Case Title: Board of Satanta v. Grant County Planning Board

Citation: 195 Kan. 640, 408 P.2d 655

Docket Number: 44,232

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1965-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
195 Kan. 640 (1965)
408 P.2d 655
BOARD OF SATANTA JOINT RURAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 2, WILLIAM H. HELTON and WAYNE LAHEY, Appellants,
v.
THE GRANT COUNTY PLANNING BOARD and ADEL THROCKMORTON, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Appellees.
No. 44,232

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 11, 1965.
Dale M. Stucky, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Wayne Coulson, Paul R. Kitch, Donald R. Newkirk, Gerrit H. Wormhoudt, Philip Kassebaum, John E. Rees, Robert T. Cornwell, Willard B. Thompson and David W. Buxton, all of Wichita, Eugene L. Smith and Harold K. Greenleaf, Jr., both of Liberal, and Homer V. Gooing and Hugo T. Wedell, of Counsel, both of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
E.F. Russell, of Ulysses, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, and J. Richard Foth, Assistant Attorney General, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment in a mandamus action refusing to compel the State Superintendent of Public Instruction *641 to issue an order transferring territory under the provisions of the Unified School District Act, K.S.A. 72-6743.
The act provides, insofar as material here, one planning unit for each county (K.S.A. 72-6736) and, recognizing that there were existing school districts extending over county lines, makes provision for the inclusion of such area in a planning unit by K.S.A. 72-6743. The area is designated as "gray-area" and described as follows:
The section then provides the method of determining in which planning unit the gray-area is to be placed. Highly summarized, (1) a meeting of the electors of the gray-area is to be called by the county superintendent of the county in which the main school building is located, (2) each elector present is to mark a ballot for or against the transfer of the territory, (3) if a majority favor the transfer the county superintendent shall so certify to the chairman of the planning units interested, and (4) the two planning boards involved shall then consider the advisability of such transfer. The section concludes:
Such a gray-area existed at the eastern edge of Grant County, comprising some fifteen sections of land. This gray-area formed a part of the territory of Joint Rural High School District No. 2, which had its school building at Satanta, Haskell County, Kansas. The gray-area also formed a part of the Red Rock Common School District and all of its territory was located in Grant County. The statutory procedure for determining to which planning unit the area *642 would be attached was duly commenced. Eighty-five percent of the electors in the gray-area cast ballots resulting in 52 votes being cast in favor of the transfer of the territory to the Haskell County Planning Unit and 44 opposed.
Following the completion of the statutory procedure the Haskell County Planning Board reported to the state superintendent its approval of the transfer of the gray-area to the Haskell County Planning Unit and the Grant County Planning Board reported its opposition.
On November 27, 1963, the state superintendent issued an order denying the transfer of the territory in the gray-area in which he concluded:
The order stated the source of the information on which it was based:
The order set out the assessed valuation of the disputed area and the school districts affected; gave the distance to the various school buildings from the gray-area, and stated specific and controlling reasons for the order refusing the transfer as follows:
*643 The above order was issued without notice and without a formal hearing giving the interested parties an opportunity to be heard.
Certain interested parties petitioned the state superintendent for a hearing. On December 27, 1963, the state superintendent issued an order for a hearing to be held on January 7, 1964, in the House of Representatives at the State House. The order laid down rather restrictive "ground rules." Each side was given one hour to present its case and one-half hour for rebuttal. No cross-examination was permitted but each side could ask the other questions during the rebuttal period. The chairman of the planning board of each county was to control each delegation and determine who was to speak and when.
On June 16, 1964, following the hearing as above provided, the state superintendent issued a second order ratifying and confirming his previous order of November 27, 1963. It does not appear that this last order was before the district court at the time of the hearing.
On May 28, 1964, Joint Rural High School District No. 2 and two taxpayers interested in the gray-area brought this action to enjoin the Grant County Planning Board from forming a unified school district with the gray-area included, and to compel the state superintendent to transfer the gray-area to the Haskell County Planning Unit.
The petition alleged facts substantially as presented here but embellished with such phrases as "purported findings of fact," "star chamber proceedings," "denial of due process" and "unlawful usurpation of power." A motion for a temporary restraining order was denied and defendants filed a motion to dismiss, stating among other grounds failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The motion to dismiss was heard July 1, 1964, at which time the parties by stipulation introduced evidence of a copy of the orders of the state superintendent dated November 27, 1963, a copy of the hearing order dated December 27, 1963, a plat showing the territory involved, and agreed that the first eight paragraphs of plaintiffs' petition were a correct statement of the facts.
The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss stating:
*644 The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and rendered judgment for the defendants.
Plaintiffs have appealed. They first contend that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment because appellants' petition presented genuine issues as to material facts which were not controverted.
The above contention will be more readily disposed of if we first consider the second contention which goes to the merits. Appellants ask:
Appellants' entire argument is based on the fallacious assumption that the legislature could not delegate to the state superintendent absolute authority to establish school district boundaries where the majority of the electors had voted to the contrary.
We find no merit in appellants' contention that the legislature did not by K.S.A. 72-6743 authorize the state superintendent to refuse to transfer territory after a majority of the electors in the area had voted in favor of the transfer.
The statute (K.S.A. 72-6743) is clear and unambiguous. It provides that if a majority of the electors in a gray-area vote in favor of transferring the territory 
It appears from the above quoted provision that the vote of the electors and the approval of one or both of the planning boards is subject to the approval of the state superintendent.
The section further provides:
We do not know how the legislature could have made it clearer that the state superintendent shall determine whether the gray-area shall be transferred and his determination shall be conclusive.
The legislature was no doubt attempting to avoid the rule announced *645 in numerous decisions by this court prohibiting the delegation of legislative authority to determine boundary lines for governmental subdivisions. A consideration of a few of these decisions will tend to disclose the fallacy of appellants' contention that the result of the election by the electors in the area is conclusive.
In the School Reorganization Act of 1945, where the legislature sought to create in each county of the state a school reorganization committee it granted to the county reorganization committee (G.S. 1945 Supp., 72-5607) the power and authority to reorganize the school districts of the county. The School Reorganization Act of 1945 also provided for hearings and provided for a review by the District Court. This court held that law to be unconstitutional in State, ex rel., v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P.2d 865, and held:
In State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171, 34 P.2d 102, this court, in considering a statute permitting a landowner to withdraw from a school district by petition to the county superintendent, stated:
See, also, Comm'rs of Wyandotte Co. v. Abbott, 52 Kan. 148, 34 Pac. 416, at page 166, where the following language is found:
*646 In the case of Hutchinson v. Leimbach, 68 Kan. 37, 74 Pac. 598, the constitutionality of a law permitting a city of the second class to enlarge the limits from territory adjacent to the city was in question. The court held that an ordinance was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and said at page 46:
In the recent case of School District, Joint No. 71 v. Throckmorton, 189 Kan. 590, 370 P.2d 89, this court considering the constitutionality of the 1961 Unified School District Act held:
It should be noted that in the cases just considered we were not called upon to determine the constitutionality of delegated authority where the legislature had laid down policies and standards as a guide to the exercise of the delegated authority. Although there may be constitutional prohibitions or lack of constitutional authority to delegate legislative power, the legislature is not denied the necessary flexibility and practicality which will enable it to perform its functions by delegating to select instrumentalities some of the legislature's functions where the policy is fixed and standards are definitely established which determine the manner and circumstances of the exercise of such power. (Johnson v. Reno County Comm'rs, 147 Kan. 211, 75 P.2d 849; Ritchie v. Johnson, 158 Kan. 103, 144 P.2d 925; State, ex rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 308 P.2d 537.) What constitutes adequate standards will of necessity depend upon the nature of the power delegated in each particular case and the constitutional grants or prohibitions pertaining thereto.
Neither is there any merit to appellants' contention that the granting of authority to the state superintendent to refuse to approve the transfer after the approval by a majority of the electors in the area is in violation of sections 1 and 21 of article 2 of our constitution.
The vote of the electors is merely advisory under the statute as is the approval of the planning boards. The electors have no vested right in school boundaries, nor does such right vest after they have *647 exercised their vote in connection therewith. The legislature may use the vote of the electors in such advisory capacity as it sees fit, either for its consideration in fixing school boundaries or for the consideration of the instrumentality to whom the authority is properly delegated.
The people have by their constitution divested themselves of all control over school boundaries and placed such authority in the hands of the legislature.
The people have also by their constitution placed the responsibility for the general supervision of the educational interests of the state in the state superintendent. He is, therefore, the logical officer to be delegated legislative authority in connection with school matters.
This issue has been fully covered by this court and it would serve no useful purpose to extend the argument further than was done in State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311, 58 P.2d 1051. In the Storey case the court had under consideration a contention that because the state superintendent is an administrative officer the legislature could not confer legislative authority upon him. We stated, beginning at page 316 of the opinion:
*648 The same rule was followed in State, ex rel., v. Brooks, 160 Kan. 526, 163 P.2d 414, and it was stated: "The state superintendent is better equipped to ascertain what is good for the particular school district than a court would be."
What has been said also disposes of appellants' contention that the trial court erroneously disposed of the case on summary judgment. The facts alleged in the petition and stipulated into the record at the hearing left no genuine issue of material fact in controversy on the question of whether the state superintendent's actions were within the purview of the Unified School District Act. The Act laid down no standards to control the manner in which the state superintendent would obtain the facts and information which would govern his discretion in granting or denying transfer of the gray-area. In Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 403 P.2d 964, we held:
The steps taken by the state superintendent, being in harmony with the statute which we have held to be constitutional (Tecumseh School District v. Throckmorton, 195 Kan. 144, 403 P.2d 102), cannot be made the subject of a charge of unlawful and arbitrary conduct.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
PARKER, C.J., not participating.