Case Title: Scott v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 140, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEFFREY SCOTT, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 140, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr.A. No. IK04-07-1020 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   I.D. No. 0407003957 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  December 13, 2006 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  February 22, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc) 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of February 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Scott (“Scott”), appeals his 
Superior Court judgments of conviction for Murder in the Second Degree 
and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  
Scott presents two arguments on appeal.  First, Scott contends that there 
were no exigent circumstances to justify the issuance of a nighttime search 
warrant.  Second, Scott contends that the restriction on cross-examination of 
April Stinson, a State witness, was an abuse of discretion.   
 
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2) 
We have concluded that Scott’s challenge to the nighttime 
search warrant is without merit.  Scott correctly asserts that his right to 
cross-examine April Stinson was violated.  However, we have concluded 
that error was harmless.  Accordingly, the judgments of conviction must be 
affirmed. 
3) 
Scott was residing in an apartment, located in the Capital Green 
subdivision of Dover, with his girlfriend, Elaine Denise Curd (“Elaine”).  
During the evening of July 6, 2006, a power outage occurred.  Also present 
at the apartment that evening were:  Elaine’s seventeen-year-old daughter, 
Dominique Curd (“Dominique”), who was visiting for the weekend; Kim 
Odwin (“Odwin”), who resided with Elaine; and Odwin’s children, Ebony 
and Endya, ages five and three respectively. 
4) 
Scott had been drinking that evening and began arguing with 
Elaine about her alleged sexual affair with her nephew.  During the 
argument, Scott pushed Elaine down the stairs in front of the apartment.  
Two of Elaine’s neighbors, Stacy Scott, Scott’s niece, and April Stinson 
(“Stinson”) observed the dispute between Scott and Elaine.  Stacy Scott 
stated that she saw Scott slap Elaine.  Stinson was sitting outside her house 
when she observed Scott push Elaine out the door.  
 
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5) 
When Elaine went back inside the apartment, she sat on a couch 
in her living room.  Although it was dark because of the power outage, 
Dominique heard Scott go into the kitchen and open a drawer.  Dominique 
stated that Scott returned to the living room and announced that he didn’t 
care if he went to jail and that Elaine was going to die.  Then, according to 
Dominique, Scott stabbed Elaine.  Dominique ran outside for help and Stacy 
Scott telephoned 911.  Elaine was stabbed eleven times and died as a result.  
Scott sustained five lacerations on his left hand and was treated for his 
injuries.  At the crime scene and the hospital, Scott admitted that he had 
stabbed Elaine following an argument.   
6) 
Scott filed a pretrial motion seeking suppression of nine items 
of physical evidence (two kitchen knives, three blood swabbings, two 
telephones, a purse, and keys).  The Superior Court, after conducting an 
evidentiary hearing, denied the motion.  In this appeal, Scott argues that the 
nighttime search warrant is invalid as to both its form and its substance.   
7) 
Title 11, section 2308 of the Delaware Code provides that a 
search warrant shall not authorize the person executing it to search a 
dwelling house in the nighttime unless it is necessary to prevent the removal 
 
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of evidence and such authority is expressly given.1  Scott contends that the 
nighttime search warrant was improper as to its form because it failed to 
contain the language used in the sample nighttime search warrant found in 
11 Del. C. § 2310(c).2  The State argues there is no requirement that a 
nighttime warrant contain specific language so long as it expressly provides 
authority to conduct the search during the nighttime.3   
8) 
This Court has previously held that a failure to use the exact 
language provided in the sample form does not invalidate the warrant.4  In 
this case, the warrant expressly authorized the search of the residence in the 
nighttime.5  Although it did not contain the language from the sample form, 
the content of the warrant was sufficient.   
                                          
 
1 11 Del. C. § 2308 provides:  
A search warrant shall not authorize the person executing it to search any 
dwelling house in the nighttime unless the judge, justice of the peace or 
magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary in order to prevent the escape or 
removal of the person or thing to be searched for, and then the authority 
shall be expressly given in the warrant. 
2 The sample nighttime search warrant includes language that the “search of the premises 
in the nighttime is necessary in order to prevent the escape or removal of the person or 
thing to be searched for.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 2310(c). 
3 Hope v. State, 570 A.2d 1185, 1187 (Del. 1990). 
4 “Although the police did not use the sample form . . . the warrant on its face expressly 
authorized a nighttime search.”  Id. at 1188.  On its face the warrant lacked express 
language reflecting the need for a nighttime search to prevent the removal of evidence. 
Instead, it simply authorized a nighttime search: “This warrant my [sic] be executed in 
the nighttime as requested in the application, probable cause being shown for the issuance 
of a nighttime warrant by the attached affidavit.”  Id. 
5 The warrant is titled, “Nighttime Search Warrant,” and authorizes the officers to 
perform the search “in the daytime, or in the nighttime.” 
 
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9) 
Next, Scott argues that the warrant was substantively defective 
because the supporting affidavit did not indicate that evidence would be 
tampered with before a daytime search could be conducted.  In denying the 
motion to suppress, the Superior Court noted that the following exigent 
circumstances existed:  evidence within the residence was in plain view and 
there was a danger of tampering or loss because “members of Odwin’s 
family or others would find a way to enter the dwelling despite it being 
secure, and disturb the crime scene.”6  The trial judge also stated that he was 
“satisfied that trace evidence by its nature is subject to risk of loss if not 
seized as soon as practicable.”7   
10) 
The record reflects that the probable cause affidavit stated that 
members of Odwin’s family wanted to retrieve items from the apartment.  
The affidavit also references “possible blood stains.”  The magistrate who 
issued the search warrant could reasonably infer that trace evidence could be 
destroyed or “removed” by the presence of anyone in the home and that 
trace evidence can be lost or “removed” simply by the passage of time.  In 
its review, the Superior Court noted that is the nature of trace evidence.  The 
affidavit for a nighttime search warrant also stated that the scene was 
                                          
 
6 State v. Scott, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 04071020, Vaughn, P.J. (November 23, 2005).  
7 Id. at 5. 
 
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unsecured and that family members wanted to recover property for their 
children.   
11) 
A probable cause determination by a magistrate is entitled to 
“great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a 
hypertechnical, rather than common sense, interpretation of the warrant 
affidavit.”8  In determining whether sufficient facts existed to justify the 
issuance of the warrant, a reviewing court must apply a “four-corners” test to 
the affidavit attached to a nighttime search warrant:9 
[T]he “four-corners” test [for probable cause] is likewise 
applicable to the determination of whether a warrant may 
authorize a search at nighttime under § 2308. In other words, 
sufficient facts showing that a nighttime search is necessary to 
prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be 
searched must appear on the face of the affidavit before such a 
search may be authorized. Only in this way can a reviewing 
court verify existence of the statutory requirements.10 
 
We hold that the Superior Court properly applied the “four corners” test in 
reviewing the magistrate’s decision to issue a nighttime search warrant.  
Therefore, Scott’s motion to suppress was properly denied. 
12) 
Scott’s second argument on appeal is that the trial judge erred 
by restricting his cross-examination of April Stinson.  At trial, Stinson 
testified that she saw Scott push Elaine out the door and heard him say, 
                                          
 
8 Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984). 
9 Id. at 113. 
10 Id.   
 
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“You want me to go to jail?”  She also stated that it appeared that Scott 
“snapped out” that night.   
13) 
Scott’s argument is based upon the fact that Stinson had 
recently entered a drug diversion program in lieu of being prosecuted for 
felony drug-related charges.  The trial judge ruled that Scott could not raise 
that issue on cross-examination because Stinson’s entry into the drug 
diversion program was not a prior criminal conviction within the meaning of 
D.R.E. 609 (a).  Scott concedes that the entry into a drug diversion did not 
constitute a conviction permitting impeachment under D.R.E. 609.  
Nonetheless, Scott asserts that evidence of Stinson’s arrest, prosecution, and 
diversion was relevant to show potential bias for the prosecution in her 
testimony.   
14) 
The trial judge considered whether the drug diversion 
information was relevant for impeachment.  The judge noted that Stinson’s 
drug arrest occurred nearly a year after the events at issue in Scott’s 
prosecution.  The trial judge concluded that the relevance of the 2005 drug 
arrest of the witness was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
prosecution in having Stinson portrayed as a bad person.  Accordingly, the 
trial judge ruled that even if the information was relevant for the purpose of 
 
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showing bias, it would be inadmissible under D.R.E. 403.   
15) 
The trial judge’s refusal to allow questions relating to the drug 
diversion program deprived Scott of the opportunity to inquire about the 
witness’ entry into a program for which the determination of eligibility is 
entirely in the discretion of the Attorney General’s Office.  If Stinson 
complies with the diversion program the charges against her will be 
dropped.  While the State denied there was any deal for Stinson’s testimony, 
the opportunity for diversion with the prospect of charges being dropped 
could reasonably create a bias for the prosecution.  Therefore, we hold that 
Scott should have been permitted to explore that potential bias through 
cross-examination.   
16) 
Nevertheless, the record reflects that other witnesses for the 
State corroborated Stinson’s testimony.  Stacy Scott testified at trial that she 
saw Scott slap Elaine and heard them arguing.  Dominique’s testimony that 
she saw Scott stab Elaine and Scott’s incriminatory statements are sufficient 
to support Scott’s conviction.  Given that other evidence, and because the 
same testimony was properly admitted through another witness, the 
 
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limitation upon the cross-examination of Stinson was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.11   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgments 
of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
11 In Van Arsdall, this Court ruled that a harmless error analysis is required when it is 
alleged that there has been an impermissible restriction on the defense right to bias cross-
examination of a prosecution witness.  Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3 (Del. 1987).