Case Title: Ward v. Dept. of Election, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 126, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID P. WARD 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 126, 2009 
 
Appellant-Below 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for Kent County 
 
 
§ 
THE DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS §  
a State Agency, and THE MERIT 
§ 
C.A. No. 08A-07-011 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellees-Below 
§ 
 
Appellees. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 24, 2009 
  Decided:  July 27, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 27th day of July 2009, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Plaintiff-Appellant David P. Ward appeals from the decision of the 
Superior Court affirming the order of the Merit Employee Relations Board 
(“MERB”) upholding the termination of his employment.  Ward raises two 
arguments on appeal.  First, Ward argues that the MERB interpreted Merit Rule 
10.1 in a manner which was inconsistent with the requirements of 29 Del. C. § 
5903.  Second, Ward argues that the MERB erred as a matter of law when it 
determined that he was not a “merit employee” and not entitled to application of 
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the Merit Rules, specifically the “end of employment” provisions.  We find no 
merit to his arguments and affirm.   
(2) 
The Department of Elections (the “DOE”) appointed Ward for a 
limited term as an Accounting Specialist on August 10, 2004.  Ward’s position was 
created by the State Clearinghouse Committee and funded by a non-specific 
federal grant under the “Help America Vote Act” (“HAVA”).  The position was 
approved for a term of two years by the State Personnel Director and was posted as 
a limited term (two-year) position.  Ward, who was never previously an employee 
of the State of Delaware, and hence, was not a Merit employee, applied for and 
was appointed to the position.  Ward worked as an Accounting Specialist for just 
over three years, until September 14, 2007, when he was terminated.  Thus, Ward 
was employed for one year and one month more than the two-year term for which 
the position was originally designated. 
(3) 
On September 24, 2007, Ward filed a Merit System appeal with the 
Director of Human Resource Management (“HRM”), grieving his termination.  
The appeal was heard by an HRM hearing officer, who concluded that a non-Merit 
employee hired into a limited term position does not accrue full Merit status.  Ward 
then filed an appeal of the HRM decision with the MERB.  Ward moved for 
summary judgment.  Following a hearing, the MERB issued a written decision 
denying Ward’s appeal.  The MERB concluded that, pursuant to Merit Rule 10.1, 
 3
Ward was not a Merit employee of the DOE when he accepted his limited term 
appointment to the Accounting Specialist position.  Therefore, he was not entitled 
to protection under the Merit Rules after he was terminated. 
(4) 
Ward appealed the MERB’s decision to the Superior Court.  On 
February 9, 2009, the court issued a decision and order finding that the MERB 
interpreted Merit Rule 10.1 appropriately, and affirming the decision of the 
MERB.1  This appeal followed. 
(5) 
In reviewing decisions of the MERB, our role is limited.  We review 
the record to determine whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial 
evidence and is free from legal error.2  We review questions of law de novo.3  
However, we do not reweigh the evidence, determine credibility or draw our own 
factual findings or conclusions; we merely determine if the evidence is legally 
adequate to support the agency’s factual findings.4  Furthermore, “[j]udicial 
deference is usually given to an administrative agency’s construction of its own 
rules in recognition of its expertise in a given field.”5  Therefore, an appellate court 
                                          
 
1 Ward v. Dep’t of Elections, et al., Del. Super., No. 08A-07-011, at 5-6 (Feb. 9, 2009) 
[hereinafter Superior Court Decision]. 
2 Vincent v. Eastern Shore Markets, 970 A.2d 160, 163 (2009); accord Histed v. A.I. duPont de 
Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340 (Del. 1993); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 
1965); GMC v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); see also 29 Del. C. § 10142(d).  
3 Vincent, 970 A.2d at 163; Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, 564 A.2d 1132 (Del. 1989). 
4 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); see also 29 Del. C. § 10142(d). 
5 Div. of Soc. Servs v. Burns, 438 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Del. 1981); accord Kaushal v. Dep’t of 
Health and Soc. Servs., 529 A.2d 772 (Del. 1987); Thompson v. Dep’t of Transp., 542 A.2d 1215 
(Del. 1988) (Table). 
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will only reverse an agency’s interpretation of its own rules if the interpretation is 
“clearly wrong.”6   
(6) 
Ward contends that the MERB interpreted Merit Rule 10.1 in a 
manner that was inconsistent with the requirements of 29 Del. C. § 5903, which 
expressly states that: (1) all positions of state employment are “classified service” 
or “state service” and within the Merit Rules, unless expressly excluded by one of 
the twenty-five subsections of the statute;7 and (2) “[t]he term durational is not 
applicable to any classification of employee employed by the State….”8  Ward 
argues that his position was not within any of the designated subsections of Section 
5903.  He also argues that his position was not a “limited term appointment” based 
on an assigned passage of time, but even if it was, Section 5903(17)(b) does not 
permit the MERB to create such a “durational” position.  Therefore, Ward argues, 
he is entitled to the due process requirements of the Merit Rules.  In response, the 
DOE argues that Ward was never a permanent Merit employee pursuant to Merit 
Rule 10.1, that the MERB’s interpretation of Merit Rule 10.1 is consistent with 
Section 5903, and that Ward’s argument relating to Section 5903(17)(b) was not 
fairly presented to either the MERB or the Superior Court. 
                                          
 
6 Burns, 438 A.2d at 1229. 
7 See 29 Del. C. § 5903. 
8 29 Del. C. § 5903(17)(b) states: “The term durational is not applicable to any classification of 
employee employed by the State of Delaware.” 
 5
(7) 
Section 5903 provides: “Unless otherwise required by law, as used in 
this chapter, ‘classified service’ or ‘state service’ means all positions of state 
employment other than the following positions, which are excluded….”9  The 
statute then enumerates twenty-five classes of positions that are excluded from the 
term “classified service,” including members of the General Assembly, heads of 
state agencies, all employees and trustees of the University of Delaware and 
Delaware State University, judges or other members of the state judiciary,  
members and employees of the Delaware State Police, casual and seasonal 
positions, and positions designated as exempt by either the determination of the 
State Personnel Director, Budget Director, and Controller General, or via budget 
epilogue language.10  Among other effects, the significance of a position being in 
the “classified service,” is that such positions are covered by the Merit Rules 
promulgated by the MERB pursuant to 29 Del. C.  § 5914.11 
(8) 
 Merit Rule 1.1 provides that “these Rules apply to initial 
probationary, Merit, and limited term employees, except as otherwise specified….”  
Merit Rule 10.1 purports to allow the State Personnel Director to make limited 
term appointments to merit system positions when the position must be filled on a 
less-than-permanent basis.  That rule provides:  
                                          
 
9 29 Del. C. § 5903. 
10 See 29 Del. C. §§ 5903(1) – (25). 
11 29 Del. C. § 5914 provides that “[t]he Director shall prepare and submit to the [Merit 
Employee Relations] Board proposed rules covering the classified service. 
 6
Limited term appointments are permitted when a Merit vacancy exists 
that is not of a continuing nature, but is projected to exceed 90 days.  
Such vacancies may be filled for a period of up to one year.  The 
Director may approve a longer time period.  Established selection 
procedures shall be followed for filling the vacancy.12 
 
(9) 
Merit Rule 10.1.1 provides that “Merit employees who accept limited 
term appointments shall be placed in a vacant position comparable to their former 
class in the present agency at the end of the limited term appointment.  If agencies 
demonstrate that no comparable vacant position exists, employees shall be given 
hiring preference.”  When read together, Merit Rules 10.1 and 10.1.1 distinguish 
between a “position” that falls within the Merit System and the individual who 
occupies that position.  In its decision denying Ward’s appeal, the MERB 
explained this distinction as follows:  
When an agency makes a limited term appointment to a Merit position 
vacancy, during the term of appointment the employee enjoys certain 
benefits of the Merit status, including vacation and sick time and 
credited time in service.  When the limited term expires, however, the 
employee is protected by the Merit rules only to the extent that he or 
she was a Merit employee prior to the limited term appointment.13 
(10) Finding that Ward was not a Merit employee prior to his appointment, 
the MERB concluded that when the DOE terminated Ward on September 14, 2007, 
his limited term appointment ended and he no longer enjoyed Merit status.14  This 
interpretation of Merit Rules 10.1 and 10.1.1 is not inconsistent with Section 5903.  
                                          
 
12 Merit Rule 10.1. 
13 MERB Decision at 3. 
14 MERB Decision at 4-5. 
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Section 5903 expressly applies to “all positions of state employment,” not the 
individual occupying that position.  Thus, the fact that an individual occupies a 
position in the classified service does not automatically transform that individual 
into a permanent Merit System employee.  Rule 10.1 allows state agencies to fill 
Merit positions which are only needed for a limited period of time.  When an 
employee is appointed to such a position, he or she is entitled to enjoy the benefits 
of the Merit Rules; however, the employee should not be entitled to due process 
before he or she can be terminated when the position ceases to exist at the end of 
the designated limited period.  Although permanent Merit employees who accept 
limited term appointments are entitled to certain preferences when their limited 
term expires, an employee does not become a permanent Merit employee by virtue 
of a limited term appointment. 
(11) Ward argues that Section 5903(17)(b) precludes limited term 
appointment because it prohibits application of the term “durational” to any 
classification of employee employed by the State.15  This argument was not fairly 
presented to either the MERB or the Superior Court.16  Even assuming Ward did 
properly raise the argument, it is without merit.  Ward concedes that neither the 
MERB nor the Superior Court squarely addressed this argument, but asserts that 
                                          
 
15 29 Del. C. § 5903(17)(b) states: “The term ‘durational’ is not applicable to any classification 
of employee employed by the State of Delaware.” 
16 SUPR. CT. R. 8.   
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we can nonetheless determine whether the MERB committed plain error based on 
the plain meaning of the term “durational.”  That term is not defined in the statute, 
however Section 5903(17) expressly contemplates appointments for a specified 
length of time for a variety of purposes, including appointments for a season, a 
project, or to replace a primary incumbent.17  Additionally, subsection (17)(c) 
provides that a casual seasonal employee may be used for an undefined purpose 
with the approval of the Budget Director, State Personnel Director, and Controller 
General.18  Accordingly, the limited-term appointment made here was permitted by 
law and there was no plain error by the MERB. 
(12) The position was created lawfully for the HAVA project and was 
designed as a temporary position to last only two years.  The position was intended 
to end automatically upon completion of the limited term.  Ward was aware of the 
temporary nature of the position when he applied for it.  The fact that it extended 
past the initial two-year term did not transform the temporary appointment position 
into a permanent position.19 
 
                                          
 
17 See 29 Del. C. § 5903(17)(a). 
18 See 29 Del. C. § 5903(17)(c). 
19 See Showell v. Dep’t of Corrections, 534 A.2d 657 (Del.1987) (Table) (rejecting theory that a 
temporary appointment could become a permanent position if the employment lasted longer than 
the original appointed term.) 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice