Case Title: In re Interim Bylaw, Waitsfield, VT

Citation: 170 Vt. 541, 742 A.2d 742

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Interim Bylaw, Waitsfield, VT (98-453); 170 Vt. 541; 742 A.2d 742

[Filed 06-Oct-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-453

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1999

In re: Interim Bylaw, Waitsfield, Vermont      }      APPEALED FROM:
	                                       }
	                                       }
     	                                       }      Washington Superior Court
	                                       }
Edmund W.E. and Deborah Stein, Appellants      }	
                         	               }      DOCKET NO. 159-3-97WnCv

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

	
       Plaintiffs Edmund and Deborah Stein appeal a final order dismissing
  their complaint for  declaratory judgment and holding that an interim bylaw
  adopted by the Town of Waitsfield does  not constitute an unconstitutional
  taking of their property.  We affirm.
	
       Plaintiffs own 195 acres of land in Waitsfield, of which 130 acres are
  located above 1,700 feet in  a forest reserve zoning district.  In February
  1997, the Town's Selectboard, pursuant to 24  V.S.A. § 4410, adopted an
  interim bylaw imposing limitations on land development.  Plaintiffs 
  challenge that portion of the interim bylaw that prohibits one and
  two-family dwelling units in  the district at or above an elevation of
  1,700 feet.  Plaintiffs neither applied for nor sought any  approvals under
  the bylaw or relief from its application prior to bringing this declaratory 
  judgment action.
	
       In March 1997, plaintiffs served their complaint on the Town agent. 
  In May 1997, the Town  answered plaintiffs' complaint and moved for summary
  judgment, arguing that plaintiffs had  failed to demonstrate that the
  Town's interim bylaw constituted an unconstitutional taking of  plaintiffs'
  land.  On September 9, 1997, the trial court issued an order granting
  summary  judgment in the Town's favor.  Both sides stipulated that the
  court's order constituted a final  judgment, and this appeal followed.
	
       When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard
  as the trial court.   See Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 165 Vt. 306, 309,