Case Title: Santa Fe Commun. Sch. v. NM STATE BD. OF ED.

Citation: 518 P.2d 272, 85 N.M. 783

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1974-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
518 P.2d 272 (1974) 85 N.M. 783 SANTA FE COMMUNITY SCHOOL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The NEW MEXICO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 9745. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 18, 1974. Michael P. Gross, Santa Fe, G. Emlen Hall, Pecos, for plaintiffs-appellants. David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., C. Emery Cuddy, Jr., Agency Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Templeman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for defendants-appellees. McMANUS, Chief Justice. This suit was brought in the District Court of Santa Fe County praying for a judgment which would declare that defendants had no jurisdiction to regulate the educational activities of plaintiffs (a private school). Plaintiffs further sought an injunction against such regulation and asked for monetary damages. The parties hereto entered into a stipulation as to certain facts surrounding the case. Plaintiffs then sought a summary judgment. An order of the court was subsequently entered granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees (hereinafter Board), and the plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter School) appeal. The sole issue on appeal is related in the "Parties' Stipulations of Fact," as follows: *273 The court, after hearing the motion for summary judgment, ordered as follows: Article XII, § 5 of the New Mexico Constitution provides: The legislature, seeking to carry out this constitutional provision, provided in § 77-10-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp. 1973) that: It is readily apparent that this compulsory education statute does not require that every child attend public school but does require that every child attend some recognized school public, private, or institutional. The School contends, however, that the Board does not have the constitutional authority to approve the program of instruction since the second constitutional provision here involved, N.M.Const., art. XII, § 6, provides: It is true that the constitutional authority of the Board under this provision to make regulations for and supervise schools only mentions public schools. However, the Board may exert such authority in the supervision and control of private schools as is conferred by the legislature in the proper exercise of State police power. The police power of the State has been defined by this court in State v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 242, 141 P.2d 192, 200 (1943) as follows: The same type of problem confronting us in the instant case was considered by the New York Courts in Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of State of N.Y., 273 App.Div. 203, 76 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (1948), *274 and the language from that decision, which we approve, is as follows: At page 504, the same court reasoned as follows: We approve of the above-quoted language but it might be noted that Packer, supra, was later reversed on the grounds that even though the legislature has a limited right to regulate private schools under the police power, the legislature cannot hand over to the school board (as it did in New York) an unlimited, unrestrained and undefined power to make such regulations as it may desire. As indicated above, there is no constitutional authority granted to the Board to supervise or exercise control or management over private elementary and secondary schools, which is the sole issue in this case. Assuming that the legislature had authority to enact § 77-10-2, supra, and assuming further that this statute is an effective grant of power to the Board under the police power, this compulsory education statute only gives the Board authority to approve the courses of instruction in private schools. The stipulated issue before us is to determine if the Board has the authority to "supervise or exercise control or management over private schools." This stipulation goes beyond what § 77-10-2, supra, provides. In view of the limited issue acted upon by the trial court, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of the Board and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the school consistent with the stipulation of the parties concerning the sole issue involved and the views expressed in this opinion. It is so ordered. OMAN, STEPHENSON, MONTOYA and MARTINEZ, JJ., concur.