Case Title: State, Dept. of Family Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services v. DDM

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-93-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
State, Dept. of Family Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services v. DDM1994 WY 70877 P.2d 259Case Number: C-93-6Decided: 06/29/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE 
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND 
SOCIAL SERVICES; and STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., BJC, a minor child, 

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

 

 v. 

 

DDM, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County: The Honorable Hunter Patrick, 
JudgeRepresenting Appellants: Frank D. Peasley and Kari Jo 
Gray of Gray & Associates, Douglas, WY. Representing 
Appellee: P. Jaye Rippley of Brown & Drew, Casper, WY.Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, J. 
Ret. CARDINE, 
Justice.[¶1]  The Department 
of Family Services (DFS) appeals from a district court order awarding attorney 
fees to DDM, who successfully defended an allegation of paternity. DFS claims 
that attorney fees are not statutorily authorized against it and, in the 
alternative, the award in this case was unreasonable.[¶2]  We affirm.[¶3]  DFS frames the issues for review as 
follows: 

I. 
Did the trial court err in assessing a putative father's attorney fees and costs 
against the State of Wyoming Department of Family Services under Wyoming 
Statutes § 14-2-114 (1977 as amended) in a child support establishment action 
brought by that Department pursuant to congressional mandate as implemented 
under the Wyoming Child Support Enforcement Act, Wyoming Statutes §§ 20-6-101 
through 109 (as amended)? II. In a paternity action brought by the 
State of Wyoming pursuant to the Child Support Enforcement Act, is it 
unreasonable for the trial court to award fees and costs to a putative lather 
and against the State under Wyoming Statutes § 14-2-114 (1977 as amended) when 
it has been established that the putative lather had sexual access to the mother 
at the time of conception and the action is dismissed immediately following the 
filing of genetic test results excluding the putative 
father?

 FACTS[¶4]  The facts are brief and uncontroverted. 
On November 24, 1992, DFS filed a Petition to Establish Paternity and Support 
for a minor child against DDM and JAD. The mother of the child did not know who 
the father was but had narrowed the possibilities down to DDM and JAD. DDM and 
JAD both admitted to having sexual access to the mother at the time of 
conception.[¶5]  DDM and JAD 
agreed to have genetic tests taken to determine if either was the father. The 
genetic tests eliminated both JAD and DDM as possible fathers. The district 
court then dismissed the action against them.[¶6]  DDM then filed a motion for reasonable 
attorney fees and costs which the district court granted in the amount of $ 
601.97. The district court based its award on W.S. 1-14-126(b) (1993 Cum.Supp.) 
and W.S. 14-2-114 (1993 Cum.Supp.). DFS now appeals that 
award.DISCUSSION[¶7]  We begin with the language of the 
statutes at issue. Wyoming Statute 1-14-126(b) provides: 

In 
civil actions for which an award of attorney's fees is authorized, 
the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party without requiring expert testimony. In exercising its 
discretion the court may consider the following factors: 

(i) 
The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; (ii) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular 
employment precluded other employment by the lawyer; (iii) The fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services; (iv) The amount involved and the results 
obtained; (v) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances; (vi) The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; (vii) The experience, reputation and 
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
and (viii) Whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent.

 (emphasis 
added). Wyoming Statute 14-2-114 states that 

the 
court may order reasonable fees of counsel, experts and the child's guardian ad 
litem, and other costs of the action and pretrial proceedings including genetic 
tests, to be paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the 
court.

Wyoming 
Statute 1-14-126(b) permits a court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees 
to a prevailing party in civil actions when such an award is authorized. The 
question we confront is whether W.S. 14-2-114 authorizes an award of attorney 
fees against DFS. Our answer depends on whether or not DFS is a "party" as that 
word is used in the statute.[¶8]  
Wyoming Statute 14-2-114 allows a court to impose costs, including 
reasonable fees of counsel, on the pares "in proportions and at times determined 
by the court." DFS correctly points out that "parties" is not defined in the 
statute or anywhere else in the Wyoming Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 to -120. 
DFS claims that it is not a party but rather a "functionary" in the sense that 
it has no choice or interest in the action but it must, by law, attempt to 
establish the paternity of children whose mothers receive state financial 
assistance. See W.S. 20-6-101 et seq. (Wyoming Child Support 
Enforcement Act). DFS also points to W.S. 14-2-107 to support its position, 
claiming that the statute limits "parties" to the natural mother, the presumed 
lathers and the alleged fathers.[¶9]  DDM counters that the Wyoming Parentage 
Act, read in its entirety, provides for the State to be a party. DDM also notes 
that DFS has an interest in the matter because a determination of paternity in a 
father reduces the amount of support the State is required to pay. Finally, DDM 
argues that the State is a party because it had standing to bring this action 
and DFS identified itself in its petition as a "party."[¶10]  Since the disputed word "parties" in § 
14-2-114 is subject to varying interpretations in this context, we turn to 
extrinsic aids of interpretation. See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game 
& Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993). 

In 
connection with judicial proceedings the term "parties" is a technical word 
which has a precise meaning in legal parlance. It designates the opposing 
litigants in a judicial proceeding -- the persons seeking to establish a right 
and those upon whom it is sought to impose a corresponding duty or liability; it 
includes all the persons by whom or against whom a suit, either at law or 
in equity, is brought.

59 
Am.Jur.2d Parties § 7 (1987). A "party" has also been defined as one who 
"is directly interested in the subject matter of the suit or some part thereof, 
who has a right to make defenses, control proceedings and examine and 
cross-examine the witnesses." Helge v. Druke, 136 Ariz. 434, 666 P.2d 534, 537 (Ariz.App. 1983) citing Chalpin v. Mobile Gardens, Inc., 18 
Ariz. App. 231, 501 P.2d 407 (Ariz.App. 1972).[¶11]  In this case, DFS initiated the action 
by filing the petition alleging DDM's paternity. DFS's attorney signed the 
stipulation for genetic testing and the order approving the tests. The attorney 
also filed the motion to dismiss the action against DDM after the tests were 
negative. DFS is listed as a petitioner in the captions of documents filed in 
the district court, including those filed by its counsel. Clearly, DFS 
participated in and exercised control over the proceedings below. There can be 
no doubt that DFS was a party.[¶12]  Furthermore, DFS was a "real party in 
interest" since it stood to benefit if the father could have been 
identified. Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 202, 209, 97 P.2d 667, 669 
(1940) ("[a] 'real party in interest' is one who has an actual and substantial 
interest in the subject * * * *."). A mother, as prerequisite to receiving state 
aid, is required to assign to DFS any support obligations to which she is 
entitled. W.S. 20-6-106(a).[¶13]  
DFS's assertion that it is not a party because it was required by statute 
to bring this action is irrelevant to whether DFS is a party. While the degree 
of discretion accorded an agency may affect the decision to file an action, it 
does not relate in any way to the status of the agency once the action has been 
filed in court. An agency cannot bring an action and then claim it is not a 
party. See Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Council, 869 P.2d 435, 438-39 (Wyo. 1994).[¶14]  DFS also asserts that attorney fees 
cannot be imposed against it because there is no statute which specifically 
authorizes such an award. While a statute that waives sovereign immunity is 
strictly construed to favor the government, we conclude that the statute in 
question, W.S. 14-2-114, authorizes an award of attorney fees against DFS. See 
Powder River, at 439.[¶15]  
Wyoming Statute 14-2-114 allows an award of attorney fees against "the 
parties in proportions and at times determined by the court." The Wyoming 
Parentage Act contemplates that DFS will be a party to some actions under the 
title. W.S. 14-2-104(c) (1993 Cum.Supp.). We have already found that DFS was a 
party to this action. Therefore, we conclude that § 14-2-114 authorizes an award 
against DFS.[¶16]  This cane 
is analogous to Powder River. The statute at issue in that case referred 
only to a "party" and did not make specific reference to the State or the 
agency. Id., at 437-38. We concluded that, in part, the plain meaning of 
that statute authorized the Department of Environmental Quality to make an award 
of attorney fees against itself in the appropriate circumstances. Id., at 
439. Similarly, W.S. 14-2-114 authorizes an award of attorney fees against 
DFS.[¶17]  Finally, DFS 
argues that even if an award is authorized, the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees to DDM in this case. Essentially DFS 
argues that any award against it is unreasonable because it does not have any 
discretion in bringing the action, it must rely on what the mother told them and 
DDM should not be allowed to "benefit" from extra-marital sex -- he should 
accept the consequences of his act including the possibility of a paternity 
action. DFS also suggests that DDM was not a "prevailing party" under W.S. 
1-14-126(b).[¶18]  We review 
an award of attorney fees under an abuse of discretion standard. LC v. 
TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo. 1994). 

A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an 
error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances.

 Martinez 
v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980). See also LC, 870 P.2d  at 
381, and Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Wyo. 
1981).[¶19]  The district 
court did not give any reasons for its award. However, we find that the award 
was reasonable in amount and that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion. There can be no doubt that DDM was a "prevailing party" -- he 
avoided being adduced the father and becoming responsible for all the 
obligations that determination would entail. We are not persuaded by the policy 
arguments of DFS and conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting them.CONCLUSION[¶20]  DFS was a party to the action, and W.S. 
14-2-114 authorized an award of attorney fees against it. The district court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorney fees to DDM. Therefore, the 
district court's decision is affirmed.