Case Title: Board of Nursing v. Nechay

Citation: 347 Md. 396

Docket Number: 112/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
   No. 112
  
September Term, 1996
__________________________________________
MARYLAND BOARD OF NURSING
V.
     NANCY NECHAY
__________________________________________
           Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
        * Karwacki
Raker
Wilner
JJ.
__________________________________________
          OPINION BY BELL, C.J.
__________________________________________
      Filed:   October 15, 1997                 
        
* Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and the adoption of this
opinion.
Md. Code (1981, 1994 Repl. Vol.1997 Cum.  Supp.) Title 8 of the Health
1
Occupations Article provides, inter alia, for the creation and duties  of the State Board of
Nursing, the State regulatory agency, §8-201, et seq., and the licensing of registered
nurses.  § 8-301et seq.  Unless otherwise indicated, all future references will be to that
Act. 
 Section 8-316 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[s]ubject to the hearing
2
provisions of §8-317,  the Board may... reprimand any licensee... or suspend or revoke
the license of a licensee if the... licensee :
*    *   *
(5) Willfully and knowingly
(i) files a false report or record of an individual under the licensee’s care;
                                                                  *   *   *
(8) Does an act that is inconsistent with generally accepted professional standards   
          in the practice of registered nursing or licensed practical nursing....”
                                                                 
The issue that this case presents for our resolution is whether one circuit court judge,
acting within thirty days after the entry of an order by another member of that circuit court
is empowered by Md. Code (1977, 1995 Replacement Vol.) §6-408 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Article, and Md. Rule 2-535 to revise, alter, or amend that order, notwithstanding that no
timely motion to revise has been filed by a party to the action.
This appeal had its genesis in a complaint received by the petitioner, the  Maryland
Board of Nursing, (hereafter “the Board”), concerning Nancy Nechay, the respondent, a
registered nurse whom it licensed .   Following an  investigation,  the Board charged the
1
respondent with filing “a false report or record of an individual under [the respondent’s]
care,” and committing an “act that is inconsistent with generally accepted professional
standards in the practice of registered nursing.”    Rather than taking the charges to a
2
The respondent consented to the Order by executing a form of consent which appeared
3
immediately after the Order:
CONSENT
By this Consent, I hereby admit the truth of the Findings of  Fact, and
accept and submit to the foregoing Order.   I acknowledge the validity of the
Order as if made after a hearing in which I would have had the right to counsel, to
confront witnesses, to give testimony, to call witnesses on my own behalf and to
all other substantive and procedural protections provided by law.   I also recognize
that I waive all such rights.
I sign this Order after having the opportunity to consult with an attorney,
without reservation, and I fully understand its meaning.  
The findings of fact described the conduct in which the respondent engaged as occurring
4
when she worked in the cardiac surgery unit at St. Joseph’s Hospital and involving her failure to
assess a patient for breath sounds in an appropriate manner and falsely recording the time at which
she assessed a patient’s productive cough and an admission that she did not have sufficient clinical
background successfully to work in the cardiac surgery unit.
That section provides:
5
(b) If, after a hearing under § 8-317 of this subtitle, the Board finds that
there are grounds under subsection (a) of this section to suspend or revoke a
license to practice registered nursing or licensed practical nursing, to
reprimand a licensee, or place a licensee on probation, the Board may
impose a penalty not exceeding $5,000 instead of or in addition to
suspending or revoking the license, reprimanding the licensee, or placing
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hearing,  the parties agreed to a Consent Order , in which the respondent admitted the §8-
3
316(a)(8) violation  and the  Board dismissed the §8-316(a)(5) violation. The order was
4
incorporated into the Board’s Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order.    After
reciting the facts necessary to sustain the admission and setting forth its conclusions of law,
the Board “ORDERED that the license of Nancy Nechay an individual licensed to practice
REGISTERED NURSING is hereby REPRIMANDED.”  
A reprimand is one of the final orders that, pursuant to §8-316(b),  the Board is
5
the licensee on probation.
(f)(1) "Public record" means the original or any copy of any documentary material
6
that:
         (i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political
subdivision or received by the unit or 
      instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business;  and
      (ii) is in any form, including:
      1. a card;
      2. a computerized record;
      3. correspondence;
      4. a drawing;
      5. film or microfilm;
      6. a form;
      7. a map;
      8. a photograph or photostat;
      9. a recording;  or
      10. a tape.
 Under §10-617(h)(2)(vi), “[a] custodian shall permit inspection of the part of a
7
public record that gives ... any orders and findings that result from formal disciplinary
actions.”
Pursuant to §8-316(d), revocations and suspensions are required to be treated
8
somewhat differently.   That section provides:
 (d) The Board shall file a notice for publication in the earliest publication
of the Maryland Register of each revocation or suspension of a license
under this section within 24 hours of the revocation or suspension.
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authorized to issue.   Such orders are public records as defined by Md. Code (1957, 1995
Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) §10-611(f)(1)  of the State Govt. Article which, as prescribed
6
by §10-617(h)(2)(vi), may be disclosed.    Those orders are published, as is the Board’s
7
standard practice,  in the Communicator, the Board’s newsletter .   Aware of the practice and
8
her request that the Board not publish her reprimand in the Communicator having been
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rejected on the grounds that a reprimand is a public document, that it was an appropriate
sanction for the case, and that withholding publication would set an inappropriate precedent,
the respondent filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a Complaint for Injunctive
Relief, asking that court to pass “An order that the Maryland Board of Nursing must not
publish the order of reprimand regarding the actions of Nancy Nechay on August 3, 1991 and
August 17, 1991.”   She also filed a Motion for Ex Parte Injunction seeking immediate
injunctive relief in order to maintain the status quo until a hearing on the merits could  be
had.   The Board responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary
Judgment, to which the respondent filed an answer challenging the Board’s entitlement to
both dismissal of the complaint and summary judgment.
A hearing, at which arguments were presented,  was conducted by the motions judge,
the Hon. Thomas Ward.   He subsequently entered an order denying the Board’s motion for
summary judgment and prohibiting it from publishing the reprimand.   More specifically, the
order provided:
1.   The Maryland Board of Nursing is charged with notice of Maryland Code
Ann. Health Occ. §8-316 and Maryland Code Ann. State Government §10-
617.
2.   Pursuant to Maryland Code Ann. Health Occ.§8-316(26)(d) and Maryland
Code Ann. State Government§10-617(h)(2)(vi) the Maryland Board of
Nursing is prohibited from publishing the findings of reprimand against Nancy
Nechay signed on November 28, 1994.
3.   The publication of the finding of reprimand against Nancy Nechay signed
on November 28, 1994 would be an invasion of her right to privacy as there
is no public interest in the publication of the order of reprimand.
There were two scheduling notices, one printed May 2, 1995 and the other printed
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May 23, 1995.   Only the first notice contained the notation “INT INJNCTN.”   
-5-
4. The statutes are clear and unambiguous and speak only to the publication
of revocation and suspension of licenses where there is a public interest in
knowing the names of those who are unable to practice in their profession.  
After the hearing on the Board’s motion had been scheduled, but before it had actually
occurred, the respondent had filed an Amended Complaint For Interlocutory Relief.   Its
effort to realize an early victory having failed, the Board answered the amended complaint.
Thereafter, within 30 days of the entry of Judge Ward’s order, as instructed by a scheduling
notice issued by the City Clerk’s office, the parties appeared before another judge of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, this time the Hon. Mabel Houze Hubbard.   According to
the scheduling notice, the case was “Scheduled for Motion Hearing - Fast Track (Categories
B, D - INT INJNCTN[)].”     Judge Hubbard’s opening comments put into perspective what
9
was to occur at that hearing and why:
As I understand it Mr. Bouse, you believed the case was over, that it
had been decided by Judge Ward based on his May 3 , 1995 order, after he
rd
says he considered the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or any alternative
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff’s response and arguments that he
heard on April 27 , 1995.  The original complaint, docketed to be heard on the
th
merits  in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for June 6, 1995 was not
removed from the docket. 
Based on all of that information says Judge Ward in his order, he
denied the Defendant’s motions, that is that Motion to Dismiss, or in the
alternative, the Motion for Summary Judgment.   And he made further orders,
and his further orders include a prohibition to the Maryland Board of Nursing
for publishing the findings of a reprimand against Ms. Nechay, that reprimand
having been signed on November 28 , 1994.
th
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Judge Ward indicated further that the publication of the finding of
reprimand would be an invasion of Ms. Nechay’s right to privacy as there’s no
public interest in the publication of the order of reprimand.   And finally,
Judge Ward found and says in his order that the statutes are clear, and
unambiguous and speak only to the publication of revocation and suspension
of licenses where there’s a public interest in knowing the names of those who
are unable to practice in their profession.
Kind of an unusual order, but it clearly is his opinion as stated.    The
Court is eager to hear from both sides as to whether or not Judge Ward’s order
is a final decision as to the merits of this case. 
    
After a vigorous argument as to the finality of the order, Judge Hubbard inclined toward the
view espoused by the Board, ruling that she was not convinced that it was “a complete and
final order as to permanent injunction.”    She also observed that “Judge Ward had before
him a Motion for Summary Judgment which he denied.   And that means to me that the
matter should go on for the trier of fact, if you please, to make a determination.”
Judge Hubbard conducted a full trial on the merits.   At the conclusion of that trial,
she found as a fact that there are no Maryland code provisions which preclude or prohibit
the Board’s practice of publishing reprimands.    That being so, Judge Hubbard denied the
respondent’s prayer for an injunction.
The Respondent successfully appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.   In an
unreported opinion, a majority of the panel held that Judge Ward entered a final judgment
which terminated the dispute between the parties and that, by finding that order interlocutory
and conducting a hearing on the merits, Judge Hubbard erred.    As to the latter point, the
majority explained:
Importantly, the circuit court, in conducting such further proceedings, was not
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sua sponte acting in a capacity to revise or modify the May 3, 1995 order. 
Indeed, the Board never sought to have the order revised, nor did the Board
object to the order’s terms or scope.   Thus, the circuit court proceeded on the
mistaken ground that more was necessary to be determined in the case.   In
other words, the events following the May 3, 1995 order were not proceedings
for the purpose of revising that order, but were proceedings conducted on a
mistaken belief that the issue of permanent injunctive relief remained
undecided.
Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court did not reach the issue that we granted
certiorari to consider, whether Judge Hubbard was authorized to revise the judgment entered
by Judge Ward.
The issue in this case is the “jurisdiction” of the circuit court, in the person of Judge
Hubbard, to enter a  judgment denying the relief requested by Nechay.   Our cases make
clear that, because its meaning depends upon the context and circumstances in which it is
used, the word “jurisdiction” is equivocal. Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497, 507, 141 A.2d
176, 182 (1958).    Indeed, we long have recognized that “Juridically, jurisdiction refers to
two quite distinct concepts: (i) the power of a court to render a valid decree, and (ii) the
propriety of granting  the relief sought.”  Id. (Citing 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th
ed. 1941), §§ 129-31); First Federated Commodity Trust Corp. v. Commissioner of
Securities for Maryland, 272 Md. 329, 334, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974).    See   Kaouris v.
Kaouris, 324 Md. 687, 708, 598 A.2d 1193, 1203 (1991).    The former concept involves
jurisdiction in its fundamental sense. McAllister, 216 Md. at 507, 141 A.2d at 182.   We
explicated the concept in Kaouris, 324 Md. at 708-09, 598 A.2d at 1203, as follows:
Whether a court has fundamental jurisdiction, i.e., the power, to decide a
matter, must be determined by looking to "the applicable constitutional and
-8-
statutory pronouncements," First Federated Com. Tr., 272 Md. at 335, 322
A.2d at 543, because fundamental jurisdiction involves the power, or
authority, of a court to render a valid final judgment.  Stewart v. State, 287
Md. 524, 526, 413 A.2d 1337, 1338 (1980).   It is a court's "power to act with
regard to a subject matter ... 'conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court, and is to be sought for in the   general nature of its
powers, or in authorities specially conferred.' "  Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406,
416, 412 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1980), quoting Cooper v. Reynolds' Lessee, 77
U.S.  (10 Wall), 308, 316, 19 L.Ed. 931 (1870).   See First Federated Com.
Tr., 272 Md. at 335, 322 A.2d at 543 ("If by that law which defines the
authority of the court, a judicial body is given the power to render a judgment
over that class of cases within which a particular one falls, then its action
cannot be assailed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.");  Medical
Examiners v. Steward, 207 Md. 108, 111, 113 A.2d 426, 427 (1955)
(Fundamental jurisdiction exists when the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties.);  Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. at 507-08, 141
A.2d at 182 ("[J]urisdiction over the person and the subject matter goes to the
very basic power of the equity court."  (Emphasis in the original)).
“On the other hand, the question of whether it was appropriate to grant the relief merges into
the final decree and cannot thereafter be successfully assailed for that reason once enrolled.”
First Federated Com. Tr., 272 Md. at 334, 322 A.2d at 543 (citing Steinpreis v. Leet, 240
Md. 212, 213 A.2d 555 (1965)).
Thus, “[i]t is only when the court lacks the power to render a decree, for example
because the parties are not before the court, as being improperly served with process, or
because the court is without authority to pass upon the subject matter involved in the dispute,
that its decree is void.” Id.  See also Stewart, 287 Md. at 526, 413 A.2d at 1338; McAllister,
216 Md. at 509-10, 141 A.2d at  183; Fooks' Executors v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 619 , 192
A.782, 785-786, cert. denied, sub nom., 302 U.S. 726, 58 S.Ct. 47 , 82 L.Ed. 561 (1937). 
 Moreover, “[t]here is a wide distinction between the lack of jurisdiction to decide a given
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case, and the improper or irregular exercise of a power which, while within the general
jurisdiction of the court, under its established practice, is not applicable to the facts in respect
to which it is exerted.” Ghingher, 172 Md. at 624, 192 A. at 787.    Once a court acquires
fundamental jurisdiction of a case, any judgment that it renders in that case “is not
invalidated because of an [alleged] improper exercise of that jurisdiction.”  Parks v. State,
287 Md. 11, 19, 410 A.2d 597, 602 (1980).   Rather than rendering the judgment void, such
exercise merely renders it voidable. Brown v. Baer, 291 Md. 377, 387, 435 A.2d 96, 101
(1981); Block v. State, 286 Md. 266, 273-74, 407 A.2d 320, 324 (1979); Ghingher, 172 Md.
at 623, 192 A. at 787.
No issue is presented by either party as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court over the
parties; indeed, none could have been raised on that score.   The respondent’s contention is
that the court, acting through Judge Hubbard, did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.   The Board, noting that the second circuit court order, the one issued by Judge
Hubbard, and which denied the respondent injunctive relief,  occurred within thirty days of
the circuit court order, granting it, the one issued by Judge Ward, counters with the argument
that the court’s, and so Judge Hubbard’s jurisdiction derives, without question, from §6-408
and Rule 2-535.    In that regard, it argues, “[u]nder the plain language of ... §6-408 and
Maryland Rule 2-535(a), Judge Hubbard had full ‘revisory power and control over the
judgment’ and complete authority to act as she did.”
Section 6-408 provides:
For a period of 30 days after the entry of a judgment, or thereafter
-10-
pursuant to motion filed within that period, the court has revisory power and
control over the judgment. After the expiration of that period the court has
revisory power and control over the judgment only in case of fraud, mistake,
irregularity, or failure of an employee of the court or of the clerk’s office to
perform a duty required by statute or rule.
Addressing the same subject and along the same lines, Rule 2-535(a) states:
(a) Generally. - On motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of
judgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the
judgment and, if the action was tried before the court, may take any action that
it could have taken under Rule 2-534.
The first sentence of the statute and §(a) of the Rule differ in that the Rule may be read as
conditioning the court’s exercise of its revisory power during the 30 day period on the filing
of a motion for that purpose by a party, while the statute is silent on that point.    The
respondent relies on that difference in arguing that, since neither party filed a motion to
revise or modify the first circuit court order, Judge Hubbard was not authorized to issue the
second.   That is not, however, the thrust of our cases on this subject nor the intent of the
Court in promulgating the Rule.
The Committee note to Rule 2-535 states clearly that “This section is intended to be
as comprehensive as Code, Courts Article §6-408.”   This suggests strongly that when the
Court adopted the Rule, it did not intend that the rule supercede the statute or even contradict
it; rather, it intended that they be read together, complementing or supplementing each other.
  This is consistent with the teachings of our cases with respect to the power of circuit courts
to revise or modify their judgments.    In that regard, it is well settled in this State that, “Read
together, the rules, the statute and our decisions boil down to a dictate that for a period of
-11-
thirty days from the entry of a law or equity  judgment a circuit court shall have ‘unrestricted
discretion’ to revise it.” Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 13, 485 A.2d 250, 252 (1984)(quoting
Maryland Lumber v. Savoy Construction Co., 286 Md. 98, 102, 405 A.2d 741, 743 (1979)).
  We recently reiterated the point in Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 313, 648 A.2d
439, 444 (1994).   Moreover, in  Eshelman Motors v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 301, 189 A.2d
818, 819 (1963), we stated that the discretion reposed in the trial court "is a discretion which
must be exercised liberally, lest technicality triumph over justice."    To the same effect is
Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 558,451 A.2d 658, 663 (1982).    See Henley v. Prince
George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 328, 503 A.2d 1333, 1337 (1986), in which this Court
stated, quoting J.B. Corporation v. Fowler, 258 Md. 432, 434-36, 265 A.2d 876, 877-78
(1970), in turn quoting Clarke Baridon v. Union Co., 218 Md. 480, 483, 147 A.2d 221, 222-
23 (1958), whether the court entertained a reasonable doubt that justice had not been done
is an appropriate basis for the exercise of that discretion.    See also Int’l-Industrial
Developers, Ltd. v. Berg, 269 Md. 250, 251, 305 A.2d 121, 122 (1973).
The exercise of the court’s discretion is not triggered exclusively, our cases make
clear, by a motion filed by one of the parties.    The court may act to revise its judgment sua
sponte. Yarema v. Exxon, 305 Md. 219, 241, 503 A.2d 239, 250 (1986);  Scott  v. State, 223
Md. 376, 381, 164 A.2d 716 (1960).  See also Goins v. State, 293 Md 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550,
557(1982).   In  Yarema, acting pursuant to a motion filed within 30 days after entry of the
judgment, the court modified the judgment and one of the parties appealed, filing the notice
within 30 days of the modification, but more than 30 days of the original judgment. We held
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that the appeal was timely, reasoning that “when a motion under Rule 2-535(a) to revise a
final judgment is filed within thirty days and the circuit court in fact revises the judgment,
and there has been no intervening order of appeal, the prior judgment loses its finality and
the revised judgment becomes the effective final judgment in the case.” Id. at 241, 503 A.2d
at 250.    We went on to say that, as the court can act sua sponte to revise a judgment under
Rule 2-535, the same result obtains when the circuit court sua sponte revises the judgment
within thirty days.  Id at 241.   In so concluding, the Court pointed out that the court’s power
to revise a judgment within the time prescribed by the rules is “inherent.”  Id., citing Ayre
v. State, 291 Md. 155, 160, 433 A.2d 1150, 1193 (1981); Owen v. Freeman, 279 Md. 241,
245-46, 367 A.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1977).  
 
We made very clear in Scott, that a trial judge has discretionary control over his or
her decision during the term in which it is rendered.   Thus, the Court reversed a trial court’s
judgment when it became apparent that the court’s erroneous belief that it could not revise
its decision, coupled with other irregularities, resulted in the denial of the defendant’s ability
to prosecute his motion for new trial. 223 Md. at 381, 164 A. 2d. at 719.
 Although it involved the 180 day rule and the interplay between Maryland Code
(1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.)Article 27,  §591 and former Maryland Rule 746,  Goins is
instructive, as it provides the rationale for why, in a case such as the one sub judice, a mere
reference in the rule to “motion” can not deprive the court of the power to act sua sponte. 
 293 Md. at 111, 442 A.2d. at 557.    In that case, this Court granted certiorari to determine
 Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, §591 provided:
10
(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a
criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of
counsel or the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal
matter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of
the Circuit Court of the criminal court of Baltimore City in which the
matter is pending shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date shall
be not later than 180 days from the date of the arraignment of the person
accused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused,
whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter shall
not be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving party and
only with the permission of the administrative judge of the court where the
matter is pending.
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized
to establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the
implementation of this section in the criminal court of Baltimore City and
in the various circuit courts throughout the State of Maryland.
Maryland Rule 746, present Rule 4- 576, provided:
a. General Provision.
 Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the
first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a
trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the
appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before
the court pursuant to Rule 723.
b. Change of Trial Date.
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for
good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge designated by
him may grant a change of trial date.
 
 
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if, applying § 591 and Rule 746,  there had been an impermissible delay in bringing the
10
defendant to trial.   Section 591 required simply that the date within the 180-day limit for
trying a criminal case “shall not be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving
-14-
party.”    Rule 746, like Rule 2-535, was worded differently,  providing that the
postponement may be granted upon “motion of a party.” Goins  argued that neither the
statute nor the Rule was complied with since there was no motion for postponement as they
both required.   This Court rejected that argument and instead opined:
Except as limited by statute or rule, a trial court has inherent authority to
control its own docket. A rule authorizing a litigant to file a procedural motion
for this purpose in one respect or another should not be construed to prohibit
the court from accomplishing the same object sua sponte unless such
construction is compelled by clear language.” 
Id.   Stated differently, that a negative inference may be drawn from the Rule and statute
does not suffice to preclude the court from acting sua sponte. Link v. Wabash Railroad
Company, 370 U.S. 626, 630, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388, 8 L.Ed.2d 734, 1388-89, (1962).   This
rationale applies, if anything, more forcefully to the interplay between § 6-408 and Rule 2-
535(a). 
Before the Court of Special Appeals, the respondent argued that “since the circuit
court granted total relief by its May 3, 1995 order [the order issued by Judge Ward], there
was nothing more for the circuit court to do and, therefore, this Court was the appropriate
forum for ‘overruling’ the May 3, 1995 order.”   The intermediate appellate court agreed
with that position.    Thus, as we have seen, it held that Judge Ward’s order was a final order,
which adjudicated all of the issues between the parties and that Judge Hubbard erred in
determining that further proceedings were necessary.   Furthermore, it opined,  “the circuit
court, in conducting such further proceedings, was not sua sponte acting in a capacity to
revise or modify the May 3, 1995 order,” rather, it, in the person of Judge Hubbard,
The respondent asserts that “the clerk’s docketing of Judge Ward’s final order
11
divested Judge Hubbard of jurisdiction over the case.”   She relies on Carroll v. Housing
Opportunities Comm’n, 306 Md. 515, 520, 910 A.2d 540, 542 (1986).    All that case
stands for is that a final judgment terminates the action in the court in which it is entered;
it does not even suggest that a docket entry, which, by the way, is not held out as
divesting every judge on the court of jurisdiction - the respondent pointedly
acknowledges that Judge Ward could have revised the judgment - may divest a judge of
jurisdiction even before the expiration of the revisory period.
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proceeded on the mistaken premise that permanent injunctive relief remained an issue.
By so holding, the Court of Special Appeals failed to recognize and thus give effect
to the jurisdiction conferred on the circuit court by §6-408 and Rule 2-535(a).    The court’s
jurisdiction exists, or not, by virtue of those provisions, not by  whether the judge exercising
it does so for the right or wrong reason; it is not dependent on the basis that a particular
judge might give for its exercise.    Inasmuch as the statute and the rule gives the court broad
discretion to revise its judgment for 30 days, Judge Hubbard was fully authorized to do what
she did - she  acted within 30 days of the entry of the Judge Ward order. And, whether
intended as a modification or revision, or not, when that action results in the change of a
prior order, it supercedes that order and, therefore, it does not matter on what theory that
change occurred, so long as jurisdiction resided in the court effecting the change. See
Yarema, 305 Md. at  240-41, 530 A.2d at 250.    Nor does the fact that the order was a final
order affect the result.    Though the order may have disposed of all issues between the
parties, leaving nothing more for the circuit court to do, it still remained subject to that
court’s broad discretion to revise for 30 days.   Again, the revision of the order occurred
within the revisory period, albeit by a judge other than the judge who entered it .
11
The order of December 2, 1853, suspended the execution of the judgment.  Therefore,
12
the decision of  Judge Price was valid, as it did not run afoul of any statutory time limitations on
enrolled judgments.
-16-
Robinson v.  Commissioners   12 Md. 132 (1858) speaks to the power of a second
judge to rule on a decree of a previous judge of the same court.  It is a slave valuation case.
On November 23, 1853, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, George Brown, the slave,
was tried and found guilty of larceny.  Judge Constable directed  that George Brown should
be sold as a slave for life, by the sheriff of the county, to some person that would remove him
from the state.  Judge Constable then valued George Brown at $600. On December 2, 1853,
the commissioners filed a petition, asking the court to suspend and reconsider the judgment.
They  argued that Brown’s valuation was  excessive, and, noting that Brown was diseased
and crippled, that Judge Constable must have acted on the basis of misinformation.   Judge
Constable granted the  petition, and Brown was imprisoned until the court could re-value
him.  On November 29, 1855,   a different judge, Judge Price ordered that Brown be sold,
12
and the order went on to say:
 “[T]he court, upon proof and personal visit and examination of said negro,
values said negro, George Brown, at the sum of $400 , to be paid to the owners
of said negro, and the court further directs, that if said negro produces, on sale,
more than $400, that the excess over $400, which said negro may produce on
such sale, be paid to his owners, in addition to said $400.” 
12 Md. at 139.  Appellees argued that not even  Judge Constable had the authority to revise
or reconsider the valuation, or to pass any order for such a purpose, on December 2, 1853,
but that, admitting Judge Constable had the authority, his successor could not in any manner
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change or modify the first valuation.  This Court rejected the first argument, stating, “It has
been long settled, as a general rule, that during the entire term in which a judgment is
rendered in a court of record, the judgment is under the control of the court, and liable to be
stricken out, altered, or amended, unless such general authority is limited or restricted by
some positive rule.”  Id. at 141.  We found no such limitation or restriction in that case.   As
to the argument that only Judge Constable had the authority to change the valuation, this
Court held , “On the contrary, we think Judge Price could exercise the same authority over
the case which would have been possessed by his predecessor, [even] if  he [Constable] had
been living, and still in office.” Id. at 142.  As Robinson demonstrates,   jurisdiction is
conferred upon the court, and not the individual judge.  Therefore, as we have held, Judge
Hubbard could revise, alter, or amend the  unenrolled judgment of Judge Ward within thirty
days, just as Judge Ward could have done during the period.
Having determined that the circuit court was empowered to render a valid judgment
in the proceedings before Judge Hubbard, it follows that the judgment actually entered in that
case may not be reversed for lack of power to enter it, only because the court abused its
discretion in doing so.   As we have seen, the question of whether a court should have
entertained a proceeding or granted the relief sought merges into the judgment and once
enrolled may not be attacked successfully.  First Federated Com. Tr., 272 Md.  at 334, 322
A.2d at 543.   Although she states that the order passed by Judge Hubbard complied with
neither prong of the jurisdictional components, except for arguing that Judge Hubbard did
not act to revise the prior judgment, the respondent does not profess to address the propriety
The respondent raises the specter of a legal free for all if we affirm the judgment
13
entered by Judge Hubbard.   When, as here, two orders have been entered on the same
subject by two different judges, it is the second prong of the jurisdictional components
that provides the answer to any such free for all.   Whether the second judge abused his or
her discretion in acting in the proceedings and in rendering the relief sought is the
appropriate inquiry, and that inquiry will ensure that in the few times when situations
such as presented here occur, they will be handled properly.
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of that ruling.  Accordingly, we will not further consider that question.13
                                                  JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
                                                  REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT  
                                                 WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE                     
                                                  JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR               
                                                  BALTIMORE CITY.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND    
                                                  IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID 
                                                  BY THE RESPONDENT.