Case Title: JERAL DEE HARSHBERGER V. CHARLES A. HARSHBERGER

Citation: 117 P.3d 1244, 2005 WY 99

Docket Number: 444476

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cite as: 2005 WY 99, 117 P.3d 1244

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JERAL 
DEE HARSHBERGER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHARLES 
A. HARSHBERGER,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Carol K. 
Watson of Phelan-Watson Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Greg 
Knudsen of Knudsen Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jeral Dee 
Harshberger (Mother) appeals a district court order that transferred primary 
custody of the parties' two minor children to Charles A. Harshberger (Father). 
We affirm.

 
 

[¶2]      Mother states 
four issues in her brief:

I.                     
Whether 
the district court committed an error of law, when it considered evidence from 
the date of the original divorce decree, to conclude there was a material change 
of circumstances to change custody, rather than considering evidence from the 
date of the most recent order modifying visitation, as prescribed by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-204(c).

 
 

II.                   
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion, when it concluded in its Decision 
Letter that "the evidence shows that frequent moving creates an expectation of 
upheaval for the children, and can negatively affect school work and 
relationships" without any expert testimony to prove the truth of the court's 
statement.

 
 

III.                  
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion and/or committed an error of law, when 
it considered evidence of [Father's] unsubstantiated motions for contempt as a 
basis of changing custody.

 
 

IV.               
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion, when it changed custody to [Father], 
knowing that, at least once, he had been convicted for indecent 
exposure.

 
 
In his 
brief, Father simply reiterates the issues as presented by 
Mother.

 
 

[¶3]      The parties were 
divorced in 1999.  Mother was 
granted primary custody of the parties' two minor children.  On February 5, 2004, Father filed a 
petition to modify custody wherein he sought primary custody of the 
children.  The hearing on Father's 
petition was not recorded.  When an 
appealed order is predicated upon testimony and evidence adduced at an 
unrecorded hearing our review is constrained:

 
 
When 
this Court does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, it must 
accept the trial court's findings of fact upon which it bases any decisions 
regarding evidentiary issues.  Capshaw v. Schieck, 2002 WY 54, 
¶21, 44 P.3d 47, ¶21 (Wyo. 2002).  The failure to provide a transcript does 
not necessarily require dismissal of an appeal, but our review is restricted to 
those allegations of error not requiring inspection of the transcript.  Lacking a transcript, or a substitute for 
the transcript, the regularity of the trial court's judgment and the competency 
of the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be presumed. Stadtfeld 
v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 
1996); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993); and see Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616 
(Wyo. 1993) 
(dismissing appeal for lack of record, rather than 
affirming).

 
 

Burt v. 
Burt, 2002 
WY 127, ¶7, 53 P.3d 101, ¶7 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
[¶4]      Since the lack of 
a transcript means that we must accept the trial court's findings of fact, we 
set forth the relevant portions of that court's Decision 
Letter:

 
 
The 
Court considered the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing on July 23, 
2004.  The Court had previously 
heard evidence at hearings on motions for contempt, and at a hearing on a motion 
for counseling for [the parties' children, L.H. and T.H.] The Court finds that 
much of [Mother's] testimony lacks credibility. It is inconsistent with other 
testimony, vague, and often unsupported by evidence that is within [Mother's] 
control but for unknown reasons [Mother] chose not to 
present.

 
 
The 
Court finds that circumstances have materially changed since the divorce in the 
following respects:

 
 

1.                  
At the 
time of the divorce both parties lived in the Goshen County, Wyoming vicinity. 
Since then [Mother] * * * has changed residences thirteen (13) times.  One of those moves occurred while the 
children were with [Father] for summer visitation, and 2 of the moves involved 
improved circumstances (from a 2 bedroom apartment to a 3 bedroom apartment to a 
house).  However, the other moves 
are inexplicable. [Mother] told [Father] she would move to keep him away from 
the children, and then she moved to Cody, taking them 350 miles from their 
father. No evidence suggested that [Mother] improved her employment situation by 
this move, particularly in light of the pay and the work hours she has in Cody. 
 The evidence established that 
[Mother] is considering another change of residence. On the other hand, [Father] 
has remained in the parties' family home since the divorce. The evidence shows 
that frequent moving creates an expectation of upheaval for the children, and 
can negatively affect school work and relationships.

[Mother] 
testified that the girls, especially L.H., have excelled academically and 
socially in Cody. The Court finds this testimony, along with much of her other 
testimony, lacking credibility and unpersuasive. [Mother] did not introduce any 
school records.  She did not present 
testimony from any school personnel. She is unaware of a "directed learning" 
program that [L.H.] is in.  [Mother's] opinion about current school 
performance is entirely inconsistent with [L.H.'s] prior 
performance.

2.                  
[Mother] 
has changed employment four (4) times since the divorce.  She now works as a [certified nursing 
assistant], making $900 per month. She works a 12-hour long night shift, 
requiring that she leave the children at night. She claims that her very elderly 
grandmother has consistently supervised the girls at night, but her testimony is 
not persuasive.  Certainly, her job 
requires her absence when the girls require supervision and involvement about 
homework and activities.  [Father] 
works 7:30 a.m. to 11 a.m. and noon to 5:30 p.m. Monday through Friday, and part 
of Saturdays, depending on the time of year.  He has remarried, and if custody is 
changed, his wife will arrange to be at home about the time the girls get home 
from school each day.

3.                  
[Father] 
established that [Mother] has consistently interfered with his relationship with 
[L.H. and T.H.] The Court file indicates that [Father] sought the Court's 
assistance with [Mother's] failure to cooperate in his relationship with the 
girls three (3) times before, on May 21, 2001, on September 25, 2002, and again 
on April 2, 2003.  The evidence 
showed that [Mother] has scheduled or permitted the girls to participate in 
activities which conflict with his visitation.  She has called [Father] derogatory names 
in front of the children, and has told the children that [Father] has a new 
family and doesn't love them any more. [Mother] also interferes with [Father's] 
relationship with the girls emotionally.  She makes statements to the girls during 
their visits which are emotionally harmful and place them in a position of 
having to choose between parents emotionally (ie: "I can't live without you" and 
"I'm so lonely").  [Mother] fails to 
recognize the impact of such statements on the girls, and claims to only be 
"expressing her concern for them."  Although the Court's decree requires the 
parties to provide copies of records and information they obtain about the 
girls' education to each other, [Mother] has consistently refused to do so. 
 She continued this refusal through 
the hearing, stating that she didn't have the time to get copies of school 
records for [Father] and that he could get them for himself.  The evidence established that [Father] 
has attempted to obtain the girls' school records direct from the Cody schools, 
but inexplicably the Cody schools refused until faced with a subpoena from the 
Court.

4.                  
Since 
the divorce decree [T.H.] has displayed signs of extreme social withdrawal. 
 During the 2000-2001 school year 
[T.H.'s] pre-school recommended that she be professionally evaluated and 
possibly counseled. [Mother] refused these recommendations.  During the past year [Mother] accused 
[Father's] step son of inappropriately touching [T.H.].  The Wyoming Department of Family 
[S]ervices investigated those allegations and found them to be unsubstantiated. 
 However, in the course of their 
investigation DFS observed [T.H.'s] behavior and again recommended professional 
counseling.  [Mother] refused, and 
[Father] petitioned the Court for an order requiring counseling.  The Court ordered counseling for [T.H.] 
by a counselor selected jointly by the parties.  [Mother] claims that she unilaterally 
selected a counselor who has seen [T.H.].  She failed to present any evidence from 
that counselor, or any records or evaluations.  The counselor has refused to speak with 
or include [Father].  No information 
or recommendations were provided to [Father] for use during this summer 
visitation.  This summer, [T.H.] 
continues to exhibit extreme withdrawal.  She does not speak to anyone except her 
father and sister, does not interact with other children, and won't look at or 
converse with guests at home.  A 
preponderance of the evidence establishes that [T.H.'s] condition is largely 
ignored by [Mother] and that [Mother] shuts [Father] out from information about 
or involvement in any evaluations or counseling.

5.                  
The 
evidence established that [Mother] emotionally involved the girls in this 
dispute by telling them that if custody is changed "she will never be able to 
see the girls again."

 
 
These 
changes in circumstances, taken together, are material and support a change in 
custody.

 
 
The 
factors in W.S. § 20-2-201 support a change of custody. The evidence establishes 
that [Father] has a greater ability to "provide adequate care, including 
arranging for each child's care by others."  [Father] has better ability to recognize 
and understand the children's educational, social and psychological needs.  He is less likely to involve the children 
in an emotional tug of war between their parents.  [Father] is more likely to permit the 
children to have and develop a relationship with both of their parents.  He will provide appropriate educational 
and psychological care for the children, and is better able to insure that 
[Mother] is involved in those matters.

The 
Court finds that it is in the best interests of [L.H. and T.H.] that primary 
custody be changed to [Father].

 
 
Mother 
has appealed the district court's order changing primary custody of the parties' 
children.

 
 

[¶5]                  
Custody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court. It has been our consistent principle 
that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given 
paramount consideration.  The 
determination of the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of 
fact.  We do not overturn the 
decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or 
the presence of a violation of some legal principle. 

 
 

Resor v. 
Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Reavis v. 
Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998)).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
[exercising] sound judgmentwith regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) 
(quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).

 
 

[¶6]      The lack of a 
transcript of the hearing on Father's petition to modify custody means that we 
accept the district court's findings of fact.  As a consequence, our review is 
effectively limited to determining whether or not an error of law appears on the 
record.  To the extent that Mother 
contests the factual findings of the district court we will not consider her 
arguments.  After sifting through 
Mother's arguments, we have managed to discern arguments that arguably could be 
characterized as claims of legal error in the first, third, and fourth issues 
set out in her brief.  We will 
address each of those in turn.

 
 
[¶7]      In the Decision 
Letter the district court cited Mother's thirteen relocations since the divorce 
as one of the factors in its decision to award custody to Father.  Mother contends that the court erred by 
considering this factor because this Court has held that a custodial parent has 
the right to move, and so relocation cannot be grounds for a substantial or 
material change in circumstances.  A 
review of our case law reveals that Mother's characterization of our case law is 
accurate as far as it goes, but she neglects a limitation and an exception to 
our teaching.

 
 
[¶8]      Our first foray 
into this area was in Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321 (Wyo. 1990). There the 
district court had entered a joint custody order providing that if either party 
moved from Laramie, primary custody would automatically 
vest with the non-moving party.  We 
rejected such a scheme because it circumvented the district court's duty to 
evaluate custody decisions on the best interests of the children.  Id. 
at 323.

 
 
[¶9]      In Love v. 
Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993), the custodial parent sought to 
move to another state in order to advance her educational opportunities.  We noted that relocation cases were fact 
sensitive inhibiting the adoption of a bright line test.  Id. 
at 1287-88.  We concluded that our 
review of district court decisions in relocation cases would look "closely at 
balancing the continued rights of the parties with the best interests of the 
children as established at the time of divorce."  Id. at 1288.  Despite our declaration that we would 
eschew a bright line test, we proceeded to adopt a test to be utilized in 
evaluating relocations by a custodial parent:

 
 
It would 
be incongruous for a court, when presented with a custodial order originally 
based upon the best interests of the child, to refuse to support the efforts of 
the custodial parent to maintain and enhance their standard of living, albeit in 
another jurisdiction.  So long as 
the court is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the 
move and reasonable visitation is available to the remaining parent, removal 
should be granted.

 
 

Love, 851 P.2d  at 1288-89 (emphasis in original) (quoting Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 
Ill.App.3d 1090, 41 Ill.Dec. 450, 452, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950 (1980)).  In the end, we upheld the district 
court's conclusion that the mother had good reason for the relocation, and that 
"there was no reason to suggest that mother [would] not continue to provide a 
caring, nurturing environment for her children." Id. at 1289.

 
 
[¶10]   In Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1995), we held that when both parents inform the court that a 
joint custody arrangement is not working, a sufficient change in circumstances 
justifying the reopening of the custody order had been presented to the district 
court.  Id. at 55.  In affirming the district court's 
decision to award primary custody to the father, we noted that the mother had 
correctly noted that her relocation to another city was not, in itself, a 
material change in circumstances.  Id. (citing Love, 851 P.2d at 
1288-89).  However, we noted that 
the district court could have reasonably concluded that the conditions resulting 
from the move contributed to the parties' inability to agree and communicate, 
which were sufficient to constitute a sufficient change in circumstances.  Id. 
at 55.

 
 
[¶11]   Finally,1 in Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 
1999) we considered the constitutional implications of a custodial parent's 
relocation.  The mother had been 
awarded primary custody of the parties' children.  The divorce decree provided for an 
automatic change of custody to the father if the mother were to move more than 
50 miles from their town of residence.  The mother, seeking to attend graduate 
school, asked the district court to allow her to move more than 50 miles.  The district court acknowledged that the 
automatic change clause was improper.  Nevertheless, after a hearing, the court 
ordered a change of custody.  Id. 
at 611-12.  We began our analysis 
with a review of the prior decisions in Love and Gurney and 
concluded that:

 
 
[r]elocation 
as a substantial and material change in circumstances was foreclosed by the 
decision in Love.  Our 
decision established a strong presumption in favor of the right of a custodial 
parent to relocate with her children, assuming that the criteria 
articulated in Love are satisfied.  After Love, we again held that a 
relocation, by itself, is not a substantial or material change in circumstances 
sufficient to justify a change in custody order.  Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 
(Wyo. 1995) 
(citing Love, 851 P.2d at 1288-89).  Love and Gurney together 
capture a rule that a relocation by a custodial parent, where the motivation for 
the relocation is legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still permits 
reasonable visitation by the non-custodial parent, is not a substantial and 
material change in circumstances.  A 
trial court abuses its discretion in making a contrary ruling that such a move 
amounts to a substantial and material change in 
circumstances.

 
 

Watt, 971 P.2d  at 614.  After noting that 
there was a constitutional right to travel under the federal and Wyoming constitutions and 
that there were inherent inequities in allowing a non-custodial parent but not 
the custodial parent to relocate without restraint, we 
held:

 
 
In light 
of our prior cases, and our concern for the protection of constitutional 
liberties of the citizens of the State of Wyoming, we hold that an intrastate relocation 
by a custodial parent, taking the children along, cannot by itself be considered 
a change in circumstances sufficiently substantial and material to justify 
reopening the question of custody.  


 
 
This 
precept also applies to factors that are derivative of the relocation.  The custodial parent's right to move with 
the children is constitutionally protected, and a court may not order a change 
in custody based upon that circumstance alone.  Some other change of circumstances, 
together with clear evidence of the detrimental effect of the other change upon 
the children is required.  Such a 
circumstance necessarily would have to be sufficiently deleterious to the 
welfare of the children that by itself would serve as a substantial and material 
change in circumstances even in the absence of a 
relocation.

 
 

Watt, 971 P.2d  at 616-17.  We reversed the 
district court's order changing custody but added that relocation could be the 
basis for modifying visitation, if not custody.  Id. at 617.

 
 
[¶12]   To summarize, our precedent is 
quite clear that relocation, by itself, cannot be a substantial and material 
change in circumstances sufficient to justify reopening a custody order.  That precept is also applicable to any 
factors that are derivative of relocation.  What Mother has failed to acknowledge in 
her argument, however, is that our precedent does not preclude the district 
court from considering the effects of relocation on the children so long as 
there is some other circumstance that is "sufficiently deleterious to the 
welfare of the children that by itself  would serve as a substantial and 
material change in circumstances even in the absence of a relocation."  Watt, 971 P.2d  at 617; see Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55 (Where 
a custody order was properly reopened because both parties asserted that joint 
custody was not working, district court could have reasonably concluded that 
factors derivative of the relocation could have contributed to parties' 
inability to agree and communicate.).  Furthermore, our cases stress that the 
rule set forth in Love and its progeny is predicated upon the motivation 
for the relocation being in good faith.  Love, 851 P.2d  at 1288-89 ("So 
long as the court is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in 
seeking the moveremoval should be granted."); Watt, 971 P.2d  at 614 
("Love and Gurney together capture a rule that a relocation by a 
custodial parent, where the motivation for the relocation is legitimate, 
sincere, in good faith, and still permits reasonable visitation by the 
non-custodial parent, is not a substantial and material change in 
circumstances."). 

 
 
[¶13]   Here, a review of the record shows 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering Mother's 
numerous relocations since the parties' divorce.  The court's Decision Letter sets forth 
various factors independent of the relocations that could establish the 
existence of a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying the 
decision to reopen the custody order: (1) Mother had not maintained stable 
employment and had not provided adequate supervision of the children; (2) Mother 
had repeatedly interfered with Father's parental and visitation rights; (3) 
Mother had failed to provide adequate treatment to the youngest daughter for her 
emotional problems until compelled to provide therapy by court order, and even 
thereafter she refused to provide Father with any information about the results 
of the therapy; and (4) there was evidence that Mother had attempted to 
emotionally manipulate the children against their Father. Collectively, or 
individually, these factors support the district court's decision to reopen the 
custody order.  Moreover, the court 
made a specific factual finding that Mother's motivation for at least one of her 
moves was not in good faith: "[Mother] had told [Father] that she would move to 
keep him away from the children, and then she moved to Cody, taking them 350 
miles from their father."  In either 
case, it appears on the record before us that there was a sufficient basis for 
the court to consider Mother's multiple relocations and their impact on the 
children in making the best interest determination.

 
 
[¶14]   In a related argument, Mother 
contends that the district court erred when it considered relocations that 
occurred before the court modified the parties' custody and support order on 
July 8, 2003.  Similarly, she claims 
that the court also considered employment changes that occurred before this 
date.

 
 
[¶15]   Mother cites to the Wyoming 
statutes:

§ 
20-2-204.  Enforcement and 
modification.

.

(c)  A 
court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a 
material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in 
question and that the modification would be in the best interests of the 
children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a).  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2005).  We recently held that this statute 
prohibits consideration of pre-divorce evidence when there is a determination of 
whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances but that it did not 
limit the court's consideration of such information when making a determination 
of the children's best interest.  Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, 
¶18, 102 P.3d 210, ¶18 (Wyo. 2004).  As noted above, there are independent 
grounds in the record for finding a material change of circumstances without 
considering either the relocations or Mother's employment history.  Once material changes of circumstances 
have been found, the district court could consider evidence of Mother's 
relocations and employment history under our decision in Selvey.  We also note that the July 8, 2003 order 
was only concerned with visitation, not custody.  Mother does not explain why the 
visitation order should act as a bar on the evidence the court could consider 
when determining custody.  The 
original custody order set forth in the parties' 1999 divorce decree was still 
in effect at the time this proceeding was commenced.  A review of the Decision Letter indicates 
that all of the events cited by the court relating to Mother's relocations and 
employment occurred after the divorce decree was entered.  No matter how one views it, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in considering this evidence when determining 
the best interests of the children.

 
 
[¶16]   In her third issue, Mother contends 
that the district court erred when it considered three motions to show cause 
filed by Father alleging that Mother had interfered in his relationship with the 
children. Mother insists that this was an error of law because Mother was never 
found in contempt and "it's a well known precept that accusations in affidavits 
are evidence of absolutely nothing without a hearing and a decision on the 
merits."  The only citation that 
Mother offers in support of her contention is to our decision in Donnelly v. 
Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298 (Wyo. 2004).  Mother does not provide a pinpoint 
citation or offer any discussion of the case; she simply lists it at the end of 
her argument.  There is no 
discussion in Donnelly of "affidavits" or the effects of any statements 
made therein.  The issues analyzed 
in that case concerned the effect of the improper admission of confidential 
statements made during mediation where trial was before the district judge, the 
use of gender as a basis for a custody decision, a non-cogent claim regarding 
visitation and a request for attorney's fees.  We do not address claims of error that 
are not supported by cogent argument with citation to pertinent legal authority. 
 Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 
49, ¶20, 88 P.3d 1050, ¶20 (Wyo. 2004).  Mother has not presented either to us, so 
we decline to address her claim.2

 
 
[¶17]   In her final claim of error, Mother 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a change of 
custody despite knowing that Father had been convicted of indecent exposure. 
 Father vehemently denies the 
accusation claiming that he has never been charged with, or convicted of, 
indecent exposure.  Father concedes 
only that he was convicted of breach of the peace approximately five years 
before the divorce action was commenced in 1999. 

 
 
[¶18]   There is no evidence in the record 
of any conviction of any crime for Father.  As the proponent, the burden is on Mother 
to establish evidence on the record supporting her contention.  As we noted at the outset, the absence of 
a transcript means that we presume the regularity of the trial court's judgment 
and the competency of the evidence upon which that judgment is based.   In the absence of any evidence in the 
record that the trial court had before it verification of a conviction of Father 
and that Mother's characterization of such was accurate, we cannot conclude that 
there was an abuse of discretion by the court in reaching the custody decision. 

 
 

[¶19]   Since no error appears on the 
record before us, the district court's decision granting custody of the parties' 
children to Father is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1See Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146 
(Wyo. 1999) 
for an analysis of our decisions in Love and Watt and their 
application in the context of the initial custody 
decision.

 
 
  2We note in 
passing that even if we had accepted Mother's contention of error, the district 
court's Decision Letter contains adequate grounds for affirming its decision 
without any consideration being given to the motions for cause filed by 
Father.