Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Michael Christopher Grieco

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2020-1118

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2020-1118 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER GRIECO, 
Respondent. 
 
June 27, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that 
Respondent, Michael Christopher Grieco, be found guilty of 
professional misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The 
Florida Bar (Bar Rules), and recommending that he be suspended 
from the practice of law for 90 days.1  For the reasons discussed 
below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt, but we disapprove the referee’s 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
- 2 - 
 
recommendation as to discipline.  We instead suspend Grieco from 
the practice of law for one year. 
BACKGROUND 
In July 2020, the Bar filed a complaint against Grieco, alleging 
that during a period of time spanning 2016 and 2017, while serving 
as a city commissioner for Miami Beach and running as a candidate 
for its mayor, Grieco engaged in conduct that violated Bar Rules    
3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) and 4-8.4(b) 
(Misconduct; A lawyer shall not “commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.”).  The Bar further alleged that Grieco later 
made statements that were violative of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) 
(Misconduct; A lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”).   
The allegations concerned Grieco’s behavior in connection with 
an entity known as People for Better Leaders (PBL), a political 
organization that facilitated contributions to Grieco’s mayoral 
campaign.  The alleged violations of Bar Rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(b) 
arose from Grieco pleading no contest to accepting a campaign 
contribution donated by an individual in the name of another 
- 3 - 
 
individual—a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of section 
106.08(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2017).  Adjudication was withheld 
and Grieco was placed on misdemeanor probation.  He agreed not 
to seek elected office during the probationary period, and he 
resigned from his position as city commissioner.  His criminal 
history was later expunged. 
The asserted violations of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) arose from 
statements Grieco gave to the Miami Herald and to the operator of 
an internet blog known as Political Cortadito.  Grieco made 
statements denying any involvement in the operation and control of 
PBL.  The Bar alleged that Grieco made multiple false or misleading 
statements to the press, and by extension the public, in violation of 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).   
The disciplinary hearing commenced in August 2022.  The Bar 
called a single witness, Karl A. Ross, who testified about his 
participation in a joint investigation conducted by the State 
Attorney’s Office and the Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics & 
Public Trust (MDCOE).  Ross testified that administrative ethics 
charges had been brought against Grieco based on allegations that 
he gave inaccurate statements to the Miami Herald and Political 
- 4 - 
 
Cortadito.  Ross testified about a formal MDCOE complaint brought 
against Grieco that alleged violations of the Truth in Government 
provision of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights in the Miami-Dade County 
Charter.  The Bar introduced several documents through Ross, 
including court records, news articles, MDCOE reports, sworn 
statements, hearing transcripts, filings from the Florida Division of 
Elections, and letters from Grieco’s counsel. 
Grieco called three witnesses to testify on the charged 
misconduct: an expert on Florida campaign law; an expert in 
Florida election law and Miami-Dade County political committees; 
and a member of the Florida House of Representatives.  Collectively, 
these witnesses opined in part that the only persons responsible for 
a political committee are that committee’s officers and bank 
account signatories, and that because Grieco’s name did not appear 
on PBL’s organizational or bank account documents, he had no 
legal role in PBL and could not direct its operations.  
Grieco also testified on his own behalf.  He swore that his 
position as city commissioner did not involve the practice of law, 
and he insisted that he had never been an officer, director, owner, 
or signatory of PBL.  He testified that he did not believe that the 
- 5 - 
 
