Case Title: Fletcher v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-2468

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2468 
____________ 
 
TIMOTHY W. FLETCHER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 25, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Timothy W. Fletcher was convicted of the first-degree murder of Helen 
Googe, two counts of grand theft of a motor vehicle, home-invasion robbery, two 
counts of burglary, and escape.  Fletcher appeals his convictions and the sentence 
of death imposed by the trial court for the murder.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm Fletcher’s 
convictions and the death sentence.   
FACTS 
 
On April 14 and 15, 2009, Timothy Fletcher was lawfully in custody at the 
Putnam County Jail.  On the evening of April 14, 2009, and into the early morning 
 
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hours of April 15, 2009, Fletcher and his cellmate, Doni Ray Brown, escaped their 
jail cell pursuant to a previously-discussed plan.  Following their eventual re-arrest, 
Fletcher was interrogated by a detective with the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office 
and an investigator with the State Attorney’s Office.  During the interrogation, 
Fletcher recounted the details of the escape and subsequent crimes.  
 
Fletcher explained that on his return from a court hearing on April 2, 2009, 
he removed a car jack from the jail transportation vehicle, which he concealed in 
his pants.  Nearly two weeks later, on April 14, 2009, after another trip to and from 
the courthouse, he appropriated the handle for the jack in the same manner.  
Fletcher explained they executed the escape because he had just been sentenced to 
ten years’ incarceration.1   
That evening, Fletcher and Brown used the jack and jack handle to pry the 
toilet away from the wall of their cell, which created a hole through which they 
could escape.  Just after the 2 a.m. cell check, Fletcher and Brown escaped through 
the hole.  They then crawled under a fence, climbed over another fence, and 
through a gap in a third fence.  This brought them to a field next to the jail, which 
they crossed to reach the highway.   
                                          
 
1.  Fletcher had pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a dwelling and two 
counts of burglary of a structure or conveyance.  He was sentenced to ten years’ 
incarceration for the counts of burglary of a dwelling, and five years’ incarceration 
for the counts of burglary of a structure or conveyance, with the sentences to run 
concurrently.   
 
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They searched for a vehicle at various properties along the highway.  First, 
they located a Z71 pickup truck.  After breaking the window, he and Brown 
entered the vehicle, but Fletcher was unsuccessful as he attempted to start the 
engine.  They searched for a second vehicle and located an unlocked van.  
However, they were also unable to start that vehicle, so they searched for a third 
vehicle.  They discovered an unlocked Ford pickup truck with the keys in it in a 
fenced-in yard of a business.  Brown struck the gate with the pickup and knocked it 
down.   
As they had previously planned, Fletcher and Brown drove to the house of 
Helen Googe, the ex-wife of Fletcher’s grandfather, because it was the closest 
place where he and Brown believed they could acquire money.  Fletcher believed 
that Googe kept money in a safe at her house, and he had knowledge of her 
financial status.   
At this point during his post-arrest statement, Fletcher provided varying 
accounts of subsequent events.  In his initial account, Fletcher asserted that Googe 
voluntarily admitted him into the house, and Brown followed.  Fletcher described 
altercations between Brown and Googe that ultimately led to Googe’s death.  He 
asserted that, other than one open-handed slap, he was either absent from the room 
during the altercations or nothing more than a passive bystander.  However, 
Fletcher renounced this version of events after a detective informed him that 
 
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fingernail scrapings had been collected from Googe to test for DNA evidence.  The 
officer observed that Fletcher had scratch marks on his hands and arms, whereas 
Brown did not, and asked Fletcher if there was any reason why his DNA would be 
found under Googe’s fingernails.  Fletcher responded that it should not be, but also 
stated that he had held Googe down at one point.  The detective asked when this 
occurred, and Fletcher responded, “I really don’t even want to tell you everything 
that happened, to be honest with you.”  After some discussion, Fletcher admitted, 
“I’ll be honest with you, I kind of lied to you a little bit,” and then presented a 
different version of the events that transpired at Googe’s home.  This second 
description matched the description provided by Brown, except with the roles 
reversed—both Fletcher and Brown asserted that the other committed the actual 
strangulation of Googe.   
Fletcher confessed that he and Brown entered the house through a firewood 
door that provided an opening to pass wood into the house from the outside.  
Fletcher was aware that Googe had firearms on the walls of her house; while in 
jail, he and Brown discussed using a gun to scare and rob Googe.  After they 
entered the house, Fletcher removed an unloaded revolver from the wall above the 
bathroom door and gave it to Brown.  Upon retrieving the gun, Fletcher and Brown 
changed into clothes belonging to Fletcher’s grandfather that they found at the 
house.  Fletcher showed Brown the safe, which was located inside a closet.   
 
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Fletcher located Googe’s purse, which contained a credit card, car keys, and 
$37.  Fletcher placed the purse in the closet with the discarded prison clothing.  
Fletcher and Brown then approached the bedroom where Googe slept, and Brown 
entered the room.  Fletcher had tied a t-shirt around his face so that Googe would 
not recognize him, and Brown donned a blue and red baseball cap that he pulled 
down over his face.  Fletcher intended to remain outside of the room until Brown 
indicated that Googe was restrained.  Brown approached the bed, pointed the gun 
at Googe’s face, and woke her up.  Brown then said, “[t]his is a stickup, roll over 
and you’ll be all right.”  Googe sat up and screamed that she was frightened at least 
four times.  She asked, “why are you doing this?”  Brown told her that nothing 
would happen to her as long as she complied with his instructions.  Brown then 
signaled for Fletcher, who entered the room, pushed Googe onto the bed, and tied 
her hands with a phone cord.   
Googe informed them that she did not have any money, except maybe $40 in 
her purse.  Brown asked what was in the safe, and she asserted that she did not 
have a safe.  After Brown informed Googe that he knew she had a safe, she 
repeated that she had no money.  During this interaction, Googe attempted to get 
out of the bed and her hands became untied.  While describing these events during 
his post-arrest statement, Fletcher commented, “[s]he wasn’t listening—she didn’t 
want to listen.”   
 
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After the cord became untied, Brown held the gun against Googe’s head and 
pushed her back onto the bed.  Fletcher then said, “you better fucking listen, we 
don’t want to hurt you, just you better fucking listen.”  They continued to argue 
with Googe and demanded to know the personal identification number to her credit 
card, but she stated that she did not have one.   
Googe jumped out of the bed, but Brown pushed her back down, put the gun 
on a dresser, and climbed on top of her.  He held her down with one hand on her 
neck and the other on her chest and told her, “[b]itch, this ain’t how it works.”  
Googe was kicking her legs, and Fletcher picked up the gun, pressed it against her 
leg, and said, “[y]ou better stop moving your fucking legs or else I’m going to 
shoot you.”   
Googe then went with Fletcher and Brown to the safe.  However, she said 
that she needed her glasses, so Brown led her back to the bedroom.  Once there, 
Googe claimed she needed to use the restroom.  She entered the restroom and tried 
to slam the door shut.  Brown pushed the door open, and Googe hit him with a 
hairdryer.  Brown yelled for Fletcher, who had remained by the safe.  When 
Fletcher entered the bedroom, Brown had Googe pinned to the bed with a pillow 
over her face, and Googe was attempting to fight back.  After Fletcher entered the 
bedroom, the three returned to the closet that contained the safe.   
 
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Googe opened the safe with her hands visibly shaking.  Brown and Fletcher 
looked for money, but did not find any.  Brown pointed the gun at Googe and 
asked where the money was.  Googe repeated that she did not have any money, 
except for some money in her purse.   
Googe then attempted to rise, but Brown pushed her down to the floor.  With 
Googe in a fetal position, Brown wrapped his arm around her neck and mouthed to 
Fletcher that he was going to kill her.  Fletcher stated that he watched, but 
otherwise did nothing.  After several minutes, Brown said it was not working and 
released her.  He mouthed to Fletcher that he would break Googe’s neck, then 
grabbed her chin and head and attempted to do so, but failed.   
Fletcher, Brown, and Googe then moved towards the den.  Fletcher secured 
his arm around Googe’s neck, and Brown attempted to pick Googe up by her feet.  
Brown lifted one of Googe’s legs off the ground, but was unable to hold the other 
because she kicked at him.  During the struggle, Googe scratched Fletcher, who 
called her a bitch and released her.  When Googe attempted to rise from the 
ground, Fletcher struck her in the head three times—once on the cheek and twice 
high on the side of her head—with an open hand.  Fletcher explained during his 
post-arrest statement that he struck her  
[b]ecause she was—she was being ignorant. . . .  If she wouldn’t have 
been being like that, she wouldn’t have never got hit or nothing.  She 
was being—. . .  She was—she was ready to fight.  She wanted to 
fight.  She didn’t want to just—over $37.  All she had to do was just 
 
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be quiet and give up the $37 and tell—say what the PIN number is to 
her credit card and she would have just got tied up and left.  
 
Fletcher stated that Brown positioned himself on top of Googe with his 
knees on her arms to hold her down, and choked her with both hands.  Googe 
began kicking, so Fletcher held her legs down at the knees.  Googe tried to speak, 
but could only make choking noises.  When Googe stopped fighting, Fletcher let 
her go and entered another room, where he took a jewelry box.  Fletcher claimed 
that when he returned to the den, Brown had released Googe, who was laying on 
her side making snoring noises.  Fletcher watched her while Brown retrieved a 
plastic storage bag from the kitchen.  Brown placed the bag over Googe’s head and 
secured it by tying a phone cord around Googe’s neck.  The bag became foggy.  
Fletcher stated that he left the room, and when he returned, Brown informed him 
that Googe was dead.   
Fletcher and Brown then departed from the house.  Fletcher drove Googe’s 
Lincoln Town Car, and Brown drove the stolen pickup truck.  They discarded the 
pickup in the woods a short distance from Googe’s house.  The plastic bag, the 
telephone cord, the prison clothing, the purse, and the wallet were discarded in a 
retention pond.   
Fletcher then described the remainder of their flight through Georgia and 
Tennessee, to his aunt and uncle’s house in Kentucky, and then their return to 
Florida, where they were re-arrested.   
 
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The evidence presented during trial with respect to the discovery of the 
escape and Googe’s murder corroborated the description of events given by 
Fletcher, with the exception of who strangled Googe.  After the officers discovered 
that Fletcher and Brown were missing, a K-9 officer and his trained canine were 
dispatched to search for Fletcher’s and Brown’s scents.  The canine detected a 
scent outside of the barbed-wire fence that separated the sheriff’s office and the 
field.  This scent led across the highway and terminated near a dance studio.  The 
owner of the Z71 pickup truck—the first vehicle that Fletcher stated he and Brown 
attempted to steal—had left his truck outside of the studio to advertise that it was 
for sale.  He received a phone call from the sheriff’s office on April 15 that his 
vehicle had been broken into, and he travelled to the studio, where he discovered 
that the passenger window of the extended cab had been smashed.  Additionally, 
the steering column and ignition had been tampered with, as though someone had 
tried to start the vehicle without a key.   
 
On that same morning at approximately 9 a.m., the owner of a home and 
business across from the jail discovered that the ignition switch to his blue GMC 
van was broken and locked into position, also as if someone had forcibly attempted 
to start the vehicle without a key.  He walked over to the sheriff’s office and told 
officers about his vehicle.  A crime scene technician observed muddy footprints 
that led from the dance studio towards the van.   
 
- 10 - 
Additionally on that morning, the owner of a tire business located across 
from the jail discovered that the gates of the business were lying flat on the 
driveway as though they had been run over.  He also noticed that his Ford F150 
was missing.  He reported this to the sheriff’s office.  The truck was later 
discovered in the woods near Googe’s residence. 
Meanwhile, at approximately 6:40 that morning, a deputy with the Clay 
County Sheriff’s Office observed a four-door gold Lincoln with Putnam County 
license plates while he drove home from work.  He became suspicious because 
nothing was open in the area, he rarely saw Putnam County plates there, and his 
office had received a “be on the lookout” for two escapees from the Putnam 
County Jail.  He wrote down the tag number and accelerated to examine the 
individuals in the vehicle.  He was able to see the passenger, who was wearing a 
blue baseball cap with a red bill.  The officer continued home, and later ran the 
plate number through the National Crime Information Center database.  He 
discovered that the vehicle was owned by Googe, who he knew had been married 
to Fletcher’s grandfather.  He recalled that Fletcher was one of the escaped 
prisoners, and contacted the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office.  Later that day, he 
saw a television broadcast with photographs of Fletcher and Brown, and he 
recognized Brown as the passenger in the Lincoln.   
 
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Because of the observation by the Clay County deputy, a warrants officer 
with the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office was asked to make contact with Googe.  
When the officer arrived at the property, the Lincoln was not in the carport.  The 
officer knocked on the door and, when nobody responded, walked around the 
house knocking on doors and windows.  He travelled to a nearby grocery store to 
ask if anyone had seen Googe, her Lincoln, or a truck matching the one missing 
from the tire business.  Nobody had seen Googe or the missing vehicles, and the 
officer returned to the property.  When two other officers arrived, they entered the 
home and found Googe dead.   
A crime lab analyst with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE) located pliers above the firewood door that created an entrance into the 
home.  The lock on the door was still attached, but the hasp was broken.  Inside the 
home, the analyst found an open jewelry box on the floor of the study.  The interior 
walls of the family room were decorated with a sword, knives, and a revolver.  The 
weaponry was supported by wooden pegs, but one set of pegs was unadorned.  In 
the master bedroom, he found a phone set on the floor with the cord broken off, 
and a hairdryer in the bathroom.  Near Googe’s body, he found part of a broken 
eyeglasses chain.  The remainder of the chain, as well as the eyeglasses, were 
found near the safe.    
 
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A detective with the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office contacted Googe’s 
credit card company and obtained a subpoena for records showing any transactions 
on April 15, 2009.  Two transactions occurred on that date, one at a Florida gas 
station, and another at a Georgia gas station.   
Law enforcement learned that after Brown and Fletcher left Googe’s home, 
they proceeded to the home of Brown’s aunt.  She allowed Brown into the house 
and he used her computer to look up directions, which he wrote down.  Brown then 
departed, and his aunt testified that she saw him enter the passenger’s seat of a 
vehicle resembling a tan Cadillac with a Caucasian driver.  She did not observe any 
scratches or other physical injuries on Brown.   
The FDLE crime lab analyst who processed the Lincoln found a piece of 
paper with handwritten directions.  The paper had fingerprints and handprints that 
were identified as belonging to Brown.  A soda bottle was also discovered, which 
had a fingerprint that was identified as belonging to Brown.  Brown’s fingerprints 
were also identified on a handbook and a plastic shopping bag found in the vehicle.   
The FDLE also analyzed swabs taken from the Lincoln for DNA evidence.  
The analyst found a complete DNA profile on the swab taken from the headlight 
switch and an interior door handle that matched Fletcher’s DNA profile.  The 
probability that the DNA profile would match another individual is approximately 
one in 490 trillion Caucasians, one in 13 quadrillion African Americans, and one in 
 
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1.1 quadrillion Southeastern Hispanics.  Two soda bottles found in the car were 
also analyzed for DNA evidence, and the analyst found mixed DNA profiles on 
each bottle.  With respect to the first bottle, Brown was a possible contributor, but 
no determination could be made as to whether Fletcher was a possible contributor.  
More than 99% of Caucasians, African Americans, and Southeastern Hispanics 
could be excluded as contributors to the mixed DNA profile.  With respect to the 
second bottle, Brown and Fletcher were both possible contributors to the mixed 
profile, and again more than 99% of Caucasian, African American, and 
Southeastern Hispanic individuals could be excluded as contributors.  With respect 
to the fingernail scrapings taken from Googe, the analyst found a partial DNA 
profile that matched the known profile of Fletcher.  The probability that the partial 
DNA profile would match another individual is approximately one in 260 million 
Caucasians, one in 3.6 billion African Americans, and one in 580 million 
Southeastern Hispanics.   
The medical examiner determined that the cause of Googe’s death was 
asphyxia due to manual strangulation.  He identified fingertip contusions2 under 
the chin, as well as hemorrhages in the neck area.  The injuries were consistent 
with a person grabbing Googe around the neck and squeezing with his or her 
thumbs down onto her neck.  Additionally, the cartilage of Googe’s larynx was 
                                          
 
2.  Fingertip contusions are contusions that resemble fingertips. 
 
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fractured and surrounded with contusions and hemorrhages, and the thyroid 
cartilage was fractured.  The medical examiner found a contusion on Googe’s left 
upper eyelid, which was the result of blunt trauma, as well as a contusion on the 
right side of her scalp.  The scalp contusion was superficial, and there was no 
underlying skull fracture, bleeding into her brain, or subdural or subarachnoid 
hemorrhages.  On her right arm, he found fingertip contusions, which indicated 
that she was restrained by someone.  Because Googe was elderly, little force would 
be necessary to cause this kind of bruising.  There was also a contusion and 
ligature marks on Googe’s left wrist and a superficial laceration on her right 
forearm that most likely resulted from being held by the wrist.  The medical 
examiner also found abrasions on her knees.   
The medical examiner determined that all of Googe’s injuries occurred pre-
death and during the same time frame.  Because there was no significant trauma to 
the head that would cause a loss of consciousness, he also concluded that the 
injuries occurred while Googe was conscious.  Significantly, there was no 
hemorrhaging at the top of the brain, despite the fact that Googe was elderly and 
would bleed more easily.   
On May 25, 2012, a jury found Fletcher guilty of the first-degree murder of 
Googe, two counts of grand theft of a motor vehicle, home-invasion robbery, two 
counts of burglary, and escape.  During the penalty phase, the State presented 
 
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records of Fletcher’s commitment to the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) 
for a previous conviction.  The State also presented the victim impact statement of 
Googe’s daughter, read by Googe’s brother.   
The defense presented the testimony of Fletcher’s brother, Jeffrey.  Jeffrey 
testified that their parents separated when Jeffrey was between the ages of five and 
seven, and he lived with Fletcher and their father for approximately one year after 
the separation.  During that year, their father drank almost every day.  
Additionally, he testified that their father would spank him if he did something 
wrong, but he never saw his father abuse Fletcher.  After a year, Jeffrey moved in 
with his mother and would spend one or two weekends each month with Fletcher 
and their father until he was eleven or twelve, when he stopped visiting.  Jeffrey 
testified that Fletcher and his mother spoke frequently on the phone before she died 
and they had a good relationship.   
Fletcher also presented the testimony of his father, Ricky.  Ricky testified 
that when Fletcher was approximately five or six years old, Ricky and Fletcher’s 
mother began having violent domestic disputes that always involved alcohol.  On 
one occasion, Ricky threatened the mother with a shotgun, but stopped when he 
saw Fletcher watching.  Ricky was arrested six or seven times for violent acts, 
which were witnessed by the children.  The mother obtained a restraining order 
 
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against Ricky at one point.  Ricky testified that he and Fletcher’s mother separated 
when Fletcher was about eleven years old.   
Fletcher presented mental health mitigation through the testimony of Dr. 
Harry Krop, a licensed psychologist.  Dr. Krop’s assistant, a licensed mental-health 
professional, met with Fletcher once to conduct psychological testing and a 
neuropsychological evaluation.  The testing revealed that Fletcher had no brain 
damage, possessed an average IQ, and functioned in the top 40% of the population.  
Fletcher was an underachiever in school, which Dr. Krop concluded resulted from 
emotional, family, and environmental issues.   
Dr. Krop conducted a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI), the results of which were invalid because of inconsistent answers.  Dr. 
Krop testified that there are several reasons for MMPI test results to be invalid, 
including that the person taking the test is in distress.  Dr. Krop did not believe that 
Fletcher was malingering because other tests in the neuropsychological battery 
resulted in normal or average results.   
Dr. Krop diagnosed Fletcher with polysubstance dependence, which he 
determined had been ongoing since Fletcher was eleven years old, the age that 
Fletcher asserted he began drinking and using marijuana.  Since then, Fletcher has 
used other drugs, including methamphetamines, prescription drugs, powder 
cocaine, crack cocaine, acid, and mushrooms.  Dr. Krop also diagnosed Fletcher 
 
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with chronic insomnia, chronic depressive disorder, and antisocial personality 
disorder.  Dr. Krop noted that Fletcher had been diagnosed in the past with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but no longer displayed any symptoms of the 
disorder.  Although Fletcher’s records reflected a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, Dr. 
Krop did not observe any symptoms of the disorder, and testified that the reference 
could have been a misdiagnosis.   
Dr. Krop believed Fletcher abused drugs and alcohol to self-medicate for 
depression.  He testified that Fletcher suffered from both situational depression 
from his incarceration and a lifetime of depression due in part to his family 
environment.  Additionally, Fletcher’s mother died of brain cancer when Fletcher 
was eighteen years old.  The last six months of her life were very difficult, and 
Fletcher was incarcerated at the time of her funeral.  Although he was allowed a 
private viewing, he was not permitted to attend the funeral.  Further, Dr. Krop 
testified that Fletcher had a history of self-harm and cut himself when he was 
fifteen years old.  
Dr. Krop additionally testified that Fletcher was raised in an extremely 
dysfunctional family environment, which included physical abuse, emotional 
abuse, domestic violence, and a tumultuous relationship between his parents.  Both 
parents were unfaithful and would use Fletcher as an intermediary.  Fletcher felt 
abandoned by his mother after his parents separated.  Fletcher described to Dr. 
 
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Krop physical abuse by his father, which included being struck with a belt, being 
instructed to make a paddle that the father would then use to strike him, being 
struck with his father’s fist on one occasion, being choked on one occasion, and 
being threatened with a gun on one occasion.   
Fletcher’s aunt described to Dr. Krop severe domestic violence between 
Fletcher’s parents, in which law enforcement was called.  There was also a 
domestic violence incident between Fletcher’s father and a subsequent girlfriend.   
Dr. Krop testified that Fletcher resented Googe.  Fletcher explained to Dr. 
Krop that his resentment was due to friction that arose between his grandfather and 
Googe because his grandfather continued to support Fletcher, despite the repeated 
instances of trouble.   
The defense also presented the testimony of a mental health specialist who 
had counseled Fletcher during his incarceration at the Suwannee Correctional 
Institution.  She testified that inmates were designated as level one, two, or three 
according to the amount of mental-health treatment they would receive, with level 
one being no treatment.  Fletcher was assigned a level three, was prescribed 
psychotropic medications, and was diagnosed with depression. 
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Gregory Prichard, a 
licensed psychologist.  Dr. Prichard testified that he found no evidence of 
neurological issues.  He diagnosed Fletcher with antisocial personality disorder, 
 
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polysubstance dependence, and depressive disorder not otherwise specified.  He 
testified that Fletcher had been treated for depression during prior incarcerations 
and responded well to antidepressants.  However, when released from 
incarceration, Fletcher returned to the use of drugs.   
The jury recommended a death sentence for the murder of Helen Googe by a 
vote of eight to four.  During the Spencer3 hearing, the State presented the victim 
impact statements of Googe’s brother and nephew.  The defense asked the trial 
court to review the presentence investigation report and to consider the mitigating 
circumstances contained in it, including Fletcher’s history of drug and alcohol 
abuse and his dysfunctional family.  Fletcher then read a statement he had 
prepared, in which he apologized to his and Googe’s families and detailed his 
struggles through childhood and adolescence.   
The trial court found the evidence established that Fletcher, not Brown, 
killed Googe.  The trial court considered that Fletcher admitted he was the 
architect of the criminal episode; stole the jack and crank shaft; knew Googe, while 
Brown did not; had been to Googe’s home, while Brown had not; knew about the 
firewood door and the safe, which Brown did not; knew Googe’s financial status, 
while Brown did not; hated Googe, while Brown did not; and took the keys to 
                                          
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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Googe’s car.  Additionally, Fletcher had scratches on his arms, while Brown did 
not, and Fletcher’s DNA was under Googe’s nails, while Brown’s was not.   
The trial court found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
the existence of three statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was 
committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of 
imprisonment (great weight); (2) the murder was committed while Fletcher was 
engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of a robbery (great weight), 
merged with the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for 
financial gain (no added weight); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight).   
The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance—Fletcher’s age 
of twenty-five at the time of the crime (minimal weight).  The trial court 
additionally found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) 
Fletcher was physically abused by his alcoholic father in the past (little weight); (2) 
Fletcher suffered from chronic addiction to drugs in the past (moderate weight); (3) 
Fletcher has been treated for and suffers from depression (little weight); (4) 
Fletcher has been treated for PTSD in the past (slight weight); (5) as a child, 
Fletcher witnessed his mother being physically abused by his father (some weight); 
(6) Fletcher has attempted suicide (little weight); (7) Fletcher responded well to 
counseling while at the Suwannee Correctional Institute (little weight); (8) Fletcher 
 
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reported that he was awake all night before the escape and consumed 
methamphetamines (very little weight); (9) Fletcher obtained his GED while 
incarcerated (some weight); (10) Fletcher comes from a dysfunctional family 
(some weight); (11) Fletcher’s mother died when he was eighteen, and he had a 
close relationship with her (little weight); (12) Fletcher has artistic ability (slight 
weight); (13) Fletcher expressed remorse (some weight); (14) Fletcher displayed 
good behavior during the trial and all subsequent court proceedings (some weight); 
(15) Fletcher cooperated with police after his arrest by providing them with a 
lengthy videotaped statement (moderate weight); and (16) Brown, Fletcher’s 
accomplice, pled guilty to the same offenses and received a life sentence (great 
weight).  The trial court found the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that 
Fletcher had been treated for bipolar disorder had not been established.   
The trial court specifically found that  
[d]espite the existence of a number of mitigating circumstances and 
the weight assigned to each by this Court, the nature and quality of 
those factors, including the disparate sentences, pale in comparison to 
the strength of the aggravating circumstances established in this case.  
The Court now finds that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances.  The fact that the homicide was 
committed while the Defendant had previously been convicted of a 
felony and was under a sentence of imprisonment, the fact that the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain during the course of a 
robbery, and the heinous, atrocious and cruel manner in which the 
murder was committed, greatly outweighs the statutory and non-
statutory mitigating circumstances established by the record.  
 
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Accordingly, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced 
Fletcher to death.  
This direct appeal followed.   
ANALYSIS 
Consolidation of Offenses 
Fletcher was charged by indictment with one count of escape, two counts of 
grand theft of a motor vehicle, one count of first-degree murder, and one count of 
home invasion robbery.  Fletcher was additionally charged in two separate 
informations with two counts of burglary of a structure or conveyance (i.e., the 
first two motor vehicles that Fletcher attempted to steal).  The State moved to 
consolidate both burglary offenses with the crimes charged in the indictment, and 
the trial court granted the motion.  Fletcher later moved to sever the escape charge 
and one of the grand theft charges because (1) they were temporally and physically 
separate from the other counts, and (2) a separate trial for each was necessary for a 
fair determination of Fletcher’s guilt or innocence.  Fletcher subsequently filed a 
supplemental motion to sever the motor vehicle burglary charges.   
The trial court denied the motions to sever on the basis that the charges were 
all part of the same criminal episode and severance was not necessary for a fair 
determination of Fletcher’s guilt or innocence.  The trial court noted that all of the 
crimes occurred within approximately ten miles of one another and on the same 
 
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morning.  Additionally, the trial court found that each crime was relevant to the 
others because they were all committed to evade re-arrest.   
A trial court’s decision on consolidation and severance is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  Crossley v. State, 596 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 1992).  Two or 
more offenses may be charged together if they are based on the same act or 
transaction, or on two or more connected acts or transactions.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.150(a).  Additionally, two or more indictments or informations that charge 
related offenses shall be consolidated for trial if a timely motion is filed by either 
party.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.151(b).   
There must be a meaningful relationship between or among charges before 
they can be tried together.  Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 93 (Fla. 2003).  In other 
words, the crimes must be linked in some significant way.  Id.  Whether acts or 
transactions are connected is considered in an episodic sense.  Fotopoulos v. State, 
608 So. 2d 784, 789 (Fla. 1992).  Courts may consider whether the acts or 
transactions are temporally or geographically associated, the nature of the crimes, 
and the manner in which they are committed.  Id. at 789-90.   
When a defendant engages in a crime spree uninterrupted by any significant 
period of respite between the individual offenses, the crimes are considered to be 
connected and a single uninterrupted episode.  See Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991, 
999 (Fla. 1993).  Additionally, even where there is a significant lapse of time, if 
 
- 24 - 
there is a causal link—one crime is used to induce the other—then consolidation is 
appropriate.  See Ellis, 622 So. 2d at 999.   
However, a defendant is entitled to severance if severance is necessary to 
achieve a fair determination of guilt or innocence.  Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 790.  
Interests in practicality, efficiency, expense, convenience, and judicial economy do 
not outweigh a defendant’s right to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.  
Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1029-30 (Fla. 1991).   
We conclude that the crimes in this case were properly tried together.  On 
the morning of April 15, Fletcher executed a plan to escape, with the intent to 
travel to Googe’s house.  His goal was to acquire funds to avoid re-arrest.  Because 
Googe lived approximately ten miles away from the jail, Fletcher sought transport, 
which resulted in failed attempts to steal two vehicles and the successful theft of a 
third.  He used the third vehicle to travel to Googe’s house, where he 
surreptitiously entered the home and, after a struggle, eventually strangled her.  
After the murder, Fletcher stole her vehicle in a continued effort to avoid re-arrest.  
Each of the events of that morning demonstrates a resolute effort to effectuate the 
goal of escaping and avoiding re-arrest.  The crimes were causally connected, and 
each crime committed subsequent to the escape cannot be fully understood without 
this context.  These events were all part of a single and uninterrupted criminal 
spree, and occurred within a close temporal and geographic proximity.  
 
- 25 - 
Accordingly, the crimes have a meaningful relationship, are linked in a significant 
way, and were properly consolidated.   
In this case, Fletcher has not established that severance was required in order 
to ensure “the fair determination of guilt or innocence.”  Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 
790.  Cf. State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1982) (holding that 
severance was necessary because even though the three crimes were committed 
during the same incident and were all admissible, the evidence needed to prove one 
of the counts would prejudice the defense to the other counts, and thus could 
“deprive [the defendant] of the presumption of innocence”); McCray v. State, 416 
So. 2d 804, 806-07 (Fla. 1982) (emphasizing that the critical element in 
determining a motion to sever is examining whether a defendant’s right to a fair 
determination of guilt or innocence is compromised).  Although some prejudice 
exists during any trial in which multiple offenses are tried together, this “garden 
variety” prejudice is not sufficient to justify severance.  Lugo, 845 So. 2d at 96 
n.39.  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Motion to Suppress 
 
Prior to the post-arrest interrogation, the following exchange occurred 
between Fletcher and the deputies who escorted him into the interrogation room:  
FLETCHER:  Will you do me a favor and loosen the (inaudible) 
around the shackle? 
 
- 26 - 
 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE DEPUTY:  What’s that? 
 
FLETCHER:  Will you loosen the shackle a little bit, please? 
 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE DEPUTY:  Have a seat. 
               
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE DEPUTY:  No.  No. 
 
FLETCHER:  No?  It’s too tight.  I don’t want to talk to nobody then. 
 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE DEPUTY:  Sit down.  (Inaudible) waist 
chains first and then we can do the shackles.   
 
 Shortly after this exchange, the detective who interrogated Fletcher and an 
investigator from the State Attorney’s Office entered the room, and the deputies 
left.  The detective read the Miranda4 rights to Fletcher, and asked Fletcher if he 
understood those rights.  Fletcher responded affirmatively.  The detective then 
inquired whether, with those rights in mind, Fletcher was willing to speak with the 
detective and the investigator.  Again, Fletcher responded affirmatively, and he 
signed a waiver. 
 
Before trial, Fletcher filed a motion to suppress his post-arrest statement on 
the basis that he invoked his right to remain silent during the exchange with the 
deputies.  The trial court denied the motion and noted in its order that Fletcher’s 
statement “I don’t want to talk to nobody then” was not given in response to a 
question or during the interrogation; that the interrogating detective was not in the 
                                          
 
4.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
 
- 27 - 
room at the time of the statement; and that the deputies to whom the statement was 
directed left the room before the interrogation commenced.  The trial court found 
that the statement was conditional on the deputies loosening the shackle.  The trial 
court also found that Fletcher made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of 
his Miranda rights.   
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is clothed with a presumption 
of correctness.  Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1997).  A reviewing 
court must interpret the evidence, reasonable inferences, and deductions in the 
manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.  Id.  Mixed questions 
of law and fact are reviewed de novo.  Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 605 (Fla. 
2001).   
 
We hold that the statement by Fletcher, “I don’t want to talk to nobody 
then,” was neither an equivocal nor an unequivocal invocation of his right to 
remain silent.  The purpose of the statement was to persuade the guards to loosen 
the shackles.  No questioning, discussion, or even casual conversation occurred 
prior to this statement.  Fletcher was simply being secured in the interrogation 
room, and during this process he made a conditional statement to bargain with the 
deputies to have his shackles loosened.   
 
Fletcher’s reliance on Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992), is 
misplaced.  In Traylor, we commented that an interrogation must cease if the 
 
- 28 - 
defendant indicates “in any manner” that he or she does not wish to be 
interrogated.  Id. at 966.  However, the use of the phrase “in any manner” by this 
Court was to convey only that no magic words are necessary to invoke the right to 
remain silent.  See State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997); Traylor, 596 
So. 2d at 966.  There is no discussion in Traylor with respect to what qualifies as 
an equivocal or unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.  Traylor 
simply acknowledges that when a defendant has made an invocation, all 
interrogation must cease.  596 So. 2d at 966.  Thus, Traylor does not provide any 
guidance with respect to whether the statement by Fletcher was an invocation of 
the right to remain silent.   
 
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the statement was an equivocal 
invocation of the right to remain silent, any uncertainty as to whether Fletcher 
sought to invoke this right was clarified by the subsequent reading of the Miranda 
warnings prior to the interrogation.5  This case is similar to Henry v. State, 574 So. 
                                          
 
5.  One basis relied on by the trial court when it denied the motion to 
suppress was that the alleged invocation was equivocal and did not need to be 
clarified.  We note that when a defendant who has not yet waived the right to 
remain silent makes an ambiguous statement with regard to the right, the police 
must clarify whether the ambiguous statement was an invocation of that right.  See 
Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 162 (Fla. 2007); see also Miles v. State, 60 So. 3d 
447, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“Even if the statement could be construed as an 
equivocal request to remain silent, because [the defendant] had not yet waived his 
Miranda rights, the detectives were required to clarify his intent before proceeding 
further with the interrogation.”).  However, because this was not the only basis for 
 
- 29 - 
2d 66, 68-69 (Fla. 1991), in which the defendant stated to one officer while the 
second officer was outside the room, “I’m not saying nothing to you.  Besides, you 
ain’t read me nothing yet.”  When the second officer entered the room, he read the 
defendant the Miranda rights.  Id. at 68.  The first officer never informed the 
second officer of the defendant’s statement.  Id.  This Court held that the statement 
was not an equivocal request to remain silent, and even if it had been, the second 
officer effectively, if unintentionally, clarified the defendant’s intent when he read 
the Miranda rights.  Id. at 70.   
Similarly, even if we were to conclude that Fletcher made an equivocal 
statement as to his right to remain silent, the subsequent reading of the Miranda 
rights clarified his intent.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly denied 
the motion to suppress and deny relief on this claim.   
Opening Statements 
 
During opening statements, defense counsel admitted that Fletcher 
committed six of the seven crimes with which he was charged.  Defense counsel 
stated:  
As you know, there are seven charges against Timothy Fletcher, 
six of which we are not going to seriously dispute.   
Timothy Fletcher, in the early morning hours of April the 15th 
of 2009, was housed in the same cell as Doni Ray Brown, in the same 
cell at the Putnam County Jail.   
                                          
 
the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, we hold that the denial was 
nonetheless proper for the alternate reasons stated above.   
 
- 30 - 
And the two of them, in the early morning hours, did break out 
of that cell . . . . 
. . . . 
After they left the jail, . . . there’s a series of places, three in a 
row, where Doni Ray Brown and Timothy Fletcher, acting together, 
went to those places and first attempted to take a couple of vehicles 
in—a couple of a series in the early morning hours of the 15th and 
then, eventually, did take a truck that belonged to Mr. Louis and take 
that truck and went over to Helen Googe’s residence. 
The evidence will show that Helen Googe’s residence was, in 
fact, entered by both Timothy Fletcher and Doni Ray Brown. 
. . . . 
There’s reasonable doubt, we’re going to ask you, on the first-
degree-murder charge, which was one of the seven charges against 
Mr. Fletcher, to render a verdict of not guilty because it’s our 
contention that the State will never be able to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the first-degree-murder charge. 
As I say, I say this with a focus that the other charges, the theft 
of Mrs. Googe’s car, the attempted burglary of two other vehicles, the 
theft of Mr. Louis’ vehicle, those really are not going to be in dispute, 
the escape from the Putnam County Jail.   
The State does have to prove those.  They brought them—
brought forth in the trial.  They still have to prove those charges, but 
many of the witnesses regarding those events and those allegations 
will not be seriously or lengthily examined or questioned about those 
events. 
 
After the first witness had testified, the trial court asked Fletcher the following 
questions: 
COURT: Mr. Fletcher, during opening statements, your attorney, 
although not necessarily conceding guilt on the other counts other 
than first-degree murder, did indicate there would not be really 
contesting the other counts.  Have you had a discussion with Mr. 
Wood about the strategy in defending you in this case? 
 
FLETCHER:  Yes, ma’am. 
 
 
- 31 - 
COURT:  And do you agree with the strategy that—that he’s 
proceeding with? 
 
FLETCHER:  Yes, ma’am. 
 
COURT:  All right.  So you agree with the strategy in the opening 
statement? 
 
FLETCHER:  Yes, ma’am. 
 
Fletcher claims that the admissions by counsel during opening statements rendered 
the trial fundamentally unfair, resulted in his guilty verdicts, and conceded two of 
the three aggravating circumstances.  He further claims that the colloquy was 
insufficient to cure the resulting prejudice because the court did not plainly inform 
him that counsel conceded guilt on all but one count, and did not address the 
implications of such concessions on the penalty phase.   
 
This issue presents a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Such 
claims are rarely cognizable on direct appeal, and will be considered only when (1) 
the ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record, and (2) it would be a waste 
of judicial resources to require the trial court to address the issue in postconviction 
proceedings.  See Robards v. State, 112 So. 3d 1256, 1266 (Fla. 2013).   
We have held that admission of participation in noncapital crimes while 
contesting a capital charge can be a legitimate tactical decision.  See Kormondy v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 418, 431 (Fla. 2007).  As a result, such a tactic does not 
demonstrate ineffectiveness on the face of the record.  Moreover, Fletcher 
 
- 32 - 
informed the trial court that he discussed the strategy with his counsel and agreed 
to it.  Whether such a discussion occurred between Fletcher and his counsel, and 
the contents of such a discussion, could be discovered only through an evidentiary 
hearing.  Therefore, we decline to consider this claim on direct appeal.     
References to Past Crimes and Sentence 
 
Fletcher next alleges that he was unduly prejudiced and denied a fair trial 
based on two6 references that were made to his incarceration at the time of the 
escape.  In the first comment, the officer who transported Fletcher in the vehicle 
from which Fletcher acquired the jack and jack handle stated, “I believe Mr. 
Fletcher told me that he had been sentenced for—.”  Defense counsel stopped the 
testimony with an objection and moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied the 
motion and offered to provide a curative instruction, which the defense declined.    
 
The second comment that Fletcher contends was unduly prejudicial was a 
statement made by Fletcher himself during his post-arrest statement, a recording of 
which was played for the jury.  Prior to trial, the trial court had granted the 
                                          
 
6.  Fletcher references a third statement by an officer that Fletcher had been 
housed in the felony area at the time of his escape.  However, no argument or 
elaboration is made with respect to this comment, and it appears to have been 
inserted to bolster the claim with respect to the first challenged comment.  To the 
extent that Fletcher asserts this third comment denied him a fair trial, we conclude 
that it was insufficiently pled.  See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1029 n.8 (Fla. 
2009) (“Vague and conclusory allegations on appeal are insufficient to warrant 
relief.”).   
 
- 33 - 
defense’s request for several redactions.  Before the video was played, the State 
redacted portions of the recording and provided the recording to the defense to 
verify that all redactions were made.  However, the following statement had not 
been redacted from the recording or the transcripts provided to the jury to read 
while the recording was played: 
INVESTIGATOR:  When did you start planning [the escape]?  
Obviously, before April 2nd because you took the jack. 
 
FLETCHER:  No.  I didn’t really—I didn’t fully plan on escaping 
before that, but I had talked about it.  And I had just got sentenced to 
the ten years.  My grandma just died, my—my real grandma, my 
grandpa’s first wife— 
 
INVESTIGATOR:  Right. 
 
FLETCHER:  —just died in December.  And I don’t know.  I just—
ten years is a long-ass time.  I thought it was before, but— 
 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Judge, I need to take something out of the— 
 
COURT:  All right. 
   
(Emphasis supplied.)  The defense again moved for a mistrial.  The trial court 
reserved ruling on the motion and collected the transcripts.  Defense counsel 
declined the trial court’s offer for a curative instruction.  The trial court later 
denied Fletcher’s renewed motion for mistrial.   
 
The statements Fletcher challenges were the subject of a motion in limine 
that was granted by the trial court, and no references to Fletcher’s sentence should 
have been heard by the jury.  The State has a duty to prepare its witnesses so as to 
 
- 34 - 
avoid any violation of a court order.  Each witness presented by the State should 
have been clearly instructed not to testify with respect to the sentence.  These 
unpermitted disclosures could have been avoidable with adequate preparation.   
However, a motion for mistrial is to be granted only when an error is so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  See Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 976 (Fla. 
2011).  The ruling on such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Id.  
Although evidence with regard to the underlying crime that resulted in the 
incarceration leading to the escape should not have been heard by the jury, the 
standard for a motion for mistrial is high, and we conclude that the remarks in this 
case were not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  
 
Remarks that relate to a defendant’s prior imprisonment are to be evaluated 
in the context of the surrounding circumstances and do not always require reversal.  
See Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 713-14 (Fla. 2002); see also Ferguson v. State, 
417 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1982); Nodel v. State, 579 So. 2d 768, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1991).  A comment that is brief, isolated, and inadvertent may not warrant a 
mistrial.  See Ruger v. State, 941 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).   
 
Here, the statement by the officer that Fletcher had been sentenced was brief 
and did not reveal the nature of the conviction or the severity of the sentence.  The 
statement informed the jury only that Fletcher was incarcerated pursuant to a 
conviction.  Any prejudice resulting from this statement could have been cured by 
 
- 35 - 
an instruction, but defense counsel decided that no further attention should be 
drawn to the statement and declined such an instruction.  Furthermore, during trial, 
Fletcher stipulated that he was in lawful custody prior to the escape, and therefore 
the jury could not have been surprised that he was incarcerated.  Thus, we 
conclude that this brief statement by the officer did not vitiate the entire trial.   
With respect to the unredacted statement by Fletcher, the trial court stated, 
“[d]espite the fact that it was in violation of my ruling on the motion in limine, it 
was just a blip.”  The unredacted statement was brief in comparison to the lengthy 
transcript and video statement, which was over two and a half hours long.  Neither 
the trial court nor defense counsel brought the jury’s attention to the statements 
regarding the length of Fletcher’s sentence.   
Accordingly, we conclude that these brief and fleeting statements were not 
so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial and deny this claim. 
Guilt-Phase Closing Statements 
Post-Arrest Silence 
 
During his post-arrest statement, after he was informed that the police had 
swabbed Googe’s nails for DNA evidence, Fletcher stated, “I really don’t even 
want to tell you everything that happened, to be honest with you.”  During the 
closing statements, the prosecutor referenced this statement:  
When you—when he was—when the defendant was confronted 
with the possibility that he left DNA behind, all of a sudden, he went 
 
- 36 - 
from I didn’t touch her, I wasn’t involved in her strangulation, I went 
into the other room, I didn’t see anything, you know, until it was over, 
Doni Brown came to me and he said, oh, she had a heart attack.   
He went from that story to, oh, oh, I kind of lied to you.  And 
I—at first, he said I don’t really want to talk about it.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Fletcher contends that this was an improper comment on his 
post-arrest silence.  No objection was made to this statement during trial.  
Therefore, this claim is reviewed for fundamental error.  Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 
510, 519 (Fla. 2009).  Error is fundamental when it reaches down into the validity 
of the trial such that a guilty verdict could not have been obtained in the absence of 
the error.  Id.   
 
Although comments on post-Miranda silence are generally prohibited, see 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), this Court has held that no such 
prohibition exists where a defendant does not invoke his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to answer “one question out of 
many.”  Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 911 (Fla. 2001); Valle v. State, 474 So. 
2d 796, 801 (Fla. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986).  Here, 
Fletcher not only waived his right against self-incrimination by engaging in a 
lengthy interview with police, but also continued to talk to the officers even after 
he made this statement as a direct part of that lengthy interview, which was played 
for the jury.  
 
- 37 - 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor did not improperly comment on 
any post-arrest silence.  However, even if there was error, it was not fundamental.  
We therefore deny relief on this claim.   
Sending a Message 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated: 
And I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, send the message to this 
defendant that his behavior is not acceptable.   
Send the message to him and tell him, it’s not okay to kill 
people.   
You send that message and you find him guilty as charged.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Fletcher contends that these comments by the prosecutor 
constitute an improper attempt to bypass the prohibition against asking jurors to 
send a message to the community through their verdict.  We agree.   
 
We have clearly stated that prosecutors may not ask the jury to send a 
message through its verdict.  See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720, 724 (Fla. 
1996); Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).  Prosecutors are not 
permitted to make statements that inject fear and emotion into jury deliberations.  
See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 419 (Fla. 1998).   
The substitution of Fletcher in lieu of the community as the recipient of the 
message does not take this statement outside of the prohibition.  In Urbin, the 
Court addressed a statement similar to the one made by the prosecutor here.  714 
So. 2d at 419-421.  The prosecutor in Urbin commented during closing statements, 
 
- 38 - 
“Now this defendant wants a life sentence for robbing somebody and murdering 
them.  What kind of message would that send—what kind of message would a life 
recommendation send to this defendant?”  Id. at 421.  This Court held that the 
statement was improper even though the prosecutor urged the jury to send a 
message to the defendant and not the community.  Id.  We reiterate that such 
statements are improper and prohibited.  As we have previously explained, the 
prosecutor has a duty to seek justice—not merely “win” a death recommendation.  
See, e.g., Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 170 (Fla. 2012); Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 
422; Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 133.   
No objection was made to the improper comment, and therefore we review 
this claim for fundamental error.  An error is not fundamental unless improper 
comments are so prejudicial that they tainted the jury’s verdict.  See Mendoza v. 
State, 964 So. 2d 121, 133 (Fla. 2007).  The phrase “send a message” was iterated 
only three times during the closing statements, all at roughly the same time.  The 
prosecutor did not use this as a theme, and these were the only improper comments 
made during the closing statements.  Further, the evidence against Fletcher, 
including his post-arrest statement and the DNA evidence, is overwhelming.  As a 
result, we conclude that these improper statements did not taint the jury’s verdict, 
and we deny relief on this claim.   
Nonstatutory Aggravation 
 
- 39 - 
During the penalty phase, Fletcher presented mental health mitigation 
evidence through the testimony of Dr. Krop, a psychologist.  In rebuttal, the State 
presented the testimony of Dr. Prichard, another psychologist.  Both doctors 
diagnosed Fletcher with antisocial personality disorder.  The subclaims in this 
issue relate to their testimony.   
Future Dangerousness 
 
Dr. Prichard testified that forensic psychologists employ a psychopathy 
checklist to determine whether a person is a psychopath, which he stated is 
important to determine treatment recommendations.  He testified that:  
A psychopath is basically a criminal variant that has a number 
of personality and behavioral characteristics that make them fairly 
unique, even among criminal people, even among people with a 
criminal personality.   
It’s kind of the turbocharged antisocial personality disordered 
individual.[7]   
 
Dr. Prichard explained how the test is scored and that a score of thirty or higher out 
of forty meant that the person was psychopathic, or had “a lot of the behavioral and 
personality characteristics on the psychopathy checklist that connote that the 
person is psychopathic.”  He testified that he conducted such a test on Fletcher, and 
began to testify as to Fletcher’s score on the test, but defense counsel objected.  
                                          
 
7.  Dr. Krop had previously explained that the psychopathy checklist is 
highly correlated with antisocial personality disorder and that many of the traits 
overlap. 
 
- 40 - 
The trial court ruled that the results were relevant only to future dangerousness and 
were not admissible.  Further, the trial court stated that the only rebuttal testimony 
that was relevant to the psychopathy checklist was whether each doctor determined 
the test to be relevant.   
Fletcher asserts that this testimony, and testimony that antisocial personality 
disorder is a chronic disorder, constituted evidence of future dangerousness, which 
is improper nonstatutory aggravation.  Assertions of future dangerousness may not 
be used by prosecutors as a basis for the death sentence.  See Delhall, 95 So. 3d at 
168.   
We hold that these statements did not constitute improper nonstatutory 
aggravation.  The only direct reference to future dangerousness during the penalty 
phase was the unchallenged testimony of Dr. Krop that psychopathic traits are used 
to perform risk assessments for sexual offenders.  Dr. Prichard did not testify that 
Fletcher was a psychopath or that psychopaths posed a future threat.  Rather, he 
testified that the psychopathy checklist tested for psychopathic traits.  Additionally, 
he did not testify as to what psychopathic traits Fletcher exhibited, only that he 
performed the test on Fletcher.  Such references in and of themselves do not 
improperly interject future dangerousness into the proceedings, and therefore this 
testimony is not evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor.  Accordingly, we 
deny relief on this claim.    
 
- 41 - 
Prior Criminal Record 
 
To explain how Dr. Prichard determined that Fletcher had one criteria of 
antisocial personality disorder—that the individual fails to conform to social norms 
with respect to lawful behaviors—Dr. Prichard testified:  
For Mr. Fletcher, we have his—he began criminal offending at 
approximately the age of 13 or 14. 
 
He began stealing cars.  He indicated in my interview with him 
that he had ten juvenile arrests. 
 
He had at least ten school suspensions before he was expelled 
during the ninth-grade year.   
 
So a lot of criminal misbehavior and general misbehavior in the 
school environment and outside the school environment.   
 
He was first sent to prison as a youthful offender.  That was for 
crimes in 2000.  He’s— 
 
At that point, defense counsel objected, the jury was excused, and the remainder of 
Dr. Prichard’s testimony with regard to the criteria for antisocial personality 
disorder was proffered.  The trial court ruled that Dr. Prichard could testify with 
respect to past crimes to the extent necessary to explain the criteria, but the 
explanation could not be a detailed list of what crimes Fletcher committed and 
when.  When Dr. Prichard resumed his testimony before the jury, he simply stated 
what this criteria was and did not discuss why or how Fletcher met it.   
 
Fletcher contends that Dr. Prichard’s references to his criminal history and 
the use of the term “psychopath” constituted nonstatutory aggravation.  However, 
we conclude that this testimony fell within permissible rebuttal.  Prior to Dr. 
Prichard’s testimony, Dr. Krop testified during direct examination that he 
 
- 42 - 
diagnosed Fletcher as having antisocial personality disorder, a “characterological 
or personality deficit, which we see in individuals who get into trouble at a 
relatively young age.”  Additionally, Dr. Krop testified during direct examination 
that to be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, an individual must exhibit 
traits of a conduct disorder as a juvenile.  Dr. Krop explained that Fletcher “got 
into trouble at school.  He’s had suspensions in school.  He’s had behavioral 
outbursts in school.  He started getting into the criminal system in his adolescent 
years.  So I would say maybe goes back to [the age of] 11 or 12 . . . .”  Further, 
during cross-examination, Dr. Krop testified that Fletcher “had a number of arrests, 
dating back to when he was a juvenile, including mostly grand theft, burglary or 
breaking-and-entering types of charges.  As a juvenile, those were pretty much the 
preponderance of the charges for what he was arrested and, similarly, as an adult.”   
Because Fletcher presented evidence that he was diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder, had been suspended from school, and had a juvenile record, 
he opened the door to Dr. Prichard’s testimony.  Dr. Krop had already made the 
jury aware of Fletcher’s long criminal history.  Moreover, the use of the word 
“psychopath” during Dr. Prichard’s testimony did not constitute evidence or 
argument of nonstatutory aggravation.  Contrary to Fletcher’s assertions, Dr. 
Prichard never labelled Fletcher as a psychopath in front of the jury.  Although he 
used the words psychopath and psychopathic, he did so in explanation of the 
 
- 43 - 
psychopathy checklist.  As explained above, the simple use of such words is 
insufficient to establish error.   
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Lack of Remorse 
On the other hand, the trial court impermissibly allowed the State to question 
its expert, Dr. Prichard, as to lack of remorse.  Dr. Prichard testified that one of the 
criteria for antisocial personality disorder is lack of remorse: 
DR. PRICHARD:  And the seventh [criteria] is lack of remorse as— 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Objection, your honor. 
 
COURT:  Well, that’s—he can—overruled.  
 
DR. PRICHARD:  Lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent 
to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated or stolen from another. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Okay.  And you felt that all seven of these applied 
in the defendant’s case following your evaluation of him and the items 
you reviewed?  
 
DR. PRICHARD:  Yes. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  With regard to the last criteria, criteria number 
seven, when you’re talking about rationalizing having hurt or 
mistreated another, rationalizing that behavior— 
 
DR. PRICHARD:  Correct. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  —what evidence did you see of that during your 
evaluation of the defendant and your review of the materials that you 
were provided? 
 
 
- 44 - 
As examples of rationalization, Dr. Prichard referenced two events: (1) Fletcher’s 
explanation that he stole a four-wheeler because the keys had been left in it, and 
(2) Fletcher called Googe “ignorant” for fighting over $37 and the PIN for her 
credit card and stated she would not have been hurt had she cooperated.   
Fletcher asserts that this testimony constituted nonstatutory aggravation in 
the form of an impermissible lack of remorse argument.  We agree.   
It is axiomatic that the State may not assert lack of remorse as an 
aggravating factor.  See, e.g., Silvia, 60 So. 3d at 975; Peterson v. State, 2 So. 3d 
146, 158 (Fla. 2009).  While the State argued to the trial court and before this 
Court that lack of remorse is admissible in rebuttal to proposed mitigation based on 
Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 115 (Fla. 2007), that case is distinguishable.  In 
Tanzi, the defendant’s own mental health expert first testified on direct 
examination that the defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder and 
that lack of remorse is a symptom of this disorder.  Accordingly, based on the 
testimony from the defendant elicited from his own expert, the defendant opened 
the door to such testimony.  More importantly, in Tanzi, we stressed that there was 
no error because the trial court instructed the jury not to consider lack of remorse 
and the State did not present any testimony regarding Tanzi’s lack of remorse for 
the murdered victim.   
 
- 45 - 
 Here, Fletcher did not open the door to lack of remorse evidence by calling 
an expert who testified generally that Fletcher suffered from antisocial personality 
disorder.  This Court has repeatedly held that a diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder does not permit this type of testimony.  Specifically, in Atwater v. State, 
626 So. 2d 1325, 1328 (Fla. 1993), this Court stated that a trial court “err[s] in 
permitting the State on cross-examination to ask [the defense’s expert] whether 
persons with antisocial personality showed remorse.”  See also Peterson, 2 So. 3d 
at 158 (holding that “the State ordinarily may not present evidence or argument 
about a defendant’s lack of remorse in the context of discussing a diagnosis of 
antisocial personality disorder”).  In fact, this Court actually recognized this 
holding favorably in Tanzi, but found the situation to be different because the 
defendant himself elicited this information. 
Similarly, in Silvia, 60 So. 3d at 975, defense counsel asked the State’s 
mental health expert whether there were “other criteria of these antisocial 
personality disorders that you observed in [the defendant]?”  The expert responded, 
“Limited remorse.  Not much remorse for what has happened or what has been 
done.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  While the trial court struck this response from the 
record and instructed the jury to disregard this exchange, the trial court denied the 
defendant’s motion for mistrial.  Id.  This Court held that, even under 
circumstances involving testimony concerning antisocial personality disorder, 
 
- 46 - 
“there is no question that lack of remorse is an improper aggravator” but affirmed 
the denial of the motion for mistrial because such mistrial “should only be granted 
when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.”  Id. at 976 (quoting 
England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006)).   
In this case, the trial court erroneously permitted the State to question its 
own expert on lack of remorse.  However, improper questions regarding lack of 
remorse may be harmless error.  See Atwater, 626 So. 2d at 1328 (holding that a 
question as to whether an individual with antisocial personality disorder shows 
remorse was harmless error). 
Here, Dr. Krop, the defense expert, had already testified during cross-
examination without objection that a criteria of antisocial personality disorder was 
lack of remorse.  Additionally, while the State’s expert, Dr. Prichard, was also 
asked about Fletcher’s “lack of remorse,” the prosecutor later characterized the last 
criteria of antisocial personality disorder as rationalization and did not emphasize 
the phrase “lack of remorse.”  Importantly, the prosecutor did not argue a lack of 
remorse during closing statements.  
The trial court considered Fletcher’s remorse to be a mitigating factor, and 
assigned it some weight.  We conclude that, although error, the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 
1986).  There was no reasonable possibility that the reference in Dr. Pritchard’s 
 
- 47 - 
testimony to lack of remorse contributed to the jury’s sentencing recommendation 
or to the judge’s sentence of death.  Nevertheless, we caution the State to take 
precautions to prevent a reoccurrence of this problem that arises when a defendant 
permissibly offers a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating 
circumstance.  As we have stated, this type of evidence in itself does not open the 
door to the State rebutting the testimony with questions about lack of remorse as a 
feature of the disorder.  However, because the trial court’s error in permitting this 
type of testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we deny relief on this 
claim. 
Penalty-Phase Closing Statements 
 
Fletcher asserts that several remarks made by the prosecutor during the 
penalty-phase closing statements entitle him to resentencing.  No objections were 
made to the allegedly improper statements, and therefore they are reviewed for 
fundamental error.  Mosley, 46 So. 3d at 519.  Further, we note that attorneys are 
generally afforded wide latitude while presenting closing statements to the jury.  
See Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 551 (Fla. 1997) (citing Breedlove v. State, 413 
So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982)).   
Lack of Remorse 
 
The prosecutor made the following remarks during his closing statement:  
The question today is what is the appropriate sentence for that 
brutal, senseless and heinous crime.  
 
- 48 - 
What is the appropriate sentence for someone who has the 
capacity to wake up an elderly woman from her sleep, to rob her and 
murder her? 
What is the appropriate sentence for someone who murders 
someone who was essentially his step-grandmother? 
What is the appropriate sentence for someone who, just three 
days after her murder, refers to her with—by terms such as bitch, 
ignorant, dumb-ass?   
What is the appropriate sentence for that person? 
What is the appropriate sentence for someone who, rather than 
recognizing the heinous crime that they have committed, instead 
blames the victim and says—essentially says that it is her fault, that if 
she had not fight—fought them, that she—they would have left her 
alone. 
Is the appropriate sentence for that person life?  No. 
The appropriate sentence in this case is death.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Fletcher contends that the underlined portion of the above 
question constituted a lack of remorse argument.   
 
However, the prosecutor never asserted during his closing statement that 
Fletcher lacked remorse for his crime.  The statement includes no references to 
remorse or any other term that alludes to remorse.  The remark was made at the 
beginning of the statement, when the prosecutor had not yet begun to discuss 
aggravation or mitigation.  The remark simply related to what an appropriate 
sentence would be in the context of the facts of the case.  Accordingly, we deny 
this claim.   
Nonstatutory Aggravation 
 
Fletcher next contends that the previous statement regarding what the 
appropriate sentence is for a person who committed the acts Fletcher committed 
 
- 49 - 
was an improper request for the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances.  However, almost immediately following the challenged remarks, 
the prosecutor explained that the judge would instruct the jury on how to make a 
decision regarding the advisory sentence, and that the jury would weigh 
aggravating factors and mitigating factors.  Further, the prosecutor later explained 
that there were only three aggravating circumstances for the jury to consider.  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Denigration and Conversion 
Fletcher next challenges the following portion of the prosecutor’s closing 
statement: 
Number three, the defendant has suffered from a chronic 
addition to drugs in the past.  I submit to you a lot of people have drug 
addictions.  Most of them do not murder other people. 
Number four, the defendant is depressed.  A lot of people are 
depressed, but they don’t go and murder other people. 
. . . . 
The defendant—number six, the defendant has witnessed his 
mother being physically abused by his father. 
Now there’s a lot of people who come from tough 
circumstances, abusive families, but they, too, most of them, do not go 
and murder other people.   
. . . . 
You will also hear the mitigation that will be presented to you 
that the defendant has artistic ability.  
A lot of people have artistic ability.  You could ask why wasn’t 
he putting it to good use? 
A lot of people have artistic ability, but they don’t murder other 
people.   
 
 
- 50 - 
Fletcher contends that these comments improperly denigrated the mitigation 
evidence and converted mitigation into aggravation.8   
As to denigration, although a prosecutor may not improperly denigrate or 
attempt to invalidate mitigation evidence by characterizing it as an “excuse,” 
“flimsy,” or “phantom,” the prosecutor may comment on the validity of the 
mitigation evidence and assert that it should be afforded less weight.  Delhall, 95 
So. 3d at 167-68.  In doing so, the prosecutor may remark on the evidence 
produced during trial and rebut the closing statements of the defense, as long as 
such comments are a fair representation of what was presented.  Id. at 168.   
 
In Delhall, the prosecutor labelled the mitigation evidence presented as 
excuses, and the objections by the defense were overruled.  Id. at 167.  The 
prosecutor in Delhall made several other improper statements, to the point that the 
trial judge admonished her.  Id. at 170.  This Court held that the comments 
labelling the mitigation as excuses were improper, and further held that the 
numerous improper prosecutorial comments made during penalty-phase closing 
statements denied the defendant a fair trial.  Id. at 167.   
                                          
 
8.  Fletcher also asserts that the comments were irrelevant.  However, he 
provides no explanation as to why the prosecutor’s discussion of the mitigation 
evidence was irrelevant, and therefore we do not address this claim.  See Heath, 3 
So. 3d at 1029 n.8. 
 
- 51 - 
 
Similarly, in Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 903 (Fla. 2000), the prosecutor 
remarked during closing statements: 
I submit to you, don’t do that; follow the law, do your duty.  
Weigh everything all out.  When you do, you will see that the 
aggravating circumstances create a powerful case for a 
recommendation of [death].  They are not outweighed by those flimsy, 
I would submit to you, phantom, mitigating circumstances. 
 
This Court held that the comments were improper.  Id. at 904.  Like in Delhall, the 
prosecutor’s statements in Brooks were not intended to persuade the jury that the 
proffered mitigation was not mitigating in nature, or should be given only little 
weight.  Rather, the prosecutor specifically characterized mitigation evidence with 
negative terms, and by doing so, sought to demean the mitigation.    
 
Here, the prosecutor did not contend that the mitigating circumstances 
presented were invalid or excuses, and his remarks are not comparable to those 
made in Delhall or Brooks.  He did not characterize the mitigation evidence in a 
negative way.  Rather, the statements by the prosecutor addressed the weight that 
the jury should assign to these mitigating circumstances.   
Fletcher additionally contends that the prosecutor impermissibly denigrated 
the mitigation when he asked the jury to compare the choices of law-abiding 
people with the choices of Fletcher.  Fletcher relies on Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 
17, 41 (Fla. 2009), in which the prosecutor commented on the life choices of the 
victim, admitted as victim-impact evidence, and then compared the choices made 
 
- 52 - 
by the defendant with those of the victim.  This Court explained that victim impact 
evidence is admissible only to demonstrate the individuality of the person and the 
loss to the community.  Id.  As a result, this Court held that a prosecutor may not 
ask the jury to compare the life choices of the victim with the life choices of the 
defendant.  Id.  We reiterated this proscription in Wheeler v. State, 4 So. 3d 599, 
611 (Fla. 2009).   
Hayward and Wheeler address the improper juxtaposition of the life of the 
victim with that of the defendant through the use of victim impact evidence.  
Although a victim impact statement was presented to the jury in this case, the 
prosecutor did not ask the jury to compare the life of Googe to the life of Fletcher.  
Neither Hayward nor Wheeler stands for the proposition that a prosecutor cannot 
make broad statements that other people in the community with the same 
background or characteristics as the defendant do not commit murder.  Therefore, 
we deny relief on this claim.   
 
Finally, Fletcher asserts that the prosecutor improperly converted mitigating 
circumstances into aggravating circumstances by attaching aggravating labels to 
mitigation evidence.  Fletcher does not elaborate as to how the closing statement 
by the prosecutor attached an aggravating label to any mitigating circumstances.  
This Court has previously held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
overruling an objection to the prosecutor’s statement that the defendant’s loving 
 
- 53 - 
family environment appeared mitigating, but was the most aggravating factor of 
all.  Moore, 701 So. 2d at 551.  The remarks by the prosecutor in this case do not 
even directly characterize any of the mitigating circumstances as aggravating.  
Accordingly, we conclude that this challenge is without merit.   
Cumulative Effect 
 
Fletcher contends that the cumulative effect of the improper statements by 
the prosecutor during closing statements amounted to fundamental error.  Because 
we conclude that none of the remarks made by the prosecutor were improper, we 
deny relief on this basis.  See Mendoza v. State, 87 So. 3d 644, 657 (Fla. 2011). 
Sentencing Order 
 
Fletcher next asserts that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because: (1) 
the aggravating circumstance of a contemporaneous conviction is an impermissible 
automatic aggravator, and the aggravating circumstance did not warrant great 
weight; (2) the aggravating circumstance that Fletcher committed the murder while 
under a sentence of imprisonment did not warrant great weight; (3) the trial court 
improperly found the HAC aggravating circumstance; (4) the trial court improperly 
rejected the mitigating circumstance that Fletcher has been treated for bipolar 
 
- 54 - 
disorder;9 and (5) the trial court did not properly assess the mitigating 
circumstances, each of which warranted great weight.10   
Contemporaneous Robbery 
 
This Court has repeatedly held the claim that a contemporaneous robbery 
constitutes automatic aggravation to be without merit, and, accordingly, we deny 
this claim.  See, e.g., Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006); see also 
Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997).   
 
Fletcher also asserts that the contemporaneous robbery aggravator should 
have been afforded little weight because the prosecution heavily relied on a felony 
murder theory, and there was little to no evidence with respect to premeditation.  
The weight assigned to an aggravating circumstance is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 934 (Fla. 2000).  If a reasonable 
person could reach the conclusion made by the trial court, then discretion has not 
been abused.  Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990). 
                                          
 
9.  Fletcher asserts that the trial court made no finding with respect to the 
mitigating factor that he suffers from attention deficit disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, or a mood disorder.  This mitigating factor was not 
presented to the trial court, and therefore the trial court’s failure to find this 
mitigating circumstance cannot be challenged on appeal.  See Lucas v. State, 568 
So. 2d 18, 24 (Fla. 1990).   
 
10.  Fletcher also disagrees with the finding by the trial court that he 
committed the murder.  The sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the murder 
conviction is addressed under a separate heading below.   
 
- 55 - 
Fletcher relies on Scott v. State, 66 So. 3d 923, 937 (Fla. 2011), in which 
this Court vacated the death sentence as disproportionate due, in part, to the lack of 
evidence of premeditation, as well as the presence of minimal aggravation.  The 
trial court found only two aggravating circumstances—contemporaneous violent 
felony and commission during an attempted armed robbery—and assigned both 
great weight.  Id. at 935.  The contemporaneous felony aggravating factor arose 
from the fact that the defendant struck an individual with the butt of his gun before 
he shot the victim.  Id.  This Court noted that although the aggravated assault 
qualified as a prior violent felony, it involved a relatively limited use of violence, 
was charged only on the eve of trial, and was qualitatively different from the 
circumstances in other cases in which the death penalty was imposed.  Id. at 937.   
Thus, although in Scott the Court determined that the contemporaneous 
felony aggravating circumstance did not weigh as heavily in that case, this was due 
to the circumstances of the underlying offense.  See id. at 937 (“Furthermore, the 
prior violent felony aggravator [in Scott] . . . is qualitatively different than in cases 
where this Court has affirmed the death penalty when similar aggravators were 
considered and the prior violent felony aggravator was based on a 
contemporaneous act.” (emphasis omitted)).  Nowhere in Scott did this Court 
suggest that a contemporaneous felony could never be given great weight as an 
aggravating circumstance.   
 
- 56 - 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
affording great weight to the contemporaneous felony aggravating factor.   
Sentence of Imprisonment 
Fletcher also asserts that the aggravating circumstance that the murder was 
committed while he was under a sentence of imprisonment did not warrant great 
weight because the crimes for which he was imprisoned were property crimes.  
Fletcher relies on Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 250 (Fla. 2012), in which the 
trial court gave little to some weight to the aggravating circumstance that the 
defendant was on community control for the felony of tampering with physical 
evidence.  The defendant contended that this aggravating factor should have been 
given even less weight because the offense was non-violent and did not merit a 
prison sentence.  Id. at 258.  Because the trial court gave this factor only little to 
some weight based on this very consideration, this Court held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion.  Id. 
Here, the trial court found the State had established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Fletcher was serving concurrent ten-year sentences for four separate 
burglary charges.  Therefore, it necessarily considered the nature of the underlying 
offenses in assigning this aggravating circumstance great weight.  Unlike in 
Snelgrove, in which the defendant was on community control, Fletcher’s sentences 
merited a punishment of ten years’ incarceration.  Moreover, although the offenses 
 
- 57 - 
were property crimes, Fletcher was lawfully incarcerated at the time of the murder, 
and planned and executed several additional property crimes upon his escape.  
Accordingly, we hold that Fletcher has not established that the trial court abused its 
discretion in affording this aggravating circumstance great weight.   
HAC 
This Court will not overturn the finding of an aggravating circumstance 
where it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See, e.g., Guardado v. 
State, 965 So. 2d 108, 115 (Fla. 2007).  This Court does not reweigh the evidence 
to determine whether each aggravating circumstance was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 608 (Fla. 2009).   
Fletcher asserts that because the medical examiner who conducted the 
autopsy could not rule out the possibility that Googe was unconscious at the time 
she was strangled, there is reasonable doubt as to whether Googe was conscious.  
The HAC aggravator may not apply where a victim was unconscious when 
strangled.  See DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1993).    
 
However, the medical examiner who testified during trial stated that it was 
his opinion that Googe was conscious at the time of the strangulation because there 
was no significant trauma to Googe’s head that would cause a loss of 
consciousness.  The trial court recognized this evidence in its sentencing order, and 
additionally noted that it was consistent with Fletcher’s statement that Googe 
 
- 58 - 
fought against him and Brown.  Additionally, these events occurred over a 
prolonged period of time.  Prior to the fatal strangulation, Googe was confronted in 
her bed in the middle of the night by two men, threatened with a firearm, struck, 
and choked.  She screamed that she was frightened at least four times.  
Accordingly, we conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the 
finding of the HAC aggravator.  See Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 
2002) (“Because strangulation of a conscious victim involves foreknowledge and 
the extreme anxiety of impending death, death by strangulation constitutes prima 
facie evidence of HAC.”).   
Mitigating Circumstances 
The finding of whether a mitigating circumstance has been established is a 
question of fact that will not be overturned where it is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Blanco, 706 So. 2d at 10.  With respect to nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances, the trial court must determine whether the circumstance 
is truly of a mitigating nature.  Allen v. State, 137 So. 3d 946, 967-68 (Fla. 2013).   
Fletcher asserts that the trial court improperly rejected the mitigating 
circumstance that Fletcher had been treated for bipolar disorder.  However, the 
record demonstrates that no symptoms of bipolar disorder were observed by the 
defense mental health expert, the State mental health expert, or a doctor with 
whom the State mental health expert consulted who had previously provided 
 
- 59 - 
psychological treatment to Fletcher.  No reason was indicated for the notation of 
bipolar disorder in Fletcher’s records, and none of the medications that have been 
prescribed to Fletcher during his lifetime are used to treat bipolar disorder.  The 
State mental health expert testified that bipolar disorder will manifest if not treated 
by medication.  Accordingly, we hold that competent, substantial evidence 
supports the rejection of the mitigator.   
Fletcher also asserts that the mitigating circumstances provided by the 
defense should have been accorded great weight.  However, he provides no legal 
basis for this assertion.  With respect to Fletcher’s drug addiction, he asserts that 
the trial court downplayed this mitigating circumstance by referring to it as a 
“disease of choice,” and additionally disregarded that this was a form of self-
medication.  However, no legal basis is provided for this assertion, and this 
challenge constitutes nothing more than a disagreement as to the appropriate 
weight of this factor.  Fletcher makes similar assertions with respect to the 
mitigating circumstances that he came from a dysfunctional family and that as a 
child he witnessed his father physically abuse his mother.  Simple disagreement 
with the weight given by the trial court is not a basis for relief, so we deny these 
claims.  See Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 409 (Fla. 2000).   
Fletcher also asserts that the trial court mistakenly ascribed his depression to 
be the result only of his incarceration, and did not take into consideration that he 
 
- 60 - 
was diagnosed with depression during his childhood.  However, the sentencing 
order specifically states that both mental health experts testified that Fletcher 
suffered from depression throughout his life.  Thus, this claim is without merit.   
Additionally, Fletcher asserts that the trial court impermissibly required that 
several mitigating factors have a nexus to the crime, including: (1) Fletcher has 
been treated for PTSD (slight weight); (2) Fletcher previously attempted suicide 
(little weight); and (3) Fletcher’s mother died of cancer when he was eighteen 
(little weight).  With respect to the PTSD diagnosis, the trial court found that 
Fletcher did not suffer from PTSD at the time of the murder.  With respect to the 
two other mitigating circumstances, the trial court found that they had little 
significance to the murder.  
 
Although a trial court cannot require a nexus between the crime and 
mitigating evidence, the court may place mitigating evidence in context.  See 
Martin v. State, 107 So. 3d 281, 318 (Fla. 2012).  This Court explained in Cox that 
although mitigating evidence cannot be dismissed, the trial court may assign 
weight based on the context of the mitigating circumstance.  819 So. 2d at 723.  In 
Cox, the trial court gave no weight to the mitigating factor that the defendant 
suffered from heightened anxiety when interacting with other people because there 
was no evidence that this anxiety contributed to any decisions made by the 
defendant or the actions that led to the murder.  Id. at 723 n.15.  This Court held 
 
- 61 - 
that the assignment of no weight was not an abuse of discretion because the record 
contained no evidence that the mitigating circumstance was relevant to the case.  
Id. at 723.   
Cox establishes that the trial court may consider the connection or 
relationship between the mitigating circumstance and the murder.  The challenged 
explanations given by the trial court in the sentencing order here are substantially 
similar to the explanation given in Cox—the trial court placed the mitigating 
circumstance in context and assigned weight on that basis.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court did not improperly require a nexus.   
Fletcher further asserts that the trial court converted the mitigating 
circumstance that he received his GED while incarcerated into an aggravating 
circumstance because the trial court noted that this “proves he is capable of 
focusing on a task,” and “the nature and sophistication of this very crime shows 
[Fletcher] has the ability to focus on a task and achieve a goal . . . .”  This claim is 
unsupported by the sentencing order, which assigned some weight to this 
mitigating circumstance.   
These comments by the trial court simply explained why the mitigating 
circumstance warranted only some weight.  A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion when it explains why a proposed nonstatutory mitigating factor is not 
truly mitigating or warrants little weight.  Cf. Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 
 
- 62 - 
1055 (Fla. 2000) (“We therefore recognize that while a proffered mitigating factor 
may be technically relevant and must be considered by the sentencer because it is 
generally recognized as a mitigating circumstance, the sentencer may determine in 
the particular case at hand that it is entitled to no weight for additional reasons or 
circumstances unique to that case.”).  Thus, we deny this claim.   
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court fulfilled its obligation to 
address each mitigating circumstance offered by the defendant, did not improperly 
reject any mitigating circumstance, and did not abuse its discretion in assigning 
weight to any of the mitigating circumstances.   
Constitutionality 
 
Fletcher alleges that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We have previously held that Ring 
does not apply when the aggravating circumstance that the defendant committed 
the murder while under a sentence of imprisonment is applicable.  See Hodges v. 
State, 55 So. 3d 515, 540 (Fla. 2010).  We acknowledge that the United States 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review our decision in Hurst v. State, 147 
So. 3d 435 (Fla. 2014), cert. granted, Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015), and 
framed the issue to be decided in that case as follows: “Whether Florida’s death 
sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in 
light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).”  135 S. Ct. 
 
- 63 - 
at 1531.  Unlike this case, however, Hurst did not involve the under-sentence-of-
imprisonment aggravator, which this Court’s precedent clearly establishes does not 
implicate Ring.  Accordingly, until the Supreme Court issues a contrary decision, 
Fletcher’s claim is without merit under established Florida precedent. 
Fletcher raises several additional subclaims under this issue, which we have 
also repeatedly held to be without merit.  See Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 97 
(Fla. 2007) (rejecting the claim that victim impact evidence may not be presented 
to the jury); Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 14 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting the claim that 
the standard jury instructions do not properly instruct the jury on consideration of 
mitigating and aggravating factors); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 
2003) (rejecting the claim that aggravating circumstances must be charged in the 
indictment, and the claim that each aggravating circumstance must be individually 
found); Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001) (rejecting the claim that the 
HAC aggravating circumstance is vague and overbroad); Blanco, 706 So. 2d at 11 
(rejecting the claim that Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional 
because every person convicted of first-degree felony murder automatically 
qualifies for the circumstance of commission during an enumerated felony).   
Cumulative Error 
 
Fletcher asserts that the cumulative effect of guilt-phase and penalty-phase 
errors renders the convictions and the death sentence fundamentally unfair.  
 
- 64 - 
However, because we hold that only one error occurred during the guilt phase, and 
no errors occurred during the penalty phase, no cumulative error analysis is 
necessary, and we deny this claim.  See Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 815.   
Proportionality 
 
To ensure uniformity in the application of the death sentence, this Court 
performs a comprehensive review of each case in which the death sentence is 
imposed to determine whether the crime is among both the most aggravated and 
the least mitigated of murders.  Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 205 (Fla. 2010).  
We examine the totality of the circumstances of the case and compare them to 
other capital cases.  Id.  Our review entails a qualitative, rather than a quantitative, 
analysis of the basis for each aggravating and mitigating circumstance.  Id.   
Precedent supports the death sentence as a proportionate punishment in this 
case based on the nature of the three aggravating circumstances.  See Kopsho v. 
State, 84 So. 3d 204, 210-11, 220 (Fla. 2012) (holding death sentence 
proportionate where four aggravating circumstances—including under sentence of 
imprisonment or on felony probation, prior violent felony, murder committed 
during armed kidnapping, and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated—
were weighed against no statutory mitigating circumstances and fourteen 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); see also Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 
960, 966 (Fla. 2002) (holding death sentence proportionate where defendant hung 
 
- 65 - 
victim and where the aggravators of prior violent felony and HAC were weighed 
against thirteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including history of suicidal 
thoughts, artistic ability, history of drug and alcohol abuse, PTSD, violent 
childhood, and remorse).  Additionally, the HAC aggravator is among the 
weightiest of the aggravating circumstances.  See Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 
958 (Fla. 2007).   
 
This case is distinguishable from those relied on by Fletcher for the assertion 
that the death penalty is disproportionate.  In four of the five cases relied on by 
Fletcher, the defendant was under eighteen years old, and age was a significant 
mitigator.  See Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 417 (seventeen-year-old defendant); Curtis v. 
State, 685 So. 2d 1234, 1237 (Fla. 1996) (same); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6, 14 
(Fla. 1994) (sixteen-year-old defendant); Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288, 
1292 (Fla. 1988) (seventeen-year-old defendant).  Because the United States 
Supreme Court has since held that the death sentence cannot be imposed on 
individuals for crimes committed under the age of eighteen, these cases are 
inapplicable.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).  Moreover, this 
case is not comparable to Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 1999), in which 
the defendant was only eighteen, suffered a brutal childhood, had brain damage, 
suffered from mental retardation and paranoid schizophrenia, and had no prior 
criminal record.   
 
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Fletcher was twenty-five years old at the time of the murder.  The trial court 
found that Fletcher’s 
level of maturity and intelligence with regard to the planning of this 
crime is of most significance.  In his April 18, 2009, confession, 
[Fletcher] described, in vivid detail, his involvement in these crimes, 
minimizing only his role in the actual murder of Helen Googe.  His 
age, if a factor at all, played little if any role in mitigating his 
involvement in this offense. 
 
The trial court recognized that a sentencing court may decline to find age as a 
mitigating circumstance where the defendant is twenty-five years old at the time of 
the murder.  Accordingly, the trial court gave the age factor little weight.   
Moreover, Fletcher is of average intelligence, functions in the top 40% of 
the population, and has no brain damage.  As such, we conclude that Fletcher’s age 
at the time of the murder does not render the death sentence disproportionate.   
 
Further, we hold that the death sentence is not disproportionate, even though 
codefendant Brown received a life sentence.  The trial court gave great weight to 
Brown’s life sentence, but imposed the sentence of death because it found that 
Fletcher was the mastermind of the plan and committed the actual murder.  
Fletcher had a relationship with Googe, resented Googe, knew Googe’s financial 
status, and knew how to enter Googe’s house.  Fletcher’s DNA, and not Brown’s, 
was found under Googe’s fingernails.  The death penalty is not disproportionate 
even where a codefendant received a life sentence if the defendant who received 
the death sentence is more culpable.  See Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 305 (Fla. 
 
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2009) (holding the death sentence proportionate despite codefendant’s sentence of 
life).   
Based on the above, we hold that the death sentence is not disproportionate 
in this case.    
Sufficiency 
 
This Court has a mandatory obligation to independently review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in each case that imposes the death sentence.  See 
Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 850 (Fla. 2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5).  The 
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine 
whether a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
existence of the elements of the crime.  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 
2001).   
 
Fletcher was convicted of first-degree murder, escape, two counts of 
burglary, two counts of grand theft, and home invasion robbery.  His post-arrest 
statement includes admissions to each of the crimes except the actual strangulation 
of Googe.  Further, during his post-arrest statement, he bragged that he was the 
only inmate with enough nerve to escape from prison, and boasted about his 
driving skills when he explained why he, rather than Brown, drove the stolen 
vehicles.  The record also contains evidence that Fletcher, who was the mastermind 
of the plan to escape from jail and rob Googe, was the actual killer.  He knew 
 
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Googe’s address, how to enter her house, where she was likely to place money for 
safekeeping, and her financial status.  Additionally, the record contains evidence 
that Fletcher resented Googe, and his DNA was found under Googe’s fingernails.  
Although Fletcher asserts that Brown committed the murder, Brown did not have a 
relationship with Googe, and his DNA was not found on Googe’s body.  We 
conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could have 
convicted Fletcher of the crimes, including the first-degree murder of Googe.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Fletcher’s convictions and his sentence of 
death.   
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Putnam County,  
Wendy Williams Berger, Judge - Case No. 542009CF000648CFAXMX 
 
Jose Rafael Rodriguez of the Law Offices of J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stacey Elaine Johns 
Kircher, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee