Case Title: Coder v. Ohio Edison Co.

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5220

Docket Number: 2019-0951

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5220.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5220 
CORDER ET AL., APPELLEES, v. OHIO EDISON COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5220.] 
Subject-matter jurisdiction—Public utilities—Common pleas courts—Public 
Utilities Commission is not a court of general jurisdiction, and it may not 
adjudicate claims involving competing property rights, including those 
asserted by or against a public utility—Determination of scope of an 
easement does not depend on the Public Utilities Commission’s exercise of 
administrative expertise or review of a public utility’s vegetation-
management program, but requires a court to interpret and apply the 
language of the instrument creating the easement—Judgment affirmed in 
part and reversed in part, and cause remanded to the trial court. 
(No. 2019-0951—Submitted June 17, 2020—Decided November 12, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Harrison County, 
No. 18 HA 0002, 2019-Ohio-2639. 
________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Seventh District 
Court of Appeals presents a single question: does a common pleas court have 
subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether an easement granting a public 
utility “the right to trim, cut and remove * * * trees, limbs, underbrush or other 
obstructions” permits the public utility to use herbicide to control vegetation within 
the easement?  
{¶ 2} The General Assembly has vested the Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio (“PUCO”) with exclusive jurisdiction over most matters relating to public 
utilities, including the rates charged and the services provided.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 119 Ohio St.3d 301, 2008-Ohio-3917, 893 N.E.2d 824, 
¶ 5.  However, the PUCO is not a court of general jurisdiction, and it may not 
adjudicate claims involving competing property rights, including those asserted by 
or against a public utility.  In re Complaint of Wilkes v. Ohio Edison Co., 131 Ohio 
St.3d 252, 2012-Ohio-609, 963 N.E.2d 1285, ¶ 9.  The determination of the scope 
of an easement does not depend on the PUCO’s exercise of its administrative 
expertise or its review of a public utility’s vegetation-management program, but 
rather requires a court to interpret and apply the language of the instrument creating 
the easement.  See id.; State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont, 140 Ohio St.3d 471, 
2014-Ohio-2962, 20 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 28.  Interpreting legal instruments is a judicial 
function, even when the property rights of a public utility are at stake. 
{¶ 3} A court of common pleas therefore has subject-matter jurisdiction to 
determine whether the use of herbicide to control vegetation is within the scope of 
a public utility’s easement.  For this reason, the court of appeals correctly reversed 
the trial court’s judgment dismissing this matter as falling within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the PUCO.  However, the appellate court went beyond the narrow 
issue presented to it in the appeal when it examined the merits of the case and 
determined that the language of the easements is ambiguous.  The sole issue before 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
the court of appeals was whether the cause of action and relief sought were within 
the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and the appellate court’s analysis should 
have gone no further. 
{¶ 4} We therefore affirm the portion of the judgment of the Seventh 
District relating to the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, reverse the 
remaining portion of its judgment, vacate its holding that the language of the 
easements is ambiguous as well as its suggested interpretation of the language’s 
meaning, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} Appellees Craig D. Corder, Jackie C. Corder, and Scott Corder own 
property in Nottingham Township, Harrison County, Ohio, that is burdened by 
electrical-transmission-line easements that were originally obtained by the Ohio 
Public Service Company in 1948 and were subsequently acquired by appellant, 
Ohio Edison Company.  The easements grant Ohio Edison “the right to trim, cut 
and remove at any and all times such trees, limbs, underbrush or other obstructions 
as in the judgment of [Ohio Edison] may interfere with or endanger [its] structures, 
wires or appurtenances, or their operation.” 
{¶ 6} Following a widespread electrical blackout in August 2003, the 
Federal Electric Regulatory Commission imposed a requirement that public utilities 
implement a Transmission Vegetation Management (“TVM”) program to prevent 
vegetation growth from interfering with transmission lines.  The PUCO adopted 
that requirement as an administrative rule, Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E)(1)(f).  
Ohio Edison’s vegetation-management plan was adopted pursuant to that provision 
and became effective in 2010. 
{¶ 7} According to Katherine M. Bloss, the manager of transmission-
vegetation management for First Energy Service Company (the company that 
administers the TVM program for Ohio Edison), both the TVM program and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
established industry practice require the use of herbicides to control vegetation on 
Ohio Edison’s electrical-transmission-line easements throughout the state, 
including those passing through the Corders’ property.  She explained that “the only 
absolute way * * * to avoid future interference with incompatible vegetation that 
remains after vegetation removal is to use herbicides to remove it.” 
{¶ 8} Rogerio Maldonado, a transmission forestry specialist for First 
Energy Service Company, had visited the Corders’ property and determined that 
the condition of the vegetation on the easements required the use of herbicide to 
prevent interference and contact with Ohio Edison’s electrical lines. 
{¶ 9} Christina Todd, the general manager of transmission engineering for 
First Energy Service Company, opined that if vegetation is not controlled, it might 
interfere with Ohio Edison’s electrical-transmission lines and “could result in 
cascading outages and dangers to life and property.” 
{¶ 10} The Corders objected to the use of herbicide on the easements as 
incompatible with their use of their land as an organic farm.  They filed this action 
in the Harrison County Common Pleas Court seeking injunctive relief and a 
declaratory judgment that the easements do not give Ohio Edison the right to use 
herbicide to control vegetation on their property.  The parties each moved for 
summary judgment. 
{¶ 11} The trial court noted: “The [question] before the Court is whether 
‘remove’ encompasses herbicides in regards to vegetation removal.”  However, 
relying on the Seventh District’s decision in DeLost v. First Energy Corp., 7th Dist. 
Mahoning No. 07 MA 194, 2008-Ohio-3086, the trial court concluded that the 
question whether a public utility may remove vegetation from an easement involves 
a factual issue regarding the service provided by the public utility and therefore 
“the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of vegetation removal on a 
public utility transmission line.” 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
{¶ 12} The Seventh District reversed the trial court’s judgment.  It 
distinguished this case from its decision in DeLost and from our decision in 
Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524, 910 N.E.2d 1009, on 
the ground that no party in DeLost or Corrigan had challenged the public utilities’ 
right to remove trees under the easements at issue in those cases; rather, the 
landowners had argued that the removal of trees was not needed to maintain the 
public utilities’ power lines.  2019-Ohio-2639, ¶ 39.  In contrast, the court of 
appeals noted, the Corders’ complaint sought a declaration that the easements did 
not grant Ohio Edison the right to control vegetation in the easements using 
herbicide.  Id. at ¶ 14.  It concluded that the easements were subject to multiple 
interpretations and therefore were ambiguous regarding whether the word 
“remove” in the easements had been intended to include the right to use herbicide.  
Id.  at ¶ 51-52.  It then remanded the matter to the trial court for it to resolve the 
ambiguity concerning the scope of the easements.  Id. at ¶ 52-53. 
{¶ 13} We accepted for review Ohio Edison’s two propositions of law:  
 
l.  When a state court sets its own standards for methods that 
a utility can use to permanently maintain its lines, it usurps the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO to ensure that a public utility has 
adequate facilities to deliver electric power contrary to Corrigan. 
2.  When an Ohio court improperly finds an ambiguity 
within a common word or phrase that frustrates the entire purpose 
of a utility easement, it fails to adhere to the important public policy 
of permitting electric utilities to erect and properly maintain 
adequate facilities to provide reliable electric service under R.C. 
4905.22. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
See 157 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2019-Ohio-4211, 132 N.E.3d 700.  The resolution of 
Ohio Edison’s first proposition of law resolves this case, and therefore we decline 
to address its second proposition of law. 
Law and Analysis 
The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court 
{¶ 14} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory 
power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.  Pratts v. Hurley, 
102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34.  “A court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the 
individual parties involved in a particular case.”  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 
Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19.  Instead, “the focus is on 
whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.”  State v. Harper, 
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-2913, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 23, citing 18A Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) 
(“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate 
judicial authority among different courts”). 
{¶ 15} Article IV, Section 4(A) of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
“[t]here shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof as may be 
established by law serving each county of the state,” and Article IV, Section 4(B) 
provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such 
original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.”  
“[W]e have interpreted Article IV’s mandate that the courts of common pleas have 
jurisdiction ‘as may be provided by law’ to mean that ‘[t]he general subject matter 
jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined entirely by statute.’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 
2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 
42, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
{¶ 16} The General Assembly exercised its power to define the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the common pleas courts in enacting R.C. Chapter 2721, the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.  Subject to a statutory limitation that is not at issue here, 
“courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations,” R.C. 
2721.02(A), and “any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other 
writing constituting a contract * * * may have determined any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument * * * and obtain a declaration 
of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.”  R.C. 2721.03.  In addition, R.C. 
Chapter 2727 authorizes the common pleas courts to grant injunctions and 
temporary restraining orders in the cases before it.  R.C. 2727.02; 2727.03; see State 
ex rel. CNG Fin. Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 149, 2006-Ohio-5344, 855 N.E.2d 
473, ¶ 15 (the common pleas court has “basic statutory jurisdiction over actions for 
injunction and declaratory judgment”); State ex rel. Erie Cty. Democratic Executive 
Commt. v. Brown, 6 Ohio St.2d 136, 138, 216 N.E.2d 369 (1966) (same); see also 
Apel v. Katz, 83 Ohio St.3d 11, 697 N.E.2d 600 (1998) (reversing court of appeals’ 
judgment in action for declaratory judgment interpreting the scope of an easement). 
The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the PUCO 
{¶ 17} “The General Assembly enacted R.C. 4901.01 et seq. to regulate the 
business activities of public utilities and created [the] PUCO to administer and 
enforce these provisions.”  Corrigan, 122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524, 910 
N.E.2d 1009, at ¶ 8.  As we explained in Allstate Ins. Co.,  
 
“The General Assembly, by the enactment of statutory provisions 
requiring a public utility to file and adhere to rate schedules, 
forbidding discrimination among its customers, prohibiting free 
service, and providing a detailed procedure for service and rate 
complaints, has lodged exclusive jurisdiction in such matters in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
Public Utilities Commission, subject to review by the Supreme 
Court.” 
 
(Emphasis added.)  119 Ohio St.3d 301, 2008-Ohio-3917, 893 N.E.2d 824, at ¶ 5, 
quoting State ex rel. N. Ohio Tel. Co. v. Winter, 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 260 N.E.2d 827 
(1970), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 18} “That PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over service-related matters 
does not diminish ‘the basic jurisdiction of the court of common pleas * * * in other 
areas of possible claims against utilities, including pure tort and contract claims.’ ”  
(Ellipsis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Shaker, 68 Ohio 
St.3d 209, 211, 625 N.E.2d 608 (1994).  That is, the mere fact that a claim has been 
brought against a public utility does not mean that the claim is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the PUCO.  Id. 
{¶ 19} In Corrigan, we applied a two-part test asking the following in 
determining whether the PUCO had exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute in which 
a landowner sought to prevent a public utility from removing a silver-maple tree 
within a power-line easement: (1) is the administrative expertise of the PUCO 
required to resolve the issue in dispute, and (2) does the act complained of constitute 
a practice normally authorized by the utility?  Corrigan at ¶ 11.  We explained that 
if the answer to either part of the test is no, then the dispute is not with the PUCO’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 20} We concluded that the question whether the silver-maple tree should 
be removed from the easement rather than pruned was committed to the PUCO’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.  We explained that the utility’s decision to remove the tree 
was governed by a vegetation-management plan that was regulated by the PUCO, 
so determining the reasonableness of that decision required the PUCO’s 
administrative expertise.  Corrigan, 122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524, 910 
N.E.2d 1009, at ¶ 15.  We also recognized that vegetation removal is necessary to 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
maintain safe and reliable electrical service.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Accordingly, we held that 
both prongs of the test had been satisfied.  Id. 
{¶ 21} Importantly, we pointed out in Corrigan that there was no question 
in that case that the public utility had a valid easement, that the silver maple was 
within the easement, and that the easement “grant[ed] the company the right to 
remove any tree within the easement that could pose a threat to the transmission 
lines.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  It was also “clear from the record that the [landowners were] 
not contesting the meaning of the language of the easement but rather the 
company’s decision to remove the tree instead of pruning it.”  Id.  at ¶ 20.  That is, 
the scope of the easement was not at issue in Corrigan. 
The Scope of the Easements 
{¶ 22} Unlike in Corrigan, the parties here dispute the scope of the property 
rights conferred on Ohio Edison by the language of the easements. 
{¶ 23} Applying the Allstate Ins. Co. test here, we recognize that this court 
determined in Corrigan that vegetation control is a practice normally authorized by 
a public utility and is necessary to maintain safe and reliable electrical service, 122 
Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524, 910 N.E.2d 1009, at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 24} However, the exercise of administrative expertise is not needed to 
determine whether the language in the easements granting Ohio Edison “the right 
to trim, cut and remove at any and all times such trees, limbs, underbrush or other 
obstructions” also authorizes it to use herbicides to control vegetation within the 
easements.  Nor does that determination turn on a consideration of the requirements 
of Ohio Edison’s TVM program, an expert opinion on the need to use herbicides, 
industry practice, or the PUCO’s regulations. 
{¶ 25} Rather, the scope of an easement must be determined from the plain 
language of the conveyance that created it.  We have explained that “[w]hen an 
easement is created by an express grant, * * * the extent of and limitations on the 
use of the land depend on the language in the grant.”  (Emphasis added.)  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
Wasserman, 140 Ohio St.3d 471, 2014-Ohio-2962, 20 N.E.3d 664, at ¶ 28.  
Moreover, “[t]he construction of written contracts and instruments of conveyance 
is a matter of law.”  Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 
N.E.2d 146 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 26} However, the PUCO “ ‘does not possess judicial power and may not 
adjudicate controversies between parties as to property rights.’ ”  Wilkes, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 252, 2012-Ohio-609, 963 N.E.2d 1285, at ¶ 9, quoting Dayton 
Communications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.2d 302, 303-304, 414 
N.E.2d 1051 (1980).  The authority to decide “competing claims of property 
ownership * * * is constitutionally reserved to the judiciary.”  Dayton 
Communications Corp. at 303.  Accord Marketing Research Servs., Inc. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm., 34 Ohio St.3d 52, 56, 517 N.E.2d 540 (1987) (“The PUCO is not a 
court of general jurisdiction, and therefore has no power to determine legal rights 
and liabilities with regard to contract rights or property rights, even though a public 
utility is involved”). 
{¶ 27} The PUCO does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the scope 
of an easement owned by a public utility, because such a determination requires an 
adjudication of competing property rights that may be made only by a court.  Ohio’s 
public-utilities law does not deprive the common pleas courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties regarding an easement and to enjoin 
violations of the easement, even when a public utility’s property rights are at stake. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} We reiterate that a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction turns on 
whether the court has the constitutional and statutory power to “entertain and 
adjudicate a particular class of cases * * * [and its jurisdiction is determined] 
without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.”  
Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, at ¶ 19.  And when 
a declaratory-judgment action seeks an adjudication of the terms of an electrical-
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
transmission-line easement to determine the respective property rights of a 
landowner and a public utility, that particular class of case is not within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO, but rather may be heard and decided by a court 
of common pleas. 
{¶ 29} The court of appeals in this case, however, looked beyond the narrow 
issue raised on appeal, reviewed the particular facts in this case, and held that the 
common pleas court had jurisdiction over the action because the terms of the 
easement were ambiguous.  2019-Ohio-2639 at ¶ 51-52.  We acknowledge that our 
cases have sometimes suggested that in determining whether the PUCO or the 
common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a controversy, “we are not 
limited by the allegations in the complaint” and “we must review the substance of 
the claims to determine if service-related issues are involved.”  Corrigan, 122 Ohio 
St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524, 910 N.E.2d 1009, at ¶ 10.  But such language was 
meant to explain that a claimant may not avoid the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
PUCO by disguising a service-related claim as a contract or tort claim through 
creative pleading.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 
102 Ohio St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 19 (“the mere fact that 
[the public utility’s customer] cast its allegations in the underlying case to sound in 
tort is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the common pleas court”). 
{¶ 30} The court of appeals went too far by reviewing the merits of the 
Corders’ causes of action and finding that the easements are ambiguous.  The 
Corders are seeking a declaration regarding the scope of Ohio Edison’s easements 
as well as injunctive relief, and their claims are within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the common pleas court.  The merits of those claims, including any 
question of the easements’ ambiguity, were beyond the scope of the appeal and 
remain for the trial court’s review in the first instance. 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judgment of the Seventh 
District Court of Appeals relating to the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
reverse the remaining portion of its judgment, vacate its holding that the language 
of the easement is ambiguous as well as its suggested interpretation of the 
language’s meaning, and remand the cause to the Harrison County Common Pleas 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
FRENCH, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 32} I agree with the majority that the claims raised by the Corders 
regarding the construction of the easements are within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas.  But I see no need to remand the matter 
to the trial court.  The easements unambiguously permit the use of herbicide, and 
there is no reason we ought not just say so. 
