Case Title: Miller v. LC Fulenwider, Inc.

Citation: 362 P.2d 570

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1961-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
362 P.2d 570 (1961) Morris MILLER, Plaintiff In Error, v. L. C. FULENWIDER, INC., a Colorado Corporation, Defendant in Error. No. 19244. Supreme Court of Colorado. In Department. May 29, 1961. Rehearing Denied June 26, 1961. *571 Fred M. Winner and Edwin P. Van Cise, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Raymond J. Turner, Denver, for defendant in error. DAY, Justice. We will refer to the parties by name or as they appeared in the trial court, where Miller was defendant in a suit by Fulenwider to recover a broker's commission. Trial was to the court upon the conclusion of which elaborate findings were made and judgment entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $75,000. The defendant is here by writ of error, seeking reversal. By its complaint plaintiff alleged that on August 2, 1955, defendant Miller orally employed plaintiff to procure a purchaser for his stock in Miller's Super Markets, Inc., that pursuant to such agreement plaintiff was authorized to offer the Miller controlled stock for sale at a price fixed by Miller for cash, and if the stock were so sold to a purchaser produced by plaintiff, a commission of $75,000 would be paid by defendant. It was further alleged that a sale was consummated with a purchaser produced by plaintiff for the sum of $6,000,000 and that plaintiff was the procuring and efficient cause of the sale, having carried on extensive negotiations with the parties involved from the time the agreement was entered into up to a few days before the sale. Defendant denied employment of plaintiff as alleged in the complaint and denied generally the other allegations thereof. There was surprisingly little conflict in the testimony and the chief dispute here, as in the trial court, stems from two letters written by Miller to the plaintiff and which he claims constituted the entire agreement or contract between the parties. The trial court in elaborate findings of fact found that the plaintiff was employed as broker to negotiate the sale of Miller's stock and that Miller had agreed to pay a commission of $75,000; that a sale was consummated to a purchaser produced by plaintiff, upon the terms and conditions prescribed by Miller, and that plaintiff has earned its commission; that the two letters identified in the record as Exhibits "P" and "EE" were nothing more than incidents of the listing agreement of the parties, furnished to plaintiff by Miller in order to confirm plaintiff's authority to negotiate a sale of the stock at the price *572 and terms fixed. The letters referred to, omitting captions, are as follows: Exhibit "P" Exhibit "EE" *573 It is the contention of the defendant that the foregoing letters constitute the entire agreement between the plaintiff and defendant and that all previous oral agreements or negotiations were merged in the final form expressed by the letters; that, therefore, the admission of parol evidence of the listing agreement, the services of plaintiff pursuant thereto, and the transactions which followed tending to vary the terms expressed in the letters was error. Concerning the effect of the letters, the findings of the trial court include the following: From the evidence and from the findings of the trial court, with which we agree, the parol evidence rule has no application. The listing agreement established by the evidence not being in writing, the letters are subject to examination and explanation of their connection with the contract. Defendant was a witness and did not deny the commission he agreed to pay in the event of a sale was $75,000no more, no less. The letters on this point are ambiguous. Miller does not contend that the agreement between him and plaintiff contemplated giving the plaintiff an option to purchase the stock; it was well understood that plaintiff was in touch with a prospective purchaser to whom the option would be submitted. The evidence supports the court's finding that the letters do not represent the brokerage contract between the parties, but were furnished for the purpose of assuring plaintiff's prospect that the stock was available through plaintiff at the price stated. The conduct of the parties clearly indicates that they did not intend, nor did they consider the letters or either of them, to represent the contract between them. The evidence is all one way that negotiations continued unabated after the thirty day option periods contained in the letters had expired. No one testified that the parties intended the letters to be other than an affirmation of Miller's willingness, and an expression of the terms upon which plaintiff was authorized, to sell. The findings of the trial court on this point accurately reflect the evidence: "The Court Further Finds that at all times herein mentioned and particularly late in 1956, and at all times thereafter, one McNamara, president of the National Tea Company, and whose decision in the acquisition of property by his Company was required, knew of the foregoing agreement between plaintiff and defendant, and well knew of the efforts of the plaintiff to make the sale herein, and had full knowledge and advantage of the data and information furnished by plaintiff to his Company, met clandestinely with the defendant Miller in Denver late in March, 1957, at which time a written agreement was made with Miller for the purchase of Miller's Supermarkets, Inc., including all stock and assets, by the National Tea Company, for the precise and exact amount `to the penny' for cash, and under the same price, terms, and conditions that had been required by Miller from August *574 2, 1955, in his listing and agreement with the plaintiff. The sale and formal transfers of the corporate stock of Miller's Supermarkets, Inc. were made a few days later. All of this was without notice to or the knowledge of the plaintiff, who was still in close communication with both Miller and National Tea Company in order to finally close the sale of the said Miller's stock and assets aforesaid. The sale was caused to be made upon the basis of the information and data, the facts presented, and through the efforts of the plaintiff. That such secret meeting and the resulting sale in the manner aforesaid were had and made with the purpose and intent by the defendant to thwart and circumvent the efforts of the plaintiff, and to evade paying plaintiff the $75,000.00 agreed commission." In urging that parol evidence was not admissible under the circumstances here, defendant overlooks the true rule applicable to the situation disclosed by this record. True, when a contract has been expressed in writing, to which both parties have assented as a complete and accurate expression of their agreement, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations is not admissible for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the writing. But where, as here, the issue is whether the parties have made a contract, and whether such contract is expressed in a particular writing and, if so, whether the writing has been assented to as the complete and accurate expression of their agreement, any evidence tending to explain or clarify the intent and purpose of the parties is admissible. See 3 Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.) section 573, page 357 et seq.; Witherspoon et al. v. Pusch, 141 Colo. 525, 349 P.2d 137. The judgment is affirmed SUTTON and McWILLIAMS, JJ., concur.