Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Braskey

Citation: 378 Md. 425

Docket Number: 69ag/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-C-02-15418-OC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 69
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND
v.
JAMES F. BRASKEY
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________________
Filed: November 24, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this Court;
after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of
this opinion.
1Rule 1.5 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.  The factors to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”
2Rule 1.7 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests,
unless:
(1) 
the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the
representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.”
3Rule 1.15 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition
with this Court for disciplinary action against James F. Braskey, alleging violations of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Commission charged respondent with
violating Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5 (Fees),1 1.7 (Conflict of interest:
General rule),2 1.15 (Safekeeping property),3 8.4 (Misconduct),4 Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-
separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept
in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter
600 of the Maryland Rules.  Other property shall be identified
as such and appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of
such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
***
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their
interests.  If a dispute arises concerning their respective
interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until the dispute is resolved.”
4Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
***
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Rule 16-604 provides as follows:
“Trust account—Required deposits.
Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all
funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or
law firm in this State from a client or third person to be
delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless
received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or
in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of
the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an
approved financial institution.  This Rule does not apply to an
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606, and 16-609 (regarding trust accounts),5 and Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Repl. Vol.)
instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made
payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted
directly to the client or third person.”
Rule 16-606 provides as follows:
“Name and designation of account.
An attorney or law firm shall maintain each attorney trust
account with a title that includes the name of the attorney or law
firm and that clearly designates the account as ‘Attorney Trust
Account’, ‘Attorney Escrow Account’, or ‘Clients’ Funds
Account’ on all checks and deposit slips.  The title shall
distinguish the account from any other fiduciary account that
the attorney or law firm may maintain and from any personal or
business account of the attorney or law firm.”
Rule 16-609 provides as follows:
“Prohibited transactions.
An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any
funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney
trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial
institution for depositing any funds in the account, or use any
funds for any unauthorized purpose.  An instrument drawn on
an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or
to bearer.
6Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Repl. Vol.) §10-306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article provides as follows:
“Misuse of trust money.
A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other
than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the
lawyer.”
Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Repl. Vol.) § 10-606 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article provides as follows:
“Penalties.
***
-3-
§ 10-306 and § 10-606 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (regarding trust
money and trust accounts).6  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the matter
(b) Attorney trust accounts.—A person who willfully
violates any provision of Subtitle 3, Part I of this title, except
for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust moneys in an
attorney trust account for charitable purposes under § 10-303 of
this title, is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject
to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding
5 years or both.”
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to Judge W. Kennedy Boone of the Circuit Court for Washington County to make findings
of fact and proposed conclusions of law.  Judge Boone held an evidentiary hearing and
concluded that respondent had violated Rules 1.5(a), 1.7(b), 1.15(a) and (c), 8.4(c) and (d),
Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-606, 16-609, and § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article.
I.
Judge Boone made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
“Respondent is age 56 and in reasonably good health, except for an
asymptomatic congenital pituitary gland condition and stress/depression as a
result of the protracted proceedings herein, for which he has been prescribed
paxil.  However, for the time period 1989-1999, he was in ‘good health’ and
was not hindered or impaired in his practice of law by medical or
psychiatric/psychological difficulties.  
“Respondent received his undergraduate degree from Frostburg State
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University and Juris Doctorate from the University of Baltimore, and admitted
to practice in Maryland in 1977.  During the period concerning the complaint,
1989-1999, Respondent was a sole general practitioner with offices in
Grantsville, Frostburg and Cumberland with support staff.  His primary
practice 
involved 
residential/commercial 
real 
estate 
closings 
with
approximately 15% - 20% of his practice time representing plaintiffs in
personal injury matters.  
“On or about November 30, 1989 the Respondent was retained by John
Dormio (Dormio) to represent him in a personal injury claim as a result of an
automobile accident which occurred November 8, 1989, Dormio being a long
time acquaintance of the Respondent.  Respondent agreed to represent Dormio
on a contingency legal fee basis, with the written Retainer Agreement
providing for Respondent to be paid one-fourth (1/4) of any settlement and
one-third (1/3) of the recovery if suit was filed, with Dormio responsible for
all incurred costs.  Dormio, being seriously injured, incurred over Thirty
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) in medical bills which were covered through
Medicare, administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS), which timely
notified Respondent of its subrogation lien on any proceeds recovered.  
“Respondent negotiated an automobile liability insurance policy limits
settlement in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), with
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the settlement check received on February 11, 1992, which was deposited to
an account at First Union National Bank and Trust titled ‘Braskey Law Office,
P.A., Attorney Trust Account, IOLTA Account’ (IOLTA).
“On February 11, 1992 the Respondent disbursed Six Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($6,250.00) to himself as a one-fourth (1/4) contingency
legal fee, as well as Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) reimbursement for
costs incurred during representation.  The balance of the settlement proceeds,
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00), remained in the IOLTA account,
pending resolution of the BC/BS lien.
“On April 16, 1992 Respondent forwarded documentation to BC/BS on
behalf of Dormio and made telephone calls to BC/BS on or about July 22,
1992 and November 18, 1994 in an effort to make known he was holding
funds subject to their lien, attempting to negotiate a settlement.  After
November 18, 1994 Respondent made no further attempts to communicate
with BC/BS.  Respondent was not knowledgeable or experienced in the
practice of negotiating and finalizing an agreement concerning BC/BS
subrogation liens, which led to no further activity on this issue.  
“Prior to February 1996 Respondent met with Dormio to discuss
options concerning the BC/BS lien.  Respondent proposed, and it was alleged
to have been agreed, that Dormio and Respondent would equally divide
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$18,000.00 held in the trust account if there was no further contact by BC/BS.
It was also allegedly agreed that Respondent would defend Dormio against any
legal action taken by BC/BS and indemnify Dormio against any loss.
Respondent also agreed to cease any negotiations with BC/BS, thereby giving
up his claim to a 25% lien recovery fee he believed he was entitled to from
BC/BS.  This verbal agreement was never reduced to writing.  
“In February or March 1996 Respondent learned Dormio had suffered
a stroke, had become incapacitated, was residing in a nursing home and no
longer competent to handle his affairs.  His nieces, Joanna Rase (Rase) and
Gail Richards (Richards) had received legal power of attorney to handle
Dormio’s affairs.  
