Case Title: TR Miller Mill Co. v. Ralls

Citation: 192 So. 2d 706

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1966-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
192 So. 2d 706 (1966)
T. R. MILLER MILL CO., Inc.
v.
J. M. RALLS.
3 Div. 139.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 1, 1966.
Rehearing Denied December 8, 1966.
*707 B. E. Jones & R. L. Jones and Edwin C. Page, Jr., Evergreen, for appellant.
Prestwood & Prestwood, Andalusia, and Alvin T. Prestwood, Montgomery, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
From judgment for defendant, rendered on jury verdict in action for trespass to land by cutting timber, the plaintiff appeals.
Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appeal was not taken within the time allowed by law.
Judgment for appellee was rendered on the 19th day of September, 1962, and appellee contends that appellant was required to appeal within six months thereafter. Appeal was not taken until March 14, 1964.
Within thirty days after rendition of judgment, appellant filed motion for new trial and on October 10, 1962, the trial court continued the motion to the 19th day of November, 1962, on which day the court continued the motion to December 31, 1962.
On December 31, 1962, the cause was submitted on the motion and taken under advisement.
On December 26, 1963, the court overruled the motion.
Appeal was taken within six months after the date of the judgment overruling the motion for new trial.
If a motion for new trial has been duly filed, considered, and overruled, the time limited for taking an appeal from the original judgment dates from the judgment overruling the motion for new trial. Local 204 of Textile Workers Union of America v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 37, 15 So. 2d 578; Harden v. United States F. & G. Co., 267 Ala. 321, 101 So. 2d 302.
Appellee argues that the submission and taking under advisement of a motion for a new trial operates to keep the motion alive only until the end of the term, citing: Childers v. Samoset Cotton Mills, 213 Ala. 292, 104 So. 641; and Greer v. Heyer, 216 Ala. 229, 113 So. 14.
The two cases last cited were decided prior to amendment of Section 6667, Code 1923; now § 114, Title 13, Code 1940; by Act No. 56, Extra Session 1936, page 32. Prior to amendment, Section 6667 prescribed the dates for beginning and ending *708 of terms of the circuit courts. As amended, the statute provides that the circuit courts shall be open "at all times," and abolishes the matter of terms of court. Williams v. Wicker, 235 Ala. 348, 179 So. 250.
In the Wicker case, supra, appellee insisted that a motion for new trial had lapsed because the motion had been carried over into another term, and, therefore, that no valid judgment could be rendered on the motion. This court said that the motion was timely filed and continued to date of submission when it was taken under advisement; that this submission and taking the motion under advisement operated to keep the motion alive until the end of the term, as in Greer v. Heyer, supra, and kept the trial of the motion constructively in progress until judgment was rendered on the motion.
So in the instant case, after the motion was duly continued to the date it was submitted and taken under advisement, the motion was kept alive and the trial of the motion was considered as constructively in progress until judgment was rendered on December 26, 1963, overruling the motion.
The record here contains adequate showing of continuance, submission, and judgment on the motion; Holman v. Baker, 277 Ala. 310, 169 So. 2d 429. The time for taking appeal ran from the judgment on the motion, December 26, 1963; and, within six months thereafter, appeal was taken. Because the appeal was taken within the time allowed by law, the motion to dismiss the appeal is due to be and is overruled.
Plaintiff sued defendant for cutting trees on the east half of southwest quarter of Section 16, Township 4 North, Range 13 East, in Conecuh County.
Defendant pleaded not guilty. Defendant's contention is that the trees he cut were on his own land, which is the west half of southwest quarter of said section. The disputed question is the location of the east boundary of defendant's eighty acres, that is, the line which divides the west half from the east half of the southwest quarter of Section 16.
The plaintiff formerly owned the entire section 16. In 1923, plaintiff conveyed the west half of southwest quarter of section 16 to E. N. Amos, through whom defendant derived title.
The testimony of plaintiff's president is to the effect that the southwest corner of Section 16 was marked as early as 1911 or 1912; that, in 1923 when defendant's eighty was sold to Amos, the witness sent one George W. Kirkland "to lay out the lines"; that the southeast corner of defendant's eighty "was set" by Kirkland; that the east line of defendant's eighty has been marked since 1923; that the witness saw that the corner was there; that "the trees were marked to show that the corner was there and they are old marks and there's not any question that that corner was set there in '23 and it's been there until it's been removed recently"; that, in 1951, plaintiff cut timber "right up to that line"; that, in 1951, defendant's mother owned defendant's eighty and sold the timber on it to Anthony Lumber Company, which "recognized the line and cut to the line" that plaintiff had marked; that plaintiff "cut it all" when it sold to Amos; that, after '27, plaintiff went on its own land lying east of and adjoining defendant's eighty to get poles and piling; that plaintiff "stumped" its own land; and that plaintiff's land was cut "up to the line in '51."
Plaintiff's forester testified that he had been looking after "this land" since 1943; that about a year later, Ed Ralls, who was defendant's father as we understand it, took the witness to defendant's southeast corner and showed it to witness; that it "was just a lightwood corner"; that the line was marked up to the northeast corner of defendant's eighty, and the line was never questioned up until the difficulty.
*709 Plaintiff's evidence is to the effect that the trees cut by defendant were trees which stood east of the marked line on a strip of plaintiff's land which was about one hundred forty feet wide lying immediately east of the marked east boundary line of defendant's eighty as contended for by plaintiff.
No witness testified that he had made or had been present at the making of any survey to locate the line marked by plaintiff or the corners at the north or south end of the line.
Plaintiff's forester, Ezell, testified that concrete markers were put at the north and south ends of the marked line in 1951 or 1952. On direct examination, he testified to effect that he himself placed the concrete markers as follows:
On cross-examination, however, Ezell testified as follows:
In 1960, defendant employed Ralph Powell, County surveyor for Conecuh County, to survey the east line of defendant's eighty. The surveyor testified that he began at government corners of adjacent sections and established the correct east line of defendant's eighty by "government proof," that is, according to the markers that government surveyors set when the land was originally surveyed from 1820 to 1823. This line we refer to as the Powell line. It seems to lie about one hundred forty feet east of the marked line claimed by the plaintiff. The trees cut by defendant were in the strip between the two lines.
Plaintiff's assignment 3 is that the court erred in overruling plaintiff's objection to defendant's Exhibit 4 which is a map or plat made by Powell showing his survey and the Powell line. Plaintiff's argument is stated in brief as follows:
*711 We do not understand how the plaintiff can, by evidence which tends to establish its case, render inadmissible evidence which tends to establish defendant's case. There is no evidence that Powell was not a qualified surveyor or that his survey was incorrect in any particular. Defendant claims to own to the east boundary of the west half of the southwest quarter of Section 16. Powell's survey was relevant to establish the correct location of defendant's east boundary.
To be admissible, the survey must not be subject to any proper objection that it offends some rule of evidence, but we do not know of any rule which is offended by the Powell survey. Defendant had a right to introduce evidence which tended to show that the trees he cut were on his own land and the Powell survey tended to support defendant's contention. We are of opinion that the court correctly overruled plaintiff's objection to Powell's survey.
Plaintiff assigns that the court erred in permitting the introduction into evidence, over plaintiff's objection, of a certain letter purporting to have been written by defendant to plaintiff's president.
Plaintiff's objection to the letter was stated to the trial court as follows:
Plaintiff now says that the letter was not admissible because it is a self-serving declaration by defendant and, therefore, defendant cannot introduce the letter into evidence.
The general rule is that self-serving declarations in a letter which was not answered cannot be treated as admitted because the letter was not answered. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Beeland Bros. Mercantile Co., 242 Ala. 591, 594, 7 So. 2d 265.
The mere self-serving declaration of the plaintiff in a letter to defendant, which defendant does not answer, is ordinarily not admissible against the defendant, "if a proper objection be directed to that portion of the letter." Hannon v. Espalla, 148 Ala. 313, 320, 42 So. 443.
As defendant points out, however, plaintiff did not base its objection to the letter on the ground that the letter was a self-serving declaration. The only ground assigned in the trial court is that the letter is "in reference to the survey" and "all testimony in reference to the survey is not legal."
There is only one survey shown by evidence in this case and that is the Powell survey. We have already stated our reasons *712 for holding that evidence showing the Powell survey is admissible in this case. We are of opinion that the letter was not inadmissible on the ground that the letter was in reference to the survey.
Many decisions of this court support the rule of review which applies when specific objection to evidence is made and overruled. In an early trial of the right of property, the claimant offered in evidence a certain agreement and note. Plaintiffs objected to the same being read to the jury because plaintiffs had no knowledge of the agreement or note. Plaintiffs lost on the trial and sued out a writ of error in this court where plaintiffs contended that the agreement and note were incompetent because "their execution was not proved." In affirming the judgment this court said:
In another early case where the trial court had overruled objection to evidence, this court said:
Many citations supporting this rule may be found in Alabama Digest, Appeal & Error.
Among later cases supporting the rule that this court, in reviewing rulings on evidence *713 will consider only the grounds of objection which were assigned in the trial court, see: Marigold Coal, Inc. v. Thames, 274 Ala. 421, 424, 149 So. 2d 276; Granberry v. Gilbert, 276 Ala. 486, 163 So. 2d 641; Danley v. Marshall Lumber and Mill Co., 277 Ala. 551, 556, 173 So. 2d 94; Circuit Court Rule 33.
In the case at bar, plaintiff did not assign, on the trial, the ground of objection that the letter was a self-serving declaration. Plaintiff, therefore, waived that ground and cannot raise it now.
We are of opinion that assignment 4 is without merit.
Plaintiff's assignments 1 and 2 are that the court erred in refusing affirmative charges, with hypothesis, requested by plaintiff.
Plaintiff says in brief:
In civil cases, the question must go to the jury if the evidence or the reasonable inferences arising therefrom furnish a mere gleam, glimmer, spark, the least particle, the smallest trace, a scintilla, in support of the theory of the opposing party. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Bishop, 265 Ala. 118, 123, 89 So. 2d 738, 64 A.L.R.2d 1190.
In considering assignments 1 and 2, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. Before plaintiff is entitled to the affirmative charge with hypothesis, the evidence against defendant must be clear, without conflict, and must leave nothing to be done except to draw a legal conclusion from the facts. Randolph v. Greason, 275 Ala. 89, 91, 152 So. 2d 156.
Even if plaintiff be correct in saying that there is evidence sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of title by prescription, we think such evidence is not without conflict. We think there is material evidence which conflicts with plaintiff's claim as to the existence of the marked line to which plaintiff claims and as to the prior cutting of timber in relation to plaintiff's claimed line.
The land here is woodland, wild land, used for production of timber and turpentine stumps. Plaintiff's acts tending to show possession consist of cutting timber and removing stumps. Plaintiff claims that there is a plainly visible line marked by hacks and blazes on trees thirty or more years old. There is evidence which denies the existence of plaintiff's claimed line and concrete markers. Defendant is sometimes referred to as Mutt Ralls. Powell testified:
The plaintiff claimed that since 1923, whenever any party cut timber on defendant's land, such party stopped cutting at the line claimed by plaintiff. Plaintiff offered the testimony of C. B. Faisen who testified that in 1952 he worked for Anthony. Lumber Company, that he, Faisen, was in charge of cutting the timber on defendant's eighty. Plaintiff's president testified that Anthony recognized and cut to the line that plaintiff had marked.
Defendant testified to the contrary. Defendant testified:
Defendant gave testimony that the line and markers claimed by plaintiff did not exist, to wit:
We are of opinion that, because there are material conflicts in the testimony, plaintiff's requested affirmative charges with hypothesis were refused without error.
Plaintiff's assignment 5 is that the court erred in overruling plaintiff's motion for new trial. Plaintiff seems to argue that the court erred in overruling the grounds of the motion which assert that the verdict is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence.
When the presiding judge refuses to grant a new trial, the presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict is strengthened. Ditsch v. Baggett Transportation Co., 258 Ala. 26, 29, 61 So. 2d 98.
A verdict is not to be set aside merely because it may not correspond with the opinion of the court as to the weight of the testimony, or because it is against the mere preponderance of the evidence Locklear v. Nash, 275 Ala. 95, 98, 152 So. 2d 421.
There was material conflict in the evidence and we are of opinion that the motion for new trial was overruled without error.
Error not being shown, the judgment is due to be and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, Justice.
On application for rehearing, plaintiff says that we "erred in ruling" that it had not acquired title by adverse possession up to the line laid out in 1923 "regardless of the true government line between the West Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 16" and plaintiff's land.
