Case Title: CA. State Personnel Bd. v. CSEA

Citation: 

Docket Number: S122058

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/28/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CALIFORNIA STATE PERSONNEL 
) 
BOARD et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
S122058 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C042437 
CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES 
) 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, 
) 
SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 02CS00787 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The California Constitution establishes that permanent appointments and 
promotions in state service shall be made solely on the basis of merit.  In light of 
this constitutional imperative, we conclude the Legislature may not approve 
collective bargaining agreements requiring that state employers make such 
appointments and promotions based solely on the seniority status of candidates 
meeting all eligibility requirements, including the requisite ranking after a 
competitive examination in nontransfer cases, without allowance for comparative 
merit evaluations of those candidates. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) represents the 
Governor of California in collective bargaining negotiations with representatives 
of state employees in civil service.  (Gov. Code, §§ 3517, 19815.4, subd. (g); all 
 
2 
further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise specified.)  The 
California State Employees Association (CSEA) is the exclusive elected 
representative for state employees in bargaining unit 1 (professional, 
administrative, financial, and staff services), unit 4 (office and allied staff), and 
unit 11 (engineering and scientific technicians). 
At issue in this case are collective bargaining agreements that DPA and 
CSEA negotiated for units 1, 4, and 11.  The agreements provide that “post and 
bid” pilot programs be applied within a limited number of classifications in the 
three units, requiring that permanent appointment and promotion of employees 
eligible for post and bid positions be based on seniority in state service.  The 
programs were to sunset on July 2, 2003, in the absence of any future agreement 
on their continuance.  The Legislature approved the resulting memoranda of 
understanding (MOU’s), and the Governor signed them into law.1 
Plaintiffs herein, the State Personnel Board (the SPB) and its executive 
officer, filed a petition for writ of mandate to enjoin defendants DPA and CSEA2 
from implementing the post and bid programs on the ground they violate the merit 
principle enshrined in article VII of the state Constitution for permanent civil 
service appointments and promotions.  (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 1, subd. (b).) 
                                              
1 
Although these MOU’s expired while the appeal was pending, the Court of 
Appeal did not dismiss the matter as moot.  We agree review is appropriate, 
because the constitutionality of the post and bid programs is an issue of continuing 
public interest that is likely to recur but evade review.  (Conservatorship of 
Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1; Almassy v. L.A. County Civil Service 
Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 387, 390.) 
2  
Defendant DPA is not before this court.  Accordingly, all further references 
to defendant are to CSEA. 
 
3 
The superior court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, concluding the challenged 
programs “will, as routinely implemented, fundamentally, directly, and inherently 
conflict with state Constitutional merit principles and, as such, are unconstitutional 
on their face.”  In essence, the court determined the merit principle “extends 
throughout the hiring process, up to and including the actual appointment or 
promotion of the individual” and is not limited to the initial qualification and 
examination phase resulting in the compilation of certified lists of ranked 
employees who are eligible for available post and bid positions. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, finding no violation of the merit principle. 
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
A.  The Constitutional Merit Principle and the State Civil Service Act 
Article VII of the California Constitution provides that, generally, the civil 
service includes “every officer and employee of the State” (id., art. VII, § 1, subd. 
(a)) and that permanent appointment and promotion in the civil service “shall be 
made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive 
examination” (id., art. VII, § 1, subd. (b)).  This constitutional mandate, known as 
the “merit principle,” was adopted by California voters in 1934 in an effort to 
eliminate the “spoils system” of political patronage from state employment and to 
ensure that “appointments and promotions in state service be made solely on the 
basis of merit.”3  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 184; id. at pp. 
                                              
