Case Title: JOHN ANTHONY MESSER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHN ANTHONY MESSER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 141145 P.3d 457Case Number: 05-236Decided: 11/03/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JOHN 
ANTHONY MESSER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellant 
contends that the district court erred in revoking his probation because the 
State failed to carry its burden of proving that he acted willfully.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Appellant 
states the issue simply as being whether the trial court erred in revoking his 
probation.  In his brief, however, 
he raises two separate questions:

 
 
           
1.   Whether the State or 
the defendant has the burden of proof at a probation revocation 
hearing?

 
 
           
2.   Whether the State 
proved that he willfully violated the terms of his 
probation?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of this case are detailed in our opinion following the Appellant's direct 
appeal from his conviction.  See Messer v. State, 2004 WY 98, ¶¶ 4-7, 
96 P.3d 12, 14-15 (Wyo. 2004).  
Suffice it to say for purposes of the present appeal that we affirmed the 
Appellant's conviction for felony domestic violence.  The appellant was sentenced by the 
district court to a term of 18 to 24 months imprisonment in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, but that sentence was suspended and a "split" sentence was imposed 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2003).1  The general terms of the split sentence, 
which was entered on September 22, 2003, were that the Appellant serve 6 months 
in the county jail, followed by 24 months of supervised 
probation.

 
 
[¶4]      The next relevant 
occurrence in this case was the State's filing on September 7, 2004, of a 
petition to revoke the Appellant's probation.  The single allegation of that petition 
reads as follows:

 
 
That 
paragraph six (6) of page three (3) of the Judgment and Sentence of August 6, 
2003 (sic.), states to-wit:  It is further ordered that the Defendant 
shall successfully complete the felony program at Community Alternatives of 
Casper.  It is further ordered that 
the sentence imposed in this matter shall run consecutive to all other sentences 
imposed.  That said Defendant is in 
violation of paragraph six (6) of page three (3) in that he was terminated from 
Adult Community Corrections for non-payment of services rendered, and self and 
medical reported inability [to] be employed because of pending surgical issues, 
on April 12, 2004.

 
 
[¶5]      On December 20, 
2004, the district court granted the State's motion to add the following 
allegations to its petition:

 
 
            
1.   That the Defendant 
was at an unauthorized location in Converse 
County, Wyoming;

 
 
            
2.   That the Defendant 
failed to enter and continue counseling as directed; and

 
 
            
3.   That the Defendant 
did not follow the directives of his probation officer.

 
 
Numerous 
additional allegations followed in the next few months, including allegations 
that the Appellant was not reporting to his probation officer, that his 
whereabouts were unknown, that he had left the county without permission, that 
his residence and employment status were unknown, and that he had failed to 
contact a "day reporting" center as instructed.

 
 
[¶6]      The State's 
petition to revoke probation was heard on April 1, 2005.  The district court declined to consider 
the allegations made after the December 20, 2004 petition because the Appellant 
and his counsel had not properly been served with notice of the same.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court ruled from the bench, denying the petition because the State had 
failed to prove that the Appellant had willfully violated the terms of his 
probation.

 
 
[¶7]      Less than three 
months later, the State filed another petition seeking revocation of the 
Appellant's probation.  The new 
petition contained four allegations:

 
 
            
1.   That said Defendant 
has failed to complete anger management, having only attended two (2) group 
sessions since August 6, 2003, in violation of conditions number one (1) and 
seven (7) of his Judgment and Sentence.

 
 
            
2.   That said Defendant 
has failed to keep this Agent appraised (sic.) of his current residence in 
violation of condition number one (1) of his Judgment and 
Sentence.

 
 
            
3.   That said Defendant 
failed to keep scheduled office appointments with this Agent on April 27, 2005, 
and again on May 12, 2005, in violation of condition number one (1) of his 
Judgment and Sentence.

 
 
            
4.   That said Defendant 
has failed to complete the felony program at Community Alternatives of Casper 
after being terminated on April 12, 2004 pursuant to Major Violations (MJ48) in 
violation of his Judgment and Sentence.

 
 
A fifth 
allegation was added by subsequent amendment, that allegation being that the 
Appellant had ceased all contact with his probation officer and appeared to have 
"absconded from supervision."

 
 
[¶8]      The State's 
petition was heard on July 13, 2005.  
After withdrawing the fourth allegation, the State presented its evidence 
through the testimony of the Appellant's most recent probation officer.  The Appellant did not testify, but 
called his girlfriend as a witness.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court reviewed the 
evidence and concluded that the State had proven each of the allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The 
Appellant's probation was revoked, and the sentence of imprisonment for 18 to 24 
months was re-imposed, with credit for 286 days served.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
 [¶9]     Not too long ago, we 
set forth in detail our standard for reviewing a decision to revoke 
probation:

 
 
Revocation 
of probation is largely governed by court rule.  W.R.Cr.P. 39.  The State is required to establish the 
violation of the conditions of probation alleged in the petition by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5).  The 
probationer has the right to appear in person and by counsel and to confront and 
examine adverse witnesses, and the rules of evidence apply to the adjudicative 
phase. W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5)(A) and (B);  
also see W.R.E 1101(a)(3).

 
 
            
A district court's decision to revoke probation is discretionary and will 
not be disturbed unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of 
discretion.  The district court is 
required to make a conscientious judgment that the alleged violation occurred 
after considering the reasons underlying the conditions of probation, the 
violation of those conditions, and the reasons leading to the violation.  Moehr v. State, 13 P.3d 1114, 1116 
(Wyo.2000); Johnson v. State, 6 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Wyo.2000).  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo.1998).  The district court's 
determination that the probation agreement has been violated "must be based upon 
verified facts and must be made pursuant to due process protections[.]"  Counts v. State, 899 P.2d 1341, 1343-44 
(Wyo.1995) (quoting Gailey v. State, 
882 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo.1994)).

 
 
            
In addition, we have also expressed a general agreement with the 
proposition that in order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition 
of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful, 
or, if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society.  Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 362 
(Wyo.1992); and see Johnson, 6 P.3d  
at 1263.  We have also held that 
notice to a probationer of the grounds for revocation is fundamental and that 
failure of notice is a defect affecting a substantial right and may be 
prejudicial to the probationer's cause.  
Shaw v. State, 998 P.2d 965, 
967-8 (Wyo.2000).

 
 

Anderson 
v. State, 2002 WY 
46, ¶¶ 24-26, 43 P.3d 108, 118 (Wyo. 2002) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The Appellant's first issue is not 
so much a question as to who bears the burden of proof at a probation revocation 
hearing, as it is an allegation that the district court improperly allocated 
that burden to him.  He points in 
particular to two statements made by the court in its summation at the end of 
the hearing to the effect that nothing had been shown to indicate any reason or 
excuse for the violations.  We do 
not read these statements as does the Appellant; rather, we read them as 
comments about the evidence then before it, not as comments about the burden of 
proof.  The district court's full 
statement shows that it recognized and applied the correct burden of 
proof:

 
 
            
The Court would find that the violations in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the 
affidavit and the singular paragraph in the addendum have been established by a 
preponderance of the evidence presented, that the State has met its burden.  It appears to me that the initial 
Judgment and Sentence in this case clearly mandated that anger management class 
be undertaken, and we had a very specific direction from Ms. Miner that he start 
the week of May 5th, I believe it was of this year; and he did not attend class 
at that time.  He did not start up 
and make efforts to complete that.

 
 
            
And I would have to speculate that his reasons for not doing that were 
not a willful violation.  There's 
been nothing shown to indicate any excuse whatsoever.  And you would think that since that was 
raised with him just the week before that if there was some problem with him 
starting the program, attending, or completing the program, that would have been 
raised with the probation agent.

 
 
            
Additionally, the failure to advise of the address and residence I think 
has been clearly established.  And 
to try to say whether he willfully decided to not comply with that Probation and 
Parole requirement is a concern because he is the one that made the decision to 
apparently not be at the residence that he reported to later be in Glenrock, Wyoming, without the permission of his 
probation agent.  And it's 
impossible for the agent to supervise, to know where his whereabouts were or the 
reasons for that whereabouts when there's that type of 
noncompliance.

 
 
            
The same rationale would apply to the missed office appointments.  It appears that there were at least two 
specifically scheduled appointments that were missed, and there's been no 
showing of any reason or excuse.  
There was an indication in I think one of the phone calls that he was 
delayed by other matters, but that is no sufficient showing of why he didn't 
make scheduled office visits.

 
 
            
And finally, with his not making contact and communicating with his agent 
since a telephone message on or about May 12th, it becomes impossible for 
Probation and Parole to supervise, to know the whereabouts, to know what's going 
on, to monitor all of the other conditions and requirements of 
probation.

 
 
            
So with those comments, the Court would find that the State has met its 
burden in this matter, and I would adjudicate those four violations of 
probation.

 
 
[¶11]   The second issue, intertwined with 
the first, is whether the State proved that the Appellant willfully violated his 
probationary terms.  The district 
court's summation clearly shows that the judge inferred from the evidence 
presented that the violations were willful.  We have previously held that such an 
inference is appropriate where the evidence warrants.  Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 363 
(Wyo. 
1995).  We have carefully examined 
the record in this case, paying particular attention to the evidence adduced at 
the revocation hearing, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding the probation violations to have been willful.  The sequence of events, in full context, 
easily supports a conclusion that the Appellant's actions and inactions were 
willful.  Furthermore, given the 
district court's denial of the first petition on the ground that willfulness had 
not been proven, it is clear that the district court treated willfulness as an 
element that required proof.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The district court properly imposed 
upon the State the burden of proof at the hearing to revoke the Appellant's 
probation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that the State had met that burden.

 
 
[¶13]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-107 allows certain felons to be confined in the county jail, rather 
than in the state prison.