Case Title: City of Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11620

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11620 
 
CITY OF SOMERVILLE & another1  vs.  COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS BOARD & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2014. - February 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
School and School Committee, Retirement benefits, Group 
insurance, Collective bargaining.  Municipal Corporations, 
Group insurance, Collective bargaining.  Retirement.  
Public Employment, Retirement benefits, Collective 
bargaining.  Insurance, Group. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Division of Labor Relations. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Matthew J. Buckley, Assistant City Solicitor, for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
T. Jane Gabriel for the defendant. 
 
Laurie R. Houle, Ira Fader, Colin R. Confoey, & Jason 
Powalisz for the interveners, submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 School Committee of Somerville. 
 
 
2 Somerville Teachers Association, Somerville Police 
Superior Officers Association, Somerville Administrators 
Association, and Somerville Municipal Employees Association, 
interveners. 
2 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  At issue in this case is whether the city of 
Somerville (city) and the school committee of Somerville (school 
committee) violated G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), and, 
derivatively, G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), when the city 
unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired 
employees' health insurance premiums without engaging in 
collective bargaining over the matter with current employees.3  
We conclude that the city and the school committee did not 
violate these statutory provisions.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board), 
which reached a contrary conclusion. 
 
1.  Statutory framework.  Our resolution of the present 
dispute is based on the interplay between G. L. c. 150E and 
G. L. c. 32B.  General Laws c. 150E, § 2, protects the rights of 
public employees to self-organization and collective bargaining.  
Pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 6, "[t]he employer and the 
exclusive representative . . . shall negotiate in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, standards [of] productivity and 
performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment 
. . . ."  General Laws c. 150E, § 10, states, in relevant part: 
 
"(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public 
employer or its designated representative to: 
 
                     
 
3 A municipality and a school committee are a single entity 
for purposes of collective bargaining.  See City of Malden, 23 
M.L.C. 181, 183-184 (1997). 
3 
 
 
"(1) Interfere, restrain, or coerce any employee in 
the exercise of any right guaranteed under this chapter; 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"(5) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with 
the exclusive representative as required in section six 
. . . ." 
 
 
"Under the Home Rule Amendment, art. 89, § 6, of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, municipalities of 
the Commonwealth may choose to provide health insurance coverage 
to their employees."  Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 
261 (2014).  See Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449 Mass. 690, 
695 (2007).  General Laws c. 32B is a so-called "local option" 
statute that governs the provision of health insurance to active 
and retired employees of a municipality once that entity has 
voted to accept the terms of the statute.4  See Twomey v. 
Middleborough, supra; Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 316 
(1997).  See generally D.A. Randall & D.E. Franklin, Municipal 
Law and Practice § 10.25 (5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2014).  When 
enacted, see St. 1956, c. 730, § 1, G. L. c. 32B, §§ 1 and 3, 
authorized municipalities to offer certain eligible persons and 
their dependents group indemnity health insurance coverage.  
Beginning in 1971, municipalities were given the option of 
making available to such individuals the services of a health 
                     
 
4 For the sake of simplicity, we use the term "municipality" 
in this opinion to refer to the counties, cities, towns, and 
districts covered by G. L. c. 32B. 
4 
 
maintenance organization (HMO) by accepting G. L. c. 32B, § 16, 
inserted by St. 1971, c. 946, § 5. 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, § 9, retirees bear the full cost 
of their health insurance premiums unless a municipality has 
accepted the more generous provisions of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A or 
§ 9E.  If a municipality accepts G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, then it may 
elect to pay fifty per cent of a retiree's premium for health 
insurance coverage.  If a municipality accepts G. L. c. 32B, 
§ 9E, then it may elect to pay "a subsidiary or additional rate" 
greater than fifty per cent of a retiree's health insurance 
premium. 
 
2.  Factual and procedural background.  We summarize the 
relevant facts as stipulated by the parties in lieu of a hearing 
before the board.  The city is a public employer within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 150E, § 1.  The school committee is the 
collective bargaining agent of the city for the purpose of 
dealing with school employees.  The Somerville Teachers 
Association, Somerville Police Superior Officers Association, 
Somerville Administrators Association, and Somerville Municipal 
Employees Association (collectively, the unions) are employee 
organizations within the meaning of G. L. c. 150E, § 1,5 and they 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 150E, § 1, defines an "[e]mployee 
organization" as "any lawful association, organization, 
federation, council, or labor union, the membership of which 
includes public employees, and assists its members to improve 
their wages, hours, and conditions of employment." 
5 
 
are the exclusive bargaining representatives for various 
individuals employed by the school committee and the city. 
 
In 1979, the city accepted G. L. c. 32B, § 9E, by a vote of 
the board of aldermen, thereby authorizing the city to pay more 
than fifty per cent of a retired employee's monthly premium for 
an indemnity health insurance plan.  From that point forward 
until August 1, 2009, the city contributed ninety-nine per cent 
of the premium for a retired employee's health insurance 
coverage under the indemnity plan offered by the city.  Retired 
employees contributed the remaining one per cent of the premium.  
In addition, the city offered active and retired employees 
health insurance coverage through several HMOs.  The city paid 
fixed percentages of the total premium costs, which varied 
between eighty and ninety per cent, depending on the particular 
plan.  Employees and retirees paid the remainder of the premium 
costs. 
 
On or about July 1, 2009, the city had approximately 1,262 
retirees who were participating in the city's group health 
insurance plans.  The majority of these individuals had retired 
from positions in the unions' bargaining units.  Effective 
August 1, 2009, the city decreased the percentage of its 
contribution for retired employees' health insurance coverage 
under the indemnity plan from ninety-nine per cent to sixty per 
cent, and it decreased the percentage of its contribution for 
6 
 
retired employees' health insurance coverage under all other 
insurance plans to seventy-five per cent.  These changes were 
approved by the board of aldermen after a properly noticed 
public hearing at which the new rates were proposed by the 
mayor.6 
 
Neither the city nor the school committee provided the 
unions with notice of or an opportunity to bargain over the 
decision to change contribution rates.  None of the collective 
bargaining agreements between the city and the various 
bargaining units addressed the contribution rates for retired 
employees' health insurance coverage, and such rates had never 
been a subject of negotiation between the city and the 
bargaining units.  At all material times, the city has 
maintained that the authority to set the contribution rates for 
retirees' health insurance coverage is vested exclusively with 
the board of aldermen and the mayor, and that such contribution 
rates are not a mandatory subject of bargaining with current 
employees. 
 
On September 10, 2009, the Somerville Teachers Association 
filed two prohibited practice charges with the division of labor 
                     
 
6 According to the city of Somerville (city), the board of 
aldermen voted to amend the city's 1979 acceptance of G. L. 
c. 32B, § 9E, thereby allowing the city to reduce its health 
insurance contribution rates for retirees. 
7 
 
relations (division).7  It alleged that the city and, separately, 
the school committee had violated G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), 
and, derivatively, G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), by "failing to 
provide notice and an opportunity to bargain over the future 
benefits [on retirement] of active employees when the City 
announced at the meeting of the Board of Aldermen, on May 28, 
2009 that effective August 1, 2009 the percentage contribution 
rate for all retirees would be increased."8  Based on essentially 
the same grounds, the Somerville Police Superior Officers 
Association filed a prohibited practice charge with the division 
on December 21, 2009; the Somerville Administrators Association 
filed two prohibited practice charges with the division on 
January 26, 2010;9 and the Somerville Municipal Employees 
Association filed a prohibited practice charge with the division 
on April 13, 2010.  The division investigated the allegations 
and found probable cause to believe that statutory violations 
had occurred.  The division issued complaints with respect to 
all six matters, and, on July 30, 2010, they were consolidated 
                     
 
7 The division of labor relations is now the Department of 
Labor Relations.  See St. 2011, c. 3, § 36. 
 
 
8 In its prohibited practice charge against the city, the 
Somerville Teachers Association (association) also alleged that 
the city had failed to provide certain health insurance 
information that was reasonable and necessary for the 
association to fulfil its obligations under the law.  It 
subsequently withdrew this claim on February 18, 2011. 
 
 
9 One prohibited practice charge was against the city, and 
the other was against the school committee of Somerville. 
8 
 
for hearing.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 11 (f), the parties 
petitioned to have the consolidated complaints heard by the 
board in the first instance (rather than by a hearing officer),10 
and the request was granted.  The parties then stipulated to the 
facts. 
 
By decision dated October 19, 2011, the board concluded 
that the city and the school committee had failed to satisfy 
their statutory bargaining obligations before unilaterally 
reducing contributions for retired employees' health insurance 
premiums.  In the board's view, health insurance contributions 
for municipal retirees are a mandatory subject of bargaining.  
The board rejected the city's claims that current employees have 
no right to bargain over such contributions made on behalf of 
retirees, and that, pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, health insurance 
rates for retirees must be established through the local 
governmental process, not the collective bargaining process. 
 
The board ordered the city and the school committee to 
cease and desist from failing and refusing to bargain 
collectively in good faith with the unions over changes to 
future retirees' health insurance contribution rates.  Further, 
the board ordered the city and the school committee to restore 
the terms of the retirement health insurance benefit that was in 
                     
 
10 The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board) is 
the body within the division of labor relations that is charged 
with reviewing orders from investigators and issuing decisions.  
See G. L. c. 23, § 9R; G. L. c. 150E, § 11. 
9 
 
effect prior to August 1, 2009, for the unions' bargaining unit 
members who were active employees before that date and retired 
thereafter.  In addition, the board ordered the city and the 
school committee to make whole those bargaining unit members who 
retired after August 1, 2009, for any losses they may have 
suffered as a result of the unilateral change in retirement 
health insurance contribution rates, plus interest.  The city 
and the school committee appealed the board's decision, the case 
was entered in the Appeals Court, and we transferred it to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
3.  Standard of review.  We review the board's decision in 
accordance with the standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7), governing appeals from final administrative agency 
decisions.  See G. L. c. 150E, § 11 (i).  See also Worcester v. 
Labor Relations Comm'n, 438 Mass. 177, 180 (2002).  The board's 
decision will be set aside only if it is "[a]rbitrary or 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).  We defer to 
the board's specialized knowledge and expertise.  See Worcester 
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra.  However, the duty of 
statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the courts.  See 
Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 
(2006), citing Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 343-
344 (1964). 
10 
 
 
4.  Discussion.  The thrust of the arguments made by the 
city and the school committee is that current public employees 
do not have the right to bargain collectively over the issue of 
health insurance contribution rates for retirees.  They contend 
that, pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, such contribution rates are to 
be determined solely by the local government.  In their view, a 
contrary conclusion would give the unions veto power over 
decisions made by a municipality acting in accordance with its 
statutory authority.  Therefore, they continue, neither the city 
nor the school committee violated G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), 
and, derivatively, G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), when the city 
unilaterally reduced its percentage contributions to retirees' 
health insurance premiums.  We agree. 
 
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 
1935, it exempted public employers -- States and their political 
subdivisions -- from the obligation to engage in collective 
bargaining.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).  See also Brookfield 
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 443 Mass. 315, 326 n.5 (2005).  
States and their political subdivisions were "free to regulate 
their labor relationships with their public employees."  
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007).  
However, as was the case in most States, public employees in the 
Commonwealth "had virtually none of the rights that had been 
widely guaranteed since the nineteen thirties to employees in 
11 
 
private business to organize and bargain collectively and to be 
protected in the associated activities of asserting and 
negotiating grievances."  Dedham v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 365 
Mass. 392, 396 (1974).  "[T]raditional hostility to 
organizational rights on the part of public employees gradually 
diminished in the post-war period, and in 1958 Massachusetts was 
among the first States . . . to afford a measure of recognition 
to those rights."  Id. at 397.  See St. 1958, c. 460, inserting 
G. L. c. 149, § 178D.  See also St. 1964, c. 637, inserting 
G. L. c. 149, § 178F; St. 1965, c. 763, § 2, inserting G. L. 
c. 149, §§ 178G-178N.  In 1973, the public sector collective 
bargaining law, G. L. c. 149, §§ 178D, 178F-178N, was repealed 
and replaced with G. L. c. 150E, see St. 1973, c. 1078, §§ 1, 2, 
as comprehensive legislation designed to provide organizational 
and collective bargaining rights to public employees.11  See 
                     
 
11 Historically speaking, "the subjects of public sector 
collective bargaining are more restricted than those in private 
sector labor relations."  School Comm. of Boston v. Boston 
Teachers Union, Local 66, 378 Mass. 65, 70 (1979).  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 150E, § 9A (a) (prohibiting public employees and their 
organizations from engaging in strikes).  "'Public policy, 
whether derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in 
statute or decisional law, or in neither' may limit the ability 
of a public employer . . . to bind itself to a given contractual 
provision or to delegate to an arbitrator the power to bind it."  
School Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 
supra, quoting School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 
685 (1976).  "While this principle may be raised in varied 
contexts . . . the analysis to be utilized is essentially the 
same in all instances:  whether the ingredient of public policy 
in the issue subject to dispute is so comparatively heavy that 
collective bargaining . . . on the subject is, as a matter of 
12 
 
Labor Relations Comm'n v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 374 
Mass. 79, 93-95 (1977); Gallagher v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 
371 Mass. 691, 693 (1977).  Thus, the scope of matters for 
negotiation has been defined, albeit somewhat broadly, by the 
Legislature. 
 
General Laws c. 150E, § 6, provides that the public 
employer and the employee organization "shall negotiate in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, standards [of] productivity 
and performance, and any other terms and conditions of 
employment."  These matters, subject to limited exceptions, are 
deemed to be mandatory subjects of bargaining.12  See Local 1652, 
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Framingham, 442 Mass. 463, 467 
(2004).  See also Worcester v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 438 Mass. 
at 180-181 (certain types of managerial decisions must, as 
matter of policy, be reserved for public employer's discretion).  
The failure of a public employer to negotiate in good faith over 
                                                                  
law, to be denied effect."  Id. at 70-71.  "Underlying this 
development is the belief that, unless the bargaining 
relationship is carefully regulated, giving public employees the 
collective power to negotiate labor contracts poses the 
substantial danger of distorting the normal political process 
for controlling public policy."  Id. at 71. 
 
 
12 It has been observed by appellate courts that "[a]ny 
attempt to define with precision and certainty the subjects 
about which bargaining is mandated by [c.] 150E is doomed to 
failure."  Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 
172, 177 (1997), quoting Greenbaum, The Scope of Mandatory 
Bargaining Under Massachusetts Public Sector Labor Relations 
Law, 72 Mass. L. Rev. 102, 102 (1987).  See Local 2071, Int'l 
Ass'n of Firefighters v. Bellingham, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 522 
(2006) (Mills, J., dissenting), S.C., 450 Mass. 1011 (2007). 
13 
 
mandatory subjects of bargaining is a prohibited practice.  See 
G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5).  See also Commonwealth v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. 124, 127 (1989) ("A public employer 
has a duty to bargain in good faith and, short of impasse, it 
may not unilaterally implement changes to a mandatory subject of 
bargaining without negotiation"); School Comm. of Newton v. 
Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 572 (1983).  The 
commission of a prohibited practice is remediable through the 
enforcement procedures set forth in G. L. c. 150E, § 11. 
 
The issue here is whether the city's contribution rate for 
retired employees' health insurance coverage is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining such that its unilateral reduction 
constitutes a prohibited practice in violation of G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 10 (a) (5).  As a general proposition, health insurance 
coverage for public employees is "an unearned benefit, no 
different in concept from holidays, future sick leave, or other 
similar benefits."  Larson v. School Comm. of Plymouth, 430 
Mass. 719, 724 (2000).  "As an unearned benefit, health 
insurance, like 'wages, hours . . . and . . . other terms and 
conditions of employment' is subject to mandatory collective 
bargaining between public employers and public employees."  
Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Cambridge Pub. Health Comm'n, 82 
Mass. App. Ct. 909, 911 (2012), quoting School Comm. of Medford 
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 (1979), 
14 
 
S.C., 380 Mass. 932 (1980).  See Anderson v. Selectmen of 
Wrentham, 406 Mass. 508, 511 (1990) (municipality's contribution 
to unionized employees' group health insurance premiums is 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining).  The language of 
G. L. c. 150E, § 6, governs the terms and conditions of the 
public employee's existing employment.  It goes without saying 
that a retiree cannot bargain over the percentage contributions 
made by a municipality to the retiree's health insurance 
premiums, given that the retiree is no longer employed.  With 
respect to current employees, a municipality's contributions to 
the health insurance premiums of retirees is not a term or 
condition of employment that is subject to mandatory collective 
bargaining where the Legislature expressly has conferred 
authority over the provision of such a benefit on the 
municipality. 
 
The Legislature, by way of G. L. c. 32B, § 9, has stated 
that retirees "shall pay the full premium cost" of their health 
insurance, subject to the provisions of either G. L. c. 32B, 
§ 9A, or G. L. c. 32B, § 9E, which, if accepted by a 
municipality, permits the municipality to pay a portion of the 
retirees' premiums.  The authority conferred on a municipality 
to decide whether and how much to contribute to the monthly 
health insurance premiums of retired employees (within defined 
statutory percentages) would be wholly undermined by an 
15 
 
obligation to collectively bargain the matter.  See, e.g., 
Somerville v. Somerville Mun. Employees Ass'n, 451 Mass. 493, 
494 (2008) (explicit legislative directive of G. L. c. 115, 
§ 10, that city's director of veterans' services "shall be 
appointed . . . by the mayor, with the approval of the city 
council," precluded challenged appointment from being proper 
subject of collective bargaining); National Ass'n of Gov't 
Employees v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 448, 453, cert. denied, 515 
U.S. 1161 (1995) (where Legislature reserved for itself in G. L. 
c. 32A, § 8, power to change percentage of Commonwealth's 
agreed-to contribution to employees' health insurance premiums, 
such reserved power could not be overridden by collective 
bargaining); Watertown Firefighters, Local 1347, I.A.F.F. v. 
Watertown, 376 Mass. 706, 714 (1978) (characterization of matter 
as term or condition of employment does not require its 
submission to collective bargaining if to do so will "defeat[] a 
declared legislative purpose").  See generally Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 
(1983), quoting Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 
(1908) ("One whose rights . . . are subject to [S]tate 
restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by 
making a contract about them"). 
 
Except as provided in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), which we 
shall discuss next, "[t]here is no obligation to engage in 
16 
 
collective bargaining as to matters controlled entirely by 
statute."  Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 
172, 183 (1997).13  See Commonwealth v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 
404 Mass. at 126; National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local R1-
162 v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 544 
(1984).  Here, current public employees cannot bargain over how 
the city should exercise the authority conferred on it by G. L. 
c. 32B, § 9E, because such bargaining effectively would negate 
the Legislature's purpose in entrusting the matter to the city.  
See Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra at 184.  Cf. Twomey v. 
Middleborough, 468 Mass. at 271 (board of selectmen has 
statutory authority to establish percentage of total monthly 
premium for HMO coverage that is to be paid by town's retired 
employees); Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. at 323-324 
(municipal contribution rate for HMO premiums for retired 
nonunionized employees determined at local government level).  
In our view, the Legislature conferred authority on 
municipalities to decide whether and how much to contribute to 
                     
 
13 In Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 
182, the Appeals Court cogently explained:  "In the range of 
cases where the governmental employer acts pursuant to broad, 
general management powers, the danger is presented, as pointed 
out in School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 
Mass. [557,] 564-566 [(1983)], that to recognize the statutory 
authority as exclusive would substantially undermine the purpose 
of G. L. c. 150E, § 6, to provide for meaningful collective 
bargaining as a general rule with respect to compensation and 
other terms and conditions of employment.  That danger simply is 
not present when the governmental employer acts pursuant to a 
specific, narrow statutory mandate." 
17 
 
retirees' health insurance premiums in recognition of the fact 
that, as public employers, they must balance the needs of their 
retired workers with the burdens of safeguarding their own 
fiscal health, thereby ensuring their ability to provide 
services for all of their citizens. 
 
If we were to conclude that the city's percentage 
contribution to retirees' health insurance premiums is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining, we would have to confront the 
import of the so-called "conflicts" statute, G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 7 (d).  See Adams v. Boston, 461 Mass. 602, 607-608 (2012).  
General Laws c. 150E, § 7 (d), provides that, with respect to 
matters within the scope of negotiations under G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 6, the terms of a collective bargaining agreement prevail over 
contrary terms in certain enumerated statutes.  See Adams v. 
Boston, supra; Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial 
Court v. Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 6, 
441 Mass. 620, 625-626 (2004).  Generally speaking, those 
enumerated statutes "contain specific mandates regarding terms 
and conditions of employment of public employees."  Adams v. 
Boston, supra at 607 n.11.  See G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d); School 
Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. at 566.  
General Laws c. 32B, § 9E, is not among the enumerated statutes.  
It is well established that "statutes not specifically 
enumerated in § 7 (d) will prevail over contrary terms in 
18 
 
collective bargaining agreements."  Commonwealth v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. at 126.  See Chief Justice for 
Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court v. Office & Professional 
Employees Int'l Union, Local 6, supra; School Comm. of Natick v. 
Education Ass'n of Natick, 423 Mass. 34, 39 (1996).  "There is 
no duty to bargain over the specific requirements of such 
statutes."  Commonwealth v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra.  As 
pertinent to the present case, even if the city's contribution 
to retirees' health insurance premiums was deemed to be a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the provisions of 
G. L. c. 150E, § 9E, would prevail, and the city could 
unilaterally change the percentage of its contribution in 
accordance with the statute.  See National Ass'n of Gov't 
Employees, Local R1-162 v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 17 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 544 (where statute not listed in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 [d], 
public employer and union cannot amend statute's requirements 
through collective bargaining). 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The city and the school committee did not 
violate G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), or, derivatively, G. L. 
c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), when the city unilaterally reduced its 
percentage contribution to retired employees' health insurance 
premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the 
matter with current employees.  Accordingly, the decision of the 
board is reversed. 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.