Case Title: Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51342

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  August 11, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
COAST RANGE CONIFERS, LLC,
an Oregon Limited Liability Company,
Respondent on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
by and through
THE OREGON STATE BOARD OF FORESTRY, 
Petitioner on review.
(CC 011423; A117769; SC S51342)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 7, 2005.
Denise Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General. 
Phillip D. Chadsey, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Edward J. Sullivan, of Garvey Schubert Barer, Portland,
filed the brief for amici curiae 1000 Friends of Oregon, The
American Planning Association, and its Oregon Chapter.
Gary K. Kahn, of Reeves, Kahn & Hennessy, Portland, filed
the briefs for amicus curiae City of West Linn.
Margaret S. Olney, of Smith, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon AFL-CIO.
Jeffrey B. Litwak, White Salmon, Washington, filed the brief
for amicus curiae Columbia River Gorge Commission.
Bart A. Brush, Portland, and Nathan Baker, Portland, filed
the briefs for amici curiae Audubon Society of Portland, Friends
of the Columbia Gorge, Inc., Institute for Fisheries Resources,
League of Women Voters of Oregon, Pacific Coast Federal of
Fishermen's Associations, and Oregon Trout, Inc.  With them on
the briefs was John D. Echeverria, Washington, D.C.
Christy K. Monson, Salem, filed the briefs for amici curiae
League of Oregon Cities, Multnomah County, National League of
Cities, and International Municipal Lawyers Association.  With
her on the briefs was Timothy J. Dowling, Washington, D.C.
Michael G. Neff, of Haglund Kelley Horngren & Jones LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Neil Westfall, SDS Co.
LLC, and Senate President Pro Tem Ted Ferrioli.  
James S. Burling, of Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento,
California, and John M. Groen, of Groen Stephens & Klinge, LLP,
Bellevue, Washington, filed the brief for amicus curiae Pacific
Legal Foundation.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Lincoln County Circuit Court, Robert J. Huckleberry, Judge. 189 Or App 531, 76 P3d 1148 (2003).
KISTLER, J.
A state wildlife regulation prevents plaintiff from
logging approximately nine acres of a 40-acre parcel that it
owns.  Plaintiff brought this action claiming that the regulation
amounted to a "taking" of its property without just compensation
in violation of the state and federal constitutions.  The Court
of Appeals agreed with plaintiff.  It reasoned that, in
determining whether the regulation deprived plaintiff of all
economically beneficial use of the property and thus took the
property, it should focus on the nine-acre parcel that the
regulation affected rather than the 40-acre parcel that plaintiff
owns.  Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry, 189 Or App 531,
550, 76 P3d 1148 (2003), adh'd to on recons, 192 Or App 126
(2004).  Because the regulation deprived plaintiff of all
economically viable use of the nine acres, the Court of Appeals
held that the state had taken that part of plaintiff's property
in violation of the state constitution.  Id.  We hold that the
correct test is more comprehensive than the Court of Appeals
perceived and that, under the correct test, the state did not
take plaintiff's property under either the state or the federal
constitution.
Plaintiff is a limited liability company in the
business of logging timber.  In 1996, plaintiff acquired a 40-acre parcel of timber in the Coast Range as part of a land
exchange with the United States Forest Service.  On May 1, 1998,
an employee of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife saw two
adult bald eagles at a nest within the 40-acre tract.  A month
later, an employee of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
observed the nest from a helicopter.
Because bald eagles are listed as a threatened species
under the Endangered Species Act, 16 USC § 1533 (2000), state
regulations required plaintiff to file a written plan with the
State Forester before engaging in any logging activities that
might damage the nest site.  See OAR 629-605-0170(1)(d) (State
Forester approval required to log within 300 feet of protected
species' nesting site); OAR 629-665-0020 (State Forester approval
of written plan required before undertaking forest practice that
conflicts with resource site); OAR 629-665-0220(1) (bald eagle
resource site includes active nest tree).  On July 31, 1998,
plaintiff submitted a plan to log within 330 feet of the bald
eagle nest site.  The State Forester rejected that plan because,
in the State Forester's view, the plan did not provide the site
with sufficient protection.  The State Forester recommended that
plaintiff modify its plan to provide, among other things, a 400-foot buffer of standing trees (approximately nine acres) around
the nest.  On August 26, 1998, plaintiff submitted a modified
plan that incorporated the State Forester's recommendations and
the State Forester approved the plan.
