Case Title: Cook v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 228, 2010, 284, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEROY COOK, SR.,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 228 and 284, 2010 
§  CONSOLIDATED 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0608025757 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 28, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    September 14, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of September 2010, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Leroy Cook, Sr., filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s April 1 and April 21, 2010 orders denying his request 
that the Superior Court judge recuse himself and summarily dismissing his 
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
61.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the 
                                                 
1 The Court consolidated the appeals by Order dated May 21, 2010.   
 
2 
judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm.   
 
(2) 
In January 2009, Cook pleaded guilty to one count of Rape in 
the Second Degree.  He was sentenced to 25 years of Level V incarceration, 
to be suspended after 12 years for probation.  Cook did not file a direct 
appeal from his conviction.  In October 2009, Cook filed a motion for 
postconviction relief grounded in, among other things, claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  After obtaining trial counsel’s affidavit, the Superior 
Court denied the motion.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s 
judgment.3 
 
(3) 
In March 2010, Cook filed a motion in the Superior Court 
requesting that the judge who had denied his first postconviction motion 
recuse himself.  The Superior Court denied that motion as moot.  In April 
2010, Cook filed a second postconviction motion, which the Superior Court 
summarily dismissed.  Cook filed appeals from both decisions of the 
Superior Court, which were subsequently consolidated.   
 
(4) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his request 
for recusal and its summary dismissal of his postconviction motion, Cook 
claims that the Superior Court erred a) by denying his motion for recusal; b) 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Cook v. State, Del. Supr., No. 333, 2009, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 26, 2010). 
 
3 
by failing to obtain affidavits from counsel and a response from the State 
and by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on his 
postconviction motion; and c) by failing to conclude that his indictment was 
defective.   
 
(5) 
Cook first claims that the Superior Court erred when it denied 
his motion for recusal.  He contends that he anticipated filing a second 
motion for postconviction relief and wanted a different judge to rule on it.  
The record reflects that, at the time the motion was filed, there were no 
matters involving Cook pending before the Superior Court.  Because the 
motion was not ripe for adjudication, the Superior Court properly denied the 
motion.4  On that basis, therefore, Cook’s first claim is without merit. 
 
(6) 
Cook’s second claim is that the Superior Court erred by 
summarily dismissing his postconviction motion.  He contends that the 
Superior Court should have ordered the record to be expanded, including an 
evidentiary hearing.  Before considering the merits of a postconviction 
motion, the Superior Court must first determine whether the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61 have been met.5  In addition, it is within the 
Superior Court’s discretion to decide whether an expanded record is required 
                                                 
4 In re Brady, Del. Supr., No. 255, 2007, Ridgely, J. (Aug. 6, 2007). 
5 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002).  
 
4 
in a particular case.6  In this case, the Superior Court properly determined 
that Cook’s claims were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) and (4) and 
that relief was not warranted under Rule 61(i)(5).  Moreover, the Superior 
Court properly exercised its discretion in determining that, under the 
circumstances of this case, an expanded record was not necessary.  We, 
therefore, conclude that Cook’s second claim is without merit. 
 
(7) 
Cook’s third claim is that the Superior Court wrongly 
concluded that his indictment was not defective.  Because Cook 
unsuccessfully raised the claim of a defective indictment in his first 
postconviction motion7 and failed to demonstrate a colorable claim of a 
miscarriage of justice,8 the claim is barred.  As such, the Superior Court 
properly ruled that Cook was foreclosed from pursuing that claim in his 
second postconviction motion.   
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) and (h). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice