Case Title: Dorman v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0292

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS OF: RYAN DORMAN, AN EMPLOYEE OF MELEHES BROTHERS, INC., v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION 2012 WY 94Case Number: S-11-0292Decided: 07/03/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION CLAIMS OF:RYAN DORMAN, AN 
EMPLOYEE OF MELEHES BROTHERS, 
INC.,Appellant(Petitioner/Claimant),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent/Objector).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Sean W. 
Scoggin of McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney 
General; Michael J. Finn, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly Roseberry, 
Assistant Attorney General
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      This appeal 
arises out of Ryan Dorman’s petition for an extension of his worker’s 
compensation temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and for reimbursement of 
travel expenses incurred in travelling from Idaho to Cheyenne, Wyoming, to 
obtain medical care.  The Wyoming 
Workers’ Compensation Division (Division) denied those benefits, and that denial 
was upheld by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the district 
court.  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Ryan Dorman 
(Dorman) presents the following issues on appeal:
 
I.          
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearing’s decision and affirmation 
thereof by the district court, that Mr. Dorman is not entitled to receive 
additional temporary total disability benefits was arbitrary and capricious, as 
well as not supported by the substantial evidence presented at the hearing and 
case law.
 
II.         
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearing’s decision and affirmation 
thereof by the district court that Mr. Dorman is not entitled to reimbursement 
for travel to and from visits with Dr. Beer was arbitrary and capricious and not 
supported by the substantial evidence presented at the hearing and case 
law.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On June 23, 2005, 
Dorman, then a construction foreman for Melehes Brothers, Inc. of Alta, Wyoming, 
injured his back while lifting concrete panels.  He sought medical care initially from a 
chiropractor in Jackson, Wyoming, and then continued his treatment with Dr. 
Morgan Barkdull, a chiropractor in Driggs, Idaho, which was closer to his home 
in Victor, Idaho.  Both 
chiropractors originally diagnosed Dorman’s injury as a “sprain/strain” of his 
thoracic spine.    

 
[¶4]      On June 30, 2005, 
after Dorman had experienced no improvement in his pain, Dr. Barkdull referred 
him to Dr. Scott Thomas, a medical doctor in Driggs.  Dr. Thomas ordered x-rays, which 
revealed no fractures, and he injected trigger points with cortisone.  On July 26, 2005, noting Dorman’s 
continued improvement, Dr. Barkdull modified Dorman’s disability certification 
to allow a return to light duty work with no twisting or lifting.  
 
[¶5]      On August 1, 
2005, the Division notified Dorman that he had been awarded TTD benefits, but 
that those benefits were terminated as of July 27, 2005, due to his ability to 
return to work.  In October 2005, 
the Division issued final determinations notifying Dorman that it would no 
longer approve payment of medical bills or TTD benefits because Dorman’s work 
injury had resolved.  Dorman 
appealed, and the Division’s determinations were reviewed by the OAH and 
district court.  

 
[¶6]      While Dorman’s 
first contested case was pending, in May 2006, Dorman sought treatment from Dr. 
Grant Walker of the Idaho Spine Center.  
Dr. Walker observed “a central compression fracture at approximately the 
T-3 level along with an extensive soft tissue edema at T-2, including 
inflammation and inflammatory fluids that tracked between the bones 
posteriorly.”  Dr. Walker diagnosed 
a flexion/distraction injury, and during the first contested case, 
testified:
 
The 
flexion and distraction injuries or what we’ll call a soft-tissue chance injury, 
consists of the force exiting out posteriorly in the ligaments, through the 
ligaments that connect the vertebra together.  These tears can be classified as a 
third-degree sprain or complete disruption of the ligament.  In these flexion/distraction injuries 
where the bone sustains a majority of the force, once the bone heals, the 
patients get better.  In this type 
of a case, the central portion of the vertebra acts as the pivot point.  So as the front goes down, the back goes 
up.  And the soft tissue damage has 
been shown throughout the literature, throughout many years to cause continued 
pain symptoms if left untreated, unstabilized.
 
