Case Title: Gibson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 628, 2011

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NEAL GIBSON,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
                     Plaintiff Below- 
          Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 628, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1005002098  
§                      1005002161 
§ 
§ 
 
                                        Submitted:  April 10, 2012 
 
Decided:  
April 20, 2012 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 20th day of April 2012, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The defendant-appellant, Neal Gibson, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s November 2, 2011 violation of probation (“VOP”) 
sentencing order.  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved 
to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on 
 
2
the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) The record before us reflects that, in May 2010, Gibson entered a 
plea of guilty to Possession With Intent to Deliver Marijuana in Cr. ID No. 
1005002098.  He was sentenced to 5 years of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended for 18 months at Level III probation.  In January 2011, Gibson 
entered a plea of guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree in Cr. ID No. 
1005002161.  He was sentenced to 6 years of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after 1 year for 1 year at Level II probation.   
 
(3) At a VOP hearing on November 2, 2011, the Superior Court 
found that Gibson had committed a VOP with respect to both of his criminal 
convictions.  With respect to the first, he was re-sentenced to 3 years at 
Level V, with credit for 27 days previously served.  With respect to the 
second, he was re-sentenced to 5 years at Level V, to be suspended after 2 
years for 1 year at Level III. 
 
(4) In this appeal, Gibson first claims that the Superior Court 
violated standards of due process and Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1 at 
his VOP hearing.  Essentially, he argues that he did not receive an adequate 
opportunity to defend himself against the State’s charges.  Second, Gibson 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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claims that the attorney who represented him at the VOP hearing provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Third, Gibson claims that his VOP 
sentences were unduly harsh, reflecting that the sentencing judge imposed 
sentence with a “closed mind.”  
 
(5) The transcript of the VOP hearing belies Gibson’s claim of an 
inadequate opportunity to defend against the State’s charges.  A VOP 
hearing is neither a criminal prosecution nor a formal trial and only minimal 
requirements of due process must be observed.2  The transcript reflects that 
Gibson was represented by counsel at the VOP hearing.  Counsel was 
prepared to address the charges against his client—new charges of Burglary 
in the Second Degree and Possession With Intent to Distribute Marijuana.  
Counsel cross-examined both police officers and the probation officer who 
testified on behalf of the State.  Counsel also argued to the presiding judge 
that his client had a serious drug problem and requested a lesser sentence 
than the State had been requested.  The transcript reflects that the evidence 
against Gibson was overwhelming.  In the absence of any evidence that the 
requirements of Rule 32.1 were not met, we conclude that Gibson’s first 
claim is without merit. 
                                                 
2 Perry v. State, 741 A.2d 359, 362-63 (Del. 1999) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 782 (1973)). 
 
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(6) Gibson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is equally 
unavailing.  Even assuming that Gibson may assert an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim in connection with his VOP hearing,3 this Court does not 
entertain an ineffectiveness claim asserted for the first time on direct appeal 
where the trial court has not been given an opportunity to fully adjudicate it.4  
Gibson did not present his claim to the Superior Court in the first instance.  
We, therefore, decline to address it here. 
 
(7) Finally, Gibson claims that the sentencing judge imposed 
sentence with a “closed mind.”  This Court reviews a defendant’s sentence 
for a) unconstitutionality; b) factual predicates that are false, impermissible 
or that lack minimum indicia of reliability; c) judicial vindictiveness, bias or 
sentencing with a “closed mind”; or d) any other illegality.5  The transcript 
of Gibson’s VOP hearing fails to support Gibson’s contention that the judge 
imposed his sentence with a “closed mind.”  Although the judge stated that 
he did not “see any basis for leniency,” that statement was justified in light 
of Gibson’s violations.  Also, the sentences imposed were within the 
statutory limits and were not illegal.6  We find no error or abuse of discretion 
                                                 
3 Jones v. State, 560 A.2d 1056, 1057 (Del. 1989). 
4 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
5 Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 83 (Del. 1997).  
6 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
 
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on the part of the Superior Court in imposing Gibson’s sentences.  
Therefore, Gibson’s third claim is likewise without merit. 
 
(8) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
          Justice