Case Title: State v. Herring

Citation: 2014-Ohio-5228

Docket Number: 2011-0451

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Herring, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5228.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-5228 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HERRING, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Herring, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5228.] 
Criminal law—Postconviction relief—Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in 
capital case—Deficient investigation of mitigating evidence—Reasonable 
probability that but for deficiency, result of penalty phase would have 
been different—Decision remanding for new sentencing hearing affirmed. 
(No. 2011-0451—Submitted April 29, 2014—Decided December 3, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, 
No. 08-MA-213, 2011-Ohio-662. 
_________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, the state challenges a decision of the court of 
appeals granting the petition for postconviction relief of the defendant-appellee, 
Willie Herring, a death-row inmate.  The state challenges the appellate court’s 
finding that Herring’s counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to 
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properly prepare for the mitigation phase of trial and the court’s decision to order 
a new sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 2} We hold that the court of appeals properly applied the standards set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), in holding that trial counsel were deficient in preparing for mitigation and 
that the deficiency was prejudicial.  Accordingly, we uphold the decision of the 
court of appeals vacating the death penalty and remanding the matter to the trial 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
I. Facts 
{¶ 3} Evidence presented at trial showed that Herring and five other 
individuals robbed the Newport Inn, a bar in Youngstown, shortly after midnight 
on April 30, 1996.  They shot five people, robbed the till, and left.  Three of the 
five victims died and two others were seriously wounded.  See State v. Herring, 
94 Ohio St.3d 246, 762 N.E.2d 940 (2002). 
{¶ 4} Herring was the evident ringleader of these crimes.  Id. at 266.  
The participants had gathered at Herring’s house before the robbery.  Id. at 246.  
Herring provided three of the individuals with handguns and kept a 9 mm Cobray 
semiautomatic for himself.  Id. at 246-247.  Herring donned a Halloween mask, 
which was a “store-bought” mask similar to one seen in “slasher” movies.  No 
one else had a similar mask; the others hid their faces with bandanas or a T-shirt.  
Id. at 247. 
{¶ 5} Ronald Marinelli, the Newport Inn’s owner, was tending bar that 
night.  Several customers were in the bar, including Deborah Aziz, Herman Naze 
Sr., Dennis Kotheimer, and Jimmie Lee Jones.  Id. 
{¶ 6} Upon bursting into the bar, one of the gunmen ordered Naze to 
“[g]ive me your fucking money.”  Id.  When Naze stated that he did not have any 
money, the gunman shot him.  Then Herring shot Aziz, who fell to the floor.  She 
managed to crawl away and hide behind a cooler and a trash can.  She later 
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described her assailant’s mask as “a hard plastic, like one of those Jason masks.”  
Id. 
{¶ 7} Herring then walked around the end of the bar and approached 
Marinelli and the cash register.  He shot Marinelli four times in the stomach from 
about five feet away.  Marinelli managed to stay on his feet as Herring came 
closer.  94 Ohio St.3d at 247, 762 N.E.2d 940.  Herring told Marinelli, “Give me 
your fucking money.”  Despite his wounds, Marinelli obeyed, handing over the 
cash in the register.  Id. at 248.  But Herring screamed that Marinelli had not 
given him everything.  As Herring threatened to “blow [Marinelli’s] brains out,” 
Marinelli gave him money from a nearby drawer.  Herring then screamed for 
more money.  Marinelli urged him to “[b]e cool” and told him that there was no 
more.  Herring responded by leveling his gun at Marinelli’s head.  Id. 
{¶ 8} Marinelli reached into the drawer again and pulled out a gun.  But 
Marinelli was so weak that Herring easily took it away from him.  Marinelli 
collapsed.  Herring then said, “You ain’t dead yet, motherfucker,” and shot 
Marinelli in the legs as he lay on the floor.  Id. 
{¶ 9} After Herring shot Marinelli, Aziz heard Kotheimer say, “You 
motherfucker.”  Then she heard more shots.  Marinelli saw Kotheimer get shot 
but did not see who shot him.  Nobody saw who shot Jones.  Id. 
{¶ 10} Following the arrival of the police, the shooting victims were taken 
to a Youngstown hospital.  Naze, Jones, and Kotheimer died from their wounds.  
Id. 
II. Trial results and the mitigation hearing 
{¶ 11} At trial, Herring was convicted of three counts of complicity to 
commit aggravated murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, two 
counts of aggravated robbery, and firearm specifications.  94 Ohio St.3d at 248-
249, 762 N.E.2d 940.  As to Count One, the murder of Jones, the jury found 
Herring not guilty as the principal offender but guilty as an accomplice.  Herring 
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was also found guilty of three course-of-conduct death-penalty specifications that 
were attached to each of the murder counts, pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Id. 
at 249. 
{¶ 12} During the mitigation hearing, trial counsel presented evidence 
showing that Herring’s accomplices did not receive the death penalty.  The 
defense also presented the testimony of Deborah Herring, the defendant’s mother, 
and Nicole Herring, the defendant’s sister. 
{¶ 13} Deborah testified that Herring has six brothers and sisters.  She 
testified that Herring had a good and loving relationship with his siblings and 
continues to stay in touch with them.  Herring helped with chores and helped take 
care of his younger brothers and sisters when he was growing up.  Deborah asked 
the jurors to spare her son’s life. 
{¶ 14} Nicole testified that Herring helped to take care of his younger 
brothers and sisters.  She stated that she had a close relationship with Herring and 
that they did numerous things together.  Finally, Nicole asked the jury to spare her 
brother’s life. 
{¶ 15} On rebuttal, Timothy Franken, an assistant prosecuting attorney, 
testified that Antwan Jones, one of the accomplices, was originally charged 
exactly the same as Herring.  The death-penalty specifications, however, were 
voluntarily dismissed against Jones because the prosecutors did not think that they 
could prove them.  Franken also testified that Adelbert Callahan was charged 
exactly the same as Herring, but Callahan could not receive the death penalty 
because he was a juvenile at the time of the crimes.  Franken also mentioned that 
Eugene Foose, another accomplice, was a juvenile.  The two other accomplices 
had had lesser culpability.  Louis Allen did not shoot anyone; indeed, he ran away 
as soon as the shooting started.  Kitwan Dalton, the getaway driver, neither 
entered the Newport Inn nor carried a weapon.  94 Ohio St.3d at 268, 762 N.E.2d 
940. 
January Term, 2014 
 
5
{¶ 16} During closing arguments, trial counsel emphasized that Herring 
had been convicted as an aider or abettor and that he had been found not guilty as 
a principal offender in committing the murders.  Trial counsel also argued 
regarding the disparity in sentencing that would exist if Herring were sentenced to 
death when the state had not pursued death sentences for his accomplices.  In 
addition, counsel raised Herring’s youth as a mitigating factor; he was 18 at the 
time of the offenses. 
{¶ 17} After the mitigation hearing, the jury recommended death for all 
three aggravated murders.  The trial court sentenced Herring to death.  Id. at 249. 
{¶ 18} On February 27, 2002, this court affirmed Herring’s convictions 
and death sentence.  Id. at 269.  The United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.  Herring v. Ohio, 537 U.S. 917, 123 S.Ct. 301, 154 L.Ed.2d 202 (2002). 
III. Postconviction proceedings 
A. Herring’s postconviction claim 
{¶ 19} On September 17, 1999, Herring filed his petition for 
postconviction relief.  He requested discovery and an evidentiary hearing.  
Herring’s primary claim challenged trial counsel’s effectiveness in failing to 
conduct an adequate mitigation investigation prior to his mitigation hearing.  
Herring presented affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of his 
claim. 
1. Affidavits from experts and family members 
{¶ 20} Dr. Jolie Brams, a psychologist, submitted an affidavit stating that 
the jurors were presented “no meaningful psychological information” about 
Herring’s “problematic functioning over the course of his life.”  She stated that no 
lay or expert testimony was presented that “would have given the jurors an 
opportunity to understand the sociocultural, psychological, developmental and 
intellectual factors that operated to bring Mr. Herring to that particular point in 
time.” 
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{¶ 21} Dr. Brams indicated that the testimony of Herring’s mother and 
sister during the mitigation hearing presented a distorted picture of Herring’s 
upbringing.  As to their testimony, Dr. Brams stated: “The jurors only saw two 
supposedly caring individuals which did nothing to educate them regarding the 
marked dysfunction in Mr. Herring’s family and the amazingly dysfunctional role 
models by whom this young [man] was raised.  Instead, they were presented a 
picture of a family that cared.” 
{¶ 22} Dr. Brams discussed her own evaluation of Herring’s family, his 
history, and his past and present functioning that could have been presented 
during mitigation.  She stated that Herring’s “childhood was remarkably 
dysfunctional in almost every aspect.”  She stated that Herring “was raised in an 
environment in which basically every parental figure, caregiver, family member, 
and associate was involved in illegal activities, significant drug and alcohol abuse, 
and to whom the consequences of violating the law evoked little anxiety.”  Dr. 
Brams described Herring as a “ ‘feral child,’ who roamed the neighborhood 
aimlessly, without any adult having meaningful or consistent concern.” 
{¶ 23} Dr. Brams stated that Herring began using marijuana and alcohol 
on a frequent basis by the time he was 13 or 14.  Herring’s active substance abuse 
was a primary factor leading to his failure in school and his eventual decision to 
drop out of school. 
{¶ 24} Herring’s family members introduced him to gangs and drug 
dealing, which was described to Dr. Brams as “the family business.”  Dr. Brams 
added that Herring’s mother asked him to purchase drugs for her own 
consumption and that his mother and other family members used drugs openly. 
{¶ 25} Dr. Brams stated that no psychometric tests were conducted prior 
to trial assessing any aspect of Herring’s mental capacities.  There was also no 
exploration of his intellectual and academic capacity from other sources, such as 
interviews with Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) personnel and public 
January Term, 2014 
 
7
school teachers or a review of his institutional records.  Dr. Brams also stated that 
a neuropsychological evaluation should have been conducted prior to trial to 
establish whether Herring suffered from organic brain impairment. 
{¶ 26} Dr. Brams’s staff administered various tests to Herring.  Test 
results on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (“WAIS-III”) 
showed that Herring had a verbal IQ of 85, a performance IQ of 91, and a full-
scale IQ of 87.  Results on the Beery Buktenica Developmental Test of Visual-
Motor Integration (“VMI”) placed Herring in the third percentile nationally and 
showed his difficulty with visual-motor functioning.  Results on the Matrix 
Analogies Test (“MAT”) showed that Herring has the perceptual-learning skills of 
a ten year old. 
{¶ 27} Dr. Brams also indicated that Herring’s DYS records provided 
information about Herring’s positive characteristics.  She stated that the DYS 
records “reflect that Mr. Herring was able to meet the expectations of the staff in 
many areas and complete goals that were set out for him in terms of socialization 
and education.” 
{¶ 28} Finally, Dr. Brams set forth her diagnoses of a number of 
psychiatric disorders as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Psychiatric Disorders (“DSM-IV”).  She concluded that Herring presents (1) 
alcohol abuse, chronic, (2) cannabis abuse/dependence, (3) polysubstance 
abuse/dependence, (4) depressive disorder, (5) personality disorder with 
narcissistic and antisocial features, and (6) learning disabilities. 
{¶ 29} Dr. C. Ronald Huff, the Director of the School of Public Policy 
and Management at Ohio State University, submitted an affidavit about Herring’s 
gang involvement.  Dr. Huff stated that Herring “grew up with a host of gang 
members as role models, especially on his father’s side of the family.”  He stated 
that Herring became a gang member when he was 11 or 12 years old and that 
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Herring’s substance abuse, drug trafficking, and other crimes were greatly 
influenced by his gang involvement. 
{¶ 30} Herring also presented affidavits from his paternal grandmother, 
two aunts, two uncles, his sister Nicole, his mother, and a cousin.  These 
affidavits discussed Herring’s gang involvement, his life as a drug dealer, his 
mother’s drug use, and other family members who have been incarcerated.  
Herring’s cousin and grandmother and an aunt and an uncle would have testified 
at trial if they had been asked. 
{¶ 31} Herring’s sister, Nicole, stated that their grandmother took care of 
her and Herring until he was about 12, when their grandmother moved out of their 
home.  Nicole indicated that their grandmother provided them with structure and 
discipline.  She was strict and made Nicole and Herring do chores and complete 
their homework. 
{¶ 32} Herring’s mother, Deborah, stated that she has seven children by 
four different fathers.  Deborah said that she was overwhelmed with caring for her 
children.  Herring’s father had been shot to death over a drug dispute when 
Herring was four years old.  Deborah admitted that she has had a longstanding 
drinking problem and had been addicted to crack for 12 years.  She knew that 
Herring sold crack but did not think that he had a substance-abuse problem. 
2. Dr. Darnall’s letter 
{¶ 33} Herring’s petition included a letter from Dr. Douglas Darnall, a 
clinical psychologist, that had been sent to trial counsel before the mitigation 
phase.  At trial counsel’s request, Dr. Darnall had conducted pretrial testing of 
Herring by administering the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(“MMPI-2”).  Dr. Darnall told trial counsel in the letter that he had not had the 
opportunity to conduct a clinical interview or a complete assessment and therefore 
was “unable to derive any specific clinical conclusions.” 
January Term, 2014 
 
9
{¶ 34} Dr. Darnall’s letter reported that the results of the MMPI-2 were of 
“questionable” validity.  He stated that certain test results suggested that Herring 
was “exaggerating his symptoms or not understanding the specific test items.”  
Dr. Darnall added: 
 
The configuration of the clinical scales would suggest that 
Mr. Herring has made some discriminations in his 
responses.  The configuration would characterize Mr. 
Herring as a very suspicious individual who is likely to be 
hostile to authority figures.  He is inclined to be rather 
impulsive, unreliable, egocentric, and irresponsible.  Others 
may perceive him as suspicious, hostile, and hypersensitive 
to the reactions of others.  * * *  It is possible that Mr. 
Herring may have a delusional disorder that could be 
distorting his perceptions and interpretations as to what is 
going on around him.  He may feel socially isolated and 
have persecutory ideas. 
 
{¶ 35} Dr. Brams submitted an addendum affidavit that responded to Dr. 
Darnall’s report.  Dr. Brams stated:  “Even a cursory perusal of Mr. Herring’s 
MMPI-2 profile would indicate [the] need for further neuropsychological and 
psychiatric follow-up in terms of evaluation and testing.”  She added:  “Defense 
counsel did not follow-up this MMPI-2 report with any further evaluation of the 
defendant.  Simply stated, the sole use of an MMPI * * * to determine mitigation 
factors or lack thereof is grossly limited and in no way could fully describe the 
functioning or history of that individual.” 
 
 
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3. Hrdy’s affidavit 
{¶ 36} The affidavit of Thomas Hrdy, the mitigation specialist engaged by 
Herring’s attorneys prior to the trial, discussed his employment and his meeting 
with counsel in preparing for Herring’s mitigation: 
 
I believe that I was first contacted by the trial 
attorneys Mr. Van Brocklin and Mr. Zena around the first 
week of August, 1997.  As it turned out, this did not allow 
adequate time for me to collect the necessary records for a 
full investigation of the case, such as school records and 
medical records.  I met with the attorneys only once, at our 
initial meeting.  I do not know what information the 
attorneys collected.  I do not know if the attorneys followed 
up on my suggestion to bring a psychologist in to evaluate 
Willie.  I do not know these things because the attorneys 
did not share the information with me, and we did not have 
subsequent meetings after our initial one. 
 
{¶ 37} In his affidavit, Hrdy stated that he had interviewed Herring four 
times and Herring’s mother once.  He did not interview any other family 
members.  Hrdy stated that due to time constraints, he was unable to complete 
extensive interview research.  He did not recall “the specific attempts to collect 
specific records, such as Ohio Department of Youth Services or Mahoning 
County Human Services.”  Hrdy added: “I felt like before I knew it, I was over 
my head in terms of time necessary to complete the investigation.  I do not recall 
if I told trial counsel that I was running out of time.” 
{¶ 38} Hrdy said that he had provided mitigation services “in two or three 
other capital cases” prior to Herring’s case.  He concluded:  “Looking back now 
January Term, 2014 
 
11
on the work I did for the Herring case, I feel that I did a substandard job of 
mitigation investigation.  This is primarily due to the fact that I underestimated 
the amount of time which was needed to contact all of the necessary mitigation 
witnesses and locate all the necessary resources and records.” 
4. Hall’s affidavit 
{¶ 39} In another affidavit attached to the petition, Dorian Hall, the 
supervisor of the mitigation section of the Office of the Ohio Public Defender, 
analyzed the deficiencies in Hrdy’s mitigation investigation.  Hall stated that Hrdy 
obtained education records and attempted to obtain records from Southside 
Medical Center, “but did not appear to make any attempts to obtain additional 
records.”  Hall also stated that Hrdy interviewed only Herring and his mother and 
neglected to interview various family members, friends, and professionals who 
could have provided detailed information about Herring’s life.  Hall also stated 
that there was “a family history of substance abuse and drug dealing, gang 
involvement, criminal activity, neglect and lack of nurturing” that was not 
properly investigated. 
B. Trial court denies Herring’s petition 
{¶ 40} On January 6, 2003, the trial court granted the state’s motion for 
summary judgment and overruled Herring’s requests for discovery and an 
evidentiary hearing.  The trial court rejected Herring’s claim that counsel were 
ineffective in conducting their mitigation investigation, stating: 
 
It is clear from the transcript of the sentencing 
phase that counsel elected to present positive evidence from 
the Defendant’s family, and not to present negative 
evidence concerning the Defendant’s childhood.  At this 
point, one can only speculate as to what effect, if any, 
negative evidence would have had in the jury’s 
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deliberations.  Tactical decisions and strategic choices must 
be reviewed with the strong presumption that effective 
legal counsel is rendered.  * * *  A different opinion, which 
varies from the theory used at trial does not depict 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  * * * 
In the instant case, Defendant simply suggests and 
speculates that trial counsels [sic] failure to present an 
alternative 
theory, 
specifically, 
negative 
testimony 
concerning his childhood, amounts to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  This Court does not agree, and the Defendant is 
not entitled to a hearing as to these claims. 
 
{¶ 41} The trial court also rejected Herring’s claim that trial counsel were 
ineffective by failing to hire a neuropsychologist to examine him.  The trial court 
noted that Dr. Darnall prepared and submitted a report and did “not recommend 
that the Defendant be examined by a neuro-psychologist.  Additionally, there 
were specific findings made by Dr. Darnall that were not favorable to the 
Defendant.” 
C. Court of appeals remands 
{¶ 42} On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court had erred in 
granting summary judgment to the state.  7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03-MA-12, 
2004-Ohio-5357, ¶ 2, 115.  The court reviewed the postconviction evidence that 
the defense presented in support of its ineffectiveness claim, id. at ¶ 70-91, and 
compared it with the meager amount of evidence that had been presented during 
mitigation, id. at ¶ 60-62.  The court held that the trial court should not have 
rejected Herring’s arguments on the ground that trial counsel made a tactical 
decision to present only (minimal) positive mitigation evidence without first 
considering whether counsel had made an “intelligent strategic decision” after 
January Term, 2014 
 
13
conducting a proper investigation.  Id. at ¶ 99-100, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (holding that counsel has 
the duty to conduct a thorough investigation of a capital defendant’s background).  
The appellate court further determined that “[t]here is little evidence herein 
documenting the extent of Appellant’s trial counsels’ reasoning for their 
investigative decisions.”  Id. at ¶ 114.  The court observed that “Hrdy’s affidavit 
is inconclusive as to whether Appellant’s trial counsel actually knew of Hrdy’s 
investigation’s deficiencies.”  Id. at ¶ 102. 
{¶ 43} The court remanded the case to the trial court “to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing relative to Appellant’s trial counsels’ efforts in advance of 
their decision to present only Appellant’s positive mitigation history.”  Id. at 
¶ 114.  The court added:  “Without a hearing to determine the extent of the 
mitigation evidence before Appellant’s trial counsel and their investigative 
efforts, Appellant’s postconviction exhibits may simply present an alternative 
mitigation tactic.”  Id. at ¶ 104.  In ordering an evidentiary hearing, the court 
specifically directed the trial court to “assess whether Appellant’s counsel were 
apprized of Hrdy’s investigation’s shortcomings.  Only then could counsel have 
made a reasoned decision to cease investigating.”  Id. at ¶ 116. 
D. Trial court’s hearing on remand 
{¶ 44} On August 28 and December 4, 2006, the trial court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, at which Gary Van Brocklin and Thomas Zena, Herring’s 
trial attorneys, and Dorian Hall testified.  Documentary evidence was also 
presented.  Hrdy did not testify at the hearing. 
1. Van Brocklin’s testimony 
{¶ 45} Van Brocklin had been lead counsel at Herring’s trial.  Van 
Brocklin testified that after the defense had a difficult time obtaining a mitigation 
specialist, the Office of the Ohio Public Defender had identified Hrdy as a 
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possible mitigation specialist.  Hrdy was then contacted and hired as the defense 
mitigation specialist. 
{¶ 46} Counsel’s first meeting with Hrdy in early September 1997 was 
four-and-one-half hours long.  Van Brocklin recalled, “Mr. Hrdy was to obviously 
investigate and determine if we could find mitigation for Mr. Herring in the event 
that there was a conviction of capital specifications.”  Van Brocklin could not 
recall whether defense counsel met with Hrdy again or only discussed the case 
over the phone. 
{¶ 47} Van Brocklin stated that Hrdy never told defense counsel that “he 
in any way fell short of the mark” and always represented himself as an expert.  
Van Brocklin said, “I believed at the time that he had done all of the work 
necessary to look into Mr. Herring’s background.  * * *  I believe, that had Mr. 
Hrdy requested additional time, we would’ve immediately filed a motion for it, 
and I’m quite confident that Judge Durkin would’ve allowed us the time.” 
{¶ 48} Van Brocklin also stated that Hrdy had had sufficient time to 
conduct an adequate mitigation investigation.  Hrdy was hired in August or 
September 1997, and the start of the trial was delayed because a mistrial was 
declared during jury selection.  The trial then eventually commenced on January 
5, 1998, and the mitigation proceedings began on February 14, 1998. 
{¶ 49} Van Brocklin testified that he and Zena “knew a lot of negative 
information” about Herring “through our own investigation and through criminal 
records and those kinds of things that were supplied to us during the lengthy 
discovery process.”  Van Brocklin could not recall specific information that they 
had known about Herring’s background because the case files had been 
transferred to the public defender’s office.  Yet Van Brocklin had known that 
Herring had a prior juvenile record and that members of his family had criminal 
records.  Van Brocklin also recalled that a subpoena had been issued for Herring’s 
confinement records to show that he had behaved himself during incarceration.  
January Term, 2014 
 
15
But defense counsel decided not to use that information because the records 
showed Herring’s involvement in “a death threat or a fight.” 
{¶ 50} Van Brocklin also stated that the defense had hired Dr. Darnall.  
Dr. Darnall provided defense counsel with “a report that didn’t work well, or was 
not very definitive.”  He did not perform any testing for neurological impairment. 
{¶ 51} Van Brocklin stated that he and Zena decided to present “positive 
mitigation evidence.”  He also stated, “I hammered home in argument * * * that 
Mr. Herring had not been convicted as a principal offender in this matter.”  Van 
Brocklin explained that the decision to present positive evidence in mitigation had 
“a lot to do with the fact that we had picked two juries, and the second jury was 
far more conservative that the first jury panel was, and both Tom and I did not 
think that negative information would have worked with that particular jury 
panel.”  He added, “I thought that any kind of information that you would give the 
second jury panel that Mr. Herring had been involved in a life of crime would 
simply be more ammunition for them to find a death verdict.” 
2. Zena’s testimony 
{¶ 52} Zena had been co-counsel at Herring’s trial and had the primary 
responsibility for preparing mitigation.  Zena testified that the defense initially 
was prepared to engage a different mitigation specialist, but after that person 
could not take the job, trial counsel hired Hrdy.  Zena did not believe that they 
developed a theory of mitigation with Hrdy.  Zena stated, “I think we said let’s 
see what we have and try to put the best foot forward to save [Herring], whatever 
that might be.”  As to Hrdy’s role, Zena said that although “it’s the lawyer’s 
responsibility to present the mitigation,” people in Hrdy’s position are called 
mitigation specialists because it is their job to “go out and find and give ideas on 
how they think something should be presented.” 
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{¶ 53} Zena stated that he and Van Brocklin had talked to Hrdy on the 
phone as Hrdy’s mitigation investigation progressed.  Counsel did not have a 
timetable for getting information from Hrdy.  Zena testified: 
 
[I]t was like if you need anything, call us, and we had our 
normal discussions.  If there’s anything you’re having 
trouble with or need, call us.  And I don’t think there was 
ever a time when we weren’t accessible to him.  I know 
every time he tried to reach me, I was.  Likewise, he was 
accessible. 
 
{¶ 54} Zena testified that he had met Herring’s mother on a few occasions 
and got to know Herring’s sister.  Zena stated that he spoke to Herring’s mother 
about “arranging a meeting with anybody she thought would be helpful with 
mitigation, and we met at their home.”  Herring’s mother never told Zena that she 
had been a drug addict during a large part of Herring’s life. 
{¶ 55} Zena also had spoken to Herring about mitigation.  He stated that 
Herring told him nothing negative about the family, because Herring “is a person 
that did not accent the negative about any family member or himself.”  Zena 
stated, “When we got to the mitigation phase, he was cooperative in the sense of 
knowing we—what we were going to do, but he was not forthcoming with any 
information.”  But Herring did not put any restrictions on trial counsel’s 
presentation of mitigation evidence. 
{¶ 56} Zena stated that he and Van Brocklin made a “conscious choice to 
* * * put on good things about him” and to emphasize that Herring was not a 
principal offender.  Zena explained that this was “an awful case as cases go.  * * *  
This was mayhem in a bar where people wound up dead, people wound up shot, 
bullets all over the floor.”  Moreover, the victims were innocent bystanders who 
January Term, 2014 
 
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were not “involved in any transgressions with any of the individuals who came 
in.”  Thus, Zena said that the goal was “separating [Herring] out as a non 
principal offender, not responsible for the death of anyone, and showing whatever 
I could of the other side of him.” 
3. Billing statements 
{¶ 57} Defense exhibit A was Van Brocklin’s billing statement, submitted 
in February 1998, for serving as Herring’s defense counsel at trial.  Hrdy’s billing 
statement and its cover letter were attached.  Hrdy’s letter included the 
observation, “This has been a most difficult case to find mitigation on as you well 
know[.]  I know you did the best you could with the little I provided.”  Hrdy’s 
billing statement showed that he sent a bill to counsel for time and expenses 
totaling $1,501.30. 
4. Hall’s testimony 
{¶ 58} Hall explained the responsibilities of a mitigation specialist in 
conducting an investigation.  Hall stated that Hrdy’s invoice showed that he had 
completed approximately 30 hours of work.  Hall did not believe that this was an 
adequate amount of time to properly conduct a mitigation investigation for 
Herring. 
E. Trial court again denies Herring’s petition 
{¶ 59} On September 26, 2008, the trial court again denied Herring’s 
petition for postconviction relief. 
{¶ 60} After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial 
court made the following ruling: 
 
Based on this evidence, it is abundantly clear that 
Thomas Hrdy never advised trial counsel that his 
investigation was not complete, and never asked them for 
additional time to complete it.  Trial counsels [sic] decision 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
to present positive mitigation was reasonable, based on an 
objective review of counsels [sic] performance, measured 
with reasonableness under professional norms, including a 
context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct 
as seen from counsels [sic] perspective at the time of that 
conduct. 
In addition, consistent with the Trial Court’s 
opinion that granted summary judgment to the State, “one 
can only speculate as to what effect, if any, negative 
evidence would have had in the jury’s deliberations.” 
 
F. Court of appeals orders a new sentencing hearing 
{¶ 61} On appeal following this ruling, the court of appeals held that the 
trial court abused its discretion in finding that trial counsel’s decision to present 
only positive mitigation evidence was reasonable.  7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08-
MA-213, 2011-Ohio-662, ¶ 90.  The court stated:  “Trial counsel can make the 
decision to forego the presentation of evidence, but only after a full investigation.  
* * *  Only after completing a full investigation can counsel make an informed, 
tactical decision about what information to present in their client’s case.”  Id. at ¶ 
55, citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 
(2003), and Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389. 
{¶ 62} The court stated that information about Herring’s background in 
the postconviction affidavits 
 
brought to light appellant’s deeply troubled childhood, his 
complete lack of any positive role models, his substance 
abuse problems, his depression, his low IQ, and his 
possible organic brain impairment.  These areas of 
January Term, 2014 
 
19
appellant’s life, had they been investigated and explored 
fully, are all very significant factors to be weighed and 
considered in determining what mitigation evidence to 
present.  And counsel did not have this information before 
them when they made the decision to present only positive 
mitigation evidence. 
 
Id. at ¶ 79.  The court then concluded that “counsel could not have made an 
intelligent strategic decision without the proper investigation before them.”  Id. 
{¶ 63} The court also stated that investigations into mitigating evidence 
“ ‘ “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating 
evidence.” ’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 82, quoting Wiggins at 524, quoting 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989).  
The court determined that trial counsel’s testimony showed that they had failed to 
meet this standard.  Id. at ¶ 82.  The court also noted that Hrdy admitted that his 
investigation was “substandard” and that he did not complete many of the tasks 
that he should have in investigating Herring’s background.  Id. at ¶ 79.  But the 
court stated that it was trial counsel’s duty to ensure that a complete investigation 
was conducted and that they could not simply rely on Hrdy’s investigation.  Id. at 
¶ 82. 
{¶ 64} In ordering a new sentencing hearing, the court of appeals stated 
that the undiscovered mitigating evidence “ ‘ “might well have influenced the 
jury’s appraisal” ’ ” of Herring’s culpability.  Id. at ¶ 90, quoting Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), quoting 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389.  The court of appeals 
also stated that “the probability of a different sentence if counsel had presented 
the evidence is ‘ “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” ’ reached 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
by the jury.”  Id., quoting Rompilla at 393, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
IV. Issues on appeal 
{¶ 65} The cause is now before this court following the acceptance of the 
state’s discretionary appeal on the following three propositions of law: 
 
I.  Defense counsel’s performance is constitutionally 
effective under the federal and state Constitutions where, 
absent 
any 
knowledge 
of 
a 
mitigation 
expert’s 
shortcomings, they proceed reasonably in light of the 
information that they have obtained, and despite the fact 
that a mitigation expert failed to complete several tasks in 
preparation for the sentencing phase (of a capital trial). 
II.  Capital defendants do not have a federal constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of a mitigation specialist; 
therefore, a mitigation specialist’s deficiencies cannot be 
imputed to trial counsel without having sufficient 
knowledge of those deficiencies. 
III.  An appellate court errs in finding that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective without determining whether or 
not the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of 
trial counsel’s performance, as set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington. 
 
V. Analysis 
A. Deficient mitigation investigation (Proposition of Law I) 
{¶ 66} The state argues that trial counsel were not deficient in presenting 
positive mitigating information about the defendant.  The state contends that trial 
January Term, 2014 
 
21
counsel performed reasonably even though the defense mitigation specialist failed 
to conduct a complete investigation, because counsel were unaware of those 
shortcomings. 
1. Legal standards 
{¶ 67} To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
Herring must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced him.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 68} In assessing counsel’s investigation, an objective review of 
counsel’s performance must be conducted in light of professional norms 
prevailing when the representation took place.  Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 7, 
130 S.Ct 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009); Strickland at 688.  Under the deficient-
performance prong, the court should “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 
689. 
{¶ 69} Counsel in a capital case have an “obligation to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the defendant’s background” to determine the availability of 
mitigating evidence.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389.  
Counsel’s “investigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to 
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any 
aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.’ ”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, quoting ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989). 
 
