Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Heller

Citation: 2021-Ohio-2211

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Heller, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2211.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-2211 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. HELLER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Heller, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-2211.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-
year suspension, with six months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2020-0742—Submitted January 27, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2019-041. 
 
 
______________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael Aaron Heller, of Euclid, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0073376, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001. 
{¶ 2} In a January 14, 2020 amended complaint, relator, Cleveland 
Metropolitan Bar Association, alleged that Heller committed multiple ethical 
violations related mostly to his handling of a single client’s bankruptcy matter and 
to his supervisory and financial relationship with a nonlawyer who worked in his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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office.  Heller stipulated to most of the alleged facts and misconduct.  After a 
hearing, a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Heller had committed 11 of the charged rule violations.  
The panel unanimously dismissed three other alleged rule violations for insufficient 
evidence. 
{¶ 3} The panel recommended that Heller be suspended from the practice 
of law for one year with the final six months stayed on conditions, including that 
upon his reinstatement, he be required to serve a period of monitored probation.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanction, with some modifications to the conditions of the stay.  
Heller objects to the board’s findings of misconduct and its recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we overrule Heller’s objections, adopt the 
board’s findings of misconduct and aggravating and mitigating factors, and suspend 
Heller from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed on the 
conditions recommended by the board. 
Misconduct 
Lax Supervision and Improper Fee Sharing with a Nonlawyer 
{¶ 5} Sometime in 2016, Heller, a sole practitioner, hired T.F.1 to work as 
an assistant in his law office.  In addition to performing general office duties, T.F. 
met with Heller’s clients, prepared bankruptcy petitions and related documents 
under Heller’s supervision, and accepted client payments on Heller’s behalf.  He 
also rented a room in Heller’s home. 
{¶ 6} Heller charged a standard fee of $650 to represent clients from their 
initial consultation through discharge or final adjudication of their Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceedings, though he often reduced that fee to $599.  He typically 
                                                          
 
1. We identify T.F. only by his initials because, although Heller claims that T.F. has committed a 
crime, it does not appear that he has ever been charged with any offense related to Heller’s 
allegations.   
January Term, 2021 
 
3
paid T.F. $100 or $150 in cash for each bankruptcy petition that T.F. prepared.  He 
compensated T.F. for his general office work in cash or credit toward T.F.’s rent.  
However, Heller kept very poor records regarding moneys owed or paid to T.F. 
{¶ 7} In December 2016, Heller discovered that T.F. was collecting cash 
payments from clients but was not keeping accurate records or remitting all of the 
funds to Heller.  Nevertheless, Heller allowed T.F. to continue working as his office 
assistant, believing that T.F. would repay to the firm any money that he had not 
properly remitted.  By early to mid-2017, however, Heller came to believe that T.F. 
was stealing money from the law firm.  After some internal investigation, Heller 
estimated that T.F. had embezzled approximately $19,000 from the firm—some of 
which Heller claimed had been stored in an office safe—but Heller’s financial 
records proved insufficient to establish the exact amount of the loss. 
{¶ 8} In November 2017, Heller reported the alleged theft to the Euclid 
police department.  According to Heller, T.F. eventually admitted that he stole some 
client payments—albeit substantially less than Heller had alleged.  There is no 
evidence that criminal charges were ever brought against T.F., and the Euclid police 
report states that the case is closed.   
 
{¶ 9} Heller now admits that he exercised extremely poor supervision over 
T.F. even after he discovered serious irregularities in T.F.’s recordkeeping and 
handling of client payments. 
{¶ 10} On these facts, the parties stipulated and the board found that Heller 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(b) (requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that a nonlawyer employee’s conduct is compatible with the professional 
obligations of the lawyer), 5.3(c)(2) (providing that a lawyer shall be responsible 
for the conduct of a person over whom the lawyer has direct supervisory authority 
if that person’s conduct would be a violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer, and the lawyer knew of the conduct at a time 
when its consequences could have been avoided or mitigated but failed to take 
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reasonable remedial action), and 5.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer or law firm from 
sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, except in certain enumerated circumstances 
not applicable here).  We adopt these findings of misconduct. 
The VanEyk Bankruptcy 
{¶ 11} On March 4, 2017, Melissa VanEyk retained Heller to represent her 
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  She agreed to pay a flat fee of $599 plus court filing 
fees of $335.  Instead of informing her that she may be entitled to a refund of all or 
part of Heller’s fee if he did not complete the representation for any reason, the 
written fee agreement stated that any refund would be at Heller’s sole discretion.  
By March 17, 2017, VanEyk had made payments totaling $950 to Heller’s firm, 
but Heller did not deposit these payments into his client trust account.  Nor did he 
maintain adequate records regarding the funds that VanEyk (or his other clients) 
had entrusted to him. 
{¶ 12} VanEyk had little or no substantive communication with Heller 
about her bankruptcy petition.  Instead, she spoke with T.F. by telephone and in 
person regarding the preparation of the petition.  She told T.F. that she was in the 
process of purchasing a Ford Escape from a car dealership owned by her landlord, 
for which she had made a down payment of $3,000 to $3,500, and she made it clear 
to T.F. that one of her primary goals in the bankruptcy proceedings was to keep that 
vehicle.  On March 10, 2017, VanEyk purchased and took possession of the vehicle 
for an agreed purchase price of $4,499.97, plus taxes and fees, and the seller 
retained a $1,335.72 lien on the vehicle.  When VanEyk met with T.F. following 
her purchase of the vehicle, she explained that she had made a down payment but 
still owed a balance and reiterated the importance of keeping the vehicle.  T.F. told 
her that he did not think it would be a problem. 
{¶ 13} On March 17, 2017, Heller electronically filed VanEyk’s Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition without first giving her the opportunity to review it.  Even 
though VanEyk had already paid Heller’s $599 attorney fee plus $335 for the 
January Term, 2021 
 
5
court’s filing fee, the bankruptcy petition falsely stated that Heller had received 
only $300 of his attorney fee and sought the court’s permission for VanEyk to pay 
the filing fee in installments on the ground that she was unable to pay the full filing 
fee at once.  By filing the petition electronically, Heller certified that to the best of 
his knowledge, the information in the petition and other papers had evidentiary 
support—and there is no evidence that he ever corrected the misrepresentations 
contained therein.  See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9011(b). 
{¶ 14} On March 31, 2017, Heller filed a property schedule in VanEyk’s 
case that identified the Ford Escape as an asset but valued it at approximately 
$1,200 less than what VanEyk had paid for the vehicle just three weeks earlier.  He 
also failed to identify the seller as a secured creditor on another bankruptcy 
schedule.  Another document filed with the bankruptcy court contained a signature 
that VanEyk testified was not hers, though Heller presented some circumstantial 
evidence that T.F. had been the one who forged it. 
{¶ 15} Although VanEyk appeared for the first meeting of creditors in late 
April 2017, the meeting had to be rescheduled because Heller failed to attend.  
Heller had his first substantive communication with VanEyk regarding her 
bankruptcy immediately before the second meeting of creditors.  At that time, he 
asked VanEyk whether her landlord was holding $3,000 for her.  VanEyk informed 
him that the $3,000 was the down payment for a vehicle that she had purchased 
from her landlord’s car dealership and that she had already disclosed the purchase 
to T.F.  Heller became angry and told VanEyk that there was no way she would be 
able to keep the vehicle and if that was her primary goal, they should skip the 
creditors’ meeting, let the bankruptcy court dismiss her case, and then refile the 
petition.  VanEyk accepted Heller’s recommendation, and they left without 
attending the meeting.  After they failed to attend a third creditors’ meeting, the 
court dismissed the case for failure to pay the $335 filing fee and ordered VanEyk 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
to pay the outstanding fee within ten days.  However, VanEyk had no knowledge 
of that order until after she had filed a grievance against Heller. 
{¶ 16} Although Heller offered to refile VanEyk’s bankruptcy petition, he 
informed her that she would have to pay the outstanding filing fee plus a new filing 
fee and that they would need to discuss whether he would require additional 
attorney fees.  VanEyk later requested a refund, which Heller ultimately provided.  
At the time of Heller’s disciplinary hearing, she had not refiled her bankruptcy 
petition. 
{¶ 17} At Heller’s disciplinary hearing, relator presented the expert 
testimony of Robert Barr, an experienced bankruptcy attorney and trustee.  Barr 
testified that he had reviewed VanEyk’s bankruptcy filings and found that they 
contained numerous deficiencies and inaccuracies.  He opined that Heller did not 
properly review the documents that VanEyk had given him or properly advise her 
regarding the bankruptcy proceeding or the likely disposition of the Ford Escape, 
which could likely have been protected.  Based on Barr’s testimony and the other 
evidence admitted at the hearing, the board found that the VanEyk bankruptcy 
filings were deficient and inaccurate. 
{¶ 18} The parties stipulated and the board found that Heller’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation 
to a client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing 
a client), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a fee denominated as 
“earned upon receipt,” “nonrefundable,” or any similar terms, without 
simultaneously advising the client in writing that if the lawyer does not complete 
the representation for any reason, the client may be entitled to a refund of all or part 
of the fee based on the value of the representation), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to 
hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from 
the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
each client on whose behalf funds are held), and 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal). 
{¶ 19} The board also found that Heller’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means 
by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished) and 1.4(b) (requiring a 
lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions about the representation), as charged in the amended 
complaint. 
Heller’s Objections to the Board’s Findings of Misconduct 
{¶ 20} Heller objects to three of the board’s findings of misconduct, arguing 
that the offenses have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence.  For the 
reasons that follow, we find that these objections are without merit. 
{¶ 21} First, Heller argues that relator failed to prove that he knowingly 
made false statements to the bankruptcy court in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
3.3(a)(1).  But before his disciplinary hearing, Heller stipulated that (1) VanEyk 
paid $950 to his law firm, including the $335 filing fee, by March 17, 2017, (2) he 
stated on VanEyk’s bankruptcy petition that he had received only $300 in fees, and 
(3) he requested permission to pay VanEyk’s filing fee in installments because she 
was unable to pay the fee in full, and that, “[b]y his actions, Heller knowingly made 
false statements to the Bankruptcy Court in violation of [Prof.Cond.R.] 3.3(a)(1).”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} At his disciplinary hearing, Heller sought leave to withdraw his 
stipulation to a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) on the grounds that he did not 
have adequate time to review the stipulations and that his misrepresentations to the 
bankruptcy court were not knowingly made.  However, the panel chair denied that 
motion and declined to hear evidence that contradicted Heller’s stipulation, finding 
that (1) Heller had ample time to review the stipulations, (2) the stipulation was 
quite clear, and (3) allowing Heller to withdraw the stipulation after relator had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
rested its case would be unfair to relator.  Because Heller was in the best position 
to know when he acquired the information about VanEyk’s payments and waited 
until after relator rested its case to attempt withdrawal of his stipulation to that fact, 
we conclude that Heller is bound by his own stipulation that he knowingly made 
false statements to the bankruptcy court in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1). 
{¶ 23} In his second objection, Heller contends that relator did not present 
clear and convincing evidence that he “affirmatively” failed to properly deposit 
client funds into his client trust account in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).  
Specifically, Heller asserts that it was “implausible” for him to deposit VanEyk’s 
funds because he did not personally receive them or know that T.F. had received 
them on his behalf.  Yet, in the joint stipulations, Heller admitted that he “required 
that all court filing fees be paid directly to him for subsequent filing with the court,” 
and that “[b]y this policy, [he] took control of VanEyk’s fund[s] to be used for this 
purpose, but then failed to segregate the funds in [a client trust] account for her 
benefit.”  He also stipulated that he failed to deposit cash payments from VanEyk 
and other clients into his client trust account.  Further, he testified that he received 
one $100 payment directly from VanEyk, that he recognized his own handwriting 
and initials on the receipt, and that he never deposited any funds from VanEyk into 
his client trust account.  These facts constitute clear and convincing evidence that 
Heller violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a). 
{¶ 24} In his third objection, Heller asserts that he complied with the notice 
requirement of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3) because a clause in his written fee agreement 
with VanEyk states, “Prepaid but unearned fees and/or filing fees advanced by a 
client but not used will be refunded, less any balance owing.”  Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(d)(3) prohibits a lawyer from “enter[ing] into an arrangement for, charg[ing], 
or collect[ing]” a “fee denominated as ‘earned upon receipt,’ ‘nonrefundable,’ or in 
any similar terms, unless the client is simultaneously advised in writing that if the 
lawyer does not complete the representation for any reason, the client may be 
January Term, 2021 
 
9
entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee based upon the value of the 
representation.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
{¶ 25} Heller’s written fee agreement generally states that “[p]repaid but 
unearned fees * * * will be refunded.”  But it also provides that Heller has the sole 
discretion to determine whether a client is entitled to a refund upon the termination 
of his representation in at least one circumstance.  Specifically, the fee agreement 
states that in the event of termination due to client inactivity for more than 60 days, 
“there shall be no right to [a] refund of any prepaid fees,” though the attorney may 
“at [the attorney’s] sole discretion, issue a partial refund for the portion of fees 
deemed to be unearned or not reasonably related to the firm’s efforts.” 
{¶ 26} Similarly, a separate document setting forth Heller’s policies for 
bankruptcy matters (and signed by VanEyk the same day that she signed Heller’s 
fee agreement) states that in the event of client delays exceeding 60 days, “Attorney 
has full discretion as to whether or not a refund of any type will be issued, 
determined by the circumstances of the situation.”  (Italics sic.)  That document 
further provides that if the client chooses to terminate the representation, “fees and 
monies paid will not be refunded, except by Attorney discretion.”  (Italics and 
boldface sic.)  These statements simply do not comport with the notice requirements 
of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3). 
{¶ 27} On these facts, we overrule Heller’s first three objections and adopt 
the board’s findings of misconduct with respect to the VanEyk matter. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 28} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 29} The board found that four aggravating factors are present:  Heller 
acted with a selfish or dishonest motive by collecting the money for and then failing 
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10 
to pay VanEyk’s filing fee, engaged in a pattern of misconduct by failing to 
properly deposit client funds from VanEyk and other clients into his client trust 
account, committed multiple offenses, and caused harm to a vulnerable client.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), and (8). 
{¶ 30} As for mitigating factors, the board found that Heller had no prior 
discipline in his 19 years of practice, made full restitution to VanEyk (albeit after 
she had filed a grievance against him), made full and free disclosure to the board 
and exhibited a cooperative attitude throughout the disciplinary proceedings, and 
presented evidence of his good character and reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1), (3), (4), and (5).  The board also noted that Heller was remorseful and 
for the most part accepted responsibility for his actions. 
{¶ 31} At his disciplinary hearing, Heller admitted that he is an alcoholic 
and had recently attended Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings on a regular 
basis.  Notwithstanding that fact, he did not present any evidence necessary to 
establish that his addiction qualified as a mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(7). 
{¶ 32} After considering these factors and eight cases in which we imposed 
one- or two-year partially stayed suspensions for similar acts of misconduct, the 
board recommended that we suspend Heller from the practice of law for one year, 
with six months stayed on the conditions that he (1) complete additional continuing 
legal education (“CLE”) focused on law-office and client-trust-account 
management, (2) submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment conducted by the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and comply with any treatment or 
counseling recommendations arising from that assessment, (3) pay any additional 
filing fees, not already refunded, for which VanEyk is responsible upon the refiling 
of her bankruptcy petition, and (4) commit no further misconduct. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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{¶ 33} Additionally, the board recommended that Heller be required to 
work with a monitor upon his reinstatement to the practice of law to ensure that he 
implements proper law-office and trust-account management procedures. 
Heller’s Objections to the Aggravating Factors and the Weight Attributed to 
the Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 34} In his fourth through eighth objections, Heller argues that the 
aggravating factors found by the board are not supported by the evidence and that 
the board did not attribute sufficient weight to the mitigating factors in this case.  
For the reasons that follow, we overrule these objections. 
{¶ 35} In his fourth objection, Heller argues that his failure to pay VanEyk’s 
filing fee was neither selfish nor dishonest because he did not personally receive, 
retain, or otherwise benefit from those funds, which he claims were received and 
embezzled by T.F.  But even in this objection, Heller admits that he failed to 
adequately supervise T.F. and that his bookkeeping practices were flawed.  And 
Heller was aware that T.F. was embezzling or, at a minimum, mishandling client 
funds as early as December 2016, but he placed his own needs and desires above 
those of his clients by allowing T.F. to continue working in his legal office without 
confronting him about his conduct, providing additional supervision, or 
implementing any additional procedures to protect his clients from such actions 
going forward.  For these reasons, we find that the record supports the board’s 
finding that Heller acted with a selfish or dishonest motive. 
{¶ 36} In his fifth and sixth objections, Heller contends that although he was 
charged with multiple counts of misconduct, there was no showing that he 
committed multiple offenses or engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  But Heller has 
been found to have committed 11 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
arising from his employment of T.F. and his representation of VanEyk.  We have 
previously found that misconduct that results in two or more rule violations is 
sufficient to support a finding that an attorney committed multiple offenses.  See, 
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e.g., Erie-Huron Cty. Bar Assn. v. Bailey and Bailey, 161 Ohio St.3d 146, 2020-
Ohio-3701, 161 N.E.3d 590, ¶ 40.  Moreover, the record plainly demonstrates that 
Heller engaged in patterns of misconduct by improperly sharing legal fees from 
multiple cases with a nonlawyer and failing to deposit payments for attorney and 
filing fees into his client trust account even after this disciplinary case was filed 
against him.  These facts amply support the board’s findings that Heller committed 
multiple violations and engaged in patterns of misconduct. 
{¶ 37} In his seventh objection, Heller challenges the board’s finding that 
he caused harm to a vulnerable client, arguing that because he made full restitution 
to VanEyk, any harm that she suffered was the direct result of her choice not to 
refile her bankruptcy petition.  However, we find that Heller caused VanEyk 
significant stress and frustration, deprived her of the protections that she sought 
from the bankruptcy court, and left her with the burden of an additional $335 debt 
at a time when she was already struggling financially. 
{¶ 38} Heller’s eighth objection challenges the weight that the board 
assigned to the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors in this case.  We 
acknowledge that Heller submitted 22 letters, including 4 from fellow attorneys and 
15 from satisfied clients, that generally attest to his good character, reputation, and 
skill as an attorney.  Two of those letters also note that Heller has provided legal 
services to people with limited resources who might otherwise have had no access 
to counsel.  However, we agree with the board’s assessment that those letters and 
the other mitigating factors are insufficient to overcome the gravity of Heller’s 
misconduct and the significant aggravating factors that are present in this case. 
{¶ 39} On these facts, we overrule Heller’s fourth through eighth 
objections. 
Heller’s Objections to the Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 40} In his ninth and tenth objections, Heller challenges the board’s 
recommended sanction.  In addition to arguing that the cases on which the board 
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13 
relied to support its recommended sanction are distinguishable from the facts of 
this case and that a fully stayed suspension is the appropriate sanction for his 
misconduct, Heller asserts that he should not be required to submit to an OLAP 
evaluation because there has been no showing that his alcohol use contributed to 
his misconduct or otherwise affected his practice of law. 
{¶ 41} In determining the appropriate sanction for Heller’s misconduct, the 
board considered cases in which we have imposed one- or two-year suspensions, 
with some portion of the suspension conditionally stayed, for comparable acts of 
misconduct.  In three of those cases, we imposed one-year suspensions with six 
months conditionally stayed on attorneys who, among other things, made false 
statements to a court.  See Toledo Bar Assn. v. Miller, 132 Ohio St.3d 63, 2012-
Ohio-1880, 969 N.E.2d 239 (attorney made false statements on behalf of his 
employer in an action seeking to garnish his wages, made false statements regarding 
his income in his pending bankruptcy proceeding, and used funds belonging to a 
client of his firm to pay a filing fee on behalf of a non-firm pro bono client); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.2d 
850 (attorney made false statements and submitted a fraudulently altered document 
in order to collect a clearly excessive guardian-ad-litem fee); Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Simonelli, 113 Ohio St.3d 215, 2007-Ohio-1535, 863 N.E.2d 1039 (attorney 
made false statements in documents filed in two bankruptcy proceedings, 
improperly shared legal fees with nonlawyers in those proceedings, and neglected 
two clients’ legal matters). 
{¶ 42} Heller attempts to distinguish Miller, Schuman, and Simonelli on the 
ground that those attorneys made knowing misrepresentations to a court and that 
he did not.  But we have already found that Heller is bound by his stipulation that 
he knew that his statements to the bankruptcy court were false when he made them.  
Furthermore, Heller offers no precedent to support his contention that a fully stayed 
suspension is appropriate on the facts of this case. 
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{¶ 43} Having independently reviewed the record in this case, we are 
convinced that Heller’s misconduct and the relevant aggravating and mitigating 
factors are most comparable to those of the cases in which we have imposed one-
year suspensions with six months conditionally stayed and therefore overrule his 
objection. 
{¶ 44} We also find that there is ample evidence to support the board’s 
recommendation that Heller be required to submit to an OLAP evaluation and 
comply with any recommendations arising from that assessment.  Heller admitted 
that (1) he is an alcoholic, (2) he was convicted of driving under the influence of 
alcohol in December 2017,2 and (3) he has continued to drink periodically, despite 
having regularly participated in AA for the two and a half years leading up to his 
disciplinary proceeding.  See, e.g., Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Yavorcik, 158 Ohio 
St.3d 436, 2020-Ohio-123, 144 N.E.3d 413, ¶ 16, 21 (requiring an attorney to 
submit to an OLAP evaluation after he testified that he had used alcohol every night 
to cope with the stress of his criminal trial); Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Sciortino, 
155 Ohio St.3d 457, 2018-Ohio-4961, 122 N.E.3d 139, ¶ 20-24 (requiring an 
attorney, over his objection, to submit to an OLAP evaluation based on his 
testimony that he had a problem with alcohol and the absence of sufficient evidence 
to corroborate his testimony that he had achieved sobriety).  We therefore overrule 
Heller’s final objections and adopt the sanction recommended by the board. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 45} Accordingly, Michael Aaron Heller is suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for one year, with six months stayed on the conditions that he (1) 
complete, within six months of this order, six hours of CLE in law-office and client-
trust-account management in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (2) 
                                                          
 
2. The hearing panel unanimously dismissed two alleged rule violations related to Heller’s 
November 2017 conviction for driving under the influence. 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment conducted by OLAP (which shall be 
instructed to consider whether his current participation in AA is sufficient to 
maintain his sobriety) and comply with any treatment or counseling 
recommendations arising from that assessment, (3) pay the outstanding filing fee 
for VanEyk’s 2017 bankruptcy filing, and (4) commit no further misconduct.  If 
Heller fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he 
will serve the entire one-year suspension.  Upon reinstatement to the practice of 
law, Heller shall be required to work with a monitor appointed by relator for a 
period of six months to ensure that he implements proper law-office and client-
trust-account management procedures.  Costs are taxed to Heller. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 46} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding its 
decision to suspend respondent, Michael Heller, from the practice of law for one 
year with six months stayed on conditions.  I believe that a fully stayed suspension 
would be more appropriate in light of the particular circumstances at play in this 
case. 
{¶ 47} I do not dispute that the case law cited in the majority opinion 
indicates that an attorney’s violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) for knowingly 
making a false statement of law or fact to a tribunal usually merits an actual 
suspension from the practice of law.  But like any attorney-discipline case, the 
severity of the violation or violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
appropriate corresponding sanction lies on a spectrum.  A violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
3.3(a)(1) does not always require an actual suspension. 
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{¶ 48} In the face of mitigating evidence or in certain unique circumstances, 
this court has imposed fully stayed suspensions for misconduct that included 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1).  See Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Cameron, 130 
Ohio St.3d 299, 2011-Ohio-5200, 958 N.E.2d 138 (imposing a fully stayed one-
year suspension on an attorney who directly contacted an opposing party instead of 
contacting the party’s attorney and then falsely averred to a court that he had 
reached a settlement with the opposing party; mitigating factors included a lengthy 
career with no prior discipline and limited harm ultimately resulting from the 
misconduct); Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, 158 Ohio St.3d 248, 2019-Ohio-
4171, 141 N.E.3d 142 (imposing a fully stayed two-year suspension on an attorney 
who, in addition to six other violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, falsely 
stated to a magistrate that his client had been kidnapped; mitigating factors included 
a lengthy career with no prior discipline and numerous letters attesting to the 
attorney’s good character). 
{¶ 49} This court has even imposed public reprimands instead of a 
suspension for violations of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) in certain exceptional 
circumstances.  See Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Clifton, 147 Ohio St.3d 399, 2016-
Ohio-5587, 66 N.E.3d 713 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who altered a 
client’s will before submitting it to probate; mitigating factors included the absence 
of prior discipline, cooperation with the disciplinary process, and the fact that the 
misconduct did not change the outcome of the probate proceedings); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Wilson, 142 Ohio St.3d 439, 2014-Ohio-5487, 32 N.E.3d 426 (publicly 
reprimanding an attorney who forged a client’s signature on an affidavit, notarized 
the document, and instructed the client to tell the magistrate that the client had 
signed the affidavit; mitigating factors included the absence of prior discipline, 
cooperation with the disciplinary process, and evidence of the attorney’s good 
character). 
January Term, 2021 
 
17 
{¶ 50} This case does not involve exceptional circumstances that merit the 
absolute minimum sanction, but it does involve circumstances that warrant a fully 
stayed suspension, similar to the stayed suspensions imposed in Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Assn. v. Thomas, 125 Ohio St.3d 24, 2010-Ohio-1031, 925 N.E.2d 959, and 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Henderson, 95 Ohio St.3d 129, 2002-Ohio-1756, 766 
N.E.2d 590.  In Thomas, the attorney filed a misleading document regarding 
attorney fees in a client’s bankruptcy proceeding.  Thomas also neglected another 
client’s personal-injury proceedings by failing to appear for the final pretrial 
conference and the trial and failing to inform the client of the dismissal of her case.  
Thomas’s own counsel in the subsequent disciplinary proceedings explained to the 
client, months later, that the case had been dismissed and that she could still refile 
within the statute-of-limitations period.  This court determined that a fully stayed 
six-month suspension was warranted after considering Thomas’s mitigating 
evidence, including his lack of prior discipline and his cooperation in the 
disciplinary process. 
{¶ 51} In Henderson, the attorney used letterhead that falsely implied that 
he and another attorney were partners in a firm, and he made false statements to a 
court regarding the fees he intended to charge two clients in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Henderson also violated four other disciplinary rules by failing to 
reimburse his clients’ relatives more than $6,000 for the costs of a trial transcript 
after recovering those costs from a settlement award.  This court rejected the 
board’s recommendation to suspend Henderson from the practice of law for one 
year with six months stayed and instead imposed a fully stayed six-month 
suspension in light of the fact that he did not conceal the fees that he ultimately 
received in the bankruptcy case and had no record of prior discipline. 
{¶ 52} As in Thomas and Henderson, Heller should receive a suspension 
that is fully stayed.  However, because his overall misconduct involves more rule 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
violations than the foregoing cases, a one-year—rather than a six-month—stayed 
suspension is appropriate. 
{¶ 53} Heller’s violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct are all 
founded in disorganization, inattention, and mismanagement rather than fraud or 
deception.  Intervention is necessary here, and both the public and Heller will 
benefit from the conditions of his stayed suspension, including involvement with 
the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program and supplemental continuing-legal-
education courses in law-office and client-trust-account management, as well as the 
involvement of a monitoring attorney.  Such measures will help Heller achieve 
greater stability in his law practice while also ensuring that he strictly observes the 
standards of professional conduct.  We should not include measures that would 
serve only to further destabilize Heller and his practice, and I believe that a six-
month actual suspension will do just that. 
{¶ 54} Because I would fully stay Heller’s one-year suspension, I dissent. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., R. Jeffrey Pollock, and Sarah M. Mancuso; and 
Heather M. Zirke, Bar Counsel, and Kari L. Burns, Assistant Bar Counsel, for 
relator. 
Michael Aaron Heller, pro se. 
_________________