Case Title: Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families

Citation: 2013 WI 7

Docket Number: 2011AP000593

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP593 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Angelia Jamerson, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Department of Children & Families and Wisconsin 
Department of Administration, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 340 Wis. 2d 215, 813 N.W.2d 221 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 32 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 10, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Roggensack, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
Ziegler, Gableman, J.J., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners, the cause was 
argued by Mary E. Burke, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
For the petitioner-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Jill M. Kastner and Sheila Sullivan, and Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jill M. 
Kastner. 
 
 
2013 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP593 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV11864) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Angelia Jamerson, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Department of Children & Families and Wisconsin 
Department of Administration, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 10, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The genesis of this case 
is the revocation of Angelia Jamerson's child care license by 
the Department of Children and Families (the Department).  The 
Department based its action on Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
(2009-10).1  This statute permanently bars those who have ever 
been convicted of specified predicate crimes from holding a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version, except references to Wis. Stat. §§ 49.12 
and 49.127 are to the 1989-90 version. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
2 
 
child care license.  Section 48.685(5)(br) was created by 2009 
Wis. Act 76 with an effective date of February 1, 2010.2  We 
refer to § 48.685(5)(br) herein either by the statutory number 
or descriptively as the new caregiver law.  
¶2 
The new caregiver law imposes a lifetime ban on 
licensure, a harsh penalty on a license holder who had been 
convicted of a predicate offense many years before the new 
caregiver law went into effect.  In the present case, Ms. 
Jamerson had her license revoked on January 20, 2010, and her 
appeal of the revocation was dismissed without a hearing based 
on her conviction on a guilty plea of violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.12(1) and (6) nearly 20 years before.3 
                                                 
2 The license revocation in the present case preceded the 
effective date of the new caregiver law, which was enacted on 
November 13, 2009, but did not go into effect until February 1, 
2010.  Like the parties, the Administrative Law Judge, the 
circuit court, and the court of appeals, we nevertheless treat 
the revocation under the new caregiver law. 
The legislature later made a technical revision in 2009 Act 
185, changing the words "day care" to "child care," the phrase 
used to describe care and supervision for children for less than 
24 hours a day. 
3 The court of appeals found the procedures in the present 
case troubling, as do we.  "Indeed, the fact that [Ms.] 
Jamerson's 
convictions 
formed 
the 
entire 
basis 
of 
the 
Department's decision was, in this case, troubling——especially 
given the harsh penalty demanded by the new caregiver law."  
Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families, 2012 WI App 32, ¶24, 
340 Wis. 2d 215, 813 N.W.2d 221.  
Indeed, Ms. Jamerson has not had a license since December 
11, 2009, when the license was suspended because of criminal 
charges filed against an employee. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
3 
 
¶3 
This matter is a review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals reversing orders of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Dennis P. Moroney, Judge.4   
¶4 
The circuit court affirmed the Department's decision5 
to dismiss Ms. Jamerson's appeal without a hearing, concluding 
that Ms. Jamerson's food stamp offense under Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.127(2m) constituted a conviction of "[a]n offense involving 
fraudulent activity as a participant of the food stamp program."6  
The circuit court concluded that it was unclear whether Ms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ms. Jamerson's contested case hearing on the revocation was 
scheduled for June 8, 2010, which was 134 days after the 
Department received her appeal.  The statute provides for a 
hearing within 30 days.  Wis. Stat. § 48.72.  Revoking Ms. 
Jamerson's license, which inhibits her ability to make a living, 
is a serious action, and her opportunity to have her case heard 
quickly and fairly is imperative. 
4 Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families, 2012 WI App 32, 
340 Wis. 2d 215, 813 N.W.2d 221. 
5 We interchangeably refer to reviewing the Department's 
decision and the Administrative Law Judge's decision of May 27, 
2010.  The Department adopted the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision as the Department's final order. 
6 Despite the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge 
that the Department's motion to dismiss was not premised upon 
the conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.127(2m) but was premised on 
the conviction under § 49.12(1) and (6), the circuit court 
concluded otherwise.  The circuit court explained that "it is 
not clear that Jamerson's violation of Wis. Stat. § 49.12(6) 
involved fraudulent activity, even though it was 'considered a 
fraud' by statute, because it would be possible for an 
individual to violate the statue [sic] without knowledge, as it 
was a strict liability statute."  The circuit court concluded, 
however, that Ms. Jamerson was ineligible for licensure because 
of her conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.127(2m). 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
4 
 
Jamerson's 
violation 
of 
§ 49.12(1) 
and 
(6) 
constituted 
fraudulent activity.     
¶5 
The court of appeals reversed the orders of the 
circuit court affirming the Department's decision.  The court of 
appeals concluded that a remand for an administrative hearing 
was required to determine whether the facts underlying the 
conviction established it as a conviction barred under the new 
caregiver law.  The court of appeals explained that Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.12(1) and (6) is not an offense specifically enumerated in 
the new caregiver law as a predicate offense, and nothing in the 
record demonstrates that Ms. Jamerson's conduct was a fraudulent 
activity involving a food stamp offense.7  The court of appeals 
reasoned that Ms. Jamerson's conviction under § 49.12(1) and 
(6), without further factual development, does not place her 
under the new caregiver law's permanent bar.     
¶6 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which 
remanded the matter to the Division of Hearings and Appeals for 
a hearing to determine whether Ms. Jamerson's 1991 conviction 
under Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) fulfills the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. 48.685(5)(br)5.   
                                                 
7 The court of appeals also concluded that a conviction 
under Wis. Stat. § 49.127(2m) "does not, as a matter of law, 
show that an offender has partaken in a 'fraudulent activity' 
regarding food stamps" for purposes of permanent prohibition 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.  Jamerson, 340 Wis. 2d 215, 
¶20.  We do not address this offense; it is not before the 
court.  The Department did not rely on it in the motion to 
dismiss and the Administrative Law Judge did not rely on it.  
The Department adopted the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
as the final order of the Department. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
5 
 
¶7 
We address three issues presented to this court.  The 
concurrence addresses issues not briefed or argued. 
¶8 
First, we address the level of deference to be 
accorded the Department's interpretation and application of the 
new caregiver law in the present case.  More specifically, we 
address 
the 
deference 
to 
be 
accorded 
the 
Department's 
determination that Ms. Jamerson's conviction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.12(1) and (6) constitutes, as a matter of law, an offense 
involving fraudulent activity as a participant in certain public 
benefit programs for the purposes of the new caregiver law.   
¶9 
We conclude that due weight deference should be 
accorded the Department's interpretation and application of the 
new caregiver law in the present case.     
¶10 Second, we address the procedure the Administrative 
Law Judge is to use in Ms. Jamerson's appeal of the Department's 
decision to revoke her license.  More specifically, we address 
whether the Department's interpretation and application of the 
relevant statutes to deny Ms. Jamerson a contested case hearing 
is contrary to the clear meaning of the statutes or no more 
reasonable interpretation of the statutes exists.  
¶11 We conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.72 and 227.44 govern 
this issue.  Section 48.72 explicitly states that "any person 
aggrieved 
by 
the 
department's 
refusal 
or 
failure 
to . . . continue 
a 
license . . . has 
the 
right 
to 
an 
administrative hearing provided for contested cases in ch. 
227. . . ."  It further provides that the administrative hearing 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
6 
 
be held "under s. 227.44 within 30 days after receipt of the 
request for an administrative hearing . . . ." 
¶12 Adhering to the text of Wis. Stat. §§ 48.72 and 
227.44, we conclude that the clear meaning of the relevant 
statutes and the more reasonable interpretation of the statutes 
is that Ms. Jamerson has the right to a hearing provided for a 
contested case under § 227.44.  Like the court of appeals, we do 
not address the authority of an administrative law judge to 
grant a motion to dismiss without convening a hearing. 
¶13 Third, 
we 
address 
whether 
the 
Department's 
interpretation and application of the relevant statutes to 
permit the Administrative Law Judge, as a matter of law, to 
grant the Department's motion to dismiss Ms. Jamerson's appeal 
is contrary to the clear meaning of the relevant statutes or no 
more reasonable interpretation of the statute exists.  To answer 
this question, we must clarify several factual and procedural 
matters.   
¶14 On this review, the only basis for the revocation, 
that is, the only predicate crime under the new caregiver law 
justifying revocation, is Ms. Jamerson's conviction in 1991 on 
her guilty plea for violating Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6).  
Any other bases for the Department's revoking Ms. Jamerson's 
license are no longer at issue. 
¶15 With regard to the adequacy of the record to prove the 
only alleged predicate offense for revocation, namely the 1991 
conviction for violating Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6), the 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
7 
 
Department has changed its position since briefing and oral 
argument in this court.   
¶16 In its briefs to the court of appeals and this court, 
the Department asserted that it may be factually inferred from 
Ms. Jamerson's food stamp conviction (under § 49.127(2m)) that 
food stamps were the public benefit upon which the § 49.12(1) 
and (6) conviction was based.8 
¶17 The Department now "withdraws" this argument and asks 
this Court to decide the other issues presented but to remand 
the narrow factual issue of the public benefit involved in Ms. 
Jamerson's 
§ 49.12(1) 
and 
(6) 
conviction 
for 
further 
administrative proceedings pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(7).9 
¶18 We conclude, as did the court of appeals (and as the 
Department now concludes), that on the present record, the 
Department and the Administrative Law Judge could not have 
                                                 
8 The court of appeals was unwilling to infer that 
Jamerson's 1991 conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) 
arose out of the same food stamp activity that was the basis of 
her conviction under § 49.127(2m).  Without that inference, the 
court of appeals could find no link between a food stamp 
violation under § 49.127(2m) and the public assistance fraud 
conviction under § 49.12(1) and (6).  The court of appeals noted 
that the different time periods listed on the judgment of 
conviction relating to the two offenses suggested that the same 
course of behavior may not have been the basis for each 
conviction. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. 227.57(7) provides as follows:  "If the 
agency's action depends on facts determined without a hearing, 
the court shall set aside, modify or order agency action if the 
facts compel a particular action as a matter of law, or it may 
remand the case to the agency for further examination and action 
within the agency's responsibility." 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
8 
 
determined, 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law 
without 
further 
factual 
development, whether Ms. Jamerson's conviction was for a 
predicate offense under the new caregiver law.   
¶19 A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Ms. 
Jamerson's conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6). 
Therefore, the Department's interpretation and application of 
the relevant statutes permitting the Department to dismiss Ms. 
Jamerson's appeal was contrary to the clear meaning of the 
relevant statutes and a more reasonable interpretation exists.  
Ms. Jamerson is entitled to a hearing.  
¶20 In sum, we conclude that due deference should be 
accorded the Department's interpretation and application of the 
new caregiver law in the present case; that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.72 
and 227.44 accord Ms. Jamerson the right to a hearing, which 
shall be treated as a contested case under § 227.44; and that 
because 
genuine 
issues 
of 
material 
fact 
exist, 
the 
Administrative Law Judge erred as a matter of law in dismissing 
Ms. Jamerson's appeal without a hearing for factual development.    
¶21 Accordingly, we remand Ms. Jamerson's appeal to the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals for a hearing consistent with 
this opinion.     
I 
¶22 The historical and procedural facts relevant to this 
review are essentially undisputed.  Angelia Jamerson owned and 
operated a child care facility, Children's Fantasy Child Care 
and Preschool, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.   
No. 
2011AP593   
 
9 
 
¶23 On January 20, 2010, the Department notified Ms. 
Jamerson that her child care license was revoked.  The notice of 
revocation provided two bases for the Department's action of 
revocation: (1) criminal charges against an employee for sale of 
marijuana during working hours; and (2) the new caregiver law 
prohibiting Ms. Jamerson from holding a license because she had 
been convicted of two offenses relating to the receipt of public 
assistance benefits.  In 1991, Ms. Jamerson was convicted of two 
criminal offenses on a plea of guilty: violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.12(1) and (6) and violation of § 49.127(2m).   
¶24 Although the Department's notice of revocation relied 
on the marijuana charge against the employee and the two 1991 
convictions, the Department's motion to dismiss Ms. Jamerson's 
request for a hearing relied only on her violation of § 49.12(1) 
and (6) as a predicate offense under the new caregiver law.  The 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (which the Department 
adopted as its final order) also relied only on Ms. Jamerson's 
violation of § 49.12(1) and (6). 
Section 49.12(1) and (6) provide as follows: 
(1) Any person who, with intent to secure public 
assistance under this chapter, whether for himself or 
herself or for some other person, wilfully makes any 
false representations may . . . if the value of such 
assistance exceeds $2,500, be punished as prescribed 
under s. 943.20(3)(c). 
 
 . . . . 
(6) 
Where 
a 
person 
is 
originally 
eligible 
for 
assistance and receives any income or assets or both 
thereafter and fails to notify the officer or agency 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
10 
 
granting such assistance of the receipt of such assets 
within 10 days after such receipt and continues to 
receive aid, such failure to so notify the proper 
officer or agency of receipt of such assets or income 
or both shall be considered a fraud and the penalties 
in sub. (1) shall apply.   
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) relate to public 
assistance.  These provisions are not, however, listed as 
predicate offenses under the new caregiver law. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.685(5)(br), the new caregiver 
law, identifies certain crimes the conviction of which forever 
bars the convicted person from a license.  The provision 
applicable to the present case is § 48.685(5)(br)5., which reads 
in relevant part as follows: 
(5)(br) For purposes of licensing a person to operate 
a day [child] care center . . . no person who has been 
convicted . . . of any of the following offenses on or 
after his or her 12th birthday may be permitted to 
demonstrate that he or she has been rehabilitated: 
 
 . . . . 
5. An offense involving fraudulent activity as a 
participant in the Wisconsin Works program under ss. 
49.141 to 49.161, including as a recipient of a child 
care subsidy under s. 49.155, or as a recipient of aid 
to families with dependent children under s. 49.19, 
medical assistance under subch. IV of ch. 49, food 
stamps benefits under the food stamp program under 7 
USC 
2011 
to 
2036, 
supplemental 
security 
income 
payments under s. 49.77, payments for the support of 
children of supplemental security income recipients 
under s. 49.775, or health care benefits under the 
Badger Care health care program under s. 49.665.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶27 Food stamps are a form of public assistance, and a 
violation of § 49.12(1) and (6) may involve a violation of laws 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
11 
 
relating to food stamps.  Ms. Jamerson's conviction therefore 
may come within the new caregiver law.   
¶28 Ms. Jamerson timely filed a request for a hearing on 
January 25, 2010, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.72.   
¶29 On April 22, 2010, an Administrative Law Judge of the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals notified the parties of a 
hearing scheduled for June 8, 2010, to review the Department's 
decision to revoke Ms. Jamerson's license.  
¶30 On May 18, 2010, three weeks before the scheduled 
hearing, the Department filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Jamerson's 
appeal.  The Department relied solely on Ms. Jamerson's 
conviction under § 49.12(1) and (6), explaining that "[t]he 
factual circumstances surrounding Ms. Jamerson's arrest and 
conviction are irrelevant in this matter . . . [because she] was 
found guilty of a statute that explicitly states such a 
conviction shall be considered fraud.  [The Department] has 
absolutely no choice but to revoke Ms. Jamerson's license." 
¶31 In support of its argument that Ms. Jamerson's 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) satisfied the new 
caregiver law, the Department attached three documents to its 
motion to dismiss:  (1) Ms. Jamerson's Notice of Revocation 
(labeled Exhibit A), (2) Ms. Jamerson's Crime Information Bureau 
Report (labeled Exhibit B), and (3) Ms. Jamerson's Background 
Information Disclosure (labeled Exhibit C).  No other documents 
are in the record.  The Department did not attach the complaint 
against Ms. Jamerson, any plea questionnaire, or the 1991 
Judgment of Conviction (except as set forth below).   
No. 
2011AP593   
 
12 
 
¶32 On May 20, 2010, the Department submitted the 1991 
Judgment of Conviction to the Administrative Law Judge (along 
with a list of other exhibits and witnesses not relevant here) 
for purposes of the scheduled June hearing.   
¶33 The Judgment of Conviction, entered on August 12, 
1991, explains that Ms. Jamerson was convicted of two offenses: 
(1) Failure to Report Receipt of Income, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 49.12(6) and (1) and § 943.20(3)(c), which occurred on 
or between November 3, 1988 and February 28, 1991; and (2) Food 
Stamp Fraud, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 49.127(2m), (8)(a)(2), 
and (8)(b)(d), which occurred on or between January 1, 1989 and 
February 28, 1990.   
¶34 None of the documents in the record before the 
Administrative Law Judge or this court states whether Ms. 
Jamerson's conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) stems 
from conduct involving food stamps.   
¶35 Ms. Jamerson filed a document entitled Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss arguing that she had a statutory and 
constitutional right to a hearing regarding the permanent loss 
of her license, that the underlying conviction did not require a 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
13 
 
showing of fraud, and that a factual determination is required 
on the issue of fraud.10 
¶36 On May 27, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge issued a 
decision granting the Department's motion to dismiss Ms. 
Jamerson's appeal.  The decision concluded, as a matter of law, 
that Ms. Jamerson's conviction for a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.12(1) and (6) constituted "'fraudulent activity as a 
participant' and recipient of Food Stamps benefits . . . ."  The 
decision went on to conclude the Ms. Jamerson's conviction is 
exactly the type of crime for which the legislature under the 
new caregiver law intended to bar a licensee from holding a 
child care license.  The Administrative Law Judge's decision 
also concluded that a hearing on Ms. Jamerson's appeal of the 
license revocation was moot as a matter of fact and law.  
¶37 On 
June 
23, 
2010, 
the 
Department 
adopted 
the 
Administrative Law Judge's May 27, 2010, decision as the final 
order of the Department. 
II 
¶38 The parties dispute the level of deference due to the 
Department's decision.  When this court reviews a decision of an 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, Ms. Jamerson argued that the Department 
lacked standing to seek to dismiss her appeal without a hearing 
because none of the conditions in Wis. Adm. Code § DCF 
250.11(11)(b) had been met.  Ms. Jamerson argued that she did 
not (1) consent to an extension of the time before the hearing; 
(2) withdraw her request for a hearing in writing; (3) agree in 
writing to accept an informal resolution of her appeal; or (4) 
abandon the hearing request. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
14 
 
administrative agency, it reviews the agency decision, not the 
decision of the court of appeals or the circuit court.11   
¶39 Interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
statutes 
are 
ordinarily questions of law to be decided by a court, and a 
court is not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute.12  
Nevertheless, a court will, under certain circumstances, give 
deference to an agency's statutory interpretation.13   
¶40 The court has set forth three levels of deference that 
may be accorded to an agency's interpretation and application of 
a statute: great weight deference, due weight deference, and no 
deference (de novo).14  These three levels of deference take into 
account 
the 
comparative 
institutional 
qualifications 
and 
capabilities of the court and the administrative agency.15  
¶41 Great weight deference is accorded to agency action 
when four requirements are met:  (1) the agency is charged by 
the legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) 
the agency's interpretation is one of long standing; (2) the 
agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in 
                                                 
11 West Bend Co. v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 438 
N.W.2d 823 (1989). 
12 Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of Hearings & 
Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶14, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184; West 
Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 357 N.W.2d 534 
(1984). 
13 Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶11. 
14 Id., ¶¶12-20. 
15 Id., ¶¶13-14. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
15 
 
forming its interpretation; and (4) the agency's interpretation 
will provide uniformity and consistency in the application of 
the statute.16 
¶42 The Department argues for great weight deference, 
asserting that (1) it has previously administered child care 
licensing 
and 
revocation; 
(2) 
it 
is 
now 
charged 
with 
administering the new caregiver law; and (3) applying its 
interpretation of the new caregiver law will provide uniformity 
and consistency in the law's application. 
¶43 Alternatively, the Department argues that nothing less 
than 
due 
weight 
deference 
should 
be 
applied 
to 
its 
interpretation.  Due weight deference applies when the agency 
has some experience in an area but has not developed the 
expertise that places it in a better position than the court to 
make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute.17 
¶44 Ms. Jamerson argues that the court of appeals was 
correct in according the Department's statutory interpretation 
no deference in the present case and interpreting and applying 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶16. 
17 Mercycare Ins. Co. v. Wis. Comm'r of Ins., 2010 WI 87, 
¶10, 328 Wis. 2d 110, 786 N.W.2d 785. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
16 
 
the statute independently of the agency.18  Ms. Jamerson argues 
that no deference, that is, a court's de novo interpretation and 
application of a statute, is appropriate here, because the case 
is one of first impression and the Department lacks experience 
or expertise in deciding the legal issue presented.19    
¶45 Although the Department has had experience issuing and 
revoking childcare licenses, it has had no prior experience 
interpreting the new caregiver law.  Thus, we will not accord 
the Department the great weight deference it requests.20   
¶46 The question then becomes whether the Department is to 
be afforded due weight deference, or no deference.  We make this 
determination even though the court has acknowledged that "in 
most situations, applying due weight deference will lead to the 
same result as would applying no deference at all."21  Due weight 
                                                 
18 After the court of appeals ruled in the instant case, it 
was faced with a similar case in Brown v. Dep't of Children and 
Families, 2012 WI App 61, 341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827.  
There, the court of appeals gave the Department's conclusions of 
law due weight deference because the court of appeals concluded 
that after the agency's interpretation in the present case, its 
interpretation in Brown was no longer one of first impression 
and the agency no longer lacked experience in determining the 
questions presented.  Brown, 341 Wis. 2d 449, ¶23. 
19 Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶19.  See also 
Jamerson, 340 Wis. 2d 215, ¶11 (citing Kitten v. DWD, 2001 WI 
App 218, ¶22, 247 Wis. 2d 661, 634 N.W.2d 583). 
20 Mercycare, 328 Wis. 2d 110, ¶35. 
21 Mercycare, 328 Wis. 2d 110, ¶37 (quoting Racine Harley-
Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶20:  "Under both due weight 
deference and no deference, the reviewing court may adopt, 
without regard for the agency's interpretation, what it views as 
the most reasonable interpretation of the statute."   
No. 
2011AP593   
 
17 
 
deference may be warranted when the agency has specialized 
experience with the issues regulated by the statute, but has not 
yet interpreted the specific statutory language at issue.22   
¶47 This case presents an issue of first impression, but 
involves 
a 
statute 
that 
the 
Department 
is 
charged 
with 
enforcing, and the Department has had experience in issuing and 
revoking licenses.  Thus, we conclude that the Department's 
interpretation and application of the new caregiver law in the 
present case should be afforded due weight deference.  
¶48 When a reviewing court applies due weight deference, 
it sustains an agency's statutory interpretation if it is not 
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute, unless the 
reviewing court determines a more reasonable interpretation.23  
Under due weight deference, the reviewing court may adopt, 
without regard for the agency's interpretation, what the court 
views as the most reasonable interpretation of the statute.24 
III 
¶49 We now address the procedure the Administrative Law 
Judge is to use in Ms. Jamerson's appeal of the Department's 
decision to revoke her license.  More specifically, we address 
whether the Department's interpretation and application of the 
relevant statutes to deny Ms. Jamerson a contested case hearing 
                                                 
22 Mercycare, 328 Wis. 2d 110, ¶37 (citing DOR v. Menasha 
Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶51, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95). 
23 Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶18. 
24 Id., ¶20. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
18 
 
is contrary to the clear meaning of the statutes or no more 
reasonable interpretation of the statutes exists.  
¶50 The 
Department's 
January 
20, 
2010, 
Notice 
of 
Revocation to Ms. Jamerson explains that its "action is taken 
pursuant to s. 48.715(4)(b)" and that she may appeal and seek an 
administrative hearing under Wis. Stat. § 227.44.  Ms. Jamerson 
filed 
a 
timely 
appeal 
of 
the 
Department's 
decision 
of 
revocation.  
¶51 Because the Department's action was taken pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.715, § 48.72 applies.  Section 48.72 provides 
that any person aggrieved by the department's failure to 
continue a license or any action taken by the department under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.715 has the right to an administrative hearing 
provided for a contested case under § 227.44.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.72 provides as follows:  
[A]ny person aggrieved by the department's refusal or 
failure to issue, renew, or continue a license or by 
any action taken by the department under s. 48.715 has 
the right to an administrative hearing provided for 
contested 
cases 
in 
ch. 
227. 
 
To 
receive 
an 
administrative hearing under ch. 227, the aggrieved 
person shall send to the department a written request 
for a hearing under s. 227.44 within 10 days after the 
date of the department's refusal or failure to issue, 
renew, or continue a license or the department's 
action taken under s. 48.715.  The department shall 
hold an administrative hearing under s. 227.44 within 
30 
days 
after 
receipt 
of 
the 
request 
for 
the 
administrative hearing unless the aggrieved person 
consents 
to 
an 
extension 
of 
that 
time 
period.  
Judicial review of the department's decision may be 
had by any party in the contested case as provided in 
ch. 227 (emphasis added).  
No. 
2011AP593   
 
19 
 
¶52 Ms. Jamerson is a person aggrieved by the Department's 
actions 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.715. 
 
She 
appealed 
the 
Department's 
decision 
timely. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.72 
explicitly grants Ms. Jamerson the statutory right to a 
contested case hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.44.   
¶53 Furthermore, the Department has apparently interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 48.72 in the same way.  The Department's Notice of 
Revocation to Ms. Jamerson explicitly instructed her of her 
"right to an administrative hearing under s. 227.44." 
¶54 The Department now argues that Ms. Jamerson has only a 
"qualified right" to a hearing and that she must meet the 
statutory requirements under Wis. Stat. § 227.42(1) to get a 
contested case hearing.25  The court has not accepted this 
                                                 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.42(1) provides as follows: 
227.42. Right to hearing. (1) In addition to any other 
right provided by law, any person filing a written 
request with an agency for hearing shall have the 
right to a hearing which shall be treated as a 
contested case if: 
 (a) A substantial interest of the person is injured 
in fact or threatened with injury by agency action or 
inaction; 
 (b) There is no evidence of legislative intent that 
the interest is not to be protected; 
 (c) The injury to the person requesting a hearing is 
different in kind or degree from injury to the general 
public caused by the agency action or inaction; and 
 (d) There is a dispute of material fact. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
20 
 
interpretation 
of 
§ 227.42(1).  In Milwaukee Metropolitan 
Sewerage District v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 73, 375 N.W.2d 648 
(1985), the court declared that Wis. Stat. § 227.42 "creates a 
residual hearing right.  It serves as a safety net, affording a 
hearing right to those who are not granted a specific right to a 
hearing by other statutory provisions or administrative rules."26   
¶55 Here, Wis. Stat. § 48.72 grants Ms. Jamerson a 
specific right to a hearing under § 227.44, and thus, she need 
not rely on the residual safety net of § 227.42.  Wisconsin 
Stat. §§ 48.72 and 227.44 govern Ms. Jamerson's appeal and grant 
her the right to a contested case hearing on appeal of the 
revocation of her license.  Even if we accepted the Department's 
view of § 227.42(1), which we do not, Ms. Jamerson fits within 
§ 227.42(1)(d). 
¶56 Adhering to the text of Wis. Stat. §§ 48.72 and 
227.44, we conclude that the clear meaning of the relevant 
statutes and the more reasonable interpretation of the statutes 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast with Wis. Stat. § 48.72 and the Department's 
Notice of Revocation, both of which refer to an administrative 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 227.44, Wis. Adm. Code § DCF 
251.11(10)(a) and (b) speak of an appeal hearing under Wis. 
Stat. § 227.42. 
26 This case discussed Wis. Stat. § 227.064(1) (1983-84), 
which was renumbered § 227.42(1) effective April 22, 1986. 
See also Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. DHSS, 130 
Wis. 2d 79, 93, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986) (citing Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 375 N.W.2d 648 (1985), 
for holding that the precursor of Wis. Stat. § 227.42(1) is 
clear and unambiguous in creating a residual hearing right as a 
safety net).     
No. 
2011AP593   
 
