Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1141281

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
02/05/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1141281
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Devonte Cortes Acosta
v.
State of Alabama)
(Morgan Circuit Court, CC-13-897;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-1763)
STUART, Justice.
1141281
Devonte Cortes Acosta was convicted of first-degree
burglary and was sentenced to 156 months in prison.  The Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction and sentence. 
Acosta v. State, [Ms. CR-13-1763, May 29, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. Crim. App. 2015).  The State petitioned for certiorari
review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision.  We reverse
and remand.
The evidence presented at trial indicates that on the day
of the burglary, James W. Benford, Sr., and two of his three
sons were in their house when three armed black men entered
the house, demanded to know where Benford's absent son was,
and stated that they wanted their "property" back from the
absent son.  The men left after rummaging through the house. 
Benford and the two sons who were present during the burglary
testified that they recognized Acosta and R.J.  as two of
1
three armed men who had entered Benford's house.
Detective Josh Fisher testified that, during his
investigation, Benford, the two sons who were present during
the burglary, and R.J. provided statements.  On cross-
examination, Detective Fisher testified that Benford's trial
Because 
R.J. 
was 
granted 
youthful-offender 
status, 
we 
are
1
using initials instead of his name.
2
1141281
testimony differed from his statement given during the
investigation.  Fisher testified that, unlike Benford's trial
testimony in which Benford identified Acosta and R.J. as two
of the three men who entered his house, in the statement he
gave on the day of the incident Benford stated that he could
not identify any of the men who had entered his house. 
In his defense, Acosta maintained that he was not
involved in the burglary.  In support of his defense, Acosta
testified that at the time of the burglary he was with his
brother and that he did not participate in the burglary. 
R.J.'s mother testified that Acosta was not with R.J. at the
time of the burglary.  She stated that Acosta and his younger
brother arrived at her house shortly after R.J. had left. 
According to R.J.'s mother, Acosta waited at her house awhile,
then left her house minutes before R.J. and "a couple of other
little fellows" returned.  Acosta's brother testified that he
and Acosta were together at the time of the burglary,
confirmed the testimony of R.J.'s mother, and stated that he
and Acosta did not burglarize Benford's house.  Acosta called
R.J. as a witness, but R.J. refused to answer any questions,
instead invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-
3
1141281
incrimination.  Acosta then called Detective Fisher as a
defense witness and asked him if R.J. had indicated to him
whether Acosta was involved in the burglary.  The State
entered a hearsay objection, and Acosta argued that R.J., in
light of his invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, was
unavailable but that testimony as to his statement should be
admitted into evidence through Detective Fisher.  After much
discussion, including a statement by Acosta's counsel that
"Acosta has every right to maintain a defense," the trial
court determined that Detective Fisher's testimony about the
contents of R.J.'s statement was hearsay and that it was not
admissible under any exception to the general hearsay rule. 
A jury found Acosta guilty of first-degree burglary. 
Acosta moved the trial court to set aside the jury's verdict
and to order a new trial.  In his motion, Acosta argued that
he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense
when the trial court refused to admit Detective Fisher's
hearsay testimony to the effect that R.J. had told him that
Acosta was not present during the burglary.  After citing
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Ex parte
Griffin, 790 So. 2d 351 (Ala. 2000), Acosta argued:
4
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"[Acosta] contends that [R.J.'s] statement was
due to be heard by the jury.  They should have been
given the opportunity to consider this exculpatory
statement regarding [Acosta].  This was an essential
element of his defense  –- [R.J.'s] statement being
admitted into evidence.  The statement was to the
effect that [Acosta] was not present with [R.J.] at
a burglary.  The statement was also given following
a confession, which will likely be relied upon by
the State in the subsequent prosecution.  The cases
cited herein reference the court's rulings that the
accused has the right to present a defense, and the
inadmissibility of [R.J.'s] statement in this case,
was essential to that defense.  It was exculpatory,
and the witness was unavailable due to his claiming
his privileges extended to him by the 5th Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution[;] thus, [Acosta] had no
other means by which to introduce this statement. 
Without the admission of that exculpatory statement
by the unavailable [R.J.], [Acosta] was denied his
right to present a defense, inherent in the United
States Constitution."
The trial court summarily denied Acosta's motion to set aside
the jury's verdict.  
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Acosta contended
that the trial court improperly prevented him from presenting
his defense that he was not present during the burglary at
trial by refusing to admit into evidence Detective Fisher's
hearsay testimony concerning R.J.'s statement.  After
concluding that Acosta's argument was properly preserved for
appellate review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence Detective
5
1141281
Fisher's hearsay testimony regarding R.J.'s statement.  That
court reasoned that the trial court's strict application of
the hearsay rule deprived Acosta of the ability to present a
complete defense.  The State petitioned this Court for
certiorari review of the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
First, the State maintains that the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in holding that Acosta preserved his argument
that the trial court's strict application of the hearsay rule
to exclude Detective Fisher's hearsay testimony rendered his
trial 
fundamentally 
unfair 
and 
deprived 
him 
of 
his
constitutional right to present a defense.  We agree with the
State that Acosta's general statement that he had a right to
maintain a defense did not sufficiently apprise the trial
court of his constitutional argument that the strict
application of the hearsay rule to prohibit the admission of
Detective Fisher's testimony regarding R.J.'s statement would
render his trial fundamentally unfair and deprive him of his
constitutional right to present a defense.  See Ex parte
Works, 640 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Ala. 1994)("The purpose of
requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for
6
1141281
appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice of the
alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it before the
case is submitted to the jury.").
However, upon review of the entirety of Acosta's argument
when seeking to admit Detective Fisher's hearsay 
testimony and
his argument in his motion for a new trial, we conclude that
the Court of Criminal Appeals properly held that this issue
was preserved for appellate review.  "'[A] motion for a new
trial ... is not sufficient to preserve the issue where no
timely objection was made at the time the evidence was offered
and admitted.'"  Smith v. State, 756 So. 2d 892, 905 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1997)(quoting Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717
(Ala. Crim. App. 1989)).  In this case, when attempting to
admit the evidence, Acosta did argue that Detective Fisher's
hearsay testimony to the effect that R.J., who had admitted to
law-enforcement officers that he had participated in the
burglary, had told him that Acosta was not present at the 
burglary was important to develop Acosta's defense that he was
not present during the burglary.  Therefore, Acosta did, at
the time the evidence was admitted, argue that the evidence
was integral to his defense.  Then, in his motion for a new
7
1141281
trial, Acosta further developed the argument, cited caselaw,
and unequivocally argued that the trial court's strict
application of the hearsay rule to exclude Detective Fisher's
hearsay testimony deprived him of his defense, rendered his
trial fundamentally unfair, and deprived him of due process. 
Cf.  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n. 3.  Upon consideration of
the entirety of the argument made by Acosta's counsel when
seeking to admit Detective Fisher's hearsay testimony at 
trial
and the additional development of the argument in Acosta's
motion for a new trial, we conclude that Acosta adequately
presented to the trial court the argument he made on appeal,
that he provided the trial court with an opportunity to
address the alleged error, and that he properly preserved the
argument for appellate review.   
Next, the State maintains that, even if the issue was
preserved, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that
the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence Detective
Fisher's hearsay testimony to the effect that R.J. had stated
that Acosta was not present during the burglary prohibited
Acosta from presenting a complete defense, rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair, and deprived him of due process.
8
1141281
According to the State, the holding of the Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with Chambers.  
In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court held that
"where 
constitutional 
rights 
directly 
affecting 
the
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may
not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 
410 U.S. at 302.  In Chambers, the trial court's application
of the rules of evidence prohibited Leon Chambers, the
defendant, from presenting evidence of a third party's
culpability. Chambers was charged with killing Aaron Liberty. 
At trial, Chambers maintained that he did not shoot Liberty. 
In support of his defense, Chambers presented testimony from
Gable McDonald, who had given a sworn statement to Chambers's
counsel, that McDonald had shot Liberty.  
On 
cross-examination
by the State, McDonald repudiated his confession 
and 
testified
that he did not shoot Liberty and that he confessed to the
crime in order to receive favorable treatment from law
enforcement.  When Chambers attempted to challenge McDonald's
renunciation of his confession by having him declared an
adverse 
witness, 
the 
trial 
court, 
applying 
Mississippi's 
rules
of evidence, denied Chambers's request.  Additionally, the
9
1141281
trial 
court, 
applying 
Mississippi's 
rules 
of 
evidence, 
refused
to admit testimony from individuals to whom McDonald had
admitted that he shot Liberty.  In reaching its conclusion
that the trial court's application of the rules of evidence
prevented Chambers from developing his defense that another,
not he,  shot Liberty, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the evidence the trial court refused to admit was
critical to Chambers's defense.  The United States Supreme
Court reasoned that because the strict application of
Mississippi's rules of evidence had prohibited the admission
of critical evidence in Chambers's defense, the trial court's
strict application of those rules to exclude the critical
evidence denied Chambers a trial that complied with due
process.  410 U.S. at 302.
In Ex parte Griffin, 790 So. 2d 351 (Ala. 2000), this
Court applied Chambers.  In Ex parte Griffin, the State
charged Louis Griffin with the murder of Christopher Davis
after he had admitted, while pleading guilty to various
offenses in federal court, that he had participated in the
murder.  At trial, Griffin's defense was that he did not kill
Davis and that he had lied to the federal court in his
10
1141281
allocution to receive favorable treatment.  To support this
defense, 
Griffin 
attempted 
to 
present 
evidence 
indicating 
that
two other men had been charged with killing Davis; that one of
the men, Anthony Embry, had admitted under oath in court that
he had killed Davis; that Embry had been convicted of Davis's
murder; that Embry had been incarcerated for the conviction;
and that a state court had dismissed Embry's conviction ex
mero motu.  The trial court, applying the Alabama Rules of
Evidence, 
refused 
to 
admit 
the 
evidence 
of 
Embry's
culpability.  This Court, recognizing that the evidence of
Embry's 
confession 
and 
conviction 
was 
critical 
in 
establishing Griffin's defense that another, not he, killed
Davis, held that the trial court's ruling excluding the
evidence with regard to Embry's confession and conviction
prohibited Griffin from presenting his defense to the jury and
violated his due-process rights under the 5th and 6th
Amendments. 
