Case Title: Dubois v. Town of Arundel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 21

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 21 
Docket: 
Yor-18-147 
Submitted 
On Briefs: November 28, 2018 
Decided: 
February 12, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
MARCEL DUBOIS et al. 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF ARUNDEL et al. 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Marcel Dubois and Sol Fedder appeal from an order of the Superior 
Court (York County, O’Neil, J.) granting the Town of Arundel’s motion to dismiss 
their complaint and imposing sanctions on Dubois and Fedder.  We affirm the 
order dismissing Dubois and Fedder’s complaint, but vacate the order of 
sanctions and remand to the Superior Court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  This appeal relates to the Town of Arundel Planning Board’s denial 
of an application to renew a conditional use permit submitted by Dubois 
 
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Livestock, Inc.1  Dubois and Fedder were not listed as the applicants for the 
renewal permit, were not listed as the property owners, and were not listed as 
the authorized agents of Dubois Livestock.  Dubois Livestock’s application was 
denied by the Town of Arundel Planning Board on July 21, 2017, during a public 
hearing that was not attended by any representative of Dubois Livestock.2  
Dubois and Fedder did not participate in the public hearing in any capacity.   
[¶3]  On September 18, 2017, Dubois and Fedder filed a complaint against 
the Town of Arundel, individual members of the Planning Board, and the 
Arundel Town Planner.  Dubois and Fedder’s complaint alleged that a 
memorandum drafted by the town planner and distributed to the members of 
the Planning Board led to an illegal executive session or sessions.  Following the 
submission of briefs pursuant to a Rule 80B Notice and Briefing Schedule, the 
Town of Arundel moved to dismiss Dubois and Fedder’s complaint as untimely 
filed, for lack of standing, and for failure to state a claim.  On February 1, 2018, 
the Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding: 
[T]he plaintiffs lack standing to bring the action, no subject matter 
jurisdiction exists for the court to properly review the matter, and 
                                         
1  Dubois Livestock is an agricultural composting facility located in Arundel, Maine, which was 
granted a conditional use permit pursuant to a consent decree that it entered into with the Town of 
Arundel on June 27, 2016.   
2  The application was denied because Dubois Livestock failed to demonstrate that it was in 
compliance with the terms of the consent decree.   
 
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plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
under the [Freedom of Access Act].  Defendants’ motion to dismiss 
is granted.  Given the significant problems with the present 
litigation, the court also awards defendants reasonable attorney’s 
fees and expenses pursuant to Rule 11 of the Maine Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . . 
 
At the invitation of the Superior Court, the Town of Arundel subsequently 
submitted an affidavit of attorney fees and costs, seeking $5,862.50 in attorney 
fees and $231.75 in costs, which the court then determined was reasonable.  
Dubois and Fedder moved for reconsideration and relief from the Superior 
Court’s judgment, but both motions were denied.  This timely appeal followed.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(n); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1)-(2)(D).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶4]  It is unclear from the face of the complaint whether Dubois and 
Fedder rely on the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-414 (2017), 
as the statutory avenue for review under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B, or 
if they are asserting a separate cause of action pursuant to FOAA.  Nevertheless, 
the present appeal fails in either event because Rule 80B is not the proper 
mechanism to assert a FOAA claim, Dubois and Fedder lacked standing to 
pursue a Rule 80B complaint, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted under FOAA.   
 
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A. 
Rule 80B Standing 
[¶5]  The court concluded that Dubois and Fedder did not have standing 
to bring this claim pursuant to Rule 80B and, alternatively, that any such claim 
was untimely.  We have held that Rule 80C is inapplicable to FOAA claims.  See 
Dubois v. Office of the Attorney General, 2018 ME 67, ¶ 7 n.3, 185 A.3d 734.  
Rule 80B is the municipal analogue to Rule 80C, which applies to appeals from 
state administrative action, and thus the same principle applies here, in the 
context of appeals from municipal action.  Accordingly, to the extent that Dubois 
and Fedder seek to assert a FOAA claim through the process prescribed by 
Rule 80B, the court correctly dismissed the claim because Rule 80B is 
inapposite.  See id. 
[¶6]  Even if the complaint can be construed as a Rule 80B appeal that 
seeks relief from municipal action other than a FOAA violation, the court 
correctly concluded that neither Dubois nor Fedder has standing.  We review 
whether a party has standing de novo.  See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2015 
ME 127, ¶ 6, 124 A.3d 1122.  “Standing is a condition of justiciability that a 
plaintiff must satisfy in order to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
in the first place.”  Id. ¶ 7.  In order to have standing to file a Rule 80B complaint, 
the complainant must show “(1) that it was a party at the administrative 
 
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proceeding, and (2) that it suffered a particularized injury as a result of the 
agency’s decision.”  See Norris Family Assocs., LLC v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 
ME 102, ¶ 11, 879 A.2d 1007.    
[¶7]  Here, Dubois and Fedder were not involved in the administrative 
proceedings in any manner.  In Dubois Livestock’s application for renewal of 
the conditional use permit, “Dubois Livestock” is listed as the applicant, 
“Randrick Trust” is listed as the property owner, and “Ricky Dubois and Randy 
Dubois” are listed as the authorized agents for Dubois Livestock.  Neither 
Dubois nor Fedder attended the administrative hearing on July 21, 2017, and 
neither has alleged a particularized injury as a result of the Planning Board’s 
denial of Dubois Livestock’s application for a renewal permit.  As a result, the 
Superior Court did not err by dismissing Dubois and Fedder’s Rule 80B 
complaint for lack of standing.  See Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Town of Lincoln, 
2010 ME 78, ¶¶ 12-17, 2 A.3d 284. 
B. 
Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to FOAA 
[¶8]  Dubois and Fedder argue that a complaint brought pursuant to 
FOAA is not subject to dismissal under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Dubois and Fedder 
further assert that, even if a claim for relief based on FOAA is subject to a motion 
to dismiss, the Superior Court erred because they pleaded sufficient facts to 
 
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entitle them to relief pursuant to FOAA.  We review the grant of a motion to 
dismiss de novo and examine the complaint in the light most favorable to 
Dubois and Fedder to determine whether their complaint sets forth elements 
of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle them to relief on some 
legal theory.  See Paul v. Town of Liberty, 2016 ME 173, ¶¶ 17, 19, 151 A.3d 924. 
[¶9]  Pursuant to section 403 of FOAA, “all public proceedings must be 
open to the public and any person must be permitted to attend a public 
proceeding” unless an exception applies.  See 1 M.R.S. § 403(1) (2017); see also 
1 M.R.S. § 405 (2017) (listing the exceptions to 1 M.R.S. § 403(1)).  The purpose 
of FOAA’s public meeting requirement is to ensure that the actions of 
government are taken openly.  See Hughes Bros., Inc. v. Town of Eddington, 
2016 ME 13, ¶ 18, 130 A.3d 978.   
[¶10]  Contrary to Dubois and Fedder’s contentions, the Superior Court 
did not err in dismissing their complaint because they had failed to state a claim 
that would entitle them to relief pursuant to FOAA.  Specifically, Dubois and 
Fedder failed to allege that any action was taken during the alleged executive 
session or sessions which would entitle them to the relief provided for by 
1 M.R.S. 409(2) (2017).  See Lewiston Daily Sun v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 43, 1999 
ME 143, ¶ 11, 738 A.2d 1239.  Rather, their complaint alleged only that Planning 
 
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Board members received a memo from the town planner that led to an 
executive session or sessions and that the Planning Board subsequently held a 
public hearing where the Planning Board denied Dubois Livestock’s 
application.  Additionally, we find no merit to Dubois and Fedder’s argument 
that a motion to dismiss is not permitted or authorized in the context of a FOAA 
complaint.  See Wright v. Dep’t of Def. & Veterans Servs., 623 A.2d 1283, 1286 
(Me. 1993); Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶¶ 8, 10 n.4, 
770 A.2d 574. 
[¶11]  Because Dubois and Fedder failed to allege that any action was 
taken during the alleged executive session or sessions which would entitle 
them to any relief, the Superior Court did not err in dismissing their complaint. 
C. 
Sanctions 
[¶12]  Finally, Dubois and Fedder argue that the Superior Court’s 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 11 was an abuse of discretion.  
Specifically, Dubois and Fedder contend that the order imposing sanctions 
lacked a sufficient basis and was imposed without notice and opportunity to be 
heard.  We review a trial court’s imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 for 
an abuse of discretion.  See Pepperell Tr. Co. v. Mountain Heir Fin. Corp., 1998 
ME 46, ¶ 10, 708 A.2d 651.  “An appellate court will not lightly overrule a trial 
 
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court’s judgmental choice of an appropriate sanction . . . .”  See Reeves v. 
Travelers Ins. Cos., 421 A.2d 47, 50 (Me. 1980). 
[¶13]  “Maine’s trial courts may sanction parties for various types of 
pretrial misconduct,” see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Welch-Gallant, 2017 ME 105, 
¶ 7, 162 A.3d 827 (quotation marks omitted), and among the sanctions that 
courts are authorized to impose are reasonable attorney fees and expenses 
pursuant to Rule 11.  See M.R. Civ. P. 11(a).  In Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 
2017 ME 68, 158 A.3d 931, we outlined the procedural steps that courts should 
follow when determining whether to impose sanctions.  Id. ¶¶ 19-22.  These 
steps include adequate notice to the opposing party and an opportunity for that 
party to be heard before the court considers the imposition of sanctions.  Id. 
¶¶ 20-21.  “The opportunity to be heard may, but need not be, a full evidentiary 
hearing.  For example, a court may simply invite the plaintiff to submit an 
affidavit . . . .”  Id. ¶ 21.  
[¶14]  Although in Welch-Gallant and Cope we considered the sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice in the context of a foreclosure case, due process 
requires that the same procedure be afforded here to Dubois and Fedder.  See 
Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me. 1985) 
(describing “the essence of due process as notice and an opportunity to be 
 
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heard.”); Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 246 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting 
“the general desirability and sometime necessity of affording notice and an 
opportunity to be heard when monetary sanctions are imposed . . . .” (quotation 
marks omitted)).  Here, Dubois and Fedder had neither notice of the possible 
imposition of sanctions nor an opportunity to be heard, and thus the Superior 
Court abused its discretion.  Accordingly, we vacate the Superior Court’s order 
imposing sanctions.  We remand to the Superior Court for it to conduct 
proceedings consistent with the process articulated in Cope, which will afford 
Dubois and Fedder notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of 
sanctions.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 
[¶15]  We affirm the court’s order granting the Town of Arundel’s motion 
to dismiss Dubois and Fedder’s complaint, and we vacate the court’s imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions against Dubois and Fedder and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
The entry is: 
Judgment as to sanctions vacated.  Judgment 
affirmed in all other respects.  Remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Marcel Dubois, appellant pro se 
Sol Fedder, appellant pro se 
Leah B. Rachin, Esq., and Benjamin T. McCall, Esq., Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, 
Kennebunk, for appellees Town of Arundel et al. 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2017-25 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY