Case Title: Commonwealth v. Walters

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11769

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11769 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LUCAS WALTERS. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     February 14, 2020. - July 23, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional 
rights.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Intoxication, Photograph, 
Knife, Relevancy and materiality.  Intoxication.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Instructions to 
jury, Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 1, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Paul E. 
Troy, J.; the cases were tried before Kenneth J. Fishman, J., 
and a motion to set aside the verdict was heard by him. 
 
 
 
William S. Smith for the defendant. 
 
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the  
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury of murder in the first degree, on a theory of extreme 
2 
 
 
atrocity or cruelty, in the stabbing death of his neighbor, 
Jeffrey Phillips.1  In this appeal, the defendant asserts 
multiple errors in the denial of his pretrial motion to 
suppress, in the trial proceedings themselves, and in the denial 
of his motion to set aside the verdict.  The defendant also asks 
us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the verdict or to order a new trial.  We affirm the 
convictions, and we discern no reason to use our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Facts.  We recite the facts as the jury could have found 
them, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving 
certain details for later discussion. 
In the summer of 2009, the victim and his girlfriend shared 
an apartment in Braintree in the same three-unit apartment 
building as the defendant.  On the afternoon of Friday, July 24, 
2009, the victim left work and returned to his apartment.  At 
approximately 6:45 P.M., he spoke to his mother by telephone and 
made plans to meet her the following day.  Later that evening, 
the victim spoke by telephone with a friend for about an hour. 
At some point thereafter, the victim joined the defendant 
                     
1 The defendant also was convicted of breaking and entering 
into the dwelling of another during the day time, with the 
intent to commit a felony while armed, G. L. c. 266, § 18, and 
larceny from a building, G. L. c. 266, § 20.  The jury found him 
not guilty of murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation. 
3 
 
 
in a makeshift shed that the defendant had built on the 
property.  The defendant was, by his own account, "messed up"; 
he had gotten drunk, had smoked "crack" cocaine and marijuana, 
and had taken Xanax.  The defendant asked the victim to lend him 
money; the victim refused and became angry, because the 
defendant already owed him money for some drugs the victim had 
provided him.  The defendant told police that a fight ensued, 
and that the victim attacked him with a rake, injuring his legs.  
The defendant then hit the victim multiple times in the head and 
back with an axe.2 
The defendant covered the body with a tarp, and put mulch 
over the blood on the pavement.  When he saw his landlord later 
that weekend, he explained that he had spilled oil in the shed, 
and had placed the mulch to soak it up.  The defendant's 
girlfriend had planned to see him that Friday evening, and had 
asked him to attend her family reunion on Saturday, but the 
defendant called her to let her know that he was not going to 
meet her. 
On Saturday, July 25, 2009, the defendant used the victim's 
credit card to purchase gasoline.  He also entered the victim's 
apartment and removed the victim's television, laptop, and video 
                     
 
2 The defendant told police that he had hit the victim two 
or three times, while the medical examiner testified that there 
had been at least eleven blows. 
4 
 
 
game system; the defendant traded these items for crack cocaine, 
which he obtained from his long-time supplier in Springfield.  
The defendant drove the victim's body to a rural area in West 
Suffield, Connecticut, near where the defendant lived during the 
week on property belonging to his girlfriend's parents.  The 
body was wrapped in tarps tied with rope, and placed near an 
irrigation pond.  The defendant put the axe, the remaining rope, 
and a knife he had used to cut the rope in the toolbox on a 
trailer he owned. 
During the afternoon of Sunday, July 26, 2009, the 
defendant arrived at his girlfriend's parents' house in 
Southwick; he and his girlfriend returned to Braintree that 
evening.  During the trip, the conversation was tense, and it 
was apparent to his girlfriend that something was wrong. 
Early on Monday morning, July 27, 2009, the defendant 
returned to western Massachusetts, where he worked.  He remained 
in western Massachusetts on Monday and Tuesday.  His 
girlfriend's father saw the defendant on Monday, and noted that 
the defendant seemed "hurried."  On Tuesday, July 28, 2009, the 
defendant told his girlfriend's mother that he loved her, and 
thanked her for letting him be a part of her family. 
On Wednesday, July 29, 2009, the defendant returned to 
Braintree.  At approximately 5:30 P.M., he spoke with the third 
tenant in his and the victim's apartment building.  At around 
5 
 
 
the same time, the defendant's girlfriend returned home from 
work.  The defendant was crying and hanging onto her, and he 
would not eat.  Eventually, they decided to drive to a store to 
rent a movie.  During the drive, the defendant began apologizing 
to her for what was happening.  After a while, she told the 
defendant that she wanted to go home.  The defendant initially 
headed toward their apartment, but then passed it and drove to 
the Braintree police station.  When he drove into the parking 
lot, he said that he had gotten into a fight with the victim and 
accidentally had hit him too hard.  The defendant then told his 
girlfriend that he loved her, and walked to the police station. 
Detectives Robert Joseph and Michael Reynolds of the 
Braintree police were standing outside the police station at 
approximately 8 P.M. when the defendant approached and said that 
he "really need[ed] to speak to someone"; Joseph told the 
defendant to take a seat in the lobby.  The defendant soon 
reemerged, agitated and distraught, and reiterated his earlier 
statement.  The detectives, who knew that the victim had been 
reported missing,3 asked the defendant what he knew about the 
                     
3 The victim had been reported missing on Monday, July 27, 
2009.  Officers conducted a welfare check on his apartment that 
day, and canvassed the neighborhood.  Police also discovered 
that the victim's credit card had been used to purchase 
gasoline.  There were no signs of foul play in his apartment, 
however, and neither the defendant nor anyone else was a suspect 
at that point. 
6 
 
 
person; the defendant replied, "I killed him."  Joseph and 
Reynolds handcuffed the defendant and read him the Miranda4 
rights.  The defendant indicated that he wished to speak with 
police. 
Sergeant Timothy Cohoon and Detective Sergeant Edward 
Querzoli interviewed the defendant.  During the interview, 
Detectives Thomas Molloy and Mark Sherrick were dispatched to 
the victim's and the defendant's apartment building to secure 
the scene.  Molloy put crime scene tape around the shed, and 
noticed a rake behind it, but did not enter the shed itself. 
The defendant told the detectives that he had gotten drunk, 
smoked crack cocaine, and taken Xanax, that the victim had 
attacked him with a rake, and that he "lost it" and hit the 
victim in the head with an axe.  The detectives noticed scratch 
marks on the defendant's legs, and inquired whether he had been 
wandering through any bushes.  The defendant said that he had 
not; later in the interview, the defendant indicated that the 
scratches on his legs were sustained when the victim hit him 
with the rake.  The defendant told the officers that he had used 
the victim's credit card and had taken items from the victim's 
apartment and traded them to his supplier for drugs.  He 
explained the manner in which he had disposed of the victim's 
                     
 
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
7 
 
 
body, and said that the axe could be found in his trailer, which 
was parked on his girlfriend's parents' property in Southwick.  
The defendant drew a map of the area where he had put the 
victim's body, and agreed to lead the officers there.  Later 
that evening, the defendant traveled with police to West 
Suffield, Connecticut, and guided them to the location. 
Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on charges 
of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; breaking and 
entering into the dwelling of another during the day time, with 
the intent to commit a felony while armed, G. L. c. 266, § 18; 
and larceny from a building, G. L. c. 266, § 20.  Prior to 
trial, he filed a motion to suppress his statements to police on 
the ground that they were involuntary.  The motion was denied, 
and a video recording of the interview was played for the jury.  
The Commonwealth proceeded at trial on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
The defendant was convicted of all charges; on the charge 
of murder in the first degree, he was convicted solely on a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  After his convictions, 
the defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict; he 
argued, inter alia, that the jury returned an inconsistent 
verdict, in light of the acquittal on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  The motion was denied, and the defendant filed a 
8 
 
 
timely notice of appeal.5 
Discussion.  The defendant asserts numerous errors in the 
trial proceedings, including:  (1) the motion judge's improper 
denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police; 
(2) the introduction of inflammatory photographs; (3) the 
absence of an instruction on "lost evidence"; (4) the 
introduction in evidence of knives that might have been used to 
cut the rope that bound the victim; (5) multiple improper 
statements in the prosecutor's closing argument; and (6) a 
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth has filed a motion in this court seeking 
to supplement the record to include a transcript of the hearing 
on the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict.  After his 
motion to set aside the verdict was denied, the defendant asked 
the trial judge to issue written findings of fact and a more 
detailed statement of his rulings of law.  The judge implicitly 
denied the motion by taking no action on it, and the defendant 
unsuccessfully sought relief in this court, asking the court to 
order the judge to make further findings and rulings.  The 
motion was referred to the single justice, who denied it.  At 
that time, the Commonwealth argued that written findings were 
unnecessary. 
 
 
The Commonwealth now asserts that the transcript of the 
hearing is necessary to provide a complete record pertaining to 
the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, and that it is 
appropriate to supplement the record in light of this court's 
duty to review the entire record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The 
defendant opposes the motion, on the ground that the 
Commonwealth previously opposed his motion for further written 
findings and rulings, and that it should be estopped from now 
asserting that a transcript of the hearing on the same motion is 
relevant or necessary.  Even if we were inclined to allow such a 
motion, which we are not, the transcript does not augment our 
understanding of the issues raised in the defendant's motion to 
set aside the verdict. 
9 
 
 
legally inconsistent verdict.  The defendant also asks us to use 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of 
guilt or to order a new trial. 
 
1.  Denial of motion to suppress statements.  Before trial, 
the defendant moved to suppress his statements to police on the 
grounds that his physical and mental condition rendered him 
unable validly to waive his Miranda rights and give police a 
voluntary statement.  After an evidentiary hearing,6 the motion 
judge determined that, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his rights, and that the defendant's will was 
not overborne to the extent that his statements were not a free 
and voluntary act.  Accordingly, the judge denied the motion.  
On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the judge's findings 
of fact, but argues that the judge's ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law did not consider adequately the defendant's 
mental state. 
 
a.  Motion judge's findings of fact. On July 29, 2009, the 
                     
 
6 The two interviewing officers, as well as the officer who 
drove with the defendant to Connecticut so that he could show 
police the location of the body, testified at the hearing.  The 
motion judge also received and reviewed the audio-video 
recording of the defendant's statement to police.  The judge's 
findings are well supported by this evidence, and, with respect 
to the audio-video recording, are consistent with our 
independent review of it.  See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 
Mass. 645, 654-655 (2018). 
10 
 
 
defendant approached detectives at the Braintree police station 
and said that he really "need[ed] to speak to someone" about a 
missing person.  After he said that he had killed the person, 
the defendant was handcuffed, brought into an interview room, 
and seated at a table, where he began to cry.  Sherrick entered 
the room and obtained the defendant's permission to record the 
interview; the defendant agreed, but then appeared to gag, and 
Sherrick offered him a wastebasket and advised him to relax.  
The defendant responded, "I can't relax.  My brain is fucked up.  
I did something real bad."  He added, "I should just kill 
myself." 
Sherrick left the room and Cohoon, the lead investigator in 
the missing person investigation, entered dressed in casual 
clothing.  Cohoon asked the defendant if he was okay and offered 
the defendant water; the defendant indicated he was okay and 
declined the offer.  Cohoon then removed the defendant's 
handcuffs.  The defendant complied with instructions to place 
one hand, and then the other, on his head as the handcuffs were 
being removed.  He said repeatedly, "Just kill me." 
Cohoon informed the defendant that he was going to read the 
defendant the Miranda rights, and the defendant again muttered, 
"Just kill me."  Cohoon read the Miranda rights.  The defendant 
indicated that he understood and wanted to talk to police, and 
signed a Miranda waiver form.  Throughout the interview, the 
11 
 
 
defendant cried quietly, and at times sobbed.  He repeatedly 
interjected statements such as "What is wrong with my head?" and 
"Just fucking kill me."  At one point, he put his head on the 
table and let out a loud scream.  Interspersed with these 
comments, the defendant provided a cohesive narrative of events, 
answered questions, and gave further details when asked.  
Despite his emotional state, the defendant was lucid and 
responsive to questions, and corrected the officers if they 
misstated details of what he told them.  When a State police 
trooper entered the room, the defendant repeated his account, 
described where the fight took place, and marked the location of 
the victim's body on a map. 
Approximately one-half hour into the interview, after 
responding to a question regarding the number of times he struck 
the victim, the defendant gagged, vomited into a wastebasket, 
and fell off the chair onto his stomach.  The officers rolled 
the defendant onto his side and told him to take a deep breath 
and relax because he was okay.  They called medics and helped 
the defendant back into his chair.  He vomited again, said "Kill 
me," and took a drink of water.  The officers took a break from 
questioning and left the defendant alone in the interview room 
for several minutes, where he drank water, sobbed quietly, and 
gagged a few more times without vomiting. 
When the detectives reentered the room, they asked him if 
12 
 
 
he was under the influence of any drugs.  He said that he had 
smoked crack a few hours earlier, and that he had been drinking 
and taking drugs and driving around in his truck for the past 
few days.  The questioning resumed, while the defendant 
continued to sob and repeat similar statements such as "Shoot 
me" and "I just want to die," while continuing to respond to 
questions.  When he said that he did not want to talk anymore, 
the interview ended approximately one hour and nine minutes 
after it began. 
 
b.  Standard of review.  When reviewing a decision on a 
motion to suppress, we grant "substantial deference to the 
judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but 
independently review[] the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found."  
Commonwealth v. LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 254 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 122 (1998).  "Because the 
defendant was advised of, and waived, his Miranda rights," in 
considering whether the judge erred in denying his motion to 
suppress statements, "the issue becomes whether the Commonwealth 
has proved, by a totality of the circumstances, that the 
defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of 
his rights, and that his statements were otherwise voluntary."  
LeBeau, supra at 254-255, and cases cited.  A judge must weigh, 
among other factors, the "conduct of the defendant, the 
13 
 
 
defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional 
stability, . . . physical and mental condition, . . . and the 
details of the interrogation, including the recitation of 
Miranda warnings" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Tolan, 
453 Mass. 634, 642 (2009). 
"Special care must be taken in assessing a waiver and the 
voluntariness of the statements where there is evidence that the 
defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs."  
Commonwealth v. Shipps, 399 Mass. 820, 826 (1987).  Nonetheless, 
"|a]n otherwise voluntary act is not necessarily rendered 
involuntary simply because an individual has been drinking or 
using drugs."  Id. 
 
c.  Validity of the Miranda waiver.  The defendant argues 
that his consumption of crack cocaine a few hours before the 
interview, and his evident emotional distress during the 
interview, made his waiver of his Miranda rights involuntary, 
and the waiver invalid.  The defendant maintains that the motion 
judge placed undue emphasis on his initial decision to talk to 
police, and erred in concluding that the defendant's wish to 
speak to police, and his remorse during the interview, 
demonstrated a rational decision to waive his rights. 
For a waiver to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a 
defendant must understand the Miranda warnings themselves, but 
need not fully appreciate the tactical or strategic consequences 
14 
 
 
of waiving the enumerated rights.  Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 
Mass. 597, 606 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 173 (2007).  The fact 
that a defendant repeatedly was given Miranda warnings, 
indicated that he understood his rights, and signed a form 
agreeing to waive them, while evidence of voluntariness, is not 
dispositive.  See Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 387 n.8 
(1996) (signed waiver form, although not dispositive, 
constitutes evidence of voluntariness).  As stated, in making 
this determination we also must consider evidence of the 
defendant's intoxication and disturbed mental state. 
While intoxication bears heavily on a determination whether 
a Miranda waiver was voluntary, as discussed supra, intoxication 
alone is insufficient to invalidate a waiver.  Here, the motion 
judge concluded that, notwithstanding the defendant's statement 
that he had smoked crack cocaine hours before speaking to the 
police, there was "no evidence that the drugs caused [the 
defendant] to be detached from reality or unable to concentrate, 
or affected his memory."  This conclusion was bolstered by the 
defendant's ability to offer a detailed narrative of the 
incident, including a self-serving estimate of the number of 
times he hit the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Silankas, 433 
Mass. 678, 685-686 (2001) (intoxicated defendant's high degree 
of concentration, memory, rationality, and coherence at time of 
questioning support conclusion waiver was voluntary). 
15 
 
 
As with intoxication, "[t]he fact that a defendant may have 
been in a disturbed emotional state, or even suicidal," while 
important, "does not automatically make statements involuntary."  
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 Mass. 549, 555 (2001), citing 
Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 542, 543 (1990) 
(statements were voluntary even though defendant had asked for 
gun to kill himself). 
Here, the defendant made suicidal statements throughout the 
interview.  He also cried quietly, sometimes sobbed, screamed 
once, and gagged repeatedly.  Nonetheless, the defendant gave 
lucid and coherent responses to the officers' questions, and at 
times corrected the officers' misstatements of his account.  
Accordingly, the motion judge did not err in finding that the 
defendant was not too intoxicated or mentally disturbed to 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda 
rights. 
 
d.  Voluntariness of statements.  Although both require the 
same totality of the circumstances test, the voluntariness of a 
defendant's statements is a distinct inquiry from the question 
of the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver.  See Commonwealth v. 
Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 343 (1985).  A statement is voluntary 
if it "is the product of a rational intellect and a free will, 
and not induced by physical or psychological coercion" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 802 (2016), 
16 
 
 
aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017). 
i.  Coercion.  There is no evidence of police coercion 
here.  Police provided the defendant with proper Miranda 
warnings; the tone of the conversation was "low-key and 
sympathetic"; police several times told the defendant that it 
was important to talk, but that they wanted to be sure he was 
okay before they continued; the defendant was not handcuffed; 
the officers did not use deceptive tactics or misleading 
assurances; when he vomited, they offered him medical assistance 
and water, left him alone briefly to compose himself, and 
verified that he was willing to continue speaking before 
continuing. 
ii.  Intoxication and disturbed mental state.  As with the 
validity of a Miranda waiver, evidence of a defendant's 
intoxication and mental state are important factors when 
determining whether the defendant's statements were voluntary.  
To be sure, the record in this case indicates both that the 
defendant was intoxicated and in a disturbed mental state.  The 
defendant was highly agitated, and repeatedly commented that he 
should kill himself, or the police should kill him.  He cried 
throughout the interview.  He gagged and vomited, falling off 
his chair.  When the officers asked him whether he was under the 
influence of any drugs, he responded that he had been drinking 
and taking drugs and driving his truck around for the past two 
17 
 
 
days, and had smoked crack cocaine a few hours before coming 
into the station. 
The analysis whether a defendant's intoxication renders the 
defendant's statements involuntary is similar to the analysis 
whether a defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary.  See 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 727-728 (2014), S.C., 479 
Mass. 52 (2018).  Here, the facts that the defendant gave a 
detailed and coherent narrative, and appeared lucid throughout 
the interview, indicate that his level of intoxication did not 
render his statements involuntary.  See id. 
Turning to the defendant's disturbed mental state, the 
motion judge concluded that, notwithstanding the defendant's 
emotional distress, his intoxication, and his suicidal ideation, 
the defendant's statements were voluntary in the totality of the 
circumstances.  The judge reasoned that the defendant's 
detailed, coherent narrative of facts, attempts at exculpation 
by underplaying the number of times he hit the victim, and 
apparent grounding in reality demonstrated that his statements 
were voluntarily and intelligently made. 
Where, as here, it is clear that a defendant makes a 
statement in an agitated or emotional mental state, the question 
whether the statement was freely given requires close analysis.  
In Magee, 423 Mass. at 386-387, for example, the court held that 
a defendant's statements were involuntary after seven hours of 
18 
 
 
prolonged questioning, where the defendant, in an exhausted and 
sleep-deprived state, cried and shook uncontrollably.7  
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Scherben, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 952, 
952-953 (1990), the Appeals Court held that there was no clear 
error in a motion judge's findings and ultimate conclusion of 
involuntariness ,where the defendant was not drunk but was under 
the influence of alcohol, and was nervous and upset; where three 
police officers were present; and where the interrogation was 
conducted at a late hour, close to midnight. 
Nonetheless, a defendant's disturbed, or even suicidal, 
mental state does not automatically render his or her statements 
involuntary.  See LeBlanc, 433 Mass. at 555.  An agitated or 
distressed mental condition, for example, could be "natural for 
someone who [has] admitted the commission of serious crimes."  
See Perrot, 407 Mass. at 542-543 (statement voluntary despite 
fact that defendant was emotional, asked for police officer's 
gun to kill himself, and was placed on suicide watch).  
                     
 
7 Importantly, in Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 386-
387 (1996), the defendant's physical and emotional condition was 
not the only relevant factor; unlike here, the judge in that 
case also observed that police failed scrupulously to honor the 
defendant's right to remain silent and her right to counsel; 
that the seven-hour length of the interrogation, taking place in 
the early morning after a sleepless night, and the presence of 
as many as three officers at one time created a coercive 
environment; and that the promise that the defendant would 
receive the psychological help she sought if she gave police the 
information they wanted affected her capacity to give a knowing 
and voluntary waiver. 
19 
 
 
Moreover, despite his distressed demeanor, here the defendant 
repeatedly provided officers with a coherent narrative of the 
incident, and there was no indication that he was acting 
irrationally.  See LeBlanc, supra at 552, 554-555 (statement was 
voluntary where defendant, although suicidal and in emotional 
turmoil, described incident in detailed narrative form).  We 
discern no error in the judge's conclusion that the defendant's 
statements were voluntary. 
 
2.  Introduction of crime scene and autopsy photographs.  
Over the defendant's objection, photographs of the victim's body 
were introduced in evidence.  These included photographs taken 
at the scene where the body was recovered, and five autopsy 
photographs.8  The defendant asserts that these photographs, 
                     
8 The photographs from the crime scene showed the body as it 
was found wrapped in a tarp, and then showed the body partially 
unwrapped.  At a pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth argued that 
these photographs were relevant to show the efforts undertaken 
to conceal the victim's body, and thus to counter the possible 
defense that the defendant had been highly intoxicated at the 
time of the killing, as well as to show insect activity to 
indicate the time of death.  After the judge asked the 
prosecutor what the relevance of the photographs was in the 
case, "other than horror engendered by the insects to somebody 
who there is no doubt he was dead when he was placed there," the 
prosecutor agreed that there was "no doubt as to the timing," 
and also that the body had been kept in the shed, unmoved, "for 
two days or so," as evidenced by insect activity in the shed.  
Thus, it is unclear how the wrapping and tying on a Sunday had 
any relevance to the victim's mental state or level of 
intoxication on Friday evening, or why the judge allowed the 
introduction of admittedly gruesome photographs as duplicative 
evidence to establish a fact that the Commonwealth agreed it had 
more than ample evidence to establish without them. 
20 
 
 
which depicted the body in a state of decomposition and 
highlighted gruesome post-mortem injuries to the victim's head 
and face, were inflammatory and unduly prejudicial.  In 
particular, the defendant challenges the admission of an autopsy 
photograph showing the bulging left eye of the victim.  We agree 
that the risk of unfair prejudice arising from that photograph 
substantially outweighed its probative value.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 403 (2020). 
 
"The question whether the inflammatory quality of a 
photograph outweighs its probative value and precludes its 
admission is determined in the sound discretion of the trial 
judge" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 Mass. 
354, 358 (2015).  A reviewing court will defer to the trial 
judge's exercise of this discretion unless the judge has made 
"'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to 
the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Alleyne, 474 Mass. 771, 779 (2016). 
 
Where it is probative of a material issue, the fact that a 
photograph is gruesome, or may have an inflammatory effect on 
the jury, does not necessarily preclude its admission.  See 
Commonwealth v. Keohane, 444 Mass. 563, 572-573 (2005).  
"Recognizing the heightened risk of prejudice from autopsy 
photographs depicting a body in a state of decomposition, we 
21 
 
 
have cautioned[, however,] that such photographs should be 
admitted only if the judge determines that 'they are important 
to the resolution of any contested fact in the case'" (citation 
omitted).  Alleyne, 474 Mass. at 779.  See Commonwealth v. 
Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 108-109 (1995); Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 
433 Mass. 427, 431 (2001). 
 
