Case Title: In re Conservatorship of O.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S254938

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
Conservatorship of the Person of O.B. 
 
 
T.B. et al., as Coconservators, etc., 
Petitioners and Respondents, 
v. 
O.B., 
Objector and Appellant. 
 
S254938 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B290805 
 
Santa Barbara County Superior Court 
17PR00325 
 
 
July 27, 2020 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger 
and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
S254938 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
Measured by the certainty each demands, the standard of 
proof known as clear and convincing evidence — which requires 
proof making the existence of a fact highly probable — falls 
between the “more likely than not” standard commonly referred 
to as a preponderance of the evidence and the more rigorous 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  We granted 
review in this case to clarify how an appellate court is to review 
the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding made by 
the trier of fact pursuant to the clear and convincing standard.   
The issue arises here after the probate court appointed 
limited coconservators for O.B., a young woman with autism.  In 
challenging this order, O.B. argues that the proof before the 
probate court did not clearly and convincingly establish that a 
limited conservatorship was warranted.  (See Prob. Code, 
§ 1801, subd. (e) [“The standard of proof for the appointment of 
a conservator pursuant to this section shall be clear and 
convincing evidence”].)   
There is a split of opinion over how an appellate court 
should address a claim of insufficient evidence such as the one 
advanced here.  One approach accounts for the fact that the 
clear and convincing standard of proof requires greater certainty 
than the preponderance standard does.  Courts adopting this 
view inquire whether the record developed before the trial court 
contains substantial evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
to make the challenged finding with the confidence required by 
the clear and convincing standard.  (E.g., T.J. v. Superior Court 
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1239-1240 (T.J.).)  Another position 
maintains that the clear and convincing standard of proof has 
no bearing on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.  
(E.g., In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 
581, 604.)  From this perspective, a court reviewing a finding 
requiring clear and convincing proof surveys the record for 
substantial evidence, without also considering whether this 
evidence reasonably could have yielded a finding made with the 
specific degree of certainty required by the clear and convincing 
standard.   
We conclude that appellate review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and convincing 
proof must account for the level of confidence this standard 
demands.  In a matter such as the one before us, when reviewing 
a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing 
evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the 
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that 
the fact was true.  Consistent with well-established principles 
governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this 
assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due 
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the 
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and 
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.   
Because the Court of Appeal below took the position that 
the clear and convincing standard of proof “ ‘ “disappears” ’ ” on 
appeal (Conservatorship of O.B. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 626, 633) 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
when it rejected O.B.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we reverse. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In August 2017, respondents T.B. and C.B. filed a petition 
in Santa Barbara County Superior Court requesting that they 
be appointed as limited coconservators for O.B., a young woman 
with autism spectrum disorder.  T.B. and C.B. are O.B.’s mother 
and older sister, respectively.  At the time T.B. and C.B. filed 
their petition, O.B. was 18 years old and resided with her great-
grandmother, L.K., in Santa Barbara County.   
The public defender was appointed as counsel for O.B.  
(See Prob. Code, § 1471.)  A contested evidentiary hearing was 
held in the probate court to determine whether a limited 
conservatorship should be imposed.  This hearing was conducted 
across several court sessions occurring between September 2017 
and May 2018, with the probate court judge sitting as the trier 
of fact.  Several witnesses testified at the hearing.  Among them, 
T.B., C.B., L.K., and a cousin of O.B. testified to their 
interactions with and observations of O.B.  Dr. Kathy Khoie, a 
psychologist, testified that in her opinion, O.B. was not a proper 
candidate for a limited conservatorship.  Christopher Donati, an 
investigator with the Santa Barbara County Public Guardian’s 
Office, similarly testified that he did not feel a limited 
conservatorship was necessary.  
Before ruling on a limited conservatorship, the judge 
stated that he had “been involved in numerous hearings, and 
[O.B.] has been at all of them or most of them.  So in addition to 
some of the different witnesses I am entitled to base my decision 
based in part on my own observation of [O.B.] at the 
proceedings.”  The judge found that a limited conservatorship 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
was “appropriate” and appointed T.B. and C.B. as limited 
coconservators.  The parties were asked if any requested a 
statement of decision.  No one did, and the judge did not 
otherwise explain in detail how he had arrived at his findings.  
He said, “I can go through and comment on everybody’s 
testimony.  I don’t see any reason to do that.  The reviewing 
court can look at the record.”   
O.B. appealed, raising several claims of error.  The Court 
of Appeal affirmed.  As relevant here, the appellate court 
rejected O.B.’s argument that the evidence before the probate 
court was insufficient to justify the appointment of limited 
coconservators.  In making this argument, O.B. explained that 
the clear and convincing standard of proof applies to the decision 
to appoint a limited conservator and argued that the Court of 
Appeal “must apply the same standard in determining whether 
‘substantial evidence’ supports the judgment.”  (Conservatorship 
of O.B., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.)  In finding the evidence 
sufficient, the Court of Appeal observed that, contrary to O.B.’s 
position, “ ‘The “clear and convincing” standard . . . is for the 
edification and guidance of the trial court and not a standard for 
appellate review.  [Citations.]  “ ‘The sufficiency of evidence to 
establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to 
be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial 
court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to 
support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review 
on appeal.’  [Citations.]”  [Citation.]  Thus, on appeal from a 
judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing 
evidence, “the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the 
usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to 
the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
appellant’s evidence, however strong.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  
(Id., at pp. 633-634.)1 
We granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Our analysis of the issue before us begins with an 
explanation of the clear and convincing standard of proof and a 
survey of its various applications.  We next assess how appellate 
courts have perceived their role in reviewing claims that the 
evidence before the trial court did or did not satisfy the clear and 
convincing standard.  Ultimately, we conclude that logic, sound 
policy, and precedent all point toward the same conclusion:  
When reviewing a finding made pursuant to the clear and 
convincing standard of proof, an appellate court must attune its 
review for substantial evidence to the heightened degree of 
certainty required by this standard. 
A.  
Clear and Convincing Evidence as a Standard of 
Proof 
A “ ‘[b]urden of proof’ means the obligation of a party to 
establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a 
fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 115.)  “The burden of proof may require a party to . . . establish 
the existence or nonexistence of a fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence, by clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Ibid.)  The standard of proof that applies to 
a particular determination serves “to instruct the fact finder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society deems necessary 
                                        
1  
The Court of Appeal also rejected other claims of error 
raised by O.B. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 632-633, 635-636), none of which are presently before us.   
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, 
and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
decision.”  (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 
546 (Wendland); see also In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 369-
373 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).)   
“The default standard of proof in civil cases is the 
preponderance of the evidence.”  (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 546, citing Evid. Code, § 115.)  This standard “ ‘simply 
requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence of a fact is 
more probable than its nonexistence.” ’ ”  (In re Angelia P. (1981) 
28 Cal.3d 908, 918.)  The more demanding standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, meanwhile, applies to findings of 
guilt in criminal matters.  (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 
p. 364.)  Reasonable doubt “ ‘is not a mere possible doubt; 
because everything relating to human affairs is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case, which, 
after the entire comparison or consideration of all the evidence, 
leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say 
they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 1096.) 
The standard of proof known as clear and convincing 
evidence demands a degree of certainty greater than that 
involved with the preponderance standard, but less than what 
is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This intermediate standard “requires a finding of high 
probability.”  (In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 919; see 
also CACI No. 201 [“Certain facts must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence . . . .  This means the party must persuade 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
you that it is highly probable that the fact is true”].)2  One 
commentator has explicated, “The precise meaning of ‘clear and 
convincing proof’ does not lend itself readily to definition.  It is, 
in reality, a question of how strongly the minds of the trier or 
triers of fact must be convinced that the facts are as contended 
by the proponent. . . .  Where clear and convincing proof is 
required, the proponent must convince the jury or judge, as the 
case may be, that it is highly probable that the facts which he 
asserts are true.  He must do more than show that the facts are 
probably true.”  (Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing 
Proof: Appellate Review (1944) 32 Cal. L.Rev. 74, 75.) 
Today, the clear and convincing standard applies to 
various 
determinations 
“ ‘where 
particularly 
important 
individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the 
termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and 
deportation.”  (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487, 
quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 
389; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769; 
Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424; Woodby v. 
Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.S. 276, 285-286.)  Other 
findings requiring clear and convincing proof include whether a 
civil defendant is guilty of the “oppression, fraud, or malice” that 
allows for the imposition of punitive damages (Civ. Code, § 3294, 
subd. (a)), whether a conservator can withdraw life-sustaining 
care from a conservatee (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 524), 
whether 
conditions 
necessary 
for 
the 
nonconsensual, 
                                        
2  
The clear and convincing standard also has been described 
“as requiring that the evidence be ‘ “so clear as to leave no 
substantial doubt”; “sufficiently strong to command the 
unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” ’ ”  (In re Angelia 
P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 919.)   
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
nonemergency administration of psychiatric medication to a 
prison inmate have been satisfied (Pen. Code, § 2602, subd. 
(c)(8)), and whether a publisher acted with the intent (“actual 
malice”) that must be shown for a plaintiff to prevail in certain 
kinds of defamation cases (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 
418 U.S. 323, 342). 
Going further back in time, “[t]he requirement in civil 
actions of more than a preponderance of the evidence was first 
applied in equity to claims which experience had shown to be 
inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the 
flexibility of conscience.”  (Note, Appellate Review in the Federal 
Courts of Findings Requiring More than a Preponderance of the 
Evidence (1946) 60 Harv. L.Rev. 111, 112.)  This court’s early 
case law addressing the clear and convincing standard of proof 
commonly involved claims of this character, such as assertions 
that a written instrument should be reformed on the basis of 
fraud, mistake, or parol evidence.  In one early case of this kind, 
Lestrade v. Barth (1862) 19 Cal. 660, we observed that when the 
correction of a mistake in a written instrument was sought in 
equity, the evidence showing such a mistake “must be clear and 
convincing, making out the mistake to the entire satisfaction of 
the Court, and not loose, equivocal or contradictory, leaving the 
mistake open to doubt.”  (Id., at p. 675.)  We later stated in 
Sheehan v. Sullivan (1899) 126 Cal. 189 (Sheehan) that “[t]he 
authorities are uniform to the point that to justify a court in 
determining from oral testimony that a deed which purports to 
convey land absolutely in fee simple was intended to be 
something different, as a mortgage or trust, such testimony 
must be clear, convincing, and conclusive — something more 
than that modicum of evidence which appellate courts 
sometimes hold sufficient to warrant a finding where the matter 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
is not so serious as the overthrow of a clearly expressed deed, 
solemnly executed and delivered.”  (Id., at p. 193.) 
B. Consideration of the Clear and Convincing 
Standard in Appellate Review for Sufficiency of 
the Evidence 
The court in Sheehan, supra, 126 Cal. 189, also addressed 
how other appellate courts had evaluated claims that parol 
evidence introduced before the trial court had not adequately 
established that a written deed instrument, absolute on its face, 
was in fact a mortgage or trust.  Our opinion in Sheehan 
observed that through such matters (e.g., Mahoney v. Bostwick 
(1892) 96 Cal. 53) the authorities “clearly declare that the rule, 
as above stated [requiring clear and convincing evidence that 
the intent was contrary to the deed’s terms], should govern trial 
courts, and that, where an absolute deed has been found to be 
something else, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
finding should be considered by the appellate court in the light 
of that rule.”  (Sheehan, at p. 193, italics added.)  In other words, 
even though the standard of clear and convincing evidence 
directly governed only the determination made by the trier of 
fact, appellate courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence 
still had to take this standard of proof into account by 
appropriately reframing their inquiry. 
It was understood even at the time Sheehan was decided 
that this adjustment in appellate perspective when the clear and 
convincing standard applied below did not provide reviewing 
courts with a liberal license to substitute their views for the 
conclusions drawn by the trier of fact on matters such as witness 
credibility and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence.  In 
Jarnatt v. Cooper (1881) 59 Cal. 703, for example, this court had 
explained, “It is doubtless a well-settled rule that the party 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
alleging fraud or mistake is bound to prove his allegation by 
clear and convincing evidence.  That is, that the evidence which 
tends to prove the alleged fraud or mistake, if standing alone, 
uncontradicted, would establish a clear prima facie case of fraud 
or mistake.  If it does not, this Court may reverse the judgment 
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
decision.  But where the evidence which tends to prove fraud or 
mistake, if standing alone, uncontradicted, is sufficiently clear 
and convincing, we can not reverse the judgment on the ground 
that such evidence is contradicted by other evidence, because 
the right to pass upon the credibility of witnesses is not vested 
in this Court.”  (Id., at p. 706.)   
Since Sheehan, we have reiterated — albeit sometimes 
subtly — that when the clear and convincing standard of proof 
applied in the trial court, an appellate court should review the 
record for sufficient evidence in a manner mindful of the 
elevated degree of certainty required by this standard.  This 
guidance often has been coupled with language recognizing the 
limits of such review.  More than a century ago, in Wadleigh v. 
Phelps (1906) 149 Cal. 627, we upheld a finding that a deed, 
absolute on its face, was in fact a mortgage.  (Id., at p. 639.)  In 
doing so, we expounded, “It is, of course, the universal rule that 
the presumption of law, independent of proof, is that such a deed 
is what it purports to be — viz. an absolute conveyance — and 
that this presumption must prevail unless the evidence to the 
contrary is entirely plain and convincing.  This, however, does 
not mean that the evidence in the record on appeal must be 
entirely plain and convincing to an appellate court.  This 
question of fact, like other questions of fact, is one for the trial 
court, and while, as said in Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 
193 . . . , the appellate court will consider the question as to the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
sufficiency of the evidence in the light of that rule, it will not 
disturb the finding of the trial court to the effect that the deed 
is a mortgage, where there is substantial evidence warranting a 
clear and satisfactory conviction to that effect.  All questions as 
to preponderance and conflict of evidence are for the trial court.”  
(Id., at p. 637, italics added; see also Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. 
Ingersoll (1910) 158 Cal. 474, 484; Couts v. Winston (1908) 
153 Cal. 686, 688-689.)   
Several of our more recent decisions involving the clear 
and convincing standard of proof also have recognized that this 
standard affects a reviewing court’s assessment of the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  In In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d 
908, we stated that when reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting an order terminating parental rights, 
issued upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence (see Civ. 
Code, former § 232, subd. (a)), “ ‘the [appellate] court must 
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 
evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and 
of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 
[that termination of parental rights is appropriate based on 
clear and convincing evidence].’ ”  (In re Angelia P., at p. 924; see 
also In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 423 [taking a similar 
view of the appellate court’s responsibility in reviewing a finding 
under Civ. Code, former § 232].)  In Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
519, where we reviewed a finding by the trial court that the clear 
and convincing standard had not been satisfied, we described 
our task as follows:  “The ‘clear and convincing evidence’ test 
requires a finding of high probability . . . .  Applying that 
standard here, we ask whether the evidence . . . has that degree 
of clarity . . . .”  (Id., at p. 552.)  And most recently, in In re White 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
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12 
(2020) 9 Cal. 5th 455, 465 (White), we specified, “To deny bail 
under article I, section 12(b) [of the California Constitution], a 
trial court must also find, by clear and convincing evidence, “a 
substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great 
bodily harm to others.’  [Citation.] . . .  On review, we consider 
whether any reasonable trier of fact could find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, a substantial likelihood that the person’s 
release would lead to great bodily harm to others.”   
As respondents observe, we have on other occasions 
provided somewhat different descriptions of the reviewing 
court’s role in evaluating a finding requiring clear and 
convincing evidence.  We often have emphasized the appellate 
court’s general responsibility to review the record for 
substantial evidence, even when the clear and convincing 
standard of proof applied before the trial court.  (E.g., In re 
Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863; Crail v. Blakely 
(1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 (Crail); Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. 
Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 
26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 
815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 
205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 260-
261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81, 84-85 
(Steinberger).)  In Crail, we explained that the clear and 
convincing “standard was adopted . . . for the edification and 
guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard 
for appellate review.  ‘The sufficiency of evidence to establish a 
given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear 
and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to 
determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its 
conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.’ ” 
(Crail, at p. 750.)  Respondents extract from these decisions the 
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13 
principle that appellate review of a finding made under the clear 
and convincing standard is limited to whether the finding is 
supported by evidence that is “credible, reasonable, and solid” 
— words commonly used in describing “substantial evidence.”  
(See In re Teed’s Estate (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644.)3   
The decisions of the Courts of Appeal also do not speak 
with one clear voice regarding how appellate review for 
sufficiency of the evidence should unfold when the standard of 
proof before the trial court was clear and convincing evidence.  
(T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1238-1239 [discussing the 
views expressed on this subject].)  One view downplays the 
significance of the clear and convincing standard of proof in this 
                                        
3  
Dissenting in Stromerson, supra, 22 Cal.2d 808, Justice 
Traynor wrote, “While it rests primarily with the trial court to 
determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its 
finding is not necessarily conclusive, for in cases governed by the 
rule requiring such evidence ‘the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the finding should be considered by the appellate court 
in the light of that rule.’  (Sheehan[, supra], 126 Cal. 189, 193; 
[citation].)  In such cases it is the duty of the appellate court in 
reviewing the evidence to determine, not simply whether the 
trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it is more probable 
that the fact to be proved exists than that it does not, as in the 
ordinary civil case where only a preponderance of the evidence is 
required . . . but to determine whether the trier of facts could 
reasonably conclude that it is highly probable that the fact 
exists.  When it [is held] that the trial court’s finding must be 
governed by the same test with relation to substantial evidence 
as ordinarily applies in other civil cases, the rule that the 
evidence must be clear and convincing becomes meaningless.”  
(Id., at pp. 817-818 (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.); see also Traynor, 
The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970) p. 29 [“When it is the 
responsibility of the trier of fact to observe the requirement of 
clear and convincing evidence . . . it becomes the responsibility of 
the appellate court to test the finding accordingly”].) 
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14 
context.  Within this group, a few courts have flatly stated that 
a requirement of clear and convincing proof before the trial court 
does not necessitate any modifications to the conventional 
approach to appellate review for substantial evidence in a civil 
matter.  (Ian J. v. Peter M. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 189, 208; In 
re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 345; In re 
Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 604; Patrick v. 
Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576.)  
Thus it has been said, “[t]he substantial evidence rule that 
applies on appeal, applies without regard to the standard of 
proof applicable at trial” (In re Marriage of Ruelas, at p. 345), 
meaning that a court reviewing a finding requiring clear and 
convincing proof is “not required to find more substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding ‘than [it] would if 
the burden of proof had been only a preponderance of the 
evidence’ ” (Ian J. v. Peter M., at p. 208).   
Many courts have drawn a similar lesson from the Witkin 
treatise on California Procedure, which provides in relevant 
part, “In a few situations, the law requires that a party produce 
more than an ordinary preponderance; he or she must establish 
a fact by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’  [Citations.]  But the 
requirement applies only in the trial court.  The judge may reject 
a showing as not measuring up to the standard, but, if the judge 
decides in favor of the party with this heavy burden, the clear 
and convincing test disappears.  On appeal, the usual rule of 
conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the 
respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the 
appellant’s evidence, however strong.”  (9 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 371, p. 428, italics added.)  
The assertion that “the clear and convincing test disappears” 
(ibid.) on appeal fairly imparts that this standard of proof has 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
no bearing whatsoever on appellate review for sufficiency of the 
evidence.4   
Another viewpoint regards an appellate court as obligated 
to review the record for substantial evidence in a manner 
mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of 
proof applied before the trial court.5  This approach recently was 
                                        
4  
The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the 
Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing:  Morgan v. Davidson 
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 
18 Cal.App.5th 
438, 
451; 
Parisi 
v. 
Mazzaferro 
(2016) 
5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 
5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720;  In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 
812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage 
of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. 
v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 
202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 
909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. 
(2010) 
184 
Cal.App.4th 
568, 
578; 
In 
re 
I.W. 
(2009) 
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 
113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 
911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. 
v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. 
Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 
5  
E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 
37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 
1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. 
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. 
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 
212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 
48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re 
William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl 
M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 
119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 
684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re 
Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 
 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
adopted by the court in connection with a dependency 
proceeding (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii)) 
in T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 1229.  The court in T.J. observed 
that “[i]f the clear and convincing evidence standard ‘disappears’ 
on appellate review, that means the distinction between the 
preponderance standard and the clear and convincing 
standard . . . is utterly lost on appeal . . . .”  (T.J., at p. 1239.)  
Such an outcome was regarded as compromising “the integrity 
of the review process,” because if the clear and convincing 
standard has no bearing whatsoever on appellate review, “the 
ability of the appellate court to correct error is unacceptably 
weakened.”  (Ibid.)  Moved by these considerations, the court in 
T.J. concluded that it must “ ‘review the record in the light most 
favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is 
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could 
make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing 
evidence standard.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting In re Isayah C., supra, 
118 Cal.App.4th at p. 694.) 
All in all, it would be a fair summarization to say that 
although the trend within our more recent decisions has been to 
recognize that the application of the clear and convincing 
standard of proof before the trial court affects appellate review 
for sufficiency of the evidence, our case law also contains 
contrary suggestions that have contributed to what is now a 
significant split of authority among the Courts of Appeal.   
                                        
Innovative 
Products 
Sales 
& 
Marketing, 
Inc. 
(2000) 
78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 
1635, 1654; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170-171; 
Osal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197, 
1200; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1326; In re 
Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038. 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
C. The Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof 
Informs 
Appellate 
Review 
for 
Substantial 
Evidence 
We now dispel this uncertainty over the proper manner of 
appellate review by clarifying that an appellate court evaluating 
the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding must make 
an appropriate adjustment to its analysis when the clear and 
convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.  In 
general, when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and 
convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the 
record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from 
which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of 
high probability demanded by this standard of proof.6   
This rule finds support in logic, in the policy interests that 
are often implicated when clear and convincing evidence 
supplies the standard of proof, and in precedent.  First, “[a]s a 
matter of logic, a finding that must be based on clear and 
convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one 
that may be sustained on a mere preponderance.”  (In re C.H. 
(Tex. 2002) 89 S.W.3d 17, 25.)  As we have long acknowledged 
(see, e.g., Sheehan, supra, 126 Cal. at p. 193), the clear and 
convincing standard of proof normally applies directly only 
before the trial court; appellate courts normally do not decide 
                                        
6  
In announcing only a general rule, we recognize that 
different forms of appellate review may apply in certain 
circumstances when a determination has been made by the trier 
of fact under the clear and convincing standard of proof.  (See, 
e.g., McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 845-846 
[discussing appellate review of findings of actual malice in 
defamation suits].)  
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
whether they themselves believe the evidence was so probative.  
And the fundamental question before an appellate court 
reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence is the same, regardless 
of the standard of proof that applied below:  whether any 
reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding that is now 
challenged on appeal.  But the issue before a reviewing court in 
a given case is whether the trier of fact could have made the 
finding it did arrive upon, rather than a hypothetical finding 
involving a different standard of proof.  Therefore, when 
reviewing a finding that demands clear and convincing 
evidence, an appellate court must determine whether the 
evidence reasonably could have led to a finding made with the 
specific degree of confidence required by this standard.   
Taking the clear and convincing standard into account in 
this context is also logically consistent with the principle that 
an appellate court addressing a claim of insufficient proof 
reviews the record for substantial evidence supporting the 
challenged finding.  Substantial evidence is evidence that is “of 
ponderable legal significance,” “reasonable in nature, credible, 
and of solid value,” and “ ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials 
which the law requires in a particular case.”  (In re Teed’s Estate, 
supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 644.)  Respondents draw from this 
definition of substantial evidence in advocating for their 
approach to appellate review.  They assert that “[s]olid, credible 
evidence is . . . by definition, clear and convincing because we 
have rationally invested with determinative significance the 
trial court’s rejection — on credibility, persuasiveness, or other 
grounds — of the evidence to the contrary,” and “[t]he evidence 
necessary to support the decision below must be credible, 
reasonable, and solid; otherwise the judgment will be reversed.”  
But these assertions ignore part of what makes substantial 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
evidence substantial.  Even if evidence is capable of being 
regarded as “credible,” “reasonable,” and “solid,” to amount to 
substantial evidence it also must be “of ponderable legal 
significance.”  (In re Teed’s Estate, at p. 644.)  And whether 
evidence is “of ponderable legal significance” (ibid.) cannot be 
properly evaluated in situations such as the one at bar without 
accounting for the heightened standard of proof that applied 
before the trial court.   
Second, keeping the clear and convincing standard in 
mind when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence helps 
ensure that an appropriate degree of appellate scrutiny attaches 
to findings to which this standard applies.  As previously noted, 
the clear and convincing standard is used for various 
determinations where “ ‘particularly important individual 
interests or rights are at stake.’ ”  (Weiner v. Fleischman, supra, 
54 Cal.3d at p. 487.)  The selection of the clear and convincing 
standard in these situations reflects “a very fundamental 
assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual 
determinations.”  (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 370 (conc. 
opn. of Harlan, J.).)  That is to say, the significant consequences 
of an erroneous true finding when these interests or rights are 
involved — such as an improper deportation, an unnecessary 
involuntary commitment, or an unjustified termination of 
parental rights — support the application of a heightened 
standard of proof, relative to the preponderance standard.  Yet 
the use of a clear and convincing standard of proof before the 
trial court may not by itself completely protect these interests, 
because “the trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, 
be wrong in his factual conclusions.”  (Ibid.)  Admittedly, an 
appellate court that gives appropriate deference to the trier of 
fact will not be in a position to detect or correct some of these 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
errors.  But when a review of the record establishes that no 
reasonable factfinder could have found a matter proved to a 
degree of high probability, appellate intervention reaffirms that 
the interests involved are of special importance, that their 
deprivation requires a greater burden to be surmounted, and 
that the judicial system operates in a coordinated fashion to 
ensure as much.   
Third, our holding is more consistent with our recent 
precedent and with the case law of other state high courts than 
would be a contrary rule that would have appellate courts ignore 
the clear and convincing standard when reviewing for 
substantial evidence.  As discussed ante, in In re Angelia P., 
supra, 28 Cal.2d at page 924, In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th 
at page 423, Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at page 552, and 
White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 465, we recognized that the 
applicability of the clear and convincing standard of proof before 
the trial court was relevant to appellate review of the 
evidentiary record.  (Cf. Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1082 (conc. opn. of Brown. 
J.).)  Moreover, a survey of the case law of other state courts of 
last resort reveals numerous recent decisions in which these 
courts have calibrated their review for sufficient evidence to 
reflect that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied to 
the finding at issue.  (E.g., In re N.G. (Ind. 2016) 51 N.E.3d 1167, 
1170; Moore v. Stills (Ky. 2010) 307 S.W.3d 71, 82-83; In re B.D.-
Y. (Kan. 2008) 187 P.3d 594, 606; Ex parte McInish (Ala. 2008) 
47 So.3d 767, 778; In re B.T. (N.H. 2006) 891 A.2d 1193, 1198; 
In re S.B.C. (Okla. 2002) 64 P.3d 1080, 1083; In re C.H., supra, 
89 S.W.3d at p. 25; Hudak v. Procek (Del. 2002) 806 A.2d 140, 
150; Rogers v. Moore (Minn. 1999) 603 N.W.2d 650, 658; In re 
N.H. (Vt. 1998) 724 A.2d 467, 470; Estate of Robinson v. Gusta 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
(Miss. 1989) 540 So.2d 30, 33; In Interest of Bush (Idaho 1988) 
749 P.2d 492, 495; Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health 
(Me. 1984) 481 A.2d 139, 153; Blackburn v. Blackburn (Ga. 
1982) 292 S.E.2d 821, 826.) 
Our approach also harmonizes with the firmly established 
rule in criminal cases that the prosecution’s burden of proving a 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt affects how an 
appellate court reviews the record for substantial evidence.  In 
Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 (Jackson), the United 
States Supreme Court considered “what standard is to be 
applied in a federal habeas corpus proceeding when the claim is 
made that a person has been convicted in a state court upon 
insufficient evidence.”  (Id., at p. 309.)  The Jackson court 
decided that “the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply 
to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to 
determine whether the record evidence could reasonably 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id., at 
p. 318.)  The high court explained that “this inquiry does not 
require a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence 
at 
the 
trial 
established 
guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.’  [Citation.]  Instead, the relevant question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
[Citation.]  This familiar standard gives full play to the 
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.  Once a defendant 
has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role 
as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be 
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”  (Id., 
at pp. 318-319.)   
The decision in Jackson prompted this court “to review 
and define the California standard for review” of a claim brought 
by a defendant on direct appeal alleging that a criminal 
conviction lacked sufficient support in the evidentiary record.  
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562.)  We concluded in 
Johnson that the standard of review already established by our 
case law was consistent with the rule announced in Jackson.  
(Johnson, at p. 577.)  “[W]henever the evidentiary support for a 
conviction faces a challenge on appeal,” we determined, “the 
court must review the whole record in the light most favorable 
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses 
substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id., at 
p. 562.)  We observed that when engaging in this review, an 
appellate court “ ‘must view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment 
the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce 
from the evidence.’ ”  (Id., at p. 576.)   
Thus it has long been the law that appellate inquiry into 
the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a criminal 
conviction both accounts for the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof that applied before the trial court and extends 
an appropriate degree of deference to the perspective of the trier 
of fact.  And with infrequent exceptions, appellate courts have 
grasped what this kind of review entails.  This experience 
contradicts respondents’ argument that a rule that requires the 
clear and convincing standard of proof to be taken into account 
when reviewing for substantial evidence will encourage these 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
same courts to overstep their authority by reweighing the 
evidence themselves.  Out of an abundance of caution, however, 
we use this opportunity to emphasize that as in criminal appeals 
involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an 
appellate court reviewing a finding made pursuant to the clear 
and convincing standard does not reweigh the evidence itself.  In 
assessing how the evidence reasonably could have been 
evaluated by the trier of fact, an appellate court reviewing such 
a finding is to view the record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment below; it must indulge reasonable inferences that the 
trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence; it must accept 
the factfinder’s resolution of conflicting evidence; and it may not 
insert its own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in 
place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 35-36; People v. 
Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278, 307.)  To paraphrase the high 
court in Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at page 318, the question 
before a court reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by 
clear and convincing evidence is not whether the appellate court 
itself regards the evidence as clear and convincing; it is whether 
a reasonable trier of fact could have regarded the evidence as 
satisfying this standard of proof. 
This court’s precedent offers less support for respondents’ 
position that appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence 
should in no way account for the clear and convincing standard 
of proof that applied before the trial court.  As observed ante, 
respondents emphasize language appearing in a line of decisions 
beginning with Steinberger, supra, 175 Cal. 81 and including our 
statement in Crail, supra, 8 Cal.3d 744, that the clear and 
convincing “standard was adopted . . . for the edification and 
guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
for appellate review.  ‘The sufficiency of evidence to establish a 
given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and 
convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to 
determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its 
conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.’ ” 
(Crail, at p. 750; see also In re Marriage of Saslow, supra, 
40 Cal.3d at p. 863; Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 
34 Cal.2d at p. 25; Viner v. Untrecht, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 267; 
Stromerson, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 815; Simonton v. Los Angeles 
T. & S. Bank, supra, 205 Cal. at p. 259; Treadwell v. Nickel, 
supra, 194 Cal. at pp. 260-261; Steinberger, 175 Cal. at pp. 84-
85.)  Respondents assert that representations such as this 
commit this court to the position that the clear and convincing 
standard of proof has no bearing on appellate review for 
substantial evidence.   
We disagree.  For starters, it is not perfectly clear that 
Steinberger and its progeny all stand for the proposition that the 
clear and convincing standard of proof’s application before the 
trial court has no effect upon appellate review for sufficiency of 
the evidence.  As it appeared in Steinberger, supra, 175 Cal. 81, 
the assertion that “if there be substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion reached below, the finding is not open to review 
on appeal” served to clarify a point made earlier in the opinion, 
that it was the province of the fact-finder to resolve conflicts in 
the evidence.  (Id., at p. 85.)  Statements in our later decisions 
also could be read as stopping well short of the absolutist 
position respondents assign to them.  To say that clear and 
convincing evidence is not a standard for appellate review is 
correct in the sense that an appellate court normally does not 
itself review the record for clear and convincing proof.  Likewise, 
representations that an appellate court reviews the record for 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
substantial evidence, without further explanation of what that 
evidence must establish, could be understood as more 
incomplete than incorrect.   
We 
nevertheless 
appreciate 
that 
the 
decisions 
respondents rely upon have been interpreted, and not entirely 
without reason, as casting the clear and convincing standard of 
proof as irrelevant to appellate review for sufficiency of the 
evidence.  (See, e.g., Morgan v. Davidson, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 549.)  Even so understood, however, these decisions mean 
only that our court has in the past sent mixed signals regarding 
the issue before us.  As we have explained, the clear trend within 
our recent case law, which finds support in older decisions of this 
court, has been to recognize that when a heightened standard of 
proof applied before the trial court, an appropriate adjustment 
must be made to appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.  
We confirm today that this modern trend is correct.  We 
therefore disapprove In re Marriage of Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 
848; Crail v. Blakely, supra, 8 Cal.3d 744; Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. 
v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 34 Cal.2d 20; Viner v. Untrecht, supra, 
26 Cal.2d 261; Stromerson v. Averill, supra, 22 Cal.2d 808; 
Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank, supra, 205 Cal. 252; 
Treadwell v. Nickel, supra, 194 Cal. 243; and Steinberger v. 
Young, supra, 175 Cal. 81, to the extent each could be read as 
regarding the use of the clear and convincing standard of proof 
before the trial court as having no effect on appellate review for 
sufficiency of the evidence.  (See Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
17 Cal.4th 396, 401; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 
1126.)7 
                                        
7  
Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also 
disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189, In re 
Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339, In re Marriage 
of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581, and Patrick v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, as well as the Court 
of Appeal decisions that have described the clear and convincing 
standard as disappearing on appeal: Morgan v. Davidson, supra, 
29 Cal.App.5th 540; In re Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 
438; Parisi v. Mazzaferro, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th 1219; In re Z.G., 
supra, 5 Cal.App.5th 705; In re F.S., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 
799; In re J.S., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 1483; In re Marriage of 
E. & Stephen P., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 983; In re A.S., supra,  
202 Cal.App.4th 237; In re K.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 905; In 
re Levi H., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 1279; In re E.B., supra, 
184 Cal.App.4th 568; In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th 1517; In 
re Angelique C., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 509; In re J.I., supra, 
108 Cal.App.4th 903; In re Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 573; 
Sheila S. v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 872; and 
Ensworth v. Mullvain, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 1105.   
We also use this opportunity to comment upon another 
provision within the Witkin treatise’s discussion of appellate 
review of findings involving clear and convincing evidence.  
After observing that “the clear and convincing test disappears” 
on appeal, the treatise adds that “[o]n appeal, the usual rule of 
conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the 
respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the 
appellant’s evidence, however strong.”  (9 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 371, p. 428.)  It should be 
understood that even if conflicts in the evidence are viewed this 
way by a reviewing court, giving “full effect” to the respondent’s 
evidence, “however slight” (ibid.), does not necessarily mean 
that this evidence will amount to substantial evidence of 
“ponderable legal significance” (In re Teed’s Estate, supra, 
112 Cal.App.2d at p. 644) which reasonably could have been 
regarded as sufficient to establish a fact with the certainty 
required by the clear and convincing standard.  
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
Finally, respondents raise a narrower argument sounding 
in legislative intent.  They assert that even if we were to 
conclude here that the clear and convincing standard of proof 
does not simply disappear when an appellate court reviews for 
substantial evidence, the Legislature thought this standard 
vanished on appeal when it enacted the limited conservatorship 
statute (Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 14, p. 523; see also Stats. 1980, 
ch. 1304, § 6, p. 4400) and specified that the standard of proof 
for the appointment of a conservator is clear and convincing 
evidence (Stats. 1995, ch. 842, § 7, p. 6410).  Respondents argue 
that we should defer to this expectation in interpreting the 
requirement of clear and convincing evidence found in Probate 
Code section 1801, subdivision (e).   
This argument is not persuasive.  Respondents fail to 
identify anything within the text or legislative history of 
Probate Code section 1801 affirmatively establishing that the 
Legislature believed the clear and convincing standard of proof 
should be ignored by an appellate court reviewing a record for 
substantial evidence.  Instead, respondents assert that when the 
Legislature recognized limited conservatorships and directed 
that the clear and convincing standard of proof applies to the 
appointment of a conservator, “it did so against the backdrop of 
150 years of consistent precedent from this Court squarely 
holding that such standards [of proof] direct only the trial court, 
and do not apply (‘disappear’) on appeal.”  Thus, respondents 
claim, the Legislature should be regarded as having implicitly 
incorporated this judicially created rule within the statute.  As 
we have explained, however, our precedent did not consistently 
articulate the view respondents ascribe to it.  Therefore, even if 
we were to regard our case law as informing prevailing 
expectations among legislators, and these expectations as 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
reflective of legislative intent, respondents’ argument would 
still falter at the outset.  Given the mixed signals sent by our 
past decisions, we still could not reasonably conclude that when 
the Legislature provided for limited conservatorships and 
specified in section 1801, subdivision (e) that the appointment 
of a conservator requires clear and convincing evidence, it 
intended for appellate courts to completely disregard this 
standard of proof when reviewing the record developed before 
the probate court for substantial evidence.  
To summarize, we hold that an appellate court must 
account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when 
addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a finding 
made under this standard.  When reviewing a finding that a fact 
has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question 
before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole 
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder could have found it highly probable that the fact was 
true.  In conducting its review, the court must view the record 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give 
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have 
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the 
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.  
Because the Court of Appeal below believed that the clear and 
convincing standard of proof “ ‘ “disappears” ’ ” on appeal 
(Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 633), we 
remand the cause to that court for it to reevaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence in light of the clarification we have 
provided. 
 
 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion   Conservatorship of O.B. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 32 Cal.App.5th 626   
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S254938  
Date Filed: July 27, 2020    
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior     
County:  Santa Barbara 
Judge:  James Rigali 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Objector and Appellant. 
 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson and Edward L. Xanders for Association of Southern 
California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant. 
 
Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Protecting Our Elders as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Objector and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Laura Hoffman King, Laura Hoffman King; Tardiff Law Offices, Neil S. Tardiff; and 
Shaun P. Martin for Petitioners and Respondents. 
 
Nelson & Fraenkel and Gretchen M. Nelson for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioners and Respondents. 
 
Rita Himes for Legal Services for Prisoners with Children as Amicus Curiae. 
 
Horovitz & Levy, Curt Cutting, Jeremy B. Rosen; U.S. Chamber Litigation Center and Janet Galeria for 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae. 
 
Thomas F. Coleman; Fitzgerald Yap Kredito and Brook J. Changala for Spectrum Institute, TASH, and 
Siblings Leadership Network as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gerald J. Miller 
P.O. Box 543 
Liberty Hill, TX 78642 
(512) 778-4161 
 
Shaun P. Martin 
5998 Alcala Park, Warren Hall 
San Diego, CA 92210 
(619) 260-2347