Case Title: Heller v. Fergus Ford, Inc.

Citation: 322 N.E.2d 441, 59 Ill. 2d 576

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1975-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
59 Ill. 2d 576 (1975)
322 N.E.2d 441
PAUL HELLER, Appellant,
v.
FERGUS FORD, INC., et al.  (The Department of Revenue et al., Appellees.)
No. 46389.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed January 21, 1975.
*577 L. Louis Karton and Samuel T. Wexler, of Kreger and Karton, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Fred F. Herzog, First Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WARD delivered the opinion of the court:
In March 1972 Paul Heller filed a class action in the circuit court of Cook County on his own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated against Fergus Ford, Inc. (hereafter, Fergus), George Mahin, the then Director of Revenue, William J. Scott, the Attorney General, and Alan J. Dixon, the Treasurer of Illinois. It alleged that persons who had purchased automobiles equipped with emission controls from the defendant Fergus had not been allowed the benefit of the tax exemption provided under the Illinois Use Tax Act and the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act for "pollution control facilities." The plaintiff, who had purchased a 1971 model automobile from Fergus, asked for a refund of so much of the tax he had paid as had been based on the cost of the emission-control equipment on the automobile, which, he argued, was tax exempt as a "pollution control facility." The complaint also asked for an injunction restraining Fergus from including the cost of such equipment when calculating the tax on purchases of autos and for an order directing the Director of the Department of Revenue to issue a bulletin directing other automobile retailers to terminate that practice. The circuit *578 court granted a temporary injunction, but on the interlocutory appeal of the Department of Revenue and Alan Dixon the appellate court reversed (15 Ill. App.3d 868). We granted leave to appeal.
The exemption for purchases of "pollution control facilities" under the Use Tax Act states:
There is a like exemption in the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 120, par. 440a.) The Department of Revenue adopted a regulation relating to the exemption:
The principal and controlling question presented is whether the pollution-control equipment on automobiles is to be considered as "pollution control facilities" under exemptions provided in the Use Tax and Retailers' Occupation Tax Acts.
It is clear from decisions of this court that a statutory exemption from taxation must be strictly construed in favor of taxation. One claiming the benefit of exemption has the burden of proving clearly he is entitled to it. In determining whether property falls within a statute of exemption, doubts will be resolved in favor of taxation. People ex rel. County Collector v. Hopedale Medical Foundation, 46 Ill. 2d 450, 462; Northshore Post No. 21 American Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 235.
The plaintiff did not meet the burden of showing that his case is within the exemption. The pollution-control equipment built into recent-model automobiles by manufacturers cannot be considered pollution-control facilities *580 within the meaning of the exemption. Its installation by automobile manufacturers is required by statute as part of the Federal environmental program. The purchaser of an automobile is given no option to purchase or not to purchase the pollution-control equipment. A purchaser obviously is purchasing an auto, and not individual components.
The statute allowing the tax exemption clearly requires that the personal property must have been purchased "as pollution control facilities" in order to qualify for exemption. The purchases concerned here were of automobiles; they were not purchases of personal property as pollution-control equipment.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.