Case Title: BOS v DOLAJAK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12787 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 75 GARY B O S and STEVEN BOS, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, MIKE DOLAJAK and DOLAJAK MANUFACTURING and IRON W O R K S C O M P A N Y , INC. , a corporation, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Morgan, Bozeman, Montana Richard J. Andriolo argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: March 5, 1975 F i l e d $f3mf .-4 w lf@$ i M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This i s an appeal from a judgment entered following a jury v e r d i c t rendered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of G a l l a t i n County. From t h e record it appears t h a t p l a i n t i f f s Gary Bos and Steven Bos, contracted with defendants, Mike Dolajak and Dolajak Manufacturing C o . , Inc., r e s i d e n t s of North Dakota, f o r t h e con- s t r u c t i o n of a metal s i l o on p l a i n t i f f s ' d a i r y farm near Bozeman. P l a i n t i f f s purchased t h e s i l o secondhand from t h e manufacturer, who had repossessed it i n California s h o r t l y a f t e r it had been i n s t a l l e d t h e r e . The s i l o was dismantled and shipped t o Montana where defendants agreed t o e r e c t it f o r t h e sum of $6,500 f o r l a b o r , a l l materials t o be furnished by p l a i n t i f f s . Defendants constructed a concrete base and on June 12, 1972, Mike Dolajak a r r i v e d a t t h e Bos ranch t o personally super- v i s e t h e e r e c t i o n of t h e main portion of t h e s i l o by h i s corpor- a t i o n . The general construction procedure consisted of placing t h e top of t h e s i l o and two r i n g s on t h e base r i n g and then jack- ing t h i s portion up and adding a d d i t i o n a l r i n g s u n t i l t h e s i l o w a s completed. I n t h i s case Dolajak u t i l i z e d e i g h t i n s i d e jacks although t h e construction manual s p e c i f i c a l l y required t h e use of twelve jacks during t h e e r e c t i o n procedure i n a 36 f o o t diameter s i l o . The s i l o was suspended i n t h e a i r on cables hanging down from each jack and due t o i t s unstable nature was required t o be lowered and bolted t o t h e base r i n g i n t h e event of bad weather and a t night. During t h e e r e c t i o n of t h e s i l o one of t h e jacks broke leaving seven jacks remaining t o hold t h e approximately 20,000 pound weight of t h e s i l o . Dolajak's men had a l s o allowed t h e s i l o t o t w i s t so t h a t it could not be r e a d i l y lowered and a f f i x e d t o t h e base r i n g . Dolajak a t no t i m e made any e f f o r t t o s t a b i l i z e t h e s i l o by use of guy wires o r any o t h e r device. An expert witness f o r p l a i n t i f f s s t a t e d guy wires w e r e always u t i l i z e d as a standard construction procedure and t h a t he would not allow h i s men t o work on a job without guy wires. Also, standard construction procedures required t h a t one i n s u r e t h e s t i f f e n e r s were a t a l l times i n a l i n e ; t h a t a l l jacks were working; and, t h a t weather conditions be c l o s e l y monitored. O n t h e afternoon of June 1 6 , 1972, when t h e s i l o was approximately 60 f e e t i n t h e a i r and within a few hours of com- p l e t i o n , a windstorm developed throwing t h e s i l o off i t s founda- t i o n and v i r t u a l l y destroying it. After t h e s i l o was blown down, Dolajak returned t o North Dakota and made no attempt o r o f f e r t o a s s i s t i n removal of t h e s i l o o r t o make s p e c i f i c arrangements f o r t h e e r e c t i o n of a second s i l o . A s a r e s u l t , t h e e n t i r e decision a s t o t h e a c t i o n t o be taken was t h r u s t upon t h e shoulders of t h e Bos brothers, both a s t o removal of the o l d s i l o and any salvage, a s well a s re-erection of t h e s i l o . With t h e i r limited knowledge of construction pro- cedures, p l a i n t i f f s undertook t o remove t h e damaged s i l o and t o salvage whatever i t e m s they could. They estimated approximately 1 2 0 0 man hours were required t o complete t h e salvage and removal operation. P l a i n t i f f s were then required t o determine what addi- t i o n a l materials would be required f o r e r e c t i o n of t h e s i l o and t o secure t h e s e items. N o other used s i l o s were a v a i l a b l e a t t h e time and t o purchase a new s i l o , exclusive of t h e c o s t of e r e c t i o n , would have c o s t $40,000. P l a i n t i f f s purchased t h e m a t e r i a l s necessary f o r r e p a i r s and reconstruction of t h e s i l o . They presented proof of alleged damages i n these amounts: Costs of replacing t h e downed s i l o - $15,342.61; l o s s e s r e s u l t i n g from i n a b i l i t y t o use t h e s i l o - $9,932; a t o t a l of $25,274.61. Against t h e s e alleged damages w a s an o f f s e t of $2,900, alleged t o be t h e value of t h e concrete base which was not damaged. Plaintiffs claim the evidence clearly shows damages of $22,374.61. Defendants admit to damages in the maximum total of $8.695.60, arrived at by taking the value of the silo before it was damaged, and subtracting the salvage value. The jury awarded $17,626.75. Defendantst motion for new trial was denied and defendants appeal. Defendants contend the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the general measure of damages in tort and contract actions; that the damages awarded are excessive under the law and the court's instructions; and that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. Defendants claim that in order to find damages in the amount set by the jury it had to make an award for consequential damages, such as the loss of milk production, corn spoilage, baling hay and rolling feed, and the jury did this because of the court's instructions allowing it to consider general damages as a result of negligence and also breach of contract. They in- sist the court should have instructed the jury solely on the appropriate measure of damages for damage to, or destruction of, personal property. The court gave these instructions, over defendants1 ob- jection: "You are instructed that for the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for a11 the detriment prox- imately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom." This instruction follows Montana's statute, section 17-301, R . C . M . 1947. "Every person who suffers detriment from the negligent act or omission of another person may recover from him a compensation therefor in money which is called damages. In this case detriment is t h e l o s s o r harm suffered. The measure of damages is t h e amount which w i l l compensate f o r a l l t h e detriment proximately caused thereby hereinbefore defined, whether it could have been a n t i c i p a t e d o r not." This i n s t r u c t i o n follows Montana's s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 17- 4 0 1 , R.C.M. 1947. Defendants offered two i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e measure of damages, one where t h e property could not be repaired and t h e other where it could. These were refused, but t h e c o u r t did give an abbreviated version of one of t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , which read : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e owner is not e n t i t l e d t o have property put back i n t o b e t t e r condition than before t h e damage. Nor i s t h e owner e n t i t l e d t o be compensated f o r l o s s of use beyond t h e time reasonably required t o complete t h e necessary r e p a i r s . "The amount awarded, i f any, may not exceed t h e value of t h e property j u s t before it was damaged. " While it i s defendants contention t h a t i n Spdckman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 506, 509, 510, 4 1 4 P.2d 918, t h i s Court c l e a r l y delineated t h e proper measure of damages f o r damage t o personal property, t h i s quotation i s a p t here: " A s f o r t h e i s s u e of compensatory damages, t h e question is always a d i f f i c u l t one. I n t o r t a c t i o n s , t h e wrongdoer is l i a b l e , i n general, f o r any i n j u r y which i s t h e n a t u r a l and probable consequence of t h e wrong. These may include both t h e d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t , but reasonably probable, r e s u l t s of t h e wrong. Where damage t o property is concerned, t h e purpose of awarding damages i s t o r e t u r n t h e p a r t y injured t o t h e same, o r a s nearly possible t h e same, condition a s he enjoyed before t h e i n j u r y t o h i s property. The injured p a r t y is t o be made a s nearly whole a s possible--but not t o r e a l i z e a p r o f i t . Compensatory damages a r e de- signed t o compensate t h e injured p a r t y f o r a c t u a l l o s s o r injury--no more, no l e s s . " The t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s based upon s e c t i o n s 17-301 and 17-401, R.C.M. 1947, i l l u s t r a t e t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a - t u r e t o insure t h a t one who i s injured by t h e wrongful a c t of a r l u ~ h e r , w l l e t k r L I ; be 3 aegligel-it a c t o r a breach 02 c o n t r a c t , baa a r i g h t t o recover such damages a s w i l l make him whole a g a i n . 'This b a s i c o b j e c t i v e of making t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y whole must now be a p p l i e d t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . A t t h e o u t s e t , t h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s a unique f a c t u a l sit- u a t i o n . The testimony i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e Bos b r o t h e r s w e r e d a i r y farmers and t h e i n h e r e n t n a t u r e o f t h e i r o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e s an i n t e g r a t e d program of c r o p production, s t o r a g e , and f e e d i n g which must be decided upon p r i o r t o t h e s p r i n g growing season and implemented a t t h e t i n e of s p r i n g p l a n t i n g . I n a n t i c i p a t i o n of t n e scheduled completion o f t h e s i l o p l a i n t i f f s had programmed t h e i r d a i r y farming o p e r a t i o n t o g a i n maximum c r o p production aild maximum u t i l i z a t i o n o f t h e s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s . T h i s program, once under way, could n o t be turned on and o f f l i k e a w a t e r t a p and s e r i o u s problems a r o s e when d e f e n d a n t s ' wrongful a c t i o n s saused t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e s i l o . The s i l o which defendants were t o e r e c t was an i t e m of property with s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t could n o t be r e p l a c e d the next day a t t h e l o c a l hardware s t o r e o r automobile d e a l e r s h i p . This was t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t t h e d i s m a n t l i n g and r e - e r e c t i o n of a s i l o of t h i s type had been attempted, and p l a i n t i f f s were a b l e t o a c q u i r e t h e s i l o a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e s a v i n g s . Due t o t h e success of t h e o p e r a t i o n t h e market value a t t h e t i m e of i t s d e s t r u c t i o n f a r exceeded t h e a c t u a l c o s t investment. N o o t h e r used s i l o s were a v a i l a b l e and t h e p r i c e r e q u i r e d f o r purchase of a new s i l o was $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . Due t o p l a i n t i f f s ' e f f o r t s an arrangement was made where- by they could a c q u i r e t h e m a t e r i a l s needed i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e salvaged from t h e downed s i l o a t a f o r t y p e r c e n t d i s c o u n t . Another f a c t o r is t h e need f o r removal of t h e downed s i l o . This was r e q u i r e d s o t h a t t h e foundation could be u t i l i z e d f o r t h e r e - e r e c t i o n of t h e s i l o and s o t h a t a s many p a r t s a s p o s s i b l e could be salvaged t o minimize t h e c o s t of re-erecting t h e s i l o . I n view of t h e condition of t h e downed s i l o and t h e unusual stresses placed upon t h e material, t h e dismantling of it was an extremely hazardous operation. F i n a l l y , defendants would not r e t u r n t o re-erect t h e s i l o and no other experienced builders could be found with a v a i l - a b l e time t o do t h e re-erection. P l a i n t i f f s determined t h a t i n order t o minimize t h e i r damages they had no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o undertake t h e job of e r e c t i n g t h e s i l o on t h e i r own with t h e help of neighbors. P l a i n t i f f s brought t h i s a c t i o n seeking damages from de- fendants on t h e b a s i s of breach of c o n t r a c t and negligence. A s p e c i f i c c o n t r a c t was entered i n t o f o r t h e e r e c t i o n of t h e s i l o i n a good and workmanlike manner. The performance of t h e work r e - quired under t h i s c o n t r a c t was never completed. Further, defend- a n t s were negligent i n t h e manner i n which they undertook t o per- form t h e e r e c t i o n c o n t r a c t , which negligence was t h e proximate cause of t h e destruction and l o s s of t h e s i l o . Under t h i s f a c t s i t u a t i o n p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d t o go t o t h e jury with i n s t r u c - t i o n s on damages r e l a t i n g both t o breach of c o n t r a c t and t o neg- ligence. Gunderson v. B r e w s t e r , 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589. The c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e measure of damages i n a c o n t r a c t a c t i o n i s i n t h e words of section 17-301, R.C.M. 1947, and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n f o r damages i n a noncontract a c t i o n i s i n t h e words of s e c t i o n 17-401, R.C.M. 1947, and Montana Jury Instruc- t i o n Guide I n s t r u c t i o n No. 30 except t h a t t h e word "unlawful" has been changed t o t h e word "negligent". C i t i n g Spackman defendants contend the property damage i n s t r u c t i o n is t h e same whether we a r e t a l k i n g about a t o r t o r c o n t r a c t case--i.e.--the value of t h e property immediately before, less t h e salvage value, o r t h e value t h a t it would take t o r e p a i r it, p l u s t h e l o s s of use, not t o exceed t h e value of t h e property immediately preceding t h e dam- age. This r u l e is c o r r e c t under a f a c t s i t u a t i o n such a s e x i s t e d i n Spackman, when dealing with r e a d i l y replaceable items with an established market value. Such a r u l e is c l e a r l y not applicable when dealing with a f i x t u r e , a s t h e s i l o i n t h e i n s t a n t case, which i s not r e a d i l y replaceable and which has no estab- l i s h e d market value and i s programmed a s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of a t o t a l d a i r y farming operation. Defendant Dolajak was w e l l aware of t h i s and of t h e damages which would r e s u l t from l o s s of use of t h e s i l o a s he a l s o owns and operates a d a i r y farm i n North Dakota. I n Spackman t h i s Court s t a t e d i n dealing with formulas f o r t h e determination of damages: "While such methods serve a s u s e f u l guides, t h e f i n a l answer r e s t s i n good sense r a t h e r than mechanical a p p l i c a t i o n of such formulas." I n Spackman t h i s Court f u r t h e r recognized d i f f e r e n t r u l e s f o r property which has no market value when it s t a t e d : "One f u r t h e r note i n t h e area of compensatory damages r e l a t e s t o property which, because of its peculiar nature, has no market value. I n such cases, reference can be made t o t h e value placed on such an item by i t s owner, so long a s such valuation is not f a n c i f u l o r unreasonable. Prop- e r t y within t h i s category, f o r example, would be clothing, luggage, heirlooms o r p o r t r a i t s . " See a l s o 22 Am J u r 2d, Damages S 1 4 9 . I n Reynolds v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assln, 53 Cal.2d 49, 345 P.2d 9 2 6 , 927, 73 ALR2d 716, c i t e d with approval by t h i s Court i n S t a h l v. Farmers Union O i l Co., 145 Mont. 1 0 6 , 1 1 4 , 399 P.2d 763, t h e s o l e i s s u e before t h e Court was whether t h e owner of personal property which was wrongfully destroyed i s limited i n damages t o t h e value of t h e property a t t h e t i m e of d e s t r u c t i o n o r may he a l s o recover f o r t h e l o s s of use during t h e period reasonably required f o r replacement. The C a l i f o r n i a court held such l o s s of use recoverable i n addition t o t h e value of t h e property destroyed s t a t i n g : "There appears t o be no l o g i c a l o r p r a c t i c a l reason why a d i s t i n c t i o n should be d r a m be- tween cases i n which the property i s t o t a l l y destroyed and those i n which it has been in- jured but i s r e p a i r a b l e , and we have concluded t h a t when t h e owner of a negligently destroyed commercial vehicle has suffered i n j u r y by being deprived of t h e use of t h e vehicle during t h e period required f o r replacement, he i s e n t i t l e d , upon proper pleading and proof, t o recover f o r l o s s of use i n order t o 'compensate f o r a l l t h e detriment proximately caused' by t h e wrongful destruction." Here, by use of e i t h e r t e s t t h e v e r d i c t of t h e jury is reasonable and c o r r e c t . The evidence i n t h e record established t h a t p l a i n t i f f s had acquired a secondhand s i l o which was equiv- a l e n t t o a new s i l o a t a considerable savings. Thus, t h e jury could q u i t e properly f i n d t h a t t h e "market value'' ( a c t u a l value) of t h e s i l o a t t h e time of t h e l o s s was between $30,000 and $40,000. 22 Am J u r 2d, Damages 5142. The jury then awarded plain- t i f f s t h e replacement c o s t of t h e s i l o , together with t h e damages which they had incurred f o r t h e l o s s of use thereof l e s s an o f f - set of approximately $2,900 t o t h e defendants f o r construction of t h e foundation. The j u r y ' s v e r d i c t was eminently f a i r and reasonable. The cases of Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable O i l & Feed Co., 1 2 6 Mont. 415, 252 P.2d 1 0 4 0 , and McGuire v. Nelson, 1 6 2 Mont. 3 7 , 508 P.2d 558, c i t e d by defendants a r e c l e a r l y not applicable t o t h e present f a c t s i t u a t i o n . This is not a case involving any breach of an express o r implied warranty. It i s our opinion t h a t t h e damages awarded by t h e jury were reasonable under t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e court and t h e l a w applicable. W e come now t o a determination of whether t h e r e is sub- s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t and judgment. Kirby v. Kelly, 161 Mont. 6 6 , 504 P.2d 683. I n making t h i s determination t h e evidence is t o be reviewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o the p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , being t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s cause. Rogers v. Hilger Chevrolet Co., 155 Mont. 1, 465 P.2d 834; ~ o l e n s t e i n v . Rndrews, Mont . - (1975), 530 P.2d 476, 32 St.Rep, 4 1 . W e do f i n d t h e v e r d i c t is supported by s u b s t a n t i a l cred- i b l e evidence and t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s affirmed. Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: /-