Case Title: Edwards v. Cooper

Citation: 

Docket Number: 524, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
It appears from the record that the Child and the Coopers are second cousins.  See
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1104 (identifying persons eligible to petition for the termination
of parental rights). 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CATHERINE EDWARDS,
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No. 524, 2004
Respondent Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Family Court of
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the State of Delaware, in and 
v.
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for Kent County in File No.
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03-12-1 TK.
TRACY L. COOPER and JOHN
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N. COOPER,
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Petitioners Below,
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Appellees.
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Submitted: May 9, 2005
   Decided: May 23, 2005
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
O R D E R
This 23  day of May 2005, it appears to the Court that:
rd
(1)
This is an appeal from an order of the Family Court terminating
parental rights with respect to a child born July 25, 2003 (“the Child”).  The
appellees, Tracy L. Cooper and John N. Cooper (“the Coopers”), filed the
petition to terminate the parental rights of the appellant, Catherine Edwards, the
Child’s mother, and James Gregory Wells, the Child’s father.   The Coopers
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Wells was also charged with having raped and assaulted Edwards, who was sixteen
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years old.
See State v. Wells, Del. Super., Cr. ID Nos. 0307019531, 0308002490, 0403025060,
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Vaughn, J. (Aug. 23, 2004) (sentencing Wells to thirty-two years at Level V, suspended after
fifteen years, followed by one year at Level IV and probation).
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also filed a petition for adoption, which is pending before the Family Court.
The Child has resided with the Coopers since August 25, 2003.
(2)
In September 2003, Wells was charged with several offenses,
including attempted murder, stemming from his alleged assault on the three-
week old Child.   The Child sustained serious injuries as a result of the assault
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and was hospitalized for nearly a month.  Wells eventually pled guilty to
several offenses, including Assault in the First Degree, and is serving a prison
sentence.3
(3)
In September 2003, the Family Court granted temporary custody
and limited guardianship of the Child to the Coopers.  Soon after, Edwards left
Delaware and went to Ohio where she remained, off and on, until May 2004.
In May 2004, Edwards was arrested on forgery charges and was returned to
Delaware where she was detained at the Stevenson House on a violation of
probation. 
(4)
In December 2003, the Coopers filed the petition to terminate
Edwards’ and Wells’ parental rights.  The Family Court appointed Gregory
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Morris, Esquire (“Counsel” or “Edwards’ Counsel”), to represent Edwards in
the termination proceeding.
(5)
On October 12, 2004, the Family Court held a hearing on the
petition for termination of parental rights at which Edwards appeared with her
counsel.  By order dated November 10, 2004, the Family Court terminated
Edwards’ parental rights and those of Wells.  Edwards directed Counsel to file
a notice of appeal from the termination decision, which he did on December 1,
2004.  
(6)
Counsel has not filed Edwards’ opening brief, which was due to
be filed on or before April 4, 2005.  Instead, prior to the deadline for filing the
brief, Counsel has filed a motion seeking to withdraw as counsel on the basis
that Edwards is a fugitive whose whereabouts are unknown.
(7)
According to Counsel, Edwards has been a fugitive since early
December 2004 when she removed her ankle bracelet and absconded from
Level IV home confinement.  Counsel does not know where Edwards is, and
Edwards has not responded to Counsel’s attempts to contact her.  According to
Counsel, “there is no indication that [Edwards] will be voluntarily turning
herself in or that she will [be] apprehended in the near future.”  Counsel states
that he is unable to pursue the appeal without Edwards’ assistance.
See 
Davis v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, 1995 WL 319186 (Del. Supr.)
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(stating that a fugitive from justice “lacked standing to invoke the rules, processes and
jurisdiction of this Court”); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 610 A.2d 1374 (Del. 1992) (stating that if
a litigant “decides to work outside the judicial process he forfeits his entitlement to such
process”); Crawford v. State, 94 A.2d 603, 604 (Del. 1953) (stating that “a fugitive from
justice, while he remains a fugitive, has no right to the appellate procedures provided for
those who rely upon the orderly course of justice”).
According to Counsel, Edwards is subject to an outstanding capias out of Family
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Court and an unexecuted arrest warrant obtained by the Dover police.
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(8)
By notice dated April 12, 2005, the Clerk directed Edwards’
Counsel to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed on the basis
that Edwards is a fugitive and has forfeited her right to pursue this appeal.   In
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his response to the notice to show cause, Counsel argues that the appeal should
not be dismissed on that basis because the matter on appeal is not related to the
matters underlying Edwards’ fugitive status.   As an alternative to dismissal,
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Counsel requests that the Court permit him to withdraw and grant Edwards
additional time to file a pro se opening brief.  In their responses to Counsel’s
response to the notice to show cause, the Coopers and the Child’s guardian ad
litem argue that the appeal should be dismissed on the bases that Edwards is a
fugitive and has failed to diligently prosecute the appeal.
(9)
Under all of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
Edwards has abandoned any claims in this appeal from the termination of her
parental rights.  Edwards’ voluntary absence has made it impossible for
See 
Del. Code Ann., tit. 13, § 1115 (providing that the paramount objective of the
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best interest of the child should be achieved without undue delay in a termination of parental
rights proceeding).
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Counsel to diligently prosecute the appeal that was filed on Edwards’ behalf
and at her direction.  The Court cannot permit Edwards to frustrate the appellate
process and the orderly administration of justice, when it is clear that the undue
delay caused by her voluntary absence is prejudicial to the Child whose best
interests are of paramount importance.  
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 29(b), that this appeal is DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs
Justice