Case Title: P. v. Anzalone

Citation: 

Docket Number: S192536M

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 6/12/13 (unmodified opinion attached) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S192536 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H035123 
CHRISTINA MARIE ANZALONE, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC935164   
 
____________________________________) 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND 
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE COURT: 
 
The opinion in this matter filed on April 15, 2013, and appearing at 
56 Cal.4th 545, is modified as follows: 
On page 561, the disposition is modified to read as follows:  ―The judgment 
of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to that court for 
consideration of defendant‘s remaining claims.‖ 
The modification changes the judgment.   
The petition for rehearing is denied.  
 
 
1 
 
Filed 4/15/13 (unmodified opinion) 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S192536 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H035123 
CHRISTINA MARIE ANZALONE, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC935164  
 
 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Penal Code section 1149 provides, ―When the jury appear they must be asked 
by the Court, or Clerk, whether they have agreed upon their verdict, and if the 
foreman answers in the affirmative, they must, on being required, declare the 
same.‖1  Here, the court failed to follow this mandated procedure.  The case turns 
on whether the error is structural error, and thus reversible per se, or trial error 
subject to harmless error review.  For the reasons set forth below, the error was not 
structural.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment. 
 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.   
 
2 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
On February 22, 2009, defendant Christina Marie Anzalone went to the front 
desk of a San Jose motel and asked the owner if she could speak to Leon Wallace, 
the maintenance man.  The owner said that Wallace was not in and refused to let 
her go to Wallace‘s room.  Defendant accused the owner of lying and left.  She 
returned a few minutes later, pushed over a computer, pulled a knife, and 
threatened to kill the owner.  Police were called and defendant left. 
Later that day, defendant was speaking with Kimberly Malott when she saw 
Kimberly‘s husband, Richard.  Defendant accused Richard of abusing Kimberly, 
approached him, and struck him in the chest.  Richard initially walked away, but 
turned around.  Defendant threw a bagel and an open knife at him, hitting him in 
the chest with the butt end of the weapon.  He picked up the knife, then got in his 
truck with Kimberly.  Defendant blocked their exit and spat on the windshield.  As 
Richard and Kimberly tried to leave, defendant grabbed onto the truck‘s side 
mirror and broke the radio antenna.  Defendant was charged with making a 
criminal threat against the motel owner (§ 422), and assault with a deadly weapon 
on Richard (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), with allegations that she personally used a deadly 
weapon in both counts (§§ 667, 1192.7, 12022, subd. (b)(1)).  She was also 
charged with misdemeanors for vandalism of Richard‘s truck (§ 594, 
subd. (a)(b)(2)(A)), and brandishing a weapon against the motel owner (§ 417, 
subd. (a)(1)). 
On October 7, 2009, after final argument and instructions, the jury 
deliberated in the afternoon.  The next day, after a readback of testimony, the 
jurors deliberated for another six minutes before informing the bailiff they had 
reached a verdict.  The jury returned to the courtroom and the following 
proceedings took place: 
 
3 
 
―THE COURT:  We‘re in session in Docket CC 935164.  Attorneys are 
present, Mr. Hultgren and his client and DA Ms. Frazier. 
―Jury has indicated they have a verdict.  We‘ll bring them out. Thank you. 
―(Jury Present) 
―THE COURT:  We‘re back on the record in the presence of the jury now as 
well.  And ladies and gentlemen, I understand you‘ve reached a verdict.  Who is 
the foreperson?  Mr. (juror)? 
―JUROR:  Yes sir. 
―THE COURT:  Hand the verdict forms to the deputy.  I‘ll hand those to the 
clerk to read the verdict.‖ 
The verdicts were then read aloud.  Defendant was acquitted of vandalism 
but found guilty on the other counts.  The jury also found true both allegations of 
using a deadly weapon.  Neither party asked the court to poll the jury.  (See 
§§ 1163, 1164.) 
After the verdict was read and recorded, the court addressed the jurors:  
―Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you‘ve now completed your jury service in this 
case and on behalf of the judges and attorneys and everyone in the court, please 
accept my sincere thanks for your time and effort that you put into your verdicts in 
this case.‖  The court gave jurors additional instructions with regard to 
administrative matters such as accepting payment for information about the case, 
communications with counsel, and the sealing of personal juror information.  The 
court concluded, ―Again, I can‘t thank you enough for your attention during this 
trial.  I never say this, I‘ll say you‘re one of the best juries I‘ve ever had as far as 
being prompt, attentive to the evidence.  [¶]  We notice that, we all notice it here 
and we talked about it and I appreciate your service.  You are now excused for at 
least one year and if you want to talk to the attorneys, they will be out in about 
three minutes in the hall, otherwise you can leave . . . .‖  On December 4, 2009, 
 
4 
 
defendant was sentenced to a prison term of four years eight months.  On appeal, 
defendant argued that her state constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict was 
violated because the court failed to ask the jury foreperson or the jurors to affirm 
their verdict as required by section 1149.  The Court of Appeal agreed.  It went on 
to conclude the error was structural and, thus, reversible per se. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The Attorney General argues that defendant forfeited her claim by failing to 
object to the trial court‘s alleged failure to comply with section 1149.  This court 
has held that the failure to object to an incomplete polling of the jury forfeits any 
claim of error on appeal.  (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 262-
270 (Keener); see People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 415; People v. Lessard 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 447, 452 (Lessard).) 
In the extensive discussion of forfeiture in Keener, we cited with approval 
authorities stating that the general rule in both civil and criminal cases is that an 
objection to a defective verdict must be made before the jury is discharged.  
(Keener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 263-265.)  ―[T]he basis for the requirement of an 
objection to asserted imperfections in the polling of a jury concerning its verdict is 
no different from the basis for requiring objections to other equally important 
procedural matters at trial . . . .  The requirement of an objection is premised upon 
the idea that a party should not sit on his or her hands, but instead must speak up 
and provide the court with an opportunity to address the alleged error at a time 
when it might be fixed.‖  (Id. at pp. 265-266, fns. omitted.) 
The trial court‘s inadvertent failure to comply with section 1149 in the 
present case appears analogous to an incomplete polling of the jury, and there is 
no apparent reason to apply a different forfeiture rule.  After all, rather than an 
appellate court reviewing a cold record, the parties are present in the courtroom to 
observe the exchange between the court and the jurors, hear the court‘s comments, 
 
5 
 
understand what is transpiring, and seek any necessary clarification.  That they 
make no objection suggests they see no reason to question whether the verdict as 
read accurately represents the verdict reached by the jury.  The parties are in the 
best position to know if there is reason to suspect any juror might not be fully 
committed to the verdict.  A party with concerns about the accuracy of the verdict 
may test it by polling.  A party that eschews the opportunity has no cause to 
complain that the court failed to test the verdict‘s accuracy by requiring public 
affirmation.   Accordingly, a defendant who does not object to the trial court‘s 
failure to comply with section 1149 forfeits the argument that the trial court erred. 
However, notwithstanding defendant‘s forfeiture, we will address the 
merits because the case concerns an issue of statewide importance.  (People v. 
Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 809.) 
Our state Constitution provides that a defendant in a criminal case has a 
fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) 
As noted, section 1149 also requires that when the jury returns after reaching 
a verdict, the court or clerk must ask ―whether they have agreed upon their verdict, 
and if the foreman answers in the affirmative, they must, on being required, 
declare the same.‖  Thus, a foreperson‘s oral declaration may provide sufficient 
acknowledgment of the verdict.  (See People v. Wiley (1931) 111 Cal.App. 622, 
625.)  But, if either party so requests, the jury may be polled and each juror must 
orally affirm the verdict.  (§§ 1149, 1163, 1164.) 
Sections 1163 and 1164 govern jury affirmation of the verdict by polling.  
Under section 1163, either party may request polling before the verdict is 
recorded.  If any juror disagrees with the verdict, the jury must be sent out for 
 
6 
 
further deliberations.2  Section 1164 provides that after the verdict is recorded, 
either party may request that the clerk read the verdict as recorded.  If a juror 
dissents to the recorded verdict, the jury is sent out for further deliberations.3 
Here, the Attorney General argues that the foreperson‘s statement, ―Yes, sir,‖ 
was an oral acknowledgement that the jury had reached a verdict.  (§ 1149.)  The 
Attorney General claims that ―the combination of the court‘s stating its 
understanding the jury reached a verdict, its asking the foreperson to identify 
himself, the foreperson‘s complying, the court‘s asking the foreperson to hand the 
verdict forms to the bailiff, the foreperson‘s complying again without further 
qualification or comment, and the clerk‘s reading the verdict in the presence of the 
jury and the parties amounted to substantial compliance with section 1149‘s 
requirement of an acknowledgement by the foreperson that the jury had reached its 
verdict.‖ 
The court did not ask whether the jury had reached a verdict.  It made a 
statement to that effect.4  It then asked a particular juror if he was the foreperson.  
It was to this question that the juror replied, ―Yes, sir.‖5  It is clear that neither the 
court nor the clerk actually complied with section 1149, because neither asked the 
                                              
2  
―When a verdict is rendered, and before it is recorded, the jury may be 
polled, at the request of either party, in which case they must be severally asked 
whether it is their verdict, and if any one answer in the negative, the jury must be 
sent out for further deliberation.‖  (§ 1163.) 
3  
―(a)  When the verdict given is receivable by the court, the clerk shall 
record it in full upon the minutes, and if requested by any party shall read it to the 
jury, and inquire of them whether it is their verdict.  If any juror disagrees, the fact 
shall be entered upon the minutes and the jury again sent out; but if no 
disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete, and the jury shall, subject to 
subdivision (b), be discharged from the case.‖  (§ 1164, subd. (a).) 
4  
The court said, ―And . . . I understand you‘ve reached a verdict.‖ 
5  
By order of the trial court, jurors‘ names and other personal identifying 
information were kept confidential. 
 
7 
 
foreperson or other members of the jury whether they had agreed to the verdict or 
sought to receive the foreperson‘s affirmation.  Accordingly, the trial court failed 
to follow the statutory directive.6  The defense did not object to this failure of 
procedure at the time, after the jury was discharged, or at the subsequent 
sentencing hearing.  Defendant made no motion for retrial. 
The Court of Appeal held that the error violated defendant‘s state 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict.  It stated that ―although the jury 
deliberated and rendered a verdict, which was read in court, the lack of oral 
acknowledgement by the jurors individually or by the foreperson rendered the 
jury‘s verdict incomplete, defective, and invalid.‖  The court held the defective 
verdict invalidated the judgment.  It deemed the error structural, reasoning that it 
                                              
6 
The clerk‘s minutes conflict with the reporter‘s transcripts.  Minute entries 
report the court did inquire and the foreperson acknowledged that the jury had 
reached a verdict. 
 
―As a general rule, a record that is in conflict will be harmonized if 
possible.  [Citation.]  If it cannot be harmonized, whether one portion of the record 
should prevail as against contrary statements in another portion of the record will 
depend on the circumstances of each particular case.‖  (People v. Harrison (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 208, 226.) 
 
When adequate, the clerk‘s minutes can be relied upon to establish an 
admission and a waiver of constitutional rights even where the reporter‘s transcript 
is silent on the subject.  (People v. Malabag (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1422-
1423.)  However, in Malabag, there was specific evidence that the reporter‘s 
transcript was incomplete—the transcript began in the middle of the proceedings 
and contained only sentencing orders.  (Id. at p. 1422.)  It was in this context that 
the court found the reporter‘s transcript was incomplete and the clerk‘s transcript 
could be used to demonstrate that certain advisements had been given.  (Id. at 
pp. 1422-1423.) 
 
Here, there is nothing to suggest that the reporter‘s transcript is incomplete 
and the Attorney General does not argue that the transcript is inconsistent or 
incomplete.  Accordingly, we presume the court reporter accurately reported the 
proceedings.  (See People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 289 [presumption that 
an official duty has been performed applies to court reporters].) 
 
8 
 
could not apply a harmless error analysis because ―[a]lthough there is ample if not 
overwhelming evidence to support the verdict reflected in the verdict forms, and 
although there is nothing in the record to suggest that the jurors did not agree with 
the verdict when read, it is not possible for us to know whether the foreperson 
would have acknowledged the verdict; and if so, whether defendant would have 
requested that jurors be individually polled; and if polled, whether all of the jurors 
would have endorsed the verdict as his or her verdict.‖  The court erred in 
denoting this procedural failure as structural error. 
We have recently considered the distinction between structural error and trial 
error.  ―Under article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution, trial error does not 
merit reversal of a judgment unless ‗the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.‘  Typically, a defendant who has established error under 
state law must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of 
the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.  (People v. 
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 968; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  
As we have explained, however, ‗under the California constitutional harmless-
error provision some errors . . . are not susceptible to the ―ordinary‖ or ―generally 
applicable‖ harmless-error analysis — i.e., the Watson ―reasonably probable‖ 
standard — and may require reversal of the judgment notwithstanding the strength 
of the evidence contained in the record in a particular case.‘  (People v. Cahill 
[(1993)] 5 Cal.4th [478,] 493.)  ‗[T]he kinds of errors that, regardless of the 
evidence, may result in a ―miscarriage of justice‖ because they operate to deny a 
criminal defendant the constitutionally required ―orderly legal procedure‖ . . . all 
involve fundamental ―structural defects‖ in the judicial proceedings, analogous to 
those to which the United States Supreme Court referred in its [Arizona v. 
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279] decision . . . .‘  (Cahill, at pp. 501-502.)‖  
(People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 699, fn. omitted.) 
 
9 
 
―Error that occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury is generally 
trial error; an error that erroneously adds to or subtracts from the record before the 
jury can ‗be quantitatively assessed in the context of the other evidence presented 
in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.‘  (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 308; see also People v. Allen 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 870–871.)  A court in such circumstances can meaningfully 
ask ‗whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error.‘  (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279.)  In 
contrast, structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis are those that 
go to the very construction of the trial mechanism — a biased judge, total absence 
of counsel, the failure of a jury to reach any verdict on an essential element.‖  
(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 396 (Gamache); see People v. Aranda 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363-366 [addressing federal constitutional structural 
error].)  The Fulminante court described some of these errors as affecting the 
―entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end . . . .‖  (Fulminante, at p. 309.) 
In short, trial errors can be fairly examined in the context of the entire record 
and are amenable to harmless error review.  Structural errors, on the other hand, 
go to the very reliability of a criminal trial as a vehicle for determining guilt or 
innocence and are reversible per se.  (See Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 396;  
In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 914 (James F.).)  A structural error requires 
per se reversal because it cannot be fairly determined how a trial would have been 
resolved if the grave error had not occurred.  For example, it would be impossible 
to divine how a trial would have proceeded if a defendant had been allowed 
counsel or the trial judge not been biased.  There is a strong presumption that any 
error falls within the trial error category, and it will be the rare case where a 
constitutional violation will not be subject to harmless error analysis.  (People v. 
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 851 (Marshall).) 
 
10 
 
To our knowledge, the United States Supreme Court has never suggested that 
the lack of an oral acknowledgement of the verdict in open court is a structural 
defect.  As noted, reversal for structural error has been limited to instances such as 
adjudication by a biased judge (Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510), the complete 
deprivation of counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335), the unlawful 
exclusion of grand jurors based on race (Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254), 
the infringement on the right to self-representation (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 
465 U.S. 168), the denial of a public trial (Waller v. Georgia (1984) 467 U.S. 39), 
and the giving of a constitutionally deficient instruction on the reasonable doubt 
standard (Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. 275).  (See Washington v. 
Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218, fn. 2 [listing structural errors]; United States 
v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 148-149 [same]; Neder v. United States 
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8 [same].)  Such errors clearly affect the ―the framework within 
which the trial proceeds . . . .‖  (Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 310.)  
Consistent with the limited nature of structural error, we have held that in the 
absence of a request, there is no denial of a constitutional right when the court fails 
to poll the jury.  (Lessard, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 452.) 
Certainly, the safeguard of a unanimous jury verdict is a core constitutional 
right.  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; see People v. Russo 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.)  Here, there is no indication that the jury was not 
unanimous.  It was clearly instructed on the requirement of unanimity and it 
deliberated for just over three hours before it notified the bailiff that it had reached 
a verdict.  The court stated in the jury‘s presence that it understood the jury had 
reached a verdict.  The foreperson returned signed verdict forms.  The jury 
convicted on some counts, but also acquitted on one.  No juror objected when the 
 
11 
 
verdicts were read.7  Neither party requested polling.  Indeed, the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the complete absence from the record of any apparent jury 
disagreement and the presence of ample, if not overwhelming, evidence of guilt. 
Of course, trial judges are charged with knowing what the statutes require 
and with following their dictates.  However, as our state Constitution makes clear, 
a judgment cannot be reversed for state law error unless there has been a 
miscarriage of justice.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836.)  In the absence of structural error, the Watson standard for 
demonstrating prejudice controls.  Sections 1149, 1163, and 1164 are procedural 
provisions designed to protect the right to a unanimous verdict.  (See Thornton, 
supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 859.)  Many statutes, however, set out procedures 
designed to protect constitutional principles.  Broadly construed, many of these 
procedural statutes may be said to protect due process and other constitutional 
safeguards.  Nevertheless, most procedural shortcomings constitute trial error.  
Indeed, most constitutional violations themselves are subject to harmless error 
review, particularly if, as here, a defendant had counsel and was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator.8  (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 410 (Mil).)  As we 
                                              
7  
In People v. Thornton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 845, 852 (Thornton), the 
court observed that it may be unreasonable to expect that an average juror will 
understand that he or she could object in such circumstances.  While that may be 
so, and thus it should not be required that an objection be made in order to find a 
lack of unanimity, the absence of any juror objection is a legitimate factor, among 
others, that can be considered in determining whether there is any real question as 
to unanimity. 
8  
For example, in Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pages 306-307, 
the high court set out numerous instances of constitutional error properly reviewed 
for harmless error.  They included: (1) overbroad jury instructions at the 
sentencing stage in a capital case (Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738, 
752–754); (2) jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive presumption 
(Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 266-267); (3) the erroneous admission 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
12 
 
have previously noted, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.  (See 
People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 442.)  Despite the trial court‘s error 
here, nothing in the record indicates that defendant‘s trial was in any way unfair. 
In addition, any number of cases of venerable vintage have subjected 
technical violations of the statutory requirements for receiving jury verdicts to 
harmless error analysis.  (See, e.g., People v. Rodundo (1872) 44 Cal. 538, 541 
[failure to call names of jurors before receiving verdict forms when all jurors were 
present]; People v. Gilbert (1880) 57 Cal. 96, 97-98 [failure to record verdict 
before discharge of jury]; People v. Smith (1881) 59 Cal. 601, 603-604 [same]; 
People v. Smalling (1892) 94 Cal. 112, 118-119 [verdict recorded, but not 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
of evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment counsel clause during the 
sentencing stage in a capital case (Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 257-
258); (4) jury instruction misstating an element of the offense (Pope v. Illinois 
(1987) 481 U.S. 497, 501-504); (5) jury instruction on an erroneous rebuttable 
presumption (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579-580); (6) the erroneous 
exclusion of the defendant's testimony regarding his confession (Crane v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 691); (7) restricting a defendant's right to cross-
examine a witness for bias (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681); 
(8) denying a defendant's right to be present at trial (Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 
U.S. 114, 117-118, and fn. 2); (9) improper comment on the defendant‘s silence at 
trial (United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499, 509); (10) failure to instruct 
on a lesser included offense in a capital case (Hopper v. Evans (1982) 456 U.S. 
605, 613-614); (11) failure to instruct on the defendant‘s presumption of 
innocence (Kentucky v. Whorton (1979) 441 U.S. 786, 788); (12) admitting 
improper identification evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment (Moore v. 
Illinois (1977) 434 U.S. 220, 232); (13) admitting the out-of-court statement of a 
nontestifying codefendant (Brown v. United States (1973) 411 U.S. 223, 231–
232); (14) admitting a postindictment, pretrial confession obtained by a police 
officer posing as a fellow prisoner (Milton v. Wainwright (1972) 407 U.S. 371, 
372); (15) admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
(Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 52–53); (16) denial of counsel at a 
preliminary hearing (Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 10–11). 
 
13 
 
transcribed into bound minutes and order book before the jury was discharged].)  
Thus, there is clear precedent for considering some failures to follow statutory 
procedure as ordinary trial error. 
Our decision in People v. Nichols (1881) 62 Cal. 518 (Nichols) is particularly 
instructive.  There, the jury indicated it had reached a verdict and returned to the 
courtroom.  The court asked the jury if it had reached a verdict.  The foreperson 
indicated that it had done so, and handed the verdict to the judge.  The judge 
handed the clerk the verdict form and directed the clerk to record the verdict.  The 
defendant asked that the verdict be read before it was recorded, but the court 
refused.  After the clerk copied the verdict into the court‘s minutes, he read it to 
the jurors and asked them if this was their verdict.  Some answered yes, while 
others did not voice any dissent.  The jury was then polled and each member 
affirmed the verdict.  The jury was discharged.  (Id. at p. 519.)  On appeal, the 
defendant claimed the trial court erred by denying his request that the verdict be 
read before being recorded or declared as required by the procedures set forth in 
the Penal Code.  (Nichols, at p. 520.) 
We held that the trial court committed a ―palpable irregularity‖ by recording 
the verdict before it was read.  (Nichols, supra, 62 Cal. at p. 520.)  However, we 
concluded that the error did not prejudice the defendant in any substantial way.  
(Ibid.)  Here, the trial court‘s procedural error is similar to the ―palpable 
irregularity‖ in Nichols.  The technical error here did not affect the essential 
framework within which defendant‘s trial was conducted.  (See Marshall, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 851.) 
The jury was instructed that unanimity was required.  In the absence of some 
indication to the contrary, it is presumed the jury followed the instructions.  (See 
People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 426.)  Defendant makes no claim that the 
jury ignored the court‘s instructions, nor did the court give any instruction that 
 
14 
 
undermined the unanimity mandate.  To call what transpired here structural error 
would be to expand that notion beyond any example articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court, and elevate form over substance. 
A number of cases have considered the significance of a juror affirmation 
when a court attempts to reconvene a jury (Thornton, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 
856; People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 597), or to substitute a juror  
(People v. Green (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009; People v. Lankford (1976) 55 
Cal.App.3d 203, 211).  Cases also have examined juror affirmation when a juror 
equivocates (Chipman v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 263, 266; People 
v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 929, 932-933), when a jury returns 
inconsistent verdicts (People v. Mestas (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 780, 786), when 
the court erroneously declares a mistrial (Stalcup v. Superior Court (1972) 24 
Cal.App.3d 932, 936), and when the verdict forms on guilt and sanity are not 
signed by the same foreperson (People v. Wiley, supra, 111 Cal.App. at p. 624). 
No case, however, has squarely considered whether a failure to comply with 
section 1149, standing alone, must always render a verdict defective.  We hold 
that, under the circumstances of this case, where the verdict was read and recorded 
in the presence of all 12 jurors, the verdict was not rendered invalid.9 
In defending its conclusion of structural error the Court of Appeal leaned 
heavily on Thornton, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d 845.  It reads Thornton too broadly 
and thus its reliance on it is misplaced.  Thornton was charged with possession of 
a drug for sale.  The jury acquitted him of that charge but apparently agreed to 
convict him of simple possession, as a lesser included offense.  When the jury was 
                                              
9  
In addition, we note the following.  The guilty verdicts that were signed by 
the foreperson all read, ―We, the Jury, in the above entitled cause find the 
defendant . . . [guilty of] . . . .‖  (Italics added.) 
 
15 
 
brought to the courtroom, the clerk read the not guilty verdict form returned on the 
charged offense.  The jury collectively affirmed that verdict.  (Id. at pp. 848-851.)  
The court asked both advocates whether there was ― ‗[a]ny matter to come before 
the court before the jury is discharged.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 849.)  Both counsel replied in 
the negative and the jury was discharged.  (Ibid.)  Later in the day, the clerk noted 
that a second verdict form, delivered by the jury but evidently overlooked by the 
court and the clerk, indicated a guilty finding on the lesser offense.  (Id. at pp. 850-
851.) 
The court notified counsel and, over defense objection, ―reassemble[d]‖ the 
jury the next day.  (Thornton, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 850.)  At that time the 
court explained the inadvertent failure to read the second verdict form.  The court 
ordered both verdicts recorded, and both the guilty and not guilty verdicts were 
read as recorded.  The jury collectively acknowledged both verdicts.  The jury was 
polled as to both verdicts and each juror, individually, affirmed both verdicts.  (Id. 
at pp. 850-851.)  The Thornton court framed the issue as ―whether the court erred 
in reconvening the jury the day after it was discharged, and if so, whether the 
signed and dated verdict form as to the lesser included offense can be accorded 
any legal effect.‖  (Id. at p. 851.) 
 The Thornton court held that the trial court erred by reconvening the 
discharged jury, and as a result, the only true verdict was the one the jury rendered 
before its discharge.  (Thornton, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 858.)  As the facts 
make plain, the failure in Thornton has nothing to do with a failure to affirm.  
Instead, the failure was that, after the first verdict was read, the court discharged 
the jury.  (Ibid.)  No other verdict was mentioned, read, recorded, or affirmed.  
―The conclusion is inescapable that a discharge accompanied by loss of control of 
the jury divests the court of jurisdiction to reconvene them whether or not a 
 
16 
 
complete verdict was rendered and whether or not any error occurred at all.‖  (Id. 
at p. 856, italics added.) 
Here, the Court of Appeal quoted from Thornton as to the inability of the 
court to evaluate the impact of the error.  The quoted language focused on the 
inability to determine whether any jury taint may have taken place after the jury 
was discharged, but before it was ―reassemble[d].‖  Unlike Thornton, our case 
involves no loss of jurisdiction, improper recalling of the jury, or any possibility of 
juror taint. 
The Court of Appeal‘s reliance on People v. Traugott (2010) 184 
Cal.App.4th 492 (Traugott) was similarly misplaced.  Traugott was tried by a 12-
person jury, which returned verdict forms indicating findings that she possessed 
methamphetamine for sale and had suffered a prior conviction.  The jury reported 
about 3:30 p.m. that it had reached a verdict.  (Id. at p. 496.)  The defendant 
mistakenly left the court environs during deliberations.  (Id. at pp. 497-498.)  The 
court began the process of bringing all necessary participants together to receive 
the verdict.  Ultimately the defense agreed the verdict could be taken in the 
defendant‘s absence.  (Id. at pp. 497-498.) 
The court convened with ― ‗stand-in‘ ‖ counsel for both the prosecution and 
the defense.  (Traugott, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.)  By that time, Juror No. 
4 had left to go to a job interview.10  (Ibid.)  The court indicated it would take the 
verdicts in the absence of Juror No. 4 unless there was an objection.  Substitute 
defense counsel initially declined to agree to this procedure, saying she was not 
authorized to do so.  (Ibid.)  The court responded that she was standing in as 
attorney of record, had ― ‗all authorization and all power to do it,‘ ‖ and, ― ‗If not, 
                                              
10 
The opinion does not explain whether the juror was formally released and, 
if so, by whom. 
 
17 
 
you shouldn‘t be here.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Told, ― ‗You have to make a decision, 
Counsel,‘ ‖ defense counsel replied, without conferring with her absent client, 
― ‗We can proceed, Your Honor.  No objection.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 499.) 
The remaining 11 jurors returned to the courtroom, the clerk read the verdict, 
and the foreperson acknowledged it as correct.  (Traugott, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 499.)  Defendant‘s counsel asked the court to poll the jury.  The court 
responded:  ― ‗I can‘t poll [Juror] No. 4.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Defense counsel replied, 
― ‗Yes, I understand.‘ ‖  The remaining jurors were polled and affirmed the 
verdict.  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  It noted that while a defendant‘s state 
constitutional right to a unanimous 12-person jury is fundamental, a defendant can 
waive it.  (Traugott, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 500-501.)  The problem was 
that the defendant did not expressly waive this right and counsel‘s consent was 
insufficient.  (Id. at p. 502.)  As a result, the court held that the defendant‘s 
conviction could not stand because she did not receive a unanimous verdict of 12 
jurors.  (Ibid.)  The court stated that ―the right to an oral affirmation of the verdicts 
by the jurors is not a mere procedural formality,‖ because jurors ―may equivocate 
or change their vote when called upon in open court.‖  (Id. at p. 501.)  If an 
equivocating juror is not present in open court to be polled, the court and counsel 
cannot be confident that the verdict is unanimous.  (Id. at pp. 501-502.) 
Traugott is readily distinguishable from our case.  Here, all 12 jurors were 
present when the verdict was read and none expressed dissent when the verdict 
was read in open court.  Neither party objected to the court‘s actions in receiving 
the verdict nor requested a poll of the jury. 
The court‘s failure to follow section 1149‘s requirement did not deprive 
defendant of her constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict.  The error did not 
render the trial fundamentally unfair and its effect may be assessed in the context 
 
18 
 
of the entire proceedings.  (See Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th 347, 396; James F., 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 914.)  As we recently observed, ―Plainly, not every 
violation of the state and federal right to a jury trial is a structural defect requiring 
reversal without regard to whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice.‖  (Mil, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 411.)  Accordingly, we conclude that here noncompliance 
with section 1149 is procedural error, subject to harmless error review.  (People v. 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)11  For the reasons set out above, the error was 
plainly harmless. 
III. DISPOSITION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment, and affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
 
 
                                              
 
11  
Because we hold that reversal was unwarranted, we need not address 
defendant‘s claim that double jeopardy bars a retrial. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Anzalone 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 3/17/11 – 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S192536 
Date Filed: April 15, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Ron M. Del Pozzo 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Gabriel Bassan, under appointment 
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Laurence K. Sullivan, 
Sharon G. Birenbaum and Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson 
PMB 187 
316 Mid Valley Center 
Carmel, CA  93923-8516 
(831) 625-6581 
 
Michael Chamberlain 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5870