Case Title: CARL GLOVER V. KAREN CRAYK, f/k/a KAREN GLOVER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
CARL GLOVER V. KAREN CRAYK, f/k/a KAREN GLOVER2005 WY 143122 P.3d 955Case Number: 04-174Decided: 11/17/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
CARL 
GLOVER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
KAREN 
CRAYK, f/k/a

KAREN 
GLOVER,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
A. Cole, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

John J. 
Metzke and Billie LM Addleman of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Appellant, 
Carl Glover, seeks review of the district court's order purportedly clarifying 
the original decree of divorce regarding the benefits due Appellee, Karen Crayk, 
formerly known as Karen Glover, from Glover's military pension.  We find that the district court erred in 
entering this order and reverse.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Glover 
presents the following issue for our review:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in modifying the formula for determining the Appellee's 
proportionate share of Appellant's military pension as set forth in the property 
settlement agreement and divorce decree?

 
 
Crayk 
states the issue as follows:

 
 
Did the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt abuse its discretion in clarifying the Divorce Decree to 
create an "order" within the meaning of the Uniformed Services Former Spouse 
Protection Act so that Appellee Crayk could receive her rightful portion of the 
Appellant's military pension?

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
The 
parties were married on March 16, 1979, and were divorced on February 10, 
1997.  A Property and Child Custody 
Agreement executed between the parties and the subsequent Decree of Divorce 
awarded Crayk one-half of the sum that accrued in Glover's military retirement 
fund during the first seventeen years of his military career. 

 

[¶4]           
Apparently, 
the military was unable to divide Glover's pension upon his retirement without 
further guidance from the district court.  
On September 4, 2003, Crayk filed a motion to amend and/or modify the 
provision of the divorce decree relating to the retirement benefits on the 
ground that the decree "did not constitute a [sic] Order' within the meaning of 
the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act."  Crayk requested that the provision be 
modified in accordance with the following "time rule" formula to provide a fair 
and equitable division of the marital property:

 
 
            
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that [Crayk] is awarded 
33.59621% of [Glover's] disposable military retired pay, to be computed by 
multiplying 50% times a fraction, the numerator of which is 213 months of 
marriage during [Glover's] creditable military service, divided by [Glover's] 
total number of months of creditable military service, which is 317. 

 
 
Glover 
opposed the motion. 

 
 

[¶5]           
Following 
a hearing1 and consideration of additional 
exhibits submitted by Glover,2 the district court issued a 
decision letter adopting Crayk's proposed formula for dividing Glover's 
retirement benefits.  Glover asked 
the district court to reconsider its decision because it "gives [Crayk] a 
portion of [his] promotions and longevity increases after seventeen year [sic] 
of service and after the divorce."  
The district court declined to do so and entered an order granting 
Crayk's motion.  The order 
provided:

 
 
WHEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the Defendant, Karen Crayk, 
formerly known as Karen Glover, is awarded 33.59621% of the Plaintiff Carl 
Glover's disposable military retired pay, to be computed by multiplying 50% 
times a fraction, the numerator of which is two hundred thirteen (213), 
representing the number of months the parties were married during the Plaintiff 
Carl Glover's creditable military service and the denominator of which is three 
hundred seventeen (317), representing Plaintiff Carl Glover's total months of 
creditable military service.  

 
 
This 
appeal followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]           
At the 
outset, it must be noted that the record before this Court is ambiguous as to 
the exact nature of the proceedings below.  
Neither the parties nor the district court specify under what authority 
Crayk's motion was brought or granted.  
Crayk's motion was styled a "Motion to Amend and/or Modify Decree of 
Divorce."  Such a motion, however, 
could not be entertained by the district court because, once their divorce 
became final, the district court no longer had the authority to modify the 
property division provided by the divorce decree.  Elsasser v. Elsasser, 989 P.2d 106, 109 
(Wyo. 
1999).  

 
 

[¶7]           
The 
district court, however, retained the authority to clarify an ambiguous property 
settlement provision provided in the original decree in order to effectuate the 
provision.  Elsasser, 989 P.2d at 108-09; see also Kelly v. Kelly, 2003 WY 133, 78 P.3d 220 (Wyo. 2003).  In her 
motion, Crayk stated that the original divorce decree had to be modified because 
it "did not constitute a [sic] Order' within the meaning of the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouse Protection Act."  
Presumably, the original decree was ambiguous as to how Crayk's one-half 
share of Glover's retirement benefits was to be calculated, thus preventing 
distribution of the benefits to Crayk.  
Based upon this underlying ambiguity, the divorce decree obviously needed 
to be clarified.

 
 

[¶8]           
This 
Court has previously held that the appropriate manner to handle such a 
clarification is by way of a W.R.C.P. 60(a) motion to correct a clerical 
mistake.  Elsasser, 989 P.2d  at 108 (stating that 
"W.R.C.P 60(a) is designed to clarify, as well as to correct, and is properly 
invoked to dispel either patent or latent ambiguities in a judgment"); Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P.2d 1146, 1149 
(Wyo. 
1978).  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(a), 
a court may correct a clerical mistake "at any time of its own initiative."  Because of the patent ambiguity in the 
divorce decree, the district court would have been well within its discretion to 
sua sponte invoke Rule 60(a).  It appears from our review of the record 
and the order on appeal that the district court approached the proceedings as a 
request for clarification of an ambiguous divorce decree, thereby implicitly 
invoking Rule 60(a).  We will 
therefore treat this as a Rule 60(a) proceeding. 

 
 

[¶9]           
When 
reviewing a district court's application of Rule 60(a), this Court employs a 
two-part process.  The first 
question we must answer is whether the correction or clarification of a judgment 
relates to a "clerical mistake."  If 
so, we then review the district court's order to ascertain whether it clarified 
or modified the original judgment.  
Elsasser, 989 P.2d 108; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 4, 
8 (Wyo. 1993) 
(Taylor, J., dissenting).  Both 
questions are questions of law, which we review de novo.  Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 
1106 (Wyo. 
1996); see also Johnson, 851 P.2d  at 
7-8.

 
 

[¶10]      
Having 
already determined that the proceeding properly related to clarifying a clerical 
mistake, we turn to our review of the district court's order.  We must compare the language of the 
original divorce decree to the district court's order to determine whether the 
court correctly clarified the decree.  
"[T]he central purpose of Rule 60(a) is to effectuate the contemporaneous 
intent of the court and to ensure that the judgment reflects that intent."  Spomer, 580 P.2d  at 1149.  This Court applies the same rule when 
construing a court order as used in construing a contract.  Brockway, 921 P.2d  at 1106. The 
interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for the 
Court.  The language of a contract 
is to be construed within the context in which it was written, and this Court 
may look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose 
of the instrument to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time it was 
made.  Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, 
Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶11]      
The 
divorce decree provided for the division of Glover's military retirement 
benefits.  The ambiguity in the 
decree is the absence of a formula to be applied in calculating the amount Crayk 
is entitled to from Glover's retirement benefits.  The district court accepted Crayk's 
argument that her one-half should be calculated pursuant to the "time 
rule."  The "time rule" is computed 
by multiplying 50% times a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of 
months of marriage during Glover's creditable military service and the 
denominator of which is the total number of months of Glover's creditable 
military service.  The result is the 
percentage of Glover's disposable retired pay to which Crayk is entitled.  See In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 530-32 (Colo. 1995).  This allows Crayk to realize a benefit 
from promotions and pay increases Glover may have received following the divorce 
up until the time of his retirement.

 
 

[¶12]      
Glover 
argues that the language of the divorce decree does not support Crayk's 
formula.  The language of the 
divorce decree states that Crayk's entitlement is limited to "one-half (1/2) of 
the sum that accrued in [Glover's] 
retirement fund during the first 
seventeen (17) years of [Glover's] military career."   (Emphasis added.)  Glover argues that this language 
prohibits Crayk from benefiting from any income increases he received after the 
seventeen years.  We 
agree.

 
 

[¶13]      
Crayk's 
formula is inconsistent with the language of the divorce decree.  Crayk's formula awards her the benefit 
of any income increases Glover received after the first seventeen years of his 
military career.  Crayk supports 
this formula by simply stating that it is fair and equitable.  The validity, let alone the "equity," of 
Crayk's formula is not the issue.  
The real issue is the intent of the divorce decree.  Nowhere does Crayk present her formula 
within the context of the language of the decree.  Upon review, we find no indication that 
the divorce decree anticipated Glover's retirement calculation to be based upon 
sums yet to be accrued.  Instead, 
the divorce decree speaks of sums already accrued.  Indeed, the decree expressly defines the 
time frame for accrual as the first seventeen years of Glover's military 
service.  Under these circumstances, 
we hold that the district court erred in adopting Crayk's 
formula.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶14]      
This 
Court concludes that the divorce decree does not provide for Crayk to benefit 
from any promotions and pay increases Glover received after seventeen years of 
military service.  The order of the 
district court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1The record 
on appeal does not contain a transcript of the 
hearing.

 
 

2The exhibits 
included a recommendation for division of his military pension, a copy of a 
handout for dividing military retired pay under the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses' Protection Act prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 
and the amount of Glover's base pay at the time of divorce.