Case Title: O'Sullivan v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 3/21

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michael O’Sullivan v. State of Maryland, No. 3, September Term, 2021. 
Opinion by Biran, J. 
 
 
PERJURY – PROSECUTION’S BURDEN OF PRODUCTION – COMMON LAW 
“TWO-WITNESS” RULE – The Court of Appeals declined to abrogate Maryland’s 
common law “two-witness” rule. The rule provides that the State does not meet its burden 
of production with respect to the falsity element of a perjury prosecution if it offers only a 
single witness who testifies directly and positively that the defendant’s prior testimony was 
false. The State can prove falsity entirely through circumstantial evidence, by introducing 
direct evidence of falsity through multiple witnesses, or by introducing circumstantial 
evidence as well as direct evidence of falsity through one or more witnesses.  
 
APPELLATE REVIEW – SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – PERJURY – The 
Court of Appeals held that, where the State meets its burden of production under the 
two-witness rule, appellate courts review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
perjury conviction as they do in any other case, asking whether any rational trier of fact 
could find each element of the offense, including falsity, beyond a reasonable doubt. In this 
case, the State introduced sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner, a police officer who 
allegedly testified falsely at the trial of an arrestee, of perjury and misconduct in office.  
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 3 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
MICHAEL O’SULLIVAN 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Getty, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Biran 
Raker, Irma S. 
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Biran, J. 
McDonald and Raker, JJ., concur and dissent. 
 
 
                 Filed:  December 17, 2021
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 119148010 
Argued: September 13, 2021 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-12-17 09:45-05:00
Under Maryland’s common law, the State may not obtain a conviction for perjury 
based solely on the word of one witness who testifies at trial that the defendant gave false 
testimony in the underlying case. If the State introduces that kind of direct evidence through 
a witness, the State must either put on a second witness who also provides direct evidence 
of the falsity of the defendant’s prior testimony, or the State must introduce – in place of a 
second witness – other evidence that tends to corroborate the sole witness’s claim that the 
defendant provided false testimony. This burden of production has come to be known as 
the “two-witness rule.” Although the rule has been criticized in some quarters for many 
years, it has endured in perjury cases in Maryland, as well as in many other states and in 
the federal criminal justice system. In this case, taking up the cause of the two-witness 
rule’s critics, the State asks us to judicially abrogate the rule in Maryland. 
The State prosecuted Michael O’Sullivan, the Petitioner here, for perjury and 
misconduct in office. O’Sullivan was a veteran officer in the Baltimore Police Department 
when he was charged. After participating in an arrest of Yusuf Smith, O’Sullivan testified 
at Smith’s trial in the District Court of Maryland that he saw Smith remove something from 
his waistband and toss it; according to O’Sullivan, the object he saw Smith discard was a 
.32 caliber revolver that O’Sullivan subsequently recovered. Based on O’Sullivan’s 
testimony, the District Court found Smith guilty of a handgun charge and related offenses. 
Smith then appealed his convictions to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Before the 
appeal was heard, the State dismissed the case against Smith and began investigating 
O’Sullivan. The State subsequently obtained an indictment charging O’Sullivan with 
2 
perjury and misconduct in office based on his allegedly false testimony at Smith’s District 
Court trial. 
At O’Sullivan’s nonjury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State called 
Smith as a witness. Smith testified that O’Sullivan provided untrue testimony at Smith’s 
trial when O’Sullivan claimed to have seen Smith remove a handgun from his waistband 
and throw it to the ground. In addition, the State introduced video footage from body 
cameras worn by O’Sullivan and another officer, which showed the two officers approach 
the area where O’Sullivan claimed he saw Smith discard an object. The footage from 
O’Sullivan’s camera also showed him recover the revolver. The State argued that the video 
footage showed it was impossible for O’Sullivan to have seen Smith discard the revolver 
and, therefore, that O’Sullivan had testified falsely at Smith’s trial. The circuit court found 
O’Sullivan guilty of perjury and misconduct in office.  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed O’Sullivan’s convictions, holding that the 
two-witness rule did not apply to O’Sullivan’s perjury charge because a reasonable 
factfinder could conclude that O’Sullivan testified falsely at Smith’s trial, based solely on 
the video footage. Alternatively, the court held that the State satisfied the two-witness rule 
because the video footage sufficiently corroborated Smith’s testimony.  
O’Sullivan filed a petition for certiorari in this Court, contending that both of the 
intermediate appellate court’s bases for affirmance are erroneous. The State filed a 
conditional cross-petition for certiorari, asking us to abrogate the two-witness rule 
prospectively. We granted both petitions. 
3 
For the reasons stated below, we decline to abrogate the two-witness rule. Further, 
we conclude that, in this case, the State met its burden of production under the two-witness 
rule as well as its burden to persuade the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that 
O’Sullivan was guilty of perjury and misconduct in office. 
I 
 
Background 
A. The Two-Witness Rule 
In Brown v. State, 225 Md. 610, 615-16 (1961), this Court noted that there had “been 
few cases in Maryland dealing with the crime of perjury and, so far as we know, none 
where the quantum of proof necessary for conviction has been before this Court.” The 
Court explained that, “[a]t common law it was originally held that to warrant a conviction 
of perjury the falsity had to be shown by direct and positive testimony of two witnesses,” 
and that perjury “required a greater measure of proof than any other crime known to law, 
treason alone excepted.” Id. at 616. In defining the two-witness rule’s parameters, the Court 
observed that the rule had “been relaxed so as to allow a conviction of perjury to stand if 
there are two witnesses, or one witness corroborated by circumstances proved by 
independent testimony.” Id. The Court further stated that, if the State opts to produce a 
single direct witness and corroborating circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial 
evidence must be “of such a nature so as to be of equal weight to that of at least a second 
4 
witness, thus foreclosing any reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt.” Id. 
at 616-17. 
This relaxation of the two-witness rule is a deviation from its history of strict 
application in medieval ecclesiastical courts, which conceived “of the oath as a formal act, 
mechanically and ipso facto efficacious ... and quantitative in its nature.” Hourie v. State, 
53 Md. App. 62, 70-71 (1982) (“Hourie I”) (internal quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted). Under those courts’ quantitative system of proof, “a degree of greater certainty 
[was] thought to be attained, not by analyzing the significance of each oath in itself and 
relatively to the person, but by increasing the number of the oaths.” Id. at 71 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Relying on the quantity, rather than the quality of 
testimony, ecclesiastical law “elaborated many specific rules as to the number of witnesses 
necessary in various situations; against a cardinal, for example, twelve or perhaps 
forty-four witnesses were required.” John H. Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses; 
A Brief History of the Numerical System in England, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 84 (1901). 
Although the rule endured in civil and ecclesiastical courts for centuries, most 
notably the Court of the Star Chamber, 
[t]here was no such rule in use in common law courts until the first half of 
the Eighteenth Century. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2040 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
In 1640, the Court of the Star Chamber was abolished and its jurisdiction 
transferred to the King's Bench.... Since the crime of perjury had been 
prosecuted almost entirely in the Star Chamber, it follows that the rule 
requiring two witnesses accompanied the transfer of jurisdiction to the 
King’s Bench. 7 Wigmore, Id. Since perjury was one of the few crimes in 
which the accused was allowed to testify, the rule gained acceptance in the 
common law court. If only one person’s testimony was offered against the 
accused, the situation would present oath against oath, or a “draw”. The 
5 
quantitative theory of testimony, then, played a key role in the establishment 
of the rule. 
 
Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 420-21 (1982). 
While the quantitative system of proof was replaced at common law with a system 
that relies upon the quality of the prosecution’s proof, the relaxed two-witness rule has 
endured in perjury cases in which the State has opted to introduce direct evidence of falsity 
through the testimony of at least one witness. Most recently, in State v. McGagh, 472 Md. 
168 (2021), after a nonjury trial, the circuit court convicted McGagh of perjury for falsely 
averring that a Verizon Wireless employee had sexually assaulted her. Id. at 181-82. At 
trial, the State introduced both the testimony of the employee McGagh had accused of 
sexual assault, as well as surveillance footage from the Verizon store. The circuit court 
found McGagh guilty of perjury, based in part on the value the court assigned to the 
surveillance video. Id. at 179, 181. This Court upheld the conviction, concluding that 
[t]he Verizon surveillance video in this case also satisfies the purpose of the 
two-witness rule articulated in Brown. The two-witness rule prevents “oath 
against oath” by allowing the fact finder to observe and judge the credibility 
of witnesses offering competing recollections of events, while comparing the 
witness statements against independent, circumstantial evidence. The trial 
court here had the opportunity to judge and observe McGagh’s and [the 
Verizon employee’s] testimony. The Verizon surveillance video provided 
independent corroboration of the pertinent factual dispute: whether [the 
Verizon employee] cupped McGagh’s breast and touched her inner thigh. 
 
Id. at 202; see also Mason v. State, 225 Md. App. 467, 491 (2015) (applying the 
two-witness rule and determining that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Mason’s 
conviction for perjury where the State introduced both direct and circumstantial evidence). 
6 
Although the two-witness rule has endured in Maryland, this Court and the Court of 
Special Appeals have affirmed perjury convictions where the State did not put on the direct 
testimony of at least one witness to prove the element of falsity, but rather proved falsity 
entirely through other evidence. Brown itself was such a case. As the Court of Special 
Appeals explained in Hourie I, although the Brown Court “paid lip service to the relaxed 
two-witness rule,” a “close reading reveals nothing but circumstantial evidence as to the 
key element of the falsity of the allegedly perjurious testimony.” Hourie I, 53 Md. App. at 
78 n.15. The defendant in Brown was charged with perjury, based on her testimony in a 
civil trial that she had not signed the confessed judgment note at issue in that case. See 
Brown, 225 Md. at 613. The Court of Special Appeals’ description of the evidence the State 
introduced in Brown to prove the falsity of Brown’s testimony in the civil trial 
demonstrates that the two-witness rule did not come into play in that perjury prosecution: 
The circumstantial case of falsity consisted of the confessed judgment note 
itself bearing what was determined to be the defendant’s signature. To prove 
this single fact, a number of links were necessary to forge the chain. The 
State called the bank official who received the note itself with its questioned 
signature; several other witnesses who supplied, for comparison purposes, 
documents bearing the known signature of the defendant; and the 
handwriting examiner who offered the expert opinion that the known and 
questioned signatures emanated from the same source. This multiplication of 
witnesses, however, is not the multiplication contemplated by the two-
witness rule (even in its relaxed form of one witness plus corroboration). The 
two-witness rule mandated two direct witnesses (or at least one corroborated 
direct witness) who could testify on oath that the defendant’s earlier 
testimony was false. The two-witness rule had nothing to do with the total 
number of witnesses paraded to the stand by the State to prove elements of 
perjury other than the falsity or to provide circumstantial proof of the element 
of falsity itself. The reality … is that the circumstantial evidence (the proved 
signature on the document) was not the “functional equivalent of a second 
witness” but was legally sufficient proof of guilt all by itself. The document 
7 
did not corroborate even a single direct witness as to falsity; standing alone, 
it established that falsity. 
 
Hourie I, 53 Md. App. at 78 n.15.  
Similarly, in Smith, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Smith’s perjury 
conviction based on her testimony in a prior case that she had sent refunds to two 
customers. At Smith’s perjury trial, the customers (Berry and Farber) testified that they did 
not receive the checks Smith claimed to have sent them. Smith, 51 Md. App. at 410-11. 
The State also introduced evidence of unsatisfied judgments that Berry and Farber had 
obtained against Smith in the District Court, from which the jury could infer that Smith 
knew they were unpaid. Id. at 411, 425. Further, the Court of Special Appeals noted, the 
jury had the opportunity to observe Smith’s demeanor and attitude on the stand during the 
perjury trial, and could form its own opinion as to her veracity. Id. at 425. Based on this 
evidence, the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith’s testimony in the prior 
case was false, despite the fact that “there was no direct and positive testimony [at the 
perjury trial] that [Smith] did not, in fact, send the checks to Berry and Farber[.]” Id. The 
Court of Special Appeals relied on Brown in concluding that the State was permitted to 
prove the element of falsity entirely through circumstantial evidence: “The mandate of 
Brown is clear. Pursuant to [that] mandate, we explicitly hold that where the State produces 
and relies upon circumstantial evidence, that circumstantial evidence in and of itself may 
be sufficient for a conviction of perjury, and the two witness rule is not applicable.” Id. at 
426. 
8 
The two-witness rule has long been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., Hourie I, 53 
Md. App. at 74-76, 81 (explaining that commentators such as Wigmore “are disdainful of 
the rule as an utterly discordant note in present-day jurisprudence” and describing the rule 
as a “[r]elic [f]ound in a [b]ottle” that owes its continuing existence to having “been in the 
right place at the right time”); Smith, 51 Md. App. at 422 (“While the rule may continue to 
serve a practical purpose by preventing charges based solely on annoyance or retaliation, 
… we are not sure that this purpose outweighs the desirability of consistency in proofs for 
the various criminal offenses.”). These misgivings about the two-witness rule led the 
Hourie I Court to limit the rule’s applicability to common-law perjury charges. See Hourie 
I, 53 Md. App. at 88.  
In this Court’s review of the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Hourie I, we 
stated that the two-witness rule should “be limited to the situation for which it was 
designed, namely to prevent a conviction of perjury when there is no evidence other than 
the word of one witness against that of the defendant,” and that the rule “has no place in a 
case in which the falsity of [a] defendant’s testimony can be established by evidence of a 
different kind.” Hourie v. State, 298 Md. 50, 60-61 (1983) (“Hourie II”) (quoting R. 
Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969)). In McGagh, we expressed approval of the two-
witness rule, opining that the rule’s “logical underpinnings remain sound.” 472 Md. at 199 
n.14. 
We glean from these cases that the two-witness rule, as it presently exists in 
Maryland, is a burden of production that applies if the State elects to present the testimony 
of a witness as “direct and positive” evidence of the element of falsity. Brown, 225 Md. at 
9 
616. If the State opts to introduce such witness testimony, the two-witness rule requires 
that the State do more: the State must also produce evidence from at least one additional 
witness that directly and positively contradicts the allegedly false testimony, or the State 
must introduce other evidence that tends to corroborate a sole witness’s direct evidence, 
i.e., that tends to establish the falsity of the defendant’s prior testimony. If the State does 
not meet this burden of production, then the trial court must grant a defendant’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case.1 However, the State is not required to 
prove falsity in a perjury case by calling at least one witness who testifies that the 
defendant’s prior testimony was false. Rather, the State may obtain a conviction for perjury 
if it produces “evidence of a different kind,” Hourie II, 298 Md. at 61 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), that is sufficient to prove the element of falsity beyond a 
reasonable doubt (assuming, of course, that the State also proves the other elements of 
perjury).  
 
1 As discussed above, prior cases discussing the two-witness rule have stated that, 
if the State produces direct and positive witness testimony as to falsity, as well as 
corroborating circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence must be “of such a 
nature so as to be of equal weight to that of at least a second witness, thus foreclosing any 
reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt.” Brown, 225 Md. at 616-17. This 
describes the burden of persuasion that the State must meet to obtain a conviction. See also 
Smith, 51 Md. App. at 421 (describing the “relaxed” rule as “allow[ing] a conviction to 
stand based on the testimony of one witness corroborated by circumstances sufficient to 
equal the weight of a second witness”). These references to the State’s burden of persuasion 
in describing the two-witness rule, which is a burden of production, have led to confusion. 
We address the State’s burden of persuasion – and how an appellate court should review 
the sufficiency of the evidence of falsity in a perjury case – in Section III.B. below. 
10 
B. O’Sullivan’s Perjury Prosecution 
This appeal arises from the conviction of Baltimore Police Officer Michael 
O’Sullivan stemming from his testimony at Yusuf Smith’s criminal trial in the District 
Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City. After a nonjury trial in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, the court found O’Sullivan guilty of perjury and misconduct in office, and 
the Court of Special Appeals affirmed O’Sullivan’s convictions.  
1. Smith’s Trial 
At Smith’s trial in the District Court in June 2018, O’Sullivan testified to the 
following: On May 1, 2018, O’Sullivan received information of criminal activity at the 
Alameda Apartments (the “Apartments”) in Baltimore City. That afternoon, he and his 
supervisor, Sergeant Amy Streett, parked in the west surface lot of the Apartments and 
entered the Apartments’ courtyard on foot. As O’Sullivan walked from the parking lot into 
the courtyard, he saw a man officers later identified as Smith standing near the rear corner 
of the Apartments next to another man named Shaqeil Cozart. O’Sullivan testified that, as 
O’Sullivan  
walked into the complex, the second male, Mr. Cozart, fled on foot straight 
back. Mr. Yusuf Smith … removed an object from his waistband and threw 
it, and then ran what would be southbound through the rear of the courtyard. 
 
O’Sullivan testified that he recovered a .32 caliber revolver on the ground after walking 
through the courtyard. Officers apprehended Smith as he ran through an alley south of the 
Apartments. 
11 
On direct examination, O’Sullivan identified the gun that he recovered, responded 
“Yes,” when asked whether he saw someone throw it, and further stated that the person he 
saw throw the gun was Smith. 
The District Court convicted Smith, after which Smith noted an appeal to the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City. While that appeal was pending, the State dismissed the charges 
against Smith and began investigating O’Sullivan. 
2. O’Sullivan’s Trial for Perjury and Misconduct in Office 
On May 28, 2019, a grand jury in Baltimore City indicted O’Sullivan for perjury, in 
violation of Md. Code, Crim. Law (CR) § 9-101, and for the common law offense of 
misconduct in office, for allegedly providing false testimony at Smith’s trial. O’Sullivan 
elected a nonjury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which took place over two 
days in October 2019. 
The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
showed the following: On May 1, 2018, O’Sullivan and Sergeant Streett were on patrol on 
The Alameda in Baltimore City. After taking note of a man carrying a satchel in the vicinity 
of an Exxon station, the officers saw the man notice them. The man, to whom we will refer 
as John Doe,2 then started running and tossed the satchel into a dumpster. O’Sullivan 
recovered the abandoned satchel and discovered a gun inside it. The officers arrested Doe 
at the Exxon station, which is approximately one block away from the Apartments in the 
5600 block of The Alameda. After his arrest, Doe told O’Sullivan that “a black male 
 
2 The name of this man is not contained in the record. 
12 
wearing jeans, a white T-shirt, a red thermal and red shoes” was at the Apartments, carrying 
a gun. Streett, O’Sullivan, and several other officers proceeded to the Apartments to 
attempt to apprehend the individual described by Doe.  
The Apartments consist of two parallel rows of townhomes separated by a 
courtyard.3 To the west of the courtyard, and at a lower elevation than the courtyard, is a 
surface parking lot. The courtyard can be reached from the west surface lot by ascending 
two sets of steps, separated by a landing, or by walking up a dirt path alongside the steps. 
To the east of the courtyard is another surface lot. Just to the south of the apartment 
complex is an alley running from east to west. The alley is separated from the southern 
portion of the apartment complex by a chain-link fence and, close to where the alley abuts 
the Apartments’ east surface lot, a tall wooden fence.  
On May 1, 2018, if one walked through the courtyard from west to east and turned 
right at the end of the row of townhomes on the south side of the complex, a few steps later 
one would come upon a stairwell leading down to a basement landing. The stairwell was 
enclosed on one side by the outer wall of the townhomes and, on the opposite side, by a 
tall wooden fence. 
At trial, the State played Streett’s body-worn camera footage as she provided a 
running narrative.4 The State also played O’Sullivan’s body-worn camera footage. The 
 
3 We have included as an Appendix to this opinion an aerial view of the Apartments 
and surrounding area, which the State introduced as State’s Exhibit 3 at O’Sullivan’s trial. 
  
4 Baltimore Police Department officers are required to activate their body-worn 
cameras from standby mode when beginning an investigation. Activation of the camera 
restores the previous 30 seconds of captured footage, albeit without sound.  
13 
video footage and Streett’s testimony established that, after they arrived at the Apartments, 
Streett and O’Sullivan parked in the west surface lot, exited their vehicle, and approached 
the courtyard on foot. Streett and O’Sullivan were both in uniform. Meanwhile, other 
officers had positioned themselves in the adjacent alley, based on the officers’ expectation 
that, if there was an individual present with a gun, he might attempt to flee by way of the 
alley after Streett and O’Sullivan made their presence known. 
O’Sullivan walked from the parking lot to the courtyard using the paved steps, while 
Streett took the dirt path on O’Sullivan’s right. As she walked up the hill, with O’Sullivan 
to her left making his way up the steps, Streett could not see over the crest of the sidewalk 
toward the proximate corner of the most distant townhome on the south side of the 
complex, a corner where criminal activity frequently occurred. When the officers neared 
the top of the hill, O’Sullivan smiled and greeted two children sitting on the top of the 
stairs. Once she reached a point where she could see through the courtyard to the back 
corner of the townhomes on the south side of the complex, Streett saw nothing concerning; 
rather, she only saw individuals on the porches in front of their townhomes.  
O’Sullivan and Streett proceeded through the courtyard, and the officers were never 
separated by more than 10 to 15 feet. It took the officers approximately 30 seconds to cross 
the courtyard. During that time, O’Sullivan said nothing to Streett about seeing anyone 
throw something or take flight.  
As the officers neared the proximate corner of the most distant townhome on the 
south side of the complex, Streett activated her body-worn camera on the basis that, given 
the criminal activity that regularly occurred near that location, she was “initiating an 
14 
investigation.” As the officers turned right at the corner and approached the stairwell, 
Streett observed a man (later identified as Smith) in the alley running from east to west. At 
first, Smith was obscured from Streett’s view by the wooden fence separating the eastern 
part of the alley from the yard of the apartment complex, but as Smith continued to run 
west through the alley, he came into Streett’s view. Other officers pursued Smith and at 
least one other man as they ran west through the alley.  
After Streett and O’Sullivan saw Smith and the other man running through the alley, 
O’Sullivan proceeded down the stairs to the basement landing, shining his flashlight into 
the stairwell. While O’Sullivan inspected the stairwell, Streett approached the alley. As she 
did so, she walked past a revolver lying in the grass two to three feet to the left of the 
wooden fence enclosing the stairwell.5 With her attention focused on the chase taking place 
in the alley, Streett did not notice the gun as she walked past it. She then climbed over the 
chain-link fence into the alley, and made her way west down the alley, where Smith had 
been apprehended by officers. Smith was wearing a white t-shirt, jeans, and red and white 
sneakers. This was consistent with John Doe’s description of the man carrying a firearm at 
the Apartments.  
 
5 During her testimony, Streett placed an “X” on State’s Exhibit 3 to indicate the 
spot where the gun was recovered. See App. She also marked the spot where she and 
O’Sullivan parked when they first arrived (with a dot), the steps where O’Sullivan greeted 
the children before the officers entered the courtyard (with a triangular shaped mark), the 
spot where she first saw Smith and another man running in the alley (with two circles) and 
the direction they ran (with an arrow), and the spot where Smith was taken into custody 
(with a square). See id. 
15 
After he completed his inspection of the stairwell, O’Sullivan walked back up the 
steps. When he reached the top of the stairs, O’Sullivan turned right and then walked 
around the tall wooden fence that enclosed the stairwell, approaching the alley. At that 
point, O’Sullivan saw the black and silver handgun in the nearby grass, activated his 
body-worn camera, radioed “got the gun” to the other officers, and picked up the firearm. 
When O’Sullivan recovered the gun, it was in a spot that was at least 20 feet away from 
the corner of the building at which he and Streett had turned after walking through the 
courtyard and reaching the end of the south row of townhomes. A portion of the tall wooden 
fence enclosing the stairwell was in the direct line between the corner of the building and 
the spot where O’Sullivan recovered the gun. Thus, when O’Sullivan and Streett reached 
the corner of the building, the wooden fence completely blocked their view of the gun. It 
was only after O’Sullivan came back up the stairwell, walked around the wooden fence 
and proceeded toward the alley with the fence to his right, that he saw the gun. 
After he picked up the revolver, O’Sullivan climbed over the chain-link fence 
between the apartment complex and the alley, and entered the alley. As he approached the 
spot where Streett and other officers were detaining Smith, O’Sullivan radioed “30,” an 
indication that someone should be taken into custody. 
Smith testified that he was at the Apartments that day to visit with his cousin and 
others. He admitted that he played dice and smoked marijuana with a group of people, but 
denied that he had a handgun. Smith claimed that he was around the corner of the rear 
apartment building when someone yelled “police,” after which he and the others playing 
dice scattered. Smith testified that, prior to the moment when the group scattered, he had 
16 
been standing around the corner of the building with his back to the corner of the building. 
According to Smith, he was in that spot for approximately five minutes before someone 
yelled “police.” In other words, for approximately five minutes prior to the time Smith fled, 
Smith was not in a position where he could be seen by someone on the landing between 
the west surface parking lot and the second set of steps leading to the courtyard or by 
someone who was approaching the rear corner of the south row of townhomes from the 
west, by way of the courtyard.  
The State asked Smith to specify what O’Sullivan testified to at Smith’s District 
Court trial that was “inconsistent with the truth.” Smith replied: “He said that he saw me 
with a silver handgun and I removed it from my waistband and threw it on the ground and 
that was not true.”6 
Testifying in his own defense, O’Sullivan stated that, as he walked on the landing 
between the two sets of steps prior to entering the courtyard, he could see through the 
courtyard to the corner of the rear townhome in the south row of townhomes. At that time, 
according to O’Sullivan, he saw the man later identified as Smith standing next to the 
corner of the rear townhome, facing O’Sullivan. Smith was standing next to the man 
subsequently identified as Cozart. O’Sullivan testified that he then saw Cozart flee 
eastbound through the east surface parking lot. According to O’Sullivan, at that same time, 
he saw Smith turn and also begin to run. O’Sullivan further testified that, as Smith turned 
away from him to flee, Smith reached into his waistband and tossed an object. 
 
6 In its case-in-chief, the State also played an audio recording of O’Sullivan’s 
testimony at Smith’s trial. 
17 
After the close of evidence, and after hearing argument from the State and 
O’Sullivan’s trial counsel, the circuit court ruled as follows: 
[T]he issue is whether … [O’Sullivan] was telling the truth on the statement 
of charges [and] in his testimony in front of the district court, and this Court 
finds that the detective did not tell the truth. 
 
I sat and watched the body camera video of Sergeant Streett and the 
observations from that body camera of what was possibly the vision of two 
individuals approaching that area, and I took into great consideration that 
Officer O’Sullivan had a different angle, a different perspective in his 
testimony of what he saw of Mr. Smith being at the side of the building and 
discharging or … tossing. 
 
Today what he said was it was an object that – under oath he said it was a 
gun and numerous times he was positive that it was a gun. The gun was found 
so far away that it could not have been tossed. It had to go around the corner, 
basically over a fence and that to me is inconsistent with the testimony of 
Sergeant Streett, the video, body-worn camera video, the testimony of all the 
other officers who didn’t observe any of it. 
 
His lack of turning on his video, his stopping and talking with some kids 
when allegedly suspects are running off, his not even mentioning to his 
partner who was right beside him the possibility of something being tossed, 
I found the testimony of Detective O’Sullivan to be challenged and I find that 
his statements in district court, he perjured himself on direct examination 
from the State’s attorney and from cross examination of the Defense 
attorney. 
 
So this Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of 
both perjury and misconduct in office. 
 
On December 3, 2019, the circuit court sentenced O’Sullivan to concurrent 
15-month terms of incarceration on the two counts of conviction. 
C. Appeal 
O’Sullivan noted a timely appeal, presenting the Court of Special Appeals with the 
sole question of whether the evidence introduced at trial was legally sufficient to sustain 
18 
his perjury and misconduct in office convictions. In an unreported opinion, the Court of 
Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The intermediate appellate 
court held that, “because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that O’Sullivan testified 
falsely at Smith’s criminal trial based solely on the body camera footage, this was not an 
oath-against-oath case implicating the two-witness rule.” O’Sullivan v. State, No. 2275, 
slip op. at 17, Sept. Term, 2019, 2020 WL 7419686, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 18, 
2020). The court also held that, even if it were to apply the two-witness rule, the rule would 
be satisfied because Streett’s body camera footage was independent corroborative evidence 
of Smith’s testimony, and because “the direct and circumstantial evidence was legally 
sufficient to foreclose any reasonable hypothesis other than O’Sullivan’s guilt.” Id.  
O’Sullivan filed a petition for certiorari in this Court, seeking review of the 
following questions: 
1. Whether, in an oath-against-oath perjury case, the State is relieved of its 
burden of production under the two-witness rule by introducing 
circumstantial evidence? 
 
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence that [O’Sullivan] committed 
perjury and misconduct in office? 
 
The State subsequently filed a conditional cross-petition for certiorari, presenting 
the following question:  
Should the “two witness” rule, which provides for a heightened burden of 
production that is only applicable to the misdemeanor offense of perjury, be 
prospectively abrogated in favor of the standard burden of production in a 
criminal case, which requires the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt and trusts in the ability of the fact-finder to weigh evidence? 
  
19 
On April 9, 2021, we granted both petitions. O’Sullivan v. State, 474 Md. 221 
(2021). 
II 
 
Standard of Review 
Maryland Rule 8-131(c) governs the appellate review of nonjury trials: 
When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review 
the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment 
of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due 
regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “Maryland appellate courts ... adopt a 
deferential standard ... that asks whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” McGagh, 472 Md. at 193 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). An appellate court’s 
only question, in reviewing sufficiency, is “whether the verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the 
defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Manion, 442 
Md. 419, 431 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Weighing the 
credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the 
fact finder,” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533-34 (2003) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted), and, upon review, the evidence must be viewed “in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 533.  
We review questions of law de novo. State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 358 (2019).  
20 
III 
Discussion 
A. Maryland Shall Retain the Two-Witness Rule. 
 
We first consider the State’s cross-petition, in which the State asks us to 
prospectively abrogate the two-witness rule. Because doing so would be inconsistent with 
the doctrine of stare decisis, we shall retain the rule.  
“Under stare decisis, absent extremely narrow exceptions, an appellate court does 
not overrule its precedent.” Thompson v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 443 Md. 47, 57 (2015) 
(cleaned up). While “stare decisis does not preclude this Court from changing a common 
law rule where, in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge,” a rule “has become 
unsound in the circumstances of modern life” and “a vestige of the past,” State v. 
Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 604 (1998) (cleaned up), there are only two exceptions to the 
general rule that could potentially apply here. “First, the Court may strike down a decision 
that is clearly wrong and contrary to established principles.” Wallace v. State, 452 Md. 558, 
582 (2017) (cleaned up). “Second, precedent may be overruled when there is a showing 
that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Outside of these exceptions, to abide by 
stare decisis “is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Livesay v. 
Baltimore Cty., 384 Md. 1, 14 (2004) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991)). 
21 
Neither of these exceptions applies with respect to the two-witness rule. Analyzing 
the federal version of the rule more than 70 years ago, the Supreme Court observed that, 
“[w]hether it logically fits into our testimonial pattern or not, the government has not 
advanced sufficiently cogent reasons ... to reject the rule.” Weiler v. United States, 323 
U.S. 606, 609 (1945). The same holds true with respect to the State’s arguments here. 
1. The Two-Witness Rule Is Not Clearly Wrong and Contrary to Established 
Principles. 
The Supreme Court articulated the modern rationale7 for the rule in Weiler: 
Lawsuits frequently engender in defeated litigants sharp resentments and 
hostilities against adverse witnesses, and it is argued, not without 
persuasiveness, that rules of law must be so fashioned as to protect honest 
witnesses from hasty and spiteful retaliation in the form of unfounded perjury 
prosecutions. 
The crucial role of witnesses compelled to testify in trials at law has impelled 
the law to grant them special considerations. In order that witnesses may be 
free to testify willingly, the law has traditionally afforded them the protection 
of certain privileges, such as, for example, immunity from suits for libel 
springing from their testimony. Since equally honest witnesses may well 
have differing recollections of the same event, we cannot reject as wholly 
unreasonable the notion that a conviction for perjury ought not to rest entirely 
upon “an oath against an oath.” The rule may originally have stemmed from 
quite different reasoning, but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality 
has been the fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or 
convicted in perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were adopted. 
Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609 (footnote omitted). The modern purpose of the two-witness rule, 
then, is not only to prevent the wrongful conviction of purported perjurers, but also to deter 
their being wrongly prosecuted at all.  
 
7 The parties agree – as do we – that the quantitative approach of the ancient 
ecclesiastical courts, from which the two-witness rule originally developed, provides no 
justification for the rule today. It would be bizarre to suggest otherwise. 
22 
As discussed above, in McGagh we stated that the “logical underpinnings” of the 
two-witness rule “remain sound.” 472 Md. at 199 n.14. However, in McGagh, the State did 
not seek the abrogation of the two-witness rule. In this case, the State makes several 
arguments in support of its position that the logical underpinnings of the rule are not sound.  
First, the State argues that, while the two-witness rule ostensibly serves as protection 
against wrongful convictions, “by affording such extra protection only to those who have 
been charged with giving false testimony, the rule potentially licenses the very harm it 
seeks to avoid.” This concern seems overblown, given the relatively modest burden that 
the two-witness rule imposes on the State. All the State must do to meet its burden of 
production under the rule is introduce some evidence – direct and/or circumstantial – that 
(in addition to a witness’s direct and positive testimony) tends to prove the defendant’s 
prior testimony was false. As discussed further below, once the State meets this burden of 
production, it is the factfinder’s task to determine whether the State’s proof as a whole 
establishes the falsity of the defendant’s prior testimony (and the other elements of perjury) 
beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable witness would not feel emboldened by the 
two-witness rule to testify falsely, as the State likely will be able to produce some other 
evidence of falsity in addition to the direct and positive testimony of a witness who asserts 
that the defendant’s prior testimony was false. It is telling that, despite Maryland having 
maintained the two-witness rule for more than two centuries, the State has provided us with 
no empirical or anecdotal evidence that perjury occurs more frequently in Maryland than 
in states that have dispensed with the rule.  
23 
Although we doubt that the two-witness rule encourages perjury, we think the rule 
does encourage a reasonable, truthful witness – who otherwise might be reluctant to testify 
out of fear that she may not be believed – to provide testimony. It does so by requiring the 
State to have more than just one person’s uncorroborated contrary account to successfully 
prosecute the witness for perjury. This gives the truthful witness confidence that, if the 
factfinder does not accept the witness’ testimony, the State will not proceed against the 
witness on a perjury charge based solely on a “he said/she said” dispute.  
Second, the State argues that the modern justification for the two-witness rule 
incorrectly assumes that there is a relatively greater likelihood of unfounded accusations 
of perjury than there is for other crimes. In support of this contention, the State relies upon 
Hourie I’s assertions that “fear [of retaliatory prosecution] now seems illusory” and that 
“[t]he institutionalization of the charging mechanism in America, as opposed to the private 
prosecution of crime that was for long permitted in England, effectively forestalls the 
danger of reckless charging.” Hourie I, 53 Md. App. at 83. However, this criticism of the 
two-witness rule does not convince us that the rule is clearly wrong. Perjury prosecutions 
do differ from other prosecutions, in that a perjury charge concerns a defendant’s prior 
sworn statement, often given to the detriment of the prosecution in a prior case. In such a 
case, a prosecution for perjury resembles a private prosecution. McGagh observed that 
perjurers harm not only the people of the state writ large, and not only those individuals 
who may be wrongfully charged or convicted on the basis of their testimony, but also the 
24 
justice system itself.8 The individuals who make the decisions to investigate, charge, and 
arrest are at the heart of that system. Thus, alleged perjurers may be perceived as wasting 
the time and energy of the very people responsible for deciding whether to prosecute them 
for perjury. Even where perjury occurs in a civil case as opposed to a criminal case, the 
prosecutor becomes the defender of the administration of justice in such a case by virtue 
of the existence of criminal penalties for perjury in civil cases.  
Although most prosecutors undoubtedly strive to maintain objectivity when 
considering whether to pursue a perjury case, we cannot say that the two-witness rule is a 
wholly unnecessary check against a prosecutor potentially losing objectivity and bringing 
an unfounded perjury case based on the word of a single witness who claims that the 
putative defendant testified falsely. 
Third, the State contends that maintaining the two-witness rule is not justified by 
the concern that equally honest witnesses may have differing recollections of the same 
event, “because falsity (the only element to which the rule applies) is only one element of 
the criminal offense of perjury. It is thus not sufficient to prove the testimony was factually 
untrue (i.e. false).” Rather, the State reminds us, it must also prove that the defendant acted 
“willfully” in providing the false testimony, Md. Code, Crim. Law (CR) § 9-101(a) (Repl. 
 
8 See McGagh, 472 Md. at 198 (“[T]he trial court identified multiple instances 
where McGagh’s false statements harmed the justice system. The false accusation pulled 
[a police officer] away from his other law enforcement duties to investigate her specious 
claim. It occupied the attention of [a] Commissioner in evaluating and issuing the arrest 
warrant. It wasted the time of the officers who arrested [the employee who allegedly 
assaulted McGagh]. It consumed the time of the trial court in litigating her claim.”). 
25 
Vol. 2021); that is, that “the false oath [was] deliberate and not the result of surprise, 
confusion or bona fide mistake.” McGagh, 472 Md. at 204 (cleaned up).  
We recognize that the two-witness rule is not the only safeguard against a wrongful 
perjury conviction. The requirement that the State prove the element of willfulness is also 
significant. However, once the State sufficiently proves falsity, it often is a small leap from 
that point to prove willfulness. Indeed, it has long been accepted that the trier of fact in a 
perjury case may infer willfulness from the proof of falsity itself. See, e.g., McGagh, 472 
Md. at 204 (“Proof of falsity permits a trial court’s inferences of wrongful intent.”); State 
v. Boratto, 404 A.2d 604, 608 (N.J. 1979) (knowledge of falsity in a prosecution for perjury 
may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including “the objective falsity itself”); 
State v. McCaslin, 482 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Neb. 1992) (“Proof of the falsity of a response 
may circumstantially imply knowledge that such was untrue when uttered.”); La Placa v. 
United States, 354 F.2d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 1965) (holding that “appellant’s belief that the 
statements he made were false need not be proved by the ‘two witness rule;’ and that in 
appropriate circumstances belief of falsity may be inferred by proof of the falsity itself”). 
This principle makes it easier for the State to prove willfulness in a perjury case. But it is 
sound only if one is confident that the State has sufficiently proven the element of falsity. 
Because proof of falsity and proof of willfulness often are coextensive, or at least 
intertwined, the willfulness element does not carry the weight that the State ascribes to it 
here. But even if we assume that the State often will be able to point to additional evidence 
besides the proof of falsity to establish the element of willfulness, we cannot say it is clearly 
26 
wrong to provide a second check against a wrongful perjury conviction in the form of the 
two-witness rule. 
We gather that the State seeks to abrogate the two-witness rule because it would like 
to have the freedom and flexibility to bring a perjury case in the seemingly rare situation 
where, after an investigation, the only proof of falsity it has is the word of a single witness. 
It is true that the two-witness rule constrains the State’s prosecutorial discretion in such a 
case. However, this burden does not justify a “departure from the established rules of law.” 
Loeffler v. Carey, 181 Md. 648, 652 (1943).  
2. The Rule Has Not Been Superseded by Changes in the Law or Facts. 
The State identifies no changed factual circumstances in the 60 years since this 
Court first analyzed and recognized the two-witness rule in Brown that would justify 
abandoning it. Indeed, the two-witness rule appears to be thriving nationwide, growing, 
rather than shrinking, in its applicability. While five states have statutorily abrogated the 
rule9 and one state high court has declined to adopt it,10 no state high court has explicitly 
 
9 See Alaska Stat. § 11.56.220 (2021); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2707 (2021); N.D. 
Cent. Code § 12.1-11-01(2) (2021); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 498(a) (2021); 11 R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 11-33-1(e) (2021). 
 
10 See State v. Sands, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (N.H. 1983). 
27 
abrogated the rule,11 and 16 states have codified it.12 This case, then, is not like State v. 
Jones, in which this Court abrogated the accomplice corroboration rule at a time when 
“most jurisdictions (thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, the federal courts, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) either [had] not adopted the ... rule or [had] repealed 
it.” 466 Md. 142, 160 (2019) (footnote omitted). Indeed, when this Court decided Jones, 
“Maryland and Tennessee [were] the only jurisdictions with a judicially-created 
accomplice corroboration rule.” Id. at 160-61. 
Still, the State identifies one potential change in the law that could support 
abrogation. The State notes that, in 1970, the Supreme Court held “that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This was nine years after this Court first discussed the 
two-witness rule in Brown, and 25 years after the Supreme Court preserved the two-witness 
 
11 In State v. Storey, 182 N.W. 613, 615 (Minn. 1921), the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that “perjury may be proved by circumstantial evidence [alone] if proof is made 
beyond reasonable doubt, as in the case of other crimes.” The Storey Court was not 
“primarily concerned with the question whether the direct testimony of one witness without 
more will sustain a conviction, for in [Storey’s] case there was no direct testimony of the 
falsity of the oath. The evidence was circumstantial.” Id. at 614-15. 
 
12 See Ala. Code § 13A-10-105 (2021); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-107 (2021); Cal. 
Penal Code § 118(b) (2021); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1234 (2021); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-
1067 (2021); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 523.060 (2021); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.070 (2021); Mont. 
Code Ann. § 45-7-201(7) (2021); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-915(7) (2021); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:28-1(e) (2021); N.Y. Penal Law § 210.50 (McKinney 2021); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2921.11(E) (2021); Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.115 (2021); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4902(f) (2021); 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.18(a) (West 2021); Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-505(1) 
(2021). 
28 
rule at the federal level and articulated its modern policy justification in Weiler. Arguably, 
the justification for a burden of production unique to perjury and unknown to any other 
crime (with the exception of treason) is undermined by the universal guarantee of this 
burden of proof, one of the most stringent safeguards afforded criminal defendants, and 
one that is “basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society[.]” Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Yet, the Winship Court itself identified multiple Supreme Court opinions indicating 
that, by 1970, “it [had] long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt [was] constitutionally required.” 397 U.S. at 362. In Maryland, at least 
by the 1870s, proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” was accepted as the relevant standard in 
a criminal case. See, e.g., Norwood v. State, 45 Md. 68, 75 (1876) (stating that “[t]he corpus 
delicti must be found beyond reasonable doubt”). Notwithstanding prior practice in 
Maryland under which trial courts instructed juries that, consistent with Article 23 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights,13 the jurors were the judges of the law in addition to being 
the judges of the facts,14 the reasonable doubt standard was firmly entrenched in Maryland 
by 1961, when this Court judicially recognized the two-witness rule in Brown. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. State, 227 Md. 159, 163 (1961) (“Everyone accused of crime is presumed to be 
innocent; and, in order to justify a finding of guilt, it is incumbent upon the State 
 
13 Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in part: “In the trial of 
all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the 
Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” 
 
14 For a discussion of this practice, see Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167 (1980), 
overruled by Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383 (2012).  
29 
affirmatively to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Thus, the 
State’s invocation of Winship as a changed circumstance that should cause us to abrogate 
the two-witness rule is unavailing.  
To conclude, we reaffirm what we said about the two-witness rule in McGagh: its 
“logical underpinnings remain sound.” 472 Md. at 199 n.14. Nor do we perceive any 
changed circumstances that warrant the rule’s abrogation. For these reasons, we shall retain 
the two-witness rule in Maryland. 
B. Evaluation of the Sufficiency of the Evidence in a Perjury Case 
As discussed above, the two-witness rule is a burden of production that applies if 
the State elects to present the testimony of a witness as “direct and positive” evidence of 
the element of falsity. However, the State need not prove falsity in a perjury case through 
the testimony of a witness who directly contradicts the truth of the alleged perjurious 
statement. Rather, the State may prove falsity by producing “evidence of a different kind.” 
Hourie II, 298 Md. at 61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, the 
State may prove falsity entirely through circumstantial evidence, as it did in Brown and 
Smith. In such a case – which does not involve “oath-against-oath” – the two-witness rule 
has no application. It is clear that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of falsity 
(and the other elements of a perjury charge) in a case where the two-witness rule is 
inapplicable, an appellate court applies the same standard of review as it does in all other 
criminal cases that do not include perjury charges. That is, the appellate court asks whether 
30 
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Manion, 442 Md. at 430 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
O’Sullivan argues that, because Smith did provide direct evidence of falsity at 
O’Sullivan’s trial, the two-witness rule applies to this case, and we must therefore review 
the sufficiency of the evidence using a unique three-part test, which focuses on the 
circumstantial evidence the State offered to corroborate Smith’s testimony as to the 
element of falsity. Relying on Mason v. State for this test, O’Sullivan argues that, first, the 
circumstantial evidence “must be ‘independent,’ meaning that it must come ‘from a source 
other than that of the direct testimony.’” Pet. Br. at 23 (quoting Mason, 225 Md. App. at 
486). Second, the evidence must be “sufficiently corroborative” of the direct testimony – 
i.e., it must “tend[] to substantiate that part of the testimony of the principal prosecution 
witness, which is material in showing that the statement made by the accused under oath 
was false.” Mason, 225 Md. App. at 487. Third, the evidence must be “of such a nature so 
as to be of equal weight to that of at least a second witness, thus foreclosing any reasonable 
hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 488 (quoting Brown, 225 Md. at 616-
17).  
The Court of Special Appeals opined that “a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that Officer O’Sullivan testified falsely at Smith’s criminal trial based solely on the body 
camera footage[.]” O’Sullivan, slip op. at 17, 2020 WL 7419686, at *8. That being the case, 
the court stated that “this was not an oath-against-oath case implicating the two-witness 
rule.” Id. We agree with O’Sullivan that the two-witness rule does apply to his prosecution. 
Whether or not the State could have proved the element of falsity without calling Smith as 
31 
a witness, the State did not proceed that way. Because the State chose to introduce Smith’s 
direct and positive testimony to establish the element of falsity, the two-witness rule was 
applicable, and the State was required to produce additional evidence that tended to prove 
the falsity of O’Sullivan’s prior testimony. 
However, we disagree with O’Sullivan’s contention that a different standard of 
review should apply with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence of falsity in an “oath-
against-oath” perjury case versus a perjury case in which the two-witness rule is 
inapplicable. Prior cases discussing the relaxed two-witness rule have conflated the rule’s 
burden of production with the State’s burden of persuasion in proving falsity beyond a 
reasonable doubt, resulting in confusion. Most notably, in Brown, this Court stated that, if 
the State attempts to prove falsity in a perjury case through the use of direct testimony from 
a single witness and corroborating circumstantial evidence, the latter must be “of such a 
nature so as to be of equal weight to that of at least a second witness, thus foreclosing any 
reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt.” Brown, 225 Md. at 616-17.  
We find this formulation, ultimately, to be unhelpful. The State always has the 
burden to prove all elements of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have 
explained, the two-witness rule prohibits the State from proving falsity in a perjury case 
solely through direct and positive evidence from a single witness. Beyond that limitation, 
the State may proceed as it sees fit. It may attempt to meet its burden to prove falsity 
through direct and positive testimony from at least two witnesses; or entirely through 
circumstantial evidence; or through a combination of direct witness testimony and 
circumstantial evidence. How the State chooses to attempt to meet its burden of persuasion 
32 
as to falsity in any particular case does not affect the standard of review that a court applies 
in determining whether the State has met that burden. Thus, circumstantial evidence in an 
oath-against-oath perjury case need not be equal to the conceptual “weight” of a second 
witness. This abstract proposition suggests that the reviewing court should compare the 
weight of the direct witness testimony against the weight of the other evidence. That 
inquiry is not necessary or appropriate. Rather, where the State introduces direct and 
positive testimony from a single witness as well as circumstantial evidence to prove falsity, 
a reviewing court should examine the totality of the evidence, as it does in every other case. 
Again, under that standard of review, the court asks whether “any rational trier of fact could 
have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” McGagh, 472 Md. at 
193 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319), with the evidence presented 
at trial viewed in the light most favorable to the State.15  
C. O’Sullivan’s Convictions for Perjury and Misconduct in Office  
With the principles we have discussed above in mind, we now review O’Sullivan’s 
convictions for perjury and misconduct in office. We conclude that the State met its burden 
 
15 O’Sullivan also contends that proof of falsity by circumstantial evidence is 
permissible only where that evidence is documentary in nature. He is incorrect. Certainly, 
circumstantial evidence that goes to the element of falsity often comes in the form of 
documents. In days of yore, such circumstantial evidence sometimes could only be 
documentary in nature, given the technology that existed at the time. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wood, 39 U.S. 430, 440 (1840) (“[C]ircumstances, without any witness, when 
they exist in documentary or written testimony, may combine to establish the charge of 
perjury[.]”) (emphasis added). In McGagh, we recognized that evidence of falsity today 
comes in multiple forms, including “documents, video footage, or other circumstantial 
evidence.” 472 Md. at 199 n.14. 
33 
of production under the two-witness rule, as well as its burden to persuade the trier of fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt that O’Sullivan was guilty of the charged offenses. 
1. The State Met Its Burden of Production Under the Two-Witness Rule. 
The State introduced more than the direct and positive testimony of a single witness 
to prove the falsity element of perjury at O’Sullivan’s trial. In addition to Smith’s direct 
testimony, the State introduced video evidence, informed by Sergeant Streett’s testimony, 
which tended to prove that O’Sullivan could not have seen Smith throw a firearm where 
and when O’Sullivan claimed Smith did so. Thus, the State met its burden of production 
under the two-witness rule. 
2. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove That O’Sullivan Committed Perjury and 
Misconduct in Office. 
Under the perjury statute that applies to O’Sullivan’s prosecution, CR § 9-101(a)(1), 
“[a] person may not willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact 
... if the false swearing is perjury at common law.” At common law, perjury was “the wilful 
[sic] giving of a false oath (a corrupt sworn statement made without sincere belief in its 
truthfulness) in a judicial proceeding in regard to a material matter.” McGarvey v. 
McGarvey, 286 Md. 19, 25 (1979). False testimony is “material” when it is “capable of 
affecting the course or outcome of the proceedings or the decision-making of the court[.]” 
McGagh, 472 Md. at 206 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). False 
testimony is “willful” when it is deliberate, and not the result of “surprise, confusion or 
bona fide mistake[.]” State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360, 372 (1971), overruled on other 
grounds, In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280 (1988). As discussed above, 
34 
“[p]roof of falsity permits a trial court’s inferences of wrongful intent.” McGagh, 472 Md. 
at 204. 
Misconduct in office is a common law misdemeanor entailing “corrupt behavior by 
a public officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his 
office.” Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 387 (1978). The public officer’s “corrupt behavior 
may be (1) the doing of an act which is wrongful in itself – malfeasance[;] or, (2) the doing 
of an act otherwise lawful in a wrongful manner – misfeasance; or, (3) the omitting to do 
an act which is required by the duties of the office – nonfeasance.” Id.  
O’Sullivan contends the evidence at trial showed that “it was entirely possible for 
Smith to have been standing where [O’Sullivan] testified [Smith was at the time Smith 
allegedly threw a gun] and for the gun … to have landed where it did.” That being the case, 
O’Sullivan argues that the trial court’s verdict was based on “mere speculation or 
conjecture,” Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 185 (2010), and that its reasoning therefore was 
“obviously insufficient,” Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 458 (1997) (citation omitted). 
O’Sullivan also argues that, even if the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s 
finding that he testified falsely, it was insufficient to support a finding that any false 
testimony was willful. In regard to the former point, the State counters that O’Sullivan’s 
arguments pertaining to his point of view and the physics of the gun’s potential landing 
spot go to the weight of the evidence and therefore implicate issues that are within the 
province of the factfinder. With respect to the latter point, the State responds that proof of 
falsity permits, but does not require, a trial court’s inference of wrongful intent, and that 
the trial court here, rather than finding O’Sullivan saw Smith throw something that was not 
35 
a gun, found that O’Sullivan did not see Smith throw anything at all. Based on this finding, 
the State argues, the trial court reasonably could find that O’Sullivan’s testimony at Smith’s 
trial was not mistakenly inaccurate, but rather was willfully false. 
The State is correct on both counts. First, the trial court’s inferences from the 
body-worn camera footage regarding what O’Sullivan could or could not see as he crested 
the hill from the west surface lot, and whether the gun could have landed where it did from 
where Smith allegedly threw it, are not based on speculation or conjecture, but are plainly 
supported by the record. Pages 31, 41, and 42 of O’Sullivan’s opening brief contain 
photographs extracted from body-worn camera footage depicting the geography and 
architecture of the rear corner of the easternmost townhome near which O’Sullivan found 
the gun. These photographs show that the trial court’s finding regarding the flight path of 
the gun is not clearly erroneous. Given the tall wooden fence between the corner of the 
building and the spot where O’Sullivan recovered the gun, it was highly unlikely, if not 
physically impossible, for someone standing where O’Sullivan claimed Smith was 
standing to have thrown the gun. 
Nor is the trial court’s drawing an inference that O’Sullivan did not see anything 
thrown from his “lack of turning on his video, his stopping and talking with some kids 
when allegedly suspects are running off, [and] his not even mentioning to his partner who 
was right beside him the possibility of something being tossed,” clearly erroneous or based 
on mere speculation or conjecture. For O’Sullivan’s testimony regarding Smith’s having 
thrown a gun to be accurate, he would have had to watch a gun being thrown in a 
high-crime area, then fail to mention that to his supervisor or radio nearby police officers, 
36 
then calmly greet the two children at the top of the hill, and then walk all the way through 
the Apartments’ courtyard before taking any action consistent with his having seen the gun 
being thrown. In addition, Streett, who accompanied O’Sullivan closely up the hill from 
the west lot and through the courtyard, testified that she saw nothing suspicious, despite 
being prepared to investigate criminal activity at the proximate corner of the easternmost 
townhome. 
A rational trier of fact could find that these circumstances are inconsistent with 
O’Sullivan having testified truthfully at Smith’s trial. Bearing in mind that “[w]eighing the 
credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the 
fact finder,” State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 (1998), and, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, see, e.g., State v. Morrison, 470 Md. 86, 105 
(2020), a rational factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that O’Sullivan’s 
testimony was false, based on the body-worn camera footage, Streett’s testimony, and 
Smith’s testimony concerning his location prior to the time someone yelled “police” and 
he started running.16  
 
16 The defense impeached Smith effectively by playing a recording of a jailhouse 
call from which the court could have concluded that Smith possessed a gun at the 
Apartments that afternoon. Regardless, a rational trier of fact could have credited the 
portion of Smith’s testimony in which he described his position for the five minutes prior 
to someone yelling “police” and the crowd then scattering. According to Smith, he was 
around the corner of the easternmost townhome during that period of time. Based on this 
testimony, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Smith was not visible to 
O’Sullivan and Streett as they ascended the hill from the west parking lot and proceeded 
through the courtyard. 
37 
A rational trier of fact also could infer wrongful intent from the State’s evidence 
proving falsity. As stated above, perjury is willful when the pertinent testimony is not the 
result of “surprise, confusion or bona fide mistake.” Devers, 260 Md. at 372. Here, the 
circuit court discredited the very “possibility of something being tossed.” For the reasons 
stated above, this was a rational inference from the available evidence. If O’Sullivan did 
not see anything being tossed, then the trial court could conclude that O’Sullivan did not 
testify falsely as a result of confusion or bona fide mistake. 
As to the materiality element of perjury, as O’Sullivan was the only witness called 
by the State at Smith’s trial, his testimony was plainly “capable of affecting the course or 
outcome of the proceedings or the decision-making of the court[.]” McGagh, 472 Md. at 
206 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). O’Sullivan makes no 
argument to the contrary. 
Ultimately, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
O’Sullivan gave “a false oath in a judicial proceeding in regard to a material matter,” 
Hourie I, 53 Md. App. at 64, that was not the result of “surprise, confusion or bona fide 
mistake.” Devers, 260 Md. at 372. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict O’Sullivan 
of perjury. 
The evidence also sufficiently supported the misconduct in office conviction. In 
proving that O’Sullivan perjured himself – that is, that he willfully provided false testimony 
– at the trial of a person he arrested, the State proved “corrupt behavior by a public officer 
in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.” Duncan, 
282 Md. at 387.  
38 
“Requiring that the State prove corrupt intent in misfeasance cases shields public 
officers from liability for ‘the consequences of mistakes honestly made.’” Sewell v. State, 
239 Md. App. 571, 603 (2018) (quoting Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479, 483 (1862)). Here, 
the evidence presented at trial not only permitted a reasonable factfinder to conclude that 
O’Sullivan testified falsely without surprise, confusion, or bona fide mistake, but also to 
determine that his conduct was driven by corrupt intent. If the evidence allowed for the 
determination that O’Sullivan’s testimony was not error, and that it emerged not from 
confusion or surprise, but from a deliberate attempt to introduce falsehood, then there is no 
question that the purpose of the “corrupt intent” inquiry, that is, to avoid conviction for 
honest mistakes by public officials, has been satisfied.  
IV 
Conclusion 
Maryland’s common law will retain the two-witness rule for “oath-against-oath” 
perjury cases. Under the rule, the testimony of a single witness who testifies that the 
defendant’s prior testimony was false cannot, by itself, satisfy the falsity element of a 
perjury charge. The State can prove falsity by introducing only circumstantial evidence, by 
introducing direct evidence from multiple witnesses, or by introducing circumstantial 
evidence along with direct evidence from one or more witnesses. Any such combination of 
forms of proof will satisfy the State’s burden of production as to the element of falsity. The 
State met its burden of production under the two-witness rule in this case.  
Appellate courts review the sufficiency of the evidence in an oath-against-oath 
perjury case as they do in any other case, asking whether any rational trier of fact could 
39 
find each element of perjury, including falsity, beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain O’Sullivan’s convictions for perjury and misconduct in 
office.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 3 
 
                    September Term, 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   MICHAEL O’SULLIVAN 
 
   v. 
 
     STATE OF MARYLAND 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Getty, C.J. 
McDonald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Biran 
Raker, Irma S. 
       (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J., 
which McDonald, J., joins. 
 
 
        Filed: December 17, 2021 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 119148010 
Argued: September 13, 2021 
 
 
Raker, J. concurring and dissenting, McDonald, J. joining. 
I join in the judgment of the Court and agree that the evidence presented by the State 
was sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.  I write separately because I would 
abrogate, prospectively only, the common law “two-witness rule” applicable to certain 
common law perjury prosecutions under CR § 9-101(a)(1), and instead would adopt the 
universal burden of production and persuasion applicable in all other criminal cases.  
Because the majority retains the “two-witness rule” for certain perjury cases,1 I respectfully 
urge the General Assembly to review the rule and the outmoded reasons supporting it. 2 
It has been almost 40 years since Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., in Hourie v. State, 
53 Md. App. 62 (1982), called for the abolition of the “two-witness rule” in perjury cases.  
His reasoning was persuasive then, and no less so today.  Judge Moylan wrote “the two-
witness rule is an alien from a long-dead world that was, during the English Civil War, 
accidentally caught in a time warp.”  Id. at 69.  He said it perfectly, stating as follows: 
“The glaring invalidity of this ‘oath versus an oath’ non 
sequitur is clear to the modern mind.  If there were vitality to 
the argument, we should have to adopt a two-witness rule for 
the prosecution of every crime, now that criminal defendants 
are competent to testify in their own defense.  Whenever the 
single witness to a murder, rape, or robbery swears, ‘He did it,’ 
and the defendant swears, ‘No, I didn't,’ there is the old 
quantitative standoff of an oath versus an oath.  This does not 
trouble us in the least.  We overcome an oath (or even many 
 
1 Even if this Court characterizes the rule in Maryland as modified or revamped from its 
original iteration, it makes no sense to retain the rule as a unique exception to the general 
rule that evidence that is sufficient to convince the jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 
 
2 Other states have abrogated the rule by statute.  See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13–2707 
(1978). 
 
2 
 
oaths) with an oath all the time.  The modern resolution to the 
problem of proof is to rely upon fact finders, in their unfettered 
discretion, to judge credibility and weigh evidence.  We guard 
the liberty of the criminally accused not by some ancient and 
artificial burden of production but by allocating the burden of 
persuasion to the State and by establishing that burden at the 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ level.” 
 
Id. at 78-80 (footnotes omitted). 
Dean Wigmore, in rejecting the quantitative measurement of proof,3 concluded as 
follows: 
“What we must conclude, then, is that our whole presumption 
should be against any specific rule requiring a number of 
witnesses, or corroboration of a single witness; that such 
arbitrary measurements are likely to be of little real efficacy 
and to introduce disadvantages greater than those which they 
purport to avoid.” 
 
7 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2030–2043 at 342 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Judge Moylan, embracing Wigmore in Hourie, explained as follows: 
 
3 In Dean Wigmore’s view, the common law rejected the quantitative approach by the end 
of the sixteenth century, based on four general principles: 
“The common law, then, in repudiating the numerical system, lays down four 
general principles: 
(1) Credibility does not depend on numbers of witnesses.  Therefore: 
(2) In general, the testimony of a single witness, no matter what the 
issue or who the person, may legally suffice as evidence upon which 
the jury may found a verdict. 
(3) Conversely, the mere assertion of any witness need not be 
believed, even though he is unimpeached in any manner, because to 
require such belief would be to give a quantitative and impersonal 
measure to testimony. 
(4) As a corollary of the first proposition, all rules requiring two 
witnesses, or a corroboration of one witness, are exceptions to the 
general principle.” 
Hourie v. State, 53 Md. App. 62, 73-4 (1982) (quoting Wigmore) (emphasis in original).  
See id. at 74 for further explanation of “how. . .this single relic from the vanquished system 
survive[d].” 
 
3 
 
“Under the general heading of ‘Synthetic (or Quantitative) 
Rules,’ Wigmore demonstrated meticulously that the civil law 
(including its English manifestations) was one where the 
‘process of proof rested fundamentally on a numerical system,’ 
that the common law, by way of contrast, ultimately rejected 
that mode of proof in favor of ‘the rational notion of analyzing 
and valuing testimony other than by numbers,’ and that the 
single exception to the triumph of the qualitative over the 
quantitative analysis was truly of accidental origin.  ‘By the 
common law, there was but a single instance, and that a 
borrowed and modern one, of almost accidental and of 
anomalous origin (the rule in perjury), in which a numerical 
rule existed.’” 
 
Hourie, 53 Md. App. at 69 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Judge Moylan and Dean Wigmore were correct then and are correct today.  
Credibility does not depend upon the number of witnesses.  Therefore, as jurors are 
commonly instructed, the weight of the evidence “does not depend on the number of 
witnesses on either side.”  MPJI–Cr 3:16.  Thus, the testimony of a single witness, if it 
establishes the elements of an offense or cause of action, and if believed by the jury, may 
be sufficient to support a verdict.4  Handy v. State, 201 Md. App. 521, 559 (2011); N.B.S., 
Inc. v. Harvey, 121 Md. App. 334, 342-3 (1998); United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604, 
 
4 Although not abrogating the two-witness rule in federal courts, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1945), observed as follows: 
“Our system of justice rests on the general assumption that the truth is not to 
be determined merely by the number of witnesses on each side of a 
controversy.  In gauging the truth of conflicting evidence, a jury has no 
simple formulation of weights and measures upon which to rely.  The 
touchstone is always credibility; the ultimate measure of testimonial worth is 
quality and not quantity.  Triers of fact in our fact-finding tribunals are, with 
rare exceptions, free in the exercise of their honest judgment, to prefer the 
testimony of a single witness to that of many.” 
 
4 
 
613 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 
2012)); People v. Smith, 708 N.E.2d 365, 369 (Ill. 1999). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Goins v. United States, 
99 F.2d 147, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1938), discussed the viability of the “two-witness rule” in 
the context of jury instructions and, in dicta, expressed strong doubt as to whether the rule 
made sense anymore (in 1938).  The court noted as follows: 
“It may well be doubted whether any distinction should now 
be made between the proof necessary to convict of perjury and 
that necessary to convict of other crimes.  See State v. Storey, 
148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613, 15 A.L.R. 629; Marvel v. State, 
3 W. W. Harr., Del., 110, 131 A. 317, 42 A.L.R. 1058; 
Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) vol. 4, sec. 2040.  The old ‘oath 
against oath’ reasoning of the earlier decisions is without force 
now that the defendant is allowed to take the stand and that 
corroboration sufficient to satisfy the jury of the falsity of the 
oath may well arise from his demeanor and manner of 
testifying.  Boren v. United States, 9 Cir., 144 F. 801, 806; 
State v. Miller, 24 W.VA. 802.  And in any event it is difficult 
to see why there should be any greater reason for charging with 
respect to the necessity of corroboration in such cases than 
there is for charging on the necessity of corroborating the 
testimony of an accomplice, and on the duty of scrutinizing 
such testimony, as to which we have recently held that the 
giving of such charge is a matter resting in the sound discretion 
of the trial judge.  Both go to the weight to be accorded 
testimony by the jury; and the ordinary rule is that charging as 
to such matters should rest in the sound discretion of the trial 
judge, upon whom rests the duty of guiding and directing the 
jury in their consideration of the case.” 
 
 
In Cohen v. United States, 27 F.2d 713, 714 (2d Cir. 1928), Judge Learned Hand, in 
commenting on the two-witness rule, observed as follows: 
“The doctrine itself has indeed a rational basis when applied to 
mere recantations, though it must be owned that, if extended to 
 
5 
 
the oath of another than the perjured witnesses, it is hard to 
justify in a court of common law.” 
 
Justice Holmes observed as follows: 
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.” 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
Finally, as is apparent from the discussion in the majority opinion, the “two-witness 
rule” for perjury cases is neither a “rule” applicable to all perjury cases, nor does it 
necessarily require two witnesses.  See Maj. op. at 6-9.  In attempting to reconcile the alien 
origin of the “rule” to modern conceptions of the burden of proof and the sufficiency of 
evidence, this Court and others have developed various exceptions.  Ironically, under those 
exceptions, the strictures of the rule do not apply if the State’s case consists entirely of 
circumstantial evidence.  Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 420 (1982).  Similarly, it is 
sometimes stated that the rule may be satisfied with a single witness if there is other 
admissible evidence of “equal weight” to substitute for the second witness.  State v. 
McGagh, 472 Md. 168, 203 (2021).  This approach echoes the origin of the rule in counting 
numbers of witnesses (rather than looking to the substance of the witnesses’ testimony) 
and simply invites a judge to intrude into the province of the jury in determining the weight 
of the evidence. 
 
6 
 
 
In short, it appears as though the only crime requiring corroboration for conviction 
is perjury.5 In today’s world it makes no sense. 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis is not a bar to the abrogation of the two-witness rule in 
this case.  We all know that stare decisis is not absolute.  Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417 
(2012) (quoting State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 78-9 (2001)).  Stare decisis is most meaningful 
in those areas of the law where individuals and entities order their affairs in reliance on 
past court decisions.  See, e.g., Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 68 (1979) (Eldridge, 
 
5 In State v. Storey, 182 N.W. 613, 615 (1921), the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the 
rule, concluding as follows: 
“The question is a new one in this state and we are at liberty to choose the 
rule which appeals to us as being most consonant with reason.  
Notwithstanding the high authority above cited, we are of the opinion that 
the rule laid down is out of harmony with our system of jurisprudence.  In 
our opinion it is one of the rules of the common law inapplicable to our 
situation and ‘inconsistent with our circumstances,’ and hence not to be 
followed.  See State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 164 (Gil. 99).  We find ourselves 
unable to approve the doctrine that perjury is a more heinous crime than 
murder or that one charged with perjury should have greater immunity than 
one charged with murder.  Suppose for example the only eyewitness to a 
murder should testify that the accused is not the man who committed the 
crime and yet the circumstantial evidence of guilt is so strong that the jury 
convicts of first degree murder.  With what consistency can it be said that a 
quality of testimony which will justify a court in condemning a defendant to 
life imprisonment, or, in some jurisdictions, to be hanged, is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of the falsifier of the crime of perjury for which he may 
suffer a penalty of a short term of imprisonment.  The lightness with which 
we are pained to say, the oath of a witness is too often treated, does not 
warrant us in making conviction of the crime of perjury most difficult of all 
crimes of which state courts have jurisdiction.  We hold that perjury may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence if proof is made beyond reasonable doubt, 
as in the case of other crimes.  Nor is this doctrine without authority to sustain 
it.  Metcalf, Ex parte, 8 Okl. Cr. 605, 129 Pac. 675, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) 513.  
See People v. Doody, 172 N. Y. 165, 64 N. E. 807, holding that the old rule 
has no application where the proof of the crime is necessarily based on 
circumstantial evidence.” 
 
7 
 
J. concurring) (noting that stare decisis is compelling in areas of the law such as 
testamentary law, property law, and commercial law, but less so in other areas of the law).  
It seems unlikely that many people order their affairs in reliance on the “two-witness rule” 
for perjury cases—and it would be difficult to do so, given the rule’s exceptions. 
It is time that this Court ends its blind imitation of the past on this subject and 
relegates the “two-witness rule” to the history books. 
I am authorized to state that Judge McDonald joins in this opinion.