Case Title: Sweezey v. Neel

Citation: 179 Vt. 507, 2006 VT 38, 904 A.2d 1050

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sweezey v. Neel (2004-225); 179 Vt. 507; 904 A.2d 1050


2006 VT 38

[Filed 05-May-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 38

                                No. 2004-225


  J. Kent Sweezey                                Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Lamoille Superior Court


  Hartley Neel, Virginia Neel and   October Term, 2005 Morristown
    Landowner's Association


  Alan W. Cheever, J.

  Robert F. O'Neill and Heather Rider Hammond of Gravel and Shea, Burlington,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

  Christopher D. Roy of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for
    Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-Appellees.


       PRESENT:   Reiber, C.J., Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ., and
  Gibson, J. (Ret.), 
       Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   This case concerns a longstanding dispute over
  plaintiff J. Kent Sweezey's encroachment upon a deeded easement traversing
  his property.  Ultimately, the superior court allowed plaintiff to bend the
  easement around a new addition to his house and prohibited the easement's
  owner from using the right-of-way as an avenue for future development of
  the dominant estate.  The easement's owner, a landowner's association
  comprised of two couples, appeals several aspects of the superior court's
  decision.  Plaintiff cross-appeals, asking this Court to allow servient
  landowners to obtain court approval to unilaterally relocate easements in a
  manner that does not unduly burden the dominant estate.  We conclude that
  the superior court acted prematurely in prohibiting use of the easement as
  an avenue for any future development on defendants' adjoining property, but
  the court did not err in allowing plaintiff to bend the easement around his
  addition.  We decline, however, plaintiff's request that we abandon the
  general rule that easements cannot be relocated without the consent of both
  the servient and dominant landowners.

       ¶  2.  For the most part, the facts and procedural history of this
  case are undisputed.  In 1965, William and Marian Bernhard transferred to
  themselves and another couple a portion of a large parcel of land that they
  had purchased in the 1950s.  In consideration of the transfer, the other
  couple agreed to construct an eight-acre pond and boathouse on the
  property.  Earthmoving and other equipment used to construct the pond and
  boathouse accessed the conveyed property by way of a shallow portion of a
  nearby stream.  Out of concerns for potential liability, ownership of the
  property was placed in the couples' corporation, Kimibakw, Inc.  As part of
  the conveyance, the Bernhards deeded to the corporation a fifty-foot-wide
  easement over their retained parcel to allow access to the conveyed
  property.  The easement starts as a single path and then diverges into an
  upper and lower fork, forming a "Y" into the dominant estate. (FN1)  The
  deed conveying the easement does not describe the right-of-way by metes and
  bounds.                                                              
   
       ¶  3.  In July 1978, Kimibakw sold the property to defendant
  Morristown Landowner's Association, which was comprised of Virginia and
  Hartley Neel and four other couples.  Thereafter, the Association's members
  and guests used the deeded easement for vehicular and other access to and
  from the Association property.  In 1988, the Bernhards built a home on
  their retained parcel, the servient estate.  In doing so, the Bernhards
  upgraded as a driveway the first 1100 feet of an access road that was later
  ruled to be part of the disputed easement.  The Neels initially challenged
  the location of utility poles placed near the Bernhards' home, but
  eventually dropped that challenge after conferring with Mrs. Bernhard.

       ¶  4.  In 1997, Mrs. Bernhard sold the servient estate to plaintiff J.
  Kent Sweezey.  At this point, the Neels and another couple, the Redlichs,
  were the only remaining members of the Association.  In advance of the
  closing, plaintiff had a survey of the property done.  The survey, which
  was recorded in the town land records, was consistent with a 1977
  unrecorded survey with respect to the location of the easement.  In 1998
  and 1999, plaintiff worked on the upper fork of the easement in the hopes
  of converting it into a ski trail.  At the same time, he began constructing
  an alternative road that would replace the deeded easement.  In August
  1999, plaintiff met with Mr. Neel to discuss the possibility of the
  Association members using the alternative road for ingress and egress to
  the Association's property.  Plaintiff explained that he was anticipating
  building an addition to his house and wanted to reduce the traffic on the
  access road running near the house.  Mr. Neel indicated that he would
  consider using the proposed alternate route.
   
       ¶  5.  In November 1999, plaintiff began work on his planned
  addition.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Neel telephoned him to complain about
  the addition.  After telephoning his contractor, plaintiff learned that no
  building permit had been obtained.  Plaintiff halted the construction and
  applied for a permit.  In December 1999, Mrs. Neel and the Association's
  attorney attended a hearing before the town development review board,
  arguing that the permit should not be issued because the proposed addition
  would encroach upon the Association's easement.  The board responded that
  it lacked jurisdiction to establish the location of the easement, but
  encouraged the parties to work out a solution to the problem.  In response,
  plaintiff, his attorney, Mrs. Neel, and the Association's attorney met in
  private before returning to the meeting to announce that they had reached
  an agreement.  The details of the agreement are in dispute, but, at
  minimum, they agreed that the Neels would have an engineer inspect the
  alternative road in the spring to determine whether it was a suitable
  substitute for the deeded easement.  The board eventually issued the
  building permit, and, in the ensuing months, plaintiff completed
  construction of his addition, which came within ten feet of the fifty-foot
  easement's centerline.

       ¶  6.  In late April 2000, plaintiff's attorney sent the Association's
  attorney a letter inquiring about a schedule for having an engineer inspect
  the alternative road.  The following month, the Association's attorney
  responded by stating that the Neels were reluctant to hire an engineer
  unless the parties could agree that the proposed right-of-way was for
  "unlimited access" to the dominant estate.  Plaintiff's attorney then
  accused defendants of trying to impose new conditions on their agreement to
  use the alternative road as long as it proved to be a suitable substitute
  for the deeded easement.  Plaintiff threatened legal action if an agreement
  could not be reached within ten days.
   
       ¶  7.  In June 2000, plaintiff filed suit and obtained an ex parte
  temporary restraining order preventing the Association from using the
  deeded easement.  Thereafter, the parties agreed to an interim order
  allowing the Association to use the alternative road and upper and lower
  forks of the easement but prohibiting vehicular traffic on the upper fork
  pending resolution of their cross-motions for a preliminary injunction.  In
  June 2001, in response to cross-motions for summary judgment on certain
  issues, the superior court ruled that the scope of defendants' permissible
  use of the easement "includes pedestrians and vehicles of the kind
  ordinarily permitted on unpaved public roads in Vermont such as may be
  reasonably necessary to access the dominant estate."  In its October 2001
  ruling on the parties' cross-motions for a preliminary injunction, the
  court denied plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief and granted
  defendants' request for a preliminary injunction based on its conclusions
  that the location of the deeded easement was clearly marked and plaintiff
  had encroached upon the easement without obtaining defendants' consent.

       ¶  8.  In the fall of 2003, following a four-day bench trial before a
  different judge, the superior court issued a final decision upholding the
  court's earlier rulings with respect to the location of the easement and
  denying, for the most part, plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief. 
  Nevertheless, the court allowed plaintiff to keep his addition intact by
  constructing a bend in the easement away from his house up to a distance of
  fifty feet.  The court also determined that the scope of the deeded
  easement did not include its use as an avenue for future development of the
  Association's property.

       ¶  9.  Defendants appeal the superior court's decision, arguing, among
  other things, that the trial court erred by relocating the course of the
  deeded easement and by restricting the scope of the use of the easement
  with respect to future development.  Plaintiff cross-appeals, asking this
  Court to adopt the position that the owner of a servient estate can, with
  court approval, unilaterally relocate a deeded easement not set forth in
  metes and bounds, as long as the relocated easement does not frustrate the
  use and enjoyment of the dominant estate.

                                     I.
   
       ¶  10.  We first consider defendants' argument that the superior
  court erred by allowing plaintiff to bend the easement up to fifty feet
  from his house rather than requiring him to remove his encroaching
  structure.  In support of this argument, defendants rely upon two general
  principles of property law.  The first "is that the owners of both the
  dominant and servient estates must consent to relocate an easement."  In re
  Shantee Point, Inc., 174 Vt. 248, 261,