Case Title: Ian Smith v. Larry Norris, Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction

Citation: 

Docket Number: 07-42

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. 07-42 IAN SMITH Appellant v. LARRY NORRIS, DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION Appellee Opinion Delivered October 4, 2007 PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF IZARD COUNTY, CV 2006-114, HON. TIMOTHY M. WEAVER, JUDGE AFFIRMED. PER CURIAM In 2006, appellant Ian Smith, an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in Izard County Circuit Court seeking relief on a judgment entered in Benton County. The petition was denied and dismissed, the circuit court finding that the allegations that appellant raised did not demonstrate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face. Appellant now brings this appeal of that order. The judgment and commitment order entered February 5, 2004, reflects that appellant entered a guilty plea to three counts of rape and was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate of thirty years’ imprisonment. In his brief, appellant presents his arguments organized as four points of error, as follows: (1) that the trial court erred in finding that the judgment was invalid because there was no “foundation” or basis for the plea; (2) that the judgment was invalid because his plea agreement -2- was based upon a different sentence than the one that he received; (3) that underlying judgments supporting his sentencing as a habitual offender were invalid, that the judgment omitted the subsection of the applicable habitual-enhancement statute and contained a number of perceived inconsistencies, and that the judgment was a result of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on the petition. As we find no reversible error, we affirm the order dismissing the petition. This court does not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). It is well settled that the burden is on the petitioner in a habeas corpus petition to establish that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face; otherwise, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Young v. Norris, 365 Ark. 219, 226 S.W.3d 797 (2006) (per curiam). The petitioner must plead either the facial invalidity or the lack of jurisdiction and make a "showing by affidavit or other evidence, [of] probable cause to believe" he is illegally detained. Id. at 221, 226 S.W.3d at 798. Appellant’s first two points assert that defects in his plea proceedings invalidate the judgment because the court lost jurisdiction as a result of those defects. Yet, we have previously found that such defects in the plea proceedings do not raise a question of a void or illegal sentence and require the kind of factual inquiry beyond the face of the judgment that is inappropriate to a habeas proceeding. Friend v. Norris, 364 Ark. 315, 219 S.W.3d 123 (2005) (per curiam). A habeas corpus -3- proceeding does not afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his case, and is not a substitute for direct appeal or postconviction relief. Id.; Meny v. Norris, 340 Ark. 418, 420, 13 S.W.3d 143, 144 (2000) (per curiam). Appellant next claims in his third point that the underlying judgments used to sentence him as a habitual offender are invalid and this judgment, as a consequence, is invalid. Appellant cannot challenge the underlying judgments, however, because for purposes of sentence enhancement, a conviction is final when the judgment is pronounced. Birchett v. State, 291 Ark. 379, 724 S.W.2d 492 (1987). Nor would a later invalidation of any of the underlying sentences result in invalidation of the judgment; the relief would be modification of appellant’s sentence, not a void sentence. See Halfacre v. State, 292 Ark. 331, 731 S.W.2d 179 (1987). Moreover, the sentence appellant received, thirty years, is well within the statutory range provided for Class Y felony charges under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 2006), as well as within the range for enhanced charges under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2001). As a result, even if imposed in error, the sentence would not have required modification. The perceived defects appellant points to in the judgment on the rape charges are insignificant, if real. Appellant urges that the subsection of the statute upon which the habitual enhancement was based is not identified because the letter of the subsection was not circled in the form part of the document. But, following those letters, (a)(1)(B) is typed in and clearly legible. Appellant next contends he was charged as a habitual offender but received a criminal history score of zero. Yet, the portion of the judgment detailing the habitual offender charge does not provide information as to any such score, and the indication of zero for the rape charge would be appropriate unless one of the previous convictions was for rape. -4- Appellant’s claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct raised in the petition are the type of claim that should be challenged on direct appeal rather than in a habeas proceeding. Clearly, those are claims, once again, that require an inquiry beyond the face of the judgment. Appellant asserts in his last point that the trial court should have provided an evidentiary hearing prior to rendering its decision. A hearing is not required if the petition does not allege either of the bases of relief proper in a habeas proceeding, and, even if a cognizable claim is made, the writ does not have to be issued unless probable cause is shown. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, ___S.W.3d ___ (2007). For those reasons set out above, to the extent that appellant may have alleged any claim under either of the two bases, he has clearly failed to show probable cause. No hearing was required to dismiss the petition, as further evidence would not overcome those deficiencies. The trial court did not clearly err in dismissing the petition, and we affirm the order denying the petition. Affirmed.