Case Title: DEWEY v. WENTLAND

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-93

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
DEWEY v. WENTLAND2002 WY 238 P.3d 402Case Number: 00-93, 00-178, 00-179, 00-244,Decided: 01/10/2002
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
     

JOHN C. 
DEWEY and ELIZABETH

A. 
DEWEY, 

Appellants(Defendants/Third-Party

Plaintiffs),

v.

RICHARD 
D. WENTLAND and

DORIS J. 
WENTLAND, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs),

                                                                                    

and

HARRY 
BARNETT, d/b/a Hub

Real 
Estate, 

Appellee(Third-Party 
Defendant).

RICHARD 
D. WENTLAND and

DORIS J. 
WENTLAND, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

v.

                                                                                    

DEWEY 
FAMILY TRUST, and

JOHN C. 
DEWEY and ELIZABETH

A. 
DEWEY, Co-trustees; and

JOHN C. 
DEWEY and ELIZABETH

A. 
DEWEY, as individuals, 

Appellees(Defendants).

JOHN C. 
DEWEY and

ELIZABETH A. DEWEY,

                                            
Appellants(Third-Party 
Plaintiffs),

v.

HARRY 
BARNETT, d/b/a

Hub Real 
Estate, 

Appellee(Third-Party 
Defendant).

RICHARD 
D. WENTLAND and

DORIS J. 
WENTLAND, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

                                                                                    

v.

DEWEY FAMILY TRUST,

JOHN C. DEWEY and ELIZABETH A.

DEWEY, Co-trustees; and JOHN C. DEWEY

and ELIZABETH A. DEWEY, as individuals, 

Appellees(Defendants).

JOHN C. DEWEY and ELIZABETH A.

     DEWEY, as 
individuals
Appellants(Defendants/Third-PartyPlaintiffs),

v.

RICHARD D. WENTLAND and

DORIS J. WENTLAND, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs),

and

HARRY BARNETT, d/b/a

Hub Real Estate,

                                             
Appellee(Third-Party 
Defendant).

Appeal from the District Court of Big Horn County

The Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing the Wentlands:

            
Randy L. Royal, Greybull, Wyoming  

 Representing the Deweys:

            
James P. Castberg, Sheridan, Wyoming

 Representing Harry Barnett: 

            
Timothy M. Stubson of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      John and Elizabeth 
Dewey (the buyers) entered into a lease purchase agreement with Richard and 
Doris Wentland (the sellers) regarding the sellers' ranch.  A dispute arose over 
the sellers' obligation to provide hay during the first winter for certain 
cattle.  The 
buyers ultimately withdrew from the agreement and made numerous claims against 
the sellers and their real estate agent, Harry Barnett (the agent), including 
misrepresentation and breach of contract.  The sellers countered with 
a breach-of-contract claim and requested specific performance of the 
agreement.  The buyers seek review of the trial court's dismissal of 
numerous claims at various stages of the proceedings on issues of law, and the 
sellers challenge the trial court's denial of specific performance and the 
jury's verdict which awarded less damages than they deemed appropriate.  We conclude the 
trial court properly applied the law and the jury's verdict was consistent and 
supported by legally sufficient evidence.

[¶2]      
On June 22, 1994, the sellers entered into an Exclusive Right to Sell 
Listing Contract with the agent.  After inspecting the property on three 
occasions, the buyers submitted an offer to buy the sellers' property for 
$450,000 on October 1, 1994.  The buyers signed a form entitled "Offer, 
Acceptance and Receipt Specific Performance Contract (Farm & Ranch & 
Vacant Land)" as well as a form entitled "Addendum to Contract."  In the addendum, the 
offer was made contingent upon the buyers' obtaining financing and selling their 
Sheridan property before March 1995.  The addendum further provided that, if the 
Sheridan property was not sold by the designated date, the buyers would lease 
the sellers' ranch until their property sold with the lease cost to be applied 
to the purchase price of the sellers' property.  Finally, the addendum added personal 
agreements regarding the buyers' leasing the sellers' cattle.

[¶3]      
In response to the offer, the sellers presented a counteroffer which was 
accepted by the buyers.  The counteroffer incorporated all the 
provisions in the offer and addendum but added terms regarding the leased 
cattle.  
Thereafter, the parties prepared and executed a lease purchase agreement 
for a one-year lease term which incorporated the offer, addendum, and 
counteroffer.  

            

[¶4]      After the buyers took 
possession of the premises, problems arose which resulted in multiple claims.1  The buyers assert the sellers and 
their agent made several misrepresentations regarding the sellers' 
property.  In 
addition, the buyers claim the sellers failed to leave sufficient first-cutting 
hay to winter the leased cattle.  As a result, the buyers filed a lien statement 
in the amount of $10,430 with the Big Horn County Clerk.  Subsequently, the 
sellers filed a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary 
Injunction and Permanent Injunction in the District Court for the Fifth Judicial 
District in Big Horn County, thus initiating this litigation.  On the hearing date, 
the parties stipulated that the buyers would not proceed with the lien 
foreclosure action, and in return the sellers agreed the court would hold 
$10,430 as a bond for satisfaction of the lien.  Meanwhile, the buyers gave the sellers notice 
that they would not exercise their option to purchase the property and would 
leave the premises by November 1, 1995.  The buyers did in fact vacate the premises on 
or about November 11 or 12, 1995.

            

[¶5]      In response to the 
sellers' complaint, the buyers counterclaimed alleging intentional 
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to disclose, breach of 
good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and breach of contract, and they 
requested a remedy of declaratory judgment.  In addition, the buyers filed an amended 
complaint to include claims of negligent misrepresentation, failure to disclose, 
and conversion against the real estate agent as a third-party defendant.  The sellers also 
filed an amended complaint seeking initial injunctive relief, specific 
performance, and damages for breach of contract.  The sellers intimated that, because the buyers 
no longer wanted to purchase the property, they were asserting essentially 
frivolous claims to elude performance.

[¶6]      Following a summary 
judgment hearing on motions filed by all parties, the trial court, in a thorough 
and lengthy decision letter, dismissed several of the claims against the sellers 
and the agent.  
The only surviving claims against the sellers were breach of contract, 
intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation regarding the 
number of acres included in the state lease.  The only surviving claim against the agent was 
negligent misrepresentation on the same issue.  

            

[¶7]      The remaining claims 
proceeded to a jury trial.  At the conclusion of trial, the trial court 
granted the sellers' motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 50 on the claims of negligent and intentional misrepresentations.  The jury 
subsequently returned a verdict which essentially found the real estate 
transaction was a lease with an option to buy rather than a contract for 
purchase.  
According to the verdict form, unless the jury found the parties entered 
into a contract to purchase the ranch, damages could not be awarded to the 
sellers.  The 
jury informed the trial court:  "We do not think that the lease purchase 
agreement was a contract to purchase the property.  It was a lease for 
one year.  [The 
sellers] do deserve to be compensated for some expenses.  Are we allowed to 
award them some damages[?]"  The court instructed the jury to answer the 
question regarding damages regardless of its answer to the initial 
question.  The 
jury then determined the sellers incurred $32,497.29 in damages for certain 
payments that should have been made under the lease.  Additionally, the 
jury awarded the buyers $10,430 in compensation for hay they had to 
purchase.  
Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50 and the lack of sufficient evidence, the trial 
court struck the $10,430 damage award to the buyers.  After  trial, the court 
denied the sellers' complaint for specific performance but awarded them the 
earnest money deposit and the lease payments with accrued interest.  The buyers filed 
three appeals, the sellers filed two appeals, and this court consolidated all 
the appeals for appellate review.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense which has been asserted by the parties.  Williams Gas ProcessingWamsutter Company v. Union Pacific 
Resources Company, 2001 WY 
57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2001).  
We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable 
to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.  Id.  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were 
employed and used by the lower court.  Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, 
Inc., 2001 WY 
23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2001).  
We do not accord any deference to the district court's 
decisions on issues of law.  Id.  

[¶9]      For purposes of 
efficiency, we will conjunctively examine the propriety of the grant of partial 
summary judgment to the agent and the sellers.  The same facts are alleged to support the 
claims for both intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, 
although we reiterate the claim against the agent is only for negligent 
misrepresentation.2  The buyers based the alleged 
misrepresentations upon statements contained in the information sheet provided 
to them and several alleged oral statements made while they inspected the 
property with the agent.  The trial court based its decision on the 
parties' depositions, affidavits, and briefs.  We note, because the parties designated only a 
limited portion of the record, our review is necessarily constrained.

[¶10]   Intentional misrepresentation and 
negligent misrepresentation share common elements.  Intentional 
misrepresentation (fraud) is established when the following elements are 
proven:  
"(1)  the 
defendant made a false representation intended to induce action by the 
plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the representation to be true; 
and (3) the plaintiff relied on the false representation and suffered 
damages."  
Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Company, 
Inc., 8 P.3d 324, 330 (Wyo. 2000).  
Intentional misrepresentation must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Id.  Quite similarly, a plaintiff in a claim 
for negligent misrepresentation must show:

"One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their 
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable 
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information."

Hulse v. First American Title Company of Crook 
County, 2001 WY 
95, ¶52, 33 P.3d 122, ¶52 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 1995)).  A fundamental difference between the two 
causes of action is, a plaintiff need only prove negligent misrepresentation by 
a preponderance of the evidence, not unlike any other plaintiff in any other 
action sounding in negligence, while a plaintiff must prove intentional 
misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence.  Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, 907 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶11]   The trial court found the buyers failed 
to provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate material issues of fact concerning 
the various misrepresentations they claimed occurred.  First, the buyers 
alleged statements in the information sheet provided by the sellers and the 
agent to interested potential purchasers misrepresented the amount of water 
rights attributable to the property as follows:  "Water rights for 1075 acres plus reservoir 
water from Lake Adelaide.  Several small reservoirs on the property," and 
"WATER COSTS:  
Shell Canal Rehab  $4,251.97; Shell Canal Adelaide  $5,994.02; 1994 
Shell Canal @ $8.50/acre  $8,604.96."  The buyers argued the testimony of J. R. 
Kvenild, a Wyoming real estate broker, demonstrated a misrepresentation when he 
testified that, according to his research and information from the State 
Engineer's office, "there isn't a full 1,075 acres of water rights."  However, the 
designated record provides no evidence submitted by the buyers to establish the 
amount of water rights they contended was accurate. 

 [¶12]  An affidavit from Dorothy Balo, an employee 
with the Shell Canal Company, was presented to the trial court and provided in 
part: 

            
(4)  
According to the books, records and accounts of Shell Canal Company, 
there are water rights for 1,075.62 acres.  These are the same water rights available to 
[the sellers] from and after September of 1994, according to our books and 
records.

            
(5)  In 
addition to those water rights, there is water available from Lake Adelaide to 
service the [sellers'] property.

 [¶13]  The trial court granted summary judgment 
concluding that no false statement was intentionally or negligently made because 
the Shell Canal Company records were used to compile the information sheet and, 
while the sellers occupied the property, they paid for water rights on 1,075 
acres.  
Testimony that the water rights were not on a full 1,075 acres without 
any evidence as to the amount the buyers contended was accurate is insufficient 
to create a material issue of fact that a false statement was made.        

            

[¶14]   Second, the buyers contend the statement 
that the property consisted of  approximately 1,956 acres plus seven acres for 
the home place was a misrepresentation of the acreage.  The buyers' claim is 
either they were not provided with land descriptions or it was not possible to 
accurately determine the total amount of acreage included in the sellers' 
property from the land descriptions.  Regardless of which contention is applied, 
both arguments fail to establish the essential element of a misrepresentation; 
i.e., that a false representation was made.  The designated record does not reflect any 
evidence provided to the trial court which would establish a material issue of 
fact. 

[¶15]   Third, the buyers allege the number of 
acres which were capable of being put into production was  misrepresented.  The information 
sheet provided there were "[a]pproximately 600 acres 
in production now with another 200 acres that could be put in."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The 
agent testified the sellers had told him "there was about 450 acres of alfalfa, 
about 100 acres of oats, and I believe 60 to 80 acres of irrigated 
pasture."  This 
statement is consistent with the estimated production set out in the information 
sheet.  
Furthermore, the Farm Service Agency (the Agency) supervisor's affidavit 
reflected the buyers had filed three separate reports with the Agency indicating 
they had 745 acres of "crop land." 

            

[¶16]   In granting summary judgment on this 
issue, the trial court relied upon the following factors:

            
Considering the use of the word, "approximately," in the Property 
Condition Statement, the caveat found at the bottom of the Property Condition 
Statement, the fact that John Dewey did not know the dates the photographs he 
used were taken and did not know whether all of the property depicted was part 
of the [sellers'] place or not, the fact that there was no survey done and there 
was no engineer's report available, and the fact that John Dewey, himself, after 
drilling his grain, represented a significantly larger number to the Department 
of Agriculture, there is clearly no material issue of fact regarding the point 
in question -- that is, whether there was a misrepresentation . . . .  

Upon a thorough review of the evidence and materials 
presented to the trial court, we agree with the court's reasoning and assessment 
of the evidence.3  The buyers did not provide any evidence that 
there was less than the approximated acreage as identified in the information 
sheet.  

[¶17]   Finally, the buyers assert the number of 
cattle located on the property was misrepresented by the statement on the 
information sheet that the sellers were "[p]resently running 175 cows and calves 
on the place."  
The buyers assert "175 cows and calves" implies there were 175 cow/calf 
pairs, for a total of 350 animals on the property.  Specifically, the 
buyers maintain, "It would only stand to reason tha[t] any court in Wyoming, a 
state rich in the heritage of the livestock industry, . . . would take judicial 
notice that when speaking of a cow and a calf, you are speaking of a pair."  The buyers admitted 
that, on their three property inspections, they saw only a total of 
approximately 160 animals, an amount significantly less than what they 
maintained was represented in the information sheet. 

[¶18]   In White v. 
Ogburn, 528 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Wyo. 
1974), we addressed a fraudulent misrepresentation claim regarding the number of 
cattle being run on the property at the time of sale.  In that case, we 
dismissed the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with the following 
language: "We do not say that [defendants] could not rely upon representations 
made to them by the [plaintiffs], but they could not blind themselves to observe 
the readily available facts and place reliance upon such alleged 
misrepresentations without making a diligent inquiry of these facts."  528 P.2d  at 
1171.  We have 
previously stated that "[r]eliance is reasonable when false representations have 
occurred prior to the execution of the contract which is sought to be avoided or 
for which damages are sought to be recovered."  Sundown, Inc., 8 P.3d  at 331.  Just as the purchasers in White were able to observe the cattle on the premises, 
so too were these buyers.  Even if the buyers could have initially proven 
a misrepresentation, once they inspected the property and had the ability to 
observe the number of cattle on the premises, they could no longer rely upon 
their belief that the property supported 350 animals.  The buyers failed to 
provide evidence to establish a material issue of fact existed as to the 
essential element of reliance.  

                        

[¶19]   Summary judgment was properly granted on 
each of the claimed intentional and negligent misrepresentations contained 
within the information sheet.

[¶20]   The buyers also complain the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment on several oral misrepresentations allegedly 
made to them by the agent during the property inspections.  On appeal, the 
buyers provided no evidentiary support for these claims.  Instead, they argued 
the questions of whether all the oral representations were even made and whether 
they were false were factual questions appropriate for consideration by a 
jury.  This 
argument disregards the buyers' duty to come forward with competent evidence of specific facts to counter the motion 
for summary judgment.  
The alleged oral misrepresentations are as follows:

            
1.  The agent stated the alfalfa was killed by "heat 
broiling";

            
2.  The buyers were not told about the existence of the 
weeds;

            
3.  The agent misrepresented that he helped harvest sixty 
bushels of barley from the sellers' place;

            
4.  The agent misrepresented that the Letellier house was 
"about six years old";

            
5.  The agent was not aware of the condition of the irrigation 
pipes and head gates and should have been;

            
6.  Misrepresentation of the condition of the septic system at 
the Hallsted place;

            
7.  Misrepresentation that a new septic system had been put in 
at the Letellier place;

            
8.  Misrepresentation on the number of places alkali had leaked 
to the surface of the ground;

            
9.  Cistern was represented to have been cleaned but was 
neither cleaned nor disinfected;

            
10.  House at the Hallsted place had not been cleaned as 
represented; and

            
11.  The agent misrepresented the alfalfa production 
capability.

Summary judgment was granted on five of the alleged oral 
misrepresentations due to a lack of admissible evidence that the representations 
were false.  
These include:

            
1.  Alfalfa was killed by "heat broiling";

            
2.  The agent misrepresented that he helped harvest sixty 
bushel/acres of barley from the sellers' place;

            
3.  Misrepresentation on the septic system at the Letellier 
place;

            
4.  Cistern at the Hallsted place was represented to have been 
cleaned but was neither cleaned nor disinfected; and

            
5.  The agent misrepresented the alfalfa production 
capability.

The trial court commented:

[T]his Court has scoured every detail of the record for some 
admissible evidence that the representations referred to therein were 
false.  [The 
buyers] have offered zero evidence on any of those allegations, and simply rely 
upon the proposition that whether they were false or not is a question of fact; 
however, [the sellers] have come forward with admissible evidence that they are, 
in fact, true.

 "One of the basic elements of fraud is the 
falsity of the representation of a material fact."  White, 528 P.2d  at 1171.  Our review of the same material considered by 
the trial court likewise leads us to the same conclusionthe buyers presented no 
evidence to support the allegation the representations were in fact false.  

            

[¶21]   The trial court granted summary judgment 
on three of the alleged oral misrepresentations stating, "[the buyers] have 
neither argued nor submitted evidence that there were misrepresentations with 
respect to any of these items."  The allegations concerned (1) the existence of 
the weeds, (2) the condition of the irrigation pipes and head gates, and (3) 
misrepresentations about the alkali leaking to the surface.  These claims reflect the buyers' propensity throughout this 
litigation to make bald assertions without evidentiary support.  In fact, the buyers did not come forward with any evidence 
to show these representations were even made to them.

                        

[¶22]   Next, the buyers claim the agent 
represented the Letellier home was about six years old.  The agent testified 
in his deposition that, if the buyers had asked about the Letellier home, he 
would have told them it was probably built in the '50s.  Notably, the buyers 
admitted they inspected the home, both inside and out, before they submitted 
their offer.  
It is not reasonable for the buyers to rely upon a 
representation, if in fact one was made, that the home was only six years old 
when it would be evident upon inspection that the home was much older.  In terms of the 
intentional misrepresentation claim, the buyers are not justified in relying 
upon the truth of a representation if its falsity is obvious to them.  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 541 (1977).  
Stated another way, one cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a 
representation, the falsity of which would be obvious to him upon a cursory 
examination or investigation.  Id. at cmt. a.  In this instance, 
the buyers were required to use their own senses, and, because they had the 
opportunity to inspect the property, no reasonable jury could conclude they 
relied on the statement.  As there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding justifiable reliance or evidence that the representation was made, we 
affirm.

[¶23]   The buyers also maintain the Hallsted 
place had not been cleaned as represented.  The trial court remarked that this claim 
"demonstrate[d] the frivolous nature of the vast majority of the [buyers'] 
claims."  Again, 
the buyers admitted they inspected the Hallsted place before they submitted 
their offer and, therefore, were not relying on its cleanliness as an inducement 
to enter into an agreement. 

            

[¶24]   Finally, the buyers allege the condition 
of the Hallsted place septic system was misrepresented.  They claim a septic 
problem occurred subsequent to their possession of the premises.  However, no evidence 
was offered that either the sellers or the agent knew of any problem or problems 
which had existed prior to closing.  The buyers do not direct this court to any 
evidentiary basis to prove a false representation was made.

  

[¶25]   The various misrepresentations must fail 
for a lack of proof that representations were made, relied upon, or false.  In order to succeed 
on summary judgment, the movant must establish a prima facie case, and then the 
burden shifts to the opposing party who must show a genuine issue of material 
fact or come forward with competent evidence of specific facts countering the 
facts presented by the movant.  Bender v. Phillips, 
8 P.3d 1074, 1077 (Wyo. 
2000).  At the 
trial court level and again on appeal, the buyers failed in their burden to 
establish material issues of fact on both the intentional misrepresentation and 
the negligent misrepresentation claims.  Consequently, we affirm all aspects of the 
trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the sellers and the 
agent.

            
2.  Negligent 
Nondisclosure

  
[¶26] The 
buyers also assert claims based on negligent nondisclosure.  Their brief sets out 
a single argument in support of their contention that partial summary judgment 
was improperly granted on this issue:

            
The lower court in its ruling on the issue of failure to disclose held 
that the authority in Richey, supra, was dispositive 
and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of [the sellers] and [the 
agent].  The 
elements necessary to establish a cause of action for non-disclosure are founded 
in factual determinations.  The Court committed error in not allowing 
these factual determinations to be made by the jury.

 "We summarily affirm cases or issues that have 
not been presented with cogent argument or supported by pertinent 
authority."  Small v. Convenience Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Wyo. 
2000).  Thus, we 
decline to consider the claims for negligent nondisclosure.

B.        Motions 
for Judgment as a Matter of Law

1.  
Representation of Number of Acres in State Lease 

[¶27]   Following the presentation of evidence, 
the sellers and the agent made a W.R.C.P. 50 motion for judgment as a matter of 
law contending the buyers' claims of intentional and negligent 
misrepresentations regarding the number of state leased acres lacked a legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis.  The information sheet contained the following 
language:  
"STATE LEASES:  
190 acres  annual cost $155.00."  The accurate number of state leased acres was 
later determined to be eighty acres.  The trial court granted the motions stating: 
"it certainly is apparent that no reasonable jury having heard the evidence in 
this case could find for [the buyers] on any of those claims."  The court concluded 
the buyers failed to show they had relied upon the misinformation of the amount 
of acres in the state lease due to the information sheet disclaimer and because 
the buyers admitted they had done their own investigation.  The trial court also 
found the buyers completely failed to show damages and voiced a concern that the 
jury would be forced to speculate in order to assess an amount of damages.  We agree.

            

[¶28]   W.R.C.P. 50(a)(1) provides:

            
(a)  Judgment as a matter of law. 

            
(1)  If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on 
an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 
jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue 
against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the 
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that 
issue.

"Despite the fact that judgment as a matter of law should be 
granted cautiously and sparingly, the district court has an obligation to direct 
entry of such a judgment where there is legally insufficient evidence to support 
a verdict on a particular issue."  Sayer v. Williams, 
962 P.2d 165, 167 (Wyo. 
1998).  We 
review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a judgment as a matter of law 
de novo.  Sundown, Inc., 8 P.3d  at 330.  
Under our de novo standard, we undertake a 
full review of the record without giving deference to the trial court's 
views.  Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. v. Murray, 2001 WY 63, ¶7, 27 P.3d 266, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2001).  The test 
is whether the evidence is such that, without the witnesses' credibility being 
weighed or the weight of the evidence otherwise being considered, there can be 
but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons could have 
reached.  Id.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.  Id.  When the facts presented permit the drawing of 
more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose which will be used.  Id.  "If the inferences favorable to the movant are 
subject to doubt, or if parallel inferences can be drawn, the motion 
appropriately is denied."  Id.  We affirm the 
district court's grant of the motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
the sellers and the agent because there was no evidence for the jury to consider 
on two of the required elements:  reliance and damages.  

[¶29]   The sellers admitted they supplied the 
facts contained in the information sheet to the agent.  Specifically, the 
information sheet represented 190 acres of state leased land existed on the real 
property at issue.  
The sellers conceded the information sheet error at trial and 
acknowledged there were only eighty state leased acres.  The buyers admitted 
that, during a prepurchase inspection, the agent had shown them a strip of land 
dividing the property which was identified as state land.  Mr. Dewey expressed 
his concern that:

[T]he fence lines on this state property that divided the 
ranch had approximately a 200-foot jog in it.  I needed to know where that state land was, 
because if I put in new fences and I put them in on state land, even if they are 
wrong, state land cannot be assumed by adverse possession if you have the fences 
wrong.

The buyers' unease did not establish reliance but rather 
established a specific recognition that the information might be incorrect and 
needed to be investigated.  Indeed, rather than relying upon the stated 
amount of acres, the buyers offered to make an independent investigation through 
a friend at the Wyoming State Land and Farm Loan Office (the Office).  On September 29, 
1994, the buyers asked the Office to provide identification for all the state 
land where the sellers' ranch was located.  The Office's response revealed there were only 
eighty acres of state leased land rather than the 190 acres listed in the 
information sheet.4 

[¶30]   The buyers fail to point to any 
evidence, let alone legally sufficient evidence, to establish their reliance 
upon the stated amount of leased acres in the information sheet or damages 
suffered as a result of such reliance.  Instead, they present only conclusory 
statements unsupported by the record, which will not be given credence by this 
court.  
Eklund, ¶10 (general allegations and conclusory statements are not 
sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment).  On the claims of 
intentional and negligent misrepresentations, the record demonstrates a manifest 
absence of any evidence which could allow a reasonable person to conclude that 
either reliance or damages existed.  For these reasons, the trial court 
appropriately granted the W.R.C.P. 50 motion brought by the agent and the 
sellers.  

            
2.  
Damages for Hay 

 [¶31]  After the trial, the sellers requested the 
trial court grant a judgment as a matter of law because the buyers failed to 
offer the jury a mathematical computation or method to support the $10,430 
damage award for hay.  
The trial court struck the jury's finding of hay damages stating:

[T]here was no evidence whatsoever shown which would 
quantify the amount [the sellers] should have paid to [the buyers].  The jury was not 
allowed to speculate concerning the amount of damage and the Court finds that no 
reasonable jury could have concluded that based upon the testimony presented in 
court, $10,430.00 was an appropriate amount to have awarded [the buyers].

[¶32]   Our duty is to determine whether the 
evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury verdict on this particular 
issue.  Sundown, Inc., 8 P.3d  at 330.  Plaintiff's Exhibit 
34 is the only evidence which the buyers could argue substantiates the 
award.  The 
exhibit is a bank ledger with an entry on May 22, 1995, which reflected a bank 
operating loan disbursement to the buyers in the amount of $10,430.  The notation in the 
column entitled "Purpose of Advance/Source of Repayment" states "per John 
hay."  The 
buyers offered no further factual basis to support the $10,430 amount other than 
this exhibit.  
There was absolutely no testimonial evidence that the loan was used to 
purchase hay to feed the cattle.  Furthermore, the buyers acknowledged that the 
sellers' only contractual obligation was to furnish sufficient first-cutting hay 
for the leased cattle.  
The buyers further conceded they used the first-cutting hay to feed both 
their own cattle and the leased cattle.  Therefore, the amount chosen by the jury could 
not have accounted for the amount used to feed the buyers' cattle.  A jury is not 
permitted to speculate or engage in conjecture in awarding damages.  Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 960 (Wyo. 
1990).  
Therefore, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50, the trial court properly struck the 
$10,430 jury award due to legally insufficient evidence. 

C.        Order 
Releasing Bond

 [¶33]  The buyers claim the trial court erroneously 
released the sellers' bond.  Again, the buyers provide no pertinent 
authority to support their position.  As noted in the recitation of the facts:  (1) The buyers filed 
a lien statement in the amount of $10,430; (2)  the sellers filed a Complaint for Temporary 
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction; (3) the 
sellers were ordered to post an injunction bond in the amount of $10,430, the 
amount the buyers claimed was owed to them for the hay; (4) the parties 
stipulated that the buyers would not proceed with their lien foreclosure action; 
and (5) in return the sellers agreed the court would hold the $10,430 as a bond 
for satisfaction of the lien.  The stipulation provided the court could hold 
the bond for satisfaction of the lien, "if the Court determines in fact the lien 
is valid."  On 
June 22, 2000, the trial court granted the sellers' motion for release of the 
bond reasoning the buyers' failure to provide evidence of the specific amount 
owed to them for hay eliminated any grounds for the bond.  

[¶34]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-310 (LexisNexis 
2001) addresses the satisfaction of a lien when a bond is filed in the district 
court as occurred in the instant case.  A bond guarantees that, if the lien claimant 
is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover upon the lien, the lien claimant 
shall be paid at least the amount for which the lien was filed plus costs.  Here, the matter was 
adjudicated, and the trial court properly concluded there was no evidence to 
support the buyers' claim that they paid a particular amount of money for the 
hay.  It 
accordingly struck the $10,430 damage award to the buyers.  Likewise, there was 
no basis upon which to support the lien claim, and the bond was properly 
released.

D.        Specific 
Performance

[¶35]   Specific performance will be granted in 
the court's discretion only where there is a valid, binding contract and the 
facts and special equities of the situation demand such relief.  Rainbow Oil Company v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 545 (Wyo. 
1982).  Before a 
court may order a contract to be specifically performed, the contract terms must 
be so certain that the court can require the specific thing agreed upon to be 
done.  Williams v. Dietz, 999 P.2d 642, 644-45 (Wyo. 
2000).  "The 
party requesting specific performance must be able to establish that damages for 
breach are an inadequate and impractical remedy under the circumstances of the 
case."  Rainbow Oil Company, 656 P.2d  at 545.  

[¶36]   The trial court denied the sellers' 
request for specific performance of the purchase of the property finding 
ambiguities existed regarding the amount of hay to be provided by the sellers, 
the amount of acreage in the state lease, the certificate of title, and finally 
whether the agreement was a lease with an option to purchase or a contract for 
purchase.  The 
trial court also concluded the liquidated damage clause in the lease purchase 
agreement arguably "provided an escape hatch for the [buyers]."  We agree with the 
trial court's denial of specific performance but find the conclusion regarding 
the effect of the liquidated damages provision erroneous given the contractual 
provisions allowing multiple remedies.

            

[¶37]   Significant to our conclusion specific 
performance was not warranted is the sellers' failure to show damages were an 
inadequate or impractical remedy or there were special equities which commanded 
such relief.  
The sellers made no showing why damages would not serve as an adequate 
remedy for the buyers' failure to purchase the property; e.g., significant 
changes in the real estate market, any unique property characteristics, or the 
sellers' circumstances that made damages an inadequate remedy.  It was incumbent on 
the sellers to show to the court the equities which entitled them to obtain 
specific performance, and the court's discretion should not be exercised unless 
the case is clear.  
Furthermore, "[o]ne of the basic tenets of equity is that equitable 
remedies depend upon a showing by the claimant of clean hands."  Fremont Homes, Inc. v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 952, 959 (Wyo. 
1999); see also Hammond v. 
Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 203 (Wyo. 
2000).  Neither 
party to this transaction had completely clean hands so as to demand 
equity.  

[¶38]   The jury's response in the special 
interrogatories, which determined that the agreement was not a contract to 
purchase the subject real property and therefore the buyers should not have to 
purchase the property, was a factor equally important to the trial court's 
ruling and to our resolution of this issue.  After hearing all the testimony at trial, the 
jury made it clear it believed the transaction was essentially a lease with an 
option to purchase the property.

 [¶39]  Specific performance is only appropriate where 
the agreed upon terms were sufficiently certain.  Ambiguity is found if indefiniteness of 
expression or double meaning obscure the parties' intent, though disagreement 
between the parties as to the agreement's meaning does not give rise to an 
ambiguity.  Hansen v. Little Bear Inn Company, 9 P.3d 960, 964 (Wyo. 
2000).  "Whether 
or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court."  Collins v. Finnell, 2001 WY 
74, ¶15, 29 P.3d 93, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2001).  
The trial court held the provision regarding the hay to be left by the 
sellers was ambiguous, and we agree.  The parties settled upon the following 
language:  
"Lessor shall leave sufficient first cutting hay to winter the above 
animals during the 1994-1995 winter," as stated in the lease purchase 
agreement.  The 
ambiguity arises as to whether the sellers should have left sufficient hay to 
winter the animals during the 1994-95 winter or whether they were merely 
required to leave all their first-cutting hay, regardless of whether or not it 
was sufficient to winter the animals.  This issue was litigated extensively without 
resolution.  
Hence, we conclude this provision created an ambiguity that was 
appropriate for the trial court to consider in denying specific performance.

[¶40]   However, we do disagree with the trial 
court's reliance upon the liquidated damage provision in the lease purchase 
agreement in concluding specific performance was barred.  Although erroneous, 
the trial court's determination does not undermine our ultimate conclusion that 
specific performance was properly denied.  The liquidated damage provision provides:

            
(3)  If Lessee shall fail for any reason to purchase the 
demised premises in the manner provided in this lease agreement, Lessor shall 
retain all earnest money payments and all lease payments received from Lessee 
pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph (2) of this section as liquidated 
damages and Lessee shall have no right to receive back any part of such 
amount.

As we explained in Walters v. 
Michel, 745 P.2d 913, 915 (Wyo. 
1987), remedies provided in a contract generally are not exclusive.  Rather, such 
remedies are merely some of several remedies which might be pursued by an 
injured party.  
745 P.2d  at 915.  "A subsequently sought remedy will only be 
barred where it is inconsistent with the remedy initially pursued.'"  Id. (quoting Helmer v. 
Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 569 P.2d 10, 14 (Or. 1977)).  Restatement of Contracts § 382 at 715 (1932) 
provides in pertinent part:  
"The bringing of a suit either for specific performance or for 
compensation in money is not such an election of the remedy sued for as to 
operate as a bar to a later suit or to an amendment asking for the other remedy 
with respect to the same breach."  

[¶41]   We note the agreement between the 
parties did not include a limiting "exclusive remedy" clause which this court 
determined was significant to our decision in Walters.  745 P.2d  at 915.  In fact, the lease purchase agreement contained the 
following paragraph found under the heading "Lessor's Remedies of Default by 
Lessee":

            
A.  
Lessee agrees that in the event it should be in default of the 
performance of any of the terms, covenants, or conditions of this lease 
agreement, or have otherwise breached this lease agreement, Lessor may in addition to every 
remedy now or hereafter available at law or in equity have the rights and 
remedies set forth in this lease agreement, which shall be deemed cumulative and 
not exclusive of those available at law or in equity.

(Emphasis added) On the basis of the foregoing authority and 
the existence of the qualifying paragraph in the lease purchase agreement, we 
conclude the remedies of damages and specific performance were not inconsistent 
and, as a result, both were potential remedies for the sellers to pursue.  

            

[¶42]   Specific performance is an equitable 
remedy subject to the court's sound discretion.  Rainbow Oil 
Company, 656 P.2d  at 545.  We clarified the definition of an abuse of 
discretion when we stated the core of our inquiry must reach "the question of 
reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).  In Vaughn, we confirmed that judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id.  We can discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
denial of specific performance. 

E.        Jury 
Verdict

 [¶43]  The sellers claimed the jury rendered an 
inconsistent verdict and sought a judgment as a matter of law or, in the 
alternative, a new trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50 and 59(a).  On appeal, they 
challenge that portion of the verdict which determined that, while there was no 
contract entered into between the parties for the purchase of the property, the 
contract terms were fair and reasonable, understandable, and reasonably set 
forth and the buyers knew or should have known of the terms when they entered 
into the contract.  
As a further indication of inconsistency, the sellers point to the jury's 
decision to award them damages, despite its finding that they did not comply 
with the contract.  
When the verdict and special interrogatories are reviewed in full, the 
jury's logic is apparent.5  The jury returned a verdict finding that the 
real estate transaction created a lease for one year with an option to buy 
rather than a contract for purchase, and it concluded the buyers had caused the 
sellers some damages by failing to make certain payments required under the 
agreement.  

            

[¶44]   The jury specifically asked whether it 
would be allowed to award damages to the sellers based on the buyers' actions 
under the lease purchase agreement, and the trial court instructed the jury, 
with the agreement of both parties, to determine damages despite its finding 
that a contract to purchase the property did not exist.  Neither party can 
now be heard to complain about this  "inconsistency."

            

[¶45]   The trial court did, however, alter the 
jury's answer to the question of whether the parties entered into a contract for 
the purchase of the real property to an affirmative response.  The court 
reasoned:  
"[T]here is no reasonable basis upon which the jury could have found that 
there was not a contract under which the [buyers] agreed to purchase the 
property that was involved."  We conclude the trial court's action was 
unnecessary and the verdict was consistent.  Our standard of review is de novo; thus, we will not give deference to the trial 
court's decision.  
Jurkovich v. Tomlinson, 905 P.2d 409, 411 (Wyo. 
1995).  If a 
jury acted unreasonably or returned a verdict contrary to the one reasonable 
conclusion that could be reached, a judgment as a matter of law may be 
granted.  This 
jury did neither in this case.

            

[¶46]   Although the jury concluded there was no 
contract for purchase, it was not precluded from determining both the sellers 
and the buyers failed to comply with certain terms of the lease purchase 
agreement.  It 
was the lease portion of the contract the jury determined the sellers breached 
by failing to leave sufficient hay and the buyers breached by failing to make 
required payments.  
From this perspective, the verdict form was entirely consistent.  Each question 
subsequent to the jury's determination that there was no contract for purchase 
logically addressed the lease portion of the agreement.  Given the convoluted 
nature of the verdict form and the special interrogatories, to which both 
parties agreed, it is a testament to the wisdom of the jurors in general that 
this jury could make its way through the questions and answer them in a manner 
consistent with the evidence.  Rather than belatedly claiming the jury was 
confused, the parties' counsel and trial court should be held accountable for 
creating and acquiescing to such an unartfully drafted jury verdict form.  Nonetheless, 
reviewing the entirety of the jury verdict, we conclude the jury was consistent 
and rendered a proper verdict.  

[¶47]   Upon this conclusion, we hold the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the sellers a new trial.  The trial court's 
alteration of the jury's answer that no purchase contract was entered into was 
not necessary to make the verdict consistent and did not change the jury's 
ultimate conclusion.

F.         Both 
Parties' Requests for Attorney's Fees and Costs

[¶48]   Both parties filed motions for 
attorney's fees and costs relying on the lease purchase agreement's terms.  The sellers also 
sought costs pursuant to Rule 501(a)(1) of the Uniform Rules for District Courts 
of the State of Wyoming.  The trial court denied each request concluding 
that neither party "prevailed" in this maze of claims and counterclaims, and we 
agree.

                        

[¶49]   The sellers' request for costs under 
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1), based on the buyers' failure to object to the demand, fails 
because the parties entered into a contractual agreement regarding costs.  In Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1091 (Wyo. 
1999) (emphasis added and citations omitted), we said:

            
Costs are purely statutory, as they did not exist at common law.  However, this is 
true only in the absence of an agreement concerning costs between the 
parties.  
Parties to an agreement are free to bargain for payment of costs, just as 
they can bargain for payment of attorney's fees.  The parties' agreement to an allocation of costs is not 
subject to the provisions of U.R.D.C. 501.  

 In the face of a valid contractual agreement 
imposing a clear standard, we will not apply the provisions of U.R.D.C. 
501(a)(1). 

            

[¶50]   In Wyoming, we follow the American rule 
which states each party is responsible for his own attorney's fees in the 
absence of an express contractual or statutory provision to the contrary.  McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 533 (Wyo. 
2000).  Even in 
the face of a valid contractual provision for attorney's fees, we have clearly 
stated that a trial court has the discretion to exercise its equitable control 
to allow only such sum as is reasonable or the court may properly disallow 
attorney's fees altogether on the basis that such recovery would be 
inequitable.  Id. at 534.  Here, the parties rely on two express contract 
provisions regarding attorney's fees and costs.  First, the counteroffer incorporated 
substantially all the terms and conditions of the offer including:

            
In the event that any party shall become in default or breach of any of 
the terms of this Contract, such defaulting or breaching party shall pay all 
reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses which the nonbreaching or 
nondefaulting party may incur in enforcing this Contract with or without 
suit.  This 
provision shall not limit any other remedies to which the parties may otherwise 
be entitled.

Second, the lease purchase agreement provided in pertinent 
part:  "In the 
event that any action is filed in relation to this lease agreement, the 
unsuccessful party in the action shall pay to the successful party, in addition 
to all the sums that either party may be called on to pay, a reasonable sum for 
the successful party's attorney fees."  In light of its various rulings and the jury's 
verdict, the trial court determined that neither the sellers nor the buyers 
could be considered the prevailing party; therefore, it denied the cross-motions 
for attorney's fees and costs.  We conclude the trial court made an equitable 
decision and did not abuse its discretion.  Contrary to the parties' divergent opinions 
that the prevailing party's identity was clear, the record tells a quite 
different story.  
We hold the trial court exercised sound judgment in concluding neither 
party prevailed and denying all requests for attorney's fees and costs.

G.        Adequacy 
of Damages

[¶51]   The sellers insist they suffered 
extensive damages as a result of the demise of the real estate transaction.  The jury awarded 
$32,497.29 to compensate the sellers for reduction in the value of the cattle 
and the sale value of the calves, the real property taxes paid by the sellers, 
and lease expenses.  
The trial court determined the evidence justified the award of these 
damages.  The 
sellers contend the jury neglected to consider all the evidence presented which 
identified the actual expenses sustained by the sellersdamages which were 
significantly more than the jury awarded. 

            

[¶52]   In general, the legal remedy for a 
breach of contract is the award of damages designed to place the plaintiff in 
the same position in which he would have been had the contract been fully 
performed, less proper deductions.  BHP Petroleum Company, Inc. v. Okie, 836 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1992).  
"The jury's determination of the amount of damages is inviolate absent an 
award which is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience 
and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, or other 
improper cause had invaded the trial."  Brittain v. 
Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 536 (Wyo. 1979); see also Carlson v. BMW Industrial Service, Inc., 744 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Wyo. 1987).  
"This standard recognizes a range within which the verdict must fall and 
recognizes the judge, who has observed, tried, and compared numerous cases of 
this kind, as knowledgeable in determining a reasonable value of damages to be 
awarded."  Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 92 (Wyo. 
1990), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn, 962 P.2d  
at 151.  The 
trial court instructed the jury as follows: "You may award to the [sellers] all 
sums that you find reasonable to compensate them for their damages and to 
compensate them for breach of contract by the [buyers] and to compensate them 
for damages that they have suffered at the hands of [the buyers]."  

[¶53]   The following is that portion of the 
jury's verdict which addressed the sellers' damages:

            
a.  Reduction in value of cattle

            
     $     16,730.39                  

            
b.  Sale value of calves

            
     $     6,346.42                     

            
c.  Interest paid by the [sellers] to Farm Credit

            
     $     -0-                               

            
d.  Insurance paid by the [sellers]

            
     $     -0-                               

            
e.  Shell Canal Company assessments paid by the [sellers]

            
     $     -0-                               

            
f.  Miscellaneous expenses

            
     $     -0-                               

            
g.  Lease 
expense

            
     $     196.00                                    

            
h.  Real property taxes pa[i]d by the [sellers] to Big Horn 
County

            
     $     9,224.48                     

            
i.  
Damage to equipment

            
     $     0                                  

            
j.  Other 
amounts, if any

            
     $     0                                  

Plaintiff's Exhibit 58 supports the jury's award of 
$16,730.39 for the reduction in the value of the cattle.  The exhibit 
identifies the contractual value of the cattle which were subject to the lease 
purchase agreement.  
The value was $56,500 from which the $39,769.61 sale value was deducted, 
resulting in a total loss of $16,730.39the amount the jury awarded to the 
sellers.  
Likewise, a check to the buyers in the amount of $6,346.42 supports the 
jury's award for the sale value of the calves.  The testimony at trial showed this amount 
represented proceeds from the Worland Livestock Auction for the sale of the 
leased first-year calves, which the parties' agreement recognized would belong 
to the sellers in the event of default.  Further, the jury's award for lease expenses 
reflected the sellers' 1995 renewal fee payment.  This is consistent with the jury's 
determination that the lease purchase agreement represented a one-year 
lease.  

[¶54]   We are aware that the jury failed to 
award an amount to compensate for other damages the sellers claim they 
suffered.  
However, this court may not substitute its own judgment for 
the collective judgment of the jurors.  Archuleta v. 
Valencia, 871 P.2d 198, 202 (Wyo. 
1994).  In Archuleta, we cited the following passage:

            
"The Court is not free to set aside the verdict merely because the judge 
might have awarded a different amount of damages, but it may do so if the 
proceedings have been tainted by appeals to prejudice or if the verdict, in 
light of the evidence, is so unreasonable that it would be unconscionable to 
permit it to stand."

Id. (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2807 (1973)).  This elevated standard of review does not 
allow this court to alter the damages awarded to the sellers by the jury.  At trial, the jury 
heard ample evidence to support the amount awarded, and we can discern no 
evidence that passion or prejudice influenced it.  The sellers sought approximately $135,000 in 
damages to reimburse them for expenses they incurred related to the property 
during the course of the parties' dealings.  Those expenses not awarded by the jury as 
damages are fairly allocated to a lessor who retains title to the property and 
benefits of ownership and are not contractually allocable to a lessee who 
declined to purchase the property.  We are satisfied the jury could have inferred 
from all the facts presented that $32,497.29 was an appropriate award to the 
sellers and was within an acceptable range.  We conclude the jury verdict was not so 
insufficient as to shock our judicial conscience.6

H.        Breach of 
Contract

 [¶55]  The sellers challenge the jury's determination 
that they did not comply with the contract as not being supported by the 
evidence.  When 
we review the  
sufficiency of the evidence, we assume the evidence in favor of the 
successful party is true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence in 
conflict and assigning every favorable inference to the successful party's 
evidence that can be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  Murray, ¶8.  It is the jury's duty to ascertain the facts, 
reconcile conflicts therein, and draw its own inferences if more than one 
inference is permissible.  Id.  "When the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose 
which one will be used; and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's 
choice will be conclusive."  Id.

[¶56]   The jury made it clear it believed the 
sellers should have left sufficient hay to feed the cattle throughout the 
winter.  In the 
verdict form, the jury answered the following question in the affirmative:  "Do you find that 
the [sellers] should compensate the [buyers] for hay which the [sellers] should 
have left to provide winter feed for their animals?" Accordingly, the jury 
awarded the buyers $10,430 for the hay.  Sufficient evidence exists on this issue to 
support the jury's determination that the sellers failed to comply with this 
provision of the contract.

[¶57]   The addendum provided as follows:  "1st year Seller to 
leave enough first cutting hay to winter above cows for this Purchaser."  Mr. Wentland 
testified that "above cows" referred to the animals that he leased to the 
buyers.  This 
language was subsequently changed to provide "Lessor shall leave sufficient 
first cutting hay to winter the above animals during the 1994-1995 winter," as 
stated in the lease purchase agreement.  Mr. Wentland also testified that "enough" is 
synonymous with "sufficient."  The trial court described the controversy at 
issue as follows:

[W]hether it means that the seller was only to leave all of 
the first-cutting hay regardless of whether it was enough to winter the seller's 
animals during the 1994-'95 winter, or whether it meant that the seller was to 
leave enough hay to winter the above animals during that entire winter.  It's an ambiguity in 
the contract, an issue that never has really been resolved between the 
parties.

The sellers conceded that, although they left all the 
first-cutting hay, they did not leave enough first-cutting hay to feed the 
animals for the winter.  Applying our standard, we conclude there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to reconcile the facts and draw the inference 
that the sellers breached the first-cutting hay provision in the contract.  Therefore, the 
jury's determination is beyond our review.

[¶58]   In summary, we find the trial court did 
an admirable job of sifting out the unsupported claims in this complicated case 
by granting partial summary judgment, granting the motions for judgment as a 
matter of law, releasing the bond, and denying specific performance and both 
parties' requests for attorney's fees and costs, and we affirm those 
rulings.  The 
court also properly denied the sellers' request for a new trial or a judgment as 
a matter of law.  
In addition, we affirm the jury verdict and judgment which awarded 
adequate damages to the sellers as a result of the buyers' failure to make 
certain payments under the lease purchase agreement.  Finally, we hold 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the sellers breached the 
lease purchase agreement.  

[¶59]   Affirmed.  

FOOTNOTES

1We note the buyers were 
represented by counsel for the majority of the pretrial proceedings.  The buyers' counsel 
was allowed to withdraw on February 11, 1999.  Subsequently, the buyers represented 
themselves pro se through trial but are represented 
by counsel on appeal.

  

2In Hulse v. First American 
Title Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 
95, ¶60, 33 P.3d 122, ¶60 (Wyo. 2001), we clarified that tort claims against licensed 
real estate professionals premised on their duties imposed by statute give rise 
to a claim for professional negligence.  In that case, we concluded that claims raised 
against the real estate professional at issue, while labeled "negligent 
misrepresentation," were essentially asserted as a breach of duty of care owed 
by real estate professionals to nonclient buyers.  Hulse, ¶62.  Because the claims 
against the agent in the instant case were labeled and analyzed as negligent 
representation, our analysis will proceed accordingly. 

3On 
appeal, the sellers ask this court to consider several portions of the jury 
trial transcript.  
We take this opportunity to remind counsel that, in reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we are constrained to employ the same materials as were used 
by the trial court.  
Scherer Construction, LLC, ¶15.  Obviously, the trial 
court's decision on partial summary judgment preceded the jury trial in this 
matter; therefore, we will not consider evidence presented at trial.

4At trial, there was a disputed issue as to when the buyers 
actually received this information.  The letter written by the Office was 
postmarked the day of the buyers' requestSeptember 29, 1994.  The sellers contend 
the date of receipt was significant because September 29, 1994, was one day 
prior to the buyers' offer.  According to the sellers, if the buyers 
received notice prior to submitting the offer, there could be no justifiable 
reliance.  
However, the buyers claim they did not receive the letter until 
approximately three months later.  

5The special interrogatories 
and verdict form were not well thought out and were overly detailed. They 
addressed issues which were not in contention and failed to distinguish between 
a contract to purchase and a lease purchase agreement.  In actuality, the 
jury did an admirable job applying the facts to the questions asked and reaching 
an equitable and sound final judgment.  The forms it had to contend with presented the 
following questions:

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

            
Interrogatory No. 1:  Do you find that the 
[buyers] entered into a Purchase Contract to purchase the [sellers'] Ranch East 
of Greybull, Wyoming[?]

Yes                  
            
No        X          

            
Interrogatory No. 2:  Do you find that the 
[sellers'] Ranch has 1075 acres of water rights from Shell Canal Company 
together with water rights from the Lake Adelaide Reservoir[?]

Yes      
X          
            
No                    

            
Interrogatory No. 3:  Do you find that at 
the time of the agreement entered into between the parties in October, 1994, 
that there were approximately 600 acres in production with another 200 acres 
that could have been put into production[?]

Yes      
X          
            
No                    

            
Interrogatory No. 4:  Do you find that 
[the buyers] adequately maintained and cared for the real property which is the 
subject of this action including the gates, fences and corrals[?]

Yes      
X          
            
No                    

            
Interrogatory No. 5:  Do you find that the 
[buyers] should be required to perform [their] contract with the [sellers] and 
purchase the [sellers'] Ranch according to the terms and conditions agreed upon 
by the parties to that agreement[?]

Yes                  
            
No        X          

            
Interrogatory No. 6[:]  Did the [sellers] 
fail to disclose any material aspects of the property of which they were 
aware?

Yes                  
            
No        X          

  

VERDICT FORM

            
WE THE DULY EMPANELLED JURY in the above-captioned case do hereby find as 
follows:

            
1.  Do you find that the [sellers] have established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the [buyers] entered into a contract with 
them for the purchase of their ranch east of Greybull, Wyoming?

            
[  ]  
Yes                                    
[X]  
No

            
If you marked yes, then proceed to number 2.  If you marked no, 
please proceed to number 11.

            
2.  Do you find that the terms of the contract were fair and 
reasonable on the date that it was entered into?

            
[X]  
Yes             
[  ]  No

            
3.  Do you find that the terms of the contract were 
understandable when it was entered into?

            
[X]  
Yes             
[  ]  No

            
4.  Do you find that the terms of the contract were reasonably 
set forth in the documents utilized by the parties?

            
[X]  
Yes             
[  ]  No

            
5.  Do you find that the [sellers] reasonably relied upon the 
terms of the contract entered into with the [buyers]?

            
[  ]  
Yes                                    
[X]  
No

            
6.  Do you find that [the buyers] reasonably knew or should 
have known of the terms of the contract as of the date it was entered into?

            
[X]  
Yes             
[  ]  No

            
7.  Do you find that the [sellers] complied with the contract 
entered into between the parties insofar as possible?

            
[  ]  
Yes                                    
[X]  
No

            
8.  Do you find that [the buyers] did not comply with the terms 
of the agreement entered into with the [sellers] and therefore that they 
breached their contract for the purchase of the [sellers'] ranch?

            
[  ]  
Yes                                    
[X]  
No

            
If you marked yes, then proceed to number 9.  If you marked no, 
please proceed to number 11.

            
9.  Do you find that the [sellers] have been damaged by the 
breach of contract on the part of the [buyers]?

            
[X]  
Yes             
[  ]  No

            
If you marked yes, then proceed to number 10.  If you marked no, 
then proceed to number 11.

            
10.  What, if any, damages do you award to the [sellers] as a 
result of the breach of contract by the [buyers] for:

            
a.  Reduction in value of cattle

            
     $     16,730.39                      

            
b.  Sale value of calves

            
     $     6,346.42                        

            
c.  Interest paid by the [sellers] to Farm Credit

            
     $     -0-                                

            
d.  Insurance paid by the [sellers]

            
     $     -0-                                

            
e.  Shell Canal Company assessments paid by the [sellers]

            
     $     -0-                                

            
f.  Miscellaneous expenses

            
     $     -0-                                

            
g.  Lease 
expense

            
     $     196.00                          

            
h.  Real property taxes pa[i]d by the [sellers] to Big Horn 
County

            
     $     9,224.48                        

            
i.  
Damage to equipment

            
     $     0                                  

            
j.  Other 
amounts, if any

            
     $     0                                  

            
11.  Do you find that the [sellers] should compensate the 
[buyers] for hay which the [sellers] should have left to provide winter feed for 
their animals?

            
[X]  
Yes             
[  ]  No

            
If you marked yes, then proceed to paragraph 12.  If you marked no, 
then sign the Verdict Form and return it to the Court.

            
12.  What amount if any, do you award to the [buyers] for the 
hay[?]

                                    
$          
10,430.00          

            
DATED this 10th day of November, 1999.

6The buyers asked this court 
to reduce the amount of the sellers' award on the basis of an exhibit not 
admitted at trial, and we decline to do so.