Case Title: Ex parte Jerry Bohannon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1150640

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/30/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1150640
____________________
Ex parte Jerry Bohannon
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Jerry Bohannon
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-11-2989 and CC-11-2990;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0498)
STUART, Justice.
1150640
This Court granted certiorari review of the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Jerry Bohannon's
conviction for capital murder and his sentence of death.  We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
established 
the
following.  Around 7:30 a.m. on December 11, 2010, Jerry
Bohannon, Anthony Harvey, and Jerry DuBoise were in the
parking lot of the Paradise Lounge, a nightclub in Mobile. 
The security cameras in the parking lot recorded DuBoise and
Harvey talking with Bohannon.  After DuBoise and Harvey had
turned and walked several feet away from him, Bohannon reached
for a pistol.  Apparently, when they heard Bohannon cock the
hammer of the pistol, DuBoise and Harvey turned to look at
Bohannon.  DuBoise and Harvey then ran; Bohannon pursued them,
shooting several times.  DuBoise and Harvey ran around the
corner of the building and when the reappeared they had guns. 
A gunfight ensued.  Harvey was shot in the upper left chest;
DuBoise was shot three times in the abdomen.  The testimony
indicated that, in addition to shooting DuBoise and Harvey,
2
1150640
Bohannon pistol-whipped them.  Both DuBoise and Harvey died of
injuries inflicted by Bohannon. 
In June 2011, Bohannon was charged with two counts of
capital murder in connection with the deaths.  The murders
were made capital because two or more persons were killed "by
one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct." §
13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.  Following a jury trial,
Bohannon was convicted of two counts of capital murder. 
During the penalty phase, the jury recommended by a vote of
11-1 that Bohannon be sentenced to death; the circuit court
sentenced 
Bohannon 
to 
death 
for 
each 
capital-murder
conviction.  Bohannon appealed.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed one of Bohannon's capital-murder convictions but
remanded the case, in light of a double-jeopardy violation,
for the circuit court to set aside one of Bohannon's capital-
murder convictions and its sentence.   Bohannon v. State, [CR-
13-0498, October 23, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2015).  The
circuit court vacated one conviction and sentence, and, on
return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
Bohannon's death sentence.   Bohannon v. State, [CR-13-0498,
December 18, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2015).  Bohannon
3
1150640
petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals.  This Court granted Bohannon's
petition to consider four grounds:
–- Whether Bohannon's death sentence must be vacated
in light of Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.
Ct. 616 (2016);  
–- Whether the circuit court's characterization of
the 
jury's 
penalty-phase 
determination 
as 
a
recommendation and as advisory conflicts with Hurst;
–- Whether the circuit court committed plain error
by allowing the State to question defense character
witnesses about Bohannon's alleged acts on the night
of the shooting; and
-– Whether the circuit court committed plain error
by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the
victims' intoxication?  
Standard of Review
Bohannon's case involves only issues of law and the
application of the law to the undisputed facts; therefore, our
review is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.
2003)("This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo."), and State v. Hill, 690 So. 2d 1201, 1203–04
(Ala. 1996).
Discussion
4
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First, Bohannon contends that his death sentence must be
vacated in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Hurst.
In 2000, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
the United States Supreme Court held that the United States
Constitution requires that any fact that increases the 
penalty
for a crime above the statutory maximum must be presented to
a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I n  R i n g  v .
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the United States Supreme Court,
applying its decision in Apprendi to a capital-murder case,
stated that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a "jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions
an increase in their maximum punishment."  536 U.S. at 589.  
Specifically, the Court held that the right to a jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment required that a jury "find
an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the
death penalty."  Ring, 536 U.S. at 585.  Thus, Ring held that,
in a capital case, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
requires that the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance
that would make the defendant eligible for a death sentence. 
5
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In Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002), this
Court considered the constitutionality of Alabama's capital-
sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi and Ring, stating:
"Waldrop argues that under Alabama law a
defendant cannot be sentenced to death unless, after
an initial finding that the defendant is guilty of
a capital offense, there is a second finding: (1)
that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
exists, see Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(f), and (2)
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, see Ala. Code 1975, §
13A–5–46(e)(3). 
Those 
determinations, 
Waldrop
argues, are factual findings that under Ring must be
made by the jury and not the trial court. Because,
Waldrop argues, the trial judge in his case, and not
the jury, found that two aggravating circumstances
existed and that those aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances, Waldrop
claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial was violated. We disagree.
"It is true that under Alabama law at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance under Ala. Code
1975, § 13A–4–49, must exist in order for a
defendant convicted of a capital offense to be
sentenced 
to 
death. 
See 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
§
13A–5–45(f)('Unless 
at 
least 
one 
aggravating
circumstance as defined in Section 13A–5–49 exists,
the sentence shall be life imprisonment without
parole.'); Johnson v. State, 823 So. 2d 1, 52 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001)(holding that in order to sentence
a capital defendant to death, the sentencer '"must
determine the existence of at least one of the
aggravating circumstances listed in [Ala. Code
1975,] § 13A–5–49"' (quoting Ex parte Woodard, 631
So. 2d 1065, 1070 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993))).  Many
capital offenses listed in Ala. Code 1975, §
13A–5–40, include conduct that clearly corresponds
6
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to certain aggravating circumstances found in §
13A–5–49:
"'For example, the capital offenses of
intentional murder during a rape, §
13A–5–40(a)(3), intentional murder during
a robbery, § 13A–5–40(a)(2), intentional
murder 
during 
a 
burglary, 
§ 
13A–5–40(a)(4),
and 
intentional 
murder 
during 
a 
kidnapping,
§ 13A–5–40(a)(1), parallel the aggravating
circumstance that "[t]he capital offense
was committed while the defendant was
engaged ... [in a] rape, robbery, burglary
or kidnapping," § 13A–5–49(4).'  
"Ex 
parte 
Woodard, 
631 
So. 
2d 
at 
1070–71
(alterations and omission in original). 
"Furthermore, when a defendant is found guilty
of a capital offense, 'any aggravating circumstance
which 
the 
verdict 
convicting 
the 
defendant
establishes was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial shall be considered as proven beyond a
reasonable doubt for purposes of the sentencing
hearing.'  Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(e); see also
Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–50 ('The fact that a
particular capital offense as defined in Section
13A–5–40(a) 
necessarily 
includes 
one 
or 
more
aggravating circumstances as specified in Section
13A–5–49 shall not be construed to preclude the
finding 
and 
consideration 
of 
that 
relevant
circumstance 
or 
circumstances 
in 
determining
sentence.').  This is known as 'double-counting' or
'overlap,' and Alabama courts 'have repeatedly
upheld death sentences where the only aggravating
circumstance supporting the death sentence overlaps
with an element of the capital offense.'  Ex parte
Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 178 (Ala. 1997); see also
Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 965 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992).
7
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"Because the jury convicted Waldrop of two
counts of murder during a robbery in the first
degree, 
a 
violation 
of 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
§
13A–5–40(a)(2), 
the 
statutory 
aggravating
circumstance of committing a capital offense while
engaged in the commission of a robbery, Ala. Code
1975, § 13A–5–49(4), was 'proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.'  Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(e); Ala. Code
1975, § 13A–5–50.  Only one aggravating circumstance
must exist in order to impose a sentence of death.
Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(f).  Thus, in Waldrop's
case, the jury, and not the trial judge, determined
the existence of the 'aggravating circumstance
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.'
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. 
Therefore, the findings reflected in the jury's
verdict alone exposed Waldrop to a range of
punishment that had as its maximum the death
penalty.  This is all Ring and Apprendi require.
"....
"Waldrop also claims that Ring and Apprendi
require that the jury, and not the trial court,
determine whether the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Ala. Code
1975, §§ 13A–5–46(e), 13A–5–47(e), and 13A–5–48. 
Specifically, Waldrop claims that the weighing
process is a 'finding of fact' that raises the
authorized maximum punishment to the death penalty. 
Waldrop and several of the amici curiae claim that,
after Ring, this determination must be found by the
jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because in
the instant case the trial judge, and not the jury,
made this determination, Waldrop claims his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated.
"Contrary to Waldrop's argument, the weighing
process is not a factual determination.  In fact,
the relative 'weight' of aggravating circumstances
and mitigating circumstances is not susceptible to
any quantum of proof.  As the United States Court of
8
1150640
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted, 'While the
existence 
of 
an 
aggravating 
or 
mitigating
circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof under a
reasonable doubt or preponderance standard ... the
relative weight is not.'  Ford v. Strickland, 696
F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983).  This is because
weighing the aggravating circumstances and the
mitigating circumstances is a process in which 'the
sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible
for the death penalty should in fact receive that
sentence.'  Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,
972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
sentencer in a capital case need not even be
instructed as to how to weigh particular facts when
making a sentencing decision.  See Harris v.
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130
L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995)(rejecting 'the notion that "a
specific 
method 
for 
balancing 
mitigating 
and
aggravating 
factors 
in 
a 
capital 
sentencing
proceeding is constitutionally required"' (quoting
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179, 108 S.Ct.
2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988)) and holding that 'the
Constitution does not require a State to ascribe any
specific weight to particular factors, either in
aggravation or mitigation, to be considered by the
sentencer').  
"Thus, the weighing process is not a factual
determination or an element of an offense; instead,
it is a moral or legal judgment that takes into
account a theoretically limitless set of facts and
that cannot be reduced to a scientific formula or
the discovery of a discrete, observable datum.  See
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008, 103 S.Ct.
3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)('Once the jury finds
that the defendant falls within the legislatively
defined category of persons eligible for the death
penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a
myriad of factors to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment.'); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 902, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235
9
1150640
(1983)(Rehnquist, 
J., 
concurring 
in 
the
judgment)('sentencing 
decisions 
rest 
on 
a
far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and
circumstances and not on the type of proof of
particular elements that returning a conviction
does').  
"In Ford v. Strickland, supra, the defendant
claimed that 'the crime of capital murder in Florida
includes the element of mitigating circumstances not
outweighing aggravating circumstances and that the
capital sentencing proceeding in Florida involves
new 
findings 
of 
fact 
significantly 
affecting
punishment.'  Ford, 696 F.2d at 817.  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rejected this argument, holding that 'aggravating
and mitigating circumstances are not facts or
elements of the crime.  Rather, they channel and
restrict the sentencer's discretion in a structured
way after guilt has been fixed.'  696 F.2d at 818. 
Furthermore, in addressing the defendant's claim
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances, the court stated that the
defendant's argument 
"'seriously confuses proof of facts and the
weighing of facts in sentencing. While the
existence of an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof
under a reasonable doubt or preponderance
standard, see State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1,
9 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. [1950], 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), and
State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d
597, 617–18 (1979), the relative weight is
not.  The process of weighing circumstances
is a matter for judge and jury, and, unlike
facts, is not susceptible to proof by
either party.'  
10
1150640
"696 F.2d at 818.  Alabama courts have adopted the
Eleventh Circuit's rationale.  See Lawhorn v. State,
581 So. 2d 1159, 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)('while
the existence of an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof, the
relative weight of each is not; the process of
weighing, unlike facts, is not susceptible to proof
by either party'); see also Melson v. State, 775 So.
2d 857, 900–901 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Morrison v.
State, 500 So. 2d 36, 45 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
"Thus, 
the 
determination 
whether 
the 
aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
is not a finding of fact or an element of the
offense. Consequently, Ring and Apprendi do not
require 
that 
a 
jury 
weigh 
the 
aggravating
circumstances and the mitigating circumstances."
Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d at 1187–90 (footnotes omitted). 
This Court concluded that "all [that] Ring and Apprendi
require" is that "the jury ... determine[] the existence of
the 'aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the
death penalty.'" 859 So. 2d at 1188 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at
609), and upheld Alabama's capital-sentencing scheme as
constitutional when a defendant's capital-murder conviction
included a finding by the jury of an aggravating circumstance
making the defendant eligible for the death sentence. 
In Ex parte McNabb, 887 So. 2d 998 (Ala. 2004), this
Court further held that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial
by jury is satisfied and a death sentence may be imposed if a
11
1150640
jury unanimously finds an aggravating circumstance during the
penalty phase or by special-verdict form.  McNabb emphasized
that a jury, not the judge, must find the existence of at
least one aggravating factor for a resulting death sentence to
comport with the Sixth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Hurst applied its holding in Ring to Florida's capital-
sentencing scheme and held that Florida's capital-sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional because, under that scheme, the
trial judge, not the jury, made the "findings necessary to
impose the death penalty." ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622. 
Specifically, 
the 
Court 
held 
that 
Florida's 
capital-sentencing
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury
because the judge, not the jury, found the existence of the 
aggravating circumstance that made Hurst death eligible.  The
Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment requires that the
specific findings authorizing a sentence of death must be made
by a jury, stating:
"Florida concedes that Ring required a jury to
find every fact necessary to render Hurst eligible
for the death penalty. But Florida argues that when
Hurst's 
sentencing 
jury 
recommended 
a 
death
sentence, it 'necessarily included a finding of an
aggravating circumstance.' ... The State contends
12
1150640
that this finding qualified Hurst for the death
penalty under Florida law, thus satisfying Ring. 
'[T]he additional requirement that a judge also find
an aggravator,' Florida concludes, 'only provides
the defendant additional protection.' ...
"The State fails to appreciate the central and
singular role the judge plays under Florida law. ...
[T]he Florida sentencing statute does not make a
defendant eligible for death until 'findings by the
court that such person shall be punished by death.'
Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1) (emphasis added). The trial
court alone must find 'the facts ... [t]hat
sufficient aggravating circumstances exist' and
'[t]hat 
there 
are 
insufficient 
mitigating
circumstances 
to 
outweigh 
the 
aggravating
circumstances.' § 921.141(3) ....  '[T]he jury's
function under the Florida death penalty statute is
advisory only.'  Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508,
512 (Fla. 1983). The State cannot now treat the
advisory recommendation by the jury as the necessary
factual finding that Ring requires.
"....
"The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's
right to an impartial jury.  This right required
Florida to base Timothy Hurst's death sentence on a
jury's 
verdict, 
not 
a 
judge's 
factfinding. 
Florida's sentencing scheme, which required the
judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating
circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional."
Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622-24  (final emphasis
added).
Bohannon contends that, in light of Hurst, Alabama's
capital-sentencing 
scheme, 
like 
Florida's, 
is 
unconstitutional
because, he says, in Alabama a jury does not make "the
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critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty." ___
U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622.  He maintains that Hurst
requires that the jury not only determine the existence of the
aggravating circumstance that makes a defendant death-
eligible but also determine that the existing aggravating
circumstance outweighs any existing mitigating circumstances
before a death sentence is constitutional.  Bohannon reasons
that because in Alabama the judge, when imposing a sentence of
death, makes a finding of the existence of an aggravating
circumstance independent of the jury's fact-finding and makes
an 
independent 
determination 
that 
the 
aggravating 
circumstance
or circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances found to exist, the resulting death sentence is
unconstitutional.  We disagree.
Our reading of Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst leads us to the
conclusion that Alabama's capital-sentencing scheme is
consistent with the Sixth Amendment.  As previously
recognized, Apprendi holds that any fact that elevates a
defendant's sentence above the range established by a jury's
verdict must be determined by the jury.  Ring holds that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires that a jury
14
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"find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of
the death penalty."  Ring, 536 U.S. at 585.  Hurst applies
Ring and reiterates that a jury, not a judge, must find the
existence of an aggravating factor to make a defendant death-
eligible.  Ring and Hurst require only that the jury find the
existence of the aggravating factor that makes a defendant
eligible for the death penalty –- the plain language in those
cases requires nothing more and nothing less.  Accordingly,
because in Alabama a jury, not the judge, determines by a
unanimous verdict the critical finding that an aggravating
circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt to make a
defendant death-eligible, Alabama's capital-sentencing scheme
does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  
Moreover, Hurst does not address the process of weighing
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or suggest that
the jury must conduct the weighing process to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment.  This Court rejected that argument in Ex
parte Waldrop, holding that  that the Sixth Amendment "do[es]
not require that a jury weigh the aggravating circumstances
and the mitigating circumstances" because, rather than being
"a factual determination," the weighing process is "a moral or
15
1150640
legal judgment that takes into account a theoretically
limitless set of facts."  859 So. 2d at 1190, 1189.  Hurst
focuses on the jury's factual finding of the existence of a
aggravating circumstance to make a defendant death-eligible;
it does not mention the jury's weighing of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.  The United States Supreme Court's
holding in Hurst was based on an application, not an
expansion, of Apprendi and Ring; consequently, no reason
exists to disturb our decision in Ex parte Waldrop with regard
to the weighing process.  Furthermore, nothing in our review
of Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst leads us to conclude that in
Hurst the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury impose a capital sentence. 
Apprendi expressly stated that trial courts may "exercise
discretion –- taking into consideration various factors
relating both to offense and offender –- in imposing a
judgment within the range prescribed by statute."  530 U.S. at
481.  Hurst does not disturb this holding.
 
Bohannon's argument that the United States Supreme
Court's overruling in Hurst of Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984), and Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), which
16
1150640
upheld 
Florida's 
capital-sentencing 
scheme 
against 
constitutional challenges, impacts the constitutionality of
Alabama's capital-sentencing scheme is not persuasive.  In
Hurst, the United States Supreme Court specifically stated: 
"The decisions [in Spaziano and Hildwin] are overruled to the
extent they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggravating
circumstance, independent of a jury's factfinding, that is
necessary for imposition of the death penalty."  Hurst, ___
U.S. at ____, 136 S.Ct. at 624 (emphasis added).  Because in
Alabama a jury, not a judge, makes the finding of the
existence of an aggravating circumstance that makes a capital
defendant eligible for a sentence of death, 
Alabama's capital-
sentencing scheme is not unconstitutional on this basis. 
Bohannon's death sentence is consistent with Apprendi,
Ring, and Hurst and does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  The
jury, by its verdict finding Bohannon guilty of murder made
capital because "two or more persons [we]re murdered by the
defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct," see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975, also found
the existence of the aggravating circumstance, provided in §
13A-5-49(9), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
that 
"[t]he 
defendant
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intentionally caused the death of two or more persons by one
act or pursuant to one scheme of course of conduct," which
made Bohannon eligible for a sentence of death.  See also §
13A-5-45(e), Ala. Code 1975 ("[A]ny aggravating circumstance
which the verdict convicting the defendant establishes was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial shall be considered
as proven beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of the
sentence hearing.").  Because the jury, not the judge,
unanimously found the existence of an aggravating factor –-
the intentional causing of the death of two or more persons by
one act or pursuant to one scheme of course of conduct --
making Bohannon death-eligible, Bohannon's Sixth Amendment
rights were not violated. 
Bohannon's argument that the jury's finding of the 
existence of the aggravating circumstance during the guilt
phase of his trial was not an "appropriate finding" for use
during the penalty phase is not persuasive.  Bohannon reasons
that because, he says, the jury was not informed during the
guilt phase that a finding of the existence of the aggravating
circumstance during the guilt phase would make him eligible
18
1150640
for the death penalty, the jury did not know the consequences
of its decision and appreciate its seriousness and gravity.
A review of the record establishes that the members of
the 
venire 
were 
"death-qualified" 
during 
voir 
dire. 
Specifically, the trial court instructed:
"THE COURT: The defendant was indicted by the
Grand Jury of Mobile County during its term in June
of 2011. ...
"....
"THE COURT: The case –- and by that I mean the
Grand Jury indictment –- is indicted for what is
known as capital murder.
"Capital murder is an offense which, if the
defendant is convicted, is punishable either by
death 
or 
by 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
the
possibility of parole.
"The first part of this case that will be
presented to the jury is what is known as the guilt
phase.  The jury will be called upon to determine
whether the State has proved that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense, or
whether the State has proved the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of anything at
all.
"If the jury finds the defendant not guilty,
that, of course, ends the matter.
"If the jury finds the defendant guilty of some
offense less than capital murder, then it will be
incumbent upon the Court –- or me –- to impose the
appropriate punishment.
19
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"If, however, the jury finds the defendant
guilty of the offense of capital murder, the jury
would be brought back for a second phase, or what we
know as the penalty phase of this case.  And, at
that time, the jury may hear more evidence, will
hear legal instructions and argument of counsel. 
The jury would then make a recommendation as to
whether the appropriate punishment is death or life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole."
Bohannon's jury was informed during voir dire that, if it
returned a verdict of guilty of capital murder, Bohannon was
eligible for a sentence of death.  Therefore, Bohannon's
argument that his jury was not impressed with the seriousness
and gravity of its finding of the aggravating circumstance
during the guilt phase of his trial is not supported by the
record.
Next, Bohannon contends that an instruction to the jury
that its sentence is merely advisory conflicts with Hurst
because, he says, Hurst establishes that an "advisory
recommendation" by the jury is  insufficient as the "necessary
factual finding that Ring requires."  Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___,
136 S.Ct. at 622 (holding that the "advisory" recommendation
by the jury in Florida's capital-sentencing scheme was
inadequate as the "necessary factual finding that Ring
requires").  Bohannon ignores the fact that the finding
20
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required by Hurst to be made by the jury, i.e., the existence
of the aggravating factor that makes a defendant death-
eligible, is indeed made by the jury, not the judge, in
Alabama.  Nothing in Apprendi, Ring, or Hurst suggests that,
once the jury finds the existence of the aggravating
circumstance that establishes the range of punishment to
include death, the jury cannot make a recommendation for the
judge to consider in determining the appropriate sentence or
that the judge cannot evaluate the jury's sentencing
recommendation to determine the appropriate sentence within
the statutory range.  Therefore, the making of a sentencing
recommendation by the jury and the judge's use of the jury's
recommendation to determine the appropriate sentence does not
conflict with Hurst.
Bohannon further contends that the circuit court erred 
when it failed to limit the State's questioning of defense
character witnesses about his alleged acts on the night of the
shooting.  Because Bohannon made no objection on this basis at
trial, we review the issue for plain error.
"Plain error is 
"'error that is so obvious that the failure
to notice it would seriously affect the
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fairness or integrity of the judicial
proceedings. Ex parte Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73
(Ala. 1995).  The plain error standard
applies 
only 
where 
a 
particularly 
egregious
error occurred at trial and that error has
or probably has substantially prejudiced
the defendant. Taylor.' 
 
"Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d [162,] 167 [(Ala.
1997)].
Ex parte Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 742 (Ala. 2007).  See also Ex
parte Womack, 435 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983).
According to Bohannon, the State's questioning was highly
prejudicial in light of the facts that his state of mind was
a central issue for the jury's determination and that his
defense depended on persuading the jury that it should view
the surveillance tape and other evidence through the lens of
his law-abiding character.  He further argues that the
prejudice was compounded by the State's argument that each of
his character witnesses admitted that a person who beats and
shoots somebody is not a law-abiding, peaceful person. 
Accordingly, he maintains that his conviction should be
reversed as a result of the circuit court's failure to limit
the State's cross-examination of his character witnesses.  
Our review of the record establishes that the State's
questioning of Bohannon's character witnesses about his
22
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conduct immediately before and during the offense 
as 
reflected
in the surveillance tape "'did not seriously affect the
fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.'"  Ex parte
Walker, 972 So. 2d at 742 (quoting Ex parte Trawick, 698 So.
2d 162, 167 (Ala. 1997)).   The record establishes that the
State asked three of Bohannon's witnesses whether the content
of the tape was consistent with Bohannon's reputation for good
behavior.  For example, the State asked a witness:  "[Y]ou saw
what happened out there at the Paradise Lounge ... [T]hat's
not consistent with having a good reputation."  The State's
questions were about a surveillance tape that had already been
admitted into evidence and had been viewed by the jury. 
Because the jury was free to draw its own conclusions about
Bohannon's state of mind from its viewing of the tape, no
probability exists that the alleged improper questioning
substantially 
prejudiced 
Bohannon 
or 
affected 
the 
integrity 
of
his trial.  Plain error does not exist in this regard. 
Lastly, Bohannon contends that the circuit court also
committed plain error by failing sua sponte to instruct the
jury on the victims' intoxication.  Specifically, he argues
that because the evidence supported a reasonable inference of
23
1150640
self-defense, the circuit court should have instructed the
jury that the victims' intoxication at the time of the offense
may have made them aggressive.  See Stevenson v. State, 794
So. 2d 453, 455 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)(recognizing that "'[a]
defendant is permitted to demonstrate, under a theory of self-
defense, that the victim was under the influence of alcohol at
the time of the fatal altercation'" and that "a defendant
should be allowed a jury instruction [when requested]
regarding the intoxication of the deceased, to 
show tendencies
towards aggression, when the evidence would support a
reasonable inference of self-defense"(quoting Quinlivan v.
State, 555 So. 2d 802, 805 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989))).  
In Ex parte Martin, 931 So. 2d 759 (Ala. 2004), this
Court, when addressing whether the trial court's failure to
give, sua sponte, instructions to the jury explaining the
scope of the victim's statements constituted plain error,
recognized:
"'"To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed
error must not only seriously affect a defendant's
'substantial rights,' but it must also have an
unfair 
prejudicial 
impact 
on 
the 
jury's
deliberations."'  Ex parte Bryant, 951 So. 2d 724,
727 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d
199, 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)).  In United States
v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d
24
1150640
1 
(1985), 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court,
construing the federal plain-error rule, stated:
"'The Rule authorizes the Courts of
Appeals to correct only "particularly
egregious errors," United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982), those errors that
"seriously affect the fairness, integrity
or 
public 
reputation 
of 
judicial
proceedings," United States v. Atkinson,
297 U.S. [157], at 160 [(1936)].  In other
words, the plain-error exception to the
contemporaneous-objection rule is to be
"used 
sparingly, 
solely 
in 
those
circumstances in which a miscarriage of 
justice would otherwise result."  United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S., at 163, n. 14.'
"See also Ex parte Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936, 947–48
(Ala. 2003)(recognizing that plain error exists only
if failure to recognize the error would 'seriously
affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial
proceedings,' and that the plain-error doctrine is
to be 'used sparingly, solely in those circumstances
in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result' (internal quotation marks omitted))."
931 So. 2d at 767-68.
This Court has required a trial court to instruct the
jury sua sponte "only [in] those instances where evidence of
prior convictions [were] offered for impeachment purposes." 
Johnson v. State, 120 So. 3d 1119, 1128 (Ala. 2006)(citing Ex
parte Martin, 931 So. 2d at 769).  In such cases, the trial
court has been required to issue a sua sponte instruction
because, in light of the facts in those particular cases, an
25
1150640
instruction was considered necessary to protect the defendant
from the misuse of "presumptively prejudicial" information
that could be considered by the jury for a limited purpose. 
Ex parte Minor, 780 So. 2d 796, 804 (Ala. 2000).  
The record in this case simply does not support a
conclusion that the circuit court's failure to issue a sua
sponte  instruction on the victims' intoxication constituted
plain error.  The evidence at issue is not "presumptively
prejudicial" to Bohannon, and, because the jury was 
instructed
to consider all the evidence,  Bohannon was not substantially
prejudiced by the circuit court's failure to issue such an 
instruction.  The record establishes that Bohannon's counsel
argued in his opening statement that one of the victims pushed
Bohannon a couple of times during the altercation and that the
victims were high on methamphetamine and that that drug makes
individuals aggressive.  The record also establishes that
evidence was admitted indicating that the victims were
intoxicated and that the jury, when it viewed the surveillance
tape, was able to observe the confrontation between Bohannon
and the victims.  Therefore, the jury was free to consider all
the evidence Bohannon presented, which included evidence of
26
1150640
the victims' intoxication and Bohannon's argument that the
victims' intoxication made them act aggressively.  
Because 
the
jury was instructed to consider all the evidence, the  failure
to sua sponte give an instruction on the victims' intoxication 
did not seriously affect the fairness or integrity of
Bohannon's trial or substantially prejudice Bohannon.  Ex
parte Martin, supra; and Ex parte Henderson, 583 So. 2d 305,
306 (Ala. 1991).  After considering the evidence and the
totality of the circuit court's jury instruction, we conclude
that the circuit court's failure to give sua sponte an
instruction about the proper use of the victims' intoxication
did not constitute plain error.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
27