Case Title: State v. Davis

Citation: 328 N.W.2d 301

Docket Number: 67922

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1982-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
328 N.W.2d 301 (1982) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Frederick DAVIS, Appellant. No. 67922. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 22, 1982. *302 Francis C. Hoyt, Jr., Appellate Defender, and Linda Del Gallo, Asst. Appellate Defender, Des Moines, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Teresa Baustian, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William E. Davis, Scott County Atty., for appellee. Considered by LeGRAND, P.J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McGIVERIN, and CARTER, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. In this appeal we consider several legal problems in a prosecution for first-degree kidnapping and second-degree sexual abuse under sections 710.1, .2, 709.1, and .3 of the Iowa Code of 1979. The jury could find the following from the evidence. A young woman returned to her apartment alone in Davenport, Iowa, at about 3:00 a.m. on October 4, 1980. She unlocked the garage door and drove in. As she got out of her car defendant William Frederick Davis put his arm around her neck from the rear, held a knife to her throat, and told her to get back into the car. She did so, and defendant got in and drove the car. Defendant had his trousers unzipped and lowered, and required the woman to keep her head down and have oral sex as he drove out of the garage. Defendant drove to a wooded area in Illinois, where he told the woman to remove her clothing. She complied, and defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse. She viewed defendant briefly on two occasions while in the car. After the intercourse defendant told the woman to get out of the car before he hurt her. She was able to grab her sweater and pants, and she ran to the highway. Defendant left the car in a parking area near the woman's apartment. The woman flagged down a truck and later received help from a law officer who took her to a hospital. She was unable to identify her assailant from mug shots but later did identify him from photographs, and she identified him in court. Two latent fingerprints on her car door were found to be those of defendant. Illinois law officers later arrested defendant for an unrelated rape in that state, charged him, and placed him in jail there. Defendant obtained an attorney who spoke with him at the jail for about an hour. The attorney told defendant not to talk with the officers, and told the officers on duty he did not want defendant questioned. The same evening an Illinois state's attorney authorized law officers to charge defendant with a rape in Illinois, which they did. They informed defendant of the additional charge, and he became distraught and stated he wanted to talk with someone. They asked if he wanted to talk with them, he said he did, and they took him to an interview room and gave him the Miranda warning. *303 The record contains a conflict of testimony regarding the conversation which is common in such cases. The officers testified to conduct which would lead to the conclusion that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and voluntarily related the circumstances of the Davenport incident and others; defendant testified to conduct which would lead to a contrary conclusion. For reasons which will appear, we find no necessity to resolve this conflict. Defendant told the officers about five separate sex incidents, the fifth being the present one. He was allowed to speak with his wife after asking to do so. The conversation with the officers then resumed, this time with a tape recorder. The taped conversation was transcribed. The next day defendant read the transcription, made corrections to it, and signed each page of it. The Scott County Attorney charged defendant with first-degree kidnapping, second-degree sexual abuse, and second-degree theft. The theft charge was subsequently dropped. Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress the statement he gave the officers; he asserted constitutional grounds which included involuntariness. During the hearing on the motion, the following transpired: Mr. Davis: That's correct, your Honor. The Court: And only you would be using it for the purpose of impeachment in the event the defendant took the stand? The Court: I think the burden is on the State to show that that is a right which is understood by the defendant and that he waived the same, and I think that is a high burden on the State. A review of the circumstances in this case would reveal that this was the fourth in a series of statements given by the defendant. In fact, they were given twice, once orally and once on tape with some interval between times. It is also the Court's understanding of the evidence that between the oral statement and the one that was taped, the defendant had an opportunity to speak with his wife. It is also noted that the defendant's attorney, Mr. Jamison, did pass on some information to certain police officers of the propriety of interrogating his client, but those were not the officers who were doing the interrogating in this instance. Each of the exhibits which have been submitted to the Court, the transcripts of the four statements taken, go to great lengths to demonstrate that the investigating officers, questioning officers, were quite aware that the defendant was represented by counsel and asked him about his representation and reminded him that he was represented by counsel, and at each instance, the defendant responded that it was his desire to talk with the police officers at that time. I think that factor and the other factors I've mentioned weigh heavily in favor of the State having sustained their burden to show that the waiver of his attorney at the time *304 that this statement was given was a voluntary waiver, and for each of those reasons, the motion to suppress the statement previously given is overruled. Is there anything else pending? The Court: All right. That's fine. At the subsequent trial the State did not use defendant's statement in its case in chief. After the State rested and the trial court overruled defendant's motion for acquittal, the following occurred: Defense counsel renewed the motion for acquittal and the court overruled it. Defendant then rested as did the State. The statement was never used. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. After sentencing, defendant appealed. I. Defendant's statement. Defendant's first proposition in the appeal is that the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress his statement. The determinative question here is whether defendant sustained prejudice and properly raised error. The State did not use defendant's statement in its case in chief. Therefore defendant sustained no harm in that respect. The State could have used the statement for impeachment, however, if defendant had taken the stand and testified differently in material respects, but only if the statement was voluntarily given. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 303 (1978). We will assume for purposes of this appeal the district court erred in its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress by finding that his statement was voluntary. If, after the State rested, (1) defendant had taken the stand and had testified differently from the statement in material respects, (2) the State had sought to use the statement to impeach defendant's testimony, (3) defendant had objected that the statement could not be so used because it was involuntary, (4) the court had overruled the objection, and (5) the State had used the statement to impeach, defendant would have demonstrated prejudice and raised error with respect to the court's ruling that the statement was voluntary. Under this record, defendant might have demonstrated prejudice and raised error if only (1) he had taken the stand and testified differently from the statement in material respects and (2) the State had used the statement to impeach his testimonya question we do not decide, since this scenario did not occur. Cf. State v. Harlow, 325 N.W.2d 90 (Iowa 1982) (if unequivocal pretrial ruling made that testimony is admissible, no necessity exists to object when that testimony is introduced at trial). Actually, defendant's attorney announced, with defendant's concurrence, that defendant would not take the stand because the court had ruled the statement was voluntary "and for other reasons that we have discussed. . . ." Defendant did not take the *305 stand and the statement was not used. By this scenario did defendant raise the alleged error and sustain prejudice? The question brings into play the decision in New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S. Ct. 1292, 59 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1979). In that case the defendant did not take the stand, but the New Jersey Appellate Division, the highest New Jersey court that heard the case, considered the main question on its merits of whether the prior statements (before a grand jury) were voluntary. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court first faced the question of whether the voluntariness issue was properly raised for the federal courts in view of Portash's failure to testify. It held the New Jersey appellate court "necessarily concluded that the federal constitutional question had been properly presented, because it ruled in Portash's favor on the merits." Id. at 455, 99 S. Ct. at 1295, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 507. The Court further held that "nothing in federal law" prohibited New Jersey from following such a procedure. The Court therefore reached and decided the voluntariness issue. In so doing, however, the Court stated "federal law does not insist that New Jersey was wrong in not requiring Portash to take the witness stand in order to raise his constitutional claim." Id. at 456, 99 S. Ct. at 1295, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 508. Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred in the Court's opinion in an opinion which included this: Id. at 463, 99 S. Ct. at 1298-99, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 512 (emphasis added). Footnote 2 to this quotation stated: Justice Blackman dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He stated inter alia that Portash's failure to testify precluded presentation of the issue of involuntariness: . . . . . . . . Id. at 464, 467, 468, 99 S. Ct. 1300, 1301-02, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 513, 515-16. Similar problems, although distinguishable for the most part, have arisen in a variety of contexts, including United States v. Halbert, 668 F.2d 489 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 1989, 72 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1982) (prior convictions held admissible); United States v. Kiendra, 663 F. 349 (1st Cir.1981) (same); United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716 (3rd Cir.1980) (refers to Portash in note 14); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S. Ct. 706, 62 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980) (prior convictions, several opinions discussing question); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985, 101 S. Ct. 403, 66 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1980); United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1979); (question of impeachment of statements elicited on the defendant's cross-examination as well as on direct examination); United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S. Ct. 1426, 59 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1979) (advance ruling is tentative and dependent on the defendant's taking stand); United States v. Johnston, 543 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.1976) (prior convictions); People v. Evans, Colo.App. 630 P.2d 94 (1981) (trial court impermissibly ruled unconstitutional prior statement could be used for substantive as well as impeachment purposes); Offutt v. State, 44 Md. App. 670, 410 A.2d 611 (1980) (prior convictionstates can require that defendants take stand in order to raise the issue); Haskins v. State, 97 Wis.2d 408, 294 N.W.2d 25 (1980) (other crimes in a conspiracy). We agree with the interpretation of Portash which the court made in Offutt v. State, that the states possess authority to determine whether a defendant must, or need not, take the witness stand in order to demonstrate prejudice and raise constitutional issues of the present kind for appeal. Under the authority that a state possesses, we hold a defendant must take the stand and testify and the prosecutor must use the statement to impeach before the defendant can raise a constitutional claim such as we have herethat his prior statement could not be used for impeachment because it was involuntary. Among our reasons for so holding are these. First, to hold otherwise would permit an accused to create an alleged error by merely announcing he would have taken the stand but for the trial court's prior finding that the statement was voluntary. Merely stating that he would have taken the stand is easy, but would the defendant have actually taken the stand had the prior ruling been the other way? Staying off the witness stand is one of the chief defense tactics *307 in any case. Actually taking the stand constitutes an acid test which transforms the hypothetical to the concrete. Moreover, defendants in criminal cases take the stand or do not take the stand for a variety of reasons. Here defense counsel candidly stated that defendant would not take the stand because of impeachment by the prior statement "and for other reasons that we have discussed. . . ." Second, a prosecutor cannot use a prior statement for impeachment unless the present testimony of the accused is inconsistent with it, and is inconsistent in material respects. State v. Hilleshiem, 305 N.W.2d 710, 713-14 (Iowa 1981). Can a court really know that a defendant would have testified at material variance to his prior statement until he actually does so? Defendant's typed statement was not pressed on him at the jail in a hurry; it was not presented to him until the next day. He read it, made corrections to it, and signed each page. The real reason for defendant's failure to testify may be that the statement is true. Finally, even if defendant would have taken the stand and testified at material variance, how can we be sure that the State would have used the prior statement to impeach, even if the prosecutor early-on indicated his intention to do so? Prosecutors like defense counsel must continually make tactical decisions during the turns and twists of trial. A prosecutor's cross-examination without the statement, for example, may be sufficiently successful that he concludes his best tactic is to rest on that and thus obviate the necessity of persuading the appellate court that the statement was voluntary. The best way to transform this problem from the theoretical to the actual is to require that a defendant actually testify in order to raise the constitutional issue and demonstrate prejudice. In some cases in which the defendant testifies a prior statement may not be used because of the defendant's testimony or the prosecutor's tactics, and the defendant will suffer no harm from the statement. In other cases the statement may be used to impeach defendant as a witness, with substantial effect. In those cases the defendant can press his contention on appeal that the statement was involuntary, and if the appellate court so finds the defendant will have a new trial without use of the statement by the State. We hold that the constitutional issue was not properly raised and prejudice was not shown. II. Change of venue. Defendant argues that the district court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue. We have examined the record regarding this motion and hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2038, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589, 597 (1975); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Iowa 1982); State v. Love, 302 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Iowa 1981). III. Identification. Defendant contends that the State did not introduce substantial evidence identifying him as the assailant. The woman's in-court identification of defendant from her two brief observations of him at the scene, her photo identification, and the fingerprint evidence generated a jury question on identification under the test of sufficiency in State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Iowa 1980). The jury could have found that the State failed to carry its burden of proof of identification, or it could also find as it did that defendant was the man. IV. Double punishment. The county attorney charged defendant generally in two counts with first-degree kidnapping based on sexual abuse and with second-degree sexual abuse. The charges, the trial, the instructions, and the verdicts correspond with those in the second case of State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 796 (Iowa 1982). When defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, he could not also be convicted of sexual abuse because that crime was an element of the kidnapping and was therefore an included offense. The case falls squarely under section 701.9 of the Iowa Code: No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person *308 is convicted. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, the court shall enter judgment of guilty of the greater of the offenses only. Section 814.20 of the Code authorizes us, after examination of the entire record, to reduce the punishment, but we cannot increase it. Under this authority we nullify the judgment and sentence for sexual abuse. V. Assistance of counsel. Defendant argues, finally, that his trial counsel did not perform within the range of normal competency. The record is insufficient to permit us to pass upon this proposition, State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Iowa 1979), and defendant may present it by postconviction proceedings if he chooses. We uphold the kidnapping conviction without prejudice to postconviction proceedings on the issue of assistance of counsel in district court, but nullify the sexual abuse conviction. MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.