Case Title: Boriss v. Edwards

Citation: 77 So. 2d 909

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1954-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
77 So. 2d 909 (1954)
Olivia H. BORISS et al.
v.
William Wren EDWARDS et al.
6 Div. 625.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 4, 1954.
Rehearing Denied February 10, 1955.
Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Reid B. Barnes, Birmingham, for appellants.
Gillespy & Dominick, Geo. Peach Taylor, Birmingham, for appellees.
*910 CLAYTON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County at law based upon the verdict of a jury. The verdict and judgment were in favor of plaintiffs for $2,500 damages for deceit by alleged misrepresentation in the sale of a house and lot to plaintiffs. Motion for new trial was overruled and this appeal is from the judgment and also from the order overruling the motion for a new trial. The amended complaint, as submitted to the jury, consisted of one count in the following words:
As a preliminary consideration we set out herein our applicable statutes which may constitute the basis in law for an action of this kind, namely, Sections 108 and 110 of Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940.
*911 Assignments of error and argument in brief of appellant are addressed to two general propositions of law which were properly raised in valid manner in the trial court. The first proposition is that the three conjunctively alleged misrepresentations of condition of (1) the house, (2) the septic tank, and (3) the ditch, must all be proved for the judgment to stand; that they together constitute one cause of action, and failure of proof of any one of these three averments must result in reversal of this appeal. The other proposition, broadly stated, is that the evidence of misrepresentation in the case was not of such character as will support a verdict for punitive damages.
Evidence for the plaintiffs was that Mr. and Mrs. Edwards (plaintiffs) one Sunday afternoon drove through the development known as Oak Grove Estates, and talked to Mr. Montgomery who was in the office at the development. They were shown two houses by Mr. Montgomery. The one which they later decided to buy, was not completed but was near completion. The floor was not then finished and some interior decorating was not completed. Other work on the house had been finished. This was about September 1, 1950. The contract for purchase of the house was signed two weeks later. Mr. Edwards inspected the house outside the presence of Montgomery after that first visit, and before the day of the signing of the contract, by picking up the key at the office and himself opening the house. Mr. Montgomery was next seen at the signing of the contract in the office of Mr. James Marbury, but even though Mr. Marbury was present, plaintiffs had no dealing whatever with him. The contract was signed by Mr. Edwards, one of the plaintiffs, and Olivia H. Boriss, one of the appellants. The four appellants and their spouses executed a deed to the plaintiffs conveying the house and lot for a stated consideration of $9,725.00. The representations, made the basis of this action, were stated in evidence by plaintiffs to have been made by John E. Montgomery on the occasion when they first visited the subdivision. Mr. Edwards' testimony stated, in substance, these representations, as follows:
Mrs. Edwards' version of these representations, as given in her testimony was substantially as follows:
The pertinent parts of the testimony of Mr. Edwards on the question of falsity of the foregoing representations are as follows:
John E. Montgomery, III, being absent in the armed forces testified by deposition, emphatically denying the making of any representations as testified by plaintiffs. He stated in positive terms that plaintiffs inspected the house themselves and bought on the basis of their own examination of the property.
Mr. William E. Hull, a real estate agent, testified for plaintiffs as to the difference in value of the property as it actually was at the time of the sale and what the value would have been had the property been as represented to the plaintiffs by defendants' agent Montgomery. His testimony placed the actual value of the property at $9,000 at the time of the sale, and the value of the property, had it been as represented, to be $9,750a difference of $750. Mr. Hull's qualifications as a real estate man were unquestioned and his testimony as to these values was uncontradicted.
We consider the first proposition raised by appellants. In our recent case of Mazer v. Brown, 259 Ala. 449, 454, 455, 66 So. 2d 561, 566, this court held:
*914 Also, our case of Campbell v. Jackson, 257 Ala. 618, 623, 60 So. 2d 252, 256, stated the law to be:
A leading case decided by our Court of Appeals, City Loan & Banking Co. v. Byers, 1 Ala.App. 583, 586, 55 So. 951, 952, contains the following statement of the law:
The early case of Birmingham Railway & Electric Co. v. Baylor, 101 Ala. 488, 493, 13 So. 793, 795, states the rule which has been quoted many times, viz:
Other cases in point on this subject are Preston Motors Corporation v. Wood, 208 Ala. 172, 94 So. 70; Cartwright v. Braly, 218 Ala. 49, 117 So. 477; Cartwright v. Hughes, 226 Ala. 464, 147 So. 399.
Proof of the making of a false statement in regard to the condition of the house or the ditch or the septic tank will authorize a recovery in the instant case because each of these averments, stated conjunctively in a single count, presents a substantive cause of action. Proof of one false representation would be complete without proof of the averment as to any one or two of the others, and the loss occasioned thereby could easily be separated *915 from that occasioned by the others. Any one of the three averments can stand alone without the presence of either of the other two to complement it. This disposes of the first proposition adversely to appellants. Authorities, supra.
Adverting now to the question of the measure of damages: "We recognize the general rule to be in this state, as contended by appellee's counsel, that if plaintiff retains title and does not offer to rescind, but sues for damages for the deceit, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the property at the time of the sale, and what it would have been had it been as represented. Tillis v. Smith [Sons] Lbr. Co., 188 Ala. 122, 65 So. 1015; 20 Cyc. 132." Preston Motors Corporation v. Wood, supra, 208 Ala. at page 175, 94 So. at page 71; Southern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 225 Ala. 527, 144 So. 367; Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Fields, 235 Ala. 602, 180 So. 275.
"* * * that punitive damages may not be recovered in such an action (deceit) unless the fraud is gross, malicious, oppressive, and committed with an intention to so injure and defraud. (Caffey v. Alabama Mach. & Supply Co., 19 Ala.App. 189, 96 So. 454, 457; Ex parte Alabama Machinery & Supply Co., 209 Ala. 466, 96 So. 459; Alabama Mach. & Supply Co. v. Caffey, 213 Ala. 260, 262, 104 So. 509; 24 C.J. 104, § 265)." Southern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, supra [225 Ala. 527, 144 So. 368]; Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Fields, supra; Caffey v. Alabama Mach. & Supply Co., 19 Ala. App. 189, 96 So. 454.
Gauging the evidence by the rule above, we have reached the conclusion that there was no justification for an award of punitive damages and that the verdict of the jury was excessive in the amount of $1,000.
There was no proof of any actual intent to deceive appellees by Mr. Montgomery, the salesman for appellants. The defects in the condition of the house, septic tank and ditch were not apparent. So far as the evidence shows, Mr. Montgomery had no more reason to suspect their presence than did appellees. They developed some months later. Hence our conclusion above that the award of punitive damages was not justified. On the question of compensatory damages, however, the evidence was in conflict.
While the allegations of the complaint were not exactly matched by the proof, they were substantially, or by inference, established by the evidence sufficiently to support the jury in awarding compensatory damages. Schock v. Bear, 250 Ala. 529, 35 So. 2d 97; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brackin, 248 Ala. 459, 28 So. 2d 193; Southern R. Co. v. Lee, 167 Ala. 268, 52 So. 648.
One further proposition merits treatment. Plaintiffs' charge number 1 was misleading in instructing the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs in the event they found that defendants had falsely represented "any material fact" as to the condition of the house and lot. It might have been corrected by an explanatory charge. However, under the circumstances of this case, the giving of the charge was not erroneous to the extent of being injurious to the defendants in view of the fact that the allegations of the complaint referred to three alleged misrepresentations and likewise the evidence of the plaintiffs referred only to these same three alleged misrepresentations. The jury could not reasonably have understood the charge to refer to any other *916 representations. On that account, the giving of the charge was error without injury.Supreme Court Rule 45, Code 1940, Tit. 7 Appendix.
The judgment will stand reversed, and the cause remanded, unless the appellees shall, within thirty days after this date, file a remittitur pursuant to § 811, Tit. 7, Code 1940, reducing the judgment from $2,500 to $1,500. Let notice issue to appellees accordingly. If the appellees shall file such remittitur, the judgment will be reduced and affirmed for the sum of $1,500.
Affirmed conditionally.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.
On Rehearing
Opinion corrected and application for rehearing overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, STAKELY and MERRILL, JJ., concur.