Case Title: Matlack v. City of Wichita

Citation: 195 Kan. 484, 407 P.2d 510

Docket Number: 44,193

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1965-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
195 Kan. 484 (1965)
407 P.2d 510
DON MATLACK, Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF WICHITA, Appellee.
No. 44,193

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 6, 1965.
Richard V. Foote, of Wichita, argued the cause, and John R. Blair, Don Matlack and Ronald H. Rogg, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Arthur G. Johnson, of Wichita, argued the cause, and John Dekker, of Wichita, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This was an action to quiet title to a strip of land condemned by the City of Wichita, Kansas, for the widening of Kellogg Street but claimed not to have been used for such purpose.
The facts which were stipulated will be summarized.
In June, 1950, the City of Wichita condemned various tracts of land including Lots 170 and 172 facing Ida Avenue, belonging to Roger W. Estep and his wife, for the purpose of opening and widening Kellogg Street. The City of Wichita paid the Esteps the full value of the fee. No claim has been made that the price paid was not adequate, neither was the propriety nor the validity of the condemnation proceedings in anyway challenged.
A portion of the two lots was used for widening Kellogg Street, constructing sidewalks and placing poles for street illumination. The City has not occupied the north portion of Lot 170 consisting of a strip 15.2 feet wide facing Ida Avenue and widening to 29.85 feet on the alley to the east but has kept it mowed.
*485 The stipulation further states:
..............
In June, 1961, the plaintiff, for a consideration, acquired all of the interest of the Esteps in Lots 170 and 172 by quitclaim deed. Thereafter, on a date not disclosed by the record, plaintiff brought an action to quiet title to the unoccupied strip of land.
The court considered the case on the written stipulation of the parties and rendered judgment for the defendant City.
The plaintiff has appealed.
It is conceded by the appellee, as contended by appellant, that the condemner took only an easement and did not acquire a fee title to the land condemned.
Appellant further contends:
..............
Surveyed in their entirety appellant's contentions amount to nothing more than the simple assertion that the condemner has lost its easement to the involved portion of the land condemned because it is not presently used for specific street purposes.
It would appear that appellant's contentions are disposed of by the stipulated fact that at the time of the taking by the condemnation proceeding the premises were not susceptible of being divided. It was necessary for the city to condemn and pay the fee value *486 for the entire tract in order to get the necessary portion. However, under the stipulated facts the contentions of appellant may be readily disposed of by the established law of this state relating to abandonment of condemned easements.
Mere nonuse, for a limited time, of the land condemned for public purposes, unless accompanied by failure to pay compensation, does not constitute abandonment. An easement on land dedicated to or condemned for a public use does not revert to the fee owner unless its use for the dedicated or condemned purpose has become impossible, or so highly improbable as to be practically impossible. (See McAlphine v. Railway Co., 68 Kan. 207, 75 Pac. 73.)
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the use of the land for some street purpose is impossible or even highly improbable.
In Christman v. City of Wichita, Kan., 209 F.2d 639, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in considering the Kansas rule, stated:
The same question was also considered in Harvey v. Railroad Co., 111 Kan. 371, 207 Pac. 761, where the following statement appears:
What was said in Gadarl v. City of Humboldt, 87 Kan. 41, 123 Pac. 764, is applicable here.
For other applicable decisions see McAlpine v. Railway Co., supra; Burlingame v. Thompson, 74 Kan. 393, 394, 86 Pac. 449; DePriest v. City of Salina, 101 Kan. 810, 812, 168 Pac. 872, and Swope v. Kansas City, 132 F.2d 788.
We also find the rule stated in 30 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 458, pp. 660, 661, as follows:
See, also, 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 124, p. 744.
Appellant places great weight on Kingman County Comm'rs v. Hufford, 126 Kan. 106, 266 Pac. 932. What is there said and held is not applicable to the facts in this case. The defendant in that case continued to farm condemned land which had not been used by the county and the county attempted to collect rent. It was held:
The evidence in the case at bar does not establish that the use of the land for which it was condemned has become impossible or highly improbable. Many possible proper future uses can be imagined.
Based on what has been heretofore stated and held we are forced to conclude that the stipulated facts do not establish an abandonment of any part of the easement in controversy because of nonuse.
The judgment is affirmed.