Case Title: Bowen v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019-SC-0473-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2020 TO BE PUBLISHED 2019-SC-000473-MR RICKY ALLEN BOWEN APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT V. HON. STOCKTON B. WOOD, JUDGE NO. 19-CR-00009 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER AFFIRMING A Maso n Co unt y jury fo und Ricky Allen Bo wen guilt y o f at t empt ed murder and t heft by unlawful t aking o f a firearm. The t rial co urt , co nsist ent wit h t he jury’s reco mmendat io n, sent enced Bo wen t o t went y years o f impriso nment o n t he at t empt ed murder charge and five years o f impriso nment o n t he t heft by unlawful t aking charge, t o run co ncurrent ly fo r a t o t al sent ence o f t went y years. This appeal fo llo wed as a mat t er o f right . See Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Having reviewed t he reco rd and t he argument s o f t he part ies, we hereby affirm t he judgment o f t he Maso n Circuit Co urt . I. BACKGROUND In December 2018, Bo wen lived wit h his part ner, Rebecca Greene, in a farmho use t hat t hey rent ed. On December 7, 2018, an argument erupt ed bet ween Bo wen and Greene. The co uple went t o bed aro und 10:00 PM t hat evening. Greene ult imat ely slept o n t he co uch in t he living ro o m, st ill upset fro m t he argument . Bo wen t est ified t hat he wo ke t he fo llo wing mo rning st ill t hinking abo ut t he argument . He t est ified t hat he want ed t o “end it all” and want ed t he co uple t o “be t o get her fo rever,” so he decided t o kill Greene and himself. He t hen walked t o a bam lo cat ed abo ut 500 feet behind t he farmho use. The bam was o wned by t he co uple’s landlo rd, Larry Darnell. Fro m t he bam, Bo wen ret rieved a lo aded .22 caliber revo lver, which also belo nged t o Darnell. Unbekno wnst t o Bo wen, t he gun was lo aded wit h t wo shells o f “rat sho t ” o r “snake sho t .” This t ype o f ammunit io n is t ypically used fo r pest co nt ro l and co nsist s o f small pellet s t hat spread o ut when t he gun is fired. Bo wen t o o k t he gun back int o t he rent al ho me. He t hen t o o k an appro ximat ely o ne-ho ur nap. Upo n waking up, he prayed and walked int o t he living ro o m, where Greene remained asleep o n t he co uch. Bo wen t hen sho t Greene in t he head wit h t he revo lver. Acco rding t o his o wn t est imo ny, he want ed t o kill her. Greene t est ified t hat she was sleeping when she heard so met hing and felt pain. She t o uched her head and realized it was bleeding. She saw Bo wen st anding o ver her, and she asked him what he had do ne. He did no t respo nd. She jumped up fro m t he co uch, ran t o t he kit chen, and ret rieved a dishclo t h t o ho ld against her head. Bo wen t est ified t hat when Greene jumped up fro m t he 2 co uch, he realized he no lo nger want ed t o kill her. He t est ified t hat he laid t he gun do wn and t ried t o help Greene. At t his po int , Greene checked o n her so n, who was asleep in ano t her ro o m. She also asked Bo wen t o call 911, but he t o ld her his pho ne was no t wo rking. Greene t hen called 911 o n her o wn pho ne. Bo wen t est ified t hat he helped relay info rmat io n t o t he dispat cher. Bo wen wait ed wit h Greene unt il law enfo rcement arrived. Greene t est ified t hat , during t his t ime, Bo wen t ried t o get Greene and her so n int o his car, but she refused. Bo wen t est ified t hat he want ed t o t ake her t o t he ho spit al. When po lice arrived, Bo wen claimed t hat he accident ally sho t Greene. At an o fficer’s request , he led t he o fficer t o t he gun, at which po int he admit t ed t hat he had int ended t o kill Greene. He was arrest ed. Meanwhile, Greene received medical t reat ment . She survived wit h a wo und t o her fo rehead and small met allic part icles embedded in t he so ft t issue o f her fo rehead. Aft er a o ne-day t rial, a juiy fo und Bo wen guilt y o f o ne co unt o f at t empt ed murder and o ne co unt o f t heft by unlawful t aking o f a firearm. He was sent enced t o a t o t al o f t went y years o f impriso nment . This appeal fo llo wed. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, Bo wen argues t hat t he t rial co urt erred by (1) declining his request fo r a renunciat io n jury inst ruct io n and (2) denying his mo t io n fo r direct ed verdict o n t he charge o f t heft by unlawful t aking o f a firearm. We address each argument in t urn. 3 A. The trial court did not err in declining Bowen’s request for a renunciation instruction. On appeal, Bo wen argues t hat t he t rial co urt sho uld have grant ed his request fo r a renunciat io n, o r abando nment , inst ruct io n, an issue which he pro perly preserved. We review t he t rial co urt ’s refusal t o give a specific jury inst ruct io n fo r an abuse o f discret io n. Sargent v. Schaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Ky. 2015). “[A] t rial co urt abuses it s discret io n when it s decisio n is arbit rary, unreaso nable, unfair, o r unsuppo rt ed by so und legal principles.” Id. at 203 (cit ing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)). In co nsidering whet her t he t rial co urt abused it s discret io n in refusing t o give a jury inst ruct io n, we are mindful t hat a t rial co urt is under no o bligat io n t o inst ruct t he jury o n a t heo ry t hat is unsuppo rt ed by t he evidence. Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Ky. 2001) (cit ing Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky. 1998)). When co nsidering whet her t he t heo ry was suppo rt ed by t he evidence, we “must co nsider t he evidence in t he light mo st favo rable t o ” t he request ing part y. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. 2005) (cit ing Ruehl v. Houchin, 387 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Ky. 1965)). In t he present case, Bo wen request ed a renunciat io n, o r abando nment , inst ruct io n o n t he at t empt ed murder charge. Under Kent ucky Revised St at ut e (“KRS”) 506.020, a defendant charged wit h at t empt t o co mmit a crime may present a defense t hat “under circumst ances manifest ing a vo lunt ary and co mplet e renunciat io n o f his criminal purpo se, t he defendant abando ned his 4 effo rt t o co mmit t he crime and, if mere abando nment was insufficient t o avo id t he co mmissio n o f t he crime, t o o k t he necessary affirmat ive st eps t o prevent it s co mmissio n.” KRS 506.020(1). Bo wen argues t hat he was ent it led t o a renunciat io n inst ruct io n because he t o o k affirmat ive st eps t o help Greene aft er sho o t ing her. Fo r example, he t ried t o call 911 wit h his o wn pho ne, but it did no t wo rk. When Greene called 911 wit h her pho ne, Bo wen did no t t ry t o st o p her, but inst ead helped relay info rmat io n t o dispat ch. He t hen wait ed wit h her unt il po lice arrived. Thro ugho ut t hat t ime, he did no t t hreat en Greene, no r did he at t empt t o flee t he scene. Based o n t hese circumst ances, Bo wen argues t hat he was ent it led t o a renunciat io n inst ruct io n. We disagree. We recent ly addressed a similar argument in Ball v. Commonwealth, 2018-SC-000244-MR, 2019 WL 4739251 (Ky. Sept . 26, 2019). In t hat case, Ball and his co -defendant ro bbed a co nvenience st o re. Id. at *1. During t he ro bbery, Ball appro ached a man sweeping at t he back o f t he st o re and sho t him in t he neck. Id. Ball and his acco mplice event ually ran fro m t he st o re, at which po int t he st o re o wner called 911. Id. The sho o t ing vict im survived. Ball was co nvict ed o f at t empt ed murder. Id. On appeal, Ball argued t hat t he t rial co urt erred in declining his request fo r a renunciat io n inst ruct io n. Id. He specifically argued t hat he was ent it led t o such an inst ruct io n because he present ed evidence t hat he left t he st o re aft er sho o t ing t he vict im, t o o k no addit io nal st eps t o ensure t hat t he vict im died, and t hereby allo wed t he vict im t o receive life-saving medical t reat ment . Id. at 5 *10. We explained, ho wever, t hat t here was no evidence t hat Ball “made any effo rt s t o abando n his co mmissio n o f t he crime o r t o o k any st eps t o avo id it s co mmissio n prior t o t he sho o t ing.” Id. In o t her wo rds, “[l]eaving t he st o re after t he crime do es no t co nst it ut e abando nment , as t he crime—t he sho o t ing o f [t he vict im]—had already t aken place.” Id. We reach a similar co nclusio n in t his case. While Bo wen t est ified t hat he want ed t o help Greene, assist ed her in calling 911, and st ayed wit h her unt il law enfo rcement arrived, t here is no evidence t hat he “made any effo rt s t o abando n his co mmissio n o f t he crime o r t o o k any st eps t o avo id it s co mmissio n prior t o t he sho o t ing.” Id. Inst ead, t he evidence indicat es t hat he ret rieved t he gun fro m t he bam, bro ught it int o t he ho me, t o o k a nap, and t hen sho t Greene in t he head, wit h t he int ent t o kill her. It was no t unt il aft er she jumped up fro m t he co uch, st ill alive, t hat he decided he no lo nger want ed t o kill Greene. His at t empt s t o help her receive medical t reat ment do no t co nst it ut e abando nment , “as t he crime—t he sho o t ing o f [t he vict im]—had already t aken place.” Id. Thus, even co nsidering t he evidence in t he light mo st favo rable t o Bo wen, t here is no evidence t hat , “under circumst ances manifest ing a vo lunt ary and co mplet e renunciat io n o f his criminal purpo se, [Bo wen] abando ned his effo rt t o co mmit t he crime and, if mere abando nment was insufficient t o avo id t he co mmissio n o f t he crime, t o o k t he necessary affirmat ive st eps t o prevent it s co mmissio n,” as required by KRS 506.020(1). Rat her, he co mplet ed t he act o f sho o t ing Greene, but failed t o kill her as he had int ended. Acco rdingly, we ho ld 6 t hat t he t rial co urt did no t abuse it s discret io n in declining t o give a renunciat io n inst ruct io n. B. The trial court did not err in denying Bowen’s motion for directed verdict on the theft by unlawful taking charge. Bo wen argues t hat t he t rial co urt erred in denying his mo t io n fo r a direct ed verdict o n t he t heft by unlawful t aking charge. In fro nt o f t hat co urt , he argued t hat t he Co mmo nwealt h failed t o present sufficient evidence o f an int ent t o deprive Darnell o f t he gun, and it had similarly failed t o pro ve t hat t he gun wo uld no t have been ret urned t o Darnell if Bo wen had co mplet ed t he murder-suicide. The t rial co urt denied bo t h Bo wen’s init ial mo t io n fo r a direct ed verdict made at t he clo se o f t he Co mmo nwealt h’s case as well as his renewed mo t io n fo r a direct ed verdict made at t he clo se o f all o f t he evidence. In reviewing a t rial co urt ’s denial o f a mo t io n fo r direct ed verdict , we are mindful o f t he fo llo wing: On mo t io n fo r direct ed verdict , t he t rial co urt must draw all fair and reaso nable inferences fro m t he evidence in favo r o f t he Co mmo nwealt h. If t he evidence is sufficient t o induce a reaso nable juro r t o believe beyo nd a reaso nable do ubt t hat t he defendant is guilt y, a direct ed verdict sho uld no t be given. Fo r t he purpo se o f ruling o n t he mo t io n, t he t rial co urt must assume t hat t he evidence fo r t he Co mmo nwealt h is t rue, but reserving t o t he juiy quest io ns as t o t he credibilit y and weight t o be given t o such t est imo ny. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). Thus, “t here must be evidence o f subst ance, and t he t rial co urt is expressly aut ho rized t o direct a verdict fo r t he defendant if t he pro secut io n pro duces no mo re t han a mere scint illa o f evidence.” Id. at 187-88 (cit ing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983)). In o t her wo rds, so lo ng as t he Co mmo nwealt h 7 pro duces mo re t han a mere scint illa o f evidence t o suppo rt t he charges, a defendant ’s mo t io n fo r direct ed verdict sho uld be denied. When we review t he t rial co urt ’s decisio n t o deny a mo t io n fo r direct ed verdict , we must co nsider whet her, “under t he evidence as a who le, it wo uld be clearly unreaso nable fo r a jury t o find guilt ” because “o nly t hen t he defendant is ent it led t o a direct ed verdict o f acquit t al.” Id. at 187. Thus, in t his case, we must det ermine whet her, under t he evidence as a who le, it wo uld have been clearly unreaso nable fo r a jury t o find Bo wen guilt y o f t heft by unlawful t aking o f a firearm. Under KRS 514.030, a perso n is guilt y o f t heft by unlawful t aking o r dispo sit io n when he unlawfully (a) Takes o r exercises co nt ro l o ver mo vable pro pert y o f ano t her wit h int ent t o deprive him t hereo f; o r (b) Obt ains immo vable pro pert y o f ano t her o r any int erest t herein wit h int ent t o benefit himself o r ano t her no t ent it led t heret o . Theft by unlawful t aking is classified as a Class A misdemeano r, except in cert ain circumst ances list ed in KRS 514.030(2). Relevant t o t his case, under KRS 514.030(2)(a), t heft by unlawful t aking is a Class D felo ny when t he pro pert y is a firearm, regardless o f t he value o f t he firearm. To t his Co urt , Bo wen reit erat es his argument t hat t here was insufficient evidence t o pro ve t hat he int ended t o deprive Larry Darnell o f t he gun. He po int s t o t he definit io n o f “deprive” fo und in KRS 514.010(1): (a) To wit hho ld pro pert y o f ano t her permanent ly o r fo r so ext ended a perio d as t o appro priat e a majo r po rt io n o f it s eco no mic value o r wit h int ent t o rest o re o nly upo n payment o f reward o r o t her co mpensat io n; o r 8 (b) To dispo se o f t he pro pert y so as t o make it unlikely t hat t he o wner will reco ver it . Thus, t here are fo ur definit io ns o f “deprive”: 1) t o wit hho ld pro pert y o f ano t her permanent ly; 2) t o wit hho ld pro pert y fo r so ext ended a perio d as t o appro priat e a majo r po rt io n o f it s eco no mic value; 3) t o wit hho ld pro pert y wit h int ent t o rest o re it o nly upo n payment o f reward o r o t her co mpensat io n; o r 4) t o dispo se o f t he pro pert y so as t o make it unlikely t hat t he o wner will reco ver it . Hall v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Ky. 2018) (cit at io ns o mit t ed). Bo wen argues t hat t here was no evidence t o pro ve an int ent t o deprive under any o f t hese fo ur definit io ns. Rat her, he argues, t he evidence indicat ed t hat he int ended t o use t he gun t o kill Greene and t hen himself. If he had do ne so , he argues, he wo uld no t have permanent ly deprived Darnell o f t he gun, no r wo uld he have been wit hho lding t he gun fo r eco no mic value o r fo r reward o r co mpensat io n o r dispo sing o f t he gun so as t o make it unlikely t hat Darnell wo uld reco ver it . Inst ead, Bo wen co nt ends t hat Darnell wo uld have been able t o simply reco ver t he gun if Bo wen’s murder-suicide plan had succeeded. Fo r suppo rt , Bo wen cit es t o Hall v. Commonwealth. In t hat case, Hall was st o pped by po lice but managed t o flee t he scene in a po lice cruiser. Id. at 11. The o fficers pursued Hall, but event ually lo st sight o f him. Id. So o n aft er, t hey lo cat ed t he cruiser abando ned o n a dirt ro ad. Id. Hall was apprehended a few days lat er and charged wit h t heft by unlawful t aking. Id. At t rial, Hall mo ved fo r a direct ed verdict o n t his charge, arguing t hat no pro o f exist ed o f his int ent t o deprive. Id. The t rial co urt denied t he mo t io n, and Hall was ult imat ely co nvict ed o f t heft by unlawful t aking, amo ng o t her t hings. Id. 9 We reversed t his co nvict io n, ho lding t hat t he t rial co urt had erred in denying Hall’s mo t io n fo r a direct ed verdict o n t he charge o f t heft by unlawful t aking. In do ing so , we examined each o f t he fo ur definit io ns o f “deprive.” Id. at 12. The seco nd and t hird definit io ns did no t apply; t here was no evidence t hat Hall so ught eco no mic gain o r co mpensat io n. Id. The fo urt h definit io n—t o dispo se o f t he pro pert y so as t o make it unlikely t hat t he o wner will reco ver it — also did no t apply, as Hall t o o k a po lice cruiser, no t a civilian vehicle, and knew t he po lice were clo se behind him when he abando ned t he car. Id. at 13. Thus, we held, no reaso nable jury co uld say t hat Hall int ended t o dispo se o f t he cruiser so as t o make it unlikely t hat t he po lice wo uld ever find it . Id. Last ly, we t o o k a clo ser lo o k at t he first definit io n o f “deprive”: t o wit hho ld t he pro pert y o f ano t her permanent ly. Id. We explained t hat t he int ent t o wit hho ld t he pro pert y o f ano t her permanent ly means “t hat t he defendant int ends t hat t he pro pert y never be rest o red t o it s right ful o wner, where int ent can be inferred fro m t he fact s and circumst ances.” Id. (cit at io n o mit t ed). Thus, “[a] defendant do es no t need t o maint ain act ual po ssessio n o ver t he t aken [pro pert y] at all t imes aft er t aking t he pro pert y—a defendant can po ssess t he intent to withhold property of another permanently if evidence exist s sho wing t hat t he defendant int ended t hat t he right ful o wner never exert act ual po ssessio n o ver t he pro pert y again.” Id. Turning t o Hall’s case, we no t ed t hat “[n]o rat io nal perso n wo uld t hink t hat an individual who uses a po lice cruiser as a get away car and who abando ns t hat po lice cruiser in t he middle o f t he ro ad, kno wing t hat po lice are fo llo wing clo se behind, int ends t hat t he po lice 10 [c]ruiser never again be rest o red t o t he po lice.” Id. at 14. We t herefo re held t hat t he t rial co urt had erred in denying Hall’s mo t io n fo r a direct ed verdict o n t hat charge. Id. at 15. We believe Hall t o be dist inguishable. When apprehended by po lice, Hall t o o k a marked po lice cruiser, led t he po lice o n a high-speed chase, and quickly abando ned t he vehicle in t he middle o f t he ro ad aft er appro ximat ely t hirt y minut es, kno wing t hat po lice were clo se behind. We t herefo re held t hat Hall “was simply t rying t o evade t he po lice.” Id. at 14. In co nt rast , Bo wen t o o k t he gun fro m t he bam fo r t he st at ed purpo se o f killing Greene and himself. He no w argues t hat Darnell co uld simply have ret rieved t he gun aft er t heir deat hs, but t his igno res t he fact t hat Bo wen admit t ed his int ent t o use t he gun as a murder weapo n. Had Bo wen carried o ut his plan, t here wo uld be no abando nment o r ret urn o f t he pro pert y by Bo wen; rat her, he wo uld have been dead, leaving t he gun behind as a key piece o f evidence t hat may have been co nfiscat ed by po lice. Furt hermo re, a reaso nable jury co uld believe t hat Bo wen, who had been arguing wit h Greene t he evening befo re, int ended t o kill o nly Greene and no t himself. A reaso nable jury co uld believe t hat , under t ho se circumst ances, he had never planned t o ret urn t he murder weapo n t o it s right ful o wner. We t herefo re co nclude t hat , under t he evidence as a who le, a reaso nable jury co uld infer t hat Bo wen int ended t o permanent ly deprive Darnell o f t he gun. Acco rdingly, we ho ld t hat t he t rial co urt did no t err in denying Bo wen’s mo t io n fo r direct ed verdict o n t he charge o f unlawful t aking o f a firearm. 11 III. CONCLUSION Fo r t he reaso ns set fo rt h abo ve, we hereby affirm t he judgment o f t he Maso n Circuit Co urt . All sit t ing. Hughes, Keller, Lambert , Nickell and Wright , JJ., co ncur. Mint o n, C.J., co ncurs in part and dissent s in part by separat e o pinio n in which VanMet er, J., jo ins. MINTON, C.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: Chief Just ice Mint o n wo uld affirm t he at t empt ed murder co nvict io n but wo uld reverse t he t heft by unlawful t aking co nvict io n because t he reco rd co nt ains no evidence t hat Bo wen int ended t o deprive Darnell o f t he gun. VanMet er, J., jo ins. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Brando n Neil Jewell Assist ant Public Advo cat e Depart ment o f Public Advo cacy COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Jay Camero n At t o rney General o f Kent ucky Mat t hew Ro bert Krygiel Assist ant At t o rney General 12