3  
We recounted a detailed history of the constitutional mandate in Pacific 
Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168 (Pacific Legal Foundation).  In 
brief, we explained:  “In 1913, the California Legislature enacted a statute creating 
California’s first civil service system in an attempt to combat the ‘spoils system’ 
of political patronage in state employment.”  (Id. at pp. 181-182.)  By the early 
1930’s, however, that statutory system was failing due to abuse in the creation of 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
4 
181-183; see also Professional Engineers in Cal. Government v. State Personnel 
Bd. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 678, 690 (Professional Engineers).)  Another 
constitutional provision, also adopted in 1934, calls for a nonpartisan personnel 
board (the SPB) to enforce the civil service statutes (Cal. Const., art. VII, §§ 2, 3, 
subd. (a)) and for an executive officer to administer the statutes under the SPB’s 
rules (id., §§ 2, subd. (c), 3, subd. (b)). 
To implement the merit principle, which we have deemed “inviolate” 
(Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 194), the Legislature passed the 
State Civil Service Act (§ 18500 et seq.) (the Act).  (§ 18570.)  The Act’s purpose 
is “to ensure that appointments to state office are made not on the basis of 
patronage, but on the basis of merit, in order to preserve the economy and 
efficiency of state service.”  (State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing 
Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, 432 (plur. opn. of Broussard, J.).)  To accomplish this, 
the Act generally requires appointing powers to fill vacant positions “by 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
exemptions and of authorizations for temporary employment that were not subject 
to the civil service statutes.  (Ibid.)  In response to the perceived statutory failures, 
the people of California, in 1934, adopted article XXIV of the state Constitution 
“to establish, as a constitutional mandate, the principle that appointments and 
promotions in state service be made solely on the basis of merit.”  (Pacific Legal 
Foundation, at pp. 182-184.)  “The 1934 version of article XXIV was revised in 
1970 under the auspices of the California Constitution Revision Commission, but 
the revision made no substantive changes in the provisions relevant to this action 
and merely deleted obsolete and superfluous language from the original 
provisions.  [Citation.]  Under a constitutional reorganization measure in 1976, 
article XXIV was repealed but its provisions were adopted verbatim as article 
VII.”  (Id. at p. 184, fn. 8.)  Thus, “[t]he current provisions of article VII derive 
directly from the provisions of former article XXIV.”  (Ibid.) 
 
5 
appointment” and, except as otherwise provided, requires appointments to “be 
made from employment lists.”  (§ 19050.)4 
The Act specifies that an “employment list” includes an “eligible list,” 
meaning “a list of persons who have been examined in an open competitive 
examination and are eligible for certification for a specific class.”  (§§ 18532, 
18537.)  Eligible lists are “established as a result of free competitive examinations 
open to persons who lawfully may be appointed to any position within the class 
for which these examinations are held and who meet the minimum qualifications 
requisite to the performance of the duties of that position as prescribed by the 
specifications for the class or by board rule.”  (§ 18900, subd. (a).) 
The competitive examination process has been referred to as the 
“ ‘cornerstone’ ” of the merit principle.  (Alexander v. State Personnel Bd. (2000) 
80 Cal.App.4th 526, 542 (Alexander), quoting Lund v. California State Employees 
Assn. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 174, 186.)  Under the Act, examinations to establish 
eligible lists must be “competitive and of such character as fairly to test and 
determine the qualifications, fitness, and ability of competitors actually to perform 
the duties of the class of position for which they seek appointment.”  (§ 18930, 1st 
par.)  While all examinations must conform to this requirement, they may vary in 
terms of being “assembled or unassembled, written or oral, or in the form of a 
demonstration of skill, or any combination of these; and any investigation of 
character, personality, education, and experience and any tests of intelligence, 
capacity, technical knowledge, manual skill, or physical fitness which the board 
deems are appropriate, may be employed.”  (Id., 3d par.)  The names of the 
                                              
4  
An “appointing power” refers to “a person or group having authority to 
make appointments to positions in the State civil service.”  (§ 18524.) 
 
6 
persons who have attained passing marks in the examination “shall be placed on 
the [eligible or promotional] list in the order of final earned ratings,” subject to 
modification for application of constitutional veterans’ preferences.  (§ 18937.) 
The civil service classifications affected by the MOU’s in this case are 
subject to the Act’s so-called rule of three ranks, which requires certification of a 
list to the appointing power with the names of those eligible employees who place 
in the top three ranks of scores and who are willing to accept appointment under 
the conditions of employment specified.  (§ 19057.1; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, 
§ 254.)5  For purposes of ranking, scores are rounded to the nearest whole percent; 
a rank consists of one or more eligible employees with the same whole percentage 
score.  (§ 19057.1.) 
In making a hiring decision, the appointing power must select a candidate 
from the eligible list, but need not select the one with the highest ranked score.  
(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 254.)  This rule safeguards the merit principle by 
                                              
5  
Under the governing statute, the SPB may certify as eligible those 
candidates with lower scores in order to have three ranks on the certified list.  
(§ 19057.1.)  Additionally, examinations may be conducted until at least three 
names appear on the list.  (Ibid.)  Finally, a candidate in the top three ranks may 
not challenge a department’s selection of another eligible candidate on the basis 
that the person selected is less qualified.  The grounds for a challenge are limited, 
and include claims pertaining to improper withholding of a name from a certified 
list, unlawful discrimination (see § 19700 et seq.), and appeals of examination 
results or claims alleging violation of board regulation or policy.  (See Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 2, § 53.1; see generally Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 53.) 
 
There is another rule, the rule of three names, which requires the SPB to 
certify an eligible list naming the three persons who stand highest on the 
promotional list for the class in which the position belongs and who have indicated 
their willingness to accept appointment.  (§ 19057.)  That rule applies to other 
classifications not at issue here. 
 
7 
assuring that one of the better scoring candidates, if not the top scoring one, will 
be chosen.  (See Alexander, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 542.) 
Finally, the Act imposes a mandatory probationary period for permanent 
appointments from employment lists.  (§ 19170 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 
322.)  The probationary period gives the appointing power “the opportunity to 
observe the conduct and capacity of the probationer, and if, in the opinion of that 
power, the probationer is not fitted to discharge the duties of the position, then he 
[or she] may be discharged by the summary method provided for in the Civil 
Service Act before he [or she] acquires permanent civil service status.”  (Wiles v. 
State Personnel Board (1942) 19 Cal.2d 344, 347; see § 19173, subds. (a), (b).)  
This serves “to supplement the work of the civil service examiners in passing on 
the qualifications and eligibility of the probationer.”  (Wiles v. State Personnel 
Board, at p. 347; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 250, subd. (c).) 
Although the Legislature must at all times abide by the merit principle, it 
retains “a ‘free hand’ to fashion ‘laws relating to personnel administration for the 
best interests of the State.’ ”  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 
184.)  Moreover, “[n]othing in the Constitution requires that all civil service rules 
apply to all public employees and nothing prohibits the Legislature from 
experimenting to treat certain employees under different rules, provided the merit 
principle is not infringed.”  (Alexander, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.) 
B.  The Post and Bid Pilot Programs 
As indicated in part A, ante, the process relating to permanent civil service 
appointments and promotions generally involves three phases.  The first phase, 
pertaining to eligibility, involves administration of a competitive examination to a 
group of candidates seeking permanent appointment or promotion to positions 
within a classification.  The examination results in a certified eligible list 
 
8 
identifying those candidates with examination scores in the top three ranks who 
have indicated their willingness to accept appointment under the conditions of 
employment specified.  In the second phase, the appointing power reviews the 
candidates on the eligible list and selects the candidate it finds best suited to the 
position it seeks to fill.  The third phase requires the appointing power to evaluate 
the selected candidate throughout a probationary period to determine whether 
permanent appointment or promotion to the position is merited. 
The post and bid pilot programs follow this general process for the 
eligibility phase and the probationary phase, but mandate a significantly different 
procedure for the hiring or selection phase, as described below. 
The post and bid programs require appointing powers to post, in approved 
locations, bid notices regarding available positions in specified clerical, technical, 
and professional classifications.  Eligible employees may bid for posted positions 
by completing and submitting the appropriate bid forms. 
An employee must meet several requirements to be eligible to bid.  First, 
the employee must have immediate list eligibility or be eligible for appointment 
under the civil service rules and either have permanent full-time civil service 
status, or have permanent intermittent civil service status and meet certain 
specified criteria.  Although each MOU is slightly different, an employee in a 
nontransfer situation must score within the top three ranks on a competitive 
examination in order to be eligible for a list appointment or promotion.  Each 
employee must not only meet certain minimum qualifications for the posted 
position and possess the physical ability to perform the essential job functions, but 
also must have demonstrated an overall satisfactory performance in his or her 
current job.  Finally, the employee must not be on probation or on an official 
training and development assignment, and must not have had an adverse action 
related to job performance in the 12 months preceding the bid process. 
 
9 
Once the bidding process is closed, the post and bid programs generally 
require the appointing power to hire or promote from among eligible bidders—
including those employees scoring in the top three ranks on a competitive 
examination and meeting all other eligibility requirements—on the basis of 
seniority.6  Specifically, the eligible bidder with the most seniority in state service 
must be selected, regardless of the nature of the positions in which the seniority 
was earned, the specific duties and responsibilities of the position to be filled, or 
the relative qualifications of the competing eligible bidders. 
Two of the MOU’s provide for a 30-day trial period during which 
management or the selected employee may terminate the post and bid appointment 
and the employee may be returned to the former position.  All three MOU’s retain 
the probationary period applicable under state civil service statutes and rules.  
(§ 19170 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 322.) 
The MOU’s state they are “not intended to . . . contravene the spirit or 
intent of the merit principle in State employment,” and that “[a]ny matters which 
concern the application of the merit principle to State employees are exclusively 
within the purview of those processes provided by Article VII of the 
State Constitution or bylaws and rules enacted thereto.” 
C.  Analysis 
We must decide whether the Legislature’s approval of the post and bid pilot 
programs violates the merit principle. 
Plaintiffs contend the merit principle applies throughout the appointment 
and promotion process, including the hiring phase that follows the ranking of 
                                              
6  
Except for certain positions in the Employment Development Department, 
the post and bid programs for unit 1 and unit 4 also specify that selection must be 
based on the departmental geographic area. 
 
10 
eligible candidates after a competitive examination.  In plaintiffs’ view, an 
appointing power’s ability to interview the candidates in the top three ranks and to 
evaluate their comparative fitness to the specific needs and duties of posted 
positions is a fundamental and indispensable component of the merit principle.  By 
imposing an absolute seniority-based preference during the hiring phase, plaintiffs 
argue, the programs violate the constitutional mandate that permanent civil service 
appointments and promotions be based solely on merit.7 
Conversely, defendant asserts the programs do not violate the Constitution 
because their seniority-based selection procedure occurs after administration of 
competitive examinations and after adherence to the rule of three ranks.  Amicus 
curiae California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association adds that seniority is a 
recognized merit factor that is properly considered.  Finally, defendant contends 
contractual trial periods and statutory probationary periods ensure the selection of 
qualified employees. 
Case law establishes that state employers generally may not make 
permanent appointments or promotions in the absence or disregard of competitive 
examinations and the ranking of examination takers.  (E.g., Professional 
Engineers, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 678; Kidd v. State of California (1998) 62 
Cal.App.4th 386 (Kidd).)  But the issue whether the merit principle applies to the 
hiring phase of the appointment and promotion process is one of first impression. 
                                              
7  
Plaintiffs represent they recognize and respect the laws and rules protecting 
employees’ seniority in state civil service.  They also support adequately 
compensating civil service employees for their long-term, dedicated, and 
competent performance.  Plaintiffs’ only contention here is that, to adhere to the 
merit principle, appointing powers cannot be required to “substitute” seniority in 
the civil service for merit when selecting eligible candidates for permanent 
appointments and promotions. 
 
11 
In determining the constitutionality of the legislatively sanctioned post and 
bid programs, “we are guided ‘by well settled rules of constitutional construction.  
Unlike the federal Constitution, which is a grant of power to Congress, the 
California Constitution is a limitation or restriction on the powers of the 
Legislature.  [Citations.]  Two important consequences flow from this fact.  First, 
the entire law-making authority of the state, except the people’s right of initiative 
and referendum, is vested in the Legislature, and that body may exercise any and 
all legislative powers which are not expressly or by necessary implication denied 
to it by the Constitution. . . .  Secondly, all intendments favor the exercise of the 
Legislature’s plenary authority:  “If there is any doubt as to the Legislature’s 
power to act in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
Legislature’s action. . . .” ’  [Citations.]  On the other hand, ‘we also must enforce 
the provisions of our Constitution and “may not lightly disregard or blink at . . . a 
clear constitutional mandate.” ’  [Citation.]”  (County of Riverside v. Superior 
Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 284-285.)  Finally, challenges to the facial 
constitutionality of legislative acts require a demonstration that the acts “inevitably 
pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.”  
(Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 181.) 
As indicated, article VII of the California Constitution provides that 
“permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system 
based on merit ascertained by competitive examination.”  (Cal. Const., art. VII, 
§ 1, subd. (b).)  By its terms, the constitutional provision unmistakably commands 
that all permanent appointments and promotions in the civil service be based on 
merit, and that merit be determined on the basis of competition. 
The history of the constitutional amendment adopting this provision 
confirms this meaning.  In explaining the provision to the voters who ultimately 
approved it, the ballot materials stated:  “The purpose of this constitutional 
 
12 
amendment is to promote efficiency and economy in State government.  The sole 
aim of the act is to prohibit appointments and promotion in State service except on 
the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness ascertained by competitive examination.”8  
(Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. 
Elect. (Nov. 6, 1934), argument in favor of Prop. 7, p. 12.)  In summing up the 
provision, the materials stated:  “[T]his constitutional amendment provides:  (1) 
Employment in the classified service based solely on merit and efficiency . . . .”  
(Ibid., italics added.) 
In Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d 168, we explained that, 
while article VII, section 1, subdivision (b) of the state Constitution refers to “a 
general system based on merit,” the 1934 ballot arguments “make[] it quite plain 
that the draftsmen of the provision intended only ‘to prohibit appointment and 
promotion in State service except on the basis of merit,’ and did not intend to 
engrave into the state Constitution every aspect of the then current civil service 
system.”  (Pacific Legal Foundation, at p. 184, fn. 7.)  Consistent with Pacific 
Legal Foundation, we find the full constitutional phrase, “a general system based 
on merit ascertained by competitive examination” (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 1, subd. 
(b)), refers to “ ‘the concept “under which public employees are recruited, 
selected, and advanced under conditions of political neutrality, equal opportunity, 
and competition on the basis of merit and competence.” ’ ”  (Pacific Legal 
Foundation, at p. 184, fn. 7.)  By referencing this general concept, article VII 
                                              
8  
As enacted in 1934, the constitutional provision provided that “appointment 
and promotion shall be made on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness 
ascertained by competitive examination.”  (Cal. Const., former art. XXIV.)  
Subsequent revisions of the 1934 provision merely deleted obsolete and 
superfluous language and made no substantive changes in the provisions relevant 
to this action.  (See ante, fn. 3.) 
 
13 
requires that appointment and promotion decisions, not just preappointment 
eligibility determinations and other screening measures, be based on merit.  (See 
also Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1970), argument in favor of Prop. 14, p. 24 [describing 
proposed initiative amendments as continuing “the requirement that permanent 
appointment and promotion in the state civil service shall be based on merit and 
competitive examinations” (italics added)].) 
In sum, “[b]oth the constitutional provision and the ballot argument[s] in 
favor thereof are remarkably straightforward:  The Legislature . . . has a free hand 
with regard to personnel administration except that with regard specifically to 
appointment to service, merit and efficiency shall be the only considerations.  The 
merit principle is sacrosanct; however free the hand of the Legislature, neither that 
hand nor the hand of any other branch or agency of government can manipulate 
the merit principle to serve ends inconsistent with article VII of the state 
Constitution.”  (Kidd, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 401-402, fn. omitted.) 
Plaintiffs contend that seniority may not be “substituted” for merit at the 
postexamination phase when appointing powers make their hiring decisions.  To 
the extent this contention suggests seniority is not at all reflective of merit, we 
disagree and do not question that seniority may be an appropriate factor in 
evaluating merit and efficiency.  (Accord, Apuzzo v. County of Ulster 
(N.Y.App.Div. 1983) 470 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815; Gaskill v. Mayor and Com’rs, etc. 
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1977) 373 A.2d 1019, 1020; Heminger v. Police Com’n of 
the City of Fort Wayne (Ind.Ct.App. 1974) 314 N.E.2d 827, 832-833.)  “Generally, 
years of seniority indicate years of on-the-job experience.”  (Communications 
Workers of America v. State of California (1984) PERB Dec. No. S-CE-134-S [8 
 
14 
PERC ¶ 15138, p. 737] (Communications Workers).)9  Indeed, California 
regulations recognize that time spent on a job is job related when ordinarily 
requiring employees to spend a specified amount of time in a job class to become 
eligible for promotion to the next level of that class.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, 
§ 212; Communications Workers, supra, PERB Dec. No. S-CE-134-S [8 PERC 
¶ 15138, p. 737]; see also § 18950 et seq. [authorizing addition of career credits to 
examination scores for promotions].) 
Seniority in state service, however, may or may not reflect fitness for a 
posted position.  Much depends on whether a candidate’s current and previous 
positions (or other background) provided the job-related knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and experience necessary for efficient and successful performance in the 
posted position.  (See Lucchesi v. City of San Jose (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 323, 
329 [in invalidating a city ordinance that gave preference to city employees for 
firefighter positions, court observed that a city employee with no experience in a 
field related to the position sought is not more competent than a noncity employee 
with 25 years’ experience in a related field].)  More importantly here, greater 
seniority does not necessarily equate to greater ability, efficiency, or productivity.  
Thus, while consideration of seniority may be appropriate as part of a general 
merit-based system of appointments and promotions, depriving appointing powers 
                                              
9  
Communications Workers was a decision by an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) finding that a collective bargaining proposal for a seniority-based selection 
process did not conflict with the SPB’s exclusive statutory jurisdiction over the 
area of promotions.  In doing so, the ALJ rejected the SPB’s argument it was 
constitutionally forbidden from considering seniority in its promotional scheme 
because seniority is neither job related nor merit related.  While we agree with the 
decision’s rejection of that position, we note it did so in the limited context of a 
claim the state employer could not negotiate over issues that were not job related 
or merit related. 
 
15 
of the ability to interview eligible candidates and base their hiring decisions on a 
broader range of criteria bearing on fitness and efficiency “inevitably pose[s] a 
present total and fatal conflict” (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 
181) with the constitutional command that “appointments and promotions in state 
service be made solely on the basis of merit” (id. at p. 184). 
We acknowledge that the civil service statutes providing for competitive 
examinations and the rule of three ranks afford a “bulwark against favoritism.”  
(Professional Engineers, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 693.)  But the statutes readily 
indicate that the competitive examinations that result in eligible lists typically test 
and rank only the general fitness and minimum qualifications required for an 
entire class of positions.  (See §§ 18523, 18532, 18900, 18930.)  These classes 
may encompass many different positions that vary somewhat in their duties and 
responsibilities, particularly if numerous agencies in the state use them.  Thus, 
while such examinations may effectively prevent the selection of incompetent 
political favorites, they do not test for all the specific knowledge, skills, abilities, 
and other personal characteristics and attributes that might reflect an eligible 
candidate’s superior fitness for a particular position within a class.  (See ibid.; 
Professional Engineers, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 716 (dis. opn. of Scotland, J.) 
[“[e]ligible lists are established for classes of position, but are not position-
specific”].) 
For these reasons, we look to the purpose of a competitive examination, 
which “was (and is) to provide accurate information to the hiring authority about 
the relative merits of the candidates, but not unfairly (or unconstitutionally) 
circumscribe the appointing power’s ability to make the actual selection.”  
(Professional Engineers, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.)  Mindful of that 
purpose and the constitutional principle the examination is designed to serve, we 
conclude the Legislature may not approve collective bargaining agreements 
 
16 
requiring that state employers make their permanent appointments and promotions 
based solely on the seniority status of employees meeting all eligibility and 
ranking requirements, without allowance for comparative merit evaluations of 
those employees. 
Our conclusion is fully consistent with the manner in which permanent 
appointments and promotions are handled outside the post and bid process.  
Appointing powers ordinarily have authority, consistent with their obligations 
under the merit principle, to consider all job-related qualifications when hiring an 
eligible candidate for a specific position.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 250, subd. 
(a).)10  Significantly, appointing powers are not compelled to select the candidate 
who is ranked highest on an eligible list, but may evaluate other merit-based 
criteria in addition to list ranking.  As courts have aptly observed, “ ‘[i]t would be 
perverse to sanctify rank ordering of exam scores in a quest to maximize 
competitiveness if, as a result, other considerations relevant to merit and fitness 
are discounted or swept aside.’ ”  (Professional Engineers, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 696, quoting McGowan v. Burstein (1988) 71 N.Y.2d 729, 734.) 
Even though the post and bid programs preserve the rule of three ranks, 
their seniority-based selection procedures leave no room at the postexamination 
                                              
10  
This regulation, which became operative on May 17, 2004, affirms that 
appointments to civil service positions “shall be made on the basis of merit and 
fitness, defined exclusively as the consideration of each individual’s job-related 
qualifications for a position, including his/her knowledge, skills, abilities, 
experience, education, training, physical and mental fitness, and any other 
personal characteristics relative to job requirements, as determined by candidate 
performance in selection procedures, including, but not limited to, hiring 
interviews, reference checks, background checks, and/or any other procedures, 
which assess job-related qualifications and are designed and administered to select 
those individuals who best meet the selection need.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, 
§ 250, subd. (a).) 
 
17 
hiring phase for comparatively evaluating employees who meet the threshold 
requirements for eligibility and ranking.  By dictating an absolute seniority 
preference in hiring, and foreclosing appointing powers from interviewing eligible 
candidates and considering a broader and more meaningful range of merit-based 
criteria as appropriate to determine the candidate most qualified for a posted 
position, the programs undermine the constitutional mandate that appointments 
and promotions be based on merit. 
We are aware that, before the Legislature ratified the MOU’s, the 
Legislative Counsel’s Office issued an opinion concluding they did not violate the 
merit principle if supplemented by an addendum reflecting the parties’ agreement 
to apply the seniority selection procedure only where a competitive examination 
had been held or in cases of transfer where an examination was not required.  But 
Legislative Counsel’s opinions are only as persuasive as their reasoning (see 
Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 922), and we do 
not find the opinion offered here persuasive for all the reasons identified above. 
Defendant argues the post and bid programs are constitutionally valid under 
the following primary rationale:  The Legislature has the authority and ability 
under the state Constitution to pass personnel administration laws in the state’s 
best interests and has accomplished this by enacting the current civil service 
statutes.  As relevant here, these statutes require certification of eligible lists 
naming those candidates who represent the three highest ranks and are willing to 
accept appointment to open positions, and they require the appointing powers to 
make their selections from these lists.  (§ 19057.1.)  Subject to these restrictions 
and certain statutorily prohibited criteria, the civil service laws generally give the 
appointing powers flexibility to exercise hiring discretion.  Because appointing 
powers may select any candidate in the top three ranks (ibid.) and are subject to no 
hearing or review process to determine if their final selections are based solely on 
 
18 
merit (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 53), their actual hiring decisions are 
discretionary and need not be based on an additional merit review.  In sum, 
because hiring decisions are discretionary, the Legislature may limit that 
discretion by adopting a conclusive seniority-based preference for selection among 
eligible candidates.  We are not convinced. 
In adopting the constitutional merit principle, California voters made clear 
their intent that permanent civil service appointments and promotions be made 
solely on the basis of merit.  No matter what discretion the Legislature has 
purported to give or withdraw from appointing powers, it does not have a free 
hand to approve MOU’s or enact statutes that flout this mandate.  Defendant offers 
no authority suggesting the merit principle does not or cannot extend to the hiring 
phase of the appointment process on the ground there is no legislatively sanctioned 
administrative process to review merit challenges.  Whether or not an 
administrative process is in place, the Legislature cannot validly approve programs 
that operate in contravention of the Constitution. 
Defendant next asserts the post and bid programs impose a number of 
eligibility requirements, in addition to list eligibility, that adequately protect the 
merit principle.  For instance, the employee must have demonstrated an overall 
satisfactory performance in the current job and have received no adverse action 
related to job performance in the preceding 12 months.  But these are simply 
threshold requirements that any employee must meet to be eligible to bid.  
Satisfaction of these minimum requirements does not serve to distinguish between 
bid-eligible candidates. 
Indeed, even if the foregoing criteria could be viewed as providing 
independently relevant information on a candidate’s overall competence to 
perform in a posted position, their value is minimized because the post and bid 
programs obviate any opportunity or need for their qualitative assessment.  For 
 
19 
example, it would make no difference if the most senior eligible candidate had a 
number of adverse actions that were more than a year old, while an eligible 
candidate with three months less seniority had none at all.  Neither would it matter 
that a less senior candidate had developed job-related skills that were far more 
relevant to a posted position than the skills the most senior candidate acquired, nor 
that a less senior candidate was exceptionally productive and skilled, while the 
most senior candidate was only satisfactory in meeting job expectations.  Under 
any of these circumstances, the post and bid programs require selection of the 
most senior eligible candidate, in disregard of these merit-based job-related 
considerations. 
Defendant relies on a passage in Alexander, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 526, 
542, stating “the merit principle does not require that the most qualified or best 
candidate be chosen.”  Fairly read, however, that passage merely recognizes the 
Constitution does not require the appointment of the most qualified or best 
candidate, as determined by rankings on an eligible list.  Indeed, the passage 
supports our conclusion that the merit principle is served when an appointing 
power relies both on ranking and other merit considerations to select the eligible 
candidate it finds best suited for a position.  In any case, nothing in Alexander 
suggests that merit considerations have no constitutional relevance in the hiring 
process once competitive examinations have been administered and the three 
highest ranks ascertained. 
Finally, defendant argues the post and bid programs protect hiring 
discretion and ensure selection of qualified employees by allowing termination for 
unsatisfactory performance during either the trial period provided in the MOU’s or 
the probationary period prescribed by statute.  But those periods are operative only 
after state resources have been needlessly consumed in selecting and training the 
unfit employee, and do nothing to mitigate the further time and resources that 
 
20 
presumably will be spent finding and training a replacement.  Conversely, 
interviewing eligible candidates and making evaluations as necessary to assess 
each candidate’s comparative fitness for a posted position can often avoid the 
waste of state resources by ensuring that a careful and thoroughly considered 
hiring decision is made in the first instance.  Thus, eliminating the ability of 
appointing powers to make such informed decisions at the outset tends to frustrate 
rather than promote the goal of the merit principle and the purpose of the civil 
service statutes to achieve efficiency and economy in state government. 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
While collective bargaining may be used to negotiate many terms and 
conditions of employment, it cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional 
mandate that permanent appointment and promotion in the civil service be based 
solely on merit.  By designating seniority as the sole consideration for the 
permanent appointment and promotion of eligible employees, the legislatively 
approved post and bid provisions impermissibly conflict with this fundamental 
mandate. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remand the matter to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion California State Personnel Bd. v. California State Employees Assn. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 114 Cal.App.4th 11 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S122058 
Date Filed: July 28, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Lloyd Connelly 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Anne M. Giese and Robin O’Sullivan for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Howard L. Schwartz, Linda D. Buzzini, Patricia M. Keegan and Marguerite D. Seabourne for Department 
of Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Ronald Yank, Gregg McLean Adam; and Benjamin C. Sybesma for 
California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Karen J. Brandt, Elise S. Rose and Dorothy Bacskai Egel for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Anne M. Giese 
1108 “O” Street, Suite 327 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 326-4208 
 
Karen J. Brandt 
California State Personnel Board 
801 Capitol Mall – MS-53 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 653-1403