Case Title: Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-3914

Docket Number: 2011-0181

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3914.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3914 
RUMPKE SANITARY LANDFILL, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES, v. COLERAIN  
TWP. ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3914.] 
Zoning—Public utilities’ exemption from township zoning—R.C. 519.211—
Factors for determining status as public utility. 
(No. 2011-0181—Submitted February 7, 2012—Decided September 5, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-090223. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt 
from township zoning when there is no public regulation or oversight of 
its rates and charges, no statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid 
waste delivered to the landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the 
public to demand and receive its services. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we decide whether a private sanitary landfill is a 
public utility that is exempt from township zoning regulations pursuant to R.C. 
519.211.  For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a private sanitary landfill is 
not a public utility and is therefore subject to township zoning regulations.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the trial court for trial. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellant Colerain Township is a governmental entity in Hamilton 
County, Ohio with all the rights, privileges, and duties imposed upon it by R.C. 
Title 5.  Appellant Colerain Township Board of Trustees, through the elected 
trustees Bernard A. Feideldey, Keith N. Corman, and Jeff Ritter, is the legislative 
administrative body responsible for governing Colerain Township under R.C. 
Title 5.  Colerain Township and the Colerain Township Board of Trustees 
(collectively, “Colerain Township”) adopted a set of zoning regulations for the 
township, which are embodied in the Colerain Township Zoning Resolution. 
{¶ 3} Appellee Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. and its subsidiaries 
operate a sanitary landfill in Colerain Township.  Rumpke, along with appellees 
Charles and John Stoeppel as trustees and Claire Stepaniak, are the owners of the 
disputed property, approximately 350 acres located between Hughes Road, 
Interstate 275, and Buell Road in Colerain Township. 
{¶ 4} The present action is not the parties’ first dispute regarding zoning 
of Rumpke’s property.  Rumpke also owns adjacent property used for the disposal 
of household and commercial waste.  In 1999, Rumpke and others who are not 
parties to the present litigation applied for a change in zoning of the adjacent 
property.  The Colerain Township Board of Trustees rejected the recommendation 
of the Colerain Township Zoning Commission to approve the application.  
Rumpke filed a lawsuit against Colerain Township contesting the constitutionality 
January Term, 2012 
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of the zoning and claiming damages.  The case was settled by an agreed judgment 
entry and consent decree. 
{¶ 5} In March 2006, Rumpke applied to change the existing zoning of 
the disputed property so that Rumpke could expand its landfill.  The Hamilton 
County Regional Planning Commission recommended the rezoning requested by 
Rumpke, but the Colerain Township Zoning Commission recommended that the 
Colerain Township Board of Trustees deny the proposed rezoning.  Following 
public hearings, Colerain Township denied Rumpke’s application. 
{¶ 6} After Colerain Township denied the application, Rumpke filed a 
complaint against Colerain Township, the Colerain Township Board of Trustees, 
and the individual township trustees for a declaratory judgment, compensation for 
the unconstitutional taking of property, and mandamus.  Rumpke later amended 
its complaint to request a declaratory judgment that it “is a public utility and 
under R.C. 519.211, the operation of * * * [its] existing landfill and its proposed 
expansion * * * are not subject to Colerain Township’s zoning authority.” 
{¶ 7} Both Colerain Township and Rumpke filed motions for summary 
judgment on the issue of whether Rumpke is a public utility exempt from zoning.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rumpke, holding that 
“Rumpke Sanitary Landfill is a public utility, not subject to the zoning restrictions 
of Colerain Township, Ohio.” 
{¶ 8} On April 1, 2009, Colerain Township appealed to the First District 
Court of Appeals.  Colerain Township argued on appeal that the trial court had 
improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Rumpke because a privately 
owned sanitary landfill is not a public utility under R.C. 519.211. 
{¶ 9} The First District held:  
 
“As a general rule, Ohio law provides that townships have 
no power under the zoning laws to regulate the location, erection, 
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or construction of any buildings or structures of any public utility.”  
[Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 551, 
721 N.E.2d 1057.]  R.C. 519.211 was “intended to exempt public 
utilities providers from regulation by township zoning boards and 
boards of zoning appeals.”  [Campanelli v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 
Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 706 N.E.2d 1267.]  The “exemption 
ensures that public utilities will be able to construct the facilities 
required to serve the public interest across the state without undue 
interference from township zoning resolutions.”  [Symmes at 556.] 
 
Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp., 1st Dist. No. C090223, at 3. 
{¶ 10} The First District then analyzed whether Rumpke was a public 
utility.  In doing so, it held, “ ‘To determine “public utility” status for purposes of 
the R.C. 519.211(A) exemption,’ a court must consider the ‘ “factors related to 
the ‘public service’ and ‘public concern’ characteristics of a public utility.” ’ ”  
Id., quoting Trustees of Washington Twp. v. Davis, 95 Ohio St.3d 274, 2002-
Ohio-2123, 767 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 16, quoting A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. 
Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 385, 596 N.E.2d 423, 
syllabus. 
{¶ 11} The appellate court then set forth the factors under both the “public 
service” and “public concern” prongs.  It held: 
 
The factors relating to the public-service requirement 
include a demonstration that the entity provides “an essential good 
or service to the general public which has a legal right to demand 
or receive this good or service.”  [A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. 
Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 64 Ohio St.3d at 387, 596 N.E.2d 
423.]  The entity must also demonstrate that it provides its service 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
to the public “indiscriminately and reasonably.”  [Id.]  And the 
provider must have an obligation to provide the good or service 
that cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably withdrawn. 
Next the public utility must “conduct its operations in such 
a manner as to be a matter of public concern.”  [Id. at 388.]  
Factors considered in reaching this determination include the 
nature of the services provided, competition in the local 
marketplace, and regulation by a government authority. 
 
(Footnotes and citations omitted.)  Id. at 3–4. 
{¶ 12} The First District then analyzed whether Rumpke is a public utility 
under both prongs and held: 
 
[N]o genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether (1) 
Rumpke provides virtually all residents and businesses of 
Southwest Ohio a vital and essential service—the sanitary disposal 
of solid wastes in a facility licensed under R.C. Chapter 3734; (2) 
Rumpke operates in a monopolistic position with no other cost-
effective alternative to its services; (3) Rumpke is legally required 
to dispose of all of the city of Cincinnati’s solid waste; (4) Rumpke 
has pledged, in sworn statements to the Hamilton County Solid 
Waste Management District and the Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency, that it will remain open and will accept any 
qualifying solid waste so long as it has the capacity to do so; and 
(5) the disposal of solid waste is an essential public necessity. 
 
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Id. at 4.  The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and held that “Rumpke 
was entitled to the trial court’s declaration that it is a public utility for purposes of 
R.C. 519.211.”  Id. 
{¶ 13} The First District also addressed Colerain Township’s argument 
that “the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because the 
plain language of the amended public-utility statute prohibits a privately owned 
landfill like Rumpke from benefiting from the regulatory exemptions of a public 
utility.”  Id. at 5.  “Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562, the 2009–2010 biennial budget bill, 
* * * modified the statutory definition of ‘public utility’ to exclude ‘a person that 
owns or operates a solid waste facility or a solid waste transfer facility, other than 
a publicly owned solid waste facility or a publicly owned solid waste transfer 
facility.’ ”  Id. at 3, quoting R.C. 519.211(A).  The appellate court noted that it 
had previously “declared that the Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562 modifications to R.C. 
519.211” “violated the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II, Ohio 
Constitution” and therefore are “unconstitutional and not enforceable.”  Id. at 3 
and 5, citing Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 184 Ohio App.3d 135, 2009-
Ohio-4888, 919 N.E.2d 826, at ¶18. 
{¶ 14} (Colerain Township had appealed that decision to this court, and 
we accepted discretionary review only of the following proposition of law: “A 
township is an interested and necessary party to a constitutional challenge brought 
by a property owner within the township’s jurisdiction to a law passed by the 
General Assembly that directly affects the township’s police powers over that 
owner’s property and pending litigation.”  Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 
128 Ohio St.3d 41, 2011-Ohio-6037, 941 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 9.  We ultimately held 
that Colerain Township was “not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to 
the bill premised on a violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution.”  
Id. at ¶ 21.  The issue before us was not whether the amendments to R.C. 519.211 
violated the one-subject rule.) 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 15} The First District affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying 
Colerain Township’s motion for summary judgment by relying heavily upon the 
fact that this court had not reversed its holding that the amendments to R.C. 
519.211 were unconstitutional and not enforceable.  The court of appeals wrote, 
“Absent reversal by the Ohio Supreme Court, we will apply this decision in each 
case submitted for our review.”  But again, the appellate court’s holding of 
procedural unconstitutionality based on the one-subject rule had not been 
presented to us, and we did not rule on that issue.  Our decision in Rumpke 
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State is controlling authority on the issue of whether the 
township was a necessary party but not on the constitutional issues previously 
addressed by the First District. 
{¶ 16} We accepted the cause as a discretionary appeal.  Rumpke Sanitary 
Landfill v. Colerain Twp., 129 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2011-Ohio-3710, 951 N.E.2d 88.  
Two propositions of law are before us: 
 
(1) A private sanitary landfill is not exempt from township 
zoning regulations under the comprehensive statutory framework 
of solid waste disposal and township zoning. 
(2) A privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common 
law “public utility” exempt from township zoning when there is no 
public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no statutory 
or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the 
landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to 
demand and receive its services. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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ANALYSIS 
The Definition of “Public Utility” Has Been Developed Through Case Law 
{¶ 17} R.C. 519.211(A), which sets forth limitations on zoning powers, 
provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in division (B) or (C) of this 
section, sections 519.02 to 519.25 of the Revised Code confer no 
power on any board of township trustees or board of zoning 
appeals in respect to the location, erection, construction, 
reconstruction, change, alteration, maintenance, removal, use, or 
enlargement of any buildings or structures of any public utility or 
railroad, whether publicly or privately owned, or the use of land by 
any public utility or railroad, for the operation of its business.  As 
used in this division, “public utility” does not include a person that 
owns or operates a solid waste facility or a solid waste transfer 
facility, other than a publicly owned solid waste facility or a 
publicly owned solid waste transfer facility, that has been issued a 
permit under Chapter 3734. of the Revised Code or a construction 
and demolition debris facility that has been issued a permit under 
Chapter 3714. of the Revised Code. 
 
{¶ 18} Although the General Assembly exempted public utilities from 
zoning restrictions, it did not define “public utility” insofar as it relates to R.C. 
519.211.  This court’s jurisprudence, however, offers guidance as to what 
constitutes a public utility for purposes of R.C. 519.211.  Marano v. Gibbs, 45 
Ohio St.3d 310, 544 N.E.2d 635 (1989); A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Ravenna 
Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 64 Ohio St.3d 385, 596 N.E.2d 423 (1992). 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 19} In Marano v. Gibbs, we held that “the determination of entities as 
public utilities is a mixed question of law and fact.”  Marano v. Gibbs, at 311.  
“[I]n determining public utility status” courts must examine “the character of the 
business in which the entity is engaged.”  Id., citing Ohio Power Co. v. Attica, 23 
Ohio St.2d 37, 41, 261 N.E.2d 123 (1973).  “ ‘To constitute a “public utility,” the 
devotion to public use must be of such character that the product and service is 
available to the public generally and indiscriminately or there must be the 
acceptance by the utility of public franchises or calling to its aid the police power 
of the state.’ ”  Id., quoting S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 110 Ohio St. 
246, 143 N.E. 700 (1924). 
{¶ 20} We set forth two factors, i.e., public concern and public service, 
which must be taken into consideration to determine whether an entity is a public 
utility for purposes of R.C. 519.211.  “[A]n entity may be characterized as a 
public utility if the nature of its operation is a matter of public concern, and 
membership is indiscriminately and reasonably made available to the general 
public,” otherwise known as public service.  Marano, 45 Ohio St.3d at 311, 544 
N.E.2d 635. 
{¶ 21} We further developed the definition of “public utility” in A & B 
Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees.  A & B Refuse 
Disposers, Inc. operated a landfill in Ravenna Township, Portage County.  A & B 
Refuse acquired a 66-acre parcel of land adjacent to the landfill intending to 
construct a truck terminal and offices.  After discussing the proposed use with 
township officials, A & B Refuse was advised that the proposed use would 
probably not be approved for rezoning.  A & B Refuse filed a declaratory-
judgment action against the Ravenna Township Board of Trustees, asking for a 
determination of whether its landfill operation was subject to regulation under the 
township zoning code. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} We were faced with a similar issue to that before us today: 
“whether the definition of a ‘public utility,’ as expressed in case law, is applicable 
to [A & B Refuse’s] landfill operation for the purpose of exemption from 
township zoning restrictions.”  A & B Refuse, 64 Ohio St.3d at 386, 596 N.E.2d 
423.  To resolve this question, we turned to Marano and affirmed the definition of 
“public utility.”  We also significantly expanded upon the two factors identified in 
Marano, holding that “the determination of whether a particular entity is a public 
utility for the purpose of exemption from local zoning restrictions requires a 
consideration of several factors related to the ‘public service’ and ‘public 
concern’ characteristics of a public utility.”  Id. at 389. 
{¶ 23} As for the public-service factor, we held that we must look at 
whether there  
 
is a devotion of an essential good or service to the general public 
which has a legal right to demand or receive this good or service.  
S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 246, 
252, 143 N.E. 700, 701, quoting Allen v. RR. Comm. of California 
(1918), 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466; Freight, Inc. v. Northfield Ctr. Bd. 
of Twp. Trustees (1958), 107 Ohio App. 288, 292-293, 8 O.O.2d 
212, 215, 158 N.E.2d 537, 540; Motor Cargo v. Richfield Bd. of 
Twp. Trustees (1953), 67 Ohio Law Abs. 315, 318, 52 O.O. 257, 
258, 117 N.E.2d 224, 226.  See, generally, 2 Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning (3 Ed.1986) 568, Section 12.32.  * * * [T]he entity 
must * * * provide its good or service to the public 
indiscriminately and reasonably.  Marano v. Gibbs, [64 Ohio 
St.3d] at 311, 544 N.E.2d at 636. * * * Further, this attribute 
requires an obligation to provide the good or service which cannot 
be arbitrarily or unreasonably withdrawn. 
January Term, 2012 
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A & B Refuse, 64 Ohio St.3d at 389, 596 N.E.2d 423   “The fact that a private 
business provides a good or service associated with the usual subject matter of a 
public utility does not give rise to a presumption that it is devoted to public 
service.”  Id., citing S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 110 Ohio St. 246, 
143 N.E. 700 (1924), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 24} As for the public-concern factor, we held: 
 
Normally, a public utility occupies a monopolistic or ogopolistic 
[sic] position in the marketplace.  Greater Fremont, Inc. v. 
Fremont (N.D.Ohio 1968), 302 F.Supp. 652, 664-665. See, also, 
Mammina v. Cortlandt Zoning Bd. of Appeals (1981), 110 Misc.2d 
534, 442 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691.  This position gives rise to a public 
concern for the indiscriminate treatment of that portion of the 
public which needs and pays for the vital good or service offered 
by the entity.  Factors utilized in determining whether an enterprise 
conducts itself in such a way as to become a matter of public 
concern include the good or service provided, competition in the 
local marketplace, and regulation by governmental authority. * * * 
[N]one of these factors is controlling.  Nevertheless, in a case 
where the business enterprise serves such a substantial part of the 
public that its rates, charges and methods of operation become a 
public concern, it can be characterized as a public utility.  Indus. 
Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., supra, 135 Ohio St. [408] at 414, 21 
N.E.2d [166] at 168 [1939]. 
 
(Citations and footnotes omitted.)  Id. at 388. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 25} We further held that “the determination of public utility status 
requires a flexible rule, a rule which often intertwines the factors considered in 
relation to the concepts of ‘public service’ and ‘public concern.’ ”  Id.  
Furthermore, a simple claim that a business’s services are open to the public does 
not automatically categorize the business as a public utility.  Id. at 389.  Such a 
holding would incorrectly encompass as public utilities “traditional private 
business enterprises which are, in various degrees, regulated by diverse public 
authorities, e.g., dry cleaners, restaurants, and grocery stores.”  Id. 
{¶ 26} We also determined that the business claiming public-utility status 
bears the burden of offering sufficient evidence on these factors.  Id. 
{¶ 27} Applying the principles set forth above, we held that A & B Refuse 
“failed to present sufficient evidence on those factors essential to a determination 
of whether an entity can be classified as a public utility.”  Id. at 390.  The only 
evidence that related to the public-utility factors was a single statement that “the 
landfill is ‘open to the residents of Ravenna Township.’ ”  Id.  Thus, we never 
reached the question of whether a “privately operated solid waste disposal 
facility” could be a public utility pursuant to R.C. 519.211.  Id.  We now turn to 
that question. 
Rumpke, in Its Operation of a Private Sanitary Landfill, Is Not a 
Public Utility, Because There Is a Lack of Governmental 
Regulation over the Public-Service and Public-Concern Factors 
{¶ 28} The interesting question of whether a private sanitary landfill can 
be a public utility answers itself, especially in light of the fact that no 
governmental body regulates private sanitary landfills on those factors that make 
an entity a public utility. 
{¶ 29} In A & B Refuse Disposers, we cautioned owners of sanitary 
landfills that although achieving public-utility status would exempt the sanitary 
landfills from local zoning restrictions, obtaining public-utility status also “invites 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
even greater governmental regulation and control than is currently experienced in 
this industry.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d at 390, 596 N.E.2d 
423.  Here, there is no such control, as there is with traditional public utilities. 
{¶ 30} As a private sanitary-landfill operator, Rumpke is subject primarily 
to the regulations of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“OEPA”) 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3734 as well as the local solid-waste regulator, the 
Hamilton County Recycling and Solid Waste District (“HCRSWD”) pursuant to 
R.C. Chapters 3734 and 343.  The concerns of the OEPA are related to the 
“adverse environmental effects related to the collection and disposal of solid 
waste,” and therefore “[t]he rules and regulations promulgated and administered 
by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency arise from this public concern and 
are imposed for the protection of the environment and for human health and 
safety.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio St.3d at 389, citing Families Against 
Reily/Morgan Sites v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 56 Ohio App.3d 90, 96, 
564 N.E.2d 1113 (12th Dist.1989); Hulligan v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals, 59 Ohio App.2d 105, 108, 392 N.E.2d 1272 (9th Dist.1978); N. Sanitary 
Landfill, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 52 Ohio App.2d 167, 170-171, 
369 N.E.2d 17 (2d Dist.1976). 
{¶ 31} The HCRSWD has authority over the “[a]cquisition, construction, 
improvement, enlargement, replacement, maintenance, and operation of solid 
waste facilities within the district.”  R.C. 343.011(B)(2).  Like the OEPA, the 
solid-waste-management districts have a major concern for the management of 
waste.  The vision statement of the HCRSWD is as follows: “The District 
provides ethical environmental leadership to equitably promote the public good 
through innovative and responsible strategies leading to the management of all 
waste as a resource that leads to a society that generates zero waste.”  
http://www.hamiltoncountyrecycles.org/index.php?page=vision-statement. 
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{¶ 32} We have held that “the public concern with environmental 
regulation is separate and distinct from the public concern involved in the 
regulation of public utilities.”  A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio St.3d at 389, 596 
N.E.2d 423.  Therefore, the public concern of both OEPA and HCRSWD is not 
the same public concern that is relevant when determining whether an entity is a 
public utility. 
{¶ 33} Still, Rumpke argues that the regulation of its landfill is not limited 
to environmental protection, but also includes regulations to enjoin, take over, or 
terminate landfill operations.  Rumpke also argues that it is regulated for nuisance 
and operates under a requirement that the landfill be fully utilized.  It asserts that 
“the General Assembly has provided for regulatory oversight of landfill location, 
design, operation, permitting, closure and post-closure handling.”   Although we 
do not dispute that the landfill is subject to each of the regulations mentioned by 
Rumpke, none of those are of consequence to our analysis here.  Our review is 
limited to those factors set forth by this court in A & B Refuse Disposers. 
Public-Service Factor 
{¶ 34} Turning to the public-service factor, the lack of governmental 
regulation means that Rumpke determines to whom it provides its service and 
how or when that service is provided.  The general public has no legal right to 
demand or receive Rumpke’s services.  Therefore, there is no assurance or 
guarantee that Rumpke will provide its services to the public indiscriminately and 
reasonably, nor is there anything preventing Rumpke from arbitrarily or 
unreasonably withdrawing its services.  Rumpke could lawfully close its doors to 
the public.  Furthermore, as a private company, Rumpke has the ability to set its 
own rates without any governmental oversight.  Thus, Rumpke fails to meet the 
public-service factor of the public-utility test. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
Public-Concern Factor 
{¶ 35} As for the public-concern factor, the parties do not dispute that 
Rumpke occupies a monopolistic position in the marketplace by collecting the 
majority of the solid waste generated within Hamilton County.  Rumpke also 
provides an essential service by operating its sanitary landfill and collecting and 
disposing of solid waste.  However, no governmental body, including the OEPA 
and HCRSWD, regulates the rates or methods of Rumpke.  That means that 
Rumpke may treat discriminately and arbitrarily the portion of the public to whom 
it provides its services.  Because Rumpke dominates such a large portion of the 
market and provides an essential service but does so without any government 
oversight or regulation, it is not a public concern. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 36} The lack of governmental control over the public-service and 
public-concern factors in A & B Refuse Disposers is critical in determining that 
Rumpke is not a public utility.  Thus, we hold that a privately owned sanitary 
landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt from township zoning 
when there is no public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no 
statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the landfill be 
accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to demand and receive its 
services. 
{¶ 37} For these reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s decision 
affirming the trial court’s declaration that Rumpke is a public utility for purposes 
of R.C. 519.211.  Therefore, we remand the cause to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
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Keating, Muething & Klekamp, P.L.L., Joseph L. Trauth Jr., Thomas M. 
Tepe Jr., Charles M. Miller, and Barrett P. Tullis, for appellees. 
Brahm & Cunningham, L.L.C., Catherine A. Cunningham, Richard C. 
Brahm, and Aaron M. Glasgow; and James E. Reuter, Law Director, Colerain 
Township, for appellants. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Robert C. Moormann and Nicholas J. Bryan, Assistant Attorneys 
General, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Dirk P. Plessner, Albin Bauer II, and Rene L. 
Rimelspach, urging reversal for amici curiae Bokescreek Township, Carroll-
Columbiana-Harrison Joint Solid Waste Management District, Erie County, Lake 
Township, Logan County, Lorain County, Medina County, Miami County, 
Monroe Township, New Russia Township, North Central Ohio Solid Waste 
Management District, Ottawa-Sandusky-Seneca Joint Solid Waste Management 
District, Richland Township, and Stark-Tuscarawas-Wayne Joint Solid Waste 
Management District. 
Matthew J. DeTemple, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Township 
Association and Coalition of Large Ohio Urban Townships. 
______________________