Case Title: Graham v. Springfield Vermont School District

Citation: 178 Vt. 515, 2005 VT 32, 872 A.2d 351

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Graham v. Springfield Vermont School District (2004-087); 178 Vt. 515;
872 A.2d 351

2005 VT 32

[Filed 15-Mar-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 32

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-087

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2004

  Keith Graham	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }			
       v.	                       }	Windsor Superior Court
                                       }	
  Springfield Vermont School District  }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 410-9-01 Wrcv

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant Springfield Vermont School District appeals a jury
  verdict in favor of plaintiff Keith Graham, a maintenance worker who
  claimed that the District fired him because of his speech-related union
  activities, in violation of the federal and state constitutions.  We
  conclude that the superior court erred by not considering the District's
  arguments that Graham had no direct cause of action for damages under the
  United States or Vermont Constitution, which should have resulted in
  dismissal of Graham's claims.  Accordingly, we vacate the jury verdict in
  favor of Graham and enter judgment in favor of the District.

       ¶  2.  This case commenced after the District terminated Graham's
  employment in April 2001 because he allegedly misappropriated school
  equipment and then was not forthcoming about what happened with the
  equipment.  Graham had worked for the District for more than twenty-five
  years at the time of his termination.  He filed a lawsuit in August 2001,
  alleging that the District fired him because of his age and in retaliation
  for union activities that he had engaged in over the years.  In October
  2001, the trial court entered a scheduling order requiring the parties to
  file all pretrial dispositive motions by July 15, 2002.  Shortly before
  that deadline, the District filed a motion for summary judgment.  In
  September 2002, the trial court granted the District's motion with respect
  to all of Graham's claims except for his claim brought directly under the
  federal and state constitutions alleging that the District fired him
  because of his free speech activities.  The court declined to dismiss that
  claim due to the lack of briefing on whether Graham's union activities
  implicated constitutional issues.  A May 2003 trial on that claim resulted
  in a hung jury.
   
       ¶  3.  On August 18, 2003, two new attorneys replaced the District's
  previous counsel.  Approximately one week later, a second trial was
  scheduled to begin on September 22, 2003 before a new judge and jury.  On
  September 2, the District filed a motion to amend its answer to assert
  additional affirmative defenses.  Specifically, the District asserted that
  (1) Graham could not bring a damages action for violation of free speech
  rights directly under the United States Constitution because of the
  availability of a federal statutory remedy, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Graham
  had no right of action based on the Vermont Constitution's free speech
  clause because of the availability of a state statutory remedy, the Vermont
  Municipal Labor Relations Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 1721-1735; and (3) the District
  had not waived its defense of sovereign immunity.  Graham opposed the
  District's motion to amend, arguing that the new defenses were futile.  The
  trial court denied the District's motion, stating that the new defenses did
  not challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and that they should
  have been raised earlier.  The court indicated that it was not inclined to
  allow new legal theories after the first trial had ended.

       ¶  4.  The second trial began on September 22 and lasted four days. 
  At the close of Graham's case, the District moved for judgment as a matter
  of law on the same grounds that it had raised in its motion to amend.  The
  court denied that motion, as well as the District's motion for judgment as
  a matter of law filed at the close of all evidence.  The jury returned a
  verdict in favor of Graham and awarded him $257,728.  In response to the
  District's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the
  alternative, its request for a remittitur, the court ruled that the
  evidence supported the jury's award, and that the District's attempt to
  raise new legal issues less than three weeks before commencement of the
  second trial prejudiced both the court and Graham by not allowing him
  sufficient time to prepare.  On  appeal, the District argues that the trial
  court erred (1) by refusing to allow it to raise additional affirmative
  defenses before the second trial even though those defenses would have
  precluded Graham's claims and there was no showing of prejudice; (2) by
  finding sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation even though
  Graham's alleged speech related primarily to internal workplace matters
  rather than issues of public concern and there was no evidence that
  Graham's termination resulted from his speech or union activities; and (3)
  by refusing to grant a remittitur even though the jury failed to reduce
  Graham's future losses to present value, as the trial court had instructed
  it to do.
        
       ¶  5.  We find little evidence in the record demonstrating either
  that Graham engaged in constitutionally protected speech activities
  involving a public concern or that his speech was a motivating factor in
  the District's decision to fire him.  We need not address these issues,
  however, because we conclude that Graham did not have a direct cause of
  action under either the United States or Vermont Constitution, and that the
  trial court should have dismissed Graham's remaining claims on that basis. 
  Both the District, in its motion to amend, and the court, in its ruling on
  that motion, treated the District's new defenses as affirmative defenses
  that had to have been raised in the District's answer to Graham's
  complaint.  None of the defenses raised by the District's new attorneys
  following the first trial, however, is one of the affirmative defenses
  explicitly set forth in V.R.C.P. 8(c).  While the list in Rule 8 is not
  exclusive, the defenses raised by the District's new attorneys challenged
  the sufficiency of the pleadings, essentially alleging a failure to state a
  claim upon which relief may be granted.  See V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  Motions
  under rule 12(b)(6) may be made "by motion for judgment on the pleadings
  [under V.R.C.P. 12(c)], or at the trial on the merits."  V.R.C.P. 12(h)(2);
  5C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367, at 216
  (3d. ed. 2004) ("The Rule 12(c) motion may be employed by the defendant as
  a vehicle for raising several of the defenses enumerated in Rule 12(b)
  after the close of the pleadings.").  "In this context, Rule 12(c) is
  merely serving as an auxiliary or supplementary procedural device to
  determine the sufficiency of the case before proceeding any further and
  investing additional resources in it."  C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, at
  217.

       ¶  6.  To be sure, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should
  be made promptly after the close of pleadings so as not to delay the trial,
  see V.R.C.P. 12(c), but "if it seems clear that the motion may effectively
  dispose of the case on the pleadings, the . . . court should permit it
  regardless of any possible delay consideration of the motion may cause." 
  C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, at 216.  By the same token, with respect to a
  motion to amend, "V.R.C.P. 15 directs the trial court to consider not
  whether the amendment raises a new cause of action but 'whether the just
  and expeditious disposition of the controversy between the parties will be
  advanced by permitting the amendment.' " Perkins v. Windsor Hosp. Corp.,
  142 Vt. 305, 313,