Case Title: Ford v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion 55

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JEROME TIMOTHY FORD, A/K/A No, 52272
JEROME FORD,
Appellant,

vs. FILED
|THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. SEP 29 2011

 

 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of pandering of prostitution. Kighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; J. Charles Thompson, Judge.

versed i,

 

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Philip David Westbrook, Deputy
Public Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.

[Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Michael J. Watson, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent,

 

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

Jerome Ford appeals his conviction of pandering of
prostitution, a felony. He contends that the statute under which he was

convicted, NRS 201.300(1)(a), is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.

 

 
jis challenge proceeds from a misinterpretation of the statute. NRS
1201.300(1)(a) does not impose strict liability on a person who
junintentionally causes another to engage in prostitution—say, the actress
[who romanticized prostitution in the movie Pretty Woman. It criminalizes
the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in
Jresponse to the solicitation, she “become a prostitute” or “continue to
Jengage in prostitution.” Id.

‘Thus interpreted, NRS 201.300(1\(a) survives Ford's
constitutional challenge. We also reject Ford’s secondary argument that
pandering cannot occur when the target is an undercover police officer
who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute. The jury
instructions, however, did not adequately describe the specific intent
required for pandering. For this reason, we reverse and remand for a new
trial

L

Ford’s conviction grows out of a sting operation that the Las
Vogas Metropolitan Police Vice Squad conducted on the Las Vegas Strip.
‘An undercover officer, Leesa Fazal, posed as a prostitute. Ford
approached Fazal who, unknown to Ford, was wearing a wire under her

skimpy dress, Captured on audiotape, the two discuss the fact that Fazal

 

was “working"; that she'd been paid $300 for a 30-minute, “full service”
date earlier that evening; that Ford had a “bi-coastal” escort service in

‘Atlantic City and Las Vegas that he advertised (or planned to advertise)

on yellowpages.com; and that with him, “You're going to make more than

 

 
ean

[$300 a date}, that’s my point. Believe what I'm telling you.” Not pulling
Jany punches, Ford says, “I'm about making that mother fucking money,
Jand make that mother fucking money do miracles.”

[As the conversation progressed, Ford described his business
land the services he could offer Fazal. He told Fazal that he would take
care of her, that he is the backbone of the business, and that he would
protect her if a “trick” tried to attack her. Ford asked Fazal if she
lunderstood a pimp’s role in her line of work. Ironically, he offered to
instruct Fazal on how to properly interview a potential customer to
[determine if he was an undercover cop. He also offered Fazal practical

advice: “As soon as you enter the room, you get your money ... . once

 

everything is over and you don't got the money, then the trick has the
advantage.” When Fazal said she was working without a pimp, Ford
encouraged her to work with him but warned her that if she did, she
would have to obey his instructions because “

 

a a pimp’s game.” He said
Fazal could make a lot of money if she stuck to his rules.

On appeal, Ford emphasizes that he did not ask Fazal for
money, touch her, or arrange for her to have sex with anyone, He also
stresses that Fazal did not decide to become a prostitute after they met

and her trial testimony that she neither was nor ever would become one.

 

\Phe district court permitted Fazal and another officer to testify to
the prostitution subculture and its vernacular. “Working” and “date” refer
to prostitution, while “full service” refers to sexual intercourse and fellatio
(on the same “date’).

 

 
com Be

‘The State charged Ford with both pandering and attempted
jpandering. Ford contested probable cause in a pretrial petition for writ of
habeas corpus that was denied. The jury convicted Ford of pandering, a
category D felony. Ford was sentenced as a habitual criminal to 5 to 20
Jvears in prison.

I

Ford’s principal argument on appeal is that NRS 201.300(1)(a)
lcriminalizes speech and innocent conduct and so is overbroad under the
First Amendment and impermissibly vague under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. “The overbreadth
doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of
First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are
substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.” Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (quoting Broadrick v.

lahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973). ‘The vagueness doctrine holds
that “[a] conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under
which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States_v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 286, 304 (2008),

Our review is de novo, City of Las Vegas wv. Dist. Ct, (Krampe),
122 Nev. 1041, 1048, 146 P.3d 240, 245 (2006), and Ford, as the proponent
of the constitutional challenge, has the burden of establishing the statute's
invalidity, Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Att'y General, 125 Nev. 502,
509, 217 P.8d 546, 551 (2008).

 

 
A

‘The first step in both overbreadth and vagueness analysis is to
Jconstrue the challenged statute. Williams, 563 U.S. at 293 (‘it is
jimpossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first
Skilling v, United States, 561 U.S. __.
|__. 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2930 (2010) (“[I]f the general class of offenses to
which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will

/knowing what the statute covers”

 

inot be struck down as vague .... And if this general class of offenses can
Ibe made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the

statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction.”

