Case Title: State ex rel. Sitton v. Norman

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93020

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State ex rel. William J. Sitton, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. SC93020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Jeff Norman, Warden, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
)  
 
Original Proceeding in Habeas Corpus 
Opinion issued July 30, 2013 
 
William Sitton was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, 
section 565.024, and armed criminal action, section 571.015.  Sitton filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court permitted otherwise qualified jurors to 
opt out of jury service by agreeing to perform community service.  Sitton argues that this 
opt-out practice entitles him to habeas relief because it constitutes a fundamental and 
systemic failure to comply with the jury selection requirements sections 494.400-
494.505.1  Finding no claim warranting relief, the petitioner is remanded to the custody 
of the respondent.   
                                                
I. Background 
 
In 2005, a Lincoln County jury convicted Sitton of involuntary manslaughter and 
armed criminal action.  The circuit court sentenced Sitton to consecutive terms of seven 
and 18 years imprisonment.  The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct 
appeal.  State v. Sitton, 214 S.W.3d 404 (Mo. App. 2007).  The circuit court denied 
Sitton’s motion for post-conviction relief.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment.  
Sitton v. State, 294 S.W.3d 137 (Mo. App. 2009).  Sitton did not raise any issue regarding 
defects in the jury selection process in his direct appeal or during post-conviction 
proceedings.   
 
At the time of Sitton’s trial, the circuit court of Lincoln County allowed jurors to 
opt out of service by agreeing to perform community service and paying a $50 fee.  Sitton 
alleges he was unaware of this practice until October 18, 2010, after the court of appeals 
held that Lincoln County’s opt-out practice violated Missouri’s jury selection statutes.  
See Preston v. State, 325 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. App. 2010).  On October 25, 2010, Sitton 
filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the opt-out practice was a fundamental and 
 
1 Sitton’s point relied on alleges that the opt-out practice violates Missouri’s jury selection 
statutes, sections 494.400-494.505, as well as his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process, equal protection and a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the population.  Sitton 
does not specifically develop his constitutional claims in the text of his argument and, instead, 
focuses his argument on the alleged violation of the jury selection statutes.   When a party 
identifies an error in a point relied on but does not support this allegation of error in the argument 
portion of a brief, that portion of the point relied on is abandoned.  See 8000 Maryland, LLC v. 
Huntleigh Fin. Services Inc., 292 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. App. 2009).  Consequently, this opinion 
does not address any state or federal constitutional requirements for jury selection.  
systemic violation of the statutory jury selection requirements.  The circuit court denied 
the motion. 
 
Sitton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that the opt-out practice 
violated the jury selection statutes.  Sitton alleged that five prospective jurors elected to 
opt out of jury duty by agreeing to perform community service.  Sitton alleged that the 
illegality of this practice entitled him to a new trial.   The circuit court and the court of 
appeals denied Sitton’s petition.  Sitton then filed his writ petition with this Court. 
II. Habeas Corpus 
 
“[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.”  State 
ex rel. Griffin v. Denney, 347 S.W.3d 73, 76-77 (Mo. banc 2011).  Habeas proceedings 
are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner’s confinement.  Denney, 347 
S.W.3d at 77.   Sitton has the burden of proving he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.   Id. 
 
Sitton’s claim that the opt-out practice violated Missouri’s jury selection statutes 
was cognizable on direct appeal and in his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.  
The state asserts that the failure to raise these claims earlier constitutes a procedural 
default precluding review of Sitton’s claim.  Sitton argues that his claim is timely 
pursuant to section 494.465.1 and, alternatively, that he can satisfy the “cause and 
prejudice” standard for obtaining review of a procedurally defaulted claim.  The parties 
contest the facts pertaining to when Sitton knew or should have known of the Lincoln 
County opt-out practice.  It is unnecessary to resolve this dispute because the undisputed 
facts demonstrate Sitton has not established prejudice warranting habeas relief.  
 
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III. Missouri’s jury selection statutes 
 
Sections 494.400-505 provide the framework for jury selection in Missouri.  
Preston 325 S.W.3d at 423.  Section 494.400 provides that “[a]ll persons qualified for 
grand or petit jury service ... shall be selected at random from a fair cross section of the 
citizens of the county” and that all qualified Missouri citizens have “an obligation to 
serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose, unless excused.”  There are two 
grounds on which a citizen may be disqualified from jury duty:  (1) ineligible persons and 
(2) persons entitled to be excused.  See sections 494.425 (ineligibility) and section 
494.430 (excusal). 
 
The statutes provide that each county in Missouri must have a board of jury 
commissioners.  Section 494.405.  The board is required to compile a “master jury list” 
for the county.  Section 494.410.  Consistent with the statutory requirement that jurors are 
selected randomly from a fair cross-section of the population, the master jury list contains 
a “random selection of names from a minimum of two government records.”  Id.  The 
master jury list must contain at least 400 names and must constitute at least 5 percent of 
the county’s total population.  Id.  From the master list, the board randomly draws the 
names of as many prospective jurors as a trial court may require for a term.  Section 
494.415.  When a prospective juror’s name is drawn, the board sends that individual a 
“juror qualification form.”  Id. This form is designed to “[e]licit information concerning 
the prospective juror’s qualifications.”  Id.    
 
If a prospective juror is not ineligible pursuant to the ineligibility provisions of 
section 494.425, that individual may be excused from service by the court if he or she 
 
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satisfies one of the five enumerated categories for in section 494.430.  Section 494.430 
provides that, if an individual makes a timely application, the court may excuse such 
individual from jury service.  For example, a judge may excuse an individual from jury 
service if the judge determines that serving as a juror would impose “an undue or extreme 
physical or financial hardship” on that individual.  Id. 
 
After prospective jurors are determined ineligible or are excused from service, the 
remaining names are compiled into the “qualified jury list.”  Section 494.415.  Whenever 
a judge of the circuit court requires a panel of jurors for jury service, the judge shall 
designate the number of jurors required.  Section 494.420.  The board then will draw this 
number randomly from the qualified jury list and summon the prospective jurors to 
appear at the courthouse.  Id. 
 
The foregoing procedures, as well as the plain language of section 494.400, 
demonstrate that Missouri’s jury selection statutes are drafted to ensure that juries are 
comprised of a random sample of eligible jurors drawn from a fair cross-section of the 
population.  Section 494.465.1, on which Sitton relies, establishes the procedure for a 
party to enforce the jury selection process prescribed by section 494.400-494.505.  
Section 494.465.1 provides: 
 A party may move to stay the proceedings or for other appropriate 
relief including, in a criminal case, to quash the indictment if there has 
been a substantial failure to comply with the declared policy of 
sections 494.400 to 494.505 in selecting a grand jury, on the ground 
of substantial failure to comply with the provisions of sections 
494.400 to 494.505.  Such motion may be made at any time before the 
petit jury is sworn to try the case or within fourteen days after the 
moving party discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
could have discovered the grounds therefor, whichever occurs later. 
 
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IV. Sitton’s Claim 
 
Sitton alleges that the Lincoln County circuit court allowed five individuals on the 
“qualified jury list” to opt out of jury duty by agreeing to perform community service.  
Sitton claims that this practice is a substantial failure to comply with the jury selection 
statutes and that Preston is dispositive.  
 
In Preston, the appellant argued that the motion court erroneously denied his Rule 
29.15 motion for post-conviction relief in which Preston argued that the Lincoln County 
opt-out practice required a reversal of his conviction and new trial.  325 S.W. at 421.   
The court of appeals reasoned that the procedural irregularity of removing judicial 
discretion from the excusal of jurors was so great as to demonstrate actual and in fact 
prejudice.  Id.  at 425-26.  The court held that the Lincoln County opt-out practice 
constituted a substantial failure to comply with the jury selection statutes.  Id. at 426.  
Similarly, in State ex rel. Koster v. McCarver, 376 S.W.3d 46, 54 (Mo. App. 2012) the 
court affirmed the circuit court judgment granting a writ of habeas corpus and ordering 
that the petitioner be remanded to Lincoln County for a new trial.  In both cases, the 
courts reasoned that the practice of allowing otherwise qualified jurors to opt out of jury 
service was a  fundamental and systemic deviation from the jury selection statutes 
because it allows an otherwise qualified citizen to be excused from serving without a 
discretionary judicial determination as to ineligibility or legitimate grounds for excusal 
from service.   Preston, 325 S.W.3d at 426. 
 
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Sitton’s claim is similar to the claims raised in Preston and McCarver, and he 
asserts that those cases are dispositive.  Sitton is correct that the Lincoln County opt-out 
practice is not authorized by the jury selection statutes.  As noted in Preston, there is no 
provision in the statutes that allows an otherwise qualified juror to opt out of jury duty by 
agreeing to perform community service.  Although section 494.450 allows a circuit judge 
to impose community service, the statute provides that the circuit judge can do so only 
after a person summoned to appear for jury service “willfully fails to appear” without 
first obtaining a postponement pursuant to section 494.432, obtaining an excuse pursuant 
to section 494.430 or by failing to respond to a juror qualification form.  In this case, the 
jurors participating in the opt-out program were all “qualified” jurors who were, by 
definition, eligible to serve and had not obtained an excuse.   
 
Contrary to Sitton’s argument, the fact that the opt-out practice allowed otherwise 
qualified jurors to perform community service in lieu of jury service does not necessarily 
mean that the Lincoln County opt-out practice as applied in this case constitutes a 
substantial failure to comply with the jury selection statutes.  In State v. Anderson, 79 
S.W.3d 420, 431 (Mo. banc 2002), this Court held that a substantial failure to comply 
with the jury selection statute “is one that either rises to the level of a constitutional 
violation, and/or that actually prejudices a defendant.”  The Court qualified this holding 
by recognizing that “[i]n rare cases, certain violations of the statutory jury selection 
requirements may be so fundamental or systemic in nature as to amount to a “substantial” 
failure to comply with the statutes, thereby entitling a defendant to relief, even in the 
absence of a clear showing of actual prejudice or of a constitutional violation.”  Id. at 431 
 
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n.4.  Anderson cited State v. Gresham, 637 S.W.2d 20, 26 (Mo. banc 1982), as an 
example of a “rare” case in which a statutory violation alone could constitute substantial 
failure to comply with the jury selection statutes.  
 
In Gresham, the county board of jury commissioners removed certain individuals 
from a jury list, not because of statutory ineligibilities or because they had been excused 
from service by the court, but because the board members asserted that they knew the 
members of their community and that the removed individuals would be either too harsh 
or too lenient to make good jurors.  Id. at 637 S.W.2d at 22-23.   This Court held that, 
even though the defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice due to this violation of 
the jury selection statutes, the practice substantially departed from the policy of the jury 
selection statutes because it “readily lends itself to jury packing.”  Id. at 26. 
 
Similarly, in State v. Sardeson, 174 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Mo. App. 2005), and State 
v. Hudson, 248 S.W.3d 56, 60 (Mo. App. 2008), the courts held that a computer error that 
caused prospective jurors to be seated in the courtroom according to their ages 
constituted a substantial failure to comply with the jury selection statutes because it 
“destroyed the randomness of the jury selection.”  Consistent with fundamental purpose 
of the jury selections statutes as expressed in section 494.400, the premise of Gersham, 
Sardeson and Hudson is that a substantial failure to comply with the jury selection 
statutes will arise if the procedural irregularity substantially interferes with the goal of 
randomly selecting a jury from a representative cross-section of the community. 
 
Sitton’s claim that five prospective jurors were excused improperly from service 
does not constitute a “substantial failure” to comply with the jury selection statutes.  
 
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Sitton does not allege how many people were summoned for jury duty during the court 
term when the trial was conducted.  There is simply no way to assess the extent to which 
the improper excusal of the five jurors impacted the randomness of jury selection.  
Although the opt-out practice interferes with the random selection of otherwise qualified 
jurors, Sitton has not demonstrated that allowing five prospective jurors to opt out of 
service substantially interfered with the selection of jurors in his case or undermined the 
confidence in the verdict.  The petitioner is remanded to the custody of the respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge 
 
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge, Fischer, Stith and 
Wilson, JJ., concur.  Draper, J., dissents.