Case Title: Sturdivant v. City of Farmington

Citation: 500 S.W.2d 769

Docket Number: 73-137

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1973-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
500 S.W.2d 769 (1973) Helen STURDIVANT, Adm'x, Appellant, v. CITY OF FARMINGTON, Arkansas, Appellee. No. 73-137. Supreme Court of Arkansas. November 5, 1973. *770 Jones & Segers, Fayetteville, for appellant. James E. Evans, Sr., Springdale, for appellee. BROWN, Justice. This suit in tort was brought by appellant against appellee, City of Farmington. It arose out of a fatal collision between the city marshal of Farmington and appellant's intestate, a minor. The city's demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that municipalities are immune from tort action. Act 165, 1969; Ark.Stat.Ann. § 12-2901 (Supp.1971). On appeal it is asserted that the recited act makes it mandatory that the State's political subdivisions carry liability insurance and that failure to do so makes the city amenable to a tort action. In Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968), we set aside the rule of law established by precedent which granted immunity to municipalities from tort liability. The first session of the General Assembly thereafter, referring specifically to Parish v. Pitts, enacted Act 165 (Ark.Stat. Ann. § 12-2901-03) (Supp.1971): We have had at least three cases in which we have discussed Act 165. Sullivan v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 259, 445 *771 S.W.2d 94 (1969); Chandler v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 262, 445 S.W.2d 96 (1969); Williams v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n., 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969). In those cases we did not discuss the precise question now before us, namely, that the failure to carry liability insurance makes the political subdivision amenable to a tort action. The preamble to Act 165 states one of the purposes of the act to be "to require all political subdivisions to carry liability insurance on their motor vehicles". Then Section 3 says "they shall carry liability insurance on all their motor vehicles". We think it was the intent of the General Assembly to require such liability insurance. Two of the fundamental purposes of Act 165 are (1) to set aside Parish v. Pitts, supra, and (2) to make it possible for persons injured by municipally owned vehicles to have redress for negligence. If we hold that the city of Farmington is entitled to the immunity afforded it under Act 165 and at the same time hold that it is not mandatory that it comply with the liability insurance provision thereof, then we have destroyed the second purpose of the act above enumerated. The mandatory provision for carrying liability insurance is so strongly and clearly stated that we cannot agree to such emasculation. We think, and so hold, that any city which fails to conform to the insurance requirement places itself in the posture of being responsible, as would a self-insurer, in case it is found to be liable, in an amount not to exceed the minimum amount prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 75-1466 (Supp.1971). We think it reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended that the public be protected to the extent of the recited limits. That may be done in only one of two ways, namely, insurance or self-insurance. Our interpretation avoids opportunities to evade the act. An interpretation which defeats evasion is favored in the law. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 361. Then in Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 285 (1840), it was said: "And such construction ought to be put upon it, [the act] as will not suffer it to be eluded". And in Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) Vol. 2A, § 57.01 we find this significant statement: "No statutory provisions are intended by the legislature to be disregarded; but where the consequences of not obeying them in every particular are not prescribed, the courts must judicially determine them. In doing so they must necessarily consider the importance of the literal and punctilious observance of the provision in question to the object the legislation is calculated to serve." Reversed and Remanded. FOGLEMAN, J., dissents. FOGLEMAN, Justice (dissenting). I cannot agree with the court's construction of the act, and I would affirm the judgment. Had the legislature said, or indicated any intent whatever to say, what the court says today I would be bound to agree. I feel the court has again acted legislatively in the municipal immunity field. I need not dwell on my differences with the majority in Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45, however, because my position in that case leads directly to a construction of the statute, which is the same approach as that taken by the majority. Previous decisions mentioning Act 165 of 1969, the General Assembly's reaction to Parish v. Pitts, are not directly in point, because the decision in Parish v. Pitts had no direct bearing upon tort liability of either counties or charitable institutions. The court's remarks about the act are pertinent, however. In Sullivan v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 259, 445 S.W.2d 94, we deemed the action of the General Assembly sufficient reason why a suitor in tort against the county *772 could not prevail, calling attention to Act 165. There we said: In Chandler v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 262, 445 S.W.2d 96, decided the same day, we said that the reasoning in Sullivan applied. Then we recited the reasoning: To the same effect, see Reem and Rhodes v. Natural Gas. Imp. Dist., 247 Ark. 983, 448 S.W.2d 647. In Williams v. Jefferson Hospital Association, 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243, in rejecting a plea that we abandon the doctrine of charitable immunity, we said: True it is, we were dealing with immunities of agencies other than municipalities. It is also true that the requirement of automobile liability insurance had no application in any of these cases. It is significant that in none did we find any qualifying "ifs," "ands" or "buts" in the statute. This is attributable to the fact that there are none, or were not until the court imported them today. It is also significant to me that the language quoted from Williams is consistent with my construction of the act. That language indicates the appropriate procedure in tort claims against municipal corporations. The language of Section 1 of the act says without qualification that "no tort action shall lie against any such political subdivision, on account of the acts of their agents and employees." This is a positive and unequivocal statement and there is no language qualifying or restricting this language anywhere in the act, even if we could consider the act itself ambiguous, and look to the title and emergency clause. Section 3 definitely does not limit, qualify or restrict this positive prohibition. We have said that this statement of public policy is unambiguous. If so, no resort to the title or the emergency clause is proper. But if it is ambiguous enough to permit this, certainly nothing can be found to mandate the construction given the act by the majority in either. The emergency clause is in the majority opinion. The title reads: The patent effect of the majority opinion is to create a cause of action, otherwise nonexistent, by reason of the nonfeasance of municipal officers, something *773 heretofore unheard of in Arkansas. It was clearly and unequivocally held in City of Little Rock v. Holland, 184 Ark. 381, 42 S.W.2d 383 (aside from and independent of the holding that a municipality is not liable for the negligence of its officers and agents in the performance of its governmental functions), that it is well settled that a municipality is not liable for the nonfeasance of its officers and agents. We quoted extensively from Collier v. Ft. Smith, 73 Ark. 447, 84 S.W. 480, 68 L.R.A. 237, as follows: Resort to 18 McQuillin (Third Edition Revised) reveals the following rules: In construing Act 46 of 1947, which permitted, but did not require, municipal corporations to carry liability insurance, and in holding that the insurer could not assert the municipality's immunity from suit as a defense in a direct action on the policy, we relied upon the comments of that eminent Arkansas legal scholar, Dr. Robert A. Leflar, 1 Ark.L.Rev. 215. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Brashears, 226 Ark. 1017, 297 S.W.2d 662. Among other things, Dr. Leflar said: I submit that Section 3 of Act 165 of 1969, by which the carrying of automobile liability insurance by municipalities was made mandatory rather than optional, had exactly the same effect and none other, i. e., it directed the insured city to contract for such suits to be brought against the city's insurer who is indemnified by the payment of premiums. The mere change from a permission to carry insurance to a direction to do so certainly should not be construed to create an exception from a clearly and positively declared immunity from suit. The result reached by the majority actually reads into the statute either an exception to the immunity stated or granted (depending upon one's point of view) or an implied limited waiver of immunity from suit by the failure of municipal officers to acquire the required policies.[1] I insist that there is no indication that the legislature so intended, or that it intended that a liability be imposed by nonfeasance of municipal officials. *774 This situation is not unprecedented. In Knauer v. Ventnor City, 13 N.J.Misc. 864, 181 A. 895 (1935), an effort was made to recover on behalf of a policeman the amount of a judgment against him on a cause of action arising out of his negligent operation of a police car while in pursuit of his duties. Liability was based upon a statutory provision similar to that before us. It provided that "[e]very political subdivision in this State shall cause to be insured the drivers of its motor cars * * * against liability for damages resulting in personal injury or death or damage to property caused by reason of the operation and use of such motor cars * * *. Said insurance may be issued in the name of the political subdivision, but it shall insure the authorized drivers * * * against liability for damages to property, in any one accident, to an extent of not less than one thousand dollars and against liability for injuries or death of one person in any one accident to an extent of five thousand dollars, and against liability for injury or death of more than one person, in any one accident, of not less than Ten Thousand Dollars." The New Jersey court said: In a later case, Osback v. Lyndhurst Tp., 7 N.J. 371, 81 A.2d 721 (1951), the New *775 Jersey Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in which it was urged that a liability should be imposed upon the city because the lower court decision on the basis of Knauer effectively took away the benefit of the statute from the two classes of people upon whom it was intended to be conferred. The court, relying upon the well-established rule that an action will not lie in behalf of an individual who has sustained a special damage by reason of the neglect of a public corporation, or its agents, to perform a public duty, said: The underlying principle followed in these cases has been recognized in Arkansas. In Gregg v. Hatcher, 94 Ark. 54, 125 S.W. 1007, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 138, we quoted, with approval, from 20 American and English Encyclopedia of Law (Second Edition), pp. 1193 and 1194. That quotation included the following language: Without further elaboration, I feel the result reached is inappropriate only because of the means and agency through which it is reached. Not only would I have no quarrel with that result had it been reached by the General Assembly, I would agree that it was desirable. If the General Assembly had intended that result it could have said so in a few simple words. We must presume that the legislature knew that nonfeasance of municipal officers does not give rise to a cause of action against the municipality. If the effect of this decision were limited to this particular act, perhaps I should not protest so strongly. As a precedent it can be very far-reaching, and can be the vehicle for many quasi-legislative actions by this court under the guise of statutory construction. I must add that there is an additional reason why I would affirm the action of the trial court. Failure of the municipal officers to procure the required liability insurance does not mean that Section 2 of the act may not be invoked. Section 2 is clearly applicable to all tort claims, even those arising out of operation of motor vehicles and particularly those which might be for an excess over the limits of automobile liability insurance. There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that appellant had sought to invoke procedures under that section or that the city had not established them. [1] Municipal officers cannot waive or relinquish the rights of the municipality in the absence of express authority. 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (Third Edition Revised) 524, § 12.126.