Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Link

Citation: 380 Md. 405

Docket Number: 97ag/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 97
September Term, 2002
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
HAROLD S. LINK, JR.
Bell, C.J.
           Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
                 
Eldridge, John C. 
(retired, specially assigned),         
                          
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Wilner and Battaglia, JJ., concur
Raker and Eldridge, JJ., concur in judgment only
Filed: March 19, 2004
1Maryland Rule 16-751 provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.- Upon approval of
the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.” 
2Maryland Rule of Professional conduct 4.4 provides:
“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person,
or use methods of obtaining evidence that the lawyer knows violate the
legal rights of such person.’
3 MRPC 8.4 (d) provides:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
*     *     *     *
 “(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice;”
*     *     *     *  
4Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order.- Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
  The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, acting pursuant
to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 approved the filing by Bar Counsel of a  Petition For Disciplinary
or Remedial Action charging the respondent, Harold S. Link, Jr., with violating Rule 4.4,
Respect for Rights of Third Persons,2 of the  Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”), as adopted by Maryland rule 16-812 and, in so doing, acting in a manner
prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of M RPC 8.4 (d). 3   We referred the
case to the Honorable Robert E. Cadigan, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, for
hearing, Rule 16-752 (a), 4 and to find facts and draw conclusions of law. See 16-757 (c).5
of motions, and hearing.”  
5Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions.- The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
6In that letter, consisting of approximately 5 ½ single spaced pages, the respondent
painstakingly presents his side of the incident.   The respondent’s bottom line is that he
did nothing wrong and, indeed, he was the model of decorum and was himself victimized. 
According to the respondent, the complaint was riddled with “so many blatant lies” that it
was difficult to know where to start to answer it.
2
Following the hearing, at which the complainant, Wilbert Myles, the complainant’s
supervisor and the respondent, both for himself and in the petitioner’s case, all testified, the
hearing court concluded that the respondent violated the rules charged.   Those conclusions
were based on the findings of fact made by  the court, after summarizing the testimony, as
follows:
“1.  The Incident of May 10, 2002
“The Respondent’s testimony (hereinafter “Link”) is best summarized by his letter
directed to Mr. Grossman dated July 4, 2002 introduced as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (E) ....6
“In addition, Link  testified at the hearing that he has been a member of the Maryland
Bar since 1990.  He engages in a general practice working out of his home in Cockeysville.
His practice emphasizes personal injury litigation.  He employs no associates, paralegals or
3
secretaries.  Approximately 90% of his personal injury clients are African American.  Link
is Caucasian.
“In his testimony. Link alluded to ‘problems’ he previously encountered at the MVA
in Towson when a clerk informed him he was not entitled to certain information ‘because of
the Privacy Act.’  Following calls to one of the ‘higher-ups’ at MVA, Link concluded that
the ‘whole MVA system is imbued with violations of the Maryland Public Information Act.’
He referred to another prior incident with a ‘government employee’ following which he
asked to see the employee’s supervisor.   He indicates that his conversation with the
supervisor ‘was not friendly.’
“When Link went to the MVA office in Mondawmin on May 10, 2002 he was ‘hoping’
they would give him the insurance coverage information he needed but he ‘wondered’ if the
MVA was ‘persisting in its policy’ of non-disclosure because of the Privacy Act.  He
purposely dressed causally because he wanted to see ‘how ordinary people are treated.’  He
is ‘appalled’ by the way he and others are ‘treated poorly.’  Link admitted that he has had
‘difficulty’ with other agencies.  His ‘standard’ is not to ‘back-down’ but rather ‘go into the
mouth of the beast.’  Link stated in closing argument that the MVA is a ‘criminal
organization’ and is ‘acting illegally.’  He argued that ‘its all about the little guy ... taking on
the government ... whistle-blowing.’   
“As stated in Link's July 4, 2002 letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1(E), he testified that the
MVA Customer Service Agent, Wilbert Myles (hereinafter ‘Myles’) was rude and curt.
4
After being asked by Myles if he was an attorney and to produce identification. Link admits
that he told Myles and his supervisor, Ms. Ryce, (hereinafter ‘Ryce’) that Myles was
incompetent, didn't know the law and ‘needs to be trained properly.’  He admits that he called
Myles ‘a loathsome bureaucrat.’  In his testimony, he stated Myles is ‘rude, arrogant,
incompetent and lazy ....  He doesn’t know the law ... he acted like a complete fool ... he was
shouting ... like a complete idiot.’  Link contends that his right to tell an employee how he
is doing his job is protected by the First Amendment.
“When Myles refused to give Link his name, he admits that he said ‘OK, Sparky, I’ve
had enough of your nonsense - let me talk to your supervisor.’  Link testified that ‘Sparky’
is a ‘meaningless term ... for someone whose name you don’t know ... it's a filler.  I would
usually say “partner.”   I am being condescending ... the term “sir” is a form of respect and
I had absolutely none.’  Link denied any knowledge that ‘Sparky’ has any racial connotation
or is in any way racially offensive.
“Finally, Link testified that he ‘calmly answered Mr. Myles’ silly questions’ and
never raised his voice during the May 2002 encounter but rather was verbally abused by
Myles.  Link contends that his conduct was ‘impeccable.’
“Wilbert Myles testified that he is 61 years old and has been a Customer Service
Agent with MVA for nine years.  He previously worked as a Senior Assistant Underwriter
with  USF&G for 15 years.  He has had "four major surgeries" and takes ‘nine pills a day’
including a ‘heart pill.’   Myles is an African American.
5
“On May 10, 2002  Link approached Myles’ work station and gave him an application
for a driver's record in which he had checked off ‘registration records.’  According to MVA
policy, Myles requested Link's driver's license as identification.  When asked ‘why’ by Link,
Myles responded that without identification, he could not give Link the requested information
because of the Privacy Act.  Myles explained that attorneys can get a complete driver’s
record including name and address.   Myles then inquired as to whether Link was an
attorney.  Link responded ‘what difference does it make?’   Myles offered an explanation
which was in accord with his training manual.  Link then stated that Myles was ‘breaking
the law’ in not providing the information.
“Myles described Link’s demeanor as ‘very smug and pretentious.’  Based upon Mr.
Myles’ ‘work experience’, he suspected that Link was an attorney because they ‘have certain
airs.’
“Myles testified that when Link continued the ‘name calling ... the maligning and the
indignities that he hurled at me’, Myles stated ‘you need to see the supervisor.’  Link stated
‘you need to bring someone out here ... because obviously you don’t know what you are
doing.’
“Before the supervisor (Ryce) was summonsed, Myles testified  that Link called him
‘Sparky’ several more times.  Myles took offense and protested that that was not his name
and that Link’s comment was demeaning, sarcastic, disrespectful and insulting.   He stated
that he was humiliated, upset, infuriated and embarrassed.  Myles further testified that
6
‘Sparky’ is just another name for the N word for ‘most people of color at my age or older.’
As Myles left his work station to speak with his supervisor, he states that Link ‘threw his
driver's license’ on the counter.
“When Myles went to his supervisor's office, she was on the telephone with
customers.  She placed the customer on ‘hold a minute’ and Myles told her ‘what had
happened.’  When the supervisor appeared, Myles testified that Link stated ‘what took
you so long?’  At the point, he stated Link was ‘irate’ and told the supervisor that ‘Sparky
over here doesn’t know his job’ and that he should be retrained because he doesn't know the
law and is incompetent.  Myles states that Link told his supervisor that ‘... the system needs
to hire folk who have a brain because everyone I have encountered throughout the system
does not have one and they are completely incompetent.’
“Myles further testified that Link asked his supervisor for his name.  She gave his last
name.  He then asked for his first name and she replied ‘Wilbert.’   Thereafter Link
continued ‘to yell’ and proceeded to refer to Myles as Wilbert which he found to be
offensive and disrespectful.
“In his supervisor’s presence, Link ‘proceeded to yell  across the counter and pointing
his finger, Wilbert, you have broken the law’  and stated that he ‘could be brought up on
charges and that type of thing.’
“Myles admitted that he has not read the Privacy Act or the Maryland Public
Information Act but states his training manual contains all relevant information.
7
“After hearing Myles’ testimony,  Link later testified that Myles was ‘a liar’ and that
Myles was ‘incredibly rude, feisty, mean’ and like the ‘Energizer bunny.’
“Delease Ryce has been a Customer Agent with MVA since 1988.   She was Myles’
supervisor at the Mondawmin office in May 2002.   While she was on the telephone, Myles
came to her office and told her that an attorney refused to show his identification.   She had
heard ‘voices’ but couldn’t hear the conversations.
“About five to ten minutes later, she left her office and went to Myles' work station.
Both Myles and Link were ‘going at it’.    Both were being ‘rude’ to each other.  Their voices
were not in a ‘conversational’ tone.  She asked M yles to be quiet and ‘let me handle it.’
“She believes Link asked her - ‘what took you so long?’  She replied that she was
talking on the phone with two customers.    She thinks Link said ‘you need to hire a
competent person.’   Link said ‘explain to me why I had to wait ten minutes.’  She replied
that ‘you didn't produce any identification.’   She explained to Link that everyone has to
show identification.  She asked Link ‘what kind of report do you need?’   She then gave him
the information he had requested.  She testified that Link was not rude to her.  She believes
Myles was ‘retaliating.’  Myles only ‘retaliated’ when Link said something to him.  It was
‘back and forth’ between Myles and Link.
“She stated that Link asked her for Myles’ name.  When she did so. Link referred to
Myles as ‘Wilbert.’   She did not hear Link call Myles ‘Sparky.’  Ryce is an African
American.
8
“The above summary of Link's testimony includes his testimony presented at the
conclusion of Bar Counsel's case.  In addition, Link did state that Myles was incredibly
‘rude’ to three customers who were in line before Link and he ‘sensed’ that Myles was
‘going to be trouble.’   He claims Myles ‘demanded’ Link’s identification and gave Link a
‘hate stare.’
Link states that Myles never told him that ‘Sparky’ was a racially offensive epithet.
Link claims that he ‘gets along with black people.’
“2.   Findings of Facts
“After considering the testimony presented at the hearing before this Court on July
30, 2003 and reviewing the exhibits admitted into evidence, this Court finds the following
facts by clear and convincing evidence:
“1.   Link casts himself in the role or protector of the ordinary citizen.   He believes
his cause is just and necessary.  His agenda is to expose what he perceives to be dual standards
and unfair policies of governmental agencies.
“2.   This was not an isolated incident.  Link had a pattern of past confrontations with
agency personnel.
“3.   Link pursues his agenda with design and purposely provokes controversy
utilizing tactics of sarcasm, verbal abuse, offensive and disrespectful language which is not
protected by the First Amendment and had no substantial purpose.
9
“4.   Link’s agenda is misguided and his conduct was unprofessional and prejudicial
to the administration of justice.
“5.   Link’s anger needs to be controlled.
“6.   Link’s testimony that he never raised his voice during this incident is not
credible.
“7.   Myles is a public servant trying to do his job.
“8.   Myles was justifiably offended and embarrassed by Link’s conduct, language and
attitude.
“9.   Ryce's testimony raised inconsistencies in Myles’ testimony.  This Court accepts
as credible Ryce’s testimony that  Myles had also raised his voice and was retaliating to Link’s
verbal abuse and sarcasm.
“10.  Ryce is a pleasant woman and credible witness.  She was acting as a ‘peace-
maker.’
“11.  Link did not know that the name ‘Sparky’ was racially offensive.  Link did
believe he was condescending.
“The undersigned has no personal knowledge of whether the name ‘Sparky’ is a racial
epithet or is racially offensive.  The undersigned has only heard the name in reference to a
World War II radioman, electrician or the baseball manager, ‘Sparky’ Anderson.
Accordingly, the undersigned is unable to make a finding of fact in that regard.
“If indeed ‘Sparky’ is racially offensive, its use is obviously unprofessional, totally
7The court summarized the referee’s findings as this count, as follows:
“[D]uring a recess to a hearing in the Berger proceedings, when Mr. Paton
entered the courtroom, Martocci said ‘here comes the father of the nut
10
inappropriate and increases the seriousness and severity of the confrontation and the
consequences.
“Whether ‘Sparky’ is offensive or innocuous in and of itself depends upon the
circumstances under which it is said, who said it and to whom it is directed.”
The petitioner filed no exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.   It did file, however, Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanctions. 
Noting the hearing court’s finding that the respondent’s conduct was unprofessional and
engaged in the pursuit of a “misguided” agenda, in which the respondent, casting himself as
the protector of the ordinary citizen, “pursues his agenda with design and purposely provokes
controversy utilizing tactics of sarcasm, verbal abuse, offensive and disrespectful language
which is not protected by the First Amendment and had no substantial purpose,” it
recommends that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for thirty  (30) days.
 In support of that recommendation, the petitioner relies on Florida Bar v. Martocci,
791 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2001), Matter of Golden, 496 S. E. 2d 619 (S. C. 1998) and Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 565 A. 2d 660 (1989).
In Martocci, the Bar charged that Martocci made “unethical, disparaging, and profane
remarks to belittle and  humiliate the opposing party, Florence Berger, and her attorney ...”
and engaged in in unethical confrontation with the opposing party’s father.7  791 So. 2d at
case.’ Mr. Paton responded by approaching respondent and saying, ‘If you
have something to say to me, say it to my face, not in front of everyone here
in the courtroom.’ Thereafter, in open court and for all to see, Martocci
closely approached Mr. Paton and threatened to beat him. Upon Ms.
Figueroa's attempt to intervene,  Martocci told her to ‘go back to Puerto
Rico.’ This confrontation only ended when a bailiff entered the courtroom.”
Florida Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (2001).
8On several occasions, Martocci called the opposing party a “nut case” and “crazy”
and, on one occasion, made “demeaning facial gestures and stuck out his tongue at” her
and her lawyer.    Martocci, 791 So. 2d at 1075. With respect to opposing counsel,
Martocci was found to have called her a “stupid idiot” and to have told her that she
should “go back to Puerto Rico.”   Id.  In addition, the court determined that he repeatedly
told her that she did not know the law or the rules of procedure and needed to return to
law school.   Id.
11
1074.  The offensive conduct occurred, it alleged, in separate incidents during the
representation of the husband in divorce proceedings and spanned a period of two years. Id.
at 1075.   The referee concluded that Martocci engaged in the charged conduct, which
consisted of directing demeaning, insulting and intemperate remarks8 to the opposing party
and her counsel and threatening, in open court, though court was not then in session, to beat
that party’s father.  Id.  The court accepted the referee’s sanction recommendation, publicly
reprimanding Martocci and placing him on two years probation, with conditions.  Id.
The conduct for which the respondent attorney in Golden was sanctioned similarly
was engaged in in connection with his representation of clients in divorce proceedings,
specifically, at two depositions.    In the first, the deposition of  his client’s former boyfriend,
who apparently informed the husband’s attorney of the former boyfriend’s  relationship with
the wife after it was terminated on advice of Golden, Golden’s examination displayed, the
9The opinion catalogues the offensive questions Golden asked the deponent.   A
few examples will suffice to give context to the court’s comments:
“(1) [Attorney]: And who was your lawyer in your first divorce?
“[Smith]: Me.
“[Attorney]: Was that because you are cheap or you think you are
12
Hearing  Panel determined, “‘his total disregard and failure to show any respect for the rights
of a third party.”  496 S. E. 2d at 622.  Moreover, it was satisfied that
“The extent, the intensity, the sarcasm and maliciousness, the unnecessary
combativeness, the gratuitous threatening and intimidation, and the unequivocal
bad manners of [Attorney's] conduct could have been for no purpose other than
to embarrass or burden [Mr. Smith].”
Id.   
The second deposition, taken in a different case, was of the wife of Golden’s client.
 After the deposition, she alleged that Golden said to her: “You are a meanspirited, vicious
witch and I don't like your face and I don't like your voice. What I'd like, is to be locked in
a room with you naked with a very sharp knife.”  Id. at 621.   Later, she stated, Golden
commented: “What we need for her [pointing to Mrs. Jones] is a big bag to put her in without
the mouth cut out.”   Id.  The hearing panel concluded that Golden, in an agitated voice and
without an attempt at humor, did call Mrs. Jones “mean spirited” and state that someone
should be locked in a room with her naked and that he would like to put a bag over her
without a hole for her mouth.  Id. at 622.     
As to the first deposition, the court agreed that the attorney had violated South
Carolina’s version of Rule 4.4.  It  stated:
“Attorney's words speak for themselves.[9] Even if we assume that the
smart enough to be your own lawyer? Is that what you think?
 “[Smith]: What kind of a question is that?
 “[Attorney]: Its a good question.
“(2) [Attorney]: I don't need criticism from you. You ain't nearly as
good as I am about answering questions or asking them. Just answer
my questions, mister.
*      *      *     *
 
“(4) [Attorney]: You are coming across as an absolutely ridiculous
person. But that's okay, you will learn the hard way.
“(5) [Attorney]: You are not smart enough to question my questions.
You are not smart enough to even answer my questions. But do the best
you can.
*     *     *     *
“(10) [Attorney]: Well, I am not going to argue with you. You are not
smart enough to argue with.
*     *     *     *
 
“(16) Attorney referred to Smith, who had been a patient at Charter
Hospital, as an "inmate" of the hospital.”
13
deposition witness was uncooperative, Attorney would not be justified abusing
this witness in the manner illustrated above. The record further shows that
Attorney interrupted Smith on numerous occasions. Moreover, the audio
recording reveals the volume of Attorney's voice was repeatedly loud, and his
statements were sarcastic, rude, or otherwise inappropriate. He acted in a
threatening and demeaning manner. His conduct was outrageous and
completely departed from the standards of our profession, much less basic
notions of human decency and civility.” 
The court concurred with the hearing panel’s conclusion that Golden’s conduct after
the second deposition violated Rule 8.4 (d), as it was prejudicial to the administration of
justice.   Id. at 623.   Noting “the serious nature of the issues and highly charged atmosphere
of the deposition,” the court concluded that “Attorney's comments only served to insult an
adverse party.”   Id.
The court  imposed as a sanction for both counts a public reprimand. 
14
Violations of Rules 4.4 and 8.4 (d) were found and sustained in Alison.   The Rule 4.4
violation was premised on the respondent’s issuance of a subpoena to a newspaper reporter
for the purpose, the hearing court found, of harassing him and preventing his reporting on
the respondent’s trial.  317 Md. at 539, 565 A. 2d at 668.      The 8.4 (d) violation was
premised, inter alia, on the behavior of the respondent toward District Court clerks.  When
the clerks refused, in compliance with a judge’s order, to accept for filing papers tendered
by   the respondent post judgment, the respondent demanded, “you have to take the fucking
papers,” and in their presence, used other profanities, including referring to  the attorney for
his opponent as a “son of a bitch” and an “asshole.”  Id. at 531, 565 A. 2d at 663-64.   As he
left  the area, he said “fuck you” to the supervisor.    The respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for ninety days.
With respect to the Rule 4.4 violation, the Court rejected the only challenge to its
inapplicability, the respondent’s argument, that it did not apply due to the fact that he was not
representing a client, only himself.   It recognized, in connection with the Rule 8.4 violation
involving the verbal abuse of the District Court clerks, that there is a difference between
hurling epithets during a judicial proceeding and engaging in the  same conduct outside the
courtroom.  317 Md. at 536-537, 565 A. 2d at 666.   The Court pointed out, nevertheless, that
while “[a]ttorneys are not prohibited from using profane or vulgar language at all times and
under all circumstances, they are prohibited from using such language when to do so would
be prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Id. at 538, 565 A. 2d at 667, citing  In Re
10The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that, because his speech was
protected, he could not be sanctioned as a result of it, relying on   Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309-10, 60 S. Ct. 900, 906, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940)
(“Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal
act would raise no question under that instrument.”) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U. S. 568, 571-572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942). 
11The pleading containing the respondent’s exceptions is captioned, inadvertently,
we are sure, “Exceptions of Petitioner to Recommendations of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County.”
15
Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn.1987).
Assuming that the respondent’s words directed to the clerks were protected speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment, the Court held that his speech and conduct on
that occasion did not comply with the reasonable, necessary, and content-neutral restrictions
imposed upon attorneys by the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.10  Id. at 537, 565
A. 2d at 666-667.   We explained:
“We have no hesitancy in concluding that Alison's  conduct in his professional
dealings with the clerks was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  It is
not difficult to visualize the damage to the court system and to the reputation
of the legal profession that would result if attorneys were free to conduct their
daily business with court clerks in the manner employed by Alison.  This court
has not only the authority but the obligation to censure conduct of this kind by
an attorney.  As in the case of speech within a courtroom, the restrictions are
content-neutral, reasonable, necessary, and do not contravene First Amendment
rights.”
Id. at 538, 565 A. 2d at 667.
 
The respondent filed exceptions to the findings of fact and the  conclusions of law of
the hearing court.11   To say that the respondent disagrees with the hearing court’s findings
12The respondent boasts that he is prone “to criticizing government agencies, and
other institutions and individuals, when I feel that they are breaking the law.”  
Elucidating, he says:
“I do this in my own personal life, and I do it as part of my law practice.  
When I took my oath as an attorney, I was under the impression that it was
my duty to uphold the law and to resist illegality on the part of the
government, not to shill for a particular administration, political party,
minority group, or politically useful group, such as government employees.  
I am afforded protection for my activities by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.   One of the most sacrosanct aspects of that law,
16
of fact is to engage in understatement.   Indeed, what he thinks of the hearing court’s fact
finding is summarized quite early in his submission:
“2.  The blatant piece of advocacy for the Commission masquerading as a
Memorandum Opinion by Judge Cadigan is disgraceful.   It goes beyond
rubber-stamping and well into the realm of overt cheerleading for the
Commission.   It constitutes the actions of a shameless sycophant who has
openly colluded with the Commission to bring about a preordained result.   It
is obvious that my complete testimony was disregarded by Judge Cadigan,
except for those portions which could be regarded as detrimental to my case,
which were ruthlessly recorded, and frequently distorted.   Mr. Myles’
testimony, which was riddled with inconsistencies and numerous outright lies,
was treated as holy writ.”
Thereafter, the respondent details at length the various deficiencies from which he believes
the Memorandum Opinion suffers, characterizing them as errors, inaccuracies and intentional
distortions.   In addition, the respondent accuses the hearing court of abdicating its
responsibility as finder of fact.
Concerning the court’s conclusion that he violated Rule 4.4, the respondent maintains
that the Rule either does not apply or is unconstitutionally vague.   If the Rule does apply, he
submits, his speech directed to Mr. Myles and in criticism of the government,12 was protected
and one of the battlefields on which so many conflicts have raged against
petty, tyrannical court systems that have tried unsuccessfully to invalidate
the concept, is my right to criticize my government.    What the Court is
going to do in this case does not merely have a chilling effect on those
rights - it is a blizzard.   It effectively completes the downward spiral begun
in the Alison case and effectively deprives 30,000 Maryland attorneys of
anything remotely resembling human dignity.   The Commission seeks to
give Rule 8.4 d an interpretation that is so broad, so intentionally ill-
defined, so vague, and so all-encompassing that it will make all of the other
rules superfluous....”
17
speech, that did not disrupt the operations of a courthouse and, therefore, is not sanctionable.
In any event, the respondent asserts: “I had a substantial purpose in criticizing Wilbert
Myles’ conduct.   I had no intent to embarrass, delay, or burden him.   If such was the result
of my decision to criticize a government, then the fault was his and not mine.    I was delayed
and burdened because of his illegal actions which did not even comply with his own training
manual, let alone state or federal law.”  
It is well settled that, in attorney discipline cases, we review the findings of fact of the
hearing court to determine whether they are based on clear and convincing evidence.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 74, 839 A. 2d 718, 736 (2003); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 158, 825 A. 2d 430, 446 (2003); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566, 577, 805 A. 2d 1040, 1046 (2002); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d 174, 179 (1990).  Indeed, we
conduct an independent review of the record.   Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, 368
18
Md. 277, 288, 793 A.2d 535, 542 (2002). Moreover, we have said, the “hearing court's
findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be
clearly erroneous,” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d
465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347,
624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McCoy, 369 Md. 226, 234-
235, 798 A. 2d 1132, 1137 (2002), and that we will not disturb those factual findings  if they
are based on clear and convincing evidence. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368
Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002). On the other hand, the ultimate question, whether
a lawyer has violated the professional rules, what, in other words,  to make of those facts,
rests with this Court.  Post, 379 Md. at 74, 839 A. 2d at 726; Garland, 345 Md. at 392, 692
A.2d at 469; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 599, 667 A.2d 659, 663
(1995). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 240, 812 A. 2d 981,
990 (2001). 
The findings of fact in this case are not clearly erroneous.   In fact, there is ample
evidence in the record, which we have independently reviewed, to support each of them.  
To be sure, the hearing court did not address expressly each of the defenses the respondent
raised or specifically reject his various contentions concerning the complaining witness’s
credibility.   As we stated recently, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Braskey, 378 Md.
425, 446, 836 A. 2d 605, 618 (2003), that is not required.   In Braskey, we explained:
“We are unable to say why the hearing judge omitted reference to respondent’s
testimony regarding the February calls. It may be that the judge did not believe
19
respondent; it may have been an oversight. In any case, even if the judge
believed respondent, the hearing judge is not required to recount all of the
evidence presented at the hearing. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n  v.
Granger, 374 Md. 438, 453, 823 A.2d 611, 620 (2003) (noting that ‘it is
elementary that the hearing judge ‘may elect to pick and choose which evidence
to rely upon’”).”
The respondent’s exceptions, to the extent that they challenge the hearing court’s findings
of fact, are overruled. 
Turning to the question of whether, as the petitioner contends, the respondent violated
Rules 4.4 and 8.4 (d) or, as the respondent maintains, the rules do not apply or he did not
violate them, we have been referred to no case, and we have found none, in which the
conduct sought to be sanctioned occurred under circumstances similar to those sub judice.
In the cases on which the petitioner relies, including Alison, and the cases we have found,
see In the Matter of Weir, 668 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 1996);  In the Matter of Burns, 657 N.E.2d
738 (Ind. 1995); In the Matter of Vincenti, 554 A.2d 470 (N. J. 1989); In the Matter of
McAlevy, 354 A.2d 289 (N. J. 1976);  In the Matter of Mezzacca, 340 A.2d 658 (N.J. 1975),
the offending conduct occurred during the actual litigation process or while interviewing
clients or others in connection with  litigation or potential litigation.
Thus, in Burns, the conduct for which the attorney was sanctioned consisted of
threatening behavior and remarks made to a party to the litigation during the recess of a pre-
trial hearing.   More specifically, the attorney said, inter alia, 
“Let me . . . let me warn you about something. If you file anything with the
bankruptcy court against me, I'll be asking for attorney fees and punitive
damages. You have my word on it, . . . And the next time you write my client
20
a letter, I'm not going to file anything with the Court; I'm going to come over
to your house and I'm going to hit you in the head with a baseball bat. Now, you
may not be practicing law, but you know better than that. If I ever find out you
wrote my client a letter again or sent him anything, you've got me to deal with.
Do you understand: You better understand it right now, because I'm not going
to tell you a second time. Now, that's my promise to you, right here on the
record. I'm going to come over to your house and beat you half to death with a
baseball bat.”
657 N. E. 2d at 739.   Later, the attorney, aware that he was speaking on the record,  
acknowledged that he was threatening the opposing party physically, adding:
“You'll either follow the rules or you'll have to deal with me. Do you
understand? And if I have to tell you that again, you're going to go out of here
in a hospital van. Don't press your luck, . . . Don't press your luck. Because
you're not going to like me if I'm angry. You won't walk away from it, I
guarantee you. Don't look grave to me, because if you do, you're a . . .
(obscenity). swear to God.”
Id.     The court concluded that the respondent violated Rules 4.4 and 8.4 (d), reasoning: his
“threatening behavior to a defendant had no purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or
burden such person. Conduct of this nature during the course of a legal proceeding is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Id. 
 
The conduct, described by the court as rude, intimidating  and disruptive, for which
the respondent in Mezzacca was sanctioned - he was reprimanded -  as in violation of Rules
4.4 and 8.4 (d), occurred before an administrative review board conducting departmental
hearings in connection with misconduct charges brought against the attorney’s client.  340
A. 2d at 658.  The court summarized the offending conduct, as follows:
“When respondent appeared before the review  board he challenged its right to
hear the matter on the ground it was in no way legally constituted.  He claimed
21
the sheriff was biased against his client and was just looking for the opportunity
to get rid of him.  He asserted that the proceeding was a conspiracy to violate
his client's civil rights and demanded that the hearing “stop right now.” During
the course of the hearing respondent referred to the board as a “Kangaroo
Court.” He said the hearing was “a waste of county money, perpetrated by a
demented sheriff that thinks he is a King or a God.” He characterized the
members of the board as “Nazis, that's what you are.’ He told one of the
members of the board that “You may have to answer to a higher tribunal than
this before this is over, including the Grand Jury.” He made numerous
accusations as to lying and threatened several times to go to the prosecutor and
have the person indicted. At one point respondent said: “If you want Mr. Jones
to be indicted put him on the stand.  Because I will  see to it that he will be
indicted. Believe me, he will be indicted.”
Id. at 658-59.
In Vincenti, the misconduct, for which the respondent was suspended for three months
and until further order of court, occurred during a trial call and at the trial of a civil personal
injury action that the respondent filed on behalf of his client.   It consisted of engaging in a
course of harassment and intimidation in an actively-litigated case in the Superior Court
against his adversary and his witness, including challenging opposing counsel and his witness
to a fight on several occasions, using loud, abusive, and profane language against his
adversary and opposing witness, and, on at least one occasion, employing racial innuendo.
554 A. 2d at 473.  According to the court: “This conduct was pervasive and recurrent,
continuing from the time of the trial call until after the filing of a motion for a new trial.  It
indisputably was, or had the clear capacity to be, disruptive, distracting, and unsettling to
persons having significant responsibilities and important roles in the handling of the
litigation.”  Id.
22
The respondent in McAlevy was sanctioned, a reprimand, for misconduct during a
criminal trial.   At a bench conference out of the jury’s hearing, the respondent responded to
the request by the Deputy Attorney General to keep his voice down with a threat of physical
violence.   Subsequently, during a chambers conference, in the course of an argument
concerning the scope of a sequestration order, the respondent, reacting to remarks of the
Deputy Attorney General, flew into a rage, “sprang from his chair screaming, grabbed
opposing counsel by the throat and began to choke him” and a melee between the two men
thereafter ensued until broken up with the assistance of the judge, his law clerk and others.
There were three incidents in Weir.   In each of them, the attorney, in the presence of
a third party, in each instance a woman, fondled his genitals and or masturbated.   In the first,
he was meeting with a defendant in his capacity as Deputy Prosecuting Attorney to discuss
resolution of her case by pre-trial diversion.   In the second, the woman was a client who was
consulting the respondent about filing bankruptcy.    The third incident also involved a client,
a student, who was at the time engaged in working off the fee she owed the respondent by
babysitting at his home.   
 
In this case, the conduct in which the respondent engaged and the remarks he made
to the third party, while occurring during the representation of a client and in the course of
obtaining information beneficial to that client, did  not occur in the courthouse or involve
court personnel.   Neither were the parties to the litigation or their attorneys involved in the
confrontation or  the objects of the respondent’s conduct or remarks.  And it was not during
23
the actual litigation process or any one of its stages that the incident at issue took place.
Rather, the confrontation was with, and the resulting conduct and remarks were directed at,
an agent of the custodian of the records that the respondent was attempting to obtain and was
the result of the respondent’s perception that the requirements for accessing the information
imposed by the agent were improper and even illegal.
To be sure, at the foundation of the rule of law is  respect for the law, the courts and
judges who administer it.   And the attorneys who practice law and appear  in the courts are
officers of the court.  McAlevy, 354 A. 2d at 290-291.    Consistently, as Chief Justice
Benham of the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out:
“The practice of law is an honorable profession that requires a high standard of
conduct of its members. It is a high calling where competence, civility,
community  service, and public service are integral parts of the professional
standards. It is not a profession where  disrespectful, discourteous, and impolite
conduct should be nurtured and encouraged. Such conduct should be alien to
any honorable profession.
“Those who hold themselves out as lawyers should realize that they help shape
and mold public opinion as to the role of the law and their role as lawyers. The
law sets standards for society and lawyers serve as problem solvers when
conflicts arise. To fulfill their responsibility as problem solvers, lawyers must
exhibit a high degree of respect for each other, for the court system, and for the
public. By doing so, lawyers help to   enhance respect for and trust in our legal
system. These notions of respect and trust are critical to the proper functioning
of the legal process.”
Butts v. State, 546 S.E.2d 472, 485-86 (2001) (Benham, C. J., Concurring).
It follows, therefore, and, indeed cannot be gainsaid, that attorneys are required to act
with common courtesy and civility at all times in their dealings with those concerned with
the legal process, McAlevy, 354 A. 2d at 290-291, see Alison, 317 Md. at 537, 565 A.2d at
24
666, and that “[c]onduct calculated to intimidate and distract those who, though in an
adversarial position, have independent responsibilities and important roles in the effective
administration of justice cannot be countenanced.”   Vincenti, 554 A.2d at 473.   Thus,
“[v]ilification, intimidation, abuse and threats have no place in the legal arsenal[,]”
Mezzacca, 340 A. 2d at 659, common courtesy and civility being expected from a member
of the bar whether   appearing before the State's highest court, some administrative body or
proceedings ancillary to, but a necessary part of, the litigation.  Id.  This is so because the
effectiveness of the adversary system depends on the effectiveness of adversary counsel and
because conduct characterized by “the undue and extraneous oppression and harassment of
participants involved in litigation” and “consciously and intentionally engage[d] in” perverts
advocacy.  Vincenti 554 A. 2d  at 473-74.   Moreover, 
“Such conduct redounds only to the detriment of the proper administration of
justice, which depends vitally on the reasonable balance between adversaries
and on opposing counsels' respect, trust, and knowledge of the adversary
system. There cannot be genuine respect of the adversary system without
respect for the adversary, and disrespect for the adversary system bespeaks
disrespect for the court and the proper administration of justice.”
Id. at 474.   An attorney whose conduct in the practice of law is characterized by lack of
civility, good manners and common courtesy  tarnishes the image of what the bar stands for.
McAlevy, 354 A. 2d at 291.  
As indicated, this case does not fall within this construct.    The respondent was not
dealing in this case with a person “concerned with the legal process;” the complainant is not
a party to litigation in which the respondent is attorney, nor is he a witness or opposing
25
counsel.    Moreover, the respondent’s interaction with the complainant was not during the
course of litigation or court proceedings; while the respondent was representing a client, he
was gathering information that may become evidence in a trial and, thus, he was engaged
solely in preparation for litigation, rather than actually being involved in litigation.
Nevertheless, it is true, this Court has interpreted the phrase, “prejudicial to the
administration of justice” broader than the practice of law, to encompass “conduct the lawyer
engages in outside his or her role as a lawyer.”Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Childress, 360
Md. 373, 383, 758 A.2d 117, 122 (2000).   See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheinbein,
372 Md. 224, 251, 812 A2d 981, 997 (2002) (“this Court has found conduct to be prejudicial
to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) when there has either been conduct
that is criminal in nature or conduct that relates to the practice of law”); Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Black, 362 Md. 574, 766 A.2d 119 (2001) (finding a Rule 8.4 (d) violation for
possession of cocaine); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 745 A.2d
1086 (2000) (failing to file, and pay, personal income taxes); Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v.Painter, 356 Md. 293, 739 A.2d 24 (1999) (committing acts of domestic violence);
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 251, 739 A.2d 1, 2 (1999)(“To be
sure, it cannot be gainsaid that the possession of cocaine by a lawyer, an officer of the court,
especially when it results in a conviction and probation is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.”).  See also  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712
A.2d 525, 532 (1998), in which we said:
26
“The respondent argues that to be conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, the act must be one that hinders or otherwise
interferes with a judicial proceeding of which he is a party or represents a party.
This Court has never so narrowly defined Rule 8.4(d). We have instead
recognized that conduct that impacts on the image or the perception of the
courts or the legal profession, see  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Alison, 317 Md.
523, 536, 565 A.2d 660, 666 (1989) and that engenders disrespect for the courts
and for the legal profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Lawyers are officers of the court and their conduct must be assessed in that
light.”
We have suggested, however, but have not tested whether, a lawyer's non-criminal,
purely private conduct might be a basis for discipline under Rule 8.4 (d).   See Childress, 360
Md. at 385-86. (suggesting that, while Rule 8.4(d) has been applied in our cases only to
conduct which is related to the practice of law, directly or indirectly, or when there has been
a criminal conviction or conduct which is criminal in nature, a lawyer's non-criminal, purely
private conduct might be a basis for discipline under the Rule, noting specifically that “the
harm, or potential harm, in a stranger soliciting sex over the Internet to young girls, after
imploring them to keep the meeting a secret from their parents, is patent”).    Because the
conduct in Childress was arguably criminal, the issue was not addressed in that case.
The issue must be addressed in this case.    The respondent’s conduct, as found by the
hearing court, was rude, boorish, insensitive, oppressive and certainly insulting, but it was
not even arguably criminal.   Nor was the respondent engaged in a purely personal pursuit.
Although he was representing a client at the time of the incident, that fact was not readily
apparent or sought to be emphasized.  Indeed, the respondent resisted informing the
complainant that he was a lawyer.    A confrontation, with resulting similar behavior by the
13In response to the Report of the Task Force on Professionalism, chaired by the
Honorable Lynne Battaglia, this Court authorized, on December 16, 2003,  the formation
of a Professionalism Commission.    Its purpose is “to develop a consensus about the
definition of professionalism and to examine ways to promote professionalism among
Maryland’s lawyers and to provide sustained attention and assistance to the task of
ensuring that the practice of law remains a high calling, enlisted in the service of client
and public good.”   It is not intended to, and will not,  be a vehicle for the micro-
management of all aspects of the legal profession, including purely private activities and
conduct. 
27
respondent, likely  would have occurred in any event. 
To be sure, conduct of the kind exhibited by the respondent in this case when directed
toward a member of the public by a lawyer  negatively affects the perception of lawyers and,
in that sense, may breed disrespect for the legal profession and potentially for the courts.  See
Alison, 317 Md. at 536, 565 A. 2d at 666.   Undoubtedly, it reinforced the complainant’s
already negative view of lawyers.  As important as civility and professionalism are as
professional standards and as desirable as it is that civility and common courtesy be the rule
of the day in the interpersonal relations between citizens, it is neither feasible nor desirable
that every social interaction between a lawyer and a non-lawyer be regulated to insure that
the lawyer acts, in each such instance, with the requisite civility and courtesy. 13    Only when
such purely private conduct is criminal or so egregious as to make the harm, or potential
harm, flowing from it patent will that conduct be considered as prejudicing, or being
prejudicial to, the administration of justice.
This Court considers the respondent’s conduct in this case to be most inappropriate
and unfortunate,  and it is conduct that we do not condone.   Nevertheless, it being neither
28
criminal nor conduct of the kind that the harm or potential harm flowing from it is patent, we
hold that it is not conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and, thus, is not
sanctionable.    The petition for disciplinary action is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
    
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 97
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
HAROLD S. LINK, JR.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
           Eldridge, John C.
(retired, specially assigned)
   JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Wilner, J.,
which Battaglia, J., joins
______________________________________
Filed: March 19, 2004
-1-
I join in the Court’s Opinion, because I believe that, however inappropriate Link’s
behavior was, it did not constitute a violation of MRPC 8.4(d).  I write separately only to
express my indignation over Link’s behavior in this Court during argument on Bar Counsel’s
petition.  On more than one occasion, he accused Deputy Bar Counsel of suborning perjury,
a criminal offense in this State.  He was questioned about that, whether his accusation was
mere (but nonetheless grossly inappropriate) rhetorical flourish or whether he really meant
to accuse bar counsel of criminal behavior, and he made clear that it was the latter.
There is utterly no basis in the record for such an accusation.  Link’s unsupported
accusation cannot be used against him in this proceeding, but I find it inexcusable and
deplorable.  If Link continues to act as he has done, belittling other people and making
unfounded accusations against them, he is surely headed for additional problems with Bar
Counsel and with this Court. 
Judge Battaglia has authorized me to state that she joins in this concurring opinion.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-03-001185
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 97
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
HAROLD S. LINK, JR.
_______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C. (retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
_______________________________________________
Concurring opinion by Raker, J.,
in which Eldridge, J., joins
______________________________________________
Filed: March 19, 2004
Raker, J., with whom Eldridge, J. joins, concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the Court and would dismiss the petition because Bar
Counsel has not sustained its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent used a means in representing a client that had no substantial purpose other than
to embarrass, delay or burden a third person, in violation of Rule 4.4.  Respondent’s
conduct, although highly inappropriate and unprofessional, was not unethical subjecting him
to discipline under the Rules of Professional Conduct.
I.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that because respondent, although he was
representing a client, was not dealing with a person concerned with the legal process, this
case does not fall within the construct of Rule 4.4, Respect for Rights of Third Persons.  See
maj. op. at 24.  As I read the majority opinion, the majority determines that in order to come
within the ambit of Rule 4.4, the complainant must be a party to the litigation in which the
respondent is an attorney, a witness or opposing counsel.  Id. at 24-25.  Moreover, gathering
information in preparation for a trial or conduct in preparation for litigation would not fall
within the Rule.  It seems to me that Rule 4.4 is broad enough to cover the conduct of a
lawyer who, while acting in that capacity, interacts with a State employee and uses means
in representing a client which have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or
burden a third person.
In considering whether respondent violated Rule 4.4, we look at the purpose of his
-2-
actions rather than the effect.  Maryland Rule 4.4 focuses on the “substantial purpose” of the
lawyer’s actions, and not on the effect the conduct might have upon the third person.  See
American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 4.4 cmt. at
424 (4th ed. 1996); Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (Idaho 2002);
Mississippi Bar v. Robb, 684 So. 2d 615, 621 (Miss. 1996).  I agree with the majority’s
analysis that respondent’s confrontation in the matter sub judice “was with, and the resulting
conduct and remarks were directed at, an agent of the custodian of the records that the
respondent was attempting to obtain and was the result of the respondent’s perception that
the requirements for accessing the information imposed by the agent were improper and
even illegal.”  Maj. op. at 23.  Although respondent was rude, his purpose was not to
embarrass, delay or burden a third person.  Accordingly, Bar Counsel has not proven a
violation of the Rule.
II.
I also do not subscribe to the majority’s construct of Rule 8.4(d).  The majority sets
out a two-prong test to determine if a lawyer’s conduct comes within the Rule:  “Only when
such purely private conduct is criminal or so egregious as to make the harm, or potential
harm, flowing from it patent will that conduct be considered as prejudicing, or being
prejudicial to, the administration of justice.”  Maj. op. at 27 (emphasis added).  I agree that
the Rule covers criminal conduct.  I do not agree, however, with the view that the Rule is
-3-
applicable to any conduct which is so egregious as to make the harm, or potential harm,
flowing from it patent.  The phrase “prejudicial to the administration of justice” is not
defined in the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor do the rules or our case law give guidance
for application to specific circumstances.  The standard embraced by the majority is
ambiguous and elusive.  It smacks of “I can’t define it but I know it when I see it.”  Simply
because some conduct is so obviously violative of the Rule and “prejudicial to the
administration of justice” does not, in my view, save the Rule.  It is unfair to lawyers in the
State to be subject simply to the moral barometer of four judges of this Court.  Due process
requires more—a lawyer is entitled to have fair notice of conduct which would subject him
or her to discipline under the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The standard adopted by the
Court today fails to give fair notice.
I would construe Rule 8.4(d) to apply to criminal conduct or, when dealing with
private conduct, such conduct that is in some way connected to the practice of law.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 812 A.2d 981(2002) (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting, joined by Raker, J.).  Judge Eldridge pointed out that, until Sheinbein, this Court
has found conduct to be in violation of Rule 8.4(d) only when there has been conduct that
is criminal in nature, or when the lawyer’s conduct concerned his own legal practice or his
relationship with his clients.  Id. at 276-77, 812 A.2d at 1011-12.
In sum, I do not subscribe to the majority’s two-prong description of the various types
of conduct which violate Rule 8.4(d) because that description does not capture an essential
-4-
element, which is that the conduct must either be criminal conduct, or conduct that has some
connection, directly or indirectly, to the practice of law.
Judge Eldridge authorizes me to state that he joins in this concurring opinion.