By September 1998, plaintiff had logged approximately
31 of the 40 acres in a manner consistent with the modified plan. 
One month later, following the end of the bald eagle nesting
season, plaintiff submitted a new plan to log the remaining nine
acres.  The State Forester denied that plan because he found,
among other things, that the area was an active resource site,
that bald eagles were likely to use the nest site in the future,
and that plaintiff's plan failed to provide any protection for
the nesting site.  Plaintiff sought a contested case hearing. 
After that hearing, the Board of Forestry issued a final order
upholding the State Forester's ruling.
Plaintiff then filed this action against the State of
Oregon and Board of Forestry (collectively the "state"), alleging
that the state's refusal to let it log the remaining nine acres
took that property in violation of Article I, section 18, of the
Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (1)  Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, and the state filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment.  In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted an
affidavit stating that "[t]he Subject Timber [on the nine-acre
tract] has no economic value unless it can be logged."  The state
did not dispute that statement in its response.  Rather, it
argued that, in determining whether the regulation deprived
plaintiff of all economically viable use of its property, the
proper focus was the 40-acre parcel that plaintiff had acquired
in the land exchange.  The state contended that the fact that the
regulation prevented plaintiff from using part of its property
did not mean that the property, as a whole, had no economically
viable use. (2)
The trial court agreed with the state, granted its
summary judgment motion, and denied plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  The
court began by recognizing that, under the federal constitution,
the United States Supreme Court has applied the "whole parcel
rule" in determining whether a regulation denies an owner any
economically beneficial use of his or her property; that is,
under the federal constitution, a court does not "'divide a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated.'"  Coast Range Conifers, 189 Or App at 546 (quoting
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US 104, 130-31, 98
S Ct 2646, 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978)).
Citing two of this court's cases, the Court of Appeals
concluded that this court had "effectively rejected" the whole
parcel rule under the state constitution.  Id. at 546-49.  The
Court of Appeals noted that, in determining whether a regulation
effected a taking, this court had focused on the owner's ability
to use the part of the property that the regulation affected; it
had not focused on the owner's ability to use the property as a
whole.  Id. at 547-49.  Following that perceived lead, the Court
of Appeals held that, because plaintiff did not have any
economically viable use of the nine acres affected by the
wildlife regulation, the state had taken that part of plaintiff's
property in violation of Article I, section 18, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Id. at 550.  We allowed the state's petition for
review and now reverse.
On review, the state argues that Article I, section 18,
does not apply to regulations that merely limit the uses to which
property may be put and that, if it does, we should look at the
40-acre parcel that plaintiff acquired rather than the nine acres
of timber that the regulation affects in determining whether the
regulation takes plaintiff's property.
Plaintiff raises two state constitutional arguments in
response. (3)  Initially, it advances a unified theory of state
takings law that attempts to draw a single set of principles from
the separate strands of this court's takings cases. 
Alternatively, plaintiff argues that this court implicitly has
rejected the whole parcel rule and urges us to determine whether
a taking occurred by looking only at the specific property
interest that the regulation affects.  Plaintiff also advances a
series of arguments under the federal Takings Clause.
We begin with the state's argument that Article I,
section 18, applies only to physical appropriations of property
and has no application to regulations that limit the uses to
which an owner may put his or her property.  See State v.
Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (addressing state
constitutional claims first).  In analyzing that argument, we
consider the text of Article I, section 18, its history, and the
cases interpreting it.  See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16,
840 P2d 65 (1992) (stating methodology).  Our goal in undertaking
that inquiry is to identify the historical principles embodied in
the constitutional text and to apply those principles faithfully
to modern circumstances.  State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 297, 4 P3d
1261 (2000).
Article I, section 18, provides, in part:  "Private
property shall not be taken for public use, nor the particular
services of any man be demanded, without just compensation." 
Because Article I, section 18, was part of the original Oregon
Constitution, we look to the meaning of the words that the
framers used.  See Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or 111, 120, 107 P3d
18 (2005) (looking to dictionary relevant to time constitutional
provision adopted).  In 1857, the word "take" meant "[i]n a
general sense, to get hold or gain possession of a thing in
almost any manner."  Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the
English Language (1828) (emphasis in original). (4)  That
definition implies that governmental acts that result in the
appropriation of private property for public use will constitute
a taking -- a conclusion that is consistent with the corollary
prohibition in Article I, section 18, against demanding or
appropriating the uncompensated services of any person.  Webster
defined "property" in 1828 both concretely (as "[a]n estate,
whether in lands, goods or money") and more abstractly (as "[t]he
exclusive right of possessing, enjoying and disposing of a
thing").  Id.  Put differently, the dictionary definition of
property in 1828 was broad enough to include both the tangible or
physical thing and the legal interests pertaining to it.
The history of Article I, section 18, sheds more light
on its meaning. (5)  Before the adoption of the federal Takings
Clause, only two state constitutions guaranteed compensation for
a taking.  William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum L Rev 782,
790-91 (1995).  The Vermont Constitution of 1777 required
compensation "whenever any particular man's property is taken for
the use of the public" -- a requirement that most likely stemmed
from the New York colonial government's refusal to recognize
earlier land grants when England transferred control of the
Vermont territory from New Hampshire to New York.  Id. at 828-29. (6)  Worded somewhat differently, Article X of the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 required compensation
"whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any
individual should be appropriated to public uses" -- a guarantee
that Treanor suggests stemmed from uncompensated wartime
appropriations.  Id. at 830-34. (7)
As a general rule, however, the state constitutions
that preceded the federal Bill of Rights did not guarantee
compensation for any form of taking.  Rather, legislatures
typically provided for compensation in the bills that
appropriated private property for public use, although the
practice was not universal.  Treanor, 95 Colum L Rev at 786-87. 
Some commentators reason that this legislative practice reflected
the view that compensation for the taking of private property was
a natural right.  See Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory
Takings:  Setting the Record Straight, 1996 Utah L Rev 1211,
1230-31 (so stating).  Others discount the general acceptance of
that view before Congress proposed, and the states ratified, the
federal Bill of Rights.  William Michael Treanor, The Origins and
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale LJ 694, 714-16 (1985).  They recognize,
however, that the Fifth Amendment provided a model for later
state constitutions and that, whatever its initial status, the
"right [to compensation soon] came to seem an important and long
honored part of the Anglo-American legal tradition."  Id. at
715. (8)  
The United States Supreme Court had few occasions to
interpret the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment before Oregon
adopted its constitution, and none of those decisions sheds any
particular light on the issue presented here.  The states,
however, had greater opportunity to interpret their own takings
clauses.  Most state court decisions involved physical
appropriation of property and typically resulted in the transfer
of title.  See William B. Stoebuck, Nontrespassory Takings in
Eminent Domain 16-18 (1977) (summarizing early state takings
cases).  An emerging line of cases, however, recognized that the
government could "take" a person's land even though it did not
acquire title to the land.  See Kobach, 1996 Utah L Rev at 1234-59 (identifying state cases).  By 1868, Cooley explained, in
commenting on a flooding case, that "any injury to the property
of an individual which deprives the owner of the ordinary use of
it is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to compensation." 
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
544 (1868). (9)  
The Oregon cases interpreting Article I, section 18,
have followed that pattern.  They have recognized that a
"classic" taking occurs when the government physically occupies
or appropriates property.  They also have recognized, however,
that Article I, section 18, is not limited to that paradigm; it
applies as well to actions that are equivalent to a taking. 
Approximately 30 years after the adoption of the Oregon
Constitution, this court held that the government took private
property within the meaning of Article I, section 18, when it
placed a railway in a public street, denying the property owner
access to the street.  McQuaid v. Portland & V. R'y Co., 18 Or
237 (1889); accord Iron Works v. O.R. & N. Co., 26 Or 224, 228-29, 37 P 1016 (1894) (explaining and applying McQuaid).  The
court based that holding on the theory that the owner had a right
of access that the railway obstructed even though the government
did not physically invade or occupy the owner's property. 
McQuaid, 18 Or at 247-48, 252. 
Similarly, this court has held that government takes
property when it intentionally floods private property, Morrison
v. Clackamas County, 141 Or 564, 18 P2d 814 (1933), and when
government-authorized overflights deny an owner the use and
enjoyment of his or her property, even in the absence of a
trespass, Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or 178, 192, 376 P2d
100 (1962).  Additionally, the court has recognized that
regulations that deny an owner the ability to put his or her
property to any economically viable use will result in a taking
and entitle the owner to compensation.  Boise Cascade Corp. v.
Board of Forestry, 325 Or 185, 198, 935 P2d 411 (1997); see Dodd
v. Hood River County, 317 Or 172, 182, 855 P2d 608 (1993)
(phrasing test as whether property retains "some substantial
beneficial use").
It may be, as the state argues, that, when the framers
adopted the Oregon Constitution, they did not consider the
possibility that overflights or regulations could become so
burdensome that they could constitute a taking.  As Cooley makes
clear, however, the framers would have been aware that
governmental actions that did not fit precisely within the
classic paradigm of a taking still could be "equivalent to a
taking" and thus entitle the owner to compensation.  Following
that principle, this court has held that physically invasive
actions, overflights, and regulations can rise to the level of a
taking.  Those decisions do not depart from the principle that
underlies Article I, section 18; rather, they faithfully apply
that principle to modern circumstances as they arise. 
See Rogers, 332 Or at 297 (stating test).  Having considered the
wording, history, and case law surrounding Article I, section 18,
we adhere to our decisions and reject the state's argument that
Article I, section 18, applies only to physical appropriation of
property.
We turn to plaintiff's state constitutional arguments. 
As noted, plaintiff advances a unified theory of takings law that
attempts to draw a single set of principles from the separate
strands of this court's taking cases.  As we understand
plaintiff's argument, it would not distinguish between cases in
which the state physically invades a person's land and cases in
which the state regulates the use of that land.  Rather,
plaintiff argues that government actions taken to advance the
public interest, regulatory or otherwise, unconstitutionally take
a person's property if they substantially interfere with the use
of that property. (10)
Plaintiff's unified theory is difficult to square with
settled case law.  This court consistently has distinguished
among takings claims depending on the nature of the government
action that gives rise to the claim and has applied different
tests to different categories of government action.  For example,
when the government intentionally has authorized a physical
invasion of private property, the court has asked whether the
invasion substantially interfered with the owner's use and
enjoyment of that property.  See Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego,
335 Or 19, 26, 56 P3d 396 (2002) (applying that test to claim
that government intentionally diverted water onto private
property); Morrison, 141 Or at 568-69 (same). (11)  By
contrast, when government regulates the use of land to advance a
public policy, this court has held that no taking occurs as long
as the property retains some economically viable use.  Boise
Cascade Corp., 325 Or at 198; Dodd, 317 Or at 182. (12)
Plaintiff would have us blur, if not obliterate, those
well-established distinctions and apply the same legal test to
governmental regulations that the court has applied to physical
invasions of land.  Plaintiff's proposed rule fails to take into
account the different character of regulatory action.  As the
court concluded in Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or
254, 259, 656 P2d 306 (1982), and reaffirmed in Dodd, 317 Or at
182 n 12, "[r]egulation in pursuit of a public policy is not
equivalent to taking for a public use, even if the regulated
property is land."  To be sure, government may exercise
regulatory authority in a way that is tantamount to a public
appropriation of private property.  Seuss Builders, 294 Or at 259
n 5.  But, for the purposes of Article I, section 18, we decline
to treat regulation of property and physical invasion of property
as if they were the same.
Plaintiff advances an alternative state constitutional
argument.  It contends that, in determining whether the property
retains any economically viable use, we should consider only the
property interest that the regulation affects.  Put in the
context of this case, plaintiff argues that, in determining
whether its property has any economically viable use, we should
consider only the nine acres of timber surrounding the bald eagle
nest.  Plaintiff contends that this court followed that approach
in Boise Cascade Corp. and Suess Builders and thus has rejected,
at least implicitly, the whole parcel rule.
Plaintiff's reliance on Suess Builders is misplaced. 
In that case, the City of Beaverton had adopted a comprehensive
plan that "designated two-thirds of plaintiffs' property as a
site for a future public park."  Suess Builders, 294 Or at 261. 
Although the city had designated only part of the plaintiff's
property for future acquisition, the plaintiffs alleged that the
city's actions had "'irreversibly deprived the Plaintiffs of the
fair rental value of all their property.'"  Id. (quoting
allegations) (emphasis added).  Because the case arose on a
motion to dismiss, the court had no occasion to consider whether
the whole parcel rule applied:  The complaint alleged that the
entire property had no economically viable use after the city
announced its intent to condemn part of it.  Perhaps for that
reason, the parties did not argue whether the whole parcel rule
applied, and the court did not address that issue.
The decision in Boise Cascade Corp. is closer to the
mark.  In that case, a state wildlife rule prevented the
plaintiff from logging any trees on 56 acres of a 64-acre parcel. 
325 Or at 188-89.  The plaintiff brought an action, alleging
"'depriv[ation] * * * of the only economically viable use of
approximately 56 acres of merchantable timber.'"  Id. at 198
(quoting complaint; brackets and ellipses in original).  The
trial court dismissed the complaint because, among other reasons,
it failed to state a takings claim under the state constitution. 
Id. at 190, 196-97.  Before this court, the state did not argue
that the whole parcel rule applied.  Accordingly, this court did
not address that question.  Rather, it held that,
"[a]ssuming the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged
in the complaint and giving plaintiff the benefit of
all favorable inferences that may be drawn from those
facts, th[e plaintiff's] allegation is sufficient to
meet the 'deprivation of all economically viable use of
the property' standard."
Id. at 198.
We agree with plaintiff that, in deciding whether the
complaint in Boise Cascade Corp. stated a regulatory taking claim
under the state constitution, this court focused on the 56-acre
parcel that the regulation affected rather than the larger 64-acre parcel that the plaintiff owned.  That fact, however, adds
little to plaintiff's argument.  As noted, in Boise Cascade
Corp., the state did not argue before this court that the whole
parcel rule should apply, and this court did not address, much
less purport to resolve, that issue.  We decline to convert the
absence of any mention of the whole parcel rule in Boise Cascade 
Corp. into a binding resolution of that rule's applicability
under the Oregon Constitution. (13)
We note that, in other cases, this court has appeared
to apply the whole parcel rule in deciding regulatory takings
claims.  See, e.g., Dodd, 317 Or at 185-86 (focusing on uses that
remained in determining whether plaintiffs retained "some
substantial beneficial use of their property").  The court did
so, however, without discussing whether the whole parcel rule or
some other rule should apply.  Id.  As a result, those cases are
entitled to no greater weight than our decision in Boise Cascade
Corp., and the question whether the whole parcel rule applies
under Article I, section 18, remains an open one.
Although the existing cases do not resolve the
question, we think that the principles underlying the regulatory
takings doctrine point the way to an answer.  The court
recognized in Suess Builders that government routinely regulates
the use of private property to advance public policy and that it
does so in ways that can affect, sometimes significantly, the
property's value.  See 294 Or at 258-59 (illustrating point).  In
the area of land use, government may impose height or size
restrictions on buildings, prohibit or impose limitations on
industrial and commercial uses in certain areas, or impose
setback requirements that prevent property owners from building
within a specified distance of their property lines.  In each of
those instances, government limits in one way or another the uses
to which an owner may put his or her land, and it does so to
advance broader public goals. (14)
This court has concluded that, as a general rule,
"[r]egulation in pursuit of a public policy is not equivalent to
taking for a public use, even if the regulated property is land." 
Id. at 259.  Regulation, however, can go too far and become
tantamount to a governmental appropriation of property.  See id.
at 259 n 5 (recognizing principle).  Courts have employed
different tests in attempting to determine when a regulation that
reduces the subject property's economic value crosses that line. 
As noted, this court's approach, under the Oregon Constitution,
has been to ask whether the regulation leaves the owner with any
economically viable use of the property.  Boise Cascade Corp.,
325 Or at 198.
The foregoing test for regulatory takings looks to the
owner's ability to use the whole parcel and asks whether the
remaining interests have any economically viable use.  Were we to
adopt a contrary rule and focus only on the interest affected by
the regulation, an ordinance that prevented property owners from
building homes within ten feet of a street would "take" that ten-foot strip even though the property owner remained free to place
the home elsewhere on the lot.  We decline to adopt that approach
and make explicit what is implicit in the state constitutional
test for regulatory takings:  Under Article I, section 18, of the
Oregon Constitution, a court should consider a property owner's
ability to use the whole parcel that he or she owns in
determining whether the property retains any economically viable
use.
To be sure, determining what constitutes the relevant
parcel may present a close question in some cases.  Cf. City of
Salem v. H.S.B., 302 Or 648, 653, 733 P2d 890 (1987) (discussing
that issue in condemnation context); Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v.
Taffe, 67 Or 102, 134 P 1024, reh'g den, 135 P 332 (1913) (same). 
The facts in this case, however, are straightforward.  Plaintiff
owns a contiguous 40-acre parcel of forest land.  In determining
whether plaintiff retains any economically viable use of that
property, we look to plaintiff's ability to use the entire 40-acre parcel, not merely the nine acres of timber that the
regulation affects.
Plaintiff argues alternatively that we should consider
its interest in the timber separately from its interest in the
real property.  Under Oregon law, however, timber is part of the
underlying real property unless it is subject to a contract to be
cut.  ORS 71.1070(2); (15) see Paullus v. Yarbrough, 219 Or
611, 637, 347 P2d 620 (1959) (timber constitutes goods under
Uniform Sales Act when agreement to sever timber exists).  In
this case, no contract to cut the timber existed, and no basis
exists, as a matter of state property law, for viewing
plaintiff's property interest in the timber as separate from its
interest in the real property. (16)
It follows that, in determining whether the regulation
at issue here deprived plaintiff of any economically viable use
of its property, we focus on plaintiff's ability to use the 40-acre parcel, not merely on its ability to use the nine acres of
timber.  Viewed from that perspective, plaintiff's property has
an economically viable use.  The regulation leaves plaintiff able
to log more than three fourths of its property.  The regulation,
in effect, is no different from a rule that permits a landowner
to log three out of every four trees in order to prevent soil
erosion.  Because plaintiff's property has an economically viable
use, the challenged regulation does not effect a taking under
Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution.
Having resolved plaintiff's claim under Article I,
section 18, we turn to its claim under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.  Plaintiff identifies four theories that, in its
view, either entitle it to summary judgment or, at a minimum,
require a jury trial.  First, plaintiff argues that the state
wildlife regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate
governmental interest and is a taking under Agins v. Tiburon, 447
US 255, 100 S Ct 2138, 65 L Ed 2d 106 (1980).  Second, plaintiff
contends that, because the nine acres of timber has no economic
value, the state has taken its property under Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 112 S Ct 2886, 120 L Ed 2d
798 (1992).  Third, plaintiff argues that the state regulation
results in a physical occupation of its land and is a per se
taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US
419, 102 S Ct 3164, 73 L Ed 2d 868 (1982).  Finally, plaintiff
reasons that a jury should decide whether the regulation is a
taking under the balancing test set out in Penn Central.
Plaintiff bases its first argument on Agins, which
stated that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests."  447 US at
260.  After oral argument in this case, the United States Supreme
Court overruled that part of Agins, holding "that the
'substantially advances' formula announced in Agins is not a
valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the
Fifth Amendment requires just compensation."  Lingle v. Chevron,
___ US ___, 125 S Ct 2074, ___ L Ed 2d ___ (2005).  After Lingle,
plaintiff's first theory provides no basis for finding a taking.
Plaintiff bases its second theory on the Court's
decision in Lucas.  In that case, the Court held that a
regulation that completely deprives an owner of "all economically
beneficial uses" of his or her property is a taking.  Lucas, 505
US at 1019 (emphasis in original).  Plaintiff notes that the
undisputed evidence in this case establishes that the state
regulation deprived it of all economically beneficial use of nine
acres of timber.  It follows, plaintiff concludes, that the state
took those nine acres.  
In arguing that the regulation effected a taking under
Lucas, plaintiff focuses solely on the part of its 40-acre parcel
that the state wildlife regulation affected.  Put another way,
plaintiff's argument assumes that the whole parcel rule does not
apply.  That assumption is inconsistent with Penn Central, which
explained: 
"'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated * * * [T]his Court focuses rather on both the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of
the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole."
438 US at 130-31.  To be sure, the Court questioned the whole
parcel rule in a footnote in Lucas.  505 US at 1016-17 n 7. 
Since then, however, it has reaffirmed the rule twice.  See
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 331, 122 S Ct 1465, 152 L Ed 2d 517
(2002)(rejecting argument that courts should consider only part
of property affected by regulation and reaffirming whole parcel
rule); Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508
US 602, 644-45, 113 S Ct 2264, 124 L Ed 2d 539 (1993) (same).
Under the whole parcel rule, plaintiff's Lucas claim
fails.  Plaintiff's ability to log 31 acres of the 40-acre parcel
establishes that the regulation does not deprive plaintiff's
property of all its economic value.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 US 606, 630-31, 121 S Ct 2448, 150 L Ed 2d 592 (2001)
(wetlands regulations that prevented owner from developing two
acres of a 20-acre parcel but permitted a single residence on
remaining 18 acres did not "take" two acres under Lucas). (17)
Plaintiff bases its third federal takings argument on
Loretto.  The Court held in Loretto that an ordinance that
authorized a company to place a permanent television cable on an
apartment building constituted a taking.  In reaching that
conclusion, Loretto reaffirmed the rule that "'[t]he one
incontestable case for compensation (short of formal
expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately
brings it about that its agents, or the public at large,
"regularly" use, or "permanently" occupy, space or a thing which
theretofore was understood to be under private ownership.'"  458
US 427 n 5 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1184 (1967)).  That was
so, the Court concluded, even though the physical occupation that
New York City authorized in Loretto -- placing a one-half inch
cable and two cable boxes on the roof of an apartment building --
was relatively minimal.  Id. at 436-37.
Plaintiff argues that preventing it from logging the
trees in which the bald eagles nested results in a physical
occupation within the meaning of Loretto.  But Loretto does not
hold, as plaintiff argues, that state rules that prevent an owner
from cutting a heritage tree, eradicating a rare native plant, or
destroying an endangered species' habitat results in a physical
occupation and thus a per se taking.  State rules that prevent a
property owner from altering a naturally occurring condition
differ from rules that authorize a third person to enter and
occupy another's property.  The Court's decision in Loretto
addresses only the latter class of rules; its reasoning does not
extend to the separate class of rules at issue here, as the
courts that have addressed that specific issue have agreed.  See
Seiber v. United States, 364 F3d 1356, 1366-67 (Fed Cir), cert
den, ___ US ___, 125 S Ct 113 (2004) (so holding); Boise Cascade
Corp. v. United States, 296 F3d 1339, 1352-57 (Fed Cir 2002),
cert den, 538 US 906 (2003) (same); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board
of Forestry, 164 Or App 114, 125-26, 991 P2d 563 (1999), rev den,
331 Or 244 (2000) (same).
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court should
have submitted its claim to a jury under a Penn Central balancing
test.  Plaintiff does not identify any disputed historical facts
that are material to the Penn Central analysis.  Rather, relying
on Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F3d 1560,
1571-73 (Fed Cir 1994), cert den, 513 US 1109 (1995), plaintiff
contends that only a jury can weigh the factors that the Court
noted in Penn Central to determine whether a regulation effects a
taking.
The Court held in Penn Central that no set formula
exists to determine when a regulation will constitute a taking. 
438 US at 124. (18)  Rather, a number of factors come into
play.  Primary among them are:
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[.] * * * So, too, is the character
of the governmental action.  A 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government * * * than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good."
Id. (citations omitted).  In determining whether a regulatory
taking had occurred, the Penn Central Court weighed those and
other factors based on the historical facts that the state court
had found.  The Court did not remand the case so that a trier of
fact could weigh those factors.
Penn Central makes clear that the question whether the
undisputed historical facts establish that a challenged
regulation effects a taking presents a question of law for the
court.  Florida Rock Industries, on which plaintiff relies, is
not to the contrary.  There, the Federal Circuit remanded to
resolve a disputed issue of historical fact.  See 18 F3d at 1571-73 (remanding to allow trial court to determine degree to which
state wetlands development law impaired owner's investment-backed
expectations).  In this case, plaintiff does not argue that the
historical facts are disputed.  Rather, it argues that a jury
should weigh plaintiff's investment-backed expectations against
the state's interest in enforcing its wildlife regulations to
determine whether the regulation took its property.  Under Penn
Central, the trial court properly reached the merits of
plaintiff's claim and resolved it. (19)  Having considered
plaintiff's claims, we hold that the state's wildlife regulations
did not take plaintiff's property under either Article I, section
18, of the Oregon Constitution or the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use,
nor the particular services of any man be demanded,
without just compensation."
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."  
2. The state also raised certain procedural defenses that
it no longer pursues.
3. Plaintiff does not argue that Oregon Laws 2005, chapter
1, popularly known as Measure 37, applies in this case, and we
express no opinion on the application and meaning of that
statute.
4. The more specific definitions of "take" that Webster
listed do not apply in this context.
5. No record of the framers' specific intent is available. 
The framers did not debate the decision to include Article I,
section 18, in the Oregon Constitution, or at least no record of
any debate exists.  See Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A
Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857, 37
Willamette L Rev 469, 530 (2001) (identifying that no record of
any discussion of Article I, section 18, exists).
6. The preamble to the proposed 1777 Vermont Constitution
recited that "the late Lieutenant Governor Colden, of New York,
with others, did * * * covet those very lands; and * * * obtained
jurisdiction of those very identical lands ex parte; which ever
was, and is, disagreeable to the inhabitants [of this state]." 
Treanor, 95 Colum L Rev at 828.
7. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 contained a similar
provision.  95 Colum L Rev at 831-32.
8. Indeed, by 1833, Joseph Story was able to state that
the Fifth Amendment's takings clause represented "an affirmance
of a great doctrine established by common law for the protection
of private property."  Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States 661 (1833).
9. Cooley distinguished between governmental actions that
indirectly affect the value of land and do not constitute a
taking and those actions that directly affect land and are
equivalent to a taking even though they do not result in the
transfer of title.  Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations at 541-48.
10. Plaintiff would recognize some exceptions to its
proposed rule.  It would distinguish between cases in which the
government is acting in its enterprise capacity rather than its
arbitral capacity.  It also would distinguish between cases
depending on whether the regulatory burden falls unevenly on some
landowners.
11. The court also has applied this test to some
governmentally authorized nuisances.  See Thornburg, 233 Or at
192 (recognizing that overflights could substantially interfere
with owner's use and enjoyment of property and could constitute a
taking even though no trespass occurred).
12. Those two categories of takings claims do not exhaust
the field; other categories exist.  See, e.g., Dodd, 317 Or at
181-82 (recognizing condemnation blight cases as a discrete
category of takings cases).
13. The Court of Appeals opined that Fifth Avenue Corp. v.
Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 581 P2d 50 (1978), also demonstrated
that this court had rejected the whole parcel rule.  Coast Range
Conifers, 189 Or App at 546-47.  The Court of Appeals read that
decision too broadly.  This court held in Fifth Avenue Corp. that
the complaint failed to allege that the specific part of the
plaintiff's property affected by the county's action retained no
economically feasible use.  Id. 282 Or at 614.  In light of that
failure, there was no need for the court to consider whether the
whole parcel rule applied and consequently no discussion of that
issue.
14. We note that those regulations may, depending on a
myriad of economic and other factors, increase or decrease the
affected property's value.
15. ORS 71.1070(2) provides, in part:
"A contract for the sale apart from the land * * *
of timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of
goods."
16. Under the federal constitution, the fact that state law
regards a property interest as separate does not necessarily mean
that a regulation that prevents the owner from using that
interest effects a taking.  See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 498-502, 107 S Ct 1232, 94 L Ed 2d 1232
(1987) (holding that no taking occurred when state law prevented
owner from mining support estate, which state regarded as
separate property interest).  Because we conclude that the timber
in this case is not separate from the underlying real property,
we need not decide whether we would find the federal analysis
persuasive in interpreting Article I, section 18.
17. The Court assumed in Palazzolo that the whole parcel
rule applied.  533 US at 631-32.  In light of the Court's later
reaffirmation of the whole parcel rule in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, plaintiff's Lucas claim in this case has no
greater vitality than the plaintiff's similar claim in Palazzolo.
18. Since Penn Central, the Court has recognized two
categories of per se regulatory takings:  when the law authorizes
a third person to occupy another's property permanently and when
the regulation leaves the owner with no economically beneficial
use of his or her property.  See Lingle, ___ US at ___, 125 S Ct
at 2081 (summarizing federal regulatory takings law). 
19. We note that, beyond arguing that a jury should
determine the merits of its Penn Central claim, plaintiff does
not appear to advance any other argument in this court that the
trial court erred in resolving its Penn Central claim.  Having
resolved the one issue that plaintiff raises, we do not reach any
other issues that plaintiff might have raised in support of its
Penn Central claim.