Case Title: State v. Siler

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5637

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39, 2007-Ohio-5637.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SILER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39, 2007-Ohio-5637.] 
Constitutional right to confront witnesses—Hearsay statements by child declarant 
to police investigator are testimonial—Age of declarant not determinative 
of whether statements are testimonial. 
(No. 2006-0185—Submitted June 5, 2007 – Decided October 25, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County, No. 02 COA 028, 164 
Ohio App.3d 680, 2005-Ohio-6591. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
l.  To determine whether a child declarant’s statement made in the course of 
police interrogation is testimonial or nontestimonial, courts should apply 
the primary-purpose test:  “Statements are nontestimonial when made in 
the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”  (Davis v. Washington (2006), __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 
2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, followed.) 
2.  A declarant’s age is not determinative of whether a testimonial statement has 
been made during a police interrogation. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Ashland County 
Court of Appeals that reversed Brian Siler’s convictions for aggravated murder 
and five other offenses and held that the admission of hearsay statements of his 
three-year-old son at his trial denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him because his child did not testify at trial and because he had 
no prior opportunity to cross-examine him. 
{¶ 2} The focus of this appeal concerns whether a child’s statements 
made in the course of a police interrogation to a sheriff’s deputy should be 
considered testimonial or nontestimonial, as explained in Crawford v. Washington 
(2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct.1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, Davis v. Washington 
(2006), __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834.  After careful review, we have 
concluded that the statements made to the deputy sheriff were testimonial because 
the circumstances objectively indicate that no ongoing emergency existed and that 
the primary purpose of the police interrogation was to establish past events 
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Brian and Barbara Siler married in 1988 and had one child, 
Nathan, born in July 1998.  In June 2001, Brian discovered that Barbara had been 
having an affair with one of her co-workers.  In the ensuing weeks, Barbara 
placed several 911 calls to sheriff’s deputies due to arguments with Brian.  No 
criminal charges arose from these calls, but Barbara frequently expressed her fear 
of Brian to friends and family. 
{¶ 4} On July 30, 2001, after an incident in which Brian allegedly 
choked her, Barbara obtained a civil protection order that required Brian to 
surrender his house keys and garage door openers and to stay at least 300 feet 
away from her; it also established a schedule for him to visit Nathan, who 
January Term, 2007 
3 
continued to live with Barbara.  As a result, Brian moved in with his brother and 
sister-in-law, who lived about five or six miles away.  Barbara subsequently filed 
for divorce, and Brian told several people that he wanted to hurt her as much as 
she had hurt him. 
{¶ 5} On September 20, 2001, Duane Keener, Barbara’s father, received 
a phone call from Barbara’s employer, the accounting firm of Whitcomb & Hess, 
expressing concern that she had not reported to work that day.  After 
unsuccessfully trying to reach her by phone, Keener drove to her house.  Upon 
arrival, he looked through the garage window, noticed that the door to her van 
was open, and discovered that he could open the side door to the garage by 
pushing on it.  He entered and continued into the house but did not see anyone.  
Growing worried, he went back outside and called 911. 
{¶ 6} Deputy Ron Singleton and Captain Richert of the Ashland County 
Sheriff’s Office responded to the 911 call and met him around 2:00 p.m.  They 
went into the garage and found Barbara Siler’s body hanging from a yellow cord 
tied to the track of the overhead garage door.  The Ashland County Coroner, Dr. 
William Emery, later estimated that her death occurred eight to ten hours earlier, 
sometime between 4:00 and 6:00 a.m. that morning. 
{¶ 7} Singleton continued into the house by himself and discovered 
three-year-old Nathan asleep in one of the bedrooms.  Upon waking him, he 
carried Nathan outside through the garage to his grandfather, shielding the child 
from any view of his mother. 
{¶ 8} Detective Larry Martin, a trained child interviewer, arrived shortly 
thereafter wearing plain clothes with a vest that concealed his badge and gun.  
While Nathan sat on his grandfather’s lap, Martin lay next to them on the ground 
and began talking to Nathan.  Nathan eventually began to ask for his mother and 
to go back into the house; according to Martin, Nathan also said that his mother 
was in the garage “sleeping standing.”  As a result of the questioning, Martin 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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learned that Nathan’s father, Brian, had been there the previous night, that he had 
scared Nathan by banging on the door, and that he had fought with Barbara in the 
garage.  Nathan also told Martin that Brian had placed the yellow rope around her 
neck. 
{¶ 9} The state indicted Brian Siler in December 2001 on two counts of 
aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications, two counts of domestic 
violence, and single counts of endangering children, aggravated burglary, and 
violation of a protection order.  He pleaded not guilty, and a trial commenced in 
May 2002.  As part of its case-in-chief, the state called Deputy Singleton and 
Detective Martin to testify about Nathan’s statements, and, over Siler’s repeated 
objections, the trial court admitted the testimony as excited utterances pursuant to 
Evid.R. 803. 
{¶ 10} On direct examination, Singleton testified that when he carried 
Nathan from the house, he asked Nathan, “Was daddy here today?” to which 
Nathan answered “no,” and he testified that Nathan told him to “[f]ind mommy,” 
pointing to the garage.  On cross-examination, Singleton stated that Nathan did 
not cry or resist at any point. 
{¶ 11} Martin testified that he had been briefed upon his arrival at the 
scene and before he began speaking with Nathan.  He stated that when 
interviewing a child, he would “attempt to identify what information the child 
might have as to what had happened.”  He further testified that when he asked 
Nathan if anything had scared him the night before, Nathan responded, “Daddy 
did” by “[k]nocking loudly,” and jumped up and demonstrated by banging on the 
front door.  Martin stated that he asked if anything else had scared Nathan and 
that Nathan answered, “Daddy, mommy fighting” in the garage. 
{¶ 12} Martin also testified that 30 to 45 minutes into his questioning, 
Nathan said that he was hungry and thirsty, and Martin arranged for him to have 
January Term, 2007 
5 
lunch with Terrie Cato, a nurse employed by the Ashland County Sheriff’s Office 
and a friend of Barbara and Brian Siler. 
{¶ 13} Martin further stated that when they returned from lunch, he again 
spoke with Nathan, this time in the presence of Jenny Taylor, a children’s services 
investigator who had arrived at the scene.  He asked “if anyone was hurting 
mommy,” to which Nathan responded, “Daddy did.”  Using a teddy bear that had 
been brought to the scene, Martin asked Nathan to demonstrate how daddy had 
hurt mommy, but Nathan did not respond.  Martin then placed Taylor in different 
holds, asking Nathan, “Was this how daddy was hurting mommy?”  When he 
placed his arm around the investigator’s shoulder from behind, Nathan told him to 
move his arms up.  Martin demonstrated, and Nathan said, “yes,” and began 
crying; until this point in the interrogation, Martin stated, the child had not 
seemed nervous, upset, or in any distress.  Nathan told Martin that “the yellow 
thing” held mommy upright in the garage, and, when Martin asked who put the 
yellow thing on her, the child responded, “Daddy.”  Martin did not question him 
further. 
{¶ 14} Among other witnesses, the state also called Dr. Andrea 
McCollom, a forensic pathologist, who testified that Barbara’s body displayed 
injuries that were inconsistent with suicide; rather, in her opinion, Barbara had 
been hanged after she had died from injuries caused by cervical compression 
consistent with a choke hold applied from behind. 
{¶ 15} At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury found Siler 
guilty of all counts and specifications and, after the penalty phase, unanimously 
recommended the death penalty.  However, the court rejected the 
recommendation and instead imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole. 
{¶ 16} Siler then appealed to the Ashland County Court of Appeals and 
raised several assignments of error, including a Sixth Amendment challenge to the 
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admission of Nathan’s statements to Martin.  The appellate court overruled that 
assignment of error, determined that Nathan’s statements were admissible as 
excited utterances pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2), and affirmed the convictions.  State 
v. Siler, Ashland App. No. 02-COA-028, 2003-Ohio-5749.  We denied review of 
his appeal.  State v. Siler, 101 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 539. 
{¶ 17} Siler then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the 
case with instructions to reconsider the Sixth Amendment issue in light of 
Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.  
Siler v. Ohio (2004), 543 U.S. 1019, 125 S.Ct. 671, 160 L.Ed.2d 494.  On remand, 
the appellate court reversed Siler’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, 
holding that Nathan’s statements to Detective Martin were testimonial and that 
their admission during trial violated Siler’s Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him, stating, “there is presently no cognizable dispute 
concerning whether the child was unavailable * * * and whether defense counsel 
was given a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.”  State v. Siler, 164 Ohio 
App.3d 680, 2005-Ohio-6591, 843 N.E.2d 863, ¶49.  The appellate court 
explained, “Martin’s questioning of Nathan, although resulting in allowable 
‘excited utterances’ under the Ohio Rules of Evidence, was nonetheless a 
structured police interrogation as envisioned in Crawford, and therefore 
constituted testimonial evidence.”  Id.  The court further held that the erroneous 
“admission of Nathan’s statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. at ¶ 50. 
{¶ 18} The state appealed the decision that Nathan’s statements to Martin 
were testimonial, contending that the appellate court misapplied Crawford and 
contravened our subsequent holding in Stahl when it concluded that Nathan’s 
statements were testimonial because they resulted from police interrogation.  The 
state urges that Nathan’s statements should not be considered testimonial, asking 
January Term, 2007 
7 
us to apply the objective-witness test established in Stahl and to consider the 
statements from the perspective of a three-year-old declarant, who could not have 
understood that his statements would be available for use at a later trial. 
{¶ 19} Siler, on the other hand, asserts that the objective-witness test 
adopted in Stahl is inapposite because Stahl involved statements made to a nurse 
for medical purposes, not to law-enforcement officers for investigatory purposes.  
He contends that in Davis v. Washington (2006), ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 
2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, the court set forth a different test that applies to 
statements generated from police interrogation, and he argues that Davis stands 
for the proposition that when the primary purpose of the police interrogation is to 
determine what has occurred in the past, without regard to an ongoing emergency, 
then the statements generated are testimonial for purposes of Confrontation 
Clause analysis, regardless of the age of the declarant. 
{¶ 20} Thus, we are called upon to set forth an appropriate test for courts 
to apply when faced with a Sixth Amendment challenge to statements made by a 
child declarant in response to police interrogation. 
Crawford, Davis, and Stahl 
{¶ 21} In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that the proper 
analysis 
for 
determining 
whether 
out-of-court 
statements 
violate 
the 
Confrontation Clause is not whether they are reliable but, rather, whether they are 
testimonial.  541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.  The court went on 
to state that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay 
but that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment 
demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”  Id. at 68. 
{¶ 22} Although the court expressly declined to set forth a comprehensive 
definition for the term “testimonial,” it described three “formulations of this core 
class of ‘testimonial’ statements,” one of which includes statements “ ‘made 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’ ” Id., 541 U.S. at 51-
52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, quoting the brief of amicus curiae National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  The court further stated, “Whatever 
else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 68. 
{¶ 23} Two years after its decision in Crawford, the court revisited the 
issue of testimonial statements in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington 
and Hammon v. Indiana (2006), ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d 
224.  Davis involved statements that a domestic-violence victim made to a 911 
operator identifying her assailant and describing his whereabouts immediately 
after an assault, while Hammon involved statements made to police officers 
responding to a domestic-violence complaint after they had secured the scene.  
Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2270-2272, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.. 
{¶ 24} In considering whether the statements in these cases were 
testimonial, the court distinguished between police interrogations that concern an 
ongoing emergency and those that relate to past criminal conduct.  Id., ___ U.S. at 
___, 126 S.Ct. at 2276-2278, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.  Thus, it formulated what courts 
around the country have come to refer to as the primary-purpose test (see, e.g., 
People v. Geier (2007), 41 Cal.4th 555, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104; State 
v. Kirby (2006), 280 Conn. 361, 908 A.2d 506):  “Statements are nontestimonial 
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
January Term, 2007 
9 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 
2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224. 
{¶ 25} Applying that test, the court determined that “the circumstances of 
[the 911] interrogation [in Davis] objectively indicate its primary purpose was to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”  Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 
126 S.Ct. at 2276.  Accordingly, those statements were nontestimonial.  Id.  In 
Hammon, however, the court stated, “Objectively viewed, the primary, if not 
indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime.”  
Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2278.  Therefore, the court held that those 
statements were testimonial.  Id. 
{¶ 26} In State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 
834, we considered whether an adult rape victim had made testimonial statements 
to a nurse practitioner during a medical examination at a hospital DOVE unit 
specializing in health care for victims of rape and domestic violence.  There, for 
analysis of a statement made to a medical professional, we adopted the objective-
witness test from Crawford, stating, “For Confrontation Clause purposes, a 
testimonial statement includes one made ‘under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.’ ”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.  We further held, “In 
determining whether a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, 
courts should focus on the expectation of the declarant at the time of making the 
statement; the intent of a questioner is relevant only if it could affect a reasonable 
declarant’s expectations.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 27} In Stahl, we expressly acknowledged Davis and Hammon but 
distinguished them, stating, “They involve statements made to law-enforcement 
officers, while the statement at issue here covers one made to a medical 
professional at a medical facility for the primary purpose of receiving proper 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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medical treatment and not investigating past events related to criminal 
prosecution.”  (Emphasis sic.) 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 
834, ¶25.  Applying the objective-witness test, instead, we concluded that the 
statements made by the rape victim to the nurse were nontestimonial because she 
“could have reasonably believed that although the examination conducted at the 
DOVE unit would result in scientific evidence being extracted for prosecution 
purposes, the statement would be used primarily for health-care purposes.”  Id. at 
¶47. 
The Primary-Purpose Test 
{¶ 28} Although the state and amicus curiae, the American Prosecutors 
Research Institute (“APRI”), invite us to apply the objective-witness test, as we 
did in Stahl, we decline to do so because the primary-purpose test enunciated in 
Davis is the more appropriate analysis.  Contrary to the assertions of the state and 
APRI, Stahl is factually distinguishable from the instant case based on the identity 
of the interrogator and the purpose of the questioning.  The distinction is as 
significant here as it was in Stahl, where we specifically concluded that the 
objective-witness test applied, rather than the primary-purpose test in Davis, 
because of the lack of a law-enforcement interrogator.  111 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-
Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834, ¶25.  Moreover, the court in Davis acknowledged 
that its “holding is not an ‘exhaustive classification of all conceivable 
statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police 
interrogation,’ supra, [___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct.] at 2273 165 L.Ed.2d 224], but 
rather a resolution of the cases before us and those like them.”  (Emphasis added.)  
___ U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2278, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, fn. 5. 
{¶ 29} Since Davis, courts have consistently applied the primary-purpose 
test to statements that a child declarant made to police or those determined to be 
police agents, and we are aware of no courts that continue to apply the objective-
witness test in such cases.  See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965, 56 
January Term, 2007 
11 
Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. 
Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic 
interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 
946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection 
Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 
N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. 
Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police and 
child-protective-services worker); State v. Justus (Mo.2006), 205 S.W.3d 872 
(three-year-old’s statements to child-abuse investigators); State v. Buda (2006), 
389 N.J.Super. 241, 912 A.2d 735 (three-year-old’s statements to youth-services 
worker); State v. Blue, 2006 N.D. 134, 717 N.W.2d 558 (four-year-old’s 
statements to forensic interviewer with police observing); In re S.R., 2007 
Pa.Super. 79, 920 A.2d 1262 (four-year-old’s statements to forensic interview 
specialist); State v. Hooper (Aug. 11, 2006), Payette App. No. 31025, ___ Idaho 
___, ___P.3d ___, 2006 WL 2328233 (six-year-old’s statements to sexual trauma 
personnel during visit arranged and observed by police). 
{¶ 30} Thus, we conclude that to determine whether a child declarant’s 
statement made in the course of police interrogation is testimonial or 
nontestimonial, courts should apply the primary-purpose test:  “Statements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Davis v. 
Washington (2006), __ U.S. at __, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224. 
{¶ 31} Having determined that the primary-purpose test applies in this 
instance, we next consider the argument of the state and APRI that a child’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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statements to police are nontestimonial when the child, because of his or her age 
and limited understanding of court or trial, could not reasonably expect that those 
statements may be used in a later criminal proceeding. 
{¶ 32} We recognize, as did the court of appeals in this case, that 
“younger children have lesser reflective capabilities,” Siler, 164 Ohio App.3d 
680, 2005-Ohio-6591, 843 N.E.2d 863, at ¶ 9, citing State v. Wagner (1986), 30 
Ohio App.3d 261, 30 OBR 458, 508 N.E.2d 164; we further acknowledge the 
authorities submitted by APRI indicating that children lack an understanding of 
court proceedings and testimony.  See, e.g., R. Friedman, The Conundrum of 
Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay (2002), 65 Law & Contemp.Prob. 243, 251-
252. 
{¶ 33} The court’s analysis in Davis, however, does not focus on the 
expectations of the declarant in order to determine whether statements are 
testimonial; rather, the test set forth in Davis centers on the statements and the 
objective circumstances indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation.  ___ 
U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.  In this way, the argument 
by the state and APRI that we should focus on the cognitive limitations of a child 
who made the statements to police is inconsistent with the primary-purpose test. 
{¶ 34} The state and APRI cite numerous cases in support of their 
position that statements made by child declarants are nontestimonial because of 
their lack of understanding.  Those cases are inapposite, however, because they do 
not concern statements that a child made to law-enforcement officers or to 
individuals held to be agents of law enforcement.  See People v. Vigil 
(Colo.2006), 127 P.3d 916 (seven-year-old’s statements to doctor, father, and 
father’s friend); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira (2006), 447 Mass. 56, 849 N.E.2d 
218 (six-year-old’s statements to doctor); State v. Scacchetti (Minn.2006), 711 
N.W.2d 508 (three-year-old’s statements to nurse); State v. Brigman (2006), 178 
N.C.App. 78, 632 S.E.2d 498 (children’s statements to mother); State v. Johnson, 
January Term, 2007 
13 
Butler App. No. CA 2005-10-422, 2006-Ohio-5195 (nine-year-old’s statements to 
medical staff); State v. Copley, Franklin App. No. 04AP-1128, 2006-Ohio-2737 
(three-year-old’s statements to mother); State v. Muttart, Hancock App. No. 5-05-
08, 2006-Ohio-2506 (five- and six-year-old children’s statements to medical 
professional), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 2007-Ohio-
5267, 875 N.E.2d 944; United States v. Coulter (2005), 62 M.J. 520 (two-year-
old’s statements to mother). 
{¶ 35} Only one case cited by the state and APRI concludes that a child’s 
statements made during a police interrogation were nontestimonial: Lagunas v. 
State (Tex.App.2005), 187 S.W.3d 503.  There, police responding to a 911 call 
found an injured woman who had been abducted from her home but who had 
managed to escape her captor.  She told the police that her two children, ages two 
and four, were still at home, and an officer was dispatched to check on their 
safety.  Upon arrival, the officer entered the house, found the children in bed, and 
asked the four-year-old if everything was okay.  As the Lagunas court recounted, 
“[The child] responded that it wasn't and added, ‘Her mommy was dead.’ At this 
point, [the officer] asked [her] what happened to her mother.  She responded, ‘A 
bad man had killed her and took her away’ and grew more upset. * * * He did not 
question [her] further.”  Lagunas, 187 S.W.3d at 520.  The Texas court of appeals 
concluded that the child’s statements were nontestimonial after applying the 
objective-witness test, in which it considered the age of the child. 
{¶ 36} The court’s analysis and decision predated the establishment of the 
primary-purpose test in Davis.  Moreover, although the court in Lagunas 
considered the child’s age in its analysis, it specifically stated, “We need not 
decide now whether, as a general rule, statements by children are inherently non-
testimonial or whether [the child’s] age alone renders her statements non-
testimonial.”  187 S.W.3d at 519.  Furthermore, the court’s analysis paralleled the 
analysis in Davis by focusing on the purpose of the interrogation; as the Lagunas 
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14
court explained, the officer’s questioning of the child “was closer in nature to a 
preliminary question in which [the officer] sought to clarify [the child’s] 
spontaneous statement that her mother was dead. There was not time to formulate 
careful, structured questioning. Instead, [the officer’s] questions were consistent 
with the behavior of a reasonable adult seeking (in some ways successfully, in 
some ways not) to calm a frightened child in the middle of the night. 
Significantly, after calming [the child], [the officer] asked her no further questions 
regarding the circumstances of her mother's disappearance.”  Id. at 520. Thus, 
Lagunas supports the conclusion not only that the primary-purpose test is 
appropriate in cases involving police interrogation of a child but also that the 
declarant’s age is not dispositive when determining whether statements to police 
are testimonial. 
{¶ 37} We similarly distinguish State v. Bobadilla (Minn.2006), 709 
N.W.2d 243, which APRI primarily relies upon for the proposition that a child’s 
limited cognitive ability renders his statements nontestimonial.  There, a three-
year-old sex-abuse victim made statements to a child-protection worker during a 
risk-assessment interview while a police detective observed.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the child’s statements were nontestimonial because “the 
interview of [the child] was initiated by a child-protection worker in response to a 
report of sexual abuse for the overriding purpose of assessing whether abuse 
occurred, and whether steps were therefore needed to protect the health and 
welfare of the child” and because “neither [the child] nor the child-protection 
worker were acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for 
trial, and therefore [the child’s] statements in the assessment interview were not 
testimonial.”  Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255-256. 
{¶ 38} Although the court acknowledged the child’s limited cognitive 
abilities, this was not, as APRI claims, the focal point of its analysis; rather, the 
purpose of the interview constituted the dispositive issue:  “If part of the purpose 
January Term, 2007 
15 
of this interview was to produce a statement for use at a future trial, such a 
purpose was at best incidental to the main purpose: assessing and responding to 
imminent risks to [the child’s] health and welfare.”  Id. at 255.  Moreover, as with 
Lagunas, the court decided Bobadilla without the benefit of the analysis that the 
United States Supreme Court set forth in Davis. 
{¶ 39} We are aware of no case in which a court has concluded that a 
declarant’s age rendered statements to police nontestimonial.  Rather, courts have 
held that children’s statements to police or police agents are testimonial in 
circumstances that indicate that no ongoing emergency existed and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation was to establish past events potentially 
related to later criminal prosecution.  See, e.g., T.P. v. State (Ala.Crim.App.2004), 
911 So.2d 1117 (eight-year-old’s statements to social worker and investigator as 
part of criminal investigation); People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 
789, 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sisavath (2004), 
118 Cal.App.4th 1396, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 (four-year-old’s statements to police); 
People v. Sharp, 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer 
during visit arranged by police); People ex rel. R.A.S. (Colo.App.2004), 111 P.3d 
487 (four-year-old’s statements to police); Hernandez v. State, 946 So.2d 1270 
(statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); 
State v. Grace (Haw.App.2005), 107 Hawai’i 133, 111 P.3d 28 (ten- and eleven-
year-old children’s statements to police); State v. Hooper, Payette App. No. 
31025, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2006 WL 2328233 (six-year-old’s 
statements to sexual trauma personnel during visit arranged by police); People v. 
Stechly, 225 Ill.2d 246, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s 
statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776 
(three-year-old’s statements to police and child-protective-services worker); State 
v. Snowden (Md.App.2005), 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (eight- and ten-year-old 
children’s statements to sex-abuse personnel during police investigation); State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16
Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (three-year-old’s statements to child-abuse investigators); 
State v. Blue, 2006 ND 134, 717 N.W.2d 558 (four-year-old’s statements to 
forensic interviewer with police observing); State v. Buda, 389 N.J.Super. 241, 
912 A.2d 735 (three-year-old’s statements to youth-services worker); State v. 
Mack (2004), 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349 (three-year-old’s statements to case 
worker in an interview directed by the police); In re S.R., 2007 Pa.Super. 79, 920 
A.2d 1262 (four-year-old’s statements to forensic interview specialist); Rangel v. 
State (Tex.App.2006), 199 S.W.3d 523 (six-year-old child’s statements to child-
protective services); United States v. Bordeaux (C.A.8 2005), 400 F.3d 548 
(statements by child of unknown age to forensic interviewer). 
{¶ 40} Significantly, several courts have expressly rejected the state’s and 
APRI’s argument that a child’s statements are necessarily nontestimonial when 
the child would not be able to understand that the statements would be used in a 
later criminal proceeding.  State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 785, citing State v. 
Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (“A young victim’s awareness, or lack thereof, that her 
statement would be used to prosecute, is not dispositive of whether her statement 
is testimonial”); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. at 89-90, 867 A.2d 314 (“we are 
unwilling to conclude that, as a matter of law, young children's statements cannot 
possess the same testimonial nature as those of other, more clearly competent 
declarants”); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. at 66, 849 N.E.2d 218 
(declining to adopt the same argument that APRI presents here); People v. Vigil, 
127 P.3d at 926, fn. 8 (“if a child makes a statement to a government agent as part 
of a police interrogation, his statement is testimonial irrespective of the child’s 
expectations regarding whether the statement will be available for use at a later 
trial”); see, also, State v. Hooper, Payette App. No. 31025, ___ Idaho ___, ___ 
P.3d ___, 2006 WL 2328233, *17. 
{¶ 41} Thus, we conclude that the age of a declarant is not determinative 
of whether a testimonial statement has been made during a police interrogation. 
January Term, 2007 
17 
{¶ 42} Our conclusions in this case regarding a police interrogation of a 
child do not affect our decision in Stahl, which applied the objective-witness test 
to determine whether a declarant had made testimonial statements during an 
interview conducted by a nurse at a DOVE unit for purposes other than to 
investigate a past crime.  In this regard, we agree with the Supreme Court of 
Illinois, in People v. Stechly, which recently concluded that the objective-witness 
test applied to statements that a five-year-old child made to her mother but that 
the primary-purpose test set forth in Davis applied to statements that she made 
during an interrogation conducted by an agent of the police.  225 Ill.2d at 299-
302, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333.  See, also, Vigil, 127 P.3d  at 926, fn.8 
(applying the objective-witness test to a child’s statements to a nonpolice 
questioner but stating that the child’s statements to police during an investigation 
are testimonial regardless of child’s expectations); and State v. Mechling (2006), 
219 W.Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311 (the objective-witness test applies, generally, but 
statements generated from police interrogation require application of the analysis 
in Davis); but see State v. Alvarez (App.2006), 213 Ariz. 467, 143 P.3d 668; and 
People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205 (holding that 
after Davis, the objective-witness test no longer applies). 
Application of the Primary-Purpose Test in This Case 
{¶ 43} The record reveals that before Detective Martin arrived at the 
scene, Deputy Singleton had entered the home, awakened Nathan, and taken him 
outside.  The Ashland County Sheriff’s Office had secured the crime scene and 
had begun its investigation into Barbara’s death.  Martin testified that he had been 
briefed before he began questioning Nathan, that Nathan did not appear nervous 
or upset, and that Nathan was sitting in his grandfather’s lap during the 
questioning.  Thus, this record does not reflect the existence of an ongoing 
emergency. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18
{¶ 44} Martin identified the primary purpose of Nathan’s questioning 
when he testified that he would “attempt to identify what information the child 
might have as to what had happened.”  In addition, Nathan’s statements 
concerned what had occurred the night before in relation to Martin’s effort to 
establish past events possibly relevant to a criminal prosecution. 
{¶ 45} The interrogation before us parallels that in Hammon, where the 
court stated:  “It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was 
part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct * * *.  There was no 
emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no 
arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything * * *.  When the 
officers first arrived, [the declarant] told them that things were fine, * * * and 
there was no immediate threat to her person.”  ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2278, 
165 L.Ed.2d 224.  The court further stated, “[The declarant’s] statements were 
neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers 
immediately to end a threatening situation * * *.”  Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. 
at 2279, 165 L.Ed.2d 224. 
{¶ 46} As the court stated with respect to the interrogation in Hammon, 
“Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the 
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime * * *.”  Id. at 2278.  We 
conclude that the same is true of this interrogation. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 47} In conformity with Davis and the weight of authority in other 
jurisdictions, we conclude that Nathan made testimonial statements to Detective 
Martin, and as a result we are constrained to affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  We further agree with the statement by the court of appeals that, for 
purposes of remand, the Confrontation Clause “ ‘does not bar admission of a 
statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.’ ”  
January Term, 2007 
19 
Siler, 164 Ohio App.3d 680, 2005-Ohio-6591, 843 N.E.2d 863, ¶51, quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct.1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, fn. 9. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, and MCGRATH, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
PATRICK M. MCGRATH, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
CUPP, J. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 48} I concur in the judgment and in paragraph two of the syllabus only, 
because the majority unduly limits the primary-purpose rule stated in paragraph 
one by referring only to a “child” declarant and expands the scope of the opinion 
beyond the stated issue. 
{¶ 49} As we elaborate our understanding of Crawford v. Washington 
(2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct.1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, and our examination of 
Ohio law regarding what statements are testimonial for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, I believe we should articulate clear guidance for judges 
who must make these decisions initially.  In State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 
2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834, we declined to expand the definition of 
“testimonial statements” to include statements made to a medical professional for 
purposes of receiving medical treatment or diagnosis.  In Stahl, we adopted the 
“objective witness” formulation set forth in Crawford to discover whether 
statements were made “ ‘under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.’ ”  Stahl at ¶ 36, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct.1354, 158 
L.Ed.2d 177.  We adopted the objective-witness test not because the declarant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20
was an adult but because of the identity of the questioner—a medical 
professional, rather than a law enforcement officer. 
{¶ 50} In analyzing whether statements are testimonial, the identity of the 
questioner is the first issue to resolve.  Whenever the interrogators are members of 
law enforcement, the rule regarding any statements made by a declarant in 
response is governed by the primary-purpose test, as explained in Davis v. 
Washington (2006), ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.  If the 
primary purpose of the police questioning is to elicit statements that relate to an 
ongoing emergency, the statements are nontestimonial; if the primary purpose is 
to prove past events that relate to a potential criminal prosecution, they are 
testimonial.  I agree with paragraph two of the syllabus, which makes it clear that 
age is irrelevant when a declarant is under police interrogation.  In other words, 
the primary-purpose test is used if the police are questioning. 
{¶ 51} Assuming the questioner is not a member of law enforcement, as 
was the case in Stahl, the objective-witness standard (at least for an adult) applies: 
whether  the statement was “made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. 
{¶ 52} The majority opinion frames the issue of the instant case to set 
forth “an appropriate test for courts to apply when faced with a Sixth Amendment 
challenge to statements made by a child declarant in response to police 
interrogation.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, to the extent that the majority discusses 
consequences of statements made by children to interrogators who are not law 
enforcement, the opinion exceeds its self-imposed boundary. 
{¶ 53} In my view, it is still an open question whether children, by virtue 
of their reasoning abilities, should be subject to the objective-witness standard as 
expressed in Stahl when they are questioned by those other than police officers.  
We should hesitate to express dicta on this issue when the ramifications on any 
January Term, 2007 
21 
ruling regarding testimonial statements can be so great, particularly where the 
child is the victim as well as the witness, in,  for example, sexual abuse cases.  I 
therefore dissent as to the portion of the opinion that exceeds the issue of the 
police interrogation of children. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Ramona Francesconi Rogers, Ashland County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Joyce Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Jill E. Stone and Craig M. 
Jaquith, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee. 
Alice Anna Phillips, urging reversal for amicus curiae, American 
Prosecutors Research Institute. 
______________________