Case Title: Conley v. Brown Corp. of Waverly, Inc.

Citation: 1998-Ohio-194

Docket Number: 19971143

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
CONLEY ET AL.; NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANIES/NATIONWIDE PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. BROWN CORPORATION OF 
WAVERLY, INC., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Conley v. Brown Corp. of Waverly, Inc. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Employer and employee — Liability of employer for intentional tortious conduct 
— Standing to file suit against employer alleging that employer committed 
an intentional tort leading to employee’s injury, disease, or death. 
1. 
An employer is not immune from civil liability for employee injuries, 
disease, or death caused by the employer’s intentional tortious conduct in 
the workplace, since such conduct necessarily occurs outside the 
employment relationship.  (Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, 
Inc. [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, and its 
progeny, approved and followed.) 
2. 
A suit against an employer alleging that the employer committed an 
intentional tort leading to an employee’s injury, disease, or death may be 
maintained by the employee or his or her legal representative, an assignee of 
the right of action against the employer, or any other person or entity with a 
statutory or common-law right to recover against the employer, including a 
third-party tortfeasor with a statutory or common-law claim for contribution 
or for indemnification, or the subrogee of the third-party tortfeasor’s rights 
or claims.  (Taylor v. Academy Iron & Metal Co. [1988], 36 Ohio St.3d 149, 
522 N.E.2d 464, overruled.) 
(No. 97-1143 — Submitted April 21, 1998 — Decided August 5, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Pike County, No. 96CA583. 
 
The following relevant matters can be gleaned from the record and from the 
briefs and supplements of the parties. 
 
2
 
In 1992, David Conley worked as a contract laborer for Brown Corporation 
of Waverly, Inc. (“Brown”), appellee, a business engaged in the operation of 
machine presses for manufacturing wholesale parts and supplies.  In October 
1992, Conley was severely injured while operating a machine press at his place of 
employment.  The injuries occurred when the press suddenly and unexpectedly 
activated while Conley was placing steel sheets into the machine as part of his 
assigned job duties. 
 
In July 1993, Conley and his wife, Donna Conley, filed a complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Pike County against Brown and two “John Doe” 
defendants.  This case was assigned No. 228-CIV-93 in the common pleas court.  
In June 1994, the Conleys filed an amended complaint in case No. 228-CIV-93, 
naming, as defendants, Brown, Hitachi Zosen Clearing, Inc., IDC Corporation, and 
Rexcon, Inc.  Apparently, Hitachi was the manufacturer of the machine press, and 
IDC and Rexcon were manufacturers of certain control systems or devices that had 
been used in connection with the operation of the press.  In the amended 
complaint, David Conley sought recovery against Brown for employer intentional 
tort.  Additionally, he sought recovery against the remaining defendants for 
products liability.  Donna Conley sought recovery for her loss of consortium.  In 
the amended complaint, the Conleys alleged that the defendants were jointly and 
severally liable for compensatory damages. 
 
In August 1994, the Conleys voluntarily dismissed their action against 
Brown without prejudice.  In 1995, various cross-claims that had been filed by the 
defendants against Brown were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, including 
a cross-claim that had been filed by Rexcon against Brown for contribution.  
Apparently, at some point, the Conleys also dismissed their claims against IDC 
and Hitachi, but the case proceeded on the Conleys’ claims against Rexcon. 
 
3
 
The Conleys eventually refiled their suit against Brown in August 1995, but 
did not serve Brown until December 1995.  This new case was assigned No. 280-
CIV-95 in the common pleas court.  Brown was the only defendant named in the 
action.  Additionally, in December 1995, Nationwide Insurance Companies 
Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), appellant, 
Rexcon’s liability insurance carrier, paid the Conleys $397,500 in settlement of 
the litigation in case No. 228-CIV-93.  In exchange for the payment, the Conleys 
signed a document entitled “Covenant Not to Proceed,” whereby they expressly 
agreed “to cease suing and not to initiate new legal action” against Rexcon, 
Nationwide, Brown, and others.  As part of the agreement, the Conleys assigned to 
Nationwide their causes of action against Brown for employer intentional tort and 
loss of consortium.1  Also, in December 1995, Nationwide, as subrogee of 
Rexcon’s rights and as assignee of the Conleys’ causes of action against Brown, 
moved to intervene as a plaintiff in case No. 280-CIV-95 to assert claims against 
Brown for “contribution and/or indemnity.”  The trial court granted Nationwide’s 
motion to intervene. 
 
Thereafter, on January 24, 1996, Nationwide, as an intervening plaintiff in 
case No. 280-CIV-95, filed a complaint against Brown.  Subsequently, the 
Conleys dismissed their action against Brown in case No. 280-CIV-95,2 and also 
dismissed their action against Rexcon in case No. 228-CIV-93. 
 
In its complaint in case No. 280-CIV-95, Nationwide set forth the following 
relevant allegations and prayer for relief: 
 
“8.  [Brown] did not formally instruct or train Mr. Conley in the safe 
operation of any particular press * * * [including the LP5 press he was operating 
at the time of his injury]. 
 
4
 
“9.  The control system activation devices [manufactured and designed by 
Rexcon] of the LP5 press which Mr. Conley was operating at the time of his injury 
had been altered by [Brown], or [Brown] knew of their alteration. 
 
“10.  [Brown] violated the standards of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration by the manner in which it installed or used the control system 
activation devices. 
 
“11.  [Brown] failed to install safety devices necessary for the safe operation 
of the LP5 press or used said press knowing that such safety devices had not been 
installed or were not functioning. 
 
“12.  [Brown] was aware of the dangerous conditions * * *; [Brown] knew 
that * * * Mr. Conley * * * was substantially certain to be harmed; and [Brown], 
under such circumstances and with such knowledge, did act to require Mr. Conley 
to continue to perform the dangerous task of operating the LP5 press. 
 
“13.  As a direct and proximate result of [Brown’s] actions or failure to act, 
Mr. Conley sustained * * * [severe and debilitating injuries]. 
 
“14.  In Case No. 228-CIV-93, in Pike County, Ohio, [the Conleys] sued, 
among others, Rexcon, for the injuries and damages caused the Conleys as a result 
of [the personal injuries sustained by Mr. Conley]. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“16.  During the litigation and prior to judgment, Nationwide, on behalf of 
Rexcon, entered into a settlement agreement with [the Conleys] * * *. 
 
“17.  Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, in consideration of 
$397,500.00, [the Conleys] released all claims arising out of the accident, subject 
of Case No. 228-CIV-93 against Defendant, [Brown] and Rexcon. 
 
5
 
“18.  The consideration of $397,500.00 which Nationwide paid * * * is in 
excess of Rexcon’s proportionate share of the common liability of Rexcon and 
[Brown]. 
 
“19.  Pursuant to [former R.C. 2307.31(C)], Nationwide is subrogated to 
Rexcon’s right of contribution from [Brown] to the extent of the amount it paid in 
excess of Rexcon’s proportionate share of the common liability. 
 
“WHEREFORE, [Nationwide] demands judgment against [Brown] for 
$397,500.00 or, in the alternative, that the Court cause the common liability of 
Rexcon and [Brown] to be apportioned and order judgment to Nationwide in the 
amount equal to [Brown’s] proportionate share of the common liability * * *.” 
 
Brown filed an answer to Nationwide’s complaint and asserted, as one of its 
defenses, that Nationwide’s claims were “barred by the Ohio Workers’ 
Compensation laws.”  Following a period of discovery, Brown moved for 
summary judgment on the merits of Nationwide’s claims.  However, during a May 
1996 pretrial conference, a question arose as to whether Nationwide could 
maintain the action, since Brown’s liability to Nationwide (if any) was predicated 
on Brown’s alleged activities in having committed an employer intentional tort.  
Specifically, at the pretrial conference, counsel for Nationwide raised the issue 
whether Taylor v. Academy Iron & Metal Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 149, 522 
N.E.2d 464, was, as an initial matter, dispositive of Nationwide’s claims.  
Following the pretrial conference, Brown filed a “supplemental memorandum” in 
support of its motion for summary judgment, claiming that Nationwide’s suit was 
barred by Taylor.  Nationwide responded to the supplemental memorandum. 
 
On July 8, 1996, the trial court, relying on Taylor, dismissed Nationwide’s 
entire complaint, finding that Nationwide had no standing to pursue an employer 
intentional tort claim against Brown.  The trial court never reached the issues that 
 
6
had been raised by Brown in its original motion for summary judgment on the 
merits of Nationwide’s claims. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals, by a divided vote, affirmed the judgment of 
the trial court.  The court of appeals’ majority held that Taylor barred 
Nationwide’s suit, stating: 
 
“Nationwide sought to recover on three theories:  (1) contribution; (2) 
indemnification; (3) assignment of the Conleys’ intentional tort claim to 
Nationwide.  Nationwide stands in the place of the third-party tortfeasor Rexcon.  
We find that each of Nationwide’s theories attempts to assert the Conleys’ 
intentional tort claim against Brown.  Taylor holds at paragraph one of the 
syllabus that a third-party tortfeasor has no standing to assert an employee’s 
intentional tort claim against an employer.  We therefore reluctantly conclude that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor bars all of Nationwide’s claims because 
Nationwide has no standing to raise an employee’s intentional tort claim against 
an employer. * * * 
 
“Our reluctance to follow Taylor is based on * * * [the] well-reasoned 
dissent [in Taylor] as well as policy concerns.  The [Taylor] majority’s rationale 
for finding that no standing exists for a third-party tortfeasor is less than 
convincing.  We believe that the immunity provided to employers by workers’ 
compensation law has no place in an intentional tort analysis. * * * 
 
“If this were an issue of first impression, our balance would weigh in favor 
of [allowing] contribution and indemnity and encouraging settlements for injured 
victims. * * *  We would also find that the immunity provided to complying 
employers by workers’ compensation is irrelevant when an intentional tort is 
asserted.  However, the Ohio Supreme Court has spoken on this issue and we, as 
an inferior court, must adhere to the Supreme Court’s position.  We therefore 
 
7
affirm the judgment of the trial court.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor 
bars Nationwide’s action.” 
 
Conversely, Judge Harsha of the court of appeals, in a separate dissenting 
opinion, concluded that Taylor did not mandate affirmance of the trial court’s 
judgment in this case.  Specifically, Judge Harsha argued that this court’s holding 
in Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, 
paragraph one of the syllabus (an intentional tort committed by an employer 
against an employee necessarily occurs outside the scope of the employment 
relationship), represented a repudiation of Taylor’s rationale that the workers’ 
compensation statutes insulate an employer from all common-law claims of 
liability.  Thus, Judge Harsha determined that Taylor had been overruled sub 
silentio in Brady.  Additionally, Judge Harsha concluded that Nationwide should 
have been allowed to proceed “on the assignment theory,” i.e., as assignee of the 
Conleys’ claims against Brown. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Arter & Hadden and Irene C. Keyse-Walker; Mollica, Gall, Sloan & Sillery 
Co., L.P.A., Steven T. Sloan and James D. Sillery, for appellant. 
 
Lindhorst & Dreidame and James M. Moore, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The case at bar presents us with an excellent opportunity to 
revisit the holdings in Taylor, 36 Ohio St.3d 149, 522 N.E.2d 464, and to 
expressly overrule Taylor as an anomaly of Ohio law.  For the reasons that follow, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial 
court, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
8
 
In Taylor, Luke Scargill and Bobby Lee Taylor were employees of a metal 
manufacturing concern known as Alumax, Inc.  Scargill was injured and Taylor 
was killed as a result of an explosion that occurred while aluminum scrap was 
being fed into a crusher machine at Alumax.  Scargill and the administrator of 
Taylor’s estate filed suit against Academy Iron & Metal Company (“Academy 
Iron”), the supplier of the aluminum scrap.  The plaintiffs sought recovery against 
Academy Iron for products liability.  Academy Iron then filed a third-party 
complaint against Alumax, alleging that Scargill’s personal injuries and Taylor’s 
death had been caused by the intentional tortious acts of the employer.  The third-
party complaint sought indemnification from Alumax to Academy Iron for any 
damages for which Academy Iron was found to be liable in the underlying actions 
of Scargill and Taylor. 
 
Alumax moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a 
claim.  Academy Iron later sought leave to file an amended third-party complaint 
to add a claim for contribution.  The amended third-party complaint was filed 
along with the motion for leave to amend.  Thereafter, the trial court dismissed 
Academy Iron’s third-party complaint, apparently holding that Academy Iron had 
no standing to bring an action against Alumax due to the immunity provided to 
complying employers under R.C. Chapter 4123, Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation 
Act.  The dismissal of the third-party complaint (in which Academy Iron had 
asserted only a right to indemnification) implicitly disposed of the claim for 
contribution that Academy Iron had attempted to assert in its amended third-party 
complaint. 
 
Academy Iron settled the claims in the underlying actions by Scargill and 
the administrator of Taylor’s estate, but appealed the dismissal of the third-party 
complaint.  On appeal, the court of appeals in Taylor affirmed the judgment of the 
 
9
trial court, finding that the third-party complaint was precluded by former R.C. 
4121.80.  Upon further appeal, this court, by a divided (five-to-two) vote, affirmed 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
At the outset of this court’s decision in Taylor, the Taylor majority noted 
that, pursuant to Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 4123.74, 
employers who comply with Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws are immune from 
damages for employee injuries that arise in the course of the employment.  Id. at 
150-152, 522 N.E.2d at 466-467.  The majority observed that “[a]s these 
provisions [i.e., Section 35, Article II and former R.C. 4123.74] explicate, the 
General Assembly, in carrying out its constitutional mandate and adopting a 
workers’ compensation law, provided complying employers with immunity from 
damages for employee injuries that arise in the course of employment.”  Id. at 152, 
522 N.E.2d at 467.  The Taylor majority also noted that an employer is not 
immune from damages for employee injuries caused by the intentional tortious 
conduct of the employer, since such conduct falls outside the scope of employment 
and workers’ compensation law.  Id., citing Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron 
Chemicals, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572.  
However, following a brief discussion of the holding in Blankenship, the court in 
Taylor found that Academy Iron, which the court labeled a “third-party 
tortfeasor,” 
lacked 
standing 
to 
pursue 
the 
third-party 
complaint 
for 
indemnification.  Id. at 152-153, 522 N.E.2d at 467-468. 
 
The Taylor court reached its conclusion on the issue of standing based on a 
single statement in Blankenship that “ ‘an employee may resort to a civil suit for 
damages.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Taylor at 152, 522 N.E.2d at 467, quoting 
Blankenship at 613, 23 O.O.3d at 508, 433 N.E.2d at 576.  Specifically, the Taylor 
majority interpreted that statement as barring suit by anyone other than the 
 
10
employee or the employee’s legal representative.  Id. at 152, 522 N.E.2d at 468.  
Thus, the court in Taylor concluded that third-party tortfeasors have no standing to 
bring a civil suit against an employer “alleging that the employer committed 
intentional torts leading to an employee’s work-related death, disease, or injury.”  
Id. at 153, 522 N.E.2d at 468.  The Taylor court also attempted to bolster its 
conclusion in this regard based on the immunity granted to complying employers 
under Ohio’s workers’ compensation law.  Id. at 150-153, 522 N.E.2d at 466-468.  
Additionally, the court went on to hold that Academy Iron could not recover from 
Alumax on any theory of implied or equitable indemnification, since Alumax had 
never expressly waived immunity from suit stemming from Section 35, Article II 
of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 4123.74.  Id. at 153-154, 522 N.E.2d at 468-
470.  Therefore, the court in Taylor held, at paragraphs one through three of the 
syllabus: 
 
“1.  Only an employee or his legal representative, not a third-party 
tortfeasor, may bring a civil suit against an employer alleging that the employer 
committed an intentional tort leading to an employee’s work-related death, 
disease, or injury.  (Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc. [1982], 69 
Ohio St.2d 608, 614, 23 O.O.3d 504, 508, 433 N.E.2d 572, 577, certiorari denied 
[1982], 459 U.S. 857, 103 S.Ct. 127, 74 L.Ed.2d 110, followed.) 
 
“2.  A third-party tortfeasor has no standing to bring an indemnification 
claim against an employer, who is acting in compliance with the Ohio workers’ 
compensation law, for damages suffered by an employee in the course of or arising 
out of his employment. 
 
“3.  Relief from common-law liability under the Workers’ Compensation 
Act extends to cases in which a third-party tortfeasor, having paid damages to an 
employee or his estate, seeks indemnity from the employer on the ground that the 
 
11
liability of the employer is primary or active and the liability of the third-party 
tortfeasor is secondary or passive.” 
 
The dissent in Taylor pointed out an array of problems and inconsistencies 
with the rationale and holdings of the majority opinion in that case.  Taylor, 36 
Ohio St.3d at 155-163, 522 N.E.2d at 470-477 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent noted, among other things, that the majority in Taylor had misused a 
statement from Blankenship to reach a conclusion that was absolutely inconsistent 
with the underpinnings of Blankenship and its progeny.  Taylor at 157-158, 522 
N.E.2d at 472-473.  The Taylor dissent took issue with the majority’s reliance on 
the immunity provided to complying employers under Ohio’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act, and suggested that it should now be clear “that intentional 
misconduct by an employer which results in an injury to his employee is outside 
the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the employer in such cases 
is not entitled to the protections afforded by the Act.”  Id. at 157-158, 522 N.E.2d 
at 472.  Likewise, the dissent in Taylor noted that “[i]f the conduct of [Alumax] 
was indeed intentional, an assumption that the majority acknowledges must be 
made, then the protections of the workers’ compensation system have no relevance 
whatsoever.”  Id. at 158, 522 N.E.2d at 472.  The dissent concluded that Academy 
Iron’s amended third-party complaint had stated a claim for contribution under 
former R.C. 2307.31, as well as a claim for indemnity.  Id. at 157-159, 522 N.E.2d 
at 471-473.  Additionally, the dissent in Taylor went on to address the 
constitutionality of former R.C. 4121.80 (an issue not decided by the Taylor 
majority), and concluded that the statute represented an invalid exercise of 
legislative authority.  Id. at 161-162, 522 N.E.2d at 475-476. 
 
The following passage from the Taylor dissent dealt with issues concerning 
former R.C. 4121.80, but the passage adequately summarizes the rationale of the 
 
12
entire dissent that employers have no immunity or special protection from civil 
liability for employee injuries that are caused, in whole or in part, by the 
intentional tortious conduct of the employer: 
 
“Injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional torts, even though 
committed at the workplace, are utterly outside the scope of the purposes intended 
to be achieved by Section 35 [Article II of the Ohio Constitution] and by the 
[Workers’ Compensation Act].  Such injuries are totally unrelated to the fact of 
employment.  When an employer intentionally harms his employee, that act effects 
a complete breach of the employment relationship, and for purposes of the legal 
remedy for such an injury, the two parties are not employer and employee, but 
intentional tortfeasor and victim.  If the victim brings an intentional tort suit 
against the tortfeasor, it is a tort action like any other.  The employer has forfeited 
his status as such and all the attendant protections fall away.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 
36 Ohio St.3d at 162, 522 N.E.2d at 476 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 
In Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, this court adopted the 
rationale of the above-quoted passage from the Taylor dissent in holding that 
former R.C. 4121.80 was, in fact, unconstitutional.  Brady at 634, 576 N.E.2d at 
729, quoting Taylor at 162, 522 N.E.2d at 476 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Brady 
recognized that employer intentional torts “will always take place outside” the 
employment relationship.  Brady at 634, 576 N.E.2d at 729.  Brady does not, 
however, expressly or impliedly overrule Taylor.  The constitutionality of former 
R.C. 4121.80 was not addressed by the Taylor majority, and Brady did not address 
the issue whether a third-party tortfeasor has standing to bring an action against an 
employer for intentionally tortious conduct that injures an employee.  
Nevertheless, Brady does effectively repudiate the rationale of Taylor, insofar as 
Taylor was predicated on the theory that workers’ compensation statutes can 
 
13
insulate an employer from common-law liability for damages caused by the 
employer’s intentional tortious conduct in the workplace.  Specifically, Brady, like 
the dissent in Taylor, recognizes that an intentional tort committed by an employer 
against an employee necessarily occurs outside the scope of the employment 
relationship and, thus, outside the realm of any protections afforded to complying 
employers by Ohio’s workers’ compensation law.  Brady at paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
To apply Taylor in the case at bar would preclude Nationwide, as subrogee 
of the rights of a “third-party tortfeasor,” or as assignee of the Conleys’ claims, 
from maintaining suit against Brown for Brown’s alleged activity in having 
committed an intentional tort in the workplace and having caused or contributed to 
the injuries sustained by David Conley.  This is so, of course, because Taylor 
holds, among other things, that “[o]nly an employee or his legal representative, not 
a third-party tortfeasor, may bring a civil suit against an employer alleging that the 
employer committed an intentional tort leading to an employee’s work-related 
death, disease, or injury.”  Id., 36 Ohio St.3d 149, 522 N.E.2d 464, at paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  Nationwide is neither the “employee” nor the employee’s 
“legal representative” within the meaning of Taylor.  Rather, Nationwide is a 
“third-party tortfeasor,” insofar as Nationwide stands in the place of Rexcon as 
subrogee of Rexcon’s rights against Brown.  Furthermore, according to the 
holdings and rationale of Taylor, Nationwide would have no standing to maintain 
claims against Brown because of the immunity conferred upon complying 
employers under Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act. 
 
However, upon a careful review of Taylor, the dissent in Taylor, and our 
decision in Brady, it is now absolutely clear to us that Brady and the dissent in 
Taylor are consistent with Ohio law and the case of Blankenship and its progeny, 
 
14
whereas the majority opinion in Taylor is not.  We find that Taylor was bad law 
when it was first decided, and that it remains bad law today.  The rationale in 
Taylor for finding a lack of standing for “third-party tortfeasors” is, as the court of 
appeals’ majority recognized, “less than convincing.”  Employer immunity under 
Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act has no relevance whatsoever where, as here, 
the employer has allegedly committed an intentional tort against an employee.  
Because employer intentional torts “will always take place outside” the 
employment relationship (Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d at 634, 576 N.E.2d at 729), 
workers’ compensation law has no connection with suits alleging an employer 
intentional tort.  We can perceive of no legitimate reason why Brown, simply 
because it is an employer, should be absolved from civil liability to Nationwide if, 
in fact, an intentional tort was committed.  An employer who commits an 
intentional tort against an employee in the workplace is to be treated the same as 
other persons or entities that may be called upon to answer for the injurious 
consequences of their own tortious conduct. 
 
Accordingly, in keeping with the rationale of Blankenship, 69 Ohio St.2d 
608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, and its progeny, we now hold that an 
employer is not immune from civil liability for employee injuries, disease, or death 
caused by the employer’s intentional tortious conduct in the workplace, since such 
conduct necessarily occurs outside the employment relationship.  Additionally, we 
hold that a suit against an employer alleging that the employer committed an 
intentional tort leading to an employee’s injury, disease, or death may be 
maintained by the employee or his or her legal representative, an assignee of the 
right of action against the employer, or any other person or entity with a statutory 
or common-law right to recover against the employer, including a third-party 
tortfeasor with a statutory or common-law claim for contribution or for 
 
15
indemnification, or the subrogee of the third-party tortfeasor’s rights or claims.  
Taylor is therefore overruled. 
 
In the case at bar, Nationwide’s status as subrogee of Rexcon’s rights, and 
as assignee of the Conleys’ claims, clearly provides the basis for Nationwide’s 
interest and standing to maintain suit against Brown for all or part of the proceeds 
that have been paid by Nationwide to the Conleys on behalf of Rexcon.  
Nationwide, as assignee of the Conleys’ causes of action for intentional tort, is 
entitled to assert claims for full recovery against Brown and, also, as subrogee of 
Rexcon’s right, if any, to indemnification, including implied or equitable 
indemnification of the type at issue in Taylor, 36 Ohio St.3d 149, 522 N.E.2d 464. 
 
Moreover, insofar as Nationwide’s complaint was based on an asserted right 
to contribution, we find that former R.C. 2307.31 and 2307.32(C) (now R.C. 
2307.32 and 2307.33[C]) provided a clear basis for Nationwide’s interest and 
standing to maintain its claims against Brown.  Former R.C. 2307.31(A) provided, 
in part: 
 
“[W]here two or more persons are jointly and severally liable in tort for the 
same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right 
of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against 
all or any of them.  The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor 
who has paid more than his proportionate share of the common liability, and his 
total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his proportionate 
share.  No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own 
proportionate share of the common liability.  There is no right of contribution in 
favor of any tortfeasor who intentionally has caused or intentionally has 
contributed to the injury or loss to person or property or the wrongful death.” 
 
16
 
Former R.C. 2307.31(B) provided that a tortfeasor who entered into a 
settlement with a claimant was not entitled to recover contribution from another 
tortfeasor whose liability was not extinguished by the settlement.  Former R.C. 
2307.31(C) permitted a liability insurer that discharged the obligation of a 
tortfeasor to be subrogated to the tortfeasor’s right of contribution “to the extent of 
the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor’s proportionate share of the 
common liability.”  Former R.C. 2307.31(G) and 2307.32(C) permitted 
enforcement of the right to contribution by separate action. 
 
Here, Nationwide settled with the Conleys on behalf of Rexcon.  The 
Conleys assigned claims to Nationwide as part of the settlement.  The covenant 
obtained by Nationwide in connection with the settlement may be viewed as 
having extinguished Brown’s liability, if any, to the Conleys.  Nationwide may 
therefore be entitled to contribution from Brown to the extent of the amount 
Nationwide has allegedly paid in excess of Rexcon’s proportionate share of the 
common liability of Brown and Rexcon. 
 
Nevertheless, Brown protests that Taylor has the effect of advancing 
important public policy interests and that Taylor should be preserved to bar claims 
such as those advanced by Nationwide.  Specifically, Brown argues that “[i]n its 
decision in Taylor, supra, this Court determined that employer intentional tort 
claims are personal to the employee.  If the employee chooses not to pursue such a 
claim, no one else can do so.  That decision provides an important check on 
frivolous lawsuits mounted by opportunists and, thus, satisfies policy concerns 
raised by the availability of an employer intentional tort theory.”  However, the 
solution to such “frivolous” lawsuits is in the use of a Civ.R. 56 summary 
judgment motion challenging the merits of the claims or, perhaps, through the use 
 
17
of Civ.R. 11.  The appropriate solution is not (and cannot be) to bar the courthouse 
door to possibly meritorious claims of intentional tort. 
 
Brown also argues that Taylor is consistent with the wishes of the General 
Assembly “to rein in, not expand, employer intentional tort as a theory of recovery 
by injured workers beyond the workers’ compensation system.”  Brown’s 
argument concerning the desires of the General Assembly is apparently based on 
R.C. 2745.01 and former R.C. 4121.80.  However, former R.C. 4121.80 was struck 
down in Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
as an invalid exercise of legislative authority.3  Additionally, as Brown readily 
concedes, R.C. 2745.01, which became effective November 1, 1995, is not 
applicable in this case and, thus, we refrain from any further comment concerning 
that statute or the expression of legislative intent accompanying the enactment. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and we remand this cause to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the judgment and 
syllabus only. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The “Covenant Not to Proceed” was signed by the Conleys and by their 
attorney.  The agreement provides, in part: 
 
“[W]e, DAVID CONLEY and DONNA CONLEY, individually and as 
husband and wife do hereby acknowledge receipt of [$397,500] which amount has 
been accepted as sole consideration for their covenant to cease suing and not to 
 
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initiate new legal action against [inter alia, Rexcon, Nationwide, Brown] or any 
other person, corporation, association or partnership which might be charged with 
responsibilities for damages to the Undersigned, and the consequences flowing 
therefrom, resulting, or to result, or which might result from the accident subject 
of the action filed by David Conley and Donna Conley known as Case Number 
228-CIV-93 in the Court of Common Pleas, Pike County, Ohio and for which the 
Undersigned claims the said persons or parties are legally liable in damage; but 
which legal liabilities and damages have been disputed and denied; David Conley 
and Donna Conley hereby assign their claims for damages set forth in the 
complaint in Pike County Court of Common Pleas case number 280-CIV-95 to 
Nationwide * * *[.]” 
2. 
The notice of dismissal in case No. 280-CIV-95 states: 
 
“David A. Conley and Donna K. Conley hereby give notice that they 
dismiss their within actions against the Defendant, Rexcon, Inc., with prejudice, 
pursuant to [Civ.R. 41(A)]. 
 
“The claims of [Nationwide] against the Defendant, Rexcon, Inc., shall 
remain pending.” 
 
Rexcon was not a defendant in case No. 280-CIV-95.  Brown was the only 
named defendant in that case.  Thus, it appears that the above-quoted notice of 
dismissal was intended to dismiss the Conleys’ actions against Brown — i.e., the 
reference to Rexcon in the notice of dismissal was an error.  In any event, the 
Covenant Not to Proceed appears to have required the Conleys to dismiss their 
complaint against Brown. 
3. 
We note, in passing, that the Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate 
District recently determined that R.C. 2745.01 is unconstitutional.  Johnson v. BP 
Chemicals, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1997), Allen App. No. 1-97-32, unreported, 1997 WL 
 
19
729098, discretionary appeal and cross-appeal allowed (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
1500, 691 N.E.2d 1061. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in judgment and syllabus only.  By 
this decision, we have not determined the underlying issue of whether an 
intentional tort in fact occurred.  Brown alleges that this is only a products liability 
case and that the intentional tort action was filed to obtain discovery in the 
products liability case.  These are issues that remain for the trial court to resolve 
before the issue of contribution or indemnity can be reached. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.