Case Title: Glen H. Rocker v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company

Citation: 2006 WI 26

Docket Number: 2004AP000356

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 26 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP356 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Glen H. Rocker and Theresa Rocker,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
USAA Casualty Insurance Company, General  
Casualty Company of Wisconsin, and  
Cornell Cousins,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 16, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Virginia 
M. Antoine, Timothy S. Trecek, and Habush Habush & Rottier S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Timothy S. Trecek. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent 
USAA 
Casualty 
Insurance 
Company, there was a brief by Frederick J. Smith and Peterson, 
Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Frederick J. Smith. 
 
For the defendant-respondent General Casualty Company of 
Wisconsin, there was a brief by Jacqueline E. Frakes and Eiche & 
Frakes, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jacqueline E. 
Frakes. 
 
 
 
 
2006 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP356  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV1069) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Glen H. Rocker and Theresa Rocker, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
USAA Casualty Insurance Company, General 
Casualty Company of Wisconsin and Cornell 
Cousins, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Clare L. Fiorenza, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification 
from 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2003-04).1  The appellants, Glen H. Rocker 
and Theresa Rocker (the Rockers) appealed an order of the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Clare L. Fiorenza, Judge, 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
2 
 
wherein the court dismissed all claims and causes of action with 
prejudice against defendant USAA Casualty Insurance Company 
(USAA) and dismissed defendant General Casualty Company of 
Wisconsin (General Casualty).   
¶2 
Glen Rocker (Rocker) was injured while working at an 
Octopus Car Wash (Octopus)2 when a coemployee, Cornell Cousins 
(Cousins), accidentally drove a customer's motor vehicle into 
him.  General Casualty insured Octopus, while USAA insured the 
customer, Andrew Paretti (Paretti).  The Rockers brought suit 
against General Casualty, USAA, and Cousins.  General Casualty 
filed a motion for declaratory and summary judgment3 arguing that 
its comprehensive insurance policy4 did not cover Rocker's 
injuries.  After General Casualty's motion was granted and the 
Rockers' claims against General Casualty were dismissed with 
prejudice, USAA brought its own motion for declaratory judgment, 
requesting that the circuit court declare that USAA's maximum 
amount of coverage with respect to Cousins was the $25,000 
                                                 
2 The car wash at issue is referred to as both "Octopus Car 
Wash" and "University Car Wash" by the parties; however, there 
is no dispute that both names refer to the same entity.  For 
consistency, we will use the name Octopus Car Wash (Octopus).   
3 General Casualty's motion was initially framed as a motion 
for declaratory judgment.  However, General Casualty entitled 
its supporting brief as one for summary judgment.  In its order 
granting General Casualty's motion, the circuit court also 
characterized it as one for declaratory and summary judgment.  
We will follow the characterization of the circuit court.         
4 General Casualty's comprehensive insurance policy included 
two pertinent coverage parts:  (1) commercial general liability 
coverage; and (2) commercial umbrella coverage. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
3 
 
minimum 
amount 
required 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
financial 
responsibility law.  The circuit court also granted USAA's 
motion, upon payment of its $25,000 policy limit to the court.  
After the court issued its final order on December 16, 2003, the 
Rockers appealed. 
¶3 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
certified 
the 
following 
questions: (1) Does a full-service car wash fall within the 
definition 
of 
a 
"motor 
vehicle 
handler" 
found 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b); (2) Does the holding in Heritage 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Co. 
v. 
Wilber, 
2001 
WI 
App 
247, 
248 
Wis. 2d 111, 635 N.W.2d 631——that a commercial general liability 
policy 
providing 
an 
endorsement 
for 
non-owned 
automobile 
liability falls within Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1)'s scope provision—
retain its vitality, since § 632.32 has been amended, and 
significantly altered, and now requires, inter alia, uninsured 
motorist coverage, medical payments and coverage, and prohibits 
exclusion of coverages for relatives of the insured?; (3) Was 
Gorzalski v. Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Co., 145 Wis. 2d 794, 
429 N.W.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1988), decided correctly when it failed 
to enforce the requirement of coverage for a motor vehicle 
handler as mandated by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a)? 
¶4 
We conclude the following:  (1) A full-service car 
wash is a motor vehicle handler under § 632.32(2)(b) because it 
is a "service station"; (2) The holding of Heritage Mutual 
retains its validity, and the requirements of § 632.32(6)(a) 
apply to commercial general liability policies and commercial 
umbrella policies that provide automobile liability coverage; 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
4 
 
(3) Gorzalski was incorrectly decided, and we overrule its 
holding as it pertains to coemployee exclusions.   
¶5 
As such, the final order issued by the circuit court 
on December 16, 2003, is reversed and the cause is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶6 
On February 3, 1999, Paretti drove his 1999 Mercury 
Marquis to an Octopus located in Milwaukee.  Paretti had been a 
customer for many years, and per the standard procedure, he 
proceeded to an overhead door area and waited for an attendant.  
Paretti ordered a standard wash, left the car running and in 
park, and went inside an enclosed area to pay the bill and 
receive a claim ticket.  An employee then drove the car onto an 
automatic conveyor for washing.  At the end of the conveyor, 
Cousins got into the car to drive it off the conveyor and into 
the drying area.  While driving the vehicle off the conveyor, 
Cousins allegedly stepped too hard on the accelerator, causing 
the vehicle to lunge forward, hit the wall of the car wash and 
strike Rocker, his coworker, who was standing in the drying 
area.  Rocker was seriously injured by the accident.   
¶7 
Along with his wife, Rocker filed a lawsuit against 
General Casualty,5 USAA, and Cousins on January 31, 2002.6  
                                                 
