Case Title: State v. Janet A. Conner

Citation: 2011 WI 8

Docket Number: 2008AP001296-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1296-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Janet A. Conner, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 2009 WI App 143, 321 Wis. 2d 449, 
775 N.W.2d 105 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 9, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Richland 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Rosborough 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J. dissent (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Stephen E. Mays, Mays Law Office, LLC, 
Middleton. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren 
D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 8
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2008AP1296-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2005CF119) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Janet A. Conner,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
FEB 9, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals opinion1 that affirmed the conviction 
of Janet Conner for aggravated stalking.  Conner appeals the 
conviction on the following grounds: first, that the way the 
State charged, and was permitted to prove, the elements of the 
stalking crime violated her constitutional due process guarantee 
to notice, and second, that the stalking statute provision under 
which her conviction was elevated from a Class I felony to a 
Class H felony was incorrectly applied.  The questions presented 
                                                 
1 State v. Conner, 2009 WI App 143, 321 Wis. 2d 449, 775 
N.W.2d 105. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
2 
 
are: 1) whether the charging documents were specific enough to 
give Conner adequate notice of the alleged conduct constituting 
the "course of conduct" element of the statute and 2) whether, 
in the provision describing a Class H felony, the element 
requiring that the "present violation" occur within seven years 
of a prior conviction is satisfied where a single post-
conviction incident, rather than a series of acts, is alleged in 
the complaint and information.  
¶2 
To make clear the issues we are deciding, we first set 
forth important facts concerning the case.  In 2005, Conner was 
charged in a complaint with two counts of stalking James and 
Rhonda Gainor and one count of criminal damage to property.  The 
charges were in connection with an incident that occurred on the 
afternoon of November 30, 2005, when James Gainor discovered 
that his truck, which was parked near the post office where he 
worked, had been vandalized, with large deep scratches across 
the hood and doors on both sides.  Standing nearby was Conner, a 
former girlfriend who had admittedly previously warned Gainor to 
be careful where he parked his vehicles and had threatened to 
damage them; she had also been convicted of other acts of 
harassment against him.  He drew the obvious inference, and the 
two had a heated exchange that ended with Conner cursing Gainor 
and leaving the scene.  Conner was subsequently charged with two 
counts of stalking with a previous conviction within seven 
years, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2) and (2m)(b)(2003-
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
3 
 
04),2 and one count of criminal damage to property in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1).  (The previous conviction referenced 
in the first charges was for 2003 convictions for three counts 
of violating a harassment restraining order and two counts of 
unlawful use of a telephone, all of which arose from acts in 
2000 and 2001 that targeted the Gainors.)  The case proceeded to 
trial before the Circuit Court for Richland County, the Hon. 
Michael J. Rosborough presiding.  After a four-day trial, a jury 
convicted Conner of one count of stalking and acquitted her on 
the other counts. 
¶3 
Conner challenged the conviction on the grounds that 
she was not given adequate notice of the allegations she would 
be defending against because the information identified only a 
single incident on November 30, 2005, as the basis of the charge 
and did not specify what two or more acts formed the "course of 
conduct" element of the crime with which she was charged.  She 
argued that after failing to allege a factual basis for the 
course of conduct element, the State was then wrongly permitted 
to prove the course of conduct element of the stalking charge 
using evidence of acts that were not charged and evidence of 
acts for which Conner was previously convicted.  The State 
responds that Conner had adequate notice of the allegations 
against her because a complaint may properly incorporate by 
reference attached documents, as the complaint in this case did.  
It explicitly incorporated, among other attached documents, a 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
4 
 
filing from a previous case that the complaint described as 
containing "a summary recounting of some of the history of 
harassment and stalking perpetrated upon [the Gainors] by Janet 
Conner as related by [the Gainors]."  The document listed 27 
dates on which specific acts were alleged to have occurred.  
¶4 
Conner also argued that the statute requires the 
State, in order to show that the conduct was aggravated and 
constituted a Class H felony, to allege and prove that a course 
of conduct consisting of two or more acts occurred after the 
prior conviction, which in this case occurred in 2003, that 
serves as the basis for the Class H felony designation.3  At 
Conner's trial, the circuit court permitted testimony concerning 
acts that occurred between 2000 and 2005.  These acts were 
initially ruled admissible as other-acts evidence but were 
later, 
at 
the 
jury 
instruction 
conference, 
construed 
as 
admissible for proving the course of conduct element of the 
stalking charges.  Further, the State, in closing, pointed the 
jury to the November 2005 incident and to two 2003 convictions 
as evidence to prove Conner's "course of conduct" with regard to 
the Gainors.  The State responds that the chronological 
requirement of the statute is that the "present violation" have 
occurred within seven years after the prior conviction and that 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) (2003-04) states, "Whoever 
violates 
sub. 
(2) 
is 
guilty 
of 
a 
Class 
H 
felony 
if . . . [t]he actor has a previous conviction for a crime, 
the victim of that crime is the victim of the present 
violation of sub. (2), and the present violation occurs 
within 7 years after the prior conviction."  
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
5 
 
the "present violation" in this case is the conduct alleged in 
the complaint, that is, the ongoing course of conduct including 
the November 30, 2005, incident, which did occur within the 
required time period. 
¶5 
We consider Conner's due process challenge and employ 
a two-prong test for evaluating the sufficiency of the charge4 
that addresses constitutionally sufficient notice and exposure 
to double jeopardy.  The challenge here is focused only on the 
first prong, that of sufficient notice.5  In Wisconsin, "[a] 
defendant has the benefit of both the factual allegations 
required in the complaint and the final statutory charges 
alleged in the information."6  It is also settled that a 
complaint may appropriately incorporate other documents.7  We 
hold that by appending and incorporating into the complaint 
documents listing and specifying the dates of alleged acts, both 
                                                 
4 The test was set forth in Holesome v. State, 40 
Wis. 2d 95, 102, 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968). 
5 The parties agree that double jeopardy concerns are not, 
at this point, implicated in this case given that the prior 
convictions were for crimes other than stalking. As to future 
implications, at oral argument, the State stated that Conner 
could not in the future be convicted of stalking using evidence 
of the same acts again to satisfy an element of the crime.  It 
is therefore not necessary for us to decide that question or 
address the second prong of the test in this case.  The double 
jeopardy implications are addressed more fully infra ¶¶30-31 and 
¶43. 
6 State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 576, 309 N.W.2d 850 
(Ct. App. 1981). 
7 State v. Williams, 47 Wis. 2d 242, 252, 177 N.W.2d 611 
(1970). 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
6 
 
charged and uncharged, that began in 2000, and by alleging a 
"course of conduct," the State gave Conner notice of the 
allegations she would be required to defend against, and 
therefore there was no violation of Conner's due process right 
to notice. 
¶6 
As to the application of the statute's language 
requiring that "the present violation" have occurred "within 
seven years after the prior conviction," we hold that it was 
properly applied in this case because in this case the "present 
violation" was a continuing course of conduct that included the 
acts on November 30, 2005, and occurred within seven years after 
the 2003 convictions for crimes involving the same victim.  
Contrary to Conner's assertions, the statute does not specify 
how many acts in that course of conduct must take place after 
the prior conviction.  Conner's reading is at odds with the 
context of the statute, which defines stalking as acts "carried 
out over time, however short or long, that show a continuity of 
purpose."8  Further, the list of acts the statute defines as 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1) states: 
(1) In this section: 
(a) “Course of conduct” means a series of 2 or more 
acts carried out over time, however short or long, 
that show a continuity of purpose, including any of 
the following: 
1. Maintaining a visual or physical proximity to the 
victim. 
2. Approaching or confronting the victim. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
7 
 
stalking conduct9 makes clear that even if we read the statute as 
Conner suggests, the Class H felony conviction in this case 
would still be proper because a properly instructed jury could 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. Appearing at the victim's workplace or contacting 
the victim's employer or coworkers. 
4. Appearing at the victim's home or contacting the 
victim's neighbors. 
5. Entering property owned, leased, or occupied by the 
victim. 
6. Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the 
victim's telephone or any other person's telephone to 
ring repeatedly or continuously, regardless of whether 
a conversation ensues. 
6m. 
Photographing, 
videotaping, 
audiotaping, 
or, 
through any other electronic means, monitoring or 
recording 
the 
activities 
of 
the 
victim. 
This 
subdivision applies regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
7. Sending material by any means to the victim or, for 
the 
purpose 
of 
obtaining 
information 
about, 
disseminating information about, or communicating with 
the victim, to a member of the victim's family or 
household or an employer, coworker, or friend of the 
victim. 
8. Placing an object on or delivering an object to 
property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim. 
9. Delivering an object to a member of the victim's 
family or household or an employer, coworker, or 
friend of the victim or placing an object on, or 
delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or 
occupied by such a person with the intent that the 
object be delivered to the victim. 
10. Causing a person to engage in any of the acts 
described in subds. 1. to 9.  
9 See supra ¶6 n.5 and infra ¶44. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
8 
 
reasonably find that evidence showed that on November 30, 2005, 
Conner carried out more than one act constituting stalking 
behavior, and those acts were within seven years after the 2003 
conviction involving the same victim. 
¶7 
We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶8 
This case is the second case to arise from the 
conflict that Conner had with James Gainor that began shortly 
after their six-month relationship ended in 2000.  The testimony 
of witnesses, including James Gainor and Rhonda Gainor, at the 
trial 
detailed 
years 
of 
harassing 
incidents 
the 
Gainors 
experienced that had escalated from what might initially be 
considered fairly minor annoyances to disruptive and disturbing 
actions.  At one end of the spectrum were frequent prank phone 
calls in which the caller hung up immediately, repeated 
instances when restaurant orders were falsely placed in Gainor's 
name, and an occasion when the Gainors' wedding reception 
reservation was cancelled by a caller claiming to speak for the 
Gainors.  At the other were acts that caused serious disruption 
in the Gainors' daily lives, such as the occasion when a caller 
stranded James Gainor's stepson at his elementary school by 
leaving a false message that he was to wait after school to be 
picked up rather than taking the bus home.  Others appeared 
calculated to cause panic or distress, such as the occasion when 
a caller left a false message for Rhonda Gainor purportedly from 
the school nurse that she needed to get to the hospital urgently 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
9 
 
because her young son was there, and the occasion when a caller 
taunted her by asking about a friend who had recently died 
unexpectedly.  There were many magazines that arrived at the 
Gainors' 
home, 
obtained 
by 
someone 
submitting 
bogus 
subscriptions. 
 
There 
was 
evidence 
of 
repeated 
personal 
confrontations.  There was evidence of a range of damage to 
property, too, from the incident when Rhonda Gainor's coat was 
smeared with nail polish while she had a dental appointment at 
the dentist's office where Conner worked at the time to acts of 
vandalism to James Gainor's vehicles.  Gainor testified to 
having arrived at his vehicles on various occasions to find that 
the windshields had been shattered on two vehicles, that the 
paint on doors and hoods had been extensively scratched or 
"keyed," that the air had been let out of the tires, and that 
door locks on his car and truck had been filled with a super 
glue-type substance.  There was testimony that the harassing 
phone calls to phones at the Gainors' home, places of work, 
school and family members' homes had been unrelenting, with the 
only period of relief coinciding with a period of time when 
Conner was in jail for other unrelated convictions.  There was 
evidence presented that Conner admitted some of the acts, denied 
some of the acts, and admitted others after initially denying 
them.  There was also evidence of nine convictions between 1996 
and 2001, several of which were for similar conduct, such as 
damage to vehicles and harassing phone calls, targeting the 
Gainors and other persons unrelated to this case.  Conner 
testified; she denied all calls and all damage to the Gainors' 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
10 
 
vehicles (even calls she had in previous proceedings admitted), 
though she admitted keying a car in a separate unrelated 
incident as revenge for having been wronged by a person related 
to the owner of the car.   
¶9 
For purposes of analysis of the issues before us, 
there are several key points on that timeline.  In 2001, Conner 
was arrested and charged with violating a restraining order in 
connection with harassing acts targeting the Gainors.  That case 
is not directly before us, but it is relevant here because a 
copy of a motion to admit evidence of other acts filed in that 
case was appended to the complaint in the 2005 stalking case 
against Conner.  That document listed numerous alleged acts of 
harassing conduct that occurred between July 2000 and September 
30, 2001, summarized in the State's brief as follows: 
- James [Gainor] and Conner had been involved in a 
brief relationship that ended in May 2000. 
- James began seeing Rhonda Sugden in 2000. 
- Conner began calling James in the first week of 
July, 2000. 
- In October 2000, Rhonda began receiving calls from 
Conner. 
- Conner entered James' home on October 4, 2000, and 
used his phone to call James, who was at Rhonda's 
home. 
- On October 5, 2000, Conner and her sister came to 
James's property and got into an argument with James. 
Conner followed Rhonda around. 
- On October 6, 2000, Conner came to Rhonda's place of 
employment 
and 
gave 
her 
a 
letter 
containing 
accusations about James. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
11 
 
- In October and November, 2000, both James and Rhonda 
received numerous prank calls; caller I.D. identified 
the calls as coming from Conner's house and pay 
phones. 
- Conner called Rhonda's daughter and mother numerous 
times in November and December 2000. 
- Conner called James during the first week of 
December 2000 and stated that she was going to cause 
problems with Rhonda when the couple attended James's 
work Christmas party. 
- Conner called Rhonda and repeated her threat to 
cause problems at the Christmas party. 
- During the first week of December 2000 James began 
experiencing 
vandalism 
to 
his 
vehicle, 
including 
[finding that someone had] flatten[ed] his tires. 
- 
On 
December 
15, 
2000, 
James 
discovered 
the 
windshield of his truck smashed. 
- On December 25, 2000, Conner warned James to watch 
where he parked [his car] so that Conner "won't be 
tempted to" do something to it. 
- On January 2, 2001, Conner called Rhonda's place of 
employment twice claiming to be Rhonda's mother. 
- On January 4, 2001, Conner called Rhonda's son's 
school claiming to be Rhonda and told school officials 
to keep Rhonda's son off the school bus because she 
would pick him up.  When no one picked her son up, 
Rhonda had to leave work to pick him up. 
- On January 24, 2001, someone called twice attempting 
to cancel the reservation at the facility hosting [the 
Gainors'] wedding reception. 
- On January 24, 2001, someone called Rhonda's place 
of employment; after finding out Rhonda was on jury 
duty, the person called the Richland County Clerk of 
Court [falsely] claiming to be the school nurse and 
informed the clerk that Rhonda needed to go to the 
emergency room as soon as possible. Rhonda was excused 
from jury duty. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
12 
 
- On January 26, 2001, a man called Rhonda from a pay 
phone Conner had previously used and threatened James. 
- On January 26, 2001, James again discovered the 
windshield of his vehicle smashed. 
- 
James 
and 
Rhonda 
received 
numerous 
magazine 
subscriptions they had not ordered, [and] received 
crank phone calls at work, some from Conner's sister. 
- On February 16, 2001, the circuit court enjoined 
Conner from harassing James and Rhonda. 
- On September 29, 2001, Conner barged into James's 
residence and demanded he leave. 
- On September 30, 2001, Conner called claiming to be 
"Monica"; caller I.D. identified the call as coming 
from Conner's sister's residence. 
¶10 In 2003, when that case went to trial, the jury 
convicted Conner of three counts of violating a harassment 
restraining order.  She also was convicted on a no contest plea 
of two counts of unlawful use of a telephone.  The judgments of 
conviction for those five counts were entered June 30 and August 
7 of 2003.   
¶11 In 2005, Conner was charged in a complaint with two 
counts of stalking and one count of criminal damage to property 
in connection with the November 30, 2005, incident described 
above.  The charges were two counts of stalking with a previous 
conviction within seven years in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(b) and one count of criminal damage to property in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1).  This is the case that 
gives rise to the instant appeal. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
13 
 
¶12 The timeline may also be helpful at the outset in 
sorting the evidence at issue in this case into the following 
categories:   
(1) There are the acts targeting the Gainors for which 
Conner was charged in 2001, and of those, the ones for which she 
was ultimately convicted (unlawful phone calls and violations of 
a harassment restraining order). 
(2) There were acts underlying prior convictions for crimes 
targeting other victims.  Of those, the only acts we concern 
ourselves with are those the circuit court permitted into 
evidence in this case.  The circuit court permitted, as showing 
modus operandi, evidence of a conviction for keying the vehicle 
of a person related to a person with whom Conner was involved in 
a dispute.10  The circuit court prohibited evidence of the acts 
underlying the remainder of the convictions, though the fact of 
nine 
prior 
convictions 
did 
come 
in 
during 
Conner's 
own 
testimony. 
(3) There were acts of harassment prior to 2001 that never 
resulted in charges.  These included prank calls, flattened 
tires on Gainor's vehicle, windshields shattered on a truck and 
car, unauthorized entrance to Gainor's home by Conner, threats 
to damage property, and the bogus magazine subscriptions sent to 
                                                 
10 The jury instruction regarding this evidence stated that 
it was for the purpose of identity; Conner did not object to the 
jury instruction, so we need not address the reason for any 
apparent discrepancy between the reason given by the court in 
ruling 
on 
the 
motion 
and 
the 
subsequently 
given 
jury 
instruction. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
14 
 
the Gainor address.  These acts were detailed in the motion to 
admit other-acts evidence that was filed in a 2001 case, prior 
to the instant case and recited above. 
(4) There were other uncharged acts that the prosecutor 
alleged Conner had done between 2001 and 2005, such as the 
dumping of a gallon of paint on Gainor's truck, a vehicle 
scratched, spray paint sprayed on truck, a car windshield 
smashed, locks on car and on truck vandalized with glue, car 
scratched on both sides, and ongoing crank calls to home, work, 
and the school Gainor's stepson attended.  These acts were 
testified to by the Gainors and other witnesses at trial. 
(5) There are the acts alleged to have occurred on November 
30, 2005.  This conduct was detailed in the complaint dated 
December 7, 2005.  In the police reports appended to the 
complaint, the incident is described as happening in the 
midafternoon of November 30, 2005.  James Gainor had left his 
vehicle parked near his workplace, the Richland Center post 
office, with the intention of having his wife pick him up after 
work to drive their son to a doctor's appointment in Madison.  
When he came out of the post office that afternoon, he noticed 
someone walking around his vehicle and then saw that the vehicle 
had been scratched on every side, including the hood.  He 
recognized that the person he had noticed next to the truck was 
Conner and angrily shouted at her that he had seen her 
scratching the truck.  Conner had been walking away from him, 
but turned to face him and angrily deny that he had seen her do 
anything; she then went to her own car and drove away.  Rhonda 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
15 
 
Gainor had driven up to pick up James Gainor and witnessed the 
confrontation, as did Gainor's stepson.  The Gainors called the 
police from a cell phone, reported the incident, and then left 
to take their child to the doctor.  The officer who responded to 
the scene included in his report that the scratches had left a 
large quantity of paint chips that he collected as evidence.  He 
also observed fresh footprints in the snow between the curb next 
to the truck and the sidewalk.  The Gainors later gave 
additional statements to the police, as did Conner. 
(6) There are acts alleged to have occurred starting 
November 3, 2005, and continuing into mid-2006.  These included 
multiple occasions of food orders placed at restaurants in the 
Gainors' name, calls to Rhonda Gainor's parents' home, a call to 
Rhonda Gainor's workplace, Wal-Mart, purporting to be Rhonda 
Gainor and notifying her supervisor that she would not be 
reporting to work for two weeks, and a taunting call to Rhonda 
Gainor at work inquiring about a friend who had died that week.  
This evidence is described in the State's other-acts evidence 
motion filed in this case. 
¶13 An 
understanding 
of 
the 
categories 
of 
acts 
is 
necessary to an understanding of both of Conner's arguments.  
The 
first 
is 
that 
in 
violation 
of 
due 
process 
notice 
requirements, the complaint and information charged stalking 
crimes that include an element of a "course of conduct," i.e., 
"a series of two or more acts," yet a single incident on 
November 30, 2005 is listed as a factual basis for the charges.  
Conner argues that she had no notice of what specific acts she 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
16 
 
would be required to defend against as to these charges.  
Further, the State then was permitted to introduce acts from the 
first through fourth categories, both convictions and uncharged 
acts, as other-acts evidence.  Conner's argument, in other 
words, is that evidence that might properly have been admitted 
as "other-acts evidence" was essentially converted into evidence 
of an element of the crime without those acts ever having been 
properly charged as such.   
¶14 The 
second 
of 
Conner's 
challenges 
concerns 
the 
question of which category or categories of acts may be used to 
prove the "within seven years after the prior conviction" 
element such that the crime becomes a Class H felony.  If the 
statute requires that a new "course of conduct" must be proved 
after the 2003 conviction, then the conviction here was not 
properly obtained, Conner argues, because in this case, the jury 
was directed to consider the 2003 convictions themselves as 
fulfilling the course of conduct element for the present charge.  
Even though there were alleged acts from 2003 through 2005 that 
might, if proved, otherwise satisfy the requirement, those acts 
were not charged. 
¶15 At the circuit court, Conner moved to dismiss the 
charges on the grounds that the complaint failed to establish 
probable cause because the single incident could not constitute 
a "course of conduct."  The motion was denied.  The State moved 
to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, pursuant 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
17 
 
to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) (2005-06).11  The motion sought to 
introduce evidence of some uncharged conduct directed at the 
Gainors and their family and four prior convictions for similar 
conduct.  As noted above, the circuit court permitted the 
introduction of the evidence related to the Gainors and to the 
conviction for keying a vehicle in an unrelated case.  The jury 
heard three days of testimony.  The prosecution presented the 
following witnesses in addition to the officers who investigated 
the case: James and Rhonda Gainor both testified concerning the 
events of November 30 and the history of events dating to 2000.  
Their young son, who witnessed the November 30 altercation, also 
testified.  Rhonda Gainor's daughter testified about the calls 
she had answered at her mother's home during 2000 and 2001, 
stating that in some calls Conner identified herself and in 
others she gave a different name, but that the voice had been 
recognizably hers.  Conner's probation officer testified that 
Conner had given her a statement admitting keying Joy Stoltz's 
vehicle in 2003.  The IT manager from Conner's previous employer 
testified that he had traced prank calls in 2001 at the request 
of the sheriff and had determined that they had come from 
Conner's work phone.  Stoltz testified that she had seen Conner 
                                                 
11 The relevant portion of this statute provides, "Except as 
provided in par. (b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This 
subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident."  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) (2005-06). 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
18 
 
keying her vehicle in her driveway at night and then fleeing 
before the police arrived.  She described "deep scratches all on 
[the] hood, all down the side and on [the] trunk."   
¶16 Conner testified and presented witnesses including 
several family members and an acquaintance, as well as the 
library director, and a payroll custodian from the hospital 
where she worked who presented evidence that she had not been 
clocked in on one day in 2003 when a call was allegedly made 
from her work phone.  The defense also, by presenting a 
computer-generated video reenactment of the November 30 incident 
and expert testimony about the reenactment, sought to prove that 
Conner could not have been near the vehicle, and that the 
confrontation could not have happened as the Gainors had 
testified it did.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 
count of stalking James Gainor and verdicts of not guilty on the 
counts of criminal damage to property and of stalking Rhonda 
Gainor.  Conner brought a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, which was denied, and then appealed the conviction.  
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.  It reasoned that 
Conner's notice issue was without merit because the information 
contained allegations corresponding to each of the elements of 
stalking in the statute, satisfying the notice requirement, and 
that Conner's challenge to the application of the statute was 
without merit because "the final act charged, the keying of the 
Gainors' vehicle, occurred within seven years of Conner's 
previous conviction." State v. Conner, 2009 WI App 143, ¶19, 321 
Wis. 2d 449, 775 N.W.2d 105. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
19 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 Where the sufficiency of a pleading is challenged on 
constitutional grounds, it presents a question of law that is 
reviewed without deference.  State v. Chambers, 173 Wis. 2d 237, 
251, 496 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1992).  The second issue in this 
case requires interpreting a statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2) and 
(2m)(b); statutory interpretation presents a question of law, 
which this court reviews de novo.  State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, 
¶18, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶18 As already noted, there are two issues to resolve in 
this case.  They are 1) whether Conner received constitutionally 
adequate notice of allegations relating to the course of conduct 
element of the stalking statute and 2) whether, in the provision 
describing a Class H felony, the element requiring that the 
"present violation" occur within seven years of a prior 
conviction is satisfied where a single post-conviction incident, 
rather than a series of acts, is alleged in the complaint and 
information. 
¶19 Conner was convicted under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2) and 
the conviction became a Class H felony under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(b).  Those provisions state:  
(2) Whoever meets all of the following criteria is 
guilty of a Class I felony: 
(a) The actor intentionally engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause 
a reasonable person under the same circumstances to 
suffer serious emotional distress or to fear bodily 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
20 
 
injury to or the death of himself or herself or a 
member of his or her family or household. 
(b) The actor knows or should know that at least one 
of the acts that constitute the course of conduct will 
cause the specific person to suffer serious emotional 
distress or place the specific person in reasonable 
fear of bodily injury to or the death of himself or 
herself or a member of his or her family or household. 
(c) The actor's acts cause the specific person to 
suffer serious emotional distress or induce fear in 
the specific person of bodily injury to or the death 
of himself or herself or a member of his or her family 
or household. 
 . . .  
(2m) Whoever violates sub. (2) is guilty of a Class H 
felony if any of the following applies: 
 . . .  
(b) The actor has a previous conviction for a crime, 
the victim of that crime is the victim of the present 
violation of sub. (2), and the present violation 
occurs within 7 years after the prior conviction. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2), (2m)(b). 
Conner's challenges center on the "course of conduct" element, 
as noted above.  She argues that the State failed to allege a 
course of conduct as to the charges and failed to allege a new 
course of conduct following the 2003 convictions as is necessary 
to elevate the charges to Class H felonies.  "Course of conduct" 
is defined in Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(a) as follows: 
 
“Course of conduct” means a series of 2 or more acts 
carried out over time, however short or long, that 
show a continuity of purpose, including any of the 
following: 
1. Maintaining a visual or physical proximity to the 
victim. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
21 
 
2. Approaching or confronting the victim. 
3. Appearing at the victim's workplace or contacting 
the victim's employer or coworkers. 
4. Appearing at the victim's home or contacting the 
victim's neighbors. 
5. Entering property owned, leased, or occupied by the 
victim. 
6. Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the 
victim's telephone or any other person's telephone to 
ring repeatedly or continuously, regardless of whether 
a conversation ensues. 
6m. 
Photographing, 
videotaping, 
audiotaping, 
or, 
through any other electronic means, monitoring or 
recording 
the 
activities 
of 
the 
victim. 
This 
subdivision applies regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
7. Sending material by any means to the victim or, for 
the 
purpose 
of 
obtaining 
information 
about, 
disseminating information about, or communicating with 
the victim, to a member of the victim's family or 
household or an employer, coworker, or friend of the 
victim. 
8. Placing an object on or delivering an object to 
property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim. 
9. Delivering an object to a member of the victim's 
family or household or an employer, coworker, or 
friend of the victim or placing an object on, or 
delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or 
occupied by such a person with the intent that the 
object be delivered to the victim. 
10. Causing a person to engage in any of the acts 
described in subds. 1. to 9. 
A. The due process notice claim 
¶20 The framework for analyzing a claim of inadequate 
notice of 
charges, 
set forth in Holesome v. State, 40 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d 95, 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968), was discussed and put into 
its constitutional context in State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 
230 N.W.2d 253 (1975). The George court first noted that "the 
scope of the state's latitude [with] respect [to alleging with 
precision the time of the commission of a crime] is restricted 
by due process and by art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution which guarantee to an accused the right to be 
informed of 'the nature and cause of the accusation.'" George, 
69 Wis. 2d at 97.  It then quoted the test from Holesome: 
 
In order to determine the sufficiency of the charge, 
two factors are considered. They are whether the 
accusation 
is 
such that the defendant determine 
whether it states an offense to which he is able to 
plead and prepare a defense and whether conviction or 
acquittal is a bar to another prosecution for the same 
offense. 
Id. 
¶21 Holesome, in turn, cites its test as originating in 
several earlier cases including an 1863 case, Fink v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26 (1863).  Holesome, 40 Wis. 2d at 102 n.2.  
In Fink, a defendant had been charged with a violation of a city 
ordinance that created a fine for any person guilty of 
intoxication, 
indecent 
exposure, 
obscene 
language, 
"loud, 
boisterous or insulting language, tending to incite a breach of 
the peace," or disorderly conduct.  Fink, 17 Wis. at 28.  As the 
Fink court noted in reversing the judgment, "It will be seen 
that this ordinance provides for the punishment of five distinct 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
23 
 
offenses, and it is utterly impossible to determine from the 
complaint with which one the party was charged."  Id.  It was in 
this context that the test that came to be known as the Holesome 
test was first set forth:   
Now it is an elementary rule of criminal law, 
that . . . the 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
which 
constitute the offense . . . must be stated with such 
certainty and precision that the defendant may be 
enabled to judge whether they constitute an indictable 
offense or not, in order that he may demur or plead to 
the indictment accordingly, prepare his defense, and 
be able to plead the conviction or acquittal in bar of 
another prosecution for the same offense."   
Fink, 17 Wis. at 28-29.   
In Fink, the charging documents failed both prongs of the test 
because both the ordinance and the charging document were 
imprecisely drafted.  Id.  The court also noted that the record 
would not indicate for what specific offense the defendant would 
have been convicted.  Id. at 28. 
¶22 Conner concedes that she had sufficient notice as to 
the November 30 incident, and at oral argument conceded in 
response to questioning from the court that a prosecution based 
on a theory that her conduct on that date satisfied the "course 
of conduct" element would not be challengeable on these grounds.  
She argues, however, that as the case was actually tried and 
argued to the jury, she did not have notice that certain 
evidence would ultimately be used to satisfy the course of 
conduct element because the State was improperly allowed at 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
24 
 
trial to expand the scope of the offense to a course of conduct 
spanning five years.12 
¶23 Conner argues that under the notice prong of the test, 
the facts of this case parallel those of Kaufman, a case where 
the court of appeals reversed a judgment because the State had 
charged an offense as having occurred between two specified 
dates and then sought to treat the offense as a continuing 
violation, introducing evidence from prior dates.  State v. 
Kaufman, 188 Wis. 2d 485, 491-93, 525 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 
1994).  The Kaufman court held that the State was "bound by the 
time period specified in the information."  Id. at 493.  Conner 
argues that Kaufman's reasoning is applicable here and would bar 
any use of acts from prior to November 30, 2005, the date given 
in the complaint, for the purpose of proving the course of 
conduct element of the charge.  
¶24 The State counters that the complaint must be given "a 
common sense reading,"13 that the information need not repeat 
facts set forth in the complaint,14 and that the complaint may 
incorporate a document,15 as the complaint against Conner 
                                                 
12 Her other related challenge, that it was improper for the 
State to be allowed to use the 2003 convictions themselves to 
satisfy the course of conduct element because the "present 
violation" must have occurred after the previous conviction, 
implicates the application of the statute addressed in the 
second part of the analysis, see infra Part III.B. 
13 State v. Smaxwell, 2000 WI App 112, ¶5, 235 Wis. 2d 230, 
612 N.W.2d 756. 
14 Copening, 103 Wis. 2d at 577. 
15 Williams, 47 Wis. 2d at 252. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
25 
 
properly 
did. 
 
The 
complaint 
attaches 
and 
explicitly 
incorporates: 
1) police reports of two officers detailing the investigation of 
the November 30 incident; 
2) a property crime non-consent form related to the November 30 
incident, signed by the Gainors; and 
3) a copy of a motion filed in the prior case seeking to admit 
evidence of other acts by Conner and listing at least 27 
specific acts and specifying the date on which each is alleged 
to have occurred.  
¶25 The test we apply is whether the complaint and 
information "state[] an offense to which [the defendant] is able 
to plead and prepare a defense" and "whether a conviction or 
acquittal is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."  
State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 573, 309 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. 
App. 1981).  Of the cases in which Wisconsin courts have had 
occasion to apply the Holesome test, the challenge presented 
here most closely resembles those in which the alleged lack of 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
26 
 
notice arises from the complaint's lack of specificity about 
when in a long period of time the alleged crime took place.16   
¶26 The two cases that are on point17 involve allegations 
of illegal conduct that spans a period of time.  In the first, 
State v. George, the State had appealed the dismissal of 29 
counts charging the defendant with illegally taking bets on 
football and basketball games.  State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 
                                                 
16 State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 230 N.W.2d 253 (1975) 
(affirming circuit court's dismissal of certain counts because 
"each count covers an expansive period of time without stating 
at what point or points during that period the alleged crimes 
were committed"); State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 421 
N.W.2d 77 (1988) (finding no constitutional violation of notice 
where charging documents alleged an occurrence of sexual contact 
had occurred during a six-week period of time); State v. 
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding 
sufficient 
notice 
where charging documents alleged sexual 
assaults occurring during six months preceding December 1985); 
State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 197, 257 Wis. 2d 124, 650 
N.W.2d 850 (finding allegations covering four-year charging 
period sufficient to permit a defendant to prepare a defense).  
Two other lines of cases involving notice challenges are those 
involving convictions for lesser included offenses, as in 
Holesome (e.g., Martin v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 499, 204 N.W.2d 499 
(1973)) and those challenging on notice grounds the "on or about 
[date]" language commonly used in charging documents (e.g., 
Blenski v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 685, 245 N.W.2d 906 (1976); Thomas 
v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 372, 284 N.W.2d 917 (1979)). 
17 Because the cases that involve allegations of sexual 
assault of a child implicate considerations not relevant to this 
case, we do not look to the reasoning of those cases as to the 
notice prong of the test.  See, e.g., Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 
254 ("In a case involving a child victim . . . a more flexible 
application of notice requirements is required and permitted.  
The vagaries of a child's memory more properly go to the 
credibility of the witness and the weight of the testimony, 
rather than to the legality of the prosecution in the first 
instance."). 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
27 
 
94-95, 230 N.W.2d 253 (1975).  Without giving the specific acts 
or when they were committed, each of the dismissed counts 
alleged illegal acts that occurred at some point during periods 
of time that were as long as four months.  Id. at 94-96.  The 
court held that the complaint satisfied neither prong of the 
Holesome test and upheld the dismissal of the counts as to the 
notice prong on the following grounds: 
[I]f 
the 
twenty-nine 
dismissed 
counts 
allege 
continuous offenses they are faulty because they are 
multiplicitous.  If they allege single offenses they 
are faulty because they are duplicitous, vague and are 
not sufficient to afford the defendant a basis to 
plead or prepare a defense. 
Id. at 99-100. 
¶27 The second case that is arguably comparable to 
Conner's is State v. Kaufman, which involved two counts of a 
continuing violation of statutes prohibiting welfare fraud.  
Kaufman, 188 Wis. 2d at 488.  There the State alleged a 
violation spanning the time between June 21 and September 22, 
1991, and then sought to broaden the scope of the continuing 
offense to include evidence from before that period.  Id. at 
491-93.  While the challenge in Kaufman appears to have been to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, unlike Conner's challenge, the 
determination of whether a continuing offense was alleged 
required an analysis of the sufficiency of the charging 
documents, and the court's analysis alluded to constitutional 
notice requirements and cited to the pages of George that 
discuss Holesome.  Kaufman, 180 Wis. 2d at 490, 492.  The court 
found that the complaint was insufficient because "the State did 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
28 
 
not allege a date from which the continuing offense allegedly 
began" which made it impossible for Kaufman to know that "she 
would have to prepare a defense to a continuing violation."  Id. 
at 492. 
¶28 The complaint in Conner's case suffers from neither of 
the problems present in George and Kaufman.  Unlike the faulty 
charging documents in George, for example, the complaint here, 
with its incorporated documents, listed 27 dates on which 
specific acts occurred.  And unlike the incomplete complaint in 
Kaufman,18 which failed to give notice of a continuing violation, 
the complaint against Conner alleged a "course of conduct" and 
alleged that "the basis for the complainant's charge is 
contained in the attached police reports . . . , the Property 
Crime Non-consent Statement signed by James Gainor and Rhonda 
Sugden and the factual basis contained in the attached Motion to 
Introduce Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts . . . [in a 
separate case], all of which are incorporated into this 
Complaint by this reference and attachments."  It is, of course, 
                                                 
18 Indeed, the Kaufman court contrasted the attempt to 
improperly expand the prosecution with a complaint in another 
welfare fraud prosecution, John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 291 
N.W.2d 502 
(1980), 
that 
did 
not 
run 
afoul 
of 
notice 
requirements.  Kaufman, 188 Wis. 2d at 493.  In John, the 
charged violation was alleged to have occurred from April 1, 
1972, through June 30, 1977, and the complaint specifically 
included the time prior to the charged violation, in 1970, when 
the child falsely being claimed as a household member had 
actually moved elsewhere.  John, 96 Wis. 2d at 186.  The 
complaint filed here, like the one in John, omitted none of the 
necessary dates required to give the defendant notice of the 
allegations. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
29 
 
true that in a stalking case, the acts alleged as part of the 
course of conduct need not be chargeable as individual criminal 
offenses.  See State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶36, 315 
Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557 ("[S]talking statutes criminalize 
what otherwise would be legitimate behavior based upon the fact 
that the behavior induces fear . . . ." (quoting Nat'l Inst. of 
Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-
Stalking Code for States 49 (1993))). 
¶29 It is implicit in Conner's due process challenge that 
there 
are 
necessarily 
difficulties 
in 
defending 
against 
allegations of this nature, and that is true; it is equally true 
that it is difficult to prove them, which is undoubtedly why so 
much of the alleged conduct the Gainors experienced remained 
uncharged.  Even so, there was evidence in the record from prior 
cases that Conner admitted making calls to the Gainors in which 
she did not identify herself, testimony from witnesses who knew 
Conner's voice that she had been the person making the anonymous 
calls, evidence that she admitted damaging another person's 
vehicle by severely scratching it, testimony that video evidence 
had been introduced in prior cases of Conner making calls that 
she had denied making, testimony from Conner herself that she 
had previously lied to police when denying damaging a vehicle, 
and testimony that when Conner was in jail on unrelated charges, 
the Gainors had temporary relief from harassing anonymous phone 
calls and vandalism.  In the context of this case, there was 
further testimony from Conner that she had kept written records 
of every occasion she saw the Gainors, including the date and 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
30 
 
location, which, if true, would likely be admissible and would 
be helpful evidence for her in rebutting untrue allegations.19  
In short, while the prosecutor might well have worded the 
complaint more precisely, there was no constitutional infirmity 
to the complaint as it was worded because there was no question 
of what allegations Connor faced. The difficulty presented in 
mounting a defense here had nothing to do with any technical 
wording of the complaint, which we noted above, explicitly 
incorporated by reference a document listing at least 27 
specific acts and specifying the date on which each is alleged 
to have occurred.   
¶30 The second part of the Holesome test deals with the 
question of double jeopardy.  As noted above, in the case from 
which 
the 
Holesome 
test 
was 
taken, 
there 
were 
obvious 
implications for double jeopardy created by the combination of 
an imprecise charging document and the expansive language of the 
relevant ordinance, which included a laundry list of prohibited 
acts.  See supra ¶21.  The statute in this case involves a 
continuous crime, that of stalking, a situation that this court 
                                                 
19 In applying the Holesome test in a case involving 
allegations of child sexual assault during treatment sessions 
with a therapist, the court acknowledged "the problem of dimmed 
memories and the possibility that the defendant may not be able 
to sufficiently recall or reconstruct the history regarding the 
allegations"; it thus found it relevant under the facts of that 
case that the defendant, as the victim's therapist, "had the 
benefit of his own notes and records documenting the dates of 
his treatment sessions with [the victim]."  Miller, 257 
Wis. 2d 124, ¶35. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
31 
 
addressed in George.  There, when applying the Holesome test, we 
stated: 
[U]nder the state's theory, each of the dismissed 
counts charges a continuing crime. The established 
rule, as stated in 1 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law 
and Procedure (1957), p. 351, sec. 145, is that[] 
"Only one prosecution may be had for a continuing 
crime. When an offense charged consists of a series of 
acts extending over a period of time, a conviction or 
acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that 
period will bar a prosecution covering the whole 
period . . . ." 
George, 69 Wis. 2d at 97-98. 
¶31 In addition, as noted above, at oral argument, the 
State acknowledged that a future prosecution of Conner for 
stalking for the same course of conduct would violate double 
jeopardy protections.  In Fawcett, in concluding that the second 
prong of the Holesome test had been satisfied, the court noted 
that "double jeopardy is [not] a realistic threat in this case," 
and gave as a reason that "the state concedes that Fawcett may 
not again be charged with any sexual assault growing out of this 
incident."  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 255. 
¶32 Because the complaint charged a course of conduct and 
incorporated documents listing detailed acts along with specific 
dates on which they allegedly occurred, we hold that the 
complaint and information stated an offense to which Conner was 
"able to plead or prepare a defense," and we concur with the 
State that "conviction or acquittal is a bar to another 
prosecution for the same offense."  Under the Holesome test, 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
32 
 
therefore, the complaint was sufficient, and we affirm the court 
of appeals' decision on that issue. 
B. Statute 
¶33 The issue raised by Conner's second argument concerns 
the proper application of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b), which 
elevates a conviction for stalking to a Class H felony under 
specific circumstances, and thus subjects the convicted person 
to a higher penalty.  Conner argues that the language of the 
statute does not properly apply to the facts of this case; in 
other words, even if she is guilty of violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32, 
the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(b) applies are not present here. 
¶34 Those circumstances are set forth in the statute as 
follows: 
(2m) Whoever violates sub. (2) is guilty of a Class H 
felony if any of the following applies: 
 . . .  
(b) The actor has a previous conviction for a crime, 
the victim of that crime is the victim of the present 
violation of sub. (2), and the present violation 
occurs within 7 years after the prior conviction. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b). 
¶35 Conner argues that Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) requires 
that the words "present violation" be read as meaning the 
current stalking violation.  She contends that when read 
together with the definition of "course of conduct" in the 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
33 
 
statute,20 Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) is properly read as meaning 
that "a series of 2 or more acts" must occur "within 7 years 
after the prior conviction."  Here, Conner argues, only one act, 
the one occurring on November 30, occurred after the prior 
conviction, and therefore, the portion of the statute making her 
crime a Class H felony was not properly applied to her.  Conner 
further asserts that the circuit court's improper reading of the 
statute led to the giving of jury instructions that, contrary to 
the properly given limiting instruction,21 invited the jury to 
consider as evidence the acts that the circuit court had 
initially admitted as other-acts evidence.  This was so because 
the jury instruction given, Wisconsin Jury Instruction--Criminal 
1284, stated in part:  
Acts that you may find constitute a course of conduct 
are limited to: maintaining a visual or physical 
proximity to the victim; approaching or confronting 
the 
victim; 
appearing 
at 
the 
victim's 
home 
or 
contacting the victim's neighbors; entering property 
                                                 
20 Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(a) states, "In this section[] 
'Course of conduct' means a series of 2 or more acts carried out 
over time, however short or long, that show a continuity of 
purpose . . . ." 
21 The jury was given the following limiting instruction:  
"Evidence has been presented regarding other conduct of the 
defendant 
for 
which 
the 
defendant 
is 
not 
on 
trial.   
Specifically, evidence has been presented that the defendant 
intentionally caused damage to an automobile owned by Joy Stolz 
by scratching the paint with a sharp object.  If you find that 
this conduct did occur, you should consider it only on the issue 
of identity.  You may not consider this evidence to conclude 
that the defendant has a certain character or a certain 
character trait and that the defendant acted in conformity with 
that trait or character with respect to the offense charged in 
this case." 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
34 
 
owned, leased or occupied by the victim; contacting 
the victim by telephone or causing the victim's 
telephone or any other person's telephone to ring 
repeatedly or continuously regardless of whether a 
conversation 
ensues; 
photographing, 
videotaping, 
audiotaping, or, through any other electronic means, 
monitoring or recording the activities of the victim; 
sending material by any means to the victim, or, for 
the 
purpose 
of 
obtaining 
information 
about, 
disseminating information about, or communicacting 
with the victim, to a member of the victim's family or 
household or an employer, coworker or friend of the 
victim; placing an object on or delivering an object 
to property owned, leased or occupied by the victim; 
causing a person to engage in any of the acts 
described above. 
¶36 In contrast, the State points to the text of the 
statute, which uses the phrase "present violation" rather than 
the words "course of conduct"; and the context of the statute, 
which explicitly sets no time period for the acts, but rather 
states that they may be "carried out over time, however short or 
long," and must "show a continuity of purpose."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(1)(a), (2m)(b).  The State argues that there is no 
support in the statute for the requirement Conner describes. 
¶37 The court of appeals concisely summarized the parties' 
arguments on this score as follows: 
Conner contends that under the plain meaning of these 
provisions, once an individual has been convicted of a 
crime involving the same victim, the perpetrator must, 
within 
seven 
years 
of 
the 
prior 
offense, 
have 
committed at least two subsequent acts constituting a 
course of conduct in order to be subjected to the 
subsection's enhanced penalty.  Thus, Conner argues 
that the acts used to establish the crime of stalking 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) must be confined to 
acts which occurred after her June 2003 conviction for 
violating the Gainors' restraining order.  The State 
takes the position that under the plain meaning of 
these provisions, the course of conduct may include 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
35 
 
acts that occurred prior to Conner's June 2003 
conviction. 
Conner, 321 Wis. 2d 449, ¶13. 
¶38 The court of appeals examined the statute in light of 
this court's decision in Warbelton, 315 Wis. 2d 253.  The court 
of appeals cited Warbelton's discussion of the Wisconsin 
legislature's decision to adopt a "statutory scheme that 
delineates three degrees of stalking depending on the presence 
of aggravating factors." Conner, 321 Wis. 2d 449, ¶17.  That 
statutory scheme, Warbelton noted, followed a recommendation to 
state 
legislatures 
from 
the 
U.S. 
Department 
of 
Justice 
concerning stalking statutes, encouraging them to establish a 
"continuum of charges that could be used by law enforcement 
officials to intervene at various stages."  Warbelton, 315 
Wis. 2d 253, ¶37 (quoting Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for 
States 49 (1993))..  The court of appeals reasoned as follows: 
Conner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) 
is inconsistent with the reasoning underlying the 
statute. . . . [Under 
her 
interpretation,] 
[t]he 
conviction 
would effectively serve to sever the 
continuum of stalking behavior that could be taken 
into consideration in making the charging decision, 
and would permit the consideration of only certain of 
the acts closer in time to the present charged 
offense. 
Conner, 321 Wis. 2d 449, ¶18. 
The court of appeals concluded that "the seven year time 
restriction specified in Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) requires 
that only the final act charged as part of a course of conduct 
occur within seven years of the previous conviction, and does 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
36 
 
not restrict by time the other acts used to establish the 
underlying course of conduct element of sub. (2)."  Id., ¶19. 
¶39 Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we 
address de novo. Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶18.  As we have often 
recited, our approach to a statute is one in which we focus on 
the text and the context of the statute: 
Context is important to meaning. So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative 
language appears. Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results.  Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage. 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (internal citations 
omitted). 
¶40 The text and context of this statute indicate that the 
statutory language does not have the meaning Conner suggests.22  
First, there is no language in the provision itself that limits 
the meaning of "present violation" to a course of conduct that 
occurs in its entirety only after the earlier conviction.  
Second, and more persuasively, the surrounding language makes 
clear that the continuum of conduct—acts "carried out over time, 
                                                 
22 The court of appeals took a slightly different path to 
its 
conclusion, 
initially 
deciding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(b) is ambiguous and proceeding to consider evidence 
of legislative intent.  Conner, 321 Wis. 2d 449, ¶¶16-17.  
Because we find that the meaning of the statute's text is plain 
in its context, we need not take that path. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
37 
 
however short or long"—is the essence of a stalking crime; to 
read the language as Conner does would result in shearing off 
evidence of a course of conduct that had been continuous and was 
punctuated by a conviction in 2003, which conviction was itself 
a part of the continuous conduct the statute criminalizes.   
¶41 In this case, interpreting a statute reasonably to 
avoid absurd results and giving reasonable effect to the words 
of the statute mean that we must avoid a construction that, 
where the statute's words state explicitly otherwise, would 
insulate a defendant from liability for certain acts in a course 
of conduct that spans a period of time during which there has 
been a conviction.  Where the elements of the controlling 
definition of the crime in the statute have been satisfied, it 
would frustrate the application of the entire statute to read 
into (2m)(b) a condition that eliminates certain acts from 
consideration and severs a course of conduct into what are, in 
effect, successive courses of conduct.  In this case, it would 
mean that acts by Conner that would otherwise be eligible to 
prove a course of conduct would be barred from being so used 
when the statute explicitly states that the acts the finder of 
fact may consider may span a period of time "however short or 
long." 
¶42 Because the statute explicitly states that it applies 
to acts that occur over a period of time, "however . . . long," 
and 
because 
Conner's 
construction 
of 
the 
statute 
would 
necessarily lead to excising from proper consideration acts in a 
course of conduct that the language of the statute specifically 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
38 
 
contemplates covering, we hold that the application of (2m)(b) 
was correctly applied where the "present violation" was a course 
of conduct that continued through November 30, 2005.   
¶43 There are two further points to mention with regard to 
the acts making up the course of conduct in this case.  First, 
we reiterate that it is not necessary for us to decide the 
double jeopardy question or address the second prong of the test 
in this case.  Given the facts of this case and our 
interpretation of the statute, double jeopardy concerns are not 
implicated by Conner's prosecution on these stalking charges 
because this is not a situation where successive identical 
prosecutions for stalking are being undertaken using the same 
past acts to satisfy the elements of the charges.  This court 
described the principles that guide a double jeopardy analysis 
in a case we decided in the wake of U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 
(1993), the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision that retreated from 
Grady, a short-lived departure from the established Blockburger 
test, and firmly re-established the Blockburger test: 
We 
believe 
that 
Blockburger, 
and 
the 
case 
law 
developed around it, adequately protect the interests 
embodied 
in 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause. 
Under 
Blockburger, the state cannot successively prosecute a 
defendant 
for 
two 
offenses 
unless 
each 
offense 
necessarily requires proof of an element the other 
does not. Neither can the state prosecute an offense 
whose elements are “incorporated” into the elements of 
an offense already prosecuted.  Finally, the state 
cannot relitigate factual issues that have already 
been adjudicated to the defendant's benefit in an 
earlier prosecution.  These protections ensure that 
defendants will not be forced to unfairly “run the 
gauntlet” a second time for the same offense. 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
39 
 
Of course, we recognize that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause's prohibition against “successive prosecutions” 
protects different interests than does its prohibition 
against “multiple punishments.”  Still, we do not 
believe that these different interests necessarily 
require 
or 
even 
recommend 
separate 
analyses. 
Blockburger's emphasis on statutory elements is simple 
and objective. It provides defendants, courts, and 
prosecutors certainty as to which offenses are the 
same for double jeopardy purposes. Moreover, it is the 
approach that best comports with the language of the 
double jeopardy clause. Blockburger is not a perfect 
test, but it is better than Grady's “same conduct” 
approach. We hereby follow the United States Supreme 
Court and adopt the analysis of Dixon and Blockburger 
in 
double 
jeopardy 
cases 
involving 
successive 
prosecutions. 
State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 524-25, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994) 
(internal citations omitted). 
¶44 Second, we note that the alleged acts of November 30, 
2005, themselves might well have provided a basis for the jury 
to find a violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) because under 
the list of acts that may constitute stalking, at least two were 
alleged to have occurred on that date.  A jury that was properly 
instructed, as the jury was here, might therefore reasonably 
have found that, looking solely to the elements of the statute 
and solely to the evidence of the acts alleged on November 30, 
2005, Conner had committed "a series of two or more acts" that 
qualified as stalking.  Both parties acknowledged as much at 
oral arguments before us. 
¶45 We therefore hold that the statute was properly 
applied to Conner such that the conviction was for a Class H 
felony. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
40 
 
¶46 A two-prong test for evaluating the sufficiency of the 
charge addresses constitutionally sufficient notice and exposure 
to double jeopardy.  The challenge here is focused only on the 
first prong, that of sufficient notice.  In Wisconsin, "[a] 
defendant has the benefit of both the factual allegations 
required in the complaint and the final statutory charges 
alleged in the information."  Copening, 103 Wis. 2d at 576.  It 
is also settled that a complaint may appropriately incorporate 
other documents.  We hold that by appending and incorporating 
into the complaint documents listing and specifying the dates of 
alleged acts, both charged and uncharged, that began in 2000 and 
by alleging a "course of conduct," the State gave Conner notice 
of the allegations she would be required to defend against, and 
therefore there was no violation of Conner's due process right 
to notice. 
¶47 As to the application of the statute's language about 
requiring that "the present violation" have occurred "within 
seven years after the prior conviction," we hold that it was 
properly applied in this case because, in this case, the 
"present violation" was a continuing course of conduct that 
included the acts on November 30, 2005, and that occurred within 
seven years after the 2003 convictions for crimes involving the 
same victim.  Contrary to Conner's assertions, the statute does 
not specify how many acts in that course of conduct must take 
place after the prior conviction.  Such a reading is at odds 
with the context of the statute in which it appears, which 
defines stalking as acts "carried out over time, however short 
No. 
2008AP1296-CR   
 
41 
 
or long, that show a continuity of purpose."  Further, the list 
of acts the statute defines as stalking conduct makes clear that 
even if we read the statute as Conner suggests, the conviction 
in this case would still be proper because a properly instructed 
jury could reasonably find that evidence showed that on November 
30, 2005, Conner carried out more than one act constituting 
stalking behavior, and those acts were within seven years after 
the 2003 conviction involving the same victim. 
¶48 We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority 
begins 
by 
providing 
an 
avalanche 
of 
Conner's 
misconduct.  In doing so, the majority argues persuasively that 
Conner engaged in a remarkably massive series of stalking acts.  
But the issue before the court is whether the conviction for 
Class H felony stalking was obtained in accordance with the 
statutory requirements and Conner's due process rights.  I 
conclude it was not.  
I 
¶50 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) elevates a Class I 
felony stalking offense to a Class H felony.  In this case, 
Conner was charged and convicted of a Class H felony.  Section 
940.32(2m)(b) states as follows: 
(2m) Whoever violates sub. (2) [describing underlying 
Class I felony offense of stalking] is guilty of a 
Class H felony if any of the following applies: 
. . . . 
(b) The actor has a previous conviction for a crime, 
the victim of that crime is the victim of the present 
violation of sub. (2), and the present violation 
occurs within 7 years after the prior conviction 
(emphasis added). 
¶51 The statute requires the State to establish three 
elements to convict Conner of the Class H felony.   
¶52 First, the State must prove a violation of the 
stalking statute, which includes proving that the accused 
engaged in a "series of 2 or more acts carried out over time, 
however 
short 
or 
long, 
that 
show 
a 
continuity 
of 
purpose . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(a).   
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶53 Second, the State must prove that the defendant has a 
prior conviction for a crime and that the victim of that prior 
crime is the victim of the present violation of the stalking 
statute. 
¶54 Third, the State must prove that the present violation 
of the stalking statute occurred "within 7 years after the prior 
conviction."  
 
¶55 The disagreement in this case involves the third 
element: "the present violation occurs within 7 years after the 
prior conviction."  Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b).   
 
¶56 Conner asserts that the statutes require the State to 
confine the acts used to establish the present violation of the 
stalking offense to those acts that occurred after her June 2003 
conviction.  That is, Conner would restrict the course of 
conduct in the present violation to a time period consisting of 
the seven years after the prior conviction involving the same 
victim.   
¶57 In contrast, the State asserts that the course of 
conduct may include acts that occurred before Conner's June 2003 
conviction of a crime.  That is, the State would not restrict 
the course of conduct to any time period.  
 
¶58 The majority opinion agrees with the State's statutory 
interpretation, asserting that the definition of "course of 
conduct" "makes clear" that the "essence" of a stalking crime is 
acts carried out over time, however short or long.  Majority 
op., 
¶40. 
 
The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(b) 
places 
significant 
weight 
on 
the 
context 
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
provided by the plain language of the underlying stalking 
offense.  Majority op., ¶44.  This context is important to our 
interpretation of the stalking offense.  However, in relying 
upon the essence of the underlying stalking offense, I believe 
that the majority overrides the unambiguous language of a more 
specific element the legislature determined was necessary to 
prove a violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b), a class H 
felony.           
¶59 As I read the statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) 
delineates a specific timeframe within which the present course 
of conduct must be committed: The State must prove that the 
accused committed the present violation (which by definition 
means two or more acts) within the seven years after the prior 
conviction.  My reading of the statutory language is consistent 
with the text of the statute and the legislature's intent to 
establish delineated degrees of conduct that punish aggravated 
incidents of stalking behavior.  State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, 
¶¶38-39, 315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557.  The majority's 
interpretation of § 940.32(2m)(b), in my view, effectively 
undercuts the legislatively established graduated system of 
punishment for stalking.   
¶60 The majority opinion repeatedly states that the jury 
instructions were correct.  I disagree. 
¶61 Under my interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b), 
the jury instructions given in this case were erroneous.  The 
jury was not instructed to limit its consideration of acts 
constituting a course of conduct to acts occurring after the 
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
prior June 30, 2003 conviction.  Because of the instructions 
given, we do not know which acts the jury used in finding that 
Conner engaged in a course of conduct.     
¶62 Even 
under the majority's interpretation of the 
statute, 
it appears that at the very least Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(b) requires that one of the acts constituting the 
course of conduct in the underlying stalking violation must 
occur 
within 
seven 
years 
after 
the 
prior 
conviction.  
Nevertheless, adhering to the jury instructions given in the 
present case, the jury could have relied only upon acts 
occurring in 2000-2001 to establish Conner's course of conduct.  
This view of the jury verdict is supported by the jury's 
acquittal of Conner of the charge of criminal damage to property 
stemming from the November 30, 2005 incident.   
¶63 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the circuit 
court improperly admitted evidence of acts that preceded 
Conner's conviction of June 30, 2003, for the purpose of 
establishing the course of conduct element of the present 
stalking offense.  In light of the evidence offered in the 
instant case, and the jury instructions given, I can not be sure 
that the jury determined that any of the acts constituting the 
present course of conduct occurred after the prior 2003 
conviction.  Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of 
conviction entered against Conner. 
II 
¶64 I now turn to Conner's assertion that her due process 
right to notice was violated.  As the majority correctly states 
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
at ¶¶20 and 21, Conner has a due process right to notice of the 
facts the State claims constitute the offense charged.  Due 
process requires that the prosecution state an offense to which 
Conner is able to plead or prepare a defense.  
¶65 Conner concedes that she had proper notice regarding 
incidents occurring on or about November 30, 2005.  The alleged 
facts of these incidents were detailed by police investigation 
reports 
that 
the 
State 
expressly 
incorporated 
into 
the 
complaint.  Conner asserts, however, that her due process right 
was violated because the charging documents do not contain the 
time frame for which she was prosecuted for a continuing 
offense. 
¶66 The majority opinion concludes that the complaint gave 
Conner sufficient notice that the State was relying on 27 or so 
other incidents occurring in 2000-2001 to prove the 2005 
underlying charge of stalking.  These 27 or so incidents were 
listed in a motion that was attached to the complaint.  The 
motion had been filed in another case against Conner and was a 
motion seeking to admit other acts evidence against Conner.  
Majority op., ¶25.  Citing State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 
309 
N.W.2d 850 
(Ct. 
App. 
1981), 
the 
State 
asserts 
that 
evidentiary facts are generally found in the complaint and need 
not appear in the information.   
¶67 As I read the complaint, it is not clear that the 
State was contending that Conner had engaged in a course of 
conduct that spanned the years 2000 through November 2005.  If 
that was the point of the complaint, why did the State later in 
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
the present case move to seek admission of these prior acts set 
forth in the motion attached to the complaint (as well as later 
acts) as other acts evidence?  The circuit court in the present 
case originally ruled that this evidence of Conner's acts 
between 2000 and 2005 was admissible as other acts evidence for 
the purpose of establishing motive.  In a change of course in 
the waning moments of trial, the circuit court permitted the 
prosecutor to use these acts to establish the course of conduct 
element in the underlying stalking offense.  The number of 
alleged acts and the time frame of the acts to prove the crime 
were thus dramatically increased.   
¶68 Under these circumstances I cannot conclude that a 
list of acts set forth in a motion relating to another case 
against Conner and relating to the admission of other acts 
evidence against Conner gave Conner notice that the State was 
relying on the numerous acts specified in the motion to prove 
the 2005 underlying charge of stalking.   
¶69 For the reasons set forth, I would reverse the 
judgment of conviction.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1296-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1