Case Title: Rios v. Montgomery County

Citation: 386 Md. 104

Docket Number: 71/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No.  71
September Term 2004
__________________________________
NELLY RIOS, as Parent and Next Friend
of Her Son, Luis Fernando Rios
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MARYLAND, et al.
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
           
             Filed:   April 7, 2005
1
Section 5-304 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Notice Required. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section, an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought
against a local government or its employees unless the notice of
the claim required by this section is given within 180 days after
the injury.
* * * 
(c) Waiver of notice requirement. Notwithstanding the other
provisions of this section, unless the defendant can affirmatively
show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required
notice, upon motion and for good cause shown the court may
entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given.
Md. Code (1987, 2002 Repl. Vol. 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 5-304 (a) and (c) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.  
This case arises under the 180-day notice provision of the Local Government Tort
Claims Act [hereinafter “LGTCA”], Md. Code (1987, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.),
§ 5-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.1  We have been  asked to determine
whether the 180-day notice provision as applied to minors violates the Federal Constitution
and Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  We also have been asked to review
the Circuit Court’s holding that the “good cause” exception contained in Section 5-304 (c)
of the LGTCA was not satisfied under the facts of this case.  Because we find that the 180-
day notice requirement of the LGTCA is constitutional as applied to minors, and that the
Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that good cause did not exist, we shall
affirm.
I.  Background
Nelly Rios Saravia [hereinafter “Ms. Rios”], formerly of Bolivia, immigrated to the
United States in 1983.  She subsequently returned to Bolivia and later re-entered the United
2
States in 1987 with her husband, Luis Rios [hereinafter “Mr. Rios”].  In 1991, Ms. Rios
became pregnant, and a friend referred her to a clinic in Rockville operated by the
Montgomery County Health Department to obtain prenatal care. 
During an appointment at the clinic on June 17, 1991, Ms. Rios signed a form written
in Spanish, entitled “Maternity Programa De Maternidad Pruebra De Domicilio,” on which
she represented that she was a resident of Montgomery County, Maryland.  The words
“Montgomery County Government” appeared in large letters at the top of the form with the
County seal, and at the bottom of the form appeared the words “Department of Health,
Division of Family Health Services” with the Department’s address.  The form instructed the
“person requesting service” to “report all changes in . . . residency (within 14 days) to the
Montgomery County Health Department.”  Ms. Rios also signed a document called a “Face
Sheet” that contained the words “Montgomery County” at the top.
In 1991, Dr. Richard Footer, M.D. was employed part-time by Montgomery County
in a program called, “Project Delivery.”  On December 31, 1991, while Ms. Rios was in labor
at Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, Inc. [hereinafter “Holy Cross”], Dr. Footer was on
call.  Although Dr. Footer had never previously met Ms. Rios and had never provided
prenatal care to her at the clinic, he delivered Mr. and Ms. Rios’s son, Luis, on that date.  The
only payment made by Ms. Rios for Luis’s delivery was made to Holy Cross Hospital.
Luis weighed ten pounds, five ounces at birth, and his size apparently complicated the
delivery.  During labor, Luis’s anterior shoulder became lodged, and Dr. Footer used forceps
2
A “sulcus” is “a furrow, groove, or fissure.”  MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS
652 (3d ed. 1960). 
3
A “brachial plexus” is defined as “a large network or tangle of the neck and armpit,
formed by the union of the anterior branches of the lower four cervical and the first dorsal
nerve.  MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS at 572.  “Cervical” is of “[p]ertaining to the
neck.”  Id. at 157.  “Dorsal” is defined as “[p]ertaining to or situated near the back.”  Id. at
248.
4
“Erb’s Palsy” is defined as “[p]aralysis of the upper roots of the brachial plexus due
to destruction of the fifth and sixth cervical roots and characterized by absence of
involvement of the small hand muscles.  THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-
LEGAL DICTIONARY 528 (1987).
5
Maryland Rule 2-202(b) provides that “[a]n individual under disability [including
minority] to sue may sue by a guardian or other like fiduciary or, if none, by next friend . .
.”
6
In the Second Amended Complaint filed on March 4, 2002, Petitioner added David
Solberg, M.D. as a defendant.  The complaint was amended a third time on September 9,
2002, adding Holy Cross as a defendant.  Both Holy Cross and Dr. Solberg have been
dismissed from the suit and are not parties to the present appeal.
3
to deliver him, which resulted in a sulcar tear2 and a fourth degree tear of the brachial
plexus.3  Luis now suffers from Erb’s Palsy,4 a permanent condition.  Ms. Rios paid Holy
Cross, not Montgomery County, for the costs accrued from Luis’s birth.
Although Luis’s injury was apparent at birth, Petitioner did not provide notice of the
malpractice claim to the County until almost a decade later on April 6, 2001.  On May 11,
2001, Petitioner filed a claim for negligence with the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration
Office.  After arbitration was waived, Ms. Rios filed a negligence suit against Dr. Footer and
Montgomery County on July 24, 2002, as Luis’ next friend,5 seeking to recover for Luis’s
injuries.6  
4
Ms. Rios was deposed through a Spanish interpreter on June 6, 2002.  She testified
that she spoke very little English in 1991 and did not know how to read English when she
went to the clinic on her initial visit.  She acknowledged, however, that the “nurses spoke
Spanish” and helped her to complete the forms and to communicate with the doctor.  Ms.
Rios estimated that she visited the clinic approximately twelve times and paid $ 8.00 per
appointment, but maintained that she “did not know that it was a clinic run by the County”
or that Dr. Footer was a County employee.  The following deposition testimony is pertinent
to the issues at bar:
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: What was your status here in
the United States in 1990 and 1991?
[MS. RIOS]: I was still here illegally.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: You indicated that a friend of
yours told you to go to the clinic at 50 Monroe Street?
[MS. RIOS]: Yes.
* * * 
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: You indicated that she [Ms.
Rios’s friend] said that if you went there, they could help.  What
did they say they could do for you?
[MS. RIOS]: Because I was told to have a baby and to have – to
give childbirth in a hospital would cost about $5,000, and I did
not have those resources, sufficient resources to pay that bill, so
I was told there at the clinic that they could do that for me for
$1,500.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: And this was your
understanding that this clinic was a clinic that was run by
7
Under Montgomery County’s “Project Delivery” program, qualified individuals paid
$1,500.00 for a delivery as compared to $5,000.00 that it would normally cost.
5
Montgomery County, Maryland?
[MS. RIOS]: No.  I just knew it was – I was under the
impression that it was a clinic that would help people, but I
didn’t know anything more about it.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: Did you know who ran the
clinic?
[MS. RIOS]: No.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: Did you know anything about
the clinic other than you just go there and you get help?
[MS. RIOS]: Just that I would have to pay less, and that’s why
I went there.
* * * 
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: Was it your understanding
that the clinic was not run by Montgomery County?
[MS. RIOS]: No.  I did not know that it was clinic run by the
County.  I though it was just a public clinic, and that’s why you
pay the $1,500.[7]
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: So it was your understanding
that it was a public clinic; is that right?
[MS. RIOS]: Yes, but one where you had to pay, but I did not
know it was run by the County.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: Did you understand that it was
run by the government or a government?
[MS. RIOS]: No, I never knew that.  I would go once a month
6
for my appointments.  I would just sign in, have my
appointment, and go back.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: At any point in time did you
ask any of the individuals there who they worked for?
[MS. RIOS]: No, never.  I never would ask anything.  I would
just go in and come back out.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: After your son was born did
you ever ask any of the individuals at the clinic who they
worked for?
[MS. RIOS]: No, never.  I never asked anybody there.
* * * 
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES]: You also understood when
you signed up at the clinic that the clinic was going to provide
– was going to have someone deliver your baby; correct?
[MS. RIOS]: Yes.  I thought it would be the same doctor that
would give me the checkups.
Ms. Rios recalled that, by six months of age, Luis still could not move his hand, and
that her husband had visited a lawyer to discuss the matter before Luis was a year old;
however, she had “no idea who that lawyer would be.”  
At his deposition, Dr. Footer stated that he learned of Luis’s size “at the time of
delivery,” and acknowledged that he was surprised at the baby’s size.  He also recalled that,
after the delivery he explained to Ms. Rios that “the baby had nerve damage” and required
further examination.  Dr. Footer stated that he told Ms. Rios “that we would have to wait and
see whether this resolved totally or not.”  He did not, however, remember discussing with
Ms. Rios the risks associated with a forceps delivery, nor did he know whether Ms. Rios was
7
aware that he was paid by the County to deliver her son.  
On September 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Waive Requirement of Timely
Notice Under the Local Government Tort Claims Act and to Permit Action to Proceed.”  The
motion  claimed that “[p]rior to consulting with her current attorney she did not know, and
had no reason to know,” that Dr. Footer was paid by the County when he delivered Luis.
