Case Title: MARCHAK V. CLARIDGE COMMONS, INC., ET AL.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-24-93

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Argued October 13, 1993 -- Decided December 8, 1993 POLLOCK, J., writing for a unanimous Court. Ronald Marchak contracted with Claridge Commons, Inc. (Claridge) for the purchase of a newly constructed, single-family home in New Jersey. Pursuant to the language in the contract for sale, Marchak and the Claridge agreed that the warranty and insurance remedies contained in the homeowners warranty provided by Claridge to Marchak constituted the exclusive remedies available to the parties. At the closing on July 13, 1987, Claridge delivered to Marchak a "Home Buyer's Warranty," which included a clause providing for conciliation and arbitration of disputes. That clause also noted that the homeowner could pursue remedies other than conciliation and arbitration but that that election would bar the homeowner from pursuing the same claim under the warranty. The " Home Buyer's Warranty" included, among other warranties, a one-year warranty that the "housing unit" would be free from defects in materials or workmanship, a two-year warranty covering defects in the electrical, plumbing and mechanical systems and a ten-year warranty on major construction defects. These warranties were consistent with the requirements of the New Home Warranty and Builder's Registration Act (the Act). Both before and after the closing, Marchak submitted to Claridge "punchlists," informing Claridge of certain problems with the home, including certain structural defects. According to Marchak, Claridge did not correct these problems. Therefore, he filed a complaint on April 11, 1990, after the expiration of the applicable two-year warranty period. Marchak alleged counts in negligence and fraud, as well as violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. Because of the expiration of the warranty period, Marchak did not assert claims for breach of warranty. Claridge filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to the arbitration clause of the contract. The trial court granted Claridge's motion, finding that arbitration was Marchak's sole remedy. On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed that the contract limited Marchak to arbitration; however, the court ruled that that limitation conflicted with the Act, which provides that homeowners have the opportunity to pursue any remedy legally available. The Appellate Division held that Claridge's attempt to eliminate by contract the available statutory remedies violated public policy. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: The actual terms of the agreement between the parties does not clearly express the election of arbitration as the sole remedy. 1. The Act standardizes the responsibilities of new-home builders. New-home builders are required to register with the Department of Community Affairs and participate in the Department's new home warranty security fund or an approved alternative new home warranty security program. The purpose of that fund, or an alternative program, is to protect a homeowner by providing a source of payment to correct deficiencies caused by the fault of the builder. Under the Act, litigation and arbitration are mutually exclusive; a buyer may not submit a claim both to litigation and to arbitration. (pp. 6-7) 2. Claridge did not participate in the Department's fund; it obtained insurance issued from the Homeowner's Warranty Corporation (HOW), an approved alternative program. Like the Act, Claridge's warranty contemplates arbitration and litigation as mutually exclusive alternative forms of dispute resolution. However, the owner's right to sue remains intact. (pp. 7-8) 3. A builder and a homeowner may contract for arbitration as the exclusive remedy; there is no policy consideration that would prevent such a mutual agreement. Therefore, the Court disagrees with the Appellate Division's conclusion that a homeowner's agreement to arbitrate is contrary to public policy. (pp. 8-10) 4. An agreement to arbitrate should be read liberally in favor of arbitration. However, a contractual provision in which a consumer elects arbitration as the exclusive remedy must be read in light of its effect on that purchaser's right to sue. A clause depriving someone of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose. Here, the actual terms of the agreement did not clearly state the election of arbitration as the sole remedy. Marchak was limited to the warranty and insurance remedies contained in the homeowner's warranty. That warranty expressly recognized that the buyer retained the right to pursue remedies other than conciliation and arbitration. Thus, the "Home Buyer's Warranty" did not preclude Marchak from suing; it required him to choose between arbitration and litigation. (pp. 10-11) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. RONALD MARCHAK, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CLARIDGE COMMONS, INC., RONALD RACIOPPI, FRANK RACIOPPI, and ZYGMUNT WILF, Defendants-Appellants, and SALVATORE MAURO, Defendant. Argued October 13, 1993 - Decided December 8, 1993 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 261 N.J. Super. 126 (1992). Marc J. Friedman argued the cause for appellants (Rich & Friedman, attorneys). Murray A. Klayman argued the cause for respondent (Ferdinand and Klayman, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by POLLOCK, J. Seller shall provide buyer with insurance-backed warranty coverage and protection under New Jersey's Homeowners Warranty Act. Buyer and seller acknowledge and agree that the warranty and insurance remedies contained in the homeowners warranty provided by seller to buyer constitute the exclusive remedies of the buyer. The parties agree that the conciliation and arbitration procedures as outlined in the Homeowner's Warranty Act, are better suited to the determination of outstanding issues, if any, between the parties than any remedy which may be sucured [sic] by resort to legal process. Buyer represents that he has read the act to which reference is made and that he has secured the advice of counsel in making this election of remedies. This election of remedies, it is agreed, shall survive closing of title. At the closing on July 13, 1987, Claridge delivered to Marchak a "Home Buyers Warranty," which provided in paragraph IV, Conciliation and Arbitration: If the Builder and the Homeowner do not reach agreement with respect to the extent of, or the responsibility for, any alleged defects claimed in accordance with the warranty documents and the Construction Quality Standards, or if the Homeowner is not satisfied with any repair of defects made by the Builder, either the Builder or the Homeowner may request an impartial third party arbitration with the A.A.A., which will be conducted in accordance with its rules and regulations. The Homeowner can demand arbitration by completing a Request for Arbitration form which shall be provided by the Service. In accordance with the Act and the Regulations, the Homeowner has the right to pursue remedies other than conciliation and arbitration; however, election of other remedies shall bar the Homeowner from pursuing the same claim under this warranty. Non-Magnuson-Moss rights and remedies pertaining to consumer products may be pursued without first resorting to the conciliation and arbitration process. The "Home Buyers Warranty" included, among other warranties, a one-year warranty that the "housing unit" would be free from "[d]efects in materials or workmanship as established in the Constructive Standards," a two-year warranty covering "defects in the electrical, plumbing and mechanical systems," and a ten-year warranty on "major construction defects." The warranties were consistent with the requirements of the Act, which provides: b. The time periods of warranties established pursuant to this act are as follows: (1) One year from and after the warranty date the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty workmanship and defective materials due to noncompliance with the building standards as approved by the commissioner pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 46:3B-3a]. (2) Two years from and after the warranty date the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty installation of plumbing, electrical, heating and cooling delivery systems; however, in the case of appliances, no warranty shall exceed the length and scope of the warranty offered by the manufacturer. (3) Ten years from and after the warranty date for major construction defects as defined in this act. Both before and after the closing, Marchak submitted to Claridge "punch lists" for problems of varying importance. According to a September 6, 1991, report obtained by Marchak from consulting engineer Norman J. Coons, the house failed to meet the "Performance Standards" of N.J.A.C. 5C:25-3.5 to -3.6 and suffered from numerous defects. The defects ranged from structural failures, including the substitution of a wood support for a concrete-filled steel lolly column in the basement, to the omission of windows, insulation, and electrical outlets. The report concluded that Claridge had shown "blatant disregard for the safety and integrity of the building and its occupants." According to Marchak, Claridge failed to correct the problems. Consequently, he filed the complaint on April 11, 1990, after the expiration of the two-year warranty period. Ultimately he alleged counts in negligence and fraud, as well as violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -60. Because of the expiration of the warranty period, he did not assert claims for breach of warranty. The Law Division granted Claridge's motion for summary judgment, finding that the arbitration clause constituted arbitration as Marchak's sole remedy. The Appellate Division agreed that the contract limited Marchak to arbitration. 261 N.J. Super. at 131. It ruled, however, that the limitation conflicted with the Act, id. at 132, which provides that homeowners "shall have the opportunity to pursue any remedy legally available . . .," N.J.S.A. 46:3B-9. The court concluded that "the attempt in this case to eliminate by contract the available statutory remedies is a clear violation of public policy and remedies." 261 N.J. Super. at 132. In addition to providing for conciliation and arbitration, the Act provides for an election of remedies by the buyer: Nothing contained herein shall affect other rights and remedies available to the owner. The owner shall have the opportunity to pursue any remedy legally available to the owner. However, initiation of procedures to enforce a remedy shall constitute an election which shall bar the owner from all other remedies. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to limit the owner's right of appeal as applicable to the remedy elected. Thus, under the Act, litigation, on the one hand, and arbitration or conciliation, on the other, are mutually exclusive. A buyer may submit a claim to litigation or arbitration, but not both. Claridge elected not to participate in the department's fund. Instead, it obtained insurance issued by the Home Owner's Warranty Corporation (HOW), an alternative program approved pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:3B-8. HOW's program, like that of the department, provides for informal dispute settlement. It recognizes that "State or federal laws may permit filing of suit without waiting" for an informal dispute settlement. Home Owner's Warranty Corp., The Homeowner's Guide to HOW 11 (1991). Accordingly, section IV of Claridge's warranty provided Marchak with "the right to pursue remedies other than conciliation and arbitration; however, election of other remedies" would bar him "from pursuing the same claim under this warranty." Like N.J.S.A. 46:3B-9, Claridge's warranty contemplates arbitration and litigation as mutually exclusive alternative forms of dispute resolution. The owner's right to sue, however, remains intact. By providing for claims against the department's security fund, N.J.S.A. 46:3B-7, or against alternative security programs, such as that provided by HOW, N.J.S.A. 46:3B-8, the Act supplements an owner's right to sue. As N.J.S.A. 46:3B-9 specifically states, "Nothing contained herein shall affect other rights and remedies available to the owner." Notwithstanding the Act's recognition of an owner's right to pursue either remedy, parties remain free to limit those remedies by mutual agreement. Thus, a builder and a homeowner may contract for arbitration as the exclusive remedy. Generally speaking, arbitration is a favored form of relief. See Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 186 (1981) (listing statutes and cases favoring arbitration). More specifically, the Legislature has authorized persons to enter binding agreements to arbitrate and to accept the arbitrator's award. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-2. In sum, arbitrators function with the support, encouragement, and enforcement power of the State. Barcon Assocs., supra, 86 N.J. at 188. As a practical matter, moreover, arbitration and conciliation are particularly useful means for resolving construction-contract cases. In such cases, factual disputes tend to predominate over legal niceties. Questions such as whether a door bell is properly aligned, weather strips are loose, or recessed lighting fixtures contain bulbs of the correct wattage -- all of which appeared on plaintiff's punch lists -- do not require the attention of a Superior Court judge. An arbitrator or conciliator can resolve those questions. Resolving such questions in a judicial proceeding can be inefficient and wasteful. Often people are better served not by an adversary proceeding, replete with discovery and confined by the Rules of Evidence, but by an informal proceeding before an impartial arbitrator. In technical areas such as home building, moreover, arbitrators often bring expertise that can facilitate a fair and efficient resolution of a dispute. Generally, "courts should enforce contracts as made by the parties." Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 83 N.J. 86, 101 (1980). Honoring an agreement to submit a matter to arbitration is consistent with the premise that, as long as the agreement does not violate public policy, parties may bargain freely. See Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Hocroft Assocs., 256 N.J. Super. 328, 332 (Ch. Div. 1992). We perceive no policy consideration that would prevent homeowners and builders from agreeing to arbitrate their disputes. To this extent, we disagree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that a homeowner's agreement to arbitrate is contrary to public policy. The question remains whether Marchak agreed that arbitration was his sole remedy. When reading a contract, our goal is to discover the intention of the parties. Generally, we consider the contractual terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract. Jacobs v. Great Pac. Century Corp., 104 N.J. 580, 586 (1986); Nitta v. Yamamoto, 31 N.J. Super. 578, 580 (App. Div. 1954). Here, we need not go beyond the actual terms of the agreement to find that it did not clearly express the election of arbitration as the sole remedy. In so finding, we are aware that Marchak was represented by counsel at all relevant times, including when he signed the "Contract for Sale of Real Estate." The problem, therefore, is not inequality of bargaining power between the parties. Rather, it is something more fundamental: the agreement simply does not state that the buyer elects arbitration as the sole remedy. Instead, the contract limited Marchak to the "warranty and insurance remedies contained in the homeowners warranty provided by seller to buyer . . .." That warranty expressly recognized that the buyer retained "the right to pursue remedies other than conciliation and arbitration." Thus, the warranty did not preclude Marchak from suing. It merely required him to choose between arbitration and litigation. True, the contract contained precatory language stating that "[t]he parties agree that the conciliation and arbitration procedures as outlined in the Homeowner's Warranty Act, are better suited to the determination of outstanding issues, if any, between the parties than any remedy which may be sucured [sic] by resort to legal process." But buyers could readily agree to such a provision as a matter of philosophy and still believe that they were retaining the right to sue. The provision cannot reasonably be read as Marchak's election of arbitration as his sole remedy. Marchak never elected arbitration as his exclusive remedy. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.