Case Title: Thomas v. Pepper Southern Const., Inc.

Citation: 585 So. 2d 882

Docket Number: 1900119

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1991-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
585 So. 2d 882 (1991)
Rogers THOMAS and Ethel Thomas
v.
PEPPER SOUTHERN CONSTRUCTION, INC., and Sears, Roebuck & Company.
1900119.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 9, 1991.
*883 Thomas J. Knight, Anniston, for appellants.
George C. Douglas, Jr. of Gaines, Gaines & Gaines, Talladega, for appellees.
ADAMS, Justice.
The plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Pepper Southern Construction, Inc. ("Pepper Southern"), and Sears, Roebuck & Company ("Sears"). Rogers and Ethel Thomas sought to recover damages for injuries Mr. Thomas received in an accident while working as an employee of Crestview Plumbing and Heating Company. Crestview was doing some work on the expansion of the Sears store building in Oxford, Alabama, when a trench caved in, resulting in injury to Mr. Thomas. His wife, Ethel Thomas, sued for damages for loss of consortium. The plaintiffs contend that Pepper Southern, as general contractor for the job, and Sears, as premises owner, both assumed the responsibility for the safety of the project and that they negligently performed their duties; therefore, the plaintiffs contend, the summary judgment should not have been entered.[1]
Pepper Southern and Sears, on the other hand, argue that the summary judgment was proper, because, they say, Crestview was an independent contractor.
We wrote the following in Pugh v. Butler Telephone Co., 512 So. 2d 1317 (Ala. 1987):
"Our standard of review of a summary judgment granted in favor of a defendant requires us to review the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and to resolve all reasonable doubts against *884 the defendant. Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381 (Ala.1986); Burt v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 489 So. 2d 547 (Ala.1986); Autrey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 481 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 1985)."
512 So. 2d  at 1318. Even considering the evidence in "a light most favorable to the plaintiff," we find that Crestview was an independent contractor and that no agency relationship existed between the parties to impose a duty on Pepper Southern and Sears with regard to the safety of Thomas. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we find that the summary judgment was proper.
This Court has set out the following rules:
Spell v. ConAgra, 547 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1989).
Alabama Power Co. v. Williams, 570 So. 2d 589, 591 (Ala.1990).
Weeks v. Alabama Elec. Co-op., Inc., 419 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Ala. 1982).
Alabama Power Co. v. Williams, 570 So. 2d 589, 592 (Ala.1990).
In the present case, the depositions indicate that Pepper Southern had someone on the job site in order to make sure that the specifications of the job were carried out. The president of Crestview stated in his deposition that Crestview had control over the manner in which the job was performed, as long as the specifications in the contract were met. He further stated that Crestview had control over the number of employees that were maintained on the job site and that Crestview was responsible for the safety of its employees and the job area. The president of Crestview, as well as Mr. Thomas, stated that there were frequent *885 safety meetings held by someone with Pepper Southern. Mr. Thomas stated that at these meetings, the workers were reminded to wear their hard hats and safety shoes. He said that they were told that the failure to wear their hats and shoes would result in a $50 fine. Such meetings, however, do not indicate an exercise of control over the job site sufficient to present a jury question on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
[1]  The Thomases settled their dispute as it related to Crestview Plumbing; therefore, Crestview's liability is not at issue in this appeal. We note that because this case was pending on June 11, 1987, the "scintilla rule," and not the "substantial evidence rule," is the standard by which the propriety of the summary judgment in this case will be judged. See Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12.