Case Title: Miller v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 113 Ariz. 52, 546 P.2d 19

Docket Number: 12065-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1976-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
113 Ariz. 52 (1976) 546 P.2d 19 Glenn A. MILLER, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Phelps Dodge Corporation, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. No. 12065-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 9, 1976. Rehearing Denied March 16, 1976. Davis & Eppstein by Robert W. Eppstein, Tucson, for petitioner. Edward F. Cummerford, Chief Counsel, The Industrial Commission of Ariz., Phoenix, for respondent. Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, P.C., by Leon D. Bess and James G. Speer, Phoenix, for respondent Employer. Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel, State Compensation Fund, Phoenix, for respondent Carrier. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. This Writ of Certiorari is to review the lawfulness of an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona. Petitioner was injured while in the course of his employment with Phelps Dodge Corporation. After a hearing, a decision was entered fixing Petitioner's average monthly wage as $212.50. A timely protest was filed and a decision on review was issued without change. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 23 Ariz. App. 221, 532 P.2d 163. We accepted review. Decision of the Court of Appeals vacated and award of the Industrial Commission set aside. Petitioner was a geology student at the University of Arizona. He worked for the *53 Phelps Dodge Corporation during the summer of 1969. In the summer of 1970 he again worked for the Phelps Dodge Corporation, with the understanding that in the fall he would return to school. Petitioner was hired as a field geologist. During the first 30 days of his summer employment he was injured, but was able to do work other than that for which he had been hired. He was paid $850.00 a month for each of the three summer months he worked. Petitioner suffered a 10% general disability involving partial loss of use of both legs. The hearing officer multiplied $850.00 by 3 [the months Petitioner worked] and divided by 12 [the months in a year] thus arriving at the figure of $212.50 which figure was used as Petitioner's average monthly wage. We think this was erroneous. In 1925 the Legislature provided: In 1933 the Legislature amended the foregoing act by adding a third sentence. Thereafter, the language remained substantially the same to the present time. At present, Section 23-1041 A.R.S. 1956 as amended by Laws of 1972 reads: The "monthly wage" alluded to in Subsection D must obviously be read "average monthly wage" as it was prior to the revision of 1956 because the words "monthly wage" are not used in Subsection A and B of 23-1041. Unless so read, Subsection D is wholly without meaning. The language of Subsection A of 23-1041 is plain and unequivocal. It says: Similarly, Subsection B insofar as it relates to this case reads: The import of the word "average" as it is used in § 23-1041 is that there must be a base period of more than one month upon which to determine a claimant's wage. But Subsection B of the statute clearly mandates that where a claimant has not worked continuously for thirty days his average monthly wage is to be his monthly earning capacity. This becomes so simply because the statute says so. Petitioner must, therefore, be compensated on a basis of his earning capacity at the time of his injury. Any division by twelve months of an earning base established by three months of wages finds no support whatsoever in the statute. While earning capacity is synonymous with the ability or power to earn rather than wages actually received, Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 R.I. 448, 216 A.2d 886 (1966), where there is no proof of earnings of other employees of the same class, proof of the actual earnings of a claimant is sufficient to properly represent his earning capacity, Belliamo v. Marlin-Rockwell Corporation, 215 App.Div. 845, 213 N.Y.S. 85 (1926). An employer can, of course, show that actual earnings are not a true measure of a claimant's earning capacity, Sammis v. Queens Borough Gas & Electric Co., 257 App.Div. 58, 12 N.Y.S. 2nd 286 (1939). This is not such a case as Dominguez v. Industrial Commission, 22 Ariz. App. 578, 529 P.2d 732 (1974). There the issue was the proper manner of determining the average monthly wage of an injured seasonal worker, the worker being a fruit picker. In Pettis v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 298, 302, 372 P.2d 72, 75 (1962), we said: Any inferences or suggestions arising out of the language used in Dominguez v. Industrial Commission, supra, contrary to this opinion, are disapproved. Nor is this case similar to that of Powell v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 257, 451 P.2d 37 (1969). There the claimant was a school teacher under contract of employment for a nine-month period. She was not injured during the first month of her employment and no contention was made that Subsection B of § 23-1041 was applicable. This case is not like Gene Autry Productions v. Industrial Commission, 67 Ariz. 290, 195 P.2d 143 (1948). Work in the movie industry is known to be intermittent and irregular. Rather, this case is similar to Pacey v. Industrial Commission, 93 Ariz. 1, 377 P.2d 1015 (1963), wherein the deceased was killed while employed as a welder's helper on the construction of a natural gas line across Northern Arizona. We held the work was not seasonal because there were opportunities for continuous employment in other pipe line jobs. Petitioner's earning capacity is not to be determined by whether he intended to work steadily in the industry in which he is employed. The test is whether the employment not the worker is intermittent or erratic. As was said in the English case of Anslow v. Cannock Chase Colliery Co., L.R. App.Cas. (1909) 435, which we first quoted in Brisendine v. Skousen Brothers, 48 Ariz. 416, 420, 62 P.2d 326, 328 (1936): See also Vinyard v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 164, 472 P.2d 33 (1970). The award of the Industrial Commission is set aside. CAMERON, C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.