Case Title: In re Marriage of Mayfield

Citation: 2013 IL 114655

Docket Number: 114655

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 IL 114655
 
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 114655)
In re MARRIAGE OF SHANNON MAYFIELD, Appellee, v.
HOWARD R. MAYFIELD, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 23, 2013.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,
Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
Howard Mayfield appeals the decision of the appellate court,
which affirmed the decision of the circuit court of Woodford County
to award his ex-wife, Shannon Dykes, 20% of a lump-sum workers’
compensation settlement as child support. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
¶ 2
BACKGROUND
¶ 3
In 1995, Mayfield and Dykes married. They had two children:
Zachary and Jessica. In 2003, Mayfield and Dykes divorced. Because
Dykes was the custodial parent, the trial court ordered Mayfield to
pay $158.50 per week in child support.
¶ 4
In 2004, Mayfield filed a petition to modify child support,
asserting that he had been laid off and would apply for unemployment
benefits. Dykes responded with a petition for rule to show cause,
asserting that Mayfield was in arrears on child support. The trial court
denied Mayfield’s petition to modify, and granted Dykes’ petition for
rule to show cause. The trial court found that Mayfield was in arrears
by $1,580 and ordered him to pay an additional $32 per week in child
support.
¶ 5
In 2009, Mayfield filed another petition to modify child support
because Zachary began living with him. To reflect the new living
arrangements, and the parties’ respective child support obligations,
the trial court ordered Mayfield to pay $37.57 per week in child
support.
¶ 6
In 2011, Dykes filed a petition to modify child support because
Zachary had reached the age of majority, ending her child support
obligation to him. At a hearing on that petition,  Mayfield testified
1
that, in 2007, he suffered a workplace injury and, in 2010, he received
a lump-sum workers’ compensation settlement of $300,000, which
was reduced to $239,920 after deducting attorney fees and medical
expenses. Under section 10.1 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the
settlement agreement prorated the lump sum over Mayfield’s life
expectancy. See 820 ILCS 305/10.1 (West 2010). The settlement
agreement stated, “It is the parties[’] intent and agreement that this
shall constitute the equivalent of monthly payments for the duration
of [Mayfield’s] life expectancy of 34 years which comes out to
$580.30 per month.” The agreement further stated that Mayfield’s
average weekly income before the injury was $969.60, and that he
was seeking employment that could accommodate his medical
restrictions.
¶ 7
Apparently, Mayfield did not testify about the injury or his
restrictions, but he did testify that he spent most of the settlement by
paying off his home mortgage and a $9,000 loan, buying hunting
property for $44,000 and a motorcycle for $10,000, taking a $5,000
Florida vacation, and extensively remodeling his home. Mayfield’s
financial affidavit showed that he owned three cars free of liens; a
money market account with $31,204.36; $20,000 of furniture and
appliances in his home; and $3,000 of jewelry and furs. Mayfield
admitted that he did not notify Dykes of his workers’ compensation
claim or his settlement.
¶ 8
Dykes testified that Jessica was 14 years old and needed support,
but that Zachary had reached the age of majority. Dykes further
Mayfield has not submitted a transcript of this hearing, but instead a
1
bystander’s report, summarizing the parties’ testimony.
-2-
testified that after Mayfield’s injury, he was unemployed, which
caused a significant reduction in child support.
¶ 9
Pursuant to a request, Dykes’ attorney mailed to the trial court
copies of, inter alia, In re Marriage of Dodds, 222 Ill. App. 3d 99
(1991), and In re Marriage of Schacht, 343 Ill. App. 3d 348 (2003),
which held that lump-sum workers’ compensation settlements were
income for purposes of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act’s child support provisions. Mayfield then filed a
memorandum in opposition to Dykes’ petition to modify. In that
memorandum, Mayfield attempted to distinguish those cases because
the issues there did not involve apportionment of a workers’
compensation settlement. Mayfield argued:
“Where the child is a teenager, and where clearly the award is
to compensate for limited monthly payments over the life
expectancy of the workman’s compensation petitioner, it
would be manifestly unfair to award a 20% portion of the
entire settlement, to the former spouse. Such an award would
grant the former spouse child support, in this case, effectively,
for 25 years after the child has reached her majority.”
Mayfield asked the trial court to order child support from the
settlement “based upon the weekly amount upon which it was
calculated.” According to Mayfield, his child support should be
$116.06 per month, or 20% of the prorated monthly amount of the
settlement, retroactive to the date of the settlement.
¶ 10
The trial court granted Dykes’ motion. The court’s short written
order provided:
“The Court has reviewed the authorities provided. This
Court is compelled to follow [Dodds]. [Dodds] found workers
compensation awards to be income and approved a percentage
distribution of the total lump sum payment for child support.
[Mayfield] is correct in pointing out that the lump sum
payment he received represented his wage differential basis
over his 34 year life expectancy. However 820 ILCS 305/9
provides that workers may elect to receive the compensation
due them resulting from work injury in a lump sum payment.
The compensation however is an amount which will equal the
total sum of the probable future payments capitalized at their
present value. If [Mayfield] desired to pay his child support in
weekly or monthly payments, he could have ignored the
election and taken his compensation over his life expectancy.”
-3-
The trial court ordered Mayfield to pay $47,984, or 20% of the entire
settlement, within 30 days.2
¶ 11
Mayfield filed a motion to reconsider. He again argued that Dodds
was inapposite because it only addressed whether a lump-sum
workers’ compensation settlement was income, not how it should be
allocated. According to Mayfield, the latter issue was one of first
impression, and the trial court was not bound by Dodds. Instead, the
court was free to determine a “fair and equitable” amount of child
support, considering “the nature of the award, the child’s age, and the
circumstances of the case,” including the fact that the settlement
stated a prorated monthly amount. Thus, Mayfield contended, the
court had “clear evidence as to what his monthly income was
calculated at, for purposes of the settlement. The fact that he chose to
take it as a lump sum does not alter or undermine the nature of the
compensation.” The trial court denied Mayfield’s motion, and he
appealed.
¶ 12
The appellate court affirmed. 2012 IL App (4th) 110737-U. The
appellate court initially noted that its standard of review was de novo,
because Mayfield challenged the trial court’s interpretation of section
505(a) of the Dissolution Act. Id. ¶ 17. However, the appellate court
further noted that Mayfield conceded “workers’ compensation awards
should be treated as income for purposes of child support” under
Dodds. Id. ¶ 22. The court still analyzed that issue:
“As workers’ compensation payments are intended to replace
lost wages, it is only logical that [they are] a type of ‘income’
under the Act. These payments consist of a financial benefit
received by the obligor parent that has a positive impact on
the parent’s ability to support his children. Including workers’
compensation as income is consistent with the policy of
including all income from all sources as it improves a parent’s
economic situation at the time of the payment. Therefore, we
agree that workers’ compensation payments are included in
the statutory definition of ‘net income.’ ” Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 13
The appellate court then turned to the issue of apportionment.
Mayfield contended that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay
20% of the total settlement because that would constitute child
support beyond Jessica’s majority, and the settlement was intended
The court also ordered him to pay child support of $197.20 per month
2
based on his income from a pension disability fund.
-4-
to replace lost wages over his life expectancy. Id. ¶ 31. The appellate
court rejected this argument, concluding that the lump-sum workers’
compensation settlement constituted current income: “[H]ad a lump
sum like the award in this case been realized through employment or
investment, it would be ordinary income for purposes of determining
child support.” Id. ¶ 32. According to the appellate court, this
approach is consistent with Dodds. Id. The appellate court noted that
trial courts always possess the authority to deviate from the statutory
guidelines when appropriate, provided they explain their reasoning.
Id. ¶ 33.
¶ 14
This court allowed Mayfield’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.
Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). This court also allowed the Illinois
Department of Healthcare and Family Services to file an amicus
curiae brief in support of Dykes. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20,
2010).
¶ 15
ANALYSIS
¶ 16
Under section 505(a) of the Dissolution Act, a trial court has the
authority to order either or both parents to pay “an amount reasonable
and necessary for [the] support” of the child. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)
(West 2010). Calculating this amount is a two-step process. The trial
court must determine the parties’ income, then apportion that income,
setting an amount of child support for the noncustodial parent. See In
re Marriage of McGrath, 2012 IL 112792, ¶ 13. Section 505(a)(3) of
the Dissolution Act governs the first step. It provides a definition of
net income, which is the “total of all income from all sources,” minus
various deductions. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2010). In In re
Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129, 136-37 (2004), we noted that
that definition is broad, and that “income” includes gains and benefits
that enhance a noncustodial parent’s wealth and facilitate that
parent’s ability to support a child or children. Id. at 137. Such gains
and benefits are normally linked to employment or self-employment,
investments, royalties, and gifts. Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
778 (8th ed. 2004)).
¶ 17
Section 505(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Dissolution Act governs the
second step. Section 505(a)(1) provides guidelines to help the trial
court determine the minimum amount of child support. The
guidelines state that the minimum amount for one child is 20% of the
supporting party’s net income. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West 2010).
Section 505(a)(2) provides that the court should apply the guidelines,
-5-
unless it finds that a deviation from them is appropriate after
considering the best interests of the child in light of the evidence
presented on several relevant factors. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West
2010). These factors include the financial resources of the child; the
financial resources of the custodial parent; the standard of living the
child would have enjoyed if the marriage not been dissolved; the
physical, mental, emotional, and educational needs of the child; and
the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent. Id. “If
the court deviates from the guidelines, the court’s finding shall state
the amount of support that would have been required under the
guidelines, if determinable. The court shall include the reason or
reasons for the variance from the guidelines.” Id.
¶ 18
The issue here does not involve the first step, determining
income. Mayfield acknowledged before the appellate court, and still
concedes before this court, that a lump-sum workers’ compensation
settlement is income under section 505(a)(3). This position is
consistent with the holding in Dodds, and we believe that case was
correctly decided. As the appellate court observed, workers’
compensation is compensation for lost wages. 2012 IL App (4th)
110737-U, ¶ 28; see Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial
Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 530 (2006); cf. 750 ILCS 28/15(d) (West
2010) (stating that, under the Income Withholding for Support Act,
“income” includes workers’ compensation).
¶ 19
The issue here, however, does involve the second step,
apportioning income. As framed in Mayfield’s supplemental brief, the
question in this appeal is “whether the Trial Courts have discretion,
in awarding child support, to apportion a workman’s [sic]
compensation settlement that is intended, by its terms, as a lifetime
disability award to equitably meet all parties’ needs.” Mayfield’s
argument is less than artfully developed, but it seems partly semantic
and partly substantive. He initially insists that, based upon the
comment that it was “compelled” to follow Dodds, the trial court felt
it had no discretion. On that point, we believe that Mayfield
misapprehends the trial court’s order. The trial court simply meant
that it would apply Dodds’ holding that a lump-sum workers’
compensation settlement is income for child support purposes.
Dodds, in fact, did not address how to allocate such a settlement (see
Dodds, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 104), so the trial court was not compelled
to follow it on that issue.
-6-
¶ 20
Mayfield further intimates that, based upon its refusal to deviate
from the guidelines, the court may have abused its discretion.
Mayfield offers three factors that trial courts could use in
apportioning a noncustodial parent’s workers’ compensation
settlement: (1) the “nature and extent of the disability, especially
whether the disability was permanent and prevented the worker from
further gainful employment”; (2) the “age of the minor child or
children and the remaining time for which the injured worker would
be responsible for child support”; and (3) “the financial condition of
both parties, and the likelihood of other income to the injured worker
in the future.” Mayfield advocates a “creative and equitable solution”
in which the trial court balances the competing interests of a custodial
parent in receiving child support and of a noncustodial parent who
has suffered a work-related injury in receiving compensation for that
injury. According to Mayfield, such a solution would include an order
setting child support at 20%, but only of the prorated monthly amount
of the lump-sum settlement, and not of the entire settlement.3
¶ 21
In support of this approach, Mayfield cites a single case, In re
Marriage of Wolfe, 298 Ill. App. 3d 510 (1998). In Wolfe, the
husband was injured in a work-related accident before the parties
divorced. After the parties divorced the husband received a settlement
from a Structural Work Act claim related to the accident. The
husband filed a petition for allocation of the settlement proceeds. The
trial court ordered the husband to pay 20% of the portion of the
settlement that represented his future lost wages as child support for
the parties’ six-year-old daughter. The husband appealed, contending
that that amount of child support was improper in light of the
daughter’s age and his financial situation.
¶ 22
The appellate court agreed with the husband and reversed and
remanded. Id. at 517. According to the appellate court, the husband
was permanently disabled, so the lost-wages portion of the settlement
compensated him for the remainder of his work life—arguably 25
years, well past the time when the daughter would reach majority. Id.
Based on our own calculations, this approach would yield a
3
significantly smaller amount of child support: Dykes would receive
$5,222.70 (20% of $580.30 for 45 months after the date of the settlement,
when Jessica becomes 18 years old), as opposed to $47,984 (20% of
$239,920).
-7-
at 515. Thus, directing the husband to pay 20% of that portion as
child support would be a deviation from the guidelines. Id. The
appellate court concluded that because the trial court did not explain
its reasoning for such a deviation, it abused its discretion. Id.
¶ 23
Under section 505(a)(2), the trial court must apply the guidelines,
unless it finds that a deviation is appropriate based on the evidence
presented by the parties on various factors; if it does, it must explain
why. Seemingly, the trial court in Wolfe applied the guidelines and
did not find a deviation was appropriate. But the appellate court still
discerned a deviation based solely on the discrepancy between the
years remaining on the husband’s child support obligation and the
years covered by his settlement. That holding, in effect, turns the
statute on its head, requiring the trial court to justify an adherence to
the guidelines, rather than a departure from them, when allocating a
lump sum. Wolfe was wrongly decided and is, therefore, overruled.
¶ 24
In Rogers, the issue was whether gifts and loans given to the
noncustodial parent from his parents constituted income under section
505 of the Dissolution Act. We held that they were, but noted that the
nature of an income stream is “not irrelevant” in calculating child
support. Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at 139. We explained:
“Recurring or not, the income must be included by the circuit
court in the first instance when it computes a parents ‘net
income’ and applies the statutory guidelines for determining
the minimum amount of support due under section 505(a)(1)
of the Act. If, however, the evidence shows that a parent is
unlikely to continue receiving certain payments in the future,
the circuit court may consider that fact when determining,
under section 505(a)(2) of the Act [citation], whether, and to
what extent, deviation from the statutory support guidelines
is warranted.” Id.
Thus, a one-time payment is income, but its nonrecurring nature may
factor into the trial court’s decision on how to allocate
it—presumably, under section 505(a)(2)(e), which concerns “the
financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent.” 750 ILCS
5/505(a)(2)(e) (West 2010).
¶ 25
Like the gifts and loans in Rogers, the lump-sum workers’
compensation settlement that Mayfield received was income. Indeed,
he treated it as income, and apparently spent most of it. Although he
alluded to the nonrecurring nature of the settlement, and proposed an
order setting child support at 20% of the prorated monthly equivalent,
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he never specifically asked the trial court to depart from the
guidelines.
¶ 26
More importantly, Mayfield presented insufficient evidence to
warrant a deviation under section 505(a)(2). Apparently, Dykes
testified that Jessica was “in need of current support,” but Mayfield
did not testify that Jessica’s financial resources; her standard of living
if the marriage had not been dissolved; her physical, mental,
emotional, and educational needs; or even his own financial resources
and needs were such that a downward deviation from the guidelines
was appropriate. He provided no details about his injury or his
prognosis for future employment, other than the settlement
agreement, which stated only that he is “seeking employment [within]
his restriction,” but provided telling details about how he spent the
settlement. Accordingly, the trial court was correct to set child
support at 20% of the lump-sum settlement in the absence of any
evidence to support a different amount.
¶ 27
CONCLUSION
¶ 28
For the reasons that we have stated, the judgment of the appellate
court is affirmed.
¶ 29
Affirmed.
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