Case Title: SEG V. GDK

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0075

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEG V. GDK2007 WY 203173 P.3d 395Case Number: S-07-0075 Decided: 12/18/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

SEG,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.GDK,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

M. Jalie 
Meinecke and Alex H. Sitz III of Meinecke & Sitz, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Meinecke.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Ethelyn 
Boak of Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, 
J., files a dissenting opinion.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mother, SEG, 
contests the district court's refusal to terminate the parental rights of 
Father, GDK, to the parties' minor child, KGK.  We determine that the district court's 
order is not an appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05, and we therefore dismiss 
this appeal.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue in this case is whether the district court's Order on Termination of 
Parental Rights is an appealable order from which this Court has jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother petitioned 
for termination of Father's parental rights to KGK on November 17, 2005.  Mother's petition also requested back 
child support and future child support.  
Father responded to the petition, and counterclaimed for visitation.  The district court held a hearing on the 
petition and counterclaim and issued an order, in which it concluded that Mother 
had failed to prove the statutory requirements for terminating Father's 
rights.  The court also found that 
the parties had not presented adequate evidence regarding child support or 
visitation and suggested further hearings on those issues.  Mother appealed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      Under W.R.A.P. 
1.04(a) this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a judgment or 
from an appealable order.  Whether a 
court has jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.  Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶5]      W.R.A.P. 1.04(a) 
states "[a] judgment rendered, or appealable order made, by a district court may 
be:  reversed, vacated, remanded, or 
modified by the supreme court for errors appearing on the record."  W.R.A.P. 1.05 defines an appealable 
order as:

 
 
(a)    An order affecting a 
substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the 
action and prevents a judgment; or

(b)    An order affecting a 
substantial right made in a special proceeding; or

(c)    An order made upon a summary 
application in an action after judgment; or

(d)    An order, including a 
conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a) (4) 
and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment 
shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal by another party; 
or

(e)    Interlocutory orders and 
decrees of the district courts which:

(1)    Grant, continue, or modify 
injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify 
injunctions; or

(2)    Appoint receivers, or issue 
orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to accomplish the purposes 
thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.

 
 
[¶6]      W.R.A.P. 1.05(c), 
(d), and (e) are not implicated in any possible analysis of the district court's 
Order on Termination of Parental Rights.  
Therefore, in order to qualify as appealable, the order must affect a 
substantial right, and must either be issued in a special proceeding, or prevent 
a judgment in the case, under W.R.A.P. 1.05(a) or (b).  The first question is dispositive.  

 
 
[¶7]      This order does 
not affect a substantial right.  
Father's parental rights and right to associate with his daughter (and 
thus, KGK's right to association with her father) were not altered in any way by 
this interlocutory order.  No 
substantial right of any party was affected.1  Therefore, the order was not an 
"appealable order" under W.R.A.P. 1.05.

 
 
[¶8]      In addition, 
contrary to what Mother implies on appeal, the order cannot be considered a 
judgment.  Black's Law Dictionary 858 (8th ed. 2004) defines a judgment as "[a] court's 
final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a 
case".  The order specified that 
issues remained to be resolved and invited the parties to request further 
hearings on those issues.  In 
particular, the court found it necessary to leave the issues of child support 
and visitation unresolved because the parties had not presented sufficient 
evidence on those matters at the hearing on the petition to terminate.  We cannot hear an appeal from an order 
that does not affect a substantial right, in a case where two of the three 
issues raised remain unaddressed by the court.2

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶9]      The Order on 
Termination of Parental Rights in this case did not affect a substantial right 
and so was not an appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05.  The order also was not a judgment under 
W.R.A.P. 1.04, as it did not resolve all the issues in the case.  Therefore, this court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the order.  We dismiss.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Compare 
FML v. TW, 2007 WY 
73, ¶ 5-7, 157 P.3d 455, 458-59 (Wyo. 2007), where we found that an order 
changing child custody was an appealable order because it affected a substantial 
right in a special proceeding.  The 
cases are distinguishable because, here, the fundamental parent-child 
relationship was not altered by the order.

