Case Title: State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1265

Docket Number: 19992022

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as  State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm., 92 Ohio St.3d 455, 2001-Ohio-1265] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CLARK, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO; 
SOUTHERN OHIO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATION & CORRECTION, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 455.] 
Workers’ compensation — R.C. 4123.56(A) does not require a setoff of 
temporary total disability benefits where hostage leave has been paid 
pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
(No. 99-2022 — Submitted February 27, 2001 — Decided August 15, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-1178. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 4123.56(A) does not require a setoff of TTD benefits where hostage leave 
has been paid pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  In April 1993, Darrold R. Clark, Jr., appellee, worked as a 
corrections officer for the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.  On April 11, 
1993, inmates rioted at the correctional facility and took Clark hostage.  While 
being held captive, Clark was beaten by the prisoners and sustained multiple 
physical injuries, including abrasions on his wrists, an open laceration on his 
upper forearm, an abrasion on his face, dehydration, and malnutrition.  In addition 
to his physical injuries, Clark suffered severe stress and anxiety as a direct result 
of being held hostage as well as having been beaten.  The inmates released Clark 
on April 15, 1993. 
 
Subsequent to his release, Clark submitted a claim to the Ohio Department 
of Rehabilitation and Correction for hostage leave pay pursuant to Article 34.05 
of the collective bargaining agreement between the state of Ohio and the Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Civil Service Employees Association.  Clark’s request was granted, and, pursuant 
to the collective bargaining agreement, he received hostage leave payable at his 
regular rate beginning April 18, 1993, and continuing through July 10, 1993. 
 
On April 28, 1993, Clark filed a claim with the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation 
(“BWC”) 
seeking 
temporary 
total 
disability 
(“TTD”) 
compensation for the injuries he sustained while he was held hostage.  The BWC 
first allowed his claim for “dehydration; malnourishment; abrasions bilateral 
wrists and face; laceration right upper arm; [and] atrial fibrillation.”  The bureau 
later allowed the additional condition of “post-traumatic stress disorder.”  On July 
11, 1993, Clark began receiving TTD benefits. 
 
On October 26, 1993, Clark filed a claim with BWC requesting TTD 
benefits for the period from April 12, 1993, through July 10, 1993, i.e., 
approximately the same period for which he had received hostage leave benefits.  
This claim for TTD benefits was denied.  Clark appealed the denial to a BWC 
district hearing officer (“DHO”).  The DHO denied the appeal and found that 
TTD compensation was not payable, reasoning that if TTD were permitted for the 
same period as hostage leave, hostage leave would have to be deducted from TTD 
benefits, resulting in no payment.  Clark appealed the DHO decision, and a 
hearing was held before a BWC staff hearing officer (“SHO”), who affirmed the 
DHO decision.  The SHO found that hostage leave payment was the equivalent of 
wages.  Notwithstanding that finding, the SHO ordered TTD to be paid for April 
11, 1993, through July 15, 1993, but also ordered the hostage leave pay to be 
deducted from the award of TTD.1 
 
Clark appealed the decision to the Industrial Commission.  The 
commission denied Clark’s claim on the basis that hostage leave compensation 
                                                          
 
1. 
The SHO affirmed the DHO decision denying Clark’s claim.  However, in contrast to the 
DHO decision, the SHO ordered that “temporary total compensation is payable from 4/11/93 
through 7/15/93 per the C-30 report from Dr. Gilman, less wages (or in this case, Hostage Leave) 
previously paid over such period.” 
January Term, 2001 
3 
constituted one hundred percent wage replacement and that R.C. 4123.56(A) 
prevents TTD payments when a claimant has not lost any wages. 
 
Clark filed an action in mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, 
claiming that he was entitled to TTD benefits payable over the same period that 
he received hostage leave.  Clark sought a determination that the denial of his 
claim was an abuse of discretion. 
 
Pursuant to Civ.R. 532 and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Franklin County Court of 
Appeals, the matter was referred to a magistrate.  The court magistrate found that 
the Industrial Commission had not abused its discretion and recommended that 
the court deny the writ. 
 
Clark filed objections to the magistrate’s recommendation.  The court of 
appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact but rejected the magistrate’s 
conclusions of law.  The court of appeals found that the commission abused its 
discretion when the commission determined that the payment of hostage leave 
constituted a wage as opposed to a benefit paid pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement.  Accordingly, the court of appeals issued a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order denying Clark’s 
application for TTD for the period of April 12, 1993, through July 10, 1993, and 
to enter an order granting that compensation, with no setoff for hostage leave pay. 
 
The case is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
The Workers’ Compensation Act provides for compensation to be paid to 
workers injured in the course of their employment.  R.C. 4123.54.  Every 
employee who is injured, who contracts an occupational disease, or who dies 
while in the course of employment is “entitled to receive, either directly from the 
                                                          
 
2. 
Civ.R. 53(A) provides that “[a] court of record may appoint one or more magistrates who 
shall be attorneys at law admitted to practice in Ohio.”  Civ.R. 53(C) sets out the powers of 
magistrates.  It provides that a magistrate may hear an issue in any nonjury trial or in any case in 
which the parties consent in writing to submit an issue to a magistrate.  Civ.R. 53(C)(1)(ii) and 
(iii). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
employee’s self-insuring employer as provided in section 4123.35 of the Revised 
Code, or from the state insurance fund, the compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury” provided by R.C. Chapter 4123.  R.C. 4123.54(A)(2). 
 
Injury, for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, is defined in 
R.C. 4123.01(C) and “includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental 
means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising 
out of, the injured employee’s employment.” 
 
R.C. 4123.56 provides compensation for workers who suffer injuries that 
result in temporary disability.  The purpose behind TTD compensation is to 
compensate an employee for a loss of earnings while recovering from an injury. 
State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 
533, 535. 
 
Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 4123.56(A) provides: 
 
“If any compensation under this section has been paid for the same period 
or periods for which temporary nonoccupational accident and sickness insurance 
is or has been paid pursuant to an insurance policy or program to which the 
employer has made the entire contribution or payment for providing insurance or 
under a nonoccupational accident and sickness program fully funded by the 
employer, compensation paid under this section for the period or periods shall be 
paid only to the extent by which the payment or payments exceeds the amount of 
the nonoccupational insurance or program paid or payable.” 
 
The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction, appellant, argues that R.C. 4123.56(A) precludes 
payment of any TTD compensation where an injured worker has been paid 
benefits through a program fully funded by the employer.  Thus, appellant 
contends that, pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(A), TTD compensation should be offset 
by the hostage leave pay that Clark received, since hostage leave is a 
nonoccupational benefit program fully funded by Clark’s employer.  We disagree. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
Article 34.05 of the collective bargaining agreement provides: 
 
“In the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the Department of 
Youth Services, and the Forensic Centers within the Department of Mental 
Health, any employee who has been taken hostage shall be eligible for up to sixty 
(60) days leave with pay at regular rate which shall not be charged to sick leave, 
vacation, or any other accrued leave, as determined necessary by a licensed 
physician or psychiatrist to recover from stress.” 
 
R.C. 4123.56(A) requires setoff of any payments received by the claimant 
from an employer-funded “nonoccupational accident and sickness” insurance or 
program against temporary total disability compensation paid for the same period.  
We find that the hostage leave payments received by Clark pursuant to the 
collective bargaining agreement are not “nonoccupational,” and that therefore 
setoff is not required. 
 
The hostage leave pay provided to corrections officers under the collective 
bargaining agreement is a benefit that arises from the peculiar hazards associated 
with prison work.  Corrections officers are in daily intimate contact with 
convicted criminals, some of whom have violent propensities.  The emotional and 
physical pressures of extended incarceration can erupt into violence, rioting, and 
prison takeovers, as in this case, which often involve hostage-taking of prison 
employees.  This is a risk that corrections officers face every day on the job.  In 
consideration of that risk, the employer in this case has offered a benefit designed 
to compensate those of its employees who actually suffer the trauma of being 
taken hostage in the course of their employment.  Thus, this benefit is designed to 
address a risk that is occupational, i.e., one that is clearly connected to the nature 
of the work.  As such, it is not a “nonoccupational accident and sickness” 
program, and it is not within the purview of R.C. 4123.56(A). 
 
Furthermore, Clark argues that hostage leave, pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement, is a contractual fringe benefit.  As such, hostage leave falls 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
outside the Worker’s Compensation Act, and, therefore, hostage leave payments 
may not be used as a basis to offset TTD benefits. 
 
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Clark was entitled to take 
sixty days of paid leave, if deemed necessary by a physician, in order to recover 
from the stress associated with being held hostage.  In order to qualify for hostage 
leave, Clark was not required to have suffered any physical injury; he was 
required to show only that he suffered from stress associated with being held 
hostage.  Thus, according to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 
hostage leave is payable with or without any contemporaneous physical injury. 
 
Moreover, for the purposes of R.C. 4123.54, “injury” does not include 
psychiatric conditions “except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or 
occupational disease.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).  A psychological 
injury without a corresponding physical injury is not compensable under the 
workers’ compensation system.  Bunger v. Lawson Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
463, 464, 696 N.E.2d 1029, 1031.3 Therefore, a corrections officer who suffers a 
psychological injury as a result of being held hostage, but without a 
contemporaneous physical injury, is without a remedy under the workers’ 
compensation system. 
 
In Kerans v. Porter Paint Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 486, 575 N.E.2d 428, 
we held that the workers’ compensation statutes do not provide the exclusive 
remedy for claims based upon sexual harassment in the workplace.  Id. at 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  We recognized in Kerans that workers’ 
compensation is essentially directed at compensating a worker for lost earnings 
and thus does not provide benefits for sexual harassment, since victims of sexual 
harassment generally do not suffer loss of wages.  Id.  We also noted that the 
immunity provisions of R.C. 4123.74 did not bar the plaintiff’s suit because her 
                                                          
 
3. 
The author of this opinion continues to adhere to his dissent in Bunger v. Lawson Co. 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 463, 468, 696 N.E.2d 1029, 1033. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
sexual harassment claims fell outside the purview of the workers’ compensation 
system.  Id. at 489-490, 575 N.E.2d at 431.  Thus, we held that a damage award as 
a result of a sexual harassment lawsuit is a means of compensating a worker for 
an injury that is incurred during the course of employment but is not compensable 
under workers’ compensation. 
 
Similarly, hostage leave pay provides a remedy to workers who suffer a 
psychological injury as a result of being held hostage that is not otherwise 
compensable under workers’ compensation.  In other words, hostage leave can 
provide a separate remedy, outside the workers’ compensation system, for a 
worker 
who 
has 
suffered 
psychological 
injury 
without 
suffering 
a 
contemporaneous physical injury.  As such, hostage leave is very similar to the 
damage award in Kerans.  Therefore, we find that hostage leave pay, as provided 
in the collective bargaining agreement, is not intended to be the type of wage-
replacing benefit contemplated in R.C. 4123.56(A). 
 
Clark also argues that any offset of TTD by hostage leave payments 
received deprives him of the benefit of the bargain negotiated through the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement between Clark’s union and the state.  We 
agree. 
 
In Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504, the 
plaintiff, Sorrell, prevailed in a personal injury claim against defendant, Thevenir.  
Thevenir claimed that because Sorrell had received workers’ compensation 
benefits in excess of the personal injury verdict, Thevenir was entitled, pursuant 
to R.C. 2317.45(B)(2), to a setoff of the entire damage award.  We held that the 
collateral source statute, R.C. 2317.45, by requiring the offset of collateral 
benefits, including workers’ compensation benefits, violated Sections 2, 5, and 
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and accordingly was unconstitutional in 
toto. Id. at syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
We found persuasive in Sorrell the contention that there is no double 
recovery from a tortfeasor in the typical tort case involving collateral benefits, 
since one of the supposed double recoveries is actually the benefit of the 
plaintiff’s bargain with his or her own insurance company.  In Sorrell, we found 
that the benefit of the bargain was the employer-paid workers’ compensation and 
disability compensation programs that were earned by the employees as an 
employment benefit.  Id., 69 Ohio St.3d at 424, 633 N.E.2d at 511-512. 
 
Similarly, hostage leave is a bargained-for benefit of Clark’s collective 
bargaining agreement.  In this case, Clark’s union and the state negotiated in good 
faith and have agreed to a presumably mutually beneficial collective bargaining 
agreement.  If we were to deny TTD benefits to Clark based upon his receipt of 
hostage leave pay, we would circumvent the negotiated provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement that entitles Clark to hostage leave. 
 
Moreover, and in any event, we find that the language of the collective 
bargaining agreement suggests that hostage leave pay is not intended to require an 
offset of TTD benefits.  The provision of the collective bargaining agreement 
immediately preceding the section providing for hostage leave is Article 34.04, 
entitled “Occupational Injury Leave.”  Article 34.04 provides: 
 
“Employees of * * * The Department of Rehabilitation and Correctio[n] * 
* * shall be entitled to a total of nine hundred sixty (960) hours of occupational 
injury leave a year with pay at regular rate.  (See Appendix K).” 
 
Appendix K of the collective bargaining agreement, entitled “Guidelines 
for Occupational Injury Leave,” provides: 
 
“1. An employee of the * * * Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
* * * shall be eligible for his/her regular rate of pay during the period he/she is 
disabled as a result of such injury but in no case to exceed 960 hours.  This form 
of compensation shall be in lieu of Workers’ Compensation.”  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Article 34.04 specifically states that occupational injury benefits are paid 
in lieu of workers’ compensation pursuant to Appendix K of the agreement.  
However, there is no provision stating that hostage leave, payable pursuant to 
Article 34.05, is to be paid in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits.  Since 
occupational injury leave is subject to the provisions of Appendix K of the 
collective bargaining agreement, and hostage leave is not subject to those 
provisions, we conclude that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement 
had no intention that hostage leave is to be paid in lieu of TTD benefits or any 
other workers’ compensation benefits. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that hostage leave is not a “nonoccupational 
accident and sickness” program, and it is not within the purview of R.C. 
4123.56(A).  In addition, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the state of Ohio and the OCSEA, hostage leave is a benefit 
independent of the Workers’ Compensation Act and is provided to employees of 
the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for the unique risks of 
psychological injury associated with their employment as corrections officers.  
For the foregoing reasons, we therefore find that R.C. 4123.56(A) does not 
require a setoff of TTD benefits where hostage leave has been paid pursuant to the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  The majority holds that R.C. 4123.56(A) does not 
require a setoff of TTD benefits where hostage leave has been paid pursuant to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  For the following reasons, 
however, I disagree. 
 
As the majority notes, “[t]he purpose behind TTD compensation is to 
compensate an employee for a loss of earnings while recovering from an injury.  
State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 
533, 535.”  (Emphasis added.)  I agree with this statement of purpose, and that is 
precisely why I must respectfully dissent.  Clark’s receipt of hostage leave under 
Article 34.05 of the CBA compensated him at the regular rate of pay, with leave 
that was not charged to him.  He thus suffered no “loss of earnings” attributable to 
the period during which he recovered. 
 
I agree with the appellate court magistrate’s conclusion that the term 
“nonoccupational,” construed in the context of R.C. 4123.56(A)’s setoff 
provisions, refers to wage-replacing compensation paid for temporary disability by 
sources collateral to the workers’ compensation system.  The magistrate’s 
interpretation is buttressed by the administrative interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provisions—an interpretation to which we should accord appropriate 
deference.  See Swallow v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 55, 57, 521 
N.E.2d 778, 779.  Though notably absent from the majority’s discussion, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-5-20(C) provides: 
 
“Where claimants are paid a regular salary during the period of disability 
on any * * * basis [other than vacation], for example, sick leave, [TTD] cannot be 
paid so long as such regular salary or wages are paid, unless * * * such salary was 
paid as an advancement.”4 (Emphasis added.) 
 
It is undisputed that Clark was paid his regular salary during his period of 
disability and that it was not paid as an advancement. 
                                                          
 
4. 
See, also, Memo Nos. C1 and C2 of the Industrial Commission of Ohio Policy 
Statements and Guidelines (Jan. 1, 1989), which implement this directive. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
The majority relies heavily on the fact that the CBA article immediately 
preceding the article providing hostage leave expressly provides that such leave is 
“in lieu of Workers’ Compensation”—whereas the article providing hostage leave 
does not.  But the preceding article to which the majority refers is entitled 
“Occupational Injury Leave.”  (Emphasis added.)  The fact that hostage leave 
does not appear in the CBA article entitled “Occupational Injury Leave” actually 
undercuts the majority’s thesis by demonstrating that the parties to the CBA, like 
the magistrate and the commission, deemed hostage leave nonoccupational—and 
thus subject to setoff under R.C. 4123.56(A). 
 
An award of TTD benefits to Clark in this case does not correspond to the 
overall purpose of  R.C. 4123.54 and 4123.56(A) to compensate employees for 
TTD only to the extent that they have not been compensated for their lost wages 
by their employers.  The  commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that the TTD Clark received should be set off by the hostage leave 
compensation that he received.  I would reverse the appellate court’s decision to 
the contrary. 
__________________ 
 
Phillip J. Fulton & Associates and William A. Thorman III, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Karla L. Stultz, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Lee M. Smith, Special Counsel, for appellant. 
__________________