Case Title: Nettles v. Pettway d/b/a Pettway's Paint, Body & Wrecker Service

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1181015

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: April 10, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1181015
____________________
Cedrick D. Nettles
v.
Ryan Pettway d/b/a Pettway's Paint, Body and Wrecker Service
Appeal from Wilcox Circuit Court
(CV-18-900039)
SELLERS, Justice.
Cedrick D. Nettles was struck by a wheel that detached
from an automobile owned and operated by Antwon Aaron. 
Nettles sued Ryan Pettway, doing business as Pettway's Paint,
Body and Wrecker Service ("Pettway"), in the Wilcox Circuit
1181015
Court, alleging that Pettway had negligently and/or wantonly
installed the wheel on the automobile and that Pettway's
negligence and/or wantonness resulted in Nettles's injury.1 
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Pettway.  We affirm.
I.  Undisputed Facts
Aaron engaged Pettway to install "after market" wheel
rims and tires on his automobile.  The wheel rims and tires
required the use of wheel adapters containing studs.  Aaron
purchased used adapters containing the studs from a discount
tire store.  He thereafter provided the wheel adapters, rims,
and tires to Pettway for installation.  Pettway inspected the
used adapters and determined that the studs on the adapters
looked "good."  Likewise, Aaron averred in an affidavit that
the wheel-assembly parts did not appear to him to be deformed
or worn.  Nettles does not direct this Court to any testimony
from any witness averring that there was a visible defect in
1Nettles also sued Aaron, but subsequently dismissed him
from the action with prejudice; accordingly, Aaron is not a
party to this appeal.  Nettles has also asserted no argument
on appeal with regard to his wantonness claim; that claim is,
thus, deemed waived. Pardue v. Potter, 632 So. 2d 470, 473
(Ala. 1994)("Issues not argued in the appellant's brief are
waived."). 
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the parts used to complete the wheel assembly and mount the
tires.  
After Aaron picked up his automobile from Pettway, he
test drove it and determined that there were no problems with
its overall operation.  On the same day, Aaron drove the
automobile extensively during the "May Day" festivities in his
community.  Aaron explained that, approximately 10 to 12 hours
after picking up the automobile from Pettway and driving it,
the left rear tire of the automobile suddenly, unexpectedly,
and without warning came off, injuring Nettles, who had been
standing in a yard adjacent to the street on which Aaron was
driving.  The next day, Aaron returned the automobile to
Pettway, who determined that three of the five studs on the
left rear adapter were completely sheared off and that the
other two were broken.  Pettway replaced the adapter
containing the broken studs with a new adapter that, he said,
Aaron supplied. Pettway discarded the used adapter in the
normal course of business.  Accordingly, there was no physical
evidence to indicate why the studs on the adapter had broken,
and there was no allegation of spoliation of evidence.    
     
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Nettles's suit alleged that Pettway had negligently
installed the wheel assembly and tire that detached from
Aaron's automobile and that Pettway's negligence was the
proximate cause of Nettles's injuries.  Pettway moved for a
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), Ala.  R. Civ. P. 
During the summary-judgment proceedings, Nettles presented no
specific act of negligence on Pettway's part.  Rather, he
sought to demonstrate Pettway's negligence by inference under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  Following a hearing, the
trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Pettway,
finding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable. 
Nettles filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that
judgment, which the trial court denied.  This appeal followed.
II.  Standard of Review
"We review the trial court's grant or denial of
a summary-judgment motion de novo, and we use the
same standard used by the trial court to determine
whether the evidence presented to the trial court
presents a genuine issue of material fact. Bockman
v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2006). Once the
summary-judgment movant shows there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the nonmovant must then
present substantial evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. 'We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant.' 943 So.
2d at 795. We review questions of law de novo."
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Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 342, 346
(Ala. 2006). 
III.  Discussion
 This  appeal asks us to determine (1) whether the trial
court erred in finding as a matter of law that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable and (2) if the trial court
did not err in finding the doctrine inapplicable, whether
Nettles met his burden of 
demonstrating negligence by ordinary
means.  "Proof of negligence requires the establishment of a
duty and a breach thereof that proximately caused damage to
the plaintiff."  South Coast Props., Inc. v. Shuster, 583 So.
2d 215, 217 (Ala. 1991).  "Mere proof that an accident and an
injury occurred is generally insufficient to establish
negligence."  Id.  However, negligence may be inferred under
certain circumstances if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable.  
"The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows 'an
inference of negligence where there is no direct
evidence 
of 
negligence.' 
Ex 
parte 
Crabtree
Industrial Waste, Inc., 728 So. 2d 155, 156 (Ala.
1998). For the doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must
show that:
"'(1) the defendant ... had full management
and control of the instrumentality which
caused the injury; (2) the circumstances
[are] such that according 
to common
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knowledge and the experience of mankind the
accident could not have happened if those
having 
control 
of 
the 
[instrumentality] had
not 
been 
negligent; 
[and] 
(3) 
the
plaintiff's injury ... resulted from the
accident.'
"Crabtree Industrial Waste, 728 So. 2d at 156
(quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228,
236, 48 So. 2d 231, 238 (1950), and citing Ward v.
Forrester Day Care, Inc., 547 So. 2d 410, 411 (Ala.
1989), and Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 594 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Ala. 1992)). However,
'[i]f one can reasonably conclude that the accident
could have happened without any negligence on the
part of the defendant[], then the res ipsa loquitur
presumption does not apply.' Crabtree Industrial
Waste, Inc., 728 So. 2d at 158."
Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So. 2d 282, 286 (Ala. 2000). 
"Whether a fact is a matter of common knowledge is an issue to
be determined by the court."  Id.
The trial court determined that Nettles failed to satisfy
the second element of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because
he failed to offer substantial evidence to foreclose other
possibilities for the detachment of the wheel from the
automobile.  The 
only person who provided testimony concerning
the installation of the wheel was Pettway, whom Nettles
himself has referred to as an auto-collision expert.  Pettway
stated in his deposition that it was common for customers to
provide their own parts, new or used, for repairs or
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installation, and that he never installed used parts on an
automobile if the parts did not look right and/or were
cracked.  Pettway further stated that he could tell that the
studs on the adapters provided by Aaron were in used condition
but that he did not change them out because they looked
"good."  Pettway also provided, without contradiction, a 
step-
by-step analysis of how he installed the wheel adapters and
tires.  Pettway noted that, after he installed the wheel
adapters and tires, he double-checked all the lug nuts.  When
asked by Nettles's attorney what could cause a stud to break,
Pettway explained:
"A.  Well, actually, you know, certain ruts in the
road, when you [have] that thin wheel on there like
that, [the studs] get in a jam.  Also when the
[automobile] shift[s] to one side, it will break the
studs on it.  Like if you [were] turning hard and
[the automobile shifts], it will break the studs on
it. 
"....
"Q.  How many studs broke on [the left rear
adapter]?
"....
"A.  Okay.  You [have] five studs on it.  It cut
three of them off real flat, but it cut two of them
off where you could at least get another turn just
to sit the rim back on the [automobile].
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"Q.  Okay.  So three of them were cut in half,
basically.
"A.  Well, [they] were cut flush.
"Q.  Right.  So cut in two–-not in half but cut in
two.
"A.  Yes.  Well, all of them–-you know, like the lug
came off of one, and you could tell it like shifted. 
Like 
I 
say, 
if 
a 
car 
shift[s] 
like 
this
(demonstrating), if you drive it a certain way and
it hit[s] in a certain way and it hit[s] in a
certain rut in the road, it will shift the wheel. 
Those kind of cars, called a G-body, that the rear
end is just like this, so [it will] shift."
Pettway presented prima face evidence that he properly
inspected and installed the adapter containing the studs and
that the detachment of the wheel could have been attributable
to the manner in which Aaron had operated the automobile
during the 10 to 12 hours before the accident.  Pettway also
pointed out that common sense dictates that there could have
been internal structural defects in the studs that caused them
to break and that those defects would not have been detected
upon inspection.
In his motion in opposition, Nettles asserted that
Pettway installed the used adapters on Aaron's automobile
without asking how old they were, where they came from, or how
used they were.  He asserted that Pettway knew the studs were
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1181015
used, yet he decided not to replace them with new ones. 
Nettles also points out that the accident occurred less than
12 hours after Aaron picked up the automobile from Pettway's
shop.  Nettles claims that this evidence supports an inference
that Pettway negligently failed to properly inspect and 
verify
the integrity of the studs.  Nettles, however, provided no
evidence to foreclose the possibility that the detachment of
the wheel could have occurred as a result of the manner in
which Aaron had operated the automobile during the 10 to 12
hours before the accident or as a result of internal latent
defects in the wheel-assembly parts.  Because Nettles offered
no evidence to foreclose such possibilities, he did not
satisfy the second element of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
Simply put, one could reasonably conclude that the tire
detached from the automobile without any negligence on
Pettway's part.  See, e.g., Ex parte Crabtree Indus. Waste,
Inc., 728 So. 2d 155, 158 (Ala. 1998) (holding that, despite
plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur argument, the defendants were
entitled to a summary judgment because one could reasonably
conclude that the wheel detached from the moving vehicle as a
result of a failure of the materials or third-party
9
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negligence, rather than the defendant's negligent inspection
of the wheel). 
Nettles argues that he was not required to exclude all
other explanations for the detachment of the wheel to prove
Pettway's negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
See George v. Alabama Power Co., 13 So. 3d 360, 365 (Ala.
2008)("'"The plaintiff need not ... conclusively exclude all
other possible explanations.... It is enough that the facts
proved reasonably permit the conclusion that negligence is 
the
more probable explanation. ..."'" (quoting Kmart Corp. v.
Bassett, 769 So. 2d at 289, 365 (Hooper, C.J., dissenting and
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. e (1965)
(emphasis added))).  However, Nettles fails to appreciate
that, once Pettway offered evidence of other plausible
explanations for the accident, he was required to offer
substantial evidence demonstrating that his theory of
negligence attributable to Pettway was the more probable
explanation for the detachment of the wheel.  In this case,
such a proffer would be difficult, given the number of
potential intervening causes that could explain the shearing
of the studs.  To show substantial evidence in this case,
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Nettles was required to preclude all other rational
explanations such that the only plausible explanation was
Pettway's negligent installation of the wheel.  The
circumstances surrounding this accident, however, show that,
after the automobile was released to Aaron, Pettway no longer
had exclusive control over the automobile, the wheel assembly,
or the tires.  And, given the time lapse between the time
Aaron took possession of his automobile and the accident, any
number of other significant factors could have proximately
caused the accident.  Pettway's work on the automobile was too
remote to infer his exclusive negligence.    
Because the res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not supply an
inference of negligence in this case, Nettles was required to
show negligence through the ordinary means, i.e., by adducing
substantial evidence of a duty, breach of duty, and proximate
cause.  Nettles argues that Pettway's negligence can be
established completely through circumstantial evidence. 
Although circumstantial evidence may establish negligence,
reliance on inferences based on 
conjecture and speculation are
not sufficient to overcome a properly supported summary-
judgment motion.  In this case, there were other plausible
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theories for the detachment of the wheel from the automobile. 
Nettles bases his theory of negligence, i.e., that Pettway was
negligent in his installation of the wheel, solely on
conjecture, without any corroborating substantial evidence. 
See Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So. 2d 397, 400 (Ala.
1996)(noting that "mere conclusory allegations or speculation
that fact issues exist will not defeat a properly supported
summary judgment motion, and bare argument or conjecture does
not satisfy the nonmoving party's burden to offer facts to
defeat the motion").  See also Southern Ry. v. Dickson, 211
Ala. 481, 486, 100 So. 665, 669 (1924) (noting that "[t]here
may be two or more plausible explanations as to how an event
happened or what produced it; yet, if the evidence is without
selective application to any one of them, they remain
conjectures only"). 
IV.  Conclusion
Nettles failed to produce substantial evidence by
inference or ordinary means to establish that Pettway
negligently installed the wheel that caused Nettles's
injuries.  Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of
Pettway is affirmed.
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AFFIRMED.           
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., dissents.
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PARKER,  Chief Justice (dissenting).
I disagree with both major conclusions of the main
opinion.  First, Cedrick D. Nettles met the ordinary-
occurrence element of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as
that element is currently understood by this Court.  Second,
drawing all reasonable inferences in Nettles's favor, I
believe he produced substantial evidence that Ryan Pettway was
negligent. 
I. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Under the facts of this case, Nettles met the second
element of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  To create an
inference of negligence sufficient to overcome a summary-
judgment motion, this element requires the plaintiff to
produce evidence that "'the circumstances [of the accident
were] such that[,] according to common knowledge and the
experience of mankind[,] the accident could not have happened
if those having control of the [instrumentality] had not been
negligent.'"  Ex parte Crabtree Indus. Waste, Inc., 728 So. 2d
155, 156 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254
Ala. 228, 236, 48 So. 2d 231, 238 (1950) (final bracketed
language added in Crabtree)). As currently understood by this
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Court, this ordinary-occurrence element requires merely that
the plaintiff produce evidence from which it can reasonably be
inferred that the defendant's negligence was the 
most probable
cause of the accident.  See George v. Alabama Power Co., 13
So. 3d 360, 365 (Ala. 2008).  The plaintiff is no longer
required, as the main opinion incorrectly asserts, to show
that the defendant's negligence was the only possible cause.2 
In Crabtree, this Court held that a plaintiff failed to
meet the ordinary-occurrence element because "the plaintiff
failed to present substantial evidence to foreclose [the]
possibilities" that the subject accident may have been caused
by events or factors other than negligence by the defendant. 
2See ___ So. 3d at ___, ___, ___, ___ ("'"[I]f one can
reasonably conclude that the accident could have happened
without any negligence on the part of the defendant[], then
the res ipsa loquitur presumption does not apply."'" (quoting
Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So. 2d 282, 286 (Ala. 2000),
quoting in turn Crabtree, 728 So. 2d at 158); "[Nettles]
failed to offer substantial evidence to foreclose other
possibilities ...."; "Nettles ... provided no evidence to
foreclose the possibility that" the accident could have been
caused by problems other than Pettway's negligence; "Nettles
offered no evidence to foreclose such possibilities ....";
"[O]ne could reasonably conclude that the tire detached from
the automobile without any negligence on Pettway's part.";
"Nettles was required to preclude all other rational
explanations such that the only plausible explanation was
Pettway's negligent installation 
of 
the 
wheel."; 
"[A]ny 
number
of other significant factors could have proximately caused the
accident.").
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728 So. 2d at 157-58.  We understood this element to mean that
res ipsa loquitur does not apply "[i]f one can reasonably
conclude that the accident could have happened without any
negligence on the part of the defendants."  Id. at 158.
Crabtree's interpretation of the ordinary-occurrence
element was most recently relied on by this Court in Kmart
Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So. 2d 282 (Ala. 2000).  There, a
malfunctioning automatic door injured a store patron.  
Relying
on Crabtree, we discussed possible causes of the malfunction
other than the store owner's negligence, and we concluded that
the plaintiff failed to satisfy the ordinary-occurrence
element.  We reasoned that the plaintiff 
"did not 'foreclose the possibility that [the
company that installed the door or another company
that sometimes serviced the door] was negligent,
that the safety mat itself was inherently defective,
or ... that the alleged malfunction could have
occurred even in the absence of any negligence.' ...
"... '[I]f one can reasonably conclude that the
accident could have happened without any negligence
on the part of the defendant[], then the res ipsa
loquitur presumption does not apply.' Crabtree[],
728 So. 2d at 158.
"....
"... [Here,] 'one can reasonably conclude that
the accident could have happened without any
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negligence on the part of the defendant[].'
Crabtree[], 728 So. 2d at 158."
Id. at 286-87.
Chief Justice Hooper dissented, arguing that Crabtree's
interpretation of the ordinary-occurrence element was wrong. 
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, he posited that
"'[t]he plaintiff need not ... conclusively exclude all other
possible explanations.... It is enough that the facts proved
reasonably permit the conclusion that negligence is the more
probable explanation....'"  Id. at 289 (Hooper, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D,
cmt. e (Am. Law. Inst. 1965)).  As to the facts in Kmart,
Chief Justice Hooper contended that "[the plaintiff] should
not have to prove that automatic doors cannot malfunction in
the absence of negligence; she should have only to present
facts that would permit the jury to conclude that negligence
was the more probable explanation."  Id.  In other words,
"[the plaintiff] should not be required to disprove all other
possible reasons for the malfunction, as the majority
suggests."  Id.  Chief Justice Hooper agreed with the Supreme
Court of Nebraska:
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"'"The plaintiff is not required to eliminate with
certainty all other possible causes or inferences,
which would mean that the plaintiff must prove a
civil case beyond a reasonable doubt. All that is
needed is evidence from which reasonable persons can
say that[,] on the whole[,] it is more likely that
there was negligence associated with the cause of
the event than that there was not. It is enough that
the court cannot say that the jury could not
reasonably come to that conclusion."'"
Id. (quoting Brown v. Scrivner, Inc., 241 Neb. 286, 289, 488
N.W.2d 17, 19 (1992), quoting in turn Anderson v. Service
Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873, 880, 485 N.W.2d 170, 176
(1992)).
  
Chief Justice Hooper's interpretation was adopted
unanimously by this Court in George v. Alabama Power Co., 13
So. 3d 360 (Ala. 2008).  After reciting the ordinary-
occurrence element, we specifically stated: "'"The plaintiff
need not ... conclusively exclude all other possible
explanations.... It is 
enough that the facts proved reasonably
permit the conclusion that negligence is the more probable
explanation...."' Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So. 2d 282, 289
(Ala. 2000) (Hooper, C.J., dissenting ... ) (emphasis added)."
13 So. 3d at 365.
The difference between the Crabtree standard and the
George standard is more than semantics.  Under Crabtree, the
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plaintiff must affirmatively exclude all other potential
causes of the accident, whereas under George, the plaintiff
must merely produce evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the defendant's negligence was the
most probable cause  of the accident.  Under the George
standard, as explained by the Restatement:
"The plaintiff need not ... conclusively exclude all
other possible explanations, and so prove his case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such proof is not
required in civil actions, in contrast to criminal
cases. It is enough that the facts proved reasonably
permit the conclusion that negligence is the more
probable explanation. This conclusion is not for the
court to draw, or to refuse to draw, in any case
where either conclusion is reasonable; and even
though the court would not itself find negligence,
it must still leave the question to the jury if
reasonable men might do so."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. e.  See also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 17
cmt. j (Am. Law. Inst. 2010) ("[T]he court determines whether
the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury
to find that res ipsa loquitur is appropriate; that is,
whether reasonable minds can infer that the accident is of the
type that usually happens because of the negligence of the
class of actors to which the defendant belongs.").  Indeed,
the Crabtree standard would place a virtually insurmountable
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burden on plaintiffs who have been injured by a probable but
unobserved negligence to conclusively disprove all other
possible causes of their injuries.  Thus, it is with good
reason that in George we rejected that draconian standard in
favor of the Restatement approach embraced by Chief Justice
Hooper's Kmart dissent.
Consequently, since George, the Crabtree standard is no
longer good law.  Yet, as detailed in footnote 2 above, the
main opinion relies almost exclusively on the Crabtree
standard in concluding that Nettles failed to meet the
ordinary-occurrence element of res ipsa loquitur.  And
although the main opinion refers to this Court's current
George standard, ___ So. 3d at ___, the main opinion fails to
follow it.  Instead, after a two-sentence discussion noting
that the George standard would be "difficult" to meet in this
case, the main opinion immediately reverts to the superseded
Crabtree standard. ___ So. 3d at ___.
Moreover, contrary to the main opinion's conclusion,
Nettles did meet the George standard.  The accident occurred
10 to 12 hours after Pettway installed the wheel equipment;
three of the five studs were "sheared off"; and Pettway
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admitted that he did not closely inspect the wheel adapters. 
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the
most probable cause of the wheel's detachment was negligence
on Pettway's part.  That is all that is required by George. 
While other causes were possible, such as negligent driving by
Antwon Aaron, a rut in the road, or a hidden defect in the
equipment, there was no concrete evidence to support any of
those causes.  And under George, their mere possibility does
not preclude the application of res ipsa loquitur.  
In summary, Nettles presented substantial evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude that Pettway's
negligence was the most probable cause of the accident. 
Accordingly, Nettles met the ordinary-occurrence element of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
II. Substantial Evidence of Negligence
Even if res ipsa loquitur did not apply, Nettles still
presented substantial evidence of negligence by Pettway.  As
previously noted, the wheel flew off less than 12 hours after
Pettway installed it without having inquired about the age or
history of the used adapters.  This evidence supported an
inference that Pettway negligently installed the wheel
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equipment or negligently failed to inspect it before
installing it.  That is, this was "evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment [could] reasonably infer" that Pettway negligently
caused Nettles's injury.  West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of
Fla., 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
The main opinion dismisses this inference as "conjecture
and speculation." ___ So. 3d at ___.  But this Court did not
think so, in a still valid part of Crabtree.  There, under
very similar facts, we specifically said: "The evidence
presented would support an inference that the wheel came off
as a result of negligence on the part of the third party ...
who repaired the tire three days before this [accident] ...." 
728 So. 2d at 157.  If three days supported an inference of
repairman negligence in Crabtree, I cannot see how 12 hours
support only "conjecture and speculation" here.
Further, the main opinion finds Nettles's evidence
insufficient because "there were other plausible theories for
the detachment of the wheel." ___ So. 3d at ___.  But on a
motion for summary judgment, the existence of other plausible
theories is irrelevant. Rather, the question is whether,
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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Nettles
(not least favorable to him) and drawing all inferences in his
favor (not against him), the evidence supported a conclusion
of negligence by Pettway.  See Dow v. Alabama Democratic
Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038–39 (Ala. 2004).
Therefore, Nettles presented substantial evidence of
negligence sufficient to rebut Pettway's motion for summary
judgment.  
III. Conclusion
Under George, the "most probable" standard has superseded
Crabtree's exclusivity standard for applying the ordinary-
occurrence element of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Although the main opinion fails to recognize this development
in our jurisprudence, in this case application of the George
standard means that Nettles satisfied this element. And even
if res ipsa loquitur were not applicable, Nettles's evidence
would still be sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether negligence on Pettway's part
caused 
the 
wheel 
detachment 
that 
injured 
Nettles. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the summary judgment. 
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