We did not "rule" whether plaintiff had acquired title or not. We did say that the question was for the jury.
Defendant's defense was that he owned the west half of the southwest quarter of section 16 and that he was not liable for the trees he had cut because they were his own trees on his own land.
Plaintiff itself introduced into evidence a deed which showed that it had conveyed the "West Half of Southwest Quarter (W ½) of (SW ¼) of Section Sixteen (16) ...." to E. N. Amos. It seems to be conceded that defendant had acquired the title which plaintiff conveyed to Amos. Defendant sought to show the location of the east boundary of his land. The deed from plaintiff to Amos described the land so that defendant's east boundary would be the true east boundary of the west half of the southwest quarter of section sixteen. Defendant introduced the Powell survey to show the location of the true east boundary of west half of southwest quarter of section sixteen. Plaintiff does not even now, if we understand its brief, say that the line shown by the Powell survey is not the true east boundary of the west half of southwest *717 quarter of section sixteen. We think defendant had a right to introduce relevant, competent evidence to prove his theory of the case. The survey was admissible as such evidence.
Plaintiff's theory, as we understand it, is that the property line between plaintiff and defendant is not the true east boundary of the west half of southwest quarter of section sixteen, but is a line marked by plaintiff in 1923 when the deed to Amos was made. Plaintiff contends that it has acquired title up to this marked line by adverse possession. Plaintiff contends that its line was plainly marked for over thirty years, that defendant's predecessors agreed to the line, and that plaintiff has exercised dominion and has had possession up to this line since plaintiff marked it in 1923.
Plaintiff's president testified:
Other witnesses for the plaintiff testified to the same effect.
In answer to plaintiff's contention, however, defendant says plaintiff has not acquired title to the line claimed by plaintiff and that the marked line claimed by plaintiff did not exist. As we undertook to point out on original deliverance, the surveyor, Powell, and defendant himself, testified that the line claimed by plaintiff did not exist. We do not understand how the jury could accept as true the testimony of all of plaintiff's witnesses and all of defendant's witnesses. Plaintiff's witnesses testified that the line and corners claimed by plaintiff were marked in 1923, and, as we understand the testimony, that the markings were plainly visible until defendant, in 1960, cut the trees for which he is now sued. On the other hand, defendant's witnesses say no such line existed.
If the jury had been instructed to find for the plaintiff if they believed the evidence, how would the jury have known which evidence to believe? They could not believe both versions. They had to accept one version and reject the other. For that reason, the court did not err in refusing plaintiff's requested affirmative charges with hypothesis.
Plaintiff correctly says that we did not even mention the cases cited by plaintiff in its original brief to support its Proposition 3, that, if two coterminous owners agree on a boundary and each occupies to it, the possession is presumed adverse and, after ten years, fixes such line as the boundary between such owners. We carefully read all the cases cited in all plaintiff's briefs but we saw no reason then, and see none now, to mention any cases relating to plaintiff's Proposition 3 because the correctness of the proposition was not disputed.
We will refer to one case cited by plaintiff on rehearing, to wit, Chastang v. Chastang, 141 Ala. 451, 37 So. 799, for a proposition which, perhaps, we did not clearly express in the original opinion. That proposition is that ".... the party claiming to hold adversely must show by some evidence that he is holding the particular piece of land to which he claims title, and to show that, there must be some evidence showing the exact boundaries of the land claimed by him." In Chastang, this court reversed for the error, among others, of refusing the affirmative charge requested by defendant because ".... the entire evidence in this case was wanting; 1st, in pointing out definitely the land which was claimed to have been adversely held...."
In the case at bar, plaintiff claimed, by adverse possession. To prove its claim, plaintiff had the burden of offering evidence to show the exact boundaries of the land claimed by plaintiff. Plaintiff did offer evidence to show such a boundary. Plaintiff offered evidence that there existed a plainly marked line to which plaintiff *718 claimed to have had possession. Defendant, however, offered evidence contradicting plaintiff's evidence. Defendant's witnesses testified that the line claimed by plaintiff did not exist. Because the contradictory evidence as to existence of the line clearly presented a question for the jury, if for no other reason, the court did not err in refusing plaintiff's requested affirmative charges.
After fully considering plaintiff's application we are not persuaded that we ought to disturb the judgment appealed from.
Opinion extended.
Application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.