Case Title: Hazuri v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-61

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-61 
____________ 
 
STEVEN HAZURI,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 31, 2012] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
Steven Hazuri seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of 
Appeal in Hazuri v. State, 23 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), on the ground that it 
expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District 
Courts of Appeal in Barrow v. State, 27 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA), review 
granted, 49 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2010), Avila v. State, 781 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001), and Roper v. State, 608 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), on a question of 
law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  The issue before us is 
whether the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury of its right to request a 
read-back in response to the jury’s request for trial transcripts during deliberations.  
 
 
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We conclude that the trial court erred, that the trial court’s actions constituted 
reversible error, and that Hazuri is entitled to a new trial.  Accordingly, we quash 
the decision of the Third District below, and approve of the reasoning applied by 
the district courts in Barrow, Avila, and Roper, and Judge Cope’s dissent in 
Hazuri. 
FACTS 
The following facts come from the Third District Court of Appeal’s opinion 
in Hazuri v. State, 23 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009): 
Hazuri was tried for armed robbery and aggravated battery with 
a weapon.  After a couple hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note to 
the court stating the jurors were unable to reach a verdict.  The parties 
agreed the jury should be sent home for the evening and return the 
next day to continue its deliberations.  The next morning, after 
[almost] an hour of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court 
requesting trial transcripts.  The following transpired: 
 
THE COURT:  Back on the record.  Note for the record 
the presence of the defendant, his attorney, the assistant 
state attorney.  Counsel, we have a note from the jury.  
Could they get transcripts from the trial.  State, 
suggestions. 
 
[ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY]:  My only 
suggestion is that we tell them they must rely on their 
own recollection of the testimony. 
 
THE COURT:  [Defense counsel]. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  My answer is you should 
inform the jury that they are allowed to have whatever, 
you know, portion of the transcript read back to them if 
 
 
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they have a question about some evidence, but to have a 
set of transcripts from the trial, absolutely not. 
 
THE COURT:  There are no trial transcripts of moment.  
Certainly portions of the record could be read, however, I 
do believe that the accurate and correct response is that 
they must rely on their own collective recollection of the 
evidence and we will answer the question that way. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You are not going to advise 
them that they have a right to have the transcript read 
back? 
 
THE COURT:  They don’t have a right.  It is within my 
discretion. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Would you note my objection 
for the record. 
 
THE COURT:  I will note your objection, counselor.  I 
will note it for the record. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You are just going to send the 
note back? 
 
THE COURT:  Yeah.  Okay.  Okay.  There you go.  
Okay. 
 
Hazuri v. State, 23 So. 3d 857, 857-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).  Thereafter, Hazuri 
was convicted of aggravated battery with a weapon, which he then appealed to the 
Third District Court of Appeal.  Id. at 857.  On appeal, Hazuri argued that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to inform the jury that it was entitled to have 
portions of the trial transcript read back to it, although it could not have a copy of 
any transcripts.  Id. at 858.  The district court first quoted Florida Rule of Criminal 
 
 
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Procedure 3.410, which governs read-backs.  Id.  However, the district court noted 
that rather than ask for a read-back, the jury asked a specific question.  Id.  The 
court determined that the trial court’s purported answer that the jurors “must rely 
on their own collective recollection of the evidence,” was fair and legally accurate 
in relation to the question posed.  Id. at 858-59.1  Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.400, which lists the items permitted in the jury room, does not contain 
a provision allowing transcripts in the jury room.  Id.  Thus, the district court 
reasoned that the trial court was required to reject the jury’s request.  Id. at 859.  
Moreover, the court was not required to advise the jury that it could request a read-
back of testimony.  Id.       
 
The Third District acknowledged case law prohibiting a trial court from 
misleading a jury into thinking that a read-back was prohibited.  Id. (citing Avila v. 
State, 781 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).  However, the district court 
determined that the trial court never stated that it would disobey rule 3.410 and 
deny a read-back if requested.  Id.  The Third District then distinguished the cases 
cited by the dissent.  Id.  The court determined that in two of the cases, the trial 
court preemptively informed the jury that there was no provision permitting a read-
back of trial testimony, in direct contravention of rule 3.410.  Id. (citing Huhn v. 
                                         
1.  The Third District pointed out that the record did not contain the written 
response sent to the jury.  Hazuri, 23 So. 3d at 858 n.1. 
 
 
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State, 511 So. 2d 583, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), and Biscardi v. State, 511 So. 2d 
575, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)).  In the third case cited by the dissent, Avila, the 
trial court rejected a read-back based on the erroneous impression that it was not 
permitted to provide a read-back of testimony of only certain witnesses.  Id. (citing 
Avila, 781 So. 2d at 414-15).  In contrast, in the case before the Third District, the 
jury requested transcripts and the district court concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in informing the jury that it could not have copies of the 
transcripts, and therefore had to rely on its recollection of the testimony.  Id. at 
859-60. 
 
In his dissent, Judge Cope asserted that the read-back instruction timely 
requested by the defense should have been given.  Hazuri, 23 So. 3d at 861 (Cope, 
J., dissenting).  After a brief mention of Avila, Huhn, and Biscardi, Judge Cope 
wrote: 
With all due respect, much of the majority opinion is niggling 
nitpicking.  The majority opinion finds dispositive the fact that the 
jury note asked for transcripts.  According to the majority, since no 
transcripts were in existence, it follows that the question could be 
answered with a simple “no.” 
 
The majority opinion overlooks the fact that jurors are 
composed of lay persons.  If they knew the technical details of the 
law, then they would have written a better note.  But the substance of 
the question was whether the jury could review the testimony.  
Defense counsel quite properly said that under rule 3.410, a jury may 
request to have “testimony read to them,” and the court may so order. 
 
 
 
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Id.  In light of this reasoning, Judge Cope concluded that the defendant was 
entitled to a new trial.  Id.  
ANALYSIS 
In the only issue raised before this Court, Hazuri argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion in its handling of the jury’s request for trial transcripts.  In this 
case, the jury did not specifically request a read-back.  It is also significant that 
counsel for Hazuri requested that the trial court, in response to the jury’s request, 
should inform the jury of the availability of read-backs.  Hazuri argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to inquire of the jury what portion of the 
transcript they wanted reviewed.  However, the underlying thread of Hazuri’s 
argument is the assumption that a transcript request constitutes a request for a read-
back.  Whether this assumption is true or not is an important question for this 
Court to consider, as the two requests receive dissimilar treatment.  The standard of 
review for this claim is de novo.  See Bordes v. State, 34 So. 3d 215, 216-17 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2010) (applying de novo review to an issue involving legal 
determinations).    
A jury’s request for a read-back of trial testimony is governed by Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.410, which provides: 
After the jurors have retired to consider their verdict, if they 
request additional instructions or to have any testimony read to them 
they shall be conducted into the courtroom by the officer who has 
them in charge and the court may give them the additional instructions 
 
 
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or may order the testimony read to them.  The instructions shall be 
given and the testimony read only after notice to the prosecuting 
attorney and to counsel for the defendant.  
 
As a general rule, trial courts have wide discretion in determining whether to grant 
read-back requests.  In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Civil Proc., 967 So. 2d 178, 
183.  (Fla. 2007).  Indeed, “courts have found no abuse of discretion even where 
the trial judge has, without much consideration, entirely rejected the jury’s request 
for a read back.”  Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 130 (Fla. 2001).  In 2007, we 
authorized the publication and use of Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 4.4, 
providing a framework for acknowledging and either granting, deferring, or 
denying a jury’s request for a read-back of testimony.  In re Amends. to the Fla. 
Rules of Civil Proc., 967 So. 2d at 183.2  However, we expressed no opinion on the 
                                         
2.  Standard Instruction 4.4, titled “Read-Back of Testimony,” reads: 
1. Read-Back granted as requested 
Members of the jury, you have asked that the following 
testimony be read back to you: (describe testimony) 
The court reporter will now read the testimony which you 
have requested. 
OR 
2. Read-Back Deferred 
Members of the jury, I have discussed with the attorneys 
your request to have certain testimony read back to you. It will 
take approximately (amount of time) to have the court reporter 
prepare and read back the requested testimony. 
 
 
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correctness of the instructions set forth in the appendix to that opinion, which 
included Standard Instruction 4.4, and emphasized that the notes and comments to 
the instructions were not necessarily indicative of the views of the Court as to their 
correctness and applicability.  Id. at 184.  The Notes on Use of Standard Instruction 
4.4 preclude the trial court from sending transcripts to the jury room.  Id. at 194.   
 
On the other hand, the general consensus is that trial judges have absolutely 
no discretion in permitting a jury to receive physical transcripts.  Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.400(a) states that the following items are permitted in the 
jury room:  (1) a copy of the charges against the defendant; (2) verdict forms; and 
(3) all things received in evidence, excluding depositions.  In addition, the court is 
required to provide a written copy of the jury instructions to be taken into the jury 
room.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.400(b).  The rule’s omission of transcripts from the list of 
                                                                                                                                   
I now direct you to return to the jury room and discuss 
your request further. If you are not able to resolve your question 
about the requested testimony by relying on your collective 
memory, then you should write down as specific a description as 
possible of the part of the witness(es)’ testimony which you want 
to hear again. Make your request for reading back testimony as 
specific as possible. 
3. Read-Back Denied 
Members of the jury, you have asked that the following 
testimony be read back to you: (describe testimony) 
I am not able to grant your request. 
Fla Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 4.4. 
 
 
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permissible items indicates that transcripts are prohibited.  See Janson v. State, 730 
So. 2d 734, 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that the trial court erred in 
permitting transcripts of testimony of two witnesses in the jury room).  This Court 
has held that a transcript of prior testimony which was read to the jury during trial 
should not be provided to the jury during deliberations.  Barnes v. State, 970 So. 2d 
332, 338 (Fla. 2007).  The transcript was not permitted because “[i]f . . . the jury 
takes the . . . transcript to be read and discussed while the oral evidence contra has 
in a measure faded from the memory of the jurors, it is obvious that the side 
sustained by written evidence is given an undue advantage.”  Id. (quoting Fuller v. 
United States, 873 A.2d 1108, 1116-17 (D.C. 2005)).  Although Barnes involved a 
transcript of prior testimony, the risk noted by the Barnes Court is still present 
where the jury receives transcripts of testimony it heard in the case before it as the 
jury may emphasize the testimony contained in the physical transcripts over the 
oral testimony previously heard during the trial.  In light of this risk, and rule 
3.400, Florida courts have consistently barred transcripts from the jury room.   
Here, the trial court considered the jury’s transcript request as just that.  
Although the Third District in this case held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in its literal answer to the jury’s transcript request, see also Simmons v. 
State, 334 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (holding that where the jury did not 
request to have the testimony read and the reading of the testimony was 
 
 
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impractical, the trial court did not abuse its discretion), several cases from other 
district courts have held that a jury’s request for transcripts of specific witness 
testimony should be given a broader interpretation.  For example, in Roper v. State, 
608 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), a case involving the sexual abuse of a minor, 
the jury requested to “see” the victim’s cross-examination during deliberations.  Id. 
at 533.  The trial court interpreted the request as a literal request for something to 
see, and noted that there was “nothing to be seen” as there was no transcript 
produced or available at that time.  Id. at 534.  Although the defense requested a 
read-back of the cross-examination, the court informed the parties that a read-back 
request would be considered only if the jury sent another request to have the 
testimony read to them.  Id.  The trial court ultimately told the jury that a transcript 
had not been produced, and that there was “no way” for the jury to see the cross-
examination.  Id.  Finally, the court instructed the jury to rely on its collective 
recollections and remembrances, and shortly thereafter, the jury found the 
defendant guilty on all charges.  Id. at 534-35.   
On appeal, the State argued that the trial court’s instruction to the jury in the 
case was not an abuse of discretion as the jury only requested to “see” a transcript 
and did not specifically request a read-back.  Id. at 535.  The Fifth District Court of 
Appeal rejected this argument, reasoning:  
We believe the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question may well 
have led the jury to conclude that their only recourse was to rely upon 
 
 
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their “collective recollections and remembrances” as to the cross-
examination of the minor.  Rather than weighing the pros and cons of 
having the cross-examination read back to the jury, as did the trial 
judge in Simmons, the trial judge here narrowly focused upon the 
word “see” (as distinguished from “hear”) in the jury’s request and 
deftly side-stepped the problem.  As we see it, he employed a 
semantic shell game effectively negating an option allowed the jury 
under Rule 3.410.  At the very least, the trial judge should have 
apprised the jury that a method was available to have the cross-
examination, or specific portions of it, read to them.  Then, if the jury 
requested it, the trial court could have weighed that request in light of 
any applicable considerations. 
Id.   
In Avila v. State, 781 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the jury sent the trial 
court a note during deliberations, requesting that it review a timetable presented by 
the testimonies of five alibi witnesses.  Id. at 414.  When the court asked for 
clarification, the jury sent another note stating that it needed a review of the timing 
of specific events set forth by the testimonies of four named alibi witnesses.  Id.  It 
was clear that the jury was seeking a read-back of only a portion of the witnesses’ 
testimonies concerning the timeline but the trial court believed it was prohibited 
from providing a partial read-back.  Id.  The court responded to the jury, in part, 
“We have no transcripts to submit back to you at this point . . . [and] [y]ou should 
attempt to rely on the collective recollection of the six of you in determining what 
the various factual questions that you have.”  Id. at 415. 
In addition to noting that partial read-backs were permitted under certain 
circumstances, the Fourth District held that the trial court improperly responded to 
 
 
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the jury’s request.  Id.  The district court explained that trial courts may not 
mislead a jury into believing that a read-back was prohibited.  Id.  The district 
court observed that the trial court failed to inform the jury that a method of read-
back was available, stated that there were no transcripts, and told the jurors they 
would have to rely on their collective recollection.  Id. at 415-16.  In concluding 
that the trial court’s response may have confused the jury as to whether a read-back 
was permissible, the Fourth District held that the trial court had abused its 
discretion.  Id. at 416.   
 
The Fourth District also decided Barrow v. State, 27 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 4th 
DCA), review granted, 49 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2010), which involved a jury’s request 
for transcripts of the testimonies of five witnesses only ten minutes into its 
deliberations.  Id. at 215.  The trial judge told the attorneys that he would inform 
the jury that “there are no transcripts.”  Id.  Although the State suggested that the 
judge inform the jury they could request a read-back, the judge stated, “No, I don’t 
do read backs.”  Id.  The judge then discussed case law concerning a trial court’s 
broad discretion on a read-back request.  Id. at 216.  The defense counsel requested 
that the court inform the jury of the right to ask for a read-back.  Id.  The court 
denied the defense counsel’s request and sent the jury a note stating, “There are no 
transcripts available for your review.  Please rely on the evidence presented during 
 
 
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the proceedings.”  Id.  The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  
Id.   
Relying on Roper and Avila, the Fourth District held that the trial court erred 
in its response to the jury’s request, and should have told the jury a method of read-
back was available, rather than “effectively negat[ing] an option allowed the jury 
under Rule 3.410.”  Id. at 218 (quoting Roper, 608 So. 2d at 535).  The Fourth 
District recognized the contrary result reached by the Third District in Hazuri, and 
certified conflict with that decision.  Id. at 218.  In addition, the Fourth District 
noted its agreement with Judge Cope’s dissent in Hazuri.  Id. at 218 n.2.3    
Subsequent to Barrow, the Fourth District, in dicta, stated that the trial court 
correctly interpreted the jury’s request to “read [State witness’s] testimony” as a 
request for a read-back.  See Wicklow v. State, 43 So. 3d 85, 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2010).  Recently, the Fourth District issued its decision in Francois v. State, 65 So. 
3d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), which involved a jury’s request to see transcripts of 
the testimony of a witness for the State.  Id. at 635.  The trial court informed the 
jury that it was unable to grant the jury’s request notwithstanding the State and 
defense counsel’s agreement that the trial court should “read it back.”  Id. at 636-
37.  The Fourth District, in reliance on Barrow, held that the trial court’s failure to 
                                         
3.  As to the trial judge’s statement that he “[did not] do read backs,” the 
Fourth District held it was an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse to 
exercise discretion, i.e., rely on an inflexible rule for a decision that is to be made 
with discretion.  Barrow, 27 So. 3d at 218. 
 
 
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inform the jury that a read-back could be available upon request was error.  Id. at 
637. 
Interestingly, in a decision issued almost eighteen years after the Roper 
decision, the Fifth District declined to address whether a request for a trial 
transcript should give rise to the trial court’s obligation to inform the jury of its 
right to request a read-back.  See Frasilus v. State, 46 So. 3d 1028, 1030-31 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2010), review denied, 69 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2011).4  The district court 
concluded that the case before it was distinguishable, as the jury had asked for an 
answer to a specific fact question regarding the date of a photograph of the 
defendant, rather than a request for a transcript or the examination of testimony.  
Frasilus, 46 So. 3d at 1029-31; compare Coleman v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283, 1286 
(Fla. 1992) (holding that a trial court need not answer questions of fact from a 
jury), with Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 578, 583 (Fla. 1986) (finding no abuse of 
discretion where the trial court offered to read back portions of testimony in 
response to the jury’s factual question).      
In sum, the Fourth and Fifth Districts have essentially held that a request for 
transcripts triggers a trial court’s obligation to inform the jury of the possibility of 
                                         
4.  It is our view that the Fifth District decided this issue in Roper.  See 
Roper, 608 So. 2d at 535 (“At the very least, the trial judge should have apprised 
the jury that a method was available to have the cross-examination, or specific 
portions of it, read to them.”). 
 
 
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a read-back.5  It naturally follows that these district courts also believe that a 
request for transcripts that would normally implicate the guidelines in rule 3.400 
concerning the items permitted in a jury room would also implicate rule 3.410 and 
its guidelines concerning read-backs.  Conversely, the Third District has held that 
where the jury has requested transcripts of trial testimony, there is no affirmative 
duty to instruct a jury of its right to request a read-back.6 
                                         
5.  The First District Court of Appeal decided Hendricks v. State, 34 So. 3d 
819 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), review granted, 49 So. 3d 746 (Fla. 2010).  In that case, 
the jury requested a transcript as to a portion of the victim’s testimony.  Id. at 821.  
The attorneys did not request that the trial court inform the jury of the possibility of 
a read-back.  Id.  The trial court denied the jury’s request for the portion of the 
transcript and instructed the jury to rely on its recollection.  Id.  On appeal, the 
First District observed that it had not yet considered in a written opinion whether a 
trial court commits error when it denies a jury’s request to view a portion of the 
trial transcript without informing the jury that a read-back of testimony may be 
permissible.  Id. at 829-30.  Although it assumed arguendo that the instruction 
given was erroneous, the district court in Hendricks left that question for another 
day.  Id. at 830.   
 
6.  The Fourth District has also held that it is error for a trial court to give a 
preemptive instruction to the jury that a read-back would not be permitted.  See 
Huhn v. State, 511 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Biscardi v. State, 511 So. 2d 
575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).  In Huhn and Biscardi, the trial court stated that “there is 
really no provision” for reinstruction or to have testimony read back.  Huhn, 511 
So. 2d at 591; Biscardi, 511 So. 2d at 580.  In Huhn, the district court stated, “[W]e 
have to assume, as reasonable people, that some, or all, of the jury so understood 
the trial court’s remarks to mean [a prohibition on a read-back or reinstruction] 
existed.”  511 So. 2d at 591.  In Biscardi, the Fourth District stated, “[T]he judge’s 
words may reasonably have conveyed to jurors that to ask for clarification of 
instructions or rereading of testimony would be futile.  As a result they may have 
reacted as they did because they misapprehended the law or had a distorted 
recollection of some of the testimony.”  511 So. 2d at 581.  In the instant case, the 
 
 
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We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth and Fifth Districts in Barrow, 
Avila, and Roper, and Judge Cope’s dissent in this case.  The jury’s general right 
to ask questions of the trial court was discussed by this Court in Sutton v. State, 51 
So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1951): 
In our system of jurisprudence, the jury is of ancient and 
constitutional sanction . . . . [I]t performs an extremely important duty 
and neither its duty nor that performed by the court can be done 
properly in the absence of mutual aid and assistance.  It resolves 
controversies of fact about which the judge cannot speak or apply the 
rule of law till the jury announces its judgment.  The law applied by 
the court arises from the factual truth adduced by the jury. . . . The 
jury has a perfect right to return to the court room at any time and ask 
questions that are calculated to shed light on the controversy or that 
will in any way assist it or the court in developing the truth of the 
controversy. 
 
Id. at 726.  As recognized by the Sutton Court, the role of a jury as a factfinder is 
of utmost importance.  The guilt or innocence of a defendant hinges on the facts of 
any given case and a courtroom trial can be a long, drawn out, and complex 
process, fraught with conflicting witnesses and intricate expert testimony.  Thus, a 
jury’s accurate recollection of the testimony is crucial to its verdict.  Simply put, a 
jury cannot properly fulfill its constitutionally mandated role if it cannot recall or is 
confused about the testimony presented in a case.  Thus, in order to assist the jury 
in completing its fact-finding mission, trial courts should apply a liberal 
construction to a jury’s request for transcripts.  In other words, a jury’s request for 
                                                                                                                                   
trial judge did not provide a preemptive instruction to the jury that a read-back of 
testimony would not be permitted. 
 
 
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transcripts of testimony should prompt a judge to inform the jury of the potential 
availability of a read-back of testimony. 
In addition, we refrain from arriving at any legal conclusion that would 
essentially eviscerate the right of juries to request read-backs recognized in rule 
3.410.  Whether a jury asks for transcripts of witness testimony or rather uses the 
term “read-back,” it is clear that the jury is requesting a review of trial testimony.7  
A jury is composed of laypersons often unfamiliar with legal terms of art, and there 
should be no magic words required for a read-back request, especially when the 
intent of the jury’s request for transcripts is clear.  Failing to require further 
instruction concerning a read-back after a jury has requested transcripts leaves the 
jury without the means to refresh its memory of witness testimony—testimony that 
could be critical to the outcome of the verdict.  Where a jury does not precisely 
request a “read-back,” the read-back portion of rule 3.410 is meaningless without 
an instruction to the jury that it can request a read-back. 
                                         
 
7.  A request for transcripts of witness testimony should not be confused 
with a request for an answer to a specific factual question.  Pursuant to this Court’s 
Coleman decision, trial judges are not required to answer factual questions.  610 
So. 2d at 1286.   Moreover, a request to review witness testimony allows the jury 
to fulfill its own fact-finding role, while asking a question of fact invites the trial 
judge to fill that role.  Notably, the Fifth District in Frasilus stated that in response 
to a factual question, requiring the trial court to inform the jury of the right to a 
read-back request is neither necessary nor desirable.  46 So. 3d at 1032.  However, 
that specific issue does not need to be decided by this Court in this case. 
 
 
- 18 - 
We recognize that there is no requirement in the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure that a trial judge must advise a jury that it may request a read-back of 
testimony.  However, this absence must be balanced against this Court’s reminder 
in Sutton that “mutual aid and assistance” is required for the jury to perform its 
duty properly.  51 So. 2d at 726.  In cases such as the one presently before this 
Court, such aid and assistance from the trial court should consist of an instruction 
from the court that the jury can request a read-back.  This in turn helps to ensure 
that the jury is fulfilling its duty to discern the facts of a given case. 
In light of the above discussion concerning the critical nature of the jury’s 
fact-finding role, and to give effect to rule 3.410, we approve of the reasoning 
applied by the courts in Barrow, Avila, and Roper, and Judge Cope’s dissent in the 
instant case.  We adopt the following two rules: (1) a trial court should not use any 
language that would mislead a jury into believing read-backs are prohibited, and 
(2) when a jury requests trial transcripts, the trial judge should deny the request, 
but inform the jury of the possibility of a read-back.  A trial judge can respond to a 
request for transcripts in the following manner: “Transcripts are not available, but 
you can request to have any testimony read back to you, which may or may not be 
granted at the court’s discretion.”  Additionally, when a jury makes a general 
request for trial transcripts, it is incumbent on the trial judge to instruct the jury to 
specify the trial testimony sought to be reviewed in the event the jury thereafter 
 
 
- 19 - 
requests a read-back.  This clarification is necessary so that the trial judge may 
properly exercise his or her discretion in granting, denying, or deferring any read-
back requests.    
THIS CASE 
 
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury, in response to the jury’s 
request for trial transcripts, to rely on its own collective recollection of the 
evidence, contrary to defense counsel’s suggestion that the trial court should 
inform the jury of the availability of read-backs.  We conclude that the trial court 
erred in two respects.  First, the court erred in failing to inform the jury of its right 
to request a read-back in response to its request for trial transcripts.  Second, 
because the jury made a general request for transcripts, the court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury to clarify which portion of the testimony the jury wished to 
review.  Here, the trial court’s actions are subject to the standard pronounced in 
Johnson v. State, 53 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 2010).   
In Johnson, the trial court gave the jury a preemptive instruction providing 
that read-backs of testimony would not be permitted.  53 So. 3d at 1005.  The 
Third District Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred, but concluded that the 
error was harmless.  Id.  After agreeing that this instruction was erroneous, this 
Court held: 
 
 
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A [reviewing] court attempting to conduct a harmless error 
analysis [where the trial court has given an erroneous preemptive 
instruction] cannot know what testimony a jury would have requested 
to have read back or even whether a jury would have asked for a read-
back at all.  Therefore, a reviewing court cannot determine whether a 
jury was confused or needed clarification about the facts of the case, 
and it is impossible to discern whether the defendant was prejudiced 
by the error.  An appellate court would be required to engage in pure 
speculation because if the jury followed the erroneous instruction, the 
jury would be misled to believe that it was not permitted to request 
read-backs of testimony.  Because a harmless error analysis cannot be 
conducted when a judge preemptively instructs a jury that it cannot 
have any testimony read back, we hold that such error is per se 
reversible error. 
 
Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 1009.  Similarly, in this case, we cannot ascertain which 
testimony the jury was interested in reviewing.  Unlike Barrow, Avila, Roper, 
Hendricks, and Francois, where the juries requested the testimony of a specific 
witness or witnesses, the jury in this case merely asked for trial transcripts.  
Because the trial judge did not instruct the jury to clarify which portion of the 
transcript the jury wanted to review, we cannot determine whether the jury was 
confused regarding specific testimony in the case.8  Although the record indicates 
that the jury had difficulty reaching a verdict in this case, it is unclear whether this 
difficulty was caused by the jury’s confusion as to the facts or testimony in this 
case.  As in Johnson, this Court would have to engage in pure speculation as to the 
                                         
8.  Notably, in Johnson this Court recognized that a harmless error analysis 
is appropriate where a judge refuses a jury’s request for a specific read-back of 
testimony.  Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 1006 n.4.  Again, the jury in this case only made 
a general request for transcripts. 
 
 
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effect of the trial court’s failure to inform the jury of the possibility of a read-back 
or the trial court’s failure to ask which portion of the testimony it wanted to 
review.  Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error, and accordingly, 
Hazuri is entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we quash the Third District’s decision in 
Hazuri, and approve of the reasoning applied in Barrow, Avila, and Roper, and 
Judge Cope’s dissent in Hazuri.  As the trial court’s response to the jury’s request 
for trial transcripts constituted reversible error, Hazuri is entitled to a new trial.   
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion. 
PARIENTE and LABARGA, JJ., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
   
I respectfully dissent.  As reasoned by both the Third and Fifth District 
Courts of Appeal, I would not require the trial court to advise the jury on readbacks 
when not requested.  See Hazuri v. State, 23 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see 
also Frasilus v. State, 46 So. 3d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that trial 
court’s refusal to answer a factual question from the jury and decision not to advise 
 
 
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jurors of right to read-back was not fundamental error and reasoning that “[w]e do 
not think it is either necessary or desirable to impose a requirement on the trial 
court to inform the jury of its right to request a read-back in response to any 
question from the jury concerning an issue of fact that may have been the subject 
of testimony somewhere during the course of trial [and] [b]ecause a trial court is 
not required to accede to a jury’s request for a read-back of evidence it has already 
heard, it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which a trial court’s failure to 
advise the jury of its right to request a read-back could vitiate the fairness of the 
entire trial”).  Decisions regarding read-back of trial testimony should be left to the 
discretion of the trial court.  See Frasilus, 46 So. 3d at 1029 (“Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.410 provides that a trial court may, in its discretion, allow 
portions of the trial testimony to be read back to the jury upon their request.  A trial 
court’s discretion over whether to allow a read-back of testimony is wide.  Kelley 
v. State, 486 So. 2d 578, 583 (Fla. 1986).”).  
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D07-3046 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
 
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for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, Forrest L. Andrews, Jr., and Lunar C. Alvey, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent