Case Title: DEVONTE LAVAL WEBB V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015-SC-000198-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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erred in overruling two motions for mistrial; (8) officer’s testimony concerning
out-of-court identifications constituted hearsay and bolstered other witnesses’
testimony, amounting to palpable error; (4) the trial court erred in denying,
Appellant's motions for a continuance and to sever his case from King’s; and (5)
the trial court erred in ordering Appellant pay $500 in restitution to one of the
robbery victims. We disagree and affirm Appellant's convictions and their
corresponding sentences.
1. BACKGROUND

In October 2012, three individuals robbed six University of Kentucky
students at gunpoint in a home shared by four of the six students. The victims
included Kyle Stamp, his three roommates, and two of their friends. On the
day in question, Stamp had arranged to sell Ethan King four ounces of
‘marijuana and told the other five victims he was expecting King to come to the
residence. In spite of the fact Stamp had instructed King to come alone, when
King arrived, he was accompanied by two other men. Stamp let the three men
into his home to complete the drug transaction. They proceeded to the
kitchen, where Stamp had the marijuana and scales out on the kitchen table,
ready for the drug deal

At some point, Stamp left the kitchen to get change from his bedroom.
Upon his return, Stamp noticed the three men had removed everything from
the table. At this point, one of the men who accompanied King pulled a gun
and pointed it at Stamp, The man with the gun told Stamp not to move or
make arty loud noises—that they were going to rob him. Eventually, the three

robbed Stamp’s roommates and friends who sat in the living room watching a

2
football game. The robbers also removed some items (including a flat screen
television, MacBook laptop computer, and iHome device) from the bedroom of
cone of Stamp's roommates. After the completion of the robbery, the three men
fled the scene with the marijuana and stolen items.

‘One of the victims had hidden his cell phone during the robbery and
used it to call 911 after the robbers left the house, One of the two victims who
did not live in the home left before police arrived, but the other five provided
statements to police. The primary officer, Officer Wallace, realized Stamp had
‘more information than the other four victims, and interviewed him separately.
Stamp gave Officer Wallace the phone number he had for Ethan King, whom he
knew only as “Little E.” Wallace put together a photographic lineup including a
picture of King and took it to the scene. Three of the roommates identified King
from the lineup without hesitation or confusion, and the fourth said that he
‘was “positive, but not 100% sure.” The other two victims were not at the home
when police presented this lineup. -

Approximately three hours after the robbery, police took King into
custody at his parents’ home. Wallace interviewed King at the jail, and King

‘stated he was too high on narcoti

 

to remember everything he had done. King
‘said he recalled picking up the other two robbers but indicated that he did not
know them. He denied recalling any events after that. When confronted with
the victims’ stories, King said that, in spite of his lack of memory, he must have
committed the crime.

Police did not have a good enough description of either of the other two
robbers to develop a suspect list at that time, In fact, there were no further

leads in the case until a year later when King’s attorney gave police Appellant's
3
name. By this time, Officer Wilson had been assigned to the case and he
‘compiled a photographic lineup. Three of the four prior roommates still lived
together, and Officer Wilson individually showed these three the lineup. All
three roommates identified Appellant.

As noted above, Appellant was charged with five counts of first-degree
robbery and with being a persistent felony offender. A jury convicted him of
those crimes and he was sentenced to twenty-seven years’ imprisonment. He
now appeals to this Court, raising six allegations of error, which we will
address in turn. We will develop further facts below as necessary for our

analysis.

TL, ANALYSIS
‘A. Photographic Lineup
‘Appellant filed a motion at trial to suppress the three out-of-court

identifications made pursuant to a photographic lineup, The trial court
overruled the suppression motion after conducting an evidentiary hearing at
which Officer Wilson was the sole witness.

Appellant now appeals the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion,

  

arguing the trial court erred in failing to suppress the three witnesses’
Jdentifcations in violation of his due process rights under both the state and
federal constitutions. The standards under which we analyze this issue are
well settled, “Only when evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission
Violates fundamental conceptions of justice’ Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342, 352... (1990), have we imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process

Clause.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 8. Ct. 716, 723 (2012). “A conviction
based on identification testimony following pretrial identification violates the
defendant’s constitutional right to due process whenever the pretrial
identification procedure is so ‘impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Thigpen v. Cory, 804
F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986), quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 877,
384 (1968).

As this Court has explained,

[thhe determination of whether the in-trial use of identification

testimony violates due process involves a two-step process. First,

the court examines the pre-identification encounters to determine

whether they were unduly suggestive. If so, “the identification may

still be admissible if ‘under the totality of the circumstances the

identification was reliable even though the [identification]

procedure was suggestive.” Stewart v. Duckworth, 93 F.3d 262,

265 (7th Cir.1996), quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93

S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2¢ 401 (1972).

Diltingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Ky. 1999).

In the case at bar, the trial court found that Appellant failed to
demonstrate the photographic array was unduly suggestive and, therefore, did
not move on to the second step of the inquiry. In making the determination as
to whether a photographic array was unduly stiggestive, “[clourts use a number
of factors . . . including the size of the array, the manner of its presentation by
the officers, and the details of the photographs themselves.” United States v.
Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1994).

“The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to a trial judge's findings of fact
on a motion to suppress evidence.” King v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 645,
649 (Ky. 2004) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972)). A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous only if it is manifestly against the great weight of the

evidence. Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754 (Ky. 2008). We review a trial
5
‘court's decision on the admissibility of identification evidence for an abuse of
discretion. King, 142 8.W.34 at 649; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
‘Thompson, 11 8.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000) (holding “abuse of discretion is the
proper standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings"). “The test for
‘abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 93 8.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999),

Appellant asks this Court to hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that he failed to carry his burden of proving the
photographic array was unduly suggestive. He asks that we hold that the trial
court should have reached the second Neil v. Biggers step (totality of the
circumstances). After examining the photographic array Officer Wilson
presented to the robbery victims and the process he used in compiling and
presenting it, we disagree with Appellant and hold the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.

‘We now turn to the relevant background in Appellant's case. More than
year after the robbery, King’s attorney gave Officer Wilson Appellant's name
‘asa suspect. At that point, Officer Wilson obtained Appellant's booking
photograph from 2011 and compiled a photographic lineup to present to the
robbery victims. Officer Wilson testified that though this particular photograph
of Appellant had been taken a year and a half before the robbery, he used it
rather than a more recent picture, as he preferred to use photographs pre-
dating the crime in case there had been any changes in appearance.

Officer Wilson testified there was no standard method for choosing the

pictures of the other individuals in the lineup. He stated he searched for
6
pictures of men who were close to Appellant's weight and age in the detention
center database. He then went through the search results and looked for
individuals who looked like Appellant—with similar features such as eyes,
‘complexion, and facial hair, He testified that each of the photographs matched
the very general descriptions given by the victims on the night of the robbery
and that none of the victims gave any details regarding complexion, so he
assumed an average skin color,

‘Once he had compiled a six-person photographic lineup, Officer Wilson
discovered that three of the four original roommates still lived together and set
up a meeting with them. (Stamp lived in Louisville by this time, and he and
Officer Wilson failed to coordinate a meeting.) When he contacted the
roommates, Officer Wilson explained he had a new lead in the case and may

have found one of the

 

ividuals involved in the robbery. The three
roommates consented to Icok at the lineup, and Officer Wilson arranged to
‘meet them in their apartment.

During the meeting, Officer Wilson used the same procedure in
presenting the lineup to each of the three. Specifically, Officer Wilson took
each of the roommates into a separate room, while the other two waited in the
living room playing video games. Officer Wilson used the same numbered
lineup for each of the roommates. He handed each individual roommate the
photographs in the lincup one at a time. Each of the three identified Appellant.

At trial, Appellant argued the photographic array was unduly prejudicial,
basing his argument in part on the differing complexions of the individuals in
the pictures. Officer Wilson admitted that two of the six men in the lineup had

differing complexions than Appellant. Defense counsel also argued to the trial
7
court that the individual in another of the photographs had a different
complexion. On appeal, Appellant argues that the complexions of two or three

of the men included in the array were “so different as to invite the victims to

 

discount [those photographs] out of hand, virtually [eJnsuring that one of these
three men would be chosen as the robber.”

