Case Title: Pritchett v. Alabama

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1100465

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/07/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1100465
____________________
Ex parte Stanford Earl Pritchett
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Stanford Earl Pritchett
v.
State of Alabama)
(Marengo Circuit Court, CC-07-112;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-09-1050)
MURDOCK, Justice.
While represented by counsel, Stanford Earl Pritchett
pleaded guilty to murder.  Thereafter, Pritchett filed a pro
se motion to set aside his guilty plea, asserting ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.  The trial court denied
1100465
2
Pritchett's motion without conducting a hearing and without
making a determination that Pritchett had validly waived his
right to counsel with respect to the motion.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
order denying Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Pritchett petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari as to
that decision, asserting that it conflicted with Berry v.
State, 630 So. 2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).  We granted
the petition, and we now reverse the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and remand the case.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 22, 2010, Pritchett entered a plea of guilty
to murder, see Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-2.  The trial court
sentenced him to 23 years' imprisonment.  
In the proceedings up to and through Pritchett's entry of
a guilty plea, Pritchett was represented by appointed counsel.
Among other things, counsel signed an explanation-of-rights-
and-plea-of-guilty form and were present in court during the
hearing in which the trial court accepted Pritchett's guilty
plea. 
On March 22, 2010, Pritchett filed a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.  The motion was handwritten.  It
expressly stated that it was being filed "pro se."  The ground
1100465
In his motion, Pritchett alleged, among other things,
1
that his two appointed attorneys failed to adequately prepare
and investigate his case, failed to negotiate for a plea to a
lesser-included offense, and failed to argue self-defense.
3
for relief stated in the motion was the alleged inadequacy and
ineffectiveness of the counsel who had represented Pritchett
up to that point.    
1
The trial court denied Pritchett's motion the next day
without a hearing.  The record does not reveal the basis for
the denial of Pritchett's motion; the trial court did not
enter a written order but merely noted the denial on the first
page of the motion.  On April 20, 2010, Pritchett, acting
pro se, filed an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals from
the denial of his motion.
On May 11, 2010, appointed counsel filed a motion to
withdraw as attorneys of record.  In their motion to withdraw,
counsel stated that "Pritchett has never, by letter or
otherwise, requested counsel to file any notice of appeal,
pleading, motion or other request for relief in connection
with his plea of guilty on February 22, 2010."  The trial
court granted the attorneys' motion to withdraw on the same
day the request was made.
Following the withdrawal of appointed counsel, new
counsel was appointed to represent Pritchett on appeal.  On
1100465
4
appeal before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Pritchett
contended that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a
"critical stage" in a prosecution and that the trial court
denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying his
motion when he was not "duly" represented by counsel and
without obtaining a valid waiver of his right to counsel.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment by an unpublished memorandum.  Pritchett v. State
(No. CR-09-1050, Dec. 3, 2010), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2010) (table).  That court purported to distinguish this
case from Berry and Casteel v. State, 21 So. 3d 11 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2008), on the ground that Pritchett was represented by
counsel when he filed his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and that Pritchett had no constitutional right to so-
called "hybrid representation" (that is, self-representation
and representation by counsel).  See Christianson v. State,
601 So. 2d 512, 519 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (no right to hybrid
representation).  This Court  granted Pritchett's petition for
review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision.
Analysis
In his brief to this Court, Pritchett contends, as he did
in the Court of Criminal Appeals, (1) that the preparation and
presentation of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was a
1100465
5
critical stage in the judicial proceedings as to which the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied, and (2) that the
trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when
it denied his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea
without first determining that Pritchett knew he had a right
to the assistance of counsel in connection with such a motion
and that he had knowingly and intelligently waived that right.
 A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at any
"critical stage" in the proceedings in which he or she is
prosecuted and sentenced, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224 (1967), that is, at any stage at which a
substantial right of the accused may be affected, Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 257 (1967).   "If the accused ... is not
represented 
by 
counsel 
and 
has 
not 
competently 
and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment [to the United States Constitution] stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his life or liberty."  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 468 (1938).  The trial "court should advise the
defendant regarding the 'dangers and disadvantages' of
proceeding without the assistance of counsel in order for the
record to show that the defendant has decided to proceed
without counsel 'with eyes wide open.'"  Johnson v. State, 716
1100465
6
So. 2d 745, 749 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).  See also Faretta, 422
U.S. at 807 (recognizing a criminal defendant's right to
proceed without counsel when he or she "voluntarily and
intelligently elects to do so").
Like the present case, Berry involved a defendant who was
represented by appointed counsel up to and through the entry
of a guilty plea.  Berry subsequently filed a pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.  A hearing was conducted on this
motion; Berry attended that hearing unaccompanied by counsel.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held "that the
hearing, insofar as [Berry's] motion to withdraw his guilty
plea was reviewed, was a critical stage in the judicial
proceedings that required that he have the assistance of
counsel during that proceeding or that he have validly waived
such assistance."  Berry, 630 So. 2d at 130.  The Berry court
found that because Berry was not represented at the hearing on
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, a fundamental error
had occurred, and, therefore, the case was remanded to the
trial court with instructions for the trial court to set aside
its order denying Berry's motion to withdraw the guilty plea
and to conduct a new hearing on the motion at which Berry was
to be represented by counsel. 
1100465
7
Casteel involved an appeal from the denial of a Rule 32,
Ala. R. Crim. P., petition.  Casteel, an indigent defendant
represented by appointed counsel, had entered a guilty plea to
first-degree 
sexual 
abuse. 
 
Acting 
pro 
se, 
Casteel
subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in
which he requested the appointment of new counsel because,
among other things, his current counsel allegedly was
ineffective.  Casteel represented himself at the hearing on
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The court held that
Casteel "was denied counsel during a critical stage of his
criminal proceeding –- the pendency and denial of his motion
to withdraw his plea –- and that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his motion at which he is represented
by counsel."  Casteel, 21 So. 3d at 14.  The case was remanded
to the trial court with directions for the trial court to hold
a hearing on Casteel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea at
which Casteel was to be represented by counsel.
It is important to observe that the fact that the
defendants in Berry and Casteel had their motions denied
following hearings, whereas Pritchett's motion was denied
without 
the 
benefit 
of 
a 
hearing, 
is 
no 
basis 
for
distinguishing between those earlier cases and this one.
Indeed, although the State argued this as a distinction in the
1100465
8
Court of Criminal Appeals, it abandons that argument in this
Court.  As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Berry:
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of
counsel to the accused in all criminal prosecutions.
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.  This right to counsel
encompasses 
all 
federal 
and 
state 
criminal
prosecutions 
that 
result 
in 
imprisonment.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006,
32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).  This
right is applicable to the states by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon v. Wainwright. The
right attaches at the initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings, and extends to every critical
stage of the proceedings.  United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).
A critical stage is any stage where a substantial
right of an accused may be affected, Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967),
and can arise in pre-trial as well as post-trial
proceedings. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106
S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (pre-trial right
to 
presence 
of 
attorney 
violated 
during 
any
interrogation occurring after the first formal
charging proceedings, absent a valid waiver); Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d
424 (1977) (pre-trial right to counsel violated
where judicial proceedings had been initiated and
confession obtained without the presence of counsel
and in absence of a valid waiver); Johnston v.
Mizell, 912 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1094, 111 S.Ct. 982, 112 L.Ed.2d 1067
(1991) (post-trial motion for new trial critical
stage in criminal proceedings); Menefield v. Borg,
881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1989) (post-trial motion for
new trial critical stage requiring counsel or valid
waiver); King v. State, 613 So. 2d 888 (Ala. Cr.
App. 1993) (post-trial motion for new trial critical
stage requiring counsel, absent a valid waiver).
Courts have held that a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is a critical stage in a criminal proceedings,
requiring effective assistance of counsel. See,
e.g., United States v. White, 659 F.2d 231 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066
1100465
9
(3rd Cir. 1976). In recognizing that a defendant in
Alabama has a right to counsel at sentencing and in
the first appeal, this court stated in King v.
State, 613 So. 2d at 891, 'It would appear that if
an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled
to the assistance of counsel at sentencing and in
the first appeal as a matter of right, that
defendant would be entitled to the assistance of
counsel in the interim period, absent a waiver.'
"Based upon the foregoing authorities, we find
that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a
critical stage in a criminal proceeding requiring
representation of counsel or a valid waiver of the
right to counsel."
630 So. 2d at 129 (emphasis added).  See also Casteel, 21
So. 3d at 13-14 (holding that "the pendency and denial" of a
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is a critical
stage in his criminal proceeding).  
Accordingly, in its unpublished memorandum in the present
case, the Court of Criminal Appeals rightly rejected the fact
that the trial court held a hearing in Berry and Casteel as a
basis for distinguishing between those cases and this one:
"We note that the State argues that Pritchett's
case is distinguishable from Berry and Casteel
because, according to the State, Berry and Casteel
had to represent themselves at a hearing on their
motions, whereas Pritchett's motion was summarily
denied without a hearing.  However, this not a
sufficient distinction.  In King v. State, 613 So.
2d 888 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), this Court was called
upon 
to 
determine 
'whether 
the 
appellant 
is
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of
counsel in the preparation of his motion for a new
trial.'  King v. State, 613 So. 2d at 890.
(Emphasis added.)  The King Court held that 'the
filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical
1100465
10
stage of the prosecution and that an indigent
defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel,
absent a waiver, at that stage of the proceedings.'
King v. State, 613 So. 2d at 891.  (Emphasis added.)
....
"Thus, 
the 
distinguishing 
factor 
between
Pritchett's case and Berry and Casteel is not that
Pritchett was not afforded a hearing." 
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the
preparation, filing, and consideration of a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea as a "critical stage," that court nonetheless
affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that
the 
defendant 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
so-called 
"hybrid
representation" during this critical stage.  That holding,
however, presumes that, unlike the defendant in such cases as
Berry and Casteel, Pritchett was in fact represented by
counsel for these purposes.  This cannot be presumed and, as
to this issue, we see no difference between the circumstances
presented in Berry and Casteel and those presented here.
In Berry, counsel who had been appointed to represent the
defendant had not asked for permission to withdraw, and,
therefore, that counsel nominally remained "of record."   Yet,
based on the facts that the defendant had filed what the Court
of Criminal Appeals simply referred to, without explanation,
as a "pro se" motion and then appeared at a hearing on that
motion without being accompanied by counsel, the court
1100465
11
recognized the practical reality that the defendant "did not
have the assistance of counsel."  Berry, 630 So. 2d at 127.
The present case is indistinguishable in this regard.
As in Berry, counsel in the present case were appointed
for the defendant, and at no point before the filing and
adjudication of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea did
counsel formally withdraw.  Nonetheless, Pritchett filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea that, in this case, we know
was handwritten and that explicitly stated that it was being
filed as a "pro se" motion.  Furthermore, we also know that,
in this case, the ground for relief asserted in this motion
was that counsel who had represented the defendant before the
filing of the motion allegedly had been inadequate and
ineffective.   As in Berry, although Pritchett nominally had
counsel of record at the time he filed his motion, it was
clear that the motion was prepared and relief was sought by
Pritchett without the involvement of that counsel.  We find no
distinction between the present case and Berry in this regard.
Given this lack of distinction between Berry and the
present case, we in turn find persuasive and applicable the
holding of Berry as to the necessity of advising a defendant
of his or her right to counsel and ensuring that, if there is
1100465
12
to be a waiver of this right, it is a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver:
"The right to counsel does not depend upon a
request by the accused. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Kitchens
v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 91 S.Ct. 1089, 28 L.Ed.2d
519 (1971). '[I]f an accused does not waive counsel
and does not retain acceptable counsel, the court
must appoint counsel.' United States v. Turnbull,
888 F.2d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 78, 112 L.Ed.2d 51 (1990). If a
defendant 
in 
a 
criminal 
proceeding 
is 
not
represented by counsel, the state must prove an
intentional relinquishment of that right. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461
(1938). If an accused waives his right to counsel,
that 
waiver 
must 
be 
intelligently 
and
understandingly made and cannot be presumed from a
silent record.   Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82
3
S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962).
"'But 
it 
is 
settled 
that 
where 
the
assistance of counsel is a constitutional
requisite, the right to be furnished
counsel does not depend on a request....
"'....
"'...  Presuming waiver from a silent
record is impermissible. The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and
evidence which show, that an accused was
offered counsel but intelligently and
understandingly 
rejected 
the 
offer.
Anything less is not waiver.'
"Id. at 513-16, 82 S.Ct. at 889-90.
"....
"In reviewing the record in the instant case, we
conclude 
that 
the 
hearing, 
insofar 
as 
the
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
reviewed, was a critical stage in the judicial
1100465
13
proceedings 
that 
required 
that 
he 
have 
the
assistance of counsel during that proceeding or that
he have validly waived such assistance. The record
shows and we find that he did not have the
assistance of counsel, and no waiver is reflected on
the record before us. Because we conclude that the
hearing was a critical stage of the proceeding,
involving the appellant's substantial rights, the
trial court was required to advise the appellant of
his right to counsel and to ensure that counsel was
provided or to ascertain if the right to counsel had
been waived. On the record before us, we conclude
that the trial court did neither.
"Because of this fundamental error, the order of
the trial court denying the appellant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea is set aside. A new
evidentiary hearing at which the appellant shall be
represented 
by 
counsel 
must 
be 
held 
on 
the
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
"____________
" The 
state 
cannot 
force 
counsel 
upon 
a
3
defendant. Every defendant has a right to waive
counsel and to conduct his own defense. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d
562 (1975)."
630 So. 2d at 129-30 (emphasis added).
By the same token, the judgment of the trial court in the
present case is due to be set aside.  Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and this
case is remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for that
court to reverse the order of the trial court and remand this
case for a hearing on Pritchett's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in which Pritchett is represented by counsel or in
1100465
14
which the trial court determines that Pritchett has knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and
Shaw, JJ., concur.
Main and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.*
*Justice Main and Justice Wise were members of the Court
of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.