Case Title: STATE v HAWKINS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12686 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - S H E R M A N P. HAWKINS, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Sandall, Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, B i l l i n g s , Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, and A. C l i f f o r d Edwards argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John P- Atkins, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Charles A. Bradley, Deputy County Attorney, argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: September 13, 1974 DecideQEC - 2 I. Filed : PTr:) b ' , ++ i - - Clerk M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a f i n a l judgment of conviction a f t e r a jury verdict of guilty of murder i n the f i r s t degree i n the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, i n connection with the slaying of defendant ' s wife, Sandra Hawkins. This appeal presents but one issue for t h i s Court's review: The refusal by the t r i a l judge t o give additional instructions t o the jury during i t s deliberation. The facts are not i n dispute and appellant agrees the court properly instructed the jury, prior t o deliberation. The jury retired for deliberation a t 4:53 p.m.; a t 12:40 a.m., the court ordered the jury into the courtroom and proceeded i n t h i s manner: "THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I don't want you t o indicate t o m e i n any way what your vote may be a t t h i s point or which way your vote may be, but I want t o ask you i f you think that you a r e close t o reaching a verdict a t t h i s t i m e . "JURY F O R E M A N : Yes, Xour Honor, I think that we a r e f a i r l y close. I mean it i s n ' t that lopsided. "THE COURT: The reason that I a m asking t h i s i s that it has been a long day for a l l of you, I know, and some of you probably have great endurance, physical and otherwise, than others because of age and various things, and t h i s i s what I a m concerned about, and t h i s i s why I was inquiring a s t o whether o r not you think you a r e close t o a verdict. "JURY F O R E M A N : M a y I ask a question, sir? "THE COURT: No, the law won't permit that. I f you have any questions the law requires that you submit the question to me i n writing and I w i l l answer it i n the same way. "JURY F O R E M A N : W e have it i n writing. "THE COURT: Very well, M r . Bailiff, w i l l you submit the written question t o the Court? " (Thereupon the Bailiff submitted the written questions t o the Court, said questions being a s follows : "1. D o each of the conditions of willful, deliberate and premeditated have t o be proven by the State? "2. Does deliberate have anything t o do with premeditate? "3. Does deliberate mean the defendant has given thought t o more than deciding to perform o r not per- form the action? "4. Does deliberation mean considering the con- sequences of the crime before committing it?" The court excused the jury u n t i l 9:00 a.m., the following day and immediately met with counsel i n chambers. The court's f i r s t impression, stated i n the record, was that i f counsel agreed the court would instruct the jury that the words w e r e already defined i n the instructions and he could not instruct further on definition. Further, the court suggested that i f both counsel could agree on any further definition that would answer the jury's questions, the court would also consider that a s well. Counsel could not agree t o additional instruction. Counsel representing the s t a t e requested that no further instruction be given the jury t o prevent any further confusion. Counsel for defendant requested that question number 1 be answered, but that numbers 2 , 3, and 4 not be answered. Counsel for the s t a t e objected to the answering of question 1, and stated t h a t i f number 1 was answered, then numbers 2, 3 and 4 should also be answered. In other words, counsel disagreed about which of the questions, i f any, should be answered and did not make any e f f o r t t o propose further definition a s suggested by the court, except i n t h i s suggestion by defense counsel t o c a l l further attention t o court's Instruction No. 1; "MR. K A M P F E : The f i r s t question bothers me, Judge. "THE COURT: But it should be clearly defined. "MR. BRADLEY: Every material allegation of the Information has t o be proved and these a r e the material allegations. The word willful, premeditated and deliberate are a l l defined. "MR. K A M P F E : W e l l , the f i r s t question bothers m e because - . that is very p l - ain i n the Instructions. "THE C O U R T : It's i n the f i r s t instruction. I think the f i r s t two instructions cover that, the fact that they must prove a l l of the material allegations are i n about three o r four instructions altogether, but it is specifically set out what the specific allegations a r e and you can de- fine willful and premeditation. '?MR. KAMPFE: It would be m y suggestion t o the Court that the f i r s t question should be answered by e i t h e r referring t o a specific Court instruction and an example of that would be see Court's Instruction such and such, o r i n the alternative, which would be answered by saying, yes, before a conviction of f i r s t degree murder can be rendered you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that each of these separate elements have been proven by the State, and I make the additional suggestion that the three remaining questions should not be answered. * * * . I 1 (Emphasis supplied.) The s t a t e , a s stated heretofore, objected and the court submitted the following answer t o the jury: I I The answers t o your questions a r e contained in the instructions given. I cannot further instruct you on these matters and suggest that you r e f e r t o the written instructions on the law which you have i n the jury room. 1 I The record does not indicate any objection by counsel t o the method the judge adopted t o solve the problem of the jury's questions. Appellant contends that the court's refusal t o answer the jury's questions i s an abnegation by the t r i a l judge of h i s specific and his single most important duty: to insure a f a i r and impartial t r i a l for the accused. That without an answer t o the jury's question number 1, submitted t o the court, appellant main- tains the jury was s t i l l confused a s t o who had the burden of proof a s t o the material allegations of willful, deliberate and pre- meditated. H e contends he was thereby denied his right t o a f a i r jury t r i a l . It i s , however, also arguable that the reply of the t r i a l judge t o the jury sufficiently cleared up the confusion on the part of the jury so that it fully comprehended who had the burden of proof i n proving the material allegations. Section 95-1913(d), R.C.M. 1947, provides i n pertinent part: 'I* * * After the jury has retired for deliberation * * * i f they desire t o be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the in- formation requested may given i n the discretion o m court * * & . I 1 n (E mphasis added.) It is therefore, in the discretion of the court whether or not to give additional instructions to the jury. The district judge did not abuse his discretion. If the judge is of the opinion the instructions already given are adequate, correctly state the law, and fully advise the jury on the procedures it is to follow in its deliberation, his refusal to answer a question already answered in the instructions is not error. Tellis v . State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938; State v . Vaughn, 200 Ore. 275, 265 P . 2 d 249; State v . Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 380 P . 2 d 634; State v . Weinandt, 8 4 S . D . 322, 171 ~ . ~ . 2 d 73. This is particularly true when defense has argued that the instructions as a whole are adequate and the answer to the jury's question number 1 "is very plain in the instruction" given. This takes defendant's argument away from judicial discretion and into the area of personal opinion and conjecture as to confusion, i . e . , the five instructions presented as primarily responsible; which questions caused confusion and if one or all should or should not be answered, and if any confusion existed after the court's instruc- tion to reread the instructions already given. Defendant relies on State v . Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P . 309, for support. However, a close reading of Jackson will demonstrate that these are not our facts and hence easily distinguishable from the instant case. Jackson arose from the withdrawal of an in- struction felt necessary by the Supreme Court, which in fact was instructing the jury further and orally at that, when told by the trial court to disregard the w i t h d m instruction. The judgment of the district Justice i' We Concur: . - - - - - - - Chief Justice