Case Title: P. v. Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S170778

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/22/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S170778 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. D050432 
ELI JORDAN ANDERSON, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County  
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCE262419 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in 
death,1 and was placed on felony probation pursuant to Penal Code section 
1203.1.2  As a condition of probation, the court ordered defendant to pay 
restitution for the victim‟s final hospital expenses.  After the prosecutor 
represented that the deceased had no “financial ability” to pay those expenses, the 
court ordered that restitution be paid directly to the hospital.  The sole issue before 
us is whether the order of direct payment to the hospital was statutorily 
unauthorized under section 1203.1.  Defendant argues that section 1203.1 
expressly requires trial courts to apply the definitions of “victim” contained in 
section 1202.4, the statute implementing the constitutional right to restitution.  
Defendant asserts the hospital was not a victim as defined in section 1202.4.  
                                              
1  
Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2).   
2  
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
2 
 
Defendant is incorrect that the victim definitions of section 1202.4 are 
incorporated into section 1203.1.  Under the particular and narrow circumstances 
of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under section 1203.1 by 
ordering that restitution be paid directly to the hospital.  
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 
Shortly after midnight on July 2, 2005, defendant was driving on the five-
lane Fletcher Parkway in San Diego County.  As he briefly took his eyes off the 
road to change the radio station, he heard a bang and his windshield shattered.   
Defendant pulled into a mall parking lot to look at his car, believing 
someone had thrown a rock at his windshield.  Seeing the significant damage to 
his car and blood at the top of the windshield, he realized he had struck either an 
animal or a person.  Defendant drove slowly through a parking lot bordering the 
parkway, but did not see what he might have hit.  He drove to the freeway and 
telephoned his girlfriend, who told him to meet her at a restaurant parking lot.  He 
left his car there and they went to the girlfriend‟s house.   
A passing motorist saw 50-year-old Robert Milligan lying across the fifth 
lane of traffic, trying unsuccessfully to lift himself from the pavement.  Help was 
summoned, but Milligan died at the hospital from massive head and chest injuries.   
Defendant‟s girlfriend and her brother drove back to the scene, spoke to a 
police officer and learned that a pedestrian had been struck.  They then drove to 
the restaurant parking lot and saw blood on defendant‟s shattered windshield.  
When the girlfriend returned home and told defendant what happened, he appeared 
                                              
3 
Because we have limited review to a narrow legal question, we have largely 
condensed the factual background from the Court of Appeal‟s opinion.  We accept 
the Court of Appeal‟s statement of fact unless a party calls the Court of Appeal‟s 
attention to any alleged omission or misstatement in a petition for rehearing.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)  Although defendant petitioned for rehearing, he 
did not do so on the basis of any factual omission or misstatement.   
3 
shocked and wanted to turn himself in.  Nonetheless, he did not do so.  The next 
day police learned his identity from anonymous tips.   
Evidence indicated that Milligan had been running from the median toward 
the sidewalk when he was struck.  The investigating police officer concluded the 
“primary collision factor” was the victim‟s jaywalking.  
Defendant‟s first trial ended in a hung jury.  His second trial produced a 
conviction.4  
At sentencing, the court noted that it had received and considered a written 
statement from the victim‟s mother, Nancy Milligan.  The statement included a 
summary of expenses associated with the victim‟s death.  Mrs. Milligan also 
addressed the court.  She supported a grant of probation, but urged that defendant 
be ordered to pay the victim‟s medical expenses.  Mrs. Milligan had been 
“harassed week after week for thousands of dollars in payment of medical bills.”  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court placed defendant on five years‟ formal 
probation and sentenced him to one year in the county jail.  Regarding restitution, 
the trial court stated:  “[A]ctual victim restitution is being ordered in favor of the 
                                              
4  
Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) provides:  “The driver of a 
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself 
or herself, or in the death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the 
scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 
20004.”  
 
Vehicle Code sections 20003 and 20004 specify the duties of the driver at 
the scene.  Section 20003 provides in relevant part:  “(a) The driver of any vehicle 
involved in an accident resulting in injury to . . . any person shall also give his or 
her name, current residence address, . . . the registration number of the vehicle he 
or she is driving, and the name and current residence address of the owner to the 
person struck . . . , and shall give the information to any traffic or police officer at 
the scene of the accident.  The driver also shall render to any person injured in the 
accident reasonable assistance, including transporting, or making arrangements for 
transporting, any injured person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or 
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary . . . .” 
4 
surviving family members of Robert Milligan,” in an amount to be set following a 
formal restitution hearing.  
At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor presented receipts for out-of-
pocket expenses incurred by Milligan‟s mother and sister for funeral expenses and 
related costs.  The prosecutor also presented two pages of hospital bills totaling 
$31,397.55 for Milligan‟s treatment at Sharp Memorial Hospital.  The prosecutor 
stated, “I understand that the family apparently is not liable for those amounts, but, 
nonetheless, from the People‟s perspective, [the hospital], who is going to have to 
eat those expenses in light of the decedent‟s lack of financial ability, . . .  should 
be entitled to those, too.”  Defense counsel acknowledged the trial court‟s broad 
discretion to impose conditions of probation, but objected to restitution for 
medical expenses on the sole basis that the evidence supported the defense theory 
that Milligan committed suicide.5  The trial court rejected counsel‟s argument.  
After reviewing the family‟s itemized expenses, the court ordered restitution of 
$31,397.55 to the hospital and $2,694.47 to the family members.   
In the Court of Appeal, defendant argued that restitution to the hospital and 
family should be stricken.  Defendant emphasized that he was not convicted of 
causing the accident, but only of improperly leaving the scene.  He asserted that 
restitution was improper under the mandatory victim restitution statute, which 
requires a causal relationship between the criminal conduct and the loss.  The gist 
of his argument was that he should not be ordered to pay restitution because 
Milligan was the cause of his own injuries.  Defendant also urged that restitution 
was improper as an exercise of the court‟s discretion under section 1203.1.   
The Court of Appeal upheld the restitution order under section 1203.1.  It 
relied on People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 (Carbajal), in which we 
                                              
5  
In the first trial, defendant was permitted to present evidence that Milligan 
may have committed suicide by jumping in front of defendant‟s car.  This 
evidence was excluded in the second trial.   
5 
determined that a restitution order for property damage was proper because the 
loss was “reasonably related” to the defendant‟s crime of leaving the scene of the 
accident and because it served the goal of deterring future criminality.  (Id. at p. 
1123.)  In applying the Carbajal principles, the Court of Appeal here observed:  
“Because the jury necessarily found, as an element of the crime of felony hit and 
run, that Anderson was involved in an accident that resulted in injury or death, the 
restitution order was reasonably related to the expenses related to Milligan‟s 
injuries and death.  Further, the order serves the purpose of deterring future 
criminality.”   
Defendant petitioned for rehearing on the propriety of restitution to the 
hospital only, relying on People v. Slattery (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1091 
(Slattery), which was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal after 
defendant‟s appellate matter was submitted for decision.  Slattery concerned a 
defendant sentenced to prison for assault and ordered to pay the deceased victim‟s 
hospital expenses under section 1202.4.  The Slattery court determined that the 
hospital was not a direct victim for purposes of mandatory restitution required by 
that statute.  Defendant argued the reasoning of the Slattery court was applicable 
to his circumstances.  He asserted that section 1203.1 expressly provides that 
restitution orders imposed under its authority must comply with the requirements 
of section 1202.4.  
The Court of Appeal denied defendant‟s petition for rehearing, with no 
change in the judgment, but modified its opinion to include a discussion of 
Slattery, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1091.  Without addressing defendant‟s statutory 
argument, the Court of Appeal declined to apply Slattery.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
The propriety of restitution under section 1203.1 for defendant‟s conviction 
of leaving the scene is not in dispute here.  The only question before us is whether 
an order of restitution payable directly to the hospital was unauthorized under that 
statute.   
6 
Defendant relies on a provision of section 1203.1 to assert that the 
requirements of section 1202.4, including its “victim” definitions, are incorporated 
into section 1203.1.  He asserts that, accordingly, the hospital was not an 
authorized victim for purposes of restitution.  As we shall explain, defendant 
misinterprets the applicable provision of section 1203.1 and conflates two separate 
statutes relating to restitution.  The application of section 1203.1 is not limited by 
the terms of the later-enacted section 1202.4.   
At the outset, respondent contends that defendant has forfeited his claim by 
failing to assert it in the trial court.  However, defendant, based on his 
interpretation of section 1203.1, argues that the trial court exceeded its statutory 
authority in ordering restitution to the hospital.  As framed, his claim falls within 
the “narrow exception” for “a so-called unauthorized sentence or a sentence 
entered in excess of jurisdiction.”  (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886-
887.)  “[T]he „unauthorized sentence‟ concept constitutes a narrow exception to 
the general requirement that only those claims properly raised and preserved by 
the parties are reviewable on appeal.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Scott (1994) 9 
Cal.4th 331, 354.)  “[A] sentence is generally „unauthorized‟ where it could not 
lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.”  (Ibid.)  “An 
obvious legal error at sentencing that is „correctable without referring to factual 
findings in the record or remanding for further findings‟ is not subject to 
forfeiture.”  (In re Sheena K., at p. 887.)  We therefore consider whether the trial 
court‟s order of restitution was unauthorized under section 1203.1, although we 
ultimately reject defendant‟s statutory interpretation.6   
                                              
6  
At oral argument, appellate counsel argued for the first time that restitution 
should be awarded to the victim‟s estate, and urged that the matter be remanded 
for a determination of the proper amount of restitution.  Counsel argued that the 
hospital, in order to resolve the outstanding bill, may have been willing to accept 
less than the full amount owed.  As the Attorney General responded, however, the 
appropriate amount of restitution was subject to challenge by defendant regardless 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
7 
A.  Comparison of Sections 1203.1 and 1202.4 
Section 1203.1 was added to the Penal Code in 1935.  (Stats. 1935, ch. 604, 
§ 2, pp. 1708-1709.)  The statute gives trial courts broad discretion to impose 
probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.  
(Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1120.)  The court may impose upon probationers 
“reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that 
justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the 
law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally 
and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .”  
(§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)   
Restitution as a condition of probation has always been expressly 
authorized by section 1203.1.  Originally, the statute called on trial courts to 
consider reparation or restitution as a condition of probation.  (See Stats. 1935, ch. 
604, § 2, p. 1708; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 234, fn. 8.)  The statute 
was amended in 1982 to require that restitution be imposed “in proper cases.”  
(Stats. 1982, ch. 1413, § 6, pp. 5403-5404; now § 1203.1, subd. (a)(3).)  
While restitution under section 1203.1 may serve to compensate the victim 
of a crime, it also addresses the broader probationary goal of rehabilitating the 
defendant.  “ „Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the 
defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.‟ ”  
(Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124.)  Restitution “impresses upon the offender 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
of who the recipient was.  Defendant did not object in the trial court to the amount 
of restitution ordered.  His sole objection was that restitution for these expenses 
was improper because the victim‟s injuries resulted from a suicidal act.  Defendant 
has waived a claim of error as to the amount of restitution by failing to object on 
that ground in the trial court.  (See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 882.)   
8 
the gravity of the harm he has inflicted upon another, and provides an opportunity 
to make amends.”  (See Charles S. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 741, 748.)   
We noted in Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1114, that under section 1203.1, 
“California courts have long interpreted the trial courts‟ discretion to encompass 
the ordering of restitution as a condition of probation even when the loss was not 
necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction.”  (Id. at p. 
1121.)  As we explained:  “Under certain circumstances, restitution has been found 
proper where the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction 
(People v. Miller [(1967)] 256 Cal.App.2d [348,] 355-356), by conduct underlying 
dismissed and uncharged counts (People v. Goulart (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 71, 
79), and by conduct resulting in an acquittal (People v. Lent [(1975)] 15 Cal.3d 
[481,] 483).  There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact 
amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there 
any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable 
in a civil action.  (See In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532, 534, fn. 
4.)”  (Carbajal, at p. 1121.)  In Carbajal, we upheld a restitution order for 
property damage after concluding that “in the context of the hit-and-run statute, 
the restitution condition may relate to conduct that is not in itself necessarily 
criminal, i.e., the probationer‟s driving at the time of the accident.”  (Id. at p. 1123, 
fn. omitted.)   
Section 1202.4 has a more recent history.  The statute in its present form is 
the result of a lengthy and complex evolution that began with the 1982 adoption of 
Proposition 8, also known as the Victims‟ Bill of Rights.  That measure added 
article I, section 28 to the California Constitution, which provided:  “It is the 
unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who 
suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from 
9 
the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer.”  (Cal. Const., art. I,  
§ 28, former subd. (b).)7  
Section 1202.4 provides:  “It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of 
crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall 
receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime.”  
(§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).)  Subject to exceptions not relevant here, “in every case in 
which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant‟s conduct, 
the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims 
in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by 
the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.”  (Id., subd. (f).)   
The term “victim” is specifically defined in section 1202.4, subdivision (k) 
and encompasses “[a]ny corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or 
instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct 
victim of a crime.”  (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(2), italics added.)  “Thus, Penal Code 
section 1202.4, subdivision (k) permits restitution to a business or governmental 
entity only when it is a direct victim of crime.”  (People v. Martinez (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 384, 393.)  When the Legislature added the direct victim language to 
section 1202.4 in 1994, “that term already carried a precise meaning.”  (Ibid., fn. 
omitted.)  This definition was adopted in People v. Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th 226, 
“in which we described a provision in Penal Code former section 1203.04 
permitting restitution to entities that are „direct‟ victims of crime as limiting 
restitution to „entities against which the probationer‟s crimes had been 
committed‟—that is, entities that are the „immediate objects of the probationer‟s 
offenses.‟  (Birkett, supra, at pp. 232-233.)”  (Martinez, at p. 393.) 
                                              
7  
California Constitution article I, section 28 was amended by initiative 
measure on November 4, 2008.  Former subdivision (b) of that provision was 
renumbered subdivision (b)(13) and the text of the subdivision was amended.    
10 
Nevertheless, as the mandatory direct victim restitution statutes were 
implemented, section 1203.1 continued to provide trial courts “broad general 
discretion to fashion and impose conditions of probation appropriate to individual 
cases.”  (People v. Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 235.)  The predecessor statute to 
section 1202.4 expressly provided that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed 
to limit the authority of the court to grant or deny probation or provide conditions 
of probation.”  (Former § 1203.04, subd. (g), as amended Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, 
§ 4, p. 6552.)  In People v. Birkett, we recognized that courts interpreted their 
discretion under section 1203.1 as ordering restitution conditions even under 
circumstances not strictly governed by Proposition 8 and the mandatory restitution 
statutes.  (Birkett, at p. 235.)   
Trial courts continue to retain authority to impose restitution as a condition 
of probation in circumstances not otherwise dictated by section 1202.4.  In both 
sections 1203.1 and 1202.4, restitution serves the purposes of both criminal 
rehabilitation and victim compensation.  But the statutory schemes treat those 
goals differently.  When section 1202.4 imposes its mandatory requirements in 
favor of a victim‟s right to restitution, the statute is explicit and narrow.  When 
section 1203.1 provides the court with discretion to achieve a defendant‟s 
reformation, its ambit is necessarily broader, allowing a sentencing court the 
flexibility to assist a defendant as the circumstances of his or her case require.   
B.  Effect of Section 1203.1, Subdivision (a)(3)  
Despite the distinction between the statutes, defendant nevertheless argues 
that the requirements of section 1202.4 have been incorporated into section 
1203.1. 
Section 1203.1 provides that “[t]he court shall consider whether the 
defendant as a condition of probation shall make restitution to the victim or the 
Restitution Fund.”  (§ 1203.1, subd. (b).)  Section 1203.1 does not define “victim.”  
However, defendant refers to section 1203.1, subdivision (a)(3), which states:  
“The court shall provide for restitution in proper cases.  The restitution order shall 
11 
be fully enforceable as a civil judgment forthwith and in accordance with Section 
1202.4 of the Penal Code.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant reads the italicized phrase 
to mean that a restitution order imposed under section 1203.1 must comply with 
the requirements of mandatory restitution orders imposed under section 1202.4, 
including its definitions of “victim.”   This reading is overbroad.   
We apply basic principles of statutory construction to ascertain the 
Legislature‟s intent in using the phrase “in accordance with Section 1202.4 of the 
Penal Code.”  “Because the language of a statute is generally the most reliable 
indicator of the Legislature‟s intent, we look first to the words of the statute, 
giving them their ordinary meaning and construing them in context.  If the 
language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the 
plain meaning of the statute controls.  (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 812, 818; People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 810.)”  (People v. 
Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1009.) 
The grammatical structure of the sentence upon which defendant relies does 
not support his interpretation.  The statutory language provides that “the restitution 
order shall be fully enforceable as if the order were a civil judgment,” with two 
modifiers: “forthwith” and “in accordance with Section 1202.4.”  “Forthwith” is 
defined as “immediately” (Merriam-Webster‟s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2003)  
p. 493), and “accordance” is defined as “agreement, conformity”  (id. at p. 8).  In 
other words, the restitution order shall be fully enforceable, immediately and in 
conformance with section 1202.4.   
In turn, section 1202.4 provides that a restitution order “shall be 
enforceable as if the order were a civil judgment.”  (Id., subds. (a)(3)(B), (i).) 
Section 1202.4, subdivision (m) provides that, as to probationers, “[a]ny portion of 
a restitution order that remains unsatisfied after a defendant is no longer on 
probation shall continue to be enforceable by a victim pursuant to Section 1214 
until the obligation is satisfied.”  The language of section 1203.1 relied on by 
12 
defendant reflects no more than the Legislature‟s intent to assure consistency in 
the immediate enforceability of restitution orders.  
The legislative history provides further, albeit unnecessary, confirmation.  
The sentence in section 1203.1, subdivision (a)(3) upon which defendant relies 
was added in 1998.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 931, § 393.5, p. 6611.)  Section 1202.4 was 
amended at the same time.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 201, § 1, pp. 1012, 1014.)  Section 
1202.4 had provided that a restitution order was “enforceable as if the order were a 
civil judgment pursuant to section 1214.”  (Id., former subds. (a)(3)(B), (i).)  The 
1998 amendment deleted the italicized phrase.     
In early 1998, Senate Bill No. 1608 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.), which led to 
the amendments at issue, was introduced.  A report of the Senate Committee on 
Public Safety stated the purpose of the bill was “to make it clear that restitution 
orders obtained by victims of crime and enforceable against a convicted offender 
may be enforced as a civil order immediately, without any delay during a period of 
probation (in lieu of incarceration) or parole (after release from prison).”  (Sen. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1608 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Apr. 21, 1998, p. 2 (Analysis).)  The report noted that section 1214 had 
created some confusion in that regard.  (Analysis, at p. 4.)  Specifically, the bill 
was described as effecting the following changes to the statutes:  “(1) Adds to 
Section 1203.1 that a restitution order is effective immediately upon issuance, 
thereby removing any delay during a period of probation.  [¶] (2) Deletes from 
Section 1202.4 any reference to the enforcement of restitution orders „pursuant to 
Section 1214‟ so that it is clear that restitution orders may be enforced without any 
delay during a period of probation or parole.”  (Analysis, at p. 3.)  Nothing in the 
legislative documents supports the broader construction urged by defendant.  
Because the definitions of “victim” in section 1202.4, subdivision (k) are 
not incorporated into section 1203.1, defendant‟s reliance on Slattery, supra, at 
page 1091, is inapposite.  Slattery was convicted of assaulting her dependent 
mother, who later died leaving unpaid hospital expenses.  Defendant was 
13 
sentenced to state prison and the court ordered her to pay restitution to the hospital 
under the authority of section 1202.4, subdivision (f).  (Slattery, at pp. 1094-1095.) 
The Court of Appeal in Slattery modified the judgment by striking the 
restitution order and otherwise affirmed the judgment.  It determined that the 
hospital was not a “direct victim” of the defendant‟s crime, as defined in section 
1202.4, subdivision (k)(2).  “[T]he hospital incurred its economic loss indirectly 
from defendant‟s conduct: first, defendant illegally inflicted injuries upon her 
mother; second, Marshall Hospital treated defendant‟s mother for the injuries; 
third, defendant‟s mother did not pay the hospital bills.”  (Slattery, supra, 167 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1097.)   
The Slattery court stated:  “Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) explicitly 
requires that the immediate victim, defendant‟s mother, be made whole for her 
economic losses, including medical expenses, resulting from defendant‟s criminal 
conduct.  (§ 1202.4, subd. (f), (f)(3)(B).)  Because defendant‟s mother is deceased, 
the court must order the restitution to be paid to her estate.  Diverting the 
restitution due defendant‟s mother to a third party, such as Marshall Hospital, 
violates the statute because it fails to make defendant‟s mother whole.  (Birkett, 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 245-247.)  As the People concede, Marshall Hospital may 
bring a civil claim against the mother‟s estate to ensure payment of the debt.”  
(Slattery, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097.)  
As discussed above, section 1202.4‟s mandatory requirement for restitution 