21 
 
is that Ms. Jamerson has the right to a hearing provided for a 
contested case under § 227.44.   
¶57 Like the court of appeals, we need not and do not 
address the authority of an administrative law judge to grant 
the Department's motion to dismiss an appeal without convening a 
hearing.27  Resolution of this question is unnecessary in the 
present case.  As we explain below, the Administrative Law Judge 
erred as a matter of law in granting the Department's motion to 
dismiss in the present case, and the matter will therefore be 
remanded for a contested case hearing.28   
                                                 
27 Although not directly on point, an Attorney General 
Opinion relating to real estate licensing advised that "no 
contested motion to dismiss should be granted until an actual 
hearing is convened on notice."  The opinion continued, "Where 
the proceedings involve revocation or denial of a license, for 
reasons other than failure to pass a written examination, it 
would be a rare case where circumstances would permit dismissal 
of the proceedings prior to the conclusion of a meaningful 
evidentiary hearing on other than jurisdictional grounds or 
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action."  68 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 31 (1979) (OAG 12-79). 
In Brown v. Dep't of Children and Families, 2012 WI App 61, 
341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827, the Administrative Law Judge 
decided the matter on briefs.  Both parties agreed to present 
their respective cases on briefs in lieu of an administrative 
hearing.  Brief and Appendix of Respondents-Respondents (the 
Department) to Court of Appeals at 3, available at 2011 WL 
5006372. 
28 The parties have expressed disagreement about and have 
not fully briefed and argued the issue of burden of proof in the 
contested case hearing.  We therefore do not decide the issue at 
this time.   
No. 
2011AP593   
 
22 
 
IV 
¶58 We now address the last issue before us: whether the 
Department's interpretation and application of the relevant 
statutes to permit the Administrative Law Judge, as a matter of 
law, to grant the Department's motion to dismiss Ms. Jamerson's 
appeal without a hearing is contrary to the clear meaning of the 
relevant statutes or no more reasonable interpretation of the 
statutes exists.  The Department concluded that Ms. Jamerson's 
appeal could be dismissed without a hearing because the very 
conviction for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) 
barred Ms. Jamerson, as a matter of law, from continuing to hold 
a child care license under Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.   
¶59 We look to Wis. Stat. § 227.44 for guidance on the 
procedure in contested case hearings including the use of a 
motion to dismiss.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.44(1) explains that 
"[i]n a contested case, all parties shall be afforded an 
opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 227.44(3) explains that an "[o]pportunity shall be 
                                                                                                                                                             
We merely note that the party moving for summary judgment 
ordinarily has the burden of proof.  Peninsular Carpets Inc. v. 
Bradley Homes, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 405, 410, 206 N.W.2d 408 (1973) 
(citing Kubiak v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 15 
Wis. 2d 344, 349, 113 N.W.2d 46 (1962)).   
We also note that Wis. Admin. Code § HA 1.12(3)(a) (Dec. 
2002) comments on the burden of proof as follows:  
In proceedings where an agency has issued an order or 
proposed order and the order recipient requests a 
hearing on the matter, the agency shall proceed first 
with the presentation of evidence and shall bear the 
burden of proof. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
23 
 
afforded all parties to present evidence and to rebut or offer 
countervailing evidence." 
¶60 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 227.44(5) 
authorizes 
informal 
disposition 
of 
a 
contested 
case 
"by 
stipulation, 
agreed 
settlement, consent order or default" unless precluded by law.  
This subsection was not satisfied in the present case.   
¶61 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 227.43(1)(d) 
directs 
the 
administrator of the Division of Hearings and Appeals to 
"[p]romulgate 
rules 
relating 
to 
the 
exercise 
of 
the 
administrator's and the division's powers and duties under 
[Section 227]."  The Division of Hearings and Appeals has 
promulgated rules to which we now refer.  
¶62 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ HA 
1.01(2) 
(Dec. 
2002) 
explains that "[t]his chapter shall apply in all contested case 
proceedings and hearings before the division of hearings and 
appeals under ch. 227, Stats., except as specifically provided 
otherwise."   
¶63 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ HA 
1.10(2) 
(Dec. 
2002) 
explains that the summary judgment procedure provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08 shall be available to parties in a contested case 
upon the approval of the Division of Hearings and Appeals or the 
Administrative Law Judge.  While permitting summary judgment, 
neither § HA 1.10(2) nor any other provision in Chapter HA 1 
makes any mention of motions to dismiss in a contested case 
hearing. 
¶64 Although the Department labeled its motion a motion to 
dismiss and the Administrative Law Judge characterized the 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
24 
 
motion as a motion to dismiss, the motion had exhibits attached29 
and such a motion might be treated in a civil case as a motion 
for summary judgment.30   
¶65 Because the administrative rules do not provide for a 
motion to dismiss but do provide for summary judgment, we shall 
treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment for 
purposes of this review to determine whether the Administrative 
Law Judge could decide the motion as a matter of law, or was 
required 
to 
hold 
a 
contested 
case 
hearing 
for 
further 
development of the facts.   
¶66 Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.31   
¶67 We 
conclude 
that 
in 
the 
present 
case, 
a 
more 
reasonable interpretation of the statutes governing summary 
                                                 
29 Attached to the Motion to Dismiss were a copy of Ms. 
Jamerson's Notice of Revocation (labeled Exhibit A), Ms. 
Jamerson's Crime Information Bureau Report (labeled Exhibit B), 
and Ms. Jamerson's Background Information Disclosure (labeled 
Exhibit C). 
30 Cf. Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3) and Bammert v. Don's Super 
Valu, Inc., 2002 WI 85, ¶7 n.2, 254 Wis. 2d 347, 646 N.W.2d 365 
(treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 802.06(2)(b) and 802.08).  
See CTI of N.E. Wis., LLC v. Herrell, 2003 WI App 19, ¶¶9-
11, 259 Wis. 2d 756, 656 N.W.2d 794 (Ct. App. 2002) (discussing 
the proper procedure to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion 
for summary judgment).  
31 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. 
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
25 
 
judgment and the new caregiver law exists than the one adopted 
by the Department.  There are genuine issues of material fact 
and the Department, the moving party, is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on its motion.  The documents in 
this record, without any additional evidentiary support, are 
insufficient to satisfy the requirements established by the 
legislature for summary judgment and for the new caregiver law.  
We therefore do not defer to the Department's interpretation and 
application of the statutes.  
¶68 We agree with the court of appeals that any conviction 
or group of convictions used to satisfy § 48.685(5)(br)5. must 
satisfy 
two 
elements. 
 
First, 
the 
offense 
must 
involve 
"fraudulent activity."  Second, the convicted person must have 
undertaken that fraudulent activity "as a participant in" a 
public 
assistance 
program 
specifically 
enumerated 
in 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5.   
¶69 With regard to "fraudulent activity" we note, as did 
the court of appeals, that Wis. Stat. § 49.12(6) states that an 
offense involving the failure to notify the proper agency about 
received assets or income "shall be considered fraud" and that 
the "violations described in Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) have 
an essential element of fraud . . . ."32  The Department argues 
that at all times relevant to the present case, § 49.12(1) and 
(6) included the elements of fraud.   
                                                 
32 Jamerson, 340 Wis. 2d 215, ¶22. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
26 
 
¶70 The Department argues that the State had to prove the 
following elements for a conviction under § 49.12(1) and that 
these 
elements 
constitute 
fraud: 
one 
makes 
a 
false 
representation to a public assistance agency, knowing the 
representation was false, with the intent to secure public 
assistance for himself or another and secures the public 
assistance.  The Department argues that the State had to prove 
the 
following 
elements 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 49.12(6) 
that 
constitute 
fraud: 
one 
who 
receives 
public 
assistance 
intentionally failed to notify the agency within ten days of the 
receipt of other income or assets which made him ineligible to 
receive all or part of the public assistance he had been 
granted, and he continued to receive the public assistance after 
he failed to report the new income or assets within the ten-day 
period. 
 
¶71 In contrast, Ms. Jamerson argues that proof of fraud 
was not always required or clearly accepted as an element of 
Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) in the 1980s and 1990s, and that 
her conviction was not based on fraudulent activity. 
¶72 The record in the present case does not contain the 
complaint or any other document from which it can be clearly 
determined that Ms. Jamerson engaged in fraudulent activity.  
When the Department has the authority to impose the harsh 
penalty 
of 
a 
lifetime 
bar 
on 
licensure 
for 
decades-old 
convictions, the conviction under Wis. Stat. § 49.12 (1) and (6) 
must indeed be based on "fraudulent activity."   
No. 
2011AP593   
 
27 
 
¶73 On the basis of this record, this is not the case for 
the court to define "fraudulent activity" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.685(5)(br)5. and "fraud" in Wis. Stat. § 49.12(6), and the 
relationship between these two phrases.  Instead,  we look to 
Brown v. Dep't of Children and Families, 2012 WI App 61, ¶18, 
341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827, for guidance.  In Brown, the 
court of appeals examined the complaint to which Ms. Brown had 
pled guilty, to determine whether the complaint shows that she 
had made false representations in securing food stamps contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6).   
¶74 With regard to the element that the convicted person 
have engaged in fraud "as a participant in" a public assistance 
program specifically enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5., 
we conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the record does 
not support an inference that the conviction was based on a 
violation of a food stamp law or any other public assistance 
program specifically enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.33  
¶75 As we noted previously, the Department's brief argues 
that an inference can be made that the conviction under Wis. 
Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) was based on the illegal food stamp 
conduct that is the basis for Ms. Jamerson's 1991 conviction 
under § 49.127(2m).  According to the judgment of conviction, 
the two convictions are not based on conduct during precisely 
the same period.  As we have explained previously, the 
Department has recently withdrawn this argument and now agrees 
                                                 
33 Id., ¶¶18, 22, 23. 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
28 
 
that there is no evidence in the record supporting the inference 
that the two convictions stem from the same conduct.     
¶76 Under the most reasonable interpretation of the new 
caregiver law, the judgment of conviction and the documents 
filed in the present case, standing on their own and without any 
additional factual support, do not satisfy the two factors 
required in § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
¶77 Genuine issues of material fact exist here.  The 
matter must be remanded to the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
to determine whether Ms. Jamerson's conviction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.12(1) 
and 
(6) 
involved 
"fraudulent 
activity 
as 
a 
participant" in the specific public benefits programs enumerated 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5.  
* * * * 
¶78 We conclude that due deference should be accorded the 
Department's interpretation and application of the new caregiver 
law in the present case; that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.72 and 227.44 
accord Ms. Jamerson the right to a hearing, which shall be 
treated as a contested case under § 227.44; and that because 
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Administrative Law 
Judge erred as a matter of law in dismissing Ms. Jamerson's 
appeal without a hearing for factual development.    
¶79 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
remanding the matter to the Division of Hearings and Appeals for 
a hearing to determine whether Ms. Jamerson's 1991 conviction 
under Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) involved "fraudulent 
No. 
2011AP593   
 
29 
 
activity as a participant" in the specific public benefits 
programs enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. 
¶80 By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2011AP593.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶81 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I do not 
join the majority opinion.  Rather, I write in concurrence 
because subsequent to oral argument, the State conceded that 
there is a dispute of material fact in regard to "the narrow 
factual issue of the [specific] public [] benefits involved in 
Ms. Jamerson's Wis. Stat. § 49.12(6) and (1) conviction[s]."  
The State now agrees with Jamerson to seek remand to the 
Department of Children and Families pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(7) to conduct fact finding to determine whether 
Jamerson's food stamp conviction was a public benefit Jamerson 
received when she failed to report receipt of income in 
Milwaukee County Case No. 1991CF911244.1   
¶82 On remand, the Department may take judicial notice of 
the Complaint and the Guilty Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of 
Rights Form (hereinafter, Guilty Plea Questionnaire) that 
underlie Jamerson's 1991 convictions, or the State may provide 
copies of the Complaint and Guilty Plea Questionnaire in 
1991CF911244.  See Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2)(b) (providing that a 
judicially noticed fact is one that is "capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned"); Estate of Kriefall v. Sizzler USA 
Franchise, Inc., 2011 WI App 101, ¶60, 335 Wis. 2d 151, 801 
N.W.2d 781 (concluding that a judge or a court may take judicial 
                                                 
1 At the time of her 1991 conviction, Angelia Jamerson 
appears to have been known as Angelia Leanetta Zollicoffer, 
according to the judgment of conviction that is part of the 
record before us.   
No.  2011AP593.pdr 
 
2 
 
notice of certain types of facts whether requested to do so or 
not).  
¶83 However, on remand to the Department, the facts 
alleged in the Complaint or stated by Jamerson in the Guilty 
Plea Questionnaire cannot be challenged because there has been 
no appeal of the judgment that was based on these documents.   
To challenge the facts upon which Jamerson's conviction is based 
would involve a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction.  
See Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, 
¶27, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652 (explaining that permitting 
evidence to undermine a judgment is a collateral attack on and 
an attempt to evade the judgment); See also Zrimsek v. Am. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959) (explaining that 
at times a defense actually constitutes a collateral attack on a 
judgment).   
¶84 The powers of the Department are governed by statute.2  
See Wis. Stat. § 227.46(1) (defining limited powers of hearing 
examiners); see also Stern v. WERC, 2006 WI App 193, ¶24, 296 
Wis. 2d 306, 722 N.W.2d 594 (explaining that the subject matter 
jurisdiction of administrative agencies is limited to what has 
been conferred by statute).  There exists no statutory authority 
for the Department to hear a collateral attack on the 1991 
circuit court judgment convicting Jamerson of violating Wis. 
Stat. § 49.12(6) and (1).  Accordingly, the Department does not 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 48.72 (establishing appeal procedure for 
persons aggrieved by Department's refusal to issue, renew, or 
continue child care licensure, and directing that such appeals 
are governed by Wis. Stat. § 227.44). 
No.  2011AP593.pdr 
 
3 
 
have jurisdiction to hear a collateral attack on that judgment.  
See Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 
40, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (reaffirming that an 
administrative agency has "only those powers which are expressly 
conferred or which are necessarily implied by the statutes under 
which 
it 
operates" 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted)).  
Therefore, if it is Jamerson's intent to attack the facts that 
form 
the 
basis 
for 
the 
Complaint 
or 
the 
Guilty 
Plea 
Questionnaire in 1991CF911244, such a collateral attack cannot 
proceed as a part of the Department's hearing on remand.  See 
id. 
¶85 In addition, in order to have a contested case hearing 
in this proceeding, the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 227.42(1) 
must be fulfilled.  Section 227.42(1) requires: 
In addition to any other right provided by law, any 
person filing a written request with an agency for 
hearing shall have the right to a hearing which shall 
be treated as a contested case if: 
(a) A substantial interest of the person is 
injured in fact or threatened with injury by agency 
action or inaction; 
(b) There is no evidence of legislative intent 
that the interest is not to be protected; 
(c) The injury to the person requesting a hearing 
is different in kind or degree from injury to the 
general 
public 
caused 
by 
the 
agency 
action 
or 
inaction; and  
(d) There is a dispute of material fact. 
¶86 Therefore, on remand, when the Complaint and the 
Guilty Plea Questionnaire in the 1991 case are provided, it is 
possible that there will be no dispute of material fact, such 
No.  2011AP593.pdr 
 
4 
 
that the hearing will be in the nature of record supplementation 
to afford the Department the opportunity to address the narrow 
factual finding of the specific public benefits involved in 
Jamerson's Wis. Stat. § 49.12(6) and (1) convictions.  Where the 
facts found are based on undisputed evidence, a question of law 
is presented.  See State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 
587, 609, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994) (concluding that the findings of 
the factfinder based on undisputed evidence present a question 
of law).   
¶87  Accordingly, to enable the parties to address the 
narrow factual issue of the specific public benefits that were 
involved in Jamerson's Wis. Stat. § 49.12(6) and (1) convictions 
in Milwaukee County Case No. 1991CF911244, I respectfully write 
in concurrence with the majority opinion to the extent that the 
opinion remands the matter to the Department for further 
proceedings. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2011AP593.pdr 
 
1