Case Title: City of Homestead, Dade County v. Watkins

Citation: 285 So. 2d 394

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1973-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
285 So. 2d 394 (1973)
CITY OF HOMESTEAD, DADE COUNTY (Self-Insured), Petitioner,
v.
Daniel L. WATKINS and the Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
No. 43841.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 7, 1973.
Stuart Simon, County Atty., and Stanley B. Price, Asst. County Atty., for petitioner.
Dudley Burton, Burton & Burton, Miami, for respondents.
McCAIN, Justice.
This cause is before us to review a decision of the Industrial Relations Commission which reversed and remanded a decision of the Judge of Industrial Claims. We dispensed with oral argument as unnecessary. See Rule 3.10(e), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A.
The respondent, a building inspector for the petitioner, sustained an injury to his back when a ladder on which he was standing broke, causing him, after hanging onto a tie beam he was able to grab, to fall to the ground. As a result of this accident, which occurred on November 14, 1971, the respondent filed a claim against the petitioner seeking various workmen's compensation benefits. The claim was controverted by the petitioner upon the ground that the respondent had made a false representation concerning a known physical impairment and his medical history in obtaining employment with the petitioner, and thus was not entitled to benefits.
The record discloses that, while serving with the United States Air Force during World War II, the respondent suffered several disc injuries. These injuries resulted in the hospitalization of the respondent for approximately six months, during which time the respondent underwent disc surgery and had a spinal fusion. The respondent was then placed in a body cast for a period of five to six months and subsequently discharged from the service with an anatomical disability rating of 40%, for which he is still paid a pension.
In August, 1971, the respondent applied with the petitioner for employment and, as required, the respondent filled out a written application which included a medical questionnaire. The medical questionnaire contained the following pertinent questions:
The respondent answered all of these questions "No". The answers which the respondent gave were false and it is not argued by the respondent that he did not know they were false.
The Judge of Industrial Claims found that, in so answering the medical questionnaire, the respondent had knowingly misrepresented material facts; that the petitioner had relied upon the misrepresentations; that, had the petitioner known the correct answers to these questions, it would not have hired the respondent; and that there was a causal relationship between the misrepresentation and the respondent's injury. The Judge concluded as follows:
The Industrial Relations Commission reversed the Judge's decision, finding as follows:
The decision of the majority of the Commission was dissented with by Commissioner Coleman. After quoting extensively from the record, Commissioner Coleman stated:
The excerpts from the record which Commissioner Coleman based his decision upon consist of the testimony given by Olaf Pearson, City Manager. Mr. Pearson, the only person to interview the respondent, testified that he had looked at the application prior to hiring the respondent, and that he did not recall having been told of the respondent's true medical history. Additionally, Mr. Pearson stated that, had it been known what the respondent's true medical history was, he would not have been hired.
We agree with Commissioner Coleman that Mr. Pearson's testimony constitutes competent substantial evidence upon which the Judge of Industrial Claims could rely to find that the petitioner relied upon the misrepresentation of the respondent. We have fully considered the respondent's arguments to the contrary and find them to be without merit.
In reaching our decision, as did the Judge of Industrial Claims and the Industrial Relations Commission, we have applied this Court's decision in Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961). In Carpenter we adopted the following rule of law in cases of false representations:
In adopting such a rule, this Court relied upon several federal court decisions interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions. Subsequent to our decision, however, the rule established in those federal decisions was limited by the United States Supreme Court in Still v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 368 U.S. 35, 82 S. Ct. 148, 7 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1961).
In light of the Still decision, the respondent argues that we should reconsider and reverse our decision in Carpenter. We do not agree, for, while the applicable rule of law under the Federal Employer's Liability Act has been limited, the reasons behind the policy which was adopted in Carpenter are still persuasive. Those reasons were stated to be as follows:
The respondent does not suggest, nor do we find, that these reasons, somehow, no longer support the policy of Carpenter. We are therefore compelled to adhere to our decision in Carpenter. Accordingly, having found that there is competent substantial evidence to support the finding of the Judge of Industrial Claims that all of the prerequisites to precluding recovery under the Carpenter decision have been met, the decision of the Industrial Relations Commission is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents.