Case Title: Helms v. Manspile

Citation: 

Docket Number: 072306

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
THOMAS M. HELMS, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 072306               OPINION BY 
CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY ROUNTREE HASSELL, SR. 
JAMES L. MANSPILE, ET AL.        January 16, 2009 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY 
Malfourd W. Trumbo, Judge 
 
I. 
 
 
In this appeal the primary issue we consider is whether 
alleged owners of real estate established as a matter of law 
that they own title to a parcel of land by adverse possession. 
II. 
 
James L. Manspile and Sheri N. Graham (the Manspiles) 
filed a complaint against Thomas M. Helms, Barbara S. Helms, 
and others.  The Manspiles sought a declaration that they own 
an easement that transverses land owned by the Helms.  The 
Helms filed a counterclaim and, among other things, sought an 
adjudication that they own a “102-feet” tract of land, 
described as Parcel 2, by adverse possession. 
 
At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court 
held that the Manspiles did not have an easement over the 
Helms’ property and had an easement existed, it had been 
abandoned.  The circuit court also ruled that the Helms failed 
to establish their claim of ownership of Parcel 2 by adverse 
possession. 
III. 
 
The relevant facts necessary to our resolution of this 
appeal are not in dispute.  The Helms and the Manspiles own 
adjoining tracts of land in Botetourt County.  The Helms 
purchased their land in 1972.  Their expert witness testified 
that the Helms’ property consists of two parcels:  Parcel 1 
which is not pertinent to this appeal; and Parcel 2, which is 
a rectangular strip of land 102 feet in length.  The actual 
boundary line between the Helms’ property and the Manspiles’ 
property could not be determined because the descriptions in 
the deeds in both the Manspiles’ and the Helms’ chains of 
title are inadequate to permit a surveyor to ascertain the 
property line. 
 
When the Helms purchased their property in 1972, the 
property was enclosed within a fence.  They considered the 
fence, which extended along the northern border of the 102-
feet parcel, as the boundary for their property.  Their land 
was “mostly cleared” and contained “second growth timber.” 
An old barbed wire fence, that extended along the 
northern boundary of Parcel 2, had existed for over 50 years.  
In 1998 or 1999, the Manspiles, with the Helms’ permission, 
replaced the old barbed wire fence with a new fence and the 
Manspiles erected the new fence in the same location where the 
old fence had been located. 
 
2
 
The Helms’ predecessors in title kept cattle that grazed 
on Parcel 2.  They also kept a milk cow and a horse on the 
enclosed Parcel 2.  The Helms’ predecessors in title had 
erected buildings on Parcel 2, including a “smokehouse” that 
had been built over 65 years ago. 
 
Since 1972, Thomas Helms used a tractor to clear “brush 
off” of Parcel 2.  He also maintained dog kennels on Parcel 2.  
The Helms constructed a “skid road” and hauled timber on 
Parcel 2.  On one occasion, Thomas Helms asked the Manspiles 
for permission to “haul timber” across their property.  The 
Manspiles refused to grant permission, so Helms transported 
the timber across Parcel 2.  James Manspile testified at trial 
that he did not believe he had any right to prevent Helms from 
hauling timber across Parcel 2. 
 
The Helms testified that beginning with their purchase of 
the property in 1972, they treated Parcel 2 as their property.  
James Manspile thought that the Helms owned Parcel 2 because 
“[j]ust over time [Thomas Helms] had cleared brush and had cut 
wood and different things on that property.  The fence never 
was no further.  So in my knowledge, being 31 years old, I 
didn’t figure it went any further.”  The Manspiles did not 
assert any claim of ownership of Parcel 2 until the 
commencement of this litigation. 
IV. 
 
3
 
The Helms contend that they proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that they own the title to Parcel 2 by 
adverse possession.  Responding, the Manspiles assert that 
this Court should dismiss the Helms’ appeal because they did 
not object to the circuit court’s rulings.  Continuing, the 
Manspiles argue that the Helms failed to establish that they 
had title to Parcel 2 by adverse possession.  We disagree with 
the Manspiles’ contentions. 
 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at 
trial, the circuit court directed the litigants to submit 
written memoranda of law that included their closing 
arguments.  The Helms submitted their memorandum that 
included, among other things, their contention that they owned 
Parcel 2 by adverse possession.  After the circuit court 
reviewed the memoranda submitted by counsel for the litigants, 
the circuit court issued a letter opinion that embodied its 
rulings.  Subsequently, the circuit court entered an order 
that incorporated its letter opinion by reference.  Counsel 
for both litigants endorsed the order as “seen.” 
 
We hold that the Helms preserved their right to challenge 
on appeal the circuit court’s ruling on adverse possession.  
Code § 8.01-384(A) states: 
“No party, after having made an objection or motion 
known to the court, shall be required to make such 
objection or motion again in order to preserve his 
 
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right to appeal, challenge, or move for 
reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or action of 
the court.  No party shall be deemed to have agreed 
to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial 
court so as to forfeit his right to contest such 
order on appeal except by express written agreement 
in his endorsement of the order.  Arguments made at 
trial via written pleading, memorandum, recital of 
objections in a final order, oral argument reduced 
to transcript, or agreed written statements of facts 
shall, unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be 
deemed preserved therein for assertion on appeal.” 
 
 
Once a litigant informs the circuit court of his or her 
legal argument, “[i]n order for a waiver to occur within the 
meaning of Code § 8.01-384(A), the record must affirmatively 
show that the party who has asserted an objection has 
abandoned the objection or has demonstrated by his conduct the 
intent to abandon that objection.”  Shelton v. Commonwealth, 
274 Va. 121, 127-28, 645 S.E.2d 914, 917 (2007); see King v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 581, 570 S.E.2d 863, 865-66 (2002); 
Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 
829, 833 (1998). 
Clearly, pursuant to Code § 8.01-384(A), the Helms 
preserved their right to challenge on appeal the ruling of the 
circuit court.  As agreed upon by the circuit court, the Helms 
submitted a written memorandum and argued that they owned the 
title to Parcel 2 by adverse possession.  The trial court was 
well aware of the Helms’ legal positions and the Helms did not 
expressly withdraw or waive their arguments. 
 
5
 
We recognize that Rule 5:25 states:  “Error will not be 
sustained to any ruling of the trial court or the commission 
before which the case was initially tried unless the objection 
was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the 
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to 
attain the ends of justice.”  However, Code § 8.01-384(A), 
which the Manspiles cite but do not discuss in its entirety, 
is controlling over Rule 5:25, and we must apply the statutory 
provision.  Va. Const. Art. VI, § 5; Dorn v. Dorn, 222 Va. 
288, 291, 279 S.E.2d 393, 394-95 (1981);  Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 519-20, 273 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1980).
 
We now consider the Helms’ contention that they 
established title to Parcel 2 by adverse possession.  Upon our 
determination of the proper application of the law of adverse 
possession to the facts of this case, we review the circuit 
court’s judgment de novo.  Quatannens v. Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 
365, 601 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2004); Turner v. Caplan, 268 Va. 
122, 125, 596 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2004); The Barter Foundation v. 
Widener, 267 Va. 80, 90, 592 S.E.2d 56, 60-61 (2004). 
 
We stated in Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61-62, 400 
S.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1991): 
“To establish title to real property by adverse 
possession, a claimant must prove actual, hostile, 
exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, under 
a claim of right, for the statutory period of 15 
years.  A claimant has the burden of proving all the 
 
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elements of adverse possession by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
“Use and occupation of property, evidenced by 
fencing the property, constitutes proof of actual 
possession.  One is in hostile possession if his 
possession is under a claim of right and adverse to 
the right of the true owner.  One’s possession is 
exclusive when it is not in common with others.  
Possession is visible when it is so obvious that the 
true owner may be presumed to know about it.  
Possession is continuous only if it exists without 
interruption for the statutory period.” 
 
 
We held in Grappo that the terms claim of title, claim of 
right, and claim of ownership are synonymous and mean  
“a possessor’s intention to appropriate and use the 
land as his own to the exclusion of all others.  
That intention need not be expressed but may be 
implied by a claimant’s conduct.  Actual occupation, 
use, and improvement of the property by the 
claimant, as if he were in fact the owner, is 
conduct that can prove a claim of right.” 
 
Id. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171.  In Grappo, we concluded that 
when a landowner enclosed approximately four acres of his 
neighbor’s land in addition to his own in a fence and 
“zealously examined his boundary fence for damage,” the 
landowner had acquired title to the fenced land by adverse 
possession.  Id. at 62-63, 400 S.E.2d at 171 (citations 
omitted). 
 
Upon application of the aforementioned principles to the 
record before this Court, we hold that the Helms established 
that they own title to Parcel 2 by adverse possession.  The 
Helms established each element necessary to support a claim 
 
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for adverse possession.  Their possession was actual because 
the property was within their fence; Thomas Helms mowed the 
grass on Parcel 2 and maintained dog kennels on it; and his 
predecessors in title kept cattle, a milk cow, and a horse on 
the parcel. The Helms' predecessors in title had also erected 
a "smokehouse" on the parcel. 
The Helms’ possession of the property was adverse to the 
Manspiles.  Parcel 2 was enclosed within a fence.  When the 
Manspiles desired to rebuild the fence, which they considered 
to be the boundary line, they sought and obtained permission 
from the Helms.  Additionally, on one occasion that we have 
already mentioned, Mr. Helms asked the Manspiles for 
permission to use a portion of the Manspiles’ property 
adjacent to Parcel 2 to load timber that had been cut.  The 
Manspiles refused to give Mr. Helms permission to load timber 
on the Manspiles’ property.  Nonetheless, Mr. Helms made a 
“skid road” on Parcel 2 and used the skid road to transport 
the timber.  James Manspile testified that he did not take any 
action to stop Mr. Helms from using Parcel 2 to transport the 
timber because he did not think he had a right to stop him.  
Parcel 2 was used exclusively by the Helms and their 
predecessors in title and such use was open and notorious and 
 
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continuous well in excess of fifteen years.*  For example, the 
Helms cleared brush and cut wood on the property, and they 
treated Parcel 2 as their property and used all of it since 
they acquired the property in 1972.  The Helms also asserted a 
claim of right to the property as demonstrated by their use 
and conduct. 
V. 
 
The Manspiles, relying in part upon a document dated 
March 1915, claim that they have an easement to use a wagon 
road that extends from their property to a public road, Indian 
Rock Road.  The circuit court held in its letter opinion and 
order that if the March 1915 document created a valid 
easement, the easement was in gross and did not run with the 
land, that the Helms’ property could not be burdened by the 
easement because the March 1915 document was never recorded 
and the Helms are bona fide purchasers of value without 
notice; and that the easement had been abandoned.  The 
Manspiles argue that the circuit court erred in its rulings.  
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the March 1915 document 
created a legally valid easement, we hold that the circuit 
                     
* We note that Code § 8.01-236 states in relevant part:  
“No person shall make an entry on, or bring an action to 
recover, any land unless within fifteen years next after the 
time at which the right to make such entry or bring such 
action shall have first accrued to such person or to some 
other person through whom he claims.” 
 
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court correctly held that the easement had been abandoned.  
The principles controlling the abandonment of an easement are 
well established.  The litigant claiming abandonment of an 
easement must establish such abandonment by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 296, 302, 541 
S.E.2d 556, 560 (2001); Pizzarelle v. Dempsey, 259 Va. 521, 
528, 526 S.E.2d 260, 264 (2000); Robertson v. Robertson, 214 
Va. 76, 82, 197 S.E.2d 183, 188 (1973).  “Nonuse of an 
easement coupled with acts which evidence an intent to abandon 
or which evidence adverse use by the owner of the servient 
estate, acquiesced in by the owner of the dominant estate, 
constitutes abandonment.”  Robertson, 214 Va. at 81-82, 197 
S.E.2d at 188; accord Hudson, 261 Va. at 302, 541 S.E.2d at 
560; Pizzarelle, 259 Va. at 528, 526 S.E.2d at 264.  If the 
litigant asserting abandonment relies upon the non-use of the 
easement coupled with an adverse use by the owner of the 
servient estate, that adverse use must continue for a period 
of time sufficient to establish a prescriptive right.  Hudson, 
261 Va. at 302, 541 S.E.2d at 560; Lindsey v. Clark, 193 Va. 
522, 525, 69 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1952).  Mere non-use is not 
sufficient to establish an abandonment.  Hudson, 261 Va. at 
302, 541 S.E.2d at 560; Lindsey, 193 Va. at 525, 69 S.E.2d at 
344. 
 
10
 
Applying the aforementioned principles to the evidence in 
this case, it is clear that the Manspiles abandoned the 
easement, if it ever existed.  When the Helms acquired their 
property in 1972, the property was improved with a house that 
contained a carport and a retaining wall that had blocked the 
easement for more than 30 years.  The Helms have barred the 
Manspiles from using the easement for more than 20 years, 
except when the Helms gave the Manspiles permission to use the 
easement.  Brush had grown in portions of the easement and 
“deadfall [trees]” blocked portions of the easement.  The 
Manspiles never made a claim of right to use the easement with 
the Helms and the Manspiles’ claims of vehicular use of the 
easement all occurred with permission of the Helms.  The Helms 
told the Manspiles’ predecessors in title, on several 
occasions, that they could not use the easement and the 
uncontradicted testimony is that the easement had not been 
used since 1959.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court 
did not err in concluding that if an easement did exist, the 
easement had been abandoned. 
VI. 
In conclusion, we hold that the Manspiles do not have an 
easement to use the southern portion of the Helms’ property 
and we will affirm that portion of the circuit court’s 
judgment.  We also hold that as a matter of law, the Helms 
 
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12
established title ownership, by adverse possession, of Parcel 
2 and we will reverse that portion of the circuit court’s 
judgment that holds otherwise.  We will remand this case to 
the circuit court for the entry of a judgment, which shall be 
recorded among the land records, that the Helms own title to 
Parcel 2. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
  and remanded.