Case Title: State v. Ralph

Citation: 194 Kan. 356, 399 P.2d 548

Docket Number: 43,079

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1965-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
194 Kan. 356 (1965)
399 P.2d 548
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
WAYNE E. RALPH, Appellant.
No. 43,079

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1965.
E.J. Malone, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
J.O. Ballinger, Deputy County Attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, and Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
The defendant, Wayne E. Ralph, was charged with the crimes of second degree forgery and uttering, as defined by statute (G.S. 1949, 21-608 and 21-609 [now K.S.A. 21-608 and 21-609].) After his arrest on the charges indicated, and preliminary proceedings about which no complaint is made, he was charged by information in the district court of Sedgwick County with the commission of such crimes. In that court, while represented by competent court-appointed counsel, namely, John Pyles of Wichita, defendant entered a plea of guilty to each of the crimes charged in the information and was thereupon sentenced, for their commission, to the state penitentiary under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 21-631 and 21-107a (now K.S.A. 21-631 and 21-107a), for the period of time therein prescribed.
Subsequently defendant gave a pro se notice of appeal to this court from his judgment of conviction and sentence. Later, and pursuant to his motion, the trial court directed that he be furnished with a free transcript of the record pursuant to G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1304, and, in conformity with our Rule No. 56, ultimately appointed E.J. Malone, a capable attorney of Wichita, to represent him in this court on appeal. Mr. Malone fulfilled this obligation by filing a proper abstract and brief and by orally arguing the cause on the date appellant's appeal was heard by this court on its merits.
*357 The record in this case presents but three questions. They will be considered in the order in which they are discussed in the abstract and briefs.
Appellant's first contention is that he was not properly represented by counsel at the time of arraignment and sentence as contemplated by G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1304. This claim finds its answer in the court reporter's transcript of the record. It is to be noted such transcript is included in the appellant's abstract, is certified by both the reporter and the appellant's attorney as a correct copy of the transcribed record, and must be accepted as reflecting a true and accurate account of the trial court proceedings therein set forth and described.
So far as material to the claim now under consideration, and other contentions to be presently discussed, pertinent portions of the reporter's transcript, as abstracted by appellant, read:
"THE TRANSCRIPT"
"THE COURT: Wayne E. Ralph
"MR. RALPH: Yes, sir
"THE COURT: You are Wayne E. Ralph, are you, sir?
"MR. RALPH: Yes, sir.
"MR. RALPH: Yes, I am.
"MR. PYLES: I been appointed."
..............
"MR. RALPH: Yes, sir.
"MR. RALPH: Yes, your honor.
"THE COURT: And if so, how do you plead?
"MR. RALPH: Guilty, sir.
"MR. RALPH: Yes.
"THE COURT: Do you know of any reason why 
"MR. PYLES: Yes, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: And how do you plead?
"MR. RALPH: Guilty, sir.
"MR. RALPH: Yes, sir.
"MR. PYLES: No, we do not know of any reason.
"MR. PYLES: I have.
"MR. RALPH: Yes, sir.
"MR. BALLINGER: At least two of them.
"MR. PYLES: That is concurrent.
"MR. PYLES: No.
"THE COURT: Concurrently, concurrently...."
..............
"MR. PYLES: Alright. Thank you."
Nothing would be gained by repeating or further laboring what is to be found in the first portion of the court reporter's transcript, as heretofore quoted. It sufficies to say the statements therein recited unmistakably establish, in language so clear and unequivocal it is subject to no other interpretation, that appellant was represented by counsel at the time of his arraignment and sentence, as contemplated by 62-1304, supra. It follows the claim now under consideration lacks merit and cannot be upheld.
Support for the conclusion just announced is to be found in our decisions. See State v. Trams, 189 Kan. 393, 369 P.2d 223, where it is held:
*359 And in the opinion said:
The sole argument advanced by appellant in support of his second contention reads:
Portions of the records, to which we have heretofore referred, and what has been previously stated and held, fully demonstrate this claim raises no new or additional issue and must be denied.
Appellant's third and final claim is based upon the general premise that he was deprived of his rights as contemplated by G.S. 1949, 62-1516 (now K.S.A. 62-1516), and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, in support of this claim, he raises two points. These points, hereinafter identified as (a) and (b) will now be stated and, for purposes of further discussion, will be referred to as indicated.
(a) Appellant was compelled to furnish evidence against himself with respect to prior conviction. (b) Appellant was erroneously sentenced inasmuch as there was no evidence introduced to warrant the court to invoke the habitual criminal statute (G.S. 1949, 21-107a (now K.S.A. 21-107a).
Appellant's claim as to point (a) lacks merit and cannot be upheld. The inescapable facts, as disclosed by quoted portions of the transcript, make it clearly appear that at the hearing upon the applicability of the habitual criminal statute (21-107a, supra) appellant and his counsel, in open court, freely and voluntarily admitted appellant had been convicted of previous felonies. Under these circumstances, and other facts set forth in the transcript, it cannot be successfully argued that appellant was compelled to furnish evidence against himself in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or that he was deprived of rights under 62-1516, supra.
After an extended examination of the many cases dealing with issues similar to the one raised by appellant in point (b) of his third contention we have no difficulty in concluding this claim of error is also devoid of merit and must be denied.
*360 We now direct attention to just a few of our decisions which not only support but compel the conclusions herein announced with respect to all claims of error advanced by appellant.
In State v. Messmore, 175 Kan. 354, 264 P.2d 911, we held:
In State v. Graham, 172 Kan. 627, 242 P.2d 1067, it is said:
See, also, State v. Haught, 180 Kan. 96, 299 P.2d 573, which reads:
For another interesting decision see Reffitt v. Edmondson, 177 Kan. 83, 276 P.2d 341, where it is said:
See, also, State v. Watkins, 190 Kan. 446, 375 P.2d 634, which states:
And see Johnson v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 383 P.2d 978, which reads:
We find nothing in the record or in arguments advanced respecting the appellate issues involved to require, warrant or permit a reversal of the judgment. Therefore it must be and is hereby affirmed.