Case Title: The Florida Bar v. R. Patrick Mirk

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-1423

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1423 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
R. PATRICK MIRK,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 7, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee's report recommending that Respondent R. 
Patrick Mirk be found guilty of professional misconduct and disbarred.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed herein, we 
approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations of guilt, as well as the 
referee’s recommended discipline.  Accordingly, we disbar Mirk from the practice 
of law in Florida. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Bar filed a two-count complaint against Mirk, alleging that he violated 
several of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules).  A referee was 
 
- 2 - 
appointed.  After holding a hearing, the referee has submitted his report for the 
Court’s review, in which he makes the following findings and recommendations. 
 
Count I.  Lorne Lyles retained Patrick Mirk to represent him in a dispute 
with a contractor concerning a residential construction project.  Lyles agreed to pay 
Mirk $250 per hour for his work on the case.  He also made an initial payment to 
Mirk, totaling $750.  Mirk did not inform Lyles that the $750 payment would be 
treated as a “non-refundable retainer.”  Nonetheless, Mirk deposited Lyles’ $750 
check into his operating account, rather than in his trust account as is required 
under the Bar Rules.1   
 
Given these facts, the referee found clear and convincing evidence that 
Lyles’ $750 payment was an advance payment for legal fees, and was not a non-
refundable retainer.  Absent an agreement that the $750 would be treated as a non-
refundable retainer, Mirk was obligated to hold the advance fee payment in trust 
until earned.  The referee found that by failing to deposit Lyles’ advance payment 
into his trust account, Mirk failed to apply trust funds for the intended purpose.  
For this misconduct, the referee recommended that Mirk be found guilty of 
violating the following Bar Rules: 5-1.1(a) (a lawyer shall hold in trust, separate 
                                          
 
 
1.  The referee found that Mirk earned some, but not all, of the $750 fee 
advance.  Lyles eventually became dissatisfied with Mirk’s representation and 
demanded a refund of the $750 payment.  The referee found that Mirk did issue the 
refund. 
 
- 3 - 
from the lawyer’s own property, any property of clients or third persons that are in 
a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation); and 5-1.1(b) (money or 
other property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose, including advances 
for fees, costs, and expenses, is held in trust and must be applied only to that 
purpose).  The referee has also recommended that Mirk be found guilty of 
violating 4-8.4(g) (a lawyer shall not fail to respond to an official inquiry made by 
bar counsel or a disciplinary agency). 
 
Count II.  During the course of his practice, Mirk developed a professional 
relationship with Frank Bragano.  Mirk represented Bragano and the business 
entities with which Bragano was involved in various projects over a number of 
years.  Two such projects are at issue in this case. 
 
First, Bragano hired Mirk to help resolve a dispute with Bragano’s former 
attorney concerning an investment deal known as the “Meridian Project.”  Mirk 
was successful in negotiating a resolution to the dispute.  As a result of the 
settlement, Mirk received a check for $100,462.50, to be distributed equally to 
each of the investors in the Meridian Project.  Mirk deposited the check into his 
trust account.  On June 30, 2004, Mirk wrote a check to Bragano for $31,487.50, 
representing his share of the settlement.  At that time, Bragano placed the check in 
a desk drawer and it was not cashed. 
 
- 4 - 
 
As to the second project, in June 2004 Mirk began discussions with Bragano 
and others about plans to establish a large multi-million dollar “investment 
platform.”  Mirk would serve as corporate counsel for the venture.  The project 
was intended to include four separate limited liability corporations; the first of 
these corporations to be established was called Montpelier, LLC.   
 
The primary dispute in this case concerns Mirk’s compensation for his work 
on the Montpelier venture.  Mirk testified that he and Bragano had an oral 
agreement that Mirk would be paid a $40,000 flat fee for each company he 
established and $100,000 per year to act as corporate counsel.  In contrast, Bragano 
testified before the referee that he did not agree to any type of flat fee arrangement.  
Instead, Bragano maintained that Mirk agreed to be paid a portion of the future 
profits from the investment venture in the event it was ultimately successful.  On 
this central point, the referee found Bragano’s testimony to be credible and that 
Mirk’s testimony was not credible.  Indeed, based on the evidence, the referee 
found that Mirk did not have an agreement to be paid a $40,000 flat fee for his 
work on the Montpelier project. 
 
In October 2004, Bragano informed Mirk for the first time that he had not 
cashed the Meridian Project check for $31,487.50.  Within a short time thereafter, 
Mirk executed a stop payment on that check without advising Bragano; bank 
records submitted into evidence show the stop payment was issued October 25, 
 
- 5 - 
2004.  At this point, Mirk began a series of transactions disbursing the Meridian 
Project funds represented in the check for which Mirk had issued the stop payment 
order to himself.  First, on October 25, 2004, the date the stop payment was 
entered, Mirk wrote a check to himself for $10,000.  Next, Mirk issued three 
checks, each for $2,000, on November 10, November 12, and November 15, 2004, 
payable to himself.  On November 22, 2004, Mirk wrote a check payable to the 
United States Treasury in the amount of $7,068.14.  On November 24, 2004, he 
wrote a check to himself for $1,931.86, and on December 13, 2004, he wrote 
another check for $4500.  Mirk later disbursed the remainder of the Meridian 
Project funds to himself on April 11, 2005.  The referee found that Bragano had no 
knowledge of these disbursements and did not authorize them.  In fact, the referee 
found that Mirk intentionally concealed these distributions from his client. 
 
In December 2004, Bragano called Mirk to inform him that he was planning 
to cash the Meridian Project check to loan the money to a friend.  The following 
day, December 20, 2004, Mirk sent Bragano a letter informing him for the first 
time that he had stopped payment on the check.  In the letter, Mirk explained that 
he distributed and applied the Meridian Project funds, among other things, toward 
the $40,000 claim he asserted he was owed for his work on the Montpelier project 
and the other limited liability corporations involved in the investment platform, as 
well as toward the $100,000 he argued he was owed as corporate counsel. 
 
- 6 - 
 
Upon receiving the letter of December 20, Bragano was furious with Mirk.  
However, his business partners urged Bragano to take no action at the time to 
protect their investment venture.  In June 2005, the Montpelier project came to an 
unsuccessful end.  At that time, Bragano hired a new attorney to secure the return 
of the Meridian Project funds.  On August 11, 2005, new counsel held a meeting 
with Mirk to discuss the matter.  Notably, the referee found that Mirk did not 
produce any invoices or billing statements at this meeting to support his claim that 
he was owed $40,000 for his work on Montpelier.  Thus, the referee found that the 
parties did not resolve their dispute at the August 2005 meeting.  Ultimately, Mirk 
never returned the $31,487.50 he had withdrawn from Bragano’s trust funds, and 
in June 2006 Bragano filed a complaint with the Bar.  
Given the conduct described, the referee found: 
 
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Respondent did not 
have an agreement to be paid a $40,000 flat fee for work done in 
relation to Montpelier.  Although it is not necessary to have a written 
fee agreement in this instance, the clear and convincing evidence is 
that Respondent did not have a written fee agreement or a verbal fee 
agreement for a $40,000 flat fee for work performed on Montpelier.   
 
The evidence cited by Respondent to support the alleged flat fee 
agreement is not persuasive and is directly contradicted by the record.  
Respondent’s claim of an agreement for a $40,000 flat fee is flatly 
contradicted by Bragano and further undermined by the testimony of 
Bragano’s partner Lynch, and attorney Ricardo Roig.  Respondent’s 
evidence consists of his own testimony, handwritten notes he claims 
to have made contemporaneously, or letters he wrote after the fact. 
 
 
- 7 - 
The referee recommended that Mirk be found guilty of violating Bar Rules 5-1.1(a) 
(a lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer’s own property, property of 
clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation); 5-1.1(b) (money or other property entrusted to an attorney for a 
specific purpose, including advances for fees, costs, and expenses, is held in trust 
and must be applied only to that purpose); 5-1.1(e) (upon receiving funds or other 
property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly 
notify the client or third person); and 5-1.2(g) (failure of a member to timely 
produce trust accounting records shall be considered as a matter of contempt).2 
 
The referee found several aggravating factors: (1) prior disciplinary 
offenses;3 (2) dishonest or selfish motive; (3) bad faith obstruction of the 
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of 
                                          
 
 
2.  Concerning the violation of rule 5-1.2(g), the referee’s report in this case 
appears to contain a scrivener’s error which indicates that Mirk is guilty of 
violating Bar Rule 5-1.1(g) (pertaining to interest on attorney trust accounts).  
However, based on the record before us, it is apparent that the referee intended to 
find Mirk in violation of rule 5-1.2(g). 
 
3.  The referee found that Mirk received an admonishment for minor 
misconduct in 2003 for failing to timely communicate with his client regarding a 
post-judgment collection matter involving funds deposited into his trust account.  
The matter was eventually resolved and Respondent provided the client with the 
promised financial document.   
 
- 8 - 
the disciplinary agency;4 (4) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (5) 
indifference toward making restitution.  The referee also found one mitigating 
factor: (1) favorable reputation for character and professional skill. 
 
As to the disciplinary sanction, the referee considered the Florida Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and case law, together with the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and has recommended that Mirk be disbarred from the practice 
of law in Florida.  The referee also awarded costs to the Bar in the amount of 
$11,504.95. 
 
Mirk has filed a petition for review in this case, raising a number of 
challenges to the referee’s report.  We approve the referee’s findings of fact and his 
recommendations of guilt without further discussion.  The findings are supported 
by competent evidence and those findings support the recommended finding of 
                                          
 
 
4.  The referee found that on October 13, 2006, the Bar sent a letter to Mirk 
requesting that he provide his trust account records for its review.  Mirk objected to 
the Bar’s request and refused to provide the records.  The Bar then served Mirk 
with a subpoena, directing him to produce his trust account records.  Mirk again 
failed to comply.  Accordingly, in February 2007, a Florida Bar grievance 
committee entered a finding of non-compliance, and the Bar filed a petition for 
contempt in this Court.  See Fla. Bar v. Mirk, No. SC07-394 (petition filed Mar. 1, 
2007).  On March 7, 2007, we issued an order directing Mirk to show cause why 
he should not be held in contempt of Court and suspended until he complied with 
the subpoena.  Ultimately, we determined that Mirk did not show cause and, on 
May 14, 2007, we entered an order suspending him from the practice of law.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Mirk, 958 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2007) (table).  Several months later, the Bar 
filed a “Certificate of Compliance with Subpoena Duces Tecum” and, on 
September 19, 2007, Mirk was reinstated.  See Fla. Bar v. Mirk, 967 So. 2d 199 
(Fla. 2007) (table). 
 
- 9 - 
guilt.  Mirk also challenges the referee’s recommended discipline.  He urges the 
Court to disapprove the referee’s recommendation for disbarment.  However, as 
discussed below, we conclude that the referee’s recommended sanction based on 
the findings is supported in the Standards and case law. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In reviewing a referee's recommended discipline, this Court's scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
However, generally speaking this Court will not second-guess the referee's 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
The referee’s findings of fact demonstrate that Mirk misappropriated 
$31,487.50 in client funds held in his trust account.  This Court has long held that 
attorney misconduct involving the misuse or misappropriation of client funds is 
unquestionably one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit.  See Fla. 
Bar. v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2007).  Indeed, disbarment is 
presumed the appropriate discipline when an attorney engages in this type of 
misconduct.  Id.; see also Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 338 (Fla. 
 
- 10 - 
2008) (holding that disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction, under 
both the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and case law, when a 
lawyer misappropriates trust funds).  We have also emphasized that the 
presumption of disbarment is exceptionally weighty when the attorney's misuse is 
intentional rather than a result of neglect or inadvertence.  See Fla. Bar v. Travis, 
765 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 2000). 
In defense of his actions in this case, Mirk asserts that he was owed a 
$40,000 flat fee for his work on Montpelier and each of the other limited liability 
corporations he planned to establish for the investment platform.  Thus, he 
contends that he was entitled to retain the Meridian Project funds held in trust as 
payment toward Bragano’s debt.  We disagree.  At the outset, we note that Mirk’s 
compensation arrangement was never reduced to writing.  When a lawyer fails to 
place an agreement for representation in writing, he or she is always at risk of 
becoming involved in a fee dispute with the client.  In situations such as the instant 
case, absent a written agreement, the referee is required to consider all evidence 
and weigh the parties’ testimony at the disciplinary hearing and evaluate 
credibility.  We have long held that because the referee is in the best position to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the referee's assessment and his 
resolution of the conflicting testimony.  See Fla. Bar v. Batista, 846 So. 2d 479, 
483 (Fla. 2003).   
 
- 11 - 
Moreover, the facts here demonstrate that Mirk made a number of secret 
withdrawals from his client trust account without his client’s knowledge or 
permission.  When lawyers do face disputes over fees with their clients, the Bar 
Rules certainly do not permit attorneys to resolve such disputes in this manner.  
There is never a valid reason for misappropriating client funds held in trust.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d at 338.  Once again, we emphasize to the 
members of the Bar that an attorney is never permitted to withdraw or otherwise 
use client funds held in trust except as specifically authorized under the Bar Rules.  
To engage in such conduct, a lawyer risks full disciplinary sanctions under the 
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, including disbarment. 
As we have stated, disbarment is presumed the appropriate discipline when 
an attorney misappropriates client money held in trust and Mirk simply has not 
presented any arguments to rebut the presumption in this case.  The Florida 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions applicable to Mirk’s misconduct state 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 
4.11 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or knowingly 
converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury.”); Fla. Stds. 
Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.61 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
or intentionally deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another 
regardless of injury or potential injury to the client.”). 
 
- 12 - 
 
Additionally, this Court has previously imposed disbarment for violations of 
the ethical rules similar to those found in this case.  See Fla. Bar v. Brownstein, 
953 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2007) (disbarring respondent who misappropriated $20,000 in 
client funds held in trust, a portion of the total amount entrusted to the respondent 
by the client for the purpose of paying a bankruptcy settlement); see also Fla. Bar 
v. Barley, 831 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2002) (disbarring respondent who misappropriated 
$76,760.68 in client funds held in trust, making a series of withdrawals from the 
funds over a period of three months, and ultimately depleting the entire amount). 
 
In sum, after considering the referee’s factual findings, the rules violated, the 
Standards, and the case law, we approve the referee’s recommendation of 
disbarment as the appropriate sanction. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact, recommendations of 
guilt, recommended sanction, and award of costs.  R. Patrick Mirk is hereby 
disbarred.  The disbarment will be effective thirty days from the filing of this 
opinion so that Mirk can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing 
clients.  If Mirk notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and 
does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an 
order making the disbarment effective immediately.  Mirk shall fully comply with 
 
- 13 - 
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(g).  Further, Mirk shall accept no new 
business from the date this opinion. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from R. Patrick Mirk in the 
amount of $11,504.95, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, Henry Lee Paul, Bar 
Counsel, and Cynthia Lois Miller, Assistant Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
R. Patrick Mirk, Pro se, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent