for in-court appearances. In section 106D-1(a) of the Code, it states that
"[w]hen a defendant's personal appearance is not required by the
Constitution of the United States or Illinois Constitution, the court
may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or
post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television when: (a)
the court has authorized the use of closed circuit television and has
by rule or order set out the type of proceedings that may be
conducted by closed circuit television ***." 725 ILCS
5/106D-1(a) (West 1998). Thus, a strict construction of the "open
court" language found in sections 103-6 and 113-1 as excluding
closed circuit television appearances is not warranted. Construing
the provisions of sections 103-6 and 113-1 in pari materia with
section 106D-1, we discern the legislature's intent to interpret the
"open court" language broadly to include appearances by closed
circuit television. See In re Application for Judgment & Sale of
Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 171-72 (1995) (Revenue Act and section 16 are in pari materia and
may be construed together to determine the intent of the
legislature). Consequently, we find that defendant's appearance by
closed circuit television at his arraignment and jury waiver
satisfied the statutory requirement that he "be called into open
court" for arraignment and waive his right to trial by jury "in open
court."
	Parenthetically, even if it had been error to conduct
defendant's arraignment by closed circuit television, defendant
would not have been able to demonstrate plain error. Section
113-6 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/113-6 (West 1998)) provides that
"[n]either a failure to arraign nor an irregularity in the arraignment
shall affect the validity of any proceeding in the cause if the
defendant pleads to the charge or proceeds to trial without
objecting to such failure or irregularity." Thus, any "irregularity"
of conducting defendant's arraignment by closed circuit television
would have been waived once defendant proceeded to trial without
objection.

C. Circuit Court's Violation of Section 106D-1
	As a final argument, defendant contends that the circuit court
of Kankakee County, where the proceedings in this case took
place, had no authority to conduct any pretrial or post-trial
proceedings by closed circuit television because the court failed to
fulfill its statutory duty to set out, by rule or order, the type of
proceedings that could be conducted by closed circuit television.
As noted earlier, section 106D-1(a) of the Code provides that a
court "may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television
when *** the court has authorized the use of closed circuit
television and has by rule or order set out the type of proceedings
that may be conducted by closed circuit television ***." 725 ILCS
5/106D-1(a) (West 1998). The appellate court found that the
record failed to disclose whether the circuit court complied with
its statutory duty to promulgate rules or orders concerning the use
of closed circuit television. See 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1035. However,
defendant asks that this court take judicial notice of the published
Uniform Rules of Practice for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit,
which he has appended to his brief on appeal, as evidence that the
circuit court failed to fulfill its duty.
	We agree that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of the
circuit court's published rules. See Murdy v. Edgar, 103 Ill. 2d 384, 394 (1984) (courts may take judicial notice of matters which
are commonly known). Further, we agree that the rules do not
evidence the court's compliance with the statutory directive. The
State offers no argument on the subject. Thus, we must assume
that defendant is correct and that the circuit court has failed to
fulfill its statutory duty to formally authorize the use of closed
circuit television by setting forth rules or orders as to the types of
proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television.
	We are disturbed by the circuit court's laxity and caution that
courts must discharge their responsibility to promulgate rules as
required by section 106D-1 of the Code. Nevertheless, we are
constrained by the procedural posture of this case to find that the
error does not require reversal. There is no plain error. Defendant
was not deprived of a substantial right because of the circuit
court's failure to adopt rules.

CONCLUSION
	Under the facts presented, defendant's appearance via closed
circuit television at his arraignment and jury waiver did not violate
his federal or state constitutional right to be present or impair his
right to be represented by counsel. The record fails to show that
defendant's physical absence from the proceedings violated due
process or denied him substantial rights. Further, we find that the
statutory right to be present in "open court" at arraignment and
jury waiver does not afford defendant any broader rights than the
federal and state constitutions. For the reasons stated, we affirm
the judgment of the appellate court.

Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	Contrary to legislative mandate, the circuit court of Kankakee
County has failed to adopt rules regulating the use of closed circuit
television or setting forth the type of proceeding that may be
conducted by closed circuit television. At issue is whether the
circuit court could require defendant to appear via closed circuit
television at arraignment and at jury waiver, without such rules.
The majority holds that defendant's appearances via closed circuit
television at arraignment and at jury waiver did not render those
proceedings unconstitutional. Further, the majority holds that the
circuit court's failure to adopt rules regulating the use of closed
circuit television at these proceedings does not require reversal.
Because such rules are required by our legislature as a safeguard
to the defendant's rights, I respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND
	Issues surrounding the use of closed circuit television have
arisen with some frequency in the Third District of the appellate
court. See People v. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243 (2001); People v.
Caruth, 322 Ill. App. 3d 226 (2001); People v. Dixon, 319 Ill.
App. 3d 881 (2001); People v. Mendez, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1145
(2001); People v. Speed, 318 Ill. App. 3d 910 (2001); People v.
Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1044 (2000). The circuit courts of the
Third District have allowed the use of closed circuit television at
arraignment (Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243; Caruth, 322 Ill. App. 3d
226; Dixon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 881; Mendez, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1145;
Speed, 318 Ill. App. 3d 910), jury waiver (Dixon, 319 Ill. App. 3d
881), guilty plea hearings (Speed, 318 Ill. App. 3d 910;
Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1044), and upon the return of the
jury's verdict (Mendez, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1145). In each instance,
the defendant argued he had the right to be present at every critical
stage of the criminal proceedings. In most instances, the defendant
also argued that the circuit court erred in failing to promulgate
rules governing the use of closed circuit television. To date, the
circuit courts of the Third District have failed to promulgate rules
governing the use of closed circuit television.
	In the present case, the circuit court convicted defendant of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
deliver and unlawful possession of cannabis with the intent to
deliver. Defendant appealed, claiming that the court erred in
arraigning him and accepting his jury waiver when defendant was
present only by closed circuit television. Defendant also
maintained that the court was not authorized to hold pretrial
proceedings via closed circuit television because the court had
failed to adopt any rules regulating the type of proceedings to be
conducted by closed circuit television as required by statute. See
725 ILCS 5/106D-1 (West 1998).
	The appellate court noted that defendant had waived these
issues by failing to object in the circuit court. 309 Ill. App. 3d at
1033. Further, the court determined that it was not appropriate to
excuse the waiver because the evidence of guilt was not closely
balanced and defendant was not deprived of substantial
constitutional rights. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35. The court also
noted that the record did not disclose whether the circuit court had
complied with its statutory duty to promulgate rules concerning
the use of closed circuit television at pretrial proceedings. 309 Ill.
App. 3d at 1035. In the absence of a complete record, the court
assumed that the circuit court had adopted the necessary rules. 309
Ill. App. 3d at 1036. The court affirmed defendant's conviction.
309 Ill. App. 3d at 1036.
	This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal to
consider the propriety of the use of closed circuit television at
arraignment and jury waiver.

ANALYSIS
	In this court, the State notes that defendant did not object to
the appearances via closed circuit television. Further, defendant
did not allege error in his post-trial motion. Accordingly, the State
argues that defendant has waived any objection to the use of
closed circuit television. Additionally, the State maintains that any
alleged error did not impact a substantial constitutional right.
Defendant has not shown that he suffered any prejudice in the use
of closed circuit television. The State concludes that this court
should not excuse defendant's waiver by application of the plain
error doctrine.
	The rule of waiver is, of course, a limitation on the parties and
not the courts. Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994); People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209, 219 (1984).
In the exercise of its responsibility for a just result and the
maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent, a
reviewing court may consider issues not properly preserved by the
parties. People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993), citing Hux
v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). In the present case, I believe
this court should excuse defendant's waiver for precisely these two
reasons. First, this court may address defendant's arguments on the
merits in order to foster uniformity in our jurisprudence. See
People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 465 (1997) (addressing
substantive arguments where questions regarding the failure to
secure a written jury waiver had arisen frequently in appellate
court); People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 333 (1985) (considering
issue of jury waiver on its merits given its importance and the
frequency with which it arises); People v. Rehbein, 74 Ill. 2d 435
(1978) (addressing issue on the merits because of the importance
of the issue and the great number of cases reaching the appellate
courts on the issue). Second, the record does not contain either a
signed waiver indicating that defendant was voluntarily and
understandingly giving up his right to be present in court, or any
other indication defendant had been advised he had the right to be
present in court and was voluntarily and understandingly giving up
that right. It must be remembered that defendant's first appearance
was via closed circuit television.(4) At that time, the court advised
defendant of the charges against him, the minimum and maximum
penalty, the right to jury trial and the right to counsel. However,
the court did not inform defendant that he had a right to be
physically present in the courtroom. Each subsequent hearing
followed the same format, with defendant appearing via closed
circuit television. The record contains neither a hint nor whisper
of a caution to defendant that he could object to the format of the
hearings. Given these circumstances, and recalling our
responsibility for a just result, I believe it appropriate to consider
defendant's arguments on the merits. See Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d  at
219 (a reviewing court may ignore the waiver rule in order to
achieve a just result).
	The majority reviews defendant's arguments under the plain
error doctrine. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Plain error is a limited
and narrow exception to the general waiver rule, to be invoked
only where the evidence is closely balanced, or the alleged error is
so substantial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. People
v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 200 (1998). In the present case, the
evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Further, defendant
does not contend in this court that the evidence was insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Jackson,
84 Ill. 2d 350, 360 (1981). Consequently, application of the plain
error doctrine must rest upon the deprivation of a substantial right.
	The majority considers the alleged errors in light of this
standard. The majority holds that defendant's appearances via
closed circuit television at arraignment and at jury waiver did not
render those proceedings unconstitutional. The majority also holds
that defendant was not deprived of a substantial right because of
the circuit court's failure to adopt rules governing the use of close
circuit television.(5)
	Our legislature has defined arraignment as "the formal act of
calling the defendant into open court, informing him of the offense
with which he is charged, and asking him whether he is guilty or
not guilty." 725 ILCS 5/102-4 (West 1998). Our legislature has
also provided that"[b]efore any person is tried for the commission
of an offense he shall be called into open court, informed of the
charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto." 725 ILCS
5/113-1 (West 1998). Thus, our legislature seems to require a
defendant's presence in court at arraignment. Likewise, our
legislature has provided that every person accused of an offense
shall have the right to a trial by jury unless understandingly waived
by the defendant in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1998).
Again, our legislature seems to require a defendant's presence in
court whenever the defendant waives trial by jury.(6)
	This court has heretofore recognized that a defendant's
presence in open court is required at a jury waiver. People v. Scott,
186 Ill. 2d 283 (1999); People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327 (1985). In
Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, this court considered whether a written
waiver alone validly waives a defendant's right to a jury trial. The
defendant had executed a written jury waiver in his attorney's
office, which stated that the defendant had until the last Thursday
of December 1994 to revoke the waiver. Subsequently, the written
jury waiver was filed in court outside of the defendant's presence.
On the day of trial, in the defendant's presence, defense counsel
and the court each indicated that the trial would be a bench trial.
The defendant did not object.
	Initially, this court noted that section 103-6 provides that a
bench trial may be held if the right to trial by jury is
understandingly waived by defendant in open court. Thus, a
waiver of the right to a jury trial is valid only if made (1)
understandingly and (2) in open court. Next, this court noted that
it had never found a valid jury waiver where the defendant was not
present in open court when a jury waiver, written or otherwise,
was at least discussed. Pointing to the statement in the jury waiver
regarding revocation, this court stated that the language created the
inference that the jury waiver was irrevocable after the last
Thursday of December 1994. The defendant's silence in court at
the mention of a bench trial may have been due to his belief that
it was too late to revoke the jury waiver. This court refused to hold
that the defendant's silence constituted acquiescence in the jury
waiver. Instead, this court concluded that the defendant did not
validly waive his right to a jury trial in open court. Accordingly,
this court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, reversing
the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded the cause for a
new trial. See also Smith, 106 Ill. 2d  at 334 (consistent with
constitutional jury trial provisions, section 103-6 provides that a
jury waiver must be made in open court).
