Case Title: Commonwealth v. Welch

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11839

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11839 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RYAN D. WELCH. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     February 5, 2021. - May 14, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Privacy.  
Privacy.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of privacy, 
Hospital.  Hospital.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Authentication, Prior 
misconduct.  Cellular Telephone.  Practice, Criminal, 
Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 24, 2012. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress was heard by C. Jeffrey 
Kinder, J.; the case was tried before Daniel A. Ford, J.; and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 20, 2019, was considered 
by Ford, J. 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for the defendant. 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney (Jeremy 
C. Bucci, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  During the early hours of February 20, 2012, the 
victim, Jessica Pripstein, foreshadowed her own death.  In a 
brief and frantic emergency call, she relayed to the dispatcher 
that her boyfriend was trying to kill her.  Soon after, officers 
from the Easthampton police department responding to the call 
found the victim dead on the bathroom floor of her apartment, 
her throat cut.  Her boyfriend, the defendant Ryan D. Welch, was 
on the bedroom floor with his throat cut, but alive.  The 
defendant subsequently was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, on theories of both deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant's 
direct appeal from that conviction was consolidated with an 
appeal from the trial judge's denial of his motion for a new 
trial, and both are now before this court. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge who heard 
his motion to suppress (motion judge) erred in not suppressing 
several statements that he made while hospitalized and that the 
trial judge erred in admitting in evidence allegedly 
unauthenticated text messages as well as prior bad acts evidence 
and in denying his motion for a new trial without first holding 
an evidentiary hearing.  Finding no reversible error either in 
any issue raised by the defendant or in our review under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we affirm the defendant's conviction and the 
order denying his motion for a new trial. 
3 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for later discussion. 
 
The defendant and the victim had been dating since the fall 
of 2011.  As 2012 dawned, signs of unease in their relationship 
were apparent.  Around early February, the victim told a 
coworker that she had "broken things off" with the defendant.  
Then, on February 10, one of the victim's neighbors overheard an 
argument between the victim and the defendant.  This altercation 
culminated in the victim slamming a door and yelling at the 
defendant to leave, which he did.  The victim told her sister on 
February 18 that she planned on finding a way to end the 
relationship. 
 
On the evening of February 19, the defendant spent several 
hours eating and drinking at a local bar.  He explained to a 
bartender how he had recently both lost his job and been 
arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol (OUI).  In regard to the OUI, the defendant 
complained that the victim had refused to post his forty dollar 
bail even though he had just spent seventy dollars on a bouquet 
of flowers for her for Valentine's Day.  According to the 
bartender, the defendant appeared to be "aggravated."  The 
victim later joined the defendant at the bar.  When the bill was 
due, the defendant did not have enough money to pay it and the 
4 
 
victim paid the difference, appearing to be embarrassed.  Then, 
at around 11:05 P.M., the defendant and the victim left the bar. 
 
At 12:04 A.M. on February 20, the victim called 911, 
screaming that her boyfriend was trying to kill her.  By the 
time the call was transferred to a public safety dispatcher, the 
victim was no longer on the line.  The dispatcher's attempts to 
call the victim back went unanswered.  Officers arrived at the 
victim's apartment within three minutes of being dispatched. 
 
After knocking on the apartment's door and receiving no 
response, an officer peered through a window and noticed blood 
on the floor.  Officers then forced their way through the front 
door, which was blocked by a futon.  Once inside the apartment, 
the officers discovered the victim dead on the bathroom floor 
with her throat cut and a knife lying on her back.  The 
defendant was lying nearby on the floor of the bedroom, a knife 
in his back pocket.  His throat, too, was cut, but he was alive.  
Bloody sock prints led from the bathroom toward where he lay.  
The defendant's fingerprints were later found on the futon that 
had blocked officers' entry through the front door, and a large 
amount of his blood was found in front of the futon. 
The defendant received emergency medical treatment at the 
scene and then was transported to a nearby hospital, where he 
underwent surgery.  Autopsy results later confirmed that the 
victim's throat wound -- which measured two and one-half inches 
5 
 
deep and four inches across -- was inconsistent with suicide.  
The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with the 
victim's murder. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant moved to suppress handwritten notes and oral 
statements he made to officers while he was hospitalized on 
February 21 and February 22, 2012.1  The motion judge allowed the 
motion as to the statements the defendant made to officers after 
he had been arrested on February 22, but otherwise denied it.  
On appeal, the defendant makes three arguments pertaining to the 
motion to suppress:  (1) that his handwritten notes should have 
been suppressed as the product of an illegal search; (2) that 
his statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, 
see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966); and (3) 
that even if these statements were not obtained in violation of 
Miranda, they were made involuntarily.2 
 
 
1 The defendant also argued below that the notes were seized 
illegally, but he does not renew this argument on appeal. 
 
 
2 The defendant further argues that suppression of several 
notes to hospital personnel, as well as statements he made to a 
nurse at the Hampshire County house of correction, is required 
because these communications were provided to officers, 
resulting in violations of both the Federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6, and the Massachusetts Patient's Bill of Rights, G. L. 
c. 111, § 70E.  Yet even if the notes are covered by it, "HIPAA 
does not provide any private right of action, much less a 
suppression remedy."  United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 
935 (9th Cir.) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring), cert. denied, 558 
6 
 
 
"In general, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, 
we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 
645, 652 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 
340 (2012).  As is noted infra, some of the interactions between 
the officers and the defendant were video recorded.  When a 
judge's findings are based solely on documentary evidence such 
as a video recording, we review those findings de novo.  
Tremblay, supra at 654-655.  "By contrast, findings drawn partly 
or wholly from testimonial evidence are accorded deference and 
are not set aside unless clearly erroneous."  Id. at 655. 
 
a.  Facts.  Before considering each of the defendant's 
arguments in turn, we set out the relevant facts that the motion 
judge found following an evidentiary hearing.  The facts are 
supplemented with uncontroverted facts in the record.  
Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). 
 
