Case Title: People v. Mitchell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83281

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed January 27, 2000.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
A jury convicted defendant, Anthony Mitchell, of two counts of first degree 
murder. The same jury also determined that defendant was eligible for the death 
penalty and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the 
imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the circuit court of St. Clair 
County sentenced defendant to death.
On direct review, we affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People 
v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274 (1992) (Mitchell I). The United 
States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. Mitchell v. Illinois, 508 U.S. 962, 124 L. Ed. 2d 685, 113 S. Ct. 2936 (1993). On December 7, 1993, defendant filed a petition for 
post-conviction for relief, and on May 16, 1996, defendant filed an amended 
petition. The State moved to dismiss the amended petition without an evidentiary 
hearing. Defendant then filed three additional claims for post-conviction 
relief, based on this court's decisions in People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996). The court 
allowed the State's motion to dismiss to stand against the additional counts. 
The court granted the State's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. 
Because the judgment challenged in defendant's petition imposed a sentence of 
death, the appeal was taken directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
BACKGROUND
Defendant's convictions arose from the stabbing deaths of teenagers David and 
Dawn Lieneke in July 1989. The facts detailing the crime and the investigation 
leading to defendant's arrest are set out in our original opinion, and we 
provide only a brief summary here. Additional facts will be noted where 
necessary to address the particular arguments defendant raises.
David and Dawn lived with their grandparents. On the evening of July 4, 1989, 
their grandparents were out playing bingo. The grandparents returned home at 
approximately 10:30 p.m. and found David's and Dawn's dead bodies. 
Eighteen-year-old David was lying in a pool of blood in the hallway. He had been 
stabbed seven times. The wounds were large and deep, and David had died from 
blood loss caused by a stab wound to the liver and from the collapse of both 
lungs, due to a stab wound to his chest. Thirteen-year-old Dawn was lying in a 
pool of blood on her grandmother's bed. She also had seven stab wounds in her 
body, including one that went through the right temple and penetrated her brain. 
Dawn bled to death from knife wounds to the aorta and liver.
The police located defendant by tracing the license plate number of his 
sister's car. Defendant had been driving that car on the night of the murders. 
Witnesses had spotted the car at the scene. Defendant confessed to the crime, 
explaining that he had gone to the Lieneke's house looking for Viroon Williams, 
whom defendant claimed had tried to run him down with a car the day before and 
who had stolen a VCR, radio, and video game from defendant's mother's house. 
Williams sometimes stayed with the Lienekes. Defendant went into the house and 
stabbed David, and then killed Dawn when she screamed his name and ran into the 
bedroom. David was still alive and was threatening to tell Williams, so 
defendant stabbed him again.
In addition to defendant's confession, the State relied upon the testimony of 
Maurice Douglas, who was with defendant on the night of the murders. Defendant 
showed the bloody knife to Douglas and told him that he had just killed two 
persons. The police recovered the murder weapon-a survival knife-from 
defendant's basement. The knife had blood on it, and the blood was consistent 
with a mixture of David's and Dawn's blood. The police also recovered black 
clothes and a pair of two-toed shoes. Blood on a pair of pants recovered from 
defendant's basement was consistent with Dawn's blood. One of the two-toed shoes 
matched a shoe print that was left in the mud near where defendant's sister's 
car was seen parked in the victims' neighborhood.
Defendant testified and denied any involvement in the crime. Defendant's 
testimony suggested that Williams was the murderer. Defendant denied owning the 
clothes or the knife, but said that Williams had an outfit like the one 
recovered and that he had seen Williams with the knife. Defendant denied showing 
the knife to Douglas or saying that he killed two persons. Defendant testified 
that the police made him sign the confession by raising their voices.
Defendant was convicted of the murders and sentenced to death. After his 
convictions and sentence were affirmed by this court and his petition for a writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied, defendant 
filed a post-conviction petition. As twice amended, defendant's post-conviction 
petition contained 28 counts. Eleven counts, however, restated constitutional 
arguments that were rejected on direct appeal. In dismissing the petition 
without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the majority of 
defendant's claims were barred by waiver and res judicata. As to 
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court ruled that 
defendant had not made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights had 
been violated.
The trial court found merit to one of defendant's claims based on 
Brandon and Nitz. Defendant argued that at the time of his 
trial and sentencing he was taking two medications to control his 
epilepsy-Depakote and Phenobarbital-and that these medications were 
psychotropic. Defendant contended he was denied due process when he did not 
receive a fitness hearing and that he received the ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his trial and appellate attorneys failed to invoke his right to 
such a hearing. The trial court agreed that Depakote was psychotropic medication 
and that defendant therefore would have been entitled to a fitness hearing. See 
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a); Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450. 
However, the trial court ruled that defendant could not prevail on this claim 
because he was seeking to benefit from the retroactive application of a "new 
rule" announced in Brandon.(1) The 
court based its analysis on Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); and People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 
(1990), which held that, except in certain limited situations, new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applied retroactively to 
cases pending on collateral review. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed 
defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant raises six issues 
on appeal.
ANALYSIS
Standard of review
A petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)) is a collateral attack on a prior 
conviction and sentence. People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 
(1995). To obtain relief under the Act, a defendant must establish a substantial 
deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that 
produced the judgement being challenged. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 1998); 
People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997).
An evidentiary hearing on the petition is required only when the allegations 
of the petition, supported by the trial record and the accompanying affidavits, 
make a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right. People 
v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). For the purpose of determining 
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition 
and in the supporting affidavits are to be taken as true. People v. 
Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 259 (1989). If the circuit court determines 
that the petition should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, its 
judgment is subject to de novo review. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998). 
Psychotropic Medication
Defendant argues that he was denied due process when he did not receive a 
hearing to determine his fitness for trial while under medication. The statute 
in effect at the time of his trial provided, in part, as follows:
Defendant further argues that he received the ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his trial attorney failed to invoke his right to a fitness hearing 
and when his counsel on direct appeal failed to raise the due process and 
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments as they related to his failure to 
receive a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing.
The factual basis for defendant's claim, as provided in his post-conviction 
petition and the accompanying affidavits, is as follows. Defendant has suffered 
from epilepsy since the age of six, when he suffered a head injury. To control 
his seizures, defendant has been taking medications for many years. During his 
trial and sentencing, defendant's epilepsy medications were Depakote and 
Phenobarbital. The trial court was aware that defendant was taking medication 
for epilepsy.
The Physicians' Desk Reference categorizes Depakote as an "antimanic agent," 
which is a subcategory of "psychotherapeutic agents."(2) 
Physicians' Desk Reference 215 (53d ed. 1999) (PDR). Defendant attached to his 
petition the affidavit of Dr. James O'Donnell, a pharmacology consultant. 
O'Donnell states in the affidavit that Depakote and Phenobarbital are both 
central nervous system depressants that are prescribed to prevent epileptic 
seizures. O'Donnell lists the probable side effects of the drugs as "sedation, 
hallucinations, dizziness, incoordination, depression, emotional changes and 
behavioral deterioration, psychosis and aggression." O'Donnell further states 
that "[t]he combination of the effects of both of these drugs can cloud the 
sensorium (alter the ability to think clearly) and thus effect [sic] 
any individual's ability to make certain decisions." O'Donnell concludes that 
"[t]he overall sedative effect may have caused Mr. Mitchell to appear too 
relaxed or too detached during court proceedings."
Before deciding the merits of defendant's arguments, we address the State's 
contention that Phenobarbital and Depakote are not psychotropic medications. In 
People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163, 198 (1996), we adopted the definition 
of "psychotropic medications" found in the Mental Health and Developmental 
Disabilities Code:
We further relied on the definition given by the United States Supreme Court 
in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990): 
The trial court found that Depakote was a psychotropic drug, but that 
Phenobarbital was merely "an anticonvulsant barbiturate." We agree that Depakote 
falls within the purview of section 104-21(a)'s reference to "psychotropic drugs 
or other medications." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a). Depakote is 
listed in the PDR as a psychotherapeutic antimanic agent and thus clearly falls 
within the Britz definition. Further, Dr. O'Donnell stated in his 
affidavit that the combination of Depakote and Phenobarbital could affect the 
individual's ability to think clearly and to make certain decisions. We thus 
agree with defendant that his ingestion of Depakote would have entitled him to a 
fitness hearing under section 104-21(a). This conclusion renders unnecessary a 
discussion of whether Phenobarbital fits the Britz definition. 
Our decision is not in conflict with People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1 
(1996), another case in which a defendant argued that his epilepsy medication 
was a psychotropic drug. In Kidd, the defendant was taking Dilantin to 
control his seizures. We applied the Britz definition and held that 
Dilantin was not psychotropic medication because its use for psychotropic 
purposes was not listed in the PDR or the AMA Drug Evaluations. Further, it was 
not being administered to the defendant for psychotropic purposes. 
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 17-19. By contrast, Depakote is listed in the PDR 
as a psychotherapeutic antimanic medication, and thus falls squarely within the 
Britz definition.
We turn now to the merits of defendant's arguments. Defendant argues that the 
trial court erred in finding that Brandon could not be applied 
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review, and points out that 
Nitz and People v. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541 (1997), were both 
cases in which this court applied Brandon in post-conviction cases. The 
State counters that it did not raise the Flowers/Teague 
retroactivity rule in those cases and therefore this court has not yet ruled on 
this issue. According to the State, the Flowers/Teague rule 
bars application of Brandon to petitioner's case. We need not address 
this issue, however, as we believe that the dismissal of defendant's 
psychotropic medication claims was proper for other reasons.
Due Process
We first address defendant's argument that he was denied due process when he 
did not receive the fitness hearing to which he was entitled. Petitioner's 
claim-that denial of a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing is a denial of due 
process-has its genesis in Nitz. In Nitz, the defendant raised 
a Brandon issue for the first time in a post-conviction petition. The 
State argued that Brandon was not applicable because the defendant did 
not argue that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the 
defendant's claim was lacking a constitutional foundation. We rejected the 
State's argument and held that the court's failure to follow the relevant 
statutory procedures resulted in a due process violation to the defendant. 
Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160-61.
The reasoning in Nitz was as follows. The due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment prohibits the prosecution of a defendant who is unfit for 
trial. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992). Where information raises the possibility 
that an accused is incompetent, the failure to inquire concerning competency 
violates the accused's due process rights. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 86 S. Ct. 836 (1966) (holding that the Illinois court's 
failure to invoke the relevant statutory procedures deprived the defendant of an 
inquiry concerning his fitness to stand trial, and defendant therefore suffered 
a due process violation). The relevant statute-section 104-21(a)-provides for a 
fitness hearing, and therefore the court's failure to invoke it denied defendant 
an inquiry into his fitness for trial and consequently denied him due process. 
Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 155-61.
Nitz correctly recognized that due process does not mandate a 
particular procedure for an inquiry into fitness; it requires only that there be 
an adequate procedure to implement the right to an inquiry. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160, citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975). Nitz further correctly recognized that the 
particular procedures to be invoked are purely by legislative design and that 
the right to a particular procedure is wholly statutory. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160.
Although we recognized in Nitz that defendant's right to section 
104-21(a)'s procedure was wholly statutory, we reached the somewhat 
contradictory conclusion that the trial court's failure to invoke the statute 
denied defendant due process. The relevant passage in Nitz is our 
conclusion that, "Here, as in Pate, because no procedure was invoked, 
defendant was denied inquiry into the issue of his fitness. Due process was 
thereby denied." Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 161. This conclusion does not 
follow from the recognition that the particular procedure to be invoked is 
purely by legislative design and that defendant's right to that procedure is 
wholly statutory. Three members of the court dissented in Nitz, on the 
basis that a defendant's right to a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing was 
statutory and that the court was creating a constitutional deprivation where 
none existed. See Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 165-66 (Miller, J., dissenting, 
joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). The dissent concluded that 
defendant's petition (which did not argue ineffective assistance of counsel) 
should have been dismissed because it lacked a constitutional foundation. After 
careful consideration and reevaluation, we have determined that the dissent's 
position in Nitz was correct and that this court erred in holding that 
a denial of a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing was in and of itself a due 
process violation.
In Nitz, we failed to distinguish the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Pate. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the 
defendant should have received a fitness hearing because the evidence introduced 
on his behalf established a bona fide doubt of his fitness. 
Pate, 383 U.S.  at 385, 15 L. Ed. 2d  at 822, 86 S. Ct.  at 842. The 
court's failure to inquire into the defendant's fitness in the face of evidence 
establishing a bona fide doubt of his fitness deprived the defendant of 
his constitutional right to a fair trial. Pate, 383 U.S.  at 385, 15 L. Ed. 2d  at 822, 86 S. Ct.  at 842. The Supreme Court later explained its 
Pate holding in Drope:
Thus, Drope clearly recognized that Illinois' statutory 
procedure-requiring a fitness hearing when there is a bona fide doubt 
of defendant's fitness-was constitutionally adequate to safeguard a defendant's 
due process right not to be tried or convicted while unfit to stand trial. The 
Supreme Court did not hold, as Nitz implies, that the failure to follow 
any statute concerning a defendant's fitness for trial deprives a 
defendant of due process. See Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160-61. Under the 
Nitz rationale, if the legislature passed a statute entitling 
defendants who watch professional wrestling to a hearing on their mental 
fitness, the court's failure to follow the statute would be a denial of due 
process. This cannot be so. As Nitz correctly recognized, "due process 
does not mandate any particular procedure for the inquiry; it requires merely 
that there be an adequate procedure to implement the right to an inquiry." 
Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160.
The United States Supreme Court has determined the constitutional adequacy of 
the Illinois statutory scheme of requiring a fitness hearing when there is a 
bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness. Thus, Illinois has in place 
procedures that are constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant's due 
process right not to be tried while unfit.(3) Due 
process does not require that everyone taking "psychotropic or other medication" 
under medical direction should be granted a fitness hearing. Section 104-21(a)'s 
provision is merely a statutory right granted by the legislature-a right that 
the legislature has now taken away. See 725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1998). 
Statutes do not confer constitutional rights, and the allegation of a 
deprivation of a statutory right is not a proper claim under the Act. People 
v. Orndoff, 39 Ill. 2d 96, 99 (1968). The Illinois statutory scheme for 
determining fitness comports with due process with or without section 104-21(a) 
fitness hearings. Nitz's conclusion that a defendant may raise in a 
post-conviction petition a denial of a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing as a 
denial of due process was erroneous, and we hereby overrule Nitz. 
Nitz's conclusion was largely based on this court's continued 
equating of a defendant's ingestion of psychotropic medication with a bona 
fide doubt of defendant's fitness. This position has its genesis in 
Brandon, although it was not specifically articulated until People 
v. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461 (1995). In Brandon, we stated that 
section 104-21(a) "evinces a recognition by the General Assembly that 
psychotropic medication is an important signal that a defendant may not be 
competent to stand trial." Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 457. In 
Gevas, we specifically stated that, "The legislature has equated the 
administering of psychotropic medication to a defendant with a bona 
fide doubt as to fitness to stand trial." Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 
469. Three members of this court have taken the position that the right to a 
fitness hearing in section 104-21(a) cannot be equated with a bona fide 
doubt of a defendant's fitness and is much broader than the constitutional 
right with which it is mistaken. People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464, 
482 (1996) (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). 
These justices have pointed out that, under section 104-21(a), a defendant 
taking psychotropic or other medication is entitled to a fitness hearing "even 
in the absence of evidence that might otherwise trigger an inquiry into the 
separate constitutional right." Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 482 (Miller, 
J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). As previously stated, 
section 104-21(a) merely contained a statutory right conferred by the 
legislature. The legislature has now rewritten the statute to remove that right. 
If the right was constitutional, the legislature could not have eliminated 
it.
This court's prior determination that the legislature equated the ingestion 
of psychotropic medication with a bona fide doubt of defendant's 
fitness was simply erroneous. Section 104-11(a) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 1998)) provides, in 
part, that "[w]hen a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness is raised, the 
court shall order a determination of the issue before proceeding further." 
Section 104-21(a), at the relevant time, provided that "[a] defendant who is 
receiving psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction is 
entitled to a hearing on the issues of his fitness while under medication." Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a). The wording of these provisions is 
significant. The first places a mandatory burden on the trial judge to order a 
determination of a defendant's fitness when a bona fide doubt of that 
fitness is raised. See People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997) 
("use of the word 'shall' is generally considered to express a mandatory 
reading"); Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) ("[a]s used in statutes, 
contracts, or the like, [shall] is generally imperative or mandatory"). The 
second provision merely provides that a defendant taking psychotropic or other 
medication under medical direction is entitled to a fitness hearing. The word 
" 'entitled' " means " 'to give a right or legal title to' " 
(Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 461, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 532 (6th 
ed. 1990)), or "[t]o qualify for; to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or 
claiming" (Black's Law Dictionary 532 (6th ed. 1990)). See also People v. 
Tilson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 973, 977 (1982) ("the word 'entitled' signifies 
the granting of a right or privilege to be exercised at the option of parties 
for whose benefit it is used; it is directly opposed to the idea of imposing an 
obligation or limitation"). Section 104-21(a) does not, as does section 104-11, 
require the trial judge to make a further inquiry when certain facts are brought 
to his attention. Rather, it gives the defendant the "proper grounds for seeking 
or claiming" a fitness hearing. As Justice Miller has stated, "While section 
104-21(a) declares that a defendant receiving psychotropic drugs is entitled to 
a fitness hearing, the statute does not establish a defendant's incompetency, 
say that a hearing must be held if the defendant refuses one, or excuse 
counsel's failure to request a hearing in a timely manner." Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 473 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, 
J.); see also People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394, 419 (1995) (Miller, 
J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.) ("[t]o say that a 
defendant is 'entitled' to a fitness hearing is much different from saying that 
a hearing is absolutely required in all circumstances, no matter how tardy the 
defendant's request might be"). We erred in Gevas when we stated, and 
in Brandon when it implied, that the legislature equated the 
administering of psychotropic medication to a defendant with a bona 
fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial, and we no longer adhere to 
that conclusion.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his trial and appellate attorneys failed to invoke his right to a section 
104-21(a) fitness hearing. We first address whether defendant received the 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when his attorney failed to argue on 
direct appeal that he was denied due process when the trial court failed to hold 
a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing. To prevail on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1) 
counsel's performance was so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the 
deficient performance so prejudiced the defendant as to deny him a fair trial. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). As applied to claims involving the failure of 
appellate counsel to raise a particular issue, the defendant must show that the 
failure to raise the issue was objectively unreasonable and that, but for this 
failure, a reasonable probability exists that the sentence or conviction would 
have been reversed. People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 532 (1995). 
Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, 
and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues that in his 
judgment are without merit. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 381 
(1996).
Defendant cannot meet the first prong of the Strickland test in 
arguing that appellate counsel should have argued that he was denied due process 
when the court failed to hold sua sponte a fitness hearing when it 
found out that defendant was taking psychotropic medication. As thoroughly set 
out earlier in this opinion, defendant's right to a fitness hearing under 
section 104-21(a) is a statutory rather than a constitutional right. At the time 
of defendant's direct appeal, no Illinois court had held that a trial court's 
failure to order sua sponte a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing 
deprived a defendant of due process. Defendant's attorney therefore would have 
had no reason to believe that this court was about to reach that conclusion. 
Further, existing case law would have indicated that the argument was meritless. 
See Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1989); People v. 
Lopez, 216 Ill. App. 3d 83 (1991); People v. Balfour, 148 Ill. 
App. 3d 215 (1986); People v. Tilson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 973 (1982). 
Clearly defendant's attorney's decision not to raise this issue on direct appeal 
was not objectively unreasonable.
We next address whether trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a 
fitness hearing and whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue trial counsel's ineffectiveness in not requesting a fitness hearing. We 
must first consider the relevant standard for assessing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to request section 104-21(a) fitness hearings. 
In Brandon, we cited the Strickland standard, but then held 
that a defendant could meet the prejudice prong of Strickland merely by 
showing that, if his attorney would have requested a fitness hearing, he would 
have gotten one. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 458-59. This was an 
unwarranted modification of the Strickland rule. 
To establish prejudice under Strickland a defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. As the Brandon dissent 
correctly noted, "the relevant inquiry in this case is not whether a fitness 
hearing would have been conducted if defense counsel had requested one under 
section 104-21(a), but whether the outcome of the hearing would have been 
favorable to the defendant, that is, whether the defendant would have been found 
unfit to stand trial. The majority, by considering only whether a fitness 
hearing would have been held (Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d at 457-59), simply 
presumes the existence of prejudice in certain circumstances in which such a 
presumption is not warranted." Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 462-63 (Miller, 
J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.) 
Clearly, defining the test as whether a defendant would have received a 
fitness hearing cannot be correct. If a defendant would have been found fit to 
stand trial, he suffered no prejudice by not having a fitness hearing. The 
correct test for evaluating prejudice in these situations is whether a 
reasonable probability exists that, if defendant would have received the section 
104-21(a) fitness hearing to which he was entitled, the result of the proceeding 
would have been that he was found unfit to stand trial. Brandon is 
overruled.
We now consider whether defendant's trial attorney was ineffective for 
failing to request a hearing. We will not find this claim waived for defendant's 
failure to raise it on direct appeal because it depends on facts outside the 
original trial record. See Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 372. After 
carefully reviewing the record and the evidence attached to the post-conviction 
petition, we cannot say that there was a reasonable probability that defendant 
would have been found unfit to stand trial.
Under section 104-10 of the Code, a defendant is unfit for trial "if, because 
of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and 
purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." Here, the 
record belies any claim that defendant did not understand the nature of the 
proceedings or was unable to assist in his defense. Defendant's exchanges with 
the trial judge do not display any confusion about the nature of the 
proceedings, and defendant assisted in his defense by testifying in his own 
behalf. Defendant testified to his whereabouts at the relevant times, denied any 
involvement in the crime, and asserted that his confession to the police was 
coerced. Defendant's testimony covered over 50 pages of the report of 
proceedings and does not disclose any signs of confusion about the nature or 
purpose of the proceedings. Similarly, defendant gave extensive testimony in 
support of his motions to suppress statements and evidence, and there is no 
indication that defendant did not understand the nature or purpose of those 
proceedings. 
In Kinkead, we downplayed the importance of a defendant's trial 
court demeanor in determining fitness, stating that it encouraged "unprincipled 
speculation into matters requiring medical expertise." Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d  at 411. This position fails to consider the fundamental purpose of a 
fitness hearing, which is solely to determine a person's ability to function 
within the context of a trial. People v. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 432 
(1978). By statute, evidence on the following matters is admissible at a fitness 
hearing:
Defendant's trial demeanor, as evidenced by the record, is clearly relevant 
to these factors. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant would be found 
unfit based on a consideration of these factors.
We recognize that a trial judge cannot rely on trial demeanor to dispense 
with a fitness hearing in the face of evidence of a bona fide doubt of 
defendant's fitness (Pate, 383 U.S.  at 385-86, 15 L. Ed. 2d  at 822, 86 
S. Ct. at 842), but that is not the issue here; there is no evidence in the 
record suggesting a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness. The issue 
here is whether a reviewing court should ignore relevant and compelling evidence 
of a defendant's fitness for trial when determining whether the outcome of a 
statutory fitness hearing would have been favorable to defendant. The evidence 
that defendant attached to his post-conviction petition does not show a 
reasonable probability that defendant would have been found unfit. First, it 
must be remembered that defendant was not taking these medications for any 
underlying psychiatric problems. He was merely taking them to control seizures. 
Thus, the only real question is whether these medications in and of themselves 
rendered defendant unfit for trial. O'Donnell's affidavit established that the 
combination of defendant's medications might have affected defendant's ability 
to make certain decisions. O'Donnell also believed that the medication may have 
caused defendant to appear too relaxed or detached during court proceedings. 
O'Donnell's affidavit simply does not establish that defendant would not have 
been able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist 
in his defense. 
Defendant also attached to his petition the affidavit of clinical 
psychologist Michael M. Gelbort. In the affidavit, Gelbort testifies to 
defendant's learning disability, difficulty in school, borderline mental 
retardation, seizure disorder, and difficulty in processing information. In 
light of the factors that a trial court considers in determining fitness for 
trial, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have been found 
unfit based on Gelbort's testimony.
The facts of this case are similar to Murphy. The issue in 
Murphy was whether there was a bona fide doubt of the 
defendant's fitness such that the trial court should have ordered a fitness 
hearing. In that case, psychiatric evidence established that defendant was 
mentally retarded and could only " 'understand simple procedures but not 
complicated ones or those having abstract meanings.' " Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d  at 426-27. The defendant had a limited vocabulary and could not read 
above the first-grade level. However, the defendant testified in his own behalf, 
said that he knew what an attorney was and understood that his attorney was 
representing him, and read aloud from his signed statement and said that he 
could read the whole thing. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d  at 429. The defendant 
had previously told the police that he understood his Miranda rights. 
In holding that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that no 
bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness existed, we stated that the 
evidence showed "an educable mentally handicapped young man who comprehended his 
situation and recognized the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him 
and the function of an attorney to represent him. Defendant cooperated with [his 
attorney] in presenting his defense." Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d  at 434-35. 

The record and post-conviction affidavits show that defendant was functioning 
at a higher level than the defendant in Murphy, fully understood the 
nature of the proceeding against him, and was able to cooperate in his defense. 
There is no reasonable probability that defendant would have been found unfit, 
and therefore defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
request a fitness hearing. This conclusion also disposes of defendant's argument 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct 
appeal. 
In sum, the right to a fitness hearing that used to be provided for in 
section 104-21(a) was a statutory right. A defendant did not have a due process 
right to such a hearing, and trial courts had no obligation to order sua 
sponte a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing if a defendant did not request 
one. Thus, in a post-conviction case, the claim will be considered only if it is 
framed in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a 
claim, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, if a section 
104-21(a) fitness hearing would have been held, he would have been found unfit 
to stand trial. 
We are not unmindful of the import of today's decision. Normally, because of 
stare decisis considerations, we would continue to adhere to our 
established precedent, even if certain members of this court disagreed with it. 
In this case, however, we deem it appropriate to depart from stare 
decisis. We stated in Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of 
Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994), that "stare decisis is the 
means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, 
but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion." No reasonable 
observer of this court's jurisprudence could argue that the law in this area has 
been developing in a principled and intelligible fashion. As Justice Harrison 
stated in 1998, "This court decided People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 
(1994), fewer than four years ago and has been running from it ever since." 
Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d  at 348 (Harrison, J., specially concurring). 
In 1995, we held that after a period of two years had passed it would be 
impossible to conduct a meaningful hearing as to defendant's fitness at the time 
of trial and sentencing. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 471. In 1996, we 
"rejected any notion that a nunc pro tunc determination of fitness can 
provide the necessary reliability." Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 164. In 1997, 
we saw no problem with a retrospective fitness hearing conducted 15 years after 
defendant's trial and sentencing. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 553-56. In 1998, 
we held that the automatic reversal rule of Brandon had been replaced 
by the "case-by-case" approach and that a defendant could no longer prevail on a 
request for a new trial simply by showing that he had been taking psychotropic 
medications at the relevant time. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d  at 340. Although 
not clearly stated in Kinkead, it appears that retrospective fitness 
hearings are now the norm. What was constitutionally forbidden three years ago 
is now compelled. This is not a principled and intelligible development of the 
law. As Justice Heiple wrote when rejecting stare decisis in another 
situation, "explicitly overruling Brinkmann is not an 'erratic' change 
in the law. In the eighteen years since Brinkmann, every case 
interpreting Brinkmann, including today's majority opinion, has eroded 
its holding. I would merely make explicit what this court has done implicitly 
for the last eighteen years." McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 518 (1998) (Heiple, J., specially concurring).
Our most important duty as justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, to which 
all other considerations are subordinate, is to reach the correct decision under 
the law. Our jurisprudence in this area has become erratic and confused, and it 
all stems from an erroneous statutory interpretation five years ago. Stare 
decisis should not preclude us from admitting our mistake, interpreting the 
statute correctly, and bringing some stability and reason to this area of the 
law. As Justice Frankfurter once observed, "Wisdom too often never comes, and so 
one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Henslee v. Union 
Planters National Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600, 93 L. Ed. 259, 
264, 69 S. Ct. 290, 293 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The trial court 
correctly dismissed defendant's additional claims for post-conviction 
relief.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Suppression Hearing
Failure to Establish "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Defendant next argues that his attorney was ineffective at the hearing on his 
motions to suppress evidence because he failed to establish that the physical 
evidence recovered from defendant's basement was the fruit of his unlawful 
arrest. On direct appeal, we held that defendant's due process rights were 
violated by the trial court's failure to recall critical testimony by defendant 
that defendant did not believe he was free to leave police custody. However, we 
declined to remand the matter for a new suppression hearing because we concluded 
that, even if the trial court would find that defendant's confession should have 
been suppressed, the other evidence of defendant's guilt was so overwhelming 
that introduction of his confession was harmless error. Mitchell I, 152 Ill. 2d  at 326. We further held that defendant had not established that the 
physical evidence recovered from defendant's basement was the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Mitchell I, 152 Ill. 2d  at 326-27.
Defendant argued on direct appeal that the physical evidence recovered from 
his basement was the fruit of his illegal detention. Defendant reasoned that he 
told the police that he was with Maurice Douglas on the night of the murders. 
The police questioned Douglas, and he told them where the murder weapon was 
probably hidden. We held that the record did not establish that Douglas told the 
police where the weapon was hidden and that defendant's argument was based 
solely on conjecture. Without establishing that Douglas informed the police 
where defendant's Ninja equipment and the murder weapon were hidden, defendant 
could not meet his initial burden of showing a connection between his detention 
and the police's finding that evidence.
Defendant attached to his post-conviction petition the hearsay affidavit of 
Gilbert Roberts, an investigator with the office of the State Appellate 
Defender, who interviewed Douglas on November 19, 1993. In the affidavit, 
Roberts states that Douglas told him that Douglas told the police where the 
murder weapon was probably hidden. Defendant contends that he has now made the 
crucial connection showing that the physical evidence was the fruit of his 
unlawful detention and that his trial attorney was therefore ineffective for 
failing to make the connection at the suppression hearing.
Assuming, without deciding, that one can obtain an evidentiary hearing based 
upon inadmissable hearsay evidence, we find defendant's argument to be 
meritless. Under the Strickland standard, counsel's performance need 
not be evaluated if it can be shown that the defendant suffered no prejudice. 
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 527 (1984). To meet the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate "that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. We find defendant's 
argument to be without merit because we do not believe he has shown a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been 
different if his attorney had made and argued the Douglas connection. 
We believe that if defendant would have argued the Douglas connection, the 
State would have prevailed under the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule. We recognize that, ordinarily, if the State does not raise 
the inevitable-discovery argument in the trial court, the argument will be 
considered waived. People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 98-99 (1990). In 
this case, however, there was no reason for the State to make that argument at 
the suppression hearing because defendant did not argue that the evidence was 
found only because defendant told the police about Douglas. Defendant made that 
argument for the first time on direct appeal, and the State then argued in its 
response brief that the police would inevitably have discovered Douglas even 
without defendant's statement. The defendant argued in his direct appeal reply 
brief that the State had waived this argument. Defendant cannot argue that the 
State waived its right to reply to an argument that defendant had not yet made. 
The State also made this argument at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the 
post-conviction petition, and hints at it, but does not develop it, in its 
current appellate brief.(4) We 
believe we can properly consider this argument because we are only determining 
what the probable outcome of the suppression hearing would have been if 
defendant's attorney would have made the argument that defendant contends he 
should have made. As the State raised inevitable discovery in response to the 
Douglas argument the first time it was made, we believe it is reasonably likely 
that the State would have made the argument if defendant had first made the 
Douglas argument at the suppression hearing.
Under the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, evidence 
that otherwise would be inadmissible may be admitted if the prosecution can show 
that the evidence " 'would inevitably have been discovered without reference to 
the police error or misconduct.' " People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 142 (1991), quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 390, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2511 (1984). Professor LaFave has stated that, 
"Circumstances justifying application of the 'inevitable discovery' rule are 
most likely to be present if *** investigative procedures were already in 
progress prior to the discovery via illegal means." 5 W. LaFave, Search & 
Seizure §11.4(a), at 249 (3d ed. 1996).
Here, before defendant was taken to the police station, the police were 
looking for a car that had been seen near where the murders occurred. The police 
had the car's license plate number and knew that two black males were seen in 
the car. The police traced the car to defendant's sister and learned that 
defendant had been driving the car the night before. The police also spoke to 
defendant's mother, who knew that defendant and Douglas were together the night 
of the murders. Defendant and Douglas and been friends since they were five 
years old. Douglas' father also knew that defendant and Douglas were together on 
the night of the murders. Considering the above evidence, we simply cannot 
accept defendant's contention that the police would not have found out that 
Douglas was with him the night of the crime if they had not illegally detained 
him. Before the police detained defendant, they knew he had been in the car and 
that there was another black male in the car. Given that a thorough 
investigation into the violent murder of two teenagers was underway, that 
defendant and Douglas were friends, and that the police were speaking to people 
who knew that Douglas and defendant had been together that night, we believe 
that it was inevitable that the police would have found Douglas even if 
defendant had not told them that Douglas was the person who was with him. 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the 
physical evidence recovered from his basement. Assuming that the trial court 
would have ruled that defendant's confession should have been suppressed, there 
is no reasonable probability that the court would have also ordered the physical 
evidence suppressed. If defendant's attorney would have argued that the police 
only learned of that evidence through Douglas, and the police only learned about 
Douglas through defendant's confession, there is a reasonable probability that 
the State would have argued the inevitable-discovery rule. We believe the State 
would have prevailed in showing that the physical evidence should not have been 
suppressed, even if the confession would have been. Accordingly, defendant has 
not established that his trial attorney was ineffective at the suppression 
hearing for failing to argue the Douglas connection. The court correctly 
dismissed this count of defendant's post-conviction petition.
Failure to Establish that Defendant Would Not Have Been Able 
to Make a Valid Miranda Waiver
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective at the hearing 
on the motion to suppress when he failed to introduce evidence that would have 
helped to establish that defendant was incapable of making a valid waiver of his 
Miranda rights. Defendant similarly raised a Miranda argument 
on direct appeal, but we declined to address it because we had already 
determined that, assuming defendant's confession should have been suppressed, 
its admission into evidence was harmless error. Mitchell I, 152 Ill. 2d  
at 330.
Defendant tries to revive the Miranda argument by relying on 
post-conviction affidavits that he believes help to establish that he would have 
been unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his 
Miranda rights. Just as we held on direct appeal, however, the 
Miranda issue is irrelevant given our determination that any error in 
the admission of defendant's confession was harmless. Defendant suggests that 
the jurors would have given less weight to his confession if they had been 
apprised of the degree of his intellectual defects. We fail to see how this 
contention affects our conclusion on direct appeal that all of the remaining 
evidence, absent defendant's confession to the police, so overwhelmingly 
established his guilt that any error in the admission of his confession was 
harmless. Our holding on this issue in the prior appeal is res 
judicata, and the trial court did not err in dismissing this count of 
defendant's post-conviction petition.
Trial Court's Refusal to Provide Funds for a Mitigation 
Expert
Defendant next argues that he was denied due process when the trial court 
denied his pretrial request for funds to hire a mitigation expert to assist with 
the capital sentencing hearing. We agree with the State that this claim is 
waived because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Considerations of 
waiver and res judicata limit the range of issues available to a 
post-conviction petitioner to constitutional matters that have not been, and 
could not have been, previously adjudicated. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 
378. Rulings on issues that were previously raised at trial or on direct appeal 
are res judicata, and issues that could have been raised, but were not, 
are waived. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995). Defendant 
argues that this claim is not waived because it is based on evidence outside the 
original trial record. We disagree. This exception to the waiver rule in 
post-conviction appeals refers to those claims that could not have been 
considered by the reviewing court on direct appeal because the claim's 
evidentiary basis was de hors the record. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 372. Defendant claims that, through the post-conviction affidavits of 
people critical of the presentence investigation report, he has now established 
that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. We are unsure why defendant 
is discussing prejudice. The question here is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's request for appointment of a mitigation 
specialist. See People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 79 (1995). The evidence 
necessary to resolve that question is what was presented to the trial court at 
the time the request was made.
In the motion, defendant's attorney claimed that neither he nor the staff of 
the public defender's office had the necessary skills to prepare a life history 
of defendant. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel elaborated that the 
public defender's office did not have adequate staff to prepare a mitigation 
report dealing with defendant's schooling, his family and work histories, his 
medical records, and his school records. However, defense counsel told the 
court, "for the record, I'm aware of no-certainly there is no statute or basis 
for this request. I'm not aware of any, and I also am not aware of any case law 
in the circuit that allows the same, but, I believe that this request is very 
important." Defense counsel also maintained that he did not believe that the 
probation department could do an adequate job. 
The trial court denied the motion, and instead ordered the probation and 
court services department of St. Clair County to investigate defendant's 
background and to prepare a report in the nature of a presentence investigation 
report. The court also ordered Cheryl Prost to conduct psychological 
examinations and tests on defendant and to make the results available to the 
State, defendant, and the court. The question is, in light of what defense 
counsel represented to the trial court, did the court abuse its discretion in 
denying the request for a mitigation expert? Defendant preserved this issue in 
his post-trial motion, and argued it at the hearing on the post-trial motion. 
There is no reason he could not have made this argument on direct appeal. The 
argument does not depend on the fact that defendant now has attached to his 
petition what he considers to be better mitigating evidence. That was his 
argument all along: that he needed funds to have someone conduct an adequate 
investigation and that he would not be able on his own to muster evidence of 
this quality. This was a routine abuse of discretion argument that should have 
been presented on direct appeal, as it was in Burt and People v. 
Lear, 143 Ill. 2d 138 (1991). Defendant has waived this argument, and the 
trial court properly dismissed this count of the post-conviction petition.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Failure to Investigate and 
Present Mitigating Evidence
Defendant next argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his attorney failed to conduct an adequate investigation of potential 
mitigating evidence and failed to present this evidence at his capital 
sentencing hearing. As this claim depends upon evidence outside the original 
trial record, it is not waived for counsel's failure to raise it on direct 
appeal. See People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 149 (1995). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel at sentencing, a 
defendant must show that his attorney's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, absent counsel's errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the trier of fact would have concluded that the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant the death penalty. 
People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 145 (1996). Counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations of potential sources of mitigating evidence to 
present at a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 510 (1998). When made after a thorough investigation of the law and facts 
relevant to plausible options, strategic choices of what evidence to present are 
virtually unchallengeable. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514; 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. 
Choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2066.
Background
We begin by reviewing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. The 
State presented no evidence in aggravation. Defendant presented three witnesses 
in mitigation. The first person to testify was probation officer Michael 
Buettner, who prepared a presentence investigation report of defendant. Buettner 
testified that defendant was born on December 21, 1969. Buettner also testified 
about defendant's family members, giving their ages and cities of residence. 
Defendant lived with his mother, who provided his room and board. Buettner 
testified that defendant attended school until the eighth grade and then dropped 
out. Defendant received average to below-average grades. For part of his 
education, defendant was enrolled in a home bound study program, but Buettner 
did not know what that was.
Buettner testified that defendant told him that he had worked at "Bob's 
Liquor Store," but Buettner could not verify that such a place existed. 
Defendant also claimed to have worked for a company selling cable boxes, but 
Buettner could not verify that. In the summer of 1986, defendant worked in a 
summer youth program. 
Buettner learned that defendant had epilepsy and verified that defendant took 
Phenobarbital and Depakote. Defendant said that in recent years he experienced 
seizures only twice a year while on that medication. Buettner did not discover 
any history of alcohol or drug abuse by defendant. Defendant told Buettner that 
there was no history of mental illness in his family. Defendant did not have an 
adult criminal record, and had one delinquency incident when he was 14 years 
old. At that time, defendant was charged with burglary and placed on two years' 
probation. Defendant successfully completed the probation.
Cheryl Prost, a psychological consultant for the 20th Judicial Circuit, 
testified that she had been employed in that capacity for 19 years. Prost had a 
bachelor's degree in psychology and a master's degree in clinical psychology. 
She had also completed a year of doctoral work in psychology. She was ordered by 
the court to evaluate defendant. The evaluation took place at the St. Clair 
County jail and was conducted on days that defendant's jury trial was underway. 
Prost testified that she gave defendant the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
tests, a short reading test, tests to determine eye motor coordination and 
visual memory problems, and a clinical analysis questionnaire.
Prost testified that the testing conditions were not good. She had to work 
around defendant's trial, so the testing began as early as 6:15 a.m., there were 
interruptions from jail guards, and there was a lot of noise in the background. 
Defendant tried very hard to pay attention to what was going on and to shut out 
the noise. Prost believed that the test conditions might have caused defendant's 
scores on the Wechsler test and the reading test to be slightly lower than they 
otherwise would have been. Prost discussed defendant's educational background 
with him and learned that he had been in learning disability classes.
Prost explained that the results of the Wechsler test showed defendant's 
verbal IQ to be 75, which is in the middle of the borderline range of mental 
retardation. Defendant's performance IQ is 79, which is still in the borderline 
range of mental retardation, but is close to the dull-average range. Defendant's 
full scale IQ score was 76, which is in the borderline range of mental 
retardation. The range of mild mental retardation is 60 to 69. Borderline mental 
retardation is 70 to 79, and dull average is 80 to 89.
Prost elaborated on defendant's defendant's verbal IQ score, explaining that 
it is based on six subtests. An average score on any of these tests would be a 
10, and anything below a 7 would indicate a serious problem area. Defendant's 
scores were as follows: 3 on the information subtest, which tests academic 
information that one would pick up from being in class; 7 on the digit span, 
which is remembering a series of numbers forwards and backwards; 4 on vocabulary 
definitions; 6 on the arithmetic test; 8 on the comprehension section; and 5 on 
similarities, which compares two objects and asks how they are the same. 
Prost further testified about defendant's reading difficulties. She 
administered the Wide Range Achievement test, and it showed that defendant's 
reading level was fourth grade, first month. According to Prost, a fifth grade 
reading level is normally necessary to perform daily business. Defendant labored 
over the clinical analysis questionnaire questions, but he seemed able to 
comprehend them if given adequate time to do so. Defendant tested negative for 
any visual memory impairment or dyslexia.
Prost testified that the clinical analysis questionnaire, which she 
administered to defendant, asks 148 true/false questions about what a person is 
like or what types of experiences a person has. Defendant scored highly on five 
out of the six scales for depression. The tests showed that he felt anxiety and 
felt physically unwell at times. Prost reiterated that defendant was instructed 
to answer the questions based upon how he felt before he was arrested. Prost 
testified that defendant's answers on the clinical analysis questionnaire showed 
that he was not having delusions, hallucinations, or strange experiences. 
Prost's psychological report was admitted into evidence.
Defendant's mother, Irene Mitchell, testified that defendant was 20 years 
old, the youngest of her six children. Defendant always minded her when he was 
growing up and never talked back. She had never had any discipline problems with 
defendant. Defendant's father, Aber Mitchell, had worked at Olin Brass in East 
Alton, but the family was poor. Irene stayed home to raise the children. Aber 
was now deceased, as were all of defendant's grandparents.
Irene testified that defendant suffered from epilepsy. Defendant suffered a 
head injury when he was around five years old and was playing Superman with his 
brother. Defendant's foot slipped, and he hit his head on the rail of the bed. 
Defendant received stitches, and began having seizures seven months after the 
incident. The seizures are ongoing, and defendant has been treated for the 
seizures many times. Defendant initially took Dilantin for the seizures, but it 
did not control them sufficiently. Defendant's medications were switched to 
"Depakene" and phenobarbital, and these worked better.
Irene testified that the children in the neighborhood loved defendant because 
he "trained them to do flips, acrobats and things like that, and they just love 
Anthony, all of them." Defendant trained his dog, Poochie, very well, and 
appeared on a TV show, in which he demonstrated how he and his dog would do 
flips together. 
Irene clarified that defendant's juvenile conviction was for an incident in 
which defendant and five other kids broke into an empty house by going through a 
window. Defendant successfully completed probation and had no other encounters 
with the legal system.
Defendant did volunteer work with senior citizens in East St. Louis. He was 
going to school there for reading, and became good enough to help out some of 
the senior citizens. Irene testified that the senior citizens were crazy about 
defendant. Defendant attended church regularly at the New Bethlehem church.
Irene testified that defendant had learning difficulties and had a home tutor 
for two years. Defendant was having seizures, and Irene did not want him to miss 
too much school because his grades were already bad. A tutor came to defendant's 
home every day, which was the home bound instruction to which Buettner referred. 
Irene testified that, during that period, defendant missed a lot of school 
because of his seizures.
Irene further testified that defendant got along well with his siblings and 
that he had close friends, some of whom testified on his behalf during the 
trial. Defendant had recently worked at Bob's, which is a confectionary and 
variety store. The year before, defendant had worked at the Chrysler plant in 
St. Louis. Defendant was also taking courses at a police academy school in St. 
Louis; defendant had passed a course to become a security guard.
In the State's closing argument, the assistant State's Attorney argued that 
none of defendant's mitigating evidence was sufficient to preclude the death 
penalty. The State pointed out that defendant had had contacts with the criminal 
justice system, had not worked, was borderline mentally retarded rather than 
mentally retarded, and was not suffering from mental illness.
The State acknowledged that it did not put on additional aggravating 
evidence, but rather focused on the violent nature of the crime. The assistant 
State's Attorney noted that defendant armed himself with a knife, went into the 
Lieneke's trailer and stabbed 18-year-old David, and then pursued 13-year-old 
Dawn into the bedroom and stabbed her seven times as she cowered under the 
covers with the telephone in her hand. He asked the jury to consider the terror 
that would have gone through the victims' minds, and that defendant's attack 
upon them was unprovoked and brutal.
Defendant's attorney began by reminding the jurors that if even one of them 
felt there were mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the 
death penalty, the defendant's life could be spared and that he would be 
sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment. Defense counsel reminded the 
jury that either sentence was very severe, and that at best the 20-year-old 
defendant would be spending the rest of his life in prison. He emphasized that 
the State had the opportunity to present additional aggravating evidence but had 
not produced any.
Defense counsel then asked the jury to consider that defendant was mildly 
mentally retarded or borderline mentally retarded. Defense counsel further 
argued that defendant was only 20 years old and had a family who loved him.
Defense counsel also pointed out that defendant's one contact with the 
criminal justice system occurred when he was 14 years old and was not 
significant. Defense counsel went on to talk about defendant's seizure disorder, 
that defendant had grown up poor, and had only a fourth-grade reading level. He 
emphasized that the cumulative nature of this evidence, and that the alternative 
to death was natural life imprisonment, showed that the death penalty was not 
appropriate in this case.
Analysis
Against this backdrop, we consider the additional mitigating evidence that 
defendant now contends should have been presented. Defendant first contends that 
the jury did not receive accurate and comprehensive information about his 
intellectual functioning. Defendant criticizes trial counsel's reliance on 
Prost's report. Defendant relies on an affidavit from Dr. Michael Gelbort, who 
is critical of Prost's work in this case. Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, 
tested defendant at the Menard correctional center and determined that 
defendant's verbal IQ was 73, his performance IQ was 75, and his full scale IQ 
was 73. Gelbort determined that defendant's math skills were at a fourth-grade 
level and that his reading and spelling skills were below the third-grade level. 
Gelbort characterized defendant as having a severe language-based learning 
disability. Gelbort concluded that defendant's cognitive abilities were limited 
and that, although defendant's IQ scores showed that he was borderline mentally 
retarded, his inability to read and his slowed information-processing speed left 
him functioning more like someone in the mildly to mild/moderately impaired 
range.
We need not determine whether counsel's performance was objectively 
unreasonable under the first prong of the Strickland test, because 
defendant clearly cannot meet the second prong. The jury was informed of 
defendant's borderline retardation, and his severe difficulties with reading and 
learning and did not find that those factors mitigated against imposition of the 
death penalty. There simply is no reasonable probability that, had the jury 
known that defendant's IQ score might have been three points lower, that he 
actually read at below the third-grade level rather than at the fourth-grade 
level, and that a psychologist believed that the combination of his reading 
difficulties and low IQ left him functioning more in the mildly impaired range, 
it would have reached a different conclusion.
Defendant next argues that counsel minimized his seizure disorder to the 
point of insignificance and should have introduced more evidence on how it 
affected his day-to-day life. The jury learned that defendant had been suffering 
from epilepsy since he was a young child, that he initially took Dilantin, and 
then switched to Depakote and Phenobarbital when that was ineffective. Even with 
the Depakote and Phenobarbital, defendant was still suffering seizures twice a 
year. Defendant had been treated many times for his seizures, and they caused 
him to miss so much school that he had to get a home tutor. We do not agree that 
defense counsel's evidence minimized defendant's seizures to the point of 
insignificance.
Defendant claims that counsel should have introduced testimony from 
defendant's sisters, who could have testified about what defendant's seizures 
were like, how he had to be hospitalized for them many times, and how he missed 
school because of them. We believe this evidence would have been cumulative and 
there is no reasonable probability that additional testimony on this matter 
would have caused the jury to conclude that defendant's epilepsy was a 
mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty.
Defendant also claims that defense counsel should have introduced evidence 
such as that found in Gelbort's report that defendant sometimes had to go 
without his epilepsy medication as a child when the family could not afford it. 
Defendant points out that O'Donnell stated in his report that withholding 
medication in an epileptic patient can cause anxiety and apprehension. As there 
is no evidence that defendant was without his medication at or near the time of 
the murders, we do not believe defendant has shown there is a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have reached a different result based on this 
evidence. 
Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
introduce evidence that, because of his learning disabilities and illnesses, 
defendant was victimized throughout his youth. According to defendant's brief, 
defendant was "continually degraded, humiliated, and subjected to the violence 
of bullies, in and out of school." Defendant's argument is based on the hearsay 
statements of defendant's friend, Eric Nicholson, which are contained in a 
mitigation report prepared by social worker Jeffrey Eno. According to Eno's 
report, Nicholson told him that defendant was laughed at by his peers and was 
picked on by other students. Nicholson recalled an incident in which another 
student put a choke hold on defendant. Nicholson also stated that defendant's 
second-grade teacher, Ms. Davis, viciously ridiculed defendant for his inability 
to read up to grade level. Another childhood friend, Carlos Lumas, told Eno that 
other kids in the neighborhood picked on defendant and asked him to spell the 
word "tree." Defendant told Eno that he was the target of gangs who would beat 
him up and try to recruit him, but that he successfully resisted their 
efforts.
On this issue we do not believe that defendant can meet the first prong of 
the Strickland test. Defendant has not shown that counsel's decision 
not to present evidence of defendant's turbulent childhood fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. As we noted in People v. Sanchez, 
169 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1996), evidence of a violent and abusive childhood is not 
inherently mitigating. Here, it appears that defense counsel's strategy was to 
portray defendant as a pleasant person who was well-liked, who got along with 
other children in the neighborhood and taught them to do acrobatic tricks, who 
had close friends, and who volunteered his time to help others. It was not an 
objectively unreasonable strategy for defense counsel to emphasize this evidence 
rather than to portray defendant as an outcast and a loner who was picked on and 
beaten up. Defendant has not shown that his attorney's performance in this 
regard fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Finally, defendant claims that the jury never received information about 
defendant's history of depression and "other possible indicators of 
neurological/organic brain impairment." Defendant points out that Gelbort 
observed that defendant's mood was consistent with a reactive type of 
depression, and that, in 1983, defendant was diagnosed with childhood 
depression. Defendant also argues that several factors indicated that he had a 
neurological impairment, including a complicated birth, loss of consciousness 
after a head injury, another incident of blunt head trauma, possible lead 
intoxication, seizures, and a learning disability.
Again, defendant cannot meet the second prong of the Strickland 
test. Defendant's claim that the jury received no information about his 
depression is untrue. Prost testified that defendant's tests showed that he 
scored highly for depression on five out of six scales, and that he suffered 
from anxiety. The evidence also showed that defendant suffered from neurological 
impairment. It was established that defendant suffered from epilepsy following a 
head injury, that he had a learning disability, that he had difficulty reading, 
and that his IQ was in the borderline range for mental retardation. The jury 
rejected these factors as sufficiently mitigating to preclude the death penalty, 
and defendant has not established a reasonable probability that additional 
evidence on these matters would have changed that result.
We have carefully considered all of the evidence that defendant argues 
counsel was ineffective for not presenting in mitigation at his capital 
sentencing hearing. Defendant cannot meet both prongs of the Strickland 
test with any of this evidence. Accordingly, he has not made a substantial 
showing of the denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and 
the trial court properly dismissed this count of the petition without an 
evidentiary hearing.
Adequacy of Post-Conviction Representation
Finally, defendant asks us to remand this cause to allow different attorneys 
to replead his petition. According to defendant, the petition's shortcomings are 
such that it does not comply with either Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d 
R. 651(c)), or the right to a reasonable level of assistance (see People v. 
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992)). Defendant notes that his attorneys filed 
the original petition on December 7, 1993, but asked for an extension of time to 
complete additional investigation and discovery. Over the next 2½ years, the 
circuit court allowed the attorneys several more extensions. They filed an 
amended petition on May 16, 1996, that raised three new claims, and attached the 
mitigation report of social worker Jeffrey Eno. However, the amended petition 
was largely the same as the original petition, and the three new claims covered 
barely more than two pages of the petition. Defendant argues that it is now 
apparent that his attorneys did nothing for 2½ years but wait for a mitigation 
report, and then failed to incorporate adequately that report into the claims. 

Defendant acknowledges that there is no sixth amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. 
Defendant's right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is statutory, and 
that right is the right to a reasonable level of assistance. Flores, 
153 Ill. 2d  at 276. Here, defendant's attorneys clearly provided a reasonable 
level of assistance. They filed a lengthy post-conviction petition raising 17 
new claims of deprivations of constitutional rights. The petition was supported 
by 47 exhibits. We not believe that their representation was unreasonable merely 
because the only additional evidence they came up with in 2½ years was a 
mitigation report. 
Defendant contends that his attorneys did not meet their obligations under 
Rule 651(c). The State counters that Rule 651(c) applies only to defendants who 
file pro se petitions and does not apply when the original petition is 
filed by an attorney. Here, the provision of Rule 651(c) that defendant claims 
was not complied with was the one requiring the petitioner's claims to be shaped 
into appropriate legal form. The clause defendant refers to is the one requiring 
counsel to affirm that he "has made any amendments to the petitions filed 
pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's 
contentions." 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). As defendant did not file a pro se 
petition, his attorneys could not have violated that provision. Moreover, we 
find that petitioner's claims are in appropriate legal form.
As a final matter, we note that defendant argues that counsel's deficiencies 
prejudiced him particularly with respect to his second, third, and fourth 
appellate arguments. No additional evidence or pleading would have helped 
defendant on these arguments. As to the second appellate argument, even if it 
could have been conclusively established that Douglas was the only person who 
told the police where the items of physical evidence could be found, the police 
would have inevitably spoken to Douglas and found that evidence. Regarding the 
third argument, that argument is irrelevant in light of our holding that any 
error in the admission of defendant's confession was harmless. Defendant waived 
the fourth argument by failing to raise it on direct appeal. We decline 
defendant's invitation to remand this matter for repleading of the 
post-conviction petition.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's post-conviction petition, supported by the accompanying exhibits 
and the trial record, does not make a substantial showing that defendant's 
constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, the court did not err in 
dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the 
circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is 
directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, May 24, 2000, as the date on which 
the sentence of death entered in the circuit court is to be imposed. Defendant 
shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996)). 
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case 
to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the 
warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I join the majority opinion. I write separately to respond to several points 
raised by the dissenting opinion in this case.
Notably, the dissent musters only a brief defense of People v. Brandon, 
162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994), and its progeny, and their interpretation of 
section 104-21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a)). The dissent offers no new analysis of the 
question and simply perpetuates the erroneous premise of the Brandon 
line of cases by equating the statutory right found in section 104-21(a) with 
the distinct constitutional right not to be tried while unfit, as embodied in 
the due process clause. Too, the dissent takes issue with what it insists are 
inconsistencies in the views of the justices who disagreed with the Brandon rule 
and who questioned the court's efforts to transmute a statutory right into a 
constitutional one. What the dissent's lengthy discussion fails to mention, but 
is evident from even a cursory reading of the earlier cases, is that the 
majority opinions themselves evolved and changed focus, as the court considered 
different aspects of the problems posed by its application of the Brandon 
rule in different procedural contexts. The dissents to those decisions 
appropriately addressed the specific factual settings in which the issue then 
happened to arise.
In support of the Brandon rule, the dissent relies primarily on the 
doctrine of stare decisis as grounds for leaving that line of authority 
undisturbed. Our departure from stare decisis finds ample justification 
here, however. The earlier cases attest to the continuing problems the 
Brandon rule produced as the court labored to provide the statutory 
right with a constitutional foundation. Considerations of stare decisis 
should weigh little in these circumstances, where a misguided 
interpretation of a procedural statute threatened to become a permanent and 
curious feature of our constitutional law. Relevant here are the concerns 
expressed by the Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), when it overruled part of its 
four-year-old decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), which had barred the use of victim impact evidence 
at capital sentencing hearings. The Court noted the importance normally played 
by stare decisis in our system of justice but also recognized that the 
doctrine does not mean that a precedent must remain forever frozen in the 
law:
As Payne instructs, the doctrine of stare decisis is not 
intended to permanently enshrine an incorrect rule of law, isolating it forever 
from review and reconsideration. "Stare decisis is an important factor 
in the judicial process, but we must not forget that it is not the whole 
process." Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 615 (1956). The rule first 
announced by the court in Brandon and later applied in a variety of 
circumstances mistakenly confused a statutory right with a constitutional right. 
It is not too late to correct that erroneous interpretation. The surprising 
thing in all of this is not that the court now decides to overrule Brandon 
and its progeny, but that those cases managed to survive as long as they 
did.
JUSTICES BILANDIC and HEIPLE join in this special concurrence.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court's decision to overrule Brandon 
and its progeny.
Prior to today, our case law had been settled as to what remedy would be 
afforded to a defendant who was entitled, under section 104-21(a) (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a)), to a fitness hearing, but who did not 
receive one. Specifically, that case law dictated that the failure to hold the 
hearing necessitated reversal of the defendant's convictions and remandment for 
further proceedings, unless it could be established that defendant did not 
suffer mental impairment as a result of his ingestion of psychotropic 
medication. People v. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541 (1997); People v. 
Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997) (modifying People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994)). This rule applied to cases on direct appeal as well as to 
those on collateral review. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 549 (modifying 
People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996)). Indeed, the parties in this 
appeal have framed their contentions regarding this issue in light of the 
principles set forth in these cases. Neither defendant nor the State has, in 
this appeal, requested that this court revisit the Brandon/Burgess 
rationale. The State only asks that this court consider the retroactivity of the 
above rule in light of the retroactivity test announced by the United States 
Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), and adopted by this court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990). The court, however, states that it "need not address this 
issue, however, [because] the dismissal of defendant's psychotropic medication 
claims was proper for other reasons." Slip op. at 7. The "other reasons" alluded 
to in this sentence eventually reveal themselves to be nothing other than the 
court's disregard of the doctrine of stare decisis. Contrary to the 
views expressed in today's opinion, no legitimate reason exists in this case 
that warrants a departure from stare decisis. I, therefore, believe 
that this court should continue to adhere to its established precedent in this 
area.
I
The term stare decisis is derived from the Latin phrase stare 
decisis et non quieta moevre, which translates " 'to stand by matters 
that have been decided and not to disturb what is tranquil.' " J. Wallace, 
Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism 
and Politics in Casey, 42 Buff. L. Rev. 187, 189 (1994), quoting Dictionary 
of Foreign Phrases and Abbreviations 187 (K. Guinach trans., 3d ed. 1983). This 
principle was engrafted in English jurisprudence, having been recognized by Sir 
William Blackstone, who acknowledged that " 'precedents and rules must be 
followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust.' " J. Stein, The Hobgoblin 
Doctrine: Indentifying "Foolish" Consistency in the Law, 29 Tex. Tech. L. 
Rev. 1017, 1019 (1998) quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *70. In American 
jurisprudence, stare decisis reflects a " 'policy judgment that 
"in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right." ' " State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 20, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199, 212-13, 118 S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997), quoting 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 422, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997), quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
285 U.S. 393, 406, 76 L. Ed. 815, 823, 52 S. Ct. 443, 447 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting, joined by Roberts and Cardozo, JJ.). As the United States Supreme 
Court has observed, the judiciary prefers this doctrine because it "promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters 
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
This court, too, has voiced similar sentiments. Long ago in Prall v. 
Burckhartt, the court observed that the rule of stare decisis
In light of the foregoing, this court has recognized that the doctrine, while 
not inviolable, demands that it be overturned "only on the showing of good 
cause." Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 167 (1955). In my view, my colleagues have not shown any cause, let alone 
good cause, for their actions today.
Purporting to appreciate the considerations noted above, the court states 
that "normally" it "would continue to adhere to *** established precedent, even 
if certain members of this court disagreed with it." Slip op. at 18. 
Nevertheless, the court explains that "[i]n this case, however, we deem it 
appropriate to depart from stare decisis [because] *** [n]o reasonable 
observer of this court's jurisprudence could argue that the law in this area has 
been developing in a principled and intelligible fashion." Slip op. at 18. I 
take this statement to refer to this court's decision, in People v. 
Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1977), to change from a bright line, automatic 
rule of reversal to a case-specific approach. I cannot fathom how Justice Miller 
can join in an opinion that characterizes this change as unprincipled and 
unintelligible because Justice Miller himself authored Burgess. The 
case law that the court today characterizes as "erratic and confused" is, in 
reality, neither. None of the parties in this case appear to be confused; 
rather, both defendant and the State have presented cogent arguments grounded in 
the law as it existed up until today. Likewise, the various districts of our 
appellate court have rendered opinions in this area that do not exhibit any 
degree of chaos with respect to this issue. The only people who are "confused" 
by this case law are those members of this court who do not like it and have 
resisted its consistent application as the law of this state.
Although I acknowledge that stare decisis is applied less rigidly in 
constitutional cases (see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 148, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989)), the United 
States Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine is so persuasive that, even in 
constitutional cases, the Court has required a departure from precedent to be 
supported by some "special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984). I must point out 
that our prior case law in this area did not produce an "unworkable"or 
problematic application of the law to defendants. See Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842-43, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 746-47, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2617-18 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.) 
(recognizing that constitutional error in past decisions alone is not reason to 
override stare decisis, but rather needs "special justification"). My 
review of the appellate court decisions that have cited to Brandon and 
Burgess reveals that the lower courts have not had any difficulty in 
applying the case-specific approach established in Burgess and utilized 
by this court in our decisions which postdate it.
In order to understand how our case law has evolved since the time 
Brandon was announced, a complete review of the history of this court's 
psychotropic drug jurisprudence is necessary. This review will illustrate that 
nothing has changed from the time that Brandon was modified by the 
court's decision in Burgess, except for the fact that one member of the 
court that decided Brandon has retired. However, the circumstances that 
warrant changes in the law do not include changes in personnel of the court. As 
Justice Ryan once eloquently stated, "[i]f the law were to change with each 
change in the makeup of the court, then the concept that ours is a government of 
law and not of men would be nothing more than a pious cliche." People v. 
Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 167 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring).
A
One of the most basic tenets of our criminal justice system is the 
recognition that the conviction of an incompetent defendant violates that 
defendant's fundamental right to due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 818, 86 S. Ct. 836, 838 (1966); People v. 
Barkan, 45 Ill. 2d 261, 263 (1970); People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 368 (1957) (and cases cited therein). The constitutional right derives from 
the notion, recognized at common law, that no person should be compelled to 
stand trial while insane. People v. Gavrilovich, 265 Ill. 11 (1914). As 
this court has recognized, the need for inquiry into fitness at the time of 
trial stems from concerns that an incompetent defendant may be disabled from 
making a rational defense and may be incapable "of co-operating with his counsel 
to the end that any available defenses may be interposed." Burson, 11 Ill. 2d  at 369. Moreover, in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the 
Illinois General Assembly has expressly prohibited the trial, adjudication, 
sentence, or execution of person charged with a criminal offense while insane. 
See 725 ILCS 5/104-10 et seq. (West 1996). The statute, however, does 
not, and was not intended to, abrogate the common law rule. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d  at 368.
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the issue of a defendant's 
fitness to stand trial, to plead, or to be sentenced may be raised by the 
defense, the State or the court at any appropriate time before a plea is entered 
or before, during, or after trial. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 1996). Prior to 
December 28, 1979, our Criminal Code provided that, when a bona fide 
doubt of a defendant's fitness has been raised, the court shall order a 
determination of the issue before proceeding further. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 
1996). This court strictly construed these statutory provisions to mean that 
whenever the court becomes aware of facts that raise a bona fide doubt 
as to sanity, the court becomes duty-bound to "cause a sanity hearing to be held 
as provided by law." Burson, 11 Ill. 2d  at 370.
The failure to hold a fitness hearing once a bona fide doubt as to 
competence has been raised has long been deemed reversible error. See 
Burson, 11 Ill. 2d  at 370. The failure to make the requisite inquiry 
has been regarded as so fundamental to the right to a fair criminal trial that 
it can be raised as an issue on appeal despite a defendant's failure to properly 
preserve it. This court's decision in Burson is illustrative in this 
respect. The court there reversed a criminal conviction because the trial court 
did not hold the sanity hearing that was required by the Criminal Code. The 
court did so even though the defendant
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that this court has long acknowledged 
that the deprivation of the sanity hearing required by the statute was, in 
essence, a violation of constitutional due process. See also Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479, 492, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1817-18 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that a defendant's waiver of the right 
to be tried while competent would not withstand scrutiny under the Due Process 
Clause and casts doubt on his or her exercise or waiver of all subsequent rights 
and privileges through the whole course of the trial). Moreover, this court has 
held that such a claim is cognizable on collateral review. See People v. 
Smith, 44 Ill. 2d 82, 85 (1969) (noting that successful petition must 
allege facts which "demonstrate that such a hearing should have been had").
On December 28, 1979, the General Assembly amended the Code of Criminal 
Procedure to address the issue of psychotropic drugs. Such drugs, also known as 
antipsychotic drugs, were first introduced in the 1950s and have since gained 
wide acceptance in the psychiatric community as treatment for psychotic thought 
disorders. See Riggins, 504 U.S.  at 141, 118 L. Ed. 2d  at 493, 112 S. Ct.  at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although these drugs worked to restore 
normal thought processes by clearing hallucinations and delusions, they also had 
unwanted side effects, namely, slowed physical and mental functioning. These 
side effects are severe enough to have caused one member of the United States 
Supreme Court to acknowledge that ingestion of the drugs by a criminal defendant 
can cause prejudice to that defendant by rendering him or her unable or 
unwilling to assist counsel. See Riggins, 504 U.S.  at 141-42, 118 L. Ed. 2d  at 493-94, 112 S. Ct.  at 1818-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Our General 
Assembly recognized the adverse effect these types of drugs could have on the 
competency of an accused and amended the Criminal Code to provide that
The first reported Illinois decision that addressed this amendment was 
People v. Tilson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 973 (1982). There, defendant Tilson 
contended that his conviction must be reversed because the circuit court failed 
to hold the hearing provided for in section 104-21(a) despite the fact that 
defendant was taking a psychotropic drug under medical direction at the time of 
his trial. The appellate court rejected Tilson's challenge, noting that the word 
"entitled" did not necessitate an obligation to hold the hearing. Further, the 
court did not view the statute as being indicative of an intent by the 
legislature to "remove the right of a trial judge to exercise all discretion 
when he is possessed of sufficient information to assure that the particular 
defendant is fit to stand trial and to be sentenced." Tilson, 108 Ill. 
App. 3d at 978. For this reason, the court concluded that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing to hold the fitness hearing, sua 
sponte, and affirmed the conviction. The holding in Tilson was 
followed in several other appellate court decisions, culminating in the general 
rule that a defendant's ingestion of psychotropic medication was, in effect, but 
one factor in determining whether a bona fide doubt of a defendant's 
competence exists. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 216 Ill. App. 
3d 83, 87-88 (1991); People v. Balfour, 148 Ill. App. 3d 215, 226 
(1986).
Such was the state of Illinois' decisional law on this issue when defendant 
Tyrone Brandon directly appealed his first degree murder conviction and death 
sentence to this court. People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994). In 
that appeal, this court was presented, for the first time, with a challenge to 
the trial court's failure to hold a fitness hearing under section 104-21(a). In 
contrast to the appellate court decisions on this subject, the court concluded 
that section 104-21(a) "evinces a recognition by the General Assembly that 
psychotropic medication is an important signal that a defendant may not be 
competent to stand trial." Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 457. The court 
further concluded that Brandon's trial attorney was ineffective for failing to 
point out to the trial court that Brandon was entitled to the hearing under 
section 104-21(a) and that the resulting prejudice was "manifest." 
Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 459. In so holding, four members of this court 
explicitly rejected the notion, first developed in Tilson, that the 
fitness hearing described in section 104-21(a) was a matter of discretion with 
the trial court. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 459, citing Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 822, 86 S. Ct. 836, 842 
(1966). The court interpreted the word "entitled" to mean just that-if facts are 
brought to the court's attention that indicate that defendant is taking 
psychotropic drugs under medical direction, then the court does not have the 
discretion to not hold the required hearing. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 
459.
Justice Miller, joined by Justices Bilandic and Heiple, dissented in 
Brandon. Although the dissenting justices acknowledged that it was 
"true that the defendant was entitled to a fitness hearing under [section 
104-21(a)]," they disputed whether defendant had established the requisite 
prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 461-63 (Miller, 
J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.).(6) 
According to the dissent, defendant Brandon could not establish prejudice for 
counsel's failure to request a hearing under section 104-21(a) because defendant 
could not show that he was unfit. In other words, the dissent took the view that 
the hearing, had it been ordered, would have resulted in a finding that Brandon 
was fit for trial. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 461-63 (Miller, J., 
dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.).
This court's decision in Brandon marked a departure, in several 
critical respects, from the previous reported appellate court decisions 
concerning the effect of a trial court's failure to hold a fitness hearing 
pursuant to section 104-21(a). First, all seven members of the court embraced 
the notion that a defendant who is taking psychotropic drugs under medical 
direction is entitled to a hearing, for even the dissent conceded that 
proposition. Second, a majority of the court deviated from the appellate court's 
holding that the decision to hold a fitness hearing pursuant to the statute 
rests within the discretion of the trial court.
Inexplicably, the court today holds that the word "entitle" does not mean 
what most people of average intelligence believe it to mean, namely, "to furnish 
with a right." Indeed, the court goes to great lengths to explain that the word 
"entitle" does not mean that a court must make a "further inquiry" when certain 
facts are brought to the court's attention. See slip op. at 12. I know of no 
rule of statutory construction which supports such a reading of this statute. 
The language of section 104-21(a) is exactingly clear: a defendant who is taking 
psychotropic drugs under medical direction at the time of trial has the right to 
have an inquiry into the issue of fitness. Under this statute, once a defendant 
is being treated with psychotropic drugs, he or she need not raise a bona 
fide doubt as to fitness in order to receive a hearing. The hearing is 
automatic. The statute does not say that the trial judge has discretion to hold 
such a hearing when a defendant is taking psychotropic drugs under medical 
direction. Nor does the statute limit such hearings to only those who "timely" 
request them. In fact, the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly allows for a 
post-trial inquiry into fitness. See 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 1996). Thus, 
section 104-21(a) was not couched in terms which would limit the circuit court's 
ability to hold such a hearing, as today's opinion suggests. If psychotropic 
drugs were being administered, a fitness hearing was to be held. The court in 
Brandon did not erroneously construe section 104-21(a).
After Brandon was announced, this court next addressed section 
104-21(a) in People v. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461 (1995). Defendant Gevas 
appealed his conviction and death sentence to this court, arguing, among other 
things, that the trial court erred by not ordering a fitness hearing after 
learning that defendant was taking psychotropic drugs under medical direction. 
Relying on the decision in Brandon, the court concluded that the trial 
court's failure to hold the hearing necessitated reversal of the convictions and 
a new trial. The court held that, by enacting section 104-21(a), the General 
Assembly had "equated the administering of psychotropic medication to a 
defendant with a bona fide doubt as to fitness to stand trial." 
Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 469. In so holding, the court noted that the 
legislature's concern in this area was substantial not only because such drugs 
signal that a defendant may not be competent to stand trial, but because these 
types of drugs can also "have severe side effects which can affect a defendant 
during criminal proceedings." Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 470. In support of 
this statement, the court cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479, 495, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1820 
(1992) in which he pointed out that "[t]he side effects of antipsychotic drugs 
can hamper the attorney-client relation *** rendering the defendant less able or 
willing to take part in his defense [and] 'can also lead to the defendant's loss 
of self-determination undermining the desire for self-preservation which is 
necessary to engage the defendant in his own defense in preparation for his 
trial.' " Finally, the court concluded that remanding the matter for a 
retrospective fitness hearing would be inherently difficult. Therefore, the only 
proper remedy was a new trial. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 471.
Once again, Justice Miller, joined by Justices Bilandic and Heiple, 
dissented, this time on the basis that defense counsel's failure to inform the 
trial judge sooner in the proceedings of defendant's ingestion of psychotropic 
drugs was a matter of trial strategy. According to the dissent, the trial judge 
in the case "was warranted in concluding that the defendant was fit and was 
justified in refusing counsel's untimely request for a hearing." Gevas, 
166 Ill. 2d  at 473 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and 
Heiple, J.). Moreover, the dissenting justices stated the following:
It was for these reasons that the dissenting justices believed that the 
court's decision to grant defendant Gevas a new trial was erroneous.
This court was next presented with the psychotropic drug issue in Kinkead 
I, 168 Ill. 2d 394, another capital case. Defendant Kinkead claimed that he 
was not afforded a fitness hearing despite the fact that he was taking 
psychotropic drugs at the time of the proceedings against him. The court began 
its analysis by reaffirming the principles established in both Brandon 
and Gevas. Moreover, the court again rejected any notion that the 
ingestion of psychotropic medication was, in effect, but one factor in the trial 
court's bona fide doubt analysis. Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 
409. The court specifically noted that the appellate court decisions relied upon 
by the State were all decided prior to Brandon. The court further 
rejected the State's contention that the trial court's "observations of 
defendant's demeanor during the proceedings [were] dispositive of the fitness 
issue in the case at bar." Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 409-10. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court specifically stated:
Nevertheless, the court noted that Kinkead's situation was slightly different 
from that of the defendants in Brandon and Gevas because the 
record on appeal was inadequate-the court could not "determine whether the 
administration of the Thorazine was proximate enough in time to defendant's 
guilty plea and sentencing to trigger the right to a full fitness hearing 
pursuant to section 104-21(a)." Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 414. The 
matter was therefore remanded with directions that the circuit court conduct an 
inquiry into the factual circumstances surrounding defendant's asserted use of 
psychotropic medication. Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 417.
Again, Justice Miller, joined by Justices Bilandic and Heiple, dissented. 
Contrary to the view expressed in their Gevas dissent, the dissenting 
justices now took issue with remanding the matter for the factual inquiry. 
Compare Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 418 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined 
by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.), with Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d  at 474 
(Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). Moreover, 
the dissenting justices disagreed with the conclusion that the legislature, 
through section 104-21(a), essentially equated the use of psychotropic drugs 
with the presence of a bona fide doubt concerning fitness. According to 
the dissent, a defendant may be entitled to a fitness hearing under the 
provision, but such a defendant must invoke the statute in "a timely manner." 
Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 419 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by 
Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.).
The court next addressed the same issue in yet another capital case, 
People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464 (1996). Defendant Birdsall 
contended, inter alia, that he was denied due process of law and 
effective assistance of counsel because he was not afforded the competency 
hearing to which defendants are entitled by section 104-21(a) if they are taking 
psychotropic medication under medical direction at or near the time of trial or 
sentencing. The court noted that under long-established principles of due 
process, an accused may not be prosecuted or validly convicted if he or she is 
unfit to stand trial. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 474-75. Moreover, to 
secure this due process protection, Illinois statutory and case law require a 
trial court to hold a competency hearing if there is a bona fide doubt 
concerning the defendant's mental fitness to understand the nature and purpose 
of the proceedings and to assist in his or her defense. Citing the 
Gevas decision, the court noted that the legislature indicated through 
the plain language of section 104-21(a) that it had "equated the administering 
of psychotropic medication to a defendant with a bona fide doubt as to 
fitness to stand trial." Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 475.(7) After 
a thorough review of Illinois law, the court concluded that Birdsall was 
entitled to relief based on the denial of his right to a fitness hearing, and a 
new trial was ordered. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 475-77. Moreover, the 
court rejected the State's explicit request that the court "repudiate" its 
holdings in Brandon, Gevas, and Kinkead I. In place 
of the automatic reversal rule enunciated in Brandon and 
Gevas, the State urged this court to adopt a totality of the 
circumstances test in which the court could assess whether the psychotropic 
drugs had impaired defendant's fitness to understand and assist in his defense. 
The court declined the State's request, noting that the State did not point to 
anything in the record on appeal that contained any evidence of a medical nature 
respecting the influence the drugs may have had on Birdsall. Birdsall, 
172 Ill. 2d  at 477-79.
Justice Miller, again with Justices Bilandic and Heiple joining, dissented. 
Once more, the dissenting justices charged that the court was mistakenly 
equating the statutory entitlement to a fitness hearing found in section 
104-21(a) with a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness. The 
dissent also believed that the court had confused "defendant's failure to assert 
the procedures it believes are designed to secure due process with a denial of 
due process itself." Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 482 (Miller, J., 
dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). According to the dissent, 
section 104-21(a) "grants to a defendant an entitlement to a fitness hearing in 
cases in which the constitutional right is not at all implicated." 
Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 482 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by 
Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). The dissenting justices also maintained that 
"[r]ather than being a question of due process, the issue is properly analyzed 
in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel." Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  
at 482 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). In 
order to establish prejudice, a defendant must show not only that a fitness 
hearing would have been conducted if requested, but defendant must also 
demonstrate that the outcome of the hearing would have been favorable to 
him.
Up until Birdsall, all of this court's decisions which had addressed 
the psychotropic drug issue had done so in the context of a direct appeal from 
trial. In People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996), the court faced the 
same question in the context of collateral review. Defendant Nitz sought relief 
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, asserting that his murder convictions and 
death sentence were obtained in violation of his federal and state 
constitutional rights. Nitz contended that he was entitled to a new trial 
because the State withheld information that it was administering psychotropic 
medication to him throughout the course of this trial and sentencing. According 
to Nitz, the State's failure to disclose the information deprived him of his 
constitutional due process right to a fitness or competency hearing. The court 
began its analysis of defendant's contention by examining the nature and scope 
of the due process right in the context of an accused's competency to stand 
trial, noting that the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a 
defendant's right not to be tried while unfit deprived the defendant of due 
process. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 156. The court then cited several cases, 
decided before the enactment of section 104-21(a), that held that if facts 
existed at the time of defendant's trial which, if presented to the trial court, 
would have raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant's sanity, the 
accused would have had a right to have a hearing and that such a claim could be 
heard on collateral review. See Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 157 (citing 
People v. Smith, 44 Ill. 2d 82 (1969), People v. McLain, 37 Ill. 2d 173 (1967), and People v. Harris, 113 Ill. App. 3d 663 (1983)). 
Recognizing the due process implications of Nitz's claim, the court went on to 
evaluate it in light of Brandon and its progeny. Although the court 
noted that the procedures contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding 
fitness were purely statutory, the court held that the right to inquiry 
established in the Code, be it through bona fide doubt or be it through 
the ingestion of psychotropic drugs, flows from the due process guarantee that 
an accused who is unfit will not be tried. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160-61. 
Moreover, the court rejected the State's contention that Nitz's demeanor at 
trial was dispositive of the issue, noting that the court had previously 
rejected similar arguments in Brandon, Gevas, and Kinkead 
I. The court also rejected the State's invitation to overturn the 
"automatic reversal" rule enunciated in Brandon and the cases which 
followed it. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 163. Noting that an "automatic 
reversal" has always been the appropriate remedy where a requisite statutory 
fitness hearing was not provided, the court concluded that Nitz was entitled to 
a new trial. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 164. In other words, the court in 
Nitz held that the failure to hold the required hearing under section 
104-21(a) necessitated the same type of relief as did the failure to hold a 
hearing under section 104-11(a).
Justice Miller, joined by Justices Bilandic and Heiple, again dissented. The 
dissenting justices continued to adhere to the notion that the right to the 
hearing established in section 104-21(a) could not be equated with a bona 
fide doubt of fitness. In addition, the dissent believed that the right 
provided in section 104-21(a) was statutory as opposed to constitutional and, 
therefore, was not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 
Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 165 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, 
C.J., and Heiple, J.).
Nitz and the cases decided before it firmly established that due 
process considerations were at play in those cases in which a defendant was 
entitled to, but did not receive, a hearing under section 104-21(a) at the time 
of trial or sentencing. Under the guise of "correcting" "erroneous" precedent, 
the court today deprecates the constitutional right to be fit when tried. For 
example, the court insists that the failure to hold a section 104-21(a) hearing 
is merely a violation of a statute, stating that "[s]tatutes do not confer 
constitutional rights, and the allegation of a deprivation of a statutory right 
is not a proper claim under the Act." Slip op. at 10. The court ignores the 
reality, just as the dissenters did in Nitz, that the statutory 
provisions concerning fitness contained in our Code of Criminal Procedure 
implicate the fundamental constitutional right to be competent while tried. The 
court seems incapable of understanding that these psychotropic drug cases 
present, at root, the question of whether defendants were unfit when tried. If 
the answer to this question is yes, the conviction cannot stand because the 
"conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due 
process." Pate, 383 U.S.  at 378, 15 L. Ed. 2d  at 318, 86 S. Ct.  at 838. 
The purpose of the post-conviction remedy is to provide a mechanism by which 
convicted persons could raise "the question of whether they were denied due 
process of law" at their original trials. People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 
243 (1950). Our Post-Conviction Hearing Act was specifically designed to 
vindicate those constitutional rights that were not and could not have been 
raised at the time of trial. In the psychotropic drug cases, the defendants are 
presenting evidence, which if known at the time of trial, would have 
necessitated that an inquiry be made into the issue of fitness. No inquiry was 
made in these cases; therefore, a possibility exists that the drugs that were 
being administered may have rendered some unfit. As noted, an accused who is 
unfit to be tried and is nevertheless convicted has been denied due process. 
That four members of this court fail to see the due process implications in such 
cases is incredulous.
Moreover, the court today mischaracterizes the facts in Nitz. It 
must be remembered that, in that case, defendant Nitz alleged in his 
post-conviction petition that the State withheld from both defendant and his 
attorney the psychotropic nature of the drugs that were administered to 
defendant Nitz at the time of the trial. Clearly, had those facts been known to 
either defense counsel or the trial judge, the court would have been duty-bound 
to hold the hearing mandated by the statute. Therefore, the post-conviction act 
provided the only means by which defendant could vindicate his constitutional 
right to inquiry surrounding his competence. See People v. Smith, 44 Ill. 2d 82 (1969) (acknowledging the cognizability on post-conviction of a claim 
regarding the failure of a court to hold a bona fide doubt hearing); J. 
Decker, "Last Chance" State Judicial Review in Criminal Cases-Illinios' 
Collateral Attack Remedies: A Call For Principled Jurisprudence, 38 DePaul 
L. Rev. 201, 271 (1988) (noting that competency to stand trial or to enter a 
plea is of constitutional magnitude and is an issue cognizable under the 
Illinois post-conviction hearing act). 
After Nitz was announced, the court next addressed section 104-21(a) 
in People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163 (1996), which, like Nitz, 
was a post-conviction challenge to a death sentence. Defendant Britz argued, 
inter alia, that he was on "medication" pursuant to medical orders 
during his trial proceedings. Britz maintained that, under section 104-21(a), 
the trial court should have held a fitness hearing. The court began its analysis 
by citing Brandon, Gevas, Kinkead I, and 
Nitz for the proposition that when psychotropic drugs are prescribed to 
an accused pursuant to medical direction and no fitness hearing is held, either 
a new trial is necessary or a remand is required in order to establish if the 
drugs were administered at the time of the proceedings so as to trigger the 
statute's application. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d  at 195-96. The court 
determined, however, that Britz did not come within the purview of section 
104-21(a) because the medications that he was given were not psychotropic in 
nature and that the legislature intended to address only psychotropic drugs or 
their equivalent in the statute. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d  at 196-98. The 
court reached this conclusion because the legislature was concerned with 
protecting against medications "capable of interfering with [the ability to 
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or assist in 
his defense]." Britz, 174 Ill. 2d  at 197. For these reasons, the court 
concluded that Britz had not been entitled to a fitness hearing on the basis of 
the medications he had ingested. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d  at 198. The court, 
therefore, affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Britz's post-conviction 
petition.
Given their previous dissent in Nitz, one would have expected 
Justices Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple to have concurred only in the judgment of 
the court, explaining that they did so only because they believed that Britz's 
section 104-21(a) claim was not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act 
due its statutory nature. See Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 165 (Miller, J., 
dissenting, joined by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). Moreover, none of these 
justices registered any disagreement with the premise of the court's opinion, 
i.e., that had the drugs Britz ingested been psychotropic (or the 
equivalent) then a fitness hearing would have been required pursuant to 
Brandon and it progeny. Notwithstanding the views expressed in their 
previous dissents, each of the three justices joined fully in the court's 
decision.
Section 104-21(a) next came before the court in People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1 (1996), a direct capital appeal. Defendant Kidd contended that he was 
entitled to a fitness hearing under Brandon because he was taking the 
drugs Dilantin, Tegretol, and Elavil at the time of the proceedings against him. 
Despite his consistent dissenting view on the psychotropic drug issue, Justice 
Miller authored the court's decision. The court noted that the record on appeal 
established that Kidd was receiving only Dilantin at the time relevant to the 
proceedings. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 17. Citing to Britz, the 
court concluded that Dilantin was not a psychotropic drug or its equivalent; 
therefore, Kidd "was not entitled to a fitness hearing under section 104-21(a) 
[and] defense counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to seek one 
pursuant to that provision." Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 19.
Neither Justice Bilandic nor Justice Heiple filed a separate opinion in 
Kidd. As in Britz, the three original Brandon 
dissenters joined fully in the court's opinion, without specifically registering 
their continued disagreement with the court's interpretation of section 
104-21(a). Surprisingly, these three justices joined in an analysis concerning 
whether the "other medications" referred to in section 104-21(a) were the 
equivalent of psychotropic drugs-given their previous dissents, these three 
justices could have taken the position that, even if Kidd had been taking 
psychotropic drugs as he alleged on appeal, he would not be entitled to a new 
trial for the reasons previously cited in their dissenting opinions in 
Brandon, Gevas, Kinkead I, and Birdsall.
Such was the state of this court's psychotropic drug jurisprudence when 
Raymond Burgess appealed his conviction and death sentence directly to this 
court. People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997). I note that today's 
decision is remarkable in failing to discuss or even cite the Burgess 
decision. Defendant Burgess argued that he was entitled to a fitness 
hearing under section 104-21(a) because he was taking psychotropic medication at 
the time of his trial. Following the submission of his initial brief, however, 
defendant filed a motion in this court requesting a limited hearing pursuant to 
our decision in Kinkead I. The court granted the motion without 
recorded dissent, remanding the cause for a hearing for the " 'limited 
purpose of determining whether defendant ingested psychotropic medication at or 
near the time of his trial and sentencing.' "(8) 
Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  at 299. After the conclusion of the hearing, the 
parties submitted briefs to this court on the issues raised by the remand 
proceedings. Defendant contended that he was entitled to a new trial under 
Brandon and its progeny because the evidence adduced at the hearing 
established that he was receiving psychotropic drugs at the time of his trial, 
but had not received the requisite fitness hearing. In response, the State 
argued that a new trial was not necessary because the medical evidence adduced 
at the limited hearing established that defendant was not impaired by the 
ingestion of the drugs.
Justice Miller, writing for the court, began the analysis of the issue by 
stating the following:
The court went on to conclude that defendant's own expert witness did not 
believe that the psychotropic drugs administered to Burgess could have had any 
effect on Burgess. According to the court, the testimony of defendant's expert 
"demonstrates [that] we should not automatically assume that every psychotropic 
drug will inevitably render the person taking it unfit for purposes of trial or 
sentencing, and we therefore conclude that retrospective hearings are sometimes 
proper." Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  at 304. The court affirmed Burgess' 
conviction and sentence.
Justice Harrison dissented, and I joined in his dissent. The dissenting 
justices questioned why Burgess should be treated differently from the 
defendants in the other cases which had preceded his. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  at 325 (Harrison, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.). According to the 
dissent, the court in Burgess' case was making the same after-the-fact 
assessment of fitness that had been repeatedly and consistently rejected in 
Gevas and Birdsall. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  at 325 
(Harrison, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.).
The decision in Burgess is notable because of the position taken in 
it by the three original Brandon dissenters, three justices who today 
comprise 75% of the majority. Recall that none of these three justices believed 
that due process concerns were implicated by the failure to hold the hearing 
required under section 104-21(a). Contrary to their previously expressed views, 
they held, in Burgess, that there could be "some circumstances in which 
it can be said that the use of psychotropic medication did not affect the 
defendant's mental functioning in such a way that relief would be appropriate." 
Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  at 303. The converse of such a statement is, of 
course, that there could be some circumstances in which it cannot be 
said that the use of psychotropic medication did not affect a defendant's mental 
functioning. If, as the three dissenters had maintained prior to 
Burgess, the failure to hold the hearing required under section 
104-21(a) did not implicate due process, why then did Justice Miller construct 
the Burgess analysis and why did Justices Bilandic and Heiple concur in 
it? Burgess did not explicitly overrule Brandon or any of the 
cases that had adhered to the rule of automatic reversal enunciated in it. 
Rather, Burgess merely modified the type of relief that would be 
afforded to defendants who had failed to receive the requisite fitness hearing 
at the time of the proceedings against them. Brandon and the cases 
which followed it had held that due process required that a new trial be ordered 
in all such cases because of the inherent unreliability of retrospective fitness 
hearings. Burgess changed the rule in that if it could be later 
established that the medications did not impair defendant's ability to 
participate and assist in his defense, due process did not require that a new 
trial be ordered. If the original Brandon/Nitz dissenters were correct 
in their legal analyses, as the court today insists that they were, then they 
should not have joined in a decision which still left the basic premise of 
Brandon intact-that some inquiry must be undertaken in order to 
evaluate the effect, if any, the psychotropic drugs had on a defendant's fitness 
to be tried and sentenced.(9) Given 
their views in Brandon, Gevas, Birdsall, Kinkead 
I, and Nitz, the three dissenters could have chosen to continue to 
dissent in Burgess. One would certainly not expect Justice Miller, the 
author of all of these dissents, to author an opinion which was grounded in 
principles first recognized in Brandon. The Brandon/Nitz 
dissenters cannot have it both ways. After the Burgess opinion was 
announced, the court next addressed section 104-21(a) in People v. 
Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541 (1997), a capital post-conviction proceeding. 
Defendant Neal filed a post-conviction petition, his third, in which he alleged 
that he should have received a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104-21(a) 
because of his ingestion of psychotropic drugs. The State filed a motion in the 
circuit court seeking dismissal of the petition, but the circuit court denied 
the motion. An evidentiary hearing was held at the conclusion of which the 
circuit court denied post-conviction relief. This court affirmed the denial of 
relief without dissent. The court held that
The court considered Neal's case to be such an "exceptional" case based on 
the evidence adduced at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. See 
Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 554 (finding situation at bar "directly analogous 
to that present in Burgess"). The court further held that although the 
court in Burgess was able to assess the evidence "closer in time to the 
original proceeding," that fact, in and of itself, was "of no consequence." 
Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 554. The court explained why this was so:
Therefore, Neal stands for the proposition that in some, but not 
all, cases, circumstances may be such that the issue of defendant's fitness or 
lack of fitness may be fairly and accurately determined long after the fact. 
Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 554. In such cases, a new trial would not be the 
appropriate remedy for the failure to hold a fitness hearing under section 
104-21(a).
The decision in Neal was issued without any dissent. None of the 
three original Brandon dissenters filed separate opinions in the case. 
This was somewhat surprising because all three previously had noted that 
post-conviction relief could not be obtained on the basis of the statutory 
right. See Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 165-66 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined 
by Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). Despite their votes in Neal, 
Justices Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple appear to have now returned to their 
pre-Neal view that such a claim is not cognizable in post-conviction 
cases. Moreover, not one member of the court questioned why res 
judicata did not bar defendant's petition since Neal's petition was his 
third such pleading under the Act. The failure of Justices Miller, 
Bilandic, and Heiple in Neal to note any of these procedural points 
seemed to indicate that they had acquiesced in the Brandon holding as 
it was modified by Burgess. Moreover, the two dissenting justices in 
Burgess also fully joined in Neal. Thus, it appeared that all 
seven members of the court had reached a compromise and had settled upon a rule 
that each could apply. Such an assumption would only be strengthened when the 
court issued its next opinion in this area, People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249 (1998), a direct capital appeal.
Defendant Cortes argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of his 
ingestion of psychotropic drugs at the time of the proceedings against him. 
Cortes' trial had been conducted between October 24 and November 4, 1994, and 
the sentencing hearing was held from November 9 to November 10, 1994. During the 
post-trial motions, defense counsel presented the circuit court with a copy of 
this court's decision in Brandon and the appellate court's decision in 
People v. Guttierez, 271 Ill. App. 3d 301 (1995), in which the 
appellate court ordered a new trial for defendant based upon this court's 
holding in Brandon. Defense counsel also alerted the circuit court to 
the fact that several doctors had declared Cortes fit to stand trial under 
medication. Because it was unclear whether the medication was psychotropic in 
nature, the trial court ordered a behavioral clinical examination of Cortes and 
instructed defense counsel to determine the particulars of Cortes' use of 
medication. Eventually, the trial court held a fitness hearing on the question 
of Cortes' competence. Defense counsel objected, noting that a retrospective 
fitness hearing was inappropriate and that the only proper remedy was to order a 
new trial. After receiving evidence at the hearing, the trial court denied 
Cortes' motion for a new trial.
In a decision issued without dissent, this court affirmed the trial court's 
decision. We began our analysis by noting the development of our case law from 
the time that Brandon was decided. We further noted that the General 
Assembly had amended section 104-21(a) subsequent to Brandon, but that 
the new amendment could not be applied to Cortes' case retroactively. 
Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d  at 275 n.2. The court found that Burgess 
controlled Cortes' case because Cortes' fitness "could be fairly and accurately 
determined after the fact because, as in Burgess, the evidence showed 
that the medication ingested by [Cortes] did not have any affect on his 
fitness." Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d  at 276 (citing Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  at 303-04, and Neal, 179 Ill. 2d at 554).
Thus, Burgess, Neal, and Cortes unequivocally 
illustrate that the seven members of this court had reached common ground over 
the question of how to handle the psychotropic drug issue. The original 
dissenters had fully joined in decisions that recognized the right to raise the 
issue, whether it be on direct or collateral review, in cases where a defendant 
had been deprived of the section 104-21(a) fitness hearing at the time of trial. 
In addition, the two dissenting justices in Burgess had joined in the 
post-Burgess decisions which held that in exceptional cases 
retrospective fitness determinations could resolve the psychotropic issue.
Our most recent published opinion that addressed section 104-21(a) was 
Kinkead II, 182 Ill. 2d 316, the appeal from the remand hearing ordered 
in Kinkead I. Applying the case-specific approach of Burgess, 
Neal, and Cortes, the court determined that
The court therefore concluded that Kinkead should receive a new trial.
The three original Brandon dissenters disagreed, this time with 
Justice Heiple writing for them. The dissenting justices took issue with two 
specific aspects of the court's decision. The first centered on the retroactive 
effect of the amended section 104-21(a). Despite the fact that in 
Cortes all three justices had joined in an opinion which explicitly 
rejected the notion that the new amendment was retroactive (see Cortes, 
181 Ill. 2d  at 275 n.2), the dissent now believed that retroactivity was in 
order. Kinkead II, 182 Ill. 2d  at 351 (Heiple J., dissenting, joined by 
Miller and Bilandic, JJ.), citing First of America Trust Co. v. 
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282, 290 (1996) (applying vested rights doctrine). 
Notwithstanding the alleged retroactivity of the amended section 104-21(a), the 
three dissenters disagreed with the court's view of the evidence adduced at the 
hearing on remand. It is significant to note that the dissenters did not disavow 
Burgess or the views expressed in that decision. In fact, their 
reasoning was based on the recognition in Burgess that evidence adduced 
at a later proceeding could establish definitively that the psychotropic drugs 
did not impair a defendant's ability to participate and assist in his defense. 
According to the dissent, the evidence adduced at the hearing "fully comports 
with the trial court's conclusion that defendant's use of Thorazine *** was not 
medically significant with regard to his fitness to stand trial." Kinkead 
II, 182 Ill. 2d  at 358 (Heiple, J., dissenting, joined by Miller and 
Bilandic, JJ.). For these reasons, the dissenting justices did not believe that 
Kinkead was entitled to a new trial.
The foregoing review of this court's psychotropic drug case law affirmatively 
belies today's assertion that our case law in this area has developed in an 
unprincipled and unintelligible fashion. See slip op. at 18. To the contrary, my 
review demonstrates that the three original Brandon/Nitz dissenters 
joined in decisions which recognized the right to make an inquiry, be it an 
after-the-fact inquiry. Nevertheless, these three justices now believe that 
applying our current case law to this defendant is unnecessary because that case 
law is "erroneous." As I stated at the outset of this dissent, neither of the 
parties have asked this court to revisit the arguments made in Brandon 
and Nitz. The only reason those arguments have been resurrected in this 
case is because the three dissenters now have a fourth vote to achieve that 
which they could not achieve on the day Gevas, Kinkead I and 
II, Birdsall, Nitz, Burgess, Neal, 
and Cortes were issued-to overrule Brandon. Today's decision 
merely reiterates, this time with the approval of four justices as opposed to 
three, the same arguments made by Justice Miller in his initial dissents. While 
my colleagues are quick to point out the alleged deficiencies in the legal 
analyses contained in Brandon, Gevas, Kinkead I and 
II, and Nitz, they are utterly silent as to the fact that 
these decisions were modified by Burgess and that for the past two 
years, this court, up until today, had been content to follow the approach that 
Justice Miller himself had constructed in Burgess.(10) 
What the three dissenters have failed to explain today is why defendant Mitchell 
in this case cannot have the opportunity to establish that the antipsychotic 
drugs he ingested may have affected him in a way that did not affect defendant 
Burgess. If, as Justice Miller clearly stated in Burgess, there might 
be some circumstances that would not necessitate a new trial, then why does he 
refuse to apply his own analysis to the case at bar? Since the time that 
Brandon was issued, Justices Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple have 
concurred in subsequent decisions which hold that some sort of after-the-fact 
inquiry is necessary in cases such as this. Thus, I believe that the opportunity 
to overrule Brandon and its progeny has long passed. In several of our 
earlier decisions on this issue, the State specifically asked the court to 
repudiate the Brandon rule, and we explicitly declined to do so. In the 
interim, we have issued opinions approving of a defendant's right to inquire if 
the psychotropic drugs affected fitness. Although the court has changed its view 
as to how that inquiry is to be made, the court has consistently recognized a 
defendant's ability to raise the issue and the court has consistently, in every 
case since Brandon was decided, resolved the issue on its merits. Our 
previous opinions represented this court's best effort to deal with the critical 
questions raised by the failure to have held the hearing required by section 
104-21(a). I must remind my colleagues those opinions represent the law and as 
such are relied upon by the judiciary, prosecutors, criminal defendants, as well 
as the citizens of this state.(11) For 
the three original Brandon dissenters to shift gears now, after having 
participated in and authored opinions in other cases in which psychotropic drugs 
were in issue, is, with all due respect, inconsistent and without principle. 

As I noted earlier, the court contends that stare decisis need not 
be applied in this case because "[n]o reasonable observer of this court's 
jurisprudence could argue that the law in this area has been developing in a 
principled and intelligible fashion." Slip op. at 18. The court points out that, 
although in 1995 this court rejected any notion of retrospective fitness 
hearings as being reliable, two years later in 1997, "we saw no problem with a 
retrospective fitness hearing conducted 15 years after defendant's trial and 
sentencing." Slip op. at 18, citing Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 553-56. The 
court then states that "[i]n 1998, we held that the automatic reversal rule of 
Brandon had been replaced by the 'case-by-case' approach and that a 
defendant could no longer prevail on a request for a new trial simply by showing 
that he had been taking psychotropic medications at the relevant time." Slip op. 
at 18, citing Kinkead II, 182 Ill. 2d  at 340. I have already 
demonstrated how the court today has manipulated our jurisprudence in this area 
by conveniently omitting the role Burgess played in this history and 
the hand that the original Brandon/Nitz dissenters had in creating 
Burgess. While Justice Rathje, who was not a member of this court at 
the times those cases were decided, is entitled to the view that such a 
development is unprincipled and unintelligible, I find it beyond belief that 
Justices Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple could share in that view. After all, it 
was Justice Miller, writing for the court in Burgess, who opened the 
door for the retrospective fitness hearings. See Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d  
at 303. Had Justices Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple been concerned with the 
propriety of such a volte face, they should not have been willing to 
adopt Burgess and should not have added their imprimatur to the 
decisions in Neal and Cortes-two cases which followed the 
approach endorsed by them in Burgess. Moreover, to cite Kinkead 
II as an example of unprincipled jurisprudence is to mischaracterize the 
decision-the court in Kinkead II merely followed the precedent of the 
court as established in Burgess and applied in Neal and 
Cortes. Under the case law set forth in those decisions, the court 
concluded that defendant Kinkead was entitled to a new trial.
In addition, the court's decision in Burgess to change from a bright 
line rule announced in Brandon to a case-specific approach, though 
criticized at the time by two members of the court, is hardly the type of change 
in circumstance that warrants the overturn of stare decisis. As noted 
in Kinkead II, the case-by-case approach comports with due process and 
ensures that those defendants who were ingesting psychotropic drugs were not 
impaired by them to the extent that their ability to participate in the defense 
was hampered. Under today's decision, such similarly situated defendants now 
have no recourse whatsoever. I do not believe that the doctrine of stare 
decisis should be overturned when to do so produces such an unjust result. 
I must point out that, when this issue arises in the context of a capital case, 
as all of our cases have been, the need to ensure, as the statute then required, 
that antipsychotic drugs did not impair or hamper the defendant's ability to 
assist in his or her defense becomes all the more important. This last point 
should not be overlooked for it leads to another disturbing aspect of today's 
decision. All of our psychotropic drug cases have been capital appeals, either 
direct appeals from trial or appeals from post-conviction proceedings. Although 
this court is a court of permissive review, capital appeals come to us directly. 
See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a), 651(a). As a 
result, this court is frequently presented with the same arguments in case after 
case, in term after term. Once a legal question has been settled and closed to 
further argument, I, for one, cannot emphasize enough the need for its 
consistent application in similar cases. The law of this court cannot be seen by 
the bar and the public to be one that is constantly "in flux," changing from 
opinion to opinion, particularly in capital cases. Both the State and the 
appellate defense bar should be entitled to view a decision of this court on a 
given issue as static once that issue has been settled. Both this case and the 
Palmer case (see supra at 64 n.11) all too sadly demonstrate that it is 
the arbitrary hand of fate, as opposed to the established rule of law, that will 
mean the difference between life and death. In my view, the court today fails to 
recognize the important need for following stare decisis in capital 
cases. 
B
In light of the above, I believe that the circuit court in this case erred by 
dismissing defendant's psychotropic drug claim without an evidentiary hearing. 
Defendant's petition alleged that he was taking two psychotropic medications at 
the time of his trial. Had defense counsel requested a fitness hearing at that 
time, the circuit court would have been required by statute to hold the hearing. 
Therefore, I would instruct the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
in order to establish what effect, if any, those drugs had on defendant's 
fitness during the proceedings. As this court acknowledged in Neal, in 
certain cases, "circumstances may be such that the issue of defendant's fitness 
or lack of fitness at the time *** may be fairly and accurately determined long 
after the fact. In such cases, Burgess will apply." Neal, 179 Ill. 2d  at 554. I, therefore, would instruct the court to follow the precedents 
of this court as set forth in Burgess, Neal, Cortes, 
and Kinkead II.
II
Today's result sends the unfortunate message to the bench, the bar, and the 
public that "this court does not decide issues based on the law, but based 
instead on who happens to be sitting on the court at a particular time." 
People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 170 (1981) (Clark, J., concurring). In 
this respect, Justice Clark's sentiments, expressed almost two decades ago, have 
resonance today:
Moreover, Justice Clark's view of stare decisis is not at all novel. 
This court, in a per curiam opinion, observed just five years ago 
that:
See also People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1999) (Bilandic, J., 
dissenting) (noting that stare decisis "should not be disregarded 
simply because some members of the court disagree or have changed their minds"). 
By joining in Burgess, Neal, and Cortes, Justices 
Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple ceased to voice their spirited dissents on this 
issue and to challenge the legal analyses contained in Brandon and its 
progeny. The three dissenters, in those cases, did not question, as they do 
today, the legal underpinnings of the earlier decisions. To the contrary, they 
merely changed the remedy for the alleged violation-from automatic reversal to 
an after-the-fact, case-specific inquiry. Therefore, I respectfully disagree 
that the doctrine of stare decisis must be overridden today on the 
basis that our case law in this area was incorrect. Although the three original 
Brandon dissenters consistently voted against the automatic reversal 
rule created in Brandon, they were instrumental in creating the 
retrospective approach they now criticize as "confused and erratic." Had they 
indeed felt that way, they should never have voted to adopt Burgess in 
the first place.
As I have endeavored to show by my review of our precedent, not one 
circumstance has changed in our psychotropic drug jurisprudence since this court 
announced its decision in Burgess. All of the legal arguments set forth 
in today's opinion are the same arguments that were made and considered at the 
time Brandon and Nitz were decided. These same arguments were 
in existence when the court issued Burgess. The only "circumstance" 
that has changed since this court announced Burgess is that Justice 
John Nichols, who joined in Brandon, authored Gevas, joined in 
Kinkead I and II, and joined in Birdsall, 
Nitz, Britz, Kidd, Burgess, Neal, 
and Cortes, has retired, and Justice Rathje has been appointed to fill 
the vacancy created by the retirement. I submit that this type of "circumstance" 
does not rise to the level necessary to overturn the doctrine of stare 
decisis. 
Unfortunately, today's decision demonstrates that "[p]ower, not reason, is 
the new currency of this [c]ourt's decisionmaking." Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 844, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 748, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). As noted throughout this 
dissent, neither the law nor the facts supporting the Brandon/Burgess 
rule underwent any change since the time that this court issued its last 
psychotropic drug case, Kinkead II, in 1998. Only the personnel of this 
court did. One must now wonder how many other of our previous decisions, decided 
by 4-3 margins, will be similarly overruled on the basis of a change in court 
personnel. I must stress again that neither party in this case asked this court 
to revisit Brandon and its progeny. The court acts today sua 
sponte. If this court can so cavalierly disregard its own precedent, we 
surely cannot expect others to follow it nor can we justly criticize those who 
do not. Today's imprudent action invites nothing but open defiance of our 
precedent and seriously undermines this court's legitimacy. Clearly, there is no 
genuine reason not to apply Burgess to the present case, and the 
court's attempt to style its decision as one made to restore "some stability and 
reason to this area" (slip op. at 19) is beyond credulity. It is obvious to me, 
at least, that four members of this court are willing to discard any principle 
of constitutional law that, in the past, was recognized over the votes of three 
dissenting justices and with which four justices currently disagree. This does 
not bode well for the future. At the end of this current year, the makeup of 
this court will undergo some change because four justices by virtue of election 
or retention may not return. While I am not clairvoyant, I do know that when the 
court reconvenes in January 2001, the current makeup of the court will have 
changed. It is my sincere hope that this case will not serve as a model for 
future courts to follow.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and JUSTICE McMORROW join in this dissent.
1. 1Brandon held that if a defendant is 
taking psychotropic medication at the time of trial or sentencing, and his 
attorney does not request a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing, the defendant has 
received the ineffective assistance of counsel and is entitled to a new trial. 
Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d  at 458-61. 

2. 2The PDR has a listing for "Psychotropics," 
but the only listing under that heading says "see under Psychotherapeutic 
Agents." Physicians' Desk Reference 215 (53d ed. 1999). 

3. 3Defendant does not argue that the Illinois 
Constitution affords him greater protection in this regard. 

4. 4The State argues primarily that the evidence 
shows that it was just as likely that Viroon Williams told the police where the 
murder weapon was hidden. This assertion, however, does not defeat defendant's 
argument. The police also learned about Williams from defendant. 

5. 5The court in Burson did not evaluate 
the procedural default in terms of our plain error rule. Nevertheless, the 
court's recognition that error was of constitutional magnitude comports with the 
second prong of the plain error rule, i.e., that the error affected a 
substantial right. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996). 

6. 6Justices Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple 
apparently now believe differently and challenge the definition of the word 
"entitle." See slip op. at 12. 

7. 7The court noted that the General Assembly 
had, during the pendency of Birdsall's appeal, amended section 104-21(a). The 
amendment provided that, effective December 13, 1995, the granting of a fitness 
hearing based on the defendant's treatment with psychotropic drugs is not 
required unless the court finds there is a bona fide doubt of the 
defendant's fitness. The court held that the amendment did not apply to 
Birdsall's case and expressed no opinion regarding the amendment's effect on 
future cases after the effective date of the amendment. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d  at 475 n.1. 

8. 8The fact that Justices Miller, Bilandic, and 
Heiple concurred in the order was surprising given the fact that in Kinkead 
I they specifically took issue with the need to remand the case for a 
limited hearing. According to their dissent in Kinkead I, the lack of 
the evidentiary basis for the claim in the record on appeal established that 
Kinkead did not seek in "a timely manner" the hearing to which he was entitled. 
See Kinkead I, 168 Ill. 2d  at 419 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by 
Bilandic, C.J., and Heiple, J.). 

9. 9I, along with Chief Justice Harrison and 
Justice McMorrow, am not alone in my interpretation of the Burgess 
decision. Various panels of the appellate court have taken the view that "while 
Burgess represents a departure from the rule of automatic reversal, it 
is still entirely consistent with the fundamental underpinning of 
Brandon-to protect the due process rights of a defendant who ingested 
psychotropic medication." People v. Flynn, 291 Ill. App. 3d 512, 520 
(1997) (reversing conviction and remanding for a new trial pursuant to 
Burgess). See also People v. Jamerson, 292 Ill. App. 3d 944, 
951 (1997) (remanding matter for a limited hearing pursuant to 
Burgess); People v. Abraham, 293 Ill. App. 3d 801, 804-05 
(1997) (same). 

10. 10Following the issuance of 
Burgess, this court remanded to the appellate court those cases which 
had been decided under the automatic reversal rule enunciated in 
Brandon. See, e.g., People v. Johns, 173 Ill. 2d 535 
(1997) (directing appellate court to reconsider its holding in light of 
Burgess). 

11. 11An example of such reliance can be found 
in the case of another death row inmate, Leslie Palmer. On June 1, 1998, Palmer 
filed a post-conviction petition in which he alleged, inter alia, that 
he was denied a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing at the time of his capital 
sentencing hearing. The State confessed error on the psychotropic drug claim, 
agreeing that a new sentencing hearing was required. The parties eventually 
reached an agreement in which defendant would forgo all future appeals in 
exchange for a 65-year prison sentence. The circuit court approved the 
agreement, and this court closed defendant's supreme court file on September 17, 
1999. Clearly, the State confessed error in reliance on our previous 
psychotropic drug decisions. Had the State's Attorney of Mason County, who 
prosecuted Palmer, chosen not to confess error on the psychotropic drug issue, 
Palmer would still be on death row today.