Case Title: Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company

Citation: 12 Utah 2d 268, 365 P.2d 633

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1961-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
12 Utah 2d 268 (1961) 365 P.2d 633 SHERMAN V. LUND, PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. No. 9389. Supreme Court of Utah. October 25, 1961. Kastler & Crawford, Salt Lake City, for appellant. Omon & Saperstein, Salt Lake City, for respondent. CALLISTER, Justice. Plaintiff brought this action against defendant seeking damages for injury to his lawn, flowers, shrubs and trees alleged to have been caused by the saturation of the soil with natural gas which escaped from a leak or break in the defendant's gas lines. The jury found the issues in favor of plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $1,800. Defendant appeals from this verdict and plaintiff cross-appeals from a denial of his motion for an additur to the awarded damages. Defendant corporation is a public utility company engaged in the sale and distribution of natural gas. Plaintiff was a customer at his home in Bountiful, Utah. The defendant maintained a two-inch main line which ran east and west across the street from plaintiff's residence. A three-quarter inch service or feeder line ran from the main line to the house. In the latter part of May, 1958, plaintiff and his wife noticed a wilting and discoloration of their lawn and foliage. They inquired of a county farm agent, who suggested they contact the defendant, which they did on June 17, 1958. An immediate investigation was made by two of defendant's employees, who discovered a break in the service tap near the main line, directly across the street from plaintiff's house. They ascertained that this break had permitted natural gas to escape into the surrounding soil, including plaintiff's yard. The line was immediately repaired. It is undisputed that the main pipeline, at the point of the break, was 16 inches below the surface of the ground. However, defendant contends, and two of its employees so testified, that the pipe had initially been placed three feet below the surface, but that the grade had been lowered by the construction of a driveway to a new home directly across the street from plaintiff's residence. This was disputed by the plaintiff who maintained that the pipe was never buried deeper than 16 inches. There was evidence introduced to the effect that a heavy cement truck with dual wheels had become stuck directly over the main line and tap, and that it was the pressure of the weight of the truck which caused the break. The record shows that the tire tracks were approximately 12 inches in depth and within four inches of the main line. The jury, who viewed the scene and the gas line, evidently concluded that the pipe had been buried only 16 inches and found that this was not a sufficient depth and that the defendant was therefore negligent. In this regard, defendant contends the trial court erred in submitting the issue to the jury in the absence of testimony regarding any standard as to what is a proper depth that natural gas lines should be buried in the earth. Defendant argues that the instant situation is analogous to that found in medical malpractice cases in which this court has held that evidence must be submitted showing that the act complained of was not in accordance with accepted standards of professional skill.[1] We do not think the analogy lies. When facts may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of lay witnesses or jurors, it is not necessary that expert testimony be produced and relied upon.[2] The question of whether 16 inches was a proper and safe depth at which to bury the pipe, or a proper and safe depth to maintain it, in an area where residential construction was being carried on and where one could reasonably anticipate heavy vehicular traffic, was properly within the unaided competence of the jury to determine. Defendant next contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction to the jury: Defendant assigns several reasons as to why the instruction is erroneous. We need consider only one, namely, that it, in effect, plainly suggested to the jury that they find the issue of negligence in favor of the plaintiff. The instructions asked the jury to assess damages prior to their determination of the issue of the defendant's negligence, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. We observe that the instructions and interrogatories as formulated fall short of the desired simple and concise presentation of the issues for their determination. E.g. 2-A is particularly obscure and difficult to visualize as being meaningful to a jury in their attempt to settle the issues in the law suit. Certainly, the ordinary and long standing procedure is to instruct the jury in such a manner that they will determine liability before considering the matter of damages. While it is true that there is no fixed rule as to the order of the instructions, it being a matter of choice with the court,[3] nevertheless, the instructions must not tend to mislead or influence the jury.[4] The instant instruction could very well convey to the jury the impression that the trial judge was of the opinion that plaintiff was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of the damages. Furthermore, the trial court, after reading the instructions, advised the jury that Instruction No. 15 was in error. This instruction was read to the jury and included in the written instructions submitted to them. It instructed them in part as follows: This is the cautionary instruction usually given which advises the jury that from the fact that they are instructed concerning damages they should not assume the court believes that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery. However, in the instant case the trial court cancelled the effect of that instruction by further telling the jury: The foregoing could hardly do other than give the jury the impression that the judge believed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover and that he wanted to know the amount of the damages in the event he had to set the jury's verdict aside if they should find the issues of liability in favor of the defendant. We hold the giving of Instruction No. 6, together with the trial court's comments concerning Instruction No. 15, to be prejudicial error. In view of this holding, it is not necessary to consider plaintiff's cross-appeal. Reversed and remanded for new trial. No costs awarded. WADE, C.J., and McDONOUGH, HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. [1] See Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523. [2] Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772. [3] 1 Reid's Branson, Instruction to Juries, 3d Ed., p. 249 [4] 3 Am.Jur., p. 644.