Case Title: Haltom v. Haltom

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Haltom v. Haltom1988 WY 78755 P.2d 876Case Number: 87-206Decided: 06/06/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOE C. HALTOM, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

LOIS A. HALTOM, A/K/A 
LOIS ARLENE DIGLIANI, A/K/A LOIS A. GOOD, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Fred W. Phifer, 
Wheatland, for 
appellant.

Douglas W. 
Weaver, Wheatland, for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Joe C. Haltom 
appeals from an order modifying a property settlement which had been 
incorporated into a stipulated judgment for the dissolution of marriage entered 
by a California court. 

[¶2.]     We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for entry of an appropriate 
judgment.

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues, and appellee Lois A. Haltom, a/k/a Lois Arlene Digliani, a/k/a Lois A. 
Good, essentially agrees, as follows:

"1. [Whether t]he 
District Court exceeded [its] basic authority in altering the property division 
previously decreed by the California Court when it found that the Appellee was 
fully justified in spending the $19,150.55 proceeds from the check issued by the 
California State Board of Equalization; in awarding a Judgment against the 
Appellant in the amount of $21,966.00 as the value of clothing and personal 
items plus 5% for inflation; and in ordering that in the event Appellant fails 
to deliver the clothing and personal items or pay the total Judgment of 
$25,496.30, that Appellee shall be entitled to retain the gold nugget necklace 
with a diamond in it and the 4.23 car[a]t diamond ring as a 
set-off.

"2. [Whether t]he 
[District] Court abused [its] discretion in awarding attorney's fees in the sum 
of $1,502.00 to Appellee's attorneys and in awarding the sum of $930.00 for 
mileage and per diem costs for Appellee's trip to 
California."

[¶4.]     On January 7, 1986, the 
parties were granted a dissolution of marriage, and a stipulated judgment was 
entered by the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. That stipulated judgment 
incorporated by reference the parties' marital and property settlement agreement 
entered into by them on August 21, 1985. Appellant registered the California judgment in the State of Wyoming on May 28, 1986, by filing a certified copy of 
that judgment with the district court in Platte County, Wyoming.1

[¶5.]     On June 5, 1986, the 
district court filed an order to show cause, ordering appellee to appear before 
the district court on June 24, 1986, to show cause why she should not be found 
in contempt for failing to comply with the California court order. Appellee was also 
ordered to deliver a check from the California State Board of Equalization in 
the amount of $19,149.39, a 4.23-carat diamond ring, and a gold nugget necklace 
with a one-carat diamond to the district court at the hearing or to be fully 
prepared to account for that property. This hearing was later reset for July 15, 
1986.

[¶6.]     On July 14, 1986, 
appellee filed a petition for an order to show cause, stating that appellant had 
failed to deliver to her personal clothing, jackets, shoes, handbags, and a 
full-length fox fur coat, all valued at approximately $20,000, as required by 
the California order. Consequently, the hearing was rescheduled for September 
16, 1986.

[¶7.]     During the September 
16, 1986, hearing, the district court continued the hearing until further notice 
and ordered appellee to submit a memorandum of law. Appellee filed her 
memorandum of law on September 24, 1986, and her prehearing memorandum on 
December 2, 1986.

[¶8.]     A hearing on the merits 
was conducted on June 2, 1987. On July 17, 1987, the district court entered an 
order which stated that:

"1. [Appellee] is not in 
contempt of Court and was fully justified in spending the 
$19,150.55.

"2. [Appellant] shall 
return [appellee's] clothing and personal items which the decree awarded her and 
which she testified she has not received.

"3. In the event 
[appellant] fails to return to [appellee] her clothing and personal items, 
[appellee] shall have a monetary judgment against [appellant] in the amount of 
$21,966.00, the value of the clothing and personal items, plus 5% on this amount 
for inflation. 

"4. [Appellant] shall 
have 30 days from the date of this order to deliver the clothing and personal 
items to [appellee] or pay the $21,966.00, the value of the clothing and 
personal items, to [appellee], and in the event [appellant] fails to do either 
of those things [appellee] shall be entitled to retain the necklace and ring as 
a set-off.

"5. [Appellant] shall pay 
unto [appellee's] attorneys * * * the sum of $1,502.00 plus any additional 
accruing attorney fees arising from this action.

"6. [Appellant] shall pay 
unto [appellee] the sum of $930.00 for mileage and per diem costs incurred by 
[appellee] in her trip to California."

[¶9.]     On July 27, 1987, 
appellant filed his notice of appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered an 
order staying its judgment, pending the outcome of the appeal before this 
Court.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that the district 
court erred when it altered the California court's property division judgment 
by entering paragraphs 1 through 4 of its judgment. He asserts that neither the 
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act nor applicable case law gave the 
district court the power to modify the decree.

[¶11.]  Section 1-17-703, W.S. 1977, 
states:

"A copy of any foreign 
judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes of 
this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any district court of this 
state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment as a judgment of the district 
court of this state notwithstanding the amount of the judgment or that the 
action giving rise to the judgment, if initiated in this state, would be within 
the jurisdiction of a minor court. A 
judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, 
defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of a 
district court of this state and may be so enforced or satisfied." (Emphasis 
added.)

This Court had 
an occasion to interpret this section in Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976). However, at that 
time, Wyoming's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act was entitled the "Uniform Foreign Judgments Act." In that case, we 
stated:

"Under our statute, then, 
if not under the full faith and credit clause, it must be considered that the 
judgment [entered in a sister state], when filed with the district court [in 
accord with the section], justified any action that could be taken by a judgment 
plaintiff in a case originating in the state of Wyoming." Id. at 1250.

We see no reason 
why we should now stray from this rule of law and not apply such rule to this 
case.

[¶12.]  In David v. David, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1141 
(1986), we noted that property settlement agreements entered into by the parties 
prior to divorce are generally recognized and given force and effect in the 
decree and that such agreements are favored by the courts. However, we also 
stated in that case that:

"As a corollary of both 
rules the confluence effect is that even though property settlements are favored 
by the courts and are generally recognized in Wyoming, the parties cannot oust a 
court's statutory duty to `make such disposition of the property of the parties 
as appears just and equitable' by entering into a property settlement agreement 
which the judge cannot in good conscience approve and adopt when granting a 
divorce." Id. 
at 1143.

A trial court, 
therefore, has broad discretion in approving a property settlement agreement and 
in including it within its divorce decree or marital property division order. We 
have also recognized that, once a divorce decree dividing the marital property 
has been entered by the trial court, it is final and is not subject to revision 
or modification because of a change in circumstances. Broadhead v. Broadhead, Wyo., 737 P.2d 731 
(1987).

[¶13.]  Under the California judgment, appellant was to receive 
"[a]ll proceeds from the State Board of Equalization deposit refund in the 
approximate sum of $18,660.00." However, the district court effectively modified 
or reversed the California court's order regarding the deposit 
refund moneys when it found that appellee was not in contempt of court and was 
fully justified in spending those proceeds. That modification or reversal of the 
California 
court's order by the district court was beyond the district court's authority. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order in that 
regard.

[¶14.]  The California judgment also provided in 
applicable part that:

"Items a through q 
inclusive of paragraph 2 herein are presently in the custody and control of 
[appellant] and [appellant] shall give possession of these items to [appellee] 
contemporaneously with the delivery of items number 7 and 8 of Appendix `B' to 
[appellant]."

Previous to that 
language, the California court specifically and particularly 
listed items a through q in applicable part as follows:

"j) Wife's personal 
clothing

"k) 
Jackets

"l) 
Shoes

"m) 
Handbags

"n) Foxfur Full Length 
Coat"

Appendix "B" of 
the California 
judgment provided in applicable part:

"To 
[appellant]

* * * * * 
*

"7) 4.23 Point Diamond 
Ring subject to a loan in the amount of $9,200.00 with Coffey's Consignment in 
[appellee's] possession.

"8) Gold Nugget necklace 
w/one (1) carat diamond in [appellee's] possession."

[¶15.]  From the time the California order was 
entered on January 7, 1986, to the present time, more than two years have 
elapsed, during which time appellant has failed to comply with the provisions of 
the agreement by not delivering the respective items to appellee. In the 
interest of finality, and recognizing our general principle that a proper 
property division allows each party to make a clean break and go his or her 
separate way, starting life anew, Broadhead v. Broadhead, we have ascertained 
that, because of appellant's failure to surrender appellee's property to her, he 
is estopped from claiming any interest in the jewelry held by appellee. 
Accordingly, appellee is entitled to the 4.23-carat diamond ring and gold nugget 
necklace with the one-carat diamond. Any of appellee's personal clothing, 
including the full-length fox fur coat, which were left with appellant after the 
dissolution of their marriage, and any moneys derived from the previous sale of 
those articles is the property of appellant.

[¶16.]  Appellant also asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it awarded appellee attorney's fees and 
compensation for the mileage and per diem costs she incurred during a trip to 
California.

[¶17.]  Section 20-2-111, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"In every action brought 
for divorce, the court may require either party to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to 
carry on or defend the action and for support and the support of the children of 
the parties during its pendency. The 
court may decree costs against either party and award execution for the 
costs, or it may direct costs to be paid out of any property sequestered, in the 
power of the court, or in the hands of a receiver. The court may also direct 
payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due and owing from any 
person." (Emphasis added.)

This Court has 
considered this statute as authority to award attorney's fees in an action for 
divorce or any continuing litigation of such action. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, Wyo., 583 P.2d 1265 (1978); Prentice v. Prentice, Wyo., 568 P.2d 883 (1977). We have also 
recognized that, in awarding such fees and costs, the trial court has extremely 
broad discretion and that such discretion should not be interfered with by this 
Court except upon clear proof that such discretion was gravely abused. Broyles 
v. Broyles, Wyo., 711 P.2d 1119 (1985); Book v. Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546, 
167 A.L.R. 352 (1943).

[¶18.]  After review of appellant's arguments 
regarding the award of attorney's fees and costs in this case, we are not 
convinced that the district court abused its discretion in granting such awards 
to appellee. Therefore, we determine that appellant failed in his burden of 
proof and hold that the district court properly awarded appellee those 
moneys.

[¶19.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 While we recognize that 
§ 1-17-703, W.S. 1977, of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 
requires that an authenticated judgment be filed, the parties stipulated that 
the action should continue because the certified copy was in fact a true and 
accurate copy of the original stipulated judgment filed in the California court. 
We, therefore, will assume that, because of such a stipulation, the filing of an 
authenticated judgment requirement has been met pursuant to that 
section.