Case Title: Estate of McCall v. United States

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-1148

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1148 
____________ 
 
ESTATE OF MICHELLE EVETTE MCCALL, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
 
[March 13, 2014] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court to answer four questions of Florida law 
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that are 
determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no 
controlling precedent.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  In 
Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh 
Circuit certified the following questions: 
(1) DOES THE STATUTORY CAP ON NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES, FLA. STAT. § 766.118, VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE 
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? 
 
 
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(2) DOES THE STATUTORY CAP ON NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES, FLA. STAT. § 766.118, VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO THE COURTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 21 OF 
THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? 
(3) DOES THE STATUTORY CAP ON NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES, FLA. STAT. § 766.118, VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO 
TRIAL BY JURY UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE 
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?  
(4) DOES THE STATUTORY CAP ON NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES, FLA. STAT. § 766.118, VIOLATE THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE II, 
SECTION 3 AND ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION? 
Id. at 952-53.  Because this case involves a wrongful death, we rephrase the first 
certified question as follows: 
DOES THE STATUTORY CAP ON WRONGFUL DEATH 
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES, FLA. STAT. § 766.118, VIOLATE 
THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 2 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? 
As explained below, we answer the first rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative and hold that the cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages 
provided in section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Florida Constitution.  We find it unnecessary to answer the remaining 
certified questions because Florida’s Wrongful Death Act is of statutory origin, 
and the present case is under the Federal Tort Claims Act and its procedures. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit detailed the facts regarding the legal 
 
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action filed by the estate of Michelle McCall, Ms. McCall’s parents, and the father 
of Ms. McCall’s son (Petitioners) against the United States: 
During June 2005, Michelle McCall received prenatal medical 
care at a United States Air Force clinic as an Air Force dependent.  
Ms. McCall opted for the Air Force’s family practice department to 
provide primary prenatal care and delivery services throughout her 
pregnancy.  She had a healthy and normal pregnancy until the last 
trimester.  On February 21, 2006, test results revealed that Ms. 
McCall’s blood pressure was high and that she was suffering from 
severe preeclampsia.  Ms. McCall’s serious condition required that 
labor be induced immediately. 
Instead of transferring Ms. McCall to the OB/GYN department, 
the family practice department continued to provide medical care.  
The Air Force hospital was temporarily unavailable for obstetric and 
delivery services, so members of the family practice department 
transferred Ms. McCall to the Fort Walton Beach Medical Center 
instead.  There, Air Force family practice doctors treated Ms. McCall 
for hypertension and induced labor.  When Ms. McCall dilated to five 
centimeters, her contractions slowed and became weaker.  The Air 
Force family practice doctors treating Ms. McCall called an Air Force 
obstetrician, Dr. Archibald, and asked if he could perform a cesarean 
section.  Dr. Archibald reported that he was performing another 
surgery and would not be available to perform a cesarean section on 
Ms. McCall until after he finished that surgery.  The Air Force family 
practice doctors prepared Ms. McCall for a cesarean section but did 
not call other obstetricians to determine if one was available to 
provide immediate medical care. 
On February 22, 2006, Dr. Archibald finally arrived to perform 
the cesarean section, but Ms. McCall’s contractions had resumed and 
the Air Force family practice doctors decided to allow Ms. McCall to 
deliver vaginally.  Dr. Archibald left the Fort Walton Medical Center. 
On February 23, 2006 at 1:25 a.m., Ms. McCall delivered a healthy 
baby boy.  Family members who visited Ms. McCall after the delivery 
expressed concerns about the amount of blood Ms. McCall had lost 
during delivery.  Medical personnel assured these family members 
that Ms. McCall was stable. 
Thirty-five minutes later, when the placenta had not delivered 
as expected, two family practice doctors from the family practice 
 
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department tried without success to manually extract the placenta.  An 
Air Force nurse anesthetist administered additional epidural pain relief 
and gave Ms. McCall two separate doses of Morphine intravenously.  
Around 2:35 a.m., the family practice department doctors called Dr. 
Archibald, the obstetrician, for assistance when they could not remove 
the placenta manually. 
Ms. McCall’s blood pressure began to drop rapidly and 
remained dangerously low over the next two and a half hours.  The 
Air Force nurse anesthetist monitoring Ms. McCall’s vital signs did 
not notify the family practice doctors of the drop in Ms. McCall’s 
blood pressure.  Dr. Archibald arrived at 2:45 a.m. and removed the 
placenta within five minutes.  The family practice department doctors 
informed Dr. Archibald that Ms. McCall had not lost much blood 
during delivery.  Dr. Archibald, however, noticed severe vaginal 
lacerations and worked to repair them over the next hour.  During that 
time, the Air Force nurse anesthetist monitored Ms. McCall’s vital 
signs, reported to Dr. Archibald that they were stable, and failed to 
inform him that Ms. McCall’s blood pressure was dangerously low 
and continuing to drop.  Dr. Archibald never checked the vital signs 
himself and relied exclusively on the nurse to inform him of any blood 
pressure changes or problems. 
At 3:50 a.m. when Dr. Archibald finished his work, he 
requested an immediate blood count and, if needed, a transfusion to 
compensate for the blood Ms. McCall lost during the procedure.  
Forty minutes later, the family practice department physician ordered 
the blood count test.  Forty minutes after that, and over an hour after 
Dr. Archibald had requested immediate blood work, a nurse attempted 
to draw blood from Ms. McCall.  Ms. McCall was unresponsive.  She 
had gone into shock and cardiac arrest as a result of severe blood loss.  
It is not clear how long Ms. McCall had been in this state, since no 
one had monitored her or checked her status for the hour following 
Dr. Archibald’s procedure.  Ms. McCall never regained consciousness 
and was removed from life support on February 27, 2006. 
 
Id. at 946-47. 
The Petitioners filed an action against the United States under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80.  Id. at 947.  In addition 
 
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to finding the United States liable under the FTCA, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida determined that the Petitioners’ economic 
damages, or financial losses, amounted to $980,462.40.  Id.  The district court 
concluded that the Petitioners’ noneconomic damages, or nonfinancial losses, 
totaled $2 million, including $500,000 for Ms. McCall’s son and $750,000 for each 
of her parents.  Id. 
However, the district court limited the Petitioners’ recovery of wrongful 
death noneconomic damages to $1 million upon application of section 766.118(2), 
Florida Statutes (2005), Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic 
damages based on medical malpractice claims.  Id.1
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the Petitioners challenged the district 
court’s rulings with regard to both the application and the constitutionality of the 
cap mandated by Florida law on wrongful death noneconomic damages for medical 
  The district court denied a 
motion filed by the Petitioners that challenged the constitutionality of Florida’s 
wrongful death statutory cap under both the Florida and United States 
Constitutions.  Id.  The district court also denied the Petitioners’ motion to alter or 
amend the judgment.  Id. at 947-48.  
                                         
 
1.  Under the FTCA, damages are “determined by the law of the State where 
the tortious act was committed, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), . . . subject to the limitations 
that the United States shall not be liable for ‘interest prior to judgment or for 
punitive damages.’ ”  Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956) (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2674). 
 
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malpractice claims.  Id. at 948.  The Petitioners contended that the statutory cap 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  Id.  They also asserted that the cap violates the 
following provisions of the Florida Constitution: (1) the separation of powers 
guarantee in article II, section 3 and article V, section 1; (2) the right to trial by 
jury under article I, section 22; (3) the right of access to the courts under article I, 
section 21; (4) the right to equal protection under article I, section 2; and (5) the 
prohibition against the taking of private property without full compensation under 
article X, section 6.  Id.   
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the application of the statutory cap on 
noneconomic damages and held that the statute does not constitute a taking in 
violation of article X, section 6, of the Florida Constitution.  Id. at 953.  The 
federal appellate court also held that the cap does not violate either the Equal 
Protection Clause or the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.  Id.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit granted a motion filed by the Petitioners to certify 
four questions to this Court regarding the remaining challenges to the statutory cap 
under the Florida Constitution.  Id.   
 
 
 
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STATUTORY PROVISION 
 
At issue is Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death2
(2) Limitation on noneconomic damages for negligence of 
practitioners.— 
 noneconomic damages 
in medical negligence actions as articulated in section 766.118.  Section 
766.118(2) states:  
(a) With respect to a cause of action for personal injury or 
wrongful death arising from medical negligence of practitioners, 
regardless of the number of such practitioner defendants, 
noneconomic damages shall not exceed $500,000 per claimant.  No 
practitioner shall be liable for more than $500,000 in noneconomic 
damages, regardless of the number of claimants. 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), if the negligence resulted in 
a permanent vegetative state or death, the total noneconomic damages 
recoverable from all practitioners, regardless of the number of 
claimants, under this paragraph shall not exceed $1 million.  In cases 
that do not involve death or permanent vegetative state, the patient 
injured by medical negligence may recover noneconomic damages not 
to exceed $1 million if: 
1. The trial court determines that a manifest injustice would 
occur unless increased noneconomic damages are awarded, based on a 
finding that because of the special circumstances of the case, the 
noneconomic harm sustained by the injured patient was particularly 
severe; and 
2. The trier of fact determines that the defendant’s negligence 
caused a catastrophic injury to the patient. 
(c) The total noneconomic damages recoverable by all 
claimants from all practitioner defendants under this subsection shall 
not exceed $1 million in the aggregate. 
 
                                         
 
2.  The legal analyses for personal injury damages and wrongful death 
damages are not the same.  The present case is exclusively related to wrongful 
death, and our analysis is limited accordingly.   
 
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§ 766.118(2), Fla. Stat.3
EQUAL PROTECTION 
  Noneconomic damages refer to “nonfinancial losses . . . 
including pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish . 
. . loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses to the extent 
the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the 
Wrongful Death Act.”  § 766.202(8), Fla. Stat. (2005) (incorporated in § 
766.118(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005)).   
We have rephrased the first question certified to this Court by the Eleventh 
Circuit which addresses whether the cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages 
under section 766.118 violates the right to equal protection guaranteed by the 
Florida Constitution.  The Florida Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 
All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law. 
Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.  This Court has stated “[t]he constitutional right of equal 
protection of the laws means that everyone is entitled to stand before the law on 
                                         
3.  Section 766.118 separates the cap on noneconomic damages into two 
categories, providing different limitations on damages for practitioners and 
nonpractitioners.  See § 766.118(2), (3), Fla. Stat.  Section 766.118(3), Florida 
Statutes, limits noneconomic damages for the negligence of nonpractitioner 
defendants.  The Petitioners asserted that they were entitled to recover under this 
subsection as well; however, the federal district court noted that “no evidence at 
trial singled out a specific nonpractitioner for negligent conduct.”  McCall, 642 
F.3d at 948-49 (quoting Estate of McCall v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 
1295 (N.D. Fla. 2009)).  The federal district court concluded that the Petitioners 
had failed to establish that Ms. McCall’s death resulted from the negligence of a 
nonpractitioner, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this determination.  Id. at 949.  
 
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equal terms with, to enjoy the same rights as belong to, and to bear the same 
burden as are imposed upon others in a like situation.”  Caldwell v. Mann, 26 So. 
2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1946).   
Unless a suspect class or fundamental right protected by the Florida 
Constitution is implicated by the challenged provision, the rational basis test will 
apply to evaluate an equal protection challenge.  See Amerisure Ins. Co. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 897 So. 2d 1287, 1291 n.2 (Fla. 2005).  To satisfy the 
rational basis test, a statute must bear a rational and reasonable relationship to a 
legitimate state objective, and it cannot be arbitrary or capriciously imposed.  
Dep’t of Corr. v. Fla. Nurses Ass’n, 508 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 1987).  Stated 
another way, the test for consideration of equal protection is whether individuals 
have been classified separately based on a difference which has a reasonable 
relationship to the applicable statute, and the classification can never be made 
arbitrarily without a reasonable and rational basis.   
Having carefully considered the arguments of both parties and the amici, we 
conclude that section 766.118 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida 
Constitution under the rational basis test.  The statutory cap on wrongful death 
noneconomic damages fails because it imposes unfair and illogical burdens on 
injured parties when an act of medical negligence gives rise to multiple claimants.  
In such circumstances, medical malpractice claimants do not receive the same 
 
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rights to full compensation because of arbitrarily diminished compensation for 
legally cognizable claims.  Further, the statutory cap on wrongful death 
noneconomic damages does not bear a rational relationship to the stated purpose 
that the cap is purported to address, the alleged medical malpractice insurance 
crisis in Florida.   
Arbitrary Distinctions 
This Court previously reasoned in St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 
So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000), that the type of classification addressed in this case is 
purely arbitrary and unrelated to a true state interest.  We clearly announced in 
Phillipe that aggregate caps or limitations on noneconomic damages violate equal 
protection guarantees under the Florida Constitution when applied without regard 
to the number of claimants entitled to recovery.  This inherently discriminatory 
action and resulting invidious discrimination do not pass constitutional muster.  
We stated:  
If we were to accept St. Mary’s contention that the Legislature 
intended to limit noneconomic damages to $250,000 per incident in 
the aggregate, then the death of a wife who leaves only a surviving 
spouse to claim the $250,000 is not equal to the death of a wife who 
leaves a surviving spouse and four minor children, resulting in five 
claimants to divide $250,000.  We fail to see how this classification 
bears any rational relationship to the Legislature’s stated goal of 
alleviating the financial crisis in the medical liability industry.  Such a 
categorization offends the fundamental notion of equal justice under 
the law and can only be described as purely arbitrary and unrelated to 
any state interest. 
 
 
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Id. at 972 (emphasis supplied).   
The equal protection violation identified by Phillipe is evident in the present 
case.  The plain language of this statutory plan irrationally impacts circumstances 
which have multiple claimants/survivors differently and far less favorably than 
circumstances in which there is a single claimant/survivor and also exacts an 
irrational and unreasonable cost and impact when, as here, the victim of medical 
negligence has a large family, all of whom have been adversely impacted and 
affected by the death.  Three separate noneconomic damage determinations were 
assessed by the federal district court based on the evidence presented.  The 
damages suffered by Ms. McCall’s parents were determined to be $750,000 each, 
and Ms. McCall’s surviving son sustained damages determined to be $500,000.  
Applying the cap, the federal court then reduced the amounts of damages so each 
claimant would receive only half of his or her respective damages.  Yet, if Ms. 
McCall had been survived only by her son, he would have recovered the full 
amount of his noneconomic damages: $500,000.  Here, the cap delineated in 
section 766.118 limited the recovery of a surviving child (and surviving parents) 
simply because others also suffered losses.  In a larger context, under section 
766.118, the greater the number of survivors and the more devastating their losses 
are, the less likely they are to be fully compensated for those losses.   
Other state supreme courts have struck down caps on noneconomic damages 
 
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based upon a similar rationale.  In holding that a $500,000 cap per plaintiff on 
noneconomic damages in negligence and product liability actions violated the state 
constitution,4
In the first example . . . three plaintiffs are injured as a result of 
the same tortfeasor’s negligence.  Plaintiff A is injured moderately, 
and suffers pain, disability and disfigurement for a month.  Plaintiff B 
is severely injured and suffers one year of pain and disability.  
Plaintiff C is drastically injured, and suffers permanent pain and 
disability.  . . .  [I]t is further assumed that a jury awards plaintiffs A 
and B $100,000 in compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries.  
Plaintiff C receives $1 million for his permanent, lifelong pain and 
disability. 
 the Supreme Court of Illinois aptly described how the cap operated 
to discriminate against claimants who have suffered the most grievous injuries, 
while benefitting the tortfeasor and/or the insurance company: 
. . . 
The tortfeasors in this example are also treated differently, 
without any justification.  The tortfeasor who injures plaintiffs A and 
B is liable for the full amount of fairly assessed compensatory 
damages.  In contrast, [the challenged legislation] 
With respect to plaintiff C, [the challenged legislation] 
arbitrarily and automatically reduces the jury’s award for a lifetime of 
pain and disability, without regard to whether or not the verdict, 
before reduction, was reasonable and fair. 
confers a benefit on 
the similarly situated tortfeasor who injures plaintiff C
                                         
 
4.  The Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that the cap violated the special 
legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution.  Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 
N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997).  This clause “expressly prohibits the General 
Assembly from conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a 
group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated.”  Id. at 1069.  The 
Supreme Court of Illinois noted that special legislation constitutional challenges 
are generally “judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection 
challenge.”  Id. at 1070-71. 
.  This 
tortfeasor pays only a portion of fairly assessed compensatory 
damages because of the limitation [on noneconomic damages].  
 
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Therefore, the statute discriminates between slightly and severely 
injured plaintiffs, and also between tortfeasors who cause severe and 
moderate or minor injuries. 
 
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1075 (Ill. 1997) (emphasis 
supplied).  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire condemned on equal protection 
grounds a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, 
concluding that it is “simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of 
supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most 
severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation.”  Carson v. Maurer, 
424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980), overruled on other grounds, Cmty. Res. for 
Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H. 2007).   
Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, has the effect of saving a modest amount 
for many by imposing devastating costs on a few—those who are most grievously 
injured, those who sustain the greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants for 
whom judicially determined noneconomic damages are subject to division and 
reduction simply based upon the existence of the cap.  Under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Florida Constitution, and guided by our decision in Phillipe, we hold 
that to reduce damages in this fashion is not only arbitrary, but irrational, and we 
conclude that it “offends the fundamental notion of equal justice under the law.”  
Phillipe, 769 So. 2d at 972; see also id. at 971 (“Differentiating between a single 
claimant and multiple claimants bears no rational relationship to the Legislature’s 
 
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stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical liability insurance 
industry.”). 
Our holding today is not inconsistent with the decisions in Samples v. 
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n, 114 So. 3d 912 
(Fla. 2013), Mizrahi v. North Miami Medical Center, 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000), 
or University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993), because a review of 
those cases reveals that they involved statutes or challenges which are 
distinguishable from the present challenge to section 766.118.  In Samples, the 
statute at issue created funding and authorized a $100,000 award to parents under 
the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan), which 
was structured with other benefits and provided compensation without regard to 
fault for birth-related neurological injury claims.  114 So. 3d at 914-15; see also § 
766.303, Fla. Stat. (2013).  In rejecting an equal protection challenge on the basis 
that the statute treats a parent who files for the $100,000 award alone differently 
than parents who share or divide the award, this Court distinguished the decision in 
Phillipe, upon which we rely today: 
Whereas the provision of the Medical Malpractice Act at issue in 
[Phillipe] expressly concerns fault-based noneconomic damages for 
survivors of the deceased, the Plan at issue here establishes a system 
of no-fault compensation.  The no-fault character of the Plan sets the 
parental award provision apart from the statutory limitation on fault-
based damages at issue in [Phillipe].  Limitations on damages that 
raise equal protection concerns under a fault-based system are 
dissimilar and appropriately viewed differently than limitations on 
 
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compensation under a system where eligible claimants are assured of 
a recovery without regard to fault. 
114 So. 3d at 919.  Here, as in Phillipe, section 766.118 concerns the award of 
damages in a traditional fault-based action.  Further, section 766.118 arbitrarily 
reduces damages without regard to the fault of a tortfeasor simply based upon the 
number of survivors who are entitled to recovery.  This is clearly distinguishable 
from the no-fault compensation award under the Plan at issue in Samples.  The 
Plan was created by the Florida Legislature with the express purpose of “providing 
compensation, irrespective of fault, for birth-related neurological injury claims.”  § 
766.303(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis supplied).  We reiterate that the present 
case does not involve a statutorily-created no-fault compensation plan.  Thus, the 
two statutory schemes are, quite simply, completely different and distinct.  
Accordingly, Samples is distinguishable from the present case and, contrary to the 
assertion of the dissent, does not control, or even inform, the outcome here.   
 
Mizrahi involved a statute that precluded adult children of wrongful death 
victims from recovering noneconomic damages where the cause of death was 
medical malpractice.  761 So. 2d at 1041.  In rejecting an equal protection 
challenge, we noted that under the common law an adult who was not dependant 
on a parent had no action and could not recover damages for injuries to that parent.  
Id. at 1042 (quoting Stewart v. Price, 718 So. 2d 205, 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)).  
When the Legislature created the right for adult children to recover damages for 
 
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the injuries and wrongful death of a parent, it chose to exclude those children from 
recovering noneconomic damages in one type of action (medical malpractice).  Id.  
We ultimately held that the statute, “which created a right of action for many while 
excluding a specific class from such action, and which exclusion is rationally 
related to controlling healthcare costs and accessibility,” did not violate equal 
protection.  Id. at 1043.   
Unlike Mizrahi, the statute under review here does not address and expand a 
class of individuals eligible to recover noneconomic wrongful death damages.  
Instead, it treats similarly situated, eligible survivors differently by reducing the 
damages awarded without regard to the fault of the wrongdoer and based solely 
upon a completely arbitrary factor, i.e., how many survivors are entitled to 
recovery.  The greater the number of survivors who are eligible to recover 
noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice wrongful death action, the lesser 
the award that each individual survivor will receive.  Thus, the statute at issue in 
Mizrahi is also distinguishable from the noneconomic damages caps in section 
766.118.   
Finally, in Echarte this Court considered whether a $250,000 cap on 
noneconomic damages for medical malpractice claims where a party requested 
arbitration violated the access to courts provision of the Florida Constitution.  618 
So. 2d at 190, 193.  In the present case, because we address only an equal 
 
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protection challenge—not an access to courts challenge—Echarte is inapposite.  
Nevertheless, the holding in Echarte that the cap was constitutional does not 
impact our decision today.  In upholding the constitutionality of the cap in medical 
malpractice arbitration proceedings, this Court in Echarte noted that arbitration 
provided commensurate benefits in exchange for the cap, such as saving the 
expense of attorney fees and expert witnesses.  Id. at 194.  Conversely, under 
section 766.118, survivors receive absolutely no benefit whatsoever from the cap 
on noneconomic damages, but only arbitrary reductions based upon the number of 
survivors.   
Moreover, the statute imposing the cap in Echarte was later addressed by 
this Court in Phillipe.  In Phillipe, we held that the cap applied per claimant rather 
than per incident, and noted that to hold otherwise would create equal protection 
concerns.  769 So. 2d at 971.   In reaching this conclusion, we expressly stated that 
“Echarte does not control our decision.”  Id.  Similarly, Echarte does not compel a 
different result here.  Rather, Phillipe, which recognized that Echarte did not 
address a circumstance in which similarly situated survivors would receive 
different, arbitrarily reduced noneconomic damage awards solely based upon the 
number of survivors, is the decision which guides our analysis as to the 
constitutionality of section 766.118.  See Phillipe, 769 So. 2d at 971 (noting that 
 
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“the loss of a survivor is not diminished by the mere fact that there are multiple 
survivors”).    
Despite our discussion of Phillipe, we emphasize that, contrary to the 
assertion in the concurring in result opinion, our examination of the validity of 
section 766.118 cannot simply conclude without further analysis.  The statute at 
issue in Phillipe, related to damage limits, is not identical to the factors in the 
present case.  Phillipe involved a very different statutory scheme, based upon 
noneconomic damage awards in the arbitration context, a factual scenario not 
presented here.  Therefore, while Phillipe provides guidance and may be 
considered persuasive, it is not dispositive of our equal protection analysis today.  
We cannot take the drastic step of invalidating a statute simply by declaring it so 
and relying upon an unrelated case which evaluated an unrelated statute.  Instead, a 
comprehensive equal protection analysis of the cap on damages in section 766.118 
is required under Florida law to resolve the certified question.  Accordingly, a 
description of the elements of an equal protection review, and our evaluation of 
those elements, must follow.  This is a consideration of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the challenged statute and the subject matter it addresses.  
The Alleged Medical Malpractice Crisis 
In addition to arbitrary and invidious discrimination between medical 
malpractice claimants, the cap on noneconomic damages also violates the Equal 
 
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Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution because it bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate state objective, thereby failing the rational basis test.  
See Fla. Nurses Ass’n, 508 So. 2d at 319.  Although the concurring in result 
opinion seeks to avoid a full proper legal analysis, contrary to the view of that 
opinion, no single prior case provides a complete answer and none provides any 
legal analysis which affords a basis for an answer to the question we must address.  
Our precedent expressly states that a proper equal protection analysis under the 
rational basis test “requires this Court to determine: (1) whether the challenged 
statute serves a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) whether it was 
reasonable for the Legislature to believe that the challenged classification would 
promote that purpose.”  Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 
1090, 1095 (Fla. 2005) (emphasis supplied); see also Zapo v. Gilreath, 779 So. 2d 
651, 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Fla. Dept. of Ins. v. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 
So. 2d 599, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).  Thus, under Warren, and contrary to the 
view of the concurring in result opinion, both prongs of the rational basis test must 
be evaluated to determine the constitutionality of a statute. 
Despite this precedent, the concurring in result opinion loudly proclaims that 
the full rational basis test be ignored and the legitimacy of the purpose for the cap 
not be addressed as part of our constitutional analysis.  Further, that concurring in 
result opinion argues that only a single decision which does not set forth a proper 
 
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analysis be applied.  However, we would abandon our obligation under Warren 
were we to simply rubber stamp the Legislature’s asserted justification for the 
cap—as the concurring in result and dissenting opinions suggest we do—and fail 
to consider the existing factors and circumstances to determine whether there is 
legitimacy to that justification.  We decline to abdicate our responsibility under the 
law and, therefore, address whether the cap “serves a legitimate governmental 
purpose” pursuant to the first prong of Warren.  899 So. 2d at 1095 (emphasis 
supplied).  
The Florida Legislature attempted to justify the cap on noneconomic 
damages by claiming that “Florida is in the midst of a medical malpractice 
insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude.”  Ch. 2003-416, § 1, Laws of Fla., at 
4035.  The Legislature asserted that the increase in medical malpractice liability 
insurance premiums has resulted in physicians leaving Florida, retiring early from 
the practice of medicine, or refusing to perform high-risk procedures, thereby 
limiting the availability of health care.  Id.   
In enacting the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, the Legislature 
relied heavily on a report prepared by the Governor’s Select Task Force on 
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance (Task Force), which concluded that 
“actual and potential jury awards of noneconomic damages (such as pain and 
suffering) are a key factor (perhaps the most important factor) behind the 
 
- 21 - 
unavailability and un-affordability of medical malpractice insurance in Florida.”  
Report of Governor’s Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability 
Insurance (Task Force Report) (Jan. 29, 2003), at xvii.   
To evaluate the constitutionality of the cap on noneconomic damages 
imposed by section 766.118, we are not required to accept the findings of the 
Legislature or the Task Force at face value.  Instead: 
While courts may defer to legislative statements of policy and 
fact, courts may do so only when those statements are based on actual 
findings of fact, and even then courts must conduct their own inquiry: 
The general rule is that findings of fact made by 
the legislature are presumptively correct.  However, it is 
well-recognized that the findings of fact made by the 
legislature must actually be findings of fact.  They are not 
entitled to the presumption of correctness if they are 
nothing more than recitations amounting only to 
conclusions and they are always subject to judicial 
inquiry. 
N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Serv., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 627 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting Moore v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla. 1960)) (some 
emphasis supplied).   
Our consideration of the factors and circumstances involved demonstrates 
that the conclusions reached by the Florida Legislature as to the existence of a 
medical malpractice crisis are not fully supported by available data.  Instead, the 
alleged interest of health care being unavailable is completely undermined by 
authoritative government reports.  Those government reports have indicated that 
 
- 22 - 
the numbers of physicians in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have 
increased.  For example, in a 2003 report, the United States General Accounting 
Office found that from 1991 to 2001, Florida’s physician supply per 100,000 
people grew from 214 to 237 in metropolitan areas and from 98 to 117 in 
nonmetropolitan areas, or percentage increases of 10.7 and 19, respectively.  
Physician Workforce: Physician Supply Increased in Metropolitan and 
Nonmetropolitan Areas but Geographic Disparities Persisted, No. GAO-04-124, 
(Oct. 31, 2003), at 23, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04124.pdf.  
Thus, during this purported crisis, the numbers of physicians in Florida were 
actually increasing, not decreasing.   
Additionally, an analysis of claim activity certainly does not provide a 
rational basis for the clear discrimination presented by the legislation.  Although 
assertions of a malpractice insurance crisis are often accompanied by images of 
runaway juries entering verdicts in exorbitant amounts of noneconomic damages, 
see, e.g., Task Force Report at xvii, one study revealed that in Florida cases which 
resulted in payments of $1 million or more over a fourteen-year period, only 7.5 
percent involved a jury trial verdict.  See Neil Vidmar, Kara MacKillop & Paul 
Lee, Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-Verdict and Pre-
 
- 23 - 
Suit Settlements, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1345-46 (2006).5  Moreover, 10.1 percent 
of settlements that involved payments of $1 million or more were resolved without 
a legal action ever being filed.  Id. at 1360.  Such statistics led the authors of the 
study to conclude that jury trials constitute only a very small portion of medical 
malpractice payments.  Id. at 1345.  The authors also concluded that “tort reform 
efforts focused on jury verdicts are misdirected, at least with respect to $1 million 
verdicts in Florida.  Not only do jury trials constitute only a small portion of $1 
million payments, [but] the settlements following verdicts tend to be substantially 
less than the jury awards.”  Id. at 1381 (emphasis supplied).6
Even the Task Force whose report was relied upon by the Florida 
Legislature employed extremely equivocal language and speculation when 
  Thus, available data 
indicates the Task Force’s finding that noneconomic damage awards by juries are a 
primary cause of the purported medical malpractice crisis in Florida is most 
questionable.   
                                         
 
5.  Further, a national study reflects that from 1991 until 2003, judgments at 
trial accounted for only 4 percent of all malpractice payments.  Amitabh Chandra, 
Shantanu Nundy, & Seth A. Seabury, The Growth Of Physician Medical 
Malpractice Payments: Evidence From The National Practitioner Data Bank, 
Health Affairs at W5-240, W5-243 (May 31, 2005), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/05/31/hlthaff.w5.240.full.pdf+ht
ml.    
 
6.  According to the authors, with one exception, cases with verdicts in 
excess of $4 million settled for, on average, 37 percent less than the verdict.  
Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida, 59 Vand. L. Rev. at 1380.   
 
- 24 - 
describing the existence of a crisis.  For example, the Task Force stated that it 
“believes” the alleged crisis “could get worse in the coming years. . . .  Medical 
malpractice insurance premiums may become unaffordable, and/or coverage may 
become unavailable at any price to many physicians and hospitals.”  See Task 
Force Report, at 211-12 (emphasis supplied).  Further, despite blaming “actual and 
potential jury awards of noneconomic damages” for this ominous prediction, Task 
Force Report at xvii, the Task Force recognized that there are other explanations 
for the dramatic rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums.  For example, the 
Task Force Report notes that in the opinion of Joanne Doroshow, Executive 
Director of the Center for Justice and Democracy:  
[T]his so-called “crisis” is nothing more than the underwriting cycle 
of the insurance industry, and driven by the same factors that caused 
the “crises” in the 1970s and 1980s.  According to . . . Doroshow, 
with each crisis, there has been a severe drop in the investment 
income for insurers, which has been compounded by sever [sic] 
under-pricing of insurance premiums in the prior years. . . .  [D]uring 
years of high interest rates or excellent insurer profits that are invested 
for maximum return, the insurance companies engage in fierce 
competition for premium dollars by selling under-priced premiums 
and insuring very poor risks.  Then . . . when investment income 
drops, either due to increases in interest rates or the stock market, or 
due to low income resulting from unbearably low premiums, the 
insurance industry responds by sharply increasing premiums and 
reducing coverage.   
 
. . . The tort reform changes in the 1980s had nothing to do with 
the flattening of rates.  The flattening was caused instead by 
modulations in the insurance cycle throughout the country. 
 
Task Force Report, at 64 (footnotes omitted).  The Task Force itself 
 
- 25 - 
acknowledged: 
 
Medical malpractice insurance has been subject to sudden jolts, 
both in availability of coverage and cost.  An entire cycle has been 
defined as the period of years in which insurer underwriting profits 
cycle from above average to below average.  These cycles have 
always occurred in the insurance industry, particularly in medical 
malpractice insurance.   
Task Force Report, at 31 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).  See also Tom 
Baker, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 53-54 (2005) (“[T]he two most recent 
medical liability insurance crises did not result from sudden or dramatic increases 
in medical malpractice settlements or jury verdicts.  . . . [T]he crises resulted from 
dramatic increases in the amount of money that the insurance industry put in 
reserve for claims.  Those reserve increases were so big because the insurance 
industry systematically underreserved in the years leading up to the crisis.”). 
 
Finally, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee and debate within 
the Florida Senate raised questions concerning the magnitude of any purported 
health care crisis.  With regard to the former, the deputy director of the Florida 
Office of Insurance Regulation testified he had found no evidence to suggest that 
there had been a large increase in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed in Florida, 
nor was there any evidence of excessive jury verdicts in the prior three years.   
Testimony of Steve Roddenberry, Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting, July 14, 
2003, at 3, 10.   
 
During the subsequent floor debate, the following dialogue occurred 
 
- 26 - 
between a senator and the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
SENATOR:  Were you able to determine whether or not there 
is an access to health care crisis in terms of the number of doctors 
licensed to practice medicine, the number of hospital closures or the 
number of emergency rooms closed? 
. . . .  
CHAIRMAN:  [T]his is not what I found.  What the testimony 
was from both the Department of Health, the Agency for Health Care 
Administration and various other people . . . was that there, in fact, are 
more doctors licensed to practice today in the State of Florida than 
there were five years ago. 
 
Applications to the medical schools in the State of Florida are 
up and have been up consistently for the past, for the past number of 
years. 
 
And also that emergency rooms have not been closing as a 
result of medical malpractice.   
 
As a matter of fact, the Department of Health and the Agency 
for Health Care Administration both testified under oath that they 
could not cite any incidents where because of a medical malpractice 
crisis patients were denied some type of care or directed someplace 
else.   
 
Senate Floor Debate Tr. 22-23 (Aug. 13, 2003) (emphasis supplied).  Further 
support for the testimony of the committee chairman exists in a report prepared by 
the United States General Accounting Office, which states: 
Reports of physician departures in Florida were anecdotal, not 
extensive, and in some cases we determined them to be inaccurate. 
For example, state medical society officials told us that Collier and 
Lee counties lost all of their neurosurgeons due to malpractice 
concerns; however, we found at least five neurosurgeons currently 
practicing in each county as of April 2003.  Provider groups also 
reported that malpractice pressures have recently made it difficult for 
Florida to recruit or retain physicians of any type; however, over the 
past 2 years the number of new medical licenses issued has increased 
and physicians per capita has remained unchanged. 
 
- 27 - 
Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care, 
No. GAO-03-836, (Aug. 2003), at 17-18, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf.   
Moreover, for those doctors who are leaving or have left Florida, there was 
no concrete evidence to demonstrate that high malpractice premiums were the 
cause of that departure.  During her testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the CEO of the Florida Medical Association testified with regard to 
two cases where physicians had relocated from Florida to North Carolina and New 
York, after which the following testimony ensued: 
 
SENATOR:  The [American Medical Association] has 
identified the states with national [crises], medical malpractice.  One 
of the states is North Carolina.  One of the states is New York.  So it 
seems like you get some physicians that are leaving Florida for states 
that are also considered by the AMA to be in national crisis.  Why? 
 
CEO:  Maybe they haven’t figured that out yet.   
 
CHAIRMAN:  You better call the guy from North Carolina 
and— 
 
CEO:  I haven’t got the answer to that.  I haven’t talked to any 
of these people individually.   
 
CHAIRMAN:  You better call the guy from North Carolina and 
tell him they don’t have caps there either. 
Testimony of Sandra Mortham, Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting, July 14, 
2003, at 117, 129-30. 
Based upon these statements and reports, although medical malpractice 
premiums in Florida were undoubtably high in 2003, we conclude the Legislature’s 
determination that “the increase in medical malpractice liability insurance rates is 
 
- 28 - 
forcing physicians to practice medicine without professional liability insurance, to 
leave Florida, to not perform high-risk procedures, or to retire early from the 
practice of medicine” is unsupported.  Ch. 2003-416, §1, Laws of Fla., at 4035.  
Thus, the finding by the Legislature and the Task Force that Florida was in the 
midst of a bona fide medical malpractice crisis, threatening the access of Floridians 
to health care, is dubious and questionable at the very best.  
The Impact of Damage Caps on the Alleged Crisis 
Even if these conclusions by the Legislature are assumed to be true, and 
Florida was facing a dangerous risk of physician shortage due to malpractice 
premiums, we conclude that section 766.118 still violates Florida’s Equal 
Protection Clause because the available evidence fails to establish a rational 
relationship between a cap on noneconomic damages and alleviation of the 
purported crisis.  See generally Fla. Nurses Ass’n, 508 So. 2d at 319 (stating that 
for legislation to be constitutional under the rational basis standard, it must bear a 
rational and reasonable relationship to a legitimate state objective). 
Reports have failed to establish a direct correlation between damages caps 
and reduced malpractice premiums.  Weiss Ratings, which evaluates the 
performance of the malpractice insurance industry, has detailed two particularly 
salient findings.  First, based upon data acquired from 1991 until 2002, the  
median medical malpractice premiums paid by physicians in three high-risk 
 
- 29 - 
specialties—internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology—rose 
by 48.2 percent in states that have damages caps, but in states without caps, the 
median annual premium increased at a slower rate—by 35.9 percent.  Martin D. 
Weiss, Melissa Gannon & Stephanie Eakins, Medical Malpractice Caps: The 
Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, Claims Payout 
Levels, and Availability of Coverage, at 7-8 (rev. ed. June 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.weissratings.com/pdf/malpractice.pdf.  Second, the study noted that 
among states with caps on damages, only 10.5 percent (two of nineteen states with 
caps) experienced static or declining medical malpractice premium rates following 
the imposition of caps.  In contrast, among states without damages caps, 18.7 
percent (six of thirty-two states7
Additionally, Robert White, the President of First Professionals Insurance 
Company (FPIC), testified during a Senate Judiciary Committee meeting that a 
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages would achieve “virtually nothing” with 
regard to stabilizing medical malpractice insurance rates.  Testimony of Robert 
White, Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting, July 14, 2003, at 48, 50-51.  Earlier 
in 2003, Mr. White informed a group of Palm Beach physicians: “No responsible 
 without caps) experienced static or declining 
medical malpractice premiums.  Id. at 8. 
                                         
 
7.  The study states that “the District of Columbia is being referred to as a 
‘state’ since it effectively operates as such with regard to insurance regulation.”  
Medical Malpractice Caps, at 7 n.4. 
 
- 30 - 
insurer can cut its rates after a bill [that caps noneconomic damages at $250,000] 
passes.”  Phil Galewitz, “Underwriter Gives Doctors Dose of Reality,” Palm Beach 
Post, Jan. 29, 2003, at 1A.  Mr. White advised that “[e]ven if a cap is approved by 
the legislature and survives the likely legal challenge . . . it would yield on average 
only a 16 percent premium cut.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).  Interestingly, during his 
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. White acknowledged that in 
2002, the experience of FPIC was more positive in Florida than in Missouri, a state 
which at that time had implemented caps on damages.  Testimony of Robert White, 
Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting, at 59. 
Members of the Florida Senate and the House of Representatives also 
expressed doubt as to whether a noneconomic damages cap would have the effect 
of reducing premiums.  During floor debate in the Senate, the following dialogue 
between a senator and the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee occurred:   
SENATOR:  [W]as there any testimony from either FPIC or 
any other insurance company that may have testified . . . that they 
would immediately reduce rates if they got a cap on damages? 
SENATE PRESIDENT: [Chairman] to respond. 
CHAIRMAN:  No. 
 
. . . .  
SENATOR:  Was there any testimony the only way that you 
could reduce malpractice premiums was to cap damages? 
SENATE PRESIDENT:  [Chairman to respond.] 
CHAIRMAN:  No. 
 
. . . . 
SENATOR:  . . . It’s my recollection, and maybe this might 
help [the Chairman], I remember a Mr. Bob White, representing FPIC, 
in testimony relative to the caps said, no, there wouldn’t be an 
 
- 31 - 
immediate reduction in medical malpractice premiums due to caps, 
but as soon as they would be affirmed by a Court, there would be an 
immediate reduction available. 
 
. . . . 
CHAIRMAN:  Senator . . . that was not the testimony given by 
Mr. White.  I believe he said that bad faith and a series of other things 
had to be there, so the answer is no, it was not by placing a $250,000 
cap that would give a reduction.   
 
. . . .  
[T]he question was very specific, whether or not caps, whether 
or not Mr. White said that caps would reduce insurance rates.  That 
was the question. 
 
The answer is, he said no.  I have the transcripts on my desk, 
and if you would care to show me where it says otherwise, I would be 
happy to say so. 
 
. . . . 
 
What he did say was you have to add several variables, bad 
faith is one of them and I believe there were others.  So if the question 
is on caps, the answer is no. 
 
Senate Floor Debate Tr. 45-47, 49 (Aug. 13, 2003).  Further, during floor debate in 
the House of Representatives, one representative expressed concern that if the 
Florida Legislature implements a cap on noneconomic damages, there is no 
requirement in the bill that insurers pass any savings onto physicians.  House Floor 
Debate Tr. 38-39 (Aug. 13, 2003) (“[A]t the end of the day, actually, [the insurance 
companies] don’t have to pay anything back to the doctors.  It’s just a windfall, and 
there’s no provision in the bill that says otherwise.”). 
The concerns of that representative were very perceptive and were not 
unfounded.  While the cap on noneconomic damages limits the amount of money 
that insurance companies must pay injured victims of medical malpractice, section 
 
- 32 - 
766.118 does not require insurance companies to use the acquired savings to lower 
malpractice insurance premiums for physicians, and the argument and reliance by 
the Respondent on rate reduction statutes is misplaced.  When the statutory cap on 
noneconomic damages was first enacted, the legislation contained a provision, 
codified at section 627.062(8)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2003), that simply required 
the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (FLOIR) to calculate a “presumed 
factor that reflects the impact that the changes contained in such legislation will 
have on rates for medical malpractice insurance and shall issue a notice informing 
all insurers writing medical malpractice coverage of such presumed factor.”  Ch. 
2003-416 § 40, Laws of Fla, at 4078.  There was no mandated rate reduction.  
After FLOIR issued a notice of the presumed factor, all medical malpractice 
insurance companies that offered coverage in Florida were directed to submit a rate 
filing for medical malpractice insurance that reflected “an overall rate reduction at 
least as great as the presumed factor.”  § 627.062(8)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2003). 
Although at first glance this statutory subsection may appear to compel 
medical malpractice insurance companies to reduce their rates in response to the 
2003 legislation, FLOIR nonetheless advised that “[e]ven after application of the 
presumed factor, we anticipate insurers will file for rate increases.”  Press Release, 
Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, Office of Insurance Regulation Releases 
Presumed Factor (Nov. 10, 2003), available at 
 
- 33 - 
http://www.floir.com/PressReleases/viewmediarelease.aspx?id=1316.  Moreover, 
despite any intended moderation of medical malpractice premiums based upon the 
calculation of the presumed factor, the 2013 Annual Report on Medical 
Malpractice Financial Information, Closed Claim Database and Rate Filings, 
prepared by FLOIR compared the premiums of Florida doctors in four specialties 
(family practice, obstetrics, emergency, and orthopedics) with other sampled states 
and concluded that “Florida is either the highest (of nine states) or the second 
highest state as far as premiums go in all but one of the scenarios.”  2013 FLOIR 
Annual Report (Oct. 1, 2013) at 57-58, available at 
http://www.floir.com/Office/DataReports.aspx#rec (CY2012).  Therefore, despite 
assertions that the presumed factor created in section 627.062(8)(a) caused massive 
rate reductions by medical malpractice insurers to pass savings onto their 
customers, the data suggests otherwise.  Subdivision (8) was even repealed from 
section 627.062 in 2011, having been designated “obsolete” by the Legislature.  
Ch. 2011-39, § 12, Laws of Fla., at 514, 536-37. 
  A number of state courts have expressed concern that without a statutory 
mandate that insurance companies lower their insurance premiums in response to 
tort reform, the savings resulting from reforms such as damages caps may simply 
increase insurance company profits.  In Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 
2006), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a statute requiring a medical 
 
- 34 - 
malpractice claimant to obtain an affidavit of merit from a qualified expert as a 
prerequisite to filing an action was unconstitutional under the Oklahoma 
Constitution.  See id. at 874.  While Zeier did not address caps, we find an 
observation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to be just as applicable to caps on 
noneconomic damages: 
[An] unanticipated result of statutes similar to Oklahoma’s scheme 
has been the creation of a windfall for insurance companies . . . which 
are not required to implement post-tort reform rates decreasing the 
cost of medical malpractice insurance to physicians.  These companies 
happily pay less out in tort-reform states while continuing to collect 
higher premiums from doctors. 
Id. at 869-70 (footnote omitted). 
 
Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has strongly questioned whether caps 
on damages will lower insurance premiums.  In Lucas v. United States, 757 
S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988), the court noted that when the Texas Legislature enacted 
medical malpractice damages caps, it stated that “adoption of certain modifications 
in the medical, insurance, and legal systems . . . may or may not have an effect on 
the rates charged by insurers for medical professional liability coverage.”  Id. at 
691.  In striking down the caps as unconstitutional, the court concluded that “[i]n 
the context of persons catastrophically injured by medical negligence, we believe it 
is unreasonable and arbitrary to limit their recovery in a speculative experiment to 
determine whether liability insurance rates will decrease.”  Id.  We completely 
agree with and adopt the position of the Supreme Court of Texas.   
 
- 35 - 
We conclude that the record and available data fail to establish a legitimate 
relationship between the cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages and the 
lowering of medical malpractice insurance premiums.  Accordingly, we hold that 
section 766.118 fails the rational basis test and violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Florida Constitution.  See generally Fla. Nurses Ass’n, 508 So. 2d at 319.   
The Current Status of Medical Malpractice in Florida 
Lastly, even if a “crisis” existed when section 766.118 was enacted, a crisis 
is not a permanent condition.  Conditions can change, which remove or negate the 
justification for a law, transforming what may have once been reasonable into 
arbitrary and irrational legislation.  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that “[a] law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other 
certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or 
the facts change even though valid when passed.”  Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 
264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924).  See also Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin 
Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 468 (Wisc. 2005) (“A statute may be 
constitutionally valid when enacted but may become constitutionally invalid 
because of changes in the conditions to which the statute applies.  A past crisis 
does not forever render a law valid.” (footnotes omitted)).  Thus, even if section 
766.118 may have been rational when it was enacted based on information that 
was available at the time, it will no longer be rational where the factual premise 
 
- 36 - 
upon which the statute was based has changed.  It is for this reason that Florida 
courts consider both pre- and post-enactment data in assessing the continued 
rationality of a statute.   
Having evaluated current data, we conclude that no rational basis exists to 
justify continued application of the noneconomic damages cap of section 766.118.  
The 2011 State Physician Workforce Data Book prepared by the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) reflects that in 2010, there were 254.8 active 
physicians for every 100,000 people in Florida, a number higher than twenty-eight 
other states.  AAMC, 2011 State Physician Workforce Data Book, at 9 (Nov. 
2011), available at 
https://www.aamc.org/download/263512/data/statedata2011.pdf.  Further, data 
collected through December 31, 2010, reflects that 59.4 percent of active 
physicians who completed medical school in Florida are practicing in Florida.  Id. 
at 53.  Only three other states retained a higher percentage of medical students.  Id.   
Additionally, the Office of the State Courts Administrator (OSCA) reports 
that medical malpractice filings in Florida have decreased significantly.  During 
fiscal year 2003-04, a total of 5,829 professional malpractice and product liability 
actions were filed in Florida circuit courts, comprising 3.2 percent of all civil 
 
- 37 - 
actions filed that year.8
Finally, and perhaps most telling, is that the leading companies selling 
medical malpractice insurance in Florida are far from struggling financially.  The 
2013 FLOIR Annual Report notes: 
  However, during fiscal year 2011-12, only 2,313 such 
actions were filed in Florida circuit courts, a decrease of more than 60 percent, and 
comprising just 0.76 percent of all civil actions filed.  The Annual Reports on 
Medical Malpractice Financial Information prepared by the Florida Office of 
Insurance Regulation (FLOIR Annual Report) reflect a similar decrease in both the 
number of claims and in the amount of noneconomic damages paid by medical 
malpractice insurance companies.  For example, 3,574 medical malpractice claims 
were closed in 2004, and insurance companies paid $195,132,457 in noneconomic 
damages.  2005 FLOIR Annual Report (Oct. 1, 2005) at 40, 44, available at 
http://www.floir.com/Office/DataReports.aspx#rec (CY2004).   On the other hand, 
in 2012 only 2,491 medical malpractice claims were closed, and insurance 
companies paid $140,941,965 in noneconomic damages, decreases of 30.3 percent 
and 27.7 percent, respectively.  2013 FLOIR Annual Report (Oct. 1, 2013) at 10, 
88, available at http://www.floir.com/Office/DataReports.aspx#rec (CY2012).   
It is estimated that the Florida medical malpractice line of business 
standing alone generated a direct (before reinsurance) return on 
                                         
 
8.  The OSCA combines these two types of legal actions for statistical 
purposes.   
 
- 38 - 
surplus of 14.0% in 2012.  This return compares very positively with 
the average countrywide all-lines net return on surplus for Florida’s 
leading medical malpractice writers of 5.3% (down from 7.1% in 
2011, but not far out of line with market returns in 2012).  This 
represents the ninth consecutive year of profitability.  . . .  Related 
financial information in the report also suggests that the leading 
malpractice carriers as a class are financially strong
2013 FLOIR Annual Report at 8-9 (emphasis supplied).  The most recent records 
and reports of the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, and the annual reports of 
medical malpractice insurers, confirm that not only has the number of insurers 
providing medical malpractice insurance coverage increased, see 2012 FLOIR 
Annual Report at 40-41 and 2013 FLOIR Annual Report at 44, the profits would 
probably shock most concerned.  Indeed, between the years of 2003 and 2010, four 
insurance companies that offered medical malpractice insurance in Florida 
cumulatively reported an increase in their net income of more than 4300 percent.
. 
9
                                         
 
9.  The four insurance companies were The Doctors Company, Mag Mutual 
Insurance Company, ProAssurance Corporation, and First Professionals Insurance 
Company.  Each of the three remaining insurance companies posts its annual 
reports online.  See http://www.thedoctors.com/TDC/Financials/CON_ID_000780; 
http://www.magmutual.com/annual-reports; and 
http://www.proassurance.com/investorrelations/annualreport.aspx.  In October 
2011, the Doctors Company merged with the parent company of FPIC.  See 
http://www.thedoctors.com/TDC/PressRoom/PressContent/CON_ID_004471.  
Since FPIC is no longer an independent entity, the 2003 annual report for FPIC is 
not available on the website for a specific insurance company, but is available at 
http://www.rocketfinancial.com/IRVault.aspx?fID=6352&tID=1002.  Every 
insurance company authorized to conduct business in Florida is required to file an 
annual statement “of its financial condition, transactions, and affairs” with the 
Office of Insurance Regulation.  Fla. Admin. Code R. 69O-137.001(2)(a). 
  
 
- 39 - 
With such impressive net income estimates, the insurance industry should pass 
savings onto Florida physicians in the form of reduced malpractice insurance 
premiums,10
Thus, even if there had been a medical malpractice crisis in Florida at the 
turn of the century, the current data reflects that it has subsided.  No rational basis 
currently exists (if it ever existed) between the cap imposed by section 766.118 and 
any legitimate state purpose.  See generally Fla. Nurses Ass’n, 508 So. 2d at 319.  
At the present time, the cap on noneconomic damages serves no purpose other than 
to arbitrarily punish the most grievously injured or their surviving family members.  
Moreover, it has never been demonstrated that there was a proper predicate for 
imposing the burden of supporting the Florida legislative scheme upon the 
shoulders of the persons and families who have been most severely injured and 
died as a result of medical negligence.  Health care policy that relies upon 
 and it should no longer be necessary to continue punishing those most 
seriously injured by medical negligence by limiting their noneconomic recovery to 
a fixed, arbitrary amount.  
                                         
 
10.  Despite such increases in net income, in 2012 one medical malpractice 
insurance company nonetheless charged obstetricians in Miami-Dade County more 
than $190,000 for $1 million of coverage.  See 2013 FLOIR Annual Report at 57.  
The company charged obstetricians in other Florida counties approximately 
$98,000 for the same coverage.  Id. at 58.  During 2012, the same company 
charged orthopedists in Miami-Dade County more than $115,000 for $1 million of 
coverage, whereas orthopedists in other Florida counties were charged 
approximately $59,000.  Id. at 57-58.    
 
- 40 - 
discrimination against Florida families is not rational or reasonable when it 
attempts to utilize aggregate caps to create unreasonable classifications.  
Accordingly, and for each of these reasons, the cap on wrongful death 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions does not pass constitutional 
muster.   
THE REMAINING CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 
 
We conclude that the remaining certified questions need not be addressed.  
With regard to the second and third questions, the provision of the Florida 
Constitution that governs access to courts protects those rights which existed either 
at common law or by statute prior to the adoption of the 1968 Declaration of 
Rights.  See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).  Similarly, the right to 
trial by jury is guaranteed only in those cases where the right was enjoyed at the 
time the first Constitution of Florida became effective in 1845.  In re 1978 
Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986).   
At common law, Florida did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful 
death.  White v. Clayton, 323 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1975) (“An action for wrongful 
death was not authorized at common law, and is a creation of the legislature.”).  
Moreover, although the Florida Legislature authorized an action for wrongful death 
prior to 1968, see, e.g., § 768.01, Fla. Stat. (1941), the right of survivors to recover 
noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering, did not become part of Florida 
 
- 41 - 
statutory law until 1972.  Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc. v. Afonso, 4 So. 3d 764, 
769 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 23 So. 3d 711 (Fla. 2009).   
Section 766.118 caps noneconomic damages in both wrongful death medical 
malpractice actions and personal injury medical malpractice actions where the 
victim survives.  This case involves only a wrongful death medical malpractice 
action.  Because the right of Ms. McCall’s parents and son to recover noneconomic 
damages for her death did not exist prior to 1972, their access to courts and jury 
trial challenges to section 766.118 are not cognizable.  Accordingly, to answer the 
second and third questions certified by the federal appellate court with regard to 
personal injury medical malpractice actions would constitute an advisory opinion, 
which we are not authorized to provide.  Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist. v. 
Certain Lands Within Said Dist., 80 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 1955) (“We have 
repeatedly held that this Court was not authorized to render advisory opinions 
except in the instances required or authorized by the Constitution.”). 
Our decision not to answer the fourth certified question addressing the 
separation of powers challenge is based upon a similar rationale.  As previously 
stated, with regard to wrongful death, the Florida Legislature created a cause of 
action where none previously existed.  Clayton, 323 So. 2d at 575.  However, 
section 766.118 addresses both personal injury medical malpractice actions, which 
previously existed under the common law, Maggio v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor and 
 
- 42 - 
Emp. Security, 899 So. 2d 1074, 1081 n.5 (Fla. 2005) (noting that “unlike causes 
of action that are solely the creature of statute, medical malpractice actions existed 
as common law torts”), and wrongful death medical malpractice actions, which are 
purely a statutory creation.  Were we to answer the fourth certified question, it 
would constitute, in part, an impermissible advisory opinion.  Sarasota-Fruitville, 
80 So. 2d at 336.  For this reason, we decline to do so.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we answer the first rephrased certified question in 
the affirmative and hold that the cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages in 
section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Florida Constitution.  We defer answering the remaining certified questions.  We 
return this case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, J., concurs. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which QUINCE and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.   
I agree with the plurality opinion authored by Justice Lewis that the statutory 
cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages provided by the medical malpractice 
 
- 43 - 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution.  Like the 
plurality, I would therefore answer the first rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative and decline to answer the remaining questions certified by the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  In fact, as I explain, I agree with much of the plurality 
opinion that declares the statutory damages cap unconstitutional as applied to 
wrongful death actions.  
However, I do not fully join in the plurality opinion because I respectfully 
disagree with the plurality’s application of the rational basis test in this case.  
Specifically, my primary disagreement is with the decision not to afford deference 
to the legislative findings in the absence of a showing that the findings were 
“clearly erroneous.”  Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 196 (Fla. 1993).   
Although this Court is not bound to blindly defer to all legislative findings, I 
disagree with the plurality’s independent evaluation and reweighing of reports and 
data, including information from legislative committee meetings and floor debate, 
as well as an article published in the Palm Beach Post newspaper, as part of its 
review of whether the Legislature’s factual findings and policy decisions as to the 
alleged medical malpractice crisis were fully supported by available data.  See, 
e.g., plurality op. at 25-28 (Lewis, J.) (quoting from the legislative floor debate and 
committee meeting testimony and reviewing studies); id. at 29-31 (citing to and 
quoting from a newspaper article and quoting additional legislative committee 
 
- 44 - 
testimony and floor debate).  I emphasize, however, that although I do not fully 
join in the plurality’s application of the rational basis test, I agree with the ultimate 
conclusion that the arbitrary reduction of survivors’ noneconomic damages in 
wrongful death cases based on the number of survivors lacks a rational relationship 
to the goal of reducing medical malpractice premiums. 
My analysis proceeds in the following way.  I first set forth the background 
of the case, which frames the specific constitutional question in need of this 
Court’s resolution—a resolution the plurality and I both agree on.  With this 
context in mind, I then explain how and why the plurality and I agree as to the as-
applied unconstitutionality of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in 
wrongful death actions.  Finally, I discuss where my legal analysis diverges from 
the plurality’s and why, despite my agreement with the ultimate conclusion, I am 
unable to fully join in the plurality opinion.   
I.  Background 
As described in the findings of fact of the federal district court where this 
litigation began, at the time of her death, Michelle McCall was a “bright, beautiful, 
and healthy, 20-year-old woman” who tragically “bled to death in the presence of 
all medical staff who were attending her” in the course of receiving prenatal care 
and delivery services for her pregnancy at Eglin Air Force Base’s clinic.  Estate of 
McCall v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1283, 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2009).  The 
 
- 45 - 
facts of the medical malpractice and the circumstances of Michelle’s tragic death 
are not in dispute or at issue before this Court.  Rather, we are faced with a legal 
question as to the constitutionality of Florida’s statutory limitation on 
noneconomic damages to Michelle’s survivors, as set forth in section 766.118, 
Florida Statutes.  
Section 766.118 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) Limitation on noneconomic damages for negligence of 
practitioners.— 
(a) With respect to a cause of action for personal injury or 
wrongful death arising from medical negligence of practitioners, 
regardless of the number of such practitioner defendants, 
noneconomic damages shall not exceed $500,000 per claimant.  No 
practitioner shall be liable for more than $500,000 in noneconomic 
damages, regardless of the number of claimants. 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), if the negligence resulted in 
a permanent vegetative state or death, the total noneconomic damages 
recoverable from all practitioners, regardless of the number of 
claimants, under this paragraph shall not exceed $1 million.  In cases 
that do not involve death or permanent vegetative state, the patient 
injured by medical negligence may recover noneconomic damages not 
to exceed $1 million if: 
1. The trial court determines that a manifest injustice would 
occur unless increased noneconomic damages are awarded, based on a 
finding that because of the special circumstances of the case, the 
noneconomic harm sustained by the injured patient was particularly 
severe; and 
2. The trier of fact determines that the defendant’s negligence 
caused a catastrophic injury to the patient. 
(c) The total noneconomic damages recoverable by all 
claimants from all practitioner defendants under this subsection shall 
not exceed $1 million in the aggregate. 
 
§ 766.118, Fla. Stat. (2005). 
 
- 46 - 
 
As to noneconomic damages, Michelle left as survivors her parents and her 
baby boy, who was born at the same time Michelle died.  The federal district court 
found as follows as to the child’s noneconomic damages: 
W.W., who is now a healthy and active 3 1/2 year-old boy [as of 
2009], has been deprived the privilege of ever knowing his mother, of 
having her comfort and emotional support throughout his and her 
shared lifetimes, and of benefitting from her guidance and 
companionship.  The negligent conduct in this case occurred within a 
matter of hours of his birth, but it leaves for W.W. a void in his life 
that will never truly be filled.  His pain and suffering are difficult to 
quantify, but no one disputes the magnitude of his loss.  On the other 
hand, the court is mindful that W.W.’s pain is necessarily tempered by 
his age at the time of his mother’s death.  He lives with the pain of 
never knowing her, but not with the pain that comes from suddenly 
losing the love and companionship of a parent one has bonded with 
emotionally.  W.W.’s life, while shadowed by this tragedy, will be 
lived with the love of those who have surrounded him from infancy—
his father and his grandparents—not the pain of a conscious memory 
of his mother’s death.  The court does not intend to minimize the loss 
of one’s mother; such is an obvious and enormous loss.  The court 
simply finds that the pain and suffering for W.W. is tempered by his 
infancy at the time of his mother’s death, a factor that should be 
reflected in the noneconomic damage award.  To compensate for 
W.W.’s loss of parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and 
for his mental pain and suffering, the court awards $500,000.00. 
Id. at 1293-94 (footnote omitted). 
 
As to Michelle’s parents, Edward M. and Margarita F. McCall, the federal 
district court awarded $750,000 to each for their pain and suffering, explaining as 
follows: 
There is no question, as shown by the evidence, that Mr. and 
Mrs. McCall were both very close to their daughter and that this 
tragedy has greatly impacted the quality of their lives, emotionally as 
 
- 47 - 
well as physically.  They were otherwise healthy, active, and excited 
about helping their daughter and new grandson.  They went to the 
hospital with the happy and hopeful expectation of bringing their 
daughter home with a healthy baby but instead found themselves 
faced with the agonizing decision of whether to remove life support 
from her.  Mr. McCall struggled as he recounted their hope of 
Michelle possibly regaining consciousness as they laid W.W. across 
her before she died, and also so they could have one photograph of her 
“holding” her baby before she died.  The pain from the loss of their 
only daughter and the mental agony of having to make the decision to 
remove her from life support will not soon abate, if ever in their 
lifetimes.  The court takes into consideration, however, that because 
of their relationship as a married couple, they will both undeniably 
benefit from each other’s noneconomic damage award. 
Id. at 1294.    
 
 
As set forth by the plurality, because section 766.118(2) caps total 
noneconomic damages recoverable by all claimants at $1 million, each of these 
three independent survivors had his or her award of noneconomic damages 
significantly reduced so that the damages were proportionally divided so as not to 
exceed the statutory cap.  In other words, instead of receiving the full amount of 
noneconomic damages awarded by the federal district court, none of which 
individually exceeded $1 million, each individual survivor was treated differently 
as to his or her noneconomic damages award because there was more than one 
survivor entitled to noneconomic damages in this case.   
This is where the equal protection argument addressed by the plurality 
becomes important.  Critically, as I explain in the next section, despite not fully 
joining in the plurality opinion, I do agree that the noneconomic damages cap 
 
- 48 - 
violates Florida’s Equal Protection Clause as applied to wrongful death actions 
under the constitutional rational basis test.    
II.  Agreement with the Plurality Opinion 
I agree with the plurality opinion as to the following issues.  First, I agree 
that there are two prongs to the rational basis test, requiring the Court to consider 
both whether the statute serves a legitimate governmental purpose and whether the 
Legislature was reasonable in its belief that the challenged classification would 
promote that purpose.  See, e.g., Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 
2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003).  As this Court explained in one of its most recent 
applications of the rational basis test in the equal protection context, “[t]o be 
entitled to relief under the rational basis test, the [challengers] must show that the 
[challenged statute] does not ‘bear some rational relationship to legitimate state 
purposes.’ ”  Samples v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n, 114 
So. 3d 912, 917 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 110 (Fla. 
2002)).  It is not this Court’s “task ‘to determine whether the legislation achieves 
its intended goal in the best manner possible, but only whether the goal is 
legitimate and the means to achieve it are rationally related to the goal.’ ”  
Samples, 114 So. 3d at 917 (quoting Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist. v. 
Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 496 So. 2d 930, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)).      
 
- 49 - 
Second, I also agree that this Court’s role is not to simply “rubber stamp” the 
Legislature’s actions.  Plurality op. at 20 (Lewis, J.).  Indeed, although this Court’s 
case law requires deference to the Legislature’s factual determinations, see 
Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 196, this Court’s precedent also clearly establishes that the 
Legislature’s findings “must actually be findings of fact” and are not entitled to the 
presumption of correctness “if they are nothing more than recitations amounting 
only to conclusions.”  Moore v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla. 1960) 
(quoting Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 
1951)). 
 
Third, and most importantly, I agree with the plurality’s conclusion that the 
statutory cap on noneconomic damages is unconstitutional as applied to wrongful 
death actions.  In my view, the Court’s controlling precedent in St. Mary’s 
Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961, 971 (Fla. 2000), is directly on point in 
holding that this type of statutory scheme is improper because “[d]ifferentiating 
between a single claimant and multiple claimants bears no rational relationship to 
the Legislature’s stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical 
liability insurance industry.”  Id.   
Indeed, as the plurality correctly notes, this Court “clearly announced in 
Phillipe that aggregate caps or limitations on noneconomic damages violate equal 
protection guarantees under the Florida Constitution when applied without regard 
 
- 50 - 
to the number of claimants entitled to recovery.”  Plurality op. at 10 (Lewis, J.).  I 
agree with the plurality that this “inherently discriminatory action and resulting 
invidious discrimination do not pass constitutional muster.”  Id. 
The rationale of Phillipe is particularly applicable in this case given that, in 
capping wrongful death noneconomic damages regardless of the number of 
survivors, the only asserted legitimate State interest is the alleviation of rising 
medical malpractice insurance premiums paid by the affected doctors.  However, 
as the plurality explains, there is no mechanism in place to assure that savings are 
actually passed on from the insurance companies to the doctors.  See plurality op. 
at 31-34 (Lewis, J.) (explaining that section 766.118 contains no requirement that 
insurance companies use the acquired savings to lower malpractice premiums, 
discussing how subdivision (8) was subsequently repealed, and reviewing the 
reasoning of other courts that have expressed concern about the constitutionality of 
a damages cap in light of this missing link).   
Of course, the statutory cap on noneconomic damages provides no 
commensurate benefit to the victims of medical malpractice, and if there is also no 
commensurate benefit to the doctors and hospitals involved in medical malpractice 
litigation, then only the insurance companies benefit in the form of an increase in 
profits.  See id.  This critical missing link causes me to believe that the statutory 
cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions not only fails the 
 
- 51 - 
smell test, but the rational basis test as well, especially in light of the fact that 
subdivision (8) was repealed as “obsolete.”  See id. at 33.  In other words, the 
statutory cap on noneconomic damages fails the rational basis test because “the 
Legislature could not have had any reasonable ground for believing that there were 
public considerations justifying the particular classification and distinction made,” 
North Ridge General Hospital, Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461, 465 
(Fla. 1979), since an aggregate cap on damages without regard to the number of 
claimants bears no rational relationship to the asserted State interest in “alleviating 
the financial crisis in the medical liability insurance industry.”  Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 
at 971.   
 
Finally, I strongly agree with the plurality that “even if a ‘crisis’ existed 
when section 766.118 was enacted, a crisis is not a permanent condition.”  
Plurality op. at 35 (Lewis, J.).  As I stated in my dissent in Mizrahi v. North Miami 
Medical Center, Ltd., 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000): 
There is no indication that the past medical malpractice crisis 
continues into the present.  If the medical malpractice crisis does not 
continue into the present, I fail to see how a past crisis can justify the 
permanent exclusion of an entire class of victims from seeking 
compensation for pain and suffering damages due to the wrongful 
death of their parents as a result of medical malpractice. 
Indeed, it is a “settled principle of constitutional law” that 
although a statute is constitutionally valid when enacted, that statute 
may become constitutionally invalid due to changes in the conditions 
to which the statute applies.  See Conner v. Cone, 235 So. 2d 492, 498 
(Fla. 1970); see also Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co. v. Seven-Up Bottling 
Co. of Southeast Ga., 175 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1965).  Accordingly, 
 
- 52 - 
while it is not our role to reexamine legislative fact-finding, we also 
need not blindly accept the Legislature’s conclusions, especially when 
such conclusions may no longer be valid due to changed conditions.  
See Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235, 236 
(Fla. 1951); see also Conner
  
. . . . 
, 235 So. 2d at 498. 
All other adult children who lose their parents as a result of 
other negligent conduct have the right to recover pain and suffering 
damages if their parent died without a spouse.  See
 
 . . . . 
 § 768.21(8), Fla. 
Stat. (1999).  However, in the case of adult children of medical 
malpractice victims, the Legislature has denied compensation for 
mental pain and suffering not because the claims of the adult children 
are meritless, but because of the adult children’s age and because their 
parents died as a result of medical malpractice. . . .     
In sum, there is no indication that the distinction drawn by the 
statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest 
associated with ensuring accessible health care.  Further, there is no 
indication that the medical malpractice crisis that formed the basis for 
treating this class of survivors differently than all other adult children 
even continues to this day.  I therefore believe that the challengers of 
this statute have met their burden and have demonstrated that the 
distinction drawn by the Legislature is arbitrary. 
 
Id. at 1043-44 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 
The same reasons that led me to conclude that the continued deprivation of 
wrongful death actions to a class of survivors in medical malpractice actions was a 
denial of equal protection in Mizrahi apply in this context as well.  There is no 
evidence of a continuing medical malpractice crisis that would justify the arbitrary 
reduction of survivors’ noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases based on 
the number of survivors.  This arbitrary reduction punishes the survivors of victims 
of medical malpractice without any commensurate benefit to the survivors and 
 
- 53 - 
without a rational relationship to the goal of reducing medical malpractice 
premiums.  Accordingly, like the plurality, I would answer the first rephrased 
certified question in the affirmative and hold that Florida’s statutory cap on 
noneconomic damages is unconstitutional as applied to wrongful death actions.  
III.  Disagreement with the Plurality Opinion 
Although I agree with many aspects of the plurality opinion and with the 
ultimate conclusion as to the unconstitutionality of the statute, I cannot join in all 
of the plurality’s legal analysis.  In particular, my disagreement stems from my 
view that our precedent does not allow this Court to engage in the type of 
expansive review of the Legislature’s factual and policy findings that the plurality 
engages in when undertaking a constitutional rational basis analysis.   
I emphasize that I have no reason to question the plurality’s excellent 
scholarship regarding the flaws in the Legislature’s conclusions as to the existence 
of a medical malpractice crisis.  See plurality op. at 18-28 (Lewis, J.).  In my view, 
however, the rational basis test articulated by this Court, based on precedent from 
the United States Supreme Court, is a deferential standard.  As explained by this 
Court in Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 196, “the Legislature’s factual and policy findings 
are presumed correct” in a rational basis analysis unless there has been a showing 
made that the findings are “clearly erroneous.”   
 
- 54 - 
The plurality relies on a case, North Florida Women’s Health and 
Counseling Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 627 (Fla. 2003), involving a 
fundamental right, for the proposition that “courts must conduct their own inquiry” 
of the Legislature’s findings.  See plurality op. at 21 (Lewis, J.).  My primary 
disagreement with the plurality’s analysis begins with the extensive discussion that 
questions the “alleged medical malpractice crisis” and relies on North Florida 
Women’s Health to support the plurality’s review of available data to consider the 
“factors and circumstances involved.”  Plurality op. at 18, 21 (Lewis, J.).   
North Florida Women’s Health involved the fundamental right to privacy, 
which required strict scrutiny review, rather than rational basis review, and in 
North Florida Women’s Health, a trial court had made findings of fact based on a 
trial where both parties had the opportunity to present evidence on the underlying 
issues.  See N. Fla. Women’s Health, 866 So. 2d at 616.  Although the plurality 
capably demonstrates that the Legislature’s conclusions as to the existence of a 
medical malpractice crisis may be questionable, I respectfully conclude that there 
is simply no precedent for this Court to engage in its own independent evaluation 
and reweighing of the facts and legislative policy findings, as done by the plurality, 
when conducting a rational basis analysis.   
The plurality asserts that Warren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 2005), stands for the proposition that 
 
- 55 - 
the rational basis test envisions judicial consideration of the existing factors and 
circumstances to determine whether the legislative findings were fully supported.  
My review of Warren and the cases on which it relied, however, reveals that this 
Court has never engaged in the type of expansive, independent review when 
conducting a rational basis inquiry that the plurality undertakes in this case.  
Instead, as Warren explained, the rational basis test must be undertaken “in a light 
deferential to the Legislature’s action.”  Warren, 899 So. 2d at 1096.    
Accordingly, in my view, despite the plurality’s thoughtful and scholarly 
approach to analyzing the alleged justification for the medical malpractice crisis, 
there has been no showing made in this case that the Legislature’s findings as to 
the existence of a crisis at that time were “clearly erroneous.”  Echarte, 618 So. 2d 
at 196.  I emphasize again, however, that I agree with many aspects of the plurality 
opinion, particularly the conclusion that the arbitrary reduction of survivors’ 
noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases based on the number of survivors 
lacks a rational relationship to the goal of reducing medical malpractice premiums.   
IV.  Conclusion 
 
Based on the above, I concur with the plurality’s decision to hold the cap on 
wrongful death noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions 
unconstitutional but do not join in all of the plurality opinion’s reasoning.  
QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
- 56 - 
POLSTON, C.J., dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent because the plurality disregards the rational basis 
standard prescribed by our precedent as well as the Legislature’s policy role under 
Florida’s constitution.  The Legislature’s policy choice of enacting a cap of $1 
million on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases involving death is 
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of decreasing medical malpractice 
insurance rates and increasing the affordability and availability of health care in 
Florida.  Therefore, under our precedent, the cap does not violate Florida’s 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.  It also does not violate the access to 
courts, jury trial, and separation of powers provisions of the Florida Constitution.  
Accordingly, I would answer the four certified questions posed by the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the negative.        
I.  Background 
 
Justice Lewis’ plurality opinion accurately quotes the Eleventh Circuit’s 
description of Michelle McCall’s tragic death following the birth of her son.  Ms. 
McCall’s parents and her son’s father (on behalf of her son) filed suit against the 
United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which provides that 
the United States is liable for torts to the same extent as a private individual would 
be under the applicable state’s law.  Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 
944, 947 (11th Cir. 2011); Estate of McCall v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 2d 
 
- 57 - 
1276, 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2009).  After a two-day bench trial, the federal district court 
ruled that the United States was liable for Ms. McCall’s death and found that 
“Plaintiffs’ economic damages, or financial losses, amounted to $980,462.40.”  
McCall, 642 F.3d at 947.  Additionally, the federal district court “found that 
Plaintiffs’ noneconomic damages, or nonfinancial losses, totaled $2 million, 
including $500,000 for Ms. McCall’s son and $750,000 for each of her parents.”  
Id.  The federal district court then applied Florida’s statutory cap pursuant to 
section 766.118(2), Florida Statutes (2005), to limit Plaintiffs’ recovery for 
noneconomic damages to an aggregate of $1 million.  Id.  The $1 million capped 
amount for noneconomic damages “will be equitably divided among the eligible 
survivors in proportion to their respective awards.”  McCall, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 
1295.  The federal district court “also denied Plaintiffs’ motion challenging the 
constitutionality of Florida’s statutory cap under both the Florida and United States 
Constitutions.”  McCall, 642 F.3d at 947.       
 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered multiple constitutional 
challenges to Florida’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages.  First, the Eleventh 
Circuit applied rational basis review to hold that Florida’s cap does not violate the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Id. at 950-51.  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned as follows: 
Plantiffs ask us to second guess the legislature’s judgment in enacting 
a “per incident” rather than “per claimant” statutory cap.  However, 
 
- 58 - 
“equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”  Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 
U.S. at 313.  The legislature identified a legitimate governmental 
purpose in passing the statutory cap, namely to reduce the cost of 
medical malpractice premiums and health care.  See
Id. at 951.  The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the cap 
fails rational basis review because “the Florida legislature ‘had no objective, 
factual basis for believing’ that a cap on noneconomic damages . . . would reduce 
the cost of medical malpractice insurance.”  Id. at 950.  To the contrary, the 
Eleventh Circuit found the Legislature issued a report on the issue, held public 
hearings, heard expert testimony, and reviewed another report prepared by the 
Governor’s Task Force that recommended a per incident cap to remedy the 
problem.  Id. at 950-51. 
 Fla. Stat. § 
766.201.  The means that Florida chose, a per incident cap on 
noneconomic damages, bears a rational relationship to that end.  The 
Florida legislature could reasonably have concluded that such a cap 
would reduce damage awards and in turn make medical malpractice 
insurance more affordable and healthcare more available.   
 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the cap on noneconomic 
damages does not constitute a taking either under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or under section 6 of article X of the Florida 
Constitution.  Id. at 951.  The Eleventh Circuit stated that the cap does not deprive 
the plaintiffs of a vested right, explaining that the cap was enacted in 2003 before 
the medical malpractice at issue in the case took place in 2006.  Id. 
 
- 59 - 
 
Finally, rather than deciding the plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to the cap 
under the Florida Constitution, the Eleventh Circuit certified to this Court the 
following questions: 
(1) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 
766.118, violate the right to equal protection under Article I, Section 2 
of the Florida Constitution? 
(2) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 
766.118, violate the right of access to the courts under Article I, 
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution? 
(3) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 
766.118, violate the right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 22 of 
the Florida Constitution?  
(4) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 
766.118, violate the separation of powers guaranteed by Article II, 
Section 3 and Article V, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution? 
Id. at 952-53. 
II.  Florida’s Caps on Noneconomic Damages 
Section 766.118, Florida Statutes (2005), places limitations on noneconomic 
damages11
                                         
 
11.  Section 766.202(8), Florida Statutes (2005), defines noneconomic 
damages as “nonfinancial losses that would not have occurred but for the injury 
giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, 
physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for 
enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses to the extent the claimant is 
entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death 
Act.” 
 in medical malpractice cases, and the limitations vary depending upon 
the circumstances.  For cases involving the negligence of practitioners providing 
 
- 60 - 
nonemergency care, the limitation is $500,000 per claimant, per incident, and per 
practitioner: 
With respect to a cause of action for personal injury or wrongful death 
arising from medical negligence of practitioners, regardless of the 
number of such practitioner defendants, noneconomic damages shall 
not exceed $500,000 per claimant.  No practitioner shall be liable for 
more than $500,000 in noneconomic damages, regardless of the 
number of claimants. 
§ 766.118(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).  If the negligence resulted in death or a 
permanent vegetative state, the cap rises to $1 million: 
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), if the negligence resulted in a 
permanent vegetative state or death, the total noneconomic damages 
recoverable from all practitioners, regardless of the number of 
claimants, under this paragraph shall not exceed $1 million. 
§ 766.118(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The cap also rises to $1 million dollars in the 
absence of death or a permanent vegetative state if the trial court determines that a 
manifest injustice would occur or if the negligence resulted in a catastrophic injury.  
Id.  However, section 766.118(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), emphasizes that 
“[t]he total noneconomic damages recoverable by all claimants from all 
practitioner defendants under this subsection shall not exceed $1 million in the 
aggregate.”  
For cases involving nonpractitioners providing nonemergency care, the 
limitation is $750,000.  § 766.118(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).  This cap rises to $1.5 
million if the negligence caused a permanent vegetative state or death or if the trial 
 
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court determines that a manifest injustice would occur or if the trier of fact 
determines that a catastrophic injury resulted.  § 766.118(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).  
And section 766.118(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that “[t]he total 
noneconomic damages recoverable by all claimants from all nonpractitioner 
defendants under this subsection shall not exceed $1.5 million in the aggregate.” 
These limitations on noneconomic damages are part of an overall legislative 
plan enacted in 2003 to address the rising costs of medical liability insurance and 
the affordability and availability of healthcare in Florida.  See ch. 2003-416, Laws 
of Fla.  Other components of the plan include new healthcare facilities regulations, 
insurance regulation, license requirements, and agency requirements.  Id.        
The legislative effort began with the convening of the House Select 
Committee on Medical Liability Insurance, which “conducted an inquiry into the 
possible causes and potential solutions to the vexing problems associated with the 
availability of medical liability insurance in Florida.”  Fla. H. Select Comm. on 
Med. Liab. Ins., Select Comm. on Med. Liab. Ins. Rep., at 2 (March 2003) 
(available at Fla. Dept. of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).  The Select 
Committee examined “how the reduced availability of affordable medical liability 
insurance affects the availability of medical services” and was “mindful of the 
need to maintain the right of access to redress when citizens are harmed during the 
delivery of medical services.”  Id. at 3.  The Select Committee held a series of 
 
- 62 - 
meetings in Tallahassee, held four hearings outside the capital, and published an 82 
page report (not including appendices).  Id.  It “received testimony from experts in 
each of the professional areas impacted” and reviewed records from efforts to 
address prior crises.  Id. at 4.   
The Select Committee also reviewed the record of the Governor’s Select 
Task Force on Health Care Professional Liability Insurance, which produced a 
“345 page report as well as thirteen volumes of supportive materials.”  Id. at 9.  
The Governor’s Task Force “undertook a comprehensive review of published 
studies and relevant literature” and held ten meetings at which it received extensive 
testimony and information.  Gov.’s Select Task Force on Healthcare Prof. Liab. 
Ins., Gov.’s Task Force on Healthcare Prof. Liab. Ins. Rep., at 3, iv (2003).  The 
five members of the Governor’s Task Force were (1) John Hitt, President of 
University of Central Florida, (2) Richard Beard, Trustee of University of South 
Florida, (3) Marshall Criser, Jr., President Emeritus of University of Florida, (4) 
Fred Gainous, President of Florida A&M University, and (5) Donna Shalala, 
President of University of Miami.  Id. at 3.  In the end, the Legislature based many 
of its findings and its policies upon the work of the Governor’s Task Force, 
including the per incident cap on noneconomic damages.  See, e.g., ch. 2003-416, 
§ 1, Laws of Fla.   
 
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Specifically, when enacting chapter 2003-416, Laws of Florida, the 
Legislature made the following findings: 
 
(1) The Legislature finds that Florida is in the midst of a 
medical malpractice insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude. 
 
(2) The Legislature finds that this crisis threatens the quality 
and availability of health care for all Florida citizens. 
 
(3) The Legislature finds that the rapidly growing population 
and the changing demographics of Florida make it imperative that 
students continue to choose Florida as the place they will receive their 
medical educations and practice medicine. 
 
(4) The Legislature finds that Florida is among the states with 
the highest medical malpractice insurance premiums in the nation. 
 
(5) The Legislature finds that the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance has increased dramatically during the past decade and both 
the increase and the current cost are substantially higher than the 
national average. 
 
(6) The Legislature finds that the increase in medical 
malpractice liability rates is forcing physicians to practice medicine 
without professional liability insurance, to leave Florida, to not 
perform high-risk procedures, or to retire early from the practice of 
medicine. 
(7) The Legislature finds that there are certain elements of 
damage presently recoverable that have no monetary value, except on 
a purely arbitrary basis, while other elements of damage are either 
easily measured on a monetary basis or reflect ultimate monetary loss. 
(8) The Governor created the Governor’s Select Task Force on 
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance to study and make 
recommendations to address these problems. 
(9) The Legislature has reviewed the findings and 
recommendations of the Governor’s Select Task Force on Healthcare 
Professional Liability Insurance. 
(10) The Legislature finds that the Governor’s Select Task 
Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance has established 
that a medical malpractice crisis exists in the State of Florida which 
can be alleviated by the adoption of comprehensive legislatively 
enacted reforms.  
 
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(11) The Legislature finds that making high-quality health care 
available to the citizens of this state is an overwhelming public 
necessity. 
(12) The Legislature finds that ensuring that physicians 
continue to practice in Florida is an overwhelming public necessity. 
(13) The Legislature finds that ensuring the availability of 
affordable professional liability insurance for physicians is an 
overwhelming public necessity. 
(14) The Legislature finds, based upon the findings and 
recommendations of the Governor’s Select Task Force on Healthcare 
Professional Liability Insurance, the findings and recommendations of 
various study groups throughout the nation, and the experience of 
other states, that the overwhelming public necessities of making 
quality health care available to the citizens of this state, of ensuring 
that physicians continue to practice in Florida, and of ensuring that 
those physicians have the opportunity to purchase affordable 
professional liability insurance cannot be met unless a cap on 
noneconomic damages is imposed. 
(15) The Legislature finds that the high cost of medical 
malpractice claims can be substantially alleviated by imposing a 
limitation on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions. 
(16) The Legislature further finds that there is no alternative 
measure of accomplishing such result without imposing even greater 
limits upon the ability of persons to recover damages for medical 
malpractice. 
(17) The Legislature finds that the provisions of this act are 
naturally and logically connected to each other and to the purpose of 
making quality health care available to the citizens of Florida. 
(18) The Legislature finds that each of the provisions of this act 
is necessary to alleviate the crisis relating to medical malpractice 
insurance. 
 
III.  Equal Protection 
 
 
McCall argues that Florida’s cap of $1 million on noneconomic damages 
pursuant to section 766.118(2)(b), Florida Statutes, violates the right to equal 
protection under the Florida Constitution by imposing additional burdens when an 
 
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act of medical negligence gives rise to multiple claims as well as when the 
negligent act causes severe injuries.  However, under the rational basis test our 
precedent requires, McCall’s argument is without merit.   
Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[a]ll natural 
persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law. . . .”  Florida’s courts 
have interpreted this provision consistently with interpretations of the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Moore, 
754 So. 2d 708, 712 (Fla. 2000); Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204, 211 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 
As this Court explained in Duncan, 754 So. 2d at 712 (citations omitted),  
[e]qual protection is not violated merely because some persons 
are treated differently than other persons.  It only requires that persons 
similarly situated be treated similarly.  In the absence of a 
fundamental right or a protected class, equal protection demands only 
that a distinction which results in unequal treatment bear some 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.  This is known as 
the rational basis test. 
 
In this case, McCall argues that section 766.118(2)(b)’s cap on noneconomic 
damages creates unequal treatment between those with noneconomic damages over 
the cap and those with noneconomic damages under the cap, claiming that the most 
severely injured are discriminated against.  McCall also claims that the per incident 
cap creates a discriminatory classification between those who are members of 
larger families and those who are not.  Because these alleged classifications do not 
 
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involve a protected class or a fundamental right, McCall’s equal protection claim 
must be analyzed using the rational basis test.   
“Under a ‘rational basis’ standard of review a court should inquire only 
whether it is conceivable that the regulatory classification bears some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose[:]” 
The burden is upon the party challenging the statute or regulation to 
show that there is no
Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983); see 
also Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 112 (Fla. 2002).  It is not the judiciary’s 
task under the rational basis standard “to determine whether the legislation 
achieves its intended goal in the best manner possible, but only whether the goal is 
legitimate and the means to achieve it are rationally related to the goal.”  
Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist. v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 496 So. 
2d 930, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).   
 conceivable factual predicate which would 
rationally support the classification under attack.  Where the 
challenging party fails to meet this difficult burden, the statute or 
regulation must be sustained. 
This Court has employed the rational basis test in its prior decisions 
involving equal protection challenges to limitations on damages in medical 
malpractice cases.  For example, in Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corp., 
403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981), this Court applied a rational basis analysis when 
rejecting an equal protection challenge under both the Florida and federal 
 
- 67 - 
constitutions to a statute that required judgments in medical malpractice actions to 
be reduced by amounts received from collateral sources.  This Court explained that 
the Legislature, when enacting the statute, had determined that there was a medical 
malpractice liability insurance crisis in Florida that was threatening public health.  
Pinillos, 403 So. 2d at 367.  Then, this Court concluded that “the classification 
created by section 768.50[, Florida Statutes (1979),] bears a reasonable relationship 
to the legitimate state interest of protecting the public health by ensuring the 
availability of adequate medical care for the citizens of this state.”  Id. at 368. 
In 1993, in a case primarily denying an access to courts challenge, this Court 
held that caps on noneconomic damages in certain medical malpractices cases did 
not violate equal protection under either the United States or Florida constitutions.  
See Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993) (“[W]e have also 
considered the other constitutional claims and hold that the statutes do not violate 
the right to trial by jury, equal protection guarantees, substantive or procedural due 
process rights, the single subject requirement, the taking clause, or the non-
delegation doctrine.”).  The statutes at issue in Echarte capped noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases at $250,000 if the parties agreed to arbitrate.  
Id. at 193 (describing section 766.207(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988)).  They also 
capped noneconomic damages at $350,000 if the plaintiff proceeded to trial after 
 
- 68 - 
refusing a defendant’s offer to arbitrate.  Id. (describing section 766.209(4), Fla. 
Stat. (Supp. 1988)).   
Thereafter, in April 2000, this Court held that the statute precluding adult 
children from recovering noneconomic damages for a parent’s death due to 
medical malpractice did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the Florida 
and federal constitutions.  See Mizrahi v. N. Miami Med. Ctr., 761 So. 2d 1040 
(Fla. 2000).  In Mizrahi, this Court employed the rational basis test and explained 
that “the Legislature referred to and discussed the medical malpractice crisis and 
its adverse impact on the accessibility of health care during the passage of section 
768.21.”  Id. at 1042.  And this Court stated that it had previously recognized the 
medical malpractice crisis as a legitimate state interest in Echarte.  Id. at 1042 n.3.  
This Court further explained that “limiting claims that may be advanced by some 
claimants would proportionally limit claims made overall and would directly affect 
the cost of providing health care by making it less expensive and more accessible.”  
Id. at 1043.  Thus, because the exclusion is rationally related to controlling costs 
and healthcare accessibility, the statute at issue in Mizrahi did not violate equal 
protection.  Id. 
But, in June 2000, this Court in dicta expressed equal protection concerns 
about the noneconomic damages caps that had previously passed constitutional 
muster in Echarte.  See St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000).  
 
- 69 - 
In Phillipe, this Court held that the noneconomic damages caps under section 
766.207 applied to claimants individually rather than on a per incident basis.  769 
So. 2d at 972.  In reaching this holding, this Court first concluded that “section 
766.207(7)(b) is neither clear nor unambiguous.”  Id. at 968.  Then, this Court 
found that the Legislature’s intent with the statute was to “provide substantial 
incentives to claimants and defendants to voluntarily submit their cases to binding 
arbitration” and that this intent “can be obtained by interpreting section 
766.207(7)(b) so that each claimant is fairly and reasonably compensated for his or 
her pain and suffering.”  Id. at 970.  Moreover, this Court stated, “were we to 
interpret the noneconomic damages cap to apply to all claimants in the aggregate, 
we conclude that such an interpretation would create equal protection concerns.”  
Id. at 971.  Thus, this Court mentioned in Phillipe that “[d]ifferentiating between a 
single claimant and multiple claimants bears no rational relationship to the 
Legislature’s stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical liability 
insurance industry.”  Id. 
However, this Court very recently rejected a challenge that was nearly 
identical to the equal protection concern this Court had mentioned in Phillipe.  
Specifically, in Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Compensation Ass’n, 114 So. 3d 912, 917 (Fla. 2013), the Samples argued that the 
$100,000 parental award under the Florida Birth-Related Injury Compensation 
 
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Plan violated equal protection under the Florida and federal constitutions because 
“those parents who apply for an award alone can receive twice the amount awarded 
to parents who share or split a parental award.”  Applying the rational basis test, 
this Court in Samples concluded that “[l]imiting the parental award to $100,000 
per claim—as opposed to per parent—is rationally related to maintaining the 
actuarial soundness of the Plan.”  Id.  Therefore, this Court upheld the statutory 
provision.  Id. 
Similar to this Court’s precedent, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have all upheld limitations on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice cases against equal protection challenges.  See McCall, 642 F.3d at 
951; Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2005) (“By 
limiting at least one component of health care costs, the noneconomic damages 
limitation is rationally related to its intended purpose.”) (quoting Zdrojewski v. 
Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 
1191, 1197 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that cap on all damages, including economic 
damages, does not deny equal protection because it “bears a reasonable relation to 
a valid legislative purpose—the maintenance of adequate health care services in 
the Commonwealth of Virginia”); Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (“Clearly the Virgin Island’s decision to curb, through legislation, the 
high costs of malpractice insurance and thereby promote quality medical care to 
 
- 71 - 
the residents of the islands, provides a rational basis for capping the amount of 
damages that can be awarded a plaintiff.”); Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 
422 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Lucas has failed to convince us that there is no reasonable 
basis for the Texas legislature to conclude that this ceiling on recovery from certain 
institutions is not conceivably related to the availability and cost of malpractice 
insurance and that such insurance and the distribution of medical care in Texas are 
not conceivably linked.”); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 
1985) (“The record clearly supports a finding that the California Legislature had a 
‘plausible reason’ to believe that the limitations on noneconomic recovery would 
limit the rise in malpractice insurance costs.”).     
 
Additionally, multiple state courts have rejected equal protection challenges 
to statutory caps on noneconomic damages.  See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Med. 
Grp., 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2002); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992), 
overruled on other grounds by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 
636 (Mo. 2012); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. 
Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr. Inc., 
414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991). 
Applying our rational basis precedent, it is clear that the statutory cap in this 
case passes constitutional muster.  When enacting the noneconomic damages cap 
 
- 72 - 
at issue here, the Legislature found that “Florida is in the midst of a medical 
malpractice insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude” and that “this crisis 
threatens the quality and availability of health care for all Florida citizens.”  Ch. 
2003-416, at § 1.  The Legislature concluded that the “cost of medical malpractice 
insurance has increased dramatically during the past decade” and that “both the 
increase and the current cost are substantially higher than the national average.”  
Id.  As a result, physicians are being forced “to practice medicine without 
professional liability insurance, to leave Florida, to not perform high-risk 
procedures, or to retire early from the practice of medicine.”  Id.  
 
This Court has previously recognized the existence of a medical malpractice 
insurance crisis as a legitimate state interest.  See Mizrahi, 761 So. 2d at 1042 n.3; 
Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 196-97.  Further, it is undisputed that increasing the quality, 
availability, and affordability of health care for Floridians is a legitimate state 
interest.  And the Legislature’s policy choice of enacting a cap on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases is rationally related to these state interests.  
As this Court explained in Mizrahi, 761 So. 2d at 1043, “limiting claims that may 
be advanced by some claimants would proportionally limit claims made overall 
and would directly affect the costs of providing health care by making it less 
expensive and more accessible.”  In fact, “it is hard to conceive a more rational 
means of assuaging the fear of huge damage awards and reining in insurance costs 
 
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in the case of a victim’s death than by limiting noneconomic wrongful death 
damages.”  Maurin v. Hall, 682 N.W.2d 866, 890-91 (Wis. 2004).   
More specifically, the Florida Legislature could have rationally believed that 
the cap on noneconomic damages under section 766.118(2)(b) would reduce 
malpractice damage awards, which would thereby increase predictability in the 
medical malpractice insurance market and lead to reduced insurance premiums.  
Then, as a result of decreased insurance premiums, physicians would be more 
willing to stay in Florida and perform high-risk procedures at a lower cost to 
Floridians.12
McCall contends that the cap at issue in this case violates Florida’s equal 
protection guarantee because it applies on a per incident, rather than a per claimant, 
   
                                         
12.  In fact, the Governor’s Task Force, upon which the Legislature 
expressly relied, concluded as much: 
 
[I]mposing caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
cases will significantly reduce the exposure of Florida healthcare 
providers to risk of loss from jury awards of inherently subjective 
damages.  Such a reduction of risk will make malpractice losses much 
more predictable, and thereby lead to stability in malpractice 
insurance premium rates. 
A reduction in potential liability and resulting stability will 
encourage more malpractice insurers to participate in the Florida 
market.  This, along with the reduced exposure to risk, will permit 
insurers to charge lower premiums, on a sound financial basis.  Lower 
premiums will encourage providers (particularly those in high-risk 
specialties) to offer healthcare services to Floridians, and persons 
visiting this state, and to do so at lower prices. 
 
Gov.’s Task Force Report, at xvii. 
 
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basis.  However, the Legislature could have reasonably believed that a per incident 
cap would more effectively reduce noneconomic damages awards and create more 
stability in the insurance market than a per claimant cap would.  A per incident cap 
leads to more predictability in the insurance market since the noneconomic 
damages cannot exceed the cap in any particular instance of malpractice regardless 
of the number of individual claimants.  And the Legislature could have reasonably 
believed that this increased predictability would more effectively decrease medical 
malpractice insurance rates, thereby keeping more physicians in Florida to provide 
more access to quality health care (including high-risk procedures) at a lower cost 
to Floridians.   
As a federal district court ably stated when rejecting a similar per incident 
argument regarding the same statutory cap at issue here, 
[t]he aggregate limit on non-economic damages—applying to each 
incident regardless of the number of claimants—serves precisely the 
same legitimate interest served by individual caps:  by reducing 
damage awards, limits on damages make medical malpractice 
insurance more affordable and quality healthcare services more 
available.  A cap applicable to each occurrence, in cooperation with 
caps individually applicable to each claimant, reduces damage awards 
as a matter of mathematical certainty, enhances needed predictability, 
places a calculable limit on the exposure of healthcare and insurance 
providers, reduces malpractice insurance premiums, and promotes the 
availability of quality healthcare.   
M.D. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1280-81 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
 
- 75 - 
 
McCall also argues that the noneconomic damages cap violates equal 
protection because the more severely injured may not recover their full damages, 
unlike those whose damages fall under the cap.  However, if this were an equal 
protection violation, no cap on damages could survive equal protection review 
because all caps have that effect.  And this Court has rejected equal protection 
challenges to caps on damages previously.  See Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189; see also 
Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961.  In fact, in Echarte, this Court rejected an equal protection 
challenge under the Florida Constitution to statutory caps on noneconomic 
damages when the parties and amici advanced the precise argument that McCall 
raises here, namely that the noneconomic damages cap discriminated against the 
most severely injured.  Therefore, under this Court’s precedent, McCall’s equal 
protection argument based upon the fact that some may not fully recover is without 
merit.  Ultimately, “the Legislature simply may have felt that it was fairer to 
malpractice plaintiffs in general to reduce only the very large noneconomic 
damage awards, rather than to diminish the more modest recoveries for pain and 
suffering and the like in the great bulk of cases.”  Fein, 695 P.2d at 683. 
 
Rather than applying the analysis prescribed by our precedent, the plurality 
concludes that the statutory cap is “unfair” and “purely arbitrary” by citing two 
other state supreme courts and improperly relying on dicta from our decision in 
Phillipe, while ignoring the fact that this Court in Samples very recently rejected 
 
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an argument that was nearly identical to the dicta expressed in Phillipe.  See 
plurality op. at 9-13 (Lewis, J.).   
Even more disturbingly, and as acknowledged by Justice Pariente to be 
inappropriate and unprecedented,13
                                         
 
13.  See concurring in result op. at 54 (Pariente, J.) (“[T]here is simply no 
precedent for this Court to engage in its own independent evaluation and 
reweighing of the facts and legislative policy findings, as done by the plurality, 
when conducting a rational basis analysis.”). 
 Justice Lewis’ plurality opinion addresses 
McCall’s equal protection challenge by conducting a de novo review of medical 
malpractice issues, overruling the findings made by the Legislature, and 
disregarding the evidence upon which those findings were based.  Justice Lewis’ 
plurality opinion reweighs the evidence and disbelieves the Governor’s Task Force 
as well as the legislative testimony, claiming that its own independent review has 
revealed that the other two branches were incorrect and that a “bona fide medical 
malpractice crisis” probably did not and certainly does not currently exist.  See id. 
at 18-28, 35-40.  Additionally, despite the Legislature’s and the Task Force’s 
conclusions on the matter after reviewing the evidence, this plurality’s independent 
review has revealed that the “available data” “failed to establish a direct correlation 
between damage caps and reduced malpractice premiums.”  Id. at 28, 35.   
 
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While the plurality clearly would have come to a different policy choice than 
the Legislature based upon the hardly unambiguous data14
                                         
 
14.  Justice Lewis notes that medical malpractice filings have decreased 
significantly since fiscal year 2003-04 and that Florida, according to a 2011 report, 
is now retaining a fairly high percentage of Florida-trained medical students.  See 
plurality op. at 36-37 (Lewis, J.).  While he uses this information to support the 
plurality’s argument that the statutory caps are no longer justified because a 
medical malpractice crisis does not currently exist, this information just as easily 
(and perhaps more likely) supports the argument that the cap has had its intended 
effect and that, if the cap is eliminated, the medical malpractice crisis would return 
in full force.  
 that the plurality could 
cull from the record and the internet, that is not the point.  Instead, our precedent 
dictates that we employ the rational basis test, which is a relatively easy test for a 
statute to pass and which recognizes and respects the Legislature’s role as the 
primary policymaker in our constitutional system.  See McElrath v. Burley, 707 
So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (explaining that the rational basis test 
provides “minimal scrutiny” under which the challenger bears “a heavy burden”); 
see also Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (“This 
inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that 
the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an 
unavoidable one.”).  In fact, the rational basis standard is less stringent than the 
deferential competent substantial evidence standard we employ when reviewing 
 
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our own branch’s findings of fact.15
                                         
 
15.  Of course, there is competent substantial evidence to support the 
Legislature’s findings of fact.  For example, one actuary testified before the 
Governor’s Task Force that “[m]aking losses more predictable is a key to attracting 
companies to provide coverage, and it is also a key to getting more stable pricing 
in the marketplace.”  And there was testimony that “[i]n Georgia, physicians pay 
from $5,000 to $6,000 for $1,000,000 of coverage.  Thirty miles south, in 
Jacksonville, that costs $27,000.”  Moreover, “[i]n one instance, a Fort Lauderdale 
pediatric orthopedic surgeon’s premiums went from $32,000 to $96,000 a year,” 
and, due to the increase, the surgeon planned to move to a state with tort reform.   
  Under the rational basis standard, there just 
has to be a conceivable factual predicate that would provide a rational reason for 
the Legislature to have done what it chose to do.  See Fla. High School Activities 
Ass’n, 434 So. 2d at 308 (“The burden is upon the party challenging the statute . . . 
to show that there is no conceivable factual predicate which would rationally 
support the classification under attack. . . .”).  The statute does not need to be 
supported by unequivocal evidence in the record from the point in time when the 
statute was enacted or by more recent and allegedly authoritative reports posted on 
the internet.  In other words, as Justice Pariente’s concurring in result opinion 
recognizes, this Court is not supposed to conduct an independent review of 
available data.  See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“A State, moreover, 
has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory 
classification.  ‘[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and 
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ 
”) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).  Rather, if 
 
- 79 - 
we can conceive of a possible factual predicate that provides a rational basis in 
furtherance of a legitimate state interest, the statute does not violate the equal 
protection provision of the Florida Constitution. 
 
Here, applying the proper rational basis test, it is clear that the cap on 
noneconomic damages passes muster because it is rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest of decreasing medical malpractice insurance rates and 
increasing the affordability and availability of health care in Florida.  Accordingly, 
I would answer the Eleventh Circuit’s equal protection question in the negative and 
then address its access to courts, jury trial, and separation of powers questions. 
IV.  Access to Courts 
Relying on this Court’s decision in Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 
So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987), McCall contends that section 766.118(2)’s $1 million cap 
on noneconomic damages does not satisfy the access to court test set forth in 
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).  I would hold otherwise. 
 
Section 21 of article I of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he courts 
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be 
administered without sale, denial or delay.”  In Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4, this Court 
enunciated the following test for determining whether a statute violates this 
constitutional guarantee: 
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular 
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of 
 
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the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or 
where such right has become a part of the common law of the State 
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power 
to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to 
protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, 
unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for 
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting 
such public necessity can be shown. 
In other words, to survive an access to courts challenge, a statute eliminating 
redress for an injury must satisfy at least one of two possible prongs: (1) either the 
statute must provide a reasonable alternative to redress the injury involved, or (2) 
the Legislature must show that there was “an overpowering public necessity for the 
abolishment” and that there was “no alternative method of meeting such public 
necessity.”  Id. 
 
In Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, this Court applied the second prong from Kluger 
to hold that the statutory caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases when a party requests arbitration do not violate the right of access to courts.  
Specifically, this Court upheld the $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages if the 
parties agree to voluntary binding arbitration as well as the $350,000 cap if the 
plaintiff refuses a defendant’s offer to arbitrate.  In its analysis, this Court in 
Echarte ruled that the first Kluger alternative was satisfied because “[t]he 
defendant’s offer to have damages determined by an arbitration panel provides the 
claimant with the opportunity to receive prompt recovery without the risk and 
uncertainty of litigation or having to prove fault in a civil trial.”  Echarte, 618 So. 
 
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2d at 194.  Next, this Court held that “[e]ven if the medical malpractice arbitration 
statutes at issue did not provide a commensurate benefit, we would find that the 
statutes satisfy the second prong of Kluger.”  Id. at 195.   
In Echarte, this Court explained that the judiciary exercises restraint when 
reviewing the legislative findings necessary to satisfy the second prong of Kluger.  
Specifically, this Court stated the “legislative determinations of public purpose and 
facts are presumed correct and entitled to deference, unless clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
at 196.  This Court explained that “[t]he Legislature has the final word on 
declarations on public policy, and the courts are bound to give great weight to 
legislative determinations of facts.”  Id.   
 
This Court in Echarte began its discussion of the legislative showing of an 
overwhelming public necessity by explaining that the preamble to the statute at 
issue “clearly states the Legislature’s conclusion that the current medical 
malpractice insurance crisis constitutes an ‘overpowering public necessity.’ ”  Id.  
This Court also noted that the “Legislature made a specific factual finding that 
‘[m]edical malpractice liability insurance premiums have increased dramatically in 
recent years, resulting in increased unavailability of malpractice insurance for 
some physicians.’ ”  Id. (quoting § 766.201(1)(a)).  Then, this Court concluded that 
the Legislature’s findings were supported by the work of the Academic Task Force 
for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, which found, among other things, 
 
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that “a family physician who performs no surgery and practiced outside Dade and 
Broward Counties saw a 229% increase in medical malpractice insurance 
premiums.”  Id.  This Task Force had based its findings upon seven public hearings 
and meetings as well as surveys, research projects, and a literature review.  Id. at 
196 n.17.  Based upon this record, this Court concluded that “the Legislature has 
shown that an ‘overpowering public necessity’ exists.”  Id. at 196-97. 
 
Additionally, despite the lack of an express legislative finding on the matter, 
this Court in Echarte held that “the record supports the conclusion that no 
alternative or less onerous method exists.”  Id. at 197.  This Court noted that “in 
determining whether no alternative means exists to meet the public necessity of 
ending the medical malpractice crisis, the plan as a whole, rather than focusing on 
one specific part of the plan, must be considered.”  Id.  This Court explained that 
the Task Force believed that “reforms of the civil justice system, of the medical 
regulatory system, and of the insurance system complement each other” and that 
“all are necessary to address the complex problems with multiple causes” of the 
medical malpractice insurance crisis.  Id. (quoting the Task Force’s 
recommendations to the Legislature).  And this Court in Echarte rejected the 
contention that professional discipline alone would have been an alternative 
method to meet the public necessity at issue, explaining that “the Task Force 
specifically found that: ‘[s]trengthened regulation of medical care providers is not 
 
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a substitute for tort and insurance reform.’ ”  Id. (quoting Task Force).  “The Task 
Force specifically stated that even though a small percentage of the physicians 
were responsible for 42.2% of the total claims paid out, the facts did not support 
the conclusion that these doctors were incompetent.”  Id.  Thus, because it was 
“clear that both the arbitration statute, with its conditional limits on recovery of 
noneconomic damages, and the strengthened regulation of the medical profession 
are necessary to meet the medical malpractice insurance crisis,” this Court in 
Echarte held that the second prong of Kluger was satisfied.  Id. 
 
Similar to Echarte, the Legislature when enacting the statute at issue in this 
case expressly found that “Florida is in the midst of a medical malpractice 
insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude” and that “making high-quality health 
care available to the citizens of this state,” “ensuring that physicians continue to 
practice in Florida,” and “ensuring the availability of affordable professional 
liability insurance for physicians” are overwhelming public necessities.  Ch. 2003-
416, at § 1.  The Legislature specifically found that “Florida is among the states 
with the highest medical malpractice insurance premiums in the nation” and that 
“the cost of medical malpractice insurance has increased dramatically during the 
past decade and both the increase and the current cost are substantially higher than 
the national average.”  Id.  Further, the Legislature determined that “the increase in 
medical malpractice liability insurance rates is forcing physicians to practice 
 
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medicine without professional liability insurance, to leave Florida, to not perform 
high-risk procedures, or to retire early from the practice of medicine.”  Id. 
           These Legislative findings of an overwhelming public necessity are 
supported by the determinations of the Governor’s Task Force.  For example, in its 
report, the Governor’s Task Force concluded that the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance had increased dramatically, explaining the following particulars: 
In 2002 the average medical malpractice premium per doctor in 
Florida was 55 percent higher than the national average.  Florida’s 
average insurance premiums have increased 64 percent since 1996 
while nationally the average insurance premiums have increased 26 
percent. 
Gov.’s Task Force Rep. at v.  The Task Force received specific testimony 
indicating that “[i]n Georgia, physicians pay from $5,000 to $6,000 for $1,000,000 
of coverage.  Thirty miles south, in Jacksonville, that costs $27,000.”  Id. at 76.  
And the Task Force noted that: 
[t]he Professional Medical Insurance Services, Inc., underwriters for 
Florida physicians, estimates that, in 2003, for OB/GYNs who 
presently have coverage, costs for $1 million dollar[s] of coverage 
will average between $70,000 and $110,000 per year; $250,000 of 
coverage will cost between $50,000 and $60,000 per year.  For 
OB/GYNs seeking new insurance in 2003, estimates show that $1 
million dollars in coverage will cost $150,000 per year[] and $250,000 
in coverage will cost between $90,000 and $107,000 per year.  As a 
result of these escalating costs, physicians are simply either under 
insuring or becoming uninsured with regard to their practices.   
Id. at 306.  The Task Force found that “[i]n Miami, evidence reflects that 80 
percent of the OB/GYNs carry no insurance and those who do are paying over 
 
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$207,000 per year for $1 million dollars worth of coverage.”  Id.   And “[t]he 
number of insurance companies writing medical malpractice policies in Florida 
went from a high of sixty-six companies in 1999 to twelve currently.”  Id. at v.  
The Task Force also described testimony indicating that, as a result of these issues, 
over half the doctors in Florida that carry insurance can only afford to carry a 
$250,000 policy even though the most prevalent rate in the rest of the country is 
for a doctor to carry a $1,000,000 policy.  Id. at 76.  The Task Force further found 
that “[t]he concern over litigation and the cost and lack of medical malpractice 
insurance have caused doctors to discontinue high-risk procedures, turn away high-
risk patients, close practices, and move out of the state.”  Id. at vi.  Indeed, “[i]n 
Broward County alone, 400 physicians have left the state, or retired early in the 
past year.”  Id. at 72.   The Task Force learned that “[i]n one instance, a Fort 
Lauderdale pediatric orthopedic surgeon’s premiums went from $32,000 to 
$96,000 a year.”  Id.  Due to this increase, the surgeon reported a plan “to return to 
his home state, Louisiana, as that state has tort reform.”  Id.  Therefore, because the 
Legislature’s factual and policy findings are presumed correct (as explained in 
Echarte), and because (as in Echarte) these findings are supported by the work of 
the Governor’s Task Force, the Legislature has shown the existence of an 
“overpowering public necessity.”   
 
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Regarding the “no alternative method” showing necessary to satisfy the 
second prong of Kluger, the Legislature expressly found that “the overwhelming 
public necessities of making quality health care available to the citizens of this 
state, of ensuring that physicians continue to practice in Florida, and of ensuring 
that those physicians have the opportunity to purchase affordable professional 
liability insurance cannot be met unless a cap on noneconomic damages is 
imposed.”  Ch. 2003-416, at § 1(14), Laws of Fla.  The Legislature determined that 
“the high cost of medical malpractice claims can be substantially alleviated by 
imposing a limitation on noneconomic damages” and that “there is no alternative 
measure of accomplishing such result without imposing even greater limits upon 
the ability of persons to recover damages for medical malpractice.”  Ch. 2003-416, 
at § 1(15), (16), Laws of Fla.  The Legislature also found that “each of the 
provisions of this act is necessary to alleviate the crisis relating to medical 
malpractice insurance.”  Ch. 2003-416, at § 1(18), Laws of Fla. 
The record supports these legislative findings and determinations.  For 
instance, the Governor’s Task Force stated that, “without the inclusion of a cap on 
potential awards of non-economic damages in the package, no legislative reform 
plan can be successful in achieving a goal of controlling increases in healthcare 
costs and thereby promoting improved access to healthcare.”  Gov.’s Task Force 
 
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Rep. at 218.  The Task Force noted that various other alternatives had been tried 
previously without success:  
Since 1975, Florida has implemented (or attempted to implement) 
numerous alternatives to the cap on non-economic damages and the 
other reforms recommended in this Report.  None, alone or together 
with the others, has solved the crisis of medical malpractice insurance 
availability and affordability.  Instead, Florida’s numerous attempts to 
solve this problem are nothing more than a failed litany of 
alternatives.   
Id. at 219.   
The Task Force explained that “one of the primary drivers of the current 
medical malpractice crisis is that a large percentage of medical malpractice losses 
(77 percent in Florida) apply to non-economic damages (i.e., pain and suffering).”  
Id. at 212.  The Task Force also stated its belief that “caps on non-economic 
damages are particularly effective, because they limit the escalation of awards for 
pain and suffering, which fuels large increases for all awards and settlements.”  Id.  
In fact, the Task Force thought that a cap on noneconomic damages was so 
important to alleviating the crisis and lowering premiums that it recommended a 
$250,000 per incident cap on noneconomic damages, rather than the $1 million per 
incident cap at issue in this case.  See id. at xi.  Based upon this record, the 
Legislature has shown that “no alternative or less onerous method exists.”  Echarte, 
618 So. 2d at 197. 
 
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Accordingly, because the Legislature has shown an overpowering public 
necessity for the cap on noneconomic damages and that there is no alternative 
method of meeting the public necessity, the second prong of Kluger (as applied in 
Echarte) is satisfied.  Therefore, section 766.118(2)(b) does not violate the right of 
access to court guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. 
V.  Jury Trial 
 
 
McCall also contends that the cap on noneconomic damages violates the 
right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.  However, I would 
disagree and therefore answer the Eleventh Circuit’s certified question in the 
negative. 
Article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he right of 
trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate.”  Florida’s “first 
constitution of 1838, which became effective upon Florida’s admittance to the 
Union in 1845, and all subsequent constitutions have contained similar 
provisions.”  In re 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986).  Thus, 
section 22 of article I “guarantees the right to trial by jury in those cases in which 
the right was enjoyed at the time this state’s first constitution became effective in 
1845.”  Id.   
 
This right to a jury trial is not implicated here because survivors of a 
wrongful death did not have the right to recover noneconomic damages in 1845.  
 
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“It is well known that at common law the cause of action died with the person and 
that a parent had no right of action as parent for the wrongful death of a minor 
child.”  Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587, 592 (Fla. 1955).  Parents only gained 
this statutory right in 1899.  Id. at 591.  Other survivors were not entitled to recover 
pain and suffering damages until the Legislature enacted the Wrongful Death Act 
in 1972.  See ch. 72-35, Laws of Fla.; Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc. v. Afonso, 4 
So. 3d 764, 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“A survivor’s right to recover pain and 
suffering did not become part of the Wrongful Death Act until 1972. . . .”); see also 
Martin v. United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765, 767-68 (Fla. 1975) (describing 
the damages that were recoverable before and after the enactment of the Wrongful 
Death Act in 1972).  Therefore, because the petitioners would not have had the 
right to recover damages from Ms. McCall’s death in 1845, the cap on 
noneconomic damages under section 766.118(2)(b) does not violate the right to a 
jury trial guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. 
VI.  Separation of Powers 
 
 
Lastly, McCall contends that the cap on noneconomic damages violates the 
Florida Constitution’s provision ensuring separation of powers because the cap 
amounts to an impermissible legislative remittitur.  I would reject this argument. 
 
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he powers 
of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial 
 
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branches.  No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers 
appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”  As 
this Court has explained, “[g]enerally, the Legislature is empowered to enact 
substantive law while [the judicial branch] has the authority to enact procedural 
law.”  Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 936 (Fla. 2008).  Therefore, “[i]f a statute 
is clearly substantive and operates in an area of legitimate legislative concern, this 
Court will not hold that it constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment on the 
judicial branch.”  Id. at 937. 
 
In Rowlands v. Signal Construction Co., 549 So. 2d 1380, 1381-82 (Fla. 
1989) (footnote omitted), this Court explained remittitur as follows: 
In its classic sense, the term “remittitur” means nothing more 
than “[t]he procedural process by which a verdict of the jury is 
diminished by subtraction.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1164 (5th ed. 
1979).  Indeed, when remittitur was created in 1822 by Justice Story, 
it was for the express purpose of subtracting a specific amount from 
an excessive verdict if the plaintiff wanted to avoid the court’s 
alternative new-trial order.  Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 (No. 
1578) (C.C.A. Mass. 1822).  See Note, Remittitur Practice in the 
Federal Courts
In other words, “remittitur operates as a procedural device to bring the damages 
back within the outer bounds of law.”  Rowlands, 549 So. 2d at 1382 n.1. 
, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1976) (discussing 
history of remittitur).  Thus, remittitur is proper where liability clearly 
exists, but the total dollar amount of damages is merely excessive. 
 
Here, the challenged cap does not invade the province of the judiciary 
because it does not operate as a legislative remittitur.  The statutory cap establishes 
 
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a limit to noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases generally.  It does 
not perform the judiciary’s function of reviewing the specific support for particular 
damage awards in individual cases.  Accordingly, “[b]ecause the challenged law 
does not purport to vest the Legislature with authority to make a fact intensive, 
case-by-case determination of the propriety of damage awards in individual cases, 
it does not usurp the authority of the judiciary.”  M.D., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.   
 
Moreover, in Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1092, this Court rejected the argument 
that statutory limitations on punitive damages violated Florida’s separation of 
powers provision.  See also Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 191 (holding that the caps on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases where a party offers 
arbitration do not violate “the non-delegation doctrine”); Cauley, 403 So. 2d at 387 
(holding that caps on damages in tort cases against municipalities do not violate 
“the separation of powers rule”).  This Court in Smith explained that “[w]hen the 
legislature enacted these provisions, it was addressing the substantive rights of 
plaintiffs and defendants in civil litigation actions with regard to recovery of 
damages.”  507 So. 2d at 1092.  This Court also approved the following reasoning 
the trial court employed when rejecting the separation of powers claim:   
Sections 51 and 52 deal with the subject of punitive damages.  
Section 51 defines the conditions the plaintiff must meet to recover 
punitive damages.  Section 52 limits the amount of punitive damages 
available in certain civil actions.  In addition, section 52 specifies who 
shall receive any punitive damages so awarded.  Section 51 is clearly 
substantive because it sets the standard for establishing a claim for 
 
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punitive damages.  The legislature, which has the authority to abolish 
punitive damages can surely set the standard for establishing such 
claims.  The Court is of the view that both sections create substantive 
rights and further that any procedural provisions of these sections are 
intimately related to the definition of those substantive rights.  
Id. at 1092 n.10. 
 
Like the punitive damages statute at issue in Smith, the statutory cap on 
noneconomic damages at issue here addresses the substantive rights of parties with 
regard to the recovery of damages.  And because section 766.118(2)(b) addresses 
substantive rights, it does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida 
Constitution. 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
As explained above, the plurality chooses to disregard the rational basis 
standard prescribed by our precedent as well as the Legislature’s policy role under 
Florida’s constitution.  Under our precedent, Florida’s per incident cap for a 
wrongful death action does not violate Florida’s constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection, access to courts, jury trial, and separation of powers.  Therefore, I 
would answer the certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit in the negative.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 07-00508CV-3-MCR/EMT 
 
 
 
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Henry T. Courtney and Sara Courtney-Baigorri of Courtney Law Firm, Coral 
Gables, Florida; Stephen S. Poche of The Law Office of Stephen S. Poche, P.A., 
Shalimar, Florida; and Robert S. Peck and Valerie M. Nannery of Center for 
Constitutional Litigation, P.C., Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
for Appellants 
 
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Marsh, United States Attorney, 
Daniel J. Lenerz and Thomas M. Bondy, Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, 
United States Department of Justice, Washington, District of Columbia; and 
Pamela A. Moine, United States Attorney’s Office, Pensacola, Florida, 
 
for Appellee 
 
Raoul G. Cantero and David P. Draigh of White & Case LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Coral Gables Hospital, Delray Medical Center, Good 
Samaritan Medical Center, Hialeah Hospital, North Shore Medical Center, 
North Shore Medical Center-FMC Campus, Palm Beach Gardens Medical 
Center, Palmetto General Hospital, St. Mary’s Medical Center and West 
Boca Medical Center 
 
Thomas E. Warner and Dean A. Morande of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm 
Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Amicus Curiae HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, California, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae The Civil Justice Association of California 
 
Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel, Florida Department of Health, Tallahassee, 
Florida; M. Drew Parker, General Counsel, and John Slye, Acting General 
Counsel, Florida Department of Children & Families, Tallahassee, Florida; Dean 
C. Kowalchyk, General Counsel, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, Tallahassee, 
Florida; William H. Roberts, Acting General Counsel, Florida Agency for Health 
Care Administration, Tallahassee, Florida; and Mike Palecki, General Counsel, 
Florida Department of Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
- 94 - 
for Amici Curiae Surgeon General Frank Famer and Florida’s Healthcare 
Agencies 
 
William W. Large, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Reform Institute 
 
Stephen Hogge of Stephen Hogge, Esq., LLC, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Professor Paul H. Rubin 
 
George N. Meros, Jr. and Allen Winsor of GrayRobinson PA, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida College of Emergency Physicians and The Florida 
Orthopaedic Society 
 
Mark Hicks, Dinah Stein, and Shannon Kain of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, 
P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Medical Association 
 
Arthur J. England, Jr. and Christopher B. Carbot of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 
Miami, Florida; Mark K. Delegal and Cynthia S. Tunnicliff of Pennington, Moore, 
Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae The Florida Hospital Association and The Safety Net 
Hospital Alliance of Florida 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Diane G. DeWolf, Deputy Solicitor 
General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae The State of Florida 
 
Christopher L. Nuland and Brian Hart of Law Offices of Christopher L. Nuland, 
P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,  
 
for Amici Curiae The Florida Chapter of the American College of 
Physicians, Florida Chapter of the American College of Surgeons, Florida 
Obstetric and Gynecologic Society, Florida Society of Plastic Surgeons, 
Florida Society of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeons, Florida 
 
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Neurosurgical Society, Florida Society of General Surgeons, Florida Society 
of Dermatology and Dermatologic Surgery and Florida Gastroenterologic 
Society 
 
Michael L. Rosen of Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Tampa, Florida; Mark A. 
Behrens and Cary Silverman of Shook Hardy & Bacon, Washington, District of 
Columbia, 
 
for Amici Curiae American Medical Association, American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons, American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Chambers of Commerce of the United States of American, 
Health Coalition on Liability and Access, Physicians Insurers Association of 
America, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, National 
Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and NFIB Small Business 
Legal Center  
 
Lincoln J. Connolly of Rossman, Baumberger, Reboso, Spier & Connolly, P.A., 
Miami, Florida,  
 
for Amici Curiae Floridians for Patient Protections, Inc. and Florida 
Consumer Action Network, Inc. 
 
Barbara W. Green of Barbara Green, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida; and Joel S. 
Perwin of Joel S. Perwin, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae The Florida Justice Association, AARP, Florida AFL-CIO, 
and Florida Public Employee Council 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
 
John S. Mills and Andrew D. Manko of The Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida 
 
 
for Amici Curiae Professors Neil Vidmar, Tom Baker, Ralph L. 
Brill, Martha Chamallas, Stephen Daniels, Thomas A. Eaton, Theodore 
Eisenberg, Marc Galanter, Valerie P. Hans, Edward J. Kionka, Thomas 
Koenig, Herbert Kritzer, Nancy S. Marder, Joanne Martin, Frank M. 
McClellan, Deborah Jones Merritt, James T. Richardson, and Michael L. 
Rustad 
 
Stephen N. Zack, President, American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois; and 
Herman J. Russomanno, Robert J. Borrello, Herman J. Russomanno III,  of 
Russomanno & Borrello P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
- 96 - 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae The American Bar Association 
 
George S. Christian, Austin, Texas, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Texas Civil Justice League