Photographs depicting the extent of a victim's injuries, 
such as the force applied and the number of wounds, may be 
probative of whether a defendant acted with deliberate 
premeditation or with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
Commonwealth v. Meinholz, 420 Mass. 633, 635-636 (1995), and 
cases cited.  See also Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 
227 (1983).  Given that the Commonwealth proceeded at trial on 
the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, the judge's decision to allow introduction of at least 
some of the challenged photographs was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
It is not evident, however, that all of the photographs 
introduced were more probative than prejudicial.  In particular, 
we note, as the defendant argues, that the photograph showing 
the victim's face, and the bulging left eye, after the body had 
been decomposing for six days, was likely to be particularly 
22 
 
 
inflammatory, and had little probative value.9  Indeed, the 
substitute medical examiner10 himself testified during voir dire 
that the appearance of the victim's left eye had no medical 
significance.  At a pretrial hearing on the defendant's motion 
to exclude the photographs, the Commonwealth argued that the 
photograph was relevant to the condition of the victim's body 
when it was found, the time of death, and the extent of the 
injuries.  At trial, when the objection was renewed, the 
prosecutor argued that the photographs were relevant to show the 
extent of the victim's injuries.  The photograph was at best 
slightly relevant as to the time of death and the extent of the 
injuries.  The decision to place this indisputably gruesome 
photograph before the jury, however, did not weigh appropriately 
the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the 
                     
9 Before us, the defendant argues, as the substitute medical 
examiner stated, that the photograph showing the eye had no 
medical relevance, and was not relevant to the issue of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty because it showed post-mortem decomposition 
and not pre-mortem injuries.   At a pretrial hearing, the 
defendant opposed admission of the photograph, although 
ultimately he agreed that the photograph potentially was 
relevant to show the nature of the victim's injuries, because it 
depicted a cut above the eye.   At that hearing, the defendant 
argued that if the photograph were admitted, the portion showing 
the eye should be obscured. 
 
 
10 The Commonwealth relied upon a substitute medical 
examiner because, at the time of trial, the medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy was facing criminal charges in an 
unrelated matter. 
23 
 
 
photograph.  See Commonwealth v. Chalifoux, 362 Mass. 811, 817 
(1973).  The time of death was not seriously in dispute,11 the 
injuries shown were primarily post-mortem, the medical examiner 
testified that the photograph had no medical relevance, and the 
other autopsy photographs provided ample, indeed better,12 
evidence of the extent of the injuries that caused the victim's 
death.  Thus, the risk that the photograph would distract the 
jury outweighed any probative value.  See Commonwealth v. 
Richmond, 371 Mass. 563, 565-566 (1976) (reversing murder 
conviction where jury were shown photographs of victim's face 
after it had been eaten by dogs because evidential value of 
photographs was overwhelmed by prejudicial effect and "it would 
take a pretty sophisticated [j]ury not to be affected by that 
kind of photo"). 
 
Nonetheless, although this photograph should not have been 
introduced, we discern no cause to disturb the verdict.  We note 
in particular the precautionary measures taken by the judge to 
attempt to mitigate the prejudice.  See Amran, 471 Mass. at 358.  
The judge limited the number of photographs that could be shown, 
                     
 
11 See note 8, supra. 
 
 
12 The fatal injuries were to the back of the victim's head.  
The substitute medical examiner testified that the injuries to 
the shoulder and neck were not fatal, and the injury to the 
forehead might have been simply an extension of the wound to the 
back of the head. 
24 
 
 
and repeatedly cautioned the jurors that, despite the gruesome 
nature of the photographs, they were to render a verdict based 
on the evidence, rather than on sympathy, anger, or passion.  
The judge also prevented the prosecutor from displaying enlarged 
versions of the autopsy photographs, instead ordering that 
booklets be distributed to each juror so that the juror could 
control exposure to the photographs.  Moreover, the evidence in 
this case, which included the defendant's detailed statement to 
police, was overwhelming, thereby making much less likely the 
possibility that the autopsy photographs had a significant 
impact on the jury's thinking.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 
Mass. 116, 124 (2012). 
3.  Instruction on lost evidence.  The defendant argues, 
for the first time on appeal, that the judge should have, sua 
sponte, instructed the jury that they were permitted, but not 
required, to draw an inference adverse to the Commonwealth 
because of the Commonwealth's failure to recover a rake from the 
defendant's shed.13  The defendant contends that the inability to 
test the rake for his deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) prejudiced his 
defense.  He argues that the evidence from the rake would have 
                     
13 The defendant cites a comment in the Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court pertaining to 
"Omissions in Police Investigations," which noted that such an 
instruction might be appropriate in certain circumstances where 
evidence was lost or destroyed.  See Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court, Instruction 3.740 note 3 (2009). 
25 
 
 
corroborated his statement that he hit the victim with an axe 
only after the victim had hit him with a rake and injured his 
legs.  The absence of an instruction on "lost" or "missing" 
evidence, in the defendant's view, created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
The affidavit supporting the search warrant for the 
defendant's shed referred to the existence of a rake.  No rake 
was recovered at the time of the search.  While Molloy saw a 
rake when he put up the crime scene tape, he was unaware at that 
time of the defendant's statements, or that a rake might be 
significant to the case.  Molloy testified before the grand jury 
and at trial, however, that he had observed a leaf rake with a 
wooden handle and plastic teeth behind the defendant's shed when 
he was securing the scene.  Molloy did not participate in the 
subsequent search of the shed, and did not mention the rake to 
the other detectives involved in the investigation, who only 
learned of Molloy's observations as the trial was underway. 
On cross-examination, several investigators conceded that 
they would like to have located the rake, and that such a rake 
could have been useful to corroborate the defendant's statement.  
The investigators did not recall whether the area behind the 
shed had been searched thoroughly, although at least one crime 
scene technician testified that he went behind the shed and did 
not recall observing anything of note. 
26 
 
 
In closing, the prosecutor queried whether a rake such as 
the one described by Molloy, even if it did exist, could have 
caused the scratches on the defendant's legs.  The prosecutor 
also suggested that the rake had never existed.  At the 
defendant's request, the judge provided the jury with the so-
called Bowden instruction concerning an inadequate police 
investigation.14  While the defendant did not request a more 
specific instruction at trial pertaining to lost or missing 
evidence, he now asserts error in the absence of such an 
instruction, and ineffective assistance of counsel for the 
failure to have requested one. 
Where "potentially exculpatory evidence is lost or 
                     
14 The Bowden instruction, based on the court's holding in 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980), informs 
jurors that they may consider whether a failure to conduct 
scientific tests or otherwise follow standard procedure, if 
significant and not adequately explained, affects the 
reliability of the Commonwealth's evidence or indicates 
investigators' bias against the defendant. 
 
The judge's presentation of the instruction was largely 
consistent with the instruction requested by the defendant.  The 
only exception was the omission of an introductory sentence 
stating, "You have heard some evidence suggesting that the 
Commonwealth did not conduct certain scientific tests or 
otherwise follow standard procedure during the police 
investigation."  The defendant did not object to the form of the 
instruction at trial; on appeal, he asserts that the omission of 
this prefatory language "compounded" the prejudice incurred from 
the absence of a "lost evidence" instruction.  Given the 
prominence afforded to the rake on cross-examination and in 
closing arguments, we are confident that the jury could 
understand and apply the instruction notwithstanding this 
omission. 
27 
 
 
destroyed," courts craft an appropriate outcome after balancing 
the Commonwealth's culpability against "the materiality of the 
evidence and the potential prejudice to the defendant" (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Phoenix, 409 Mass. 408, 412 
(1991).  The proper remedy is left to the discretion of the 
trial judge; "[i]n certain cases . . . it may be appropriate to 
instruct the jury that they may, but need not, draw an inference 
against the Commonwealth."  See Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 
550, 557 (2007). 
 
Here, however, the Commonwealth has neither "lost" nor 
"misplaced" any evidence that was previously in its possession.  
Cf. Phoenix, 409 Mass. at 412 (fingerprint in blood and paper 
bag containing bullet hole destroyed during testing); 
Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 1, 2 (1984) (samples from 
breathalyzer test not preserved).  "While the prosecution 
remains obligated to disclose all exculpatory evidence in its 
possession, it is under no duty to gather evidence that may be 
potentially helpful to the defense" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 479 Mass. 124, 140 (2018). 
 
The defendant's contention that the rake should be 
considered "lost" in light of the fact that Molloy testified to 
having observed a rake within a secured crime scene is 
unavailing.  Molloy was the only law enforcement official to 
recall seeing a rake, and thus the only person to whom custody 
28 
 
 
of the rake theoretically could be attributed.  As the rake bore 
no significance to Molloy at the time of his observation, we 
assign no error to his decision not to collect it.  Cf. Wright, 
479 Mass. at 139 (2018) (rejecting argument that failure to 
collect certain evidence unduly prejudiced defendant "primarily 
because the potentially exculpatory value of this evidence was 
not apparent at the time").  Moreover, Molloy was responsible 
for securing the scene, not for collecting the evidence that the 
technicians later retrieved from it.  Hence, we discern neither 
error in the absence of a sua sponte instruction on lost 
evidence, nor ineffective assistance of counsel in not 
requesting such an instruction. 
 
4.  Introduction of knives in evidence.  The Commonwealth 
introduced two knives and related photographs in evidence.  One 
knife was found in the defendant's trailer near the axe and a 
ball of yellow synthetic rope with human blood near the end that 
had been cut; the other knife was found in the shed.15  The 
Commonwealth argued that the knives were relevant in connection 
with testimony showing that the rope tied around the victim's 
body was frayed as if it had been cut with a knife, and the 
proffered knives could have been used to cut the rope.  In 
overruling the defendant's objection to the admission of the 
                     
 
15 No DNA test was performed on the red-brown stain near the 
tip of the knife that had tested positive for human blood. 
29 
 
 
knives, the judge said that the Commonwealth was "not offering 
[the knife evidence] as a weapon but as a tool consistent with 
the manipulation of a body fluid." 
 
The defendant argues that allowing the introduction of the 
knives was error, as they were irrelevant to the cause of death 
or the placement of the body, and the knives created a danger 
that the jury incorrectly would infer from them that the 
defendant had had the wherewithal to be armed, and thus to act 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
We review a trial judge's decision to allow the 
introduction of proffered evidence for abuse of discretion, and 
do not disturb such a decision absent "palpable" error (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013).  
"Where a weapon definitively could not have been used in the 
commission of the crime, [however,] we have generally cautioned 
against admission of evidence related to it."  See Barbosa, 463 
Mass. at 122.  Such evidence creates a risk that the jury will 
use the evidence impermissibly to infer that the defendant has a 
bad character or a propensity to commit the crime charged.  See 
Commonwealth v. Monico, 396 Mass. 793, 807 (1986). 
Nonetheless, evidence of "[a] weapon that could have been 
used in the course of a crime is admissible, in the judge's 
discretion, even without direct proof that the particular weapon 
was in fact used in the commission of the crime."  See Barbosa, 
30 
 
 
463 Mass. at 122.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 
683, 695-696 (2011); Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 
871 (2010).  "Such evidence is relevant for demonstrating that 
the defendant had the 'means of committing the crime.'"  
Barbosa, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 
744 (2000).  Here, the Commonwealth offered the knives as 
"tools," because of their possible connection to cutting the 
rope used to bind the victim.  Although the knives were of 
limited probative value, the evidence received "scant" attention 
during trial and had, at most, a "very slight effect" on the 
jury (citation omitted).16  See Barbosa, supra at 124. 
5.  Improprieties in prosecutor's closing argument.  The 
defendant contends that a number of the prosecutor's statements 
in his closing argument were improper and, collectively, 
prejudiced the defendant.  We agree that certain statements were 
improper, but conclude that the improprieties do not require a 
new trial. 
a.  Characterization of defense theories as "excuses."  
                     
16 We note, however, some discrepancy between the stated 
reason that the judge provided, that the evidence of the knives 
was consistent with the "manipulation of body fluid"(for which 
there was no evidence and which would have been erroneous), and 
the Commonwealth's use of the knives, which focused on the 
possibility that the knives had been used to cut the ropes that 
bound the victim's body.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 
Mass. 476, 483 (2007) (court may affirm judge's decision on any 
ground supported by record). 
31 
 
 
Throughout his closing, the prosecutor argued that the 
defendant's case consisted of "excuses."  The prosecutor told 
the jury, for example, that defense counsel "has spent virtually 
this entire trial trying to show you what the defendant feels is 
an excuse why. . . .  What excuses can we come up with to show 
this jury that [the defendant] didn't mean to do what he did?"  
Later, referring to evidence that the defendant told a neighbor, 
shortly before turning himself in to the police, that he had 
placed mulch in the shed to cover up an oil spill, the 
prosecutor argued that, "ninety minutes before the defendant 
walks into that police station, he is still making excuses and 
he is still telling lies."  The prosecutor urged the jury not to 
"be distracted by all these excuses," and suggested that the 
defendant's actions had a financial motive. 
The defendant did not object at trial; he now contends that 
these statements were improper ad hominem attacks.  He argues 
that describing his case as an "excuse" misstated the law, and 
that he had been arguing, inter alia, that his intoxication 
mitigated, but did not excuse, his actions, while the 
prosecutor's choice of language conveyed to the jury that the 
defendant was claiming that his intoxication would entirely 
excuse his actions. 
As the defendant argues, prosecutors undoubtedly may not 
disparage the defense.  See Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 
32 
 
 
569, 581 (2002) (characterization of defense tactic as 
"despicable" went "beyond labeling it as unworthy of 
belief . . . and smacks more of an ad hominem attack").  A 
prosecutor may, however, "argu[e] forcefully for a conviction 
based on the evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 
516 (1987).  The realm of appropriate "forceful" advocacy 
includes commentary on the relative merits of the defendant's 
arguments.  See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 586 
(2001) (characterization of defense argument as "insult" was not 
improper where "remark was designed to demonstrate the lack of 
evidence to support the self-defense claim").  Here, although 
the choice of the word "excuse" well may have been ill-advised, 
it did not cross the line into impropriety.  The prosecutor's 
remarks, as evidenced by his reference to the defendant's 
fabricated explanation that he placed mulch on the pavement to 
cover an oil spill, appear designed to suggest that the jury 
should disbelieve the defendant's version of events. 
"We have repeatedly warned that, in 'closing argument, 
"[l]awyers shall not and must not misstate principles of law."'"  
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 81 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 367 (2013).  While an 
unfortunate choice of words, the prosecutor's statements about 
"excuses" here stand in clear contrast to those cases where we 
33 
 
 
have concluded that a prosecutor explicitly misrepresented a 
principle of law.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 
271 (2019) (repeated use of word "justification" in lieu of 
"mitigation" improperly suggested that defendant had to 
demonstrate "justification" to reduce degree of guilt to 
voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Morales, 461 Mass. 765, 
783-784 (2012) (prosecutor failed to mention that theory of 
deliberate premeditation requires deliberation in addition to 
intent to kill); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644 
(1976) (prosecutor falsely implied that if jury found defendant 
lacked criminal responsibility, defendant would be set free).17 
b.  Statements pertaining to the missing rake.  The 
defendant argues that the prosecutor's statements regarding the 
missing rake exceeded the scope of the evidence, and 
impermissibly shifted the burden of production to the defendant.  
At one point in his closing, the prosecutor argued, 
"Let's assume that there was, in fact, a rake . . . .  It's 
a big mouth plastic leaf rake.  Does it look like the type 
of rake that could inflict the injuries that we see in the 
defendant's leg?  You all understood in your common 
experience what one of those rakes look like. 
 
" . . . 
 
                     
17 The facts of this case differ from Commonwealth v. 
Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 118 (2018), where we held that the 
prosecutor's "statement that the defendant's possible 
intoxication did not 'excuse' his actions," while technically 
correct, improperly implied that intoxication could not diminish 
the defendant's culpability. 
34 
 
 
"You know where he got those injuries from.  He got them 
through all the thorny vines that he traipsed through 
dragging the body of [the victim] through the woods. 
 
" . . . 
 
"If there was, in fact, really a rake that any significance 
to this case whatsoever, don't you think the police would 
have found it?  Because the defendant . . . hid all the 
incriminating evidence against him . . . . If it's the rake 
that is going to make or break this case . . . don't you 
think he would have put it front and center before he 
traveled thirty seconds down the street to the police?  
There was no rake." 
 
The defendant maintains that these statements concerning the 
source of the scratches on his legs went beyond the scope of the 
evidence, and thus were impermissible.  We disagree. 
"The prosecutor is entitled to argue the evidence and fair 
inferences to be drawn therefrom," Commonwealth v. Paradise, 405 
Mass. 141, 152 (1989), but cannot base an argument "on mere 
conjecture or surmise," id. at 153.  Although there was no rake 
in evidence, the relevant evidence included (1) a description of 
a rake observed by Molloy, (2) photographs of the scratches on 
the defendant's legs, (3) testimony and photographs regarding 
thorny vegetation where the victim's body was found, and (4) the 
defendant's statements that his legs had been injured when the 
victim hit him with a rake.  That the thorns, rather than the 
rake, could have been the source of the defendant's injuries is 
a reasonable inference from this evidence.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Buckman, 461 Mass. 24, 37-38 (2011), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 920 
35 
 
 
(2012) (not improper for prosecutor to argue that scratches on 
defendant's head had been inflicted by victim). 
Moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, expert 
medical testimony is unnecessary to support such an inference.  
Expert testimony is required where an inference is "beyond [the] 
'common knowledge and experience of the ordinary lay[person]'" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 363 
(2013).  Here, whether the scratches on the defendant's legs 
were caused by a rake or by thorny bushes was within an ordinary 
juror's common experience.18 
 
The prosecutor's suggestion that the defendant would have 
made sure that the police could find a rake likewise was not 
beyond the bounds of propriety.  Without question, a prosecutor 
may not make statements that "adversely implicate the 
defendant's fundamental right to be presumed innocent." 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 113 (1987) (error to 
argue that jury should acquit defendant if they find he is 
"truly innocent").  Although we urge prosecutors to tread with 
caution when discussing the evidentiary support (or lack 
thereof) of a defendant's case, the prosecutor did not suggest 
that the defendant had an obligation to present evidence in his 
                     
18 Indeed, defense counsel adopted similar reasoning to 
suggest a different result; he argued that the evidence 
demonstrated that there was a rake, and that the rake, not the 
thorns, was the source of the defendant's injury. 
36 
 
 
defense.  Instead, the prosecutor noted gaps and inconsistencies 
in the defendant's explanation of the events.  "The question is 
whether the challenged remark, when viewed in the context of the 
entire argument, is directed more at the general weakness of 
[the] defense than toward the defendant's own failure to 
testify" (citation and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 12 (2014).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 
404 Mass. 221, 236-237 (1989) (prosecutor's remark that there 
was no evidence defendant ever tried to tell his side of story 
infringed upon right to remain silent). 
 
c.  Reference to Lamb warning.  During the Commonwealth's 
cross-examination of Dr. Ronald Ebert, a forensic psychologist 
who testified as an expert for the defense, Ebert acknowledged 
that he had warned the defendant that any statements he made 
could be used against him in court.19  In closing argument, the 
prosecutor argued that Ebert's assessment could not be trusted 
because, having received the Lamb warning, the defendant was 
unlikely to be truthful with Ebert.20 
                     
 
19 This procedure, derived from this court's decision in 
Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 270 (1974), is known as a 
"Lamb warning." 
 
