Case Title: BEAUGUREAU v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
BEAUGUREAU v. STATE2002 WY 16056 P.3d 626Case Number: 01-94Decided: 10/22/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
   

 

ROBIN 
BEAUGUREAU,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Assistant Appellant Counsel.  
Argument presented by Ms. Kerin.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Prosecution Assistance Program; 
and Crystal S. Swanson and Howard Scotland, Student Interns.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Scotland.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Robin 
Beaugureau, seeks review of the judgment and sentence of the district court 
finding her guilty of two counts of child abuse.1  She contends that there is insufficient 
evidence to sustain her convictions on two counts of felony child abuse.2  She also contends that she was denied 
due process of law and a fair trial because the State prevented her from 
interviewing one of the victims before trial, that the trial court erred in 
refusing to inquire into the competency of one of the victims who was called as 
a witness, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his 
cross-examination of Beaugureau, and that the trial court erred in not 
conducting an inquiry into whether or not she needed substitute 
counsel.

 

[¶2]      Although we find 
serious errors in the proceedings, the errors were not prejudicial and are 
harmless.  Thus, we will 
affirm.

 

 

[¶3]      Beaugureau 
provides this statement of the issues:

 

I.          
Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of child abuse of 
the alleged victim, [BC]?

 

II.          
Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of child abuse of 
the alleged victim, [SD] and did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the late amendment of the information with regard to the allegation of 
child abuse of SD?

 

III.         
Was Appellant denied due process of law when an agent of the State, a 
DFS3 employee, refused to allow 
Appellant's trial counsel to interview the alleged victim, [BC], particularly in 
view of the fact that the prosecutor was allowed to speak with [BC] prior to 
trial?

 

IV.        Did the 
trial court err in refusing to examine [BC's] competency prior to the substance 
of his testimony?

 

V.        Should 
this Court reverse its position articulated in Dike v. 
State, 990 P.2d 1012 (Wyo. 1999), wherein the Court reaffirmed that "when 
the jury is presented with contradictory testimony, counsel is allowed to 
communicate the reasonable inference that one of the witnesses is lying"? 
[sic]  
Additionally, did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by using 
contradictions in the testimony to improperly question Appellant?

 

VI.        Did the 
trial court err in not holding a hearing or inquiry to determine if appellant 
needed substitute counsel?

 

The State rephrases the issues in these words:

 

I.          
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of child abuse as to 
BC?

 

II.          
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of child abuse as to 
SD, and did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the State to 
amend the information with regard to the dates when the child abuse was 
committed?

 

III.         Was 
Appellant denied due process of law when the Department of Family Services 
refused to allow Appellant's counsel to interview victim BC prior to trial?

 

IV.        Did the 
district court err in refusing to conduct a further competency hearing regarding 
BC?

 

V.        Did the 
district court apply the correct rule of law to the facts in the case, should 
this Court overrule Dike v. State, and did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by using contradictions in the testimony during 
questioning of Appellant?

 

VI.        Did the 
district court err in not holding a hearing or inquiry to determine if Appellant 
needed substitute counsel?

 

 

[¶4]      The instant appeal is 
limited to facts that describe two fairly discrete incidents, though the 
testimony at trial spanned more than a decade and a half worth of instances of 
ongoing abusive conduct by Beaugureau and her husband, Francis.4  Their victims were principally SD and BC.5  The first incident relates to Beaugureau's 
daughter SD (SD was a step-daughter to Francis).  Sometime between December 1, 1997 and March 
31, 1998, it was alleged that Beaugureau severely beat SD, inflicting physical 
injury constituting felony child abuse.

 

[¶5]      The second incident 
involved BC.  
It was alleged that between July 1, 1995 and October 3, 1996, Beaugureau 
inflicted physical injury on BC constituting felony child abuse.  The central 
incident, although the record bears out more incidents than we care to attempt 
to count, took place when Beaugureau forced BC to stick his hand into a burning 
acetylene torch.  
BC suffered a severe burn during that incident and a skin graft became 
necessary in order to successfully treat the injury.

 

[¶6]      We note at this 
juncture that the record chronicles incidents of child abuse that span most of 
the lifetimes of SD and GD (who were 15 and 19 years of age, respectively, at 
the time of trial) and 15 months in the life of BC.  No issue is raised 
in regard to the volume of evidence that was admitted at trial.  It was a part of 
Beaugureau's trial strategy to attempt to show that Francis was a controlling 
and manipulative religious zealot who forced Beaugureau to abuse children, and, 
thus, it was Beaugureau's intention that this great volume of evidence be 
admitted.

 

 

 

[¶7]      The benchmark for 
review of sufficiency of the evidence claims is whether the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is such as to permit a 
reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22 ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 
¶ 15 (Wyo. 2001); Hadden v. State, 2002 WY 41, 
¶ 27, 42 P.3d 495, ¶ 27 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶8]      Applying this 
standard to the two convictions challenged in this appeal, we need only point 
out that SD testified that Beaugureau beat her so that she had a bloodied and 
broken nose, and that BC testified that Beaugureau forced him to thrust his hand 
into the flame of an acetylene torch.  In each instance, the testimony of the victim 
is sufficient to sustain the respective conviction.  It is surplusage, 
but we note, as well, that there was considerable corroborating evidence in each 
instance.

 

 

[¶9]      The trial court 
permitted the amendment of the information with respect to the count involving 
SD.  The 
original information set forth a time frame ranging from December 1, 1997 until 
December 31, 1997.  
SD's testimony put the salient date as between January and March of 
1998.  Other 
corroborating testimony also placed the date of that occurrence in early 
1998.  The 
motion to amend was filed on November 29, 1999, and the district court granted 
the motion on that date.  The trial began on November 29, 1999.  The State contended 
that Beaugureau was given ample notice because the motion was delivered to the 
office of her attorney "four or five days" before the commencement of trial.6  The State neglected to also relate that the 
date of manual service was on Thanksgiving Day, when the defense attorney was 
not in his office.  
Although the conduct of the State is in many ways inexcusable and 
demonstrates a disregard for the time-honored processes of the criminal justice 
system, we will not let the "criminal go free, merely because the prosecutor 
blundered."  See Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶¶ 15-19, 37 P.3d 1279, 
¶¶ 15-19 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶10]   As was the case in Meek, there is no demonstrable prejudice to Beaugureau 
here.  
Beaugureau was not charged with an additional or different crime.  Beaugureau did not 
deny the incident at issue, she only contended that she did not beat SD, but 
rather only gently slapped her in order to bring her out of the fit of hysteria 
she was suffering.  
No substantial right belonging to Beaugureau was prejudiced, but the 
system bears a black mark due to the manner in which this issue was handled.

 

 

[¶11]   Beaugureau contends that her rights to 
due process of law were denied because the prosecutor interfered with her 
attorney's efforts to interview BC before trial.  The issue was not raised before the trial 
court, and the parties have agreed that we must review this asserted error under 
the plain error standard.  The arguments by both Beaugureau and the 
State are wide of the mark.  The issue is not whether BC had a right to 
refuse to talk with Beaugureau's attorney, but whether, as Beaugureau claimed, 
the State actively interfered with defense counsel's right (as well as duty) to at least try to talk with 
BC.  See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Interference by Prosecution with Defense Counsel's Pretrial 
Interrogation of Witnesses, 90 A.L.R.3d 1231 (1979 and 2001 Supp.).  The record does not 
bear out Beaugureau's assertion that the prosecution interfered with defense 
counsel's efforts to interview BC, nor does it demonstrate that the matter was 
ever called to the attention of the district court.  We decline to 
further consider this issue because it was not raised below in any meaningful 
manner.  We 
generally will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal 
unless they are jurisdictional issues or issues of such a fundamental nature 
that they must be considered.  Bell v. State, 
994 P.2d 947, 957 (Wyo. 2000); also see Bailey v. 
State, 12 P.3d 173, 177-79 (Wyo. 2000).

 

 

[¶12]   Although the context was somewhat 
different (sexual abuse of a five-year-old child), in English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999) we 
held:

 

The Wyoming Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]very person 
is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."   W.R.E. 
601.  "A person 
is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and 
narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before 
testifying."  
Simmers, 943 P.2d at 1199;  Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo.1984).  "Intelligence, not 
age, is the guiding criteria in determining the competency of a witness."  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo.1987).  It is a 
well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a 
question within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 655 P.2d 342, 347 
(1982);  People v. Estorga, 200 Colo. 78, 612 P.2d 520, 524 
(1980);  State v. Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 689 P.2d 767, 771 
(1984);  State v. Howard, 247 Mont. 370, 806 P.2d 1038, 1039 
(1991).  
However, when children are called into the courtroom to testify, we have 
held that once the child's competency is called into question by either party, 
it is the duty of the court to make an independent 
examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination 
will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.  Burt v. Burt, 48 Wyo. 19, 41 P.2d 524, 525 (1935) (quoting 5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence 3958, 3959, § 
2107 (2d Ed.)).  
See also Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 
1136 (Wyo.1997); Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 
579 (Wyo.1994); Baum, 745 P.2d  at 879; and Larsen, 
686 P.2d  at 585.

 

            
We have directed the district courts to utilize a 
five-part test for determining the competency of child witnesses:

 

"(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth 
on the witness stand;  
(2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he 
is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it;  (3) a memory 
sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;  (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence;  and (5) the capacity to understand simple 
questions about it."

 

Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585 (quoting State v. 
Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967)).

 

(Emphasis added.)  Also see Alicea v. 
State, 13 P.3d 693, 696-98 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶13]   In the instant case there is no 
allegation that BC's testimony was in some way tainted.  However, there was 
an obvious basis for a request for a competency hearing in the record, as BC was 
then residing at the Wyoming State Hospital and, prior to his appearance on the 
witness stand, the record was replete with references to his numerous 
institutionalizations for mental disorders and emotional problems.  At the time BC was 
called to testify, defense counsel requested that the trial court conduct a 
brief competency hearing.  At that point, it was the duty of the court 
to make an independent examination of BC to determine competency.  However, the trial 
court declined to perform that duty, viewing the request as a disruption to the 
proceedings and insisting that an examination should have been done prior to 
trial.  Without 
question, the trial court erred in failing to make some limited inquiry as to 
BC's competency.  
However, our rules of appellate procedure admonish us to disregard "[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights."  
W.R.A.P. 9.04.  
In this instance, both counsel for the State and counsel for the defense 
asked the crucial questions that serve to assist an appellate court in deciding 
and/or reviewing whether a witness appears to be "competent."  We are comfortable 
in concluding that the record clearly reflects that BC was competent to testify 
and that his testimony was corroborated by several witnesses, including that of 
his Mother and Beaugureau herself.  To the extent there is any residual doubt 
that BC was competent to appear as a witness in this matter, that doubt quickly 
fades in light of the fact that virtually all of his testimony was the same as 
that of other witnesses to those same events.  Therefore, we will disregard the trial 
court's error as harmless.

 

 

[¶14]   Beaugureau asks us to overrule our 
decision in Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1026 (Wyo. 
1999) to the effect that "[w]hen the jury is presented with contradictory 
testimony, counsel is allowed to communicate the reasonable inference that one 
of the witnesses is lying."  That holding was based on our decision in Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83-84 (Wyo. 1990) wherein 
we opined:

 

In an often quoted opinion, the United States Supreme Court 
stated that a prosecutor should prosecute with earnestness and vigor but "while 
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 
633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935).  Determining the location of the line between 
fair and foul requires reference to the underlying reasons for limiting argument 
of counsel.

 

            
The purpose of limiting the argument of counsel is, fundamentally, to 
preserve the prerogatives of the jury.  Cases involving the propriety of argument are 
analyzed in terms of protecting the jury from deciding the facts on a basis 
other than the evidence produced at trial.  This analysis is seen in cases where the 
prosecutor alludes to information that he claims to possess but which has not 
been presented as evidence.  See, e.g., Berger, 295 U.S.  at 86-89, 55 S. Ct.  at 633.   The perceived 
risk is that the jury will consider the statements made by the prosecutor as 
evidence, subverting the controls that the law places on admission of 
evidence.  When 
a prosecutor misstates the law concerning the burden of proof, the risk is that 
the jury will determine the facts with reference to the incorrect law.  Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo.1989).  A similar example 
is when a prosecutor asserts that his credibility is superior to that of a 
witness and that the jury is to choose between the prosecutor's credibility and 
that of a witness.  
Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889 
(Wyo.1982).

 

            
When the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an 
additional factor is injected into the case.  This additional factor is that counsel may be 
perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than 
their own opinion:  
that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but 
rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his 
position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the 
criminal laws of a sovereign state.  While the prosecutor is expected to be an 
advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law.  See Hopkinson v. 
State, 632 P.2d 79, 166 (Wyo.1981).

 

            
The trial court is in the best position to consider the propriety of 
argument that falls into the gray area between the permissible and the 
prohibited.  United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984).  
In the context of a particular trial, a statement may be objectionable 
even if the identical statement would be permitted in a different trial.  These questions are 
best left to the discretion of the trial court.  Jeschke v. State, 
642 P.2d 1298 (Wyo.1982).  For the purpose of review under the plain 
error standard, the limit on argument by the prosecutor is exceeded if the 
prosecutor's argument states or implies that the jury should consider factors 
other than the evidence presented in determining the facts.

 

            
Appellant bases part of his claim of plain error on the following 
statements made by the prosecutor:

 

"When all else fails, when there is no other defense, you 
use consent;  
but there was none in this case."  

"Again, and again, and again we're going to be asking the 
question, who was telling the truth?   People can lie in Court and people do 
lie in Court * * *."  

"Who do you believe in this particular situation?   Do you 
believe the Plaintiff or the victim in this particular matter?"  

"You saw Mr. Taylor and Mr. Gonzales, and you know what 
they testified to, and you know who's telling the truth.  If you lie long 
enough, and you lie, and you keep up with this story, and I contend that this is 
a story that Mr. Barela made up, you will lie * * *."  

"He lied throughout this, the court proceeding, and he has 
a real motive to lie * * *."

 

Appellant contends that these statements constitute an 
attack on his credibility and were statements of the prosecutor's personal 
belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence presented.  He argues that 
these statements were so egregiously prejudicial that they deprived him of a 
fair trial.

 

            
When these statements are read in the context of the complete argument, 
it is apparent that the prosecutor was not attempting to induce the jury to base 
their factual determination on his beliefs or opinions.  Rather, he was 
articulating the State's position upon inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.  It 
was argument pure and simple.  The prosecutor was careful to make it clear 
that the decision was in the hands of the jury.  As to the statement that defendant was lying, 
when there is express contradictory testimony, as there was here, the inference 
that at least one of the witnesses is lying is a reasonable one.  Wheeler, 691 P.2d  at 604-5.   We have 
previously considered the effect of a similar statement in Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo.1982), where 
we said that "calling a defendant a thief and a liar may not be in good taste," 
but when the evidence supports a reasonable inference that such is in fact the 
case, it does not constitute reversible error to argue the question.  Id. at 1266.

 

We see no reason to revisit that authority in the context 
of this case and, therefore, we decline to overrule or otherwise modify our 
holdings in the above-recited cases.

 

[¶15]   Beaugureau's argument in this regard 
also asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his 
cross-examination of her.  The prosecutor asked Beaugureau several times 
whether or not she believed that other witnesses were lying if they contradicted 
her.  On the 
first occasion, defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained, 
striking the question and the answer.  On the second occasion, the trial court 
cautioned the prosecutor,  "Please don't ask one witness to comment on 
the truth of another witness's testimony.  I think that's objectionable."  On the next 
occasion, the district court sustained another objection made by defense 
counsel, again cautioning the prosecutor,  "Mr. Schafer, I think I made that ruling a 
couple of times.  
Do you have any authority that indicates that my prior ruling, about not 
challenging one witness as to whether another witness lied, is incorrect?"  The prosecutor 
indicated that he did not, and the trial court admonished the prosecutor to 
"heed my admonition."  
Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial based upon the 
prosecutor's repeated misconduct in this regard.  The district court denied the motion for 
mistrial, concluding that he had properly handled defense counsel's objections 
and that the prosecutor's "violations" were not of a magnitude to require a 
mistrial.  The 
jury was given the standard instructions with respect to its role in determining 
the credibility of witnesses, but defense counsel did not seek further 
clarification in the form of a more explicit instruction to address the 
prosecutor's misconduct.

 

[¶16]   In Sheeley v. 
State, 991 P.2d 136, 138-140 (Wyo. 1999), although the overall context is 
significantly different, we emphasized that any improper invasion of the jury's 
function as the arbiter of a witness's credibility is critical and must be 
treated as error per se.  Our discourse from that case is worth 
repeating here:

 

At the preliminary hearing for another case against 
Sheeley, the victim testified she did not have sexual contact with Sheeley in 
Wyoming.  At 
trial the victim testified she did have sexual contact with Sheeley in Wyoming, 
but then appeared to recant that testimony.  On direct examination, the defense 
investigator testified that the victim told him she did not have sex with 
Sheeley in Wyoming.  
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the investigator 
about the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing as follows:

 

[Prosecutor] Q:  You were present for that.  Then she testified 
in court apparently much the way that she talked to you, did she not, that it 
had happened once in Oregon and whatever?  

A: Yes.  

Q: And do you recall what the 
court, the judge said with regard to that testimony?

A.  I think he cautioned her in regard to 
perjury.

 

Sheeley did not object to this testimony and presents the 
issue to this court in terms of plain error.  However, we are inclined to perform an error 
per se analysis because the prosecutor asked the witness to repeat a judge's 
admonition from another proceeding.  We can not fathom a time nor a place where 
such a question would properly be presented to a witness.  First, it 
improperly interjected judicial bias into the proceedings; and second, it 
required an answer that seemed to address the judge's opinion of the credibility 
of the victim.

 

            
We have held that "'testimony offering an opinion as to the guilt of the 
defendant, when elicited by a prosecuting attorney, should be perceived as error 
per se.'"  Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wyo.1998) 
(quoting Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 
(Wyo.1989)).  
We considered a similar dilemma in Stephens:

 

We are sensitive to the proposition that judicial restraint 
generally demands that we address only those issues properly before us and 
preserved for our review.  We also know that it is within our 
jurisdiction to decide any case as justice may demand.  In addition, recent 
experience with post-conviction remedies teaches us that the failure of counsel 
to raise issues which implicate constitutional rights of a defendant in an 
appeal will result in those issues being presented in a subsequent proceeding 
under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Consequently, 
judicial efficiency strongly suggests the treatment of obvious matters in the 
first appeal.  
We also have in mind the pertinenc[e] to the State of Wyoming of this 
statement by the Supreme Court of the United States:

 

" * * * Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair;  our system of the administration of justice 
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.  An inscription on the walls of the Department 
of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:  'The United States 
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.' "  

 

Stephens, 774 P.2d at 63(quoting Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) 
(citations omitted)).

 

In Dudley, we discussed the 
significance of per se error:

 

The import of proclaiming an event as error per se is 
articulated in Stephens as follows:

 

            
Even though error is found, it still is necessary, in most instances, to 
determine whether the error was prejudicial.  Unless the situation reaches the level of 
error per se, or is perceived to be constitutional error, error is prejudicial 
only if the defendant can establish a reasonable probability that, in the 
absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable.  

 

Id. at 67 (citation omitted).  Testimony elicited by a prosecutor which 
offers an opinion as to the defendant's guilt must be presumed prejudicial 
rather than treated as a question of plain error because it is impossible to 
determine whether the jury may have relied on the opinion in reaching its 
verdict.  Id. at 68; Bennett v. 
State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo.1990);  Whiteplume [v. 
State], 841 P.2d [1332] at 1338 [ (Wyo.1992) ].  

 

Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 1178.   Although the investigator did not give 
his opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, the prosecutor's question 
obviously sought to elicit, and did elicit, not only irrelevant evidence, but 
evidence which infected the proceedings with judicial bias and improper opinion 
testimony.

 

            
The North Carolina Supreme Court has discussed the danger of judicial 
comments concerning perjury affecting the jury:

 

      Any intimation by the 
judge in the presence of the jury, however, that a witness had committed perjury 
would of course, ... constitute reversible error....  Therefore, judicial 
warnings and admonitions to a witness with reference to perjury are not to be 
issued lightly or impulsively.  Unless given discriminatively and in a 
careful manner they can upset the delicate balance of the scales which a judge 
must hold evenhandedly.  Potential error is inherent in such warnings, 
and in a criminal case they create special hazards.  

 

      First among these is 
that the judge will invade the province of the jury, which is to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and determine the facts from the evidence 
adduced....  It 
is most unlikely that a judge would ever warn a witness of the consequences of 
perjury unless he had determined in his own mind that the witness had testified 
falsely.  

 

State v. Locklear, 309 N.C. 428, 306 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1983) (quoting State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E.2d 631, 636-38 
(1976)).

 

            
We have often warned that a trial judge must use care not to comment on 
the evidence.  
Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1118 
(Wyo.1997) (quoting Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 
458 (Wyo.1979)) (quoting Peterson v. McMicken (Nelson's 
Estate), 72 Wyo. 444, 499, 266 P.2d 238, 261 (1954)).  In a jury trial the 
judge must refrain from expressing an opinion on the weight or quality of the 
evidence.  Harris, 933 P.2d  at 1118.   Any 
expression of opinion on the evidence indicating possible bias on the part of 
the trial judge is prejudicial, as infringing upon the jury's duties.  Id. This is especially true in criminal cases.  Phillips, 597 P.2d  at 458.   Such comments 
are prejudicial, reversible error.  Id.

 

            
The jury was asked to decide which version of the victim's allegations 
was true.  The 
jury could have drawn the conclusion that the preliminary hearing judge believed 
the story which would result in the guilt of the defendant over the story which 
absolved him.  
That opinion, or the impression of that opinion, had no place before this 
jury.  "The 
jury is charged with resolving the factual issues, judging the witnesses' 
credibility, and ultimately determining whether the accused is guilty or 
innocent."  Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Wyo.1999) 
(citing Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo.1998);  Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo.1988)).  "A witness may not, 
therefore, vouch for the credibility of another witness or a victim."  Newport, 983 P.2d  at 1215 (citing Gayler, 957 P.2d at 860;  Curl v. State, 
898 P.2d 369, 373-74 (Wyo.1995)).  The testimony raises concerns about its 
effect on the jury, "namely, that 'the testimony could have decided the case for 
the jury.' "  
Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882 
(Wyo.1990) (quoting Stephens, 774 P.2d at 67).  "[I]mproper 
invasion of the jury's function remains critical and any invasion of the jury's 
role must be treated as error per se."  Id.

 

(Emphasis added.)

[¶17]   Of course, the violation is even more 
serious when the province of the jury is invaded by the opinion of a judge.  Nonetheless, it is 
likewise error and misconduct for the prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant 
using the "lying" or "mistaken" technique (i.e., 
well, then if "so-and-so" said "such-and-such," was he "mistaken" or 
"lying?").  
Such questions are improper.  If the prosecutor merely asked Beaugureau 
about what other witnesses had to say, allowing the jury to draw its own 
conclusions, the cross-examination would not have been objectionable.  State v. Diggs, 34 P.3d 63, 72-73 (Kan. 2001); State v. Manning, 19 P.3d 84, 100-3 (Kan. 2001) 
("Questions which compel a defendant or witness to comment on the credibility of 
another witness are improper.  It is the province of the jury to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses." (collecting cases)); State v. Stevenson, 797 A.2d 1, 7-9 (Conn. 2002) (Such 
questions are improper because they "require a defendant to comment on another 
witness' veracity  invade the province of the jury, create the risk that the 
jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the 
other witnesses lied, and distort the state's burden of proof.") (relying on State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 234-39 (Conn. 2002)) 
(collecting cases); also see State v. Walden, 847 P.2d 956, 959 (Wash. App. Div. 1 (1993); and State v. 
Pitts, No. 47488-0-I, 2001 WL 1641225 at *4 (Wash App. Div. 1, Dec. 24, 
2001) (per curiam) (use of word "lying" is misconduct; use of word "mistaken" 
merely objectionable).

 

[¶18]   As noted above, defense counsel 
objected on each occasion and the objections were sustained.  The prosecutor's 
persistence in engaging in misconduct despite two very clear admonitions causes 
grave concern.  
But the same authorities we have cited immediately above also counsel 
that errors such as these must be prejudicial to the defendant, and must have 
served to deny that defendant a fair trial, before reversal of the conviction 
becomes the required remedy.  We have examined the evidence in this case 
carefully and thoroughly, and we will hold that the misconduct of the prosecutor 
should not result in the reversal of defendant's conviction.  The prejudice to 
Beaugureau was slight and the evidence against her overwhelming.  Thus, we will 
conclude that the errors were harmless.

 

 

[¶19]   This issue arises because Beaugureau 
expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of her attorneys at a change of 
plea hearing held on November 16, 1999.  The record does not reflect that Beaugureau 
asked for the appointment of different, substitute, or additional counsel (she 
had two attorneys representing her).  This matter was not raised in the trial court 
and, therefore, we decline to review it on appeal.  Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 957 (Wyo. 2000); also see Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 177-79 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

 

[¶20]   We hold that there is evidence to 
sustain both convictions.  Further, we hold that the errors committed by 
the trial court and the State, as well as the misconduct of the prosecutor, is 
not sufficiently prejudicial so as to require reversal of those 
convictions.  
The judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1§ 6-2-503. Child abuse;  penalty.

            
(a) Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, 
a person who is not responsible for a child's welfare as defined by W.S. 
14-3-202(a)(i), is guilty of child abuse, a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than five (5) years, if:

                        
(i) The actor is an adult or is at least six (6) years older than the 
victim; and

            
(ii) The actor intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child under 
the age of sixteen (16) years:

                                    
(A) Physical injury as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B); or

                                    
(B) Mental injury as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A).

            
(b) Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, 
a person is guilty of child abuse, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than five (5) years, if a person responsible for a child's welfare as 
defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(i) intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child 
under the age of eighteen (18) years:

(i) Physical injury as 
defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B), excluding reasonable corporal punishment; 
or

                        
(ii) Mental injury as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A).

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 
(LexisNexis 2001).

 

§ 14-3-202. 
Definitions.

            
(a) As used in W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215:

(i) "A person responsible 
for a child's welfare" includes the child's parent, noncustodial parent, 
guardian, custodian, stepparent, foster parent or other person, institution or 
agency having the physical custody or control of the child;

(ii) "Abuse" with respect 
to a disabled adult means as defined under W.S. 35-20-102(a)(ii).  "Abuse" with respect to a child means inflicting or causing 
physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or mental 
health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, including 
abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or 
substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and 
the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense against a child as 
defined by law:

(A) "Mental injury" means an injury to the psychological 
capacity or emotional stability of a child as evidenced by an observable or 
substantial impairment in his ability to function within a normal range of 
performance and behavior with due regard to his culture;

(B) "Physical injury" means death or any harm to a child 
including but not limited to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, skin 
bruising, bleeding, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or 
substantial malnutrition;  [This subsection was amended in 2002 and has 
been substantially changed; see footnote 2.]

(C) "Substantial risk" 
means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility;

(D) "Imminent danger" 
includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, condition or status 
which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or physical 
or mental injury.

                        
(iii) "Child" means any person under the age of eighteen (18);

            
(iv) "Child protective agency" means the field or regional offices of the 
department of family services;

(v) "Court proceedings" 
means child protective proceedings which have as their purpose the protection of 
a child through an adjudication of whether the child is abused or neglected, and 
the making of an appropriate order of disposition;

(vi) "Institutional child 
abuse and neglect" means situations of child abuse or neglect where a foster 
home or other public or private residential home, institution or agency is 
responsible for the child's welfare;

(vii) "Neglect" with 
respect to a disabled adult means as defined under W.S. 35-20-102(a)(xi).  "Neglect" with 
respect to a child means a failure or refusal by those responsible for the 
child's welfare to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or 
medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the child's well being.  Treatment given in 
good faith by spiritual means alone, through prayer, by a duly accredited 
practitioner in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church 
or religious denomination is not child neglect for that reason alone;

            
(viii) "State agency" means the state department of family services;

            
(ix) "Subject of the report" means any child reported under W.S. 14-3-201 
through 14-3-215 or the child's parent, guardian or other person responsible for 
the child's welfare, or any disabled adult reported under W.S. 35-20-101 through 
35-20-109 or the disabled adult's caretaker;

(x) "Unfounded report" 
means any report made pursuant to W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 or 35-20-101 
through 35-20-109 that is not supported by credible evidence;

(xi) "Substantiated 
report" means any report of child abuse or neglect pursuant to W.S. 14-3-201 
through 14-3-215, or any report of abuse, neglect, exploitation or abandonment 
of a disabled adult under W.S. 35-20-101 through 35-20-109, that is determined 
upon investigation that credible evidence of the alleged abuse, neglect, 
exploitation or abandonment exists;

(xii) "Abandonment" with 
respect to a disabled adult means as defined under W.S. 35-20-102(a)(i);

            
(xiii) "Disabled adult" means any person defined under W.S. 
35-20-102(a)(vi);

            
(xiv) "Exploitation" with respect to a disabled adult means as defined 
under W.S. 35-20-102(a)(ix).

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-202 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).

 

 

   2The definition 
of "physical injury" was amended by the legislature during its 2002 session so 
that it now provides:

 

(B)         
"Physical injury" means any harm to a child including but 
not limited to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising if 
greater in magnitude than minor bruising associated with reasonable corporal 
punishment, bleeding, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or 
substantial malnutrition;

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(B) (LexisNexis 2002 
Supp.).

 

 

   3Department of Family Services.

   4Francis 
was also charged with felony child abuse with respect to BC and was found guilty 
in a separate proceeding.

 

   5There 
is considerable evidence that both Beaugureau and her husband Francis also 
abused GD, a brother to SD, though no charges were brought against either of 
them in that regard.

  6W.R.Cr.P. 3(e) provides:          

 

     
(e) Amendment of Information or Citation.  Without leave of the court, the attorney for 
the state may amend an information or citation until five days before a 
preliminary examination in a case required to be tried in district court or 
until five days before trial for a case not required to be tried in district 
court.  The 
court may permit an information or citation to be amended:

            
(1) With the defendant's consent, at any time before sentencing.

            
(2) Whether or not the defendant consents:

            
(A) At any time before trial if substantial rights of the defendant are 
not prejudiced.

(B) At any time before verdict or finding if no additional or 
different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 

(Emphasis added.)