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 847 U.S, 612,
618 (1954))); State v, Castaneda, 126 Nev. _, _, 245 P.3d 550, 553-54

(2010) (‘Enough clarity to defeat a vagueness challenge may be supplied
by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, by giving a statute's
words their well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning, and by
looking to the common law definitions of the related term or offense.”
(citations and quotations omitted))..

Here, the challenged statute, NRS 201.300(1), reads as
follows: “A person who: (a) Induces, persuades, encourages, inveigles,
entices or compels a person to become a prostitute or to continue to engage

rostitution ... is guilty of pandering.” (Emphases added). Originally
enacted in 1913, 1913 Nev. Stat., ch. 233, § 1, at 356, NRS 201.300(1)(@)

has not changed significantly over the years, beyond its amendment in
1977 to add the words emphasized above. 1977 Nev. Stat., ch. 510, § 1, at

 

 
11054. “Prostitute” and “prostitution” are defined terms,* but the serial
verbs “[iJnduces, persuades, encourages, inveigles, entices or compels,” are
jnot. Notably NRS 201.300(1)(a) does not specify the intent required for
Jpandering. This is atypical of more modern criminal statutes, which often
employ words (usually adverbs) or phrases indicating some type of bad-

mind requirement: ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent to...; ‘knowingly’ or

with knowledge that .
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(a), at 333 (2d ed.
12003) (alteration in original); see Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) (1985)
(defining kinds of culpability).

Because NRS 201.900(1)(a) does not use any “bad-mind”
adverbs or phrases, Ford takes the statute to impose strict liability based

‘purposely’ or ‘for the purpose of... .” and so on,

 

Jon cause and effect, not intent. By his account, NRS 201.300(1)(a) reaches
not only the human trafficker who recruits teenage ronaways for
prostitution rings but also the following: ‘The “over-protective mother.
whose constant nagging and stern disapproval encourages her daughter to
engage in prostitution as an act of rebellion; [t]he amorous 22-year-old

male, steeped in the ‘urban’ culture popularized by rap artists and other

 

media figures, who falsely represents himself as a ‘pimp’ or a ‘player’ in

the hopes of en

 

icing a woman to sleep with him"; and Julia Roberts,

2NRS 201.295(3) states that “Prostitute’ means a male or female
person who for a fee engages in sexual intercourse, oral-genital contact or
any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts of a person for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person.”
“Prostitution’ means engaging in sexual conduct for a fee,” NRS
201.295(4), while “[s}exual conduct’ means any of the acts enumerated in”
the definition of prostitute. NRS 201.295(5).

 

 
|vhose film Pretty Woman suggests that “wholesome and beautiful girls
‘can use prostitution as a means to achieve wealth, see the world, and
lobtain the love of a dashing businessman like Richard Gere.”

‘The intent, if any, required to be convicted of pandering under
INRS 201.300(1)(a) lies at the heart of Ford's appeal. If he is right and
INRS 201.300(1)(a) provides for strict liability, the statute is
lunsustainable. But Ford misinterprets the statute. To be convicted of
pandering under NRS 201.300(1(a), a defendant must act with the
specific intent of inducing (or persuading, encouraging, inveigling,
lenticing, or compelling) his target to become or remain a prostitute. A
number of factors lead us to this conclusion.

First, Ford makes too much of NRS 201.300(1)(a)'s omission of
fa stated intent requirement. “While strict-liability offenses are not
‘unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional
requirements,” they occupy a “generally disfavored status” and “{clertainly
far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the
statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent
requirement.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
487-38 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)
(mere omission . .. of intent [in a criminal statute] will not be construed
as eliminating that clement from the crimes denounced’); see United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S, 64, 70 (1994) (many “cases
interpret[] criminal statutes to inclide broadly applicable scienter
requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain
them’).

In Sharma v. State, 118 Nev, 648, 652-55, 56 P.3d 868, 870-72
(2002), we addressed the intent required for

 

ability under another

 

 
|Nevada criminal statute, NRS 195.020, that, like NRS 201.300(1)(a), was
lenacted in the early twentieth century, Crimes and Punishments Act of
1911 § 9, reprinted in Nev. Rev. Laws § 6274 (1912), and does not specify
lan intent requirement. Using words similar to those in NRS
1201.300(1)(a), NRS 195.020 provides that every person concerned in the
lcommission of a crime is liable as a principal, whether he or she commits
the act constituting the offense, aids or abets in its commission, or
“counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or otherwise procures
another to commit a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor.” Even
though NRS 195.020 does not state an intent requirement, in Sharma we
interpreted it to require that the aider and abettor “knowingly aid[] the
lother person with the intent that the other person commit the charged
jcrime.” 118 Nev. at 655, 56 P.3d at 872 (emphasis added). See Robey v.
State, 96 Nev. 459, 461, 611 P.2d 209, 210 (1980) (‘the general conditions
of penal liability requir{e] not only the doing of some act by the person to
be held liable, but also the existence of a guilty mind during the
commission of the act” (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. 246).

We therefore reject Ford’s argument that NRS 201.300(1\a)'s,
omission of a stated intent requirement automatically meens that it
provides for strict criminal liability.

Second, NRS 201.300(1)(a)'s history and apparent purpose
support reading it to require specific intent of persuading the target to
become or remain a prostitute.

‘The Nevada Legislature passed NRS 201.300(1)(a) three years

after Congress passed the Mann Act, then popularly known as the “White-
Slave Traffic Act,” 36 Stat., §§ 1-8, at 825, 825-27 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 et seq.). Using words like those in NRS

 

 
1201.300(1)(a), section 3 of the Mann Act prohibited “knowingly
ipersuad[ing], inducfing], enticfing], or coerefing] . .. any woman or girl to
igo from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce . .. for the
ipurpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”*
lLaws modeled on the Mann Act swept the country in the early 1900s in
lresponse to what historians describe as ‘intense, widespread, and often
Inysterical” concern with coerced prostitution. Mark Thomas Connelly,

vonse to Prostitution in the Progressive Era 115 (1980). See Peter

 

That Nevada did not include the “for the purpose of’ phrasing is not
surprising. While the omission arguably suggests that Nevada meant to
dispense with the specific intent required by the Mann Act, § 3, it seems
more reasonable to take Nevada's version as reworking the foderal
statute's language to eliminate its interstate travel/Commerce Clause
/component.

Congress modernized the Mann Act in 1986 and revised its test
again in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, See Andriy Pazuniak, A
Better Way to Stop Online Predators: Encouraging_a_More Appealing
Approach to § 242, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 691, 694-98 (2010). Other states
have similarly revised their dated prostitution and pandering laws to
remove “obsolete language.” to replace “archaic language” with “modern
terminology,” and to streamline them. State v. Grazian, 164 P.3d 790,
794-95 (Idaho 2007); see alzo Model Penal Code § 251.2 (1980). Nevada
has added to, but not meaningfully pruned, its prostitution and pandering
laws; with brothels being permitted in certain counties at local
government option, this thicket of laws has led to litigation and

uncertainty. Coyote Pub,, Inc. v. Miller. 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010),
Inc. v, Heller, No, CV-06-329-JCM-PAL, 2007 WE.

2254702 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007); see Daria Snadowsky, The Best Little
Whorekouse Is Not_in Texas: How Nevada's Prostitution Laws Serve

 

 

Public Poliev, and How Those Laws May Be Improved. 6 Nev. LJ. 217
(2005) (Winner, William S, Boyd School of Law Excellence in Writing
Award 2004-08).

 

 
    
  
  
   
   
  
 
 
 
    
   
  
  

JJ.L. & Human. 123, 157 (2004) (“Beginning in the early 1900s, America
Jawoke to a startling new threat: the ‘existence’ of an international
Jconspiracy to seduce, entrap and ultimately enslave (white) American girls
into a life of prostitution.”). The desire to protect women from coerced
prostitution that drove these laws led to “a discursive reconceptualization
of the prostitute within American society, {from] ‘fallen woman'—perhaps
[deserving of sympathy, but ultimately responsible for her position in life
{to] ‘white slave-—an innocent, agency-

 

lon account of her lax morals .
less, pre-sexual (country) girl who had been tricked into a life of
prostitution by urban panders.” Id. at 126. Consistent with these
lconcerns, the Mann Act focuses on the defendant's intent to prostitute the
victim, not whether the prostitution actually occurs. See United States v.
Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1138, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Simpson v, United
States, 245 F. 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1917)).

Similarly, our case law recognizes that the “primary
emphasis” of NRS 201.300(1)(a) is “upon the recruitment of females into
the practice of prostitution.” Stanifer v. State, 109 Nev. 304, 308, $49 P.2d
282, 285 (1993). “[A] “pimp” solicits patrons for the prostitute and lives
off her earnings, while a “panderer” recruits prostitutes and sets them up
in business.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 Wharton's Criminal
Law § 274 (14th ed, 1979); sce also 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's
Criminal Law § 266, at 637 (15th ed. 1994) (“The life-blood of prostitution

 

 

 

is not the prostitute but the parasite who ‘promotes’ prostitution. It is the
promoter who makes prostitution a going business; therefore, his activity

is usually punished more severely than prostitution itself”). The

  

 
Jpanderer’s target is seen as the victim of the crime, not a co-conspirator.
I‘The gist of the offense is... the spread of prostitution, and whether the
liemale becomes debauched or not is unimportant in view of the emphasis
Jon punishing the promotion and expansion of the vicious evil.”
Commonwealth v. Stingel, 40 A2d 140, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944)
(interpreting Pennsylvania statute almost identical to NRS 201.300(1)(a))

To read NRS 201.300(1)(a) as imposing strict liability would
shift the crime’s focus from the panderer’s efforts to recruit prostitutes to
{the success of the recruiting program—liability would depend not on what
{the panderer intended to achieve but the effect he caused, intended or not,
which is counterintuitive.

Also significant: From the date of its original enactment until
12005, NRS 201.300(1)(a) had a companion statute providing that, “[ulpon
fa trial for... inveigling, enticing or taking away any [person] for the
purpose of prostitution.” corroboration of the targeted person's testimony
was required. Nev. Rev. Laws § 717 (1912) (emphasis added); see Nev.
Compiled Laws § 10975 (1929); 1967 Nev. Stat,, ch. 523, § 447, at 1472;
1981 Nev. Stat., ch. 604, § 1, at 1029; 2005 Nev. Stat., ch. 113, § 1, at 308

 

(repealing corroboration requirement as to pandering). ‘The words “for the
purpose of prostitution” in NRS 201.300(1)(a)'s companion statute
confirms that it is fair to read NRS 201.300(1)(a) as requiring specific
intent.

‘Third, the statute's language supports, if it does not compel, a
specific intent requirement, “and there is no grammatical barrier to
reading it that way.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008).
Although a “statute may contain no adverbs or phrases indicating a

requirement of fault, some fault may be inherent in a verb . .. the statute

 

 
lemploys (e.g, whoever ‘refuses’ to do something or ‘permits’ another to do
|something).” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(a)\1),
lat 333 (2d ed, 2003). The verbs that NRS 201.300(1)(a) strings together
lare active; they contemplate that the subject of the sentence act with the
Ispecifie purpose that his object do what he asks. Thus, Black's Law
[Dictionary defines “persuade” as “[t]o induce (another) to do something’;
“encourage” as “[tJo instigate; to incite to action; to embolden; to help":
-inveigle” as “{tJo lure or entice through deceit or insincerity "; “entice” as “[t]o
lure or induce; esp., to wrongfully solicit (a person) to do something”; and
compel” as “1. To cause or bring about by force, threats, or overwhelming
pressure.”* Id. at 1260, 607, 901, 611, 321 (9th ed. 2009).

Fourth, while the statutory formulations vary from state to
state, none of the cases interpreting these statutes treats pandering (or
promoting prostitution,” as some places call it) as anything other than @
specific intent crime. As the California Supreme Court recently held:

We clarify here that pandering is a specific intent
crime. Its commission requires that a defendant
intends to persuade or otherwise influence the
target “to become [or remain] a prostitute.”
This . .. effectuates the purpose and intent of the
pandering statute, which is to criminalize the

 

‘Oddly, Black’s does not define “induce.” It has been defined
elsewhere to mean: "1, To lead (a person), by persuasion or some influence
or motive that acts upon the will, to (into unto) some action, condition,
belief, ete; to lead on, move, influence, prevail upon (any one) to_do
something.” Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VII, at 887 (2d ed, (with
corrections) 1998).

 

 
knowing_and_purposeful conduet of any person
seeking to encourage another person to work with
the panderer or another pimp in plying the
prostitution trade.

People v. Zambia, 254 P.3d 965, 974 (Cal. 2011) (first emphasis added)
[quoting Cal. Penal Code § 266i(a)(2))>  Construing a statute almost
jidentical to Nevada's, Michigan has likewise acknowledged that specific
intent is required for pandering. See People v. Morey, 583 N.W.2d 907,
911 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (finding error in a portion of the trial court's
pandering instruction but not questioning its statement that pandering “is
fa specific intent crime, which means that the prosecution must prove not
lonly that the defendant did the acts but that she did the acts with the
intent to cause a particular result,” to wit: that the target “become a

prostitute”); People v. Rocha, 312 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)

 

 

Phe California statute at issue in Zambia, like NRS 201.300(1)(a),
is silent as to the intent required for pandering of prostitution. But the
‘two states’ pandering statutes differ in several respects. First, Nevada's is
broader in that it proscribes efforts to persuade or otherwise influence a
person “to become a prostitute or to continue to engage in prostitution.”
NRS 201.300(1)(a) (emphasis added), while California's lacks the above-
emphasized language, Cal. Penal Code § 266i(a)(2) (West 2008), obviating
the issue that divided the Zambia court. Second, the California statute
penalizes a person who “[bly promises, threats, vi or y device
‘or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, or encourages another person to
become a prostitute.” Id, (emphasis added). Although the string of verbs
differs slightly in each statute (Nevada adds “compels,” “entices,” and

 

“inveigles” and omits “causes”), the more significant difference is that
Nevada's statute lacks the emphasized language, “by promises, threats,
violence, or by any device or scheme.” This language strengthens the
foundation for the Zambia court's specific intent holding. For the reasons
expressed in the text, however, its absence doesn’t affect our decision,

 