20 The prosecutor argued, "Ebert told you that he gave the 
defendant the specific warnings that he had to at the outset of 
the interview.  Whatever we discuss is not going to remain 
confidential.  It can be used against [the defendant].  It can 
be used in court. . . . Of course the defendant isn't going to 
give anything that's going to help the Commonwealth." 
37 
 
 
 
The prosecutor's statement was over the line.  The Lamb 
warning is an extension of the defendant's right to remain 
silent.  See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 270 (1974), 
invoking Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  It is well 
established that a prosecutor may not invoke a defendant's 
silence to suggest the defendant's guilt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fowler, 431 Mass. 30, 39-40 (2000).  Absent such a protection, 
the right to remain silent would be of limited value. 
 
Because the defendant did not object at trial, we review 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 195 (2001).  We conclude 
that there was none.  On direct examination, Ebert testified 
that the defendant provided him a less detailed version of the 
incident than he had given to police.  On cross-examination, 
Ebert was questioned regarding possible discrepancies between 
the defendant's statements to police and to Ebert.  Ebert agreed 
that his assessment of the defendant was heavily dependent on 
the defendant's account of what had transpired.  Therefore, 
without the prosecutor's reference to the Lamb warning, the jury 
had an independent basis on which to question the reliability of 
the defendant's statements to Ebert.  Hence, while improper, the 
prosecutor's comment did not create a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice. 
 
d.  Duty to convict.  The defendant argues that the 
38 
 
 
prosecutor impermissibly urged the jury to do their duty to 
convict the defendant when he said: 
"All of you are here for a specific reason . . . .  You are 
the ones who were chosen because you are the ones who could 
most pay attention, most focus, and give both sides a fair 
trial in this case." 
 
The defendant contends that the "palpable" inference to be 
gleaned from this statement is that the jury had a duty to 
convict. 
 
"It is improper for a prosecutor to equate a guilty verdict 
with justice."  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 20 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140 
(2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582 (2017).  "[A] reference to the 
jury's 'duty,' [even] without an explicit statement that its 
exercise will result in a verdict of guilty, should be held to 
pass the line of permissible advocacy" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 375 (1989) (prosecutor 
erred by urging "the jury to convict the defendant in order to 
end the victims' nightmares").  A prosecutor is, however, 
permitted to remind jurors of their duty to consider the 
evidence and to render a "just" verdict, even while urging the 
jury to convict.  See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471-
472 & n.10 (1998) (not improper for prosecutor to argue that the 
"one just verdict . . . is guilty as charged" where prosecutor 
also urged jury to consider evidence and not act with 
39 
 
 
"vengeance").  As in Lyons, supra, the prosecutor here concluded 
his closing by urging the jury, 
"Ladies and gentlemen, find [the defendant] guilty of first 
degree murder . . . that's what you should do.  And don't 
do it for [the victim].  Don't do it for his family.  Don't 
do it for his friends.  Convict [the defendant] because 
that's where the evidence leads you." 
 
These statements were not impermissible. 
 
e.  "Parading" of photographs.  At multiple junctures 
during closing, the prosecutor showed the jury eight- by ten-
inch prints of a number of the autopsy photographs.21  At the end 
of closing arguments, defense counsel moved for a mistrial; he 
argued that the prosecutor repeatedly had "paraded" the 
photographs in front of the jury in an inflammatory manner. 
The judge agreed that the prosecutor had done so on one 
occasion, or, at least, had "walked in front of the jury."  
Although the judge did not express concern about the display of 
the photographs, which were the same as those the jury would be 
able to review during deliberations, the judge did observe that, 
                     
21 Contrary to the defendant's assertion, it is not apparent 
from the transcripts that any of the photographs displayed were 
"inadmissible."  Each of the photographs had been introduced in 
evidence.  Earlier during trial, the judge had informed the 
prosecutor that he could not display enlarged versions of the 
autopsy photographs during the medical examiner's testimony.  
Instead, the parties agreed that any testifying witness would 
use the eight- by ten-inch copies that were entered in evidence, 
and that the jurors would be provided with a booklet containing 
the same copies to enable them to follow the testimony as it was 
given. 
40 
 
 
on one occasion, the prosecutor had held up a photograph and 
said, "Did [the victim] deserve this?"  The judge denied the 
defendant's request for a mistrial, but instructed the jury that 
they were to disregard the prosecutor's comments concerning the 
photographs.  The defendant maintains that the judge erred in 
denying his request for a mistrial, and that the curative 
instruction was inadequate. 
 
"A trial judge is in the best position to determine whether 
a mistrial . . . is necessary, or whether a less drastic 
measure, such as a curative instruction, is adequate."  Amran, 
471 Mass. at 360.  Hence, we review the denial of a motion for a 
mistrial for abuse of discretion.  See id. at 359.  Here, the 
judge, who repeatedly had reminded the jury not to be swayed by 
the gruesome nature of certain photographs, gave a specific 
curative instruction that the jury were to disregard the 
improper statements. 
The judge also instructed the jury that closing arguments 
are not evidence.  Absent an "'overwhelming probability' that 
the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions," and 
"a strong likelihood that the effect of the [statements] would 
be 'devastating' to the defendant," we presume the judge's 
instructions are sufficient.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 252 (2014), quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123, 136 (1968).  See also Gentile, 437 Mass. at 581.  The 
41 
 
 
jurors each had received copies of the same photographs during 
the medical examiner's testimony, and would have had access to 
them during deliberations.  While the display should have been 
avoided, and the improper statement should not have been made, 
the brief display was mitigated by the curative instruction, and 
thus was unlikely to have had any prejudicial effect.22 
 
6.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
argues that the verdict was not consonant with justice, and that 
we should exercise our power to reduce the verdict or to order a 
new trial.  We have reviewed the entire record, as is our duty 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and identify no grounds raised by the 
defendant or otherwise, on which to reduce the degree of guilt 
or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
22 The defendant also maintains that his acquittal of murder 
in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and 
his conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty were legally inconsistent, and that 
the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict on these 
grounds was error.  This argument is unavailing.  A verdict is 
legally inconsistent "when there exists no set of facts that the 
government could have proved in the particular case that would 
have resulted in the verdict at issue."  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 452 Mass. 142, 151 n.8 (2008).  Deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty each require proof 
of at least one element that the other does not.  See 2013 Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide at 38, 44.  As such, the verdicts 
were not legally inconsistent.