Case Title: Hoeker v. Dept. of Social & Rehabilitation Services

Citation: 171 Vt. 620, 765 A.2d 495

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hoeker v. Dept. of Social & Rehabilitation Services (99-260); 171 Vt. 620;
765 A.2d 495 

[Filed 25-Oct-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-260

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2000

Kathleen M. Hoeker	                }	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }
     v.	                                }	Windsor Superior Court
                                        }	
Department of Social and Rehabilitation	}
Services and Sally Lindberg	        }	DOCKET NO. 176-4-96 Wrcv

                                                Trial Judge: Richard W. Norton

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Kathleen Hoeker appeals from an order of the Windsor
  Superior Court granting  defendant Department of Social and Rehabilitative
  Services (SRS) summary judgment on her claim  for damages against SRS. 
  This dispute arises out of a contract between plaintiff and SRS for 
  plaintiff to serve as a foster parent.  Plaintiff claims that SRS was
  negligent in breaching the contract  by failing to provide wraparound
  services.  We affirm.

       In December 1989, plaintiff began serving as a foster parent for
  J.P.S., a juvenile previously  adjudged to be a child in need of care or
  supervision (CHINS) under 33 V.S.A. § 5526.  J.P.S.  received additional
  services such as counseling and respite care, collectively called
  wraparound  services, through Northeastern Family Institute (NFI), an
  organization providing professional  therapeutic foster care services to
  emotionally disturbed children.  In March 1992, plaintiff and her  husband
  moved to Alabama and took J.P.S. with them after consulting with SRS. 
  Prior to the move,  plaintiff discussed the move with Sally Lindberg,
  J.P.S.'s social worker at SRS.  At that time,  plaintiff alleges that
  Lindberg promised to arrange for extensive supplemental services for J.P.S.
  in  Alabama, such as were being provided in Vermont by NFI.

       Upon arriving in Alabama, plaintiff discovered that SRS had not
  arranged for supplemental  services in advance and those services that were
  available in Alabama were not commensurate with  those available through
  NFI.  Plaintiff contacted Lindberg in Vermont on several occasions in 
  attempts to secure the provision of wraparound services for J.P.S.  In
  response, SRS proposed a  contract that would govern the relationship
  between plaintiff and SRS.  Plaintiff consulted with an  attorney,
  negotiated several changes to the contract and signed the document in
  November 1992.

       In April 1993, J.P.S. assaulted plaintiff, causing permanent injury to
  her thumb.  Shortly  thereafter, plaintiff terminated the contract with SRS
  and returned J.P.S. to Vermont.  Plaintiff filed  suit against SRS claiming
  that SRS's failure to provide wraparound services in Alabama caused her 

 

  injury.  The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
  holding that enforcement  of any prior oral agreement between Lindberg and
  plaintiff to provide wraparound services is barred  by a merger clause in
  the written contract.  On appeal, plaintiff claims that 1) the merger
  clause does  not exclude the oral agreement; 2) in any event she is not
  bound by the merger clause; and 3) SRS  failed to provide wraparound
  services as required by the written contract.  She argues that the written 
  contract, by its terms, incorporated a duty to provide wraparound services,
  and that the statutory and  regulatory regime governing SRS, which she
  claims is part of the contract, also includes these duties.

       Before turning to the merits, we address defendant's motion to dismiss
  the notice of appeal as  untimely, in violation of V.R.A.P. 4.  At the time
  of its decision in February 1999,  the trial court  filled out an "Entry
  Regarding Motion" form and the court clerk entered "case closed" on the
  docket.  Defendant claims that this entry is sufficient to begin tolling of
  the 30 day appeal period.  In May  1999, the court signed a formal Final
  Judgment order.  Plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal until  June
  1999, within 30 days of this order.  Plaintiff contends that the court's
  judgment did not become  final, and thus subject to appeal, until this
  later date.  We agree.  As we made clear in Baker v. Town  of Goshen, 169
  Vt. 145, 150,