Case Title: State ex rel. Kuhar v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2006-Ohio-1079

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Kuhar v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-
1079.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. KUHAR v. MEDINA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Kuhar v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
108 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-1079.] 
Mandamus — Elections — Constitutionality of R.C. 1901.31 — Challenging 
constitutionality of legislation through mandamus is generally prohibited 
— Mandamus claim is manifestly a claim for prohibitory injunction and 
declaratory judgment — Court lacks jurisdiction — Cause dismissed. 
(No. 2006-0328 ─ Submitted March 6, 2006 ─ Decided March 10, 2006.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election case in which an elector seeks to 
prevent a board of elections from conducting primary and general elections for 
municipal court clerk. 
{¶ 2} Before September 29, 2005, the Clerk of Courts of the Medina 
Municipal Court was appointed by a single judge of that court.  Effective 
September 29, 2005, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66 (“H.B. 66”), the biennial budget bill 
for 2006-2007, amended R.C. 1901.31(A)(1)(a) by making the Clerk of Courts of 
the Medina Municipal Court an elected position.  Pursuant to this amendment, 
respondent, Medina County Board of Elections, will conduct a May 2, 2006 
primary election and a November 7, 2006 general election for the municipal clerk 
position.  The appointed clerk of courts earns $75,743.02 in salary and benefits.  
The elected clerk of courts will earn $106,267.85 in salary and benefits. 
{¶ 3} On February 13, 2006, approximately four and one-half months 
after the amendment to R.C. 1901.31 became effective, relator, Mark Kuhar, a 
registered voter and taxpayer in Medina, filed this expedited election action.  
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Kuhar seeks a writ of mandamus “instructing [the board of elections] not to 
conduct elections in accordance with [R.C.] 1901.31 as amended by Amended 
Substitute House Bill 66 because said section was amended in violation of the 
Ohio Constitution.”  On February 24, 2006, the board of elections filed an answer 
to the complaint.  On February 28, 2006, we granted the motion of Ohio Attorney 
General Jim Petro to intervene as a respondent.  The parties filed evidence and 
briefs pursuant to the schedule delineated for expedited election cases in 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
{¶ 4} This cause is now before us for a decision on the merits. 
{¶ 5} Kuhar requests a writ of mandamus to prevent the board of 
elections from conducting primary and general elections for municipal court clerk 
based on his claim that H.B. 66 violates the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which provides, “No bill shall contain more 
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” 
{¶ 6} “ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Mackey 
v. Blackwell, 106 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-4789, 834 N.E.2d 346, ¶ 13, quoting 
State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 
704. 
{¶ 7} We have applied this general rule in expedited election cases.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. McCord v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 
2005-Ohio-4758, 835 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 24-26.  Under this rule, “we must examine 
[Kuhar’s] complaint ‘to see whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather than to 
compel, official action.’ ”  State ex rel. Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., 
L.P.A. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 324, 762 N.E.2d 1012, quoting State ex rel. 
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Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic Data Processing Bd. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105. 
{¶ 8} In his merit briefs, Kuhar expressly requests (1) that the court “find 
that R.C. 1901.31 was amended in violation of the Ohio Constitution” and (2) that 
the court order the elections board “not to engage in the illegal elections 
scheduled for May 2, 2006 and November 7, 2006.” 
{¶ 9} Consequently, after examining Kuhar’s complaint and briefs, we 
note that he actually seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that H.B. 66 is 
unconstitutional and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing the elections board 
from conducting primary and general elections for municipal court clerk based on 
H.B. 66.  Cf. State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 69, 70-71, 647 N.E.2d 769 (“The essence of relators’ request for 
mandamus relief is injunctive, i.e., to enjoin respondents from holding any 
election for city council” for two years). 
{¶ 10} Admittedly, we have occasionally permitted mandamus actions to 
test the constitutionality of legislation in expedited election cases.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 242, 
725 N.E.2d 255 (“It is appropriate to consider the merits of Watson’s 
constitutional claim in this mandamus action because an action for a declaratory 
judgment and prohibitory injunction would not be sufficiently speedy in this 
expedited election case”); State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 342, 673 N.E.2d 1351 (“given the fact that relators are 
seeking to have their petitions certified and names placed on the ballots for the 
upcoming November election, the alternative remedy would not be adequate”); 
State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 
147, 580 N.E.2d 767 (mandamus allowed to compel placement of local option 
questions on election ballot); State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections 
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(1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 166, 545 N.E.2d 1256 (mandamus denied to place name of 
city-council candidate on election ballot). 
{¶ 11} But these cases are easily distinguishable because they involved 
relators seeking to compel the certification of candidates or issues for placement 
on election ballots ─ relief in the nature of a mandatory injunction ─ rather than 
Kuhar’s ill-disguised claim for a prohibitory injunction to prevent the primary and 
general elections for municipal court clerk. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, any possible limited exception to the general rule 
prohibiting an extraordinary action in mandamus to challenge the constitutionality 
of legislation is inapplicable because this is not a “rare and extraordinary case” in 
which the challenged statute operates “directly and broadly, to divest courts of 
judicial power.”  (Emphasis deleted.)  State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 504, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  The 
amendment to R.C. 1901.31 challenged by Kuhar involves only one office in one 
county.  Notably, Sheward included a claim for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
judges from exercising judicial authority; conversely, there is no prohibition claim 
here, and indeed, there could not be because the board of elections is not 
exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial authority in conducting the elections 
specified by the amended legislation. 
{¶ 13} Therefore, in accordance with the general rule and in the absence 
of any possible exception that might warrant departure from that rule, we lack 
jurisdiction over Kuhar’s claim and must dismiss it.  Mackey, 106 Ohio St.3d 261, 
2005-Ohio-4789, 834 N.E.2d 346, ¶ 16; McCord, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 2005-
Ohio-4758, 835 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 26.  Like the relators’ claim in another expedited 
election case, Youngstown, 72 Ohio St.3d at 70-71, 647 N.E.2d 769, Kuhar’s 
claim is manifestly for a prohibitory injunction to prevent the board of elections 
from conducting any election for municipal court clerk. 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the cause for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Marco, Marco & Bailey, Robert B. Campbell, and Steve C. Bailey, for 
relator. 
 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and William L. 
Thorne, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Holly J. Hunt and Frank M. Strigari, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for intervening respondent. 
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