Case Title: State of Idaho v. Stanley Elliott Oliver Appeal from jury verdict felony conviction claiming insufficient evidence and abuse of discretion

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33899

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2007-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33899 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
STANLEY ELLIOTT OLIVER, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
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Boise, September 2007 Term 
 
2007 Opinion No.  105 
 
Filed: October 17, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Ada County.  The Hon. Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.  Justin Curtis 
argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Thomas Tharp 
argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
The Defendant appeals his felony conviction of driving while under the influence and his 
sentence of five years in the custody of the board of correction, with one year fixed.  He contends 
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of guilty and that his sentence 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.  We affirm both the conviction and the sentence. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Following a low-impact vehicle collision during rush-hour traffic on Chinden Boulevard 
in Garden City, the defendant Stanley Oliver was arrested and charged with felony driving while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.  He entered a plea of not guilty, and the jury found 
him guilty.  Because Oliver challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support that verdict, the 
relevant facts will be presented in detail below.  The district court sentenced Oliver to five years 
in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with one year fixed and the remaining four years 
indeterminate.  The court also suspended Oliver’s driving privileges for five years commencing 
on the date of his release from confinement.  Oliver timely appealed. 
 
The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district 
court in an unpublished opinion.  We then granted Oliver’s petition for review.  In cases that 
come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision, this Court gives 
serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of 
the lower court.  Head v. State, 137 Idaho 1, 43 P.3d 760 (2002). 
 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.  Is there substantial, competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict? 
2.  Did the district court abuse its discretion when sentencing the Defendant? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Is There Substantial, Competent Evidence to Support the Jury’s Verdict? 
“This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, 
where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that 
the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003).  We view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of 
the jury regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Id. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a) provides, “It is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of . . . any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, . . . 
to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state.”  In order to be 
“under the influence,” a person need only have consumed sufficient alcohol and drugs or other 
intoxicating substances “to such extent as to influence or affect his driving of the motor vehicle, 
State v. Glanzman, 69 Idaho 46, 49, 202 P.2d 407, 408 (1949), accord State v. Gleason, 123 
Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992).  Thus, the issue is whether the jury was presented with 
substantial, competent evidence showing that Oliver had consumed sufficient alcohol and/or 
drugs to influence or affect his driving of his motor vehicle.  It clearly was. 
 
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On March 4, 2004, shortly after 5:00 p.m., a Mr. Shaw was traveling west on Chinden 
Boulevard during heavy rush-hour traffic.  Chinden Boulevard is a five-lane road, with two 
eastbound lanes, two westbound lanes, and a center turn lane.  As Mr. Shaw was driving in the 
inside westbound lane, he saw a yellow Toyota pickup turn westbound onto Chinden Boulevard 
from an intersecting street on the north side of the boulevard.  When doing so, the Toyota 
crossed both westbound lanes, causing Mr. Shaw to brake and slow down, and then began 
driving west down the center turn lane.  As Mr. Shaw followed the Toyota pickup, he saw it 
travel about three-fourths of a block in the center turn lane, drift once into the oncoming 
eastbound lane, and make quick, jerky, erratic movements.  He lost sight of the pickup when 
other vehicles merged in front of him.  Suddenly, the traffic came to a stop.  He thought to 
himself that the Toyota had probably caused an accident.  When he made it to the cause of the 
stoppage, he saw he was correct and stopped to wait for the police in order to tell them what he 
had observed. 
 
Ms. Lawrence was also driving westbound in the heavy rush-hour traffic on Chinden 
Boulevard.  The traffic was stop and go.  When the traffic in front of her slowed, she also slowed 
down and was hit by a vehicle from behind.  As she continued moving, the vehicle hit her two 
more times.  When she stopped, it hit her a fourth time.  She looked in her rearview mirror and 
saw the yellow Toyota pickup behind her.  Its driver, Oliver, was holding a cigarette in one hand, 
with that arm wrapped around the steering wheel.  In his other hand, he was holding a cell phone, 
on which he was talking.  She noticed that Oliver did not look up or do anything to indicate that 
he knew there had been an accident.  After he finished his cigarette and stopped talking on his 
cell phone, Oliver put his pickup in reverse, backed up almost hitting the vehicle behind him, and 
then drove forward striking Ms. Lawrence’s vehicle a fifth time.  The impacts were low enough 
that there was no apparent damage to either vehicle. 
 
Officer Furniss was the first peace officer to arrive at the accident scene.  He contacted 
Oliver, and noticed an odor of alcohol on his breath.  Oliver stated that he was stopped and that 
the car in front of him backed into his pickup.  He later admitted that he had struck the car in 
front of him.  He had two prescription medications in his pickup, one of which was for 
OxyContin.  He also admitted having one beer four hours before the accident.  Officer Furniss’s 
shift was ending, so he turned the investigation over to Officer Dennis who had just arrived at the 
scene. 
 
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Officer Dennis performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Oliver.  Oliver scored 
six out of six, indicating intoxication.  Officer Dennis then asked Oliver to perform several field 
sobriety tests.  Because of a prior leg injury, Oliver could not do the walk-and-turn test or the 
one-leg-stand test.  Officer Dennis asked Oliver to recite the alphabet, which he did.  He also 
asked Oliver to count backward from ninety-five, which Oliver failed to do properly.  He began 
counting from eighty-five.  Officer Dennis arrested Oliver and transported him to the Ada 
County jail. 
 
At the jail, Officer Dennis administered a breath test for alcohol concentration to Oliver.  
It showed an alcohol concentration in Oliver’s breath of 0.03, which is below the legal limit of 
0.08.  Believing that Oliver’s apparent intoxication was not consistent with that test result, 
Officer Dennis had Oliver provide a urine sample.  It later tested positive for oxycodone, 
Phenobarbital (a barbiturate) and carbamazepine, and it screened positive for a benzodiazepine.  
All of these were medications that Oliver was taking pursuant to valid prescriptions. 
 
Officer Dennis then had Detective Moore examine Oliver.  Detective Moore had been 
trained to conduct drug recognition exams to determine whether an individual was under the 
influence of a drug.  After examining Oliver, Detective Moore concluded that Oliver was under 
the influence of a central nervous system depressant and a narcotic analgesic.  When examining 
Oliver, Detective Moore noted that Oliver had decreased motor control, decreased reaction time, 
and decreased ability to process appropriate responses to stimuli. 
 
Mr. Dawson, a pharmacist, testified that OxyContin is a brand name for oxycodone.  It is 
a narcotic analgesic that is a central nervous system depressant with mood-altering effects.  It 
affects motor skills and can cause drowsiness, confusion, and disorientation.  The effect of the 
drug is being in a mild stupor, which decreases reaction time to stimuli.  Carbamazepine is an 
anti-convulsant which decreases the electrical transmission in the brain.  Phenobarbital is a 
barbiturate typically used to treat seizure disorders.  Benzodiazepine is a class of drugs typically 
used as anti-anxiety agents.  Carbamazepine, Phenobarbital, and a benzodiazepine are all central 
nervous system depressants that can cause drowsiness, dizziness, and lack of coordination. 
 
Mr. Dawson stated that when all four drugs are taken, their effects are additive.  Their 
combined effects are greater than the effect of a therapeutic dose of only one.  In addition, a 
small amount of alcohol will further increase the effect of each of the drugs.  Oliver testified that 
he had drunk a sixteen-ounce can of beer. 
 
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Oliver offered testimony seeking to explain his driving pattern.  He stated that his size 
fifteen work boots made it difficult to manipulate the small foot pedals in his Toyota pickup.  He 
also testified that he had taken his medications at about 6:00 to 6:30 a.m., and their effects would 
have worn off by the time of the accident.  He stated that he did not feel he was under the 
influence at the time of the accident.  He contended that he failed the counting-backwards test 
because he did not understand the officer’s instructions due to being distracted by the noise and 
lights of the passing traffic.  The jury did not have to accept Oliver’s explanations.  State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003).  It was the jury’s province to judge his credibility 
and to decide what weight, if any, to give his testimony.  Id. 
Considering Oliver’s driving pattern, the drugs and alcohol in his system, the additive 
effects of combining the four drugs and alcohol, and the testimony of Officer Dennis and 
Detective Moore, there was substantial, competent testimony from which the jury could 
reasonably have concluded that Oliver was driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or 
drugs.  Its verdict is supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
 
B.  Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion when Sentencing the Defendant? 
 
“We review the length of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard,” State v. 
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002), and when doing so we consider the 
defendant’s entire sentence, State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007).1  We 
presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of 
confinement.  State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999).  That is because whether or 
not a defendant serves longer than the fixed portion of the sentence is a matter left to the sole 
discretion of the parole board, and “[c]ourts cannot intrude on this discretion when fashioning a 
sentence nor when reviewing a sentence,” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 
840 (2007). 
                                                 
1 Prior to our opinion in State v. Huffman, our Court of Appeals had held that the indeterminate portion of a 
sentence will be examined on appeal only if the defendant shows that there are special circumstances justifying 
review of more than the fixed portion of the sentence.  State v. Arthur, No. 31470 (Idaho Ct. App. May 12, 2006).  
As we pointed out in State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 145, 159 P.3d at 839, “We have never held that we will not 
review the aggregate portion of a defendant's sentence to see if it is reasonable under the facts of the case when the 
sentence is appealed.”  A defendant challenging his or her sentence on appeal need not show special circumstances 
in order for the appellate court to review the entire sentence, including the indeterminate portion.   
 
 
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When conducting our review, “we independently review the record on appeal, having due 
regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest,” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002).  We review the record 
for the information that was known to the sentencing court at the time the sentence was imposed.  
“A sentence is reasonable if at the time of imposition it appears necessary to achieve ‘the 
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to the given case.’”  State v. Lundquist, 134 
Idaho 831, 836, 11 P.3d 27, 32 (2000) (quoting from State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982)).  To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that the 
sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). 
 
The district court sentenced Oliver to five years in the custody of the Idaho Board of 
Correction, with one year fixed and four years indeterminate.  Oliver challenges the 
indeterminate portion of his sentence.  He asserts “that this Court should find that the four year 
indeterminate sentence imposed by the district court is excessive in light of mitigating 
circumstances present in his case.” 
 
Under our standard of review, we assume that Oliver will be paroled after serving one 
year of incarceration.  Once he is paroled, the commission for pardons and parole will specify in 
writing the conditions of his parole.  I.C. § 20-228; IDAPA 50.01.01.250.  Oliver apparently 
contends that it is unreasonable for him to be on parole supervision for four years after he is 
released from incarceration. 
 
In support of his argument that the indeterminate portion of his sentence is unreasonable, 
Oliver states:  that at the time of sentencing he was fifty-eight years old; that when he was 
younger he had been drafted into the Army, served two years, and was honorably discharged; 
that he suffers from several physical impairments and mental illness; that this is his first felony; 
that his only other criminal convictions are two offenses of driving while under the influence in 
2000; that he has a serious alcohol problem; and that he has been in treatment for alcoholism and 
is eligible for further treatment at the Veteran’s Administration.  These factors do not indicate 
any abuse of discretion by the district court.  In fact, they show the proper exercise of discretion. 
 
Oliver admittedly has “a serious alcohol problem.”  He was first arrested for driving 
while under the influence on November 18, 2000.  A breath test showed an alcohol concentration 
 
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of .21/.20.  His second arrest occurred on November 24, 2000, when the pickup he was driving 
slammed into a vehicle stopped at a traffic light.  According to the medical personnel, Oliver was 
very intoxicated, but he refused to submit to a blood alcohol test.  On June 20, 2001, he pled 
guilty to both charges and was sentenced.  He did not stop consuming alcohol.  His medical 
records from the Veterans Administration show that on July 12, 2004, “Pt states he ‘went on a 
bender’ yesterday.  Was drinking wine primarily, took his ‘heart meds:  captopril and 
metoprolol, double dose the night before’ because he knew he would be drinking.”  The records 
show he was hospitalized for alcohol detoxification and a possible heart attack.  The heart attack 
was ruled out, but he was treated for alcohol withdrawal. 
The record shows that Oliver is an alcoholic.  This is his third conviction for driving 
while under the influence.  Four months after he was arrested and charged in this case, he “went 
on a bender” and was hospitalized for alcohol detoxification.  A four-year period of parole 
supervision after Oliver’s release from incarceration is clearly reasonable not only for the 
protection of the public, but for his own protection.  We affirm the district court’s sentence. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the jury verdict and Oliver’s sentence. 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and  TROUT, J. Pro Tem  CONCUR. 
 
 
 
 
 
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