Truth in Government provision of the Miami-Dade County Charter 
implicated his duties as a lawyer but that, either way, he did not 
think any of his statements to the Miami Herald or Political 
Cortadito violated the Truth in Government provision.  Grieco also 
testified that Political Cortadito has a poor reputation for 
truthfulness and that it denigrates politicians who are unwilling to 
pay for favorable treatment, and he claimed that the Miami Herald 
attributed to him quotes he did not actually say.  Notably, however, 
the referee found that Grieco made no effort to correct any 
misquoted or inaccurate statements published in either source.   
Grieco called 17 witnesses to testify in mitigation.  These 
witnesses testified generally that Grieco engaged in good works and 
community service, that he had a reputation for truth and honesty, 
and that he was excellent as both a lawyer and an elected official.   
Following the disciplinary hearing, the referee submitted a 
Report of Referee.  The referee found that the Bar clearly and 
convincingly proved violations of Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-8.4(b), and     
4-8.4(c).  The referee found that the evidence presented referenced 
Grieco’s actions in political and campaign processes, including 
public statements he made to the media about political 
- 6 - 
 
organizations, and that no misconduct caused harm to clients or 
involved the practice of law.  The referee recommends that we find 
Grieco guilty of violating all three Bar Rules.  As to the sanction, the 
referee recommends that Grieco be suspended from the practice of 
law for 90 days.  Both Grieco and the Bar now seek review of the 
referee’s report.   
ANALYSIS 
A. 
The Referee’s Findings of Fact and Recommendations as 
to Guilt. 
 
Our review of a referee’s findings of fact is limited; if the 
referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence in the record, we will not reweigh the evidence or 
substitute our own judgment for that of the referee.  Fla. Bar v. 
Schwartz, 284 So. 3d 393, 396 (Fla. 2019); Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 
756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000).   
When we review a referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the 
referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable  
rules to support the recommendations.  Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 
So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005).  Ultimately, the party challenging a 
referee’s findings of fact or conclusions as to guilt has the burden to 
- 7 - 
 
demonstrate “that there is no evidence in the record to support 
those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the 
conclusions.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007). 
Here, the referee found that the Bar proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that Grieco violated Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-8.4(b), 
and 4-8.4(c).  The referee recommends that Grieco be found guilty 
of violating all three Bar Rules.  Grieco challenges the referee’s 
findings and recommendations as to guilt. 
Bar Rule 3-4.3 
Bar Rule 3-4.3 states that a lawyer shall not commit “any act 
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice.”   
The referee found that the Miami-Dade County State 
Attorney’s Office charged Grieco with accepting a campaign 
donation from an individual in the name of another individual.  
Grieco pled no contest to the first-degree misdemeanor charge.  
Adjudication was withheld, and Grieco was placed on misdemeanor 
probation for 12 months.  The referee found that these facts 
constituted a determination of guilt under Bar Rule 3-7.2(a)(2) 
(Procedures on Criminal or Professional Misconduct; Discipline on 
Determination or Judgment of Guilt of Criminal Misconduct; 
- 8 - 
 
Discipline on Removal from Judicial Office).  The referee further 
found that Grieco admitted to the above facts during the Bar’s 
investigation and that the testimony from Ross (who was present 
when Grieco entered his no-contest plea) about the plea agreement 
and MDCOE investigation provided further evidence of misconduct.   
We agree that the withholding of adjudication following 
Grieco’s no-contest plea constitutes a determination of guilt under 
Bar Rule 3-7.2(a)(2).  We also observe that while Grieco made 
admissions to his no-contest plea and to the misdemeanor offense 
in his responses to the Bar’s investigation, he later denied the same 
facts in his answer to the Bar complaint.   
Grieco insists that section 943.059, Florida Statutes (2017), 
prohibits expunged records from being used as evidence in Bar 
disciplinary proceedings.  He claims that under the 2017 version of 
section 943.059(4)(a), expunged records may only be introduced in 
certain enumerated types of proceedings, and that while Bar 
admission proceedings are enumerated, Bar disciplinary 
proceedings are not.  Grieco misreads the statute.  Section 
943.059(4)(a) does not say that expunged criminal records are 
inadmissible in Bar disciplinary proceedings; it merely states that 
- 9 - 
 
aside from certain enumerated circumstances (such as Bar 
admission proceedings), a person to whom the statute applies “may 
lawfully deny or fail to acknowledge the arrests covered by the 
sealed record.”  § 943.059(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017).  But Grieco is not 
being accused of perjury, and whether he could lawfully deny an 
arrest has never been an issue in this case. 
Given that the evidence of Grieco’s criminal history was 
admissible at the disciplinary proceeding, we find that the criminal 
information charging Grieco with violating section 106.08(7)(a) by 
willfully accepting a contribution from one individual in the name of 
another; the letter to the Bar from Grieco’s counsel reporting his 
no-contest plea admitting to the criminal charge; and the testimony 
of Ross, who participated in the joint investigation with the MDCOE 
and State Attorney’s Office and was present for Grieco’s plea, all 
constitute competent, substantial record evidence supporting the 
referee’s finding that Grieco engaged in an unlawful act.  For these 
reasons, we approve the referee’s recommendation as to guilt and 
find Grieco guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3. 
- 10 - 
 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(b) 
 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(b) provides that a lawyer shall not “commit a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”  The 
referee’s factual findings as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 served as the primary 
basis for his findings on Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).   
Grieco argues that even if the evidence introduced at the 
disciplinary hearing establishes that he committed a crime, the Bar 
failed to prove that the crime was one that “reflects adversely on 
[his] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects,” as required to prove a violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).  He 
argues that because the charged offense did not involve the practice 
of law, the crime of conviction was not one that reflects adversely on 
his fitness as a lawyer.  He also argues that because fraud, deceit, 
and misrepresentation are not essential elements of section 
106.08(7)(a), the crime of conviction is not a crime of dishonesty for 
purposes of Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).  
We find Grieco’s arguments unpersuasive.  Knowingly 
accepting campaign donations from one individual, through or in 
the name of another (the offense to which Grieco pled no contest) is 
- 11 - 
 
a dishonest act.  We agree with the referee that the nature of 
Grieco’s criminal act establishes conduct that reflects adversely on 
his honesty and on his trustworthiness—two components of fitness 
as a lawyer as expressly identified in Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).  Because 
the record evidence does not clearly contradict the referee’s 
conclusion that Grieco’s criminal act reflects adversely on his 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, 
we approve the referee’s recommendation and find Grieco guilty of 
violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(b). 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) 
 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) prohibits lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”  While 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) requires a showing of intent, establishing intent 
only requires proof that the lawyer “deliberately or knowingly 
engaged in the activity in question.”  Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 
41, 46 (Fla. 2004).  And as relevant here, to establish a violation of 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c), reliable hearsay is admissible.  Fla. Bar v. 
Bischoff, 212 So. 3d 312, 318 (Fla. 2017).  Though we may assess 
the reliability of the hearsay evidence, we do not second-guess a 
- 12 - 
 
referee’s findings as to evidentiary weight or witness credibility.  
See Fla. Bar v. Vannier, 498 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1986). 
In the proceedings below, Grieco argued to the referee that the 
Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any quotes 
printed in the Miami Herald or Political Cortadito were in fact uttered 
by him or that his statements were given proper context.  He 
further argued that the Bar did not prove that his statements were 
deliberately or knowingly false or misleading, and he urged the 
referee not to adopt the MDCOE’s findings that he made false or 
misleading statements as proof of violations of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).   
The referee rejected Grieco’s arguments, finding that the 
MDCOE report—which included findings that Grieco violated the 
Truth in Government provision of the Citizen’s Bill of Rights on two 
occasions—was sufficient to support violations of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).  
Of note, the referee emphasized that the Bar also submitted the 
evidence and documents relied upon by MDCOE to establish that 
Grieco was heavily involved with every aspect of the creation, 
operation, and funding of PBL.  Such evidence undermined Grieco’s 
public statements disavowing any involvement with or knowledge of 
- 13 - 
 
PBL.2  And that evidence also showed that Grieco never made any 
attempt to publicly correct what he now claims were inaccurate 
representations of his earlier comments.  
Furthermore, Grieco made admissions during the disciplinary 
process that directly contradicted his earlier public statements on 
his relationship with PBL.  For example, during the Bar 
proceedings, when trustworthiness as a lawyer had become an 
issue, Grieco changed his story and asserted that he had actually 
never been retained as a lawyer for PBL and had never performed 
any legal services for the organization.  He attempted to explain 
these contradictions by stating in his briefs that he was only 
retained as PBL’s lawyer after PBL’s officers became subjects of 
 
2.  The referee also observed that one of the Miami Herald 
articles reported that forensic handwriting examiners had identified 
handwriting on a PBL document as Grieco’s handwriting.  After the 
handwriting report was made public, Grieco stated for the first time 
that he had in fact been involved with PBL, but as its lawyer, and 
that the confidential attorney-client relationship required him to 
initially deny any involvement.  The referee found the handwriting 
report to be significant—not for its truth, but because Grieco and 
his team “shifted the official party line” after the report’s release.  In 
addition, the referee found that PBL’s two officers were both close 
friends of Grieco and that both admitted they performed very few 
services for PBL.  
 
- 14 - 
 
investigation.  He insists that his assertions about never being 
PBL’s lawyer and never performing legal services were meant to 
refer only to the period of his alleged misconduct.  But this creates 
yet another contradiction: if Grieco only began performing legal 
services after investigations began, then there would have been no 
attorney-client relationship to justify his initial denials of 
involvement with PBL. 
Grieco asserts that the media articles are unreliable as proof of 
his statements, because the articles could easily have misquoted 
him or taken his words out of context.  We acknowledge the 
potential for error in newspapers and other media.  However, the 
referee’s findings are not based simply on Grieco’s initial statements 
as reported in the articles.  Instead, in determining that Grieco 
made false or misleading public statements, the referee considered 
the articles, Grieco’s shifting storyline, the MDCOE investigation 
into Grieco’s involvement with PBL, and the admissions Grieco 
made during the Bar grievance process.  As aptly noted by the 
referee, “it is clear that [Grieco’s] narrative and testimony on this 
topic change depending on the audience to whom it is presented, 
and the goal [he] wishes the statements to accomplish.”  
- 15 - 
 
Moreover, we emphasize that we are not scrutinizing political 
speech made by Grieco while campaigning or otherwise engaging in 
the political arena.  We are aware that the standard governing the 
propriety of a lawyer’s statements often depends on the factual 
context and setting of such statements.  Here, the focus is not on 
statements of a political nature, but on the referee’s findings that, 
on more than one occasion, Grieco intentionally deceived or mislead 
the public about his involvement with PBL. 
Consistent with the discussion above, we find that competent, 
substantial evidence in the record supports the referee’s finding 
that Grieco deliberately engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct 
by making repeated false or misleading statements.  We further 
conclude that Grieco has failed to show that the referee’s 
recommendations as to guilt are clearly contradicted by the record.  
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt and, thus, find Grieco guilty of 
violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(c). 
B.  
The Referee’s Recommendation as to Discipline. 
We now turn to the referee’s recommendation to impose a 90-
day suspension as a sanction for Grieco’s misconduct.  A referee’s 
- 16 - 
 
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing 
case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(Standards).  See Fla. Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 765 (Fla. 2016); 
Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  Our review of 
a referee’s recommendation as to discipline is broader than our 
review of a referee’s findings of fact, for it is ultimately this Court’s 
responsibility to determine the appropriate discipline.  Fla. Bar v. 
Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 
538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989)); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
That said, we have recognized that a referee “is in a unique position 
to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his judgment regarding 
credibility should not be overturned absent clear and convincing 
evidence that his judgment is incorrect.”  Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 
2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 
1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991)).   
In this case, the referee considered the following Standards: 
5.1(b) (Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity; Suspension); 6.1(d) 
(False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation; Admonishment); 
7.1(d) (Deceptive Conduct or Statements; Admonishment); and 
8.1(b) (Violation of Court Order or Engaging in Subsequent Same or 
- 17 - 
 
Similar Misconduct; Suspension).  We agree with the referee that 
suspension is the appropriate sanction.  We question the referee’s 
reliance on the admonishment subdivisions of Standards 6.1 and 
7.1.  Subdivision (d) of each of these Standards addresses negligent 
dishonest conduct, which is incongruous with the referee’s finding 
that Grieco “chose to make misleading statements” and with the 
referee’s findings on Grieco’s failure to truthfully clarify statements, 
his shifting narrative following the handwriting report, and his 
misrepresentations about his role as PBL’s lawyer.  According to the 
referee, the Bar established clearly and convincingly that Grieco 
“intended to mislead” the public.  Nevertheless, we agree with the 
referee that the suspension subdivisions of Standards 5.1 and 8.1 
apply, and both of those Standards indicate that suspension is the 
appropriate sanction. 
Next, we consider the referee’s findings on the applicable 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  “Like other factual 
findings, a referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a 
presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous or without support in the record.”  Fla. Bar v. Scheinberg, 
129 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Germain, 957 So. 2d at 
- 18 - 
 
621).  A finding that an aggravating or mitigating factor applies—or 
a failure to find that an aggravating or mitigating factor applies—is 
afforded the same deference.  Id.  “The fact that there is some 
evidence in the record to support a finding that a mitigating [or 
aggravating] factor might apply does not mean that the referee 
should have necessarily found it applicable.”  Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8 
So. 3d 1100, 1106 (Fla. 2009).  Ultimately, the party challenging a 
referee’s findings of fact on aggravation or mitigation “must 
establish there is a lack of evidence in the record to support such 
findings or that the record clearly contradicts the referee’s 
conclusions.”  Fla. Bar v. Horton, 332 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 2019) 
(quoting Fla. Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2008)). 
Here, the referee found the existence of seven aggravators: 
3.2(b)(1) (prior disciplinary offenses); 3.2(b)(2) (dishonest or selfish 
motive); 3.2(b)(3) (a pattern of misconduct); 3.2(b)(4) (multiple 
offenses); 3.2(b)(6) (submission of false evidence, false statements, 
or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process); 
3.2(b)(7) (refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
conduct); and 3.2(b)(9) (substantial experience in the practice of 
law).  The referee also found several mitigating factors. 
- 19 - 
 
The referee’s findings as to the applicable aggravators and 
mitigators have record support and are not clearly erroneous.  
However, in light of Grieco’s continued dishonest conduct over time, 
including the crime of dishonesty underlying this case, the multiple 
misleading public statements regarding his involvement with PBL, 
the submission of false or misleading statements during the 
disciplinary process, and past misconduct for which Grieco was 
previously disciplined (conduct that involved misrepresentations to 
law enforcement about his role in an investigation), we conclude 
that the referee should have afforded greater weight to the pattern 
of misconduct aggravator.   
To be clear, we recognize that mitigation testimony was 
provided by no less than seventeen witnesses, including judges and 
elected officials, who spoke of Grieco’s good works and 
rehabilitation efforts.  We also acknowledge the referee’s finding 
that Grieco has taken steps to correct deficiencies in his campaign 
and electioneering conduct.  However, we find that Grieco’s 
continuous shifting of the narrative (including presentation of yet 
another new narrative in his briefing and oral argument before this 
Court), and his reliance on the technically accurate nature of 
- 20 - 
 
statements that were clearly intended to mislead the public, 
indicate a troubling character flaw that requires a period of 
rehabilitation before he can be readmitted to the Bar.   
As for the appropriate length of time for the rehabilitative 
suspension, we must examine existing case law.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Maurice, 955 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that because 
the Standards “do not suggest the appropriate length of a 
suspension, the Court examines caselaw to determine whether the 
referee’s recommendation . . . has a reasonable basis”). 
Looking at relatively recent analogous cases, we first take note 
of Germain, 957 So. 2d at 623-24, where we imposed a one-year 
suspension on a lawyer who lied under oath in connection with 
ongoing legal proceedings.  We are also mindful of Florida Bar v. 
MacNamara, 132 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 2013), a case relied on by the 
referee and cited by Grieco in the briefing of this case.  In 
MacNamara, a lawyer misrepresented to the probate court that he 
had filed a tax return, despite knowing he had not sent the IRS a 
signed return.  Id. at 172.  The lawyer also sent a deliberately 
misleading cover letter to the IRS and failed to honestly inform his 
client about the status of the return.  Id.  Finally, the lawyer made 
- 21 - 
 
misrepresentations to the Bar, claiming he filed the tax return 
earlier than he had.  Id.  In MacNamara, we determined that the 
appropriate sanction was a 90-day suspension, making note of the 
absence of any prior disciplinary history and of the lawyer’s 
acknowledgment that he had engaged in misconduct.  Id. at 173.  
Grieco argues that he should get a lighter sanction than the 
90-day suspension issued in MacNamara.  However, Grieco not only 
engaged in multiple instances of dishonest behavior (including 
misrepresentations to the Bar), but he also submitted false 
statements during the disciplinary proceeding to distance his prior 
misconduct from his professional duties as a lawyer, and he 
committed a crime of dishonesty when he solicited, facilitated, and 
accepted an unauthorized campaign contribution in an illegal 
manner.  And unlike the attorney in MacNamara, Grieco has not 
owned up to his misconduct, and he has received discipline in the 
past for prior dishonest conduct.  We believe Grieco’s actions 
warrant a harsher sanction than the conduct in MacNamara, 
particularly in light of the aggravating circumstances discussed 
above. 
- 22 - 
 
Finally, we note our decision in Florida Bar v. Kinsella, 260 So. 
3d 1046 (Fla. 2018).  In Kinsella, a lawyer pled no contest to a 
criminal misdemeanor, and like in this case, adjudication was 
withheld.  Id. at 1047.  Also like in this case, the lawyer’s criminal 
conduct in Kinsella did not involve the practice of law.  Id.  We 
found that substantial mitigation existed in Kinsella, including the 
lawyer’s full cooperation with law enforcement, her voluntary entry 
into a treatment contract, her efforts to return the money at issue, 
and the fact that she had already been subjected to other penalties 
for the same misconduct.  Notably, the referee in this case found 
many of the same mitigating factors.  But unlike Grieco, the lawyer 
in Kinsella also had no prior Bar disciplinary history, was 
inexperienced in the practice of law, had personal or emotional 
problems, and made serious expressions of remorse.  Id. at 1049. 
We suspended the lawyer in Kinsella for a period of three years, and 
while that lawyer’s conduct was egregious (including stealing money 
that had been entrusted to her), we focused on the significant 
aggravating circumstances—which included a dishonest and selfish 
motive and a pattern of misconduct.  Id. at 1050.  Both of those 
serious aggravators are also present in this case. 
- 23 - 
 
Based on the existing caselaw, and in consideration of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we conclude that a one-
year rehabilitative suspension is the appropriate sanction for 
Grieco’s misconduct.   
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt.  However, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation for a 90-day suspension and instead suspend 
Grieco from the practice of law for one year.  The suspension will be 
effective 30 days from the filing of this opinion so that Grieco can 
close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If 
Grieco notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing 
and does not need the 30 days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  
Grieco shall fully comply with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-
5.1(h).  Grieco shall also fully comply with Rule Regulating The 
Florida Bar 3-6.1, if applicable.  In addition, Grieco shall accept no 
new business from the date this order is filed until he is reinstated.  
Grieco is further directed to comply with all other terms and 
conditions of the report.   
- 24 - 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Michael Christopher Grieco in the amount of $12,572.00, for which 
sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, 
and SASSO, JJ., concur. 
COURIEL, J., recused. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Mark Lugo Mason, Bar 
Counsel, and Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida 
Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar Counsel, 
The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Benedict P. Kuehne of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent