Case Title: McCleaf v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 684, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTHONY MCCLEAF,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 684, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr ID. No. 9910005729 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  December 16, 2003 
Decided:  February 5, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 5th day of January 2004, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, 
it appears to the Court as follows: 
 
1. 
In February 2000, a Superior Court judge found Anthony McCleaf 
guilty of Shoplifting, Forgery in the Second Degree, and Criminal Impersonation.  
The judge declared McCleaf a habitual offender.  The judge sentenced him to ten 
years incarceration on the forgery conviction and fifteen days incarceration on each 
of the remaining charges followed by a period of probation.  We affirmed 
McCleaf’s convictions on direct appeal.  In July 2000, McCleaf filed a pro se 
motion for a new trial.  A Superior Court judge denied his motion and we affirmed.  
On March 25, 2002, McCleaf filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.  A 
 
2
Superior Court Commissioner recommended that McCleaf’s postconviction motion 
be dismissed as procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3).  
McCleaf appealed the Commissioner’s recommendation and a Superior Court 
judge denied his motion for postconviction relief.  
2. 
McCleaf appeals claiming that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to 
find him guilty of Forgery in the Second Degree; (2) his convictions were based on 
false and perjured testimony; (3) there was insufficient evidence to establish that 
he was eligible for sentencing as a habitual offender; (4) a Superior Court judge 
abused his discretion when he denied his request for a continuance; (5) his counsel 
was ineffective; (6) the ten-year sentence imposed for Forgery in the Second 
Degree violated the Eighth Amendment; (7) a Superior Court judge abused his 
discretion when he did not address all of McCleaf’s postconviction issues; and, (8) 
a Superior Court judge abused his discretion when he denied McCleaf’s request for 
preparation of a transcript of the habitual offender hearing. 
 
3. 
On July 29, 2003, we granted the State’s Motion to Affirm on all 
issues except McCleaf’s claim that his ten-year sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  We held that McCleaf’s claim under the Eighth Amendment is not 
subject to summary affirmance in light of our recent decision in Crosby v. State.1  
                                                 
1 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003). 
 
3
Accordingly, we appointed counsel for the limited purpose of addressing 
McCleaf’s Eighth Amendment claim. 
4. 
We address whether McCleaf’s sentence, pursuant to the habitual 
offender statute, violated his Eighth Amendment rights.  Sentences are 
unconstitutional if they are grossly disproportionate to the conduct being 
punished.2  We have established a two-step analysis to determine whether a 
habitual offender’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to the conduct being 
punished.  First, we compare the sentence imposed to the crime committed.3  Only 
if this comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality will the Court 
then proceed to the second step; a comparison of defendant’s sentence with similar 
cases.4 
5. 
Here, McCleaf’s conviction for Forgery in the Second Degree 
triggered his status as a habitual offender.  While that conviction by itself carries a 
maximum sentence of two years, McCleaf received a ten-year sentence because of 
his habitual offender status pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 4214.  Habitual 
offender statutes protect society and allow Courts to punish more severely “those 
who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of 
                                                 
2 Id. at 908. 
3 Id. at 907. 
4 Id. at 906. 
 
4
conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.”5  We 
recognized, in Crosby, that Delaware has a “legitimate public-safety interest in 
incapacitating and deterring habitual offenders.”6  Crosby faced a minimum of 
thirty-six years incarceration on a life sentence (a forty-five year term) for the same 
triggering crime as the one committed by McCleaf.  McCleaf’s ten-year sentence, 
therefore, was at the low end of the sentencing spectrum.  When considering good 
time credit, McCleaf is likely to serve a minimum of eight years in prison.  In 
Crosby, we stated, “if the trial judge had chosen to accept the State’s 
recommendation and impose a sentence ‘close to a ten year range,’ then this case 
would be controlled by Rummel,7 and there would be no valid constitutional 
claim.”8  McCleaf’s sentence falls within the parameters we discussed in detail in 
Crosby.   
 
6. 
Therefore, when we consider Delaware’s legitimate public-safety 
interest in punishing and deterring habitual offenders, the sentencing judge’s 
discretion to sentence within the maximum statutory range applicable to habitual 
offenders, and McCleaf’s actual sentence relative to the maximum sentence 
available under the statute, we find it clear that there can be no inference of 
disproportionality. 
                                                 
5 824 A.2d. at 906. 
6 Id. at  907. 
7 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
8 Crosby, 824 A.2d at 910. 
 
5
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court judge’s 
Order denying Postconviction Relief and McCleaf’s sentence are AFFIRMED.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice