Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ramsey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ramsey1992 WY 127839 P.2d 936Case Number: 91-244Decided: 10/08/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE of 
Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

Judy RAMSEY, 
surviving spouse of Steven Ramsey, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., and J.C. 
DeMers, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellant.

Phillip T. Willoughby, Casper, for appellee. 

Before MACY, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ., and PRICE, District 
Judge.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     Can a suicide become a 
compensable event for worker's compensation coverage? We answer the question in 
the affirmative in concurring with the decision of the administrative hearing 
officer which was affirmed upon first appellate review by the district court. 
Our decision employs the chain of causation test as the predominating principle 
on this subject within the volume of appellate cases. See Leslie A. Bradshaw, 
Annotation, Suicide as Compensable Under Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 
616, 631 (1967).

 [¶2.]     Steven R. Ramsey 
suffered a very severe 1988 industrial accident. He was eligible for and 
received worker's compensation benefits. His effort to receive compensation 
through a third-party culpable negligence case was not productive although 
pursued through appeal to this court. Ramsey v. Pacific Power and Light, 792 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1990). Following the 1988 injury, regular 
medical care and a total disability status continued after the accident, 
including psychiatric care and use of anti-depressant medication. Mr. Ramsey was 
not able to resume any significant employment. It was Sunday, April 26, 1990, 
and the family had planned to go out for dinner. Mr. Ramsey excused himself from 
joining them, stayed home and committed suicide.

 [¶3.]     His widow, Judy Ramsey, 
appellee herein, applied for survivor benefits under worker's compensation, 
received an administrative denial, pursued the claim through hearing before the 
administrative hearing office and obtained a favorable reversal. The Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division took an appeal by a petition for review to the 
district court where the award benefit and favorable decision of the 
administrative hearing officer was affirmed. Dissatisfied, the Workers' 
Compensation Division has again appealed to now place benefit eligibility before 
this court.

 [¶4.]     Our review presents two 
coordinate but quite different questions: As a matter of law, can a suicide 
under Wyoming 
law ever trigger survivorship entitlement to benefits and, then, as a matter of 
fact, if the benefit should ever be available, is proper causative proof 
provided in this record?1 The Workers' Compensation Division 
argues that the non-applied statutory bar to benefit eligibility is a legal 
error of the administrative hearing officer and the district court. The Workers' 
Compensation Division states the issues:

     1. Does the suicide 
death of an Employee-Claimant need to meet the definition of injury under W.S. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi), as supplemented by the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division's rules and regulations, in order to be 
compensable?

     2. Was there 
sufficient evidence to find that Employee-Claimant's death constituted a 
compensable injury within the definition of W.S. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) as 
supplemented by the Workers' Compensation Division's rules and 
regulations?

     3. Was the hearing 
examiner correct in applying W.S. § 27-14-403 in determining the issue of 
compensability and, if so, was there sufficient evidence to find compensability 
under that statutory section?

 [¶5.]     Mrs. Ramsey restates in 
response:

     1. Did the 
Administrative Law Judge err in finding substantial evidence that the death of 
Steve Ramsey was the direct result of his work related 
injury?

     2. Did the 
Administrative Law Judge err in finding that the death of Steve Ramsey was a 
consequence of his injury and therefore compensable to his 
widow?

 [¶6.]     We address the legal 
issue first and recognize a Workers' Compensation Division rule which adopts and 
interprets statutory provisions to specifically deny compensability where an 
injury is followed by suicide. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Rules and 
Regulation Fee Schedule, ch. 1, § 2(a)(ix)(C), at 6 provides in part: "The term 
`willful intention to injure' as used in the Act, shall also include the 
employee's suicide or attempted suicide."

 [¶7.]     Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1991) provides in part:

"Injury" means any harmful change 
in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of 
any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of 
employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled 
by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer's 
business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to 
extrahazardous duties incident to the business. "Injury" does not 
include:

* * * * * 
*

(B) Injury caused 
by:

* * * * * 
*

(II) The employee's willful 
intention to injure or kill himself or another.

 [¶8.]     In consideration of the 
statute and the supplementing rule, the Workers' Compensation Division 
argues:

     According to W.S. 
27-14-102(a)(xi) II, "`injury' does not include the employee's willful intention 
to injure or kill himself or another" or, under II(c), "injury due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee."

     According to the 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedule (Chapter I, 
Section 2(a)(ix)(C), p. 6 of the "Brown Book" effective October 28, 1989), "the 
term `willful intention to injure' as used in the Act, shall also include the 
employee's suicide or attempted suicide." This prohibition against the 
compensability for suicide or attempted suicide has existed in the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation rules since at least November 1, 1987, and has therefore 
not been altered or changed despite legislative consideration of the 
Act.

In addressing this topic, we 
simplify by examining whether a suicide, following a serious and totally 
disabling accident, can ever be compensable under the provisions of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation statute. Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi).

 [¶9.]     Surprisingly, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court has not previously considered this well defined and 
clearly presented question. The Workers' Compensation Division, in arguing from 
analogy and practical policy, provides no case law from other jurisdictions. The 
argument is generally made by the Workers' Compensation Division that any of the 
available non-Wyoming decisions cannot come from jurisdictions which have 
dissimilar statutes. The comparison cases and the alternative statutes were not 
reviewed in briefing. See, however, Annotation, supra, 15 A.L.R.3d 616 and the 
near 100 cases cited therein specifically relating to this general and 
comprehensively litigated subject.

 [¶10.]  
Mrs. Ramsey's appellate brief cites only one case, Matter of Death of 
Stroer, 672 P.2d 1158 (Okla. 1983). In Matter of Death of Stroer, the 
court rejected absolute benefit preclusion and placed the burden upon claimant 
to prove the unbroken chain of causation from the event of compensable injury to 
a disturbance of mind which then resulted in suicide. Friedman v. NBC, Inc., 178 A.D.2d 774, 577 N YS.2d 517 (N.Y.A.D. 1991) provides a complete and equally 
logical direction of persuasion. In affirming the award, the court 
said:

Initially, we reject the contention 
that the claim is barred by Workers' Compensation Law § 10. It is well settled 
that if a work-related injury causes "insanity", "brain derangement" (Matter of 
Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 94, 96, 161 N.E. 431) or "a 
pattern of mental deterioration" (Matter of Reinstein v. Mendola, 39 A.D.2d 369, 
371, 334 N.Y.S.2d 488, aff'd 33 N.Y.2d 589, 347 N.Y.S.2d 455, 301 N.E.2d 438), 
which in turn causes suicide, death benefits may be awarded under Worker's 
Compensation Law § 10 (* * * 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 36.40 * * *). 
"The question of whether a causal relationship exists between any particular 
work activity and an ensuing disability is an issue of fact for resolution by 
the [B]oard * * *" (Matter of Ottomanelli v. Ottomanelli Bros., 80 A.D.2d 688, 
688-689, 436 N.Y.S.2d 442 * * *).

Friedman, 577 N.Y.S.2d  at 
518.

 [¶11.]  
Post-injury suicide has been the subject of substantial litigation and 
significant academic review. In addition to Annotation, supra, 15 A.L.R.3d 616, 
law journal consideration is found in Suicide Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 
12 Clev-Mar L.Rev. 26 (1963); Henry E. Sheldon II, Recent Case, Workmen's 
Compensation - Suicide Compensable Where Causal Connection to Injury, 31 
U.Cin.L.Rev. 187 (1962); and Arising Out of - Suicide Held Compensable Though 
Insane Employee Knew the Physical Consequences of his Suicidal Act - Liberal 
Construction, 8 NACCA L.J. 46 (1951).

 [¶12.]  
The courts have chosen one of four rules, the first and determinably the 
harshest is the Sponatski rule, In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 
(1915), which states:

"[W]here there follows as the 
direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such violence as to cause the 
victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium 
of frenzy `without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the 
physical consequences of the act,' then there is a direct and unbroken causal 
connection between the physical injury and the death. But where the resulting 
insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary wilful choice 
determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and 
the physical effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dominated and 
ruled by a disordered mind, then there is a new and independent agency which 
breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury."

Annotation, supra, 15 A.L.R.3d at 
628-29. At least in A.L.R. review, it is considered that In re Sponatski was 
followed at one time by eleven states. Today, it is firmly established in only 
six (actually five). The annotation lists as present states that follow the 
Sponatski rule: Iowa, Missouri, Texas, 
Vermont and Washington. Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 
95 N.W.2d 40 (1959); Mershon v. Missouri Public Service Corp., 359 Mo. 257, 221 S.W.2d 165 (1949); Saunders v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n., 526 S.W.2d 515 
(Tex. 1975); McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 100 Vt. 45, 134 A. 640 (1926); 
Mercer v. Department of Labor and Industries, 74 Wn.2d 96, 442 P.2d 1000 
(1968).2

 [¶13.]  
The predominating and progressively adopted rule is the chain of 
causation principle found in both Friedman and Matter of Death of Stroer. One 
statement of the rule is "where the injury and its consequences directly result 
in the workman's loss of normal judgment and domination by a disturbance of the 
mind, causing the suicide, his suicide is compensable." Annotation, supra, 15 
A.L.R.3d at 631. 

 [¶14.]  
The third rule, which is designated the New York rule and, coincidentally, is not 
specifically followed in Friedman, is generally a chain of causation test but 
with the possible requirement of physical damage to the brain itself. Soileau v. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 198 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 1967); Stapleton v. Keenan, Gifford 
& Lunn Apartment House Co., 265 N.Y. 528, 193 N.E. 305 (1934); Delinousha v. 
National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431 (1928).

 [¶15.]  
The fourth rule, designated the English rule, differs from the general 
chain of causation test in addressing the requirement that the "insanity must be 
the direct result of the injury itself or the shock produced by it, and not an 
indirect result caused by brooding over the injury and its consequences." 
Annotation, supra, 15 A.L.R.3d at 635. No American cases are cited in the 
annotation. See Grime v. Fletcher, 1 KB 734 (Eng. 
1915).

 [¶16.]  
We agree with the district court in the first appellate review and adopt 
the chain of causation principle as most logical and supported by the current 
weight of persuasive precedent. Larson states the 
principle:

Suicide under the majority rule is 
compensable if the injury produces mental derangement and the mental derangement 
produces suicide. The minority rule, which is steadily losing ground, is that 
suicide is not compensable unless there has followed as the direct result of a 
work-connected injury an insanity of such severity as to cause the victim to 
take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy 
without conscious volition to produce death.

1A Arthur Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 36.00 at 6-160 (1990).

 [¶17.]  
The concept that ties the causal relationship, unbroken chain, cases 
together, is that the act causing death was an intervening act but not an 
intervening cause. Harper v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ill. 2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962) (citing Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949) and Burnight 
v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960)). See 
Sheldon, supra, 31 U.Cin.L.Rev. 187; Note, Workmen's Compensation: 
Compensability of Suicide of Mentally Ill Employee, 8 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 673 (1961); 
and 1A Larson, supra, § 36.30 at 6-172, which discusses the causal connection 
rule.

 [¶18.]  
In the developing predominance of jurisdictions with the same rule and 
case application, see as illustrative: Wood v. Industrial Commission, 108 
Ariz. 50, 492 P.2d 1157 (1972); Beauchamp v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 259 Cal. App. 2d 147, 66 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1968); Jakco Painting Contractors v. 
Industrial Com'n of State of Colorado, 702 P.2d 755 (Colo. App. 1985); Delaware 
Tire Center v. Fox, 411 A.2d 606 (Del.Super. 1980); Jones v. Leon County Health 
Dept., 335 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1976); Wells v. Harrell, 714 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.App. 
1986); In re Lambert's Case, 364 Mass. 832, 304 N.E.2d 428 (1973); Meils by 
Meils v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 355 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1984); Schell v. 
Buell ECD Co., 102 N.M. 44, 690 P.2d 1038 (1983); Hall v. State Workmen's 
Compensation Com'r, 172 W. Va. 87, 303 S.E.2d 726 (1983); Brenne v. Department 
of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 38 Wis.2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 
(1968).

 [¶19.]  
A reasonable similarity of statutory provisions can be extracted from 
many of these cases. With this legal precedent now provided and without 
countervailing case law submitted by the Workers' Compensation Division, we 
recognize the rationale and discern no preemptive statutory preclusion. 
Additionally, it follows that the rule preclusion adopted by the Workers' 
Compensation Division lacks required statutory justification to create the 
prohibition by rule when not authorized by statutory limitation. Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 786 P.2d 874, 878 
(Wyo. 1990). 
Benefit approval then follows from our principle of favorable statutory 
construction to afford compensability since the enactment of worker's 
compensation statutes extinguished significant common law interests for injury 
recovery to the disabled worker that might otherwise have existed. Seckman v. 
Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1989); Lehman 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div., 752 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1988). In general, "[o]ur scope of review in a 
workmen's compensation appeal is limited to determining whether an error of law 
was committed, constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Andromalos-Dale v. 
W.C.A.B., 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 505, 599 A.2d 304, 305 (1991).

 [¶20.]  
Consequently, another topic, factual in intrinsic examination, also 
requires our review. Does the record provide evidence upon which the 
administrative hearing officer was justified to make the factual decision 
required of the unbroken causal relationship? Evidentiary conflict in the 
factual details within the record, in particular between differing testimony of 
doctors, does exist. This court returns to a standard of review regarding 
factual determinations of the administrative agency requiring substantial 
evidence to support the factual decision. Exxon Corp. v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 783 P.2d 685 (Wyo. 1989), cert. denied 495 U.S. 910, 110 S. Ct. 1937, 109 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1990). This court considers the decision of the 
worker's compensation hearing officer for the administrative agency appellate 
review to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1989); Claim of Grindle, 722 P.2d 166 (Wyo. 1986); Shaw v. Lewmont Drilling Associates, Inc., 694 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 
1985).

 [¶21.]  
We agree with Mrs. Ramsey:

     The circumstances of 
this case are clear. Steve Ramsey would not have committed suicide if not for 
his work place injuries. There were no pre-existing conditions that caused him 
to be susceptible or prone to suicide, there were not intervening conditions or 
situations that occurred between the time of his work place injury and his 
death, and Steve Ramsey continued to do all those things necessary to try and 
get well. But for the injury at the Wydak Power Plant, Steve Ramsey would not 
have committed suicide.

 [¶22.]  
The most significant denial issue comes on a factual contention in the 
Workers' Compensation Division's denial argument that the injured worker voluntarily discontinued psychological 
treatment which then, as a self-inflicted injury, broke the otherwise 
established chain of causation. This argument addresses a contention that the 
nexus between injury and subsequent suicide is consequently missing if the real 
cause of the suicide was the discontinuance of the medical treatment and not the 
earlier disabling accident.

 [¶23.]  
This court has in prior cases addressed in detail the causal connection - 
logical nexus - topic. Mrs. Ramsey asks the question: "Is the causal connection 
present?" She then answers that question:

"For an employee's injury to be 
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, there must be some logical 
nexus between injury and work, environment, working conditions, activity or 
other requirements of employment. Claims of Nailer [Naylor], 723 P.2d 1237, 1241 
(Wyo. 
1986)"

"An injury occurs under the 
statutory definition when the nexus test has been satisfied, regardless of 
whether it takes place on or off employee's premises. Matter of Injury to 
Corean, 723 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1956 [1986])"

"In order for the definition of 
`injury' and the Workers' Compensation Act to be complied with, there need only 
be causal connection between the injury and course of employment. Parker v. 
Energy Development Co., 691 P.2d 981 (Wyo. 1984)"

 [¶24.]  
An examination of the evidence provided in this record does not require 
us to reverse the district court. Likewise, we do not now hold that the 
administrative hearing officer committed a fact finding error regarding the 
causal relationship between injury and death or that unwillingness of the worker 
to obtain medical care intervened under the circumstance proven to "break the 
chain." See Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-407 (1991).3 The administrative hearing officer 
was entitled to find, as she did from the evidence:

Approximately 5 weeks prior to his 
death, the Employee-Claimant had been admitted [to] the GottscheCenter for pain management and treatment. 
Mrs. Ramsey testified that the clinic discontinued most of the 
Employee-Claimant's pain medication, and that his depression and pain increased 
afterwards.

The weekend prior to his death, the 
Employee-Claimant stayed in Thermopolis at his mother's home, along with Mrs. 
Ramsey. He began to complain of severe neck pain on Friday night; Saturday 
morning he telephoned Dr. Metz, who gave him an injection for the pain Saturday 
afternoon in Casper. The Employee-Claimant and his wife 
returned to Thermopolis, where Saturday night the Employee-Claimant was up all 
night and could not sleep due to pain.

Mrs. Ramsey testified that Sunday 
the family watched some television; that her husband seemed to still be in pain, 
but that he appeared to be in control. The family was to have dinner with her 
parents, but the Employee-Claimant said he didn't feel up to it and stayed home. 
Soon after everyone had left for dinner, the Employee-Claimant went into the 
bathroom and shot himsel[f] in the head with a rifle.

* * * * * 
*

The record in this case also 
establishes that the Employee-Claimant was under continued medical treatment for 
his neck and back injury until the time of his death. He was in constant pain, 
taking a variety of pain medications or receiving injections for minimal relief. 
The Employee-Claimant had been receiving Total Temporary Disability benefits 
from Workers Compensation, and he had not been released to return to work, nor 
had his condition stabilized for any Permanent Partial Disability 
rating.

I find that the injury sustained by 
the Employee-Claimant on May 27, 1988 was the cause of his depression, despair 
and pain, and those factors were the cause of the Employee-Claimant's 
death.

Further, the pain, depression, and 
despair were of such degree as to override normal and rational judgment by the 
Employee-Claimant. The Employee-Claimant's suicide, committed under such 
circumstances, is not an "intentional and willful" act, which would be an 
independent, intervening act, to break the chain of causation and bar a claim 
for death benefits.

 [¶25.]  
This court addresses the two decisive questions by adoption of the chain 
of causation principle for determination of benefit eligibility after a 
seriously disabling injury is followed by suicide with recognition that no 
preclusive Wyoming statutory bar has been enacted. This 
court then concurs, under our standard of review, that substantial evidence 
exists to sustain the benefit award decision of the administrative hearing 
officer. That decision was factually supported in finding the existence of an 
unbroken chain of causation.

 [¶26.]  
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 1 The decision letter 
of the district court in appellate review stated in part:

     A number of Courts 
recognize that benefits can be awarded where the evidence shows that, but for 
the injury, there would have been no suicide. Matter of Death of Stroer, 672 P.2d 1158 (Okla. 1983). There was substantial evidence in 
this case to support the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the 
suicide was caused by the work related injury.

     The State also argues 
that recovery should be barred because the employee refused to submit to 
treatment reasonably necessary to promote his recovery. The burden is upon the 
State to show that this happened. The evidence indicates that the State did not 
meet this burden. It is not clear that the employee refused treatment. He was 
still receiving treatment until just a few days before his 
death.

The facts of the 
initial accident are more comprehensively related in Ramsey, 792 P.2d 1385. 
Essentially, a pin not quite ten pounds in weight was dropped from an area about 
sixty-six feet above the injured worker's head and struck him. Mr. Ramsey was 
knocked to the ground falling about fourteen feet. His injury included three 
fractured vertebrate. Continued pain to the date of his death followed the 
resulting operations.

2 The annotation also lists the state 
of New Jersey and provides as its citation Kahle v. Plochman, Inc., 85 N.J. 539, 
428 A.2d 913 (1981). That case clearly adopted the chain of causation test and 
New Jersey can 
no longer be listed as a Sponatski jurisdiction.

3 Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-407 
states:

     If an injured employee 
knowingly engages or persists in an unsanitary or injurious practice which tends 
to imperil or retard his recovery, or if he refuses to submit to medical or 
surgical treatment reasonably essential to promote his recovery, he forfeits all 
right to compensation under this act. Forfeiture shall be determined by the 
hearing examiner upon application by the division or 
employer.