[¶7]      Dorman remained 
under Dr. Walker’s care until the summer of 2009, when Dr. Walker retired.  Following an examination on March 12, 
2009, Dr. Walker recorded the following treatment plan:
 
If 
we did surgery on the patient today, he would be off his construction job and on 
restrictions for 1 year.  Therefore, 
I will renew his total temporary disability benefits form for 12 months from 
today’s date.
 
[¶8]      In the final 
treatment note from Dr. Walker, dated July 10, 2009, Dr. Walker recorded the 
following observations:
 
SUBJECTIVE:  Mr. Dorman is being seen in 
follow-up.  He still continues to 
have the same complaints.  His pain 
on average is a 5/10 and on the bad days of which he has had several in the last 
2 weeks, it can get up to 9/10.  He 
is not working.
 
I 
think for an injury that is now 4 years old, the greatest single deciding piece 
of information is the fact Mr. Dorman is still very symptomatic.  A soft tissue injury that would result 
in just a sprain or strain of the paraspinal muscles would not cause this amount 
of symptomatology for years out.
 
PLAN:  My plan is that the patient still needs 
surgical stabilization and that he should not work.  I do not think he is capable of 
working.
 
[¶9]      On August 29, 
2009, Dorman submitted a Request for Change of Health Care Provider to the 
Division, requesting that his physician of record be changed from Dr. Walker to 
Dr. Lynn Stromberg of Idaho Falls, Idaho.  
The reason provided for the change was Dr. Walker’s retirement.  On October 6, 2009, Dorman withdrew his 
request to have Dr. Stromberg approved as his physician of record and informed 
the Division that Dr. Stromberg had declined to take his case.  
 
[¶10]   On October 20, 2009, Dorman 
submitted another Request for Change of Health Care Provider, this time 
requesting that Dr. Robert Cach of Idaho Falls, Idaho, be designated his 
physician of record.  On October 23, 
2009, the Division issued a final determination approving Dr. Cach as Dorman’s 
physician of record.  

 
[¶11]   Dorman saw Dr. Cach on October 20, 
2009, and Dr. Cach noted complaints of neck pain and T-spine pain.  Dr. Cach ordered MRIs of the cervical 
and thoracic spine.  The MRI of the 
cervical spine showed:
 
1.         
Mild left neural foraminal narrowing at C4-5 due to uncovertebral joint 
osteophyte.
 
2.         
Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing at C5-6 due to uncovertebral 
joint osteophyte.
 
3.         
There is mild reversal of the lordotic curvature in the cervical spine at 
approximately the C4-5 level.  This 
effaces the anterior thecal sac at this level but does not produce spinal 
stenosis.
 
The 
MRI of the thoracic spine showed:
 
1.         
Mild degenerative endplate spurring at multiple levels as detailed 
above.
 
2.         
Tiny right paracentral disc protrusion at T3-4, which does not produce 
spinal stenosis or significantly deform the thoracic cord.
 
[¶12]   On November 3, 2009, Dr. Cach 
reviewed the MRI results and entered the following treatment note in Dorman’s 
chart:
 
I 
have reviewed the new MRI’s and feel no surgical intervention on his neck or 
T-spine is indicated.  I have 
recommended he be seen by chronic pain management.
 
[¶13]   On December 7, 2009, Dorman 
submitted another Request for Change of Health Care Provider to the 
Division.  Dorman requested that his 
physician of record be changed from Dr. Cach to Dr. Steven Beer of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  In requesting the 
physician change, Dorman stated that the request was not for a second opinion 
but because “Dr. Cach stated this is outside of his scope of expertise.”  On December 14, 2009, the Division 
issued a final determination approving Dr. Beer as Dorman’s physician of 
record.  In that final 
determination, the Division advised Dorman as follows concerning travel 
reimbursement for care by Dr. Beer:  

 
The 
Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Act does not allow for travel reimbursement other 
than that necessary to obtain closest available medical and hospital care needed 
by the employee.  Wyoming Statute § 
27-14-401(d)(ii).  Dr. Beer is not 
the closest available provider for medical or hospital 
care.
 
[¶14]   Dr. Beer examined Dorman for the 
first time on December 7, 2009.  
After obtaining a new MRI, Dr. Beer diagnosed a thoracic sprain and a 
small herniated disc in the upper thoracic spine.  He recommended a T2-3 facet injection, a 
T3-4 facet injection, and a T2-3 epidural steroid injection.  The facet injections were for diagnostic 
purposes, and the steroid injection was for pain relief.  When that treatment did not produce long 
term pain relief, Dr. Beer recommended nerve ablation treatment.  As of the date of Dr. Beer’s deposition 
in the present contested case, now on appeal, Dorman had not yet undergone the 
nerve ablation treatment and Dr. Beer had not recommended surgery to treat 
Dorman’s injury.  

 
[¶15]   During the period that Dorman was 
changing physicians, the Division and Dorman negotiated a stipulation concerning 
his TTD benefits and other benefits.  
This followed OAH and district court decisions that largely reversed the 
Division’s earlier determinations concerning TTD benefits and Dorman’s need for 
continued medical treatment.  On 
September 19, 2009, the Division and Dorman entered into a Stipulated Order 
Awarding Temporary Total Disability and Workers’ Compensation Benefits, which 
awarded Dorman the maximum twenty-four months of TTD benefits allowed by statute 
and provided that any extended TTD benefits would be awarded only as permitted 
by the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404.  The Stipulated Order also provided that 
medical benefits would be paid as directed by the district court’s order. 

 
[¶16]   On October 18, 2009, after the 
Division paid the stipulated twenty-four months of TTD benefits, Dorman 
submitted a letter to the Division requesting extended TTD benefits.  The letter, which was copied to Dorman’s 
attorney, stated:
 
Thank 
you again for payment of 2 years wages pursuant to the Order signed by the 
Office of Administrative Hearings in Sept. 2009.
 
I 
am requesting reimbursement under the WY Special Circumstances provision for the 
remainder of my wages from 8/1/2007 forward until I have obtained surgery for my 
injury and have recovered to Maximum Medical Improvement.  TTD forms are on 
file.
 
[¶17]   The Division thereafter issued a 
final determination denying extended TTD benefits.  The Division also issued final 
determinations denying several applications for travel expense reimbursement for 
Dorman’s trips to Cheyenne and final determinations denying payment for cervical 
spine testing by Dr. Cach.  Dorman 
requested hearings on all of the denials.  

 
[¶18]   The matters were referred to the 
OAH where a combined hearing was held on the denial of TTD benefits, denial of 
travel reimbursement, and denial of diagnostic testing related to Dorman’s 
cervical spine.  The OAH upheld the 
denial of TTD benefits on the ground that Dorman had failed to make the required 
showing that he reasonably expects to return to gainful employment within twelve 
months, and it upheld the denial of travel reimbursement on the ground that 
Dorman had failed to make the required showing that Dr. Beer was the closest 
available medical provider.  The OAH 
reversed the denial of benefits for diagnostic testing related to Dorman’s 
cervical spine, holding that such testing was appropriate to determine the 
extent of Dorman’s work related injury.  

 
[¶19]   Dorman appealed the portion of the 
OAH order denying extended TTD benefits and travel reimbursement to the district 
court.  On September 12, 2011, the 
district court issued its Order Affirming Final Agency Order, 
concluding:
 
Petitioner 
failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances justified the extension 
of his TTD benefits, specifically by failing to make a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that he could return to work within a year, given his 
current course of treatment.  
Instead, at best, Petitioner was able to demonstrate that if he underwent 
surgery, he may be able to return to 
work in a year, even though surgery was not being considered by his current 
doctor as a course of treatment.  
Furthermore, Petitioner failed to present any evidence to show that Dr. 
Beer, his doctor in Cheyenne, was the closest doctor qualified to treat his 
medical condition.  Therefore, 
Petitioner failed to show that he was entitled to the reimbursement for travel 
to Cheyenne for treatment with Dr. Beer.  
(Emphasis in original.)
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶20]   We review administrative decisions 
based on the factors set forth in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 
which provides:
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
 
(i) Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and
 
(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
 
(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;
 
(B) Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
 
(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;
 
(D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or
 
(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶21]   Under this statute, we review an 
agency’s findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence standard.  Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 
2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 
2008). 
Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bush 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 120, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 176, 179 (Wyo. 
2005) 
(citation omitted). “'Findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence if, 
from the evidence preserved in the record, we can discern a rational premise for 
those findings.’”  Kenyon 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2011 WY 14, ¶ 11, 247 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 
2011) 
(quoting Bush, 
¶ 5, 120 P.3d at 179).
 
[¶22]   With regard to an agency’s 
determination that a claimant did not satisfy his burden of proof, this Court 
has said:
 
If 
the hearing examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his 
burden of proof, we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the agency’s decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by 
considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence in the record as a whole. If, in the course of its decision making 
process, the agency disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for 
doing so based upon determinations of credibility or other factors contained in 
the record, its decision will be sustainable under the substantial evidence 
test. Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether we 
agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude as 
it did, based on all the evidence before it.
 
Davenport 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2012 WY 6, ¶ 12, 268 P.3d 1038, 1041-42 (Wyo. 2012) 
(quoting Dale, 
¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561 
(citations omitted)).
 
[¶23]   “'We review an agency’s conclusions 
of law de novo, and will affirm only if the agency’s conclusions are in 
accordance with the law.’” Kenyon, 
¶ 13, 247 P.3d  at 849 (quoting Moss 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2010 WY 66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 
2010)).  In an appeal from a district court’s 
appellate review of an administrative decision, we review the case as if it came 
directly from the hearing examiner, affording no deference to the district 
court’s decision.  Deloge v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2011 WY 
154, ¶ 5, 264 P.3d 28, 30 (Wyo. 2011); In re Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 7, 215 P.3d 277, 280 
(Wyo. 2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.        
Extended TTD Benefits
 
[¶24]   Dorman received an award of 
twenty-four months of TTD benefits and applied for and was denied extended TTD 
benefits.  On appeal, he contends 
the OAH decision upholding the Division’s denial of extended TTD benefits was 
not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and 
capricious.
 
[¶25]   The Wyoming Workers’ Compensation 
Act defines the circumstances under which an injured employee is entitled to TTD 
benefits and the maximum period of time for which those benefits shall be made 
available.  It provides, in 
part:
 
The 
period for receiving a temporary total disability award under this section for 
injuries resulting from any one (1) incident or accident shall not exceed a 
cumulative period of twenty-four (24) months, except that the division pursuant 
to its rules and regulations and in its discretion may in the event of 
extraordinary circumstances award additional temporary total disability 
benefits.  The division’s decision 
to grant such additional benefits shall be reviewable by a hearing examiner only 
for an abuse of discretion by the division.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶26]   Pursuant to this statutory 
direction, the Division has enacted a rule defining an injured employee’s 
eligibility for extended benefits.  
That rule requires clear and convincing evidence of five factors before 
an employee will be considered eligible for extended benefits.  It provides:
 
(b)       
Limitation on Period of Temporary Total Disability (TTD); 
Extraordinary Circumstance.
 
            
(i)         
The period for receiving a TTD award under W.S. § 27-14-404 resulting 
from a single incident, accident, or period of cumulative trauma or exposure 
shall not exceed a cumulative period of 24 months, except that the Division, in 
its discretion, may award additional TTD benefits if the claimant establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence that the claimant:
                        
(A)       
remains totally disabled, due solely to a work-related 
injury;
                        
(B)       
has not recovered to the extent that he or she can return to gainful 
employment;
                        
(C)       
reasonably expects to return to gainful employment within 12 months 
following the date of the first TTD claim occurring after the expiration of the 
24-month period;
                        
(D)       
does not have an ascertainable loss which would qualify for benefits 
under W.S. §§ 27-14-405 or 406; and,
                        
(E)       
has taken all reasonable measures to facilitate recovery, including 
compliance with the recommendations of the treating 
physician.
 
Wyoming 
Workers’ Compensation Div., Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, 
Ch. 7 § 2(b)(i) (June 6, 2011).1
 
[¶27]   The OAH review of the extended TTD 
benefits issue was confined to a determination of whether the Division abused 
its discretion in denying the benefits.  
An agency abuses its discretion when its 
decision “appears to be so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could 
not abide it.” Watkins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. 
Comm’n, 2011 WY 49, ¶ 21, 250 P.3d 1082, 1089 
(Wyo. 2011) (quoting Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman’s Rest., 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Wyo. 1996)).  
Additionally, the extended benefits rule requires that a claimant prove 
the factors entitling him to those benefits by clear and convincing evidence, 
which we have held is the “kind of proof which would 
persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly 
probable.”  Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 83, ¶ 29, 47 P.3d 206, 216 (Wyo. 2002) 
(quoting MacGuire 
v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 
612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 
1980)).  Thus the scope of the OAH review was 
whether the Division abused its discretion in finding that Dorman had not proven 
by clear and convincing evidence his entitlement to extended TTD 
benefits.
 
[¶28]   The OAH determined that Dorman had 
proven with clear and convincing evidence four of the five required factors to 
make a showing of his entitlement to extended TTD benefits, but it upheld the 
Division’s denial because Dorman had not made the required showing that he 
reasonably expected to return to gainful employment within twelve months.  In support of this determination, the 
OAH made the following findings:
 
77.       The 
deciding factors then with respect to this claim is whether or not Dorman 
proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that he reasonably expected to return 
to gainful employment.
 
78.       With 
respect to that issue the evidence is not clear and convincing.  Rather the evidence is equivocal.  At best there is an office note from Dr. 
Walker dated March 12, 2009 which states
 
            
“If we did surgery on the patient today, he would be off his construction 
job and on restrictions for 1 year.  
Therefore, I will renew his total temporary disability benefits form for 
12 months from today’s date.”  Exhibit 4-3
 
79.       This 
Hearing Officer does not find this clear and convincing evidence however as it 
is simply a conclusory statement without foundation or basis.  No evidence was offered as to Dorman’s 
ability to perform any work other than construction work and Dr. Walker’s prior 
statements in his medical records are not clear as to whether he thought that 
Dorman was permanently incapable [of] returning to construction work, or would 
be capable of returning after surgery.
 
80.       In any 
event, surgery has not yet taken place.  
Further, it is not clear that surgery is still even in the plans as Dr. 
Cach did not recommend it and Dr. Beer appears to be hesitant to pursue it until 
all other options have been exhausted.
 
81.       While Dr. 
Cach testified that Dorman could return to light duty work with restrictions, 
that was the sum total of evidence stating Dorman could return to work in any 
capacity.  The evidence was 
insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Dorman could be 
reasonably expected to return to gainful employment within 12 months of his last 
application for TTD benefits.
 
82.       Dr. Beer’s 
testimony with respect to Dorman’s return to work certainly was not clear and 
convincing either.  Dr. Beer stated 
it was impossible for him to state if Dorman would be recovered within the one 
year period to the extent he could return to work.
 
83.       Dorman 
presented no credible evidence he would likely be able to return to gainful 
employment within one year from his last TTD payment or at any time in the 
foreseeable future.  Rather although 
Dorman professes he would like to return to work he has consistently maintained 
that his condition requires surgical repair and/or some form of further 
treatment and will not resolve until he receives such treatment.  He also contends that he has been 
consistently restricted from work and unable to engage in gainful 
employment.
 
84.       
Accordingly, this Office must find that the Division’s determination not 
to award Dorman TTD benefits in excess of the statutory 24 month period was 
based on consideration of all relevant factors, was rational and was within the 
bounds of reason[].  Under the 
Division’s Rules, Dorman was required to prove all the necessary elements for 
extended TTD benefits, including that he “reasonably expects to return to 
gainful employment within 12 months following the date of the first TTD claim 
occurring after the expiration of the 24-month period.”  The Division’s determination that Dorman 
had not proven he would likely return to gainful employment was not an abuse of 
discretion.  Thus, Dorman did not 
prove all the necessary elements as provided in the Division’s Rules for 
awarding extended TTD benefits.
 
[¶29]   Although Dorman framed his 
challenge to the OAH determination with an assertion that the ruling was not 
supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious, his argument 
articulates no such defect.  In 
particular, Dorman does not dispute the evidence on which the OAH findings are 
based or contend that the record contains evidence that he is reasonably 
expected to return to gainful employment within twelve months.  Instead, in his brief Dorman 
argues:
 
            
Mr. Dorman’s medical treatment has been delayed for extended periods of 
time due to the Decisions and final determinations of the Division.  The Division cutoff [sic] treatment and 
temporary total disability benefits with entry of final determinations in 
October of 2005, placing Mr. Dorman in a position where financially, he did not 
have access to medical treatment.  
The matter was then “tied up” in litigation surrounding the final 
determinations until September of 2009, when the District Court overturned the 
final determinations, finding that the Division had improperly denied benefits 
and reinstating those benefits. . . . During those periods of time that a final 
determination of the division denying benefits is pending, staying medical 
treatment benefits, he was unable to pay for treatment that would improve his 
condition and allow him to return to gainful employment.  Other than the delays caused by 
decisions and actions of the Division herein, Mr. Dorman had consistently sought 
medical treatment and followed the recommendations of his medical 
providers.
 
            
It is understandable that the Division does have this right to review all 
benefits and determine whether or not the benefits requested are proper under 
the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation statutes, however it is not proper that the 
Division then deny Mr. Dorman’s request for additional temporary total 
disability benefits when the sole reason for his continued disability is because 
of delays caused by the Division.
 
[¶30]   We reject Dorman’s argument.  The Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Act 
authorizes the Division to define the circumstances under which extended TTD 
benefits shall be awarded to an injured employee, and the Division has 
promulgated a rule setting forth those circumstances.  That a claimant’s benefits are disputed 
or the subject of a contested case is not a circumstance the Division has 
established as a basis for extended TTD benefits, and Dorman has provided no 
legal authority to expand the circumstances defined by the Division’s duly 
promulgated rule.  Moreover, even if 
such legal authority existed, Dorman has not supported his argument with clear 
and convincing evidence that the “sole reason for his continued disability is 
because of delays caused by the Division.”
 
B.        
Reimbursement of Travel Expenses
 
[¶31]   Dorman has traveled several times 
from Idaho Falls, Idaho, to Cheyenne, Wyoming, to be examined and treated by Dr. 
Beer, a Cheyenne neurosurgeon.  The 
Division has awarded benefits for the medical care provided by Dr. Beer, but it 
made a determination that Dr. Beer was not the closest available medical 
provider and thus denied reimbursement of Dorman’s travel expenses.  Dorman contends that the OAH decision 
upholding the denial of travel expenses was not supported by substantial 
evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.
 
[¶32]   The Wyoming Workers’ Compensation 
Act provides as follows concerning reimbursement of travel expenses incurred in 
obtaining medical care:
 
            
(d)       
Medical and hospital care shall be obtained if possible within Wyoming, 
or in an adjoining state if the hospital or health care provider in the 
adjoining state is closer to the scene of the accident or to the usual place of 
employment of the employee than a hospital or health care provider in Wyoming, 
unless otherwise authorized by the division.  Except as otherwise authorized by the 
division, reimbursements for travel in obtaining medical and hospital care shall 
not be paid:
 
* 
* * * 
 
            
(ii)        For 
travel other than that necessary to obtain the closest available medical or 
hospital care needed by the employee except in those instances where 
travel within Wyoming is at a greater distance than travel outside of 
Wyoming[.]
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-401(d)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis 
added).
 
