Case Title: MARRIAGE OF ISLER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13565 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ROBERT ISLER, Petitioner and Respondent, and CHRISTINE M. ISLER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B . Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: William J. Miele argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondent : Kenneth R . Wilson argued, Miles City, Montana Submitted: April 18, 1977 Decided: JUN 2 1 1 9 7 z Filed: JUN 22 ]gin M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by ,the mother from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Rosebud County, awarding custody of the p a r t i e s ' two minor children t o t h e i r father. Christine and Robert I s l e r were married i n September 1970, and divorced i n April 1976. Although the d i s t r i c t court found both parents f i t and proper persons, it awarded custody of David, then four years old, and Douglas, then one year old, t o the father. The mother contends the award of custody t o the f a t h e r was an abuse of discretion on the p a r t of the d i s t r i c t court because : 1) Evidence a t t r i a l on the factors l i s t e d i n section 48-332, R.C.M. 1947, of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, favored the mother. 2) The award was erroneously based on the r e l a t i v e earning capacity of the p a r t i e s . 3) The d i s t r i c t court erred i n finding t h a t the presumption i n favor of awarding children of tender years t o t h e i r mother was overcome by the evidence. I n determining t h e issue of custody t h e paramount considera- t i o n i s the welfare of the children and must of necessity be l e f t largely i n the discretion of the d i s t r i c t court. The deci- sion of the d i s t r i c t court w i l l not be overruled on appeal absent a showing of a c l e a r abuse of discretion. Tweeten v. Tweeten, Mont . 9 P.2d , 34 St.Rep. 337,339. Section 48-332, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "Best i n t e r e s t of child. The court s h a l l determine custody i n accordance with the best i n t e r e s t of the child. The court s h a l l consider a l l relevant factors including : "(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as t o h i s custody; "(2) the wishes of the child as t o h i s custodian; 'I (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with h i s parent or parents, h i s siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest; "(4) the child's adjustment t o h i s home, school, and community; and "(5) the mental and physical health of a l l indivi- duals involved ." The f i r s t two factors of section 48-332 are not helpful i n t h i s case. Both parents seek custody and the children were too young a t the time'of t r i a l t o express a preference, The f i f t h factor also provides l i t t l e guidance. The record indicates that.both parties coped well with the s t r a i n of t h i s dispute and none of the persons involved, including the children, were shown t o have a physical or mental problem that would have an effect on the custody issue. The third factor involves the interaction of the children with t h e i r parents and others "who may significantly affect1' their best interests. The d i s t r i c t court found both the mother and father expressed their love for the children and: "That both of the minor children of the parties are healthy, normal children that love each other and both of their parents, and have benefited from a healthy home environment .I1 The record supports these findings. However, the mother t e s t i f i e d she intended t o move t o the San Francisco area i n Cali- fornia and live temporarily with her parents while searching for a permanent home for herself and the children. During t h i s time she planned t o work as an accounting clerk for a stockbroker in San Francisco and commute the 40 miles from her parents' home. She argues i f she were given custody her plan would enable the children to form a close and rewarding relationship with t h e i r maternal grandparents which they would otherwise lose. The fourth factor relates t o the children's adjustment t o home, school, and community. The mother contends she can provide a more stable environment for the children. She notes the father, an engineer for Bechtel Power Corporation, is sub- ject t o many geographical disruptions in h i s career. Although the family had lived in Colstrip, Montana, for over three years a t the time of t r i a l , it was the father's third duty assignment in the s i x and one-half years he had worked for Bechtel, and h i s stay i n Colstrip was not projected t o l a s t beyond 1981. The mother argues i f she were given custody the children would not be subject t o these constant and predictable relocations, but instead would have the benefit of a stable and secure l i f e with her near their maternal grandparents. However, the record shows a stable home i n Colstrip. The family lived i n a modern three-bedroom home. The father spent a l o t of time with the children and they had a close relation- ship. H e shared i n the housekeeping duties and helped discipline the children. H i s place of work was only a few minutes drive from the home and he was available i f an emergency arose. But the mother, a t least temporarily, would be 40 miles away from the children, working i n San Francisco. Considering the factors applicable i n section 48-332, w e find no abuse of discretion i n granting custody t o the father. The mother next argues the d i s t r i c t court erroneously based i t s custody decision on the superior earning power of the father. The father earned approximately $1,800 per month and the mother would earn substantially less i n her position as an accounting clerk. Nothing i n the record expressly s t a t e s the d i s t r i c t court considered t h i s factor i n determining the custody issue, but the mother argues the court must have done so because that was "the only distinction between the parties1' favorable t o the father that was set forth i n the d i s t r i c t court's findings of fact. That i s not enough. Absent any other indication i n the record we w i l l not presume the d i s t r i c t court's custody award t o the father was based on h i s superior earning power. The mother's f i n a l argument is that the d i s t r i c t court erred i n finding the evidence rebutted the presumption i n favor of awarding custody of children of tender years t o t h e i r mother when a l l things are equal. I n Tweeten v. Tweeten, Mont . 9 P. 2d , 34 St.Rep. 337, 341, w e stated t h i s presumption continues under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, but held that it i s not conclusive and each custody case must be decided on i t s own facts "rather than by the use of 'controlling o r con- clusive' presumption. * * *" I n The Matter of the Adoption of Redcrow, Mont . - 3 P.2d , 34 St.Rep. 306, 308, the Court stated that a finding that both competing couples are f i t and suitable adoptive parents i s "not equivalent t o a finding that each would equally promote the best interests of the child." This i s also true i n custody cases. Accordingly, the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n concluding that "* * * t h i s presumption, like any other disputable presumption, may be overcome by contrary evidence." The mother relies on Casale v. Casale, (Ky.1977' No. 76- 273) , S.W.2d , where the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed an a&rd of custody of the parties' infant child t o the father, stating: "* * * W e are not prepared t o define precisely the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the pref- erence that the mother should be the custodian of children of tender years. This i s a value judgment that has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Here the evidence i s so close, we are of the opinion that the natural preference for the mother should prevail." It thus appears that the preference for the mother comes into F . I play i n Kentucky a t the close of the evidence. That is not the case i n Montana. Here, the parties proceed from the presumption and once it i s overcome by a preponderance of the evidence there i s no preference for the mother. I n meeting t h i s burden, the father need not prove the mother t o be unfit. In the instant case the d i s t r i c t court found the presumption i n favor of the mother had been overcome by the evidence and the interests of the children would be best served by granting custody to the father. W e affirm the judgment . W e Concur: . . .---.--- I*'