Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 26/21

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kenyatta M. Smith v. State of Maryland, No. 26, September Term, 2021.  Opinion by Getty, 
C.J. 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS — QUALIFICATIONS FOR 
RELIEF — DISCRETION OF THE CORAM NOBIS COURT 
The Court of Appeals held that a circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 
petition for writ of error coram nobis where the petitioner satisfied the qualifications set 
forth in Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52 (2000), but did not establish that the matter presented 
circumstances compelling the extraordinary remedy of a writ of error coram nobis to 
achieve justice.  
  
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 03-K-02-002951 
Argued: January 11, 2022 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 26 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
  
KENYATTA M. SMITH 
 
 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
*Getty, C.J. 
*McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, C.J. 
 
 
Filed: August 15, 2022 
 
*Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior 
Judges, 
participated 
in 
the 
hearing 
and 
conference of this case while active members of 
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to 
Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, 
they also participated in the decision and 
adoption of this opinion.
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2022-08-15 13:15-04:00
 
The case before us involves a petition for the extraordinary remedy of a writ of error 
coram nobis, which overturns a person’s prior criminal convictions.  Petitioner Kenyatta 
M. Smith (“Ms. Smith”) has twenty-year old convictions for forgery and fraud/identity 
theft.  Due to these felony convictions, Ms. Smith is not eligible to receive the license 
required to work as a mortgage loan originator under Maryland law.  As such, Ms. Smith 
petitioned the Circuit Court of Baltimore County for a writ of error coram nobis, which the 
circuit court ultimately denied.  The circumstances of that denial led to the present appeal.  
Accordingly, this Court is asked to resolve whether the circuit court abused its discretion 
in denying Ms. Smith’s petition for writ of error coram nobis.  For the reasons explained 
in detail below, considering the legislative purpose of the Maryland mortgage loan 
originator licensing statute and the fact that granting Ms. Smith’s petition for writ of error 
coram nobis would effectively circumvent a federal mandate on mortgage loan originator 
licensing requirements, we answer that question in the negative and affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Special Appeals.   
BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Underlying Convictions 
On June 3, 2002, the District Court for Baltimore County convicted Ms. Smith of 
one count of forgery and two counts of fraud/identity theft.  Ms. Smith subsequently 
appealed her convictions to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where she then entered 
a guilty plea to all counts.     
The underlying circumstances that led to these convictions involved Ms. Smith 
using, without authorization, her former employer’s personal identifying information, 
 
2 
 
including the employer’s name, tax identification number, and social security number, to 
obtain a commercial loan for $40,000.00.  Ms. Smith then used checks bearing her former 
employer’s forged signature to deposit the fraudulently obtained loan into her personal 
bank account.  Ms. Smith purchased a Lexus automobile from a Lexus dealership in 
Reisterstown, Maryland with the fraudulently obtained money.   
The circuit court sentenced Ms. Smith to three years of incarceration, all suspended.  
The circuit court did not require Ms. Smith to pay restitution because after her convictions 
of forgery and fraud/identity theft, Ms. Smith sold the automobile, used the proceeds of the 
sale to pay back the loan, converted the loan to her name and then continued making 
payments on the outstanding balance. 
B. 
Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis 
 
 On May 21, 2015, over a decade after her convictions, counsel for Ms. Smith filed 
a petition for writ of error coram nobis (“Petition”) with the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County, requesting that the circuit court vacate the forgery and fraud/identity theft 
convictions.  The Petition argued that Ms. Smith’s entry of a guilty plea should be 
invalidated because neither the circuit court nor Ms. Smith’s counsel advised her of the 
following:  
(1) the offenses to which she was pleading guilty; (2) the elements of the 
crime to which she was pleading guilty; (3) the presumption of innocence; 
(4) her forfeit of preliminary motions to contest the charging document, 
arrest, any confession or statement, results of searches and seizures, pretrial 
or in-court identifications, or other technical defenses; (5) or of the 
immigration or other collateral consequences of entering a plea of guilt.   
 
Accordingly, counsel for Ms. Smith argued that the “plea was involuntary[.]”   
 
3 
 
Additionally, the Petition asserted that Ms. Smith faces significant collateral 
consequences as a result of these convictions.  Specifically, Ms. Smith is disqualified from 
obtaining a mortgage loan originator’s license pursuant to Maryland Code (1980, 2020 
Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.) Financial Institutions Article (“FI”) § 11-605,1 and Ms. Smith lost 
“the opportunity for employment in her field on at least five separate occasions[.]”  Counsel 
for Ms. Smith attached two exhibits to the Petition—the transcript from Ms. Smith’s 
hearing before the circuit court on September 20, 2002, and a letter from the Department 
of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (“DLLR”) denying Ms. Smith’s application for a 
mortgage loan originator’s license dated January 26, 2007.  The hearing transcript from the 
guilty plea hearing reflects that neither the circuit court nor Ms. Smith’s counsel advised 
her of the nature and elements of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty.  The letter from 
DLLR specifically cited Ms. Smith’s felony conviction for “forgery[—]private 
 
1 In pertinent part, FI § 11-605 provides: 
 
(a) The Commissioner may not issue a mortgage loan originator license unless the 
Commissioner makes, at a minimum, the following findings: 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
 
(2) The applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere 
to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military court: 
 
(i) During the 7-year period immediately preceding the date of the 
application for licensing; or  
 
(ii) At any time preceding the date of application, if the felony 
involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust, or money 
laundering; 
 
4 
 
documents” as “negatively relat[ing] to [her] fitness and qualification to act as a mortgage 
originator.”   
C. 
The Circuit Court’s Initial Denial of the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis 
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued a memorandum opinion and order 
on August 18, 2015 denying Ms. Smith’s Petition without a hearing.  In its analysis, the 
circuit court relied on State v. Hicks, which articulated that the following five conditions 
must be satisfied for coram nobis relief to be granted: 
(1) [T]he grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a 
constitutional, jurisdictional or fundamental character. 
 
(2) [A] presumption of regularity attaches to the criminal case, and the 
burden of proof is on the coram nobis petitioner. 
 
(3) [T]he coram nobis petitioner must be suffering or facing significant 
collateral consequences from the conviction. 
 
(4) Basic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in coram nobis 
proceedings. 
 
(5) [O]ne is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction by a coram nobis 
proceeding if another statutory or common law remedy is then available.   
 
139 Md. App. 1, 10 (2001) (citing Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78–80 (2000)). 
The circuit court acknowledged that Ms. Smith was “not advised of the nature and 
elements of the crimes to which she was pleading guilty[,]” and that Ms. Smith had 
exhausted all other potential legal remedies.  However, the circuit court disagreed that Ms. 
Smith had suffered “significant collateral consequences” as a result of these convictions.  
The circuit court stated that Ms. Smith “is simply unable to work in the industry of her 
choosing.  The financial industry has vested and obvious reasons for refusing to hire 
 
5 
 
individuals with convictions for fraud and forgery.  It is, therefore, not unjust that she 
cannot work in that industry because of the convictions.”  The circuit court also determined 
that Ms. Smith waived her right to coram nobis relief “because she did not appeal her 
conviction when it occurred in 2002.”     
D. 
Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals & the Circuit Court’s Remand Hearing  
Ms. Smith timely appealed the circuit court’s denial of her Petition to the Court of 
Special Appeals.  On August 1, 2016, the intermediate appellate court vacated the judgment 
of the circuit court in an unreported opinion and remanded the case for the circuit court to 
hold a hearing on the Petition.  See Smith v. State, No. 1605, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. Aug. 1, 2016).  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that “the circuit court was 
wrong to deny [Ms. Smith’s Petition] without a hearing,” and therefore vacated the 
judgment and remanded the matter to the circuit court.  Id.  Judge Daniel A. Friedman 
authored a concurring opinion, maintaining “that the test for ‘significant collateral 
consequences’ is not supposed to be quite so high a bar as the trial court originally set it[.]”  
Smith v. State, No. 1605, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 1, 2016) (Friedman, J., 
concurring).  The concurring opinion set forth that “economic harm, even without more, 
can satisfy the ‘significant collateral consequences’ element of the test for issuance of the 
writ of coram nobis.”  Id. at 3.   
The remand hearing took place in the circuit court on February 17, 2017.  At the 
beginning of the hearing, counsel for Ms. Smith stated, “[a]nd in speaking with the State, 
we’re both of the opinion we’re sort of back only on the collateral consequences prong if 
you will[.]”  The State agreed and responded that it would not be introducing any evidence 
 
6 
 
at the hearing.  Ms. Smith’s counsel reiterated that Ms. Smith’s convictions prevent her 
from working in the mortgage loan origination industry, and proffered that her convictions 
have: (1) prevented her from obtaining jobs from at least four private sector firms; (2) 
prevented her from obtaining work with a salary comparable to what she would be earning 
as a mortgage loan originator; (3) led numerous recruiters to conclude that a background 
check would preclude her from particular job opportunities; and (4) resulted in potential 
educational funding being cut off.  Additionally, Ms. Smith’s counsel highlighted that these 
hardships are exacerbated by the fact that Ms. Smith is a single mother with a liver 
condition, which limits her mobility.  
On September 18, 2017, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion, denying 
Ms. Smith’s Petition on the grounds that Ms. Smith had not established significant 
collateral consequences.  The circuit court explained that prohibiting an individual with 
underlying forgery and fraud/identity theft convictions from obtaining employment in a 
profession that strongly values honesty and integrity, such as the mortgage loan origination 
field, is not an uncommon occurrence.  Accordingly, the circuit court found that Ms. 
Smith’s employment difficulties were “incommensurate with the extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances that warrant” granting a petition for writ of error coram nobis.   
E. 
Second Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals 
Ms. Smith again noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which 
reversed the decision of the circuit court in an unreported opinion.  See Smith v. State, No. 
1721, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 20, 2019).  The intermediate appellate court 
concluded that “the circuit court failed to properly evaluate the significant collateral 
 
7 
 
consequences element of coram nobis[.]”  Id.  Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals 
held, as a matter of law, that Ms. Smith’s inability to become a licensed mortgage loan 
originator “demonstrated that she is suffering a significant collateral consequence.”  Id.  
Therefore, the intermediate appellate court remanded the matter to the circuit court to 
determine if Ms. Smith’s Petition “presents ‘circumstances compelling relief to achieve 
justice.’”  Id.  The intermediate appellate court instructed the circuit court to consider on 
remand whether its “error concerning the significant collateral consequences element of 
the coram nobis test may have influenced its determination as to whether there were 
‘compelling circumstances’ necessary to ‘achieve justice[.]’”  Id. at 5.     
Judge Friedman authored another concurring opinion “because . . . the per curiam 
majority [did] not go far enough to dispel the circuit court’s erroneous conclusion that 
economic consequences are not significant collateral consequences on their own.”  Smith 
v. State, No. 1721, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 20, 2019) (Friedman, J., 
concurring).  The concurring opinion emphasized that “economic consequences are alone 
sufficient to establish significant collateral consequences for coram nobis.”  Id. at 7.   
F. 
Further Proceedings in the Circuit Court 
The Court of Special Appeals issued the mandate for its decision on June 20, 2019, 
which the circuit court received on September 12, 2019.  In response to the mandate, the 
State filed “State’s Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief” in the circuit court on 
October 2, 2019.  The State argued that the present circumstances “do not necessitate 
coram nobis relief in order to achieve justice.”  Specifically, the State relied on the clear 
 
8 
 
“nature of the offenses[,]” “the statement of the facts, common understanding of the 
offenses, and the age of [Ms. Smith,]” to demonstrate the lack of such circumstances.   
Without receiving a response from Ms. Smith,2 the circuit court issued a 
memorandum opinion on January 28, 2020, again denying Ms. Smith’s Petition.  The 
circuit court concluded that Ms. Smith satisfied all “of the substantive elements that would 
afford someone the opportunity to be granted [coram nobis relief].”  Beyond the 
substantive elements, the circuit court explained that Ms. Smith also needed to “convince 
the [circuit court] that there are compelling circumstances necessary to achieve justice.”  
(Footnote omitted).  The circuit court was “not persuaded . . . that there are compelling 
circumstances necessary to achieve justice.”   
Further, the circuit court reasoned that “Maryland does not allow those who were 
convicted of or pled guilty to a felony involving an act of fraud, dishonesty, breach of trust, 
or 
money 
laundering 
to 
obtain 
a 
mortgage 
[loan] 
originator’s 
license.”  
(citing FI § 11-605(a)(2)(ii)).  Summarizing the legislative history of FI § 11-605, the 
circuit court concluded that the legislative purpose for the statute outweighed the purpose 
of coram nobis relief and any argument in favor of granting Ms. Smith’s Petition.  The 
circuit court set forth that 
[a] review of the legislative history clearly indicates that the Maryland 
General Assembly in enacting this legislation intended to combat the 
problems arising from the dishonesty amongst individuals employed in the 
mortgage origination field and by necessity given access to the private 
 
2 Ms. Smith noted in her opening brief to this Court that the certificate of service on the 
State’s Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief listed Ms. Smith’s home address 
instead of the address of Ms. Smith’s counsel that represented her in the prior coram nobis 
proceedings.   
 
9 
 
financial information of individual members of the general public be of good 
moral character, free from issues of dishonesty and lack of trustworthiness.  
 
Accordingly, the circuit court denied Ms. Smith’s Petition.3   
G. 
Third Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals 
Ms. Smith noted a third timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging 
the circuit court’s denial of her Petition.  The intermediate appellate court issued an 
unreported opinion on April 20, 2021, affirming the circuit court’s denial of Ms. Smith’s 
Petition.  See Smith v. State, No. 2534, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 20, 2021).  
The Court of Special Appeals stated that it reviews “the circuit court’s ultimate decision to 
deny Ms. Smith relief under the abuse of discretion standard, with legal determinations 
reviewed without deference and factual findings left undisturbed unless clearly erroneous.”  
Id. at 4 (citing State v. Rich, 454 Md. 448, 470–71 (2017)).  The intermediate appellate 
court concluded that “[a]lthough we might have granted Ms. Smith the relief she sought, 
we certainly cannot say that the circuit court’s decision to deny the writ was so far removed 
from any center mark as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 4–5.   
Judge Friedman authored a third concurring opinion, stating “I do not think the 
circuit court abused its discretion in denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  I 
write separately because I cannot imagine a more deserving petitioner than Kenyatta 
 
3 On January 30, 2020, two days following the issuance of the circuit court’s memorandum 
opinion and order, an attorney in the Office of the Public Defender’s Post-Conviction 
Defenders Division filed a notice of appearance in the circuit court.  The same attorney 
filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis on February 
12, 2020.  Ms. Smith noted her third timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on 
February 25, 2020.  To date, the circuit court has not ruled on this motion.       
 
10 
 
Smith.”  Smith v. State, No. 2534, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 20, 2021) 
(Friedman, J., concurring).  Judge Friedman further articulated that “[t]he collateral 
consequence is . . . always a respect-worthy legislative policy judgment” and the 
legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 “ought not be the sole reason to deny relief.”  Id. at 3.   
H. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
Ms. Smith petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on August 
25, 2021.  Smith v. State, 475 Md. 700 (2021).  Ms. Smith posed the following questions: 
1. When a petitioner satisfies the substantive requirements for receiving 
coram nobis relief—i.e., they have exhausted all other available remedies, 
have proven that the convictions they are challenging suffer from 
constitutional or other fundamental error, and have established that the 
challenged convictions create a significant collateral consequence—to what 
extent does the petitioner still need to show that there are “compelling 
circumstances” warranting relief? 
 
2. Where Petitioner met the established prerequisites for obtaining coram 
nobis relief, did the circuit court err in ruling that, under dicta in Coleman v. 
State, 219 Md. App. 339 (2014), there are not “compelling circumstances” 
to vacate Petitioner’s convictions because, inter alia, the legislative purpose 
behind the creation of Petitioner’s significant collateral consequence (i.e., her 
inability to obtain a license as a mortgage originator) takes precedence?    
 
We consolidate and restate the questions as to whether the circuit court abused its 
discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition.  For the reasons discussed in detail below, we 
answer that question in the negative.  We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals.            
 
11 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court reviews a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of 
error coram nobis for abuse of discretion.  See Rich, 454 Md. at 470–71.  “However, in 
determining whether the ultimate disposition of the coram nobis court constitutes an abuse 
of discretion, [this Court] should not disturb the coram nobis court’s factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous[.]”  Id. at 471.  An abuse of discretion “occurs where no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court.”  Mainor v. State, 475 
Md. 487, 499 (2021) (quoting Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 674 (2020)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Writ of Error Coram Nobis  
 
A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy, rooted in English common 
law, which is available to correct errors of fact that affect the validity or regularity of a 
judgment and to correct constitutional or fundamental legal errors.  See United States v. 
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507–12 (1954).  In 2000, this Court adopted the United States 
Supreme Court precedent decided in Morgan, which is “[t]he leading American case 
concerning the nature and scope of a coram nobis proceeding[,]” Skok, 361 Md. at 71, that 
clearly established that a writ of error coram nobis should be utilized “only under 
circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”  Id. at 72 (quoting Morgan, 346 
U.S. at 511) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We consistently emphasize the 
extraordinary nature of this remedy in analyzing matters involving a writ of error coram 
 
12 
 
nobis.  See Rich, 454 Md. at 461, 470–71; State v. Smith, 443 Md. 572, 597 (2015) (quoting 
Skok, 361 Md. at 72).          
In Skok, this Court set forth five “qualifications” that a petitioner challenging a 
criminal conviction must establish in a petition for writ of error coram nobis, namely—(1) 
“the grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a constitutional, 
jurisdictional, or fundamental character[;]” (2) “the burden of proof is on 
the . . . petitioner[;]” (3) the petitioner “must be suffering or facing significant collateral 
consequences from the conviction[;]” (4) “[b]asic principles of waiver are applicable to 
issues raised in [coram nobis] proceedings[;]” and (5) “one is not entitled to challenge a 
criminal conviction by a [coram nobis] proceeding if another statutory or common law 
remedy is then available.”  361 Md. at 78–80.  
Five years after our decision in Skok, the Court adopted procedural rules governing 
coram nobis proceedings, which took effect on January 1, 2006.  See Md. Rule 15-1201, 
et seq.  Maryland Rule 15-1202(a) establishes that “[a]n action for a writ of error coram 
nobis is commenced by the filing of a petition in the court where the conviction took place.”  
Subsection (b) sets forth the pleading requirements for the petition for writ of error coram 
nobis, which encompasses the five qualifications this Court articulated in Skok.  Maryland 
Rule 15-1202(b) states, in pertinent part, that the petition shall include: 
(D) the facts that would have resulted in the entry of a different 
judgment and the allegations of error upon which the petition is based;  
 
(E) a statement that the allegations of error have not been waived;  
 
(F) the significant collateral consequences that resulted from the 
challenged conviction; [and] 
 
13 
 
 
(G) the unavailability of appeal, post conviction relief, or other 
remedies[.]  
 
Md. Rule 15-202(b)(1)(D)–(G). 
 
 
Maryland Rule 15-1206(a) sets forth that it is within the coram nobis court’s 
discretion to hold a hearing on the petition for writ of error coram nobis.  The coram nobis 
court is permitted to deny the petition without holding a hearing but, notably, may only 
grant the petition if a hearing is held.  Md. Rule 15-1206(a).  Additionally, at the hearing, 
it is within the coram nobis court’s discretion to “permit evidence to be presented by 
affidavit, deposition, oral testimony, or any other manner that the court finds convenient 
and just.”  Id. 
 
The coram nobis court is required to “prepare and file or dictate into the record a 
statement setting forth separately each ground on which the petition is based, the federal 
and state rights involved, the court’s ruling with respect to each ground, and the reasons 
for the ruling.”  Md. Rule 15-1207(a).  Further, “[t]he statement shall include or be 
accompanied by an order granting or denying relief.”  Md. Rule 15-1207(b).  If the coram 
nobis court grants the petition for writ of error coram nobis, “the court may provide for 
rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters that 
may be necessary and proper.”  Id.        
This Court’s precedent regarding the extraordinary nature of a writ of error coram 
nobis in connection with the governing Maryland Rules, clearly establishes that the Skok 
qualifications are threshold requirements that a petitioner must satisfy, but satisfaction of 
these qualifications does not result in an automatic grant of a petition for writ of error 
 
14 
 
coram nobis.  If these qualifications are not sufficiently established in the petition for writ 
of error coram nobis, the coram nobis court is permitted to deny the petition without 
conducting a hearing on the matter.  See Md. Rule 15-1206(a).  Notably, even where the 
Skok qualifications are established in the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the coram 
nobis court still has the discretion to deny the petition without a hearing if the petition does 
not present the coram nobis court with circumstances compelling such action to achieve 
justice.  Id.   
Accordingly, a petition for writ of error coram nobis shall only be granted where 
the coram nobis court conducts a hearing pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-1206(a), 
determines that the Skok qualifications are satisfied, and settles that the matter presents 
circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice consistent with this Court’s 
precedent.  Determining whether the matter involves circumstances compelling such action 
to achieve justice is not a threshold requirement such as the qualifications enumerated in 
Skok.  Instead, this is a discretionary determination left with the coram nobis court to ensure 
that this extraordinary remedy is reserved for only the most egregious and deserving of 
situations.  With this understanding, we turn now to the principal issue before us—whether 
the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition.                
B. 
 The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Petition for Writ 
of Error Coram Nobis. 
 
  
1. 
Parties’ Contentions 
Ms. Smith maintains that the circuit court erred in denying her Petition because she 
satisfied the Skok threshold requirements.  Ms. Smith emphasizes that the qualifications 
 
15 
 
this Court enumerated in Skok are the “only requirements . . . that must be satisfied in order 
to receive coram nobis relief.”  As such, “establishing ‘compelling circumstances’[4] is not 
listed as a separate, sixth requirement.”  Ms. Smith argues that the circuit court 
misinterpreted this Court’s “use of the phrase ‘compelling circumstances’ (or a variation 
of the phrase)” in Skok.  Further, Ms. Smith explains that satisfaction of the Skok 
requirements demonstrates that a petitioner has also established “compelling 
circumstances.”  Accordingly, because Ms. Smith satisfied the “traditional coram nobis 
requirements[,]” Ms. Smith contends that she “must be granted relief[.]” 
In the alternative, Ms. Smith argues that if this Court determines that establishing 
“compelling circumstances” is an additional requirement to the Skok requirements, the 
circuit court still erred in denying her Petition.  Ms. Smith sets forth that her case “does 
present compelling circumstances” because “the constitutional, fundamental error proved 
by Ms. Smith is inherently compelling.”  Additionally, Ms. Smith maintains that “the 
significant collateral consequence in this case should [not] be treated as any less compelling 
than other more common consequences.”  Further, Ms. Smith highlights that “Maryland 
does not have a definitive list of recognized collateral consequences eligible for coram 
nobis relief.”  Therefore, Ms. Smith asserts that “regardless of whether or not this Court 
concludes that providing ‘compelling circumstances’ is a separate requirement for 
receiving coram nobis relief, the circuit court erred in denying the [P]etition.”  
 
4 Both Ms. Smith and the State clarified at oral argument before the Court that they utilize 
the term “compelling circumstances” as shorthand when referring to the Skok Court’s full 
language of “circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”   
 
16 
 
Accordingly, Ms. Smith requests that we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals.               
The State responds that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying 
Ms. Smith’s Petition, as Ms. Smith did not demonstrate that her case presents 
circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.  The State argues that under this 
Court’s holding in Skok, “the circuit court must weigh the existence of compelling 
circumstances when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant a coram nobis 
petition.”  As such, the State further asserts that satisfying the Skok qualifications is a 
“threshold requirement to obtain coram nobis relief,” however, “nothing in this Court’s 
jurisprudence indicates that doing so automatically entitles a petitioner to relief.”  The State 
cites to this Court’s holding in Rich in support of its contention that the decision to grant a 
petition for writ of error coram nobis is a discretionary determination left with the coram 
nobis court.  454 Md. at 470–71. 
The State also argues that the intermediate appellate court properly affirmed the 
circuit court’s denial of Ms. Smith’s Petition because the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in reaching its decision.  The State maintains that the circuit court properly 
weighed the legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 in analyzing whether Ms. Smith’s Petition 
presented circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.  The State highlights 
that the legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 is “to prevent dishonest individuals from 
working in the mortgage origination field where they would have ‘access to the private 
financial information of individual members of the general public[.]’”  Accordingly, 
overturning Ms. Smith’s fraud convictions through a writ of error coram nobis would 
 
17 
 
“thwart the legislative purpose of” FI § 11-605 and is an appropriate factor for the circuit 
court to consider.  Therefore, the State requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals.   
2. 
FI § 11-605 
It is undisputed that Ms. Smith’s Petition satisfied the Skok qualifications necessary 
for receiving coram nobis relief.5  However, the circuit court found that Ms. Smith did not 
persuade the court that this matter involves compelling circumstances necessary to achieve 
justice, and therefore denied Ms. Smith’s Petition.  The circuit court based its conclusion 
on the legislative purpose of FI § 11-605, the statutory provision that permanently bars Ms. 
Smith from obtaining a mortgage loan originator’s license due to her underlying criminal 
convictions.  Accordingly, a review of FI § 11-605 and its legislative history is crucial to 
our analysis of the circuit court’s denial of Ms. Smith’s Petition.        
i. 
Plain Language of FI § 11-605 
“When engaging in statutory interpretation, this Court’s ‘chief objective is to 
ascertain the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.’”  Lyles 
v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 478 Md. 588, 601 (2022) (quoting Berry v. Queen, 469 
Md. 674, 687 (2020)).  Therefore, “[w]e assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in 
 
5 The circuit court determined that Ms. Smith’s Petition established that the grounds for 
challenging her criminal convictions were constitutional in nature because she was not 
advised of the elements of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty or the collateral 
consequences of the guilty plea.  Additionally, the circuit court determined that Ms. 
Smith’s Petition established that she had exhausted all other available statutory and 
common law remedies.  However, it was the intermediate appellate court that determined 
Ms. Smith’s Petition established that she suffers significant collateral consequences from 
the convictions, which the circuit court ultimately adopted. 
 
18 
 
the statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the 
language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly.”  
Berry, 469 Md. at 687 (quoting Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 550–51 (2017)).  With these 
principles, we turn now to the statutory language of FI § 11-605.     
FI § 11-605 sets forth the mandatory qualifications for an applicant seeking a 
mortgage loan originator’s license.  Subsection (a) states: 
The Commissioner may not issue a mortgage loan originator license unless 
the Commissioner makes, at a minimum, the following findings: 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
(2) The applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere 
to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military court: 
 
(i) During the 7-year period immediately preceding the date of the 
application for licensing; or  
 
(ii) At any time preceding the date of application, if the felony 
involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust, or money 
laundering; 
 
FI § 11-605(a).  Subsection (b) explains that “[a] conviction for which a pardon has been 
granted is not a conviction for purposes of subsection (a)(2) of this section.”  
FI § 11-605(b).   
The plain language of FI § 11-605(a) and (b) establishes that individuals with felony 
convictions may not qualify for a mortgage loan originator’s license unless seven years 
separate the date of the felony conviction and the date of the application for licensing.  
Further, an individual with a felony conviction involving “an act of fraud, dishonesty, a 
breach of trust, or money laundering” is not eligible, and cannot become eligible, to receive 
 
19 
 
a mortgage loan originator’s license.  However, the statute makes an exception for those 
convictions that a pardon has been granted.  Ms. Smith’s convictions for forgery and 
fraud/identity theft permanently bar her from qualifying for a mortgage loan originator’s 
license because these convictions are felonies involving “an act of fraud, dishonesty, a 
breach of trust, or money laundering[,]” and she has never been pardoned. 
ii. 
The Legislative History of FI § 11-605 
In addition to reviewing the statute’s plain language, it is the modern tendency of 
this Court to continue the analysis of the statute beyond the plain meaning.  Moore v. 
RealPage Util. Mgmt., Inc., 476 Md. 501, 514 (2021) (quoting In re: S.K., 466 Md. 31, 50 
(2019)).  Here, a review of the legislative history of FI § 11-605 reveals that the prohibition 
against Ms. Smith qualifying for a mortgage loan originator’s license is one that is federally 
mandated to ensure those working in the mortgage loan industry are vetted for concerns of 
dishonesty or untrustworthiness and are of good moral character.      
The General Assembly enacted FI § 11-605 in 2005, with the passing of 
House Bill 1040 (“HB 1040”), “[for] the purpose of prohibiting an individual from acting 
as a mortgage originator on or after a certain date unless the individual is a licensee[.]”  
2005 Md. Laws, ch. 590.  In its original form, FI § 11-605(a) stated: 
To qualify for a license, an applicant shall satisfy the commissioner that: 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
(2) The applicant is of good moral character and has general fitness to 
warrant the belief that the applicant will act as a mortgage originator in a 
lawful, honest, fair, and efficient manner. 
 
Id.   
 
20 
 
Prior to 2005, mortgage loan originators could practice in Maryland without 
receiving a license from the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of DLLR.  When 
misleading and deceptive practices permeated the mortgage loan industry, DLLR requested 
HB 1040 to require the licensing of mortgage loan officers and justified their request 
through written testimony to the House Economic Matters Committee that stated: 
At present, the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation is limited 
in its ability to control the activities of loan officers.  It is the mortgage loan 
officers, not the licensed mortgage broker who deals with a consumer face to 
face and may participate in fraud, misleading and deceptive practices, real 
estate flipping and predatory lending practices.  Although this Office can 
initiate action against licensed mortgage lenders or brokers by suspending or 
revoking their license due to activities of the loan officers, there is no 
practical way to sanction the loan officer who is participating in these 
schemes and directly cause financial harm to victims.  Often times, the owner 
of the company may terminate the individual and may or may not notify law 
enforcement about the alleged crime because of the effect on their company’s 
reputation.  The person who may be most culpable because they are dealing 
directly with the borrower is free to move on, work for another licensed 
broker, exempt lender or otherwise continue their career in the mortgage 
lending industry. 
 
A way should be found to protect the public from predatory loan officers as 
well as from the predatory mortgage lenders and brokers with whom they 
work.  The licensing program contained in HB 1040 should provide that 
authority. 
 
See Written Testimony from the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to the 
House Economic Matters Committee in legislative bill file for House Bill 1040 (2005). 
The President of the Maryland Appraiser’s Coalition, Inc., also submitted written 
testimony in support of HB 1040 to the House Economic Matters Committee, which 
articulated a similar sentiment: 
Lender coercion of real estate appraisers has become, over the past decade, 
an insidious virus undermining the integrity of the entire mortgage process.  
 
21 
 
Unscrupulous loan officers - or uninformed or incompetent ones - tell 
appraisers that they must come up with an opinion of value high enough to 
support the loan, or they will not be paid (and they certainly will not get more 
business from that lender).  Or, they demand other actions that are clearly 
unethical, such as changing the description of the property to make it sound 
more desirable.  This perpetrates a fraud on the investor who will ultimately 
underwrite the loan, believing that the property represents sufficient 
collateral to protect against loss.  Worse, it permits the buyer to be misled 
into a mortgage that is for more than the property is worth, leaving him or 
her unable to sell the property without coming up with additional cash - or 
declaring bankruptcy.     
 
* 
* 
* 
 
“Lender pressure”, as it is frequently called, was clearly a factor in the 
flipping scandal in Baltimore.[6]  But it is not a home-grown problem.  The 
Federal Financial Institution Regulatory Agencies recently published a 
notice to banks, S & L’s, and credit unions nationwide re-emphasizing their 
policies prohibiting such practices, and warning that the examiners will be 
looking for violations.  But this still does not apply to mortgage brokers and 
their often untrained and inexperienced loan officers, many of whom seem 
to treat mortgage lending as the financial equivalent of the untamed wild 
west.  As President of The Appraisers coalition, my office continues to 
receive complaints from frustrated appraisers who have been berated by loan 
officers attempting to dictate the content and value conclusions of the 
appraisal. 
 
HB 1040 addresses this issue.  In its intent to impose order and discipline 
upon the present laissez-faire attitudes prevalent in the mortgage lending 
industry, it is consistent with government activities elsewhere in the areas of 
securities and financial fraud, where both federal and state governments have 
found it necessary to increase regulatory activities in order to prevent the 
abuses that are now being prosecuted after the fact.   
 
6 During the late 1990s, Baltimore City experienced a real estate flipping scheme in which 
real estate speculators purchased homes at depressed prices, made minor cosmetic repairs, 
and resold the homes quickly at inflated prices.  Generally, buyers of these homes “secured 
mortgages that were more than [the value of] the house, eventually leading to foreclosure.”  
See Daniel Taylor, Making sure appraisals are ‘independent’ - Pressure: Appraisers say 
lenders push them to inflate values so that homeowners can maximize their refinancings., 
Balt. Sun, March 7, 2004, at 1L; see also John B. O’Donnell, Judge condemns actions of 
appraiser Home assessments decried as dishonest in 4 flipping cases License could be 
rescinded, Balt. Sun, May 24, 2000, at 1A.     
 
22 
 
 
See Letter from Beth L. Riedel, President of the Maryland Appraisers’ Coalition, Inc., to 
the House Economic Matters Committee in legislative bill file for House Bill 1040 (2005).  
Accordingly, the General Assembly enacted FI § 11-605 to combat the problems 
arising from the lack of oversight in the mortgage loan industry.  FI § 11-605, as originally 
enacted, established that mortgage loan originators had to “become licensed with the 
Commissioner of Financial Regulation[,]” and “[t]o qualify for a license, an applicant [had 
to] satisfy the commissioner that the applicant is of good moral character and has general 
fitness to warrant the belief that the applicant will act as a mortgage originator in a lawful, 
honest, fair, and efficient manner.” Dep’t Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, House Bill 
1040, at 1–2 (2005 Session).   
 
 During the 2008 Legislative Session, Senate President Thomas V. Miller, Jr. 
introduced Senate Bill 270 (“SB 270”), an administration bill7 supported by Governor 
Martin O’Malley, with the intention of “expand[ing] the licensing requirements for 
mortgage lenders and mortgage originators” set forth in FI § 11-605.  See Dep’t Legis. 
Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, Senate Bill 270, at 1 (2008 Session).  A member of the 
Governor’s Legislative Office, the Secretary of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, the 
Secretary of Housing, and the Commissioner of Financial Regulation collectively 
 
7 An administration bill provides the Governor with “an opportunity to introduce major 
initiatives[,]” and is an exception to the traditional method of introducing a bill to the 
General Assembly, which requires sponsorship from a member of the Senate or House of 
Delegates.  See Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 126 n.19 (2018).   
 
23 
 
submitted written testimony to the Senate Finance Committee in support of SB 270.  This 
testimony explained that 
in response to the unprecedented default and foreclosure rates throughout 
Maryland as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis, Governor Martin 
O’Malley established the Homeownership Prevention Task Force last 
summer.  The Task Force was charged with developing an action plan to 
address escalating foreclosure rates and identify effective ways to preserve 
homeownership in Maryland . . . Based largely on the work of the Task 
Force, the O’Malley-Brown Administration [] introduced a package of bills 
designed to help those families at risk of foreclosure, and create greater 
protections for future homeowners. 
 
See Written Testimony from Lisa L. Jackson, Governor’s Legislative Office, Tom Perez, 
Secretary of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Ray Skinner, Secretary of Housing and 
Sarah B. Raskin, Commissioner of Financial Regulation to the Senate Finance Committee 
in legislative bill file for Senate Bill 270 (2008 Session).   
The written testimony further explained that “Senate Bill 270 gives greater authority 
and oversight to the Commissioner of Financial Regulation to provide better, more 
effective regulatory oversight over the mortgage industry.”  Id.  Specifically, SB 270 
prohibited “persons who have been convicted of felony theft, fraud, or forgery within the 
last ten years from obtaining a mortgage lender or originator license and requires that 
persons convicted of such felonies while licensed have their licenses revoked.”  Id.   
Accordingly, following the passing of SB 270 during the 2008 Legislative Session, 
FI § 11-605 set forth: 
(a) To qualify for a license, an applicant shall satisfy the Commissioner that: 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
 
24 
 
(2) The applicant is of good moral character and has general fitness to 
warrant the belief that the applicant will act as a mortgage originator 
in a lawful, honest, fair and efficient manner.        
 
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the 
Commissioner may deny an application for a license filed by an individual 
who has committed an act that would serve as a sufficient ground for 
suspension or revocation of a license under this subtitle or a mortgage lender 
license under Subtitle 5 of this title. 
 
(2) The Commissioner shall deny an application for a license filed by 
an individual who has been convicted within the last 10 years of a 
felony involving fraud, theft, or forgery.    
 
2008 Md. Laws, ch. 7. The amended statutory language required “that the commissioner 
deny an application for a license filed by an individual who has been convicted within the 
last 10 years of a felony involving fraud, theft, or forgery[,]” which effectively 
strengthened the licensing requirements for mortgage loan originators.  Dep’t Legis. Servs., 
Fiscal and Policy Note, Senate Bill 270, at 4 (2008 Session).      
The General Assembly last amended FI § 11-605 during the 2009 Legislative 
Session with the passing of Senate Bill 269 (“SB 269”) to its current language “[for] the 
purpose of altering certain provisions of law regulating mortgage lenders and mortgage 
loan originators to conform to the requirements of the federal Secure and Fair Enforcement 
for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 [(“SAFE Act”).]”  2009 Md. Laws, ch. 4.  The SAFE 
Act “establish[ed] a Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry for the 
residential mortgage industry” that provided “uniform license applications and reporting 
requirements for State-licensed loan originators.”  See Secure and Fair Enforcement for 
Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1502, 122 Stat 2810.  The SAFE 
Act advanced a federal mandate “requir[ing] all states to transition to the National 
 
25 
 
Mortgage Licensing System and Registry (“NMLS”) and set[] minimum federal licensing 
standards.”  See Written Testimony from Carolyn Quattrocki, Governor’s Legislative 
Office, Sarah B. Raskin, Commissioner of Financial Regulation, and Mark Kaufman, 
Deputy Commissioner of Financial Regulation to the Senate Finance Committee in 
legislative bill file for Senate Bill 269 (2009 Session).   
“While Maryland [was] well ahead of many other states in mortgage licensing and 
regulation, Senate Bill 269 [made] the changes which [were] still necessary to bring the 
State into compliance with the SAFE Act and to facilitate the transition to NMLS.”  Id.  
Further, the Office of Counsel to the General Assembly also confirmed in a letter dated 
April 6, 2009, that SB 269 “conforms to all SAFE Act requirements.”  See Letter from 
Kathryn Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher J. Young, Assistant Attorney 
General, to The Honorable Brian Feldman, House Economic Matters Committee in 
legislative bill file for Senate Bill 269 (2009).      
The Floor Report for SB 269 establishes that this legislation altered the “licensing 
requirements . . . for mortgage lenders and mortgage loan originators” and required 
“licensees to submit certain information to the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System 
and Registry[.]”  See Floor Report, Senate Bill 269, Senate Finance Committee of the 
Maryland Senate, 2009 Leg., 419th Sess. (Md. 2009).  Specifically, SB 269 established 
that “the commissioner may not issue a mortgage loan originator’s license unless the 
applicant . . . has never been convicted of, pled guilty, or pled nolo contendere to a felony 
involving an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust, or money laundering[.]”  Id.  The 
amended statutory language again strengthened the licensing requirements for applicants 
 
26 
 
seeking a mortgage loan originator’s license.  Dep’t Legs. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, 
Senate Bill 269, at 1 (2009 Session).  As amended, the statute permanently prohibits those 
individuals with felony convictions involving “an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust, 
or money laundering” from qualifying for a mortgage loan originator’s license in 
accordance with the federal mandate established in the SAFE Act.  FI § 11-605(a)(2)(ii). 
 
Members of the mortgage loan industry are given access to people’s private 
financial information and therefore it is in the general public’s interest that individuals 
employed as mortgage loan originators are of good moral character.  A review of the 
legislative history of FI § 11-605 clearly indicates that the General Assembly, in 
accordance with the SAFE Act’s federal mandate, intended to combat the problems arising 
from the dishonesty and untrustworthiness amongst individuals employed in the mortgage 
loan industry in enacting and subsequently amending FI § 11-605.  Accordingly, this Court 
is bound by that federal mandate and the legislative policy set forth in FI § 11-605 in 
considering Ms. Smith’s Petition.    
3. 
The Circuit Court’s Denial of Ms. Smith’s Petition 
In its analysis, the circuit court acknowledged that Ms. Smith “met her burden of 
proving” the qualifications this Court set forth in Skok.  However, the circuit court 
ultimately denied Ms. Smith’s Petition because the court found that the extraordinary 
remedy of a writ of error coram nobis is not necessary to effectuate justice in this case.  As 
previously discussed, satisfaction of the Skok qualifications does not automatically entitle 
a petitioner to a writ of error coram nobis.  Instead, this is just one piece of the circuit 
court’s analysis in reviewing a petition for writ of error coram nobis.  It is within the circuit 
 
27 
 
court’s discretion to determine whether the petition for writ of error coram nobis also 
presents circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice, as adopted by the Skok 
Court.  The circuit court did not err by looking beyond Ms. Smith’s satisfaction of the Skok 
qualifications to determine whether to grant the Petition.   
Here, the circuit court looked to the legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 in 
determining that Ms. Smith’s Petition did not present circumstances compelling this 
extraordinary remedy to effectuate justice.  The circuit court concluded that the General 
Assembly intended to combat issues of dishonesty and untrustworthiness within the 
mortgage loan industry with the enactment of and subsequent amendments to FI § 11-605.  
The circuit court emphasized in its analysis that Ms. Smith “had access to personal and 
private information given to her by her employer when she committed the offenses that led 
her to plead guilty to one count of Forgery and two counts of Fraud (Identity Theft).”  
Accordingly, the circuit court determined that Ms. Smith fits squarely within the federally 
mandated prohibition established in FI § 11-605.   
This Court reviews the circuit court’s denial of Ms. Smith’s Petition for an abuse of 
discretion.  Rich, 454 Md. at 470–71.  We would reverse the circuit court’s denial of Ms. 
Smith’s Petition only where the decision under consideration is well removed from any 
center mark imagined by this Court and beyond the fringe of what we deem minimally 
acceptable.  Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 418–19 (2007).  Reviewing 
the circuit court’s analysis and conclusion, it is clear that the circuit court’s decision is not 
well removed from any center mark.  The legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 is a relevant 
consideration for the circuit court where granting Ms. Smith’s Petition would effectively 
 
28 
 
circumvent the federally mandated prohibition against Ms. Smith receiving a mortgage 
loan originator’s license set forth in FI § 11-605.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Special Appeals.       
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition.  Satisfaction of the qualifications set forth by this Court 
in Skok is only one consideration in examining a petition for writ of error coram nobis.  It 
is within the coram nobis court’s discretion to also consider whether the petition for writ 
of error coram nobis presents the rare circumstances where this extraordinary remedy is 
necessary to achieve justice.  Here, the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion 
in considering the Skok qualifications, examining the legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 
and the federal mandate that it encompasses, and ultimately denying Ms. Smith’s Petition.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.