Case Title: SLOAN v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COIJRT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1989 RAND LYAL SLOAN, Defendant and Appellant , VS. STATE OF MONTANA, PI-aintiff and Respondent. APPEAJ, FROM: The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, In and for the County of Reaverhead, The Honorable Arnold H. Olsen, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Thomas A. Dooling; Dooling Lav~ Office, P.C., Dillon, Montana For Respondent: Honorable Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Paulson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas R. Scott, Beaverhead County Attorney, Dillon, Montana Calvin Erb, Esq., Deputy County Attorney, Dillon, Montana Submitted on Briefs: December 16, 1988 Decided: February 9, 1989 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. M r . Sloan was convicted by a jury o f aggravated a s s a u l t i n t h e District Court f o r t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Beaverhead County. H e was sentenced t o 15 y e a r s . M r . Sloan a p p e a l s . W e a f f i r m . The i s s u e s a r e : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s motion i n l i m i n e which requested t h a t defense counsel be r e s t r a i n e d from i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y o f t h e S t a t e ' s witness? 2 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n o t h e r e v i d e n t i a r y r u l i n g s ? During t h e l a t e a f t e r n o o n of June 7 , 1987, Les E r n s t , a 6 3 y e a r o l d sheepherder, and Glenn Hone e n t e r e d t h e Lobby Bar i n D i l l o n , Montana, t o d i s c u s s a h o r s e owned by M r . Hone which M r . E r n s t was i n t e r e s t e d i n purchasing. M r . Hone was on p a r o l e from a homicide conviction. While they w e r e stand- i n g n e a r t h e b a r t h e defendant approached them. M r . Hone t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant asked him t o buy him a d r i n k . When M r . Hone r e f u s e d , t h e defendant asked M r . E r n s t i f he would buy him a d r i n k . M r . E r n s t a l s o r e f u s e d , whereupon t h e defendant t o l d M r . E r n s t t o lend him some money and he would buy h i s own d r i n k s . When M r . E r n s t again r e f u s e d , t h e defen- d a n t h i t him, knocking him t o t h e f l o o r unconscious. M r . Hone t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant h i t M r . E r n s t a g a i n i n t h e f a c e , and t h e n " p u t t h e b o o t s t o him," o r kicked and stomped on him. Another w i t n e s s , Rod F o r t i e r , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw t h e defendant h i t M r . E r n s t f o u r o r f i v e t i m e s w i t h h i s f i s t a s M r . E r n s t l a y on t h e f l o o r unconscious. M r . E r n s t sus- t a i n e d s e r i o u s i n j u r i e s , i n c l u d i n g two f r a c t u r e s of h i s jaw, a n a s a l f r a c t u r e , f a c i a l contusions, and four broken r i b s . Did the District Court err in granting the State's motion in limine which restrained defense counsel from in- quiring into the criminal history of the State's witness? Prior to trial the State made a motion in limine to prevent defense counsel from inquiring into Glenn Hone ' s criminal history for purposes of impeachment. On the morning of trial and later in a written offer of proof, defense counsel informed the court that testimony from either Mr. Hone or the defendant would reveal that Mr. Hone told defen- dant that "he, Hone, would personally see to it that [defen- dant] served time in prison, because a year at the pen had done him, Hone, a lot of good." Counsel for defendant argued that this statement showed bias or motive to fabricate testi- mony, and was admissible for this purpose, although linked to the evidence of his felony conviction. The court, however, granted the State's motion, reserving the right to consider the matter at a later time. Mr. Sloan argues that the credibility of a witness can be impeached by showing motivation to fabricate under Rule 607 (a), M.R.Evid., which states, "The credibility of a wit- ness may be attacked by anv party, including the party call- ing him." Rule 607, M.R.Evid., i . s intended to preserve traditional methods of impeachment, which include impeachment by showing bias or motive to fabricate. Montana statutorily prohibits inquiry into prior crimi- nal history for impeachment purposes through Rule 609, M.R.Evid., which states: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has heen convicted of a crime is not admissible. The rationale behind this rule as explained by the Commission Comments is that impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime has low probative value in relation to credibility. The Commission Comments further state, "The Commission does not accept as valid the theory that a person's willingness to break the law can automatically be translated into willing- ness to give false testimony." This rule also avoids the highly prejudicial effect on a jury that is inherent in this type of evidence. There is a strong probability that a juror, hearing that the witness is a convicted felon, will- immediately discredit that witness' testimony. The trial mav even he turned into a "trial of the witness." Evidence of a witness' prior criminal history for im- peachment purposes is normally irrelevant to any issue at trial. It has low probative value in determining whether a witness is telling the truth. It is highly prejudicia!-. Therefore, Montana has statutorily declared it to be inadmis- sible. This exclusionary rule has been upheld by this Court. State v. Short (Mont. 1985), 702 P.2d 979, 42 St.Rep. 1026; State v. Rose (1980), 187 Mont. 74, 608 P.2d 1074. Mr. Sloan argues that his right to impeach by showing bias should override the prohibition against evidence of criminal history when, as in this case, the two rules con- flict. Alternatively, defendant argues that the court's granting of the motion in limine was overly restrictive in that defense counsel should have been allowed to elicit testimony regarding the portion of the statement which did not mention Mr. Hone's criminal history. Since the record. does not establish that defense counsel ever offered to restrict testimony on this statement to the admissible por- tion, we will not consider this argument. The statement as offered, both orally by defense counsel and later in the offer of proof, would necessarily have revealed Mr. Hone's prior criminal history. We consider only whether it was error to prohibit the entire statement. We hold that it was not. In the present case Mr. Hone's statement that he would personally see to it that the defendant served time in prison could he interpreted to show bias or motive to fabricate. Defendant contends that the exclusion of this testimonv deprived him of a fair trial by denying him the right to confront a witness as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant refers this Court to Davis v. Alaska (3.974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 3 9 L.Ed. 347. In Short, this Court previously considered the right to cross-examination in light ofthe holding in Davis. In Short we held that limiting the extent of cross-- examination on charges against a witness which were pending in another state did not violate defendant's right to con- frontation of witnesses. We stated: A witness' credibility may be attacked through cross-examination to reveal possible biases, preju- dices, or ulterior motives if they relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Davis, 415 U.S. at 315, 94 S.Ct. at 1109, Camitsch, 626 P.2d at 1254-1256. However, the extent of cross-examination on whether a witness has been accused of another or prior crime is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Carns (1959) , 136 Mont. 126, 136, 345 P.2d 735, 741; State v. Howard (1904), 30 Mont. 518, 77 P. 50; see also, Alford v. United States (1931), 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624. The extent of cross-exam- ination for these purposes is restricted because of the limited probative value in relation to credibility. Montana also considered the Davis rationale in State v. Camitsch (Mont. 1981), 626 P.2d 1250, 38 St.Rep. 563. Howev- er, in Camitsch the defendant did not seek to elicit testimo- ny at trial which would reveal prior criminal history. Camitsch is therefore dissimilar to the present case. Addi- tionally, in Rose, this Court found error in the fact that defense counsel did not object to evidence of a witness' prior criminal history. Rose, 608 P.2d at 1081. In the present case, the trial court was faced with a statutory mandate prohibiting the statement purportedly made by Mr. Hone. Mr. Sloan's asserted denial of the right of confrontation is based upon his own uncorroborated allegation that Mr. Hone made this statement. We hold that the court was well within its exercise of discretion in granting the State's motion in limine restraining Mr. Sloan from eliciting testimony which would reveal Mr. Hone's prior criminal history. Mr. Sloan also asserts that the trial judge literally endorsed Mr. Hone's testimony as Mr. Hone left the witness stand. This assertion is based on the following excerpt from the transcript: THE COURT: All right. Anything further from this witness at all? MR. ERB: No. We don't have anvthinq. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. You're excused. THE WITNESS: Thanks. All I can dc is say what I seen and that's it. THE COURT: You did good. You did good. THE WITNESS: And thank you very much. THE COTJRT: Thank you, and you're permanently excused. Mr. Sloan contends that the judge's comment, "You did good. You did good," encouraged the jury to regard Mr. Hone's testimony as "gospel." We note that a court should refrain from comments on witness credibility. Rule 614 M.R.Evid., State v. Bier (1979), 181 Mont. 27, 34, 591 P.2d 1115, 1119. However, taken in context the court's statement was not a comment on the witness' credibility. We hold that Mr. SLoan was not denied a fair trial by this comment. I1 Did the District Court err in other evidentiary rulings? Mr. Sloan contends that the District Court erred by not granting him a continuance in order that Police Chief Pat Clark could be subpoenaed and called as a witness. According to Mr. Sloan's offer of proof, Chief Clark's report to the Crime Compensation T J n i t of the Workers' Compensation Division indicated that the victim was initially receptive to the fight. The District Court did not err in denying this re- quest. Mr. Sloan's motion to compel the service of subpoeva on Chief Clark was not timely made. A request for a continu- ance is within the discretion of the trial judge, taking into consideration the diligence of the movant, S 46-13-202(3), MCA; State v. Walker (Mont. 1987), 733 P.2d 353, 44 St.Rep. 363. Additionally, Mr. Sloan was not prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. Police reports are inadmissible hearsay. Rules 802 and 803(8), M.R.Evid.; Camitsch, 626 P.2d at 1257. Chief Clark was not present during the assault; therefore his own testimony about the report would be inad- missible hearsay. We hold that the District Court did not err in refusing the continuance. Mr. Sloan next contends that it was error for the court to grant the second part of the State's motion in limine, which restrained him from calling Gloria Sutherland as a witness. Mr. Sloan's offer of proof stated that if allowed, Ms. Sutherland would have testified that she overheard a conversation in which the victim asked Mr. Sloan for money in return for dropping the charges, and also that the victim admitted that as far as he knew Mr. Sloan hit him only once. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to testimony of witnesses in his favor. State TT. Higley (Mont. 1980), 621 P.2d 1043, 1050, 37 St.Rep. 1942, 1948, citing Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed. 1019, 1023. However, it does not guarantee him the right to any and all witnesses, regardless of their competency or knowledge. Higley, 621 P.2d at 1050. Ms. Sutherland had no personal knowledge of the assault. Her testimony would have been of a collateral matter of limited probative value. Furthermore, any testimony regarding the victim's statement that as far as he knew, Mr. Sloan hit him only once, would be repetitious since it would be consistent with the victim's own testimony at trial. We hold that there was no error in excluding this testimony. Mr. Sloan next contends that the trial court should have allowed Ralph Merry to testify that after the assault Mr. Ernst attempted on more than ten occasions to solicit Mr. Merry's aid in getting money from Mr. Sloan, even offering to give Mr. Merry a "cut" of the money. Defendant contends that this testimony might serve to "impugn Ernst' s motivations. I' This testimony is not relevant to the assault incident. It has limited probative value regarding Mr. Ernst's credibili- ty. It was within the discretion o f the District Court to limit Mr. Merry's testimony. Finally, Mr. Sloan contends that Loren Rafn's testimony was improperly limited. Mr. Sloan made no offer of proof concerning this testimony, nor is there any indication in the record that his testimony was improperly limited. We affirm the District Court's rulings on this testimony. The judqment and sentence are affirmed. Justlces