Case Title: State Ex Rel. Nixon v. Hutcherson

Citation: 96 S.W.3d 81

Docket Number: SC 84679

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
96 S.W.3d 81 (2003)
STATE ex rel. Jeremiah W. (Jay) NIXON, Attorney General, and Carroll County Trust Company, Relators,
v.
The Honorable John R. HUTCHERSON, Retired, Circuit Judge, 8th Judicial Circuit, Ray County, Respondent.
No. SC 84679.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
February 11, 2003.
*82 Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. General, Tracy E. McGinnis, Sarah E. Ledgerwood, Assistant Attys. General, Jefferson City, James A. Foland, David W. White, Jacqueline M. Sexton, John A. Watt, Kansas City, for Relators.
Roger M. Driskill, Liberty, John P. Killian, Independence, for Respondent.
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge.
Because only the attorney general of the state of Missouri or individuals with a "special interest" have standing to bring suit to enforce charitable trusts, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss a class action lawsuit in Ray County seeking to enforce certain provisions of a trust and the last will of Mary Katherine Axtell. The preliminary writ is made absolute.
Prior to her death in 1960, Mary Katherine Axtell created a will and testamentary trust. The will contained a number of provisions that are at issue here. First, the will dealt with a farm in Ray County stating,
The will also dealt with items of personal property, ultimately stating,
The will also provided for another farm in "Moss Creek, Trotter and Egypt Townships". The "income" of this farm "or accumulated cash therefrom" was ultimately to be distributed in equal shares among seven individuals until the death of the last survivor. Then,
Finally, the will provided that the trust created therein should extend for twenty years beyond the death of the last survivor of the above group of seven individuals and that,
Lucille Palmer is the sole living beneficiary of the above group of seven individuals. She is a plaintiff in the lawsuit below making individual claims on her own behalf and is not involved in the writ proceeding now before this Court. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit[1] sought and obtained class certification pursuant to Rule 52.08 to proceed in this matter as representatives of the class of "all persons including students past and present, parents of such students and adults responsible for such students who were and are `capable children desiring higher education of Ray and Carroll Counties, Missouri, especially those whose parents are unable, financially, to provide such education and children between the ages of five and twelve desiring to receive a farm life education.'" It was represented to the court below that this class contains "at least six thousand persons". The putative class representatives, and certain other individual plaintiffs, seek relief against the trustee, the Carroll County Trust Company, alleging that it never operated the Ray County real estate as a boarding ranch for children; that it never operated the Ray County real estate as a stock ranch; and that it never provided financial assistance for the academic interests of the children from Ray and Carroll Counties.
The Carroll County Trust Company and the attorney general sought dismissal below of these claims arguing, inter alia, that the class plaintiffs, and the other individual plaintiffs, have no standing to bring this action. They maintain that only the attorney general has standing to bring a lawsuit to enforce a charitable trust. This Court issued its preliminary writ on August 27, 2002.
The nature of a charitable trust, in contrast to a private trust, determines who has standing to bring suit thereunder. This is most clearly explained in Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts vol. IVA, § 364, p. 108 (4th ed. 1989):
The law of Missouri is in accord. "A public charity is one in which there is a benefit to be conferred on the public at large, or some portion thereof, or upon an indefinite class of persons." Voelker v. Saint Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359 *84 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Mo.1962) (quoting 10 Am.Jur. Charities, § 5). "The essential elements of a public charity are that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." Id. at 694.
Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d 278, 281 (1928).
German Evangelical St. Marcus Cong. v. Archambault, 404 S.W.2d 705 (Mo.1966). The purpose for such a restriction is clear.
George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 411, p. 8 (rev. 2d ed. 1991). See also Voelker, 359 S.W.2d  at 695.
There is no question that the trust established by Mary Katherine Axtell is a charitable trust. The beneficiaries of the trust are "children ranging in age from five (5) years through twelve (12) years, inclusive"; "capable children of Ray and Carroll Counties, Missouri, especially those whose parents are unable, financially, to provide [their children with higher] education"; "capable children of Ray and Carroll Counties". The putative class representatives have estimated the number of individuals in the class to be at least six thousand people.
Respondent acknowledges the charitable nature of the trust at issue. Respondent, however, maintains that the putative class representatives are the parents of capable children desiring higher education and/or education on farm life but cannot afford such education and the capable children themselves. As such, Respondent maintains that they have a "special interest" that allows them standing to enforce the terms of the Axtell trust.
A person who has a "special interest" in the performance of a charitable trust can maintain an action for its enforcement. The test to determine whether such an interest is special enough to confer standing is whether the person "is entitled to receive a benefit under the trust that is not merely the benefit to which members of the public in general are entitled." Scott & Fratcher, § 391, p. 366. A person also may have standing if he or she is entitled to a preference under the terms of the trust or if the person is a member of a small class of identifiable beneficiaries, Scott & Fratcher, § 391, pp. 366-368, or if *85 he or she is "certain to receive trust benefits", Bogert & Bogert, § 414, p. 43. However, "[t]he mere fact that a person may in the discretion of the trustee become a recipient of the benefit under the trust does not entitle him to maintain suit for the enforcement of the trust." Scott & Fratcher, § 391, p. 373. "As a general rule no private citizen can sue to enforce a charitable trust merely on the ground that he believes he is within the class to be benefited by the trust and will receive charitable or other benefits from the operation of the trust." Bogert & Bogert, § 414, p. 39. The Southern District of the Court of Appeals described the analysis in this way,
State ex rel. Champion v. Holden, 953 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Mo.App.1997).
Application of this body of law to the present case leaves little doubt that the putative class representatives and the individual plaintiffs cannot meet the burden of showing a clear, identifiable, and present claim to any benefits from the Axtell trust sufficient to establish a "special interest". At most they have merely a potential interest that is no greater than the interest of all of the other members of the putative class.
"We note in passing that charitable trusts are generally not enforceable by potential beneficiaries or by members of the general public." Hinton v. St. Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo.App.1994). The duty and the responsibility for enforcing this charitable trust falls upon the attorney general of the State of Missouri.[2] He has standing, the individual plaintiffs do not.[3]
The preliminary writ is made absolute.
All concur.
[1]  The motion and order for class certification designate "Carr, Hall and Gilbow" as class representatives. It is unclear whether this is meant to include all plaintiffs of those names or only the parents or only the children. For purposes of this decision, it does not matter.
[2]  The proper parties to bring suit against charitable corporations are set out in sections 352.240 and 355.086, RSMo 2000.
[3]  We have not been asked to determine and we do not address whether the prosecuting attorneys of Ray or Carroll Counties also might have authority and standing to enforce this trust.