Case Title: People v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90678, 90693, 90706

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 90678, 90693, 90706 cons.-Agenda 1-November 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
DeANGELO JOHNSON, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLYDE COWLEY, Appellee.-THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JIMMIE 							PARKER, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.-Modified on denial of rehearing
January 26, 2004.
	
JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	These consolidated cases come before us in the wake of our
decision in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138-39 (2000), wherein a
unanimous court held that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial
misconduct and trial error had deprived the defendant of a
fundamentally fair trial and thus warranted reversal notwithstanding
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. In Blue, this court
recognized that a pervasive pattern of error, engendered in the main
by prosecutorial misconduct, had divested defendant of his right to a
fair, orderly, and impartial trial, a substantial right that inures to a
criminal defendant " 'whether guilty or innocent.' " Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 
at 138, quoting People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). In Blue,
where the trial was permeated by the presentation of emotionally
charged evidence, and the prosecutors "encouraged the jury to return
a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the
facts" (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), the members of this court, acting "as
guardians of constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal
justice system" (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), reversed and remanded for
a new trial. Disposition of the instant cases requires that we further
delineate the dimensions of Blue, applying the principles and standards
of review utilized in that case.
	Consolidated for purposes of appeal are the cases of People v.
Johnson, No. 90678, People v. Cowley, No. 90693, and People v.
Parker, No. 90706.
	Defendants Cowley and Parker were codefendants of Murray
Blue, and their trials involved the same prosecutors. Cowley's case
was severed from Blue's and the two were tried simultaneously, but
with separate juries. Parker's jury trial took place several months later.
Ultimately, Parker and Cowley were each convicted of first degree
murder and two counts of attempted murder. In addition, Cowley was
convicted of two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm and
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; Parker was
convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver.
	The appellate court reversed the convictions of both defendants,
relying upon our decision in Blue. In Cowley, the appellate court
noted the errors this court had identified in Blue, and the bases of this
court's disposition in that case, concluding, "Our supreme court
reviewed the exact record before us, and we are bound by its findings
of error." Cowley, 317 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842. The appellate court
"reverse[d] in accordance with" Blue. Parker, 317 Ill. App. 3d 845,
853. In Parker, the court similarly stated:
			"Because the supreme court reviewed a similar record and
found error as to identical evidence and similar tactics as
evidence[d] in this record, and found that Blue did not
receive a fair trial despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt,
we are bound by the findings of the supreme court that the
errors were so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial
process and of such magnitude that the accused here was
denied a fair trial. Accordingly, this defendant's convictions
should be reversed as he was denied a fair trial." Parker, 317
Ill. App. 3d at 850.
The records in Parker and Cowley are indeed similar to that of Blue;
they are not identical.
	Defendant Johnson was tried before a jury and convicted of first
degree murder and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm.
The appellate court reversed and remanded, stating:
			"The defendant claims he was the victim of prosecutorial
excess during his murder trial before a jury. He was. He was
inaccurately described at trial as a convicted narcotics
salesman and a convicted felon. In addition, his failure to
testify was argued by inference and his lawyer was referred
to as 'a professional criminal defense lawyer.'
			*** We conclude that serious trial errors, taken in
combination, were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d 666, 667-68.
The appellate court also concluded that it was not required to decide
whether any one error would result in reversal. Johnson, 317 Ill. App.
3d at 676-77. The court quoted from Blue: " 'Cumulatively, we find
that the errors created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to
defendant's case.' " Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 677, quoting Blue,
189 Ill. 2d  at 139.
	Thus, the common threads that bind these cases for purposes of
appeal are alleged patterns of prosecutorial misconduct and related
trial error, the utilization of cumulative-error analysis, and reliance
upon this court's opinion in Blue.
	The State raises multiple issues, only some of which are actually
germane to our disposition of these consolidated cases. Among these
are the following arguments. The State contends, "under due process
analysis there was no cumulative error that justified the reversal of
DeAngelo Johnson's convictions." With respect to defendants Cowley
and Parker, the State argues that the appellate court misapplied Blue,
as there was "no pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct" in
either case and the juries were called upon to return verdicts "based
on a dispassionate evaluation of the facts and the complex rules of
accountability rather than emotion and sympathy for the victim."
	Other issues raised by the State are, in the context of this appeal,
little more than requests for abstract pronouncements from this court.
For example, the State in oral argument requested that we declare the
plain error rule to be a standard of review rather than an exception to
the "waiver doctrine." The State also claims that "the closely balanced
evidence test applied to Supreme Court Rule 615(a)'s plain error
clause is *** confusing and unworkable, it creates an internal conflict
with Rule 615(a)'s harmless error clause, and should therefore be
abandoned and replaced by the test used in the federal system to
identify plain error." The State urges us to abrogate our longstanding
formulation of plain error analysis and adopt the "federal test," as set
forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 518, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). Application of the Olano
standard, the State submits, would result in reversal of the appellate
court's judgment in defendant Johnson's case.
	We have considered these issues; however, for reasons which will
become manifest in the course of our discussion, we decline to address
them, as they are not pertinent to our resolution of these cases.
Although the second prong of plain error analysis does figure in our
resolution of Cowley's and Parker's cases, the closely balanced
evidence component of plain error analysis is not a factor in our
disposition. Since defendants did not object to some of the claimed
errors in these cases, we begin with a discussion of basic principles of
plain error analysis.
	Illinois reviewing courts, faced with allegations of plain error,
examine, substantively, on a rudimentary level, the records before
them to determine if the claimed errors constitute "plain" and
"reversible" errors. People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995); People
v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 526 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially
concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).
	Our plain error rule is set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a),
which states as follows:
			"Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." 134
Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
Our prior decisions make clear that this court may invoke the plain
error rule to review alleged errors not properly preserved when (1) the
evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced or (2) the error is so
fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused is denied the
right to a fair trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process. People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45, 54
(2002), quoting People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2002);
People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335 (2000); People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 348 (2000). Absent reversible error, there can be no plain
error. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 348. "[T]o determine whether a
purported error is 'plain' requires a substantive look at it. But if, in the
end, the error is found not to rise to the level of a plain error as
contemplated by Rule 615(a), the procedural default must be
honored." Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17.
	Initially, we note that a pattern of intentional prosecutorial
misconduct may so seriously undermine the integrity of judicial
proceedings as to support reversal under the plain error doctrine. See
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 33 n.16, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 n.16,
105 S. Ct. 1038, 1055 n.16 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); People
v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 189 (2001) (Freeman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.). Indeed, concern over the
cumulative effect of errors that "created a pervasive pattern of unfair
prejudice," much of it attributable to misconduct of the prosecutors,
is what drove this court's analysis in Blue. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at
138-40. This court recognized in Blue the "synergistic effect" that
multiple errors of this kind can have in a trial. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 139.
See also People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 847, 952 P.2d 673, 699, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 682 (1998) (a unanimous California Supreme
Court, foregoing harmless error analysis, reversed a death penalty
conviction due to pervasive prosecutorial misconduct and trial errors
that, cumulatively, "created a negative synergistic effect, rendering the
degree of overall unfairness to defendant more than that flowing from
the sum of the individual errors").
	Blue represents an important step this court has taken to stem 
prosecutorial misconduct, a problem that courts across the country
have, for the most part, been unable or unwilling to control. See P.
Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The
Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 115,
115-18 (1999) ("Despite long-standing and widespread dissatisfaction,
there does not seem to be any substantial change in the perception of
the performance of prosecutors or courts. The volume of reported
appellate cases of misconduct in argument remains high; there are
frequent findings of improper argument, but only occasional reversals;
and the volume of scholarly criticism is, if anything, increasing"). To
suggest that the problem is proliferating is not to say that it is of
recent origin. Roscoe Pound commented on it over 70 years ago. R.
Pound, Criminal Justice in America 187 (1930); 1 J. App. Prac. &
Process, at 115. Over 50 years ago, Judge Jerome Frank of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on the same exasperating
issue:
			"This court has several times used vigorous language in
denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of
the United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said
that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of
helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to
prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For
otherwise it will be as if we declared in effect, 'Government
attorneys, without fear of reversal, may say just about what
they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the subject
are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of
"disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of their
victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing
displeasure. The deprecatory words we use in our opinions
on such occasions are purely ceremonial.' Government
counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to
win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic
verbal spanking. The practice of this court-recalling the bitter
tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters-breeds a
deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary." United
States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (1946).
See also Dardeen v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 205-06, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144, 173, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2484 (1986) (Blackman, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.), quoting Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d  at 661; 1 J. App. Prac. & Process, at 116.
	Members of this court have recently expressed concern over the
frequency with which this court is seeing instances of prosecutorial
misconduct:
			"Unfortunately, the kind of courtroom tactics which
occurred in this case does not appear to be an isolated
occurrence. This court recently cited the conduct of two
assistant State's Attorneys as lacking in maturity and
professionalism, once again in a Cook County courtroom
during a capital trial. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 142
(2000). The frequency with which this court is seeing such
behavior is not only alarming, but causes legitimate public
concerns regarding the fairness and integrity of these
proceedings." Moss, 205 Ill. 2d  at 191 (Freeman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride,
J.).
The Moss dissent also conveys a sense of exasperation with the
"helpless piety" that afflicts our judiciary. In Moss, our distinguished
colleagues in dissent observed that threats of reversal, and words of
condemnation and disapproval, have been less than effective in
curbing prosecutorial misconduct and are unlikely to achieve any
greater success in the future:
		"It is obvious to me that our admonishments-that such
behavior risks reversal-have not been heeded. ***
* * *
			*** [M]y colleagues' disposition of this issue will serve
only to embolden those who would engage in such highly
charged rhetoric and confuse the trial judges who have to
deal with it. This court cannot expect the trial judges to
vigorously guard against improper conduct if we ourselves
fail to address the problem with any consistency. ***
[N]otions of reform ring hollow when this court, faced with
conduct which requires reversal, fails to acknowledge it."
Moss, 205 Ill. 2d  at 191, 195-96 (Freeman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.).
	Within this milieu, and against the precedential backdrop of Blue,
we now turn our attention to the facts of these consolidated cases. We
begin with the cases of Blue's codefendants, Clyde Cowley and
Jimmie Parker.
	The tragic events of March 8, 1995, and the details of the
resulting trials have been set forth with specificity in this court's
opinion in Blue and the appellate court's opinions in Parker and
Cowley. We reiterate evidence common to Parker's and Cowley's
trials as necessary to provide a factual framework for our disposition.
	These cases involve two shootings at different times and different
locations: the shooting of Victor Young (the first shooting) and, later
the same day, the contemporaneous shooting of Officers Daniel
Doffyn and Milan Bubalo (the second shooting). The evidence
suggests that Young was shot because he sold drugs for a rival street
gang and, perhaps, because Blue believed Young had discussed Blue's
activities with the police. The officers were later shot as they tried to
apprehend Blue, Cowley and Parker as they fled from Blue's
apartment.
	Young testified that, on the day he was shot, he had exchanged
words with Blue, who was at the time visible in the first-floor window
of an apartment building on Maypole Street in Chicago. When Blue
produced a gun, Young began to run and was felled by gunshot
wounds to the hip or buttocks. From the ground, Young looked
behind him and saw Blue run out of the apartment building,
accompanied by Cowley and Parker. Parker was holding a weapon
and, at Blue's direction, also shot at Young. Blue then said, "Let's get
out of here. It's getting too hot." Young testified that he saw Blue,
Cowley and Parker run through a vacant lot. A few minutes later,
Young observed a black Lincoln Continental drive north on Kildare
Street. Young knew the car belonged to Blue.
	Blue, Cowley, and Parker fled to Blue's apartment at 750 North
Lorel Avenue, which is located across the street from Chicago's 15th
District police station. Because Blue had forgotten his keys, he had to
break the glass of his front window to gain entry. That resulted in a
neighbor's report of a burglary in progress.
	Officer Elois Jackson testified that she was at the 15th District
police station when she heard a report over her police radio of a
burglary in progress. Jackson told the dispatcher she could respond to
the call. She and several other police officers proceeded to the
apartment building across the street, the location given in the report.
	Officer Jackson testified that, as she approached the building, she
saw Officers Bubalo and Doffyn walking to the front of the building.
She entered a gangway at the south side of the building, leading
toward its rear. As she reached the far end of the gangway, she was
approached by two black males. One carried a gun with his hands
extended in front of him. The other male appeared to be unarmed.
Jackson keyed in her radio that she had an emergency, pointed her gun
at the men, and yelled at them to get on the ground.
	The unarmed man, later identified as Parker, raised his hands in
the air, but did not immediately go to the ground. The other man
turned and started to run away. Eventually, Parker followed Jackson's
command to get to the ground. As he did so, Jackson heard gunfire.
Jackson remained behind the wall of the gangway, with her gun
trained on Parker, until other officers arrived.
	Officer Bubalo testified that he and Officer Doffyn were in the
parking lot of the police station when they learned of the suspected
burglary across the street. They went to investigate the reported
burglary and saw broken glass on the ground from a window next to
the entrance of the building. Bubalo testified that he went inside the
building followed by Doffyn. Bubalo knocked on the front door of the
apartment with the broken window. He heard the sound of several feet
running to the back of the apartment and the sound of breaking glass.
	Officer Bubalo further testified that Doffyn ran down the steps
from the first-floor landing and out of the building. Bubalo followed
Doffyn as Doffyn ran from the front of the building to the rear,
through a gangway at the north side of the building. When Bubalo
entered the gangway, Doffyn was already rounding the far corner of
the gangway, into the back yard of the building. According to Bubalo,
Doffyn never drew his service weapon at any time.
	When Bubalo reached the backyard of the building, he saw
Doffyn struggling with a black male. Doffyn had the man, whom
Bubalo identified in court as Cowley, in a "bear hug" and Cowley was
trying to break free. Almost immediately, Bubalo heard several
gunshots fired in quick succession. Both Doffyn and Cowley fell to the
ground, with Doffyn lying face down on top of Cowley.
	Bubalo testified that, just as Doffyn and Cowley dropped, Bubalo
himself sustained a gunshot wound to his left hip. As he fell to the
ground, Bubalo saw Blue running toward him from "around the
corner." Blue fired a gun at Bubalo and Bubalo returned fire. Bubalo
fired a total of five shots; one struck Blue in the back of the head as
Blue ran past Bubalo. This shot caused Blue to fall face forward to the
ground, slightly behind Bubalo.
	After Blue fell, Bubalo radioed for help, disarmed Blue, and
crawled to the aid of Doffyn and Cowley. Bubalo underwent surgery
the next day for a total replacement of his left hip. Officer Doffyn died
from a gunshot wound to his head.
	Police officers searched the first-floor apartment with the broken
front window. They discovered that the window of the rear door to
the apartment had also been broken. Not knowing whether there were
other offenders inside, they entered and searched the apartment. No
one was inside. In the living room, they found several bags of
marijuana on a table and a jacket with .38-caliber bullets in its pocket.
In the bedroom, they found plastic bags containing rock cocaine and
folded tin packets containing heroin. Also in the bedroom were $5,385
in cash, a scale and a razor blade. An open box of nine-millimeter
cartridges lay on the bed. They did not see any mail, receipts, bills or
other papers connecting Cowley or Parker to the apartment. A
drinking glass on the living room table had Cowley's fingerprint on it.
	In addition to the foregoing evidence, each defendant gave a
statement that was ultimately admitted at his trial. Cowley gave both
an oral statement to a police officer, shortly after the shooting, and a
subsequent written statement to an assistant State's Attorney at the
hospital. Cowley told the assistant State's Attorney that on the
afternoon of March 8, 1995, Blue, Parker and Charlie "Chow Mein"
pulled up in Blue's Lincoln Continental and told Cowley they had to
take care of business with Puff, a rival drug dealer infringing on their
territory. Blue gave Cowley a loaded .38-caliber gun to protect
himself and "watch the others' backs." The four men then went to a
building at 4300 Maypole to wait for Puff and his workers. They
intended to kill Puff or one of his workers to teach them a lesson.
Before Puff or any of his workers arrived, Charlie left the building.
Shortly thereafter, Parker saw Charlie talking to Victor Young.
Young had sold drugs for Blue in the past, but at the time of the
incident was selling drugs for someone else and had been known to
"stick up" Blue's workers. Although Young did not work for Puff,
Blue said, "Let's shoot him," and started shooting. As Blue, Parker
and Cowley left the building to run to Blue's car, Parker also fired at
Young. Cowley still had the .38-caliber gun when they left the scene
of the first shooting.
	Cowley indicated that they drove down Lake Street fast because
they thought Puff's guys or the police would be looking for them.
Their intent was to "chill" at Blue's apartment and then continue the
plan to kill Puff or one of his workers. Blue let Parker and Cowley in
the back door of the apartment and told them he had to break the
front window because he had forgotten his keys. Blue and Parker
went to the bedroom to hide a couple of extra shotguns under the bed,
and Cowley went to the living room to drink a glass of soda pop.
Parker then reported that the police had arrived. Upon hearing this,
Blue stated, "We're all in this together!" Blue then grabbed the TEC-9
he had just used to shoot Young and followed Parker outside through
a window. Cowley, still armed with the .38-caliber weapon, followed
Parker and Blue out the window and into the alley. Cowley then heard
someone yell, "Police! Stop!" He turned around and ran into a police
officer who grabbed him. Blue began shooting and hit the officer and
Cowley. Both fell.
	Parker's written statement was consistent with the State's proof
as to the shooting of Young. The written statement also indicated that
Parker had placed shotguns under the bed in the bedroom of Blue's
apartment after the shooting of Young and had retrieved some beer
from the kitchen. Shortly thereafter, he informed Blue and Cowley
that the police had arrived. Parker also stated that, when police
knocked on the door, he wanted to grab a gun, but he did not have
enough time. When Blue said, "they were all in this," Parker knew
Blue meant they were not going to get caught and would shoot it out.
Cowley and Blue grabbed weapons and all three jumped out the
window together.
	Parker testified at trial, inter alia, that when police began to
arrive at the apartment, he had wanted to escape because he thought
Cowley and Blue would have a shoot-out with police. He did not
want to get caught, and lowered himself out of the window while Blue
and Cowley were still in the apartment. He then ran into the alley, but
turned around to head to the car. He had escaped from the apartment,
unarmed and ahead of his codefendants. Further, Parker testified he
was stopped by a police officer before the second shooting involving
Officers Doffyn and Bubalo.
	In both Parker's and Cowley's cases, the State utilized an exhibit
and evidence which, in Blue, this court held warranted reversal when
considered in conjunction with the prosecutors' improper closing
argument and testifying objections. More to the point, the prosecutors
obtained admission and display of Officer Doffyn's blood- and brain-splattered uniform, they presented the emotionally charged testimony
of Officer Doffyn's father, much of which was irrelevant and
obviously intended to appeal to the jury's emotions, and they
succeeded in compounding these errors by the introduction of
transparently inflammatory testimony that served only to highlight the
ceremonies and oath associated with Officer Doffyn's service and
duties as a police officer, matters irrelevant to defendants' guilt or
innocence.
	During each defendant's trial, the bloodied and brain-splattered
uniform of Daniel Doffyn was displayed on a life-size, headless
mannequin, which was later taken into the jury room during
deliberations. The uniform consisted of Doffyn's shirts, police jacket
and bulletproof vest. The clothing was torn as a result of medical
treatment rendered to Officer Doffyn.
	In Blue, this court found "the potential prejudice of the uniform
outweighed its probative value." Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 125. This court
observed: "[W]e perceive a coalescence of facts that tip the
evidentiary scale from items that are merely useful to those that are
aimed directly at the sympathies, or outrage, of the jury." Blue, 185 Ill. 2d  at 126. That pattern was to continue throughout Blue's trial,
and it is impossible not to notice it in the trials of Cowley and Parker
as well.
	In the trial of these cases, as in Blue, the testimony of Officer
Doffyn's father, Roger Doffyn, was presented by the State, ostensibly
for the purpose of identifying the victim as Daniel Doffyn and proving
that he was alive, and subsequently died, on the date of the crimes.
However, this court in Blue noted that the State had apparently
elicited a portion of Mr. Doffyn's testimony for another purpose:
			"[S]ome of the evidence admitted through Mr. Doffyn,
such as the age of his granddaughter, the number of years he
has been married to decedent's mother, and the living
arrangements of the Doffyn family, was not probative of
defendant's guilt or innocence. This evidence served only one
purpose, namely, to highlight the poignancy of the Doffyn
family's loss and to suggest to the jury that the family's pain
could be alleviated by a guilty verdict. Moreover, the
knowledge of these facts surely heightened the impact of the
State's emotional closing argument on the jury." Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 131.
	In the trial of these cases, as in Blue, the prosecutors presented
the testimony of Commander Joseph Delopez of the Chicago police
department. In Cowley's case, Delopez testified in person; in Parker's
trial, the testimony was offered by way of stipulation. Delopez was the
commander of the training division of the department. He was present
for the "star ceremony" when Daniel Doffyn took his oath of office as
a police officer. As part of Delopez's testimony, the oath of office
sworn by Officer Doffyn was read to the jury. The oath states:
			"I, Daniel Doffyn, having been appointed to the office of
police officer, do solemnly swear that I will support the
constitution of the United States and the constitution of the
State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties
of the office of such to the best of my abilities."
Delopez was also permitted to testify that Doffyn's police badge was
retired and is now displayed in the "honored star case" at Chicago
police department headquarters.
	This court in Blue held that the testimony was irrelevant to the
issue of guilt or innocence and speculated whether the evidence was
elicited "by design" to intensify the State's "nakedly prejudicial"
closing argument which followed. This court's comments in Blue
obviously apply to the instant cases as well.
	We find no meaningful differences between these three instances
of error identified in Blue and their occurrence and impact in the trials
of Cowley and Parker. Indeed, there was no difference at all in the
presentation of this evidence in Blue's and Cowley's cases, as the two
were tried simultaneously in the same courtroom.
