Case Title: State v. Anderson Garron

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-16-02

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANDERSON GARRON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 4, 2003 Decided July 23, 2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Edwin J. Jacobs, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Jacobs & Barbone, attorneys; Joseph A. Levin and Arthur J. Murray, on the briefs). Paul H. Heinzel, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Mark H. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Office of the Public Defender (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ALBIN, J., A jury convicted defendant of aggravated sexual assault, rejecting his defense that the victim consented to have sexual relations with him. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed. We must determine whether the trial court properly applied the Rape Shield Statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7, in excluding evidence of the victim s past relationship with defendant. Defendant claims that the excluded evidence would have explained the events leading to the sexual encounter and to the victim s consent and, therefore, was critical to a fair trial. The State claims that the victim s prior conduct did not possess sufficient probative value on the ultimate issue before the jury, whether defendant forced the victim to perform a sexual act against her will. In these competing arguments are found the tension between defendant s right to confrontation and the compulsory process of witnesses, and the victim s right to be free from an unnecessary invasion of her privacy. We conclude that the trial court misapplied the Rape Shield Statute in keeping from the jury highly relevant evidence that was necessary for a fair determination of the case and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial. We also conclude that at the new trial, the court must charge the jury with any lesser-included offenses that are clearly indicated by the evidence, even in the face of objections by the defense or the State. A jury cannot be denied the opportunity to find guilt on a lesser-included offense as a result of the strategic posturing of the parties. Approximately two weeks later, defendant was standing on the porch of the prosecutor s office waiting for his wife, when J.S. pulled up in her car. In response to a comment made by J.S., defendant said, are you ready to have an affair now? Now that I don t have to look at your wife anymore, you re damn right, replied J.S. With that, defendant told her to give him a call. J.S. left just as defendant s wife came onto the porch. Defendant told his wife that she better watch it, [J.S.] is ready to fool around. Defendant s wife, Mrs. Garron, a detective at the prosecutor s office since 1989, testified about the flirtatious behavior between her husband and J.S. and J.S. s outrageous conduct. Mrs. Garron described J.S. as a touchy feely person. J.S. would always grab and hug defendant, and touch his face, arm, and chest. J.S. would have full body contact with defendant with her breast and butt. J.S. was not discreet in the attention she lavished on defendant; her behavior was open and notorious. Over the years, J.S. would make bold comments to Mrs. Garron, seemingly in jest, that nevertheless suggested she had designs on defendant. J.S. told Mrs. Garron that she was going to take [her] husband and that she was available now that she was in between husbands. She also remarked, I ll take that man away from you if he spends just one night with me. J.S. thought nothing of stepping between Mrs. Garron and her husband, even in the presence of other people, and going on a riff: [Y]ou don t need to talk to her, . . . you ve got me. You know if you were with me, . . . you d throw rocks at her. . . . [W]hat do you want with that scrawny white girl. J.S. would often make suggestive remarks to defendant, such as, I love a man in uniform, is that your gun or are you happy to see me. And she would constantly give [defendant] a kiss, grab his arm, hold his hand, [and] literally try to pull him away. For her thirtieth birthday present, in 1996, J.S. announced that she wanted defendant: They don t make men like [defendant] anymore. Where did you find [him]. Sometime in 1995 or 1996, Mrs. Garron learned, apparently from Barbara Carney, a secretary at the prosecutor s office, that J.S. had touched defendant s buttocks. Mrs. Garron confronted J.S., who did not deny the incident: She laughed. . . . [a]nd she went into this little routine that she does and she said I m sorry but . . . I was overwhelmed, you know, and she was fanning herself. It was right there in front of me[,] I had no choice. On J.S. s last day of employment at the prosecutor s office in March 1997, J.S., defendant, and Mrs. Garron were on the office porch together, and Mrs. Garron told defendant to kiss (assuming just a peck) J.S. goodbye: I said the thorn in my side is gone . . . [Y]ou two don t ever have to see each other again. J.S. told Mrs. Garron to go in the building because I got to kiss your husband goodbye. I m never going to see him again. Mrs. Garron laughed and did go inside. When J.S. returned to the building, with a dramatic flourish, she threw herself up against the wall and fanned herself with her hand, saying, that is some man. . . . [T]hat man can kiss. Whenever -- whenever you need to get rid of him you just send him my way girlfriend. Mrs. Garron also recalled an incident after one of J.S. s visits to the prosecutor s office in the summer of 1998. J.S. had been speaking with defendant and Carney on the porch, and Carney told Mrs. Garron as J.S. drove away, you know [J.S.] says that she s going to have an affair with your husband now that she doesn t have to look at you every day. On another visit in September 1998, approximately three months after the Garrons had separated and two weeks before the alleged rape, J.S. spoke with Mrs. Garron on the porch of the prosecutor s office. J.S. was down and advised Mrs. Garron that she needed to find a way not to work anymore and to find me a man. Wendy Frost, a secretary at the prosecutor s office throughout J.S. s tenure, gave testimony that corroborated to a large degree the accounts of defendant and his wife. In Frost s view, J.S. s behavior went beyond flirtation. Frost estimated that J.S. approached defendant every time he came to visit his wife at the prosecutor s office, which was as often as every other week. During defendant s visits, [J.S.] would immediately get up from her desk and interact with him, by touching his shoulder, [and] grabbing his arm. When defendant talked with Mrs. Garron, [J.S.] would get up and stand extremely close to [defendant] and make sure she brushed up against him. On those occasions, she would grab his arm and touch[] his upper shoulder. J.S. constantly made inappropriate remarks, such as if your wife s never around let me know. . . . I can take care of you. Frost recalled the remarks by J.S. that stood out most prominently in her mind. One day, Frost, Mrs. Garron, and defendant were out on the porch of the prosecutor s office smoking when J.S. appeared. With regard to Mrs. Garron s plans to visit her family in Virginia, J.S. commented that she would have no problems going to see [defendant] while [Mrs. Garron] was away. Frost opined that Mrs. Garron had always taken J.S. s behavior toward defendant lightly, but not as a joke. Though Frost was unable to give specific dates of the many incidents, her memory of them had not dimmed. Terri Seay, another secretary at the prosecutor s office throughout most of J.S. s tenure, also testified about J.S. s very flirtatious behavior toward defendant. J.S. brushed her breast area against defendant s arm and chest on more than one occasion. It seemed that every time [defendant] was [in the prosecutor s office] she would be somewhere around him. J.S. would go over to defendant and put her arm on his arm or give him a hug with her arms around his neck. J.S. said that she liked a man in uniform. Seay had heard that on J.S. s last day of work at the prosecutor s office, J.S. commented that she was free to flirt with [defendant] since she would no longer be working with Mrs. Garron. Nevertheless, Seay believed that J.S. and Mrs. Garron were friends. Although the incidents occurred during J.S. s tenure, Seay was unable to give specific dates between September 1992 and March 1997. Carney, who worked at the prosecutor s office throughout J.S. s tenure, claimed that she did not see J.S., defendant, and Mrs. Garron together very often. On those occasions when she did, J.S. just act[ed] like herself. . . . always happy and talkative. Carney did not recall ever seeing J.S. touch defendant, or ever discussing defendant with J.S. or Mrs. Garron. At trial, however, Carney testified that J.S. told her that defendant had visited her home in the summer of 1998. Two months before the incident at issue, J.S. had asked Carney whether the Garrons were separated. Carney confirmed that they were. The trial court determined that defendant had presented clear and convincing evidence to dispel the presumption under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7b against admitting evidence of J.S. s sexual conduct more than one year before the alleged sexual assault. The trial court, however, ruled that only three of the above-described alleged incidents would be admissible at trial: (1) that J.S. had grabbed defendant s buttocks in 1995 or 1996; (2) that she had kissed him passionately in March 1997, on her last day of work at the prosecutor s office; and (3) that she had kissed him similarly in July 1998, after he helped her to resolve the bench warrant. The court concluded that those incidents were admissible under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7d because they were relevant to show that J.S. consented to the sexual conduct at issue by demonstrating a continuing course of conduct on the part of J.S. to engage in sexual conduct with the defendant. The court decided that the remainder of J.S. s conduct was merely flirtatious, rather than sexual, and was therefore not probative of whether she might have actually consented to perform oral sex on September 28, 1998. The court also concluded that the testimony to be excluded did not specify with sufficient particularity the dates between September 1992 and March 1997, that the alleged sexual conduct, such as hugging and flirting, occurred. Frost and Seay therefore did not testify at trial. Defendant and Mrs. Garron were not permitted to testify to the catalogue of flirtatious and sexual behavior of J.S., including J.S. s seeming obsessive attention to defendant, her habit of brushing her body parts against defendant, her constant petting of his arm, chest and face, her many come-on remarks, such as he needed somebody like her and was too good to his wife, her affirmative response to defendant s inquiry, are you ready to have an affair now, and her comments that she wanted defendant for her thirtieth birthday and that she was available while she was between husbands. Judge Wecker also concluded that the trial court s failure to charge the proposed lesser-included offenses at defendant s request constituted reversible error, because the public interest in fair and proper convictions outweighed defendant s interest in the trial strategy of gambling on an all-or-nothing verdict. She reasoned that the evidence was such that a reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant used only physical force, and never verbally or physically threatened J.S. with his gun. Defendant s appeal is before us as of right under Rule 2:2-1(a)(2), based on the dissent. We now reverse. [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7d.] However, before such evidence is admitted several further evidentiary hurdles must be cleared. The Shield Statute only permits evidence of prior sexual conduct if that evidence is highly material and the probative value of the evidence offered substantially outweighs its collateral nature or the probability that its admission will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7a. See footnote 2 Moreover, [i]n the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, such evidence occurring more than one year before the date of the offense charged is presumed to be inadmissible. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7b. The Shield Statute has been expanded by amendment three times since its 1978 enactment for the purpose of strengthening and expanding the privacy rights of victims. See footnote 3 The legislative history to the 1994 amendment reveals that the drafters were concerned specifically about protecting the privacy of a sex-crime victim from collateral examination bearing no relevance to the central issues of the case. The 1994 amendment was intended to strike an appropriate balance between protecting a defendant s constitutional rights, and protecting a rape victim from an assault upon the victim s character. Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 677 (Jan. 20, 1994), reprinted in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 (1995). Through that amendment, the Legislature raised the bar to such evidence from requiring that it merely be relevant and that the probative value of the evidence offered is not outweighed by its collateral nature or by the probability that its admission will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of privacy of the victim, [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7a (1988) (emphasis added),] See footnote 4 and material to negating the element of force or coercion, [ N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7c (1988),] to requiring that the evidence be relevant and highly material and meet[] the requirements of subsection[] . . . d. . . . and that the probative value of the evidence offered substantially outweigh[] its collateral nature. [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7a (1994) (emphasis added).] This Court has recognized the tension between the demands of the Confrontation Clause and those of the Rape Shield Statute in interpreting the pre-1994 enactment. See Cuni, supra, 159 N.J. at 596-99 (addressing 1988 version); Budis, 125 N.J. at 529-33 (same). In analyzing whether the restrictions on the admissibility of evidence under the current Shield Statute are constitutional, we must review the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process Clause to determine whether those clauses compel the admission of evidence that would otherwise be barred by the Shield Statute. [Id. at 532. See also Cuni, supra, 159 N.J. at 600 (same).] Stated a different way, if evidence is relevant and necessary to a fair determination of the issues, the admission of the evidence is constitutionally compelled. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 229-33, 109 S. Ct. 480, 482-84, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513, 518-20 (1988) (holding that right of confrontation was violated by excluding cross-examination concerning rape victim s cohabitation with defendant s half-brother that was crucial to consent defense to demonstrate victim s motive to fabricate); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52, 62, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709, 2714, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 46, 52-53 (1987) (holding that right of compulsory process was violated by excluding manslaughter defendant s hypnotically-refreshed testimony concerning circumstances of shooting husband that was material and favorable to defense that gun accidentally discharged); Crane, supra, 476 U.S. at 690-91, 106 S. Ct. at 2146-47, 90 L. Ed 2d at 645 (holding that fair trial required admission of testimony that was central to defense concerning reliability of sixteen-year-old s confession to murder); Chambers, supra, 410 U.S. at 294-303, 93 S. Ct. at 1045-49, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 308-13 (holding that rights of confrontation and compulsory process were violated by excluding cross-examination and direct testimony concerning third party s oral and written confessions to murder that was critical to defense of third-party guilt); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16, 23, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1921-22, 1925, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 1021, 1025 (1967) (holding that right of compulsory process was violated by excluding co-defendant s testimony concerning circumstances of shooting that was vital to defense that co-defendant fired fatal shot). We must interpret the current version of the Shield Statute in accordance with those constitutional precepts. An unconstrained reading of the Statute leads to the exclusion of prior sexual conduct unless it is highly material and its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7a. (The Shield Statute is a complete reversal of N.J.R.E. 403, which provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of . . . undue prejudice . . . . N.J.R.E. 403(a) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, evidence of prior sexual conduct that is only material (not highly material) and that only has probative value outweighing (not substantially outweighing) its prejudicial impact would not be admissible at trial. That formulation of the Shield Statute would keep from the jury evidence that is admissible under the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses, and the constitutional standard enunciated in Budis. We must construe the Statute so that its reach does not exceed its constitutional limits. We reaffirm the test advanced in Budis that evidence relevant to the defense that has probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect must be placed before the trier of fact. We do not read the Shield Statute in a way that would deny a defendant a fair trial. In summary, evidence that is relevant and necessary to prove the defense of consent is not excluded under the Shield Statute. Those principles must now be applied to the facts. In doing so, we first must say a word on the mystique of language and manners. Men and women express their feelings and desires in many different ways, from the demonstrative and unequivocal to the subtle and suggestive. Communications in the most mundane matters may have many layers of meaning. Interpreting language and conduct concerning our passions and affairs of the heart may be no easier than deciphering hieroglyphics. Some remarks, if taken literally will mean one thing, and if taken in jest another, and if taken half-in-jest, both one thing and another. Unraveling the riddle of the messages we convey through body language and the spoken word requires a high degree of discernment, for often there are surface and underlying meanings. J.S. s remarks and physical conduct in reference to defendant are susceptible to varying interpretations. One view is that she engaged in office buffoonery, bawdy humor, and innocent but self-indulgent attention seeking. Another view is that she aggressively pursued defendant, using humor as a thinly-veiled cover for her sexual advances. The jury was particularly well suited to divine the true meaning of the language and conduct of J.S. A jury represents a cross section of the citizens of a community, men and women of varying backgrounds and experience who bring an understanding of the everyday practical realities of life. We can trust the jury to distinguish mere playful words and harmless gestures from expressions of sexual desire and sexual advances. Certainly, the trial court was in no better position than the jury to fathom J.S. s intentions and to understand whether a reasonable person would have believed that J.S. encouraged and ultimately consented to the sexual acts that occurred. In this case, [t]he role of the factfinder [was] to decide . . . whether . . . defendant s belief that the alleged victim had given affirmative permission was reasonable. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 448 (1992). Defendant s state of mind was directly at issue. How defendant s prior relationship with J.S. affected his state of mind was critical to the ultimate determination of the jury. The trial judge permitted only fragmented pieces of evidence to be presented to the jury concerning J.S. s relationship with defendant. That judicial censorship did more than distort the true picture of events leading to the sexual encounter it made less likely that the jury would believe any part of the defense of consent. The trial court allowed testimony by defendant concerning J.S. s two passionate kisses and her grabbing his derri re. However, J.S. denied that those events ever occurred. Therefore, the truth regarding those incidents and the sexual encounter was reduced to a credibility contest between just two people. Without the testimony of independent witnesses from the Cumberland County Prosecutor s Office who were able to give examples of J.S. s public shows of affection toward defendant, it was less likely the jury would believe that J.S. passionately kissed defendant and grabbed his buttocks, and that in turn made it less likely the jury would find believable defendant s consent defense. Had J.S. contradicted Frost s and Seay s testimony describing J.S. s physical advances toward defendant, as well as her sexually alluring remarks, the case would not have boiled down to a he said-she said dispute. The credibility determination between J.S. and defendant may well have hinged on the presentation of seemingly disinterested witnesses whose testimony had no partisan flavor, testimony that would have buttressed defendant s assertions. Each piece of evidence delicately supported another in the presentation of the consent defense, and the removal of key pieces of evidence presaged the total collapse of that defense. Applying another metaphor, the jury was given a book with missing chapters. This Court is sensitive to the rights and concerns of those who file sexual assault complaints and to the objectives of the Rape Shield Statute. We do not expect, as a result of this ruling, that a trial court will admit into evidence irrelevant and prejudicial material concerning the reputation of a complaining witness. Victims need not be fearful of our judicial process and must know that they will be treated with dignity and fairness. We do not pass on the credibility of the accounts given by J.S. and defendant. We express no view whether defendant would have succeeded had he been given the full opportunity to present his defense. But that opportunity to cross-examine effectively J.S. and present witnesses on his behalf in furtherance of a legitimate defense was his constitutional right. It was for the jury to decide whether the testimony offered by defendant at the Rape Shield hearing was worthy of belief. The privacy interests of the victim must be measured against preserving the integrity of the fact-finding process, the objective of which is to achieve a just verdict. We cannot say that J.S. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her past relationship with defendant, much of which was in public view. Even privileges are not absolute. A client or patient waives the protection of the attorney-client privilege or patient-physician privilege when he charges the attorney or physician with malpractice. See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20(2)(c) (N.J.R.E. 504(2)(c)) (excepting from attorney-client privilege communication[s] relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client ); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.4 (N.J.R.E. 506(d)) (excepting from physician-patient privilege communications relevant to action[s] in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the patient ). Confidences, in those circumstances, lose their protected status if the privileged information is necessary for the defense of the lawyer or doctor. State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 233, 296 (1999); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 292 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 440-43 (1997); Stigliano v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 140 N.J. 305, 311-12, 316-18 (1995). J.S. could hardly expect her relationship with defendant to remain a private matter if information concerning that relationship was necessary for defendant to receive a fair trial. In this case, the information withheld from the jury did not concern the victim s intimate relations with persons other than this defendant. The withheld evidence did not paint the victim as a woman with a sordid past, making her allegations unworthy of belief. The withheld evidence, however, did shed light on the victim s relationship with defendant. However unflattering or embarrassing the details, the evidence was offered for a legitimate objective, to support defendant s consent defense. The story left untold by defendant was of a woman infatuated with him and who pursued him aggressively, even in the presence of her fellow office workers and his wife. The defendant needed to explain why he was at the victim s house in the early morning of September 28, why he followed her into the laundry room of her home, and why he reasonably believed she consented to have sexual relations with him. The untidy details of defendant s relationship with J.S. were essential to understanding his side of the story. Selectively editing those details, as the trial court did here, did not advance the truth-seeking function of the trial. [Id. at 319.] No defendant should be convicted of a greater crime or acquitted merely because the jury was precluded from considering a lesser offense that is clearly indicated in the record. In view of this ruling, parties, generally, should not be surprised by a court instructing a jury on such a lesser-included offense. Moreover, we cannot foresee specific circumstances that will make defending against a lesser-included offense more unfair or burdensome than defending only against the greater offense, even in those cases in which the defense is alibi or a general denial, I did not do it. Of course, counsel is still free to argue that the evidence does not support a rational basis for giving a lesser-included jury charge. See footnote 5 Nevertheless, in a case in which instructing a jury on a lesser-included offense would be so unanticipated by either party as to cause complete surprise, or so inconsistent with the defense as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings, the trial court may depart from this general rule, but must place its reasons for doing so on the record. State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 158-64 (1991); State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 300-01 (1985). On the evidence presented here, defendant would be guilty of first-degree aggravated sexual assault if the jury found he accomplished fellatio with J.S. by threatening her, by word or gesture, with his gun. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(4). However, if the jury found that he accomplished that act through the use of physical force or coercion only, and that J.S. did not sustain severe personal injury, defendant could only be found guilty of second-degree sexual assault. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1). Similarly, defendant would be guilty of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact if the jury found that he masturbated after the fellatio while threatening J.S. with his gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(4), -3a, but defendant would only be guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact if the jury found that he masturbated without the threat of his weapon, but while using physical force or coercion against J.S., N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1), -3b. As noted by Judge Wecker, the facts supporting the conviction of aggravated sexual assault, even in the absence of consent, were that defendant laid his gun on the dresser, and J.S. was frightened because she saw a red light on the gun and believed that meant that the gun was ready to be fired. There was no evidence that defendant verbally threatened J.S. with the gun, or did anything with it physically, other than place it on the dresser. The jury was presented with two stark choices, either to find defendant not guilty, or to find him guilty of aggravated sexual assault because he was armed with a weapon or threaten[ed] by word or gesture to the use the weapon to compel J.S. to perform a sexual act. That all-or-nothing alternative did not serve the public interest. There were sufficient facts in the record to support convictions of sexual assault and sexual contact if the jury believed that defendant grabbed J.S., forced her to her knees, placed his penis into her mouth, and held her head as he ejaculated. In addition, the act of sexual penetration itself, without J.S. s consent, would be sufficient to establish the physical force or coercion required to support a sexual assault conviction. M.T.S., supra, 129 N.J. at 447-49. Accordingly, at the new trial, the jury must be instructed on the lesser-included offenses of sexual assault and sexual contact. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANDERSON GARRON, Defendant-Appellant. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. New Jersey s Rape Shield Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.1 to -32.3, and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7, was enacted to protect rape victims from excessive cross-examination, thereby encouraging them to report the abuse. . . . [and to] preserve the integrity of trials. . . . [b]y ensuring that juries will not base their verdicts on prejudice against the victim . . . . State v. Cuni, 159 N.J. 584, 597 (1999) (quoting State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 529 (1991) (citations omitted)). The critical issue raised in this aggravated sexual assault case is whether the Rape Shield Law permits a defendant to introduce evidence of alleged flirtatious conduct by an alleged rape victim towards the defendant, most of which occurred more than a year prior to the alleged rape, to prove that the victim consented to the sexual conduct charged in the indictment. The Court today holds that a defendant can present evidence that the victim flirted with him several weeks, months, or even years before the intimate sexual conduct charged in the indictment occurred. Because I believe the Court s decision today is retrogressive and violative of the Rape Shield Law, I must dissent, not because I condone the victim s alleged flirtations, but because I wish to implement the Legislature s intent of preventing victims from being victimized twice: first by the defendant and second by the judicial system. [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7d.] The 1994 amendments also modified N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7a, which now provides that evidence of a victim s past sexual conduct is inadmissible unless it is relevant and highly material and . . . [its] probative value . . . substantially outweighs its collateral nature or the probability that its admission will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7a (emphasis added). Finally, the Code s version of the Rape Shield Law defines the victim s sexual conduct to mean any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of the victim, including but not limited to previous or subsequent experience of sexual penetration or sexual contact, use of contraceptives, sexual activities reflected in gynecological records, living arrangement and life style. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7e, subsequently renumbered as f. L. 1995, c. 237, 1. In amending the Code s version of the Rape Shield Law, the Legislature clearly intended to protect victims of sexual assault to the maximum extent permissible under the state and federal constitutions. The legislative history in respect of the 1994 amendments provides: It is vitally important to assure rape victims that they will not themselves be put on trial if they press charges against their attackers. This bill is intended to strike an appropriate balance between protecting a defendant s constitutional rights, and protecting a rape victim from an assault upon the victim s character. It is in the public interest to protect the privacy of the victim, as opposed to allowing the defendant to freely examine the victim s past when the examination serves no material or relevant evidentiary or constitutional purpose. [Assembly Statement, supra, at 1.] The Legislature intended to assure victims of sexual assault that if they took the courageous step of reporting the crime and confronting their attacker at trial, the State would endeavor to protect them from further humiliation in court. The legislative history reflects the Legislature s judgment that the sexual history of rape victims often serves no material or relevant evidentiary or constitutional purpose, and that judges should be especially vigilant when a defendant wishes to present such evidence. Ibid. Defendant and many others similarly charged have frequently challenged the application of Rape Shield Laws by arguing that the laws deprive them of their constitutional rights of confrontation, compulsory process, and due process. See, e.g., State v. G.S., 278 N.J. Super. 151, 170 (App. Div. 1994), rev d on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 (1996); State v. Ryan, 157 N.J. Super. 121, 124 (App. Div. 1978). In State v. Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 530-32, we upheld the constitutionality of New Jersey s Rape Shield Law as it existed prior to the 1994 amendments. We noted that the United States Supreme Court has endeavored to maintain a balance between upholding defendants fundamental rights, such as confrontation and cross-examination, and permitting trial courts to retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. at 532 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 683 (1986)). Adoption of the foregoing Rule 403 analysis would provide a well established and meaningful approach as compared to the amorphous continuing course of conduct standard adopted by the majority. Furthermore, the N.J.R.E. 403 analysis has been used consistently to conduct Rape Shield Law balancing. State v. Scherzer, supra, 301 N.J. Super. at 413; State v. G.S., supra, 278 N.J. Supra at 161, 168-69. The exclusion of evidence after a proper Rule 403 analysis is reversible error only if it is critical to the defense, as where there was no other available evidence to support defenses raised. State v. Scherzer, supra, 301 N.J. Super. at 414. The evidence excluded by the trial court in this case was not critical to the defense. In addition to introducing evidence in respect of the three instances of prior sexual conduct of J.S., defendant presented other evidence through his testimony to support the defense of consent. I agree with the trial court that most of the proffered evidence is not probative of whether a reasonable person would have believed that J.S. freely and affirmatively consented to the sexual conduct on September 28, 1998. Application of the N.J.R.E. 403 balancing test leads me to conclude that the trial court properly balanced the appropriate factors and concluded that the excluded evidence has little appreciable probative value that is far outweighed by its potential to mislead and prejudice the jury. Two of defendant s proposed witnesses, Wendy Frost and Terri Seay, were not permitted to testify at all. The trial court and the Appellate Division majority properly concluded that their testimony had nothing to do with whether J.S. consented to the sexual encounter with defendant on September 28, 1998. Frost testified that whenever J.S. encountered defendant visiting his wife at the Prosecutor s Office, she would run to him, stand close to him and touch his arm or shoulder. Frost also described J.S. s remarks to defendant, that were made in front of Stephanie Garron: if your wife s never around let me know[;] I can take care of you[;] [I] would have no problems going to see [defendant] while Stephanie was away. Seay s testimony was similar: that she saw J.S. brush her breast area against defendant, that J.S. frequently hugged him, touched his arm and started flirtatious conversations with him, and that J.S. expressed how lucky Stephanie was and that she could flirt with defendant after she ceased working with his wife. Viewed in the abstract, those alleged remarks may make it seem plausible that J.S. wanted to engage in sexual activity with defendant. However, neither Frost nor Seay could provide approximate dates for when any of that behavior occurred (save the remarks made on J.S. s last day of work in March 1997). In any event, none of their testimony involved events occurring later than March 1997, and they could date back as far as 1992, when J.S. began working at the Prosecutor s Office. Absent a more specific date, the testimony of Wendy Frost and Terri Seay is not probative of whether J.S. consented to engage in sexual activity with defendant on September 28, 1998. Their testimony refers to events that took place sometime between eighteen months and six years before the night in question. The Legislature recognized the scant value of such stale evidence when it provided in the Rape Shield Law that [i]n the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, evidence of the victim s sexual conduct occurring more than one year before the date of the offense charged is presumed to be inadmissible . . . . N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7b. That presumption was not rebutted. Much of the additional excluded evidence suffers from the same defect: it is far too attenuated in time to have any significant probative value. Stephanie Garron testified at the Rape Shield hearing that J.S. openly touched and hugged her husband and held his hand when J.S. saw him at the Prosecutor s office, and that the more people that were around the more of a production it became to grab him and hug him. She described outrageous remarks made by J.S. ( what do you want with that scrawny white girl[;] is that your gun or are you happy to see me[;] I ll take that man away from you if he spends just one night with me ), but Stephanie also stated that these remarks were made for impact. . . . to get to me. Stephanie was permitted to testify at trial that she had confronted J.S. after hearing that J.S. touched her husband s buttocks, and also described the circumstances surrounding J.S. and defendant s goodbye kiss on J.S. s last day of work. All of those incidents took place in or before March 1997. Stephanie was barred from describing only one incident relating to her husband that occurred later, probably in [19]98, when another Prosecutor s Office employee told Stephanie that [J.S.] says that she s going to have an affair with your husband now that she doesn t have to look at you every day. That last alleged incident was inadmissible hearsay, N.J.R.E. 801(c); State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 152 (2002). Nor was it evidence of the victim s previous sexual conduct within the meaning of the Rape Shield statute. The majority includes in its list of excluded evidence additional remarks J.S. made to Stephanie in September 1998. However, it defies reason to claim that those innocuous statements, made to a friend ( she needed to find a way not to work anymore and to find me a man ), show intent to perform fellatio on the friend s husband in the near future. Defendant also testified at the Rape Shield hearing with respect to J.S. s prior flirtations toward him both inside and outside her workplace. He testified that whenever he saw J.S. at the Prosecutor s Office, she would make a big production of hugging him, and brushing her chest area and . . . her butt area against him. Defendant described flirtatious remarks J.S. made to him, such as she would like to have a white man like me. . . . I spoiled my wife . . . I was too good to my wife . . . I needed somebody like her . . . my wife didn t treat me right. Defendant also testified that in or around July 1998, he happened to see J.S. visiting the Prosecutor s Office and asked her if she was ready to have an affair, and she responded now that I don t have to look at your wife anymore, you re damn right. Defendant invited J.S. to call him. However, she did not accept his offer to call and there was no further contact between them until the early morning of September 28, 1998. The only time J.S. ever initiated contact with defendant away from the Prosecutor s Office was when she called him to help her dispose of the warrant in July 1998, but that occurred only after he visited her home more than once to offer his assistance. A reasonable person would not infer that because J.S. touched and spoke to defendant in a flirtatious manner when she happened to see him, she was agreeing to have defendant to come to her home at 3:30 a.m., a year or more later, to engage in fellatio. Only one of the excluded incidents of flirtatious conduct described by defendant at the Rape Shield hearing took place within a year of the alleged assault: their meeting on the porch in or about July 1998, when J.S. purportedly expressed her interest in having an affair with defendant. Even if such a remark could be probative of affirmative consent to sex two months in the future, and I submit that it is not, its exclusion was harmless error. As the Appellate Division majority noted, the jury was aware of three prior incidents when J.S. allegedly kissed or touched defendant in a sexual way. The omission of this one statement, which was not followed by any affair-like behavior between J.S. and defendant before September 28, 1998, was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. Defendant was permitted to testify at trial in respect of those three acts of prior sexual conduct between himself and J.S. Although they satisfy the prior sexual conduct requirement, they were of miniscule or no probative value. J.S. s grabbing of defendant s buttocks, and their passionate kisses occurring in March 1997 and July 1998 do not indicate to a reasonable person that J.S. consented to perform fellatio on defendant on September 28, 1998. Nonetheless, those episodes and other evidence were placed before the jury allegedly to support the consent defense. Because of the substantial quantity of evidence heard by the jury with respect to the defense of consensual penetration, there was no violation of defendant s right of confrontation, cross-examination or compulsory process. Hence, the excluded evidence was merely cumulative and not critical to the defense. State v. Scherzer, supra, 301 N.J. Super. at 414-16. [State v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487, 491 (Mont. 2001).] I also agree with the Montana Supreme Court that such flirtatious conduct does not even constitute sexual conduct under the Rape Shield Law and is not probative of whether a victim consented forty-eight hours later. Ibid. In contrast, this Court today allows the defense to scrutinize the victim s flirtatious behavior, not merely days before the incident, but weeks, months, or even years before. Such an archaic approach to rape flies in the face of the Legislature s purposes in enacting the Rape Shield Law. NO. A-16 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANDERSON GARRON, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 23, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Coleman