Case Title: People v. Rodriguez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S223129

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 8/22/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S223129 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H038588 
ADAM SERGIO RODRIGUEZ, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. C1110340 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Criminal defendants routinely file motions at the outset of their cases to 
suppress the evidence against them.  When a judge grants such a motion, the 
prosecution may decide to dismiss the case and refile charges.  But if the 
prosecution does refile such charges, Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (p)1 
provides that any suppression motion the defendant subsequently files must be 
heard by the ―same judge‖ who granted the prior motion so long as that judge is 
―available.‖  The question before us is whether trial courts are vested with 
discretion to decide whether a judge is available under section 1538.5(p), and if so, 
what limitations constrain that discretion. 
What we hold is that although trial courts possess broad discretion to 
distribute business within their courts and make determinations concerning the 
                                              
1 
Subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code, and 
subsequent textual references to section 1538.5‘s subdivisions shall take the 
following form:  section 1538.5(a), section 1538.5(p), etc. 
2 
availability of judges, that discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent 
with constraints imposed by section 1538.5(p).  In light of the statute‘s text, as 
well as its purpose of prohibiting prosecutorial forum shopping, the trial court‘s 
discretion should be exercised in accordance with the following understanding:  A 
judge may be found unavailable for purposes of section 1538.5(p) only if the trial 
court, acting in good faith and taking reasonable steps, cannot arrange for that 
judge to hear the motion.  The trial court must make its finding of unavailability 
on the record. 
Because the trial court below did not take reasonable measures to ensure 
compliance with section 1538.5(p), we find an abuse of discretion.  And because 
the resulting error was prejudicial, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
and remand the case with directions that the Court of Appeal instruct the trial court 
to determine on the record whether the relevant judge is now available. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On February 24, 2010, the People filed a complaint in Santa Clara County 
Superior Court charging defendant Adam Sergio Rodriguez with one count of 
possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)) and one count of 
misdemeanor marijuana possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (c)).  On 
September 1, 2010, Rodriguez moved under section 1538.5(a) to suppress all 
evidence seized from his desktop computer, arguing that this evidence was 
obtained after police had entered Rodriguez‘s home without a warrant or proper 
consent.  Judge Diane Northway, sitting as a magistrate, denied this motion and 
held Rodriguez to answer. 
Rodriguez filed a renewed suppression motion in superior court on January 
3, 2011, pursuant to section 1538.5(i), which permits a defendant who ―was held 
to answer at the preliminary hearing‖ to ―renew or make the motion [to suppress] 
at a special hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure.‖  Judge 
3 
Vincent Chiarello granted the renewed motion on May 2, 2011, finding that 
statements made by police outside Rodriguez‘s home rendered any consent to 
search the premises involuntary.  The suppressed evidence included images and 
video footage of child pornography obtained from Rodriguez‘s desktop computer.  
Also inadmissible was a subsequent search warrant — a fruit of the initial 
encounter — that resulted in further forensic analysis of Rodrigez‘s computer, as 
well as statements he made to police during the execution of that search warrant.  
The case was dismissed at the People‘s request. 
The People then filed a new complaint on July 11, 2011, alleging the same 
offenses.  Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress, contending that the ―Proper Venue 
for This Motion‖ was before Judge Chiarello pursuant to section 1538.5(p) 
because Judge Chiarello was the ―same judge‖ who had granted Rodriguez‘s 
previous motion.  In conjunction with his suppression motion, Rodriguez also filed 
a ―Request For Calendar Setting,‖ which asked that the motion be assigned to 
Judge Chiarello.   
The People opposed assignment to Judge Chiarello.  In a hearing before 
Presiding Judge Jerome Nadler, in San Jose, the court denied Rodriguez‘s request 
to have Judge Chiarello hear this latest suppression motion.  The court explained 
its decision thus:  ―Well, counsel, I don‘t agree with your interpretation that it 
needs to go back to Judge Chiarello by law.  Furthermore, Judge Chiarello is not 
available to me any longer; he‘s been transferred to another division, in Palo 
Alto.‖  Judge Nadler continued:  ―And judges are -- mine is a limited jurisdiction 
Court – I hate to say it – and so departments make themselves available when 
they‘re available to me, with the exception of Department 54, who‘s Judge Del 
Pozzo, who‘s assigned full time to my division, or to take Preliminary 
Examination matters.  Everyone else volunteers for that assignment on an 
availability basis.  [¶]  So I‘m not sure who‘s going to be available on October 
4 
27th at 8:32 when this matter is set for Preliminary examination and now 1538.5.  
[¶]  It will just have to go out to whatever Judge is available on that date.‖ 
The matter then came before Judge Vanessa Zecher, sitting as a magistrate, 
for preliminary hearing in San Jose on December 8, 2011.  Rodriguez opposed the 
assignment to Judge Zecher, arguing again that under section 1538.5(p) Judge 
Chiarello should hear the motion to suppress.  The People disagreed.  Judge 
Zecher sent the parties back to Judge Nadler to argue the matter.  After 
considering the parties‘ arguments, Judge Nadler reaffirmed his prior conclusion:  
―Judge Chiarello has a sentencing calendar today in Palo Alto[2] and, therefore, 
[is] not available for this prelim.  [¶]  This matter is reassigned to Judge Zecher for 
prelim right now.‖  The parties returned to Judge Zecher, who on December 13, 
2011, denied Rodriguez‘s motion to suppress and held him to answer on count 1, 
the child pornography charge.  Count 2, for marijuana possession, was dismissed. 
Dissatisfied with these rulings, Rodriguez filed a renewed motion to 
suppress pursuant to section 1538.5(i) on February 8, 2012, seeking review in 
superior court.  Rodriguez sought to set aside Judge Zecher‘s order holding him to 
answer and reiterated that Judge Chiarello should have heard the relitigated 
motion to suppress.  This time, the People conceded the motion should have been 
heard by Judge Chiarello, not Judge Zecher, because ―Judge Chiarello was 
available‖ even though ―he had been transferred to another department of the 
Superior Court.‖  But according to the People, the appropriate vehicle for 
challenging Judge Zecher‘s rulings was a section 995 motion.  Rodriguez 
ultimately withdrew his motion after the trial court concluded a renewed motion to 
                                              
2 
The Palo Alto courthouse is about 15 miles from San Jose. 
5 
suppress under section 1538.5(i) was not the proper vehicle for setting aside Judge 
Zecher‘s holding order. 
Instead, Rodriguez moved on March 6, 2012, to set aside the information 
under section 995.  He argued that because his motion to suppress had been heard 
by Judge Zecher — and not Judge Chiarello — he had been deprived of a 
substantial right, for which the proper remedy was to set aside the information.  
The People opposed the motion, asserting that Rodriguez‘s decision to bring his 
motion to suppress in conjunction with the preliminary hearing — rather than 
waiting to bring the motion until after the hearing — removed the situation from 
the ambit of section 1538.5(p), which contains no requirement that the same judge 
preside over any subsequent preliminary hearing.  Judge Linda Clark denied 
Rodriguez‘s motion on March 28, 2012. 
In so doing, however, Judge Clark invited Rodriguez to file yet another 
section 1538.5(i) motion to the extent he wanted review of Judge Zecher‘s denial 
of the relitigated motion to suppress.  Rodriguez did so.  The People opposed the 
motion to suppress, which Judge Clark denied on April 25, 2012. 
With no more suppression motions to file, Rodriguez waived his right to a 
jury trial on May 7, 2012.  Four days later, Judge Chiarello conducted a bench trial 
in Palo Alto.  He found Rodriguez guilty of the single child pornography charge, 
suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Rodriguez on three years‘ felony 
probation, subject to various terms and conditions. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  At the outset, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that section 1538.5(p) grants the trial court discretion to determine 
whether a judge is available.  The Court of Appeal then concluded that Judge 
Nadler‘s ―wholly discretionary‖ authority, as presiding judge, to assign motions to 
different superior court judges justified the conclusion that Judge Chiarello was 
not available because he was in Palo Alto hearing other matters. 
6 
Rodriguez petitioned this court, and we granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Trial courts operate according to norms that confer substantial discretion in 
the conduct of judicial business.  (See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 
Cal.4th 953, 967 [―It is . . . well established that courts have fundamental inherent 
equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to 
control litigation before them. . . .  ‗That inherent power entitles trial courts to 
exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation 
. . . in order to insure the orderly administration of justice‘ ‖].)  But trial court 
procedures are also subject to certain statutory constraints.  Section 1538.5(p), for 
instance, provides:  ―If a defendant‘s motion to return property or suppress 
evidence in a felony matter has been granted twice,[3] the people may not file a 
new complaint or seek an indictment in order to relitigate the motion or relitigate 
the matter de novo at a special hearing as otherwise provided by subdivision (j), 
unless the people discover additional evidence relating to the motion that was not 
reasonably discoverable at the time of the second suppression hearing.  
Relitigation of the motion shall be heard by the same judge who granted the 
                                              
3 
Although the requirement that a subsequent suppression motion be heard by 
the same judge who granted the previous motion appears in a subdivision that also 
addresses third suppression motions, courts have held that the requirement applies 
to second suppression motions as well.  (See Soil v. Superior Court (1997) 55 
Cal.App.4th 872, 880 (Soil) [concluding ―that the language in question must be 
construed as applying to all relitigations, not just to suppression motions which 
have been heard two times‖].)  The People here do not argue otherwise.  (See 
People v. Superior Court (Jimenez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 806, fn. 2 (Jimenez) 
[describing Soil‘s rejection of the People‘s argument there that ―the requirement 
that the same judge rehear the motion applied only when the motion had already 
been granted twice,‖ and noting that ―[t]he People do not renew that argument 
here‖].) 
7 
motion at the first hearing if the judge is available.‖  (Italics added.)  It is this last 
portion of the statute that concerns us. 
The phrase ―if the judge is available‖ immediately underscores the extent to 
which this case implicates a trial court function that is traditionally considered 
discretionary in nature — namely, the authority to determine which judge will 
hear what.  (See Anderson v. Phillips (1975) 13 Cal.3d 733, 737 (Anderson).)  The 
Legislature routinely recognizes the discretion of trial courts, at times explicitly 
vesting them with it.  (See, e.g., § 1054.7 [―In its discretion, the trial court may 
after trial and conviction, unseal any previously sealed matter‖].)  The statute at 
issue in this case also bears on how trial courts protect a defendant‘s right to have 
a subsequent suppression motion heard by the same judge who granted the 
previous one.  The critical inquiry is how we interpret the five words at the end of 
section 1538.5(p), and how much flexibility we conclude those words afford trial 
courts in implementing the statutory scheme in light of the discretion they 
ordinarily possess when assigning work to judicial officers.  Given the stakes both 
for trial courts and defendants, we must in this case consider how to harmonize the 
need for (and existence of) trial court discretion, while at the same time reflecting 
on how to make sense of a statutory provision that appears, on its face, to 
constrain how that discretion is exercised. 
A.  The Nature of Discretion 
The parties agree that trial courts possess some amount of discretion to 
determine whether the same judge who granted a defendant‘s previous motion to 
suppress is available to hear the subsequent motion.  What their disagreement 
concerns is whether any limits exist on that discretion, given the explicit language 
of section 1538.5(p).  According to the People, the statute does not purport to limit 
a trial court‘s broad discretion, typically exercised by a presiding judge, to make 
8 
judicial assignments.  Rodriguez, by contrast, argues that the trial court‘s 
discretion is more circumscribed because the Legislature‘s intended purpose in 
enacting the relevant portion of section 1538.5(p) was to prohibit prosecutorial 
forum shopping.  As a result, Rodriguez maintains, the phrase ―if the judge is 
available‖ should be construed as a narrow exception to the statute‘s general rule 
that a subsequent suppression motion ―shall be heard by the same judge‖ who 
granted the previous one. 
As a matter of routine institutional practice, the authority to determine 
whether a particular judge is available resides with the trial court and its presiding 
judge.  Section 1538.5(p) does not explicitly say as much.  But its language is best 
understood to imply that someone must decide whether the sought-after judge is 
indeed available.  And even a rudimentary survey of the relevant institutional rules 
would suggest that trial courts — more specifically, their presiding judges — 
should be the ones making the availability determination as part of their statutorily 
prescribed responsibility to distribute business within their courts.  (See Gov. 
Code, § 69508, subd. (a) [vesting presiding judges with the authority to ―distribute 
the business of the court among the judges‖ and to ―prescribe the order of 
business‖]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.603(b)(1)(A) & (B) [authorizing presiding 
judges to ―[a]ssign judges to departments‖ and ―[a]pportion the business of the 
court, including assigning and reassigning cases to departments‖].) 
The proceedings below aptly illustrate this norm.  Rodriguez, invoking his 
statutory right under section 1538.5(p), requested that Judge Chiarello be assigned 
to hear his relitigated suppression motion.  That request was entertained by Judge 
Nadler, who then, as presiding judge, made the determination that Judge Chiarello 
was not available to hear Rodriguez‘s motion because he was in Palo Alto for a 
sentencing calendar.  This chain of events generally comports with how we expect 
a criminal defendant would request that a trial court honor his or her section 
9 
1538.5(p) right.  (See Beck v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 77, 80 [explaining 
that new trial motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 661, which generally 
requires that ― ‗the [same] judge who presided at the trial‖ hear the motion unless 
unable to do so, are ―set for hearing by order of [the trial] court‘ ‖].) 
Such requests arise against the backdrop of trial courts‘ institutional 
decisions to allocate work in accordance with an eclectic range of constraints as 
well as concerns.  Given the existence of different trial courts with different needs 
— in some counties, involving dozens of judges and multiple locations — we have 
emphasized the need for courts to have particularly broad discretion in the exercise 
of such managerial functions.  (See Anderson, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 737 
[describing a presiding judge‘s authority to make ordinary judicial assignments as 
―wholly discretionary‖].)  Yet that managerial authority is not necessarily immune 
from any constraints or review.  In Anderson, for instance, the petitioner had been 
appointed to fill a vacancy on the Alameda County Superior Court, and sought a 
writ of mandate to compel the presiding judge to assign him judicial duties.  (Id. at 
p. 735.)  We held that although the petitioner may not compel the presiding judge 
to assign him judicial duties, the petitioner was nevertheless entitled to require that 
the presiding judge exercise his discretion to determine whether such assignments 
should be made.  (Id. at pp. 735-736.)  A writ of mandate, we explained, is an 
appropriate vehicle for compelling an officer to exercise his or her discretion and 
to do so ―under a proper interpretation of the applicable law.‖  (Id. at p. 737.)  We 
concluded that if the presiding judge‘s refusal to assign court business was based 
on a determination that the petitioner was no longer a judge of the Alameda 
County Superior Court, ―the writ will lie if that determination is erroneous.‖  
(Ibid.; see also Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 356 [Governor‘s 
discretion under Government Code section 8200 to ―appoint notaries in such 
10 
number as he deems necessary‖ did not mean the Legislature left it ―to the whim 
or caprice of the governor as to whether there should be any notaries appointed‖].) 
What these examples indicate is that the authority to determine whether a 
particular judge is available does not plainly fall into a category of unconstrained 
trial court discretion, assuming such a category even exists.  (See Black‘s Law 
Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 565, col. 2 (Black‘s 10th ed.) [defining ―discretion‖ as, 
inter alia, ―[w]ise conduct and management exercised without constraint . . .‖ 
(italics added)].)  Rather, courts‘ discretion to administer their business, in light of 
the right that section 1538.5(p) affords, is more akin to ―judicial discretion,‖ which 
we have long emphasized is subject to appropriate legal constraints.  (See Bailey v. 
Taaffe (1866) 29 Cal. 422, 424 [―The discretion intended, however, is not a 
capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and 
controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles‖]; see also Black‘s 10th ed., at 
p. 565, col. 2 [defining ―judicial discretion‖ as, inter alia, ―[t]he exercise of 
judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under the circumstances and 
guided by the rules and principles of law . . .‖].) 
B.  Discretion in Section 1538.5(p) 
Where, as here, a specific statute affects the extent and nature of a trial 
court‘s discretion, we examine a trial court‘s actions in light of the specific law 
bearing on that discretion.  (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of Southern Cal. 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 [― ‗The scope of discretion always resides in the 
particular law being applied, i.e., in the ―legal principles governing the subject of 
[the] action . . .‖ ‘ ‖].)  As part of that inquiry, we consider whether the trial 
court‘s exercise of discretion is consistent with the statute‘s intended purpose.  
(See Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 
396 [trial court must ―exercise its judicial discretion to accomplish the purposes of 
11 
the law granting such discretion‖].)  This is true even though a trial court may 
have broad discretion under a statute.  (See Williams v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 
47 Cal.3d 195, 204 [trial court abused its discretion by ordering police officer‘s 
reinstatement and excluding his statements from consideration at subsequent 
disciplinary hearings even though the court had ―broad discretion‖ under 
Government Code section 3309.5 to fashion an ―appropriate‖ remedy].) 
Far from being mutually exclusive, then, discretion and statutory 
commands must often coexist.  So our analysis in this case implicates more than 
the aforementioned norm vesting trial courts with substantial managerial 
discretion, and the strong case for deference in matters implicating judicial 
administration.  We must also contend with the substantive content of section 
1538.5(p), the statutory provision that was tailored by the Legislature to fit 
precisely the issue before us. 
We interpret that section by starting, as we must in all problems of statutory 
interpretation, with its text.  (See, e.g., People v. Cottle (2006) 39 Cal.4th 246, 
254.)  When interpreting the text of a specific provision, we consider the language 
of the entire legislative scheme and related statutes in ascertaining the 
Legislature‘s intended purpose.  (See Riverside County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 632.)  In so doing, we ask whether our interpretation, as 
well as its resulting consequences, advances that purpose.  (See People v. Zambia 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 976-977.)  Where the statutory text admits of more than 
one reasonable interpretation, we may also consider various extrinsic aids — 
including the legislative history — to the extent they are helpful in advancing the 
Legislature‘s purpose.  (See Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
1175, 1198.) 
Any reasonable reading of section 1538.5 would recognize that the statute‘s 
purpose — as reflected in its text — includes taking account of the practical 
12 
constraints that would necessarily affect, and to some extent justify, trial court 
discretion.  Such a reading would also recognize the importance that 
subdivision (p) appears to have in the broader structure of section 1538.5, which 
singles out for special treatment suppression motions arising in cases where 
charges are dismissed and refiled following a successful suppression motion.  But 
the statute itself does not settle the precise scope of those constraints by providing 
a definition of the term ―available.‖  Nor does it describe what considerations 
should guide a court‘s determination of whether a judge is or is not available.  So 
the term‘s ordinary meaning is instructive.  (See Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 341, 349 [―In the absence of a statutory definition, we assume that the 
Legislature intended [the term in question] would have its ordinary meaning 
. . .‖].)  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ―available‖ means, inter alia, 
―capable of being made use of, at one‘s disposal, within one‘s reach.‖  (1 Oxford 
English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 812.)  At the time section 1538.5(p) was enacted, 
Black’s defined “available” as follows:  “Suitable; useable; accessible; obtainable; 
present or ready for immediate use.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 135, 
col. 1 (Black’s 6th ed.).) 
Rodriguez would take these definitions to mean that trial courts possess 
only a sliver of discretion in this context.  A judge is unavailable for purposes of 
section 1538.5(p), contends Rodriguez, ―if and only if that judge is no longer a 
judge of the court, due for example to death or retirement, or if the court finds, 
after active consideration of the circumstances surrounding that judge‘s calendar, 
that assigning that judge to hear the motion would occasion an intolerable delay in 
a jury trial or other time-sensitive proceeding.‖  Under this view, a judge who has 
merely been assigned to a different courthouse or division within the county would 
still be available under the statute.  The judge, Rodriguez might say, would still be 
―capable of being made use of.‖  (1 Oxford English Dict., supra, at p. 812, italics 
13 
added.)  The People argue, on the other hand, that a judge is not available within 
the meaning of section 1538.5(p) if the judge is, as a matter of practical 
convenience, unable to take on the motion at the time the request is made.  In other 
words, the People might conclude, an available judge is one who is ―present or 
ready for immediate use.”  (Black’s 6th ed., supra, at p. 135, col. 1, italics added.)  
The trial court has plenary authority to make that determination, according to the 
People. 
But what must be true about a statutory term such as ―available,‖ at least 
under any plausible interpretive approach, is that in this context the term has some 
underlying content.  And that content is difficult to reconcile with a conclusion 
that the trial court‘s discretion in this arena is entirely unconstrained.  In other 
contexts, we have suggested that statutory terms related to a judge‘s availability 
indeed function as a constraint of sorts.  (See Francis v. Superior Court in and for 
Los Angeles County (1935) 3 Cal.2d 19, 27 (Francis) [finding a judge not 
―otherwise unavailable for the purpose of hearing [a new trial] motion‖ under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 661, which generally requires the same judge who 
presided at trial to hear such a motion, when ―[the judge], on the day when the 
motion for a new trial was made before [another judge], was sitting in his 
department and was available for his usual duties‖].)  The Legislature‘s inclusion 
of the word ―available‖ in section 1538.5(p) not only qualifies the defendant‘s 
otherwise mandatory statutory right — that a subsequent suppression motion 
―shall be heard by the same judge‖ who granted the previous one (italics added) 
— but it also suggests a limitation on the institution that must honor that right.  To 
wit:  for a trial court to deny a defendant the opportunity to relitigate a suppression 
motion before the same judge who granted the previous one, the court must find 
that that judge is not available to hear the motion.  Only when such a finding has 
been made can the defendant‘s right be set aside.  It is within this context that the 
14 
trial court may lawfully exercise its discretion.  Ignoring the import of said context 
would risk eliding the entire statutory scheme. 
No such risk was at issue in Anderson.  As explained above, we considered 
in that case whether a writ of mandate could lie to compel a presiding judge to 
assign judicial duties pursuant to Government Code section 69508.  (Anderson, 
supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 735-737.)  In finding the writ could lie, we nonetheless 
observed that the presiding judge‘s authority to ― ‗distribute the business of the 
court among the judges‘ ‖ and to ― ‗prescribe the order of business‘ ‖ under 
Government Code section 69508 was ―wholly discretionary.‖  (Anderson, at 
pp. 736-737 & fn. 2.)  If such language appears to imply that trial courts possess 
even greater discretion to make assignments than what we here acknowledge, it is 
important to recognize that there was no equivalent in Anderson to section 
1538.5(p) and its express command that subsequent suppression motions ―shall be 
heard by the same judge‖ who granted the previous one.  (Cf. Anderson, at p. 737 
[―Government Code section 69508 does not require that a presiding judge assign 
specific matters or any ‗business‘ of the court to a particular judge‖ (italics 
added)].) 
To the extent the meaning of ―available‖ in section 1538.5(p) remains 
unclear — even after taking account of the word‘s ordinary meaning, the cases in 
which we have found discretion to be constrained by statutory terms, and the fact 
that no other statutory provisions dilute its importance — an analysis of the 
legislative history further bolsters the case for interpreting the statute in a manner 
that gives some effect to that term.  We previously described this history in 
Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 805-808, and we do so again here.  (See also 
Barnes v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 631, 638-641; Soil, supra, 55 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 878-880.) 
15 
The sequence of events that led to the enactment of section 1538.5(p) 
appears to have begun with our decision in Schlick v. Superior Court (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 310.  There, we interpreted section 1538.5(d) as precluding the People 
from relitigating a suppression motion that the superior court had granted in a 
felony matter.  (Schlick, at p. 316.)  Although the People were free to dismiss the 
case and refile new charges, they could not relitigate the suppression motion post-
Schlick.  Instead, the initial court‘s ruling would bind any subsequent prosecution.  
(Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 805.) 
In response to Schlick, the Legislature amended section 1538.5 in 1993 by 
revising subdivision (j) and adding subdivision (p).  (Stats. 1993, ch. 761, § 2, 
pp. 4251-4252.)  Section 1538.5(j) now provides that if a suppression motion is 
granted either at the preliminary hearing or in the superior court, resulting in 
dismissal of the action, the prosecution may refile the action, and the previous 
suppression ruling ―shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding, except as 
limited by subdivision (p).‖  At the same time, the Legislature added subdivision 
(p), which, as relevant here, provides:  ―Relitigation of the motion shall be heard 
by the same judge who granted the motion at the first hearing if the judge is 
available.‖ 
It was the Los Angeles County District Attorney (the District Attorney) that 
lobbied for Senate Bill No. 933 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), which resulted in the 
1993 amendments to section 1538.5.  In support of the bill, the District Attorney 
told the Legislature that because prosecutors were overburdened with crushing 
caseloads and suppression motions were often dispositive in criminal matters, 
defendants would (unfairly) get off simply because an overworked prosecutor did 
a poor job of presenting the evidence at the initial hearing.  Prosecutors, argued the 
District Attorney, should therefore get the benefit of a second chance to present 
evidence and respond to the concerns reflected in a suppression motion.  (See 
16 
Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 933 (1993-1994 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 20, 1993, pp. 2-3 [― ‗[S]uperior court calendars are 
crowded.  Deputy district attorneys must juggle many cases each day. . . . [¶] . . . 
[¶] . . . Often, the [motion to suppress evidence] is dispositive of a case.  If it is 
granted, the case must be dismissed.  If it is denied, the defendant will plead guilty 
or in all likelihood be found guilty if brought to trial.  The [District Attorney] 
believes that ‗it is unfair to the prosecution . . . for a criminal defendant whose 
culpability for a serious felony may be beyond question to ―beat the rap‖ simply 
because an overworked prosecutor at one pretrial hearing was unable to present 
the People‘s evidence in the most effective manner.  The ability to refile and 
relitigate the suppression motion . . . will largely overcome this without 
compr[om]ising any constitutional right of the defendant . . .‘ ‖].) 
The result was Senate Bill No. 933 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).  But when 
introduced, the bill had no provision governing which judge should hear relitigated 
suppression motions.  (Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 807.)  It was this omission 
that appears to have prompted the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
(CACJ) to oppose the original bill, which, in CACJ‘s view, ―would allow 
prosecutors to ‗take another shot‘ with another judge after losing a suppression 
motion in superior court‖ and, thus, ―would encourage forum shopping.‖  (Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 933 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) May 11, 
1993, p. 4.)  In response to CACJ‘s concerns, the bill was amended to include a 
statement of the Legislature‘s intended purpose:  ―It is the intent of the 
Legislature, in amending Section 1538.5 of the Penal Code, that this act shall not 
be construed or used by a party as a means to forum shop.‖  (Sen. Bill No. 933 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 1993.)   
The bill was soon amended yet again.  Included in the amended version was 
language modifying proposed subdivision (p) to direct that the judge who granted 
17 
the earlier suppression motion shall hear the relitigated motion if that judge is 
available.  (Sen. Bill No. 933 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 16, 1993.)  
With that language added, the bill passed both houses and was prepared for 
executive signature.  In his cover letter to the Governor, the bill‘s sponsor 
explained that ―[Senate Bill No. 933] prohibits ‗forum shopping‘ by requiring that 
all search and seizure motions in a case be heard by the same judge, if that judge is 
available.‖  (Sen. Kopp, sponsor of Sen. Bill No. 933 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), 
letter to Governor Wilson, Sept. 7, 1993.)4 
This legislative history makes even clearer what can be inferred from a 
close analysis of the statute‘s text and structure:  that the Legislature‘s purpose in 
enacting section 1538.5(p)‘s same judge rule was to prohibit prosecutors from 
engaging in forum shopping — or, more specifically, judge shopping.  (See 
Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 807.)  As we explained in Jimenez, attempts by 
the People ― ‗to direct a case away from a particular court . . . can only be 
described as the very forum shopping the Legislature recognized as a problem and 
attempted to remedy by inserting a prohibition against the evil within [Penal Code] 
section 1538.5, subdivision (p).‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 808.) 
The same judge rule also serves a related institutional purpose:  It ensures 
that prosecutors will have to make their renewed case before a judge already 
familiar with the relevant facts and, more importantly, the bases for the original 
grant.  That judge is in the best position to weigh whatever new evidence or 
arguments the People have brought to bear and test those against his or her reasons 
                                              
4 
Although we may only draw limited inferences from an individual 
legislator‘s letter, we have considered letters expressing the views of a bill‘s 
sponsor to the Governor, where those views are fully consistent with the statutory 
language and purpose.  (See Larkin v. WCAB (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 164 & fn. 10; 
Harrott v. County of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1162 & fn. 4.)  
18 
for granting the previous motion to suppress.  (Cf. Francis, supra, 3 Cal.2d at 
p. 29 [―To have the motion for a new trial heard by a judge familiar with the facts 
and law of the case, rather than by one totally unfamiliar with such facts and who 
has made no special study of the law applicable to those facts, was the very 
essence of section 661 of the Code of Civil Procedure‖].)  This arrangement, the 
Legislature determined, would best protect a defendant‘s constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, while still allowing overworked 
prosecutors a second chance to oppose suppression.  This legislative balancing 
underscores once more how this case, unlike Anderson, requires us to devise a rule 
grounded in a statutory scheme intended to account for a multitude of important 
interests. 
C.  Reasonable, Good Faith Measures 
In light of these purposes and how they were embodied in the statute, we 
generally agree with Rodriguez‘s interpretation.  Although trial courts have 
discretion to determine whether a judge is available within the meaning of section 
1538.5(p), that discretion must be meaningfully cabined to protect the statutory 
right of every defendant, if possible, to have the same judge decide any relitigated 
suppression motion.  To that end, we find that mere inconvenience is not sufficient 
to render a judge unavailable for purposes of section 1538.5(p).  (Cf. People v. 
Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 757, fn. 5 (Arbuckle) [explaining that ―a 
defendant‘s reasonable expectation of having his sentence imposed, pursuant to 
bargain and guilty plea, by the judge who took his plea and ordered sentence 
reports should not be thwarted for mere administrative convenience‖].)   
This is not to say that reviewing courts are now free to second-guess 
judgment calls that are better left to the trial courts.  Trial courts have considerable 
discretion to administer their logistical affairs, and rightly so:  lodged in trial 
19 
courts is likely the contextual knowledge and motivation to deploy judicial 
resources effectively, and to learn over time.  But to adequately protect a 
defendant‘s statutory right under section 1538.5(p), we hold that a trial court must 
take reasonable steps in good faith to ensure that the same judge who granted the 
previous suppression motion is assigned to hear the relitigated motion.  Only if the 
trial court has done so may it make a finding of unavailability.  And the trial court 
must make such a finding on the record, so appellate review proves meaningful.  
(See People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1063-1064; cf. Still v. Pearson (1950) 
96 Cal.App.2d 315, 318 [―when a judge other than the one who presided at the 
trial proceeds to hear the motion for a new trial, it is the best practice, in the 
interests of certainty and convenience, to cause a record to be made reciting the 
fact of the inability or absence of the judge who presided at the trial‖].)  Such a 
finding, unsupported by record evidence demonstrating the reasonable measures a 
trial court has taken to honor a defendant‘s section 1538.5(p) right, is an abuse of 
discretion. 
This standard strikes an appropriate balance:  it reflects the importance of 
the statute‘s provisions and purpose, while taking account of the sensible reasons 
for preserving trial courts‘ discretion.  (Cf. Francis, supra, 3 Cal.2d at p. 28 
[holding that, for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 661, a ―motion for 
the new trial shall be heard and determined whenever practicable by the judge 
who had heard the evidence at the trial of the case, and who was therefore best 
prepared and qualified to pass upon the merits of the motion‖ (italics added)].)  In 
exercising that discretion, trial courts may consider a variety of factors bearing on 
a particular judge‘s availability, including the court‘s resources, the interests of the 
parties, and the interests of litigants in other cases.  But the trial court must do so 
in a manner that is consistent with section 1538.5(p)‘s requirement that, if at all 
practicable, the same judge who granted the defendant‘s previous suppression 
20 
motion shall hear the relitigated one.  And the trial court must take reasonable, 
good faith measures to comply with that requirement. 
This standard is also in line with our previous holdings.  In Arbuckle, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to a plea 
bargain.  (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 752.)  But the judge who had accepted 
the defendant‘s plea was transferred to another department of the superior court, 
so the defendant was sentenced to prison, over his objection, by another judge of 
that court.  (Id. at p. 753.)  We reversed, stating generally that ―whenever a judge 
accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an 
implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge.‖  (Id. at 
pp. 756-757.)  We explained that a defendant‘s reasonable expectation of having 
his sentence imposed by the same judge who took his plea should not yield ―for 
mere administrative convenience.‖  (Id. at p. 757, fn. 5.)  If, however, the original 
judge is truly ―not available‖ for sentencing purposes — say, because it would be 
impracticable for the judge to hand down the sentence — we said the defendant 
must be afforded the option of proceeding before another available judge or of 
withdrawing his plea.  (Ibid.) 
Here, as in Arbuckle, a showing of more than mere inconvenience is 
necessary before a judge can be deemed unavailable.  In fact, section 1538.5(p) 
cases command at least as great a showing of impracticability.  This is so because, 
unlike the defendant in Arbuckle, Rodriguez has no alternative remedy at his 
disposal.  Nothing quite compares, in this case, to allowing a defendant‘s 
withdrawal of his or her guilty plea.  If the same judge does not hear Rodriguez‘s 
relitigated suppression motion, it will be heard by another, just as the People 
intended below. 
Permitting a different judge to hear the suppression motion despite the text 
of section 1538.5(p) –– and without a demonstrated showing of reasonable, good 
21 
faith measures taken –– would risk rendering the statute‘s same judge rule a dead 
letter.  In Jimenez, we considered whether the People could make a judge 
unavailable to hear a relitigated suppression motion by disqualifying that judge 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, which allows a party to 
peremptorily challenge a judge on the basis of prejudice.  (Jimenez, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 801.)  After recounting section 1538.5(p)‘s legislative history, much 
as we did above, we concluded that the Legislature‘s intended purpose in enacting 
section 1538.5(p) was ― ‗to prohibit prosecutors from forum shopping.‖  (Jimenez, 
at p. 807.)  We concluded further that allowing the People to render a judge 
unavailable simply by filing a peremptory challenge ―would permit this prohibited 
forum shopping and ‗essentially eviscerate[] the provisions of subdivision (p)‘ of 
Penal Code section 1538.5.‖  (Ibid.) 
The same is true here.  Although it was the trial court in this case, not the 
People, that concluded Judge Chiarello was unavailable by virtue of his 
assignment to the Palo Alto courthouse, the People repeatedly opposed 
Rodriguez‘s requests for Judge Chiarello to hear his subsequent motion to 
suppress.  Such opposition suggests the People may have preferred that someone 
other than Judge Chiarello decide the relitigated suppression motion; the presiding 
judge‘s ruling enabled that preference.  Allowing modest administrative 
inconvenience to trump concerns about forum shopping would frustrate the 
statutory purpose plainly evident in the text and legislative history of section 
1538.5(p).  (See Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 808.)   
The Court of Appeal‘s decision in People v. Roberts (2010) 184 
Cal.App.4th 1149 (Roberts) addresses a different issue.  Section 629.60 requires 
that once a judge has issued an order authorizing a wiretap, periodic reports about 
the wiretap ―shall‖ be submitted ―to the judge who issued the order.‖  In Roberts, 
one judge had authorized a wiretap on the defendant‘s cell phone, but some of the 
22 
reports required by section 629.60 were submitted to a different judge for review, 
in violation of the statute.  (Roberts, at p. 1183.)  The Court of Appeal found that 
this error did not warrant reversal, however, because ―we do not believe the 
requirement the report be signed only by the judge that issued the authorization 
order plays a central role in the statutory scheme.‖  (Id. at p. 1185.) 
Here, by contrast, section 1538.5(p)‘s requirement that a subsequent 
suppression motion be heard by the same judge who granted the previous motion 
plays a critical role in the statutory scheme.  That is the very statutory scheme that 
abrogated Schlick by allowing prosecutors to dismiss a case, refile it, and then 
relitigate anew any subsequently filed motion to suppress.  The same judge rule 
was adopted precisely because of concerns that this new scheme would also permit 
prosecutors to forum shop.  To guard against that ill, the Legislature inserted the 
same judge requirement in section 1538.5(p).  (Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 807-808.)  Unlike in this case, moreover, the main purpose of the wiretap 
statute at issue in Roberts — to ―limit[] unnecessary interception of wire and oral 
communications‖ (Roberts, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185) — can still be 
served even when a different judge reviews the required reports.  We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeal below that Roberts is inapposite. 
D.  Abuse of Discretion 
Applying our rule to the facts here, we conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion. 
The ineluctable realities of life sometimes mean that the judge designated 
by statute to hear a suppression motion has died, retired, resigned, or lacks the 
capacity to undertake his or her duty.  This is not such a case.  (Cf. Telefilm, Inc. v. 
Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1949) 33 Cal.2d 289, 292 
[explaining that ―a variety of contingencies‖ can render a judge unable to hear a 
23 
new trial motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 661, including ―death or 
the happening of an equally significant event in life affecting his continued 
performance of his judicial duties, such as expiration of his term of office, 
resignation or retirement from service, disqualification, as well as some physical 
or mental disorder‖].)  Indeed, Judge Chiarello ultimately presided over 
Rodriguez‘s bench trial. 
What happened instead is Rodriguez properly requested that Judge 
Chiarello be assigned to hear the relitigated suppression motion, and Judge Nadler, 
the presiding judge, denied the request without taking reasonable steps to comply 
with section 1538.5(p).  In October 2011, Judge Nadler indicated that he did not 
agree the motion needed to be heard by Judge Chiarello, and that, in any event, 
Judge Chiarello was unavailable because he had been transferred to another 
division up the road in Palo Alto.  The record does not show Judge Nadler ever 
attempted to contact Judge Chiarello, or that he inquired as to when Judge 
Chiarello might be available to hear Rodriguez‘s motion.  This failure to take 
reasonable measures to honor Rodriguez‘s statutory right was an abuse of 
discretion. 
Rodriguez contends that this error was prejudicial because the same facts 
were presented in the second case as were presented to Judge Chiarello in the first 
case, and ―[t]here is no reason to suppose that Judge Chiarello would have 
analyzed them any differently the second time he heard the suppression motion 
than he did the first time.‖  The People do not dispute that the same facts were 
presented in each case.  What they assert instead is that the second judge 
―reasonably denied the defense motion to suppress evidence,‖ citing only the 
conclusion of the Court of Appeal that substantial evidence supported the second 
judge‘s finding of voluntary consent to the search. 
24 
But the fact that substantial evidence could conceivably support the second 
judge‘s conclusion that consent was lawfully obtained does not imply that Judge 
Chiarello would have altered his interpretation of the circumstances in which the 
officers entered the home and took Rodriguez‘s computer.  Nor does it establish 
that Judge Chiarello‘s ruling, based on his interpretation of the evidence, was 
erroneous.  Indeed, the justification underlying section 1538.5(p) is the value of 
consistency in this very context:  the same judge who granted the previous 
suppression motion must hear the relitigated motion because it is that judge who is 
best suited to weigh whatever new evidence or arguments the prosecution has 
brought to bear and test those against his or her reasons for granting the prior 
motion.  We risk undermining precisely the statutory scheme we are charged with 
interpreting by trying to reconstruct, in the abstract, what Judge Chiarello might 
have done if presented with the same evidence and arguments the prosecution 
offered to the second judge. 
For these reasons, we agree with Rodriguez that it is reasonably probable 
he would have achieved a more favorable ruling had Judge Chiarello heard the 
relitigated suppression motion.  (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836.)  And because the prosecution of Rodriguez depended on the images and 
video footage seized from his desktop computer, along with the incriminating 
statements he made to police during the execution of the subsequent search 
warrant, it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to Rodriguez would have 
obtained absent the trial court‘s abuse of discretion.  (See ibid.)  So the lower 
court‘s error, we conclude, was prejudicial.5   
                                              
5 
If a defendant immediately seeks review by writ of a trial court‘s decision 
not to send a relitigated suppression motion to the judge who granted the previous 
one, the only issue will be whether the record establishes that the trial court took 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
25 
So we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  We remand the case 
with directions that the Court of Appeal instruct the trial court to determine, on the 
record, whether Judge Chiarello is now available to hear Rodriguez‘s relitigated 
suppression motion.  And if Judge Chiarello is available, section 1538.5(p) 
requires that he hear the motion. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
reasonable steps in good faith to ensure the same judge heard the relitigated 
motion.  The defendant will not be required to establish a reasonable probability 
that the original judge would grant the suppression motion a second time.  Prompt 
resolution of the issue by writ review may prevent the waste of resources on a trial 
that results in a judgment that must be reversed, as occurred in this case. 
26 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The same judge requirement in section 1538.5(p) does not eliminate an 
important measure of discretion vested in the trial court and its presiding judge to 
handle matters of judicial availability.  Yet because judicial discretion and 
statutory commands routinely coexist, trial courts must use that discretion to 
determine whether a judge is available within the meaning of section 1538.5(p) 
only in accordance with the constraints imposed by the statute‘s text and purpose. 
Before a trial court (or its presiding judge) can declare a judge unavailable, it must 
take reasonable, good faith measures to ensure that the same judge who granted 
the previous suppression motion is assigned to hear the relitigated motion.  Any 
finding of unavailability must also be made on the record.  The trial court‘s failure 
to meet that standard constituted prejudicial error.  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the case with 
directions that the Court of Appeal instruct the trial court to determine on the 
record, consistent with our analysis here, whether Judge Chiarello is now available 
to hear Rodriguez‘s relitigated suppression motion. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment and join in the court‘s conclusion that a presiding 
judge must take reasonable steps in good faith to ensure that the same judge who 
granted an earlier suppression motion is assigned to hear the relitigated 
suppression motion.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  However, I disagree with two 
aspects of the majority‘s analysis.   
The majority states that cases involving the ―same judge‖ rule of Penal 
Code section 1538.5, subdivision (p) (section 1538.5(p)), ―command at least as 
great a showing of impracticability‖ as was required in People v. Arbuckle (1978) 
22 Cal.3d 749.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  Arbuckle is analytically different.  We 
did not find, there, that a presiding judge had discretion to assign a defendant‘s 
sentencing hearing to a different judge from the one who accepted his plea 
agreement.  Nor did we establish a threshold level of impracticability that would 
justify such an assignment.  Arbuckle was based on a contract enforcement 
analysis.  The defendant agreed to plead guilty upon the implied assurance he 
would be sentenced by a certain judge.  If circumstances arose which prevented 
the honoring of that condition, the contract was breached.  The remedy thus 
available was to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea and return the parties to 
the status quo ante.   
To be sure, we can conclude that a judge‘s transfer to another division of a 
superior court should not thwart a defendant‘s statutory right to have the same 
2 
judge hear his relitigated suppression motion.  However, the suggestion that an 
equal or greater degree of impracticability must be shown in these cases than in 
Arbuckle is perplexing, because we did not find in Arbuckle that any degree of 
impracticability would excuse a presiding judge‘s assignment of a sentencing 
hearing to a different judge. 
The majority also compares the district attorney‘s action here to that of the 
prosecution in People v. Superior Court (Jimenez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798.  There, 
the prosecution attempted to render a judge unavailable to hear the defendant‘s 
relitigated suppression motion by disqualifying that judge under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 170.6.  (Jimenez, at p. 802.)  If permitted, the prosecution‘s 
actions would have divested the presiding judge of the discretion to determine the 
relevant judge‘s availability.  Here, the prosecution argued that section 1538.5(p) 
did not compel the presiding judge to assign defendant‘s relitigated suppression 
motion to Judge Chiarello for a variety of reasons.  But the discretion to determine 
Judge Chiarello‘s availability remained at all times with the presiding judge.  The 
two situations are quite different.  Although the standard the court announces 
today certainly would honor the same judge rule, the prosecution‘s actions here 
were not comparable to those in Jimenez.   
With those reservations, I join the majority.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rodriguez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 231 Cal.App.4th 288 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S223129 
Date Filed: August 22, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Vincent J. Chiarello 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jonathan E. Berger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Victoria Hobel Schultz, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Seth K. Schalit 
and René A. Chacón, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jonathan E. Berger 
1415 Fulton Road, #205-170 
Santa Rosa, CA  95403 
(707) 206-6649 
 
René A. Chacón 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5957