Case Title: Shull v. Reid

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109136

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHULL v. REID2011 OK 72Case Number: 109136Decided: 07/06/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

PATRICIA SHULL and BRIAN SHULL, Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
v.MONICA REID, M.D., ANDREW ELIMIAN, M.D., ANDREW 
WAGNER, M.D., ERIC KNUDSTON, M.D., and OU MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants/Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW CERTIFIEDINTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT OFOKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA,HONORABLE DANIEL J. 
OWENS
¶0 This is a first-impression question where the trial court lacked guidance 
as to what damages are available to parents of an unhealthy, abnormal child, 
bringing a claim for wrongful birth and medical malpractice.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDERREVERSED AND REMANDED
Giles H. Manley, M.D. & Hal J. Klienman (pro hac vice), JANET, 
JENNER & SUGGS, LLC, Baltimore Maryland, and Shannon F. Davies, Courtney D. 
Powell, Andrew W. Lester, LESTER LOVING & DAVIES P.C., Edmond, Oklahoma, for 
Patricia and Brian Shull, Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Chad Moody, Leslie C. Weeks, Sidney D. Smith, Jr., RODOLF &TODD, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, for OU Medical Center, Defendants/Appellees. 
Kyle N. Sweet, Vanessa A. Hicks, THE SWEET LAW FIRM, Oklahoma City Oklahoma, 
for Monica Reid M.D., Andrew Elimian M.D., Andrew Wagner, M.D., and Eric 
Knudtson, M.D., Defendants/Appellees.
COMBS, J. 
¶1 On June 8, 2009, the Shulls initiated an action sounding in medical 
malpractice seeking compensation for the injuries suffered as a result of the 
Appellees' alleged malpractice in failing to properly diagnose a Cytomegalovirus 
infection,

¶2 Defendants/Appellees filed a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment alleging 
the Shulls may only recover damages for the medical cost of continuing the 
pregnancy, offset by the cost of termination of the pregnancy. The district 
court found the issue raised in the Defendants/Appellees' motion was one of 
first impression and the trial court lacked guidance because there were no 
published opinions from this Court addressing what damages are available to 
parents of an unhealthy, abnormal child, bringing a claim for wrongful birth and 
medical malpractice. The trial court, claiming judicial economy, suggested to 
the parties it was procedurally preferable to grant defendants/appellees' motion 
for partial summary judgment, and let this matter pass to this Court as a 
Certified Interlocutory Order on a Petition for Certiorari.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3 An appeal on summary judgment comes to this Court as a de novo 
review. Carmichael v. Beller, 
ISSUE ON APPEAL
¶4 The issue raised on appeal is what damages are available in this medical 
malpractice case. The only proposition in Defendants/Appellees' motion for 
partial summary judgment was the Shulls' damages, based on Appellees' alleged 
malpractice, are limited to the medical cost of continuing the pregnancy, offset 
by the cost of termination the Shulls would have elected to have, had they known 
of their child's exposure to the CMV infection. The district court sustained the 
motion, limiting damages to that amount.
ANALYSIS
¶5 This Court has previously addressed the question of wrongful conception in 
three separate cases. The first case was Morris v. Sanchez, 
1987 OK 
110, 746 P.2d 184, where this Court found the birth of a healthy child does not 
constitute a legal harm for which damages are recoverable.2 The next case was 
Goforth v. Porter Medical Associates, Inc., 1988 OK 63, 755 P.2d 678, where again, this Court found that the 
birth of a normal, healthy child is not a compensable damage. However, this 
Court held:

Morris, however, should not, and must not, be interpreted as precluding a 
claim for other forms of damages that may arise out of the negligent performance 
of sterilization operations. Insofar as the petition in this case alleges 
negligence and actual, ordinary damages arising out of the alleged negligence, 
to-wit: $2,000.00 in medical expenses incurred as result of the unplanned 
pregnancy, we are of the opinion that the petition adequately states a claim for 
which relief may be granted.
Goforth v. Porter Medical Associates, Inc., 1988 OK 63, ¶5, 755 P.2d 678, 680. Finally, in Wofford v. Davis, 
1988 OK 
112, ¶7, 764 P.2d 161, 162, this Court again disallowed recovery of damages for raising 
a healthy child, but allowed for damages that may arise out of the negligent 
performance of sterilization operations. These cases dealt with normal, healthy 
children, born after failed attempts at sterilization. 

¶6 To reach that result we relied upon the Kansas case, Byrd v. Wesley 
Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (KS 1985). We again turn to 
another Kansas case for guidance. In Arche v. Unites States of America, 
Department of the Army, 247 Kan. 276, 798 P.2d 477 (KS 1990), the Kansas 
Supreme Court was requested to answer two questions. First, did Kansas law 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth of a permanently handicapped 
child, and if so, what is the extent of damages which may be recovered upon 
proper proof. The Kansas Court held:
Wrongful birth plaintiffs typically desire a child and plan to support the 
child. Such support is, of course, the obligation of all parents. It is 
therefore reasonable to deny those normal and forseeable (sic) costs which 
accrue to all parents. We hold that those expenses caused by the child's 
handicaps may be recovered, but not those expenses natural to raising any child. 
(citations omitted)
Arche v. Unites States of America, Department of the Army, 247 Kan. 276, 
282-283 798 P.2d 477, 481 (KS 1990). The Kansas Court then addressed the 
plaintiff's emotional damages and found that such damages were not allowable in 
this type of medical malpractice action. They held:
We have thus far held that visibility of results as opposed to visibility of 
the tortious act does not give rise to a claim for emotional damages. The 
child's injury in this case occurred without human fault during development of 
the fetus; the parents were not aware of the injury at the time. The parents in 
Schmeck3 were responsible for their disabled child and suffered 
emotional distress because of the disablement, but were denied recovery for 
emotional distress. We see no reason why a wrongful birth case should be 
distinguished. We therefore hold that damages for emotional distress of the 
parents are not recoverable in a wrongful birth case. 

Arche v. Unites States of America, Department of the Army, 247 Kan. 276, 283, 
798 P.2d 477, 482 (KS 1990). Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court 
addressed the issue concerning allowable damages, and over what period of time 
such damages may be recovered. The Kansas Court found that recovery may be had 
only for the period of time of the child's life expectancy or until the child 
reaches the age of majority, whichever is the shorter period. Arche at 247 
Kan. 276, 291, 798 P.2d 477, 486. 

¶7 In Liddington v. Burns, 916 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-1131(W.D.Okla. 
1995), the U.S. District Court, sitting in diversity, addressed the issue 
before us. Applying Oklahoma law, the court found that Oklahoma would recognize 
an action for wrongful birth. As to damages that court held:
Neither party briefed the issue of what elements of damages are recoverable 
in a wrongful birth action. Certainly the extraordinary medical expenses and 
other pecuniary losses proximately caused by the negligence are recoverable. 
Arche v. Unites States of America, Department of the Army, 247 Kan. 276, 
798 P.2d 477 (1990). Just as certainly, the normal and foreseeable costs of 
raising a normal, healthy child are not recoverable. Morris v. Sanchez, 
746 P.2d 184 
(Okla.1987).

Liddington v. Burns, 916 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (W.D.Okla. 1995). 
¶8 Subsequent to the birth of the child in the instant case, the Oklahoma 
State Legislature passed 63 O.S. Supp. 2008 § 1-741.114 that recognized wrongful birth actions but 
does not allow a parent, or other person who is legally required to provide for 
the support of a child, to seek economic or noneconomic damages because of a 
condition that existed at the time of the child's birth, based on a claim that a 
person's act or omission contributed to the mother not terminating the 
pregnancy. This Statute, however, was passed after the birth of the child in the 
instant matter, and it does not affect our holding in the instant case following 
this Court's holding in Welch v. Armer, 1989 OK 117, ¶27, 776 P.2d 847, 850, where we held "[t]he general 
rule in Oklahoma is that statutes, and amendments, are to be construed to 
operate only prospectively unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary 
intent." In Sudbury v. Deterding, 2001 OK 10, ¶19, 19 P.3d 856, 860, this Court held:
Remedial or procedural statutes may operate retrospectively only where they 
do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested rights. A substantive change 
that alters the rights or obligations of a party cannot be viewed as solely a 
remedial or procedural change and cannot be retrospectively 
applied.
The statute at hand does acknowledge the tort of wrongful birth and does not 
show any retrospective intent. The statute is a substantive change to the law 
which alters the rights and obligations of parties. It cannot be considered 
merely a remedial or procedural change, and therefore, cannot be retrospectively 
applied. 
¶9 We adopt the findings and the rationale, in Arche and Liddington 
and hold that in any case arising prior to the enactment of 63 O.S. § 1-741.11 in 2008, in a wrongful birth action 
alleging medical malpractice, the measure of damages allowable is the 
extraordinary medical expenses and other pecuniary losses proximately caused by 
the negligence. There is no cause of action for emotional distress5 as the child's injury in 
this case occurred without human fault during development of the fetus, and the 
parents were not aware of the injury at the time. Loss of consortium is also not 
allowable in the instant matter as Oklahoma law does not provide for this type 
of damage in the instant case.6 Finally, recovery may be had only for extraordinary 
expenses, not the normal and foreseeable costs of raising a normal, healthy 
child, for the period of time of the child's life expectancy or until the child 
reaches the age of majority,7 whichever is the shorter period.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDERREVERSED AND REMANDED
¶10 CONCUR: WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, GURICH, JJ.

¶11 DISSENT: KAUGER (I DISSENT TO THE PREMATURE CONSIDERATION OF 
THIS QUESTION OF FIRST AND LAST IMPRESSION. THIS CASE SHOULD GO TO TRIAL AND 
THEN ANY PARTY MAY APPEAL THE VERDICT BASED UPON A COMPLETED RECORD.), J., 
TAYLOR (JOINS KAUGER, J.), C.J., WINCHESTER (JOINS KAUGER, J.), J.

¶12 NOT PARTICIPATING: COLBERT, V.C.J.

FOOTNOTES

1 CMV is a common virus and 
a member of the herpes virus family. 

2 Morris v. Sanchez, 1987 OK 110, ¶12, 746 P.2d 184, 188, citing Byrd v. Wesley Medical 
Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 at 467-468 (KS 1985). 

3 Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 231 Kan. 588, 647 P.2d 1263 ( KS 1982). 

4 This Statute was passed and became effective November 
1, 2008. It has since been repealed and again passed by the Oklahoma Legislature 
and is now numbered 63 O.S. Supp.2010, § 1-741.12 

5 In Kraszewski v. Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, 
Inc., 1996 OK 
141, ¶11-12, 916 P.2d 241, 249, this Court adopted a direct 
victim approach to emotional distress similar, but even more far reaching than 
that of Kansas' witness approach. The plaintiff must be a victim, not a 
bystander, directly involved in the incident, damaged from directly viewing the 
incident and a close family relationship must exist between the plaintiff and 
the party whose injury gave rise to plaintiff's mental anguish. 

6 In Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 
1982 OK 
25, ¶25, 646 P.2d 593, 600, this Court recognized that a spouse is entitled to bring a 
derivative action for loss of consortium, that is as a result of a direct injury 
to a spouse. In Williams v. Hook, 1990 OK 136, ¶10-11, 804 P.2d 1131, 1136, the right to parental 
consortium was extended to children of a totally disabled parent. 

7 This Court has previously held that a parent has a 
legal duty to support his or her child until the child reaches the age of 
majority. Holleyman v. Holleyman, 2003 OK 48, ¶7, 78 P.3d 921, 924; State ex rel. Dept. of Human 
Services v. Baggett, 1999 OK 68, ¶ 22, 990 P.2d 235, 244.