Case Title: Waukesha County v. Steven H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1998AP003033

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3033 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights of 
Brittany Ann H., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Waukesha County,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
John J. Grau, Guardian ad Litem,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Steven H.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  224 Wis. 2d 939, 592 N.W.2d 320 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 24, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs and oral argument by Anton S. Jamieson, assistant 
corporation counsel. 
 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by John J. 
Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha and oral argument by John J. 
 
Grau. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by 
Thomas K. Voss and Love, Voss, Murray & Goeschko, Waukesha and 
oral argument by Thomas K. Voss. 
 
2000 WI 28 
 
   NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
No. 98-3033 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
 
   IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
of Brittany Ann H., a Person Under the  
Age of 18: 
 
Waukesha County,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
John J. Grau, Guardian ad Litem,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, In re the 
Termination of Parental Rights of Brittany Ann H., No. 98-3033, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Feb. 24, 1999), reversing 
an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, J. Mac Davis, 
Judge.  The circuit court order terminated the parental rights 
of Steven H. to his daughter Brittany.  The court of appeals 
reversed the termination order because some orders removing 
Brittany from her home did not include the written notice 
FILED 
 
MAR 24, 2000 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
2 
prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) (1997-98).1  The court of 
appeals held that Steven H.'s trial counsel's failure to object 
to the deficient orders amounted to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.2 
¶2 
Two 
issues 
are 
presented: 
(1) 
Do 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.356(2)3 and 48.415(2)4 require that each and every order 
                     
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
1997-98 unless otherwise stated. 
2 Section 48.23(2) provides that a parent 18 years old or 
older who appears before the court in a proceeding involving 
involuntary termination of parental rights shall be represented 
by counsel unless the parent waives counsel.  The right to be 
represented includes the right to effective counsel.  See A.S. 
v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995, 1003-04, 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992). 
Steven H. claims that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move to strike the continuing CHIPS grounds of the 
petition to terminate parental rights on the ground that he did 
not receive the prescribed written notice.  Steven H. claims 
that had he known about this defense, he would not have waived 
his right to a fact-finding hearing on the continuing CHIPS 
grounds.  
CHIPS is the acronym used to denote the phrase "child in 
need of protection or services" in the Wisconsin Children's 
Code, Chapter 48, Wis. Stat. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 48.356 reads in pertinent part: 
 
(1) Whenever the court orders a child to be placed 
outside his or her home . . . under s. 48.345, 48.347, 
48.357, 48.363 or 48.365, the court shall orally 
inform 
the 
parent 
or 
parents 
who 
appear 
in 
court . . . of any grounds for termination of parental 
rights under s. 48.415 which may be applicable and of 
the conditions necessary for the child or expectant 
mother to be returned to the home . . . . 
 
(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), 
any written order which places a child . . . outside 
the home or denies visitation under sub. (1) shall 
notify the parent or parents . . . of the information 
specified under sub. (1).  
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
3 
placing a child outside his or her home contain the written 
notice prescribed by § 48.356(2) in order for the termination of 
parental rights to proceed?  The written notice is to describe 
any grounds for termination of parental rights under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415 that may be applicable and the conditions necessary for 
the child to be returned to the home.  The issue is whether the 
termination of parental rights petition must be dismissed 
because one or more orders failed to contain such notice.  (2) 
Did the circuit court violate Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3) in 
conducting the hearing on the petition to terminate parental 
rights by 
failing 
to 
hear 
testimony 
in 
support of the 
allegations in the petition, and, if so, was Steven H. 
prejudiced by the circuit court’s error? 
¶3 
We hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) do 
not require that each and every order removing a child from his 
or her home contain the written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2) 
                                                                  
 
4 Wis. Stat. § 48.415 (2) provides as follows:  
48.415 Grounds for involuntary termination of parental 
rights.  At the fact-finding hearing the court or jury 
may make a finding that grounds exist for the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights. 
 
Grounds 
for 
termination of parental rights shall be one of the 
following . . . . 
 
(2) 
Continuing 
Need 
of 
Protection 
or 
Services.  
Continuing need of protection or services, which shall 
be established by proving any of the following: 
 
