Case Title: P. v. Crandell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S134883

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 4/30/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S134883 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H027641 
JEFFREY DAVID CRANDELL, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC268506 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The trial court imposed on defendant a restitution fine of $2,600 that had 
not been mentioned by the prosecutor when he recited the parties’ plea agreement.  
Defendant contends imposition of the fine violated his plea bargain and he 
therefore is entitled, pursuant to People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013 (Walker), 
to have the fine reduced to the statutory minimum of $200.  (See Pen. Code, 
§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1); Walker, at p. 1029.)  We conclude the error that occurred in 
Walker did not occur here.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
Background 
In November 2002, defendant, armed with a .45-caliber handgun, entered 
an apartment and ordered its two occupants not to move.  Two accomplices also 
entered.  Defendant brandished his gun and demanded the victims’ wallets; after 
obtaining them, he bound the victims’ wrists and ankles with tape.  Defendant and 
his accomplices then left, taking some electronic components and marijuana plants 
 2
with them.  A short time later, police apprehended the three, and the victims 
identified them as the perpetrators. 
The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a complaint charging 
defendant and his accomplices with two counts of first degree robbery in violation 
of Penal Code sections 211 and 212.5.1  The complaint further alleged that 
defendant used a firearm during the commission of the robbery.  (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (b).) 
Defendant and the People entered into a negotiated disposition.  At the 
change of plea hearing in September 2003, the district attorney amended the 
complaint to include both victims in one count of robbery and moved to dismiss 
the second count.  When the trial court directed the district attorney to “state the 
offered disposition,” the district attorney responded:  “As to the defendant Jeffrey 
David Crandell, the People have made the following offer:  If he should plead no 
contest or guilty to Count One as amended and admit the enhancement of Penal 
Code Section 12022.53(b), the offer is to dismiss Count Two and the enhancement 
on Count Two as well.  And that would be for a 13-year top bottom.”  A moment 
later, defendant’s counsel responded, “Yes, your Honor,” to the court’s question 
whether defendant would accept the district attorney’s offer. 
“Do you understand, Mr. Crandell,” the court then asked, “that the 
maximum time you could be sentenced to if you were convicted of this one charge 
at a later time or if you were to plead guilty or no contest at a later time, the 
maximum would be sixteen years in state prison?”  Defendant said, “yes.”  The 
court continued:  “The district attorney has offered that you will go to state prison, 
                                              
1 
Unlabeled section references are to this code.   
 3
but it will be for 13 years, no more, no less.  [¶] Do you understand that?”  
Defendant answered, “Yes, ma’am.” 
In further colloquy a few moments later, the trial court advised defendant of 
various consequences his pleading guilty or no contest would have.  The court 
warned defendant he would “have to pay a restitution fund fine of a minimum of 
$200, a maximum of $10,000.”  The trial court also notified defendant it “could 
impose a general fund fine of up to $10,000.”  Defendant told the court he 
understood these things. 
After additional advisements, the trial court asked defendant whether 
“anyone made any promises to you other than what I promised you here today in 
open court?  [¶] And all I promised you is Mr. Crandell, 13 years in prison . . . .  
[¶] Has anyone made any other promises to you, Mr. Crandell?”  Defendant 
answered, “No, ma’am.”  Defendant also acknowledged that he was pleading 
freely and voluntarily. 
Immediately thereafter, the trial court amended count one as the parties had 
agreed and asked, “How do you plead to that charge, Mr. Crandell?”  Defendant 
responded, “No contest.”  He also admitted the truth of the firearm allegation.  The 
trial court thereupon accepted defendant’s plea, finding it to have been free and 
voluntary.  The court did not admonish defendant on his right to withdraw the plea 
should the court subsequently withdraw its approval.  (§ 1192.5.) 
The probation officer’s report on defendant’s case was prepared after 
defendant’s plea had been taken.  The report recommended imposition of a $2,600 
restitution fine, using the mathematical formula found in section 1202.4, 
 4
subdivision (b)(2),2 and a $2,600 parole revocation fine, pursuant to section 
1202.45,3 the latter to be suspended. 
At the sentencing hearing in April 2004, defendant moved to withdraw his 
no contest plea, asserting he had been under the influence of prescription 
medication for a psychiatric disorder at the time of the plea and that the court had 
not fully explained to him his rights respecting the firearm enhancement 
allegation.  Defendant’s motion made no mention of the potential imposition of a 
restitution or parole revocation fine as recommended in the probation report. 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion and sentenced him to 13 years in 
state prison—the lower statutory term of three years for residential robbery, plus 
10 years for the firearm enhancement.  Consistently with the probation officer’s 
recommendation, the court also imposed a restitution fine of $2,600.4  Defendant’s 
counsel argued for reducing the amount of the fine, but did not object that its 
imposition violated the plea agreement. 
                                              
