Case Title: Connell v. Barrett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Connell v. Barrett1997 WY 137949 P.2d 871Case Number: 97-48Decided: 12/10/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

LARRY D. CONNELL,  

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

JAMES H. BARRETT and JOHN A. ZERBE,  

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

 

 

Larry D. 
Connell, Pro Se.

 

Ronald L. 
Brown, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee 
Barrett.

 

W.W. Reeves 
and Timothy W. Miller of Reeves & Miller, Casper, for Appellee 
Zebre.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Larry 
Connell appeals from the summary judgment which was granted in favor of 
Appellees James Barrett and John Zebre.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Connell presented 
numerous issues for our review. We have consolidated and condensed those issues 
into three primary questions: (1) whether the statute of limitations bars the 
legal malpractice claims; (2) whether a genuine issue of material fact exists; 
and (3) whether Connell had separate contract and negligence claims which were 
not barred by the statute of limitations.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      A federal grand 
jury returned a sixty-four-count indictment against Connell, charging him with 
conspiracy, money laundering, drug dealing, and participating in a continuing 
criminal enterprise. Barrett and Zebre represented Connell in this criminal 
matter.

 

[¶5]      Barrett 
negotiated a plea agreement under which the government would dismiss sixty-two 
of the sixty-four felony charges in exchange for Connell pleading guilty to one 
count of conspiracy to launder money and one count of conspiracy to distribute a 
controlled substance. Connell accepted the plea agreement and agreed to 
cooperate with the government, to truthfully testify at motion hearings and 
trials, and to forfeit certain property to the government. The government agreed 
that, if Connell fully cooperated and followed the terms of the plea agreement, 
it would move for a two-level reduction in his sentence within one year of his 
sentencing.

 

[¶6]      After Connell 
pleaded guilty and before he was sentenced, a dispute arose over the weight of 
the drugs which were associated with the remaining charges. The government 
contended that the drugs weighed 865.6 kilograms and that the crime was within a 
sentencing level of thirty. Connell asserted that the drugs weighed 616.1 grams 
and that the crime fell within a sentencing level of twenty-eight. At the 
November 26, 1991, sentencing hearing, the court agreed with the government's 
computation and applied the sentencing level of thirty. As a result, Connell 
received a ninety-seven-month sentence.

 

[¶7]      Barrett filed a 
notice of appeal on behalf of Connell, claiming that the court erred when it 
applied the sentencing level of thirty rather than applying the sentencing level 
of twenty-eight. After filing the notice of appeal, Barrett accepted a position 
with the federal public defender's office. Since Connell was indigent, Barrett 
assisted him in filing the appropriate motions so that he could retain Barrett 
as his counsel. The court appointed Barrett to represent Connell in his appeal 
proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed Connell's sentence.

 

[¶8]      Barrett wrote to 
the government, asking it to file the motion to reduce Connell's sentence 
pursuant to the plea agreement. The government claimed that Connell did not 
cooperate with it and refused to file the motion. Instead of challenging the 
government's refusal to request a reduction in his sentence, Connell wrote a 
letter to Barrett, accusing him of ignoring legal requests and threatening to 
bring a malpractice action against him. Connell subsequently wrote another 
letter to Barrett's supervisor, asserting the same allegations and requesting 
legal assistance. Barrett's supervisor informed Connell that a conflict of 
interest existed between the public defender's office and him as a result of his 
allegations and advised him to ask the court to appoint counsel to represent 
him.

 

[¶9]      Connell filed an 
action in the state district court against Barrett and Zebre, alleging attorney 
malpractice and negligence, breach of a written and oral contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary 
duties. Barrett and Zebre each moved for a summary judgment on the ground that 
the action was barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-107(a)(i) (1997). The district court granted the motions for summary 
judgments and assessed attorneys' fees against Connell. Connell appeals from 
that order.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   A summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing 
party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual Insurance 
Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). Generally, a 
summary judgment on the issue of when a statute of limitations commences is 
inappropriate because the issue is usually a mixed question of law and fact. Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 1996). However, if uncontroverted facts reveal when a reasonable 
person should have been placed on notice, we can resolve the question as a 
matter of law. Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]   Connell contends that the district 
court improperly granted a summary judgment because a genuine issue of material 
fact existed with regard to when he knew or had reason to know that he had a 
legal malpractice cause of action. Barrett and Zebre argue that the two-year 
limitation specified in § 1-3-107(a)(i) barred Connell's legal malpractice 
claims. That statute provides:

 

(a) A cause of action arising from an act, error or 
omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care 
services shall be brought within the greater of the following 
times:

 

(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged 
act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more 
than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the 
claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was: 

(A) Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year 
period; or

(B) The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, 
error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due 
diligence.

 

Section 
1-3-107(a)(i).

 

[¶12]   Connell claims that Barrett and 
Zebre were responsible for a calculation error in the weight of the marihuana 
and that this miscalculation extended his sentence by thirty-seven months. He 
asserts that, therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
June of 1994 when he actually started serving the additional thirty-seven 
months. Connell also contends that Barrett and Zebre were negligent when they 
failed to obtain a two-level reduction in his sentence and that he could not 
discover this act until he began to serve the time which would have been cut 
from his sentence had the government requested the sentence 
reduction.

 

[¶13]   Section 1-3-107(a)(i) clearly 
provides that a legal malpractice cause of action must be commenced not more 
than two years after the discovery of the alleged act, error, or omission. 
Because Wyoming is a "discovery" state, the running of the statute of 
limitations is not triggered until such time as the plaintiff knows or has 
reason to know that a cause of action exists. Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach 
and Associates, 824 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 
1989).

 

[¶14]   The dates surrounding the events in 
this case are not in dispute. On November 26, 1991, the court resolved the 
weight dispute in the government's favor and used that weight computation in 
imposing Connell's ninety-seven-month sentence. Connell knew or had reason to 
know on that date that he had a cause of action concerning his claim that 
Barrett and Zebre were responsible for the error which occurred in calculating 
the weight of the marihuana. The statute of limitations, therefore, began to run 
on November 26, 1991, for this claim.

 

[¶15]   With regard to Connell's claim that 
Barrett and Zebre were negligent when they failed to obtain the sentence 
reduction, the government agreed to request a sentence reduction within one year 
after Connell was sentenced. Connell knew or had reason to know on November 26, 
1992, one year after the court imposed his sentence, that the government had not 
filed its motion within the specified time and that his sentence was not going 
to be reduced. The statute of limitations, therefore, began to run on November 
26, 1992, for this claim.

 

[¶16]   Connell filed his malpractice 
action on March 28, 1996, more than two years after the dates on which he knew 
or had reason to know that he had causes of action; therefore, he did not file 
his action within the time prescribed by the statute of 
limitations.

 

[¶17]   Connell contends that the 
continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. He 
maintains that Barrett and Zebre did not formally terminate their 
attorney-client relationship with him and that they continuously represented him 
until he filed his malpractice action on March 28, 1996.

 

[¶18]   Wyoming has not adopted the 
continuous representation doctrine. Hiltz, 910 P.2d  at 571. "The continuing 
representation doctrine is absent from our legal malpractice statute, and we 
decline to judicially adopt such a provision." Id. The district court correctly refused 
to apply this doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in this 
matter.

 

[¶19]   We do not need to address the issue 
of whether a genuine issue of material fact existed because our ruling that § 
1-3-107(a)(i) barred Connell from bringing his malpractice action is dispositive 
of this issue. Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 506 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶20]   Connell also addresses the issue of 
whether he had separate contract and negligence claims for which the statute of 
limitations had not yet run. He has failed to cite authority or present cogent 
argument. This Court refuses to consider positions which are not supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority. Coones v. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 894 P.2d 613, 617 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶21]   Affirmed.