Case Title: State ex rel. Jones v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-164

Docket Number: 19941715

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. JONES, APPELLEE, V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 
1 
AL.; CINCINNATI TRUCK CENTER, APPELLANT. 
2 
[Cite as State ex rel. Jones v. Indus. Comm. (1996), ___  Ohio St.3d ___.] 
3 
Workers’ compensation -- Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(2)(d) does 
4 
not 
preclude 
termination 
of 
temporary 
total 
disability 
5 
compensation upon the finding by a regional board of review that 
6 
claimant has been offered suitable employment sufficient to 
7 
terminate temporary total disability compensation. 
8 
 
(No. 94-1715 -- Submitted April 30, 1996 -- Decided August 28, 1996.) 
9 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APD10-
10 
1364. 
11 
 
 
Appellee Daniel Jones injured his back while working for 
12 
appellant Cincinnati Truck Center (“CTC”).  A district hearing officer 
13 
(“DHO”) for the Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed the workers’ 
14 
compensation claim and awarded temporary total disability compensation 
15 
(“TTD”) for April 18 through August 2, 1992, with further  compensation to be 
16 
paid upon submission of medical evidence demonstrating Jones’s inability to 
17 
return to work as a result of the allowed condition.  CTC administratively 
18 
 
2 
appealed the DHO’s order to the Dayton Regional Board of Review (“RBR”).   
1 
Meanwhile, in a letter dated September 2, 1992,  Jones’s doctor, Michael J. 
2 
Klosterman, D.C., advised CTC of Jones’s medical restrictions: 
3 
 
“Weight limit - 25 lb. -- 20 times an hour to waist height 
4 
 
“No prolonged sitting (ie.more than one hour without 5min. stretch 
5 
 
breaks) 
6 
 
“No prolonged standing in one place (ie. over 1/2 hr) 
7 
 
“No excessive bending/twisting 
8 
 
“No climbing (ie. ladders)”  
9 
 
In response, Jay D. Burgess, director of parts and service operations for 
10 
CTC, made Jones an oral job offer consistent with Dr. Klosterman’s letter.  
11 
Burgess followed up with a memo to Jones reiterating the offer.  The next day 
12 
Dr. Klosterman sent a letter to CTC stating, “Please be advised that the letter 
13 
previously sent to you regarding the restrictions was not a release for work for 
14 
Mr. Jones.”   
15 
 
On October 6, 1992, Burgess sent the following letter to Jones: 
16 
 
3 
 
“This letter is in reference to the phone conversation I had with you on 9-
1 
14-92.  I have offered you light duty work in accordance with your Doctor’s 
2 
orders and you have not responded.  It is our position you have abandoned your 
3 
job. I am sending this letter to you to make sure this is your desire.  If you do 
4 
not report to Cincinnati Truck Center to work by 10-12-92 at 8:00AM your 
5 
position will be terminated.”  Jones did not respond. 
6 
 
Following a hearing on October 20, 1992, the RBR issued an order 
7 
modifying the DHO’s order by discontinuing TTD from October 6, 1992 
8 
“based upon a bona fide written offer of light work from the employer which 
9 
was within claimant’s restrictions, which offer was refused.”   That decision 
10 
was affirmed by two Industrial Commission staff hearing officers. 
11 
 
Jones next sought a writ of mandamus in the Franklin County Court of 
12 
Appeals, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion by terminating 
13 
TTD on the basis of CTC’s job offer.  A referee recommended that the court of 
14 
appeals deny the writ because CTC’s October 6 letter was an offer of suitable 
15 
employment sufficient to terminate TTD.   The referee further found that the  
16 
 
4 
RBR had authority to consider evidence of CTC’s job offer even though the 
1 
issue of job abandonment had not been presented first to the DHO.   
2 
 
Jones objected to the referee’s report and the court of appeals sustained 
3 
those objections and granted a writ of mandamus.  Relying on Ohio Adm. Code 
4 
4121-3-32(B)(2)(d) the appellate court held that the RBR had no authority to 
5 
terminate Jones’s TTD on new evidence that had not been considered by the 
6 
DHO.  The court ordered the commission to vacate its order and to direct an 
7 
appropriate DHO to review the issue of Jones’s job abandonment. 
8 
 
The cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
9 
 
Cynthia C. Felson, for appellee. 
10 
 
Joseph Wessendarp, for appellant. 
11 
 
COOK, J.   The narrow question before us is whether the language of 
12 
Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B)(2)(d) precludes the termination of TTD upon 
13 
the finding of an RBR that the claimant has been offered a suitable job.     
14 
 
R.C. 4123.56(A) establishes the conditions for payment of Jones’s TTD: 
15 
 
5 
“* * * Payments shall continue pending the determination of the 
1 
matter, however payment shall not be made for the period when * * * 
2 
work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made 
3 
available by the employer or another employer, or when the employee 
4 
has reached the maximum medical improvement. * * *”  (Emphasis 
5 
added.) 
6 
 
CTC argues that the RBR had authority to determine Jones’s continuing 
7 
entitlement to TTD based on the reasoning in State ex rel. Webb v. Indus. 
8 
Comm. (Sept. 26, 1989), Franklin App. No. 88AP-429, unreported.1  The 
9 
claimant in Webb maintained, as Jones does here, that new evidence of 
10 
disqualifying factors must be submitted first to a DHO, who possesses original 
11 
jurisdiction in “contested claims matters” involving TTD under R.C. 
12 
4121.34(B).  The Webb court disagreed, holding that the RBR had jurisdiction 
13 
to review all aspects of a claimant’s TTD eligibility, including evidence that 
14 
the claimant’s condition had become permanent, notwithstanding that the issue 
15 
of permanency or maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) had not been 
16 
 
6 
determined initially by the DHO.  The reasoning of Webb is instructive in this 
1 
case because under R.C. 4123.56(A), MMI and an offer of suitable 
2 
employment are equals in precluding the continued payment of TTD. 
3 
 
In effect, Webb reasoned that “contested claims matters,” as used in 
4 
former R.C. 4121.34(B)(2) (now R.C. 4121.34[B][3]), granted DHOs authority 
5 
to resolve the claimant’s overall TTD eligibility, which depends on whether the 
6 
claimant qualified initially for benefits and continues to be qualified.  Accord 
7 
State ex rel. Jeep Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 64, 66, 577 
8 
N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (claimant’s right to continued compensation contingent on 
9 
successive medical reports that claimant has burden to produce).  The Webb 
10 
court concluded that where the claimant seeks TTD, the “contested matter” is 
11 
the challenged allowance of the entire claim, not the various considerations, 
12 
such as permanency, that may factor into this determination.  The DHO in 
13 
Webb had already exercised original jurisdiction in initially awarding TTD.  
14 
Thus, the court concluded that the administrative appeal necessarily placed 
15 
 
7 
before the RBR developments occurring since the DHO’s order that could 
1 
disqualify the claimant from receiving TTD. 
2 
 
We agree with the court’s analysis in Webb and  we conclude that Ohio 
3 
Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B) does not dictate a contrary holding. 
4 
 
Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B)(2) establishes the conditions under 
5 
which a self-insured employer or the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation may 
6 
terminate TTD after a hearing notwithstanding administrative appeal or a final 
7 
order of the commission.  Paragraph (B)(2) states: 
8 
 
“[T]emporary total disability compensation may be terminated after a 
9 
hearing as follows:  
10 
 
“* * *  
11 
 
“(d) Upon the finding of a district hearing officer that the employee has 
12 
received a written job offer of suitable employment.”2 
13 
 
 
14 
 
The court of appeals read the DHO hearing provision in Ohio Adm. 
15 
Code 4121-3-32(B)(2)(d) as an absolute procedural prerequisite for the 
16 
 
8 
termination of TTD when the employer has offered a claimant suitable 
1 
employment.  By its terms, however, the rule establishes only the conditions 
2 
under which self-insured employers and the bureau may cut off TTD without a 
3 
final commission order; the rule does not establish a DHO’s exclusive original 
4 
jurisdiction to determine whether the pertinent conditions exist. Such a narrow 
5 
reading as espoused by appellee does not comport with the multilevel 
6 
administrative hearings scheme of Ohio workers’ compensation.  New evidence 
7 
affecting continued TTD eligibility could be presented at the RBR 
8 
administrative appeal level.   See State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Indus. 
9 
Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 639, 642, 614 N.E.2d 1044, 1046;  State ex rel. 
10 
DeMint v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 19, 550 N.E.2d 174.   
11 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the RBR did have authority to consider the 
12 
October 6, 1992 job offer because it was necessary to determine Jones’s 
13 
continued eligibility to receive TTD. We also find no basis for a writ of 
14 
mandamus on Jones’s claim that the commission abused its discretion in 
15 
 
9 
terminating TTD due to CTC’s job offer.3  The judgment of the court of appeals 
1 
granting a writ of mandamus is reversed. 
2 
Judgment reversed 
3 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
4 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
5 
 
6 
Footnotes: 
7 
1.  Although the claimant’s condition in Webb arose prior to the effective date 
8 
of Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32, we find the Webb court’s reasoning regarding 
9 
the RBR’s authority under R.C. 4123.56(A) compelling in this case.  Ohio 
10 
Adm. Code 4121-3-32 does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on a DHO for the 
11 
cessation of TTD payments pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(A). 
12 
    2.   Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B) further states:  “If a district hearing 
13 
officer determines, based upon the evidence, that as of the date of the hearing, 
14 
the claimant is no longer justified in remaining on temporary total disability 
15 
compensation, he shall declare that no further payments may be made. If the 
16 
 
10 
district hearing officer determines that the claimant was not justified in 
1 
receiving temporary total disability compensation prior to the date of the 
2 
hearing, he shall declare an overpayment * * *.” 
3 
3. There was “some evidence” to support the commission’s factual conclusion 
4 
in this case, specifically the October 6, 1992 letter which confirmed the oral 
5 
offer of  employment consistent with Jones’s medical restrictions.  This offer 
6 
was sufficient because there is no requirement that the offer contain a specific 
7 
listing of the duties and physical demands of the job.  Accordingly, mandamus 
8 
relief was not available.  See, generally,  State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible 
9 
Corp. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 649, 652, 640 N.E.2d 815, 818. 
10 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I would affirm the judgment of the 
11 
court of appeals. 
12 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
13 
opinion. 
14 
 
15