Case Title: WILKS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-51

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILKS v. STATE2002 WY 10049 P.3d 975Case Number: 01-51Decided: 07/03/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

RYAN 
LEE WILKS, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

(Appeal 
Converted to Petition for Writ of Review)

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel  

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument
  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Ryan Wilks of second-degree murder for the shooting death of a Pizza Hut 
delivery woman.  This case comes 
before us as a writ of review1 of Mr. Wilks' judgment and 
sentence.  He claims multiple 
evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, insufficient evidence, and an 
excessive sentence.  Finding either 
no error or harmless error in connection with his trial and sentence, we 
affirm.

 

 

 

[¶2]      Mr. Wilks 
presents these issues for our review:

 

I.  Did 
the trial court err in allowing victim impact testimony and victim impact 
argument from the prosecution?

 

            
II.  Did the trial court err in permitting improper, irrelevant 
and prejudicial character evidence concerning [Mr. Wilks]?

 

            
III.  Did the trial court err in permitting speculative 
evidence from a layperson that [Mr. Wilks] was not intoxicated shortly before 
the death of the victim?

 

            
IV.  Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument?

 

            
V.  Was there insufficient evidence to convict [Mr. Wilks] of 
murder in the second degree?

 

            
VI.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing 
[Mr. Wilks] to 70 years to life in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary?

 

The 
State of Wyoming phrases the issues as:

 

            
I.  Does the record in [Mr. Wilks'] case contain plain error 
relating to victim impact testimony or argument?

 

            
II.  Was any error arising from the district court's 
evidentiary rulings harmless?

 

            
III.  Did the district court properly admit lay testimony that 
[Mr. Wilks] was not intoxicated shortly before he killed his 
victim?

 

            
IV.  Does the record in [Mr. Wilks'] case contain prosecutorial 
misconduct amounting to plain error?

 

            
V.  Does the record in [Mr. Wilks'] case contain sufficient 
evidence to sustain [his] conviction?

 

            
VI.  Did the district court abuse its discretion at sentencing, 
where [Mr. Wilks'] sentence was within the statutory 
limits?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On January 5, 
2000, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Mr. Wilks ordered a pizza from Pizza Hut. The 
victim delivered the pizza to his residence.  Pizza Hut employees became concerned 
when the victim failed to return from the delivery.  Two co-employees went to search for her, 
and, upon arrival at the delivery residence, they observed her car with its 
engine running.  The victim was 
lying in a pool of blood next to her pizza delivery bag clutching $13 in her 
hand.  A loaded .38 caliber gun was 
lying on the floor in Mr. Wilks' kitchen.  
A pathologist testified that the victim died from a single, very 
close-range gunshot wound in the right cheek.  Mr. Wilks was apprehended at his 
father's home and arrested the following day.

            

[¶4]      Mr. Wilks did not 
testify at trial.  However, even 
though the trial court suppressed his statement given to the police, he 
voluntarily introduced the statement into evidence.2  In his statement, Mr. Wilks related how 
he endured a succession of employment failures and began to spiral downward into 
depression.  He seldom left his 
apartment and admitted he drank heavily.  
He had a distant relationship with his family and had no friends.  He reached his breaking point and on 
January 5, 2000, decided to end his life.  
He claimed he drank alcohol throughout the entire day and attempted to 
buy a gun but was unwilling to withstand the required waiting period.  He took his father's gun from the family 
home and called a local hotel to inquire about a room rate.  He wanted to avoid committing suicide in 
his apartment out of respect for his landlord.  However, he could not afford a room and 
instead chose to order his last meal from Pizza Hut.

 

[¶5]      According to Mr. 
Wilks, when the victim arrived at his residence to deliver the pizza, an 
argument ensued over his forty-one-cent tip.  He admitted that, in the midst of the 
argument, he pulled out the gun and shot the victim.  He claims he "shot the wrong person" and 
actually intended to kill himself.  
He left the victim lying in front of his apartment, drove around town for 
several hours, and went to his father's home where he was ultimately 
apprehended.  

            

[¶6]      On January 7, 
2000, Mr. Wilks was charged with one count of first-degree murder. On October 
14, 2000, a jury acquitted him of first-degree murder but convicted him of the 
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The trial court 
sentenced him to serve not less than seventy years nor more than the term of his 
natural life in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  He seeks review of his judgment and 
sentence.

 

 

 

 

[¶7]      In Mr. Wilks' 
first claim of error, he asserts the trial court improperly permitted several 
instances of victim impact testimony and argument.  With one exception, Mr. Wilks failed to 
object to the challenged statements at trial.  We, therefore, review his claims under 
our three-part plain error standard:

 

First, 
the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error.  Second, the party claiming the error 
amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated.  Finally, that 
party must prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he 
has been materially prejudiced.

 

Worcester 
v. State, 2001 
WY 82, ¶7, 30 P.3d 47, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001) (citations omitted).

 

[¶8]      Wyoming law 
permits the trial court to consider oral or written victim impact statements 
prior to imposing a sentence.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 7-21-101 to -103 (LexisNexis 2001).  In this case, the allegations of 
improper victim testimony and argument arose at trial and, therefore, do not 
fall under §§ 7-21-101 through 7-21-103.  
The key inquiry on the admissibility of victim impact testimony during 
the guilt phase of a criminal trial is relevancy.  McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo. 
1993).  Victim impact testimony must 
not be permitted "unless there is a clear justification of relevance."  Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1011 
(Wyo. 1989).  Such testimony may be 
irrelevant if offered during the guilt phase of the trial as proof of the 
victim's loss; the physical, emotional, or psychological impact on the victim; 
or the effect upon the family.  Yet, 
it may be relevant if offered for another proper purpose.  Id. at 1010.  Mr. Wilks contends that either the 
testimony and argument were irrelevant or their probative value was outweighed 
by their prejudice.  

 

[¶9]      Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  
W.R.E. 401.  In criminal 
cases, "[e]vidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of 
the elements of the crime charged."  
Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo. 1980); see also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶42, 43 P.3d 80, ¶42 (Wyo. 2002); Geiger v. 
State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo. 1993).  
Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  W.R.E. 403.  For this court to conclude that the 
trial court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of W.R.E. 403, the 
appellant must demonstrate "that the evidence had little or no probative value 
and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of 
inflaming the jury."  Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 
(Wyo. 1981).  

 

[¶10]   First, Mr. Wilks challenges the 
testimony obtained from the victim's husband.  He testified that he and the victim had 
breakfast together every morning they were married and, on the day she was 
murdered, she was in a "good mood" and was "happy and normal."  The state contends this testimony was 
relevant to establish a foundation for the husband's knowledge of the victim's 
mood on the day of the murder, which in turn related to the unlikelihood that 
she would have engaged in an argument with Mr. Wilks.  The state bolsters its theory by 
directing our attention to the husband's rebuttal testimony wherein he recounted 
an incident in which the victim received a meager tip and immediately forgave 
the customer, assuming the small amount was all the customer could afford to 
give her.  We agree that, on 
rebuttal, there may have been some limited relevance to this testimony in an 
effort to impeach Mr. Wilks' assertion that the victim bickered over the tip 
amount.  However, we cannot see how 
the evidence was relevant in the prosecution's case-in-chief.  The prosecutor is not allowed to 
bootstrap relevancy in the first instance by what it subsequently offers in 
rebuttal testimony.  Although the 
victim's state of mind was not relevant when offered in the prosecution's 
case-in-chief, we cannot say the evidence was extremely inflammatory sufficient 
to warrant reversal.  

            

[¶11]   The second instance of challenged 
testimony occurred when the prosecution questioned the husband about identifying 
the victim's body.  As with several 
of his other contentions, Mr. Wilks makes no effort to explain how the 
prosecutor's question resulted in error or to point this court to any pertinent 
authority.  Upon our own independent 
review, we cannot find any plain error in its admission.  

 

[¶12]   Third, Mr. Wilks claims the trial 
court erred by permitting the introduction of a photograph of the victim taken 
while she was alive.  At trial, the 
state showed the victim's photograph to the husband and asked him to identify 
it.  Defense counsel objected 
arguing the defense was not contesting the victim's identification and the 
photograph was irrelevant and prejudicial because it tended to invoke sympathy 
for the victim.  The state argues 
the introduction of the photograph was relevant to show that the victim was 
alive before Mr. Wilks took the actions for which he was on trial.  The state's contention is wholly without 
merit.  

 

[¶13]   We have said:

 

Generally 
the question of admission of photographs is left to the reasonable discretion of 
the trial court.  However, in any 
case of which we are aware in which a photograph was deemed properly admitted it 
had some probative value.  This 
principle would seem to be applicable to the admission of any exhibit, for if 
that which is offered has no probative value there would appear to be no reason 
for its admission.

 

Reeder 
v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1973) (citations omitted); see also Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 
130 (Wyo. 1980).  We adopt the 
following test for the use of "in life" photographs of homicide 
victims:

 

Photographs 
of homicide victims taken during life should be admitted to the jury only under 
very limited circumstances:

 

Photographs of [homicide] victims [taken while alive] are 
inadmissible unless they are relevant to some material issue and their relevancy 
outweighs the danger of prejudice to the 
defendant. . . . [W]here there is no purpose in introducing 
such pictures into evidence, such admission invokes the sympathy of the jury and 
constitutes error. (FN83)[3]

 

Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363, 380 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).  Several witnesses 
testified that the victim was alive on the day of her murder.  The state, 
therefore, did not need the photograph to establish this fact.  However, an "in 
life" photograph is often relevant to establish the victim's identity.  Although Mr. Wilks 
stipulated throughout trial to causing the victim's death and her identity was 
not in dispute, in every homicide case the state must establish the identity of 
the person killed.  
State v. 
Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 610-12 (Md. 1996).  Since the prosecution has the burden of 
proving all the elements of a crime, relevant photographs do not become 
inadmissible because the defendant concedes the fact and cause of the victim's 
death.  Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Wyo. 1978).  Admission of homicide victims' "in life" 
photographs is discouraged and should be permitted under only very limited 
circumstances where their relevancy outweighs the potential to inflame the 
jury.  

 

[¶14]   Several jurisdictions that have 
considered the issue have held there is no inherent prejudice in the use of a 
victim's life photograph.  This is especially true where the jury will 
also view autopsy or crime scene photographs showing the victim, as was the case 
in this instance.  
See 
Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 716 (Pa. 1994); Broberg, 677 A.2d at 
610-12; People v. 
Thompson, 753 P.2d 37, 54 (Cal. 1988) (In Bank); People v. Hovey, 749 P.2d 776, 791-92 (Cal. 1988).  Our review of the record reveals that the 
state did not spend a great deal of time introducing and discussing the 
photograph.  
Given the evidence against Mr. Wilks, there is no reasonable possibility 
the verdict might have been more favorable to him if the error had never 
occurred.  
Therefore, the introduction of the photograph was not prejudicial to Mr. 
Wilks.  

 

[¶15]   Next, he complains that two Pizza Hut 
employees were permitted to testify that they never saw the victim alive again 
and such testimony was elicited to show the trauma caused to them.  We think this 
testimony was relevant because it tended to show the timing of the victim's 
death.  Both 
witnesses were examined as to the specific events of the evening up until the 
time they discovered her death.  The prosecutor did not explore whether the 
witnesses were traumatized by never seeing the victim again, and they did not 
elaborate.  The 
prosecutor was simply trying to establish a timeline for the events in question; 
therefore, the questioning was relevant and admissible.

 

[¶16]   Mr. Wilks additionally asserts that 
testimony elicited from the two Pizza Hut employees amounted to improper victim 
impact testimony.  
The prosecutor asked the employees whether they remained employees at 
Pizza Hut.  The 
first witness responded in the negative and explained the reason for her 
departure:  
"Because this totally scared the ba-jeebers out of me.  I couldn't -- I 
couldn't -- I couldn't function normally like I used to.  I -- it just really 
threw me into, you know -- I felt like I was going crazy, pretty much."  The second witness 
replied that she no longer worked for Pizza Hut "[b]ecause of -- of the 
incident.  I 
couldn't -- I don't want to."  We look to the analysis in Justice for guidance 
on how best to resolve this issue.  In that case, the appellant argued the court 
erred in admitting the victims' testimony as to the impact of the crime upon 
them, and we held:

 

It is clear that the testimony offered by the victims of 
this crime with respect to how it affected them in connection with their lives 
after the crime is absolutely irrelevant with respect to the issues before the 
jury.  Their 
discussion of the impact of the crime upon them could not in any way serve to 
establish any of the elements of the crime of aggravated robbery.  The only purpose 
must have been to attempt to arouse the passions of the jury.  Consequently, we are 
satisfied that the admission of such evidence is error, and the trial courts are 
cautioned not to permit such evidence to be presented unless there is a clear 
justification of relevance.  In the context of this case, however, we are 
persuaded that such evidence was harmless.  Given the other evidence against Justice, 
which the trial court aptly described as overwhelming, the admission of the 
testimony about the impact on the victims did not constitute prejudicial 
error.  

 

Justice, 775 P.2d  at 1010-11.  Accordingly, we hold the admission of the 
employees' testimony was without a clear justification of relevance and was 
calculated to arouse the passions of the jury.  However, while these individual isolated 
questions and answers may have been irrelevant and resulted in error, as a 
whole, the employees' testimony was relevant.  See Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 656 (Wyo. 1993) 
(holding certain answers by the victim amounted to irrelevant victim impact 
testimony; however, the testimony was harmless because, as a whole, it was 
clearly relevant).  
The first witness testified that she took Mr. Wilks' pizza order over the 
telephone, and the second witness arrived at the crime scene while searching for 
the victim.  
Therefore, in light of their entire testimony, the remarks by the two 
witnesses that amounted to irrelevant victim impact statements did not result in 
material prejudice to Mr. Wilks.

 

[¶17]   Finally, Mr. Wilks contends the 
prosecutor made several remarks in closing argument and rebuttal that amounted 
to impermissible victim impact remarks.  We believe his argument essentially asserts 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and we will, therefore, address those claims 
in that section of this opinion.

 

 

[¶18]   Mr. Wilks argues the prosecution 
elicited improper testimony from his former employer who testified that she 
fired him in September of 1999 because he was in a physical altercation with 
another employee.  
He maintains this evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, remote in time, 
and tended to make him look habitually violent, which is by definition an 
improper use of character evidence.  He claims the trial court additionally erred 
in admitting a former co-employee's testimony regarding occasional derogatory 
comments he made.  
The trial court allowed the testimony under W.R.E. 801(d)(2), an 
admission by a party opponent.  Again, Mr. Wilks asserts the remarks were 
irrelevant, remote in time, and prejudicial character evidence.  

 

[¶19]   We have said:

 

"Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and 
relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion."  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted).  We have described the standard of an abuse of 
discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's 
choice.  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  "In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we 
will not disturb the trial court's determination."  [Griswold v. State, 
2001 WY 14, ¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).]  The burden is on the defendant to establish 
such abuse.

 

Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo. 2001), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 1554 (2002) (some citations omitted).

 

[¶20]   Relevant evidence is defined as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401.  "Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible."  
W.R.E. 402.  
During oral arguments, the state conceded that the witnesses' testimony 
was not relevant.  
We agree that this type of evidence was not relevant to prove or disprove 
any of the elements of first-degree murder or its lesser-included offenses.  Therefore, we hold 
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the testimony into 
evidence.

 

[¶21]   We must ascertain whether the error 
affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing grounds for reversal, 
or whether it is harmless.  The harmless error standard is set out in 
W.R.A.P. 9.04:  
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court."  See also W.R.Cr.P. 
52(a).  An error 
is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been 
more favorable to the defendant had the error never occurred.  To demonstrate 
harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play."  
Johnson v. 
State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990).  Under our harmless error analysis, we must 
judge whether the jury's verdict might have been different but for the 
witnesses' testimony.  
There are circumstances in this case which tend to alleviate any unfairly 
prejudicial effect the testimony may have caused.  First, defense counsel effectively neutralized 
the suggestion that Mr. Wilks was violent or prone to vengeance on the 
cross-examination of both witnesses.  Second, Mr. Wilks failed to show how he was 
prejudiced by the alleged improper testimony.  In addition to the challenged testimony, the 
jury heard Mr. Wilks' own statement to the police wherein he admitted he shot 
the victim in the face after an argument concerning his meager tip.  Based on the entire 
record, a reasonable possibility does not exist that, in the absence of the 
witnesses' testimony, the verdict might have been more favorable to Mr. 
Wilks.  
Therefore, we find these evidentiary errors to be harmless.

 

C.        Lay 
Testimony

 

[¶22]   Whether or not Mr. Wilks was intoxicated 
at the time of the murder and, if so, to what extent he was intoxicated were 
important issues at trial.4  The state offered lay testimony concerning his 
level of intoxication.  
A Pizza Hut employee took his pizza order over the telephone and 
testified that, in her opinion, he did not sound intoxicated or exhibit any of 
the typical signs of intoxication.  She based her opinion on her prior experience 
in taking telephone orders from intoxicated customers.  Mr. Wilks complains 
the trial court erred when it improperly admitted this testimony in violation of 
W.R.E. 701.  The 
burden is on the appellant to establish the trial court's evidentiary ruling was 
an abuse of discretion.  Skinner, 2001 WY 102, ¶38.

 

[¶23]   W.R.E. 701 authorizes lay witness 
testimony under the following circumstances:

 

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony 
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful 
to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue.

 

In State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539 (1947), 
numerous lay witnesses were permitted to testify at trial that, based on their 
personal observations of the defendant, the defendant was intoxicated.  We upheld the trial 
court's admission of the opinions concluding that lay witnesses 
may testify as to a defendant's intoxication provided the witnesses state the 
facts on which they base their opinion.  186 P.2d  at 546.  Our decision was 
based on the general proposition that most adults are sufficiently experienced 
with people who have been drinking to offer an opinion as to whether a person 
is, in fact, intoxicated from alcohol based on their personal observations.  Id.; see also State v. 
Nobach, 2002 MT 91, ¶15.

 

The 
determination whether a person is intoxicated is open to the observation of all 
persons without the necessity of peculiar scientific knowledge.  The recognition of 
intoxication, however, is one of those matters which involves the statement of 
the impression or belief in the mind of the witness produced by various 
circumstances which cannot be made intelligible to the jury apart from the 
impression they create.  Since a description of the appearance of a 
person, his or her acts, gestures, looks, and other indications of a state of 
sobriety or of intoxication which make the impression on one's mind as to 
whether a person is sober or intoxicated is regarded as practically impossible, 
a witness who has had the opportunity to observe the facts forming the basis of 
his or her opinion may therefore give an opinion as to whether the person was 
intoxicated at the particular time in question.

 

31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 209 at 212-13 (1989).

 

[¶24]   Here, the witness' opinion that Mr. 
Wilks was not under the influence of alcohol was sufficiently based on her 
personal observations.  
She initially testified as to the commonly recognizable signs of 
intoxication and explained her extensive experience in taking telephone orders 
from intoxicated customers and generally being around intoxicated persons.  She then detailed 
her opportunity to observe Mr. Wilks' voice on the telephone.  He repeatedly gave 
meticulous directions to his home and did not express any confusion as to what 
type of pizza he desired, and, although he spoke quietly, the witness was able 
to satisfactorily understand him throughout the entire telephone 
conversation.  
Based on her personal observations and experience, the witness concluded 
Mr. Wilks was not intoxicated.  

 

[¶25]   Mr. Wilks argues the witness was not in 
a suitable position to determine whether he was intoxicated because she had only 
an aural perception of him.  An aural perception is one form of an 
observation, and a witness can adequately discern certain characteristics from 
such a perception.  
We will not limit the type of perceptions a witness must experience, 
especially given this court liberally construes W.R.E. 701 in favor of admitting 
opinion evidence of lay witnesses.  Rhoades v. K-Mart Corporation, 863 P.2d 626, 633 (Wyo. 
1993).  It is 
the jury's function to determine the weight to be given the evidence.  In this case, the 
witness was entitled to rely on her lay experience and form an opinion which (1) 
was rationally based on her aural perception of Mr. Wilks and (2) was helpful to 
the jury's determination of whether he was intoxicated at the time of the 
murder.  
Accordingly, we perceive no error in the admission of the witness' lay 
opinion testimony.

            
  

D.        
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

[¶26]   Mr. Wilks advances several instances of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during closing argument.  

 

Prosecutorial misconduct "has always been condemned in this 
state."  Earll v. State, 2001 
WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 
527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo. 1974)).  Whether such misconduct has been reviewed on 
the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis 
of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has focused on 
whether such error affected the accused's "substantial rights."  Id.  "The accused's right 
to a fair trial is a substantial right. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; and see, e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo. 1978)."  Id.  "Before we hold that an error has affected 
an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must 
conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, 
in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused."  Id. 

 

O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, ¶35, 45 P.3d 225, ¶35 (Wyo. 2002) (citation 
omitted).  "In 
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the court 
looks at the entire record to determine whether the defendant's case was so 
prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair 
trial."  Burton v. State, 
2002 WY 71, ¶11, 46 P.3d 309, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).  We judge the challenged comments in the 
context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the 
statements and comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial.  Id.  The burden of 
establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the 
issue.  The 
plain error standard of review set out in our discussion of the first issue 
applies here as well given the defense did not object to any of the challenged 
statements.  

 

[¶27]   In Trujillo v. State, 
2002 WY 51, ¶5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶5 (Wyo. 2002), this court set forth the following 
broad guidelines found in the Standards for Criminal Justice which are 
applicable to a prosecutor's arguments to a jury: 

 

(a)  The prosecutor may argue all reasonable 
inferences from evidence in the record.  It is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the 
inferences it may draw.

 

(b)  It is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.

 

(c)  The prosecutor should not use arguments 
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.

 

(d)  The prosecutor should refrain from argument 
which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by 
injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the 
controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury's 
verdict.

 

(e)  It is the responsibility of the court to 
ensure that final argument to the jury is kept within proper, accepted 
bounds.

 

I A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 at 3.87 to 
3.88 (2d ed. 1980).  
We will analyze each of Mr. Wilks' claims based upon the Standards for 
Criminal Justice.

 

[¶28]   Mr. Wilks asserts the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when he said to the jury, "Do your duty, please, and find 
the Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder."  We are required to look at this statement in 
the context it was made.  The full context of the prosecutor's statement 
is as follows:

 

Read the law.  Please follow the law.  It's all there for 
you.  I don't 
want you to twist it, I don't want you to turn it.  Just read it as it 
is and apply the facts to the law.

 

There is no triumph greater that the ascertainment of the 
truth.  That's 
your job.  Do 
your duty, please, and find the Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder.

 

"Generally, an exhortation to the jury to do the right 
thing,' to do your job,' or to do your duty' is error if it impl[ies] that, 
in order to do so, it can only reach a certain verdict, regardless of its duty 
to weigh the evidence and follow the court's instructions on the law.'"  Jackson v. State, 
791 So. 2d 979, 1029 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 934 (2001) (quoting Arthur v. State, 575 So. 2d 1165, 1185 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1990)).  Such a 
statement may also run afoul of the admonition against injecting issues broader 
than the guilt or innocence of the accused.  See Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(d), supra.  When this statement 
is read in context, it is clear the prosecutor was not telling the jury that 
fulfillment of its duty could be achieved only through a first-degree murder 
conviction.  
Rather, the prosecutor explicitly encouraged the jury to do its duty and 
ascertain the truth and to apply the evidence to the given law.  When the statement 
is reviewed in context, it is apparent there was not a transgression of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law.  

 

[¶29]   Mr. Wilks' second allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct is not supported by any authority whatsoever.  He claims the 
prosecutor erred in rebuttal by telling the jury the case was "about justice for 
[the victim], and it's about justice in the larger sense, and to call what 
happened to [the victim] Manslaughter would be a disservice to both of those 
things." Without a proper plain error analysis, Mr. Wilks cannot satisfy his 
burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct.

 

[¶30]   Next, he maintains the prosecutor 
misstated the evidence by stating, "[a]t some point, [Mr. Wilks] said, I am 
going to shoot this lady in the face.'"  He claims nobody knows what occurred on the 
night in question and there is no evidence in the record to show he made such a 
calculated decision.  
While a prosecutor is not permitted to intentionally misstate the 
evidence or mislead the jury, he may reflect upon the evidence admitted at trial 
and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence.  Burton, 2002 WY 71, 
¶15.  That he 
decided at some point to shoot the victim is a reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the evidence based upon the fact that he admitted aiming the gun, pulling 
the trigger, and shooting her.  Mr. Wilks fails to establish the second prong 
of the plain error analysis.  

            

[¶31]   His next claim of error arises when the 
prosecutor discussed from where Mr. Wilks retrieved the gun used in the 
murder.  The 
prosecutor said, "He took a revolver, we don't know from where.  There was a holster 
on his bed.  He 
might have went all the way back there.  Hold on a second.  Let me get the 
money.'  He came 
back with that revolver."  He asserts the only evidence before the jury 
as to the location of the gun was introduced through his statement to the police 
when he said he kept the gun in the front of his waist the entire day.  However, the police 
did find a gun holster on his bed that fit the gun used in the murder.  The prosecutor is 
permitted to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.  See Standards for 
Criminal Justice 3-5.8(a), supra.

 

"Closing arguments are meant to be just that, arguments 
premised upon the evidence already submitted to the jury.  Prosecutors are no 
more limited in their closing than defense counsel.  They may review the 
evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based thereon.  The purpose of 
closing arguments is to allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance 
of the evidence.  
However, there are limits, not only on prosecutors, but on all 
attorneys.'"  Schmunk v. State, 
714 P.2d 724, 742 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982) 
(emphasis in original)).

 

McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 970 (Wyo. 1989).  The prosecutor was 
careful to say nobody knew where Mr. Wilks retrieved the gun from but one 
possible inference was that he retrieved it from his bed.  The comment was well 
within the latitude given prosecutors in presenting the state's case; therefore, 
we find no error.

 

[¶32]   Mr. Wilks contends prosecutorial 
misconduct arose from the following statement: "[T]he Defense wants to tell you, 
this is Manslaughter.  
Well, that's getting away with murder."  Again, Mr. Wilks did not cite any authority to 
support his assertion that this statement resulted in error.  "[A] prosecutor must 
be free to present arguments with logical force and vigor."  Standards for 
Criminal Justice 3-5.8 at 3.88 (Commentary), supra.  We conclude the 
prosecutor's statements were merely rhetorical and not improper; therefore, they 
did not amount to errorplain or otherwise.

 

[¶33]   Finally, Mr. Wilks points to the 
following remarks in the prosecutor's closing argument:

 

He watched her as she fell to the ground onto the cold 
concrete and the life ran from her face, walked past her, didn't know whether 
she was dead, whether she was going to bleed to death, whether she was going to 
freeze to death, walked right past her as blood was running out of her head when 
she was alone, and he got in his car and he drove away. Left her there 
alone.  He 
didn't know if she was dead at that time; just left her there bleeding on the 
concrete.  He 
had just shot a complete stranger, the lady delivering the pizza, had just shot 
that lady right in the face, and then walked past her and got in his car and 
drove away.

 

            
[The victim] laid there, and the pathologist told you she died, that her 
body laid there, and it passed alone.  No family or friends there to support her, 
nobody to hold her hand, and where today, where today, right now, as we speak, 
is that suicidal murderer?  Where's the guy who had the loaded gun and the 
Defense wants you to think was suicidal?  Where is he?  Right there.  Alive, well, surrounded by his family, his 
support.  He's 
right there.  
You can see him.  He's alive.  [The victim] is in the ground.  She was alive.  She was alive.  He stole her 
life.

 

            
He's suicidal.  
He had a loaded gun in his hands.  She was this, and now she's this.  And he's sitting 
there surrounded by his family.  You'll see that photo.  I don't want to 
shove that in your face, but the officers told you her eyes were open and they 
were fixed.  The 
last thing she got to see was a stranger, a complete stranger, who she came to 
his house to deliver a pizza, who he beckoned to his house and killed.  The last thing she 
saw was the wrong side of this gun being held by that man right there.  The last thing she 
saw was him draw it right to her face and maliciously pull the trigger.  That's it.  She went to deliver 
a pizza, he murdered her, and now she's dead.  Those are facts.

 

            
. . . .

 

            
You've heard from the Defense from jury selection, opening and all the 
way throughout, this is about Ryan.  We're here about Ryan.  Well, it's not.  This is about Ryan, 
the cold-blooded murderer.  This is about Ryan who murdered [the victim], 
who ended a stranger's life and left her on the cold concrete to die.  Have mercy, 
compromise, reduce it.  
It's only a Manslaughter.  Give him a break.  Well, who's not here 
to ask for a break?  
He didn't show her any mercy.  She didn't get a chance to beg for her 
life.  She 
didn't get a chance to mount her defense.  Ryan Lee Wilks showed her no mercy.

 

            
[The victim] didn't get a chance to explain how she had some living left 
to do, how she wasn't ready to die, how she had had some bad things happen in 
her life but wanted to live on and make it better.  She didn't get to 
sit there and explain that she may have had a Christmas without a tree, that she 
may have had some bad relations with family.  She didn't get a chance to beg for that mercy, 
and he didn't give her that chance.  Not once.  Shot her dead, murdered her.  No, she didn't get 
mercy.  She was 
shot in the face by a total stranger and left alone to die.

 

            
. . . .

 

            
[The victim] didn't choose death.  By all accounts that you heard, she was 
happy.  She 
liked to get out and socialize with people.  She didn't choose to die.  That wasn't her 
choice.  He 
chose that for her.  
He chose the time, the place and the manner that she would die.  She had no 
choices.

 

The prosecution continued on rebuttal:

 

"Of death I dreamed."  Ladies and gentlemen, maybe for the Defendant 
death is some romanticized idea that we can be obsessed with in heavy [metal] 
music and poetry, and it's some romantic idea about escape from a cruel world 
where he can't hold a job and he's got a drinking problem.  For [the victim] and 
her family, death is not some romanticized dream.  It's a harsh reality that they are going to 
have to live with today and every day the rest of their lives.

 

Of death I dreamed indeed.  The Defense says this is the evidence, poetry 
and a suicide note that was never used.  It was in his pocket folded up after [the 
victim] had laid dead for hours and her blood was frozen on the sidewalk.

 

Mr. Wilks additionally posits it was error for the 
prosecutor to state the victim died "alone on that concrete."  Finally, he 
complains the prosecutor improperly talked about an "interval" of time when Mr. 
Wilks "would have had to see the horror in her eyes as she finally, in the last 
second, realized what's going on, and after seeing the horror in her eyes, he 
had to do the final act." 

 

[¶34]   Again, Mr. Wilks failed to make a 
contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's remarks.  Rather than 
providing this court with a comprehensive plain error analysis, Mr. Wilks relies 
on conclusory statements to support his claim.  As we have repeatedly stated, a prosecutor is 
permitted to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at 
trial so long as the argument is not calculated to inflame the passions or 
prejudices of the jury.  See Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(a), (c), supra.  Arguing all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence is precisely what the prosecutor did in 
this case, albeit with an element of vigorous rhetoric.  The sole case Mr. 
Wilks relies on to assert error is Justice, which we discussed previously in this 
opinion.  In Justice, we 
recognized that testimony offered by the crime victims with respect to how their 
lives were affected after the crime was absolutely irrelevant.  775 P.2d  at 
1010.  Likewise, 
the impact on an actual homicide victim prior to her death is also 
irrelevant.  
Yet, as in Justice, due to the overwhelming evidence presented 
against Mr. Wilks, we are persuaded the prosecutor's argument, in its entirety, 
did not constitute plain error.

 

E.        
Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶35]   Mr. Wilks questions the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain his second-degree murder conviction.  "When reviewing a 
sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we analyze whether a 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime were 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2000).  "Evidence is 
sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the state, that evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  
Yung v. 
State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Wyo. 1995).  "We will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury but will only determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did."  
Lane, 12 P.3d  at 1063.

 

[¶36]   For Mr. Wilks to be convicted of 
second-degree murder, the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that he purposely and maliciously killed the victim.  Section 
6-2-104.  The 
trial court gave the jury the following proper second-degree murder 
instruction:

 

INSTRUCTION NO. 19

 

            
The elements of the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, which must be 
proven, are:

 

1.  On or about the 5th day of January, 
2000

 

2.  In Sweetwater County, Wyoming

 

3.  The Defendant, RYAN LEE WILKS

 

4.  Purposely and

 

5.  Maliciously

 

6.  Killed a human being 
. . . .

 

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the defendant not guilty.

 

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

 

[¶37]   In attacking the sufficiency of the 
evidence, Mr. Wilks points to a lack of evidence that he acted purposely.  In making his 
argument, he claims the events did not transpire as he anticipated because he 
actually intended to kill himself, thus negating the required element of 
purposefulness.  
In Young v. 
State, 849 P.2d 754, 759 (Wyo. 1993), this court drew a clear distinction 
between first-degree murder and second-degree murder stating, "[T]he difference 
between first degree murder and second degree murder is the element of 
premeditation and, to commit first degree murder, the defendant must have killed 
purposely while, to commit second degree murder, the defendant is only required 
to have acted purposely."  First-degree murder is a specific intent crime 
requiring proof the defendant killed purposely and with premeditation.  849 P.2d  at 
759.  On the 
other hand, second-degree murder is a crime of general intent requiring only 
proof of acting purposely or voluntarily.  Id.  Hence, the prosecution needed to prove only 
that Mr. Wilks acted 
purposely when he shot the victim.

 

[¶38]   The evidence in this case demonstrates a 
factual basis sufficient to justify the second-degree murder conviction.  Mr. Wilks relies on 
his statement to police officers that it "[w]asn't supposed to be like 
this."  He 
contends there was nothing in his statement to prove he acted purposely.  Apparently, Mr. 
Wilks confuses killing purposely with acting purposely, the very distinction 
this court has consistently drawn between first-degree murder and second-degree 
murder.  While 
there may not have been sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Mr. 
Wilks committed an act with the intention of killing the victim, there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find he acted purposely beyond a reasonable 
doubt when he drew the gun, pointed it at the victim, and pulled the 
trigger.  

 

[¶39]   Finally, Mr. Wilks contends that, 
according to the Eagan5 rule, the jury should have accepted his 
version that he did not intend for the events to occur as they did.  "Where the rule is 
applicable, the defendant's version of a homicide must be accepted even in the 
face of a jury verdict to the contrary."  Doe v. State, 569 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Wyo. 1977).  Under the rule, an 
accused's testimony should be accepted if three conditions are fulfilled:  (1) the defendant is 
the sole witness, (2) the defendant's testimony is accepted if not improbable or 
not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, and (3) the defendant's 
credibility has not been impeached.  Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1979).  However, this court 
will not consider a claim of error based upon the Eagan rule unless 
the defendant made a request for an instruction to the trial court.  Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Wyo. 1986).  In this instance, Mr. Wilks did not make such 
a request.  
Furthermore, even Mr. Wilks' version of the events supports a conviction 
for second-degree murder because he acted purposely whether or not he intended 
to kill the victim.  
After considering this record in light of our recognized standard, we 
conclude there was ample evidence to justify Mr. Wilks' conviction for 
second-degree murder.

            

F.         
Sentencing 

 

[¶40]   Mr. Wilks contends the trial court 
abused its discretion by sentencing him to serve seventy years to life in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The punishment for a crime is within the 
legislature's province.  Hodgins v. State, 706 P.2d 655, 658 (Wyo. 1985).  Here, the 
legislature has provided for a sentence of up to life in prison for those 
convicted of second-degree murder.  See § 6-2-104.  "[W]e do not set aside a sentence if it is 
within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in the absence of a 
clear abuse of discretion."  Young v. State, 904 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1995).  Since the relevant 
statute sets a maximum term of life in prison, Mr. Wilks' sentence is within 
permissible limits.  
However, we still "maintain a window of reviewability, even when the 
trial court has imposed a legally prescribed sentence."  Smith v. State, 922 P.2d 846, 848 (Wyo. 1996).  Trial courts have broad discretion to 
determine the appropriate length of imprisonment.  We recently described the standard of an abuse 
of discretion as "reaching the question of reasonableness of the choice made by 
the trial court."  
Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  We confirmed the following definition:

 

            
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria;  it means a sound judgment exercised with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily 
or capriciously."

 

Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

[¶41]   "In assessing 
the reasonableness of the sentence, consideration is to be given to the crime 
and its circumstances and the character of the criminal."  Smith, 922 P.2d  at 
848-49.  There 
is no tangible indication that Mr. Wilks had the propensity to commit this type 
of crime either in his criminal record or in any character description of 
him.  However, 
looking to the seriousness of the crime committed, we acknowledge this was a 
horrific and violent crimeone that tragically ended a human life.  By his own account, 
he summoned the victim to his home to deliver a pizza, became upset when she 
complained about the paucity of his tip, and shot her in the face.  Although Mr. Wilks 
asks us to examine other second-degree murder sentences, we abide by our prior 
decision not to consider the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants 
except in cases where the mode of punishment is unusual or the relative length 
of a sentence to imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the 
offense.  Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Wyo. 1986).  In this case, Mr. Wilks' sentence is wholly 
consistent with the severity of the crime and its attendant circumstances.  

 

[¶42]   The trial court had the opportunity to 
examine the presentence investigation report and, at the sentencing hearing, to 
listen to evidence and argument including a detention officer's testimony, 
counsel's recommendations, victim impact statements, and Mr. Wilks' and his 
family's statements.  
Given the information presented and the gravity of the crime, we conclude 
the trial court did not act in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances and did not abuse its discretion.  Upon review, 
therefore, we will not disturb its sentencing decision.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶43]   While we recognize certain errors were 
made at trial, a complete review of the record and the issues presented assures 
us that Mr. Wilks received a fair trial and the verdict would have been 
unchanged had the errors not occurred.

 

[¶44]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1This court dismissed Mr. 
Wilks' appeal for lack of jurisdiction under W.R.A.P. 1.03 because his notice of appeal was 
not filed in the district court within the W.R.A.P. 2.01 time limits.  His case was then 
converted sua 
sponte to a petition for a writ of review, which we granted.

 

2We note the egregious violation of Mr. Wilks' constitutional 
right to counsel, which occurred at the hands of both the prosecutor's office 
and the police department. Over the course of his interview, Mr. Wilks 
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel no less than five times and 
referenced his need for counsel three more times.  Each request was blatantly ignored, the first 
of which was ignored upon the recommendation of a prosecutor.  Obviously, we 
approve the trial court's ineluctable decision to suppress the statement.

 

  3Footnote eighty-three reads in pertinent part:

 

Staggs v. State, 804 P.2d 456, 458 (Okl. Cr. 1991).  
See also 
Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 870 (Okl. Cr. 1990) (concluding that "[t]his 
Court does not encourage the use of photographs taken of victims before their 
demise and we caution prosecutors to first seek other forms of proof which are 
less prejudicial.") . . . .

 

Valdez v. 
State, 900 P.2d 363, 380 n.83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).

 

  4Mr. Wilks was charged with first-degree murder, a 
specific intent crime.  
Intoxication may negate a specific intent crime but is not a defense to a 
general intent crime.  
Streitmatter 
v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 927 (Wyo. 1999).  Ultimately, Mr. Wilks was acquitted of 
first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murdera general intent 
crime.

 

  5Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226 
(1942).