Case Title: State v. Brown

Citation: 2014 WI 69

Docket Number: 2011AP002907-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2907-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Antonio D. Brown, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
346 Wis. 2d 98, 827 N.W.2d 903 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 17 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Rebecca F. Dallet 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
ROGGENSACK, ZIEGLER, JJ., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Aaron O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Hannah B. 
Schieber, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Hannah B. Schieber. 
 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak and Henak 
Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2011AP2907-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF3318) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Antonio D. Brown, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The State of Wisconsin seeks 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 that 
reversed the circuit court's denial of Antonio Brown's motion to 
vacate his conviction and plea and to suppress all evidence 
seized during a stop of his vehicle.  The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court erred because there was no 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Brown's vehicle.  
                                                 
1 State v. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, 346 Wis. 2d 98, 827 N.W.2d 
903 (reversing order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
Rebecca F. Dallet, J.). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
2 
 
Accordingly, it concluded that the evidence resulting from the 
search should have been suppressed.  
¶2 
The State contends that the officers' observation of 
an unlit light bulb in Brown's tail lamp justified a stop 
because the law requires all light bulbs in a tail lamp to be 
lit.  It asserts that this requirement is found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.13(1) (2009-10),2 which prohibits the operation of a 
vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in "good working 
order."  Because the officers observed a violation of the law, 
the State maintains that they had probable cause to stop the 
vehicle.  Even if the unlit bulb was not part of the tail lamp, 
the State contends that it still created reasonable suspicion to 
stop the vehicle and the results of the search should not be 
suppressed. 
¶3 
Contrary to the State, we do not interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.13(1) as requiring every single light bulb in a tail lamp 
to be lit.  The plain language of the statute requires that a 
tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the 
vehicle during hours of darkness.  This interpretation is 
further supported by related statutes requiring that the lamps 
be in proper working condition.  Wis. Stat. § 347.06(3). 
¶4 
Because the only basis for the stop of Brown's vehicle 
was the unlit bulb, we conclude that there was not probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.  Where the 
stop of the vehicle was unlawful, so too was its search, and the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
3 
 
results of that search must be suppressed.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
It is uncontested that Brown was a passenger in a 
Buick Electra that was stopped by police officers.  During the 
stop, the officers searched the vehicle and discovered a gun.  
Brown was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).  He subsequently filed a 
motion to suppress the gun, asserting that the officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. 
¶6 
At 
the 
motion 
hearing 
the 
State 
presented 
the 
testimony of Officer Wawrzonek and Officer Feely.  Although some 
details varied, the officers' testimony regarding the stop of 
Brown's vehicle was largely consistent.   
¶7 
According to the officers, they were on a routine 
patrol when they spotted a 1977 Buick Electra with a "defective 
tail light."  Officer Wawrzonek explained that there was a "wide 
band" with three light panels on the back of the vehicle and one 
of the panels was out.  Officer Feely stated that it was the 
middle light on the driver's side that was out.  Based on the 
Buick's "defective" tail lamp, Officer Feely activated the 
flashing red and blue lights on their patrol car and conducted a 
traffic stop.  After stopping the vehicle and removing its 
passengers, Officer Feely searched the vehicle and discovered a 
firearm under the front passenger-side seat. 
¶8 
Brown presented the testimony of Willie Lipsey who 
stated that on the night of the stop he attended a barbeque with 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
4 
 
Brown.  When they left, Lipsey drove Brown's car because Brown 
was intoxicated.  Lipsey testified that he stopped at a gas 
station and observed that the tail lamps were functioning 
properly when he pumped gas into the car.  He was in a position 
to see this as the gas tank of the Buick is behind the rear 
license plate.  After leaving the gas station, Lipsey headed 
home.  The stop occurred as he was parking. 
¶9 
Several photographs of the back of Brown's vehicle 
were admitted into evidence.  One photograph is a close-up view 
of the rear-passenger side of the vehicle with the outside panel 
encasing the tail lamp removed.  Four light bulbs are visible: a 
cluster of three bulbs on the left-hand side and a fourth bulb 
toward the center of the vehicle next to its license plate.   In 
explaining the photo, Lipsey testified that the first and third 
lights were tail lights, the second light was a brake light, and 
the separate light was a reverse light.  According to Lipsey, 
only the two tail lights are lit when the car is driving down 
the street.   
¶10 The circuit court denied the suppression motion.  It 
determined that Lipsey's testimony that the tail lights were 
working was not credible.  In contrast, it found the officers' 
testimony to be credible and therefore determined that there was 
probable cause for the stop.  It further determined that the 
search was justified by the need to protect the officers' 
safety.   
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
5 
 
¶11 Following the ruling, Brown pled guilty to the charge.3  
Subsequently, 
the 
court 
sentenced 
Brown 
to 
five 
years 
imprisonment with three years initial confinement and two years 
extended supervision.  
¶12 Brown submitted a motion for postconviction relief 
seeking an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and 
suppressing all evidence seized during the stop of the Buick.  
Citing Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1), he asserted that there was no 
basis for the stop because under the law only two tail lamps 
must be in good working order, not all of four of them.  
Accordingly, he contended that the stop of the Buick was 
unconstitutional and evidence found during its search must be 
suppressed.4   
¶13 The circuit court denied the postconviction motion.  
It determined that the officers had a reasonable belief that one 
of the vehicle's tail lamps was defective.  Even if the officers 
                                                 
3 Although 
a 
guilty 
plea 
generally 
waives 
all 
nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, there is an exception 
which permits appellate review of orders denying motions to 
suppress evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10); Cnty. of Racine v. 
Smith, 122 Wis. 2d 431, 434-35, 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984). 
4 In the alternative, Brown argued to the circuit court that 
he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial 
attorney failed to bring Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) to the court's 
attention. 
 
The 
court 
concluded 
that 
this 
argument 
was 
unconvincing 
because 
it 
did 
not 
agree 
with 
Brown's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. §347.13(1).  Brown's motion also 
requested an order amending the judgment of conviction to 
include 209 days of sentence credit for the time he spent in 
jail between the date of his arrest and the date of his 
sentencing.  The court determined that Brown was entitled to 195 
days, not 209 days of sentence credit. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
6 
 
were wrong, the court stated, that did not affect their 
reasonable belief at the time of the stop.     
¶14  On appeal, Brown again argued that the evidence from 
the search of the vehicle should have been suppressed because 
there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the 
stop.   
¶15 Although a stop can be based on either probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion, the court of appeals determined that 
the issue in this case was whether the unlit bulb created 
probable cause.  State v. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, ¶¶14-15, 346 
Wis. 2d 98, 827 N.W.2d 903.  It noted the officers' testimony 
that they stopped the vehicle because of the unlit bulb, stating 
"[t]hey did not act upon a suspicion that warranted further 
investigation, but on [their] observation of a violation being 
committed in [their] presence."  Id. at ¶15 (quoting State v. 
Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1999)).  
Because the officers were not acting on a suspicion, but on what 
they believed was a violation of law being committed in their 
presence, the court concluded that probable cause was the 
appropriate focus.  Id.   
¶16 The court of appeals agreed with Brown.  Id. at ¶21.  
It reasoned that under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) a vehicle's tail 
lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition in 
order to be in "good working order."  Id.  Noting that a lawful 
stop cannot be predicated on a mistake of law, the court 
determined that the officers' mistaken belief that all the tail 
lights on a vehicle need to be lit could not serve as probable 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
7 
 
cause for a stop.  Id. (citing Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d at 9).  
Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court.5  
II 
¶17 In this case we are asked to consider whether Brown's 
vehicle was lawfully stopped.6  "Whether there is probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of 
constitutional fact."  State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶10, 317 Wis. 
2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569.  As such, it is a mixed question of fact 
and law, requiring a two-step standard of review.  State v. 
Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.  This court 
reviews the circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly 
erroneous standard, and reviews independently the application of 
those facts to constitutional principles.  Id.   
¶18 Here, the relevant facts are undisputed.  The parties 
agree that the officers stopped Brown's vehicle because one of 
                                                 
5 Because it reversed on the merits, the court of appeals 
did not address Brown's alternative argument that his trial 
counsel was ineffective.  Brown, 346 Wis. 2d 98, ¶21 n.6.   
Brown also appealed the issue of his sentence credit.  The court 
also determined that it did not need to address Brown's 
sentencing credit issue because it reversed his conviction.  It 
noted that the State had conceded that had Brown's conviction 
stood, he would have been entitled to the sentence credit he 
sought.  Id. at ¶22.  For the same reason as the court of 
appeals, we also do not address the issues of ineffective 
assistance of counsel or Brown's sentence credit. 
6 When accepting the petition for review, we asked the 
parties to address the propriety of the search in light of 
Arizona 
v. 
Gant, 
556 
U.S. 
332 
(2009). 
 
Both 
parties 
affirmatively stated that Gant does not apply and that the issue 
in this case is whether the stop itself violated Brown's rights, 
not the subsequent search.  Accordingly, we limit our analysis 
to the reasonableness of the stop of Brown's vehicle. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
8 
 
the three lights on the rear driver's side of the car was not 
lit.  Thus, our inquiry focuses on whether under the facts there 
were sufficient grounds for a traffic stop.  This inquiry calls 
upon us to interpret the relevant statute establishing the 
requirements for vehicle tail lamps, Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1).  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review 
independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and 
the court of appeals.  State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238. 
III 
¶19 We begin our analysis by examining the constitutional 
principles underlying traffic stops.  The Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
protect 
citizens 
from 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures.7  Traffic stops are considered seizures 
and thus must be reasonable to pass constitutional muster.  
                                                 
7 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause 
 . . . ."  Likewise, Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, provides: "The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause . . . ."   
This court generally interprets the protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the state and 
federal constitutions coextensively.  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 
¶10 n.2, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.  "However, the state 
provisions may provide greater protections."  Id. (citing State 
v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶63, n.31, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 
625). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
9 
 
Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 809-10 (1996).  If the seizure is unreasonable and 
therefore unconstitutional, then evidence obtained as a result 
is generally inadmissible.  State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 
263, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  A good faith exception to this rule 
applies in limited circumstances such as where the police have 
relied in good faith on either a warrant issued by a detached 
and 
neutral 
magistrate 
or 
on 
well-settled 
law 
that 
was 
subsequently overturned.  State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶44, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶3, 
245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  
¶20 The burden is on the State to prove that a stop meets 
the constitutional reasonableness requirement.   Post, 301 Wis. 
2d 1, ¶12; Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 263.  A traffic stop can be 
based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  State v. 
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 439 (1984)).  "[P]robable cause exists when the officer has 
'reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or 
has committed a crime.'"  Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶14 (quoting 
Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 344, 348, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1977)).  
There is reasonable suspicion justifying a stop if "the facts of 
the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of 
his or her training and experience, to suspect that the 
individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit 
a crime."  Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.   
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
10 
 
¶21 In this case, the officers stopped Brown's vehicle 
because one of the bulbs on the back of the vehicle was unlit.  
The State asserts that the unlit bulb created probable cause to 
stop the vehicle because it violated the requirement in Wis. 
Stat. § 347.13(1) that tail lamps be in "good working order."  
It further contends that even if the officers were wrong and the 
unlit bulb was not part of the tail lamp, the unlit bulb still 
created reasonable suspicion that Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) was 
being violated.  Brown disagrees with both contentions, arguing 
that Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) does not require all bulbs in a tail 
lamp to be lit and thus the officers had neither probable cause 
nor reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.   
¶22 Both 
parties 
agree 
that 
if 
the 
officers' 
interpretation of the law were incorrect that the stop would be 
unconstitutional because a lawful stop cannot be predicated upon 
a mistake of law.  Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d at 9.  At oral 
argument, 
the 
State 
explicitly 
stated 
that 
"we 
are 
not 
challenging Longcore."8  In its supplemental briefing the State 
                                                 
8 At oral argument counsel for the State engaged in the 
following exchange: 
Justice Ziegler: Why couldn't [the stop] be based upon 
the officer's reasonable belief that the tail light 
was out?  
Attorney for the State: It could be based on the-  if 
the officer could reasonably believe that that bulb 
was part of the tail lamp, and the law requires that 
all the bulbs be lit in the tail lamp, if that's 
correct, then the stop would be valid on the basis of- 
Chief Justice Abrahamson:  Even if he's wrong. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
11 
 
maintained that "the existence of probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion in the context of a traffic stop depends on the 
correct interpretation of the statute prohibiting the conduct." 9 
¶23 A substantial majority of the federal circuit courts 
have also held that a lawful stop cannot be predicated upon a 
mistake of law.10  United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 
(4th Cir. 2014) ("Nor do we suggest that a police officer's 
mistake of law can support probable cause to conduct a stop when 
the underlying conduct was not, in fact, illegal."); United 
                                                                                                                                                             
Attorney for the State:  Even if he's wrong about the 
facts.  But if he's wrong about the law, then we are 
conceding that the stop was invalid.  
9 After oral argument this court asked the parties for 
supplemental briefing.  Specifically, the court asked the 
parties to brief: 
 
1) whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Brown's vehicle because the officer believed that Wis. 
Stat. § 347.13(1) was violated when not all the tail 
light bulbs on Brown's vehicle were working.   
 
2) whether an officer's good faith mistake of law on which 
the officer makes a traffic stop, requires reviewing 
courts to conclude that the stop was not lawful. 
 
State v. Brown, No. 2011AP2907, unpublished order (Feb. 26, 
2014). 
10 Justice 
Roggensack's 
dissent 
advocates 
a 
minority 
position.  Only three circuit courts have adopted an approach 
which would permit a stop based on an error of law: the D.C. 
Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit.  See United 
States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Bueno, 443 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 
2006).   
 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
12 
 
States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(determining stop was unreasonable where "even if [the driver] 
acted exactly as [the officer] believed, his actions were not a 
violation of any Illinois state traffic law."); United States v. 
Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Stops premised on a 
mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are 
generally held to be unconstitutional."); United States v. 
Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[F]ailure to 
understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it 
is 
not 
objectively 
reasonable."); 
United 
States 
v. 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[A] 
mistake of law cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to justify a traffic stop.");  United States v. Twilley, 
222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[I]n this circuit, a belief 
based on a misunderstanding of the law cannot constitute the 
reasonable suspicion required for a constitutional traffic 
stop."); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 
1998) ("[G]iven that having a turn signal on is not a violation 
of Texas law, no objective basis for probable cause justified 
the stop of Miller").   
¶24 As the Seventh Circuit has explained, "[a]n officer 
cannot have a reasonable belief that a violation of the law 
occurred when the acts to which an officer points as supporting 
probable cause are not prohibited by law."  McDonald, 453 F.3d 
at 961.  The grounds for a traffic stop must be objectively 
reasonable and "[a] stop based on a subjective belief that a law 
has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
13 
 
objectively reasonable."  Id. at 962.  Admitting evidence into 
the record on such a basis "would defeat the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police 
to make certain that they properly understand the law that they 
are entrusted to enforce and obey."  Id. (quoting United States 
v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also 
Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 Emory L.J. 69, 106 
(2011) ("there has been no mistaking that the specter of [the 
exclusionary rule's] application has prompted police departments 
to significantly fortify and improve their training efforts 
relative to Fourth Amendment expectations."). 
¶25 Further, the rule that an officer's mistake of law is 
not sufficient grounds for a stop is consistent with holdings 
from a substantial majority of the state courts that have 
addressed the issue.  State v. Babcock, 992 N.E.2d 1215, 1220 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2013) ("[W]e hold that the exclusionary rule 
operates to bar the admission of evidence obtained as a result 
of a traffic stop based on conduct that a police officer 
mistakenly believes is a violation of the law."); Martin v. Kan. 
Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008) ("[A] police 
officer must be held to a more demanding standard of legal 
knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's 
exercise of authority. . . .  [C]onsequently [we] hold that an 
officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop 
violative of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."); State v. Tiffin, 121 
P.3d 9, 12 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]he facts, as the officer 
perceives them, must actually constitute an infraction in order 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
14 
 
for the officer's belief that an infraction occurred to be 
objectively reasonable.").  See also State v. Cantsee, 321 P.3d 
888, 891 (Nev. 2014); State v. Dunbar, 728 S.E.2d 539, 545 (W. 
Va. 2012); State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 2010); 
McDonald v. State, 947 A.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Del. 2008); State v. 
Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 319 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Lacasella, 
60 P.3d 975, 981 (Mont. 2002); State v. Lussier, 757 A.2d 1017, 
1029 (Vt. 2000); Commonwealth v. Rachau, 670 A.2d 731, 735 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. Bernard, 3 N.E.3d 1113, 1115 
n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); Gilmore v. State, 42 A.3d 123, 135 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 
722 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); J.D.I. v. State, 77 So. 3d 610, 617 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2011);  Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 139 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007); State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007); People v. Ramirez, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 816 (Cal. 
App. 2006); State v. Puzio, 878 A.2d 857, 860 (NJ App. Div. 
2005); Gordon v. State, 901 So. 2d 399, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005); Byer v. Jackson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997).11 
                                                 
11 We acknowledge that a minority of the state courts that 
have addressed the issue have taken a contrary position.  See, 
e.g., State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); Moore v. 
State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008); Travis v. State, 959 
S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ark. 1998); McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111, 
113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); DeChene v. Smallwood, 311 S.E.2d 749, 
751 (Va. 1984). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
15 
 
¶26 Having examined the application of constitutional 
principles underlying traffic stops, we turn to address the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) in order to apply those 
principles in this case.  Statutory interpretation begins with 
the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  The language in a statute "is given its common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical 
or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.  Further, a statute's 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used, "in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id. at ¶46. 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.13(1) requires a vehicle to have 
at least one tail lamp which emits a red light visible to 
another vehicle traveling 500 feet behind it and prohibits 
operation of a vehicle at night when its tail lamps are not "in 
good working order."  Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1).  The statute 
provides: 
No person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . upon a 
highway during hours of darkness unless such motor 
vehicle . . . is equipped with at least one tail lamp 
mounted on the rear which, when lighted during hours 
of darkness, emits a red light plainly visible from a 
distance of 500 feet to the rear. No tail lamp shall 
have any type of decorative covering that restricts 
the amount of light emitted when the tail lamp is in 
use. No vehicle originally equipped at the time of 
manufacture and sale with 2 tail lamps shall be 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
16 
 
operated upon a highway during hours of darkness 
unless both such lamps are in good working order.  
Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) (emphasis supplied).  The term "tail 
lamp" is defined as "a device to designate the rear of a vehicle 
by a warning light."12  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(66).  At issue in 
this case is what constitutes a tail lamp in "good working 
order." 
¶28 The phrase "good working order" is not defined in the 
statute, thus we accord the phrase its common, ordinary and 
accepted meaning.  "In determining the ordinary meaning of 
undefined words, '[w]e may consult a dictionary to aid in 
statutory construction."  Xcel Energy Servs. v. Labor & Indus. 
Review Comm'n, 2013 WI 64, ¶30, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665 
(quoting Cnty. of Dane v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2009 WI 
9, ¶23, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571).   
¶29 Dictionary 
definitions 
of 
"good," 
"working," 
and 
"working order" suggest that the term "good working order" means 
suitable or functioning for the intended use.13  Thus, the 
                                                 
12 Because Wis. Stat. § 340.01(66) defines "tail lamp" as "a 
device," it is the entire tail lamp, and not each individual 
light bulb in the tail lamp, that must function as indicated by 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1). 
13 For definitions of "good" see The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 780 (3d ed. 1992) ("[s]erving 
the desired purpose or end, suitable"); The Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 822 (2d ed. 1993) ("satisfactory in 
quality, 
quantity, 
or 
degree"); 
and 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International Dictionary 978 (1986) ("adapted to the end 
designed or proposed: satisfactory in performance"). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
17 
 
ordinary meaning of "good working order" focuses on whether an 
object is functioning so as to fulfill its intended purpose.   
¶30 Further, construing "good working order" in the 
context of Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) to mean functioning for the 
intended purpose is consistent with how we have construed "good 
working order" in the past.   
¶31 In State v. Trailer Service, Inc., 61 Wis. 2d 400, 
404, 212 N.W.2d 683 (1973), the court looked to function when 
determining whether a certified scale for weighing a vehicle was 
in "good working order."  The case involved a dispute over 
whether a truck had been properly weighed before its driver was 
given a citation for overload.  Id. at 402.  The court examined 
two statutes: Wis. Stat. § 348.19(1)(a), permitting an officer 
to require a truck to be weighed on the nearest usable scale, 
and Wis. Stat. § 348.15(5), requiring trucks to be weighed on 
scales that are in "good working order."  Id. at 404-05.  It 
noted that "'[u]sable' also means 'in good working order,' i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                             
For definitions of "working" see The American Heritage 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language 
2057 
(3d 
ed. 
1992) 
("[o]perating or functioning as required," "[s]ufficient to 
allow action," and "[a]dequate for practical use");  The Random 
House Unabridged Dictionary 2189 (2d ed. 1993) ("operating; 
producing effects, results, etc.," and "adequate for usual or 
customary 
needs"); 
and 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 2635 (1986) ("adequate to permit work to be done"). 
For definitions of "working order" see The Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 2189 (2d ed. 1993) ("[T]he condition of a 
mechanism when it is functioning properly."); and Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 2635 (1986) ("[A] condition 
of a machine in which it functions according to its nature and 
purpose."). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
18 
 
in such operating or mechanical condition that it correctly 
performs the function or utility or the purpose of a scale."  
Id. at 405.  Accordingly, the court determined that the scale's 
use was permissible because it was shown to make true and 
accurate measurements.  Id.  
¶32 Other jurisdictions have also focused on function when 
determining whether tail lamps are in compliance with a 
statutory requirement that they be in good or proper working 
order.  See Kroft v. State, 992 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013) (determining that a tail lamp was still in good working 
order despite a dime-sized hole because there was no evidence 
the hole affected the visibility of the light to another 
vehicle); Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1988) (taillight in proper condition despite crack in a 
taillight because it still emitted a red light visible within 
the requisite distance).14  We likewise conclude the focus should 
be on the function of a tail lamp in determining whether it is 
in "good working order" under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1). 
¶33 The statutory definition of "tail lamp" provides that 
its intended purpose is to "designate the rear of a vehicle as a 
warning light."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(66).  The language of Wis. 
Stat. § 347.13(1) clarifies that a tail lamp does so by emitting 
                                                 
14 Contrary to Justice Roggensack's dissent's assertion, we 
do not cite to Kroft and Vicknair in support of a conclusion 
that "the officers acted unreasonably." Justice Roggensack's 
dissent, ¶112. Rather, the cases are cited for the premise that 
courts look to function to determine whether there is a 
violation of a statute. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
19 
 
during hours of darkness "a red light plainly visible from a 
distance of 500 feet to the rear."  Accordingly, a tail lamp is 
functioning for its intended use and thus in good working order 
when during hours of darkness it emits a red warning light that 
is visible to another vehicle traveling 500 feet behind it. 
¶34 We do not agree with the State that when read in the 
context of surrounding statutes Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) requires 
all light bulbs in a tail lamp to be lit.  The State points to 
Wis. Stat. § 347.06(3) and Wis. Admin. Code § Trans. 305.16(2) 
which require tail lamps to be kept in "proper working 
condition."  However, "proper" is not a synonym for "perfect."  
Rather it is more akin to "good" or "suitable."15  Thus, the 
statutes requiring tail lamps to be in proper working condition 
are more in line with requiring a tail lamp to function for its 
intended purpose than with requiring all light bulbs in a tail 
lamp to function perfectly. 
¶35 Construing Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) as requiring every 
single light bulb on the back of a vehicle to be in perfect 
condition would lead to absurd and unreasonable results.  Not 
only is such an interpretation inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute, but it is also not practical 
                                                 
15 "Proper" 
is 
defined 
as 
"[c]haracterized 
by 
appropriateness 
or 
suitability." 
 
The 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1452 (3d ed. 1992); see also 
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1550 (2d ed. 1993) (defining 
"proper" 
as 
"adapted 
or 
appropriate 
to 
the 
purpose 
or 
circumstances; 
fit; 
suitable"); 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
1817 
(1986) 
("adequate 
to 
the 
purpose"). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
20 
 
considering the variety of tail lamp designs today.  Brown 
points to tail lamps that are composed of multiple light bulbs 
creating intricate designs.  He cites as an example the tail 
lamp of an Audi, composed of thirty tiny light bulbs, which is 
pictured in his brief.  We agree with Brown that there is 
nothing to suggest that a single unlit bulb out of several in a 
tail lamp would necessarily impair the tail lamp's function.   
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.13(1) requires that vehicles 
with two tail lamps not be operated during hours of darkness 
"unless both such lamps are in good working order."  It would be 
unreasonable to require the public to maintain every light bulb 
in a tail lamp in perfect condition when that is more than is 
required by the statute.  The legislature determined that 
visibility from 500 feet is sufficient to protect public safety 
and we defer to its policy decisions.   
¶37 Contrary to the State's assertions, the standard we 
adopt is not unworkable and does not fail to give guidance to 
police officers.  This interpretation requires officers to 
determine if they can see a red light emitted from the back of a 
vehicle from a distance of 500 feet.  Officers routinely have to 
gauge distances to determine whether motorists have violated 
traffic laws.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 346.33(1)(e) (requires 
officers to determine whether a driver making a U-turn on a 
curve or crest can be seen by another driver approaching from 
500 feet); § 346.51(1)(b) (requires officers to determine if a 
standing vehicle can be seen by operators of other vehicles from 
a distance of 500 feet); § 346.14 (requires officers to 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
21 
 
determine whether there are 500 feet between vehicles).  We are 
confident that they can apply that ability to determine whether 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) has been violated as well. 
¶38 In this case, the only basis that the State presented 
for the stop of Brown's vehicle was the unlit bulb in his tail 
lamp.  However, there was no evidence that his tail lamp was not 
visible from 500 feet to the rear of the car.  The officers 
testified that only one of the bulbs on the back of Brown's 
vehicle was unlit.  Because having one unlit bulb on the back of 
a vehicle does not on its own violate the statutory requirements 
for tail lamps, the State has failed to show that the officers 
had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had 
occurred. 
¶39  We likewise reject the State's alternative argument 
that it had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.  The 
State asserts that the officers could have reasonably believed 
that the unlit light bulb was part of the tail lamp.  In this 
case, such an argument is inextricably intertwined with the 
interpretation of the underlying traffic violation.  It fails 
because even assuming the officers made a mistake of fact 
regarding whether the unlit light bulb was part of the tail 
lamp, they would still have to rely on a mistake of law to have 
reasonable suspicion.  
¶40  Like probable cause, reasonable suspicion cannot be 
based on a mistake of law. 
Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 633 
(7th Cir. 2013) ("[A] police officer's suspicion of wrongdoing 
that is premised on a mistake of law cannot justify a Terry 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
22 
 
stop."); United States v. Tyler, 512 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 
2008) ("[A] mistake of law (as opposed to a mistake of fact) 
cannot justify an investigative detention."); Chanthasouxat, 342 
F.3d at 1279 ("[A] mistake of law cannot provide reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop.").    
¶41 Because one unlit bulb in a tail lamp does not 
establish a violation of Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1), the unlit light 
bulb on Brown's vehicle was an insufficient basis to reasonably 
suspect that Brown had committed, was committing, or was about 
to commit a crime.  Given that there was no lawful basis 
asserted as grounds for stopping Brown's vehicle, the evidence 
the officers found in the vehicle pursuant to that stop is "the 
fruit" of an illegal seizure.  Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 263.  
Accordingly, the evidence resulting from the search should be 
suppressed.  
IV 
¶42 In sum, we do not interpret Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) as 
requiring every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit.  The 
plain language of the statute requires that a tail lamp emit a 
red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours 
of darkness.  This interpretation is further supported by 
related statutes requiring that the lamps be in proper working 
condition. 
¶43 Because the only basis for the stop of Brown's vehicle 
was the unlit bulb we conclude that there was not probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.  Where the stop of 
the vehicle was unlawful, so too was its search, and the results 
No.  2011AP2907-CR 
   
 
23 
 
of that search must be suppressed.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 DAVID T. 
PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  
The issue 
presented in this case is whether two Milwaukee police officers 
had probable cause to stop a vehicle when they perceived what 
they believed was an unlit light bulb in the tail lamp of the 
vehicle.  There is dispute whether there was or was not an unlit 
light bulb in the tail lamp of the vehicle.  The majority 
concludes that it makes no difference because "we do not 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) as requiring every single light 
bulb in a tail lamp to be lit."  Majority op., ¶3.  Thus, the 
majority concludes that the officers made an unconstitutional 
mistake of law when they acted on the belief that a tail lamp 
with an unlit bulb was not in "proper working condition at all 
times" and not "in good working order."   
¶45 In my view, the conclusion that partially unlit tail 
lamps comply with Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) if they are visible 
from 500 feet away creates a vague, unworkable standard for law 
enforcement.  Consequently, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶46 On July 3, 2010, two Milwaukee police officers, 
William Feely and Michael Wawrzonek, were on patrol duty near 
2900 West Capitol Drive in the City of Milwaukee.  It was 
approximately 9:30 p.m.  Officer Feely was driving a marked 
squad car.  Officer Wawrzonek was in the passenger seat.  The 
officers spotted a 1977 Buick Electra turn south on North 28th 
Street.  Both officers observed what they perceived as a 
defective tail lamp.  When the squad car was approximately three 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
car lengths behind the Electra, it activated its red and blue 
emergency lights to make a stop of the Electra.  At the same 
time, the vehicle slowed down and pulled over to the curb to 
stop. 
¶47 Following the stop, the officers seized a pistol 
belonging to the defendant, Antonio D. Brown, who was riding as 
a passenger in his own vehicle because he was intoxicated.  
Brown was a convicted felon on parole.  He subsequently moved to 
suppress evidence of the weapon on grounds that police "seizure" 
of his vehicle was unlawful. 
¶48 At the suppression hearing on January 13, 2011, the 
two officers described the stop.  Officer Wawrzonek testified: 
Q. 
Is there anything specific about that vehicle 
that caught your attention? 
A. 
Yeah, defective tail light. 
. . . .  
Q. 
Do you remember what tail light it was that was 
defective on that unit? 
A. 
It was the driver side tail lamp.  There is a 
wide band and there is actually three light panels on 
that wide band and one of those panels was out. 
 
. . . .  
Q. 
Now, when you said that there was a defective 
tail light . . .  are you referring to the reflective 
red lights or the white back-up lights? 
A. 
One of the red lights.  He was going——he was 
going forward so there was no reverse going on at this 
point so I wouldn't see a white light.  It was one of 
the red lights. 
 
. . . .  
Q. 
So two of the panels were working properly? 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
A. 
That's my recollection. 
¶49 When Officer Feely testified, he identified the 
specific light that appeared to be defective: 
Q. 
And do you recall what the basis for the stop 
was, Officer? 
A. 
Defective tail lamp. 
Q. 
And 
when 
you 
say 
that, 
did 
you 
remember 
specifically which tail light was out? 
A. 
Believe it was the driver side middle one. 
Q. 
Would that have been a red or white light if you 
recall? 
A. 
Red. 
¶50 At a continuation of the suppression hearing on 
January 21, 2011, the driver of the Electra testified that there 
were no defects in the tail lamps.  He also testified that the 
vehicle "has red lights on both sides, and a white light is the 
reverse light, and the middle light is a brake light." 
¶51 The driver, Willie Lipsey (Lipsey), said that when the 
vehicle was operating with its lights on, there were only two 
red lights showing in the tail lamps on each side of the rear 
license plate.  He said a red brake light situated between the 
other red lights in the tail lamp1 did not illuminate until the 
driver applied the brakes. 
¶52 This description of the operation of the rear lights 
does not explain why the officers noticed a difference in the 
two tail lamp panels——with only the left panel appearing to have 
                                                 
1 "A stop lamp may be incorporated with a tail lamp."  Wis. 
Stat. § 347.14.  From the testimony, it seems as though the stop 
lamp was incorporated with the tail lamp in the Electra. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
a gap between the lights.  This description also fails to 
explain why the officers did not state that both panels were 
working perfectly when the driver applied the brakes before 
stopping at the curb.  It may have been because the left brake 
light was not working when the vehicle turned the corner and 
when it came to a stop.  It is also possible that one of the 
light bulbs in the tail lamp, other than the brake light, was 
out. 
¶53 There appear to be only three possible scenarios: (1) 
one of the light bulbs in the left tail lamp was not working; 
(2) the officers thought that one of the light bulbs in the left 
tail lamp was not working;2 or (3) the officers were not telling 
the truth about what they saw.  Although the facts remain in 
dispute, the circuit court found that the officers were credible 
when they testified that they saw a defective tail lamp and that 
Lipsey was not credible when he testified that he remembered 
that all the rear lights were functioning properly. 
II 
¶54 Wisconsin 
has 
an 
elaborate 
motor 
vehicle 
code,3 
including 
detailed 
provisions 
for 
motor 
vehicle 
lighting 
equipment.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 347.06-347.30. 
¶55 Chapter 347 begins with a section that indicates that 
"Words and phrases defined in s. 340.01 are used in the same 
sense 
in 
this 
chapter 
unless 
a 
different 
definition 
is 
specifically provided."  Wis. Stat. § 347.01. 
                                                 
2 This possibility would have been a mistake of fact. 
3 See Wis. Stat. chs. 340-51. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶56 Section 340.01 includes definitions for numerous lamps 
such 
as 
"Clearance 
lamps,"4 
"Direction 
signal 
lamp,"5 
"Headlamp,"6 "Identification lamps,"7 "Multiple beam headlamp,"8 
"Stop lamp,"9 and "Tail lamp."10  Chapter 347 contains both 
general and specific provisions governing these various types of 
lighting equipment. 
¶57 For example, Wis. Stat. § 347.06 reads in part: 
 
(1) [N]o person may operate a vehicle upon a 
highway during hours of darkness unless all headlamps, 
tail lamps and clearance lamps with which such vehicle 
is required to be equipped are lighted. 
                                                 
4 "'Clearance lamps' means lamps on the left and right sides 
of the front and rear of a vehicle which show to the front and 
rear to mark the extreme sides of the vehicle."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(7). 
5 "'Direction signal lamp' means a lighting device used to 
indicate the intention of the operator of a vehicle to change 
direction."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(13). 
6 "'Headlamp' means a major lighting device used to provide 
general illumination ahead of a vehicle."   Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(21). 
7 "'Identification 
lamps' 
means 
lamps 
grouped 
in 
a 
horizontal row and mounted on the permanent structure of the 
vehicle at or near the vertical center line."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(23m). 
8 "'Multiple beam headlamp' means a headlamp designed to 
permit the operator of the vehicle to use any one of 2 or more 
distributions 
of 
light 
on 
the 
roadway." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 340.01(36). 
9 "'Stop lamp' means a device giving a steady warning light 
to the rear of a vehicle to indicate the intention of the 
operator of the vehicle to diminish speed or stop."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(63). 
10 "'Tail lamp' means a device to designate the rear of a 
vehicle by a warning light."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(66). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) The operator of a vehicle shall keep all 
lamps and reflectors with which such vehicle is 
required to be equipped reasonably clean and in proper 
working condition at all times. 
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.06 is relevant to this case 
because it prohibits operation of a motor vehicle during hours 
of darkness unless "all . . . tail lamps . . . are lighted."  
Wis. Stat. § 347.06(1).  Moreover, the operator of a motor 
vehicle "shall keep all lamps . . . in proper working condition 
at all times."  Wis. Stat. § 347.06(3). 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.13 is entitled "Tail lamps and 
registration plate lamps."  The section reads in part: 
 
(1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle, 
mobile home or trailer or semitrailer upon a highway 
during hours of darkness unless such motor vehicle, 
mobile home or trailer or semitrailer is equipped with 
at least one tail lamp mounted on the rear which, when 
lighted during hours of darkness, emits a red light 
plainly visible from a distance of 500 feet to the 
rear.  No tail lamp shall have any type of decorative 
covering that restricts the amount of light emitted 
when the tail lamp is in use.  No vehicle originally 
equipped at the time of manufacture and sale with 2 
tail lamps shall be operated upon a highway during 
hours of darkness unless both such lamps are in good 
working order.  This subsection does not apply to any 
type of decorative covering originally equipped on the 
vehicle at the time of manufacture and sale. 
 
. . . .  
 
(4) Tail lamps and registration plate lamps 
shall be so wired as to be lighted whenever the 
headlamps or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted. 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13. 
¶60 The first sentence of § 347.13(1) serves two purposes.  
It prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle during 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
hours of darkness unless the vehicle is equipped with at least 
one tail lamp.  It also establishes equipment standards for 
motor vehicle tail lamps. 
¶61 Most vehicle operators seeking to comply with motor 
vehicle 
equipment 
laws 
are 
dependent 
upon 
automobile 
manufacturers and parts suppliers for the equipment on their 
vehicles.  These operators expect that the tail lights they 
purchase will meet the requirements of the law.  All four states 
bordering Wisconsin have statutes like Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) 
that require 500 feet of visibility from rear lamps, implying 
that 500 feet is a common standard.11 
                                                 
11 Every motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer shall 
also exhibit at least 2 lighted lamps, commonly known 
as tail lamps, which shall be mounted on the left rear 
and right rear of the vehicle so as to throw a red 
light visible for at least 500 feet in the reverse 
direction . . . .   
625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-201(b) (West 2014).   
Every motor vehicle and every vehicle which is 
being drawn at the end of a train of vehicles shall be 
equipped with a lighted rear lamp or lamps, exhibiting 
a red light plainly visible from a distance of five 
hundred feet to the rear.  All lamps and lighting 
equipment originally manufactured on a motor vehicle 
shall be kept in working condition or shall be 
replaced with equivalent equipment.   
Iowa Code Ann. § 321.387 (West 2014). 
A 
motor 
vehicle, 
trailer, 
semitrailer, 
pole 
trailer, or vehicle which is being drawn in a train of 
vehicles shall be equipped with at least 1 rear lamp 
mounted on the rear, which, when lighted as required 
by this act, shall emit a red light plainly visible 
from a distance of 500 feet to the rear.   
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.686(1) (West 2014). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶62 The majority opinion appears to conclude that if a 
tail lamp can be seen from 500 feet, it cannot violate the motor 
vehicle equipment statutes.  Majority op., ¶3. 
¶63 The next sentence in Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1), which 
bears on functionality, shows that such a conclusion is 
incorrect.  The second sentence reads: "No tail lamp shall have 
any type of decorative covering that restricts the amount of 
light emitted when the tail lamp is in use."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.13(1) (emphasis added).  This sentence demonstrates that 
there is a concern that each tail light be lit and unobscured.  
The sentence does not say that a decorative covering may not 
restrict the amount of light emitted so as to reduce visibility 
unless it can be seen from 500 feet.  The sentence permits no 
restriction of light. 
¶64 The third sentence of Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) requires 
that there be no flaw in the tail lamps: "No vehicle originally 
equipped at the time of manufacture and sale with 2 tail lamps 
shall be operated upon a highway during hours of darkness unless 
both such lamps are in good working order."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  This sentence requires both tail lamps to be operating 
in good working order.  When this sentence is combined with Wis. 
Stat. § 347.06(3), an operator is required to keep all tail 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Every motor vehicle and every vehicle that is being drawn 
at the end of a train of vehicles must be equipped with at least 
one taillamp, exhibiting a red light plainly visible from a 
distance of 500 feet to the rear."  Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 169.50.1(a) (West 2014). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
lamps in proper working condition at all times; that is, in good 
working order at all times. 
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.14, relating to "stop lamps," 
reads in part as follows: 
(1) No 
person 
shall 
operate 
a 
motor 
vehicle . . . upon 
a 
highway 
unless 
such 
motor 
vehicle . . . is equipped with at least one stop lamp 
mounted on the rear and meeting the specifications set 
forth in this section. . . .  A stop lamp may be 
incorporated with a tail lamp.  No vehicle originally 
equipped at the time of manufacture and sale with 2 
stop lamps shall be operated upon a highway unless 
both such lamps are in good working order. 
(2) A stop lamp shall be so constructed as to be 
actuated upon application of the service or foot 
brake . . . and shall emit a red or amber light 
plainly visible and understandable from all distances 
up to 300 feet to the rear during normal sunlight when 
viewed 
from 
the 
driver's 
seat 
of 
the 
vehicle 
following. 
Wis. Stat. § 347.14 (emphasis added). 
¶66 Like 
the 
previous 
section, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.14 
requires a particular type of lighting equipment to be "in good 
working order."  Inasmuch as a 1977 Buick Electra has only one 
rear brake light on each side of the vehicle, a brake light that 
is defective is 100 percent defective and cannot be——under any 
reasonable definition——in "proper working condition" or "in good 
working order." 
¶67 The Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) has 
developed administrative rules to flesh out its lighting 
equipment statutes.  See Wis. Admin. Code § TRANS 305. 
¶68 Among these rules are the following: 
Trans 305.01 Purpose and Scope. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
(1) The purpose of this chapter is to prescribe 
minimum 
equipment 
requirements 
for 
vehicles 
and 
standards for the equipment used on vehicles.  
 . . . . 
Trans 305.02 Applicability. 
 
 . . . . 
(7) Nothing in this chapter is intended to 
modify the provisions of ch. 347, Stats., and all 
vehicles to which this chapter applies shall also 
comply with the requirements of ch. 347, Stats. 
 . . . . 
Trans 305.03 Enforcement. 
No person may operate or allow to be operated on 
Wisconsin highways any vehicle subject to this chapter 
that 
is 
not 
in 
conformity 
with 
the 
applicable 
requirements of this chapter. 
 . . . . 
Trans 305.15 Stop Lamps. 
(1) Every 
automobile 
originally 
manufactured 
commencing 
with 
the 
1950 
models . . . shall 
be 
equipped with at least 2 stop lamps.  All other motor 
vehicles shall be equipped with at least one stop 
lamp. 
(2) The stop lamps of every vehicle shall be 
maintained 
in 
proper 
working 
condition 
and 
in 
conformity with this section and s. 347.14, Stats. 
 . . . . 
Trans 305.16 Tail Lamps. 
(1) Every 
automobile 
originally 
manufactured 
commencing 
with 
the 
1950 
models . . . shall 
be 
equipped with at least 2 tail lamps.  All other motor 
vehicles shall be equipped with at least one tail 
lamp. 
(2) The tail lamps of every motor vehicle shall 
be maintained in proper working condition and in 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
conformity with this section and s. 347.13 (1) and 
(2), Stats. 
(3) All 
wiring 
and 
connections 
shall 
be 
maintained in good condition. 
 . . . . 
(5) The tail lamps shall be so wired as to be 
lighted whenever the parking lamp or headlamps are 
lighted. 
Wis. Admin. Code §§ TRANS 305.01 (emphasis added), 305.02, 
305.03, 305.15 (emphasis added), 305.16 (emphasis added). 
¶69 The rules repeat the phrase "in proper working 
condition" from Wis. Stat. § 347.06(3), even in Wis. Admin. 
Code. § TRANS 305.15 and § TRANS 305.16, which implement Wis. 
Stat. §§ 347.14 and 347.13 respectively.  Those statutes use the 
phrase "in good working order."  This suggests that the DOT sees 
these phrases as interchangeable. 
¶70 As the majority notes, we may turn to a dictionary to 
construe undefined words according to their ordinary meanings.  
Majority op., ¶28.  However, the majority's definition of "good 
working order" is incomplete because it defines "good working 
order" and "working order" to mean essentially the same thing.  
Using dictionary definitions, the majority defines "good working 
order" as "suitable or functioning for the intended use."  Id., 
¶29 (footnote omitted). 
¶71 According 
to 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 2635 (1986), "Working order" means "a condition of a 
machine in which it functions according to its nature and 
purpose . . . ."  This definition is substantially similar to 
the majority's definition of "good working order."  Thus, the 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
majority's definition renders "good" mere surplusage.  In my 
view, "good working order" must mean something more than 
"working order."12   
¶72 As the majority notes, one definition of "good" is 
"adapted to the end designed or proposed: satisfactory in 
performance."  Majority op., ¶29 n.13.  However, there is more 
to the definition.  The cited definition goes on to define 
"good" as "free from flaws or defects" or "not impaired."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 978 (1986).  The 
definition of "good" that includes "free from flaws or defects" 
is more helpful than the majority's definition because it better 
fits within the framework of statutory analysis and the aversion 
to surplusage.  It also gives law enforcement a clear standard 
to apply when confronted with broken tail lights. 
¶73 Because "proper working condition" and "good working 
order" appear to be interchangeable terms, it is hard to imagine 
that a tail lamp or a stop lamp that has defective lights can be 
described as being "in proper working condition" and the 
condition to which the lamp should be kept "at all times."  Wis. 
Stat. § 347.06(3). 
                                                 
12 Two online definitions of "working order" are different 
from the majority's minimalist definition.  One dictionary 
suggests "in working order" means "working correctly, without 
any 
problems." 
 
MacMillan 
Dictionary, 
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/workin
g-order (last visited July 3, 2014).  Another dictionary 
suggests that "(in) working order" means "working properly and 
not broken" or "be in good/perfect/full etc working order."  
Longman 
Dictionary 
of 
Contemporary 
English, 
http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/working_1 
(last 
visited 
July 3, 2014). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
III 
¶74 This 
case 
is 
about 
much 
more 
than 
the 
felony 
conviction of Antonio Brown.  The majority opinion significantly 
dilutes the meaning of "proper working condition" and "good 
working order" in the lighting equipment statutes.  This is 
likely to affect the enforcement of these statutes. 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.30 provides: 
(1) Any person violating s. 347.06 or 347.13 
(2), (3) or (4) may be required to forfeit not less 
than $10 nor more than $20 for the first offense and 
not less than $25 nor more than $50 for the 2nd or 
subsequent conviction within a year.  
(2) Any person violating ss. 347.03, 347.07 to 
347.12, 347.13(1) or 347.14 to 347.29 may be required 
to forfeit not less than $10 nor more than $200. 
¶76 The majority concludes that Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) 
does not require "every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be 
lit."  Majority op., ¶3.  But it does not say what is required 
for a violation of this statute.  The answer cannot turn on 
whether the tail lamp can be seen from 500 feet because that is 
not the correct statutory standard and would pose an impossible 
burden of proof on law enforcement. 
¶77 The majority's analysis is bound to affect the 
interpretation of other lighting equipment statutes involving 
more than one light, and other statutes that employ the phrases 
"in proper working condition" or "in good working order."13 
                                                 
13 For instance, there are at least 11 statutes in addition 
to Wis. Stat. § 347.13 that use the phrase "good working order."  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 30.62, 48.658, 283.31, 285.30, 347.14, 347.36, 
347.38, 347.42, 348.15, 350.055(1m) (2013-14), 350.095. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶78 Because the court has diluted the meaning of these 
phrases, it has seriously impaired law enforcement's ability to 
stop vehicles to alert the drivers of equipment defects.  Of 
course these stops sometimes serve other purposes.  Now, these 
purposes are in jeopardy because of the confusion created by the 
court's decision. 
¶79 Now that law enforcement officers are precluded from 
pulling over vehicles with flawed tail lamps if the tail lamps 
are visible from 500 feet, there is likely to be a bonanza for 
litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.  The 
uncertainty in the law will create difficulties for law 
enforcement and new burdens on circuit courts. 
¶80 In my view, this court is making a mistake.  It should 
be providing a clear, commonsense, easy-to-understand standard: 
if a tail light or brake light is out, the tail lamp or stop 
lamp is not in good working order. 
¶81 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶82 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   For 
purposes of this dissent, I assume, arguendo, that the majority 
opinion's conclusion that Antonio Brown's tail lamp was in "good 
working order" under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) is correct.  I write 
in dissent to explain why the majority opinion's conclusion that 
"an officer's mistake of law is not sufficient grounds for a 
stop" is not correct.1  See State v. Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 
593 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1999).  I conclude that the legality of 
a 
stop 
depends 
on 
whether 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances a reasonable officer could have believed that a 
law violation was occurring.  See United States v. Martin, 411 
F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (a search is valid when "an 
objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a 
reasonable suspicion that [a defendant] was committing a . . . 
violation").  Therefore, "in mistake cases[,] the question is 
simply whether the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an 
objectively reasonable one."  United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 
767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005).  I further conclude that under the 
totality of the circumstances a reasonable officer could have 
believed 
that 
Brown's 
tail 
lamp 
violated 
§ 347.13(1).  
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶83 On the evening of July 3, 2010, Milwaukee police 
officers Michael Wawrzonek and William Feely were patrolling an 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶25.  
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
area near Capitol Drive as part of an effort to "saturate areas 
that are targeted" by armed robbers.  Both officers testified 
that they observed a 1977 Buick Electra with one panel of the 
driver's 
side 
tail 
lamp, 
which 
had 
three 
panels, 
not 
illuminated.  They pulled the vehicle over based on what they 
described as a "defective tail light."   
¶84 After stopping the car, Officer Feely approached the 
vehicle and noticed Brown, who was sitting in the back seat, 
kick a small wooden object under the passenger seat.  He ordered 
all of the occupants out of the car, and ultimately recovered a 
.38 Taurus revolver from under the front seat.   
¶85 The State charged Brown with felony possession of a 
firearm.  Brown moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 
stop because officers lacked probable cause to stop the car.   
¶86 The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the 
officers' observation of the unlit panel justified the stop.  In 
denying Brown's motion for post-conviction relief, the circuit 
court reiterated that stopping the car was proper because the 
officers "believed that the taillight was out."  Even if it is 
"later to be shown that somehow that . . . light is supposed to 
not be on at that time," the circuit court reasoned that would 
not be "a fatal flaw in the stop itself."   
¶87 The court of appeals reversed.  It concluded that "[a] 
tail lamp with one of three light bulbs unlit does not violate 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) when it otherwise meets the statutory 
definition of a tail lamp."  State v. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, 
¶21, 346 Wis. 2d 98, 827 N.W.2d 903.  Because "[t]he officers 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
mistakenly believed that the law required all of the tail lamps 
light bulbs to be lit; and 'a lawful stop cannot be predicated 
upon a mistake of law,'" it held that the evidence should have 
been suppressed.  Id. (quoting Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d at 9).   
¶88 We granted the State's petition for review, which asks 
us to decide whether the officers had probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to stop Brown's car and whether the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to search Brown's car.  We 
asked for additional briefing on the following issues:   
(1) whether the officer had reasonable suspicion 
to stop Brown's vehicle because the officer believed 
that Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) was violated when not all 
the tail light bulbs on Brown's vehicle were working; 
[and]  
(2) whether, assuming an officer makes a good 
faith mistake of law on which the officer makes a 
traffic stop . . . that mistake of law nevertheless 
require[s] reviewing courts to conclude that the stop 
was not lawful. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶89 This case is about the legality of a traffic stop, 
which is constitutional if supported by probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.  State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶20, 341 
Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675.  We evaluate a stop according to 
two steps.  "First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard."  Id. at 
¶21.  Next, "we review independently the application of those 
facts to constitutional principles."  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 
¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.   
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
B.  Lawfulness of Stop 
1. Introduction 
¶90 The majority opinion concludes that "an officer's 
mistake of law is not sufficient grounds for a stop."2  See also 
Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d at 9.  The majority opinion string-cites 
cases from other jurisdictions that have concluded that an 
officer's mistake of law cannot sustain a stop.3  The majority 
opinion reasons that admitting evidence obtained based on a 
mistake of law "would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make 
certain that they properly understand the law that they are 
entrusted to enforce and obey."4  Because officers' understanding 
of Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1),5 which is contrary to the majority 
opinion's interpretation herein, provided the sole basis for the 
                                                 
2 Id., ¶25.    
3 Id. 
4 Id., ¶24 (quoting United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 
962 (7th Cir. 2006)) (further citation omitted). 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.13(1) provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
No person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . 
during hours of darkness unless such motor vehicle 
. . . is equipped with at least one tail lamp mounted 
on the rear which, when lighted during hours of 
darkness, emits a red light plainly visible from a 
distance of 500 feet to the rear.  No tail lamp shall 
have any type of decorative covering that restricts 
the amount of light emitted when the tail lamp is in 
use.  No vehicle originally equipped at the time of 
manufacture and sale with 2 tail lamps shall be 
operated upon a highway during hours of darkness 
unless both such lamps are in good working order.  
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
stop in this case, it suppresses all evidence obtained from the 
stop. 
¶91 I do not agree that an officer's mistake of law 
renders a search per se unreasonable.  A statute may be 
ambiguous or unclear so that an objectively reasonable officer 
could form a reasonable belief that a violation was occurring, 
even when it was not.  In that instance, I would uphold the 
search.  While the majority opinion's circuit-counting shows 
that this may be a minority position, I nonetheless conclude 
that it is the conclusion the law requires for the reasons I now 
explain. 
2.  General Fourth Amendment principles 
¶92 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.  "Temporary 
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the 
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited 
purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning 
of [that] provision."  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
809-10 (1996); see State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶11, 317 Wis. 2d 
118, 765 N.W.2d 569.  A traffic stop is reasonable, and 
therefore constitutional, if:  (1) an officer has probable cause 
to believe a law violation has occurred; or (2) an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to be or has been 
committed.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 810; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
22 (1968).  "Taken together, then, Terry and Whren stand for the 
proposition that a traffic stop will be deemed a reasonable 
'seizure' when an objective review of the facts shows that an 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
officer possessed specific, articulable facts that an individual 
was violating a traffic law at the time of the stop."  United 
States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006).   
¶93 Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 
417, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  The exclusionary rule is "a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved."  United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).6  By preventing the use of 
illegally obtained evidence, it not only deters unconstitutional 
police conduct, but also protects the integrity of the judicial 
process by refusing to sanction unlawful searches.  State v. 
Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶79, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.7   
¶94 In some instances, "the substantial social costs of 
excluding relevant evidence" obtained illegally outweigh "the 
benefit of deterring future police misconduct" produced by the 
rule.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶31, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-09.  We therefore have 
recognized a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
                                                 
6 See also Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 636, 218 N.W.2d 
252 (1974) ("The exclusionary rule is a judge-made one in 
furtherance of conduct that courts have considered to be in the 
public interest and to suppress conduct that is not."). 
7 But see id. at 635 (questioning the effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule to accomplish its objectives.) 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
some circumstances.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶28.  We recently 
explained our approach to the exclusionary rule and its 
exceptions as follows: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 
be 
sufficiently 
deliberate 
that 
exclusion 
can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
system. . . . [T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter 
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or 
in 
some 
circumstances 
recurring 
or 
systemic 
negligence. 
State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶36, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 
97 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). 
¶95 For example, when an officer reasonably relies on a 
warrant issued by an independent magistrate, but the warrant is 
later held to be invalid, evidence seized in reliance on that 
warrant may nonetheless be admissible.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 
¶3; Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.  In Eason, we explained that in such 
a situation, the exclusionary rule would not serve its purpose 
of deterring police misconduct because no misconduct occurred.  
Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶55.  Although it might later be 
discovered that an officer had no legal basis for a search 
because the warrant on which the officer relied was defective, 
the officer nonetheless could have acted reasonably.  Id. at ¶3.  
Because there is "no real benefit in regard to deterrence, the 
social cost of excluding relevant evidence . . . [is] the 
determining factor."  Id. at ¶58. 
¶96 Suppression is likewise not required when an officer 
relies in good faith on a substantive criminal statute that is 
later held unconstitutional, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
31, 39-40 (1979), or "when the officer reasonably relies on 
clear and settled precedent," Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶46.  
See also Davis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 
2423-24 (2011).  There again, because the officer is acting 
reasonably, "the exclusionary rule would have absolutely no 
deterrent effect on officer misconduct, while at the same time 
coming with the cost of allowing evidence of wrongdoing to be 
excluded."  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶44.   
¶97 And finally, when the basis for a traffic stop is 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, the fruits 
of the stop may be used against a defendant when the officer's 
belief is reasonable, even if he is wrong and the defendant did 
not actually commit an offense.  United States v. Thomas, 93 
F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996).  "The touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness" because only unreasonable seizures 
are prohibited.  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 
(2001).  Therefore, an officer's conduct is examined to 
determine whether it was reasonable. 
3.  Mistakes of fact and law 
¶98 Other jurisdictions allow the use of evidence obtained 
from a stop based on a mistake of fact.8  In other words, "an 
                                                 
8 E.g., United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 
(3d Cir. 2006) ("mistakes of fact are rarely fatal to an 
officer's reasonable, articulable belief that an individual was 
violating a traffic ordinance at the time of a stop"); United 
States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) 
("A traffic stopped based on an officer's incorrect but 
reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment."); United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th 
Cir. 2000) ("the Fourth Amendment requires only a reasonable 
assessment of the facts, not a perfectly accurate one"). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
officer need not be factually accurate in her belief that a 
traffic law had been violated but, instead, need only produce 
facts establishing that she reasonably believed that a violation 
had taken place."  Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 398.  This is so 
"because of the intensely fact-sensitive nature of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause determinations."  United States v. 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).  When an 
officer is mistaken as to whether observed conduct is a 
violation, the law is less settled. 
¶99 The majority opinion string-cites cases that have not 
allowed an officer's mistake of law to serve as the basis for a 
stop.9  The majority opinion asserts that "[a]n officer cannot 
have a reasonable belief that a violation of the law occurred 
when the acts to which an officer points as supporting probable 
cause are not prohibited by law."  United States v. McDonald, 
453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006).  Under that view, "[i]t makes 
no difference that an officer holds an understandable or 'good 
faith' belief that a law has been broken."  Id. at 961-62.  
Other jurisdictions adopt a somewhat softer approach under which 
"'[s]tops premised on a mistake of law . . . are generally held 
to be unconstitutional' . . . [but] [a] stop is lawful despite a 
mistake of law . . . if an objectively valid basis for the stop 
nonetheless exists."  United States v. Booker, 496 F.3d 717, 722 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶25. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
101 (1st Cir. 2006));10 see Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 399 ("In 
situations where an objective review of the record evidence 
establishes reasonable grounds to conclude that the stopped 
individual has in fact violated the traffic-code provision cited 
by the officer, the stop is constitutional even if the officer 
is mistaken about the scope of activities actually proscribed by 
the cited traffic-code provision.").  The majority does not 
discuss the reasoning of contrary authority that I conclude is 
persuasive. 
¶100 In some jurisdictions, "the validity of a stop depends 
on whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in 
the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply 
whether the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an 
                                                 
10 The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in 
Booker 
and 
remanded 
to 
the 
district 
court 
for 
further 
consideration in light of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
Booker v. United States, 556 U.S. 1218 (2009).  The D.C. 
Circuit's holding regarding stops based on mistakes of law, 
however, remains good law.  See United States v. Williams, 878 
F. Supp. 2d 190, 200 n.4 (D.D.C. 2012).  Prior decisions of the 
D.C. Circuit on the same point also remain in tact.  United 
States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(stop was lawful "even assuming [officers] were mistaken that 
the law required display of the front plate on the bumper"); 
United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (where an independent valid ground for an arrest exists, 
there is no reason to distinguish between arrests "where the 
crime charged was not actually a crime" and arrests "in which 
the charged offense was a crime but the officer lacked probable 
cause to believe it had been committed"). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
objectively reasonable one."  Smart, 393 F.3d at 770.11  That is, 
there is "no constitutional requirement to distinguish between 
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law" and an officer's mistake 
of law is not per se unreasonable.  State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 
351, 358 (N.C. 2012); see also United States v. Southerland, 486 
F.3d 1355, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding a stop was lawful, 
even assuming the officers were mistaken about what the law 
required, 
because 
their 
interpretation 
of 
the 
law 
was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances). 
¶101 One 
reason 
for 
concluding 
that 
a 
stop 
can 
be 
reasonable 
notwithstanding 
a 
mistake 
of 
law 
is 
that 
determinations about the validity of traffic stops are not "to 
be made with the vision of hindsight, but instead by looking to 
what the officer reasonably knew at the time."  United States v. 
Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999).  Because courts 
"should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the 
traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal 
defense attorney," it is possible that an officer could form a 
reasonable, yet mistaken, understanding of the law.  Id.  In 
                                                 
11 See also Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1139 (Miss. 
2001) ("deputies had probable cause to stop Harrison, even 
though it was based on a mistake of law"); DeChene v. Smallwood, 
311 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Va. 1984) ("an arrest resulting from a 
mistake of law should be judged by the same test as one stemming 
from a mistake of fact"); McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111, 
113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) ("If the officer acting in good faith 
believes that an unlawful act has been committed, his actions 
are not rendered improper by a later legal determination that 
the defendant's actions were not a crime according to a 
technical legal definition or distinction determined to exist in 
the penal statute."). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
those situations, "[a] post hoc judicial interpretation of a 
substantive traffic law does not determine the reasonableness of 
a previous traffic stop within the meaning of the state and 
federal constitutions."  Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 357. 
¶102 I conclude that a traffic stop is valid when an 
officer reasonably believes that a law has been or is about to 
broken, notwithstanding "a later legal determination that the 
defendant's actions were not a crime according to a technical 
legal definition or distinction."  McConnell v. State, 374 
S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).  As the Eighth Circuit 
explained, "neither mistake of law nor mistake of fact renders a 
traffic stop illegal so long as the officer's actions were 
objectively reasonable in the circumstances."  United States v. 
Bueno, 443 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2006).  Accordingly, when a 
statute is either ambiguous or unclear so that an objectively 
reasonable officer could have believed that a violation was 
occurring, and that belief turns out to be incorrect, I would 
uphold the search.    
¶103 This approach is consistent with the cornerstone of 
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:  law enforcement must act 
reasonably.  Reasonable suspicion does not involve a technical 
analysis.  As with probable cause, it invokes "the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act."  See 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).  While it 
is true that, as a matter of policy, courts should not destroy 
incentives for officers to "properly understand the law," I 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
nevertheless conclude that an officer can make an objectively 
reasonable mistake of law.  This is particularly true where, as 
here, members of this court reasonably interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.13(1) and came to contradicting constructions12 and the law 
at issue is a traffic code provision that has not been 
previously interpreted in a published decision.13   
¶104 There are several arguments against this approach that 
merit discussion.  First, some courts say that "[t]o create an 
exception 
here 
would 
defeat 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police 
to make certain that they properly understand the law that they 
are entrusted to enforce and obey."  McDonald, 453 F.3d at 962 
(quoting United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th 
Cir. 2000)).  Additionally, "if officers are allowed to stop 
vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws 
have been violated even where no such violation has, in fact, 
occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic infractions as 
pretext for effecting stops [could] seem[] boundless and the 
costs to privacy rights excessive."  United States v. Lopez-
Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999).  And finally, the 
rule excluding evidence from stops based on mistakes of law 
aligns with the principle that courts should not use a statute's 
                                                 
12 See Prosser, J., dissenting, ¶73.  
13 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals held 
that "[a] tail lamp with a burnt out bulb cannot be said to be 
'in good working order.'"  State v. Olson, No. 2010AP149-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010).   
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
ambiguity or vagueness against a defendant.  Chanthasouxat, 342 
F.3d at 1278-79.   
¶105 Criticism about the incentives this "boundless" rule 
would create are grounded in a misunderstanding of the proper 
inquiry.  The question is not whether a particular officer made 
a mistake of law.  Rather, it is whether, under a totality of 
the circumstances an objectively reasonable officer could have 
understood the law in such a way.  The stopping point is 
reasonableness.  Because a mistake of law must be reasonable, 
this approach does not invite abuse.   
¶106  As to the fact that sustaining a search premised on a 
mistake of law has the effect of using an ambiguity against a 
defendant, I agree with the following assessment of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court:  
[T]he reasonable suspicion standard does not require 
an officer actually to witness a violation of the law 
before making a stop.  That rule generally applies 
regardless of the particular substantive law at issue, 
and results in part because Terry stops are conducted 
not only to investigate past crime but also to halt 
potentially ongoing crime, to thwart contemplated 
future 
crime, 
and, 
most 
importantly 
in 
 these 
circumstances, to protect the public from potentially 
dangerous activity.  
Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 356-57 (citations omitted).  I likewise 
conclude that "because we [should be] concerned for maintaining 
safe roadways, we [should] not want to discourage our police 
officers 
from 
conducting 
stops 
for 
perceived 
traffic 
violations."  Id. at 357.   
¶107 I therefore conclude that when an officer's mistake of 
law is reasonable, the costs of excluding evidence are not 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
outweighed by the benefit of deterrence.  See Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 
206, ¶31.  A reasonable mistake of law is, by definition, not 
the kind of police misconduct the exclusionary rule aims to 
deter.  It is not the result of deliberate misconduct, 
recklessness, or grossly negligent performance of duty.  See 
Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶36.  It is an objectively reasonable 
interpretation 
that 
a 
later 
legal 
determination 
declares 
incorrect.  In those situations, I see no reason to distinguish 
between mistakes of law and fact, and would uphold a traffic 
stop if under the totality of the circumstances the officer's 
interpretation of the law is objectively reasonable. 
4.  Application 
¶108 I 
conclude 
that 
the 
officers 
acted 
reasonably 
notwithstanding the majority opinion's determination that Wis. 
Stat. § 347.13(1) does not require every panel in a tail lamp to 
be lit.  Section 347.13(1) requires a tail lamp to be in "good 
working order."  Although I assume, arguendo, that a tail lamp 
is in good working order when it is visible from 500 feet, a 
reasonable officer could have believed otherwise.  In other 
words, at the time of the stop, "good working order" was 
ambiguous and the officers acted reasonably.  See Teschendorf v. 
State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶20, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 
N.W.2d 258 ("[a] statute that is unambiguous in one context may 
be ambiguous in another"). 
¶109 To explain further, a tail lamp is "a device to 
designate the rear of a vehicle by a warning light."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(66).  The individual panels of a tail lamp generally 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
function together as a unitary device.  The majority opinion 
concludes that the device is functional when the light it emits 
can be viewed from a distance of 500 feet.14  It takes no great 
leap of logic to conclude that an unlit panel might impair the 
function of the lamp.  As Justice Prosser explains, "it is hard 
to imagine that a tail lamp or a stop lamp that has defective 
lights 
can 
be 
described 
as 
being 
'in 
proper 
working 
condition.'"15  Put differently, a reasonable officer could have 
suspected that the unlit panel in Brown's tail lamp violated 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) because an unlit panel could render the 
tail lamp less visible, or even invisible, from a distance of 
500 feet.16 
¶110 I also note that the court of appeals has previously 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) differently than the majority 
opinion does today.  In State v. Olson, No. 2010AP149-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010), an officer 
observed "a slow moving vehicle equipped with four tail lamp 
bulbs, one of which was burnt out" and stopped the vehicle.  Id. 
at ¶2.  The court of appeals upheld the stop, concluding that 
"[a] tail lamp with a burnt out bulb cannot be said to be 'in 
good working order.'"  Id. at ¶12.  "Though not dispositive, the 
fact 
that 
[courts] 
reached 
contradictory 
interpretations, 
                                                 
14 Majority op., ¶33.  
15 Prosser, J., dissenting, ¶73. 
16 Moreover, the record does not indicate whether the tail 
lamp was visible from a distance of 500 feet.  It is possible 
then, given the record before us, that the tail lamp violated 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1). 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
despite both courts concluding that the statute was clear, is 
indicative of ambiguity."  Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶19. 
¶111 The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld a stop based on a 
similar mistake of law to the one in the present case.  In Moore 
v. State, 986 So. 2d 928 (Miss. 2008), an officer stopped a 
vehicle for having only one working tail lamp.  Id. at 929.  
There, the court upheld the search even though it was "clear [to 
the court of appeals] that what the police observed did not 
constitute a violation of the cited traffic law."  Id. at 931 
(citation omitted).  The officers' mistake in the present case 
is equally reasonable. 
¶112 The majority cites to two cases in support of its 
conclusion that the officers acted unreasonably because the tail 
lamp was functional and therefore in good working order:  Kroft 
v. State, 992 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) and Vicknair v. 
State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).17  In Kroft, an 
officer stopped a vehicle with a dime-sized hole in the plastic 
cover of a tail lamp.  Kroft, 992 N.E.2d at 820.  Rejecting the 
State's argument that the tail lamp was not in good working 
order, the court concluded that "there [wa]s simply no evidence 
[the vehicle] posed any danger to motorists approaching [the 
vehicle] from behind" and the officer "did not testify that he 
had trouble spotting [the vehicle] from behind."  Id. at 822.  
Vicknair involved a similar defect, a cracked tail lamp. 
Vicknair, 751 S.W.2d at 187.  There, the court concluded that 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶32. 
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
the device was in good working order because it was still 
visible from the requisite distance.  Id. at 189-90.   
¶113 These cases are easily distinguished.  Unlike in Kroft 
and Vicknair, the defect in the present case implicates the 
function of a tail lamp, which the defects in Kroft and Vicknair 
did not.  Here, the totality of the circumstances on July 3, 
2010, could have led a reasonable officer to suspect that 
Brown's vehicle violated the law because a panel in the tail 
lamp was not functioning.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶114 For purposes of this dissent, I assume, arguendo, that 
the majority opinion's conclusion that Brown's tail lamp was in 
"good working order" under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) is correct.  I 
write 
in 
dissent 
to 
explain 
why 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion that "an officer's mistake of law is not sufficient 
grounds for a stop" is not correct.18  See Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 
at 9.  I conclude that the legality of a stop depends on whether 
under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable officer 
could have believed that a law violation was occurring.  See 
Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (a search is valid when "an objectively 
reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable 
suspicion that [a defendant] was committing a . . . violation").  
Therefore, "in mistake cases[,] the question is simply whether 
the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an objectively 
reasonable one."  Smart, 393 F.3d at 770.  I further conclude 
that under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶25.  
No.  2011AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
officer could have believed that Brown's tail lamp violated 
§ 347.13(1).   
¶115 Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals, and I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
¶116 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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