Case Title: In Re P.M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 88-380



 In re P.M., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

                                              March Term, 1990

 Joseph J. Wolchik, J., on motion to dismiss
 Shireen Avis Fisher, J., at merits hearing

 Jane Woodruff, Orleans County State's Attorney, Newport, and Gary S.
   Kessler, Resource Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson, Department of State's
   Attorneys, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
    Defender, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



      GIBSON, J.   P.M. appeals from a judgment of the district court,
 sitting as a juvenile court, finding him guilty of committing a delinquent
 act, engaging in lewd and lascivious conduct with a child.  We affirm.
                                     I.
      The findings of the court are not contested on appeal.  P.M., who was
 nearly fifteen years old at the time of the incident on September 16, 1986,
 engaged in inappropriate sexual activity with M.C., a neighborhood girl who
 was just short of her ninth birthday.  The girl "had a crush" on P.M. and
 was close to his family.  Taking advantage of M.C.'s vulnerability, her
 feelings for him and his family, and the disparity in their ages, P.M.
 kissed and hugged M.C., and rubbed the genital areas of his partially
 clothed body against the genital areas of M.C.'s partially clothed body in
 order to gratify his own sexual desires.  M.C. initially submitted to P.M.'s
 sexual advances, but then asked him to stop.  P.M. never threatened M.C. or
 used force during the incident, and he ceased his advances upon her request.
 M.C. reported the incident to her mother shortly after it took place.  P.M.
 admitted kissing, hugging, and "rubbing bodies" with M.C., but denied that
 he attempted to have intercourse with her, as she claimed.
      In February of 1987, a delinquency petition was filed against P.M.,
 alleging that he engaged in lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under
 the age of sixteen.  In a motion to dismiss prior to the merits hearing and
 again following the hearing, P.M. argued that he had not committed a delin-
 quent act because 13 V.S.A. { 2602, (FN1) the statute proscribing lewd and
 lascivious conduct with a child under sixteen years, was "not intended to
 prosecute children under the age of 16."  The court denied the motion to
 dismiss, stating,
             Whether or not P.M. could be held criminally responsi-
           ble under { 2602 is irrelevant to the proceeding here.
           It is the act in question which is critical; a delin-
           quent act is an act designated a crime.  The requirement
           of specific intent does not alter the nature of the act
           upon which the definition is predicated.  P.M. would
           have the court equate "delinquent act" with "an act for
           which the juvenile actor could be criminally convicted."
           This would largely frustrate the purposes of Chapter 12,
           Title 33, and contravene the plain meaning [of] the
           statutory definition.
 (Emphasis in original.)
      Following the merits hearing, the court found P.M. guilty of having
 committed a delinquent act.  The court pointed out that the case concerned
 sexual conduct between an adolescent and a child, not between adolescents.
 Based on the age disparity of the participants and other factors, the court
 concluded that P.M. committed acts that would have constituted lewd and
 lascivious conduct had he been in adult court.  P.M. was placed on juvenile
 probation and required to participate fully in and successfully complete a
 sexual therapy and education program.  On appeal, P.M. contends that (1) {
 2602 does not criminalize sexual conduct between two consenting children
 under the age of sixteen, and (2) the trial court erred in prohibiting
 defense counsel from inquiring into allegations that M.C. had falsely
 accused others of engaging in sexual activity with her.
                                     II.
      P.M. first argues that the statute proscribing lewd or lascivious
 conduct with a child under sixteen, { 2602, was intended to punish only
 persons over sixteen; therefore, P.M. was not guilty of committing a
 delinquent act.  We disagree.  Under 33 V.S.A. { 632(a)(3), a "delinquent
 act" is "an act designated a crime under the laws of this state."  13 V.S.A.
 { 2602 makes it unlawful for "a person" to "wilfully and lewdly commit any
 lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof,
 of a child under the age of sixteen years, with the intent of arousing,
 appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions or sexual desires of such
 person or child."  Under the plain language of the statutory provisions,
 P.M. could be found guilty of having committed a delinquent act.
      P.M., however, argues that unless we construe the term "a person" as "a
 person over sixteen years of age," we must make the following two
 "preposterous" assumptions: (1) the Legislature intended to punish children
 who engage in consensual lewd or lascivious acts with other minors more
 severely than those children who engage in consensual sexual intercourse
 with other minors; and (2) the Legislature intended to make all adolescent
 "petting" a five-year felony.  In support of this contention, P.M. points
 out that when the Legislature enacted { 2602, there was a rape statute in
 place providing that if a person under the age of sixteen "carnally knows" a
 female under age sixteen with her consent, both persons were guilty of com-
 mitting a misdemeanor and could be sent to reform school.  See 13 V.S.A. {
 3202 (repealed in 1977). (FN2) Thus, according to P.M., a broad interpretation
 of the term "a person" in { 2602 would mean that two children engaging in
 consensual sexual intercourse could only have been sent to reform school,
 while two children engaged in "petting" could be sentenced to five years in
 prison for engaging in lewd or lascivious conduct.
      We do not find P.M.'s reasoning to be persuasive.  First, we agree with
 the trial court that the crucial inquiry is whether the act committed is
 designated a crime under a statute, not whether the juvenile could be
 criminally prosecuted under the statute.  P.M. was not prosecuted under {
 2602; rather, he was charged with being a delinquent child.  Thus, the fact
 that the penalty for engaging in lewd or lascivious conduct with a child
 under { 2602 is greater than the penalty given to minors engaging in
 consensual sexual intercourse is irrelevant.  Second, we agree with the
 State that the disparity between the penalties in the two provisions is
 reconciled by recognizing that former { 3202 addressed situations involving
 consensual sexual activity between minors, while { 2602 concerns situations
 where a child is sexually exploited by another person.
      Noting that the Model Penal Code's "Corruption of Minors and Seduction"
 provision imposes liability on a person, regardless of age, who initiates
 sexual contact with a child four or more years younger and under the age of
 sixteen, Model Penal Code and Commentaries { 213.3 comment 2 at 385-86
 (1980), P.M. concedes the desirability of a provision penalizing the
 exploitation of children by experienced adolescents, but claims that { 2602
 is not such a statute and cannot be construed in such a manner.  We believe
 that age differential is an important factor that may and should be
 considered by the trial court.  Here, P.M. is six years older than the
 victim.  In determining what constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct, this
 Court has deferred to common-sense community standards.  State v. Purvis,
 146 Vt. 441, 443,