Case Title: State v. Ketterer

Citation: 2010-Ohio-3831

Docket Number: 20071261 and 20072425

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Ketterer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3831.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3831 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KETTERER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Ketterer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3831.] 
Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Combination of judgment entry and 
sentencing opinion satisfying Crim.R. 32(C) — No violation of 
prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence relevant to resentencing — Motion 
to withdraw guilty plea at resentencing — Failure to notify of postrelease 
control — Remand for resentencing under R.C. 2929.191. 
(Nos. 2007-1261 and 2007-2425 — Submitted March 9, 2010 — Decided 
August 25, 2010.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, 
No. CR-2003-03-309. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or panel to file a sentencing 
opinion, a final, appealable order consists of both the sentencing opinion 
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filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) and the judgment of conviction filed 
pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C). 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to consider a number of issues arising 
from the resentencing of appellant, Donald Ketterer, who has been convicted of 
capital and noncapital offenses.  We hold that the order appealed from is a final, 
appealable order, that the Foster remedy was properly applied and no Brady 
violation occurred during resentencing, and that the trial court properly denied the 
motion to withdraw Ketterer’s guilty pleas.  Because mandatory postrelease 
control was not properly imposed, however, we remand the case for the trial court 
to conduct a hearing under R.C. 2929.191. 
I. Case Background 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Donald J. Ketterer, pleaded guilty to aggravated 
murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, grand theft of a motor vehicle, 
and burglary in the February 2003 death of Lawrence Sanders.  In February 2004, 
a three-judge panel convicted Ketterer as charged and sentenced him to death.  On 
the noncapital offenses, the three-judge panel imposed a nine-year prison term for 
Count 2, aggravated robbery, a nine-year prison term for Count 3, aggravated 
burglary, a 17-month prison term for Count 4, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and 
a four-year prison term for Count 5, burglary.  The sentence for Count 4 was 
concurrent with the sentences for the other counts, while sentences for Counts 2, 
3, and 5 were consecutive. 
{¶ 3} We affirmed Ketterer’s convictions and death sentence on October 
25, 2006.  111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 209.  On April 
18, 2007, we granted Ketterer’s application for reopening his appeal with respect 
to his claim that appellate counsel had been ineffective by failing to challenge 
Ketterer’s noncapital sentences as a violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, and State v. Foster, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470.  We then vacated his noncapital 
sentences and remanded for resentencing.  113 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2007-Ohio-1722, 
864 N.E.2d 650. 
{¶ 4} Upon remand, on May 24, 2007, the three-judge panel conducted a 
resentencing hearing on the noncapital offenses and resentenced Ketterer to the 
same sentence as originally imposed.  Ketterer appealed as a matter of right to 
challenge his resentencing (case No. 2007-1261). 
{¶ 5} On November 15, 2007, the panel filed a nunc pro tunc entry to 
correct errors in the resentencing entry.  Ketterer filed a notice of appeal of the 
nunc pro tunc entry (case No. 2007-2425).  The state filed a motion to dismiss 
Ketterer’s appeal of the nunc pro tunc entry, and on January 30, 2008, we denied 
the state’s motion and ordered Ketterer’s appeal of the nunc pro tunc entry to be 
consolidated with his appeal challenging his resentencing.  116 Ohio St.3d 1498, 
2008-Ohio-290, 880 N.E.2d 97.  Ketterer’s merit brief raises six propositions of 
law challenging his resentencing. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Requirements for final, appealable orders under R.C. 2929.03(F) 
{¶ 6} Because it is potentially dispositive of this case, we first address 
Proposition of Law II, in which Ketterer states that a trial court’s sentencing must 
be vacated if it does not contain the information required by Crim.R. 32(C).  On 
October 29, 2009, we ordered that the parties file supplemental briefs to address 
whether the November 15, 2007 nunc pro tunc sentencing entry is a final, 
appealable order in light of our decision in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 
2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163.  Ketterer argues that the trial court’s November 
7, 2007 nunc pro tunc entry does not comply with Baker because it fails to reflect 
Ketterer’s guilty pleas. 
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{¶ 7} The state responds that because R.C. 2929.03(F) requires courts to 
file a separate sentencing opinion setting forth the court’s specific findings in 
cases in which the death penalty is imposed, the final, appealable order in 
Ketterer’s case is the combination of the judgment entry of conviction filed in 
May 2007, the nunc pro tunc entry filed in November 2007, and the sentencing 
opinion in support of the death penalty filed in February 2004.  The state 
recognizes that the nunc pro tunc entry does not state specifically that Ketterer 
pleaded guilty but argues that because the 2004 sentencing opinion states that 
Ketterer “waived his right to a jury and entered a plea of guilty to all charges 
January 27, 2004,” the combination of the nunc pro tunc entry and the sentencing 
opinion satisfies Baker. 
 
{¶ 8} “ ‘[I]n order to decide whether an order issued by a trial court in a 
criminal proceeding is a reviewable final order, appellate courts should apply the 
definitions of “final order” contained in R.C. 2505.02.’ ”  State v. Baker, 119 
Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Muncie 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 444, 746 N.E.2d 1092, citing State ex rel. Leis v. Kraft 
(1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 10 OBR 237, 460 N.E.2d 1372.  R.C. 2505.02(B) 
states: 
{¶ 9} “An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 
{¶ 10} “(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in 
effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.” 
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 32(C) sets forth the requirements for a final, appealable 
order in criminal cases.  It states that “[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth 
the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each conviction is based, and the 
sentence.”  Furthermore, “The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall 
enter it on the journal.  A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal 
by the clerk.” 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 12} But we must also recognize that Ketterer was also convicted in a 
capital case.  R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the trial court to issue a separate 
sentencing opinion in addition to the judgment of conviction in cases in which the 
death penalty may be imposed.  The statute provides: 
{¶ 13} “The court or the panel of three judges, when it imposes sentence 
of death, shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings as to the existence of 
any of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the 
Revised Code, the existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating 
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and the reasons why 
the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were 
sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.  * * *  For cases in which a sentence 
of death is imposed for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, the 
court or panel shall file the opinion required to be prepared by this division with 
the clerk of the supreme court within fifteen days after the court or panel imposes 
sentence. The judgment in a case in which a sentencing hearing is held pursuant 
to this section is not final until the opinion is filed.” 
{¶ 14} In Baker, we did not address any interaction between R.C. 
2929.03(F) and Crim.R. 32(C).  Baker entered a not-guilty plea at his arraignment 
and, after a jury trial, was convicted of having weapons while under a disability 
and obstructing official business.  The court of appeals had granted the state’s 
motion to dismiss Baker’s appeal for lack of a final order because the judgment of 
conviction did not contain Baker’s initial plea of not guilty.  State v. Baker, 119 
Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 3.  The Ninth District 
certified a conflict to this court, and we accepted the certified question to 
determine what must be included in a judgment of conviction to allow it to 
become a final, appealable order pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C). 
{¶ 15} The first issue in Baker was whether, under Crim.R. 32(C), “the 
plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence” must be contained within a single 
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document.  We noted that the Twelfth District erroneously interpreted Crim.R. 
32(C) when it held that multiple documents were sufficient to meet the rules 
requirements in State v. Postway, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-06-154, 2003-Ohio-
2689, 2003 WL 21213409, and we held that “[o]nly one document can constitute 
a final appealable order.”  State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 
893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 16} The second issue in the case was whether the judgment of 
conviction must include the plea entered at arraignment.  We held that “the 
judgment of conviction is a single document that need not necessarily include the 
plea entered at arraignment.”  Id. at ¶ 1.  After analyzing Crim.R. 32(C), we 
emphasized that “a judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the 
court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the 
judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.”  Id. at ¶ 18.  In so 
holding, we noted that the trial court is “required to sign and journalize a 
document memorializing the sentence and the manner of the conviction.”  Id. at ¶ 
14. 
{¶ 17} We distinguish the present case from Baker and agree with the 
state that in aggravated-murder cases subject to R.C. 2929.03(F), the final, 
appealable order consists of the combination of the judgment entry and the 
sentencing opinion.  Because R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court to file a 
sentencing opinion, Baker does not control this case, because Baker addressed 
only noncapital criminal cases, in which a judgment of conviction alone 
constitutes a final, appealable order.  R.C. 2929.03(F) requires that a separate 
sentencing opinion be filed in addition to the judgment of conviction, and the 
statute specifies that the court’s judgment is not final until the sentencing opinion 
has been filed.  Capital cases, in which an R.C. 2929.03(F) sentencing opinion is 
necessary, are clear exceptions to Baker’s “one document” rule. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 18} We hold that in cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court 
or panel to file a sentencing opinion, a final, appealable order consists of both the 
sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) and the judgment of 
conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C).  Therefore, while the final, appealable 
order must satisfy the four requirements enumerated in Baker, the first 
requirement — that the final, appealable order include the guilty plea, the jury 
verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based — will be 
satisfied if either the judgment of conviction or the sentencing opinion includes 
the guilty plea, jury verdict, or finding of the court upon which the conviction is 
based. 
{¶ 19} Ketterer’s sentencing opinion states, “The defendant waived his 
right to a jury and entered a plea of guilty to all charges January 27, 2004.  
Evidence was presented as to the charges.  The three Judge panel returned a 
verdict of guilty to the One Count of Aggravated Murder and guilty to all three 
specifications contained in the indictment as well as a verdict of guilty on Count 
Two, Three, Four and Five of the indictment.”  The November 2007 nunc pro 
tunc entry states that the trial court “has considered the record, the charges, the 
defendant’s Guilty Finding by Judges, and findings as set forth on the record and 
herein.”  While the court failed to set forth Ketterer’s guilty plea in the judgment 
of conviction, the sentencing opinion states that Ketterer pleaded guilty and 
satisfies the requirement that the final, appealable order set forth the guilty plea, 
the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based.  
The sentencing opinion and judgment of conviction combine to form a valid final, 
appealable order. 
B. The trial court properly applied State v. Foster 
{¶ 20} In his third proposition of law, Ketterer challenges the application 
of State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at his 
resentencing.  Specifically, Ketterer argues that retroactive application of Foster 
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to his resentencing violates his right to a jury trial, is an ex post facto violation, is 
a due process violation, and violates the rule of lenity. 
{¶ 21} Each of Ketterer’s arguments was considered and resolved by this 
court in State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-Ohio-3478, 912 N.E.2d 582.  
In Elmore, we held that resentencing pursuant to Foster for crimes that were 
committed before Foster does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial or the Ex Post Facto or Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution 
and that a trial court is not required by the rule of lenity to impose a minimum 
prison term upon resentencing pursuant to Foster.  Id. at syllabus.  Elmore is 
accordingly dispositive of the challenges raised in Ketterer’s third proposition of 
law. 
C. No Brady violation occurred 
{¶ 22} In his fourth proposition of law, Ketterer argues that the three-
judge panel improperly denied his motion to provide the defense with exculpatory 
evidence that was material to sentencing. 
{¶ 23} Due process requires that the prosecution provide defendants with 
any evidence that is material either to their guilt or punishment.  Brady v. 
Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.  Evidence is 
considered material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 
L.Ed.2d 481 (opinion of Blackmon, J.). 
{¶ 24} In determining materiality, the relevant question “is not whether 
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with 
the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a 
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 
U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490.  Thus, the rule set forth in Brady 
is violated when the evidence that was not disclosed “could reasonably be taken 
January Term, 2010 
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to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.”  Id. at 435.  “In the end, this standard not only protects defendants; by 
ensuring a fair trial, it also protects the system of justice as a whole.”  State v. 
Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 25} In a motion prior to resentencing, Ketterer requested disclosure of 
information concerning a police raid on Donald Williams’s property 17 days 
before the homicide, any potential charges pending against Williams and Mary 
Gabbard at the time, Williams’s and Gabbard’s history as police informants, 
evidence linking Williams and Gabbard to the homicide, and any evidence 
concerning Ketterer’s mental state between the time of the offenses and his arrest.  
In response, the state asserted that the requested information had already been 
provided to the defense or was not Brady material.  The court overruled the 
defense motion. 
{¶ 26} As an initial matter, the state invokes State v. Chinn (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 548, 709 N.E.2d 1166, in arguing that Ketterer’s Brady claims should 
be rejected because the evidence could not be presented at his resentencing 
hearing.  In Chinn, the court of appeals had remanded a capital defendant’s case 
to the trial court for resentencing because the trial judge had committed errors in 
his original independent evaluation and in his sentencing opinion.  Id. at 562.  The 
trial court reimposed the death penalty, and the court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 
563-564. 
{¶ 27} On appeal to this court, Chinn claimed that he was denied the right 
to present new mitigating evidence at his resentencing hearing.  Id. at 564.  In 
rejecting this argument, the court stated, “[T]he errors requiring resentencing 
occurred after the close of the mitigation phase of the trial.  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court is to proceed on remand from the point at which the 
error occurred.”  Id. at 565.  Chinn concluded that the defendant “ ‘was not 
entitled to an opportunity to improve or expand his evidence in mitigation simply 
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because * * * [the court of appeals] required the trial court to reweigh the 
aggravating circumstance and mitigating factors.’ ”  Id. at 565, quoting State v. 
Chinn (June 21, 1996), 2d Dist. No. 15009, 1996 WL 338678, at *3. 
{¶ 28} Based on Chinn, the state argues that Ketterer was not entitled to 
present evidence at resentencing that could have been presented at his original 
sentencing hearing but was not.  However, Ketterer’s case was remanded for 
resentencing on the noncapital offenses in accordance with Foster.  A case 
remanded for resentencing in accordance with Foster “anticipates a sentencing 
hearing de novo, * * * [although] the parties may stipulate to the existing record 
and waive the taking of additional evidence.”  State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 37.  Thus, we reject the state’s reliance on Chinn. 
{¶ 29} Ketterer raises three specific Brady claims. 
{¶ 30} 1.  Information on Williams and Gabbard  
{¶ 31} First, Ketterer argues that the panel erred when it refused to order 
that the prosecution provide all information concerning other individuals who 
were possibly involved in Sanders’s homicide.  Ketterer asserts that Williams and 
Gabbard were “persons of interest” during the investigation but that their 
involvement in the homicide was never disclosed.  Ketterer relies on his own 
February 28 police statement, made two days after his confession, in which he 
implicated Williams and Gabbard in the murder.  In that statement, Ketterer 
claimed that Williams drove him to Sanders’s residence and Gabbard 
accompanied him inside Sanders’s house, where Ketterer killed Sanders.  Ketterer 
claimed that Gabbard helped him look for property inside Sanders’s house and 
that she accompanied him when he stole Sanders’s car. 
{¶ 32} Before trial, the state provided the defense with the pretrial 
statements of Williams and Gabbard.  Williams’s and Gabbard’s statements 
corroborated Ketterer’s version of events in his initial confession but provide no 
evidence that either one of them accompanied Ketterer to the Sanders residence.  
January Term, 2010 
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The state did not provide any additional information concerning the involvement 
of Williams and Gabbard in Sanders’s murder because there was none. 
{¶ 33} Nevertheless, Ketterer claims that the court should have disclosed 
(1) all information relating to the commission of illegal activities at Williams’s 
business at 706 East Avenue, (2) all documents relating to prior illegal activities 
of Williams and Gabbard, (3) all documents relating to crimes with which 
Ketterer was charged in which Williams and Gabbard are mentioned, (4) whether 
they were working as informants and their history of working with law-
enforcement agencies, (5) the potential charges they faced for the raid at 706 East 
Avenue, and (6) any consideration they received in return for their cooperation.  
These Brady requests lack merit because the information about Williams’s and 
Gabbard’s activities and their criminal record is not material to Ketterer’s 
resentencing. 
{¶ 34} However, Ketterer argues that the involvement of other individuals 
in the offenses was a mitigating or exculpatory factor during his resentencing.  In 
making this argument, Ketterer cites Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 98 
S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, and other capital cases that govern the admissibility 
of mitigating evidence during a court’s consideration of whether to impose the 
death penalty.  However, the statutory mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 
2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(7) are not applicable as to Ketterer’s resentencing for 
his noncapital offenses. 
{¶ 35} The state cites United States v. Ruiz (2002), 536 U.S. 622, 122 
S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, in arguing that disclosure of the requested material 
to Ketterer was rendered unnecessary by his guilty pleas.  In Ruiz, the Supreme 
Court held that “the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose 
material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 633.  The court reasoned that when a 
defendant pleads guilty he or she forgoes not only a fair trial but also other 
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accompanying constitutional guarantees.  Id. at 628–629.  Ruiz stated that 
impeachment information is special, as it is “more closely related to the fairness 
of a trial than to the voluntariness of the plea.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 633. 
{¶ 36} Ruiz supports the state’s argument as it pertains to the disclosure of 
impeachment evidence.  Information about Gabbard’s and Williams’s activities at 
706 East Avenue related to possible impeachment evidence.  Nothing in the 
record indicates that such evidence would lead to the disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence as to the noncapital offenses. 
{¶ 37} Even assuming that Ketterer was entitled to such information, 
Ketterer knew about most of this information before his resentencing hearing.  
See State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 28, 
fn. 2 (no Brady violation occurs where a defendant knows of essential facts 
permitting him to take advantage of exculpatory information or where evidence is 
available from another source), citing United States v. Clark (C.A.6, 1991), 928 
F.2d 733, 738; see also State v. Iacona (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100, 752 
N.E.2d, quoting United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc. (C.A.4, 1985), 
760 F.2d 527, 532 (“ ‘No due process violation occurs as long as Brady material 
is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial’ ”). 
{¶ 38} Ketterer was aware of illegal activities at 706 East Avenue, 
although no link to these activities was ever established with Sanders’s murder.  
At a hearing to determine support for Ketterer’s guilty plea, Gabbard testified that 
she and Williams were arrested during a drug raid at 706 East Avenue on 
February 7, 2003, for selling cocaine.  Gabbard also admitted that she used and 
sold cocaine, fenced property, and committed prostitution while staying at 706 
East Avenue.  The defense was also aware of Gabbard’s extensive criminal 
history. 
{¶ 39} In addition, Ketterer knew before pleading guilty that Williams 
was a confidential police informant and provided information to police that led to 
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Ketterer’s arrest for Sanders’s murder.  The defense was also aware of Williams’s 
prior criminal history and that he had received consideration in exchange for 
information that he provided to the police. 
{¶ 40} Ketterer invokes Banks v. Dretke (2004), 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 
1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166, to argue that the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence applies to his resentencing.  In Banks, the state had failed to disclose that 
an essential prosecution witness was a paid police informant.  Id. at 675.  The 
state also failed to disclose interviews with another witness, who falsely stated 
that his testimony was entirely unrehearsed.  Id.  Based on these facts, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Banks had established prejudice from the violation 
and cause for failing to present his claims in state court because the defendant had 
reasonably relied on the prosecutor’s open-file policy and assertions that 
everything known to the government had been disclosed.  Id. at 698. 
{¶ 41} Banks is readily distinguishable.  Unlike the prosecution in Banks, 
the state disclosed that Williams was an informant who provided police with 
information that led to Ketterer’s arrest.  Moreover, Ketterer has not presented 
any evidence of prosecutorial concealment or that he relied on false statements by 
the prosecutor. 
{¶ 42} 2.  Information on mental and physical condition 
{¶ 43} Second, Ketterer claims that the panel erred when it refused to 
order that the prosecution provide all information in its possession as to his 
mental and physical condition at the time of the offenses. 
{¶ 44} Before the resentencing hearing, Ketterer was either provided or 
was aware of information the state had regarding his mental and physical 
condition between the time of the offenses and his arrest.  The state had provided 
Ketterer with the pretrial statements of Williams, Gabbard, and Lisa Lawson that 
described his mental status on the evening of the murder and the following day.  
In his statement, Williams said that Ketterer “seemed very shook up” and was still 
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drunk on the evening of February 24.  Gabbard said that she sold Ketterer some 
crack rocks that same evening.  Lisa Lawson, a bartender, stated that Ketterer 
appeared intoxicated when he left the pub on the evening of February 25. 
{¶ 45} Ketterer was also aware of police testimony describing his mental 
and physical condition at the time of his arrest.  During the hearing on the motion 
to suppress, Detective Steve Rogers testified that he smelled alcohol on Ketterer’s 
breath when he was arrested but that he did not think that Ketterer was 
intoxicated.  When Rogers interviewed Ketterer several hours later, Ketterer told 
him that he was taking Klonopin as medication.1  Detective James Cifuentes also 
testified that he smelled alcohol on Ketterer’s breath at the time of his arrest.  
Cifuentes felt that Ketterer was intoxicated but said that he seemed to have 
control of himself.  Nevertheless, Ketterer suggests that there may be reports from 
others whom the state did not disclose who witnessed his impairment by alcohol 
and drugs during his arrest.  However, Ketterer provides nothing to support this 
conclusory and speculative claim. 
{¶ 46} Thus, no Brady violation occurred involving the disclosure of 
information about Ketterer’s mental and physical condition because the defense 
knew about this information before resentencing. 
{¶ 47} 3.  Information on favorable treatment of Hester and Jasper 
{¶ 48} Third, Ketterer argues that the panel erred by refusing to order the 
state to disclose information pertaining to the favorable treatment offered to Scott 
Hester and Tyrone Jasper. 
{¶ 49} Before his resentencing hearing, Ketterer did not request disclosure 
of information pertaining to any favorable treatment Hester or Jasper received in 
the disposition of their criminal charges.  Ketterer’s failure to make these requests 
is a waiver of his present claim.  See State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d at 101, 752 
                                                 
1.  In the competency evaluation, Dr. Hopes stated that Ketterer had a history of being prescribed 
Klonopin, which is a medication commonly used in the treatment of severe depressive disorders.  
January Term, 2010 
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N.E.2d 937 (when a Brady violation is uncovered prior to the close of trial, the 
failure to request a continuance will usually constitute a waiver of the error on 
appeal).  Nevertheless, these claims also lack merit. 
{¶ 50} Hester’s testimony related solely to Ketterer’s motion to suppress 
his pretrial statements.  In that motion, Ketterer argued that he was subjected to 
custodial interrogation at the moment the police asked him to accompany them to 
the station on the evening of February 25.  Ketterer attempted to develop 
testimony at the motion hearing that Hester observed Ketterer being taken away in 
handcuffs outside 706 East Avenue.  But Hester was a reluctant witness and at 
first refused to testify.  After the court ordered him to testify, Hester stated that he 
was not going to lie for the defendant. 
{¶ 51} The defense called Jason Kristanoff, the defense investigator, who 
testified that he interviewed Hester in jail and that Hester stated that on the night 
of February 25, he saw Ketterer being arrested and taken away in handcuffs.  
While on the stand, Hester retracted the statements he had made to Kristanoff.  
The court denied the motion to suppress. 
{¶ 52} With respect to Jasper, the state informed the defense that Jasper, 
an inmate in the Butler County jail, was a potential witness.  The state provided 
the defense with a summary of Jasper’s criminal record.  But Jasper was never 
called as a witness.  During the mitigation hearing, the prosecutor informed the 
court that Jasper would have been called as a rebuttal witness if the defense had 
introduced DNA results, which raised the possibility that someone else was 
involved in committing the offenses. 
{¶ 53} Ketterer argues that the state failed to disclose favorable treatment 
that Hester received following his testimony at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress and failed to disclose the disposition of pending charges against Jasper. 
{¶ 54} The Brady claim as to Hester lacks merit because the disposition of 
charges against him was not material to Ketterer’s resentencing.  Ketterer became 
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acquainted with Hester while they were both in jail.  Yet because Hester had no 
involvement in Sanders’s murder, the robbery and burglary of his house, or the 
theft of his car, Hester’s testimony was relevant only to the motion to suppress 
and had no bearing on Ketterer’s resentencing. 
{¶ 55} Similarly, the disposition of charges against Jasper was not 
material to Ketterer’s resentencing, because he too was not involved in the 
offenses.  Jasper’s testimony was relevant only as a potential prosecution rebuttal 
witness based on what Ketterer appears to have told him about the offenses in jail.  
Accordingly, information about Jasper had no bearing on Ketterer’s resentencing. 
{¶ 56} Even assuming that information about Hester and Jasper should 
have been disclosed, no Brady violation occurred, because Ketterer knew about 
the disposition of charges against both of them.  In a motion filed before the 
resentencing hearing, Ketterer described the charges against Hester and set forth 
their disposition.  In the same motion, Ketterer discussed charges and their 
disposition against Jasper. 
{¶ 57} Based on the foregoing, no Brady violation occurred during 
Ketterer’s resentencing. 
D. Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was properly denied 
{¶ 58} The fifth and sixth propositions of law address the trial court’s 
denial of Ketterer’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
{¶ 59} While the case was on remand for resentencing, Ketterer filed a 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that (1) his pleas were based on a 
misunderstanding of the sentence he would receive (i.e., he believed that he 
would not receive the death penalty), (2) he relied on statutes that have now been 
declared unconstitutional in Foster, (3) the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory 
evidence, and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 60} Crim.R. 32.1 states: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and 
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”  “[A] presentence motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted.”  State v. Xie 
(1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715. 
{¶ 61} Ketterer raises the same grounds raised in the trial court in arguing 
that the presiding judge erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  
He argues that the three-judge panel should have granted his motion to withdraw 
his pleas under the standard that such motions should be “freely and liberally 
granted.” 
{¶ 62} In response, the state argues that res judicata bars Ketterer’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because on the first appeal, this court rejected 
his attacks on his pleas.  Res judicata bars the assertion of claims against a valid, 
final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on 
appeal.  State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 39 O.O.2d 189, 226 N.E.2d 
104, paragraph nine of the syllabus.  Ohio courts of appeals have applied res 
judicata to bar the assertion of claims in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that 
were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal.  See State v. McGee, 8th Dist. 
No. 91638, 2009-Ohio-3374, ¶ 9; State v. Totten, 10th App. No. 05AP-278 and 
05AP-508, 2005-Ohio-6210, ¶ 7 (collecting cases). 
{¶ 63} In Ketterer’s first appeal, this court considered most of the claims 
that Ketterer raised on remand as a basis to withdraw his guilty pleas.  We found 
that Ketterer was adequately informed of his rights before pleading guilty; that his 
plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and that his counsel was 
not ineffective in providing him advice on his guilty pleas.  State v. Ketterer, 111 
Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 13-14, 75-79, and 80-90.  Thus, 
res judicata was a valid basis for rejecting these claims. 
{¶ 64} In addition, the state invokes State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. 
Judges, Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97-98, 9 
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O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate 
Ketterer’s guilty pleas.  In Special Prosecutors, this court held that “Crim.R. 32.1 
does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the 
appellate court.  While Crim.R. 32.1 apparently enlarges the power of the trial 
court over its judgments without respect to the running of the court term, it does 
not confer upon the trial court the power to vacate a judgment which has been 
affirmed by the appellate court, for this action would affect the decision of the 
reviewing court, which is not within the power of the trial court to do.”  Id. at 97-
98. 
{¶ 65} On appeal, this court affirmed Ketterer’s convictions and death 
sentence.  State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, 
¶ 12.  Ketterer’s appeal was later reopened and his case was remanded for the 
limited purpose of resentencing him on his noncapital sentences.  113 Ohio St.3d 
1463, 2007-Ohio-1722, 864 N.E.2d 650.  Under the authority of Special 
Prosecutors, the panel had no authority to consider Ketterer’s motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas, let alone grant him a new trial. 
{¶ 66} Finally, this court’s decision in State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 
575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, does not apply to the present case.  
Boswell considered the effect of a void sentence on a defendant’s motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  Unlike the situation in Boswell, Ketterer’s noncapital 
sentences are not void.  As discussed below, procedures set forth in R.C. 
2929.191 apply to remedy any defects in imposing postrelease control because 
Ketterer was resentenced after July 11, 2006.  See State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 67} Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly denied Ketterer’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
E. Appellant was not properly notified of postrelease control on resentencing 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
{¶ 68} In his first proposition of law, Ketterer argues that he must be 
resentenced on the noncapital offenses because the three-judge panel failed to 
properly notify him of postrelease control at his resentencing hearing and failed to 
properly incorporate postrelease control into its resentencing entry.  In his 
additional proposition of law, Ketterer asserts that the panel’s nunc pro tunc entry 
failed to correct these errors. 
{¶ 69} During the resentencing hearing for the noncapital offenses, 
Ketterer was notified of postrelease control:  “The Court is also going to advise 
you, sir, and this is assuming that something happens to Count One, that if — in 
regards to Count Two and Five, if you are released after serving that sentence, the 
Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Control [sic] will put you on post-release 
control, mandatory for a period of five years.  And if you violated their rules and 
regulations such that you were convicted of a new crime or if you didn’t report to 
your parole officer they could send you back in increments of 30, 60, 90 days and 
they could send you back for a total amount of one half of what I have sentenced 
you to.  So we are talking — these sentences were the original sentences of — 
total up to 22 that means the parole board could give you an additional 11 years 
on that.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 70} The three-judge panel’s judgment entry dated May 29, 2007, 
states, “As to Count(s) Two, Three, Four and Five: The Court has notified the 
defendant that post release control is in this case [sic] up to a maximum of years 
[sic], as well as the consequences for violating conditions of post release control 
imposed by the Parole Board under Revised Code Section 2967.28.” 
{¶ 71} On November 15, 2007, the panel filed a nunc pro tunc entry 
providing, “As to Count(s) Two, Three, Four and Five: The Court has notified the 
defendant that post release control is Mandatory in this case up to a maximum of 
5 years, as well as the consequences for violating conditions of post release 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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control imposed by the Parole Board, under Revised Code Section 2967.28.”  
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 72} Effective July 11, 2006, R.C. 2929.191 establishes a procedure to 
remedy a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of postrelease control.  In 
State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d, 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held: “For criminal sentences imposed on 
or after July 11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose postrelease 
control, trial courts shall apply the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191.”  
Neither of the parties has addressed the application of R.C. 2929.191 as a remedy 
in this case.  However, R.C. 2929.191 applies to Ketterer because his resentencing 
hearing occurred after July 11, 2006.  See, e.g., State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 
2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 214. 
{¶ 73} Ketterer argues that the trial court failed to notify him orally of 
postrelease control as to Count Three, aggravated burglary, which is a first-degree 
felony.2  In response, the state contends that the judge merely made “an 
inadvertent slip of the tongue” at the resentencing hearing when the court referred 
only to “Count Two and Five.”  The state argues that the court meant to say 
“Counts Two through Five” when notifying Ketterer of postrelease control.  In 
support of this argument, the state asserts that the court correctly stated that the 
total prison time was 22 years for all the noncapital counts and stated that “Counts 
Two through Five * * * are consecutive to Count One.” 
{¶ 74} However, the court could not have meant Counts Two through 
Five in imposing mandatory postrelease control because neither Count Four, a 
                                                 
2.  Appellant’s brief incorrectly refers to the charge of aggravated burglary as Count Two rather 
than Count Three.  
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
fourth-degree felony, nor Count Five, a third-degree felony, subjected Ketterer to 
mandatory postrelease control under R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C).3  
{¶ 75} The state argues that any mistake in advising Ketterer of 
postrelease control as to Count Three should be overlooked because he was still 
advised that postrelease control was mandatory for five years. Watkins v. Collins, 
111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 N.E.2d 78.  In Watkins, 12 inmates 
who were incarcerated for violating postrelease control filed for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Id. at ¶ 27.  The petitioners argued that the trial courts never properly 
imposed postrelease control, because the language in their sentencing entries 
mistakenly included discretionary language concerning their terms of postrelease 
control.  Id. at ¶ 42.  This court acknowledged that the journal entries erroneously 
referred to discretionary, instead of mandatory, postrelease control, but 
determined that a “reasonable person in the position of any of the petitioners 
would have had sufficient notice that postrelease control could be imposed 
following the expiration of the person’s sentence.”  Id. at ¶ 51. 
{¶ 76} The petitioners in Watkins sought writs of habeas corpus, requiring 
the petitioners to show that they were entitled to immediate release from 
incarceration.  Because our standard of review in a habeas case differs 
considerably from our standard of review when considering a death-penalty case 
on direct appeal to this court, Watkins is of little instructional value.  More 
significantly, Watkins did not address the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191 
for correcting mistakes in notifying a defendant of postrelease control.  These 
statutory procedures provide a mechanism for correcting the failure to properly 
advise Ketterer of postrelease control on Count Three.  These statutory procedures 
must be followed in Ketterer’s case because his resentencing occurred after July 
                                                 
3.  Burglary as charged in Count Five is a third-degree felony.  Count Five charged Ketterer with 
burglary at the crime scene after the murder.  Because this offense did not involve any threat or 
physical harm to a person, it was subject to discretionary rather than mandatory postrelease 
control.  See R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
11, 2006.  Thus, the dissent’s reliance upon Watkins is misplaced, and the state’s 
argument that any mistakes in notifying Ketterer about postrelease control can be 
overlooked is rejected. 
{¶ 77} Ketterer also contends that the panel’s resentencing entry is 
defective because it failed to state that postrelease control is mandatory for five 
years.  Ketterer argues that the resentencing entry also incorrectly stated that 
postrelease control is imposed as to Counts Three and Four, because he was not 
notified of postrelease control as to Count Three and he was not subject to 
mandatory postrelease control on Count Four, a fourth-degree felony. 
{¶ 78} In response, the state argues that the missing language in the 
resentencing entry was a clerical error that was corrected when the panel filed the 
nunc pro tunc entry on November 15, 2007.  The nunc pro tunc entry added the 
omitted word “Mandatory” and the missing numeral “5.”  However, the nunc pro 
tunc entry continues to state incorrectly that Ketterer was notified of postrelease 
control on Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five. 
{¶ 79} In his additional proposition of law, Ketterer challenges the 
validity of the nunc pro tunc entry.  As discussed earlier, R.C. 2929.191(C) 
requires that a hearing be conducted before a nunc pro tunc entry is journalized to 
correct a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of postrelease control.  
Nothing in the record indicates that such a hearing was conducted.  Accordingly, 
the nunc pro tunc entry was ineffective. 
{¶ 80} The nunc pro tunc entry contains another error, which Ketterer 
does not raise.  The nunc pro tunc entry does not state that Ketterer was informed 
that if he violated his supervision or a condition of postrelease control, the parole 
board could impose a maximum prison term of up to one-half of the prison term 
originally imposed, which here is an aggregate 11 years.  See R.C. 
2929.19(B)(3)(e).  Ketterer was correctly advised of this condition of postrelease 
control during the resentencing hearing.  However, the nunc pro tunc entry 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
incorrectly states, “The defendant is ordered to serve as part of this sentence any 
term of post release control imposed by the Parole Board, and any prison term for 
violation of that post release control.”  Thus, the nunc pro tunc entry should be 
amended to incorporate the correct language of this rule.  See R.C. 
2929.191(B)(1). 
{¶ 81} Thus, in contrast to the dissent’s characterization of the facts, this 
is not a case in which the trial court merely misspoke in regard to one point 
concerning postrelease control.  Instead, at least four errors occurred in notifying 
Ketterer of postrelease control:  (1) the trial court orally advised Ketterer that he 
was subject to five years of mandatory postrelease control as to “Counts Two and 
Five” when it should have said “Counts Two and Three,” (2) the nunc pro tunc 
entry incorrectly states that Ketterer was notified of postrelease control on Counts 
Two, Three, Four, and Five, (3) the nunc pro tunc entry does not contain proper 
language explaining the consequences of a violation of postrelease control, and 
(4) the trial court issued the nunc pro tunc entry without following the procedures 
of R.C. 2929.191, which controls in this case.  Viewed cumulatively, these errors 
on the part of the trial court cannot be considered harmless.  We have stated that 
“the court must conduct proceedings in capital cases with a strict level of care that 
comports with their unique status.”  State v. Clinkscale, 122 Ohio St.3d 351, 
2009-Ohio-2746, 911 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 23.  Accordingly, while the dissent is correct 
that it is highly unlikely that Ketterer will ever be subject to postrelease control, 
trial courts in capital cases must scrupulously comply with the applicable statutes 
and rules, even those involving postrelease control. 
{¶ 82} Because the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease 
control, the case is remanded so that Ketterer may be given the proper terms of 
postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191. 
III. Conclusion 
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24 
 
{¶ 83} We hold that in cases in which a sentencing opinion is required by 
R.C. 2929.03(F), a final, appealable order consists of both the sentencing opinion 
and the judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C).  We further hold 
that the first of the four requirements for a final, appealable order enumerated in 
Baker will be satisfied if the sentencing opinion, the judgment of conviction, or 
preferably both, reflect the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court 
upon which the conviction is based.  Because Ketterer’s sentencing opinion sets 
forth his guilty plea, there is a valid final, appealable order in this case. 
{¶ 84} Furthermore, we hold that the trial court properly applied the 
Foster remedy in resentencing Ketterer, that no Brady violation occurred during 
resentencing, and that the trial court properly denied Ketterer’s motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  Because the trial court failed to properly impose 
postrelease control during resentencing, we reverse the judgment and remand the 
case so that postrelease control may be properly imposed according to R.C. 
2929.191. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 85} The majority holds that the trial court failed to properly impose 
postrelease control and, therefore, that the case must be remanded so that Ketterer 
may be given the proper terms of postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191.  I 
dissent. 
{¶ 86} In Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 
N.E.2d 78, this court acknowledged that the journal entries erroneously referred to 
January Term, 2010 
25 
 
discretionary, instead of mandatory, postrelease control, but determined that a 
“reasonable person in the position of any of the petitioners would have sufficient 
notice that postrelease control could be imposed following the expiration of the 
person’s sentence.”  Id. at ¶ 51.  Moreover, we noted that the “preeminent purpose 
of R.C. 2967.28” is that “offenders subject to postrelease control know at 
sentencing that their liberty could continue to be restrained after serving their 
initial sentences.”  Id. at ¶ 52. 
{¶ 87} In this case, Ketterer was advised that he was subject to postrelease 
control, that the duration of that postrelease control would be five years, and that 
imposition of the postrelease control was mandatory.  Therefore, while the trial 
court may have misspoken and at one point used the word “and” instead of the 
word “through,” the trial court did comply with the requirement to advise Ketterer 
that postrelease control was mandatory for five years.  Therefore, the preeminent 
purpose of R.C. 2967.28 was complied with, and no error should be found that 
warrants reversal. 
{¶ 88} In addition, Ketterer was sentenced to death for aggravated murder 
and to terms of imprisonment for burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated 
robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle.  The term sentences were in addition 
to his sentence of death.  Therefore, he will not ever be subject to postrelease 
control.  Thus, any failure to properly impose postrelease control is also a factor 
in the harmless-error analysis.  I respectfully dissent and would find that any 
failure to comply with the requirement to notify Ketterer of postrelease control 
constituted harmless error. 
__________________ 
 
Robin N. Piper, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael A. 
Oster Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Randall L. Porter, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert 
and Steven L. Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________