Case Title: Daniels v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022195

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
TRAVIS EUGENE DANIELS, NO. 304441 
 
v.  Record No. 022195 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
 
October 31, 2003 
WARDEN OF THE RED ONION STATE PRISON 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
In this habeas corpus case, Travis Eugene Daniels, the 
petitioner, previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the trial court in which he was convicted of various 
felony offenses and sentenced to a period of incarceration of 33 
years in prison.  Prior to a consideration of the merits of that 
petition, the trial court entered an order of nonsuit at 
Daniels’ request and dismissed that petition.1  On September 23, 
2002, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court, Daniels 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Warden 
of the Red Onion State Prison, challenging the legality of his 
convictions in the trial court.  The dispositive issue before us 
is whether this petition is procedurally barred by the provision 
of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) that “[n]o writ shall be granted on the 
basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had 
knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition.”  See 
                     
 
1 Daniels also filed a habeas petition in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which 
subsequently was dismissed at his request.  The fact of the 
federal court habeas petition does not impinge upon our analysis 
of this case. 
 
Dorsey v. Angelone, 261 Va. 601, 604, 544 S.E.2d 350, 352 
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001)(holding that a habeas 
petition that was “withdrawn” by the petitioner barred the 
filing of a subsequent petition). 
 
Daniels does not dispute that his initial habeas petition, 
which asserted a generalized claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, contained inadequate allegations of fact to support the 
specific issues he now raises in his current petition to this 
Court.  Rather, Daniels contends that dismissal of his habeas 
petition is not warranted because the nonsuit of his first 
habeas petition did not invoke the bar of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2).  
Daniels notes that unlike the “withdrawal” of the habeas 
petition in Dorsey, the dismissal of his prior habeas petition 
by nonsuit was pursuant to the statutory right provided by Code 
§ 8.01-380.  Thus, Daniels contends that, as would be permitted 
in any other civil case, he is entitled to commence a new 
proceeding on the same cause without limitation on the 
introduction of new claims and allegations of fact.2  This is so, 
                     
 
2 Challenging the rationale of Dorsey, Daniels also contends 
that a proper interpretation of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) would bar 
the filing of a subsequent habeas petition only where there had 
been a decision on the merits of a prior petition, and he urges 
this Court to reconsider the holding in Dorsey and overturn that 
decision.  Since the decision in Dorsey was announced, the 
General Assembly has met twice in regular session and has not 
acted to amend Code § 8.01-654 to alter our decision in that 
case.  “‘Under these circumstances, the construction given to 
the statute is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature and 
 
2
he asserts, because “[a] nonsuit does not involve a decision on 
the merits, rather it ‘simply [puts] an end to the present 
action, but is no bar to a subsequent action for the same 
cause.’ ”  Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 413, 559 S.E.2d 616, 
620 (2002) (quoting Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 
296, 311, 98 S.E. 34, 39 (1919)). 
The Attorney General, on behalf of the Warden, responds 
that, for purposes of resolving the successive petitions issue 
in this case, the holding of Dorsey controls.  The Attorney 
General asserts that there is no significant distinction between 
a habeas petition which is “withdrawn” on the petitioner’s 
motion and one which is the subject of a voluntary nonsuit by 
the petitioner.  We agree with the Attorney General. 
 
In Dorsey, we held that: 
 
The statutory language [of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)] 
is plain and unambiguous, clearly limiting the right 
of a prisoner to file successive petitions for writs 
of habeas corpus.  The key provisions of this 
statutory language focus on “the time of filing” the 
first habeas petition. 
 
 
The statutory language could not be more 
explicit; it means what it says.  At the time of 
filing the initial petition, the prisoner must include 
“all” claims the facts of which are known to the 
prisoner.  And, no habeas relief will be granted based 
                                                                  
therefore becomes obligatory upon the courts.’”  Cochran v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 604, 607, 521 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1075 (2000) (quoting Vansant and Gusler, 
Inc. v. Washington, 245 Va. 356, 361, 429 S.E.2d 31, 33-34 
(1993)).  Accordingly, we decline Daniels’ invitation that we 
revisit our decision in Dorsey. 
 
3
upon “any” allegation the facts of which the prisoner 
had knowledge at the time of filing any previous 
petition. 
 
Dorsey, 261 Va. at 603-04, 544 S.E.2d at 352. 
 
 
Daniels correctly contends that generally the effect of a 
first voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 is to put an 
end to a case without prejudice and without a decision on the 
merits, and the fact of the former suit places no impediment on 
the claims or allegations that may be raised in a timely filed 
subsequent action on the same cause.  However, Code § 8.01-380 
is a statute of general application for all civil cases.  By 
contrast, Code § 8.01-654 is a specific statute, narrow in 
scope, applying only to petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 
To the extent that these code sections can be said to be 
facially in conflict in the context of the present case, our 
resolution of that conflict is guided by a well established 
rule.  “The rule is that ‘when one statute speaks to a subject 
in a general way and another deals with a part of the same 
subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, 
if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails.’”  
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 22-23, 419 S.E.2d 606, 618 
(1992) (quoting Virginia National Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 
340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)). 
 
Applying this rule and the rationale of Dorsey that “the 
key provisions of [Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)] focus on ‘the time of 
 
4
filing’ the first habeas petition” and that at “the time of 
filing the initial petition, the prisoner must include ‘all’ 
claims the facts of which are known to the prisoner,” the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) and those of Code § 8.01-380 
may be readily harmonized.  Simply put, the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-654(B)(2) require a prisoner to include all claims that 
he intends to bring before the court in his first habeas 
petition.  Regardless of the manner in which that habeas 
petition is resolved, he may not thereafter file a subsequent 
habeas petition that seeks relief based upon any allegations of 
fact that were known to him at the time of the initial filing 
and not included therein.  Accordingly, Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) 
does not conflict with a prisoner’s right to seek a nonsuit 
under Code § 8.01-380, but having elected to take a nonsuit 
under the latter statute, the former statute bars him from 
raising in a subsequent petition those issues which he knew of 
and could have raised in the first petition, but failed to 
assert. 
 
In this case, the allegations of fact that form the basis 
of his claims challenging the legality of his convictions 
unquestionably were known to Daniels at the time he filed his 
first habeas petition in the trial court, but were not raised 
therein.  Accordingly, Daniels’ petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus will be dismissed. 
 
5
Dismissed. 
 
6