Case Title: Weaver v. City of Pascagoula

Citation: 527 So. 2d 651

Docket Number: 57647

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1988-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
527 So. 2d 651 (1988) Ralph P. WEAVER, Jr., Weaver Motor Co., Inc., and Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. CITY OF PASCAGOULA, a Municipal Corporation. No. 57647. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 18, 1988. Rehearing Denied July 13, 1988. David C. Frazier, Gordon, Myers & Frazier, Pascagoula, for appellants. *652 Raymond L. Brown, Brown & Associates, Pascagoula, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court: Ralph P. Weaver, Jr., Weaver Motor Company, Inc., and Universal Underwriters Insurance Company appeal from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mississippi, dismissing their complaint against the City of Pascagoula and holding that the appellants were collaterally estopped by a prior judgment. The sole question presented is whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. We answer the question in the affirmative and reverse and remand. On April 7, 1979, a fire broke out at Montie's Sporting Goods in Pascagoula. The Pascagoula Fire Department responded, but the fire could not be contained. Montie's was destroyed, and the blaze spread to an adjacent business, Weaver Motor Co., which was also destroyed. On July 25, 1979, Montie's brought suit against the City of Pascagoula for property damage and lost profits resulting from the fire department's alleged negligent conduct in fighting the fire. After a four-day trial, beginning June 12, 1980, the jury returned a verdict for the City. Appellants brought the present action against appellee on February 21, 1985. The allegations in appellants' complaint were virtually identical with the allegations and issues raised in the Montie's trial almost five (5) years earlier. Both complaints alleged negligence on the part of appellee in Appellee moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). The motion was heard on March 21, 1986, and the trial judge sua sponte brought up the point of collateral estoppel, which issue was neither raised in the motion nor argued at the hearing. The court took the motion under advisement, called for briefs on the question of collateral estoppel, and subsequently ordered that appellants were estopped by the prior judgment entered in the Montie's case, and, accordingly, dismissed appellants' complaint. On this appeal, the appellee does not argue or pursue the theory of collateral estoppel upon which the lower court decided the case against appellants, but contends that the lower court's dismissal reached the correct result even if by the wrong approach and for the wrong reason, and that, under decisions of this Court, the correct conclusion should be affirmed. Monroe County Board of Education v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1988); Estate of Johnson v. Adkins, 513 So. 2d 922 (Miss. 1987); Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 1983). We agree that the theory of collateral estoppel is misplaced and is not applicable here. Collateral estoppel binds only those who have already "had their day in court" regarding the particular issue. Any other application of collateral estoppel would result in a denial of due process for those neither party nor privy to the prior action. General Foods v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health, 648 F.2d 784 (1st Cir.1981); Southwest Airlines v. Texas International Airlines, 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.1977); Bronson v. Board of Education of the City School District of Cincinnati, 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.1975); Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir.1975); *653 Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.1973) cert denied, 416 U.S. 956, 94 S. Ct. 1970, 40 L. Ed. 307 (1974); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Non-Parties, 87 Harvard Law Review 1485, 1486-1501, especially note 89 (1974). In Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 213 Miss. 611, 57 So. 2d 476 (1952), a woman sued the Clarksdale Hospital for personal injuries allegedly resulting from the hospital's negligent care while she was a patient. The jury found for the hospital. In a separate and subsequent suit, the woman's husband sued the hospital for loss of consortium in connection with his wife's injuries arising from the hospital's alleged negligence. The hospital raised the defense of collateral estoppel, claiming that since the issue of its negligence had been resolved in the suit brought by the wife, the husband was now precluded from relitigating this same issue. The trial court dismissed the husband's complaint with prejudice, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. This Court noted that the husband sued for loss of consortium while the wife sued for personal injury; that the husband's cause of action was personal to him while the wife's was personal to her; and that the husband was not a party to the wife's action against the hospital. Regarding privity the Court held that, even though the husband (appellant) employed the wife's attorney in the prior suit, he 213 Miss. at 623-24, 57 So. 2d at 481. In holding that the husband was not collaterally estopped by the prior judgment against his wife, this Court quoted "with approval" the following language from Kraut v. Cleveland Railway Co., 132 Oh.St. 125, 5 N.E.2d. 324 (1936): 213 Miss. at 620-21, 57 So. 2d at 480. In the recent case of Davis v. City of Lexington, 509 So. 2d 1049 (Miss. 1987), this Court was presented with similar facts upon which the complaint was dismissed. The Court said: 509 So. 2d at 1051. In accord with Davis v. City of Lexington, supra, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for a full development of the facts on the merits. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, PRATHER, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.