Case Title: Pioneer Irrigation v. City of Caldwell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 37242

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2012-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 37242 
 
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
 
        Plaintifff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, 
           
v. 
 
CITY OF CALDWELL, 
 
       Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant.                            
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Boise, December 2011 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No.  74   
 
Filed:  April 27, 2012 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County.  Hon. Gregory M. Culet, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s grant of partial summary judgment is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
Hamilton, Michaelson & Hilty, LLP, Nampa, and Holland & Hart, LLP, Boise,  
for appellant.  Eric Stidham argued. 
 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Boise, for respondent.  Brad Williams  
argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
 
In 2008, Pioneer Irrigation District (Pioneer) filed suit against the City of Caldwell (the 
City), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the removal of urban stormwater 
discharge conduits constructed by the City without Pioneer’s authorization. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer. The court held that Pioneer held exclusive 
interests in its irrigation easements and rights-of-way such that Pioneer could maintain trespass 
claims against the City. The court also held that I.C. § 42-1209 granted Pioneer the power to 
remove encroachments constructed without its permission that it deemed to unreasonably or 
materially interfere with its easements and rights-of-way. The district court held that review of 
certain decisions by the irrigation district would be limited to whether they were arbitrary and 
capricious or reached in an unreasonable manner. The City moved for permissive appeal, which 
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motion the district court granted. We affirm the decision of the district court, except for its 
holding that irrigation easements and rights-of-way are exclusive interests. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Pioneer instituted this action in early 2008, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the City. Pioneer alleged that by adopting a new municipal storm water management 
manual, the City had caused or permitted developers to install storm water discharge pipes such 
that municipal storm water was being discharged into Pioneer’s irrigation delivery and drainage 
facilities without Pioneer’s permission. Pioneer alleged that these discharge pipes unreasonably 
and materially interfered with its irrigation easements and rights-of-ways. Pioneer sought several 
judicial declarations, including that Pioneer was authorized to both remove and prohibit the 
future construction of unauthorized, unreasonable encroachments pursuant to I.C. § 42-1209. 
Pioneer also sought injunctive relief, alleging that it enjoyed an exclusive right to possession of 
its irrigation facilities and that municipal storm water runoff events were a trespass upon those 
facilities.  
Relevant to this appeal, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The 
district court granted portions of Pioneer’s motion, holding that where Pioneer exercised its 
discretion under I.C. § 42-1209 to deny a proposed encroachment as an unreasonable or material 
interference, a court’s review of that exercise of discretion is limited to whether the decision was 
reached in an unreasonable manner, arbitrary and capricious, or based upon findings that were 
clearly erroneous. The court also held that I.C. § 42-1209 permits the owner of an irrigation 
easement or right-of-way to engage in self-help to remove an encroachment that was constructed 
without permission and unreasonably or materially interfered with the easement or right-of-way. 
The district court held that the owner of an irrigation easement or right-of-way enjoys an 
exclusive interest therein, and on those grounds denied the City’s motion for summary judgment 
seeking dismissal of Pioneer’s trespass claims.  
Following the district court’s grant of the City’s I.A.R. 12 motion for permissive appeal, 
this Court granted the City leave to appeal.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by 
the trial court. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005). A reviewing court 
will construe all disputed facts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
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party. Sprinkler Irr. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 695-96, 85 P.3d 667, 671-72 
(2004). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c).   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. This Court’s holding is limited to those issues raised in the City’s motion for 
permissive appeal. 
 
The City attacks the district court’s holdings on a variety of grounds, including errors in 
statutory interpretation, the constitutionality of the district court’s statutory interpretation, and 
lack of specificity regarding the easements’ scope. Pioneer similarly defends on a variety of 
grounds, including statutory interpretation, the application of res judicata to preclude collateral 
challenges to Pioneer’s ownership interests, and judicial estoppel of claims that the judgment is 
invalid because it does not include all affected servient landowners. 
However, review of a permissive appeal must “address only the precise question that was 
framed by the motion and answered by the trial court.” Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 
P.2d 722, 723 (1989). In the present case, the City moved for permissive appeal of the court’s 
grant of partial summary judgment. The district court granted that motion. The City’s and the 
district court’s express statements of the issues to be addressed by the permissive appeal were 
nearly verbatim. The district court phrased those issues as follows: 
1. Idaho Code section 42-1209 vests Pioneer with the initial discretion to 
determine whether an encroachment is likely to unreasonably or materially 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of its irrigation or drainage easements or 
rights-of-way, and to deny permission for the encroachment on those grounds. 
Judicial review of Pioneer’s determination and decision is limited to (a) 
whether Pioneer’s denial of permission to encroach was arbitrary and 
capricious or based on clearly erroneous findings, and (b) whether Pioneer’s 
decision-making process was reasonable. 
 
2. Idaho Code section 42-1209 authorizes Pioneer to enforce the removal of any 
encroachments installed after the effective date of section 42-1209 that 
Pioneer determines materially and unreasonably interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of its irrigation and drainage easements or rights-of-way, at the 
expense of the encroaching party, subject to certain limitations: 
 
A. Pioneer must initially request removal of the encroachment by the 
encroaching party; 
 
B. Pioneer’s right of self-help (i.e., in lieu of pursuing a judicial remedy) 
to remov[al] of the encroachment must be accomplished within the 
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borders of its easement or right-of-way and without a breach of the 
peace; and 
 
C. Judicial review of Pioneer’s determination and decision is limited to 
(a) whether Pioneer’s decision to request removal of an existing 
encroachment was arbitrary and capricious or based on clearly 
erroneous findings, and (b) whether Pioneer’s decision-making process 
was reasonable.  
 
3. That Pioneer Irrigation District enjoys exclusive rights in its primary 
easements and rights-of way under Idaho Code sections 42-1102 and 1209. 
 
We are bound to address only these issues. Since several of the parties’ claims and defenses on 
appeal are irrelevant to these precise questions, we do not address them here.  
B. Under I.C. § 42-1209, an irrigation delivery entity’s denial of permission to 
construct an encroachment is an exercise of discretion subject to limited review by a 
court.  
 
The City asserts that the question whether a proposed encroachment constitutes an 
unreasonable or material interference is a question that should be resolved by a trier of fact. The 
district court disagreed, reasoning that irrigation districts are quasi-municipal corporations 
engaged in the proprietary role of providing irrigation for landowners’ benefit, and that thus the 
scope of a civil challenge to an irrigation entity’s denial of permission to encroach must be 
limited to whether (a) the denial was arbitrary and capricious or based on clearly erroneous 
findings, or (b) the entity’s decision-making process was unreasonable.  
To resolve this issue, we must derive legislative intent, looking first to the language of 
I.C. § 42-1209. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 
(2005). Where a statute is unambiguous, its plain language controls. Id. If a statute is ambiguous 
because more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we look to rules of statutory construction 
for guidance. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 
551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). In the event that this Court is required to engage in statutory 
construction, we may ascertain legislative intent from the statute’s context, the public policy in 
support of the statute, and the statute’s legislative history. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 
988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).    
Idaho Code § 42-1209 was enacted in 2004. 2004 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 179, § 3, at 563. 
The statute expressly recognizes irrigation easements and rights-of-way as “essential” to the 
operation of irrigation districts and other irrigation entities, providing: 
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Accordingly, no person or entity shall cause or permit any encroachments onto 
the easements or rights-of-way . . . without the written permission of the irrigation 
district . . . owning the easement or right-of-way, in order to ensure that any such 
encroachments will not unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of the easement or right-of-way. Encroachments of any kind placed in 
such easement or right-of-way, without such express written permission shall be 
removed at the expense of the person or entity causing or permitting such 
encroachments, upon the request of the owner of the easement or right-of-way, in 
the event that any such encroachments unreasonably or materially interfere with 
the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-of-way. . . .  
 
I.C. § 42-1209.  
It is evident from the plain language of the statute that merely providing notice to an 
irrigation entity of an encroachment does not permit a party to construct an encroachment.  
Rather, I.C. § 42-1209 requires “written permission” from the irrigation district in order to 
“ensure that any such encroachments will not unreasonably or materially interfere with the use 
and enjoyment of the easement or right-of-way.” The plain language of the statute grants 
irrigation entities the authority to evaluate the impact of proposed encroachments and grant or 
withhold permission based on that evaluation. To hold otherwise would effectively eviscerate 
irrigation entities’ express power to grant or deny permission to construct an encroachment. 
Accordingly, we hold that the owner of an irrigation easement or right-of-way is vested with the 
discretion to determine whether an encroachment constitutes an unreasonable or material 
interference, and based on that exercise of discretion, is vested with the authority to grant or deny 
a requested encroachment.1 
We next examine the scope of legal challenges to an irrigation entity’s exercise of 
discretion regarding encroachments. The City asserts that under I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1),2 the irrigation 
entities’ decisions are not entitled to limited judicial review because there is no statute providing 
a right of judicial review. However, I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) is inapplicable here. Review of such 
decisions is not judicial review of an agency’s action. Rather, courts will be called upon to 
                                                 
1 The determination of “unreasonable or material interference” is not restricted to the physical impediment that may 
be created at the point of encroachment. Rather, the ditch owner may take into account the impact of the 
encroachment or encroachments upon the entire water delivery system. It is not difficult to envision encroachments 
that do not present a physical impediment to the operation or maintenance of a ditch, such as drainage diversions, 
which in times of heavy precipitation would permit introduction a quantity of water exceeding the carrying capacity 
of the system. Likewise, one encroachment, by itself, may not cause unreasonable or material inference while 
multiple similar encroachments may.   
2 In part, I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) states that “[a]ctions of state agencies or officers or actions of a local government, its 
officers or its units are not subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute.” 
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evaluate an irrigation district’s exercise of discretion in some form of civil action. Without 
attempting to identify all possible actions where these decisions may be reviewed, it is evident 
that such actions may well include those seeking injunctive relief or recovery of the costs of 
removal of an offending encroachment.   
This Court has previously recognized that some discretionary determinations of irrigation 
districts are subject to limited review. See Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 
Idaho 187, 194, 233 P.3d 118, 125 (2010) (irrigation district’s established method for valuing 
connection fees subject to limited review). Further, the ability to exercise the discretion that I.C. 
§ 42-1209 vests in irrigation entities is one means by which the entities are able to meet the 
various obligations imposed upon them by statute. See I.C. § 42-1201 (to the extent capable, 
keep irrigation ditches sufficiently full to meet the requirements of those entitled to water); I.C. § 
42-1202 (maintain the good order and repair of irrigation ditches, canals, and conduits); I.C. § 
42-1203 (maintain embankments in order to prevent waste of irrigation water); I.C. § 42-1204 
(duty to maintain waterworks in good repair in order to avoid damage to others). Ditch owners 
face prospective liability for failure to meet these statutory obligations. Stephenson v. Pioneer 
Irr. Dist., 49 Idaho 189, 194, 288 P. 421, 422 (1930) (owner of an irrigation ditch faces liability 
for negligent construction, maintenance, and operation thereof).  
 We hold that an irrigation entity’s determination whether to grant permission to 
construct an encroachment may be reviewed only to determine whether the decision-making 
process was reasonable, the determination was arbitrary and capricious, or the findings upon 
which the determination was reached were clearly erroneous. This conclusion rests upon two 
considerations. First, judicial deference to these decisions is consistent with the Legislature’s 
determination that irrigation entities should possess the authority to make such decisions. 
Second, a deferential approach recognizes that irrigation entities are required to satisfy 
significant statutory obligations and face exposure to liability if they fail to fulfill those 
obligations. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision on this issue.  
C. Under some circumstances, an irrigation delivery entity may remove encroachments 
at the encroaching party’s expense and without prior judicial intervention, and 
review of the decision that an unpermitted encroachment must be removed is 
limited to whether the decision-making process was reasonable and whether the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious or based upon clearly erroneous findings.  
1. 
The right to self-help 
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The City contends that an irrigation entity must initiate judicial proceedings in order to 
effect an encroachment’s removal. The district court held that irrigation entities may exercise 
self-help to remove encroachments constructed after the effective date of I.C. § 42-1209 for 
which written permission was not obtained and that unreasonably or materially interfere with the 
use and enjoyment of an irrigation right-of-way. We affirm the district court and hold that, under 
certain circumstances, I.C. § 42-1209 authorizes the owner of an irrigation right-of-way to 
remove an encroachment without prior judicial approval.  
We first look to the plain language of the statute to derive legislative intent. Four 
conditions must be satisfied before an encroachment “shall” be removed. First, the encroachment 
must have been constructed after the effective date of I.C. § 42-1209, as the statute’s provision 
for “such express written permission,” which clearly references preceding language in the 
statute, was not a requirement prior to that date. Second, the encroachment must have been 
constructed without permission. Id.  Third, the encroachment must unreasonably or materially 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-of-way. Id. Fourth, the owner must 
request that the party responsible for the encroachment remove it. Id.  
Upon satisfaction of these requirements, the statute provides that the encroachment “shall 
be removed at the expense of” the encroaching party. Id. In the event that the party responsible 
for the encroachment accedes to the demand for its removal, the statute clearly places the 
financial burden for the cost of the removal upon the encroaching party. 
The statute is silent, however, as to what happens when the party responsible for the 
encroachment fails to act upon the demand within a reasonable time.3 The question then is 
whether the irrigation entity must go to court in order to vindicate its right to cause the removal 
of the encroachment, or whether it may act first and seek compensation later. When confronted 
with statutory silence as to an appropriate remedy, this Court is “free to apply general rules of 
statutory construction to ascertain” legislative intent. Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 32, 966 
P.2d 23, 32 (1998). When engaging in statutory construction, “the Court should consider not 
only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the 
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history in order to discern and implement the 
                                                 
3 If the party responsible for the encroachment is not afforded reasonable time to respond to the request, then the 
statutory requirement of a “request” for removal would be nullified. What constitutes a “reasonable time” to respond 
to the request is clearly dependent upon circumstances. A request for removal made during spring or summer 
months when the ditch is full may well require an immediate response. Conversely, during winter months, when 
water is not flowing, there may not be a need for immediate action. 
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intent of the legislature.” Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d 524, 526 (2009) 
(citing Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398–99, 111 P.3d 73, 83–84 
(2005) and Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 
(2000)). 
The policy advanced by I.C. § 42-1209 is clear: given the essential role that irrigation 
facilities play in this state, people must not construct encroachments that unreasonably or 
materially interfere with their operation. If irrigation entities are forced into litigation in order to 
secure the removal of encroachments constructed without permission and which unreasonably or 
materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of their easements or rights-of-way, they will be 
forced to wait weeks, if not months, to cause the removal of encroachments that ought not have 
been constructed in the first instance. We conclude that the policy underlying I.C. § 42-1209 
supports the right of irrigation entities to remove such encroachments without first resorting to 
the courts.      
Interpreting I.C. § 42-1209 as authorizing irrigation entities to remove encroachments 
that have been constructed without permission and which unreasonably or materially interfere 
with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-of-way is consistent with the common law 
rule that predated the enactment of the statute. An “easement owner has a right to remove 
obstructions unreasonably interfering with use of the easement, so long as there is no breach of 
the peace.” Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 891, 728 P.2d 778, 780 (Ct. App. 1986). “Statutes 
are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal 
precedence at the time the statute was passed.” Druffel v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 
856, 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). Accordingly, we presume that the Legislature knew that the self-
help remedy was available to irrigation easement owners when it enacted I.C. § 42-1209. The 
language of the statute does not demand a construction in abrogation of the common law. 
Further, we note that this Court must read I.C. § 42-1209 in the context of the statutory 
scheme that prescribes the rights and obligations of irrigation easement and right-of-way owners. 
See I.C. §§ 42-1201 – 1204. In light of the duties that the Legislature has imposed upon irrigation 
entities, in some circumstances it will be imperative that those entities have the authority to act 
expeditiously, and without prior court intervention, to address exigencies (and potential liability 
to third parties) created by encroachments. An interpretation of I.C. § 42-1209 that authorizes 
irrigation entities to remove unreasonable encroachments that have been constructed without 
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permission advances the legislative objective of allowing these entities to meet the needs of 
water users and protect the persons and property of third parties. 
We hold that I.C. § 42-1209 does not modify the easement or right-of-way owner’s 
common law right to self-help. Rather, the statute codifies the owner’s right to recover the cost 
of removing unpermitted encroachments that unreasonably or materially interfere with the use 
and enjoyment or the easement or right-of-way.  We therefore affirm the district court’s decision 
on this issue. 
2. 
The standard of review of challenges to an irrigation entity’s decision to demand 
removal of an encroachment or remove an encroachment without prior judicial 
approval  
 
As with the standard of review of an irrigation entity’s decision to deny permission to 
encroach upon its easement or right-of-way, the parties disagree as to the standard to be applied 
when an irrigation entity demands removal of an encroachment or exercises its right to remove 
an encroachment that has been constructed without permission.  The district court concluded that 
review of such decisions is limited to determining whether the decision-making process was 
reasonable and whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious or based upon clearly 
erroneous findings.    
The considerations that led us to conclude that there is limited review of an irrigation 
entity’s decision to grant or withhold permission to construct an encroachment are applicable 
here. The Legislature has vested irrigation entities with discretion to grant or deny permission to 
construct an encroachment, and the exercise of that discretion is reviewed only to determine 
whether the decision-making process was reasonable, and whether the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious or based upon clearly erroneous findings. Considering the statutory obligations 
imposed upon irrigation entities and the potential liability that may result from failure to fulfill 
those obligations, it would be unreasonable to hold that a party who has constructed an 
encroachment in violation of its statutory obligation to obtain permission may thereby nullify the 
discretionary authority that the Legislature has conferred upon irrigation authorities. See Turner 
v. Washtenaw Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 467 N.W.2d 4, 4-5 (Mich. 1991) (review of road commission’s 
statutorily-authorized removal of encroachment limited to whether it reasonably exercised its 
discretion); Devine v. City of Seward, 258 P.2d 302, 304-05 (Kan. 1953) (challenge to city’s self-
help removal of encroachment limited to whether the decision to remove was arbitrary, 
capricious, or not made in good faith). We hold that irrigation entities’ decisions to request 
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removal of encroachments constructed without permission or to thereafter remove offending 
encroachments shall be subject to limited review to determine whether a reasonable decision-
making process was employed, and whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious or based 
upon clearly erroneous findings. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court as to this 
issue. 
D. An irrigation delivery entity does not enjoy exclusive rights in its primary easements 
and rights-of-way.  
The district court held that, pursuant to I.C. §§ 42-1102 and 1209, the owners of 
irrigation easements or rights-of-way have a primary and exclusive right to possession of 
irrigation conduits. We disagree.  
Before turning to these particular statutes, it is appropriate to look at this Court’s earlier 
statements explaining the scope of rights of a ditch owner.4 In Idaho, the common law has long 
recognized that irrigation easements and rights-of-way are not exclusive. E.g., City of Bellevue v. 
Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 550-51, 94 P. 1036, 1038-39 (1908) (owner of servient estate not liable for 
pollution caused to irrigation waters by his cattle in the ordinary course of husbandry and 
likewise not responsible for constructing a fence to protect the irrigation easement or right-of-
way); Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 630-31, 277 P. 542, 546 (1929) 
(irrigation easement owner not entitled to exclusive possession of property upon which easement 
is located and cannot assert trespass where servient estate owner’s cattle enter easement; rather 
where easement owner fails to adequately maintain irrigation conduit and injury to servient 
estate owner’s cattle results, easement owner is liable); Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 
739, 285 P. 474, 476 (1930) (irrigation district’s right-of-way is not exclusive and servient 
landowner’s reasonable, ordinary, and usual farming of hogs near and on easement is 
permissible; irrigation easement owner is responsible for damages to irrigation conduit resulting 
therefrom); Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 868, 873 (2003) 
(owners of servient estate “entitled to make any uses of their property that d[o] not unreasonably 
interfere with the District’s enjoyment of its [irrigation] easement.”). In fact, this Court has 
expressly recognized railroad easements as distinguishable from irrigation and other types of 
easements and rights-of-way, and held that only railroad easements are exclusive. Lake CDA 
                                                 
4 “Although the person who has an easement for a ditch across the land of another does not thereby gain legal title to 
any portion of that land, Reynolds Irrig. Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1948), the owner of such an 
easement is often called the ‘owner’ of the ditch.” Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 857, 55 P.3d 
304, 311 (2002). 
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Invest., LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 281-82, 233 P.3d 721, 728-29 (2010)5 
(citing Coulsen, 47 Idaho at 627-28, 277 P. at 544-45).  
As previously noted, the Legislature is presumed to be aware of this Court’s earlier 
decisions. Druffel, 136 Idaho at 856, 41 P.3d at 742. Certainly, our Legislature knows how to 
abrogate decisions from this Court. See, e.g., Act of March 4, 2010, ch. 29, 2010 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 49, 49–50 (abrogating holding of Rammell v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agric., 147 Idaho 415, 
422–23, 210 P.3d 523, 530–31 (2009)). This Court will not interpret a statute as abrogating the 
common law unless it is evident that was the Legislature’s intent. Statewide Const., Inc. v. Pietri, 
150 Idaho 423, 429, 247 P.3d 650, 656 (2011), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). See also Baker v. Ore–Ida 
Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 583, 513 P.2d 627, 635 (1973) (“Where the clear implication of a 
legislative act is to change the common law rule we recognize the modification because the 
legislature has the power to abrogate the common law.”). Nothing in the language of I.C. § 42-
1209 indicates legislative intent to overturn our longstanding precedent that ditch owners’ rights 
are non-exclusive. 
Further, this Court has previously addressed whether I.C. § 42-1102 expands the rights of 
irrigation easement holders. In Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal 
Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001), this Court rejected the irrigation district’s claim that 
the statute expanded the rights of ditch owners. Id. at 522, 20 P.3d 706 (“We conclude that 
neither the provisions expressed in [a channel change easement] nor the quoted language of the 
statute . . . operate to create a greater right”). Instead, we stated: “I.C. § 42-1102 only 
contemplates a right-of-way for cleaning, maintaining, and repairing canals. The statute provides 
notice to owners of land that the owner of the ditch or canal has the right-of-way, and serves to 
clarify what the right-of-way includes.” Id. at 524, 20 P.3d at 708. Although the issue presented 
in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District related to a dispute between the ditch owner and the 
owner of the servient estate, this Court rejected the suggestion that I.C. § 42-1102 expanded the 
rights of ditch owners: “Missing from the statute is any suggestion that owners of the right-of-
way may, in cleaning, maintaining, or repairing the canal or ditch, restrict the servient 
landowner’s use of the right-of-way because of safety concerns.” Id.   
                                                 
5 Although Pioneer challenges the application of this Court’s precedent to the matter at hand on the ground that the 
precedent predates the 2004 enactment of I.C. § 42-1209, we decided Lake CDA Investments in 2010.  
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As the statutes lack a clear expression of legislative intent to abrogate the common law 
and grant easement owners an exclusive right to possession, we conclude that the district court 
erred in holding that owners of irrigation easements and rights-of-way have an exclusive 
possessory interest in those easements.   
E. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
The City requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to both I.C. §§ 12-117(1) and 12-121. 
Pioneer requests attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. Under I.C. § 12-117(1), the prevailing 
party in an administrative or civil judicial proceeding between a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person is entitled to attorney fees if “the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law.” Under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), a court may award a 
prevailing party attorney fees if “the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation . . . .” Since each party has only prevailed in part on this 
appeal, we decline to award attorney fees to either party.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm a portion of the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the 
grounds that, pursuant to I.C. § 42-1209, an irrigation right-of-way owner’s determination that an 
encroachment unreasonably or materially interferes with the right-of-way shall only be 
overturned if it is arbitrary and capricious, was based upon clearly erroneous findings, or was not 
the product of a reasonable decision-making process. We likewise affirm the district court’s 
grant of partial summary judgment on the grounds that, pursuant to I.C. § 42-1209, the owner of 
an irrigation easement or right-of-way may engage in self-help to remove an encroachment that it 
has determined unreasonably or materially interferes with its right-of-way, and hold that such 
action is reviewed under the same standard applicable to the denial of permission to construct an 
encroachment. However, we reverse the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment 
holding that owners of irrigation easements and rights-of-way enjoy exclusive rights of 
possession. As each party has prevailed in part, we decline to award attorney fees and costs. This 
matter is remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
Justices EISMANN and W. JONES CONCUR. 
 
J. JONES, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
13 
 
 
I concur in Parts III.A, III.D, and III.E of the Court’s opinion, but dissent with regard to 
Parts III.B and III.C. I am unable to read I.C. § 42-1209 as requiring deferential review of the 
decisions of irrigation entities or authorizing irrigation entities to resort to self-help in removing 
encroachments.  
There is no language in I.C. § 42-1209 that in any way addresses the decision-making 
procedure to be employed by irrigation entities or how their decisions are to be considered by the 
courts. Had the Legislature intended special procedures to be employed under this statute, it 
undoubtedly would have provided for such procedures. The Legislature is certainly capable of 
providing for limited review of certain types of decisions and has specifically done so when it 
deems appropriate. For decisions of State agencies, the Legislature has provided a deferential 
standard of review in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA). See Chapter 52, Title 67, 
Idaho Code. However, such review does not apply to local governments, absent legislative 
direction. As we noted in Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff’s Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 7−8, 72 P.3d 845, 
847−48 (2003): 
Though the IAPA and its judicial review provisions are generally inapplicable to 
local government actions, a statute may provide for judicial review of local 
government actions pursuant to the IAPA. Absent a statute invoking the IAPA’s 
judicial provisions, local government actions may not be reviewed under the 
IAPA.  
 
The Legislature has taken specific action to bring decisions of local planning and zoning 
agencies within the review provisions of IAPA. I.C. §§ 67-6519 to 67-6521. The limited review 
provided for in the Court’s opinion is, in effect, comparable to the arbitrariness standard 
specified by the Legislature in I.C. § 67-5279 for State agency decisions.  
 
This Court has recognized the discretion of irrigation districts to regulate their internal 
affairs. In Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 194, 233 P.3d 118, 125 
(2010), we indicated that an irrigation district’s established method of valuing connection fees is 
subject to limited review. However, even then the Court in Viking vacated a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the irrigation district where the record disclosed a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether a connection fee was reasonably determined. Id. at 195, 233 P.3d at 126. And, 
it is important to note that the limited review was confined to an issue dealing with the internal 
governance of the irrigation district, rather than a matter that implicated the rights or interests of 
outside parties.  
14 
 
 
While irrigation districts have been characterized as quasi-municipal or public 
corporations, they are not to be confused with true municipal corporations, nor assumed to have 
the powers of such corporations. The nature of irrigation districts was thoroughly analyzed in 
Lewiston Orchards Irr. Dist. v. Gilmore, 53 Idaho 377, 23 P.2d 720 (1933), wherein this Court 
held such districts not to be exempt from property tax like municipal corporations under Article 
VII, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. Id. at 383, 23 P.2d at 722. The Court summarized: 
It follows that the primary purpose of an irrigation district is limited to the 
conducting of its business for the private benefit of the land owners within the 
district by the acquisition of water rights and the irrigation of lands within its 
boundaries; and that the land owners within the district are the members of the 
corporation, control its affairs, and are primarily benefited by its operations. It is 
likewise true that irrigation districts have been endowed with certain incidental 
municipal powers necessary to its proper functioning, such as the election of its 
officers and directors, the levy of assessments for bond, interest, maintenance and 
operation and other like authorized purposes, and the equalization and collection 
of such assessments, which incidental municipal powers have resulted in its 
classification as a quasi-municipal or municipal corporation in connection with 
the construction of statutes and constitutional provisions involving the exercise of 
such municipal powers. 
 
We have carefully analyzed and compared the foregoing authorities and others to 
similar effect and have reached therefrom the conclusion that an irrigation district 
is a public corporation having such incidental municipal powers as are necessary 
to its internal management and the proper conduct of its business. Its primary 
purpose is the acquisition and operation of an irrigation system as a business 
enterprise for the benefit of land owners within the district, such property being 
held in trust for them in a proprietary capacity, while secondarily and 
incidentally, certain municipal powers have been conferred for its government 
and regulation, and when this is borne in mind, any seeming confusion in or 
conflict with the authorities holding that an irrigation district is a municipal or 
quasi-municipal corporation within the meaning of certain statutes and 
constitutional provisions disappear.  
 
Id. at 381−82, 23 P.2d at 722 (emphasis added). 
Further, in Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irr. Dist., we determined that irrigation 
districts are not municipal or public corporations for purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, 
explaining:  
An essential element of a municipal or public corporation is a corporate purpose 
deemed to be for the welfare of the general public—“a  public corporation is one 
that is created for political purposes with political powers to be exercised for 
purposes connected with the public good in the administration of civil 
15 
 
government.”  However, an irrigation district’s primary purpose is the 
acquisition and operation of an irrigation system as a business enterprise for the 
benefit of its shareholders.  
 
97 Idaho 580, 587, 548 P.2d 80, 87 (1976) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
It is certainly reasonable for an irrigation district to have discretion to regulate its own 
affairs. Providing limited review of such governance decisions is akin to the manner in which the 
Court considers governance decisions of private businesses. Both the Court and the Legislature 
have adopted versions of the business judgment rule, which allows business corporations to 
make decisions within the powers of the corporation and the directors’ honest business judgment, 
without court interference. McCann v. McCann, No. 37547, 2012 W.L. 798581, at *4 (Idaho 
March 13, 2012); I.C. § 30-1-831. However, decisions of a business corporation that affect the 
rights or interests of outside parties would not be treated by the courts with the same deference. 
I am aware of no case decided by this Court that grants a deferential standard of review 
for decisions of an irrigation district that affect the rights or interests of outside parties, let alone 
any cases in which a deferential standard of review is granted for such decisions of private 
parties, such as Carey Act operating companies, non-profit irrigation entities, and lateral ditch 
associations, none of which are even quasi-governmental in nature. The Court’s opinion cites 
Viking Construction for the proposition that limited review may apply to some discretionary 
determinations of irrigation districts and then concludes from that that an “irrigation entity’s” 
determination to grant or deny permission for an encroachment or to demand removal of an 
encroachment is subject only to limited review. This appears to grant solely private companies 
and associations the same rights as an irrigation district. Such limited review is premised on the 
critical nature of the irrigation entity’s duties and the potential for liability for failure to carry out 
such duties. What other quasi-governmental entities will be entitled to a deferential standard of 
review under this decision? Does this principle, for instance, pertain to decisions made by fire 
districts? They carry out critical duties and face potential liability for failing to do so. 
And, if a non-governmental irrigation entity is entitled to deferential review for decisions 
made pursuant to I.C. § 42-1209, does that same deference apply to decisions made by all other 
landowners holding a right of way for an irrigation ditch under I.C. § 42-1102? Section 42-1102 
was amended by the same legislation that enacted the new I.C. § 42-1209 to include essentially 
the same language as that new section. 2004 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 179, p. 561. Furthermore, 
16 
 
what other statutes pertaining to irrigation districts entail a limited right of judicial review? Are 
the decisions of an irrigation entity relating to the maintenance and operations of canals and 
ditches across the land of another pursuant to I.C. § 42-1204 subject to limited review? If limited 
review applies to decisions made under I.C. § 42-1209, we can certainly anticipate that irrigation 
entities will assert that they are entitled to deferential review of decisions they make pursuant to 
other statutes.  
There is some rationale for providing limited review of some decisions made by true 
government bodies. First, those entities must observe a number of procedural safeguards in their 
decision-making process. Persons who may be aggrieved by governmental decisions have 
statutory rights to notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, a record of the proceedings, 
findings of fact and a reasoned decision by the decision-making body, and the like. See, e.g., I.C. 
§ 67-5242. There are no such statutory procedures governing the decision-making process of 
irrigation districts or private irrigation entities such as Carey Act operating companies. Second, 
the decisions of true government agencies are subject to review by voters at the ballot box. If 
county commissioners or city councilmen make what the voters perceive as a bum decision, the 
voters can throw the bums out. However, irrigation districts are not necessarily subject to the 
same political scrutiny as municipal corporations.  That is, leaders of cities and counties are 
beholden to their entire voting population—landowners and non-landowners alike.  But irrigation 
district elections may be closed to non-landowners. I.C. § 43-111. Accordingly, irrigation district 
board members may be beyond the reach of non-landowners within the district.   
 
The potential for an irrigation district’s board to lack political accountability necessitates 
a more thorough judicial review of its decisions.  In the context of cities or counties, it makes 
sense that we give elected leaders leeway in their decision-making.  But with an irrigation 
district, it is quite possible that the district’s board could make decisions that affect the interests 
of people with no political recourse.  The same is true for the other types of water-delivery 
entities covered by I.C. § 42-1209, like a Carey Act company, which have no political oversight.  
We defer to decision-makers with some skin in the political game because our constitutional 
separation of powers assumes the democratic process will temper unwise choices. See Miles v. 
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 640, 778 P.2d 757, 762 (1989) (recognizing that certain 
questions are reserved to the political branches of government).  When, however, decision-
makers lack political accountability, we should not grant undue deference to their decisions.   
17 
 
It seems to me that the Court should either require any right of limited review to be 
specifically spelled out in a statute, such as the Legislature has done in instances where it desires 
limited review, or this Court should exercise its inherent “power to fashion the procedures 
necessary to perform [its] duties.” City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 802, 215 P.3d 
514, 522 (2009). In doing so, we should specify the decision-making procedure that must be 
employed by the irrigation entity in order to qualify for limited review. That is, we should 
require procedural mechanisms, perhaps comparable to those specified in I.C. § 67-5242, in 
order to ensure the due process rights of the adverse party and a reviewable record on appeal. 
Leaving it to an irrigation entity to determine what type of procedure to employ seems to be 
risky, at best.6  
 
I read I.C. § 42-1209 to merely define the rights of water-delivery entities with respect to 
their irrigation easements.  The entities covered by I.C. § 42-1209 have the right to permit or 
deny encroachments on their rights of way in the first instance, and the courts are tasked with 
evaluating the entity’s decision by determining whether an encroachment is, or would be, 
unreasonable or would materially interfere with the entity’s use of the easement.  Under this 
reading, an entity seeking the removal of an encroachment would file a civil action, and if the 
court determined the encroachment unreasonable or a material interference, the encroaching 
party would bear the responsibility and costs of removal. If urgent action is necessary, the 
irrigation entity may seek immediate injunctive relief. 
 
It does not appear that either irrigation districts or other irrigation entities need to have 
the additional benefit of limited review of their decisions in order to carry out their important 
responsibilities. After all, I.C. § 42-1209 clearly gives them the upper hand in dealing with 
unwarranted encroachments. The very existence of the statute would give the potential 
encroacher pause in placing an encroachment on a right of way. The statute gives the irrigation 
entity a leg up in enforcement proceedings in court. Adding the element of deferential review, 
which the Legislature did not see fit to do, would overly gild the lily.  
 
My primary concern about giving this extra benefit to irrigation entities is that it may 
distort the litigation process where outside parties have legitimate rights to encroach upon, or 
have the right to cause runoff into, canals or ditches. Pioneer recognizes that some of the runoff 
                                                 
6 The record does not indicate whether Pioneer employed any particular decision-making process in determining the 
encroachments that constituted transgressions of its rights under I.C. § 42-1209 in this case, or what procedure it 
intends to pursue in the future to make such a determination.  
18 
 
water it wishes to preclude from draining into its ditches and canals has historically drained in 
such a manner. Some of the runoff it wishes to prevent is from those who hold water rights in the 
district. In a position statement contained in the record, Pioneer states: 
[Caldwell’s storm water runoff] should not be drained through existing irrigation 
drainage facilities even if the post development land proposed for such drainage is 
land that used to be historically drained in such a manner. Existing irrigation 
drainage facilities were designed to drain excess water from undeveloped 
agricultural lands and were not designed, constructed and/or not maintained to 
accept storm water runoff from developed lands. 
 
Thus, Pioneer seeks to obtain limited review of its decisions that may well impact established 
runoff or flowage rights. This is not a matter where Pioneer should go into court with the deck 
stacked in its favor. If deference has to be accorded to decisions it makes vis-à-vis existing rights 
of others, it will likely prevail in instances where it should not.  
 
Nor does I.C. § 42-1209, in and of itself, authorize any right of self-help. As the Court 
points out, I.C. § 42-1209 is silent with respect to abatement. Courts, not water-delivery entities, 
should have the responsibility of determining the reasonableness, or lack thereof, of an 
encroachment.  If a court finds that a party has unreasonably encroached on an easement, then 
the court can craft an appropriate remedy, consistent with I.C. § 42-1209.  Furthermore, when the 
Legislature wishes to give parties a self-help or abatement remedy, it says so.  See, e.g., I.C. §§ 
52-202 and 52-301 (providing an express abatement remedy for private and public nuisances, in 
addition to civil and, in the case of  public nuisances, criminal remedies).   
The Court cites the Court of Appeals’ decision in Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 728 
P.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1986), for the proposition that an easement owner is entitled to resort to self-
help to remove obstacles that unreasonably restrict the enjoyment of easement rights. The Court 
of Appeals notes that easement owners have certain common law rights to resort to self-help, 
where it can be accomplished without a breach of the peace. Nothing in I.C. § 42-1209 restricts 
or enhances any such common law right. The point is that the statute does not address the issue 
of self-help in any way and certainly does not grant a self-help remedy. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the district court’s entire summary judgment 
order.  
 
Chief Justice BURDICK CONCURS.