Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawson

Citation: 2011-Ohio-4673

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawson, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4673.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4673 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LAWSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4673.] 
(No. 2011-0131 — Submitted May 25, 2011 — Decided September 20, 2011.) 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Felony conviction for conspiracy to obtain Schedule 
II drugs by deception — Advising client to engage in illegal activity — 
Prior disciplinary violations — Permanent disbarment. 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-098. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kenneth L. Lawson, Attorney Registration No. 
0042468, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.  In 2007, pursuant 
to Gov.Bar R. V(5a), this court ordered an interim remedial suspension against 
respondent, pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings based on 
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multiple instances of professional misconduct.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawson, 
113 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2007-Ohio-2333, 866 N.E.2d 508. 
{¶ 2} On July 9, 2008, this court ordered respondent indefinitely 
suspended, finding that he had neglected and failed to properly represent 15 
clients, failed to return unearned fees, stole settlement funds from six clients, 
misused his IOLTA account to conceal his personal funds from creditors, failed to 
cooperate in numerous grievance investigations, and made repeated dishonest 
statements to clients and relator during investigation of these matters.  Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008-Ohio-3340, 891 N.E.2d 749. 
{¶ 3} On December 7, 2009, a second disciplinary complaint was filed 
against respondent, alleging that in August 2003, respondent entered into a 
conspiracy with Dr. Walter Broadnax and George Beatty to obtain Schedule II 
prescription drugs by deception.  Relator recommended that respondent be 
permanently disbarred.  Respondent recommended dismissal or a second 
indefinite suspension.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline concluded that respondent had committed the infractions alleged in the 
complaint and recommended an indefinite suspension, to run consecutively to the 
indefinite suspension that respondent was currently serving.  For the reasons that 
follow, we depart from the board’s recommendation and order respondent 
permanently disbarred. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Beginning in August 2003, respondent entered into a conspiracy 
with Dr. Walter Broadnax and George Beatty to illegally obtain the prescription 
drugs Percodan, Percocet, and OxyContin by deception.  Throughout this 
conspiracy, respondent was also acting as Dr. Broadnax’s attorney, working for 
free in exchange for prescriptions. 
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{¶ 5} Later in the conspiracy, in November 2004, respondent orchestrated 
an elaborate scheme to bilk his client/coconspirator, Dr. Broadnax, out of 
$50,000.  Respondent falsely advised the doctor that his phone had been tapped 
and that he was about to be indicted as the result of a criminal investigation by the 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for irregular billing practices.  Respondent 
told Dr. Broadnax that for $50,000, respondent could bribe state officials to make 
the investigation “go away.”  Respondent then promised Dr. Broadnax that he 
would provide him with the incriminating evidence, which the doctor could then 
destroy. 
{¶ 6} All of these claims respondent made to his client, Dr. Broadnax, 
were false.  Respondent admitted that he had made these false claims to frighten 
the doctor into giving him $50,000.  After Dr. Broadnax was unable to come up 
with the $50,000, respondent and Beatty falsely advised him that they would 
“loan” him the $50,000 for the bribe that respondent would deliver to the state 
official.  When Dr. Broadnax was later unable to repay the “loan,” respondent 
used this indebtedness to pressure the doctor into writing illegal prescriptions 
without any further compensation from respondent. 
{¶ 7} Between November 2004 and January 2007, Dr. Broadnax wrote 
approximately 700 to 800 prescriptions for respondent and Beatty.  To avoid 
triggering an investigation by law enforcement, respondent went so far as to 
provide Dr. Broadnax with names of people for him to record as the purported 
recipient of the prescriptions.  Some of the names used on the prescriptions were 
those of former or current clients, sometimes with their knowledge and/or 
assistance and sometimes without.  Sometimes respondent would pay the party for 
whom the prescription was written to fill the prescription and return it to him.  For 
example, respondent used two clients whom he had represented in multiple felony 
charges for drug trafficking and possession in this fraudulent scheme, further 
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jeopardizing them.  In addition, respondent used at least three employees from his 
law office to fill the prescriptions made out in their names and then provide the 
drugs to respondent.  Respondent even obtained a prescription in the names of his 
daughter and a friend of his daughter. 
{¶ 8} Sometimes respondent would pay Dr. Broadnax $100 per 
prescription.  Other times, he provided free legal services for the drugs.  
Moreover, respondent also purchased prescription drugs and cocaine from his 
coconspirator, George Beatty, and others, including his wife’s cousin.  To cover 
up his behavior, respondent lied to judges and other attorneys, telling them he had 
M.S. or Lou Gehrig’s disease. 
{¶ 9} In September 2008, respondent was indicted in federal court on 
conspiracy to obtain Schedule II controlled substances by deception in violation 
of Section 843(a)(3), Title 21, U.S.Code, between August  2003 and January 
2007, a felony.  A plea agreement was filed under which respondent pleaded 
guilty to conspiring with Dr. Broadnax, George Beatty, and others to unlawfully 
obtain possession of Schedule II controlled substances by deception.  On April 14, 
2009, respondent was sentenced to 24 months’ incarceration, one year of 
supervised release, and 1,000 hours of community service. 
{¶ 10} As a result of respondent’s felony conviction, this court entered an 
interim suspension order in July 2009.  In re Lawson, 122 Ohio St.3d 1485, 2009-
Ohio-3752, 910 N.E.2d 1038. 
Violations 
{¶ 11} The panel found and the board agreed that respondent had violated 
the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 
1-102(A)(3), prohibiting illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; 1-102(A)(4), 
prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 1-
102(A)(5), prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
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1-102(A)(6), prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law; 5-101(A)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from accepting employment if the 
lawyer’s professional judgment will be affected by the lawyer’s financial and 
personal interests; 7-102(A)(7), prohibiting a lawyer from counseling a client in 
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal; and 7-102(A)(8), prohibiting a lawyer 
from knowingly engaging in illegal conduct. 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
{¶ 12} Pursuant to Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”), the panel found the following 
aggravating factors: (1) prior disciplinary offense (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a)), 
(2) dishonest or selfish motive (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b)), (3) pattern of 
misconduct (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c)), and (4) multiple offenses (BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d)). 
{¶ 13} The panel further found the following factors in mitigation to be 
present: (1) full and free disclosure to the disciplinary authority or cooperative 
attitude toward the proceedings (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d)), (2) character and 
reputation (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e)), (3) imposition of other penalties or 
sanctions (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(f)), (4) chemical dependency (BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)), and (5) other interim rehabilitation (BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(h)). 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} Relator recommended that respondent be disbarred from the 
practice of law.  Respondent sought an indefinite suspension.  The panel and 
board recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law with specified conditions for reinstatement.  The suspension was 
recommended to run consecutively to the first indefinite suspension. 
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{¶ 15} Although respondent in his objections to the board’s report argued 
that his current misconduct was part of his initial misconduct, and therefore this 
matter is res judicata, respondent’s three-and-a-half-year conspiracy with Dr. 
Walter Broadnax and George Beatty to illegally obtain prescription drugs by 
deception, respondent’s misconduct towards his client, Dr. Broadnax, and 
respondent’s felony conviction were not matters charged in the prior disciplinary 
complaint. 
{¶ 16} In 2008, this court was aware of respondent’s chemical dependency 
issues, but we were unaware of the conduct of which respondent was ultimately 
convicted.  Respondent’s prior disciplinary case was decided in July 2008.  
Respondent was not charged with criminal conduct until September 2008, several 
months later, and was not sentenced until April 2009.  Thus, it was not possible 
for the board and this court to consider the issues surrounding respondent’s felony 
conviction. 
{¶ 17} In respondent’s first disciplinary case, this court noted the 
“pervasive pattern of professional misconduct.”  Id., 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008-
Ohio-3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, ¶ 2.  However, the majority emphasized the 
“compelling” evidence “showing how respondent’s chemical dependence had 
contributed to cause his misconduct.”  Id., ¶ 68.  At that time, the court noted the 
significant evidence of respondent’s efforts to address his chemical dependence.  
Id., ¶ 68-71.  The court agreed with the panel and board’s conclusion that 
respondent had made a case for eventually practicing law again based on the 
evidence of his character, reputation, remorse, chemical dependence, and 
recovery efforts.  Id., ¶ 74. 