 
(The jurors were required to find that defendant knowingly and
intentionally, for the purpose of prostitution, was inducing persuading,
encouraging, enticing, or inveigling a female person to become a
prostitute.”). See also Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 833 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983) Gury instruction required that the defendant have “the specific
intent to cause or induce [D.W.] to engage in prostitution”); State_v.
Rodgers, 655 P.2d 1348, 1357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) Gury instruction
required that the “crime of pandering requires proof that the defendant
knowingly compelled, induced or encouraged another to lead a life of
prostitution”); Flovd v. State, 575 $.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(construing “prostitution enterprise” as requiring an “immediate objective
to promote prostitution as a particular field of endeavor”; “passive
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances” will not do); Model Penal
Code § 251.2(2)(¢) (1980) (providing that a person who “knowingly
promotes prostitution” may be held criminally liable for “encouraging,
inducing or otherwise purposely causing another to become or remain a
prostitute”).¢

Fifth, and finally, courts take “particular care... to avoid

construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would

“In Glegola_v. State, 110 Nev. 344, 871 P.2d 950 (1994), we
interpreted NRS 201.358(1), which prohibits prostitution or solicitation for
prostitution after testing positive for AIDS to create a general intent
offense, not requiring for its commission that the act of prostitution
actually occur or even be intended (Glegola planned a “trick roll’). ‘The
substantial public health risk involved, the difficulty in disproving a “trick
roll” defense, and the statute's language justify the holding in Glegola but
do not support its extension to pandering.

0 008

4

 

 
‘criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.” Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (quoting Liparota_v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). Ford's examples of the overprotective
mother, the young man looking for love, and movie star Julia Roberts
convince us that reading NRS 201.300(1)(a) as not requiring specific intent
would do just that: Criminalize innocent conduct and, at the same time,
cast the statute into constitutional doubt under the First Amendment and
the due process principles articulated in Flamingo Paradise Gaming v.
Attorney General, 125 Nev. 502, 514, 217 P.d 546, 554-55 (2009), and
Robey v. State, 96 Nev. 459, 461, 611 P.24 209, 210 (1980). “[W]hen the
language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would
render it constitutional and valid and the other unconstitutional and void,
that construction should be adopted which will save the statute.” Virginia
and Truckee R.R, Co, v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 174 (1873).
B

The next question is whether NRS 201.300(1)(a), as construed,
criminalizes a substantial amount of protected expressive activity and
thus falls to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. We conclude that
it does not.

As Ford notes, NRS 201.300(1)(a) permits conviction based on
speech. But “[mJany long established criminal proscriptions—such as
laws against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech
(commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence illegal
activities.” Williams, 553 U.S, at 298, “Although First Amendment
speech protections are far-reaching, there are limits. Speech integral to
criminal conduct, such as fighting words, threats, and solicitations, remain

15
ome
nance | smn ST EO ST

 

 
 

categorically outside its protection.” United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956,
960 (7th Cir. 2010),

Pandering is a type of criminal solicitation, “In the case of a
criminal solicitation, the speech—asking another to commit a crime—is
the punishable act.” Id, (also noting that “[sJolicitation is an inchoate
crime; the crime is complete once the words are spoken with the requisite
intent"), But the specific intent required—that the panderer’s target
become or remain a prostitute—narrows the statute to illegal employment
proposals. ‘There is no First Amendment right to pander where
prostitution is illegal, as it is in Clark County. State v. Johnson, 324
N.W.2d 447, 450 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting overbreadth challenge to
Wisconsin's pandering statute because “fon its face [it] is directed at
speakers who intentionally propose an illegal commercial transaction, and,
thus, it does not, in general, implicate speech protected by the first
amendment”); see Allen v. Stratton, 428 F. Supp. 24 1064, 1071-72 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (rejecting overbreadth challenge to California’s pandering
statute). “Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically
excluded from First Amendment protection.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 297.

Ford argues that NRS 201.300(1)(a) permits conviction of

 

persons who do not harbor the requisite specific intent—maybe his words
just involved showing off, or lying, or simply recruiting Fazal for his
legitimate escort service. But that is “a dispute over the meaning and
inferences that can be drawn from the facts” in an individual case, White,
610 F.3d at 962; it does not establish overbreadth.

‘More troubling is Ford’s argument that NRS 201.00(1)(a)
may inhibit the abstract advocacy of career prostitution. As construed,
however, the statute requires that the defendant target another person

16

 
lwith the specific, subjective intent of persuading him or her to become or
lremain a prostitute. Thus, NRS 201.300(1)(a) does not prohibit abstract
ladvocacy of prostitution;

 

it forbids efforts to recruit a targeted person to

 

|work as a prostitute. To invalidate a statute on First Amendment grounds
Jat the behest of one whose conduct it permissibly forbids, the statute must
lbe “substantially overbroad.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303. Ford has not
made that showing here. See Johnson, 324 N.W.2d at 450 (rejecting
similar overbreadth challenge to a pandering law on this basis).”

