Case Title: Commonwealth v. Comenzo

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13119

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13119 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD COMENZO. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 6, 2021. – February 11, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Electronic Surveillance.  Privacy.  Constitutional Law, Search 
and seizure, Privacy, Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, 
Electronic surveillance, Expectation of privacy.  Probable 
Cause.  Obscenity, Child pornography.  Practice, Criminal, 
Motion to suppress, Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 30, 2014, and May 1, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 
C. Cosgrove, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered 
by him. 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
Patrick J. Noonan (Scott M. Martin also present) for the 
defendant. 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anna E. Lumelsky, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
Matthew Spurlock & David Rangaviz, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, Jessie J. Rossman, & Matthew R. Segal, for 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Richard Comenzo, who was 
indicted on child pornography charges, sought to suppress 
evidence obtained after surveillance was conducted at his 
apartment building via a hidden video camera placed on a nearby 
public utility pole (pole camera).  In Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 
Mass. 360, 376 (2020), we determined that, in certain 
circumstances, pole camera surveillance could constitute a 
search requiring a warrant under art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  Because surveillance of this kind 
previously was conducted without the need for a warrant prior to 
our decision in Mora, we resolved that, where a defendant 
challenges warrantless pole camera surveillance and such 
surveillance indeed constituted a search pursuant to art. 14, 
the Commonwealth should be afforded an opportunity to 
demonstrate that the surveillance nevertheless was lawful.  
Mora, supra. 
 
As Mora was decided after the surveillance at issue in this 
case took place but before the instant motion to suppress the 
pole camera footage was decided in the Superior Court, the 
parties submitted briefing in light of Mora to the judge hearing 
the motion.  That judge denied the defendant's motion, and the 
3 
 
defendant sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  A 
single justice of this court granted the application and allowed 
the appeal to proceed before the full court.  We conclude that, 
although the pole camera surveillance constituted a warrantless 
search, it was nevertheless constitutional.  We therefore affirm 
the order denying the motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
as a result of the pole camera surveillance.1 
Background.  1.  Procedural posture.  In 2014, the 
defendant was indicted on one count of possession of child 
pornography and one count of dissemination of child pornography.  
He moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search 
warrant.  A Superior Court judge allowed the motion as to items 
seized from the defendant's car but denied it as to items seized 
from the defendant's apartment. 
Two and one-half years later, the defendant was indicted on 
an additional count of possession of child pornography.  The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, alleging that 
the search warrant affidavit improperly relied on information 
derived from pole camera surveillance undertaken without a 
warrant, and therefore was unconstitutional.  A second Superior 
Court judge (motion judge) held an evidentiary hearing.  While 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General and by the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc., the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
the motion was under advisement, this court released Mora, 485 
Mass. 360, with guidance for analyzing warrantless pole camera0 
surveillance.  The motion judge ultimately denied the motion 
after the parties submitted supplemental briefing applying the 
Mora analysis.  The interlocutory appeal was transferred here to 
the full court by the single justice. 
2.  Facts.  The facts as found by the judges who presided 
over the two motion hearings may be summarized as follows.2  In 
2013, a detective with the Norfolk County district attorney's 
detective unit received information from the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children that tips had come in concerning 
images posted by a user on Tumblr, a microblogging3 and social 
networking website.  Upon investigation, the detective concluded 
that two of the reported images constituted child pornography.  
The blog's Internet protocol (IP) address was traced to a 
Verizon Internet Services Inc. (Verizon) account.  Through the 
use of an administrative subpoena, the detective determined that 
the account was registered to the defendant, and the address 
 
2 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept a 
judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 40 (2019). 
 
3 Microblogging is defined as "blogging done with severe 
space or size constraints typically by posting frequent brief 
messages about personal activities."  Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/microblogging [https://perma.cc/NX47-LPST]. 
5 
 
associated with the account was a three-level, multifamily 
dwelling. 
Surveillance of the dwelling revealed a relationship 
between the defendant's arrivals or departures and the operation 
of lights in certain areas of the building.  Based on these 
observations, investigators were able to determine that the 
defendant's apartment was either one of two units.  Because 
investigators were unable to identify further the defendant's 
unit through "conventional" surveillance techniques,4 on 
September 19, 2014, a pole camera was installed to facilitate 
additional surveillance of the building.5 
The pole camera was placed across the street from the 
building and provided a view of the front entrance, the left 
side of the building, and the driveway.6  It was equipped with 
video recording features that enabled police to monitor activity 
 
4 For example, investigators requested information via an 
administrative subpoena from National Grid.  The apartment 
number provided by National Grid differed from the apartment 
number provided by Verizon.  Additionally, the investigators 
found that none of the mailboxes in the common area of the 
building was labeled with the defendant's name, and an inquiry 
to the United States Postal Service further revealed that the 
defendant did not receive mail at the residence. 
 
5 The camera was installed without a warrant as was 
customary at that time. 
 
6 The camera was placed approximately eighty-two feet from 
the front door of the building and approximately ninety-four 
feet from the left of the building. 
6 
 
in real time, or to review footage that was searchable by date 
and time.  While an investigator watching live footage remotely 
could move the camera lens approximately forty-five degrees in 
each direction and zoom in or pan out, all recordings were 
limited to the view captured in real time and could have been 
viewed by a person physically present at the scene. 
On a review of the pole camera footage, investigators were 
able to determine which unit belonged to the defendant, and 
subsequently sought a search warrant.7  On October 6, 2014, a 
judge issued a search warrant.  The following day, the 
defendant's unit was searched pursuant to the warrant, and the 
defendant's computer and hard drives were confiscated. 
Discussion.  Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable governmental 
searches and seizures without a warrant.  As noted supra, law 
enforcement officers routinely employed pole camera surveillance 
without the need for a warrant; however, since our decision in 
Mora, we have required judges to consider the constitutionality 
 
7 The search warrant affidavit did not mention the pole 
camera surveillance, but it did include the location of the 
defendant's unit, which was obtained as a result of reviewing 
the footage of the surveillance. 
 
7 
 
of such warrantless searches under art. 14.8  See Mora, 485 Mass. 
at 376. 
Whether the use of a pole camera without a warrant is 
unconstitutional depends on (1) whether it was a search under 
art. 14 and, if so, (2) whether there was probable cause to 
conduct the search at the time it began.  Mora, 485 Mass. at 
376-377.  The defendant has the initial burden to establish that 
a search implicating art. 14 has taken place.  Id. at 366.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 490 (2007) ("To succeed on 
appeal, [the defendant] must bear the threshold burden of 
showing that a warrantless search or seizure occurred").  See 
also Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 711, 714 (1986).  The 
Commonwealth then has the burden to show that the warrantless 
search was nevertheless lawful by demonstrating there was 
probable cause to conduct the pole camera surveillance search 
prior to its initiation.  Mora, supra at 376-377. 
1.  Whether the surveillance constituted an art. 14 search.  
"[A] search in the constitutional sense occurs when the 
government's conduct intrudes on a person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy."  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 
230, 241-242 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 
 
8 Because the United States Supreme Court has yet to 
consider the constitutional implications of prolonged, targeted 
pole camera surveillance, we decide this issue solely based on 
our State Constitution.  See Mora, 485 Mass. at 365. 
8 
 
(2015), citing Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 
(1991).  A reasonable expectation of privacy has both subjective 
and objective components.  See Augustine, supra at 242.  "An 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy where (i) the 
individual has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the object of the search, and (ii) society is willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 497 (2020). 
Here, where the defendant filed an affidavit averring that 
he was unaware that a pole camera was monitoring the front of 
his residence and that he did not expect police to monitor his 
comings and goings by way of that camera, he has satisfied the 
subjective expectation requirement.  See Mora, 485 Mass. at 367 
("While people subjectively may lack an expectation of privacy 
in some discrete actions they undertake in unshielded areas 
around their homes, they do not expect that every such action 
will be observed and perfectly preserved for the future"). 
Whether an expectation of privacy is one that society 
accepts as reasonable depends on the circumstances, including 
"whether the public had access to, or might be expected to be 
in, the area from which the surveillance was undertaken; the 
character of the area (or object) that was the subject of the 
surveillance; and whether the defendant has taken normal 
precautions to protect his or her privacy."  Mora, 485 Mass. at 
9 
 
368, quoting Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 42 n.10 
(2019).  We have been clear that pole cameras trained on a 
suspect's home are "of greater constitutional significance" than 
those directed at public spaces.  Mora, supra at 369. 
Here the pole camera, which was placed across the street 
from the defendant's residence, captured footage of the 
residence's exterior, including the front entrance, the left 
side of the building, and the driveway over the course of 
approximately fifteen days.9  "[T]argeted long-term pole camera 
surveillance of the area surrounding a residence has the 
capacity to invade the security of the home," as it "captures 
. . . revealing interactions at the threshold of a person's 
private and public life."  Mora, 485 Mass. at 371, 373.  The 
camera allowed investigators either to monitor the defendant in 
real time as he arrived to and departed from the residence, or 
to search the footage by date and time.  Thus, the investigators 
had the "ability to 'pick out and identify individual, sensitive 
 
9 The defendant argues that the search lasted for seventeen 
days, which was the total length of time the pole camera had 
been in place.  In contrast, the Commonwealth contends that 
because there were two days during which the camera 
malfunctioned and because the camera remained in place two days 
after the search warrant was executed, the surveillance instead 
lasted a total of thirteen days.  In our view, the correct 
calculation is fifteen days (the number of days the camera was 
in place prior to execution of the search warrant).  However, 
regardless of whether we consider the number of days to be 
thirteen, fifteen, or seventeen, our analysis remains the same. 
10 
 
moments that would otherwise be lost to the natural passage of 
time.'"  Id. at 375, quoting Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain 
Sight:  A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government 
Surveillance in Public, 66 Emory L.J. 527, 603 (2017).  We 
conclude that under these circumstances the defendant's 
expectation of privacy was reasonable; thus, the pole camera 
surveillance constituted a search under art. 14. 
2.  Whether there was probable cause to conduct the search.  
As discussed supra, where a warrantless pole camera surveillance 
is determined to be a search under art. 14, there must have been 
probable cause to conduct the search before the surveillance 
began in order for the search to be constitutional.  See Mora, 
485 Mass. at 376-377.  That is, the Commonwealth must 
demonstrate that there was probable cause to believe that a 
particular offense had been, was being, or was about to be 
committed, and that the pole camera surveillance undertaken 
would produce evidence of the offense or that it would aid in 
the apprehension of the suspect.  See id. at 377, citing 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 255-256. 
We conclude, as did the motion judge, that the requisite 
probable cause existed to conduct the pole camera surveillance 
prior to the time the search began.  First, there is no question 
that the Commonwealth had probable cause to believe that an 
individual at that location had been engaged in the distribution 
11 
 
of child pornography.  As described supra, the investigation 
began when the police received a tip concerning images 
constituting child pornography posted online.  Officers traced 
the IP address to a computer located at the defendant's street 
address, and from a Verizon account registered to the defendant.  
Thus, detectives had amassed enough evidence to establish 
probable cause that a crime had been committed by the defendant. 
As for the second prong of the test, police had probable 
cause to believe that the pole camera surveillance would lead to 
additional evidence of the crime, including, but not limited to, 
determining the defendant's unit number so that they could apply 
for a search warrant.  As the motion judge pointed out, the 
Commonwealth could not identify the defendant's apartment even 
after having conducted physical surveillance, which, the judge 
found, had to be curtailed to avoid risk of detection. 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, the order denying 
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result 
of the surveillance via a pole camera is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.