Case Title: Whiting v. State

Citation: 389 Md. 334

Docket Number: 

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wesley Whiting, a/k/a Jeffrey Wilson, a/k/a Lynell Whiting v. State of Maryland, No. 4,
September Term, 2005.
CRIMINAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH OF PREMISES: 
Petitioner challenged the denial of a motion to suppress evidence found during two searches
of a vacant house owned by the City of Baltimore where he had been "squatting" in the
upstairs rear bedroom.  The Court of Appeals held that petitioner did possess a subjective
expectation of privacy in the upstairs rear bedroom of the vacant house, but because he did
not lawfully own, lease, control, occupy, or rightfully possess the bedroom or the house, did
not possess an objective expectation of privacy in the bedroom or the house.  The Court of
Appeals therefore held that petitioner did not have standing to challenge the two searches of
the house and upheld the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 4 
September Term, 2005
WESLEY WHITING A/K/A JEFFREY
WILSON A/K/A LYNELL WHITING
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J. joins in the judgment only.
Filed:    November 8, 2005
1
The question presented in the Petition for Certiorari is phrased in the singular with
respect to “search,” although there were two searches that occurred, one on April 27, 2001
and one on May 4, 2001.  The transcript of the suppression hearing reflects consideration of
standing with respect to both searches, although the Court of Special Appeals appears to have
evaluated Whiting’s standing only with regard to the May 4, 2001 search.  The Petition for
Writ of Certiorari refers to two searches.  Our holding disposes of the standing question with
respect to both the April 27, 2001 and May 4, 2001 searches.
Petitioner Wesley Whiting, also known as Jeffrey Wilson and Lynell Whiting, seeks
review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court’s dismissal
of Whiting’s motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of alleged illegal searches of 810 East
Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland, a house owned by the City in which Whiting was a
“squatter.”  On April 7, 2005, this Court granted Whiting’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
address the question that Whiting has presented to us for review:
Did the lower Court err by ruling that Petitioner did not have
standing to challenge the legality of the search of the house
where he was residing without a property interest?
Whiting v. State, 386 Md. 180, 872 A.2d 47 (2005).  We hold that, although Whiting did
possess a subjective expectation of privacy in the second floor rear bedroom of 810 East
Preston Street, his expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable, and as a result, he
did not have standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the searches.1
I. Background
On April 7, 2001, Baltimore City Police Officers responded to 1136 Homewood
Avenue in Baltimore to try to find William Jerome Moore, Jr., a Correctional Officer who
had failed to report to work for two days.  Upon arriving at the home, the officers discovered
Moore’s body.  An autopsy showed that Moore’s death was caused by blunt force trauma.
2
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 407 of Article 27, states:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or
lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing shall be murder in the first degree.
Section 407 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 2-201 of the Criminal Law Article. 
-2-
During the investigation, detectives were able to identify Moore’s cellular phone
number, despite failing to recover the phone.  The cellular phone records were subpoenaed
from the phone company and reflected use after Moore’s death.  On April 26, 2001, after
having traced calls made from the cellular phone, detectives located and spoke with a witness
who had received a call from Whiting and believed that Whiting had called from a number
resembling Moore’s phone number.  Another witness also made a photographic identification
of Whiting as the individual in possession of Moore’s cellular phone, and an acquaintance
of Whiting reported that Whiting lived at 810 East Preston Street in Baltimore, where, in fact,
he had been arrested on April 21, 2001, on unrelated charges.  The investigation eventually
culminated in the execution of two search warrants on April 27, and May 4, 2001 at 810 East
Preston Street where police recovered various items of personal property, some of which
contained blood.  
On April 30, 2001, Whiting was served with an arrest warrant for the murder of
Moore.  He was later indicted for one count of first degree murder in violation of Maryland
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 407 of Article 27,2 one count of first degree assault
3
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Section 12A-1 of Article 27,
states:
(a) Serious physical injury; use of a firearm. – (1) A person may
not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious physical
injury to another.
(2) A person may not commit an assault with a firearm,
including:
(i) A handgun, antique firearm, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled
shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, as those terms are defined in  §
36F of this article;
(ii) An assault pistol, as defined in § 36H-1 of this article;
(iii) A pistol, revolver, or antique pistol or revolver, as those
terms are defined in § 441 of this article; and
(iv) A machine gun, as defined in § 372 of this article.
(b) Penalty. – A person who violates this section is guilty of the
felony of assault in the first degree and on conviction is subject
to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.
Section 12A–1 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code
(2002), Section 3-202 of the Criminal Law Article. 
4
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A of Article 27, states:
(a) General prohibition. – A person may not commit an assault.
(b) Violation; penalties. – A person who violates this section is
guilty of the misdemeanor of assault in the second degree and on
conviction is subject to a fine of not more than $2,500 or
imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both.
Section 12A has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article. 
-3-
in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A-1 of  Article 27,3 one
count of second degree assault in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Section 12A of Article 27,4 one count of robbery in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996
5
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 486 of Article 27, states:
Every person convicted of the crime of robbery or attempt to
rob, or as accessory thereto before the fact, is guilty of a felony,
shall restore the thing robbed or taken to the owner, or shall pay
to him the full value thereof, and be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than 15 years.
Section 486 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Sections 3-401 and 3-402 of the Criminal Law Article. 
6
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 342 of Article 27, in relevant part,
states:
(a) Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control. – A person
commits the offense of theft when he willfully or knowingly
obtains control which is unauthorized or exerts control which is
unauthorized over property of the owner, and:
(i) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(ii) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the
property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property;
or
(iii) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use,
concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner
of the property.
