Case Title: P. v. Gray

Citation: 

Docket Number: S014664

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/25/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S014664 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
MARIO LEWIS GRAY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. A885549 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury in Los Angeles County Superior Court convicted Mario Lewis Gray 
in 1989 of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; all further statutory references 
are to this code unless otherwise indicated), burglary (§ 459), robbery (§ 211), 
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)), and forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)), all 
perpetrated against the person or home of victim Ruby Reed.  The jury also 
sustained four special circumstance allegations in connection with these crimes:  
that defendant murdered Reed while engaged in the commission of burglary, 
attempted robbery, forcible rape, and forcible sodomy.  (§ 190.2, former subd. 
(a)(17)(i), (iii), (iv) & (vii), now redesignated subd. (a)(17)(A), (C), (D) & (G).)  
In addition, the jury convicted defendant of six unrelated first degree burglaries.  
(§ 459.)  On February 1, 1990, the jury set the penalty at death under the 1978 
death penalty law.  (§ 190.1 et seq.)  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
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I.  GUILT PHASE 
A.  Facts 
1.  April 23, 1987:  Five Burglaries 
Michael Barry lived with his wife in a trailer park on Lycoming Street in 
the City of Walnut.  On the morning of April 23, 1987, around 5:30 or 6:00 a.m., 
he awoke and noticed the window on the door in the laundry room had been 
forced open and the door was ajar.  He turned on the light and found his wife’s 
purse emptied on the floor.  Her wallet was missing about $20.  Credit cards had 
been removed from the wallet but not taken. 
Joan Darling lived alone in the same trailer park as Barry.  She awoke 
around 4:00 a.m. the morning of April 23, 1987, because she heard a tapping 
sound.  She went to investigate but found nothing and went back to sleep.  She 
awoke again around 6:00 a.m. and noticed her purse had been emptied out and $40 
in cash had been taken.  Her credit cards and a ring were not taken.  Someone had 
pried open the window of her back door.  The intruder had left a used cigarette and 
a flashlight in her home.  
Barbara Hostetler lived with her husband and son in the same trailer park as 
Barry and Darling.  She did not notice anything amiss when she left for work at 
5:30 a.m. on April 23, 1987.  Her son left 10 minutes after her.  Around 7:00 a.m., 
her husband called her and she returned home, whereupon she noticed someone 
had opened the closet in the guest room and had moved things around on the desk.  
Her husband’s billfold was open, and papers were strewn about.  The screen on the 
window in her son’s room had been removed.  Her husband testified he awoke 
around 6:00 a.m. when his dog began growling as if someone were in the home.  
When he went to investigate, he saw no one but found the sliding door wide open.  
His wife would not have left that door open.  He also found a window screen had 
 
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been removed.  His billfold had been emptied of $4 or $5, and some change was 
also missing, although the thief left his credit cards.  Dwight Hostetler, Barbara’s 
son, testified he did not remove the screen from the window and that it had been in 
place when he left for work early that morning.  Police later discovered 
defendant’s fingerprints on the removed window screen. 
Kathryn Patchin lived in the same trailer park as Barry, Darling, and the 
Hostetlers.  She awoke around 5:30 a.m. on April 23, 1987, because her pet 
cockatiel began speaking.  Patchin, believing her daughter had come home from 
work early, called out and went into the next room.  She noticed the door to the 
utility room, which had been open when she went to sleep, was now closed.  When 
she went to open it, she heard a sound as if someone were falling on her washing 
machine.  She opened the door just as someone else was closing the door to the 
outside.  She did not see the intruder.  Her credit cards were strewn on top of the 
washing machine, although none was missing.  Her purse was open and her 
attaché case unzipped.  She was missing around $30.  
Letitia Larson lived on Lycoming Street with her parents, husband, and son 
in a home across the street from the trailer park.  On April 23, 1987, she got up 
around 6:30 a.m. and noticed her husband’s gym bag had been emptied out and the 
bag taken.  A camera on the table had not been taken.  A window in the laundry 
room was open, the wood around the window chipped, and the screen torn.  The 
window had been closed before she went to sleep.  The night before, her father, 
Eugenio Lozano, had ensured the doors and windows were locked.   
2.  April 25, 1987:  The Crimes Against Ruby Reed 
Eighty-seven-year-old Ruby Reed lived alone in a trailer park in El Monte, 
which was adjacent to the RTD bus terminal.  Her daughter, Margaret Pemberton, 
lived in the same trailer park.  Pemberton visited her mother every day and last 
 
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saw her around 6:00 p.m. on April 24, 1987.  Residents in nearby trailers later 
reported suspicious circumstances occurring during the early morning hours of 
April 25.  One testified her dog began making odd growling noises.  Another 
testified someone had stolen some cigarettes and a cigarette lighter she had left on 
an outdoor patio table.  Others reported hearing noises, including a woman 
screaming for help. 
 Pemberton returned to her mother’s trailer around 11:00 a.m. on April 25.  
No one answered when she rang the bell.  Pemberton walked to the back and 
found the back door ajar and a window screen pried loose.  On entering through 
the back door, she found her mother, covered in bedding, lying on the bedroom 
floor.  Police and emergency personnel were called, but the victim was 
pronounced dead at the scene.  Her hands and feet had been bound with nylon 
stockings, and strips of towels were tied around her head and mouth, attached to 
her face with tape.  Her nightgown had been pulled to the top of her body, and her 
underwear was around one leg.  Her false teeth were on the floor.  Money was 
missing from her home, which had been ransacked, with jewelry boxes and shoe 
boxes opened and scattered about.  Cigarette ashes were left in the home, although 
Reed did not smoke.  Candy wrappers were strewn about the home, whereas 
Pemberton testified her mother would have placed the wrappers in a wastepaper 
basket.  
Dr. Solomon Riley, a deputy medical examiner, testified that Reed had 
suffered blunt trauma to her face, both sides of her head, her neck, and her chest.  
Her jaw was broken on both sides of her head, and she had two broken ribs on her 
left side and one broken rib on her right side.  These injuries were consistent with 
her having been kicked, punched, or thrown into a blunt object.  She had severe 
bruising around her eyes, suggesting she had been hit around the eyes.  She had 
injuries to her scalp and bleeding on her brain.  Her neck had been compressed for 
 
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four or five minutes, causing facial swelling and, eventually, death by 
asphyxiation.  Dr. Riley suggested the assailant had pressed his elbow, knee, or 
forearm on the victim’s neck, or had possibly placed a two-by-four piece of wood 
on her neck and then pressed on it, breaking the hyoid bone at the base of her 
tongue in the process. 
In a laundry basket at the crime scene, police found two key pieces of 
evidence:  (1) a room receipt from the Frontier Hotel in downtown Los Angeles  
dated April 24, 1987, bearing the names of “Lewis Gray” and “Gregory Gray” and 
signed by one “Lewis Gray”; and (2) an RTD bus transfer.  The fingerprint on the 
hotel receipt belonged to defendant.  Further investigation showed that 
defendant—apparently attempting to conceal his identity—had checked out of the 
Frontier Hotel at 8:01 a.m. on April 25 (the morning of Reed’s murder), signing 
the receipt as “Lewis Gray,” but evidently unwilling actually to leave the hotel, he 
had three minutes earlier (at 7:58 a.m.) checked into the same hotel under the 
name of “Mario Davis.”  
Later in the morning of April 25, after he killed Reed, defendant took a 
further step to create a new identity for himself.  Evidence showed that on that 
morning he took a bus to the University of Southern California Medical Center 
and, at 11:20 a.m., sought and received from the hospital an identification card in 
the name of “Mario Davis.”  An expert testified the handwriting on the hotel 
check-out receipt (“Lewis Gray”), on the check-in receipt (“Mario Davis”), and 
defendant’s handwriting exemplars were all written by the same person. 
Investigation of the bus transfer found in Reed’s home showed it had been 
issued from a bus on line 70, which originated in downtown Los Angeles, where 
the Frontier Hotel was located, and terminated at the bus station in El Monte.  The 
transfer was valid only on local El Monte buses.  As punched by the bus driver, 
the transfer was valid until 4:20 a.m. on April 25, 1987, meaning it was probably 
 
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punched around 3:20 a.m. that day.  A number 70 bus driven by driver Aemberti 
had arrived at the El Monte bus station around 3:15 a.m. on April 25, 1987.  The 
specific punch Aemberti was using that day matched the punch marks on the bus 
transfer found at the crime scene. 
Local buses in El Monte ran along Garvey Avenue, near the home of 
Cozette Gray, one of defendant’s sisters.  Cozette Gray’s home was only 1.7 miles 
from Reed’s home.   
Elizabeth Kornblum, the prosecution’s serologist, testified she had tested 
swabs from the sexual assault kit and detected the presence of spermatozoa in 
Reed’s vagina, rectum, and external genitalia.  She also found semen present on 
the victim’s underwear.  Based on chemical and enzymatic markers found in the 
semen, two in 10,000 White males could have been the donor, whereas 
approximately one in 100 African-American males could have been the donor.  
Defendant, who is African-American, was a member of the group of possible 
donors.  Gerald Burke, a criminalist with the sheriff’s department, testified that 
two of three pubic hairs found in the victim’s anal region were consistent with 
defendant’s pubic hair and inconsistent with the victim’s hair.   
Aaron Cansadillas testified he was a close friend of defendant’s sister 
Cozette Gray and had visited her house often in April 1987.  It was there he met 
defendant.  Cansadillas told police that one morning in April 1987, when he was at 
Cozette’s house, defendant arrived and said he had broken into a home, that “there 
was a lady in there,” and he had to “shut her up.”  Cansadillas recanted this 
statement at trial and was impeached with his prior statement, in which he also 
reported that defendant did not seem upset about the events.   
 
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3.  April 28, 1987:  A Final Burglary and Defendant’s Capture 
Kim Meldrum lived in an apartment in Covina.  On April 28, 1987, three 
days after the crimes against Reed, Meldrum left for work in the early morning, 
locking the door behind her.  When she returned, she discovered someone had 
been in her apartment.  Her bank statement and cancelled checks were scattered 
around the floor and a screwdriver that did not belong to her was on her stovetop.  
The screen for her front window had been removed and was on the ground, 
leaning on the wall. 
Kim Edwards lived across the courtyard from Meldrum.  She awoke when 
she heard a gate slam at 4:15 a.m.  She went to investigate and saw defendant 
walking in the apartment complex.  He stopped in front of Meldrum’s apartment 
and rang the doorbell several times.  Receiving no answer, he began prying the 
screen off her front window and then forced the window open.  Edwards called the 
police, who came and surrounded the apartment.  Defendant tried to escape 
through the rear of the apartment but retreated back into it when he saw a police 
officer.  He eventually surrendered to police and gave his name as “Mario Davis.”   
When questioned on April 29, defendant denied knowing anything about 
the murder or the Frontier Hotel receipt, and he professed not to remember where 
he was on the night of April 24-25. 
4.  The 1983 Crimes Against J.S. and S.B. 
Defendant’s 1983 crimes against J.S. and S.B. were admitted to show the 
identity and intent of the perpetrator of the crimes against Reed.  J.S., 64 years old 
at the time of defendant’s capital trial, testified that on February 6, 1983, she was 
sleeping in her apartment with her eight-year-old granddaughter, S.B., when she 
heard someone open a drawer in her bedroom and smelled cigarette smoke.  She 
awoke to find defendant in her room.  He instructed her not to make any noise, 
gesturing in a way that led her to believe he had a weapon.  He took her to the next 
 
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room, where he tore a towel into three strips which he used to bind her.  Once she 
was immobilized, defendant kicked her and she fell down.  He tore up another 
towel and tied a strip around her head, covering her eyes.  He then demanded she 
give him gold, money, and her wallet.  He took $370 from her purse.  He also took 
some rings, but they were recovered in an alley where defendant had apparently 
discarded them.  He ransacked her closet, removing and opening shoe boxes, 
leaving them strewn about on the floor. 
While J.S. was helpless on the floor, she heard defendant turn on the 
television and call someone on her telephone.  He left the apartment through a 
window but soon returned.  During this ordeal, defendant would kick J.S. and beat 
her with his fists.  At some point, he removed his clothing and rubbed his penis on 
her neck.  He also pushed her nightgown up to her belly.  He then sat, naked, on 
her legs.   
The noise from these activities awakened S.B.  Defendant grabbed her and 
began to beat her as well.  He then took S.B. back into the bedroom and directed 
her to orally copulate him.  When she refused, he threatened to hurt her 
grandmother.  S.B. then orally copulated him for a few seconds before they heard 
a sound in the next room.   
While defendant was in the bedroom with her granddaughter, J.S., her 
hands still tied behind her back, clambered up on the sofa and attempted to escape 
through the window defendant had opened from the outside.  He emerged from the 
bedroom and tried to prevent the escape, grabbing her by the mouth.  She bit him 
and he let her go, causing her to fall into the alley, breaking her leg.  Defendant 
then fled with his clothes, leaving behind a raincoat and some screwdrivers, keys, 
and cigarettes.  
The ordeal lasted about three hours.  Police later found candy wrappers 
strewn around the apartment.  Police found defendant’s right palm print on a light 
 
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bulb at the crime scene.  Defendant eventually pleaded guilty to burglary and was 
sentenced to six years in prison.1 
B.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Alleged Wheeler Error 
Defendant contends the prosecutor violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights by using peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective 
jurors because they were African-American.  (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
258 (Wheeler); Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson).)2  “ ‘In [Wheeler] 
. . . we held that the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike 
prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates the right of a 
criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of 
the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.  
Subsequently, in [Batson, supra,] . . . the United States Supreme Court held that 
such a practice violates, inter alia, the defendant’s right to equal protection of the 
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.’ ”  
(People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116.)  As we explain, we find no 
Wheeler/Batson error. 
                                              
1  
In connection with this 1983 incident, defendant was charged with robbery, 
burglary, oral copulation with a child under 14, and lewd conduct with a child 
under 14.  He pleaded guilty to first degree burglary and was sentenced to the 
upper term of six years in state prison.  The other charges apparently were 
dismissed. 
2  
Although defendant did not specifically cite Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, or 
the federal equal protection clause as a basis of his motion to quash the venire, 
these federal issues were properly preserved for appeal.  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 93, 117.)   
 
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a.  Juror R.H. 
As is usual in capital cases, the pool of prospective jurors was reduced in 
number by excusing jurors for hardship; the remaining jurors then filled out a 
lengthy written questionnaire.  These remaining jurors were then subjected to an 
oral voir dire examination by the court and the attorneys concerning their 
impartiality and their views on the death penalty.  Following voir dire, the parties 
exercised challenges for cause and excused jurors were replaced.  Once the panel 
was passed for cause, the parties began exercising peremptory challenges in 
alternating turns, beginning with the prosecution.   
In this final round, when the prosecutor exercised his third peremptory 
challenge asking that Juror R.H. be excused, defense counsel made a Wheeler 
motion.  In support of his motion, defense counsel first noted that defendant is 
African-American, the murder victim, Ruby Reed, was White, and the panel of 
approximately 100 prospective jurors had eight African-Americans.  Counsel 
explained:  “[E]xcusing [Juror R.H.] then obviously causes one less Black juror to 
be on the panel.”  Counsel continued, explaining that, from a prosecutorial 
perspective, nothing about Juror R.H. was objectionable.  The juror was born and 
raised in British Guyana, was older (75 years old), a Republican, Catholic, had 
worked with the Department of Defense, and held moderate views on the death 
penalty.  “[He] did not say in his [responses concerning the] death penalty whether 
he was for or against [it], but his questioning in front of the court was he was for 
the death penalty and he grew up where the death penalty existed which I believe 
is British Guyana.  I believe his wife’s son is captain of police.”  There being no 
apparent reason to challenge Juror R.H., counsel argued he had been challenged 
because of his race. 
Although the trial court made clear it had not yet ruled on whether or not 
defendant had made a prima facie showing of group bias, the prosecutor suggested 
 
11
the juror’s Catholic background was relevant to his decision, noted that the panel 
still had an African-American juror, suggested that something in the death-
qualifying process led him to believe Juror R.H. was less than suitable, and 
observed that Juror R.H. was just the third juror he had excused with a peremptory 
challenge, his first two peremptory challenges having been exercised against a 
middle-aged man from Hawaii and a middle-aged White woman.  In rebuttal, 
defense counsel reiterated that Juror R.H. did not appear to be against the death 
penalty and seemed to be a conservative person.  The trial court stated it had not 
considered the prosecutor’s reasons in determining whether defendant had made a 
prima facie showing of group bias and then denied the Wheeler motion, explaining 
that it did “not appear to the court the threshold has been reached of [an] invidious 
pattern of exclusion of a particular class.”  The 12 regular jurors eventually were 
chosen; included on the panel was an African-American woman.  
b.  Juror B.J. 
Once the panel of 12 prospective jurors was accepted by both sides, 
selection of alternate jurors began.  During the selection of the alternate jurors, the 
prosecutor exercised his first three peremptory challenges against an apparently 
Latina woman and two White jurors.  When the prosecutor then challenged Juror 
B.J., defense counsel made his second Wheeler motion, explaining Juror B.J. “is 
the [fourth] Black prospective juror to be called and the second to be excused by 
the prosecution.”  The court confirmed this count, noting that two African-
American jurors had been called as regular jurors and two as alternates, and that 
the prosecutor had exercised a peremptory challenge against one of the African-
American regular jurors, Juror R.H.  Defense counsel opined that Juror B.J. held 
moderate views concerning the death penalty, believed that the penalty should be 
used more frequently and for people who intentionally kill another, and stated that 
 
12
she would judge the case on the evidence presented.  The trial court denied the 
Wheeler motion, citing legal authorities suggesting that a movant fails to establish 
a prima facie showing of group bias “especially where another member of a 
noncomprisable [sic: cognizable?] group was left on the jury and the trial court 
found challenges were reasonable.”  Eight alternate jurors were eventually chosen, 
including one African-American.  Two of the alternate jurors ultimately served.  
(See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 703 [unnecessary to address 
Wheeler issue for alternate jurors if no alternates served on the jury].) 
c.  Discussion 
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated the applicable legal 
standards.  “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by showing 
that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.’  [Citations.]  Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie 
case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by 
offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, 
‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . 
whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ”  
(Johnson v. California (2005) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416]; see 
People v. Cornwell (Aug. 18, 2005, S046176) __ Cal.4th ___, ___ [at p. 13] 
(Cornwell).)   
In order to make a prima facie showing, “a litigant must raise the issue in a 
timely fashion, make as complete a record as feasible, [and] establish that the 
persons excluded are members of a cognizable class.”  (People v. Boyette (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 381, 421-422.)  The high court recently explained that “a defendant 
satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to 
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”  
 
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(Johnson v. California, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417].)  “An 
‘inference’ is generally understood to be a ‘conclusion reached by considering 
other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.’ ”  (Id. at p. ___, fn. 4 
[125 S.Ct. at p. 2416, fn. 4].)   
We explained in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155, that when 
a trial court denies a Wheeler motion finding the objector failed to make a prima 
facie case of group bias, the reviewing court should consider the entire record of 
voir dire of the challenged jurors.  (See People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 
1171, 1201.)  That view is consistent with the high court’s recent reiteration of the 
applicable rules, which require the defendant to attempt to demonstrate a prima 
facie case of discrimination based on the “totality of the relevant facts.”  (Johnson 
v. California, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2416].)   
Applying these rules, we conclude the trial court properly found defendant 
failed to make a prima facie case of racial bias motivating the prosecutor’s 
challenges to Jurors R.H. and B.J.  At the outset, defendant contends the trial court 
applied the wrong standard.  Wheeler states that, in order to make a prima facie 
case, an objector must show “a strong likelihood” of bias (Wheeler, supra, 22 
Cal.3d at p. 280), and the trial court, from the objector’s evidence, must 
“determine whether a reasonable inference [of bias] arises” (id. at p. 281).  This 
court subsequently held that “Wheeler’s terms ‘strong likelihood’ and ‘reasonable 
inference’ state the same standard” (People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 
1313) and that “to state a prima facie case, the objector must show that it is more 
likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based 
on impermissible group bias” (id. at p. 1318, italics added).  The high court 
recently rejected that holding, explaining that “California’s ‘more likely than not’ 
standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a 
prima facie case”  (Johnson v. California, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at 
 
14
p. 2416]).  Instead, an objector need only present facts that give “ ‘rise to an 
inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
The trial court here failed to state what standard it was applying.  As in 
Cornwell, supra, however, “[r]egardless of the standard employed by the trial 
court, . . . we have reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court 
in Johnson [v. California], supra, . . . [we] are able to apply the high court’s 
standard and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference 
that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.”  (Cornwell, supra, __ 
Cal.4th at p. ___ [at p. 22].)  We conclude the record does not support such an 
inference. 
That prospective Jurors R.H. and B.J., both African-Americans, belonged 
to a cognizable class is not disputed on appeal (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
629, 652),3 nor does either party dispute that the issue was timely raised and the 
record is as complete as was feasible.  Defendant relies on certain facts that, he 
claims, raise an inference of discriminatory intent.  He first contends, “[t]he almost 
total absence of Black jurors suggests that [Jurors R.H. and B.J.] were improperly 
excluded.”  Defendant overstates the case.  The prosecutor excluded one African-
American juror from the regular jury, but left another on, and struck one African-
American from the panel of alternates, but left another on.  As defendant 
concedes, the regular jury was composed of nine White jurors, one African-
                                              
3  
At trial, the prosecutor argued Wheeler did not apply to juror R.H. because 
the juror was born and grew up in British Guyana in South America.  The trial 
court did not rely on this fact in making its ruling, and respondent does not now 
rely on that argument in this court.  Rightly so:  “In Wheeler, we imposed no 
requirement that the defendant establish that systematically excluded black jurors 
were of Afro-American, Caribbean, African or Latin American descent.”  (People 
v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 687, overruled on other grounds in People v. 
Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1219.) 
 
15
American juror, and two Latino jurors.  The panel of eight alternate jurors was 
composed of six White jurors, one African-American, and one Latino juror.  After 
examining “the totality of the relevant facts” (Johnson v. California, supra, ___ 
U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2416]), we conclude the exclusion of two African-
American jurors and the retention of two failed to raise an inference of racial 
discrimination.  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1188-1189 [that all 
excluded jurors were African-American is not necessarily dispositive in 
establishing a prima facie case]; People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1201 
[showing that “three of the six challenged prospective jurors had Hispanic 
surnames” was “insufficient”].) 
Defendant also argues the prosecutor’s decision to excuse two of the six 
African-Americans in the venire of itself suggests bias.  When the prosecutor 
challenged Juror R.H., of course, that juror was only one of three peremptory 
challenges the prosecutor had thus far exercised.  The trial court did not know 
whether the prosecutor would remove additional racial minorities from the jury.  
Moreover, as noted above, although the prosecutor eventually challenged and had 
removed from the panel a total of two African-Americans, two more remained.  
We conclude the removal of two African-American jurors in these circumstances 
failed to raise a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.  (See People v. Snow 
(1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225 [that the prosecutor accepted a jury containing 
minorities “may be an indication of the prosecutor’s good faith in exercising his 
peremptories, and may be an appropriate factor for the trial judge to consider in 
ruling on a Wheeler objection, [although] it is not a conclusive factor”].) 
Although the trial court, in ruling on defense counsel’s first Wheeler 
motion, stated it had not considered the prosecutor’s explanation of his challenge 
to Juror R.H., defendant argues the prosecutor’s volunteered reasons were 
unsupportable and, by inference, masked a forbidden motive.  Defendant observes 
 
16
that although the prosecutor suggested Juror R.H.’s age (75), Catholic upbringing, 
and the fact he was not born in the United States were all relevant factors, he 
failed to challenge other jurors having similar characteristics.  Defendant also 
argues the prosecutor’s reliance on the fact Juror R.H. was raised in a different 
country and culture was pretextual because he did not rigorously question the juror 
on this topic.  Finally, defendant contends that, although the prosecutor seemed 
concerned that Juror B.J.’s child care obligations might render her a less than 
desirable juror, the prosecutor objected to granting a hardship excusal to certain 
White jurors who had similar child care issues.  
In raising this argument, defendant would have this court compare Jurors 
R.H. and B.J. with other jurors—those who served and those whom the prosecutor 
excused—to determine whether the prosecutor’s reasons were applied consistently 
to jurors of all races.  The United States Supreme Court recently held that an 
appellate court should scrutinize a prosecutor’s reasons for exercising his or her 
peremptory challenges and determine whether those reasons were applied equally 
to other jurors, in order to assess the credibility of the prosecutor’s expressed 
motivations.  (See Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) ___ U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. 2317] 
(Miller-El).)  In Miller-El, the trial court found the defendant had made a prima 
facie case of discrimination, thus requiring the prosecutor to state the reasons for 
his challenges to specific jurors.  After hearing from the prosecutor, the trial court 
proclaimed his stated reasons were “ ‘completely credible [and] sufficient’ ” and 
denied the motion.  (Miller-El, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2323].)  
After conducting a comparative juror analysis, the high court reversed. 
Miller-El thus involved a case in the third stage of a Wheeler/Batson 
motion, that is, after the trial court has found a prima facie showing of group bias, 
the burden has shifted to the prosecution, and the prosecutor has stated his or her  
 
17
reasons for the challenges in question.  Miller-El holds that at this third stage, after 
the prosecutor has proffered his or her reasons, an appellate court should compare 
those reasons with the prosecutor’s actions with respect to other jurors to 
determine whether the reasons given were pretextual.  “If a prosecutor’s proffered 
reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar 
nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 
discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”  (Miller-El, supra, ___ 
U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2325].)  Miller-El thus did not consider whether an 
appellate court must conduct a comparative juror analysis in the first instance, 
when the objector has failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination, or 
whether an appellate court must conduct a comparative juror analysis for the first 
time on appeal, when the objector failed to do so at trial.  As we explain, even if 
we were to compare the challenged jurors with jurors who were not excused, we 
would not find a prima facie showing of group bias existed.  (See Cornwell, supra, 
__ Cal.4th at pp. ___ [at pp. 19-20]; People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 203.) 
At the outset, we reiterate that we rely on and defer to our trial courts to 
distinguish bona fide reasons from the sham that hide improper motives (People v. 
Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 422), and that a party may decide to excuse a 
prospective juror for a variety of reasons, finding no single characteristic 
dispositive.  Here, the prosecutor did not excuse an unusually high percentage of 
African-Americans from the venire, nor a particularly high number of African-
Americans as compared to jurors of other races.  At the time the prosecutor 
excused Juror R.H., he had already excused Juror C.H., who apparently was 
Japanese-American, and Juror J.R., who was White, and he had passed on 
challenging Juror D.W., an African-American woman who eventually served on 
the jury.  By the time the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 
B.J., he had excused a number of non-African-American prospective jurors.  
 
18
Unlike in Miller-El, supra, ___ U.S. at page ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2325], therefore, 
here the “bare statistics” of the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory challenges do 
not suggest a racial animus. 
Although defendant argues the prosecutor’s concern about Juror R.H.’s age 
was pretextual, we note it was defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who mentioned 
Juror R.H.’s age, speculating that this factor was important to the prosecutor’s 
decision to challenge Juror R.H.  But even if the prosecutor did rely on Juror 
R.H.’s age, the claim of pretext fails.  The two non-African-American jurors of 
comparable age the prosecutor failed to challenge (Juror J.H., 75 years old, and 
Juror L.P., 71 years old) could both have been seen as pro-prosecution despite 
their age.  Juror J.H. had previously served as a juror in a trial in which the 
defendant was charged with a double-murder; J.H. reported that jury had reached a 
verdict.  Juror L.P. had previously testified in a criminal case and reported that she 
had been treated “kindly” by both the trial judge and the prosecutor.  Moreover, 
Juror L.P. stated in her juror questionnaire that her support for the death penalty 
was “strong,” that she agreed “very strongly” with the idea of retributive justice 
(“an eye for an eye”), and that “too many murderers [were] lightly sentenced.”  
The prosecutor may well have believed that, despite their age, both jurors would 
look favorably on his case.  In short, the prosecutor’s alleged disparate treatment 
of older African-American and non-African-American jurors does not suggest a 
prohibited racial motivation. 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor’s reliance on Juror R.H.’s 
Catholicism4 was pretextual, noting that five other non-African-American 
                                              
4  
In recounting the prosecutor’s statement in support of his peremptory 
challenge of Prospective Juror R.H., we do not mean to suggest our approval, tacit 
or otherwise, of a practice of excluding jurors on the basis of religious affiliation.  
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
19
Catholic jurors were not similarly challenged.  Assuming without deciding we can 
consider the prosecutor’s volunteered reasons when the trial court did not, we find 
the prosecutor did not clearly rely on Juror R.H.’s Catholicism.  Although the 
prosecutor began his voluntary explanation of his decision to strike Juror R.H. by 
mentioning Catholicism, when he resumed his recitation after an interruption, he 
did not return to the juror’s Catholicism, but instead stated he struck him because 
he was born into a different culture in British Guyana.  
Even were we to assume that the prosecutor did rely on Juror R.H.’s 
Catholicism, a side-by-side comparison of Juror R.H. with the other Catholic 
jurors who were not excused,5 reveals clear reasons why the prosecutor may have 
preferred not to strike the other jurors.  Juror G.F.’s husband was a California 
Highway Patrol officer; the prosecutor may have believed she would thus be a 
favorable juror for the People.  Based on his juror questionnaire, Juror J.P. had a 
fear his wife and children would be the victims of sexually based crimes; because 
defendant was charged with just such crimes, the prosecutor may have believed 
Juror J.P. would be a sympathetic juror.  Juror D.G. reported her support for the 
death penalty was “strong,” whereas Juror R.H. reported his support was just 
“moderate.”  Finally, Juror D.P. had previously served as a juror in a murder trial 
that reached a verdict, suggesting this juror might look favorably on the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
(See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 115 [dictum]; Wheeler, supra, 22 
Cal.3d at p. 276 [same].)  Defendant did not object on this ground, however, and 
the trial court properly found no prima facie showing of group bias on the 
ground―race―that was presented. 
5  
Defendant is incorrect as to one juror.  Juror J.T., who reported in his 
questionnaire that he was Catholic, was in fact challenged by the prosecutor and 
excused.   
 
20
prosecutor’s case.  (By contrast, the prosecutor excused Juror C.S., who reported 
she had been a juror in a trial involving a charge of attempted murder that had 
resulted in a hung jury.) 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor’s asserted concern that Juror R.H. 
was born in British Guyana was pretextual because the prosecutor failed to 
exercise a peremptory challenge against Juror D.G. (who was born in Mexico), 
Juror H.F. (who was born in Germany), and Juror J.P (who was born in Puerto 
Rico).  The record discloses reasons the prosecutor may have decided to retain the 
other foreign-born jurors despite their foreign birth.  Juror D.G. reported in her 
questionnaire that her support for the death penalty was “strong.”  Juror J.P., as 
noted, ante, had expressed a fear that his loved ones would become victims of sex 
crimes.  Juror H.F. similarly reported that he feared his 21-year-old daughter 
would one day be raped.  On this record, the prosecutor’s reliance on Juror R.H.’s 
foreign birth does not appear pretextual. 
Nor, contrary to defendant’s argument, did the prosecutor engage in mere 
desultory or cursory voir dire questioning of Jurors R.H. and B.J.  (See People v. 
Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 137; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281.)  
The prosecutor’s questioning of Juror R.H. was similar to that of other prospective 
jurors.  Although defendant asserts the prosecutor asked Juror B.J. only one 
question,6 this characterization ignores the prosecutor’s lengthy questioning of the 
juror earlier in the voir dire process concerning her request for a hardship  
                                              
6  
The prosecutor asked her:  “[T]he last time we were here you voiced some 
concerns to us.  Are those still concerns to you?”  She answered in the affirmative.  
We assume the prosecutor was referring to the juror’s concern over her child care 
obligations. 
 
21
exemption due to her child care obligations, including the care of an autistic 
grandchild, and an even longer inquiry into her views on the death penalty, i.e., 
her Hovey voir dire.  (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1.)  
Defendant’s claim the prosecutor engaged in only cursory questioning of Jurors 
R.H. and B.J. is thus not supported by the record.   
Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor could have had no reason to 
excuse Juror B.J. except for the fact she had significant child care obligations.  
This reason, defendant argues, was pretextual because the prosecutor was 
unsympathetic to the hardship claims of other, non-African-American, jurors.  
Because the prosecutor was not called upon to provide reasons for his challenge to 
Juror B.J., defendant’s argument is mere speculation. 
In any event, an examination of the record indicates the prosecutor may 
well have exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror B.J. because she 
reported that someone close to her had been arrested and sent to jail for stealing a 
car.  The prosecutor challenged other jurors who had had such experiences with 
law enforcement.  Juror J.T. reported he had, in the past, been arrested for petty 
theft and felt he had been treated unfairly; the prosecutor excused him.  Similarly, 
Juror C.S. reported an apparent family relation was then facing charges of assault 
and battery; the prosecutor excused her.  Thus, the record contains plausible and 
credible reasons supporting the prosecutor’s action.  (See Miller-El, supra, ___ 
U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2329] [addressing the “plausibility” of the 
prosecutor’s reasons]; id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2339] [noting the prosecutor’s 
explanations were “incredible”].)  We conclude the trial court correctly found that 
defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the prosecutor was motivated by 
group bias when he exercised peremptory challenges against Jurors R.H. and B.J. 
 
22
2.  Alleged Witherspoon/Witt Error 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by excusing Jurors C.B. and L.T. 
due to their alleged views concerning the death penalty, thereby violating his right 
to an impartial jury under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  The high court has established the legal standard for 
excusing jurors due to their views on the death penalty, first in Witherspoon v. 
Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, and then in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412.  
In Witt, the Supreme Court explained that a prospective juror may be excused in a 
capital case if “the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.’ ”  (Id. at p. 424.)  We apply the same standard under the state Constitution.  
(People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1246.) 
“There is no requirement that a prospective juror’s bias against the death 
penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity.  [Citations.]  Rather, it is sufficient 
that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror 
would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the 
juror.”  (People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1246-1247.)  “Assessing the 
qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad 
discretion of the trial court.  [Citation.]  The trial court must determine whether the 
prospective juror will be ‘unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the 
case.’  [Citation.]  A juror will often give conflicting or confusing answers 
regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to serve, and the trial court must 
weigh the juror’s responses in deciding whether to remove the juror for cause.  
The trial court’s resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate 
court if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]  ‘[W]here equivocal or 
conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective juror’s ability to impose 
 
23
the death penalty, the trial court’s determination as to his true state of mind is 
binding on an appellate court.’ ”  (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910.)   
As is often the case, Jurors C.B. and L.T. gave conflicting and equivocal 
responses when, during voir dire, they were asked about their views on capital 
punishment.  In her jury questionnaire, Juror C.B. reported that she had “strong” 
feelings about the death penalty because she did “not believe anyone but God has 
the right to decide that question.”  When initially questioned by defense counsel, 
she agreed that she would “live up to [her] obligation as a juror . . . [and] base 
[her] decision on the law and the evidence.”  When questioned by the trial judge 
and the parties, she initially stated that her views against the death penalty would 
“probably not” cause her to vote against the special circumstance allegation 
although convinced it was true.  When asked whether she “would . . . always vote 
for life without possibility of parole and never even consider [voting] for death,” 
she replied:  “I don’t know.  I guess at this point I would say I don’t know because 
I have never been in this position before.”  Following up, the court rephrased the 
question and asked her whether “you are always going to say life without 
possibility of parole and never vote for the death penalty?”  She replied:  “I don’t 
think so.”  When questioned by the prosecutor, however, she reaffirmed that she 
had a “strong feeling” against the death penalty and first stated that she would 
have “a lot of trouble” voting for death, before agreeing that she “probably would” 
always vote for life over death.   
The following colloquy then occurred: 
“[THE PROSECUTOR]:  . . . you in effect will be saying put this man to 
death, that’s what you’ll be saying, and what I need to find out is are your feelings 
about the death penalty such that you just could not make that kind of decision? 
“[JUROR C.B.]:  I’m going to say it is yes, yes. 
 
24
“[THE PROSECUTOR]:  So you feel that because of your moral feelings you 
could not vote to impose the death penalty? 
“[JUROR C.B.]:  Yes. 
“[THE PROSECUTOR]:  That’s a correct statement? 
“[JUROR C.B.]:  Yes.” 
She was rehabilitated somewhat by defense counsel, agreeing that she 
could not definitively make up her mind until she had heard the actual aggravating 
and mitigating evidence.  The trial court then excused her for cause.  In light of her 
equivocal answers on voir dire, we defer to the trial court’s implicit determination 
regarding Juror C.B.’s state of mind and conclude substantial evidence supports 
the court’s ruling the juror’s views on the death penalty would “ ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with 
[her] instructions and [her] oath.’ ”  (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
p. 424.) 
We reach the same conclusion with regards to Juror L.T.; indeed, her 
responses on voir dire were less equivocal.  She reported on her questionnaire that 
she had strong feelings against the death penalty.  When asked to explain, she 
wrote:  “I don’t believe in taking a life.”  Her strong anti-capital-punishment 
beliefs informed her responses to the trial court’s questions, affirming that she 
“could never bring [herself] to vote for the death penalty” and would always vote 
for life without possibility of parole.  Although she also asserted that “it depends 
on the case, too.  I mean, what I hear might change my mind,” she averred that she 
would “never vote for the death penalty.”  Although defense counsel rehabilitated 
her somewhat, the overall thrust of her voir dire was that she would never vote to 
execute someone.  We find substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling 
to excuse her and conclude the court did not abuse its broad discretion.  In sum, 
 
25
we find neither Juror C.B. nor Juror L.T. was improperly excused for cause, and 
no violation of defendant’s right to an impartial jury occurred. 
C.  Trial Issues 
1.  Failure to Specify the Degree of the Murder 
Defendant contends that because the jury failed to set the degree of the 
murder when it initially delivered its verdict, he was convicted of only second 
degree murder by operation of section 1157.  That section provides in pertinent 
part:  “Whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime . . . which is distinguished 
into degrees, the jury . . . must find the degree of the crime . . . of which he is 
guilty.  Upon the failure of the jury . . . to so determine, the degree of the crime . . . 
of which the defendant is guilty, shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree.”  
Because section 1157 precludes a finding of first degree murder, he argues, the 
felony-murder special-circumstance findings and the penalty judgment must be 
reversed.  We disagree.  As we explain, appellate review of this issue is precluded 
by the doctrine of law of the case.  Moreover, assuming the issue were properly 
before us, section 1157 is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case, as we 
explained in both People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757 (Bonillas) and People v. 
Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896 (Mendoza). 
a.  Facts 
Defendant was charged by information with the crime of murder 
undifferentiated by degree, as is usual in such cases.  The case was tried on the 
theory that defendant had committed murder in the first degree because he killed 
the victim in the commission of a burglary, robbery, and rape.7  Accordingly, the 
                                              
7  
At one point near the end of the guilt phase, the prosecutor asserted that he 
intended to request the jury be instructed on the theory of a deliberate and 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
26
jury was instructed solely on the theory of first degree felony murder.  The court 
delivered no instructions on the theory of premeditation and deliberation, second 
degree murder, manslaughter, or the degree of the murder.8  On Wednesday, 
February 22, 1989, at 3:45 p.m., the jury returned the following verdict:  “We the 
jury in the above-entitled action find the defendant Mario Lewis Gray guilty of 
murder in violation of Penal Code section 187(a), a felony, as alleged in Count I of 
the information.”  The jury was polled and then instructed to return on Friday 
morning, i.e., in less than two days.  The court admonished the jury “not to discuss 
the case with each other or anybody else.” 
The next morning, Thursday, February 23, 1989, both the trial court and the 
prosecutor raised the jury’s failure to expressly specify the degree of the murder in 
the verdict form.  The prosecutor suggested that when the jury reconvened the 
following day, the court either poll the jurors to determine whether they had found 
the degree of the murder or ask them to resume deliberations to determine the 
degree.  The court granted defense counsel’s request for a recess to research the 
law on this issue.  When the parties reassembled without the jury later that same 
day, defense counsel argued the jury’s verdict of murder without setting the degree 
meant defendant was convicted of second degree murder by operation of section 
1157.  The trial court announced that it intended to ask the jury to renew its 
deliberations and render a verdict on the degree of the murder. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
premeditated murder.  The next day, he explained he had misspoken and that he 
intended to rely solely on the theory of felony murder.  
8  
Defendant requested an instruction defining homicide as including murder 
“and manslaughter,” but it was refused.  Defendant did not request instructions on 
second degree murder or manslaughter, and the trial court noted that defendant 
declined to request CALJIC No. 8.70 regarding the degree of the murder.  
 
27
Court reconvened on the morning of Friday, February 24, 1989.  The trial 
court gave the jury amended verdict forms and asked it to “return to the jury room, 
deliberate, and render your verdict as to Count 1 using the revised verdict forms.”  
After additional deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of first degree murder.  
The court then declared a recess, ostensibly for one week, to enable defendant to 
seek writ relief from the Court of Appeal.  The appellate court stayed the trial 
proceedings and then granted writ relief in defendant’s favor, finding he had been 
convicted of second degree murder by operation of section 1157.  Respondent then 
petitioned this court for review.  We granted and transferred the case back to the 
Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its opinion and reconsider the case in 
light of Bonillas, supra, 48 Cal.3d 757.  After reconsidering the issue, the Court of 
Appeal issued an opinion denying relief.  We denied defendant’s petition for 
review.  The parties then returned to the trial court and proceeded to commence 
the long-delayed penalty phase of the trial. 
b.  Law of the Case 
As noted, the Court of Appeal decided 11 years ago that, despite the jury’s 
initial omission when rendering its verdict, section 1157 did not compel the 
conclusion that defendant was convicted of murder only in the second degree.  
Accordingly, defendant is precluded from relitigating the issue by the doctrine of 
law of the case.  “ ‘The rule of “law of the case” generally precludes multiple 
appellate review of the same issue in a single case.  The doctrine applies to this 
court even though the previous appeal was before a Court of Appeal. . . .  “Where 
a decision upon appeal has been rendered by a District Court of Appeal and the 
case is returned upon a reversal, and a second appeal comes to this court directly 
or intermediately, for reasons of policy and convenience, this court generally will 
 
28
not inquire into the merits of said first decision, but will regard it as the law of the 
case.”  [Citations.]’ ”  (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 668.) 
“The principal reason for the doctrine is judicial economy.  ‘Finality is 
attributed to an initial appellate ruling so as to avoid the further reversal and 
proceedings on remand that would result if the initial ruling were not adhered to in 
a later appellate proceeding.’ ”  (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786 
(Stanley); see also People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841-842.)  The law of 
the case doctrine applies in criminal cases (Stanley, supra, at p. 786) and to capital 
cases before this court even where the prior decision was made by an intermediate 
appellate court (id. at p. 787; People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 683). 
We will apply the law of the case doctrine where the point of law involved 
was necessary to the prior decision and was “ ‘actually presented and determined 
by the court.’ ”  (People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 842.)  The doctrine will 
not be applied, however, when such application leads to an unjust result.  Because 
the law of the case doctrine “is merely one of procedure and does not go to the 
jurisdiction of the court [citations], the doctrine will not be adhered to where its 
application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where there has been a ‘manifest 
misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice’ [citation], or 
the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening 
between the first and second appellate determinations.  [Citation.]  The unjust 
decision exception does not apply when there is a mere disagreement with the 
prior appellate determination.”  (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 787.)   
Defendant does not dispute that the question whether section 1157 applies 
to the facts of his case was presented to, and decided by, the Court of Appeal, or 
that resolution of the issue was necessary to that court’s decision.  He argues, 
however, that we should apply the “unjust result” exception to the law of the case 
doctrine because (1) the Court of Appeal decision contained “egregious errors,” 
 
29
and (2) it would be unjust to affirm, in the name of judicial economy, a sentence of 
death containing serious flaws.  
Defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeal committed “egregious 
errors” when it decided the issue is a spare one with no elaboration.  Thus, that the 
court “adopted as the rationale of its majority opinion the very argument that it had 
recognized as insufficient only five months earlier” is easily explained by the fact 
that this court vacated the appellate court’s initial opinion and directed it to 
reconsider the issue in light of Bonillas, supra, 48 Cal.3d 757.  Defendant does not 
explain how the Court of Appeal “[f]undamentally misconstrued Penal Code 
sections 1161 and 1164,”9 but the court’s reasoning appears congruent with our 
own in Bonillas.  Although defendant accuses the Court of Appeal of “ignor[ing] 
adverse precedent that it could not distinguish, even through mischaracterization,”  
defendant does not identify such allegedly adverse precedent.  We remind litigants 
that an opening brief must support each legal point with “argument and, if 
possible, by citation of authority.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(B); Stanley, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) 
Defendant also argues that applying the law of the case doctrine here would 
be unjust because his very life should not be subordinated to the institutional 
                                              
9  
Section 1161 states in pertinent part:  “When there is a verdict of 
conviction, in which it appears to the Court that the jury have mistaken the law, 
the Court may explain the reason for that opinion and direct the jury to reconsider 
their verdict . . . .” 
 
Section 1164, subdivision (a) states:  “When the verdict given is receivable 
by the court, the clerk shall record it in full upon the minutes, and if requested by 
any party shall read it to the jury, and inquire of them whether it is their verdict.  If 
any juror disagrees, the fact shall be entered upon the minutes and the jury again 
sent out; but if no disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete, and the jury 
shall, subject to subdivision (b), be discharged from the case.”  
 
30
interest of judicial economy.  This contention is simply a repackaging of the 
argument that the doctrine should not apply in capital cases.  As noted, we have 
rejected that position.  (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 787.)  
Assuming the “unjust result” exception does not apply here, defendant also 
contends that, because this is a capital case, application of the doctrine would 
deprive him of his state constitutional right to a direct appeal to this court (see Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 11 [“The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when 
judgment of death has been pronounced”]), as well as deprive him of due process 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
We reject this argument because it also reiterates, in only slightly different 
fashion, the argument that the law of the case doctrine should not apply in capital 
cases.  (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 787.)  Defendant further argues Stanley 
and the cases on which it relied are distinguishable because, unlike those cases, his 
life or death depends directly on whether the lower appellate court was correct, 
whereas in prior cases, the effect of the legal issue in question on the efficacy of 
the death penalty was only indirect.  Stanley, however, relied on no such 
direct/indirect distinction.  The provision in the state Constitution for the 
automatic appeal to this court for capital cases presumably reflects the relative 
importance of such cases generally, not whether a particular defendant’s life hangs 
in the balance on the outcome of any specific legal issue.  We reiterate that the 
existence of a death sentence is insufficient to avoid application of the law of the 
case doctrine, and defendant does not persuade us otherwise. 
Failing to distinguish Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th 764, defendant argues we 
should reconsider that case “since the necessary consequence of that decision is to 
deprive [him] of his state and federal constitutional rights.”  Although it is true 
that automatic review by the state’s highest court provides an important procedural 
safeguard in capital cases (see Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 198), the 
 
31
rule we reiterate and adhere to today does not undermine the importance of 
automatic review.  This court was not locked out of the midtrial proceedings that 
sought to determine whether the degree of the murder should be reduced by 
section 1157.  Indeed, we reviewed the matter twice, once on a petition by the 
People, and again in response to a petition by defendant.  Moreover, if application 
of the law of the case doctrine would lead to an unjust result here, we would 
decline to apply it.  Under the circumstances, the rule set forth in Stanley, supra, 
10 Cal.4th at page 787, does not result in the removal of this court’s review of 
capital cases in any meaningful sense.   
In sum, defendant’s attempt to relitigate this issue is barred by the law of 
the case doctrine. 
c.  Bonillas and Mendoza 
Even assuming for argument the law of the case doctrine does not apply, 
we find the trial court did not err in resubmitting the question of the degree of the 
murder to the jury because the trial court retained control over the jury and 
resubmitted the question almost immediately.  We addressed this precise issue in 
Bonillas, supra, 48 Cal.3d 757, which posed almost identical facts.  We explained:  
“Where, as here, further proceedings are to take place, the jury has not been 
discharged, the jurors have been specifically instructed that they are still jurors in 
the case, they have been admonished not to discuss the case with anyone nor to 
permit anyone to discuss the case with them, and they have been directed not to 
read anything about the case, the jurors have not thrown off their character as 
jurors nor entered the outside world freed of the admonitions and obligations 
shielding their thought processes from outside influences.  Clearly, the jury here 
remained within the court’s control [citations], their verdict was incomplete, and 
 
32
the court was authorized to reconvene the jury to complete its verdict.”  (Id. at 
p. 773.) 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Bonillas, but he raises the same 
arguments he made before the Court of Appeal in his pretrial writ proceeding.  
Thus, he first argues Bonillas was premised on the fact the jury’s verdict contained 
an error because it was “incomplete.”  Here, by contrast, the information did not 
charge him with first degree murder, nor did the instructions specifically require 
the jury to make a finding as to degree; hence, his jury’s initial verdict was 
“complete” under the instructions given and under the law.   
We agree with the Court of Appeal, which observed that although Bonillas 
used the terms “incomplete” and “irregular” somewhat loosely, it did not 
pronounce a rigid rule excepting from the operation of section 1157 only those 
cases where the initial verdict is “incomplete” as measured by what the 
instructions asked the jury to decide.  In any event, as the appellate court 
explained, on the facts of this case, the jury’s verdict was in fact incomplete 
because the instructions, read as a whole, fairly asked the jury to return a verdict 
as to degree.  Thus, the jury was subject to reconvening under Bonillas.  
Moreover, even if the verdict was complete under the jury instructions, it was still 
incomplete and irregular under the law, justifying the trial court’s decision to 
reconvene the jury for further deliberations, so long as the jury had not been 
discharged and had been admonished not to discuss the case or read any news 
accounts of the case.10   
                                              
10  
People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, cited by defendant, is 
distinguishable.  In Hendricks, the trial court called back jurors it had discharged 
five months earlier in order to conduct a new sanity phase of the trial.  (Id. at 
p. 589.)  By contrast, the trial court in the instant case had not yet discharged the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
33
Even were we to conclude Bonillas could be validly distinguished, 
adherence to the rule announced recently in Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th 896, 
requires that we reject defendant’s arguments.  In that case, we clarified the proper 
interpretation of section 1157 in felony-murder cases, explaining that where the 
prosecution’s sole theory in a murder case is felony murder, a defendant subject to 
such a verdict is “not ‘convicted of a crime . . . which is distinguished into 
degrees’ within the plain and commonsense meaning of section 1157.”  (Mendoza, 
supra, at p. 908.)  Accordingly, section 1157 cannot operate in such a case to 
reduce the degree of the crime to the lesser degree. 
Defendant was prosecuted on the theory that Ruby Reed died while he was 
engaged in the commission of several felonies.  In closing argument, the 
prosecutor, in arguing defendant was guilty of first degree murder, relied only on a 
theory of felony murder, and the court instructed the jury on that theory alone.  No 
instruction was given on premeditation or deliberation.  Accordingly, as in 
Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 908, defendant was not convicted of a crime 
“ ‘distinguished into degrees’ ”; therefore, section 1157 cannot apply to reduce the 
degree of the crime. 
We reject defendant’s two counterarguments.  First, he contends Mendoza’s 
interpretation of section 1157 violates his constitutional rights because it permits 
imposition of a harsher sentence based on a fact not found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.)  But Apprendi 
and its progeny (see Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. ___ [124 S.Ct. 2531]) 
have little to do with this issue.  Defendant was sentenced to death, the statutory 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
jurors, had retained control over them, and had pointedly admonished them to 
avoid improper influences and not to discuss the case.  
 
