Case Title: Morris v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 315, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
VIRGIL MORRIS,
§
No. 315, 2001
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§       Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
v.
§
in and for Sussex County
§
Cr.A. No. IS00-12-0590
STATE OF DELAWARE
§
§
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§
         Appellee.                     §
Submitted: March 5, 2002
Decided: June 4, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.  
ORDER
This 4th day of June, 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the
parties, it appears to the Court that:
1)  Virgil Morris appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of
driving under the influence.  He argues that his conviction and sentence
should be reversed because the Superior Court improperly amended the
indictment on the morning of trial, and because the court erred in using his
prior misdemeanor convictions to enhance his sentence. 
1 21 Del. C. §4177(d) states: “Whoever is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall: .
. . (4) For a fourth or subsequent offense occurring any time after 3 prior offenses, be guilty of a class E
felony. . . and imprisoned not less than 2 years nor more than 5 years.”
2
2)  In the early hours of October 7, 2000, Seaford police officers found
Morris passed out behind the wheel of his car in the drive-thru lane of a
Dunkin’ Donuts store.  When Officer Chaffinch opened the car door in an
effort to awaken Morris, he smelled alcohol. After Officer Finch conducted
a series of field sobriety tests, and Morris failed them, Morris was arrested
for driving under the influence.  
3)  Morris was indicted for driving “under the influence of alcohol,”
pursuant to 21 Del. C. §4177(a).  Before trial, the State learned that Morris
was planning to argue that he was not under the influence of alcohol on the
night in question, but instead was under the influence of prescription
medication.  On the morning of trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion
to amend the indictment to read “under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a
combination of both,” pursuant to the same code section.  Morris was
convicted and, because this was Morris’s seventh drug or alcohol related
driving conviction, he was sentenced as a class E felon pursuant to 21 Del. C.
§4177(d)(4)1.   
2 Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d 356 (Del. 1991).  
3 21 Del.C. § 4177(a).
4 21 Del. C. §4177(b)(3).  
5 Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d at 360.  
3
4)   Morris argues that the amendment to his indictment violated his right
to indictment by a grand jury.  We review this claim of legal error de novo. 2
Subsection (a) of the relevant statute provides that: “No person shall drive a
vehicle: (1) when the person is under the influence of alcohol; (2) when the
person is under the influence of any drug; (3) when the person is under the
influence of a combination of alcohol and any drug. . .”3  The statute continues:
“the charging document may allege a violation of subsection (a) without
specifying any particular subparagraph of subsection (a) and the prosecution
may seek a conviction under any of the subparagraphs of subsection (a).”4  
5) It is settled law that an indictment may be amended by the Court “as
to matters of form,... so long as no new, additional, or different charge is
made thereby and the accused will not suffer prejudice to substantial rights.”5
Although Morris’s indictment was amended to include the possibility of a
different impairing substance, the amendment did not change the elements of
the crime, because the identity of the impairing substance is immaterial under
§4177.  Since the charge was not changed by the amendment, there was no
error in allowing it.  
6 446 U.S. 222 (1980)
7  Nichols  v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994).  
4
6)  Morris also argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in using
his prior misdemeanor convictions to enhance his sentence.  Morris relies on
Baldasar v. Illinois,6 a United States Supreme Court decision holding that a
defendant’s 6th amendment right to counsel was violated when his prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction was used for sentence enhancement.  The
Supreme Court overruled Baladasar in Nichols v. U.S.:
Today we adhere to Scott v. Illinois, supra, and overrule
Baldasar. Accordingly we hold, consistent with the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term
was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a
subsequent conviction.7  
The trial court correctly concluded that, under Nichols,  Morris’s sentence was
subject to enhancement under §4177(d)(4).  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.  
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
  Justice