Case Title: State v. Hall

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44712

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  October 8, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Petitioner on Review,

	v.

TEDDY HALL,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC C9406-34332; CA A87453; SC S44712)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted May 5, 1998.

	David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.  With
him on the petition were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Steven V. Humber, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on
the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.**  

	LEESON, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	Janice R. Wilson, Judge.

	149 Or App 358, 942 P2d 882, modified on recons 149 Or App
757, 944 P2d 1000 (1997).

	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.

		LEESON, J.

		In this criminal case involving multiple charges, a
jury convicted defendant of two counts of robbery in the first
degree, ORS 164.415, one count of robbery in the third degree,
ORS 164.395, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm,
ORS 166.270.  The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's
conviction for robbery in the third degree and affirmed his other
convictions.  State v. Hall, 149 Or App 358, 942 P2d 882,
modified on recons 149 Or App 757, 944 P2d 1000 (1997).  We
allowed review to determine whether the trial court erred in
denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the count
of third-degree robbery.  For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the trial court did not err.  The Court of Appeals'
contrary holding on that count is reversed, and its decision
otherwise is affirmed.

		We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, making
reasonable inferences, could have found the essential elements of
the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Cunningham,
320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994).  The issue is not whether we
believe defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to so find. 
State v. Rose, 311 Or 274, 281, 810 P2d 839 (1991).  When
analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we make no distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree of
proof required.  State v. Lerch, 296 Or 377, 396, 677 P2d 678
(1984).  

		Defendant walked into the McDonald's restaurant at
Jantzen Beach on June 21, 1994, at about 10:40 p.m., twenty
minutes before the restaurant closed for the night.  He wore a
leather jacket over his clothing and a bandana on his head that
covered his hair completely.  Although it was late at night, he
also had on sunglasses.  

		Defendant went to the counter near a cash register.  He
saw Ahyek, an employee, standing at the end of the counter.  He
made a motion to her with his hand and told her to "Come here." 
Ahyek walked toward defendant and stood directly across the
counter from him near the cash register.  As she stood across
from him, defendant said to Ahyek, "Put all of the money into
this bag.  I want all of your money."  He held out a small paper
bag that he had brought into the restaurant with him.  Ahyek
opened the top drawer of a cash register and gave defendant all
the money in it.  Defendant told her, "No, I want what is
underneath."  Ahyek reached beneath the drawer and gave defendant
the money that was there.  Defendant still was not satisfied that
Ahyek had given him all the money.  He told her, "No.  I want
what is in the other drawers."  Ahyek pulled the cash drawers out
of the other cash registers and set them on the counter to show
defendant that she "didn't have anything else."  Defendant took
the money and left the restaurant.  On his way out, defendant
told Atkinson, a maintenance worker, not to follow him.  Ahyek
called the police, who arrested defendant several days later.  He
was indicted for robbery in the third degree.

		Defendant represented himself at trial.  Just before
instructing the jury, the court sua sponte raised the issue of
whether the state had presented sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for robbery in the third degree.  ORS 164.395(1)
defines robbery in the third degree:

		"(1)  A person commits the crime of robbery in the
third degree if in the course of committing or
attempting to commit theft the person uses or threatens
the immediate use of physical force upon another person
with the intent of:

		"(a)  Preventing or overcoming resistance to the
taking of the property or to retention thereof
immediately after the taking; or

	  	"(b)  Compelling the owner of such property or
another person to deliver the property or to engage in
other conduct which might aid in the commission of the
theft."  (Emphasis added.)

 		In response to the trial court's having raised the
issue, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, on the ground
that he had not said any threatening words to Ahyek or made any
threatening gestures towards her.  The trial court denied the
motion, concluding that "[t]he circumstances may give rise to the
threat."  In a unanimous verdict, the jury found defendant guilty
of robbery in the third degree.(1) 

		On appeal, defendant assigned error to the trial
court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing
that the state had presented insufficient evidence to convict him
of third-degree robbery, because he did not use actual force or
threaten the immediate use of physical force against Ahyek.  The
state responded that an implied threat is sufficient to establish
robbery in the third degree and that a rational trier of fact
could find that defendant's demand to Ahyek to give him all the
money carried with it an implied threat that defendant would use
physical force if Ahyek refused to comply.

		A two-judge majority of the Court of Appeals agreed
with defendant.  The majority concluded that the trial court
erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal,
because "[t]here is no evidence that defendant made verbal
threats or engaged in conduct that indicated that he would, in
fact, immediately resort to physical force unless his demand was
met."  Hall, 149 Or App at 365 (emphasis added).  Chief Judge
Deits dissented, arguing that, considering the entire
circumstances, there was sufficient evidence from which a
rational jury could infer that defendant implicitly had
threatened to use immediate physical force against Ahyek if she
did not comply with his demands.  Id. at 368. 

		On review, the questions are what the legislature
intended by the phrase, "threatens the immediate use of physical
force upon another person," in ORS 164.395(1), and whether the
trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal on the charge of robbery in the third degree, because
the state failed to present sufficient evidence to permit the
jury to find that defendant had threatened the immediate use of
physical force on Ahyek if she did not comply with his demands.  

		The first inquiry is a matter of statutory
construction.  In construing a statute, our task is to discern
the intent of the legislature.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We begin with
the statute's text and context and give words of common usage
their "plain, natural, and ordinary meaning."  Id. at 610-11.  

		The criminal code does not define the word "threatens"
as used in ORS 164.395(1).  However, the dictionary defines the
word "threaten" as follows:

	"1:  to utter threats against: promise punishment,
reprisal, or other distress to * * * 2 * * *:  to
charge under pain of punishment: WARN * * * 3:  to
promise as a threat:  hold out by way of menace or
warning * * * 4a: to give signs of the approach of
(something evil or unpleasant): indicate as impending: 
PORTEND * * * b: to hang over as a threat:  MENACE 

	* * * 5: to announce as intended or possible * * *."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 2382 (unabridged ed
1993).

		The dictionary definition indicates that the act of
threatening another person can be explicit (such as uttering
threats) or implicit (such as giving signs of the approach of
something evil or unpleasant).  That conclusion is supported by
examining the dictionary definition of the noun "threat," which
is used repeatedly in the definition of the verb threaten.  A
"threat" is:

	"1: an indication of something impending and usu.
undesirable or unpleasant * * * as a: an expression of
an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on
another usu. as retribution or punishment for something
done or left undone * * * b:  expression of an
intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal
means and esp. by means involving coercion or duress of
the person threatened ([threats] inducing fear of
bodily harm are often cause of legal action even in the
absence of overt violence) 2: something that by its
very nature or relation to another threatens the
welfare of the latter * * *."  Id.  

Like the act of threatening, a threat can be explicit (an
expression of an intention to inflict harm or loss on another) or
implicit (something that by its nature or relation to another
announces that a person's welfare is in danger).  Whether a
person implicitly threatens another in the course of an encounter
depends on the reasonable inferences that the fact finder can
draw from that encounter.  

		ORS 164.395(1) requires that, in the course of
committing or attempting to commit theft, a defendant use or
threaten to use immediate physical force on another person with
the intent of preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking
of property or compelling the person to deliver property.  Having
concluded that the act of threatening can be explicit or
implicit, the next inquiry is whether, under ORS 164.395(1), a
person who demands that the victim deliver property, or not
resist the taking of property, implicitly can threaten the
immediate use of physical force if the victim does not comply. 
The answer to that question is yes.  If the context in which the
demands were made supports a reasonable inference that the person
implicitly threatened the immediate use of physical force if the
victim did not comply, a trial court does not err in denying a
motion for judgment of acquittal on robbery in the third degree.

		We turn to the facts of this case.  Defendant came into
the restaurant late at night, just before its closing time,
dressed in a manner that disguised his identity.  He does not
contest that his purpose in coming into the restaurant was to
obtain money.  He made a series of demands on Ahyek while she was
standing close to him:  While making a gesture to Ahyek,
defendant told her to "Come here" and, when she was standing
across the counter from him, near a cash register, told her to
put all the money into the bag that he was carrying.  After Ahyek
put the money from the drawer of the cash register into the bag,
defendant told her to give him the money underneath the cash
drawer.  He then told her that he wanted the money in the other
cash registers as well.  

		From the facts of this case, a jury reasonably could
infer that, if Ahyek did not comply with defendant's demands to
give him all the money, he would reach across the counter and
take the money that he had demanded and that he immediately would
use physical force against Ahyek if she tried to stop him from
doing so.  A jury also reasonably could infer that, if Ahyek did
not comply with defendant's demands, he immediately would use
physical force on her to compel her to give him the money. 
Finally, a jury could infer that, if Ahyek did not comply with
defendant's demands, he would abandon his intent to commit theft
and simply leave the restaurant.  Any of those inferences is
reasonable; therefore, it was appropriate to allow the jury to
decide the question.  Consequently, the trial court did not err
in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the
count of robbery in the third degree. 

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.

	DURHAM, J., dissenting.

	Without question, defendant committed serious criminal
conduct when he entered the restaurant, told the cashier to put
the restaurant's money into his bag, and fled.  The legal
question before the court is whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the charge of robbery in the third degree.  The
parties disagree about whether the evidence would permit a jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, in the course of
committing theft, defendant "threaten[ed] the immediate use of
physical force upon another person" within the meaning of ORS
164.395(1).(2)  The task of statutory interpretation is
particularly important here because the statutory requirement of
proof that the perpetrator "use[d] or threaten[ed] the immediate
use of physical force upon another person" while committing theft
is common to all statutes that define the degrees of robbery. 
See ORS 164.405(1); ORS 164.415(1).

	In view of the importance of a proper legal analysis of
that question, the opinion offered by the majority is a
disappointment.  Two critical methodological mistakes, identified
below, lead the majority into legal error.  Because the
majority's errors concern methodology, and because the majority
opinion does not clarify the point, the reader is left to guess
whether this case exhibits an analysis that affects only this
case or, instead, represents a change in the way that the court
goes about resolving statutory interpretation and sufficiency of
evidence problems.  In either case, the majority's rationale is
incorrect.

	The majority's first error occurs in its attempt to
interpret the word "threaten."  The majority properly quotes the
following dictionary definition of the verb "threaten":

	"1 : to utter threats against: promise punishment,
reprisal, or other distress to * * *  2 * * *: to
charge under pain of punishment: WARN * * *  3 : to
promise as a threat: hold out by way of menace or
warning * * *  4a : to give signs of the approach of
(something evil or unpleasant): indicate as impending :
PORTEND * * * b : to hang over as a threat : MENACE * *
*  5 : to announce as intended or possible * * *."

Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 2382 (unabridged ed 1993).

	From that definition, the majority draws the conclusion
that the act of threatening another can be explicit or implicit. 
I agree with that conclusion.  For example, if defendant had
displayed a clenched fist to Ahyek, that would satisfy the
requirement of the robbery statute that he "threaten" to use
force on another person immediately, even if he made no explicit
statement that he would strike her if she failed to comply with
his demands.

	Having observed that the act of threatening may be
explicit or implicit, the majority ceases its analysis of the
definition of the term "threaten."  The majority turns, instead,
to the definition of the term "threat," finds further support for
its already-stated conclusion that a threat may be explicit or
implicit, and concludes that an "implicit" threat is "something
that by its nature or relation to another announces that a
person's welfare is in danger."  State v. Hall, ____ Or ____,
____, ____ P2d ____ (1998) (slip op at 7).  That analysis is
flawed.

	The term set forth in ORS 164.395(1) is the verb
"threaten," not the noun "threat."  A verb expresses action. 
Every usage in the dictionary for the verb "threaten" states that
that term describes communicative action, that is,