{¶ 18} At the time of the first case, Chief Justice Moyer issued a strong 
dissent in which he concluded that in view of the seriousness and frequency of the 
misconduct at issue, he would disbar the respondent.  Id., ¶ 76 (Moyer, C.J., 
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dissenting).  The dissent acknowledged respondent’s chemical dependency, but 
noted that respondent “ignored his clients’ interests and stole their money.  He 
used his client trust-fund account to avoid creditors and purchase drugs.  He lied 
to the Disciplinary Counsel about his illegal use of drugs, as well as his use of 
settlement proceeds and a client trust fund for personal uses.  The great weight of 
his misconduct cannot be lifted by the mitigating factors cited by the majority.”  
Id., ¶ 80 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 19} Because we conclude that respondent’s pervasive scheme in which 
he scammed his own clients and exploited dozens of current and former clients, 
office staff, and his own daughter were not part of the facts this court passed 
judgment on in respondent’s prior disciplinary case, we reject the sanction 
recommended by the board.  We believe that an indefinite suspension would fall 
short of protecting the public, which this court has articulated is the primary goal 
of the attorney disciplinary system.  In re Disbarment of Lieberman (1955), 163 
Ohio St. 35, 41, 56 O.O.23, 125 N.E.2d 328; Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Marshall, 
121 Ohio St.3d 197, 2009-Ohio-501, 903 N.E.2d 280, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 20} Chemical dependency and mental-health impairments present a 
significant problem for attorneys and the disciplinary system.  But the harm 
respondent inflicted on his clients, his office staff, the profession, and the 
administration of justice through his elaborate and continuing pattern of 
misconduct outweighs the mitigation of his substance-abuse issues.  Although 
respondent attempts to minimize his criminal acts and illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude by arguing that he did not distribute medications to others, the 
cumulative nature of respondent’s misconduct, beginning with his first 
disciplinary case involving multiple clients, and ending with his scheme to scam 
clients, staff, and the system, merits disbarment. 
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{¶ 21} This court has disbarred attorneys for similar or less egregious 
conduct than that demonstrated by respondent.  For example, most recently in 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farrell, 129 Ohio St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 
N.E.2d 390,  this court disbarred an attorney who had previously been suspended 
from the practice of law for two years, stayed on conditions, based on findings 
that he had fabricated documents, forged his wife’s signature to a power of 
attorney, lied to secure the notarization of the power of attorney, and then used the 
forged document to obtain credit.  Id. ¶ 6-10, 23. 
{¶ 22} In Farrell, this court concluded, as we do here, that Farrell 
displayed the same deceit as he had in the 2008 case.  Id. at ¶ 33.  Although we 
concluded that Farrell’s depression appeared to be the result, rather than the 
cause, of his misconduct, while respondent’s chemical dependence clearly was a 
contributing factor in his misconduct, the result should be the same.  Both Farrell 
and respondent demonstrated a penchant for lying and deceit.  Farrell engaged in 
a six-year pattern of pathological lying and deceptive conduct.  Respondent 
engaged in a three-and-a-half-year pattern of similar pathological lying and 
deceit. 
{¶ 23} In Farrell, we emphasized three cases that are equally relevant 
here.  “We have permanently disbarred attorneys who have demonstrated a 
proclivity for lying and deceit.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 
19, 2004-Ohio-1587, 806 N.E.2d 503, ¶ 3-22, an attorney had repeatedly lied and 
deceived his clients and his firm to cover up his neglect of client matters.  
Observing that the attorney had deliberately concealed his neglect to protect his 
personal interests, and adopting a master commissioner’s finding that the attorney 
was predisposed to dishonesty and was lacking in integrity, we concluded that an 
indefinite suspension was too lenient.  Id. at ¶ 27, 30.  Therefore, we permanently 
disbarred the attorney.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
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{¶ 24} “Similarly, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Manogg (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 213, 214-216, 658 N.E.2d 257, we permanently disbarred an attorney who 
had been convicted on two felony counts of using false Social Security numbers, 
had created several aliases, and had made up fake property deeds and appraisals to 
obtain fraudulent mortgage loans.  In doing so, we stated that we were ‘most 
troubled * * * by respondent’s propensity to scheme and deceive without any 
moral appreciation for the lies he tells or the fraud he perpetrates.’  Id. at 217.  
And in Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-
1389, 904 N.E.2d 875, ¶  6-7, 15, we found that permanent disbarment was the 
only appropriate sanction for an attorney who, among other things, submitted an 
affidavit to this court falsely stating that he had complied with the terms of a 
previous suspension order.  Likewise, we agree that respondent’s pattern of lying 
and deceit strongly suggests that he lacks the ability to conform his behavior to 
the ethical standards incumbent upon attorneys in this state.”  Farrell, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 N.E.2d 390,  ¶ 34-35. 
{¶ 25} Other examples of disbarment that are relevant to this case include 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Longo (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 219, 761 N.E.2d 1042, 
where this court disbarred the respondent after he pleaded guilty to misprision of 
a felony.  Longo was found to have violated three Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-
102(A)(3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) 
(conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  Here, 
respondent has been held responsible for violating those three Disciplinary Rules, 
as well as four others, including those prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and knowingly engaging in illegal conduct. 
{¶ 26} Further, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Bein, 105 Ohio St.3d 62, 2004-
Ohio-7012, 822 N.E.2d 358, this court disbarred an attorney following felony 
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convictions for conspiracy to engage in the interstate transportation of stolen 
property and conspiring to engage in money laundering.  We noted that “[a] 
lawyer who engages in the kind of criminal conduct committed by respondent 
violates the duty to maintain personal honesty and integrity, which is one of the 
most basic professional obligations owed by lawyers to the public.  Respondent’s 
misconduct was harmful not only to the businesses affected but also to the legal 
profession, which is and ought to be a high calling dedicated to the service of 
clients and the public good.”  Id. at ¶ 13.  This principle is equally applicable in 
this case.  Respondent’s elaborate scheme was harmful not only to his clients, 
staff, and family, but to the legal profession and the administration of justice. 
{¶ 27} In Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Fatica (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 40, 57 
O.O.2d 158, 274 N.E.2d 763, the respondent, an attorney and member of city 
council, was charged with soliciting and accepting money to influence his vote on 
an application for transfer of a state liquor permit.  This court noted that “[a] 
civilized society cannot long remain without implicit confidence in those who 
occupy responsible positions of public trust, including both public officials, and 
members of the bar who are ‘officers of the court.’  The solicitation and 
acceptance of a bribe by such a person is, by its very nature, so serious as to 
warrant, if not to compel, permanent removal from such a position of trust.”  Id. at 
43.  In the case at bar, respondent offered to bribe a public official during his 
scheme to defraud his own client. 
{¶ 28} In Toledo Bar Assn. v. Neller, 98 Ohio St.3d 314, 2003-Ohio-774, 
784 N.E.2d 689, this court disbarred an attorney who was convicted of five felony 
counts: one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, marijuana, and heroin and 
four counts of unlawful use of a communication facility, all in violation of federal 
law.  Moreover, Neller furthered and promoted the conspiracy by advising his 
client on ways to avoid detection of illegal activities.  In spite of similarly 
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glowing testimonials by the legal community regarding Neller’s significant 
contributions as an outspoken advocate for minorities, this court held that “no 
mitigating circumstances can undo the harm of respondent’s integral role in this 
drug ring.”  Respondent, too, engaged in a drug ring of his own creation, which 
included scamming his own clients and using and abusing other current and 
former clients, office staff, and his own family.  He enlisted these parties and in 
some cases made them accomplices to his criminal enterprise.  He put them all at 
risk for criminal charges of their own. 
{¶ 29} Moreover, this court has permanently disbarred attorneys in the 
past for less pervasive misconduct in their first disciplinary case.  For example, in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Phillips, 108 Ohio St.3d 331, 2006-Ohio-1064, 843 
N.E.2d 775, this court disbarred an assistant  prosecuting attorney with no prior 
disciplinary violations when he accepted bribes to fix criminal cases.  Id., ¶ 4-6.  
Although the assistant prosecutor violated the law while he served in a position of 
public trust, the court also considered his strong evidence of mitigation regarding 
his chemical dependency.  Id., ¶ 13.  However, we noted that “any mitigating 
factor in a disciplinary case like this must be weighed against the seriousness of 
the rule violations that the lawyer has committed.”  Id.  Although it can be argued 
that respondent was not in a position of public trust like the assistant prosecutor, 
that fact is offset by respondent’s prior disciplinary action and commission of a 
felony.  Respondent violated ethical prohibitions against illegal conduct and 
advising clients to engage in illegal acts.  He also solicited a client to participate 
in a phony scheme to bribe a state official.  Moreover, respondent was aware of 
this deception during the 2008 disciplinary proceeding and failed to disclose it, 
which conflicts with his protestations of remorse. 
Client Security Fund and Money Owed 
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{¶ 30} Respondent’s misconduct affected numerous clients beyond the 15 
in his prior disciplinary case and those in his current disciplinary case.  The Client 
Security Fund (“CSF”) has made awards to over 30 of respondent’s former 
clients, totaling over $300,000.  Over 20 of those clients were in addition to those 
identified in respondent’s current and prior disciplinary cases.  All of these clients 
received CSF awards due to respondent’s dishonest conduct.  Despite the fact that 
at the time of the hearing, respondent held a job earning around $40,000 per year, 
respondent admitted that he had made no effort to begin to reimburse the CSF or 
this court for the costs associated with his prior disciplinary case, despite this 
court’s order to do so. 
OLAP Contract Requirements 
{¶ 31} In addition to owing thousands of dollars to former clients and in 
court costs, respondent has failed to comply with his Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program (“OLAP”) contract as this court previously ordered.  Respondent entered 
into a five-year OLAP contract in April 2007.  This contract required that 
respondent contact his OLAP monitor at least weekly and to submit monthly logs 
of his attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.  In this court’s prior 
indefinite-suspension order, respondent was ordered to comply with his OLAP 
contract.  Despite these requirements, respondent has failed to have weekly 
contacts with his OLAP monitor and has failed to submit any AA meeting logs to 
OLAP. 
{¶ 32} At his hearing, respondent attempted to suggest that his volunteer 
activities with the Hawaii lawyers’ assistance program were somehow equivalent 
to compliance with his OLAP contract.  However, the evidence established that 
respondent’s AA sponsor lives in Ohio and has only limited telephone and e-mail 
contact with respondent in Hawaii.  Further, respondent has not entered into a 
formal, written monitoring contract with the Hawaii lawyers’ assistance program.  
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Respondent was ordered to comply with his OLAP contract, and he admitted that 
he has not done so.  This failure to comply with an order from this court further 
erodes our confidence in respondent’s ability to practice law in accordance with 
the high standards required of all attorneys. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 33} “The purpose of disbarment is not to punish the individual.  It is 
intended to protect the public, the courts and the legal profession.  Thus the moral 
character of an attorney is at all times to be scrutinized for the purpose of insuring 
that protection.  And such moral character is necessarily at issue in a disbarment 
proceeding.  If a prior attempt at discipline has been ineffective to provide the 
protection intended for the public, then such further safeguards should be imposed 
as will either tend to effect the reformation of the offender or remove him entirely 
from the practice.  The discipline for a repeated offense may be much greater than 
would have been imposed were it a first offense, yet such greater discipline is not 
a meting out of further punishment for prior acts but is a determination of the 
attorney's fitness to practice.”  Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. at 41, 56 O.O. 23,125 
N.E.2d 328. 
{¶ 34} Respondent could have been found unfit to continue to practice law 
in 2008.  Had this court known of the full extent of respondent’s abuse of the 
legal system, of his deception, and of his criminal enterprise in 2008, the court 
likely would have disbarred him at that time. While we are sensitive to the 
respondent’s struggles with chemical dependency, this elaborate and felonious 
conspiracy to obtain prescription narcotics by exploiting current and former 
clients, staff, and family goes far beyond simple drug addiction.  Respondent 
intentionally deceived clients, family, office staff, fellow attorneys, and judges 
alike. 
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{¶ 35} Having weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case 
as found by the board and having considered the sanctions previously imposed for 
comparable conduct, we reject the board’s recommendation.  Accordingly, we 
permanently disbar Kenneth L. Lawson from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs 
are taxed to the respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, Senior 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., and David C. Greer, for respondent. 
______________________