Case Title: ROBERT GLADYCH V NEW FAMILY HOMES INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119948

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 1, 2003  
ROBERT GLADYCH,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119948  
NEW FAMILY HOMES, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
This case concerns the proper interpretation of MCL  
600.5856, which sets forth the requirements for tolling the  
statute of limitations.  We hold that the unambiguous language  
of MCL 600.5805 and MCL 600.5856 provides that the mere filing  
of a complaint is insufficient to toll the statute of  
limitations.  In order to toll the limitations period, one  
must also comply with the requirements of § 5856.  In so  
holding, we overrule the erroneous interpretation of § 5856 in  
 
 
Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971),  
overruled in part on other grounds by McDougall v Schanz, 461  
Mich 15; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).  The decision in Buscaino  
ignored the plain language of the statutes and, in so doing,  
impermissibly limited the operation of § 5856. 
Upon  
consideration of the effect our decision would have on the  
administration of justice, however, we find it appropriate to  
give our holding limited retroactive application.  Therefore,  
this case will apply retroactively only to those cases in  
which this specific issue has been raised and preserved. In  
all other cases, this opinion will apply prospectively,  
effective September 1, 2003.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Plaintiff alleged that he was injured on January 23,  
1996, while employed by defendant.  Plaintiff filed his  
complaint on January 22, 1999, one day before the three-year  
limitations period expired.  MCL 600.5805. 
Plaintiff made  
three unsuccessful attempts to serve defendant.  On April 20,  
1999, a second summons was issued because the original summons  
was due to expire.  Plaintiff served defendant on May 4, 1999,  
within the life of the second summons.  
Defendant 
moved 
for 
summary 
disposition, 
arguing 
that 
the  
statute of limitations barred plaintiff’s claim because  
plaintiff did not serve defendant or place the summons with an  
2  
 
 
 
  
officer for service before the limitations period expired, as  
required by MCL 600.5856. 
The circuit court granted  
defendant’s motion, agreeing that plaintiff had not satisfied  
the requirements of § 5856 and that therefore the limitations  
period was not tolled.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed:  
Because plaintiff filed this action before the 
three-year limitations period expired, it was  
timely filed.  Goniwicha v Harkai, 393 Mich 255  
. . . (1974); Buscaino[, supra]. 
Because the  
limitations period had not expired before plaintiff 
filed suit, the tolling provisions of § 5856 were 
not implicated.[1]  
Defendant moved for rehearing, arguing that Buscaino  
should be overruled. The Court denied defendant’s motion.2  
We granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal,  
directing the parties “to include among the questions to be  
briefed whether Buscaino[, supra], is consistent with the  
language of MCL 600.1901 and of MCR 2.101(B) to the effect  
that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with  
the court.”3  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to  
1Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued June 5, 2001
(Docket No. 222343). 
2Unpublished order, entered August 2, 2001 (Docket No.
222343). 
3467 Mich 856 (2002). 
3 
  
  
 
 
grant or deny a motion for summary disposition.  Wickens v  
Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 59; 631 NW2d 686 (2001).  
Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de  
novo. Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250;  
632 NW2d 126 (2001).  
III. DISCUSSION  
When interpreting statutes, our obligation is to discern  
and give effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in  
the statutory language. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461  
Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).  If the language is  
unambiguous, “we presume that the Legislature intended the  
meaning 
clearly 
expressed-
-
-no 
further 
judicial 
construction 
is  
required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as  
written.” Id.
 “Similarly, courts may not speculate about an  
unstated purpose where the unambiguous text plainly reflects  
the intent of the Legislature.” 
Pohutski v City of Allen  
Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).  
MCL 600.5805(1) provides:  
A person shall not bring or maintain an action  
to recover damages for injuries to persons or 
property unless, after the claim first accrued to 
the plaintiff or to someone through whom the 
plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within 
the periods of time prescribed by this section.  
MCL 600.1901 defines “commenced” as the filing of a complaint  
with the court.  Focusing solely on the statutory language, §  
5805 simply provides a threshold requirement before the  
4  
filing of a complaint. In other words, § 5805 provides that  
one cannot commence an action unless the complaint is filed  
within the periods prescribed by that section.  
Section 5805 does not provide, however, that the statute  
of limitations somehow becomes irrelevant once the complaint  
is filed.  In fact, the plain language of the statute extends  
no further than the filing of the complaint.  If, 
as  
concluded in Buscaino, supra at 481, the mere filing of a  
complaint under § 5805 rendered the statute of limitations  
irrelevant, the provisions of § 5856 that effectuate the  
tolling would be unnecessary.  It is precisely because § 5805  
pertains only to the filing of the complaint that one must  
then turn to § 5856 to determine the effect of the statute of  
limitations once the complaint has been filed.  Applying §  
5856 to all claims as required by the statutory language gives  
full effect to both the threshold requirement of § 5805 and  
the tolling requirements of § 5856.  
Section 5856 provides that the statute of limitations is  
tolled only if (1) the complaint is filed and a copy of the  
summons 
and 
complaint 
are 
served 
on 
defendant, 
(2)  
jurisdiction is otherwise acquired over defendant, (3) the  
complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in  
good faith are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate  
service (but no longer than ninety days after the summons and  
5  
 
  
 
complaint are received by the officer), or (4) if, during the  
applicable notice period under MCL 600.2912b, a claim would be  
barred by the statute of limitations, but only for the number  
of days equal to that in the applicable notice period after  
notice is given in compliance with § 2912b.  
In other words, if one does not perform any actions  
specified by § 5856, the statute of limitations is not tolled  
and therefore the period of limitations continues to run after  
the complaint has been filed.  If the period of limitations  
somehow “stopped” at the filing of the complaint, as concluded  
in Buscaino, there would be no need to specify tolling  
requirements. Buscaino attempted to retain some meaning in §  
5856 by limiting its application to situations in which a  
prior suit was not adjudicated on the merits, but nothing in  
the plain language of § 5856 indicates that the statute should  
be limited in such a manner.  Rather, the statute provides,  
without 
exception, 
that “statutes of limitations or repose are  
tolled” when one of the four enumerated actions take place.  
It follows logically, then, that if one of the four enumerated  
actions does not occur, the statutes of limitations or repose  
are not tolled. 
Nothing in the statutory language permits  
limiting § 5856 to actions in which a prior suit was not  
adjudicated on the merits.  
The inherent flaw in the Buscaino analysis lies in the  
6  
 
fact that Buscaino was not concerned with the plain language  
of the statute.  Rather, the Court in Buscaino, operating  
under the erroneous belief that statutes of limitations were  
merely “procedural” in nature, was concerned with avoiding an  
apparent conflict between GCR 1963, 101, which provided that  
“[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the  
court” and the requirements of § 5856.  Buscaino, supra at  
480-481.  In order to avoid a conflict between the court rule  
and the statute, the Court adopted a strained, limited  
interpretation of § 5856.  
This Court has since clarified the distinction between  
statutes regarding matters of “practice and procedure” and  
those regarding substantive law in McDougall, supra. If the  
statute concerns a matter that is purely procedural and  
pertains only to the administration of the courts, the court  
rule would control. Id. at 26-27. If, however, the statute  
concerns a “‘principle of public policy, having as its basis  
something other than court administration . . . the [court]  
rule should yield.’”  Id. at 31, quoting Joiner & Miller,  
Rules of practice and procedure: A study of judicial rule  
making, 55 Mich L R 623, 635 (1957).  
Statutes 
regarding 
periods 
of 
limitations 
are 
substantive  
in nature.  In Nielsen v Barnett, 440 Mich 1, 8-9; 485 NW2d  
666 (1992), this Court noted the various policies underlying  
7  
 
 
 
 
statutes of limitations:  
By enacting a statute of limitations, the 
Legislature determines the reasonable period of 
time given to a plaintiff to pursue a claim.  The  
policy reasons behind statutes of limitations  
include: the prompt recovery of damages, penalizing 
plaintiffs who are not industrious in pursuing 
claims, security against stale demands, relieving 
defendants’ fear of litigation, prevention of  
fraudulent claims, and a remedy for general 
inconveniences resulting 
from 
delay. 
. 
. 
.  
[Citations omitted.]  
Therefore, after McDougall, it is clear that, to the extent §  
5856 enacts additional requirements regarding the tolling of  
the statute of limitations, the statute would supersede the  
court rule.
 There is no reason to continue to adhere to  
Buscaino’s tortured reading of § 5856 that contradicts the  
statute’s plain and unambiguous language.  
Further, it should be noted that although the Court in  
Buscaino relied in part on the Committee Comment to § 5856, it  
failed to consider the entire comment.4  In Buscaino, after  
4We note that the Court in Buscaino erred in relying on
the Committee Comment without first finding the statutory
language  ambiguous.  It would be proper, however, to turn to 
the Committee Comment if the statutory language were 
ambiguous.  Although the committee comments lack the force of
law, they may be useful interpretive aids.  See Shurlow v 
Bonthuis, 456 Mich 730, 735 n 7; 576 NW2d 159 (1998); In re 
McKim Estate, 238 Mich App 453, 460 n 5; 606 NW2d 30 (1999).
Section 5856 was part of extensive proposals drafted by the
Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision, not unlike
model acts such as the Uniform Commercial Code, and eventually
adopted by the Legislature. 
When it considered the 
committee’s proposal, the Legislature had the benefit of the
explanatory comments by the draftsmen. 
Indeed, the 
committee’s proposal was adopted verbatim as § 5856.  State 
8  
 
holding that § 5856 dealt only with prior lawsuits between the  
parties that were not adjudicated on the merits, the Court  
stated:  
Even the Committee Comment recognizes this 
function of MCLA § 600.5856 . . . . The Committee 
Comment reads:  
“In the event of the dismissal, on some ground 
other than on the merits (as for example—lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter) of an action 
in which jurisdiction over the defendant is  
acquired, the period of time from the time of 
service or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the 
defendant until dismissal will not count as a part 
of the time of limitation, for during such time the 
statute has been tolled. Subsections (1) and (2).” 
[Buscaino, supra at 482-483.]  
The Court in Buscaino failed to clarify, however, that  
this was only the final paragraph of the Committee Comment.  
Viewed as a whole, the Committee Comment completely  
contradicts the Court’s holding in Buscaino:  
Section [600.5856] is designed to avoid the 
problems which have commonly arisen in those  
jurisdictions lacking such a section, as to  
precisely at what point the statutes of limitation 
are tolled. The question of whether mere filing of 
the complaint constituted commencement of an action 
to stop the running of the statutes of limitation 
was presented to the Federal Advisory Committee on 
Rules in their preliminary meetings in 1937, but 
was left unanswered. Consequently many difficult  
Bar of Michigan, Final Report: Joint Committee on Michigan  
Procedural Revision, ch 41.28, pp 318-319 (1960).  Therefore, 
because the comments informed the Legislature’s decision to 
adopt the committee’s proposal, they would be useful  
interpretive aids if the statutory language were ambiguous. 
See Miller v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 410 Mich 538, 
559; 302 NW2d 537 (1981).  
9  
 
 
problems of interpretation arose in federal courts, 
with various results. One court held that the mere  
filing of the complaint was sufficient to toll the 
statute of limitations.  Bomar v Keyes, 162 F2d 136 
[(CA 2, 1947)]. On the other hand, it has been held 
that an action is commenced by the filing of the 
complaint so long as process is issued in due 
course with intent that it be served. Jacobson v  
Coon, 165 F2d 565 [(CA 6, 1948)].  
As yet the United States Supreme Court has not 
directly passed on the question insofar as it 
relates to federal questions. The court has held 
that local law will govern diversity cases on this 
matter. Existing Michigan law as stated in Korby v  
Sosnowski, 339 Mich 705[; 64 NW2d 683 (1953)],  
holds that an action at law for damages is  
commenced when the summons is in good faith placed 
in the hands of an officer for service although 
service is not actually made until after expiration 
of the statutes of limitation. It is submitted that  
permitting the determination of when an action is 
commenced as to toll the statutes of limitations  
ought not to depend on a particular court's  
interpretation of such tenuous words and phrases as 
“intent,” “due course,” “reasonable diligence,” 
etc. Therefore, the instant section has been  
included in the statute of limitations in order  
that the question might be definitely settled 
without resort to case law.  
The mere act of filing a complaint should not 
toll the statute, as a matter of policy. The 
section does not accept the theory of the case as 
cited above. It is unrealistic to argue that 
defendants are put on notice of a lawsuit merely 
because a public court record exists to that 
effect. The defendant has a vital interest in being 
informed of the pendency of an action against him. 
Thus we have sought to enable a plaintiff to avoid 
the bar of a statute of limitation by taking the 
proper steps of establishing a court record (filing 
the complaint) and complying with the requirements 
of a method reasonably calculated to give a  
defendant notice. At the same time, we have  
required the plaintiff to prosecute his action 
diligently by the imposition of a maximum tolling 
period. The rights of both parties are thus  
10  
 
protected. The plaintiff has the option of using 
some other method of getting jurisdiction over the 
defendant. And, if he does use some other method of 
getting jurisdiction over the defendant, the period 
of 
limitation 
will 
be 
tolled 
at 
the 
time  
jurisdiction over the defendant is accomplished.  
The section does not constitute any radical 
departure from presently accepted principles, but 
it prescribes a definite procedure to be utilized 
wherein counsel are informed of the necessary steps 
which will guarantee the tolling of the statute of 
limitation. The adoption of this section will 
greatly increase predictability.  
Under 
subsection 
(1) 
the 
statutes 
of  
limitations are tolled when the complaint is filed 
and a copy of the summons and complaint are served 
on the defendant. Under subsection (2) the statutes 
of limitations are tolled when jurisdiction over 
the defendant is obtained by some other method. The 
statutes of limitations are also tolled when the  
complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and 
complaint are in good faith placed in the hands of 
an officer for service as per subsection (3). Thus 
a plaintiff need not actually have secured the 
accomplishment 
of 
service 
or 
have 
otherwise  
obtained jurisdiction over the defendant in order 
to preserve his cause of action. It should be 
noted, however, that under subsection (3) the 
statutes are tolled for a maximum period of ninety 
days. The statute again begins to run when the 
90-day period has expired, and may not be tolled 
again until the service is made or jurisdiction 
over the defendant is obtained by some other 
method. It should also be noted that in order to  
secure the benefits of subsection (3), a copy of 
the summons and complaint must be placed in the 
hands of an “officer,” and not just any person of 
suitable age and discretion.  
In summary, a method has been provided whereby 
a plaintiff, by taking the proper steps, can toll 
the statute of limitation on his cause of action  
for 
a 
maximum 
period 
of 
ninety 
days. 
The  
establishment of a maximum toll period should 
eliminate the litigation-provoking questions as to 
whether 
or 
not 
a 
plaintiff 
“intended” 
to  
11  
“diligently prosecute” his suit, as bearing on the 
issue of how long the statute could be tolled by 
placing a copy of the summons and complaint in good 
faith in the hands of an officer for service.  
Example: Suppose a two year statute of  
limitation. P files a complaint one year and eleven 
months after the cause of action arose. On the same  
day a copy of the summons and complaint are in good 
faith placed in the hands of an officer for  
service. Actual service is made 100 days later. Can 
D plead the two-year statute as a bar to the 
action?  
No-
-
-the statute was tolled for 90 days when P 
filed a complaint and in good faith placed a copy 
of the summons and complaint in the hands of an 
officer for service. At the end of the 90-day 
period, the statute again started to run--at this  
point P still had 30 days in which service could be 
made (the two-year statute minus one year and 
eleven months) and service was actually made on the 
tenth of these 30 days left. If the service had 
been made 121 days after the filing of the  
complaint D could have pleaded the statute of 
limitations as a bar to the action.  
In the event of the dismissal, on some ground 
other than on the merits (as for example-
-
-lack of  
jurisdiction over the subject matter) of an action 
in which jurisdiction over the defendant is  
acquired, the period of time from the time of 
service or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the 
defendant until dismissal will not count as a part 
of the time of limitation, for during such time the 
statute has been tolled. Subsections (1) and (2).  
In sum, the interpretation of § 5856 adopted in Buscaino  
is contrary to the plain language of the statute and should be  
repudiated. Section 5805, by its very terms, creates only a  
threshold requirement to the filing of the complaint. Nowhere  
in the statute does it provide that, once the complaint is  
filed, the statute of limitations becomes irrelevant and  
12  
 
tolling immaterial.  Rather, one must then turn to § 5856,  
which provides the specific requirements for tolling the  
statute of limitations.  If those requirements are not met,  
the period of limitations continues to run.  Nothing in the  
statutory language of either § 5805 or § 5856 permits limiting  
§ 5856 to claims in which prior actions were not adjudicated  
on the merits.5  Therefore, we overrule Buscaino and clarify  
that one must satisfy the requirements of § 5856 in order to  
toll the limitations period.  
IV. APPLICATION  
In overruling Buscaino, we are mindful of the effect our  
decision may have. We recently addressed the application of  
decisions overruling prior precedent in Pohutski, supra at  
695-696:  
As this Court noted in Placek v Sterling  
Heights, 405 Mich 638, 665; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), 
quoting Williams [v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266;  
111 NW2d 1 (1961)]:  
“This Court has overruled prior precedent many 
times in the past. In each such instance the Court 
must 
take 
into 
account 
the 
total 
situation  
confronting it and seek a just and realistic 
solution of the problems occasioned by the change.”  
* * *  
Although the general rule is that judicial 
decisions are given full retroactive effect, Hyde v  
5We further note that nothing in the text of MCR 2.101
permits limiting § 5856 to claims in which prior actions were
not adjudicated on the merits. 
13  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 
393 NW2d 847 (1986), a more flexible approach is 
warranted where injustice might result from full 
retroactivity. Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 
68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997).  
  Although this opinion gives effect to the intent of the  
Legislature that may be reasonably inferred from the  
unambiguous text of § 5856, practically speaking our holding  
is akin to the announcement of a new rule of law, given the  
erroneous interpretation set forth in Buscaino.  
Further, there has been extensive reliance on Buscaino’s  
interpretation of § 5856.  Parties have undoubtedly relied on  
Buscaino’s erroneous interpretation when calculating filing  
deadlines regarding limitations periods, and courts have  
relied on Buscaino’s erroneous interpretation when ruling on  
motions regardings limitations periods.  In light of the  
extensive 
reliance 
on 
Buscaino, 
limited 
retroactive  
application minimizes the effect of this decision on the  
administration of justice.6  
6We note that the equities in this case differ from those 
in Pohutski, supra, which applied prospectively only. 
In 
Pohutski, the Legislature had passed 2001 PA 222 providing a
remedy for damages or physical injuries caused by a sewage
disposal system event. 
2001 PA 222 did not apply
retroactively.
 
Therefore, 
we 
held 
that 
prospective
application was appropriate because, otherwise, plaintiffs in
pending cases would have been part of a discrete class of
litigants denied relief, as those who came before received
relief under Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139;
422 NW2d 205 (1988), and those who came after would receive
relief under the statute.
 This case, however, does not
present this unique situation, as there is no statute taking 
14  
    
Accordingly, this decision will be given limited  
retroactive application, applying only to cases in which this  
specific issue has been raised and preserved. People v  
Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 367; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); Lowe v Estate  
Motors, Ltd, 428 Mich 439, 475; 410 NW2d 706 (1987). In all  
other cases, this decision will have prospective application,  
effective September 1, 2003.  
In this case, although plaintiff satisfied the threshold  
requirement of § 5805 by filing the complaint before the  
period of limitations expired, plaintiff did not immediately  
complete any of the actions required by § 5856 to toll the  
statute of limitations.  Therefore, the period of limitations  
continued to run and expired on January 23, 1999, well before  
plaintiff served defendant on May 4, 1999.  
V. CONCLUSION  
We hold that the unambiguous language of §§ 5805 and 5856  
provides that the filing of a complaint alone does not toll  
the running of the limitations period.  In addition to filing  
the complaint, one must also comply with the requirements of  
§ 5856 in order to toll the limitations period.  In so  
effect at some point in the future codifying Buscaino.  
Although prior litigants have proceeded under Buscaino’s  
flawed interpretation, all subsequent litigants (after the 
effective date of this opinion) will be governed by this case. 
Therefore, 
the 
extreme 
measure 
of 
pure 
prospective 
application 
is unnecessary and inappropriate because there is no discrete 
class of litigants who would be denied relief.  
15  
 
holding, we overrule our prior interpretation of § 5856 in  
Buscaino.  After considering the effect of this decision on  
the administration of justice, however, we hold that this  
decision is given limited retroactive application, applying  
only to those cases in which this specific issue has been  
raised and preserved.  In all other cases, the decision is  
given prospective application, effective September 1, 2003.  
Therefore, we  reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
and 
reinstate 
the 
circuit court’s grant of summary disposition  
for defendant.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
16  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT GLADYCH,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119948  
NEW FAMILY HOMES, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority’s interpretation of MCL  
600.5856, and its decision to overrule the erroneous  
interpretation of this statute articulated in Buscaino v  
Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971). 
However, in  
fairness to the plaintiff in the present case, I would give  
the decision prospective application only and allow the  
plaintiff to rely on Buscaino.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly