Case Title: Sommers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 233, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PAUL W. SOMMERS,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 233, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 0801019271 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  November 3, 2010 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  December 20, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of December 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Paul W. Sommers (“Sommers”), was 
charged by Indictment with, inter alia, Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
Prohibited (“PFBPP”).  Sommers entered a guilty plea to the PFBPP count.  
The Superior Court sentenced Sommers for PFBPP, as follows:  eight years 
imprisonment suspended after serving six years and eight months of 
incarceration at Level V for an eighteen-month term of probation at Level 
III.  The Superior Court noted in its sentencing order that, as to the PFBPP, 
“5 years at Level 5 [is a] minimum” and further that “[t]he five year term of 
incarceration 
regarding 
the 
PDWBPP 
IN08-01-2878 
is 
a 
 
2
minimum/mandatory term of incarceration pursuant to 11 Del. C. 1448, due 
to the fact that the defendant has two prior violent felony convictions.” 
2) 
The record reflects that Sommers had been previously 
convicted of Vehicular Assault in the First Degree1 in 1993.  He was 
convicted of Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the Second Degree in 1999.2  
Sommers does not challenge the separate existence and validity of these two 
prior felony convictions.  At the time Sommers committed the current crime 
of PFBPP, both of these prior offenses were included in the list of those 
violent felonies that could be used to enhance a sentence for PFBPP.3 
 
3) 
The only issue in this direct appeal is whether a conviction for a 
felony listed in title 11, section 4210(c) of the Delaware Code that occurred 
prior to the 1996 enactment of section 4210(c) could be used as a predicate 
conviction when applying the enhanced sentencing provision in title 11, 
section 1448(e)(1)(c).  Whether Sommers’ 1993 conviction constitutes a 
predicate felony under title 11, section 1448(e)(1) is a question of law which 
is reviewed de novo by this Court.4 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 629 (1993). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 771 (1999).  Sommers was convicted of Kidnapping in the 
Second Degree at the same time.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 783 (1999). 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4210(c). 
4 E.g., Wehde v. State, 983 A.2d 82, 85 (Del. 2009) (citing Tony Ashbury & Son, Inc. v. 
Kent County Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 962 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2008) (“We review 
questions of law including the interpretation of a statute, de novo.”)). 
 
3
 
4) 
Both parties agree that, because of his prior felony convictions, 
Sommers was subject to the penalty provisions set out in title 11, section 
1448(e)(1).  The parties disagree on whether Sommers’ record reflects one 
or two convictions for prior violent felonies.  At issue is the interpretation of 
the phrase in section 1448(e)(1)(c), “been convicted on 2 or more separate 
occasions of a violent felony.”  The State contends that Sommers’ two prior 
convictions satisfied the statutory language.  Sommers asserts that the plain 
meaning of title 11, section 1448(e)(1)(c) provides that a person needs to be 
convicted on two or more separate “occasions” of a “violent” felony.  
According to Sommers, he does not qualify for an enhanced sentencing 
penalty because on the “occasion” of his conviction for Vehicular Assault in 
the First Degree it was not defined as a “violent” felony. 
 
5) 
Sommers argues that the General Assembly’s use of the word 
“occasion” and the term “violent felony” reflect its intention that only prior 
convictions that occurred after 1996 are to be used to subject a defendant to 
the enhanced provisions in section 1448(e)(1)(c).  The sentencing judge 
rejected Sommers’ argument that the language in section 1448(e)(1)(c) 
should be interpreted to exclude any pre-1996 conviction for a crime now 
 
4
listed in title 11, section 4210(c).5  We agree.  The intention of the General 
Assembly is reflected in the unambiguous language of the statute. 
6) 
When applying section 1448(e)(1)(c), the convictions that are 
properly used as predicates for an enhanced sentence must arise from 
separate criminal acts and be for the specific crimes currently listed in 
section 4210(c).6  Reading subsection 1448(e)(1)(c) and the definition of 
“violent felony” in subsections 1448(e)(3) and 4210(c), in pari materia, 
Sommers’ record reflected two prior violent felony convictions, to wit, 
Vehicular Assault in the First Degree and Unlawful Sexual Penetration in 
the Second Degree.  Since Sommers came within the terms of the 
unambiguous statutory requirement for an enhanced penalty, the Superior 
Court was required to apply the statute as written.7  We hold that Sommers’ 
sentencing order properly denominates a portion of his term of 
imprisonment as the five-year minimum sentence required by section 
1448(e)(1)(c). 
                                          
 
5 Once the Superior Court notified him that he was subject to the five-year minimum 
sentence under title 11, section 1448(e)(1)(c) of the Delaware Code, Sommers was given 
the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.  He expressly declined and went forward 
with sentencing.    
6 See Ross v. State, 990 A.2d 424, 431 (Del. 2010). 
7 See id. at 430-31. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice