Case Title: State v. Eatmon

Citation: 2022-Ohio-1197

Docket Number: 2020-1018

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Eatmon, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1197.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1197 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. EATMON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Eatmon, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1197.] 
Criminal law—Material-witness warrants—When requesting that a court issue a 
material-witness warrant, state must establish, by oath or affidavit, 
probable cause to believe that the witness is material and that the warrant 
is necessary to procure the witness’s attendance at trial—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2020-1018—Submitted October 27, 2021—Decided April 12, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 108786, 2020-Ohio-3592. 
_________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} R.C. 2937.16 through 2937.18 and R.C. 2941.48 provide mechanisms 
by which a trial court may secure the presence of a witness at a criminal trial—
either by requiring the witness to provide surety or by ordering that the witness be 
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detained until trial.  In this discretionary appeal, we consider what the state must 
establish when requesting that a court issue a material-witness warrant.  The Eighth 
District Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err when it denied 
the state’s requests to issue material-witness warrants because the state failed to 
demonstrate, by oath or affirmation, “probable cause that warrants were necessary 
to procure the witnesses’ attendance at trial.”  2020-Ohio-3592, ¶ 20.  We agree 
and therefore affirm the Eighth District’s judgment. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In December 2017, a Cuyahoga County grand jury returned an 
indictment charging appellee, Darnell Eatmon Jr., with five counts relating to the 
shooting of Khaalis Miller: one count each of attempted murder, discharging a 
firearm on or near prohibited premises, and having a weapon while under a 
disability; and two counts of felonious assault.  All but the weapons-under-
disability charge contained multiple firearm specifications.  The police did not 
apprehend Eatmon until early 2019.  He pleaded not guilty to the charges. 
{¶ 3} The trial court scheduled Eatmon’s trial for May 15, 2019.  
Approximately three weeks before trial, the state filed motions for recognizance 
and/or the commitment of material witnesses.  In its briefs in support of those 
motions, the state requested that the trial court declare Khaalis Miller and his 
mother, Lisa Ford, material witnesses and order them to give recognizance “in the 
amount of $5,000 to assure [their] attendance at trial” or, in the alternative, issue an 
arrest warrant for them and order that they be detained until they testified at 
Eatmon’s trial.  The state’s briefs also informed the trial court of the various efforts 
it had made to contact Miller and Ford. 
{¶ 4} With respect to Miller, the state’s brief alleged that the assistant 
prosecutor attempted to call him at multiple phone numbers, left voicemails for 
him, and mailed letters to him.  The state’s investigator also called Miller at 
“multiple phone numbers” and traveled to four residences in an attempt to locate 
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him: one in East Cleveland, two in Euclid, and one in Painesville.  The investigator 
left letters at the East Cleveland residence and one of the Euclid residences.  A 
woman answered the door at the second Euclid residence and stated that she had 
lived there for three years and did not know Miller.  At the Painesville residence, 
another woman answered the door and also claimed that she did not know Miller.  
But the apartment manager of the Painesville residence subsequently informed the 
investigator that the apartment was rented to a person with the name “Miller” and 
that one of the occupants was named “Khaaliah Miller.”  After receiving the 
investigator’s information, the state sent a letter to Miller at the Painesville address 
and included a copy of a subpoena for Miller’s appearance at an April 3, 2019 
pretrial hearing, but Miller did not appear at that hearing.  On April 4, 2019, the 
assistant prosecutor contacted Miller via Facebook but never received a response. 
{¶ 5} Regarding Ford, the state’s brief in support of its motion explained 
that she was a material witness because Eatmon had allegedly confessed “his 
crimes” to her.  The brief further explained that the state had called Ford at her 
place of employment but did not reach her, and there was no answering machine.  
The state also sent letters to Ford’s home and work, requesting that she contact the 
prosecuting attorney.  The prosecutor spoke to Ford’s sister, who said that she 
would have Ford return the prosecutor’s call, but Ford did not do so.  A Cleveland 
police detective also went to Ford’s home and her job and left letters at both 
locations, asking Ford to call him.  The state claimed in its brief that Ford later 
called the detective and “yell[ed] at him” for coming to her house and her job and 
“stat[ed] that she want[ed] nothing to do with the case.”  Ford further told the 
detective that Miller did not want the case to be prosecuted, although she did 
confirm that Miller lived in Painesville and worked in Mentor. 
{¶ 6} The trial court held a pretrial hearing on April 30, 2019.  Without 
explanation, the judge denied the state’s motions for recognizance and/or the 
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commitment of material witnesses and stated that Eatmon’s trial remained set for 
May 15, 2019. 
{¶ 7} On May 9, 2019, the state moved to continue Eatmon’s trial due to its 
inability to secure the presence of Miller and Ford as witnesses.  On May 10, the 
state filed new motions for material witnesses, this time requesting that the trial 
court declare Miller and Ford material witnesses, issue arrest warrants for them, 
and keep them incarcerated without bail until they testified at Eatmon’s trial. 
{¶ 8} In support of the May 10 motions, the prosecutor submitted briefs that 
detailed the state’s previous efforts to contact Miller and Ford, but also added that 
she called Miller on April 30, 2019.  According to the brief, a male answered the 
phone and replied, “Yes,” when the prosecutor asked for “Mr. Miller.”  When the 
prosecutor identified herself, however, the male stated that he would “need to take 
a message because ‘Mr. Miller’ was not there.”  The prosecutor unsuccessfully 
attempted to call Miller at that same phone number two more times. 
{¶ 9} The trial court again denied the state’s material-witness motions, but 
granted the state’s motion for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for July 9, 
2019. 
{¶ 10} On July 9, the court asked the parties whether they were prepared to 
go forward with the trial.  The state informed the court that it was not prepared to 
do so because Miller and Ford were not present.  The state orally renewed its request 
that the court issue material-witness warrants for Miller and Ford. 
{¶ 11} The trial court asked the state what steps it had taken to serve Miller 
and Ford with a “subpoena so that they would know that the trial [was] set” for that 
day “and that their presence was requested.”  The prosecutor began to recite what 
she had explained in her previous motions, but the court interrupted and said, “But 
those were for prior occasions * * * and [it] wasn’t inclined to issue a material 
witness warrant at that time.”  The court asked the state again, “So for this specific 
date, today’s date, what steps did the State take?”  The prosecutor told the court 
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that in addition to the state’s previous attempts, letters had been mailed to each 
witness and subpoenas had been “left at the residence of Lisa Ford for both her as 
well as her son for today’s appearance.”  The trial court asked the prosecutor 
whether she had spoken to either witness directly about the trial scheduled for that 
day.  The prosecutor responded that the witnesses would not answer her phone calls.  
The prosecutor then discussed the time that she had called Miller before she filed 
her May 10 motions, explaining that she believed Miller had answered the phone 
but that he then claimed to be someone else after she introduced herself.  The court 
asked the prosecutor whether the witnesses had been personally served with 
subpoenas.  The prosecutor replied that they had not but argued that R.C. 2941.48 
“does not require a person or witness to be personally served prior to a warrant 
being issued.” 
{¶ 12} The trial court denied the state’s request for material-witness 
warrants, explaining that it had granted the state’s request for a continuance “back 
in May” so that the state could find its witnesses, but that the state still had not done 
so.  The trial court subsequently dismissed the case without prejudice. 
{¶ 13} The state appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to issue material-
witness warrants and dismissed Eatmon’s case.  The Eighth District affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment, concluding that the state failed to establish probable cause 
“that the witnesses would not appear at trial.”  2020-Ohio-3592 at ¶ 43.  The state 
appealed to this court, and we accepted its sole proposition of law: 
 
Where a party to a criminal proceeding shows probable 
cause that a witness is material to its case and the witness is 
uncooperative and refuses to appear and detention of the witness is 
necessary to procure the witness’[s] attendance at trial, the Trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Court shall issue a material witness warrant, pursuant to R.C. 
2937.16 and 2937.18. 
 
See 160 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2020-Ohio-5166, 157 N.E.3d 771. 
Material-Witness Warrants 
{¶ 14} The “duty to disclose knowledge of crime * * * is so vital that one 
known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material witness.”  
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).  The government’s authority to arrest and detain material 
witnesses was “the long established rule of English Law, in effect when the United 
States became a nation.”  Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938-939 (9th 
Cir.1971).  In Bacon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
observed that material-witness statutes existed in every state.  Id. at 939.  See also 
18 U.S.C. 3144 (federal material-witness statute). 
{¶ 15} Ohio’s material-witness statutes are set forth in R.C. 2937.16 
through 2937.18 and R.C. 2941.48.  These statutes provide mechanisms by which 
a trial court may require material witnesses to give sufficient surety to secure their 
attendance at trial or, in some cases, order their detention until they testify. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 2937.16, which governs when witnesses must enter into 
recognizance,  provides: 
 
When an accused enters into a recognizance or is committed 
in default thereof, the judge or magistrate shall require such 
witnesses against the prisoner as he finds necessary, to enter into a 
recognizance to appear and testify before the proper court at a proper 
time, and not depart from such court without leave.  If the judge or 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
 
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magistrate finds it necessary he may require such witnesses to give 
sufficient surety to appear at such court. 
 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2937.18, which governs a witness’s refusal to comply with a 
recognizance order,  provides: 
 
If a witness ordered to give recognizance fails to comply 
with such order, the judge or magistrate shall commit him to such 
custody or open or close detention as may be appropriate under the 
circumstances, until he complies with the order or is discharged.  
Commitment of the witness may be to the custody of any suitable 
person or public or private agency, or to an appropriate detention 
facility other than a jail, or to a jail, but the witness shall not be 
confined in association with prisoners charged with or convicted of 
crime.  The witness, in lieu of the fee ordinarily allowed witnesses, 
shall be allowed twenty-five dollars for each day of custody or 
detention under such order, and shall be allowed mileage as 
provided for other witnesses, calculated on the distance from his 
home to the place of giving testimony and return.  All proceedings 
in the case or cases in which the witness is held to appear shall be 
given priority over other cases and had with all due speed. 
 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2941.48, which addresses the recognizance of witnesses,  
provides: 
 
In any case pending in the court of common pleas, the court, 
either before or after indictment, may require any witness designated 
by the prosecuting attorney to enter into a recognizance, with or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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without surety, in such sum as the court thinks proper for his 
appearance to testify in such cause.  A witness failing or refusing to 
comply with such order shall be committed to the county jail until 
he gives his testimony in such case or is ordered discharged by the 
court.  If a witness is committed to jail upon order of court for want 
of such recognizance, he shall be paid while so confined like fees as 
are allowed witnesses by section 2335.08 of the Revised Code.  The 
trial of such case has precedence over other cases and the court shall 
designate any early day for such trial. 
 
{¶ 19} These statutes enable a court to ensure the presence of a material 
witness at trial if the court has good reason to believe that the witness will not 
appear.  R.C. 2937.16 authorizes a court to order a witness to enter into 
recognizance “as [the judge or magistrate] finds necessary.”  R.C. 2937.16 further 
authorizes the court to require such witnesses “to give sufficient surety to appear at 
* * * court.” 
{¶ 20} If a court orders a witness to give recognizance and that witness fails 
to comply with the court’s order, then the court “shall commit” the witness “to such 
custody or open or close detention as may be appropriate.”  R.C. 2937.18. 
{¶ 21} Similarly, R.C. 2941.48 provides that a court “may require any 
witness designated by the prosecuting attorney to enter into a recognizance, with or 
without surety.”  If the witness fails or refuses to comply with the court’s order, 
then the witness “shall be committed to the county jail” until the witness testifies 
or the court orders the witness to be released.  Id. 
{¶ 22} It is clear that under R.C. 2937.16 and 2941.48, a court retains some 
discretion for purposes of initially ordering a witness to enter into recognizance.  It 
is only after a court orders a witness to enter into recognizance and that witness 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
 
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does not comply with the court’s order, that the court is further authorized to issue 
an arrest warrant for that witness.  R.C. 2937.18; R.C. 2941.48. 
{¶ 23} A court is similarly authorized to order the arrest of a witness who 
fails to appear in court after the witness was personally served with a subpoena.  
See R.C. 2317.21 (in such an instance, the court “may issue to the sheriff or a 
constable of the county, a writ of attachment, commanding him to arrest and bring 
the person named in the writ before such court or officer at the time and place the 
writ fixes, to give his testimony and answer for the contempt”).  And when a witness 
is served with a subpoena by residential service and fails to appear, then the court 
may order the witness “to show cause why such writ should not issue against him” 
or her.  Id. 
{¶ 24} Thus, it appears that there are two ways in which a court may obtain 
personal jurisdiction over witnesses: (1) by ordering them to enter into a 
recognizance or (2) through service of a subpoena.  Once either of those things 
happen and the witness subsequently fails to appear, then the court may issue an 
arrest warrant for that witness. 
{¶ 25} In State ex rel. Dorsey v. Haines, a petitioner, who was “being held 
as a material witness pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 2937.16 through 2937.18 
and 2941.48 in the custody” of the county sheriff, filed a writ of habeas corpus.  63 
Ohio App.3d 580, 581, 579 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist.1991).  The Second District Court 
of Appeals granted the writ after determining that a Montgomery County Court of 
Common Pleas judge had issued the warrant “without the most fundamental 
rudiments of constitutional due process.”  Id.  The Second District explained that 
“at a minimum, a warrant to detain a material witness must be supported by 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, to believe that the witness is 
material and that the detention of the witness is necessary to procure her attendance 
at trial.”  Id. at 582. 
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{¶ 26} Here, the Eighth District relied on Dorsey when it determined that 
the state had failed to demonstrate probable cause that the warrants were necessary 
to procure the witnesses’ appearance at trial.  2020-Ohio-3592 at ¶ 26.  The court 
of appeals explained that the state (through the detective) had talked to Ford only 
once⸻and that conversation “occurred before the continuance and before residence 
service of the trial subpoenas.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 29.  The court further 
pointed out that even after the state had been granted a continuance, it “still failed 
to secure personal service of subpoenas on Miller and Ford or otherwise directly 
contact the witnesses to sufficiently demonstrate that they would not show up for 
trial without a warrant.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  The court of appeals concluded that “the state’s 
failure to obtain personal service contributed to its failure to demonstrate probable 
cause, by oath or affirmation, that detention was necessary to procure the witnesses’ 
attendance at trial.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  The court reasoned that “[t]hese requirements are 
not mere procedural technicalities or formalities.  Rather, they exist to ensure that 
people are afforded ‘ “the most fundamental rudiments of constitutional due 
process.” ’ ”  Id. at ¶ 32, quoting Robinson v. Green, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 
MA 0134, 2016-Ohio-5688, ¶ 9, quoting Dorsey at 581. 
{¶ 27} The state argues that the material-witness statutes require neither 
personal service nor an affidavit.  While this is true, individuals who may have 
information regarding a crime still have constitutional rights.  The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,” and further provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  “Article I, Section 14 
of the Ohio Constitution affords the same protection in felony cases,”   State v. 
Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 12, citing State v. 
Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 10, fn. 1, and even 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
 
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more protection in certain misdemeanor cases, see State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 
323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 22-25.  Based on the language in the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions, we now hold that material witnesses are 
entitled to these basic, fundamental rights and therefore agree with the Eighth 
District that the state’s request for a warrant to detain a material witness must be by 
oath or affirmation and be supported by probable cause to believe that the witness 
is material and that the warrant is necessary to procure the witness’s attendance at 
trial.  Federal courts have also held as much.  See Simon v. New York, 893 F.3d 83, 
93 (2d Cir.2018) (“a person detained as a material witness enjoys any Fourth 
Amendment protection that is extended to criminal suspects.  * * *  The former is 
suspected of refusing to share information about a crime, whereas the latter is 
suspected of having committed one”), citing Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 322 
(3d Cir.2011). 
{¶ 28} The state claims that the facts of this case are similar to the facts in 
State v. Hollins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103864, 2016-Ohio-5521, in which the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred when it did not 
grant the state’s motion for a material-witness warrant.  Id. at ¶ 29.  In Hollins, 
however, the state provided a detailed affidavit explaining why the witness was 
material and setting forth its efforts to procure her attendance at trial.  Id. at ¶ 25.  
Specifically, in a telephone conversation before the first trial date, the witness told 
the prosecutor that she had received a subpoena and that she would appear at trial, 
but she then hung up on the prosecutor after he began asking questions about the 
incident.  Id. at ¶ 3.  The witness then refused to answer her phone when the 
prosecutor tried to call her again on multiple occasions before the first and second 
trial dates, and she did not respond to the prosecutor’s voicemail messages asking 
that she call him.  The prosecutor also obtained personal service on the witness 
before the second trial date, but she still did not appear.  Id. at ¶ 6, 8.  The Eighth 
District concluded that under those facts, “court intervention was necessary to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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procure [the witness’s] attendance at trial,” id. at ¶ 26, and “the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the state’s motion for a material witness warrant,” id. at  
¶ 29. 
{¶ 29} We agree with the Eighth District that Hollins is distinguishable 
from the facts in the present case, 2020-Ohio-3592 at ¶ 27-32.  The state’s motion 
in Hollins was supported by a detailed affidavit.  Further, in addition to the state’s 
other efforts to contact the witness in Hollins, the state perfected personal service 
on the witness before trial and the witness still failed to appear. 
{¶ 30} In its merit brief to this court, the state argues that the prosecutor’s 
statements to the trial court on the record on the day of trial “were never rebutted.”  
The state further maintains that because a prosecutor is an officer of the court and 
as such must speak truthfully to the court, the prosecutor’s statements were the 
equivalent of a “virtual affidavit.”  The state provides no authority for recognizing 
an officer-of-the-court exception to the oath or affirmation requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Moreover, the prosecutor’s statements to the court were 
merely that—statements—not a “virtual affidavit.”  The difference between a 
statement and an oath is that an oath contains the additional element of being sworn.  
See Youngstown Steel Door Co. v. Kosydar, 33 Ohio App.2d 277, 279, 294 N.E.2d 
676 (8th Dist.1973).  The state’s “virtual-affidavit” argument is unpersuasive.  But 
even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s statements could be considered the 
equivalent of a “virtual affidavit” or an oath or affirmation, the state still did not 
establish probable cause that Miller and Ford would not appear at trial. 
{¶ 31} The state never personally served the witnesses⸻not for any of the 
pretrial hearings or the initial trial date, and, most importantly, not for the July 9, 
2019 trial.  Instead, the state mailed letters to Miller and Ford and left subpoenas 
for them at Ford’s residence.  Crim.R. 17(D) states that “[s]ervice of a subpoena 
upon a person named therein shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to such 
person or by reading it to him in person or by leaving it at his usual place of 
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residence.”  “When a subpoena is left at a witness’ usual place of residence, or 
business location, or place of employment, and the witness has actual knowledge 
of the subpoena, service of summons has been completed.”  State v. Juenger, 12th 
Dist. Butler No. CA2003-02-049, 2004-Ohio-796, ¶ 32, citing State v. Castle, 92 
Ohio App.3d 732, 734, 637 N.E.2d 80 (9th Dist.1994); see also Denovchek v. 
Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988) (this 
court held the same with respect to “actual knowledge” of a subpoena in civil cases 
under Civ.R. 45).  There is nothing in the record to establish that Ford had actual 
knowledge of the subpoena.  And although the state never confirmed where Miller 
lived, it knew that he did not live with Ford. 
{¶ 32} Moreover, at the July 9 hearing, the state focused its arguments on 
the efforts that it had previously made to contact Miller and Ford⸻essentially, the 
efforts it had included in its prior motions.  But the trial court granted the state’s 
motion to continue the trial after denying those motions.  When the trial court asked 
the prosecutor what the state had done to secure the presence of the witnesses for 
Eatmon’s July 9 trial, the prosecutor explained that the state had mailed letters to 
Miller and Ford and also left subpoenas for them at Ford’s residence.  However, 
this was not sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the witnesses 
would not appear at trial. 
{¶ 33} Although the state asserts that it “did not just request material 
witness warrants without any basis in fact,” the reality is that the state’s efforts 
merely established that Miller and Ford were reluctant to cooperate.  Reluctance to 
cooperate does not amount to deliberate defiance of a lawfully served subpoena.  
Simply put, the state failed to lawfully serve subpoenas on the witnesses or ensure 
that they had actual knowledge of the subpoenas the state left at Ford’s residence.  
The state’s efforts were therefore not sufficient to establish probable cause that 
material-witness warrants were necessary. 
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{¶ 34} Finally, we address the standard of review for this case.  Although 
the end of an opinion is generally not where we would discuss a standard of review, 
due to the question presented in this case and our analysis of that question, 
discussing the standard of review is more appropriate here.  The Eighth District 
applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, but it did so in the context of a 
continuance.  It stated, “A request for a continuance to issue a material witness 
warrant is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  2020-Ohio-3592 at ¶ 19, citing 
State v. Metz, 2019-Ohio-4054, 146 N.E.3d 1190, ¶ 86 (8th Dist.).  Thus, the Eighth 
District did not set forth the appropriate standard of review because it framed the 
issue in the context of a continuance.  After reviewing the statutes at issue in this 
case, it is clear that the standard of review depends on the question presented. 
{¶ 35} When reviewing whether a trial court’s decision to issue a material-
witness warrant was proper, i.e., whether the court could order that a witness be 
arrested and detained, abuse of discretion is not the proper standard of review.  
Rather, the appropriate standard of review is for courts to conduct an independent 
review of the record to determine whether the state established probable cause that 
the witness is material and will not appear at trial to testify.  But when the issue is 
simply whether the trial court should have ordered a witness to enter into 
recognizance in the first place, a matter over which the court has discretion, that 
decision would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 36} When the state requests that a court issue a material-witness warrant, 
it must establish, by oath or affidavit, probable cause to believe that the witness is 
material and that the warrant is necessary to procure the witness’s attendance at 
trial.  The state did not do so in this case.  Therefore, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that the trial court did not err by denying the state’s 
request to issue material-witness warrants. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John 
Kosko and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
_________________