	As the State notes, one kind of error identified in the evidentiary
portion of Blue's trial is not present in either Parker's or Cowley's
case. The juries in these cases were not exposed to the prosecutors'
"testifying objections" during the cross-examination of Etoya Nelson.
In a bit of wishful advocacy, the State suggests that this violation of
the advocate-witness rule was the "most egregious error" identified in
Blue.
	While the prosecutors' conduct in this respect was undoubtedly
unprofessional and improper, and certainly contributed to this court's
decision in Blue, the error does not bear the weight the State
attributes to it. The subject matter of Nelson's testimony was
relatively insignificant when considered in the context of Blue's trial.
The State had called her to establish Blue's purported hostility toward
police, and his belief that the police were pursuing him in the days
preceding the shootings. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 134. The
prosecutors' quibbling with the witness over minor points or collateral
issues during the course of that testimony was a factor in this court's
disposition in Blue, but it was hardly the "most egregious error" in
that case. Indeed, the predominant feature of this court's cumulative
error analysis in Blue concerned the prosecutors' relentless appeal to
the jurors' passions and emotions, culminating in a "nakedly
prejudicial" closing argument.
	We now consider the State's closing arguments in these cases,
and we begin with the State's closing argument in Parker's trial. There
is no mistaking that much of the argument was aimed at directly at the
sympathies of the jury or was intended to evoke outrage.
	Though the prosecutor did not explicitly ask the jury to send a
message of support to law enforcement, the jury could not have
missed the import of his argument, which was clear from the outset:
			"In March of 1995, Daniel Doffyn was a 40 years [sic] old
rookie police officer. And you have learned, ladies and
gentlemen, over the course of the last few days that on March
8, 1995, he was more than just a 40 year old rookie police
officer.
			You have learned, ladies and gentlemen, that he was a
hero. He risked his life in the backyard at 750 North Lorel as
did his partner, Milan Bubalo[,] to serve and to protect the
people who lived in the 15th District.
			And you have also learned, ladies and gentlemen, that in
March of 1995, this guy sitting right over here was a gun
tooting [sic], drug dealing cop killer. And while Dan
Doffyn's duty and oath was to serve and protect, Jimmie
Parker's duties was [sic] to maim, kill and destroy.
* * *
			And while Dan Doffyn was in the police station at the 15th
District with his shiny uniform on, what was then a clean blue
uniform shirt and a brand new leather jacket, as Dan Doffyn
talked with his partners Dan Doffyn clipped on the radio to
his jacket[,] and as Dan Doffyn talked to his sergeant and was
told about the days events, who to look out for, how better
to serve and protect the good people of the community, this
guy was talking about the problems he and his partners are
facing in business. About how he and Murray [Blue] and
Clyde [Cowley] and the rest didn't like getting ripped off."
The prosecutor's theme and emotional appeal continued as he
discussed the events immediately preceding the shooting of Officer
Doffyn:
		"Dan Doffyn is now struggling with Clyde Cowley as Milan
Bubalo told you. And Dan Doffyn was just doing his job.
And as he struggled with Dan, with Clyde, Dan Doffyn, who
looked like this when he was sworn in to be a police officer
for us, to serve us, and to protect us, later looked like this
with his head shaved at the Cook County Hospital where they
looked at that horrible gunshot wound to his skull. *** And
that shiny bright uniform is covered in blood and brain
matter.
			And a 40 year old hero falls to the ground. And within
hours he's dead."
	We must consider the foregoing remarks in conjunction with
others in the prosecutor's well-orchestrated argument-companion
comments which were clearly intended to do service to the same
theme and achieve the same end of arousing the jury's passion and
outrage. Although these isolated comments might otherwise occupy
the margins of proper argument as exhortations to fearlessly
administer justice, an overview of the prosecutor's argument reveals
their dichotomous presentation was likely calculated to avoid the
appearance of urging the jurors to use their verdict to send a message
of support to the police, a tactic that this court deemed improper in
Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 133. See People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390
(1972) ("What are you going to tell this community and what are you
going to tell 12,000 Chicago policemen?"); People v. Swets, 24 Ill. 2d 418, 423 (1962) (the prosecutor observed that a lot of people were
watching the case "and if [defendant] can get away with it there are a
lot of sharpies that will figure they can and they'll try it"); see also
People v. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 723, 731 (2001).
	Referring to Parker, Cowley and Blue explicitly, and unidentified
others implicitly, the prosecutor in this case stated:
			"[T]hey think they run this society. Ladies and gentlemen,
we are going to ask that you respond affirmatively that they
do not. We as a society do not have to live in their twisted
world. We do not have to accept their values. We don't have
to allow that to happen in our community. We don't have to
allow these guys blasting sawed off shotguns at other human
beings. We as a people can stand together and say, no, you're
not going to do it here. And if you do, you have the-you will
be held responsible for your actions.
			Consider what the defense is suggesting that you do.
Consider the message that they want you to send. That by
allowing him to escape responsibility for the actions that he
has placed in motion, think about what message would be
sent out to the streets. Hey, go ahead and get those sawed off
shotguns. Go ahead and plan those murders. Grab your best
Tec 9s, your best .38 and get them all over to the drug spots,
deal dope and go ahead and blast away.
			And when you blast away, go ahead and flee. Flee to
another location because there if a police officer responds and
gets killed, don't worry, just say, not me, had nothing to do
with it.
			Think about that message."
	To the extent that the concept of general deterrence is employed
in our criminal justice system, it is generally associated with
punishment and imposition of sentence. The broader problems of
crime in society should not be the focus of a jury considering the guilt
or innocence of an individual defendant, lest the remediation of
society's problems distract jurors from the awesome responsibility
with which they are charged. "At least in theory, it should be obvious
that any conviction ought to be summarily overturned if it turned out
the jurors thought their verdict was supposed to be a referendum on
whether their state ought to surrender to some heinous crime, or
whether they should convict in order to 'send a message' that the
crimes charged 'will not be tolerated in this state.' " J. Duane, What
Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them to
"Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 565, 569
(1995).
	We are aware that courts have, in the past, both sanctioned and
condemned prosecutors' exhortations to "send a message" that crime
in general will not be tolerated. See People v. Chavez, 265 Ill. App.
3d 451 (1994); People v. Batson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 157, 168 (1992)
(prosecutor could properly admonish the jury during closing argument
to " 'send a message to the community' that violent crime will not be
tolerated"); People v. Fluker, 318 Ill. App. 3d 193, 202-03 (2000)
("[T]he prosecutor [improperly] turned the jury's attention away from
the issues in an effort to turn the case into a referendum on attitudes
toward gangs"); People v. Herrero, 324 Ill. App. 3d 876, 888 (2001)
(improper for prosecutors to shift the focus of attention away from the
actual evidence in the case); People v. Martin, 29 Ill. App. 3d 825,
829 (1975) (" 'The prosecutor should refrain from argument which
would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence,
by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused
under the controlling law' ").
	In People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159 (1989), this court
condoned the prosecutor's incitement of the jury to do something
about crime on the streets:
		"Everybody hears about crime. Nobody does anything about
it. You have a unique opportunity to actually do something
about crime on your streets." Harris, 129 Ill. 2d  at 159.
However, the prosecutor in Harris concluded with specificity: " 'You
are the only ones that sit between this man, this ticking bomb, and that
door.' " Harris, 129 Ill. 2d  at 159. This court noted that the remarks
"were apparently intended to persuade the jurors to convict because
by convicting they would prevent both crime in general, and further
crime by this defendant. As such, they were proper." Harris, 129 Ill. 2d  at 159.
	To the extent that Harris and the cases cited therein stand for the
proposition that limited prosecutorial exhortations are proper where
it is made clear to the jury that its ability to effect general and specific
deterrence is dependent solely upon its careful consideration of the
specific facts and issues before it, we will not disavow the holding of
Harris. However, where, as here, the prosecutor blurs that distinction
by an extended and general denunciation of society's ills and, in effect,
challenges the jury to "send a message" by its verdict, he does more
than urge "the fearless administration of justice," he interjects matters
that have no real bearing upon the case at hand, and he seeks to incite
the jury to act out of undifferentiated passion and outrage, rather than
reason and deliberation. In that respect, the prosecutor's comments
were improper.
	Moreover, the exhortation to "send a message" was exacerbated
by the prosecutor's attempt to identify and merge his position, on
some irrelevant and ethereal level, with the jury, the society, and the
community:
			"We as a society do not have to live in their twisted world.
We do not have to accept their values. We don't have to
allow that to happen in our community. We don't have to
allow these guys blasting sawed off shotguns at other human
beings. We as a people can stand together ***."
We reiterate this portion of the prosecutor's argument in part to
underscore its similarity to an argument held improper in People v.
Thomas, 146 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1089 (1986), where the prosecutor
told the jury, " 'There's nobody here for the People, just you.' " The
appellate court in Thomas considered the remark plain error, holding
that it "was a perversion of the principle that a jury is composed of
nonpartisans who function under the presumption that a defendant is
innocent until proved otherwise." Thomas, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 1089.
Indeed, such arguments seek to engender an "us-versus-them"
mentality that is, as the Thomas court held, inconsistent with the
inherent principles of the criminal trial process.
	Moreover, the prosecutor twice utilized a metaphor in his
argument on accountability which likened defendant to an animal: "If
you run with the pack, you share the kill." Remarks referring to
defendant as an animal are improper. People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 139 (1987); see People v. Ivory, 333 Ill. App. 3d 505, 517
(2002) (the prosecutor stated that defendant was " 'just a wolf in
sheep's clothing' " and was " 'part of a pack of predators' "). The
prosecutor, near the conclusion of his argument, quoted the English
statesman Edmund Burke, stating, "All it takes for evil to thrive [is]
for good men and women to do nothing." The prosecutor immediately
followed up with the entreaty, "Ladies and gentlemen, we ask that you
do something today." Again, such tactics serve only to divert the
jury's attention from the more tangible issues to be considered. It is
improper to characterize a defendant as "evil"or to cast the decision
of the jury as a choice between "good and evil." People v. Hudson,
157 Ill. 2d 401, 457 (1993); see People v. Williams, 295 Ill. App. 3d
456, 467 (1998).
	The prosecutor also mischaracterized evidence and the applicable
law, and suggested that the defense was deceptive in its dealings with
the jurors.
	The prosecutor repeatedly stated that defendants had
"celebrated" by drinking beer upon their return to Blue's apartment
after the first shooting.
			"And think about who Jimmie Parker is at that moment.
Picture if you will, just twenty minutes earlier you have fired
a loaded sawedoff shotgun at an unarmed human being. What
do you do?
			Does it affect you? Does it bother you? It didn't bother
Jimmie. He goes into the kitchen, grabs a couple of bottles of
beer for him and his buddies and they have a few cold ones.
And he sits there and he watches a tape. That is cold
blooded.
* * *
			He drinks with Murray Blue. He celebrates shooting other
human beings with Murray Blue.
* * *
			They, as we had heard, they were having their beers. They
were celebrating and the sad part about it is most of us in
civilized society celebrate life.
