Case Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi

Citation: 2012-Ohio-879

Docket Number: 2011-0340

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-879.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-879 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. PARISI. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-879.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Six-month stayed license suspension. 
(No. 2011-0340—Submitted June 7, 2011—Decided March 8, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-064. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Georgianna I. Parisi of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0022538, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1982.  In 
August 2009, relator, Dayton Bar Association, filed a complaint alleging that 
respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of 
Professional Conduct by representing both the proposed guardian and ward in a 
guardianship proceeding, collecting legal fees from her client’s account without 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
court approval while the application for guardianship was pending, and collecting 
a clearly excessive fee from an elderly client with diminished mental capacity.1   
{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline conducted a hearing, at which it received the parties’ stipulations of 
fact, witness testimony, and numerous exhibits.  Having considered the evidence, 
the panel found that respondent had engaged in a conflict of interest and conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice and had charged a clearly excessive 
fee.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and its 
recommendation that Parisi be suspended from the practice of law for six months, 
with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that she commit no further 
misconduct. 
{¶ 3} Both parties have objected to the board’s report.  Parisi challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence, raises constitutional challenges to several of the 
ethical rules that she has been found to have violated, and seeks dismissal of 
relator’s complaint.  Relator argues that the clearly excessive fee charged by 
respondent is tantamount to misappropriation and therefore warrants a period of 
actual suspension. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we overrule the objections of both 
parties and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, as well as its 
recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
The Demming Guardianship 
{¶ 5} The board found that Parisi began to provide legal services for 
Sylvia Demming, a 93-year-old woman who claimed that she was being held 
                                                 
1  Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before 
and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility. When both the former and current rules are 
cited for the same act, the allegation constitutes a single ethical violation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1. 
 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
against her will in a nursing home.  Concerned about Demming’s financial 
welfare and having observed her confusion and disorientation, on November 8, 
2007, Parisi applied for guardianship in the Warren County Probate Court.  In her 
guardianship application, respondent alleged that Demming was incompetent as a 
result of Alzheimer’s-related memory loss, and Parisi submitted an evaluation 
from a licensed physician diagnosing Demming with dementia.  Seven weeks 
later, Parisi had Demming sign a durable power of attorney designating Parisi as 
her attorney in fact.  The next month, Parisi withdrew her own application and 
filed a separate application for guardianship on behalf of Demming’s niece. 
{¶ 6} Believing that the court no longer had jurisdiction after Demming 
informed the court that she had left the county and intended to move out of state, 
Parisi sent her bill to Demming’s niece for review.  The guardianship proceeding 
was not dismissed as Parisi had anticipated; but acting as Demming’s attorney-in-
fact, Parisi paid her own fees of more than $18,000 without first obtaining the 
court’s approval.  The probate court later removed Parisi as counsel for both 
women, and Parisi returned the money to Demming’s account. 
{¶ 7} The board found that by representing both Demming and her niece 
in the guardianship proceeding, Parisi violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) (providing 
that a lawyer’s continued representation of a client creates a conflict of interest if 
there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former 
client, or a third person or by the lawyer’s own personal interests).  The panel also 
found that by obtaining a power of attorney over her client’s affairs while her 
guardianship application was pending and using it to pay $18,820 of her own 
legal fees, Parisi violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  Citing the 
duplication of other claimed violations and the insufficiency of the evidence, the 
board recommended the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
(prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct) and (b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal 
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness). 
{¶ 8} Parisi challenges the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with 
respect to her representation of Demming.  First, she argues that this court has 
held as a matter of law that simultaneous representation of a proposed ward and 
an applicant for guardianship does not present a conflict of interest that requires 
disqualification.  In support of this argument, respondent cites In re Guardianship 
of Love (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 111, 48 O.O.2d 107, 249 N.E.2d 794; In re 
Clendenning (1945), 145 Ohio St. 82, 30 O.O. 301, 60 N.E. 676; and In re 
Guardianship of Santrucek, 120 Ohio St.3d 67, 2008-Ohio-4915, 896 N.E.2d 683. 
{¶ 9} None of the cases, however, stand for the proposition that an 
applicant for guardianship has no interest in the determination of the proposed 
ward’s competence or incompetence or that an applicant cannot have an interest 
that is adverse to that of the proposed ward.  Indeed, the far-reaching and life-
altering consequences of an incompetency determination—involving a judicial 
determination that a mental or physical illness or disability has left a person so 
mentally impaired that the person is incapable of taking proper care of the 
person’s self or property—create an inherent conflict between the proposed ward 
and the applicant for guardianship, even if guardianship is ultimately in the 
proposed ward’s best interest.  Nevertheless, Parisi contends that Prof.Cond.R. 
1.14(b), 1.7(b), and the comments thereto permit attorneys to simultaneously 
represent both the proposed ward and the applicant for guardianship and that any 
contrary interpretation of those rules cannot constitutionally be applied to her 
because she had no notice that her conduct was unethical. 
{¶ 10} Prof.Cond.R. 1.14(b) provides:  “When the lawyer reasonably 
believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, 
financial, or other harm unless action is taken, and cannot adequately act in the 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, 
including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action 
to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.” 
{¶ 11} Prof.Cond.R. 1.14(a) directs that “the lawyer shall, as far as 
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client,” 
and comment 92 to the rule emphasizes, “A lawyer who undertakes to represent a 
person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the 
lawyer would with respect to a client.”  Thus, the emergency provisions of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 do not entirely abrogate a lawyer’s duties to the client under 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Therefore, when taking actions authorized by 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.14, the lawyer must still determine whether the representation of 
one client will be directly adverse to the other and whether there is a substantial 
risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate 
course of action for one client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a).3  
                                                 
2   Comment 9 to Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 provides, “In an emergency where the health, safety, or a 
financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and 
irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the 
person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered 
judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person’s 
behalf has consulted with the lawyer.  Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not 
act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent, or other 
representative available.  The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the 
extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and 
irreparable harm.  A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has 
the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.”   
 
3   Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 provides:  
    “(a)  A lawyer’s acceptance or continuation of representation of a client creates a conflict of 
interest if either of the following applies:   
    “(1) the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another current client;  
    “(2) there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an 
appropriate course of action for that client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by the lawyer’s own personal 
interests.”   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 12} The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility has addressed this situation.  ABA 
Committee on Ethics & Professionalism, Formal Ops. No. 96-404 (1996) 
(discussing clients under disability).  The ABA recognizes that Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.14 (1983, as amended) which is identical to our 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.14  in all material respects, permits a lawyer to file a petition for 
guardianship of a client when no less-restrictive alternatives are available, but 
concludes that “a lawyer with a disabled client should not attempt to represent a 
third party petitioning for a guardianship over the lawyer’s client.”  The ABA 
observes:  “Rule 1.14(b) creates a narrow exception to the normal responsibilities 
of a lawyer to his client, in permitting the lawyer to take action that by its very 
nature must be regarded as ‘adverse’ to the client.  However, Rule 1.14 does not 
otherwise derogate from the lawyer’s responsibilities to his client, and certainly 
does not abrogate the lawyer-client relationship.  In particular, it does not 
authorize a lawyer to represent a third party in seeking to have a court appoint a 
guardian for his client.  Such a representation would necessarily have to be 
regarded as ‘adverse’ to the client and prohibited by Rule 1.7(a), even if the 
lawyer sincerely and reasonably believes that such representation would be in the 
client’s best interests, unless and until the court makes the necessary 
determination of incompetence.  Even if the court’s eventual determination of 
incompetence would moot the argument that the representation was prohibited by 
Rule 1.7(a), the lawyer cannot proceed on the assumption that the court will make 
such a determination.  In short, if the lawyer decides to file a guardianship 
                                                                                                                                     
     (b)  A lawyer shall not accept or continue the representation of a client if a conflict of interest 
would be created pursuant to division (a) of this rule, unless all of the following apply:  
    “(1) the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client; 
    “(2) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing;  
    “(3) the representation is not precluded by division (c) of this rule [protecting certain 
representations regardless of client consent].”  
 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
petition, it must be on his own authority under Rule. 1.14 and not on behalf of a 
third party, however well-intentioned.”  Id. 
{¶ 13} We concur with this analysis and conclude that the guardianship 
proceeding that Parisi initiated on behalf of Demming’s niece, no matter how 
well-intentioned, was necessarily adverse to Demming.  Therefore, Parisi’s 
actions in representing both women in the guardianship proceeding violated 
Prof.Cond.R.  1.7, regardless of Demming’s assent or objection to the process.  
And in light of Demming’s diminished capacity, as evidenced by Parisi’s own 
petition for guardianship, we cannot countenance Parisi’s arguments that 
Demming was either competent to execute the durable power of attorney or 
capable of giving informed consent to the dual representation.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 4-6 
(finding that an attorney had engaged in conduct adversely reflecting upon his 
fitness to practice law by witnessing his mother-in-law execute a power of 
attorney just 29 days after filing a complaint in which he had alleged that she was 
incompetent). 
{¶ 14} Parisi’s constitutional objections to the application of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.7 and 1.14 to her conduct are also without merit.  “ ‘It is a basic principle of due 
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly 
defined.  Vague laws offend several important values.  First, because we assume 
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give 
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.’ ”  In re Complaint Against Harper 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 221, 673 N.E.2d 1253, quoting Grayned v. Rockford 
(1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222.  In this case, 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 expressly permits the attorney to consult with persons who 
may take action to protect the client, to seek the appointment of a guardian in 
some circumstances, and to reveal client confidences otherwise protected by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.6 to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s 
interests.  It does not, however, authorize the attorney to represent third parties in 
guardianship proceedings against a client or otherwise permit any departure from 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, which generally prohibits attorneys from representing multiple 
clients who have conflicting interests.  Because Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 clearly 
delineates the conduct permitted when an attorney represents a client with 
diminished capacity and does not purport to alter the prohibition against engaging 
in conflicts of interest set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, we reject Parisi’s argument 
that those rules are void for vagueness and cannot constitutionally be applied to 
her. 
{¶ 15} We also reject Parisi’s claims that she was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing prior to her disqualification in the probate matter.  We have 
held that a court must hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact in 
ruling on a motion for disqualification of an individual or of an entire firm when 
an attorney has left a law firm that represents one party to an action and has joined 
a firm that represents an opposing party.  Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining 
Co., Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258, syllabus.  But we have never 
held that a court must hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on every motion 
for disqualification.  Nor are we willing to impose such a requirement when an 
attorney has admitted that she represents two clients, it is apparent that those 
clients have inherently conflicting interests, and the entire basis of the legal action 
is to determine that one of those clients is incompetent to handle his or her 
personal affairs—incompetence that would presumably render the client unable to 
give informed consent to the conflict. 
{¶ 16} Parisi’s claim that her use of Demming’s power of attorney to pay 
her legal fees during the pendency of the guardianship proceeding was not 
prejudicial to the administration of justice is likewise without merit.  Regardless 
of Parisi’s claims that the probate court no longer had jurisdiction over the 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
guardianship proceeding due to Demming’s purported departure from the county 
and her expressed intent to move to Florida, the action remained pending at the 
time she paid her own fees.  And as the board found, the very power of attorney 
that Parisi used to make the unauthorized payment was obtained at a time when 
she had reason to believe that Demming was incompetent.  Therefore, we have no 
difficulty concluding that Parisi’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). 
{¶ 17} Having rejected Parisi’s factual and constitutional objections, we 
adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to count one of 
relator’s complaint. 
The Royal John Greene Matter 
{¶ 18} In August 2004, Royal John Greene, a widower in his mid-70’s 
whose extended family was either unwilling or unable to assist in his care, 
appointed Parisi his attorney-in-fact.  At that time, it was apparently understood 
that Parisi would be paid at her usual attorney hourly rate for legal and nonlegal 
services, but this agreement was not reduced to writing.  While Greene was 
competent at the time that he retained Parisi, his physical and mental health 
declined significantly during the course of her representation.  As early as 
November  2005, Parisi’s records indicate that Greene was “sometimes forgetful.”  
Billing records express concern about his increased memory loss in January 2006, 
profound cerebral atrophy and small strokes in August, and confusion in 
December. 
{¶ 19} Parisi provided some traditional legal services for Greene, 
including the preparation of estate-planning documents and the administration of 
his wife’s estate.  She also advised him about several annuities that he had 
purchased.  The bulk of her time, however, was devoted to the nonlegal tasks of 
managing Greene’s life—overseeing his living arrangements, supervising his 
medical care, transporting him to doctors’ appointments and dialysis treatments, 
reconciling his bank and brokerage statements, and delivering spending money 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
and an occasional meal to him.  The board found that respondent had done a good 
job taking care of Greene and indicated that without her assistance, he probably 
would not have been able to achieve his goal of avoiding a nursing home. 
