Case Title: Idaho v. Jimenez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 43938

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2016-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 43938-2016 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MARCOS APOLLO JIMENEZ, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
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Boise, June 2016 Term 
 
2016 Opinion No. 80  
 
Filed: July 22, 2016 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Bingham County.  Hon. Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, argued for appellant. 
 
Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, argued for respondent. 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal out of Bingham County from a judgment sentencing a child molester to 
prison.  He contends that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing 
negative inferences based upon his refusal to submit to a psychosexual evaluation.  We affirm 
the judgment of the district court. 
 
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
 
In September 2013, 44-year-old Marcos Jimenez (“Defendant”) was at his girlfriend’s 
apartment after she had gone to work leaving him to care for her 17-year-old daughter, who had 
the mental capacity of a 10-year-old and a learning disability.  Defendant had told the daughter 
that he would take her to town to buy her a computer, but first she had to take a shower.  While 
she was doing so, he removed her clothing from the bathroom.  When she came out of the 
bathroom with a towel wrapped around her, Defendant was waiting and told her that he wanted 
 
 
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to show her something.  He took her clothing into the bedroom, and she followed him to regain 
her clothing.  Once in the bedroom, he put gel on his fingers and told her he wanted to show her 
what an orgasm was like.  He then penetrated her vagina with his finger.  She felt very 
uncomfortable and told him she had to use the bathroom.  When she came out of the bathroom, 
he told her “just a few minutes more,” but she protested.  He then picked her up and put her on 
the bed.  After climbing on top of her, he began kissing her neck and then penetrated her vagina 
slightly with his penis.  She told him to stop and pushed him off.  He left the room, and after she 
was dressed he took her to town and bought her a computer. 
 
Defendant was charged with sexual battery of a child seventeen years of age and rape.  
Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pled guilty to the sexual battery charge, and the State dismissed the 
rape charge.  The district court ordered Defendant to have a psychosexual evaluation, which 
included a polygraph examination, and informed him that he had a Fifth Amendment right to 
refuse to answer any questions during that evaluation.  The court set the matter for sentencing. 
Defendant ultimately decided to exercise his right to remain silent and refused to have the 
psychosexual evaluation.  The court sentenced Defendant to eighteen years in the custody of the 
Idaho Board of Correction with three years fixed followed by an indeterminate period of fifteen 
years.  The court also imposed a fine of $5,000 and a fine of $5,000 that is payable to the girl and 
her mother.  Defendant was also required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.  
Defendant timely appealed.  He contends that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights 
because it drew adverse inferences from his refusal to submit to the psychosexual evaluation. 
The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
judgment of the district court.  In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a 
decision of the Court of Appeals, we do not review the decision of the Court of Appeals.  We 
hear the case anew as if the appeal had initially come directly to this Court.  State v. Suriner, 154 
Idaho 81, 83, 294 P.3d 1093, 1095 (2013). 
 
II. 
Did the District Court Violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right to Remain Silent? 
 
 
Under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a criminal defendant has 
the right not to participate in a psychosexual evaluation.  Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564, 
149 P.3d 833, 839 (2006).  The issue in this case, as framed by Defendant, is, “Did the district 
 
 
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court err by using Mr. Jimenez’s decision to exercise his right not to participate in the 
psychosexual evaluation against him at sentencing?”  The United States Supreme Court has not 
decided the issue of whether a court could draw an adverse inference against a defendant from 
the defendant’s silence at sentencing where such inference does not involve a factual 
determination regarding the circumstances and details of the crime.  White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. 
___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014).  We need not decide that issue, because the record does not 
indicate that when imposing sentence the court drew an adverse inference from Defendant’s 
silence. 
 
At the commencement of the sentencing hearing, the district court explained to 
Defendant that without an assessment of his risk, the court would make its decision based upon 
the circumstances of the case.  The dialogue was as follows: 
THE COURT:  The point I’m making is that if the court doesn’t have an 
assessment of your risk, that I would be within my authority from the totality of 
the circumstances, specifically the circumstances of this case that I have before 
me, to assume that you are a significant risk.  Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Risk, but then you have the rest of my history.  
There is no other charges. 
THE COURT:  Well, I have your criminal history, but I don’t know your 
full sexual history.  In other words I don’t know whether you’ve abused other 
minors; I don’t know whether or not you have a history of this kind of behavior, I 
just know you’ve never been charged with it before. 
THE DEFENDANT:  I see what you are saying. 
THE COURT:  Okay. And so that’s the record before me, and I’ll have to 
make my decision based upon the information I have, not the information I don’t 
have. 
And so one of the reasons we have a psychosexual evaluation is so that the 
court can understand who you are and what type of a person you are.  If I don’t 
have any information, then I have to look at the facts of this case and pretty much 
nothing else, or there is very little else in the record to help me make a decision 
about what kind of a person you are.  I just know what you’ve done here, and that 
tells me what kind of a person you are, unless there are some other factors. 
Now there might be reasons why you don’t want me to know your past, 
and if you don’t want me to know your past, then I can’t make you tell me; and 
the Constitution says you don’t have to tell me.  But if I don’t know your past, 
then I’m going to have to just judge you by the type of man I know you are from 
the information that’s before me.  Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
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Later in the hearing and before announcing its sentence, the district court stated that it 
could draw an adverse inference from Defendant’s refusal to submit to the psychosexual 
evaluation, but that would not be a factor in its sentence and the court would base its sentence on 
the information the court had.  The court stated: 
The court is very aware that you have no record.  I’m not sure what to 
make of that without a psychosexual evaluation or the polygraph.  I could assume 
that that means that you’ve just never broken the law in your entire life, or I could 
assume that you’ve never been caught; sometimes it’s somewhere in between.  I 
do note some of the most dangerous criminals are the ones that are good enough 
to get away with it.  But, again, I just don’t have any evidence there to give me 
confidence of what conclusions I should a [sic] draw from that. I can only assume, 
though, that the fact that you didn’t participate must mean there’s some 
information you don’t want me to know about.  I wouldn’t hold that against you at 
a trial, that would be wrong because you have a right to remain silent at your trial 
and you do have a right to remain silent here now, too.  But generally if there is 
something that you didn’t want me to know, I can only assume there is a good 
reason you didn’t want me to know it.  But, again, those things really played no 
factor in my sentence.  I just have to deal with the case as what it is, and not what 
it’s not, and my discussion is based on the information I do have. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Despite the district court’s statements to the contrary, Defendant contends that the court 
did draw adverse inferences against him because of his assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights.  
Defendant points to the court’s statement that without an assessment of Defendant’s risk of 
reoffending, the court would err on the side of protecting the community.  The statement in 
context was as follows:  
First of all, I am required to by law look at the objectives of criminal punishment 
set forth by the Toohill decision [103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982)], 
as the prosecutor mentioned; the first and foremost of those factors I’m supposed 
to consider is protection of society.  With no risk assessment, I think it would be 
improper for this court to do anything else other than err on the side of safety.  I 
have to make sure we keep this community safe.  And this is the paramount 
concern that I must have. 
 
 
Defendant also points to the district court’s statement that without a psychosexual 
evaluation, it could not assess Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and so would “have to go 
back to protection of society.”  The court’s statement in context was as follows: 
Next, the court has to consider the possibility of rehabilitation.  This is 
where the lack of a psychosexual evaluation really puts the court at a 
 
 
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disadvantage, because I don’t know how amenable you are for rehabilitation, 
whether or not you can be treated through counseling in the community or 
whether or not you need to be incarcerated.  So, again, with no assessment there, I 
have to go back to protection of society, and I still have a responsibility to try to 
get you help, and I want to do that, Mr. Jimenez.  Normally my inclination would 
be to give you the least degree of supervision necessary to get you the type of help 
that you need.  In other words it’s kind of like prescribing medication, I want to 
give you enough medication to cure you but not more than you need.  But here, 
without the evaluation, I don’t know how amenable you are to treatment in the 
community. 
 
The objectives of criminal punishment are protection of society, deterrence of the 
individual and the public, possibility of rehabilitation, and punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing, State v. Carver, 155 Idaho 489, 496, 314 P.3d 171, 178 (2013), with the primary 
objective being the protection of society, State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616, 619 
(2004).  Defendant did not begin the sentencing hearing with the possibilities of incarceration or 
of probation being in equipoise.  The district court stated that “this was a terrible crime, one of 
the more reprehensible acts I’ve seen.”  The court also stated that it attempts to discern between 
evil and stupidity and will give someone who acts out of stupidity a second chance.  With respect 
to Defendant, the court stated, “Everything about this case tells me this wasn’t about stupidity, 
this was an evil act no matter how you define the term, and so it needs to be punished as an evil 
act.”  In his comments, defense counsel stated, “I would submit to the court that the crime in 
itself, Mr. Jimenez understands that there is going to be incarceration here; he knows that.”  In 
fact, defense counsel recommended a sentence two to four years in prison, hopefully two years, 
followed by a “lengthy” indeterminate sentence during which Defendant could be on supervised 
parole, if he could “get past” the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole.  That is essentially 
the sentence that the court imposed. 
 
Commenting on the fact that without the psychosexual evaluation there was a lack of 
evidence regarding Defendant’s amenability to treatment in the community and his 
corresponding risk does not constitute drawing an adverse inference from Defendant’s silence.  
There is a difference between drawing an adverse inference and recognizing the lack of 
evidence.  An inference is “[a] conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a 
logical consequence from them.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 781 (19th ed. 2010).  The record is 
clear that the district court did not infer that Defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation and 
was a high risk to the community based upon his refusal to submit to a psychosexual evaluation.  
 
 
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Defendant had planned a forcible rape upon a vulnerable teenage girl who had diminished mental 
capacity apparently in the twisted belief that she would enjoy it.  His conduct showed that he was 
a risk to the community.  Defendant had an opportunity to present whatever information or 
evidence he desired in mitigation.  He did not present any expert testimony regarding his 
amenability to treatment or his risk to the community.  He obviously was not required to do so, 
but the court could certainly take into consideration the lack of such evidence when deciding 
whether to place Defendant on probation. 
 
Defendant also contends that the district court drew an adverse inference regarding the 
facts of the crime from his refusal to submit to the psychosexual evaluation.  The victim’s 
account of what occurred would also support Defendant having committed the crime of rape.  
During the sentencing hearing, the court asked if there were any changes to the presentence 
investigation report, and defense counsel responded that Defendant said that “he did not have 
sexual intercourse of the kind of putting his penis inside the victim.”  The court noted 
Defendant’s version differed from the victim’s, but the court could not change the report.  The 
court then stated: 
THE COURT:  I do recognize that there is some disagreement there.  I do 
know what he pled guilty to. 
MR. BROWNING:  Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT:  And at the time he entered his plea he made those 
comments under oath, and that certainly will be the primary focus of the court. 
MR. BROWNING:  Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT:  And, again, he would have had the right to discuss this issue 
with a polygrapher, but apparently he didn’t want to participate in that. 
 
Defendant contends that the district court’s statement shows that it drew an adverse inference 
regarding the facts of the crime from Defendant’s refusal to submit to the psychosexual 
evaluation. 
 
In Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), the defendant pleaded guilty to one 
count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, reserving the right to contest 
the quantity of cocaine attributable to her under that charge.  Id. at 317.  Three of the co-
conspirators pleaded guilty and agreed to testify at the trial of nine other co-conspirators.  Id. at 
318.  During their testimony, they stated that the defendant regularly sold cocaine for the 
ringleader.  Id.  The defendant did not testify at her sentencing hearing, but her counsel argued 
that she was only responsible for the two ounces of cocaine that she had sold to the undercover 
 
 
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informant.  Id. at 319.  The trial court held that the defendant had sold more than five ounces of 
cocaine, thus mandating a minimum sentence of ten years, because the defendant had not come 
forward and testified to the contrary.  Id.  On appeal, the Supreme Court held, “By holding 
petitioner’s silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, 
the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right 
against compelled self-incrimination.”  Id. at 330. 
 
Defendant in this case likewise asserts that the district court’s above-quoted statement 
shows that it drew adverse inferences against him regarding the facts of the crime because he did 
not submit to the psychosexual evaluation.  The record is to the contrary.  The disputed facts 
relate to the rape charge, which was dismissed.  To the extent that the court may have taken into 
consideration that Defendant committed the rape, as opposed to only attempting to do so, such 
facts were based upon the victim’s account as recorded by the nurse who interviewed her three 
days afterward.  That account was included in the presentence investigation report, as was the 
probable cause statement that set forth facts consistent with Defendant having committed a rape.  
Even the statement by Defendant’s counsel does not state facts inconsistent with him having 
committed a rape.  According to his counsel, Defendant denied having “sexual intercourse of the 
kind of putting his penis inside the victim.”  The victim did not contend that Defendant put his 
penis inside her.  She reported that when Defendant climbed on top of her, he tried to put his 
penis in her vagina and penetrated her “a little.”  With respect to the crime of rape, “[a]ny sexual 
penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.”  I.C. § 18-6103.  Thus, 
Defendant’s contention that he did not commit rape may be based upon his misunderstanding of 
what constitutes that crime.  Nevertheless, there is nothing in the record indicating that the 
court’s sentence was based upon it drawing an adverse inference from Defendant’s refusal to 
submit to the psychosexual evaluation. 
 
  
III. 
Conclusion. 
 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
 
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.