Case Title: New Jersey v. Sims

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                     State v. Anthony Sims, Jr. (A-53-20) (085369)

Argued October 12, 2021 -- Decided March 16, 2022 -- Revised March 16, 2022

PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.

        In this appeal, defendant Anthony Sims, Jr. challenges his conviction of attempted
murder and weapons offenses arising from the April 9, 2014 shooting of P.V. The Court
first considers the Appellate Division majority’s holding that police officers, prior to
interrogation, are required to inform an arrestee of the charges that will be filed against
him, even when no complaint or arrest warrant has been issued identifying those charges.
Here, the divided panel found that the police officers who interrogated defendant violated
his Miranda rights by not providing that information. Second, the Court considers
whether the trial court’s decision to admit at trial P.V.’s prior testimony at a pretrial
hearing violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.

        On April 13, 2014, four days after the shooting, detectives went to the hospital and
met with P.V., who identified defendant as the man who shot him in a recorded
statement. On April 14, 2014, prior to the issuance of any complaint or warrant or the
filing of formal charges against defendant, detectives arrested defendant and conducted a
videorecorded interview. Defendant was read his Miranda rights and he waived those
rights. In an interview that lasted just over two hours, defendant gave a statement in
which he said that he knew P.V., that he was aware of the shooting, and that his girlfriend
owned a vehicle that matched the description of a vehicle observed near the scene of
P.V.’s shooting. Defendant denied that he was involved in the shooting.

        Defendant moved to suppress his April 14, 2014 statement to police. Based on the
totality of the circumstances, the trial court held that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda
rights was knowing and voluntary, and accordingly denied defendant’s motion.
Defendant also moved to suppress P.V.’s April 13, 2014 statement to police at the
hospital. On April 14, 2016, the trial court held a Wade/Henderson hearing, and the State
called P.V. as a witness. During his direct examination, P.V. testified that he
remembered nothing about the incident and had no recollection of telling detectives that
defendant was the person who shot him. When defense counsel cross-examined P.V., he
suggested that he had learned details of the shooting in later conversations with his
mother, reiterated that he had no recollection of the incident or his conversation with
detectives, and stated that he feared the prosecutor’s office and the police department.

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       P.V. was subsequently indicted for the murder of defendant’s brother. Although
offered an immunity agreement by the State and ordered to testify by the trial court, P.V.
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. The trial court permitted the State
to present at trial P.V.’s testimony at the Wade/Henderson hearing as the prior testimony
of an unavailable witness.

        The Appellate Division vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new
trial.  466 N.J. Super. 346, 354-55 (App. Div. 2021). A divided panel held that the police
officers who interrogated defendant violated his Miranda rights. Id. at 361-69. The court
unanimously held that the trial court’s decision to admit at trial P.V.’s prior testimony
violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 377-78.

        The State appealed as of right as to the Miranda issue, and the Court granted
certification on the remaining issues.  246 N.J. 146 (2021).

HELD: The Court declines to adopt the new rule prescribed by the Appellate Division
and finds no plain error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his
statement to police. The Court also concurs with the trial court that the victim’s
testimony at the pretrial hearing was admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A)’s exception
to the hearsay rule for the prior testimony of a witness unavailable at trial, and that the
admission of that testimony did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights.

1. The Court first considers the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion to
suppress his statement to police. Under New Jersey law, the State bears the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a suspect’s waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination prior to an inculpatory statement was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in
light of all the circumstances. In State v. A.G.D., the Court departed from the totality-of-
the-circumstances rule and required law enforcement officers to inform a suspect that a
criminal complaint has been filed or arrest warrant has been issued before interrogating
him.  178 N.J. 56, 68-69 (2003). The Court reasoned that the failure to inform a suspect
that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of
information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. Id. at 68. The
rule announced in A.G.D. is clear and circumscribed. If a complaint-warrant has been
filed or an arrest warrant has been issued against a suspect whom law enforcement
officers seek to interrogate, the officers must disclose that fact to the interrogee and
inform him in a simple declaratory statement of the charges filed against him before any
interrogation. The officers need not speculate about additional charges that may later be
brought or the potential amendment of pending charges. (pp. 23-28)

2. The Appellate Division’s expansion of the rule stated in A.G.D. is unwarranted and
impractical. A.G.D. mandates disclosure of factual information about pending charges
that the officer can readily confirm and clearly convey. The principle stated in A.G.D.
stands in stark contrast to the Appellate Division’s expanded definition of an arrestee’s

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Miranda rights, which relies not on an objective statement of the charges pending against
the arrestee, but on an officer’s prediction, based on information learned to date in a
developing investigation, of what charges may be filed. The Appellate Division’s new
rule would starkly depart from the Court’s prior precedent and from the law of every
other jurisdiction. The Court affirms the trial court’s application of the totality-of-the-
circumstances standard to deny defendant’s motion to suppress his statement. Defendant
was read his Miranda rights and waived those rights verbally and in writing. (pp. 28-33)

3. The Court next considers the trial court’s decision to admit into evidence P.V.’s
testimony at the Wade/Henderson hearing at defendant’s trial. N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A)
authorizes the admission of an unavailable declarant’s testimony from a prior proceeding
if the testimony “is now offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar
motive in the prior trial, hearing or deposition to develop the testimony by examination or
cross-examination.” A declarant who persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject
matter of the statement despite an order of the court to do so is deemed unavailable to
testify at trial. N.J.R.E. 804(a)(2). The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of
proving that the requirements of N.J.R.E. 804 are met. (pp. 33-38)

4. The trial court’s admission of P.V.’s prior testimony constituted a proper application
of N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A). P.V. was unavailable under N.J.R.E. 804(a)(2) because he
confirmed that he would invoke his right against self-incrimination if called as a witness
despite the State’s offer of immunity and the trial court’s order that he testify. At the
Wade/Henderson hearing, defense counsel not only had the opportunity to cross-examine
P.V., as N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A) requires, but thoroughly and skillfully questioned P.V.
The jury had the benefit of that cross-examination when it considered P.V.’s hearing
testimony and assessed his credibility. The State also demonstrated that defendant had a
similar motive at the hearing to develop the testimony because at the hearing, as at trial,
defendant’s motive was to impeach P.V.’s credibility, underscore P.V.’s claimed lack of
recollection, suggest that police coercion was a factor in P.V.’s identification of
defendant, and attack P.V.’s statement as unreliable. (pp. 38-40)

5. The Court considers whether the introduction of P.V.’s statement violated defendant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause. The Federal and State Constitutions provide that
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court
held that the framers of the Constitution intended the Confrontation Clause to bar the
admission of “testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the
declarant is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant had . . . a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”