Case Title: Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 103672

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,672 
 
AEROFLEX WICHITA, INC., 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
KENNETH W. FILARDO and CHRIS ALLEN, Defendants, and 
TEL-INSTRUMENT ELECTRONICS CORP., 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
A district court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
filed under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) may choose from several procedures for 
handling the motion. Before trial, the district court may determine the outcome based on 
the pleadings; it may determine the outcome based on affidavits alone; it may permit 
discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of 
the motion. Additionally, rather than make a pretrial determination, the court may await 
the trial on the merits with the fact issues being left to the jury for determination, and it 
should do so if the issue of jurisdiction is dependent upon a decision on the merits.  
 
2. 
 
When a defendant's K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction is decided before trial on the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, and 
other written materials without an evidentiary hearing, any factual disputes must be 
resolved in the plaintiff's favor and the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction. 
 
2 
 
3. 
 
A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a ruling on a K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 60-212(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
 
4. 
 
Kansas' long-arm jurisdiction statute, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b), is to be 
liberally construed to allow the exercise of jurisdiction to the outer limits allowed under 
due process. Accordingly, a case should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction as being 
outside the scope of the statute, unless by no reasonable construction of the language 
could it be said to fall within the statute's terms. 
 
5. 
 
When specific jurisdiction is asserted under Kansas' long-arm statute, K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 60-308(b), due process requires that the nonresident defendant have certain 
minimum contacts with the forum in order for the exercise of jurisdiction to be 
constitutional. In considering whether the defendant's minimum contacts meet this 
standard, courts should consider the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in 
determining whether it is reasonable and fair to require a defense in the forum, rendering 
jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Due 
process requires a demonstration that the nonresident defendant purposely established 
minimum contacts with the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws. 
 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DOUGLAS R. ROTH, judge. Opinion filed April 27, 2012. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
James D. Oliver, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Jay F. Fowler 
and Timothy B. Mustaine, of the same firm, of Wichita, were on the briefs for appellant Aeroflex Wichita, 
Inc. 
 
3 
 
 
F. James Robinson, Jr., of Hite, Fanning, & Honeyman, L.L.P., of Wichita, argued the cause, and 
Scott M. Hill, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellee Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  After allowing discovery on the issue of whether Kansas courts 
could exercise personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants in this case, the district 
court granted defendant Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp.'s (TIC) motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal from that decision, the parties 
dispute the correct standard for judging a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction filed under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) when that motion is decided after 
discovery and after submission of supporting affidavits, documents, and deposition 
excerpts but without an evidentiary hearing. We hold that plaintiff Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. 
(Aeroflex), as the party with the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction and as the 
party responding to a motion to dismiss presented to the district court without an 
evidentiary hearing, need only establish a prima facie basis for jurisdiction. In 
determining if that prima facie burden has been met, a district court should view factual 
disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and an appellate court 
applies the same standard de novo.  
 
 
Applying that standard, we determine that the district court erred by weighing the 
evidence rather than granting all favorable inferences to Aeroflex. Aeroflex presented a 
prima facie case of jurisdiction based on a conspiracy between TIC and its codefendants, 
over whom the court has jurisdiction. This prima facie showing provides a basis to 
conclude (1) there was an agreement to steal trade secrets and other proprietary 
information from Aeroflex and (2) there were acts performed in Kansas by the 
coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, we reverse the district 
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.  
 
4 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
This lawsuit arose out of a multimillion-dollar contract awarded in 2009 to TIC by 
the United States Army. The contract related to a high-technology radar-transponder test 
system. Both TIC and Aeroflex participated in a competitive bid contest that led to the 
2009 contract. Before the 2009 contract, the system had been manufactured for the Army 
by Aeroflex.  
 
 
As early as 2002, it was known the Army was planning to solicit bids for an 
upgrade to the system that Aeroflex had been manufacturing. By at least that point in 
time, Aeroflex began working on an upgrade. From 2005 to 2006, the Army issued three 
sole-source proposals for Aeroflex to provide the upgraded system. The first proposal 
was cancelled, and the second was negotiated but never awarded. After the third request 
for proposal, TIC protested the decision to issue a sole-source contract, asserting it had 
the capability to perform the upgrade. The Army reviewed TIC's protest and ultimately 
opened the contract award process to competition.  
 
 
Soon after the Army's decision, TIC hired two Aeroflex employees. First, TIC 
hired Chris Allen as its Director of Marketing. According to Aeroflex, Allen had 
"intimate knowledge" of the pricing structure for the system. He was also aware of and 
had been involved in the design process as well as the preparation of Aeroflex's previous 
proposals to the Army. Second, just a few months after hiring Allen, TIC hired Kenneth 
Filardo as its Director of Engineering. Filardo had been the chief design authority for 
Aeroflex's work on the upgrade. According to Aeroflex, Filardo had been "intimately 
involved in each facet of the design, development and manufacture of the . . . test sets and 
their upgrades" and had played a "key role" in the development of Aeroflex's proposals to 
the Army.  
 
5 
 
 
Allen and Filardo had each signed an Aeroflex "Employee Patent, Copyright, and 
Non-Disclosure Agreement." Upon their resignations from Aeroflex, Aeroflex sent letters 
to each of them and reminded them of the agreement.   
 
Approximately 1 year later, the Army solicited proposals for the upgrade kits. 
After 6 months of review and negotiation, the Army awarded the contract to TIC. 
Aeroflex filed a protest of the contract award, alleging in part that TIC had stolen its trade 
secrets. The protest led to an investigation and report by the Army to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) rejecting Aeroflex's claim.  
 
 
Aeroflex then filed this lawsuit. In a verified petition, Aeroflex alleged Filardo and 
Allen breached their nondisclosure agreements with Aeroflex. As to TIC, Aeroflex 
alleged TIC could not have economically developed or manufactured an upgrade without 
using Aeroflex's trade secrets and confidential and proprietary information. Aeroflex 
alleged claims of misappropriation of Aeroflex's trade secrets, tortious interference with 
Aeroflex's business relationships, and civil conspiracy against all three defendants.  
 
 
In asserting a basis for a Kansas court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants, the verified petition alleged Filardo is, and at all times material to the lawsuit 
has been, a Kansas resident. Aeroflex acknowledged that Allen had been an Arizona 
resident since 2003, but it alleged his many contacts with Kansas through his 
employment with Aeroflex were sufficient for the court to have personal jurisdiction over 
him. The petition also stated:  "Filardo, Allen, and TIC . . . intentionally targeted 
Aeroflex Wichita, whose headquarters and facilities they knew to be located in Kansas, 
and knew that these actions, if successful in their aims, would cause economic injury in 
Kansas to Aeroflex Wichita." 
 
 
After being served with the petition, TIC specially appeared and challenged 
personal jurisdiction by filing under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) the motion to 
6 
 
dismiss that is the subject of this appeal. Before ruling on the motion, the district court 
permitted limited discovery, ordering that Aeroflex "may take depositions on the 
jurisdictional issue of defendant Kenneth Filardo, of defendant [TIC], under K.S.A. 60-
230(b)(5), and a corporate representative . . . regarding business activities of [TIC], in 
Kansas." Later, after limited discovery confirmed that Filardo had been working for TIC 
from his Kansas residence approximately 1 week per month, the district court allowed 
additional discovery relating to Filardo's time sheets.  
 
 
 
At the completion of discovery, Aeroflex responded to the motion to dismiss by 
arguing the district court had jurisdiction under the Kansas long-arm statute, specifically 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b)(1)(A), (B), and (E), in that TIC transacted business in 
Kansas, committed a tortious act in Kansas, and entered into a contract with a Kansas 
resident to be performed at least in part in Kansas. Affidavits and documents were 
attached to the written arguments. In addition, Aeroflex sought permission to file an 
amended petition. The district court allowed the filing of the amended petition but 
granted TIC's motion to dismiss.  
 
