Case Title: David Weiss v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 17S03-0510-CR-487

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen R. Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
J. Michael Sauer  
 
 
 
 
 
Gary Damon Secrest 
Deputy Public Defender  
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 17S03-0510-CR-487 
 
DAVID WEISS, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the DeKalb Superior Court, No. 17D01-0309-FA-2 
The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 17A03-0501-CR-32 
_________________________________ 
 
June 14, 2006 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
 
David Weiss seeks transfer from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his 
sentences for drug related offenses.  More specifically, Weiss was charged with two counts of 
dealing in methamphetamine of more than three grams, a Class A felony, one count of unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony, one count of maintaining a 
common nuisance, a Class D felony, and of being a habitual offender.  In exchange for his plea 
of guilty to a reduced charge of dealing in methamphetamine as a Class B felony, unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and of being a habitual offender, the State 
dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to refrain from filing three additional charges of 
dealing in methamphetamine.  The plea agreement provided in pertinent part that “the B Felony 
sentences shall be served concurrently, and executed time is capped at 40 years.”  Appellant’s 
App. at 173.  At the sentencing hearing the trial court sentenced Weiss to twenty years for the 
dealing offense, which was enhanced by twenty years for the habitual offender adjudication.  The 
trial court also sentenced Weiss to twenty years for the firearm possession charge to be served 
concurrently with the other sentences imposed for a total executed term of forty years. 
 
On review Weiss raised a single issue: whether his sentence was inappropriate in light of 
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court but declined to evaluate the merits of 
Weiss’ claim.  Citing Gist v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. not sought, and 
other recent Court of Appeals opinions, in an unpublished memorandum decision the court held, 
“[I]f a defendant signs a plea agreement in which he agrees to a specific term of years, or to a 
sentencing range other than the range authorized by statute, he will not be able to claim 
thereafter that a sentence imposed consistent with the agreement is inappropriate.”  Weiss v. 
State, No. 17A03-0501-CR-32, slip op. at 4 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2005).  The underlying 
rationale for the court’s holding is that by entering into such agreements the defendant either 
acquiesced in or implicitly agreed to the sentence imposed.  In an opinion handed down today we 
disagreed with this proposition and held instead that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)  
 
articulates a standard of review designed as guidance for appellate 
courts. . . .  Of course a defendant must persuade the appellate 
court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness 
standard of review. But to say that a defendant has acquiesced in 
his or her sentence or has implicitly agreed that the sentence is 
 
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appropriate undermines in our view the scope of authority set forth 
in Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution.  We thus 
disapprove of language in Gist, Mann, and their progeny providing 
otherwise.   
 
Childress v. State, No. 61S01-0510-CR-484, ___N.E.2d___, ___, slip op. at 9 (Ind. June 14, 
2006).  Accordingly, we proceed to address Weiss’ inappropriateness claim.  
 
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by 
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”  Regarding 
the nature of the offense, the presumptive sentence1 is the starting point the Legislature has 
selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.  Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929 
(Ind. 2004); Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1214-15 (Ind. 2002).  The presumptive sentence 
(or now advisory sentence) for a Class B felony is ten years.  See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.  Here 
the trial court enhanced both presumptive terms by an additional ten years—the maximum 
authorized by statute.  Id.  Also, the trial court further enhanced one of the Class B felony 
offenses by an additional twenty years for the habitual offender adjudication.2  
 
Arguing that the nature of the offenses warrants no more than the presumptive sentences 
of ten years, Weiss contends, “[t]here was nothing about the manner in which these offenses 
were committed that would call for a greater sentence.  Weiss sold some methamphetamine to an 
old friend who had come to him asking for the drug, not knowing that his friend was a 
confidential informant being paid $100 each time he made a purchase for the police.”  Br. of 
Appellant at 6.  Weiss greatly understates the nature of his drug dealing activities.  A search of 
                                                 
1 Subsequent to the date Weiss was sentenced the Legislature amended Indiana’s sentencing statutes to 
provide for “advisory sentences” rather than “presumptive sentences.”  See Pub. L. No. 71-2005, § 5 
(codified at I.C. § 35-50-2-1.3) (2005)).  In addition, the amendments permit a trial court to impose any 
sentence that is authorized by statute and permissible under the Indiana Constitution “regardless of the 
presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.”  Pub. L. No. 71-2005, § 3 
(codified at I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d) (2005)).   
 
2 The court is required to sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed term that 
is not less than the presumptive sentence for the underlying offense nor more than three times the 
presumptive sentence for the underlying offense.  See I.C. § 35-50-2-8(h).  Thus for the habitual offender 
adjudication Weiss was eligible for a sentence ranging from ten to thirty years.   
 
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Weiss’ home, which apparently was secured by motion sensors and audio and video surveillance 
equipment, Appellant’s App. at 129, revealed over thirteen grams of amphetamine and over 
fourteen grams of methamphetamine.  Appellant’s App. at 97.  And as a part of the plea 
agreement the State refrained from filing three additional charges against Weiss arising out of his 
sale of drugs occurring within weeks of the day on which Weiss was arrested.  Appellant’s App. 
at 173.  In essence the record shows that Weiss was involved in a large-scale drug operation that 
consisted of more than simply selling methamphetamine to an old friend.  
 
As for the character of the offender, Weiss has an extensive criminal history, most of 
which is drug related.  In 1982, at the age of twenty-four, Weiss pleaded guilty in the State of 
Nevada to the sale of a controlled substance (LSD) and carrying a concealed weapon.  
Appellant’s App. at 69.  Several months later he was again charged with the sale of LSD for a 
separate transaction but charges were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.  Id. at 69-70.  In 
March 1988 Weiss pleaded guilty in the State of Arizona to possession of dangerous drugs 
(methamphetamine).  Id. at 70.  In August 1991, Weiss pleaded guilty in the State of Nevada to 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to sell.  And eight months 
later Weiss was convicted in the same state for another offense of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to sell.  Id.  Weiss was released from parole for that 
offense in January 2002.  Less than two years later, on September 8, 2003, Weiss was arrested 
for the offenses giving rise to this action.  Id. at 70-71.  Further, while on bond in this case, 
Weiss was arrested and charged in Allen County with dealing in methamphetamine.  Id. at 71.3  
The record makes clear that Weiss is a serial criminal whose primary interest is financial gain 
through the sale of drugs.  His repeated contacts with the criminal justice system have had no 
impact on persuading him to reform.  We conclude that Weiss’ forty-year sentence is not 
inappropriate.  See Vazquez v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1229, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting 
inappropriateness claim and affirming defendant’s fifty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit 
dealing in cocaine because of defendant’s large-scale drug operation and frequent contacts with 
the criminal justice system); Kendall v. State, 825 N.E.2d 439, 452-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)  
(rejecting inappropriateness claim and affirming defendant’s forty-year sentence for dealing in 
                                                 
3 The disposition of this offense is not clear from the record.  However at the sentencing hearing, counsel 
for Weiss noted that a plea agreement was contemplated under which Weiss would receive a ten-year 
sentence.  Tr. at 14.  
 
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cocaine because of large amount of drugs recovered from defendant’s residence and defendant’s 
lengthy criminal record).  
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
 
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