Case Title: Harrell v. Bowen

Citation: 362 N.C. 142

Docket Number: 587PA06

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
RICHARD HARRELL v. MELVIN BOWEN, Administrator of the Estate of
CHELSON EARL PERRY
No. 587PA06 
FILED: 25 JANUARY 2008
1.
Damages–punitive–no assertion against personal representative
Punitive damages may not be asserted against a defendant’s estate on the basis of
his alleged egregiously wrongful acts (driving while impaired).  N.C.G.S. § 1D-1, which
provides for the award of punitive damages, states as a purpose the punishment and deterrence of
defendant and others; contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, a legislative intent to treat disjunctively
the purposes of punishment and deterrence or the deterrence of defendant and others could not
be discerned.  Neither could an obvious legislative intent to read N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 disjunctively
be inferred from  N.C.G.S. § 1D-26.
2.
Estates–personal representatives–punitive damages claims
The survival statute of N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-1, which allows claims to be asserted
against a personal representative, does not apply to punitive damages.  Chapter 1D (which has
provisions for punitive damages) by its terms prevails over any law to the contrary, and N.C.G.S.
§ 1D-1 precludes a claim for punitive damages against an estate.
Justices NEWBY and HUDSON dissenting.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 179 N.C. App. 857,
635 S.E.2d 498 (2006), affirming an order dismissing plaintiff’s
punitive damages claim entered on 7 November 2005 by Judge
William C. Griffin, Jr. in Superior Court, Martin County.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 15 October 2007.
Keel O’Malley, LLP, by Joseph P. Tunstall, III, for
plaintiff-appellant.
Valentine, Adams, Lamar, Murray, Lewis & Daughtry,
L.L.P., by Kevin N. Lewis, for defendant-appellee.
BRADY, Justice.
In this case we determine whether, as a matter of law,
a claim for punitive damages may be asserted against a decedent’s
estate on the basis of his alleged “egregiously wrongful acts.” 
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We hold that it may not and therefore affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND
On 19 May 2005, plaintiff Richard Harrell filed a
summons and complaint initiating a civil action against Melvin
Bowen (defendant) in his capacity as administrator of Chelson
Earl Perry’s (decedent’s) estate.  In his complaint, plaintiff
stated that he was operating a passenger vehicle traveling
westbound on U.S. Highway 64 on 6 June 2002, at approximately
9:45 p.m.  He asserted that decedent, who was operating another
passenger vehicle traveling eastbound at the time, veered across
the median and struck plaintiff’s vehicle.  Plaintiff further
alleged that decedent was under the influence of alcohol at the
time of the incident and otherwise acted negligently and was
grossly negligent in violation of several North Carolina motor
vehicle safety laws.  In his complaint, plaintiff sought
compensatory damages for pain and suffering, medical bills, lost
wages, and property damage, and he additionally prayed for
punitive damages.
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s punitive damages
claim, pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  On 7
November 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s
motion and subsequently ordered plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, which unanimously affirmed the order
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on 17 October 2006.  Plaintiff then petitioned this Court for
discretionary review, and we allowed the petition on 3 May 2007.
ANALYSIS
The dispositive question before the Court is whether
plaintiff is barred as a matter of law from asserting a claim for
punitive damages against defendant in his capacity as the
administrator of decedent’s estate.  See Newberne v. Dep’t of
Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 784, 618 S.E.2d 201,
203 (2005) (“A motion to dismiss under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
‘is the usual and proper method of testing the legal sufficiency
of the complaint.’” (quoting Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 98, 176
S.E.2d 161, 163 (1970))).  As the Court stated in Newberne, our
task in reviewing the trial court’s order dismissing this claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to inquire “whether, as a matter of
law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under some legal theory.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
I. “The Purpose of Punitive Damages” in N.C.G.S. § 1D-1
[1] Plaintiff contends that N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 sets forth
the controlling legal theory upon which his claim for punitive
damages may rest.  This statute provides:  “Punitive damages may
be awarded, in an appropriate case and subject to the provisions
of this Chapter, to punish a defendant for egregiously wrongful
acts and to deter the defendant and others from committing
similar wrongful acts.”  N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 (2005) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff asserts that punitive damages may be awarded to deter
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others from similar wrongful acts, even though it is obvious that
decedent could neither be punished for any wrongdoing nor
deterred from committing similar wrongful acts in the future.
It is axiomatic that “[w]hen the language of a statute
is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to
give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial
construction of legislative intent is not required.”  See Diaz v.
Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)
(citation omitted).  This Court has also stated that
“[o]rdinarily, when the conjunctive ‘and’ connects words, phrases
or clauses of a statutory sentence, they are to be considered
jointly.”  Lithium Corp. of Am. v. Town of Bessemer City, 261
N.C. 532, 535, 135 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1964) (citation omitted).  In
Sale v. Johnson, this Court recognized a limited number of
circumstances in which the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive
“or” could be interchanged by a court when applying a statute,
one of which is “to effectuate the obvious intention of the
legislature.”  258 N.C. 749, 755-56, 129 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1963)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, we can discern no
obvious legislative intent to treat the purposes of punishment
and deterrence disjunctively in N.C.G.S. § 1D-1.  The same must
be said for the purpose of deterring a defendant and that of
deterring others.  As this Court has clearly stated, “Chapter 1D
reinforces the common-law purpose behind punitive damages.” 
Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 167, 594 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2004)
(citing N.C.G.S. § 1D-1).  Plaintiff cites no authority preceding
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the enactment of Chapter 1D in 1995 in which this Court held that
the purpose of deterring others, standing alone, was sufficient
to support an award of punitive damages.  In fact, when this
Court has identified the purpose of deterring others, that
purpose has consistently been coupled with the purpose of
punishing a wrongdoer.  See, e.g., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins.
Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976) (“North
Carolina has consistently allowed punitive damages solely on the
basis of its policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter
others from similar behavior.” (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)); Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118,
134, 225 S.E.2d 797, 807 (1976) (stating that punitive damages
“are usually allowed to punish defendant and deter others”
(emphasis added)).  Nor has this Court interpreted N.C.G.S. § 1D-
1 as abrogating the pre-existing common law.  See, e.g., Rhyne,
358 N.C. at 176, 594 S.E.2d at 12 (“A plaintiff’s recovery of
punitive damages is fortuitous, as such damages are assessed
solely as a means to punish the willful and wanton actions of
defendants and, unlike compensatory damages, do not vest in a
plaintiff upon injury.” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff contends this obvious legislative intent to
have courts read “and” as a disjunctive “or” in N.C.G.S. § 1D-1
is found in N.C.G.S. § 1D-26.  This statute exempts from the
“statutory cap” on punitive damages claims established by
N.C.G.S. § 1D-25 any punitive damages sought “for injury or harm
arising from a defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle if the
actions of the defendant in operating the motor vehicle would
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give rise to an offense of driving while impaired under G.S.
20-138.1 [impaired driving generally], 20-138.2 [impaired driving
while operating a commercial vehicle], or 20-138.5 [habitual
impaired driving].”  N.C.G.S. § 1D-26 (2005).  We certainly
acknowledge the General Assembly’s intent in section 1D-26 to
punish individuals more severely for driving while impaired than
for other tortious conduct by exempting such claims from section
1D-25(b).  However, we cannot infer from section 1D-26 an obvious
intent to have courts read “and” as a disjunctive in section 1D-
1, which governs all punitive damages claims.
Because we discern no obvious legislative intent to the
contrary, we are constrained to apply the plain meaning of
N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. 
Plaintiff concedes that decedent can no longer be punished or
deterred for whatever “egregiously wrongful acts” he may have
committed before his death.  As a consequence, plaintiff is
precluded as a matter of law from asserting his claim for
punitive damages under N.C.G.S. § 1D-1.
II. Survival of Actions Against Personal Representative
[2] Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that N.C.G.S.
§ 28A-18-1 allows any claims he may have asserted against
decedent to survive against defendant as the administrator of
decedent’s estate, including his claim for punitive damages. 
This statute provides:
   (a) Upon the death of any person, all
demands whatsoever, and rights to prosecute
or defend any action or special proceeding,
existing in favor of or against such person,
except as provided in subsection (b) hereof,
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shall survive to and against the personal
representative or collector of his estate.
   (b) The following rights of action in
favor of a decedent do not survive:
 (1) Causes of action for libel and for
slander, except slander of title;
 (2) Causes of action for false imprisonment;
 (3) Causes of action where the relief sought
could not be enjoyed, or granting it
would be nugatory after death.
N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-1 (2005).  Although punitive damages claims are
not expressly excepted by this statute, the General Assembly has
mandated that Chapter 1D prevails over “any other law to the
contrary” with respect to such claims.  N.C.G.S. § 1D-10 (2005). 
Thus, since N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 precludes plaintiff from asserting a
claim for punitive damages against defendant, plaintiff cannot
rely upon the “survival statute” to procure a different result.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages against defendant must fail as a matter of law. 
Thus, the trial court did not err when it ordered plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages dismissed, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
No. 587PA06 - Harrell v. Bowen
Justice NEWBY dissenting.
I agree with the majority that our common law has
traditionally viewed punitive damages as valuable for punishing a
wrongdoer and deterring others and that Chapter 1D reinforces the
common law in this regard.  However, I believe the majority
misconstrues the framework for punitive damages enacted by the
General Assembly.  When Chapter 1D is examined in its entirety,
the intent of the legislature becomes clear:  a jury is permitted
to award punitive damages despite the death of the tortfeasor. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Chapter 1D has several sections which are typical of
other chapters in the North Carolina General Statutes.  Section
1D-1 describes the broad policy of punitive damages.  Section 1D-
5 provides definitions applicable to the Chapter.  Section 1D-10
details the scope of the Chapter, and section 1D-15 delineates
the “[s]tandards for recovery of punitive damages.”  
In particular, section 1D-15 states:  “Punitive damages
may be awarded only if the claimant proves that the defendant is
liable for compensatory damages and that one of the following
aggravating factors[: (1) fraud, (2) malice, or (3) willful or
wanton conduct] was present and was related to the injury for
which compensatory damages were awarded.”  N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a)
(2007).  Moreover, “[t]he claimant must prove the existence of an
aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence.”  Id. § 1D-
15(b) (2007).  Once the plaintiff meets the requirements of this
section, the jury must determine in its discretion whether or not
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to award punitive damages.  See id. § 1D-35 (2007).  Notably,
neither section 1D-15 nor any other section of Chapter 1D limits
punitive damages to situations in which a plaintiff can establish
the presence of every stated statutory purpose for the award of
punitive damages.  Instead, with regard to the statutory purposes
of punitive damages, Chapter 1D requires only that, once
plaintiff has established eligibility under section 1D-15, the
jury “consider” those purposes when “determining the amount of
punitive damages, if any, to be awarded.”  Id. § 1D-35(1).
The North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions illustrate
the approach intended by the legislature.  First, the jury must
answer, “Is the defendant liable to the plaintiff for punitive
damages?”  2 N.C.P.I.--Civ. 810.96, at 1 (gen. civ. vol. May
2001).  “On this issue the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
prove three things.”  Id.  The plaintiff must first prove the
existence of an aggravating factor by clear and convincing
evidence.  Id., at 2.  The plaintiff also must prove by the
greater weight of the evidence that the aggravating factor was
related to the injury and that the defendant participated in the
wrongful conduct.  Id., at 2-3.  If the plaintiff satisfies its
burden of proof on these three issues, it is the jury’s duty to
answer “Yes” and find the defendant liable to the plaintiff for
punitive damages.  Id., at 3.
If the jury determines the defendant is liable to the
plaintiff for punitive damages, it must then answer a second
question:  “What amount of punitive damages, if any, does the
jury in its discretion award to the plaintiff?”  2 N.C.P.I.--Civ.
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810.98, at 1 (gen. civ. vol. May 1996).  At this point, the jury
is instructed to consider the purposes of punitive damages
because any amount awarded should bear a rational relationship to
those purposes.  Id., at 2-3.  
Thus, neither Chapter 1D nor the Pattern Jury
Instructions make plaintiff’s eligibility for an award contingent
upon satisfying all of the statutory purposes of punitive
damages.  Rather, they give the jury discretion to determine the
appropriate amount of an award with reference to the statutory
purposes.  The jury is free to consider a defendant’s death when
using its discretion to determine the award amount, just as the
jury would be permitted to consider that a living defendant
should be punished even though it believed any deterrent effect
would be small or nonexistent.  See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d
470, 474-75 (Tex. 1984) (concluding punitive, or exemplary,
damages could be collected from the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor after discussing the “equally important considerations
other than punishment of the wrongdoer” recognized in Texas as
purposes for punitive damages); Perry v. Melton, 171 W. Va. 397,
401, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1982) (holding punitive damages could be
collected from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor because
“[p]unitive damages in [West Virginia] serve other equally
important functions and are supported by public policy interests
going beyond simple punishment of the wrongdoer”).
In contrast to the statutory structure and the Pattern
Jury Instructions, the majority incorporates the statutory
purposes of punitive damages into section 1D-15.  The majority
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holds that punitive damages cannot be awarded unless the
plaintiff meets the criteria in section 1D-15 and establishes
that the punitive damages will punish the defendant, deter the
defendant, and deter others.  If the legislature intended the
purposes of punitive damages to be treated as prerequisites for
an award, it would have included those purposes in section 1D-15. 
The General Assembly’s use of the word “purposes” in
Chapter 1D is equally significant.  Although the title of section
1D-1 is “[p]urpose of punitive damages,” language in other
sections of the Chapter indicates there are several “purposes”
for awarding punitive damages.  See N.C.G.S. §§ 1D-5(6) (2007)
(“‘Punitive damages’ means extracompensatory damages awarded for
the purposes set forth in G.S. 1D-1.”), -35(1) (“In determining
the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be awarded” the jury
“[s]hall consider the purposes of punitive damages set forth in
G.S. 1D-1.”); see also Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C.
364, 371, 90 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1956) (stating that a statute’s
caption cannot control the unambiguous text of the statute). 
Viewing Chapter 1D in its entirety reveals the legislature’s
intent that section 1D-1 be interpreted as a broad policy
statement that includes the three purposes of punitive damages
recognized in North Carolina:  (1) punishing defendants, (2)
deterring defendants, and (3) deterring others.  When section 1D-
1 is viewed as a list of purposes to be considered in determining
the amount of an award rather than a list of prerequisites, the
General Assembly’s use of the conjunctive rather than the
disjunctive becomes irrelevant.
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In addition, unlike the majority’s interpretation,
concluding that Chapter 1D permits a punitive damages award
against a deceased defendant is consistent with North Carolina’s
survival statute.  See N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-1 (2007).  A punitive
damage award against a deceased defendant is permitted under the
survival statute which states that “all demands whatsoever, and
rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding,
existing in favor of or against” a deceased person “shall survive
to and against the personal representative or collector of his
estate.”  Id. § 28A-18-1(a).  Although certain rights of action
in favor of a decedent do not survive, see id. § 28-18-1(b), no
actions or demands against a decedent are excepted from section
28A-18-1(a).
Here, plaintiff’s allegations, treated as true, are
sufficient to satisfy the eligibility requirements for a claim
for punitive damages under section 1D-15.  As such, this claim
should not have been dismissed.  Plaintiff is not required to
prove that all three statutory purposes of punitive damages will
be furthered by an award.  Rather, should it determine
plaintiff’s allegations are true, the jury should decide the
appropriate size of an award, if any, taking into consideration
the death of the tortfeasor as it relates to the purposes of
punitive damages stated in section 1D-1.
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.