In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court considered TIC's contacts with 
Kansas, finding: 
 
"15. 
TIC is a publicly traded company that has only two Kansas shareholders 
accounting for less than 1% of its outstanding shares. It has and maintains no facilities, 
offices, leases, property, accounts, licenses, operations or employees in Kansas. . . . 
"16. 
TIC has never focused sales efforts toward Kansas customers, targeted 
advertisements or bulk e-mail in Kansas, or advertised in Kansas. No employees travel to 
Kansas to conduct business. It generates virtually no revenue from Kansas (.12% in 2007 
and .33% in 2008) and it is not subject to Kansas taxation." 
 
7 
 
The district court also found that Allen performed no work for TIC in Kansas. 
Filardo on the other hand did perform work on TIC's proposal from his Kansas residence, 
although "the exact amount can't be determined."  
 
 
The district court then drew the legal conclusion that Aeroflex failed to make a 
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over TIC. In reaching this conclusion the 
court determined the alleged causes of action did not arise out of any business 
transactions in Kansas, Aeroflex "failed to make a prima facie showing that the causes of 
action arose from the commission of a tortious act in Kansas," and that TIC did not enter 
into a contract with a Kansas resident "for some or the entire contract to be performed in 
Kansas." With regard to the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets as it relates to 
jurisdiction, the court also found Aeroflex did not show that Filardo committed an act in 
Kansas in furtherance of the conspiracy or that TIC purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in Kansas. Finally, the district court found Aeroflex 
failed to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable under due process 
requirements.  
 
 
Although the district court granted TIC's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
Filardo and Allen remain as defendants. Filardo, a Kansas resident, did not raise a 
challenge to personal jurisdiction. And although Allen, an Arizona resident, did challenge 
personal jurisdiction, the district court found personal jurisdiction existed because Allen 
was sued for actions arising under an employment contract entered into with a Kansas 
resident (Aeroflex) and at least partially performed in Kansas.  
 
 
Aeroflex appeals the district court's dismissal of the case against TIC. The case 
against Filardo and Allen was subsequently stayed by the district court, pending this 
appeal. This court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-3018(c) (transfer by this court).  
 
 
8 
 
STANDARD BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT  
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Before discussing the substance of the parties' arguments, we must determine the 
standard or test that controlled the district court's determination of whether Kansas could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over TIC. This determination requires us to decide which 
party had the burden of persuasion and the nature of that burden. Then, we must 
determine the standard that applies to our review of the district court's determination of 
whether that standard or test was met.  
 
The parties seem to agree that the standard or test may vary, depending on the 
procedural posture of the motion, that is whether the motion is considered before 
discovery, after discovery, or after an evidentiary hearing. There is very little discussion 
of these various procedures in Kansas law or of the standard or test to be applied in each 
situation.  
 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2), the provision under which TIC's motion was 
filed, provides no assistance. It does not indicate whether the decision is limited to the 
pleadings or whether matters outside the pleadings may be considered and, if so, what 
standard applies. Another portion of the statute, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(d), applies to 
some motions to dismiss where matters outside the pleadings are considered, but its 
application is limited to motions filed pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) 
(failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) or K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-
212(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings). TIC's motion pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 60-212(b)(2) is not included.  
 
Kansas' statute is not unique in this regard. In fact, Kansas' statute is patterned 
after Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Without direct guidance in Rule 
12(b)(2), federal courts have defined procedures and the applicable standards for 
9 
 
considering motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We turn to these federal 
decisions for persuasive guidance, as we have on other occasions when considering 
issues relating to civil procedure. See Back-Wenzel v. Williams, 279 Kan. 346, 349, 109 
P.3d 1194 (2005).  
 
Many federal cases, including decisions of the United States Supreme Court, have 
recognized that federal district courts have wide discretion in determining the most 
appropriate mechanism for resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
See Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 487 U.S. 72, 79, 108 S. Ct. 2268, 
101 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1988) (recognizing a court's "inherent and legitimate authority" to issue 
orders of discovery and other orders as necessary for the court to determine jurisdiction); 
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
253 (1978) ("where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to 
ascertain the facts bearing on such issues"); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S. Ct. 
725, 83 L. Ed. 1111 (1939) ("As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an 
issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court."); see also 5B 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil § 1351 (3d ed. 2004) (5B 
Wright, § 1351), p. 305 ("When a federal court is considering a challenge to its 
jurisdiction over a defendant or over some form of property, the district judge has 
considerable procedural leeway in choosing a methodology for deciding the motion.").  
 
Exercising this discretion, the district court may choose from several procedures 
for handling a motion to dismiss. Before trial, the district court may determine the 
outcome based on the pleadings; "'on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit 
discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of 
the motion.' [Citation omitted.]" Serras v. First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n, 875 F.2d 
1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989); see 5B Wright, § 1351, pp. 305 & 308-09. Additionally, 
rather than make a pretrial determination, the court "may await the trial on the merits 
with the fact issues being left to the jury for determination." 5B Wright, § 1351, pp. 308-
10 
 
09. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the determination should 
be deferred until trial if the issue of jurisdiction is dependent upon a decision on the 
merits. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, 67 S. Ct. 1009, 91 L. Ed. 1209 (1947). As the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he purpose of postponing a 
determination upon a jurisdictional question when it is tied to the actual merits of the case 
is to prevent a summary decision on the merits without the ordinary incidents of a trial 
including the right to jury. [Citations omitted.]" Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d 143, 149 
(10th Cir. 1965). We hold that these same principles apply in Kansas.  
 
In this case, the district court chose to make a pretrial determination after 
discovery and supplementation of the record with written evidence and affidavits. TIC 
suggests in that procedural circumstance a plaintiff must establish the requirements for 
personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, it argues, if discovered 
evidence is presented to the district court, the court can weigh conflicting evidence and 
make factual findings related to jurisdiction. Finally, TIC argues that because the district 
court made "findings" based on such discovery "evidence," regardless of the fact that 
information consisted of "written materials," this court should give deference to those 
findings and examine whether the district court's factual findings were supported by 
substantial competent evidence.  
 
To support its arguments, TIC cites cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 1998) ("[I]n 
situations where the parties are permitted to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional issue 
a plaintiff must prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."); see 
also Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges, 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 
(D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 70); In re Vitamins Antitrust 
Litigation, 270 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) ("[p]laintiffs must establish personal 
jurisdiction . . . by a preponderance of the evidence"); BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior 
Court, 190 Cal. App. 4th 421, 429, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914 (2010) ("If the jurisdictional 
11 
 
facts are conflicting, we review the lower court's factual determinations for substantial 
evidence, but still review its legal conclusions de novo."); State ex rel. Cooper v. 
Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 188 N.C. App. 302, 304, 655 S.E.2d 446 (2008) (Where 
district court denies motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and makes 
findings of fact, "review is limited to whether the . . . court's findings of fact are 
supported by competent evidence in the record and whether the conclusions of law are 
supported by the findings of fact.").  
 
Aeroflex, on the other hand, argues it only needed to present a prima facie case 
and the district court should have considered the record in the light most favorable to 
Aeroflex in resolving the motion. To support this argument, Aeroflex cites federal cases, 
cases from other states, and decisions of this court that apply this standard. The various 
federal cases on which Aeroflex relies represent "[t]he most common formulation found 
in the [federal] judicial opinions," which is that the plaintiff "needs only make a prima 
facie showing when the district judge restricts her review of the Rule 12(b)(2) motion 
solely to affidavits and other written evidence." 5B Wright, § 1351, pp. 275 & 286-88.  
 
