Case Title: State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh

Citation: 2007-Ohio-4798

Docket Number: 20070711

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. EVERHART, APPELLANT, v. MCINTOSH, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 
 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798.] 
Prohibition –– Prohibition will not lie to prevent trial judge from proceeding in 
case purportedly on appeal when appeal not properly perfected —  Writ 
denied. 
(No. 2007-0711 ─ Submitted September 12, 2007 ─ Decided  
September 20, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 06AP-1025, 2007-Ohio-1494. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a common pleas court judge from proceeding in a case during the 
purported pendency of an appeal.  Because that appeal was dismissed as 
premature, we affirm. 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Angela Sue Everhart, is the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice case in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entitled Everhart 
v. Knox Community Hosp., case No. 03CV-9986.  Judge Angela White orally 
denied Everhart’s motion for a protective order and modification of a subpoena in 
that case, and Everhart appealed from that decision to the Franklin County Court 
of Appeals in case No. 06AP-971. 
{¶ 3} In October 2006, Everhart filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge White 
from exercising any jurisdiction in the underlying case relating to discovery 
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during the pendency of her appeal from the denial of her motion for a protective 
order and for modification of a subpoena. 
{¶ 4} On November 6, 2006, the court of appeals dismissed Everhart’s 
appeal from the denial of her motion in the medical malpractice case for lack of a 
final appealable order.  The court of appeals concluded that Everhart had “filed a 
premature notice of appeal from a purported oral decision of the trial court 
denying [her] motion for protective order and motion to modify subpoena” and 
that “[a] review of the record indicates a judgment entry has not been entered by 
the trial court.” 
{¶ 5} Judge White filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Everhart’s 
prohibition action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
The court of appeals, sua sponte, took judicial notice that it had dismissed 
Everhart’s appeal from Judge White’s decision in the medical malpractice case 
and granted Judge White’s motion and denied the writ. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon Everhart’s appeal from the 
denial of her prohibition case. We substitute Judge White’s successor, Judge 
Stephen L. McIntosh, for her as the appellee.  Civ.R. 25(D)(1). 
{¶ 7} Everhart first asserts that the court of appeals erred in taking 
judicial notice of its dismissal of her appeal from Judge White’s decision in the 
medical malpractice case when that dismissal was not part of the record in the 
prohibition case.  Everhart is correct that it has been held that “trial courts may 
not take judicial notice of their own proceedings in other cases even when the 
cases involve the same parties.”  Phillips v. Rayburn (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 
374, 379, 680 N.E.2d 1279, fn. 1, and cases cited therein; see, also, In re Knotts 
(1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 267, 271, 671 N.E.2d 1357.  “The rationale for these 
holdings is that when judicial notice is taken of prior proceedings, such prior 
proceedings are not part of the record as defined in App.R. 9, and whether the trial 
January Term, 2007 
3 
court correctly interpreted such prior proceedings is not reviewable by the 
appellate court.”  Phillips, 113 Ohio App.3d at 379, 680 N.E.2d 1279, fn. 1. 
{¶ 8} It is true that the record here does not include the dismissal entry 
relied upon by the court of appeals.  It is also true that the website of the clerk of 
the trial court does not include this entry.  See http://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us.  
Cf. Doe v. Golden & Walters, P.L.L.C. (Ky.App.2005), 173 S.W.3d 260, 265 
(court takes judicial notice of content of federal district court’s docket in separate 
cases that are accessible via the Internet); Leatherworks Partnership v. Berk 
Realty, Inc. (Nov. 15, 2005), N.D.Ohio No. 4:04 CV 0784, 2005 WL 3059623, *2 
(court takes judicial notice of public court records available on Internet). 
{¶ 9} Nevertheless, Everhart filed the dismissal entry as part of her 
supplement in this appeal.  “Our plenary authority in extraordinary actions 
permits us to consider the instant appeal as if it had been filed in this court 
originally.”  State ex rel. Walker v. Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 216, 220, 680 N.E.2d 993. 
{¶ 10} Because the parties agree that the court of appeals did, in fact, 
dismiss Everhart’s appeal from Judge White’s oral decision to deny Everhart’s 
discovery motion in the medical malpractice case, we will exercise this authority 
here.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 
N.E.2d 1288.  It is appropriate for us to take judicial notice of the dismissal entry 
in deciding whether dismissal of Everhart’s prohibition claim was warranted.  See 
Stutzka v. McCarville (C.A.8, 2005), 420 F.3d 757, 761, fn. 2 (court takes judicial 
notice of judicial opinions and public records on motion to enlarge record in 
appeal); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 
Inc. v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 8 (“An 
event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence 
outside the record”); State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-
Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 26 (court can take judicial notice of appropriate 
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matters in determining Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion without converting it to a motion 
for summary judgment). 
{¶ 11} In so holding, we reject Everhart’s claim that only matters in 
existence at the time a complaint is filed can be judicially noticed in assessing a 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.  In extraordinary-writ cases, courts are not limited to the 
facts at the time a proceeding is commenced, but should consider facts at the time 
it determines whether to grant the writ.  See State ex rel. Westlake v. Corrigan, 
112 Ohio St.3d 463, 2007-Ohio-375, 860 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 22 (court could consider 
events occurring after complaint in prohibition case was filed in determining 
motion to dismiss). 
{¶ 12} On the merits issue, Everhart contends that the court of appeals 
erred in denying the writ of prohibition because her premature appeal of the 
denial of her motion for a protective order divested Judge White of jurisdiction to 
proceed in the underlying civil case.  “[W]e have consistently held that once an 
appeal is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over matters that are 
inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm 
the judgment.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement 
Bd., 96 Ohio St.3d 206, 2002-Ohio-3957, 772 N.E.2d 1197, ¶ 8; see, also, In re 
S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 13} Even so, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the 
foregoing rule does not apply when the appeal is no longer pending.  Rock at ¶ 9 
(“neither S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(D)(1) nor the foregoing precedent authorizes a court 
to dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction once the appeal involving the case has 
concluded”); State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 16, 661 
N.E.2d 170 (“even if the attorney fees matter had been raised in the prior appeals, 
once those appeals were dismissed, [the trial judge] possessed jurisdiction to 
consider [the] motion”); State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio 
January Term, 2007 
5 
St.3d 553, 558, 653 N.E.2d 366 (once appeal was dismissed, trial court had 
jurisdiction to rule on previously filed motion for relief from judgment). 
{¶ 14} Moreover, a premature notice of appeal under App.R. 4(C) does 
not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed because the appeal has not yet 
been perfected.  Bennington v. Robinson (Feb. 7, 2000), Stark App. No. 
1999CA00212, 2000 WL 222156, * 2; App.R. 4(C) (“A notice of appeal filed 
after the announcement of a decision, order, or sentence but before entry of the 
judgment or order that begins the running of the appeal time period is treated as 
filed immediately after the entry”).  Because no entry was journalized, Everhart’s 
attempted appeal was not perfected, and the appeal did not prevent the trial court 
from proceeding in the medical malpractice case. 
{¶ 15} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly denied the 
writ of prohibition.  Judge White had the requisite jurisdiction to proceed in the 
underlying case once Everhart’s appeal had been dismissed.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Bringman & Bringman Co., L.P.A., and William Paul Bringman, for 
appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and A. Paul Thies, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________