Case Title: Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes

Citation: 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1952-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
62 So. 2d 100 (1952) 222 La. 57 FREDERICK et al. v. BROWN FUNERAL HOMES, Inc. In re BROWN FUNERAL HOMES, Inc. No. 40705. Supreme Court of Louisiana. April 28, 1952. On Application for Rehearing November 10, 1952. *101 G. Allen Kimball, Lake Charles, and Benj. W. Miller, Bogalusa, for relators. Raymond H. Saal, Covington, for plaintiffs and respondents. HAWTHORNE, Justice. Plaintiffs-respondents, residents of the Town of Covington, Louisiana, instituted this action on December 7, 1951, to enjoin the proposed establishment and operation of a funeral home by defendant-relator at 1919 Theard Street in that town. The plaintiffs allege that they are property owners residing in the immediate vicinity of the proposed funeral home; that on October 27, 1951 (a little more than one month prior to the institution of this suit), defendant-relator acquired the lot and residence designated as No. 1919 Theard Street for the purpose of establishing a funeral home; that the area in which the proposed funeral home is to be located is strictly and exclusively a residential, church, and school area; that the establishment and operation of the proposed funeral home in a strictly residential neighborhood will be a nuisance because it will produce noxious odors, will create an atmosphere detrimental to the use and enjoyment of their homes, and will render them and their families physically uncomfortable; that the arrival and departure of mortuary wagons, hearses, and ambulances and the holding of funerals will serve as a constant reminder of death and will impair in a substantial way the comfort, repose, and enjoyment of their homes, will result in their mental annoyance, will produce upon them and the members of their households depressing effects, will depreciate the value and diminish the rental value of their property. They further allege that the establishment and operation of a funeral home in a strictly residential area is a nuisance per accidens or in fact by reason of the proposed locality, surroundings, or the manner in which such an establishment is conducted or managed, and they conclude that for these reasons they are entitled to be protected from the establishment of this proposed business or occupation as a nuisance because of the inappropriateness of its location. Upon the filing of this petition the lower court ordered the defendant to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and after trial of this rule the court granted the preliminary injunction as prayed for by plaintiffs. Upon the refusal of the trial judge to grant a suspensive appeala devolutive appeal was granted, defendant applied to this court for writs. This court ordered the issuance of a writ of certiorari with a stay order and also ordered the respondents to show cause why the relief sought in relator's application for writs should not be granted. In Borgnemouth Realty Co., Ltd., v. Gulf Soap Corporation, 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488, 490, this court recognized the distinction between a nuisance per se and a nuisance per accidens or in fact. We said: It is universally recognized that the operation and conducting of a funeral home, in itself, does not constitute a nuisance per se. See 3 Cooley on Torts, 4th Ed., sec. *102 435, p. 180; Annotation, 87 A.L.R. 1061. This rule has been recognized in this state in the case of Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281. Plaintiffs-respondents concede this, but contend that the establishment and operation of such a business in a strictly residential area is a nuisance per accidens or in fact; that such a funeral home becomes a nuisance by reason of the inappropriateness of the place (a strictly residential area) in which it is established and conducted. The greater weight of modern authority is to the effect that the establishment and operation of a funeral home in a strictly residential district is sufficiently objectionable to make it a nuisance in fact. The inherent nature of the business is such that, if located in a purely residential district, it will inevitably create an atmosphere detrimental to the use and enjoyment of residential property in that it will produce a constant reminder of death, depress the residents of homes located in close proximity, materially impair the use and enjoyment of such homes, produce material annoyance and inconvenience to the occupants of adjacent property, and render them physically uncomfortable. Cooley, op. cit. supra; Annotation, 87 A.L.R. 1061, 1062; 54 Am.Jur., Undertakers and Embalmers, sec. 7, p. 512. According to our research, the courts of 22 states have considered and passed upon the question of whether the establishment and operation of a funeral home should be enjoined in a strictly residential neighborhood. Nineteen of these states follow the majority rule set out hereinabove[1], and three have adopted the view that a funeral home in a strictly residential district does not become a nuisance per accidens by the fact of its location in such a district.[2] In Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429, 432, the Supreme Court of Alabama in affirming a decision of the lower court overruling a demurrer to the complaint had this to say: "The home is a place for comfort and repose, where one can eat and sleep and spend the leisure hours with his family free, from business cares and anxieties. A citizen has a right to be protected in his home and in his right to the enjoyment of it. Death is an enemy of human life. `The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.' 