Case Title: Buck v. Mueller

Citation: 207 Or. 169, 293 P.2d 736

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1956-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed February 23, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied March 21, 1956.
*170 E.R. Robnett, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Easley & Whipple, Portland.
George P. Winslow, Tillamook, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Winslow & Winslow, Tillamook.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LATOURETTE and PERRY, Justices.
REVERSED.
PERRY, J.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for breach of a covenant in an executed lease granting him an option to re-lease the property of the defendant.
The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained by the trial court, and the plaintiff has appealed.
The plaintiff's complaint, insofar as it is pertinent to this opinion, alleges the following:
*172 The lease set out in the complaint provides, among other matters, the following:
The defendant contends that the two clauses above referred to are so repugnant to each other that they cannot be harmonized, and, this being so, the clause in the lease providing that "should first party desire to re-rent the property," etc., appearing first in the lease must prevail over the absolute option clause. If this contention of defendant is sustained, then the plaintiff *173 has only a qualified right to the first acceptance or rejection of the use of the premises should the lessor desire to re-rent the premises, and no cause of action is stated.
1. We cannot agree with defendant's contention. In Dellwo v. Edwards, 73 Or 316, 323, 144 P 441, we stated:
2. The two covenants in the lease refer to different situations. The option clause, if exercised, binds the lessee to a three-year term, the length of which might, when the time came to exercise the option, be deemed by the optionee greater than he desired; while the first clause permits him, should he not exercise the option, the first refusal of the use of the premises should the lessor desire to re-rent upon such terms and for such length of time as might be agreed upon between the parties.
The defendant also seeks to sustain the trial court's ruling upon the demurrer on the ground that the complaint does not set forth facts showing a wrongful eviction of the defendant sufficient to deprive him of the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the premises.
3. We do not construe the complaint as one seeking damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, but as complaining of the breach of the covenant to renew the lease. "An action for damages for the *174 breach of an agreement for a lease by the other party may be maintained by the lessor or by the lessee, provided the plaintiff is not himself in default." 32 Am Jur 53, Landlord and Tenant § 31. See also 3 Thompson, Real Property, (perm ed) 284, § 1212.
This cause is reversed; the order of the trial court is set aside with instructions to overrule the demurrer.