Case Title: Wilcox v. Estate of Hines

Citation: 2014 WI 60

Docket Number: 2012AP001869

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1869   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Richard S. Wilcox and Susan K. Wilcox, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Estate of Ralph Hines, Estate of William J. 
Newman and  
Lake Delton Holdings, LLC, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Chicago Title Insurance Company, 
          Defendant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 124, 831 N.W.2d 791 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 68  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 19, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk  
 
JUDGE: 
James Evenson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by James E. Bartzen, Richard L. Schmidt, and Boardman & 
Clark LLP, Madison, and oral argument by James E. Bartzen. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellants, there was a brief by Edward 
A. Corcoran and Neider & Boucher, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Edward A. Corcoran.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors Association.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1869 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV845) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard S. Wilcox and Susan K. Wilcox, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Estate of Ralph Hines, Estate of William J. 
Newman and Lake Delton Holdings, LLC, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Chicago Title Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
  REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a decision 
and order of the Sauk County Circuit Court2 dismissing the 
                                                 
1 Wilcox v. Estate of Hines, 2013 WI App 68, 348 Wis. 2d 
124, 831 N.W.2d 791. 
2 The Honorable James Evenson presiding. 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
2 
 
adverse possession claim brought by the respondents, Richard and 
Susan Wilcox. 
¶2 
This case involves an action for adverse possession 
brought by the respondents, Richard and Susan Wilcox, for the 
purpose of gaining title to a strip of land separating their 
property from Lake Delton.  The question presented is whether 
the Wilcoxes can establish that they adversely possessed the 
disputed property when their predecessors in interest, the 
Somas, 
expressly 
disclaimed 
ownership 
of 
it 
and 
sought 
permission to use the property from an entity that the Somas 
mistakenly believed was its true owner.  The Wilcoxes argue it 
is irrelevant whether the Somas subjectively intended to claim 
ownership of the property, so long as their use of the property 
was sufficient to put the true owner on notice of occupation.  
In contrast, the titleholders3 maintain that a party's subjective 
intent4 to claim ownership is relevant to whether "claim of 
title"5 has been established under Wis. Stat. § 893.25 (2011-
12).6  The titleholders assert that the fact the Somas expressly 
                                                 
3 For the purposes of clarity, we refer to the Estate of 
Ralph Hines, the Estate of William J. Newman, Lake Delton 
Holdings, 
LLC, 
and 
the 
Chicago 
Title 
Insurance 
Company 
collectively as "the titleholders." 
4 In referring to a party's subjective intent, we mean the 
actual state of a person's mind, as opposed to the objective 
appearance of the party's intentions.  
5 As discussed below, the "claim of title" requirement in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.25 is equivalent to the common law "hostility" 
element of adverse possession.   
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
3 
 
disclaimed ownership of the lakefront strip and requested 
permission to use it from an entity they mistakenly believed was 
its true owner demonstrates they did not intend to claim title 
to the property. 
¶3 
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the 
titleholders and hold that evidence regarding a possessor's 
subjective intent to claim title may be relevant in an adverse 
possession claim to rebut the presumption of hostility that 
arises when all other elements of adverse possession are 
satisfied.  Because the circuit court properly considered the 
Somas' subjective intent and concluded that the Wilcoxes failed 
to establish adverse possession for the requisite statutory 
period, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, and we need 
not remand for further proceedings.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
In 2002, Richard and Susan Wilcox ("the Wilcoxes") 
purchased a parcel of property ("the Wilcox property") from 
Ronald and Mary Soma ("the Somas") near Lake Delton in Sauk 
County.  A 25-foot-wide strip of land ("the lakefront strip") 
runs between the eastern border of the Wilcox property and Lake 
Delton.  It is this lakefront strip that is the subject of 
dispute in this case, and a brief account of its ownership 
history is necessary to understand the parties' arguments.  
¶5 
At the time the Wilcoxes filed their complaint in this 
case, the southeast portion of the lakefront strip was owned by 
The Estate of William Newman ("Newman").  Newman originally 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
4 
 
created Lake Delton in 1927 by constructing a dam on Dell Creek, 
and at that time he owned the entire lakefront strip, as well as 
what is now the Wilcox property.   
¶6 
In 1933, Newman transferred ownership of the northeast 
portion of the lakefront strip and a portion of the Wilcox 
property to Ralph Hines ("Hines"), and transferred the remainder 
of the Wilcox property to Hines in 1935.  Newman also granted 
Hines the right to foot traffic across the southeast portion of 
the lakefront strip.  In 1935, Hines sold the Wilcox property to 
Henry C. Titus ("Titus") but retained ownership of the northeast 
portion of the lakefront strip.  Hines also granted Titus the 
right to foot traffic across the entire lakefront strip.   
¶7 
In 1963, the Somas purchased the Wilcox property from 
Titus and, as part of the sale, were granted the right to foot 
traffic across the entire lakefront strip.  At this time, 
ownership of the lakefront strip remained with Hines and Newman, 
and Titus explained to the Somas that the Wilcox property did 
not include the lakefront strip.  The Somas, however, never knew 
who actually owned the lakefront strip.  Following the deaths of 
both Hines and Newman, ownership of the lakefront strip was 
ultimately transferred to the Estate of Ralph Hines and the 
Estate of William Newman.  These estates retained ownership of 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
5 
 
the lakefront strip at the time the complaint in this case was 
filed.7    
¶8 
The Somas owned the Wilcox property for nearly 40 
years.  During this time, the Somas made numerous improvements 
to the lakefront strip, while understanding that they did not 
own that land.  For instance, the Somas installed and removed a 
pier on the lakefront strip every year that they owned the 
Wilcox property.  They also cleared out undergrowth on the 
lakefront strip, added rocks, planted trees and flowers, 
repaired a cement wall, installed riprap8 along the shoreline, 
and maintained the lawn.  In addition, the Somas put up a "No 
Trespassing" sign and regularly told trespassers that they were 
on private property and instructed them to leave.  The Somas 
never asked permission from either the Newman or Hines Estates 
                                                 
7 During the course of litigation, Lake Delton Holdings, 
LLC, an enterprise owned by the law firm representing the Hines 
and Newman Estates in this case, acquired quitclaim deeds to 
both portions of the lakefront strip.  Following acquisition of 
the deeds, Lake Delton Holdings moved to intervene in place of 
the Estates.  The Wilcoxes objected, arguing that Lake Delton 
Holdings had unclean hands because it "attempted to acquire the 
property interest in order to advance a defense on behalf of 
First American Title Insurance in a dispute with the Wilcoxes on 
an adjoining parcel that had already generated three appeals."  
The circuit court denied the motion to intervene but allowed 
Lake Delton Holdings to continue as an interested party.  Lake 
Delton Holdings' motivation for acquiring deeds to the lakefront 
strip is irrelevant to whether the Wilcoxes have established 
adverse possession.  
8 "Riprap" is defined as "[l]oose stone used to form a 
foundation for a breakwater or other structure; a structure made 
of this."  Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2590 (6th ed. 
2007). 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
6 
 
to make these alterations to the lakefront strip.  However, they 
did ask and receive permission from John Dixon ("Dixon"), the 
manager of the Wisconsin Ducks ("the Ducks"), a company that 
provides boat tours of Lake Delton and Dell Creek.  The Somas 
did so because they mistakenly believed that the lakefront strip 
was owned by the Ducks.   
¶9 
In 1982, the Somas granted the Ducks an easement 
across their property to bring trucks and equipment to the 
lakefront strip.  The Ducks cleared out trees and undergrowth 
and placed rocks on the lakefront strip.  The Somas never 
objected to these improvements because they believed the 
lakefront strip belonged to the Ducks.  After the Ducks were 
finished, the Somas wished to make certain improvements to the 
lakefront strip.  Before doing so, they sought and received 
permission from Dixon to rearrange the rocks, place peat and 
grass seed on the lakefront strip, and put up a fence with a 
gate and an additional "No Trespassing" sign.   
¶10 The Wilcoxes purchased the Somas' property in 2002.  
Prior to the purchase, the Somas informed the Wilcoxes that the 
lakefront strip was not part of the sale, but that the Wilcoxes 
would have a right of foot traffic across it.9  Nevertheless, the 
Wilcoxes maintained and developed the lakefront strip in the 
                                                 
9 In addition, the Surveyor's Certificate of the purchased 
property states that the lakefront strip is not included in the 
parcel: "Said parcel does not include that land lying between 
said line being 25 feet, more or less, from the water's edge of 
Lake Delton and the water line of Lake Delton . . . ."   
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
7 
 
years following their purchase, adding improvements such as 
piers, a patio, flowers, trees, a fire pit, and steps.   
¶11 On August 26, 2011, the Wilcoxes brought a claim for 
title by adverse possession under Wis. Stat. § 893.25 against 
the owners of the lakefront strip, the Estate of Ralph Hines and 
the Estate of William Newman, in the Sauk County Circuit Court.10  
The circuit court conducted a bench trial on May 10, 2012.  In 
its oral ruling, the circuit court explained that adverse 
possession 
requires 
possession 
that 
is 
"open, 
notorious, 
visible, exclusive, hostile, and continuous . . . ."  The 
circuit court found that the Wilcoxes, in conjunction with their 
predecessors in interest,11 had met their burden of proof on the 
open and visible elements of adverse possession. However, the 
circuit court determined that they had failed to establish the 
elements of exclusive, hostile, notorious, and continuous 
possession.  The circuit court dismissed the Wilcoxes' adverse 
possession claim, noting that 1) the Somas had specifically 
disclaimed ownership of the lakefront strip; and 2) the Somas 
                                                 
10 The Wilcoxes also brought a claim for reformation of 
title, and the titleholders raised a counterclaim for trespass 
against the Wilcoxes.  Both claims were dismissed by the circuit 
court and not raised before the court of appeals.  Accordingly, 
we do not address them.  
11 The Wilcoxes cannot, by themselves, demonstrate adverse 
possession for the requisite statutory period.  This is so 
because the Wilcoxes' use of the lakefront strip began in 2002, 
and consequently, they had only occupied the disputed property 
for less than ten of the statutorily required 20 years at the 
time they brought suit.  The Wilcoxes must therefore "tack" 
their period of possession onto that of the Somas in order to 
satisfy the statutory period in Wis. Stat. § 893.25(1). 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
8 
 
sought and received permission to make improvements to the 
lakefront strip.  A final order reflecting this ruling was 
issued on May 22, 2012. 
¶12 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
circuit court.  Wilcox v. Estate of Hines, 2013 WI App 68, 348 
Wis. 2d 124, 831 N.W.2d 791.  The court of appeals first 
acknowledged "what might appear to be an inconsistency in 
adverse possession case law."  Id., ¶2.  Specifically, the court 
observed that while the adverse possession statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.25(2)(a), requires "occupation under claim of title," 
several cases appear to hold that the subjective intent of a 
possessor——that is, whether the possessor intended to claim 
title——is an irrelevant factor in determining the merits of an 
adverse possession claim.  Id.  After noting this apparent 
tension between the language of Wis. Stat. § 893.25 and our 
precedent, the court of appeals determined that reviewing courts 
should consider "the appearance that a possessor's use would 
give to the true owner" and not the "actual subjective intent" 
of a party.  Id., ¶15.  In other words, the court of appeals 
concluded that it is "a possessor's actions, not a possessor's 
belief" that matters when considering the hostile nature of the 
occupation.  Id., ¶16.  The court of appeals reasoned that this 
distinction reconciles various cases that appear "to declare, in 
one breath, that a possessor must actually intend to claim an 
exclusive right to possess property, and then, in the next 
breath, assert that the subjective intent of the possessor is 
irrelevant. . . ."  Id., ¶19.  Applying this rule, the court of 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
9 
 
appeals held that evidence of permission to use the property 
from a non-owner and a party's express declarations of non-
ownership should not be considered. 
¶13 The court of appeals recognized an exception to this 
rule: a party's permissive use of property is relevant in cases 
where the permission is granted by the true owner of the 
property.  Id., ¶21.  The court of appeals explained this 
exception is warranted because when an owner has granted a party 
permission to use property, a party's use in accordance with 
that permission would not appear hostile to the owner.  Id.  In 
this case, however, the Somas' permission to use the lakefront 
strip came from a non-owner and was therefore irrelevant.  Id.  
Consequently, the court of appeals held that the Wilcoxes 
satisfied the requirements of adverse possession.  Id., ¶24. 
¶14 The titleholders petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on September 17, 2013.  We now reverse. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 Review of an adverse possession claim presents a mixed 
question of fact and law.  
Perpignani v. Vonasek, 139 
Wis. 2d 695, 728, 408 N.W.2d 1 (1987).  We accept the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Peter H. & Barbara J. Steuck Living Trust v. Easley, 2010 WI App 
74, ¶11, 325 Wis. 2d 455, 785 N.W.2d 631.  However, whether 
these facts are sufficient to establish adverse possession is a 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
10 
 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Id.; 
Perpignani, 139 Wis. 2d at 728.12  
¶16 This 
case 
also 
involves 
an 
interpretation 
of 
Wisconsin's adverse possession statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.25.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Grp., 
LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶12, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 N.W.2d 332.  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶17 The 
question 
before 
us 
is 
whether 
the 
Somas' 
subjective intent not to claim title to the lakefront strip, as 
demonstrated by their express statements and their use of the 
property with the permission of a non-owner, is relevant to the 
Wilcoxes' adverse possession claim.   
¶18 We begin in Part A by reviewing the basic requirements 
to establish ownership by adverse possession under both the 
common law and Wisconsin's adverse possession statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 893.25.  In Part B, we address whether a court may 
consider evidence relating to a party's subjective intent in 
determining whether the claim of title requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.25, 
or 
its 
common-law 
counterpart, 
the 
hostility 
                                                 
12 The parties dispute how the standard of review applies in 
this case.  The titleholders maintain that the court of appeals 
improperly reviewed the evidentiary issues in this case de novo, 
when the circuit court's factual findings should be upheld 
unless clearly erroneous.  However, the Wilcoxes point out, and 
we agree, that this case does not center solely on the review of 
the circuit court's findings of fact.  Instead, we must 
determine whether the circuit court properly considered evidence 
related to the Somas' subjective state of mind, which is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo. 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
11 
 
requirement, has been satisfied.  We conclude that evidence 
regarding a party's subjective intent to claim title can be 
relevant to rebut the presumption of hostility that arises when 
all other elements of an adverse possession claim are met.  In 
Part C, we apply this conclusion to the facts of this case and 
determine that the Somas' statements disclaiming ownership and 
their use of the property with permission from a non-owner 
provided a sufficient basis for the circuit court to conclude 
that the Wilcoxes had failed to establish adverse possession of 
the lakefront strip.   
A. The Essential Elements of Adverse Possession 
¶19 Adverse possession is a legal action that enables a 
party to obtain valid title of another's property by operation 
of law.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.25(1) bars an action for recovery 
or possession of real estate if it has been adversely possessed 
for a minimum of 20 years.  Property is adversely possessed only 
if the possessor is in "actual continued occupation under claim 
of title, exclusive of any other right," § 893.25(2)(a), and the 
property is "protected by a substantial enclosure" or "usually 
cultivated and improved," § 893.25(2)(b).   
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.25 codifies the common law 
elements 
of 
adverse 
possession, 
which 
require 
physical 
possession that is "hostile, open and notorious, exclusive and 
continuous . . . ."  Leciejewski v. Sedlak, 116 Wis. 2d 629, 
636, 342 N.W.2d 734 (1984); see also Pollnow v. State Dep't of 
Natural Res., 88 Wis. 2d 350, 356, 276 N.W.2d 738 (1979) ("[T]he 
[adverse possession] statute carries over the common law 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
12 
 
definition of adverse possession").  In an adverse possession 
claim, the burden of proof is on the person asserting the claim.  
Allie v. Russo, 88 Wis. 2d 334, 343, 276 N.W.2d 730 (1979).  The 
evidence of possession must be "clear and positive and must be 
strictly construed against the claimant."  Id.  The court must 
make all reasonable presumptions in favor of the true owner, 
including the presumption that actual possession is subordinate 
to the right of the true owner.  Zeisler Corp. v. Page, 24 
Wis. 2d 190, 198, 128 N.W.2d 414 (1964) (quoting Illinois Steel 
Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499, 514, 81 N.W. 1027 (1900)).  
¶21 In order to demonstrate continuous possession for the 
requisite statutory period, a possessor may "tack" his time of 
possession to that of his predecessor in interest.  Perpignani, 
139 Wis. 2d at 724-25.  However, "in order to benefit from 
tacking, the adverse claimant must be shown to be in privity 
with any prior adverse possessor," id. at 725, and the prior 
possession must be actually adverse.  Id. at 727. 
¶22 The parties dispute what is necessary to satisfy the 
"claim of title" requirement in Wis. Stat. § 893.25, which 
corresponds to the common law "hostility" element.13  Within the 
                                                 
13 We agree with the parties and the court of appeals that the common law "hostility" 
requirement for adverse possession is equivalent to the "claim of title" requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.25(2)(a).  See, e.g., Kimball v. Baker Land & Title Co., 152 Wis. 441, 448, 140 N.W. 47 
(1913) (adverse possession statute "requir[es] allegation of hostile title, to allege facts from 
which the hostile claim of title or interest is raised as a necessary or reasonable inference"); 
Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 446, 85 N.W. 402 (1901) ("If the claimant 'raises his 
flag and keeps it up,' so to speak, sufficiently to attract the attention of the true owner to the 
situation . . . as a hostile claim of title, knowledge of such owner may be presumed as a fact . . . 
."); see also Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo. L.J. 2419, 
2426 (2001) (the hostility element "goes by a variety of names, including 'adverse,' 'hostile,' 
'under claim of title,' 'under claim of right,' and 'hostile and under claim of right.'"); Richard R. 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
13 
 
context of adverse possession, "'[h]ostility' means only one in 
possession [of the disputed property] claims exclusive right 
thereto and actual possession prevents the assumption of 
possession in the true owner."  Burkhardt v. Smith, 17 
Wis. 2d 132, 139-40, 115 N.W.2d 540 (1962).  "'Hostile intent' 
does not mean a deliberate, wilful, unfriendly animus. If the 
elements of open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession 
are satisfied, the law presumes the element of hostile intent."  
Id. at 139.  In other words, when all other elements of adverse 
possession 
are 
satisfied, 
a 
hostile 
intent 
is 
presumed.  
However, as explained below, this presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence demonstrating that a possessor lacked the subjective 
intent to claim title to the property.   
B.  A Presumption of Hostility is Rebuttable with Evidence 
of a Possessor's Subjective Intent 
¶23 The facts in this case raise a novel issue in our 
adverse possession jurisprudence: whether an adverse claimant 
can establish the elements of adverse possession when evidence 
demonstrates the party's predecessor in interest lacked the 
subjective intent to claim title to the property.  Specifically, 
the circuit court considered evidence that the Wilcoxes' 
predecessors in interest, the Somas, expressly disclaimed 
ownership of the lakefront strip and sought and received 
                                                                                                                                                             
Powell, 16 Powell on Real Property § 91.05[4], at 91-31 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000) ("In 
essence, to require adverse possession under a claim of right is the same as requiring hostility, in 
that both terms simply indicate that the claimant is holding the property with an intent that is 
adverse to the interests of the true owner").  
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
14 
 
permission to use the property from an entity they mistakenly 
believed was its true owner.  The titleholders assert that 
evidence the Somas never intended to gain possession of the 
lakefront strip was properly considered by the circuit court in 
reaching its conclusion that the Wilcoxes failed to satisfy the 
hostility element of adverse possession.  In contrast, the 
Wilcoxes argue the circuit court erred in considering the intent 
of the Somas, because such an inquiry is irrelevant so long as 
the Somas' use of the property was sufficient to put the true 
owner on notice.   
¶24 We agree with the titleholders and conclude that, 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.25 and our precedent, evidence relating 
to a party's subjective intent to claim title is relevant to 
rebut a presumption of hostility in an adverse possession claim.  
The "claim of title" requirement in Wis. Stat. § 893.25 is the 
statutory equivalent of the common law "hostility" requirement.  
As discussed below, the plain meaning of "claim of title" is 
that a possessor must subjectively intend to claim ownership of 
the 
disputed 
property. 
 
Although 
the 
"claim 
of 
title" 
requirement is presumed when all other elements of adverse 
possession are established, this presumption may be rebutted 
with evidence that a party never intended to assert ownership 
over the property.  A party who expressly disclaims ownership of 
property and seeks permission for its use is not "claiming 
title" to the property.  Therefore, express declarations of non-
ownership and evidence of permissive use are properly considered 
by a circuit court in determining whether the "claim of title" 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
15 
 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 893.25 has been satisfied.  To hold 
otherwise would render this essential element of adverse 
possession a nullity.   
¶25 This case is a dispute about whether the Wilcoxes have 
met the statutory requirements of adverse possession under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.25, which codifies the common law elements of 
continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, and hostile possession.  
In analyzing the requirements of a statute, we "begin[] with the 
language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, 
we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  The plain meaning of statutory 
language is generally the "'common,' 'ordinary,' 'natural,' 
'normal,' or dictionary definition[]" of a term.  Id., ¶41 
(citation omitted).   
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.25(2)(a) provides that property 
is adversely possessed "[o]nly if the person possessing it, in 
connection with his or her predecessors in interest, is in 
actual continued occupation under claim of title, exclusive of 
any other right." (emphasis added).  The plain meaning of "claim 
of title" is that the possessor intends to claim ownership of 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
16 
 
the disputed property.14  See 10 Thompson on Real Property 
§ 87.11, at 159 (David A. Thomas, ed., 3d ed. 2013) ("Claim of 
title is where one enters and occupies land with the intent to 
hold it as one's own against the world . . . .").15  Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "claim of title" as being synonymous with 
"claim of ownership."  Black's Law Dictionary 283 (9th ed. 
2009).  "Claim of ownership" is defined as "[t]he possession of 
a piece of property with the intention of claiming it in 
hostility to the true owner," as well as "[a] party's manifest 
                                                 
14 The same is true for the common law "hostility" 
requirement.  See Burkhardt v. Smith, 17 Wis. 2d 132, 139-40, 
115 N.W.2d 540 (1962) ("'Hostility' means only one in possession 
claims exclusive right thereto and actual possession prevents 
the assumption of possession in the true owner.") (emphasis 
added); see also Stake, supra note 13, at 2428 (discussing the 
hostility element and explaining, "[t]o be a possessor, [the 
claimant] must have had a true owner's intent to use the land, 
develop the land, or exclude others from the land"); 10 Thompson 
on Real Property § 87.11, at 156-7 (David A. Thomas, ed., 3d ed. 
2013) ("[The] intention to claim as owner is said to be the very 
essence of title by adverse possession, and to say that the 
possession must be hostile is equivalent to saying that it must 
be under a claim of right"); Powell, supra note 13, at 91-21 
("Hostile possession can be understood as possession that is 
opposed and antagonistic to all other claims, and that conveys a 
clear message that the possessor intends to possess the land as 
his or her own"). 
15 Our interpretation of the "claim of title" element as 
requiring an actual subjective intent to claim ownership of 
property is in keeping with the historic purpose of the common 
law hostility requirement, which was to distinguish adverse 
claimants from mere trespassers or squatters.  See Ewing's 
Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 52 (1837) (explaining that the 
difference between ouster and trespass turns on "the intention 
with which it is done; if made under claim and color of right, 
it is an ouster, otherwise, it is a mere trespass . . . ."). 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
17 
 
intention to take over land, regardless of title or right."  
Id.16   
¶27 Although the "claim of title" requirement in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.25 is presumed when all other elements of adverse 
possession are established, this presumption must be rebuttable 
for the requirement to have meaning.17  As we explained in Ovig 
v. Morrison,  
[U]pon unexplained, exclusive, continuous occupancy of 
land under a chain of title, by one not the true 
owner, 
for 
the 
statutory 
period . . . there 
arises . . . the presumption that, during all such 
period, the possession had all the requisites of an 
adverse holding, subject to be rebutted by proof that 
it was in fact subordinate to the right of the true 
owner, but conclusive in the absence of such rebuttal. 
Ovig v. Morrison, 142 Wis. 243, 249-50, 125 N.W. 449 (1910) 
(emphasis added).  If the requirement that the disputed land be 
occupied "under claim of title" were irrebuttable, its presence 
in the statute would be meaningless.  "Statutory language is 
read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
                                                 
16 Similarly, 
the American Heritage Dictionary defines 
"claim" as "to demand, ask for, or take as one's own or one's 
due. . . ." and "lay claim to" is defined as "[t]o assert one's 
right to or ownership of."  American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 340-41 (5th ed. 2011). 
17 We note that instances where evidence exists to refute 
the "claim of title" requirement will necessarily be rare, as is 
underscored by the fact that this is the first time we have been 
asked to address the issue.  In all adverse possession cases, 
the adverse claimant intends to possess the disputed property; 
indeed, that is the purpose of raising an adverse possession 
claim.  However, under the uncommon facts presented to us in 
this case, it is clear the Somas did not occupy the lakefront 
strip "under claim of title."  Wis. Stat. § 893.25(2)(a).  
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
18 
 
order to avoid surplusage."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  In 
other words, evidence demonstrating that a party's possession 
was not "under claim of title" must be admissible, as it is 
directly relevant to whether an essential element of adverse 
possession has been satisfied.  To conclude otherwise would read 
the "claim of title" requirement out of the adverse possession 
statute entirely.  Likewise, to hold that the claim of title 
presumption is irrebuttable would also be contrary to the 
general rule that evidence in an adverse possession case must be 
"clear and positive and must be strictly construed against the 
claimant."  Allie, 88 Wis. 2d at 343. 
¶28 The Wilcoxes argue that this reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.25 improperly ignores applicable case law instructing 
courts to consider only the observable physical characteristics 
of possession, without inquiring into a party's subjective state 
of mind.  Specifically, the Wilcoxes rely on our decisions in 
Allie and Ovig, where we held that the "sole test" for adverse 
possession 
is 
"the 
physical 
characteristics 
of 
possession . . . ." Ovig, 142 Wis. at 248, and that "[t]he 
subjective intent of either of the parties is irrelevant to a 
determination of a claim of adverse possession."  Allie, 88 Wis. 
2d at 347.  Similarly, the court of appeals held that "claim of 
title" 
is 
demonstrated 
through 
"the 
appearance 
that 
a 
possessor's use would give to the true owner" and "refers to a 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
19 
 
possessor's actions, not a possessor's belief."  Wilcox, 348 
Wis. 2d 124, ¶¶15-16.18 
¶29 While we acknowledge, as the court of appeals did, 
that case law does not always discuss the issue of subjective 
intent "with optimal clarity,"19 we disagree with the Wilcoxes' 
contention that Ovig and Allie stand for the blanket proposition 
that 
subjective 
intent 
is 
never 
relevant 
in 
an 
adverse 
possession claim.  See Thompson, supra, § 87.11, at 156  ("No matter how exclusive and 
hostile the possession may be in appearance, it cannot be adverse unless accompanied by an intent 
on the part of the occupant to make it so . . . ."). 
¶30 In most adverse possession cases, a court's inquiry is 
primarily focused on the observable physical characteristics of 
the claimant's occupation, including whether the elements of 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals reasoned that the "sole exception" 
to this general rule is if permission is sought from a 
property's true owner.  However, knowledge of the identity of 
the true owner is not a required element of adverse possession, 
and the fact that the Somas were mistaken about who actually 
owned the lakefront strip is not decisive in this case.  Even if 
the court of appeals was correct, it failed to accurately apply 
its rule to the facts of this case.  It was established at trial 
that the Wilcoxes and the Somas both had permission to use the 
lakefront strip——a right to foot traffic——that was originally 
granted by the property's true owners. 
19 Wilcox, 348 Wis. 2d 124, ¶16.  In contrast to the 
language relied upon by the Wilcoxes in Allie and Ovig, we have 
also explicitly stated in other cases that a "hostile intent" is 
necessary to establish adverse possession.  See, e.g., Stone 
Bank Improvement Co. v. Vollriede, 11 Wis. 2d 440, 447, 105 
N.W.2d 789 (1961) (quoting Bank of Eagle v. Pentland, 197 Wis. 
40, 42, 221 N.W. 383 (1928)); Bettack v. Conachen, 235 Wis. 559, 
571, 294 N.W. 57 (1940) (adverse possession requires "something 
which indicates what is known in the law as a hostile intent, 
that is, intent to claim title in hostility to the true owner").   
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
20 
 
open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive use are established. 
If they are, hostility is presumed.  See Burkhardt, 17 
Wis. 2d at 139 ("If the elements of open, notorious, continuous 
and exclusive possession are satisfied, the law presumes the 
element of hostile intent").  There is rarely a dispute about 
whether possession is hostile, for the simple reason that the 
party bringing the claim usually intends to possess the property 
in question.  In such cases, a possessor need only present 
evidence 
regarding 
a 
property's 
observable 
physical 
characteristics, 
making 
it 
the 
"sole 
test" 
for 
adverse 
possession.  See Ovig, 142 Wis. at 248.  Nevertheless, while the 
presumption of hostility allows adverse possession to be 
established on the basis of the physical characteristics of 
possession alone, evidence can still be admitted to show that an 
essential element has not been satisfied.  This evidence is not 
part of the "sole test" for adverse possession, however, because 
it is not required for a successful claim.   
¶31 In Allie, we explained why the respondent's subjective 
belief was insufficient to support the circuit court's finding 
about the property's true boundary line.  Allie, 88 Wis. 2d at 
347.  Our statement that "subjective intent . . . is irrelevant" 
is accurate insofar as it describes an adverse possession case 
in which the elements of open, notorious, continuous, and 
exclusive use are established, and a possessor's hostile intent 
is therefore presumed.  However, Allie does not stand for the 
principle that subjective intent is never relevant.  For 
example, in Allie, we went on to consider the intent of both 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
21 
 
parties in relation to the disputed property's true boundary 
line.  Id. (noting that the respondent "considered the fence to 
be the lot line" and "[t]he appellants did not consider the 
fence to be the lot line . . . .").  Ultimately, we held in 
Allie that the property was not adversely possessed because the 
respondent's possession was not exclusive.  However, this 
conclusion was not based on any determinations about the 
respondent's subjective intent to claim title.  Id. at 348.  
Indeed, in both Allie and Ovig, it was understood that the 
possessor intended to claim possession of the property.  
¶32   As discussed below, because evidence that a party 
did not subjectively intend to claim title to property is 
admissible to rebut a presumption of hostility, the circuit 
court properly considered evidence that the Somas expressly 
disclaimed 
ownership 
of 
the 
lakefront 
strip 
and 
sought 
permission for its use. 
C. The Circuit Court Properly Held that the Wilcoxes Failed 
to Establish Adverse Possession 
¶33 Applying our reasoning to the facts of this case, we 
agree with the circuit court's conclusion that the Wilcoxes 
failed to establish adverse possession of the lakefront strip.  
The circuit court heard testimony demonstrating that the Somas 
had expressly disclaimed ownership of the lakefront strip and 
asked permission to make improvements to the property.  Based on 
this testimony, the circuit court found that the Somas "never 
claimed to own [the lakefront strip].  They obtained permission 
whenever they made improvements."  The circuit court properly 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
22 
 
considered this evidence and found that the Somas "did not 
intend their actions to be hostile to any ownership interest."  
As we have held, express statements disclaiming ownership of 
property are relevant in an adverse possession case in order to 
rebut a presumption of hostility.  Similarly, the fact that the 
Somas sought and received permission to use the lakefront strip 
is relevant evidence to rebut the presumption that the Somas 
claimed title to the property.20  A request for permission is 
relevant under the circumstances regardless of whether it is 
sought from the true owner, because the request goes to the 
possessor's subjective intent to claim title.  See, e.g., Stone 
Bank Improvement Co. v. Vollriede, 11 Wis. 2d 440, 447, 105 
N.W.2d 789 (1961) (quoting Bank of Eagle v. Pentland, 197 Wis. 
40, 42, 221 N.W. 383 (1928)) ("To constitute adverse possession 
there must be the fact of possession and the hostile intention,-
the intention to usurp possession. Mere permissive possession is 
never a basis for the statute of limitations").    
¶34 Having determined that the Somas lacked a hostile 
intent, the circuit court concluded that the Wilcoxes failed to 
                                                 
20 The titleholders assert that permissive use is also 
relevant to the exclusivity element of adverse possession.  As 
discussed infra note 21, we do not address the issue of 
exclusivity because our holding on the hostility element is 
decisive.  
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
23 
 
establish adverse possession of the lakefront strip.21  The 
burden of proof was on the Wilcoxes.  The titleholders, as the 
true owners, were entitled to the benefit of having "all 
reasonable presumptions" made in their favor.  Allie, 88 
Wis. 2d at 343; Zeisler, 24 Wis. 2d at 198.  We agree with the 
circuit court that the Wilcoxes failed to meet their burden and 
the facts were not sufficient to establish that they adversely 
possessed the lakefront strip.    
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 ¶35 We hold that a party's subjective intent to claim 
title to property is relevant to rebut the presumption of 
hostility that arises when all other elements of adverse 
possession are established.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.25 requires 
that property be possessed "under claim of title" to establish 
adverse possession.  The plain meaning of the "claim of title" 
                                                 
21 The circuit court also held that the Wilcoxes did not 
satisfy the elements of exclusive, notorious, and continuous use 
of the property.  The titleholders argue that possession was not 
exclusive because the Somas asked for permission to use the 
property and allowed the Ducks to enter the property in 1982.  
In order to reach the central issue in this case, we assume, 
without deciding, that the elements of exclusive, notorious, and 
continuous use were met and the presumption of hostility was 
triggered.  We therefore need not consider whether the circuit 
court 
properly 
considered 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
Somas' 
subjective intent in relation to these other elements.  The 
outcome in this case would be the same regardless. 
We note, however, that the court of appeals based its 
decision to reverse the circuit court on the premise that if 
hostility was established, there was "no remaining issue in need 
of resolution."  In fact, had the circuit court erred in regards 
to the hostility element, the additional elements of exclusive, 
notorious, and continuous use would still need to be addressed. 
No. 
2012AP1869   
 
24 
 
requirement is that a party must intend to claim possession of 
the disputed property.  Therefore, in order to gain title by 
adverse possession, the adverse claimant and all predecessors in 
interest must have the actual intent to possess the property 
under a claim of ownership.  The Somas' express declarations of 
non-ownership and requests for permission to use the lakefront 
strip were sufficient to support the circuit court's conclusion 
that they lacked the requisite hostile intent to adversely 
possess the property.  Because the circuit court properly 
considered the Somas' subjective intent and concluded that the 
Wilcoxes 
failed 
to 
establish 
adverse 
possession 
for 
the 
requisite statutory period, we affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court, and we need not remand for further proceedings.  
For these reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2012AP1869.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶36 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the well-reasoned published opinion of the court of 
appeals.  Wilcox v. Estate of Hines, 2013 WI App 68, 348 
Wis. 2d 124, 831 N.W.2d 791.   
¶37 The majority opinion seems to introduce a minefield of 
blanket pronouncements and unanswered questions into the varied 
fact scenarios that adverse possession cases provide. 
¶38 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP1869.ssa 
 
1