This court should decide the meaning of the easements 
{¶ 33} Ohio Edison Company holds easements over the Corders’ property 
for the maintenance of electrical-power lines.  The company determined that it 
needed to use herbicide to control vegetation that may interfere with the power 
lines.  The Corders filed this action to prevent Ohio Edison from using herbicide, 
asserting that the easements do not authorize Ohio Edison to remove vegetation in 
that manner.  Because the Corders’ claims ask only for the interpretation of the 
language in the easements, they fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
courts.  Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 
(1978), paragraph one of the syllabus; R.C. 2721.03 (“any person interested under 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
a deed, will, written contract, or other writing constituting a contract * * * may have 
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument 
* * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it”). 
{¶ 34} The majority is correct that subject-matter jurisdiction is proper, but 
there is no reason to remand this matter to the trial court.  Construing the language 
in the easements is purely a question of law.  The record is complete and there are 
no unresolved factual matters.  Further, both parties have fully briefed the issue and 
agreed during oral argument that this court may decide the easement-interpretation 
question.  Remanding the case will only unnecessarily delay the resolution of this 
matter. 
The easements are unambiguous 
{¶ 35} It is undisputed that the easements grant Ohio Edison some ability 
to remove interferences with its electrical-power lines; the question is the scope of 
its authority.  The disputed language provides: 
 
 
The easement and rights herein granted shall include the 
right to * * * trim, cut and remove at any and all times such trees, 
limbs, underbrush or other obstructions as in the judgment of [the 
utility company] may interfere with or endanger said structures, 
wires or appurtenances, or their operation. 
 
{¶ 36} As we will see, the court of appeals engaged in a formalistic analysis 
of the phrase “trim, cut and remove” that failed to consider the phrase in the context 
of the rest of the language in the easements. 
{¶ 37} The court homed in on the lack of a comma after the word “cut.”  
2019-Ohio-2639, ¶ 41.  It reasoned that the lone comma separates the word “trim” 
from the conjunctive phrase “cut and remove,” thereby allowing Ohio Edison to 
either “trim” or “cut and remove” the vegetation.  Id.  Presumably recognizing the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
oddity of a reading that allows a utility to remove only what it cuts but not what it 
trims, the court alternatively proposed that the word “remove” could be read to 
modify both the words “trim” and “cut.”  Id.  Under that view, Ohio Edison can 
either “trim and remove” or “cut and remove” vegetation, but it can’t “remove” 
vegetation in a manner other than by trimming and cutting it.  Id.  (It’s hard to see 
though how one could get the language “trim and remove” from the phrase “trim, 
cut and remove.”  The absence of a second comma either means something or it 
doesn’t—the court can’t have it both ways.) 
{¶ 38} Having found two possible interpretations of the phrase “trim, cut 
and remove,” the court of appeals declared it to be ambiguous.  Id. at ¶ 51.  But the 
mere fact that there are competing interpretations of a legal text doesn’t mean that 
the text is ambiguous.  One reading will often be better than the others, as often the 
less-compelling interpretations will strain ordinary usage or conflict with the 
structure or purpose of the text as a whole.  See Florida Dept. of Revenue v. 
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 41, 128 S.Ct. 2326, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 
(2008).  A court’s role is not just to decide whether language offers itself to more 
than one possible interpretation but is also to determine whether one reading is 
superior to the others.  Only when a court has concluded that no one reading of the 
language is superior to the other possibilities can it declare the language ambiguous. 
{¶ 39} In this case, one reading of the text is indeed superior to the others, 
but it’s not one of the interpretations set forth by the court of appeals below.  As I 
will explain, the best reading is that the phrase “trim, cut and remove” is a list 
providing three approaches for dealing with obstructions; in other words, Ohio 
Edison may simply “remove” the vegetation, independent of trimming or cutting it.  
The court of appeals rejected this reading because of the missing comma and the 
drafter’s use of the word “and” instead of “or.”  2019-Ohio-2639 at ¶ 41. 
{¶ 40} Such a hypertechnical reading misses the forest for the trees.  The 
word “and” can just as easily be read to grant Ohio Edison the right to trim, the 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
right to cut, and the right to remove.  See Shaw v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pa., 605 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir.2010), quoting Peacock v. Lubbock 
Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir.1958) (“The problem with and is that 
‘chameleonlike, it takes its color from its surroundings’ ” [emphasis added in 
Shaw]).  The absence of a comma between the words “cut” and “remove” may tell 
us nothing more than the drafter’s stance on the Oxford-comma debate.1  Indeed, 
when we read the easement language in its entirety, we see that serial commas were 
omitted throughout.2 
{¶ 41} So, we can’t simply decide the case on the nonuse of a comma that 
many people don’t use regularly anyway.  We have to go further and look at how 
these different readings work in the context in which they were written.  Rather 
than zero in on the meaning of a phrase in isolation, we should consider the text as 
a whole.  Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 156 Ohio St.3d 199, 2018-Ohio-
5207, 124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 11.  When we apply the court of appeals’ view of the 
phrase, we find that it actually makes little sense in context. 
                                                 
1. Oxford comma, n., “a comma immediately preceding the conjunction in a list of items.”  Oxford 
English Dictionary (3d Ed.2005).  See also Okrent, The Best Shots Fired in the Oxford Comma 
Wars, The Week (Jan. 28, 2013), available at https://theweek.com/articles/468304/best-shots-fired-
oxford-comma-wars (accessed Oct. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FDB6-26BF] (noting that the 1937 
New York Times style guide recommended against the regular use of the serial comma, while 
Follett’s 1966 edition of Modern American Usage was for it); In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 
380 B.R. 307, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“the fact that the propriety of placing a comma at that point is 
hotly disputed means one cannot read anything at all into its absence—at least not without knowing 
where the draftsman learned his or her comma-lore”). 
 
2. “The easement and rights herein granted shall include the right to erect, inspect, operate, replace, 
repair, patrol and permanently maintain upon, over and along the above described right-of-way 
across said premises all necessary structures, wires and other usual fixtures and appurtenances used 
for or in connection with the transmission and distribution of electric current, and the right of ingress 
and egress upon, over and across said premises for access to and from said right-of-way, and the 
right to trim, cut and remove at any and all times such trees, limbs, underbrush or other 
obstructions as in the judgment of Grantee may interfere with or endanger said structures, wires or 
appurtenances, or their operation.”  (Underlining added.) 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
{¶ 42} Take, for instance, a utility’s decision to pull a bush out of the 
ground, roots and all.  Under the court of appeals’ interpretation, the language of 
the instrument would not authorize such a method because it does not involve 
cutting or trimming the plant.  Or consider a situation in which a utility must mow 
grass to maintain access to the power line.  Apparently, the company would be 
outside the scope of its authority under the easement if it mowed the grass without 
also raking up what had been cut. 
{¶ 43} When we read the phrase in the context of the remainder of the 
sentence, however, we are reminded that the easements grant the utility the 
authority to “trim, cut and remove * * * trees, limbs, underbrush or other 
obstructions.”  (Emphasis added.)  And the phrase “other obstructions” 
encompasses more than just vegetation—it could include a stone wall, a treehouse, 
or a kite caught on the power lines.  The problem with the court of appeals’ reading 
is that the utility can’t simply “cut” or “trim” the stone wall, the treehouse, or the 
kite out of the way.  Its only option is to remove them.  Read in context, then, it is 
clear that the word “remove” contemplates a separate method of dealing with 
interferences: the easement language grants the utility the authority to “remove 
* * * trees, limbs, underbrush or other obstructions.” 
{¶ 44} The Corders contend that even under this reading, the use of 
herbicide does not qualify as “removal,” because it involves spraying and killing 
the plant rather than physically taking it away from the property.  But of course, 
transferring an item from one location to another is only one meaning of the word 
“remove.”  Others are “to get rid of,” “to eradicate,” and “to eliminate.”  Webster’s 
New International Dictionary 2108 (2d Ed.1947).  The use of herbicide fits easily 
within those uses of the word.  Nor is there any other language in the easements 
limiting the manner of removal.  Rather, the language is included within a broad 
grant of authority allowing the utility to “at any and all times” remove obstructions 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
that “may interfere” with its power lines.  Read in context, then, it seems clear that 
the instruments do not restrict the method of removal. 
{¶ 45} Thus, the easements do not prohibit Ohio Edison from using 
herbicide.  Any arguments about the reasonableness of its decision to do so falls 
under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 46} I agree that the claims asserted by the Corders were premised on the 
scope of the easements, and that is a legal question for the courts to resolve.  But 
we should resolve this case today.  Because the easements unambiguously gave 
Ohio Edison the ability to remove vegetation using herbicide, the case should be 
remanded to the trial court to enter a declaratory judgment in favor of Ohio Edison.  
I therefore concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Kidder Law Firm, L.L.C., and Charles L. Kidder; Arenstein & Andersen 
Co., L.P.A., Nicholas I. Andersen, and Eric R. McLoughlin, for appellees. 
 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Denise M. Hasbrook, and Nathan Pangrace, for 
appellant. 
_________________