to a legal or commercial entity is expressly limited to situations in which that 
entity was the direct victim of defendant‟s criminal conduct.  Slattery‟s holding on 
this point is correct, but it does not dispose of this case.  Restitution here was not 
ordered pursuant to section 1202.4, but rather under the broader, discretionary 
authority of section 1203.1.  We turn to the application of that statute.   
C.  Restitution Order Under Section 1203.1  
The trial court‟s discretion under section 1203.1, “although broad, 
nevertheless is not without limits; a condition of probation must serve a purpose 
14 
specified in the statute.”  (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121; see People v. 
Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)   
We determine whether the restitution order, as a condition of probation, is 
arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384; Carbajal, supra, 10 
Cal.4th at p. 1121.)  “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it 
„(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) 
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids 
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .‟ ”  (People v. 
Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)  Probation is “an act of clemency and grace” 
(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 445), not a matter of right (People v. 
Rubics (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 452, 459).  “Because a defendant has no right to 
probation, the trial court can impose probation conditions that it could not 
otherwise impose, so long as the conditions are not invalid under the three Lent 
criteria.”  (Id. at p. 460.)  If the defendant finds the conditions of probation more 
onerous than the sentence he would otherwise face, he may refuse probation.  
(People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.)  
As we have emphasized, the validity of restitution for Milligan‟s medical 
expenses is not before us.  We determine only whether the court properly ordered 
payment of that restitution directly to the treating hospital. 
Even under the general term “victim” contained in section 1203.1, it is not 
disputed that Milligan was the victim of the accident in which defendant failed to 
stop and render aid.  Had Milligan lived, he would have been entitled to restitution 
for the debt he owed to the hospital.  Because Milligan died, however, the court 
confronted the issue of how to structure the restitution order.  
When a victim is deceased, the court may properly order restitution paid to 
the victim‟s estate under section 1203.1.  The Probate Code provides an orderly 
process for claims against the estate of a deceased victim.  Nevertheless, while 
restitution to the estate was one available option, it was not the only one under the 
15 
particular circumstances of this case.  Under the court‟s broad discretion, an order 
of restitution payable directly to the hospital was not unreasonable.   
Efforts made to save Milligan‟s life at Sharp Memorial Hospital resulted in 
medical expenses totaling $31,397.55. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, the 
hospital, a trauma center, was statutorily obligated to provide emergency treatment 
to Milligan regardless of his ability to pay.  (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1317, 
subds. (a), (b) & (d).)8  At the time of the restitution hearing, almost two years 
after the accident, those medical expenses remained unpaid.  The victim‟s mother 
told the court that she was being harassed for payment.  The prosecutor 
represented that the victim lacked assets to pay the hospital bill.  The prosecutor 
also represented that the family was not liable for those expenses.  Neither 
representation made by the prosecutor was challenged by defendant.  Moreover, 
there is no evidence in this record that a probate estate was ever opened after 
Milligan‟s death, which would have allowed for the filing of creditor claims.  The 
victim‟s mother voiced no objection to direct restitution to the hospital. 
As we have emphasized, section 1203.1, subdivision (j) authorizes the 
imposition of reasonable conditions of probation:  “The court may impose and 
require . . . [such] reasonable conditions[] as it may determine are fitting and 
proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for 
                                              
8  
Health and Safety Code section 1317, subdivision (a) provides:  
“Emergency services and care shall be provided to any person requesting the 
services or care, or for whom services or care is requested, for any condition in 
which the person is in danger of loss of life . . . .”  The statute further provides that 
emergency care shall not be based upon, or affected by the person‟s ability to pay 
for medical services.  (Id., subd. (b).)   
 
Subdivision (d) provides:  “Emergency service and care shall be rendered 
without first questioning the patient or any other person as to his or her ability to 
pay therefor.  However, the patient or his or her legally responsible relative or 
guardian shall execute an agreement to pay therefor or otherwise supply insurance 
or credit information promptly after the services are rendered.” 
 
16 
the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, 
and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the 
probationer . . . .”  (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)  Under the particular circumstances of this 
case, the injury done to Milligan by defendant‟s breach was redressed by 
fashioning a restitution order in which payment for medical expenses was made 
directly to the hospital.  This was not a circumstance in which a restitution award 
was being diverted from the victim to satisfy a requested third party claim.  (See 
Slattery, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097.)9   
As a result of the order, the family would not be further burdened by having 
to open or leave open probate of Milligan‟s estate to accommodate payment of the 
restitution award.10  The court‟s order also assured that amends be made to society 
for the criminal violation because the hospital would be paid for the care it was 
required by law to provide.  Thus, the order was “fitting and proper to the end that 
justice may be done.”  (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)  Finally, restitution of the deceased 
victim‟s hospital expenses, paid directly to the hospital, renders defendant 
accountable for the financial harm he caused and contributes to his reformation 
and rehabilitation.   
We emphasize that our holding here is a narrow one.  Based on the record 
in this case, the trial court‟s order of direct payment to the hospital was not 
                                              
9  
Nothing in the record indicates the hospital made an independent claim for 
restitution.  The probation report indicates the victim‟s mother provided the 
documentation for the hospital expenses.  
10  
The court placed defendant on formal probation for five years so that, 
among other reasons, defendant would have sufficient time to pay restitution.  The 
court noted “the substantial sums being ordered paid” and stated that “the longest 
period of probation supervision would thereby enhance or maximize [defendant‟s] 
opportunity to make victim restitution as ordered over the period of the 
probationary grant.”   
 
17 
arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the bounds of reason.  Accordingly, the court did 
not abuse its discretion under section 1203.1.   
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J.  
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.  
MORENO, J.  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Anderson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 170 Cal.App.4th 910 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S170778 
Date Filed: July 22, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Allan J. Preckel 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. 
Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch, Ivy B. Fitzpatrick, James D. Dutton, Melissa Mandel 
and Charles C. Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stephen M. Hinkle 
3529 Cannon Road, Suite 2B-311 
Oceanside, CA  92056 
(760) 295-1541 
 
Charles C. Ragland 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2211