1 Cor. xv:26. To see its effect is depressing to the ordinary, reasonable person. To see almost daily the hearse carrying in and taking dead bodies from this Leinkauf residence, to know the bodies were there being embalmed, disinfected from disease, probably contagious in its nature, to hear the singing of funeral hymns and psalms in the chapel of this residence, and to see the relatives and friends of the dead and hear their mourning, would have a depressing effect on the mind of a normal person, would continually remind complainants of mortality, would deprive them and their respective homes of the comfort, repose, and pleasure to which they as owners are each entitled, and it would have a tendency to weaken their physical resistance and render them more *103 susceptible, probably to disease from the dead bodies therein if they were infected with contagious diseases. * *" In Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 N.W. 507, 508, L.R.A.1918A, 825, the appellate court in affirming a judgment of the lower court enjoining the proposed establishment of a funeral home in a strictly residential area said: In Williams v. Montgomery, 184 Miss. 547, 186 So. 302, 303, it was said: The Supreme Court of Missouri in Streett v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494, 497, said: In Blackburn v. Bishop et ux., Tex.Civ. App., 299 S.W. 264, 271, the court stated: Other cases in which the majority rule was followed are Laughlin, Wood & Co. v. Cooney, 220 Ala. 556, 126 So. 864; White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440, 129 So. 84; Mutual Service Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 254 Ala. 363, 48 So. 2d 26; Brown v. Arbuckle, 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 198 P.2d 550; Jack v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705; McGowan v. May, 186 Ga. 79, 196 S.E. 705; Albright v. Crim, 97 Ind.App. 388, 185 N.E. 304; Reiser v. Osborn, 114 Ind.App. 617, 53 N.E.2d 545; Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N.W. 98; Leland v. Turner, 117 Kan. 294, 230 P. 1061; Hatcher v. Hitchcock, 129 Kan. 88, 281 P. 869; Weinmann v. Miles, 134 Kan. 107, 4 P.2d 437; Fink v. Smith, 140 Kan. 345, 36 P.2d 976; Dillon v. Moran, 237 Mich. 130, 211 N.W. 67; Kundinger v. Bagnasco, 298 Mich. 15, 298 N.W. 386; Rockenbach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47 N.W.2d 636; Gunderson v. Anderson, 190 Minn. 245, 251 N.W. 515; Davis v. Holmes, 189 Miss. 554, 198 So. 25; Smith v. Fairchild, 193 Miss. 536, 10 So. 2d 172; Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202, 43 A.L.R. 1155; Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119; Beisel v. Crosby, 104 Neb. 643, 178 N.W. 272; Arthur v. Virkler, 144 Misc. 483, 258 N.Y.S. 886; Jordan v. Nesmith, 132 Okl. 226, 269 P. 1096; Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577; King v. Guerra, Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 373; Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656; Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 Wash. 230, 112 P. 255, 31 L.R.A.,N.S., 608; Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 184 P. 220; Haan v. Heath, 161 Wash. 128, 296 P. 816; Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W. 531, 23 A.L.R. 739. It is important to point out that the decisions throughout the United States are uniform in holding that the proposed establishment and operation of a funeral home in an area or district which is partly commercial and partly residential or which is undergoing transition from a residential to a commercial area will not be enjoined. Fentress v. Sicard, 181 Ark. 173, 25 S.W.2d 18; Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726; Devereux v. Grand-Americas Junior Corp., Sup., 85 N.Y.S.2d *106 783; Meldahl v. Holberg, 55 N.Dak. 523, 214 N.W. 802; Rick v. Cramp, 56 Pa.Dist. & Co. 295; O'Connor v. Ryan, Tex.Civ. App., 159 S.W.2d 531. No hard and set rule can be laid down as to what constitutes a strictly residential district or a semi-commercial district or an area in the period of transition from a residential to a commercial district, but that question will have to be determined from the facts and circumstances of each particular case. That question in the instant case of necessity will have to be determined when the case is tried on its merits. The Supreme Court of Mississippi in the case of Smith v. Fairchild, supra, made the following pertinent observation: Relator in support of its contention that the preliminary injunction was improperly issued here relies principally on the case of Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281, cited supra. The decision in that case is not controlling and is clearly distinguishable from a factual viewpoint, as pointed out by the trial judge in his return to the rule issued herein, in which he said: In that case this court found as a fact, as pointed out by the trial judge in this case, that the area in which the funeral home was located was semi-commercial or in transition from a residential area to a commercial area, and under such finding of fact refused to enjoin defendant from conducting a funeral home in the district. The decision in that case is correct and is in full accord with the uniform jurisprudence throughout the country that under such facts an injunction will not issue. See authorities cited supra. The Supreme Court of Iowa in a 1950 decision viewed the Burke & Trotti case as did the district judge in this case, citing it as supporting the statement that "A number of courts have refused to enjoin establishment of a funeral home in a location close to the business district or in a state of transition from residences to commercial uses. * * *"[3] The principle underlying the majority rule is found in Article 667 of our LSA-Civil Code, which provides: After a careful review of the law, all the admissible evidence, and the pleadings in the instant case, we are not in a position to say that the trial judge abused his discretion *107 in denying to defendant-relator a suspensive appeal. For the reasons assigned, the writs issued herein are recalled, and the case is remanded to the district court for trial on its merits consistently with the views expressed herein. Relator is to pay all costs incurred in this court; all other costs are to await the final disposition of the case on its merits. McCALEB, Justice (dissenting). I am sure that it is unpleasant to live next to a funeral home. Yet, in the absence of zoning ordinances or covenants in deeds running with the land prohibiting its location within a particular area, there is no authority under our law warranting the issuance of an injunction against the establishment of such a business in a residential section of a cityunless it is shown that its operation is actually a nuisance in fact by reason of the manner in which it is conducted rather than because of the nature of the business. Indeed, this court, in Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281, 285, has tersely stated the applicable principle, thus: The foregoing quotation is nothing more than judicial recognition and application of the rules set forth in Articles 667, 668, and 669 of the LSA-Civil Code, which govern the instant case. Article 667 provides that, while a proprietor has the right to use his estate in any way he pleases, he cannot make any work on it which deprives his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, "or which may be the cause of any damage to him." Article 668 qualifies this principle by declaring that, while the owner of property may not make any work which damages his neighbor's buildings, still he is at liberty to use his ground as he pleases "although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor." And Article 669 limits Article 668 by stating, in effect, that an owner may not do work on his premises which causes inconvenience to his neighbor "by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell," and that the question of whether the neighbor must suffer these inconveniences "must be determined by the rules of the police, or the customs of the place." (Italics mine.) In the case at bar, it is clear that Article 668 of the Code controlsfor plaintiffs do not show that they will sustain physical damage, but only the inconvenience of being forced to come into daily contact with defendant's business. The majority holding, that the intended operation by defendant of a funeral home constitutes a nuisance in fact, is unsound, in my opinion, because its net effect is to conclude that a funeral home in a residential district is a nuisance per se, despite denials that the business of burying dead is, of itself, legally objectionable. True enough, the majority ruling is supported by a vast weight of authority from other states. For my part, I can only say that I disagree with the principle upon which those pronouncements are founded. It is well settled (Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488, and the authorities there cited) that the difference between a nuisance per se and a nuisance in fact lies in the proof and not the remedy. In the former, the thing is a nuisance as a matter of law, whereas, in the latter, the right to relief is dependent on averment and proof of the act charged as a nuisance. In view of this, I experience difficulty in discerning why, if a funeral home is not to be regarded a nuisance per se, it should be, ipso facto, deemed to be a nuisance merely because it is established in a residential neighborhood, without proof of actual physical annoyance to the adjacent inhabitants. In each instance the nature of the business is exactly the same; difference of location alone should not render one illegal and the other not. The courts that subscribe to a doctrine adopted by the majority say that a funeral home becomes a nuisance, when established *108 in a residential section, because the operations conducted are reminders of death, which naturally affect the neighbors. But this is true of the mortuary business no matter where it is situated. Hence, those courts, which conclude that a funeral home is or is not a nuisance depending entirely upon its situation, and that it is a nuisance when located in a residential area, are not interpreting and applying the law; they are actually enacting zoning regulations, thus usurping the function of the lawmaking bodies. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. LE BLANC, Justice (dissenting). I recognize the fact that under the authorities cited in the prevailing opinion, the majority view in the country is that the establishment of funeral homes or parlors in strictly residential areas is considered a nuisance per accidens. The reason as given in many of the quotations contained in the majority opinion is that such establishments tend to create a depressing effect in that they constitute, for those living in the surrounding area, a constant reminder of death and thus produce an annoyance to the feelings of those individuals who don't like to contemplate such a tragic event. I realize that that is not an unusual feeling among many individuals but I don't believe that the business that is conducted by modern funeral homes or parlors, especially in the manner in which the public observes, is more of a reminder of death than is the funeral service that is conducted at a church in the same area, attended as it is by the toll of the funeral bell and the procession of automobiles carrying the mourners, following the funeral hearse. Churches, as we know, and as we learn from this very case because there are two of them, abound in purely residential districts in large cities as well as in towns and villages, and in most religions, as is also well known, the bodies of the dead are taken there for a last prayer and blessing before being buried in the cemetery. Cemeteries too, are, in many instances, located in the heart of residential areas and certainly the sight of the graves and tombs would seem to impress anyone, in my opinion, as being, more than any other object, a very constant reminder of our inevitable fate. I fully respect the feelings of individuals who do not like to have their thoughts made to dwell on this most certain of all human experiences but in my humble opinion that is purely a personal emotion which I don't think affects their physical well-being, and if we are to be guided by any authority on this point I believe it can be found in the very decision of this court in the case of Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281, 285, cited in the majority opinion. The court, after reviewing many authorities on the very point of conducting the business of a funeral home, concluded from them that "In the absence of legal zoning prohibition any business establishment may be established or located in a residential district, however it may affect the property values, unless by its very nature, its operations shall physically annoy the inhabitants." I believe too, as intimated in that case, that where, in a matter of this kind, it is only the individual's personal emotions that are involved, they have to yield to the greater rights of a property owner which are provided for him in this State under the Articles of the LSA-Civil Code referred to in the dissenting opinion of Justice McCaleb, which after all, are merely an elaboration of the rule of law stated in the familiar Latin maxim: "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." A person must so use his own as not to injure another's property. But, as pointed out in the Articles of the Code, although he may not make any work on his property which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may cause damages to him, yet he is at liberty "of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor." Under Article 668 it would seem that an act which occasions only an inconvenience is not enough, there must be real damage. Under that view and under the holding in the case of Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., supra, that the nuisance complained *109 of must cause some physical annoyance, I am not inclined to follow the jurisprudence relied on in the majority opinion and I, therefore, respectfully dissent. PONDER, Justice. In this suit the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the establishment or operation of a funeral home in a purported residential section of the Town of Covington. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction. The defendant was granted a devolutive appeal and applied to this court for writs which were granted. This court issued a writ of certiorari with a stay order and ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why the relief sought in the defendant's application for writs should not be granted. Upon hearing of the rule, this court recalled the writs and remanded the cause for trial on the merits. A rehearing is now submitted for our consideration. The plaintiffs opposed the granting of the rehearing and contended that under Rule XII, Section 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the rehearing was improvidently granted since the judgment did not finally dispose of the case. This rule is without application to the present case and it is expressly provided in Section 5 of Rule XII of the Rules of the Supreme Court that a petition for rehearing will be considered when the Court has decided a case on a writ of review to the Court of Appeal, or under the court's supervisory jurisdiction, the same as if the case had been decided on appeal. Our main concern in granting the rehearing was whether or not the provisions of Articles 667, 668 and 669 of the LSA-Civil Code were properly interpreted in the majority opinion in arriving at the conclusion that the operation of the funeral home was a nuisance in fact or per accidens. As we take it the majority opinion is to the effect that the funeral home became a nuisance because of its location and enjoined its operation before it was established. According to the record the funeral home was not in operation at the time the suit was filed and tried. On reconsideration we have arrived at the conclusion that the injunction should be set aside. We are governed in this controversy by Articles 667, 668 and 669 of the LSA-Civil Code, which read as follows: In the case of Borgnemouth Realty Company, Limited v. Gulf Soap Corporation, 212 La. 57, 65, 31 So. 2d 488 490, this court stated: We have carefully considered the opinion handed down in the case of Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 87, 3 So. 2d 281, 285, and have reached the conclusion that the pronouncement made therein is a proper interpretation of our codal articles, viz.: "In the absence of legal zoning prohibition any business establishment may be established or located in a residential district, however it may affect the property values, unless by its very nature, its operation shall physically annoy the inhabitants." The operation of a funeral home is a lawful enterprise, Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., supra, and under the provisions of Article 667 of the LSA-Civil Code the defendant has a right to do with his estate as he pleases provided he does not cause damage to his neighbor. As pointed out in the majority opinion the operation of a funeral home is not a nuisance per se and it is impossible for us to state at this time whether it would be operated in such a manner as to result in a nuisance. Mere inconvenience to an adjoining property owner would not necessarily constitute a nuisance. Article 668 of the LSA-Civil Code. There is no zoning ordinance or police regulation prohibiting the establishment of such an enterprise in any portion of the town and the evidence fails to show that the custom of the place would prohibit same. From a careful reading of the aforementioned articles of the LSA-Civil Code, it is apparent that, unless the establishment and operation of the funeral home is prohibited by rules of police or custom of the place, it cannot be enjoined prior to its operation and then only if it is operated in such a manner as to cause damage to those living in neighboring houses. The case of Osborn v. City of Shreveport, 143 La. 932, 79 So. 542, 3 A.L.R. 955, is only authority for what it held, that an ordinance prohibiting undertaking shops except on the business streets of the city is valid, and whatever else was said is purely obiter dicta and of no controlling effect in the case at bar. This court has on numerous occasions refused to enjoin the establishment or erection of a lawful business simply on the ground that it might be conducted so as to become a nuisance. Bell v. Riggs & Bros., 38 La.Ann. 555; Lewis v. Sandell, 118 La. 852, 43 So. 526; Canone v. Pailet, 160 La. 159, 106 So. 730; Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138. In Bell v. Riggs & Bros., cited supra, 38 La.Ann. 555, 556, this court said: Likewise in Lewis v. Sandell, cited supra, 118 La. 852, 859, 43 So. 526, 529, the court held "that a lawful business not yet in existence and not a nuisance per se could not be enjoined on the face of the papers until evidence had been adduced to establish same". Again in Canone v. Pailet, cited supra, 160 La. 159, 162, 106 So. 730, and Graver *111 v. Lepine, cited supra, 161 La. 97, 100, 108 So. 138, 139, this court held: "A lawful business is never a nuisance per se, and no one has the right to prevent the establishment of such business for fear that it might be conducted so as to become a nuisance." Citing ample authority to support the statement. While the common-law authorities relied upon and cited by the plaintiffs may be persuasive, they are not decisive of the issue in view of our codal articles and jurisprudence. For the reasons assigned, it is now ordered that the rule be discharged, and the preliminary writ of injunction dissolved. The case is remanded to be tried on the merits consistent with the views herein expressed. Plaintiffs-respondents to pay all costs incurred in this court; all other costs are to await the final disposition of the case. HAWTHORNE, Justice (dissenting). There was presented for our consideration originally and on rehearing only one question: Is a funeral home by its very nature such a business that when located in a strictly residential area its operation will so annoy and inconvenience the residents that they will be deprived of the enjoyment of their homes? There was then and there is now no disagreement on the general law relative to nuisances, which, as far as I can see, is all that is discussed in the opinion on rehearing. In that opinion there is no discussion at all of the extent of annoyance and inconvenience that a funeral home in a residential area will cause the adjoining residents or landowners. If the answer to the question presented by this case is in the affirmative, the establishment of the business would be prohibited under LSA-Civil Code Articles 667, 668, and 669 upon proof that the district is strictly residential, and under the courts' authority to issue injunctions the respondents would be entitled to injunctive relief. If the answer to this question is in the negative, they have no right to interfere with the use that relator proposes to make of its property. I can only conclude from the lack of discussion of the real question in the opinion on rehearing that the reasons given for answering it in the affirmative on original hearing are unanswerable. I cannot believe that the average person in this jurisdiction is any less sensitive to the depressing effects of a funeral home than is the average person in the common-law jurisdictions where it has been concluded that as a matter of fact funeral homes are by their very nature so depressing that their close proximity deprives one of the enjoyment of his home and that they can be enjoined when they seek to intrude themselves into an exclusively residential district. The Code provisions in my opinion do not make the relator's privilege of using its property as it pleases any more important than the respondents' right to use and enjoy their premises. A comparative evaluation of the conflicting interests in this case has convinced me that the gravity of the annoyance and inconvenience that will be caused to the respondents by the business that the relator proposes to establish is such that the relator ought to be enjoined if the respondents can show that the district is exclusively residential. I respectfully dissent. [1] Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. [2] Kentucky, New Jersey, and Oregon. [3] Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726, 731.