Case Title: Sides v. Beene

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Alvalu SIDES v. Linda BEENE, Margie Melhorne,
Trecora Hagy, Jim Hagy, Mollie Hagy, Melody
Hagy, Beth Welshans, Bradley Welshans,
Catherine Welshans
 Cantor, Cindy Welshans, Vanessa Welshans, &
Wilson Welshans

96-1020                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 24, 1997


1.   Deeds -- interpretation of -- primary intent given to intent
     of grantor. -- In interpreting a deed, the supreme court gives
     primary consideration to the intent of the grantor; the intent
     of the grantor is gathered solely from the language of the
     deed unless the language of the instrument is ambiguous,
     uncertain, or doubtful. 

2.   Deeds -- fee tail at common law discussed -- adopted persons
     traditionally excluded from class of "bodily heirs" in
     construing fee tail. -- At common law, a deed that granted
     real property and utilized granting language such as "to A and
     her bodily heirs" or similar language created a fee tail so
     that such a conveyance created a life estate in A, then
     subsequent life estates in the surviving lineal descendants of
     A; traditionally, the supreme court has excluded adopted
     individuals from the class of "bodily heirs" in construing a
     fee tail.

3.   Deeds -- adoption-inheritance laws not intended to modify
     established meaning of terms used in deeds. -- Terms such as
     bodily heirs, issue, etc. have long been defined in the law,
     and the definition does not include adopted children; the
     adoption-inheritance laws were not intended to modify the
     established meaning of terms used in deeds.

4.   Deeds -- modern rule would include adoptees in term "heirs of
     her body" -- under law in effect at time deed was drafted
     adopted person would not qualify as heir. -- Although the
     Revised Uniform Adoption Act makes it plain that it is
     applicable for all purposes, including inheritance and
     applicability of documents and instruments, and the modern
     trend is to treat adopted and natural children equally, there
     was no doubt that in 1930, when the deed in question was
     executed, the rule of property in Arkansas was that an adopted
     person would not qualify as an heir of the body of an adopting
     parent; the parties to the conveyance had a right to rely upon
     the law as it was at that time; the court found that the
     granting clause in the 1930 deed expressly excluded adopted
     children from the remainder interest. 


     Appeal from Crittenden Chancery Court; Rice Van Ausdall,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Stephen K. Wood, P.A., by:  Stephen K. Wood, for appellant.
     Sloan, Rubens & Peeples, by:  Kent J. Rubens and Fletcher
Long, Jr., for appellees.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This case involves the construction of a deed, and whether the
appellant, an adopted child, was properly excluded from the
remainder interest created by the deed.  The trial court held that
the language in the deed conveying property to the grantee for
life, and then to the legal heirs of her body who survived her,
created an estate tail, and further held that title to the property
reverted to the grantors' estate.  We find no error and affirm.   
     On February 24, 1930, T.P. Johnson and Arkie Johnson executed
a deed conveying their interest in 160 acres of land located in
Crittenden County to their daughter, Lucy Faye Thompson.  The
granting clause of this deed provided as follows:
I do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said
Lucy Faye Thompson and the legal heirs of her body, and
in the event the said Lucy Faye Thompson should die
without leaving any legal heirs of her body surviving
her, then in that case the hereinafter described property
shall revert to the said T.P. Johnson the grantor
herein... . 
T.P. and Arkie Johnson also had two other children, Hazel Welshans
and Bernard Paul.  Lucy Faye died on October 29, 1993, and was
survived by her adopted daughter, the appellant, Alvalu Sides. 
Lucy Faye did not have any natural children and adopted Sides in
March of 1956. 
     The appellees are all descendants of Hazel Welshans and
Bernard Paul.  Hazel Welshans had six surviving grandchildren: 
Beth Welshans, Bradley Welshans, Wilson Welshans, Vanessa Welshans,
Cindy Welshans, and Catherine Welshans Cantor.  Bernard Paul was
survived by three children:  Linda Beene, Margie Melhorne, and
Tecora Hagy; and three grandchildren:  Jim Hagy, Mollie Hagy, and
Melody Hagy.
     On February 3, 1994, Linda Beene and others filed an action in
Crittenden County Circuit Court to quiet title in the 160 acres. 
The case was removed to chancery court, where Sides brought a
cross-claim and moved for summary judgment.  She argued that she
owned the land in fee simple as a bodily heir of Lucy Faye
Thompson.  The trial court found that the deed "created an estate
tail in Lucy Faye Thompson with possibility of reverter to the
estate of T.P. Johnson and Arkie Johnson in the event Lucy Faye
Thompson was not survived by legal heirs of her body."  The trial
court further concluded that title to the property did in fact
revert to the grantors' estate, and the property was divided
accordingly.  Sides received a one-third interest in the land under
the trial court's pro rata distribution. 
     Sides now brings the present appeal.  Her sole point on appeal
is that the trial court erroneously determined that she was not an
"heir of the body" in construing the deed. 
     In interpreting a deed, this court gives primary consideration
to the intent of the grantor.  Wilson v. Brown, 320 Ark. 240,