Finally, a panderer recruits a person for employment as a
prostitute, and employment proposals are a species of commercial speech.
{I]t is irrelevant whether [NRS 201.300(1)(a)] has an overbroad scope
encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, because the
overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.” man

 

Of note, NRS 201.354 provides that “[iJt is unlawful for any person
to engage in prostitution or solicitation therefor, except in a licensed house
of prostitution.” (Emphasis added.) Ford's encounter with Fazal occurred
in a Las Vegas casino in Clark County, where all prostitution is illegal.
given NRS 244.345(8), which, as amended in 2011, prohibits licensing
houses of prostitution in counties with populations of more than 700,000.
Despite reference in a footnote in his reply brief to brothels being legal in
parts of Nevada, Ford does not address NRS 201.300(1)()'s application in
counties where, at least in a licensed house of prostitution, prostitution is

 

 

legal. Whether and, if so, how NRS 201.300(1)(a) applies to conduct that
‘occurs in the context of a legal brothel is thus a question we leave for
‘another day. In doing so we note that other more specific statutes address
brothel recruitment and operation. NRS 201.360 (addressing crimes
associated with placing a person in a house of prostitution); see NRS
201.310 (placing one’s spouse in a brothel); NRS 201.330 (detaining a
person in a brothel because of debt contracted while living there).

 

 
[Estates _v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982)
(emphasis added).
c

Ford makes two distinct vagueness arguments. Citing Silvar
Jv. District Court, 122 Nev. 289, 129 P.3d 682 (2006), he argues, first, that
INRS 201.300(1)(a) criminalizes conduct based on the effect it has on others
land, thus, is inherently (and unconstitutionally) indeterminate, Second,
Ihe argues that the statute's failure to define its operative verbs leaves too
much to guesswork to satisfy due process. See Flamingo Paradise
Gaming. 125 Nev. at 612-13, 217 P.2d at 553-54 (convicting a defendant
under a criminal law that fails to define key terms that lack plain
meaning violates due process).

As we have construed NRS 201.300(1)(a), the defendant must
hhave the specific intent that his target become or remain a prostitute.
‘This requirement of specific subjective intent dispositively distinguishes
NIRS 201.300(1)(a) from the loitering ordinance struck down in Silvar and
the antismoking statute considered in Flamingo Paradise Gaming.

‘The ordinance in Silvar made it a crime “to loiter... ina
manner and sumatan festin 190 of inducing,
enticing, soliciting for or procuring another to commit an act of
prostitution.” Clark County Ordinance § 12.08,030 (2006), reprinted in
Silvar, 122 Nev. at 292, 129 P.3d at 684 (emphasis added). We interpreted
this ordinance as penalizing the defendant's loitering based on what a
hypothetical viewer saw its purpose as being, not what the defendant
subjectively intended. Silvar, 122 Nev. at 294, 129 P.3d at 685. Did the
defendant's loitering demeanor “manifest” a prohibited purpose? The

loiterer could not know this until his loitering style was rated by others

 

 
land, even then, what one viewer might take as “manifesting the purpose”
lanother, less suspicious or more naive viewer might not. Id. Thus
construed, the ordinance “tied criminal culpability to... untethered
subjective judgments... [such as] whether the defendant's conduct was

tannoying’ or ‘indecent” based on how a defendant appears to a third

party. Holder v. Hum: n Law Project, 561 U.S. __, _. 180 8. Ct.
12705, 2720 (2010); see City of Las Vegas v. Dist, Ct., 118 Nev. 859, 865, 59
P.3d 477, 482 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Castaneda.

126 Nev. _, _n.1, 345 P.3d 550, 553 n.1 (2010).

By contrast, NRS 201.300(1)(a) requires that the defendant
actually intend to produce the prohibited result. As we recognized in City
lof Las Vegas v. District Court (Krampe), 122 Nev. 1041, 1051, 146 P.8d
1240, 247 (2006), a law that requires specific intent to produce a prohibited
result may avoid vagueness, both by giving the defendant notice of what is
prohibited and by affording adequate law enforcement standards. See
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 ("a scienter requirement may mitigate a
law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice”). To be
sure, conviction depends on a jury deciding whether the defendant
harbored the prohibited intent, But this is a “clear question{] of fact.
Whether someone held a belief or had an intent is a true-or-false
determination, not a subjective judgment such as whether conduet is
annoying...” Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. That “close cases can be
id, at 306; that
, but by the

envisioned” does not render a statute void for vaguene:

 

problem “is addressed, not by the doctrine of vaguené

 

requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id, at 306.
Nor does the failure to define its operative verbs render NRS

201.300(1)(a) unconstitutionally vague. As discussed in the text

 

 
laccompanying note 4, supra, the words “[iJnduces, persuades, encourages,
jinveigles, entices or compels” all carry ordinary dictionary definitions.
Like “{tJhe words ‘attempt,’ ‘persuade,’ ‘induce,’ ‘entice’ or ‘coerce’ fin 18
1U.S.C. § 2422(b), formerly Mann Act, § 3],” these “are words of common
Jusage that have plain and ordinary meanings .. . sufficiently definite that
lordinary people using common sense could grasp the nature of the
[prohibited conduct.” United States v, Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 147 (2d Cir.
12007); United States v, Hart, 635 F.3d 850, 867 (6th Cir. 2011) (the failure
to define “persuade” does not render 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) void for

vagueness; the word has “a plain and ordinary meaning that does not

 

ineed further technical explanation” and is “sufficiently precise to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice as to what is permitted and
what is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” (quoting United States v, Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d

Cir. 2006))

 

SNRS 201.300(1)(a)'s substitution of “compels” for “coerces” and
addition of “encourages” and “inveigles” does not distinguish Ford's
‘vagueness challenge from the unsuccessful challenges to 18 U.S.C. §
2242(b) in Gagliardi, Hart, and Tykarsky. particularly given our long
adherence to the doctrine of noscitur_a_sociis (words are known by-—
acquire meaning from—the company they keep). Orr Di ‘o. v. Dist.
Ct., 64 Nev. 138, 146, 178 P.2d 558, 562 (1947). The argument that
“encourages” does not require an object ignores its transitive use in NRS
201.300(1)(a)—(encourages . .. a person to become... or to
continue”); its meaning, moreover, is distinct from “persuades” in that it
encompasses situations in which the panderer’s persuasive efforts fail
See People v. Bradshaw, 107 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (Ct. App. 1973).

 

 
os

NRS 201.300(a)(1) prohibits a person from enticing another to
lbecome or remain a prostitute, a defined term. See supra note 2. Because
INRS 201.300(1)(a) requires the defendant to act with the specific intent to
Jinduce, persuade, encourage, inveigle, entice, or compel another to become
jor remain a prostitute—and the defendant is subject to penalty for his acts
land his intentions, not those of a third party that he may or may not be
lable to control, of, Flamingo Paradise Gaming, 125 Nev. at 514, 217 P.3d
lat 554-55 (invalidating statute that outlawed smoking in restricted areas
but did not specify the obligation it imposed on business owners or
lemployees)—we cannot say that it fails to give adequate notice of the
conduct it prohibits or gives law enforcement such standardless discretion
that it “authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”
Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, Ford’s vagueness challenge therefore fails. See
‘also Guzzardo v. Bengston, 643 F.2d 1300, 1903-04 (7th Cir. 1981)

(rejecting vagueness challenge to Illinois pandering statute; the term

 

“arrange a situation in which a female may practice prostitution’ evokes a
rather clear image of what the legislature had in mind when the statute
was enacted”); State v, Lee, 315 N.W.2d 60, 62 & n.1 (lowa 1982)
(upholding Iowa pandering statute against vagueness challenge because
“the terms ‘persuades’ and ‘arranges’ are common words that are easily
defined. ‘The statute gives fair warning that it prohibits affirmative acts
designed to orchestrate for or induce another to practice prostitution.")
(collecting cases).
UL

Ford offers a secondary, statutory argument. Whatever his
intent and actions were, Ford argues, he could not violate NRS
201.300(1)(a) because his target, police officer Leesa Fazal, testified she

21

 

 
|would never “become a prostitute” and, never having been a prostitute,
Jcould not “continue to engage in prostitution.” In his view, NRS
1201.300(1)(a) does not apply when the target is an undercover police
officer. Alternatively, but for much the same reasons, Ford argues that
Iehe most he can be liable for is attempted pandering, not pandering.

Ford conflates pandering, which is an inchoate crime of
solicitation, with prostitution itself. “[IJt is the defendant's intent that
{forms the basis for his criminal liability, not the victims’.” United States
lv. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1137 (2002) (upholding conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2422(a), formerly Mann Act, § 3, against the argument that the
defendant “could not have induced or enticed the [Russian] women [he
targeted] to travel ‘to engage in prostitution’ under § 2422(a) because
[they] both declared on the stand that they had no intention of working as

[prostitutes once they reached the United States’). And the crime of

 

| pandering is complete based on the defendant's act of soliciting his target
“to become a prostitute” or “to continue to engage in prostitution.” NRS
201.300(1)(a). Its commission does not require that the defendant's
persuasion succeed:

Under our statute the crime is complete when a
person “encourages a female person to become a
prostitute.” Suecess is not a necessary component
of the crime. ... It is the act of encouragement,
persuasion or inveiglement which is forbidden.
State v. Gates, 221 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1950); State v. Clark, 406 N.W.2d
802, 805 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("It is the recruiting and management

activity, and not its success, which is the evil sought to be prohibited

under a pandering statute.”).

 

 
‘A variant of the police-officer-as-target issue came before the
California Supreme Court in People v. Zambia, 254 P.3d 965 (Cal. 2011).
ere, as here, the target of the defendant's attentions was an undercover
police officer posing as a prostitute, whom the defendant allegedly
recruited to come to work for him. [d, This led the defendant in Zambia to
Jargue, among other things, that “he could not be convicted of anything
jmore than attempted pandering because there was no possibility that
[Officer Cruz would become a prostitute.” 1d. at 975 n.8. The court rejected
the argument:

the crime of pandering is complete when the
defendant “encourages another person to become a
prostitute”.... There is no requirement that
defendant succeed. Nor is there a requirement
that, in selecting his targets, the panderer choose
only those who present a high probability of
success. Again, the focus is on the actions and
intent of the panderer, not the target.

