Case Title: Eichelberger v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Natal EICHELBERGER and Johnny Elam v. STATE
of Arkansas

95-992                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 26, 1996


1.   Constitutional law -- ex post facto laws prohibited. -- The
     Constitution of the United States, art. 1,  9 and 10,
     prohibits Congress or the states from enacting ex post facto
     laws; a law is prohibited as ex post facto when it authorizes
     punishment for a crime because of an act previously done and
     which was not a crime when done, makes more burdensome the
     punishment for a crime, after its commission, or deprives one
     charged with a crime of any defense that was available
     according to law at the time when the act was committed; the
     retroactive enhancement of a penalty is just as onerous as the
     retroactive creation of a penalty.

2.   Constitutional law -- ex post facto laws -- acts constituted
     violation of Ex Post Facto Clause -- increased burden of
     punishment to juveniles -- punitive statutory scheme. -- The
     supreme court held that Acts 61 and 62 of 1994, Ark. Code Ann.
      9-27-331(d) (Supp. 1995), as applied to appellants,
     constituted a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
     United States Constitution; the 1994 acts, which raised the
     amount of juvenile restitution from $2,000 to $10,000,
     increased the burden of the punishment to the juveniles; the
     statutory scheme was punitive because it allowed for
     revocation of probation for nonpayment of restitution. 

3.   Statutes -- statutory construction -- juvenile restitution --
     statutory limits apply per victim. -- The statutory limits on
     juvenile restitution apply per victim; thus, the supreme court
     held, the trial court erred in applying the 1994 enhanced-
     restitution acts to appellants and in ordering them to pay in
     excess of $2,000 to one of the victims; the supreme court
     accordingly reversed and remanded the part of the order
     relating to that victim.

4.   Evidence -- hearsay -- invoice was written assertion made out
     of court and offered to prove amount of damages. -- An invoice
     addressed to a victim's insurance agent from a windshield-
     repair company that reflected the amount to be charged for
     repairing the victim's broken windshield was hearsay because
     it was a written assertion made out of court and offered into
     evidence to prove the amount of damages.

5.   Appeal & error -- harmless error -- no reversal where evidence
     was merely cumulative. -- The supreme court will not reverse
     where the evidence erroneously admitted was merely cumulative.

6.   Evidence -- admission of invoice was not merely cumulative --
     victim never testified to amount of his damages -- reversible
     error. -- Where the State contended that one of the victims
     testified to the amount of his damages aside from an invoice
     for $511.59, and that, as a result, the invoice, which was
     hearsay, was merely cumulative, the supreme court concluded
     that the record did not support the State's contention; the
     victim never testified to the amount of his damages but
     instead stated that he did not file a claim with his insurance
     company because his insurance policy had a $500 deductible
     provision; this statement, however, did not constitute proof
     of the amount of the damages because the victim would have
     made it had his damages been anywhere between $1 and $500;
     thus, the supreme court reversed and remanded the part of the
     order relating to restitution to that victim. 

7.   Evidence -- admission of itemized statement reflecting damages
     did not prejudice appellants. -- Where the trial court allowed
     the State to introduce an itemized statement reflecting
     damages to one of the victims in the amount of $1,374.70, but
     in making their hearsay objection, appellants stated that they
     would object to anything other than $382.00, and the trial
     court ordered appellants to make restitution to the victim in
     the amount of $382, the supreme court held that the ruling
     allowing the entire itemized statement into evidence did not
     prejudice appellants.

8.   Appeal & error -- sufficiency of evidence -- principles of
     appellate review. -- In determining the sufficiency of
     evidence, an appellate court reviews all of the evidence
     introduced at trial, whether correctly or erroneously
     admitted; if substantial evidence was presented, but
     prejudicial trial error occurred, the case is reversed and
     remanded; if, however, after considering all of the evidence,
     whether correctly or erroneously admitted, the party having
     the burden of proof failed to prove its case by the
     appropriate standard, the case is reversed and dismissed; if
     the evidence was sufficient, the appellate court considers
     other assignments of trial error; if it was insufficient, the
     case is reversed and dismissed, and there is no need to
     consider the other arguments; this is the reason an appellate
     court routinely first considers sufficiency of the evidence.


     Appeal from Johnson Chancery Court; Benny E. Swindell,
Circuit-Chancery Judge; affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in
part.
     William M. Pearson, for appellant Natal Eichelberger.
     Roderick H. Weaver, for appellant Johnny Elam.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Gil Dudley, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice.February 26, 1996 *ADVREP1*





NATAL EICHELBERGER AND JOHNNY
ELAM,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE.



95-992


APPEAL FROM THE JOHNSON COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. J94-175,
HON. BENNY E. SWINDELL,
CIRCUIT/CHANCERY JUDGE,




AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART.




                   Robert H. Dudley, Justice.

     Appellants Natal Eichelberger and Johnny Elam, along with two
other young men, destroyed property owned by the Lamar School
District, United States Corps of Engineers, Gary Hamilton, and Jack
Cline, Sr.  The juvenile division of chancery court conducted a
bifurcated hearing at which it first adjudged appellants to be
delinquents and then determined the amount of restitution they are
to make.  Before the restitution phase of the hearing began,
appellants presented a motion in limine asking that restitution be
limited to $2,000 for each victim.  The basis for the motion was
that the property was destroyed on April 2, 1994, and at that time,
restitution could not exceed $2,000 for each victim.  Ark. Code
Ann.  9-27-331(d) (Repl. 1993).  The State contested the motion
and contended that the amount of allowable restitution was raised
to $10,000 by Acts 61 and 62 of 1994.  Appellants responded that
the 1994 acts became effective on August 26, 1994, or four months
after defendants destroyed the property, and that the retroactive
application of the 1994 acts would violate the ex post facto
provision of the Constitution of the United States.  The trial
court denied appellants' motions and ordered them to pay $9,956.47
to one of the victims, Jack Cline, Sr.  The trial court ordered
appellants to make restitution of less than $2,000 to the Lamar
School District, the Corps of Engineers, and Gary Hamilton.  
     Appellants' first point of appeal is that the trial court's
ruling applying the 1994 acts violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
The argument is well taken.  Sections 9 and 10 of Article I of the
Constitution of the United States prohibit Congress or the States
from enacting ex post facto laws.  A law is prohibited as ex post
facto when it authorizes punishment for a crime because of an act
previously done and which was not a crime when done, "makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission," or
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense that was available
according to law at the time when the act was committed.  Beazell
v. Ohio,