Case Title: Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90242

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90242-Agenda 22-May 2001.

EMMA J. ROBINSON et al., Appellants, v. TOYOTA MOTOR
CREDIT CORPORATION et al., Appellees.

	In this case, we review whether plaintiffs' federal Consumer
Leasing Act (CLA) (15 U.S.C. §§1667a, 1667b (1994)) claims are
precluded by the res judicata effect of a class action judgment
rendered in another state. We also review whether plaintiffs' state
claims for violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et
seq. (West 1992)) were properly dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
	Plaintiff Emma Robinson leased an automobile from
defendant River Oaks Toyota. Plaintiff Latanya Kemp entered into
a similar lease agreement with defendant Point One Toyota. Both
leases were assigned to defendant Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation (Toyota). Plaintiffs then sued all three defendants,
claiming that the lease agreements violated various federal and
state consumer protection laws. They sought relief for themselves
and for a class of persons similarly situated. Such a class was
never certified by the court, and plaintiff's second amended
complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The trial court found that
plaintiffs' federal claims were precluded by the res judicata effect
of a California judgment in a class action suit where plaintiffs
were members of the class. The state and common law claims
were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
	The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of all of the state-law claims, except the common law breach of contract claim. 315
Ill. App. 3d 1086. The appellate court reversed as to that count and
remanded the cause to the trial court. Toyota does not contest that
ruling here. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of two of
the federal claims as barred by res judicata, but found the
remaining federal claim to be an individual claim not included in
the class action and, thus, not barred. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1093.
	We allowed plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the California
judgment specifically reserved from the settlement certain CLA
claims and that plaintiffs' CLA claims are not barred by the res
judicata effect of the California judgment. We further hold that the
appellate court properly sustained the dismissal of the state
Consumer Fraud Act claims. We therefore affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts
and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND
	On May 14, 1993, plaintiff Kemp entered into a 48-month,
closed-end motor vehicle lease with defendant Point One Toyota.
On July 6, 1993, plaintiff Robinson entered into a similar 42-month lease agreement with defendant River Oaks Toyota. Both
leases were assigned to defendant Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation.
	At the time plaintiffs' leases were signed, a class action was
pending in the circuit court of Cook County, where individual
lessees of River Oaks Toyota sought relief against that company
and Toyota for alleged violations of the CLA and the Consumer
Fraud Act. Mortimer v. River Oaks Toyota, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d
597 (1996). On July 7, 1993, the Mortimer class of persons was
certified. In September, 1993, the class was notified by mail and
publication. Mortimer, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 599. Plaintiffs received
the Mortimer notice and elected to opt out of that class action and
settlement.
	Plaintiffs then filed a 12-count complaint against defendants
in August of 1995, alleging causes of action similar to those
alleged in Mortimer. After their original complaint was dismissed,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and, in June 1996, filed a
motion seeking class certification. Toyota responded and asserted
that plaintiffs' motion should be denied because a California trial
court had already certified a nationwide class that included the
plaintiffs (Ramirez v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 752044-8
(Alameda Co. Sup. Ct.)). The Ramirez class certification included
all persons who leased a vehicle pursuant to a Toyota lease
agreement in the United States after August 1, 1993, or who had
opted out of the Mortimer class action. Plaintiffs were notified of
the Ramirez certification and were given an opt-out deadline of
September 2, 1996. They did not meet that deadline. Instead,
plaintiffs sought leave from the California court to extend the opt-out period and to modify the class definition. Their motions were
denied in December 1996.
	In January 1997, our trial court granted Toyota's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint pursuant to section
2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619
(West 1996)), finding that plaintiffs were Ramirez class members.
The trial court dismissed without prejudice, stating that plaintiffs
could petition to reinstate their action if the California appeals
court reversed the Ramirez trial court decision denying plaintiffs'
motion to extend the opt-out period. Plaintiffs' appeal of the
Ramirez court's denial of their motion to extend the opt-out period
and to enlarge the class definition was dismissed in an unpublished
order by the California appellate court in June of 1997.