2  
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2) provides in its entirety:  “In setting a 
felony restitution fine, the court may determine the amount of the fine as the 
product of two hundred dollars ($200) multiplied by the number of years of 
imprisonment the defendant is ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of 
felony counts of which the defendant is convicted.” 
3  
Section 1202.45 provides in its entirety:  “In every case where a person is 
convicted of a crime and whose sentence includes a period of parole, the court 
shall at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of 
Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same 
amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4.  This 
additional parole revocation restitution fine shall be suspended unless the person’s 
parole is revoked.  Parole revocation restitution fine moneys shall be deposited in 
the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury.” 
4  
The trial court also imposed, but suspended imposition of, a parole 
revocation fine of $2,600.  The petition for review did not raise any issue 
respecting the parole revocation fine, and we do not address it. 
 5
Defendant appealed on the ground the trial court violated the plea 
agreement by imposing the $2,600 restitution fine.  A divided Court of Appeal 
affirmed the judgment in its entirety.  We granted defendant’s petition for review. 
Discussion 
“The Supreme Court has . . . recognized that due process applies not only to 
the procedure of accepting the plea [citation], but that the requirements of due 
process attach also to the implementation of the bargain itself.  It necessarily 
follows that violation of the plea bargain by an officer of the state raises a 
constitutional right to some remedy.”  (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 
860 [citing Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262].)   
In Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1013, the trial court imposed a restitution fine 
on a defendant who had pled guilty in accordance with a plea bargain that made no 
mention of restitution.  The probation report recommended a $7,000 restitution 
fine, but “the record disclose[d] no other mention of the possibility of such a fine 
prior to sentencing” (id. at p. 1019).  Observing that the “consequences to the 
defendant [of a restitution fine] are severe enough that it qualifies as punishment 
for this purpose” (id. at p. 1024), we held that, “[a]bsent compliance with the 
section 1192.5 procedure [informing defendant of the right to withdraw a 
disapproved plea], the defendant’s constitutional right to the benefit of his bargain 
is not waived by a mere failure to object at sentencing” (id. at p. 1025) when a 
restitution fine not bargained for is imposed. 
In the course of deciding Walker, we carefully distinguished “two related 
but distinct legal principles” (Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1020) that may apply 
when a restitution fine is erroneously imposed.  “The first principle concerns the 
necessary advisements whenever a defendant pleads guilty, whether or not the 
guilty plea is part of a plea bargain.”  (Ibid.)  These include “both the 
constitutional rights that are being waived and the direct consequence of his plea.”  
 6
(Id. at p. 1022.)  “The second principle is that the parties must adhere to the terms 
of a plea bargain.  [Citation.]  [¶] In any given case, there may be a violation of the 
advisement requirement, of the plea bargain, or of both.  Although these possible 
violations are related, they must be analyzed separately, for the nature of the rights 
involved and the consequences of a violation differ substantially.”  (Id. at p. 1020.)   
In Walker, both types of error were present.  First, the trial court advised 
the defendant only that a $10,000 fine was “a possible consequence” when it 
“should have advised defendant there was a possible $10,000 penalty fine and a 
mandatory restitution fine of between $100 and 10,000.”  (Walker, supra, 54 
Cal.3d at p. 1029, italics added.)5  Second, the trial court imposed a restitution fine 
of $5,000 that had not been mentioned in the parties’ plea bargain.  (Walker, at 
p. 1019.)  Under the circumstances, we held that imposition of the restitution fine 
constituted “a significant deviation from the negotiated terms of the plea bargain.  
Since the court did not give the section 1192.5 admonition [relating to the 
defendant’s right to withdraw the plea], and this was not merely a failure to advise 
of the consequences of the plea, defendant cannot be deemed to have waived his 
rights by silent acquiescence.  Nor did he waive them expressly.  As harmless 
error analysis is not applicable, defendant is entitled to a remedy.”  (Id. at pp. 
1029-1030.) 
Respecting remedies, we concluded that by not objecting to the mandatory 
restitution fine when it was imposed, the defendant had waived the trial court’s 
error in failing to advise him about the fine.  (Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1029.)  
                                              
5  
The minimum restitution fine, formerly stated in Government Code section 
13967, subdivision (a), was $100 (Stats. 1983, ch. 1092, § 135.2, p. 3998) until in 
1992 it was increased to $200 (Stats. 1992, ch. 682, § 4, p. 2922).  (See now Pen. 
Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) 
 7
As to the court’s deviation from the plea bargain, we held that when such a 
“breach of the plea bargain is first raised after sentencing, as here on appeal, the 
proper remedy generally is to reduce the fine to the statutory minimum [then 
$100], and to leave the plea bargain intact.”  (Ibid.)  In reaching that conclusion, 
we stressed that “normally the defendant should not receive any more punishment 
than that bargained for” (id. at p. 1027, fn. 3); we allowed “the nonbargained $100 
fine” to stand on appeal only because it was “statutorily mandated and . . . not 
significant in the context of the bargain as a whole” (ibid.). 
In this case, only the second type of error, violation of the plea bargain, is 
in question.  Defendant complains that imposition of a $2,600 restitution fine 
violated his plea bargain and that, pursuant to Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1013, he is 
entitled to have the amount of the fine reduced to $200, the current statutory 
minimum.  The majority in the Court of Appeal below rejected this view, 
concluding that, “after Moser [(In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342 (Moser))] and 
McClellan [(People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367 (McClellan))], Walker can 
no longer be read as establishing a categorical rule that whenever a trial court 
imposes a restitution fine that was not mentioned in the recitation of the plea 
bargain, the trial court must have violated the plea agreement.” 
Unlike this case, both Moser and McClellan involved misadvice.  In Moser, 
we held that a defendant who has pleaded guilty after receiving inadequate or 
erroneous advice from the trial court with regard to the potential consequences of 
his plea generally is entitled to obtain relief only by showing he was prejudiced by 
the erroneous advice.  (Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 345.)  In McClellan, we held 
the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea inter alia because the 
record failed to establish he would not have pled guilty if he had been advised of 
the mandatory sex offender registration requirement.  (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
at p. 370.)  Neither case undermined our holding in Walker that imposing a 
 8
discretionary restitution fine contrary to the terms of a plea bargain constitutes “a 
significant deviation” from the terms of the bargain (Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 1029), for which “the proper remedy is generally to reduce the fine to the 
statutory minimum” (id. at p. 1030).  Rather, in each case we found no violation of 
the plea bargain had occurred because the additional burdens imposed on the 
defendant were statutorily mandated.  (Moser, at p. 357 [length of parole term]; 
McClellan, at pp. 379-380 [sex offender registration requirement].)  As we 
explained in Moser:  “Unlike the amount of the restitution fine at issue in Walker, 
the length of a parole term is not a permissible subject of plea negotiations.  The 
lifetime term of parole challenged in the present case is a statutorily mandated 
element of punishment imposed upon every defendant convicted of second degree 
murder.  (§ 3000.1, subd. (a).)  Neither the prosecution nor the sentencing court 
has the authority to alter the applicable term of parole established by the 
Legislature.”  (Moser, at p. 357.) 
By contrast, the parties to a criminal prosecution are free, within such 
parameters as the Legislature may establish, to reach any agreement concerning 
the amount of restitution (whether by specifying the amount or by leaving it to the 
sentencing court’s discretion) they find mutually agreeable.  As the Court of 
Appeal majority below correctly observed, “Moser and McClellan teach that the 
core question in every case is . . . whether the restitution fine was actually 
negotiated and made a part of the plea agreement, or whether it was left to the 
discretion of the court.”  When a restitution fine above the statutory minimum is 
imposed contrary to the actual terms of a plea bargain, the defendant is entitled to 
a remedy.  In this case, however, because the record demonstrates that the parties 
intended to leave the amount of defendant’s restitution fine to the discretion of the 
court, defendant is not entitled to relief.  
 9
As previously noted, the record reveals that the trial court, before taking 
defendant’s plea, accurately advised him he would “have to pay a restitution fund 
fine of a minimum of $200, a maximum of $10,000” and ascertained that the 
prosecution had not made “any other promises” beyond that defendant would be 
sentenced to 13 years in prison.6  These facts distinguish the case from Walker, 
where the court advised the defendant only that the “maximum penalties provided 
by law” for his offense included “a fine of up to $10,000” and obtained no 
assurance that the parties intended their plea bargain to leave the amount of the 
restitution fine to the court’s discretion.  (Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1018-
1019.) 
Thus, while “the defendant in [Walker] reasonably could have understood 
the negotiated plea agreement to signify that no substantial fine would be 
imposed” (Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 356), defendant in this case was flatly 
informed:  “You will be ordered to pay restitution to the victims in this case.”  In 
light of these circumstances, it is clear that when defendant entered his plea, he 
could not reasonably have understood his negotiated disposition to signify that no 
substantial restitution fine would be imposed. 
We reiterate our guidance in Walker that “[c]ourts and the parties should 
take care to consider restitution fines during the plea negotiations.  The court 
should always admonish the defendant of the statutory minimum [$200] and 
maximum $10,000 restitution fine as one of the consequences of any guilty plea, 
and should give the section 1192.5 admonition whenever required by that statute.”  
(Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1030.)  We again encourage trial courts either to 
                                              
6  
Specifically, the court before taking defendant’s plea asked him, “Has 
anyone made any other promises to you, Mr. Crandell?”  Defendant answered, 
“No, ma’am.” 
 10
require that defendants sign a written change of plea form specifying all 
significant elements of the plea or, when orally taking pleas, follow an informal 
“script” that calls upon the parties to disclose all such for the record.  “ ‘Where the 
court inadvertently omits to list or explain a significant element, the prosecuting 
attorney should be alert to ensure that it is expressly brought to the defendant’s 
attention.’  To this we add that whenever possible, any error in taking the plea 
should be brought to the attention of the court at sentencing so that it can be 
addressed expeditiously.”  (Ibid.) 
Disposition 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
The majority correctly holds that the imposition of a $2,600 restitution fine 
did not violate the plea bargain, because the record makes clear the parties 
negotiated no term contrary to the court’s action.  Asked to “state the offered 
disposition,” the prosecutor described it clearly:  Defendant would plead to a 
single count of robbery with use of a firearm, and would receive a sentence of 13 
years, significantly below the legal maximum term he could otherwise suffer on 
this charge and enhancement.  In turn, the People would dismiss a second robbery 
count, together with its related firearm enhancement. 
The prosecutor mentioned no other terms.  Neither defendant nor his 
counsel spoke up to say the prosecutor had omitted provisions or otherwise 
incompletely stated the agreement. 
Then, before taking the plea, the court warned defendant he would “have to 
pay” a restitution fine between $200 and $10,000.  Defendant acknowledged he 
understood.  Neither he nor either counsel protested that the parties had agreed 
there would be only a minimum fine.  Under such circumstances, we may readily 
infer the parties had made no bargain precluding the court from exercising its 
discretion as to the amount of the fine. 
As the majority notes, the court also specifically asked defendant whether 
any other promises had been made to him, and he answered no.  That dialogue 
obviously removed all possible doubt about the parties’ intent, and it seems good 
practice for trial courts to include such an inquiry in their “scripts” for taking 
negotiated pleas.  However, I do not read the majority opinion as requiring such a 
 
2 
question and answer, over and above the others presented on this record, before an 
appellate court may find the parties did not bargain for a limited fine. 
The parties have an obligation to address all subjects they deem significant 
to the bargain, specifically including the amount of a restitution fine.  (See 
People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024.)  They have the further obligation 
to state their agreement fully on the record.  They should not leave trial and 
appellate courts guessing about missing or unstated terms.  If the record does not 
disclose any agreement, one way or the other, on a particular subject, there is no 
reason to assume a term favorable to the defendant.  Thus, when (1) the parties, in 
stating their bargain for the record, have mentioned no agreement to limit the 
restitution fine, (2) the court warns that it will impose such a fine, and that the 
amount may be anywhere in the statutory range, (3) the defendant says he 
understands, and (4) neither the defendant nor counsel protests that such a fine 
would violate the bargain, it is most sensible to assume the parties made no 
agreement with respect to the fine, leaving it to the law and the court’s discretion 
upon proper advisement. 
Accordingly, if a trial court has failed, for whatever reason, to ask 
specifically about “other promises” before imposing a substantial fine, that fact 
alone should not require an appellate court to invalidate the fine.  I do not interpret 
the majority opinion to hold otherwise.  On that basis, I join the majority’s 
reasoning and result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Crandell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 5/22/05 – 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S134883 
Date Filed: April 30, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Marliese G. Kim 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Jonathan Grossman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Larry L. Dixon, under appointment by 
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, 
Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan,  René A. Chacón and David 
M. Baskind, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jonathan Grossman 
Sixth District Appellate Program 
100 N. Winchester, #310 
Santa Clara, CA  95050 
(408) 241-6171 
 
David M. Baskind 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1308