Id, (citation omitted). Nor is it a defense that Ford thought Fazal was a
prostitute when she was not, See 2 LaFave, supra, § 11.1(4) (‘it is not a
dofense to a solicitationf-type crime] that, unknown to the solicitor, the
person solicited could not commit the crime. The defendant's culpability is
‘to be measured by the circumstances as he believes them to be."):
Williams, 553 U.S. at 300 (“As with other inchoate crimes—attempt and
conspiracy, for example—impossibility of completing the crime because the
facts were not as the defendant believed is not a defense{ }.”)

Purther confirming that NRS 201.300(1)(a) applies to
undercover sting operations is NRS 175.301, which, until 2005, 2005 Nev.

Stat., ch. 113, § 1, at 308, required corroboration to convict a person of

pandering. After this court reversed a pandering conviction under NRS

 

 
1201.300, holding that one police officer could not corroborate another's
testimony, Sheriff v. Hilliard, 96 Nev. 345, 608 P.2d 1111 (1980), the
JLogislature amended NRS 175.301(2) to add an exception to the
|corroboration requirement when “[tJhe person giving the testimony is, and
jwvas at the time the crime is alleged to have taken place, a police officer or
|deputy sheriff who was performing his duties as such.” 1981 Nev. Stat.,
ich. 504, § 1, at 1029. Although the 2005 Legislature omitted pandering
from NRS 175.301's corroboration requirement altogether, its quarter-
century of dispensing with corroboration in pandering cases involving
lundercover police officer testimony cements our conclusion that NRS
}201.300(1)(a) applies to undercover sting operations.

Indeed, as Ford but not his counsel argued in the district
court, no facts appear to support giving an instruction on attempted
pandering in this case. As a species of solicitation, the crime of attempted
pandering would occur if an actor's message were uttered but didn't reach
the intended target (assuming there was enough, otherwise, for the crime).
2 LaFave, supra, § 11.1) (
the person intended to be solicited, as where an intermediary fails to pass

 

‘hat if the solicitor’s message never reaches

on the communication or the solicitor’s letter is intercepted before it
reaches the addressee? ‘The act is nonetheless criminal, although it may
be that the solicitor must be prosecuted for an attempt to solicit on such
facts.”); see NRS 193.330 (attempt exists when “[a]n act done with the
intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to accomplish it

(emphasis added). But there are no facts like that here. Ford’s message

reached Fazal. The question is not whether he attempted to pander, but

 

 
iwhether his words and conduct constitute the completed specific intent
icrime of pandering.®

WV.

‘To combat Ford’s constitutional challenges, the State readily

 

jconcedes—in fact, affirmatively argues—that NRS 201.300(1)(a) requires
lspecific intent. We agree, but the jury was not so instructed. The
linstructions the jury received simply reprised the requirements for
jgeneral intent under NRS 193.190 (there must be “a union, or joint
loperation of act and intention” for “every crime or public offense”) and
NRS 201.300(1)(a)'s text. Even more confusing, the general intent
instruction also addressed motive and admonished the jury that “[mJotive
is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to
prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict.”
Combined with the lack of an instruction on specific intent, these

instructions created the misimpression that Ford could be convicted based

‘We decline to address Ford's equal protection challenge, which
depends on matters not part of the record in the district court, and his
objection on appeal to the use of a transcript to the admission of which he
stipulated in the district court. As for the district court’s admission of
‘expert testimony concerning the pimping and prostitution culture and its
code words, on the record presented we find no abuse of discretion, see
Stanifer v. State, 109 Nev. 304, 306 n.1, 849 P.2d 282, 283 n.1 (1993), but
caution that there are risks associated with and limits to the permissible
use of such expert testimony. See United States v, York, 572 F.3d 415,
418-27 (7th Cir, 2009), We also reject Ford’s argument that using his
words to conviet him violates the corpus delicti rule stated in Hooker w.
Sheriff, 89 Nev. 89, 506 P.2d 1262 (1973), and thereby due process.
Hooker addresses post-crime admissions or confessions, not crimes like
pandering that target illegal solicitations.

 

 

 
simply on a showing that he intended to speak the words he did, rather
than that he spoke them specifically intending to persuade Fazal “to
become a prostitute” or “to continue to engage in prostitution.” Although
Ford did not object to the failure to instruct on specific intent, the error
was plain, and the failure to give a specific intent instruction affected
Ford's substantial rights. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 108

(Ct. App. 1980) (reversing pandering conviction because the jury was not

 

instructed on specific intent). For this reason, we reverse and remand for

a new trial.

Pickering