In other words, the authority cited by TIC is a minority view. Further, the rationale 
of the minority line of cases has been criticized. For example, Hazard, Jung, and In re 
Vitamins Litigation have been called into question because the analysis relied on a 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision that has subsequently been "clarified." See 
Heller v. Nicholas Applegate Capital Management, 498 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107-08 (D.D.C. 
2007) (citing In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, 245 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124-25 [D.D.C. 
2003]) (criticizing Hazard line of cases and, after discussing caselaw from other circuits, 
adopting "'factually documented'" prima facie standard). In the clarifying opinion, the 
Second Circuit held that the preponderance standard applies only if the district court has 
already held an evidentiary hearing. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 
84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 
12 
 
The Second Circuit's holding in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. is consistent with most 
other federal cases. As one court stated, it is only when the court conducts an evidentiary 
hearing to determine disputed issues of fact and weighs credibility that the burden "quite 
properly increases" to "the same standard that would obtain if the matter were deferred to 
trial:  the preponderance of the evidence." Serras, 875 F.2d at 1214; see 5B Wright, § 
1351, p. 287. Under these cases, the fact that discovery has been conducted relating to 
jurisdiction does not determine the burden; the determining factor is whether there has 
been an evidentiary hearing. See 5B Wright, § 1351. 
 
If we apply these federal cases, Aeroflex has the burden to establish a prima facie 
case of jurisdiction. "[F]or purposes of such a review, federal courts will, as they do on 
other motions under Rule 12(b), take as true the allegations of the nonmoving party with 
regard to the jurisdictional issues and resolve all factual disputes in his or her favor." 5B 
Wright, § 1351, pp. 288 & 299. 
 
Several states have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., Planning Group v. Lake 
Mathews Mineral, 226 Ariz. 262, 264 n.1, 246 P.3d 343 (2011) (stating when there is no 
evidentiary hearing regarding lack of personal jurisdiction, appellate court reviews 
district court's decision and factual findings de novo, viewing facts in light most 
favorable to plaintiff but accepting as true uncontroverted facts put forward by 
defendant); Home Depot Supply v. Hunter Management, LLC., 289 Ga. App. 286, 286, 
656 S.E.2d 898 (2008) (where motion decided without evidentiary hearing and based 
solely upon the written submissions of the parties, any disputes of fact must be resolved 
in the light most favorable to the party asserting the existence of personal jurisdiction, 
and appellate court exercises de novo review); Evans v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 
(Ind. App. 2009) ("'The standard of appellate review of rulings on motions to dismiss on 
jurisdictional grounds depends on whether the trial court resolved disputed facts, and if 
so, whether the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing or ruled on a paper record.' 
13 
 
 . . . Here, the trial court's decision is based on a paper record. Thus, our review is de 
novo."). 
 
This multistate view is consistent with the decisions of this court. Although this 
court has not specifically outlined the procedures available to a district court for 
resolution of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and has not addressed 
whether the burden of persuasion varies depending on the procedure, this court has 
stated: 
 
"Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law. [Citation omitted.] The plaintiff 
bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Where, as here, 
the issue of personal jurisdiction is decided pretrial on the basis of the pleadings, 
affidavits, and other written materials, any factual disputes must be resolved in the 
plaintiff's favor and the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." 
(Emphasis added.) Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 282 Kan. 433, 439, 146 P.3d 162 
(2006). 
 
In earlier cases, we have also held that "'when a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
is decided on the basis of affidavits and other written materials, the plaintiff need only 
make a prima facie showing.'" In re Hesston Corp., 254 Kan. 941, 954, 870 P.2d 17 
(1994).  
 
 
This standard is not only consistent with the common approach in federal courts 
and in the courts of other states, it is consistent with this court's caselaw in contexts other 
than personal jurisdiction. We have generally applied a preponderance of the evidence 
standard where the district court has the power to weigh and evaluate the evidence in the 
same manner as if it were adjudicating the case on the merits and making findings of fact 
based on a weighing of the credibility of the evidence. See In re Estate of Ewers, 206 
Kan. 623, 626, 481 P.2d 970 (1971). In contrast, when presented with affidavits, the 
parties do not have the ability to test evidence through cross-examination, and the district 
14 
 
court does not have the opportunity to judge credibility and does not take on the role of 
factfinder. Generally, "[i]n determining whether a prima facie showing has been made, 
the district court is not acting as a factfinder." Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 
671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Estate of Draper v. Bank of America, 288 Kan. 510, 
517, 205 P.3d 698 (2009) (recognizing general rule that appellate court construes written 
documents de novo and without regard to district court's ruling); Cranford v. State, 39 
Kan. App. 2d 12, 18, 176 P.3d 972, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1176 (2008) (Malone, J., 
concurring) (questioning ability to review for substantial competent evidence when the 
preliminary hearing is nonevidentiary and advocating de novo review).  
 
 
Further, the view that the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff (the nonmovant) is consistent with the standard applied to motions filed 
under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) where matters outside the pleadings are 
considered. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(d) (summary judgment standard applies); see 
Thomas v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 293 Kan. 208, 227, 262 P.3d 336 (2011) 
(when considering summary judgment motion, district judge must consider evidence in 
light most favorable to nonmoving party); Wachter Management Co. v. Dexter & 
Chaney, Inc., 282 Kan. 365, 368, 144 P.3d 747 (2006) (K.S.A. 60-212[b][3] motion 
regarding venue); Kluin v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 274 Kan. 888, 893, 56 P.3d 
829 (2002) (K.S.A. 60-212[b][2] motion regarding personal jurisdiction); see also 
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied 471 U.S. 1010 (1985) (if the parties present conflicting affidavits, the court 
resolves all factual disputes in plaintiff's favor; plaintiff's prima facie showing is 
sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by defendant); Environmental 
Ventures, Inc. v. Alda Services Corp., 19 Kan. App. 2d 292, 295, 868 P.2d 540 (1994) 
("The court may consider affidavits and documentary evidence in determining whether 
such a showing has been made but must give the plaintiff the benefit of all factual 
doubt.").  
 
15 
 
 
Hence, we reject TIC's arguments and conclude that, even though there was 
discovery, when a defendant's K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction is decided before trial on the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, 
and other written materials and without an evidentiary hearing, any factual disputes must 
be resolved in the plaintiff's favor and the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing 
of jurisdiction.  
 
 
Next, TIC argues Aeroflex cannot rely on allegations in the petition to meet this 
burden. It suggests that because there has been discovery, Aeroflex must present some 
evidence on every point required to establish the basis for jurisdiction over TIC. This 
position is not consistent with our decision in In re Hesston, where we stated:   
 
"'"The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are 
uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the parties present conflicting affidavits, 
all factual disputes are resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the plaintiff's prima facie 
showing is sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving party."' 
[Citations omitted.]" In re Hesston, 254 Kan. at 954 (quoting Rambo v. American 
Southern Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1417 [10th Cir. 1988]). 
 
Applying this procedure, the district court could consider the allegations in 
Aeroflex's petition unless TIC controverts the allegation with an affidavit or other 
evidence. If TIC controverts the allegation, Aeroflex must come forward with some 
evidence in rebuttal. Then, the district court considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Aeroflex rather than weighing conflicting evidence. 
 
If a district court's decision regarding a K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is appealed, an appellate court reviews the 
district court's determination under a de novo standard. See Merriman, 282 Kan. at 439; 
Kluin, 274 Kan. at 893; In re Hesston, 254 Kan. at 954-55; see also 5B Wright, § 1351, p. 
314 ("[A] district court's dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is reviewed de novo by the 
16 
 
court of appeals for errors of law and with regard to the facts if the district court relied 
solely upon the pleadings and affidavits.").  
 
Here, although the district court stated Aeroflex needed only make a prima facie 
showing, it did not indicate that it considered the facts in the light most favorable to 
Aeroflex. In fact, the court's findings reflect that it weighed and found persuasive the 
facts contrary to Aeroflex's position. For example, the district court relied on the "fact the 
U.S. Army's investigative report rejected the plaintiff's claim." Yet, there is no suggestion 
that determination has any preclusive effect; it is just evidence. 
 
Recognizing we might conclude the district court weighed evidence, TIC presents 
an alternative argument justifying the district court's weighing of the evidence. 
Specifically, TIC suggests that Aeroflex acquiesced in the district court's treatment of the 
parties' submissions as a proffer of evidence in place of an evidentiary hearing. 
According to TIC, this acquiescence occurred when Aeroflex objected to TIC's 
suggestion that an evidentiary hearing should be held and suggested that instead the 
parties should be allowed to conduct additional discovery. To support its argument that a 
preponderance of the evidence standard may apply in such a situation, TIC cites Boit, 967 
F.2d 671. 
 
In Boit, the court recognized an evidentiary hearing does not require "evidence 
[be] 'taken orally in open court.' [Citation omitted.]" Boit, 967 F.2d at 676. As support for 
this conclusion, the court cited the federal equivalent to K.S.A. 60-243(d)―Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 43. The Kansas version states:  "When a motion relies on facts outside the record, 
the court may hear the matter on affidavits or on declarations pursuant to K.S.A. 53-601, 
and amendments thereto, or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on 
depositions." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-243(d).  
 
17 
 
Despite this provision, the Boit court noted there were several considerations 
relevant to the determination of whether the hearing would be conducted in this manner 
and an inappropriate application of these considerations could be an abuse of discretion. 
Among the factors to be considered is whether issues of credibility must be resolved. 
Boit, 967 F.2d at 676. A second consideration is whether the case could "preclude a party 
from asserting at trial—and before a jury if one has been demanded—contentions of fact 
contrary to what the district court found at the pretrial hearing." Boit, 967 F.2d at 677. 
The court noted that this concern was "[e]specially troubling . . . when, for example, 
long-arm jurisdiction depends on a finding that the claim on the merits arises out of the 
defendant's contacts with the forum state." Boit, 967 F.2d at 677. The constitutional right 
to a trial by jury "animates" these concerns, the court concluded. Boit, 967 F.2d at 677. A 
third consideration relates to how the proceeding will impact judicial efficiency, 
remembering that "'[j]udicial resources may be more efficiently deployed if the court 
holds but one [preponderance-of-the-evidence] hearing on the contested facts.' [Citation 
omitted.]." Boit, 967 F.2d at 677. A final consideration is whether postponing proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence until trial will allow proof "'in a coherent, orderly fashion 
and without the risk of prejudicing [plaintiff's] case on the merits.' [Citation omitted.]" 
Boit, 967 F.2d at 677. The court concluded:  "Concerns about troublesome implications 
of preponderance-of-the-evidence findings weigh heavily in favor of determining a 
motion to dismiss on the prima facie standard. [Citation omitted.]" Boit, 967 F.2d at 677. 
 
In this case, there is no indication the district court gave notice it was conducting a 
hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-243(d) or that the parties discussed the 
possibility. This brings into question whether there was acquiescence. Certainly, we 
cannot find an explicit statement by Aeroflex in which it acquiesced to such a 
proceeding. But it is not clear that acquiescence or notice is necessary.  
 
Nevertheless, even if we were to agree with the Boit court and conclude the 
district court conducted a K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-243(d) evidentiary hearing without 
18 
 
taking any testimony orally in open court, the various factors listed in Boit needed to be 
considered. Our review of the record does not reveal anything suggesting that the district 
court weighed any factors relating to whether it was appropriate to have conducted this 
type of hearing. Such a failure is an abuse of discretion. See Boit, 967 F.2d at 676-78; 
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 
(2012) (abuse of discretion may occur when court fails to apply correct law or consider 
ations).  
 
Further, many of the district court's conclusions, such as whether the defendants 
committed a tortious act and did so in Kansas, depend on the merits of the lawsuit. As we 
have noted, the caselaw suggests that in such circumstances the ruling on jurisdiction 
should most appropriately be deferred until a full trial on the merits. Consequently, we 
reject TIC's suggestions that the preponderance of evidence standard applies and that the 
district court was entitled to weigh evidence.  
 
In summary, if TIC presented evidence refuting a point necessary to a finding of 
jurisdiction, Aeroflex had to respond with some evidence but needed to only make a 
prima facie showing. In determining if Aeroflex met that burden, the evidence must be 
considered in the light most favorable to Aeroflex, as the party opposing the motion. 
With that standard in mind, we begin our de novo review of whether there was 
jurisdiction. 
 
LONG-ARM JURISDICTION 
 
Before discussing the specifics of the parties' submissions, it is helpful to examine 
what Aeroflex had to establish in order to make a prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction over TIC. Such a discussion necessarily begins with Aeroflex's claims. 
 
19 
 
In this regard, we first note that Aeroflex claims Kansas has specific, not general, 
jurisdiction over TIC. This distinction relates to the two broad types of personal 
jurisdiction a state can exercise. Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of 
action arising from or related to a defendant's actions within a forum state. Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
404 (1984); Merriman, 282 Kan. at 440. The Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 
60-308(b), defines when Kansas exercises specific jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant. Kluin, 274 Kan. at 896. General jurisdiction refers to the power of a state to 
adjudicate any cause of action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the 
cause of action arose. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9; see Kluin, 274 Kan. at 895.  
 
Second, Aeroflex alleges that TIC's conduct falls within the scope of Kansas' long-
arm statute, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b). Specifically, Aeroflex claims that TIC is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in Kansas by operation of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-
308(b)(1)(A), (B), and (E). The statute provides, in part: 
 
"(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent or instrumentality does any of the following acts, thereby submits the 
person and, if an individual, the individual's representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state for any claim for relief arising from the act: 
(A) Transacting any business in this state;  
(B) committing a tortious act in this state;  
. . . . 
(E) entering into an express or implied contract, by mail or otherwise, with a 
resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state." 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b)(1)(A), (B), and (E). 
 
This court has instructed that this statute is to be liberally construed to allow the 
exercise of jurisdiction to the outer limits allowed under due process. Kluin, 274 Kan. at 
894; Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 233 Kan. 324, 329, 662 P.2d 553 (1983). 
20 
 
Accordingly, "'[a] case should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction as being outside 
the scope of the statute, unless by no reasonable construction of the language could it be 
said to fall within the statute's terms.'" J.E.M. Corp. v. McClellan, 462 F. Supp. 1246, 
1250-51 (D. Kan. 1978) (quoting Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 Kan. L. 
Rev. 1, 45 [1971]). 
 
Finally, as it must do, Aeroflex argues the exercise of jurisdiction in this particular 
case comports with the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. See Volt Delta 
Resources, Inc. v. Devine, 241 Kan. 775, 779, 740 P.2d 1089 (1987); Schlatter, 233 Kan. 
at 329.  
 
COMMISSION OF TORTIOUS ACT IN KANSAS 
 
In its brief to this court, Aeroflex first contends that K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-
308(b)(1)(B) can provide the basis for personal jurisdiction on two grounds:  (1) TIC (or 
its agent or coconspirator Filardo) allegedly committed a tortious act in Kansas or (2) 
TIC's tortious act caused injury in Kansas. As to the first argument, Aeroflex asserts that 
TIC sought out Filardo while he was in Kansas; that Filardo acquired confidential and 
proprietary information, including trade secrets, from Aeroflex while he was in Kansas; 
and Filardo used these trade secrets while working in Kansas and in New Jersey. 
Aeroflex bases its second argument on its allegation of economic injury resulting at its 
principal place of business in Wichita.  
 
Conspiracy to Misappropriate Trade Secrets 
 
Aeroflex's first argument—that TIC and its agents committed a tortious act—
focuses on Aeroflex's claim that TIC and its agents misappropriated trade secrets. To 
establish this tort at trial, Aeroflex will have to prove the following elements of 
misappropriation of trade secrets:  (1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) a confidential 
21 
 
relationship between the parties, (3) disclosures by the plaintiff to the defendant 
concerning the trade secret, and (4) an unauthorized use of those disclosures by the 
defendant. See Koch Engineering Co., Inc. v. Faulconer, 227 Kan. 813, 826, 610 P.2d 
1094 (1980); Mann v. Tatge Chemical Co., Inc., 201 Kan. 326, 332, 440 P.2d 640 (1968). 
If the actions of a person or that person's "agent or instrumentality" satisfy these elements 
and some or all of those actions occur in Kansas, the person could be subject to Kansas 
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b).  
 
The "agent or instrumentality" clause encompasses civil conspirators. A civil 
conspiracy claim generally requires a plaintiff to establish "'concert of action or other 
facts and circumstances from which the natural inference arises that the unlawful, overt 
acts were committed in furtherance of a common design, intention, or purpose of the 
alleged conspirators.'" Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054, 1064 (Utah 
2002) (quoting 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conspiracy § 68 [1998]); see Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 
234 Kan. 957, 967, 678 P.2d 153 (1984) (stating elements of civil conspiracy, which is an 
actionable tort). From a jurisdictional standpoint, if one conspirator commits acts in 
Kansas in furtherance of a conspiracy and that conspirator falls under the long-arm 
statute, jurisdiction can be obtained as to all conspirators. See Merriman, 282 Kan. at 
464; Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 695 (D. Kan. 
1978); see generally Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam 
Jurisdiction:  A Due Process Analysis, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 234 (1983).  
 
In the amended petition filed in this case, Aeroflex pleaded these elements. In 
response, TIC accepts that Aeroflex can establish some of the elements. Specifically, TIC 
does not dispute that (1) Aeroflex owns proprietary information, including trade secrets; 
(2) there were confidential relationships between Aeroflex and Filardo and Aeroflex and 
Allen when Filardo and Allen were employed by Aeroflex; and (3) Aeroflex disclosed 
trade secrets to Filardo and Allen while they were employed by Aeroflex. What TIC 
disputes is the fourth element; it argues Aeroflex has not demonstrated that TIC, either 
22 
 
personally or through its agents or coconspirators, engaged in the unauthorized use of 
those trade secrets.  
 
The district court agreed with TIC, concluding:  "Despite conducting discovery the 
plaintiff has produced no evidence Filardo misappropriated plaintiff's confidential and 
proprietary business information while working in Kansas and in fact the U.S. Army's 
investigative report rejected the plaintiff's claims. The evidence supports a finding 
Filardo worked on developing TIC's own proprietary software for the bid." 
 
Aeroflex argues this conclusion was reached by a weighing of the evidence rather 
than by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Aeroflex. We agree. 
 
To explain our conclusion, it is necessary to parse the dueling affidavits that were 
presented. To put those affidavits in perspective, we begin with Aeroflex's verified 
petition. In it, Aeroflex alleged "upon information and belief" that "TIC could not have 
modified the design of the TS-4530/UPM to meet the exact form, fit and function 
requirements of the Mode 5 Upgrade, and in turn successfully and cost-effectively have 
bid for the Mode 5 Upgrade, without access to Aeroflex Wichita proprietary and 
confidential information." The next two pages of the amended petition detailed reasons 
for this conclusion. (Because this portion of the pleading was based on "information and 
belief" these are mere allegations and not evidence even though the petition was verified 
under oath.) 
 
TIC countered this allegation with the affidavit of Jeffrey O'Hara, TIC's president 
and chief operating officer, and with the Army's report. O'Hara explained that the 
employment offers extended to Filardo and Allen "included specific protections with 
respect to any disclosure of Aeroflex proprietary technology which have been strictly 
observed by all parties." To further substantiate that TIC observed the self-imposed 
restrictions on disclosures, O'Hara stated:  "TIC technical solution proposed to the Army 
23 
 
includes a TIC designed interface that does not utilize any proprietary Aeroflex 
technology." O'Hara also indicated "the TIC technical solution entails a much more 
radical upgrade . . . than the approach apparently taken by Aeroflex." Finally, O'Hara 
quoted at length from the report the Army submitted to the GAO in response to 
Aeroflex's protest.  
 
The Army's report stated, in part, that "Aeroflex's conclusions regarding TIC's 
capabilities were reached without the benefit of reviewing TIC's proposal. After 
thoroughly reviewing TIC's proposal, the Army's evaluators found that TIC could fully 
meet the Army's stated requirements using TIC's own proprietary software currently used 
in another commercially available test set." As to Aeroflex's contention that TIC must 
have modified Aeroflex's proprietary hardware, the Army's report indicated that "TIC 
completely gutted the [unit] and replaced the hardware with a single printed circuit board 
design utilizing new hardware components." Further, the Army report indicated that "the 
software TIC utilized is based on software developed internal to TIC and currently being 
used on similar Mode 5 equipment used elsewhere."  
 
In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court gave credence to the Army's 
report. Aeroflex suggests this reliance was misplaced because the Army's report is not 
conclusive or binding. In fact, according to Aeroflex, the report was essentially a legal 
brief submitted by Army counsel to the GAO in defense of the Army's behavior. Further, 
Aeroflex disputed O'Hara's affidavit and the Army's conclusions with two affidavits, one 
from Jeffrey M. Gillum, the vice president and general manager of Aeroflex, and one 
from Guy Hill, the director of the avionics business unit of Aeroflex.  
 
Gillum, in his affidavit, provided sworn statements that presented a prima facie 
showing of the first three elements of the tort of misappropriation of a trade secret, that is 
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) a confidential relationship between the parties, and 
(3) disclosures by the plaintiff to the defendant concerning the trade secret. He did so by 
24 
 
stating that the "underlying design of the [TS-4530 project] was and is proprietary and 
confidential information owned" by Aeroflex and was "developed at great cost over at 
least the previous seven years," giving Aeroflex "a competitive advantage with respect to 
the manufacture of the [TS-4530 project] and any upgrades." Gillum further stated that 
Filardo and Allen were critical to the development, maintenance, and use of this 
proprietary and confidential information. To support this statement, Gillum provided 
considerable detail about the job responsibilities each held at Aeroflex and identified the 
types of information that each had been provided. Gillum concluded:  "[V]aluable trade 
secrets and proprietary information developed at substantial cost" were "wrongfully used 
by TIC." TIC's access to Filardo's and Allen's knowledge compromised the technology 
that had been developed by Aeroflex and its predecessor and "destroyed" Aeroflex's 
competitive advantage, according to Gillum. 
 
Hill, in his affidavit, more directly addressed the disputed fourth element 
regarding the alleged unauthorized use of Aeroflex's trade secrets by TIC. Some of the 
statements, like those in the amended petition, were Hill's own conclusions or opinions 
rather than facts and must be disregarded. See Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western Plains 
Service, 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987) (providing that "only the well pled facts of 
plaintiff's complaint, as distinguished from mere conclusory allegations, must be 
accepted as true"). 
 
But the affidavit also contained Hill's "personal knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances." For example, regarding the Army's report, Hill explained the procedure 
Aeroflex followed in bringing its protest. Citing statements made during meetings as well 
as in Army documents, Hill reported that "[t]he Army assumed that TIC's representations 
were true, in accordance with the general Army policy of assuming that representations 
of contractors that it believes to be responsible are true." Further, Hill stated, the Army's 
report did not substantiate the contention that TIC did not need or use Aeroflex's 
proprietary and confidential information because the "Army had no possible means of 
25 
 
knowing or determining whether TIC had access to [Aeroflex's] trade secrets or 
proprietary information, [or] whether TIC misappropriated such information prior to, 
during or subsequent to the preparation of TIC's technical or price proposal." While this 
statement is itself conclusory, Hill supported it by looking to the circumstances 
surrounding the bid process, specifically stating: 
 
"O'Hara's contention [and the Army's conclusion] that TIC's Mode 5 technology was 
completed and demonstrated before the hiring of Allen and Filardo cannot be true 
because: 
i. 
We understand that, until that time, TIC had been unable to produce or 
demonstrate a working prototype in a public forum;  
ii. 
TIC was unable to undergo the Navy's technical evaluation of TIC's 
Mode 5 technology in accordance with the Navy contract schedule. . . .  
iii. 
TIC was unable to achieve AIMS certification by the Department of 
Defense prior to the hiring of Allen and Filardo."  
 
Hill provided some technical reasons for his conclusion that TIC did not have the 
ability to successfully bid without appropriating some of Aeroflex's proprietary 
information. Additionally, he noted that O'Hara did "not address nor deny the use by TIC 
of Aeroflex Wichita's proprietary and confidential information in connection with the 
development of TIC's price proposal to the Army."  
 
These are just a few points made in the affidavits but are sufficient to illustrate that 
the fourth element is highly contested. Yet, as the district court noted, Aeroflex did not 
present direct evidence—the metaphorical "smoking gun"—that TIC misappropriated 
Aeroflex's proprietary information. Nevertheless, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Aeroflex, the affidavits provided circumstantial evidence of the disputed 
fourth element of the tort of misappropriation of proprietary information.  
 
26 
 
Even with that, however, for jurisdictional purposes Aeroflex must also submit 
some evidence that the tort occurred in Kansas. That evidence was submitted in the form 
of Filardo's time sheets, which showed he worked on the upgrade while in Kansas. 
Filardo is, of course, an alleged coconspirator with the other defendants, and Filardo, as a 
Kansas resident, is subject to the jurisdiction of a Kansas court. In Merriam, this court 
held:  "[I]f one conspirator commits acts in Kansas in furtherance of the conspiracy and 
that conspirator falls under the act, jurisdiction can be obtained as to all conspirators. 
[Citation omitted.]" Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 282 Kan. 433, 464, 146 P.3d 162 
(2006); see generally Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam 
Jurisdiction:  A Due Process Analysis, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 234 (1983).  
 
Granted, once again, Aeroflex did not present the district court with direct 
evidence of Filardo applying an Aeroflex trade secret to a portion of his work for TIC 
while at his home in Kansas. Yet, there is direct evidence that Filardo worked on the 
project from his home in Kansas and there is circumstantial evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could infer that Filardo used Aeroflex's trade secrets to TIC's benefit 
when developing TIC's TS-4530 upgrade while in Kansas.  
 
Hence, we conclude that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to Aeroflex, Aeroflex presented a prima facie case of jurisdiction by providing evidence 
from which it can be inferred that TIC, through its alleged coconspirator Filardo, acted in 
Kansas to misappropriate Aeroflex's trade secrets. As a result, there was a prima facie 
case of personal jurisdiction over TIC pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b)(1)(B).  
 
Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Aeroflex's alternative 
arguments for jurisdiction. It is not necessary for a party to establish multiple prima facie 
grounds for jurisdiction; one is sufficient, assuming other aspects of due process are 
satisfied.  
 
27 
 
DUE PROCESS 
 
Given our conclusion that Aeroflex has made a prima facie showing that TIC, 
through its alleged coconspirator Filardo, committed a tortious act in Kansas, we must 
now examine whether Aeroflex made a prima facie showing that TIC's contacts with 
Kansas were strong enough to satisfy the International Shoe due process test and, 
thereby, justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). This court summarized the 
International Shoe test in Merriman by stating: 
 
"When specific jurisdiction is asserted under the Kansas long arm statute, K.S.A. 
60-308(b), due process requires that the nonresident defendant have certain minimum 
contacts with the forum in order for the exercise of jurisdiction to be constitutional. In 
considering whether the corporation's minimum contacts meet this standard, courts 
should consider the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in determining whether 
it is reasonable and fair to require defense in the forum, rendering jurisdiction consistent 
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Due process requires a 
demonstration that the nonresident defendant purposely established minimum contacts 
with the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 
Merriman, 282 Kan. 433, Syl. ¶ 15. 
 
Minimum Contacts 
 
First, we consider the nature and extent of the defendant's activities in Kansas. The 
focus of this inquiry must be on the defendant's activities because a plaintiff's unilateral 
activities in the forum state cannot be used to create jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Instead, it is essential there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself to 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state thereby invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws. "The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or 
28 
 
attenuated contacts." Merriman, 282 Kan. 433, Syl. ¶ 18; see Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 
(1980).  
 
Aeroflex essentially argues that TIC intentionally induced Filardo, a Kansas 
resident, to breach his nondisclosure agreement with Aeroflex, also a Kansas resident, by 
pursuing Filardo as a potential employee, by hiring him, and by directly competing with 
Aeroflex and hindering Aeroflex's ability to compete. In addition, Aeroflex argues that 
Filardo's alleged misappropriation of trade secrets was in furtherance of a conspiracy 
between Filardo and TIC to cause damage to Aeroflex, which means the conspiracy was 
directed at causing injury in Kansas.  
 
In making these arguments, Aeroflex relies on the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). 
Under Calder, "an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the 
state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the 
effects are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the 
nonresident defendant's conduct. [Citations omitted.]" Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 
188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 
Application of the test in Calder meant that a California court could exercise 
jurisdiction over two Florida employees of a tabloid magazine who wrote and edited an 
allegedly libelous article about the California plaintiff, who was an actor. The United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the defendants knew the article's injurious effects 
would be felt by the plaintiff in California and had therefore "expressly aimed" their 
intentional and allegedly tortious conduct at the forum state. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. 
The Court noted that the focal point of the article itself was also California, because it 
was drawn primarily from California sources and pertained to an actor whose career was 
29 
 
centered in California. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89. Thus, "'"[t]he key to Calder is that the 
effects of an alleged intentional tort are to be assessed as part of the analysis of the 
defendant's relevant contacts with the forum."' [Citations omitted.]" Panda Brandywine 
Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 
As aptly pointed out by TIC in its appellate brief, the "effects" test in Calder does 
not, however, replace the need to demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute 
purposeful availment, that is conduct by the nonresident defendant that invoked the 
benefits and protections of the state or was otherwise purposefully directed toward a state 
resident. See Panda Brandywine Corp., 253 F.3d at 869; see also Revell v. Lidov, 317 
F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002) (Under Calder, "the plaintiff's residence in the forum, and 
suffering of harm there, will not alone support [personal] jurisdiction."); Far West 
Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1078 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts finding personal 
jurisdiction based upon an intentional tort analysis have not created a per se rule that an 
allegation of an intentional tort creates personal jurisdiction. Instead, they have 
emphasized that the defendant had additional contacts with the forum.").  
 
TIC argues that it did not avail itself of the protections of Kansas law. At most, it 
argues, its only contact with Kansas was its recruitment of a Kansas resident, Filardo. 
Certainly, it "did not direct tortious activity at Kansas," according to TIC's argument. To 
support its contention that merely hiring a Kansas resident from a competitor is not 
enough to establish jurisdiction, TIC cites Arch Aluminum & Glass Co., Inc. v. Haney, 
964 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. App. 2007). 
 
The Arch Aluminum case arose from a claim of misappropriation of confidential 
information by Matthew Hale, the former national sales manager for Arch Aluminum, a 
Florida corporation. During his employment with Arch Aluminum, Hale gained access to 
confidential information, including client lists, sales projections, prior sales data, business 
plans, and financial statements. Hale had been informed, through the employee 
30 
 
handbook, that such information was the property of Arch Aluminum. Soon after 
beginning new employment with a Nevada competitor, however, Hale released some of 
Arch Aluminum's confidential information to his new employer. Arch Aluminum brought 
suit against Hale and the new employer, asserting claims for, among other things, 
misappropriation of trade secrets.  
 
The Florida appellate court held that the distribution of the confidential 
information occurred in Nevada and Arizona and, therefore, the acts of the defendants did 
not result in a tortious act in Florida. As found by the Florida court:  "Even if Arch 
suffered damage, it would have been a loss of western clients and the reduction of 
revenues from its Phoenix operation," not from Florida. Arch Aluminum, 964 So. 2d at 
234. Consequently, the court concluded that neither the long-arm statute nor due process 
considerations were satisfied; therefore, there was no personal jurisdiction. Arch 
Aluminum, 964 So. 2d at 233-35.  
 
Relying on this analysis, TIC suggests the situs of Aeroflex's injury, if any, is New 
Jersey where TIC developed its product. Aeroflex, on the other hand, argues the situs of 
the injury is in Kansas where the economic impact of the misappropriation was felt. 
Aeroflex's position is supported by the holdings of many courts that explain the situs of 
injury is the place where the plaintiff suffers injury via loss of business. American Eutec. 
Weld. Alloys S. Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 432-35 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding 
that Michigan corporation did not commit tortious act causing injury in New York where 
the Michigan corporation induced the New York plaintiffs' experienced sales employees 
to leave plaintiffs and use confidential information to woo away plaintiffs' customers in 
Kentucky and Pennsylvania; the situs of injury was where plaintiffs lost business); 
Spectacular Promotions, Inc. v. Radio Station WING, 272 F. Supp. 734, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 
1967) (stating that the place where plaintiff lost business would normally be a forum 
reasonably foreseeable by a tortfeasor); cf. Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 46 N.Y.2d 197, 204-
06, 385 N.E.2d 1055 (1978) (finding injury to be felt in New York where defendant's out-
31 
 
of-state act of misappropriation of trade secrets threatened significant loss of New York 
sales).  
 
Again, however, this economic effect is not sufficient if there are not other 
purposeful contacts, and TIC makes another argument as to why its contact with Filardo 
is not sufficient to meet the test. This argument responds to Aeroflex's position that the 
fact Filardo worked for TIC from his home in Kansas is sufficient for due process 
purposes. TIC counters this argument by suggesting that this was a personal choice of 
Filardo and not something TIC planned or proposed; in other words, TIC did not 
purposefully avail itself of the Kansas location. The district court agreed with this 
analysis, citing two cases—Lucachick v. NDS Americas, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. 
Minn. 2001), and Adams v. Riverview Healthcare Ass'n., No. A3-02-135, 2003 WL 
1456442 (D.N.D. 2003) (unpublished opinion).  
 
Both of these cases stand for the proposition that the decision of the agent or 
employee to work from home in the forum state does not generally bind the nonresident 
entity to personal jurisdiction in that state, where the purpose of the arrangement is 
merely for the agent's personal convenience. As the Adams court stated, because the 
employer did not require the employee to live in the forum state of North Dakota and did 
not gain anything from allowing the employee to work in North Dakota, the employer's 
contact with the state was only the result of the employee's "unilateral activity of 
choosing to live in North Dakota, and it cannot be said that [the employer] purposefully 
directed its activities toward North Dakota by allowing Adams to work out of his home." 
Adams, 2003 WL 1456442, at *3. Likewise, TIC did not, it argues, purposefully invoke 
the privileges and benefits of Kansas law by acceding to Filardo's request to work from 
home for his own personal reasons.  
 
What TIC ignores is Aeroflex's allegation that TIC conspired with Filardo to 
misappropriate Aeroflex's proprietary interests and continued that conspiracy even while 
32 
 
Filardo continued to work on the project from Kansas. In other words, even if TIC did not 
purposefully avail itself of the protection of Kansas laws by requiring Filardo to work in 
Kansas, it purposefully availed itself by joining in and acting in furtherance of a 
conspiracy even after it knew that one actor had chosen to act in Kansas in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. This purposeful action directed at Kansas and partially performed in 
Kansas distinguishes Lucachick, Adams, and Arch Aluminum. 
 
The principal point of distinction arises because courts, including those in Kansas, 
have concluded that knowledge of and voluntary participation in a conspiracy with other 
individuals who have a physical, in-state presence does not offend due process and allows 
the court to extend personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who may otherwise lack 
specific, individualized contacts with the forum state. See Merriman, 282 Kan. 433, Syl. 
¶ 19 ("Because the conspiracy theory gives one subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum 
the ability to avoid in advance being subject to suit in the forum, it satisfies the 
fundamental due process requirement that a defendant can be involuntarily subjected to 
the personal jurisdiction of a forum only if the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state."); see also Istituto Bancario Italiano 
v. Hunter Eng. Co., 449 A.2d 210, 225 (Del. 1982) ("[A] defendant who has so 
voluntarily participated in a conspiracy with knowledge of its acts in or effects in the 
forum state can be said to have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in the forum state, thereby fairly invoking the benefits and burdens 
of its laws."); Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 703-04, 472 S.E.2d 515 (1996) 
(recognizing that coconspirators are agents of each other for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction when acting in furtherance of conspiracy but requiring specific facts of 
activity purposefully directed toward Georgia residents). 
 
Because TIC's tortious contacts were through an agent and alleged coconspirator 
who performed tortious acts in Kansas, a more analogous case is Thermal Components 
Company v. Griffith, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Kan. 2000). There, after resigning from 
33 
 
their positions at Thermal Components, the defendants became affiliated in various 
professional capacities with codefendant Thermotech, a Missouri corporation. Thermal 
Components, a Kansas corporation, sued its former employees and Thermotech in Kansas 
state court, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, interference with business 
expectancies, breach of fiduciary duty owed to the employer, and conversion. 
 
The defendants removed the case to Kansas federal district court and moved to 
dismiss, in part for lack of personal jurisdiction. With respect to the corporate defendant, 
Thermal Components argued that personal jurisdiction could be exercised under the 
"agent or instrumentality" language of the Kansas long-arm statute. The federal district 
court found that the defendants' tortious activities, including misappropriation of trade 
secrets, subjected them to the statute and further found that "the injuries for which 
plaintiff seeks redress, allegedly caused by the defendants' conduct, occurred in Kansas 
for purposes of the 'tortious act' provision of the long-arm statute." Thermal Components, 
98 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. 
 
With regard to due process requirements, the federal district court concluded that, 
taking the facts as alleged by the plaintiff as true, Thermal Components made the 
required prima facie showing that the defendants' contacts with Kansas were sufficient to 
subject them to personal jurisdiction in this state: 
 
"By misappropriating the trade secrets to which the individual defendants became privy 
only as a result of their employment by the plaintiff, and by using that information to 
interfere with Thermal Components' pre-existing and future contractual relations, 
defendants' purposeful tortious conduct toward, as well as the individual defendants' 
previous employment relationship with, a Kansas resident establishes the requisite 
contacts with the forum state. [Citations omitted.] . . . 
"Moreover, if the facts are as represented by plaintiff, the defendants' use of 
confidential information gained as a result of the defendants' employment with the 
plaintiff to divert clients from Thermal Components constitutes a breach of the duty of 
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loyalty, a duty arising from the individual defendants' previous agency relationship with 
the plaintiff. As former employees of plaintiff, the individual defendants were surely 
aware that any deleterious effects resulting from the acts complained of here would 
certainly be realized by the plaintiff in its home state. As an entity capitalizing on the 
knowledge held by plaintiff's former employees, defendant Thermotech should have been 
aware that its role in benefitting from the individual defendants' tortious activities would 
harm plaintiff, a Kansas resident, and that the derivation of such benefits at plaintiff's 
expense would require it to defend itself in the plaintiff's forum state. Thus, the court 
concludes that the defendants' contacts with this state are sufficient to subject them to the 
jurisdiction of this court." Thermal Components, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1229-30. 
 
See Equifax Services, Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1358-60 (10th Cir. 1990) (former 
branch manager had sufficient minimum contacts with forum state by virtue of 
employment relationship with Kansas employer; action to enforce covenant not to 
compete); Sprint Corp. v. DeAngelo, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186-88 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(assertion of jurisdiction in Kansas over Virginia former employee did not violate due 
process). 
 
Many of the points noted by the Thermal Components court apply to TIC's and 
Filardo's actions as well. Aeroflex's trade secrets were allegedly revealed to TIC in both 
Kansas and New Jersey. See Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 
(5th Cir. 1984) (personal jurisdiction existed over defendant for claim of 
misappropriation of trade secrets because part of tort was committed in forum). And, if 
Aeroflex's allegations are true, TIC sought out Aeroflex's employees to interfere with 
TIC's Kansas competition knowing one of them, Filardo, was a Kansas resident and 
remained a Kansas resident. It was foreseeable that this alleged purposeful contact by 
TIC with a Kansas resident and the alleged agreement to use Aeroflex's trade secrets 
would cause harm to Aeroflex in Kansas and give rise to TIC being forced to defend 
itself in a Kansas forum. Under these circumstances, TIC purposefully established 
minimum contacts with Kansas and invoked the benefits and protections of Kansas law. 
35 
 
Reasonableness—Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
 
Finally, we must consider the second prong of the International Shoe due process 
requirement and determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable or 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction offends "'"traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice."' [Citations omitted.]" Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 
480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987). Factors to consider in 
making this evaluation include:  "the quality, nature and extent of the activity in the 
forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws 
of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. 
[Citations omitted.]" White v. Goldthwaite, 204 Kan. 83, 88, 460 P.2d 578 (1969); see 
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, and factors such as burden on defendant, forum state's 
interest in resolving the dispute, plaintiff's interest in receiving convenient and effective 
relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies). This reasonableness inquiry is conducted on a sliding scale:  
"'[T]he weaker the plaintiff's showing on [minimum contacts], the less a defendant need 
show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.' [Citation omitted.]" Pro Axess, 
Inc. v. Orlux Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 
In the present case, TIC argues that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be 
unreasonable, that requiring TIC to defend this case in Kansas would create a great 
burden, and that Kansas has only a "nominal interest" in this dispute. TIC contends that 
New Jersey is the most efficient forum in which to litigate the parties' disputes, especially 
because Aeroflex has corporate counsel out of New York who has been admitted pro hac 
vice in this case.  
 
The district court agreed with TIC's position and found: 
36 
 
 
"The burden on the Defendant TIC would be considerable in that virtually none of its 
witnesses (employees and government) and exhibits is in Kansas and it has no office or 
presence in Kansas. Lead counsels for both parties are from the east coast, not Kansas. 
While the forum state (Kansas) has an interest in resolving this dispute, that interest is no 
greater than the defendant's home state (New Jersey) or the state in which the bid was 
submitted (Alabama). The plaintiff has not shown it cannot receive convenient and 
effectual relief in New Jersey or Alabama. The interstate judicial system's interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of this controversy favors the forum in New 
Jersey, the location of most of the witnesses and exhibits of the alleged tortious acts 
(misappropriation of trade secrets), the location or close location of lead counsel, and the 
location of the alleged illegal acts. Furthermore, neither Kansas, New Jersey nor any 
other state have a greater interest in furthering social policies against the alleged wrongs 
committed by TIC; the states appear to share equally in that interest. Given the weak 
showing of minimal contacts (if any) by Aeroflex, the less TIC must show in terms of 
unreasonableness to defeat due process." 
 
Aeroflex urges this court not to follow such a "misguided notion" of unfairness, 
arguing that Kansas courts must not close their doors to its residents on the premise that it 
is "'unfair' to force an interstate pirate to answer in Kansas for the injuries he intentionally 
inflicts on Kansans."  
 
As we evaluate these positions, we agree with many of the points made by the 
district court, primarily those relating to the lack of TIC's presence in Kansas means most 
of its witnesses will be from out-of-state. Yet, we disagree with other points.  
 
Most significantly, the district court's starting point for its sliding scale rested on 
the court's view of the weak or nonexistent nature of TIC's contacts. In contrast, we apply 
this sliding scale with the view that, if Aeroflex is able to prove the case for which it has 
made a prima facie showing, it will have established significant contacts. It will have 
shown that TIC purposefully sought out a Kansas resident with the purpose of stealing 
37 
 
proprietary information from a Kansas business; formed a conspiracy with Filardo, a 
Kansas resident, and Allen, who had a contract with a Kansas business and breached 
duties related to the contract; and continued a conspiracy with a person it knew to be 
residing in Kansas and committing tortious acts in Kansas. These are strong contacts and 
significant examples of TIC's purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting 
activities in Kansas. See Chem-Trol, Inc. v. Christensen, No. 09-2024, EFM, 2009 WL 
1044613, at *2 (D. Kan. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (finding Iowa corporation started 
by Kansas corporation's former employee, who was subject to noncompete agreement, 
was subject to jurisdiction under tortious act provision of Kansas long-arm statute; 
tortious interference with customer contracts); Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co., 
Ltd. v. ACI International, Inc., No. 03-4165-JAR, 2007 WL 1341699, at *5 (D. Kan. 
2007) (unpublished opinion) (former employee of a Kansas business incorporated in 
Texas with the purpose of competing with Kansas business; held that even though Texas 
corporation itself did not act in the state of Kansas, its agent's and coconspirator's 
activities were attributable to corporation, and corporation reasonably should have 
foreseen that it would be required to defend itself in a Kansas court). 
 
Weighing the burden on TIC against the backdrop Aeroflex may eventually prove 
regarding TIC's relationship with Filardo, its conspiracy to steal proprietary information, 
and the actions in Kansas to further that conspiracy, we conclude that the burden imposed 
on TIC is not unduly onerous.  
 
Another significant factor is the recognition that "'[s]tates have an important 
interest in providing a forum in which their residents can seek redress for injuries caused 
by out-of-state actors.'" Pro Axess, 428 F.3d at 1280 (quoting OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 
1096). Further, each state has an interest in resolving disputes that involve its own laws. 
Because Aeroflex is located in Kansas, and the case involves the application of Kansas 
law, the state of Kansas has an interest in providing Aeroflex with a forum to litigate. 
 
 
38 
 
The factors concerning Aeroflex's interest in convenient and effective relief also 
weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction. Further, there is no obvious reason why Kansas' 
exercise of jurisdiction would affect the substantive policy interests of any other state. 
Accordingly, we conclude Kansas courts may reasonably exercise personal jurisdiction 
over TIC; traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice will not be offended.  
 
 
In sum, when the evidence presented on the motion to dismiss is viewed in the 
light most favorable to Aeroflex, Aeroflex has presented a prima facie case that TIC, 
through its agents and instrumentalities, committed a tortious act in Kansas and is 
therefore subject to jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b)(1)(B). Exercise of 
that jurisdiction does not offend due process.  
 
 
The district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is reversed and 
remanded.