Case Title: Ex parte Milton Anderson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: State of Alabama vs. Milton Anderson)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060486

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 8/24/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
____________________
1060486
____________________
Ex parte Milton Anderson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama v. Milton Anderson)
(Macon Circuit Court, CC-04-026;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-0181)
SEE, Justice.
Facts and Procedural History
Milton Anderson was convicted of receiving stolen
property and was sentenced as an habitual offender  under the
Habitual Felony Offender Act to 20 years' imprisonment.  On
1060486
2
February 
12, 
2004, 
while 
incarcerated 
on 
the 
receiving-stolen-
property conviction, Anderson was indicted for robbery and
burglary.  The case-action-summary sheet suggests that trial
on the robbery and burglary charges was originally set for
April 19, 2004, but it appears that Anderson's case was
continued at least five times: on April 29, 2004, June 24,
2004, October 18, 2004, May 24, 2005, and March 28, 2006.  It
is clear from an order issued by the trial court that Anderson
requested the March 28, 2006, continuance "from the Spring
2006 Criminal Term of Court and rescheduled for trial during
the next term of Court."  The case-action-summary sheet does
not give the reasons for the other continuances, nor does it
state whether Anderson or the State sought them.  
On December 13, 2005, Anderson filed in the trial court
a "[r]equest for final disposition of untried indictments,
information or complaints and notice of place of inprisonment
[sic]."  On June 29, 2006, Anderson filed a motion to dismiss
his case on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial.
Anderson 
subsequently 
petitioned 
the 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals
for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the charges against him
should be dismissed because, he argued, his right to a speedy
1060486
3
trial had been violated.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
ordered Judge Howard Bryan to respond pursuant to Rule 21(b),
Ala. R. App. P.  Judge Bryan's order, issued on December 4,
2006, states:
"Defendant ... has filed a motion for speedy trial
in regard to an indictment pending against him in
Macon County.  Defendant is currently incarcerated
in the state penitentiary system.  It would appear
that defendant's case has been on the trial docket
for the last terms of court but that for reasons
that are not known to the court his case was not
reached.  However, defendant's case will be placed
on the docket for the next term of court and shall
receive priority for disposition."
The 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
dismissed 
Anderson's 
petition 
on
December 13, 2006.  Anderson now petitions this Court for the
writ of mandamus directing Judge Bryan to dismiss the charges
against him on the basis that his right to a speedy trial has
been violated.  We deny the petition.
Standard of Review
"This Court's standard of review applicable to
a petition for a writ of mandamus is well settled:
 
"'"Mandamus 
is 
an 
extraordinary 
remedy
and requires a showing that there is '(1)
a clear legal right in the petitioner to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon 
the 
respondent 
to 
perform, 
accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"'"
1060486
4
Ex parte Medical Assurance Co., 862 So. 2d 645, 649 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153,
156 (Ala. 2000)).
Analysis
Anderson argues that he has been denied his right to a
speedy trial under the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Alabama.  See Amend. VI, U.S.
Const. ("In 
all criminal prosecutions, 
the 
accused 
shall 
enjoy
the right to a speedy public trial ...."); Art. 1, § 6, Ala.
Const. 1901 ("[T]he accused has a right to ... a speedy,
public trial.").  Anderson contends that he is entitled to
have this Court issue the writ of mandamus directing the trial
court to dismiss the charges against him.  In determining
whether the trial court violated Anderson's right to a speedy
trial, this Court must balance the four factors set out by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972): the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant." (Footnote omitted.)  "'A single
factor is not necessarily determinative, because this is a
"balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution
1060486
The actual indictment is dated February 12, 2004;
1
however, 
the case-action-summary 
sheet 
states that 
the 
date of
the indictment was February 5, 2004.
5
and the defense are weighed."'" Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d
259 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Clopton, 656 So. 2d 1243,
1245 (Ala. 1995), quoting in turn Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
However, in order to trigger an examination of the remaining
Barker factors, the length of the delay must be "presumptively
prejudicial."  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652
(1992).
1. Length of delay
"In Alabama, '[t]he length of delay is measured from the
date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an
arrest warrant -- whichever is earlier -- to the date of the
trial.'" Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at 264 (quoting Roberson
v. State, 864 So. 2d 379, 394 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)).
Anderson was indicted on the robbery and burglary charges on
February 12, 2004.   His most recent trial setting was some-
1
time after December 4, 2006, the date on which the trial court
ordered that Anderson's case "be placed on the docket for the
next 
term 
of 
court 
and 
shall 
receive 
priority 
for
disposition."  Thus, the length of delay was approximately
1060486
6
three years.  The State concedes, and we agree, that the
length of delay is presumptively prejudicial under Alabama
caselaw.  See Mansel v. State, 716 So. 2d 234, 236 (Ala. Crim.
App. 
1997) 
("This 
court 
has 
previously 
found 
delays
substantially less than the one the appellant complains of
here [26 months] to be 'presumptively prejudicial,' requiring
an examination of the remaining Barker criteria.").  
2. Reason for the delay
"The State has the burden of justifying the delay." Ex
parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at 265.  As noted earlier, it appears
that Anderson's case has been continued at least five times.
The last continuance, on March 28, 2006, was granted at
Anderson's request.  "'"Delays occasioned by the defendant or
on his behalf are excluded from the length of the delay and
are heavily counted against the defendant in applying the
balancing test of Barker."'" Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at
265 (quoting Zumbado v. State, 615 So. 2d 1223, 1234 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993), quoting in turn McCallum v. State, 407 So.
2d 865, 868 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)).  The record does not
explain, however, why the other continuances were granted; nor
does it state which party sought them.  Because the State has
1060486
In his "Inmate request for final disposition of untried
2
indictments, information or complaints and notice of place of
inprisonment [sic]," Anderson states that he "has previously
7
failed to meet its burden of justifying the delay caused by
the other continuances, we must conclude that the remaining
delays of a little more than 25 months are attributable to the
State's negligence, and we hold that the second Barker factor
-- the reason for the delay -- weighs against the State. 
3. Anderson's assertion of his right
"Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in
favor of an accused."  Kelley v. State, 568 So. 2d 405, 410
(Ala. Crim. App. 1990).  On the other hand, an accused's
"delay [in filing a motion for a speedy trial] reduces the
significance of the appellant's assertion."  Archer v. State,
643 So. 2d 597, 599 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).  In the present
case, Anderson first requested a "final disposition of untried
indictments, information or complaints" in Alabama on December
13, 2005, a year and 10 months after he was indicted.  Then,
on March 28, 2006, he asked that his trial date be continued.
Shortly thereafter, on June 29, 2006, Anderson moved to
dismiss the case specifically "for failure to provide a Speedy
Trial."   Thus, Anderson waited nearly two years after his
2
1060486
filed a Motion for Fast and Speedy Trial." However, Anderson
has the burden of supplying this Court with a copy of that
motion.  Rule 21(a), Ala. R. App. P.  ("Application for a writ
of mandamus ... shall contain ... [c]opies of any order or
opinion or parts of the record that would be essential to an
understanding of the matters set forth in the petition.").
Because he has failed to file a copy of that motion, it is not
properly before this Court, and we do not consider it. 
8
indictment to request a "final disposition"; he subsequently
secured a further delay; and he then specifically asserted
that the trial court had failed to provide him a speedy trial.
Anderson's delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and
his own effort to delay the trial weighs against his claim.
Archer v. State, 643 So. 2d at 599 ("[T]he appellant did not
file his motion for speedy trial until ... over a year from
the date of indictment.  The fact that the appellant did not
assert his right to a speedy trial sooner 'tends to suggest
that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only
minimal prejudice prior to that date.'" (quoting Lewis v.
State, 469 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)).
4. Prejudice to Anderson
In 
analyzing 
the 
fourth 
factor, 
we 
consider 
the "interests
of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect. 
...: 
(i) 
to 
prevent 
oppressive 
pretrial
1060486
9
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired."  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532.  In the
present case, Anderson alleges that he "is currently suffering
from extremely oppressive incarceration" because he "has been
repeatedly denied work release, honor camps or lesser security
level transfer, institutional jobs and educational programs
that require custody."  Anderson was already incarcerated when
he was indicted on the current charges.  Thus, Anderson has
not suffered "extremely oppressive incarceration" "apart from
the obvious detriments suffered by any defendant incarcerated
prior to trial." Beaver v. State, 455 So. 2d 253, 255 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1984).  See also Kimberly v. State, 501 So. 2d 534,
537 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("[V]ague allegations that the
defendant had been deprived of 'many Federal benefits' and
programs and that the delay had affected his good time" are
"too vague to substantiate any claim of prejudice.").  
Anderson also alleges that his defense has been impaired
as a result of the delay.  In his petition for the writ of
mandamus, he states that he "has lost potential witnesses to
Death and Relocation, thereby rendering Anderson unable to
1060486
10
present his alibi defense as planned."  In his response brief,
Anderson elaborates on the prejudice he has suffered from the
delay, stating that
"he has lost one potential witness [Danial Pollard]
to death whose testimony would have proved that [he]
and Pollard [were] together all morning and all
afternoon but departed in the early evening, not
seeing each other for the remainder of the night,
corroborating Anderson's statement given to the
arresting Officer on the night he was arrested.  This
lost testimony would have been sufficient to refute
the state witness that testified at Anderson's
preliminary hearing on September 8, 2003 that
Anderson and Pollard [were] together around 11 or
12:O'Clock on the night of the offense and to raise
a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds as to
Anderson's innocence."
Anderson further states that he has "lost four potential
witnesses to relocation." 
In the parts of the record submitted as exhibits to his
petition, Anderson has made only bare allegations that his
defense has been impaired because "one potential witness is
now deceased (Danial Pollard), and four (4) other potential
witnesses have relocated and due to defendant's incarceration,
the new locations are unknown."  The materials contain "no
subpoenas for [these] witness[es] for the first trial date,"
nor any explanation as to what their testimony would have
been.  See Bishop v. State, 656 So. 2d 398, 403 (Ala. Crim.
1060486
11
App. 1994).  Thus, in determining whether Anderson has been
prejudiced by the alleged loss of witnesses caused by the
delay, we have only Anderson's assertion in his response brief
that the "lost testimony would have been sufficient to refute
the state witness that testified at Anderson's preliminary
hearing on September 8, 2003 that Anderson and Pollard [were]
together around 11 or 12:O'Clock on the night of the offense
and to raise a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds as to
Anderson's innocence."  However, we are unable to verify
whether the lack of such testimony in fact prejudices Anderson
based on the materials before us, and "[t]his Court is bound
by the record and cannot consider statements in brief not
supported by the record." Mauldin v. Mount Hebron United
Methodist Church, 289 Ala. 493, 495, 268 So. 2d 770, 772
(1972).  
We are also unable to determine whether the testimony that
could have been provided by Danial Pollard and the other
missing witnesses was truly material or would have been merely
cumulative.  See Howard v. State, 678 So. 2d 302, 304 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996) ("Because, however, the appellant presented
other alibi witnesses at trial, the testimony of the deceased
1060486
12
witness would have been cumulative. ... [W]e conclude that the
appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated.").
Thus, Anderson has not demonstrated that he has been
prejudiced by the delay.
"The United States Supreme Court in Doggett [v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992),] used three
hypothetical cases to demonstrate the accused's
burden under the fourth Barker factor.  The accused's
burden 'of proof in each situation varies inversely
with the [State]'s degree of culpability for the
delay.'  In the first scenario, where the state
pursues the accused 'with reasonable diligence,' the
delay -– however long -– generally is excused unless
the accused demonstrates 'specific prejudice to his
defense.'  Thus, when the state acts with reasonable
diligence in bringing the defendant to trial, the
defendant has the burden of proving prejudice caused
by the delay.
"The second situation recognized in Doggett
involves bad-faith efforts by the state to delay the
defendant's trial.  For 
example, 
intentional 
delay by
the state in order 'to gain some impermissible
advantage at trial' weighs heavily against the state,
and a bad-faith delay the length of the delay in
Doggett likely will 'present 
an 
overwhelming case for
dismissal.'  Obviously, the burden on the accused to
establish prejudice in this scenario would be minimal
at most, and depending on how heavily the other
Barker factors weigh against the state, the fourth
factor's inquiry into prejudice could be rendered
irrelevant. ...
"The third scenario recognized in Doggett
involves delay caused by the state's 'official
negligence.'  Official negligence 'occupies the
middle ground' between bad-faith delay and diligent
prosecution.  In evaluating and weighing negligent
1060486
13
delay, the court must 'determine what portion of the
delay is attributable to 
the [state]'s negligence and
whether this negligent delay is of such a duration
that prejudice to the defendant should be presumed.
The weight assigned to negligent delay 'increases as
the length of the delay increases.'  Negligent delay
may be so lengthy -– or the first three Barker
factors may weigh so heavily in the accused's favor
-– that the accused becomes entitled to a finding of
presumed prejudice.  When prejudice is presumed, the
burden shifts to the state, which must then
affirmatively 
show 
either 
that 
the 
delay 
is
'extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence,' or
'that the delay left [the defendant's] ability to
defend himself unimpaired.'"
Walker, 928 So. 2d at 267-68.
  
Anderson's case falls within the third Doggett scenario.
We do not find the State's negligent delay of approximately 25
months to be so severe as to relieve Anderson of any
responsibility to demonstrate at least some actual, as opposed
to conjectural, prejudice.  Moreover, Anderson's own conduct
in waiting 22 of those 25 months before first asserting his
right to a speedy trial, and then seeking a continuance,
suggests, absent some contrary explanation, that Anderson did
not consider the delay to be prejudicial.  
In order for this Court to issue the writ of mandamus,
Anderson must show that he has "(1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon
1060486
14
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586
So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991).  Anderson has failed to do so.
Moreover, we note that, although Anderson's trial has been
further delayed by the filing of this petition, the trial
court has specifically ordered that his case "be placed on the
docket for the next term of court and shall receive priority
for disposition."
Conclusion
Because Anderson has failed to establish that he has a
clear legal right to the relief he seeks, we deny the
petition. 
PETITION DENIED.
Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.