Section 482 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article. 
-4-
Repl. Vol.), Section 486 of Article 27,5 and one count of theft in violation of Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 342 of Article 27.6
Whiting moved to suppress the evidence seized during the April 27 and May 4, 2001
searches of 810 East Preston Street.  The State countered by contesting Whiting’s standing
to challenge the searches, alleging that Whiting was a “squatter” or trespasser in the house.
At the suppression hearing, Whiting argued that he had standing to challenge the searches
-5-
of 810 East Preston Street because he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the second
floor room where he was staying and, as evidence of such, introduced items seized during
the April 27th search of 810 East Preston Street, including: one college registration in the
name of Wesley Whiting, his address listed at 39 Liberty Road; four photographs; one letter
addressed to Jeffrey Wilson at 300 East Madison Street from Crystal Whiting, and one letter
addressed to Crystal Whiting at 609 29th Street from Wesley Whiting with his return address
listed as Forrest Street.  Whiting also introduced the affidavit in support of the application
for the April 27th search warrant of 810 East Preston Street, which included the phrase that
“a witness who reported knowing Wesley Whiting said when interviewed that Wesley
Whiting had told him that he had been living at the address determined to be the vacant house
at 810 East Preston Street.” 
The State, conversely, argued that Whiting did not have standing to challenge the
searches and introduced a copy of a deed reflecting that the Housing Authority of Baltimore
City owned 810 East Preston Street, and a copy of the last lease for the premises, showing
that Joyce Melvin, Robert Anderson, Corderio Washington, and Donna Fowles had been the
last tenants, having vacated the premises in May of 2000.  The State also submitted the
processing information and Statement of Charges against Whiting, showing that Whiting had
not provided any home address, as well as  the intake facility processing information for
Whiting, in which he listed his address as 39 Liberty Street, a copy of Whiting’s arrest
information showing his address as 609 North Ellwood Avenue, and a copy of Whiting’s
motor vehicle records showing he reported his home address as 550 Saint Mary’s Street and
-6-
828 East Preston Street. 
Detective Ronald Berger testified at the suppression hearing that when he visited the
premises in April and May of 2001, the front door of 810 East Preston Street was sealed shut
with either brick or boards while the rear door was unlocked.  Berger could not recall
whether the rear door’s doorknob had a functioning lock, or if he had occasion to use any
lights in the house.  The Housing Authority of Baltimore City later confirmed that the meters
for the electricity were never disconnected to the home, but that the electricity had not been
used since 2000.
Detective Berger also identified photographs taken on April 27, 2001 of the premises
which showed that the rear door to the 810 East Preston Street had a broken window in it
with “some type of material patching behind the inside area of the broken glass” and that the
rear door also had a bolt-type lock above the door knob.  The photographs also showed a
second floor rear bedroom with a green wall where Whiting had been staying; the room
contained bedding on the floor, along with some “personal items about in the room,” a
television, and a piece of plywood on the wall that appeared to cover a window.  In another
room on the second floor, distinguished by its white wall, there was also “some bedding” on
the floor and a window frame with red trim covered by plywood.  A May 4th photograph
reflected the addition of a green trash can in the second floor rear bedroom with the green
wall.
Robert Jones, also known as Crystal Whiting, also testified at the suppression hearing.
Jones noted that he temporarily had been staying at 810 East Preston Street.  He stated that
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he shared the second floor rear bedroom of the house with Whiting, and that approximately
four other people also lived in the house.  According to Jones, Whiting kept people out of the
room by means of a lock on the door, for which Whiting had the only key.  Jones
acknowledged that he never paid rent for staying at 810 East Preston Street, nor did he ever
have keys to the home.  He stated that he gained admission to the house through the back
door, which was always unlocked. Jones did not know, however, whether the other people
who resided in the home had keys or how they entered the house because he did not
“socialize” with them. 
In ruling that Whiting lacked standing to challenge the searches, Judge Joseph P.
McCurdy stated: 
Well, I think as a matter of fact I can find that the property at
issue in this case, which is 810 East Preston Street, is owned by
the Housing Authority of Baltimore City.  I find as a matter of
fact that the property was not - there was no operable lease in
effect regarding this property at the time of the search and
seizure, or at the time the Defendant arguably occupied the
premises, the last lease having expired in the year 2000.  I find,
as a matter of fact, and this is essentially admitted by the
Defendant, that the Defendant was what would normally call
[sic] a squatter in the abandoned property, or a trespasser in the
. . . of the law.  That Defendant had no rights to the property
whatsoever, no possessory interest in the property at all that’s
recognized under the law, either the constitution, which would
be a property right, or any statutory law or common law in
Maryland.  I find as a matter of fact that the Defendant was
occupying the property in some manner.  And it’s unclear if he
was actually living there full-time, or whether he spent time
there.  It does appear that there was some personal property on
the premises.  There’s no evidence that the property, the
television, the bedding, and those items that belonged to the
Defendant.  The only evidence of any property belonging to
-8-
Defendant that’s been admitted is copies of the correspondence
addressed to the Defendant at another address, and a copy of a
registration form for Baltimore City Community College in the
name of the Defendant at another address.  There’s evidence
through the exhibits that the Defendant had other addresses at
some point in the past.  There’s a Liberty Road address, I think
there’s another Mary Street address that was mentioned.  I think
that the conclusion here is that the Defendant, at some point, at
some time, occupied this property as a trespasser. Now, this
objective question of whether or not he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property, I suppose he did.
Because I suppose he felt that he could have some privacy
interest in that property if he could keep some things in there, he
wasn’t expecting the general public to walk in and out and to
pick up his property.  The other part of the issue though is
society prepared to recognize that expectation of privacy, and I
say it is not. Because the public policy of the City of Baltimore
and the State of Maryland is to keep these properties vacant.  In
fact, the property owner who culpably allows their property to
be occupied by squatters is himself in violation of the Baltimore
City Housing Code.  So the Defendant is trespassing on the
property, is essentially committing a criminal act, although a
very minor criminal act, and expecting to generate from that an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize, and
I do not agree with that principle.  I note the closing statements
and dissent in the case of Commonwealth versus Gordon, which
is the Pennsylvania case cited by the State, and the closing
words of the defense is; the poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all forces of the crown.  It may be frail, its roof may
shake, the wind may blow through it, the storm may enter, the
rain may enter, but the king of England cannot enter.  All his
force dares not cross this ruined tenement.  Well that assumes
that the Defendant has a right to be there to begin with.  Simply
stated, this is not his house.  He did not have permission to be
there, he was not authorized by the owner or anyone on the
owner’s behalf, he is a trespasser.  So I’m going to grant the
State’s Motion regarding a lack of standing of the Defendant to
challenge the search and seizure of 810 East Preston Street.
Thereafter, the jury found Whiting guilty of first degree murder, possession of a
7
The sufficiency issue is not before us as Whiting did not raise it in his Petition for
Certiorari.
-9-
deadly weapon with the intent to injure, robbery with a deadly weapon, first degree assault,
and theft, and not guilty of the charge of theft of property valued at greater than $500.
Whiting later filed an unsuccessful motion for a new trial.  On June 24, 2002, Whiting was
sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and to a consecutive
twenty-five year term of incarceration for the conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon.
For the purposes of sentencing, the first degree assault conviction was merged into the first
degree murder conviction, and both the possession of a deadly weapon, and the theft
convictions merged into the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction.
Whiting noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the
suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the May 4th search of
the bedroom at 810 East Preston Street and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions.7  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction and, with respect to the
standing issue,  held that, “[b]ecause the Housing Authority could enter the premises or could
permit anyone else to do so, and because [Whiting] had no right to exclude anyone from the
premises . . . any expectation [Whiting] had that the police would not enter was
unreasonable.”  Whiting v. State, 160 Md.App. 285, 304, 863 A.2d 1017, 1027-28 (2004).
II.  Standard of Review
In reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consider only
the evidence before the court at the suppression hearing, and not that of the record of the
-10-
trial. Nieves v. State, 383 Md. 573, 581, 861 A.2d 62, 67 (2004); Laney v. State, 379 Md.
522, 533-34, 842 A.2d 773, 779-80 (2004); State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 607, 826 Md. 486,
493 (2003); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 443-44 (2003).  We view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom  in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party on the motion.  Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 779-80; Green, 375
Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 493; Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376-77 (2003)
(quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07, 790 A.2d 660, 663 (citing Riddick v. State,
319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990))).  Although we extend great deference to
the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we review independently the application of the law to
those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and,
accordingly, should be suppressed.  See Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 779-80;
Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 493; Wallace v. State, 373 Md. 69, 78, 816 A.2d 883,
888-89 (2003).  
III. Discussion
Whiting argues that he has standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the
searches of 810 East Preston Street because he lived there and, therefore, had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the house.  He argues that, although 810 East Preston Street was
owned by the City of Baltimore, he kept possessions in a locked room in the home and there
was no indication that the City had made any effort to remove him.  Moreover, he notes that
the City had kept the electricity on, reflecting its acquiescence to his presence in the home.
Whiting iterates that an indigent’s expectation of privacy in the place where he or she stays
8
The Supreme Court made clear that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d
1081 (1961).
-11-
should be acknowledged, just as the law respects the “millionaire’s” right to privacy, because
to do otherwise, would be to discriminate against the homeless and destitute.
Conversely, the State argues that the Court of Special Appeals properly affirmed the
Circuit Court’s ruling that Whiting lacked standing to contest the searches under the Fourth
Amendment.  The State alleges that Whiting has failed to provide any evidence of a right to
exclude others from the house where he was residing or any other factor that could constitute
a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Moreover, the State contends that Whiting never held
title to the premises, nor did he have permission from the owner of the home to be there.
According to the State, as a squatter or trespasser in the vacant house, Whiting does not have
an expectation of privacy that society would consider reasonable or legitimate.
A. Standing Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees individuals the right to be secure in “their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”8  United States v.
Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2005); Nieves, 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68; Laney,
379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 786.  The capacity to invoke Fourth Amendment protection
requires the individual to establish that he or she maintained “a legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the house, papers, or effects searched or seized.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
-12-
143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
7, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2481, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, 545-46 (1977); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
752, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 1126, 28 L.Ed.2d 453, 459 (1971); Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at
786; Wallace, 373 Md. at 79, 816 A.2d at 889; Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 277, 708
A.2d 1126, 1133 (1998).  Accordingly, to determine whether an individual has standing
under the Fourth Amendment, we must examine whether the individual possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects or premises searched or seized, thereby
implicating substantive rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reconciled standing to challenge a search or seizure with the
substantive rights protected by the Fourth Amendment in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct.
at 429, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387, stating:
[T]his Court’s long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment
rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these
traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of
those rights is more properly placed within the purview of
substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.
Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged
search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a
criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained
during it.  That inquiry in turn requires a determination of
whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest
of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect . . . . [B]y frankly recognizing that this aspect of the
analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing,
we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical
footing.
See also Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 26-27, 537 A.2d 612, 619-20 (1988).  Thus, the question
9
The history of standing under the Fourth Amendment was summarized in Graham v.
State, 47 Md.App. 287, 421 A.2d 1385 (1980), in an opinion authored by Judge Wilner, who
now sits on this Court, when he was on the Court of Special Appeals. After exploring its
history, Judge Wilner succinctly opined:
[T]he “standing” question is a preliminary one that should be
resolved, for if appellant has no lawful right to contest the
respective searches, the question of their validity becomes moot.
Putting the cart before the horse may sometimes be easier to do,
but it does make the ultimate journey considerably more
difficult.
When may a person be heard to complain that his Fourth
Amendment right has been violated?
Id. at 291, 421 A.2d at 1387.  Judge Wilner then answers his question by stating:
The considerations here are not so simple as they may appear at
first glance.  Even under Rakas, the precepts of civil property
law, though highly relevant, are not necessarily controlling.  The
legitimacy of one’s expectation of privacy is in large measure a
function of its reasonableness, and that, in turn, is determined to
some extent by the elements of time, place, and circumstance.
Id. at 294, 421 A.2d at 1389.
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of whether an individual has standing under the Fourth Amendment is best analyzed in terms
of the individual’s substantive rights and requires us first to look at whether the individual
invoking the Fourth Amendment possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects
or place searched or seized.9 
A legitimate expectation of privacy has been defined by the Supreme Court as:
[M]ore than a subjective expectation of not being discovered.
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off
season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of
privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as
-14-
“legitimate.”  His presence . . . is “wrongful;” his expectation is
not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n.12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401 n.12 (citations omitted);
Ricks, 312 Md. at 27, 537 Md. at 620; Graham, 47 Md.App. at 293, 421 A.2d at 1389. 
In order to evaluate the legitimacy of a privacy expectation, Justice Harlan, in a
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,  389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19
L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967), formulated a two-prong test which requires that the person
claiming protection under the Fourth Amendment must have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy in the item or place searched, as well as have proven that the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’  Id. at 361, 88 S.Ct.
at 516, 19 L.Ed.2d at 587-88; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577,
2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226-27 (1979); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct.
1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 215 (1986); Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 786-87; Owens
v. State, 322 Md. 616, 626, 589 A.2d 59, 63 (1991); Ricks, 312 Md. at 27, 537 A.2d at 620.
In a later case, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30
(1988), the Supreme Court embraced and further refined Justice Harlan’s two-prong test to
require that the person claiming protection under the Fourth Amendment must manifest a
subjective expectation of privacy that is “objectively reasonable.”
The question that delineates whether a defendant possesses a subjective expectation
of privacy is “whether . . . the individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve something as
private.’” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d at 226 (quoting
-15-
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 516, 19 L.Ed.2d at 579.  The Supreme Court found, for
example, that the defendant had successfully met the subjective expectation criterion in
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 215 (1986),
and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1988).  In California
v. Ciraolo, the defendant challenged the search of his backyard by police.  Id. at 209, 106
S.Ct. at 1810, 90 L.Ed.2d at 214.  Observing that the defendant had  surrounded his backyard
by both a six foot high outer fence and a ten foot high inner fence, the Court noted, “[c]learly
- and understandably - respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent
and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits.”  Id. at 211, 106 S.Ct.
at 1811-12, 90 L.Ed.2d at 215.  In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at  450, 109 S.Ct. at 696-97, 102
L.Ed.2d at 842, the defendant challenged a helicopter search of his greenhouse by the police,
and the Court, noting the fact that two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed, and the other
two obscured by trees and shrubbery, concluded that the defendant “no doubt intended and
expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the precautions he
took protected against ground-level observation.”  Id. 
Despite being an integral part of the inquiry into whether the individual possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court nevertheless has remarked, that in some
cases, the lack of a subjective expectation of privacy would not defeat a party’s claim to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.  United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316, 107 S.Ct. 1134,
1147, 94 L.Ed.2d 326, 344-45 (1987); Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d
at 226-27.  In fact, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court assumed that the defendant intended to
-16-
maintain the privacy of the items searched and proceeded to measure the objective
reasonableness of that expectation.  442 U.S. at 743, 99 S.Ct. at 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d at 228-29.
As to the second prong of the test, whether an individual’s expectation is objectively
reasonable, inquiry must be made into the substance of the defendant’s claim that he or she
possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 104,
99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387; Wallace, 373 Md. at 81, 816 A.2d at 890.  As the
Supreme Court has explicated, in determining whether the individual’s expectation is
objectively reasonable, we must evaluate the pragmatics of the situation, and although
concepts of real or personal property law, or understandings recognized and permitted by
society, are to be taken into consideration, “arcane distinctions developed in property and tort
law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like” are not controlling in the inquiry.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 104 & 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430 & 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387; see also Wallace,
373 Md. at 81, 816 A.2d at 890.  
B.  The Maryland Experience
 Before the application of the Fourth Amendment to the States in 1961, this Court as
early as 1932 in Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153, 161 A. 244 (1932), clearly identified the
sources from which an individual may derive a legitimate expectation of privacy in premises.
In Baum we recognized that only those whose “private” rights have been violated can
challenge the legality of a search and seizure:
[I]t is certain that one cannot complain of an illegal search and
seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor
leases, nor controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully
-17-
possesses, or in which he has no interest.  Or, stating it
conversely, those whose private rights have been or may be
disturbed alone may invoke the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Id. at 157, 161 A.2d at 245.  In Baum, police officers seized gambling paraphernalia from a
house during a search, after calling and placing a bet with the person who answered the
phone.  Id. at 158, 161 A.2d at 246.  Various defendants, not owners of the house, moved to
suppress the evidence, but this Court denied the claim, “for the reason that the immunity
from illegal search and seizure is a privilege personal to those whose rights thereunder have
been infringed, and they alone may invoke it.”  Id. at 156, 161 A.2d at 245.
We further refined the concept of lawful occupancy of premises in Resnick v. State,
183 Md. 15, 36 A.2d 347 (1944), in which the police, pursuant to a search warrant, seized
betting slips and other gambling accouterments.  Various individuals, who claimed to have
worked in the home for approximately a year, challenged the legality of the search and
seizure.  We determined that they failed to prove “that the property or possessions seized and
searched were owned, leased, controlled or rightfully possessed by them or that they had any
interest in them,” and so lacked “a valid claim of lawful occupancy” in order to challenge the
search warrant.  Id. at 18, 36 A.2d at 348. 
In Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 75 A.2d 327 (1950), we explained that one must
“lawfully occupy” the premises; mere presence is not sufficient:
[O]ne cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of
premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor
controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in
which he has no interest10.  Only recently we cited the cases
-18-
which followed that formula, and re-affirmed it as a positive
statement of those who could complain.  Kaplar v. State, 194
Md. 580, 71 A.2d 860.  In all of these cases the words ‘lawfully
occupies’ are intended to be of the same nature and kind as the
others used, and contemplate an occupation of some character
which is connected with the property or the premises by some
lawful means . . . . The occupancy must have some relation to
the property or premises searched in order to enable such
‘occupants’ to claim that their possessions have been unlawfully
seized.  It is not sufficient that they are merely there when the
search is made.  They must be there with some show of right to
be in possession of the premises or property.
Id. at 64, 75 A.2d at 330 (emphasis in original); see also Carter v. State, 236 Md. 450, 453,
204 A.2d 322, 323 (1964) (holding that appellants had no standing to challenge search of car
because they had “no ownership or possessory rights of any kind in the car.”); Ferguson v.
State, 236 Md. 148, 158-59, 202 A.2d 758, 763 (1964) (holding that Ferguson had no right
to complain of search because he was not “in lawful possession of the property.”); Rizzo v.
State, 201 Md. 206, 209, 93 A.2d 280, 281 (1952) (concluding that defendants could not
complain of search of apartment in which they had no interest but for illegal operations);
Saunders v. State, 199 Md. 568, 573, 87 A.2d 618, 620 (1952) (noting that accused cannot
contest search of property in which he had no right, title, or interest); Lingner v. State, 199
Md. 503, 505-06, 86 A.2d 888, 890 (1952) (holding that defendant could not complain of
search and seizure of bags in which he disclaimed any ownership); Frantom v. State, 195
Md. 163, 167, 72 A.2d 744, 746 (1950) (concluding that owner could contest search of
garage that he had leased out to another person).
Amidst this exploration of lawful occupancy and searches of premises, we also had
-19-
the opportunity to address the two-prong test to evaluate the legitimacy of a claim of privacy
articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz in Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 51-
52, 367 A.2d 949, 952 (1977).  In Venner, the defendant challenged the search and seizure
of the contents of his bedpan during his stay in the hospital.  Id. at 48-49, 950-51.   We
concluded that, “[u]tilizing the criteria of Mr. Justice Harlan, we are of the view that Venner
could not have had an ‘expectation . . . that society was prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.”” Id. at 59, 367 A.2d at 956. 
This Court first applied Justice Harlan’s two-prong test within the purview of standing
to challenge the search of premises in Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 537 A.2d 612 (1988),
disapproved on other grounds in Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 719, 870 A.2d 609, 617
(2005), where we iterated the premise in Lambert, supra, that “[i]t is not sufficient to
establish standing, where challenged, merely to show that one was on the premises where a
search occurs.” Rather, 
[t]he focus of the inquiry is directed to the substance of the
defendant’s claim that he or she possessed a ‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’ in the area searched, . . . ‘arcane
distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests,
licensees, invitees, and the like,’ are not controlling.  Rakas, 439
U.S. at 104, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 387.  The
determination whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists
embraces two discrete questions . . . the first is whether the
individual, by his conduct, has exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy (that he seeks to preserve something as
private), and the second question is whether the individual’s
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable (whether the 
individual’s expectation,
viewed objectively, is justifiable under the circumstances).
-20-
Id. at 26-27, 537 A.2d at 619-20 (citations omitted).  In Ricks, appellants challenged the
video surveillance of an apartment where they had been conducting illegal sales of narcotics.
Id. at 18, 537 A.2d at 615.  In reviewing the appellants’ claim to a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: 
[W]hile appellants’ counsel’s assertion that the  appellants were
'invitees' did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the
apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants
were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee.  Moreover,
there was an indication . . . that on several occasions . . .
appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the
building in which the apartment was located, or into the
apartment itself . . . . [M]ere presence in another’s apartment,
without more, would not suffice to establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy.  More than mere presence, however, is
arguably shown in this case.
Id. at 27, 537 A.2d at 619-20 (citations omitted).  The Court in Ricks went on to find that,
whereas appellants had standing to challenge the search, the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.  Id. at 27-28, 537 A.2d at 620.
In State v. Sampson, 362 Md. 438, 765 A.2d 629 (2001), Judge Wilner, speaking for
this Court, adopted the refined two-prong test articulated in California v. Greenwood,  486
U.S. at 39, 108 S.Ct. at 1628, 100 L.Ed.2d at 36.  In Sampson, the defendant challenged the
search of trash that she had placed inside her yard, but also within reach from a municipal
sidewalk.  362 Md. at 441, 765 A.2d at 630. We noted that the proper focus after Greenwood
was whether the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy in her trash was objectively
10
We also had occasion in Wallace v. State, 379 Md. 69, 816 A.2d 883 (2003), to
explore in dicta the concept of standing in the Fourth Amendment context, where Judge
Cathell, writing for the Court, stated:
The United States Supreme Court has revisited its interpretation
of an individual’s “legitimate expectation of privacy” on several
occasions.  In Rakas v. Illinois . . . the Supreme Court further
developed this analysis by minimizing the distinction between
substantive Fourth Amendment analysis and Fourth Amendment
standing.  
Id. at 80, 816 A.2d at 889-90 (citations omitted).  Judge Cathell went on to state:
The Supreme Court has subsequently articulated the Rakas two-
step analysis as follows:  "[I]n order to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has 'a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society.' " Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 472, 142 L.Ed.2d 373,
379 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S.Ct. at
430-31 n.12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401-02 n.12). See also California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628, 100
L.Ed.2d 30, 36 (1988) (stating that "An expectation of privacy
does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however,
unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as
objectively reasonable"). 
Id. at 81, 816 A.2d at 890.
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reasonable.  Id. at 444-45, 756 A.2d at 632-33.10
This Court recently had the occasion to apply the objective reasonableness standard
in Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 842 A.2d 773 (2004), within the context of lawful possession
of premises.  In Laney, the mortgagor of a home that had been foreclosed upon challenged
-22-
several warrantless searches of the house where he had personal property.  Id. at 527-28, 842
A.2d at 777.  The searches occurred after title in the home had passed to the Department of
Veteran Affairs (“V.A.”) - the original guarantor of the mortgage.  Id.  Laney claimed that
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house under the Fourth Amendment despite
the fact that title had passed to the V.A. because the V.A.’s ownership rights in the house
were inferior to his “possessory and private rights” in the house.  Id. at 534, 842 A.2d at 780.
This Court determined that Laney had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home
because at the time of the searches the ownership of the property had passed to the V.A.,
which, accordingly, had authority to enter and possess the home.  Id. at 527, 842 A.2d at 776.
The facts found by the trial court, viewed within the “objectively reasonable” standard,
rendered Laney’s claim without merit.
C.  Squatters Nationwide
Some courts throughout the country, in trying to determine whether a “squatter” has
standing under the Fourth Amendment, have asked whether the individual manifested an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched and whether his or her
expectation was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable or legitimate.  United
States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that squatter had no standing to
challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied “solely for the business of
packing for distribution for narcotics.”); United States v. Whitehead, 415 F.3d  583, 588 (6th
Cir. 2005) (holding that a squatter had no standing to challenge search of vacant home he
frequented “for the ‘sole purpose of engaging in drug-related business transactions.’”);
-23-
United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 301-02 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that Hunyady had
no standing to challenge search of home he illegally entered because his presence was
“wrongful.”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (determining that
squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned home): United States v. Dodds,
946 F.2d 726, 728-729 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge
search of abandoned apartment because “hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be
one that could be accepted by society.”); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472
(10th Cir. 1986) (finding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of cave where he
had been staying for eight months); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d 253, 259 (Pa. 1997)
(holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was
staying); State v. Linton, 812 A.2d 382, 383 (N.J. Super. 2002) (stating that “defendant, at
best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.”);
Commonwealth v. Cameron, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (Pa. Super. 1989) (holding that squatter
had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no Fourth Amendment standing to
challenge search of abandoned structure); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 596 A.2d 172, 178-79
(Pa. Super. 1991) (finding that squatter could not claim Fourth Amendment right to privacy
in abandoned structure); but cf. State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637, 639-40 (Haw. 1980) (holding
that squatters on state-owned land had standing to challenge search “consistent not only with
reason but also with our traditional notions of fair play and justice.”). 
The only definitive circumstance, apparently, that has led to a different result where
11
New York courts apparently have also recognized the concept of acquiescence but
have yet to hold that a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated acquiescence by the
landowner.  See Walls v. Guiliani, 916 F.Supp. 214, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[I]f plaintiffs can
prove the acquiescence and toleration that they allege, they are not trespassers and they have
a possessory interest that enjoys some degree of legitimacy under New York law.”).
-24-
courts have considered societal policy, is that the owner of the premises had acquiesced in
the “squatting.”  In State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1980), standing under the Fourth
Amendment was accorded to the squatters because the squatters’ presence was well-known
to the State, and had existed, without objection, for a considerable period of time.  The
premises searched were described as a “shack,” a well lit structure built on stilts and attached
to the side of an old bus, in an area recognized as “Squatters’ Row,” located on  property
owned by the State of Hawaii.  Id. at 639.  The Hawaii court concluded that:
‘Squatters’ Row’ on Sand Island has been allowed to exist by
sufferance of the State for a considerable period of time.  And
although no tenancy under property concepts was thereby
created, we think that this long acquiescence by the government
has given rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part
of the [squatters], at least with respect to the interior of the
building itself.
Id. at 640.11  
In addition to those courts which have invoked policy grounds to deny standing to
“squatters,” other courts have merely questioned whether a squatter could have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched.  See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518
F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves
of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Mont. 2004)
-25-
(holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay
rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Kan. App. 1991)
(finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in 
house); People v. Sumlin,
431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (determining that guest of squatter did not have
Fourth Amendment rights in apartment where squatter was staying).
Other courts, like this Court, utilizing the objectively reasonable standard, have
determined that “squatters” do not have standing to challenge the legality of a search of the
premises in which they stayed. See Zimmerman v. Bishop, 25 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that Fourth Amendment rights of guest of squatter were not violated by search
of shack on another’s property); Davis v. State, 119 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex. App. 2003)
(holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he
was staying); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (Va.App. 1997) (finding that
trespasser lacked standing to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment in premises from
which he had been barred).
D.  The Searches of 810 East Preston Street
The first question to be addressed is whether Whiting had a subjective expectation of
privacy.  Although courts have assumed in the context of standing that the defendant had a
sufficient expectation of privacy in order to reach the second issue, whether an objective
expectation existed,  Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472 (“We shall assume that Ruckman
entertained a subjective expectation of privacy, i.e. absent a search warrant or probable cause
12
Whiting cites State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 903, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), in support of his
claim.  In Adams, the court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his second floor apartment, despite the fact that the apartment itself constituted a zoning
-26-
or exigent circumstances . . . his cave could not be searched.”), we need not so assume
because Whiting manifested his desire to maintain privacy in the second floor rear bedroom.
The trial court found that Whiting was occupying 810 East Preston Street “in some manner,”
and that he kept some personal property on the premises, specifically correspondence
addressed to or from Whiting and a college registration form. Whiting kept people out of the
bedroom with the green wall by means of a lock on the door for which only he had the key.
Whiting clearly sought to preserve the room as at least semi-private, and, therefore,
demonstrated that he possessed a subjective expectation of privacy in the room. 
Was Whiting’s subjective expectation of privacy objectively reasonable?  Laney, 379
Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 787.  Drawing from Baum and its progeny we look at the following
factors to determine objective reasonableness: whether the individual owned, leased,
controlled, lawfully occupied, or rightfully possessed the premises searched.  Baum, 163 Md.
at 157, 161 A. at 245; Resnick, 183 Md. at 18, 36 A.2d at 348; Lambert, 196 Md. at 64, 75
A.2d at 330; Carter, 236 Md. at 453, 204 A.2d at 323; Ferguson, 236 Md. at 158-59, 202
A.2d at 763; Rizzo, 201 Md. at 209, 93 A.2d at 281; Saunders, 199 Md. at 573, 87 A.2d at
620; Lingner, 199 Md. at 505-06, 86 A.2d at 890; Frantom, 195 Md. at 167, 72 A.2d at 746.
Turning to the first factor, it is uncontested that Whiting did not own 810 East Preston
Street12 - the house was owned by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City.13  Secondly,
violation.  Id.  In so holding, the court relied on the fact that Adams legally owned his
building and enjoyed the right to exclude anyone he wished from the property.  Id. at 907.
Because Whiting was not the owner of 810 East Preston Street, Adams is inapplicable.
13
Even if Whiting had squatted there for the appropriate period of time, he could not
avail himself of the doctrine of adverse possession because the property is owned by the City
of Baltimore.  Siejack v. City of Baltimore, 270 Md. 640, 644, 313 A.2d 843, 846 (1974)
(“Quite likely nothing is more established than the rule that title to property held by a
municipal corporation in its governmental capacity . . . cannot be acquired by adverse
possession.”).
14
Whiting also relies on Community for Creative Non-violence v. United States
Marshals Service, 791 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992).  Community for Creative Non-violence
(“CCNV”) involved an early morning raid of a homeless shelter.  Id.  In finding that CCNV
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the homeless shelter, the court noted that CCNV
was “the exclusive licensee of the shelter.”  Id. at 3-4.  Unlike the corporation in CCNV,
Whiting was not a licensee, or lessee, of 810 East Preston Street. 
15
The power to exclude others is not synonymous with the right to exclude others.  To
have the power means to have the “ability to do or act; capability of doing or accomplishing
something,” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1516 (2d ed. unabridged
1987), whereas to have the right means to have “a just claim or title, whether legal,
prescriptive, or moral.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1656 (2d ed.
unabridged 1987).
-27-
Whiting was not a lessee of the house or even a lessee of the second floor rear bedroom, as
evidenced by the fact that the home was last leased by the City in 2000, and the last tenants
vacated in May of that year.14  
Nevertheless, Whiting contends that he established an ability to exclude others from
the second floor rear bedroom by virtue of the lock on the door, thereby demonstrating
control over the premises.  Whiting relies on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion,
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d at 258, to support his assertion that the right to exclude
others from the premises is a critical characteristic of de facto ownership.15  In Gordon, a
-28-
police officer investigating a purse snatching searched the dining room of an abandoned
house, the rear door of which was open and falling off its hinges.  Id. at 255.  The officer
found the defendant in the dining room, which was closed off from the rest of the house by
a sheet hanging in the doorway and which contained a lamp, a television on a milk crate, and
a “beer ball.”  Id.  The defendant claimed that the sheet hanging in the dining room doorway
was proof that he excluded others from the dining room. Id. at 258.  The court concluded that
the defendant’s “claimed exclusion of the public from the dining room is implausible because
the evidence revealed that the house had an unlocked, exterior door.”  Id. at 258.  Whiting,
nevertheless, contends that his case is much stronger than that in Gordon because Whiting
placed a lock on the door to the bedroom and whenever he left the bedroom door unlocked,
Robert Jones was in the room to prevent anyone from entering.  In this case, however, 810
East Preston Street, like the premises in Gordon, also had an unlocked, exterior door, the
back door to the house, a fact that the Pennsylvania Court found controlling, and the front
door was boarded to exclude even Whiting.
Moreover, to “control” something is “to exercise restraint or direction over” it.
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 442 (2d ed. unabridged 1987).  In the
present case, Whiting shared the second floor rear bedroom with Robert Jones, and shared
the entire house with four or more strangers.  Sharing dominion over the premises ordinarily
does not reflect exclusive control.  See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d
at 402 (noting that “[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude
16
Whiting cites to Commonwealth v. Govens, 632 A.2d 1316 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1993).  In
Govens, the court emphasized the fact that the state had failed to contest standing in the trial
court and had not established a sufficient record for a finding of lack of standing.
-29-
others . . . and one who . . . controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”).  As noted, the special power to
exclude is not the same as the right to exclude.  
Most importantly with respect to control, even though Whiting maintained a lock on
the bedroom door, he could have been removed by the City at any time.  See Gilmore, 104
P.3d at 1055 (finding that defendant had no expectation of privacy in bedroom, despite the
fact that he kept the door locked and the home owner did not have the key or any right to
access the bedroom); Davis, 119 S.W.3d at 367-68 (holding that defendant staying in
abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key
to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it).16 
With respect to rightful possession or lawful occupancy of 810 East Preston Street,
Whiting argues that he was a lawful occupant because the City had acquiesced to his
presence in 810 East Preston, which, he argues, was demonstrated by the fact that the
Housing Authority made no effort to remove him from the premises and had not shut off the
electricity in the house. “Acquiesce” is defined as  “to assent tacitly; submit or comply
silently or without protest; agree; consent.”  Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 18 (2d ed. unabridged 1987).  Knowledge and consent are elements of
acquiescence.  See Dias, 609 P.2d at 639-40 (finding that the State of Hawaii knew of the
-30-
existence of “squatters’ row” and allowed it to exist.).  Whiting has failed to demonstrate in
this case that the City knew of his presence at 810 East Preston Street and that it consented
to his presence.
Whiting, nevertheless, analogizes his situation to defendants who successfully
challenged searches of tents they themselves constructed, citing United States v. Sandoval,
200 F.3d 659, 691 (9th Cir. 2000), United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993),
and Kelley v. State, 245 S.E.2d 872, 874 (Ga.App. 1978).  In Sandoval, 200 F.3d at 661, the
court found that the defendant possessed an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
the tent where he was staying on federally owned land.  Although it was questionable
whether the defendant had permission to do so, the court stated:
[C]amping on public land, even without permission, is far
different from squatting in a private residence. A private
residence is easily identifiable and clearly off-limits, whereas
public land is often unmarked and may appear to be open to
camping. Thus, we think it much more likely that society would
recognize an expectation of privacy for the camper on public
land than for the squatter in a private residence.  
Id. at 661. Gooch, 6 F.3d at 677, involved the search of the defendant’s tent, but in a state
campground, so that the Ninth Circuit Court opined:
We have already established that a person can have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on private
property.  LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 n.11, 1332
n.19 (9th Cir. 1985).  Accord LaDuke v. Castillo, 455 F.Supp.
209 (E.D.Wash. 1978).  This reasonable expectation is not
destroyed when a person's tent is pitched instead on a public
campground where one is legally permitted to camp. 
17
Lastly, Whiting also cites to People v. Smith, 448 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982) and State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 153 (Conn. 1991) to support his claim.  In People
v. Smith, the issue only was whether the trial court should hold a hearing regarding standing
when the defendant alleged he paid rent to one who may have ben a squatter.  The trial court
recognized that “a squatter does not have any basic legal right to an apartment.”  Id. at 406.
In Mooney, the court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
closed duffel bag and cardboard box, but did not address the issue of whether he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises - the bridge abutment - where those items
were located.  588 A.2d at 153.  
-31-
Id. at 677.  Kelley, 245 S.E.2d at 875, also involved a search of a tent but one apparently on
private property - owned by a relative of two of the defendants - upon which law
enforcement officers had “trespassed.”  All three cases are distinguishable because a public
campground “invites” tent dwellers and clearly 810 East Preston Street, although publicly
owned, did not invite inhabitants, and there is no element of police misconduct in effecting
the search.17  
Finally, Whiting asserts that we should acknowledge an indigent’s expectation of
privacy in the place where he or she stays because to not do so is to discriminate against
indigents and the homeless in favor of people who are fortunate enough to have money.  A
person’s monetary worth, however, is not the issue; the issue is lawful occupancy.  
Whiting neither lawfully owned, leased, controlled, occupied, nor rightfully possessed
810 East Preston Street, or any part of the premises therein.  Accordingly, we find that
Whiting lacked standing to challenge the April 27 and May 4, 2001 searches because,
although he may have possessed a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was not
objectively reasonable.
-32-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
Chief Judge Bell joins in the judgment only.