			These guys were celebrating death. And you have to look
at the person inside and their actions to determine what they
actually meant that day. And I submit to you those actions
speak volumes about the soul of Jimmie Parker."
There was no evidence that Parker, by drinking beer after the first
shooting, was "celebrating death." This is simply another instance of
the prosecutor's tactic of attempting to stir outrage in the jury.
Moreover, evaluation of Parker's soul was not a matter for the jury's
consideration: the jury was charged with determining Parker's guilt or
innocence by applying the applicable law.
	At one point in his argument, when he was discussing the law of
accountability, the prosecutor incorrectly advised the jury that
Parker's state of mind was irrelevant to guilt or innocence, then, after
an objection was overruled, suggested that the defense was engaging
in deception or trying to confuse the jury.
			"[U]nder the law Jimmie Parker killed Dan Doffyn, too.
* * *
			That's the law that you told us under oath you would
uphold, you would enforce. Regardless of what was going
through Jimmie Parker's mind, when he jumped out that
window that afternoon on North Lorel, whatever was going
through his mind, that don't [sic] matter.
			MS. GROHS: Objection. That is not the law.
			THE COURT: Overruled. He may argue.
			[Assistant State's Attorney]: That's the law. They don't
want you to read the law."
Unless predicated on evidence that defense counsel behaved
unethically, it is improper for a prosecutor to accuse defense counsel
of attempting to create reasonable doubt by confusion,
misrepresentation, or deception. See People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 551 (2000); People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 541-42 (1992); see
also People v. Abadia, 328 Ill. App. 3d 669, 683 (2001).
	Later in rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again implied
(ironically) that the defense was interested in something other than a
result grounded on the applicable law.
			"Remember when we stepped up here and we were
selecting you folks as jurors. We were very brief in what [we]
wanted to know. We wanted to know ourselves based on
your answers to the questions that Judge Kelley posed to
you, whether or not you were good solid citizens and we
were confident that each of you were.
			You represent your community. And we are content with
each and every one of you. Secondly, we wanted to know if
you would follow the law. And that was it. That's all we
wanted to know. And we sat down.
			Now, defense counsel asked all sorts of other questions.
			MS. GROHS: Objection. We have the right to ask
questions. He makes it sound like we did something
improper.
			THE COURT: There is nothing improper about it. He can
argue. Go ahead."
Although the prosecutor did, immediately thereafter, acknowledge
that it was not improper to ask additional questions, the ambiguity of
the trial court's ruling on the objection may well have reinforced the
impression of defense deception left by the State's earlier comment.
	Although instances of identified error in the prosecutor's closing
argument at Parker's trial are already legion, we note, in conclusion,
two final examples of irrelevant argument obviously intended to
inflame the passions of jurors. In two instances, early in his closing
argument, the prosecutor made reference to a school's proximity to
the location where the defendants parked upon their return to Blue's
apartment.
			"You will notice, folks, that they didn't park out front
where the police station is. They parked right by a grammar
school.
* * *
			And with these guns on a school day with children in that
school, they walk these guns into that apartment."
The proximity of the school to Blue's apartment was irrelevant to any
issue properly before the jury.
	Finally, as in Blue, the prosecutor interjected references to
Officer Doffyn's family that, given their context, can only be
construed as strained attempts to invoke the jury's sympathy and thus
influence its decision.
			"You know what is even more sad, more pathetic[,] is the
Doffyn family has to live with the understanding that one of
the last persons to see their son alive is this guy.
			He peered out that window and saw a forty year old police
officer, who just left his family, family didn't even see him
last. He did."
The quoted remarks shed no light on the pertinent issues in this case.
They were not probative of defendant's guilt for the several crimes
with which he was charged. They are nothing more than thinly veiled,
emotion-laden appeals to the jury, meant to intensify improper
evidence previously introduced and to reinforce the poignancy of the
Doffyn family's loss. Such matters were irrelevant at that point in the
proceedings. The comments improperly shifted the focus of attention
away from the actual evidence in the case. See generally Herrero, 324
Ill. App. 3d at 888. They are the same kinds of remarks we held
improper in Blue. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 132-34.
	As in Blue, we see in this case cumulative error and a pervasive
pattern of unfair prejudice that denied defendant a fair trial and cast
doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 
at 139. We note that the prejudice in this case, as in Blue, was
engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct. As in Blue, the
coalescence of improper, emotion-laden evidence, and inflammatory
argument obviously designed to exploit that evidence, created a
synergism of parallel errors. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 134, 139. As in
Blue, a new trial is necessary in this case to preserve and protect the
integrity of the judicial process, as "the trial court allowed the guilty
verdict to rest on considerations other than the evidence alone." See
Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 138-40. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court in cause No. 90706.
	In passing, we note that our disposition would be the same had
we applied the Olano standard. Under Olano, a reviewing court can
correct an error not raised at trial, if there is "(1) 'error,' (2) that is
'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights.' [Citation.] If all three
conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion
to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error ' " 'seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.' " ' [Citation.]" Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,
466-67, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 727, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997),
quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 518, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). With regard to the two
critical factors in that test, we note that pervasive prosecutorial
misconduct which is designed to "encourage[ ] the jury to return a
verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the
facts" (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), adversely affects a defendant's
"substantial right" to a fair trial, and in our view certainly qualifies as
a structural " 'defect affecting the framework within which the trial
proceeds.' " See generally Johnson, 520 U.S.  at 468, 137 L. Ed. 2d 
at 728, 117 S. Ct.  at 1549, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 331, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
Moreover, with respect to the final Olano factor, pervasive
prosecutorial misconduct of the kind that contaminated the
proceedings in Blue and this case clearly undermines the
"trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process," affecting the
very "integrity of the judicial process" itself, as this court unanimously
acknowledged in Blue. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 138-39. In Blue, we held
those considerations warranted reversal irrespective of the state of the
evidence. The facts of this case dictate the same result.
	We now turn our attention to Clyde Cowley's case. Many of the
errors we have noticed in Blue's and Parker's trials occurred in
Cowley's trial as well. Therefore, our discussion of the legal principles
applicable thereto applies with equal force to disposition of the State's
appeal in cause No. 90693. Of course, Cowley was tried
simultaneously with Blue; therefore, with the exception of the
prosecutors' violation of the advocate-witness rule, the identical
evidentiary errors identified in Blue were also present in Cowley's
trial. Specifically, Cowley's trial was tainted by the display of Doffyn's
bloodstained, brain-splattered uniform and the irrelevant,
inflammatory portions of testimony given by Roger Doffyn and
Commander Joseph Delopez.
	There are also striking parallels in the prosecutors' closing
arguments in the three trials. The similarities are obvious from the
outset of the State's closing argument in Cowley's case.
			"Ladies and gentlemen, on March 8th, 1995, Daniel
Doffyn said good-bye to his daughter, Britanny, for the last
time. While she was in school, Daniel Doffyn put on his
uniform for the last time. He put on his badge for the last
time. He put on his gun and holster for the last time. He said
good-bye to his mom and his dad for the last time, and he
went to work. He went to work at the 15th District because
he was a Chicago Police Officer.
			He went to work with that oath that he took at that star
ceremony just a few months before where he promised that
he would uphold the laws of the State of Illinois and the
Constitution of the United States, and he went to the roll call
room for the last time, and he got his radio and put it in its
holster for the last time.
			And he went outside in the parking lot waiting for his
partner, about to begin his shift, and you know what
happened just a few minutes later, and you know why you
can't meet Dan Doffyn today."
	Later, the prosecutor used the same predatory metaphor we
found objectionable in his closing argument in Parker's case: "If you
run with the pack, you share in the kill, and he never broke from the
pack."
	The prosecutor included the same irrelevant reference to the
nearby grammar school. Referring to the location where Blue's car
was parked when the defendants returned to Blue's apartment after
the first shooting, the prosecutor stated, "It's parked down the way
right by the grammar school with the kids ready to get out."
	We see in the prosecutor's closing argument the same
exhortation to "send a message" to the community:
			"Consider, ladies and gentlemen, what the defense wants
you to do. Consider the message that they want you to send.
By not holding him responsible, consider what message that
would give this guy and all others like him.
* * *
			We do not as a civilized society have to live in this twisted
world that they attempt to drag us into. We do not have to
put up with it. We do not."
	Finally, as he did in Parker's closing argument, the prosecutor in
Cowley's case ended his argument by casting the jury's decision as a
choice between good and evil:
			"What they want, ladies and gentlemen, is for you folks,
good citizens of our community, to do nothing. To do
nothing. There was an English statesman by the name of
Edmund Burke, and one of the things he said was all it takes
for evil to thrive is for good men and women to do nothing.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not let evil thrive in this
community."
	We have discussed the legal principles applicable to comments of
this kind, and we need not reiterate them here. Suffice it to say that
these remarks are improper. Their prejudice is enhanced by the parallel
evidence the State adduced in this case. Although we acknowledge
that much of the middle portion of the State's argument was properly
based upon relevant evidence and represents a studied and laudable
discussion of principles of accountability, we believe that the
coalescence of the factors we have discussed in this opinion requires
a new trial and affirmance of the appellate court's judgment, as a
means of preserving the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, we
affirm the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 90693.
	We need not render a pro forma accounting of which errors were
properly preserved for purposes of appeal and which were not, as the
second prong of our plain error analysis clearly justifies affirmance of
the judgments of the appellate court in these cases. As the appellate
court held in each case, the evidence is sufficient to support retrial.
Therefore, there is no double jeopardy bar to new trials. See People
v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 110 (1998).
	Before turning our attention to DeAngelo Johnson's case, we feel
compelled to reiterate that prosecutorial misconduct, such as that
which permeated the trials of Blue, Parker, and Cowley, undermines
the very foundations of our criminal justice system. Our system of
justice requires that a defendant's guilt or innocence be determined
based upon relevant evidence and legal principles, upon the
application of reason and deliberation by a jury, not the expression of
misdirected emotion or outrage by a mob. Though perhaps not as
egregious as the prosecutors' misconduct in these cases, we are seeing
such behavior with an "alarming" frequency, which "causes legitimate
public concerns regarding the fairness and integrity" of criminal trials.
See Moss, 205 Ill. 2d  at 191 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.). Misconduct on the part of
prosecutors cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. To call it
"error" is to mischaracterize it, as it represents nothing less than an
attempt to subvert a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.
Multiple instances of this kind of conduct in the course of a criminal
trial threaten the trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process
(Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), and this court will take corrective action to
preserve the integrity of the process (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138). We
mean it as no hollow warning when we say that prosecutors risk
reversal of otherwise proper convictions when they engage in conduct
of this kind. See Moss, 205 Ill. 2d  at 179 (Freeman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.) ("Our past
'messages' appear to go unheeded as this case more than amply
demonstrates"); People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 435 (1999) (this
court sent "a clear message to both bench and bar" regarding a
defendant's due process rights in postconviction proceedings).
	We now consider the State's appeal in cause No. 90678, the case
of DeAngelo Johnson. In the appellate court, Johnson raised five
issues, claiming that he had been denied a fair trial by: (1) improper
evidence of his gang membership; (2) veiled evidence he had failed a
polygraph test; (3) evidence of his prior arrests and "convictions"; (4)
the prosecution's closing argument; and (5) his attorney's
ineffectiveness. The appellate court noted that Johnson had "failed to
raise the first three issues in a post-trial motion and did not
consistently object in a timely manner." Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at
668. Johnson attributed those omissions to ineffective assistance of
counsel. The appellate court did not address Johnson's contention of
ineffective assistance, as it determined that the failure to preserve the
issues implicated the plain error rule. Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at
668-69. The appellate court then considered Johnson's first four
issues and ultimately concluded that the third and fourth issues were
meritorious and, " '[c]umulatively,' " those errors " 'created a
pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice,' " warranting reversal of
Johnson's convictions. Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 677, quoting
Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 139.
	We begin with a recitation of the facts we consider pertinent to
our resolution. On August 23, 1996, two young men wearing black
sweatshirts fired gunshots into a group of people gathered near a bar
on Chicago's west side. Four persons were hit by bullets; Gary
Thomas died as a result of his gunshot wounds. Johnson and Bernard
Williams were ultimately indicted for first degree murder, attempted
first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, armed
violence, and aggravated battery. On November 10, 1998, a jury
found Johnson guilty of first degree murder and three counts of
aggravated discharge of a firearm.
 	Prior to trial, Johnson filed a motion to suppress his confession.
At the hearing on that motion, Dr. Dawna Gutzmann, a staff
psychiatrist at Forensic Clinical Services for the Circuit Court,
testified that, in her opinion, Johnson was mildly retarded and
cognitively impaired. She believed Johnson, who was 17 years old at
the time of the offense, was not capable of knowingly and intelligently
waiving his Miranda rights. Dr. Daniel Hardy, a psychiatrist hired by
defense counsel, agreed with Dr. Gutzmann's diagnosis and
conclusions.
	Dr. Stafford Henry, Gutmann's colleague at Forensic Legal
Services, testified to a diametrically opposed conclusion. Henry
believed that Johnson's apparent limitations in understanding were
deceptive and self-serving, that he had normal intelligence with no
gross cognitive impairment, and that he was capable of understanding
and waiving Miranda rights. Assistant State's Attorney Susan Zeigler,
who interviewed Johnson and prepared his written statement, testified
to the measures she took to ensure Johnson's understanding of his
rights. She indicated that Johnson was able to read a preprinted form
setting forth his constitutional rights. She also explained those rights
to him. Her testimony does suggest that Johnson's reading ability was
somewhat limited and he required additional explanation as to some
aspects of his Miranda rights. After she took Johnson's statement, she
went over it with him and there were additions and corrections made
to the statement. Johnson then signed each page of the statement.
	Johnson testified that Detective Kristen Kato beat him during
interrogation. Kato promised to let him go if he took and passed a
polygraph test. Detective Kato testified that he never abused Johnson
and the polygraph examination was Johnson's idea.
	The circuit court found the State's witnesses more credible and
denied Johnson's motion to suppress. Thereafter, Johnson and
Bernard Williams were tried in simultaneous, but severed,
proceedings.
	Prior to trial, defense counsel made a motion in limine,
requesting "that there be no questions asked concerning [Johnson's]
prior arrest or convictions." The trial court responded:
			"Appellate courts have repeatedly held that prior contact
with the police department[ ] and whether or not the person
had previously been read and advised of his constitutional
rights in an arrest situation were highly relevant to whether
or not this person understood his Miranda rights."
Although the court's comments indicated its intent to allow
questioning as to Johnson's prior experience with the criminal justice
system, the court never explicitly so ruled. Thus, the prosecutor
sought to clarify the court's ruling:
			"[J]ust so I am clear, those are factors that go to whether
or not, whether he knowingly, intelligently waived the
Miranda rights. If [defense counsel] is going to call an expert
to say that this defendant cannot knowingly, intelligently
waive his Miranda warnings, those are areas that I can
explore, it's something that [Dr. Gutzmann] considered or
not [sic] considered. *** But I should be allowed to question
with regard to the issue."
Immediately thereafter, defense counsel interjected that he understood
the court's ruling and he directed the court's attention to another
motion. Thus, the breadth of the court's ruling was not clearly
established. It does not appear that the court balanced the prejudicial
impact of such evidence against its probative value.
	 Also prior to trial, the prosecutor made a motion in limine to
allow evidence of Johnson's gang affiliation. The trial court
provisionally indicated it would not allow the evidence, but noted it
would revisit the issue during trial if warranted.
	At trial, the State presented the eyewitness testimony of Martin
Nash. Nash was a member of the Dog Pound street gang, as was the
target of the shooting, Eric Smith, also known as "Puff." Nash
testified that he, Puff, Gary Thomas, and Irving Young were standing
on the street when Puff advised them of the approach of two men,
stating, "Man, look, here come those mother fucker niggers; man,
mother fucker travelers." When the prosecutor asked Nash what
Smith meant, defense counsel objected.
	In a sidebar conference, the prosecutor explained his view of the
motive for the shooting:
		"The Dog Pound is trying to recruit a couple of Traveling
Vice Lords to sell drugs for the Dog Pound. The Dog Pound
is a renegade street gang comprised of many different street
gangs, most of whom are Vice Lords. He [Smith] tries to
recruit two people to come to his gang to sell drugs for him.
There may have been a previous altercation, but the
retaliation by the Traveling Vice Lords is to get Puff, the
leader of the Dog Pound. It is clear it is a gang motive. It is
a gang retaliation."
	The court overruled the objection: "I will allow the State to
continue this line of inquire [sic] on the basis that the statement
apparently indicates the reason for their going after Puff. And that
being so, if Puff is a member of a different gang as related by this
person who knows Puff, I would allow it."
	When testimony resumed, Nash stated that he understood Puff's
comment to mean that members of the Traveling Vice Lords street
gang were approaching. Nash said he looked up and saw two persons
walking toward him. They were wearing black hoods, black
sweatshirts and black leather gloves. Nash identified the two men as
Johnson and codefendant Bernard Williams. Nash stated that Johnson
and Williams came to within 20 feet of him when they produced
weapons and opened fire. Nash and those with him fled. Thomas was
felled by the gunfire.
	Nash later spoke with officers at Cook County Hospital and told
them he would recognize the shooters if he saw them again. He
indicated that Puff would probably know who they were because they
were members of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang. Nash testified
that officers later showed him a photo array, and he identified both
Johnson and Williams. He subsequently picked them out of a lineup
at the police station. The jury was apprised that Nash was serving a
four-year narcotics sentence at the time of the trial, and he had been
previously convicted of burglary.
	Detective Kriston Kato testified that he was assigned to the
investigation of this case. On September 2, 1996, Kato and his partner
located and spoke to Puff. Thereafter, they began looking for
Williams. They obtained a photograph of Williams and showed Nash
a photo array that included the Williams photo. Nash identified
Williams as one of the shooters. Kato testified that, contrary to Nash's
testimony, Nash had identified only Williams, as there had been no
photograph of Johnson in the photo array. Kato eventually located
Williams driving a car in which Johnson and Shawn Harris were
passengers. All three men were taken to Area Four headquarters.
Williams initially claimed that Harris and Johnson could provide him
an alibi. After the police interviewed Harris, Johnson became a
suspect.
	Prior to questioning, Johnson was advised of his constitutional
rights. He indicated he understood and agreed to speak with the
officers. Johnson denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, the
shooting, stating he had been in Evanston at the time. When he was
confronted with information obtained from Williams and Harris,
Johnson said they were lying. When the officers asked Johnson about
his alibi, he was unable to provide any specific information about his
whereabouts in Evanston. Kato told Johnson they would conduct a
lineup after Kato had located a witness. Johnson agreed to participate
in a lineup in order to prove that Williams and Harris were lying. Both
Williams and Johnson participated in the lineup, and Nash identified
them as the shooters.
	After the lineup, Johnson was again advised of his rights and
agreed to speak with the officers. Kato testified that Johnson
continued to deny involvement in the shooting even after the officers
advised him he had been identified in the lineup. Kato then confronted
Johnson with additional information obtained from Williams.
According to Kato, Johnson asked to be interviewed by another
investigator at Chicago police headquarters at State and 11th Streets
and suggested that Williams submit to an interview by the same
investigator. Kato scheduled the interview for Johnson and then asked
Williams if he wanted to participate. Williams eventually declined.
	When Johnson was returned from "the interview," he was again
advised of his rights and was "confronted with the results *** of his
interview downtown." According to Kato, Johnson then agreed to tell
the truth. He admitted that his real name was DeAngelo Johnson, not
Donald Ware, as he had led the officers to believe. According to Kato,
Johnson said he and Williams had shot at the members of the Dog
Pound because they had been harassing and shooting at Williams. The
primary target was Puff. The conflict between Williams and Puff was
the result of Williams' refusal to sell drugs for Puff. Johnson
acknowledged his membership in the Traveling Vice Lords street
gang.
	According to Kato, Johnson then gave a statement regarding the
shooting. Johnson said he was driving Williams' car when they
observed Puff and the other Dog Pound members standing in front of
a liquor store. Johnson said he and Williams then went to a friend's
house and obtained two nine-millimeter handguns, two black hooded
sweatshirts and two pairs of gloves. Thereafter, they returned to the
liquor store, parked nearby, got out of the car, and approached Puff
and the other Dog Pound members. They fired at Puff and "Elroy"
from a distance of 15 to 20 feet, and then fled on foot. Johnson said
he threw his gun in the park on his way home. He and Williams later
burned the sweatshirts and gloves. Kato testified that he had advised
Johnson of his rights on three separate occasions, and Johnson had
never asked him to explain or clarify those rights.
	Assistant State's Attorney Zeigler offered testimony substantially
similar to that she had given at Johnson's suppression hearing.
Initially, she advised Johnson of his rights, and he indicated he
understood. She then spoke with him about the murder of Gary
Thomas. After a 30-minute conversation, Johnson agreed to give a
handwritten statement. Prior to the preparation of this statement,
Zeigler spoke with Johnson outside the presence of Detective Kato to
determine how Johnson had been treated by the police. Johnson said
he had been treated well and had no complaints.
	Kato then returned to the room and Zeigler wrote out Johnson's
statement. Zeigler asked Johnson to demonstrate his ability to read
and write. She had him read aloud the preprinted rights form and the
first paragraph of the handwritten statement. After Johnson read the
form, Zeigler had him sign the waiver. At one point, Johnson sounded
out the word "constitutional," and Zeigler asked him if he understood
what the word meant. Johnson said he did not. Zeigler explained that
the term referred to the rights they had just read, and Johnson then
indicated he understood. After the statement was finished, Zeigler
went over the statement with Johnson word for word and gave him
the opportunity to make additions or corrections, which he did.
Thereafter, Johnson signed each page of the statement. Zeigler read
the statement to the jury:
		"DeAngelo and Bernard were in a car when they saw [Eric
Smith,] Puff. When they saw Puff he was with three of his
friends[,] one was Elroy. When they saw Puff they decided to
go and get guns to teach him a lesson to leave DeAngelo and
Bernard alone. Puff was the leader of a gang called the Dog
Pound. When DeAngelo and Bernard wouldn't sell drugs for
Puff he threatened them. On Aug 21, 1996 Puff shot
Bernard's house up meaning they [sic] fired 15 shots into
Bernard's house. So on Aug 23, 1996 when Bernard and
DeAngelo saw Puff they decided to teach Puff a lesson."
	The State presented evidence that nine-millimeter cartridge
casings were recovered from the scene of the shooting. Two bullets
were recovered and examined, and they too were from a nine-millimeter weapon.
	The defense presented two witnesses: Dr. Dawna Gutzmann and
Cordelia Parker, Johnson's eighth-grade special education teacher.
Both witnesses testified that Johnson had low intelligence and limited
reading and comprehension skills.
	Parker testified that, when the 1992 school year began, Johnson
was reading out of a third-grade reading book; however, she believed
he had advanced to a fourth-grade reader by the end of the year. He
passed a modified constitution test and graduated from elementary
school pursuant to a Chicago Board of Education policy that required
the promotion to high school of all students over 15 years of age.
Parker acknowledged that her report on Johnson indicated that his
ability to express himself verbally was adequate.
	Gutzmann testified she was appointed to interview Johnson and
did so on separate occasions. The purpose of her initial examination
was to form and render an opinion regarding Johnson's ability to
comprehend Miranda warnings and waive his constitutional rights.
She first advised Johnson that what he said was not confidential and
what he said could later be brought out in court. Gutzmann said she
discovered that Johnson had not understood her initial explanation.
After she repeated it several times, Johnson indicated he understood.
	In her first interview with Johnson, Gutzmann questioned
Johnson about the meaning of key concepts regarding Miranda
warnings. Johnson told her he had never signed a statement prior to
the one at issue in this case. Gutzmann reviewed some pertinent
psychological reports and learned that Johnson had a score of 57 on
a verbal subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Test. She noted that a
complete IQ test involves more than just the verbal test.
	Based upon her initial interview, Gutzmann made a provisional
diagnosis of major depressive disorder and mild mental retardation.
She noted that a firm diagnosis would require additional information
regarding Johnson's adaptive functioning and a full IQ test. After her
initial meeting with Johnson, it was her impression that he had
dependent features to his personality which were manifest in a
tendency to be deferential. Johnson seemed to have low self-esteem,
and he appeared to be easily influenced by her authoritative position.
	In her second examination of Johnson, Gutzmann tried to obtain
more information about a prior arrest and Johnson's recollection of it.
With respect thereto, Johnson said he could not recall having been
given Miranda warnings.
	In her first and third examinations of Johnson, Gutzmann
discussed with him the statement he had given in this case. She
reviewed with Johnson the typewritten portion of the statement that
set forth Miranda warnings. With the exception of the phrase "I
understand that I have the right to talk to a lawyer," Johnson indicated
he either did not understand, or could not explain, the preprinted
rights. When Gutzmann asked Johnson about the meaning of various
words of the Miranda warnings, taken out of context, he appeared
confused. For example, when asked the meaning of the word "right,"
he responded, "like on paper." When asked about the word "present,"
he took it to mean a gift. When asked, "What does question mean?"
he responded, "Somebody telling you something." He did associate
"court" with courtroom and "lawyer" with a person who could defend
him in court.
	Gutzmann asked Johnson to read a part of the handwritten
statement. According to Gutzmann, he read the simpler, shorter words
and skipped the longer, more complex words. Gutzmann rendered her
opinion that Johnson was not capable of reading all the words in the
statement. Gutzmann believed that Johnson was not malingering.
	By the time of the third interview, Gutzmann had Johnson's
school records from 1991. Johnson had attended classes for children
with learning and behavioral disabilities. At that time, defendant was
reading at a fourth-grade level. The school records revealed that
Johnson last attended school in June of 1993, but Gutzmann did not
have test results for that time period when she did her initial
evaluations. Gutzman stated that it is commonly believed a sixth-grade
reading level is required to understand Miranda warnings. She
acknowledged that IQ is only one factor to consider in determining
whether a person is capable of waiving his or her rights. Gutzmann
acknowledged that a mentally retarded person who has had experience
in the judicial system might have gained pertinent knowledge from
that experience. However, it was Gutzmann's opinion that Johnson
was not capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his
constitutional rights. She also believed he was more susceptible to
suggestion than the average person.
	Gutzmann conceded that defense counsel had provided her with
records indicating Johnson's full-scale IQ might have been as high as
80 at some point. She stated she had received that information after
she had rendered her initial opinion, but it had not changed her
opinion. After she had received Johnson's full-scale IQ scores, she did
change her opinion regarding Johnson's overall intellectual capacity,
concluding that he was not mentally retarded. Gutzmann also admitted
she had belatedly received a computer printout indicating that
Johnson's reading level was 6.7, or the sixth grade, seventh month,
but she said the way he read to her was not consistent with the sixth-grade assessment. Other records she subsequently obtained where
consistent with her assessment of fourth-grade reading skills.
Gutzmann said she was aware that defendant had been previously
arrested and she assumed he had been read the Miranda warnings.
She had taken that information into account in rendering her opinion
that Johnson had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
constitutional rights.
	Gutzmann's testimony on cross-examination revealed that
Johnson had not been entirely forthcoming in the information he had
provided her. Although he told her he had never had a job, she knew
he had actually had two different jobs. Though he told her he had only
been arrested once, she later learned he had been arrested more than
once.
	Gutzmann stated she would find it relevant if she had known that
Johnson had been given Miranda warnings on three separate
occasions, but it would not change her opinion because she believed
a person's familiarity with the criminal justice system does not
necessarily guarantee that he understands his rights. Gutzmann noted
that it is the experience of giving up rights and actually suffering
consequences as a result thereof that causes people to comprehend the
significance of those rights. She knew Johnson had been arrested
before, and she assumed he had been read Miranda warnings, but she
did not have any specific information to that effect.
	Toward the latter stages of the prosecutor's cross-examination
of Gutzmann, he asked whether Gutzmann had "taken into account
the defendant's background that he had actually been convicted of
two separate crimes in 1994." Defense counsel requested a sidebar.
The trial court denied the request for a sidebar and sustained "the
objection." A short time later, the prosecutor asked, "Would you
consider it relevant if the defendant had previously spent time in the
Department of Corrections?" An objection was overruled, and the
witness responded, "Well, its relevant but I wouldn't know what to
make of it." The prosecutor continued, "And it's relevant because
people who are housed in the Department of Corrections often talk
about their cases, don't they?" Defense counsel objected that the
question called for speculation. The court sustained the objection.
	On redirect examination, defense counsel asked Gutzmann about
defendant's previous charges: "Now you heard [the prosecutor] talk
about Miranda warnings having been given in the past to Mr.
DeAngelo Johnson. Had Mr. DeAngelo Johnson ever been charged
with murder before in the past?" Gutzmann responded that he had not.
	On re-cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Gutzmann first
about the nature of Johnson's prior charges, then about his prior
"convictions," and finally whether Johnson had been represented by
counsel during those proceedings:
			"Q. He was arrested in 1994 on two separate occasions for
selling narcotics?
			A. Okay.
			Q. He was convicted on both of those charges?
			A. Okay.
			Q. Before being convicted on any of those charges, he was
sent to court and had a lawyer appointed for him?
			A. All right.
			Q. He had a lawyer represent him throughout the first
charge of selling narcotics?"
	Before Dr. Gutzman could answer, defense counsel objected. The
court said, "I don't know if the witness will be able to answer that. It
would be hearsay." The prosecutor continued: "You are aware that
the defendant spent time in custody on those crimes?" The court then
sustained a defense objection to the relevance of that line of
questioning.
	The State presented the testimony of Dr. Stafford Henry to rebut
Dr. Gutzmann's testimony. Henry said when he tried to ask Johnson
about his Miranda rights, Johnson repeatedly stated,"I don't know,"
or "I can't catch on." Johnson told Henry that this case was his first
contact with the criminal justice system. Henry informed Johnson he
was aware of Johnson's criminal history. Based on that occurrence
and other information, Henry stated his opinion that Johnson was
being "untruthful." Henry testified that Johnson's responses regarding
the circumstances of his arrest indicated that he was thinking clearly
on the day he was arrested. Johnson appeared to be of average
intelligence. It was Henry's opinion that Johnson understood and was
able to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda
rights.
	In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed Detective
Kato's testimony and the events leading up to Johnson's custodial
statement:
			"[Johnson] knows they are on to him. He knows they
are-it's starting to stack up against him. One last chance. Let
me go downtown. I'll show you. When he bombs that and he
comes back in, he's confronted with the results of his
interview downtown, he knows it's over."
Defense counsel did not object to this argument. Again speaking of
Johnson's statement, the prosecutor made the following comments:
			"There is absolutely no evidence before you to attack the
validity of [Johnson's inculpatory] statement. Nothing. It is
uncontested. An attorney can stand before you and argue all
he wants about what he wishes the statement to say or what
it doesn't say. But you know what? There is no evidence to
contradict the validity of the statement. None."
	Later, referring to Johnson, the prosecution returned to the same
theme:
			"You know, how dare this guy complain about his rights?
What about the rights of Mr. Thomas? Never mentioned
anything about those rights. Unfortunately for Gary Thomas,
this guy and his partner over here, Bernard Williams, were his
judge, his jury, and his executioner. Now this guy, without
presenting any evidence, wants to complain through his
lawyer standing at a podium about his rights."
	Defense counsel objected, and the court instructed the jury, "The
defendant does not have to take the stand in his own defense." The
judge did not rule on the defense objection, and he did not instruct the
jury to disregard the statement. The prosecutor then stated: "You
know, it never ends. They have no defense."
	The prosecutor also commented on the manner in which defense
counsel conducted the cross-examination of State witness Martin
Nash.
			"[D]o you think that was easy for Martin Nash to be
pulled up here from the Department of Corrections and be
asked questions by a bunch of lawyers only to have a
professional criminal defense lawyer hired to represent one of
the two people who almost killed you get up there and
ridicule you and belittle you and then stand before a jury and
call him a buffoon and a clown. Then we wonder why people
don't come forward."
	We begin our analysis by examining the admissibility of evidence
concerning gang affiliation. The circuit court's evidentiary rulings with
respect to gang-related evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 232 (2001); People v. Gonzalez,
142 Ill. 2d 481, 489-90 (1991). Such evidence may be admitted so
long as it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d  at 232; People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 118 (1994). Evidence
of gang membership is admissible only when there is sufficient proof
that membership is related to the crime charged. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990). Evidence of gang affiliation is relevant if it tends
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d  at 232-33.
	Although we see no overt indication in the record that the circuit
court actually considered whether the probative value of this evidence
substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, we find that it does.
First, as to relevance, Detective Kato testified regarding Johnson's
initial oral statement and stated that Johnson had referred to the
dispute as one involving gang rivalry. Johnson had identified himself
as a member of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang and had referred
to Puff and "the Dog Pound" as the instigators of the prior incident of
violence. Second, we believe the potential for prejudice was minimal
in this instance. In fact, it would seem that evidence of the rival gang
affiliations of Johnson and Nash would as likely work to Johnson's
benefit as his detriment, as this court's recent decision in People v.
Blue, 205 Ill. 2d 1 (2001), demonstrates. In Blue, this court held that
the trial court had erred in precluding defense counsel from
cross-examining State's witnesses regarding their gang affiliation, and
found that error was not harmless. This court acknowledged the
obvious: there is a clear motive to lie when witnesses identifying a
defendant are members of a rival gang. Blue, 205 Ill. 2d  at 15.
Therefore, while the gang affiliations provided a motive for the
shooting, they also provided a motive for Nash to lie about Johnson's
involvement. Thus, we find that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed its prejudicial impact, and its admission was not error.
	Moreover, we find no error in the admission of Kato's testimony
regarding Johnson's "interview" at Chicago police headquarters and
Kato's confrontation of Johnson with the "results of his interview
downtown." In closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury
that Johnson had asked to "go downtown" to "show" the officers. The
prosecutor observed, "[H]e bombs that and he comes back in, he's
confronted with the results of his interview downtown."
	After considering our precedents on this point, we cannot say
that the testimony adduced at trial clearly signaled the jury that
Johnson had taken and failed a polygraph. In People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 497 (1998), this court held that testimony from a witness,
that an unspecified appointment had been made for defendant with "a
technician," was sufficiently vague and would not have led the jurors
to any improper speculation that defendant had been scheduled to take
a polygraph examination. There is no reference to a "technician" or
"examiner" in this case, terms that might alert the jury that a testing
device was employed in the interview. The absence of such
terminology distinguishes this case from People v. Mason, 274 Ill.
App. 3d 715 (1995) (jury was informed that defendant had spoken
with a "technician" or an "examiner"). We find that Kato's testimony
did not improperly apprise the jury that Johnson had taken and failed
a polygraph.
	The prosecutor's comments in closing argument, when
considered with Kato's testimony, do suggest that Johnson had taken
and failed a polygraph test. By stating that Johnson intended to
"show" the officers something by participating in an interview
elsewhere, the prosecutor suggested that Johnson could conclusively
demonstrate his innocence to authorities merely by his participation in
"the interview" and that his guilt or innocence could be objectively
verified by "the interview" itself. The fact that the interview took place
elsewhere suggested that it entailed something other than mere
discussion with police officers; otherwise, there would have been no
need for Johnson to go anywhere. By stating that Johnson had
"bombed" the interview, the prosecutor used a term commonly
associated with failure, particularly with failing a test.
	However, even if the jury speculated at that point in the trial as
to the prosecutor's references, and the nature of the evidence upon
which those references were based, the inference that Johnson had
taken and failed a polygraph was, by that point in the proceedings,
properly drawn and considered. Evidence that a polygraph exam had
taken place could be properly considered because defense counsel had
made the "reliability" of Johnson's statement an issue in his opening
remarks to the jury and, by the time of closing arguments, he had
elicited testimony calling into question the circumstances of Johnson's
confession. Thus, the reliability of Johnson's statement was an issue
from the outset. Comments regarding the timing of Johnson's
confession soon after his "interview," or polygraph if that is the
characterization of the evidence one prefers, unequivocally became
proper after Johnson raised the issue of reliability at trial, first through
the opening comments of his counsel, and later by testimony. Cf.
People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361, 370-71 (2002) (improper
polygraph evidence preceded its relevance for any limited purpose).
As this court noted in Jefferson, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979),
upheld a trial judge's ruling that if a defendant were to testify that his
confession had been coerced, the prosecution could then introduce
evidence showing that the defendant made the confession after he was
told that he had failed a polygraph test. The Kampiles court explained,
"It would have been unfair to allow defendant to present his account
of his admissions *** without allowing the Government to
demonstrate the extent to which failure of the polygraph precipitated
the confession." Kampiles, 609 F.2d  at 1244. As we observed in
Jefferson, although the general rule in Illinois is to preclude
introduction of evidence regarding polygraph examinations and the
results of those tests, evidence of this kind may become admissible
when a defendant, during trial, offers an alternative explanation for the
reasons that led to a confession. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d  at 492, 497.
	We believe that the prosecutor's argument in this respect was not
improper, as Johnson's subsequent introduction of evidence, making
the circumstances of his confession an issue in the case, opened the
door for a prosecutorial argument suggesting-without specifically
stating-that Johnson had confessed after he failed a polygraph exam.
	We now consider whether testimony regarding Johnson's prior
arrests and adjudications of delinquency-characterized at trial as
"convictions"- was improperly admitted at trial. Johnson called Dr.
Gutzmann as an expert witness at trial for the avowed purpose of
challenging the "reliability" of his statement, though it appears that
Gutzmann's testimony often ranged beyond reliability and addressed
matters bearing upon the voluntariness of Johnson's statement. As
noted in our recitation of facts, Gutzmann testified that she believed
Johnson lacked the intelligence, experience, and ability to knowingly
and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. She also stated her
belief that he was more susceptible to suggestion than the average
person.
	Gutzmann acknowledged that a person with prior experience in
the judicial system might have gained pertinent knowledge from that
experience. She said she was aware that defendant had been
previously arrested on more than one occasion and she assumed he
had been given Miranda warnings. Gutzmann stated she would find
it relevant if she had known that Johnson had been given Miranda
warnings on three separate occasions, but it would not change her
opinion because she believed a person's familiarity with the criminal
justice system does not necessarily guarantee that he understands his
rights. In that respect, Gutzmann noted that it is the experience of
giving up rights and actually suffering consequences as a result thereof
that causes people to comprehend the significance of those rights.
	The prosecutor then attempted to ask Gutzmann a series of
questions in an apparent attempt to ascertain the extent of Gutzmann's
knowledge concerning Johnson's experience with the criminal justice
system and whether she had taken any such experience into account
when reaching her opinion. The prosecutor first asked whether
Gutzmann had "taken into account the defendant's background that
he had actually been convicted of two separate crimes in 1994."
Although defense counsel only asked for a sidebar in response to the
question, the trial court sustained "the objection." The prosecutor
asked whether Gutzmann would consider it relevant if the defendant
had previously spent time in the Department of Corrections. An
objection was overruled, and the witness responded, "Well, it's
relevant but I wouldn't know what to make of it."
	On redirect examination, defense counsel asked Gutzmann about
the specific nature of Johnson's previous charges: "Now you heard
[the prosecutor] talk about Miranda warnings having been given in
the past to Mr. DeAngelo Johnson. Had Mr. DeAngelo Johnson ever
been charged with murder before in the past?" Gutzmann responded
that he had not.
	On re-cross-examination, the prosecutor then asked more pointed
questions about Johnson's prior experience, including whether his
arrests in 1994 were for delivery of "narcotics," whether he was
"convicted" on those charges, and whether he had been appointed an
attorney to represent him in the proceedings on those charges.
Gutzmann responded either "Okay" or "All right" to the prosecutor's
questions. It is unclear from the cold record whether these responses
were meant as affirmative responses to the questions asked-perhaps
Gutzmann was verifying the accuracy of the information conveyed by
the questions from memory or by referring to documents at her
disposal-or whether she was acknowledging the information for
purposes of some hypothetical question she anticipated; however, it
appears by the actions of all involved that the parties and court took
Gutzmann's answers to be affirmative responses to the prosecutor's
questions.
	In the appellate court, Johnson claimed that this evidence of his
prior arrests and "convictions" denied him a fair trial. The appellate
court found that defense counsel had "opened the evidentiary door"
to questions about Johnson's prior arrests, but the defense had not
opened the door "to questions about Johnson's 1994 and 1995
delinquency findings in the juvenile court." Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d
at 674. We disagree. Johnson's defense, as presented through
Gutzmann's testimony, made his experiences in the juvenile and
criminal justice systems a proper area of inquiry.
	 Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant to establish
any fact material to the prosecution. People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249,
284 (1998). A defendant's previous experience with the criminal
justice system is a relevant factor in determining whether a defendant
is aware of his rights (People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 199 (1998))
and whether a statement was given voluntarily (People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 479 (1995)). Prior prosecutions are relevant (People v.
Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 451 (1996), overruled on other grounds by In
re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000)), as are prior convictions (People v.
Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 463 (1995); see also People v. Smith, 333
Ill. App. 3d 622, 630 (2002); People v. Marquez, 324 Ill. App. 3d
711, 720 (2001)). It follows that such evidence is relevant to a
determination of whether Johnson's custodial statement was "reliable"
or truthful, an inquiry closely related to the question of voluntariness.
See generally Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d  at 498 (voluntariness of a
confession is to be determined by the judge alone; however, a
defendant may still present evidence to the trier of fact challenging the
statement's reliability or truth). Indeed, the evidentiary line between
voluntariness and reliability was often blurred in this case, which was,
no doubt, the prosecutor's concern when he moved in limine to bar
such testimony, arguing, "We should not be relitigating the motion to
suppress."
	While there is no question that Johnson had the right to adduce
evidence bearing upon the reliability of his statement, the State had the
right to respond with evidence of Johnson's prior experience with the
justice system, the relevance of which was implicitly acknowledged by
Johnson's own expert. Clearly, evidence of Johnson's progression
through the justice system on prior occasions to the point of
adjudication was relevant to the issue Johnson's attorney had placed
before the jury. By reason of his prior adjudications of delinquency,
Johnson experienced the consequences of choices he had made, he
was undoubtedly apprised of basic rights at some point, and he was
afforded an attorney who presumably counseled him in that regard as
well. In our view, admission of this evidence was subject only to a
determination that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
Moss, 205 Ill. 2d  at 156. Although it is not apparent that the circuit
court made such a determination, we believe the evidence
unquestionably qualified for admission under the appropriate standard.
	Although the appellate court found it significant that the parties
erroneously referred to Johnson's adjudications as "convictions," we
do not. The testimony in question was adduced to establish Johnson's
familiarity with the criminal justice system and to show that he had
experienced the "consequences" of that system, something that
Gutzmann had indicated was relevant to a defendant's ability to
understand the significance of his rights. For that purpose, the
difference between adjudications and convictions is not particularly
significant. In either situation, the consequences of the justice system
are manifest to the person subject to the proceeding.
	We next address the appellate court's holding that various
comments of the prosecutor in closing argument were improper.
	At one point in his argument, the prosecutor referred to defense
counsel as "a professional criminal defense lawyer." The appellate
court held that reference was improper. Again, we disagree. In
support of its holding, the appellate court cited People v. Hawkins,
284 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1016 (1996), wherein the appellate court held
that a prosecutor's reference to defense counsel as a "paid advocate"
was improper. The Hawkins court relied upon cases that held it
improper to refer to a defense attorney as a "hired gun." See People
v. Everette, 220 Ill. App. 3d 453, 458 (1991); People v. Shaw, 98 Ill.
