Case Title: State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000203-W

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP203-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ezequiel Lopez 
Quintero, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael A. Dittmann, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 29, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
David P. Wilk 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs filed by Gregory W. 
Wiercioch, Victor Pelaez, student practitioner, and Frank J. 
Remington Center, Madison.  There was an oral argument by 
Gregory W. Wiercioch. 
 
For the respondent, there was a brief filed by Kara L. 
Mele, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Kara L. Mele. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee.  
 
 
2019 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP203-W 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF535) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ezequiel Lopez-
Quintero,   
 
 
Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Michael A. Dittmann,   
 
 
Respondent.   
FILED 
 
MAY 29, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.     
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We review the court of 
appeals' decision to summarily deny as untimely Ezequiel Lopez-
Quintero's petition for habeas corpus seeking reinstatement of 
his right to file a direct appeal.  Lopez-Quintero contends his 
petition satisfied all of the requirements under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.51 (2015-16),1 and the court of appeals erred when 
it presumed, without ordering a response from the State, that 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
2 
 
his nine-year delay in filing his petition caused prejudice.  We 
hold that neither the language of Rule 809.51 nor principles of 
equity require a habeas petitioner to allege timeliness in the 
petition.  We overrule State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 
Wis. 2d 795, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) 
abrogated in part by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 
WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900, which imposed a "prompt 
and speedy" pleading requirement on habeas petitioners.2  We 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Christopher B. Cohen, an Illinois attorney who was 
also a member of the Wisconsin bar, and Frederick F. Cohn, an 
Illinois attorney who appeared pro hac vice, represented Lopez-
Quintero.  On March 7, 2008, a jury found Lopez-Quintero guilty 
                                                 
2 The dissent contends that Coleman did not abrogate 
Smalley, but Coleman in fact did abrogate Smalley's erroneous 
enunciation of the laches test.  Coleman explained:  "[b]ecause 
it may be difficult to quantify 'actual prejudice,' we conclude 
that the three-element analysis of Sawyer and Prihoda provides 
the better analytic framework for assessing a laches defense 
than does the two-element analysis set out in McMillian, Smalley  
and Evans."  State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 
¶29, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900 (referencing Sawyer v. 
Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999); State v. 
Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857; State ex 
rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. 
App. 1986); State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 
565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam); and State v. Evans, 
2004 WI 84, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784).  
 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
3 
 
of first-degree intentional homicide and carrying a concealed 
weapon.     
¶3 
On April 7, 2008, his attorneys filed a motion for a 
new trial.  Two days later, the circuit court sentenced Lopez-
Quintero to life in prison plus five years, without any 
possibility of extended supervision.  During the sentencing 
hearing, one of Lopez-Quintero's attorneys discussed a possible 
appeal with the circuit court. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Number one, we have filed a 
motion for a new trial already. 
THE COURT:  Yes, sir. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Would that relieve us of 
filing the notice of intent to proceed to appeal? 
THE COURT:  No.  I still think you have to file 
that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Within 20 days? 
THE COURT:  Right. 
¶4 
The circuit court gave Lopez-Quintero's attorneys the 
"Notice of Right to Seek Postconviction Relief" form, which the 
attorneys reviewed with Lopez-Quintero, who checked the box 
indicating "I plan to seek postconviction relief."  One of 
Lopez-Quintero's attorneys also signed the form and certified as 
follows: 
I have counseled the defendant about the decision to 
seek postconviction relief.  I have informed the 
defendant 
that 
this 
decision 
must 
be 
made 
and 
communicated to me within 20 days of sentencing.  I 
believe 
the 
defendant 
understands 
the 
right 
to 
postconviction relief and the 20 day time limit.  I 
understand that it is my duty to file the Notice of 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
4 
 
Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief on behalf of 
the defendant if that intent is timely communicated to 
me. 
(Emphasis added.)  At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, 
one of Lopez-Quintero's attorneys advised he would "get that 
other document filed within 20 days."   
¶5 
During the June 10, 2008 hearing on Lopez-Quintero's 
motion for a new trial, his attorneys discussed Lopez-Quintero's 
indigence and the possibility of the circuit court appointing 
them as appellate counsel.  The circuit court responded it would 
"endorse [the] appointment" but expressed it did not "have the 
ability to appoint you for the appeal."  Despite the expiration 
of the 20-day deadline to file the notice of intent, Lopez-
Quintero's attorneys did not request an extension to file one.  
On the same day, the circuit court granted Lopez-Quintero's 
"Petition for Waiver of Filing and Service Fees——Affidavit of 
Indigency 
and 
Order" 
and 
allowed 
Lopez-Quintero 
to 
"get 
transcript of trial without payment."   
¶6 
Lopez-Quintero's actions manifested his intent to 
pursue postconviction relief.  However, no notice of intent was 
ever filed, and neither of Lopez-Quintero's attorneys requested 
an 
extension 
of 
time 
to 
file 
the 
notice 
of 
intent.  
Consequently, an appeal never occurred.    
¶7 
On February 1, 2018——nearly ten years after his 
conviction——Lopez-Quintero petitioned the court of appeals for a 
writ of habeas corpus under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51; see also 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
5 
 
State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).3  Lopez-
Quintero, now represented by the Frank J. Remington Center at 
the University of Wisconsin Law School, alleged that his trial 
attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a 
notice of intent within the 20-day deadline, and this deficiency 
caused his direct appeal rights to expire.  Lopez-Quintero asked 
the court of appeals to "reinstate his appellate deadlines, so 
that he may pursue a direct appeal of his conviction and 
sentence."  The petition alleged that Lopez-Quintero relied on 
his attorneys to pursue the appeal after he unequivocally 
indicated his intent to pursue postconviction relief by signing 
the Notice of Right to Seek Postconviction Relief form and 
checking the box indicating he intended to seek postconviction 
relief, but the petition omitted any reason for Lopez-Quintero's 
failure to file his claim for habeas relief until almost a 
decade after his appeal rights lapsed.  
¶8 
The court of appeals denied Lopez-Quintero's petition 
ex parte under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(2).  State ex rel. 
Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, No. 2018AP203-W, unpublished order 
at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2018).  It opined that "[t]he 
                                                 
3 "Because the circuit court is unable to provide a remedy 
for 
the 
failure 
to 
file 
a 
notice 
of 
intent 
to 
seek 
postconviction relief . . . the court of appeals is the proper 
forum for claims of ineffectiveness premised on counsel's 
failure to file a notice of intent."  State ex rel. Kyles v. 
Pollard, 2014 WI 38, ¶38, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805.  
Accordingly, Lopez-Quintero properly filed his habeas petition, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to 
file a notice of intent, in the court of appeals. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
6 
 
problem with Lopez-Quintero's petition is that it comes too 
late."  Id. at 2.  Citing Smalley, the court of appeals 
concluded that "[a]lthough Lopez-Quintero's stated limitations[4] 
can account for some delay in this case, it [sic] cannot account 
for over nine years of delay.  Accordingly, we are not persuaded 
that he sought habeas relief in a timely fashion and will deny 
the petition for that reason."  Lopez-Quintero, No. 2018AP203-W, 
unpublished order at 2-3. 
¶9 
Lopez-Quintero filed a motion for reconsideration, 
asking the court of appeals "to reconsider its decision and 
refrain from denying Mr. Lopez-Quintero's legally-sufficient 
petition ex parte" or "[a]t the very least . . . order the State 
to respond, and apply Coleman if the State raises the 
affirmative defense of laches."  Under Coleman, "[t]he State has 
the burden of proof in regard to all the elements of its laches 
defense" therefore "the court of appeals erred when it assumed 
the State was prejudiced by Coleman's unreasonable delay."  
Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶¶2, 37.  The court of appeals denied 
the motion, and Lopez-Quintero petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted. 
 
 
                                                 
4 In his petition to the court of appeals for a writ of 
habeas corpus, Lopez-Quintero asserted he did not speak English 
and was unfamiliar with the American criminal justice system, 
which we presume to be the "stated limitations" the court of 
appeals referenced in its ex parte denial of the petition. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
7 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶10 While habeas relief may be denied under the well-
established doctrine of laches if a petitioner unreasonably 
delays the filing of his petition, this case resolves whether 
the court of appeals may deny an otherwise sufficiently pled 
habeas petition ex parte, without a hearing or a response from 
the State, solely because the court of appeals deems it to be 
untimely.  We hold that the court of appeals may not deny a 
habeas petition ex parte on the ground the petitioner failed to 
demonstrate he sought relief in a prompt and speedy manner.  We 
overrule Smalley.  Any equitable concerns regarding substantial 
delays, such as the near ten-year delay in the current case, are 
properly raised not sua sponte by the court of appeals but 
instead by the State asserting the defense of laches and 
establishing prejudice resulting from the delay.5 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶11 We review the legal issues arising out of a habeas 
petition independently.  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶17.  This 
case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51, which 
                                                 
5 The dissent misapprehends this court's rather limited 
holding, which simply requires the State to respond to the 
petition, after which the court of appeals will decide whether 
to grant it or not, considering any equitable defenses the State 
may assert.  Contrary to the dissent's characterization of this 
opinion, we do not engage in any factfinding and the petitioner 
retains the burden of proving the allegations in his petition.  
The court of appeals denied him the opportunity to do so based 
on Smalley's misstatement of applicable law. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
8 
 
presents a question of law.  See State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, 
¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238. 
B.  General Legal Principles 
¶12 "A petition for writ of habeas corpus commences a 
civil proceeding wherein the petitioner claims an illegal denial 
of his or her liberty."  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶18.  Often 
referred to as the "Great Writ," habeas corpus "indisputably 
holds an honored position in our jurisprudence."  Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).  Its roots spring from English 
common law, and "its availability is guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution, and by state and 
federal statute."  State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, 
¶22, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (quoting State ex rel. Haas 
v. 
McReynolds, 
2002 
WI 
43, 
¶11, 
252 
Wis. 2d 133, 
643 
N.W.2d 771); see also State ex rel. L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 
82, ¶17, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 N.W.2d 1; Wis. Stat. § 782.01(1) 
("Every person restrained of personal liberty may prosecute a 
writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such restraint 
subject to [Wis. Stat. §§] 782.02 and 974.06.").   
¶13 The 
Great 
Writ 
constitutes 
"a 
bulwark 
against 
convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness.'"  Engle, 456 
U.S. at 126 (quoted source omitted).  Founded on principles of 
equity, habeas corpus "test[s] the right of a person to his 
personal liberty."  Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d  720, ¶22 (quoted 
source omitted; alteration in original).  "The purpose of the 
writ is to protect and vindicate the petitioner's right to be 
free from illegal restraint."  Id.; see also State ex rel. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
9 
 
Zdanczewicz v. Snyder, 131 Wis. 2d 147, 151, 388 N.W.2d 612 
(1986).  "Its function is to provide a prompt and effective 
judicial remedy to those who are illegally restrained of their 
personal liberty."  State ex rel. Wohlfahrt v. Bodette, 95 
Wis. 2d 130, 133, 289 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1980).  
¶14 However, "[t]he extraordinary relief provided by the 
writ 
of 
habeas 
corpus 
is 
available 
only 
in 
limited 
circumstances," and the writ "does not issue as a right."  
Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶¶23, 25 (quoted source omitted).  A 
party seeking habeas relief must be restrained of his liberty 
and "show that the restraint was imposed by a body without 
jurisdiction or that the restraint was imposed contrary to 
constitutional protections."  Haas, 252 Wis. 2d 133, ¶12.  
Additionally, the party "must show that there was no other 
adequate remedy available in the law."  Id.; see also Waley v. 
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942) (extending the use of the 
writ "to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been 
in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and 
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights."). 
We 
have 
long 
and 
consistently 
held 
that 
the 
extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is not available 
to a petitioner when the petitioner has other adequate 
remedies available.  For instance, habeas corpus is 
not available to challenge a bindover decision by a 
court 
commissioner 
because 
the 
decision 
is 
challengeable on a statutory motion to dismiss.  
Similarly, the writ is not available to challenge the 
sufficiency of probable cause to issue a criminal 
complaint, even when the challenge is brought between 
arrest and the preliminary hearing, because the 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
10 
 
challenge can be made using other remedies at trial.  
Habeas corpus proceedings are likewise not available 
to 
challenge 
an 
administrative 
order 
revoking 
probation, since a writ of certiorari is available, 
and is the proper remedy under such circumstances.  In 
short, if the petitioner has an otherwise adequate 
remedy that he or she may exercise to obtain the same 
relief, the writ will not be issued. 
Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶25 (quoting Haas, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 
¶14).  Ultimately, "the burden is on the petitioner . . . to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
detention is illegal."  State ex rel. Hager v. Marten, 226 
Wis. 2d 687, 694, 594 N.W.2d 791 (1999). 
¶15 A habeas petition filed in the court of appeals under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(1) "must contain a statement of the 
legal issues and a sufficient statement of facts that bear on 
those legal issues, which if found to be true, would entitle the 
petitioner to relief."  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶18.  The 
statute provides: 
(1) A person may request the court to exercise 
its 
supervisory 
jurisdiction 
or 
its 
original 
jurisdiction to issue a prerogative writ over a court 
and the presiding judge, or other person or body, by 
filing a petition and supporting memorandum. . . . The 
petition shall contain: 
(a) A statement of the issues presented by the 
controversy; 
(b) A statement of the facts necessary to an 
understanding of the issues;  
(c) The relief sought; and 
(d) The reasons why the court should take 
jurisdiction. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
11 
 
Rule 809.51(1).6  Subsection (2) provides the "court may deny the 
petition ex parte or may order the respondents to file a 
response with a supporting memorandum, if any, and may order 
oral argument on the merits of the petition."  Rule 809.51(2).     
¶16 As the respondent, the State may assert equitable 
defenses such as laches in opposing a habeas petition.7  "Laches 
is an equitable defense to an action based on the plaintiff's 
unreasonable delay in bringing suit under circumstances in which 
such delay is prejudicial to the defendant."  Sawyer v. 
Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 159, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999).  The 
application 
of 
laches 
to 
bar 
habeas 
petitions 
is 
well-
established. 
 
See 
Coleman, 
290 
Wis. 2d 352, 
¶¶2, 
19-25.  
Although our courts have described the elements of laches in 
various ways, we concluded in Coleman that the three-element 
test described in some of our cases "provides the better 
analytic framework for assessing a laches defense."  Id., ¶29.  
                                                 
6 The dissent would rewrite the statute to additionally 
require a habeas petitioner who claims his appeal rights were 
denied to allege "when, where or how [he] specifically directed 
his trial counsel to appeal."  Dissent, ¶58.  This heightened 
"when, where or how" pleading requirement does not appear in the 
text of the statutes or in any Wisconsin cases.   
7 Although 
Michael 
A. 
Dittmann, 
the 
warden 
of 
the 
correctional facility where Lopez-Quintero is confined, is the 
respondent in this case, see Wis. Stat. § 782.01 ("'respondent' 
means the person on whom the writ is to be served"), the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice represents Dittmann and responds 
to the petition; therefore, we reference the respondent as the 
"State."  See e.g., Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶¶13-15, 31-37 
(generally referring to the respondent as the State). 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
12 
 
Under Coleman, the elements of the defense of laches are:  (1) 
unreasonable delay in filing the habeas petition, (2) lack of 
knowledge on the part of the State that the petitioner would be 
asserting the habeas claim, and (3) prejudice to the State.  
Id., ¶¶28-29.  As the party asserting the defense, the State 
bears the burden to raise and prove all elements of the defense.  
Id., ¶2.   
C.  Application 
¶17 The sole issue presented is whether the court of 
appeals may deny a habeas petition ex parte for the petitioner's 
failure to plead that his claim was brought in a timely manner.  
We conclude it may not.  Lopez-Quintero's habeas petition was 
sufficiently 
pled 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
statutory 
prescriptions.  The petition contained a "statement of the legal 
issues and a sufficient statement of facts [bearing] on those 
legal issues, which if found to be true, would entitle [Lopez-
Quintero] to relief."  See Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶18.  
Lopez-Quintero's petition alleges that he communicated his 
desire to seek postconviction relief by indicating his intent 
"to seek postconviction relief" on the Notice of Right to Seek 
Postconviction Relief form, which his attorney also signed, 
explicitly acknowledging the attorney's "duty to file the Notice 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
13 
 
of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief."8  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.18(5) (explaining that "[i]f the defendant desires to 
                                                 
8 The dissent misjudges Lopez-Quintero's habeas petition as 
insufficient because he did not allege making "a specific 
request of counsel to appeal" and accuses the court of "adding 
facts to the petition" to cure the petition's purported 
deficiency.  Dissent, ¶¶50-51.  The dissent is wrong on both 
counts.  Lopez-Quintero checked the box on the Notice of Right 
to Seek Postconviction Relief form indicating "I plan to seek 
postconviction relief."  He did not check either of the two 
other 
options 
on 
the 
form: 
 
"I 
do 
not 
plan 
to 
seek 
postconviction 
relief" 
or 
"I 
am 
undecided 
about 
seeking 
postconviction relief and I know I need to decide and tell my 
lawyer within 20 days."  One of Lopez-Quintero's attorneys 
signed this form and acknowledged his responsibility to file a 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief in accordance 
with Lopez-Quintero's unequivocal wishes.  Because Lopez-
Quintero 
explicitly 
indicated 
his 
intent 
to 
pursue 
postconviction relief, his attorneys were obligated to file a 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b).  See Wis. Stat. § 973.18(5).  This 
notice 
was 
a 
prerequisite 
to 
any 
postconviction 
relief, 
including an appeal.  Rule 809.30(2)(a)-(b).  The attorneys' 
inaction in response to Lopez-Quintero's specific instruction to 
file the notice of intent under Rule 809.30(2)(b) resulted in 
the "complete denial of appeal," and prejudice is therefore 
"presumed."  See State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 
620, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).  It is this "forfeiture of a 
proceeding"——here, an appeal——and the "complete denial of 
counsel" that carries the presumption of prejudice.  See Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000).  It is immaterial that 
Lopez-Quintero indicated his intent to seek "postconviction 
relief" rather than specifying he wished to appeal; his 
attorneys' inaction resulted in the complete denial of any 
postconviction proceedings——including an appeal.  
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
14 
 
pursue postconviction relief, the defendant's trial counsel 
shall file" the notice of intent to pursue postconviction 
relief).  The petition further alleges that he relied on his 
attorneys to file the notice of intent to pursue postconviction 
relief, which is a precondition to pursuing an appeal.  See Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(a)-(b).  Lopez-Quintero's attorneys 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent also faults Lopez-Quintero for failing to 
explain "why an appeal was not pursued" and speculates that 
"[p]erhaps after denial of the motion for a new trial, counsel 
and Lopez-Quintero decided an appeal would not be worth 
pursuing."  Dissent, ¶54.  The dissent quotes Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 486 for the proposition that "evidence that [a 
defendant] sufficiently demonstrated to counsel his interest in 
an appeal . . . is insufficient to establish that, had the 
defendant received reasonable advice from counsel about the 
appeal, he would have instructed his counsel to file an appeal."  
Dissent, ¶44.  But the quoted language in Flores-Ortega did not 
address Lopez-Quintero's situation, in which his attorneys 
disregarded his instructions to file a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief thereby depriving him of his right 
to appeal, which has long been held to constitute ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel. 
 
See 
Flores, 
183 
Wis. 2d at 
620 
("[W]henever the ineffective assistance is such as to deprive 
one totally of the right to appeal, the prejudice showing is 
presumed."); see also Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (explaining 
that deficient performance leading to the forfeiture of a 
judicial proceeding is presumed to be prejudicial).  Instead, 
Flores-Ortega considered whether counsel was "deficient for not 
filing a notice of appeal when the defendant has not clearly 
conveyed his wishes one way or the other."  Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 477 (emphasis added).  Because Lopez-Quintero's petition 
alleged that he clearly communicated his desire to pursue 
postconviction 
relief 
to 
his 
attorneys, 
the 
dissent's 
speculation about why an appeal was never filed is irrelevant.  
Lopez-Quintero's 
allegations, 
if 
proved, 
would 
establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 
620. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
15 
 
failed to do so, depriving him of any opportunity to appeal.9  
Trial counsel's "failure to perfect an appeal when the defendant 
has indicated a desire to appeal constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  See State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 
Wis. 2d 587, 615, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994) (quoted source omitted).  
Whenever ineffective assistance of counsel results in the 
"complete denial of appeal, prejudice is presumed."  Id. at 620; 
see also Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) (explaining 
that "prejudice is presumed 'when counsel's constitutionally 
deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he 
otherwise would have taken'" (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. 
470, 
484 
(2000)); 
Flores-Ortega, 
528 
U.S. 
at 
477 
(explaining that "[w]e have long held that a lawyer who 
disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a 
notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally 
unreasonable," and "'[w]hen counsel fails to file a requested 
                                                 
9 The dissent faults Lopez-Quintero for failing to attach an 
"affidavit" or a "transcript from an evidentiary hearing" to 
support his claim.  Dissent, ¶39.  No law supports the 
proposition that such evidentiary materials are necessary to 
plead a habeas claim.  Under the law governing habeas pleading 
requirements, the defendant must allege sufficient facts "which 
if found to be true, would entitle the petitioner to relief."  
See Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶18 (emphasis added).  Contrary to 
the dissent's view of the case, we are at the pleading stage; 
Lopez-Quintero submitted a sworn petition for habeas corpus 
attesting that the facts alleged in the petition (including the 
attachments) were "true and correct."  See Wis. Stat. § 782.04 
(a petition for habeas corpus "must be verified").  The 
additional evidentiary materials listed by the dissent may, in 
some cases, be necessary to prove a habeas claim, but they are 
not necessary to plead the claim. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
16 
 
appeal, a defendant is entitled to [a new] appeal without 
showing that his appeal would likely have had merit'" (quoted 
source omitted; third alteration in original)); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) ("Actual or constructive 
denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally 
presumed to result in prejudice."); Castellanos v. United 
States, 26 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that "[i]f 
the defendant told his lawyer to appeal, and the lawyer dropped 
the ball, then the defendant has been deprived, not of effective 
assistance of counsel, but of any assistance of counsel on 
appeal," which is a "per se violation of the sixth amendment").  
Because a habeas petitioner need not plead that his petition was 
filed in a timely manner, we reverse the court of appeals' 
decision denying Lopez-Quintero's statutorily-compliant petition 
and remand for further proceedings. 
¶18 We begin with an analysis of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.51.  Subsection (1) describes what the petitioner must 
allege in the petition.  While the statute requires the 
petitioner to provide a statement of the issues, a statement of 
facts, the relief sought, and the reasons the court should take 
jurisdiction, see Rule 809.51(1)(a)-(d), it does not impose any 
time limit on when a petition may be brought.  Id.  Subsection 
(2) describes what the court of appeals may do upon receipt of 
the petition.  It may deny the petition ex parte or order a 
response, and it may order oral argument on the merits.  Rule 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
17 
 
809.51(2).  Lack of timeliness is not listed as a basis for 
denying a petition ex parte.10  The statute does not impose any 
deadline within which a petitioner must bring a habeas petition.  
In the absence of language imposing a time limit on filing a 
petition for the court of appeals to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus, we will not read one into the statute.11  Under the 
omitted-case canon of statutory interpretation, "[n]othing is to 
be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus 
omissus pro omisso habendus est).  That is, a matter not covered 
is to be treated as not covered."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 
(2012); see also Wisconsin Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. WERC, 
2018 WI 17, ¶45, 380 Wis. 2d 1, 907 N.W.2d 425 ("Nothing is to 
be added to what the text states or reasonably implies" (quoting 
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 93)).  "One of the maxims of 
statutory construction is that courts should not add words to a 
statute to give it a certain meaning."  Fond Du Lac Cty. v. Town 
                                                 
10 Subsection (3) authorizes the court of appeals to grant 
or deny the petition after considering the petition, responses, 
supporting memoranda, and argument, and subsection (4) requires 
a statement identifying compliance with certain formatting 
requirements for the petition.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(3), 
(4). 
11 We already implicitly recognized the absence of a 
statutory time limit in Coleman.  We explained that, in this 
respect, Wisconsin's rules on state habeas claims differ from 
the federal rules, which provide that relief "is available to a 
state prisoner for only one year after the state conviction 
becomes final."  See Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶24 n.5.  
Wisconsin's rules contain no such limit.  Id. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
18 
 
of Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 
1989).  Therefore, if habeas petitioners are subject to any sort 
of timeliness requirement, it must derive from a different 
source. 
¶19 The State maintains that the court of appeals properly 
denied Lopez-Quintero's habeas petition ex parte.  It appears to 
concede that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51 contains no timeliness 
requirement, but it emphasizes that the statute "does not 
purport to provide a comprehensive treatment of the issue of 
extraordinary writs" and therefore does not foreclose the 
imposition of a timeliness requirement as a matter of equity.  
The State grounds its argument in Smalley, which denied a habeas 
petition ex parte for failing to allege facts demonstrating that 
the petitioner sought prompt and speedy relief.  Smalley, 211 
Wis. 2d at 801-02.  The State insists that Lopez-Quintero has 
not shown that Smalley is objectively wrong; therefore, the 
State argues, we should reject his invitation to overrule it.  
We disagree and overrule Smalley. 
¶20 In Smalley, the court of appeals denied a habeas 
petition ex parte because the petitioner "did not timely file 
his petition."  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 796.  Because "[t]he 
purpose of habeas corpus is 'to provide a prompt and effective 
judicial remedy to those who are illegally restrained of their 
personal liberty,'" the court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.51(1) requires a habeas petitioner to "allege facts 
[in the petition] demonstrating that he sought prompt and speedy 
relief."  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 802 (quoting Wohlfahrt, 95 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d at 133).  The court of appeals did not attempt to 
justify this new pleading requirement under the text of Rule 
809.51(1), which contains no such requirement.  Instead, the 
court of appeals invoked the principles of equitable estoppel 
and laches, which it used to read a timeliness requirement into 
Rule 809.51(1).  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 800.  It further 
reasoned that "[e]quitable remedies are not available to one 
whose own actions or inactions result in the harm."  Id. (quoted 
source omitted).  Without any analysis, but merely highlighting 
the length of the delay, the court of appeals concluded the 
State was prejudiced by the "untimely habeas petition."  Id. at 
803.  The court of appeals did, however, clarify that "[w]hether 
a defendant's claim is made within a reasonable time must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis."  Id. at 802.     
¶21 Smalley's imposition of a "prompt and speedy" pleading 
requirement for habeas claims is unsupported either by the 
statutory text or Wisconsin cases.  The equitable cases cited in 
Smalley offer no support for its extra-textual conclusion that 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(1) imposes a burden on habeas 
petitioners to allege that they sought relief in a "prompt and 
speedy" manner or risk their petitions being denied ex parte 
under Rule 809.51(2).  Under the doctrine of laches, it is the 
State, not the petitioner, who bears the burden to show laches 
should be applied to bar a habeas petition.  Indeed, in Coleman 
we recognized the weakness of Smalley's reliance on laches to 
deny a habeas petition ex parte, thereby relieving the State of 
its burden to establish the elements of that affirmative 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
20 
 
defense, when we remarked that Smalley "conflated its analysis 
of the habeas petition's timeliness with the unreasonable delay 
element of laches."  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶25 (footnote 
omitted).12  In a similar vein, equitable estoppel in this 
context is a defense to be raised by the State, and "[t]he 
burden of proving the elements of equitable estoppel is on the 
party asserting it as a defense."  See Coconate v. Schwanz, 165 
Wis. 2d 226, 231-32, 477 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1991).  Neither 
                                                 
12 Certain language in Coleman suggests that the timeliness 
of a habeas petition is a factor to be considered "under the 
principles that we have set for evaluating habeas petitions."  
Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶25 n.6.  The court in Coleman 
proceeded to explain that "[t]he foundation for the decision in 
Smalley becomes readily apparent when the decision places the 
burden of proof for timeliness of the petition on Smalley, which 
is in accord with reviewing timeliness in regard to a habeas 
petition."  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶25.  Coleman, however, 
never identifies the source for the purported timeliness 
requirement.  Other than this unsupported language from Coleman, 
we discovered no basis in law or equity for the proposition that 
a timeliness requirement inheres in habeas petitions and the 
State in this case identifies none.  Indeed, the State 
recognized 
that 
only 
"[s]ince 
Smalley" 
has 
"this 
Court . . . acknowledged that a petitioner seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51 has the burden of 
proof to show the timeliness of his petition."  While timeliness 
must be shown by a party seeking a supervisory writ, see State 
ex rel. CityDeck Landing LLC v. Circuit Court for Brown Cty., 
2019 WI 15, ¶30, 385 Wis. 2d 516, 922 N.W.2d 832, it never was a 
prerequisite for a habeas petition, until Smalley mistakenly 
imported the concept into Rule 809.51.  Perhaps Coleman's stray 
references to "reviewing timeliness in regard to a habeas 
petition" derive from the "prompt and speedy" factor that must 
be shown by petitioners seeking supervisory writs; the decision 
does not say.  Regardless, the only source for shifting the 
burden of proof to the habeas petitioner to show timeliness is 
Smalley, which erroneously conjured this requirement from a 
statute that is entirely silent on the subject. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
21 
 
doctrine provides any foundation for denying a habeas petition 
ex parte on the basis that the petitioner failed to allege the 
petition was made within a reasonable time.  Any equitable 
defense to a habeas petition must be raised and proven by the 
State, which cannot be done unless the State is required to 
respond to the petition. 
¶22 Smalley's reliance on the general principle that 
"[e]quitable remedies are not available to one whose own actions 
or inactions result in the harm" is a similarly unpersuasive 
justification for its "prompt and speedy" pleading requirement.  
The quoted precept came from Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis. 2d 468, 
477, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1993), in connection with that 
court's application of equitable estoppel.  See Smalley, 211 
Wis. 2d at 800.  Setting aside the unavailability of equitable 
estoppel to deny a habeas petition ex parte, Smalley's reliance 
on this language begs the question of what "harm" the petitioner 
caused.  Smalley assumed, with little analysis and no response 
by the State, that mere delay (which the court of appeals 
unilaterally 
deemed 
unreasonable) 
necessarily 
harmed, 
or 
prejudiced, the State.  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 803.  There is 
no legal footing for this presumption, which led us to reject a 
similar presumption in Coleman.  The court of appeals in 
Coleman, as in Smalley, put the cart before the horse by 
concluding the State was prejudiced by the petitioner's delay in 
seeking habeas relief, without requiring the State to first 
assert unreasonable delay and then prove it prejudiced the 
State.  As we observed in Coleman, delay does not automatically 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
22 
 
prejudice the State, which must not only allege prejudice but 
then prove a factual basis for it.  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 
¶36.   
¶23 Smalley manufactured the requirement that a habeas 
petitioner must prove his petition was "prompt and speedy," a 
precondition not found in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(1) or the 
equitable cases the court cited.13  Although Coleman recognized 
that Smalley confused laches with pleading requirements, it 
overlooked Smalley's mistaken application of Wohlfahrt, which 
understood that the "function" of habeas corpus "is to provide a 
prompt and effective judicial remedy to those who are illegally 
restrained of their personal liberty."  Wohlfahrt, 95 Wis. 2d at 
133.  Smalley turned this purpose for habeas on its head.  
Rather than safeguarding the liberty interests of a petitioner 
who was illegally restrained, Smalley misused this language to 
                                                 
13 The dissent cites State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
for the proposition that a habeas petitioner "must show that 
'the request for relief [was] made promptly and speedily."  
Dissent, ¶45.  Kalal's application of the longstanding "prompt 
and speedy" requirement applies to supervisory writs, not writs 
of habeas corpus.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17.  The dissent 
confuses the two.  Compare id. (supervisory writ will not be 
granted unless "(1) an appeal is an inadequate remedy; (2) grave 
hardship or irreparable harm will result; (3) the duty of the 
trial court is plain and it must have acted or intends to act in 
violation of that duty; and (4) the request for relief is made 
promptly and speedily") with State ex rel. Haas v. McReynolds, 
2002 WI 43, ¶12, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 643 N.W.2d 771 (habeas corpus 
is available where a party is restrained of his liberty, the 
restraint was imposed by a body without jurisdiction or contrary 
to constitutional protections, and there is no other adequate 
remedy at law).   
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
23 
 
instead protect the State by imposing a requirement on the 
petitioner to plead that he sought relief in a prompt and speedy 
manner.14  Nothing in the language lifted from Wohlfahrt supports 
this application.       
¶24 With no statutory or common law basis for Smalley's 
"prompt and speedy" pleading requirement, we decline to impose 
one.  Equity cannot be advanced by denying a statutorily-
compliant habeas petition solely because an appellate court 
deems it to be filed too late, absent the State showing that the 
delay prejudiced it.  As implicitly reflected in the elements of 
the test for laches, numerous factors may influence the 
determination of whether it is equitable to bypass the merits of 
a claim on the basis of unreasonable delay.  See e.g., Coleman, 
290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶29 (explaining that "assessing whether a party 
raising laches did not have knowledge that the claim would be 
brought will permit the circuit court to more fully" evaluate 
"the effect of a claim that has been unreasonably delayed." 
(emphasis added)).  Such considerations cannot be fully vetted 
by an ex parte review of the petition. 
                                                 
14 Smalley quoted Wohlfahrt for the proposition that "[t]he 
purpose of habeas corpus 'is to provide a prompt and effective 
judicial remedy to those who are illegally restrained of their 
personal liberty,'" and concluded in the next two sentences that 
"Smalley's petition does not allege facts demonstrating that he 
sought prompt and speedy relief" and "[s]uch a showing is 
required."  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 802 (quoting State ex rel. 
Wohlfahrt v. Bodette, 95 Wis. 2d 130, 133, 289 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. 
App. 1980)). 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
24 
 
¶25 The parties' differing accounts of the near-ten-year 
delay in the filing of Lopez-Quintero's petition illustrate why 
the myriad of facts that could bear on whether it is equitable 
to bar Lopez-Quintero's statutorily-compliant habeas petition 
cannot be fully addressed in an ex parte denial.  The State 
accuses Lopez-Quintero of sleeping on his rights.  While 
conceding, as the court of appeals did, that his "stated 
limitations account for some delay in this case," the State 
insists that "Lopez-Quintero's lack of English proficiency, lack 
of education, and lack of familiarity with Wisconsin's criminal 
justice system" do not account for all of the delay.    
¶26 Lopez-Quintero describes in his brief to this court 
multiple reasons for his delay in seeking habeas relief.15  In 
addition to asserting in his verified habeas petition linguistic 
impediments, limited education, and unfamiliarity with the 
criminal justice system, Lopez-Quintero delineates in his brief 
a procedural history that he claims explains the delay.  We do 
not recount, accept as true, or rely upon Lopez-Quintero's 
assertions concerning his reasons for filing his habeas petition 
nearly ten years after his appeal rights expired.  His account 
                                                 
15 The State protests that the petition itself did not 
include the specific reasons for the delay in seeking habeas 
relief that Lopez-Quintero now presents to this court.  Because 
we conclude that the law does not require habeas petitioners to 
allege 
timeliness 
in 
their 
petitions, 
the 
purported 
insufficiency or even the total absence of any explanation in 
the petition for Lopez-Quintero's delay in filing it is 
irrelevant.  
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
25 
 
is immaterial to the issue we decide.  We merely highlight that 
the court of appeals never fully addressed the equitable 
considerations related to the timing of the habeas petition——
which would include Lopez-Quintero's proffered reasons for the 
delay——because it dismissed the petition ex parte.  Lopez-
Quintero's articulated reasons for his delay in filing his 
habeas petition are properly considered after the State's 
assertion of laches in response to the petition, not before.  
¶27 The 
State 
worries 
that 
declining 
to 
impose 
a 
timeliness requirement for pleading habeas claims undermines the 
finality of judgments and would allow "a petitioner [to] seek a 
writ of habeas corpus 50 years after his conviction."  The 
State's fears are unfounded.  Laches provides a process to 
balance the State's concerns regarding the prejudice it could 
suffer in being forced to respond to decades-old claims, as well 
as the State's interest in the finality of judgments, against 
the 
Great 
Writ's 
protection 
of 
constitutional 
rights.16  
Consistent with our previous decisions, Lopez-Quintero's habeas 
petition, or any other, may be barred if the State successfully 
argues laches.  The burden to demonstrate why a statutorily-
compliant claim for habeas relief should be denied as untimely 
                                                 
16 Laches similarly provides the process to address the 
dissent's complaint that "it did not take Lopez-Quintero ten 
years to figure out that no appeal was pending."  Dissent, ¶56.  
Equitable concerns about the near ten-year delay must be 
addressed after hearing both sides, not in a perfunctory ex 
parte dismissal. 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
26 
 
rests with the party seeking to avoid a substantive review of 
the issue.  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶2 ("The State has the 
burden of proof in regard to all the elements of its laches 
defense.")  If Lopez-Quintero's delay was unreasonable, the 
State did not know Lopez-Quintero would bring the claim, and the 
delay prejudiced the State, then the claim may be barred.  See 
id., ¶17 (explaining that once "the defense of laches is proved, 
whether to apply laches and dismiss the habeas petition is left 
to the discretion of the court of appeals").  It is the State 
who bears the burden of proving the elements of laches.   
¶28 A petition for habeas corpus constitutes the final 
opportunity for an individual restrained of his personal liberty 
to establish that the State's action against him violated our 
constitutions or other law, after all other avenues for relief 
are exhausted or shown to be inadequate.  Habeas is the people's 
bulwark against illegal confinement by the government.  Bearing 
in mind that "the overriding responsibility of [the Supreme] 
Court is to the Constitution of the United States" and of this 
court, to the Wisconsin Constitution as well, "no matter how 
late it may be that a violation of the Constitution is found to 
exist,"17 the court of appeals cannot forever foreclose an 
individual's appellate rights, ex parte and on the basis of 
untimeliness, when his attorneys failed to file the form 
necessary to initiate the appeal he requested.  Absent a 
demonstration of prejudice by the State, a habeas petition may 
                                                 
17 See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165 (1957). 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
27 
 
not be denied merely because it was filed later than the court 
of appeals believes it should have been. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We hold that neither Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51 nor 
equity imposes a "prompt and speedy" pleading requirement in the 
filing of a petition for habeas corpus.  The equitable defense 
of laches exists to address any prejudice to the State caused by 
a petitioner's unreasonable delay in the filing of a habeas 
petition.  A habeas petition may not be denied ex parte solely 
because the petitioner failed to assert and demonstrate he 
sought relief in a "prompt and speedy" manner.  Instead, the 
State bears the burden to raise laches as a defense and prove 
(1) 
unreasonable 
delay, 
(2) 
lack 
of 
knowledge 
that 
the 
petitioner would bring a habeas claim, and (3) resulting 
prejudice.  The State did not do so here because the court of 
appeals erred in denying the petition ex parte without giving 
the State the opportunity to respond and prove laches.  
¶30 We recognize that "habeas corpus should not be 'made 
the instrument for re-determining the merits of all cases in the 
legal system that have ended in detention.'"  Rose v. Mitchell, 
443 U.S. 545, 581 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the 
judgment; quoted source omitted).  Our decision is a narrow one 
and we make no assessment of the merits of Lopez-Quintero's 
petition, much less the merits of his appeal should the court of 
appeals reinstate his appellate deadlines; we merely recognize 
his right to have his statutorily-compliant petition considered 
without the court of appeals imposing a non-existent timeliness 
No. 
2018AP203-W   
 
28 
 
requirement as a basis for denying the petition ex parte.18  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision denying Lopez-Quintero's 
petition for habeas corpus and remand to the court of appeals 
for further proceedings on the petition. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals retains the discretion to otherwise 
deny habeas petitions ex parte on any grounds available under 
the law.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(2).  Puzzlingly, the 
dissent asserts that the court "never says why the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised the discretion the legislature 
granted to it."  Dissent, ¶63.  Of course, the entirety of this 
opinion explains why the court of appeals erred, although we 
recognize it relied on unsound cases it was bound to apply.  The 
dissent seemingly equates "discretion" with "whim" but of course 
the exercise of a court's discretion must be grounded in the 
law, and as we have explained in some detail, ex parte denial of 
a habeas petition for untimeliness bears no support in law or 
equity.  See State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 
826 N.W.2d 60 (court of appeals "erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard"); State v. 
Martel, 
2003 
WI 
70, 
¶8, 
262 
Wis. 2d 483, 
664 
N.W.2d 69 
(explaining that "a discretionary decision that is based upon an 
error of law is an erroneous exercise of discretion"); see also 
State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper, 2016 WI 67, ¶25, 371 Wis. 2d 127, 
883 N.W.2d 86 ("Whether a writ of habeas corpus is available to 
the party seeking relief is a question of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals."). 
No.  2018AP203-W.dk 
 
1 
 
 
¶31 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  We have previously 
suggested that a habeas petitioner must allege facts supporting 
the petition's timeliness (see State ex rel. Coleman v. 
McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶25, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900), 
which I believe is a good and prudent safeguard against abuse of 
this writ; but Coleman does not establish the timeliness element 
with clarity, and rather than announcing such an element in a 
contested case, I believe we should follow the federal court's 
example of adopting the requirement through rulemaking (see Fed. 
R. App. P. 9(a)).  With that caveat, I join the court's opinion. 
 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶32 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion errs in three major respects:  First, by 
excusing Lopez-Quintero's insufficiently pled petition; second, 
by assuming the role of factfinder as it grounds its decision in 
facts outside of the record that were never pled or supported by 
affidavit, thereby accepting a petition that never asserts when, 
where or how Lopez-Quintero specifically directed his attorney 
to file an appeal; and third, by permitting habeas to lie ten 
years after Lopez-Quintero's trial and conviction without a 
reasonable factual basis for the delay, the majority opinion 
excuses a ten-year delay.  This is a sea change in the 
responsibilities of a habeas petitioner, thereby creating an 
opportunity for abuse of habeas in regard to direct appeals.   
¶33 Accordingly, because the majority opinion overturns 
long-standing habeas corpus precedent without recognizing that 
it 
exists 
and 
thereafter 
does 
not 
apply 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 
(2000), in regard to direct appeals, I would affirm the court of 
appeals, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶34 On March 7, 2008, Lopez-Quintero was convicted of 
first-degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon 
and carrying a concealed weapon after a six-day jury trial.1  On 
                                                 
1 Lopez-Quintero was represented by privately paid counsel 
at trial.   
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
2 
 
April 9, 2008, he was sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  He moved for a new trial.2  Lopez-
Quintero signed a Notice of Right to Seek Postconviction Relief 
(Notice of Right) form while he was in court on April 9, 2008.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.18(3) requires:  
Before adjourning the sentencing proceeding, the judge 
shall direct the defendant and defendant's trial 
counsel to sign a form to be entered in the record, 
indicating that the lawyer has counseled the defendant 
regarding the decision to seek postconviction relief, 
and that the defendant understands that a notice of 
intent to pursue postconviction relief must be filed 
in the trial court within 20 days after sentencing for 
that right to be preserved.  
Lopez-Quintero was given a copy of the form he signed.  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.18(4).  The Notice of Right form does not evidence 
Lopez-Quintero's intent to appeal.  Rather, the box he checked 
states: 
 
"I 
plan 
to 
seek 
postconviction 
relief."  
"Postconviction 
relief," 
which 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 809.30(1)(c), is not specific to an appeal, but also includes 
various motions for relief following conviction. 
¶35 On June 10, 2008, the circuit court denied Lopez-
Quintero's request for a new trial because the evidence of his 
guilt was so overwhelming that the circuit court concluded a new 
trial would produce the same result.  For example, gunshots that 
caused the homicide came from a car owned by Lopez-Quintero, and 
Lopez-Quintero was found a short time after the shooting with 
the murder weapon tucked into the waistband of his pants.   
                                                 
2 Lopez-Quintero's trial counsel represented him on his 
postconviction motion.  
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶36 When the circuit court denied Lopez-Quintero's motion 
for a new trial, his attorneys asked about filing an appeal.  In 
preparation for the potential of an appeal, the circuit court 
granted Lopez-Quintero fee waivers for trial transcripts.  The 
circuit court also waived the service and filing fees that would 
be applicable if he decided to appeal.  In addition, the court 
directed Lopez-Quintero's trial counsel to continue until a 
decision about whether to appeal was made.  The transcripts for 
Lopez-Quintero's trial were filed during 2008 and payment was 
made by the State, according to the record for Kenosha County 
Case No. 2007CF535.   
¶37 Neither Lopez-Quintero nor anyone acting on his behalf 
filed anything in regard to appealing or inquiring about an 
appeal of his conviction until February 1, 2018, when the 
Remington Center filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus 
on his behalf in the court of appeals.3 
¶38 The petition for habeas asserts that Lopez-Quintero's 
"trial attorneys failed to fulfill their constitutional and 
statutory obligations to file a Notice of Intent to Seek 
Postconviction Relief ('Notice of Intent') within 20 days after 
sentencing."4  The petition alleges that failing to make the 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 782.04 states that petitions for habeas 
corpus "must be verified."  Maier v. Byrnes, 121 Wis. 2d 258, 
262, 358 N.W.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1984).  Verification entails 
signing a document in the presence of a notary public to assure 
the truthfulness of the factual allegations.  Kellner v. 
Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 188-89, 539 N.W.2d 685 (1995).  
4 "Notice of Intent" starts the postconviction process.  
Wis. Stat. § 890.30(2)(b).  It is the next step after the 
"Notice of Right" Lopez-Quintero signed in court on April 9, 
(continued) 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
4 
 
appropriate filings within 20 days constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel, citing Strickland.   
¶39 Although Lopez-Quintero's petition claims ineffective 
assistance for failing to initiate a direct appeal, the petition 
is not based on a transcript from an evidentiary hearing where 
trial counsel was questioned, or on an affidavit of counsel 
about why a Notice of Intent was not filed, or on Lopez-
Quintero's affidavit stating when, where or how he specifically 
instructed counsel to appeal and that counsel refused to do so.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶40 A petition for writ of habeas corpus presents a mixed 
question of fact and law, wherein we do not disturb historic 
facts.  State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, ¶6, 258 Wis. 2d 796, 654 
N.W.2d 12.  However, whether habeas is available to the 
petitioner is a question of law that we independently review, 
while benefitting from the discussion of the court of appeals.  
Id.   
B.  Habeas Corpus Petition 
1.  General Principles 
¶41 Habeas corpus is a civil action, even if brought about 
by a criminal charge.  State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Shanks, 124 
Wis. 2d 216, 223, 369 N.W.2d 743 (1985) (citing State ex rel. 
Korne v. Wolke, 79 Wis. 2d 22, 26, 255 N.W.2d 446 (1977)).  As 
is required with other claims for relief, "[a] habeas petition 
                                                                                                                                                             
2008.   
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
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must contain a statement of the legal issues and a sufficient 
statement of facts that bear on those legal issues, which if 
found to be true, would entitle the petitioner to relief."  
State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶18, 290 
Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 990.  The burden of proof in a habeas 
corpus 
proceeding 
is 
on 
the 
petitioner 
to 
sustain 
his 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.  State ex rel. 
Reddin v. Meekma, 99 Wis. 2d 56, 61, 298 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 
1980); State ex rel. Alvarez v. Lotter, 91 Wis. 2d 329, 334, 283 
N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1979) (citing Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 
275, 286, (1941)); Wenzlaff v. Burke, 250 Wis. 525, 527, 27 
N.W.2d 475 (1947).   
¶42 Habeas corpus when issued is an equitable writ that 
permits courts of equity to tailor a remedy that is necessary 
under the particular facts.  State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 
Wis. 2d 276, 288, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977).  However, habeas is 
available only when the petitioner's liberty is restrained in 
violation of the constitution or by a tribunal that lacked 
jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶2, 
262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155.  We have concluded that a 
petition for habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle by which to 
bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  
State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).   
¶43 As we have explained many times, in order to mount a 
successful claim under Strickland, deficient performance by 
counsel and prejudice to the defendant must be alleged and 
proved.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681-82.  "[C]ourts must 'judge 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
6 
 
the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts 
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's 
conduct.'"  Roe, 528 U.S. at 477.  
¶44 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that disregarding "specific instructions" from a defendant to 
file a notice of appeal is "professionally unreasonable."  Id.  
However, a defendant must clearly direct counsel to file an 
appeal in order to conclude that failing to do so was deficient 
performance.  Id. (explaining that counsel is not deficient for 
not filing a notice of appeal when defendant has not clearly 
directed him to appeal).  As Roe explained, "[t]o prove 
deficient performance, a defendant can rely on evidence that he 
sufficiently demonstrated to counsel his interest in an appeal.  
But such evidence alone is insufficient to establish that, had 
the defendant received reasonable advice from counsel about the 
appeal, he would have instructed his counsel to file an appeal."  
Id. at 486.   
¶45 In 
addition, 
the 
"right 
to 
claim 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to commence an appeal does not 
exist indefinitely."  State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 
Wis. 2d 795, 802, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997).5  As Smalley 
                                                 
5 The majority opinion overrules State ex rel. Smalley v. 
Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 802, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997).  
Majority op., ¶1.  In so doing, it incorrectly states that 
Smalley was "abrogated in part by State ex rel. Coleman v. 
McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900."  
Coleman did not abrogate Smalley.  Rather, Coleman explains that 
"the Smalley decision actually rests on the application of 
habeas principles" not on laches.  Id., ¶25.  In so doing, 
Coleman affirms Smalley's timeliness requirement.  
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
7 
 
explained, it was the petitioner's burden to show he was not 
"capable" of learning prior to filing habeas that counsel had 
not commenced any type of appeal on his behalf.  Id. at 880 n.4.  
Rather, in order for habeas to issue, the petitioner must show 
that "the request for relief [was] made promptly and speedily."  
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶¶16, 17, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (discussing 
invocation of the court's equitable powers to issue a writ 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.51, a statutory provision that also 
applies to writs of habeas corpus).   
¶46 I further note that "[e]quitable remedies are not 
available to one whose actions or inactions result in the harm."  
Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis. 2d 468, 477, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 
1993).  In this regard, the petitioner's conduct is a critical 
factor 
in 
deciding 
whether 
according 
habeas 
relief 
is 
appropriate.  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶25 (citing Smalley, 211 
Wis. 2d at 802 n.7, and explaining that Smalley correctly 
"places the burden of proof for timeliness of the [habeas] 
petition on Smalley"). 
¶47 Furthermore, finality requires that postconviction 
proceedings not continue indefinitely.  State v. Escalona-
Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).  For 
example, a convicted person is required to raise all grounds for 
relief from his or her conviction in the initial Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion.  Id. at 185.   
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
8 
 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 809.51 and 782.04 
¶48 Lopez-Quintero asserts a right to appeal by invoking 
this court's supervisory jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.51.  Subsection (1) requires that the petition contain: 
(a) A statement of the issues presented by the 
controversy; 
(b) A 
statement 
of 
the 
facts 
necessary 
to 
understanding of the issues; 
(c) The relief sought; and 
(d) The 
reasons 
why 
the 
court 
should 
take 
jurisdiction. 
Lopez-Quintero's petition also is required to comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 782.04(5), which commands a statement of "In what the 
illegality of the imprisonment consists."  State ex rel. Santana 
v. Endicott, 2006 WI App 13, ¶10, 288 Wis. 2d 707, 709 N.W.2d 
515.   
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.51(1) requires more than an 
assertion that Lopez-Quintero wanted a direct appeal and he did 
not get one.  It requires a statement of the "issues presented 
by the controversy" and "the facts necessary to understanding of 
the 
issues." 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 782.04(5) 
requires 
an 
explanation 
of 
why 
Lopez-Quintero 
is 
being 
imprisoned 
unlawfully.  These two statutes form the framework for what must 
be pled in a habeas petition.   
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
9 
 
3.  Lopez-Quintero's Petition 
¶50 Even though the majority opinion labels it as a 
"sufficiently pled habeas petition,"6 Lopez-Quintero's petition 
for habeas is patently inadequate.  The petition does not allege 
facts showing that Lopez-Quintero had made a specific request of 
counsel to appeal.  Rather, the petition for habeas references 
the June 10, 2008 Affidavit of Indigency.  However, that 
document demonstrates that no decision had been made on whether 
to appeal:  "Atty Frederick Cohn appointed to initiate appeal if 
desired."7   
¶51 Because the record before us is deficient, the 
majority's decision places it in the position of adding facts to 
the petition, so that if true, the petition would support 
finding that Lopez-Quintero specifically directed his counsel to 
appeal.  The majority opinion goes on this factual journey with 
the erroneous belief that "[t]he burden to demonstrate why a 
statutorily-compliant claim for habeas relief should be denied 
as untimely rests with the party seeking to avoid a substantive 
review of the issue."8  The majority opinion cites Coleman, 290 
Wis. 2d 352, ¶2 for this amazing proposition.  However, 
paragraph 2 of Coleman focuses on laches, explaining that if the 
State raises laches as a defense, it has the burden to prove the 
elements of that defense.  However, the State did not plead in 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶10.  
7 Affidavit of Indigency, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
8 Majority op., ¶27.   
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
10 
 
response to Lopez-Quintero's petition; therefore, the defense of 
laches is not at issue.  Furthermore, Coleman concludes that 
habeas petitions have an obligation to plead facts which if true 
would afford the relief the petition seeks.  Id., ¶18.  
Therefore, it is paragraph 18 of Coleman that is significant to 
Lopez-Quintero's petition, not paragraph 2.    
¶52 Furthermore, by finding facts, the majority takes a 
far different tact than the United States Supreme Court followed 
in Roe where there had been an evidentiary hearing at which 
trial counsel testified.  Roe, 528 U.S. at 475.  Even after 
reviewing testimony from that evidentiary hearing, the Supreme 
Court 
concluded 
that 
the 
record 
from 
the 
hearing 
was 
insufficient; and it remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 
487 (explaining, "we are unable to determine whether [counsel] 
had a duty to consult with respondent (either because there were 
potential grounds for appeal or because respondent expressed 
interest in appealing), whether she satisfied her obligations, 
and, 
if 
she 
did 
not, 
whether 
respondent 
was 
prejudiced 
thereby.").   
¶53 Lopez-Quintero's petition says that he "wanted to 
pursue postconviction relief" and he and Attorney Christopher 
Cohen signed a Notice of Right.  The petition also relates that 
"Lopez-Quintero could not recall any instance where he met with 
his attorneys to discuss the appeals process after sentencing."   
¶54 Apparently the preparer of the habeas petition "spoke 
with" Attorney Christopher Cohen, but Attorney Cohen "could not 
remember what transpired between sentencing and the hearing on 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
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the motion for new trial that would explain why neither he nor 
Attorney Frederick Cohn filed a Notice of Intent."  There simply 
is nothing in the petition about when, where or how Lopez-
Quintero specifically instructed his trial counsel to appeal or 
why an appeal was not pursued.  Perhaps after denial of the 
motion for a new trial, counsel and Lopez-Quintero decided an 
appeal would not be worth pursuing.  The petition provides no 
facts about any discussions with counsel on the merits or lack 
thereof in regard to an appeal. 
¶55 Furthermore, the petition does not evidence that the 
preparers of the petition reviewed the transcripts of the trial 
that have been on file with the Racine County Clerk of Court 
since December of 2008.  The petition gives us no indication of 
whether there was a nonfrivolous issue that would be put forward 
in an appeal if one were to go forward.  Although identification 
of grounds for appeal is not required, identification of an 
appealable issue would have been of assistance to Lopez-
Quintero's petition.  Id. at 487.    
¶56 In addition, the record is silent about why Lopez-
Quintero waited ten years before seeking to institute an appeal.  
While it is true that his trial counsel did not file a Notice of 
Intent, it did not take Lopez-Quintero ten years to figure out 
that no appeal was pending.  The record shows that he received 
oral and written notice that he had 20 days after sentencing to 
preserve his postconviction rights; yet, he did nothing.  
¶57 Perhaps because the majority recognized that the 
habeas petition is deficiently pled, the majority opinion chose 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
12 
 
to fill in facts that are not in the habeas petition.  The 
majority acknowledges that factual allegations to which it 
refers are not in the record, and asserts that they came from 
Lopez-Quintero's brief.9  If there actually were such facts, they 
should have been pled in the verified petition or contained 
within an affidavit signed by Lopez-Quintero that the habeas 
petition incorporated.  There was no affidavit attached to the 
petition, and none of the facts in ¶26 of the majority opinion 
are in the petition or anywhere else in the record.  Therefore, 
they should not have been considered when the majority decided 
that the State's objection to Lopez-Quintero's unexplained ten-
year 
delay 
in 
petitioning 
for 
habeas 
was 
"immaterial."10  
Associated Bank, N.A. v. Brogli, 2018 WI App 47, ¶38, 383 
Wis. 2d 756, 917 N.W.2d 37 (concluding that a reviewing court 
cannot resolve questions when pertinent facts are not of 
record); Lamb v. Manning, 145 Wis. 2d 619, 626, 427 N.W.2d 437 
(Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that documents not of record or 
authenticated by affidavit must be ignored by the court).   
¶58 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 809.51(1)(b) 
directs 
that 
a 
sufficient habeas petition must be grounded in "a statement of 
the 
facts 
necessary 
to 
understanding" 
how 
Lopez-Quintero 
specifically instructed counsel to appeal and that counsel 
refused to act on his instruction.  His petition, which says 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶26. 
10 Id.  Can other appellants now supplement habeas petitions 
with factual allegations in their briefs?  If so, this is new 
law and poor precedent to establish. 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
13 
 
only that he wanted to appeal and missed the date, is not 
sufficient.  Stated more completely, the petition does not 
allege when, where or how Lopez-Quintero specifically directed 
his trial counsel to appeal.  Without Lopez-Quintero's specific 
direction to appeal, counsel's performance is not deficient.  
Roe, 528 U.S. at 477.   
¶59 The petition in Coleman is an excellent example of how 
a petitioner for habeas can fulfill the pleading obligations of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 809.51(1) and 782.04.  Coleman's habeas petition 
averred that although he wanted to appeal, counsel advised him 
that he "had no chance of obtaining any relief on appeal."  
Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶8.  Coleman's petition then explained 
that failing to appeal the denial of his suppression motion was 
ineffective assistance because whether he had standing to 
challenge the search of his girlfriend's home was a significant 
and obvious issue.  Id., ¶¶11, 12.  Because denial of Coleman's 
suppression motion was the genesis for his guilty plea, if he 
were to prevail on the appeal and evidence found during the 
warrantless search were suppressed, he would have withdrawn his 
plea and his conviction would have been reversed.  Id.   
¶60 In the case before us, it is not surprising that the 
court of appeals denied the petition as having been filed too 
late.  The petition does not narrate any facts that could be 
read to show that Lopez-Quintero was not capable of learning for 
ten years that no appeal was pending.  Absent some reasonable 
narration about why he waited ten years to seek a direct appeal, 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
14 
 
Wis. Stat. § 809.51(2) gives the court of appeals the discretion 
to dismiss habeas petitions ex parte.  It provides: 
The court may deny the petition ex parte or may order 
the respondents to file a response with a supporting 
memorandum, if any, and may order oral argument on the 
merits of the petition.   
¶61 Here, the court of appeals denied the petition ex 
parte, focusing on the lack of an explanation for the ten years 
that passed subsequent to Lopez-Quintero's sentencing.  However, 
the inadequacy of Lopez-Quintero's petition should not result in 
this court giving him a pass on his obligations under Roe, 
Coleman, Strickland, Wis. Stat. §§ 809.51 and 782.04 to file a 
verified petition that articulates his specific instructions to 
counsel to appeal or supportive of a nonfrivolous trial error 
that he seeks to appeal.  
¶62 To some extent, the majority opinion falls into the 
trap set by Lopez-Quintero's inadequate petition for habeas.  
The majority opinion does so when it responds to the narration 
in a petition rather than independently analyzing what is 
necessary for a sufficient habeas pleading.  In so doing, the 
majority opinion erroneously gives the State the burden of 
proving that the habeas petition is sufficiently stated, 
impliedly finds facts necessary to its conclusion that the 
petition 
is 
"statutorily-compliant,"11 
and 
reverses 
the 
discretionary decision of the court of appeals, contending that 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶¶24, 25, 27 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
15 
 
principles of equity do not "require a habeas petitioner to 
allege timeliness in the petition."12   
¶63 The majority opinion never says why the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised the discretion the legislature 
granted to it in Wis. Stat. § 809.51(2).  If habeas had no time 
limitations and laches were the only defense to habeas seeking 
to appeal a ten-year-old conviction, the legislature would not 
have given courts the statutory authority in § 809.51(2) to deny 
habeas petitions ex parte.  Stated otherwise, ex parte denials 
of habeas must rely on the sufficiency of the habeas petition 
because that is all a court would have available to consider 
prior to a State response.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶64 Because, as a matter of law, the foundational pleading 
requirements of habeas corpus seeking to revive a direct appeal 
have not been met by Lopez-Quintero's petition, I conclude that 
the court of appeals did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
in denying habeas relief ex parte, and I respectfully dissent 
from the majority opinion.   
¶65 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶1. 
No.  2018AP203-W.pdr 
 
 
 
1