Case Title: Leftwich v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-2669

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2669 
____________ 
 
ROBERT B. LEFTWICH, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 18, 2014] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
Petitioner Robert Leftwich seeks review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Leftwich v. Florida Department of Corrections, 101 So. 3d 404 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2012), on the basis that the First District certified that its decision is 
in conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Downs v. 
Crosby, 874 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
 
In 1988, the Florida Legislature enacted the provisional credit statute to 
reduce overcrowding in the state prison system.  See § 944.277(1)(g), Fla. Stat. 
 
 
- 2 - 
(Supp. 1988); see also Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1998).  
Under the statute, qualified inmates could receive provisional credits applied to 
their sentence any time the prison population reached a certain threshold.  § 
944.277(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988).  However, the statute delineated criteria 
which rendered certain inmates ineligible to receive provisional credits.  Id.  One 
factor that would render an inmate ineligible for provisional credits was if the 
inmate “is sentenced, or has previously been sentenced, under s. 775.084 [the 
habitual offender statute], or has been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction 
as a habitual offender.”  Id.   
 
On February 10, 1989, Robert Leftwich committed a robbery and an 
aggravated battery with a weapon.  He was sentenced on August 7, 1989, to two 
years’ incarceration for the robbery conviction and ten years’ incarceration for the 
aggravated battery conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively.  Neither of 
these sentences was imposed under the habitual offender statute.  However, on 
August 26, 1989, while incarcerated, Leftwich was found to be in possession of 
cannabis, and he was later convicted of inmate possession of contraband.  Leftwich 
was sentenced under the habitual offender statute on September 4, 1990, to thirty 
years’ incarceration with a ten-year mandatory minimum.  At that time, Leftwich 
had accumulated 410 days of provisional credits to be applied to his sentences for 
the robbery and aggravated battery convictions.  The Florida Department of 
 
 
- 3 - 
Corrections (DOC) determined that due to the habitual offender sentence, Leftwich 
was not eligible to receive further awards of provisional credits on the robbery or 
aggravated battery convictions.  As a result, the provisional release date for 
Leftwich reflects only the 410 days of provisional credits that he acquired prior to 
his sentence as a habitual offender, and no provisional credits have been awarded 
since the habitual offender designation.   
On February 22, 2011, Leftwich submitted a request to the DOC for an 
explanation of why he has received only 410 days of provisional credits.  Leftwich 
was of the opinion that he was eligible for 1,080 days of provisional credits for the 
robbery and aggravated burglary sentences.  The DOC responded that an inmate 
who has been sentenced as a habitual offender is no longer eligible to receive 
provisional credits on non-habitual offender sentences.  After unsuccessfully 
seeking administrative relief, Leftwich filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the 
circuit court, which was denied, and then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the 
First District.  The First District held that after he was determined to be a habitual 
offender, Leftwich was not eligible to receive provisional credits on any sentence, 
even those imposed prior to the habitual offender sentence.  Leftwich, 101 So. 3d 
at 404-05.  However, the district court certified conflict with Downs, in which the 
Second District held that under the version of the provisional credit statute in effect 
from 1988 through 1992, inmates who were eligible to receive provisional credits 
 
 
- 4 - 
on a prior sentence, but who were later sentenced as a habitual offender, could 
continue to receive provisional credits on their earlier sentence.  874 So. 2d at 650, 
652.  This review follows.   
Analysis 
Provisional Credit Statute 
The provisional credit statute, as enacted in 1988, stated: 
(1)  Whenever the inmate population of the correctional system 
reaches 97.5 percent of lawful capacity as defined in s. 944.096, the 
Secretary of Corrections shall certify to the Governor that such 
condition exists.  When the Governor acknowledges such condition in 
writing, the secretary may grant up to 60 days of provisional credits 
equally to each inmate who is earning incentive gain-time, except to 
an inmate who: 
 
 
(a)  Is serving a sentence which includes a mandatory minimum 
provision for a capital offense or drug trafficking offense and has not 
served the number of days equal to the mandatory minimum term less 
any jail-time credit awarded by the court; 
 
 
(b)  Is serving the mandatory minimum portion of a sentence 
enhanced under s. 775.087(2);  
 
 
(c)  Is convicted, or has been previously convicted, of 
committing or attempting to commit sexual battery, incest, or a lewd 
or indecent assault or act; 
 
 
(d)  Is convicted, or has been previously convicted, of 
committing or attempting to commit assault, aggravated assault, 
battery, or aggravated battery, and a sex act was attempted or 
completed during commission of the offense; 
 
 
(e)  Is convicted, or has been previously convicted, of 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, or murder, 
 
 
- 5 - 
and the offense was committed with the intent to commit sexual 
battery; 
 
 
(f)  Is convicted, or has been previously convicted, of 
committing or attempting to commit false imprisonment upon a child 
under the age of 13 and, in the course of committing the offense, the 
inmate committed aggravated child abuse; sexual battery against the 
child; or a lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the 
presence of the child; or 
 
 
(g)  Is sentenced, or has previously been sentenced, under s. 
775.084, or has been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction as a 
habitual offender. 
 
(2)  The secretary’s authority to grant provisional credits in 
increments not exceeding 60 days will continue until the inmate 
population of the correctional system reaches 97 percent of lawful 
capacity, at which time the authority granted to the secretary will 
cease, and the secretary shall notify the Governor in writing of the 
cessation of such authority. 
 
(3)  At such time as provisional credits are granted, the 
Department of Corrections shall establish a provisional release date 
for each eligible inmate incarcerated, which will be the tentative 
release date less any provisional credits granted. 
 
(4)  Any eligible inmate who is incarcerated on the effective 
date of an award of provisional credits shall receive such credits.  Any 
inmate who is under any type of release supervision program of the 
department is not eligible for an award of provisional credits.   
 
§ 944.277, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).   
 
The DOC interpreted the statute to render an inmate ineligible to receive 
further provisional credits on any sentence once that inmate received a habitual 
offender sentence.  See generally Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So. 2d 1134, 1134 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1992).  In 1992, the First District held that the language “is . . . or has 
 
 
- 6 - 
previously been sentenced” with respect to a sentence imposed pursuant to the 
Florida habitual offender statute contrasted with the language “at any time” used in 
reference to a habitual offender sentence imposed by another jurisdiction.  Id.  
Based on this distinction, the district court concluded that the disqualifying 
language of the provisional credit statute did not extend to non-habitual offender 
sentences which were imposed prior to a Florida habitual offender sentence.  Id. at 
1135.  Thus, the First District held that a sentence imposed pursuant to the Florida 
habitual offender statute did not render an inmate ineligible to receive provisional 
credits for a sentence that was imposed prior to being determined to be a habitual 
offender.   
Shortly after the decision in Anderson, the Legislature amended the 
provisional credit statute to exclude from eligibility any inmate who “[i]s 
sentenced, or has previously been sentenced, or has been sentenced at any time 
under s. 775.084 [the habitual offender statute], or has been sentenced at any time 
in another jurisdiction as a habitual offender . . . .”  § 944.277(1)(g), Fla. Stat. 
(Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).  The amendment was enacted as a result of the 
decision in Anderson.  See, e.g., Mamone v. Dean, 619 So. 2d 36, 36 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1993) (“After Anderson (and, indeed, because of it), the Florida Legislature 
remedied the language of section 944.277(1)(g), Florida Statutes, to show its clear 
intent that an inmate is precluded from receiving provisional credits once 
 
 
- 7 - 
sentenced as a habitual offender.”); see also McBride v. Moore, 780 So. 2d 221, 
222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (“As the court explained in Mamone . . . , the legislature 
actually amended section 944.277(1)(g) as a reaction to the Anderson decision . . . 
.”).   
Ex Post Facto Principles 
Leftwich contends that Anderson entitles him to receive provisional credits 
on the sentences imposed prior to the date he received the habitual offender status, 
and the denial of provisional credits on these sentences based on the 1992 
amendment violates the ex post facto clause.  The ex post facto clause is violated 
by application of a penal law if the application: (1) is retrospective; and (2) 
disadvantages the offender affected by it.  See Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 
691 (Fla. 1990).  The ex post facto clause applies to gain time statutes, including 
those for incentive gain time, basic gain time, and overcrowding gain time.  See 
Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 504. 
If retroactive application of a statutory amendment results in additional 
punishment for a defendant, it violates the ex post facto clause.  See State v. Smith, 
547 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1989) (superseded by statute).  After an amendment has 
been enacted, judicial interpretations of the prior statute may be relevant to an ex 
post facto analysis.  Id.  This Court stated in Smith: 
First, it is a function of the judiciary to declare what the law is.  10 
Fla. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 166.  Although legislative 
 
 
- 8 - 
amendment of a statute may change the law so that prior judicial 
decisions are no longer controlling, it does not follow that court 
decisions interpreting a statute are rendered inapplicable by a 
subsequent amendment to the statute.  Instead, the nature and effect of 
the court decisions and the statutory amendment must be examined to 
determine what law may be applicable after the amendment.  See, 13 
Fla. Jur. 2d, Courts and Judges, § 140. 
 
Id. at 616-17 (quoting Heath v. State, 532 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)).  
Thus, where a statute is ambiguous at the time a crime is committed, and the 
Legislature subsequently enacts a clarifying amendment that would result in a 
longer prison sentence, retroactive application of the clarifying amendment runs 
afoul of the ex post facto clause.  See State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042, 1044 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that a statutory amendment characterized by the State 
as a clarification could not be applied retroactively because the statute as written at 
the time of the crime was unclear, and retroactive application of the statute as 
amended would result in an increased period of incarceration).   
At the same time, a statutory amendment may be relevant to a determination 
of the intent behind the previous statute.  See Lowry v. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 
473 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1985).  This Court stated in Lowry that if the 
Legislature amends a statute shortly after a controversy arises with respect to the 
interpretation of the statute, then the amendment may be considered to be a 
legislative interpretation of the original statute rather than a substantive change to 
the statute.   Id. at 1250.  The defendant in Lowry entered into an agreement with 
 
 
- 9 - 
the Parole and Probation Commission that provided for his release on parole on a 
specific date.  Id. at 1248-49.  Shortly before that date, the Attorney General issued 
an opinion on parole eligibility for prisoners who have received consecutive 
sentences.  Id. at 1249 (citing 1985 Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 85-11 at 28 (1985)).  In the 
opinion, the Attorney General concluded that an inmate with consecutive sentences 
is not eligible for parole until he or she has begun to serve the consecutive 
sentence.  Id.  As a result, the commission withdrew its agreement with the 
defendant, and the defendant was not released on the previously agreed upon date.  
Id.  The defendant filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to enforce the 
agreement.  Id.  During the litigation, legislation was pending that would clarify 
the manner in which presumptive parole release dates would be calculated for 
prisoners with consecutive sentences.  Id. at 1249-50.  Under the amended law, the 
defendant would be entitled to release.  Id. at 1250.  The legislation was signed 
into law two days before this Court rendered the decision in Lowry.  Id.  This 
Court examined both the prior legislation and the legislation as amended, and 
determined that the amended legislation expressed both the prior and continuing 
legislative intent.  Id.  Therefore, the Court held that the opinion issued by the 
Attorney General did not reflect legislative intent and held that the defendant was 
eligible for consideration for parole.  Id.  Thus, pursuant to Lowry and Smith, 
although subsequent legislation cannot be used to overturn prior court decisions 
 
 
- 10 - 
with respect to a statute, the legislation can be used to clarify the intent behind the 
prior version of the statute.   
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal ex 
post facto clause generally does not apply to judicial precedent.  See Marks v. U.S., 
430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the 
powers of the Legislature . . . and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial 
Branch of government.”).  Instead, retroactive application of precedent is governed 
by the due process clause, which requires that the retroactive application cannot 
result in an unforeseeable enlargement of the criminal statute.  See Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964). 
This Court applied Marks in Mayes v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 967, 973 (Fla. 
2002), where two inmates challenged the retroactive application of State v. 
Lancaster, 731 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1998).  In Lancaster, this Court held that a 1988 
statute provided the DOC with the authority to cancel provisional credits or other 
overcrowding gain time acquired by an offender when the offender is returned to 
DOC custody after a violation of conditional release.  731 So. 2d at 1232-33.  The 
defendants in Mayes contended that because Lancaster was not decided until after 
their original commitment, cancellation of the overcrowding gain time they 
accrued prior to their release upon their return to DOC custody for violation of 
their conditional release would result in an ex post facto violation.  Mayes, 827 So. 
 
 
- 11 - 
2d at 973.  Based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Marks, the Court looked 
to whether the decision in Lancaster was an unforeseeable enlargement of the 
statute and concluded that it was not.  Mayes, 827 So. 2d at 973.  Significantly, this 
Court recognized that: (1) the DOC had previously considered administrative gain 
time to be forfeitable upon supervision revocation; (2) this Court had previously 
held that provisional credits were essentially the same as administrative gain time; 
and (3) the statutory authority to revoke overcrowding gain time existed prior to 
the decision in Lancaster.  Id.  In light of these facts, this Court held that there was 
no ex post facto violation in the retroactive application of Lancaster to the 
defendants.  Id. at 974.    
Cases That Have Addressed  
Application of the 1992 Amendment 
 
After the 1992 amendment to the provisional credit statute was enacted, the 
First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal determined that retroactive application of 
the amendment would not result in an ex post facto violation.  See Mamone, 619 
So. 2d at 36; McBride v. Moore, 780 So. 2d 221, 222.  In Mamone, the Fifth 
District stated that the Legislature amended the statute to reflect its clear intent that 
an inmate who has at any time received a habitual offender sentence was not 
eligible to receive provisional credits.  619 So. 2d at 36.  The district court 
additionally noted that in Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1991), this Court 
held that the provisional credit statute did not involve substantive matters of 
 
 
- 12 - 
punishment, but rather was an administrative procedural mechanism enacted to 
control prison overcrowding.  Mamone, 619 So. 2d at 36 (citing Rodrick, 584 So. 
2d at 2).   
Likewise, in McBride, the First District held that the 1992 amendment was a 
clarification of the legislative intent behind the earlier version of the statute, and 
that changes to the statute would not result in an ex post facto violation.  McBride, 
780 So. 2d at 222.  The defendant in McBride was sentenced as a habitual offender 
while serving a non-habitual offender sentence.  Id.  He contended that pursuant to 
the First District’s decision in Anderson, he remained eligible to receive 
provisional credits on the non-habitual offender sentence because the habitual 
offender sentence was imposed after the non-habitual offender sentence.  Id.  The 
First District concluded that Anderson was inapplicable because the 1992 
amendment was a legislative clarification of the original intent to exclude inmates 
sentenced as habitual offenders from eligibility for provisional credits, regardless 
of when the designation was imposed.  Id.  In addition, the district court relied on 
Mamone and Rodrick for the proposition that amendments to the provisional credit 
statute could not result in an ex post facto violation because the statute was not 
substantive in nature.  Id. at 222-23 (citing Mamone, 619 So. 2d at 36; Rodrick, 
584 So. 2d at 2).   
 
 
- 13 - 
However, subsequent to Mamone, but prior to McBride, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Florida’s provisional credit statute was subject to ex post 
facto analysis.  See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997).1  In Lynce, the Supreme 
Court reviewed whether the cancellation of previously awarded provisional credits 
for certain classes of offenders violated the ex post facto clause of the federal 
constitution.  Id. at 435.  The defendant in Lynce pled nolo contendere to a charge 
of attempted murder and was released from prison early based on his accumulation 
of various kinds of early release credits, including provisional credits.  Id. at 435-
36.  Shortly after the defendant was released, the Attorney General of Florida 
issued an opinion that interpreted the 1992 amendment to the provisional credit 
statute as retroactively cancelling all provisional credits for inmates convicted of 
attempted murder.  Id. at 436, 438-39.  The defendant was returned to DOC 
custody, and he challenged the retroactive cancellation of his provisional credits 
based on the ex post facto clause.  Id. at 436.  The State contended that no ex post 
facto violation occurred because the credits were awarded as part of an 
                                          
 
1.  This Court later recognized that Lynce impliedly overruled the decision 
in Rodrick.  See Winkler v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 63, 65-66 (Fla. 2002) (“In 1997, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled in Lynce . . . that the State had violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause when it retroactively canceled overcrowding gain time because 
such credits, like regular gain time, were subject to ex post facto analysis.  The 
decision essentially overruled this Court’s previous decisions holding that 
overcrowding gain time was not subject to ex post facto analysis.” (citing 
Blankship v. Dugger, 521 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1988); Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 2; 
Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994))). 
 
 
- 14 - 
administrative process implemented to reduce prison overcrowding.  Id. at 439.  
However, the Supreme Court stated that the subjective motivation of the 
Legislature in enacting the statute was not the relevant inquiry for an ex post facto 
analysis.  Id. at 442.  Rather, courts must ask whether the new statute 
disadvantaged the defendant by increasing his or her term of incarceration.  Id.  
Because the amendment to the statute resulted in the defendant spending more time 
in prison, the Supreme Court held that retroactive application of the 1992 
amendment violated the ex post facto clause.  Id. at 446-47. 
As previously discussed, at the time of the decision in McBride, the 
Supreme Court had decided Lynce.  Therefore, Dugger and Mamone were no 
longer good law, and the conclusion in McBride that the provisional credit statute 
was not substantive in nature and an amendment to the statute could not result in 
an ex post facto violation was error.  However, this was not the sole basis for the 
holding in McBride.  The First District concluded the decision as follows: 
In summary, since the 1992 amendment merely clarified the 
intent of the legislature with regard to section 944.277(1)(g), the trial 
court correctly ruled that the statute has never distinguished between 
inmates who had habitual offender sentences, regardless of whether 
imposed before or after the original sentence.  On this basis, we deny 
the petition for writ of certiorari. 
 
780 So. 2d at 223 (emphasis added).  Thus, the determination that the amendment 
was a clarification of original legislative intent rather than a change in the law was 
an independent basis for the holding that a subsequent habitual offender 
 
 
- 15 - 
designation rendered an inmate ineligible to receive provisional credits on a non-
habitual sentence imposed prior to the habitual offender status being established.   
The Second District reached the opposite conclusion in Downs.  The 
defendant in Downs received two sentences for which he was eligible to receive 
provisional credits, but was subsequently sentenced for an unrelated conviction as 
a habitual offender.  874 So. 2d at 650.  The Second District recognized that in 
McBride, the First District held that halting future awards of provisional credits on 
non-habitual offender sentences did not result in an ex post facto violation, but 
concluded that the First District incorrectly relied upon Mamone because it was no 
longer good law.  Id. at 652.  The Second District then examined whether 
application of the legislative clarification would result in an ex post facto violation, 
and held that it did.  Id. at 650-51.  The Second District reached this conclusion on 
the basis that application of the 1992 amendment would result in a longer period of 
incarceration for the defendant than that required under the interpretation given to 
the prior version of the statute by the First District in Anderson.  Id. at 650, 652.   
This Case 
The relevant time period for the determination of what rights Leftwich has 
with respect to provisional credits is the law in place at the time of his offenses, 
which occurred in 1989.  See Winkler v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. 2002).  
The relevant question, therefore, is whether the 1989 statute rendered an inmate 
 
 
- 16 - 
ineligible to receive provisional credits on a non-habitual offender sentence where 
he or she is later sentenced pursuant to the Florida habitual offender statute.   
This case presents a question of statutory construction.  Questions of 
statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.  See Se. Floating Docks, Inc. v. 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 82 So. 3d 73, 78 (Fla. 2012).  Our purpose in construing a 
statutory provision is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that 
guides a statutory construction analysis.  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 
2008).  All statutory provisions must be given their full effect by the courts, and 
related statutory provisions must be construed in harmony with one another.  Id. 
(quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007)).   
The plain language of a statute is the primary method through which 
legislative intent may be discovered.  See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. 
v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla., 97 So. 3d 204, 210 (Fla. 2012).  When a statute is 
clear, courts will not resort to rules of statutory construction to determine 
legislative intent, but rather will give effect to the plain language of the statute.  
See State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004).  At the time that Leftwich 
committed the relevant crimes, the provisional credit statute provided: 
Whenever the inmate population of the correctional system 
reaches 97.5 percent of lawful capacity . . . the Secretary of 
Corrections shall certify to the Governor that such condition exists.  
When the Governor acknowledges such condition in writing, the 
secretary may grant up to 60 days of provisional credits equally to 
each inmate who is earning incentive gain-time, except to an inmate 
 
 
- 17 - 
who . . . [i]s sentenced, or has previously been sentenced under s. 
775.084, or has been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction as a 
habitual offender. 
 
§ 944.277(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988).  The plain language of the statute clearly 
expresses the legislative intent that all habitual offenders be precluded from 
acquiring provisional credits for any sentence.   
Under the plain language of the statute, the authority to award provisional 
credits occurred only when the inmate population reached 97.5 percent of lawful 
capacity, at which time provisional credits could be awarded to eligible inmates.  
Id.  Whether an inmate was eligible was subject to change over the course of each 
inmate’s sentence.  For example, subsection (1)(b) provided that an inmate was 
ineligible to receive provisional credits if he or she “[i]s serving the mandatory 
minimum portion of a sentence enhanced under s. 775.087(2)[.]”  § 944.277(1)(b), 
Fla. Stat.  In other words, an inmate was ineligible while serving the mandatory 
minimum portion of a sentence, but would become eligible once the mandatory 
portion was completed.  Thus, a determination of eligibility must be made at the 
time of the overcrowding, and eligibility may change during the course of a 
sentence.  Should the inmate fall into any of the categories not authorized to 
receive provisional credits at the time of the eligibility determination, then he or 
she could not be awarded provisional credits during that certification period.  
Accordingly, the plain language of the statute directs that if an inmate is currently 
 
 
- 18 - 
or has previously been sentenced as a habitual offender at the time the eligibility 
determination is made, he or she may not receive provisional credits.  Thus, the 
intent of the Legislature was indubitably to prevent the early release of habitual 
offenders under the provisional credit system.   
Moreover, any other interpretation of the statute would lead to an 
unreasonable result.  See Burris, 875 So. 2d at 410 (“[T]he statute’s plain and 
ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a 
result clearly contrary to legislative intent.”).  The interpretation given to the 
statute by the First District in Anderson—that an inmate sentenced as a habitual 
offender in Florida was eligible to receive provisional credits on an earlier non-
habitual offender sentence, whereas an inmate sentenced as a habitual offender by 
another jurisdiction was not—is simply not reasonable.  There is no less danger 
posed by the early release of an inmate sentenced under the Florida habitual 
offender statute than one sentenced under the habitual offender statute of another 
jurisdiction.   
Additionally, the 1992 amendment demonstrates that the legislative intent 
behind the exclusion of habitual offenders from eligibility for provisional credits 
was to prevent all habitual offenders from earning credits toward early release, 
regardless of when the habitual offender status was established.  This amendment 
excluded from provisional credit eligibility any inmate who “[i]s sentenced, or has 
 
 
- 19 - 
previously been sentenced, or has been sentenced at any time under [the habitual 
offender statute], or has been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction as a 
habitual offender[.]”  § 944.277(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1992).  Because this 
amendment was enacted in reaction to the interpretation expressed in Anderson, it 
is probative of the prior and continuing legislative intent with regard to the 
eligibility of inmates for provisional credits.  See Lowry, 473 So. 2d at 1250.  
Thus, not only was Anderson a misreading of the plain language of the statute, the 
1992 amendment demonstrates that it did not properly reflect legislative intent.   
Because we determine that the plain language of the statute in place at the 
time Leftwich committed his crimes precluded him from future awards of 
provisional credits on any sentence upon the entry of a habitual offender sentence, 
and do not apply the 1992 amendment, the ex post facto clause is not implicated.  
See Marks, 430 U.S. at 191-92 (stating that the ex post facto clause limits the 
legislative and not the judicial branch, but the due process clause applies to protect 
against a judicial violation of the right to fair warning of what conduct will give 
rise to a criminal penalty).  Further, we conclude that our interpretation of the 
statute to prohibit the award of provisional credits to any inmate who is later 
sentenced as a habitual offender does not constitute an unforeseeable enlargement 
of the statute.  Rather, this interpretation gives effect to the plain meaning of the 
 
 
- 20 - 
statute as written at the time that Leftwich committed his crimes and is consistent 
with legislative intent at the time the statute was enacted.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we hold that section 944.277, Florida Statutes 
(Supp. 1988), renders an inmate ineligible to receive provisional credits on any 
sentence after the inmate has received a habitual offender sentence, even where the 
habitual offender sentence is imposed subsequent to a sentence that is otherwise 
eligible for provisional credits.  Accordingly, we approve the decision of the First 
District in Leftwich and disapprove Downs.   
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
Because I do not conclude that the plain language of the statute in place at 
the time Leftwich committed his crimes precluded him from future awards of 
provisional credits, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. 
The plain language of section 944.277(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988) 
does not clearly express that all habitual offenders are precluded from acquiring 
provisional credits because it differentiates between inmates who are sentenced as 
 
 
- 21 - 
habitual offenders in another jurisdiction and inmates who receive habitual 
offender sentences in Florida.  We have held that the “legislative use of different 
terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different 
meanings were intended.”  State v. Marks, 698 So. 2d 533, 540-41 (Fla. 1997) 
(quoting Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1984)).  The language “[i]s sentenced, or has previously been sentenced” for 
inmates sentenced under the Florida habitual offender statute, compared to “or has 
been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction” can be reasonably interpreted to 
create a narrow category of habitual offenders sentenced in Florida who may still 
earn provisional credits.  
In addition, we should not imply language in the 1988 statute to conclude 
that Leftwich is precluded from being awarded provisional credits.  The statute 
specifically uses the language “is sentenced, or has previously been sentenced” 
when referring to inmates sentenced in Florida and the language “or has been 
sentenced at any time” when referring to those sentenced in other jurisdictions.  
Therefore, we should not imply that “or has been sentenced at any time” applies to 
those inmates sentenced in Florida in order to conclude all habitual offenders are 
precluded from receiving credits.  See State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 219 (Fla. 
2007) (“Under the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.”).  
 
 
- 22 - 
Furthermore, the 1992 amendment is more than a mere clarification of the 
legislature’s original intent.  Chapter 92-310, Laws of Florida, which amended 
section 944.277, included the following language in its preamble: “944.277, F.S.; 
expanding exceptions to eligibility for grants of provisional credits . . .”  Ch. 92-
310, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added).  This language supports the conclusion that 
the amendment expanded the exception to all habitual offenders, eliminating the 
narrow category of habitual offenders, which included Leftwich, who earned 
provisional credits under the statute.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 
1984) (“The preamble and language of [an] enactment readily reveal the 
legislature’s intent and its policy reasons.”).  
This expansion of the exceptions contained in the original statute results in 
the 1992 amendment being applied retroactively to Leftwich, deeming him 
ineligible for the provisional credits.  An amendment to a statute should not be 
applied retroactively if it would result in additional punishment for the defendant, 
thereby violating the ex post facto clause of the Florida Constitution.  State v. 
Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1989); see also State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 
1042, 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).  By precluding Leftwich from receiving the 670 
days of provisional credit he alleged to have earned, the retroactive application of 
the amendment results in a longer incarceration and violates the ex post facto 
 
 
- 23 - 
clause.  Therefore, the statute in place at the time of his offense, the original 
version of section 944.277(1)(g), must be applied. 
Due to the language in the 1988 statute being “susceptible of differing 
constructions,” one creating a narrow category of habitual offenders to earn 
provisional credits and one which categorically precludes all habitual offenders 
from earning provisional credits, the rule of lenity requires this Court to construe 
the 1988 statute most favorably to Leftwich.  § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).  Since 
the statute must be construed to allow a narrow category of habitual offenders to 
earn provisional credits, Leftwich was eligible to receive future awards of 
provisional credit on any sentence prior to the entry of his habitual offender 
sentence.  
I would therefore quash the decision of the First District below and approve 
the decision of the Second District in Downs v. Crosby, 874 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2004).  
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D12-1739 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Lindsay Morgen Saxe and Steven Douglas Knox of Quarles & Brady LLP, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Jennifer Alani Parker, General Counsel, and Barbara Debelius-Enemark, Assistant 
General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent