Case Title: Smith v. Marshall

Citation: 225 Kan. 70, 587 P.2d 320

Docket Number: 49,096

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1978-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
225 Kan. 70 (1978)
587 P.2d 320
SYLVESTER SMITH, JR., Appellant,
v.
KEVIN P. MARSHALL, Appellee.
No. 49,096

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 9, 1978.
Fred W. Phelps, Jr., of Fred W. Phelps, Chartered, of Topeka, argued the cause and Betty Joan Phelps and Fred W. Phelps were with him on the brief for the appellant.
Harold S. Youngentob, of Goodell, Casey, Briman & Cogswell, of Topeka, argued the cause and Thomas E. Wright, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
*71 The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is an action brought under the provisions of the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act (K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 40-3101 et seq.), commonly known as the Kansas No-Fault Insurance Act. Summary judgment was entered for the defendant, Kevin P. Marshall. The plaintiff, Sylvester Smith, Jr., appealed from the summary judgment and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Smith v. Marshall, 2 Kan. App.2d 213, 577 P.2d 362 (1978). The matter is before this Court on petition for review.
On May 30, 1975, the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by the defendant. The defendant drove his vehicle to the left curb of a one-way street in Topeka, Kansas. Plaintiff exited the vehicle from the passenger side and walked in front of the vehicle. Defendant attempted to put the vehicle in reverse, but instead put it in neutral or drive. The defendant's vehicle moved forward. The plaintiff's lower right leg was caught between defendant's vehicle and a parked automobile. These facts are not in dispute. The residual effect of plaintiff's injury was a discoloration of a small area of skin on his leg.
The issue before the trial court was whether or not, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's injury was sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements of K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 40-3117 which provides:
At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff's treating chiropractor, Dr. Guy Edward Counselman, testified:
"Q [By Mr. Wright] Oh, I see, right here?
"A Yes.
"A Yes.
"A Yes.
"Q This is the upper and this is the lower?
"A Yes.
"Q That is about an inch or an inch and a quarter.
The trial court described what it observed as follows:
Polaroid photographs of the plaintiff's leg were taken at the hearing to preserve the appearance of the leg for the record. These are consistent with what the court described.
The trial court's letter to counsel sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment is as follows:
The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, vacated the summary judgment. In so doing it adopted the decision in Gillman v. Gillman, 319 So. 2d 165 (Fla. App. 1975), saying:
Following the reasoning of Gillman, the majority opinion concluded *74 that the existence of the scar had been established and that it was therefore error by the trial court to grant summary judgment to the defendant.
A case with similar facts and an opposite result is Duncan v. Beck, 553 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. App. 1977). Kentucky has similar threshold requirements for the maintenance of such an action. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-060(2)(b) (1978 Supp.). In Duncan the trial court likewise entered a summary judgment for the defendant for the failure, as a matter of law, of the injuries to meet the threshold test. In affirming the trial court the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held:
The dissent of Chief Judge Foth is in accord with the reasoning of the Kentucky court and is as follows:
We find the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals to be compelling and the same is adopted as the opinion of this Court.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the trial court is affirmed.