Case Title: State v. Barnum

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45983

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  February 7, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
	v.
BYRON FRANKLIN BARNUM,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 92CR0200; CA A96131; SC S45983, S46255)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted May 10, 2000.
	Jess Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs was David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
	Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With
him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	RIGGS, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Josephine County Circuit Court, Sid Brockley, Judge. 157 Or App 68, 970 P2d 1214 (1998).
	**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
	RIGGS, J.
	This criminal proceeding, in which defendant was
convicted of two counts of burglary and one count of arson after
a trial to the court, presents three issues for review.  The
first is whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of
defendant's prior crimes to prove that he committed the crimes
charged in this matter.  The second is whether the trial court
erred in convicting defendant of two burglaries.  The third is
whether, assuming that defendant properly was convicted of two
burglaries, the trial court erred in punishing him for each
separately.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did
not err in admitting the evidence, but that it had erred by
convicting the defendant of and punishing him for two burglaries. 
State v. Barnum, 157 Or App 68, 970 P2d 1214 (1998).  For the
reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
	Given the trial court's finding of guilt, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  See State v.
Brown, 310 Or 347, 350, 800 P2d 259 (1990) (reviewing jury
verdict).
	The victim was a claims representative for an insurance
company.  Defendant had been involved in a traffic accident with
a person whom the victim's company insured.  While processing
defendant's claim, the victim communicated with defendant solely
by telephone and mail.  At some point, defendant became angry
with the victim, because of a disagreement concerning defendant's
insurance claim.
	In letters to and conversations with the victim,
defendant mentioned information about numerous matters about
which he should not have known, including details about the
insured, the insurance business, and the victim herself.  That
information was contained in the victim's files, and she had not
revealed it to defendant.  At some point, the victim discovered
evidence that someone had burglarized her office. (1)  At the time
of the burglary, she already had noted her vacation plans on her
office calendar.
	A few months thereafter, while the victim was away on
her scheduled vacation, an arsonist set fire to her home using
gasoline and other substances taken from her garage.  The
arsonist had removed clothing from her dresser drawers, stuffed
the drawers with paper, and lit the paper.  In fact, several
different fires had been started around the home.  The victim had
left her Social Security card, house keys, and a credit card
(along with its PIN number) at home.  The keys were missing and
someone used the credit card to withdraw $400 cash during her
vacation.
	On the same day as the fire, the victim's fire
insurance company received an anonymous letter on hand-trimmed
stationery suggesting that the victim was planning to set fire to
her own home.  The letter mentioned the victim's middle name, her
Social Security Number, and referred to information contained in
personal letters that she had kept at her home.  She had not
revealed any of that information to defendant.  The victim's fire
insurance policy, which contained the identity of her insurer,
was among private papers at her home.  The local fire department
also received a letter on hand-trimmed stationery, which
contained the victim's house key and stated that the she had
hired the anonymous author of the letter to set fire to her home.
	Following an investigation, a grand jury indicted
defendant for one count of arson, ORS 164.325, and two counts of
first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225. (2)  In particular, count two
charged that defendant had entered and remained in the victim's
home on the date of the fire with the intent to commit arson. 
Count three charged that defendant had entered and remained in
the victim's home on the date of the fire with the intent to
commit theft.  
	At defendant's bench trial, the state adduced evidence
of his 1979 California conviction for the attempted murder of his
college professor, in which defendant had sent accusatory letters
on hand-trimmed stationery both before and after the crime.  The
state argued that the accusatory letters proved defendant's
identity as the perpetrator in this case and, thus, that they
were admissible as a signature crime under OEC 404(3). (3)  The
trial court admitted the evidence.
	The trial court convicted defendant of the two burglary
counts and the arson count based on the fires at the victim's
home.  After concluding that the two burglary counts were
separately punishable under ORS 161.067, the trial court
sentenced defendant to a term of sixteen years' imprisonment.
	On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of
the prior signature crime involving the attempted murder, but
that the trial court had erred as a matter of law when it failed
to "merge" defendant's two burglary convictions for sentencing. (4) 
Barnum, 157 Or App at 78.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of arson and remanded the case with instructions to
enter judgment of conviction on one count of burglary and to
resentence defendant. (5)  We allowed review.	We first address whether the trial court properly
admitted evidence relating to defendant's 1979 conviction for
attempted murder under OEC 404(3).  We have reviewed the record
and the arguments of counsel and conclude that the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the trial court properly admitted
evidence of the circumstances surrounding defendant's 1979
conviction as proof of defendant's identity.  A fact-specific
discussion of this assignment of error would not benefit the
public, bench, or bar, because the jurisprudence surrounding OEC
404(3) is well developed. (6)
	Next, to resolve the second issue presented by this
case, we must determine if the trial court properly convicted
defendant of two counts of burglary.  We review the trial court's
ruling for errors of law, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state.  See State v. Boone, 327 Or 307, 309, 959
P2d 76 (1998) (stating that reviewing court's function is to
decide whether trial court applied legal principles correctly to
facts).
	ORS 164.225(1) provides that a person commits burglary
when he or she "enters or remains unlawfully" in a dwelling with
the intent to commit a crime therein.  Defendant did not
challenge the form or degree of specificity of the indictment
charging counts two and three.  If the trier of fact found that
each element of each count had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, then defendant properly could be convicted of both counts
of burglary, regardless of whether the two violations were
separately punishable.  See State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 36-37,
10 P3d 901 (2000) ("If the trial court were to enter a conviction
on only one count [of aggravated murder], and dismiss the other *
* * , it always would be possible that an appeal would result in
a reversal, for insufficient evidence, of the count that was
selected to serve as the basis for conviction.  With the other
[count] dismissed, defendant would be able to argue that he was
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the [remaining charge]."). 
In this case, there was sufficient evidence that defendant
entered or remained unlawfully with the intent to commit arson
and that he entered or remained unlawfully with the intent to
commit theft.  Accordingly, defendant properly was charged and
convicted of two counts of burglary.  
	Thus, having determined that defendant properly was
charged and convicted of two burglaries, we now turn to the third
question presented by this case:  May defendant be punished
separately for each of the two counts?  Whether defendant's two
violations of the same statute (ORS 164.225) are separately
punishable depends on whether they were "repeated violations * * * separated * * * by a sufficient pause in defendant's
criminal conduct * * * " within the meaning of ORS 161.067(3). 
"Repeated" means "renewed, or recurring again and again."  See
Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary, 1924 (unabridged ed 1993)
(defining "repeated").  
	Furthermore, ORS 161.067(3) requires that the
violations be not just "repeated," but also that they be
separated by "a sufficient pause in the defendant's criminal
conduct."  Thus, to be separately punishable, one crime must end
before another begins.  Therefore, we must determine whether, on
the facts in this case, one burglary ended before the other
began.  Although the sentencing court found a sufficient pause
between the theft and the arson, the only evidence of such a
pause is the fact that the keys were stolen from a rack some
distance from the bedroom where the fire was set.  We find that
evidence insufficient to support the conclusion that one burglary
was terminated before the other commenced.  Thus, we hold that
the two burglaries in this case were not "repeated violations"
separated by a "sufficient pause" under ORS 161.067(3) and that,
because of the lack of evidence, defendant cannot be punished for
both burglaries.  The Court of Appeals ruling in that respect was
correct.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.


1. 	A few months earlier, defendant had been arrested while
burglarizing a doctor's office, at which time he was carrying
specialized burglary tools.

2. 	Defendant also was indicted and acquitted on other
charges that do not bear on the analysis in this case.

3. 	OEC 404(3) provides:
		"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."

4. 	ORS 161.067 sometimes is referred to as an "anti-merger" statute, which is misleading.  Merger, strictly speaking,
refers to lesser-included offenses that "merge" if a defendant is
convicted of a greater offense.  See State v. Kessler, 297 Or
460, 462-63, 686 P2d 345 (1984) (so stating).  By contrast, ORS
161.067 delineates when a defendant may receive multiple
punishments for a criminal episode.

5. 	The trial court imposed a sentence under ORS 137.635
(requiring determinate sentences for certain felonies).  The
state has conceded that the trial court misapplied that statute,
and the parties agree that the matter should be remanded for
resentencing on that basis, if for no other reason.

6. 	We note that the 1997 Legislature amended OEC 404 to
provide that, "[i]n criminal actions, evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts by the defendant is admissible if relevant," with
exceptions that do not appear to apply here.  OEC 404(4); ORS
40.170(4); Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 29.  It appears that the
legislature intended the 1997 amendment to OEC 404 to apply
retroactively to defendant's case.  However, because that
amendment would not have altered the result that we have reached
under OEC 404(3), we do not address or apply OEC 404(4) in this
case.