Case Title: Ex Parte Casey

Citation: 852 So. 2d 175

Docket Number: 1001555

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
852 So. 2d 175 (2002)
Ex parte Nathan Sherman CASEY.
(Re Nathan Casey v. State of Alabama).
1001555.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 22, 2002.
Rehearing Denied May 31, 2002.
*176 Nathan Sherman Casey, pro se.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
WOODALL, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether convictions as to which a "full" pardon has been given can be used for sentence-enhancement purposes under the Habitual Felony Offender Act. We hold that a full pardon precludes such use of the pardoned convictions. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In 1982, Nathan Casey was convicted of first-degree robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole. His sentence was enhanced upon application of the Habitual Felony Offender Act because he had six prior convictions for forgery. In 1999, Casey filed his third Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. He alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence and that the sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law. Casey argued that the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles had granted him a "full and unconditional pardon" as to his six forgery convictions, and he argued that that pardon prevented the use of those convictions for sentence-enhancement purposes under the Habitual Felony Offender Act.
The trial court found no merit in Casey's petition and summarily denied the petition. Casey appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. On April 28, 2000, the Court of Criminal Appeals released an opinion holding that the pardoned convictions could not be used for sentence enhancement under the Habitual Felony Offender Act and remanding the case to the trial court for resentencing without any enhancement based on the forgery convictions. However, on the State's application for rehearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals withdrew its April 28, 2000, opinion and substituted a new opinion, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Casey v. State, 852 So. 2d 168 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).
On certiorari review, this Court has determined that the April 28, 2000, opinion released by the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly identified and applied the controlling precedents. The judgment of the trial court and the opinion of the Court of *177 Criminal Appeals on rehearing relied on Mason v. State, 39 Ala.App. 1, 103 So. 2d 337 (1956), aff'd, 267 Ala. 507, 103 So. 2d 341 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 934, 79 S. Ct. 323, 3 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1959), which was overruled by State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340 (Ala.1991), and on Johnson v. State, 421 So. 2d 1306 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982), which was based solely on the later-rejected rationale of Mason.
In its initial opinion, written by Presiding Judge McMillan, the Court of Criminal Appeals provided the following well-reasoned and clearly written analysis of the effect of a pardon upon the use of the pardoned convictions for sentence-enhancement purposes:
"580 So. 2d  at 1342. The Supreme Court reasoned further:
"Id. at 1342-45. (Footnote omitted.)
"Applying this aforestated legal authority to the facts of this case, we conclude that a remand for resentencing is in order. However, it need be noted that:
"Hooper v. State, 585 So. 2d 133, 136-37 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). See also Ex parte Grantham, 613 So. 2d 1260 (Ala.1993).
"Here, the pardon restored not only the appellant's civil and political rights, but also removed any legal disabilities incurred as a result of his prior felony convictions. Thus, the trial court erred in considering evidence of the pardoned *181 convictions for enhancement purposes. See, e.g. Murray v. State of Louisiana, 347 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.1965). As this Court held in Love v. State, 681 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Ala.Cr.App.1996):
We adopt Judge McMillan's analysis in the Court of Criminal Appeals' April 28, 2000, opinion as the opinion of this Court. State ex rel. Sokira is the controlling precedent, and this Court's holding in that case compels the conclusion that the pardon blotted out of existence Casey's guilt with respect to the pardoned convictions, making him, in the eye of the law, a new and an innocent man. Therefore, the pardoned convictions cannot be used to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Felony Offender Act. The contrary holdings by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Bush v. State, 421 So. 2d 1352 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), and Johnson v. State, supra, are overruled.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., dissent.
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority opinion for several reasons. First, the opinion relies on State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340 (Ala.1991), which in turn relies on the United States Supreme Court cases of United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160, 8 L. Ed. 640 (1833), in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote "[a] pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed," and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1866), in which Justice Field asserted:
Both Wilson and Ex parte Garland involved Presidential pardons, which under the United States Constitution are completely unrestricted, except as to impeachment, and may be granted at any time before or after conviction of a crime. A *182 pardon under the laws of the State of Alabama is fundamentally different from a Presidential pardon. Amendment No. 38 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901 removed the power to pardon from the executive branchthe governorand gave it to the Legislature, which in turn authorized the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant pardons, subject to the restrictions established by the Legislature. § 15-22-36, Ala.Code 1975.
Amendment No. 38 provides: "No pardon shall relieve from civil and political disabilities unless specifically expressed in the pardon." A pardon in Alabama, unlike a Presidential pardon, is clearly not unrestricted or unconditional. To the contrary, a pardon under our State constitution, as amended, is restricted or conditional according to the terms specifically expressed in the pardon.
The Alabama Legislature further restricted when a pardon may be granted. Section 15-22-36(a) provides: "In all cases, except treason and impeachment and cases in which sentence of death is imposed and not commuted, as is provided by law, the Board of Pardons and Paroles shall have the authority and power, after conviction and not otherwise, to grant pardons and paroles and to remit fines and forfeitures." This subsection expresses the Legislature's intent that there be a conviction before there can be a pardon; nowhere in § 15-22-36(a) is the extinguishment of a conviction provided for. Subsection (c) further restricts the power to pardon:
(Emphasis added.)
These two subsections(a) and (c)express conditions on the timing of pardons and express the legislative intent that a pardon remove the requirement that the balance of the punishment for a crime be served but not that it remove or expunge the fact of the conviction itself.[1] Subsection (c) additionally identifies two kinds of pardons available in Alabama: a regular pardon and a pardon on the ground of innocence.
Casey argues that the pardon he received in 1974 was a "full and unconditional pardon" under Alabama law. Even a pardon on the ground of innocence is a conditional pardon. Casey's certificate of pardon itself does not state that it is a "full and unconditional" pardon. It states:
Nowhere does the certificate of pardon state that Casey is relieved of the future consequences of the Alabama Habitual Offender Act. Further, the fact that a person lacks a conviction is not commonly thought of or referred to as a "civil or political right." There is nothing in the certificate of pardon or in the statutes or in Alabama caselaw as it existed in 1974 that indicates that the Board of Pardons and Paroles intended for a certificate of pardon to extinguish the defendant's conviction and to make it unusable for purposes of sentence enhancement under the provisions of the Alabama Habitual Offender Act.
The majority opinion states: "State ex rel. Sokira is the controlling precedent, and this Court's holding in that case compels the conclusion that the pardon blotted out of existence Casey's guilt with respect to the pardoned convictions, making him, in the eye of the law, a new and an innocent man. Therefore, the pardoned convictions cannot be used to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Felony Offender Act." I disagree with the holding of State ex rel. Sokira; however, even if I agreed with it, I would disagree that the holding in Sokira "compels the conclusion that the pardon blotted out of existence Casey's guilt." While the Court in Sokira quoted from United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 8 L. Ed. 640 (1833), and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1866), as heretofore noted, it did not hold that an Alabama pardon "blots out of existence the guilt." Sokira involved the issue whether Rolen Henry Burr, who had pleaded guilty to the crime of distilling in 1962 and who was sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a day in the state penitentiary and who was pardoned in 1964 with the express restoration of his civil and political rights, was disqualified from holding the office of mayor. (Holding elective office is generally considered a political right.) Notably, Burr's certificate of pardon was worded differently from Casey's. It stated as follows:
580 So. 2d  at 1341 (emphasis added). Justice Maddox, writing for the Court in Sokira, stated the Court's holding as follows:
580 So. 2d  at 1344-45.
Finally, the provisions of the Alabama Habitual Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, as originally adopted, provided for enhanced penalties "[i]n all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any felony and after such conviction has committed another felony...." (Emphasis added.) Section 13A-5-9 was amended effective May 25, 2000, to apply in cases where a defendant has been "previously convicted of a felony." (Emphasis added.) The statute does not say "any" or "a" felony other than the one for which the defendant has received a pardon. This section does not punish a defendant for a past offense, but merely increases his punishment for his most recent offense. Tate v. State, 435 So. 2d 190 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).
The majority makes a tremendous leap, well beyond the position taken by the Sokira court, in holding that Casey's pardon "blotted out of existence Casey's guilt" with respect to the pardoned convictions, "making him, in the eye of the law, a new and an innocent man." It does so based not on Alabama statutes or even on Alabama caselaw but rather on 19th century United States Supreme Court cases dealing with Presidential pardons. Judge Harwood properly warned of applying such sweeping language to a different fact situation. In Mason v. State, 39 Ala.App. 1, 103 So. 2d 337 (1956), he noted:
39 Ala.App. at 3-4, 103 So. 2d  at 339-40.
The Sokira Court readopted this Court's earlier decision in Hogan v. Hartwell, 242 *185 Ala. 646, 7 So. 2d 889 (1942), finding it to be better reasoned than Mason, supra. It also expressly reversed the holding of Sumbry v. State ex rel. Grant, 562 So. 2d 224 (Ala.1990), in which the Court held that a pardon does not restore to one pardoned the eligibility to hold public office. The Sokira Court also distinguished Randolph County v. Thompson, 502 So. 2d 357 (Ala.1987). It did not overrule the language of Randolph County that "`in Alabama, a pardon eliminates neither the fact of conviction nor the moral guilt accompanying the conviction....'" 562 So. 2d  at 226 (quoting Randolph County, 502 So.2d at 366). Until today this has been the law of this State in cases where a pardon is granted on a basis other than innocence; it should remain the law for the reasons I have stated. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals expressed in its opinion on rehearing.
SEE, J., concurs.
[1]  Subsection (e)(1), which was added by Act No. 83-750, Ala. Acts 1983, enumerates the crimes for which a pardon may not be granted.