Case Title: In re The Estates of Herbert Allen, Edward Allen and Edna Allen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2010-408

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 95













In re Estates of Allen (2010-408)
 
2011 VT 95
 
[Filed 19-Aug-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 95 
 
No. 2010-408
 
In re The Estates of Herbert O. Allen,
  Edward E. Allen
and Edna L. Allen
Supreme Court
 
On Appeal from
Gary E. Rupe   
Superior Court, Rutland Unit,
 
    v.
Civil Division
 
 
Rupe Slate Company, Inc. a/k/a 
Rupe Slate Co. Inc. and Richard R. Rupe
May Term, 2011
 
 
 
William D. Cohen, J.
 
Tracee Oakman Rupe of Law Office of Tracee Oakman, P.C.,
Wells, for Plaintiff-Appellant
  Gary Rupe.
 
Lisa Chalidze, Benson, and Theodore A.
Parisi, Jr., Castleton, for Defendants-Appellees.
 
 
PRESENT:   Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ., and Crawford, Supr. J., 
                    
Specially Assigned
 
 
¶ 1.            
DOOLEY, J.   This case originates from a quiet-title
action by defendant Richard Rupe and his father, Michael C. Rupe, laying claim
to certain mineral rights by way of adverse possession.  Plaintiff[1] Gary Rupe, Richard's brother,
subsequently asserted his own claim to the mineral rights in question, and the
probate court granted him a one-third interest in the rights.  Defendant
and his father appealed the probate decision to the superior court, which,
after first granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on certain issues,
ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claim to the mineral rights and awarded all
rights, title, and interest to defendant.[2]
 Plaintiff now appeals this superior court judgment, arguing: (1) the
court exceeded its authority by considering more than the issues raised in the
statement of questions submitted on appeal from the probate court; (2) the
court misstated the elements of proof for adverse possession and misapplied the
law; (3) the court erred in failing to find adverse possession through
cotenancy; and (4) the court erred in its requirements relating to a claim of
unjust enrichment.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.  
¶ 2.            
The material facts of this controversy are largely undisputed.  We
include them in footnotes and in our discussion of adverse possession, infra,
¶ 12.  Here, we set out the proceedings to date because they have taken a
number of confusing twists and turns.  The value of the property at the
heart of the controversy lies in the mineral rights,
first the slate that was extracted from it and then the gravel that was sold
from it.  Everyone apparently believed that the deeded title included the
mineral rights, and the parties were in litigation over that title.[3]  That litigation ended when
plaintiff gave up all interest in the title in return for a monetary settlement
from defendant and the parties' father.  Defendant then went forward to
sell the property for use as a commercial quarry, and the purchaser discovered
that an earlier owner of the property had in 1920 sold the land but reserved
the mineral rights.[4] 
The purchaser was unwilling to go through with the purchase until defendant and
his father cleared title to the mineral rights.
¶ 3.            
Defendant and his father then brought a proceeding in probate court
pursuant to 14 V.S.A. § 1801, alleging that the 1920 owner of the mineral
rights had been deceased for over  seven years, no estate had been opened
to convey the mineral rights, and defendant and father had acquired title to
them by adverse possession.[5] 
Their claim of adverse possession, which was undisputed in the probate and
superior courts, was based on the operation of a slate quarry on the property
by defendant and father from at least 1964 until approximately 1972, followed
from 1979 to 1999 by operation of a commercial gravel pit.[6]  The probate court action enabled
the sale of the property after the probate court issued a judgment that
defendant and father owned the mineral rights by adverse possession.
 Thereafter, plaintiff, who had not been served at the commencement of the
probate court action, or otherwise given notice of the action, learned of the
judgment and moved for relief from it, claiming co-extensive rights with his
father and brother.  The probate court granted plaintiff's motion without
an evidentiary hearing on his adverse possession claim, and it awarded
plaintiff a one-third interest in the mineral rights.  
¶ 4.            
Defendant and father appealed to the superior court the decision to give
plaintiff an interest in the mineral rights.  Defendant's primary theory
on appeal was that, by virtue of the earlier litigation between the brothers
and father, plaintiff had lost any interest in the mineral rights.  This
theory was reflected in the four questions[7] that defendant and father sought to have
determined pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 72(c):   
1)           
Did the proceeding captioned "Michael C. Rupe,
Richard Rupe vs. Gary Rupe, Rutland Superior Court Docket No. SO416-97 RcC["] resulting in a Judgment Order dated May 20, 2004
resolve the parties' interest in and to the real property which is the subject
matter of this litigation, including any mineral rights described in the real
property described in the petition by the appellants filed in the Fair Haven
Probate Court pursuant to 14 V.S.A. [§] 1801, being the same land involved in
the prior declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court?
 
2)           
Is the appellee barred either through the application of [principles] of
collateral estoppel or res judicata from asserting any claim to a fractional
interest of ownership of the said mineral rights subsequently acquired by the
appellants through probate petition?
 
3)           
Did the quit claim deed dated June 4, 2004, signed by the appellee, with
respect to his claimed interest in a quarry parcel of approximately 70 acres,
and given for valuable consideration in settlement of the Superior Court title
action release and extinguish any and all claims or interests to any mineral
rights located within its boundaries?
 
4)           
If the appellee claims that there were no mineral rights appurtenant to
the land at the time of his quit claim deed, does the appellee have standing to
assert any claims to such mineral rights acquired by the appellants through
probate petition after the appellee's quitclaim release of all rights, title
and interest in the subject property?  
 
Plaintiff responded to the four questions by moving for summary judgment
on all questions raised upon appeal, arguing that the outcome of the earlier
litigation over the title to the property had no effect on the action with
respect to the mineral rights.  The superior court granted the motion for
summary judgment on August 9, 2007.
¶ 5.            
Plaintiff followed up the summary judgment with a complaint for damages,
seeking a one-third share in the proceeds from the sale of the property, based
on a theory of quantum meruit.  The docket entries indicate that this
complaint was considered a counterclaim in the appeal litigation.  A
number of status conferences ensued to determine what to do next.  During this
period, father died and the litigation continued between the brothers.  
¶ 6.            
In the status conferences, the parties presented very different views of
the effect of the summary judgment.  Plaintiff's view was that the summary
judgment meant that he owned a one-third interest in the mineral rights and the
only remaining action for the court was to determine his percentage of the sale
proceeds.  Defendant argued that he and father had sold only their
interests in the mineral rights and plaintiff's remedy, if any, lies between
him and the purchaser of the mineral rights.  Important to this appeal,
defendant also took the position that summary judgment resolved only the
preclusive effect of the earlier litigation, and plaintiff had to prove in the
superior court that he obtained a one-third interest in the mineral rights by
adverse possession.  These differences were not resolved until the second
day of the three-day trial when the trial judge ruled that plaintiff had to
prove his own adverse possession.  At the end of the trial, the court
ruled that plaintiff failed to prove his adverse possession and therefore had
no interest in the mineral rights.
¶ 7.            
Plaintiff's main argument on appeal is that, under Rule 72, the superior
court had no authority to address plaintiff's ability to prove an interest in
the mineral rights by adverse possession because this was not an issue
explicitly included in the statement of questions submitted by defendant when
the case was first appealed from the probate court.  Plaintiff argues that
the dispute over his interest in the mineral rights was concluded when the
court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on defendant's four
questions.  
¶ 8.            
In a case such as this, the proceeding in the superior court is a hybrid
of an appeal from the probate court (now probate division) and a de novo
proceeding that is conducted as if the probate court proceeding never
occurred.  See Whitton v. Scott, 120 Vt. 452, 458, 144 A.2d 706, 709-10 (1958).  In these circumstances, the
statement of questions required by Rule 72(c) has a limited function. 
Recently, we have held that while a list of certified questions is mandatory,
it only "serves to focus, but cannot limit, the issues for the court."  In re Estate of Doran, 2010 VT 13, ¶ 14, 187 Vt. 349, 993 A.2d 436.  In Doran, the statement of questions was properly
submitted, the central issue being whether the wishes of the Doran property
heirs had any bearing on decisions involving the property's sale.  Id. ¶ 8.  We held that, having answered this
certified question in the affirmative, the superior court acted within its
authority when it considered the separate issue of whether the intent of the
heirs and administrators was accomplished in the sale as this was a "logical
corollary" to the central issue on appeal and therefore within the "broad
authority given to superior courts to try probate cases anew."  Id. ¶ 14.  
¶ 9.            
Plaintiff claims that Doran is distinguishable from the case at
hand because the superior court's decision in Doran was based on
evidence presented for the first time during the superior court trial and much
of the evidence related to actions occurring after the filing of the
appeal.  While those were the facts in Doran, our rulingthat the
statement of questions does not exclude the superior court's de novo review of
related issuesis not limited to situations in which new evidence arises after
appeal.  Restricting the superior court's ability to address issues
clearly relevant to the case, but overlooked in the statement of questions,
would inhibit the superior court's ability to fully and fairly decide matters
within its jurisdiction.  
¶ 10.         The
problem in this case was different from that in Doran.   Here,
plaintiff had never been required to prove the central element of his
claimthat he had acquired an interest in the mineral rights by adverse
possession.  As the facts showed, his situation had been markedly
different from that of his brother and father, and his approach to showing
adverse possession had to be different.  The statement of questions raised
appeal issues, but, as noted above, the proceeding in the superior court was
more than an appeal, and plaintiff had to prove his underlying case.
¶
11.        
Plaintiff claims that he properly relied upon the summary judgment and
was surprised at the start of trial in 2010 when the court required him to
prove adverse possession.  He claims that he did not have time to
adequately gather evidence to support his adverse possession claim to the
mineral rights.  While we do not doubt the sincerity of plaintiff's
argument, we conclude that the surprise was avoidable.  The summary
judgment decision was an interlocutory order.  See Myers v. LaCasse,
2003 VT 86A, ¶ 10, 176 Vt. 29, 838 A.2d 50.  It was apparent from the
status conferences that the meaning of the summary judgment was disputed. 
If plaintiff believed that the summary judgment meant that he had prevailed
fully on the merits, he should have sought entry of judgment under Vermont Rule
of Civil Procedure 58.  See Powers v. Hayes, 170 Vt. 639, 640, 751 A.2d 781, 782 (2000) (mem.) (stating
that summary judgment is not entry of judgment as required for a final
judgment).  Such an action would have focused the dispute before trial and
produced a ruling that would have specified his burden of proof at trial. 
We do not believe that plaintiff's surprise prevented the trial court from
requiring him to prove his adverse possession claim.
¶ 12.         Having
established that the superior court was within its discretion to require
plaintiff to prove adverse possession, we turn to the claim itself.  The
relevant facts are as follows.  From 1964, when plaintiff was eight years
old, to 1972, when he was sixteen years old, he also participated in the quarry
operations with father.[8] 
Although the quarrying ceased in 1972, defendant and father continued to keep
up the property by maintaining the roads, removing rubbish, and paying
taxes.  From 1979 to 1999, defendant and father operated a commercial
gravel pit on the premises, but did not resume stone quarrying.  Plaintiff
did not participate in the gravel pit business, but he independently removed
some gravel for personal use and, from approximately 1985 to 1992, removed some
previously quarried slate for personal use as well.  In 1997, defendant,
plaintiff, and father applied to register the slate quarry on the property,
although plaintiff did not engage in any other acts towards reestablishment of
the quarry.[9] 

¶
13.        
Adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact.  N.A.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Pafundi, 169 Vt. 437, 438, 736 A.2d 780, 783 (1999).  As such, this Court reviews the trial court's
findings of fact in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, not
setting aside such findings unless clearly erroneous.  Id. 
However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law under a plenary,
non-deferential standard.  Id. at 438-39, 736 A.2d  at 783.
¶
14.        
Plaintiff argues that the superior court misstated the elements of proof
for adverse possession and misapplied the law.  We hold that the superior
court correctly applied the law and affirm its decision on plaintiff's adverse
possession claim.  It is well-settled that to prove adverse possession,
one must demonstrate fifteen years of open, notorious, hostile, and continuous
possession.  Barrell v. Renehan, 114 Vt. 23, 29, 39 A.2d 330, 333
(1944); see 12 V.S.A. § 501 (an action for recovery of land must be made within
fifteen years after the cause of action first accrues); see also Lysak v.
Grull, 174 Vt. 523, 526, 812 A.2d 840, 844 (2002) (mem.) ("In order to earn
title to property by adverse possession, each of the petitioners must establish
open, notorious, hostile, and continuous possession of the property through the
statutory period of fifteen years.").  As this Court stated in Barrell,
"[t]he tenant must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying."  Barrell,
114 Vt. at 29, 39 A.2d  at 333.  Moreover, where
mineral rights are severed by deed from surface rights, the owners of the
mineral rights can lose title by adverse possession of another, but merely
occupying the surface, without mining the minerals, is insufficient to
establish adverse possession.  See In re Doering, 165 Vt. 603, 605,
686 A.2d 101, 103 (1996) (mem.) (citing Nebraska and
Oklahoma cases for proposition that mere occupancy of surface is insufficient
to establish title to minerals by adverse possession); Thomason v. Mullinax,
403 So. 2d 883, 884 (Ala. 1981) (citing earlier case for proposition that "[t]o
acquire by adverse possession the title to the mineral interests . . . there
must be an actual taking or use under claim of right . . . for the period
necessary to affect [sic] the bar" and to adversely possess minerals that have
been severed in title from surface, claimant must "do some act or acts evincing
a permanency of occupation and use, as distinguished from acts merely
occasional, desultory or temporary acts suitable to the enjoyment and
appropriation of the minerals so claimed, and hostile to the rights of the
owner" (quotation omitted)).  
¶
15.        
Plaintiff's main argument appears to be that the court erred in requiring
the fifteen years to be consecutive.  Thus, he argues that he showed
adverse possession for the years 1964 to 1972 and again for the period from
1985 to 1992, and these periods should be added to reach the fifteen
years.  We have often stated that the claimant must possess the property
continuously over the fifteen-year period.  This is the same as saying the
years must be consecutive.  Plaintiff cannot add two different periods,
separated by many years, to establish the fifteen years of adverse possession. 
After his contribution to the slate quarrying business from 1964 to 1972,
plaintiff vacated the property and ceased living in the area for many years,
with no objective acts indicating that he intended to continue his possession
or return to enjoy the premises.  In other words, his "flag on the land"
was not kept "flying."  Barrell, 114 Vt. at 29, 39 A.2d  at 333.   This was true both for the slate quarrying, a
business that was discontinued, and for the gravel extraction, a business in
which he was never engaged.  Plaintiff argues that the superior court
should have considered his intent to assert possession of the mineral
rights.  While possession does not require constant presence on the land,
intention alone is not sufficient to acquire possession.  Id.; see Thomason,
403 So. 2d  at 884 (stating claimant must "do some act or acts evincing a
permanency of occupation and use, as distinguished from acts merely occasional,
desultory or temporary acts suitable to the enjoyment and appropriation of the
minerals so claimed, and hostile to the rights of the owner" (quotation
omitted)).  When plaintiff did return to the area, he visited the property
only a few isolated times to remove ready materials for his personal use and
did not take any steps to utilize the quarry.  The court reasonably found
that this minimal occupation does not rise to the level of hostile, open,
notorious, and continuous possession required for a valid independent claim to
the mineral rights.
¶
16.        
Again trying to find possession for a fifteen period, plaintiff invokes
the doctrine of constructive possession.  Constructive possession is a
doctrine "under which a claimant achieves possession of an entire plot of land
through actual occupation of a part."  N.A.S. Holdings, 169 Vt. at
441, 736 A.2d  at 784.   Plaintiff suggests
that the doctrine applies because he was constructively possessing slate while
defendant was taking gravel.  Again this argument is defeated by the
court's findings that he did not show adverse possession, even in the slate,
after 1972 and our holding that he could not put together two separate periods
of alleged possession to reach fifteen years.  We see no applicability of
the doctrine of constructive possession.
¶
17.        
Plaintiff also argues that the superior court erred in failing to
recognize his adverse possession through cotenancy with defendant and
father.  His argument here is that he had a title interest in the surface
land through the corrective deed that father gave to his three sons in 1995. 
See supra, ¶ 2 n.3.  The "corrective deed" was the source of the
1997 litigation between father and defendant on one side and plaintiff on the
other that was settled with plaintiff relinquishing any interest in title to
the land.    Plaintiff relies upon Big Run Coal & Clay
Co. v. Helton, 323 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Ky. 1959), for the proposition that if
one cotenant in possession of a jointly owned tract of land "occupies and
claims as part of that tract [an] adjoining parcel, his adverse possession of
the parcel must be deemed to be that of all co-tenants."  In that case,
the court reached this holding based on the presumption that "[t]he possession
of one cotenant is . . . the
possession of all and inures to the benefit of all."  Id. 
Here, plaintiff argues that he was a cotenant under the 1995 deed and the same
principle applies to mineral rights.
¶
18.        
We have never addressed the issue decided in Big Run Coal & Clay,
although we have recognized the fiduciary duty between cotenants.  See Cooper
v. Cooper, 173 Vt. 1, 7, 783 A.2d 430, 436
(2001).  It is certainly a stretch of the holding of Big Run Coal &
Clay to apply it where the cotenancy was disputed, the adversely possessing
tenant was acting for himself, and the adverse possession was based upon extraction
of minerals as the business activity of the cotenant in possession and not the
other cotenants.  We hold, however, that even if we accept the presumption
of cotenant benefit, and it is not rebutted, the doctrine does not apply here
where plaintiff has failed to prove that he was ever a cotenant.
¶
19.        
In its judgment, the trial court concluded, based on the evidence, that
the "purported corrective deed is ineffective to convey any right, title, or
interest of any type whatsoever to any person or entity."  Thus, plaintiff
failed to prove to the satisfaction of the trial court that he was ever a
cotenant.  Further, he relinquished any claim to that status in the
settlement of the litigation between him and defendant and father.  Under
these circumstances, he cannot claim adverse possession through a cotenancy.
¶
20.        
Because we hold that the superior court acted correctly in determining
that plaintiff had no interest in the mineral rights controverted between the
parties, we do not reach plaintiff's argument on his burden to show unjust
enrichment.
 
Affirmed.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
We refer to Gary Rupe as plaintiff because, as the case comes to us, he is
seeking monetary damages from his brother, Richard Rupe.  Similarly, we
refer to Richard Rupe as defendant.  When the action began in probate court,
Richard Rupe and his father were plaintiffs and Gary Rupe was a plaintiff
intervenor.
[2] 
Father, Michael C. Rupe, died during the pendency of the superior court action.

 
[3] 
Michael C. Rupe, father of plaintiff, defendant, and a third son, Michael S.
Rupe, acquired sole title to the Regis White Property, the property in issue in
this proceeding, in a 1960 deed that was lost and never recorded. 
Cranston H. Howe, the administrator of the Regis White Estate, issued a
Replacement Deed to the Regis White Property to father in 1973.  In 1980,
father conveyed the Regis White Property to Nancy Rupe, defendant's wife, who
later reconveyed the property to father and defendant.  
 
In 1995, father signed a "corrective deed," purporting
to transfer his ownership interest in the Regis White Property to all of his
three sons.  In July 1997, however, father and defendant filed a claim in
superior court against plaintiff, alleging that the 1995 corrective deed was
fraudulently obtained.  The parties dismissed the litigation with
prejudice on stipulation in 2004, with plaintiff executing a quitclaim deed for
the Regis White Property in return for a $25,000 settlement from defendant. 

 
[4] 
The mineral rights in question are located on the southerly three-quarters of a
parcel of property that was conveyed in 1920 from the Allen family to John E.
Owens.  The Owens family transferred the property to the Rutland Savings
Bank in 1935, and the bank, in turn, transferred the property to Regis E. White
in 1938.  In their original transfer to Mr. Owens, the Allen family excepted and reserved the mineral rights, known as the
"Allen Mineral Rights," from the seventy-acre property.  Defendant tracked
the mineral rights to the heirs of Mary Allen, who died in 1931.  No
estates were opened for these heirs.  
 
[5]  A § 1801 proceeding is brought in
probate court when "the record title to real estate or an interest therein
stands in the name of a person who has been deceased for more than seven years
and the estate of such person has not been probated and the interest of the
heirs in that real estate has not been conveyed or has been defectively
conveyed."  In such a case, the probate division of the superior court
"where venue lies, upon verified petition and after notice and hearing as
provided by the rules of probate procedure, shall determine whether the
deceased person or the decedent's heirs are possessed of an existing
enforceable title or interest in that real estate."  14
V.S.A. § 1801.  In In re Estate of Allen, 129 Vt. 107,
111-12, 272 A.2d 130, 133 (1970), this Court held that if the circumstances
present in the statute were satisfied, the probate court could determine that a
party without record title holds title by adverse possession.   
 
[6] 
The probate court found that defendant and father were in continuous possession
from 1973 to 2006.  
[7] 
Defendant attempted to add a fifth question by amendment to the preexisting
questions.  The additional question is not relevant to this decision.
[8] 
In fact, there is conflicting evidence as to whether plaintiff actually
"worked" in the quarry, or was simply being watched while his brother and
father worked, but this is immaterial to the outcome of this case.  
 
[9] 
Pursuant to Act 250, 10 V.S.A. § 6081(l)(1), the owners of preexisting slate
quarries were required to register them to avoid Act 250 review.  Since
ownership was disputed, all claimants signed the registration.  This
occurred after the "corrective deed" purported to give plaintiff an interest in
the property and just before defendant and father brought the action against
plaintiff for an adjudication that plaintiff held no
interest in the property.  This was well before the parties realized that
they had no deeded title to the mineral rights.