Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Daskalopoulos

Citation: 383 Md. 375

Docket Number: 33ag/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket  AG
No. 33
September Term, 2003
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
DIMITRI G. DASKALOPOULOS
Bell, C.J.
           Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
                      Greene
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
File:    October 13, 2004
 
1Maryland Rule 16-751 provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.(1)Upon approval 
of the Commission. Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action in the Court of Appeals.” 
2Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-701 (i) “Professional misconduct” or “misconduct”
has the meaning set forth in Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as
adopted by Rule 16-812. The term includes the knowing failure to respond to a request
for information authorized by this Chapter without asserting, in writing, a privilege or
other basis for such failure.” 
3Rule 1.4 provides:
“(a)  A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.  
“(b)  A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
4Rule 1.15 provides, as relevant:
“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer’s own property.   Funds shall be kept in a separate account
maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.   Other
property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.  
Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept
by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
“(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
  The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, acting pursuant
to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 approved the filing by Bar Counsel of a  Petition For Disciplinary
or Remedial Action against Dimitri G. Daskalopoulos, the respondent.    In that  petition,
pursuant to two complaints filed against him,  Bar Counsel  charged the respondent with
misconduct, as defined by Maryland Rules 16-701 (i),2 and 16-812, and consisting of
violations of various of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the latter
Maryland Rule, to wit:.  Rules 1.4, Communication,3 1.15, Safekeeping Property,4 8.1, Bar
person.   Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and,  upon request by the client or third party, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
5Rule 8.1 provides, as relevant:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”  
6 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
“(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional
conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another;
“(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects;  
“(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; 
 
“(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice;”
*     *     *     *  
7“An attorney or the attorney’s law firm shall maintain one or more attorney trust
accounts for the deposit of funds received from any source for the intended benefit of
clients or third persons. The account or accounts shall be maintained in this State, in the
2
Admission and Disciplinary Matters,5 and 8.4, Misconduct,6 other Maryland Rules, i.e. 16-
603, Duty to maintain account,7 16-604, Trust Account-Required Deposits,8 16-606, Name
District of Columbia, or in a state contiguous to this State, and shall be with an approved
financial institution. Unless an attorney maintains such an account, or is a member of or
employed by a law firm that maintains such an account, an attorney may not receive and
accept funds as an attorney from any source intended in whole or in part for the benefit of
a client or third person.”
8Rule 16-604 provides:
“Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including
cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a
client or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third
person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client
or in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client,
shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial
institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an
attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person
and is transmitted directly to the client or third person.”
9Rule 16-606 provides:
“An attorney or law firm shall maintain each attorney trust account with a
title that includes the name of the attorney or law firm and that clearly
designates the account as "Attorney Trust Account", "Attorney Escrow
Account", or "Clients' Funds Account" on all checks and deposit slips. The
title shall distinguish the account from any other fiduciary account that the
attorney or law firm may maintain and from any personal or business
account of the attorney or law firm.”
10Rule 16-607 provides:
“a. General Prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney
trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by
Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b. of this Rule.
b. Exceptions.
“1. An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an
attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges,
or minimum balance required by the financial institution to
open or maintain the account, including those fees that cannot
be charged against interest due to the Maryland Legal
Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 b 1 (D),
3
and Designation of Account,9 16-607, Commingling of Funds,10 16-609, Prohibited
or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution to
have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account
maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney or law
firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds
expected to be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to
be reimbursed to the attorney by the client.
“2. An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust
account funds belonging in part to a client and in part
presently or potentially to the attorney or law firm. The
portion belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be
withdrawn promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes
entitled to the funds, but any portion disputed by the client
shall remain in the account until the dispute is resolved.
“3. Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and
commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held
for other clients or beneficial owners.”
11Rule 16-609 provides:
“An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by
these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any
remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in the
account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument
drawn on an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or to
bearer”
12Bar counsel included Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Replacement Volume)  § 10-
606 (b) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, a penalty section, among the
statutes violated. 
4
Transactions,11 and sections of Maryland Code (1989,200 0 Replacement Volume), of the
Business Occupations and Professions Article,12 namely, § 10-304, requiring expeditious
deposit of trust money into an attorney’s trust account, 10-306, prohibiting the use of trust
money “for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted,” and
13Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
14Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
15The respondent did call the court immediately prior to the first hearing scheduled
by the court following its entry of an Order of Default and, claiming to be hospitalized for
neurological and psychological treatment at the Stanford Medical Center, Palo Alto,
California,  requested a continuance of that hearing so that he could file responses to the
petition and discovery requests and   present a defense.   The continuance was granted;
however, the respondent did not appear at the continued hearing.
5
10-307, subjecting an attorney who misuses trust money to disciplinary action.    
We referred the case to the Honorable Michael E. Loney, of the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, for hearing pursuant to Rules 16-752 (a)13 and  16-757 (c). 14
Although he accepted service, the respondent neither filed an answer to the petition or
appeared at the hearing.15  Consequently, an Order of Default was entered.  Subsequently,
following a  hearing, the hearing court found facts, by clear and convincing evidence, and
drew conclusions of law with respect to the complaints of David Rushfield and Charles
6
D’Amico, respectively.   
The respondent was retained by David Rushfield, a New Jersey petroleum dealer, in
connection with a contract dispute with Sunoco.   In June 2002, he negotiated a settlement
of that dispute, under the terms of which Rushfield agreed to pay Sunoco fourteen thousand
($14,000.00) dollars.    To accommodate his client, who wanted to delay paying Sunoco until
after he settled on the purchase of property for a new gas station, the respondent promised
Rushfield, conditioned on being repaid at a later time, that he would pay Sunoco for him. 
He did not do so.    Two months later, however, the respondent presented Rushfield with a
settlement agreement, purportedly between Rushfield and Sunoco, in which a “Joseph D.
Zulli” acknowledged receipt of thirteen thousand ($13,000.00) dollars.   The respondent
signed that name.    Subsequently, the respondent gave Rushfield a letter addressed to a
Richard Gaines, Esq. at Sunoco.   According to that letter, due to a misunderstanding as to
payment, for which Sunoco was at fault, the respondent enclosed a second check, this one
in the amount of fourteen thousand ($14,000.00) dollars, to cover Rushfield’s obligation to
Sunoco.   A complaint against the respondent having been filed with the petitioner on behalf
of Mr. Rushfield, Bar Counsel sent respondent a letter advising him of that complaint.   The
respondent received and read that letter, but did not respond to it.
Based on the foregoing findings, the hearing court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the respondent violated Rules 1.4, 8.1 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility.    More particularly, the hearing court concluded, the respondent’s lack of
7
candor with respect to his payment of his client’s obligation, after having represented that
he would do so, resulting in failure to inform the client as to the status of settlement payment
to Sunoco, or explain to him what actually transpired with respect to it, constituted the
communications violation.    The violation of Rule 8.1 consisted of the respondent’s failure
to respond in writing to Bar Counsel’s request for information.   As to Rule 8.4, the hearing
court explained:
“Respondent’s conduct of forging a signature of Sunoco’s counsel
acknowledging receipt of thirteen thousand ($13,000.00) dollars involved
dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4 (c).    Such
conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4
(d) and these also violate Rule 8.4 (a).”
The respondent negotiated the settlement of the contract dispute between  his client,
Charles D’Amico, a New Jersey petroleum dealer, and Sunoco.    The settlement agreement
provided that Mr. D’Amico would pay and Sunoco would accept $71,188.61 for the
termination of Mr. D’Amico’s petroleum franchise.   Mr. D’Amico authorized the respondent
to wire the agreed sum directly to Sunoco.   Consistent with that authorization and to
facilitate the payment to Sunoco, on June 12, 2002, Mr. D’Amico, as instructed by the
respondent,  wired the agreed sum to a Bank of America account, “M ary Patricia M. Daskal,
POD Dimitri G. Daskal,”which the respondent represented was his attorney trust account.
That account, which before the transfer had a balance of only $211.78, was not the
respondent’s trust account.   The respondent paid Sunoco only $32,740.00 of the $71, 188.61,
by wire from the account on August 12, 2002, leaving a balance of $38,488.61. 
8
Nevertheless, the account balance as of October 8, 2002 was $1,554.08, and the respondent
has never accounted for those funds.   Although Bar Counsel notified the respondent of Mr.
D’Amico’s complaint, requesting a written response, none was ever given.   In addition, the
respondent failed to appear in response to a subpoena to personally appear for a statement
under oath, despite having been served and having requested the rescheduling of the
proceeding.
On these facts, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated all of the rules
and statutes charged.   His failure to keep Mr. D’Amico informed concerning the settlement
proceeds and, in fact, misleading him by falsely advising him that the funds would be placed
in his attorney trust account and then forwarded to Sunoco, was a violation of Rule 1.4. 
Rule 1.15 was violated, the hearing court determined, when: the respondent placed Mr.
D’Amico’s funds in a personal account, rather than in his attorney trust account; did not
promptly forward those funds to the third party to whom they were due; and failed to account
for $38, 448.61 of those funds.
The Rule 8.1 violation consisted of the respondent’s failure to respond to the
petitioner’s request for information.   His failure to appear, after service, in response to a
subpoena to personally appear for a statement under oath, also constituted a violation of that
rule.
The hearing court found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent
misappropriated $38,448.61 of Mr. D’Amico’s money.   Because misappropriation is
16The hearing court’s memorandum opinion stated that the violation was of
subsection (c).   That subsection proscribes conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misappropriation,” while Rule 8.4 (b) addresses “a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”  It is
thus clear that the hearing court intended to find a violation of the latter subsection of
Rule 8.4.
9
criminal conduct which adversely reflects on the respondent’s honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness to practice law, it constitutes, the court concluded, a violation of Rule 8.4 (b).16    Such
conduct, the hearing court also concluded, is prejudicial to the administration of justice in
violation of Rule 8.4 (d) and constitutes a violation of the rules of professional conduct.
Violations of Maryland Rules 16-603, 16-604, 16-606, 16-607 and 16-609 were found
by the hearing court based upon the respondent’s failure to: maintain an attorney trust
account; deposit client funds in such an account; and name or designate such an account in
a manner that clearly identifies it as such. The respondent also used funds for an
unauthorized purpose, the hearing court concluded.
With respect to the charged violations of § § 10-304 and 10-307 of the Business
Occupations and Professions Article, the hearing court was of the view that they were shown
by the respondent’s deposit of Mr. D’Amico’s funds in an account that was not an attorney
trust account and by the respondent’s failure to account for that portion of the D’Amico
funds that were not paid as authorized and, therefore, did not belong to him.
The petitioner has taken exception to the hearing court’s failure to find in connection
with the D’Amico complaint, a violation of Rule 8.4 (c), proscribing conduct “involving
10
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misappropriation,” and § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article, prohibiting a lawyer’s use of trust money for a purpose other than that
for which it was entrusted.   It submits:
“The facts found by Judge Loney and his specific finding that Respondent
knowingly misappropriated approximately half of the funds entrusted to him
by [Mr.] D’Amico and that the funds were clearly disbursed for unauthorized
and unintended purposes provide clear and convincing evidence of a violation
of BOP § 10-306 and MRPC 8.4 (c).” (Footnote omitted)
We agree.   The petitioner’s exceptions, accordingly, are sustained.
Turning to the sanction, the petitioner recommends that the respondent be disbarred.
It points out, in support of the recommendation, that, in addition to a myriad of violations of
varying severity, the hearing court found that in the course of representing two clients, the
respondent forged the signature of another attorney in one case and misappropriated more
than $38,000.00, or more than half of the funds entrusted to him for the purpose of
discharging the client’s contractual obligation, the amount of which the respondent
negotiated, presumably for the client’s benefit.   Such conduct, the petitioner contends, of
itself, warrants the ultimate sanction.   Indeed, the petitioner reminds us of what we have said
quite often, that “misappropriation “is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the
absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will  result in
disbarment.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 68, 839 A. 2d 718, 723
(2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568, 810 A. 2d 487, 491-92
(2002).  Thus, the general rule is, “disbarment will inevitably follow any unmitigated
11
misappropriation of client, or any third party’s funds.”   Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 512-13, 789 A.2d 119, 124 (2002), and the cases therein cited.  The
same rule applies, moreover, it continues, when intentional dishonest conduct other than
misappropriation is involved.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673,
715, 810 A. 2d 996, 1021(2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376,
410, 773 A. 2d 463, 483 (2001).  
As we have seen, the respondent has not responded to the petitioner’s charges.  He did
not appear at the hearing and  has not presented anything by way of mitigation for the Court
to consider.   There simply is nothing in this record that could, or would,  mitigate the
respondent’s conduct; there are no compelling extenuating circumstances that would justify
a lesser sanction than disbarment.   Consequently, we adopt the petitioner’s recommendation
and order the respondent disbarred.   
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
C O S T S  
O F  
A L L  
T R A N S C R IP T S,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761,
FOR 
WHICH  
SUM 
JU DGMENT 
IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST
DIMITRI G. DASKALOPOULOS.