5 General Casualty is both the liability insurer and the 
worker's compensation insurer for Octopus.  General Casualty's 
role as the worker's compensation insurer is not at issue for 
purposes of this opinion.   
No. 
2004AP356   
 
5 
 
General Casualty filed a motion for declaratory and summary 
judgment on May 15, 2002, on the grounds that the comprehensive 
policy it issued to Octopus did not provide liability coverage 
to Cousins for the injuries sustained by Rocker as a result of 
the alleged negligent acts of Cousins. 
¶8 
General Casualty had issued a comprehensive insurance 
policy to Octopus prior to the accident.  This policy included 
commercial general liability coverage with a limit of $500,000 
and commercial umbrella coverage with a limit of $2,000,000.  
The commercial general liability coverage provisions of the 
policy read in pertinent part as follows: 
SECTION I – COVERAGES   
COVERAGE 
A. 
BODILY 
INJURY 
AND 
PROPERTY 
DAMAGE 
LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreements 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which 
this insurance applies. . . . 
2. Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
 . . . . 
e. Employer's Liability 
 
"Bodily injury" to: 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Rocker also filed suit against Ford Motor Company, the 
manufacturer of Paretti's vehicle, and Heiser Lincoln Mercury, 
Inc., the seller of Paretti's vehicle.  Those entities were 
later dismissed by stipulation and order filed September 20, 
2003. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
6 
 
(1) An "employee" of the insured arising out of 
and in the course of: 
(a) Employment by the insured; or 
(b) 
Performing 
duties 
related 
to 
the 
conduct of the insured's business . . . . 
g. Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft 
 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out 
of 
the 
ownership, 
maintenance, 
use 
or 
entrustment to others of any aircraft, "auto" or 
watercraft owned or operated by or rented or 
loaned to any insured.  Use includes operation 
and "loading or unloading." 
 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
. . . . 
 
(3) Parking an "auto" on, or on the ways next 
to, premises you own or rent, provided the 
"auto" is not owned by or rented or loaned to 
you or the insured[.] 
SECTION II – WHO IS AN INSURED 
 . . . . 
2. Each of the following is also an insured: 
a. 
Your "employees" . . . but only for acts within 
the scope of their employment by you or while 
performing duties related to the conduct of 
your 
business. 
 
However, 
none 
of 
these 
"employees" is an insured for: 
(1) "Bodily injury" or "personal injury": 
(a) To you . . . or to a co-"employee" 
while that co-"employee" is either in 
the course of his or her employment or 
performing 
duties 
related 
to 
the 
conduct of your business . . . . 
¶9 
Following 
the main 
provisions of 
the 
commercial 
general liability coverage, the policy contains an endorsement 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
7 
 
entitled: "OPERATION OF CUSTOMERS AUTOS ON PARTICULAR PREMISES" 
which provides as follows: 
A. 
Exclusion g. of Paragraph 2., Exclusions of 
Coverage A. – Bodily Injury and Property Damage 
Liability (Section I – Coverages) does not apply 
to any "customer's auto" while on or next to those 
premises you own, rent or control that are used 
for any of the following businesses: 
1. Auto Repair or Service Shops; 
2. Car Washes; 
3. Gasoline Stations; 
4. Tire Dealers; 
5. Automobile Quick Lubrication Services. 
¶10 General 
Casualty 
also 
issued 
commercial 
umbrella 
coverage to Octopus as part of its comprehensive insurance 
policy.  This portion of the policy provides bodily injury 
coverage for an "insured" defined in the policy as: 
Your "employees" . . . but only for acts within the 
scope of their employment by you or while performing 
duties related to the conduct of your business.  
However, none of these "employees" is an insured for: 
(1) "Bodily injury" or "personal injury": 
(a) To you . . . or to a co-"employee" while 
that co-"employee" is either in the course 
of his or her employment or performing 
duties related 
to the 
conduct 
of 
your 
business[.] 
¶11 The commercial umbrella coverage also contains an 
automobile liability endorsement which modifies the coverage as 
follows: 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
8 
 
Except to the extent coverage is available to you or 
the 
insured in the 
"underlying 
insurance," 
this 
insurance 
shall 
not 
apply 
to 
"bodily 
injury," 
"property damage," "personal injury" or "advertising 
injury" arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use 
or entrustment to others of any "auto" owned or 
operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.  Use 
includes operation and "loading or unloading."  
¶12 After briefing and a hearing held before Judge Thomas 
P. Donegan, General Casualty's declaratory and summary judgment 
motion was granted on July 24, 2002, and the Rockers' claims 
against General Casualty were dismissed with prejudice.7  The 
circuit court concluded that General Casualty's policy was 
unambiguous and excludes from the definition of insured an 
employee who injures another employee during the course of their 
employment.  Furthermore, the court recognized the Gorzalski 
decision, 145 Wis. 2d 794, as controlling precedent. 
¶13 The Rockers, Cousins, and USAA each sought appellate 
review.  However, because General Casualty remained in the case 
as 
worker's 
compensation 
insurer, 
the 
appeals 
were 
not 
considered to be of right, and the court of appeals denied 
appellate review September 16, 2002.  The Rockers also sought 
review in this court, but we denied the petition.   
¶14 For its part, USAA had issued two policies to Paretti:  
a personal auto policy with limits of $300,000/$500,000 and a 
personal umbrella policy with a limit of $2,000,000.  The 
"INSURING AGREEMENT" of the personal auto policy stated in part:  
                                                 
7 However, General Casualty remained an interested party 
because of payments made to Rocker pursuant to a worker's 
compensation policy issued to Octopus. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
9 
 
"We will pay damages for BI [bodily injury] or PD [property 
damage] for which any covered person becomes legally responsible 
because of an auto accident."  The term "covered person" is 
defined to include "[a]ny person using your covered auto."  The 
term "your covered auto" is defined to include "[a]ny vehicle 
shown in the Declarations."  Paretti's Mercury automobile that 
Cousins operated is shown in the Declarations.   
¶15 The USAA personal auto policy further contains the 
following exclusion regarding an "auto business": 
A. We do not provide Liability Coverage for any 
person: 
 . . . . 
6. While employed or otherwise engaged in the 
auto business.  This exclusion does not apply 
to the ownership, maintenance or use of: 
a. 
your covered auto by any person, if there is no 
other valid and collectible insurance, whether 
such 
insurance 
is 
primary, 
excess 
or 
contingent, at limits equal to or greater than 
the 
limits 
of 
liability 
required 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
financial 
responsibility 
law, 
available to respond for damages for which that 
person is legally responsible.  In this event, 
we will provide liability coverage for that 
person up to the limits of liability required 
by the Wisconsin financial responsibility law.   
¶16 As defined in the policy, the term "auto business" 
means "the business of altering, customizing, leasing, parking, 
repairing, road testing, delivering, selling, servicing, or 
storing vehicles."   
¶17 Paretti also had a personal umbrella policy through 
USAA. 
 
Under 
an 
endorsement 
entitled 
"WISCONSIN 
SPECIAL 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
10 
 
PROVISIONS" the "LIABILITY COVERAGE" of the umbrella policy 
provided the following: 
We will pay for damages an insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay in excess of the retained limit.  We 
will 
also 
pay 
for 
damages 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of a 
motor vehicle below the retained limit, but only up to 
the 
amount 
required 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Financial 
Responsibility law and only in the event that there is 
no other valid collectible insurance with at least 
those limits available. . . .  
¶18 Additionally, the endorsement changed the definition 
of an "insured" to exclude "[s]ales agencies, repair shops, 
service stations, storage garages or public parking lots, their 
owners, agents or employees unless there is no other valid and 
collectible insurance and then only up to the limits required by 
the Wisconsin Financial Responsibility law." 
¶19 Due to judicial rotation, Judge Clare L. Fiorenza took 
over Judge Donegan's calendar on January 13, 2003.  USAA filed a 
motion for declaratory judgment on April 10, 2003, asking the 
circuit court to declare Octopus a "motor vehicle handler," and 
as a result, § 632.32(5)(b) entitled USAA to limit its liability 
with regard to coverage provided to Cousins to the $25,000 
amount under Wisconsin's financial responsibility law.  USAA 
also reserved its right to move for summary judgment dismissing 
all claims against it should the court of appeals reverse the 
circuit court's July 24, 2002, order.   
¶20 After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court 
entered an order on July 3, 2003, granting USAA's motion for 
declaratory judgment, finding that Octopus was a "service 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
11 
 
station" under § 632.32(2)(b)3., and therefore a "motor vehicle 
handler."  The court further determined that USAA's policies of 
insurance issued to Paretti permitted a reduction of USAA's 
coverage of Cousins to $25,000.   
¶21 On September 12, 2003, on motion of USAA, the court 
issued an order declaring that USAA would be dismissed from the 
case upon payment of its $25,000 policy limit.   
¶22 On December 16, 2003, the circuit court entered a 
final order dismissing USAA and General Casualty as worker's 
compensation insurer.  It is from this final order that the 
Rockers appealed.  After briefing and oral argument in the court 
of appeals, this matter was certified to this court. 
II 
¶23 In this case we are called upon to determine whether 
Octopus 
is 
a 
"motor 
vehicle 
handler" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) 
and 
determine 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) 
applies 
to 
commercial 
general 
liability policies and commercial umbrella policies that provide 
automobile liability coverage.  "Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law that we review de novo."  State v. Stenklyft, 
2005 WI 71, ¶7, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769.  "[O]ur goal in 
interpreting statutory provisions is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature, which we assume is expressed in the 
text of the statute."  Id. (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane 
County Cir. Ct., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110).  "To this end, absent ambiguity in a statute, we do not 
resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation and instead apply the 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
12 
 
plain meaning of the words of a statute in light of its 
textually manifest scope, context, and purpose." Id. (citing 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46).  
¶24 Additionally, "we have repeatedly held that statutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'"  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id. (citations omitted). 
III 
¶25 We first determine whether Octopus is a "motor vehicle 
handler" under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b).  The Rockers, USAA, 
and Cousins argue that if Octopus is a motor vehicle handler, 
then we must conclude that the coemployee coverage limitations 
in General Casualty's comprehensive insurance policy are invalid 
under § 632.32(6)(a),8 and that General Casualty must provide 
coverage to Cousins to the full extent of the policy limits.  
Furthermore, if Octopus is a motor vehicle handler, then USAA 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) 
provides: 
 
"No 
policy 
issued to a motor vehicle handler may exclude coverage upon any 
of its officers, agents or employees when any of them are using 
motor vehicles owned by customers doing business with the motor 
vehicle handler." 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
13 
 
may limit the coverage provided to Cousins, pursuant to 
§ 632.32(5)(b).9   
¶26 Alternatively, the Rockers argue, if the car wash is 
not a motor vehicle handler, then Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) does 
not apply, and the coemployee coverage limitations in General 
Casualty's 
policy 
are 
enforceable. 
 
Accordingly, 
General 
Casualty would not be required to provide coverage to Cousins.  
Furthermore, USAA cannot then limit the coverage provided to 
Cousins to $25,000, and instead USAA must provide coverage to 
Cousins to the full extent of the policy limits in the policies 
issued to Paretti. 
¶27 We begin our analysis, as we must, with the language 
of the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) defines the term 
"motor vehicle handler" as follows: 
"Motor vehicle handler" means any of the following: 
1. 
A 
motor 
vehicle 
dealer, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
218.0101(23)(a). 
2. A lessor, as defined in s. 344.51(1g)(a), or a 
rental company, as defined in s. 344.51(1g)(c). 
3. A repair shop, service station, storage garage or 
public parking place. 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(b) provides: 
If the policy is issued to anyone other than a motor 
vehicle handler, it may limit the coverage afforded to 
a motor vehicle handler or its officers, agents or 
employees to the limits under s. 344.01(2)(d) and to 
instances when there is no other valid and collectible 
insurance with at least those limits whether the other 
insurance is primary, excess or contingent. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
14 
 
¶28 The Rockers, USAA, and Cousins contend that the 
circuit court correctly held that Octopus is a service station.  
General Casualty disputes this conclusion.  We agree with the 
circuit court and conclude that based on the plain meaning of 
the phrase, a full-service car wash such as Octopus, where 
vehicles are serviced and driven by employees, is a service 
station and therefore a statutory motor vehicle handler. 
¶29 General Casualty principally contends that the term 
"service station" should be interpreted according to its common 
usage as of 1975 when the term was initially introduced in the 
formulation of Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (1975-76).10  In other words, 
General Casualty asserts that a service station was generally 
recognized as a gasoline or filling station, where an attendant 
would fill up the gas tank, check the oil, check the tires, and 
perform other similar services while the customer waited in the 
automobile.  See Gullickson v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 17 
Wis. 2d 220, 223-24, 116 N.W.2d 121 (1962) (describing the 
activities of a service station as the term was understood in 
1962).  Despite this historical understanding of a service 
station, we believe that such an interpretation is unreasonably 
restrictive given the plain meaning of the term "service 
station" and the broad construction generally applied to 
§ 632.32.  See Home Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 175 Wis. 2d 104, 111, 
                                                 
10 At that time, the legislature defined an "automobile 
handler" as "an automobile sales agency, repair shop, service 
station, 
storage 
garage 
or 
public 
parking 
place."  
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(a) (1975-76).   
No. 
2004AP356   
 
15 
 
499 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Section 632.32 is a remedial 
statute, and must be construed broadly so as to increase rather 
than to limit coverage."). 
¶30 The 
term 
"service 
station," 
as 
it 
appears 
in 
subparagraph 3 of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b), is not modified by 
any other word.  It simply describes one type of motor vehicle 
handler.   
¶31  Here, Octopus is a "full-service" car wash that 
provides numerous services to their customers' motor vehicles.  
As a routine part of its business, Octopus employees are 
required to operate their customers' motor vehicles in order to 
provide the various services purchased.  According to Jeffrey 
Dropik,11 the current owner/operator of Octopus and the manager 
at the time of the accident, the car wash routinely sells the 
following services: washing, vacuuming, waxing, tire dressing, 
window 
cleaning, 
towel 
drying, 
and 
additional 
detailing.  
Octopus also provides the service of having an employee drive 
the customer’s car on and off the conveyor belt and to the 
checkout area.  
                                                 
11 General Casualty argues that the deposition of Jeffrey 
Dropik and the affidavit of Andrew Paretti should not be 
considered because this evidence was submitted to the circuit 
court in USAA's declaratory judgment motion after General 
Casualty had been dismissed as a liability insurer.  We conclude 
that General Casualty made a strategic decision to rely solely 
on the coemployee coverage limitations in the Octopus policy in 
its motion for declaratory and summary judgment.  As such, it 
cannot now contend that this evidence later presented by USAA in 
its own motion for declaratory judgment should be disregarded by 
this court.   
No. 
2004AP356   
 
16 
 
¶32 Moreover, the context in which the term "motor vehicle 
handler" is used in Wis. Stat. § 632.32 supports the broad 
construction advocated by the Rockers, USAA, and Cousins.  For 
example, § 632.32(6)(a) suggests that a statutory "motor vehicle 
handler" is an entity that regularly handles its customers' 
motor vehicles.  Section 632.32(6)(a) reads as follows:  "No 
policy issued to a motor vehicle handler may exclude coverage 
upon any of its officers, agents or employees when any of them 
are using motor vehicles owned by customers doing business with 
the motor vehicle handler."  (Emphasis added.)  As part of its 
service to its customers, the employees of Octopus routinely 
"use" each customer's motor vehicle.  Under the definition of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(c), "using" includes "driving, operating, 
manipulating, riding in and any other use."  It is irrelevant 
that the employees operate the vehicles for a short time frame 
or drive the vehicle a short distance.  Octopus's operation of 
motor vehicles is very similar to other recognized motor vehicle 
handlers under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) in that a customer 
gives a business employee permission to operate his or her motor 
vehicle for some length of time in order that some service or 
services may be provided. 
¶33 In sum, in light of the plain meaning of the term 
"service station," and the broad scope of services Octopus 
provides, which includes driving its customers' vehicles on and 
off a conveyor belt, we hold that a "full-service" car wash such 
as Octopus is a service station and thus a statutory "motor 
vehicle handler" under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b)3. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
17 
 
IV 
¶34 Having determined that Octopus is a motor vehicle 
handler, 
it 
would 
seem 
evident 
that, 
on 
its 
face, 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) 
prohibits 
the 
coemployee 
coverage 
limitation 
contained 
in 
General 
Casualty's 
comprehensive 
insurance policy. Again, General Casualty's policy essentially 
maintains that an employee is not an insured for bodily injury 
or personal injury to a coemployee while that coemployee is in 
the course of his or her employment.  Section 632.32(6)(a) 
provides that "[n]o policy issued to a motor vehicle handler may 
exclude coverage upon any of its officers, agents or employees 
when any of them are using motor vehicles owned by customers 
doing business with the motor vehicle handler."  
¶35 Despite this unambiguous language, General Casualty 
argues that Wis. Stat. § 632.32, as a whole, does not apply to 
its comprehensive insurance policy.  If it did, General Casualty 
reasons, an insurer would be required to assume a risk which it 
did not contemplate and for which it received no premium.  As 
such, General Casualty contends that the holding in Heritage 
Mutual, 248 Wis. 2d 111, ¶17, in which the court of appeals held 
that § 632.32(6) applied to a commercial general liability 
policy which included coverage for non-owned vehicles, is no 
longer good law. 
¶36 We 
conclude 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a), 
General Casualty is required to provide coverage to Cousins 
because he was using a motor vehicle owned by a customer doing 
business with Octopus, and therefore, the coemployee coverage 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
18 
 
limitations in General Casualty's comprehensive insurance policy 
are invalid.  We further conclude that the holding of Heritage 
Mutual is still good law.   
¶37 According 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1), 
"[e]xcept 
as 
otherwise provided, this section applies to every policy of 
insurance issued or delivered in this state against the 
insured's liability for loss or damage resulting from accident 
caused by any motor vehicle . . . ."  Hence, the broad scope of 
the entire section is dependent upon whether a policy includes 
motor 
vehicle 
coverage, 
but 
each 
subsection 
can 
include 
provisions which exempt certain coverages from the scope as 
defined in § 632.32(1).  Therefore, in any particular case, it 
is improper to conclude that, because one subsection has been 
held to apply to a certain type of policy, all the other 
subsections must be held to apply as well.  Each subsection can 
provide its own exemption under the statutory framework.   
¶38 The commercial general liability coverage issued as 
part 
of 
General Casualty's 
comprehensive insurance 
policy 
contains an endorsement entitled "OPERATION OF CUSTOMERS AUTOS 
ON PARTICULAR PREMISES" that provides liability coverage for 
customers' automobiles while on or next to the premises.  
Therefore, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1), 
the 
provisions 
of 
§ 632.32 apply to General Casualty’s policy "except as otherwise 
provided." 
¶39 The 
statutory 
section 
at 
issue, 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a), does not otherwise provide for an 
exclusion to the general scope of the omnibus statute.  Because 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
19 
 
General Casualty provided automotive liability coverage to 
Octopus, General Casualty cannot narrow the application of 
§ 632.32 simply because the policy was called a comprehensive 
insurance policy instead of a motor vehicle policy.  See 
Heritage Mutual, 248 Wis. 2d 111, ¶16.  No policy issued to a 
motor vehicle handler may exclude coverage under § 632.32(6)(a).  
"No policy means no policy."  Bindrim v. B. & J. Ins. Agency, 
190 Wis. 2d 525, 534, 527 N.W.2d 320 (1995). 
¶40 This court first addressed whether the omnibus statute 
was applicable to a comprehensive liability policy in Nelson v. 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 29 Wis. 2d 315, 139 N.W.2d 33 
(1966).  In Nelson, a City of Hartford employee was killed while 
in the course of his employment when he was run over by a city-
owned dump truck.  Id. at 317.  The truck was operated by a 
coemployee during the unloading of the truck at a city-owned 
refuse dump, where another coemployee was also present.  Id.  
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty) had issued an 
automotive liability policy to the city covering the dump truck 
involved.  Id.  United Fire & Casualty Company (United) had 
issued a comprehensive liability policy to the city.  Id.  
United's policy did not include within the definition of 
"insured" any employees of the city, and it excluded coverage to 
"'automobiles if the accident occurs away from such premises or 
the ways immediately joining.'"  Id. at 318 (citation omitted).  
Ohio Casualty argued that United's policy was required to extend 
coverage to the coemployees pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 204.30(3) 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
20 
 
(1959-60), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).12  Id. at 
319.  United, on the other hand, argued "the omnibus coverage 
statute does not apply to a comprehensive liability policy which 
only insures motor vehicles operated on private premises or ways 
adjoining thereto."  Id. at 320. 
¶41 The Nelson court agreed with Ohio Casualty, concluding 
that no ambiguity existed in Wis. Stat. § 204.30(3) (1959-60), 
as it clearly referred back to the type of policy described in 
§ 204.30(1), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1).13  Id.  
We interpreted this statutory language as applying to "any 
policy which extends coverage to damage caused by [any] motor 
vehicle for which the insured is liable. . . . We deem it 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 204.30(3) (1959-60) provides in part as 
follows: 
No such policy [insuring against damage to person or 
property caused by any motor vehicle] shall be issued 
or delivered in this state to the owner of a motor 
vehicle, 
unless it 
contains 
a 
provision 
reading 
substantially as follows: The indemnity provided by 
this policy is extended to apply, in the same manner 
and under the same provisions as it is applicable to 
the named assured, to any person or persons while 
riding in or operating any automobile described in 
this policy when such automobile is being used for 
purposes 
and 
in 
the 
manner 
described 
in 
said 
policy . . . . 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 204.30(1) (1959-60) reads as follows:   
No 
policy 
of 
insurance 
against 
loss 
or 
damage 
resulting from accident or injury to a person, and for 
which the insured is liable, or against loss or damage 
to property caused by animals or by any motor vehicle, 
and for which the insured is liable, shall be issued 
or delivered in this state . . . .  
No. 
2004AP356   
 
21 
 
immaterial that this coverage is provided by a comprehensive 
liability policy rather than one confined to coverage of motor 
vehicles."  Id. at 320-21.  This holding was later referenced in 
Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 168 
N.W.2d 581 (1969).  That is, the omnibus statute "applies not 
only to automobile liability policies but to a comprehensive 
liability 
policy 
to 
the 
extent 
it 
covers 
an 
automobile 
liability."  Id. at 341. 
¶42 The court of appeals in Heritage Mutual addressed a 
nearly identical scenario as presented in this case.  In 
Heritage Mutual, Douglas Wilber, an officer of Wilber's Truck 
World, a motor vehicle handler, was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident while driving a customer's vehicle from a meeting.  
Heritage Mutual, 248 Wis. 2d 111, ¶2.  Heritage Mutual Insurance 
Company (Heritage) had issued Wilber's Truck World a commercial 
general liability 
insurance 
policy 
excluding 
coverage for 
liability arising from the use of an automobile.  Id., ¶3.  
However, the policy included an endorsement which provided 
certain non-owned auto liability coverage.  Id.  The circuit 
court 
ultimately 
determined 
that 
the 
elements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) had been met and Heritage was required 
to provide coverage under its policy.  Id., ¶6. 
¶43 On 
appeal, 
Heritage 
argued 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) did not apply to its policy because 
the policy was a general liability policy and because the non-
owned auto liability coverage provided under the policy was 
optional.  Id., ¶11.  The court of appeals disagreed and 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
22 
 
concluded 
that 
based 
on 
the 
reasoning 
of 
Bindrim, 
190 
Wis. 2d 525, 
and 
the 
language 
of 
§ 632.32(1), 
section 
632.32(6)(a) applied to a general liability policy: 
Using the same reasoning as Bindrim, we conclude 
that even though the Heritage policy is a general 
liability policy, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) applies.  
While 
not 
required 
by 
law 
to 
offer 
automobile 
liability coverage, Heritage did provide coverage with 
the endorsement for non-owned auto liability.  The 
policy 
covered 
Wilber's 
Truck 
World's 
liability 
resulting from an accident caused by a non-owned motor 
vehicle.  The scope of § 632.32 applies to "every 
policy of insurance issued . . . against the insured's 
liability for loss or damage resulting from an 
accident 
caused 
by 
any 
motor 
vehicle. . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1).  Therefore, the policy was 
required to comply with § 632.32(6)(a). 
Heritage Mutual, 248 Wis. 2d 111, ¶17. 
¶44 The court concluded with the following: 
The endorsement contains a clause that narrows the 
scope 
of 
the 
statute 
and 
excludes 
Wilber 
from 
coverage.  Despite labeling the endorsement as a 
limitation rather than an exclusion, the end result is 
an endorsement that operates to exclude coverage where 
coverage 
would otherwise 
be 
available 
under the 
statute's 
plain 
terms. 
 
Because 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) 
applies 
and 
because 
the 
requirements for coverage have been met, Wilber is 
covered as a matter of law.   
Id., ¶18. 
¶45 Just as the insurance company in Heritage Mutual, 
General 
Casualty 
cannot 
reduce 
the 
scope 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) 
simply 
because 
the 
motor 
vehicle 
coverage is issued as part of a comprehensive insurance policy.  
The statute applies despite the fact that General Casualty’s 
policy excludes coverage for any vehicles owned by Octopus, and 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
23 
 
no vehicles are specifically described in the policy.  There is 
no language in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) that would otherwise 
provide under these circumstances to remove General Casualty’s 
policy from the requirements of the omnibus statute.  
¶46 Contrary to General Casualty's contention, Heritage 
Mutual is still good law despite the additional coverages added 
to the omnibus statute since this court's decision in Nelson, 29 
Wis. 2d 315, because the application of Wis. Stat. § 632.32 is 
extremely 
straightforward. 
 
The 
language 
of 
§ 632.32(1) 
unambiguously requires every insurance policy that provides 
motor vehicle liability coverage to meet the requirements of the 
other 
sections 
of 
the 
omnibus 
statute, 
unless 
otherwise 
provided.  In light of the clear statutory language, we simply 
cannot reach a different result. 
¶47 For its part, General Casualty argues that subjecting 
its policy to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) 
would then, in turn, require its policy to comply with 
Wis. Stat. §§  632.32(3), (4), and (4m).  First, these other 
subsections are not at issue in this case.  Second, every 
subsection of § 632.32 does not automatically apply to all motor 
vehicle insurance policies.  Again, the various provisions of 
the omnibus statute apply "except as otherwise provided."  
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1).  Whether a particular subsection of the 
omnibus statute applies to a commercial general liability policy 
or a commercial umbrella policy is determined by examining the 
specific language of that subsection to determine if it 
otherwise provides.  Because we conclude that § 632.32(6)(a) 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
24 
 
applies to General Casualty's policy, we need not address the 
applicability of the other subsections of § 632.32 at this time.   
¶48 General 
Casualty 
also 
argues 
that 
applying 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) to its policy requires it to assume a 
risk which it did not contemplate and for which it received no 
premium.  This argument is unpersuasive.  Simply put, if a 
subsection of the omnibus statute requires an insurer to provide 
a certain type of coverage, the insurer must provide the 
coverage even if the express terms of the policy do not provide 
the coverage.  "'Coverages omitted from an insurance contract 
may nevertheless be compelled and enforced as though a part 
thereof where the inclusion of such coverage is required by a 
properly enacted statute.'"  Progressive Northern Ins. Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶13, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 
(quoting Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 
53, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969)).       
¶49 In sum, we conclude that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) compels the conclusion reached in 
Heritage Mutual that the statute applies to commercial general 
liability policies and commercial umbrella policies that include 
motor vehicle liability coverage.  Therefore, the coemployee 
coverage 
limitations 
in 
General 
Casualty's 
comprehensive 
insurance policy are invalid, and General Casualty is required 
to provide coverage to Cousins.   
V 
¶50 Finally, the court of appeals certified this appeal so 
that we may determine whether Gorzalski, 145 Wis. 2d 794, was 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
25 
 
decided correctly when it failed to enforce the requirement of 
coverage 
for 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
handler 
as 
mandated 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a).  We conclude that Gorzalski was 
incorrectly decided because the court of appeals did not fully 
consider 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
§ 632.32(6)(a), 
and 
it 
inappropriately relied on Dahm v. Employers Mutual Liability 
Insurance Co., 74 Wis. 2d 123, 246 N.W.2d 131 (1976).  We 
therefore overrule the holding of Gorzalski as it pertains to 
coemployee exclusions, and as such, it is not controlling to the 
outcome of this decision.   
¶51 In Gorzalski, Jack Gorzalski, an employee of Bob 
Tolkan Buick, Inc. (Bob Tolkan), a motor vehicle handler, was 
seriously injured when an automobile driven by a coemployee 
struck him.  Gorzalski, 145 Wis. 2d at 797.  The automobile was 
left by a customer at the garage for repairs.  Id.  Frankenmuth 
Mutual Insurance Company (Frankenmuth) had issued a policy to 
Bob Tolkan with a coemployee exclusion precluding liability for 
an employee or officer who causes bodily injury to any fellow 
employee in the course of his employment.  Id. at 803.  
Gorzalski 
argued 
the 
coemployee 
exclusion 
violated 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a).  Id.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the coemployee exclusion in Frankenmuth's policy was legal 
under the holding of Dahm:   
[O]ur supreme court stated that the fellow employee 
exclusion clause will violate no rule of law in this 
state if it is held to be valid only where the injured 
party and the tortfeasor are employees of the named 
insured under the policy, and where the named insured 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
26 
 