In Oakes v. Commonwealth, 320 $.W.3d 50, 57 (Ky. 2010), this Court
examined a number of cases in which various courts held a photographic
lineup was not unduly suggestive, including arrays in which:

the defendant is the only participant with a “fade” haircut,
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 906 N.E.2d 299,
310 (2009), or if the defendant has a different eye color,
Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 589-90 (Pa. Super. 2009),
as long as he has reasonably similar features to the other
participants. Similarly, a lineup is not unduly suggestive if “the
photograph of the defendant was the most clearly focused,

v, Sawyer, 253 A.D.2d 501, 501, 677 N.Y.8.2d 799 (N.Y. App.
1998), if the defendant's “photo is a full length shot while the rest
of the photos are bust shots,” United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231,
1235 (Sth Cir. 1972), or if the defendant was the only participant
depicted in a single, front-view photograph and the only one who
was clean shaven, United States v. Harrison, 460 F.2d 270, 271 (24
Cir.1972) (per curiam).

 

   

We stated, “(t]he key . . . is determining whether Appellant stood out of the
lineup so much that the procedure was ‘unduly suggestive.” Id.
Just as here, the appellant in King, 142 S.W.3d at 650, argued the

 

photographic array police utilized in his case was unduly suggestive. The
photographic array in King contained six photographs of African-American
ales, all “pictured in substantially similar surroundings and it is clear that all
were in custody at the time the photographs were taken.” Id. In the case at
bar, the photographic array also contained six photographs of African-
‘American males, and all six photographs were taken while the individuals were

8
in custody with the same background and perspective. The appellant in King
complained that the photographic array was unduly prejudicial, as he was the
oldest individual in the photographs and the only one wearing glasses.
However, this Court held, “the ages of the men were not clearly discernible”
and the fact that “only King wore glasses . .. did not rise to the level of a due
process violation.” Id.

{As for Appellant's argument concerning complexion, this Court
addressed a similar argument in Burrell v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-
000547-MR, 2008 WL 3890049, at *8 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2008). In Burrell, “fal of
the men pictured in the array were] African-American and . . . some [were]

darker-complected than others .. .." Id. Burrell argued that differences in the

 

‘men’s complexions and hair made the array unduly suggestive. We held that
“{t]hese differences, however, do not constitute an unduly suggestive
photographic line-up .. ..” Jd. We noted that the detective in Burrell had told

the witness that complexions were not always accurately depicted in the

 

photographs. Here, testimony at trial indicated that Officer Wilson went over
the instructions on the photographic lineup form which the three victims
signed. Those instructions clearly stated, “[pliease keep in mind that many
times, photos fail to accurately depict a person’s true complexion or skin color.”

(Our holding in Burrell is instructive here. In that case, the witness
picked out the appellant “immediately as the suspect.” Id. Here, Officer Wilson
testified the first of the three victims identified Appellant “very quickly”; the
second, “with no hesitation”; and the third, “with no hesitation or confusion.”
As in Burrell, the differences in complexion here did not render the

photographic array unduly suggestive.
9
In addition to his argument regarding complexion, Appellant argued that
(Officer Wilson told the victims that someone from the lineup might have been
involved in the robbery—and that the trial court should have suppressed the
identifications on these grounds. It puzzles the Court as to what else the
victims could have possibly surmised when a police officer wanted them to look
ata lineup. The only reasonable conclusion is that the officer believed it may
include someone involved in the crime. Otherwise, why else would the officer
ask the victims to look at the photographs? Thus, we will delve no further into
that portion of Appellant's argument. ‘The officer’s words did not create a “very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons, 390 U.S. at
384,

In spite of the slight irregularities in the photographic arrays in the cases
discussed above, all of the various courts, including this Court, held that the
photographic lineups were not unduly suggestive. Having reviewed the
photographic array, we agree and hold that the trial court was not clearly
erroneous in its findings of fact concerning the photographic array and did not
‘abuse its discretion in admitting the pre-trial identifications into evidence.

Appellant insists that the “totality of the circumstances here weigh
heavily in favor of suppressing these identifications as unreliable.” However, as
explained above, that determination need not be made, as we are affirming the
trial court's finding that the photographic lineup was not unduly prejudicial.
‘Thus, we need not reach the second step of the Neil v. Biggers analysis.

B. Mistrial Motions
Appellant next argues the trial court erred in denying two motions for

mistrial, This Court has held that “{a] mistrial is an extreme remedy and
10
should be resorted to only when there appears in the record a manifest
necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity.” Bray v.
Commonwealth, 177 8.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2005) overruled on other grounds by
Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 8.W.34 336 (Ky. 2010). “The occurrence :
complained of must be of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be
denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no
other way.” Gould v. Charlton Co., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996).
Furthermore, ‘lt is well established that the decision to grant a mistrial is
within the trial court's discretion, and such a ruling will not be disturbed
absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.” Woodard v. Commonwealth,
219 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Ky. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth
v, Prater, 324 8.W.3d 393 (Ky. 2010}. “The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993 8.W.2d at 945.

1. Photographs Obtained from Jail Website
During the Commonwealth's presentation of its case against Ethan King,

Appellant's co-defendant, Officer Wallace testified he obtained the photographs
in King’s photographic array from the jail website. Appellant objected, arguing
that the jury would infer that King’s picture was on the jail’s website because
he had committed a crime. Appellant's counsel asserted that the jury would
remember that fact when evidence concerning Appellant's own photographic
‘array was presented later in the trial. Appellant further argued at trial that the
evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.

King’s defense attorney insisted that an admonition would only

emphasize the fact that King had been in jail and moved instead for a mistrial.
ur
He argued the bell could not be “un-rung.” Appellant joined that motion. The

 

‘rial court overruled the mistrial motion and pointed out that just because an
individual had been arrested for something did not mean they had done
anything wrong. The trial judge went on to instruct the prosecutor to make no
further references to the fact that the photographs came from the jail's website.
As neither King’s counsel nor Appellant's sought an admonition (on the
grounds previously noted), the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard
Officer Wallace’s statement regarding the origin of the photographs in King’s
photographic array,

‘As noted in the previous section, the photographs of the individuals in
‘Appellant's own photographic array were all taken in custody. In fact, in our
analysis as to whether a photographic array was unduly suggestive, this Court
has used the fact that all of the photographs in various arrays depicted
individuals who were all in custody. For example, in Dillingham, we noted that
the trial court had found that “[tJhe individuals in each photo are not only
physically similar but are also clearly in custody.” 995 $.W.2d at 383. We
‘went on to point out that the picture did “not include any information
regarding the crime charged or the date of the crime.” Id. Furthermore, in
King, this Court used the fact that all the individuals in the array were
‘pictured in substantially similar surroundings and it is clear that all were in
custody at the time the photographs were taken” in support of our holding that _
the photographic array was not unduly suggestive. 142 $.W.3d at 650.

However, in spite of the fact that we have held photographic arrays
depicting all of the individuals in custody are permissible, Appellant asks this

Court to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his
12
motion for mistrial ater Officer Wallace testified he obtained the photographs
from the jail's website. Considering this Court’s precedent outlined above, we
disagree. This occurrence was certainly not ‘of such character and magnitude
that a litigant will be denied « fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect
can be removed in no other way.” Gould, 929 8.W.2d at 738.

In spite of the fact that the photographic array in question was King’s—
not Appellant’s—Appellant argues that it violated KRE 404(b)'s general
prohibition of evidence of other crimes and that it negated his presumption of
innocence in the same way that appearing handcuffed at trial would have. (In
fact, Appellant goes so far as to say, “t}hus, [Appellant] was branded a criminal
and his guilt was a foregone conclusion. Its effect on the jury was the same as
if {Appellant} had been forced to appear for trial in shackles and an orange
jumpsuit”) The analogy between an officer testifying that he obtained
photographs for a co-defendant’s array from the jail website—particularly when
hhe was not the same officer who prepared Appellant's photographic lineup—
and appearing shackled in open court is a bit of @ stretch. However, we need
not address this portion of Appellant's argument, as he failed to present it to
the trial court. It is well settled that “appellants will not be permitted to feed
one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.”
Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 8.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976) overruled on other
grounds by Wilbum v. Commonwealth, 312 $.W.34 921 (Ky. 2010).

2. Juror as Victim of Car Theft

Before court began on the morning of the final day of Appellant's trial,

the bailiff informed the trial court that one of the jurors had his car stolen that

morning. The court excused the juror, telling him not to discuss anything that
13.
had happened. King's counsel indicated that the juror had been in the room
with the rest of the panel and may have been upset and potentially made
‘comments about being the victim of a crime. King’s counsel indicated that
when the jury was told that one juror had been excused due to a serious
personal matter, some of the jurors shook their heads.

King's counsel requested that the trial court question the jurors, and the
court consented. When the trial court asked the panel if anyone was aware of
what had happened or had any conversations with the juror in question, it is
difficult to discern any responses. However, the trial court’s next statement
indicates an affirmative response: “[sjo, he did come back and tell you what
happened this morning?”

Next, the trial court asked the panel for a show of hands if anything
about what the excused juror had said about the events of the morning would
affect them in any way with respect to the case, any evidence they had heard,”
and their ability to remain fair and impartial. The trial judge then stated, “no,”
which appeared to be the answer she discerned from the panel's respdnse.

King’s counsel indicated at trial that the show of hands indicated that
the juror had talked to the entire panel. He argued that the fact that the
excused juror had told the panel that he was the victim of a crime may have
influenced the jury. He moved for a mistrial on these grounds and Appellant
joined the motion. The Commonwealth argued that an admonition to the jury
‘would suffice.

‘The trial court ultimately overruled the motion for mistrial and
admonished the jury not to allow anything that transpired during their

conversations with the excused juror to impact their deliberations in any way.
14
(On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in overruling
his motion for a mistrial.

mistrial should have

 

Appellant points to our precedent and argue
been granted because the potential jury issue in his case was “of such
character and magnitude that [he would] be denied a fair and impartial trial
and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.’ Gould, 929 S.W.2d
at 738. He emphasizes that the trial court did not individually question the
Jurors or ask them what the excused juror had told them. He also points out
the trial judge did not ask the jurors what they thought or said in response to
the excused juror’s statements.

Appellant contends that the loss of a vehicle is a significant property
theft and may have resonated with the panel as it recalled the victims’
testimony concerning their deprivation of personal property. He indicates ‘it
would be a human response to identify and feel more sympathy . . . because
the jurors were sympathetic to one of their own suffering a theft.” He insists
this created the danger that one or more of those jurors would convict
Appellant because they were inflamed by those circumstances, rather than
solely based on the evidence presented at trial. :

‘The parties disagree as to whether Appellant acquiesced to the trial
court's admonition. However, regardless of whether Appellant agreed to it, “[a]
jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and the
admonition thus cures any error.” Johnson, 105 S.W.3d at 441. This is the

case “unless (1) there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be

 

unable to follow the court’s admonition; and (2) a strong likelihood that the

effect of the inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant.”
15
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 8.W.24 856, 859 (Ky. 1993) (citing Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766, n. 8 (1987)), overruled on other grounds by Stringer v.
Commonwealth, 956 8.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997), We see no such “overwhelming
probability” here nor do we believe the consequences of the excused juror
informing the rest of the panel that his car had been stolen would be
“devastating” to Appellant.

Here, apart from both the excused juror and the victims being relieved of
their possessions, the crimes were dissimilar. As to the crime of which
Appellant was accused, it involved assailants pointing guns at and threatening
their victims as they stole from them. In the case of the juror, his car was
stolen. However, unlike the armed robbery in the present case, it seems the
juror’s car disappeared during the night as he slept.

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Appellant's motion for mistrial

Appellant also seems to argue that the panel should have been
dismissed. (Actually,
prospective juror should be stricken for cause during voir dire. Considering

is argument is based in law concerning whether a

 

the context, we assume he is likening, though inartfully, a strike during voir

 

dire to striking the entire panel.) However, he points us to no place in the

record where he requested this relief of the trial court. As with Appellant's

 

previous mistrial argument, we will not consider this argument at length, as it
was not submitted to the trial court. However, we will pause to point out that
‘[tjhe trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a jury panel

should be dismissed, and its ruling should not be disturbed absent a clear

16
abuse of discretion.” King v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Ky. 2012)
(quoting Tabor v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 69, 571 (Ky. App. 1997).

C. Testimony Concerning Out-of-Court Identifications
Appellant next argues that Officer Wilson’s testimony about Appellant's

identification by the three victims to whom he presented the photographic
array amounted to hearsay and impermissibly bolstered the victims’ in-court
identifications. At trial, Officer Wilson was the Commonwealth's second
witness, and offered his testimony before any ofthe vitims testified as to their
in-court and out-of-court identifications of Webb. Officer Wilson testified that
the three victims to whom he showed the photographic array all identified
‘Appellant without hesitation or confusion.

Appellant did not object at trial, therefore, this matter is not preserved
and we will review only for palpable error under RCr 10.26. “Palpable error
affects the substantial rights of the party and results in manifest injustice.
Furthermore, an appellant claiming palpable error must show that the error
was more likely than ordinary error to have affected the jury.” Boud v.
Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126, 129-30 (Ky. 2014). “In determining whether
an error is palpable, ‘an appellate court must consider whether on the whole
case there is a substantial possibilty that the result would have been any
diffrent." Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 8.W.9d 894, 695 (Ky, 2002) (citing
Commonwealth v. Mcintosh, 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983)). This Court has
expounded on the ‘Pace and McIntosh line of cases to hold that the “required
showing is probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to
threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law.” Martin v.

Commonwealth, 207 8.W.34 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).
7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence 801A provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Prior statements of witnesses. A statement is not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as,
required by KRE 613, and the statement is:

 

 

(3) One of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person.

Appellant acknowledges that KRE 801A(a)(8) permits testimony by both the
individual who made the identification and others who heard the identification.
However, he points out that since Officer Wilson's testimony regarding the
{identification came in before that of the victims, a proper foundation had not
been laid. Owens v. Commonwealth, 950 8.W.2d 887, 839 (Ky. 1997) (*[A}fier
the victim had testified that he made the out-of-court identification of
appellant, the Commonwealth was entitled to introduce the hearsay statements
of the police officers to corroborate the fact of the prior out-of-court
identification.”).

While Appellant is correct that Officer Wilson’s testimony concerning the
victims’ identification of Webb should have come after the victims themselves
had testified as to such, this did not affect Appellant's substantial rights and
result in manifest injustice. Moreover, Appellant does not “show that the error
was more likely than ordinary error to have affected the jury.” Boyd, 439
8.W.3d at 129-30. Here, Officer Wilson explained to the jury the factual events
surrounding the lineup. He did not provide his opinion as to whether the
victims were believable, but only the fact that the three of them identified
Appellant as one of the robbers. During the course of the trial, the three

18
victims did all testify concerning their out-of-court identifications of
Appellant—and their testimony was in line with Officer Wilson’s. This
unpreserved error did not result in a manifest injustice and, therefore, did not
amount to palpable error.
D, Motions for Continuance and Separate Trial

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for a

continuance and for a separate trial, filed on the same day.
1. Continuance

First, in Appellant's motion to continue,! Appellant's trial counsel
informed the court of “a potential conflict that cannot be resolved without
giving [Appellant] an opportunity to consult with other counsel or conflict
counsel.” This “potential conflict” of interest stemmed from an unrelated case.
In that case, Appellant had entered a guilty plea, but had allegedly sent a letter
to the trial judge indicating his counsel had misinformed him regarding the
possible sentence. According to Appellant’s motion for continuance, the letter
“indicat{ed] he was misinformed by trial counsel about the possible sentence
and indicatled] a desire to withdraw his plea in that case.” The trial court
denied his motion for a continuance, noting that whether Appellant decided to
withdraw his plea in that unrelated case had no bearing on the case at bar.
Appellant alleges the trial court erred in this ruling,

Appellant included nothing in the record on appeal supporting his

contention. He does not allege that he actually filed a motion to withdraw his

1 At the end of the motion, Appellant also asked for a separate trial. However,
‘that issue was more fully fleshed out in the second motion he filed that day.
‘Therefore, we will address the issues separately.
19
guilty plea in the murder case, but only purports to have written a letter to the
judge. Even assuming this letter exists, we cannot review it as he failed to
make it a part of this record. “It is incumbent upon Appellant to present the
Court with a complete record for review. . . . When the record is incomplete,
this Court must assume that the omitted record supports the trial court.”
Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 8.W.3d 288, 303 (Ky. 2008).

Appellant does not contend that he made any motions in the unrelated
case for a continuance or to substitute counsel based on a potential conflict.
In his motion for a continuance, filed on February 6, 2015, Appellant indicated
that final sentencing in the other matter was set for February 27. Sentencing
in the matter before us occurred on March 27, 2015. There, Appellant asked
that his sentence in the present case run concurrently with his sentence in the
murder case, as he had already been sentenced in that matter. Given the short
turn-around, and lack of evidence to the contrary in the record, we can only
assume that Appellant did not, in fact, actually move to withdraw his guilty
plea in the murder case, in spite of what his alleged letter may have indicated
to the trial judge in that case. We cannot base our opinion on speculation,
however; rather, “we must assume that the omitted record supports the trial
court” id.