	In this case, however, the majority eschews the requirement
of physical presence at arraignment and at jury waiver. The
majority explains:
			"[T]he Illinois legislature has expressed a willingness
to allow closed circuit television appearances as a
substitute for in-court appearances. In section 106D-1(a)
of the Code, it states that '[w]hen a defendant's personal
appearance is not required by the Constitution of the
United States or Illinois Constitution, the court may allow
the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television when:
(a) the court has authorized the use of closed circuit
television and has by rule or order set out the type of
proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit
television ***.' [Citation.] Thus, a strict construction of
the 'open court' language found in sections 103-6 and
113-1 as excluding closed circuit television appearances
is not warranted. Construing the provisions of sections
103-6 and 113-1 in pari materia with section 106D-1,
we discern the legislature's intent to interpret the 'open
court' language broadly to include appearances by closed
circuit television." Slip op. at 15-16.
	While it is true that section 106D-1 contemplates the use of
closed circuit television at pretrial proceedings, it is equally true
that our legislature has imposed certain requirements on the use of
closed circuit television at pretrial proceedings. Section 106D-1
shows clearly that the legislature intended to protect the rights of
the defendant, and placed a charge upon the judiciary to
implement rules regulating the use of closed circuit television. Our
legislature's expressed willingness to allow the use of closed
circuit television is, therefore, entirely contingent upon the judicial
implementation of rules governing the use of closed circuit
television.
	In the case at bar, the circuit court did not properly safeguard
defendant's rights. In spite of the legislature's command to
implement rules securing the rights of this and other defendants,
the circuit court failed to adopt any rules regulating the use of
closed circuit television. As the record clarifies, the circuit court's
failure to implement the requisite rules impacted negatively upon
defendant's ability to communicate spontaneously and completely
with defense counsel. Whenever he needed to communicate with
counsel, defendant had to interrupt the court proceedings and ask
the court's permission to do so. The court did not have a dedicated
telephone line for private communication in the courtroom
between defendant and defense counsel. Instead, the court
instructed defendant to go to a telephone and await a call from
counsel.(7) In one instance, the court told defendant:
		"Why don't you go over and wait by the phone. When he
gets a break here, he'll give you a call."
Perhaps more egregious were the conversations between defendant
and counsel recorded in the transcripts of the court hearings. These
conversations allowed all present to hear matters which would
have been better discussed with counsel in private. Certainly, the
circuit court should not have allowed defendant's appearance via
closed circuit television to substitute for consultation between
defendant and his counsel.
	The majority recognizes that arraignment and jury waiver are
critical stages of the criminal proceedings. However, the majority
does little more than the circuit court to safeguard defendant's
rights. The majority notes:
		"We acknowledge that defendant's absence from the
courtroom had some impact on defendant's access to
counsel. Because defendant and his attorney appeared at
separate locations during the arraignment and jury waiver,
defendant's ability to communicate freely with counsel
was impaired-communication through the closed circuit
system could not be done privately and, to speak
privately, counsel was required to leave the courtroom to
contact defendant by telephone. [Citation.] Nevertheless,
we cannot say that, in the context of the arraignment and
jury waiver involved here, defendant's right to counsel
was so impaired by his physical absence from the
courtroom that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel. As noted above, at the arraignment, counsel
merely entered defendant's 'not-guilty' plea. The fact that
defendant was not physically present in the courtroom, by
counsel's side, had no prejudicial effect on defendant's
plea. We note, too, that prior to waiving trial by jury,
defendant had the opportunity to consult privately with
counsel." Slip op. at 13.
Thus, according to the majority, an arraignment is nothing of
substance, at least when the defendant enters a plea of not guilty.
The majority gives greater substance to the jury waiver, requiring
prior communication between defendant and counsel. The
problem, however, is that the majority assumes the telephone
conversation between defendant and counsel was private. There is
no indication in the record as to where counsel was when he
placed the telephone call to defendant. There is also no indication
in the record as to where defendant was when he received the
telephone call or how many guards were with him. In his brief,
defendant informs this court that one of the telephone
conversations between defense counsel and defendant occurred
over the courtroom telephone.
	To be fair, the majority does recognize that the circuit court
failed in its duty to implement rules governing the use of closed
circuit television. The majority is "disturbed by the circuit court's
laxity and caution[s] that courts must discharge their responsibility
to promulgate rules as required by section 106D-1 of the Code."
Slip op. at 17. The majority's concern, however, is of no more
substance than that displayed by the courts of the Third District.
As I noted above, issues regarding the use of closed circuit
television have arisen with some frequency in the Third District.
The circuit courts of the Twelfth and Twenty-first judicial districts
have allowed the use of closed circuit television at a number of
pretrial proceedings, without first implementing rules regulating
the use of the system. The appellate court has blinded itself to this
practice by refusing to take judicial notice of the rules of the
circuit courts. In light of the widespread use of closed circuit
television, our legislature's command that the circuit courts adopt
rules governing the use of closed circuit television, and this court's
supervisory authority over all the courts of this state, this court is
called upon to do more to protect the rights of the defendants at
pretrial proceedings.
	The majority states that its holding "is in line with the
holdings of other state supreme courts which have considered the
matter," citing Commonwealth v. Ingram, 46 S.W.3d 569 (Ky
2001), Larose v. Hillsborough County Correction Administration,
142 N.H. 364, 702 A.2d 326 (1997), State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio 3d
72, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995), In re Rule 3.160(a), Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 528 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Terenbieniec, 268 Pa. Super. 511, 408 A.2d 1120 (1979). Slip op. at 14. Some distinguishing factors exist,
however, which diminish this claim of support. First, the cases
cited by the majority deal exclusively with the use of closed circuit
television at arraignment. An argument may be made that the time
requirements for arraignment justify the use of closed circuit
television. See Larose, 142 N.H. at 366, 702 A.2d  at 328 ("Here,
the legislature intended to insure the timely arraignment of a
person being held in custody, not to guarantee face-to-face contact
with the court"). The majority does not cite to any cases involving
jury waiver. Second, the majority fails to review the rules adopted
by these jurisdictions, and other jurisdictions which have
experimented with the use of closed circuit television, to protect
the rights of the defendants. My review of case law and statutes
enacted by several jurisdictions shows a greater concern for the
rights of the defendant than that shown by this court. For example,
in Ingram, the video arraignment system allowed all participants
to see and hear each other simultaneously. Another part of the
video arraignment system consisted of television monitors from
which any person present in the courtroom could view the
arraignment proceeding. Additionally, if the accused was
represented by counsel, communication between the two could be
achieved through the use of conference room telephones. Ingram,
46 S.W.3d  at 570. In Larose, the court described the arraignment
procedure as follows:
			"Pursuant to a temporary order of this court,
arraignments and bail hearings in Hillsborough County
may be conducted via a teleconference system installed
between the superior courthouse, housing in this instance
the Nashua District Court, and the Nashua Police Station.
Under the temporary procedure, a defendant and his or
her attorney is able to view the courtroom on a television
monitor divided into four sections, each displaying a
different person or part of the courtroom. Similarly, the
district court judge can view a defendant and his or her
attorney on one of five monitors mounted around the
courtroom." (Emphases added.) Larose, 142 N.H. at 365,
702 A.2d  at 328.
Thus, it appears that the defendant and counsel were at the same
location, and, were presumably able to communicate directly and
freely at the arraignment. In Terenbieniec, 268 Pa. Super. 511, 408 A.2d 1120, the Pennsylvania Superior Court allowed the use of
closed circuit television at the defendant's arraignment. The
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes specifically require that:
		"The audio-video communication must operate so that the
defendant and the judge can see each other simultaneously
and converse with each other. If the defendant has
counsel, the defendant shall be allowed to communicate
fully and confidentially with his attorney during the
proceeding." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §8703 (2001).
The Alabama Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
		"The audio-video communication shall enable the judge
or magistrate to see and converse simultaneously with the
defendant or other person and operate so that the
defendant and his or her counsel, if any, can communicate
privately, and so that the defendant and his or her counsel
are both physically present in the same place during the
audio-video communication." Ala. Code §15-26-1
(2001).
The Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
		"The defendant may be accompanied by the defendant's
counsel during [audio-video] arraignment. The defendant
shall be informed of the defendant's right to be personally
present in the courtroom during arraignment." Kan. Stat.
Ann. §22-3205(b) (2000).
The Mississippi Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
			"When the physical appearance in person in court is
required of any person who is represented by counsel and
held in a place of custody or confinement ***, upon
waiver of any right such person may have to be physically
present, such personal appearance may be made by means
of closed circuit television from the place of custody or
confinement, provided that such television facilities
provide two-way audio-visual communication between
the court and the place of custody or confinement and that
a full record of such proceedings be made by split-screen
imaging and recording of the proceedings in the
courtroom and the place of confinement or custody in
addition to such other record as may be required ***."
Miss. Code Ann. §99-1-23 (Supp. 2001).
The Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
			"(1) Unless the defendant requests physical presence
before the court, a judge or district court magistrate may
conduct initial criminal arraignments and the setting of
bail by 2-way closed circuit television communication
between a court facility and a prison, jail, or other place
where a person is imprisoned or detained. ***
* * *
			(3) Except as otherwise provided by law, the public
shall have access to the courtroom, with the ability to
view and hear the proceedings." Mich. Comp. Laws
§767.37a (2000).
The Montana Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
			"(4) Whenever the law requires that a defendant in a
misdemeanor or felony case be taken before a court for an
arraignment, this requirement may, in the discretion of the
court, be satisfied either by the defendant's physical
appearance before the court or by two-way electronic
audio-video communication. The audio-video
communication must operate so that the defendant and the
judge can see each other simultaneously and converse
with each other, so that the defendant and the defendant's
counsel, if any, can communicate privately, and so that
the defendant and the defendant's counsel are both
physically present in the same place during the two-way
electronic audio-video communication." Mont. Code Ann.
§46-12-201 (2000).
The New Mexico Court Rules provide in part:
			"H. Audio-visual appearance. The arraignment or first
appearance of the defendant before the court may be
through the use of a two-way audio-video communication
if the following conditions are met:
			(1) the defendant and the defendant's counsel are
together in one room at the time of the first appearance
before the court;
			(2) the judge, legal counsel and defendant are able to
communicate and see each other through a two-way
audio-video system which may also be heard and viewed
in the courtroom by members of the public; and
			(3) no plea is entered by the court except a plea of not
guilty." N.M. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5-303(H) (2002).
The North Carolina General Statutes provide in part:
			"(b) An arraignment in a noncapital case may be
conducted by an audio and video transmission between
the judge and the defendant in which the parties can see
and hear each other. If the defendant has counsel, the
defendant shall be allowed to communicate fully and
confidentially with his attorney during the proceeding."
N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-941(b) (2002).
The Oregon Revised Statutes provide in part:
		"[A]ppearance by simultaneous television transmission
shall not be permitted unless the facilities used enable the
defendant to consult privately with defense counsel during
the proceedings." Or. Rev. Stat. §135.030 (2001).
The Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "in the
absence of an objection by the defendant" the arraignment may be
through the use of an electronic audio-visual device. Tenn. Crim.
Proc. R. 43(e) (2002). The Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
Superior Court of the State of Delaware provide that "[t]elevision
monitors shall be situated in the courtroom and at the place of
incarceration so as to provide the public, the court, and the
defendant with a view of the proceedings." Del. Super. Ct. Crim.
R. 10(b) (2000). Lastly, the district court of the State of Louisiana
allow the use of closed circuit television at arraignment "except
when the defense counsel requests the defendant's appearance in
open court." La. 22 Dist. Ct. R. XXI (2001).
	This review, although not exhaustive, clearly demonstrates
that most jurisdictions which allow the use of closed circuit
television have also attempted to safeguard the rights of the
accused.

CONCLUSION
	This court and the United States Supreme Court have
recognized that arraignment is a critical step in a criminal
proceeding. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972); People v. Hessenauer, 45 Ill. 2d 63, 67-68
(1970). In Kirby, the United States Supreme Court explained:
			"The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far
from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our
whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only
then that the government has committed itself to
prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified. It is then that
a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society, and immersed in the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."
Kirby, 406 U.S.  at 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 417-18, 92 S. Ct. 
at 1882.
Because of the critical nature of the arraignment, a defendant is
entitled to the assistance of counsel. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961); Hessenauer, 45 Ill. 2d  at 68.
	Jury waiver is also a critical step in a criminal proceeding. As
noted in People v. Young, 201 Ill. App. 3d 521, 533 (1990), "a
critical stage has been reached whenever constitutional or other
rights can be asserted or waived, or where events occur that can
prejudice the defendant's subsequent trial." The right of a
defendant to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8), and the federal Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VI, XIV). A proceeding at which a defendant
waives his right to a jury trial involves the relinquishment of the
defendant's constitutional right and is a critical step in the criminal
process.
	Our legislature has recognized that a defendant has certain
rights at criminal proceedings, including pretrial proceedings. In
an attempt to safeguard those rights, our legislature has mandated
the enactment of rules prior to the use of closed circuit television
at pretrial proceedings. Contrary to this legislative mandate, the
courts of the Third District have allowed the use of closed circuit
television systems at pretrial proceedings without first enacting the
required rules.
	This court acknowledges that the circuit court failed to adopt
the rules required by our legislature. This court also acknowledges
that arraignment and jury waiver are critical steps in a criminal
proceeding. Lastly, this court acknowledges that the closed circuit
television system used at defendant's arraignment and jury waiver
impacted negatively on defendant's right to counsel. Contrary to
these findings, however, this court upholds the circuit's court's use
of closed circuit television at defendant's arraignment and at jury
waiver.
	This court has a duty to supervise the courts of this state.
Where certain rules are required by our legislature, this court
should take an active role in ensuring that the rules are adopted.
Further, this court has a responsibility for a just result in reviewing
a decision of a lower court. In the present case, the court fails in
both duties. By affirming defendant's conviction, the court
abandons the goal of a just result. Also, the court countenances the
circuit court's failure to comply with the legislative mandate.
Today's decision provides little incentive for our circuit courts to
obey the legislature and defeats the legislature's attempts to
safeguard the rights of those accused of crimes. I respectfully
dissent.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and JUSTICE KILBRIDE join
in this dissent.
1.      1In his direct appeal, defendant also presented an argument
concerning his entitlement to a monetary credit for 218 days of
presentence custody. The appellate court granted defendant $1,090
credit against his drug assessment fee. The amount of monetary credit
is not at issue in the appeal before this court.

2.      2In Baker v. City of Blaine, 221 F.3d 1108, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1999),
and Wootton v. Lambert, No. 01-35511 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished
opinion), a slightly different approach was taken. The arraignments in
those cases were held not to be a "critical stage" under the attendant
circumstances. 

3.      3It has also been held that, "even improper exclusion of a defendant
from a 'critical' portion of the trial does not automatically require
reversal, if in the particular case the defendant's absence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133,
1138 (9th Cir. 1976), citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39-40,
45 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6, 95 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1975). We do not consider here
whether defendant's appearance was harmless error because we find no
constitutional violation occurred.

4.      4The majority finds it is not clear from the record whether defendant
appeared in person at this proceeding or via closed circuit television.
However, in his brief, defendant has informed this court that he
appeared via closed circuit television at all pretrial proceedings in this
case. The State has adopted defendant's statement of facts.

5.      5Having found that defendant's appearance via closed circuit
television at arraignment did not constitute plain error, the majority
comments:
			"Parenthetically, even if it had been error to conduct
defendant's arraignment by closed circuit television, defendant
would not have been able to demonstrate plain error. Section
113-6 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/113-6 (West 1998)) provides
that '[n]either a failure to arraign nor an irregularity in the
arraignment shall affect the validity of any proceeding in the
cause if the defendant pleads to the charge or proceeds to trial
without objecting to such failure or irregularity.' Thus, any
'irregularity' of conducting defendant's arraignment by closed
circuit television would have been waived once defendant
proceeded to trial without objection." Slip op. at 16.
To the extent that the majority is suggesting that a deprivation of
fundamental rights is not plain error if sanctioned by the legislature, I
disagree most respectfully but emphatically.

6.      6These provisions stand in contrast to section 109-1 of the Code. 725
ILCS 5/109-1 (West 1998). The latter provides:
		"Whenever a person arrested either with or without a warrant
is required to be taken before a judge, a charge may be filed
against such person by way of a two-way closed circuit
television system, except that a hearing to deny bail to the
defendant may not be conducted by way of closed circuit
television." 725 ILCS 5/109-1 (West 1998).

7.      7From my review of the record, I cannot determine what length of
time elapsed between each request from defendant to speak with
counsel and counsel's telephone call to defendant. For the most part, it
is also impossible to ascertain whether defense counsel telephoned
defendant from a telephone outside of the courtroom or used a
telephone in the courtroom.