34
maximum penalty for first degree murder (§ 190, subd. (a)), based on the jury’s 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of first degree murder with 
special circumstances.  Defendant’s Apprendi argument presupposes that 
resubmitting the issue of degree to the jury, which occurred in this case, was 
somehow improper.  Because it was not, Apprendi’s jury requirement was 
satisfied, and thus Apprendi does not undermine Mendoza in any way. 
Second, defendant contends the retroactive application of Mendoza to his 
case violates due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  We addressed this issue in Mendoza itself, concluding that 
full retroactivity does not violate due process because “our holding ‘neither 
expands criminal liability nor enhances punishment for conduct previously 
committed.’ ”  (Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 925.) 
d.  Instruction on the Revised Verdict Form 
Before the jury resumed its deliberations on the question of degree, the trial 
court charged the jury with this instruction:  “The verdict forms originally given 
you concerning Count 1 should have specified murder in the first degree instead of 
simply murder.  [¶] Revised forms of verdicts as to Count 1 will now be given you 
specifying murder in the first degree.  [¶] Please return to the jury room, 
deliberate, and render your verdict as to Count 1 using the revised verdict forms.” 
Defendant contends the instruction was erroneous because it “effectively 
direct[ed] a verdict for first degree murder” in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial, as well as his due process right to a fair trial.  We disagree.  
Although to direct a verdict in a criminal case is constitutionally impermissible no 
matter how strong the evidence (see People v. Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714, 
725-726), the trial court’s instruction did not violate this rule.  The jury was given 
two verdict forms when it retired to renew its deliberations.  The first form stated 
 
35
defendant was “guilty” of “MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.”  The jury 
returned this form, dated and signed by the jury foreperson.  The jury was also 
given a form to find defendant not guilty of first degree murder.  The jury returned 
this form unsigned.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the court’s instruction did 
not direct the jury to return a guilty verdict or to find the murder was in the first 
degree.  Instead, the jury was instructed to “deliberate, and render your verdict as 
to Count 1 using the revised verdict forms.”  The word “forms” is plural, 
suggesting the jury should choose between the two verdict forms, one for guilty, 
one for not guilty.  Accordingly, we reject the argument that the trial court’s 
instruction was the equivalent of a directed verdict.  To the extent defendant also 
argues his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction, we 
reject that argument as well, both because the instruction was unobjectionable and 
because counsel objected to the entire procedure of having the jury resume 
deliberations, an objection we take to include reinstructing the jury. 
In sum, we find no error in submitting to the jury the question of the degree 
of the murder two days after it initially returned its guilt phase verdict.  We 
similarly find the trial court’s instruction to the jury when submitting the question 
of degree was not erroneous. 
2.  Admission of Defendant’s Crimes Against J.S. and S.B. 
The prosecutor moved before trial to introduce testimony from J.S. and her 
granddaughter, S.B., concerning the crimes defendant committed against them in 
1983 when he broke into their apartment late at night, tied up J.S., beat and kicked 
her, and sexually molested S.B.  The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible 
on the issues of identity and intent.  Defendant now contends the admission of 
evidence of his unadjudicated 1983 crimes (see ante, at p. 9, fn. 1) violated 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).  We disagree.   
 
36
The rules governing the admissibility of evidence of other crimes are 
familiar and well settled.  Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) provides in 
pertinent part that evidence of other crimes is admissible “when relevant to prove 
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to 
commit such an act.”  “ ‘Evidence of the defendant’s commission of a crime other 
than one for which the defendant is then being tried is not admissible to show bad 
character or predisposition to criminality but it may be admitted to prove some 
material fact at issue, such as motive or identity.  (Evid. Code, § 1101.)  Because 
evidence of other crimes may be highly inflammatory, its admissibility should be 
scrutinized with great care.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  In cases in which the 
prosecution seeks to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the 
charged offense by evidence he had committed uncharged offenses, admissibility 
‘depends upon proof that the charged and uncharged offenses share distinctive 
common marks sufficient to raise an inference of identity.’ ”  (People v. Medina 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 748.)  “A somewhat lesser degree of similarity is required 
to show a common plan or scheme and still less similarity is required to show 
intent.  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403.)  On appeal, we review a 
trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 1101 for abuse of discretion.  
(People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637.)”  (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 705.) 
“As Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) recognizes, that a 
defendant previously committed a similar crime can be circumstantial evidence 
tending to prove his identity [and] intent . . . in the present crime.  Like other 
circumstantial evidence, admissibility depends on the materiality of the fact sought 
to be proved, the tendency of the prior crime to prove the material fact, and the 
existence vel non of some other rule requiring exclusion.  [Citation.]  Defendant 
 
37
placed all issues in dispute by pleading not guilty.”  (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at pp. 705-706.)  Accordingly, the identity of the person who robbed, 
raped, sodomized, and killed Ruby Reed, and that person’s intent when 
committing those crimes, were material facts. 
Defendant’s guilt of the crimes against J.S. and S.B. tends to prove these 
material facts.  “For identity to be established, the uncharged misconduct and the 
charged offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as 
to support the inference that the same person committed both acts.  [Citation.]  
‘The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as 
to be like a signature.’ ”  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.)  “The 
highly unusual and distinctive nature of both the charged and uncharged offenses 
virtually eliminates the possibility that anyone other than the defendant committed 
the charged offense.”  (People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 425.) 
As the prosecutor argued in his written points and authorities in support of 
his motion, defendant’s 1983 crimes against J.S. and S.B. were eerily similar to 
the present crimes against Ruby Reed.  In both crimes (1) the victim was attacked 
in her home, (2) the crime occurred in the late evening or early morning, (3) the 
victims included older women, (4) the assailant tied the victim’s hands behind her 
back, (5) the assailant tied the victim’s ankles together, (6) the assailant wrapped a 
towel around the victim’s head, (7) the assailant pulled up the victim’s nightgown, 
(8) the assailant beat the victim severely, (9) the assailant engaged in criminal 
sexual conduct, (10) the assailant left candy wrappers at the crime scene, (11) the 
assailant left personal property at the crime scene, (12) the assailant ransacked the 
bedroom, (13) the assailant took money, and (14) the assailant “made himself at 
home.”  
The prosecutor expanded on these similarities in oral argument at the 
hearing on the motion.  In both the 1983 crimes (against J.S. and S.B.) and the 
 
38
1987 crimes (against Ruby Reed), the assailant smoked cigarettes and left ashes at 
the crime scene.  On both occasions, the assailant also left candy wrappers around 
the premises.  In the 1983 crimes, the victim heard her assailant using her 
telephone; in the 1987 crimes, cigarette ashes left by the telephone suggested the 
perpetrator had used the telephone.  In the 1983 crimes, the assailant watched 
television while the victim lay on the floor, bound and helpless; in the 1987 crime, 
candy wrappers and ashes found near the chair in which one would sit to watch 
television suggested the perpetrator had watched television.  In both crimes, shoe 
boxes were removed from a bedroom closet, opened, and then thrown on the floor.  
In 1983, the assailant pulled victim J.S. by her mouth; in 1987, the victim’s false 
teeth were found near her body.  We might add that in both crimes the assailant 
bound the victim with materials procured at the scene; in neither did he bring rope 
with him.  In light of the distinctiveness and similarity of the characteristics the 
two sets of crimes shared, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the 
jury could legitimately infer from evidence of the 1983 crimes that the same 
person had committed the 1987 crimes. 
On the issue of intent, defendant argues J.S.’s testimony was inadmissible 
because defendant’s 1983 crimes did not involve a homicide and thus were not 
probative on whether he harbored the intent to kill when he attacked Reed four 
years later.  This contention has two answers.  First, J.S. testified that when she 
first realized defendant was in her room, defendant told her not to make any noise 
or he would kill S.B.  Similarly, S.B. testified defendant coerced her to orally 
copulate him by threatening to harm her grandmother.  This proclaimed readiness 
to kill during a burglary was probative of defendant’s intent in 1987 when he 
committed a similar break-in.  Indeed, the prosecutor made this precise point in 
closing argument.  Second, that no murder occurred during the 1983 crimes may 
have been because J.S. attempted to escape and defendant lost control of the 
 
39
victims, convincing him to flee and avoid capture.  That J.S. and S.B. survived 
their ordeal does not strongly distinguish defendant’s 1983 crimes from those 
committed in 1987 against Reed that resulted in her death.  We therefore reject 
defendant’s assertion that the evidence of the 1983 crimes gave the jury no basis 
from which to infer what he might have intended when he committed a similar 
crime in 1987. 
To the extent defendant contends his crimes against J.S. should not have 
been admitted because they were not probative of his intent to rape and sodomize 
Reed, we reject this claim as well, because, assuming error, it was harmless under 
any standard.  Even should the trial court have excluded the evidence on the issue 
of intent to commit rape and sodomy, its admission could not have been 
prejudicial because the evidence was already properly admitted on the issues of 
identity and intent to kill.  Moreover, defendant’s intent to commit rape and 
sodomy was shown by ample circumstantial evidence.  We reach the same 
conclusion with respect to the issue of intent to commit robbery and burglary. 
Defendant argues that S.B.’s testimony “was completely irrelevant to either 
identity or intent for any charged crime” because her grandmother had already 
testified and reported the basic details of the crime, and that S.B.’s testimony 
“added only the highly inflammatory detail that [defendant] asked a young girl to 
orally copulate him.”  This complaint does not so much challenge the ruling under 
Evidence Code section 1101, as assert that the evidence was subject to exclusion 
under Evidence Code section 352 because it was cumulative and more prejudicial 
than probative.  The court denied defendant’s section 352 motion to exclude S.B.’s 
testimony, and we find no abuse of discretion.  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
916, 955 [applying abuse of discretion standard].)  S.B. confirmed her 
grandmother’s account of the crime in important respects, including how the 
attack turned sexual once the victims were at defendant’s mercy, defendant’s 
 
40
willingness to hurt her grandmother, and that defendant left personal items in the 
apartment.  Moreover, S.B.’s testimony was brief, taking up just four pages of 
transcript. 
3.  Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  Defense Expert 
Consultants 
Defendant next contends his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective 
because he failed to object to testimony and argument suggesting his defense 
experts’ forensic testing had confirmed the prosecution experts’ findings and to 
the prosecutor’s reliance on that same evidence in closing argument.  The 
testimony and argument were inadmissible and subject to an objection, he claims, 
because they constituted improper comment on the exercise of a recognized 
privilege in violation of Evidence Code section 913.  In addition, he claims such 
comment was inadmissible as violative of his state and federal constitutional rights 
to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution (and state corollaries) by interfering with his 
attorney-client relationship and as violative of his federal constitutional right to 
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it tended to 
interfere with his ability to prepare and present a defense.  We conclude counsel 
was not ineffective because he in fact objected to the complained-of testimony on 
attorney-client privilege grounds, and his failure to object on other grounds was, if 
deficient, harmless because it is not reasonably probable defendant would have 
enjoyed a different result had counsel objected. 
a.  Facts 
When the prosecution’s forensic expert witnesses on fingerprint 
identification, hair analysis, and serology testified, the prosecutor asked each of 
them, largely without objection, whether the evidence they tested was made 
available to defense experts.  In each instance, the answer was affirmative.  For 
 
41
example, Deputy Sheriff McRoberts testified he processed the Frontier Hotel 
receipt for fingerprints.  The prosecutor asked him:  “Have you shown any of the 
evidence to an individual that’s been retained by [defendant] in this case?”  The 
prosecutor also asked him:  “And you provided all of those fingerprints to the 
individual that has been retained by [defendant]?”  McRoberts answered in the 
affirmative to both questions.  
During the testimony of the prosecution’s serologist, Elizabeth Kornblum, 
the following colloquy occurred: 
“Q.  [THE PROSECUTOR:]  You did indicate that certain of the items 
[tested], you keep them in a permanent state; is that correct? 
“A.  [THE WITNESS:]  That’s correct. 
“Q.  And they’re still available to be examined by anybody that the defense 
would want to have look at them; is that correct?”   
“A.  Yes, it is. 
“Q.  And then that individual or individuals, after they actually examine 
those particular exhibits could come in and either say you are crazy or you’re right 
or you’re wrong or whatever they wanted to say? 
“A.  That’s correct. 
“Q.  Now, in this particular case, these exhibits were released to a defense 
lab; is that correct? 
“A.  Yes.”  
At this point, defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevancy and 
attorney-client privilege.  The trial court immediately overruled the relevancy 
objection.  After the prosecutor explained that he was not seeking to elicit any 
evidence as to the results defense testing might have obtained, the trial court also 
denied the objection based on privilege. 
 
42
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued the evidence defendant’s 
fingerprint was left at the crime scene on the hotel receipt was “uncontradicted” 
and that, regarding the hair and blood evidence, both prosecution expert witnesses 
(Burke and Kornblum) “testified that the defense actually tested these things for 
themselves.  [¶] You didn’t hear defense experts coming in here and saying Burke 
was wrong or that Kornblum was wrong or that Hannah Woods was wrong when 
she made this fingerprint [identification].”  Later, concerning Kornblum, the 
prosecutor said:  “[T]he defense can attack her all they want—but she said all 
items were made available to a defense lab, and if the defense went through the 
trouble of putting on Dr. Ryan [a defense expert,] you know very well that if the 
results the defense had from their lab were in one iota different or unreliable, if 
there was a different result than what Liz Kornblum got, we would have heard 
what the defense lab did in this case.  You know it and I know it.  We didn’t hear 
from them.  [¶] One rational conclusion.  They got the same results as Liz 
Kornblum.”  Defense counsel did not object. 
b.  Discussion 
The standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled.  
“In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a 
reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694; People v. 
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217.)  A reviewing court will indulge in a 
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional 
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter 
of sound trial strategy.  Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing 
 
43
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.  (Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at p. 687; In re Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 1253.)  If the record on 
appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner 
challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected 
unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there 
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.  (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 264, 266.)  Otherwise, the claim is more appropriately raised in a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.”  (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211.)  
“Failure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal 
representation.”  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 424.) 
Defendant relies on four theories for his claim that his defense counsel 
should have objected to testimony and argument that suggested defense experts 
had confirmed the findings of the prosecution experts.  First, he claims the 
evidence was inadmissible (and the argument improper) because it constituted 
comment on the invocation of his attorney-client privilege in violation of Evidence 
Code section 913, subdivision (a).  That statute provides:  “If in the instant 
proceeding or on a prior occasion a privilege is or was exercised not to testify with 
respect to any matter, or to refuse to disclose or to prevent another from disclosing 
any matter, neither the presiding officer nor counsel may comment thereon, no 
presumption shall arise because of the exercise of the privilege, and the trier of 
fact may not draw any inference therefrom as to the credibility of the witness or as 
to any matter at issue in the proceeding.” 
Counsel was not ineffective on this theory because he essentially objected 
on this ground.  As noted, when the prosecutor asked serologist Kornblum whether 
she had made blood and semen samples available for testing by defense experts 
and whether such samples were in fact “released to a defense lab,” defense counsel 
objected on the ground of attorney-client privilege.  Although counsel did not cite 
 
