Case Title: Cranston v. Weston County Weed and Pest Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cranston v. Weston County Weed and Pest Bd.1992 WY 20826 P.2d 251Case Number: 90-65Decided: 02/14/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gene and Dorothy 
CRANSTON,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

The WESTON COUNTY WEED 
AND PEST BOARD, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Weston County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Debra J. Hein, 
Newcastle, for appellants.

Tracy Hunt, 
Newcastle, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN, JJ., and HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Gene 
and Dorothy E. Cranston (Cranstons) appeal from the trial court's orders 
dismissing their complaint against the Weston County Weed and Pest Board (WCWPB) 
and dismissing their amended complaint against the Weston County Board of 
Commissioners (Commissioners). The trial court's dismissals were based on the 
Cranstons' failure to serve a separate notice of claim on WCWPB, to show that 
Weston County owed them a duty of care, and to prove that the county had 
insurance available to cover appellant's claim against Weston 
County.

[¶2]      Appellants raise 
the following issues:

A.        Whether the 
Weston County Weed and Pest [Board] is a "governmental entity" requiring 
separate service of a Notice of Claim?

B.        Whether 
Weston County Weed and Pest [Board] is estopped from asserting that it was a 
separate and distinct governmental entity from the Weston County Board of 
Commissioners?

C.        Whether 
Appellants substantially complied with W.S. 1-39-113 so as to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction upon the district court?

D.        Whether the 
Weston County Commissioners waived their immunity from liability by purchasing 
liability insurance?

E.        Whether the 
Weston County Board of Commissioners owe a duty to Plaintiffs in this 
case?

[¶3]      We affirm the 
order dismissing appellants' suit against WCWPB, reverse the order dismissing 
appellants' suit against the Commissioners, and remand for further 
proceedings.

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellants own a 
ranch adjoining state-owned property in Weston County. Historically, appellants' 
source of drinking water has been a well which pumps from an aquifer located 
beneath the surface of their property. Water from the aquifer has also been used 
for livestock purposes.

[¶5]      In August, 1987, 
after noticing that plants in his garden wilted when he watered them, Gene 
Cranston sent a sample of his tapwater to the Wyoming Department of Agriculture 
for testing. The test results showed that the water was contaminated with 18 
parts per billion of Picloram (tradename "Tordon"), a herbicide used to control 
broadleaf weeds. The Department of Agriculture advised Cranstons that the amount 
of Tordon present in their water was sufficient to harm vegetable crops and 
broadleaf weeds. The Department recommended that the Cranstons find another 
source of drinking water.

[¶6]      The Cranstons 
notified the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) of the 
contamination problem. After an investigation, the DEQ found that appellee WCWPB 
was responsible for spraying and applying pellets of the herbicide to the state 
land adjacent to and upgradient from the Cranstons' property. This herbicide 
polluted the groundwater from which the Cranstons obtained their drinking water. 
The DEQ issued a notice of violation to Weston County for the herbicide 
pollution.

[¶7]      Cranstons 
prepared a notice of claim against both the Commissioners and the WCWPB. The 
notice requested damages of $2 million based on various claims arising from 
negligent application of the herbicide by WCWPB employees. Cranstons sent a 
single copy of this document certified mail addressed to "Western County 
Commissioners, Weston County Courthouse, Newcastle, Wy. 92701."

[¶8]      When the claim 
went unsatisfied, Cranstons filed suit in district court. Their complaint 
requested damages for negligence by the Commissioners and WCWPB. Both entities 
moved to dismiss the complaint, citing immunity under the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act and insufficiency of process.

[¶9]      The trial court 
found that WCWPB was a separate governmental entity which should have been 
served with a notice of claim before the suit; that the Commissioners could not 
be held vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of WCWPB under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior; that the complaint failed to allege that the 
County had liability insurance; and that no other exception to the Governmental 
Claims Act was applicable. The trial court dismissed Cranstons' complaint, but 
allowed them to file a claim with WCWPB if they could still do so during the 
limitations period. See W.S. 1-39-113 (June 1988 Repl.). If not, the court found 
no just cause for delay and stated it would enter judgment in favor of 
WCWPB.

[¶10]   Cranstons were given thirty days to 
file an amended complaint against Weston County. This complaint was required to 
allege that the Commissioners could be held liable because of insurance 
coverage. Cranstons were also given the opportunity to discover information 
about the county's insurance policies.

[¶11]   Cranstons were unable to file a 
claim with WCWPB because the two-year limitations period had expired; therefore, 
they appealed to this court that portion of the trial court's order granting 
judgment for WCWPB. Cranstons also filed an amended complaint, which included an 
allegation of insurance coverage, against the Commissioners. After a hearing the 
trial court granted the Commissioners' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. 
Cranstons appealed from that order, and we now consider all of Cranstons' issues 
together in this appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   As a threshold question we must 
determine whether the trial court's orders were dismissals under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) or whether the motions to dismiss had been converted to motions for 
summary judgment by the court's consideration of material outside the 
pleadings.

[¶13]   The record reveals the following 
discussion between counsel and the court at the hearing on appellees' first 
motion to dismiss:

Mr. Hunt [counsel for 
appellees]: I have a letter that Mrs. Hein has agreed to stipulate to admission 
of which, it comes from the Farm Bureau Insurance Company, Mountain West Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, whereby the attorney for that company has 
denied liability on the claims of which it is aware * * *.

I offer that to the court 
to -

Ms. Hein [counsel for 
appellants]: No objection, Your Honor.

The Court: 
Okay.

That will convert this 
from a 12(b) motion to a motion for summary judgment then?

Mr. Hunt: In that it 
-

The Court: Looks at 
matters outside the pleadings.

Mr. Hunt: - outside the 
pleadings. That's okay with me.

Ms. Hein: That's not okay 
with me then. That's going to change it.

[¶14]   Apparently, no further discussion 
was held on whether appellees' motion to dismiss had been converted to a motion 
for summary judgment. Nor was any determination made on Cranstons' objection to 
conversion.

[¶15]   A motion for dismissal under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) converts to a motion for summary judgment if the trial court 
considers matters other than the pleadings. Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Wyo. 1987). For a more thorough explanation of this concept, 
see also Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Wyo. 1986). If the materials 
considered are affidavits attached to the motion, conversion occurs 
automatically. Torrey, 713 P.2d  at 1165; W.R.C.P. 12(b). If affidavits have not 
been filed, but other materials are considered, such as discovery documents, 
conversion does not occur automatically. The court may still treat the motion as 
one for summary judgment, but the record must demonstrate that the parties had 
notice of the conversion and that the nonmovant had an opportunity to respond. 
Torrey, at 1164. See also Kimbley v. City of Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 445 
(Wyo. 1982), appeal after remand 663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶16]   In this case, the trial court 
considered nonaffidavit materials which were outside the pleadings. Counsel for 
appellees presented the court with a letter from their insurance company at the 
first hearing. Cranstons provided insurance information to the court at the 
second hearing. The question is whether Cranstons had notice which appears in 
the record of the court's intent to convert the motion to one for summary 
judgment.

[¶17]   The court's statements in the 
colloquy reprinted above were sufficiently ambiguous that they did not satisfy 
the notice requirement. Also, although Cranstons presented the court with their 
own materials outside the pleadings, the trial court never ruled on Cranstons' 
objection to conversion. Furthermore, its orders were captioned and worded as 
orders to dismiss rather than orders for summary judgment. Because the 
requirement of clear, unambiguous notice for conversion was not satisfied, we 
will treat the court's orders in this case as orders to dismiss rather than as 
converted orders for summary judgment.

[¶18]   We set forth concisely our standard 
of review of a trial court's order dismissing a complaint:

According to our standard 
of review we will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it shows on its 
face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of facts. In 
considering such a motion, the "facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and 
the allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs." 
Dismissal is a drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted.

Matter of 
Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987)) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶19]   In Cranstons' first two issues, 
they argue alternatively that either WCWPB is not a separate governmental entity 
entitled to notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, or that 
WCWPB is estopped from asserting that it is a separate governmental 
entity.

[¶20]   Governmental entities and their 
public employees in Wyoming are immune from tort liability, except as provided 
for in W.S. 1-39-101 et seq. (June 1988 Repl.) (Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act). See W.S. 1-39-104(a). Actions against governmental entities may only be 
pursued if brought in procedural and substantive compliance with the act. See 
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 708-09 (Wyo. 1987). One 
such procedural requirement is that claimants give notice of their claim to the 
governmental entity in order to maintain an action under the act: "No action 
shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim 
upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission * * *." W.S. 1-39-113.

[¶21]   Failure to give notice within the 
two-year claim period of a claim which falls under the statute acts as an 
absolute bar to suit. Duran v. Board of County Commissioners of Sweetwater 
County, 787 P.2d 971, 972-73 (Wyo. 1990) and cases cited therein. A litigant's 
failure to file a timely claim deprives the district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶22]   It is undisputed in this case that 
Cranstons did not present a separate notice of claim to WCWPB within the 
two-year claim period. The only notice given was the certified letter mailed to 
the Commissioners. Cranstons argue, however, that this notice to the 
Commissioners gave sufficient notice to WCWPB of their claim because WCWPB is 
not a separate "governmental entity" from Weston County.

[¶23]   Cranstons make several arguments as 
to why the WCWPB should not be considered a separate governmental entity. First, 
they note that it is not included within any of the enumerated categories in 
W.S. 1-39-103 (June 1988 Repl.). For purposes of the Governmental Claims Act, 
governmental entity "means the state, University of Wyoming or any local 
government." W.S. 1-39-103(a)(i). Local government "means cities and towns, 
counties, school districts, joint powers boards, airport boards, public 
corporations, community college districts, special districts and their governing 
bodies, all political subdivisions of the state, and their agencies, 
instrumentalities and institutions." W.S. 1-39-103(a)(ii) (emphasis 
added).

[¶24]   Cranstons argue that since weed and 
pest control districts are not included as a separate entity in the definition 
of "local government," the legislature recognized them as a part of county 
government for purposes of the statute. However, we believe that the WCWPB is 
included in this statute as a "special district [or its] governing body." 
Accordingly, Cranstons' first argument fails as a matter of law.

[¶25]   Cranstons next argue that WCWPB is 
not a separate entity because it cannot operate without the authority of the 
county commissioners. Cranstons note that the Commissioners appoint the board 
members for WCWPB and that WCWPB cannot set its own budget or raise taxes on its 
own to fund itself. Cranstons conclude that WCWPB is the same governmental 
entity as Weston County. Our examination of the pertinent statutes relating to 
weed and pest control boards leads us to the opposite conclusion.

[¶26]   WCWPB is a county weed and pest 
control district created under the auspices of the Wyoming Weed and Pest Control 
Act of 1973, 1973 Wyo.Sess.L. ch. 30 § 1. This act is found within our statutes, 
W.S. 11-5-101 et seq. (June 1989 Repl.). Under the act, all land within the 
boundaries of Wyoming is included in weed and pest control districts whose 
boundaries are coexistent with the county in which the district is located. W.S. 
11-5-103. Each weed and pest control district is operated by a district board. 
W.S. 11-5-105. The board members are appointed by the county commissioners of 
each district from a list of nominations submitted by local landowners. W.S. 
11-5-104(a). County commissioners have the power to remove a director for 
"repeated unexcused failure to attend meetings or for refusal or incapacity to 
act as a district board member." W.S. 11-5-104(e).

[¶27]   County commissioners are directed 
to levy an annual tax to carry out the act. This tax, which is levied on all 
property in the district and cannot exceed one mill on each dollar of assessed 
value, is specifically defined as "not part of the general county or city mill 
levies." W.S. 11-5-111. Any funds appropriated by the legislature for weed and 
pest control are allocated by an allocation committee which consists of the 
Commissioner of Agriculture, three members appointed by the state weed and pest 
council, and one member of the Wyoming Board of Agriculture. W.S. 
11-5-113(a).

[¶28]   The above statutes indicate that 
weed and pest control boards are separate entities from the counties in which 
they are located. Although the county commissioners appoint members to the 
board, their appointment and removal powers are limited. They can only appoint 
from a list of persons nominated by local landowners, and they can only remove 
board members for failure or incapacity to carry out their duties. Furthermore, 
although the county commissioners levy the tax and set the amount which is to be 
levied for the board, the tax itself is separate from city or county levies. Any 
legislative appropriations are allocated by the allocation committee without the 
need to seek the county commissioners' authorization.

[¶29]   W.S. 11-5-105(b) enumerates the 
powers of local weed and pest districts. The deciding factor for us is the 
authorization for local districts to "sue and be sued." W.S. 11-5-105(b)(i). If 
a district is given statutory authority to be sued in its own name, it seems 
only logical that it is a separate governmental entity and, absent evidence to 
the contrary, it is entitled to notice under the Governmental Claims Act.1 Our review of statutory authority 
convinces us to hold that a weed and pest control district under Title 11 is an 
independent governmental entity for purposes of the Governmental Claims 
Act.

[¶30]   Cranstons next argue that WCWPB is 
estopped in this case from claiming that it is a separate governmental entity. 
They rely on the elements of estoppel from a statute of limitations set forth in 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 240 (Wyo. 1986): "The delay in filing 
the action must be induced by the defendant; the defendant must have misled the 
plaintiff; and the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith 
to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely 
manner."

[¶31]   Cranstons argue that WCWPB had 
actual notice of the claim against it prior to the expiration of the two-year 
claim period, that WCWPB led Cranstons to believe that it had notice, and that 
they relied on this belief in good faith in not filing their claim with WCWPB. 
They point to several elements in the record which they claim support this 
contention. First, a letter from an insurance analyst concerning coverage dated 
October 25, 1988, states that WCWPB was consulted regarding the claim. Second, 
the county attorney represented both appellees throughout the case. Third, the 
DEQ served WCWPB with a Notice of Violation which described the harm which is 
the subject of this case.

[¶32]   While these elements certainly 
establish that WCWPB had notice during the claims period that Cranstons thought 
they had a claim against WCWPB, they do not show that the delay in filing was 
induced by WCWPB, or that WCWPB misled them as to the need to file a claim. This 
court has addressed a similar estoppel argument in Duran:

Duran [appellant] relies 
upon the mere pendency of negotiations as the basis for employing the doctrine 
of estoppel, both in her brief in this court and in her defense to the motion to 
dismiss in the district court. Such an assertion is not of itself sufficient to 
establish an estoppel. * * * There was no assertion of representation by the 
insurer relied upon by appellant. As a matter of law, what is asserted is 
insufficient to require that the issue be presented to a fact 
finder.

Duran, 787 P.2d  
at 974-75 (citations omitted). In this case, the representations which Cranstons 
bring to our attention are insufficient as a matter of law to establish that 
WCWPB misled them or that the delay in filing was due to WCWPB's actions. Our 
review of the complaint in the light most favorable to Cranstons demonstrates 
that there is no set of facts alleged which, if proved, could establish the last 
two elements of an estoppel claim here.

[¶33]   Cranstons' third issue is whether 
they substantially complied with the notice provision of the Governmental Claims 
Act by sending the notice of claim to the Commissioners. Cranstons argue that 
since WCWPB had actual notice of their claim within the two-year statutory 
period, the purpose of the notice provision was served.

[¶34]   Generally, service of a notice of 
claim on one governmental entity is not sufficient to give notice to other 
potential defendants. Cf. Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827 (Wyo. 1985) 
(notice of claim sent to City of Casper but not Natrona County; dismissal upheld 
as to County for failure to send notice of claim). In this case, however, 
Cranstons assert that since both entities had the same attorney, and there is 
evidence that WCWPB had actual notice of the claim, the notice sent to Weston 
County substantially complied with the statute.

[¶35]   Cranstons cite Rissler and McMurry 
Company v. Wyoming Highway Department, 582 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1978), a case in which 
we allowed the plaintiff to assert substantial compliance with a notice of 
claims statute. In Rissler, the plaintiff submitted a claim to the Highway 
Department in compliance with a departmental regulation and then negotiated with 
the Highway Department until after the deadline for filing notice of claim with 
the state auditor had passed.2 We held that the purposes of the 
claims statute, timely notice to the state of claims against it, had been 
fulfilled by notice of claim to the Highway Department, particularly since 
plaintiff's claim had opened the way for settlement negotiations between the 
parties.

[¶36]   We distinguish Rissler from this 
case, however. In Rissler, the plaintiff sent a claim to a governmental entity 
whose published claims procedure contained an independent notice requirement. In 
this case, there was no such independent procedure on which Cranstons 
erroneously relied. Also in Rissler, the Highway Department entered into 
negotiations with the plaintiff, which suggested to the plaintiff that it was 
following the appropriate claims procedure. Here, no such negotiations were 
entered into between Cranstons and WCWPB. There is simply no consequent 
"gamesmanship" or bad faith by the governmental entity here such as the Rissler 
decision sought to avoid. Rissler, at 586.

[¶37]   Furthermore, that WCWPB and Weston 
County shared the same attorney and WCWPB had actual notice of Cranstons' claim 
do not, in and of themselves, excuse compliance with the notice provision of the 
statute. WCWPB had a right to rely on Cranstons' compliance with the statute, 
particularly in view of the cases cited above which state that compliance is 
jurisdictional. WCWPB could not be said to be on official notice of the claim 
until Cranstons filed such notice as prescribed. We will not excuse strict 
compliance with the procedural norms of the Governmental Claims Act except in 
compelling circumstances. We hold that Cranstons did not substantially comply 
with the Governmental Claims Act claim procedure as to their claim against 
WCWPB. We affirm the trial court's dismissal as to WCWPB for Cranstons' failure 
to send proper notice under W.S. 1-39-113.

[¶38]   Cranstons' final two arguments 
relate to their claim against Weston County. We will consider their last 
argument first, in order to discuss the arguments in logical order. Thus, we 
first consider whether the County owed them a duty of care.

[¶39]   Cranstons argued in their amended 
complaint that the Commissioners were negligent in their hiring of the WCWPB 
board members and in failing to properly supervise WCWPB's actions. The trial 
court determined that the Commissioners did not owe a legal duty of care to 
Cranstons for the injuries stated. It dismissed their amended complaint for 
failure to state a claim.

[¶40]   We agree that Cranstons' amended 
complaint does not state a claim for negligent supervision. The Commissioners 
had no duty to supervise WCWPB or its employees under the applicable statutes. 
However, we hold that their amended complaint does state a claim under the 
theory of negligent hiring.

[¶41]   We have found no published Wyoming 
case which sets out the elements of a claim by a nonemployee third party for 
negligent hiring. This tort was presented to the court in Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1103 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983), but the case was resolved on other grounds. We accept the 
special definition of this cause of action set forth in Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 213 (1958):

A person conducting an 
activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm 
resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(b) in the employment of 
improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving the risk of harm to 
others.

[¶42]   In this case, the Commissioners 
were not "conducting an activity through servants or other agents" when 
herbicide was applied to the state land. The employees who did the application 
were employees of WCWPB, not of the Commissioners. However, only the 
Commissioners had the statutory power to appoint the board members who actually 
did the supervising. That statutory power carried with it a duty not to 
negligently hire board members. Therefore, a jury could reasonably find that the 
Commissioners' failure to properly appoint board members was the proximate cause 
of Cranstons' injuries. See Stephenson v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989); McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 87 (Wyo. 
1989) (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring and dissenting); McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983) (proximate cause is a question of fact 
for the jury unless reasonable minds could not disagree.).

[¶43]   Appellee Commissioners argue that 
since the statute requires them to select board members from a list of nominated 
candidates, and since they can only remove board members for neglect of their 
duties, not incompetence, they cannot be held responsible for negligently 
choosing board members. See W.S. 11-5-104. These contentions, if supported by 
appropriate facts in this case, might justify the entry of summary judgment. 
However, at this stage of the proceedings there are still conceivable sets of 
facts under which Cranstons could establish their claim: if, for example, there 
were far more applicants for the board than positions and the Commissioners 
negligently failed to properly screen the applicants. Under the circumstances, 
we cannot uphold the order dismissing Cranstons' amended complaint, because 
there are factual circumstances in which they could conceivably be entitled to 
recover on their claim.

[¶44]   In sum, we hold that Cranstons' 
amended complaint states a claim for negligent appointment of the board members 
by the Commissioners. On remand Cranstons will have the burden of establishing 
that the Commissioners were negligent in appointing the board members, that the 
board members or their servants negligently caused their appellants' injuries, 
and that the failure to properly appoint the board member was the proximate 
cause of their injuries.

[¶45]   We next consider Cranstons' 
argument that the Commissioners waived their immunity to liability by purchasing 
liability insurance. W.S. 1-39-118(b)(i) provides that a governmental entity may 
extend its liability by purchasing insurance: "If a governmental entity has 
insurance coverage either exceeding the limits of liability as stated in this 
section or covering liability which is not authorized by this act, the 
governmental entity's liability is extended to the coverage."

[¶46]   The trial court in this case found 
that there was insufficient proof to establish that the county had liability 
insurance which would have indemnified the Commissioners against the Cranstons' 
injuries and thereby waive immunity under the Governmental Claims Act. However, 
in considering the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have made its 
findings based solely on the allegations of the amended complaint. The only 
question about insurance coverage at the dismissal stage was whether the 
Cranstons pled it and thereby avoided Rule 12(b) dismissal on the basis of 
sovereign immunity. If the complaint pled applicable insurance coverage, it 
should not have been dismissed on its face. The record shows that the amended 
complaint did plead applicable liability insurance:

"14. Defendant COUNTY has 
had insurance coverage in effect for the period of time covered in this 
Complaint which is 1974 through the present, and are [sic] therefore liable to 
the extent of said insurance coverage."

[¶47]   Since dismissal is inappropriate, 
we reverse and remand as to the complaint against Weston County to allow 
development of the record concerning insurance coverage. The trial court should 
see to it that the record is more fully developed, if necessary, before taking 
further action on the insurance issue. See Pickle v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Platte County, 764 P.2d 262, 266 (Wyo. 1988).

HANSCUM, District Judge, 
concurring.

[¶48]   I concur in the affirmance of the 
order dismissing Cranstons' claim against WCWPB on the basis of this court's 
prior rulings on the technical grounds of defective notice. In light of this 
court's consistent position requiring strict compliance, I subscribe to the 
majority's reasoning to reach this rather harsh result.

[¶49]   Hesitating, I have to concur in the 
reversal of the order dismissing Cranstons' amended complaint against the Weston 
County Board of Commissioners, only on the basis that the record is devoid of 
evidence that the insurance policy could not provide coverage for the claim at 
issue here. I suspect that is the case based on reasonable interpretations of 
the record and the trial court's observations on that point, but that is a 
matter for another day in the trial court.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶50]   I dissent from the portion of the 
majority that affirms the February 1990 order dismissing the complaint under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim in regard to the Weston County 
Weed and Pest Control Board (Weed and Pest District) by decision that 
insufficient notice had been given to validate that claim against the 
governmental entity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.

[¶51]   This appeal presents a major 
complexity, albeit one that is unaddressed by either appellants or appellee. 
With disposition resulting from action of the trial court on a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
dismissal motion, allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true. Fiscus v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 742 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1987). Furthermore, not only this 
court, but every American jurisdiction follows a unanimous rule that facts for 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), or summary judgment, are not created by allegations contained 
in counsel's motion argument. Nicholls v. Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 1986). 
We cannot accept contentions as determined about the operative facts because 
counsel for appellee included statements of what he thought had occurred within 
his argument on the motion to dismiss. This was a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) resolution 
and not a summary judgment decision. Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶52]   The actual "facts" for review of 
this W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) determination are:

A. Allegation in the 
complaint, which is taken to be true, stating:

11. A Notice of Claim 
pursuant to WSA 1-39-113, was served on the COUNTY and the WCWP [Weston County 
Weed and Pest Board] by the plaintiffs on September 20, 1988. A copy of said 
claim is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein and marked as 
Exhibit C.

B. The notice of claim 
attached to the complaint stating in part:

Pursuant to Wyoming 
Statutes Section 1-39-113, this claim is presented to the Weston County 
Commissioners, the Weston County Weed and Pest Board and all employees acting 
under their respective authority.

C. There is here, which 
was not available at least in written form for the trial court decision, what we 
could consider to be a concession of fact by recitation in the appellants' 
brief:

A Notice of Claim 
directed to Appellee County and Appellee WCWP was sent by certified mail to the 
official Weston County address of 1 W. Main Street, Newcastle, Wyoming on 
September 19, 1988.

[¶53]   The appellants' brief further 
stated facts, which in part are demonstrable in the record, regarding the 
response received:

The Appellants received 
no correspondence or acknowledgment of the claim until a letter dated October 
25, 1988 was sent by David McInerney, Insurance Analyst from the Department of 
Administration and Fiscal Control - Purchasing and Property Control 
Division.

The letter stated the 
following:

"The above mentioned 
claim has been forwarded to our office for reply. Both of the above entities are 
members of the Local Self Insurance Pool. They joined the Pool in December of 
1986. After review [and] discussion of the Claim with the Weed and Pest 
personnel, we do not feel that they were negligent in their spraying operation 
speaking of the time from December, 1986 to the present. We, therefore, feel 
that we must deny your clients claim."

The letter was also 
copied and sent to Paulette Thompson, Weston County Clerk and to John Fordyce, 
Weston County Weed and Pest Supervisor.

[¶54]   The statement regarding notice 
given contained in the majority opinion comes from appellee's trial court motion 
to dismiss which in effect made that contention like it was a proven statement 
of fact. However, there is absolutely nothing factually presented of any kind in 
this record by appellee about anything let alone what notice was received which 
can create factual evidence and certainly not to dispute the allegation of 
paragraph eleven of the complaint. Likewise, there is nothing to demonstrate 
whether a copy of the claim was forwarded to the Weed and Pest District by 
county officials so that it was then "filed" in the records of both governmental 
entities.1 

SEQUENCE OF 
EVENTS

[¶55]   In the summer of 1987, Gene and 
Dorothy E. Cranston, ranchers in Weston County, Wyoming, first observed garden 
wilting problems. Test results obtained from the Wyoming Department of 
Agriculture revealed that herbicide field spray was contaminating their water 
sources. The next summer, the United States Geological Survey retested and 
furnished reports to the ranching family and to the field supervisor of the Weed 
and Pest District confirming the continued pollution. As a result, the notice of 
claim was submitted to the Weed and Pest District and the Weston County 
Commissioners in September 1988. The notice of claim was sent certified mail and 
apparently mailed, in accord with the cross-examination of counsel by the trial 
court during the hearing, to the County Courthouse, Weston County, Newcastle, 
Wyoming.

[¶56]   The notice given was followed in 
October 1988 with a response from a representative of the self insurance pool, a 
state agency, in behalf of both the county and the Weed and Pest District. 
Copies of the state fund response were provided to both the county and the Weed 
and Pest District supervisor. Suit was then filed in September 1989. There is no 
question, despite the status of this file creating a motion to dismiss decision, 
that the Weed and Pest District had general notice of the proposed claim and 
specific notice of the filed claim in 1988. The principal factual issue, 
indeterminate in this record, is whether the county actually provided the Weed 
and Pest District a copy of the filed document constituting the formal claim 
under the purview of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. 1-39-101 through 
1-39-120, and specifically W.S. 1-39-113.2

DISCUSSION

[¶57]   With this background of the record, 
sketchy at best, and a significant issue to be resolved regarding a technical 
definition of "filing" whether received from one source or another, at worst, I 
would accept a reasonable standard for compliance with the notice requirement. 
The standard of reason for whatever kind or character, including some obvious 
example of present governmental conduct in law breaking, which I will not accept 
as appropriate in even contemporary society, but for here, some reasonable 
compliance should be, in my opinion, all that we do require. This court has 
faced in recent time a near blizzard of adequacy of service and appropriateness 
of notice proceedings, Gookin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992) (No. 91-130, decided 2/3/92); In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1992), including others very recently published. Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1991); Dye v. Fremont County School District No. 24, 820 P.2d 982 
(Wyo. 1991).

[¶58]   Realism and particularism require 
different practical approaches and there is a time when I find reliance on 
technicalities, if not unnecessary, to be senseless. This is such a case and, 
consequently, I dissent. What we do here in differentiating the Weed and Pest 
District where it must have received the formal claim notice, since its 
insurance carrier was advised of the claim and then denied the same, fails to 
distinguish for me between the small town office address for the Weed and Pest 
District for notice purposes or the general address of the county commissioners 
at the county courthouse. I do not seek in dissent to compare the conventional 
insurance company notice and estoppel or waiver concepts to this situation. 
Actual notice and real receipt by the Weed and Pest District and legal notice to 
the officers of the county at the county courthouse should suffice. One need not 
dispute the overt fact that the Weed and Pest District was a governmental entity 
to continue to reject appropriateness of the sustained motion to dismiss on the 
absence of notice.

[¶59]   One of the more reasoned yet 
cynical observers of the Wyoming legal scene describes the general practice of 
law to be a continuous walk across a mine field. Procedural default, waiver and 
missed deadlines become not just the deadfall of the practice, but limitations 
for justice to the client. Increasingly, we fail to reach substance where 
exploding pre-arranged booby traps in the attempted effort preclude reasoned and 
responsible justice to the litigants. I write forcefully in this case because 
obviously the Weed and Pest District had notice, had an opportunity to defend, 
and did defend against what may be a significant and proper legal liability for 
negligence in over-spray damage to the ranching family.

[¶60]   We do not deal here with the 
jurisdictional characteristics of lack of service of process to provide 
jurisdiction for the court system. See Gookin, 826 P.2d 229 (No. 91-130, decided 
2/3/92) and Colley, 821 P.2d 565. This is a filed notice case and what we know 
is notice was provided and likely filed. Cf. Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1975).

[¶61]   I do not disagree with the majority 
in recognizing the statutory inclusion of the Weed and Pest District within the 
definition of W.S. 1-39-103(a)(i) and (ii) (Supp. 1991). What I do say is that 
the subservient entity, the Weed and Pest District, may and probably did receive 
notice when it was sent to the county and particularly if actually received by 
the Weed and Pest District thereafter. In Duran v. Board of County Com'rs of 
Sweetwater County, 787 P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1990) and Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 1983), no formal notice was given, which is different from this case 
where notice was explicitly given, to leave only the question of how it was 
mailed, whether actual notice was received and whether a copy was on file in the 
records of the involved governmental entity.

[¶62]   The actual notice establishes for 
purposes of this dissent what initially occurred in communicative effort and the 
sole basis for approving the result thereafter is that mailing to an address, 
either Post Office Box 411 or 25 Fairgrounds Road, was required instead of the 
Weston County Courthouse, 1 West Main, Newcastle, Wyoming 82701.3 In technical application, it is 
obvious that the statute, W.S. 1-39-113(c) (Supp. 1991), requires "fil[ing] at 
the business office of [the] entity," but does not specifically state how 
presentation must be made for that filing to occur. The answer is obvious. In 
order to file, they have to get it and, in this case, there is nothing to 
suggest that the Weed and Pest District did not receive it and did not have it 
on file. Any conclusion by appellee that lack of mailing to some address 
different than the county courthouse is sufficient alone to resolve the question 
of filing does not, for me, reach any relevance in statutory 
application.

[¶63]   Obviously, one of the difficulties 
with all of this is a record which fails to provide evidence of what did occur 
and in no way suggests that the Weed and Pest District did not receive a copy of 
the claim or specifically how they did, if it occurred. There is no question in 
this incongruent record about the Weed and Pest District receiving notice of the 
claim prior to the date suit was filed, September 19, 1989, by virtue of the 
recognition and response afforded by the state sponsored self insurance pool 
letter, which stated:

Department of 
Administration and Fiscal Control

Purchasing and Property 
Control Division

October 25, 1988 

Debra J. Hein, Attorney 
at Law P.O. Box 884 

Newcastle, WY 
82701

Re: Claim of Gene and 
Dorothy E. Cranston vs. Weston County and Weston County Weed & 
Pest

Dear Ms. 
Hein:

The above mentioned claim 
has been forwarded to our office for reply. Both of the above entities are 
members of the Local Government Self Insurance Pool. They both joined the Pool 
i[n] December, 1986. After review and discussion of the claim with the Weed and 
Pest personnel, we do not feel that they were negligent in their spraying 
operation speaking of the time from December, 1986 to the present. We, 
therefore, feel that we must deny your client's claim.

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

David McInerney 

Insurance 
Analyst

xc:       Paulette 
Thompson, Weston County Clerk 1 West Main Newcastle, WY 82701

xc:       John Fordyce, 
Weston County Weed and Pest Supervisor P.O. Box 411 Newcastle, WY 
82701

[¶64]   John Fordyce, as an agent of the 
Weed and Pest District, had earlier received notice of the controversy and 
notice of the contamination of the United States Geological Survey by letters 
dated August 10, 1988 and September 8, 1988. The notice of violation of the 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality was furnished by mail on or about 
February 20, 1989 to Weston County, Box 411, which, from this record, is 
apparently the mailing address for John Fordyce as the Weed and Pest District 
supervisor.4

[¶65]   What we are essentially presented 
is an acknowledgement of receipt of the claim by a state agency in behalf of the 
local entity of government including liability denial. Does that suffice for 
compliance where unfortunately we are not advised what is contained in the file 
of the Weed and Pest District at its separate Weston County office not located 
in the county courthouse building? At a minimum, I would suggest that within 
this record, if the county furnished the Weed and Pest District a copy of the 
notice which was then filed in the Weed and Pest District records, subterfuge is 
being perpetrated as an unjustified tactic of hardball litigation. Furthermore, 
on this record, failure of receipt of the mailed notice should be a burden for 
appellee to prove.

[¶66]   This case has to be recognized for 
what is presented. A timely claim in proper form was made and actual notice of 
that claim was received by the governmental entity. The defense is that the 
notice was mailed to the wrong address and not that existence of the actual 
claim was neither known nor received. I find sufficient substantial compliance 
here to sustain appellants' proceeding and to reverse the action of the trial 
court. We should differentiate here notice of a claim, not notice of events from 
which a claim can be made which is an entirely different and more attenuated 
subject. I find substantial compliance by preparation and submission of a proper 
claim, albeit to a less than satisfactory address, supported within the 
documentary evidence that the submission of the claim was known by the 
responsible governmental entity. Consequently, Duran, 787 P.2d 971 and Awe, 534 P.2d 97 are not directly relevant nor dispositive.

[¶67]   I address this dissent for citation 
of legal authority in two directions. First, actual notice had been received and 
a proper claim was submitted within the criteria of well reasoned case law 
regarding sufficiency of reasonable compliance. Second, if issues of what notice 
was received and whether the actual claim was filed in the office of the Weed 
and Pest District are considered to be dispositive and remain in controversy, 
then remand should be made to clarify the record before assumptions are adopted 
to foreclose decision on the actual facts regarding what, if anything, county 
officers did to provide information, notice or the written document to the Weed 
and Pest District officialdom.

[¶68]   The case of Indiana State Highway 
Com'n v. Morris, 528 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1988) illuminates my resolution of the 
first issue that actual notice of the filed claim was sufficient. Similarly to 
this case, the notice was mailed only to the Highway Commission in Indiana. In 
accord with established policy, the Highway Commission furnished a copy to the 
Attorney General. The statutory notice provision required formal notice by the 
claimant to both the Highway Commission and the Attorney General. The contention 
for dismissal in Morris was that notice was not received by the Attorney General 
directly from the plaintiff. The language of the opinion is informative and 
should be dispositive here:

The language of the 
statute, literally applied, simply requires that the tort claim notice be 
"filed" with the Attorney General and the state agency. It does not designate 
who must file the notice. * * *

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

* * * In the present 
case, these objectives are satisfied because the Commission and the Attorney 
General each received timely notice fully advising them that the plaintiffs were 
making a claim.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

* * * In the present 
case, both the Commission and the Attorney General not only received full and 
timely information regarding the occurrence, but they each received formal 
notification of plaintiffs' intentions to assert a claim. This constituted more 
than mere actual knowledge. It satisfied the statutory objectives and achieved 
substantial, if not actual, compliance.

Id. at 470-71 
(emphasis in original).

[¶69]   Another case from the same 
jurisdiction is also informative. In Scott v. Gatson, 492 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. App. 
1986), claimant's counsel sent a demand letter to the public bus company in 
behalf of an injured automobile driver who was involved in a rearend collision. 
The letter sent regular mail was answered by acknowledgement by a private 
insurance carrier adjusting service. Contest by the bus company and its 
insurance carrier to the appropriateness of service of notice was anchored in 
argument about the failure of delivery in person or by registered or certified 
mail. The Indiana court stated:

"[T]o hold that the 
notice was defective because of its mode of delivery when the notice was 
received and the purpose of either hand delivery or registered or certified 
mail, that of assurance of receipt, was met, is contrary to logic and defies 
common sense."

Id. at 341 
(quoting Burggrabe v. Board of Public Works of City of Evansville, 469 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. App. 1984)). That court recognized its prior law:

"[W]e see no need to 
endorse a policy which renders the statute a trap for the unwary where such 
purpose has in fact been satisfied." Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis 
(1970) 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225, 229. (Emphasis in the 
original).

Scott, 492 N.E.2d  at 340.

[¶70]   Substantial compliance was found 
from the receipt of the written notice by the governmental entity in proper time 
and the purpose of notice had been consequently satisfied. "`When the purposes 
of the statute are fully satisfied, it is clear that the result is substantial 
compliance with the statute.'" Id. (quoting Delaware County v. Powell, 272 Ind. 
82, 393 N.E.2d 190, 192 (1979)).

[¶71]   Actual notice, lack of prejudice 
from character of notice provided and instigation of negotiation sufficed in 
Duesterhaus v. City of Edmond, 634 P.2d 720, 723 (Okla. 1981) (footnote 
omitted):

The purposes of the 
notice provisions of the Act are to further legitimate municipal interests by 
promoting prompt investigation; providing the opportunity to repair any 
dangerous condition and for speedy and amicable settlement of meritorious 
claims; and to prepare to meet possible fiscal liabilities.

Two of the purposes of 
the notice provisions of the Act are to afford the City the opportunity to 
promptly investigate and quickly settle meritorious claims. We fail to see how 
the City could have suffered any prejudice when the [city attorney] was actually 
engaged in settlement negotiations, and the claim was under investigation. 
Although notice to the [city attorney] is an unauthorized procedure outside the 
purview of the Act, in this instance we find that the notice was sufficient to 
constitute substantial compliance.

See also Diemert 
v. City of Mobile, 474 So. 2d 663 (Ala. 1985) and Reirdon v. Wilburton Bd. of 
Ed., 611 P.2d 239 (Okla. 1980). Cf. Johnson v. City of Memphis, 699 S.W.2d 179 
(Tenn. App. 1985). We should not ignore the fact that we deal here with a notice 
statute and not a service of process requirement. Cf. Gookin, 826 P.2d 229.

CONCLUSION

[¶72]   In reality, if any decision is to 
be based only on the documents presented by appellants, the motion of appellee 
to dismiss, the concession such as it may be by appellants' counsel at the 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) hearing or finally in the statement in appellate brief 
regarding notice received by the Weed and Pest District, justice and criteria of 
the rule itself would require reversal of the dismissal as a half-stage summary 
judgment decision. Opportunity should be provided to the injured landowner to 
document the record for a proper decision. Torrey, 713 P.2d 1160.

[¶73]   It can be contended, obviously, 
that appellants should have been more adequately prepared with documentation at 
the hearing held by the trial court. It was, however, a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
session without any notice to counsel of a different course for a proposed 
decision such as summary judgment. No factual information obtained at the 
hearing should be utilized for decision as the non-movant was not afforded a 
proper opportunity to develop all of the facts. Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
642 P.2d 443 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶74]   What this majority should be called 
to determine is simply whether the "filing" requirement is met by receipt of the 
claim form for filing of the record by the governmental entity or whether filing 
is only met if claimant or the mailman walks the last mile so that delivery does 
not occur by act of a third party or defendant's affiliate agency. Tested on 
this basis, the decision of the majority is not supported by the available case 
law. Duesterhaus, 634 P.2d 720. At the very least, a remand is required to 
develop the facts for proper decision. This requirement has strong case law 
support in similar circumstances where the appellate court remanded. Board of 
Aviation Com'rs of St. Joseph County v. Hestor, 473 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. App. 1985). 
See also Emery v. University of New Mexico Medical Center, 96 N.M. 144, 628 P.2d 1140 (1981) and Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School Dist., 81 A.D.2d 876, 439 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1981).

[¶75]   In another case, the Indiana court 
appropriately stated the standard that I would follow:

Just as the notice 
statute should not become a trap for the unwary * * * neither should it become a 
refuge for the unconscientious.

Collier v. 
Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ind. 1989).

[¶76]   I do not find counsel for 
appellants to have been unconscientious here and I would consequently reverse 
and remand in the interest of justice and a proper adjudication of the 
substantive issues of liability.

FOOTNOTE

1                       
Cranstons must recognize this principle to some extent, since they 
separately served both Weston County and the WCWPB in the district court suit 
which became this case.

2                       
Notice of claim was required under W.S. 9-2-332 (1977), which required 
persons having claims against the state to submit them within one year to the 
state auditor.

Footnotes for the 
Dissent

1           
If counsel for appellee had been sworn and then testified, one would have 
cause to expect from what little documentation is provided that appellants 
probably did mail the jointly addressed notice to the County Courthouse, Weston 
County, Newcastle, Wyoming. (Actually, that is what counsel for appellants told 
the trial judge when he asked her at the W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion hearing what 
had been done.) Applying a reasoned degree of almost certain probability, one 
would believe that the county officials made a copy of the notice and forwarded 
it to the Weed and Pest District or to its supervisor, John Fordyce. It is also 
determinable from this record that either one or both of the county and the Weed 
and Pest District then sent notice of the claim to the local governmental self 
insurance pool in Cheyenne, Wyoming and that the response to the claim by the 
self insurance pool addressed to appellants was furnished to both the county 
clerk of Weston County and to John Fordyce.

There is another 
technical circumstance about this record in that all of the documentation found 
was not filed with the original complaint. Insurance policy information and the 
letter from the self insurance pool to appellants with copies to the county and 
Weed and Pest District were filed in January 1990 without any accompanying 
affidavit or designation of the particular basis for filing. These documents 
were filed with the trial court approximately a month before the order 
dismissing the complaint was entered so that apparently the material was 
considered by the trial court for the February 22, 1990 W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
dismissal order. The trial court stated in the referenced order:

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS 
that only one copy of a Notice of Claim was served by certified mail upon the 
County Commissioners addressed to:

Weston County 
Commissioners

Weston County 
Courthouse

Newcastle, 
Wyoming

There is absolutely no 
source for factually making that finding, except by acceptance of an allegation 
contained in the motion to dismiss which had been previously filed on October 
10, 1989 and counsel's response to the question asked at the trial court's 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) hearing. Actually, supplementation of the complaint by 
subsequent facts renders the proceeding inappropriate for decision as a motion 
to dismiss. Torrey, 713 P.2d 1160.

2           
It is unfortunate that at the hearing, while the trial court was 
examining counsel for appellants regarding the mailing of the notice, that a 
similar examination was not made of counsel for appellee to establish for the 
motion to dismiss decision then underway what notice was actually received by 
the Weed and Pest District, by what documents, from whom and when.

3           
Of course on this record, we do not know whether Post Office Box 411 is 
different from the address for mail to the county offices and we do not know 
whether there is actual mail delivery to the listed location, 25 Fairgrounds 
Road, Newcastle, Wyoming.

4           
Why the deposition of John Fordyce was not taken to determine receipt of 
the claim or other notice is undisclosed by this record.