‘The cases Appellant cites are inapplicable to the facts of the case at bar.
For example, the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in
Commonwealth v. Tigue, 459 S.W.3d 372, 381 (Ky. 2015), related to that case—

and it was clear from the record that he actually made said motion. However,

 

those are simply not the facts of Appellant's case. Here, the plea was in an

20
unrelated homicide case and Appellant does not allege he actually made a
motion to withdraw his plea?
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, under the facts of this case, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Appellant

 

motion for
acontinuance. “The granting of @ continuance is in the sound discretion of a
trial judge, and unless from a review of the whole record it appears that the
trial judge has abused that discretion, this court will not disturb the findings of
the court.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 8.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Ky. 1982),

2, Separate Trials
In his other motion, Appellant requested to be tried separately from co-

defendant, Ethan King. First, we note that RCr. 6.18 permits offenses to be
Joined where “the offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on
the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a
‘common scheme or plan.” However, RCr. 8.31 provides, in pertinent part: “If
it appears that a defendant or the Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a

Joinder of .. . defendants . .. for trial, the court shall . . . grant separate trials

 

of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.”
“ Inhis motion, Appellant argued that he was neither charged nor

implicated until King’s counsel provided his name to police more than a year

2 In his brief, Appellant cites several cases regarding instances in which
‘substitute counsel is necessary in order to protect an individual's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial. However, the motion Appellant made at trial was not a motion to
substitute counsel—it was 2 motion to continue. Even though the motion indicated
that the request for more time was to “givje Appellant] an opportunity to consult with
other counsel or conflict counsel,” Appellant was simply not requesting that the trial
court appoint substitute counsel at that time. Therefore, we will not address this
portion of Appellant's argument further. The motion at issue was to continue the trial,
‘that is the motion ruled on by the trial court, and we need not address it differently.

21
after the robbery. Appellant pointed out in his motion that King had been
asked on various occasions who accompanied him during the robbery, but had

not previously implicated Appellant, and that King’s latest statement w

 

contradictory. Appellant asserted that if King did not testify at their joint trial
(which he did not), he would be unable to question King concerning his prior
inconsistent statements. Appellant insisted in his motion that the cases could
be separated easily with no prejudice to the Commonwealth, but if the co-
defendants proceeded to trial together, Appellant's right to a fair trial would be
compromised. The trial court denied Appellant's motion.

On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court’s denial of his severance
motion denied Appellant his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
present a defense, as it kept him from calling King as a witness to either
confront him or as a witness on his behalf, Appellant argues that we should
review this as a constitutional error under the harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a
motion to sever for an abuse of discretion. “We have expressed a strong

preference for such joint trials. The decision as to-severance is matter of

 

judicial discretion. We will not reverse on appeal for failure to sever unless we
are clearly convinced that prejudice occurred and that the likelihood of
prejudice was so clearly demonstrated to the trial judge as to make his failure
to grant severance an abuse of discretion.” Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151
S.W.3d 332, 340 (Ky. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

a relative term and, in the context of a

 

‘This Court has stated that “‘prejudice’
criminal proceeding, means only that which is unnecessary or unreasonably

hurtful, given that having to stand trial is, itself, inherently prejudicial.” Ware
22
v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 176 (ky. 1976); Romans v. Commonwealth,
547 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Ky. 197). Furthermore, ‘the burden is on the appellant
to show that the denial was in fact unfairly prejudicial.” Peacher v.
Commonwealth, 391 8.W.3d 821, 834 (Ky. 2013) (citing Quisenberry v.
Commonwealth, 336 8.W.3d 19 (Ky.2011)); see also Rachel v. Commonwealth,
523 $.W.2d 395, 400 (Ky. 1975) (If upon the consideration of the case a trial
Judge orders a joint trial, we cannot reverse unless we are clearly convinced
that prejudice occurred and that the likelihood of prejudice was so clearly
demonstrated to the trial judge as to make his failure to grant severance an

abuse of discretion.

 

Appellant's argument boils down to the fact that he wanted the severance
so that King could be tried first. Then, Appellant insists King would have lost
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Appellant could
call him as a witness to question him regarding his prior inconsistent
statements. Appellant goes so far as to insist that, even if King were convicted
and appealed the conviction, Appellant's trial could be “put off until King’s case
was resolved.” Unsurprisingly, Appellant cites no authority for his argument.
‘We cannot say that a trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to
sever based on Appellant's hope that it would postpone hearing his case for an
indeterminate amount of time while his co-defendant was tried, potentially
convicted, and had his appeals fully resolved.

Appellant also points out in his brief that “[ijt was also clear that King’s
defense would be that [Appellant] was the leader and King was only a
facilitator.” As to this assertion, we have held: “That different defendants

alleged to have been involved in the same transaction have conflicting versions
23
‘of what took place, or the extent to which they participated in it, vel non, is a
reason for rather than against a joint trial. If one is lying, itis easier for the
truth to be determined [ij all are required to be tried together.” Ware v,
Commonwealth, 537 8.W.2d 174, 177 (Ky. 1976) (emphasis added), overruled
(on other grounds as recognized by Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435
(Ky. 2016). We agree with this Court's reasoning in Ware and will not address
this portion of Appellant's claim further.

Appellant did not bear his burden of demonstrating that any prejudice
occurred as a result of the trial court's denial of his motion to sever. Five
witnesses and two police officers testified at his trial. Victims identified
Appellant as one of the robbers. We do not believe Appellant's inability to
question King as to why he had not come forward with his identification sooner
prejudiced him at trial. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Appellant's motion to sever hie trial from King's.

E, Restitution
Appellant's final argument relates only to his sentence. He admits the

issue is unpreserved, but argues the trial court committed palpable error when
it ordered him to pay restitution jointly and severally with King in the amount
of $500 for the items taken from one of the roommates during the robbery.
Appellant states that there was neither a hearing nor proof offered to support
the amount of restitution.

In Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 8.W.3d 22, 30 (Ky. 2011), the
“restitution imposed against Appellant was based upon unsworn and uncross-

examined statements.” There, the trial judge had merely accepted an unsworn

24
statement the victim's mother made during sentencing concerning her
daughter's medical expenses. The trial judge took the amount given by the
mother and, without taking any testimony, multiplied that amount out over a
period of forty years to reach the amount of restitution. We held that
restitution award amounted to palpable error.

In Cave v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000542-MR, 2015 WL 1544451,
at *8 (Ky. Apr. 2, 2015), we stated:

{Rlestitution may be clearly established from the evidence at trial

or readily ascertainable from receipts, invoices, estimates, etc. In

such cases, the issue of restitution may “be summarily resolved

with minimal formality and with practical efficiency.” Jones, [382

S.W.3d] at 31. In light of [the appellant's failure to contest the

‘Commonwealth's motion or its proof, we cannot find fault, and

certainly we cannot find palpable error, in the court’s
determination to order restitution.

 

We believe this case is more like Cave, where the restitution did not
amount to palpable error, than like Jones, where it did. Here, five witnesses
testified at trial about the items stolen during the robbery, which included a
flat-screen television, a MacBook laptop computer, and an iHome device.
Appellant could have objected to the amount of restitution at his sentencing
hearing, but he did not. While we agree that it would have been the better
practice for receipts or estimates to have been entered into evidence, we do not
believe their absence rises to the level of palpable error. This was not a case
like Jones in which the amount ‘was based upon unsworn and uncross-
examined statements.” The trial court informed Appellant that the restitution
was for the stolen items and heard the victim's sworn, cross-examined
testimony during trial as to what those items were. Therefore, we hold that any
error related to restitution was not palpable.

25
M1, CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence.

 

All sitting. Minton, C.J., Hughes, Keller, VanMeter, and Wright, JJ.,

concur. Venters,

 

, concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion,

in which Cunningham, J., joins.

VENTERS, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: Although I
concur with the more significant points of Justice Wright's opinion, I
respectfully dissent with respect to the portion of his opinion that orders
restitution, The trial court received absolutely no information in the form of
evidence or otherwise to establish the value of the items stolen during the
robbery. The trial court seems to have plucked the amount of $500.00 purely
out of thin air. A factual determination based upon no evidence at all is the
epitome of arbitrariness, *{Cjonstitutional due process requires . . . the
Commonwealth to establish the , . . amount of restitution by a preponderance
of the evidence, and findings with regard to the imposition of restitution must
be supported by substantial evidence.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d
22, 32 (Ky. 2011). In Jones, we found that ordering restitution in violation of
this fundamental constitutional precept was palpable error. Id. at 29. I believe
it is also palpable error here,

Cunningham, J., joins.

26
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky

Leilani K. M. Martin
Assistant Attorney General

ar