Case Title: State v. David M. Hahn

Citation: 2000 WI 118

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 118 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
David M. Hahn,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
November 1, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert A. Haase 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Steven G. Bauer and Law Offices of Steven G. Bauer, Brownsville, 
and oral argument by Steven G. Bauer. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 118 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0554-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
 
 
v. 
 
David M. Hahn 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Robert A. Haase, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is an 
appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Robert A. Haase, Circuit Court Judge.  The appeal is 
here on certification from the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.61 (1995-96).1 
¶2 
The defendant, David M. Hahn, appeals his sentence of 
life 
in 
prison 
without 
the 
possibility 
of 
parole 
under 
Wisconsin's persistent repeater statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m) 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  Section 
939.62(2m) was modified by the legislature by 1997 Wis. Act 326. 
FILED 
 
NOV 1, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
2 
(1997-98), commonly known as Wisconsin's "three strikes" law. 
The statute provides for mandatory life imprisonment for 
offenders convicted of committing for a third time a statutorily 
specified "serious offense."  The statute in issue is silent 
about whether the offender may challenge the validity of a prior 
conviction at the enhanced sentence proceeding.  
¶3 
Two questions of law are presented in this case.2  The 
first is whether the U.S. Constitution requires that an offender 
be permitted during an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated 
on a prior conviction to challenge the prior conviction as 
unconstitutional because the conviction was allegedly based on a 
guilty plea that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
The circuit court concluded that it had the power to examine the 
validity of the prior conviction on these grounds but was not 
required to do so. 
¶4 
We conclude that an offender does not have a federal 
constitutional right to use the enhanced sentence proceeding 
predicated on a prior state conviction as the forum in which to 
challenge the prior conviction, except when the offender alleges 
that a violation of the constitutional right to a lawyer 
occurred in the prior state conviction.3  We further conclude, as 
                     
2 Both questions of law are determined by this court 
independently of the circuit court, although we benefit from the 
analyses of the circuit court. 
3 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees 
the assistance of counsel.  That amendment is made applicable to 
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
3 
a matter of judicial administration, that an offender may not 
use the enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on a prior 
conviction as the forum in which to challenge the prior 
conviction, except when the offender alleges that a violation of 
the constitutional right to a lawyer occurred in the prior state 
conviction.  Because the defendant in the present case does not 
allege that a violation of his constitutional right to a lawyer 
occurred in the prior conviction, he may not challenge his 1994 
conviction during this 1997 persistent repeater proceeding. 
¶5 
The second question of law presented is whether the 
persistent repeater penalty enhancer as applied to the defendant 
violates 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution 
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.  For the reasons set 
forth, we reject the defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to 
Wisconsin's 
persistent 
repeater 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m). 
 
I 
 
¶6 
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed.  In 
1997, the Winnebago County district attorney charged the 
defendant under Wis. Stat. § 948.02 with two counts of sexual 
assault on a child.  Because the defendant had two prior felony 
convictions for sexual assault on a child, he was subject to a 
life sentence without the possibility of parole under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m).  Both prior convictions were based on the 
defendant's guilty pleas, the first in 1990 and the second in 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
4 
1994.  During the 1997 persistent repeater proceeding, the 
defendant sought to reopen the 1994 conviction on the grounds 
that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because the circuit court failed to inform him that the 
conviction could serve as a "strike" offense under the "three 
strikes" law.  During the 1997 proceeding, the circuit court 
denied the defendant's motion to strike his 1994 conviction, 
holding that the circuit court's failure to inform the defendant 
during his 1994 guilty plea that the resulting conviction could 
later be used to sentence him as a persistent repeater did not 
render his guilty plea invalid. 
¶7 
The defendant pled guilty to the 1997 offenses and, on 
the basis of his prior convictions, was sentenced as a 
persistent repeater to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m).  The defendant appealed, 
arguing that the circuit court's denial of his motion to strike 
the 1994 conviction violated his due process rights and that his 
life 
sentence 
violated the 
Eighth 
Amendment's 
prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.  We address each issue in 
turn. 
 
II 
 
¶8 
The defendant contends that the circuit court erred by 
failing to strike the 1994 conviction because his guilty plea 
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and therefore did 
not satisfy federal constitutional due process requirements. The 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
5 
defendant relies on State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 485 N.W.2d 
237 (1992), in which the offender was permitted to challenge a 
prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated 
on the prior conviction on the ground that the guilty plea in 
the 
prior 
conviction 
was 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary. 
¶9 
The State argues that this court should revisit its 
holding in Baker in light of Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 
485 (1994), a U.S. Supreme Court decision rendered after the 
Baker decision.  The State contends that the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in Custis, in contrast to this court's holding in Baker, 
that only a prior conviction that violates an offender's 
constitutional right to a lawyer may be challenged during an 
enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on the prior conviction. 
¶10 We therefore examine State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 
and Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485. 
¶11 In Baker, the offender used the enhanced sentence 
proceeding in a conviction for operating after revocation of a 
license 
to 
challenge 
two 
prior 
operating-after-revocation 
convictions that the State sought to apply for sentencing 
enhancement purposes.  The offender challenged one of the 
convictions 
because 
the 
plea 
was 
allegedly 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 58.  The 
offender challenged the other conviction because the State 
allegedly 
obtained 
the 
conviction 
in 
violation 
of 
his 
constitutional right to a lawyer.  Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 58. 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
6 
¶12 The Baker court relied on Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 
109 (1967), and its progeny to allow the offender to challenge 
both convictions. 
¶13 Burgett 
had 
considered 
whether 
prior 
convictions 
rendered without the assistance of counsel could be used to 
enhance sentences for subsequent offenses.  The Burgett court 
disallowed the use of a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence 
proceeding predicated on the prior conviction when the prior 
conviction violated Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
The Burgett court declared that such a use of the prior 
conviction was inherently prejudicial, amounted to a new denial 
of the right to counsel, and should be prohibited.  Burgett, 389 
U.S. at 115-16. 
¶14 In Baker, this court was faced with the question of 
whether to extend the holding of Burgett to prior convictions 
allegedly obtained in violation of a constitutional right other 
than the Gideon right to a lawyer.  The case law was largely 
unsettled at that time, but a number of jurisdictions had 
applied the Burgett rule to a prior conviction allegedly 
obtained in violation of a constitutional right other than the 
right to a lawyer.4  The Baker court acknowledged, however, that 
"[s]ome courts have confined the application of Burgett to 
                     
4 For examples of jurisdictions that extended Burgett v. 
Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), to forbid the use of convictions 
obtained in violation of other constitutional rights, see Baker 
v. State, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 70 n.9, 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992). 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
7 
convictions invalid under Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963)]."5  Baker, 169 Wis.2d at 69.   
¶15 The Baker court determined that the decision in 
Burgett rested on the principle that a prior conviction may not 
be used in an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on a prior 
conviction if the prior conviction was allegedly obtained in 
violation of a constitutional right that would affect the 
reliability of the prior conviction.  Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 70. 
 The Baker court viewed the question of whether a guilty plea 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as one that affected the 
reliability of a conviction.  As a result, the Baker court 
concluded that federal constitutional law prohibited a circuit 
court from using a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence 
proceeding predicated on a prior conviction when the prior 
conviction was based on a guilty plea that was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 71. 
¶16 After Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the 
Burgett decision in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 
(1994).  In Custis, the offender asserted ineffective assistance 
of counsel as a challenge to the validity of a prior state 
conviction that was used in the offender's federal enhanced 
sentence proceeding under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act. 
The Armed Career Criminal Act is silent about the means for 
                     
5 For examples of jurisdictions that narrowly construed 
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), to include only alleged 
violations of the right to a lawyer, see Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 
69 n.8. 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
8 
challenging prior convictions.  The Custis court concluded that 
the U.S. Constitution does not require that an offender be given 
an opportunity to challenge a prior state conviction in a 
federal enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on the prior 
state 
conviction 
unless 
the 
offender 
asserts 
the 
state 
conviction 
was 
obtained 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
offender's 
constitutional right to a lawyer.  The Custis court thus 
expressly limited its holding in Burgett to instances in which 
an offender asserts the conviction was allegedly obtained in 
violation of an offender's constitutional right to a lawyer.  
Custis, 511 U.S. at 496.  Relying on long-established case law 
that a violation of the constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel is "a unique constitutional defect," the Custis court 
concluded that other constitutional violations do not merit the 
same treatment under Burgett.  Custis, 511 U.S. at 496.6 
                     
6 For other states interpreting Custis v. United States, 511 
U.S. 485 (1994), as we do, see Colorado v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601 
(Colo. 1995); Kansas v. Chiles, 917 P.2d 866 (Kan. 1996); 
McGuire v. Kentucky, 885 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1994); State v. Janes, 
684 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1996). 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
9 
¶17 The Custis court read the federal constitutional 
rights of an offender to challenge a prior state conviction in a 
federal enhanced sentence proceeding more narrowly than did the 
Wisconsin supreme court in Baker.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Baker should be limited to adhere to Custis: In an enhanced 
sentence proceeding predicated on a prior conviction, the U.S. 
Constitution requires a trial court to consider an offender's 
allegations that the prior conviction is invalid only when the 
challenge to the prior conviction is based on the denial of the 
offender's constitutional right to a lawyer. 
¶18 Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant in the 
present case has no federal constitutional right in his 1997 
third strike proceeding as a persistent repeater under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.62(2m) to challenge the use of a prior conviction 
                                                                  
Custis does not bar states from allowing offenders to 
challenge prior state convictions in state enhanced sentence 
proceedings.  New York courts, for example, continue to allow 
offenders 
charged 
as 
persistent 
repeaters 
to 
challenge 
unconstitutional 
prior 
state 
convictions 
in 
the 
repeater 
proceeding.  See, e.g., People v. Zeoli, 232 A.D.2d 818 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996) (trial court was required to hear offender's 
claim that prior plea was not knowing and intelligent, but the 
offender failed to meet his burden of proof).  However, these 
challenges have a statutory basis.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
400.21.7(b) (Consol. 2000) ("A previous conviction in this or 
any other jurisdiction which was obtained in violation of the 
rights of the defendant under the applicable provisions of the 
constitution of the United States must not be counted in 
determining whether the defendant has been subjected to a 
predicate felony conviction").  The defendant in the present 
case asserts no statutory basis for his challenge. 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
10
allegedly based on a guilty plea that was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.7 
¶19 The defendant argues that Custis is a forum case based 
on considerations of federalism and administrative convenience 
and that we should not alter our Baker decision.8  The defendant 
contends that Custis applies only to an enhanced sentence 
                     
7 In 
so 
holding, 
this 
court 
joins 
several 
other 
jurisdictions that have had to scale back Burgett v. Texas, 389 
U.S. 109, protections in light of Custis v. United States, 511 
U.S. 485 (1994).  See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 42 F.3d 
697, 701 (1st Cir. 1994) (prior case law about challenging prior 
convictions during enhanced sentence proceedings is no longer 
valid precedent after Custis); United States v. Killion, 30 F.3d 
844, 846 (7th Cir. 1994) (because Custis describes the rule 
governing a challenge to a prior conviction during an enhanced 
sentence proceeding in narrower terms than existing Seventh 
Circuit case law, "[i]t may well be, therefore, that Custis has 
limited the exception that we carved out"); United States v. 
Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994) (Custis "seriously 
undermines the validity" of existing case law allowing an 
offender to challenge a prior conviction during an enhanced 
sentence proceeding). 
8 See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 766, 
114 S.Ct. 1921, 1937 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The 
issue [in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485] was where, not 
whether, the defendant could attack a prior conviction for 
constitutional infirmity"). 
For discussions of Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 
(1994), and the contradictory aspects of the opinion regarding a 
substantive limitation on the challenge to a state conviction in 
a federal enhanced sentence proceeding and the forum and 
federalism issues in challenging a state conviction in a federal 
enhanced sentence proceeding, see, e.g., Alan C. Smith, Note, 
More Than a Question of Forum: The Use of Unconstitutional 
Convictions to Enhance Sentences Following Custis v. United 
States, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1323 (1995); Barry W. Strike, Note, 
Custis v. United States: Are Unconstitutional Prior Convictions 
Being Used to Increase Prison Terms?, 25 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 
267 (1995). 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
11
proceeding in a federal court in which a challenge is made to a 
prior state conviction.  Unlike Custis, the defendant argues, 
this case involves a challenge to a prior state conviction in a 
subsequent state enhanced sentence proceeding. 
¶20 In its final paragraph, the Custis court addressed 
whether an offender who was barred from challenging a prior 
state conviction in a federal enhanced sentence proceeding could 
challenge the predicate state conviction by another means.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
 
We recognize . . . that Custis, who was still "in 
custody" for purposes of his state convictions at the 
time of his federal sentencing under § 924(e), may 
attack his state sentences in Maryland or through 
federal habeas review. . . .  If Custis is successful 
in attacking these state sentences, he may then apply 
for reopening of any federal sentence enhanced by the 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
12
state sentences.  We express no opinion on the 
appropriate disposition of such an application.9 
                     
9 Custis, 511 U.S. at 497.  This language has been subject 
to conflicting interpretations by federal courts of appeals.  
See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 203 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(offender who was no longer in custody for state conviction 
never obtained ruling that state conviction was invalid; court 
allows challenge to a prior state conviction in federal court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Smith v. United States, 213 F.3d 291 
(6th Cir. 2000), rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated by 
213 F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 2000) (offender did not challenge state 
conviction in state court but claimed no reasonable access to 
review constitutionality of state convictions; court denied 
relief; result compelled by existing Sixth Circuit case law, 
Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 1999), in the 
absence of en banc review; en banc review granted); Pack v. 
Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Sixth Circuit 
rule that offender challenging prior state conviction must first 
have prior convictions vacated either through state proceedings 
or § 2254 proceeding and then return to challenge federal 
sentence before the sentencing court); Ryan v. United States, 
214 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2000) (offender failed to exhaust state 
remedies and lost them; court interprets Custis to disallow 
collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 "as long as convictions 
remain undisturbed"; divided court denied relief); United States 
v. Daniels, 195 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 1999) (court denied federal 
habeas review of state conviction in a § 2255 proceeding unless 
the offender who either has not challenged state conviction or 
was unsuccessful in the challenge raises a Gideon claim). 
The State has advised this court that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Daniels 
v. United States, No. 99-9136, ___ U.S. ___ (2000), to review 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Daniels, 195 
F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 1999).  The solicitor general stated the 
question presented on certiorari as follows: May a defendant 
whose sentence was enhanced under a federal recidivist provision 
because of prior state convictions that have not been set aside 
by any court challenge his federal enhanced sentence in federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on the claim that the prior 
state convictions are constitutionally invalid? 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
13
¶21 Thus the U.S. Supreme Court expressly left open the 
possibility that an offender may challenge a prior state 
conviction in a state court proceeding or in a federal habeas 
proceeding and then, if successful, apply to reopen his enhanced 
federal sentence.  Custis, 511 U.S. at 497.  The Custis decision 
does not appear to alter an offender's right to challenge in a 
state court an enhanced sentence based on an unconstitutional 
prior state conviction. 
¶22 The issue then becomes whether this court should, as a 
matter of judicial administration rather than as a matter of 
federal constitutional right, allow an offender to challenge a 
prior state conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding on 
grounds other than an alleged violation of the constitutional 
right to a lawyer, or whether this court should require an 
offender to use available procedures other than the enhanced 
sentence proceeding to challenge a prior conviction.  
¶23 The Custis court presents two justifications based on 
considerations of judicial administration and federalism to 
support its constitutional holding that in an enhanced sentence 
proceeding 
predicated 
on 
a 
prior 
conviction 
the 
U.S. 
                                                                  
The issue presented in the Daniels case relates to 
procedures available to an offender in federal court, other than 
in the enhanced sentence proceeding, to challenge a prior state 
conviction. 
 
The 
present 
case 
relates 
to 
an 
offender's 
challenges in a state enhanced sentence proceeding to a prior 
state conviction.  We do not consider Daniels so directly 
related to the present case to require us to withhold our 
decision pending the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Daniels. 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
14
Constitution requires a trial court to consider an offender's 
allegations that the prior conviction is invalid only when the 
challenge to the prior conviction is based on the denial of the 
offender's constitutional right to a lawyer.  Custis, 511 U.S. 
at 496-97. 
¶24 First, the Custis court states that it would be 
difficult for federal courts to review a multitude of potential 
constitutional violations in convictions from 50 different 
states.  While Burgett focused on the lack of a lawyer, which 
the U.S. Supreme Court viewed as readily apparent in the record 
of a conviction, extending Burgett to other constitutional 
violations such as ineffective assistance of counsel would 
require federal courts to "rummage through frequently non-
existent or difficult to obtain state-court transcripts or 
records that may date from another era."  Custis, 511 U.S. at 
496. 
¶25 Although this justification does have merit in the 
context of state court proceedings, it may not apply with equal 
force.  It is probably easier for a Wisconsin court to review a 
conviction entered by another Wisconsin court than for a federal 
court to review a state court conviction.  Nevertheless, we 
conclude that an offender should not be permitted to challenge a 
prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated 
on the prior conviction except for an alleged violation of the 
constitutional right to a lawyer.  Administrative difficulties 
arise when a Wisconsin circuit court reviews a prior conviction 
entered by another Wisconsin court; the reviewing court does not 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
15
have the record of the prior conviction or of post-conviction 
proceedings. 
 
In 
addition, 
it 
seems 
preferable 
from 
an 
administrative standpoint to require all offenders to use the 
same procedures to review convictions, irrespective of whether 
the conviction becomes the basis of an enhanced penalty in a 
subsequent sentencing procedure. 
¶26 Second, the Custis court justified its holding as 
promoting finality of judgments.  A broad reading of Burgett, 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, would "undermine confidence in 
the integrity of our procedures" by calling into question the 
finality 
of 
prior 
convictions 
and 
by 
delaying 
penalty 
enhancement proceedings.  Custis, 511 U.S. at 497 (quoting 
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11 (1979)).  The 
U.S. Supreme Court noted that by challenging a previous state 
court conviction, an offender is asking the federal district 
court to "deprive [the state-court judgment] of [its] normal 
force and effect in a proceeding that ha[s] an independent 
purpose other than to overturn the prior judgmen[t]."  Custis, 
511 U.S. at 497 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 
(1992)).  
¶27 The Custis court concerns about finality and delay, 
Custis, 511 U.S. at 497, carry weight in the state court 
context.  The process prescribed by Custis avoids delay in an 
enhanced sentence proceeding and prevents an offender from using 
the proceeding for a tangential purpose. 
¶28 Although these administrative considerations may weigh 
differently in different cases, we conclude that considerations 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
16
of judicial administration favor a bright-line rule that applies 
to all cases.  We therefore hold that a circuit court may not 
determine the validity of a prior conviction during an enhanced 
sentence proceeding predicated on the prior conviction unless 
the offender alleges that a violation of the constitutional 
right to a lawyer occurred in the prior conviction.  Instead, 
the offender may use whatever means available under state law to 
challenge the validity of a prior conviction on other grounds in 
a forum other than the enhanced sentence proceeding.  If 
successful, the offender may seek to reopen the enhanced 
sentence.10  If the offender has no means available under state 
law or is unsuccessful in challenging the prior conviction, the 
offender may nevertheless seek to reopen the enhanced sentence. 
We do not address the appropriate disposition of any such 
application. 
¶29 In sum, the primary holding of Custis, to which this 
court is bound as a matter of federal constitutional law, is 
that an offender does not have a federal constitutional right to 
use an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on a prior 
conviction as the forum in which to challenge the prior 
conviction except when the offender alleges that a violation of 
the constitutional right to a lawyer occurred in the prior 
                     
10 We do not address the validity of the 1994 conviction 
because the defendant's challenge to the 1994 conviction cannot 
be raised in the enhanced sentence proceeding that is the 
subject of this appeal.  The question of whether the defendant 
has means available under state law to challenge the 1994 
conviction in another proceeding is not before us. 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
17
conviction.  An offender may challenge the validity of a prior 
conviction on other grounds in a forum other than the enhanced 
sentence proceeding by whatever means available under state law. 
If the offender succeeds, the offender may seek to reopen a 
sentence imposed as a persistent repeater under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m) 
if 
that 
sentence 
was 
based 
on 
the 
vacated 
conviction.  Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant in this 
case does not have a federal constitutional right to use the 
1997 enhanced sentence proceeding that was predicated on the 
1994 state conviction as the forum in which to challenge the 
1994 conviction because the defendant did not assert that a 
violation of the constitutional right to a lawyer occurred in 
that prior conviction. 
 
III 
 
¶30 We also reject the defendant's Eighth Amendment cruel 
and unusual punishment challenge to his life sentence under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b).  A statute is presumed constitutional and 
will be held unconstitutional only if it appears so beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
 
The 
burden 
of 
establishing 
unconstitutionality of a statute is on the party attacking its 
constitutionality.  State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 762, 482 
N.W.2d 883 (1992). 
¶31 The defendant maintains that the gravity of his 
offense is not proportional to his punishment for several 
reasons: his sexual assault contact offenses are less serious 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
18
than sexual intercourse; he is 26 years old so life imprisonment 
for him amounts to a greater punishment than for an older 
person; and his sentence is disproportionate to the sentence for 
a more serious crime such as first-degree intentional homicide. 
¶32 Several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and this 
court compel the conclusion that the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m) to the defendant does not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
¶33 The first principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
established in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980), 
is 
that 
judgments 
about 
appropriate 
punishment 
require 
subjective line-drawing, which is "properly within the province 
of legislatures, not courts."  The Rummel court recognized the 
validity of a state's "interest, expressed in all recidivist 
statutes, in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by 
repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable 
of conforming to the norms of society as established by its 
criminal law. . . .  [T]he point at which a recidivist will be 
deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the 
amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society 
are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing 
jurisdiction."  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276, 284-85. 
¶34 The Wisconsin legislature has determined that sexual 
contact is a "serious felony" and that three or more violations 
of 
crimes 
classified 
as 
serious 
felonies 
merit 
lifetime 
imprisonment.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m).  Forty-seven states 
and the District of Columbia have enacted persistent repeater 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
19
statutes, 
many 
of 
which 
require 
life 
sentences 
upon 
an 
offender's third offense.  These persistent repeater statutes 
and the resulting sentences have withstood Eighth Amendment 
challenges.11 
¶35 The defendant asserts that application of Wisconsin's 
persistent repeater statute to his case imposes punishment 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.  The U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
decisions 
relating 
to 
the 
doctrine 
of 
disproportionate sentences in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence are 
not clear.12  Nevertheless, the defendant's claim must fail.  In 
Rummel, 445 U.S. 263, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a habitual 
offender's life sentence without parole based on three non-
violent property crimes involving a total of $229.11.  In 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without 
the possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
                     
11 See, e.g., United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199-
1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (upholding sentence under federal 
three strikes statute); McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 315-
17 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding life sentence without possibility 
of parole for habitual offender convicted of stealing beer from 
a delivery truck); People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025, 1030-35 
(Colo. 1994) (en banc) (upholding life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for selling small amounts of heroin, when 
all predicate offenses were non-violent); People v. Dunigan, 650 
N.E.2d 1026, 1031-32 (Ill. 1995) (upholding life sentence 
without parole based on third sexual assault conviction). 
12 See, e.g., Harvard Law Review Association, Supreme Court: 
1990 Term Leading Cases, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 245 (1991) (noting 
that "[t]he fractured Harmelin [v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 
(1991)] opinions may be difficult for lower courts to apply"). 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
20
¶36 The case law in Wisconsin reflects a similar pattern. 
 In State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423, 554 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 
1996), the court of appeals rejected an Eighth Amendment attack 
on Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b), the same statute the defendant is 
attacking.  In Lindsey, the offender violated the same statutory 
subsection that the defendant in the present case violated in 
two of his prior offenses.  In State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 
749, 777, 484 N.W.2d 883 (1992), this court rejected an Eighth 
Amendment attack on Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1987-88), which 
permitted a circuit court to sentence the offender to life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after approximately 35 
years for first-degree murder.  
¶37 On the basis of these cases and the circumstances of 
this case, we conclude that application of the persistent 
repeater statute to the defendant does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
¶38 For the reasons set forth we affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
99-0554-CR 
 
 
1