Case Title: Commonwealth v. Felix

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11692

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11692 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NATALIO FELIX. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     December 19, 2016. - April 12, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JJ. 1 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Assistance 
of counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 21, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Bruce 
R. Henry, J.; the case was tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on March 16, 2015, was heard 
by her. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Jane A. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant, Natalio Felix, appeals from 
his conviction of murder in the first degree and the denial of 
his motion for a new trial.  The defendant was convicted of the 
                     
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
murder of his wife, Janice Santos, on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation. 
The defendant's principal arguments on appeal concern the 
absence of any instruction on manslaughter; he claims that 
although he admittedly killed his wife, the trial evidence, and 
particularly his own trial testimony, entitled him to 
instructions on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and 
that for several reasons, the absence of these instructions 
constituted error requiring reversal of his conviction and a new 
trial.  The defendant also seeks relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the defendant's conviction and the 
order denying his motion for a new trial, and decline to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize facts that the jury could 
have found, and reserve discussion of additional evidence in 
connection with the issues raised.  In May of 2011, the 
defendant and the victim had been married for a decade or more.2  
They jointly owned a home in Worcester where they lived with 
their son and daughter, aged ten and eleven, and the victim's 
sixteen year old son from a prior relationship.  The defendant 
and the victim both held jobs outside the home, the defendant as 
a truck driver and the victim at the Superior Court in Worcester 
                     
 
2 The evidence is conflicting as to whether they had married 
ten or fourteen years before the homicide. 
3 
 
 
 
County, but the defendant quit his job around this time, and the 
couple argued frequently, often about money.  Their 
relationship, however, contained no history of physical 
violence. 
 
During that month, following an argument with his stepson, 
the defendant left the couple's home and stayed with his sister 
at her home in Worcester for some time and then went to the 
Dominican Republic.  He stayed there for about one week before 
deciding to return home.  Still in contact with the victim via 
text messages both while staying with his sister and during his 
trip to the Dominican Republic, the defendant asked her to pick 
him up at the airport when he returned; she refused.  
Nonetheless, he did return to Worcester on June 6, 2011, and 
stayed at his mother's house, but slept at a friend's house on 
June 7, the night before the homicide. 
 
On the night of June 7, the defendant exchanged a series of 
text messages with Tina Rodriguez, a mutual friend of his and 
the victim's.  Pressing Rodriguez for the gossip she had heard 
about his marriage, the defendant sent a text message stating, 
"[The victim is] not who you think she is.  She's a hypocrite," 
and continued, "She's supposed to be Christian.  Laugh out loud 
4 
 
 
 
. . . .  Let's see if God saves her from this one."3  Asked to 
elaborate, the defendant answered only, "You will see.  You know 
who I am."  Rodriguez replied, "Remember that you have children 
with her.  Don't do anything stupid."  The defendant ended the 
exchange by asking that Rodriguez not tell the victim they had 
spoken. 
 
At 12:44 A.M. on June 8, the defendant sent a text message 
to his sister saying, "Love sis.  Thanks for everything," and 
another saying goodbye to his niece.  He also asked his niece to 
"get his cell phone," to thank his mother "for everything that 
she had done for him," and to relay his message that, "if 
anything happens to me just let [my mother] know that I'm sorry 
and that I love her."  Forensic analysis of the defendant's 
cellular telephone revealed a calendar entry for June 8, 2011, 
reading, "Ju[d]gment Day."  There were no other calendar entries 
for the six-month period beginning January 1, 2011, except for 
one doctor's appointment on a day in March. 
 
The defendant arrived at his and the victim's home early on 
the morning of June 8, 2011.  His stepson already had left for 
school; his son and daughter were awake and getting ready for 
school; the victim was in the master bedroom.  Having let 
                     
 
3 The victim was very religious, and attended church four or 
five nights per week, accompanied by her children but generally 
not by the defendant.  The defendant exercised at a gym on many 
evenings. 
5 
 
 
 
himself into the house using the keys he still had, the 
defendant spoke to no one before entering the master bedroom and 
locking the door behind him.  The children, both outside the 
bedroom, heard "a weird gasp," and "very loud thuds" coming from 
inside.  Unable to open the bedroom door, they looked underneath 
the door and saw a pair of black and white pants, along with 
"legs and feet wiggling."  The defendant's son asked through the 
door, "What are you doing to my mom?  Come and show yourself," 
and heard his father's voice respond, "It's me."  His daughter 
also recognized the defendant's voice saying, "Be quiet" from 
within the room.  About five minutes later, the defendant 
emerged from the bedroom, told his children their mother was 
sick, asked whether they had brushed their teeth, and drove them 
to school. 
 
The defendant then returned to his and the victim's home.  
According to what he told the police later that morning and told 
the jury at trial, when the defendant reentered the house, he 
did not check on the victim or go to the bedroom, but twice 
attempted to hang himself with a rope from the second-floor 
staircase.  Each time, however, the rope broke, and in falling, 
he sustained injuries to his neck and face and lost 
consciousness for a period of time.  When he regained 
consciousness, he drove the victim's automobile to his mother's 
house and left his house key and cellular telephone with his 
6 
 
 
 
stepfather. 
 
The defendant proceeded to the Worcester police station, 
arriving there at approximately 9 A.M.  He entered the station 
and reported to the officer at the front desk that he had killed 
his wife.  He wore a black and white track suit and the victim's 
employment identification badge on a lanyard around his neck.  
Police observed that the defendant had dried blood in both 
nostrils, a split lip, and a ligature mark on his neck.  In 
separate morning and afternoon interviews, the defendant spoke 
with police, waiving his Miranda rights each time.4 
 
As the defendant's first interview with the police was 
taking place, other police officers went to the defendant's home 
to investigate.  They found the victim lying on the bed of the 
master bedroom; she was dead.  The victim's neck showed three 
ligature marks, and the tissue underneath the marks showed 
hemorrhaging consistent with blunt trauma.  Her tongue was 
bruised, her neck cartilage fractured, and her face spotted with 
petechial hemorrhages.  The victim died as a result of asphyxia 
due to ligature strangulation, which would have required the 
                     
 
4 In the interval between the two police interviews, the 
defendant was taken to the hospital for examination and 
treatment of his injuries.  Both police interviews were video 
and audio recorded, and copies of the recordings were in 
evidence at trial and played for the jury.  In each interview 
statement and in his trial testimony, the defendant described 
his interactions with the victim on the morning of June 8.  We 
summarize this evidence, infra. 
7 
 
 
 
application of sufficient pressure to her neck for three to five 
minutes.5 
 
In September, 2011, a Worcester County grand jury indicted 
the defendant for murder.  Because the victim had worked in the 
Superior Court in Worcester County, the case was transferred by 
agreement of the parties to the Superior Court in Middlesex 
County.  After an evidentiary hearing, a judge of the Superior 
Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress his statements 
to the police, and the case was tried before a second Superior 
Court judge in October, 2012.  The jury were instructed on 
murder in the first degree on theories of premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and also murder in the second 
degree; the judge declined to instruct on voluntary or 
involuntary manslaughter.  The jury found the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree based on deliberate premeditation, 
and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. 
                     
 
5 Although the specific murder weapon was not identified, 
when the police went to the defendant's and the victim's house 
on the morning of June 8, 2011, they found various cords in 
rooms and in the halls on both floors of the house.  Police 
collected "anything that appeared to be out of place," including 
a black telephone charger found lying on the floor next to the 
bed in the master bedroom; a blue rope in the first-floor hall; 
a knotted, cut white electrical cord also found in the first-
floor hall; a blue cord in the second-floor hall; a blue rope 
tied to the second-floor banister; and a cut white electric cord 
recovered from the daughter's bedroom.  The record does not 
indicate that any forensic analysis of these cords and ropes was 
conducted. 
8 
 
 
 
 
The defendant appealed from his conviction and, represented 
by new appellate counsel, filed a motion for a new trial in 
March, 2015.  He argued in the motion that his trial counsel's 
failure to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction had 
deprived him of a viable defense and constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
trial judge denied the motion in a written memorandum of 
decision.  The defendant appealed from the denial of his motion, 
which we consider along with the defendant's appeal from his 
conviction. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Manslaughter instructions.  The 
defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter based on heat of passion caused by reasonable 
provocation or sudden combat, and contends alternatively that 
even if his trial counsel is found to have raised the 
possibility of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, the judge's 
declining to give it created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice that requires reversal of his conviction.  
He argues further that the judge committed error in declining 
his request for a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter, 
and claims that reversal is required for this reason as well.  
For the reasons we discuss hereafter, we disagree that 
reversible error occurred.  We begin, however, by summarizing 
9 
 
 
 
the defendant's statements to the police6 and trial testimony 
describing his encounter with the victim on the morning of June 
8, 2011, because these provide the sources of trial evidence on 
which the defendant's arguments are based and the only sources 
on which they could be based. 
i.  The defendant's statements and trial testimony.  The 
defendant initially told a police officer in the station lobby 
that he had killed his wife.  Brought upstairs for questioning, 
he told detectives that he had gone to his house that morning 
hoping to reconcile with his wife, but instead they fought.  He 
could not recall which of them had initiated the struggle, 
saying, "We didn't hit each other.  We just grabbed each other" 
and "just started swinging at each other."7  Asked whether she 
had hit him "with anything," the defendant indicated that she 
had not.8  Rather, "[S]he was just punching me and stuff. . . .  
And then I lost it."  Although a "struggle" ensued on the floor, 
he could not account for the victim's return to the bed because 
as soon as they started arguing, he "blanked out."  To the 
                     
 
6 The video and audio recordings of both police interviews 
were played for the jury during trial and admitted as trial 
exhibits.  See note 4 and accompanying text, supra. 
 
 
7 Although the record is silent as to the victim's and the 
defendant's relative sizes, it was undisputed that the defendant 
lifted weights at least three or four times per week. 
 
 
8 The defendant denied that his wife had caused his 
injuries, explaining that they were self-inflicted. 
10 
 
 
 
question whether he had punched the victim, the defendant 
responded, "No.  I strangled her."  He could not remember 
actually strangling the victim, saying that after he "just 
snapped," it was "all a blank."  Indeed, throughout both police 
interviews, he repeatedly said that he had "just snapped," and 
that he did not "remember anything," adding, "My head was going 
crazy," and "I was just crazy." 
When asked about his suicide attempts, the defendant 
explained that he "couldn't live with [him]self" after 
strangling the victim.  He also said that he "realized what [he 
had] done" when he regained consciousness after the failed 
attempts.  The defendant told police that "after [he] woke up" 
he drove directly to the station, and denied making any stops or 
telephone calls.  When police asked about his cellular 
telephone, the defendant told them alternately that he did not 
have it, that it had been disconnected, that he did not know 
what he had done with it, and that he did not know where it was. 
 
The defendant's trial testimony about the morning of June 8 
was similar in most respects to his statements to police, but 
newly introduced the idea that his wife had initiated the fight.  
He testified that he went to the house on the morning of June 8 
with peaceful intent to "get [his] family back."  When his wife 
saw the defendant in their bedroom, however, she immediately 
asked, "What are you doing here?" and "lunged" at him.  After 
11 
 
 
 
the victim "started swinging at" and "punching" the defendant, 
he "just snapped" and remembered nothing that followed until he 
emerged from the bedroom to speak to the children. 
 
During a charge conference that preceded the defendant's 
trial testimony, the defendant requested a jury instruction on 
manslaughter -- without specifying whether he was requesting 
voluntary, involuntary, or both -- based on anticipated evidence 
that he "blacked out, that he did not intend to harm or kill his 
wife."  The Commonwealth opined that the defendant's claim to 
have "blacked out" or "snapped" did not "rise to the level of 
either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter."  The judge saw no 
evidence warranting jury instructions on "heat of passion on 
reasonable provocation" or "[h]eat of passion induced by sudden 
combat."  She also concluded that no evidence warranted an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction.  At the final charge 
conference, after the close of the evidence, the defendant 
specifically requested an involuntary manslaughter instruction.  
The judge denied the request, and no manslaughter instructions 
were given to the jury. 
 
"If any view of the evidence in a case would permit a 
verdict of manslaughter rather than murder, a manslaughter 
charge should be given" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Sirois, 437 Mass. 845, 853 (2002).  No matter how incredible a 
defendant's testimony, "he is entitled to an instruction based 
12 
 
 
 
upon the hypothesis that it is entirely true."  Commonwealth v. 
Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 352 Mass. 387, 398 (1967). 
 
ii.  Voluntary manslaughter.  As previously stated, the 
defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  The 
portion of the trial record just summarized, however, indicates 
that regardless of whether the defendant made such a request, 
the judge clearly considered the question of a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction, ultimately deciding that the evidence 
did not warrant giving it.  In the end, it is unimportant 
whether we analyze the absence of an instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or 
a claim of judicial error, because the question raised by both 
claims is whether the absence of a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction, whether caused by counsel or the judge, created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by creating 
an error that likely influenced the jury.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 
(2014). 
A voluntary manslaughter instruction on the theory of 
13 
 
 
 
provocation9 requires evidence raising a reasonable doubt "that 
something happened which would have been likely to produce in an 
ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or 
nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection 
or restraint, and that what happened actually did produce such a 
state of mind in the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 
Mass. 724, 728 (1980).  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
64-65 (2013).10  By this standard, the defendant's trial 
testimony may have demonstrated subjective provocation.  We are 
not to judge his credibility, Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442-443, and 
he testified repeatedly that he had not intended to kill the 
victim but snapped after she lunged at him and started punching 
him.  If the question whether to give a manslaughter instruction 
is at all close, especially in a case like this one where the 
defendant testifies, prudence favors giving the instruction. 
 
However, a theory of reasonable provocation also requires 
an objective showing that the precipitating event would have 
                     
 
9  Both in discussing voluntary manslaughter during the 
first charge conference and in her memorandum of decision on the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge focused on sudden 
combat.  On appeal, however, the defendant emphasizes 
provocation.  The theories are closely related, and the 
distinction does not make a difference in this case. 
 
 
10 Although the 2013 Model Jury Instructions on Homicide had 
not yet been formally approved by this court at the time of 
trial, the trial judge informed the parties that she would be 
using the new instructions, and used them in charging the jury. 
14 
 
 
 
provoked heat of passion in the ordinary person.  Walden, 380 
Mass. at 728.  See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 419 Mass. 28, 31 
(1994).  Accordingly, "physical contact between a defendant and 
a victim is not always sufficient to warrant a manslaughter 
instruction, even when the victim initiated the contact."  
Walden, supra at 727.  This may be especially true where the 
defendant outweighs and is physically far more powerful than the 
victim, and the defendant uses a weapon or excessive force.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316, 329 (2001) 
("Bianchi's further testimony that the victim punched him in the 
face during their 'argument' adds little to his claim of 
provocation, where he intentionally precipitated the 
confrontation in violation of the protective order, was a 
weightlifter who outweighed the victim by more than 170 pounds, 
and was armed with a fully loaded weapon"); Commonwealth v. 
Parker, 402 Mass. 333, 335, 344 (1988), S.C., 412 Mass. 353 
(1992) and 420 Mass. 242 (1995) (in choking murder of elderly 
disabled man, provocation "untenable" despite defendant's 
testimony that victim had twice punched him in face); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 387 Mass. 220, 227 (1982) (evidence that 
unarmed victim choked defendant, her husband, with his shirt did 
not amount to provocation warranting manslaughter instruction, 
especially where he stabbed victim twenty-seven times); 
Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 363 Mass. 311, 321 (1973), S.C., 
15 
 
 
 
391 Mass. 123 (1984) ("It is an extravagant suggestion that 
scratches by the wife could serve as provocation for a malice-
free but ferocious attack by the defendant with a deadly 
instrument").11 
Here, the evidence supporting objective provocation was 
weak:  according to his trial testimony, the defendant showed up 
uninvited and surprised the victim by entering the bedroom as 
she was getting dressed; he perceived immediately that the 
victim did not want him there, and locked the bedroom door; and 
in response, the victim "lunged at" and punched him.  The 
defendant did not provide any information in his testimony or 
otherwise as to the force of the punch or where on his body it 
landed -- although when speaking to the police soon after the 
homicide, the defendant stated that the injuries on his face and 
to his neck were not caused by the victim but were the result of 
his failed attempts to hang himself.  In these circumstances, 
                     
 
11 The judge's decision on the defendant's motion for a new 
trial reasoned that the objective prong was unmet in part 
because the victim presented no "threat of serious harm" to the 
defendant, citing Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 838-839 
(2004).  Although, as the cases just cited in the text reflect, 
relative size and strength of a defendant and a victim may be a 
pertinent factor in evaluating whether a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction is warranted (on theories of either reasonable 
provocation or sudden combat), and in that vein, the fact that 
the victim did not pose a threat of serious physical harm may 
itself be pertinent, it is by no means required that a victim 
pose such a threat in order for a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction to be required. 
16 
 
 
 
whether or not the victim's conduct caused the defendant himself 
to "snap," her conduct does not appear to be the sort that is 
objectively likely to "eclipse [an ordinary person's] capacity 
for reflection or restraint."  Walden, 380 Mass. at 728. 
 
Even if, in light of the defendant's testimony, the better 
course to follow here would have been to give a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction, reversal is not required.  That is, if 
we were to assume that there was error -- either in counsel's 
failure specifically to request a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction or in the judge's failure to give it -- the error 
was not "likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  
Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.  The evidence was undisputed that 
irrespective of what started the physical interaction between 
the defendant and the victim, she died from being strangled by a 
ligature, and the defendant was the person who strangled her.  
Even if the jury were to have found, as the defendant stated, 
that the defendant had returned home on the morning of the 
homicide with peaceful intent to reconcile and the victim 
punched him upon seeing him in the bedroom, the time required to 
strangle the victim with a ligature supported a finding of 
deliberate premeditation inconsistent with sudden provocation.  
See Commonwealth v. Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 317 (1987) 
(although defendant arrived at scene of crime unarmed and with 
peaceful intent, heat of passion did not mitigate deliberately 
17 
 
 
 
premeditated murder by strangulation and blunt force).  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 366 (2016) (reducing 
murder in first degree to voluntary manslaughter where jury had 
rejected theory of deliberate premeditation).  By the 
defendant's own admission, he and the victim had been "arguing 
for weeks" before the murder.  See Commonwealth v. Zagrodny, 443 
Mass. 93, 107 (2004) (no voluntary manslaughter instruction 
required, where marital tension was hardly "sudden" given that 
relationship between victim and defendant had been strained by 
financial difficulties and they had argued day before killing).  
The night before the murder, he bid farewell to family members, 
arranged for them to collect his cellular telephone, and ignored 
a friend's warning not to do "anything stupid."  He created a 
calendar entry for June 8 called "Ju[d]gment Day," entered the 
house when the family member best positioned to protect the 
victim would be absent, and locked the bedroom door behind him.  
After strangling the victim, the defendant told his children 
their mother was sick and drove them to school.  He did not 
check on her, but twice attempted suicide "because [he] couldn't 
live with [him]self."  Before going to the police station, he 
left his cellular telephone with his stepfather but later 
claimed that he did not have it, that it had been disconnected, 
that he did not know what he had done with it, and that he did 
not know where it was.  See Sirois, 437 Mass. at 853-855 & n.9 
18 
 
 
 
(defendant's statement to police and conduct after shooting wife 
demonstrated that victim's act of pointing gun at defendant did 
not generate passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous excitement 
required for reasonable provocation). 
 
The jury's verdict of murder in the first degree by 
deliberate premeditation was strongly supported by the evidence, 
and in the circumstances of this case, we are persuaded that it 
was highly unlikely that the jury would have been influenced by 
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  There was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice on account of 
the absence of this instruction. 
 
iii.  Involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant also claims 
error in the judge's denial of his request to instruct the jury 
on involuntary manslaughter.  Again, if any view of the evidence 
would permit a verdict of manslaughter -- whether voluntary or 
involuntary -- rather than murder, a manslaughter instruction 
should be given.  Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 330 
(2000), and cases cited. 
 
The defendant was not entitled to an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter in this case.  "A verdict of 
involuntary manslaughter is warranted 'only where the defendant 
caused an unintentional death (1) during the commission of an 
act amounting to wanton or reckless conduct, or (2) during the 
commission of a battery'" (citation omitted).  Degro, 432 Mass. 
19 
 
 
 
at 331.  With respect to the latter, under our cases, the 
battery in question must be one that does not amount to a 
felony, but one that the defendant knew or should have known 
endangered human life.  See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 
570, 590 (2001); Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 783 
(1990).  See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 73, 87-90 
(2013). 
 
The defendant requested an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction based on this circumstance, that is, based on 
commission of a battery not amounting to a felony.  But the 
evidence in the case was that the defendant placed a ligature 
around the victim's neck and pulled with sufficient force for 
three to five minutes to cut the flow of oxygen to the victim's 
brain, cause hemorrhaging to the underlying tissue, a fracture 
to her neck cartilage, and petechial hemorrhages on her face.  
"An involuntary manslaughter charge is not required when it is 
obvious that the risk of physical harm to the victim creates a 
'plain and strong likelihood that death would follow.'"  Degro, 
432 Mass. at 331, quoting Commonwealth v. Brooks, 422 Mass. 574, 
578 (1996).  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 552–553 
(2010) (in light of medical examiner's undisputed testimony 
regarding physical force used in strangling victim, no 
reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant lacked 
malice where he manually strangled victim for at least ninety 
20 
 
 
 
seconds, did not call for emergency aid, and left victim 
unconscious behind locked door).12 
 
There was no error in declining to give an instruction 
unwarranted by the evidence.  See Linton, 456 Mass. at 553, 
citing Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 123, 132 (1989) 
("judge should not instruct jury on lesser offense not supported 
by reasonable view of evidence"). 
 
b.  "Cool reflection."  Although he did not object at 
trial, the defendant contends that the judge's failure to inform 
the jury of a requirement of "cool reflection" in her 
instruction defining deliberate premeditation as an element of 
murder in the first degree created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  A judge defining deliberate 
premeditation for a jury is not obligated to inform them that 
they must find that the defendant decided to kill after having 
an opportunity for "cool" reflection.  Where that phrase is not 
required, Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 318 & n.7 
(1999), and where the trial judge here instructed the jury using 
                     
 
12 See also Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 476 
(2004) (risk created by "prolonged and forceful strangulation 
. . . constitutes a plain and strong likelihood of death"); 
Commonwealth v. Fitzmeyer, 414 Mass. 540, 547–548 (1993) 
(involuntary manslaughter instruction not warranted where 
evidence indicated defendant choked victim to death); 
Commonwealth v. Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 315–316 (1987) 
(involuntary manslaughter instruction not warranted where 
defendant strangled victim and threw rocks at her face). 
21 
 
 
 
the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide,13 there was no error 
and, accordingly, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
c.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we should 
reduce the murder verdict because there is reason to doubt that 
he acted with deliberate premeditation.  After reviewing the 
entire record of the case, we decline to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed.  
                     
 
13 Specifically, the judge instructed as follows: 
 
 
"The third element is that the defendant committed the 
murder with deliberate premeditation, that is, he decided 
to kill after a period of reflection.  Deliberate 
premeditation does not require any particular length of 
time of reflection.  A decision to kill may be formed over 
a period of days, hours or even a few seconds.  The key is 
the sequence of the thought process.  First, the 
consideration of whether to kill.  Second, the decision to 
kill, and third the killing arising from that decision.  
There is no deliberate premeditation where the action is 
taken so quickly that a defendant takes no time to reflect 
on the action and then decide[s] to do it." 
 
This instruction tracked the language in Model Jury Instructions 
on Homicide 39-40 (2013).