Case Title: Bramblett v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981394

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
EARL CONRAD BRAMBLETT 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record Nos. 981394 
February 26, 1999 
                981395 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 
Roy B. Willett, Judge 
 
 
Near 4:30 a.m. on Monday, August 29, 1994, Dorothy Ross 
McGee was operating a vehicle through the Town of Vinton in 
Roanoke County en route to her place of employment.  As she 
drove past a two-story residence located at 232 East Virginia 
Avenue, a white pickup truck operated by a white male, who was 
alone, pulled onto the street from the area of the residence, 
followed her briefly, and then "shot" past her, exceeding the 
35-mile-per-hour speed limit. 
 
About the same time, Robert Scott Arney, travelling on 
Virginia Avenue past the home, "noticed a large cloud of smoke 
coming across the highway, very thick."  He determined the 
residence was on fire and, using a radio, reported the fire to 
authorities. 
 
Firefighters and police responded to the scene.  Upon 
entering the burning residence, the authorities found four 
bodies.  In the downstairs living room, the body of Teresa Lynn 
Fulcher Hodges, an adult, was on a couch.  She had died from 
ligature strangulation and had been doused with gasoline; the 
body was still burning when discovered. 
 
The body of William Blaine Hodges, an adult, was on the bed 
in an upstairs bedroom.  He had died from a gunshot to the left 
temple.  His body was not burned. 
 
The bodies of two children were on a bed in another 
upstairs bedroom.  Winter Ashley Hodges, 11 years of age, had 
died from two gunshots to the head; the muzzle of the weapon had 
been pressed against the skin when fired.  Winter's body had not 
been burned. 
 
The body of Anah Michelle Hodges, three years of age, was 
in the same bed with her sister.  She had died from two gunshot 
wounds to the head; the muzzle of the weapon was within inches 
of the skin when fired.  Anah's body was "covered with soot" and 
had sustained "mild burns." 
 
The mother and her daughters died during the early morning 
hours of August 29 and before the fire.  Blaine, the children's 
father, died "many hours before the female victims died," 
probably during the afternoon of Sunday, August 28. 
 
On July 30, 1996, appellant Earl Conrad Bramblett, 54 years 
of age, was indicted for the following offenses:  Capital murder 
of Winter as part of the same transaction as the murder of Anah, 
Code § 18.2-31; the murders of Anah, Blaine, and Teresa, Code 
§ 18.2-32; arson, Code § 18.2-77; and three counts of using a 
 
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firearm in the commission of the murders, Code § 18.2-53.1.  
Apprehended on July 30 in Spartanburg, South Carolina, the 
defendant waived extradition.  He was brought to Virginia and 
held in the Roanoke County jail. 
 
Upon pleas of not guilty, the defendant was tried by jury 
during 14 days in October and November 1997.  In the guilt and 
penalty phases of the trifurcated trial, 98 witnesses testified. 
 
The jury found defendant guilty of all charges, and during 
the penalty phase of the capital proceeding, fixed defendant's 
punishment at death based upon the vileness and future 
dangerousness predicates of the capital murder sentencing 
statute, Code § 19.2-264.4. 
 
On December 16, 1997, following a post-trial sentencing 
hearing during which the trial court considered a probation 
officer's report, the court sentenced defendant to death for the 
capital murder.  The court also imposed sentences in the 
noncapital cases in accordance with the jury's verdicts as 
follows:  For each of the three first degree murder convictions, 
life imprisonment and a $100,000 fine; for the arson conviction, 
life imprisonment and a $100,000 fine (the court suspended the 
fine); and for the three firearms convictions, imprisonment for 
13 years. 
 
The death sentence is before us for automatic review under 
former Code § 17-110.1(A) (now § 17.1-313(A)), see Rule 5:22, 
 
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and we have consolidated this review with defendant's appeal of 
the capital murder conviction.  In addition, by order entered 
July 13, 1998, we certified from the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia to this Court the record of defendant's appeals in the 
noncapital convictions (Record No. 981395).  The effect of the 
certification is to transfer jurisdiction over the noncapital 
appeals to this Court for all purposes.  Former Code § 17-
116.06(A) (now § 17.1-409(A)).  We have consolidated those 
appeals with the capital murder appeal. 
 
As required by statute, we shall consider not only the 
trial errors enumerated by defendant but also whether the 
sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and whether the 
sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed 
in similar cases.  Former Code § 17-110.1(C) (now § 17.1-
313(C)). 
 
Initially, we shall dispose of two appellate issues that 
require no extended discussion.  First, defendant contends the 
trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the capital 
murder indictment on the grounds that Virginia's death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional facially and as applied.  He argues 
the statute dealing with the capital sentencing proceeding is 
unconstitutional because the aggravating factors "are vague and 
do not adequately channel the discretion of the jury."  There is 
 
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no merit in this contention; we previously have rejected it in 
other cases and will not revisit the issue here.  See e.g., 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 474-79, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146-
49 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). 
 
Second, defendant contends the trial court erred "by 
failing to dismiss the indictments due to prosecutorial 
misconduct."  According to Bramblett, the prosecutor withheld 
evidence in violation of court orders and asked questions during 
the trial "which he knew were objectionable."  This assignment 
of error is procedurally defaulted because defendant did not ask 
the trial court to dismiss the indictments on the foregoing 
grounds.  We do not entertain such issues that are raised for 
the first time on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
A proper understanding of the remaining issues raised by 
defendant requires a brief summary of the facts.  The evidence 
bearing upon the commission of these crimes is undisputed.  
During the guilt phase of the trial, Bramblett, who did not 
testify, presented only four witnesses.  According to settled 
principles of appellate review, we will draw all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible from the proven facts in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth. 
 
The witness Arney, upon discovery of the fire, found 
handwritten notes on the rear and side doors of the home.  The 
 
5
note on the side door read "Had an emergency.  Back late Sunday, 
early Monday.  Teresa." 
 
Upon arrival, the firefighters found fire throughout the 
structure.  Subsequent examination of the premises revealed the 
presence of petroleum accelerants and gasoline in various areas 
of the home.  Investigators also found that the telephone line 
had been cut. 
 
Blaine and Teresa Hodges had attended an Amway conference 
in Charlottesville on the previous Friday night, leaving their 
children with a relative.  Blaine picked up the children on 
Saturday.  A friend spoke with Blaine by telephone about 5:00 
p.m. on Saturday.  Later on Saturday, a friend telephoned the 
Hodges' residence but no one answered and an answering machine 
did not activate.  About 4:30 p.m. on Sunday, Teresa left a 
telephone message with a friend to arrange for the children's 
carpool on Monday, the first day of the school session.  The 
friend returned the call and talked with Teresa at a number 
Teresa furnished, which was for a public pay telephone located 
at a gas station on Virginia Avenue. 
 
On Sunday, a neighbor saw Bramblett with Teresa and the 
children.  Bramblett, Teresa, and the children were seen 
together in a nearby national forest on Sunday afternoon; the 
forest ranger who saw them noted a black tailgate on Bramblett's 
white truck. 
 
6
 
Another friend went to the Hodges' home at 7:15 p.m. on 
Sunday; he found the note on the door.  Two other friends went 
to the Hodges' home at 8:45 p.m. on Sunday; they also found the 
note on the door.  They observed the Hodges' two motor vehicles 
parked nearby, and the home was dark except for a light burning 
in the basement.  They telephoned the house but received no 
answer and the answering machine did not take the call. 
 
When the witness McGee observed the pickup truck with a 
"dark" tailgate leave the Hodges' home about 4:30 a.m. on 
Monday, she thought the truck's color was "sort of pinkish red."  
The jury was shown a video reenactment of a truck leaving the 
area where McGee had seen the truck; the reenactment included 
the burning halogen street lights present when McGee saw the 
truck.  Referring to the video, McGee identified the truck as 
pinkish-red; that truck actually was white in color.*
 
At the time of these crimes, Bramblett, an acquaintance of 
the Hodges family for years, drove a 1972 model white pickup 
truck with a black tailgate.  On the morning of the fire, 
Bramblett, an expert in silk screening, arrived at his workplace 
at 5:08 a.m.  The workplace is 4.7 miles from the Hodges' home, 
a 12-minute drive in the early morning.  Although defendant told 
                     
* The defendant assigns error to the trial court's action in 
admitting the video into evidence.  The defendant did not object 
at trial to the playing of the video, and that failure to 
present the claim below bars review upon appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
7
his supervisor he had slept in his truck, his hair was neatly 
combed, he was freshly shaven, and his clothes were clean. 
 
Bramblett drove past the Hodges' house at 8:30 a.m. on the 
morning of the fire; he did not stop.  Later, he told his ex-
wife about the fire and his belief that the police would "blame 
it on me." 
 
A year prior to the fire, Bramblett had mailed two packages 
to his sister, who lives in Indiana.  When these packages were 
opened, with the sister's permission, they were found to contain 
photographs of the Hodges children and 62 audiotapes of 
Bramblett's voice.  On the tapes, Bramblett expressed a sexual 
interest in Winter Hodges and his belief that the child's 
parents were trying to "set him up" or entrap him in a sexual 
act with her. 
 
A firearms expert testified about weapons, bullets, and 
casings found at the crime scene, and cartridges found in 
Bramblett's truck and a storage room he had rented.  The expert 
opined that all the bullets recovered from the bodies had been 
fired from the same weapon, and that the rifling characteristics 
were consistent with weapons manufactured by QFI Arminius; an 
Arminius handgun, its barrel removed, was found in Blaine 
Hodges' bedroom.  The fact that the barrel had been removed made 
it impossible for the expert to determine whether the pistol had 
fired any of the recovered bullets.  The expert further opined 
 
8
that one cartridge retrieved from the pistol at the scene and 
one found in Bramblett's truck were fired by the same firearm 
"to the exclusion of any other gun." 
 
Another forensic scientist analyzed the chemical 
composition of the bullets recovered.  He testified that two of 
the bullets retrieved from the victims had the identical 
composition as a bullet found in the storage room.  A cartridge 
found on steps in the home was "analytically indistinguishable" 
from a cartridge found in defendant's truck. 
 
A single pubic hair, described as a "characteristically 
Caucasian pubic hair," found on the bed between the two 
children, was determined to microscopically match a sample of 
Bramblett's pubic hair.  Bramblett is white, as were the 
victims.  DNA testing of the hair matched Bramblett. 
 
Tracy Turner, a convicted felon who had been incarcerated 
with defendant at the Roanoke County jail testified about 
conversations he had with Bramblett about their addictions.  
Turner was addicted to drugs, and Bramblett said he was 
"addicted to young girls." 
 
They discussed the charges the two men faced.  Bramblett 
"said that he had been caught with that girl, the young girl, 
and that he was caught downstairs with her and that the mother 
sent them upstairs — sent her upstairs and that he had choked 
the life out of her."  According to Turner, Bramblett said he 
 
9
"walked around for a little bit and then he went upstairs.  He 
said he went first to the man's room and then he went to the 
girls' room and he finished the business, took care of his 
business." 
 
Bramblett also told Turner about a "forensic science book" 
from which he learned that "if you burn a house that it takes 
the rifling off of bullets, destroys hair samples and things 
like that."  According to Turner, Bramblett said "that's the 
reason" he set fire to the Hodges' home.  Bramblett told Turner 
his defense would be to suggest that the murders were "a drug 
hit."  The defendant offered evidence that in the late 1980s, 
Blaine and Teresa Hodges consumed cocaine supplied by one 
Michael Fulcher, Teresa's half-brother.  During that period 
Fulcher, who is presently incarcerated, was an undercover 
"cooperative witness" for the federal Drug Enforcement 
Administration.  Blaine Hodges, a discharged postal service 
employee, was about to begin serving a six-month jail sentence 
in September 1994 for embezzlement of postal funds. 
 
Initially, the police believed they were confronted with a 
murder/suicide, mainly because of the location of the weapon 
beside Blaine's body.  This theory was abandoned quickly, 
however, when the results of the autopsies showed Blaine died 
hours before the rest of his family.  The investigators also 
 
10
quickly concluded that the fire was not accidental but was "a 
set fire." 
 
The investigators wanted to talk to Bramblett because of 
his friendship with the Hodges family.  About 5:00 p.m. on the 
day of the crimes, Bramblett came to the Vinton Police 
Department in response to a telephone request from Sergeant Mark 
A. Vaught, an investigator.  Vaught told defendant the Hodges 
family had been killed in a fire.  He did not mention how the 
victims died.  At that point, defendant "seemed to appear to cry 
for a period of time."  Vaught saw no tears.   Bramblett then 
became angry and struck a file cabinet with his fist.  A few 
minutes later, after Vaught had been joined by Barry Keesee, 
Special Agent, Virginia State Police, Bramblett, during a 
discussion "just about some general things" said, "Are you going 
to charge me with murder?" 
 
Near 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31, William F. Brown, 
Jr., Assistant Chief of Police for the Town of Vinton, 
accompanied by Blaine Hodges' brother, talked with defendant at 
the nearby Apple Valley Motel, where Bramblett had rented a 
room.  At first, Bramblett was calm and then he "became . . . 
very emotional.  He started crying, shaking real bad.  He 
blurted out, 'Go ahead and arrest me for murder.'"  He said that 
he thought about suicide and that he actually had written a 
suicide note, according to Brown.  After defendant "calmed 
 
11
down,” he promised to meet Brown at twelve noon at the Vinton 
Police Department, but he failed to appear. 
 
We shall now turn to the remaining issues defendant raises 
on appeal.  He contends the trial court erred by denying his 
pretrial motion for a change of venue, claiming extensive media 
coverage of the crimes and the charges against him.  At 
Bramblett's request, the trial court took the motion under 
advisement pending selection of a jury.  After the jury was 
selected, the court denied the motion.  The court did not err. 
 
There is a presumption a defendant will receive a fair 
trial in the jurisdiction where the crimes are committed.  To 
overcome the presumption, a defendant must establish that the 
citizens of the jurisdiction harbor such prejudice against him 
that it is reasonably certain he cannot receive a fair trial.  
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 420, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 
(1998).  The decision whether to grant a motion for a change of 
venue lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Id.
 
Here, 68 potential jurors were questioned.  Only seven 
persons were excused because of fixed opinions about Bramblett 
that would have impaired their ability to serve impartially.  
The remaining persons were either unaware of media reports about 
the crimes or clearly stated their ability to put aside any 
information they may have heard or read. 
 
12
 
The defendant did not overcome the presumption that he 
could receive a fair trial in Roanoke County.  There was no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court, especially given the 
ease with which the jury was selected.  See id. at 420-21, 508 
S.E.2d at 64-65. 
 
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding 
that Bramblett was competent to stand trial.  We do not agree. 
 
In November 1996, Dr. Evan S. Nelson, a clinical 
psychologist, was appointed by the trial court to serve as 
defendant's mental health expert for sentencing.  After Dr. 
Nelson interviewed Bramblett in jail, he became concerned about 
Bramblett's competency and suggested "that someone else perform 
an evaluation." 
 
In January 1997, defendant filed a pretrial motion, 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1, seeking a competency evaluation.  
The statute provides for such an evaluation if "there is 
probable cause to believe that the defendant lacks substantial 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 
his attorney in his own defense." 
 
The court then appointed Dr. Joseph I. Leizer, a clinical 
psychologist, to conduct a competency examination and 
subsequently ordered defendant examined by Dr. Leigh D. Hagan, 
another clinical psychologist. 
 
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In May 1997, the trial court heard the testimony of the 
three psychologists and found that Bramblett was competent 
stating, "I have no question about his competency."  
Elaborating, the court said that "as a factual matter," the 
defendant "has substantial capacity to understand these 
proceedings against him, and he has substantial capacity to 
assist his Attorneys in his own defense."  These findings are 
fully supported by the record. 
 
Dr. Leizer diagnosed Bramblett with a "delusional disorder, 
persecutory type."  He testified defendant had "paranoid 
delusions about how evidence is being manufactured against him." 
 
The witness had interviewed Bramblett, listened to many of 
Bramblett's audiotapes, and read some of the many letters 
defendant had written.  Defendant told the witness that the 
police had been "following him for years on end and looking for 
reasons to arrest him."  Bramblett also believed, according to 
the witness, that the Hodges family "were involved in an 
undercover Police sting aimed at him" and that Winter was 
working undercover for the police, being "used by her parents 
for that purpose." 
 
Dr. Leizer disagreed with Dr. Nelson's conclusion that 
Bramblett was incompetent.  Dr. Leizer said that Bramblett was 
intelligent, witty, charming, verbal, and articulate; that he 
was able to relate information to his attorneys; that he 
 
14
understood the charges facing him and the adversarial nature of 
the proceedings; and that he felt his attorneys were working 
hard for him, acting in his best interest. 
 
Dr. Hagan agreed that Bramblett had a delusional disorder 
of the persecutory type.  However, he considered Bramblett 
"meets the criteria for competence."  He opined that defendant 
"is keenly motivated to work vigorously" with his attorneys on 
his defense, even though there are disagreements about "the 
principal focus of the defense."  Dr. Hagan agreed that even 
though Bramblett "may have this paranoid delusion problem," it 
"does not render him incompetent or unable to cooperate with his 
Attorneys." 
 
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying 
his motion to suppress the audiotapes seized in Indiana and by 
admitting the tapes and their contents into evidence.  When 
Bramblett's sister received the two packages in August or 
September 1993, she placed them, unopened, in a cabinet.  
Bramblett called his sister in 1993 and asked her to keep the 
boxes for him.  He said, "In case anything happens to me, you'll 
have these." 
 
On September 2, 1994, defendant arrived at the sister's 
home about 7:30 p.m. and left about 2:30 the next morning.  He 
told the sister the police had questioned him about the crimes 
"and he felt that they were going to arrest him." 
 
15
 
Bramblett related "he was with the mother and the two 
children and that they had gone for a long drive" the Sunday 
afternoon before the fire.  When they returned to the Hodges' 
home from the drive, Teresa thought Blaine was not at home and 
"she wondered where he was at," according to Bramblett. 
Bramblett told his sister that he stayed at the Hodges' home 
until twelve midnight on Sunday. 
 
The sister overheard Bramblett talking with another sister 
on the telephone; he stated that a Roanoke lawyer "had advised 
him since he hadn't been charged with anything to leave town and 
stay away from the police."  Bramblett left the Indiana home 
abruptly when the sister thought she "saw a policeman outside." 
 
After Bramblett left, the sister was reminded by her 
daughter about the boxes, which defendant had not mentioned.  
She "was afraid to keep the boxes" and "wanted to put these 
boxes in the hands of someone I could trust," according to the 
sister's testimony.  The local sheriff was called.  The sister 
and her husband executed a form consenting to the search of the 
boxes.  She opened the boxes; the sheriff inventoried and 
photographed the contents. 
 
In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to suppress the items 
obtained from the boxes.  He asserted the sister lacked 
authority to deliver the packages to the police and that the 
police were required to obtain a warrant before opening the 
 
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boxes and examining the contents.  Defendant notes that the 
"tapes contain inculpatory evidence, i.e., Bramblett's 
inappropriate sexual thoughts and comments concerning Winter 
Hodges, and reflect Bramblett's belief that Blaine Hodges was 
involved in some sort of a conspiracy to frame Bramblett for 
something." 
 
The trial court denied the motion, ruling there was "no 
evidence . . . to find a basis for unlawful search or seizure."  
The trial court was correct. 
 
The sister had boxes addressed to her in her exclusive 
possession.  Bramblett imposed no restrictions with respect to 
the contents.  Thus, he had no remaining expectation of privacy 
in the items. 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not restrict the authority of the 
police to accept evidence volunteered by private citizens.  See 
Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 739, 173 S.E.2d 799, 804 
(1970) (package addressed to son voluntarily surrendered by 
mother in lawful control of it).  The sister's consent to the 
search of the boxes was clearly sufficient to authorize the 
sheriff's actions. 
 
Next, the defendant contends the trial court erred by 
failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence obtained from 
the Apple Valley Motel and by admitting the evidence at trial.  
We do not agree. 
 
17
 
When Bramblett failed to keep his twelve noon appointment 
at the Vinton Police Department on Wednesday, August 31, the 
police "had some concerns about his safety," given his earlier 
statements about suicide.  Two officers returned to the motel, 
saw defendant's truck parked outside, knocked on the door to his 
room, and received no response.  Then, they directed the owner 
to open the door to defendant's room.  When the door was opened, 
one officer "stepped into the doorway" of the small room while 
the other officer stood "beside the door."  Neither officer 
actually entered the room.  At that time, Bramblett arrived in a 
taxicab and the officers "talked to him briefly." 
 
Later that same day, two brothers of Blaine Hodges decided 
to go to the motel to talk with Bramblett, believing the police 
might "clear Earl."  One of the men wore "a wire" at the 
suggestion of the police.  While in the room, one brother "saw a 
.22 caliber bullet in the crease of [a] chair."  The defendant's 
room was searched the next day pursuant to warrant. 
 
The trial court found that the officers saw nothing as they 
were standing at the doorway to the room and that the 
warrantless opening of the motel room door was not grounds for 
suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the later search 
warrant.  The trial court ruled correctly. 
 
Even assuming one of the officers briefly entered the room, 
as the defendant argues, no search was conducted and no evidence 
 
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was seized.  The subsequent search was conducted pursuant to 
warrant, which Bramblett never challenged. 
 
Thus, the items seized under the warrant (certain writings, 
a detective magazine, a .22 caliber revolver, cartridges, and 
cartridge cases) were properly admitted in evidence.  Also, 
there is no merit to defendant's claim that the brother who wore 
the "wire" became "an agent of the Commonwealth." 
 
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by 
permitting Tracy Turner to testify at trial.  We reject this 
contention. 
 
The prosecutor learned in January 1997 about Bramblett's 
statements to the felon Turner and planned to use him as a 
rebuttal witness at trial.  In October 1997, the prosecutor was 
advised that Bramblett "had figured out" Turner was going to 
testify.  Because of this development, the prosecutors believed 
Turner's "value as a rebuttal witness" was "diminished."  On 
"Thursday or Friday" before Turner testified on Wednesday, 
October 29, the prosecutor decided to call Turner as part of the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief.  The prosecutor immediately 
disclosed Turner's name and his criminal record to the 
defendant. 
 
Prior to Turner's testimony, defendant moved the court to 
bar Turner from testifying in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief 
because of late disclosure of Turner's criminal record.  The 
 
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trial court overruled the motion, stating the cross-examination 
would be delayed if the defendant chose, thus giving defendant's 
court-appointed investigator an opportunity to investigate 
Turner. 
 
Immediately following Turner's testimony, defendant moved 
for a mistrial or for an instruction to the jury to disregard 
the testimony.  Defendant asserted the prosecutor's failure to 
disclose Turner's criminal history violated the court's prior 
discovery orders and due process.  The prosecutor had 
interpreted the discovery order to require disclosure of 
criminal histories of only case-in-chief witnesses, an 
interpretation endorsed by the trial court. 
 
The trial court denied defendant's motion, accepting the 
prosecutor's representation concerning Turner.  The court found 
that the prosecution "acted in a rather timely manner" in 
providing the criminal history to defense counsel.  The court 
repeated its offer to grant defendant a delayed cross-
examination "if you learn more" about Turner. 
 
Of course, defendant was entitled to disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, including evidence that impeaches the 
credibility of a prosecution witness, under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 
150, 341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986).  Evidence of the prior 
convictions of a witness is impeachment evidence under Brady. 
 
20
See Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 465, 352 S.E.2d 352, 
358, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). 
 
A defendant is entitled to "sufficient time to investigate 
and evaluate the evidence in preparation for trial."  Lomax v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 168, 172, 319 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1984).  
Here, the defendant had five or six days to investigate Turner's 
background.  The defendant did not take advantage of the court's 
offer to postpone cross-examination, and he has not demonstrated 
any specific prejudice from the timing of the disclosure.  If 
exculpatory evidence is obtained in time for it to be used 
effectively by the defendant, and there is no showing that an 
accused has been prejudiced, there is no due process violation.  
Read v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 
546-47 (1987).  Hence, we hold the trial court did not err in 
its various rulings connected with Turner's testimony. 
 
Next, Bramblett argues the pubic hair should not have been 
admitted into evidence because, first, "the evidence was not 
relevant," and, second, "the prejudicial effect of the evidence 
far outweighed any probative value." 
 
There is no merit to this argument.  The evidence was 
relevant to establish Bramblett's presence in the room where the 
children's bodies were found.  This legitimate probative value 
far outweighed any incidental prejudice to defendant, and the 
 
21
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
evidence. 
 
Next, defendant argues "the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction."  We disagree. 
 
The evidence supporting the convictions was overwhelming.  
It was gathered as the result of outstanding police work by 
town, county, state, and federal authorities. 
 
A further recitation of the evidence we already have 
summarized is unnecessary.  Indeed, we have not recited many 
facts pointing to defendant's guilt.  It is sufficient to point 
out that Bramblett admitted to a jail inmate that he killed the 
victims and set the house on fire to destroy evidence.  His many 
statements to police and others clearly show his guilty 
knowledge of the circumstances of the murders.  He was with the 
Hodges family just prior to the murders.  A truck closely 
resembling Bramblett's truck was observed leaving the scene as 
the fire was discovered.  Bullets, shell casings, and cartridges 
found in Bramblett's possession matched similar items found in 
the home.  Defendant's audiotapes and writings demonstrate the 
motive for the killings.  His clothing, found at his workplace, 
was stained with the same accelerants used in the arson.  A 
pubic hair matching Bramblett was found in the same bed as the 
children's bodies.  Clearly, the jury was fully justified, based 
 
22
on the evidence, in concluding defendant was the killer of the 
Hodges family and that he set their house on fire. 
 
Finally, we have considered Bramblett's remaining 
assignments of error, and summarily reject them.  He contends 
the trial court should have directed a verdict of life 
imprisonment during the penalty phase of the capital murder 
proceeding because the jury was misinformed about his prior 
record in several respects.  Also, he contends the evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding of vileness and/or future 
dangerousness, and that imposition of the death sentence was 
arbitrary. 
 
None of these contentions has any merit.  We will respond, 
however, to defendant's claim that during the penalty phase "all 
of the factors used by the Commonwealth to enhance punishment 
concern events that occurred two decades before the current 
offenses and thus cannot be properly used as evidence of future 
dangerousness." 
 
Defendant is referring to the testimony of women who lived 
in the Bedford-Roanoke area during the late 1970s.  They 
testified they knew Bramblett during that period, when they were 
in their early teens.  Each testified that Bramblett furnished 
them alcohol and drugs, after which he engaged in sexual 
intercourse with them, and that he required them to perform 
various sex acts upon him.  The "time gap" of decades affected 
 
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only the weight to be accorded the evidence, not its 
admissibility.  George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 273, 411 
S.E.2d 12, 18 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992). 
 
Moreover, the factual basis for defendant's contention is 
inaccurate.  There was abundant other evidence presented on the 
question of future dangerousness including his recent conduct 
with 11-year-old Winter Hodges as well as his extensive and 
long-term planning and execution of the murders, all of which 
established his dangerousness. 
 
Upon the question of disproportionality and excessiveness, 
we determine whether other sentencing bodies in this 
jurisdiction generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable 
or similar crimes, considering both the crime and the defendant.  
Kasi, 256 Va. at 426, 508 S.E.2d at 68.  See former Code § 17-
110.l(C)(2) (now § 17.1-313(C)(2)).  In determining whether a 
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate in a case 
like this, we examine the records of all capital murder cases 
previously reviewed by this Court in which the death sentence 
was based upon both the vileness and future dangerousness 
predicates, including capital murder cases where a life sentence 
was imposed.  Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 462, 423 
S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). 
 
Based upon this review, we hold that defendant's sentence 
is not excessive or disproportionate to penalties generally 
 
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imposed by sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for similar 
conduct.  Generally, the death sentence is imposed for a capital 
murder when, as here, the defendant is convicted of a senseless 
murder of a young child, Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 
138, 321 S.E.2d 273, 282 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 
(1985), and when the defendant is also convicted of killing 
other persons.  See Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 469, 470 
S.E.2d 114, 132, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 
 
Therefore, we hold the trial court committed no reversible 
error, and we have independently determined from a review of the 
entire record that the sentence of death was properly assessed.  
Thus, we will affirm the trial court's judgment in both the 
capital murder case and the noncapital cases. 
Record No. 981394 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 981395 — Affirmed. 
 
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