Case Title: State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-5811

Docket Number: 20011374

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 179, 2002-Ohio-
5811.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 
179, 2002-Ohio-5811.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application for permanent partial disability 
compensation granted by Industrial Commission — Increase in award 
later sought by claimant — Increase in award by Industrial Commission 
affirmed, when. 
(No. 2001-1374 — Submitted August 27, 2002 — Decided November 6, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-990. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee-claimant, Larry E. Smith, has several workers’ 
compensation claims for injuries sustained as a truck driver for appellant, Yellow 
Freight System, Inc.  A 1988 claim has been recognized for low-back and right-
shoulder conditions.  A 1992 claim has been allowed for right-shoulder strain as 
well. 
{¶2} 
In 1995, claimant moved for permanent partial disability 
compensation (“PPD”).  Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio made a seven 
percent award in the 1988 claim and a two percent award in the 1992 claim.  The 
award in the earlier claim did not apportion the award between the back and 
shoulder conditions. 
{¶3} 
In early 2000, claimant moved for increased PPD in the 1992 claim 
only.  Claimant’s physician, Dr. James E. Lundeen Sr., assessed a 15 percent 
impairment.  Dr. H.H. Hood assessed a nine percent impairment, which after 
taking into account the earlier two percent award, prompted his conclusion of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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seven percent increase.  Dr. Leslie A. Friedman, examining on the employer’s 
behalf, issued the most extensive report.  He recited evidence that claimant’s 1988 
shoulder injury had resolved itself shortly thereafter with no residuals.  He 
concluded that claimant had a one percent impairment as to the 1992 shoulder 
injury, which would negate any allegation of increased impairment. 
{¶4} 
A commission staff hearing officer found a total shoulder 
impairment of seven percent, which represented a five percent increase in the two 
percent award made years earlier in this 1992 claim.  After unsuccessfully 
challenging this award before the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Yellow 
Freight now appeals to this court. 
{¶5} 
At issue are two workers’ compensation claims—1988 and 1992—
that have both been allowed for a right-shoulder injury.  In 2000, the commission 
awarded a five percent increase in permanent partial disability for the 1992 claim.  
Yellow Freight contests that award.  The crux of its argument is this: despite the 
existence of two claims, there is still only one right shoulder.  Thus, Yellow 
Freight contends that claimant cumulatively has received nine percent PPD for his 
shoulder condition—seven percent in the 1988 claim and two percent in the 1992 
claim.  Thus, if claimant’s total impairment now is only seven percent, then 
claimant’s impairment has not increased, and has, in fact, improved, foreclosing 
further compensation. 
{¶6} 
Yellow Freight’s argument is undermined by the additional 
presence of an allowed low-back condition in the 1988 claim.  Because it exists—
and because the commission unfortunately did not apportion the seven percent 
award in that claim between the two conditions—Yellow Freight cannot establish 
that the full seven percent, or any portion of it, was attributable to claimant’s right 
shoulder.  Yellow Freight’s argument is weakened even further by medical 
evidence indicating that claimant’s 1988 shoulder injury resolved within a few 
January Term, 2002 
3 
months.  This bolsters the commission’s assertion that the seven percent award in 
the 1988 claim was attributable solely to claimant’s low-back condition. 
{¶7} 
Yellow Freight counters that this is an unfounded assumption and 
implores us to return the cause for further proceedings, with the instruction that 
the commission provide a percentage allocation—shoulder and/or back—for the 
1988 award.  We decline this invitation.  Clearly, allocation of the 1988 award 
would have been helpful.  To try to do so 14 years later, however, would be 
extremely difficult.  A hearing officer cannot be expected to divine how the 
district hearing officer, years ago, interpreted the three medical reports relied on, 
as well as claimant’s nonmedical disability factors.  Moreover, there is evidence 
that claimant’s shoulder condition did resolve shortly after his 1988 injury.  Dr. 
Longert made that finding, which was reported by Dr. Friedman in 2000.  
Friedman’s file review also indicates considerable reference to low-back 
problems in the 1988 claim.1  We, therefore, deny the request to return the cause 
and find that the commission did not abuse its discretion in treating the 1988 
claim award as it did. 
{¶8} 
Yellow Freight also assails the contested award as unsupported by 
“some evidence,” alleging that both Dr. Friedman and Dr. Hood failed to take into 
account the 1988 claim award and its effect on total body impairment.  This fails 
for the reason given above.  Both physicians, moreover, were aware of the prior 
award in the 1992 claim and factored that amount into their calculations. 
{¶9} 
Finally, Yellow Freight contends that the seven percent total 
permanent partial impairment the staff hearing officer found represented a 
compromise between Hood’s 15 percent impairment assessment and Friedman’s 
one percent.  Yellow Freight accepts generally the commission’s right to employ 
such compromise logic, but asserts that it is improper where one doctor finds an 
                                                 
1. 
These low-back complaints were incorporated into a later low-back claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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increase and the other does not.  Yellow Freight, however, cites no authority for 
this proposition.  The commission has used this approach for years to facilitate 
disposition of the myriad of PPD requests.  To some extent, though, Yellow 
Freight has a point.  Where two medical reports contradict each other on whether 
an impairment or an impairment increase even exists, balancing the two to come 
up with an award is not really a “compromise.”  Any award results in an employer 
loss.  However, it is a result within the commission’s discretion.  If the 
commission is, for example, confronted with one report that finds a nine percent 
impairment and another that finds a zero percent impairment, it is unquestionably 
free to adopt the former and award nine percent.  To prohibit the commission 
from making a four or five percent “compromise” award but allow it to award the 
full nine percent is nonsensical and certainly does not correct any perceived 
unfairness to employers. 
{¶10} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Ronald A. Fresco, for appellant. 
 
Robert M. Robinson, for appellee Smith. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
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