Case Title: Scanlon v. Schrinar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Scanlon v. Schrinar1988 WY 98759 P.2d 1243Case Number: 87-145Decided: 08/17/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MOIRA Q. SCANLON, 
PETITIONER,

v.

HOWARD M. SCHRINAR, 
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLICLANDS, AND AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, 
RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review from 
the District Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Thomas E. 
Cahill, Cheyenne, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Clinton D. Beaver, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent Howard M. Schrinar, Com'r of 
Public Lands.

Jack D. Palma, 
II, Edward W. Harris, and William L. Combs of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, for respondent Amoco Production 
Co.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, JJ., KAIL, 
District Judge, and JOFFE, Retired District Judge.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Moira Q. Scanlon 
petitioned the district court for judicial review of the decision of the 
Commissioner of Public Lands to terminate her oil and gas lease. The case was 
then certified to this Court, and we are presented with the following issues by 
Mrs. Scanlon:

I. WHETHER MRS. SCANLON'S 
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO REMOVE SUBSURFACE RESOURCES IS A PROPERTY 
RIGHT.

II. WHETHER THE 
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC LANDS MUST ABIDE BY HIS OWN REGULATIONS IN DEALING WITH 
MRS. SCANLON'S EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO REMOVE SUBSURFACE 
RESOURCES.

III. WHETHER A "MESSAGE" 
ON A FORM SOLICITING A "REPLY" CONSTITUTES A "FINAL DECISION OF AN AGENCY IN A 
CONTESTED CASE."

It is not 
necessary to address these issues because there are determinative jurisdictional 
defects.

[¶2.]     We 
dismiss.

[¶3.]     On December 22, 1982, 
Mrs. Scanlon was the successful applicant in the simultaneous oil and gas lease 
drawing held for the right to lease Parcel No. 699.1 As a result, Mrs. Scanlon and the 
Board of Land Commissioners entered into a lease agreement, Lease No. 83-00040, 
which provided in applicable part:

Annual rentals on all 
leases shall be payable in advance for the first year and each year thereafter. 
No notice of rental due shall be sent to the lessee. If the rental is not paid 
on or before the date it becomes due, notice of default will be sent to the 
lessee, and a penalty of $0.50 per acre for late payment will be 
assessed.

The lessee is not legally 
obligated to pay either the rental or the penalty, but if the rental and penalty 
are not paid within thirty (30) days after the notice of default has been 
received, the lease will terminate automatically by operation of law. 
Termination of the lease shall not relieve the lessee of any obligation incurred 
under the lease other than the obligation to pay rental or penalty. The lessee 
shall not be entitled to a credit on royalty due for any penalty paid for late 
payment of rental on an operating lease.[2]

[¶4.]     On January 21, 1986, 
the Commissioner of Public Lands sent the following letter by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, to Mrs. Scanlon:

Payment of advance rental 
in the amount of $1280.00 on lease No. 83-00040 was not received in this office 
prior to the due date of January 2, 1985.

In accordance with a new 
rule approved by the Board of Land Commissioners and effective September 29, 
1981, you may retain this lease in good standing if you wish to pay the rental 
of $1.00 per acre plus 50¢ per acre penalty for late 
payment.

If your rental and 
penalty payment in the amount of $1920.00 is not received in this office within 
30 days from receipt of this notice, your lease will be terminated by operation 
of law.

The post office 
attempted to deliver this letter on January 25 and 30, 1986, with no success and 
returned it to the Commissioner of Public Lands on February 10, 
1986.

[¶5.]     The Commissioner of 
Public Lands received Mrs. Scanlon's certified check dated January 10, 1987, in 
the amount of $3,840 for rental payments due on January 2, 1986, and January 2, 
1987, plus penalty payments incurred on the lease. On January 15, 1987, that 
check was returned to Mrs. Scanlon with a notice stating:

We are returning your 
official bank check No. 177545 dated Jan. 10, 1987 in the amount of $3,840.00 
which was sent to this office to pay rental for lease # 83-[0]0040. Please be 
advised that this lease was terminated Feb. 21, 1986 for failure to pay rental 
when due. We are enclosing [a] copy of [the] default letter and [a] copy of 
[the] envelope in which we tried to deliver [the] letter.[3]

[¶6.]     On February 5, 1987, 
Mrs. Scanlon, through her attorney, resubmitted the check and requested 
reconsideration of the decision to terminate her lease because she had never 
received the required pretermination notice. The Attorney General's office, on 
behalf of the Commissioner of Public Lands, responded on February 12, 1987, 
stating:

I am responding on behalf 
of my client, Howard M. Schrinar, to your letter of February 5, 1987, concerning 
the cancellation of State Lease 83-00040.

It is our position that 
the lease terminated automatically by operation of law as per the terms of the 
lease and Section 9 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Leasing of Subsurface 
Resources. Under these provisions, the lease was not "cancelled" on February 21, 
1986, by any action taken by the Board of Land Commissioners or its staff. The 
lease terminated automatically 30 days after receipt of the notice of rental 
default. It is our position that a lessee has constructively received a notice 
on the date the United States Postal Service makes its last attempt to deliver a 
certified letter.

Because Mrs. Scanlon did 
not attempt to cure her default in paying rentals until nearly one year after 
the rental default notice was constructively received, she can hardly claim a 
right to cure the default. Enclosed is Mrs. Scanlon's check for $3,840.00 which 
I am returning to you. The lease will not be reinstated.

[¶7.]     On February 18, 1987, 
Mrs. Scanlon's attorney replied to the letter from the Attorney General's 
office, stating in applicable part:

It is my understanding 
that your letter of February 12, 1987, on behalf of your client, Public Lands 
Commissioner, Howard M. Schrinar, constitutes his final decision. Mrs. Scanlon 
has now exhausted her administrative remedies, and whether or not her lease 
should be reinstated is now ripe for review in the District Courts of 
Wyoming.

If I have misstated your 
understanding, please let me know.

The Attorney 
General's office did not answer this letter. On March 10, 1987, Mrs. Scanlon 
filed a petition for review in the district court.

[¶8.]     The Commissioner of 
Public Lands filed a motion to dismiss with a supporting brief, and Mrs. Scanlon 
replied with her own brief in opposition. On June 5, 1987, a "Joint Motion for 
Certification to the Supreme Court" was filed by the parties. The district 
court, after allowing Amoco Production Company to intervene as a 
defendant/respondent to the action and after Amoco Production Company had 
consented to the motion for certification to the Supreme Court, certified this 
case for review by this Court.

[¶9.]     Mrs. Scanlon argues 
that the notice dated January 15, 1987, informed her of the termination of her 
oil and gas lease but could not be considered as a final decision of an agency 
which was ripe for judicial review until after she had received the letter from 
the Attorney General's office dated February 12, 1987, or until after some time 
had elapsed following her letter to the Attorney General's office dated February 
18, 1987, asking if such determination to terminate her lease was a final 
decision. We cannot agree.

[¶10.]  Judicial review of an administrative 
action is governed by Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
W.R.A.P. 12.01 provides:

To the extent that 
judicial review of administrative action by a district court is available, any 
person who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an 
agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by 
any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely affected in fact by a 
rule adopted by [an] agency, may obtain such review as provided in this 
rule.

[¶11.]  W.R.A.P. 12.04 provides in pertinent 
part:

In a contested case, or 
in a noncontested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the 
petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, 
certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of 
the petition for a rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) 
days after written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon, 
except that upon a showing of excusable neglect based upon the failure of a 
party to learn of the decision or action, the district court may extend the time 
for filing the petition for review not exceeding thirty (30) days from the 
expiration of the original time herein prescribed.[4]

[¶12.]  The January 15, 1987, notice to Mrs. 
Scanlon advised her of a final decision by an agency which adversely affected 
her rights.5 The correspondence between the 
Attorney General's office and Mrs. Scanlon's attorney had no bearing on the 
finality of the agency's decision and did not serve to toll the thirty-day 
period of time in which to file her petition for review.6 Although Mrs. Scanlon may have had 
meritorious issues for review, her failure to file her petition for such review 
within thirty days after receiving notice divested the district court of 
jurisdiction.

[¶13.]  In the case of Stagner v. Wyoming State 
Tax Commission, 642 P.2d 1296, 1297-98 (Wyo. 1982), we stated that untimely filing is 
a ground for dismissal of a petition for review:

Timely filing of 
a petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional.

* * * * * 
*

* * * [I]t must be within 
thirty days of such action or of notice of such action or of the time the person 
becomes aggrieved or adversely affected by such action, whichever is latest. A 
petition for judicial review may be timely if filed within thirty days after a 
rule or agency action or inaction adversely affects the person although the 
action, inaction, or adoption of the rule may have occurred long before that 
time. Likewise, a petition for review may be timely if filed within thirty days 
after receiving notice thereof although the action, inaction, or adoption of the 
rule may have occurred long before that time. In a contested case, the required 
notice of the decision will normally start the running of the thirty-day 
period.

"The law is almost 
elementary that whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts to `notice.'" Rodin v. 
State [ex rel.City of Cheyenne], 
Wyo., 417 P.2d 180, 195 (1966).

(Citations 
omitted.) See also Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Young, 713 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶14.]  We also stated:

This court can have no 
greater jurisdiction of the subject matter than the trial court and where the 
trial court had no jurisdiction in an administrative appeal from an agency, this 
court must dismiss the appeal.

Snell v. 
Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Wyo. 1975), 
quoted in Joelson v. City of Casper, Wyoming, 676 P.2d 570, 572 (Wyo. 
1984).

[¶15.]  We hold that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed with this cause, and such lack of jurisdiction by the 
district court undermines the jurisdiction of this Court.

[¶16.]  Dismissed.

THOMAS, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion in which THOMAS, J., joins.

FOOTNOTES

1 Parcel No. 699 is 
legally described as follows: N 1/2: E 1/2 SW 1/4: SE 1/4 of Section 16, T. 55 
N., R. 81 W., 6th P.M. (560 acres); SE 1/4 SW 1/4: SW 1/4 S.E. 1/4 of Section 
17, T. 55 N., R. 81 W., 6th P.M. (80 acres); and all of Section 30, T. 55 N., R. 
81 W., 6th P.M. (639.48 acres).

2 We note that the default 
provisions contained in Section 9 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Leasing 
of Sub-Surface Resources for the State of Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners 
and Wyoming Farm Loan Board, effective March 1, 1982, are identical to these 
lease provisions.

3 The copy of the letter 
mentioned herein is apparently the certified letter sent by the Commissioner of 
Public Lands to Mrs. Scanlon on January 21, 1986.

4 Such review is available 
by statute. W.S. 16-3-114(a) provides in applicable part:

Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any 
person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review 
* * *. The procedure to be followed in the proceeding * * * shall be in 
accordance with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme 
court.

5 This becomes 
particularly apparent when it is recognized that on August 2, 1986, the Board of 
Land Commissioners entered into a lease agreement with Amoco Production Company 
for a portion of the land formerly leased by Mrs. Scanlon.

6 If the soliciting of 
reconsideration or clarification of agency action were permitted, the limit on 
the time to file a petition for judicial review would be rendered 
meaningless.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶17.]  In my view, Justice Urbigkit has captured 
the appropriate rationale for dismissal of this appeal. Consequently, I join in 
his concurring opinion, but I think it is appropriate to add the following 
comment of my own.

[¶18.]  In Brasel & Sims Construction 
Company, Inc. v. State Highway Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 655 P.2d 265 (1982), 
this court held that an administrative body does not have authority to 
adjudicate contract disputes involving contracts to which it is a party, unless 
that authority specifically has been granted. See also State Highway Commission 
of Wyoming v. Brasel & Sims Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 688 P.2d 871 
(1984), and Rissler & McMurry Company, Inc. v. Wyoming Highway Department, 
Wyo., 582 P.2d 583 (1978) (Justice Raper and Justice Thomas dissenting). In 
addition to the views of Justice Urbigkit, I suggest that the statute in this 
instance does not appear to afford the Board of Land Commissioners the authority 
to adjudicate disputes arising out of its leases.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom THOMAS, J. joins.

[¶19.]  Although I could find a substantive basis 
to affirm the decision of the land office for lease cancellation and also 
sustain the decision on procedural justification derived from non-exhausting 
administrative remedies, I do not find a final order was ever entered initiating 
judicial-review time limitations.1

[¶20.]  In equal substance and significance to 
the inquiry whether a final order was entered involving this administratively 
defined state agency under the general jurisdiction of the administrative 
division of state government, is the question whether a sufficient exhaustion of 
administrative remedies occurred so that appeal to the courts was authorized at 
this juncture. A not dissimilar concern could be envisioned as to who makes 
final decisions for the highway commission, the state game and fish commission, 
the environmental quality council, within the office of the Governor, or for 
that matter, a law clerk as an adjunct to the Wyoming Supreme Court 
accommodating a desired activity within the judicial branch of state government. 
Does a district highway engineer, a game warden, a field supervisor, or some 
other agency employee take final action upon which, without resort to the 
agency's superintending or supervisory authority, judicial review becomes 
justified?

[¶21.]  For this activity and agency, Wyo. Const. 
art. 18, § 3 provides:

"The governor, secretary 
of state, state treasurer, state auditor and superintendent of public 
instruction shall constitute a board of land commissioners, which under 
direction of the legislature as limited by this constitution, shall have 
direction, control, leasing and disposal of lands of the state granted, or which 
may be hereafter granted for the support and benefit of public schools, subject 
to the further limitations that the sale of all lands shall be at public 
auction, after such delay (not less than the time fixed by congress) in portions 
at proper intervals of time, and at such minimum prices (not less than the 
minimum fixed by congress) as to realize the largest possible proceeds. And said 
board, subject to the limitations of this constitution and under such 
regulations as may be provided by law shall have the direction, control, 
disposition and care of all lands that have been heretofore or may hereafter be 
granted to the state."

The 
complementary statute provides:

"The governor, secretary 
of state, state treasurer, state auditor, and superintendent of public 
instruction, being constituted a `board of land commissioners' by the provisions 
of section 3, article 18, of the constitution of the state of Wyoming, shall as 
such board, have the direction, control, leasing, care and disposal of all lands 
heretofore or hereafter granted or acquired by the state for the benefit and 
support of public schools or for any other purpose whatsoever, subject to the 
limitations contained in the constitution of the state, and the laws enacted by 
the legislature. The board shall have the power and authority to take such 
official action as may be necessary in securing title to land grants, or any 
other lands acquired by the state." Section 36-2-101, W.S. 
1977.

[¶22.]  In effectuation of that responsibility, 
the state land office, as an agency under the general administrative 
jurisdiction of the Governor of the State of Wyoming, was created.2 The duties of the commissioner of 
public lands are specified as:

"The commissioner of 
public lands shall keep the records of the board of land commissioners, and be 
the secretary thereof. He shall make out and countersign all patents, contracts 
or other instruments issued by him to purchasers and others, and make out and 
sign all leases. He shall keep a record of all such leases, patents or other 
instruments in books or other records. He shall file and preserve in his office 
all bonds, contracts, leases, and other instruments given by lessees, purchasers 
and others. He shall have the custody of the seal of the board, and shall keep 
the minutes of the proceedings thereof, and shall perform such other duties 
concerning the business transactions of the board as it may direct. He shall 
receive all applications for purchasing, leasing, entering, locating or in any 
manner acquiring title to, interest in, or any benefit from or use of any lands 
belonging to or under the control of the state of Wyoming, and he shall allow or 
disallow, subject to the approval of the board of land commissioners, such 
applications to purchase, lease, enter or otherwise acquire title to, interest 
in, benefit from or use of the lands, or the appurtenances thereof, and in all 
cases where there have been no conflicting applications, he shall report his 
decisions to the board for its approval at its next ensuing regular or special 
meeting, but in all cases where there have been conflicting applications to 
lease or otherwise acquire interests or benefits in the lands, he shall, before 
reporting his decisions to the board, give each of the applicants notice of what 
his decision is with reference to their applications, and if none of the 
applicants files an appeal in writing from the decisions of the commissioner to 
the board within a period of thirty (30) days, except in the case of oil and gas 
leases when the period shall be not less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty 
(30) days at the discretion of the board, after the date of the notice, the 
commissioner shall report his decision to the board for approval at its next 
meeting and in case an appeal in writing is taken from the decision of the 
commissioner to the board of land commissioners within the time provided, the 
commissioner shall give each of the applicants at least ten (10) days' notice, 
except in the case of oil and gas leases when the period shall be five (5) days' 
notice in writing of the date on which the appeal will be heard by the board. * 
* *" Section 36-3-102(a), W.S. 1977 (1988 Cum. Supp.).

[¶23.]  Provision for judicial appeal is provided 
in § 36-2-206, W.S. 1977 from the state board, but no similar provision is 
included as to any direct appeal from the commissioner of public lands or the 
land office which would encompass judicial review without first exhaustion of 
the administrative authority and final decisional power of the board of land 
commissioners.

[¶24.]  The board's primary jurisdiction over 
state lease cancellation is designated in § 36-5-113, W.S. 
1977:

"The board shall have the 
power and authority to cancel leases procured by fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, or for use of the lands for unlawful or illegal purposes, or 
for the violation of the covenants of the lease, upon proper proof 
thereof."

See also § 
36-6-101, W.S. 1977, for designation of authority for oil and gas leases as 
conforming to the Constitution.

[¶25.]  This relationship between the land 
office, the commissioner of public lands, and the board of land commissioners 
was specifically addressed by this court in Reese v. Bruegger Ranches, Inc., 
Wyo., 463 P.2d 23, 25 (1969):

"Under art. 18, § 3, 
Wyoming Constitution, and under § 36-14, W.S. 1957, constitutional and statutory 
authority is granted to the Board of Land Commissioners to lease lands of the 
state. Thus, the Commissioner could not finally determine what rental would be 
due in a contested case of this kind, without the Board's approval; and if he 
attempted to notify the contestee that the contestee had to accept his 
recommendation and pay the balance recommended by him, such notice would be 
premature if it preceded action by the Board.

* * * * * 
*

"It will be noticed that 
§ 36-34 [presently § 36-3-102, W.S. 1977] requires the Commissioner to give 
notice to the contesting parties of his decision. Even if there is no appeal, he 
still must report his decision to the Board for approval at its next meeting. * 
* *

"* * * There can be no 
doubt that the Board is free to follow or to modify or to disregard what the 
Commissioner has recommended."

[¶26.]  In regard at least to the issue of this 
case, an oil and gas lease cancellation or nonrenewal, it is clear that the 
basic administrative jurisdiction rests with the board of land commissioners. 
There may be functions of the commissioner of public lands where direct 
reference to the court for judicial review might exist, but this case is 
certainly not of that category.

[¶27.]  I would hold that neglect of the 
lease-right litigant to seek board review forecloses any direct appeal by review 
from the courts. Consequently, I specially concur that no decision was made 
which is properly now presented here for judicial review. This court addressed 
an almost identical issue involving the state engineer and the state board of 
control, by an order in Wyoming Water, Inc. v. George L. Christopulos, No. 
86-177, dated December 3, 1987, remanding to the district court for entry of an 
order remanding the case to the state board of control, with instructions that a 
hearing be held by the state board of control. Cf. Willadsen v. Christopulos, Wyo., 731 P.2d 1181 (1987), and Green River Development Co. v. FMC Corp., Wyo., 660 P.2d 339 
(1983), Thomas, J., specially concurring. The Wyoming Water case did at least 
pass through the board of control, which affirmed without hearing, and which is 
absent in this case where reference to the responsible administrative agency 
with final decision was never requested nor provided. See Battle, Administrative Law, Wyoming Style, XVIIILand & Water L.Rev. 223, 256 (1983) to 
"agencies with very substantial powers - e.g., the Board of Land Commissioners," 
and others. Unfortunately, nothing in this extended law journal article 
discussed the supposition that intermediate agency personnel might make final 
agency decisions. For a discussion of the general authority of the board of land 
commissioners under the Constitution and statutes, see Mayor v. Board of Land 
Com'rs, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, reh'g denied 195 P.2d 752 (1948); State ex 
rel. Cross v. Board of Land Commissioners, 50 Wyo. 181, 62 P.2d 516 (1936); and 
State ex rel. Walls v. State Board of Land Com'rs, 36 Wyo. 302, 254 P. 491 
(1927). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was directly 
addressed by this court in People v. Fremont Energy Corp., Wyo., 651 P.2d 802 
(1982) and City of Cheyenne v. Sims, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1347 
(1974).

"* * * The exhaustion 
doctrine applies where an agency alone has been granted or found to possess 
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The purpose of the doctrine then is to 
avoid premature interruption of the administrative process where the agency has 
been created to apply a statute in the first instance. * * *" People v. Fremont 
Energy Corp., supra, 651 P.2d  at 811.

[¶28.]  This policy application summarizes my 
analysis in this case, and I consequently submit this special 
concurrence.

FOOTNOTES

1 I am concerned with the 
apparent determination that an intermediate state employee can, by speed memo, 
take "final agency action" without demonstrated authority, and that this action 
is apparently now considered to be action of the designated administrator of the 
government agency, the State Land Commissioner, even though noticed in a form 
that lacks compliance with the requirement of Rule 12.04, 
W.R.A.P.:

"* * * within thirty (30) 
days after written, certified notice to 
all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of the petition 
for rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) days after 
written, certified notice to all parties 
of the decision thereon, except that upon a showing of excusable neglect 
based upon the failure of a party to learn of the decision or the action, the 
district court may extend the time for filing the petition for review not 
exceeding thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original time herein 
prescribed. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

It is 
unquestioned that no certified notice authored by whomever was ever sent, since 
the medium of communication was a speed memo sent by ordinary mail returning the 
tendered check. Real problems may arise in Wyoming administrative agency operations if 
intermediate-level employees are generally entrusted with formal agency-action 
authorization to make the "final decision" upon which judicial review is based. 
As a quick example, it is possible that this decision might extinguish the right 
of the agency head to make the final decision as then considered to be something 
in the nature of a rehearing, which might be subject to operational rules for 
authorization. The subject could be belabored in both operational practice and 
legal rules of authority delegation, but suffice it to say that this record 
simply lacks justification for designation of the returned check memo as of 
itself being final agency action. Furthermore, extraction of the certified mail 
requirement is unjustified and unexplained.

2 The commissioner of 
public lands is appointed and removable by the Governor with senatorial 
confirmation for a term of two years. Section 36-3-101, W.S. 1977. He keeps the 
records of the board of land commissioners and acts as secretary without vote. 
In a completely different constituency, the five elected officials are 
ex-officio members of the board of land commissioners, and have co-equal rights 
in voting subject to the designation of the Governor to act as president of the 
board. Section 36-2-103, W.S. 1977. In the convoluted nature of Wyoming state government, 
the board and not the Governor appoints the state forester, § 36-2-108, W.S. 
1977, who heads the state forestry division and is under the supervision of the 
commissioner of public lands.