Case Title: In re Champlain Oil Co.

Citation: 176 Vt. 458, 2004 VT 44, 852 A.2d 622

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Champlain Oil Co. (2003-111); 176 Vt. 458; 852 A.2d 622

2004 VT 44

[Filed 14-May-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 44

                                No. 2003-111

  In re Champlain Oil Company	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Environmental Court

                                                 January Term, 2004

                                                 Merideth Wright, J.

  John W. O'Donnell of Bergeron, Paradis & Fitzpatrick, LLP, Burlington, for
    Appellant.

  Jon Anderson and Jeremy Farkas of Burak Anderson & Melloni, PLC,
    Burlington, for Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.  Appellant, Champlain Oil Company, Inc., appeals
  from an order of the environmental court granting Appellee, R.L. Vallee,
  Inc.'s, motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Champlain's
  proposed site usage was illegal and should not have been permitted by the
  Town of Colchester's Planning Commission.  Champlain argues that the
  environmental court erred by 1) deciding the case based on a legal theory
  that Vallee did not raise at the planning commission level and 2)
  concluding that Champlain did not file the proper application in time to
  vest rights of review under then existing zoning laws.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  The dispute arises out of Champlain's plan to open a
  convenience store with gasoline sales in the Town of Colchester (Town). 
  The proposed site for the project was an area known as Chimney Corners,
  adjacent to Interstate 89.  Champlain engaged in numerous discussions with
  the Town's planning and zoning staff, and filed its first set of
  application materials for the project on May 14, 2001.

       ¶  3.  Meanwhile, on August 16, 2001, the Town published the First
  Notice for Amendments to its Zoning Regulations (zoning amendments).  The
  zoning amendments created new zoning classifications for the Chimney
  Corners area.  In particular, the zoning amendments imposed new limits on
  convenience stores with gas sales mandating that "no new gas sale use shall
  be permitted or allowed within 3,000 feet of an existing gas sales use,
  except that this limitation shall not apply to the distance between gas
  sale uses located on opposite sides of the Interstate 89 right of way." 
  The town subsequently adopted the zoning amendments on September 16, 2001.  
  Champlain's proposed convenience store with gasoline sales is located on
  the same side of Interstate 89 within 3,000 feet of a gas station operated
  by Vallee, and thus would not be an allowable use under the zoning
  amendments.

       ¶  4.  The Town began review of Champlain's application and at various
  times requested additional information to complete the application.  On
  October 3, 2001, Champlain filed additional materials including a "Site
  Plan Application Form."  Champlain then made another supplemental filing
  leading up to October 8, 2001, the date the planning commission apparently
  accepted the site plan application as complete.  
   
       ¶  5.  The planning commission approved Champlain's application on
  September 30, 2002.  The planning commission evaluated the project under
  the pre-amendment regulations instead of the zoning amendments.  The
  planning commission's approval contained conditions restricting certain
  aspects of the application.  Champlain appealed several of the imposed
  conditions to the environmental court.  Though it had not appeared before
  the planning commission to dispute Champlain's permit, Vallee
  cross-appealed to the environmental court.  

       ¶  6.  Vallee moved for summary judgment in the environmental court,
  arguing that the proposed project should have been evaluated under the
  zoning amendments - which barred the proposed use - and not the
  pre-amendment zoning scheme.  See 24 V.S.A. § 4443(d) (once locality issues
  notice of first public hearing on amendments to local regulations, projects
  shall be reviewed under the proposed amendments).  Vallee claimed that
  Champlain had not filed its application in time to vest rights to review
  under the pre-amendment zoning scheme.  Champlain contested the motion by
  offering affidavits stating that its application was submitted on May 14,
  2001 before the zoning amendments' notice date.  The environmental court
  granted Vallee's motion for summary judgment holding that because
  Champlain's May 14 application was not a complete site plan application
  filed in good faith, the application was insufficient to vest any rights
  under the prior zoning laws.  Champlain appeals that decision. 

       ¶  7.  As a preliminary matter, Champlain argues that, in ruling on
  the summary judgment motion, the environmental court improperly expanded
  the scope of its inquiry beyond those issues that were raised as part of
  the planning commission's review.  Champlain contends that because
  environmental court review of planning commission decisions is appellate in
  nature, the general appellate rule of issue preservation should apply.  
   
       ¶  8.  Ironically, as Vallee points out in its brief, Champlain did
  not raise this issue with the environmental court, and the environmental
  court did not rule on it.  A review of Champlain's memorandum in opposition
  to Vallee's summary judgment motion in the environmental court does not
  reveal any reference to this issue, and none is found in the environmental
  court's decision.  Champlain has not otherwise demonstrated that its issue
  was preserved as was its burden under the rules of appellate procedure. 
  See V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4) (appellant's brief to Supreme Court shall contain the
  issues presented and shall state how the issues were preserved); see also
  Limoge v. People's Trust Co., 168 Vt. 265, 270,