Case Title: Harper v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THOMAS HARPER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 94, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0108001171 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 12, 2012 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: November 27, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 27th day of November 2012, upon consideration of the opening brief, the 
State’s motion to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Thomas Harper, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s sentence for a violation of probation (VOP).  The State of Delaware 
has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on 
the face of Harper’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
Harper pled guilty in January 2003 to four counts of Unlawful Sexual 
Contact in the Second Degree.  The Superior Court sentenced him on all four 
convictions to a total period of eight years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
2 
 
after serving eighteen months in prison for decreasing levels of supervision.  The 
conditions of his sentence included a no contact order with any child under the age of 
16, no internet access, and successful completion of sex offender treatment.  Harper 
did not appeal his convictions or sentence.  In February 2012, Harper was charged 
with his third VOP.  At the VOP hearing, Harper admitted that he had been in 
possession of a cell phone with internet access and that he had had contact with his 
girlfriend’s child.  The Superior Court found Harper in violation and sentenced him 
on one count to two years at Level V incarceration with credit for six days served.  
On the second count,1 the Superior Court continued his Level III probation as 
previously ordered.  This appeal followed. 
 
(3) 
 While it is not entirely clear, Harper appears to argue on appeal that the 
cell phones found in his possession did not belong to him and that he should not have 
been found in violation for possessing them.  He also appears to suggest that this 
probation officer said things at the VOP hearing that were not true. 
 
(4) 
We find no merit to Harper’s appeal.   In a VOP hearing, unlike a 
criminal trial, the State is only required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant violated the terms of his probation.2  A preponderance of evidence 
means “some competent evidence” to “reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct 
                                                 
1 Between the time of his original sentencing and his third VOP hearing, Harper had completed 
serving sentences associated with two of his original charges. 
2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 
3 
 
of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of probation.”3  
In this case, Harper admitted having a cell phone with internet access in his 
possession and to having contact with his girlfriend’s child.  The Superior Court was 
entitled to rely on these admissions and did not err in finding that Harper had violated 
probation. 
 
(5) 
Having determined that Harper had violated his probation, the Superior 
Court was authorized to impose any period of incarceration up to and including the 
balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on the original sentence.4  There 
were four years of suspended time remaining on Harper’s original sentence.  The 
Superior Court’s two-year sentence for Harper’s third VOP, thus, was within 
statutory limits, was not excessive, and in no way reflected a closed mind by the 
sentencing judge.5    
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
3 Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 (Del. 2006)). 
4DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (2007). 
5 See Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003).