Case Title: DANIEL WILLIAM WILSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
DANIEL WILLIAM WILSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 55155 P.3d 1009Case Number: 06-16Decided: 04/06/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DANIEL 
WILLIAM WILSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),)

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Mackenzie Williams, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Williams.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to two counts of 
attempted manslaughter.  He now 
appeals the ensuing judgment and sentence on two grounds:  that he was incompetent to enter the 
guilty pleas, and that the judge restricted his right to 
allocution.

 
 
[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]     1.   Did the district court err in 
accepting the appellant's guilty pleas without first establishing his mental 
competency?

 
 
2.   Did the district court improperly 
interfere with the appellant's right to allocution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      At about 10:30 
p.m., on June 28, 2004, the appellant went to the home of his sister and 
brother-in-law in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  The appellant rang the front doorbell, 
but because of ongoing family difficulties, his sister and brother-in-law 
engaged him in conversation through an open window, rather than opening the 
door.  Upon noticing that the 
appellant was armed, the occupants began to retreat from the doorway area.  The appellant shot twice into the house, 
once in each occupant's direction, barely missing them both.  He then fled the scene and was arrested 
in his vehicle after a brief "low-speed" chase.

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant was 
charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder.  He pled not guilty to both counts during 
his district court arraignment, but his attorney told the court that he might 
later change his pleas to not guilty by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency.  On September 17, 2004, 
the district court granted the appellant's motion to continue the trial because 
defense counsel was still evaluating the possibility of entering such 
pleas.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 28, 
2004, the appellant filed a motion seeking to amend his pleas to not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency.  
In the motion, defense counsel reported his personal concern that the 
appellant was mentally unfit to proceed.  
Along with the motion, the appellant filed a copy of a psychological 
evaluation report prepared by a licensed psychologist, Mark J. Watt, Ph.D., 
J.D.  In his report, Dr. Watt opined 
that the appellant was competent to proceed, but that at the time of the 
offenses he "was suffering from a major mental illness or deficiency that would 
meet statutory threshold criteria necessary for establishing a basis for not 
guilty by mental insanity defense." 

 
 
[¶7]      In response to 
the appellant's motion and Dr. Watt's report, the district court suspended 
further proceedings and ordered the appellant to undergo a mental health 
evaluation at the Wyoming State Hospital pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 
through 304 (LexisNexis 2003).  In a 
report dated February 28, 2005, Abram C. Hitt, Ph.D., determined both that the 
appellant was competent to proceed and that he was not mentally incompetent at 
the time of the offenses.

 
 
[¶8]      On March 23, 
2005, the district court held a status hearing for the purpose of allowing 
counsel to agree on the record that "there is no issue from either the defense 
or the State as to the psychiatric evaluations as to competency or fitness to 
proceed[, but] [t]here is a divergence of opinions as to whether or not he 
qualifies for the mental illness defense."  After listening to this stipulation by 
counsel, the district court proceeded to set the matter for 
trial.

 
 
[¶9]      On April 27, 
2005, the appellant appeared before the district court for a change-of-plea 
hearing.  The court was informed 
that the parties had entered into a plea agreement under which the appellant 
would plead guilty to two reduced charges of attempted manslaughter, with 
sentencing to be left to the court's discretion.  An Amended Information was filed and the 
appellant pled guilty to the two lesser counts contained therein.  Upon counsels' request, the court 
ordered the appellant to undergo a "threat assessment" at the WyomingStateHospital as part of the pre-sentence 
investigation.  The examiners who 
conducted that assessment categorized the appellant as being a "moderate to high 
risk" for the commission of future violent acts.

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant was sentenced on 
October 28, 2005.  During the 
sentencing hearing, he was given the opportunity to allocute.1  Accepting that invitation, the appellant 
spoke for several minutes, with his primary topic being the history of his 
family's dysfunctional inter-relationships.  At one point during his discourse, the 
appellant was interrupted by his own attorney, at which point the following 
colloquy occurred:

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Judge, if I may, I 
understand the defendant is allowed to make his statements, but these are being 
made  most of the statements are being made against the advice of counsel, just 
for the record.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  I  assume that's so, 
[counsel].

 
 
[THE 
APPELLANT]:  I know most of these 
statements can be made  can be construed as motive for me to try to kill 
them.  I did not try to kill 
them.  If I was really trying, I 
think I would have got the job done.

 
 
After 
the appellant continued to speak in the same vein, the district court then 
interrupted him with the following comments:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Mr. Wilson, 
you're entitled to speak in your behalf here, but you're really way beyond the 
point by any reasonable measure.  
You're not helping yourself any.  
As you just indicated yourself, these comments do nothing but reinforce 
the belief in the view of any reasonable person who might be listening that you 
yet are resentful, and would harm these people should you be given the 
chance.  I believe the Court has 
allowed you to offer all the information that might be reasonable, helpful at 
sentencing, so we'll proceed with that.

 
 
While 
the record does not reveal what length of time the appellant spoke in 
allocution, his comments take up eight pages of the sentencing hearing 
transcript.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
district court err in accepting the appellant's guilty pleas without first 
establishing his mental competency?

 
 
[¶11]   The standard for mental competency 
of a defendant to proceed in a criminal case is set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-302 (LexisNexis 2003):

 
 
(a)       No person 
shall be tried, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense while, as 
a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacks the capacity 
to:

 
 
(i)      Comprehend his 
position;

 
 
(ii)     Understand the nature 
and object of the proceedings against him;

 
 
(iii)    Conduct his defense in a 
rational manner; and

 
 
(iv)    Cooperate with his counsel to 
the end that any available defense may be interposed.

 
 
Although 
the question of competency is a factual issue, the requirement that competency 
be established is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo.  deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 12, 
74 P.3d 1240, 1244-45 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant's present argument 
contains a procedural and a substantive element, both of which are statutorily 
based.  First, the appellant 
contends that the district court violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(f) 
(LexisNexis 2003) by not making on the record a specific finding of competency 
to proceed.2  Second, the appellant alleges that the 
district court violated its obligation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a) to 
suspend the proceedings upon its own motion, given the obvious evidence that the 
appellant was not fit to proceed.3

 
 
[¶13]   We find neither of these arguments 
compelling.  Admittedly, the record 
reveals that the appellant was difficult, argumentative, egocentric, and highly 
suspicious of others.  Nevertheless, 
both mental health professionals who evaluated the appellant, and both 
attorneys, reported to the court that the appellant did not suffer from a mental 
illness or deficiency that caused him to be incompetent to proceed.  After both evaluation reports had been 
filed, the district court held a hearing for the purpose of allowing counsel to 
stipulate this conclusion for the record.  
While it might have been the better practice for the district court at 
that hearing to have actually stated on the record that he found the appellant 
competent to proceed, that was the practical effect of the hearing and of the 
court's follow-up comment: "So, we need a trial date."  Where there was but one ruling for the 
district court to make, no prejudicial error occurred in the court's failure to 
make that specific ruling.  Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 13, 132 P.3d 1155, 1160 (Wyo. 2006).  Furthermore, because the proceedings had 
already been suspended twice for the purpose of mental health evaluations, and 
there is no evidence that the appellant's mental condition changed thereafter, 
no duty on the part of the district court arose to suspend the proceedings yet 
again and order another evaluation.  
The same is true regarding the period of time between the change-of-plea 
hearing and the sentencing hearing:  
the district court was presented with no evidence of a change in the 
appellant's mental condition that would require another 
evaluation.

 
 

Did the 
district court improperly interfere with the appellant's right to 
allocution?

 
 
[¶14]   A criminal defendant's right to 
allocution is both rule-based and constitutionally protected.4  Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 
(Wyo. 1987).5  The appellant relies upon Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1082 
(Wyo. 1992), 
for the proposition that the courts "do not prescribe limits on what the 
defendant can or cannot say during allocution."  While that statement was, indeed, made 
by this Court in Harvey, it has 
been taken out of context and does not suggest that the right to allocution 
equates to the right to filibuster.  
The context in Harvey, unlike 
the context of the present case, was the use of an allocution statement in later 
proceedings against that defendant.

 
 
[¶15]   A trial judge always has the 
inherent authority to exercise reasonable control over the presentation of 
evidence, and that authority extends to the authority to limit allocution.  United 
States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (10th 
Cir. 1993).  A defendant's right to 
allocution is not violated when he has been given an "adequate opportunity under 
the circumstances to speak on his own behalf."  Id. at 1025.  In the present case, the district court 
did not "cut off" allocution until the appellant had described at length the 
family circumstances that resulted in commission of the crimes, and not until 
defense counsel interjected that the appellant's statements were being made 
against his advice.  There was no 
error, much less an abuse of discretion suggesting manifest unfairness or 
injustice.  See Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1015 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   Under the circumstances of this 
case, the district court did not err in accepting the appellant's guilty pleas 
without having first made an explicit finding on the record that the appellant 
was competent to proceed.  Neither 
did the district court err in placing reasonable limitations upon the 
appellant's lengthy allocution.

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"Allocution" 
in this context is "[a]n unsworn statement from a convicted defendant to the 
sentencing judge or jury in which the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his 
or her conduct, apologize for the crime, or say anything else in an effort to 
lessen the impending sentence."  Black's Law Dictionary 83 (8th ed. 
2004)

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-303(f) reads in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
If 
neither the state, nor the accused or his counsel contests the opinion referred 
to in paragraph (c)(iii) of this section relative to fitness to proceed, the 
court may make a determination and finding of record on this issue on the basis 
of the report filed or the court may hold a hearing on its own motion. . . 
.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-303(a) reads as follows:

 
 
If it 
appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own 
motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental 
illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall 
be suspended.

 
 

4W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(1)(C) provides that, before imposing sentence, the court shall "[a]ddress 
the defendant personally and determine if the defendant wishes to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of the 
sentence."

 
 

5For an 
historical analysis of the concept of allocution, see   
Harvey v. 
State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1085-1093 (     
Wyo. 1992) (Urbigkit, Chief Justice, 
dissenting).