Case Title: Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC

Citation: 2016 IL 120041

Docket Number: 120041

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2016 IL 120041 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
MELINDA SCHWEIHS, Appellant, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, 
LLC, et al., Appellees. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
120041 
 
 
 
Filed 
Rehearing denied 
 
 
December 15, 2016 
March 27, 2017 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court of the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 
Daniel Lynch, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
Cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Edward T. Joyce, Jennifer L. Doherty, and Joan M. Mannix, all of 
Chicago, for appellant. 
 
Jeffrey S. Pavlovich and Gerard C. Fosco, of Leahy, Eisenberg & 
Fraenkel, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellees Safeguard Properties, Inc., Todd 
Gonsalez, and Edilfonso Centeno. 
 
 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2017.07.06 
14:34:53 -05'00'
 
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Edward J. Lesniak, Susan M. Horner, and Daniel Klapman, of Burke, 
Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee Chase 
Home Finance, LLC. 
 
R. Sean Hocking, of Craig & Craig, LLC, of Mattoon, for amicus 
curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. 
 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.  
Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This tort case arose out of foreclosure proceedings involving plaintiff Melinda Schweihs’s 
home. Plaintiff sued defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), Safeguard Properties, 
Inc. (Safeguard), Todd Gonsalez, and Edilfonso Centeno for numerous torts, including 
emotional distress, as a result of Gonsalez and Centeno entering her home. Her emotional 
distress claims, which are at issue here, were dismissed by the circuit court, and the appellate 
court affirmed. 2015 IL App (1st) 140683. This court allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to 
appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment 
of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
In 1997, plaintiff executed a note secured by a mortgage for a home located in Northbrook, 
Illinois. Chase owned the mortgage. The mortgage contained a provision granting Chase the 
right, in the event of a default by plaintiff, to enter onto the property to make repairs. The 
provision reads as follows:  
“7. Protection of Lender’s Rights in the Property. If Borrower fails to perform the 
covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, or there is a legal 
proceeding that may significantly affect Lender’s rights in the Property *** then 
Lender may do and pay for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property 
and Lender’s rights in the Property. Lender’s actions may include paying any sums 
secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument, appearing in court, 
paying reasonable attorney’s fees and entering on the Property to make repairs. 
Although Lender may take action under this paragraph 7, Lender does not have to do 
so.” 
 
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¶ 4 
 
Plaintiff defaulted on the mortgage in 2007. Chase filed a complaint to foreclose the 
mortgage against her and obtained a judgment of foreclosure on May 25, 2010. Plaintiff had 
the right to possession of her home until the redemption period expired on August 25, 2010.  
¶ 5 
 
To protect its interest in properties, Chase contracts with outside companies to provide 
property inspections and preservation services. Safeguard is one of those companies that 
provide national property monitoring and preservation services for residential properties in 
foreclosure. Safeguard’s employees do not physically perform the inspections or render 
preservation services. Instead, Safeguard employs “Client Account Representatives” (CARs) 
who coordinate with local vendors, with whom Safeguard contracts. These local vendors, in 
turn, perform the inspections and preservation services.  
¶ 6 
 
On June 17, 2010, Safeguard’s inspections department received a report from one of its 
vendors that plaintiff’s property was vacant. Based on the report, a Safeguard CAR placed an 
“initial secure” order with A1 Builders, a local contractor that performs the property inspection 
services for which Safeguard contracted. An “initial secure” order may require a vendor to 
secure access to the property by changing one of the locks on the premises and to “winterize” 
the house by turning off the utilities. A1 in turn hires subcontractors, who perform the work 
orders. Gonsalez and Centeno worked as A1 subcontractors. 
¶ 7 
 
On June 22, 2010, Gonsalez and Centeno arrived at plaintiff’s property to carry out the 
“initial secure” order. They were required to determine the occupancy status of the property 
before proceeding with the order. The order instructed them not to do any work if the property 
was occupied.  
¶ 8 
 
Gonsalez testified during his discovery deposition that he and Centeno conducted a visual 
inspection of the property. He observed that the grass on the property was uncut and the trees 
were overgrown. Gonsalez knocked on the front door but did not receive an answer. He also 
checked the gas meter and the water spout and determined that both utilities were turned off. 
He further observed a “for sale” sign at the property, along with a dumpster and a car parked in 
the driveway. 
¶ 9 
 
Gonsalez spoke with a neighbor who lived across the street from plaintiff’s home. 
Gonsalez testified that the neighbor told him that the house was not occupied but a woman 
would come and go on occasion. She also said that there were no lights on at plaintiff’s home at 
night. She did not recognize the car in plaintiff’s driveway. She also informed him that there 
was a school down the street and that people from the school would park there knowing it was 
a vacant property.  
¶ 10 
 
Centeno testified during his discovery deposition that he did not talk with any neighbors 
but that he recalled that Gonsalez told him the neighbor stated that “they come and go. And 
sometimes they leave their vehicle there.”  
¶ 11 
 
After speaking with the neighbor, Gonsalez again knocked on plaintiff’s front door, 
without a response. Gonsalez and Centeno spent in excess of 45 minutes determining if the 
house was occupied. They also entered the backyard through a latched gate of the home’s 
six-foot security fence. Gonsalez testified that he saw boxes piled on top of each other and 
garbage and debris on the floor, observing these through sliding glass doors. Gonsalez then 
contacted management at A1 Builders, relaying the abovementioned information. He was told 
to proceed with the work order.  
 
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¶ 12 
 
To secure the premises, Gonsalez had to remove one of the secondary locks on the 
property. He removed the lock to the back door. Because of the boxes and debris blocking the 
entrance, Gonsalez could only open the door about a foot and had to climb over them to enter 
the home. Centeno remained at the back door and never entered the home. Once in the home, 
Gonsalez testified that he was confronted by a woman. Both parties were startled, and plaintiff 
stated that she wanted them out of her house and she was calling her lawyer. Gonsalez 
responded he was with the mortgage company and asked her to come to the front door to speak 
with him. Gonsalez then left and went around to the front and knocked on the front door, but 
plaintiff did not answer. Gonsalez and Centeno then waited for the arrival of the police. 
¶ 13 
 
At the time Gonsalez and Centeno arrived at plaintiff’s home, she was a 58- year-old single 
woman who was living alone. Plaintiff testified during her discovery deposition that her home 
was in foreclosure; however, she anticipated selling her home while it was still in the 
redemption period. Plaintiff testified that when she placed the house for sale, she informed the 
realtor that the realtor was to accompany anybody that came to the property. She also testified 
that she was not showing the interior of the house because of the “mess” and “stuff 
everywhere” in piles and in boxes. She described herself as a “packrat” and testified she was in 
the process of packing her belongings, which were in disarray.  
¶ 14 
 
Plaintiff heard knocking on the front door while she was in the basement; however, she was 
on the phone and did not respond. After the phone call, plaintiff went to the second floor of her 
home to continue packing. She stated that she heard the flap drop on the metal mailbox 
attached to her house, at which time she looked out a second-floor window. Plaintiff testified 
that she saw two men standing in her driveway, along with a green truck facing the street, 
without any markings except for a “Harley” decal on the back window. Plaintiff thought that 
they may have been potential buyers looking at the house, and she decided to continue to pack.  
¶ 15 
 
A short time later, plaintiff heard noises coming from the back of the house. She went 
downstairs to identify the noise and encountered Gonsalez in the family room. She testified 
that Gonsalez was not wearing a uniform but was in street clothes with tattoos exposed. 
Centeno was in the open back doorway. Plaintiff testified that she spoke first and asked, “Who 
are you and what are you doing in my home?” Plaintiff testified that one of them told her in a 
“forceful way” that Chase had sent them to secure and winterize the house and that she needed 
to come outside to talk with them. She told them to leave and immediately called her attorney 
and the police. She stayed on the phone with the police dispatcher until the police arrived. The 
police investigated, speaking with plaintiff, Gonsalez, Centeno, and the neighbor with whom 
Gonsalez had spoken. No arrests were made. Gonsalez offered to replace the back-door lock 
with a new lock and key, but plaintiff declined. 
¶ 16 
 
Plaintiff testified that after the incident she was afraid while in her home and fearful that 
she may be attacked. On the same day of the incident, plaintiff went to the hospital because she 
“didn’t feel right.” Subsequently, she sought treatment, therapy, and medication from multiple 
doctors for issues with sleeping, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and depression. Plaintiff stated 
that she felt anxiety when approaching her home and that at times she stayed in hotels because 
of her fear of subsequent break-ins. She was inhibited from packing and preparing her home 
for sale because of this fear. Additionally, she alleged that she sought temporary leave from her 
employment due to the incident but that her request was denied and she was instead 
terminated.  
 
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¶ 17 
 
In October 2010, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against defendants alleging trespass, 
negligent trespass, private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligence. Extensive discovery and motion practice ensued. Defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment as to each of plaintiff’s counts. On February 4, 2014, the circuit court heard 
argument on the motions, and plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the negligence count 
to negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
¶ 18 
 
On February 6, 2014, the court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment with 
respect to plaintiff’s claims for private nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
It denied defendants’ motions with respect to the claims for trespass and negligent trespass, 
and those claims are still pending in the circuit court. The court also granted plaintiff’s motion 
for leave to amend. It then dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, as 
amended, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-615 
(West 2014). Finally, the court made a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) 
(eff. Feb. 26, 2010) that there was “no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or 
both.” Thereafter, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. 
¶ 19 
 
A divided appellate court affirmed, first addressing the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim. The court noted the two types of victims in emotional distress cases: bystanders 
and direct victims. It determined that plaintiff was a direct victim and must allege “some 
physical impact” from defendants’ conduct. The court found that because she did not plead any 
physical contact, she could not establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
and that count was properly dismissed. It further noted that its conclusion was consistent with 
this court’s holdings in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 555 (1983); 
Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 304 (1991); and Pasquale v. Speed Products 
Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 346-47 (1995). The court did acknowledge however, that certain 
language in Pasquale mischaracterized the holding in Corgan, which has led to some 
confusion in the courts. It concluded that the language in Pasquale was obiter dictum and not 
binding. 2015 IL App (1st) 140683. 
¶ 20 
 
The appellate court next addressed plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim, finding that summary judgment was proper as a matter of law because plaintiff could 
not establish that defendants’ conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” 
¶ 21 
 
Justice Harris dissented regarding the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, 
stating that the majority was wrong in continuing to require physical impact in claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress for direct victims. 2015 IL App (1st) 140683, ¶ 49 
(Harris, J., dissenting). 
¶ 22 
 
We granted plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We 
also granted the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel leave to submit an amicus curiae 
brief in support of defendants. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). We affirm the judgment 
of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 23 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 24 
 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress should not have been dismissed. We first address 
plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
 
 
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¶ 25 
 
 
 
 
A. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
¶ 26 
 
Plaintiff contends that her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should not 
have been dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code because the controlling precedent 
of this court establishes that physical impact is not a required element of a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress by a direct victim. 
¶ 27 
 
A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code challenges only the legal sufficiency 
of the complaint. Bonhomme v. St. James, 2012 IL 112393, ¶ 34. The critical inquiry is 
whether the allegations of the complaint, when considered in a light favorable to the plaintiff, 
are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Id. All well-pled facts 
in the complaint must be taken as true, but conclusions of law will not be taken as true unless 
supported by specific factual allegations. Id. Review of the dismissal of a complaint under 
section 2-615 of the Code is de novo. Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2012 IL 112219, ¶ 47. 
¶ 28 
 
Plaintiff first argues that decisions of this court make clear that Illinois, like other 
jurisdictions, has abandoned the impact rule. Plaintiff relies on this court’s decision in Corgan, 
which she claims established that a direct victim need only properly allege the accepted 
elements of a negligence claim, including an emotional or psychological injury but without the 
necessity of also proving a secondary physical impact or injury. Plaintiff further claims that 
this court reaffirmed that principle in Pasquale. 
¶ 29 
 
Plaintiff also argues that the appellate court majority misinterpreted Corgan and Pasquale 
and should not have disregarded language in Pasquale as obiter dictum. The language stated 
that Corgan had “eliminated the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for a direct 
victim’s recovery for emotional distress based on a theory of negligence.” Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d 
at 346. This court reiterated similar statements two more times in Pasquale. Id. at 348-49. 
Plaintiff maintains that this court’s statements in Pasquale were entirely consistent with its 
decision in Corgan. Plaintiff argues that, in accordance with our prior decisions, we should not 
depart from settled precedent, which eliminated the contemporaneous physical impact or 
injury requirement for direct victims.  
¶ 30 
 
Defendants and amicus contend that the impact rule is still the law in Illinois when a direct 
victim pleads negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
¶ 31 
 
To address plaintiff’s claim, we set forth this court’s history of the impact rule and claims 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Generally, to state a claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege the traditional elements of negligence: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 306. And until this court’s decision in 
Rickey, all plaintiffs were also required to allege a contemporaneous physical injury or impact. 
Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 419-20 (1898). This was known as the “impact rule.” Under the 
impact rule, a plaintiff could recover damages if he suffered (1) emotional distress and (2) “ ‘a 
contemporaneous physical injury or impact.’ ” Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 303 (quoting Rickey, 98 
Ill. 2d at 553). Prior to Rickey, there was no distinction between a direct victim and a bystander 
in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. Subsequently, in Rickey, this court drew 
such a distinction.  
¶ 32 
 
In Rickey, an eight-year-old boy witnessed his five-year-old brother’s clothing become 
entangled in a subway escalator mechanism, resulting in the younger brother being choked and 
unable to breathe for a substantial period of time. Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 549. The eight-year-old 
boy brought an action through his mother against numerous defendants, alleging that as a result 
 
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of witnessing the accident to his brother, he sustained severe mental and emotional distress and 
psychiatric trauma. Id. The complaint alleged that the emotional distress manifested in 
physical injury, including “definite functional, emotional, psychiatric and behavioral 
disorders, extreme depression, prolonged and continuing mental disturbances, [and] inability 
to attend school.” Id. at 550. This court adopted the “zone-of-physical-danger rule” for 
bystanders who allege negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 555. Under the 
zone-of-physical-danger rule, “a bystander who is in a zone of physical danger and who, 
because of the defendant’s negligence, has reasonable fear for his own safety is given a right of 
action for physical injury or illness resulting from emotional distress.” Id. The rule does not 
require that the bystander suffer a physical impact or injury at the time of the negligent act, but 
it does require that he must have been in “such proximity to the accident in which the direct 
victim was physically injured that there was a high risk to him of physical impact.” Id. 
Therefore, this court held that a bystander must show physical injury or illness as a result of the 
emotional distress, caused by the defendant’s negligence and not a contemporaneous physical 
injury or impact. Id. 
¶ 33 
 
Subsequently, in Corgan, the plaintiff, who was a patient of a man who held himself out to 
be a licensed psychologist, sued the man for emotional damages because, under the guise of 
therapy, he sexually exploited her. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 300. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant’s conduct caused and still caused her to experience fear, shame, humiliation, and 
guilt. Id. She also alleged that the defendant’s conduct compelled her to undergo more 
intensive and extensive psychotherapeutic care and counseling. Id. The circuit court certified 
questions for the appellate court, and the precise issue in Corgan was whether “as a direct 
victim of defendant’s psychological malpractice, a question remains as to whether the 
complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not allege that she suffered a physical 
injury or illness as a result of her emotional distress.” Id. at 308. This court held that the 
requirement that the plaintiff allege a physical symptom as a result of the emotional distress 
caused by the defendant’s negligence did not apply to direct victim cases. Id. at 312. 
¶ 34 
 
Also, in Corgan, this court made it clear that Rickey did not define the scope of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress as it applies to direct victims. Id. at 304. Corgan was a direct 
victim case, and the patient satisfied the impact rule; on multiple occasions, the psychologist 
had sexual relations with her. Id. at 300. Thus, Corgan is an example of the continued 
application of the impact rule in direct victim cases.  
¶ 35 
 
Moreover, in Corgan, the special concurrence clarified “that the only question before us, 
and the only one resolved by today’s decision, is the question certified by the trial judge: 
whether this court’s earlier opinion in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 
546, bars recovery of damages for emotional distress in the limited set of circumstances 
alleged here. We have, in the present case, answered that question in the negative.” Corgan, 
143 Ill. 2d at 316 (Miller, C.J., specially concurring). 
¶ 36 
 
Also of note is the case of Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 339-40, where the husband of a spectator 
at a drag race, who was killed when she was struck by flying debris resulting from the failure of 
a clutch mechanism on a race car, brought an action against the race track, the manufacturer of 
the engine housing, and the distributor of the engine parts. When the mechanism failed, the 
plaintiff’s wife was struck by the flying debris, and the plaintiff was then struck by his wife’s 
body parts. Id. at 343. The complaint alleged a cause of action for a wrongful death sounding in 
 
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strict liability. Id. Although the plaintiff maintained that he was both a bystander and a direct 
victim, this court found that the plaintiff was a bystander because his emotional distress was 
not caused by being struck with flying debris. Id. at 347. 
¶ 37 
 
Therefore, in Pasquale, this court confined its inquiry to “whether the elimination of the 
contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for bystander recovery for emotional distress 
in the area of negligence meaningfully translate[d] into an elimination of the element of 
physical harm for a bystander’s recovery for emotional distress under strict liability theory.” 
Id. This court determined that it did not and declined to reexamine the established rule that 
physical harm is required to state a bystander’s cause of action and recovery based on strict 
liability. Id. at 349-50. 
¶ 38 
 
This precedent makes clear that a direct victim’s claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress must include an allegation of contemporaneous physical injury or impact. 
To the extent plaintiff argues that Corgan eliminated the impact rule for direct victims, a 
careful reading of Rickey, Corgan, and Pasquale indicates that this court did not eliminate the 
impact rule for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims brought by direct victims.  
¶ 39 
 
Additionally, defendants have brought to our attention numerous appellate court decisions 
that have analyzed the elements necessary for a direct victim to plead negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and have correctly applied this precedent. See Borcia v. Hatyina, 2015 IL 
App (2d) 140559, ¶¶ 43-44 (observing that a cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress requires a plaintiff to allege facts establishing that she suffered a direct 
impact that caused emotional distress or that she was a bystander in a zone of physical danger 
that caused her to fear for her own safety and that she suffered physical injury or illness as a 
result of her emotional distress); see also Doe v. Northwestern University, 289 Ill. App. 3d 39, 
47 (1997) (stating that Illinois courts permit a “plaintiff who has suffered a physical impact and 
injury due to a defendant’s negligence [to] recover for emotional distress that the injury 
directly causes”); Majca v. Beekil, 289 Ill. App. 3d 760, 762-63 (1997) (same); Doe v. 
Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 793, 796 (1994) (holding that the plaintiff qualified as 
a direct victim due to the physical impact he suffered and acknowledging the requirement that 
the physical impact be contemporaneous with the occurrence); Hayes v. Illinois Power Co., 
225 Ill. App. 3d 819, 825 (1992) (holding that the plaintiff was a direct victim because he was 
electrocuted as a result of coming into contact with decedent who had been electrocuted); 
Leonard v. Kurtz, 234 Ill. App. 3d 553, 555-56 (1992) (finding there was no contemporaneous 
physical injury to the plaintiff sufficient to make her a direct victim).  
¶ 40 
 
Furthermore, consistent with our understanding of Rickey, Corgan, Pasquale, and Illinois 
tort law, federal district courts applying Illinois law have held on several occasions that the 
impact rule applies to direct victims. See Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 703 
(7th Cir. 2009) (observing that a direct victim of alleged negligent infliction of emotional 
distress must satisfy the “impact” rule); Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 
2002) (stating that Illinois follows the “impact rule,” which allows a plaintiff to recover for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the distress is directly and causally related to a 
physical injury); Kapoulas v. Williams Insurance Agency, Inc., 11 F.3d 1380, 1382 (7th Cir. 
1993) (recognizing that when a direct victim claims emotional distress, the impact rule still 
applies).  
 
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¶ 41 
 
Moreover, we agree with the appellate court’s characterization of certain language 
referring to Corgan, in Pasquale, as obiter dictum. We note that to evaluate the precedential 
effect of this court’s pronouncements concerning the impact rule, we must preliminarily 
examine general rules governing judicial statements. Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 79-80 
(1993). The term “dictum” is generally used as an abbreviation of obiter dictum, which means 
a remark or opinion uttered by the way. Id. at 80; Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 
Ill. 2d 266, 277-78 (2009). Such an expression or opinion as a general rule is not binding as 
authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 80. On the other hand, 
an expression of opinion upon a point in a case argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon 
by the court, though not essential to the disposition of the cause, if dictum, is a judicial dictum. 
People v. Palmer, 104 Ill. 2d 340, 345-46 (1984) (indicating that precedential scope of 
decision is limited to facts before the court); see Scovill Manufacturing Co. v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 
462, 470 (1916); Rhoads v. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co., 227 Ill. 328, 337 (1907); Law v. 
Grommes, 158 Ill. 492, 494 (1895); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821) (stating that 
“[i]t is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be 
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the 
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when 
the very point is presented for decision”). 
¶ 42 
 
This court wrote in Pasquale that Corgan had “eliminated the contemporaneous injury or 
impact requirement for a direct victim’s recovery for emotional distress on a theory of 
negligence.” Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 346. In fact, as previously stated, in Corgan, this court 
addressed whether a direct victim of negligent infliction of emotional distress had to allege that 
she suffered a physical symptom of her emotional distress. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 308; see 
Brogan v. Mitchell International, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 178, 184-85 (1998). This court held that she 
did not. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 312. Corgan did not address the impact rule, and in fact there 
was no question in that case that the plaintiff had suffered a physical impact, as her claim rested 
on allegations of sexual relations with her therapist. Id. at 300. Thus, Corgan did not eliminate 
the need for a direct victim to allege and prove a contemporaneous physical injury or impact. 
Id. at 304, 312; Braun, 175 Ill. at 420; Kapoulas, 11 F.3d at 1382. Further, Pasquale concerned 
a cause of action based on strict liability, and its mischaracterization of Corgan’s holding was 
not a factor in the issue on appeal in Pasquale. Therefore, we find that this court’s statements 
in Pasquale that Corgan eliminated the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for a 
direct victim’s recovery for emotional distress are obiter dictum and thus are not binding 
authority or precedent.  
¶ 43 
 
Now we turn to the allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint to determine whether they 
are sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and thus 
survive a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code. Plaintiff alleges that Chase and 
Safeguard had a duty to use reasonable care in training their employees, agents, and 
contractors and that Chase breached its duty by failing to properly train and supervise its 
employees, agents, and contractors regarding how to determine whether a property is 
abandoned and how to proceed when they are uncertain as to whether a property is abandoned. 
Also, it is alleged that defendants had a duty to use reasonable care not to interfere with 
plaintiff’s right and interest in the private use and enjoyment of her home and that defendants 
breached this duty of care by “(a) negligently determining that the property was ‘vacant,’ ” 
“(b) negligently entering a report that labeled the property as ‘first time vacancy,’ ” 
 
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“(c) negligently employing a system that permits an ‘initial secure’ work order to be placed 
and carried out without first obtaining a court order finding that [p]laintiff had ‘abandoned’ the 
property as required by both 735 ILCS 5/15-1603[1] and the Judgment of Foreclosure order,” 
“(d) negligently instructing *** Gonsalez and Centeno to carry out the ‘initial secure’ work 
order when it was clear that the property was neither vacant nor abandoned” and 
“(e) negligently carrying out the ‘initial secure’ work order even though it was clear that the 
property was neither vacant nor abandoned.” Finally, plaintiff sought damages for the injuries 
sustained by her as a direct and proximate result of defendants’ actions. 
¶ 44 
 
As previously determined, the pleading requirements for a direct victim’s recovery for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress include an allegation of a contemporaneous physical 
injury or impact. Therefore, since plaintiff did not include an allegation of a physical impact, as 
a direct victim, she failed to allege a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Thus, we conclude that the negligent infliction of emotional distress count of her 
complaint was properly dismissed. 
 
¶ 45 
 
 
 
 
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
¶ 46 
 
Initially, we respond to defendants’ argument that plaintiff has forfeited review of her 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Defendants point out that plaintiff’s 
November 4, 2015, petition for leave to appeal sought review of both her negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. However, this 
court denied the petition in its entirety, and plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider on February 1, 
2016. Defendants maintain that, because plaintiff solely referenced her negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim and so limited her motion, she has forfeited further review of her 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. We disagree. In this court’s order dated 
February 23, 2016, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was allowed. The order of January 
20, 2016, denying the petition for leave to appeal was vacated, and the petition for leave to 
appeal was allowed. Thus, the court allowed the petition in its entirety, and plaintiff has not 
forfeited review of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 
(eff. Jan. 1, 2015); Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 152 
(2004).  
¶ 47 
 
We now address plaintiff’s contention that it was improper to grant summary judgment on 
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because there was a question of fact as to 
whether Gonsalez and Centeno’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. 
¶ 48 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2014). 
Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should only be granted if the movant’s right to 
judgment is clear and free from doubt. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 
42-43 (2004). Where a reasonable person could draw divergent inferences from undisputed 
facts, summary judgment should be denied. Id. In determining the existence of a genuine issue 
of material fact, courts must consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and 
affidavits on file in the case and must construe them strictly against the movant and liberally in 
                                                 
 
1Section 15-1603 of the Code allows a court to shorten the redemption period if the court finds that 
the property has been abandoned. 735 ILCS 5/15-1603 (West 2014). 
 
- 11 - 
 
favor of the opponent. Id. In appeals from summary judgment rulings, we conduct a de novo 
review. Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay, 2013 IL 114617, ¶ 15 (citing Outboard Marine 
Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992)). 
¶ 49 
 
In Illinois, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was first recognized in 
Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 87 (1961), in which a widow was permitted to maintain such an 
action against the person who had killed her husband. It was not until 1976, however, that this 
court (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)) outlined the requirements for the 
tort. Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 90 (1976).  
¶ 50 
 
First, the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous. Second, the actor must 
either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress or know that there is at least a 
high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress. Third, the conduct must 
in fact cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86 (1988) (citing 
Public Finance, 66 Ill. 2d at 90).  
¶ 51 
 
It is clear that the tort “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, 
petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d, at 73 
(1965); McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86. “It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an 
intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or 
even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which 
would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only 
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized community.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d, at 73 (1965); Public 
Finance, 66 Ill. 2d at 90. “The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that 
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress 
are factors to be considered in determining the severity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 
cmt. j, at 77-78 (1965); McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86; Public Finance, 66 Ill. 2d at 90.  
¶ 52 
 
Several factors have been identified that should be considered in determining whether a 
defendant’s conduct may be deemed outrageous. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 
Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1992). The extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may arise from the 
defendant’s abuse of some position that gives him authority over the plaintiff or the power to 
affect the plaintiff’s interests. Id. (citing McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86-87). A factor to be 
considered is also the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that his objective is legitimate. 
McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 89. Another factor to be considered is the defendant’s awareness that 
the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 21 (citing 
McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 89-90). Those factors are to be considered in light of all of the facts and 
circumstances in a particular case, and the presence or absence of any of these factors is not 
necessarily critical to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 90. The outrageousness of a defendant’s conduct must be determined in 
view of all the facts and circumstances pled and proved in a particular case. Id. 
¶ 53 
 
Specifically, plaintiff argues that the conduct of Gonsalez and Centeno was extreme and 
outrageous because (a) breaking into someone’s locked home constitutes extreme and 
outrageous conduct and (b) there was no justification for the forcible break-in by those 
defendants. 
 
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¶ 54 
 
Here, we find that the conduct of Gonsalez and Centeno did not rise to the level of extreme 
and outrageous. We observe that the record reveals that Gonsalez and Centeno conducted an 
investigation to determine whether the house was occupied. While there were signs that the 
house was not abandoned, such as the presence of the dumpster and a vehicle, Gonsalez 
inquired into the nature of the vehicle and was told that different people were parking there. 
Gonsalez did indeed find that the gas was turned off, boxes were piled on top of each other 
haphazardly and blocked the back door entrance to the property, and debris and garbage 
littered the interior. After 45 minutes of inspection, which included knocking on the door, 
observing the property, and talking with neighbors, Gonsalez received permission to proceed 
with the “initial secure” order. By removing one secondary lock on the premises, defendants 
were securing the property for entrance for repairs, not taking possession of the property for 
residential purposes. 
¶ 55 
 
We acknowledge that under Illinois law, the sanctity of the home and the inherent right to 
be free from intrusion are important principles of law. See, e.g., Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. 
However, we note that plaintiff was aware that her property was in foreclosure and was in the 
redemption period. Moreover, knowing the legal status of her right to possession, she ignored 
the knocking on her door after observing two men and a van in her driveway. Her actions 
prevented Gonsalez and Centeno from introducing themselves and explaining their presence 
on the property. Further, once Gonsalez and Centeno found the property was occupied, they 
left the home and waited for the police. The interaction was not extreme or outrageous, and 
therefore, we decline to accept plaintiff’s argument that defendants’ entry into her home was 
sufficient, in and of itself, to be extreme and outrageous conduct. 
¶ 56 
 
We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary. Plaintiff contends that by 
entering her home, defendants were taking possession. Plaintiff claims that, absent a court 
order finding that she had abandoned her home, defendants had no right to break in and seek to 
take possession. Plaintiff argues that, under Illinois mortgage foreclosure law, “the redemption 
period shall end on the date 30 days after the date the judgment of foreclosure is entered if the 
court finds that the mortgaged real estate has been abandoned.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1603(b)(4) 
(West 2014). She further argues that foreclosure law regarding the “right to possession” 
establishes that a mortgagee is not entitled to possession of a mortgagor’s home without a court 
order. 735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (West 2014). She maintains that, absent a court order granting 
Chase the right to enter the property, defendants had no right to enter her home. 
¶ 57 
 
We find plaintiff’s reliance on foreclosure law unconvincing. As noted by the appellate 
court, there is a substantial difference between the right to possession for residential purposes, 
which these statutes address, and the contractual right to enter to make repairs. Contrary to 
plaintiff’s argument that defendants had no legal justification for their entry into the property, 
plaintiff signed a note with the mortgage that contained a provision designated “protection of 
lender’s rights in the property,” which allowed Chase to enter the property to make repairs if 
plaintiff fell into default. “It is a rule universally recognized that a written contract is the 
highest evidence of the terms of an agreement between the parties to it, and it is the duty of 
every contracting party to learn and know its contents before he signs it.” Vargas v. Esquire, 
Inc., 166 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1948). In the absence of fraud, which must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence (Bundesen v. Lewis, 368 Ill. 623, 636-37 (1938)), a man in possession 
of all his faculties who signs a contract cannot relieve himself from the obligations of the 
contract by saying he did not know or understand what it contained (Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 
 
- 13 - 
 
U.S. 45, 50 (1875)). A person is presumed to know those things that reasonable diligence on 
his part would bring to his attention. Hawkins v. Capital Fitness, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 
133716, ¶ 14 (recognizing that the act of signing legally signifies that the individual had an 
opportunity to become familiar with and comprehend the terms of the document he or she 
signed); Asset Exchange II, LLC v. First Choice Bank, 2011 IL App (1st) 103718, ¶ 43 (“One 
is under a duty to learn, or know, the contents of a written contract before he signs it, and is 
under a duty to determine the obligations which he undertakes by the execution of a written 
agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Vargas, 166 F.2d at 654.  
¶ 58 
 
Moreover, the judgment of foreclosure obtained by Chase stated that “[i]n order to protect 
and preserve the mortgaged real estate, it has or may also become necessary for [Chase] to pay 
fire and other hazard insurance premiums on the real estate or to make such repairs to the real 
estate as may reasonably be deemed necessary for the proper preservation thereof.” Therefore, 
we find that Chase had the right to enter the property to make reasonable repairs for the 
preservation of the property. Although plaintiff argues that the house was not in need of 
repairs, she does not explain how defendants were to know or determine that.  
¶ 59 
 
In addition, we note that Safeguard’s order instructed the subcontractors not to enter if the 
property was occupied and Gonsalez and Centeno undertook efforts attempting to determine 
the occupancy of the house for over 45 minutes. Furthermore, the evidence reveals that 
Gonsalez and Centeno were only instructed to change one secondary lock, which they 
attempted to do. We fail to see how removing one secondary lock to allow access to Chase for 
preservation services equates to taking possession of the property for residential purposes.  
¶ 60 
 
In sum, we cannot disagree with the appellate court that there may have been a better and 
more commonsense way to determine if the property was occupied. However, based upon this 
record in the context of mortgage foreclosure proceedings, it cannot be said that the entry, after 
which defendants left and never returned, is conduct so extreme and outrageous that it goes 
beyond all possible bounds of decency. 
¶ 61 
 
Therefore, since there is no question of fact as to whether the conduct of Gonsalez and 
Centeno could be deemed extreme and outrageous, summary judgment against plaintiff on her 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was proper. Our disposition renders 
unnecessary any discussion of the agency arguments raised by the parties. See, e.g., Standard 
Mutual Insurance, 2013 IL 114617, ¶ 35. 
 
¶ 62 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 63 
 
We conclude that the appellate court’s holding that plaintiff has no cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is affirmed. The appellate court’s granting of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants with regard to plaintiff’s intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim is also affirmed. 
 
¶ 64 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 65 
 
Cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶ 66 
 
JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring: 
¶ 67 
 
I agree that under our long-standing precedents, the impact rule continues to apply to 
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). I write separately to note that the 
 
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basis for this court’s holding in Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296 (1991), upon which our 
opinion relies, was rejected, at least in part, by our decision in Clark v. Children’s Memorial 
Hospital, 2011 IL 108656, and to make a clear distinction between a claim of NIED and a 
claim of liability for negligence or other personal tort in which the act or omission of the 
defendant caused emotional distress for which damages may be recovered.  
¶ 68 
 
In Corgan, a former patient sued an unregistered psychologist for what she characterized in 
her count I as “PSYCHOLOGICAL MALPRACTICE” after he engaged in sexual intercourse 
with her “under the guise of therapy,” causing her severe psychological symptoms requiring 
extensive treatment. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 300. Her count III alleged that defendant breached 
his duty to her by his “ ‘conscious indifference and reckless disregard’ ” for her well-being by 
repeatedly engaging in “ ‘sexual intercourse with her under the guise of therapy.’ ” Id. at 301. 
Thus, both counts I and III sounded in negligence, specifically, professional malpractice. 
¶ 69 
 
In his motion to dismiss, the defendant inaccurately characterized count I as a claim of 
NIED and count III as a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Id. She 
responded that count III stated a claim for negligence, not IIED. In response to defendant’s 
motion to dismiss both counts, the circuit court certified the two questions for interlocutory 
review, asking whether this court’s holding in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 
546 (1983), barred her claims of emotional distress. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 301-02. 
¶ 70 
 
Although the appellate court stated that count I was “ ‘in essence for negligence’ ” and that 
count II “was ‘basically an action for negligence’ ” (id. at 302), the appellate court nevertheless 
treated both counts as claims of NIED. The appellate court concluded that Rickey was not 
applicable to her claims of NIED because she was a “direct victim” of the defendant’s alleged 
negligent conduct rather than a bystander. Id. 
¶ 71 
 
After allowing the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal, this court formulated the issue 
as whether “direct victims must set forth the pleading requirements established in Rickey when 
stating a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id. It answered the 
question in the negative, distinguishing between direct victim NIED cases and bystander NIED 
cases, which require that the plaintiff be in the zone of danger. Id. at 304. After observing that 
“the zone-of-physical-danger rule is patently inapplicable to direct victims” (id. at 305), this 
court also rejected any additional requirement that the NIED plaintiff plead and prove that the 
emotional distress caused by the defendant’s negligence caused physical symptoms (id. at 
312).  
¶ 72 
 
In reaching this holding, this court discussed Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 
Ill. 2d 230 (1987), in which the parents of a child born with hemophilia sued for wrongful birth 
and sought damages, including compensation for their resulting emotional distress. In that 
case, this court’s analysis treated the parents as if they were “bystanders who were witnessing 
the effects of hemophilia” (Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 305) and said that they failed to state a claim 
for NIED because they failed to allege that they were in the zone of danger. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 
2d at 261-62. Thus, “the Siemieniec majority’s mere failure to address the direct-victim/ 
bystander distinction [did] not amount to expansion of the zone-of-physical-danger rule to 
include direct victims.” Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 305.  
¶ 73 
 
In Clark, this court expressly overruled Siemieniec, not on the basis of the distinction 
between a direct victim and a bystander, but on the basis of a distinction between the tort of 
NIED and the tort of negligence where the plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress. 
 
- 15 - 
 
¶ 74 
 
The parents in Clark claimed wrongful birth due to negligent genetic testing and 
counseling, alleging that they would not have conceived another child had the defendants 
provided them with accurate information about the risk of giving birth to a second child with a 
serious genetic abnormality. Clark, 2011 IL 108656, ¶ 5. The damages sought in the wrongful 
birth count included “the extraordinary costs of caring for [the child] during his minority” (id. 
¶ 16) but not damages for the emotional distress they experienced as a result of the burden of 
raising a second severely disabled child. To recover damages for the emotional distress caused 
by the conduct of the defendants, they pleaded a separate count of NIED. Id. ¶ 17. 
¶ 75 
 
The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of the parents’ NIED count, 
stating that “[i]n contrast to Siemieniec, plaintiffs in the present case have pleaded they are 
subject to physical pain, exhaustion, and emotional distress from caring for their son ***; they 
are subject to ‘hitting, biting, and physical trauma’ while caring for [him]; and they are thus 
within the zone-of-physical-danger caused by defendants’ alleged negligence.” Clark v. 
Children’s Memorial Hospital, 391 Ill. App. 3d 321, 332 (2009). Thus, the appellate court 
held, the parents “adequately pleaded that they fall within the zone-of-physical-danger rule and 
therefore have stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id.  
¶ 76 
 
The defendants argued before this court that the appellate court’s ruling was in conflict 
with Siemieniec. Clark, 2011 IL 108656, ¶ 96. We distinguished between a claim of NIED and 
a claim of professional negligence in which compensatory damages include compensation for 
emotional distress, explaining that “[w]here the claim of emotional distress is freestanding and 
not anchored to any other tort against the plaintiff, courts have applied special restrictions *** 
because of concerns regarding the possibility of fraudulent claims or frivolous litigation.” Id. 
¶ 106 (citing Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555). Such special restrictions include the requirement of a 
contemporaneous physical impact or injury when the plaintiff claims to be a direct victim of 
NIED (supra ¶¶ 31, 38) and the requirement that the plaintiff be in the zone of physical danger 
in a bystander NIED claim (Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 550). 
¶ 77 
 
We acknowledged contributing to this misunderstanding in Siemieniec when we viewed 
damages sought for emotional distress in a professional negligence claim as a claim of NIED. 
Clark, 2011 IL 108656, ¶ 109. Further, we noted that:  
 
“[t]he nature of the error [of denying recovery of damages for emotional distress] is 
evident when one considers that damages for emotional distress are available to 
prevailing plaintiffs in cases involving other personal torts such as defamation (see, 
e.g., Slovinski v. Elliott, 237 Ill. 2d 51 (2010)); conversion (see, e.g., Cruthis v. Firstar 
Bank, N.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d 1122 (2004)); and misappropriation of identity (see, e.g., 
Petty v. Chrysler Corp., 343 Ill. App. 3d 815 (2003)). See also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of 
Remedies § 8.2, at 413-14 (2d ed. 1993) (‘When it comes to mental or emotional 
distress, the usual rule allows free recovery of emotional distress damages to any 
victim of a personal tort.’).” Id. ¶ 111. 
¶ 78 
 
Thus, we expressly overruled Siemieniec, stating that the zone-of-danger rule “applies only 
in cases where the plaintiff’s theory of liability is the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
It does not apply where *** a tort has already been committed against the plaintiffs and they 
assert emotional distress as an element of damages for that tort.” Id. ¶ 113. 
¶ 79 
 
Like Siemieniec, Corgan was not really an NIED case. The plaintiff pleaded negligence, 
specifically professional malpractice, which resulted in emotional distress. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d 
 
- 16 - 
 
at 300. Indeed, Chief Justice Miller specially concurred in Corgan, making just this point. Id. 
at 315 (Miller, C.J., specially concurring). He would have treated the case as an ordinary 
negligence/malpractice case, which is where the court eventually arrived in Clark, 20 years 
later. He noted that the duty at issue was the duty imposed by the therapist-patient relationship. 
Id. at 316. Notably, the majority in Corgan also concluded that the defendant, as a treating 
psychologist, owed a duty to the plaintiff and that he breached that duty by having sexual 
relations with her during the course of treatment. Id. at 307 (majority opinion). Such a breach 
of such a duty is grounds for finding negligence—even if damages are claimed for emotional 
distress.  
¶ 80 
 
In light of our reasoning in Clark and the majority opinion in the present case, it should be 
clear that when a plaintiff claims NIED, she must allege a contemporaneous physical impact or 
injury as a direct result of the defendant’s conduct or else that she was a bystander in the zone 
of physical danger. If, however, she states a claim for a tort other than NIED, no such 
additional pleading requirement applies.  
¶ 81 
 
In the present case, while the plaintiff cannot state a claim for NIED in the absence of a 
contemporaneous physical impact or injury directly resulting from the defendants’ entry into 
her home, her other claims are still pending in the circuit court. Whether any of these claims 
succeeds, whether damages for emotional distress are available for the particular claim, and 
whether she proves her entitlement to such damages remain to be seen.