Case Title: Lewis v. American Cyanamid Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-83-97

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). POLLOCK, J., writing for a majority Court. On July 4, 1989, Peter Lewis was burned in an explosion that occurred while he was using two Combat Room Foggers manufactured by United Industries Corp. (United) and sold by American Cyanamid Co. (American). After reading the instructions, Lewis activated two foggers in his kitchen. After activating the foggers, Lewis left the kitchen but returned, contrary to the instructions on the label, to fix what he believed to be a malfunctioning fogger. In doing so, Lewis suffered second degree burns over twenty-five percent of his body. By the date of the trial, he had made a good recovery and had returned to his previous employment. His burns resulted in skin damage, including permanent scars. Lewis sued for his personal injuries, alleging failure-to-warn, manufacturing defect, and design-defect claims against United and American (hereinafter, defendants). Specifically, Lewis alleged that the warning on the foggers concerning flammability was inadequate, that the foggers suffered from a manufacturing defect, and that the flammability of the foggers' contents resulted from a design defect. Before trial, the Law Division dismissed Lewis' failure-to-warn claim, holding it to be preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodentia Act (FIFRA). Lewis proceeded to trial on his design- and manufacturing-defect claims. The Combat Room Foggers used a hydrocarbon propellant. At trial, Lewis asserted that the foggers should have been designed to use the compound P-22, rather than a hydrocarbon propellant. Both Lewis and defendants offered expert testimony regarding the practicality and feasibility of P-22 as an alternative design. Lewis' expert testified that P-22 was safe for use in foggers; was three times less flammable than the hydrocarbon propellant; and that other foggers marketed at that time used P-22 as a propellant. In contrast, the defense expert testified that P-22 could cause birth defects; that P-22 was eventually phased out by the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act because of its ozone-depleting qualities; and that P-22 was too highly pressurized for safe use in the foggers. The jury rejected Lewis' manufacturing-defect claim but awarded him damages on his design-defect claim. The jury found that Lewis was fifty percent at fault, and that each defendant was twenty-five percent at fault, awarding damages of $275,000. The trial court granted defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that Lewis had not met his burden of proving that P-22 was a feasible and practical design alternative. According to the trial court, defendants had adduced sufficient proof that P-22 was dangerous and, therefore, the jury should not have been asked whether the manufacturer should have incurred the risks of using P-22 over the risks posed by using the hydrocarbon propellant. The trial court also held that defendants were entitled to a heeding presumption that people who used the foggers would heed warnings cautioning against their misuse. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict; reinstated the jury verdict on liability; and remanded the case for a retrial solely on the issue of Lewis' comparative negligence and on the amount of damages. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lewis' failure to warn claim and held that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Medtronic, Inc. V. Lohr did not alter the conclusion that FIFRA preempted this claim. The Supreme Court granted defendants' petitions for certification and Lewis' cross-petition for certification. HELD: Lewis' failure-to-warn claim was properly dismissed. The Appellate Division properly reversed the trial court's entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The matter must be retried on the issues of Lewis' comparative fault and defendants' liability, but not on damages. Furthermore, Lewis introduced sufficient facts to justify submission to the jury of the proposed alternative design of the propellant. 1. The dismissal of Lewis' failure-to-warn claim was proper. As a registered insecticide product, language on a fogger's label is determined by FIFRA and related regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). FIFRA contains an express preemption provision prohibiting a state from imposing additional or different labeling requirements. Lewis' failure-to-warn claim constitutes an imposition of a labeling requirement, which FIFRA preempts. Medtronic does not alter that conclusion. (pp. 7-13) 2. For Lewis to be held comparatively negligent, he must have voluntarily and unreasonably encountered the known risk of being burned. The Appellate Division properly remanded the issue of Lewis' comparative negligence for retrial. However, issues of defendants' liability and Lewis' comparative negligence must be considered together. Because the issues of Lewis' comparative negligence and defendants' liability intertwine, it would be inappropriate to remand one without the other. Contrary to the Appellate Division, the remand should not include the issue of damages. The jury instruction on damages, although it did not literally follow the model charge, was substantially correct. That instruction did not have the clear capacity of producing an unjust result. (pp. 13-19) 3. The jury, when considering Lewis' reasonably foreseeable misuse, must decide whether the fogger's design was defective regardless of the presence of warnings cautioning against such misuse. (pp. 19-21) 4. As found by the Appellate Division, the trial court erred in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not prove with requisite certainty that in 1988 and 1989, the time the fogger was manufactured, the deleterious effects of P-22 were believed to be so probable and of such magnitude that its use as an aerosol propellant would have been unreasonable. The record reveals disputed issues of material facts concerning the practicality and feasibility of P-22. (pp. 21-29) 5. The decision to sustain the denial of the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be interpreted as altering the parties' burden of proof. In a design-defect case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and must prove either that the product's risks outweighed its utility or that the product could have been designed in an alternative manner so as to minimize or eliminate the risk of harm. Lewis has established a prima facie case that P-22 is a practical and feasible alternative design that would have reduced the flammability of the fogger's propellant. Consequently, the Appellate Division's decision to reverse the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is upheld. The Court takes no position, however, on the issue of whether Lewis has met his burden. That is for the jury to decide at retrial. Even if Lewis can prove that P-22 was a safer, practical and feasible alternative design, defendants may assert the state-of-the-art affirmative defense. If it can be proven that P-22 was not a practical and feasible alternative at the time the foggers left United's control, it would not be liable for the alleged design defect. Whether United has proven the state-of-the-art defense is a factual issue best left to the jury. (pp. 29-38) The judgment of the Appellate Division dismissing Lewis' failure-to-warn claim and reversing the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is AFFIRMED. The Appellate Divisions judgment is MODIFIED and REMANDED for a retrial on the issues of Lewis' comparative fault and defendants' liability, but not on damages. JUSTICE HANDLER concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees that Lewis' failure-to-warn claim was correctly dismissed. However, he departs from the majority in its disposition of Lewis' design-defect claim. As a matter of law, defendants owed Lewis no duty to design or sell a fogger with P-22 because the substance has been banned and defendants knew or should have known the reason for that ban. Because Lewis cannot establish that defendants owed him a duty, the issues of Lewis' comparative negligence and the trial court's erroneous instructions are moot. JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE GARIBALDI join. PETER LEWIS, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, REALEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION, CHEMSICO INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, and DOES I THROUGH V, Fictitious Designations, Defendants. Argued February 17, 1998 -- Decided July 20, 1998 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 294 N.J. Super. 53(1996). Dudley W. Von Holt, a member of the Missouri bar, argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent United Industries Corporation appearing in place of Realex Chemical Corporation and Chemsico Incorporated in this action (Piper & Marbury, attorneys; Robert J. Assuncao, of counsel; Mr. Assuncao and Steven F. Gooby, on the briefs). Anthony J. Marchetta argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent American Cyanamid Company (Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, attorneys; Mr. Marchetta, Kathryn M. Decker, Suzanne M. Sofer and Ronald D. Coleman, on the briefs). James M. Burke argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Mackevich, Burke & Stanicki, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by POLLOCK, J. Plaintiff, Peter Lewis, was burned in an explosion that occurred while he was using two Combat Room Foggers manufactured by co-defendant United Industries Corp. (United) and sold by co-defendant American Cyanamid Co. (American). He brought failure-to-warn, manufacturing defect, and design-defect claims against both defendants. The Law Division dismissed plaintiff's failure to warn claim, holding it was preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodentia Act ("FIFRA"). 7 U.S.C. 136-136y. A jury rejected plaintiff's manufacturing defect claim, but awarded him damages on his design-defect claim. The Law Division granted defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. R. 4:40-2. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded on the issues of plaintiff's comparative negligence and damages, but not on defendants' liability. 294 N.J. Super. 53, 81 (App. Div. 1996). It affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's failure to warn claim. Id. at 67. We granted defendants' petitions and plaintiff's cross-petition for certification. 151 N.J. 74 (1997). We affirm the Appellate Division's decision to dismiss plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim and to reverse the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We modify the Appellate Division's judgment by remanding for a retrial on the issues of plaintiff's comparative fault and defendants' liability, but not on damages. We also hold that plaintiff introduced sufficient facts to justify submission to the jury of the proposed alternative design of the propellant. 4. Did the plaintiff, PETER LEWIS, misuse the product, Combat Room Fogger, or use it in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable? Yes. 5. If the product was being misused at the time of the accident, was the misuse objectively foreseeable to the manufacturer? Yes . 6. Was the design defective, taking into account your answer to Question No. 5? Yes. 7. Was the design defect a proximate cause of the accident? Yes. 8. Did the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably proceed to encounter a known danger in the manner in which he used the Combat Room Fogger? Yes. 9. Was the plaintiff's voluntary and unreasonable encountering of a known danger a proximate cause of the accident? Yes. The jury found that plaintiff was fifty percent at fault and that each defendant was twenty-five percent at fault. It then awarded plaintiff damages totaling $275,000. Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court held that plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that P-22 was a feasible and practical design alternative. According to the court, defendants had adduced sufficient proof that P-22 was dangerous. Thus, the jury should not have been asked whether the manufacturer should have incurred the risks of using P-22 rather than those posed by using the hydrocarbon propellant. The court also held that the defendants were entitled to a heeding presumption that people who used the foggers would heed warnings cautioning against their misuse. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reinstated the jury verdict on liability, and remanded the case for a retrial solely on the issue of plaintiff's comparative negligence and on the quantum of damages. It affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's failure to warn claim and held that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1996) , did not alter the conclusion that FIFRA preempted this claim. 294 N.J. Super. at 67. (b) Uniformity Such state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter. . . . . SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-83/84/ 85 September Term 1997 PETER LEWIS, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, REALEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION, CHEMSICO INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, and DOES I THROUGH V, Fictitious Designations, Defendants. HANDLER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Court forces defendants between Scylla and Charybdis. It accepts plaintiff's assertion that United Industries's product, the Combat Room Fogger, may have been defective because it was flammable. It also accepts plaintiff's proposal that a jury should determine whether United Industries should have designed its fogger to contain P-22, a known ozone depleter and a suspected teratogen. By its ruling, the Court, in effect, is telling manufacturers to pick their poison. That kind of judicial admonition cannot be the law. Following the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the federal government, attempting to preserve the ozone layer, banned P-22. As a matter of public policy and fairness, a manufacturer should not have the duty to design a product with a substance that has subsequently been outlawed so long as the factual basis for that ban was known or knowable to the manufacturing community when it made or marketed the product. Otherwise, a manufacturer would face the Catch-22 of being liable for either creating a product that does not contain an unsafe, subsequently banned substance or for exposing people to the unsafe, subsequently banned substance and causing the harms that prompted the prohibition. I agree that plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim was correctly dismissed. However, I depart from the majority in its disposition of plaintiff's design-defect claim. In my opinion, as a matter of law, defendants owed plaintiff no duty to design or sell a fogger with P-22 because the substance has been banned and defendants knew or should have known the reason for the proscription. Accordingly, I would reverse the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court's granting defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Because plaintiff cannot establish that defendants owed him a duty, the issues of plaintiff's comparative negligence and the trial court's erroneous instructions are rendered moot. [Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 172 (1979).] Thus, the court, rather than the jury, has the responsibility to determine whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty in this case. In my opinion, imposing a duty on defendants to manufacture or sell a fogger with P-22, a subsequently banned substance known to deplete the ozone layer, would be contrary to public policy, unfair, and would disserve the public interest. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 phased out the use of P-22. Public L. No. 101-549, 602(a), 605, 104 Stat. 2399, 2651, 2658-59 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 7671a, 7671d). In so doing, Congress and President Bush concluded that P-22, which is also called hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22), should ultimately be banned because it is an ozone depleter. The determination that P-22 is unfit for use in this country is a reflection of this nation's public policy of protecting the environment from ozone depleters. Implementing the Clear Air Act Amendments, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1993 prohibited the use of P-22, designated a class II substance by the Clean Air Act, in foggers. 58 Fed. Reg. 69672 (1993) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 82.70). By banning nonessential products containing P-22, the EPA accelerated swiftly the prohibition of the ozone depleter. The promulgation of the rule reflected a federal public policy to eliminate rapidly P-22 from nonessential products such as foggers. Federal law can comprise this State's public policy. See Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp. 153 N.J. 163, 190-91 (1998) (finding, under Conscientious Employee Protection Act, a clear mandate of public policy based, in part, on federal regulations); D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 133 N.J. 516, 528 (1993) (holding, under CEPA, "[f]ederal law and policy can constitute New Jersey's clear mandate of public policy"). This State shares the federal government's interest in protecting the environment. Accordingly, this State and the federal government have the common goal of preserving the ozone layer. Consequently, this State's tort law should incorporate the federal government's ozone protection policies, including the prohibition of foggers containing P-22. Our State's tort law should be at least as protective of the ozone layer as federal law. Cf. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 461 (1984) (holding federal regulations are minimal standards that this State's tort law may exceed). Although foggers containing P-22 were legal at the time defendants manufactured and sold the Combat Room Fogger that injured plaintiff, as a matter of public policy defendants should not have a duty to design or sell a fogger with P-22. Despite its legality at the time, the basis for the ban existed in 1988 and 1989, when the fogger in this case was manufactured and sold. At that time P-22 was known to deplete the ozone layer, and the chemical's detrimental effect on the environment was sufficiently serious to warrant P-22's current ban from foggers and other pressurized dispensers and aerosols. In fact, in 1987 the international community agreed to limit and reduce the use of P-22 and other ozone-depleting substances. See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). The available information on P-22's ozone-depleting qualities should be imputed to defendants. In Feldman, supra, 97 N.J. at 453, this Court held that available scientific knowledge of the deleterious effects of Declomycin, a tetracycline, should be imputed to a drug manufacturer. We wrote that "in some fields . . . a manufacturer may be expected to be informed and affirmatively to seek out information concerning the public's use of its own product." Ibid. We added: "Furthermore, a reasonably prudent manufacturer will be deemed to know of reliable information generally available or reasonably obtainable in the industry or in the particular field involved." Ibid. Our law should be symmetrical. If a manufacturer may be charged with available information, it should also be credited with such information. Thus, in this case, defendants should be credited with being aware of P-22's ozone-depleting qualities, which was widely known in the scientific and manufacturing community and the subject of an international agreement. In view of defendants' knowledge, imputed or actual, that P-22 depleted the ozone layer, defendants should benefit from the subsequent ban of the substance and be shielded from the imposition of a duty to manufacture or sell a fogger comprising P-22. Due to its well-known ozone-depleting qualities, the inclusion of P-22 in foggers, whether in 1988 or 1998, is contrary to this State's public policy. Consequently, for the same public policy reason, defendants should not have a duty to manufacture or sell foggers with P-22, even when doing so was not proscribed. Imposing a duty on manufacturers to create a product with a subsequently banned substance would create inimical incentives. Influencing the behavior of persons or entities through incentives is one of the fundamental purposes of tort law. See Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 489-90 (1996) (recognizing importance of deterrence goal of torts in strict products liability); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) 4, at 25-26 (discussing tort law's goals of preventing future harm and punishing tortfeasors). Putting a duty on defendants in this case fails to discourage sufficiently manufacturers from creating products with ingredients that are fundamentally flawed and prone to proscription. Knowledge of the reasons for the ban exists long before the promulgation of the prohibition. Though creating a product with a banned substance prior to its prohibition obviously is permissible, doing so should be discouraged. By placing a duty on defendants, the majority encourages the manufacture or sale of products known to be unsafe. That conflicts our well-established strict liability jurisprudence. Accordingly, the Court's holding generates discord and confusion, rather than harmony, in our law. See Vega v. Piedilato, __ N.J. __, __ (1998) (slip op. at 12-13) (Handler, J., concurring) (recognizing need to harmonize the law). Besides, placing a duty on defendants to create or sell foggers with P-22 cannot shape their future behavior. The deterrence goal of tort law is well-grounded in our jurisprudence. See Gantes, supra, 145 N.J. at 489-90 (emphasizing this State's strict products liability law's goal to discourage manufacture and distribution of harmful products). Of course, today United Industries cannot begin to put P-22, rather than the purportedly more flammable hydrocarbon propellant, in the Combat Room Fogger because doing so would be illegal. Therefore, imposing a duty on defendants in this case does not advance the deterrence goal of tort law. In addition, imposing a duty on a manufacturer to design a product that has been prohibited contradicts the expectations the ban engenders. A manufacturer that did not design products with a subsequently banned substance known to be flawed would expect to be applauded for choosing not to use the substance prior to its proscription. By imposing a duty on defendants to have used P-22 in the foggers they created or sold, the court penalizes, rather than praises, defendants for creating or selling a product that did not deplete the ozone layer. The unanticipated imposition of a duty on defendants is unfair because defendants had no opportunity to conform their behavior in accordance with the unexpected duty. Lastly, imposing a duty on defendants puts both the manufacturer and seller in a quandary. If defendants had designed or sold foggers with P-22, a known ozone-depleter and a suspected teratogen, they would be subject to liability for the harms P-22 would have caused. By imposing a duty on defendants in this case, the majority is subjecting defendants to potential liability for using an alternative to P-22. Placing defendants in a bind from which they cannot escape the threat of liability is unfair. Instead, defendants should be immune from liability for manufacturing or selling a product that was known to have the undesirable effects that caused its subsequent ban. The Court is misguided in converting this issue into a factual matter to be determined by a jury. In strict products liability cases, juries are enjoined to determine on the basis of a risk-utility analysis whether a product's lack of safety outweighs its usefulness. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1 (1981) (explaining the risk-utility analysis). Plaintiff's theory of liability in this case requires a comparison of the risks of two distinct product designs. A jury ought not, in this context, be called upon to engage in a risk-risk analysis to determine which risk ultimately must be counterbalanced with the products' utility. In permitting a jury to do so, the Court delegates its own nondelegable responsibility for determining as a matter of law whether a duty may appropriately be placed on a manufacturer. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE GARIBALDI join in this opinion. NO. A-83/84/85 PETER LEWIS, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, and DOES I THROUGH V, etc., Defendants. DECIDED