Case Title: Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women

Citation: 

Docket Number: 051852

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SHANA J. SHUTLER 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 051852 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
June 8, 2006 
AUGUSTA HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN, P.L.C. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in granting an employer’s motion for summary judgment in a 
medical negligence action.  Specifically, we consider whether 
the dismissal “with prejudice” of claims against a physician 
barred claims against his employer, when the claims were wholly 
based on the alleged negligence of the physician. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  During the relevant 
time period, Augusta Health Care for Women, P.L.C. (“Augusta 
Health Care”) was a professional limited liability company that 
provided obstetric and gynecological medical services to 
patients.  Augusta Health Care was owned and operated by two 
licensed physicians, one of whom was Mark P. Brooks, M.D. 
 
On April 8, 2003, Shana J. Shutler filed a motion for 
judgment, jointly and severally, against Dr. Brooks and Augusta 
Health Care.  Shutler alleged therein that Dr. Brooks 
administered medical treatment to Shutler in a negligent manner, 
 
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causing her serious and permanent injury.  Shutler further 
alleged that Dr. Brooks was acting as an agent and employee of 
Augusta Health Care and within the scope of his employment 
during his treatment of her.  Accordingly, Shutler asserted a 
vicarious liability claim against Augusta Health Care for Dr. 
Brooks’ negligence.  Dr. Brooks and Augusta Health Care filed a 
joint grounds of defense, denying any negligent conduct. 
 
On the day before the matter was scheduled for trial, 
Shutler filed a motion to dismiss Dr. Brooks as a party 
defendant “with prejudice to the refiling of any action against 
[Dr. Brooks] individually.”  The motion also stated that the 
“matter will proceed forward against the co-defendant, [Augusta 
Health Care], who is vicariously liable for any negligence of 
[Dr. Brooks].”1 
 
The trial court granted Shutler’s motion the following day 
and immediately entered an order dismissing Dr. Brooks as a 
defendant.  The order provided that the dismissal was “with 
prejudice to [Shutler] to refile any actions against [Dr. 
Brooks] based upon the allegations pending herein.”  Regarding 
Shutler’s claims against Augusta Health Care, the order further 
provided that “[t]his matter shall proceed forward against the 
                     
1 At that time, it was stipulated that Dr. Brooks was no 
longer “an employee, agent, or principal” of Augusta Health 
Care. 
 
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defendant [Augusta Health Care] based upon the allegations 
pending herein.”  Counsel for the defendants endorsed the order 
without objection.2 
 
On the same day the trial court entered the order 
dismissing Dr. Brooks as a defendant, Augusta Health Care filed 
a motion for summary judgment pursuant to what is now Rule 3:20.  
In the motion, Augusta Health Care asserted that the dismissal 
“with prejudice” operated as a determination on the merits that 
Dr. Brooks was not liable to Shutler for the negligent conduct 
alleged in her motion for judgment.  Relying principally upon 
Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156, 372 S.E.2d 
147, 149 (1988), Augusta Health Care maintained that a verdict 
for an employee exonerates the employer as a matter of law when 
the two are sued together and the employer’s liability is solely 
dependent on the employee’s conduct.  Augusta Health Care 
further maintained that the rule stated in Roughton applies with 
equal force when a claim against an employee is dismissed “with 
prejudice” as when the employee is exonerated by a verdict.  
Additionally, Augusta Health Care asserted that since there was 
an adjudication on the merits of Dr. Brooks’ liability, res 
                     
2 Brooks and Augusta Health Care were represented by the 
same attorneys. 
 
 
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judicata applied to bar Shutler’s claim against Augusta Health 
Care. 
 
Shutler responded to the motion for summary judgment by 
asserting that the order dismissing Dr. Brooks “by its plain 
terms clearly intends and directs that the matter would proceed 
towards trial against Augusta [Health Care].”  Shutler contended 
that when Augusta Health Care signed the order without 
objection, it “waived any challenge, including any res judicata-
based challenge, that the Order of dismissal somehow precludes 
the plaintiff from proceeding to trial against Augusta [Health 
Care].”  Shutler further contended that the order dismissing Dr. 
Brooks was not res judicata because it was not a judgment “on 
the merits.”  Finally, Shutler maintained that the rule stated 
in Roughton did not apply because no verdict had been rendered 
in Dr. Brooks’ favor. 
 
