Case Title: Doe v. Department of Health and Welfare Termination of parental rights

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35637

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35637 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE  
TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD    
RELATIONSHIP OF: JANE DOE, A CHILD 
UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.                                                  
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JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,                                  
                                                        
          Petitioners-Appellants,                       
                                                        
v.                                                      
                                                        
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND  
WELFARE,                       
                                                        
          Respondent.                                                           
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Boise, February 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  27  
 
Filed:  March 4, 2009 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Third Judicial  
District of the State of Idaho, Canyon County.  Honorable Dan C. Grober,  
Magistrate Judge. 
 
The decision of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Wiebe & Fouser, Canyon County Public Defender, Caldwell, for appellant.  
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.    
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
This appeal arises from a magistrate judge‟s order granting the petition of Respondent 
Department of Health & Welfare (the Department) to terminate the parent-child relationship 
between Appellants John Doe and Jane Doe and their child, I.P.  This is an expedited appeal 
directly from that order.  We conclude that the record contains substantial and competent 
evidence supporting the trial court‟s findings of abandonment and we therefore affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
I.P. was born on July 19, 2005, and Appellants are her biological parents.  On July 25, 
2006, John Doe‟s parental rights were terminated as to I.P.‟s siblings.  On January 30, 2007, Jane 
Doe voluntarily terminated her parental rights as to I.P.‟s siblings.  On the morning of October 1, 
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2006, I.P. was taken to the Mercy Medical Center emergency room by ambulance.  Because I.P. 
was accompanied to the hospital by a babysitter and no parent or guardian subsequently appeared 
at the hospital, the Nampa Police Department declared I.P. in imminent danger and placed her 
into the care of the Department.  Jane Doe was incarcerated during this time and was not released 
until October 16, 2006.  John Doe‟s whereabouts were unknown at this time.   
On October 3, 2006, at a shelter care hearing, the trial court ordered I.P. to remain in the 
temporary legal custody of the Department.  Jane Doe appeared at the hearing but John Doe did 
not.  On October 26, 2006, at the adjudicatory hearing, the court ordered that I.P. be placed in the 
legal custody of the Department.  Appellants did not attend the hearing.  On December 5, 2006, 
the court approved the case plan developed by the Department with Appellants.  Appellants did 
not attend the hearing.   
John Doe was incarcerated from January 2, 2007 to March 26, 2007 on charges of 
trafficking in methamphetamine and contempt.  Jane Doe was incarcerated from January 3, 2007 
to February 1, 2007 on charges of trafficking in methamphetamine.  She was again incarcerated 
from April 16, 2007 to May 11, 2007 on charges of possession of a controlled substance and 
trafficking in methamphetamine. 
On April 24, 2007, at a review hearing, the court ordered I.P. to remain in the legal 
custody of the Department.  Appellants did not attend the hearing.  On June 5, 2007, Jane Doe 
was sentenced for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.  She received a 
suspended sentence and was placed on probation.  On July 3, 2007, the prosecution filed an 
allegation that Jane Doe had violated her probation by absconding from supervision.  She was 
arrested on July 25, 2007 and remained in custody until her suspended sentence was imposed in 
August, 2007.  She was released from prison on February 15, 2008.   
On July 7, 2007, John Doe was sentenced for possession of methamphetamine.  He 
received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation.  He subsequently absconded from 
supervision and was arrested on August 22, 2007.  His suspended sentence was imposed on 
November 16, 2007. 
On October 9, 2007, at a permanency review hearing, the court ordered I.P. to remain in 
the legal custody of the Department.  On November 29, 2007, the Department filed a Verified 
Petition for Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship.  Trial on the Department‟s petition 
was held on March 18, 2008, April 22, 2008, and May 13, 2008.  On July 24, 2008, the 
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magistrate judge issued a memorandum decision and order in which, applying a standard of clear 
and convincing evidence, he found that each Appellant had abandoned and neglected I.P. and 
that termination was in I.P.‟s best interest.  On August 14, 2008, the court issued separate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each Appellant and terminating the parent-
child relationship.  Appellants timely appealed and on September 11, 2008, we granted 
permissive appeal to this Court.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an action to terminate parental rights, where the trial court has explicitly determined 
the case by application of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard, this Court must 
determine if the decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence.  State v. Doe, 
144 Idaho 534, 535, 164 P.3d 814, 815 (2007) (citing CASI Found., Inc. v. Doe, 142 Idaho 397, 
399, 128 P.3d 934, 936 (2006)).  “Substantial competent evidence is „such evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‟”  State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 
343, 345-46, 144 P.3d 597, 599-600 (2006) (quoting Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129 
Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 
child.  Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246 (1978)).  This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007) (citing In re Bush, 
113 Idaho 873, 875, 749 P.2d 492, 494 (1988)).  Our legislature also recognizes the importance 
of maintaining the parent-child relationship: “Implicit in [the Termination of Parent and Child 
Relationship] act is the philosophy that wherever possible family life should be strengthened and 
preserved . . . .” I.C. § 16-2001.  Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when the 
Department intervenes to terminate the parent-child relationship.  State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006) (citation omitted).  Due process requires that the Department 
prove grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.  
(citing Bush, 113 Idaho at 876, 749 P.2d at 495).   
 
In the instant case, the Department filed a petition for the termination of the parent-child 
relationship pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005.  Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits the Department to 
petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child‟s best 
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interest and any one of the following five factors exist:  (a) abandonment, (b) neglect or abuse, 
(c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent, (d) mental 
incapacity of the parent, or (e) where termination is in the best interest of the parent.  I.C. § 16-
2005.  Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination.  State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 
839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007) (citing In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 
315 (1991)). 
The magistrate judge found that the Department proved the following grounds for 
termination of the parent-child relationship by clear and convincing evidence:  (1) neglect as 
defined in I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b); (2) neglect as defined in I.C. §§ 16-2002(3)(a) and 16-1602(25); 
and (3) abandonment as defined in I.C. § 16-2002(5).  As we conclude that there is substantial 
and competent evidence supporting the finding that Appellants abandoned I.P., we address only 
that ground and do not reach the issue of neglect.   
Idaho Code § 16-2002(5) defines abandonment and provides in relevant part: 
“Abandonment” means the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal 
parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular 
personal contact.  Failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just 
cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of 
abandonment under this section . . .  
 
Appellants argue that the trial court‟s findings of abandonment are not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence.  We address the evidence relating to abandonment of I.P. by John Doe 
and Jane Doe individually. 
A. There is substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate judge’s 
conclusion that John Doe abandoned I.P. 
 
I.P. was placed into the care of the Department on October 1, 2006.  The record indicates 
that John Doe has not paid any child support for the benefit of I.P. since then.  The record also 
indicates that John Doe was incarcerated during a substantial period of the time that I.P. was in 
the care of the Department.  However, even when John Doe was not incarcerated and thus free to 
maintain personal contact with I.P., he failed to do so.   
John Doe was not incarcerated from October 1, 2006 to January 2, 2007.  He had no 
contact with I.P. during this time.  He was again out of custody from March 26, 2007 to August 
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22, 2007.1  In April of 2007, John Doe contacted the Department and scheduled three visits with 
I.P, but attended only one of the visits.  This was the only in-person contact that John Doe had 
with I.P. from the time she came into the care of the Department on October 1, 2006 until his 
parental rights were terminated in July, 2008. 
John Doe did not contact I.P. during the times that he was incarcerated and his contact 
with the Department during this time was extremely limited.  John Doe contacted the 
Department by way of letter twice while incarcerated after November 20, 2007, the second letter 
being sent after the termination trial had begun.  In both letters, John Doe requested that the 
Department arrange for supervised visits with I.P. and that the Department provide him with 
photographs of I.P. 
John Doe argues that the instant case is similar to Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 
341 (2002).  In that case, the parent had been incarcerated the entirety of the child‟s life.  Id. at 
759, 53 P.3d at 342.  Even though the parent was severely restricted in what he could do to 
establish a relationship with his child, the record indicated that the parent did all he could to 
establish a relationship.  The parent sent his child gifts and made efforts to contact the child 
through the Department and the child‟s maternal grandmother, but he was unsuccessful.  Id. at 
762, 53 P.3d at 345.  We therefore vacated the judgment terminating the parental right of the 
parent in that case.  Id.   
John Doe‟s reliance on that case is misplaced.  John Doe‟s conduct in the instant case 
does not compare favorably with the efforts to establish the parent-child relationship 
demonstrated by the incarcerated parent in Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 (2002).  In 
this case, John Doe visited I.P. only once during the nearly six months that he was out of custody 
after I.P. was placed in the care of the Department.  John Doe failed to complete any steps of the 
Department‟s case plan.  In Doe v. State, we recognized that the parent‟s actions were restricted 
while he was in prison, but the parent still attempted to establish a relationship with his child 
despite those restrictions.  Here, John Doe faced no such restrictions while he was not 
incarcerated, yet he made virtually no attempt to establish a relationship with I.P.  After 
                                                 
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The record is unclear whether John Doe was incarcerated the entire time from August 22, 2007 to 
November 20, 2007.  John Doe was placed on probation on July 11, 2007 and he subsequently absconded from 
supervision.  John Doe was arrested on August 22, 2007, and he was not sentenced until November 16, 2007.  John 
Doe‟s brief on appeal states that he has been incarcerated since he was arrested in August 2007.  Therefore, for 
purposes of this opinion, we will assume that John Doe was incarcerated the entire time from August 22, 2007 until 
he was sentenced to prison. 
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reviewing the record before us, we are hard-pressed to imagine a situation wherein a parent 
resisting termination of the parent-child relationship could exhibit less effort or interest in 
maintaining the relationship than John Doe has shown in this case.  We conclude that the record 
contains substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate judge‟s conclusion that 
John Doe abandoned I.P. 
B. There is substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate judge’s 
conclusion that Jane Doe abandoned I.P. 
 
As previously noted, I.P. was placed into the care of the Department on October 1, 2006.  
Jane Doe has not paid any child support for the benefit of I.P. since then.  The record also 
indicates that Jane Doe was incarcerated during a substantial period of the time that I.P. was in 
the care of the Department.  Recognizing that custody places significant restrictions on a parent‟s 
ability to maintain personal contact with a child, we direct our attention to the time Jane Doe was 
out of custody and free to maintain personal contact with I.P.   
Jane Doe was out of custody from October 16, 2006 to January 3, 2007.  She had no 
contact with I.P. during this time.  Jane Doe was freed from February 1, 2007 to April 16, 2007 
and again she had no contact with I.P. during this time.  She did, however, contact the 
Department in February, 2007 to inform the Department that she did not wish to have contact 
with I.P. until after she was sentenced on pending charges.  She was out of custody from May 11, 
2007 to August 20, 2007 and yet she had no contact with I.P. during this time, even though her 
pending charges were resolved on June 5, 2007.   
Jane Doe subsequently violated her probation and her suspended sentence was imposed 
on August 20, 2007.  While imprisoned, Jane Doe contacted the Department by way of letter on 
four occasions in December of 2007 and January of 2008 and also wrote I.P. a letter on February 
9, 2008.  Jane Doe was released on February 15, 2008.  Following her release from prison, Jane 
Doe visited I.P. four or five times beginning in March of 2008, missing one scheduled visit. 
Jane Doe also argues that this case is similar to Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 
(2002).  However, although Jane Doe showed somewhat more interest in I.P. than did John Doe, 
Jane Doe‟s reliance on Doe v. State is equally misplaced.   In Doe v. State, the parent attempted 
to establish a relationship with his child despite the restrictions he faced while incarcerated.  In 
contrast, although Jane Doe had limited personal contact with I.P. beginning in March, 2008, she 
had no contact with I.P. from October 1, 2006, despite having been out of custody for 
approximately six months.  Despite her awareness of the child protection action, Jane Doe did 
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not complete a single step of the Department‟s case plan.  She elected not to have contact with 
I.P. while facing charges.  Even after she was placed on probation, Jane Doe had no contact with 
I.P.  It was only after her release from prison and after the Department sought to terminate her 
parental rights that Jane Doe initiated contact with I.P.  We conclude that the record contains 
substantial and competent evidence supporting the trial court‟s finding that Jane Doe abandoned 
I.P. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the record contains substantial and competent evidence supporting the 
magistrate judge‟s findings of abandonment of I.P. by each parent.  We therefore affirm the 
magistrate judge‟s order terminating Appellants‟ parental rights. 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and Justice Pro Tem TROUT, CONCUR.