employer is required to provide workmen's compensation 
coverage.   
Id. at 804 (citing Dahm, 74 Wis. 2d at 131).   
¶52 The Gorzalski court relied on Dahm despite significant 
differences 
between 
the 
cases 
that 
altered 
the 
legal 
consequences of the coemployee exclusion.  The tortfeasor in 
Dahm, who was not an employee of an "automobile handler,"14 
caused an injury to a coemployee while operating a forklift 
owned by his employer.  Dahm, 74 Wis. 2d at 125.  By contrast, 
the tortfeasor in Gorzalski, who was an employee of a "motor 
vehicle 
handler," 
caused 
an 
injury 
to 
a 
coemployee 
by 
negligently operating a customer’s motor vehicle.  Because the 
policy in Gorzalski was issued to a motor vehicle handler, the 
insurer should have been required to comply with the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a).  See Heritage Mutual, 248 
Wis. 2d  118, ¶16.  Dahm did not control because Dahm did not 
involve an "automobile handler" and thus did not involve the 
predecessor 
to 
§ 632.32(6)(a), 
which 
governed 
"automobile 
handlers."  In other words, Dahm involved a different statute 
than is at issue here, and the Gorzalski court incorrectly 
relied on the Dahm analysis without regard to the plain meaning 
of § 632.32(6)(a).     
¶53 Moreover, 
the 
justification 
for 
upholding 
the 
coemployee exclusion in Dahm does not pertain to Gorzalski.  
Dahm was based on a situation where the injured party and 
                                                 
14 The term "automobile handler" was a precursor to "motor 
vehicle handler."  See § 171, ch. 102, Laws of 1979.   
No. 
2004AP356   
 
27 
 
tortfeasor were employees of the named insured, the tortfeasor 
was operating a vehicle owned or leased by the employer, and the 
employer was required to provide worker’s compensation coverage.  
When the employer is required to provide worker’s compensation, 
the coemployee exclusion operates to create no more or less 
coverage for the employer, as the named insured, than it does 
for the employee or coemployee.  However, worker’s compensation 
was not the sole remedy in Gorzalski because the tortfeasor was 
not operating a vehicle owned or leased by his employer.  
Wisconsin Stat. §102.03(2) states in part that the worker’s 
compensation statutes do not limit the right of an employee to 
bring an action against a coemployee for negligent operation of 
a motor vehicle not owned or leased by the employer.15  Unlike 
the tortfeasor in Dahm, Cousins will be exposed to large 
potential liability because worker’s compensation is not the 
exclusive remedy.  This will always be the case when a 
customer’s auto is operated by an employee of a "motor vehicle 
handler."  Moreover, an employee could become liable for all the 
worker’s compensation benefits.  See Wis. Stat. §102.29(1).  
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(2) states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
This section does not limit the right of an employee 
to bring action against any coemployee for an assault 
intended to cause bodily harm, or against a coemployee 
for negligent operation of a motor vehicle not owned 
or leased by the employer, or against a coemployee of 
the same employer to the extent that there would be 
liability of a governmental unit to pay judgments 
against 
employees 
under 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement or a local ordinance. 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
28 
 
Therefore, the justification for upholding the validity of the 
coemployee exclusion in Dahm is not present under the facts of 
Gorzalski. 
¶54 For these reasons, Gorzalski was wrongly decided, and 
we overrule that portion of its holding pertaining to the 
validity of Frankenmuth's coemployee exclusion.  Contrary to 
Gorzalski's reasoning, courts should first consider the plain 
language of §632.32(6)(a) when determining liability coverage 
under insurance policies issued to a motor vehicle handler, in 
instances 
when 
an 
employee 
injures 
a 
coemployee 
with 
a 
customer’s vehicle. 
VI 
¶55 Because General 
Casualty 
is 
required 
to provide 
liability 
coverage 
to 
Cousins, 
USAA's 
coverage 
limit 
is 
correspondingly reduced to zero dollars.  USAA issued a personal 
auto policy and a personal umbrella policy to Paretti, each of 
which contained exclusions that allow USAA to reduce its 
coverage limits in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(b).  
This subsection reads as follows: 
If the policy is issued to anyone other than a motor 
vehicle handler, it may limit the coverage afforded to 
a motor vehicle handler or its officers, agents or 
employees to the limits under s. 344.01(2)(d) and to 
instances when there is no other valid and collectible 
insurance with at least those limits whether the other 
insurance is primary, excess or contingent. 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(b). 
¶56 USAA paid $25,000 into an account through the clerk of 
courts because General Casualty had previously been dismissed 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
29 
 
from the case.  Because we find that General Casualty is 
required to provide coverage, USAA is entitled to the $25,000 it 
paid to the court.  In essence, USAA's policies issued to 
Paretti are inapplicable to the resolution of this action, and 
USAA is entitled to dismissal from this lawsuit. 
VII 
¶57 In sum, we conclude the following:  (1) A full-service 
car 
wash 
is 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
handler 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) because it is a "service station"; (2) 
The holding of Heritage Mutual retains its validity and the 
requirements of § 632.32(6)(a) apply to commercial general 
liability policies and commercial umbrella policies that provide 
automobile liability coverage; (3) Gorzalski was incorrectly 
decided, and we overrule its holding as it pertains to 
coemployee exclusions.   
¶58 As such, the final order issued by the circuit court 
on December 16, 2003, is reversed and the cause is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded.   
 
 
 
No. 
2004AP356   
 
 
 
1