	On August 27, 1997, the Ramirez class action was settled
subject to final approval by the trial court. The settlement
agreement defined with particularity the causes of action released
by non-California settlement class members. Toyota settled for a
release of liability from certain claims as follows:
		"any violation of (1) any California or federal statutory or
common law or regulation which was or could have been
asserted relating to [Toyota's] disclosures, formula,
methodology and charges for auction, transportation
and/or reconditioning fees or the collection of such
charges; (2) any statutory or common law, regulation, or
any other allegation or claim based on California law
which was or could have been asserted in the action
relating to disclosure of the capitalized cost or initial
value of leased vehicles; (3) any statutory or common law,
regulation or any other allegation or claim based on
California law which was or could have been asserted in
the action relating to [ Toyota's] early termination/default
disclosure, formula, methodology, and charges."
	Furthermore, with regard to non-California class members,
the settlement specifically excluded from release certain claims as
follows:
		"any other statutory or common law claims, including but
not limited to claims such as (i) claims brought under the
laws of states other than California to the extent that such
claims exist and are not barred by the laws of such states
or by any order of the court in that action; (ii) claims
brought under the Federal Consumer Leasing Act and
Regulation M (12 C.F.R. part 2213) arising out of matters
other than Toyota's disclosure of, and charges for,
auction, transportation and/or reconditioning fees or the
collection or attempted collection of such charges."
	The settlement required the filing of a second amended
complaint with a motion for approval of the settlement. The
second amended complaint was filed September 9, 1997, and
included two counts alleging violation of the CLA and Regulation
M (12 C.F.R. §213.4(g) (2001)). Those counts contained
allegations accusing Toyota of a failure to disclose in a meaningful
sequence its early termination or default methodology and charges
for auction, transportation, and reconditioning.
	The settlement further reserved to Toyota its right to argue,
under applicable law, that its payment of the statutory penalty
under the CLA for California class members "constitutes the full
amount of statutory damages available under the CLA for 'any
class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure
to comply.' " Non-California class members also reserved their
right to argue to the contrary under applicable law.
	On December 10, 1997, the settlement was approved by the
California trial court, and it was incorporated in a final order and
judgment. The final judgment provided that it applied to all claims
and causes of action settled under its terms and it was made
binding on all members of the plaintiff settlement class who had
not opted out of the action. The judgment further directed
dismissal of the second amended complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiffs' counsel participated in the final judgment hearing and
did not object to the approval of the settlement or to the terms of
the final judgment.
	On December 30, 1997, plaintiffs filed a motion to decertify
in Ramirez. The California trial court denied that motion on
February 6, 1998, but entered the following order:
			"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to
Decertify Ms. Robinson and Ms. Kemp is DENIED.
However, based on the Court's ruling re: Motion for
Summary Adjudication of Issues dated January 27, 1997,
the court hereby orders that each of the petitioners herein,
i.e., Robinson and Kemp, may continue or file his or her
own lawsuit against Toyota Motor Credit Corporation in
the State of Illinois based upon violations of Illinois law.
This court does not address any right to pursue claims
under Federal law."
	Following the entry of the Ramirez settlement judgment, the
circuit court below granted plaintiffs' motion to reinstate.
Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, alleging
violations of the CLA, the Consumer Fraud Act, the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (815 ILCS 510/1 et seq. (West
1994)), and a common law breach of contract. Plaintiffs also
sought class action certification in addition to their claims for
individual relief. The CLA claims asserted that Toyota: (1) failed
either to allow early termination or to disclose penalties for early
termination in violation of Regulation M; (2) failed to disclose
Illinois sales, excise, use or rental taxes in the Kemp lease; and (3)
failed to disclose in a meaningful sequence penalties for early
termination or default so that the unsophisticated consumer could
understand the requirements of the lease. Toyota filed a motion
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
dismiss those claims as barred by the res judicata effect of the
Ramirez judgment and moved to dismiss the state and common
law claims pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code for failure to
state a cause of action (735 ILCS 5/2-619, 2-615 (West 1996)).
Those motions were granted and the cause dismissed with
prejudice. No plaintiff class was certified. Plaintiffs appealed.
	The appellate court held that all of plaintiffs' CLA claims
except the individual claim of Kemp relating to undisclosed taxes
were barred by res judicata. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1093. The
appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court that the
Consumer Fraud Act claim and the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act claim failed to state a cause of action, but it reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the breach of contract claim. The
latter holding was not challenged by Toyota. Plaintiffs appeal to
this court, arguing that res judicata does not preclude their federal
claims and that their pleading was sufficient to aver valid claims
under the Consumer Fraud Act.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Res Judicata
	The trial court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
CLA claims pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, finding that
they were barred by the res judicata effect of the California
judgment. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of two of the
class-wide CLA claims and reversed the dismissal of Kemp's
individual CLA claim. Toyota does not challenge the ruling on
Kemp's individual CLA claim. A section 2-619 motion to dismiss
presents a question of law, and our review is de novo. Parks v.
Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 175 (2000).
	The appellate court applied the res judicata analysis set out in
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290 (1998).
In River Park, we held that the doctrine of res judicata applies
when the following criteria are met: (1) a final judgment on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity
of parties or their privies; and (3) identity of causes of action.
River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 302.
	The appellate court reasoned that application of the River
Park test barred two CLA claims based on the lease provisions
regarding (1) early termination and violation of Regulation M and
(2) the failure to disclose early termination and default penalties
in a meaningful sequence. The appellate court concluded that the
first two prongs of the test indisputably applied to plaintiffs'
claims. Regarding the third prong involving the identity of causes
of action, the appellate court held that plaintiffs' claims as class
members in Ramirez and the claims asserted in this action arose
from the same core of operative facts and, thus, are the same.
Specifically, the appellate court found that the core operative facts
of plaintiffs' 1993 leases with Toyota gave rise to their inclusion
as class members in Ramirez and also formed the basis for their
alleged CLA claims here. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1092. According to
the appellate court, those claims could have been asserted in
Ramirez. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1092-93. Therefore, the court
concluded that those claims are precluded by the res judicata
effect of the California judgment. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1092-93.
	Initially, we note that plaintiffs contend that California law
applies a different standard than Illinois in determining whether a
subsequent action is precluded by res judicata. They assert that
under the California standard, the judgment would not prevent the
assertion of the causes of action pleaded in their second amended
complaint and that Illinois must extend full faith and credit to the
effect of the Ramirez judgment as determined by the law of
California.
	We need not address that argument because it is raised for the
first time in this court. In the appellate court, plaintiffs countered
the res judicata hurdle by arguing that the California judgment
was void for want of proper notice. The court rejected that
argument and held that plaintiffs were given constitutionally
proper notice of the Ramirez action and that any order or judgment
in that case affecting them is not void. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1094. In
their petition for leave to appeal to this court, plaintiffs do not
reassert their notice argument; instead, they raise a new full faith
and credit argument. Plaintiffs never raised this argument in the
trial court and, therefore, it is waived. See Wagner v. City of
Chicago, 166 Ill. 2d 144, 147 (1995).
	Nonetheless, plaintiffs argue that under the River Park test no
identity of causes of action existed between the Robinson and the
Ramirez lawsuits for two reasons. First, plaintiffs contend that the
CLA disclosure violation claims here are distinct from the CLA
claims in Ramirez. In Ramirez, the CLA disclosure claims focused
solely on auction, transportation, and reconditioning fees.
Plaintiffs' CLA claims at issue here complain that Toyota: (1)
failed to allow early termination; (2) failed to disclose early
termination penalties; and (3) failed to disclose in a meaningful
sequence the penalties for early termination or default. Second,
plaintiffs argue that the Ramirez settlement specifically excluded
all kinds of claims other than the disclosure violations concerning
auction, transportation, and reconditioning fees. Thus, plaintiffs
contend that the right to assert the CLA claims was reserved in the
Ramirez settlement.