App. 3d 682, 685 (1981). According to the Hawkins court, "The term
'paid advocate,' while slightly less pejorative than the term 'hired
gun,' nevertheless denigrates the assistance of counsel to which the
accused is constitutionally entitled and thus falls within the scope of
Everette and Shaw." Hawkins, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 1016.
	We express no opinion regarding the reasoning or holding of
Hawkins; however, we will not extend its holding to this case. We
agree that it is error to refer to defense counsel as a "hired gun," as
the term and its connotations are in fact more pejorative. Moreover,
we note that the prosecutor's use of the term "hired gun" in Shaw was
coupled with the accusation " 'they're paid to do a job to mislead you,
to confuse you.' " Shaw, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 685. The use of the term
in Everette was in the context of an argument which suggested that
defense counsel approached the trial process as " 'some kind of a card
game.' " Everette, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 458. These elements are not
present in this case. The remarks in this case do not suggest deception
or trickery on the part of defense counsel, a factor which is dominant
in the cases we have found on this point. Frankly, defense counsel was
"a professional criminal defense attorney," just as the attorney for the
State was a professional prosecutor. The jurors are not so naive that
they fail to recognize these distinctions, and we do not believe that
these comments, without more, warrant the label of "error."
	The appellate court also found that the prosecutor improperly
commented on Johnson's right not to testify when he told the jury,
"There is absolutely no evidence before you to attack the validity of
[Johnson's inculpatory] statement. Nothing. It is uncontested. ***
There is no evidence to contradict the validity of the statement." It is
not entirely clear what the prosecutor meant by the "validity" of the
statement. If by "validity" he meant to comment on the
"voluntariness" of the statement, or point out that it was uncontested
that a statement was made, or even that there was no evidence the
statement was untruthful or unreliable, his comment was not
improper. Johnson's statement had been determined to be voluntary
and it was properly before the jury. While Johnson was still entitled to
present evidence to the trier of fact challenging the statement's
reliability or truth, and the jury was entitled to consider any such
evidence as it bore upon the credibility or the weight to be given to
the confession (see Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 498), much of Gutzmann's
testimony focused on her opinion that Johnson was incapable of
knowingly and understandingly waiving his Miranda rights, matters
pertinent to voluntariness. Moreover, to the extent that Gutzmann's
testimony insinuated that the content of Johnson's statement may have
been the product of police suggestion or overreaching, the result of a
dependent personality influenced by those in authoritative positions,
that testimony too was the proper subject of comment. Indeed, the
jury heard testimony that suggested Johnson may not have understood
his rights and thus may not have knowingly and intelligently waived
them with a full appreciation of the consequences; however, the jury
heard no testimony that explicitly challenged the truth or reliability of
Johnson's statement, or the "validity" of the statement, if that is the
way one chooses to refer to it.
	When determining whether the accused's right not to testify has
been violated, a reviewing court must examine the challenged
prosecutorial comments in the context of the entire proceeding.
Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 21; People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 126
(1989). As this court stated in Keene:
		"[T]he State may comment that evidence is uncontradicted
and may do so even if the defendant was the only person who
could have provided contrary proof. [Citation.] To put it
differently, the State is free to point out what evidence was
uncontradicted so long as it expresses no thought about who
specifically-meaning the defendant-could have done the
contradicting." Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 21.
Whether the prosecutor's comments are construed as references to
reliability or voluntariness, the prosecutor in this case stayed within
the boundaries of proper argument. See People v. Williams, 38 Ill. 2d 115, 125 (1967) (it is proper for the prosecutor to say defendant's
confession was "obviously voluntary" where the trial court had so
ruled prior to trial). We find that the comments were proper.
	In our opinion, the prosecutor barely crossed the line of propriety
when, referring to Johnson in rebuttal argument, he stated, "[H]ow
dare this guy complain about his rights? *** Now this guy, without
presenting any evidence, wants to complain through his lawyer
standing at a podium about his rights." In response to a defense
objection, the court instructed the jury, "The Defendant does not have
to take the stand in his own defense." However, the judge did not rule
on the defense objection, nor did he instruct the jury to disregard the
statement. The prosecutor continued, "You know, it never ends. They
have no defense."
	A prosecutor may respond to comments made by defense counsel
in closing argument that clearly invite a response. People v. Munson,
206 Ill. 2d ___, ___ (2002); Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 154. Such
comments must be considered in the proper context by examining the
entire closing argument of the parties. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 154; see
People v. Mendez, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1145, 1152 (2001).
	During his closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly
misstated the law and the evidence, and argued inferences which were
not premised upon any evidence before the jury. We provide a few
examples to illustrate the nature and tone of defense counsel's closing
argument.
	Defense counsel argued that Johnson had "a reading score of 4.3.
Uncontradicted." The trial court sustained an objection to that
statement, presumably because it was contrary to the evidence before
the court. Defense counsel immediately reiterated that statement in
service of an argument that intensive police interrogation had
produced Johnson's statement:
			"They knew they would never convict [defendant] based
upon the testimony of Mr. Nash. This is about a confession.
That's all this case is about. It's not about evidence. It's
about a confession.
* * *
			You know what the force of interrogations are like. You
have seen it in this courtroom. Who can stand that pressure?
They wanted to get a statement out of him, whether he is
retarded or whatever. That's what Miranda is about.
Psychological coercion."
The prosecutor objected that there was "no evidence there was any
psychological coercion." The trial court sustained the objection.
	Defense counsel then embarked upon an argument suggesting
that Johnson's statement to authorities had been altered. After
repeated objections by the prosecutor that there had been no
testimony or evidence to that effect, the trial court eventually advised
defense counsel that he was required to argue from the evidence
presented at trial. Defense counsel replied, apparently seeking
clarification, "I can argue from the document." The court responded,
"The document may be argued. There is no testimony regarding that.
Counsel may argue."
	Continuing with an argument laden with innuendo and founded
upon little or no evidence, defense counsel stated:
			"Think about the testimony of Mr. Nash. The fact that
nothing corroborates what was in his statement.
* * *
			Look at [defendant's] statement, because this is made on
facts, not on emotion. Doesn't mean anything to run up to
him and call him all kinds of names and do all those kinds of
things that call him the scum of the earth."
The prosecutor objected, noting that "no one called him the scum of
the earth." The objection was sustained. Undaunted, defense counsel
asked the jurors if they believed Johnson had gone to the police
station "voluntarily" to participate in the investigative process. The
prosecutor again objected and, when asked his basis, he responded,
appropriately, "There is no evidence otherwise." The trial court
allowed defense counsel to continue with his line of argument.
	Defense counsel concluded his argument by returning to his
earlier theme that the police had not done enough to corroborate the
facts included in Johnson's statement, suggesting they were under a
legal obligation to do so:
			"Did they do anything to corroborate anything in this
statement? Nothing. If you believe they didn't do anything to
corroborate, and it's reasonable for them to do it and they
didn't do it, then they have not proven him guilty."
Responding to the State's ensuing objection, the trial court advised
the jury, "That's counsel's argument. That is not the law."
	It was in response to these arguments that the prosecutor made
the final comments of which Johnson complains. Defense counsel's
argument clearly invited appropriate State comments on many levels.
However, while we can appreciate the prosecutor's frustration with
defense counsel's conduct during closing argument, and indeed the
presentation and theory of Johnson's defense, we believe the
circumstances called for a more measured response. It would have
been enough to simply point out that there was neither evidence of
coercion, nor testimony that Johnson's rights had been violated in any
way. Defense counsel's argument did not grant the prosecutor a
license to say anything he desired. The comments suggesting that
Johnson was required to "present evidence" were improper,
notwithstanding defense counsel's comments.
	Nevertheless, even though the prosecutor's comment exceeded
the bounds of proper argument, the verdict will not be disturbed
unless the remark caused substantial prejudice to the defendant, taking
into account the content and context of the comment, its relationship
to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000),
quoting Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 152. Applying these criteria to the facts
of this case, we find that the prosecutor's remark did not result in
substantial prejudice to defendant and was not a material factor in his
conviction.
	Defense counsel repeatedly suggested in his closing argument
that there was coercion in the procurement of Johnson's confession
even though the State's evidence did not so indicate and there was no
testimony presented by the defense to that effect. It is improper to
argue assumptions or facts not based upon the evidence in the record.
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 151. We expect defense attorneys to adhere to
the same rules we apply to prosecutors. Johnson had not sustained his
burden during the pretrial suppression hearing of showing that his
statement was involuntary and much of defense counsel's closing
argument appears to have been-as the prosecutor predicted-an
attempt to relitigate that issue before the jury. Under the
circumstances, we find the impropriety of the prosecutor's comment
was marginal.
	Moreover, when the prosecutor made the remark, the trial judge
immediately advised the jury that defendant was not required to take
the stand in his own defense. Subsequently, the jury was properly
instructed pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No.
2.03 (3d ed. 1992):
			"The Defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges
against him. This presumption remains with him throughout
every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the
verdict and is not overcome unless from all the evidence in
this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
he is guilty.
			The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the
Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden
remains on the State throughout the case. The Defendant is
not required to prove his innocence."
The jury was also instructed: "The fact that the Defendant did not
testify must not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your
verdict." As this court has frequently stated, the prompt sustaining of
an objection combined with a proper jury instruction usually is
sufficient to cure any prejudice arising from an improper closing
argument. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 297 (1999); People v.
Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 298 (1994). Although the trial court did
not sustain defense counsel's objection, the court immediately and
unequivocally advised the jury that defendant was not required to take
the stand in his own defense. That admonition, together with
subsequent instructions given the jury, sufficed to cure any error
associated with the prosecutor's comments, which were brief and
isolated. See People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 396-98 (2000);
Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d  at 298; People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 564-65
(1991). Given the content and context of the comments, and their
relationship to the evidence, the prosecutor's comments did not deny
Johnson a fair trial.
	We note that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced.
The jury had before it Johnson's confession, physical evidence
corroborating the statement Johnson made to Detective Vucko in the
nine-millimeter shell casings and bullets recovered after the shooting,
and the uncontradicted testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting.
Nash's version of the shooting was consistent with what Johnson told
police regarding his participation in the shooting. Moreover, Nash's
identification of Johnson as one of the two shooters was not
contradicted by either positive testimony or by circumstances.
	In sum, the prosecutor's comments, quite simply, did not result
in substantial prejudice to Johnson under these circumstances, and
thus, they do not warrant reversal of Johnson's convictions. As there
was neither cumulative error, nor a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct and related trial error, the appellate court's reliance upon
Blue was misplaced. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court
in cause No. 90678 and remand the cause to the appellate court with
directions that the appellate court address defendant's argument
concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
	We note that our decision in Blue does not furnish a license to
courts of review to adopt a cursory or skeletal analysis of the facts
and issues before them. It does signal our intolerance of pervasive
prosecutorial misconduct that deliberately undermines the process by
which we determine a defendant's guilt or innocence.
No. 90678-Appellate court judgment reversed;
 cause remanded with directions.
No. 90693-Appellate court judgment affirmed.
No. 90706-Appellate court judgment affirmed.