U.S. 920 (2009).  See, e.g., State v. Yenzer, 40 Kan. App. 2d 
710, 712-713 (2008) (HIPAA does not provide suppression remedy); 
State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App 14, ¶ 13 ("HIPAA does not 
provide for suppression of the evidence as a remedy for a HIPAA 
violation").  See also United States v. Zamora, 408 F. Supp. 2d 
295, 298 (S.D. Tex. 2006) ("HIPAA was passed to ensure an 
individual's right to privacy over medical records, it was not 
intended to be a means for evading prosecution in criminal 
proceedings").  A breach of G. L. c. 111, § 70, also "does not 
require exclusion at trial."  Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 
453, 457 n.5 (2001). 
7 
 
 
After officers discovered the defendant at the victim's 
apartment on February 20, he was transported to a nearby 
hospital.  Following surgery on his neck, the defendant was 
moved to the intensive care unit (ICU) for recovery.  Officer 
Timothy Rogers accompanied the defendant into the ICU but did 
not have contact with him or communicate with him.  The 
defendant was sedated, as hospital staff believed he might pose 
a suicide risk. 
At around 11:45 A.M. on February 20, Rogers was relieved by 
Sergeant Bruce Nichol, who entered through the ICU's door, which 
remained open throughout the officer's stay.  Nicol sat against 
a wall in the defendant's ICU room and observed him, although at 
no point did Nicol have any contact with him or communicate with 
him.  Over the next twelve hours, the defendant began to regain 
consciousness and started to communicate with nurses by 
gesturing.  Because the defendant was intubated with breathing 
and feeding tubes, he was unable to speak.  The defendant also 
was connected to an intravenous line.  Nichol observed that the 
defendant responded appropriately to questions asked by a nurse 
to assess his mental cognition. 
 
Officer Dennis Scribner relieved Nichol at around 
11:40 P.M. on February 20.  Scribner mostly monitored the 
defendant from a position in the hallway outside the defendant's 
ICU room by looking into the room through its door, which 
8 
 
remained open.  Scribner observed hospital staff members 
entering and leaving the defendant's room freely.  At around 
5:30 A.M. on February 21, a nurse offered Scribner a note 
written by the defendant that the defendant had given to the 
nurse.  In the note, the defendant asked if he would recover and 
be able to speak again, what would happen to him when he left, 
why there were police officers in his room, and about his 
girlfriend's condition.  After Scribner read the note, it 
remained on a table in the hallway outside the defendant's room 
until one of Scribner's replacements eventually took it into 
custody. 
 
At roughly 7:45 A.M. on February 21, Scribner was relieved 
by State police Trooper William McMillan.  At around 9:50 A.M., 
a nurse invited McMillan to approach the defendant's bedside to 
answer the defendant's question.  The defendant wrote a note to 
McMillan that asked about whether he could be evicted because he 
was behind on rent.  After telling the defendant that he would 
investigate the situation, McMillan had no more interaction with 
him during this shift. 
 
State police Trooper John Riley, the lead investigator for 
the case, arrived at the ICU at around 1:35 P.M. on February 21.  
Upon entering the defendant's ICU room, Riley explained who he 
was and that he was there to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant's injury.  The defendant was still 
9 
 
unable to speak, so he nodded his head.  After Riley suggested 
that the defendant might have information that would be helpful, 
the defendant nodded his head again.  After an unclear gesture 
by the defendant, Riley asked if the defendant was not yet ready 
to speak because of his neck injury.  The defendant nodded his 
head, and Riley left the defendant's room. 
 
Later, a nurse informed Riley that they would be reducing 
the defendant's pain management medication, fentanyl, and begin 
administering oxycodone so that the defendant could be moved out 
of the ICU.  The same nurse also informed Riley that the 
defendant scored perfectly on a cognitive test.  Shortly 
afterward, a nurse told Riley that the defendant had given the 
nurse a note.  The note stated:  "Bleeding from neck then 
vaguely remember paramedics police?  Before passing out.  
Girlfriend unconscious completely.  Don't know why her or me."  
Riley left the defendant's room and noticed more notes on a 
table in the hallway.  Eventually, these notes were taken into 
custody when a nurse asked another officer whether he wanted 
them. 
 
At 4 P.M., Riley introduced State police Trooper Gary 
Darling, who had arrived for a shift, to the defendant.  Riley 
told the defendant that if he wanted to talk, he should let 
Darling know.  The defendant responded by writing "one more day 
in ICU before I can talk."  Riley then departed but returned two 
10 
 
hours later and learned that the medical staff would soon be 
administering another cognitive test.  Riley informed the 
defendant that if he wanted to speak with the officers, this 
would be a good time.  The defendant responded in writing: 
"We can talk briefly, but I am still terrified about the 
situation, I also know that you will most likel[y] be 
considering me a suspect.  Until I can speak, I can't have 
a reasonable conversation with anyone, but believe me, I am 
trying my best to get this moving.  I Just [sic] lost 
someone very important to me, and I am not sure why." 
 
 
With the defendant's consent, Riley and Darling videotaped 
the cognitive test.  After the defendant passed the test, Riley 
interviewed the defendant.  While Riley was explaining the 
interview's purpose, the defendant wrote that he "was at her 
house," "She was in the bathroom," and "Hygiene/makeup."  Riley 
then asked the defendant to stop and listen, and Riley explained 
that the defendant was not under arrest and verbally advised the 
defendant with an incomplete set of Miranda warnings.3  When 
asked whether he was familiar with Miranda warnings, the 
defendant nodded affirmatively.  The defendant then wrote:  
"What I will say for now is that when I opened the bathroom 
door, I found her in a pool of blood unconscious." 
 
At this point, Riley paused the interview again and 
explained to the defendant that everything he wrote became part 
 
 
3 Riley failed to advise the defendant that an attorney 
would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. 
11 
 
of the record and asked the defendant if he wished to continue.  
The defendant replied in writing, "I was in a total state of 
panic[] when I saw her and didn't know what to do.  I think this 
would be better discussed when I am more capable.  ASAP I want 
to talk to you all the same."  The defendant added, "It's too 
serious to discuss right now.  I will accept a lawyer maybe," 
then crossed out the words "I will accept a lawyer maybe" and 
wrote, "I will do my best.  I'm sorry."4 Nearly an hour into the 
interview, Riley terminated it after the defendant wrote, "At 
this point I would like to see a lawyer.  You k[n]ow w[h]ere to 
look now." 
 
Riley returned the following day, February 22, and arrested 
the defendant at around 10:38 A.M.  This occurred in a non-ICU 
hospital room where the defendant had been moved sometime during 
either the evening of February 21 or the early morning of 
February 22.  Riley explained to the defendant that he would be 
seizing the defendant's notepad and seeking a warrant to search 
it.  The defendant replied by writing, "[A]m I somehow waiving 
my right to an attorney by doing this?"  He added, "[A]t this 
 
 
4 The defendant also offered the following in notes:  "Is 
she still alive?  Prior injuries.  Also longstanding psychiatric 
issues as well, and as I do to some extent"; "I injured myself 
only.  I couldn't deal with having to be in this position for no 
fault of my own.  Sorry"; and "With the knife I picked up from 
next to her.  There is much more to this story beyond that, but 
both wounds were self inflicted, as far as I can tell." 
12 
 
point, I do reserve my right to remain silent, and the right to 
any private conversations with medical providers." 
 
b.  Search.  The defendant first argues that officers 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights when they read handwritten notes that the defendant 
passed to both hospital staff and law enforcement while he was 
recovering in the ICU.5  The motion judge found that no search 
occurred.  We agree. 
 
"The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 protect individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  For these constitutional 
protections to apply, however, the Commonwealth's conduct must 
constitute a search in the constitutional sense."  Commonwealth 
v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 40 (2019).  Whether such a search 
occurred "turns on whether the police conduct has intruded on a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."  
Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 259 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991).  "The 
measure of the defendant's expectation of privacy is (1) whether 
 
5 Although the thrust of the defendant's argument focuses on 
whether a search of his ICU room occurred, he references in 
passing multiple hospital rooms in which a search may have 
occurred.  Insofar as the defendant refers to the non-ICU 
hospital room where officers arrested him on February 22, we 
have reviewed the record, and it is at best unclear whether 
officers even entered this room before arresting the defendant. 
13 
 
the defendant has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the object of the search, and (2) whether society is willing 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable."  Porter P., supra, 
quoting Montanez, supra.  "The defendant bears the burden of 
establishing both elements."  Porter P., supra, quoting 
Montanez, supra. 
 
The motion judge correctly found that the defendant lacked 
a subjective expectation of privacy in his ICU room.  The door 
to the room remained open throughout the defendant's stay there.  
Hospital staff entered and left the room freely.  Various 
officers also entered the room to speak with the defendant.  
Significantly, the defendant never asked the officers to leave.  
On the contrary, on at least one occasion the defendant appears 
to have invited an officer to enter the ICU room in order to 
communicate with him. 
 
The defendant also made no effort to maintain the privacy 
of the notes themselves until after he was arrested on February 
22, 2012, at which point he expressed concern over their legal 
ramifications.  Compare State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 350, 354-
358 (2002) (defendant manifested expectation of privacy by 
hiding pills in hospital room's curtain), with State v. Rheaume, 
2005 VT 106, ¶ 9 (no subjective expectation of privacy in part 
of emergency room where door was open, defendant did not ask 
officer to leave, and defendant voluntarily communicated with 
14 
 
officer).  Instead, the defendant voluntarily shared the notes 
with both hospital staff and police to communicate with them.  
Some of the notes that the defendant gave to hospital staff were 
left by staff on a table outside the ICU for indeterminate 
lengths of time.  The defendant also passed notes to officers to 
communicate with them multiple times.  In this regard, "[o]ur 
conclusion that [the defendant] had no subjective expectation of 
privacy is compelled not by a finding that he legally abandoned 
[the notes] as much as it is by his wholesale failure to 
manifest any expectation of privacy in the items whatsoever."6  
Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 491 (2007). 
 
Although this settles whether a search occurred in this 
case, we nonetheless discuss whether there is an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an ICU room.7  When 
determining whether society is willing to recognize an 
expectation of privacy as reasonable, we consider the following 
nonexclusive factors:  (1) the nature of the place searched, (2) 
whether the defendant owned the place searched, (3) whether the 
defendant controlled access to the place searched, (4) whether 
the defendant owned the item seized or inspected, and (5) 
 
 
6 Because no search in the constitutional sense occurred, we 
do not consider the defendant's argument that nurses at the 
hospital operated as agents of law enforcement. 
 
 
7 We have never ruled on whether there is an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such a space. 
15 
 
whether the defendant took "normal precautions to protect his 
privacy."  Porter P., 456 Mass. at 259, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 545, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). 
 
Much like in an emergency room, a patient's privacy 
interests are greatly diminished in the ICU.  See Flannery, 
First, Do No Harm:  The Use of Covert Video Surveillance to 
Detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy -- An Unethical Means of 
"Preventing" Child Abuse, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 105, 155 
(1998) ("The emergency room, by its very nature, functions as a 
freely accessible area over which a patient has no control and 
where his privacy is diminished").  Although "the public at 
large may not freely access" the ICU, "medical personnel, 
hospital staff, patients and their families, and emergency 
workers . . . are, as a matter of course, frequently, and not 
unexpectedly, moving through the area."  Rheaume, 2005 VT 106, 
¶ 10 (detailing lack of reasonable expectation of privacy in 
curtained off area of emergency room). 
 
Such is true in this case.  Not only did several officers 
enter the defendant's ICU room unhindered, but a steady stream 
of hospital personnel also freely flowed through it in order to 
keep watch over him.  Given the severity of the defendant's 
injuries, and the potential suicide risk that he posed, the 
constant attention paid to him by medical staff is unsurprising.  
See Flannery, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform at 155-156 (whereas "it is 
16 
 
possible for the hospital to respect a patient's request for 
privacy in the room for a certain time period[,] such a request 
would be unreasonable in an emergency room setting" where 
constant attention is inherent to treatment). 
 
As other courts have reasoned, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, in these conditions for a patient to control access 
to the area he or she wishes to safeguard.  See, e.g., State v. 
Cromb, 220 Or. App. 315, 325 (2008) ("social norms do not treat 
a hospital emergency room, even curtained areas within it, as 
space in which privacy rights inhere" because of patient's lack 
of control); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 412, 415 
(1999) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in separate 
treatment room in emergency ward); Rheaume, 2005 VT 106, ¶ 10 
(patient's lack of control over trauma room renders expectation 
of privacy unreasonable); Wagner v. Hedrick, 181 W. Va. 482, 487 
(1989) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in emergency room 
in which medical personnel "were constantly moving around" and 
that was "freely accessible to law enforcement officers"); State 
v. Thompson, 222 Wis. 2d 179, 193 (1998) (no "reasonable 
expectation of privacy in either the emergency room or the 
operating room").  We conclude that even if the defendant had 
17 
 
manifested an expectation of privacy in his ICU room, it would 
not have been reasonable.8 
 
c.  Miranda rights.  The defendant next argues that 
statements he made on February 21 while he was in the ICU should 
have been suppressed, arguing that his Miranda rights were 
violated when officers did not scrupulously honor his invocation 
of his right to silence.9  "[I]n circumstances of custodial 
interrogation, Miranda requires that the defendant 'be warned 
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, 
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, 
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that 
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires'" (footnote omitted).  
Clarke, 461 Mass. at 341-342, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  
 
 
8 This does not mean that donning an ICU gown necessarily 
strips from a defendant every privacy interest he or she had 
before being admitted.  A defendant may, for example, have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in items stored within the 
possessions he or she brings into the ICU.  See, e.g., People v. 
Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 868 (Co. 1991) (defendant had "reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse" that police 
searched while she was being treated at hospital); State v. 
Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 564, 569 (1982) (warrantless search of 
defendant's tote bag left at nurse's station at hospital 
unreasonable).  However, as is clear from the discussion supra, 
that is not this case. 
 
 
9 The defendant also appears to argue that statements he 
made the next day, February 22, were obtained in violation of 
his Miranda rights.  Because the motion judge suppressed the 
statements made after the defendant was arrested, it is unclear 
to which other statements the defendant refers. 
18 
 
Before determining whether the defendant invoked his right to 
silence, however, we must examine whether he was in custody at 
the time and thus whether Miranda warnings were necessary.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 689 (1995), quoting Oregon 
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) ("Miranda warnings are 
required only where there has been such a restriction on a 
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody'").  We determine 
that he was not in custody. 
 
An individual is in custody when "a reasonable person in 
the suspect's shoes would experience the environment in which 
the interrogation took place as coercive."  Commonwealth v. 
Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 (1999).  To determine whether the 
environment in which an interrogation was coercive, we examine 
four nonexclusive factors, no one of which is dispositive: 
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any 
belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the 
nature of the interrogation, including whether the 
interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and 
influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; 
and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement 
was made, the person was free to end the interview by 
leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the 
interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the 
interview terminated with an arrest." 
 
Commonwealth v. Tejada, 484 Mass. 1, 8, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
441 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-
212 (2001).  See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 
(1984) ("Rarely is any single factor conclusive").  "Where a 
19 
 
defendant challenges the admission of a statement allegedly 
resulting from custodial interrogation, the defendant bears the 
initial burden of proving custody."  Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 
Mass. 222, 229 (2015). 
 
A reasonable person in the defendant's position would not 
have experienced the environment at issue as coercive.  Officers 
questioned the defendant in his ICU room, not an interrogation 
room.  See Commonwealth v. McGrail, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 346 
n.12 (2011) (hospital cubicle where defendant was treated for 
injuries and where officers and medical personnel entered and 
departed multiple times not custodial).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Mejia, 461 Mass. 384, 390 (2012) (conference room in hospital 
where defendant was treated for injuries "neutral location" and 
noncustodial).  The motion judge found that "health care 
providers freely came and went through an open door" of the 
defendant's room, signifying that officers could not dominate 
the setting.  See United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 397 
(1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 911 (2013) (defendant 
not in custody where "hospital staff came and went freely during 
the course of the interviews, suggesting that the officers were 
not in a position to dominate [the setting] as they are, for 
example, an interrogation room at a jailhouse" [quotation and 
citation omitted]).  In short, although a person may be in 
custody without having set foot into a police station, see, 
20 
 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996), the 
place of interrogation here was not coercive. 
 
Other factors, too, demonstrate that the defendant was not 
in custody on February 21.  Although the defendant wrote that he 
believed he was a suspect, officers did not communicate this to 
him at the time.  See Mejia, 461 Mass. at 390 (Miranda warnings 
unnecessary where although defendant "knew that police were 
seeking an arrest warrant for the defendant and admitted on 
cross-examination that there was probable cause to arrest, these 
suspicions were never communicated to the defendant").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 124 (1998), quoting 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994) ("an officer's 
evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the 
objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and 
thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry").  The officers' 
questioning was also not aggressive.  On the contrary, each 
interview was accompanied with inquiries by officers to the 
defendant asking whether he wished to talk to them.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 622 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 155 (2000) 
("interrogation was 'aggressive and persistent' where 
'defendant's denials were scorned and overridden,' 'substance of 
what was said was harsh and intended by the questioner to be 
so'").  Nor did the officers exploit the defendant's condition 
21 
 
by seeking to extend his stay in the hospital unnecessarily.  
See United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1985) 
("There are no facts to indicate law enforcement officials . . . 
did anything to extend [defendant's] hospital stay and 
treatment").  Indeed, it was the defendant who initiated most of 
the conversations by passing notes either to hospital staff or 
to police officers. 
 
In response, the defendant stresses that he was connected 
to machines and intravenous lines, rendering his freedom 
severely curtailed.  It is true that the defendant's medical 
condition ensured that he could not leave the room at will.  At 
the same time, the defendant, not law enforcement, created the 
situation in which he found himself.  Cf. United States v. 
Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 632 (4th Cir. 2007) (Miranda warnings 
unnecessary where defendant "was primarily restrained not by the 
might of the police, but by his self-inflicted gunshot wound, 
the medical exigencies it created, and the investigation he 
initiated").  Given the seriousness of the defendant's injuries, 
a "reasonable person would have understood that he was being 
held at the hospital by medical personnel for medical purposes," 
not by law enforcement for investigatory purposes.  McGrail, 80 
Mass. App. Ct. at 346. 
 
More importantly, officers expressly told the defendant 
that he could ask them to leave at any time.  This is analogous 
22 
 
to cases dealing with the Miranda rights of prisoners:  the 
defendant's ability to leave the room was obviously constrained, 
but his ability to change who was in it was not.  See, e.g., 
Larkin, 429 Mass. at 434 ("rather than asking whether a prisoner 
was free to leave the facility, courts have asked whether he is 
subject to some restraint in addition to those normally imposed 
on him by virtue of his status as an inmate").  In other words, 
had the defendant clearly told the officers to leave, and had 
they refused, the analysis would be different.  Because he did 
not, we discern no error. 
 
Even assuming that the defendant was in custody at the 
time, the defendant's statement -- a written note stating "one 
more day in ICU before I can talk" -- did not properly invoke 
his right to remain silent on February 21.  An invocation of the 
right must be "unambiguously" stated such that, objectively, "a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be an invocation of the Miranda right."  
Clarke, 461 Mass. at 342 (quotation and citations omitted).  
Although establishing an invocation is less demanding under art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights than under the 
Federal standard set out in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 
381 (2010), statements indicating a willingness to speak with 
officers in the future are not sufficient to invoke the right.  
See Clarke, supra at 348 (defendant's statement, "Not right now, 
23 
 
in a minute.  I need to figure some things out," did not invoke 
right to be silent).  The defendant's statement falls within 
this category. 
 
d.  Voluntariness.  The defendant also contends that the 
statements he made while hospitalized were obtained 
involuntarily.  "Where a defendant makes statements to the 
police while not in custody, we focus solely on the question 
whether his statements were voluntary" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 48 (2015).  
"[T]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that in 
light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement, the will of the defendant was [not] 
overborne, but rather that the statement was the result of a 
free and voluntary act" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012).  Because of the 
pain and confusion that he felt, as well as the effects of the 
medications with which he was being treated, the defendant 
argues that the Commonwealth cannot carry its burden.  We 
disagree. 
 
"Only voluntary confessions or admissions are admissible 
regardless of whether they are made to police or civilians."  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 198 (2017).  To 
determine whether a statement was voluntarily made, we consider 
several factors, including (1) the "conduct of the defendant," 
24 
 
(2) "the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional 
stability," (3) the defendant's "physical and mental condition," 
and (4) "the details of the interrogation, including the 
recitation of Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 
Mass. 131, 142 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hilton, 450 Mass. 173, 177 (2007). 
 
Although statements "attributable in large measure" to 
debilitating conditions are "not the product of a rational 
intellect or free will," the mere influence of drugs or alcohol 
on the defendant will not transform otherwise voluntary 
statements into involuntary ones.  Bell, 473 Mass. at 141, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 455 (1985).  
Additionally, "[t]hat a defendant is suffering from a serious 
and painful injury, such as a bullet or knife wound, does not 
necessarily preclude a statement being made voluntarily."  Bell, 
supra.  Nor does "[t]he fact that a defendant may have been in a 
disturbed emotional state, or even suicidal, . . . automatically 
make statements involuntary."  Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 
Mass. 896, 910 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 
Mass. 549, 555 (2001). 
 
Review of the record confirms that the defendant's 
statements were voluntary.  Despite being hospitalized with a 
serious medical condition, having just undergone surgery, and 
being treated with pain medication, the defendant understood and 
25 
 
was responsive to questions by hospital staff and police 
officers.  See Bell, 473 Mass. at 142 (despite suffering from 
serious injury, experiencing pain, and consuming intoxicants, 
defendant's coherent responses to medical providers and police 
officers rendered statements voluntary); Commonwealth v. 
Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 646-647 (2002) (defendant's statement to 
hospital staff and law enforcement made while in pain from 
slashed wrists was voluntary). 
 
In particular, the defendant was awake and alert and passed 
the cognitive tests administered by hospital staff.10  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 12-13 (2000) ("alert and 
oriented" defendant's statements to police voluntary despite 
recovering from gunshot wound to his head and arm); Allen, 395 
Mass. at 457 ("rational and alert" defendant's statements to 
nurse after brain surgery were voluntary).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 267 (2019) (defendant who was "not 
demonstrating confusion" voluntarily waived Miranda rights 
despite being medicated to treat pain from attempted suicide).  
The defendant could manipulate his surroundings to make himself 
more comfortable and could communicate his needs by writing 
 
 
10 The motion judge also reviewed video recordings of the 
delirium test and the questioning, as well as credited expert 
testimony by a psychiatrist that the defendant's conduct and his 
medical records supported finding that his statements were 
voluntary. 
26 
 
notes to hospital staff.  Indeed, the defendant not only 
appeared to be aware of his immediate surroundings, but also 
inquired into the victim's medical condition and his own 
financial circumstances.  The defendant even had the presence of 
mind to provide exculpatory statements, such as claiming that 
the victim's wounds were self-inflicted.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 222 (2003) (defendant's effort to 
exculpate herself supported finding her statements to be 
voluntary). 
 
Considering his OUI arrest the week before, the defendant 
"had some prior experience with law enforcement officers and the 
court system."  Libby, 472 Mass. at 49.  Even without this 
familiarity, the motion judge found that the officers' 
questioning was neither psychologically nor physically coercive.  
Officers made no improper promises or inducements.  See 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 483 Mass. 378, 390 (2019) (absence of 
either express or implied assurances by officers why, in part, 
defendant's statements were voluntary); LeBlanc, 433 Mass. at 
555-556 (same).  Furthermore, officers repeatedly told the 
defendant that he could ask them to leave.  Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, we hold that the defendant's 
statements were voluntary. 
 
2.  Evidentiary issues.  In addition to the suppression 
issues, the defendant challenges several evidentiary matters 
27 
 
from the trial.  "We review a judge's evidentiary rulings for an 
abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 
(2020). 
 
a.  Text messages.  At trial, the Commonwealth elicited 
testimony from State police Trooper David Swan regarding text 
message exchanges between the cell phones associated with the 
defendant and the victim.  Swan read aloud text messages that 
highlighted, among other things, the defendant's problems with 
alcohol, money, his job, and tensions and arguments between the 
defendant and the victim.  These text messages were exchanged 
between February 10 and February 18, 2012, the week leading up 
to the killing.  The defendant argues that the text messages 
were not authenticated, and thus the trial judge erred in 
allowing them in evidence.  We disagree. 
 
"To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or 
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what 
the proponent claims it is."  Mass. G. Evid. § 901(a) (2021).  
"Where the Commonwealth seeks to introduce evidence of cell 
phone communications, 'the judge [is] required to determine 
whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [individual] 
authored' the communications."  Commonwealth v. Webster, 480 
28 
 
Mass. 161, 170 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 
442, 447 (2011). 
 
As with other types of communication, the authentication of 
text messages "may be accomplished by way of direct or 
circumstantial evidence, including its [a]ppearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 485 Mass. 471, 477 (2020).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 901(b)(4).  Other "confirming circumstances" that may 
authenticate text messages include acknowledgement that the 
defendant uses the cell phone, acknowledged ownership by a 
defendant of the cell phone containing the messages, and whether 
the defendant knows or supplies the passwords protecting the 
cell phone.  See Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450–451.  See also Mass. G. 
Evid. § 901(b)(11). 
 
Abundant confirming circumstances are present here.  
Focusing first on the cell phones from which the text messages 
were sent and received, each was registered to the defendant's 
and the victim's e-mail accounts, respectively.  Cf. Lopez, 485 
Mass. at 478 (fact that defendant lived with victim who owned 
cell phone from which text messages were sent confirming 
circumstance of defendant's authorship of messages).  Both were 
password protected.  Indeed, Swan testified that he had to use 
specialized software to break into the cell phones.  Compare 
29 
 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 869 (2010) (messages 
sent from social media webpage unauthenticated where "no 
testimony . . . regarding how secure such a Web page is, who can 
access a Myspace Web page, [or] whether codes are needed for 
such access").  Finally, officers found the cell phones with the 
defendant and the victim on the night of the killing. 
 
Testimony about the text messages' contents further linked 
them to the defendant.  See Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450-451 (e-mail 
account's secure nature combined with its contents authenticated 
messages).  The messages were replete with details of the 
defendant's and the victim's lives, including the tensions 
within their relationship, aspects of their living arrangements, 
and the suspension of the defendant's driver's license from his 
OUI charge.  See Commonwealth v. Alden, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 
441 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2010 (2019) ("In addition 
to the content of the text messages, [victim's] prior 
relationship with the defendant and her use of the telephone 
number to communicate with him over a significant period of time 
provided the necessary link"). 
 
Various text messages from the victim's cell phone to the 
defendant's cell phone, for example, referenced the defendant's 
distinctive nickname.  Circumstances beyond the text messages 
tie this name to the defendant.  Specifically, one message from 
the defendant describes how he intended to deliver the victim 
30 
 
flowers on Valentine's Day.  The defendant later remarked to a 
bartender how he had bought the victim flowers for the holiday.  
When officers arrived at the victim's apartment on February 20, 
they found flowers with a card inscribed with the defendant's 
distinctive nickname.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 
300, 317-318 (2014) (e-mail messages authenticated "given the 
long-standing relationship between [the joint venturer] and the 
defendants, the defendants' prior use of the e-mail address at 
the time of the scheme, and the referencing of the harassing 
acts in the e-mails," which were independently observed).  See 
Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 396 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 704 (1977) 
(authentication may be established through testimony "that 
circumstances exist which imply that the thing is what its 
proponent represents it to be").  Taking all these confirming 
circumstances together, the evidence authenticating the text 
messages was overwhelming. 
 
Against this conclusion, the defendant suggests that the 
text messages could have been authored by someone else, pointing 
to the lack of evidence about how regularly he may have needed 
to enter his password to use the cell phone, that there was no 
evidence about who else may have had access to the password, and 
that the card on the flowers may have been authored by an 
unidentified party.  Maybe that is so.  The defendant's claim, 
31 
 
however, that another person may have authored either the text 
messages or the card is relevant to their weight, not their 
admissibility.  Purdy, 459 Mass. at 451.  The Commonwealth 
presented more than an ample foundation for the judge to 
determine that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant authored the text messages. 
 
b.  Prior bad acts.  The defendant next argues that the 
trial judge erred in allowing in evidence certain prior bad acts 
evidence.  "We have long held that '[e]vidence of prior bad acts 
is not admissible to show that the defendant has a criminal 
propensity or is of bad character.'"  Andre, 484 Mass. at 414, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 236 (1991).  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1).  "However, such evidence is 
admissible when offered for another purpose, such as motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
pattern of operation, so long as its probative value for that 
purpose is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect."  
Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 145, 163 (2020), citing 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  "[T]he 
application of [limiting] instructions ordinarily renders any 
potentially prejudicial evidence harmless."  Crayton, supra at 
251, quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 (2000). 
 
i.  OUI charge.  At trial, the Commonwealth introduced 
evidence that the defendant had been arrested for OUI the week 
32 
 
before the killing, arguing that the victim's unwillingness to 
post bail was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to 
kill her.  On appeal, the defendant argues that any relationship 
between the OUI and an alleged motive is slight, and that its 
introduction served only to tarnish his reputation.  Because the 
defendant preserved the issue, we review for prejudicial error.  
See Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 142 (2018).  We 
find none. 
 
Evidence concerning the OUI charge was relevant to show the 
deterioration of the defendant and the victim's relationship and 
thus provide a motive for why he killed her.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 532 (2020) (prior bad acts 
evidence "provided context for the defendant's hostility toward" 
victim); Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 144-145 (2009) 
(prior bad acts evidence "relevant to show the existence of a 
hostile relationship"); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 
464-465 (2004) ("Evidence of the hostile relationship between 
the defendant and his wife was not offered as improper 
propensity evidence, as the defendant contends, but also as 
evidence of his motive to kill her").  At trial, the officer who 
arrested the defendant for the OUI testified that, during the 
arrest, the defendant explained that he had just been in a fight 
with his girlfriend.  Text messages between the victim and the 
defendant, as well as witness testimony, established that he had 
33 
 
recently been fired from his job, was financially strapped, and 
was increasingly anxious.  For example, one witness testified 
that on the evening leading up to the killing, the defendant was 
aggravated by the victim's refusal to post his bail for the OUI 
charge. 
 
Whatever prejudicial effect this evidence had on the 
defendant was slight when considered in the context of the rest 
of the evidence that the Commonwealth presented and the crime 
for which the defendant was on trial.  In any event, the judge 
instructed the jury not to consider the OUI as evidence of the 
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged in the 
indictment.  See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 737 
(2019) (jury presumed to follow judge's limiting instructions 
concerning prior bad act evidence).  Therefore, the judge did 
not abuse his discretion. 
 
ii.  Text messages about a work-related dispute.  The 
Commonwealth also presented text messages between the defendant 
and the victim concerning a dispute that the defendant had with 
former coworkers, arguing that the exchange was relevant to 
prove motive.  The dispute, which led to the defendant being 
fired, involved a physical altercation between the defendant and 
his coworkers.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the text 
messages about the dispute bore only a "very tenuous" connection 
to the crime with which he was charged.  Because the defendant 
34 
 
did not preserve this issue, we review "for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."11  Commonwealth v. 
Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 160 (2020).  A brief description of these 
exchanges demonstrates that their link to the crime was far from 
tenuous. 
 
At the time of the killing, the defendant recently had been 
fired from his job at a local restaurant.  The victim also 
worked there and continued to do so after the defendant had been 
terminated.  Through a series of text messages to the victim in 
the days leading up to the killing, the defendant ranted about 
perceived wrongs done to him by former coworkers.  The victim's 
answers varied from seeking to change the subject to trying to 
calm the defendant down.  Yet in response to the victim's 
attempts to extricate herself from the exchanges, the defendant 
turned his ire on her, alleging that the victim was like his 
former coworkers:  aloof to his struggles.  Several instances of 
this pattern occur in the exchanges.12  After further analogous 
 
 
11 The defendant claims that the issue is preserved because 
of the motion in limine he filed to exclude the text messages.  
However, the only motion concerning the text messages filed by 
the defendant dealt with the authentication issue and did not 
raise the prior bad acts issue.  A different motion in limine 
did object to prior bad act evidence, but that referenced only 
the OUI testimony. 
 
 
12 For example, in response to the victim telling the 
defendant to "calm down," the defendant wrote:  "You don't care 
about me either apparently.  That makes it easier for me to just 
say fuck you too.  You'd be better off working at something you 
35 
 
back-and-forth exchanges, the victim appears to have grown weary 
not only of the dialogue, but also of the defendant, telling 
him, "Whatever.  Evacuate my house immediately."  As the 
defendant continued to complain about work-related problems, the 
victim repeated that she wanted him to leave her apartment. 
 
Although the impetus for these exchanges is a work-related 
dispute, their connection to the defendant and the victim's 
relationship is not "tenuous."  Like the OUI, the text messages 
demonstrated motive.  Throughout the exchanges, the defendant 
connected his complaints about his former coworkers and employer 
to the victim, eventually blaming the latter for his 
misfortunes.  In doing so, the text messages showcased the 
defendant's palpable anger with the victim.  Whatever 
prejudicial effect the text messages had did not outweigh their 
significant probative value.  We discern no error. 
 
3.  Motion for a new trial.  After being convicted, the 
defendant moved for a new trial, claiming that his trial counsel 
had been ineffective.  Specifically, the defendant argued that 
he and his trial counsel had been unable to communicate 
 
want to do."  The defendant quickly followed up this message 
with another one stating:  "I have less problem destroying [the 
defendant's former employer] now."  In another instance, after 
the victim told the defendant to leave her apartment, he wrote 
to her:  "Talk to me when either you or [a former coworker] 
grows a conscience.  You would have done what I'm doing now long 
ago if you were me.  I would bet my life on it." 
36 
 
effectively.  The judge, who had also been the trial judge, 
denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
 
A judge may rule on a motion for a new trial, without an 
evidentiary hearing, if no substantial issue is raised in the 
motion or affidavits.  Upton, 484 Mass. at 161.  "In determining 
whether a substantial issue exists, 'a judge considers the 
seriousness of the issues raised and the adequacy of the 
defendant's showing on those issues.'"  Id. at 162, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 401, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 51 (2019).  In terms of the first prong, there is no 
dispute.  "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . 
readily qualifies as a serious issue."  Commonwealth v. Lys, 481 
Mass. 1, 6 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 
629 (2004). 
 
Turning next to the adequacy of the showing, "the 
defendant's submissions 'need not prove the [motion's] factual 
premise . . . but they must contain sufficient credible 
information to cast doubt on the issue.'"  Upton, 484 Mass. at 
162, quoting Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 348 
(2004).  "Where, as here, the motion judge is also the trial 
judge, he may use his 'knowledge and evaluation of the evidence 
at trial in determining whether to decide the motion for a new 
37 
 
trial without an evidentiary hearing.'"  Commonwealth v. Riley, 
467 Mass. 799, 826 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Wallis, 440 
Mass. 589, 596 (2003).  "We review a judge's decision to deny a 
motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing 
'for a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion'" 
(citation omitted).  Upton, supra. 
 
The judge did not abuse his discretion.  Because the judge 
also had presided over the trial, he was able to observe how the 
defendant and his trial counsel interacted.  What he observed 
indicates that any communication issues were likely of the 
defendant's own making.13  For example, during a status 
conference, the defendant's trial counsel informed the judge 
that he had just learned, by receipt of a package from the 
Office of Bar Counsel, that the defendant had filed a complaint 
against him.  Trial counsel was unaware whether the defendant 
wanted to continue being represented by him.  When asked by the 
judge about this issue, the defendant expressed his interest in 
continuing to be represented because, since he had submitted his 
complaint, he had witnessed the effectiveness of his counsel.  
The defendant then opted to withdraw the complaint, 
 
 
13 By the conclusion of his trial, the defendant had been 
represented by two attorneys (one as full trial counsel and 
another initially as standby counsel and then also as full trial 
counsel), each attorney had moved to withdraw, and the defendant 
had moved pro se to dismiss his counsel. 
38 
 
acknowledging that his own stubbornness likely factored into the 
friction between him and his attorney. 
 
Although the defendant stated in an affidavit in support of 
his motion for a new trial that he had felt anxious and fearful 
toward his trial counsel, the judge did not credit these 
assertions.  Nor, for that matter, did the judge have to credit 
them.  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 241 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 672–673 (2004) 
("The judge was entitled to reject summarily any claim supported 
only by the defendant's self-serving affidavits, and infer from 
his own observation of the defendant and counsel at trial that 
they were conferring over precisely the matter the defendant now 
claims was never discussed").  We thus discern no error. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks this court to exercise its discretion under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, either to "order a new trial" or to "direct the 
entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt, and remand the 
case to the superior court for the imposition of sentence."  To 
this end, the defendant argues that a combination of mental 
illnesses, substance use disorders, and trauma indicate that the 
killing reflected spontaneity, not premeditation.14  We disagree. 
 
 
14 Specifically, the defendant has a history of obsessive 
compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, dysthymic 
disorder, alcohol dependence, and narcissistic, borderline, and 
passive aggressive personality traits.  He has a history of 
39 
 
 
The defendant's mental illnesses, although serious, do not 
demonstrate that he was "driven by [his] mental condition" alone 
to kill the victim.  Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 
434 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 95 
(2021) ("Mental illness alone is generally insufficient to 
support a verdict reduction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E").  On the 
contrary, rather than a "bolt from the blue," the victim's death 
was preceded by growing hostilities between her and the 
defendant.  Compare Colleran, supra at 433 ("There appears to 
have been no hostile relationship between the defendant and the 
victim"); Commonwealth v. Dalton, 385 Mass. 190, 196-197 (1982) 
(verdict reduced to murder in second degree where defendant and 
victim had good relationship and no motive was apparent).  These 
tensions culminated in a frantic emergency telephone call from 
the victim followed by her throat being slashed and her death.  
Amidst these developments, a jury could have found that the 
defendant formed the intent to cause the victim's death.  See 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 746 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 269 (1994) ("The law 
recognizes that a plan to murder may be formed within a few 
seconds"). 
 
suicidal ideations and attempts to commit suicide, and had been 
prescribed four medications to help manage his mental health.  
The defendant also reported a history of homelessness and being 
the victim of two rapes that went unprosecuted. 
40 
 
 
We have reviewed the entire record of this case pursuant to 
our responsibilities under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude 
that there is no basis for reducing the defendant's sentence on 
the murder conviction or ordering a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed.