Case Title: P. v. Farley

Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 1053

Docket Number: S024833a

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/2/09 (reposted same date to correct participating concurring justices) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S024833 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
RICHARD WADE FARLEY, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 123146 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders 
of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, 
Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, 189), the attempted 
murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, 
and Karen Mackey (§§ 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary (§§ 459, former § 460, subd. (2), now § 460, 
subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former § 594, subd. (b)(1)).  The jury found true 
the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while 
defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant 
was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes 
of first or second degree murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).  The jury also found true 
                                            
1 
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated (§ 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of 
murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm 
(§§ 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendant‘s 
personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley (§§ 12022.7, 
1203.075), and Black (§ 12022.7).  Following the penalty phase of the trial, the 
jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court denied defendant‘s motion for a 
new trial (§ 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict 
(§ 190.4, subd. (e)).  The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed 
sentence on the noncapital offenses.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. 
VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).)  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt phase evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
a.  Summary 
In 1984, while employed at Electromagnetic Systems Laboratory (ESL) in 
Sunnyvale as a computer technician, defendant became obsessed with coemployee 
Laura Black.  His unwelcome pursuit of Black, and his belligerent and threatening 
responses to ESL‘s attempts to stop his harassment of her, led to his termination 
from ESL in 1986.  He continued stalking and harassing Black, and threatened 
violence against others.  In 1988, Black obtained a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) against defendant.  During the approximately two-week period between the 
issuance of the TRO and the date scheduled for a hearing regarding a permanent 
injunction, defendant purchased a semiautomatic shotgun and large amounts of 
ammunition, visited shooting ranges to practice, and put his affairs in order.  On 
February 16, 1988, the day before the scheduled court hearing, he went to the ESL 
3 
facility where he had worked, shot and killed seven people, and wounded four 
others, including Black.  At trial, defendant conceded responsibility for the seven 
deaths, but claimed the shootings were not premeditated, and that defendant ―did 
not go to ESL to injure people or to destroy anything.‖   
b.  Events prior to February 16, 1988 
Laura Black testified concerning defendant‘s efforts to establish a personal 
relationship with her.  She recalled that they met in the spring of 1984.  Soon 
thereafter, defendant invited her to socialize with him, but she declined.  
Defendant continued to extend social invitations to her without success, to call her 
on the telephone, to leave her gifts, and to attend her aerobics classes and company 
softball games.  Black testified that she changed her residence three times between 
July 1985 and February 1988, but defendant obtained her new address each time, 
and surreptitiously obtained a key to one of these residences.  Between the fall of 
1984 and February 1988, she received approximately 150 to 200 letters from 
defendant, including two letters he sent to her parents‘ home in Virginia where she 
was visiting in December 1984.  She had not provided him with her parents‘ 
address.   
Various employees of ESL attempted to stop defendant‘s harassment of 
Black, and defendant reacted either defiantly or by threatening to commit violent 
acts.  Jean Tuffley, who was employed in ESL‘s human resources department, 
testified that she met with defendant in October 1985 regarding Black‘s 
complaints of harassment.  Defendant agreed at the meeting to cease sending 
letters and gifts to Black, following Black home, and using her computer terminal, 
but in December 1985 he again wrote to Black, threatening to visit her and her 
roommate.  Tuffley testified that she and defendant‘s supervisor, Charles 
4 
Lindauer, met with defendant in December 1985 and January 1986, and ESL 
issued defendant a written warning after each meeting.   
After the January 1986 meeting with Tuffley and Lindauer, defendant 
confronted Black at her residence‘s parking lot.  Black testified that defendant 
mentioned guns, told her he no longer was going to ask Black what to do and said 
he was going to tell her what to do.  Black further testified that the weekend after 
this encounter, she received a letter from defendant stating he would not kill her, 
but referencing ―a whole range of options, each getting worse and worse.‖  The 
letter warned, ―I do own guns and I‘m good with them,‖ and asked her not to 
―push‖ him.  It indicated that if neither of them yielded, ―pretty soon I crack under 
the pressure and run amok destroying everything in my path until the police catch 
me and kill me.‖  It also stated, ―You know I‘m serious when I show you a letter 
like this.‖   
In mid-February 1986, Tuffley testified, defendant stopped by her office and 
told her that ESL had no right to control his relationships with other individuals.  
Tuffley responded that sexual harassment is illegal, and that if defendant did not 
leave Black alone, his conduct would lead to his termination.  Tuffley testified that 
defendant calmly said, ―if we terminated him . . . he‘d have nothing to live for, and 
that he had guns and he wasn‘t afraid to use them, and . . . it would be over for him 
and he‘d take people with him.‖  Tuffley asked, ―Rich, are you saying that you 
would kill me?‖  Defendant said, ―Yes, but I would take others too.‖  Tuffley 
spoke to her supervisor, John Allen about her meeting with defendant and her fear 
of what he might do.  Thereafter, Tuffley explained, she did not interact with 
defendant; instead, Allen communicated directly with defendant.   
In late February or March 1986, Evor Vattuone, an ESL laboratory manager, 
met with defendant at defendant‘s request.  Vattuone testified that defendant was 
concerned about the possibility that Black would obtain a restraining order.  
5 
Vattuone told defendant he understood defendant had been bothering Black, and it 
would be good if defendant stopped.  Defendant told Vattuone he had every right 
to see Black anywhere, and described following Black home, driving by her home, 
and attending her softball games.  Vattuone told defendant this conduct was 
jeopardizing his job, and that Black was on ―the verge of getting a restraining 
order.‖  Defendant said he would be very upset if he received a restraining order, 
and did not know how he would respond.  Vattuone testified that he asked 
defendant what he meant, and defendant said, ―he had guns and he wasn‘t afraid to 
use them.‖  Vattuone understood that defendant was telling him he was ready to 
use guns, and he was going to get his own way ―no matter what.‖   
In March or April of 1986, Lloyd Bass, defendant‘s supervisor at ESL, told 
Dennis Elliott, defendant‘s former supervisor at ESL, that Bass had a problem 
with defendant leaving his work area and ―chasing some girl.‖  Elliott testified that 
Bass asked him to speak to defendant.  A few days later, Elliott told defendant he 
had learned that the human relations department was involved in a situation in 
which defendant was ― ‗hassling‘ a girl over at [ESL building] M-5 during 
working hours.‖  Elliott told defendant that ―it could cost him his job, it could cost 
him his clearances . . . .  He needed to be at his duty station and he should just do 
his job.‖  Elliott testified that defendant was ―really angry‖ and claimed, ―I don‘t 
care.  They can‘t hurt me.  I‘m not afraid of them.‖   
On May 2, 1986, ESL terminated defendant‘s employment, effective 
immediately.  Following his termination, defendant continued to write and place 
telephone calls to Black and to attend Black‘s softball games and aerobic classes, 
and he frequently was seen in or near the ESL parking lot.  At the end of the 
summer or early fall of 1986, defendant began dating Mei Chang, but he continued 
to harass Black.  On July 10, 1987, he wrote to Black, warning her not to obtain a 
restraining order.  His letter stated, ―It might not really occur to you how far I‘m 
6 
willing to go to upset you if I decide that‘s what I‘m forced to do.‖  In early 
October 1987, he wrote to Black, ―I‘ve nothing else to lose now but my life, so 
don‘t try pushing me any further.‖   
In November 1987, Thomas Burch, a longtime friend who had worked with 
defendant at ESL, spoke with him.  Burch testified that defendant was upset and 
worried, but not depressed.  Defendant told Burch that he owed the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) between $25,000 and $30,000 and that the IRS was about 
to attach his wages.2  He also said that if the IRS was not willing to ―give him 
some slack, that he didn‘t have anything or he didn‘t have much to live for.‖  
Defendant brought up the shooting massacre at a McDonald‘s restaurant in San 
Ysidro, and said, ―I wonder what they would do or what they would think if I did 
something like that.‖  Burch interpreted ―they‖ to mean ESL, and did not take 
defendant seriously.   
That same month, defendant wrote to Black, warning, ―This is going to 
escalate,‖ because, he believed, she thought he was ―a joke.‖  He advised her not 
to show his letters to anyone, because they might ―do something stupid which 
would make me do something stupid and it would spiral beyond any hope of 
recovery.‖  In December 1987, he asked in a letter to Black, ―[D]o you believe I 
can make you pay attention to me?‖   
That same month, the topic of ―shoot[ing] up‖ ESL was discussed during a 
conversation defendant had at a delicatessen with Gerald Hirst and homicide 
victim Lawrence Kane.  Hirst believed he was being forced to resign from ESL, 
and the three men discussed ESL‘s management practices.  Hirst testified that 
defendant inquired whether ―his girlfriend‖ Black was still at ESL and where her 
                                            
2 
In October 1987, defendant began working at Covalent Systems (Covalent).   
7 
office was located, and Kane provided him with directions.  The conversation 
returned to ESL‘s management, and Hirst said, ―What‘s it going to take to wake 
them up, some madman to come in there to shoot the computers, shoot the place 
up?‖  Hirst testified that as he left the table to get more coffee, he heard defendant 
say, ―I might do it.‖  When Hirst returned, Kane asked him whether the glass in 
the ESL Mardex security doors was bulletproof.  Hirst said he did not think so.  
Defendant said, ―Then double-aught buck would take care of that glass, wouldn‘t 
it?‖  Hirst agreed.  According to Hirst, the three of them ―fantasized and laughed 
and joked, about how funny it might be to go in [to] the company and shoot up the 
equipment.‖  Hirst was interested in investigating job opportunities at defendant‘s 
current employer, and gave defendant directions to his office at ESL.3   
In January 1988, ESL employee Robert Peterson confronted defendant, who 
was parked outside of ESL, and asked him to stop harassing Black.  Peterson 
testified that he told defendant something to the effect, ―If you continue doing this, 
you may have to go to jail.‖  Defendant responded that Peterson was ―only making 
things worse.‖  On January 23, 1988, approximately three weeks before the 
attacks, Black received a letter from defendant describing his encounter with 
Peterson and instructing her, ―You‘d better tell him to mind his own business. . . .  
[¶]  He doesn‘t have any idea what he‘s getting into.  You‘d better tell him, I‘d 
better never see any police around me.‖   
On February 2 or 3, 1988, Black obtained a TRO against defendant.  The 
hearing regarding a permanent injunction was scheduled for February 17, 1988, 
                                            
3 
Hirst left his employment at ESL on January 8, 1988.  On February 16, 
1988, the day the crimes were committed, his office was occupied by homicide 
victim Wayne Williams, whose body was found inside the office.  Williams shared 
the office with homicide victim Kane.   
8 
the day after the crimes were committed.  Black also sought $1,000 in attorney 
fees.  Black‘s attorney, Mary Bird, and Bird‘s receptionist and office manager, 
Ruth Day, testified that on or about February 9, defendant delivered a letter to 
Bird, claiming that, contrary to the declaration supporting the TRO, he had a 
relationship with Black.  He claimed to possess proof of this relationship, such as 
photographs of Black and defendant on dates, a garage door opener to Black‘s 
house, and hotel and credit card receipts.  On February 10, 1988, Bird prepared a 
notice in lieu of subpoena, requiring defendant to bring these items to court on 
February 17.   
In the meantime, defendant visited Bighorn Sporting Goods and asked Frank 
Janik, the store manager, to see something with ―high-capacity fire power.‖  Janik 
further testified that approximately one week later, on February 11, defendant 
returned to the store and purchased a Benelli riot configuration semiautomatic 
shotgun and ammunition.  He paid by check, which later was returned for 
insufficient funds.  According to Janik, defendant was ―very calm‖ when he 
purchased the weapon.  The same day, according to David Walker of Target 
Masters West, defendant rented a shooting lane at the shooting range, requested 
six silhouette or ―man-shaped‖ targets, and purchased 13 boxes of shotgun and 
pistol ammunition.  Walker further testified that the next day, defendant purchased 
1,000 rounds of .357 magnum handgun ammunition, one box of nine-millimeter 
hollow-point handgun ammunition, and three boxes of .380 hollow-point handgun 
ammunition.   
Approximately one week before the commission of the crimes, defendant 
spoke to Carolyn Gagnon, a secretary for Father Rewak, the president of Santa 
Clara University, where Black was enrolled.  Gagnon testified that defendant 
provided his name, and insisted upon seeing Father Rewak.  Gagnon told 
defendant that Father Rewak was not in, and asked him whether he wished to 
9 
leave a message.  Defendant declined, stating it did not matter anyway, because 
Father Rewak was always going to remember his name.  Gagnon testified that 
defendant was cocky when he said this, and displayed a sarcastic smile.   
Anthony Thurman of Homes Away From Home testified that on 
February 12, four days before the commission of the crimes, defendant visited the 
business and discussed renting a motor home.  Defendant returned that afternoon 
to fill out rental forms.  Catherine Mary Evangelista, the personnel supervisor for 
defendant‘s employer, Covalent, testified that, also on February 12, defendant 
eliminated Black as a beneficiary of two life insurance policies, and made Mei 
Chang the sole beneficiary.  Defendant was adamant the change had to be 
completed that day.   
Chang testified that very shortly before defendant was arrested, she and 
defendant rented a storage locker in Chang‘s name.  Defendant and a friend, 
Jerome Kaercher, moved some of defendant‘s belongings to a storage locker on 
either February 14 or 15.  Kaercher testified that defendant ―seemed extremely 
happy.‖  That same weekend, defendant moved belongings from the home of Lora 
Glaser, a former rental property that he had vacated in October 1987.  Glaser 
testified that defendant seemed ―upbeat, busy, productive, like he was getting 
something done.‖   
On February 15, defendant was seen by off-duty Santa Clara County Deputy 
Sheriff Larry Imas at the Santa Clara County public shooting range, where Imas 
was employed on a part-time basis.  Imas testified that defendant asked to 
purchase .22-250 ammunition, but there was none in stock.  The same day, 
defendant completed the paperwork for the motor home he had rented, and took 
possession of it.  Thurman testified that defendant did not behave out of the 
ordinary on this last visit to Homes Away From Home.  He also testified that 
defendant‘s check for the rental subsequently was returned for insufficient funds.  
10 
San Jose State University Professor John Avila, Jr., testified that on the evening of 
February 15, defendant told him that he was going to Southern California and 
would not be in class on Wednesday, February 17.   
c.  Events on February 16, 1988 
On Tuesday February 16, 1988, at approximately 8:00 a.m., defendant 
entered the accounting department of Covalent and asked for his paycheck.  Linda 
Emerson, the accounting manager, testified she told defendant the checks would 
be available at 10:00 a.m.  When defendant was asked why he needed his check at 
8:00 in the morning, he replied that ―he had to go buy a gun.‖  Early in the 
afternoon, defendant visited the Santa Clara County public shooting range.  Imas 
testified that he mentioned to the range owner and the supplier that defendant had 
been looking for .22-250 ammunition, and defendant showed them he had since 
acquired several boxes of the ammunition.4   
At about 2:50 p.m., defendant arrived in the Coachman motor home at ESL‘s 
offices in Sunnyvale.  He walked to ESL‘s two-story M-5 building with a shotgun 
in his hands, rifles strapped over his body, and approximately four bandoliers of 
ammunition strapped to his body.  He shot and killed ESL employee Lawrence 
Kane in the parking lot.  He then fired at Randell Hemingway, who safely ducked 
behind his car door.  Defendant shattered glass in the Mardex security doors to  
M-5 by firing one of his weapons.  Inside the building, he shot and killed six 
persons and wounded four others, including Black.  The precise sequence of 
events is unclear, but the evidence established that defendant generally walked 
slowly and deliberately through the building, shooting his victims at various 
                                            
4 
According to Janik, on or shortly before February 16, defendant visited 
Bighorn Sporting Goods for a third time and purchased more ammunition for a 
shotgun and a rifle.   
11 
locations in the facility.  In addition to committing these assaults, defendant fired 
at computer equipment and parts of the building.5   
The first report of the incident to a 911 operator was received at 2:53 p.m.  At 
approximately 3:15 p.m., a man identifying himself as Richard Farley placed a call 
on an inside emergency telephone line.  He told Robert Mancebo, an ESL security 
hardware repairperson, ―I‘m the one who has been wasting all these people.‖  
Mancebo testified that defendant also said he was calling ―to let us know why he 
was doing it, and that he wanted a recorder‖ so there would be a permanent record.  
Defendant said he was ―doing it . . . because of Laura Black and because of her 
lawyer and what they were doing.‖  Mancebo asked if defendant was going to kill 
anyone else, and he said no, he was ―just shooting up equipment.‖  Defendant 
terminated the call, but placed a second call on ESL‘s emergency telephone line a 
few minutes later.  He wanted to talk to the police, but no officers were in the 
security room at that time.  Mancebo and defendant had one or two more separate 
telephone conversations.  During the last call, Mancebo could think of nothing else 
to say, so he handed the telephone to ESL security officer Devin Matlock.  
Defendant told Matlock that he had told Black he would do something like this if 
her attorney obtained a restraining order.  Defendant also said he had a high-
powered rifle, and that Matlock should keep people 300 yards from the building.  
Matlock testified defendant did not sound depressed or agitated, but seemed as if 
he was anticipating that something interesting would be happening.   
At approximately 3:20 p.m., facilities engineering manager John Kitching 
received a call on an ESL emergency telephone line from a man who identified 
                                            
5 
ESL was paid $1,600,000 on its insurance claim, which included, among 
various items, equipment damage of $336,790, physical plant damage of $68,355, 
and associated internal costs to ESL of $40,929.   
12 
himself as ―Rich.‖  The caller said, ―Tell Mei Chang I‘m sorry.  I just got Laura.‖  
He also said, ―I‘ve got plenty of ammunition.  It will all be over at 5 o‘clock.‖   
At approximately 3:30 p.m., Captain Albert Scott of the Sunnyvale 
Department of Public Safety spoke to defendant.  Defendant seemed to him to be a 
―little bit excited.‖  When Scott asked defendant whether he had killed anyone, 
defendant said he had shot three or four individuals on the top floor but did not 
know how many were dead.  Defendant also said that Black had gone too far and 
that he had ―done this‖ to make a point.  He said she had belittled him, and he was 
getting even.  At one point, Scott asked whether defendant would surrender his 
guns and come down, and defendant said, ―No, I‘m not ready yet.  I want to gloat 
a little bit.‖   
At approximately 3:35 p.m., a caller who identified himself as ―Rich‖ told 
ESL telephone installer Robert Costanzo, who was assisting in answering the 
telephones, that he had an assault rifle, a shotgun, and some handguns, and enough 
ammunition — if he fired continuously — to last for two hours.  According to 
Costanzo, the caller was very clear and calm.   
During one of defendant‘s telephone conversations on the afternoon of 
February 16, Linda Walden, defendant‘s longtime friend and former landlady, 
who also worked at ESL, was hiding under the desk at which defendant was 
standing.  Defendant pulled out the chair, and said, ―Oh, there‘s someone here.  
You can come out now.  Oh, it‘s Linda.‖  When she emerged, he calmly told her 
she could leave.  Christine Hansen, who was hiding nearby, assumed it was the 
police evacuating the building.  She left her hiding place and encountered 
defendant.  She asked, ―Can I go, too?‖  Defendant said, ―Yes, you can go.‖  
Hansen testified that defendant‘s tone was ―regular,‖ and he was not angry or 
crying.   
13 
Lieutenant Ruben Grijalva of the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, an 
expert in hostage negotiations, negotiated by telephone with defendant from 
approximately 3:30 p.m. until he agreed to surrender at approximately 8:30 p.m.  
Defendant terminated the telephone communication with Grijalva several times to 
prevent the police from tracing the call.  The initial portion of the negotiations was 
not recorded, but Grijalva took notes.  According to Grijalva, in the initial 
conversations defendant was ―quite excited,‖ but his voice was not incoherent or 
slurred.  After approximately 30 to 45 minutes, ―his demeanor was much more 
calm, much more deliberate . . . .‖   
Defendant asked Grijalva to tell Black that her attorney and Bob Peterson 
had given her bad advice, and that ―he was sorry that they weren‘t there, too.‖  
Defendant told Grijalva that he was due to appear in court the next day, that Black 
had filed a lawsuit against him, and that all he wanted to do was date her.  
According to defendant, ―Had she gone out with him one time, none of this would 
have happened.‖  He said he had gone to the second floor and shot Black, and he 
wanted her to live and to remember what had occurred.  He said ―he knew what he 
had done was wrong and that he had to die because of it.‖  He constantly spoke of 
killing himself, or having the police kill him, but expressed fear the police only 
would wound him, and ―he didn‘t want to suffer.‖   
Grijalva testified defendant ―indicated that he was real good with guns‖ and 
―had several pistols and a high powered rifle and a shotgun with him.‖  When 
defendant mentioned target shooting, Grijalva inquired whether he was interested 
in hunting.  Defendant replied, ―I‘d rather kill people than animals.  It‘s not 
sporting to shoot animals.‖  When Grijalva asked how many individuals had been 
shot, defendant said there were ―three or four lying around the first floor and that 
everybody on the second floor was dead.‖  Defendant said he was ―not crazy and 
that he knew what he had done but he had to do it, he had to make a point.‖  He 
14 
told Grijalva that he almost changed his mind when he arrived at the parking lot, 
but that ―it had to be done and he didn‘t want Laura Black to think that he was a 
wimp.‖  He told Grijalva he had thought about doing this when he first received a 
notice to appear in court.   
Defendant asked Grijalva to tell his mother and father he was sorry.  He 
stated he was not sorry he had shot these victims; the only thing he was sorry 
about was shooting Black, because he wanted her to live and remember what had 
happened.  He also was sorry that ―Chuck‖ (Lindauer), who had terminated 
defendant‘s employment, was not there.   
Defendant told Grijalva that he did not plan to leave ESL alive, and had 
changed the beneficiary on his life insurance from Black to Mei Chang.  
Defendant said he had rented the motor home with a bad check and ―thought that 
was kind of funny.‖  He also told Grijalva that he had brought approximately 
1,000 rounds of ammunition and gasoline in the motor home ―to blow up ESL,‖ 
but that when he arrived, he could not carry everything.   
At approximately 4:30 p.m., defendant agreed to allow officers to enter the 
first floor of building M-5 to rescue injured individuals.  At some point thereafter, 
Grijalva‘s negotiating team obtained a tape recorder and recorded the remainder of 
the negotiations until defendant surrendered.  This recording was played for the 
jury.  Defendant declared, ―[T]here‘s no more reason to harm anybody.  I‘ve run 
out of enthusiasm for things really.‖  Defendant stated that he ―shot up a lot of 
terminals; I guess it‘s better than shooting people, . . . ‘cause it punishes ESL at 
the same time. . . .  I need to get back at somebody, basically.‖   
Defendant said that he told Peterson ―he would just cause a lot of trouble . . . 
and cause Laura to do things . . . she would regret; and this kind of stuff ‘cause I 
tried telling her that, you know, I wouldn‘t take this.  She got me fired and, . . . I 
wasn‘t going to let her do anything more to me, really.‖  Defendant told Grijalva, 
15 
―I never really wanted to hurt her.  I just wanted her to know that I was serious 
and, as I say, if we just could‘ve talked, and we hadn‘t got this court thing and she 
didn‘t try to sue me for $1,000 — and then this last letter, you know, that says 
bring all this stuff: it was just the final straw; I just had it.‖   
Grijalva inquired, ―So when you got up today, did you decide today that you 
wanted to hurt her?‖  Defendant responded, ―I didn‘t decide that I wanted to hurt 
her until I got that letter in the mail that said, you know, now you‘re going to bring 
this evidence and now we‘re really going to, you know — I took it as a real threat, 
where I was [in] real serious trouble now.  So until 10 o‘clock this . . . morning 
time, I really hadn‘t given any thought to hurting her.‖  
Grijalva asked, ―When you came down here this afternoon, . . . did you have 
anybody in mind that you wanted to shoot or just because they were a threat to 
you?‖  Defendant said, ―They were a threat to me; I wanted to destroy a lot of 
equipment at ESL. . . .  I came down to destroy, do as much damage to ESL 
equipment as I could.‖  Grijalva asked, ―And you didn‘t intend or plan on shooting 
any persons?‖  Defendant said, ―Yeah, some people popped out from around 
corners and stuff like that, um, and I just shot.‖  Grijalva continued, ―Was there 
anything in particular that you wanted to destroy here at ESL?‖  Defendant 
responded, ―No, I just want Laura to know I was serious. . . .  I wanted to do as 
much damage to their computer equipment and just cause them a lot of money 
loss.‖  He later noted, ―I‘m tired of shooting equipment and I‘m tired of shooting 
terminals.  They just explode, spread glass on me.  It‘s not any fun anymore.‖   
Grijalva asked defendant about the victims, inquiring, ―Other than Laura, do 
you know any of the people you shot today?‖  Defendant responded, ―No.‖  
Grijalva asked, ―So you don‘t even know them personally?‖  Defendant 
confirmed, ―I don‘t know them personally, no.  In fact, I have no idea who half of 
them were. . . .  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  I have to tell you, though, that if I‘d recognized 
16 
Peterson, I think I would have shot him, realistically.  Because I was pissed at him.  
I mean, him and [Black‘s attorney], . . . if they had come into my sights, I would 
have got them.‖  Defendant described how he ―went up to Laura‘s office, yeah, 
and then she tried to shove the door thing, so I fired around . . . through the door.  
And then . . . she fell against it.‖  
Defendant asked whether Black had survived.  When Grijalva said he did not 
know, defendant responded, ―I hope she‘s doing good. . . .  [I]f the slug did catch 
her, or the whatever it was that I hit her with, she can‘t regret it if she doesn‘t live.  
And that was . . . my feelings at the time.‖  During his conversations with Grijalva, 
defendant never expressed any remorse for the seven individuals killed.   
At approximately 8:30 p.m., defendant surrendered to the police after 
requesting and receiving the promise of a sandwich and a soft drink.  Toxicology 
analysis of his blood did not show the presence of either alcohol or drugs.   
Inside M-5, the police discovered a Benelli riot configuration semiautomatic 
shotgun, a rifle with a scope, a pump-action shotgun, a Sentinel revolver, a Smith 
& Wesson .357 magnum revolver, a Browning semiautomatic pistol, a Smith & 
Wesson pistol, a smoke bomb, a leather glove, a belt with pouches filled with 
ammunition, other bags containing more than 200 rounds of ammunition, and a 
vest containing more than 800 rounds of ammunition, wooden matches, a foot-
long buck knife and sheath, and ear protectors.  A search of the motor home found 
in the ESL parking lot disclosed four gallons of gasoline, a loaded semiautomatic 
pistol, and more than 2,000 rounds of ammunition.  A search of defendant‘s 
residence revealed a Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun barrel, a Ruger .22-caliber 
carbine, a gun clip, a gas mask, ammunition and empty boxes of ammunition, a 
reloading press, three cans of gunpowder, and gun-cleaning equipment.  Various 
documents — including the TRO, the notice in lieu of subpoena, and the motor 
17 
home rental agreement, were on the dining room table.  Defendant‘s will was in 
plain view on top of a computer terminal.   
On February 23, 1988, defendant said to another prisoner, ―I think they 
should be lenient since it‘s my first offense.‖  After the other prisoner made a 
comment, defendant replied, ―If I did it again, then they should throw the book at 
me.‖  The tone was conversational, and not joking or agitated.   
In March 1988, defendant wrote to Black, ―When I go to the gas chamber, 
I‘ll smile for the cameras and you‘ll know that you‘ll have won in the end.‖  In 
April 1988, he wrote to Chrysler Credit Corporation, ―I‘m in jail and will no 
longer be able to make payments.  [¶]  I would like the previous bank to know, its 
harassing letters and failure to allow me to purchase the car were contributing 
factors to the death of seven innocent people.‖  It was signed, ―Rich Farley  [¶]  
mass murderer.‖   
On March 11, 1989, defendant wrote to his friend Tom Burch, ―I‘m glad 
Laura‘s ok. . . . I hope she understands if I‘d really wanted to hurt her – she 
wouldn‘t be here today.‖ 
2.  Defense Evidence 
a.  Defendant’s testimony 
Defendant was born on July 25, 1948 at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas.  
His father was an aircraft mechanic in the Air Force, and his mother was a 
homemaker.  The family moved frequently before settling in Petaluma when he 
was seven or eight years of age.  He graduated from high school and attended one 
year of junior college.  He then enlisted in the Navy in 1967, and served for 10 
years.  He worked in cryptologic technician maintenance, which involved working 
with classified electronic systems, and traveled extensively.   
18 
In October 1977, upon his discharge from the Navy, he began working for 
ESL.  Initially he was employed at the Sunnyvale facility, and then worked as a 
field service engineer for five years in Australia.  He returned to the Sunnyvale 
facility in 1984.  In the middle of July 1984, defendant met Laura Black and ―fell 
instantly in love with her.‖  Approximately one month later, Black agreed to go to 
lunch with defendant and his friend Burch.  That lunch was defendant‘s and 
Black‘s sole social outing.   
Defendant described the steps he took to surreptitiously learn Black‘s 
birthday, home address, academic background, residence address, the addresses of 
her relatives, and her schedule, and how he obtained copies of her office, desk, and 
residence keys.  At the time defendant was obtaining information about Black, he 
did not believe his actions were wrong.  He explained that the environments in 
which he had worked fostered an attitude that gathering information was not 
wrong.  In the Navy and at ESL, he was granted security clearances, and his access 
to information gave him a feeling of power.  His work in the Navy and in 
Australia involved spying, and he saw no difference between the government‘s 
authority to spy and his ability to spy, so ―long as . . . I didn‘t harm anybody.‖  He 
developed a sense that, with secret information, ―I can, in essence, get away with 
things that normal people wouldn‘t be able to get away with. . . .  In other words, 
we go into like a[n] elite society.‖   
Defendant testified concerning his attempts to socialize with Black, and her 
rejection of him.  He testified he made his letters more threatening so that Black 
would speak to him, but ―[a]s I read the letters now, they seem much more 
intimidating and much more threatening than what I really intended them to be at 
the time that I wrote them.‖   
Defendant contradicted the testimony of many other witnesses.  He denied 
telling human resources employee Jean Tuffley that if he was terminated he would 
19 
have nothing to live for, that he had guns and knew how to use them, or that he 
would take people with him.  He claimed he did not threaten Tuffley and others.  
He asserted he did not tell laboratory manager Evor Vattuone that he had guns and 
was not afraid to use them.  According to defendant, he and Vattuone had spoken 
about defendant‘s losing his job, not about restraining orders.  He denied that he 
and Dennis Elliott discussed Laura Black, and denied that Elliott told him that he 
could lose his job and his clearances.  He asserted he was not angry when ESL 
terminated him, did not know Gerald Hirst, and did not make a reference to the 
San Ysidro McDonald‘s massacre when speaking with Tom Burch.  He also 
claimed he was not angry when he received the TRO, although he was annoyed by 
the request for $1,000 and by the term in the restraining order prohibiting him 
from going to the fitness center to which Black and defendant belonged.  He 
denied speaking to Carolyn Gagnon or attempting to see the president of Santa 
Clara University.  He also asserted he did not attempt to get his paycheck early on 
February 16 and did not tell Linda Emerson, the accounting manager, that he 
needed his check so he could buy a gun.   
Defendant also testified concerning some of his activities in the days 
preceding the commission of the crimes.  He sold his Suburban truck on Thursday 
February 11, placing a sale advertisement the Monday or Tuesday prior to that 
date.  He claimed he did not visit Big Horn Sporting Good Store until February 11 
and went there to look at paintball shooters.6  He purchased the Benelli shotgun 
because ―it happened to be there‖ and because he liked and wanted it.  He 
explained that he moved two guns from a former residence the weekend before 
                                            
6 
Mei Chang testified that she accompanied defendant to a paintball event 
about January 1988, and that he expressed interest in participating.   
20 
committing the crimes, because he wanted to display his gun collection to Black.  
He stated he bought the ammunition vest a day or so before committing the 
crimes.   
Defendant testified he went to ESL on February 16 to convince Black not to 
proceed with her legal action against him.  He stated he also planned to intimidate 
Black into entering the motor home and to take photographs of her to demonstrate 
at the court hearing that he and Black had a personal relationship.  He also wanted 
to show his sizeable gun collection to Black in order to convince her not to appear 
in court the next day.  Defendant agreed with the prosecutor that he wanted Black 
to believe he would kill persons at ESL if she went through with obtaining the 
restraining order.  Defendant added, however, that his planned demonstration was 
―just all bluff.‖  He claimed that if none of his plans worked, he planned to kill 
himself in front of Black.   
Defendant testified that after he arrived at ESL, he loaded ammunition in an 
ammunition vest ―to keep myself busy.‖  He stated that he put holstered guns, clip 
boxes, ammunition pouches, and a knife on his belt because he was bored.  
Consequently, he testified, he was wearing his ―.380 in front, the ammo pouch in 
front, .357 magnum to my right side, the .22 magnum behind it, a large buck knife 
behind that, numerous clips around the other side, and my vest, my nine 
millimeter, my two shotguns, and I tied a cord around the .22-250 and just draped 
it over me.‖  He recalled that he then put on his left leather glove and earplugs.  At 
this point he did not believe he could go through with talking to Black or taking 
photographs of her, because that was ―not the kind of behavior that I had ever 
done before,‖ and he agreed with the prosecutor that ―it was tougher to take the 
pictures than to kill myself.‖  He testified that he decided instead to go to Black‘s 
office and commit suicide in front of her.  He claimed that, other than shooting the 
21 
front door to gain entrance to ESL‘s facility, he did not intend to do any damage to 
ESL or to shoot anyone but himself.   
Defendant had a vague recollection of the ensuing events.  He recalled that in 
the parking lot, he saw ―somebody behind me with his arm raised, and I remember 
the gun going off once or twice.‖  He remembered shooting through the Mardex 
doors.  He testified that someone rushed by him and then turned around to come 
back at him, and he recalled firing repeatedly and the person disappearing.  He 
next remembered being on the landing and becoming aware of someone at the 
bottom of the stairs.  Defendant recalled shooting, adding:  ―The only thing I‘m 
thinking is to get to Laura‘s office.  These people pop up and I just shoot.‖   
Defendant next remembered being at Black‘s office.  He recalled that her 
back was to him, and she turned around smiling, but the smile disappeared ―as 
soon as she saw me.‖  Defendant testified he was stunned by the smile, and as he 
looked at the smile, the gun went off.  He ―distinctly remember[ed] not having any 
idea how the thing went off.‖  He testified that the door closed in his face.   
Defendant‘s recall of the ensuing events was fragmented and lacked 
chronological order.  He testified that at some point he watched an armed person 
walking down the hallway, who apparently was himself.  He remembered shooting 
a door lock, but was not aware of anyone being behind the door.  He remembered 
seeing Linda Walden, his former landlady.  He testified that he told her to come 
out from under the desk, and that she asked whether there was something she 
could do for him.  He told her ―no, to get out,‖ which she did.  He recalled that 
another woman asked whether she also could go, and ―I told her she could.‖  He 
testified that he felt he had to move from telephone to telephone because he did 
not want his calls traced to his location.   
Defendant testified he did not know any of the victims except Black.  He did 
not remember shooting any equipment, but did remember seeing that the 
22 
equipment was damaged.  There was, however, no doubt in his mind at trial that 
he shot the individuals killed on February 16, 1988, and damaged the equipment.   
Defendant did not recall many of the unrecorded statements he made while 
he was inside the M-5 building.  With respect to his recorded statement, defendant 
testified that he repeatedly lied to Grijalva regarding why he went to ESL, in order 
to avoid being placed in a mental institution.  He expressed confusion concerning 
why he made some incriminating remarks during the recorded statement and gave 
benign explanations for others.  He testified he was not angry at ESL and never 
wanted to hurt Black.   
b.  Expert testimony 
Dr. Charles Raymond Marmar, a psychiatrist and associate professor at the 
University of California at San Francisco Medical Center, testified for the defense 
as an expert on the role of stress in dissociative disorders.  He did not examine or 
test defendant, and expressed no opinion regarding defendant‘s mental state.  
Marmar testified that ―peritraumatic trans disassociation‖ refers to disassociation 
occurring at the time a stressful or traumatic event is taking place.  He explained 
that such dissociative experiences have some or all of the following features:  
(1) blanking out, or feeling unconnected with the experience, (2) going on ―auto-
pilot,‖ rather than performing ―consciously decided willful acts;‖ (3) experiencing 
an altered sense of the passage of time; (4) depersonalizing the experience so that 
it appears to be happening to someone else; (5) feeling outside one‘s own body 
and watching oneself from the outside; (6) perceiving a visual change in one‘s 
own body or the physical world; (7) experiencing confusion about what is 
happening to other individuals and to oneself, for example thinking when a family 
member is injured that oneself is the person injured; (8) experiencing 
psychological amnesia, or not remembering all or parts of the experience; and 
23 
(9) not feeling physical pain from an injury at the time of the trauma.  According 
to Marmar, ―[T]he single most important factor that leads people to disassociation 
is a highly stressful or traumatic life experience.‖  He explained that ―the person is 
faced with catastrophic consequences to themselves and others at the time of the 
event and . . . [the person‘s] mind cannot comprehend and fully accept what‘s 
happening to them.‖  He testified that a decision to kill oneself can result in such 
disassociation.  He further testified that although struggling with a combination of 
chronic financial, emotional, and legal stresses generally would not result in 
disassociation, such struggles might ―weaken the person and leave them 
vulnerable to disassociation.‖  According to Marmar, a person in a dissociative 
state may not appear bizarre or psychotic, but may seem merely spaced out, a little 
confused, or highly preoccupied.  Marmar explained that the veracity of a person‘s 
reported experience of disassociation may be evaluated through interviews with 
family and friends, as well as through various tests.   
3.  Rebuttal Evidence 
Mark McGinnis testified that on February 11, 1988, he purchased a 1984 
Suburban diesel truck from defendant.  According to McGinnis, the asking price 
of $5,000 was ―about twenty-five percent of its value.‖  McGinnis looked at the 
truck, which needed the transmission repaired, and purchased it for $4,500.  
McGinnis testified that defendant was nervous and fidgety.  McGinnis drove the 
truck for more than two years in conjunction with his business, and then sold it for 
$9,000.   
Richard Newbold testified that he worked with Jean Tuffley for at least five 
or six years.  At some point in the one to three months before Newbold left ESL in 
mid-April 1986, Tuffley told Newbold that defendant had threatened to kill her.  
24 
Newbold described Tuffley as ―very distraught.‖  According to Newbold, Tuffley 
was ―a pretty level-headed person,‖ and he had not seen her like that previously.   
Peri Vattuone was married to Evor Vattuone.  She testified that at some point 
in early 1986, Evor came home from work upset.  He said he had just had a long 
conversation with defendant, who had said things that scared him.  Peri testified 
that one such statement was that defendant possessed guns and knew how to use 
them, or something to that effect.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
The prosecution did not present any additional evidence.   
2.  Defense evidence 
a.  From relatives and friends 
Mina Belle Farley, defendant‘s mother, testified that she married defendant‘s 
father in 1947, and they remained married at the time of trial.  Defendant‘s father 
was an airplane mechanic in the Air Force.  They had six children, of whom 
defendant was the eldest.  The family moved frequently, but when defendant was 
about seven years of age, they settled in Petaluma.  His mother described him as a 
very quiet boy who required little attention from his parents.  In high school he 
was quiet, and did not smoke, drink, or use drugs.  His mother testified that he 
spent much of his time studying, and also played table tennis and chess, enjoyed 
photography, and baked.  His high school grades were ―very good,‖ and he 
graduated 61st out of 520 high school students.   
Mina Farley testified that defendant‘s father spent long periods of time away 
from the family while he was in the Air Force, but when he was home, he would 
spend time with the children.  She stated that he retired from the Air Force in 
1960, and then worked as a school custodian, spending little time with defendant 
25 
because of his work schedule.  According to her, there was much love in the 
house, but the family displayed little outward affection.   
Mina Farley testified that she did not see defendant often after he joined the 
Navy.  In 1973, she and her husband moved to Texas, where they resided at the 
time of trial.  She recalled that defendant visited them in Texas twice between 
1973 and 1988, and that the most recent occasion on which she had seen defendant 
prior to February 16, 1988, was in 1986 or 1987, while she was visiting her 
daughter.   
Defendant‘s mother also recalled that when defendant was 10 years of age, 
he helped care for his younger siblings while she was in the hospital and his father 
was stationed in Japan.  She testified that defendant did not have a bad temper, nor 
did she ever see him act violently toward his siblings.  She stated she was shocked 
when she heard about the ESL shootings, ―[b]ecause that wasn‘t Rick.‖  She 
testified she loved him and was proud of the fact that he tried to obtain an 
education, did not ―run around,‖ and did not smoke, consume alcohol, or use 
illegal drugs.   
Gregory Farley, defendant‘s brother, testified that defendant was nonviolent 
while growing up.  He recalled that when defendant was about 10 years of age, 
and Gregory was six years of age, Gregory, who could not swim, fell into a 
swimming pool and defendant rescued him.  He also recalled that defendant 
helped him learn to drive, and sold him a vehicle at a very low price.  Defendant‘s 
brother described defendant as someone from whom he could seek advice, 
although he could not recall any specific occasion on which he had done so.  
Defendant‘s brother had resided in Germany since 1972, and at the time defendant 
was arrested he had not seen defendant in 16 years.  The brother also stated they 
never wrote to each other or spoke by telephone.  He agreed that he ―probably‖ did 
26 
not know defendant at all as an adult, and that the person he knew as a child was 
―totally different‖ from a person who would commit these crimes.   
Lois Eaquinto resided on the same street in Petaluma as defendant when he 
was growing up, and was close to his mother.  She testified that defendant‘s home 
was well-kept.  She stated that defendant‘s brothers, but not defendant, joined her 
boys in attending church services.  She also stated that defendant‘s father was 
absent in the military much of the time, and she could not recall ever having had a 
conversation with him.  According to Eaquinto, when defendant‘s father was 
home ―everything revolved around him,‖ and defendant and his brothers did not 
play with Eaquinto‘s boys during those periods.  Eaquinto witnessed little 
interaction between defendant and his parents, and little reaction by the parents to 
their children‘s accomplishments.  She also testified that defendant sometimes was 
―real rough‖ with his brothers, sitting on them and twisting their arms and stepping 
on their fingers.   
Lois‘s son, Francis Eaquinto, was the same age as defendant, and they played 
and attended school together.  Francis testified that defendant was the smarter of 
the two, was more interested in math and science, and was conscientious about his 
schoolwork.  He recalled that defendant‘s father was strict, but Francis felt 
welcome at defendant‘s house when the father was home.  Francis had not seen 
defendant since graduating from high school.   
George Duisman grew up on the same street as defendant, and was 
defendant‘s best friend when they were teenagers.  He testified they played table 
tennis, chess, and bridge, and enjoyed chemistry and math.  According to 
Duisman, defendant did well in school and was not violent.   
Thomas Vail met defendant when defendant was a teenager.  Vail testified 
that defendant was well-mannered and had a curious mind.  He stated that 
defendant and Duisman studied bridge, and that defendant was not violent.   
27 
Dianne Mahan had at least one class with defendant in high school.  She 
testified that they were not friends socially, and that defendant was quiet and 
studious.   
In defendant‘s senior year of high school, Paula Stonitsch taught his class in 
American Institutions.  Stonitsch testified that although he received a ―C‖ in her 
class, he was a very good student.   
b.  Defendant’s service in the Navy 
Joseph Armas, an expert in the interpretation of military service records and 
performance evaluations, testified regarding defendant‘s military record.  
According to Armas, several tests were administered to defendant during his first 
three weeks in the Navy.  He performed well on the General Classification Test 
and on tests for mechanical abilities, ―electric selection,‖ clerical abilities, 
arithmetic, sonar, and programming aptitude, but did not do well on the foreign 
language aptitude test.  Defendant volunteered for submarine duty, and after 
taking extensive psychological and agility tests, was recommended for that duty.  
He graduated first in his class of six at Naval Submarine School, but did not 
remain in the submarine program, apparently withdrawing voluntarily.  Defendant 
received high evaluations during his two enlistment periods (1968 to 1971 and 
1971 to 1977) and was honorably discharged at the conclusion of each enlistment 
period.  
Kent Wells, a Navy personnel security specialist, testified concerning 
defendant‘s work in the military and at ESL.  After finishing basic training, 
defendant was trained to be a ―cryptologic technician‖ — a person who maintains 
electronic equipment.  Wells testified that there were three levels of security 
clearance, the lowest being ―confidential,‖ the middle being ―secret,‖ and the 
highest being ―top-secret.‖  Because the Navy‘s cryptologic function was a highly 
28 
classified mission, the Office of Naval Intelligence investigated all cryptologic 
technicians to determine whether they could be granted not only top-secret 
clearance, but also access to very sensitive ―compartmented‖ information that 
others with top-secret clearance could access on only a ―need to know‖ basis.  The 
security clearances received by defendant could be granted only to individuals 
who were found to be trustworthy, reliable, of unquestioned character, and loyal to 
the government of the United States.  The investigation was repeated every five 
years to check for intervening disqualifying information.  Defendant was granted 
top-secret clearance and access to sensitive compartmented information in 
November 1968, and throughout his naval career he performed work that required 
top-security clearances.   
Wells further testified that at the time defendant served in the Naval Security 
Group, the Group‘s national defense mission was to collect certain intelligence 
information about adversaries and to disseminate that information to the military 
and to various intelligence agencies.  Defendant contributed to the security of the 
United States by maintaining the Naval Security Group‘s equipment, thereby 
enabling the gathering of information.  Wells agreed with defense counsel that, in 
this context, defendant was ―vital to the national defense,‖ testifying that much of 
defendant‘s work still was classified at the time of trial.  Defendant also 
maintained equipment that assisted in search and rescue missions for aircraft or 
ships in distress, and thereby helped to save lives as well as ships and aircraft.   
c.  Defendant’s work at ESL 
Defendant began working at ESL in approximately November 1977, and 
received a top-secret security clearance from the Department of Defense in March 
1978.  No background investigation was performed, because defendant had left the 
29 
Navy so recently, and no subsequent investigation occurred because of funding 
shortages.   
Richard Rose, a Department of Defense contracting officer, testified 
regarding defendant‘s work at ESL.  ESL specialized in building direction-finding 
equipment and signal-processing systems for the United States government.  
Defendant worked in three areas — testing, repair, and preventative and corrective 
maintenance.  From November 1977 through June 1979, defendant was involved 
in a project concerning the research and development of direction-finding 
equipment and its installation on ground vehicles and aircraft.  The equipment 
enabled a military commander to determine the location of enemy communication 
or radar transmitters, and thereby learn the location and strength of enemy forces.   
From June 1979 through June 1984, defendant was assigned to the Joint 
Defense Space Research Facility in Australia.  Rose testified that this facility, 
which was shared by the United States and Australian governments, provided 
―valuable contributions to the verification of arms control and disarmament 
agreements.‖  Defendant and others provided round-the-clock maintenance of the 
electronic equipment, including diagnostic and repair functions.  According to 
Rose, defendant‘s contribution ―could be considered essential in that he was 
maintaining equipment that was of a significant value to the defense of the United 
States.‖  Rose also testified that according to the Secretary of Defense, all of the 
projects on which defendant worked were ―vital to the national defense,‖ and 
disclosure of any of this classified information could, according to the Secretary, 
result in ― ‗exceptionally grave harm to the national defense and public relations of 
the United States.‘ ‖  Defendant‘s four ESL performance evaluations for this work 
were 99 percent, 96 percent, 96.5 percent, and 98 percent.   
30 
From June 1984 until his termination by ESL in May 1986, defendant‘s work 
involved feasibility studies for the United States National Security Agency.  This 
project analyzed equipment that might be developed, and how it would function.   
d.  Other mitigating evidence 
Brian Messing, a systems engineer for ESL, worked with defendant in 
Australia.  Messing testified that he considered defendant the best technician at the 
facility, because he was conscientious about his tasks.  According to Messing, 
defendant took an active interest in his assignments, and ―would go out of his way 
to learn something else about the system.‖  Messing testified that defendant 
assisted Messing on an occasion when Messing‘s vehicle ran out of gasoline at 
night on an isolated stretch of road.  Other drivers had passed him by without 
stopping.  Defendant gave him a ride back to the ESL site to obtain gasoline, and 
then drove him back to his vehicle.  Messing also stated that during a conversation 
on another occasion in Australia, defendant mentioned he owned several guns and 
a crossbow.   
Alcina Sousa knew defendant at San Jose State University.  She testified that 
he always would offer to look at and comment upon computer programs she had 
written.  She also would see him in the hallways helping other students or just 
being friendly.  He did not seem violent to Sousa, but instead very calm.  He told 
Sousa about an incident in which he pulled someone‘s vehicle out of the snow 
with his truck.  After defendant‘s arrest, Sousa visited him in jail.  She testified 
that much of their conversation was about her life.   
Stanley Hilberg shared a home with defendant from September 1986 to the 
end of January 1987.  He testified that defendant was congenial and very 
responsible.  He also testified that defendant had a shotgun in his room.   
31 
Joseph Nielsen, who was 71 years of age, resided on the same street as 
defendant in late 1987 and early 1988.  Nielsen had spoken to defendant on 
several occasions, and testified he seemed like a very nice young man.   
Lynn Clay and Gregory Debord testified that defendant performed well when 
he was employed at Covalent.  Defendant‘s responsibilities were undertaken in a 
timely manner, and he provided needed expertise.  Clay testified that defendant 
was patient and responsive when dealing with customers.  Debord noted that 
defendant seemed able to control himself.   
Department of Corrections assistant director Robert Conroy and Santa Clara 
County Deputy Sheriff James Teichner testified that while in jail, defendant was 
courteous and respectful to officers.  Conroy further testified that defendant was 
allowed to use a calculator and a typewriter, which were special privileges.  
Defendant wrote Conroy a thank you note for providing these materials — unusual 
action for an inmate to take.  Teichner, Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Hunter, 
Correctional Officer James Darnell, and Correctional Officer Libby Reynolds 
testified that defendant did not cause any problems for officers when he was 
transported from jail to court.   
Darnell further testified that while in jail, defendant was selected to be a 
trustee.  This role required an ability to work independently.  During the three 
months Darnell was assigned to defendant‘s housing unit, defendant did a ―great 
job‖ working as a trustee.   
Reynolds and Judith Pelite, a teacher who provided jail educational services, 
testified that defendant studied mathematics.  Pelite, Reynolds, Hunter, and inmate 
Wayne Nichols testified that defendant tutored other inmates in mathematics.  
Nichols further testified that defendant was patient and encouraging.   
32 
3.  Rebuttal Evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant‘s misconduct while in jail.  
During a May 1990 search of defendant‘s jail cell, scrubbing pads, used to polish 
the floors, were found hidden in a paper bag.  An infraction report was written.  In 
June 1988, during a search of defendant‘s cell, a razor blade, two towels, a bag of 
sugar, 13 books, and 10 magazines were found.  It was determined that defendant 
had committed a minor infraction, and as a penalty he lost use of the sun deck.  In 
March 1989, while defendant was serving as a trustee, he turned off the juice 
machine to save juice for the trustees, despite having been instructed by an officer  
to leave it on.  He turned the machine on again when ordered to do so, but became 
agitated.  He raised his voice and confronted the officer in front of the other 
inmates.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Change of venue motions  
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his two motions for 
change of venue7 in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  We disagree. 
                                            
7 
As to this, and almost every other appellate claim, defendant contends the 
alleged error infringed his constitutional rights.  In those instances in which he did 
not present constitutional theories below, it appears either that (1) the appellate 
claim is one that required no objection to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments are 
based upon factual or legal standards no different from those the trial court was 
asked to apply but raise the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution.  ―To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not 
forfeited on appeal.‖  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  No 
separate constitutional discussion is required, or provided, when rejection of a 
claim on the merits necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or 
―gloss‖ raised for the first time on appeal.  (Ibid.)   
33 
a.  Factual Background 
On July 17, 1989, two years before trial, defendant filed a motion for a 
change of venue.  At the hearing on the motion, held before Judge John Flaherty, 
defendant produced expert testimony, newspaper articles, and television news 
reports.  On August 21, 1989, the trial court denied the motion without prejudice 
to its renewal after voir dire.  The trial court expressed the view that ―this is an 
extremely close case,‖ and stated that its decision to deny the motion was based in 
part ―on the applicability of the Hovey voir dire. . . .  I‘m satisfied that by the use 
of that . . . extensive voir dire procedure, that the defendant here can receive a fair 
trial in this county.‖  (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1.)   
Almost two years later, on June 13, 1991, after jury voir dire, defendant filed 
a second motion for a change of venue.  The hearing on the second motion was 
held before Judge Joseph Biafore, the trial judge, on June 26, 1991, the day before 
the parties were scheduled to exercise peremptory challenges.  The court 
considered the moving papers, the hearing transcript, and the exhibits from the 
first motion for a change of venue, as well as written and oral arguments and 
additional exhibits, including newspaper articles, television news reports, and 
summaries of voir dire responses, received prior to and at the hearing on the 
second motion for a change of venue.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 
announced it would defer ruling on the motion until 12 jurors were chosen, to 
allow the court to ―take a good hard look at those particular people seated in terms 
of analyzing whether or not the Defendant would, in fact, receive a fair trial from 
those persons.‖   
Following the selection of 12 jurors, but before they were sworn and before 
alternates were selected, the court heard further argument, and then denied the 
motion.  The court found that the gravity of the offense, and the nature and extent 
of the publicity, weighed in favor of granting the motion, but also noted that 
34 
during voir dire, prospective jurors indicated there was ―a spate of media 
exposure,‖ followed by a decline in news reports.  ―[M]any of them indicated 
there was actually nothing they heard about this case until the time for jury 
selection. . . .  [I]n the intervening time, there was not a great mass of media 
exposure.  This case did not generate the type of hysteria that counsel for the 
defense was talking about.‖  The court also found that the status of the victims and 
defendant, who were not well-known in the community, weighed against granting 
the motion.  The ―most salient factor,‖ the court found, was the size of the 
community.  The population of Santa Clara County was large, approaching 1.5 
million persons.  With respect to the jurors selected, the court had ―no doubt that 
these people will follow the law as instructed by the court.‖  The jurors ―exhibited 
to the court that they can set aside whatever opinions, impressions that they may 
have derived from the media and judge . . . this case fairly and squarely on the 
evidence presented in this courtroom.‖  The court found no reasonable likelihood 
defendant could not receive a fair trial ―in this community.‖   
b.  Analysis 
―A trial court must order a change of venue for trial of a criminal case to 
another county on motion of the defendant ‗when it appears that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held in the county.‘  
(§ 1033, subd. (a).)‖  (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1250.)  We 
consider the correctness of the trial court‘s ruling at the time it was made.  (People 
v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1127 (Zambrano), disapproved on different 
grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 (Doolin).)  ― ‗We 
will sustain the court‘s determination of the relevant facts where supported by 
substantial evidence.  We independently review the court‘s ultimate determination 
of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial.‘ ‖  (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
35 
546, 598 (Hart).)  ―Both the trial court‘s initial venue determination and our 
independent evaluation are based on a consideration of five factors:  ‗(1) nature 
and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of 
the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prominence of the 
victim.‘ ‖  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1394 (Leonard).)  ―On 
appeal, a defendant challenging a trial court‘s denial of a motion for change of 
venue must show both error and prejudice:  that is, that at the time of the motion it 
was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in the county, and that it 
was reasonably likely that a fair trial was not had.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Davis  
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 578).) 
We begin with defendant‘s initial motion, which was made before jury voir 
dire took place.  The first factor of the analysis — the nature and gravity of the 
offense — weighed in favor of a change of venue for the trial of these seven 
senseless murders.  The same could be said, however, of most capital crimes, and 
we have concluded that this factor is not dispositive.  (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 475, 506; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 224.)  Indeed, on 
numerous occasions we have upheld the denial of change of venue motions in 
cases involving multiple murders.  (See, e.g., Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1395, 1397 [six counts of murder]; People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 
407, 434-435 (Ramirez) [13 counts of murder]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
701, 721, 744-745 [six counts of murder].)  
We next consider the nature and extent of the media coverage, the factor 
upon which defendant primarily relies.  Defendant presented evidence of 
numerous newspaper articles and television news stories that discussed or 
mentioned the events, including film of persons being rescued from the ESL 
building during the siege, pictures of an injured Laura Black, and segments of 
defendant‘s recorded statements to Lieutenant Grijalva.  He complains that some 
36 
reports portrayed him as having committed various criminal acts rather than 
referring to him as a ―suspect‖ or as an ―alleged‖ criminal.  He also complains that 
the media ―consistently portrayed [him] as an obsessed, dangerous man.‖   
The media coverage, which decreased over time, was largely factual.  (See 
Murphy v. Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 800, fn. 4 [the court has ―distinguished 
largely factual publicity from that which is invidious or inflammatory‖]; id. at 
p. 802; Beck v. Washington (1962) 369 U.S. 541, 556 [the court noted that ―[e]ven 
the occasional front-page items were straight news stories rather than invidious 
articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness‖]; Hart, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at p. 599 [noting that the trial court found the reporting to be neutral, not 
inflammatory, and insufficient to sway public opinion].)  Even in a case in which 
the trial court described the media coverage as ― ‗saturation,‘ ‖ we found no error 
in the denial of a motion for a change of venue, noting, among other factors, that 
the ―defendant did not show that the media coverage was unfair or slanted against 
him or revealed incriminating facts that were not introduced at trial.‖  (Ramirez, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.) 
Defendant asserts, however, that even noninflammatory journalism may 
warrant a change of venue if the facts are sensational.  We have acknowledged 
that press coverage need not be inflammatory to justify a change of venue (People 
v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 69-70), but the cases upon which defendant relies 
involved additional factors that weighed in favor of a change of venue.  In Tidwell, 
two of the victims were prominent members of a small community, the defendants 
were strangers to that community, and some of the jurors selected to serve knew 
one or more of the victims or witnesses.  (Id. at pp. 64-65, 67, 69-75.)  Similarly, 
the change of venue ordered in Corona v. Superior Court (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 
872, was motivated by a concern that jurors in a small community, in which the 
defendant was charged with the murder of 25 migratory farm workers, would be 
37 
―vulnerable to claims of insensitivity toward migratory farm workers,‖ and 
conscious ―of the community‘s reputation for peace and security.‖  (Id. at pp. 875-
876, 883.)  As explained below, such circumstances were absent in the present 
case.  
The remaining three factors — the size of the community, and the status of 
defendant and of his victims in the community — weighed against a change of 
venue.  Santa Clara County, with a population of almost 1.5 million persons, was a 
large community.  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 523 [noting that Santa 
Clara County in 1988 was the fourth most populous county in the state].)  Neither 
defendant nor his victims were prominent members of this community.  Contrary 
to defendant‘s contention, the circumstance that defendant, his victims, and many 
qualified jurors worked in the ―high tech‖ industry did not affect the status of the 
participants for purposes of the change of venue motion; the terror engendered by 
defendant‘s attack stemmed not from its occurrence in a technology company, but 
from the circumstance that it happened in the middle of the work day in an office 
setting.  Some degree of juror identification with the victims would occur in any 
venue.  (See People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 515 [―Any sympathetic 
features of the case would be apparent wherever it was tried‖].)  For the same 
reason, defendant‘s contention that jurors would perceive him as ―a ‗changeling,‘ 
who had turned on and murdered his own kind,‖ does not establish that a change 
of venue was warranted.   
For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying 
defendant‘s first motion for a change of venue.   
As noted above, the court deferred its ruling on defendant‘s second motion 
for a change of venue until after jury selection.  (See Maine v. Superior Court 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 380 [it has long been the practice ―to permit the trial court 
to defer its final ruling on a motion for a change of venue until the jury is 
38 
empaneled‖].)  By this point in the proceedings, the trial court had heard on voir 
dire from the jurors selected that they would decide the case based solely upon the 
evidence and argument presented in court, and the trial court expressly credited 
those assertions.  (See Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1396 [―jurors selected to 
try this case bear out the trial court‘s conclusion that an unbiased jury could be 
found‖].)  In addition, none of the sitting jurors or alternates had been challenged 
for cause.  (Beck v. Washington, supra, 369 U.S. at pp. 557-558 [the circumstance 
that the defendant did not challenge for cause any of the jurors selected ―is strong 
evidence that he was convinced the jurors were not biased‖].)  Nor did defendant 
exhaust his peremptory challenges, ―thus indicating that ‗the jurors were fair, and 
that the defense itself so concluded.‘ ‖  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 
448; see also Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128 [the court cited the 
circumstance that the defendant did not challenge any of the sitting jurors for 
cause or exhaust available peremptory challenges, in support of its conclusion that 
hindsight demonstrated that retention of the case did not ―produce an unfair 
trial‖].)8   
                                            
8 
Defendant contends he justified his failure to exhaust peremptory 
challenges by stating in the trial court that although he had eight challenges 
remaining, the venire included more than eight prospective jurors against whom he 
had made unsuccessful challenges for cause.  He asserts that because it was 
―futile . . . to try to eliminate all those who had been exposed to prejudicial 
publicity, he instead tried, in vain, to eliminate those . . . who had expressed an 
opinion that [defendant] was guilty.‖  Nothing in these circumstances alters the 
principle that ―a party‘s failure to exercise available peremptory challenges 
indicates relative satisfaction with the unchallenged jurors.‖  (People v. Morris 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 185, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.)  As noted, defendant fails to identify any sitting 
juror he challenged for cause.  Nor has he shown that ―exhausting his remaining 
peremptories would necessarily have resulted in the seating of a juror who ought 
to have been removed for cause.‖  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 401.)   
39 
Defendant relies upon the circumstance that numerous jurors were excused 
for bias against the defense.9  The number of excusals may have been more than 
would occur in an ordinary criminal trial, ―but it by no means suggests a 
community with sentiment so poisoned against [the defendant] as to impeach the 
indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own.‖  (Murphy v. 
Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 803.)   
Defendant also relies upon the circumstance that three years after his 
commission of the crimes, many prospective jurors still had a recollection of the 
murders.  ―The relevant question is not whether the community remembered the 
case, but whether the jurors at [the defendant‘s] trial had such fixed opinions that 
they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.‖  (Patton v. Yount 
(1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1035; see Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435 
[―Although only one member of the jury indicated . . . he had never heard of the 
case, they all stated they had not ‗formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence 
of [the defendant] . . .‘ and could be fair‖].)  ―We must distinguish between mere 
familiarity with [the defendant] or his past and an actual predisposition against 
him.‖  (Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 800, fn. 4.)  Defendant asserts 
without citation to the record that four jurors believed he was ―guilty,‖ but our 
review of the voir dire indicates all jurors demonstrated a willingness to set aside 
any preconceived notions and make their decision solely upon the evidence 
presented.  (See Beck v. Washington, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 557 [― ‗It is sufficient if 
                                            
9 
Defendant asserts 83 prospective jurors were excused for bias against the 
defense.  Below, defense counsel represented that 65 of the 240 prospective jurors 
who were questioned were excused on the ground that they were biased against 
the defense.  The larger figure apparently includes jurors who were excused 
pursuant to defense challenge both for bias against the defense and under 
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 (Witt).   
40 
the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 
evidence presented in court‘ ‖].)   
Defendant further contends, however, that jurors‘ assertions that they could 
be impartial should not be credited.  ―In exceptional cases, ‗ ―adverse pretrial 
publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the 
jurors‘ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed,‖ [citation] . . . .‘  
[Citation.]  ‗The category of cases where prejudice has been presumed in the face 
of juror attestation to the contrary is extremely narrow.  Indeed, the few cases in 
which the [high] Court has presumed prejudice can only be termed extraordinary, 
[citation], and it is well-settled that pretrial publicity itself — ―even pervasive, 
adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial‖ [citation].‘  
[Citation.]  This prejudice is presumed only in extraordinary cases 
 not in every 
case in which pervasive publicity has reached most members of the venire.‖  
(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1216 (Prince).)   
In Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th 1179, we reviewed some of the extraordinary 
cases in which the high court has presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity.  ―In 
one case . . . the critical feature was that a local television station in a relatively 
small community on several occasions broadcast the entire spectacle of the 
defendant‘s jailhouse confession.  [Citation.]‖  (Id. at p. 1217.)  In a second case, 
― ‗[t]he trial . . . had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the 
intrusions of the press, which was allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to 
overrun it with television equipment.  Similarly, [in a third case, prejudice] arose 
from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory 
publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the public appetite 
for carnival.  The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity 
and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any 
notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob.  They cannot be made to stand 
41 
for the proposition that juror exposure to . . . news accounts of the crime with 
which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.‘  
[Citation.]  The reviewing court instead must look for ‗indications in the totality of 
the circumstances that [the defendant‘s] trial was not fundamentally fair.‘  
[Citation.]‖  (Id. at pp. 1217-1218.)   
The present case does not fall ―within the limited class of cases in which 
prejudice would be presumed under the United States Constitution.‖  (Prince, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1217.)  The publicity adduced at the second change of 
venue motion, as at the first, was largely factual and noninflammatory.  Nor is 
there evidence in the record that the jury selection process lacked solemnity.  
(Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 799.)  Moreover, the seated jurors, who 
were questioned on voir dire individually, either recalled nothing of the case or 
remembered few details.  The trial court, which observed the jurors‘ demeanor, 
expressly found they had demonstrated an ability to set aside any preconceived 
impressions derived from the media.  Thus, no extraordinary circumstances are 
presented. 
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the second motion for 
change of venue.   
2.  Excusing prospective jurors for cause due to their views 
concerning the death penalty 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused two prospective 
jurors for cause based upon their views concerning the death penalty.  We 
disagree.   
a.  Factual background 
(1)  Excusal of Prospective Juror A.S.   
In Prospective Juror A.S.‘s questionnaire, she stated she ―Will Consider‖ the 
death penalty, and drew an arrow pointing toward the ―Oppose‖ and ―Strongly 
42 
Oppose‖ responses.  She believed that the ―penalty should be exercised with great 
caution.  One must be absolutely convinced of the guilt of the accused.  He or she 
must have committed a crime for which they could never be forgiven and which 
demonstrates a disregard for human life.‖  During voir dire by the court, she stated 
that ―choos[ing] the death penalty would be very difficult for me. . . .  [T]he 
circumstances would have to be very aggravating.‖  She also stated she would be 
capable of performing the weighing process required to determine the appropriate 
penalty; she would listen to all of the evidence and arguments before choosing a 
penalty; she could make a choice between the penalties, and she would not 
automatically choose one penalty over another.  
When the defense asked whether she could vote for death if she concluded 
the death penalty was the appropriate punishment, A.S. responded, ―I think so.‖  
When the prosecutor inquired concerning the hesitancy reflected in her response, 
she agreed that although she could impose the death penalty on an intellectual 
level, ―emotionally and spiritually‖ it was more difficult.  She explained the basis 
of her inclination against the death penalty:  ―I don‘t think it‘s right to kill other 
people.  And that doesn‘t mean that‘s not justified in very, very unusual cases, but 
I would not . . . take that lightly.  Seems like a very grave issue.‖  She stated she 
could vote to send a man to his death, but when pressed by the prosecutor to 
confirm that she could vote for the death penalty, she responded, ―I‘m not sure I 
could.‖  The prosecutor asked, ―In other words, you don‘t know whether, if you 
got to that stage emotionally, then you could actually do it even though 
intellectually you believed it to be the appropriate decision?‖  A.S. agreed, ―That‘s 
true.‖   
The prosecutor challenged A.S. for cause under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412.  
Over defense objection, the trial court sustained the challenge, stating, ―I believe 
that the juror was setting the signals early in the voir dire, and she exhibited some 
43 
difficulty even going through the weighing process, when she had volunteered the 
concerns about the death penalty as it would affect her ability to go though the 
weighing process, but we got through that.  But I think under these circumstances, 
that [the prosecutor‘s] challenge should be granted because I believe that this 
juror‘s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties 
as a juror in accordance with [the] instructions.‖   
(2)  Excusal of Prospective Juror R.R.   
In Prospective Juror R.R.‘s questionnaire, he circled the ―Strongly Oppose‖ 
response when asked his view concerning the death penalty.  In response to a 
question regarding the circumstances under which the death penalty was 
inappropriate, he wrote, ―all.‖  During voir dire, he confirmed he was morally, 
philosophically, and intellectually opposed to the death penalty, but also indicated 
he understood that if the aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances, he would be required to vote for death.  The prosecutor 
then clarified that the law never would require a juror to vote for death.  Following 
this clarification, R.R. stated he ―[a]bsolutely‖ always would vote for life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and if the aggravating evidence 
substantially outweighed the mitigating evidence, he ―would vote for life‖ in 
―[e]very instance.‖   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror R.R. for cause under Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. 412.  Over defense objection, the trial court sustained the 
challenge, stating, ―I think it‘s abundantly clear after listening to this juror that 
when he finally realizes he has a freedom of choice after hearing the evidence, and 
that there is not going to be any directive as to which way he should vote, and the 
onus is on him and the choice is clearly his, he has indicated in every instance he 
44 
would vote for life no matter what the evidence is.  If given a choice, he would 
have to vote for life in prison without the possibility of parole.‖   
b.  Analysis 
―The trial court may excuse for cause a prospective juror whose views on the 
death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of that juror‘s 
duties‖ in accordance with the court‘s instructions and the juror‘s oath.  (People 
v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 601; see Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  ―The 
standard of review of the court‘s ruling regarding the prospective juror‘s views on 
the death penalty is essentially the same as the standard regarding other claims of 
bias.  If the prospective juror‘s statements are conflicting or equivocal, the court‘s 
determination of the actual state of mind is binding.  If the statements are 
consistent, the court‘s ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.‖  
(People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 896-897.)  ―Deference to the trial court 
is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and 
of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the 
attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‖  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 
1, 9.)   
A.S.‘s statements with respect to her ability to follow the law concerning 
imposition of the death penalty were equivocal.  Although her questionnaire and 
initial voir dire indicated she could weigh the relevant factors and consider either 
penalty, her subsequent responses reflected significant hesitation regarding her 
emotional ability to impose the death penalty.  The trial court was in a position, 
which we are not, to view her demeanor as she responded, and its determination of 
her state of mind is binding.  Substantial evidence supports its ruling that A.S.‘s 
views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her 
performance as a juror. 
45 
Contrary to defendant‘s claim, R.R. did not make it ―clear that while he was 
reluctant to impose a death penalty, he would follow the law.‖  Rather, R.R. 
struggled with the idea that he would be compelled to impose the death penalty if 
the aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances.  After he was informed he would have a choice concerning the 
appropriate penalty under those circumstances, he stated he always would vote for 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, regardless of the evidence.  
Nor, contrary to defendant‘s claim, does the record indicate the court and the 
prosecutor ― ‗tricked‘ [R.R.] into disqualifying himself by misrepresenting that a 
juror could properly take the position that aggravation would never outweigh 
mitigation enough to warrant a death penalty, and then disqualif[ying] [R.R.] 
because he took that position.‖  Rather, the prosecutor simply corrected R.R.‘s 
apparent belief that under certain circumstances, a juror would be required to 
impose the death penalty, and the court properly excused R.R. based upon R.R.‘s 
disclosure that he never would impose the penalty of death. 
3.  Prosecution challenges for cause  
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to 
challenge four prospective jurors on the ground they were biased against the 
defense as a result of pretrial publicity.  He contends that the prosecutor had no 
standing to make the challenges, and that the trial court erred in excusing the 
prospective jurors for cause.  He also asserts that sustaining the challenges 
impaired his right to counsel under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and deprived him of a number of peremptory challenges equal to 
that allotted to the prosecution.   
46 
a.  Factual background 
(1)  Excusal of Prospective Juror L.R.   
On his juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror L.R. wrote ―Yes,‖ when asked 
whether he thought defendant was guilty of the charges.  He also stated that he 
opposed the death penalty.  On voir dire, the trial court asked L.R. whether he 
―would be able to set aside your previous impressions and opinions and judge this 
matter solely on the evidence produced in this courtroom and on the arguments of 
the attorneys and on the body of law that the Court will instruct you?‖  L.R. found 
the question ―very difficult to answer,‖ and stated that ―I really don‘t know how I 
would behave as a juror since I have never been a juror.‖  The court explained that 
he was not being asked to forget his opinions and impressions; rather, he would be 
called upon to set them aside and decide the case based upon what he heard in the 
courtroom.  L.R. said he did not know whether he could do so.   
The prosecutor challenged L.R. for cause under People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 1046, 1090 (Bittaker), ―because he has not affirmatively said that he can set 
aside his opinions and deal only with the facts in the case as they are presented in 
the Court.‖  Defense counsel asserted the prosecutor lacked standing to challenge 
a prospective juror for cause on this basis.  In response to further questioning by 
the court, L.R. iterated that he did not know whether he could base his decision 
solely on the evidence presented in court, and stated he did not know whether he 
would be a fair and impartial juror.   
The trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s challenge, finding that ―this juror 
cannot be fair and impartial.  This juror is equivocating to the point where I have 
absolutely no idea what his state of mind is.  He has indicated to me that he cannot 
base his decision in this case solely on the evidence produced in this courtroom, 
and that he has been so impressed and influenced by the pretrial publicity that he 
cannot be fair and impartial.  I‘m making that finding.‖  Defense counsel again 
47 
opposed the challenge ―for the reasons . . .stated before,‖ and also argued that ―the 
attitudes expressed by [L.R.] . . . are not necessarily indicative of his state of mind, 
but more indicative of a desire not to serve.  I don‘t think that creates a situation 
where the Court can legitimately make a finding that he cannot be a fair and 
impartial juror.‖  The court stated, ―I don‘t think he can be fair and impartial in 
this case.  I have a duty to get fair and impartial jurors; he‘s not one of them.‖   
(2)  Excusal of Prospective Juror C.S.   
On her juror questionnaire, when asked whether defendant was guilty of the 
charges, Prospective Juror C.S. wrote ―Yes — at least some of the charges — the 
murder charges, but I don‘t know if it‘s first degree.‖  On voir dire, she repeatedly 
stated she did not know whether she could set aside her impressions and opinions 
about the case and base her decision upon the evidence presented in court.  She 
stated her work in policy analysis did not involve ―arbitrarily setting aside‖ 
information, and therefore she did not know whether she could set aside what she 
had heard out of court.   
The prosecutor challenged C.S. for cause under Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 
1046, because she could not make an affirmative declaration that she could set 
aside the views she derived from pretrial publicity.  Defense counsel objected, 
contending that the prosecutor lacked standing, and that C.S. in fact could set aside 
what she might know about the case and her conclusions about the case.  ―My 
sense of listening to her and watching her is that the ambivalence that she has 
expressed doesn‘t have to do with her inability to go through the mental or 
intellectual exercise of setting things aside; it has to do more with the emotional 
level or the responsibility of making a decision involving someone else‘s life.‖   
The trial court sustained the challenge.  ―With regard to this juror, the Court 
cannot get a clear indication of her state of mind based on her ambivalent and 
48 
ambiguous answers.  I don‘t think that she can be fair and impartial.  She said that 
she cannot set aside her opinions of the Defendant‘s guilt.  When I asked her if she 
would make every effort to set aside those opinions, she said she didn‘t know, she 
didn‘t know whether she could do it.  Under those circumstances, her opinion is 
that the Defendant is guilty, and she would have a very difficult time setting aside 
those opinions, and so the Court will grant the challenge based upon her inability 
to be fair and impartial in this case.‖   
(3)  Excusal of Prospective Juror D.M.   
On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror D.M. wrote in capital letters 
and underlined ―Yes,‖ when asked whether she thought defendant was guilty of 
the charges.  In response to the question, ―[H]ave you formed any opinions about 
this case,‖ she wrote, ―Right now, my vote is for the [d]eath sentence.‖  On voir 
dire, she stated she understood the law required that she presume defendant 
innocent, but she had difficulty applying the presumption of innocence to 
defendant.  She stated that she had heard about the case in media reports, and she 
would find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon what she had 
heard in the press, without any evidence being presented.  D.M. also noted she had 
changed her mind concerning the death penalty, and ―would not be able to at any 
time be responsible for putting anybody to the death sentence.‖  At the conclusion 
of the court‘s questioning, D.M. confirmed she would presume defendant guilty 
unless the contrary was proved.   
The prosecutor challenged D.M. under Bittaker, noting:  ―She has an opinion 
about guilt.  She has opinions about penalty . . . She‘s unfair to both sides . . . .‖  
Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor did not have standing to make a 
challenge for cause under Bittaker.  The trial court sustained the challenge, stating:  
―Counsel has the right to raise the issue of whether a juror can be fair and 
49 
impartial, and this juror . . . exhibits the presumption of guilt as to the defendant.  I 
don‘t see it any way that she is fair and impartial.‖   
(4)  Excusal of Prospective Juror D.R.   
On her juror questionnaire, in response to the question of whether defendant 
was guilty of the charges, Prospective Juror D.R. wrote, ―Yeah — probably he did 
it — but why, what drove him to it, will he or could he be driven to it again?‖  She 
also stated she could not ―handle knowing I was responsible for sending someone 
to the chair,‖ or ―responsibility for the death penalty.‖  She disclosed that her 
fiancé was in prison for murder, and expressed the opinion that her fiancé would 
not be there if ―he weren‘t poor, undereducated and Black.‖  On voir dire, D.R. 
stated she did not know whether she would follow the law as instructed by the 
court.  She stated that her recollection of the details of the case was ―hazy,‖ but if 
something presented in court conflicted with something she recalled from media 
reports, she would question what had been presented in court.  Defense counsel 
asked, ―If the court were to tell you that it‘s your responsibility as a juror to decide 
this case solely on the evidence presented here in court would you follow that 
instruction?‖  D.R. answered, ―No.‖   
The prosecutor challenged D.R. under Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046.  
Defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor did not have standing to make this 
challenge, and also argued that D.R.‘s ―hazy‖ recollections ―would not in any way 
impinge on her ability to listen to the evidence.‖  The prosecutor ―note[d] once 
again, that a fair trial is the providence of the court and everyone who knows what 
her opinions are like, they could impinge on the prosecution in terms of what 
magnificent little details she‘d dredge up during the course of the trial.‖   
The trial court sustained the challenge.  ―This juror has come in, expressed 
that attitude that defendant is guilty. . . .  She has said that she . . . doesn‘t believe 
50 
people tell the truth in court.  She has said she cannot follow the court‘s 
instructions, follow the evidence in court.  She said she would take whatever she 
remembers over what she sees in court.  She has said she doesn‘t believe in the 
court system.  She thinks that too many people make deals, and she trusts her 
perceptions far more than what is told to her. . . .  It‘s abundantly clear to me that 
she is just totally unqualified to be a juror.  I couldn‘t for the life of me understand 
why the defense persists in thinking that she above all the other people we‘ve ever 
interviewed in this case, is going to be able to set aside whatever miniscule 
specific facts that she might have pertaining to this case and be a fair and impartial 
juror.  She just flat out can‘t be.  I think it would be a travesty of justice to let her 
remain on this case.‖   
b.  Analysis 
We held in Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 1090, that a prospective juror 
who ―has an opinion based upon‖ media reports, ―is qualified only if he 
affirmatively declares that he can and will act impartially.  A declaration that he 
will try to be impartial, but doubts that he can succeed, is insufficient.‖ (Italics 
omitted.)10  Defendant describes the issue in the present case as ―whether the 
                                            
10 
Our decision in Bittaker interpreted former section 1076, which provided in 
relevant part:  ―No person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to the 
jury, founded upon public rumor, or statements in public journals, circulars, or 
other literature, or common notoriety if upon his or her declaration, under oath or 
otherwise, it appears to the court that he or she can and will, notwithstanding that 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be submitted to him or her.‖  
(Quoted in Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1088-1089.)   
 
By the time of trial in the present case, section 1076 had been repealed, and 
juror challenges for cause were governed by Code of Civil Procedure sections 225 
through 230.  The bases for disqualifying a prospective juror for cause under these 
provisions are ―[g]eneral disqualification,‖ ―[i]mplied bias,‖ and ―[a]ctual bias.‖  
(footnote continued on next page) 
51 
prosecutor can make a Bittaker challenge to a juror on the ground that the juror 
has an opinion adverse to the defendant.‖  The prosecutor‘s challenges and the 
trial court‘s rulings were not based, however, solely upon the ground that the 
prospective jurors held opinions adverse to defendant.  Rather, the Bittaker 
challenges and the court‘s rulings were based upon these individuals‘ inability to 
set aside what they knew or believed concerning the case and to decide the issues 
based upon the evidence and pursuant to the court‘s instructions.  Although 
particular opinions and beliefs expressed by these prospective jurors during voir 
dire revealed bias against defendant with respect to the issue of guilt, their answers 
also established they could not declare that they would decide the issues fairly and 
impartially based upon the evidence presented in court.  Clearly, the prosecution‘s 
case could be harmed by jurors who would decide issues based upon rumors or 
information received outside of court, and who would not follow the court‘s 
instructions.  Therefore, the premise of defendant‘s claim that the prosecutor 
lacked standing to challenge these prospective jurors — namely, that the 
prosecutor was not aggrieved by the prospective jurors‘ beliefs and attitudes — is 
mistaken.   
Defendant‘s claim that the trial court erred in excusing the prospective jurors 
for cause also fails.  ―On review of a trial court‘s ruling, if the prospective juror‘s 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1).)  Among the grounds for general 
disqualification is ―[t]he existence of any incapacity which satisfies the court that 
the challenged person is incapable of performing the duties of a juror in the 
particular action without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging 
party.‖  (Id., § 228, subd. (b).)  Among the grounds for finding implied bias is 
―[h]aving an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action founded 
upon knowledge of its material facts or of some of them.‖  (Id., § 229, subd. (e).)   
52 
statements are equivocal or conflicting, that court‘s determination of the person‘s 
state of mind is binding.  If there is no inconsistency, the reviewing court will 
uphold the court‘s ruling if substantial evidence supports it.‖  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488 (Hillhouse).)  As noted above, L.R. and C.S. each 
repeatedly responded that they could not say whether they could set aside their 
impressions and opinions and decide the case based solely upon the evidence; 
D.M. stated she would decide based upon what she heard and saw in the press, 
unless the contrary was proven, and D.R. stated she would not follow an 
instruction that she decide the case solely upon the evidence presented in court.  
Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s findings that these jurors were 
not fair and impartial, and to the extent any of these jurors‘ responses were 
equivocal, the trial court‘s determination is binding.   
Defendant contends the trial court‘s decision to excuse these jurors because 
they were biased against defendant interfered with defendant‘s right to have his 
counsel make tactical decisions, in violation of his right to counsel, and deprived 
him of a number of peremptory challenges equal to those allotted the prosecution.  
This claim is forfeited.  In the trial court, defendant never conceded that these 
prospective jurors were biased with respect to the issue of guilt, or asserted that 
they nonetheless were desirable to defendant because of their stated views in other 
areas.  Thus, People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, upon which defendant 
relies, is inapplicable.  Partida held that constitutional arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal are not forfeited if they do not invoke reasons different from 
those the trial court was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court‘s act 
or omission, to the extent erroneous for the reasons actually presented to that 
court, ―had the additional legal consequence of violating‖ the Constitution.  (Id. at 
p. 435.)  Here, the trial court never had the opportunity to consider whether 
53 
defendant had the right to retain prospective jurors concededly biased with respect 
to the issue of guilt, but acceptable to the defense for other tactical reasons.   
Moreover, as we have noted, these jurors properly were excused for reasons 
other than bias against defendant.  Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, a trial court‘s 
proper grant of a prosecutor‘s challenge for cause neither confers upon the 
prosecution a greater number of peremptory challenges than the number to which 
it is entitled by statute, nor violates a defendant‘s right to counsel.  Indeed, outside 
the context of challenges based upon juror views concerning the death penalty, a 
―[d]efendant has a right to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to any 
particular juror.‖  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656.) 
4.  Defense challenges for cause  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying a defense challenge to 
Prospective Juror E.D. for cause, in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.11  Following the 
court‘s refusal to excuse E.D., defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse 
her.   
This claim is not preserved for appeal.  Defendant exercised only 12 
peremptory challenges, leaving him with eight remaining when he accepted the 
jury.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a).)  ― ‗To preserve a claim of error in the 
denial of a challenge for cause, the defense must exhaust its peremptory 
                                            
11 
Defendant asserts the ―court erred in denying defense challenges for cause,‖ 
noting that the trial court denied 20 defense challenges, but he addresses only one 
denial of a defense challenge for cause, for the asserted reason that ―the erroneous 
denial of even one challenge for cause was reversible error because it in effect 
deprived him of a peremptory challenge.‖  Defendant states that, ―[b]ecause the 
issue . . . is one of principle rather than numbers, [defendant] will discuss in detail 
only one of the jurors in question, [Prospective Juror E.D.]‖  We therefore limit 
our analysis to this prospective juror.   
54 
challenges . . . .‘ ‖  (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 487.)  Defendant contends 
his failure to exhaust available peremptory challenges was justified by his 
assertion in the trial court that, although he had eight challenges remaining, the 
venire included more than eight prospective jurors against whom he had made 
unsuccessful challenges for cause.  We have rejected this contention above.  (See 
ante, p. 38, fn. 8.)   
Defendant asserts that this rule — that a defendant must exhaust all 
peremptory challenges before claiming on appeal that jurors should have been 
dismissed for cause — forces a defendant to choose between (1) accepting a 
biased jury or (2) exercising all peremptory challenges and risking a jury panel 
that is more unfavorable to the defendant than the panel presently seated.  Without 
citation to authority, he ―proposes a different, and more reasonable, method of 
determining whether a jury is unfair.‖  Defendant‘s proposed method would 
require the court to consider (1) whether the jurors selected appear, from their 
backgrounds and answers in voir dire, to be ―highly unfavorable‖ from the 
defense‘s viewpoint, (2) whether the ―highly unfavorable‖ jurors are balanced by 
the presence of jurors favorable to the defense, and (3) whether the defense, but 
not the prosecution, was forced to employ peremptory challenges to remove jurors 
whom the court should have removed for cause.  Defendant‘s test would require 
appellate courts to engage in a highly subjective evaluation of the relative 
―favorability‖ of jury panels.  We decline to adopt defendant‘s proposed test. 
We also reject defendant‘s contention that the assertedly erroneous denial of 
the challenge for cause to Prospective Juror E.D. is ―reversible error because it in 
effect deprived him of a peremptory challenge.‖  ―So long as the jury that sits is 
impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve 
that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.‖  (Ross v. Oklahoma 
(1988) 487 U.S. 81, 88; id. at pp. 89-91 [the court also rejected a challenge under 
55 
the 14th Amend.]); see People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 987-988 
[―where defendant did not exhaust all his peremptory challenges, he cannot even 
begin to demonstrate that his right to an impartial jury was impaired‖]; People 
v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 966 [―That an allegedly biased juror might have 
sat had he or she not been removed by peremptory challenge does not implicate 
the right to a fair and impartial jury in any substantial way‖], abrogated on other 
grounds in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117.)   
B.  Guilt Phase Issues  
1.  Denial of suppression motions  
Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by 
erroneously denying several motions to suppress.   
a.  Residence and vehicle search 
(1)  Factual background 
On February 16, at approximately 6:10 p.m., Sunnyvale Department of 
Public Safety Detectives Davis and Messier, joined by five San Jose Police 
Department officers, forced entry into defendant‘s residence to search for victims.  
Davis and at least one other officer looked in rooms, under beds, and in closets, 
but did not open any cabinets or drawers.  Davis observed in plain view a rifle 
standing against a dresser, a gas mask on top of a different dresser, and gun 
cleaning equipment on the coffee table.  Due to earlier confusion concerning 
defendant‘s current address, Davis briefly looked at documents on a table to 
determine whether there was mail addressed to defendant.  Approximately five to 
15 minutes elapsed during the search, after which all but one San Jose officer left.  
Nothing was seized.  Between approximately 6:30 and 6:45 p.m., Davis informed 
56 
Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety Detective Piatanesi that no victims had 
been found.   
At approximately 8:00 p.m., Piatanesi called Davis and instructed him and 
Messier to search the residence for explosives and garage door openers.  They 
searched for these items for approximately 15 to 20 minutes, this time opening 
cabinets and drawers.  No such items were found, and nothing was seized.  At 
approximately 8:30 p.m., defendant was taken into custody at ESL.  
The next day — February 17, 1988 — law enforcement officers sought and 
obtained warrants to search defendant‘s residence and his vehicle parked in front 
of the house.  The affidavit in support of the warrants represented that law 
enforcement authorities sought evidence regarding firearms; body armor; 
incendiary, explosive, or detonation devices; ammunition; photographs of 
defendant, Laura Black, or ESL; documents to or from Black or ESL; medical 
documents related to defendant; documents related to defendant‘s employment at 
ESL and Covalent; and evidence of ownership and occupancy of, and possessory 
right to, the vehicle and the residence.  The affidavit stated the following:  utility 
records reflected that service at the residence was in defendant‘s name; 
defendant‘s former roommate identified defendant‘s vehicle in front of the house; 
defendant was a disgruntled former employee who had entered ESL and shot and 
killed seven individuals on February 16; an ESL employee identified defendant as 
the person who had entered the building with a shotgun; Laura Black stated 
defendant shot her at ESL on February 16, 1988, and had been harassing her for 
four years; on February 2, 1988, Black had obtained a temporary restraining order 
against defendant; an officer at the scene of the shooting had jumped inside the 
open motor home for cover and there observed a rifle with a scope, a large pile of 
empty ammunition boxes, and four gallons of inflammable liquid; Home Away 
From Home Rentals confirmed defendant had rented the motor home; and during 
57 
the warrantless search of defendant‘s residence on February 16, a gas mask, a rifle, 
and gun cleaning equipment were observed in plain view.   
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized from his house and his 
vehicle.  The trial court denied the motion.   
(2)  Analysis 
Defendant contends the two warrantless entries on February 16 were invalid, 
the search warrants were tainted by evidence obtained illegally in the warrantless 
searches, and the warrants lacked probable cause and sufficient particularity.  We 
need not decide whether the warrantless searches were justified because (1) even 
assuming that the first warrantless search was invalid and excising from the search 
warrant affidavit the evidence observed during the first search, the affidavit 
nonetheless provided probable cause to support issuance of the warrants, and 
(2) the second warrantless search disclosed no additional evidence. 
Probable cause to search exists when, based upon the totality of the 
circumstances described in the affidavit, ―there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.‖  (Illinois v. Gates 
(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041 
(Kraft); § 1525.)  Excising from the search warrant affidavit the evidence observed 
during the first warrantless search (the gas mask, rifle, and gun cleaning 
equipment), the affidavit alleged that defendant was a disgruntled former 
employee who on February 16 had entered ESL and shot and killed seven 
individuals, had harassed ESL employee Laura Black for four years and then shot 
her at ESL after the recent issuance of a temporary restraining order, and 
possessed a rifle with a scope, numerous empty boxes of ammunition, and 
inflammable liquid in the motor home he had rented and driven to ESL the day of 
the shooting.  (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081.)  These 
58 
circumstances demonstrated a fair probability that evidence relevant to 
defendant‘s commission of the crimes existed in defendant‘s house and vehicle.  
(Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238; see People v.  Gonzalez (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 1179, 1206 (Gonzalez) [the court acknowledged case law ― ‗recogniz[ing] 
that from the nature of the crimes and the items sought, a magistrate can 
reasonably conclude that a suspect‘s residence is a logical place to look for 
specific incriminating items‘ ‖].)   
We also reject defendant‘s contention that the categories of the search 
warrants lacked sufficient particularity and allowed the searching officers 
―almost‖ unfettered discretion.  ―A search warrant must ‗particularly describ[e] the 
place to be searched.‘  (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; see also 
Pen. Code, § 1525.)  ‗The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was 
to prevent general searches.  By limiting the authorization to search to the specific 
areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement 
ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not 
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers 
intended to prohibit.‘  (Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84.)‖  (People v. 
Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 392.)  ―Whether the description in a warrant of 
property to be seized is sufficiently definite is a question of law subject to 
independent review by the appellate court.‖  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1041.)   
Here, the warrants sought evidence of defendant‘s possession and ownership 
of weapons and explosives, photographs and documents related to Black and ESL, 
documents concerning his employment at Covalent, proof of ownership and of a 
possessory right to the residence and the vehicle, and his medical and psychiatric 
records.  Such description was sufficiently definite to allow the officer conducting 
the search to identify the property to be seized, and to prevent a wide-ranging 
exploratory search.   
59 
b.  Storage locker search 
On February 25, 1988, Detective Piatanesi obtained a search warrant for the 
storage locker rented in Mei Chang‘s name the weekend before the commission of 
the crimes.12  The supporting affidavit sets forth the same information as was 
provided in support of the warrant to search defendant‘s residence and vehicle.  In 
addition, the affidavit noted that Mei Chang had rented the storage locker on 
February 13, three days before the shootings, at defendant‘s request — because he 
had credit problems and needed the space to store computers, books, and tools.  
The affidavit further observed that Chang was with defendant when the locker was 
rented, but not when he moved property into it.   
In the course of searching the storage locker, Piatanesi observed an IBM 
computer among the locker‘s contents.  On March 18, 1988, he obtained a second 
warrant to search the locker, authorizing seizure of the computer observed during 
the first search of the locker, ―including all software and hardware.‖   
Defendant contends the first warrant to search the storage locker lacked 
probable cause and sufficient particularity, and because of these defects, the 
second warrant authorizing seizure of the computer was based upon tainted 
evidence.  As to the first search warrant, in light of the circumstance that any items 
stored in the locker were placed there sometime during the three days preceding 
the shootings, a magistrate reasonably could conclude there was probable cause to 
believe incriminating evidence would be found in the storage locker.  (See 
                                            
12 
The storage locker warrant identified the same evidence as that itemized in 
the warrants authorizing the search of defendant‘s residence and vehicle — 
defendant‘s firearms, ammunition, explosives, documents regarding and 
photographs of Black and ESL, employment at ESL and Covalent, and medical 
records — except the evidence respecting ownership and control of the storage 
locker apart from the residence and the vehicle.   
60 
Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1206.)  Because the search authorized by the 
warrant was virtually identical to the search authorized with respect to defendant‘s 
residence and vehicle, the warrant was sufficiently particular in describing the 
objects of the search, for the same reasons as stated above.  Moreover, defendant 
has not identified any item seized that was admitted at trial.  Accordingly, even if 
we were to assume ―some provision of the warrant was overbroad, defendant has 
not shown that any evidence should have been suppressed.‖  (People v. Carpenter 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1043-1044 (Carpenter).)   
Because we conclude the first search of the storage locker was proper, we 
reject defendant‘s contention that the second search warrant was tainted by the 
first assertedly unconstitutional search of the storage locker.  His additional 
contention — that documents from the telephone company, Pacific Bell, which 
were not identified in the warrant and were unrelated to the computer, improperly 
were seized in the second search — also fails.  The documents from Pacific Bell 
were seized pursuant to a search warrant directed to Pacific Bell, and the return to 
that separate warrant apparently was attached inadvertently to the return to the 
second storage locker search warrant.  Piatanesi testified that diskettes,13 not 
documents from Pacific Bell, were seized in connection with the second search of 
the locker.   
c.  Seizure of personnel records 
On February 17, 1988, warrants were issued to search for documents and 
correspondence at ESL and Covalent relating to defendant, and to search his 
Covalent work area.  The warrants were based upon the same affidavit that led to 
the issuance of warrants to search defendant‘s residence and vehicle.  In addition 
                                            
13  
The computer no longer was in the storage locker at the time of the second 
search.   
61 
to the information noted above, the affidavit stated that complaints regarding 
harassment are kept in personnel files, and based upon Detective Piatanesi‘s 
training and experience, individuals keep personal effects in their work areas.  
(See ante, pp. 56-57.)   
Defendant contends the affidavit in support of the warrants did not set forth 
facts adequate to establish probable cause to believe relevant evidence might be 
found at ESL and Covalent.  We disagree.  As noted, the facts enumerated in the 
affidavit indicated that on February 16 defendant killed seven individuals and shot 
Black at ESL because he was a disgruntled former employee and a rejected suitor 
of Black, he was subject to a recent temporary restraining order to stay away from 
Black, and he had driven a motor home filled with gallons of inflammable liquid, 
ammunition, and a pistol to ESL on the day of the shooting.  In view of the nature 
of the crimes and the items sought, a magistrate reasonably could conclude 
defendant‘s employment files and work area were logical places to search for 
incriminating items.  (Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1206.)   
Defendant further contends the warrants lacked sufficient particularity, 
because they sought ―[a]ny and all documents and correspondence relating to 
[defendant].‖  Again, we disagree.  ―[I]n a complex case resting upon the piecing 
together of ‗many bits of evidence,‘ the warrant properly may be more generalized 
than would be the case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct 
evidence.‖  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1291.)  In any event, 
defendant has not identified any item seized pursuant to these warrants that was 
admitted at trial.  ―Accordingly, even if we were to assume these warrants were 
overbroad, defendant has not shown that any evidence should have been 
suppressed.‖  (Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1044.)  Defendant 
speculates that evidence found during the search, even if not admitted at trial, may 
62 
have been used to obtain evidence to counter the defense case in mitigation, but he 
fails to demonstrate any factual basis for this claim.   
d.  School and medical records search 
Defendant contends warrants to obtain his school and medical records from 
the high school and several colleges he attended were overbroad.  As he notes, 
however, no medical records were produced in response to the warrants, and the 
school transcripts that were produced were not introduced by the prosecution at 
trial.  Hence there was no evidence admitted that should have been suppressed.  
(Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1044.)  Defendant speculates that 
evidence found during the search, even if not admitted at trial, may have been used 
to obtain evidence to counter the defense case in mitigation, but he fails to 
demonstrate any factual basis for this claim.   
2.  Evidentiary rulings  
Defendant claims that certain evidentiary rulings were erroneous and 
violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.   
a.  Letters to Laura Black 
Defendant wrote Black approximately 150 to 200 letters.  During the 
prosecution‘s direct examination of Black, 20 of these letters were admitted into 
evidence.  The letters included the threatening comments noted above, and also 
showed defendant importuning Black to socialize with him, his obsessive need to 
know her whereabouts, his desire to buy a house with her, and information 
regarding his relationship with Mei Chang, his college classes, his work at 
Covalent and another company, his roommate, the foreclosure on his house, and 
his obligation to pay $30,000 to the IRS.  The letters also included statements such 
as that defendant cared for Black and ―tried never to really threaten you,‖ ―I 
63 
wouldn‘t hurt you and I think you realized that,‖ and ―Jean,‖ presumably Jean 
Tuffley, ―should have sent us both to a marriage counselor to find out why we 
fight like an[] old married couple.‖  
During defendant‘s cross-examination of Black, he sought to question her 
concerning 13 other letters he wrote to her.  He asserted those letters were 
admissible under Evidence Code section 356,14 because they were necessary to 
understand other documents admitted into evidence.  The trial court admitted two 
of the 13 letters and excluded the remaining 11 letters as hearsay, stating that, 
although the latter letters pertained to the same general subjects as the letters 
proffered by the prosecution, they were ―separate and distinct statements‖ from the 
letters proffered by the prosecution.   
During defendant‘s testimony on direct examination, he again sought 
admission of the 11 letters, arguing they were necessary to understand defendant‘s 
state of mind and corroborated his testimony regarding his state of mind.  He also 
argued they were admissible under Evidence Code section 356 to show the 
evolution and context of the letters.  The trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s 
objection, ruling the letters were hearsay.   
Near the conclusion of defendant‘s testimony on direct examination, 
defendant sought to introduce six additional letters.  The court admitted two of 
these letters.  The two letters, and the two previously proffered by defendant and 
admitted by the court, noted that over the prior period of nearly three years, 
                                            
14 
Evidence Code section 356 provides:  ―Where part of an act, declaration, 
conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same 
subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer 
may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is 
given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is 
necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.‖   
64 
defendant had ―never hurt you or your property,‖ referred to Black as the ―love of 
my life,‖ profusely apologized for past behavior, and asked Black to buy a house 
with him, enumerating 16 discussion points (such as what would happen if one 
person missed a monthly payment) for working ―out an agreement that both of us 
can live by.‖   
Defendant contends that all of the letters were admissible under Evidence 
Code section 356 during his testimony, because the letters presented ―the true 
tenor of the correspondence‖ by showing ―not only [defendant‘s] obsessive need 
for Black, but also his attempts to understand her, his concern with how she was 
feeling, and his attempts to control his behavior.‖  He asserts, ―[I]f it is 
unreasonable to introduce . . . all 150 letters — then at least a representative 
portion should be shown to the jury.‖   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proffered 
letters were not ―necessary‖ to the jury‘s understanding of the letters introduced by 
the prosecution.  (Evid. Code, § 356.)  Rather, the letters proffered by the 
prosecution were ―independently comprehensible‖ on the relevant topics of 
defendant‘s premeditation and intent to kill.  (People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 
115, 131, fn. 4 [postarrest statement not necessary to understand prearrest 
statement].)15  Therefore Evidence Code section 356 did not provide a basis for 
the admission of these letters.   
                                            
15 
The cases upon which defendant relies are distinguishable.  In Hinton v. 
Welch (1918) 179 Cal. 463, 466, numerous letters written by the plaintiff were 
introduced against her.  In contrast, defendant here sought to introduce his own 
out-of-court statements during his direct testimony.  (See Evid. Code, § 1220.)  
Likewise, admission of the reply to one of the plaintiff‘s letters asserting a 
property interest falls within the language of Evidence Code section 356.  (Hinton, 
at pp. 465-466.)  In People v. Snyder (1958) 50 Cal.2d 190, 192, we held that in 
defending a charge that the defendant had committed perjury in his testimony 
(footnote continued on next page) 
65 
Defendant also contends the letters were admissible to establish his state of 
mind.  (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9, disapproved on other 
grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239, and People v. Hall 
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [victim‘s out-of-court statement was not hearsay 
when offered as circumstantial evidence of the victim‘s state of mind rather than 
to prove the truth of the statement]; Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1) [evidence of 
a statement of the declarant‘s then-existing state of mind is not made inadmissible 
by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the declarant‘s state of mind].)  
Defendant testified, describing his various states of mind not only during the years 
he pursued Black and sent her numerous letters, but also when he received the 
TRO, as he thereafter prepared to confront Black, and as he undertook his assault 
upon the ESL facility.  Moreover, the letters that were admitted established the 
facts he claims would have been adduced by the excluded letters, that is, 
defendant‘s purported love and concern for Black, his obsessive need for and 
delusion regarding her, and his attempts to control his behavior.  Therefore, to the 
extent the letters he proffered establish the depth of his delusion, and thereby 
suggest ―the destruction of the psychic reality [he] had constructed and maintained 
in his mind for four years‖ and explain his state of mind during his rampage, their 
exclusion was harmless.  It is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to 
defendant would have been reached had the letters been admitted to establish his 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
before the grand jury, the defendant was permitted to introduce portions of the 
grand jury testimony that tended to explain the testimony upon which the 
prosecutor relied in proving the perjury charge, and to demonstrate that the 
defendant had not testified falsely.  (Id. at pp. 193-195.)  Hence Snyder is not 
authority for the admission of letters different from those upon which the 
prosecution relied.   
66 
state of mind.  (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  Although 
defendant makes no persuasive argument supporting his contention that the 
exclusion of the letters constitutes a violation of his right to present a defense, we 
observe that, in light of the extensive evidence presented relating to defendant‘s 
state of mind, exclusion of the proffered letters also was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)16   
b.  Impeachment of Gerald Hirst 
As noted above, Gerald Hirst testified that when he, Lawrence Kane, and 
defendant met approximately two months prior to defendant‘s commission of the 
crimes, they discussed how to get through ESL‘s security doors and fantasized 
about shooting ESL‘s equipment.  During their conversation, defendant learned 
where Black‘s and Hirst‘s offices were located.  (See ante, pp. 6-7.)   
The trial court ruled in limine that defendant would not be allowed to 
impeach Hirst with evidence establishing that in 1986, Hirst had suffered a 
misdemeanor conviction for child molestation, or with the conduct underlying that 
conviction.  The court did not state the basis for its ruling.   
Even assuming the trial court erred in precluding impeachment of Hirst with 
evidence of his act of child molestation, defendant fails to demonstrate, as he 
must, that the ―cross-examination would have produced ‗a significantly different 
impression of [the witness‘s] credibility.‘ ‖  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
894, 946 (Frye), disapproved on other grounds in Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 421, fn. 22.)  The accuracy and veracity of Hirst‘s testimony was undermined 
by other evidence:  he was completely deaf in one ear; he was depressed and in 
                                            
16 
Defendant further asserts the letters would have personalized him at the 
penalty phase.  This purpose was irrelevant at the guilt phase, and defendant did 
not seek admission of the letters at the penalty phase. 
67 
therapy at the time of the conversation with defendant; he refused to allow the 
police to record interviews with him; and his earlier statements to the police that 
his conversation with defendant occurred at the time Hirst left ESL in 
January 1988, and that he knew Black, were inconsistent with his trial testimony 
that the conversation occurred in December 1987, and that he did not know Black.   
Moreover, and contrary to defendant‘s contention, Hirst‘s testimony was not 
―the single most important evidence of premeditation offered by the prosecution.‖  
Rather, aside from this testimony, there was overwhelming evidence of 
premeditation with respect to all of the killings, including the murder of Lawrence 
Kane.  During the two years preceding commission of the crimes, defendant told 
several individuals at ESL that he possessed guns and either knew how or was not 
afraid to use them.  Although he discussed shooting ESL equipment with Hirst, 
during that same time period he mentioned the shooting massacre at the San 
Ysidro McDonald‘s to a different witness, Burch, and wondered what ESL would 
do if he committed such a massacre there.  Days before the shooting spree, 
defendant sold his truck for much less than it was worth, rented a storage locker, 
purchased a new Benelli shotgun by tendering a bad check, purchased large 
amounts of ammunition, practiced shooting ―man-shaped‖ targets, rented a motor 
home that allowed him to prepare for his assault without observation, and changed 
his life insurance beneficiary.  His will was left on top of his computer terminal.  
Finally, on February 16, 1988, defendant entered ESL during work hours, heavily 
armed.   
c.  Evidence of defendant’s interest in flame guns 
During the direct testimony of Mei Chang, defense counsel sought to 
preclude reference to an incident that occurred the weekend preceding commission 
of the crimes, when defendant expressed interest in a flame gun.  The court 
68 
overruled the objection, finding the evidence relevant and not unduly prejudicial 
under Evidence Code section 352.   
Chang testified that on the night of Valentine‘s Day, she and defendant 
watched the movie ―Rambo.‖  The prosecutor inquired whether defendant told 
Chang ―to pay any special attention to some parts of the movie?‖  Chang identified 
―[t]he firing,‖ and explained, ―in the movie lots of fire guns, fires.‖  The 
prosecutor asked, ―Did he say anything about any particular kind of gun?‖  Chang 
responded, ―I think that‘s the one he was using, the one with a lot of fire out.  A 
fire gun.‖   
We reject defendant‘s contention that the evidence was irrelevant and 
inflammatory.  The evidence was relevant because it demonstrated defendant‘s 
continuing interest in firearms during a period immediately preceding defendant‘s 
charged criminal conduct.  When contrasted with defendant‘s murderous assault 
two days later, the evidence cannot be characterized as unduly inflammatory.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.  (People 
v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1118 (Barnett) [applying abuse of discretion 
standard of review].)  Nor did its admission violate defendant‘s right to a 
fundamentally fair trial. 
d.  Conversation between Dennis Elliott and defendant 
As noted above, Dennis Elliott, who previously had supervised defendant at 
ESL, described at trial a conversation he had with defendant in March or April 
1986.  Elliott had reported to defendant what Elliott had heard concerning 
defendant‘s conduct toward ―some girl,‖ and had urged defendant to stop 
harassing her at work.  Defendant had responded by expressing anger and 
defiance.   
69 
Prior to Elliott‘s testimony regarding his conversation with defendant, 
defendant objected that neither what Elliott had heard from other persons, nor his 
conversation with defendant years before the charged crimes, was relevant to 
defendant‘s state of mind on February 16, 1988, and that the testimony was unduly 
prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  The trial court overruled this 
objection, stating that testimony concerning what Elliott had heard about 
defendant ―chasing some girl‖ was being offered solely to explain why Elliott 
spoke to defendant.  Although the record is somewhat ambiguous, it appears the 
court also ruled that the testimony of the conversation between defendant and 
Elliott was relevant and not unduly prejudicial or time consuming under section 
352.   
Defendant contends that what Elliott heard from others about defendant 
―chasing some girl‖ was hearsay.  He also contends that Elliott‘s conversation 
with defendant was irrelevant because it occurred two years before the murders 
and did not imply ―any threat to kill anyone or to damage ESL property.‖  
Defendant did not make a hearsay objection below, nor did he argue that the 
conversation was irrelevant because it did not threaten violence or damage.  
Therefore, these claims are forfeited and, moreover, are without merit, as are his 
remaining relevance claims.  As the trial court observed, testimony regarding what 
Elliott heard was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth.  It was 
relevant to explain why Elliott had a conversation with defendant.  Defendant‘s 
defiant response to Elliott‘s advice that he just do his job and avoid ―hassling‖ a 
female coworker was relevant to defendant‘s state of mind, and to the prosecutor‘s 
theory that defendant acted on February 16 in retaliation for perceived wrongs by 
ESL and Laura Black.  In addition, the prosecution properly was permitted to 
demonstrate the circumstances that led over time to defendant‘s termination, and 
ultimately to his attack on ESL.   
70 
e.  Jean Tuffley’s testimony 
Before trial, and again shortly before Tuffley testified, defendant moved to 
exclude evidence of the February 1986 conversation between Tuffley and 
defendant in which, according to Tuffley, defendant said, ―if we terminated him, 
that his life would be over, he‘d have nothing to live for, and that he had guns and 
he wasn‘t afraid to use them, and that if we terminated him, it would be over for 
him and he‘d take people with him.‖  Tuffley asked, ―Rich, are you saying that 
you would kill me?‖  According to Tuffley, defendant said, ― ‗Yes, but I would 
take others, too.‘ ‖  Defendant asserted that the conversation was so remote in time 
that it was irrelevant and immaterial, that it was improper character evidence 
under Evidence Code section 1101, and that under Evidence Code section 352 its 
minimal probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial impact.  Defendant also 
objected to Tuffley‘s testimony that defendant‘s comments put her in fear, and led 
to ESL‘s assigning a different human resources person to deal with defendant, on 
the ground Tuffley‘s state of mind was irrelevant.  The trial court denied the 
defense motions and overruled the objection.   
Defendant claims that his mental state at the time of this conversation with 
Tuffley was irrelevant because he ―did not kill or attempt to kill Tuffley,‖ and ―did 
not kill anyone when he was terminated.‖  Although defendant did not kill 
Tuffley, who was not present at M-5 on the afternoon of February 16, 1988, his 
threats to her anticipate the scenario ultimately played out in the crimes that later 
were committed.  Hence the statements were powerful evidence of long-standing 
motive and intent.  They demonstrated that defendant‘s 1988 assault on ESL was 
not a spontaneous occurrence, but a planned attack and the culmination of a 
grudge he nursed for at least two years.   
Defendant also claims Tuffley‘s testimony that defendant‘s comment made 
her fearful and led to ESL‘s transferring responsibility over defendant from 
71 
Tuffley to her superior, Allen, should have been excluded because Tuffley‘s state 
of mind was not at issue ―and the balance of the testimony is hearsay.‖  We 
disagree.  Tuffley‘s fear demonstrated she perceived the threat as serious.  
Likewise, the circumstance that the personnel matter was transferred to someone 
else dispelled any inference that Tuffley did nothing about the problem and thus 
apparently did not believe defendant‘s threat was genuine.  Finally, contrary to 
defendant‘s contention, testimony that someone else assumed responsibility for 
defendant‘s personnel matters was not an out-of-court statement and hence was 
not hearsay.  We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
Tuffley‘s testimony.  (See Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)  We therefore 
reject defendant‘s contention that its admission violated his rights to due process 
and a reliable verdict. 
f.  Evor Vattuone’s testimony 
Before Evor Vattuone testified, defendant sought to exclude reference to 
Vattuone‘s conversation with defendant in late February or March 1986, in which 
defendant told Vattuone that if defendant were to be served with a restraining 
order, he would be very upset and did not know how he would respond, and that 
―he had guns and he wasn‘t afraid to use them.‖  Defendant contended the 
conversation was irrelevant because it occurred almost two years before defendant 
was served with the TRO, constituted improper character evidence under Evidence 
Code section 1101, and was unduly prejudicial Evidence Code section 352.  The 
trial court found the evidence was relevant and was not character evidence, and 
that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.   
Defendant contends this testimony should have been excluded because in his 
conversation with Vattuone defendant did not threaten to kill anyone; rather he 
said he did not know how he would respond.  Defendant also contends his state of 
72 
mind in 1986, and particularly his uncertainty concerning how he would respond 
to a restraining order, was irrelevant.  Defendant did not, however, state only that 
he did not know how he would react; he said he had guns and was not afraid to use 
them.  This statement reasonably may be construed as a threat.  Moreover, 
according to Vattuone, when defendant said he did not know what he would do, he 
did not seem perplexed, but serious and deliberate.  Defendant‘s statements to both 
Tuffley and Vattuone indicate he planned to shoot individuals at ESL if his access 
to Black was limited.  Far from irrelevant, his statements constituted evidence 
establishing that he already was contemplating his eventual assault two years prior 
to the ultimate event.  We find no abuse of discretion and no infringement upon 
defendant‘s right to due process and a reliable verdict. 
g.  Lieutenant Dow’s testimony that Black felt threatened 
Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety Lieutenant Chris Dow, called by the 
defense, testified that he interviewed Black twice in March 1988 following the 
shootings.  Black told Dow that she decided not to seek a restraining order after 
she was told ESL would not pay for it.  On June 1, 1988, after reviewing a copy of 
Dow‘s report, Black amended this statement to say that an additional reason she 
did not obtain a restraining order was that she did not have the time to do so.  
Defense counsel asked Dow, ―Did she tell you . . . on June 1st . . . that the reason 
she didn‘t get a restraining order was because she was afraid of [defendant]?‖  
Dow answered, ―No.‖  Defense counsel asked, ―Did she tell you on June 1st . . . 
that the reason[] she didn‘t get the restraining order was because she was 
concerned with what [defendant] might do?‖  Dow answered, ―No.‖   
On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired whether Black told Dow, 
during ―either of the taped conversations‖ about the restraining order, ―that she 
also didn‘t get a restraining order because she figured it wasn‘t against the law for 
73 
the Defendant to be on a public street?‖  Dow responded, ―Yes.‖  The prosecutor 
asked, ―Did you ever ask her specifically whether she didn‘t get a TRO or 
restraining order because she was afraid of the Defendant?‖  Dow responded, 
―No.‖  The prosecutor then asked, ―Did Miss Black, in the course of those 
conversations, tell you that the Defendant had threatened her?‖  Defendant 
objected that the question was beyond the scope of the direct examination, which, 
he claimed, was limited to Dow‘s conversation with Black on June 1.  The 
objection was overruled, and Dow answered, ―Yes.‖   
Defendant contends his objection should have been sustained under Evidence 
Code section 773, because the direct examination was ―limited to the concerns that 
influenced Black‘s initial decision not to get a restraining order.  They did not 
open up the content of all of her conversations with Dow.‖  ―Cross-examination 
. . . ‗may be directed to the eliciting of any matter which may tend to overcome or 
qualify the effect of the testimony given . . . on direct examination.‘  [Citation.]  
The cross-examination is not ‗confined to a mere categorical review of the 
matters, dates or times mentioned in the direct examination.‘ ‖  (People v. 
McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 811.)  Defendant‘s questioning of Dow may 
have left the jury with the impression that Black was not frightened by defendant.  
The prosecutor properly was allowed to question Dow concerning other statements 
made by Black that tended to establish she was frightened by defendant.  (See 
People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 187-188 [the prosecutor was entitled to 
ask the defendant questions on cross-examination to rebut impressions left by the 
defendant‘s testimony].)  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing cross-examination of Dow concerning Black‘s statements to Dow 
regarding threats made by defendant against Black.  (See People v. Lancaster 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 102 [― ‗It is settled that the trial court is given wide 
discretion in controlling the scope of relevant cross-examination‘ ‖].)   
74 
h.  Alleged pattern of inconsistent determinations 
Defendant contends the trial court‘s evidentiary rulings reveal a pattern of 
inconsistent determinations that compromised the fairness of the trial and unfairly 
favored the prosecution.  This essentially is a claim of judicial bias, which 
defendant forfeited by failing to assert it below.  (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 96, 114; see People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 362-363.)  It also 
is without merit.  We have rejected all of defendant‘s claims of evidentiary error 
except for assumed error in the exclusion of evidence of Hirst‘s prior 
misdemeanor conviction, and in the exclusion of defendant‘s letters as evidence of 
his state of mind.  Although defendant summarily cites many additional examples 
in his supplemental opening brief which, he claims, illustrate that the trial court 
made erroneous and inconsistent rulings, he provides no analysis to establish that 
the trial court abused its discretion in connection with any of these rulings.  ―[A] 
trial court‘s numerous rulings against a party — even when erroneous — do not 
establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.‖  
(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112.)  Defendant fails to demonstrate 
any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias that was so 
prejudicial that it deprived defendant of ― ‗ ―a fair, as opposed to a perfect, 
trial.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  
i.  Cumulative error 
Defendant contends the trial court‘s errors on the evidentiary rulings were 
individually and cumulatively prejudicial because they deprived him ―of his right 
to present probative evidence or exclude prejudicial evidence,‖ and constituted ―an 
invidious and pervasive pattern of biased rulings.‖  As noted, we have assumed 
error only in the exclusion of evidence related to Hirst‘s prior misdemeanor 
conviction, and in the exclusion of defendant‘s letters as evidence of his state of 
mind.  Hirst was impeached through other testimony, and the issues to which 
75 
Hirst‘s testimony and the excluded letters were relevant were established by other 
overwhelming evidence.  Defendant was not prejudiced under any standard by 
these two evidentiary rulings.  Nor, once again, has any bias been demonstrated. 
 
3.  Alleged instructional error  
a.  Felony-murder and felony-murder special-circumstance 
instructions based upon burglary allegations 
The prosecution proceeded on two theories of first degree murder:  (1) all of 
the homicides were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and (2) the homicides 
perpetrated within the M-5 building were committed in the course of a burglary.  
(§ 189.)17  The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of burglary:  ―Every 
person who enters any building with a specific intent to commit assault with a 
firearm upon the person of Laura Black in violation of Penal Code Section 
245(a)(2) or with the specific intent to commit malicious damage of property of a 
                                            
17 
Section 189 provides in relevant part:  ―All murder which is perpetrated by 
means of a destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, 
knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, 
poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train 
wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or any 
murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor 
vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to 
inflict death, is murder of the first degree.  All other kinds of murders are of the 
second degree.‖   
 
Although section 189 refers to ―[a]ll murder‖ that is ―committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate‖ certain felonies, this language has long 
been broadly interpreted to mean ―any killing in the perpetration of or attempt to 
perpetrate‖ an enumerated crime.  (People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868; 
People v. Denman (1918) 179 Cal. 497, 498-499 [―one who kills another in the 
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate‖ the crimes enumerated in section 189 is 
guilty of first degree murder under the provisions of that statute, ―regardless of any 
question whether the killing was intentional or unintentional‖].)   
76 
value in excess of five thousand dollars in violation of [former] Penal Code 
Section 594(b)(1), each a felony, is guilty of the crime of burglary in violation of 
Penal Code section 459.‖  (Italics added; see also § 459 [any person who enters a 
defined structure with the intent to commit any felony is guilty of burglary].)  The 
court also gave an instruction based upon the felony-murder rule:  ―The unlawful 
killing of a human being . . .  which occurs during the commission or attempted 
commission . . .  of the crime of burglary is murder of the first degree when the 
perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime.‖  The court further 
explained that ―[a] homicide is committed in the perpetration of a burglary if the 
killing and the burglary are parts of one continuous transaction,‖ but ―[t]here is no 
requirement that the homicide occur while committing or while engaged in the 
burglary or that the killing be a part of the burglary other than that the two acts be 
part of one continuous transaction.‖  Finally, the court instructed the jurors that 
they could find true the special circumstance allegation that defendant committed 
a murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary 
if defendant committed a murder while committing or attempting to commit a 
burglary, and did so to carry out or advance the commission of the burglary or to 
facilitate his escape or avoid detection.  The court‘s instructions made clear that 
the special circumstance allegation was not established if the burglary or 
attempted burglary was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.18  
Defendant claims that neither burglary theory supports a finding that the 
homicides committed within building M-5 constituted felony murder.  First, 
defendant asserts, the charge of burglary with the intent to commit property 
                                            
18 
As to Lawrence Kane, who was killed before defendant entered the 
building, the prosecution proceeded solely on a theory of willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated murder.   
77 
damage in excess of $5,000 could be either a felony or a misdemeanor under 
former section 594, subdivision (b)(1), depending upon the sentence imposed by 
the court.  Therefore, defendant contends, he could not have entered ESL‘s facility 
with the intent to commit a felony, and thus could not be found guilty of burglary.  
Second, defendant asserts, the burglary premised upon entry with intent to assault 
Black would have ―merged‖ with the death of Black, had she been killed, and 
would not have constituted a felony — independent of the killing itself — upon 
which to base a theory of felony murder.  (People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431 
(Wilson).)  Therefore, he contends, his entry with the intent to assault Black cannot 
serve as the basis for the felony murder of six other victims who were killed inside 
the ESL facility, nor can it support a special circumstance finding that the murders 
occurred while defendant was engaged in committing a burglary.  Defendant 
claims the giving of the foregoing instructions violated his rights under the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
Defendant‘s first challenge to the felony-murder instruction is that a violation 
of former section 594, subdivision (b)(1) ―is not a felony but a wobbler, whose 
ultimate classification will depend on the judge‘s sentence.‖19  Consequently, he 
contends, a burglary count based upon an entry with intent to violate former 
                                            
19 
At the time of defendant‘s crimes, section 594 provided in relevant 
part:   
 
―(a) Every person who maliciously (1) defaces with paint or any other 
liquid, (2) damages, or (3) destroys any real or personal property not his own, in 
cases otherwise than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism.   
 
―(b)(1)  If the amount of defacement, damage or destruction is five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or more, vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.‖  
(Stats. 1985, ch. 781, § 1, p. 2520.) 
78 
section 594, subdivision (b)(1) is not a felony burglary.  A felony, however, is 
defined as ―a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state 
prison.‖  (§ 17, subd. (a), italics added.)  Former section 594, subdivision (b)(1) 
provided that ―[i]f the amount of defacement, damage or destruction is five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or more, vandalism is punishable in the state 
prison . . . .‖  That a judge ultimately may impose a sentence other than state 
prison, making the crime a misdemeanor, does not remove former section 594, 
subdivision (b)(1) from the class of crimes that may form the basis for a burglary 
conviction.  (See § 17, subd. (b)(1); see also People v. Rathert (2000) 24 Cal.4th 
200, 202, 208 [the defendant was convicted of burglary predicated upon felony 
false personation, which crime is a ―wobbler‖].)  The instructions required the 
jury, in order to find defendant guilty of burglary, to find that he entered with the 
intent to cause property damage in excess of $5,000.  Such conduct is punishable 
by imprisonment in state prison.  That is sufficient to establish the commission of 
a felony supporting the giving of the burglary instruction.20  
Defendant‘s second challenge to the felony-murder instruction is that the 
entry with the intent to assault Black merged with the six homicides committed 
inside ESL‘s facility.  His theory finds its roots in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 
Cal.2d 522, 539 (Ireland), in which the defendant was found guilty of the second 
degree murder of his wife, whom he fatally assaulted with a firearm.  We 
concluded that the jury instructions may have been understood to direct the jury to 
                                            
20  
We also reject defendant‘s further contention that the court‘s instructions 
concerning vandalism as a predicate crime for burglary were erroneous because 
―the relevant criminal intent under section 594‖ is not intent to cause property 
damage of at least $5,000, but only to deface, damage, or destroy property.  If, by 
requiring the jury to find an intent to cause property damage in excess of $5,000, 
the instruction required more than the statute, this inured to defendant‘s benefit.   
79 
―find defendant guilty of second degree murder if it found only that the homicide 
was committed in the perpetration of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon‖ 
(id. at p. 539), and we held that it was error to instruct the jury concerning felony 
murder in these circumstances.  Our opinion in Ireland explained that use of the 
felony-murder rule in cases in which the defendant is charged with assaulting and 
killing the victim ―would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue 
of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a 
result of a felonious assault — a category which includes the great majority of all 
homicides.  This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law.‖  
(Ibid.)   
In Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, we extended Ireland‘s merger doctrine to 
first degree felony murder based upon a burglary committed with the intent to 
assault the murder victim.  The first degree felony-murder rule is set forth in 
section 189:  ―All murder which is . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to perpetrate, [certain enumerated felonies, including] burglary, . . . is murder of 
the first degree.‖  In Wilson, the instructions authorized the jury to find the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder if ―he entered [his wife‘s] bathroom with 
an intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon and thereby committed a 
burglary, in the course of which he killed his wife.‖  (Id. at p. 439.)  We observed 
that ―the only basis for finding a felonious entry is the intent to commit an assault 
with a deadly weapon,‖ and concluded that, ―[w]hen, as here, the entry would be 
nonfelonious but for the intent to commit the assault, and the assault is an integral 
part of the homicide and is included in fact in the offense charged, utilization of 
the felony-murder rule extends that doctrine ‗beyond any rational function that it is 
designed to serve.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 440.)  Therefore, we held that ―an instruction on 
first degree felony murder is improper when the underlying felony is burglary 
80 
based upon an intention to assault the victim of the homicide with a deadly 
weapon.‖  (Id. at p. 442, italics added.) 
Defendant proposes that the merger rule established in Wilson be extended 
further to prohibit application of the felony-murder rule when the burglary charge 
is based upon an intention to assault someone other than the victim of the 
homicide.  Defendant relies upon People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 (Sears), in 
which the defendant entered his estranged wife‘s home and assaulted her and her 
daughter, killing the daughter.  The jury instructions, together with the trial court‘s 
answer to a question from the jury, ―could reasonably be understood to mean that 
if defendant entered with intent to assault his wife and stepdaughter he was guilty 
of burglary and that the first degree felony-murder rule was applicable.‖  (Id. at 
p. 188, italics added (lead opn. of Peters, J.).)  Therefore, under the principles 
enunciated in Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, and Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, 
Justice Peters‘s lead opinion, in which Chief Justice Traynor and Justice Tobriner 
concurred, held that the merger doctrine precluded reliance upon the felony-
murder rule to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder.  In his concurring 
opinion, in which Justices Burke and Sims (assigned) concurred, Justice Sullivan 
stated that he ―agree[d] generally . . . that the court‘s instructions on the first 
degree felony-murder rule in this case were erroneous . . . .  However, I do not 
agree with, and do not join in, the additional views of the [lead opinion], relating 
to the felony-murder rule.‖  (Id. at p. 191 (conc. opn. of Sullivan, J.).)21    
Defendant relies upon the ―additional views‖ of the lead opinion, to which 
Justice Sullivan‘s concurring opinion referred.  (Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 191 
(conc. opn. of Sullivan, J.).)  Those additional views related to the Attorney 
                                            
21 
Justice McComb summarily dissented.  (Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 191.) 
81 
General‘s theory that the evidence also supported the conclusion that the 
defendant entered with the intent to assault his wife but not his stepdaughter, and 
―that the felony-murder rule is applicable on the theory that the burglary based on 
the intent to assault the wife was independent of and collateral to the killing of the 
stepdaughter.‖  (Id. at p. 188 (lead opn. of Peters, J.).)  The lead opinion responded 
that ―the instructions given to the jury did not posit the applicability of the felony-
murder rule upon any such theory.‖  (Id. at p. 189.)  Nonetheless, the lead opinion 
expressed the view that ―[i]t would be anomalous to place the person who intends 
to attack one person and in the course of the assault kills another inadvertently or 
in the heat of battle in a worse position than the person who from the outset 
intended to attack both persons and killed one or both.‖  (Ibid.) 
As our summary reflects, a majority of the justices in Sears agreed only that 
the actual instruction and the court‘s answer to a jury inquiry — which reasonably 
could be understood to signify that ―if defendant entered with intent to assault his 
wife and stepdaughter he was guilty of burglary and . . . the first degree felony-
murder rule was applicable‖ (id. at p. 188 (lead opn. of Peters, J.), italics 
added) — were inconsistent with the merger doctrine.  (Ibid.)  Furthermore, the 
additional views expressed in response to the Attorney General‘s theory are dicta 
in the lead opinion itself.  Thus, the lead opinion and the concurring opinion in 
Sears establish only that if the jury in the present case had been instructed that 
defendant entered ESL‘s facility with the intent to assault all of his homicide 
victims, the merger doctrine would have precluded reliance upon the felony-
murder rule to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder.   
Following our opinion in Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d 180, we have assumed that 
the felony-murder rule applies to a burglary in which there was an intent to assault 
an individual other than the homicide victim.  (See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 1083 (Gutierrez.)  In Gutierrez, the defendant forced his way into his 
82 
estranged wife‘s home, and while his accomplice held a gun to the wife in the 
living room, the defendant forced his way into the bathroom and killed his wife‘s 
boyfriend.  The jury was instructed on first degree felony murder based upon 
burglary committed by the defendant with the intent to commit five target felonies, 
including assault with a deadly weapon upon his wife.  We upheld the defendant‘s 
first degree murder conviction, observing:  ―Notably, [the killing of the boyfriend] 
was not alleged as a target offense of the burglary . . . .  Had the independent target 
offenses not been alleged in connection with the burglary charge, the merger 
doctrine might have applied.  (See People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 439-
442.)‖  (Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1140, fn. 7.)  Similarly, in the present 
case, the assaults upon victims other than Black were not alleged as target offenses 
of the burglary.  Rather, only the target offenses of intent to assault Black and to 
vandalize were alleged in connection with the burglary charge.  Therefore, the 
target offenses alleged by the prosecutor did not merge with the killings of the six 
individuals inside the M-5 building, and there was no error in the instruction on 
felony murder.22   
                                            
22  
Although we conclude that both theories of felony murder were valid, we 
note that the record reflects the jury also must have concluded the homicides were 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  The prosecution argued that if the jury 
found that when defendant ―went to ESL that day [he] had it in mind that he would 
kill anyone who even marginally became an obstacle during his mission[,] . . . 
[t]hat would be willful, deliberate and premeditated murder as to those persons he 
killed while he was on his mission.‖  The prosecution made essentially the same 
argument in connection with the attempted murder counts — if defendant ―went 
into that building intending to shoot everybody he could see, intending to kill 
everybody he could see, then that would be willful, deliberate and premeditated 
attempted murder on each of those persons that he went after.‖  The jury 
specifically found that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated.  Other than Black, for whom attempted murder was not 
charged, defendant knew none of the individuals he shot, and nothing in the record 
indicates that the circumstances of any of the murders were different from the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
83 
Although our jurisprudence, including the decision in Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 
431, supports the conclusion that defendant‘s entry with intent to assault Black did 
not merge with the six homicides committed within the ESL facility, we 
acknowledge that our past decisions applying the merger doctrine to first degree 
felony murder premised upon burglary have resulted in questionable distinctions.  
As illustrated by Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d 180, whether a defendant may be 
convicted of felony murder may depend upon whether the prosecutor chooses to 
allege and prove that the defendant entered with the intent to assault only one 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
circumstances of the attempted murders in any way that could affect whether the 
murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  Indeed, the murder of Ronald 
Doney and the attempted murder of Richard Townsley occurred at the same time.  
The jury also specifically found that the murder of Lawrence Kane, who was shot 
outside ESL, was willful, premeditated, and deliberate.  Thus, there is no logical 
basis upon which to conclude that the jury could have found that the murder of 
Kane and the attempted murders of five other individuals were willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated, but that the other homicides were not.  Therefore, even if the 
jury had been improperly instructed regarding felony murder, ―other aspects of the 
verdict or the evidence leave no reasonable doubt that the jury made the findings 
necessary for‖ premeditated murder, and hence any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1205 (Chun); see 
Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 530] (per curiam) [when the 
jury was instructed on both a valid and an invalid theory of guilt, the conviction 
will not be set aside if the invalid instruction was harmless].) 
 
Similarly, although our conclusion defeats defendant‘s challenge to the 
burglary-murder special circumstance, we note that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the jury‘s findings on the burglary-murder special circumstance 
affected the penalty determination.  (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 628 
(Morgan); see Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212, 223-224.)  The jury would 
have heard the same evidence regarding the killings, in proof of the prosecutor‘s 
theory of premeditated murder and the multiple-murder special circumstance, as it 
heard regarding the burglary-murder special circumstance.  (People v. Bonilla 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 334 [second special circumstance ―was superfluous for 
purposes of death eligibility and did not alter the universe of facts and 
circumstances to which the jury could accord . . . weight‖].) 
84 
victim, or also intended to assault another person, the homicide victim.  As 
illustrated by Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1083, a defendant who enters with the 
intent only to assault the homicide victim may not be convicted of felony murder, 
but a defendant who also harbors an intent to commit a less serious felony may be 
found guilty of felony murder in connection with the intended assault.  
In addition to these analytical anomalies, we note that our recent opinion in 
Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1172, which analyzed the basis of the second degree 
felony-murder rule, has highlighted the difference between the sources of the 
second degree felony-murder rule — the context in which the merger doctrine 
developed — and the first degree felony-murder rule.  In Chun, we recognized that 
the second degree felony-murder rule reflects a judicial interpretation of section 
188‘s definition of implied malice.  Consequently, the merger doctrine developed 
as a judicial interpretation of section 188.  This clarification raises the question of 
whether Wilson‘s application of the merger doctrine in the context of first degree 
felony murder is an appropriate ―interpretation‖ of section 189‘s definition of first 
degree felony murder.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Wilson, 
supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, erred in extending the merger doctrine to first degree felony 
murder. 23 
                                            
23  
Our holding in Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 440, was rejected by New 
York (People v. Miller (N.Y. 1973) 297 N.E.2d 85, 87, fn. 3 (Miller)), and 
subsequently was rejected by numerous other jurisdictions, rendering it a minority 
rule.  (See People v. Lewis (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) 791 P. 2d 1152, 1153 [court 
observed a ―majority of jurisdictions hold that a burglary charge premised on an 
underlying crime of assault may sustain a finding of felony murder,‖ and expressly 
declined to follow Wilson]; Blango v. United States (D.C. 1977) 373 A.2d 885, 
888-889 [court expressly agreed with Miller‘s reasoning, and rejected the holding 
of Wilson]; State v. Foy (Kan. 1978) 582 P.2d 281, 289 [court expressly concluded 
Miller’s reasoning is persuasive, rejected Wilson, and held that the ―merger 
doctrine does not apply in felony-murder cases where an aggravated burglary is 
(footnote continued on next page) 
85 
―The [felony-murder] rule has two applications:  first degree felony murder 
and second degree felony murder. . . .  First degree felony murder is a killing 
during the course of a felony specified in section 189, such as rape, burglary, or 
robbery.  Second degree felony murder is ‗an unlawful killing in the course of the 
commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not 
included among the felonies enumerated in section 189 . . . .‘  [Citation.]‖  (Chun, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)  The source of the second degree felony-murder rule 
has been questioned over the years, with some members of this court expressing 
concern that the rule lacked a statutory basis.  (Id. at pp. 1182-1183.)  We resolved 
the issue in Chun, in which we explained that the second degree felony-murder 
rule ―is simply another interpretation of section 188‘s ‗abandoned and malignant 
                                                                                                                                                       
(footnote continued from previous page) 
based upon an aggravated assault‖]; Finke v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) 468 
A.2d 353, 369 [rejecting Wilson on the ground that Maryland felony-murder 
statute expressly includes ―murder committed in the perpetration of daytime 
housebreaking,‖ and such burglary ―includes breaking a dwelling house ‗with 
intent to commit murder or felony therein‘ ‖]; Commonwealth v. Claudio (Mass. 
1994) 634 N.E.2d 902, 905-907 [court observed that Wilson was the ―minority 
view,‖ and concluded that Miller and other cases following the majority view were 
―better reasoned‖]; Smith v. State (Miss. 1986) 499 So.2d 750, 753-754 [court 
declined to adopt the merger doctrine after discussing Wilson and observing that 
Miller ―aptly states this Court‘s view regarding the application of our felony-
murder statute‖]; State v. Contreras (Nev. 2002) 46 P.3d 661, 662-664 [court 
discussed Wilson and Miller, and held the merger doctrine did not apply to ―felony 
murder when the underlying felony is burglary, regardless of the intent of the 
burglary‖]; State v. Reams (Or. 1981) 636 P.2d 913, 919-920 [court discussed 
Miller and Wilson, and expressly rejected Wilson’s ―logic‖ as applied to Oregon‘s 
felony-murder and burglary statutes].  
86 
heart‘ language‖ (id. at p. 1184) and, therefore, is based upon statute.24  (Chun, at 
p. 1188.)   
Chun‘s identification of the statutory basis of the second degree felony-
murder rule focuses our inquiry upon the statutory basis of the first degree felony-
murder rule.  Section 189 provides in relevant part that ―[a]ll murder . . . which is 
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, 
robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable 
under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, . . . is murder of the first degree.‖  As 
we recently reiterated, ― ‗It is the duty of this court in construing a statute to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.‘ ‖  (Richardson v. 
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048.)  ―We begin with the language of 
the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing 
them in their statutory context.‖  (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1205, 1216.) 
We find no ambiguity in the language of section 189.  It provides that a 
killing committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the enumerated 
felonies, including burglary, is first degree murder.  Burglary has been a 
delineated felony supporting first degree felony murder since section 189 was 
enacted in 1872,25 and indeed since the crime of murder was divided into first and 
second degree in 1856.  (Stats. 1856, ch. 139, § 21, p. 219; see Chun, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 1185.)  In enacting section 189, the Legislature did not limit the 
                                            
24  
Section 188 states that malice, which is an element of murder (§ 187), ―is 
implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances 
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.‖ 
25 
The Penal Code enacted in 1872 was ―not published as part of the Statutes 
of 1871-1872,‖ and was not given a chapter number.  (Kleps, The Revision and 
Codification of Cal. Statutes 1849-1953 (1954) 42 Cal. L.Rev. 766, 775.)  
87 
definition of burglary, or exclude burglaries based upon an intent to assault.  
Rather, section 189 applies the felony-murder rule to all burglaries.  Under section 
459, also enacted in 1872, burglary is committed when the defendant ―enters any 
[defined structure] with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony,‖ 
including assault.  (§ 459,26 italics added; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 
646 [―intent to unlawfully kill or to commit felonious assault‖ will sustain a 
burglary conviction].)  Thus, nothing in the language of section 189 supports the 
application of the merger doctrine to its terms.  
We repeatedly have observed that ― ‗ ―the power to define crimes and fix 
penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.‖  (Keeler v. Superior 
Court [(1970)] 2 Cal.3d 619, 631; [citations].) ‘ ‖  (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 
1183.)  The courts may not expand the Legislature‘s definition of a crime (Keeler 
v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 632), nor may they narrow a clear and 
specific definition.  In the context of second degree felony murder, courts must 
interpret section 188‘s reference to an ― ‗abandoned and malignant heart.‘ ‖  
(Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)  In the context of first degree felony murder, 
however, there is no need for interpretation of the Legislature‘s clear language.  
Thus, the differences between the statutory bases for first and second degree 
felony murder support the conclusion that although this court properly may limit 
the breadth of second degree felony murder in a manner consistent with its 
interpretation of the Legislature‘s intent, there is no room for interpretation when 
                                            
26 
As enacted in 1872, section 459 provided:  ―Every person who, in the 
night-time, forcibly breaks and enters, or without force enters through any open 
door, window, or other aperture, any house, room, apartment, or tenement, or any 
tent, vessel, water craft, or railroad car, with intent to commit grand or petit 
larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary.‖   
88 
the Legislature has defined first degree felony murder to include any killing 
―committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . burglary.‖  (§ 189.)   
Because the power to define crimes lies exclusively with the Legislature, our 
decision in Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, erred in narrowing the Legislature‘s clear 
and specific definition of first degree murder.  In Wilson, we expressed the view 
that ―[w]here a person enters a building with the intent to assault his victim with a 
deadly weapon, he is not deterred by the felony-murder rule.‖  (Id. at p. 440.)  
Although we recognized that crimes committed inside structures entail greater 
risks to the occupants, we concluded that ―this rationale does not justify 
application of the felony-murder rule to the case at bar.  Where the intended felony 
of the burglar is an assault with a deadly weapon, the likelihood of homicide from 
the lethal weapon is not significantly increased by the site of the assault.‖  (Id. at 
pp. 440-441.)  Finally, we concluded that the burglary statute ―includes within its 
definition numerous structures other than dwellings as to which there can be no 
conceivable basis for distinguishing between an assault with a deadly weapon 
outdoors and a burglary in which the felonious intent is solely to assault with a 
deadly weapon.‖27  (Wilson, at p. 441, fn. omitted.)   
We disagree with Wilson‘s view that applying the felony-murder rule to a 
killing committed in the course of a burglary, with an intent to assault, serves no 
purpose.  First, a person who enters a building with the intent to assault, rather 
than to kill (in which case the felony-murder rule would be unnecessary), may be 
                                            
27  
Wilson noted that the burglary statute includes ―any ‗shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, railroad car, trailer 
coach . . . , vehicle . . . , aircraft . . . , mine or any underground portion thereof 
. . . .‘  (Pen. Code, §  459.)‖  (Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 441, fn. 3.)  As noted 
above, the statute included a broad array of structures when it was enacted in 
1872.  (See ante, fn. 26.) 
89 
deterred by the circumstance that if the victim of the assault dies, the burglar ―will 
be deemed guilty of first degree murder.‖  (People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 
388.)  Second, the circumstance that the degree to which the peril is heightened 
may vary, depending upon the particular structure in which the assault occurs, 
does not negate the purpose of deterring assaults and the heightened risks entailed 
by assaults that are committed within structures.  Individuals within any type of 
structure are in greater peril from those entering the structure with the intent to 
commit an assault, than are individuals in a public location who are the target of 
an assault.  (Miller, supra, 297 N.E.2d at p. 87.)  Victims attacked in seclusion 
have fewer means to escape, and there is a diminished likelihood that the crimes 
committed against them will be observed or discovered.  These risks are present 
regardless of whether the burglary and assault occur in a home, a tent, or a trailer 
coach.  (See ante, fn. 27.)  For these reasons, we reject Wilson‘s conclusion that no 
purpose is served by applying the felony-murder doctrine to a burglary premised 
upon an intent to assault.   
Defendant contends, however, that the Legislature‘s failure to amend section 
189 in response to Wilson, despite having amended the statute in other respects, 
demonstrates that this body is not ―troubled by this Court‘s merger jurisprudence.‖  
―[W]e frequently have expressed reluctance to draw conclusions concerning 
legislative intent from legislative silence or inaction.‖  (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 764, 784.)  Here, although the Legislature has not ―affirmatively 
disapproved‖ this court‘s analysis in Wilson, neither has defendant established that 
the Legislature has either ―expressly or impliedly endorsed it.‖  (People v. Escobar 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 751.)  As we observed in People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
59, 77, when this court has created a rule, we can reexamine it.  The circumstance 
that we have misconstrued the statutory scheme in the aftermath of our 1969 
90 
decision in Wilson does not justify continuing to ignore the Legislature‘s apparent 
intent in enacting section 189. 
Defendant also contends that by applying the merger doctrine to second 
degree, but not first degree, murder, this court is ―sanctioning more severe 
punishment[] for less culpable conduct.‖  As a preliminary matter, we reject 
defendant‘s premise that the insidiousness of an entry committed with the intent to 
commit an assault does not merit more severe punishment than a simple assault.  
In any event, as explained above, it is for the Legislature, not this court, to 
determine penalty.  ―This court has reiterated numerous times that ‗The purpose of 
the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by 
holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.‘  (People v. 
Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781.)  The Legislature has said in effect that 
this deterrent purpose outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the 
individual state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine 
whether the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or accidental, and 
calibrating our treatment of the person accordingly.  Once a person perpetrates or 
attempts to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the 
Legislature, he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be 
deemed guilty of first degree murder for any homicide committed in the course 
thereof.‖  (Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 388.)  Policy concerns regarding the 
inclusion of burglary in the first degree felony-murder statute remain within the 
Legislature‘s domain, and do not authorize this court to limit the plain language of 
the statute.  Therefore, we overrule our decision in People v. Wilson, supra, 1 
Cal.3d 431.   
Because, due to ex post facto concerns, an unforeseeable judicial 
enlargement of a criminal statute may not be applied retroactively, our overruling 
of Wilson does not apply retroactively to defendant‘s case.  (People v. Blakeley 
91 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91-92 [conclusion, contrary to Court of Appeal opinions, 
that a killing in imperfect self-defense is voluntary, not involuntary, manslaughter, 
is prospective only, due to ex post facto concerns]; People v. Morante (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 403, 430-432 [similar conclusion regarding an expansive reinterpretation 
of Penal Code section 182]; People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 238-241 
[overruling of People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562 (regarding the asportation 
element of kidnapping) is prospective only, for similar reasons]; People v. Davis 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 811-812 [holding, contrary to Court of Appeal opinions, that 
viability of a fetus is not an element of fetal murder, is prospective only, for 
similar reasons]; People v. King, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80 [overruling of In re 
Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 regarding firearm use enhancement is prospective 
only, for similar reasons]; see also Rogers v. Tennessee (2001) 532 U.S. 451, 462; 
Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353.)  Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 
431, was decided in 1969.  Defendant committed his crimes in 1988, at which time 
it was unforeseeable that we would overrule Wilson.  Accordingly, today‘s 
overruling is prospective only.  Of course, in light of the conclusion we reach 
under our jurisprudence governing at the time of the crimes — that the burglary 
committed with the intent to assault Black did not merge with the homicides — 
there was no error in instructing the jury concerning felony murder premised upon 
that burglary. 
b.  Instructions on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence 
Defendant asserts that the trial court‘s instructions concerning reasonable 
doubt violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  The trial court instructed the jury in the language of 
92 
former CALJIC 2.90.28  The high court upheld the language of this instruction in 
Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 13, 15, 17, and we have held that it was not 
error to give the instruction.  (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503 
(Freeman).)  Defendant provides no persuasive reason to revisit these conclusions.   
Defendant further contends that the instruction concerning reasonable doubt 
was improper when given in conjunction with the instruction that if ―one 
interpretation of [the] evidence appears to you to be reasonable, and the other 
interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation 
and reject the unreasonable.‖  A similar instruction was given with regard to the 
existence of required specific intent.  We repeatedly have rejected claims that 
these instructions allow a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof less than 
reasonable doubt, establish ― ‗an impermissible mandatory presumption‘ ‖ of guilt, 
or impose upon defendant a burden of proof.  (Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
p. 620; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 713-714.)  ―The plain meaning 
of these instructions merely informs the jury to reject unreasonable interpretations 
of the evidence and to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt.‖  
(People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 386.)   
c.  Requested defense instructions 
Defendant contends the trial court‘s denial of certain instructions he 
requested violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
                                            
28 
The jury was instructed:  ―Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  It is not 
a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending 
on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of 
the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence 
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.‖   
93 
Defendant requested the following instruction:  ―If you find that a witness 
has testified falsely, this fact may afford an inference that the witness is concealing 
the truth, but it does not, by itself, warrant an inference that the truth is the direct 
opposite of the rejected testimony.‖  This instruction was properly rejected as 
argumentative and duplicative of other given instructions.29  (People v. Gurule 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659 (Gurule).)   
Defendant requested a modified instruction concerning reasonable doubt.  
We have cautioned ―against trial court experimentation‖ with this instruction, and 
as noted earlier, we have upheld the validity of the instruction given by the court.  
(Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 504.)  Defendant‘s proposed instruction was 
duplicative of instructions that were given, and thus was properly refused.  
(Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659.)   
Defendant also requested an instruction providing: ―An abiding conviction is 
a belief with staying power.  Even absolute positivism, if it wanes after some 
undetermined and undeterminable time, is insufficient.  Therefore, not just any 
kind of conviction will dispel a reasonable doubt, it must be the abiding kind 
only.‖  We previously have held that this language is not required.  (People 
v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 203 (Turner), overruled on other grounds in 
People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5.)   
                                            
29 
The jury was instructed in the language of CALJIC No. 2.21.2, which 
provides:  ―A witness, who is willfully false in one material part of his or her 
testimony is to be distrusted in others.  You may reject the whole testimony of a 
witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point unless, from all the 
evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other 
particulars.‖   
94 
Defendant requested additional instructions defining ―deliberate‖ and 
―premeditate,‖ and three instructions that elaborated on the concept of 
premeditation.  The jury was instructed in the language of CALJIC No. 8.20.  That 
was sufficient.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 31-32; Gurule, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 659.)   
4.  Alleged cumulative error 
Defendant asserts that even if the errors alleged above are not in themselves 
reversible, their cumulative effect requires reversal.  We disagree.  As explained 
above, defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of evidence intended to 
impeach Hirst, by the exclusion of defendant‘s letters as evidence of his state of 
mind, or by any flaws in the felony-murder instructions.  The few errors that may 
have occurred during defendant‘s trial were harmless under any standard, whether 
considered individually or collectively.  Defendant ―has merely shown that his 
‗ ― trial was not perfect — few are.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 
839.)   
C.  Penalty Phase Issues  
1.  Data concerning past employment 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying him access to data 
concerning his past employment, and in prohibiting him from introducing 
evidence on that subject, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and that the error mandates reversal of the penalty imposed.30   
a.  Factual background 
Because defendant had access to classified information during his 
employment in the Navy and at ESL, the federal government expressed concern 
                                            
30 
Defendant also filed a motion for new trial raising this issue.    
95 
before and during trial that defendant would disclose confidential information at 
trial.  At a hearing held before defendant testified at the guilt phase of the trial, 
Robin Ball, an attorney from the United States Department of Justice, sought to 
assert a privilege on behalf of the federal government, proposing that, at 
defendant‘s trial, he be permitted either to rise and object, or signal the court or the 
prosecutor that he wished to assert a claim of privilege.  The trial court rejected the 
view that the federal government had standing to intervene in these proceedings, 
and could not conceive of any scenario in which Ball would be permitted to raise 
an objection before a capital case jury, but the court was not opposed to an 
arrangement between the prosecutor and Ball by which Ball might communicate 
concerns to the prosecutor.  The following day, although the prosecutor also 
questioned the assertion that the federal government had standing to object, he 
informed the court and defense counsel that ―[t]here will however be some 
mechanism where . . . Mr. Ball can communicate with me at appropriate times.  I 
will make any objections that the prosecution feels necessary.‖  He subsequently 
added, ―I‘m not nor do I intend to be an agent for the U.S. Government.  My 
interests are prosecuting murder.‖   
During defendant‘s guilt phase testimony, the trial court sustained several 
objections by the prosecution on the ground of relevancy.  Defendant claims error 
with respect to four questions he was asked but was not allowed to answer.   
First, defendant testified that following his return from Australia, he ―found a 
position working for a subset of a piece of equipment that we had deployed over in 
Australia.‖  Defense counsel asked him to explain what he meant by ―a subset of 
the equipment that had been deployed.‖  The prosecutor objected on relevancy 
grounds, which the trial court sustained.  At a sidebar conference, defense counsel 
asked whether the objection had been made in response to a signal from the 
representative of the federal government, and the prosecutor stated he had ―no 
96 
idea,‖ and had objected because the question was irrelevant.  Defense counsel 
stated he was attempting to elicit testimony (1) to counter prosecution testimony 
regarding the ESL location where defendant was assigned, as opposed to the 
location where he in fact was seen working (and by implication, stalking Black), 
and (2) to elucidate defendant‘s ―industry jargon‖ so that the jury understood 
―what it is he was working on.‖  The trial court suggested counsel simply ask 
defendant where that piece of equipment was located.   
Second, when defendant testified that he was assigned to a different project, 
defense counsel asked him to identify the new project.  The prosecutor‘s objection 
on the ground of relevancy was sustained.  At sidebar, defense counsel again 
inquired whether the prosecutor‘s objection was prompted by a signal from Ball.  
After colloquy between counsel and the court, the prosecutor said, ―When I make 
a relevancy objection, I mean that the matter is irrelevant.  Pure and simple.‖  
After further argument, the court again stated that ―[t]he relevancy is where he was 
working.‖   
Third, defendant testified that he did not believe the actions he took to gather 
information about Black were wrong, because his Navy career and his work at 
ESL fostered an attitude that gathering information surreptitiously was not wrong 
and that information was power.  Defense counsel asked, ―What are you referring 
to in terms of what you did in the military and ESL that fostered these attitudes?‖  
The prosecutor objected that the information was irrelevant.  At a sidebar 
conference, defense counsel suggested Ball had signaled the prosecutor.  The 
prosecutor stated, ―I received no signal.  I made a relevance objection.‖  After 
further discussion between the court and counsel, the court asked defendant for an 
offer of proof regarding what defendant ―is going to testify to.‖  After consultation 
with defendant, defense counsel stated defendant would testify that his work 
involved the use of ―electronic methods to monitor electronic signals generated by 
97 
foreign powers,‖ and he ―intend[ed] to ask [defendant] about that information, 
about where it was coming from, and why this work contributed to his attitudes, 
what it was about that that contributed to his attitudes . . . .‖  After further 
argument by counsel, the court sustained the objection, noting that defendant 
already had testified that his military and work environment, in which he 
possessed security clearances that allowed him to obtain information, had led to 
his ―feeling of power from getting information.‖  The trial court explained that it 
―fail[ed] to see what he did specifically in the Navy or at ESL insofar as particular 
projects that he worked on, or particular discussion about monitoring electronic 
signals of foreign powers or as well as any agencies that he worked for, how that 
has anything at all to do with this.‖  The court added that ―even if it had some 
marginal relevance under 352, this is a complete waste of time, confusion of the 
issues, and the probative value of this information is negligible.‖   
Fourth, after defendant testified further about the attitudes fostered by being 
involved in spying, and about his ―elite‖ feeling from having access to classified 
information, defense counsel asked about the type of information gathered in the 
Australian facility where defendant worked.  The trial court sustained the 
prosecutor‘s relevancy objection, and added that the testimony had ―no probative 
value‖ and was time consuming.  The court stated:  ―I think you have beat to death 
the issue of spying equals power equals information equals power, that this 
Defendant has established those attitudes from his work in the military and at ESL, 
and that he has already described his attitudes about that and that the fact that 
normal people don‘t have this information, that he‘s elitist because he had all this 
information because of his super secret clearance.  Enough is enough.‖   
Before the defense completed its direct examination of defendant, it was 
afforded a hearing regarding Ball‘s signals to the prosecutor.  Ball testified that he 
would wave to Lieutenant Dow if a question or answer raised privileged matters.  
98 
With respect to two questions, Ball stated he had waved to Dow, but the 
prosecutor already had stood up to object in each instance.  With respect to 
another question, Ball said he waved to Dow and Dow touched the prosecutor‘s 
arm.  Lieutenant Dow testified that the prosecutor stated that he was ―already 
aware‖ and was about to object.  Thus, the prosecutor did not in fact make any 
objections at the prompting of the federal representative. 
The confidential nature of defendant‘s work in the Navy and at ESL also 
resulted in limitations upon the testimony of Kent Wells, the Navy personnel 
security specialist, during the penalty phase.  The trial court ruled in limine that it 
could not order Wells to disclose classified information, because doing so could 
subject him to criminal prosecution.  It also concluded the confidential information 
defendant sought from Wells was not necessary, because the defense was ―making 
[its] point before the [j]ury with other evidence.‖   
Defendant requested that Wells testify outside the presence of the jury, be 
ordered to answer questions involving confidential information, and thereby be 
forced to invoke a privilege.  The trial court agreed.  As relevant here, Wells 
refused to disclose what information was gathered by the national security 
function with which defendant was involved, but agreed that defendant, as a 
member of the team, ―helped gather information which was essential to national 
security, search and rescue and navigational assistance.‖  The trial court found 
―[t]he gathering function itself . . . to be irrelevant.‖  Wells also testified that 
knowing the location of ships, planes, and other kinds of objects is important in 
defending the United States against its enemies, and that defendant thereby 
contributed to the country‘s national security, but he refused to explain ―[w]hat 
type of enemy movements, activities, were being monitored that was of assistance 
to the United States in its defense.‖  The trial court concluded that the ―type of 
enemy movements‖ was irrelevant.  Finally, Wells testified that in the course of 
99 
repairing and maintaining the equipment, defendant may have been exposed to 
information stored in computers, but declined to disclose whether the equipment 
contained specific information about submarine activities of enemy fleets.  The 
trial court found this information to be irrelevant, and also found that the inquiry 
would result in an undue consumption of time and would confuse the jury.  (Evid. 
Code, § 352.) 
b.  Discussion 
Defendant contends the trial court‘s rulings give rise to several related 
questions:  (1) In a capital case, does the defendant have a constitutional right to 
obtain and present mitigating evidence even if it is protected by a national security 
privilege?  (2) If the defendant is denied the right to present such mitigating 
evidence, can the state nonetheless seek the death penalty on the theory that it is 
not the state, but the federal government, that is withholding the evidence?  (3) In 
a capital case, can the court exclude details of a defendant‘s employment as 
irrelevant?   
Defendant does not argue there was error either in the trial court‘s rulings 
concerning the discovery of classified information or his motion to bar the death 
penalty, or in the federal court‘s grant of summary judgment with respect to 
defendant‘s Freedom of Information Act complaint.  His argument focuses instead 
upon the trial court‘s rulings concerning relevance and the exclusion of evidence 
under Evidence Code section 352 during defendant‘s and Wells‘s testimony, and 
the ―signaling‖ system between the prosecutor and Ball, representing the United 
States Government.  Moreover, as defendant acknowledges, during the 
presentation of evidence there were no objections or rulings on the basis of 
national security.  Therefore, the first two issues identified by defendant are not 
presented. 
100 
We turn to the third issue — whether a court, in a capital case, may exclude 
details of a defendant‘s employment as irrelevant.  ―The Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that the sentencer in a capital case not be precluded from 
considering any relevant mitigating evidence, that is, evidence regarding ‗any 
aspect of a defendant‘s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.‘ ‖  
(Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1015.)  ―Nonetheless, the trial court still 
‗ ―determines relevancy in the first instance and retains discretion to exclude 
evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that 
its admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading 
the jury.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 320; see Romano v. 
Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12 [―The Eighth Amendment does not establish a 
federal code of evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in capital sentencing 
proceedings‖]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, fn. 12 [―Nothing in this 
opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence 
not bearing on the defendant‘s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his 
offense‖].)  ―The meaning of relevance is no different in the context of mitigating 
evidence introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding‖ from what it is in any 
other context.  (McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 440.)  Thus, 
― ‗[r]elevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or 
disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to 
have mitigating value.‘ ‖  (Ibid.; see Evid. Code, § 210.)   
Defendant contends that the ―trial court‘s repeated relevancy rulings favoring 
the prosecution were nothing more than a subterfuge,‖ and that the court‘s 
―implicit goal was to avoid having to rule on an assertion of a national security 
privilege.‖  He also contends Evidence Code section 352, upon which the court 
101 
relied in several of its rulings, was inapplicable because the information sought 
was not prejudicial, and would have taken little time to present.   
We first consider the rulings made during defendant‘s testimony.  Defendant 
testified only at the guilt phase.  Thus the challenged trial court rulings regarding 
his testimony are examined not in the context of his attempt to adduce penalty 
phase mitigating evidence, as defendant contends, but rather as evidence proffered 
in defense of the charged offenses.  Defendant‘s testimony regarding his work 
assignments was relevant to counter the implication that he left his assigned work 
area in order to stalk Black.  Therefore, evidence establishing that he was assigned 
to work in areas where Black was assigned was relevant, but the precise project 
upon which defendant was working, or a more detailed description of the 
equipment used, was not.  Similarly, evidence indicating that defendant felt 
entitled to invade the privacy of others because of his military and ESL experience 
arguably was relevant to his state of mind, but the content of the classified 
information that he helped gather was not.  The court‘s rulings concerning 
relevance and the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 were 
well within the court‘s broad discretion and do not demonstrate, contrary to 
defendant‘s assertion, that the ―trial court was acting in concert with the 
prosecution and the United States Attorney‘s office . . . to ensure‖ that the basis 
for the exclusion was not national security.   
With respect to the signaling system set up between the prosecutor and Ball, 
defendant contends that the state ―actively collaborat[ed] with the federal 
government to withhold mitigating evidence from the jury.‖  He claims the 
signaling system deprived him of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, because it masked the true basis for the objections, that is, national security, 
and thereby denied him the opportunity to seek meaningful appellate review of the 
real basis ―for the exclusion of this critical evidence.‖  Once again, these events 
102 
occurred during the guilt phase, at a time when defendant was not proffering 
mitigating evidence.  In addition, the record indicates the signals did not lead to 
any objections; rather, the prosecutor was objecting or preparing to object when 
the signals were received.   
Nor did the trial court‘s challenged rulings regarding Wells‘s testimony, 
during the penalty phase, improperly limit the admission of mitigating evidence.  
The evidence presented fully informed the jury that defendant received a top-
security clearance requiring that he be trustworthy, reliable, of unquestioned 
character, and loyal to the United States; he worked on a high frequency direction-
finding network that assisted in search and rescue missions for aircraft or ships in 
distress; enemy location was one aspect of the information defendant would 
gather; the Secretary of Defense characterized all of the projects that defendant 
worked on as vital to the national defense; and much of his work remained 
classified at the time of trial.  The precise information gathered, the type of enemy 
movements monitored, and whether the equipment contained information about 
the submarine activities of enemy fleets, was tangential and had no bearing upon 
defendant‘s character or record, or the circumstances of his crimes.   
2.  Alleged improper limitation upon closing argument 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from 
arguing that defendant‘s crimes were less serious than those of other capital 
defendants, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.31  No error appears. 
                                            
31 
As we previously have observed, a claim that defense counsel‘s argument 
improperly was limited invokes an aspect of the right to counsel.  (People 
v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 854 (Marshall).)  Hence, it is grounded in the 
Sixth, not the Eighth, Amendment.   
103 
During closing argument, defense counsel stated, ―We need to look at this 
case and compare this case with other special circumstance killings . . . .‖  At a 
sidebar conference, defense counsel repeatedly asserted he did not ―intend to 
comment on what case got what penalty.‖  Rather, counsel sought to argue that 
―this is not . . . the worst of the worst . . . , there are far worse cases,‖ by referring 
to such defendants as Richard Ramirez, David Carpenter, and Ramon Salcido, and 
discussing the circumstances of their crimes.   
The court ruled that counsel would ―not be permitted to engage in a 
comparative analysis of other death penalty cases or other murder cases . . . .‖  
Counsel was not allowed to mention ―specific cases, specific names, specific 
penalties,‖ but he was permitted to say that ―this is not a child torture case or 
something like that.‖  Following the sidebar conference, defense counsel argued to 
the jury that defendant, whose crimes involved a single incident brought on by 
severe emotional and personal stress and who did not kill as many individuals as 
he might have or seize hostages, was less deserving of the death penalty than a 
person who kills with the thought of avoiding capture, tortures victims, acts for 
mercenary reasons, or kills on multiple occasions over a long period of time.   
Defendant now contends ―[t]he fact that a particular defendant‘s crime is less 
aggravated than the crimes of others who have received the death penalty — or 
especially that it is less aggravated than the crimes of persons who did not receive 
the death penalty — is nonetheless a proper consideration for the sentencing body 
in deciding what sentence to impose.‖  As set forth above, however, trial counsel 
repeatedly stated he did not seek to refer to the penalty imposed in any particular 
case.  Therefore, this claim is forfeited.   
Defendant‘s claim also is without merit.  On numerous occasions, we have 
upheld a trial court‘s refusal ―to allow defense counsel to compare the subject 
crime to other well-known murders‖ (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 
104 
400), or to note the penalty imposed in such cases (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 596, 640), while allowing argument that there ―were other murderers 
worse than he‖ (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 110).  ―[M]eaningful 
comparisons with other well-publicized crimes cannot be made solely on the basis 
of the circumstances of the crime . . . without consideration of the other 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 
481, 529; Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855.)  Here, counsel‘s central 
point was that defendant‘s murders were not ―the worst of the worst.‖  He was not 
precluded from making such an argument, and ably did so. 
3.  Alleged instructional error 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give three proposed 
instructions concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  We disagree. 
The first and second paragraphs of the first proposed instruction defined 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and therefore were duplicative of 
CALJIC No 8.88, which was given here, and which likewise defines aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  Hence the trial court properly declined to give this 
portion of the proposed instruction.  (Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659.)   
The third paragraph of the first proposed instruction provided:  ―The fact that 
[defendant] has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of 
murder in the first degree is not itself an aggravating circumstance.‖  We 
previously have rejected a claim that a trial court erred in refusing to give a 
substantially similar instruction.  (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 152-
153 (Coleman).)  We observed:  ―The request was properly denied since the 
requested instruction was unnecessary and possibly misleading.  There appeared 
no need to tell the jury that the murder conviction in the abstract, as distinct from 
the circumstances of the murder, is not an aggravating factor since no one had 
105 
suggested otherwise.  More seriously, the requested instruction might have been 
understood as a contradiction of the instruction properly given, that the jury should 
consider the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, including the 
‗circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding‘ (§ 190.3, factor (a).‖  (Id. at pp. 152-153.)     
Defendant‘s second proposed instruction provided:  ―You may not treat the 
verdict and finding of first degree murder committed under [a] special 
circumstance[s], in and of themselves, as constituting an aggravating factor.  For, 
under the law, first degree murder committed with a special circumstance may be 
punished by either death or life imprisonment without [the] possibility of parole.  
[¶]  Thus, the verdict and finding which qualifies a particular crime for either of 
these punishments may not be taken, in and of themselves, as justifying one 
penalty over the other.  You may, however, examine the evidence presented in the 
guilt and penalty phases of this trial to determine how the underlying facts of the 
crime bear on aggravation or mitigation.‖   
As with defendant‘s first proposed instruction, this instruction was 
unnecessary and possibly misleading.  The trial court instructed the jury to 
―consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances,‖ and explained that ―[a]n aggravating factor is any 
fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its 
guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond 
the elements of the crime itself.‖  The court also instructed the jury that it could 
consider ―the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in 
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be 
true,‖ but the jury could not consider both the existence of a special circumstance 
and the facts underlying the special circumstance.  ―In other words, do not 
consider the same factors more than once in determining the presence of 
106 
aggravating factors.‖  Also, like defendant‘s proposed instruction, an instruction 
given by the court explained that the penalty for a defendant who has been found 
guilty of murder in the first degree in a case in which a special circumstance has 
been found true is death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
These instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that it was required to consider 
the facts underlying the convictions and special circumstance findings, not the 
mere existence of the convictions and findings.  Defendant‘s proposed instruction 
was misleading to the extent it contradicted instructions directing the jury to 
consider the circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special 
circumstance.  (See Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 152-153.) 
The third proposed instruction provided:  ―In deciding whether you should 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or to 
death, you cannot consider as an aggravating factor any fact which was used by 
you in finding him guilty of murder in the first degree or which was used by you 
in establishing the existence of any special circumstances which you have found to 
be true unless that fact establishes something in addition to an element of the 
crime of murder in the first degree.  The fact that you have found [defendant] 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in the first degree is not 
itself an aggravating circumstance.‖  This instruction properly was refused, 
because it was erroneous and misleading.  (Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 152-
153.)  As noted above, the jury properly was instructed pursuant to section 190.3, 
factor (a), that it could consider ―the circumstances of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true.‖  Moreover, as noted above, the jury was 
instructed not to ―double-count.‖   
107 
4.  Constitutionality of death penalty statute  
Defendant makes numerous claims that the death penalty statute violates the 
United States Constitution.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude there is 
no merit in these contentions.   
Section 190.2, which sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of 
death may be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 373.)   
Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider, in choosing the 
appropriate penalty, ―[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances 
found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1,‖ does not violate the Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution merely because those 
circumstances differ from case to case, or because factor (a) does not guide the 
jury in weighing these circumstances.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 
967, 975-976, 978-979; People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 211 (Stevens).)   
The absence of a requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that aggravating factors are true (except for other, unadjudicated crimes), that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, and that death is the appropriate 
punishment, does not render the death penalty statute unconstitutional under the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
916, 971 (Cox), disapproved on other grounds in Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 421, fn. 22.)  ―Nor is there merit to defendant‘s alternative claim that a 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is compelled for the findings that 
an aggravating factor exists, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors, and that death is the appropriate sentence,‖ or that the jury should be 
instructed that there is no burden of proof.  (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212.)  
The jury was instructed that ―[t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be 
108 
persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison 
with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without 
parole.‖  That is sufficient.  (Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 979; 
Stevens, at p. 212).  ―Unlike the guilt determination, ‗the sentencing function is 
inherently moral and normative, not factual‘ [citation] and, hence, not susceptible 
to a burden-of-proof quantification.‖  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 
79.)  Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, affects our 
conclusions in this regard.  (Stevens, supra, at p. 212; Cox, supra, at pp. 971-972.)   
The absence of any requirement that the jury make written findings with 
respect to which aggravating evidence is true, and that the findings be unanimous, 
does not deny due process or violate the Eighth Amendment right to meaningful 
review.  (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212.)   
Contrary to defendant‘s arguments, the use of the words ―extreme‖ in section 
190.3, factors (d) and (g), and ―substantial‖ in factor (g), does not render these 
factors unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary, or capricious, nor does it act as a 
barrier to the consideration of mitigating evidence or violate the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments.  (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 213.)  The 
instructions in this case concerning section 190.3, factor (k), which were 
consistent with our guidance in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, 
footnote 10, allowed consideration of ―[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates 
the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‘s character or record that the 
defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to 
the offense for which he is on trial.‖  (See Ayers v. Belmontes (2006) 549 U.S. 7, 
15; Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381-382.)   
109 
The failure to require intercase proportionality review by either the trial court 
or on appeal does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment.  
(Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51; Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 970.)  
Nor does the circumstance that intercase proportionality review is conducted in 
noncapital cases cause the death penalty statute to violate defendant‘s right to 
equal protection and due process.  (Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 209; People v. 
Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 690-691, disapproved on other grounds in Doolin, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  ―[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not 
similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law 
. . . .‖  (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590.)   
5.  Cumulative error 
Defendant contends that cumulative error committed at both the guilt and 
penalty phases requires reversal.  We have found no error at the penalty phase.  As 
explained above, defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of evidence 
intended to impeach Hirst, by the exclusion of defendant‘s letters as evidence of 
his state of mind, or by any flaws in the felony-murder instructions.  The few 
errors that may have occurred during defendant‘s trial were harmless under any 
standard, whether considered individually or collectively.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
  
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
NICHOLSON, J.* 
 
*     Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Farley 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S024833 
Date Filed: July 2, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Joseph F. Biafore, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Ezra Hendon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and David L. Saine for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Ronald S. Matthias, Nanette Winaker and Michael E. Banister, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ezra Hendon 
1442A Walnut Street, No. 248 
Berkeley, CA  94709 
(510) 525-1596 
 
Michael E. Banister 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5971