In a letter opinion dated April 11, 2005, the trial court 
concluded that Augusta Health Care was entitled to summary 
judgment.  The trial court reasoned, among other things, that 
“[w]hile Roughton was decided upon a jury verdict, this [c]ourt 
can perceive no reason why Roughton should be limited to 
situations solely in which a jury has returned a verdict 
exonerating the [servant].”  Noting that the parties did not 
dispute that Augusta Health Care’s liability was “solely 
derivative” of Dr. Brooks’ conduct under the circumstances of 
 
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this case, the trial court determined that the dismissal of Dr. 
Brooks “with prejudice” rendered Augusta Health Care not liable 
as a matter of law.3 
 
By order entered on June 2, 2005, incorporating the prior 
opinion letter, the trial court granted the motion for summary 
judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Augusta Health 
Care.  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when 
no material facts are genuinely in dispute and, based on those 
facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Rule 3:20; see Brown v. Sparks, 262 Va. 567, 571, 554 
S.E.2d 449, 451 (2001); Slone v. General Motors Corp., 249 Va. 
520, 522, 457 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1995).  In this case, the material 
facts pertaining to Augusta Health Care’s motion for summary 
judgment are undisputed.  The motion was based solely on 
questions of law regarding the effect of the dismissal of the 
claim against Dr. Brooks “with prejudice” on Shutler’s claim 
against Augusta Health Care.  Under well-established principles, 
                     
3 The trial court expressly declined to rule on the 
application of res judicata and any other related issues in this 
case, because it concluded that under Roughton, Dr. Brooks’ 
dismissal “with prejudice” rendered Augusta Health Care not 
liable as a matter of law.  Accordingly, we need not address 
those issues. 
 
 
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we review these questions of law de novo.  See Westgate at 
Williamsburg Condominium Ass’n v. Philip Richardson Co., 270 Va. 
566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2005); Simon v. Forer, 265 Va. 
483, 487, 578 S.E.2d 792, 794 (2003). 
 
We begin by addressing Shutler’s contention that the terms 
of the order dismissing Dr. Brooks with prejudice expressly 
preserved her right to pursue her claim against Augusta Health 
Care as alleged in her motion for judgment.  Shutler maintains 
that by failing to object to the order, Augusta Health Care 
became bound by the terms of the order and waived the ability to 
assert that Dr. Brooks’ dismissal “with prejudice” had any 
preclusive effect on her claim against Augusta Health Care. 
 
In examining the terms of the order, we note that the 
language pertaining to Shutler’s ability to proceed with her 
claims against Dr. Brooks and Augusta Health Care, respectively, 
is clear and unequivocal.  The order plainly states that 
Shutler’s claim against Dr. Brooks was dismissed “with 
prejudice” to her ability to refile further claims against Dr. 
Brooks based on the allegations in her motion for judgment.  In 
equally straightforward terms, the order authorized Shutler to 
“proceed forward against [Augusta Health Care] based upon the 
allegations pending herein.” 
 
The trial court viewed the provision dismissing Dr. Brooks 
“with prejudice” as the equivalent of a verdict or other binding 
 
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determination on the merits that Dr. Brooks was not liable to 
Shutler for his alleged negligent conduct.  Consequently, the 
trial court applied the well-established rule that “where a 
master and servant are sued together in tort, and the master’s 
liability, if any, is solely dependent on the servant’s conduct, 
a verdict for the servant necessarily exonerates the master.”  
Roughton, 236 Va. at 156, 372 S.E.2d at 149; see Whitfield v. 
Whittaker Memorial Hospital, 210 Va. 176, 183, 169 S.E.2d 563, 
568 (1969); Monumental Motor Tours v. Eaton, 184 Va. 311, 314-
15, 35 S.E.2d 105, 106 (1945); Barnes v. Ashworth, 154 Va. 218, 
229-30, 153 S.E. 711, 713-14 (1930).  Thus, despite the express 
provision in the order preserving Shutler’s ability to “proceed 
forward” with her claim against Augusta Health Care, the trial 
court determined that the provision dismissing Dr. Brooks “with 
prejudice” precluded Shutler from further litigating the issues 
related to Dr. Brooks’ allegedly negligent conduct. 
 
We agree with the trial court that, as a general rule, a 
dismissal of a defendant or claim “with prejudice” constitutes 
“an adjudication on the merits, and final disposition, barring 
the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or 
cause.”  Reed v. Liverman, 250 Va. 97, 99, 458 S.E.2d 446, 447 
(1995).  Furthermore, a dismissal with prejudice generally “is 
as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had 
been prosecuted to a final disposition adverse to the 
 
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plaintiff.”  Id.; see also Virginia Concrete Co. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 197 Va. 821, 825, 91 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1956). 
 
However, a dismissal “with prejudice” does not always 
constitute an adjudication on the merits or operate as a bar to 
a subsequent action.  Rather, we have stated that the effect of 
the words “with prejudice” must “be considered in light of the 
circumstances in which they are used.”  Reed, 250 Va. at 100, 
458 S.E.2d at 447; see also Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 
440, n.2, 463 S.E.2d 836, 838 n.2 (1995).  In Virginia Concrete, 
for example, we held that when an attorney lacked his client’s 
authorization to consent to the dismissal of claims “with 
prejudice,” the trial court was correct in treating the 
dismissal as without prejudice.  197 Va. at 825, 91 S.E.2d at 
418. 
 
Here, we need not look beyond the language of the trial 
court’s order to determine the meaning and effect of the words 
“with prejudice” under the circumstances of this case.  The 
order addresses the claims against Dr. Brooks and Augusta Health 
Care in separate provisions, one of which clearly indicates that 
further action against Dr. Brooks was precluded while the other, 
with equal clarity, provides that the claim against Augusta 
Health Care would proceed.  Nowhere in the order does it state 
that Dr. Brooks’ dismissal “with prejudice” would have any 
effect on Shutler’s claim against Augusta Health Care. 
 
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Moreover, the order plainly states that Shutler is entitled 
to proceed against Augusta Health Care “based on the allegations 
pending herein.”  Those allegations in the motion for judgment, 
while perhaps not artfully drafted, were various negligent acts 
by Dr. Brooks for which Augusta Health Care concedes it could be 
held vicariously liable.  The motion for judgment did not 
contain allegations of independent negligent acts by Augusta 
Health Care.  Rather, as pled, Shutler’s entire case depended on 
her proof of Dr. Brooks’ negligent acts.  Under these 
circumstances, the order’s dismissal of Dr. Brooks “with 
prejudice” does not equate to an adjudication on the merits so 
as to preclude or limit Shutler’s ability to litigate the 
matters she alleged in her motion for judgment, including issues 
related to Dr. Brooks’ allegedly negligent conduct, in pursuing 
her claims against Augusta Health Care.  Accordingly, we hold 
that, consistent with the express terms of the order, the 
dismissal of Dr. Brooks “with prejudice” does not have any 
preclusive effect on Shutler’s ability to pursue her claims 
against Augusta Health Care. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court 
erred in granting Augusta Health Care’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s 
judgment in favor of Augusta Health Care and remand the case for 
 
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further proceedings in accordance with the principles stated 
herein. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE AGEE joins, dissenting. 
 
 
Because I conclude the circuit court correctly granted the 
motion for summary judgment filed by Augusta Health Care for 
Women, P.L.C. (Augusta Health Care), I respectfully dissent from 
the majority opinion.  As the circuit court noted, the dismissal 
of the servant, Mark P. Brooks, M.D., with prejudice was a 
finding that Dr. Brooks was not liable, thereby rendering his 
master, Augusta Health Care, also not liable as a matter of law.  
“[W]here master and servant are sued together in tort, and the 
master’s liability, if any, is solely dependent on the servant’s 
conduct, a verdict for the servant necessarily exonerates the 
master.”  Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156, 
372 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1988); see also Santen v. Tuthill, 265 Va. 
492, 499, 578 S.E.2d 788, 792 (2003); Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 
542, 549, 172 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1970). 
Based on the pleadings in this case, it is not disputed 
that, at the time of the alleged negligence, Dr. Brooks and 
Augusta Health Care were engaged in a master and servant 
relationship.  The motion for judgment filed by Shana J. Shutler 
alleged only acts of negligence by Dr. Brooks.  She asserted no 
independent acts of negligence by Augusta Health Care.  Thus, 
 