The holdings in both Chambers and Griffin rest upon the
fact that the trial court's strict application of the rules of
evidence excluded critical evidence proffered by the defense,
and the exclusion of the critical evidence resulted in the
11
1141281
defendants' being denied their constitutional right to a fair
trial and due process.  Critical evidence is defined as
"[e]vidence strong enough that its presence could tilt a
juror's mind."  Black's Law Dictionary 674 (10th ed. 2014). 
In both Chambers and Griffin, the excluded evidence was
critical to the defense because each defendant had denied
participation in the offense and the excluded evidence
indicated that another individual had admitted to committing
the offense.  When a defendant denies participation in an
offense, evidence indicating that someone else has 
admitted to
committing the offense and that that admission excludes the
defendant as the offender, as it did in Chambers and Griffin,
may be strong enough to influence a juror.  Thus, depending on
the facts of the case, the strict application of the rules of
evidence to exclude critical evidence may render a trial
fundamentally unfair. 
Upon review of the record, we conclude that Acosta's
fundamental rights to a fair trial and to due process were not
violated by the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence
Detective Fisher's hearsay testimony because Detective
Fisher's hearsay testimony was not critical to Acosta's
12
1141281
defense.  The testimony at trial indicated that three men were
involved in the burglary of Benford's house.  Witnesses
identified both Acosta and R.J. as two of the men who entered
Benford's house.  Acosta, in his defense, testified that he
was not present during the burglary.  In addition to his
testimony, Acosta presented testimony from R.J.'s mother and
from his brother indicating that he was not with R.J. during
the commission of the burglary.  Detective Fisher's hearsay
testimony that R.J. told him that Acosta was not present
during the burglary, if admitted, would have been cumulative
evidence. 
 
Therefore, 
Detective 
Fisher's 
hearsay 
testimony 
was
not critical evidence.  Unlike the evidence in Chambers and
Griffin, which was the only means the defendants in those
cases had of presenting their defenses, Detective Fisher's
hearsay testimony was not the only means Acosta had of
presenting his defense.  Because Detective Fisher's hearsay
testimony was not critical evidence for Acosta's defense, the
trial court's exclusion of Detective Fisher's hearsay
testimony did not deny Acosta a "trial in accord with
traditional and fundamental standards of due process." 
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
13
1141281
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to that
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
14
1141281
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial
court's "strict application of the hearsay rule deprived
[Devonte Cortes] Acosta of the ability to present a complete
defense to the jury." Acosta v. State, [Ms. CR-13-1763, May
29, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). "'[T]he
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a "meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."'" Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)); see also McWhorter v. State, 142
So. 3d 1195, 1255-56 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (recognizing a
criminal defendant's right to present a complete defense). In
this case, I believe that, under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973), and Ex parte Griffin, 790 So. 2d 351 (Ala.
2000), 
the 
trial 
court 
applied 
the 
hearsay 
rule
"'mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.'" Griffin,
790 So. 2d at 354 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302). I
therefore respectfully dissent.
In Chambers, Leon Chambers was accused of murdering a
police officer named Aaron Liberty. However, another person,
Gable McDonald, provided a sworn statement confessing to the
15
1141281
crime for which Chambers had been charged. McDonald also made
three other statements declaring that he shot Liberty. One
month later, McDonald changed his story and repudiated his
prior sworn confession. The case against Chambers went to
trial. Chambers wanted to admit McDonald's confession, 
but 
the
trial court would not allow it because it was hearsay. When
the State refused to call McDonald as a witness, Chambers
called him and asked the court for permission to treat him as
a hostile witness. The trial court denied Chambers's request
under a Mississippi rule of evidence forbidding a party from
cross-examining his own witness. 
Chambers was convicted, and his case eventually went to
the United States Supreme Court, which held:
"Few rights are more fundamental than that of an
accused to present witnesses in his own defense.
E.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948). In the exercise of this right, the
accused, as is required of the State, must comply
with established rules of procedure and evidence
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in
the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although
perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected
or more frequently applied in jury trials than that
applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions
tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which
in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long
existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court
here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness
16
1141281
and thus was well within the basic rationale of the
exception for declarations against interest. That
testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. In
these circumstances, where constitutional rights
directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.
"We 
conclude 
that the 
exclusion of 
this critical
evidence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental
standards of due process. In reaching this judgment,
we establish no new principles of constitutional
law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in
the respect traditionally accorded to the States in
the establishment and implementation of their own
criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances
of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived
Chambers of a fair trial."
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Griffin, Louis Griffin was convicted of
murdering Christopher Davis. Another man, Anthony Embry, had
pleaded guilty to Davis's murder. However, almost four years
later, Griffin stated in an allocution that he had
participated in Davis's murder. As a result, the State
exonerated Embry and charged Griffin with Davis's murder. At
trial, Griffin claimed that he lied in his allocution so that
he would receive favorable treatment. Griffin also sought to
17
1141281
introduce Embry's guilty plea into evidence, but the trial
court refused. 
Griffin's case ultimately reached this Court, which
determined 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
violated 
Griffin's
constitutional right to present a defense. Griffin, 790 So. 2d
at 353. The Court noted that Alabama had long recognized a
defendant's right to prove that somebody else committed the
crime, but it held that the evidence must be probative, not
speculative. To that end, the Court developed the following
three-element test to determine whether such evidence was
admissible: "(1) the evidence 'must relate to the "res gestae"
of the crime'; (2) the evidence must exclude the accused as a
perpetrator of the offense; and (3) the evidence 'would have
to be admissible if the third party was on trial.'" Griffin,
790 So. 2d at 354. 
As to the claim that Embry's guilty plea was hearsay, 
this Court cited Chambers for the proposition that, "'[i]n
these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly
affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the
18
1141281
ends of justice.'" Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 354 (quoting
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302). This Court then held:
"We are faced with the same general situation
here [as was the Supreme Court in Chambers]. Without
Embry's plea, Griffin will not be able to place his
defense before a jury; to bar him from placing his
defense 
before 
the 
jury 
would 
violate 
his
due-process rights under the 5th and 6th Amendments.
Furthermore, 
as 
we 
have 
noted 
above, 
this
alternative theory of the crime that Griffin sought
to present is not speculative, but probative, and
Embry's plea, along with the evidence of the arrests
and the exoneration, is some of the strongest
evidence Griffin could present to the jury to prove
that someone else committed the crime. Rather than
violate Griffin's right to due process, we follow
the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Chambers and hold that Griffin's constitutional
rights supersede the hearsay rule in the Alabama
Rules of Evidence. However, in doing so, we note
that not in every case will the defendant's right to
present his defense supersede the hearsay rule; it
will supersede that rule only in those cases that,
as indicated by the first two elements of the test
stated above, have a probative alternative theory of
culpability and not an alternative theory that is
merely speculative and meant only to confuse the
jury."
Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 355.
Like the defendants in Chambers and Griffin, Acosta
attempted to present evidence indicating that R.J. committed
the crime instead of him. Also like Chambers and Griffin, this
case involves "'constitutional rights directly affecting the
ascertainment of guilt,'" which means that "'the hearsay rule
19
1141281
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice.'" Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 354 (quoting Chambers, 410
U.S. at 302). R.J.'s statement would have been admissible
under Griffin's three-element test and would have been "some
of the strongest evidence [Acosta] could present to the jury
to prove that someone else committed the crime." Griffin, 790
So. 2d at 355. Moreover, if R.J.'s statement were admitted,
the State still would have had the right to cross-examine
Detective Fisher regarding R.J.'s statement, which would have
allowed the jury to determine whether the evidence was
credible. Thus, under those circumstances, I believe that
R.J.'s statement should have been admitted in order to
guarantee Acosta's right to present a "complete defense."
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. 
The main opinion reads Chambers and Griffin more
narrowly, reasoning that their holdings "rest upon the fact
that the trial court's strict application of the rules of
evidence excluded critical evidence ...." ___ So. 3d at ___
(emphasis added). The main opinion then provides a definition
of what constitutes "critical" evidence and concludes that the
evidence in this case was not "critical." See ___ So. 3d at
20
1141281
___. However, even though Chambers described the evidence in
that case as "critical," the rule enunciated in Chambers was
not limited solely to "critical" evidence. As the Supreme
Court enunciated in Chambers: "In these circumstances, where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of
guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 410 U.S. at
302. This is the rule from Chambers that was followed in
Griffin, which likewise did not limit Chambers's application
to "critical" evidence. See Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 354-55. I
therefore believe that the main opinion construes Chambers 
and
Griffin too narrowly. 
Moreover, even if Chambers and Griffin apply only to
"critical" evidence, I believe that R.J.'s statement would
qualify as "critical" evidence in this case. The main opinion
defines 
"critical 
evidence" 
as 
"'[e]vidence 
strong 
enough 
that
its presence could tilt a juror's mind.'" ___ So. 3d at ___
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 674 (10th ed. 2014)). The main
opinion concludes that Detective Fisher's testimony regarding
R.J.'s statement was not critical because it was cumulative.
However, as Griffin noted, an admission from an assailant "is
21
1141281
some of the strongest evidence [a defendant] could present to
the jury to prove that someone else committed the crime."
Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 355. The jury already had conflicting
testimony in this case, but a statement from R.J. that he
committed the crime and that Acosta was not with him when he
committed it might have created the reasonable 
doubt 
necessary
to acquit Acosta. I therefore cannot agree that Detective
Fisher's 
testimony 
regarding 
R.J.'s 
statement 
was 
not 
critical
evidence. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
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1141281
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  Of particular concern, in my
view, is the issue whether the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), is
apposite to a case such as this (as presumed by the parties
and the main opinion) where the potential exculpation of the
defendant is not a function of a hearsay declarant's
inculpation of himself.
Whether Chambers and Similar Cases are Apposite 
It might be argued that the holding in Chambers v.
Mississippi was limited to the unusual facts of that case. 
Chambers 
involved 
an 
arguably 
antiquated 
evidentiary 
"voucher"
rule that prohibited the defendant, Chambers, from impeaching
through "cross-examination" the trial testimony of his own
witness, McDonald.  At trial, McDonald had repudiated his
earlier out-of-court statement that he, rather than Chambers,
had committed the criminal act at issue.  This bar to the
cross-examination of McDonald as a hostile witness, when
combined with the exclusion on hearsay grounds of testimony
from several other prospective witnesses as to 
similar 
out-of-
court statements by McDonald, was held by the Supreme Court to
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1141281
violate Chambers's due-process right to present his defense. 
The Chambers Court appeared to emphasize that its holding was
limited to the unique facts of that case, however:
"We 
conclude 
that the 
exclusion of 
this critical
evidence [from other witnesses based on hearsay
grounds], coupled with the State's refusal to permit
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald [because of the
'voucher rule'], denied [Chambers] a trial in accord
with traditional and fundamental standards of due
process. In reaching this judgment, we establish no
new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our
holding signal any diminution in the respect
traditionally accorded to the States in the
establishment and implementation of their own
criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances
of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived
Chambers of a fair trial."
 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03 (emphasis added).
Consistent with this declaration, the State of Alabama
argues here that Chambers should in fact be limited to the
facts of that case.  There is much from a policy standpoint --
particularly with respect to the integrity of rules of
evidence designed to promote reliable outcomes -- to commend
the State's argument.  And without question this is a
confusing area of the law.  The United States Supreme Court
itself has evidenced it own uncertainty as to the reach and
meaning of Chambers. In Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53
24
1141281
(1996), the Supreme Court cautioned against reading Chambers
too broadly, stating:
"Thus, the holding of Chambers -- if one can be
discerned from such a fact-intensive case -- is
certainly not that a defendant is denied 'a fair
opportunity 
to 
defend 
against 
the 
State's
accusations' whenever 'critical evidence' favorable
to him is excluded, but rather that erroneous
evidentiary rulings[ ] can, in combination, rise to
2
the level of a due process violation." 
(Emphasis added.)
The problem for the State in this regard is that Chambers
has been followed in decisions such as Green v. Georgia, 442
U.S. 95, 97 (1979), and this Court's decision in Ex parte
Griffin, 790 So. 2d 351 (Ala. 2000), which do not involve the
same facts as did Chambers.  The State obviously cannot ask us
to overrule Green, and it does not seek to distinguish that
case from the present one.  Nor does it ask us to overrule
Griffin or seek to distinguish it on a viable ground.  
In Green, the United States Supreme Court invoked
Chambers in holding that due process was violated during the
penalty phase of a capital trial by the exclusion of a
The Egelhoff Court's baffling reference to "erroneous
2
evidentiary rulings" in Chambers is itself at odds with the
factual premise of Chambers and is perhaps a further
reflection of the confusion and uncertainty engendered by
Chambers.
25
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statement by third party that he had killed the victim.  The
statement inculpated the third party as the killer and thereby
exculpated the defendant.  
In Griffin, this Court invoked Chambers and held that due
process was violated when otherwise applicable rules of
evidence prevented Griffin from introducing evidence that a
third party had pleaded guilty to, and had even been convicted
of, the murder with which Griffin was charged (although a
state trial court subsequently dismissed the third party's
guilty-plea conviction after the State decided to prosecute
Griffin for the murder).  This Court noted that, as a general
rule, Alabama courts had, long before Chambers, recognized
"the right of a defendant to prove his innocence by presenting
evidence that another person actually committed the crime," 
790 So. 2d at 353-54, with the caveat that evidence that
another person committed the crime "is admissible only when it
is probative and not merely speculative."  Griffin, 790 So. 2d
at 354 (emphasis added).  We further noted:
"Three elements must exist before this evidence can
be ruled admissible: (1) the evidence 'must relate
to the "res gestae" of the crime'; (2) the evidence
must exclude the accused as a perpetrator of the
offense; and (3) the evidence 'would have to be
admissible if the third party was on trial.' See
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Ex parte Walker, 623 So. 2d [281] at 284 [(Ala.
1992)]."
Id.
Taking into consideration the circumstances presented in
Chambers, Green, Griffin, and other federal cases that have
invoked Chambers, a sound argument can be made that, if
Chambers is not to be viewed as sui generis, it is at least 
properly viewed as limited to those cases where a defendant
seeks to defend against a criminal prosecution by offering
proof that some particular third party committed the specific
criminal act of which he is accused.  That is not the
situation presented in the case now before this Court.
In West v. Bell, 550 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2008), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that,
in Chambers, there was only one perpetrator and, thus, the
inculpation of another particular person logically served to
exculpate the defendant.  550 F.3d at 558.  In contrast, in
West, the evidence 
indicated that there 
were two perpetrators. 
Thus, the evidence implicating another particular party did
not necessarily exculpate West.  As a result, the Sixth
Circuit distinguished Chambers from the case before it and
found that the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court was not
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contrary to Chambers.  550 F.3d at 558.  See generally Smith
v. Gordy (No. 7:14-CV-1420-AKK-TMP) (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2015)
(not reported in F. Supp. 3d) (denying federal habeas corpus
petition after state conviction for trafficking in marijuana
and finding no error in excluding evidence of a guilty plea by
another person to possession of the same marijuana at issue in
Smith's case; Smith was unable to meet the second prong of the
Griffin test because drugs can be possessed jointly and the
third 
party's 
guilty 
plea 
did 
not 
exclude 
Smith's
participation in the crime). 
In United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.
1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit aptly observed:
"The second issue relating to the exclusion of
the McCoys' out-of-court statements is whether, even
though the statements were outside the ambit of Rule
804(b)(3), [Fed. R. Evid.,] the exclusion of them
from evidence denied the Thomases their right to a
fair trial.  The Thomases contend that without the
McCoys' statements, they could not put forth their
defense that they lacked the requisite intent to
defraud.  The Thomases cite three cases for support:
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979); Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); and United
States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 337 (9th Cir.
1977).  In all three, the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated by the trial court's decision
to exclude 'testimony from a witness concerning
statements made by another person to that witness
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which tended to incriminate the other person and
exculpate the defendant.'  Benveniste, 564 F.2d at
342. See also Green, 442 U.S. at 96."
62 F.3d at 1338 (emphasis added).
In other words, Chambers has been understood to be
apposite in cases involving of out-of-court declarations that
inculpate the declarant in such a way that necessarily
exculpates the defendant.  See also, e.g., Thomas v. State,
539 So. 2d 375, 396 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 539 So. 2d 399
(Ala. 1988) ("The most important distinction between 
this case
and Chambers is the effect of the excluded evidence on the
guilt or innocence of the person on trial.  In Chambers, the
hearsay statements which pointed to the guilt of McDonald also
pointed to the innocence of Chambers.").
As this Court explained in Griffin:
"The United States Supreme Court has held that
a defendant has a right to put on a defense and that
that right includes the opportunity to present
evidence proving that another person committed the
offense for which he has been charged. See Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ... (1973); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 ... (1967)." 
Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 353.
Thus, Chambers arguably represents a narrowly carved
niche of cases in which a defendant seeks to prove his or her
29
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own innocence as to a certain criminal act by introducing
evidence of another particular person's commission of that
same act.  To expand the Chambers holding beyond this category
of cases holds the potential to threaten a wide array of
carefully framed evidentiary rules designed to limit the
presentation of evidence at trial to evidence with a
sufficient likelihood of reliability. 
Here, R.J.'s out-of-court statement that Acosta simply
was not present during the crime was not testimony that some
particular person other than Acosta actually filled the role
of the third participant in the crime.  Unlike Chambers, there
were multiple participants in the crime here.  Therefore,
insofar as R.J.'s out-of-court statement served to inculpate
R.J., it did not in that aspect logically exculpate Acosta. 
And, for that matter, R.J.'s out-of-court declaration did not
identify any particular third person as filling the role in
the crime that Acosta was accused of filling.  Thus, for this
case to be decided on R.J.'s testimony that Acosta was not
present during the burglary would make use of the very type of
"speculative" evidence as to who actually did commit the acts
in question disavowed in Griffin.  (And, even if R.J.'s
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statement had identified a particular person as the third
participant in the crime, I see no basis for concluding that
such a declaration would be admissible in the trial of that
third person as would be required under the third prong of
Alabama's general rule for the admission of such evidence as
described in Griffin.)
In short, I question the premise of the main opinion,
i.e., that Chambers is apposite to a case of this nature and
might require the reversal of the defendant's conviction in
this case if only the facts (the other evidence offered by
Acosta) had been a little different (less) so as to make
Acosta's defense more dependent upon the hearsay testimony in
question.  By positing our willingness to consider the
Chambers holding in cases that do not fall within the narrow
line of cases contemplated by Chambers and its progeny and
this Court's own holding in Griffin, I fear we risk
undermining 
important 
evidentiary 
rules 
designed 
to 
assure 
the
reliability of evidence and setting the stage for improper
reversals of criminal convictions in a broader array of cases
than the Chambers holding contemplated.
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The State's "Other-Evidence" Argument 
Unfortunately for the State, however, it does not argue
that the hearsay testimony at issue in this case fails to
qualify for favorable treatment under Chambers (and its
progeny) and Griffin on the ground that this testimony is not
actually testimony that inculpates a particular third person
and thereby logically exculpates Acosta.  The State ignores
the failure of the evidence in this regard and, instead,
argues simply that the hearsay evidence at issue here is not
"critical evidence" for Acosta's defense.  Specifically, the
State pins its hope for a reversal on an argument that the
hearsay evidence at issue is not "critical" to Acosta because,
the State says, it is "cumulative" of "other evidence" upon
which Acosta could and did rely.  Therefore, I will proceed,
like the parties and the main opinion, to assume that Chambers
is apposite and consider this "other-evidence" argument 
of 
the
State within that assumed context. 
The main opinion agrees with the State's argument that
the testimony of the  investigating police officer -- that
R.J. told him that R.J. participated in the crime but that
Acosta did not -- is not "critical evidence" because there is
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"other evidence" Acosta can use in an attempt to prove his
defense that he was not present.  Because I do not find
support in Chambers and its progeny for this "other-evidence"
rationale, 
I 
respectfully 
disagree 
with 
the 
conclusion 
reached
by the main opinion that Acosta is not entitled to relief
under those cases, including Griffin. 
In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court noted that
due process includes "the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the State's accusations," 410 U.S. at 294, and
specifically the right "of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense."  410 U.S. at 302.  Chambers held that where
testimony is critical to a defense, and "where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, 
the 
hearsay 
rule 
may 
not 
be 
applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."  Id. at 302.
The main opinion appears to acknowledge these principles
but concludes that there was no violation of due process  here
because, 
it 
concludes, 
R.J.'s 
statement 
exonerating 
Acosta 
was
not "critical" 
evidence.  The main opinion 
defines 
"[c]ritical
evidence ... as '[e]vidence strong enough that its presence
could tilt a juror's mind.'  Black's Law Dictionary 674 (10th
33
1141281
ed. 2014)."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  Notwithstanding its
invocation of this definition, the main opinion 
concludes that
testimony about R.J.'s statement was not critical evidence
because "Detective Fisher's hearsay testimony was not 
the 
only
means Acosta had of presenting his defense." ___ So. 3d at
___.
I cannot agree that the evidence is not "critical" merely
because there is "other evidence" to support the defense. 
First, in Chambers, the excluded evidence was held to be
critical even though there was other evidence to support the
defense.  Chambers sought to prove that another person,
McDonald, fired the shots that killed a police officer.  The
defense called McDonald as a witness and introduced a written
confession from McDonald; on cross-examination, McDonald
renounced his written confession.  The defense was not allowed
to cross-examine McDonald (under a rule that a party cannot
impeach its own witness) and was not allowed to introduce
testimony from three of McDonald's friends that McDonald had
admitted to them that he shot the police officer.  The Supreme
Court held that Chambers was denied due process by the ruling
that 
prevented 
his 
cross-examination 
of 
McDonald. 
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1141281
Significantly, the excluded examination was not the only
available evidence to support the defense: there 
was 
testimony
from an eyewitness who testified that McDonald was the
shooter, as well as McDonald's own written confession.  The
Supreme Court noted that 
"all that remained from McDonald's own testimony was
a single written confession countered by an arguably
acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense was far
less persuasive than it might have been had he been
given 
an 
opportunity 
to 
subject 
McDonald's
statements to cross-examination or had the other
confessions been admitted."
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294.
In Griffin, the decision did not turn on the presence or
absence of other evidence.  It is noteworthy, however, that
this Court observed, not that the evidence at issue was the
only evidence, but that it was "some of the strongest evidence
Griffin could present to the jury to prove that someone else
[had] committed the crime."  Griffin, 790 So. 2d at 355
(emphasis added).
The "other evidence" indicating that Acosta was not
present during the crime does not eliminate the need for
evidence of R.J.'s statement.  The other evidence identified
by the main opinion is (1) Acosta's own testimony,
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(2) testimony from Acosta's brother, and (3) testimony from
R.J.'s mother that Acosta was at her house during the relevant
period.  
The testimony from Acosta and his brother is not an
adequate substitute for R.J.'s statement.  Their testimony
easily could have been discounted by the jury as biased.  The
testimony from R.J.'s mother is also an inadequate substitute
for at least two reasons.  
First, because the mother was not at the scene of the
crime, the jury was aware that, unlike R.J., she could not
testify directly as to who did or did not commit the crime. 
Second, the mother's testimony is to some degree 
inconsistent,
as to the relevant times, with a written statement given by
Acosta to the police the day after the crime.  This
inconsistency, combined with the vagaries of memory and
inherent ambiguity of some of the language in the mother's
testimony, left room for the jury to discount that testimony.
In light of the foregoing, it seems that the testimony of
Acosta's other witnesses —-  which, lest we forget, was
directly contradicted by the victims' testimony —- would have
been greatly strengthened had it been corroborated by
36
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testimony from a police officer regarding the statement of a
participant in the crime.  In point of fact, the State
actually concedes in its brief to the Court of Criminal
Appeals that evidence as to R.J.'s statement "would have been
a boon for Acosta."  Nonetheless, the State then argues that
the evidence was not critical because there was other, albeit
weaker, evidence on the same point.
Aside from the aforesaid particulars of this case, I have
more general concerns regarding the workability and propriety
of an "other-evidence" test.  First, how much is enough?  How
much "other evidence" is needed to warrant the exclusion of
evidence that could make a the difference in the jury's
perceptions?  Should this sufficiency determination be 
left to
the jury?  I see no standard to guide trial and appellate
court judges in this endeavor.  What might be deemed by one
judge to be "enough" "other evidence" of a fact to warrant a
ruling barring a defendant from introducing any more evidence
of that fact might be quite different from what might be
deemed to be "enough" "other evidence" by another judge. 
Moreover, the "other-evidence" approach seems even more
problematic when one considers that it would require us to
37
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allow one defendant to introduce certain evidence because he
or she has no other corroborating evidence, while denying that
right to a defendant who can in fact gather corroborating
evidence of the same fact.  Does this make sense?  In relation
to evidence that could make the difference in the outcome of
a criminal trial, why would we put the defendant who can
gather corroborating evidence of the exculpating fact in a
worse position in relation to proving that fact than a
defendant who is without any such corroborating evidence? 
In fact, the approach of allowing otherwise inadmissible
evidence if it is the only evidence supportive of an
exculpating fact while excluding it when other evidence is
available that tends to prove the same fact actually inverts
the role of corroborative evidence set out in Chambers.  In
Thomas v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals
explained Chambers as follows:
"In determining that the hearsay  statements of
McDonald's three friends should have been allowed in
evidence, the Supreme Court decided that the hearsay
statements 'were originally made and subsequently
offered at trial under circumstances that provided
considerable 
assurance 
of 
their 
reliability.' 
Chambers, [410 U.S. at 300,] 93 S.Ct. at 1048. 
"The reasons for this determination were that
'each 
of 
McDonald's 
confessions 
was 
made
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spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after
the murder had occurred,' 'each one was corroborated
by some other evidence in the case,' 'the sheer
number 
of 
independent 
confessions 
provided
corroboration for each' and 'each confession ... was
in a very real sense self-incriminatory and
unquestionably against interest.'  Chambers, [410
U.S. at 300-01,] 93 S.Ct. at 1048." 
539 So. 2d at 396 (emphasis added).  The Thomas court then
went on to hold that the evidence proffered in the case before
it had been properly excluded by the trial court because it
lacked sufficient "assurances of reliability," a finding
reached largely based on the fact that the evidence was a
"lone hearsay statement [that] was not corroborated by any
other evidence":
"In the case at bar, we do not find any of the
assurances of reliability that were present in
Chambers.  At the guilt phase of the trial, the lone
hearsay statement was not corroborated by any other
evidence and it was not 'unquestionably' against
Billy's interest. Billy's statement was made to his
and the appellant's mother. Moreover, Billy did not
testify at this trial and thus could not be
cross-examined by the State."
539 So. 2d at 396 (emphasis added).
In Green, supra, the United States Supreme Court found it
important that the there were "substantial reasons ... to
assume [the] reliability" of the evidence at issue,  including
39
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the fact there was other evidence corroborating the excluded
testimony that itself was "ample":
"Regardless of whether the proffered testimony
comes within Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts
of this case its exclusion constituted a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 
The 
excluded 
testimony 
was 
highly
relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase
of the trial, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604–605 (1978) (plurality opinion); id., at 613–616
(opinion of Blackmun, J.), and substantial reasons
existed to assume its reliability.  Moore made his
statement spontaneously to a close friend. The
evidence corroborating the confession was ample, and
indeed sufficient to procure a conviction of Moore
and a capital sentence. The statement was against
interest, and there was no reason to believe that
Moore had any ulterior motive in making it."
Green, 442 U.S. at 97.
In this case, unlike in Thomas where exclusion of the
evidence was upheld on appeal, but like in Chambers and Green
where the exclusion of the evidence was overturned on appeal,
the hearsay statement has "assurances of reliability" because
there is in fact corroborating "other evidence."   The hearsay
statement at issue here is one that was given to an
investigating police officer, who would be the witness to
testify at trial as to that statement and who would be subject
to cross-examination by the State as to the circumstances
under which the statement was made and the reliability of his
40
1141281
memory or record of it.  Although the declarant himself would
not be available for cross-examination because of his
invocation of the Fifth Amendment, as was the case in Chambers
and Griffin his statement was against his own interest in that
it involved an admission that he was a participant in the
crime.  Moreover, as in Chambers and Griffin, the fact that
R.J.'s "hearsay statement was ... corroborated by ... other
evidence" (in this case, the testimony of Acosta and two other
witnesses) provides further "assurance of reliability" that
supports the admission of the statement, not its exclusion.
In sum, I cannot conclude that evidence is not critical
merely because there is "other evidence" on the same point. 
As to this particular case, I do not see how evidence the
State concedes would be "a boon for [the defendant]" in a
criminal case could not be considered "critical evidence."
Bryan, J., concurs.
41
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BRYAN, Justice (dissenting).
I join Justice Murdock's dissent.  I write specially to
emphasize that my dissent is based on the State's failure to
argue to this Court that the "critical-evidence" test, as
applied in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), is
inapposite under the facts of this particular case.
42