Case Title: Morway v. Trombly

Citation: 173 Vt. 266, 789 A.2d 965

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Morway v. Trombly (2000-499); 173 Vt. 266; 789 A.2d 965

[Filed 28-Dec-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-499

Jill Morway	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Chittenden Superior Court

Bruce Trombly and Town of Milton	         September Term, 2000 

David A. Jenkins, J.

John J. Bergeron and Kerin E. Stackpole of Bergeron, Paradis & Fitzpatrick, 
  LLP, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph A. Farnham of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington, for 
  Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff Jill Morway, who filed a negligence action
  against defendants  Town of Milton and its snowplow operator Bruce Trombly
  after being injured in a car accident  allegedly caused by Trombly, appeals
  the superior court's decision granting defendants' joint motion  for
  summary judgment.  Plaintiff does not challenge the grant of summary
  judgment in favor of the  Town, but contends that the court erred in
  granting Trombly summary judgment based on its  conclusion that his
  operation of the snowplow was a discretionary duty immunizing him from
  suit,  and that, in any event, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Trombly
  breached any legal duty owed to 

 

  her.  We conclude that Trombly's operation of the snowplow was a
  ministerial, rather than a  discretionary, duty that did not accord Trombly
  immunity from plaintiff's suit.  Further, we conclude  that the facts
  alleged by plaintiff were sufficient to avoid summary judgment and allow a
  jury to  determine whether Trombly was negligent, and, if so, whether his
  negligence was a proximate cause  of the accident.  Accordingly, we reverse
  the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of  Trombly, and
  remand the matter for further proceedings.

       At the time of the accident, which occurred on the morning of January
  1, 1999, plaintiff was  a passenger riding in the front seat of a car
  driven by her husband, Kyle Morway.  Their car came  upon and began
  following Trombly, who was operating a snowplow truck for the Town.  There
  were  snowdrifts on the road, and the wind was blowing.  At one point,
  another vehicle approached the  truck from the opposite direction.  After
  passing the truck, that vehicle collided with the Morways'  vehicle. 
  Apparently, both drivers were blinded by blowing snow caused by the truck's
  plow hitting  the snow drifts.  The investigating police officer concluded
  that the primary cause of the accident  was the Morways' vehicle drifting
  to the left of center on the road, and the secondary cause was the 
  Morways' vehicle following the snowplow truck too closely.

       In March 1999, plaintiff brought suit against the Town and Trombly,
  alleging that she was  injured as a result of Trombly's negligence in
  operating the snowplow truck.  After the parties  engaged in significant
  discovery, defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment, asserting 
  that the doctrine of sovereign immunity shielded the Town from liability,
  and that the doctrine of  qualified official immunity shielded Trombly from
  liability.  Plaintiff opposed the motion, but the  court granted summary
  judgment to both defendants, ruling that (1) under the doctrine of
  sovereign  immunity, the Town was immune from suits such as plaintiff's
  alleging negligence with respect to 

 

  governmental functions, including road maintenance; and (2) under the
  doctrine of qualified official  immunity, Trombly was immune from suits
  such as plaintiff's alleging negligence with respect to  discretionary acts
  performed in good faith during the course of his employment with the Town. 
  The  court concluded that Trombly's operation of the snowplow truck was
  discretionary in nature because  he had to make decisions concerning the
  speed of the truck and the angle of the plow in deciding  how best to
  negotiate snowdrifts while weighing the safety of others on the road.  The
  court also  concluded that, notwithstanding issues of immunity, plaintiff
  had failed to show that defendants  breached any duty owed to her. 
  Finally, the court ruled that plaintiff could not rely on the principle  of
  res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) to prove Trombly's
  negligence because she could not  show that there were any facts to infer
  or that Trombly owed her a legal duty.

       On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting summary
  judgment to Trombly  based on the doctrine of qualified official immunity
  because his operation of the snowplow truck  concerned a ministerial act
  not performed in good faith.  Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in 
  concluding that Trombly owed her no legal duty, and that she failed to
  demonstrate that he breached  any legal duty owed to her.  Finally,
  plaintiff contends that there were material facts in dispute that  preclude
  summary judgment.

                                     I.

       When we review a decision to grant summary judgment, we apply the same
  standard as that  applied by the trial court: summary judgment is
  appropriate if the moving party proves that there is  no genuine issue of
  material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
  White v.  Quechee Lakes Landowners' Ass'n, 170 Vt. 25, 28,