Case Title: Board of Zoning Appeals v. Caselin Systems Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 972060

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS  
OF BLAND COUNTY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 972060          SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
CASELIN SYSTEMS, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BLAND COUNTY 
J. Colin Campbell, Judge 
 
 
The issue here is whether a landowner acquired a vested 
property right to build and operate its planned medical waste 
incinerator before the enactment of a county zoning ordinance 
precluding such use.  
 
Michael L. Perkins, the predecessor in interest to CaseLin 
Systems, Inc. (CaseLin) and later its president, proposed to 
locate a medical waste incinerator in Bland County.  In an April 
1990 public meeting of the Board of Supervisors of Bland County 
(the Board), representatives of the incinerator manufacturer and 
state and regional air pollution control agencies, interested 
citizens, and Perkins were given an opportunity to participate 
in a discussion of his proposal. 
 
During that meeting, the Board resolved to give Perkins a 
"letter of support" regarding his proposal.  Accordingly, the 
Board’s chairman wrote to state and regional waste management 
and air pollution agencies in May 1990 that the Board had “voted 
to support” the Perkins proposal to locate “a medical waste 
incinerator in Bland County.”  Also, pursuant to a Board 
resolution adopted on May 21, 1990, and the provisions of Code 
§ 10.1-1408.1(B)(1), the chairman sent a “certification” to the 
State Department of Waste Management that “the location and 
operation of a medical waste incinerator in Bland County by Mr. 
Michael Perkins is in accordance with all local ordinances.” 
Relying on the Board’s actions, CaseLin: (1) purchased land 
in December 1990 for the location of its proposed medical waste 
incinerator from the Bland County Development Corporation; (2) 
contracted with its grantor to build an access road into the 
grantor’s recently platted industrial park for CaseLin's use and 
that of future lot owners; and (3) applied for the required 
state air pollution and waste management agency approvals.  
Citing the Board's April 1990 resolution to write a letter of 
support, the Board chairman joined in the deed from the Bland 
County Development Corporation to CaseLin, purportedly on behalf 
of the Board, to “irrevocably acknowledge and confirm 
[CaseLin’s] right . . . to use the . . . land . . . as a medical 
waste incinerator facility.”  After CaseLin purchased the land, 
the county administrator wrote letters to the state air 
pollution and waste management agencies on February 25, 1991, 
stating that “Bland County is anxiously awaiting [their] 
completion of [CaseLin’s] permit application reviews."  
 
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However, citizens opposing the proposed incinerator 
appeared before the Board on March 25, 1991, and asked for an 
additional public hearing on the issue.  At two Board-scheduled 
public meetings held in the following months and attended by 
CaseLin officials, it appeared that a large number of citizens 
opposed the plan.  Consequently, at the second meeting the Board 
voted to "rescind" its April 1990 resolution of support and so 
notified the Department of Waste Management, the Air Pollution 
Control Board, and other state and regional officials.  
 
Despite the Board’s rescission of its support, CaseLin 
continued to actively pursue the required state approvals until 
the General Assembly imposed a moratorium on state approval from 
April 1992 until December 1993.  1992 Va. Acts, c. 751, p. 1151 
(imposition); 1993 Va. Acts, c. 721, p. 1009 (termination).  
Although CaseLin resumed its active pursuit of the required 
state approvals, it had not secured them by the time the county 
enacted its comprehensive zoning ordinance on July 21, 1995, 
more than 18 months after the moratorium ended.  At that time, 
CaseLin’s property was zoned as a part of an agricultural 
district in which its incinerator was not a permitted use.   
In the 54-month period between its acquisition of the 
property in December 1990 and the enactment of the zoning 
ordinance in July 1995, CaseLin had a number of surveys 
conducted on the property and cleared a minimum amount of brush 
 
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and trees to enable it to establish "a road to go in to do soil 
and geo-technical boring."  The record does not indicate whether 
this work was done before or after the Board withdrew its 
support in May 1991.   
On July 31, 1995, the county’s zoning administrator 
notified CaseLin of the enactment of the zoning ordinance and of 
his decision that CaseLin did not have a vested right to use its 
property for construction and operation of a medical waste 
incinerator.  CaseLin appealed that decision, and the subsequent 
denial of its applications for permits to build the incinerator, 
to the Board of Zoning Appeals (the BZA).  Upon the BZA’s 
affirmation of both decisions, CaseLin appealed to the circuit 
court.  The appeals were consolidated by the court and heard on 
the records certified by the BZA.   
In a written opinion, the court concluded that because 
CaseLin had acquired a vested right to use its property in the 
operation of a medical waste incinerator prior to the adoption 
of the zoning ordinance, the BZA’s decision was “void and of no 
effect.”  The BZA appeals the circuit court's final judgment 
entered in conformity with that opinion.  
We begin with a discussion of property rights in relation 
to zoning.  Privately held land is subject to applicable local 
zoning ordinances whether enacted before or after the property 
was acquired.  Generally, landowners have no property right in 
 
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anticipated uses of their land since they have no vested 
property right in the continuation of the land’s existing zoning 
status.  Snow v. Amherst County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 248 Va. 
404, 408, 448 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1994); Town of Vienna Council 
v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978).  
However, in limited circumstances, private landowners may 
acquire a vested right in planned uses of their land that may 
not be prohibited or reduced by subsequent zoning legislation.  
See Holland v. Board of Supervisors, 247 Va. 286, 290-91, 441 
S.E.2d 20, 22-23 (1994). 
The limited circumstances are outlined in a “bright line 
test” which enables such landowners to determine the point at 
which they have acquired a vested right.  Town of Rocky Mount v. 
Southside Investors, Inc., 254 Va. 130, 132, 487 S.E.2d 855, 856 
(1997); Holland, 247 Va. at 292, 441 S.E.2d at 23.  The test is 
as follows: 
[A] landowner who seeks to establish a vested property 
right in a land use classification must identify a 
significant official governmental act that is 
manifested by the issuance of a permit or other 
approval authorizing the landowner to conduct a use on 
his property that otherwise would not have been 
allowed.  Additionally, and equally important, our 
test requires that the landowner establish that he has 
diligently pursued the use authorized by the 
government permit or approval and incurred substantial 
expense in good faith prior to the change in zoning. 
 
Snow, 248 Va. at 407, 448 S.E.2d at 608 (emphasis added). 
 
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The parties do not dispute the evidence as to their 
respective actions with relation to the sole issue in this case: 
whether those actions were sufficient to vest a property right 
in CaseLin.  Because the proper application of the test to the 
governmental acts in this case poses a question of law, we do 
not accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s 
decision.  Board of Supervisors v. Omni Homes, Inc., 253 Va. 59, 
65-66, 481 S.E.2d 460, 463, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 
S.Ct. 58 (1997); see also Town of Rocky Mount, 254 Va. at 133, 
487 S.E.2d at 857. 
CaseLin has not obtained any governmental permit to build 
and operate its incinerator.  However, it claims, and the BZA 
denies, that the Board’s actions represented "other approval" 
and constituted the "significant governmental act" required 
under our bright line test.  
CaseLin correctly notes on brief that we have never defined 
the term “other approval” as used in the test.  However, a 
review of the other language we have used in establishing the 
test, related statutes, and our prior cases gives some 
indication of the parameters of the term.   
The term "other approval" is used in the context of the 
identification of a "significant official governmental act that 
is manifested by the issuance of a permit or other approval."  
"Significant official governmental act," "issuance," and 
 
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"permit," coupled with the word "or" imply that such "approval" 
is of similar character and formality as a "permit." 
Furthermore, statutes dealing with related subjects suggest 
that sufficient "approval" requires some formality.  Code 
§ 10.1-1442(C), which envisions a hazardous waste facility 
siting agreement with local governing bodies that is "binding 
. . . in any court of competent jurisdiction," Code § 10.1-
1438(A)(3), requires such an agreement to be "executed by the 
signatures of . . . the chief executive officer of the host 
community, who has been so directed by a majority vote of the 
local governing body."  Code § 15.1-475(B)(1) (now Code § 15.2-
2259) requires that local commissions act on proposed 
subdivision plats “officially submitted for approval.”  Under 
Code § 15.1-11.02 (now Code § 15.2-929), governing bodies are 
required to “grant or deny siting approval” of solid waste 
facilities within 120 days of their submission. 
Our rejection of a number of claims of "approval" within 
the meaning of the test gives further evidence that the scope of 
an "approval" is limited to an official response to a detailed 
request for a use of a particular property that would not 
otherwise be allowed under the law.  Neither the granting of a 
variance nor the previous rezoning of particular property is a 
sufficient manifestation of “approval” under the bright line 
test.  See Snow, 248 Va. at 408, 448 S.E.2d at 608-09 (grant of 
 
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variance); Town of Rocky Mount, 254 Va. at 133, 487 S.E.2d at 
857 (zoning classification change).  Similarly, the partial 
processing of a proposed and filed subdivision plat and site 
plan does not constitute the necessary “approval.”  Town of 
Stephens City v. Russell, 241 Va. 160, 164, 399 S.E.2d 814, 816 
(1991).  Nor are informal assurances of future approval made by 
individual board members and the county administrator sufficient 
to demonstrate “approval” under the test.  Notestein v. Board of 
Supervisors, 240 Va. 146, 151-52, 393 S.E.2d 205, 207-08 (1990). 
With these considerations in mind, we consider the actions 
of the county asserted by CaseLin as evidence of the required 
approval.  The April 1990 resolution stated only that the Board 
resolved to write a letter of support, not that the Board had 
approved a specific proposal regarding the operation of a 
medical waste incinerator.  Cf. Town of Rocky Mount, 254 Va. at 
133, 487 S.E.2d at 857 (significant governmental act authorizes 
specific use to be made of the property).  Rather, the 
resolution was merely a short-lived expression of the Board's 
enthusiasm for the project which was later withdrawn in the face 
of public criticism. 
The letters to the state agencies were simply statements of 
the Board’s general support of the plan, not a specific 
authorization of the project.  Moreover, the administrator’s 
certification that the location and operation of the planned 
 
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incinerator were in accordance with the local ordinances was 
nothing more than a statement of the facts existing at that 
time, not an authorization to proceed.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the April 1990 resolution and the May 1990 letters of the 
Board and county administrator to the state agencies were not an 
“approval” of CaseLin’s planned incinerator within the meaning 
of the test. 
However, CaseLin also contends that such an approval is 
contained in the deed to CaseLin which states that the Board 
“irrevocably acknowledge[d] and confirm[ed] the right of 
[CaseLin] to use the herein described parcel of land . . . as a 
medical waste incinerator facility.”  We find no merit in this 
contention.  
Nothing in the Board’s April 1990 resolution of general 
support for the project authorized the chairman to bind the 
Board to CaseLin's “irrevocabl[e]” right to use the land for the 
incinerator.  Therefore, the chairman could not bind the Board 
as its agent.  See Leachman v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Va. 
616, 621, 626-27, 98 S.E. 656, 658, 659 (1919) (chairman not 
board's agent to sign unauthorized checks).  
For these reasons, we conclude that CaseLin failed to 
secure governmental approval sufficient to acquire a vested 
right to construct and operate a medical waste incinerator.  Our 
decision makes unnecessary a consideration of whether CaseLin 
 
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has established the other elements required to create its 
asserted vested property right.*
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter final judgment for the Board of Zoning Appeals 
of Bland County.  
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
* Additionally, we do not consider what effect, if any, Code 
§ 10.1-1408.1(F) may have had on this case because the issue was 
not raised by either party.  Code § 10.1-1408.1(F) provides: 
 
There shall exist no right to operate a landfill or 
other facility for the disposal, treatment or storage of 
nonhazardous solid waste or hazardous waste within the 
Commonwealth.  Permits for solid waste management 
facilities shall not be transferable except as authorized 
in regulations promulgated by the Board.  The issuance of a 
permit shall not convey or establish any property rights or 
any exclusive privilege, nor shall it authorize any injury 
to private property or any invasion of personal rights or 
any infringement of federal, state, or local law or 
regulation. 
 
 
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