[¶33]   A claimant must prove all essential 
elements of his claim for worker’s compensation benefits.  Keck v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 985 P.2d 430, 433 (Wyo. 1999).  Dorman 
was thus required to show that Dr. Beer was the closest available physician who 
could provide the medical care Dorman needed.
 
[¶34]   The OAH concluded that Dorman did 
not meet his burden of proof, as set forth in the following conclusions of 
law:
 
104.    In this case Dorman[’s] 
evidence consisted of his testimony that he was not able to find a doctor closer 
who could address his specific injury, i.e. a thoracic spine 
injury.
 
105.    At the onset it is noted that 
both Dr. Cach and Dr. Beer are Board Certified Neurosurgeons.  They both completed neurosurgical 
residency programs and it does not appear that either of them were “Fellowship 
Trained in Cervical or Thoroclumbar [sic] Surgery” as was Dr. Walker 
apparently.  Therefore there does 
not appear to be any difference in their education or experience, other than the 
fact that Dr. Beer has been in practice longer.  Neither doctor testified in their 
depositions that there was any subspecialty of neurosurgery dealing with the 
thoracic spine or that one had more expertise in that type of 
injury.
 
106.    While Dorman contended that 
Dr. Cach stated his specialty was cranial and cervical, that does not mean that 
Dr. Cach was not as qualified to address his thoracic spine issues.  Indeed, even though it appears that Dr. 
Cach may have gone beyond the work related injury to the thoracic spine to look 
at the cervical spine, he did engage in evaluation and recommendations relative 
to the thoracic spine.  Accordingly, 
this Office finds that the evidence shows that the closest available medical 
care was in fact Dr. Cach in Idaho Falls, Idaho.  Further, the undisputed testimony from 
Dr. Cach was that there were pain management providers in the Idaho Falls and 
Jackson area, Cach deposition page 
13.
 
107.    Dorman may have felt more 
comfortable with a health care provider other than Dr. Cach, however, he did not 
present evidence regarding the availability of other neurosurgeons in the Idaho 
Falls or Jackson area that could treat him or that a neurosurgeon without 
fellowship training could not adequately treat him.  It appears that he was determined to 
find someone who he felt had similar qualification to Dr. Walker, i.e. 
fellowship training, however, that is not the standard.  The standard is the closest medical 
provider who can provide adequate care.  
In any event as stated there is no evidence that Dr. Beer had such 
specialty training.  

 
[¶35]   Dorman argues that his own 
testimony shows that the OAH conclusions were not supported by substantial 
evidence and were arbitrary and capricious.  In particular, Dorman points to his 
testimony that Dr. Cach told Dorman that his thoracic complaints were outside 
Dr. Cach’s area of expertise and that Dorman would need to find a different 
physician.   

 
[¶36]   With respect to Dorman’s testimony 
alleging that Dr. Cach told him he was not qualified to treat Dorman’s thoracic 
injury, the OAH made a specific finding rejecting the testimony.  The OAH found:
 
            
With respect to credibility findings, overall this Hearing Officer finds 
that Dorman’s testimony was credible, however, this Hearing Officer questions 
Dorman’s statement that Dr. Cach stated he did not have expertise in the area of 
the thoracic spine.  Given Dr. 
Cach’s credentials and training this statement does not ring true.  It appears to this Hearing Officer that 
what Dorman was really trying to get at was the fact that Dr. Walker evidently 
holds himself out as having some such specialty in the thoracic spine and Dr. 
Cach did not have the same qualifications.  
As noted, Dr. Walker’s records state that he is “Fellowship Trained in 
Cervical and Thoracolumbar Spinal Surgery”.  Dr. Cach[’s] deposition states that he 
did a neurosurgical residency program and that he is Board Certified.  This Hearing Officer was under the 
impression that Dorman was simply placing more emphasis on Dr. Walker’s 
credentials as he was not satisfied with Dr. Cach’s 
treatment.
 
[¶37]   The hearing examiner in a contested 
case has the responsibility to determine the relevance and credibility of 
evidence, and to assign the probative value and weight to be given that 
evidence.  Davenport, ¶ 14, 268 P.3d  at 1042.  This Court will not reweigh the evidence 
and will defer to the trier of fact’s decision so long as it is based on 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as supporting that 
decision.  Id.
 
[¶38]   We see no reason to part ways with 
the hearing examiner on her assessment of Dorman’s testimony concerning Dr. 
Cach’s expertise.  Nothing in Dr. 
Cach’s treatment notes or deposition suggests that he felt unqualified to treat 
Dorman’s thoracic injury.  Rather, 
his notes and testimony indicate that he felt surgery was not required, that 
Dorman could return to work with certain restrictions, and that Dorman would 
benefit from a pain management program.  
Moreover, we find it significant, as alluded to by the hearing examiner, 
that Dorman, who carried the burden of proof, did not ask Dr. Cach during his 
deposition to address or reaffirm his purported lack of qualifications to treat 
Dorman’s thoracic injury.
 
[¶39]   We thus find that the OAH 
conclusion that Dr. Cach, located in Idaho Falls, was the closest available 
provider is supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and 
capricious.  We note, as did the 
hearing examiner, that this does not mean that Dorman is not permitted to choose 
a different physician.  It merely 
means that Dorman is not entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses incurred 
to obtain treatment from the physician who is not the closest available 
provider.2
 
[¶40]   We address last Dorman’s contention 
that the Division had an obligation to provide guidance in locating the closest 
available physician and that it engaged in a sort of “bait and switch” by 
approving Dr. Beer as Dorman’s health care provider of record and then denying 
reimbursement of travel expenses.  
While we agree that it would have been helpful if the Division had 
identified alternative physicians, and in particular physicians closer to 
Dorman’s residence, Dorman points to no legal obligation of the Division to do 
so.  Nor are we able to find by 
statute or regulation that the Division is under such an obligation.  With respect to the alleged “bait and 
switch,” we reject this contention given that the Division advised Dorman in 
writing, in the same notice in which it approved Dr. Beer as Dorman’s health 
care provider, that Dr. Beer was not the closest available provider and Dorman 
would not be reimbursed for travel expenses incurred in seeking treatment from 
Dr. Beer.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶41]   The OAH conclusion that Dorman had 
not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to extended TTD 
benefits was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with 
law.  Likewise, its conclusion that 
Dorman had not met his burden of showing that he was seeking treatment from the 
closest available health care provider and was thus entitled to reimbursement of 
travel expenses was also supported by substantial evidence and in accordance 
with law.  We thus 
affirm.
 
 
 FOOTNOTES
  1The citation is 
to the rules currently on file, but the relevant rule did not change between the 
current rules and the superseded rules, which were filed on September 30, 
2005.
  2This 
Court is aware that in the Division’s approval of Dorman’s initial request to 
change his health care provider from Dr. Walker to Dr. Cach, the Division 
informed Dorman that Dr. Cach was not the closest available provider.  The record does not disclose the basis 
for the Division's notice concerning Dr. Cach, but we also do know from Dorman’s 
own testimony that Dr. Cach was located only three and one-half miles from 
Dorman’s home.  Thus, the hearing 
examiner’s determination that Dr. Cach was the closest available provider is not 
against the weight of the evidence.  
Moreover, we also note that whether Dr. Cach is the closest available provider is not 
determinative of Dorman’s entitlement to travel expense reimbursement.  Dr. Cach was closer than Dr. Beer, and 
he was available and qualified.  Dr. 
Beer was therefore not the closest available provider, and Dorman was not 
entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses related to his treatment by Dr. 
Beer.