Case Title: State v. Duval

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-006


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

      v.                                     On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont
Reginald Duval                               Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

                                             January Term, 1990


Dean B. Pineles, J.

William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington, and Gary S.
  Kessler and Rosemary Hull, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier,
  for plaintiff-appellee

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and William A. Nelson and Henry
  Hinton, Appellate Defenders, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   Defendant claims, in this appeal from a sentence for
driving under the influence (DUI), that his rights to assistance of counsel
and freedom from double jeopardy were violated when the sentencing judge
failed to honor a prior determination that defendant would not be
incarcerated.  We affirm.
     On October 5, 1987, defendant appeared for arraignment on a charge of
DUI before Judge Wolchik, who denied defendant's request for  assistance of
counsel at public expense.  A court form entitled "Request for Assignment of
Lawyer & Order" had been filled out by defendant, and the judge checked the
parts of the order indicating:

          The Court finds as fact your income and expenses,
          dependents and property as set forth above, and has
          determined that you do not qualify for the appointment
          of a Public Defender or assigned counsel for the
          following reasons:

                                  *  *  *

               c.  x     Although you may be a needy person,
                         you are not entitled to a lawyer.
                         This Court has determined at
                         arraignment, and stated on the
                         record, that if you are convicted it
                         will not sentence you to a period of
                         imprisonment or fine you more than
                         $1,000.00.
See 13 V.S.A. {{ 5231, 5201(4)(B); V.R.Cr.P. 44(a).  At this time,
defendant pled not guilty and  was released on his own recognizance.
     Defendant returned to court on November 6, 1987, and indicated he
wanted to change his plea.  The presiding judge, Judge Pineles, permitted
defendant to appear pro se and, after taking appropriate steps to ensure the
plea was voluntary, accepted the plea of guilty.
     Prior to sentencing, Judge Pineles questioned defendant about his prior
criminal history.  Only then did the court learn that defendant was on
probation for two recent related driving offenses involving alcohol.  Still
believing that defendant voluntarily appeared pro se, the judge ordered a
presentence investigation.  After this hearing, when it became apparent
that a sentence involving incarceration might be appropriate, Judge Pineles
sent notice to a public defender assigning him to represent defendant.
     At a status conference, Judge Pineles refused to honor the "no
incarceration" pledge given by Judge Wolchik and instead offered defendant
the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.  On the advice of appointed
counsel, defendant rejected the judge's offer and proceeded to sentencing,
maintaining that Judge Pineles could not impose incarceration.  Defendant
was thereafter sentenced to three to six months, all suspended except for
nine days and probation with conditions.  Defendant appeals this sentence.

                                    I.

     Indigent criminal defendants have a constitutional right to assistance
of counsel at public expense.  Gideon v. Wainwright,