Case Title: Estate of Smith v. Mahoney’s Silver Nugget

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 76

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion “2e
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

THE ESTATE OF ALLEN TYRONE No. 54752
SMITH, JR., BY AND THROUGH ITS
CO-ADMINISTRATORS ALLEN

‘TYRONE SMITH, SR., AND SANDRA O.

SMITH; ALLEN TYRONE SMITH, SR;

AND SANDRA 0, SMITH, FILED
Appellants,

x W 23 20H
MAHONEY'S SILVER NUGGET, INC., 0
A NEVADA CORPORATION, casi Gt ciemete Cover
Respondent. oS pene,

Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a wrongful
death action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Valorie J.
Vega, Judge.

med,

Chesnoff & Schonfeld and David Z. Chesnoff and Richard A. Schonfeld,
Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

Christian-Kravitz, LLC, and Martin J. Kravitz, M. Bradley Johnson,

Jennifer N. Taylor, and Michael B. Lee, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
In this opinion, we consider the apparent disconnect between
NRS 651.015's limitation on innkeeper liability and our decision in Doud

1130244

 
v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 109 Nev. 1096, 864 P.2d 796 (1993). Having
concluded that this discord arises from the multifaceted concept of
“foreseeability,” we clarify that the duty element of a negligence cause of

action must be determined as a matter of law by considering whether the

 

wrongful act that precipitated the plaintiffs injury was foreseeable. We
further conclude that NRS 651.015(3)'s definition of “foreseeable” provides
the appropriate framework for conducting this inquiry in the context of
innkeeper liability by codifying the common-law approach that we set
forth in Doud. Because the district court in this case properly applied

NRS 651.015(8) in determining that the act which led to the victim's death

 

was not foreseeable, respondent Mahonoy’s Silver Nugget, Inc., did not
owe the victim a duty as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the district
court's summary judgment in favor of the Silver Nugget.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the early morning hours of June 25, 2006, Daniel Ott
entered the Silver Nugget casino with two friends, Paris Lee and Lakiva
Campbell. They proceeded into the Touchdown Lounge and joined a
boisterous group of people crowded around several pool tables near the
bar. This group had already caught the attention of casino security, and
within five minutes of Ott’s arrival, the entire group was asked to leave.

At this same time, Allen Tyrone Smith, Jr., was seated at a
bar adjacent to the Touchdown Lounge. While not entirely clear, the
record indicates that one of Smith's friends began arguing with Lee as

Ott’s group exited the Touchdown Lounge. Over a period of approximately
ten seconds, Smith rose from his barstool, pushed his way through the
crowd, and punched Lee in the face. In response to the perceived attack

 

 
ane

 

on his friend, Ott immediately revealed a concealed weapon and fatally
shot Smith.

Following Smith's death, appellants—the Estate of Allen
‘Tyrone Smith, Jr. Allen ‘Tyrone Smith, Sr, and Sandra O, Smith
(collectively, Smith's Estate)—filed suit against the Silver Nugget

 

asserting negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. ‘The Silver
Nugget filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court
granted on the ground that the Silver Nugget did not owe Smith a duty of
care under NRS 651.015. This appeal followed,
DISCUSSION

Smith's Estate argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Silver Nugget because Smith’s murder
was foreseeable, and thus, the Silver Nugget owed Smith a duty of care
under NRS 651.015.!_ This court reviews a district court’s grant of
summary judgment and its statutory construction determinations de novo.
‘See Yeager v. Harrah's Club, Inc,, 111 Nev. 830, 833, 897 P.2d 1093, 1094
(1995); Otak Nevada, LLC v. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. _, __, 260 P.3d 408,
411 (2011). Generally, when “the language of a statute is plain and

 

Mn the alternative, Smith's Estate argues that the district court
should have applied the doctrine of respondeat superior because Lakiva
Campbell was an employee of the Silver Nugget. ‘This argument is
unpersuasive. Although Ott and Campbell did enter the Silver Nugget
together, Campbell did not shoot Smith, and there is no evidence to
support the conclusion that Campbell was involved in the murder.
Moreover, Campbell was off-duty at the time of the murder, and was not
subject to the Silver Nugget’s control or supervision. Accordingly, we
conclude that NRS 651.015 provides the proper framework for
determining whether the Silver Nugget had a duty to protect Smith from
the acts of a third party.

 
unambiguous, and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room
for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself.” Attorney General v. Nevada Tax
Comm'n, 124 Nev. 232, 240, 181 P.3d 675, 680 (2008) (quotations omitted).
However, “{a] statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood
in two or more senses by reasonably informed persons or it does not
otherwise speak to the issue before the court.” Id, at 240, 181 P.3d at 680-
81 (quotation omitted). When interpreting an ambiguous statute, this
court will review the legislative history to determine the Legislature’
intent. Id, at 240, 181 P.3d at 681.

 

Before reaching the merits of this appeal, it is necessary to
draw a distinction between foreseeability as it relates to duty and
foreseeability as it relates to causation in assessing innkeeper liability.
“Foreseeability” and application of NRS 651,015

In Doud v, Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 109 Nev. 1096, 864 P.2d
796 (1993), we addressed the four elements a plaintiff must establish to
succeed on a negligence claim for innkeeper liability: (1) duty, (2) breach,
(3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. Id, at 1100, 864 P.2d at 798, In
determining the threshold inquiry of whether an innkeeper owes a duty of
care to its patron, we recognized that a duty to prevent wrongful conduct
by third parties only occurs when the wrongful conduct is foreseeable. Id,
at 1101-02, 864 P.2d at 799-800, In determining foreseeability for
purposes of establishing a duty, we considered two distinct approaches:
evidence of prior similar acts and a totality of the circumstances. Id, at
1102-03, 864 P.2d at 799-800. After concluding that the wrongful act was

foreseeable under a totality of the circumstances, thus giving rise to a duty

as a matter of law, we proceeded to discuss the remaining negligence

 

 
elements, Id, at 1104, 864 P.2d at 800-01. Ultimately, we remanded
because the issue of proximate causation—specifically whether the
plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable consequence of the wrongful act—was a
factual issue to be decided by the jury. Id, at 1100-06, 864 P.2d at 798-

802.

 

‘The Legislature subsequently enacted NRS 651.015 to resolve
@ perceived defect in Doud? and to “codify what was the old law with

 

respect” to duty. Hearing on S.B. 474 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
68th Leg. (Nev., May 18, 1995). In doing so, the Legislature set forth a
general limitation precluding the imposition of civil liability on an
innkeeper unless the death or injury of a patron was caused by the

foreseeable wrongful act of a third party (duty), and there is a

 

preponderance of evidence to show a failure to exercise due care
(evidentiary threshold for breach), NRS 651.015(1). With this general
framework in mind, the Legislature set forth the applicable standard for
assessing whether an innkeeper is liable for the acts of a third party in
NRS 651.015(2).

‘The preliminary inquiry in any case involving innkeeper
liability is whether “[tJhe wrongful act which caused the death or injury
was foreseeable,” and thus, whether a duty of care was owed to the
plaintiff. NRS 651.015(2\a). If an injury is unforeseeable, then the

innkeeper owes no duty, and the district court has no occasion to consider

*To do so, the bill clarified that a judge, not a jury, is to determine
the existence of a duty based on the innkeeper's notice of danger. See
Hearing on S.B. 474 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Leg.
(Nev., June 10, 1995). As mentioned, it appears that the Legislature may
have misconstrued Doud’s holding.

 

 
the remaining elements of the plaintiffs cause of action, including breach,
which is addressed in NRS 651.016(2)(b). ‘The determination of
foresceability as it relates to an innkeeper's duty of eare to a patron must
be made by the district court as a matter of law. See NRS 651.015(2).

In determining whether a wrongful act is “foreseeable” and
thus gives rise to a duty as a matter of law, the Legislature provided a
definition in NRS 651.015(9). The subsection provides that a wrongful act

not “foreseeable” unless:

(a) The owner or keeper failed to exercise
due_care for the safety of the patron or other
person on the premises; or
(b) Prior incidents of similar wrongful acts
occurred on the premises and the owner or keeper
had notice or knowledge of those incidents.
NRS 651.015(8) (emphases added).
At first blush, this definition appears counterintuitive because
“due care” is a term of art generally used to describe the negligence
element of breach—an element typically reserved for determination by the
jury. See Doud, 109 Nev. at 1104, 864 P.2d at 801. However, as
previously stated, NRS 651.015(2) expressly provides that duty is a
question of law to be decided by a judge.* Accordingly, as the statute is

'The parties suggest that NRS 651.015(3) requires the district court
to decide both issues of duty and proximate cause as a matter of law. We
disagree. ‘The statute expressly states that “[t]he court shall determine as
a matter of law whether the wrongful act was foreseeable.” NRS
651.015(2) (emphasis added). By using the language “wrongful act” in
NRS 651.015(3), we presume that the Legislature intended to address
foreseeability within the context of duty, but not within the context of
proximate causation. See, e.g.. Doud, 109 Nev. at 1102, 1105, 864 P.2d at
799, 801 (defining “foreseeability” in relation to duty as reasonable cause
continued on next page

 

 
one

 

ambiguous, we turn to the legislative history for guidance on NRS
651.015(3)(a)'s proper interpretation,

‘The legislative history indicates that the “due care” language
in NRS 651.015(8)(a) was intended as authority for a judge to look beyond
the existence of “similar wrongful acts” under NRS 651.016(8)(b) in
determining the existence of a duty, and to consider other circumstances
regarding the basic minimum precautions that are reasonably expected of
an innkeeper. Hearing on $.B. 474 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
68th Leg. (Ne'
the safety of guests, the Legislature recognized that certain minimum

June 10, 1995), Although an innkeeper cannot guarantee

 

precautions are necessary and concluded that a judge should be given
Id. Asa
result, the Legislature added the phrase “the owner or keeper failed to

 

broad leeway in ovaluating foreseeability on a case-by-case ba:

exercise due care for the safety of the patron or other person on the
premises” to the definition of “foreseeable,” which ensured that a duty
could be imposed “regardless of whether or not there had been prior
[similar] incidents” of wrongful conduct. Id.

‘This standard is akin to Nevada's “totality of the
circumstances” approach established in Doud, 109 Nev. at 1101-04, 864
P.2d at 799-801 (imposing a duty where there is reasonable cause to
anticipate a wrongful act, regardless of past experience). Other
jurisdictions have similarly articulated that “duty encompasses a

continued

to anticipate a wrongful act, in contrast with proximate causation, which
focuses on the foreseeability of the harmful consequence).

 
oe

responsibility to take reasonable steps to secure the premises against
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the
absence of such precautionary measures.” Lopez v, Baca, 120 Cal. Rptr.
2d 281, 286 (Ct. App. 2002) (quotations and citations omitted). In other
words: an innkeeper's outright failure to take reasonable precautions to
protect its patrons would increase the likelihood of injury caused by a
third party (without regard to the issues of breach or proximate
sable.”

causation), thus making a third party's wrongful act more “forest

   

After review of the legislative history, we conclude that NRS
651.015(8) allows

judge to evaluate evidence of “[p}rior incidents of

 

 

1r wrongful acts" or any other circumstances related to the exercise of,
“due care” when imposing a duty under NRS 651.015(2). This aligns the
statute's definition of “foreseeable” with Doud’s “totality of the
circumstances” approach by allowing a judge to look beyond the existence
of ‘similar wrongful acts” in determining the existence of a duty. Having
thus interpreted NRS 651.015's foreseeability requirement, we must now
determine whether the fatal shooting in this case was foreseeable to the
Silver Nugget.

The district court properly concluded that the Silver Nugget did not owe
‘Smith a duty of care

Smith's Estate argues that the shooting was foreseeable based
on prior incidents of similar wrongful acts that had occurred at the Silver

 

Nugget. We disagree.

‘To begin, NRS 651.015(3)(0) provides that foreseeability may
be determined by an owner's knowledge of prior similar wrongful acts.
However, it does not provide any guidance as to which acts should be
considered “similar.” Smith's Estate contends that all violent acts

occurring anywhere on an innkeeper's premises—whether inside or

 
outside the casino—should be considered similar. ‘The Silver Nugget
responds that violent acts occurring outside of the casino raise different
safety concerns and are not similar to acts of violence within the casino.
Moreover, the Silver Nugget contends that violent acts that do not concern
firearms or other deadly weapons are dissimilar to a murder involving a
firearm,

Accordingly, we return to the legislative history of NRS
651.015, in which several commentators noted that the phrase prior
incidents of “similar wrongful acts” could be interpreted in different ways.
Soe, e.g., Hearing on S.B, 474 Before the As:
Leg. (Nev., June 10, 1995). ‘The drafters of the provision explained that

mbly Judiciary Comm., 68th

 

such ambiguity was deliberate:

When we crafted this language we used the term
“similar” for purposes associated with its common,
usage. That is, letting the judge decide whether in
fact the particular wrongful act was similar to
another wrongful act.... The phrase we used was
chosen very specifically to allow the judge to have
some leeway to make the determination as to
whether they were alike and that is the way the
bill was drafted.

 

‘The legislative history proceeds to document several
hypothetical situations that implicitly recognize the distinction between

events occurring in the inner versus the outer areas of a casino, as well as

 

the contra:

 

in different levels of violence. Id, (noting the dissimilarities

 

between an armed robbery

 

jino elevator as compared to a car
burglary in the parking lot). One possible explanation for these
distinctions in determining the similarity of two events relates to a

question of whether the events involve similar security issues. Id, (noting

 

 
that casinos in different towns should not be considered similar because
“{tJhey are not similar in the way they handle security”),

In this case, Smith’s Estate points to multiple criminal
incidents occurring in and around the Silver Nugget, which it contends are
similar enough to Smith's murder to have provided the casino with notice
that additional precautions were necessary. Most notably, Smith's Estate
points to a number of fistfights and robberies that occurred inside the
casino within five years prior to the murder, However, after reviewing the
record, it does not appear that weapons were used in any of these
incidents, and no serious injuries resulted.‘ In each incident, casino
security handled the disturbance
premises while maintaining the safety of customers inside the casino.

 

by escorting the individuals off the

Smith's Estate also references several incidents that occurred

 

in the Silver Nugget’s parking lot outside of the casino. In particular,
Smith's Estate notes that there w:

 

a report of shots fired in or near the
parking lot approximately four years prior to Smith's murder, and that
there had been two other reports of people possibly brandishing firearms
in the parking lot after that time. Nobody was shot in any of these
instances, nor does it appear from the record that any of the participants
in these events were patrons of the Silver Nugget.

Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly
determined that the fatal shooting was unforeseeable under NRS

“In two incidents, the suspects possessed knives but did not use
them, In another incident, a robbery suspect asserted that he had a gun,
but never showed one.

 

 
651.015(3)(b) “because there were no prior incidents of similar wrongful
acts [that] occurred on the premises.”

However, as discussed in Doud, proof of prior incidents of
similar wrongful acts are sufficient, but not always necessary, for
establishing the existence of a duty. The legislative history of NRS
651.015(8)(a) likewise indicates that the circumstances surrounding the
commission of a wrongful act may provide the requisite foreseeability for
imposing a duty even where no prior incidents of similar wrongful conduct,

have occurred on the premises. Although Smith's Estate focuses solely on

 

“prior similar acts,” we note that the district court’s findings support its
conclusion that a duty could not have been imposed under either prong of
NRS 651.015(3).

Afior carefully reviewing the record, it is apparent that the
Silver Nugget took basic minimum precautions to ensure the safety of its
patrons. There is no evidence to suggest that the Silver Nugget should
have known that Ott was carrying a concealed weapon when he entered
the premises. Also, the Silver Nugget promptly deployed security to
request that the boisterous group leave the Touchdown Lounge. Thus, we
are convinced that the circumstances leading up to Smith's murder did not
provide the requisite foreseeability for imposing a duty upon the Silver
Nugget under NRS 651.015(8)(a).

In conclusion, the district court made detailed findings in its
order granting summary judgment in favor of the Silver Nugget. The
district court found that “the undisputed evidence revealed that there
were no prior criminal acts that involved firearms or handguns in the
premises,” and that the Silver Nugget exercised the requisite precautions

for the safety of its patrons by deploying security to control the group.

nu

 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that the fatal shooting wai
“unforeseeable,” as defined by both prongs of NRS 651.015(3).

We agree with the district court. Because the Silver Nugget
did not owe Smith a duty under NRS 651.015 as a matter of law, we

 

conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of the Silver Nugget. See Wood v, Safeway, Inc,, 121 Nev. 724, 729,
121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005); Doud, 109 Nev. at 1100, 864 P.2d at 798 (“In
order to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, a moving
defendant must show that one of the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie
case is clearly lacking as a matter of law.” (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

 

Parraguirre