“On March 25, 1996 Respondent disbursed Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) to himself from the $18,000.00 held in his trust account as partial
legal fee for Dormio representation, and on April 8, 1996 disbursed an
additional Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) to himself as balance of legal
fees owed, for a total of Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00).  
“In May 1996 Respondent contacted Rase and Richards, consulted with
them, and offered to split the $18,000.00 that remained from the personal
injury settlement.  Rase and Richards refused the offer and demanded the
entire $18,000.00 be placed in interest-bearing account.  Over a year transpired
-8-
with no further activity, and a second office consultation occurred on June 26,
1997, whereby Respondent advised of the Nine Thousand Dollar ($9,000.00)
fee disbursement, and Rase/Richards again requested the funds be placed in
an interest-bearing account with the Nine Thousand Dollar ($9,000.00) legal
fee disbursed replaced.
“On July 10, 1997 the Respondent wrote to Rase and Richards and
represented the entire $18,000.00 received from the Dormio settlement was
presently in his trust account, but on July 14, 1997 Respondent deposited Nine
Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) from his personal assets to the trust account to
make up the deficit.  Rase and Richards being dissatisfied, on July 31, 1997,
consulted with attorney Howard J. Price, who advised them that he would not
have handled the Dormio case in the same manner as Respondent, and further
instructed Rase/Richards of their right to file a complaint with the AGC.  
“On August 15, 1997 Respondent disbursed Eighteen Thousand Dollars
($18,000.00) from his trust account and opened an interest-bearing account
titled in Respondent’s name alone; however, on June 11, 1999 Respondent
withdrew Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) from the account for himself.
In correspondence with Rase and Richards the Respondent made false and
misleading statements concerning status of the disputed funds as evidenced by
attachments to the Complaint, Petitioner’s Exhibit 1.  This matter remained
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unsolved, and on July 28, 1999 Rase and Richards filed a formal complaint
with AGC against Respondent.
“On September 23, 1999 Respondent opened a new Trust Account
whereby he transferred the remaining Nine Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-
four Dollars and Twenty-four Cents ($9,624.24) from his personal interest-
bearing account, as well as the Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) of his
personal funds, total Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-four Dollars and
Twenty-four Cents ($18,624.24).  
“On April 27, 2000, Rase and Richards advised Respondent by letter
that Dormio was deceased and an estate had been opened, whereby they were
appointed personal representatives.  On May 22, 2000 Respondent disbursed
the entire account funds and made payable to the Estate of John Dormio in the
amount of Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-two Dollars and
Eighteen Cents ($14,322.18) sent to attorney Howard J. Price, and paid to
himself attorney fees in the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($4,500.00).  Respondent contends that this was an agreement reached with
Price, attorney for Rase and Richards.  Subsequently, Rase and Richards on
behalf of the Dormio estate accepted and negotiated the check.
Time Line of Significant Events as to Proceeds in Dispute:
11/10/89
Automobile accident wherein Dormio was injured.
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11/30/89
Respondent retained by Dormio for representation.
02/11/92
$25,000.00 settlement received.
02/13/92
Deposit of gross settlement proceeds:
$25,000.00
IOLTA Account No. 64-01040
02/13/92
Respondent disburses:
 -$7,000.00
From IOLTA Account:
(1) Fee:
$6,250.00
(2) Costs:
 
     750.00
$7,000.00
Net proceeds remain in IOLTA Account,
pending resolution of BC/BS lien
$18,000.00
03/25/96
Respondent issues check to himself
from IOLTA Account.
 -$5,000.00
Remaining net proceeds
 $13,000.00
04/08/96
Respondent issues fee check to himself
from IOLTA Account.
 -$4,000.00
Remaining net proceeds
   $9,000.00
07/14/97
Respondent deposits to
IOLTA Account.
+$9,000.00
Total in IOLTA Account
$18,000.00
08/27/97
Respondent withdraws from IOLTA 
Account and deposits in savings account
No. 216-023015 in his name alone
$18,000.00
04/18/99
Accrued interest
   +$519.76
Total in savings account
$18,519.76
06/11/99
Respondent withdraws, payable to
self, from Account No. 216-023025:
 -$9,000.00
Remaining proceeds
   $9,519.76
07/28/99
Complaint filed with AGC.
-11-
09/23/99
Respondent opens ‘Trust’ interest-bearing
Account No. 216-022841 and deposits:
(1) Acct. No. 216-023025
      Balance with interest:
$9,624.24
(2) Respondent’s funds:
$9,000.00
$18,624.24
04/27/00
Letter to Respondent from Complainants,
advising Estate had been opened for
Dormio, now deceased.
05/22/00
Respondent disburses from interest-bearing
trust account entire proceeds:
To Estate:
$14,322.18
Attorney fees:
  $4,500.00
$18,822.18
“After the filing of the Complaint Respondent promptly responded and
cooperated fully with the AGC by meeting with its Investigator, Mark Friedler,
on two lengthy occasions.  In addition, he submitted to AGC five (5) pieces of
detailed correspondence from August 27, 1999 through May 2, 2000 with
documentation to assist the investigation, Petitioner’s Exhibits 3-7.
Respondent was forthcoming and admitted the error of his ways, even though
at the time he did not believe he was involved in any wrongdoing and there
was no intent to mishandle funds in his charge to the detriment of his client(s).
After being advised of his alleged ethical violations he accepts ignorance is no
defense, is truly remorseful, humiliated, and regrets the incident, especially the
contents of correspondence sent to nieces of Dormio who held legal power of
-12-
attorney and later appointed personal representatives of his estate.  Simply put,
Respondent is not a thief, is basically a good person and hardworking attorney
who cares for his clients; however, he admitted wrongdoings.  He exercised
severe errors in judgments in handling the Dormio case as to monies in his
trust and his dealings with Rase and Richards.  There are no prior ethical
violations against Respondent with AGC.  Since the filing of the Complaint in
1999 to date Respondent has been in ‘agony’ over the matter where he ‘can’t
even go to the mailbox’ and now has two young partners/associates who have
become mentors/overseers.
“Without assessing blame or finger pointing, this Complaint has taken
entirely too long to work its way through the system, at least from filing
through Inquiry Panel hearing (July 28, 1999 to April 26, 2002), almost three
(3) years with charges finally filed on October 23, 2002.  Even though
Respondent was not denied due process in these proceedings, the delay has
certainly ‘taken its toll,’ where he has been ‘twisting in the wind.’  
“This Court has had no prior contact socially or professionally with the
Respondent and was not acquainted with him prior to the date of the merits
hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) in that the Nine Thousand Dollar
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($9,000.00) fee taken by him from the Eighteen Thousand Dollar ($18,000.00)
net proceeds being held for his client was unreasonable.  Said Nine Thousand
Dollar ($9,000.00) fee was in addition to the Six Thousand Five Hundred
Dollar ($6,500.00) fee taken by Respondent on the gross Twenty-five
Thousand Dollar ($25,000.00) settlement.
“Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) in that he had a conflict of interest
between client, Dormio, and his obligation to BC/BS in accordance with his
agreement to protect their subrogation lien interest.
“Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) in that he did not maintain funds
retained on behalf of his client and/or third party in a properly designated trust
account.  
“Respondent violated Rule 1.15(c) in that he withdrew Nine Thousand
Dollars ($9,000.00) from his IOLTA trust account on June 11, 1999, when the
interests of the Respondent and his client(s) and the Eighteen Thousand Dollar
($18,000.00) proceeds were in dispute.  
“Respondent violated Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-606, 16-609 and
Business Occupations and Professions Article §10,306 with respect to the
Respondent’s handling of trust proceeds.  Section 10-606 concerning criminal
sanctions need not be addressed.  
“Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) in that he engaged in a deliberate
7Attorney Grievance Commission Administrative and Procedural Guideline § 5-104
provides as follows:
“Except where impracticable, the Panel shall complete the
hearing within forty-five (45) days from the date that the file is
received by the Panel Chairman.  An extension of time for
prehearing review or for the hearing may be approved by the
Panel Chairman with the concurrence of the Committee Vice-
Chairman for the Circuit, or the Committee Chairman.  Any
further extensions may only be granted by the Committee
Chairman.  Postponements and extensions are to be granted
only for good cause and are not to be granted as a result of
-14-
course of misrepresentation in correspondence with Complainants which
misrepresented the location of the Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) in
controversy and applicable statute of limitations with regard to any causes of
actions.
“Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) in that, under the totality of
circumstances he attempted to collect an unreasonable attorney fee, which was
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
II. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
We turn first to respondent’s motion to dismiss the proceedings on due process
grounds.  Respondent maintains that he was denied due process because the disciplinary
hearing before the Attorney Grievance Commission was not completed within forty-five
days in accordance with the requirements of Attorney Grievance Commission
Administrative and Procedural Guideline § 5-104.7  Respondent claims he was prejudiced
untimely requests for disqualification of Panel members or to
permit Respondent to engage counsel.  If a panel hearing is not
scheduled within forty-five (45) days from the date that the file
is received by the Panel Chairman, the Committee Chairman or
Committee Vice-Chairman designated by him, may terminate
the Panel and reassign the Complaint to a newly constituted
Panel.”
-15-
by the delay in that he suffered anxiety, concern, and emotional stress by living under a
cloud of suspicion and hostility.
The complaint that formed the basis of the Attorney Grievance Commission’s petition
was filed on July 28, 1999.  On March 4, 2002, when an Inquiry Panel had yet to be
convened, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of his due process
rights.  Respondent argued that the Attorney Grievance Commission’s internal procedural
guidelines provide that the Inquiry Panel hearing shall take place within forty-five days from
the date that the file is received by the panel chairperson.  The Inquiry Panel hearing was not
held until April 26, 2002, 312 days after the panel chairperson received the file.  The Inquiry
Panel denied his motion to dismiss.  According to respondent, his motion was not given
proper consideration by the Inquiry Panel.  
The Review Board denied respondent’s motion to reconsider his dismissal motion
and on June 25, 2002, recommended to the Commission that disciplinary charges be filed.
The Commission filed its disciplinary petition on October 23, 2002, more than three years
after the complaint against respondent was filed.
On December 20, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, a Response to Petition
-16-
for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, and a Request for a Hearing in the Circuit Court for
Washington County.  On March 31, 2003, Judge Boone heard arguments regarding the
Motion to Dismiss.  Finding that the Circuit Court lacked the authority to rule on the motion,
Judge Boone denied the motion.  We note that Judge Boone was correct in denying
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.  See Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v.
Harris, 310 Md. 197, 200 n.2, 528 A.2d 895, 896 n.2 (1987) (holding that the hearing judge,
in attorney discipline matters, lacks authority to dismiss the petition).
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.  His asserted violations of due process all
relate to matters before the Inquiry Panel and Review Board, predating the filing of the
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action.  Even assuming arguendo, that errors occurred
in the preliminary proceedings, dismissal of the charges is not an appropriate remedy.  Rule
16-754(b), Answer, explicitly states that “[i]t is not a defense or ground for objection to a
petition that procedural defects may have occurred during disciplinary or remedial
proceedings prior to the filing of the petition.”  In Harris, 310 Md. at 202, 528 A.2d at 897,
we held that “any irregularity in the proceedings before the Inquiry Panel and the Review
Board ordinarily will not amount to a denial of due process, as long as the lawyer is given
notice and an opportunity to defend in a full and fair hearing following the institution of
disciplinary proceedings in this Court.”  In the instant case, even though the proceedings
were delayed, respondent was afforded notice and an opportunity to defend in a full and fair
hearing.
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There is no statute of limitations in an attorney disciplinary proceeding and mere
delay does not warrant dismissal.  We have often noted that the purpose of attorney
discipline proceedings is to protect the public by determining a lawyer’s fitness to practice
law, and that an attorney is entitled only to notice of the charges, and a full and fair hearing,
not anything more.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 356-
57, 624 A.2d 503, 510 (1993); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 684, 431
A.2d 1336, 1352 (1981); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Engerman, 289 Md. 330, 346, 424
A.2d 362, 370 (1981) (citing Bar Ass’n of Balt. City v. Posner, 275 Md. 250, 255, 339 A.2d
657, 659-60 (1975)).
A mere delay in disciplinary proceedings is not a basis for dismissal, absent a
showing of prejudice.  In Engerman, where Bar Counsel knew all of the essential facts
supporting certain allegations contained in the petition but failed to notify the attorney of the
allegations until about two and a half years later, we held that the doctrine of laches did not
bar the proceedings, especially where the attorney “failed to show any evidence of prejudice
from any delay in commencing disciplinary proceedings.”  289 Md. at 346, 424 A.2d at 370.
Even in a case where we found the delay “gross and inexcusable,” we noted that the attorney
was not prejudiced by the delay and that dismissal “for the sole reason that the Attorney
Grievance Commission failed to proceed with the proper dispatch is manifestly
unwarranted.”  Kahn, 290 Md. at 684, 431 A.2d at 1352.  See also Anne Arundel County
Bar Ass’n v. Collins, 272 Md. 578, 585, 325 A.2d 724, 728-29 (1974) (finding that the
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attorney had not shown any evidence of prejudice and rejecting the attorney’s exception to
the hearing panel’s refusal to dismiss the petition on the ground of laches).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that “an undue delay in
prosecution is not in itself a proper ground for dismissal of charges of attorney misconduct.”
In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C. 1986).  The court further explained: 
“Any betrayal of the trust which the attorney is sworn to keep
demands appropriate discipline; a delay in prosecution, without
more, cannot override this necessity.  The contrary conclusion
would mean that, when licensing applicants, we would engage
in a form of deceit: our endorsement of an unqualified attorney
would belie our simultaneous assertion that attorneys possess
the integrity and competence which they must constantly
demonstrate in order to earn the privilege of practicing law in
the District of Columbia.  Speedy trial principles, which in
criminal cases are a constitutionally required curb on the abuse
of government power, in the disciplinary system take second
place to other societal interests.”
Id.  This is a view shared by other courts in addressing delay in attorney disciplinary
proceedings.  See, e.g., In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against N.P., 361 N.W.2d
386, 393 (Minn. 1985); Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 619 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1980); In re
Bossov, 328 N.E.2d 309, 313-14 (Ill. 1975); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v.
McArthur, 326 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Neb. 1982); In re Wright, 310 A.2d 1, 9 (Vt. 1973).  See
also Annot., Attorneys at Law: Delay in Prosecution of Disciplinary Proceeding as Defense
or Mitigating Circumstance, 93 A.L.R.3d §§ 9, 10, at 1057 (1979).  The Supreme Court of
Oregon noted as follows:
“It ought to be made clear, however, that the primary purpose
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of professional disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public.
The punishment of an offending member of the profession is
indeed a serious matter, but it is incidental to the protection of
the public.  If the conduct of a member of the Bar disqualifies
him from the practice of law, it would not be in the public
interest to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings for no reason
other than the Bar’s failure to prosecute them with the proper
dispatch.”
In re Weinstein, 459 P.2d 548, 549 (Or. 1969), quoted in Engerman, 289 Md. at 346, 424
A.2d at 370.  This is not to say that delay is irrelevant.  If an attorney’s ability to present a
defense is substantially impaired, and an attorney can show actual prejudice to the defense,
there might be a due process violation.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Carson, 845 P.2d 47, 55
(Kan. 1993) (noting an attorney discipline proceeding may be dismissed because of delay,
but only if the delay is prejudicial to the defense and respondent convincingly establishes
prejudice); In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361 (D.C. 1996) (holding that “[i]f delay in the
prosecution of disciplinary charges substantially impaired the attorney’s ability to defend
against the charges . . . the Constitution might compel a different analysis: ‘A delay coupled
with actual prejudice could result in a due process violation’”) (quoting In re Williams, 513
A.2d at 797).  Respondent has shown no such prejudice.
III.
This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539, 810 A.2d 457, 474 (2002).  In
the exercise of our obligation, we conduct an independent review of the record, accepting
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the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763-64 (2002).  The factual findings
of the hearing judge will not be disturbed if they are based on clear and convincing
evidence.  See Md. Rule 16-757(b) (providing that Bar Counsel has burden of establishing
averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence).  See also Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002).  We consider the hearing
judge’s proposed conclusions of law de novo.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002).
Both parties except to Judge Boone’s findings of fact and proposed conclusions of
law.  Bar Counsel has the burden of establishing the allegations by clear and convincing
evidence; respondent has the burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances
by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Md. Rule 16-757(b).  On review, we keep in mind
that the findings of the trial judge are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless
clearly erroneous.  Garfield, 369 Md. at 97, 797 A.2d at 764.
We turn first to respondent’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Dormio incurred over $30,000.00
in medical bills which were covered through Medicare, administered by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield (BC/BS).  Respondent argues that “[w]e were not sure how much Blue Cross/Blue
Shield (BC/BS) covered.”  We sustain respondent’s exception, as there is no evidence in the
record that Medicare covered all of Dormio’s medical bills, or that the amount covered was
8In any case, respondent admitted that “Blue Cross/Blue Shield would have probably
have been entitled to the 18 [thousand dollars].”
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$30,000.00.8
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that respondent “made
telephone calls to BC/BS on or about July 22, 1992 and November 18, 1994 in an effort to
make known he was holding funds subject to their lien.”  Respondent acknowledges that he
made no further attempts to communicate with BC/BS after November 18, 1994.  He
contends, however, that “[t]here were calls as early as February, 1992.”  Respondent testified
that he thought that he contacted BC/BS on the day that the settlement proceeds arrived in
February, 1992.  Respondent testified that he made calls in February, 1992 to BC/BS.  The
hearing judge, in his report, made no note of these calls.  We are unable to say why the
hearing judge omitted reference to respondent’s testimony regarding the February calls.  It
may be that the judge did not believe respondent; it may have been an oversight.  In any
case, even if the judge believed respondent, the hearing judge is not required to recount all
of the evidence presented at the hearing.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Granger, 374
Md. 438, 453, 823 A.2d 611, 620 (2003) (noting that “it is elementary that the hearing judge
‘may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’”).  Accordingly, this exception
is overruled.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “respondent also agreed to
cease any negotiations with BC/BS, thereby giving up his claim to a twenty-five percent lien
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recovery fee he believed he was entitled to from BC/BS.”  Respondent maintains that he did
not agree to cease negotiations with BC/BS.  This exception is overruled.  The hearing judge
was not clearly erroneous in concluding from the evidence presented at the hearing that
respondent and the client agreed to cease negotiations and that respondent gave up his claim
to any fee he was entitled to receive from BC/BS.
In respondent’s Response to Request for Admission of Facts, read into the record by
Bar Counsel at the hearing, he admitted that he and Dormio agreed to split the $18,000.00
should they hear nothing further from BC/BS.  In his testimony before the Circuit Court,
respondent stated:
“I actually didn’t decide I wasn’t going to contact them.  I made
a contact then [in November, 1994] and I guess in my own
mind, I said, ‘Hey this is a big insurance company, they ought
to get back to me,’ but I didn’t totally actually absolutely rule
out contacting them again, but I never did.”
Judge Boone’s inferences are properly supported by the record.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that respondent learned in
February or March, 1996, that Dormio had suffered a stroke.  Respondent asserts that it was
more like late April or early May.  The record reflects the following testimony as to when
respondent learned that Dormio had a stroke:
“So I disbursed two checks to myself.  One in March and one in
early April simply to just give income for two months for the
office.  And I had been calling John during this time on the
phone.  I don’t know if I had the secretaries call him or not, but
finally I went down to his house and looked in the house.  There
were lights on in there, but there didn’t appear to be anybody
9We note, however, that the timing of respondent’s discovery of the client’s stroke
in no way affects the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  If the facts are as respondent
suggests—that respondent’s discovery took place in late April or May, respondent issued
two checks to himself in the total amount of $9,000.00 before, rather than after, he learned
that Dormio was incapacitated and no longer handling his own finances.  This time
difference matters little if, as respondent claims, Dormio had agreed to the $9,000.00 fee.
The hearing judge did not find otherwise.  Regardless of when respondent learned that his
client was incapacitated, respondent took $9,000.00, which the hearing judge concluded was
an unreasonable fee.
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living there, and the neighbor came out.  And the neighbor says
or asked me who I was.  I identified myself as ‘Jim Braskey, I
represent John Dormio.’  And I said, ‘Where is John?’  ‘Oh
John has had a stroke.  He’s down at the nursing home.’”
Although respondent’s testimony is less than clear as to when he learned Dormio had a
stroke, we will sustain his exception because the record is also unclear as to the basis of the
hearing judge’s finding.9
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Dormio’s nieces demanded
at the May, 1996 meeting that the entire amount of the trust proceeds, $18,000.00, be placed
in an interest-bearing account.  Respondent argues that Dormio’s nieces did not make that
demand until their second meeting in July, 1997.  Both nieces testified that, at the May, 1996
meeting, respondent offered to split the money in the trust account with them but he did not
tell them he had already taken half of the money.  Johanna Rase, one of the nieces, testified
that she specifically requested at the May, 1996 meeting that respondent place the
$18,000.00 in an interest-bearing account.  Respondent testified, to the contrary, that the
nieces made no such request at that time.  Lynne Richards, the other niece, testified that she
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did not recall whether she made any specific request concerning the funds at the May, 1996
meeting.  She did state, however, that respondent represented that the $18,000.00 was at his
bank and that the money was going to be held until respondent ascertained whether BC/BS
would assert its rights to the money.
This Court gives due regard to the hearing judge’s opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witnesses.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 433-
34, 697 A.2d 446, 453 (1997).  Judge Boone was not clearly erroneous in believing the
testimony of Ms. Rase and rejecting respondent’s version of the meeting.  Accordingly,
respondent’s exception is overruled.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he misrepresented in his
correspondence to the nieces on July 10, 1997, that the entire $18,000.00 received from the
Dormio settlement was in his trust account at that time.  In the letter dated July 10, 1997, the
first of four letters sent by respondent to Ms. Richards and Ms. Rase, respondent wrote that
the $18,000.00 was in his trust account.  Respondent admits that half of the money did not
go into his trust account until July 14, 1997.  This exception is overruled.
Finally, respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that respondent made “false
and misleading statements” in correspondence with the nieces.  Respondent does not deny
that the statements he made in the letters were untrue.  He argues that he believed the
statements regarding the statute of limitations to have been true when written and that those
statements were not meant to be false and misleading.  As to the statement about the money
10Both Rule 1.15(c) and Rule 16-607(b)(2) deal with the prohibition on an attorney’s
withdrawal of disputed client funds.  Rule 16-607(b)(2) provides:
“An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust
account funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently
or potentially to the attorney or law firm.  The portion
belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn
promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the
funds, but any portion disputed by the client shall remain in the
account until the dispute is resolved.”
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 269, 808 A.2d 1251, 1253 (2002),
the hearing judge concluded that Rule 1.15(c) overlapped with Rule 16-607(b)(2) and that
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in the trust account, respondent represents to this Court that “Seven years have passed.  I’m
not certain what happened.  Perhaps I was unable to get to the bank as soon as I anticipated
when I drafted the correspondence.  Perhaps I dated the letter incorrectly.”  Respondent’s
exception is overruled.  His statements in the letters were false and misleading, whether or
not he intended to deceive.  His state of mind is irrelevant to this exception.
We turn now to respondent’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions
of law.  First, respondent contends that the hearing judge erred in concluding that
respondent’s withdrawal of $9,000.00 from his IOLTA trust account on June 11, 1999 was
a violation of Rule 1.15(c) because the interests of respondent and his client(s) and the
$18,000.00 proceeds were in dispute at that time.  Respondent argues that there was no
genuine dispute because he believed that the statute of limitations on the money had run.
Respondent’s argument is without merit. 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 808 A.2d 1251 (2002),
this Court held that an attorney violated Rule 16-607(b)(2)10 by removing from an escrow
a finding of violation of the latter rule only was more appropriate.
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account money to which he believed he was entitled.  We rejected the attorney’s argument
that he had not violated the Rule because he believed, based on his understanding of the fee
agreement with his clients, that he was entitled to the funds. We noted as follows:
“The test, however, is not whether, when examining the
circumstances objectively, one would conclude that respondent
was legally entitled to the amount claimed; rather the test should
be whether there was in fact a fee disagreement between the
parties concerning respondent’s entitlement to the amount
withdrawn at the time of the withdraw.  The rule is
unambiguous: an attorney may not withdraw a portion of the
deposited funds when the attorney’s right to receive that portion
is ‘disputed’ by the client.”
Culver, 371 Md. at 275-76, 808 A.2d at 1257 (quoting In re Haar, 667 A.2d 1350, 1353
(D.C. 1995)).  The Haar court further noted that the dispute need not be “genuine,”
“serious,” or “bona fide.”  Id.  Moreover, the court noted that “the word ‘dispute’ means ‘to
argue about; to debate; to question the truth or validity of; [or] to doubt.’ The American
Heritage Dictionary 380 (1976).”  Id.  The test as to whether the Rule is violated is an
objective one, i.e., whether there was in fact a dispute regarding the funds.  An attorney’s
subjective belief that he or she is legally entitled to the fee is irrelevant.  Nor is it relevant
that the attorney is legally entitled to the fee if there is a dispute as to the fee.  An erroneous
belief that one is entitled to a disputed fee may be a mitigator with respect to an appropriate
sanction to be imposed but it is not relevant to the determination as to whether the Rule is
violated.
-27-
 Respondent and Dormio’s nieces disputed the ownership of the $18,000.00.
Respondent’s letter dated June 9, 1999, in which he calls the nieces “negligent” for not
having contacted him or not having filed a lawsuit, is evidence of a dispute as to the
entitlement of the money.  The nieces’ last communication with respondent was their
demand that the money be placed in an interest-bearing account on behalf of their uncle.
Respondent’s belief that the statute of limitations barred their claim to the money does
nothing to resolve the dispute.  Respondent’s withdrawal of $9,000.00 on June 11, 1999
violated Rule 1.15(c).  Accordingly, respondent’s exception is overruled.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion of law that he violated Rule
8.4(c).  In concluding that respondent violated Rule 8.4(c), the hearing judge found that
respondent “engaged in a deliberate course of misrepresentation” in correspondence with
Dormio’s nieces by misrepresenting both the location of the $18,000.00 in controversy and
the bar of the statute of limitations to the claim.  Respondent claims that he did not engage
in dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful misconduct, nor did he intentionally misrepresent
anything to anyone.  Essentially, respondent argues that his misrepresentations were not
deliberate.  First, respondent maintains that there is an innocent explanation for the four-day
delay between his July 10, 1997 letter, which indicated that the entire $18,000.00 was in his
account, and the date that he actually transferred half of that sum to the account.  He
suggests that he might have dated the letter incorrectly or have been unable to get to the
bank as soon as he had anticipated.  Second, regarding the statute of limitations, respondent
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argues that he believed his statements to be true at the time they were written.
The hearing judge found that respondent misrepresented to his client’s nieces that the
funds were in a particular account on a specific date and that the statute of limitations later
barred their claim.  This finding was not clearly erroneous.  Whether respondent’s
misrepresentations were intentional or fraudulent is not relevant in determining whether the
Rule was violated.  This exception is overruled.  
Respondent excepts to the judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 8.4(d).
Respondent’s final exception is also without merit.  Respondent argues that because his
conduct was not dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, or an intentional misrepresentation, he
could not have violated Rule 8.4(d).  The hearing judge’s conclusion that respondent
violated Rule 8.4(d), however, was based on respondent’s attempt, under the totality of the
circumstances, to collect an unreasonable attorney fee, which was prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  The hearing judge’s conclusion that respondent violated Rule
1.5(a) by attempting to collect an unreasonable fee was supported by clear and convincing
evidence, and respondent took no exception to that proposed conclusion of law.  The
collection of an unreasonable fee is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
Thus, respondent’s final exception is overruled.  
We turn now to Bar Counsel’s exceptions.  Bar Counsel excepts to two of Judge
Boone’s findings.  Bar Counsel argues that the hearing judge erred in failing to find a
violation of § 10-606(b) of the Business and Occupations Professions Article of the
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Maryland Code.  Section 10-606, captioned “Penalties,” provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
“A person who willfully violates any provision of Subtitle 3,
Part I of this title, except for the requirement that a lawyer
deposit trust moneys in an attorney trust account for charitable
purposes under § 10-303 of this title, is guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both.”
Md. Code (1989, 2000 Repl. Vol.) § 10-606(b) of the Business and Occupations Professions
Article.  Although Judge Boone concluded that respondent misappropriated trust funds in
violation of §10-306, he concluded that “Section 10-606 concerning criminal sanctions need
not be addressed.”  Bar Counsel maintains that respondent’s violation of § 10-306
necessitates a finding that respondent engaged in criminal conduct under § 10-606(b).
Bar Counsel’s exception is overruled.  Judge Boone was correct in concluding that
§ 10-606(b) need not be addressed.  That section is a penalty provision, setting forth the
applicable criminal penalties relevant to violations related to attorney trust accounts and the
unauthorized practice of law.  Except for the provision that trust account violations must be
willful to constitute a misdemeanor, that section has no bearing on attorney discipline
matters.
Bar Counsel also excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to make findings regarding
a violation of Rule 8.4(b)—engaging in criminal conduct which “reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”  Bar Counsel
argues that respondent’s conduct that constituted a violation of § 10-306 would also violate
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Rule 8.4(b).
In order for a violation of § 10-306, “Misuse of trust money,” to constitute criminal
conduct, the conduct must have been “willful.”  See § 10-606(b).  The hearing judge did not
find that respondent willfully misused trust money.  Bar Counsel has not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) by engaging in criminal conduct.
Rather, Judge Boone noted that respondent “exercised severe errors in judgment” in
handling the trust proceeds.  This finding does not rise to the level of criminal conduct
adversely reflecting on respondent’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.
Accordingly, Bar Counsel’s exception is overruled.
IV.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  Bar Counsel recommends
disbarment.  Respondent suggests that the appropriate sanction is a private reprimand.
The purpose of sanctioning an attorney is to protect the public rather than to punish
the errant attorney.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d
782, 789 (2002).  The severity of the sanction depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors or aggravating
factors.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416-18, 800 A.2d 747, 755
(2002).  On occasion, in considering the appropriate sanction to be imposed, we have
referred to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards).  Attorney
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Grievance Comm’n v. Santos, 370 Md. 77, 88, 803 A.2d 505, 511 (2002); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 28, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 484, 671 A.2d 463, 480 (1996).  The ABA
Standards contemplate four factors to be considered in imposing a sanction: (1) the nature
of the ethical duty or duties violated; (2) the attorney’s mental state; (3) the extent of the
actual or potential injury caused by the attorney’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.  See Standard 3.0 of the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABA Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and
Standards, 344 (1999).
We first address the duties violated by respondent.  Respondent collected an
unreasonable attorney fee, failed to keep client funds in a separate and properly labeled
account, ignored a conflict of interest between his obligations to his client and the insurance
company, and made misrepresentations to the personal representatives of his client.  
Regarding respondent’s mental state, the hearing judge specifically found that
respondent “is not a thief.”  Implicit in this finding is a determination that respondent’s
misappropriation of funds was not done with the intent to defraud.  The hearing judge also
noted that respondent was “not knowledgeable or experienced in the practice of negotiating
and finalizing an agreement concerning BC/BS subrogation liens,” evidencing the judge’s
view of respondent as inexperienced but not dishonest in his failure to maintain funds in a
properly designated trust account.  At the same time, however, the hearing judge found that
11Respondent issued to himself a check for $4,000.00 in March, 1996 and another
check for $5,000.00 in April, 1996.  He returned $9,000.00 to a trust account in July, 1997.
He again took $9,000.00 in June, 1999, after telling Dormio’s nieces that the statute of
limitations barred any claim to that money.
12The Attorney Grievance Commission did not charge respondent with any rule
violation regarding the $4,500.00 fee that respondent took before he sent a check for the
remainder of the trust money to Jack Price, who forwarded that check to Dormio’s personal
representatives in May, 2000.
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respondent “engaged in a deliberate course of misrepresentation” in his correspondence with
Dormio’s nieces.  Thus, not all of respondent’s actions were completely innocent or
unintentional.
 As to the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by respondent’s misconduct,
the hearing judge concluded that the $9,000.00 that respondent disbursed to himself on more
than one occasion11 was an unreasonable fee.  As a consequence of that unreasonable fee
arrangement, respondent disputed the ownership of the funds for several years.  Ultimately,
respondent placed the settlement proceeds in a proper, interest-bearing account and, after
deducting $4,500.00 for services allegedly rendered to BC/BS,12 sent a check for the
remainder to Dormio’s nieces.  Arguably, the nieces would have received the entire
$18,000.00, and received it much sooner, had respondent not insisted upon his entitlement
to an unreasonable fee and not agreed to protect the insurance company’s subrogation lien
interest, which conflicted with the interests of his client.  
We must also consider the potential injury caused by respondent’s conduct, as
respondent’s failure to abide by Rule 1.15 regarding trust accounts may have adverse effects
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on the public’s confidence in the legal system as well as the confidence and security of the
client’s personal representatives in this case.  As we stated in Sheridan, 357 Md. at 31, 741
A.2d at 1159, “[w]e cannot understate the importance of holding funds in escrow in
accordance with Rule 1.15 and how the Rule reinforces the public’s confidence in our legal
system.”
We take note of several mitigating factors.  First, respondent has practiced law since
1977 and has no prior discipline history.  The hearing judge found that respondent was
inexperienced in the practice of negotiating and finalizing an agreement concerning BC/BS
subrogation liens, which explains his cessation of attempts to contact BC/BS.  The hearing
judge noted that respondent was “truly remorseful.”  Respondent also promptly responded
to and cooperated fully with the Attorney Grievance Commission.  Respondent’s misconduct
involved matters pertaining to only one client (and the client’s personal representatives).
Most importantly, in mitigation, the hearing judge found that respondent “is not a thief, is
basically a good person and hardworking attorney who cares for his clients.”
With all of these factors in mind, we also consider our prior cases.  We have held that
disbarment is the appropriate sanction for “intentional dishonest conduct” and that in cases
involving “intentional dishonesty, fraud, misappropriation and the like, we will not accept
as compelling extenuating circumstances ‘anything less than the most serious and utterly
debilitating mental or physical health conditions . . . .’”  Powell, 369 Md. at 475, 800 A.2d
at 789-90 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773
-34-
A.2d 463, 485 (2001)).
In considering the appropriate sanction to be imposed, however, we have
distinguished cases of intentional misappropriation from cases of mishandling of funds
where the attorney acted with a less culpable mental state, and imposed a lesser sanction than
disbarment in the latter cases.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 789
A.2d 119 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jeter, 365 Md. 279, 778 A.2d 390 (2001);
Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 741 A.2d 1143.
In Sheridan, the hearing judge found that, among other violations, the attorney
misappropriated client funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failed to notify his client upon the
receipt of funds and failed to provide a requested accounting in violation of Rule 1.15(b);
and failed to keep disputed funds separate in violation of Rule 1.15(c).  357 Md. at 28-29,
741 A.2d at 1158.  The hearing judge found, however, that the attorney’s actions were not
intentionally fraudulent.  357 Md. at 12, 741 A.2d at 1149.  This Court accepted the hearing
judge’s finding that the lawyer’s action was not intentionally fraudulent and ordered an
indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in one year.  Id. at 35, 741 A.2d at 1162.
In Hayes, the attorney commingled client funds with his own funds in his attorney
trust account and used that account as an operating and personal account.  367 Md. at 509,
789 A.2d at 122.  On four occasions, the attorney also drew checks payable to cash on the
account.  Id.  The hearing judge found, in mitigation, that the attorney’s misconduct
occurred while the attorney was attempting to assist his client, without compensation, in a
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matter unrelated to the matter in which he represented the client.  Id. at 509-10, 789 A.2d
at 122-23.  The judge further found that the attorney attempted to locate the client, of whom
he had lost track, so that funds belonging to the client could be returned.  Id. at 510, 789
A.2d at 123.  Noting that these findings were “inconsistent with and, thus tend[] to negate,
any dishonest or fraudulent intent,” the Court held that “the automatic disbarment rule for
misappropriation does not apply, that this is not the kind of willful conduct to which the rule
was directed or intended to reach.”  Id. at 519, 789 A.2d at 128-29.
Similarly, in Jeter, we recognized the importance of an attorney’s intent in
mishandling client funds in violation of Rule 1.15.  In Jeter, the attorney placed settlement
proceeds and personal injury protection benefits in his personal bank account rather than an
escrow account.  365 Md. at 284, 778 A.2d at 393.  He also failed to forward payment to the
proper payee until six months after depositing a settlement check.  Id.  The hearing judge
found that the attorney’s inexperience in handling personal injury cases mitigated his
violation.  Id. at 286, 778 A.2d at 394.  The judge also found that the attorney was
remorseful and never intended to defraud his client or the proper payee of the funds at issue.
Id.  We stated:
“Clearly, one who acts with deliberation and calculation, fully
cognizant of the situation and, therefore, fully intending the
result that is achieved is more culpable than one who, though
doing the same act, does so unintentionally, negligently or
without full appreciation of the consequences.”
Id. at 289, 778 A.2d at 395.  Recognizing that the attorney was “entitled to the benefit of .
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. . [the hearing judge’s] findings,” we imposed an indefinite suspension with a right to
reapply after six months.  Id. at 293-94, 778 A.2d at 398.
If respondent’s conduct were limited to his failure to maintain settlement proceeds
in a properly designated trust account, which the hearing judge found did not implicate any
dishonesty, our analysis of respondent’s conduct for purposes of a sanction would be
relatively straightforward.  Sheridan, Hayes, and Jeter suggest that disbarment might be an
inappropriate sanction for respondent’s misappropriation of funds because the hearing judge
found that respondent was not a “thief.”  In Sheridan, in accepting the hearing judge’s
characterization of the attorney’s conduct, we deferred to that finding because the record
reflected a basis for the hearing judge to so conclude.  See Sheridan, 357 Md. at 29, 741
A.2d at 1158 (noting that the Court was “constrained to accept . . . [the hearing judge’s]
assessment, particularly given the judge’s superior ability to evaluate demeanor-based
credibility”).  In the instant case, however, we can find no reasonable basis in the record for
the hearing judge’s conclusion that respondent was not acting dishonestly.  Respondent did
not put client money into his trust account; he engaged in a deliberate course of
misrepresentation in his letters to Dormio’s nieces; he took $9,000.00, which he was not
entitled to take, and called it a fee; and he misstated the statute of limitations.
Respondent misrepresented the state of his trust account.  On July 10, 1997,
respondent wrote a letter to Dormio’s nieces in which he stated that the entire $18,000.00
was in his trust account.  This statement was false.  All of the funds were not in the account
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until four days later when respondent transferred half of the money.  Respondent’s
explanation for the delay is not enlightening.  He states that because of the passage of time,
he cannot recall why the money was not in the account when he wrote the letter.
Respondent also misstated the statute of limitations.  In a letter written to Dormio’s
nieces on June 9, 1999, respondent represented that the insurance company’s legal rights had
not been extinguished.  Respondent testified, however, that he believed his agreement with
BC/BS to protect their subrogation interest was subject to a three-year statute of limitations,
with the statutory period commencing in February, 1992.  Respondent stated falsely in the
same letter to Dormio’s nieces that the statute of limitations barred any claim they might
have had to the settlement proceeds, even though the statute of limitations was inapplicable.
Respondent had a fiduciary obligation to his client to keep that money in trust for the client’s
benefit.  Respondent testified that he regretted writing the June 9, 1999 letter and that it was
written “out of anger, frustration because this thing has gone on long enough and let’s get
it resolved.”
Respondent’s mishandling of his client’s funds was particularly egregious.
Respondent’s act of disbursing $9,000.00 to himself after having taken one-fourth of the
gross settlement proceeds of $25,000.00 went beyond collecting an unreasonable fee.  Even
if Dormio agreed to split evenly the $18,000.00 with respondent, the agreement was
unenforceable and amounts to “fee gouging.”  Respondent had no legitimate basis for
keeping any part of the funds subject to the BC/BS lien.  If BC/BS did not assert its
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subrogation lien, the money belonged to the client, to whom respondent was obliged to
disburse the funds.  
This Court disbarred an attorney for conduct involving exaction of an unreasonable
fee from a client.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kerpelman, 323 Md. 136, 145, 591
A.2d 516, 521 (1991), the attorney and client agreed that the client would pay $2,500.00 for
legal services up to and including the first day of trial and $1,250.00 for each additional day
of trial.  The attorney estimated that the trial would last three days and agreed to return any
unused portion of the fee, but he did not put the fee agreement in writing.  Id.  Before trial,
and after the client had paid $5,000.00, the attorney acted abusively toward his client, who
then terminated the relationship.  Id.  Although no written agreement existed, the attorney
later sent his client a letter claiming that he (the attorney) had “re-examined” the retainer
agreement and that it called for an “unrefundable retainer.”  Id. at 146, 591 A.2d at 521.  The
attorney sent his client another letter in which he misrepresented and inflated the services
he had rendered.  Id. at 146, 591 A.2d at 521-22.  In addition to his misconduct regarding
the fee, the attorney ignored a clear order from a circuit court judge to refrain from making
certain remarks to a jury and acted in a “disruptive and disrespectful manner” during a trial
in that judge’s courtroom.  Id. at 142-43, 591 A.2d at 519-20.
We concluded that the attorney violated Rules 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.16(a) and (d),
3.5(a)(8), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.2(a), and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).  In determining the appropriate
sanction, we noted that the attorney had been suspended on two previous occasions for “fee
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gouging and contumacious conduct.”  Id. at 150, 591 A.2d at 523-24.  In disbarring the
attorney, we declared that “[b]y his contumacious conduct as an officer of the court and his
exaction of an unreasonable fee from a client, he has again revealed his unworthiness to hold
himself out to the public as a practitioner of law.” Id. at 150, 591 A.2d at 524.
Respondent’s exaction of an unreasonable fee from his client combined with the trust
account violations and misrepresentations lead us to conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction.  In the instant case, respondent engaged in a “deliberate course of
misrepresentation.”  In addition, respondent collected an unreasonable fee—conduct which
we have held to be grounds for disbarment when accompanied by other misconduct.  See
Kerpelman, 323 Md. 136, 591 A.2d 516.  Further, respondent, by agreeing to protect the
subrogation lien interest of BC/BS in exchange for a $4,500.00 fee, had a conflict of interest
between his duties to his client and a self-serving and self-imposed duty to a third party.
Compounding the seriousness of these violations, respondent failed to maintain funds in a
properly designated trust account—conduct which jeopardizes “the public’s confidence in
our legal system.”  Respondent’s conduct is the “type of conduct against which the public
is entitled to protection, conduct which brings the legal profession into disrepute.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 382, 420 A.2d 940, 959 (1980).  For all of
these reasons, we order that respondent is disbarred.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
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THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
I N C L U D I N G  
C O S T S  
O F  
A L L
TRANSCRIP TS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
JAMES F. BRASKEY.