 
This constitutionally required background investigation 
is necessary to enable counsel to make strategic choices 
about presenting a mitigation defense.  * * *  Indeed, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
deference owed to counsel’s strategic judgments about 
mitigation is directly proportional to the adequacy of the 
investigations supporting such judgments.  Accordingly, 
when evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s mitigation 
strategy in a capital case, “a reviewing court must consider 
the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that 
strategy.” 
 
Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 492 (6th Cir.2008), quoting Wiggins at 527. 
2. Discussion 
{¶ 70} The state argues that defense counsel proceeded reasonably in 
presenting positive mitigating evidence about Herring to the jury.  The state 
recognizes that Wiggins required that a mitigation investigation be completed.  
The state argues, however, that it was professionally reasonable for counsel to 
believe that Hrdy had completed his investigation prior to sentencing and that 
defense counsel did not have to ensure for themselves that the mitigation 
investigation was accurate and complete. 
(a) Inadequate investigation 
{¶ 71} The affidavits and testimony presented during postconviction 
proceedings show that neither Hrdy nor trial counsel obtained detailed 
information about Herring’s background.  Thus, trial counsel did not have 
detailed knowledge about Herring’s parental neglect, gang involvement, or life as 
a drug dealer.  Trial counsel also does not appear to have known that Herring’s 
father had been murdered when Herring was a young child or that his mother had 
been a drug addict during a large part of her life. 
{¶ 72} Hrdy, the mitigation specialist, admits that he did a “substandard 
job of mitigation investigation.”  He acknowledges that he failed to interview 
family members.  Hrdy also failed to obtain Herring’s DYS records, police 
January Term, 2014 
 
23
records, or other records that might have shed light on Herring’s background.  It 
appears that Hrdy obtained only Herring’s education records and attempted to 
obtain part of his medical records.  Hrdy’s billing statement also suggests that he 
did not put in the time necessary to conduct an adequate investigation. 
{¶ 73} Moreover, Herring had not been evaluated and tested to explore 
the psychological, developmental, and intellectual factors in his background.  Dr. 
Brams conducted IQ and other psychometric tests that uncovered a wealth of 
information about Herring. 
{¶ 74} The state responds to these concerns by pointing out that defense 
counsel employed Dr. Darnall, a clinical psychologist, and obtained a report from 
him.  But Dr. Darnall administered only the MMPI-2 to Herring.  Dr. Darnall 
reached some tentative conclusions about Herring, including observing:  “It is 
possible that Mr. Herring may have a delusional disorder that could be distorting 
his perceptions and interpretations as to what is going on around him.”  Yet 
defense counsel did not arrange for follow-up psychological evaluations or other 
testing of Herring. 
{¶ 75} Herring’s trial counsel, Van Brocklin, testified that he and Zena 
“knew a number of negative things through our own investigation and through 
criminal records and those kinds of things that were supplied to us during the 
lengthy discovery process.”  Yet Van Brocklin and Zena were unable to recall 
many specific details about their knowledge because they no longer had access to 
Herring’s case file. 
{¶ 76} Here, the mitigation investigation was less comprehensive than the 
investigation that the Supreme Court found deficient in Wiggins.  In that case, 
defense counsel had arranged for a psychologist to run a number of tests on the 
defendant.  539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471.  Counsel also had 
“had available to them a written PSI [presentence-investigation report], which 
included a one-page account of Wiggins’ ‘personal history’ noting his ‘misery as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
a youth,’ quoting his description of his own background as ‘ “disgusting,” ’ and 
observing that he spent most of his life in foster care.”  Id.  Counsel also had 
tracked down records kept by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services 
(“DSS”) that documented various placements in foster care.  Id.  The PSI and the 
DSS records revealed that Wiggins’s mother was a chronic alcoholic, Wiggins 
had been “shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some 
emotional difficulties,” he had frequent, lengthy absences from school, and “on at 
least one occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without 
food.”  Id. at 525.  Despite these leads, counsel did not investigate further.  The 
Supreme Court remarked that “any reasonably competent attorney would have 
realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice 
among possible defenses.”  Id.  Had counsel investigated further, the court stated, 
they might well have discovered the severe physical and sexual abuse that the 
defendant had suffered from his mother and while in the care of a series of foster 
parents.  Id. at 516, 525. 
{¶ 77} In Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40, 130 S.Ct. 447, 175 
L.Ed.2d 398 (2009), the Supreme Court held that counsel’s failure to interview 
the defendant’s family members and to obtain school, medical, and military 
service records made his representation constitutionally deficient.  The court 
stated that “like the counsel in Wiggins, [defense counsel] ignored pertinent 
avenues for investigation of which he should have been aware,” and it concluded 
that the “decision not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional 
judgment.”  Id. 
{¶ 78} Moreover, this is not a case like Van Hook, in which the Supreme 
Court held that counsel were not deficient in failing to dig deeper into the 
defendant’s background.  In Van Hook, the defense had called eight mitigation 
witnesses and the defendant had made an unsworn statement.  558 U.S. at 5, 130 
S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255.  As for the mitigation investigation, the court noted 
January Term, 2014 
 
25
that defense counsel had contacted their lay witnesses “early and often” before 
trial.  Id. at 9.  Counsel spoke nine times with the defendant’s mother, twice with 
an aunt who lived with the family and often cared for Van Hook as a child, and 
three times with a family friend.  Id.  They also were in touch with their two 
expert witnesses and reviewed the defendant’s military records.  After reviewing 
his military records, they met with a representative from the Veteran’s 
Administration seven weeks before trial.  Id. 
{¶ 79} Despite all the evidence that defense counsel had uncovered and 
presented, Van Hook argued that his counsel were deficient by not interviewing 
other family members—his stepsister, two uncles and two aunts—as well as a 
psychiatrist who had once treated his mother.  Id. at 11.  In rejecting this claim, 
the Supreme Court stated that “there comes a point at which evidence from more 
distant relatives can reasonably be expected to be only cumulative.”  Id.  Thus, the 
court concluded, “it was not unreasonable for his counsel not to identify every 
other living family member or every therapist who once treated his parents.”  Id. 
{¶ 80} The investigation in this case was incomplete because counsel 
failed to interview witnesses and obtain records about Herring’s dysfunctional 
childhood, gang involvement, substance abuse, and his mother’s drug addiction.  
Defense counsel also failed to ensure that Herring was adequately evaluated and 
tested by a psychologist.  Thus, this is not a case in which information about 
Herring’s background that was not uncovered would have been merely 
cumulative. 
{¶ 81} Moreover, trial counsel’s decision not to expand their investigation 
fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by ABA guidelines.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the ABA standards that 
were in effect at the time of trial are guides to determining what is reasonable.  
Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 8-9, 130 S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255.  The 1989 ABA 
guidelines that were in effect at the time of Herring’s trial called for Herring’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
counsel “to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to 
rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.”  ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989). 
{¶ 82} The 1989 guidelines provided detailed guidance as to counsel’s 
investigative responsibilities.  They stated that “[a]s soon as is appropriate,” 
counsel should 
 
[c]ollect information relevant to the sentencing phase of 
trial including, but not limited to: medical history (mental 
and physical illness or injury of alcohol and drug use, birth 
trauma and developmental delays); educational history 
(achievement, 
performance 
and 
behavior) 
special 
educational needs (including cognitive limitations and 
learning disabilities); military history (type and length of 
service, conduct, special training); employment and 
training history (including skills and performance, and 
barriers to employability); family and social history 
(including physical, sexual or emotional abuse); prior adult 
and 
Juvenile 
record; 
prior 
correctional 
experience 
(including 
conduct 
or 
supervision 
and 
in 
the 
institution/education or training/clinical services); and 
religious and cultural influences. 
 
Id. at Guideline 11.4.1(D)(2)(C). 
{¶ 83} Counsel’s performance fell below these well-defined norms.  
Counsel failed to ensure that a comprehensive investigation was conducted into 
Herring’s background, obtaining only rudimentary information about Herring’s 
January Term, 2014 
 
27
childhood, substance abuse, gang involvement, and psychological makeup.  Based 
on these failures, we conclude that counsel did not conduct an adequate 
investigation into Herring’s background before the mitigation hearing started. 
(b) Defense strategy to introduce positive mitigation 
{¶ 84} The state argues that trial counsel made a “strategic decision” to 
present positive mitigating evidence.  Van Brocklin testified that they decided to 
present only positive mitigation because some of the jurors appeared to lean in 
favor of the death penalty.  He stated that “any kind of information * * * that Mr. 
Herring had been involved in a life of crime would simply be more ammunition 
for them to find a death verdict.” 
{¶ 85} The state also points to Van Brocklin’s statement that trial counsel 
“knew a number of negative things” about Herring and wanted to keep them from 
the jury.  Although his recollection was imperfect, Van Brocklin testified that they 
knew about Herring’s prior juvenile record and that members of Herring’s family 
had criminal records.  Trial counsel also employed Dr. Darnall, who conducted 
some pretrial testing of Herring, though the scope of Dr. Darnall’s evaluation was 
quite limited. 
{¶ 86} The state invokes Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 
97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), for the proposition that counsel’s decision to keep 
negative information from the jury was a sound trial strategy and did not 
necessitate a full mitigation investigation.  In Burger, the Supreme Court upheld 
the propriety of a defense decision not to present any mitigating evidence on 
behalf of the defendant.  The court rejected claims that defense counsel was 
deficient by not pursuing an all-out investigation into the defendant’s background 
in search of mitigating evidence.  Id. at 794.  The court stated that the limited 
investigation conducted was reasonable because counsel “did interview all 
potential witnesses who had been called to his attention,” and discovered little 
that was helpful and much that was harmful.  Id. at 794-795. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
{¶ 87} The state also cites Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.2000), 
in arguing that trial counsel could reasonably have presented only positive 
mitigation without conducting a full mitigation investigation.  In Scott, defense 
counsel pursued a residual-doubt strategy and presented no mitigating evidence 
other than Scott’s unsworn statement to the jury.  Id. at 880.  In state 
postconviction proceedings, the defense presented evidence showing that counsel 
had failed to contact family members who would have told them that the 
defendant’s parents were alcohol and drug abusers, the defendant grew up in 
severe poverty, and he was exposed to an exceedingly violent environment during 
his upbringing.  See State v. Scott, 63 Ohio App.3d 304, 309-311, 578 N.E.2d 841 
(8th Dist.1989). 
{¶ 88} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “Scott’s penalty-phase 
attorneys would certainly have been well-advised to conduct more research into 
mitigating factors than they did.”  209 F.3d at 881.  But the court declined to find 
that counsel were ineffective by failing to conduct a more thorough investigation.  
The court noted in dicta that counsel’s decision to pursue a residual-doubt strategy 
in the case was not unreasonable when counsel had conducted research into the 
available mitigating testimony and wanted to avoid opening the door to evidence 
of the defendant’s extensive criminal history.  Id. at 880-882. 
{¶ 89} Unlike Burger, Herring’s counsel did not talk to every witness who 
was brought to their attention and did not have a psychologist conduct a 
comprehensive psychological evaluation of the defendant.  Trial counsel also did 
not review Herring’s DYS records and other records that would have provided 
information about his dysfunctional background.  As for the applicability of Scott, 
the Sixth Circuit has since held that incomplete mitigation investigations like 
those in that case are legally inadequate.  In Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301 
(6th Cir.2011), defense counsel had presented a residual-doubt strategy like that 
in Scott.  Counsel had failed, however, to speak to most of Goodwin’s relatives, 
January Term, 2014 
 
29
had not reviewed his school records, and had not had him evaluated.  Id. at 324.  
Had counsel interviewed these witnesses and examined school and juvenile 
records, the court stated that they would have learned that he was abused by his 
drug-using mother, performed poorly in school, and had psychological problems.  
Id.  The court held that counsel’s decision to forgo presenting mitigating evidence 
was not an informed decision and that counsel’s performance was inadequate.  Id. 
at 325-326.  See also Foust v. Houk, 655 F.3d 524, 534-536 (6th Cir.2011) (partial 
but incomplete mitigation investigation deemed inadequate); Mason v. Mitchell, 
543 F.3d 766, 780 (6th Cir.2008) (same); Jells, 538 F.3d at 496 (same). 
{¶ 90} Herring acknowledges that a decision by trial counsel to present 
only positive mitigation can be a sound trial strategy “in the right case.”  Herring 
cites Wiggins in arguing that trial counsel’s decision to pursue a positive-
mitigation theory can properly be made only after counsel has conducted a full 
mitigation investigation.  We agree.  Thus, counsel’s decision to pursue a 
positive-mitigation theory was not justified because it was made before an 
adequate investigation had been conducted into Herring’s background. 
(c) Trial counsel’s responsibility for the investigation 
{¶ 91} The state argues that trial counsel were not ineffective because 
they were unaware that Hrdy had failed to conduct an adequate investigation.  
Thus, the state asserts that it was professionally reasonable for counsel to believe 
that Hrdy had completed his investigation and to rely on his status as a mitigation 
expert rather than ensuring for themselves that the investigation was accurate and 
complete. 
{¶ 92} The state cites Drummond v. Houk, 761 F.Supp.2d 638 (N.D.Ohio 
2010), aff’d on other grounds, 728 F.3d 520 (6th Cir.2013), vacated and 
remanded, sub nom. Robinson v. Drummond, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1934, 188 
L.Ed.2d 957 (2014), in arguing that trial counsel were not responsible for Hrdy’s 
failure to conduct an adequate investigation.  In Drummond, Dr. John Fabian, a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
clinical psychologist, at the penalty phase of the trial provided mitigating 
testimony about the defendant’s background and gang involvement.  Id. at 695-
696.  But later during mitigation, Dr. Fabian testified that he was “not a gang 
expert,” when he was questioned about the environmental factors in a gang 
atmosphere.  Id. at 696.  Dr. Fabian also provided other testimony about 
Drummond’s gang involvement that was not helpful to the defense.  Id. at 696-
697. 
{¶ 93} During federal habeas proceedings, Drummond claimed that trial 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to hire a “gang expert,” for failing to 
prepare Dr. Fabian for testimony, and for failing to conduct a complete 
investigation.  Id. at 702.  During habeas proceedings, Dr. Fabian stated that he 
had not had time to prepare for trial and had been unprepared to testify.  Id. at 
697, 699-700.  Defense counsel responded that Dr. Fabian had not expressed 
concerns to them about having had insufficient time to prepare his testimony.  Id. 
at 703.  Defense counsel also stated that based upon Dr. Fabian’s representations 
regarding his credentials and experience, they had believed that Dr. Fabian could 
testify as effectively as any “gang expert.”  Id. at 702. 
{¶ 94} In rejecting Drummond’s ineffectiveness claims, the court stated 
that “it was reasonable for counsel to rely on Dr. Fabian’s self-described 
experience with gang members and to presume that Dr. Fabian had sufficient time 
to prepare for his trial testimony absent any credible assertions to the contrary.”  
Id. at 703.  The court concluded that “counsel cannot be held responsible for the 
misrepresentations or omissions of Dr. Fabian.”  Id. 
{¶ 95} The state argues that as in Drummond, Hrdy never told defense 
counsel that his investigation was incomplete or that he needed more to time to 
complete it.  Thus, the state argues that defense counsel cannot be held 
responsible for Hrdy’s misrepresentations or omissions.  There are important 
differences between the two cases.  In Drummond, the court focused on the 
January Term, 2014 
 
31
testimony of a single witness.  In contrast here, Hrdy, the mitigation specialist, 
was responsible for a full investigation of the case by collecting records, 
interviewing witnesses, and providing an expert-witness list. 
{¶ 96} The state also argues that trial counsel could reasonably have relied 
on Hrdy’s expertise as a mitigation expert.  Van Brocklin testified that the defense 
obtained Hrdy’s name through the state public defender’s office and that Hrdy 
“always represented himself as an expert.”  Trial counsel’s reliance on Hrdy’s 
expertise as a mitigation specialist was not the same as counsel’s reliance on Dr. 
Fabian’s expertise in Drummond.  Dr. Fabian was a clinical psychologist and 
counsel should be able to rely on a psychologist’s professional representations.  
See Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 285 (6th Cir.2005) (it was not unreasonable 
for counsel, untrained in the field of mental health, to rely on the opinion of a 
clinical psychologist). 
{¶ 97} Additionally regarding the state’s claim that counsel could 
reasonably have relied on Hrdy’s expertise, it is instructive that the 1989 ABA 
guidelines did not mention mitigation specialists.  Not until the 2003 edition do 
the ABA guidelines call for the hiring of a mitigation specialist as part of the 
defense team.  See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guidelines 4.1(A)(1) and 10.4(C)(2)(a) 
(Rev.Ed.2003).  Even then, the guidelines call for the mitigation specialist to 
serve in an investigatory and advisory capacity.  See, e.g., id. at Guideline 10.4(B) 
(“counsel bears overall responsibility for the performance of the defense team”).  
Thus, we reject the state’s argument that counsel could rely on Hrdy’s 
representations that he was a mitigation expert without conducting further 
investigation. 
{¶ 98} The state also argues that it was reasonable for defense counsel to 
believe that Hrdy had completed his investigation because of the amount that 
Hrdy billed for his work.  Hrdy stated in his initial letter to counsel that he rarely 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
 
needed more than $2,500 to complete an investigation, and he sent a bill after trial 
to counsel for a total of $1,501.30.  It is unclear when trial counsel received 
Hrdy’s bill.  But the billing represented only a little more than 60 percent of 
Hrdy’s expected expenditures.  A review of the billing statement also shows that 
Hrdy had one meeting with Herring’s mother and four meetings with Herring and 
did not meet with any other family members or potential mitigation witnesses.  
Thus, contrary to the state’s argument, Hrdy’s billing statement put counsel on 
notice that Hrdy’s investigation had been incomplete and more work should have 
been done. 
{¶ 99} In Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.2008), the Sixth 
Circuit addressed similar ineffectiveness claims in a capital case.  Counsel’s 
mitigation strategy in that case had been to humanize the defendant through his 
grandmother’s testimony and to present her as a compelling witness who would 
suffer from a jury decision to impose a death sentence.  A central theme of the 
defense strategy was to present the grandmother as a pivotal figure in the 
defendant’s life, who “did everything that one could reasonably expect to do to try 
[to] help” him.  Id. at 599-600. 
{¶ 100} The court stated that “[i]n the abstract,” counsel’s mitigation 
strategy might have been a “legitimate strategic decision.”  Id. at 600.  But the 
court determined that trial counsel “pursued this strategy after what can only be 
described as an anemic and leaderless investigation” that suffered from significant 
flaws.  Id. 
{¶ 101} First, the court stated that the defense team chose not to 
interview the defendant’s mother because she had been a prostitute and a drug 
addict and would have been a “bad mitigation witness.”  Id.  The court stated that 
the mother’s bad background was precisely the reason why she should have been 
interviewed.  Id. Second, the court stated that the defense obtained a large 
number of files from the Ohio Department of Human Services but apparently 
January Term, 2014 
 
33
never read them.  Instead, defense counsel simply submitted them to the jury 
without knowing whether they hurt the defendant’s strategy or helped it.  Id.  The 
court stated that if counsel had read the records they would have learned that 
social workers were reluctant to place the defendant in his grandmother’s custody 
because of her abusive history.  Thus, a review of the records would have tipped 
off counsel to a different mitigation theory and avoided the pitfall of submitting 
records to the jury that directly contradicted counsel’s theory that the defendant’s 
grandmother was a positive force for change in his life.  Id. at 600-601. 
{¶ 102} 
In a situation with similarities to the present case, Johnson’s 
trial counsel acknowledged that they were not involved in the mitigation 
investigation.  Trial counsel had provided their mitigation specialists with an 
initial set of names, but one attorney admitted that he had provided no significant 
guidance, saying, “I don’t plan the investigation.  We get the mitigation experts 
out to do that.”  544 F.3d at 601.  On the day before trial began, that attorney 
admitted that he did not know what his investigator had done, and midway 
through the trial, defense counsel did not “even know what records [they were] 
going to have.”  Id. 
{¶ 103} 
The Sixth Circuit stated that these investigative blunders 
occurred because no one who participated in Johnson’s penalty-phase defense 
made any deliberate decisions about the scope of the investigation.  Id.  The Sixth 
Circuit noted that the lack of structure and supervision over the investigation led 
to significant delays and missed appointments and “ ‘suggest[s] that [the 
defense’s] incomplete investigation was the result of inattention, not reasoned 
strategic judgment.’ ”  Id. at 602, quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 
2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471.  The court concluded that defense counsel’s presentation 
could not be justified as a strategic decision since they “were not in a position to 
make * * * reasonable strategic choice[s] * * * because the investigation 
supporting their choice[s] was unreasonable.”  Id. at 603, quoting Wiggins at 536. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
 
{¶ 104} 
As in Johnson, Herring’s trial counsel had the responsibility to 
ensure that a complete investigation was performed into Herring’s background 
before the penalty phase.  Johnson also demonstrates that trial counsel cannot 
avoid their responsibility for the failure to complete an adequate investigation into 
Herring’s background because of Hrdy’s failures.  Moreover, as in Johnson, the 
evidence shows that trial counsel’s failure to complete the investigation resulted 
from “inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment.”  Id. at 602.  We conclude that 
Hrdy’s shortcomings did not excuse counsel’s failure to ensure that an adequate 
investigation was completed. 
(d) Herring’s lack of cooperation 
{¶ 105} The state also argues that Herring’s refusal to discuss or divulge 
any negative information about himself or his family precludes him from claiming 
that counsel’s investigation was inadequate. 
{¶ 106} Zena testified that Herring had not been forthcoming with any 
negative information about his family.  But Zena stated that Herring did not place 
any restrictions on the “presentment of the mitigation.”  Zena explained, “When 
we got to the mitigation phase, [Herring] was cooperative in the sense of knowing 
* * * what we were going to do, but he was not forthcoming with any 
information.”  Herring’s lack of cooperation in preparing for mitigation is an 
important factor in reviewing whether counsel was deficient. 
{¶ 107} To determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient, the 
court must measure it against an objective standard based on accepted 
professional norms.  See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 
360.  As a starting point, neither Wiggins nor Strickland addresses a situation in 
which a defendant fails to cooperate with counsel’s efforts to present mitigating 
evidence to a sentencing court.  In Rompilla, the defendant refused to assist 
counsel in the development of a mitigation case, id. at 381, but there is no 
indication the defendant ever informed the court or his counsel that he did not 
January Term, 2014 
 
35
want mitigating evidence presented.  The Supreme Court held that counsel was 
responsible for conducting a further investigation even though the defendant had 
suggested to counsel that no mitigation was available.  Id. at 381-389. 
{¶ 108} In some extreme cases, courts have held that counsel’s 
investigation was reasonable given the defendant’s lack of cooperation.  In 
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007), the 
defendant actively obstructed counsel’s investigation and outright refused to 
allow counsel to present mitigating evidence.  For example, the defendant 
explicitly instructed his mother and ex-wife not to testify and they refused to do 
so.  Id. at 469-470.  Counsel tried to make a proffer of the witnesses’ testimony, 
but the defendant repeatedly interrupted his counsel’s presentation to the court to 
reiterate that he did not want mitigating evidence presented.  Id. at 470.  The 
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s refusal to cooperate in the penalty phase 
rendered counsel’s limited investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Id. at 475-477. 
{¶ 109} In Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399 (6th Cir.2008), the court 
considered whether counsel’s failure to investigate a capital defendant’s 
background was deficient when the defendant would not cooperate.  In Owens, 
the defendant would not cooperate with mental-health examiners, would not allow 
counsel to communicate with her family and, contrary to counsel’s advice, would 
not take the stand herself.  Id. at 406-407.  The court held that any failure to 
develop mitigating evidence was the result of the defendant’s actions and not 
deficient performance by her counsel.  Id. at 412.  The court stated, “A defendant 
cannot be permitted to manufacture a winning [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] 
claim by sabotaging her own defense, or else every defendant clever enough to 
thwart her own attorneys would be able to overturn her sentence on appeal.”  Id. 
{¶ 110} Herring’s refusal to cooperate appears to fall somewhere between 
Rompilla and Landrigan.  Herring was not forthcoming with counsel during 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
 
mitigation, particularly with any negative information about his family.  But 
Herring never told trial counsel that he did not want mitigation evidence 
presented.  Thus, Herring’s refusal to divulge information did not excuse counsel 
from conducting a mitigation investigation.  See State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 
353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 242-249. 
3. Conclusion:  Counsel’s mitigation preparation was deficient 
{¶ 111} Trial counsel’s strategy to present only “positive mitigation” was 
deficient because neither defense counsel nor the mitigation specialist completed 
a thorough mitigation investigation beforehand.  Trial counsel’s responsibility to 
ensure that an investigation was completed cannot be excused because of Hrdy’s 
omissions, Hrdy’s failure to communicate with counsel, or Herring’s refusal to 
provide trial counsel with negative information about his family. 
B. No constitutional right to mitigation specialist; imputation of Hrdy’s 
deficiencies to counsel (Proposition of Law II) 
{¶ 112} The state’s second proposition recasts its claim that trial counsel 
were not responsible for inadequacies in Hrdy’s investigation.  The state argues 
that Hrdy’s deficiencies in completing the investigation cannot be imputed to 
counsel, who did not have sufficient knowledge of them, because capital 
defendants do not have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of a 
mitigation specialist. 
{¶ 113} It is true that Herring did not have a constitutional right to a 
mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one.  See Moore v. Mitchell, 708 
F.3d 760, 777 (6th Cir.2013); State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 399, 686 
N.E.2d 1112 (1997) (no requirement for counsel to hire mitigation specialist in 
capital case).  Even though “counsel did not have a specific obligation to employ 
a mitigation specialist, they did have an obligation to fully investigate the possible 
mitigation evidence available.”  Jells, 538 F.3d at 495.  The state’s argument that 
trial counsel’s responsibilities were lessened because Herring did not have a 
January Term, 2014 
 
37
constitutional right to an effective mitigation specialist is unpersuasive.  As 
discussed regarding the state’s first proposition, trial counsel had the 
responsibility to ensure that a complete investigation was performed before 
making the decision to present only positive mitigating evidence.  Moreover, trial 
counsel cannot avoid their responsibility by relying on Hrdy’s failure to tell them 
that his investigation was incomplete.  That is particularly true in this case, in 
which the facts show that the inadequate investigation resulted from trial 
counsel’s inattention and failure to monitor Hrdy’s progress in conducting it. 
C. Prejudice inquiry (Proposition of Law III) 
{¶ 114} The court of appeals concluded that trial counsel’s deficient 
performance was prejudicial.  The court stated that the undiscovered mitigating 
evidence “ ‘ “might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal” ’ ” of Herring’s 
culpability.  2011-Ohio-662, at ¶ 90, quoting Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393, 125 S.Ct. 
2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 
L.Ed.2d 389.  The court also stated that “the probability of a different sentence if 
counsel had presented the evidence is ‘ “sufficient to undermine the confidence in 
the outcome.” ’ ”  Id., quoting Rompilla at 393, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 115} The state argues that even if trial counsel’s mitigation 
investigation was deficient, the court of appeals erred in concluding that Herring 
was prejudiced as a result of the deficiency without reweighing the evidence.  The 
state claims that a reweighing of the evidence establishes that Herring was not 
prejudiced. 
1. Legal standard 
{¶ 116} In assessing prejudice, “the question is whether ‘there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
 
Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 163, quoting 
Strickland at 694.  To assess that probability, we consider “the totality of the 
available mitigating evidence” and reweigh it “against the evidence in 
aggravation.”  Williams v. Taylor at 397-398. 
{¶ 117} Additional mitigating evidence that is “ ‘merely cumulative’ of 
that already presented” does not undermine the results of sentencing.  Broom v. 
Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir.2006), quoting Clark, 425 F.3d at 286.  
Instead, “the new evidence * * * must differ in a substantial way—in strength and 
subject matter—from the evidence actually presented at sentencing.”  Hill v. 
Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir.2005); see Tibbetts v. Bradshaw, 633 F.3d 
436, 444 (6th Cir.2011). 
2. Evidence presented at the mitigation hearing 
{¶ 118} Herring was sentenced to death for the course-of-conduct 
aggravating circumstance involving his intentional participation in three murders 
and two attempted murders.  The evidence at trial showed that Herring and his 
accomplices killed these victims during a planned robbery of a Youngstown bar.  
In this court’s independent sentence review on direct appeal, we described the 
events that occurred at the Newport Inn and discussed evidence that singled out 
Herring’s culpability as the ringleader: 
 
The robbers clearly coordinated their actions in 
advance.  They discussed the robbery among themselves 
before going to the Newport Inn; they divided into two 
groups to cover both doors; they started shooting almost 
immediately.  The coordination displayed here belies the 
notion that the killings were merely impulsive acts by 
individual members of the gang.  That coordination 
supports the conclusion that the killings were integral to the 
January Term, 2014 
 
39
robbery plan and that each of the robbers intended to kill 
the victims as part of that plan. 
And that inference is especially strong with regard 
to Herring, because he was the evident ringleader.  It was at 
his house that the robbers assembled, and he initiated the 
discussion of the robbery.  Herring was the only robber 
prepared with a mask.  He also obtained the guns (except 
Foose’s), and he decided who would carry which gun. 
 
94 Ohio St.3d at 266, 762 N.E.2d 940. 
{¶ 119} We also explained why Herring should receive the death penalty 
even though Antwan Jones, one of Herring’s codefendants, did not.  Jones was 
convicted of three counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted 
aggravated murder but death specifications against him were dismissed.  Id. at 
267.  We stated: 
 
[S]ince Herring was the leader, the state certainly had a 
stronger case against him than against Jones on the issue of 
intent.  Moreover, the state had ballistics evidence pointing 
to Herring, not Jones, as the actual killer on Count One 
(even though the jury acquitted Herring of being the actual 
killer on that count).  There was no such evidence against 
Jones, who was carrying a .357-caliber firearm rather than 
a 9 mm.  The state thus had a rational basis to seek the 
death penalty for Herring and not for Jones. 
 
Id. at 268. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
 
{¶ 120} As for mitigation, trial counsel presented evidence that Herring’s 
accomplices did not receive the death penalty.  Herring’s mother and his older 
sister also provided positive testimony about his loving relationship with his 
family and asked the jury to spare his life.  In addition, trial counsel argued that 
the jury should consider Herring’s youth.  Herring was 18 years and 8 months old 
at the time of the murders.  Id. at 267. 
3. Undiscovered evidence 
{¶ 121} In contrast to the evidence produced during the mitigation 
hearing, the evidence that Herring’s counsel could have produced if they had 
conducted an adequate investigation presents a more comprehensive picture of 
Herring’s troubled background.  Compelling mitigation evidence that was never 
presented to the jury indicated that (1) Herring’s father died violently in a drug 
dispute when Herring was young, (2) his mother used crack cocaine for most of 
Herring’s childhood, (3) his stepfather was addicted to drugs, (4) Herring began 
abusing drugs and alcohol at an early age and used them almost daily, (5) Herring 
dropped out of school before finishing the tenth grade, (6) his mother did not 
know whether Herring had ever graduated from high school, (7) Herring was a 
gang member for much of his life, and (8) Herring began selling drugs in his early 
teens. 
{¶ 122} In addition, Dr. Brams could have presented information about 
Herring’s dysfunctional childhood.  The jury would have learned that Herring 
“was raised in an environment in which * * * basically every parental figure, 
caregiver, family member, and associate was involved in illegal activities, 
significant drug and alcohol abuse, and to whom the consequences of violating 
the law evoked little anxiety.”  The jury could have also heard that Herring was 
introduced to gangs and drug dealing through other family members and that 
Herring’s own mother asked him to purchase drugs for her.  Thus, in contrast to 
January Term, 2014 
 
41
the testimony presented at trial, substantial evidence showed that Herring had not 
been raised by a caring and nurturing family. 
{¶ 123} Other evidence that was not presented to the jury revealed 
cognitive and learning-skills deficits.  Herring had a full-scale IQ of 87.  But other 
test results showed that Herring had a low score on visual-motor functioning and 
had the perceptual-learning skills of a ten year old.  In addition, Dr. Brams 
diagnosed Herring with chronic alcohol abuse, cannabis abuse/dependence, 
polysubstance abuse/dependence, depressive disorder, personality disorder with 
narcissistic and antisocial features, and learning disabilities.  Dr. Brams also 
stated that Herring’s IQ and achievement profiles, his history (which is suggestive 
of learning disabilities), and his chronic and early onset of substance abuse 
showed that he should have had a neuropsychological evaluation to determine 
whether he suffers from an organic brain impairment.  Thus, additional 
information about Herring’s mental impairments could have been developed and 
presented to the jury if counsel had performed an adequate investigation. 
4. State’s position 
{¶ 124} The state argues that Herring was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
failure to ensure that a more complete mitigation investigation occurred.  First, the 
state argues that the mitigation testimony of many of the family members would 
not have been effective because a majority of them stated that they did not believe 
that Herring committed the offenses.  But this does not mean that the underlying 
information that these witnesses could have conveyed about Herring’s 
background was not believable. 
{¶ 125} Second, the state argues that the mitigating evidence that trial 
counsel failed to discover would not have made a difference in the outcome of the 
sentencing proceedings if that evidence had been presented to the jury.  The state 
cites Nields v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir.2007), and Keith v. Mitchell, 
455 F.3d 662, 670 (6th Cir.2006), in arguing that the Sixth Circuit has found that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
 
the failure to present similar background information about a capital defendant 
was not prejudicial. 
{¶ 126} In Nields, trial defense counsel had failed to discover that “ 
‘Nields’s childhood home life was chaotic and neglectful,’ that ‘he was an expert 
and dedicated musician whose life was once very focused,’ that ‘he had several 
successful employment experiences and was a hard worker,’ * * * and that he 
‘was a dependable kind-hearted friend and an extremely helpful, friendly person.’ 
”  Id. at 454, quoting Nields’s brief.  The court found that this additional 
information was “largely cumulative” of testimony at trial.  Id.  Unlike this case, 
in Nields the additional evidence did not include gang involvement, drug and 
alcohol abuse, or possible mental problems.  Also unlike this case, the court in 
Nields found that the additional information was largely cumulative of evidence 
presented at trial. 
{¶ 127} In Keith, postconviction affidavits showed that trial defense 
counsel had failed to interview family members, that friends and family had 
praised Keith’s abilities in high school football and his relationship with his 
daughter and nieces, and that a forensic and neuropsychological consultant had 
opined that Keith might suffer from a mild brain impairment.  Id. at 670.  
Evidence was also presented that his mother was a drug addict, that he had been 
raised by his grandparents, that his grandmother was a convicted murderer, and 
that his father gambled and was known to run the streets.  Id.  In concluding that 
Keith was not prejudiced, the Sixth Circuit explained:  “The additional mitigating 
evidence * * * does not demonstrate that Keith’s life had been so terrible that he 
was materially less culpable.  In addition, * * * much of the so-called additional 
information was already given to the jury in the [presentence report], including 
descriptions of Keith’s family history and childhood circumstances.”  Id. 
{¶ 128} There are similarities between the additional evidence in Keith 
and that in the present case.  Both cases implicate a family history of neglect, drug 
January Term, 2014 
 
43
abuse, and criminal misconduct, and both involve the possibility that the 
defendant suffered from brain impairment.  But unlike the present case, Keith’s 
jury had been provided a presentence report that described his family history and 
childhood circumstances. 
{¶ 129} Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has found that defense counsel’s 
failure to conduct a full mitigation investigation was prejudicial in a number of 
different circumstances that are similar to the present case.  See, e.g., Foust, 655 
F.3d at 539-546 (prejudice found when counsel had failed to obtain information 
about family chaos, parental abuse and neglect, squalor, incest, and sexual abuse 
in the family home and about good acts defendant performed in saving a baby 
from being shot in a drive-by shooting and convincing his sister to stop strip 
dancing and using drugs); Johnson, 544 F.3d at 606 (prejudice found when 
counsel had failed to discover evidence that defendant’s mother was a neglectful 
drug addict and had committed “atrocities” on him by giving him beer and 
Percocet when he was a child to stop crying, putting a cigarette out in his eye, and 
teaching him as an adolescent to prepare and sell crack cocaine); Jells, 538 F.3d at 
500-501 (prejudice found when counsel had failed to discover evidence showing 
that defendant had significant learning disabilities, which led to aggressive 
behavioral responses, and that he experienced a sense of victimization due to his 
mother’s abusive relationships). 
{¶ 130} Third, the state argues that the court of appeals ignored the fact 
that Herring’s and his family’s alcohol and drug abuse are entitled to little weight 
in mitigation.  The additional mitigation that counsel failed to discover, however, 
involved much more than Herring’s alcoholism and drug abuse. 
{¶ 131} Finally, the state argues that the trial judge’s opinion overruling 
Herring’s postconviction claim should be afforded great deference because the 
same judge presided over Herring’s trial and postconviction proceedings.  See 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 396-397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389; Schriro, 550 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
 
U.S. at 476, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836.  That judge never reached the 
prejudice prong of Herring’s ineffectiveness claim, however, because he ruled 
that trial counsel’s mitigation investigation was not deficient. 
5. Reweighing the aggravating circumstance and mitigating factors 
{¶ 132} In this case, counsel presented some evidence at the mitigation 
hearing.  The judge and jury heard almost nothing that would have humanized 
Herring or allowed them to gauge his moral culpability.  They learned about 
Herring’s crimes, that his mother and sister loved him, that his accomplices did 
not receive the death penalty, that he was young, and almost nothing else. 
{¶ 133} Had Herring’s counsel been effective, the judge and jury could 
have learned of the “kind of troubled history” that the United States Supreme 
Court has “declared relevant to assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.”  
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471.  They could have 
heard many specific details about (1) Herring’s dysfunctional childhood, (2) his 
family history of alcohol and drug abuse, (3) his gang involvement, (4) his 
mental-health problems, and (5) his possible brain impairment.  See Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated 
on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 
335 (2002), quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 
L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“ ‘evidence about the defendant’s 
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this 
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background * * * may be less culpable’ ”). 
{¶ 134} On the other side of the ledger, we acknowledge that Herring’s 
course of conduct in killing three people and attempting to kill two more was 
horrific.  “Powerful aggravating circumstances, however, do not preclude a 
finding of prejudice.”  Foust, 655 F.3d at 546.  Substantial mitigating factors 
existed in this case.  The undiscovered and omitted evidence detailed above 
January Term, 2014 
 
45
provided a compelling narrative that could have shifted the balance between the 
aggravating circumstance and the mitigating factors.  Although we express no 
view on whether the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors, 
we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the penalty-phase outcome 
would have been different but for the errors of defense counsel. 
VI. Conclusion 
{¶ 135} We hold that trial counsel were deficient by failing to conduct a 
thorough and adequate investigation into Herring’s background before his 
mitigation hearing.  We also hold that the court of appeals properly determined 
that counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial pursuant to Strickland.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Herring’s death sentence and 
remanding this matter to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing, at which a 
new jury shall be impaneled to consider whether to impose the death penalty or a 
life sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent. 
_________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 136} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 137} This case concerns the trial strategy developed by Herring’s 
defense counsel to present only positive mitigation evidence, which included 
Herring’s mother and sister asking the jury to spare his life.  In my view, Herring 
has failed to rebut the presumption that counsel performed competently and has 
not shown a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to inquire further 
into the existence of other mitigating evidence, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
 
Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
{¶ 138} As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), “A convicted 
defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal 
of a conviction or death sentence has two components.”  First, the accused must 
overcome “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance,” id. at 689, and demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that “counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 687.  Second, the accused bears the burden of proving 
that the specified errors resulted in prejudice by showing “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694. 
{¶ 139} “[S]crutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” 
id. at 689, and the court has recognized that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar 
is never an easy task,” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 
176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010).  Importantly, this case concerns the trial court’s denial of 
a petition for postconviction relief, which “should be upheld absent an abuse of 
discretion.”  State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 
77, ¶ 58.  “ ‘The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court’s attitude is 
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’ ”  State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12, 
2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 
151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).  Thus, our review here is “doubly deferential.”  
See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 
(2009) (review of ineffective assistance claim in federal habeas action is “doubly 
deferential”). 
 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
47
Deficient Performance 
{¶ 140} As the Supreme Court explained in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), “In assessing the 
reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, * * * a court must consider not only 
the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known 
evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.”  Thus, Herring 
bore the burden to demonstrate that his defense attorneys were on notice of the 
need to inquire further.  He has not, however, met this burden. 
{¶ 141} Herring’s defense attorneys, Gary Van Brocklin and Thomas 
Zena, hired Thomas Hrdy, a mitigation specialist, to conduct an investigation 
seeking to uncover potential mitigating evidence.  However, Hrdy produced little 
information, and he subsequently admitted that he “did a substandard job of 
mitigation investigation.”  He also asserted that he lacked enough time to 
complete the investigation, but both defense attorneys dispute that claim.  There is 
no proof that defense counsel had any indication at the time of trial that Hrdy 
performed an inadequate investigation into possible mitigating evidence.  Hrdy’s 
affidavit makes no such claim, and defense counsel both testified that they had no 
notice that the investigation was inadequate.  Van Brocklin testified that he 
“believed at the time that [Hrdy] had done all of the work necessary to look into 
Mr. Herring’s background” and that Hrdy never alerted defense counsel that “he 
in any way fell short of the mark.”  Notably, Hrdy told counsel, “This has been a 
most difficult case to find mitigation on as you well know,” which would 
reasonably have caused defense counsel to believe that an adequate investigation 
had been completed. 
{¶ 142} Nor did Hrdy’s billing statement “put counsel on notice that 
Hrdy’s investigation had been incomplete,” majority opinion at ¶ 98, because, as 
the majority acknowledges, it is unclear when trial counsel received Hrdy’s bill.  
Moreover, the details in the billing statement may have simply confirmed defense 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
 
counsel’s belief that Hrdy had located nothing in Herring’s past that the jury panel 
would have found mitigating. 
{¶ 143} And even if trial counsel should have known that Hrdy’s 
investigation was inadequate, there is no proof that a more in-depth investigation 
would have disclosed anything counsel did not already know.  Van Brocklin 
testified that he and Zena “knew a lot of negative information” about Herring 
“through our own investigation and through criminal records and those kinds of 
things that were supplied to us during the lengthy discovery process.”  Thus, 
contrary to the majority’s conclusion, there is no indication that counsel did not in 
fact “review Herring’s [Department of Youth Services] records and other records 
that would have provided information about his dysfunctional background,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 89, nor does the record show that defense counsel at the time 
of trial were not aware of Herring’s “parental neglect, gang involvement, or life as 
a drug dealer,” id. at ¶ 71. 
{¶ 144} Rather, the record contains “a handful of post-hoc nondenials” 
by his lawyers, Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1406, 179 
L.Ed.2d 557 (2011), who could not specifically recall what they had known about 
Herring’s background.  In assuming that because counsel could not remember the 
scope of the investigation, one must not have been conducted, the majority 
ignores the presumption that counsel had performed professionally and fails to 
recognize that, as Zena testified, defense counsel in this case strove to put “the 
best foot forward to save [Herring].” 
{¶ 145} Similarly, Herring asserts that trial counsel were deficient because 
they failed to evaluate the psychological, developmental, and intellectual factors 
in Herring’s background; he relies on a letter from Dr. Douglas Darnell indicating 
that he had administered only the MMPI-2 to Herring and suggesting that Herring 
may have “a delusional disorder.”  But Dr. Darnell’s letter reports that counsel 
had asked only for the MMPI-2 to be administered, and nothing in this letter 
January Term, 2014 
 
49
indicates that this was the only assessment that Dr. Darnell or any other expert 
conducted.  And trial counsel lacked any independent memory of what steps they 
took to evaluate Herring’s mental state.  Their case files—which would establish 
whether or not defense counsel had conducted a reasonable investigation—were 
apparently lost by his appellate attorneys in the public defender’s office. 
{¶ 146} Thus, nothing in this record indicates that defense counsel 
violated the “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Herring has therefore not rebutted 
the strong presumption in favor of the adequacy of trial counsel’s representation, 
nor has he shown that any of the claimed errors are anything more than “a 
disagreement over trial strategy.”  State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-
4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 53. 
{¶ 147} As we have consistently explained, “Debatable trial tactics 
generally do not constitute a deprivation of effective counsel.”  State v. Lang, 129 
Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 192, citing State v. Phillips, 
74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995); State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 
49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980) (“Counsel chose a strategy that proved ineffective, 
but the fact that there was another and better strategy available does not amount to 
a breach of an essential duty to his client”). 
{¶ 148} Counsel’s tactics in this case were not manifestly outside the 
bounds of reasonable trial strategy.  Defense counsel based the decision to present 
positive information on the composition of the particular jury panel, which they 
viewed as likely to impose the death sentence on Herring.  Van Brocklin 
explained that negative information that “Herring had been involved in a life of 
crime would simply [have been] more ammunition for them to find a death 
verdict.”  And Zena believed that putting on negative mitigation evidence would 
have served only to “bury him further.”  Thus, as the Supreme Court noted in 
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50 
 
Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1407, 179 L.Ed.2d 557, “it 
certainly can be reasonable for attorneys to conclude that creating sympathy for 
the defendant’s family is a better idea because the defendant himself is simply 
unsympathetic.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 149} Trial strategy is the province of defense counsel, not mitigation 
specialists.  It is the accused’s attorneys who are charged with the responsibility to 
develop the trial strategy in an effort to present the best case on behalf of the 
defendant; they bear the ultimate responsibility for defending the accused at trial.  
And this is true even if a mitigation specialist asserts, after the fact, that he failed 
to do his job in conducting the investigation to discover mitigating evidence.  
There is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of a mitigation 
specialist, only a right to the effective assistance of counsel.  See Moore v. 
Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 777 (6th Cir.2013); State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 
399, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (1997).  And because Herring has failed to prove that his 
trial attorneys performed deficiently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that counsel had provided a competent defense. 
Prejudice 
{¶ 150} Even assuming that counsel’s conduct fell outside the range of 
reasonable professional assistance, Herring still carries the burden to establish 
prejudice.  “In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation 
against the totality of available mitigating evidence,” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 
123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, and  “it is necessary to consider all the relevant 
evidence that the jury would have had before it if [trial counsel] had pursued the 
different path—not just the mitigation evidence [trial counsel] could have 
presented, but also [the other evidence] that almost certainly would have come in 
with it.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20, 130 S.Ct. 383, 175 
L.Ed.2d 328 (2009).  Thus, Herring “must show a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have rejected a capital sentence after it weighed the entire body of 
January Term, 2014 
 
51
mitigating evidence (including the additional testimony [trial counsel] could have 
presented) against the entire body of aggravating evidence.”  Id. 
{¶ 151} Here, in my view, the appellate court committed reversible error 
by failing to reweigh all the relevant evidence before it concluded that Herring 
had been prejudiced by trial counsel’s errors.  The court noted that the 
undiscovered mitigating evidence “ ‘ “might well have influenced the jury’s 
appraisal” ’ ” of Herring’s culpability and that “the probability of a different 
sentence if counsel had presented the evidence is ‘ “sufficient to undermine the 
confidence in the outcome.” ’ ”  7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08-MA-213, 2011-Ohio-
662, ¶ 90, quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 
L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398, 120 S.Ct. 
1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Yet the court made no attempt to balance the mitigating factors 
against the aggravating circumstances as required by Wiggins and Belmontes 
before reaching that conclusion. 
{¶ 152} Instead, the appellate court considered only the mitigating 
evidence that it determined counsel should have discovered and presented during 
mitigation, including details about Herring’s dysfunctional childhood and family 
life, alcohol and drug abuse, gang involvement, mental-health problems, and 
possible brain impairment, taking the extraordinary step of setting aside Herring’s 
death sentence and ordering a new mitigation hearing because this evidence was 
not presented during trial—without first determining whether the submission of 
this evidence would have made any difference when weighed against other 
evidence in the case. 
{¶ 153} In my view, weighing the aggravating circumstance for each of 
the three murder counts against the mitigating evidence that Herring asserts 
counsel should have discovered demonstrates that any error did not affect the 
outcome of the proceeding.  The jury found Herring guilty of three death-penalty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
 
specifications for a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or 
attempt to kill two or more persons.  State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 252, 
762 N.E.2d 940 (2002).  As we explained in the independent sentence review we 
conducted on direct appeal, sufficient evidence proved Herring’s intentional 
participation in three murders and two attempted murders during a planned 
robbery of a Youngstown bar.  The manner in which the robbery was committed 
showed that each of the robbers, including Herring, intended to kill all of the 
victims, and “[t]he coordination displayed here belies the notion that the killings 
were merely impulsive acts by individual members of the gang.”  Id. at 266.  We 
also noted Herring’s greater culpability as the ringleader of the group:  “It was at 
[Herring’s] house that the robbers assembled, and he initiated the discussion of 
the robbery.  Herring was the only robber prepared with a mask.  He also obtained 
the guns (except Foose’s), and he decided who would carry which gun.”  Id.  And 
not only did the evidence show that Herring was the leader of the group, but also 
the state presented ballistic evidence showing that Herring murdered Jimmie Lee 
Jones in addition to attempting to murder Deborah Aziz and Ronald Marinelli 
during the course of a robbery that also resulted in the killings of Herman Naze 
Sr. and Dennis Kotheimer.  Id. at 247, 268. 
{¶ 154} As for mitigation, trial counsel made a conscious, informed 
decision to present “positive information” to the jury and “hammered home in 
argument * * * that Mr. Herring had not been convicted as a principal offender in 
this matter.”  Counsel argued persuasively on Herring’s behalf, emphasizing that 
his accomplices did not receive the death penalty.  Herring’s mother and his older 
sister provided testimony about his loving relationship with his family and urged 
the jury to spare his life.  And trial counsel asked the jury to consider Herring’s 
youth, because he was only 18 years old at time of the murders.  Id. at 267.  This 
is a reasonable approach given the disadvantages of opening Herring’s 
background for the jury’s consideration. 
January Term, 2014 
 
53
{¶ 155} The additional evidence relating to Herring’s dysfunctional 
family background, his drug abuse, and his gang involvement is by no means 
“clearly mitigating.”  In Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1410, 
179 L.Ed.2d 557, the Supreme Court reviewed an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim asserting that Pinholster had been prejudiced by his trial counsel’s 
failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence “relating to 
Pinholster’s family—their more serious substance abuse, mental illness, and 
criminal problems”—as well as new evidence of Pinholster’s drug dependency, 
possible brain damage, and parental neglect; like Herring, “Pinholster was mostly 
unsupervised and ‘didn’t get much love.’ ”  Id.  But the court concluded that this 
evidence was “by no means clearly mitigating, as the jury might have concluded 
that Pinholster was simply beyond rehabilitation.”  Id.  And the court noted that 
negative mitigating evidence can be a “ ‘two-edged sword’ ” that might convince 
a jury of the accused’s future dangerousness.  Id., quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 
{¶ 156} The additional evidence that would have been presented on 
behalf of Herring involved his history of violence and gang involvement, drug 
abuse and drug trafficking, and other criminal behavior that he glorified as “the 
family business.”  In my view, this evidence is not mitigating and might have 
caused the jury to conclude that Herring was beyond rehabilitation.  Had counsel 
attempted to explain Herring’s behavior and humanize him with this evidence, the 
jury would likely have also learned of his extensive criminal past, including his 
commitment to DYS for shooting another person while in eighth grade, various 
aggravated robberies, and a life of gang involvement and drug trafficking.  See 
State v. Herring, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03-MA-12, 2004-Ohio-5357, ¶ 103. 
{¶ 157} Nor has Herring established any prejudice from counsel’s failure 
to have him evaluated for a delusional disorder, an organic brain impairment, or 
any other mental disorder.  There is no evidence that Herring suffers from these 
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54 
 
conditions.  Dr. Jolie Brams offered evidence in support of Herring’s petition for 
postconviction relief, but had she testified at trial, she could have informed the 
jury only that Herring had a learning disability, substance abuse problems, and 
“reasonable anxiety and depression,” none of which would have proven that 
Herring had an impaired ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. 
{¶ 158} In the last analysis, I see no reasonable probability that the jury 
would have returned a different verdict had this additional evidence been 
presented to it.  Defense counsel recognized that this was “an awful case as cases 
go.  * * *  This was mayhem in a bar where people wound up dead, people wound 
up shot, bullets all over the floor,” and the victims were innocent bystanders who 
were not “involved in any transgressions with any of the individuals who came 
in.” 
{¶ 159} Accordingly, because Herring has not shown that defense 
counsel provided ineffective assistance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the petition for postconviction relief.  I would therefore reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the sentence as imposed on Herring 
by the trial court in accordance with the recommendation of the jurors who heard 
the evidence in the case. 
 
LANZINGER and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ralph M. 
Rivera, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kimberly S. Rigby and 
Elizabeth Arrick, Assistant Public Defenders; and Andrea D. Lyon, for appellee. 
___________________