{¶ 20} The board found that most of the work that Parisi and her staff 
performed did not require great legal skill and that in many instances, the client’s 
demands for services resulted in costs that were not proportionate to the monetary 
importance of the matters involved. 
{¶ 21} Having reviewed Parisi’s voluminous and detailed records 
regarding the services provided to Greene, the board found that respondent’s 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and DR 2-106(A) (both prohibiting a lawyer 
from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly 
excessive fee).  But citing the insufficiency of the evidence, the board 
recommends that we dismiss alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a) and DR 1-
102(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Ohio 
Rules of Professional Conduct or a Disciplinary Rule), Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 
DR 1-102(A)(4) (each prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and DR 
1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice). 
{¶ 22} Parisi objects to the board’s finding that she charged a clearly 
excessive fee, arguing that among other things, (1) such a finding impairs her 
constitutional rights to contract, (2) Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and DR 2-106(A) are 
void for vagueness and therefore cannot be constitutionally applied to her, (3) 
because relator did not offer any expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of 
her fees, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that her fee was 
clearly, and (4) Prof.Cond.R. 1.2 (“Scope of Representation and Allocation of 
Authority Between Client and Lawyer”), 1.4 (“Communication”), and 5.7 
(“Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services”) required her to abide by 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
Greene’s decisions concerning the objectives of her representation and the means 
of pursuing those objectives. 
{¶ 23} This court possesses the inherent, original, and exclusive 
jurisdiction to regulate all matters relating to the practice of law.  Section 
2(B)(1)(g), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.  Nonetheless, rules adopted by 
this court must comply with the state and federal constitutions.  Shimko v. Lobe, 
103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 27, quoting Christensen 
v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 534, 537, 
575 N.E.2d 790.  While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution protect the freedom 
of contract, we have long recognized that that freedom is not absolute, but is 
subservient to the public welfare.  See, e.g., Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. 
Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney (1916), 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E. 505, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  And “compensation for advocacy has never been treated as an 
ordinary debt or contractual right, but since antiquity has been regulated by the 
prevailing governmental authority possessing the power to control the practice of 
law.”  Shimko at ¶ 47. 
{¶ 24} Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 and DR 2-106(A) prohibit a lawyer from 
charging or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee and set forth a number of 
factors to aid attorneys in determining whether their fees are reasonable.  Those 
factors include the time, labor, and skill involved in the representation; the 
likelihood that the acceptance of the employment will preclude other employment 
by the lawyer; the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; the 
amount involved and the results obtained; the nature and length of the 
professional relationship; the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer; and 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(1) through (8).  The 
prohibition against clearly excessive fees is a reasonable restriction of the 
freedom of contract that permits attorneys to charge a fee for their services, while 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
also preserving the integrity of the legal profession.  See Shimko, 103 Ohio St.3d 
59, 2004-Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 55 (“[V]irtually all aspects of the practice 
of law in general, and remuneration in particular, have always been considered to 
lie within the regulatory jurisdiction of the granting or admitting authority and to 
be distinct from other types of contractual arrangements”). 
{¶ 25} We have previously denounced as a clearly excessive fee charging 
legal fees for nonlegal services.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 
418, 2005-Ohio-5411, 835 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 17, 25 (attorney rates for administrative 
tasks, including picking up mail, depositing checks, paying bills, and arranging 
for lawn care, house cleaning, and the delivery of necessities result in a clearly 
excessive fee); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Alsfelder, 103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004-Ohio-
5216, 816 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 22-23 (attorney rates for social interaction with a client 
constituted a clearly excessive fee).  The factors set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) 
and the decisions of this court give attorneys a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited and to conduct themselves accordingly.  Thus, Parisi’s 
freedom-of-contract and void-for-vagueness arguments are without merit. 
{¶ 26} Parisi charged over $220,000 for services provided by herself and 
her staff and for cost reimbursements during the nearly three years that she 
represented Greene.  Her billings, however, were replete with charges at her 
attorney rate for nonlegal services like arranging and attending Greene’s doctors’ 
appointments, handling mundane tasks related to Greene’s cable-television and 
magazine subscriptions, researching local feline clubs, and arranging for the 
replacement of Greene’s watch battery.  She billed approximately $13,000 in fees 
and expenses for overseeing the partial restoration of Greene’s beloved Jaguar. 
{¶ 27} The board found that Parisi’s hourly rates for legal work were 
reasonable and that Greene believed that the services Parisi performed were 
important, had demanded (for the most part and sometimes irrationally) that she 
perform them, and had rejected some services when Parisi sought to have others 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
provide them.  Although relator did not present any expert testimony about the 
charges for Parisi’s nonlegal services, it is clear that the bulk of those services 
required little, if any, legal skill and that the cost of providing the services was 
disproportionate to the benefit that Greene received.  There is no question that 
those charges specifically addressed by relator and the scores of nonlegal services 
billed at attorney rates in Parisi’s 404-page billing record are clearly excessive. 
{¶ 28} Parisi’s claims that Prof.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.4, and 5.7 authorized her 
conduct must also fail.  There is no dispute that these rules require attorneys to 
consult with and abide by decisions concerning the objectives of their 
representation and the means by which they are pursued, promptly inform the 
client of decisions or circumstances that require the client’s informed consent, and 
permit attorneys to perform law-related services on their clients’ behalf.  But 
nothing in those rules permits attorneys to violate their ethical obligations in 
pursuing their clients’ objectives or to charge attorney rates for nonlegal services 
at the behest of a client. 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we overrule each of Parisi’s objections, adopt the 
board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to the Greene representation, 
and dismiss the alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a), (c), and (d) and DR 1-
102(A)(1), (4), and (5) as recommended by the board. 
Sanction 
{¶ 30} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 31} The board found three aggravating factors, including Parisi’s 
selfish motive in taking her attorney fees from Demming’s account, her 
commission of multiple offenses, and the vulnerability of the clients harmed by 
her conduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (d), and (h). 
{¶ 32} As mitigating factors, the board found that respondent had no prior 
disciplinary record in almost 30 years of practice, that she returned the attorney 
fees she had collected from Demming’s account before the probate court issued a 
formal order for her to do so, that she cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, 
and that she demonstrated her good reputation and character apart from the 
charged misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e).  
Although Parisi denied having committed any ethical violations, the board also 
found that she fully acknowledged that she should not have taken her fee from 
Demming during the pendency of the guardianship proceeding and that it would 
have been a better practice to show Greene her monthly bills, to have him sign 
and date them, and to have him personally sign the checks for his legal fees.  She 
also acknowledged that she should have arranged for someone else to review her 
monthly bills before Greene paid them. 
{¶ 33} The board recommends that we impose a six-month suspension for 
Parisi’s misconduct, but citing the panel’s belief that she will not repeat her 
transgressions and the difficult choices Parisi faced in representing these clients as 
their mental and physical conditions deteriorated, recommends that we stay the 
entire suspension on the condition that she commit no further misconduct.  In 
support of this recommendation, the board observes that in the absence of fraud or 
dishonesty, we have imposed comparable stayed suspensions for attorneys who 
have charged or collected a clearly excessive fee.  See Akron Bar Assn. v. 
Watkins, 120 Ohio St.3d 307, 2008-Ohio-6144, 898 N.E.2d 946, ¶ 6, 15 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
(imposing a six-month stayed suspension on an attorney who charged his hourly 
attorney rate for nonlegal services while serving as the trustee of a revocable 
living trust); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Alsfelder, 103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004-Ohio-
5216, 816 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 25, 34 (imposing a one-year stayed suspension for an 
attorney who allowed a client to consult him as a friend while charging her for his 
time as a lawyer); Disciplinary Counsel v. Dettinger, 121 Ohio St.3d 400, 2009-
Ohio-1429, 904 N.E.2d 890, ¶ 4, 10 (imposing a six-month stayed suspension for 
an attorney who borrowed money from a client without disclosing the inherent 
conflict of interest or advising the client, or upon the client’s death, his executor, 
to seek independent counsel); Disciplinary Counsel v. Jacobs, 109 Ohio St.3d 
252, 2006-Ohio-2292, 846 N.E.2d 1260, ¶ 3-5, 8 (publicly reprimanding an 
attorney for representing a husband and wife in their divorce, and while it was 
pending, representing each one on other matters without disclosing the conflict of 
interest). 
{¶ 34} Both parties object to the recommended sanction.  Parisi seeks 
dismissal of the complaint.  Citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-2115, 929 N.E.2d 442, Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush, 126 
Ohio St.3d 366, 2010-Ohio-3823, 933 N.E.2d 1091, and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007-Ohio-2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, relator argues 
that Parisi’s misconduct warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law 
with specific conditions imposed upon any stayed portion of that suspension. 
{¶ 35} Unlike Parisi’s conduct, however, each of relator’s cited authority 
involved fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit, and two of them involved findings 
that the attorney had misappropriated client funds.  Bandman withdrew $60,050 
from an elderly client’s trust account without the knowledge or consent of the 
client or her attorney-in-fact and altered a bank record and payment records to 
conceal his misdeeds.  Bandman, 125 Ohio St.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-2115, 929 
N.E.2d 442, ¶ 7, 10.  Because Bandman had misappropriated client funds, we 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law and conditioned reinstatement 
on proof that he has made full restitution.  Id. at ¶ 18-19.  And in Stahlbush, we 
imposed a two-year suspension with the second year stayed on conditions upon 
finding that the attorney had deceptively inflated her billable hours for court-
appointed work, billing more than 24 hours per day in three instances.  Stahlbush, 
126 Ohio St.3d 366, 2010-Ohio-3823, 933 N.E.2d 1091, ¶ 2-3, 11, 17. 
{¶ 36} Of the cases cited by relator, Johnson’s conduct is perhaps the 
most comparable to Parisi’s.  Johnson represented two elderly sisters—initially as 
the attorney in fact for one sister, and as a court appointed guardian for the other.  
Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007-Ohio-2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, ¶ 5.  He sought 
to recover more than $800,000 that had been misappropriated by his clients’ 
former attorney-in-fact, but failed to perform a cost-benefit analysis before 
pursuing their claims.  Id. at ¶ 71.  While he charged a reasonable hourly rate for 
his time and maintained detailed billing records, he overworked the client’s case, 
billing almost $160,000 to collect $197,683.45.  Id. at ¶ 24, 26, 71.  We rejected 
Johnson’s argument that he was acting at the behest of the sister for whom he had 
initially served as attorney-in-fact, observing that she became mentally 
incompetent during the representation, as evidenced by a June 1999 order 
appointing Johnson as her guardian.  Id. at ¶ 12, 74.  Johnson had also billed the 
sisters separately for his services and failed to disclose to the probate court the 
fees and expenses that he had collected pursuant to the power of attorney.  Id. at 
¶ 17.  In determining the appropriate sanction for Johnson’s misconduct, we 
observed that deliberate efforts to deceive generally warrant an actual suspension 
from the practice of law, and we imposed a one-year suspension, with the last six 
months stayed on conditions, including the payment of restitution, and a six-
month period of probation.  Id. at ¶ 85, 89. 
{¶ 37} In this case, Parisi has engaged in a conflict of interest by 
representing both Demming and the niece who sought her guardianship, has 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by paying her own 
fees during the guardianship proceeding, and has charged a clearly excessive fee 
for nonlegal services that she provided to Greene.  But unlike the situations cited 
by relator, there have been no findings that Parisi has engaged in fraud, 
misrepresentation, or deceit.  She returned the $18,000 payment to herself in the 
Demming matter and has settled litigation with Greene’s heirs with her agreement 
to forgo approximately $25,000 in additional billings and with a $21,000 payment 
from her malpractice carrier. Furthermore, the panel believes that Parisi will not 
repeat her transgressions, and we defer to that credibility determination because 
the panel members saw and heard her testimony firsthand.  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 38} Having considered Parisi’s misconduct, the aggravating and 
mitigating factors present, and the sanctions imposed for comparable offenses, we 
overrule the parties’ objections and adopt the board’s recommended sanction of a 
six-month suspension, all stayed on the condition that Parisi commit no further 
misconduct.  Accordingly, we suspend Georgianna I. Parisi from the practice of 
law in Ohio for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that 
she commit no further misconduct.  If Parisi fails to comply with that condition, 
the stay will be lifted, and she will serve the entire six-month suspension.  Costs 
are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., 
concur. 
CUPP, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents and would accept the relator’s recommended 
sanction of an indefinite suspension. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would impose a one-year suspension with six 
months stayed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
__________________ 
CUPP, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 39} Although I concur in the decision of the court, I would also add as 
a condition of the stayed suspension that respondent submit to the monitoring of 
her practice by an attorney designated by relator during the entire term of the 
stayed six-month suspension. 
__________________ 
Gary C. Schaengold and Mark A. Tuss, for relator. 
Konrad Kuczak and Dianna M. Anelli, for respondent. 
______________________