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her claim against Augusta Health Care was predicated solely upon 
its vicarious liability for Dr. Brooks’ alleged negligence.  
Consequently, if the order dismissing Dr. Brooks “with 
prejudice” was tantamount to a verdict in favor of Dr. Brooks, 
then the order likewise exonerated Augusta Health Care. 
This Court has consistently followed the general rule that 
the dismissal of a claim “with prejudice” constitutes “an 
adjudication on the merits, and final disposition, barring the 
right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or 
cause.”  Reed v. Liverman, 250 Va. 97, 99, 458 S.E.2d 446, 447 
(1995).  In Reed, the Court explained that “as a general 
proposition a judgment of dismissal which expressly provides 
that it is ‘with prejudice’ operates as res judicata and is as 
conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been 
prosecuted to a final disposition adverse to the plaintiff.”  
Id. at 100, 458 S.E.2d at 447; see also Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 
Va. 511, 514, 499 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1998).  Therefore, when the 
circuit court entered an order dismissing Dr. Brooks from the 
action “with prejudice to the plaintiff to refile any actions 
against [Dr. Brooks] based upon the allegations pending herein,” 
the dismissal had the same effect as a verdict in Dr. Brooks’ 
favor.  Since Augusta Health Care’s negligence was solely 
dependant on Dr. Brooks’ conduct, Augusta Health Care, in my 
view, was also exonerated based upon well-settled Virginia law 
 
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governing the master and servant relationship.  See Roughton, 
236 Va. at 156, 372 S.E.2d at 149. 
 
The majority, however, relies upon the proposition that the 
words “with prejudice” must “be considered in light of the 
circumstances in which they are used,” Reed, 250 Va. at 100, 458 
S.E.2d at 447, and cites to this Court’s decision in Virginia 
Concrete Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Va. 821, 829, 91 
S.E.2d 415, 421 (1956), as an example of when a dismissal “with 
prejudice” was not conclusive against a plaintiff.  In Virginia 
Concrete, an attorney dismissed an injunction suit “with 
prejudice” without his client’s consent.  Id. at 825, 91 S.E.2d 
at 418.  Relying on the principle that an attorney cannot 
dismiss a case on its merits without his client’s consent, we 
held that “[i]n the absence of express authority from [the 
client] the consent of [the client’s] attorneys did not bind it 
or deprive [the client] of a right to have the ‘with prejudice’ 
feature of the decree set aside.”  Id. at 829, 91 S.E.2d at 421.  
Stated differently, we did not hold that the dismissal “with 
prejudice” meant anything other than a final and complete 
adjudication of the matter at issue in the suit but, instead, 
decided that the client could set aside that portion of the 
decree because the dismissal with prejudice was entered without 
the client’s consent. 
 
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The majority also cites to this Court’s decisions in Reed 
and Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 463 S.E.2d 836 (1995).  
In both cases, we reiterated the proposition that the words 
“with prejudice” should “be considered in light of the 
circumstances in which they are used,” Reed, 250 Va. at 100, 458 
S.E.2d at 447, but in neither Gilbreath nor Reed did we apply 
the exception.  Instead, the Court followed the general rule 
that a dismissal “ ‘with prejudice’ operates as res judicata and 
is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had 
been prosecuted to a final disposition adverse to the 
plaintiff.”  Reed, 250 Va. at 100, 458 S.E.2d at 447; see also 
Gilbreath, 250 Va. 440, 463 S.E.2d at 837. 
 
Notably, Shutler, like the plaintiff in Reed, drafted the 
order at issue and included the language “with prejudice.”  We 
stated in Reed that, “[w]hile [the plaintiff’s] purposeful 
actions in seeking dismissal of his action with prejudice may 
have been ill-advised and the consequences of his actions 
unintended, there is no justification in [the] record to support 
[the] contention that the phrase ‘with prejudice’ was 
erroneously or inadvertently chosen.”  250 Va. at 100, 458 
S.E.2d at 447.  The same can be said with regard to Shutler’s 
decision to include the words “with prejudice.” 
 
I recognize that the majority does not dispute the well-
established law regarding the meaning and effect of the words 
 
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“with prejudice.”  Instead, the majority concludes that, under 
the circumstances of this case, i.e., the language of the 
circuit court’s order, those words do not have their usual 
significance.  The relevant language, that the “matter shall 
proceed forward against the defendant Augusta Health Care . . . 
based upon the allegations pending herein,” did not, however, 
limit Augusta Health Care’s ability and right to move for 
summary judgment or to assert other well-taken dispositive 
motions.  Under the majority’s interpretation of the language in 
the circuit court’s order, Shutler was guaranteed that she could 
litigate her claim against Augusta Health Care to the point of 
it being decided by a jury.  Whether Augusta Health Care 
asserted its motion for summary judgment immediately following 
the entry of the order dismissing Dr. Brooks “with prejudice,” 
as it did here, or later in the proceedings, the fact remains 
that Shutler’s claim against Augusta Health Care did proceed, 
albeit for only a short time, in accordance with the order. 
 
For these reasons, I conclude the circuit court did not err 
in granting Augusta Health Care’s motion for summary judgment.  
Thus, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment.