Case Title: SILVER CREEK DRAIN DIST V EXTRUSIONS DIVISION INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119721

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 17, 2003  
SILVER CREEK DRAIN DISTRICT,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 119721  
EXTRUSIONS DIVISION, INC., and 
AZZAR STORE EQUIPMENT, INC,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether environmental-contamination conditions are factors to  
be considered when a court is determining fair market value to  
establish 
just 
compensation in a condemnation action under the  
Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51 et seq.  
We hold that they are to be considered. Accordingly, we  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this regard  
and remand this matter to the trial court for further  
 
 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Defendant 
Extrusions 
Division, 
Inc. 
(Extrusions),  
operates 
a 
plastics 
extruding business and owned an eight-acre  
parcel of vacant land adjacent to its operations complex in  
Grand Rapids. In 1992, Extrusions applied to the city of Grand  
Rapids for a permit to build a warehouse on the eight acres.  
The application was denied, and Extrusions was informed that  
the Silver Creek Drain District (Drain District), in 1991, had  
identified the parcel as its desired site for a storm-water  
retention pond. Extrusions claimed that denial of a permit,  
together with the failure of the Drain District to commence a  
condemnation 
action, 
amounted 
to 
an 
unconstitutional 
taking 
of  
private property without just compensation. Accordingly, in  
1992, Extrusions initiated an inverse-condemnation action  
against the city and the Kent County Drain Commissioner.  
On March 7, 1994, the Drain District, pursuant to the  
UCPA, tendered a good-faith “just compensation” offer1 in the  
amount of $211,300 to Extrusions for the parcel. This offer,  
as allowed under MCL 213.55(1) of the UCPA, also reserved the  
1“Before initiating negotiations for the purchase of 
property, the agency shall establish an amount that it 
believes to be just compensation for the property and promptly 
shall submit to the owner a good faith written offer to 
acquire the property for the full amount so established 
. . . .” MCL 213.55(1).  
2  
 
 
 
Drain District’s right to proceed against Extrusions in a  
federal or state action for contamination-cost recovery.2  
Cost-recovery actions are intended to give governmental  
authorities the ability to seek reimbursement from those  
responsible for the damage done to the land by the release of  
hazardous substances. At the time of this litigation, the  
procedure to reserve the right to bring a cost-recovery action  
against the condemnee was new, having been established by  
amendments of the UCPA in 1993. The purpose of the amendments  
was not merely to allow the condemnor to reserve the right to  
demand remediation costs, but also to ensure that, if a  
reservation of rights occurred, the funds for condemnation  
would be escrowed to satisfy any judgment that the condemnor  
might eventually secure against the condemnee.3  
2Cost-recovery proceedings may be brought under the 
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 USC 9601 et seq., or under part 201 
of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act  
(NREPA), MCL 324.20101 et seq.  
3As discussed above, § 5 of the amended UCPA (MCL 213.55) 
requires a condemning agency to deposit its estimated just­
compensation amount in escrow when it files the condemnation 
complaint; this escrowed amount is to pay the condemnee upon 
the order of the court. MCL 213.55(5); MCL 213.58(4). However, 
in the 1993 amendments of the UCPA, in order to facilitate the 
collection 
of 
remediation 
costs 
of 
environmental  
contamination, the Legislature allowed the agency, when it 
submits a “good faith” written offer, to reserve the right to 
seek contamination costs from the condemnee. If this is done, 
the escrowed funds may remain in escrow “as security for 
remediation costs of environmental contamination . . . .” MCL  
(continued...)  
3  
On May 26, 1994, the Drain District executed, as required  
by MCL 213.55(4)(e), a “declaration of taking,” which  
indicated that this private property was being taken for  
purposes of a necessary public improvement.  
In June, the $211,300 good-faith “just compensation”  
amount was placed in escrow. The Drain District then filed its  
condemnation action and again reserved the right to bring a  
federal or state cost-recovery action.  
On February 20, 1995, the parties stipulated, and the  
trial court ordered, that the parcel be conveyed to the Drain  
District and that the Drain District pay Extrusions $211,300  
for the taking. Following this, the Drain District,  
notwithstanding the stipulation and order, sought an order  
that would hold the funds in escrow as security for the  
remediation costs as allowed under the UCPA. Extrusions, in  
response, citing part 201 of the Natural Resources and  
3(...continued) 
213.58(2).  
However, even if the governmental agency reserves the 
cost-recovery option against a condemnee, under subsection 6a 
(MCL 213.56a) a court can order an agency to waive its right 
to pursue a cost-recovery action under certain circumstances. 
The predicate for seeking this reversal of the agency’s 
election is that, under part 201 of the NREPA, the condemnee 
has no liability because it did not cause the contamination. 
MCL 213.58(3). If the court orders the waiver of the rights, 
the agency is required to submit a revised good-faith offer. 
Subsection 6a(3) also allows the parties to a condemnation 
action to stipulate the reversal of the reservation.  
4  
Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.20101 et seq.,  
claimed that it was not the cause of the contamination as  
identified in the amendments and, thus, was not liable for  
remediation 
costs. 
Accordingly, it argued, on the authority of  
MCL 213.55(5) and MCL 213.58(4), that the funds should be  
released. On November 3, 1995, by stipulation, the court  
ordered the escrowed sums, as well as interest, paid to  
Extrusions.  
In a 1997 bench trial concerning valuation, the court  
found 
that 
the 
value 
of 
the 
eight-acre 
parcel, 
if  
environmental concerns were ignored, was $278,800. The court  
then determined that the parcel “was an environmentally  
contaminated site, with respect to which a reasonably prudent  
purchaser would have required, at a minimum, a formal Type-C  
Closure from the [Department of Natural Resources] as a  
condition precedent to closing.”  
Because the court found that the reasonable cost of the  
Type-C closure was $237,768, it concluded that the net fair  
market value was $41,032. The court entered an order to that  
effect and reiterated in the order that the once-escrowed  
$211,300 was awarded to Extrusions.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and  
5  
 
 
 
 
remanded the case to the trial court.4 The Court of Appeals  
held that the UCPA gave no authority for a court to consider  
any contamination factor in the establishment of fair market  
value. Rather, contamination could only be considered in  
separate 
proceedings 
for remediation costs. It was the Court’s  
position that this outcome was appropriate because § 5 of the  
UCPA provided “little guidance regarding the factors a court  
should 
consider 
when 
called 
on 
to 
determine 
just  
compensation.”5 Given the minimal guidance, the Court  
concluded that the plain language of the UCPA amendments  
addressing federal and state cost-recovery actions meant that  
only in those separate proceedings could such factors be  
considered.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider the Drain  
District’s claim that a court may consider a parcel’s  
environmental condition as a factor affecting fair market  
value in a determination of just compensation under the UCPA.  
We conclude that a court may consider such conditions in  
establishing 
fair 
market value and, thus, reverse the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals on this issue only.  
4245 Mich App 556, 557-558; 630 NW2d 347 (2001).  
5Id. at 563.  
6  
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation of 
UCPA  
provisions. 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that  
we review de novo. Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich  
588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
“Eminent domain” or “condemnation” is the power of a  
government to take private property. The power arises from the  
sovereign power of the state and is of ancient provenance.6  
The federal government’s power in this regard is found in the  
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, in which it  
is stated that the government may not take private property  
unless it is done for a public use and with just compensation.  
Every 
Michigan 
constitution has had a similar clause requiring  
just compensation in these circumstances.7 Our current  
Constitution states that: “[p]rivate property shall not be  
taken for public use without just compensation . . . .”8  
In 
Michigan, 
in 
furtherance 
of 
this 
constitutional 
power,  
statutes have regulated the exercise and procedure of  
6See Magna Carta, Grant 39 (1215): “No freeman shall be 
. . . disseised . . . unless by the lawful judgment of his 
peers, or by the law of the land.”  
7See Const 1835, art 1, § 19; Const 1850, art 18, § 2; 
Const 1908, art 13, § 1.  
8Const 1963, art 10, § 2.  
7  
 
condemnation. 
In 
1980, 
the 
Legislature 
unified 
all  
condemnation statutes in the UCPA.  Under the act, echoing the  
Constitution, it was stated at MCL 213.55(1) that a court was  
to “. . . ascertain and determine just compensation to be made  
for the acquisition of the [condemned] property.”  
As 
is 
evident, 
the “just compensation” requirement in the  
statute 
mirrors 
the 
identical 
requirement 
in 
our 
Constitution.  
This 
reiteration 
of 
the 
constitutional 
language 
is 
significant  
because to the degree the Constitution has been construed to  
outline the nature of “just compensation,” the statute must be  
similarly construed because no act of the Legislature can take  
away what the Constitution has given. Sharp v City of Lansing,  
464 Mich 792, 810; 629 NW2d 873 (2001).  
Thus, we must determine the meaning of the phrase “just  
compensation” in our Constitution. As we recently outlined in  
Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Service  
Comm, 465 Mich 212, 222-223; 634 NW2d 692 (2001), in analyzing  
constitutional language, the first inquiry is to determine if  
the words have a plain meaning or are obvious on their face.  
If they are, that plain meaning is the meaning given them. If,  
however, 
the 
constitutional language has no plain meaning, but  
is a technical, legal term, we are to construe those words in  
their technical, legal sense.  Moreover, in that undertaking,  
we are to rely on the understanding of the terms by those  
8  
 
 
 
sophisticated in the law at the time of the constitutional  
drafting and ratification. The rule is, as we said in Michigan  
Coalition, that “if a constitutional phrase is a technical  
legal term or a phrase of art in the law, the phrase will be  
given the meaning that those sophisticated in the law  
understood at the time of enactment unless it is clear from  
the constitutional language that some other meaning was  
intended.”9  
The meaning of “just compensation” cannot be discerned  
merely by a careful reading of the phrase. The words  
themselves, as the Court of Appeals found, just do not inform  
a court about the potential complexity and variety of factors  
to be considered in determining value.10 This circumstance is  
9465 Mich 223. We also pointed out in Michigan Coalition,  
id. at n 9, that the same rule, pursuant to the Legislature’s 
directive at MCL 8.3a, applies to the construction of a 
statute.  
10It is, perhaps, useful to illustrate the correctness of 
the point, inasmuch as the partial concurrence and dissent of 
Justice Weaver asserts the contrary.  In establishing value 
for residential properties, for example, can sentimental 
factors such as long-time ownership or historic importance be 
considered?
 Or in the case of commercial properties, can 
business 
interruption 
be 
considered 
in 
establishing 
value 
and, 
if so, how?  Should an income-capitalization approach be 
considered in a business valuation, or should some other 
approach, 
such 
as 
cost-less-depreciation 
or 
sales of  
comparable properties be used to assist in fixing value? As  
is obvious, one cannot merely review the dictionary 
definitions of “just” and “compensation” and combine them to 
produce a coherent meaning for this phrase.  Rather, as a 
result of longstanding legal practice and custom, as revealed 
(continued...)  
9  
 
not unusual in the realm of statutory construction.  For  
example, it can be seen also when statutes, as they  
occasionally do, use words such as “negligence,” “due  
process,” or “equity.”  These are words with meanings that are  
not generally self-evident from a mere reading of the words or  
an assessment of their definitions in a dictionary.  They are,  
in this respect, unlike self-evident words such as “bridge,”  
“road,” “building,” or “horse.” Rather, they are words that  
fall into that category we have described as technical legal  
terms or phrases of art in the law, and thus they are to be  
given the meaning that those sophisticated in the law gave  
them at the time of enactment.  We believe it is necessary, if  
the law is to be applied uniformly across the state, that this  
class of words—words that are freighted with historic  
meaning—be given the same legal meaning in all our courts  
rather than allowing each court to impose its own meaning. to  
hold otherwise would all but ensure in similar cases different  
outcomes in different courts, as Justice Weaver, drawing from  
her opinion would apparently be content to allow.  This means  
10(...continued) 
through countless judicial opinions over the centuries, this 
phrase means something more than the sum of its discrete 
parts.
 That juries would make decisions on these issues, 
after being instructed on the law, is not contradictory to the 
point we raise.  That is always the process whether the 
statute at issue is susceptible to plain-meaning analysis or 
is interpreted using some other method of statutory 
explication.  
10  
 
that, in this case, it is appropriate to review the consensus  
understanding in 1963, by those skilled in this area of law,  
of the meaning of “just compensation.”  
Throughout our history and clearly by the 1960s, it was  
uncontroversial that a determination of “just compensation”  
required the consideration of all the multiplicity of factors  
that go into making up value. In the nineteenth century, while  
summarizing just compensation and its meaning in American  
constitutional law, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas M.  
Cooley, 
in 
his 
treatise 
The 
General 
Principles 
of  
Constitutional Law in the United States of America, said:  
The rule by which compensation shall be  
measured is not the same in all cases, but is 
largely affected by the circumstances. If what is 
taken is the whole of what the owner may have lying 
together, it is clear that he is entitled to its 
value, judged by such standards as the markets and 
the opinions of witnesses can afford, and that 
this, except in extraordinary cases, must be the 
full measure of his injury.11  
The United States Supreme Court has had a similar and  
unvarying view of this matter, holding in Searl v Lake Co  
School Dist No 2, 133 US 553, 564; 10 S Ct 374; 33 L Ed 740  
(1890), that the value of land must include “every . . .  
element entering into its cash or market value, as tested by  
its capacity for any and all uses . . . .” Then, again, in  
11Cooley, Constitutional Law (Boston; Little, Brown and 
Co, 1880), p 341.  
11  
 
1933, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he requirement that  
‘just compensation’ shall be paid is comprehensive and  
includes all elements . . . .” Seaboard A L R Co v United  
States, 261 US 299, 306; 43 S Ct 354; 67 L Ed 664 (1923);  
accord Jacobs v United States, 290 US 13, 16-17; 54 S Ct 26;  
78 L Ed 142 (1933). The calculation is to “include any element  
of value that [property] might have by reason of special  
adaptation to particular uses.” Clark’s Ferry Bridge Co v Pub  
Service Comm, 291 US 227, 238; 54 S Ct 427; 78 L Ed 767  
(1934). Yet again in 1956, the high court held that “[j]ust  
compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the  
property . . . .” United States v Twin City Power Co, 350 US  
222, 250-251; 76 S Ct 259; 100 L Ed 240 (1956).12  
Michigan’s understanding of just compensation has been  
identical in all relevant particulars.13 In In re Widening of  
Gratiot Avenue, 294 Mich 569, 574-575; 293 NW 755 (1940), we  
explained that “‘[t]he determination of value is not a matter  
of formulas or artificial rules, but of sound judgment and  
12This continues to be the universal rule. As it was  
stated more recently, just compensation “has been held to be 
equivalent to the full value of the property. All elements of 
value inherent in the property merit consideration in the 
valuation process.” 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (rev 3d), ch 12, 
§ 12.01, pp 12-2 to 12-3.  
13The effect on market value of the condemnation  
proceeding itself may not be considered as an element of 
value. MCL 213.70(1); In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park  
Project, 376 Mich 311, 318; 136 NW2d 896 (1965).  
12  
 
discretion based upon a consideration of all the relevant  
facts in a particular case.’” In considering various factors,  
we have held that compensation may include an award for the  
taking of leasehold, see id.; for fixtures, see In re Slum  
Clearance, 332 Mich 485; 52 NW2d 195 (1952); for business­
interruption expenses, see In re Grand Haven Hwy, 357 Mich 20;  
97 NW2d 748 (1959); and even for the increase in value  
attributable to the reasonable probability that the property  
would be rezoned, see State Hwy Comm’r v Eilender, 362 Mich  
697; 108 NW2d 755 (1961). Thus, in our law, “just  
compensation” was a legal phrase of art in 1963 that meant,  
and still means, that the proper amount of compensation for  
property takes into account all factors relevant to market  
value.14 It is this meaning that the constitutional drafters  
and ratifiers are held to have understood when they were  
adopting the Michigan Constitution of 1963, and a similar  
understanding is attributed to the legislators, who also used  
the phrase “just compensation” when they enacted the UCPA in  
1980.  
That 
the 
legislators who amended the 
UCPA in 1993 provided  
14We reiterated the general rule recently in Dep’t of  
Transportation v Van Elslander, 460 Mich 127, 129-130; 594 
NW2d 841 (1999), where we described what is relevant to just 
compensation as “any evidence that would tend to affect the 
market value of the property as of the date of the  
condemnation . . . .”  
13  
 
 
the procedures and means for securing remediation costs and  
dovetailed those with the just-compensation determination  
indicates no intent to abrogate the meaning of “just  
compensation” established in our jurisprudence. Indeed, to  
attribute such an intent, i.e., the intent to diminish a  
constitutional standard by statute, is to place the  
legislators in the posture of acting unconstitutionally. This  
we avoid unless no other construction is possible15 and, as  
such an alternate construction is possible, we adopt it.  
The Court of Appeals error was to utilize the plain­
language doctrine in a context where it was inapplicable. The  
phrase “just compensation” cannot be analyzed on the basis of  
the plain understanding each word conveys, but is a phrase of  
art that imports with it all the understandings those  
sophisticated in the law give it.  
Moreover, we agree with the argument made in the brief  
amicus curiae of the Attorney General, on behalf of the  
Michigan Department of Transportation, that the Court of  
Appeals was led to error by the commingling of two different  
concepts: (1) accounting for contamination in a determination  
of fair market value and (2) making an assessment of liability  
and damages for the cost of remediation of environmental  
15See Gora v Ferndale, 456 Mich 704, 722 n 15; 576 NW2d  
141 (1998).  
14  
 
contamination.  
As the Attorney General pointed out, a condemnation  
action is an in rem proceeding governed by the UCPA. It is  
instituted to allow a state agency to take title to privately  
owned property; thus, the agency and the owner are parties. An  
essential part of the proceeding is the determination of the  
fair market value of the property. Because this proceeding is  
not 
designed 
to 
assign 
liability 
for 
environmental  
contamination, the value of the property is unaffected by  
whether its owner would be liable for the contaminated state  
of the property. The estimated costs of remediation are  
relevant only as they pertain to the fair market value of the  
property.  
In contrast, a cost-recovery action under Michigan’s  
environmental-cleanup laws is an in personam proceeding  
specifically designed to assign liability for remediation  
costs.  Those costs are typically sought under CERCLA or the  
NREPA and the fair market value of property is not relevant in  
such proceedings. 
Further, in a cost-recovery action, in  
addition to the agency and the owner, any other person or  
entity, such as prior owners, lessees, adjacent property  
owners, or other third parties who may have contributed to the  
contamination, may be parties. Finally, that the damages  
awarded in a cost-recovery action are different, sometimes  
15  
dramatically so, from the amount by which contamination  
reduced 
fair 
market 
value,16 
makes 
manifest 
how 
different 
these  
proceedings are. What is to be grasped, then, is that the  
primary connection between a condemnation proceeding and a  
cost-recovery action is the escrow that may be created during  
the condemnation proceeding to provide security for the  
payment of the potential cost-recovery award.  
The trial court, we believe, understood this matter  
properly and merely considered contamination as one factor,  
albeit a significant one, in establishing a fair market value.  
It was the trial judge’s conclusion that any purchaser would  
have insisted on a minimal cleanup (the Type-C closure) that  
would have made the property useable. The cost of this Type-C  
closure is far different from the amount remediation would  
have cost.17 Thus, we conclude that the trial court made its  
just-compensation 
determination 
not 
on 
the 
basis 
of  
Extrusions’ liability for cleanup costs, but on the basis of  
the effect of contamination on the parcel’s fair market value.  
This was an appropriate way to consider contamination in a  
just-compensation proceeding under the UCPA.  
16The actual cost of remediation in this case was  
approximately $2.3 million, while the loss of value caused by 
the contamination was found by the trial court to be $237,768.  
17See n 16.  
16  
We reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals holding that the UCPA does not vest courts with the  
authority to consider contamination and how it affects fair  
market value when determining just compensation in a  
condemnation proceeding. In all other respects, we affirm the  
Court of Appeals and remand this case for proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
17  
 
 
________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
SILVER CREEK DRAIN DISTRICT,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 119721  
EXTRUSIONS DIVISION, INC, and  
AZZAR STORE EQUIPMENT, INC,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
Although the majority arrives at the correct result, it  
unnecessarily reaches a constitutional issue.  We have stated  
previously, "there exists a general presumption by this Court  
that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not  
necessary to resolve a case."  Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of  
 
Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422  
(1993); see also Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 154;  
103 NW2d 769 (1960).  Because resolution on statutory grounds  
alone would suffice, I would not reach the constitutional  
issue.  
Additionally, I write separately to note that I am  
concerned about the majority’s focus on original intent. As  
I noted in my concurrence in WPW Acquisition Co v City of  
Troy, 466 Mich 117, 128-130; 643 NW2d 564 (2002), the  
drafters’ intent is but one method among many useful in the  
endeavor to properly interpret our constitution.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
2  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
SILVER CREEK DRAIN DISTRICT,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 119721  
EXTRUSIONS DIVISION, INC.,  
AZZAR STORE EQUIPMENT, INC,  
Defendant-Appellees.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I concur in the result only of the majority. I write  
separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s  
construction of the constitutional concept, “just  
compensation.”1  The majority suggests that “just  
1Article 10, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution provides:  
Private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation therefor being first 
made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. 
Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in 
a court of record.  
(continued...)  
compensation” is a “technical legal term or phrase of art”  
that cannot be grasped by those not “sophisticated in the  
law.” Ante at 10. This incorrect suggestion leads the  
majority to conclude that the meaning of “just compensation”  
must be restricted to the “consensus understanding in 1963,  
by those skilled in this area of the law, of the meaning of  
‘just compensation.’” Ante at 11.  
While it may be that the understanding of “just  
compensation” of those sophisticated in the law of  
condemnation in 1963 may not differ significantly from that  
of the common person, either past or present, this Court  
should not engage in a method of constitutional construction  
that unnecessarily sidesteps the long-established primary  
rule of constitutional construction. The primary rule2 of  
constitutional construction is that constitutional language  
is to be interpreted according to “common understanding” as  
1(...continued) 
This case was brought under the Uniform Condemnation  
Procedures Act, MCL 213.51 et seq., which prescribes the 
manner in which just compensation is “first made or secured” 
pursuant to Const 1963, art 10, § 2.  
2If the plain meaning is unascertainable, secondarily,  
“the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
adoption 
of 
the  
constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be  
accomplished may be considered . . . .  Finally, whenever 
possible, 
an 
interpretation 
that 
does 
not 
create  
constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does.” 
State Highway Comm v Vanderkloot, 392 Mich 159, 179; 220 NW2d 
416 (1974)(opinion by WILLIAMS, J.)  
2  
 
described by Justice COOLEY:  
“A constitution is made for the people and by 
the people. The interpretation that should be 
given it is that which reasonable minds, the great 
mass of the people themselves, would give it. ‘. . 
. the intent to be arrived at is that of the  
people, and it is not to be supposed that they 
have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in 
the words employed, but rather that they have 
accepted them in the sense most obvious to the 
common understanding . . . .’” [Traverse City  
School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405; 
185 NW2d 9 (1971).]  
The Supreme Court has reiterated this primary rule of  
constitutional construction: “Each provision of a State  
Constitution is the direct word of the people of the State,  
not that of the scriveners thereof.” Lockwood v Comm’r of  
Revenue, 357 Mich 517, 565; 98 NW2d 753 (1959). Thus, when  
attempting to interpret a constitutional provision, “‘the  
primary source for ascertaining its meaning is to examine  
its plain meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time  
of its adoption.’” People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495, 507; 614  
NW2d 103 (2000), quoting Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444  
Mich 579, 606; 513 NW2d 713 (1994).  
Thus, the issue in this case is whether the term “just  
compensation” can be said to possess a “plain meaning.”  
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the meaning of “just  
compensation” is neither difficult to discern nor does it  
require “sophistication in the law” to be grasped. Ante at  
3  
 
 
  
  
9-10, generally.3  
“Just compensation” has long been readily and  
reasonably understood to be that amount of money that puts  
the property owner whose property is taken in as good, but  
not better, a financial position after the taking as the  
property owner enjoyed before the taking.4  The measure of  
“just compensation” is “the property owner’s loss rather  
than the government’s gain.”5  
Though determining the dollar figure that most  
accurately describes the property owner’s loss can be a  
complicated task, such complication does not render “just  
3In certain circumstances, it is appropriate and  
necessary 
to 
consider the meaning of constitutional terms that 
are established in the law.  See, e.g., Michigan United  
Conservation Clubs v Secretary of State (After Remand), 464  
Mich 
359, 
414-420; 
630 
NW2d 
297 
(2001)(WEAVER, 
J., 
dissenting)(construing “acts making appropriations” in art 2, 
§ 9 of the Michigan Constitution), and WPW Acquisition Co v  
City of Troy, 466 Mich 117, 123; 643 NW2d 564 (2002)(holding 
unconstitutional the Legislature’s definition of a statutory 
term that conflicted “with the established meaning of the term 
at the time that it was” adopted by constitutional amendment).  
4Wayne Co v Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608, 622; 563 NW2d  
608 (1997); In re Edward J Jefferies Homes Housing Project, 
306 Mich 638, 650; 11 NW2d 272 (1943); In re Widening of  
Bagley Ave, 248 Mich 1, 5; 226 NW 688 (1929).  
5Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington, __ US __,__; 123 
S Ct 1406, 1419; 155 L Ed 2d 376 (2003), in which the United 
States Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]his conclusion is 
supported by consistent and unambiguous holdings in our 
cases.”  See also Boston Chamber of Commerce v Boston, 217 US 
189, 195; 30 S Ct 459; 54 L Ed 725 (1910).  
4  
compensation” a “technical legal term or phrase of art.”  
Indeed, though complicated, that task was expressly  
dedicated by the 1850 and 1908 constitutions of Michigan to  
a jury of “twelve freeholders, residing in the vicinity of  
such property, or by not less than three commissioners,  
appointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by  
law . . . .” Const 1850, art 18, § 2; Const 1908, art 13, §  
2. Further, this Court has said of condemnation  
proceedings, “the jury is the judge of law and fact. Its  
conclusions need not be based entirely on the testimony but  
it may use its own judgment and knowledge from a view of the  
premises and its experience as freeholders.” Dep’t of  
Conservation v Connor, 316 Mich 565, 593; 25 NW2d 619  
(1947).6
 While the task of quantifying just compensation  
can be a complicated task, in light of this history, it  
cannot seriously be suggested that the concept of “just  
compensation” is anything but obvious on its face.  
In addition, I write to express concern with the  
majority’s adoption of a one-size-fits-all rule in the  
6Under 
the 
current 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
framework, a just-compensation award is determined by a jury 
or the court. Const 1963, art 10, § 2 provides in pertinent 
part that “[c]ompensation shall be determined in proceedings 
in a court of record.”  MCL 213.63 provides in pertinent part, 
“[t]he jury or the court shall award in its verdict just 
compensation for each parcel.”  
5  
 
context of just compensation. The majority asserts that  
contamination costs must be considered in just-compensation  
determinations or the court would “place the legislators in  
the posture of acting unconstitutionally.” Ante at 14.7  
This conclusion is certainly debatable. The statute at  
issue provides:  
Before initiating negotiations for the 
purchase of property, the agency shall establish 
an amount that it believes to be just compensation 
for the property and shall submit to the owner a 
good faith written offer to acquire the property 
for the full amount so established. . . . The  
good faith offer shall state whether the agency 
reserves or waives its rights to bring federal or 
state cost recovery actions against the present 
owner of the property arising out of a release of 
hazardous substances at the property and the 
agency’s appraisal of just compensation for the 
property shall reflect such reservation or waiver. 
The amount shall not be less than the agency’s 
appraisal of just compensation for the 
property. . . . [MCL 213.55(1).]  
The statute’s express consideration of what compensation is  
just under the constitution does not necessarily mean that  
the Legislature intended, or was constitutionally obligated  
to require, that a good-faith offer be reduced by the cost  
7The majority notes that “the primary connection between 
a condemnation proceeding and a cost-recovery action is the 
escrow that may be created during the condemnation proceeding 
to provide security for the payment of the potential cost­
recovery award.” Ante at 16. However, the existence of the  
escrow mechanism does not answer whether the Legislature 
intended that the cost of remediation should be considered in  
condemnation proceedings.  
6 
of remediation in order to constitute “just compensation.”  
Though market value typically serves as a measure of just  
compensation, it is not the sole criterion. As recognized  
by the United States Supreme Court, where the market value  
is “too difficult to find” or the “payment of market value  
would result in ‘manifest injustice’ to the owner or the  
public,” the market value should not be the measure of just  
compensation. Kirby Forest Industries, Inc v United States,  
467 US 1, 10; 104 S Ct 2187; 81 L Ed 2d 1 (1984).  
Because the effect of contamination on the value of a  
property is difficult to determine and is susceptible to  
different remediation and calculation approaches, it is  
perhaps more appropriate to leave this fact-laden and case­
specific determination to the judge or jury rather than the  
majority’s one-size-fits-all formula or artificial rule. A  
determination by a judge or jury is consistent with this  
Court’s prior holdings that just-compensation awards in  
condemnation proceedings should be decided on a case by case  
basis. “[T]he determination of value in condemnation  
proceedings is not a matter of formula or artificial rules  
but of sound judgment and discretion based upon a  
consideration of all relevant facts in a particular case.”  
In re Grand Haven Hwy, 357 Mich 20, 28-29; 97 NW2d 748  
(1959), citing In re Widening of Gratiot Avenue, 294 Mich  
7  
 
569; 293 NW 755 (1940).  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
8