Case Title: State v. Hughes

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 56

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

|THE STATE OF NEVADA, | No, 54327

Apellant, | FILED

JAAR OR HUGHES
oe BS. | SEP 29 20H

Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a charge of

production of child pornography after concluding that NRS 200.710 is
‘unconstitutionally vague. Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko County:
[Andrew J, Puccinelli, Judge.

‘Reversed and remanded,
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Gary Woodbury,
District Attorney, and Mark Torvinen, Deputy District Attorney, Elko

County,
for Appellant.

Routsis, Gilbert Ltd. and William J. Routsis, II, Reno,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

‘This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion
to dismiss a child pornography charge. Respondent Aaron Taylor Hughes
allegedly created three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual

intercourse with a 17-year-old. He faces several criminal charges, trial on

 
|which awaits resolution of this appeal. We are concerned only with the

icharge the district court dismissed: the use of a minor, identified in the

 

icriminal information as “a person less than the age of eighteen,” in

jproducing pornography or as the subject of a sexual portrayal in a

 

performance.
Under NRS 200.710, “{a] person who knowingly uses,
Jencourages, entices or perm!

 

‘a minor to simulate or engage in or assist
lothers to simulate or engage in sexual conduct to produce a performance”

lor “knowingly use’

 

encourages, entices

 

, coerces or permits a minor to be

 

[the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance”
Neither NRS 200.710 nor NRS 200,700—the applicable definition

guilty of a felony.

section—defines the term “minor.” Hughes filed a motion to dismiss the
pornography charge on the ground that the word “minor” is
‘unconstitutionally vague because it is unclear whether the term refers to
persons under age 18 or some other age. In the alternative, he argued
that the statute does not apply to his alleged conduct because “minor”
refers to people under 16 years of age. The district court dismissed the
‘child pornography charge, concluding that the statute was vague and that
it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under
16 years of age, The State appealed; we reverse.

“The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo, Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger
bears the burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutional... [T]he
challenger must make a clear showing of invalidity.” Silvar v. Dist. Ct.
122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (2006) (footnote omitted). “[E]very
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute
from unconstitutionality.” State v, Castaneda, 126 Nev. _, __, 245 P.3d

 

 

 
1550, 552 (2010) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895));
laccord Virginia and Truckee R.R, Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 174 (1873) ("It
requires neither argument nor reference to authorities to show that when
the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would
render it constitutional and valid and the other unconstitutional and void,
that construction should be adopted which will save the statute.”).

“Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First
Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause(s] of the Fifth” and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, United States _v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.dd at
684-85, “Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
independent reasons,” Chicago v, Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999): (1) if it
“fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited”
seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Holder v, Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. __, _, 10 8. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) (quoting Williams,
568 U.S. at 304),

 

or (2) if it “is 80 standardless that it authorizes or encourages

 

Enough clarity to defeat a vagueness challenge “may be

supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute,” Skilling v.
United States, 561 US. __, __, 130 S. Ct, 2896, 2933 (2010) (quoting
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997), or by giving a statute's
words their “well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning.”
Castaneda, 126 Nev. at __, 245 P.3d at 554 (quoting Berry v, State, 125
Nev. 265, 280, 212 P.3d 1085, 1095 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by
Castaneda, 126 Nev. at __n.1, 245 P.3d at 553 n.1).

 

 
We conelude that the term “minor” is not unconstitutionally
jvague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning: an
individual under 18 years of age. The common dictionary definition of the
” See Webster's New
College Dictionary 715 (3d ed. 2008); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1017

(2th ed. 2009) (defining “minor” as “[a] person who has not reached full

term is “[o]ne who has not reached full legal age.”

legal age: a child or juvenile”). Full legal age is defined in NRS 129.010 as
18 yeas

 

:“[a]ll persons of the age of 18 years... are . .. considered to be of
awful age.” Thus, the term “minor” refers to individuals under the age of
18 years.!

We disagree with Hughes's suggestion that other NRS

provisions cast doubt on the meaning of “minor.” The Legislature

1Our analysis comports with that of the United States Supreme
‘Court in Osborne v, Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 113 n.9 (1990), In Osborne, the
Court applied Ohio's general age of majority statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
/§ 3109.01, to defeat a vagueness challenge to the term “minor” in Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323(A)(3), which prohibited possession of material
‘depicting a “minor in a state of nudity.” Id.

 

“The district court correctly concluded that the plain meaning of the
word “minor” is a person under the age of 18. However, the court then
concluded that other statutes in the section rendered the meaning of
“minor” ambiguous. See, e.g., NRS 200.730 (criminalizing possession of
pornographic material depicting an individual under 16 years of age).
When the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, a court should not look to
related statutes as extrinsic aids. See 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D.

Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51:1 (7th ed. 2008).

 

Further, headings such as “Pornography Involving Minors,” which
precedes NRS 200.700-.760 and lead lines, such as the one that includes
the term “minor” in NRS 202.020, are unavailable for interpretive
purposes unless they are part of the legislative enactment; here, they are
not. See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer. Sutherland

‘continued on next page

 

 
omen Be

Jregularly defines “minor” as a person under 18 years of age. See, e.g,
INRS 609.440 (defining “minor” for employment provisions as a person who
['liJs less than 18 years of age”); NRS 201.259 (defining “minor” for
Jproscription against exhibition and sale of obscene materials as “any
jperson under the age of 18 years"), Further, our Legislature is
lconsistently explicit when it adopts age thresholds other than 18 years.
See, e.g., NRS 200.727 (proscribing the use of the Internet to control a
ldepiction of someone under the age of 16 years engaging in sexual

lconduct); NRS 200.730 (criminalizing possession of images depicting «

 

person under the age of 16 engaged in sexual conduct); NRS 201.195
(creating harsher penalties for soliciting a minor who is “less than 14
years of age” to engage in “crimefs] against nature”); NRS 202.020-.055,

202.060 (establishing certain alcohol-related offenses for those under 21

 

lyears of age), Rather than suggesting any ambiguity or vagueness in the
term “minor,” these provisions demonstrate that the Legislature
consistently uses the term in its well-settled and ordinarily understood
meaning and that when it intends a different meaning, it uses explicit

language modifying the term.>

 

‘continued
Statutory Construction § 47.14 (7th ed. 2007); A.B. 142, 60th Leg. (Nev.

1979); A.B. 189, 62d Leg. (Nev. 1983); NRS 220.120 (authorizing the
Legislative Counsel to create and revise titles, chapters, and sections of
NRS).

"The district court’s determination that “minor” was ambiguous led
it to the conclusion, after considering the legislative history, that “minor”
refers to a person under 16 years of age. Having concluded from the plain
text that “minor” refers to people under the age of 18 and is not

‘continued o7 next page

 

 

 
We do not share Hughes's concern with the Legislature
jadopting 16 years as the age of consent for sexual relations, see NRS
1200.364, yet choosing to legalize the visual memorialization of the same,
18
As the

Jconsented-to, sexual conduct only when all participants are at le
years of age, NRS 200,710. This distinction has a rational bs

 

 

Supreme Court has observed, “the materials produced by child
lpornographers permanently record the victim's abuse. The pornography’s
[continued existence ca\
the children in years to come.” Osborne, 495 U.S, at 111 (citing New York
lv. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)), Given the permanency of a visual

 

1s the child victims continuing harm by haunting

depiction, it was rational for the Legislature to conclude that participation

 

jin pornography memorializing a sexual encounter requires greater
Jmaturity from the participants than does the choice to engage in sexual
relations. See State v, Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Neb. 2005)
(concluding that, while a person might be old enough to consent to sexual
relations, the legislature rationally concluded that an individual might not
appreciate the ongoing effect of participation in pornography—thus
justifying the difference in ages between the statutes); People v, Campbell,
94 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (noting the rationality between
disparate ages for sexual consent and pornography—I5 years old and 18
years old, respectively).

continued

ambiguous, we do not reach the legislative history. See 2A Sutherland
Statutory Construction, supra, §§ 45:2, 46:4 (7th ed. 2007).

 

 
   
   
  
   
    
 
   
  
     

The term minor has a well-settled and ordinarily understood
meaning. Under NRS 200.710 it is unlawful to use a person under 18
years of age in producing a pornographic performance.

We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.*

( a.
Pickering

Hardesty

Parraguirre

‘We do not address the constitutional arguments Hughes raises for
the first time on appeal. In re Candelaria, 126 Nev. _, __, 245 P.3d 518,
1522 n.5 (2010) (noting that it is within the court's authority to determine
|whether it will address constitutional issues raised for the first time on
/appeal).

 
SAITTA, C.J., with whom, CHERRY J., agrees, concurring:

agree with the majority's conclusion that NRS 200.710 is not
unconstitutionally vague, but I write separately to express my concern
with the imprecise draftsmanship at the core of the statute. As evinced by
the considerable effort devoted by the majority to pinning down just what
the term “minor” in NRS 200.710 means, the statute is far from a model of
clarity. If the members of the majority—experienced jurists armed with

law dictionaric

 

ind treatises—require so much energy to discern what
the term means, then one must wonder how well “a person of ordinary
intelligence” would fare. Ultimately, such a person would likely throw up

is or her hands and assume that the term “minor,” as used in NRS
200.710, means someone under the age of 18. Given this reality, 1
understand why the district court concluded that the statute's imprecision
jrises to the level of unconstitutional vagueness. The Legislature should

 

Jhave prevented this very situation by fas

ith,

Saitta

\ioning a more comprehensive
statute in the first place.