(a) That the child has been adjudged to be a child or 
an unborn child in need of protection or services and 
placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or 
her home pursuant to one or more court orders under s. 
48.345, 
48.347, 
48.357, 
48.363, 
48.365 
 . . .  
containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2) . . . . 
 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
4 
in order for the termination of parental rights to proceed.  We 
conclude that Wis. Stat. §§  48.356(2) and 48.415(2) require 
that the last order specified in § 48.356(2) placing a child 
outside the home, which must be issued at least six months 
before the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, 
must contain the written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2).  This 
interpretation of §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) ensures that a 
parent receives the written notice required by § 48.356(2) in a 
timely manner and does not vitiate a termination of parental 
rights proceeding when one or more previous orders fails to 
contain the statutorily prescribed written notice.  Although we 
conclude that the petition to terminate parental rights need not 
be dismissed because of the failure of an order in this case to 
contain the prescribed notice, the better practice is to include 
the written notice required by § 48.356(2) in all orders to 
which that statute applies. 
¶4 
Regarding the second issue presented, although the 
circuit court erred by failing to follow Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3), 
we conclude on review of the entire record and the totality of 
the circumstances that Steven H. was not prejudiced by the 
error.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶5 
This case illustrates that the legislature has created 
numerous 
procedures 
to 
protect 
parents 
from 
the 
state 
precipitously 
or 
capriciously 
terminating 
parental 
rights.  
Although the goal of assisting and protecting parents is 
important, the legislature has instructed courts that the best 
interests of a child are paramount, that impermanence in family 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
5 
relationships are contrary to the welfare of a child and that 
more timely decisions about the fitness of parents are needed.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a).  This case involves reading the 
statutes with these legislative purposes in mind. 
 
I 
¶6 
The relevant facts are set forth below.  Brittany was 
born in February 1995.  Waukesha County immediately filed a 
petition alleging that Brittany was a child in need of 
protection or services.  Proceedings on this petition were held 
in March and April of 1995.  Brittany’s mother attended these 
proceedings; Steven H., Brittany’s father, did not.  In April 
1995, the circuit court left Brittany in her mother’s care but 
approved conditions of supervision for the mother. 
¶7 
In November 1995, upon finding that Brittany’s mother 
was using crack cocaine, Waukesha County filed an emergency 
change of placement petition with the circuit court.  The 
circuit court first ordered Brittany placed with her paternal 
grandparents and subsequently transferred Brittany to a foster 
home.  Neither of these 1995 orders changing placement of the 
child included notice to the parents that they were in danger of 
having their parental rights terminated. 
¶8 
In March 1996 the circuit court extended the order 
placing Brittany outside of her home.  This written order was 
sent to both parents and included conditions the parents were 
required to meet in order for Brittany to be returned to their 
care.  The written order also included a notice that the parents 
were in danger of having their parental rights terminated.  Both 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
6 
parents were in court when this order was issued and, in 
addition to the written notice, the circuit court gave the 
parents an oral warning that their parental rights were in 
danger of being terminated and of the conditions necessary for 
Brittany’s return.5 
¶9 
In May 1996 Steven H. was incarcerated and sentenced 
to serve a five-year prison term.  In April 1997 Waukesha County 
petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents on 
the grounds that Brittany was in continuing need of protection 
or services pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415(2)(a), (b) and (c), 
or, alternatively under § 48.415(1)(a)(2), that both parents had 
abandoned her. Brittany’s mother did not contest this petition. 
 Steven H. did, however, enter a contest plea and requested a 
jury trial.  
¶10 In November 1997 Steven H. moved to dismiss the 
petition seeking termination of his parental rights, alleging he 
had not been given the written notice prescribed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.356(2). 
 
This 
motion 
related 
only 
to 
the 
original 
dispositional 
order 
of 
April 
1995, 
which 
set 
forth 
the 
conditions for supervision of Brittany’s mother while Brittany 
                     
5 Steven H.'s brief states in a cursory fashion that Steven 
H. did not receive the written order for extension of placement 
that was issued in March 1996 containing the conditions for 
Brittany's return and the warning that his parental rights were 
in danger of being terminated.  The circuit court did not decide 
this factual issue.  According to the record, Waukesha County's 
first attempt at mailing the order to Steven H. was unsuccessful 
and the order was returned.  However, the record shows that mail 
for Steven H. was to be sent to his parents' address and that 
the order for the extension of placement was re-sent to that 
address on April 11, 1996.  Steven H. does not elaborate on this 
point, and we will not address it.  
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
7 
was still in the mother’s home.  Steven H.'s motion to dismiss 
did not refer to the subsequent orders that placed Brittany in 
her grandmother’s home and in a foster home, neither of which 
contained the written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2).  The 
circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the 
April 1995 order did not remove Brittany from the parental home 
and therefore did not require the § 48.356(2) written notice. 
¶11 In December 1997 Steven H. decided not to contest the 
fact-finding hearing in the termination of parental rights 
proceeding and the county agreed to drop the abandonment ground 
for terminating parental rights.  The termination of parental 
rights proceeding continued only on the ground that the child 
had been adjudged to be in continuing need of protection or 
services. 
¶12 In February 1998 Steven H. requested and received an 
adjournment until April 1998 for the contested dispositional 
hearing.  Steven H. anticipated his release from incarceration 
by the April date and hoped that he would be more capable of 
demonstrating his parental fitness.  He was not, however, 
released from prison.  
¶13 Approximately two weeks prior to the hearing, Steven 
H.'s attorney moved to withdraw from the case at Steven H.'s 
request.  The circuit court denied this request because the case 
had already been subject to numerous delays.  On April 8, 1998, 
Steven H.'s parental rights were terminated.  
¶14 Steven 
H. 
then 
filed 
for 
post-judgment 
relief, 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and the inadequacy 
of the circuit court's colloquy with him regarding the waiver of 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
8 
his right to a fact-finding hearing on the petition to terminate 
parental rights pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.422.  The circuit 
court held a Machner hearing6 and denied Steven H.'s motion. 
¶15 On Steven H.'s appeal, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court order, concluding that D.F. v. Juneau County 
Department of Social Services, 147 Wis. 2d 486, 433 N.W.2d 609 
(Ct. App. 1988), requires that each and every order placing a 
child outside his or her home must contain the written notice 
prescribed by § 48.356(2) in order to establish grounds under 
§ 48.415(2)(a) for the involuntary termination of parental 
rights.  The court of appeals held that the failure to object to 
this deficiency amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The court of appeals expressed reluctance to reverse the circuit 
court order but considered the D.F. case controlling.  The court 
of appeals urged this court to consider overturning the D.F. case 
or 
holding 
that 
substantial 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.356(2) is sufficient. 
 
 
                     
6 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979).  When trial counsel’s representation is challenged, 
a hearing may be held on the effectiveness of counsel. 
A Machner hearing is held to determine the claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Steven H.'s motion for post-
conviction relief also alleged, however, that the hearing in 
which he waived his rights to contest the grounds to terminate 
his parental rights was not conducted in accordance with Wis. 
Stat. § 48.422.  Although it was never clarified whether Steven 
H.'s argument regarding the § 48.422 violation was properly 
before the court at the Machner hearing, testimony relevant to 
the claim under Wis. Stat. § 48.422 was heard.  We address this 
argument of Steven H. in Part III of this opinion. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
9 
II 
¶16 The first issue before this court is whether Wis. 
Stat. §§  48.356(2) and 48.415(2) require that each and every 
order placing a child outside his or her home contain the 
written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2) in order for the 
termination of parental rights to proceed.  The written notice 
is to describe any grounds for termination of parental rights 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415 that may be applicable and the 
conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the home.  
Only if the statutes require such notice in each and every such 
order is the court of appeals decision that Steven H.'s counsel 
was 
ineffective 
correct. 
 
This 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that this court determines 
independently, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  
¶17 Two statutes are pertinent to this issue: Wis. Stat. 
§§  48.356(2) and 48.415(2). 
¶18 The first statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2), requires 
written notice of the grounds for termination of parental rights 
which may be applicable and of the conditions necessary for a 
child to be returned to the home whenever any written order 
under one of the listed statutes places a child outside his or 
her home.  The November 1995 orders initially placing Brittany 
in her grandmother's home and subsequently placing her in a 
foster home did not contain the written notice prescribed by 
§ 48.356(2).  The March 1996 order extending the November out- 
of-home placement order did, however, include the statutorily 
prescribed written notice. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
10
¶19 Section 48.356, Wis. Stat., reads in pertinent part: 
 
(1) Whenever the court orders a child to be placed 
outside his or her home . . . under s. 48.345, 48.347, 
48.357, 48.363 or 48.365, the court shall orally 
inform the parent or parents who appear in court 
. . . of any grounds for termination of parental 
rights under s. 48.415 which may be applicable and of 
the conditions necessary for the child or expectant 
mother to be returned to the home . . . . 
 
(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), 
any written order which places a child . . . outside 
the home or denies visitation under sub. (1) shall 
notify the parent or parents . . . of the information 
specified under sub. (1). (emphasis added)  
 
¶20 The second pertinent statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), 
establishes as a ground for involuntary termination of parental 
rights that a child has been adjudged to be in need of protection 
or services and has been placed outside his or her home “pursuant 
to one or more court orders” under one of the listed statutes 
(emphasis added).  Section 48.415(2) further provides that one or 
more of these court orders contain the written notice prescribed 
by § 48.356(2).  
¶21 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) provides as follows:  
 
48.415 Grounds for involuntary termination of parental 
rights.  At the fact-finding hearing the court or jury 
may make a finding that grounds exist for the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights. 
 
Grounds 
for 
termination of parental rights shall be one of the 
following . . .  
(2) 
Continuing 
Need 
of 
Protection 
or 
Services.  
Continuing need of protection or services, which shall 
be established by proving any of the following: 
(a) That the child has been adjudged to be a child or 
an unborn child in need of protection or services and 
placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or 
her home pursuant to one or more court orders under s. 
48.345, 
48.347, 
48.357, 
48.363, 
48.365 . . .  
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
11
containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2) . . . . 
(emphasis added) 
 
¶22 We hasten to point out that although Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.356(2) speaks of written notice in any order placing the 
child outside the home, § 48.415(2) speaks of one or more court 
orders placing the child containing the written notice. 
¶23 Steven 
H. 
is 
challenging 
the 
proceedings 
that 
involuntarily terminated his parental rights on the ground that 
some of the orders which placed Brittany outside her home 
pursuant to one of the listed statutes did not contain the 
written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2).  The last order entered 
a year before the start of the proceeding to involuntarily 
terminate parental rights did contain the written notice required 
by §  48.356(2).  The question presented in this case is the 
effect of this last order when earlier orders did not contain the 
statutorily prescribed notice. 
¶24 The 
statutes 
at 
issue 
clearly 
show 
that 
the 
legislative intent was to protect parents’ rights by mandating 
the written notice so that a parent could work to alleviate the 
kind of behavior that would justify a termination of parental 
rights.  The court of appeals in this case relied on D.F. v. 
Juneau County Department of Social Services, 147 Wis. 2d 486, 433 
N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988), to conclude that the statutory notice 
must be given in each and every order placing a child outside his 
or her home pursuant to §§ 48.345, 48.357, 48.363 or 48.365.  The 
court of appeals concluded that "a CHIPS case could have an 
entire string of such orders all but one containing the required 
written notice.  In such a case, all [termination of parental 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
12
rights] proceedings would be halted, only to be begun anew, all 
because of the one defective order."  In re the Termination of 
Parental Rights of Brittany Ann H., No. 98-3033, at 8.  The court 
of appeals viewed its decision in this case vitiating the 
termination of Steven H.’s parental rights as "tragic," but 
required by the D.F. case. 
¶25 The court of appeals in D.F. correctly stressed the 
legislature's intent that a parent be put on notice that 
parental 
rights may be 
terminated 
in 
the 
future. 
 The 
legislature created a panoply of procedures to assure that 
parental 
rights 
will 
not 
be 
terminated 
precipitously 
or 
capriciously when the state exercises its awesome power to 
terminate parental rights.  D.F., 147 Wis. 2d at 494-95 (quoting 
In re Termination of Parental Rights to M.A.M., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 
436-37, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984)).  Included in that panoply of 
rights is the circuit court's duty to warn and inform a parent 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  D.F., 147 Wis. 2d at 495.  The 
notice is necessary to give a parent an opportunity to conform 
his or her conduct to avoid termination of parental rights. 
D.F., 147 Wis. 2d at 496. 
¶26 We agree with the D.F. court about the legislative 
intent and the importance of the statutory notice.  We conclude, 
however, that D.F. does not govern this case.  The facts of the 
two cases are different.  In D.F. none of the orders placing the 
child outside the home contained the written notice prescribed 
by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2), while in this case the last order did 
contain the statutory notice.  
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
13
¶27 Steven H. relies on In re Termination of Parental 
Rights of Anthony C., 291 Wis. 2d 206, 579 N.W.2d 635 (1998).  
That case, like D.F., stressed the rigor of the statutory 
procedures established for termination of parental rights.  In 
Anthony C. several orders failed to contain the statutory 
notice.  However, the Anthony C. court concluded that the orders 
that did not contain the notice were temporary physical custody 
orders that need not contain the notice.  In Anthony C. all 
orders that were statutorily required to contain the notice did 
so.  Anthony C., 291 Wis. 2d at 219.  Thus in Anthony C., unlike 
the present case, all the orders placing the child outside the 
home pursuant to §§ 48.345, 48.347, 48.363 or 48.365 contained 
the requisite statutory notice.  Anthony C., 219 Wis. 2d at 224.  
¶28 Consequently, D.F. and Anthony C. concerned situations 
where either none or all of the required notices were given, and 
not the situation presented here, where the last order, but not 
the earlier ones, contained the required notice.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that D.F. and Anthony C. should be limited to the 
facts presented in each case; they do not determine the result 
in the different facts presented by this case. 
¶29 We agree with the D.F. and Anthony C. cases that the 
possibility of permanent loss of parental rights persuaded the 
legislature to adopt a rigorous procedure, including the 
statutory notice provided in Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  We do not 
agree with the court of appeals in D.F. that the statutory 
notice must be given "each time an order places a child outside 
his or her home" in order to continue a termination of parental 
rights proceeding.  D.F., 147 Wis. 2d at 499 (emphasis added). 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
14
Although Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) reads that "any order" placing a 
child outside the home is to include the statutorily prescribed 
notice, § 48.415(2) reads that "one or more orders" placing a 
child outside the home is to include the statutorily prescribed 
notice.  Reading §§  48.356(2) and 48.415(2) together, and in 
light of the legislative purpose expressed in § 48.01(1)(a) by 
the 1995 revisions in the Children’s Code,7 we conclude that 
these statutes do not require the statutorily prescribed written 
notice to be in every order placing a child outside the home. 
¶30 The words of Wis. Stat. §§  48.356(2) and 48.415(2) 
about what orders need to contain the written notice are not 
consistent, as we pointed out previously. Section 48.356(2) 
requires that "any written order which places a child outside 
the home" (emphasis added) under specified statutes contain 
written notice, including notification of any grounds for 
termination of parental rights.  When we turn to the statutory 
grounds for termination of parental rights we find different 
language in § 48.415(2).  Section 48.415(2) speaks of "one or 
more court orders . . . containing the notice required by s. 
48.356(2)" (emphasis added).  The words "one or more orders" in 
§ 48.415(2) are not the equivalent of "any," "each," "all," or 
"every" order. 
¶31 The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), in contrast to 
that of § 48.356(2), thus does not encompass the concept that 
any and all orders under the listed statutes must contain the 
statutory 
written 
notice 
in 
order 
for 
the 
termination 
                     
7 See 1995 Act 275. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
15
proceedings to be valid.  Under § 48.415(2) the parents will be 
given adequate notice of the conditions for return and time to 
make any necessary changes to forestall the termination of 
parental rights if the last order issued at least six months 
before the filing of the petition involuntarily terminating 
parental rights contains the written notice.  
¶32 The statement of legislative purpose in the Children's 
Code assists the court in interpreting the inconsistent language 
of the two statutes.  Although the legislature has declared that 
the Children's Code is be construed liberally to protect 
children and preserve the unity of the family,8 the legislature 
also emphasized that a court may determine whether it is in the 
best interests of a child for that child to be removed from his 
or her parents.9  The courts have the authority, according to the 
legislature, in appropriate cases, not to reunite a child with 
his or her family.  The legislature emphasized that courts 
should recognize that instability and impermanence in family 
relationships are contrary to the welfare of children.  The 
legislature 
also 
entreated 
the 
courts 
to 
recognize 
the 
importance to children of eliminating unreasonable periods while 
their parents try to correct the conditions that prevent the 
child's return to the family.10 
                     
8 Section 1m, 1995 Wis. Act 275, amending 48.01(1)(intro) 
and 
§ 8m, 
1995 
Wis. 
Act 
275, 
renumbering 
and 
amending 
48.01(1)(a). 
9 Section 2, 1995 Wis. Act 275, creating § 48.01(1)(ag). 
10 Section 8m, 1995 Wis. Act 275, renumbering and amending 
48.01(1)(a). See also Wis. Stat. 48.01(gg)(gr)(1997-98). 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
16
¶33 A Note to the 1995 revisions of the legislative 
purpose of the Children's Code encapsulates the modifications as 
focusing attention on the best interests of the child and on the 
need for courts to make more timely decisions about the fitness 
of parents.  The Note to section 48.01 states: 
 
As with the other new or modified legislative purpose 
provisions in the bill, this new language is intended 
to focus attention on: (1) the best interests of the 
child . . . and  (2) the need for juvenile courts in 
proceedings and determinations under ch. 48, to take a 
closer look at, and make more timely decisions 
regarding, the fitness or unfitness of parents to care 
for and protect their children.11 
 
¶34 Before the 1995 revisions, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(c) 
required that a child be placed outside the home for one year or 
longer before involuntary termination of parental rights on the 
ground that the child had been adjudged a child in need of 
protection or services.  In l995 the time period was reduced to 
six months.12  In this case the last order that affected 
Brittany's placement was issued at least one year before 
proceedings to terminate parental rights were started.  This 
last order contained the statutorily prescribed written notice 
of grounds for termination of parental rights and of the 
conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the home.  
Thus the last order gave Steven H. adequate warning of the 
grounds for termination as well as time to fulfill the 
conditions. 
                     
11 Note to § 4, 1995 Wis. Act 275. 
12 Section 78, 1995 Wis. Act 275. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
17
¶35 Had 
Steven 
H. 
received 
an 
order 
without 
the 
statutorily prescribed written notice after receiving the order 
with the proper notice, he might be able to complain that he was 
confused by the lack of notice and that it was unfair to allow 
the termination proceedings to continue.  But that hypothetical 
situation is not the case here.  The last order in the present 
case, 
one 
of 
several 
orders, 
satisfied 
the 
statutory 
requirements. 
¶36 If the court interprets the statutes as Steven H. 
requests, Brittany would likely remain in the impermanence of 
foster care for many more months until the alleged defects in 
orders preceding the last 
order 
could be 
cured. 
 
This 
interpretation is not required by the words of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 48.356(2) and 49.415(2).  Furthermore, this interpretation is 
contrary to the express legislative policy of the Children's 
Code that courts act in the best interests of a child, that 
courts avoid impermanence in family relations and that courts 
eliminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of 
time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent 
their return to the family.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(a). 
¶37 The notice required by Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 
48.415(2) is meant to ensure that a parent has adequate notice 
of the conditions with which the parent must comply for a child 
to be returned to the home.  The notice is also meant to 
forewarn parents that their parental rights are in jeopardy.  In 
this case Steven H. received notice one year before the filing 
of the petition to terminate parental rights and was thus 
adequately informed of the steps he had to take to avoid 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
18
termination of parental rights and was given time in which to 
take those steps.  Based on the statutory language and the 
expressed legislative purpose, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 48.346(2) and 48.415(2) were satisfied in this case and that 
therefore counsel's failure to object to the lack of notice did 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
III 
¶38 The second claim Steven H. makes is that the circuit 
court violated Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3) in conducting the hearing 
on the petition to terminate parental rights by failing to hear 
testimony in support of the allegations in the petition.13  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.422(3), governing the hearing of the petition, 
provides that "if the petition is not contested the court shall 
                     
13 Steven H. also argues that he was without the effective 
assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to follow his 
request, made in January 1998, that counsel seek to withdraw 
Steven H.'s waiver to a fact-finding hearing.  Such a motion, 
Steven H. now contends, would have properly been based on the 
failure of the circuit court, at the hearing in which the waiver 
was entered, to hear testimony in support of the allegations in 
the petition pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3).  Such a motion 
also should have alleged that Steven H. had a defense relating 
to the lack of written warnings as to the termination of 
parental rights and conditions for return of Brittany and that 
Steven H. never received the copy of the written extension order 
to which proper warnings and conditions for return were 
attached.  We have rejected Steven H.'s argument that the 
petition for termination was inadequate because the first two 
orders of placement failed to contain the written warnings 
prescribed by § 48.356(2).  As we explain in this part of the 
opinion, we agree with Steven H.'s argument that the circuit 
court failed to follow Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3).  We disagree, 
however, with Steven H.'s position that reversal of the judgment 
of the circuit court is required under the circumstances of the 
present case. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
19
hear testimony in support of the allegations in the petition, 
including testimony as required in sub. 48.422(7)."  We turn to 
§ 48.422(7). 
¶39 Section 48.422(7) imposes four obligations on the 
circuit court before accepting an admission of the alleged facts 
in a petition.  The circuit court shall: (a) address the parties 
present and determine that the admission is made voluntarily and 
understandingly; (b) establish whether any promises or threats 
were made to elicit an admission; (c) establish whether a 
proposed adoptive parent of the child has been identified; and 
(d) make such inquiries as satisfactorily establish a factual 
basis for the admission.14 
¶40 The procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.422 
addresses the legislative concern that the "power of the state 
                     
14 Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7) provides as follows: 
 
Before accepting an admission of the alleged facts in 
a petition, the court shall: 
 
(a) Address the parties present and determine that the 
admission is made voluntarily with understanding of 
the nature of the acts alleged in the petition and the 
potential dispositions. 
 
(b) Establish whether any promises or threats were 
made 
to 
elicit 
an 
admission 
and 
alert 
all 
unrepresented parties to the possibility that a lawyer 
may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances 
which would not be apparent to them. 
 
(bm) Establish whether a proposed adoptive parent of 
the child has been identified . . . . 
 
(c) Make such inquiries as satisfactorily establish 
that there is a factual basis for the admission. 
 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
20
to 
terminate 
the 
parental 
relationship . . . can 
only 
be 
exercised under proved facts and procedures which assure that 
the power is justly exercised . . . [and] that the parental 
rights will not be terminated precipitously, arbitrarily or 
capriciously."15 
¶41 In this case Steven H. entered a no-contest plea to 
the allegations in the petition to terminate his parental 
rights. 
¶42 In prior cases the analysis set forth in State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), relating 
to a circuit court's acceptance of a guilty plea in a criminal 
case, has been used to evaluate a challenge to the proceeding 
mandated by Wis. Stat. § 48.422.  See, e.g., In Interest of 
Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d 887, 892, 512 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 Under a Bangert analysis, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-75, Steven H. must 
make a prima facie showing that the circuit court violated its 
mandatory duties and he must allege that in fact he did not know 
or understand the information that should have been provided at 
                     
15 In Interest of Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d 887, 892, 512 
N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1994)(quoting In re M.A.M., 116 Wis. 2d 
432, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984)).  See also In the Interest of 
Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d 26, 38, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996). 
Waukesha County and the guardian ad litem offer several 
arguments, including that because Steven H. did not properly 
address the inadequacy of the circuit court's procedure either 
in the circuit court or before the court of appeals, he waived 
the issue.  
They 
further 
contend 
that only 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.422(7) is applicable to this case, not § 48.422(3), and 
that § 48.422 applies only to situations in which a petition is 
not contested at the initial appearance.  We do not address 
these issues because we ultimately are not persuaded by Steven 
H.'s claim. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
21
the § 48.422 hearing.  If Steven H. makes this prima facie 
showing, the burden shifts to the county to demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that Steven H. knowingly, voluntarily 
and intelligently waived the right to contest the allegations in 
the petition.  Under Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-75, a court may 
examine the entire record, not merely one proceeding, and look 
at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
circuit court’s procedures and determinations are sufficient. 
¶43 There 
has 
been 
no 
post-judgment 
motion 
hearing 
regarding a Bangert-type claim in this case, although the 
Machner hearing on December 9, 1998, addressed similar issues.  
Neither Steven H.'s brief nor his testimony clearly and 
affirmatively asserts that he did not know or understand the 
allegations in the petition or other information that he should 
have been provided or that he did not understand the waiver of 
his right to contest the grounds for the termination of parental 
rights.  He does assert that he did not know he had a defense 
about the lack of notice in the orders extending placement.  We 
have concluded that he had no such defense.  Under the Bangert 
test we should proceed no further since Steven H. has failed to 
meet his duty to make a prima facie showing. 
¶44 Nevertheless we have examined the entire record to 
determine whether the colloquy between the circuit court and 
Steven H. was sufficient to allow Steven H. to waive his right 
to contest the grounds for termination of parental rights.  
¶45 We first set forth what happened at the circuit 
court's hearing on the petition for termination of parental 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
22
rights on December 18, 1997, at which Steven H. decided not to  
 contest the grounds for termination of parental rights. 
¶46 At that hearing Steven H. was sworn as a witness and 
questioned by the circuit court.  The circuit court explained to 
Steven H. that by waiving the fact-finding hearing he was 
agreeing not to contest the following: that Brittany had been 
previously found to be in need of protection or services; that 
Brittany had been placed outside the home; that the agency had 
made diligent effort to place Brittany back in a family home; 
and that Steven H. had not fulfilled the conditions prescribed 
for Brittany's return and that it was not likely that he could 
fulfill those conditions within the next 12 months.  Steven H. 
said he understood the claims in the petition and that he was 
not contesting them.16  The circuit court explained that if 
Steven H. contested the facts alleged as grounds for termination 
of parental rights, the county would have to prove the facts 
with clear and convincing evidence.  Steven H. said he 
understood.  
¶47 The circuit court advised Steven H. that, despite his 
waiver, he still would maintain his right to contest the 
termination of parental rights.  The dispositional issue, 
explained the court, would be determined at a hearing in April.17 
                     
16 Steven H. asserts that the circuit court's failure to 
inform him that the absence of written notice in some of the 
orders extending placement was a defense to the termination of 
parental rights is reversible error.  We disagree with Steven H. 
and have held that the requisite statutory written notice was 
given to allow the termination proceedings to continue. 
17 Wis. Stat. § 48.427 governs the dispositional hearing and 
the dispositional order. 
 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
23
¶48 Upon questioning under oath, Steven H. said that he 
understood 
the 
court's 
explanation 
of 
his 
rights 
and 
consequences and that he had discussed these matters with his 
counsel.  Steven H. testified that he felt he understood what he 
was doing.  The circuit court also established that no promises 
or threats were made to elicit the waiver.  When asked whether 
he wished to contest by trial the public's claim that grounds 
existed to terminate his parental rights, Steven H. replied 
"No," after hearing the question twice. 
¶49  No other witness testified at the December 18, 1997, 
hearing.  It is clear from the colloquy that Steven H. 
understood the nature of the acts alleged in the petition and 
the potential disposition and that he voluntarily, and with 
understanding, waived his right to contest the fact-finding 
hearing.  
¶50 Moreover, one of Steven H.'s attorneys testified at 
the Machner hearing on December 9, 1998, that he had reviewed 
the petition with Steven H. line by line prior to the December 
18, 1997, hearing and that Steven H. understood the facts 
alleged in the petition.  Another of Steven H.'s attorneys also 
testified that he reviewed the petition with Steven H. prior to 
the December 18, 1997, hearing. 
¶51 The circuit court determined that Steven H.'s decision 
not to contest the factual grounds stated in the petition for 
termination of parental rights was made with the benefit of 
counsel, was voluntary, knowledgeable, and intelligent, was made 
with an understanding of potential consequences and was not 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
24
coerced.18  We have independently reviewed the colloquy, as well 
as the entire record, and we agree with the circuit court's 
conclusion.  In sum, Steven H. has failed to make the necessary 
showing under the Bangert analysis.  
¶52 Although 
Steven 
H. 
agreed 
not 
to 
contest 
the 
allegations in the petition, he did not, however, admit the 
allegations in the petition.  Deciding not to contest the 
allegations of the petition is not equivalent to admitting the 
allegations in a petition.  Thus we need no longer be concerned 
with Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7), which governs admissions to the 
facts alleged.  
¶53 We now examine Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3), which states 
that if the petition is not contested, the court shall hear 
testimony in support of the allegations in the petition.  The 
circuit court failed to hear testimony in the present case in 
support of the allegations in the petition.  Instead, at the 
dispositional hearing Waukesha County asked the circuit court to 
                     
18 The issue of whether Steven H.'s admission was made 
voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the acts 
alleged in the petition and the potential dispositions is a 
question of constitutional fact.  See State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 283-84, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  The circuit court's 
findings of historical fact will on review be upheld unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  The circuit court's decision about 
whether the historical facts meet the constitutional test is a 
question of law that an appellate court determines independent 
of the circuit court, benefiting from a prior court's analysis. 
 Nevertheless, because the circuit court has the opportunity to 
question and observe witnesses and because public policy favors 
finality of the circuit court's conclusion about the nature of a 
parent's waiver, the circuit court's conclusion about whether 
Steven H.'s waiver was given voluntarily and understandingly 
should 
be 
given 
weight, 
although 
the 
decision 
is 
not 
controlling.  See T.M.F. v. Children's Service Society, 112 
Wis. 2d 180, 188, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983). 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
25
take judicial notice of the Termination of Parental Rights 
Report dated December 16, 1997.  Steven H. did not object to the 
circuit court's taking judicial notice of the Report.  The 
Report set forth information supporting the factual allegations 
but it was not filed with the circuit court until April 14, 
1998.  The Report standing alone is not testimony.  We doubt 
whether a circuit court can take judicial notice of the facts 
contained in the Report because the facts are subject to 
reasonable dispute.  See Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2). 
¶54 Lacking any testimony in support of the allegations in 
the petition to terminate parental rights, the circuit court 
nevertheless found that the grounds stated in the petition as to 
Steven H. existed.  The circuit court apparently relied on the 
testimony of Steven H. in the no-contest colloquy and on the 
recommendation of the guardian ad litem.  Steven H. asserts that 
this finding of the circuit court is invalid because the circuit 
court did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3) requiring it to 
hear testimony in support of the allegations in the petition. 
¶55 The guardian ad litem contends that Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.422(3) does not apply in this case because Steven H. 
continued to contest the dispositional phase of the proceeding. 
 We do not agree with this interpretation of § 48.422(3).  
¶56 We conclude that the legislature intended the circuit 
court to hear testimony in support of the allegations because 
testimony safeguards accurate fact-finding and protects the 
parents.  Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3) required Waukesha County in 
this case to call a witness to testify in support of the 
allegations in the petition.  We therefore agree with Steven H. 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
26
that the circuit court erred in failing to comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 48.422(3). 
¶57 Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case we 
conclude that Steven H. cannot rely on this error to reverse the 
termination proceedings because he was not prejudiced by the 
circuit court's failure to comply with the statute.  
¶58 A factual basis for several of the allegations in the 
petition can be teased out of the testimony of other witnesses 
at other hearings when the entire record is examined.  Witnesses 
testified that Brittany had been adjudged to be in need of 
protection or services and was placed and continued in placement 
outside of her home; that Steven H. was in prison from May 1996 
through December 9, 1998, the post-judgment hearing, and failed 
to 
demonstrate 
substantial 
progress 
toward 
meeting 
the 
conditions established for the return of the child to the home; 
and that there was no substantial likelihood that Steven H. 
would meet those conditions within the 12-month period following 
the fact-finding hearing.  
¶59 Furthermore, the only defense Steven H. has made to 
the factual allegations in the petition is that the orders 
extending placement outside the home did not contain the 
requisite statutory notices.  He has not challenged the factual 
allegations in the petition, as was made clear at the post-
conviction hearing.  Steven H. testified at the post-conviction 
hearing that he thought he had a substantive defense to 
abandonment as a ground for termination.  His only defense 
asserted to the CHIPS ground for termination was that he did not 
receive the required notices.  We have rejected that defense.  
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
27
Therefore we conclude that Steven H. was not prejudiced by the 
circuit court's failure to follow the procedures mandated by 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3). 
¶60 Although we have grave concerns about the circuit 
court's failure to follow the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.422(3), our examination of the entire record in the present 
case persuades us that there are insufficient grounds to justify 
our overturning the circuit court’s judgment in this case.  
¶61 For the reasons set forth we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
98-3033 
 
 
1