 
 

2The 
parties claim that another case was filed (though they cannot agree who filed 
it) concerning the issues of child support and visitation.  We have no evidence of such a case in 
the record.  In any event, the 
filing of a new matter does not change the fact that those issues are 
outstanding in this case, though it may present issues of collateral estoppel 
and res judicata for one proceeding or the other.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 
[¶10]   I respectfully dissent because this 
case involves a special proceeding that is governed by procedures set out in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309 through 14-2-319 (LexisNexis 2007).  It virtually goes without mention that 
substantial rights are always at stake in cases such as these, and strict 
adherence to the governing statutes is mandatory.  We review such cases applying strict 
scrutiny.  E.g., In re CS, 2006 WY 130, ¶¶ 7-8, 143 P.3d 918, 921-22 (Wyo. 2006).  I 
make mention that it is a special proceeding to ensure that the Court recognizes 
it as such, although that does not play a role in my conclusion that we must 
address the issues raised by this appeal, on their merits.  In passing, I deem it important as well 
to note that the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure merely breathe life into, 
and give procedural form to, the jurisdiction of this Court.  W.R.A.P. 1.04(a) is just one of those 
rules, but it is not a source of our jurisdiction.  See Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2.  I also want to briefly note that the 
majority opinion is not a de novo 
review, inasmuch as the Court purports to be determining its jurisdiction in the 
first instance, and the mention of that standard seems mistaken in these 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶11]   I would hold that the district 
court's order is an appealable order.  
The governing statutes give the district court only two alternative 
resolutions to such cases.  The 
first possible resolution is this:

 
 
§ 
14-2-315. Order terminating the parent-child legal relationship; 
contents.

 
 
            
The order terminating the parent-child legal relationship shall be in 
writing and shall contain the findings of the court.  If the court terminates the parent-child 
legal relationship of either one (1) or both parents, it shall fix the 
responsibility for the child's support and appoint a guardian of the child's 
person or estate or both.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-315 (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶12]   The second option is 
this:

 
 
§ 
14-2-316. Dismissal of petition; continuation of 
hearing.

 
 
            
If the court does not terminate 
the parent-child legal relationship, it shall dismiss the petition or direct 
an authorized agency to continue to make efforts to rehabilitate the parent and 
continue the hearing for no longer than six (6) months.  The authorized agency shall provide the 
court with any additional reports regarding its rehabilitative efforts and 
results.  Pending final hearing, the 
court may continue the present placement of the child or place the child in the 
temporary custody of an authorized agency and fix responsibility for temporary 
child support.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-316 (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶13]   The district court chose an option 
that was not available to it.  
However, it is abundantly clear that the district court intended not to terminate Father's 
parental rights.  I would construe 
the order issued by the district court accordingly and find that the order had 
the effect of dismissing the petition.  
Therefore, the district court had no jurisdiction to consider any other 
issues (such as support or visitation) and if it had done so, we would have no 
jurisdiction to consider them here.  
The district court did not have the authority to put this family "on 
hold" while other extraneous matters, which can readily be resolved under the 
banner of other available proceedings, are resolved.  The denial of the petition to terminate 
parental rights is a dismissal of the action and that order is an appealable 
order under W.R.A.P. 1.05(a).  
W.R.C.P. 54(b) does not apply to these 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶14]   For these reasons, it is necessary 
for this Court to resolve this matter on its merits.  The difficulty with this appeal results 
from the seeming inattention of the parties, and of both courts, to the special 
requirements set out in the statutes that provide for the termination of 
parental rights.  We have recently 
re-emphasized our view that the procedures for termination of parental rights 
are mandatory, and failure to abide by them is fundamental error requiring 
reversal.  LM v. Laramie County Department of Family 
Services, 2007 WY 189, ¶ 6, ___ P.3d ____, ____ (Wyo. 2007) (citing In re FM, 2007 WY 128, ¶¶ 25-26, 
163 P.3d 844, 850-51 (Wyo. 2007)).  
In LM, we held that the failure of the district court to either appoint a 
guardian ad litem (GAL), or to make a finding on the record that the interests 
of the child are adequately represented by the petitioner or another party to 
the action, and are not adverse to that party, is reversible error.  See § 14-2-312.  Although it was not accomplished in as 
timely a manner as it should have been, the appointment of a GAL was directly 
raised before the district court at the hearing on the petition.  The district court's resolution of that 
matter in this instance is not ideal.  
Of course, in cases that are decided post LM and FM, we anticipate that the matter will 
be addressed in a timely and in a clear manner.  I conclude that the district court's 
attention to the matter of a GAL is clear enough to allow this Court to resolve 
the issue brought here in this appeal.  
The record is also clear that a decision not to appoint a GAL here was 
neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.  Moreover, the record is clear that the 
district court did not err in denying the petition for termination of Father's 
parental rights.  Finality of 
judgments can be no more important in any civil or special proceeding than it is 
in one such as this, and I think that it is a mistake for the Court to further 
prolong the uncertainties that still face Child, Father, and Mother by 
dismissing this appeal.