Case Title: Exxon Corp. v. Board of County Com'rs, Sublette County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-45

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Exxon Corp. v. Board of County Com'rs, Sublette County1999 WY 121987 P.2d 15Case Number: 98-45, 98-46Decided: 08/27/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
EXXON 
CORPORATION, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, SUBLETTE COUNTY, Appellee (Defendant).

STATE OF WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, SUBLETTE COUNTY, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County: The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
Judge.

Lawrence J. 
Wolfe and Patrick R. Day of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, WY; and Brent R. Kunz 
and Dominique D.Y. Cone of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, WY. Argument 
by Mr. Day, representing appellant Exxon Corp. Morris R. Massey of Brown, 
Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, WY for Amici Curiae Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Association, acting through its Wyoming division, the Petroleum 
Association of Wyoming, the Wyoming Taxpayers Association, the Wyoming Mining 
Association, and the Wyoming Heritage Society.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General, and Vicci M. Colgan, Senior Assistant Attorney General. 
Argument by Ms. Colgan, representing appellant Department of 
Revenue.

John C. McKinley 
and Nancy D. Freudenthal of Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, WY. Argument by Ms. 
Freudenthal, representing appellee. Wade E. Waldrip of Williams, Kelly, Waldrip 
& Thompson, Buffalo, WY for Amicus Curiae Wyoming County Commissioners 
Association.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
involves a dispute over the valuation of Exxon's production from the LaBarge 
wellfield in Sublette County. We agree with the district court that the Sublette 
County Board of County Commissioners may present allegations to the Board of 
Equalization that Exxon's production has been improperly or unequally assessed, 
thus triggering the Board's authority to carefully examine the case pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) (Michie 1997). We do not agree, however, that 
Sublette County may void a judicially approved settlement agreement which 
established the method to be used in computing Exxon's production valuation. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part.

ISSUES

[¶2]      In Case No. 
98-45, appellant Exxon Corporation (Exxon) presents the following 
issues:

1. Whether Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) should be construed as an open-ended appeals statute 
which the County can invoke to avoid its failure to file a timely 
appeal.

2. Whether 
Sublette County may retroactively void its obligations under a 1989 Settlement 
Agreement even though it has repeatedly ratified that Agreement by accepting its 
benefits.

 

[¶3]      In Case No. 
98-46, appellant State Department of Revenue presents essentially the same 
issues:

1. Whether Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) may be used by Sublette County to circumvent its 
failure to file timely appeals under Wyo. Stat. § 
39-1-304(a).

2. Whether 
Sublette County may retroactively reject a 1989 settlement agreement concerning 
mineral valuation for production occurring through 1996.

[¶4]      The Board of 
County Commissioners of Sublette County, the appellee in these consolidated 
cases, states the issues in this manner:

1. Is the Board 
of Equalization barred from exercising its statutory duty to review and remedy 
improper or negligent administration of the tax laws by any action or inaction 
of Sublette County?

2. Does the 1989 
Settlement Agreement bar the Board of Equalization from exercising its statutory 
duty to review and remedy improper or negligent administration of the tax 
laws?

FACTS

[¶5]      In 1986, Exxon 
began extracting natural gas from the LaBarge wellfield in Sublette County. 
Pursuant to Wyoming statutes, Exxon's production is subject to severance and ad 
valorem taxes. For the 1986 and 1987 tax years, Exxon used the "netback" method 
of valuation. After deductions, Exxon reported a taxable value of zero for its 
LaBarge production. The Department of Revenue disputed this valuation and did 
not certify taxable value for those years.

[¶6]      Litigation 
regarding valuation of the LaBarge production began in 1988. That year, the 
Wyoming legislature enacted Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-1-401 and -402 (Michie 
Cum.Supp. 1988). These statutes, which have since been repealed, provided that 
total deductions allowed by the Department of Revenue from the sale of taxable 
natural gas and associated natural resources could not exceed 40% of the annual 
gross receipts from the sale of these products. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-402(a) 
(Michie Cum.Supp. 1988) (Repealed by 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 57, § 1). Shortly 
after these statutes were enacted, Exxon filed a declaratory judgment action in 
district court for the First Judicial District seeking a declaration that the 
40% cap legislation was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 
Among the defendants named in the suit were the Department of Revenue, the Board 
of Equalization, and Sublette County.

[¶7]      In January 1989, 
a settlement was reached in the cap litigation, and a "Stipulation for Entry of 
Declaratory Judgment" was filed in district court. Signed by Exxon, the Wyoming 
Attorney General, and the Sublette County Attorney, the stipulation provided: 
"The parties have engaged in settlement negotiations which have resulted in an 
agreement which is embodied in a Settlement Agreement, an executed copy of which 
is attached." Sublette County was listed among the parties to the settlement 
agreement. Pursuant to the stipulation, the district court entered a declaratory 
judgment pronouncing the 40% cap legislation unconstitutional, thus ending the 
cap litigation.

[¶8]      Under the terms 
of the settlement agreement, Exxon paid the State and Sublette County $12 
million in full satisfaction of Exxon's severance and ad valorem tax liability 
for the 1986, 1987, and 1988 LaBarge production. The settlement agreement also 
established the method to be used to value post-1988 LaBarge production. For 
January 1, 1989, through August 31, 1991, the State1 and County agreed to apply the 
comparison value method of valuation; and two of Exxon's processing agreements, 
the Howell and Yates agreements, were to be used as comparable value in 
computing valuation. In exchange, Exxon agreed that, during this period, it 
would not contest the applicability of ad valorem and severance taxes to federal 
helium.2 As to the valuation method to be 
used after August 31, 1991, the agreement provided:

After August 31, 
1991, the State agrees that it will recognize the Howell and Yates agreements as 
a comparison value and that the comparison value method may be used in 
conjunction with other recognized appraisal techniques to determine value. If 
the State uses any method other than the comparison value method based on the 
Howell and Yates agreements, the Parties agree that the question of future 
taxability, for severance and ad valorem purposes, and value of future helium 
production remain open and are not resolved by this 
Agreement.

[¶9]      In 1997, Sublette 
County filed a "Petition for Board Examination" with the Board of Equalization 
(Board).3 Initiated pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) (Michie 1997), Sublette County's petition requested the 
Board investigate allegations that the 1989 settlement agreement, as it was 
administered, resulted in illegal, improper, and unequal assessment of the 
LaBarge production. At the heart of Sublette County's petition were allegations 
that use of the Howell and Yates agreements as comparable value permitted Exxon 
to make numerous improper deductions. The petition questioned Exxon's valuations 
for the 1992-1996 tax years (1991-1995 production years). Upon Sublette County's 
motion, the Board joined Exxon as a party.

[¶10]   Exxon and the Department of Revenue 
responded to Sublette County's petition before the Board by filing the present 
declaratory judgment action in the district court for the First Judicial 
District. These unconventional allies sought, inter alia, a declaration that 
Sublette County had waived any right it may have had to challenge Exxon's 
valuation. Exxon and the Department also sought a declaration that Sublette 
County was bound to the 1989 settlement agreement. With the battle shifted to 
district court, the Board of Equalization stayed action on Sublette County's 
petition before the Board, believing that "[g]iven the unique circumstances of 
these matters, it is in the best interest of all parties to seek judicial 
clarification of the scope of the administrative remedies available, if any, 
prior to any further administrative proceedings."

[¶11]   Upon cross motions for summary 
judgment, the district court ruled in Sublette County's favor. It concluded that 
(1) Sublette County may present a petition to the Board pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv), and (2) the 1989 settlement agreement was not 
enforceable against Sublette County. In rendering its decision on the settlement 
agreement, the district court reasoned that: (1) the County did not have 
authority to contract away future rights to mineral tax revenue, and (2) the 
members of the Board of County Commissioners who were in office at the time the 
settlement agreement was signed have been replaced, and under this court's 
decision in Mariano & Assoc., P.C. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sublette 
County, 737 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1987), future boards of county commissioners could 
not be bound to the settlement agreement.4 The Department of Revenue and Exxon 
timely appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   Our standard for reviewing summary 
judgment is well established. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); White v. University of Wyoming, 954 P.2d 983, 985 (Wyo. 1998). This court evaluates the propriety of summary 
judgment using the same standards and materials used by the district court, 
affording no deference to the district court's decision on issues of law. 
Id.

[¶13]   Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law. If the conclusion of law is in accordance with the law, we 
affirm it; if it is not, we correct it. Cargill v. State, Dep't of Health, Div. 
of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998); May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Wyo. 1997).

We endeavor to 
interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We begin by 
making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.

State Dep't of 
Rev. & Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994); see also 
Cargill, 967 P.2d  at 1001; State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. 
v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

Sublette 
County's Section 14 Petition (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
39-1-304(a)(xiv))

[¶14]   Before addressing the substance of 
the appellants' claims, a review of the primary players in Wyoming's mineral tax 
system will facilitate an understanding of this case.

There exists 
then, under current state taxation methodology, three state players and the 
counties: the state Department of Revenue with the collection and taxation 
supervision responsibilities; the State Board of Equalization with a 
semi-judicial appeal and supervisory responsibility; and the Mineral Audit 
Division of the Department of Audit with a delinquency audit responsibility; and 
finally, county governments which have a direct pecuniary interest in the 
collection of the ad valorem tax. Value is established by the Department of 
Revenue subject to appeal to the State Board of Equalization with the function 
of the counties regarding ad valorem tax only limited to a quantities validation 
program for collection. No particular level of cooperation between the state 
Audit Division and the county search efforts is demonstrable and the cooperation 
between the Department of Revenue and the Audit Division is not directly 
addressed.

Union Pacific 
Resources Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 377 (Wyo. 1992). The value established by 
the Department of Revenue is the same for both ad valorem and severance tax 
purposes. Id. at 362.

[¶15]   Narrowing our focus to the duties 
performed by the Board of Equalization, we see that the role of the Board under 
the mineral taxation system changed dramatically in 1991.

Prior to 
legislative changes made by 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 174, the Wyoming State 
Board of Equalization had administrative functions and duties relating to the 
Department of Revenue and Taxation. The 1991 enactment separated out the Board 
of Equalization by creating two different administrative agencies. The Board of 
Equalization became an independent quasi-judicial organization with 
constitutional and statutory duties to equalize valuation and decide 
disagreements regarding statutory provisions affecting the assessment, levy and 
collection of taxes. These responsibilities include both the ad valorem state 
taxation system which provides county funding and the severance tax system which 
provides state funding. Specific statutory direction is provided for the Board 
of Equalization to review all contentions of improper 
assessment.

Union Pacific 
Resources Co. v. State, 839 P.2d  at 363.

[¶16]   With these roles in mind, we turn 
to the appellants' argument that Sublette County should not be permitted to 
challenge Exxon's production valuation from past tax years. They contend that 
because Sublette County did not appeal the valuation certifications for those 
years, they cannot, at this late date, challenge the valuations. We 
disagree.

[¶17]   The Board of Equalization's 
authority to review valuations from prior tax years is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-1-304 (Michie 1997),5 which provides in pertinent part: 

(a) The state 
board of equalization shall perform the duties specified in article 15, section 
10 of the Wyoming constitution and shall hear appeals from county boards of 
equalization and review final decisions of the department upon application of 
any interested person adversely affected, including boards of county 
commissioners for the purposes of this subsection, under the contested case 
procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. . . . In addition, the 
board shall:

(xiv) Carefully 
examine into all cases wherein it is alleged that property subject to taxation 
has not been assessed or has been fraudulently, improperly, or unequally 
assessed, or the law in any manner evaded or violated, and cause to be 
instituted proceedings which will remedy improper or negligent administration of 
the tax laws of the state[.]

(Emphasis 
supplied.) This statute delineates two of the Board's functions. We discern 
subsection (a) to be part of the Board's adjudicatory function, i.e., that 
subsection gives the Board the power to hear appeals. Subsection (a)(xiv) 
(Section 14), on the other hand, is more closely aligned with the Board's 
regulatory function. This section gives the Board the power to carefully examine 
allegations of improper, unequal, or fraudulent assessment, and the power to 
cause to be instituted proceedings to remedy improper or negligent 
administration of Wyoming's tax laws. See also Wyoming Board of Equalization 
Rules and Regulations, Board Examination Procedures, Ad Valorem Tax, ch. 
4.

[¶18]   The Board's Section 14 power was 
examined in State Tax Comm'n v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 428 (Wyo. 
1993). In that case, after an audit, the Department of Revenue determined that 
the fair market value of BHP's production was greater than the amount originally 
certified to the county assessor. Id. at 430. As a result, the Board of 
Equalization directed the county assessor to increase the value of BHP's 
production and issue ad valorem tax notices to BHP. Id. at 430-31. On appeal, 
BHP contended that Section 14 does not contain legislative authority for 
retroactive assessment. Id. at 435. We rejected BHP's argument, holding that 
Section 14 "specifically authorizes the Board to remedy improper assessments." 
Id. at 436. We reasoned:

This section 
provides for revaluation when it directs the State Board of Equalization to 
discover errors or unequally assessed taxes and remedy those errors. W.S. 
39-1-304(a)(xiv). As the State points out, errors are usually discovered by 
looking back, therefore retroactive action is explicit in the statute. Thus the 
process that occurs is prospective correction of improper self-assessment. It is 
not retroactive revaluation.

Id. at 
435-36.

[¶19]   Despite the clear language of 
Section 14 permitting the Board to "carefully examine" allegations, the 
appellants complain that Sublette County should not be allowed to present 
allegations pursuant to Section 14 after it failed to appeal valuation 
certifications. First, the appellants claim that Sublette County's failure to 
appeal6 the certifications within 30 days 
precludes any further investigation into the assessments. Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization Rules and Regulations, Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the 
Wyoming State Board of Equalization, ch. 2, § 5(a) (30 days from final 
administrative decision to file contested case notice). However, the 30-day 
limit provided by the Board's rules is a limitation on the time a party has to 
file a contested case proceeding with the Board. Section 14 proceedings, on the 
other hand, are governed by chapter 4 of the Board's rules, which does not limit 
the time in which a party may present allegations pursuant to Section 14. 
Wyoming Board of Equalization Rules and Regulations, Board Examination 
Procedures, Ad Valorem Tax, ch. 4.

[¶20]   In the alternative, the appellants 
argue that permitting Sublette County to file a Section 14 petition is contrary 
to what they perceive to be a doctrine of finality found in Wyoming's taxation 
system. To support their finality argument, they direct our attention to a 
number of statutes within Wyoming's taxation scheme that limit the time to 
appeal or file a contested case. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-208(g) and (h) (Michie 
1997) (one year to appeal selection of valuation method); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-2-214(g) (Michie 1997) (thirty days to appeal mine production valuation 
amendments); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-201(d) (Michie 1997) (thirty days for 
taxpayer to appeal state assessment); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-203 (Michie 1997) 
(one year for taxpayer to challenge illegal assessment, levy, or collection of 
taxes). However, the appellants' argument presents a double-edged sword: these 
same statutes also clearly illustrate that the legislature is well aware of how 
to establish time limitations. We have previously recognized that Section 14 
does not contain a time limitation. State Tax Comm'n v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 
856 P.2d  at 437. The legislature is aware of this decision, and it has not 
amended Section 14 to include a time limit. We believe that limiting the time to 
present Section 14 allegations is a job for the legislature, not this court.7

[¶21]   Finally, the appellants argue that 
a broad interpretation of Section 14 will lead to parties bypassing appeals in 
order to make challenges pursuant to Section 14. We do not dismiss this concern 
lightly. However, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a) clearly indicates that the 
Board's power to "carefully examine" alleged taxation improprieties under 
Section 14 is "in addition to" the Board's duty to hear appeals from Department 
of Revenue decisions. Therefore, even though the appellants raise a legitimate 
practical concern, we cannot, in the face of clear statutory language, 
judicially remove the Board's statutory duty. Recognizing the Board's dual 
roles, the clear language of Section 14, and the lack of time limitation on 
initiating a Section 14 petition, we must reject the appellants' argument that 
Sublette County's Section 14 petition is untimely. "The necessity for equal and 
uniform taxation is compelling and overriding." State Tax Comm'n v. BHP 
Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d  at 439. The district court's decision on this 
issue is affirmed.

The Settlement 
Agreement

[¶22]   The district court ruled that the 
1989 settlement agreement is not enforceable against Sublette County and did not 
bar Sublette County from challenging Exxon's valuations. In rendering its 
decision, the district court cited two reasons: (1) the County did not have 
authority to contract away future rights to mineral tax revenue, and (2) the 
members of the Board of County Commissioners who were in office at the time the 
settlement agreement was signed have since been replaced, and that board could 
not bind the current board.

[¶23]   We first address Sublette County's 
contention that it is not a party to the settlement agreement. In the 1989 cap 
litigation, the "Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment," which was 
signed by the Sublette County Attorney and filed in district court, provided: 
"The parties have engaged in settlement negotiations which have resulted in an 
agreement which is embodied in a Settlement Agreement, an executed copy of which 
is attached." Despite the stipulation and despite the fact that it was listed as 
a party to the settlement agreement, Sublette County contends it is not a party 
to the settlement agreement because, in 1989, the Sublette County Attorney 
merely signed the agreement "approved as to form."

[¶24]   Even if we accept Sublette County's 
argument that it is not a signatory to the settlement agreement, the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel precludes Sublette County from asserting it is not a party to 
the 1989 settlement agreement.

Judicial 
estoppel is a doctrine which precludes a party from asserting inconsistent 
positions in different judicial proceedings. Under this doctrine, a party who by 
his pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed a particular 
position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an inconsistent position 
in a subsequent action.

Ottema v. State 
ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo. 1998) (citations 
omitted). In 1989, Sublette County was a party to the cap litigation; and that 
litigation was ended, in part, thanks to Sublette County's assertion in the 
stipulation that it had negotiated and executed the settlement agreement. 
Because Sublette County is taking an inconsistent position in this case, 
Sublette County is judicially estopped from asserting that it is not a party to 
the 1989 settlement agreement. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that 
Sublette County continued the cap litigation after the entry of the declaratory 
judgment. This fact perhaps weighs most heavily against Sublette County's 
assertion that it is not a party to the settlement 
agreement.

[¶25]   Having concluded that Sublette 
County is a party to the 1989 settlement agreement, the next issue to be 
resolved is whether the 1989 settlement agreement falls within the parameters of 
the rule that permits, under certain circumstances, Wyoming governmental 
entities to void contracts which extend beyond the term of office of the 
government decision makers. The rule has been stated in this 
fashion:

[A]n agreement 
extending beyond the term of the contracting authority . . . may be voidable by 
the government or void upon attack by a third party if, under the facts and 
circumstances, the agreement is not reasonably necessary or of a definable 
advantage to the city or governmental body.

Mariano & 
Assoc., P.C. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sublette County, 737 P.2d 323, 331-32 
(Wyo. 1987).

[¶26]   The question presented in this case 
is a novel one: does the Mariano rule extend to the judicially-entered 1989 
settlement agreement, i.e., may Sublette County void such an agreement? Sublette 
County argues that this court has extended this rule beyond the realm of 
government contracts, and the rule should be further extended to preclude 
enforcement of the settlement agreement. To support its argument, Sublette 
County directs our attention to Michie v. Bd. of Trustees of Carbon County Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 847 P.2d 1006 (Wyo. 1993). In Michie, the question was whether a 
school district board of trustees could discontinue its policy of permitting 
board members to participate in the school district's insurance plan. A board 
member whose insurance was discontinued filed an action based on promissory 
estoppel to prevent the board from discontinuing the plan. Id. at 1008. We 
reiterated the policy behind the Mariano rule: "A governing body should not be 
able to deprive its successor in interest of discretion to act for the public 
good." Id. at 1010 (citing Mariano & Assoc., P.C. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
of Sublette County, 737 P.2d  at 329.) We went on to say: "We believe that this 
policy applies not only to extended-term governmental contracts but also to 
extended-term governmental promises which do not constitute formal contracts." 
Michie, 847 P.2d  at 1010.

[¶27]   Relying on Michie, Sublette County 
contends that the Mariano rule should extend to the 1989 settlement agreement. 
We disagree. As previously determined, Sublette County is a party to the 
settlement agreement, and the agreement became part of the stipulation which 
ended the litigation. As such, it had the force and effect of a judicial decree. 
Day v. Davidson, 951 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1997); see also McKee v. McKee, 882 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo. 1994). Although a settlement agreement is interpreted in the 
same fashion as a contract, Matter of Estate of McCormick, 926 P.2d 360, 362 
(Wyo. 1996), it does not necessarily follow that the Mariano rule permits 
Sublette County to void the settlement agreement. As with any judicial decree, a 
party is bound to obey, and even a governmental entity does not have the option 
of disobeying a court order. If we were to allow governmental entities to avoid 
settlement agreements at the discretion of the new members of a governing body, 
the judicial system would cease to be a forum that provides final resolution of 
disputes. Instead, settlement agreements like the one before the court would 
only be final until new board members were elected. For the foregoing reasons, 
we conclude that Sublette County may not void the 1989 settlement agreement. 
Because we reverse the decision of the district court on this issue, we are 
required to go one step further than the district court did in resolving this 
case.

Does the 
Settlement Agreement Preclude Sublette County's Petition?

[¶28]   Having determined that (1) Sublette 
County's Section 14 petition before the Board of Equalization is timely, and (2) 
Sublette County is bound by the settlement agreement, the question becomes 
whether the terms of the settlement agreement preclude Sublette County's Section 
14 petition. We find they do not.

[¶29]   The settlement agreement covers 
three different periods of time. For 1986, 1987, and 1988, Exxon paid $12 
million to the State and Sublette County to settle its tax liability for those 
tax years. The second period covered is January 1, 1989 through August 31, 1991. 
For this period, the State and Sublette County specifically agreed to use the 
comparison value method and to use the Howell and Yates agreements as the 
comparable value:

The State and 
the County agree to value, for all tax purposes, all production from the 
Wellfield occurring during the period of January 1, 1989 through August 31, 1991 
using the comparison value method provided in Section 10 of the current 
Regulations of the Board of Equalization by using the agreements negotiated 
between Exxon and Howell Petroleum Corp. and Yates Petroleum Corp. as the 
comparable value.

Neither of these 
periods is at issue.

[¶30]   Sublette County does, however, 
challenge Exxon's taxation for the period beginning September 1, 1991. The 
question thus becomes whether the following portion of the settlement agreement 
precludes Sublette County's petition:

After August 31, 
1991, the State agrees that it will recognize the Howell and Yates agreements as 
a comparison value and that the comparison value method may be used in 
conjunction with other recognized appraisal techniques to determine value. If 
the State uses any method other than the comparison value method based on the 
Howell and Yates agreements, the Parties agree that the question of the future 
taxability, for severance and ad valorem purposes, and value of future helium 
production remain open and are not resolved by this 
Agreement.

This provision, 
by its permissive language, gives the State (the Department of Revenue and the 
Board of Equalization) the latitude to continue using the comparison value 
method based on the Howell and Yates agreements. If the State used a different 
method or the comparison value method without the Howell and Yates agreements, 
the question of the taxation and valuation of helium production would remain 
open. Although the State and County agreed to the valuation method for 1989 
through August 1991 production, the State alone had discretion to select a 
valuation method for post-August 1991 production. Therefore, because Sublette 
County had no role in the selection of methodology, and because nothing in the 
settlement agreement specifically precludes Sublette County from challenging the 
methodology selected, we conclude that the county may proceed with its Section 
14 allegations that the post-August 1991 valuation method has resulted in 
unequal or improper assessments.

[¶31]   The Board of Equalization has 
constitutional and statutory duties to equalize valuation. Wyo. Const. art. 15, 
§ 10; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304. Assuming the Board conducts an examination and 
discovers that Exxon production has been unequally or improperly assessed, the 
Board must "cause to be instituted proceedings" which will remedy such 
impropriety. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv). If revaluation is ordered and a 
valuation method other than "the comparison value method based on the Howell and 
Yates agreements" is used, the terms of the settlement agreement dictate that 
the questions of helium taxation and valuation would re-open, which could 
include the possibility of refund liability. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-101(b) 
(Michie 1997).

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The terms of the settlement agreement 
do not preclude Sublette County from presenting allegations of unequal or 
improper assessment pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304 (a)(xiv) (Michie 
1997), thus triggering the broad power of the Board of Equalization to carefully 
examine this case.

Footnotes

1 Under the 
terms of the settlement agreement, the term "State" refers to both the Board of 
Equalization and the Department of Revenue.

2 According 
to the settlement agreement, Exxon was producing helium from federal lands 
pursuant to an agreement with the federal government, which owns that helium. It 
was Exxon's contention that Wyoming could not tax helium owned by the federal 
government.

3 The Board 
consolidated Sublette County's petition with another case before the Board, the 
"records case." In the records case, Sublette County is attempting to obtain 
taxpayer information from the Department pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-6-309(c)(ii) (Michie 1997).

4 The 
district court also ordered the Department of Revenue to produce documents 
requested by Sublette County pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-309(c)(ii). This 
ruling has not been challenged on appeal.

5 In 1998, 
these provisions were recodified as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) and (c)(x) 
(Michie June 1998 Supp.). 1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 5, §§ 1, 4. Although the 
entire taxation statutory scheme was recodified in 1998, we will refer to the 
statutes as they were codified at the time this action was 
instituted.

6 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-1-304(a) was amended in 1995 to provide boards of county commissioners 
with the right to appeal a Department of Revenue decision to the Board of 
Equalization. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 209, § 1. Nevertheless, a county still 
does not have standing to pursue judicial review of a decision of the Board. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-306 and § 39-1-101(a)(xii) (Michie 1997). Basin Elec. 
Power Coop., Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 970 P.2d 841, 847-48 (Wyo. 
1998).

7 We 
recognize that some examinations may be limited by equitable, legal, and/or 
practical considerations. See Wyoming Board of Equalization Rules and 
Regulations, Board Examination Procedures, Ad Valorem Tax, ch. 4 § 3(b).