	Generally, parties may by agreement sever or reserve causes
of action or a court may expressly reserve a plaintiff's right to
maintain a second action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§26(1)(b) (1982). We recognized this exception to the application
of res judicata in Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381,
392-93 (2001), where a federal court declined jurisdiction over
pendent state claims.
	Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged the Restatement exception in D&K Properties
Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 112 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1997). The court held, however, that the reservation
of a cause of action must be "both express, as in writing, and
express, as in specifically identified." D&K Properties, 112 F.3d 
at 261. In general, we agree that to avoid the preclusive effect of
res judicata any reservation of a cause of action must be expressly
reserved by the parties.
	Applying the res judicata exception to this case, it is evident
that certain claims were specifically reserved in writing in the
settlement agreement approved by the California court. Those
claims were identified in the agreement as:
		"(i) claims brought under the laws of states other than
California, to the extent such claims exist and are not
barred by state law or by any other order of the Court
herein; and (ii) claims brought under the CLA and
Regulation M arising out of matters other than [Toyota's]
disclosures of and charges for auction, transportation,
and/or reconditioning fees." (Emphasis added.)
	Plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleges claims under the
CLA and Regulation M for the failure of Toyota either to allow
early termination of its lease or to disclose, in a meaningful
sequence, the penalties for early termination or default. Those
claims do not arise out of Toyota's disclosures of and charges for
auction, transportation, or reconditioning fees. Therefore,
plaintiffs' claims are within the specifically reserved category of
claims not covered by the Ramirez settlement.
	Toyota argues, however, that those claims are nonetheless
barred because they were actually litigated in Ramirez. This
assertion is based on a count in the second amended complaint
filed by stipulation in Ramirez, containing an allegation that
Toyota failed "fully, clearly and conspicuously [to] disclose in its
leases the liability of lessees who terminate early for auction,
transportation and reconditioning fees." The settlement
specifically provided for the dismissal with prejudice of the second
amended complaint. Nevertheless, that dismissal was required by
the same settlement specifically reserving certain CLA claims to
plaintiffs and other lessees. Accordingly, we conclude that the
filing and subsequent dismissal of a complaint by agreement of the
parties as part of a settlement agreement does not constitute the
"litigation" of all the claims asserted when certain of those claims
were expressly and specifically reserved by the final judgment
approving the settlement.
	Additionally, Toyota argues that the mutual reservation of a
right to argue the effect of its payment of statutory penalties under
the CLA for California class members establishes that all CLA
claims were in fact litigated in Ramirez. We disagree.
	The settlement contained the following language:
			"6.06 CLA Statutory Damages The parties understand
and agree that this settlement includes all claims
concerning [Toyota's] early termination/default
disclosures, formula, methodology and charges (including
but not limited to auction, transportation, and
reconditioning fees) which were asserted or could have
been asserted in this lawsuit under the CLA with regard
to California class members. [Toyota] reserves its rights
to argue, under applicable law, that its payment of the
CLA statutory penalty for California class members
constitutes the full amount of statutory damages available
under the CLA for any class action or series of class
actions arising out of the same failure to comply. Non-California class members reserve their rights to argue to
the contrary under applicable law." (Emphasis added.)
	This settlement language is preclusive only as to California
class members. Regarding non-California plaintiffs, it merely
reserves to each party the right to argue the legal effect of the
payment. In Illinois, the trial court must determine whether the
maximum statutory penalty was in fact paid and whether payment
could operate to satisfy claims specifically reserved by the
Ramirez settlement.
	We hold, therefore, that the Ramirez judgment does not
preclude plaintiffs' CLA claims found in counts I and III of their
second amended complaint. The appellate court erred in affirming
the dismissal of those counts by the trial court pursuant to section
2-619 of the Code.
	Alternatively, Toyota urges us to reach the issue of whether
plaintiffs' CLA claims in counts I and III should be dismissed
because they fail substantively. Neither the trial court nor the
appellate court previously considered those issues because of the
procedural posture of the case. Thus, we decline to reach that
question, and we leave it for the trial court to decide on remand.


B. Plaintiffs' State Claims 
	We now turn to plaintiffs' remaining arguments concerning
the dismissal of their Consumer Fraud Act claims in count IV of
the second amended complaint. Initially, we observe that
plaintiffs' scattered approach to pleading their second amended
complaint and the nonsequential arguments in their brief regarding
the sufficiency of the allegations in count IV create confusion, if
not incoherence. Thus, we read plaintiffs' petition for leave to
appeal and supplemental brief to assert as error only the appellate
court's holdings regarding (1) double penalties for excess wear
and tear, and mileage; (2) concealment of capitalization and
guaranteed automobile protection (GAP) charges; (3) double
recovery for auction, transportation and reconditioning fees; (4)
and early termination charges. These assertions challenge only the
dismissal of count IV of plaintiffs' complaint. We note that
plaintiffs did not seek leave from the trial court to amend further
their complaint after its dismissal.
	We first review the general requirements of claims brought
under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Consumer Fraud Act is a
regulatory and remedial statute intended to protect consumers,
borrowers, and business persons against fraud, unfair methods of
competition, and other unfair and deceptive business practices. It
is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. Cripe v.
Leiter, 184 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (1998). Unfair or deceptive practices
are described in the Act as:
			"including but not limited to the use or employment of
any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or
omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely
upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such
material fact *** in the conduct of any trade or commerce
***." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1992).
Section 10(a) of the Consumer Fraud Act creates a remedy for
persons who suffer damage as a result of a violation of the Act
committed by another person. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1992).
	The elements of a claim under the Act are: (1) a deceptive act
or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent that the
plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the occurrence of the
deception during a course of conduct involving trade or
commerce. Cripe, 184 Ill. 2d  at 191. Recovery may be had for
unfair as well as deceptive conduct. See Saunders v. Michigan
Avenue National Bank, 278 Ill. App. 3d 307, 313 (1996).
	In determining whether a given course of conduct or act is
unfair, we observe the Consumer Fraud Act mandates that
"consideration shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West
1992). The United States Supreme Court in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 31 L. Ed. 2d 170, 92 S. Ct. 898 (1972), cited with approval the published
statement of factors considered by the Federal Trade Commission
in measuring unfairness. Sperry, 405 U.S.  at 244 n.5, 31 L. Ed. 2d 
at 179 n.5, 92 S. Ct.  at 905 n.5. These factors are (1) whether the
practice offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers. Sperry, 405 U.S.  at 244 n.5, 31 L. Ed. 2d  at
179 n.5, 92 S. Ct.  at 905 n.5.
	In Saunders, the court applied Sperry and held to be
insufficient plaintiff's allegation in a Consumer Fraud Act
complaint that bank fees charged for overdrafts were excessive.
Saunders, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 313-14. The court noted that
charging an unconscionably high price generally is insufficient to
establish a claim for unfairness. Saunders, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 313.
Citing Sperry, the court held that defendant's conduct must violate
public policy, be so oppressive as to leave the consumer with little
alternative except to submit to it, and injure the consumer.
Saunders, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 313, citing Sperry, 405 U.S.  at 244
n.5, 31 L. Ed. 2d  at 179 n.5, 92 S. Ct.  at 905 n.5.
	Although the holding in Saunders seems to suggest that all
three prongs of the Sperry test must be met, that is not an accurate
statement of plaintiffs' burden. As the Connecticut Supreme Court
held in interpreting that state's unfair trade practices statute, all
three of the criteria in Sperry do not need to be satisfied to support
a finding of unfairness. Cheshire Mortgage Services, Inc. v.
Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 106, 612 A.2d 1130, 1143 (1992). The
Cheshire court cited with approval and quoted the Statement of
Basis and Purpose, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43
Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,635 (1978), as follows:
			" 'All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to
support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair
because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria
or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.' "
Cheshire, 223 Conn. at 106, 612 A.2d  at 1143-44.
We believe Cheshire expresses the correct standard and hereby
adopt it as our own.
	Turning to the procedural posture of this case, a ruling on a
section 2-615 motion to dismiss presents a question of law and
our review is de novo. Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox
Valley, N.A., 186 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1999). The question we must
determine is whether the allegations of the complaint, when
interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are
sufficient to allege a cause of action. Jackson v. South Holland
Dodge, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 39 (2001). The complaint must state with
particularity and specificity the deceptive manner of defendant's
acts or practices, and the failure to make such averments requires
the dismissal of the complaint. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 502 (1996).
	Plaintiffs allege that Toyota's various acts and omissions
violate the Consumer Fraud Act because they are unfair or
deceptive trade practices. The appellate court reviewed in turn
each of the allegations, involving early termination, capitalized
costs, GAP charges, double penalties, and auction, transportation,
and reconditioning fees. It found that none of those allegations
were sufficient to show that Toyota's conduct was either deceptive
or unfair. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1096-97. We now review the
appellate court's holdings as to each of plaintiffs' claims.
1. Double Penalties
	Plaintiffs' complaint described the default penalties as unfair
because the lease required both an excess mileage penalty and
payment for excess wear and tear, including scratches and dents.
According to plaintiffs, the penalties assessed for excess wear and
tear are subsumed by those for excess mileage. Applying the
Sperry standard to these allegations, it is apparent that plaintiffs'
complaint fails to describe conduct so unfair as to allow a
recovery.
	The appellate court held in this case that there was a total
absence of the type of oppressiveness and lack of meaningful
choice necessary to establish unfairness, observing that plaintiffs
could have gone elsewhere to lease a car. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1096.
The court also held that the assessment of a $0.10-per-mile penalty
for every mile exceeding 15,000 annual miles, coupled with a
requirement that plaintiffs pay for excess wear and tear, was not so
oppressive as to constitute unfairness. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1096.
Further, since those penalty provisions are clearly set out in the
lease, plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to establish that
Toyota's conduct was deceptive. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1096-97. We
agree with each of these findings. We further observe that
plaintiffs' complaint contains no allegation that the lease
provisions at issue violate public policy. Thus, plaintiffs'
allegations describe neither unfair nor deceptive conduct.
	Plaintiffs cite Ekl v. Knecht, 223 Ill. App. 3d 234 (1991), to
support their argument that an act or practice may be unfair even
if a consumer could have chosen another vendor. That case is
clearly not apposite. There, the plaintiff sought recovery under the
Consumer Fraud Act against a plumber who charged an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The court found that the
plumber's threat to undo his work and turn off plaintiff's water if
he was not paid immediately was coercive and oppressive conduct
in violation of public policy. Ekl, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 242. This
conduct resulted in substantial harm to the plaintiff because she
was compelled to pay an unreasonable amount for the work in
excess of what she would have reasonable agreed to pay. Ekl, 223
Ill. App. 3d at 242. Thus, all three prongs of the unfairness test
were satisfied. Ekl, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 242-43.
	Plaintiffs do not allege in their complaint that they were
coerced into signing the leases because of dire alternatives
threatened by Toyota. They do not even assert that they lacked
reasonable alternatives in the marketplace to acquire automobiles.
Plaintiffs argue here that all automobile leases have standard
provisions and that leases are not negotiable. However, no such
averments appear in the pleadings. Thus, the appellate court
correctly held that plaintiffs' bald claim of unfairness or deception
was not sufficient to state a claim.

2. Capitalized Costs/GAP Charges

	As to the alleged failure to disclose capitalized cost and GAP
charges, the appellate court held that Toyota complied with the
requirements of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C.
§1601 et seq. (1994)) and that compliance was a complete defense
under section 10(b)(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act. That statute
provides that it does not apply to "[a]ctions or transactions
specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory
body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the
United States." 815 ILCS 505/10b(1) (West 1996); see 315 Ill.
App. 3d at 1097. Plaintiffs argue that the trial and appellate courts
erred because the mere fact that TILA does not address the failure
to disclose capitalized costs and GAP charges does not mean that
Toyota is not liable under Illinois law for the concealment of
capitalized cost and GAP charges. According to plaintiffs,
capitalized cost and GAP charges are important terms.
	Plaintiffs' complaint, however, contains absolutely no
description of why or how the claimed disclosure failures are
unfair. Plaintiffs' bare assertion of unfairness without describing
in what manner the lack of disclosures either violate public policy
or are oppressive is insufficient to state a cause of action under the
standard required by Sperry. See also Connick, 174 Ill. 2d  at 502.
Since TILA does not require disclosure of the charges at issue,
there is no basis pleaded under any theory for a Consumer Fraud
Act claim arising from the challenged disclosure failures. See
Jackson v. South Holland Dodge, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 39 (2001).

3. Double Recovery
	Regarding plaintiffs' claim for failure to disclose auction,
transportation, and reconditioning fees, the appellate court held
that plaintiffs had already recovered for those elements of damages
under the CLA in the Ramirez action and that they cannot now
seek a double recovery in this action. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1096.
Plaintiffs argue that this ruling was error because their Consumer
Fraud Act claim for those charges is somehow different from the
Ramirez claims. Plaintiffs, however, do not articulate how it is
different. Nevertheless, they claim that they should be allowed to
recover under both the federal and state statutes. This argument is
untenable.
	It is well established that for one injury there should only be
one recovery irrespective of the availability of multiple remedies
and actions. Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308,
321 (1989); Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 81 Ill. 2d 548, 558 (1980).
Whatever right plaintiffs had to recover against Toyota for
damages caused by its imposition, assessment or failure to disclose
auction, transportation, and reconditioning fees, it was foreclosed
by the California judgment. Allowing plaintiffs to recover those
damages in this action would, in effect, constitute a double
recovery. In Majcher v. Laurel Motors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 719,
738 (1997), it was similarly held that plaintiffs could not recover
damages under both a Federal Odometer Act (15 U.S.C. §1989(a)
(1982)) claim and a common law fraud claim to remedy a single
injury.
	Even if plaintiffs had not already recovered for these charges
under the CLA, plaintiffs' allegations do not describe the kind of
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous conduct or
conduct in violation of public policy necessary to establish that
those lease provisions were unfair. Therefore, the complaint does
not state a cause of action for the recovery of auction,
transportation, and reconditioning fees.

4. Early Termination
	Plaintiffs' complaint characterized Toyota's lease provisions
regarding early termination and default charges as both unfair and
deceptive. The complaint did not set out any factual underpinnings
to support that conclusion. The bare allegation that the failure to
allow early termination is a deceptive trade practice is not a
specific and particular pleading sufficient to aver a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act. Connick, 174 Ill. 2d  at 502. Further, as the
appellate court observed, there was no deception because the
leases expressly stated that early termination was not permitted.
315 Ill. App. 3d at 1096.
	Plaintiffs next argue that the failure to allow early termination
is unfair because Toyota could, in the event of a default, repossess
the car and then sue plaintiffs for the remaining amounts due on
the lease. According to plaintiffs, this result would be a windfall
for Toyota and the failure to allow early termination is, therefore,
a penalty. These consequences are not, however, alleged in
plaintiffs' complaint and the pleading is thus insufficient under the
Connick standard. See Connick, 174 Ill. 2d  at 502.
	Consequently, we hold that count IV of plaintiffs' second
amended complaint is insufficient to allege any right to recovery
under the Consumer Fraud Act. The appellate court did not err in
affirming the dismissal of that count.

III. CONCLUSION
	We hold that the appellate court erred in affirming the
dismissal of counts I and III of plaintiffs' second amended
complaint, as those claims are not precluded by the res judicata
effect of the California judgment. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the trial
court for further proceedings as to those counts only. We hold,
however, that the appellate court correctly affirmed the dismissal
of the Consumer Fraud Act claims as pleaded in count IV.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
circuit court affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or
decision in this case.