Case Title: Belmore v. State Tax Commission

Citation: 245 P.2d 149, 56 N.M. 436

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1952-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
245 P.2d 149 (1952) 56 N.M. 436 BELMORE v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al. (Hittson, Third-Party Respondent). No. 5309. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 22, 1952. Rehearing Denied June 24, 1952. Martin A. Threet, Albuquerque, for appellant. H.A. Kiker, Sante Fe, Haynes M. Miller, Roswell, for third-party respondent. COORS, Justice. This action in mandamus was brought by the relator against the New Mexico State Tax Commission and the individual members of that Commission to compel the Tax Commission to sell to relator, as provided by Sec. 76-740 N.M.S.A. 1941 Lots 8, 9 and 10 in Block 33 of the Original Townsite to the City of Tucumcari, New Mexico. The statute under which relator claims a right to repurchase is as follows: An alternative writ of mandamus was issued and served. The respondent answered, stating in substance that the relator was not entitled to repurchase said Lots 9 and 10, but that he was entitled to repurchase said Lot 8 upon paying certain sums of money for back taxes; that relator's father, prior to his death, had owned the three lots but had conveyed Lots 9 and 10 by quitclaim deed to C.H. Hittson, who filed a third party answer, and who claimed the prior right to purchase them and that the relator had no preference right to purchase said Lots 9 and 10. C.H. Hittson, third party respondent, answered relator's complaint, denying that relator had ever owned any interest in said Lots 9 and 10, and denying that he was ever at any time the holder of the legal title to them and had no prior right to repurchase Hittson claims to have the first and prior right to repurchase Lots 9 and 10 under the statute quoted by virtue of a quitclaim deed delivered to him by the father of relator, who had owned the lots at the time a tax deed was delivered to the State of New Mexico, and whose first and prior right to repurchase the lots was transferred to him by the quitclaim deed which was dated January 14, 1939. The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which we deem material to a decision, to-wit: Upon these findings and conclusions the trial court entered its order and judgment, making the alternative writ permanent as to Lot 8 of Block 33 and quashed and discharged it as to said Lots 9 and 10 of Block 33 of the City of Tucumcari. Insofar as the third party respondent is concerned the trial court did not in its judgment make *152 any determination as to whether he had the right to repurchase the lots in question from the State Tax Commission. The court in its judgment went no further than to determine that the relator was not entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the State Tax Commission to convey to him said Lots 9 and 10 of Block 33. The trial court concluded that relator inherited the right from his father to repurchase Lot 8; that the quitclaim deed from D.A. Belmore, Sr. to Hittson did not convey the title, but did constitute an assignment of the owner's right to repurchase under Sec. 76-740, N.M.S.A. 1941, supra. We have held that the prior right to purchase as provided by the statute in question was an extension of the time in which the former owner could redeem the lots from the sale for taxes. Langhurst v. Langhurst, 49 N.M. 329, 164 P.2d 204; Sanchez v. State Tax Comm., 51 N.M. 154, 180 P.2d 246. In the Langhurst case we said [49 N.M. 329, 164 P.2d 205]: There is authority elsewhere to the same effect. State ex rel. Rich v. Garfield County, 120 Mont. 568, 188 P.2d 1004; Genero v. Ewing, 176 Wash. 78, 28 P.2d 116. But there are cases to the contrary: State of N.D. v. Durupt, 8 Cir., 148 F.2d 918 (construing North Dakota's statute); Beckman Bros. v. Weir, 120 Mont. 305, 184 P.2d 347. Some courts hold that the right given the former owner to repurchase after the delivery to the state of a tax deed is a special act of grace involving no vested right, and that such right could be withdrawn at any time by the legislature. Chaney v. Coos County, 168 Or. 390, 123 P.2d 192; Stutsman v. Smith, 73 N.D. 664, 18 N.W.2d 639. This seems to be the effect of Yates v. Hawkins, 46 N.M. 249, 126 P.2d 476, 478, in which we said: The Yates case was not mentioned in the opinions of this court in the Langhurst and Sanchez cases, supra. *153 Other New Mexico cases construing this statute are Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290 and De Baca v. Perea, 52 N.M. 418, 200 P.2d 715. The present case was tried below on the theory that the right to repurchase was assignable. Relator claims it through his father's will. Respondents assert that by virtue of the quitclaim deed the third party respondent was possessed of the right to repurchase Lots 9 and 10 and that relator was possessed of the right to repurchase Lot 8 as the sole legatee and devisee under his father's will. The district court's findings indicate that it followed this theory in its decision. The agreement of all the parties and the trial court that the right to repurchase is an interest which the former owner may assign or devise or which will pass to his heirs if he dies intestate will be treated as the law of the case. Mares v. N.M. Public Service Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257. We are of the opinion that it is not only the law of the case but is the correct interpretation of the New Mexico statute, Sec. 76-740, N.M.S.A. 1941, supra. Of course, the one claiming the right to repurchase under the former owner, either as assignee, heir or devisee, acquires only the same right or privilege the former owner had and the right must be exercised in the manner and within the time provided by the statute in effect at the time of repurchase or the right is lost. De Baca v. Perea, supra. In the last mentioned case the court held that a devisee of a former owner had made application to repurchase after the statutory period for repurchase had expired and therefore the devisee applicant had no such statutory right of repurchase. The question of whether or not the prior right of repurchase was such a right or privilege as could be assigned, devised or passed by inheritance was apparently not directly raised or discussed by the court but the court seemed to assume that such was the law as is seen from the following brief quotations from the opinion [52 N.M. 418, 200 P.2d 716]: While there may be some differences and likewise some similarities in the right of redemption and the right of repurchase granted by our statutes as discussed in Yates v. Hawkins, supra, and Langhurst v. Langhurst, supra, we believe both rights may be assigned, inherited or devised. Both statutes have a fundamental common purpose which is to grant or afford relief to delinquent taxpayers who have lost or are about to lose their property. Such statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the right to redeem and the right to repurchase. In 51 American Jurisprudence, Secs. 1105 and 1106, pages 958 and 959, we find the following: The first contention of appellant is stated by him as follows: It should be stated that this Point I of appellant makes no reference to any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law, as required by Sec. 14(5) of Rule XV, Rules of New Mexico Supreme Court. Lea County Fair Ass'n v. Elkan, 52 N.M. 250, 197 P.2d 228. The findings of the court are the facts upon which the case must rest. In re White's Estate, 41 N.M. 631, 73 P.2d 316; Krametbauer v. McDonald, 44 N.M. 473, 104 P.2d 900. The finding to which appellant refers probably is Finding No. 7 quoted above, and the conclusion of law may be Conclusion No. 2 quoted hereinabove. As the quitclaim deed was executed after the tax deed to the State had been executed and delivered, of course it could not convey title as the court found or concluded, because the title was already in the State. But the statuory right to repurchase was not disturbed by the tax deed. It was contemplated by the act in question that the title would be in the State at the time the right to repurchase should become effective. While the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to Hittson, the decree only determined the issues between the State Tax Commission and the relator, and in doing so discharged the alternative writ as to Lots 9 and 10, the effect of which was a determination that relator had no right to repurchase as provided by Sec. 76-740, N.M.S.A. 1941, supra. The word "void" as used by the trial court in the Quay County case in concluding that the quitclaim deed in question was "void because issued subsequent to the sale by the County Treasurer to the State Tax Commission", was used in the sense of "inoperative". The reason for the holding stated by the Quay County trial court is in language so certain that it cannot be successfully questioned, and the trial court in this case, in its finding No. 7, held: This finding we believe is sustained by the record herein. The question decided in the present case was whether the relator inherited from his father the right to repurchase. This depended upon whether his father had that right at the time of his death. At that time he had sold and assigned this right to Hittson. The improvident cancelling of the quitclaim deed of record by the District Court of Quay County because it was inoperative as a conveyance of title is immaterial. The cancelling of the deed destroyed it as a conveyance of title, but it did not transfer the right of repurchase to relator, who never owned *155 such right. It was undoubtedly inoperative as a transfer of title because it had been previously conveyed to the State, but it constituted an assignment of the prior right to repurchase. Contention No. 2 of appellant is as follows: This contention of appellant is not well taken for the reasons hereinabove stated. The court did not err in admitting in evidence the quitclaim deed in question. Appellant's Contention No. 3 is stated as follows: In stating this point in his brief the appellant is again remiss as was mentioned hereinabove with reference to his Point I. He makes no reference to any specific conclusion of law to which his Point 3 refers, as required by Sec. 14(5) of our Supreme Court Rule XV. The conclusion to which appellant refers in his Point 3 is probably Conclusion of Law No. 3 made by the trial court in this case, hereinabove quoted. We see no error of the court in reaching such a conclusion for the reasons we have heretofore discussed. In addition, however, we call attention to the fact that this suit as originally brought was between relator and respondent, and respondent was not a party to the Quay County suit, and the judgment in that suit did not affect the respondent in any way. As between the original parties to this action, the Quay County judgment was not res adjudicate of any claim of the respondent in this case nor is respondent collaterally estopped thereby, for the sufficient reason that the parties and causes of action were different. The trial court made findings in the present case to the effect that Hittson acquired the equitable right to repurchase Lots 9 and 10, but this was not followed by any judgment in favor of Hittson, which only provided that the writ be dismissed as it affected Lots 9 and 10. The respondent, in effect the State of New Mexico, is not bound by any finding of the trial court in the Quay County case affecting the claim of Hittson for several reasons: (1) The respondent was not a party to the Quay County suit, and the cause of action is different; (2) the judgment in this action ignores any right or claim of Hittson, and is confined to the determination of issues between the relator and respondent; and (3) the senior Belmore conveyed his right to repurchase and it did not descend to relator. But we need not further consider the rights of Hittson; they were unmentioned in the decree of the trial court. Even if the wrongful judgment pleaded as res adjudicata by the relator could have bound Hittson it certainly did not bind the State of New Mexico (which was not a party) and thus deprive it of its power to dispose of the State's property secured by tax title in the manner provided by law, whether to Hittson or any other person. If relator has not the right to repurchase it, it is no concern of his as to whom the respondent may sell the property. See Pioneer Irrigation Ditch Co. v. Blashek, 41 N.M. 99, 64 P.2d 388, in which this court held that a federal court's decree establishing water rights was not binding on an appropriator who was not a party to the suit, and U.S. v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 46 S. Ct. 561, 70 L. Ed. 1023, in which the United States Supreme Court held that the United States was not bound by a decree of a district court of the State of New Mexico disposing of Pueblo Indian lands in which the United States was not a party. Regarding the binding effect of a judgment in a subsequent action between the *156 same parties, see Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 129 P.2d 636, 142 A.L.R. 1237. The judgment of the district court should be and is affirmed. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., concurs. SADLER, J., concurs in the result. ARMIJO, District Judge, dissents. McGHEE and COMPTON, JJ., did not participate. Order Denying Motion for Rehearing PER CURIAM. This cause coming on for hearing upon appellant's motion for rehearing, and the Court having considered said motion and briefs of counsel, and being now sufficiently advised in the premises, It is ordered by the Court that said motion for rehearing be and the same is hereby denied. SADLER, Justice. I concur in the order of the court denying the motion for rehearing. Furthermore, it is not out of place for me to add, even at this late day, that I saw nothing to criticize in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Coors in the opinion heretofore filed in this case wherein he discusses the cases of Yates v. Hawkins, 46 N.M. 249, 126 P.2d 476; Langhurst v. Langhurst, 49 N.M. 329, 164 P.2d 204; and Sanchez v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 51 N.M. 154, 180 P.2d 246. See, also, recent case of Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781. Accordingly, there is no disagreement on my part with the conclusions drawn by him in his opinion near the close of the discussion of the three cases first mentioned above, to-wit: The foregoing observations are recorded to clarify some uncertainty otherwise likely to arise from the fact that when the opinion of Mr. Justice Coors was filed herein, my concurrence was noted as in the result only.