Case Title: Lewis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45S00-1601-LW-32

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Marce Gonzalez, Jr. 
Dyer, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Kelly A. Loy 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 45S00-1601-LW-32 
ROBERT LEWIS, III, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the Lake County Superior Court, No. 45G03-1104-MR-3 
The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell, Judge 
October 4, 2016 
Massa, Justice. 
Robert Lewis, III was convicted by a unanimous jury of murder, murder in the perpetration 
of criminal deviate conduct, criminal deviate conduct, and resisting law enforcement.  The State 
sought a sentence of life without parole pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9 (2008).  In the 
penalty phase, the same jury was subsequently unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to whether 
the State had proven its charged aggravating circumstance.  The trial court nonetheless sentenced 
Lewis to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the count of murder in the 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 04 2016, 11:01 am
 
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perpetration of criminal deviate conduct, an additional three years’ imprisonment for resisting law 
enforcement, and vacated the remaining counts.  In a previous appeal, we affirmed the convictions 
in all respects, but remanded to the trial court for a revised sentencing order as to the judge’s 
personal conclusion that life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence.  Lewis v. State, 34 
N.E.3d 240 (Ind. 2015).  The trial court affirmed the sentence on remand, and Lewis again appeals, 
on grounds not previously raised, that imposition of a life sentence violated the Sixth Amendment 
because the sole aggravating factor supporting the sentence was not determined by the trier of fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt during the penalty phase.  The State does not contest this previously-
overlooked argument, and agrees that this Court should “reverse the sentence and, as it has done 
in the past, remand to the trial court to hold a new sentencing hearing and sentence Lewis to a term 
of years.”  State’s Br. at 11. 
We agree that our precedent requires that imposition of a sentence of life without parole 
was reversible error by the trial court under these circumstances.  “When a jury is unable to reach 
a unanimous decision as to the existence of an aggravating circumstance and the Sixth Amendment 
prohibits the trial judge from imposing a sentence of life without possibility of parole under 
subsection 9(f) of the sentencing statute, a new penalty phase trial is required.”  Kiplinger v. State, 
922 N.E.2d 1261, 1265–66 (Ind. 2010) (footnotes and internal citations omitted).  In Kiplinger, it 
remained an open question whether the State would seek a new penalty phase trial in order to 
maintain its request for a life sentence, and thus remand to the trial court was the appropriate result.  
Id.  Here, however, the State concedes it will no longer seek a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole against Lewis, though it still requests remand for resentencing to a term of 
years.  Lewis initially requested that this Court exercise its appellate authority to resentence him 
directly to a term of years, but withdrew that request in favor of remand in light of the State’s 
concession.  But given the length of the prison terms at issue in the absence of a life sentence, and 
that Lewis is already 43 years of age, we concur with Lewis’s initial request, and in the interests 
of judicial economy exercise our appellate prerogative to resentence him to a term of years.  See 
 
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Dennis v. State, 908 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind. 2009) (converting sentence of life without parole to a 
term of 65 years, resulting in total aggregate sentence of 190 years).1 
Lewis was convicted of murder, murder in the perpetration of criminal deviate conduct, 
criminal deviate conduct as a Class A felony (since it resulted in serious bodily injury), and 
resisting law enforcement as a Class D felony.  But we may not give sentences on all four of these 
counts without running afoul of the double jeopardy restrictions in the Indiana Constitution, as 
there is a reasonable possibility that the jury may have used the same evidentiary facts to convict 
Lewis of the essential elements of multiple of these charges.  See Gross v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1136, 
1139 (Ind. 2002), Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999).  Accordingly, we revise 
Lewis’s sentences to 65 years for murder, Indiana Code sections 35-42-1-1(1) (2008) and 
35-50-2-3(a) (2008), 20 years for criminal deviate conduct as a Class B felony, Indiana Code 
sections 35-42-4-2(a) and 35-50-2-5, sustain his prior sentence of 3 years for resisting law 
enforcement, Indiana Code sections 35-44-3-3(b) and 35-50-2-7(a) and vacate his conviction for 
felony murder in the perpetration of criminal deviate conduct.2  Moreover, given the depravity of 
these crimes (as detailed in our previous opinion, see Lewis, 34 N.E.3d at 242–45), we further 
order each of these terms to run consecutively, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c) 
                                                 
1 The Court is fully aware that it rejected an identical argument in Lewis’s first appeal, see Lewis v. State, 
34 N.E.3d 240, 249 n.9 (Ind. 2015).  But since this matter has already been remanded once, the trial judge 
expressed her personal belief on remand that a life sentence would be appropriate (Appellant’s Br. at 15), 
and the sentence is being converted to a term of years, we believe the facts in the present appeal are now 
much more closely aligned with those in Dennis, warranting direct appellate resentencing. 
2 See Hulfachor v. State, 735 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. 2000) (“[W]hen a defendant stands convicted of murder, 
felony murder, and an additional [underlying] felony, the felony murder should be vacated and the murder 
conviction should remain.  To hold otherwise would permit a person who commits an intentional murder 
while committing another felony to use the felony murder rule to escape punishment for the underlying 
felony.  This simply cannot be.”) (quoting Fuller v. State, 639 N.E.2d 344, 347–48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 
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(2008), for a total term of 88 years.  We remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to 
impose these sentences, and for all other proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.