44
Evidence Code section 913, we deem the objection sufficient to raise the issue.  
Having had his objection overruled during Kornblum’s testimony, defense counsel 
reasonably may have decided to forgo making a similar objection during the 
prosecutor’s closing argument, believing such an objection would have been futile.   
Second, defendant contends the admission of Kornblum’s testimony and the 
prosecutor’s argument violated Evidence Code section 913 in that it constituted 
comment on his invocation of the work-product privilege.  Although defense 
counsel failed to object on this ground, he was not ineffective for failing to do so 
because such evidence and argument did not constitute “comment” on the 
“exercise of a privilege.”  The comments to section 913 by the Assembly 
Committee on the Judiciary explain that the statute “deals only with comment 
upon, and the drawing of adverse inferences from, the exercise of a privilege.  
Section 913 does not purport to deal with the inferences that may be drawn from, 
or the comment that may be made upon, the evidence in the case.”  (Assem. Com. 
on Judiciary com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 913, p. 168, 
italics added.)  Information that forensic evidence was made available to the 
defense does not constitute comment on the “exercise of” the work product 
privilege. 
Evidence Code section 913 aside, however, defendant contends counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument on the ground 
that such argument violated the work-product privilege.  (People v. Coddington 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 605-606, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior 
Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)  Even assuming for argument counsel 
should have objected on this ground, counsel’s failure to object did not result in 
prejudice.  The prosecution’s expert witnesses all testified that a scientific analysis 
of blood, semen, fingerprints, footprints, and hair found at the crime scene 
implicated defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.  Defendant presented no 
 
45
evidence to dispute these conclusions, and the jury had no reason to question 
them.  In the absence of prejudice, counsel could not have been constitutionally 
ineffective, even if he should have objected on the ground of work product 
privilege.  (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1019-1020 [no need to address issue 
of deficient performance if no prejudice resulted].)   
Defendant contends his trial attorney should have objected on yet two 
additional grounds.  Defendant contends Kornblum’s testimony that forensic 
information was made available to defense experts and prosecutorial argument that 
the jury should infer that such experts would have confirmed the prosecution 
witnesses’ conclusions violated (1) defendant’s federal and state constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and corollary state provisions by 
interfering with his attorney-client relationship, and (2) his federal constitutional 
right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it 
interfered with his ability to prepare and present a defense.   
The record does not indicate why counsel failed to object on these grounds; 
perhaps counsel chose not to contest the forensic evidence vigorously so as to 
focus on the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. John Ryan, whose examination 
of the evidence led him to conclude that the murder victim died of asphyxiation 
because the gag pushed her tongue back so as to occlude her windpipe.  If the jury 
were to believe this version of events, defense counsel could argue (as he did) that 
defendant did not intend to kill the victim, thereby sparing him the death penalty.  
But even were we to assume a reasonably diligent advocate would have objected 
on these two grounds, defendant fails to persuade us that counsel’s omission 
resulted in prejudice.  (In re Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1019-1020.)  Absent the 
now challenged inference the prosecutor raised in closing argument, the jury was 
still apprised that prosecution experts believed that an analysis of the semen, 
 
46
blood, hair, fingerprints, and shoeprints all inculpated defendant, that no defense 
evidence contradicted this forensic evidence, that a hotel receipt found at the crime 
scene bore defendant’s fingerprint, that defendant behaved suspiciously at the 
hotel, and that he made inculpatory statements to Aaron Cansadillas.  There being 
no prejudice, defense counsel’s failure to object on the identified grounds was not 
constitutionally ineffective. 
4.  Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  Other Claims 
We have discussed and rejected defendant’s claim that his trial attorney was 
ineffective for failing to prevent the prosecutor from eliciting testimony and 
presenting argument concerning defendant’s expert consultants.  (See discussion, 
ante, at pp. 40-46.)  Leaving no stone unturned, defendant also contends his trial 
counsel failed in numerous instances large and small to “exercise the degree of 
skill ordinarily exercised by reasonably competent defense counsel in a capital 
trial” and that the cumulative effect of these multiple transgressions and omissions 
resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional 
rights.  We reiterate that “[f]ailure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally 
ineffective legal representation.”  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 424.)  
We address these claims seriatim. 
a.  Failure to Object or Limit Alleged Errors 
As explained ante, at pages 35-40, the trial court did not err in admitting 
J.S.’s and S.B.’s testimony concerning defendant’s crimes against them in 1983.  
Concerning their testimony, defendant contends counsel was ineffective for:  
(1) failing to distinguish, in his moving papers, “between the differing legal 
standards applicable to prior crimes evidence when used for identity and intent”; 
(2) failing to argue S.B.’s testimony was “completely irrelevant”; (3) failing to 
argue the testimony of J.S. and S.B., even if admissible, was not relevant to 
 
47
whether he harbored the intent to kill; and (4) failing to propose a modified 
version of CALJIC No. 2.50 that could have limited the damaging effect of these 
witnesses by clarifying to which of the charged crimes the jury could apply the 
other crimes evidence, and explaining the differing rationales for the admission of 
the evidence.  We disagree.  
(1) Regarding the different legal standards for admitting other crimes 
evidence for identity and intent, counsel addressed this issue in his oral 
presentation to the court, as defendant admits.  We perceive no prejudice from 
counsel’s failure to make this point in his moving papers; certainly the trial court 
did not appear to misunderstand this point, ruling separately as to identity and 
intent.  (2) As to S.B.’s testimony, we find it quite relevant, corroborating her 
grandmother’s testimony generally and cementing defendant’s intent to commit 
sexual offenses once the victims were incapacitated.  (3) The testimony of both 
J.S. and S.B. was also relevant to proving intent to kill, as defendant threatened to 
harm both victims if they did not cooperate.  His proclaimed readiness to use 
violence against these two victims was thus relevant to whether he also would use 
violence against Reed.  (4) Because we find the testimony of J.S. and S.B. was 
properly admitted, the trial court would have had no basis for modifying CALJIC 
No. 2.50. 
b.  Failure to Seek an Instruction on His Prior Prison Term 
Defendant next argues counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an 
instruction to inform the jury that he had spent four years in prison for his crimes 
against J.S. and S.B.  Such an instruction, he claims, would have “obviate[d] the 
danger the jury would punish [him] for crimes for which he had already been 
punished.”  The record is silent as to why counsel failed to seek such an 
instruction.  Counsel may have been concerned the jury could have believed 
 
48
defendant spent too little time in prison for his crimes or that he committed the 
current crime shortly after being released from prison.  Because this is not a case 
where there could be no plausible reason for counsel’s omission, we decline to 
second-guess his decision.  This claim is more appropriately presented in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 
at pp. 266-267.)   
c.  Failure to Object to Prosecutorial Error 
Defendant contends that, for a number of reasons, his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object “or otherwise cure the misconduct of the 
prosecutor.”  These contentions repeat claims raised and addressed elsewhere.  
(See post, at pp. 54-62.) 
d.  Failure to Request Jury Instructions 
Defendant contends that, at several points, his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to request “appropriate jury instructions.”  These claims repeat ones 
raised and addressed elsewhere.  (See post, at pp. 61-62, 80; ante, at p. 35.)  
e.  Failure to Request Voir Dire Prior to Penalty Phase 
Defendant next contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the 
court to question the jury following the protracted delay between the guilt and 
penalty phases of the trial, in order to determine whether any of the jurors had 
been exposed to prejudicial information outside the courtroom.  Even assuming for 
argument that counsel was remiss, defendant does not allege any juror was in fact 
exposed to such information or that such exposure compromised any juror’s 
impartiality.11  Indeed, such information is not part of this appellate record.  
                                              
11  
We note the jurors were extensively admonished by the trial court at the 
end of the guilt phase not to discuss the case, to avoid media reports of the case, 
and to inform the court if they were exposed to such information.  The jurors were 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
49
Accordingly, we reject this claim, which is more appropriately raised in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
pp. 266-267.)   
f.  Stipulation to Substitution of Jurors 
Between the guilt and penalty phases, counsel either stipulated to, or 
declined to object to, the substitution of two jurors.  Defendant contends counsel 
was ineffective for acceding to the substitutions.  We disagree.  Decisions 
concerning the composition of the jury are tactical (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 415, 480 [“the decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously 
tactical”]), and nothing in the record suggests counsel’s decision to accept the two 
substitutions falls outside the wide range of acceptable tactical decisions a defense 
attorney must make.  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 979-980.)  Indeed, 
counsel may have been only too happy to have the trial court replace two jurors 
who had just voted to convict defendant of the first degree murder and forcible 
rape and sodomy of an elderly woman. 
g.  Failure to Object to Impeachment of Cansadillas 
Aaron Cansadillas told police that, while at Cozette Gray’s home, he saw 
defendant around the time of the crimes and heard him say:  “I went in the house 
and there was somebody—there was a lady in there and I had to shut her up.”  By 
the time of trial, Cansadillas had recanted, and he testified he had lied to police.  
The prosecutor then impeached him with his prior statement, having him first 
refresh his recollection by reading a transcript of the statement and then reading 
parts of it into the record, asking Cansadillas each time whether it was an accurate 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
also cautioned that the delay between the guilt and penalty phases “may be a fairly 
long time.”  
 
50
transcription of what he had told the police.  Counsel did not object to this line of 
questioning. 
Defendant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to object, “allowing 
the prosecution repeatedly to reinforce a statement that Cansadillas admitted he 
made, but one which he acknowledged was a fabrication.”  To the extent 
defendant is arguing counsel should have objected to revealing the witness’s prior 
inconsistent statement, he is incorrect, for such evidence was properly admitted to 
impeach the witness.  (Evid. Code, § 770.)  To the extent defendant is arguing 
counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s repetition of his questioning 
technique, no prejudice resulted from this line of questioning.  (In re Cox, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at pp. 1019-1020 [no need to address issue of deficient performance if 
no prejudice resulted].) 
h.  Failure to Object to Refreshing Margaret Pemberton’s 
Recollection 
During the cross-examination of Margaret Pemberton, Ruby Reed’s 
daughter, a dispute arose over whether, on discovering her mother’s body under 
the blanket, Pemberton had moved the blanket before calling the police.  In order 
to clarify the point, defense counsel read portions of her preliminary hearing 
testimony aloud and then asked her whether she recalled the exchange.  On 
redirect, the prosecutor did the same.  Defendant now contends the witness’s prior 
testimony was not admissible and counsel was thus ineffective for reading it into 
the record.  He also claims counsel was ineffective for not objecting when the 
prosecutor read parts of the transcript into the record.  We reject the 
ineffectiveness claim, as no conceivable prejudice resulted from this questioning 
technique.  (In re Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1019-1020.) 
 
51
i.  Failure to Object when Prosecutor Referred to Crimes as 
“Burglaries” 
During the examination of several witnesses, both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor referred to some of the break-ins as “burglaries.”  Defendant now 
contends counsel was ineffective for doing so and for not objecting to the 
prosecutor’s use of the term.  He analogizes to permitting a lay witness to give 
improper opinion evidence on the legal definitions of crimes.  (People v. Torres 
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37.)  We find the use, by both sides, of the word “burglary” 
as a shorthand reference meaning a break-in or unauthorized entry was innocuous 
in this context; the jury would not have understood the attorneys to be offering 
unsolicited testimony on whether the legal elements of a burglary had been 
proved.  We also find that, even if the practice was erroneous, no conceivable 
prejudice could have flowed from it. 
j.  Failure to Object to Characterization of the “Sexual Assault 
Kit” 
During the examination of two prosecution witnesses, both defense counsel 
and the prosecutor referred to the box of envelopes, vials, swabs, and the like, used 
to collect forensic evidence, as the “sexual assault kit.”  Defendant now contends 
counsel was ineffective for using that phrase and for not objecting to the 
prosecutor’s use of it, claiming the kit merely facilitates the collection of evidence 
and does not itself prove a sexual assault occurred.  He claims the repetition of the 
phrase “reinforced the inflammatory and biased tone . . . that the prosecution 
sought to inject into the trial.”  This claim is empty.  In context, we are confident 
the jury understood the sexual assault kit was merely a group of evidence-
gathering tools and that use of the phrase “sexual assault kit” did not itself 
constitute evidence of a sexual assault.  Moreover, even if error, it was manifestly 
harmless:  Evidence showed Reed, an 87-year-old woman, was beaten and 
strangled and that she had defendant’s semen in her vagina and rectum and on her 
 
52
underwear.  There is no reasonable probability that, had the attorneys not used the 
phrase “sexual assault kit,” the jury would have reached a different result.  
k.  Failure to Object to Pemberton’s Testimony 
Margaret Pemberton, Reed’s daughter, testified that her mother would not 
have left her home in the state of disarray in which police found it.  Specifically, 
Pemberton testified her mother would not have left candy wrappers on the floor, 
unwrapped candy about the home, cigarette ashes on the counter, or jewelry and 
shoe boxes open on the floor.  Defendant contends counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to this testimony as improper lay opinion evidence.  The evidence 
showed that Pemberton, who had lived across the street from her mother for 14 
years, was close to the victim and thus qualified to testify as to her mother’s habit 
and custom of keeping a tidy home.  (Evid. Code, § 1105.)  In any event, counsel 
no doubt acted reasonably in refraining from objecting so as not to appear 
unnecessarily harsh with a sympathetic witness, especially on a topic that was not 
much in dispute. 
l.  Failure to Object to Questions About Prior Testimony 
During the redirect testimony of serologist Kornblum, the prosecutor asked 
her whether she had testified at the preliminary hearing and at the hearing on 
defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress, and whether defense counsel had asked 
her the same questions in those hearings.  She replied in the affirmative.  Later in 
the trial, the prosecutor also asked Deputy David Crisp, a handwriting expert, 
whether he had testified in a pretrial hearing.  He also answered in the affirmative.  
Defendant contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to both lines 
of questioning, arguing evidence of the witnesses’ pretrial testimony was 
irrelevant and prejudicial because it suggested their trial testimony bore 
heightened reliability due to its repetition.  We disagree.  The apparent purpose of 
 
53
these questions was to indicate that defense counsel had had sufficient time to test 
the conclusions of these experts.  In fact, the prosecutor also asked Kornblum 
whether her evidence was “still available to be examined by anybody the defense 
would want to have look at [it].”  The testimony was thus relevant, and no basis 
appears for interposing a defense objection. 
m.  Failure to Object to Testimony About Proficiency Tests 
Kornblum testified she had thrice participated in a proficiency test 
administered by the American Association of Blood Banking and had not missed a 
single question on any of the tests.  Defendant contends counsel was ineffective 
for failing to interpose a hearsay objection.  We disagree; counsel may well have 
desired to avoid having a representative of the testing agency take the stand and 
affirm Kornblum’s perfect score for the jury.   
n.  Cumulative Effect 
Finally, defendant contends the cumulative effect of counsel’s unreasonable 
omissions and transgressions rendered his trial unfair in violation of his rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
also violated his right to effective legal counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We find that, considering the 
instances individually, counsel either performed adequately or there was no 
prejudice.  We have no reason to reach a different conclusion when we consider 
these claims in the aggregate. 
5.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor was guilty of numerous instances of 
misconduct.  As we explain, we find these claims were not preserved for appeal. 
Assuming for argument they are properly before this court, we reject them. 
 
54
a.  Impeachment of Dr. Ryan 
The prosecution’s expert, Dr. Solomon Riley, testified Ruby Reed died 
from asphyxiation caused by extreme and prolonged pressure to her neck, 
probably caused by her attacker pressing his knee, forearm, or elbow on her neck 
for four to five minutes.  By contrast, defendant’s expert witness, Dr. John Ryan, 
testified that, in his opinion, the evidence, including bruising under the victim’s 
tongue, indicated the gag the attacker placed on the victim’s mouth probably 
worked its way into her mouth, pushing back her tongue, which in turn occluded 
her windpipe causing asphyxiation.  Dr. Riley expressly rejected that possibility.  
If the jury accepted Dr. Ryan’s interpretation of the evidence, defendant may not 
have intended to kill Reed. 
The prosecutor vigorously challenged Dr. Ryan on cross-examination.  For 
example, the prosecutor attempted to impugn Dr. Ryan’s experience in the field by 
having him admit he was not a board-certified pathologist and had not conducted 
an autopsy of a homicide victim since 1956.  In addition, the prosecutor elicited 
from Dr. Ryan that he was appointed by the court to assist defendant and was paid 
by the county, i.e., the taxpayers.  The prosecutor revisited this theme in closing 
argument, emphasizing that Dr. Ryan could not say how much he billed the county 
for his services in the last year and that his remuneration ultimately came from 
taxpayers.  
Defendant now contends that, with this line of cross-examination and 
closing argument, the prosecutor crossed over from vigorous yet permissible 
cross-examination to misconduct.  Because defendant did not object to any of the 
now challenged cross-examination questions or closing argument statements, 
however, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  “ ‘As a general rule a 
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a 
timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an assignment of 
 
55
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 
impropriety.’ ”  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 (Hill).)  “Because we 
do not expect the trial court to recognize and correct all possible or arguable 
misconduct on its own motion [citations], defendant bears the responsibility to 
seek an admonition if he believes the prosecutor has overstepped the bounds of 
proper comment, argument, or inquiry.”  (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 
79.) 
Even had defendant preserved this claim, we would find no misconduct.  
“ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct 
are well established.  “ ‘A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the 
federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it 
infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due 
process.” ’ ”  (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214; People v. Espinoza 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820.)  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a 
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law 
only if it involves  “ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819.) 
Defendant complains the prosecutor “impermissibly appealed to the jury’s 
emotions, misinstructed the jury as to the law, and repeatedly exceeded the 
permissible bounds of even aggressive cross-examination,” thereby depriving him 
of a fair trial.  We disagree, because the prosecutor’s challenge to Dr. Ryan’s 
professional qualifications was quite routine.  Although for a prosecutor 
intentionally to elicit inadmissible evidence is misconduct (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960), “a witness testifying as an expert may be cross-
examined to the same extent as any other witness and, in addition, may be fully 
cross-examined as to . . . his or her qualifications” (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a)).  
In challenging Dr. Ryan’s educational and professional qualifications to render a 
 
56
persuasive expert opinion, the prosecutor did no more than Evidence Code section 
721 expressly permits. 
Similarly, the prosecutor acted within the bounds of propriety during 
closing argument.  A prosecutor has wide latitude to challenge a defendant’s 
evidence, and so long as the argument is fair comment on the evidence or a 
reasonable inference drawn therefrom, it is permissible.  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 
p. 819.)  Although defendant argues that the prosecutor’s emphasis on the fact the 
county paid Dr. Ryan’s fee was impermissible, we disagree.  Evidence Code 
section 722, subdivision (b) expressly provides that the “compensation and 
expenses paid or to be paid to an expert witness by the party calling him is a 
proper subject of inquiry by any adverse party as relevant to the credibility of the 
witness and the weight of his testimony.”  (See People v. Berryman (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 1048, 1071, overruled on other grounds in Hill, supra, at p. 823, fn. 1.)  
Defense counsel remained free to argue that the prosecutor, his investigators, and 
his expert witnesses were also paid from public coffers. 
Nor did the prosecutor, by mentioning that taxpayers ultimately would pay 
Dr. Ryan’s compensation, improperly appeal to the jurors’ self-interest.  We 
recently explained that “[a]n attorney’s appeal in closing argument to the jurors’ 
self-interest is improper and thus is misconduct because such arguments tend to 
undermine the jury’s impartiality.”  (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
780, 796.)  Nothing in the prosecutor’s argument, however, implied that the jurors 
themselves would be financially responsible for Dr. Ryan’s compensation.  (Id. at 
p. 797.)  In addition, inasmuch as it is common knowledge that the trial judge, the 
prosecutor, the prosecution expert witnesses, and even appointed defense counsel 
were all paid from the public coffers, we cannot conclude the attempt to impeach 
Dr. Ryan with the information the public paid his fee played improperly on the 
jurors’ emotions. 
 
57
Finally, to the extent defendant claims the prosecutor “misinstructed the 
jury as to the law,” we note the trial court instructed the jury that “[i]f anything 
concerning the law said by the attorneys in their arguments or at any time during 
the trial conflicts with my instruction on the law, you must follow my 
instructions.”  Absent any contrary indication, we presume the jury followed this 
instruction.  (See People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 919.) 
In sum, we find defendant forfeited this claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
by failing to object on this ground at trial.  Further, even had he preserved the 
claim by objecting, we find the prosecutor did not act improperly in attempting to 
impeach Dr. Ryan’s qualifications.  Accordingly, we also reject the claim that 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object.  (See ante, at p. 48.) 
b.  Intent to Kill 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
misleading the jury during closing argument on the meaning of intent to kill.12  
For a prosecutor to misstate the applicable law is misconduct (People v. Boyette, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 435), but, as with his claim the prosecutor improperly 
attacked Dr. Ryan’s qualifications, defendant failed to object, thereby forfeiting 
the claim.  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820.)  Even had defendant preserved this 
claim, we would find no misconduct.  The prosecutor emphasized that defendant, 
after binding and gagging the victim, saw she was in severe distress but did not 
                                              
12  
When defendant killed Reed on April 24, 1987, proof of intent to kill was a 
prerequisite to sustain a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation.  (Carlos v. 
Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131.)  Carlos was later overruled on this point by 
People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, decided on October 13, 1987.  Crimes 
committed during the window period between Carlos and Anderson are controlled 
by Carlos.  (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150; see In re Baert (1988) 
205 Cal.App.3d 514.) 
 
58
come to her aid and simply watched her die.  These actions, the prosecutor argued 
to the jury, constituted intent to kill.   
Defendant strenuously argues the prosecutor incorrectly equated intent to 
kill with implied malice.  By contrast, respondent characterizes the prosecutor’s 
argument differently, contending the prosecutor “argued that [defendant] intended 
to kill Ms. Reed and that, even if all he did was stuff gags in her mouth and cover 
her with blankets, he did so with the specific intent to kill her, not just with the 
intent to increase the probability that she might die or with disregard to her 
condition.”  Thus, by his actions, defendant “was evidencing his original intent to 
kill her and not to leave until he was sure she was dead, not just walking away and 
manifesting a disregard for her plight.”  
We agree with respondent that the prosecutor never argued defendant could 
be found to have acted with the intent to kill merely by his failure to intervene 
coupled with his subjective indifference to the consequences of binding and 
gagging an elderly woman.  Rather, the prosecutor argued the victim’s death was 
not incidental or accidental but the predictable outcome of defendant’s course of 
conduct.  Because it was likely the victim would suffocate, argued the prosecutor, 
the jury should infer that when defendant bound, gagged, beat, raped, and 
sodomized her, he acted with the intent that she should die.  Because we find no 
prosecutorial misconduct, we also reject the claim that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to object.  (See ante, at p. 48.) 
c.  Other Claims of Misconduct 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in a number 
of other ways.  Most incidents simply involve the prosecutor’s aggressive cross-
examination, highlighting weaknesses in the defense case or attempting to 
diminish Dr. Ryan’s professional qualifications.  In one incident, while cross-
 
59
examining Dr. Ryan, the prosecutor used a piece of paper wrapped around his own 
tie to simulate the gag defendant used on the victim.  Even before defense counsel 
objected, however, the trial court indicated the prosecutor’s questioning was 
argumentative.  Although the prosecutor argued vehemently at sidebar that his 
questioning was permissible, the trial court disagreed.  We find no misconduct. 
Finally, defendant attempts to equate the prosecutor’s actions in this case to 
those in Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, arguing that “the prosecutor engaged in 
precisely the kind of deceptive and reprehensible conduct that this Court has 
previously condemned.”  We disagree; although the prosecutor here was 
aggressive and at times approached the border dividing zealous yet permissible 
advocacy from unprofessional conduct, this case is far different from Hill, where 
the prosecutor repeatedly misstated the law and the evidence, referred to facts not 
in evidence, intimidated a witness, and in general exhibited a sarcastic, rude, 
unprofessional and offensive personality.  We conclude that even if defendant had 
preserved his claims of misconduct, they are meritless.  Accordingly, we also find 
no violation of either the state or federal Constitution. 
 
60
6.  Alleged Errors Related to the Jury Instructions 
a.  Failure to Instruct on Theft 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it refused13 to instruct the 
jury on theft as a lesser included offense to robbery.  “It is well settled that the trial 
court is obligated to instruct on necessarily included offenses—even without a 
request—when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of 
the charged offense are present and there is evidence that would justify a 
conviction of such a lesser offense.”  (People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 
346, 351.)  In general, “ ‘[d]ue process requires that a lesser included offense 
instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction’ ”  
(People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 696), and the mere speculation the crime 
was less than that charged is insufficient to trigger the duty to instruct (People v. 
Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1081). 
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the evidence he committed a robbery 
was quite strong.  Deadly force obviously was applied to the victim, easily 
satisfying the force or fear requirement for robbery.  (§ 211.)  And ample evidence 
showed the intruder had taken the victim’s property.  The victim’s daughter, 
Margaret Pemberton, testified that her mother accumulated nickels and dimes in 
                                              
13  
This argument misconstrues the record, for the trial court inquired whether 
defendant was requesting an instruction on theft, but defense counsel failed to 
request such an instruction.  In any event, counsel’s acquiescence does not control 
the analysis for this claim.  When evidence substantial enough to merit the jury’s 
consideration is presented to show a crime may be less than that charged, the trial 
court must instruct on the lesser crime.  (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 
195-196 & fn. 4.)  “[N]either the prosecution nor the defense should be allowed, 
based on their trial strategy, to preclude the jury from considering guilt of a lesser 
offense included in the crime charged.”  (Id. at p. 196.)  Had defense counsel 
affirmatively requested the instruction be omitted, however, defendant would have 
forfeited the issue for appeal.  (Id. at p. 198.) 
 
61
jars in her home and all but a single dime of this collection was missing after the 
murder.  In addition, the victim kept a purse with about $20 in it, money that 
Pemberton periodically would replenish so her mother would have a ready supply 
of pocket money.  After the murder, Pemberton found the purse empty and the 
home ransacked.  Neither side presented any evidence casting doubt on 
Pemberton’s testimony.  Defendant, for example, presented a defense of simple 
denial, and neither he nor the prosecution presented evidence from which the jury 
could have inferred that he took the victim’s property but formed his larcenous 
intent only after he killed her.  (See, e.g., People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d 
at p. 351.)  Similarly, neither side presented evidence suggesting he committed the 
theft but took no part in the killing.  In other words, there was no substantial 
evidence worthy of the jury’s consideration that the crime was something less than 
robbery.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on 
the lesser included offense of theft, nor was counsel ineffective for failing to 
request a theft instruction. 
b.  Alleged Threats to Cansadillas 
As noted, ante, Aaron Cansadillas told police that defendant admitted 
breaking into a home, finding a “lady” inside, and having to “shut her up.”  
Cansadillas recanted this statement at trial and was impeached with his prior 
statement.  Cansadillas admitted defendant’s brothers had been in contact with him 
about his statement to police and that defendant’s mother told him the family did 
not like “snitches.”  He denied, however, that any threats had been made.  In 
closing argument, the prosecutor argued “there is only one rational, logical 
interpretation.  And that is that [defendant] made that [incriminating] statement” to 
Cansadillas, who reported it to the police, but then recanted when it came time to 
face defendant in the courtroom. 
 
62
Defendant contends his defense counsel should have objected to the 
prosecutor’s closing argument and requested an instruction limiting the jury’s 
consideration of evidence that suggested defendant’s family had threatened 
Cansadillas, thereby dissuading him from testifying.  “ ‘ “Generally, evidence of 
the attempt of third persons to suppress testimony is inadmissible against a 
defendant where the effort did not occur in his presence.  [Citation.]  However, if 
the defendant has authorized the attempt of the third person to suppress testimony, 
evidence of such conduct is admissible against the defendant.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 599; see People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 
200 [quoting Hannon with approval].)  Cansadillas never testified that defendant’s 
family actually had threatened him as a result of his statement to police; he merely 
said he had spoken with defendant’s brothers and that defendant’s mother had said 
their family did not like “snitches.”  Nor did the prosecutor say otherwise in his 
closing argument.  Under the circumstances, counsel’s failure to object to the 
prosecutor’s argument on this ground was reasonable. 
In any event, “[e]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears 
retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is 
therefore admissible.  [Citations.]  An explanation of the basis for the witness’s 
fear is likewise relevant to [his] credibility and is well within the discretion of the 
trial court.”  (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869.)   
Defendant also claims counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
request an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of Cansadillas’s testimony, 
but we reject the claim for the same reason:  Cansadillas never actually said he had 
been threatened as a result of his statement to police; hence, no reason existed to 
limit the jury’s consideration of his testimony. 
 
63
7.  Denial of Severance 
Counts 1 to 5 in the information charged crimes committed against Reed, 
including burglary, robbery, sexual assault, and murder.  Counts 6 to 11 in the 
information charged defendant with burglaries committed in the homes of Barry, 
Darling, Hostetler, Patchin, Lozano, and Meldrum, none of whom was personally 
injured.  Before trial, defendant moved unsuccessfully to sever the counts 
concerning the crimes against Reed from the burglary charges against these other 
victims.  Defendant now claims the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion 
by denying the motion.  We disagree. 
“An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses 
connected together in their commission, or two or more different offenses of the 
same class of crimes.  (§ 954.)  Offenses falling within this description, but 
charged in separate pleadings, may be consolidated for trial in order to promote 
judicial efficiency [citation], and a trial court’s rulings on joinder are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.”  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1074.)14  
Defendant concedes the crimes were all of the same class.  We note also the 
crimes were properly joined because they were “connected together in their 
commission”:  the break-ins all occurred around the same time, in the same way, 
and in the same general area, within “some miles” of each other.  Accordingly, 
defendant “can predicate error in denying the [severance] motion only on a clear 
showing of potential prejudice.”  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030.) 
                                              
14  
Section 954 provides in pertinent part:  “An accusatory pleading may 
charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, . . . 
or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under 
separate counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the 
interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the 
different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately 
or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.”  
 
64
Defendant argues four factors undermine confidence in the trial court’s 
denial of severance, asserting:  (1) the burglaries charged in counts 6 to 11 would 
not have been cross-admissible in a separate trial for the crimes against Reed; 
(2) certain of the charges were likely to inflame the jury against defendant; (3) the 
People joined a strong case (counts 1 through 5) to some weak cases (counts 6 to 
11) in order to increase the success of all counts; and (4) the joinder of a death-
penalty-eligible offense with noncapital crimes was prejudicial.   
Where two crimes or, as here, two sets of crimes, are tried jointly and the 
evidence of one set would not have been admissible in the trial of the other had 
they been tried separately, the potential for prejudice is increased.  This is because 
the jury in a joint trial will be exposed to additional evidence of the defendant’s 
criminal behavior, raising the possibility the jury will be swayed by the evidence 
of the defendant’s bad character.  Where evidence would have been cross-
admissible in separate trials, however, “ ‘any inference of prejudice is dispelled.’ ”  
(People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 850.)   
Here, defendant committed multiple break-ins on the same night.  Four of 
the break-ins occurred in the same trailer park, within 20 minutes of each other.  A 
fifth burglary occurred across the street on the same night, and the sixth a few 
miles away a few days later.  Police found defendant’s fingerprint at the point of 
entry of one of the burglaries.  Defendant often chose trailer parks (Reed also lived 
in a trailer) and entered each trailer in the same way, prying open window screens.  
All of the break-ins occurred during the night.  Defendant took only money, 
leaving credit cards and jewelry.  He left evidence at the crime scenes of having 
smoked cigarettes during the crime.  Faced with these circumstances, the trial 
court reasonably concluded the crimes bore sufficiently similar characteristics 
such that the evidence of the noncapital burglaries would have been cross-
admissible in a separate capital trial, and vice versa. 
 
65
Having concluded evidence of the crimes was cross-admissible, we need 
not address defendant’s other contentions concerning the trial court’s denial of his 
severance motion, for he could not have been prejudiced by the court’s denial.  We 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for 
severance. 
II.  PENALTY PHASE 
A.  Facts 
1.  Aggravating Evidence 
Mark Tate testified that on January 6, 1980, he was a deputy sheriff in 
Riverside County.  On that date, he was escorting a group of county jail inmates, 
including defendant, to a recreation yard.  He was unarmed.  Suddenly one of the 
inmates grabbed him from behind in a choke hold and held a shank to his back.  
While the inmate held Tate, defendant grabbed the keys from Tate’s belt and 
attempted to open a door to the outside.  When none of the keys fit the lock, the 
inmate holding Tate demanded the key, which Tate surrendered to defendant.  
Tate was led to the outer fence and used as a human shield.  Defendant opened the 
outer gate with the key and fled with two other inmates.  They were captured 
within two hours. 
Kenneth Webb testified that on February 24, 1980, he was a deputy sheriff 
in Riverside County working in the county jail.  On that day, while he escorted 
defendant from the showers, defendant stepped behind him and threatened to stick 
him with a sharpened spoon if Webb did not surrender his keys.  Webb, unarmed, 
threw the keys and then confronted defendant, who ran and tried unsuccessfully to 
kick down a door leading to the outside.  Defendant was eventually subdued by a 
group of deputies. 
 
66
Mary Handley-Carter testified she was a custodian of records for the 
Department of Corrections and possessed documents showing defendant, under 
the name of “Mario Timbers,” was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon 
(§ 245, subd. (b)) on March 31, 1980.  On the same day, “Timbers” was also 
convicted of false imprisonment (§ 236).  Andrew Lee, a fingerprint technician, 
testified he rolled defendant’s fingerprints the day of testimony and they matched 
those of “Mario Timbers.”   
The parties stipulated to allow the jury to consider the testimony of J.S. and 
S.B. as aggravating evidence.  
2.  Mitigating Evidence 
Defendant’s sister (Marie Debra Smith), his aunt (Geneva Henderson), and 
his mother (Aurora Gray) all testified for defendant and provided family 
background information in mitigation.  They all told essentially the same story:  
Defendant came from a large family and was a loving, caring child who helped 
people when he was young.  Smith married when defendant was young and moved 
out of the family home, which upset defendant.  Around this time, defendant was 
stabbed when he tried to protect someone.   
When defendant was about 13 years old, the family moved to a housing 
project called Nickerson Gardens, and defendant changed and became quieter.  
Henderson thought he probably fell in with the wrong crowd.  He began sniffing 
glue, and his personality changed.  He did not have a good role model because his 
father moved out of the house when he was a young child.  Both Henderson and 
Smith testified that they loved defendant very much, though both admitted they 
did not know the circumstances of defendant’s crimes.   
Defendant’s mother testified that when she began having personal 
problems, defendant slept in her living room to calm her fears.  He also gave her 
 
67
money for food and rent.  She admitted he had been incarcerated for most of his 
life since the age of 16. 
B.  Discussion 
1.  Denial of a Continuance 
Near the end of the extended delay following the guilt phase occasioned by 
the writ proceedings in the Court of Appeal and this court, the parties gathered in 
the trial court on November 2, 1989, to set a date for the commencement of the 
penalty phase.  By that time, this court had transferred the writ matter back to the 
appellate court, which had ruled in the People’s favor.  (Defendant petitioned for 
review on November 8, six days after the hearing, and this court denied the 
petition on January 4, 1990.)  Both sides agreed to the trial court’s proposal to put 
the case over to January 29, 1990.  The court ordered the parties to return on that 
day, adding: “That looks like that is a real good day and [the case will] probably 
go then.” 
On January 26, defense counsel filed a motion for a continuance with the 
trial court.  When the parties and the jury reassembled in court on January 29, 
1990, defense counsel explained that he desired a one-week continuance because 
he was trailing in a double homicide case and had some problems with some 
witnesses he expected to call at the penalty phase.  The prosecutor responded:  “I 
have witnesses on call today because I subpoenaed them.  [Defense counsel] could 
have done the same thing.”  The trial court held an in camera hearing, in which 
defense counsel explained that he expected to call defendant’s mother, Aurora 
Gray, and his sister, Marie Debra Smith.  Mrs. Gray had moved during the prior 
six weeks, and counsel had not yet attempted to contact her.  Smith had been out 
of town the prior week.  Counsel had not subpoenaed either witness.  
 
68
Back in open court, the trial court heard argument from the attorneys.  
Defense counsel averred that he was not prepared to proceed because he had been 
preparing for another murder trial.  The prosecutor vehemently objected to any 
delay, arguing that defense counsel long knew of the January 29 date and that he 
simply was trying to delay the penalty phase, as evidenced by his last minute 
request for a stay in federal court.  The prosecutor also noted that he, too, was 
simultaneously working on another case, as well as presently participating in a 
preliminary hearing involving multiple defendants and witnesses from Italy and 
New York.  Understanding from the court’s earlier pronouncements that 
defendant’s penalty phase would begin on January 29, however, he had made 
arrangements to be able to proceed in defendant’s case.   
The trial court denied the continuance.  The prosecutor then announced that 
after presentation of the People’s case, he would not oppose a short continuance 
should defense counsel need one to secure the presence of his witnesses.  
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion for a continuance.  “The determination of whether a continuance should be 
granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, although that discretion 
may not be exercised so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare.”  (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646.)  
Applying this standard, we find no abuse of discretion.  Defense counsel had many 
months to prepare for the penalty phase and was specifically on notice as of the 
November 2, 1989, hearing that the penalty phase would most probably begin on 
January 29, 1990.  Counsel made no complaint of this schedule until shortly 
before the January 29 hearing, and his failure to subpoena family members, 
coupled with the fact that both defendant’s sister and mother testified on 
January 30, speaks loudly in favor of the trial court’s exercise of discretion.  We 
reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Fontana (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 326, 333, 
 
69
a case in which an appellate court found a trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied a continuance despite defense counsel’s assertion that he was not prepared 
to proceed.  Although counsel here also claimed he was unprepared to proceed, the 
trial court reasonably concluded that, given the many months counsel had to 
prepare and the number and nature of his anticipated witnesses, counsel’s 
assessment of the state of his readiness was exaggerated and a continuance was 
not necessary. 
Having found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we also find 
defendant fails to demonstrate that the denial of a continuance rendered his 
attorney’s assistance constitutionally ineffective.  As in People v. Sakarias, “[t]he 
record demonstrates neither that counsel performed below the standard of a 
reasonably competent attorney in arguing the . . . motions, nor that the single 
additional step defendant asserts should have been taken was reasonably likely to 
affect the result.”  (People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 647.)  We likewise 
reject defendant’s claim that the denial of a continuance violated his federal 
constitutional rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  
2.  Delay Between Guilt and Penalty Phase 
The jury returned its verdict of first degree murder on February 24, 1989.  
The jury was then warned that the commencement of the penalty phase might be 
delayed.  The trial court admonished the jurors not to discuss the case with 
anyone, not to speculate on the reason for the delay, to avoid media accounts, and 
to inform the court if any of them were exposed to such accounts.  The court also 
indicated that if the delay was lengthy, one of the alternates might end up on the 
jury.  While the Court of Appeal and this court were considering defendant’s writ 
application in the months following the guilty verdict, the jury returned to court 
 
70
several more times, each time being told of further delays and being 
readmonished.  The writ proceedings finally concluded, and the penalty phase 
commenced on the afternoon of January 29, 1990, 338 days after the end of the 
guilt phase.   
Defendant contends this 338-day hiatus between the guilt and penalty 
phases of his trial violated his constitutional rights and requires reversal of the 
penalty judgment.  We disagree.  At the threshold, we note defendant did not 
object to the delay, which was, in fact, instigated at his behest inasmuch as he filed 
a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition with the Court of Appeal, and that 
court first issued a stay and then ruled initially in his favor.  When asked on 
April 17, 1989, whether the court should put the case over until September, 
defense counsel replied:  “I think that is a good idea.”  Counsel’s failure to object 
in any way, and indeed his responsibility for instigating the delay, preclude raising 
the issue on appeal.  (See People v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778, 791-794 
[failure to object to break in jury deliberations forfeits claim for appeal]; People v. 
Harris (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 76, 83 [same].) 
But even were we to assume that defendant had properly preserved the 
issue for review, we would reject it on the merits.  In arguing the delay requires 
reversal, defendant relies heavily on United States v. Hay (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 
1233 (Hay) and People v. Santamaria (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 269 (Santamaria), 
but both cases are distinguishable.  In Hay, the defendant was prosecuted for mail 
fraud.  The trial took longer than expected, and some jurors informed the trial 
judge that the trial might overlap with their planned summer vacations.  The trial 
court accommodated these jurors by continuing the case, at the close of evidence, 
for 48 days over the summer.  Significantly, the defendant moved unsuccessfully 
for a mistrial, thereby preserving the issue for appeal.  (Hay, supra, at p. 1235.)  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding the district 
 
71
court had erred by continuing the trial for such a lengthy period.  The federal 
appellate court explained that, by the time the district court granted the 
continuance, the trial was nearly over, and the parties had stipulated to proceeding 
with 11 jurors if necessary.  Moreover, the Hay court opined:  “[W]e have never 
approved a jury separation even close to forty-eight days in a criminal case” 
(ibid.), terming the length of the delay “unprecedented” (id. at p. 1236). 
We are, of course, not bound by the decisions of lower federal courts 
(People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431), but in any event we find Hay differs 
from the instant case in important respects.  First and foremost, the defendant in 
Hay preserved the issue by moving for a mistrial because of the delay, whereas 
defendant here not only failed to object, but actively sought the delay by filing a 
writ petition that led to the stay of trial.  In Hay, moreover, the delay occurred 
between the presentation of evidence and submission of the case to the jury for 
deliberations.  As the Hay court explained:  “[T]he jury could not be expected to 
adjourn this late in the case for a month and a half without forgetting any of the 
relevant evidence.”  (Hay, supra, 122 F.3d at p. 1236.)  The delay in the instant 
case, by contrast, came between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; the jury 
had already returned a guilt verdict but had not yet heard any penalty phase 
evidence.  Although a trial of a capital offense is a unitary one with two parts 
(People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 67), as defendant emphasizes, we 
nevertheless find Hay distinguishable because it presents a much more egregious 
situation:  the jury in that case had just been presented with the evidence on which 
it would deliberate when the district court abruptly continued the case for more 
than a month, whereas in defendant’s case the jury’s penalty decision would turn 
largely on evidence the jury had not yet heard or for which the jury had already 
rendered a verdict.   
 
72
Although the presentation of penalty phase evidence had not yet begun, 
defendant argues the jury, when determining the appropriate penalty, could 
properly consider evidence from the guilt phase.  Thus, the jury was properly 
instructed to consider both the circumstances of the offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)) 
and the evidence presented in the “entire trial.”  If the jury in Hay, supra, 122 F.3d 
1233, could not be expected to recall evidence given 48 days previously, 
defendant argues, the jury here could not be expected to recall evidence presented 
even further in the past, some of which was over one year old. 
We acknowledge the possibility the long delay in this case may have 
caused jurors to forget details of the evidence produced at the guilt phase.  But that 
result is an inevitable consequence of defendant’s midtrial pursuit of appellate 
relief.  He cannot have it both ways.  He sought appellate court intervention 
midway through his trial, as was his legal right.  Surely the delay inherent in 
pursuing that course cannot now become the basis for reversing the judgment.  In 
any event, any concern we have that the jury may have forgotten evidence 
presented in the guilt phase is ameliorated by (1) the fact the jury had already 
deliberated on the question of guilt and rendered a verdict, necessarily having 
reviewed the evidence in detail at that time, and (2) the trial court’s offer to read 
back any testimony the jury wished to hear. 
Defendant also relies on Santamaria, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 269, but we 
find that case unpersuasive.  In one sense, Santamaria presents an even more 
egregious case than in Hay, for the trial court in Santamaria continued the case for 
11 days in the middle of jury deliberations, apparently to accommodate the trial 
judge’s schedule.  (Santamaria, supra, at pp. 274-275.)  To be sure, the 
Santamaria court emphasized the risk such delay could engender, from faded 
 
73
memories to juror contamination from outside sources.15  But in deciding to 
reverse the conviction, the Santamaria court also stressed the absence of good 
cause for the delay:  “The record in the present case discloses no administrative 
duties, congested calendar, or any other exceptional circumstances to explain the 
continuance; instead, the record indicates only that the judge was to be ‘away,’ 
and that at least two of the days involved were holidays.  If there was any 
established necessity for the delay, it is not apparent from this record.”  (Id. at 
p. 277.) 
In deciding to reverse, the Santamaria court also relied on the availability 
of alternatives.  “Another factor influencing our assessment of the court’s action is 
the existence of an alternative to suspending deliberations.  The trial court here 
might have utilized the procedure set forth in section 1053, which authorizes the 
substitution of one judge for another under certain circumstances in criminal cases.  
[Citations.]  Although the prosecutor suggested a substituted judge and the record 
before us indicates that appellant did not object to the suggestion, the record is 
absolutely silent about the court’s reasons for rejecting the section 1053 
procedure.”  (Santamaria, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 278, fn. omitted.) 
                                              
15  
Thus, the court explained:  “A long adjournment of deliberations risks 
prejudice to the defendant both from the possibility that jurors might discuss the 
case with outsiders at this critical point in the proceedings, and from the possibility 
that their recollections of the evidence, the arguments, and the court’s instructions 
may become dulled or confused.  [Citations.]  Obviously, the longer the 
separation, the greater the risk.  A long adjournment of deliberations also disrupts 
the very process and pattern of the jury’s orderly examination of the evidence.  
The People cite no case in which an interruption of jury deliberations of such 
length has been countenanced in a criminal case, and our own independent 
research has not uncovered any similar case.”  (Santamaria, supra, 229 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 277-278.) 
 
74
Although the delay in the instant case was much longer than in Santamaria, 
it occurred at a natural break in the trial, between the guilt and penalty phases, and 
not in the middle of deliberations.  Moreover, unlike in Santamaria, where the trial 
court lacked good cause for the delay and a viable alternative existed, the trial 
court here had ample cause for the delay and no alternative:  an appellate court had 
stayed the trial.  The trial court had no choice but to obey the stay order.  Under 
the circumstances, we find Santamaria distinguishable and thus not persuasive 
here. 
Defendant contends the potential for juror exposure to prejudicial 
information during the long delay was intolerable and requires reversal.  
Defendant does not conclude any juror actually received extrajudicial information, 
which might constitute misconduct giving rise to a presumption of prejudice.  (See 
People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578 (lead opn. of George, C. J.).)  Instead, 
he contends that in the “media climate” that existed at the time, “it is reasonable to 
infer that the jurors in this case were exposed to tremendous improper influences 
during the extraordinary separation between the guilt phase and the penalty 
phase.”  We do not agree that, in the absence of any proof and in the face of the 
trial court’s admonitions to the jury, it is “reasonable to infer” the jury’s 
impartiality was compromised.  The possibility of some exposure to improper 
information is a concern, but the possibility of such jury contamination is 
unavoidable given that defendant himself exercised his right to seek appellate 
relief on the issue of the degree of the murder, thereby delaying the start of the 
penalty phase.   
The situation in this case is analogous to the one in Stanley, supra, 10 
Cal.4th at page 836, where the trial was delayed by more than three months 
between the guilt and penalty phases while the trial court determined the 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.  On appeal, the defendant in Stanley argued 
 
75
the length of the delay justified creation of a rule raising a presumption that the 
jurors were exposed to improper information that undermined the jury impartiality 
to which he constitutionally was entitled.  We declined to create such a rule, 
explaining:  “During the trial, the trial court admonished the jurors each evening to 
avoid discussing the case, forming or expressing any opinion on it, or reading or 
listening to anything connected with the case that might appear in the news media.  
Just before the hiatus, the court gave a particularly strong admonition. . . .  In the 
absence of any contrary showing, we presume the jurors followed the 
admonition.”  (Id. at pp. 836-837, fn. omitted.) 
As did the court in Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th 764, the trial court here 
carefully admonished the jurors not to discuss the case, to avoid improper 
influences, not to speculate about the reason for the delay, and to inform the court 
if any such improper contact occurred.16  Although defendant argues the trial court 
did not rigorously admonish the jury each time it met, sometimes failing to direct 
the jury to avoid media coverage, “ ‘[e]rror in failing to give the required 
                                              
16  
For example, on September 18, 1989, the trial court admonished the jury:  
“I have to give you [an] admonishment.  You must decide all questions of fact 
from the evidence received in this trial and not from any other source.  You must 
not make any independent investigation of the facts or the law or consider or 
discuss facts as to which there is no evidence. 
 
“This means, for example, you must not on your own visit the scene, 
conduct experiments or consult reference works for additional information. 
 
“[You] [m]ust not discuss this case with any other person excepting a 
fellow juror and must not discuss the case with a fellow juror until the case is 
submitted to you for your decision and only then when all jurors are present in the 
jury room.  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . Now, very unlikely there be anything in the paper, but I 
never know.  If you run across anything and the headlines warn you that there is 
something about it, don’t read it.  If there is anything in the radio that comes in on 
it, turn[] it off or get away from it or the television the same.  If that happens and 
then you let us know what portion you did hear if any.”  
 
76
admonition does not require reversal unless the defendant calls the trial court’s 
attention to the omission at the time of the adjournment, or unless the defendant on 
appeal affirmatively points to prejudice resulting from the omission.’ ”  (People v. 
Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 175.)  Defendant failed to object or otherwise 
direct the court’s attention to these various omissions and thus failed to preserve 
this claim.  Were we nevertheless to address the merits of the claim, we would 
reject it.  The jury was strongly cautioned, both during the guilt phase and during 
the delay, to avoid reports of the case in the media, and both sides stipulated that 
the jury would be deemed properly admonished at every recess.  To give an 
abbreviated admonishment after first delivering a full one is permissible.  (See 
People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 565 [addressing § 1122]; People v. 
Linden (1959) 52 Cal.2d 1, 29 [same].)  Moreover, the jurors could not reasonably 
have understood that they were suddenly allowed to read about the case in the 
newspaper simply because the trial court failed on one occasion to admonish them 
not to.  Under the circumstances, the mere possibility the jury may have acquired 
or been exposed to some extrajudicial information about the case is an insufficient 
basis on which to reverse a judgment. 
Defendant also contends that, during the long hiatus in the trial, jurors 
might have changed their views about the death penalty, rendering them ineligible 
to continue to serve.  This possibility exists even in trials with no delay.  In any 
event, defendant’s assertion that one or more jurors may have altered their views 
about capital punishment during the trial delay is pure speculation and will not 
support a reversal of the judgment.  (Cf. People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
1229, 1355 [assertion that jurors, “having found defendant guilty, no longer could 
be impartial” for the penalty phase was mere speculation].)  
Defendant contends reversal is required because, when the trial resumed, 
the court failed to voir dire the jurors to determine if any of them had been 
 
77
exposed to improper influences.  But defendant did not move to voir dire the jury 
when it reconvened,17 nor did he present evidence that any juror had been exposed 
to improper influence or information.  “Voir dire is not to be reopened on 
speculation that good cause to impanel a new jury may thereby be discovered; 
rather, a showing of good cause is a prerequisite to reopening.”  (People v. Fauber 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 846.)  No reason appearing to have examined the jurors 
anew, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing sua sponte 
to do so.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1353 [“The trial court’s 
decision not to . . . re-voir dire the jury is subject to reversal only upon an abuse of 
discretion”].) 
Defendant also contends that because the trial took much longer than was 
originally promised, the jurors—finally appearing for the penalty phase after so 
many weeks—would have been “unfavorably disposed towards [defendant] since 
it was [he] who caused them to live with this criminal trial for an extended period 
of time.”  But the jury was never told the cause of the delay and was explicitly 
admonished not to speculate on the reason.  We presume that jurors understand 
and follow the court’s instructions.  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, 
fn. 17.) 
Finally, defendant argues the prejudicial effect of the delay was 
compounded by the replacement at the penalty phase of two guilt phase jurors 
with alternate jurors.  As noted ante, at page 49, defense counsel stipulated to one 
of the replacements and did not object to the other.  The alternates were subjected 
to the same admonishments as the regular jurors; in fact, the trial court warned the 
                                              
17  
Defense counsel had an opportunity to move for a renewed voir dire of the 
jury when the parties discussed whether to accept the request of certain jurors to 
be removed for reasons of hardship that arose during the delay in proceedings.   
 
78
jurors at the outset of the delay that some alternates might be called into service.  
Defendant claims the absence of the new jurors from the guilt phase deliberations 
somehow worked to his detriment, but does not explain why this is so.  His further 
complaint that the penalty phase jury was not instructed to begin deliberations 
anew is baseless:  Because the alternates were substituted in before presentation of 
the penalty phase evidence began, no such instruction was necessary.  (People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1030.) 
In summary, we conclude the long delay between the close of the guilt 
phase and the commencement of the penalty phase does not warrant reversal of the 
penalty judgment. 
3.  Failure to Instruct on Lingering Doubt 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte 
that a lingering doubt as to guilt can constitute a mitigating circumstance.  He 
acknowledges that we have held trial courts are under no obligation to so instruct a 
capital jury, even on request (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 464; People 
v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068), but insists three aspects of his trial justify a 
different result.  First, he emphasizes that defense counsel specifically relied on 
lingering doubt in his penalty phase closing argument.  Second, he contends the 
addition of two alternate jurors to the penalty phase jury heightened the need for a 
lingering doubt instruction.  Third, he argues the long delay between the guilt and 
penalty phases justifies imposing a duty on the trial court to instruct on lingering 
doubt.  
We adhere to our prior decisions on this subject and find unpersuasive 
defendant’s attempt to characterize his case as distinguishable from past cases.  
First, that defense counsel relied on a lingering doubt defense in closing 
 
79
argument18 does not undermine our prior decisions in this area.  In People v. 
Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1252, the defendant argued his “right to argue his 
possible innocence is ‘but a hollow formality’ if instructions supporting the theory 
of the defense are not given.”  We disagreed, explaining that such argument by 
defense counsel is supported by instructions on “the expanded factor (k) 
instruction.”  (Ibid.)  Defendant’s jury was so instructed:  It was told to consider, if 
applicable, “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime 
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other 
aspects of defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a 
sentence less th[a]n death whether or not related to the offense for which he is on 
trial.”  This instruction adequately informs the jury that it may consider a lingering 
doubt as to guilt (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1068); that defense 
counsel relied on a lingering doubt defense in closing argument did not create a 
duty in the trial court to give a more specific instruction on lingering doubt as a 
mitigating factor. 
Second, that two alternate jurors were substituted in for the penalty phase 
does not alter the analysis.  Although a trial court is free to instruct on lingering 
doubt in such circumstances (see People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 64-67),19 
the trial court was under no legal obligation to do so.  Significantly, the alternate 
jurors joined the jury at the commencement of the penalty phase, so no issue of 
setting aside the deliberations is raised.  The penalty phase jury, including the 
                                              
18  
Defendant overstates the case in describing lingering doubt as “one of the 
primary theories on which [his] penalty phase defense rested.” 
19  
Defendant misconstrues the holding of People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 
which—contrary to defendant’s contention—did not “recognize the necessity of 
such an instruction.”   
 
80
alternates, was properly instructed to consider “[t]he circumstances of the crime of 
which the defendant was convicted.”  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)  This instruction 
adequately permitted the jury, including the alternates, to consider lingering doubt 
as a mitigating factor. 
Third, we reject the argument that the long delay between the guilt and 
penalty phases of the trial somehow created a heightened duty in the trial court to 
instruct on lingering doubt.  Defendant argues that none of the cases cited in 
support involved such a long delay and that “the jurors . . . inevitably forgot much 
of the evidence that had been presented in the guilt phase of the trial.”  Because 
the jury was instructed to consider “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted,” we assume the jury did just that.  A pinpoint instruction 
to consider lingering doubt, if such existed in the minds of the jurors, would have 
added little to the jury’s decisionmaking.  
Defendant also contends the failure to instruct on lingering doubt violated 
various of his rights under the United States Constitution.  We disagree.  (Franklin 
v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174; People v. Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 
p. 464.)  In sum, we find the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on 
lingering doubt as a mitigating factor and further conclude counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. 
4.  Cumulative Impact of Delay and Use of Replacement Jurors 
Defendant repackages previous arguments to contend that the long delay 
between the guilt and penalty phases, the failure to voir dire the jury following the 
resumption of the trial, the replacement of two jurors who sat on the guilt phase 
jury, the mere possibility (despite the absence of any evidence) that one or more 
jurors was exposed to improper information during the delay, and the trial court’s 
failure to instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew or how otherwise to 
 
81
consider the issue of lingering doubt “combined to create a structural defect in the 
penalty phase that renders the jury decision unreliable” in violation of defendant’s 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I of the California Constitution.  Having found no 
error in any of the aforementioned aspects of the trial, we reject the assertion that 
their cumulative effect undermined defendant’s constitutional rights.  Moreover, 
the delay here—occasioned as it was by defendant’s actions—does not even 
remotely resemble the type of structural error the high court has held requires 
reversal of a judgment in the absence of prejudice.20 
5.  Factor (b):  Implied Use of Force 
At the prosecution’s request, the trial court gave CALJIC No. 8.87 (1989 
rev.) to direct the jury’s consideration of evidence of defendant’s unadjudicated21 
criminal conduct.  Thus, the jury was instructed:   
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant Mario Lewis Gray has committed the following criminal acts: 
                                              
20  
Thus, the high court has explained:  “A ‘structural’ error, we explained in 
Arizona v. Fulminante [(1991) 499 U.S. 279], is a ‘defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself,’ [citation].  We have found structural errors only in a very limited class of 
cases:  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (a total deprivation of the 
right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of an impartial trial 
judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (unlawful exclusion of grand 
jurors of defendant’s race); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right 
to self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (the right to 
a public trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (erroneous reasonable-
doubt instruction to jury).”  (Johnson v. United States (1997) 520 U.S. 461, 468-
469.) 
21  
As noted ante, at page 9, footnote 1, defendant’s acts against J.S. and S.B. 
resulted in his guilty plea to burglary only.  Charges of robbery, lewd conduct with 
a child under 14, and oral copulation with a child under 14 were then dropped.  
 
82
“One, the unlawful oral copulation by force or threat upon [S.B.] 
“Two, the assault with intent to commit rape upon [J.S.] 
“Three, the assault with intent to commit oral copulation upon [J.S.] 
“Four, the assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury upon [J.S.] 
“And, five, the robbery of [J.S.] which involve the express or implied use of 
force or violence or the threat of force and violence.22 
“Before a jury may consider any such criminal act as an aggravating 
circumstance in this case a juror must be first satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant Mario Lewis Gray did, in fact, commit such criminal act.”  
(Italics added.)  This instruction is a standard jury instruction and is unchanged to 
this day.  (See CALJIC No. 8.87 (July 2004 ed.).)   
Defendant argues this instruction (hereafter the factor (b) instruction) 
improperly directed a verdict as to an “essential element” that required a jury 
decision, to wit, whether or not his prior criminal conduct involved the express or 
implied use of force or violence.  He contends the jury should be prohibited from 
considering evidence of other crimes unless it, not the trial court, first determines 
the conduct involved force or violence, or the threat of force or violence.  Here, he 
                                              
22  
In the reporter’s transcript, the phrase (“which involve the express or 
implied use of force or violence or the threat of force and violence”) is appended 
to this sentence concerning the robbery of J.S. and could therefore be considered 
to modify this sentence only.  In the clerk’s transcript, however, the sentence is set 
out as if it modifies all five sentences that describe the crimes.  Though this latter 
interpretation was probably intended, and would be consistent with the use of the 
word “involve” in the plural form, it is nevertheless open to doubt whether the 
court’s instruction informed the jury that only the alleged robbery of J.S. involved 
force or violence, or whether all five crimes mentioned involved force or violence.  
We need not resolve this ambiguity, for, as we explain, post, the trial court did not 
err by making a preliminary determination that all five crimes involved force or 
violence. 
 
83
argues, “[t]he trial court’s instruction . . . answered that very question for the 
jurors.”  In so doing, he claims, the factor (b) instruction violated his constitutional 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution by creating what amounts to a mandatory presumption (see 
Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263).   
Respondent first contends defendant failed to preserve the constitutional 
issue because he failed to object on this ground.  If, however, defendant is correct 
that the factor (b) instruction directed a verdict on a point essential to his death 
penalty judgment, the instruction would have affected a substantial right of his, 
and section 1259 would permit him to raise the issue on appeal despite failure to 
object.  That section provides in pertinent part:  “[T]he appellate court may . . . 
review any instruction given . . . , even though no objection was made thereto in 
the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”  
(§ 1259.)  We conclude the issue is properly before this court. 
Turning to the merits, we find the factor (b) instruction did not violate 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  We recently addressed and rejected this precise 
issue:  “Defendant contends that [the factor (b)] instruction improperly told the 
jury that each listed instance of unadjudicated criminal activity actually involved 
force or violence, thus ‘removing that issue from the jury’s consideration’ and 
constituting ‘a directed verdict on an essential element of the factor (b) finding the 
jury was to make.’  We disagree. . . .  [T]he jury was provided the definition of 
each alleged crime and possible defenses and reminded as well of the 
prosecution’s burden to establish the commission of each crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  These instructions ‘properly told the jurors that they could 
consider any of the specified unadjudicated criminal acts as factors in aggravation 
only if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed the act 
or activity, and that it involved the use or attempted use or express or implied 
 
84
threat to use force or violence.’  (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 314.)  . . . 
[T]he characterization of the remaining acts as involving an express or implied use 
of force or violence, or the threat thereof, would be a matter properly decided by 
the court.  [Citation.]  ‘CALJIC No. 8.87 is not invalid for failing to submit to the 
jury the issue whether the defendant’s acts involved the use, attempted use, or 
threat of force or violence.’ ”  (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 793, 
quoting People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720.) 
Even if the factor (b) instruction was erroneous, there is no reasonable 
possibility the error resulted in prejudice.  Defendant did not challenge or 
undermine the testimony of J.S. or S.B., introduced no evidence suggesting that in 
the offenses against them he acted without using force or violence, and stipulated 
to permitting the jury to consider their testimony at the penalty phase.  Any error 
was harmless under any standard. 
6.  Challenges to the Death Penalty Law 
Defendant next raises a number of state and federal constitutional 
challenges to the state’s capital sentencing scheme.  We have rejected these 
contentions previously, and defendant does not convince us to revisit those prior 
decisions.  Thus, the penalty judgment is not unreliable, invalid, or 
unconstitutional because of: 
(a)  The jury’s consideration of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct.  
(People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)   
(b)  The failure to instruct the jury it must be unanimous in finding 
aggravating factors present.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.)   
(c)  The failure to instruct the jury it must find aggravating factors true 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 465.) 
 
85
(d)  The failure to delete inapplicable factors.  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 342, 439-440.) 
(e)  The use of the phrase “whether or not” in factors (d) through (h) and (j) 
of section 190.3.  (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079.) 
(f)  The failure to instruct the jury that some factors were mitigating only.  
(People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1123.) 
(g)  The failure to instruct the jury on the burden of proof at the penalty 
phase.  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 641-642.) 
(h)  The failure to require the jury to return explicit findings.  (People v. 
Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 656.) 
(i)  The prosecutor’s discretion to decide whether or not to charge a murder 
as a capital crime.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
(j)  The failure to require “comparative appellate review,” what we 
normally call intercase proportionality review.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
(k)  The failure of the law meaningfully to narrow the class of offenders 
eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 992.)23 
(l)  The failure to instruct on the presumption of life over death.  (People v. 
Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 440.) 
                                              
23  
Defendant argues the ballot arguments in favor of Proposition 7, which 
became the 1978 death penalty law, suggested the proposed new capital 
punishment law would make “every murderer” eligible for the death penalty, 
thereby demonstrating that the framers of the 1978 death penalty law did not 
expect the law to satisfy the constitutionally required narrowing function.  He 
contends we have never addressed the merits of this particular claim.  But “it is 
clear that the argument was merely hyperbole” (Domino v. Superior Court (1982) 
129 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1010) or “political rhetoric” (Carlos v. Superior Court, 
supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 143, fn. 11, overruled on another ground in People v. 
Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104). 
 
86
(m)  The use of a unitary list of sentencing factors “without designation of 
mitigation or aggravation.”  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466.) 
(n)  The use of “vague” and “unclear” sentencing factors.  (People v. 
Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 439 [rejecting claim that sentencing factors are 
“vague”]; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 522 [rejecting claim that 
sentencing factors are “unclear”].) 
(o)  The use of lethal injection as the means of execution.  (People v. 
Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 406 [lethal injection is not cruel and unusual 
punishment].) 
(p)  The delay between his conviction and decision on appeal.  (People v. 
Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 406.) 
We also find Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny 
(see Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584) are inapplicable to California’s capital 
sentencing scheme.  (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 595.) 
7.  Cumulative Effect of Alleged Errors 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the alleged errors by the trial 
court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel demonstrates he was denied his 
constitutional rights, requiring we reverse the penalty judgment.  Having found no 
errors, we reject this claim as well. 
 
87
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1 
C O P Y  
 
 
PEOPLE v. GRAY (MARIO LEWIS) 
 
S014664 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
I concur with the majority and have also signed Justice Chin’s concurring 
opinion.  To the extent that People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, which I 
authored, suggests that the work-product rule would bar a prosecutor from 
commenting on the defendant’s failure to call defense experts who had examined 
forensic evidence relevant to the case, it merits reexamination.  (See United States 
v. Grammer (9th Cir. 1975) 513 F.2d 673, 676.)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J.      
 
1 
C O P Y  
 
 
PEOPLE v. GRAY (MARIO LEWIS) 
 
S014664 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
I concur, but I would have preferred the majority explore the question 
whether one aspect of our decision in People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 
605-606, should be reconsidered.  Coddington suggested that the work product 
privilege (see Code Civ. Proc., former § 2018) would preclude a prosecutor from 
even arguing that the defendant’s failure to call defense experts who had 
examined forensic evidence at the crime scene logically indicated they had 
nothing helpful to contribute.   
The majority in the present case, without questioning Coddington’s 
analysis, conclude that even if defense counsel should have raised the work 
product objection, no prejudice ensued in light of the strong evidence of 
defendant’s guilt.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 44-45.)  I joined the majority in 
Coddington, but now I wonder whether its work product analysis was flawed, 
being directly inconsistent with the general rule that the prosecutor may comment 
on the defense’s failure to call a retained expert or other logical witness to rebut 
the People’s case.  (See People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 552-553 [jury 
could consider failure of retained defense expert to testify]; People v. Wash (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 215, 262-263 [prosecutor properly commented on defense failure to call 
expert psychiatric testimony to support claim of suicidal depression during 
defendant’s confession].)   
 
2 
I see nothing in the prosecutor’s argument in either Coddington or the 
present case that in any way invaded or infringed the work product or privacy of 
the defense team.  Indeed, it seems quite reasonable and legitimate for the 
prosecutor to observe that although all the forensic evidence linking defendant to 
the crimes was passed on to defense experts, none of them was called to contradict 
the prosecution experts.  In some future case, we should consider disapproving 
Coddington on this point.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gray 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S014664 
Date Filed: August 25, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert C. Gustaveson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mark A. Borenstein, under appointment by the Supreme Court; Tuttle & Taylor, John R. Dent, Jeffrey S. 
Karr; Overland & Borenstein and Julie M. Ruhlen for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Marc E. Turchin and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, 
John R. Gorey, Susan D. Martynec, Susan L. Frierson, Keith H. Borjon and Robert David Breton, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark A. Borenstein 
Overland & Borenstein 
6060 Center Drive, 7th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90045 
(310) 215-6580 
 
Robert David Breton 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2279