Petitioner also asserted that the defendants would not be prejudiced if the motion were
granted because Holy Cross’s records regarding Luis’s birth are available, and Dr. Footer and
Dr. David Solberg, the obstetrical resident who participated in the delivery, “are still
available to testify.”  At the motions hearing on January 29, 2003, Petitioner urged the Circuit
Court to find good cause to justify the belated notice based upon the concept of “excusable
neglect or mistake.”
At the close of the motions hearing, the presiding judge, the Honorable Patrick L.
Woodward, determined that even if Ms. Rios lacked actual knowledge that the clinic was a
County facility and that there was a relationship between Dr. Footer and the County, she had
“an affirmative duty to inquire as to the legal identity of the Defendant.”  According to the
Circuit Court, even a “minimum inquiry” would have led Ms. Rios to discover Dr. Footer’s
connection to the County.  In expressing his reasoning, Judge Woodward determined that the
appropriate standard to apply is that of due diligence and that Ms. Rios failed to exercise any
due diligence, stating:
The problem is that for a period of over eight and a half years,
there’s no evidence that [Ms. Rios] did anything to investigate
8
or prosecute her claim.  This was a situation where it was a
patent injury, it was not a latent injury; she was aware of that
injury, she was aware of the circumstances surrounding the
occurrence of the injury.  She was aware that her husband
wanted to talk to a lawyer and may have talked to a lawyer about
what had happened to their child.  So there was clear notice to
her that there was a potential legal claim against the doctors for
the injuries sustained by her child.  Yet there’s no evidence that
anything was done.
We don’t know what an investigation would have revealed . . .
we simply don’t know that because it was never accomplished;
it was never done.
The Circuit Court then considered whether Ms. Rios “was on some kind of inquiry notice
about whether the doctor was an employee of the County.”  The court stated that it was
satisfied that Ms. Rios had inquiry notice of the County’s involvement.  In reaching that
conclusion, Judge Woodward noted:
The clinic is run by the County, exclusively by the County, has
the County logo on it, so there seems to me to be evidence here
over and above the actual knowledge that would put a
reasonable person on notice that somehow the County would be
involved in this case, as the employer.  And she went to this
clinic because she couldn’t afford the delivery, the regular cost
of delivery; and that was another indication that the County, or
some other entity was involved in the delivery.  
So I think from the facts of this case, while she may not have
actually known the employment status, she certainly had
reasonable indication that the County was involved, and
potentially responsible for what had happened in the course of
the delivery.
The court then considered whether Ms. Rios established good cause for her failure to
comply with the notice requirement.  Concluding that she did not, the court stated:
I can’t get past the fact that there simply was no evidence of
8
This decision to grant Montgomery County’s Motion to Dismiss or for Partial
Summary Judgment terminated the proceedings against Montgomery County and Dr. Footer
and settled the rights of Petitioner with respect to those parties.  This order is final in the
traditional sense: “an unqualified order granting a motion to dismiss . . . thereby putting the
parties out of court, is a final appealable order.”  Planning Bd. Of Howard County v.
Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 651, 530 A.2d 1237, 1243 (1987), quoting Houghton v. County
Commissioners of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 412, 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986).   
9
investigation, no evidence of prosecution of this claim for over
eight and a half years after the injury occurred.  The requirement
of notice is 180 days.  She had an obligation under the law to
make that investigation.  And if that investigation had not
disclosed employment, if that investigation had been reasonably
conducted and there was a delay in discovery of employment
status, then I think it would be a whole different picture.  But
that investigation simply was not done, and I think the standard
for good cause requires me to find or determine where there was
a prosecution of the claim with the degree of diligence of an
ordinary prudent person.  I think an ordinary prudent person
would have done some investigation and none was done over
eight and a half years, according to the evidence in the record.
I simply cannot find good cause on the record in this case.  And
accordingly, and for these reasons and reluctantly, the Court will
deny the motion to waive the requirement of timely notice.
In an order dated January 29, 2003, Judge Woodward denied the Motion to Waive
Requirements of Timely Notice Under the Local Government Tort Claims Act and to Permit
Action to Proceed and dismissed with prejudice Petitioner’s Third Amended Complaint with
respect to Montgomery County and Dr. Footer. 8  Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on February 28, 2003, which asked the Circuit Court to reconsider whether
good cause excused the failure to comply with the timely notice requirement.  Additionally,
Petitioner asserted, for the first time, that the notice requirement was unconstitutional as
10
applied to minors.  The Circuit Court denied the motion on April 2, 2003, without a hearing.
On May 2, 2003, Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
Faced with similar arguments, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Circuit Court and held that because Ms. Rios was “‘on notice that there may have been
an invasion of . . . legal rights . . .’ by the doctor, it was incumbent upon her to ‘investigate.’”
It observed that the burden was on Ms. Rios to discover Dr. Footer’s identity and his
relationship with Montgomery County, and she did not do so.  The court found particularly
important the fact that Ms. Rios did not claim that Dr. Footer or the County thwarted her
effort to uncover such information.   Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that
the Circuit Court correctly determined that Ms. Rios’s failure to make any inquiry whatsoever
as to the doctor’s identity or employment status did not constitute good cause.  
With respect to the assertion that the notice requirement of the LGTCA is
unconstitutional as applied to minors, the Court of Special Appeals also found the argument
to be without merit.  The court held that the effect of the notice requirement on a minor
whose claim arises under the LGTCA does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights because it is a reasonable restriction upon access to the courts.
Moreover, the court stated that because the legislature has waived sovereign immunity in
limited contexts, it also has the power to establish the conditions for such a waiver to be
effective and to exempt minors from compliance with those conditions.  Thus, the court held
that it would usurp the legislature’s power to judicially create an exception not contained in
9
The issues before this Court were presented in the reverse order in the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari; however, due to the nature of the questions presented, we find it more
appropriate to address the issues in the order set forth in this opinion.
10
Petitioner did not raise any arguments under Article 24 of the Maryland Constitution.
11
the statute. 
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court on July 16, 2004,
presenting two issues for our consideration:
I.  Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that
the 180-day notice requirement of Section 5-304 (a) of the Local
Government Tort Claims Act is not unconstitutional as applied
to minors?
II. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the
Circuit Court’s finding that Petitioner had not shown good cause
for waiving the requirement of timely notice under Section 5-
304 (a) of the Local Government Tort Claims Act?9
On September 15, 2004, we granted the petition and issued the writ of certiorari.  Rios v.
Montgomery County, 383 Md. 211, 857 A.2d 1159 (2004).  We find that the 180-day notice
requirement of Section 5-304 (a) of the LGTCA is constitutional under the Federal
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights10 as applied to minors where the
underlying local governmental action was governmental as opposed to proprietary in nature.
Moreover, we hold that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Petitioner failed to show good cause for the failure to comply with the notice requirement
under the LGTCA.  Therefore, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals’s determination that
the Circuit Court properly granted Montgomery County and Dr. Footer’s motion to dismiss
12
with prejudice.  
II.  Standard of Review
 When determining a statute’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause or
Due Process Clause, unless a suspect or quasi-suspect class is created or a fundamental or
important right is implicated, the appropriate standard of review of constitutionality is
whether there is a rational basis for the created class or limited process afforded.  See Murphy
v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 355-56, 601 A.2d 102, 108-09 (1992).  “We have consistently
followed ‘the principle that a court will, whenever reasonably possible, construe and apply
a statute to avoid casting serious doubt upon its constitutionality.’” R.A. Ponte Architects,
LTD v. Investors’ Alert, Inc., 382 Md. 689, 718, 857 A.2d 1, 18 (2004), quoting Becker v.
State, 363 Md. 77, 92, 767 A.2d 816, 824 (2001).  
The question of whether good cause for a waiver of a condition precedent exists is
clearly within the discretion of the trial court.  Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258,  270, 761 A.2d
56, 62 (2000).  As we stated in Wilson v. Crane, __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __ (February 10,
2005):
There is an abuse of discretion ‘where no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[]’ . . . or when
the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding principles.’  An
abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under
consideration is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts and
inferences before the court[]’ . . . or when the ruling is ‘violative
of fact and logic.’
Questions within the discretion of the trial court are
‘much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts,
and the decisions of such judges should only be disturbed where
13
it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or
autocratic action has occurred.’  In sum, to be reversed ‘[t]he
decision under consideration has to be well removed from any
center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the
fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’
Id., quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312-13, 701 A.2d 110,
118-19 (1997) (citations omitted).  Thus, “an abuse of discretion should only be found in the
extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.”  Id.  
III.  Discussion
Petitioner contends that the 180-day notice requirement of the LGTCA is an
unreasonable restriction on his access to the courts in violation of Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.  He argues that although the notice requirement is not a statute of
limitations, it functions as one by restricting a minor’s access to the courts when notice is not
given.  In support of his position, Petitioner asserts that it is unreasonable to require minors
to rely on their parents to provide the notice mandated by statute.  Therefore, he concludes
that the notice is unconstitutional under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Petitioner also argues that the notice requirement of the LGTCA violates the Equal
Protection Clause and due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.  He asserts that the distinction between private tortfeasors and local
government entities is irrational and serves no real beneficial or legitimate purpose.  He also
contends that the notice requirement divides the victims of local government tortfeasors into
two arbitrary classes: adults and minors.  Petitioner posits that such a distinction creates an
14
unreasonable hurdle that denies minors their right to equal protection under the law.  With
respect to his claims of due process violations, Petitioner contends that the notice
requirement denies him a vested property right without due process of law.  He argues that
because the LGTCA created more than a remedy, but rather a new cause of action, it follows
that the cause of action is subject to due process protections.  
Finally, Petitioner argues that the Circuit Court abused its discretion when it
determined that a minor child must comply with the requirement of timely notice under the
LGTCA.  He contends that because he was only six months old when the notice period
expired, he could not satisfy the notice requirement independently.  Thus, Petitioner asserts
that minority per se constitutes good cause for waiving the requirement of timely notice
under the LGTCA, because to find otherwise would assume that a legally disabled minor
could have given notice or that an adult could have done so on his behalf.  He argues that his
status as a minor and the fact that Ms. Rios did not know, and had no reason to know, that
Dr. Footer was employed by Montgomery County, establishes good cause for waiving the
notice requirement under the LGTCA.  
Montgomery County argues that the notice requirement of the LGTCA neither violates
the Federal Constitution nor the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  It notes that minors have
the same access to courts as other claimants do because all claimants are required to serve
notice to protect their ability to file suit.  The County asserts that the notice requirement does
not violate constitutional principles of equal protection or due process and does not
15
unreasonably interfere with the access to courts protected in Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights because it is reasonable in light of the legitimate purpose of the
LGTCA.  
In addressing Petitioner’s claim that minority should constitute good cause per se, the
County notes that Section 5-304 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides
that notice may be given by the representative of the claimant as well as to the claimant
himself.  The County argues that the statute lacks a tolling provision for minority; as such,
any consideration of minority as good cause must be made on a case-by-case basis by the trial
court in its discretion, which in the present case appropriately exercised such discretion.
Furthermore, Montgomery County contends that the Circuit Court properly found that
Petitioner failed to show good cause for his failure to give notice during the statutory period.
The County asserts that failure to take any action during the statutorily prescribed period does
not establish good cause for waiver and that mere ignorance of Dr. Footer’s employment
status does not constitute good cause under the LGTCA.  Montgomery County opines that
although Ms. Rios had the opportunity to discover such information, she did not do so, and
therefore, the Circuit Court should be affirmed. 
A.  The History of Local Governmental Immunity and the LGTCA
To understand the purposes and constitutionality of the notice provision of the
LGTCA and the “good cause”exception, we must examine the status of local governmental
immunity from the initiation of a suit, up to, and including the enactment of the LGTCA.
16
We had the opportunity to explicate the historical development of local governmental
tort immunity in Housing Authority v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 754 A.2d 367 (2000).  As we
noted in that opinion, “[u]ntil the twentieth century, local governments generally had no
immunity under Maryland common law in either tort or contract actions.”  Id. at 358, 754
A.2d at 368.  In the early twentieth century, however, we “adopted a distinction that had been
developed earlier in other jurisdictions, and held that local governments enjoyed immunity
in certain types of tort actions based on activity categorized as ‘governmental’ but had no
immunity in tort actions based on activity categorized as ‘private’ or ‘corporate’ or
‘proprietary.’” Id. at 359, 754 A.2d at 368; see also DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 47, 729
A.2d 354, 369-70 (1999) (“A local governmental entity is liable for its torts if the tortious
conduct occurs while the entity is acting in a private or proprietary capacity, but, unless its
immunity is legislatively waived, it is immune from liability for tortious conduct committed
while the entity is acting in a governmental capacity.”).  We recognized that regardless of the
capacity in which the local government was functioning, it possessed no immunity for certain
types of torts, such as nuisance actions, see e.g., Board v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384,
389-90, 578 A.2d 207, 210 (1990); tort actions arising under the Maryland Constitution, see
e.g., DiPino, 354 Md. at 50-51, 729 A.2d at 371; and tort liability for violations of federal
constitutional or statutory rights, see e.g., Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 110-113, 660 A.2d
447, 467-68 (1995).  
Prior to the LGTCA, the immunity of local governments afforded through the
11
Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol., 1986 Cum. Supp.), Art. 25A, § 5(CC) was repealed
by § 1 of Ch. 594 of the Acts of 1987, which also enacted the LGTCA.
17
common law based on activities categorized as “governmental,” was waived under specific
circumstances by enactments of the General Assembly.  See e.g., Md. Code (1957, 1998
Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), Art. 44A (authorizing the creation of housing authorities and
effecting a limited waiver of any governmental immunity).  Also, prior to the enactment of
the LGTCA, some county governments were empowered to waive any governmental
immunity that they would otherwise be entitled to under the common law.  See e.g.,
Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 297-99, 396 A.2d 255, 258-59 (1979),
overruled on other grounds by James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d
1173 (1980) (holding under former Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5(S) that
Prince George’s County possessed the power to waive its governmental immunity through
its county charter); Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol., 1986 Cum. Supp.), Art 25A, § 5(CC)
(repealed) (limiting waivers of governmental immunity to the greater of $250,000.00 or the
amount of insurance coverage).11  Thus, prior to the enactment of the LGTCA, local
governments enjoyed immunity from tort liability only with respect to non-constitutional torts
based on activity classified as “governmental,” and such immunity could be waived by the
General Assembly or local enactments.  This limitation on the immunity from tort action with
respect to local governments remains applicable today under the LGTCA.
In 1987, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 594 of the Acts of 1987, which
18
repealed prior statutory provisions and replaced them with the LGTCA.  1987 Md. Laws,
Chap. 594, § 1. “[T]he purpose of the LGTCA is to ‘provide a remedy for those injured by
local government officers and employees acting without malice and in the scope of
employment.’” Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 298, 808 A.2d 1262, 1272 (2002); Moore v.
Norouzi, 371 Md. 154, 165, 807 A.2d 632, 639 (2002); Ashton, 339 Md. at 107-08, 660 A.2d
at 465.  The Act affords a remedy to those injured by acts of local government officers and
employees, while “ensuring that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local
government ultimately responsible for the public officials’ acts.”  Ashton, 339 Md. at 108,
660 A.2d at 466.  Sections 5-304 (a) and (b) of the LGTCA provide that potential claimants
must give notice of impending claims within 180 days of the injury, and that such notice be
given to designated government officials or other representatives: 
(a) Notice required. – Except as provided in subsection (c) of
this section, an action for unliquidated damages may not be
brought against a local government or its employees unless the
notice of the claim required by this section is given within 180
days after the injury.
(b) Manner of giving notice. – (1) Except in Anne Arundel
County, Baltimore County, Harford County, and Prince
George’s County, the notice shall be given in person or by
certified mail, return receipt requested, bearing a postmark from
the United States Postal Service, by the claimant or the
representative of the claimant, to the county commissioner,
county council, or corporate authorities of a defendant local
government, or:
(I) In Baltimore City, to the City Solicitor;
(ii) In Howard County, to the County Executive;
and
(iii) In Montgomery County, to the County
Executive. 
19
(Emphasis added).  Md. Code, § 5-304(a), (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
The notice requirement of Sections 5-304 (a) and (b) are  intended to apprise a local
government “of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation,
i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished
by time, ‘sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and its responsibility
in connection with it.’” Faulk, 371 Md. at 298-99, 808 A.2d at 1272, quoting Williams v.
Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 389-90, 754 A.2d 379, 385 (2000), quoting in turn Jackson v. Bd.
of County Comm’rs, 233 Md. 164, 167, 195 A.2d 693, 695 (1963).  We have expressly held
that the LGTCA notice requirements are a condition precedent to maintaining an action
against a local government or its employees to the extent otherwise not entitled to immunity
under the LGTCA.  Faulk, 371 Md. at 304, 808 A.2d 1276; Grubbs v. Prince George’s
County, 267 Md. 318, 320-21, 297 A.2d 754, 755-56 (1972) (stating “we have regarded it
[the predecessor statute to the LGTCA, Md. Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.), Art. 57, § 18] as
a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action for damages”); see also
Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 187 Md. 67, 77, 48 A.2d 593,
599 (1946) (stating that “the notice is a condition precedent to the right to maintain the suit”),
overruled on other grounds by statute as stated in Arnold v. Prince George’s County, 270
Md. 285, 311 A.2d 223 (1973); Leppo v. State Highway Admin., 330 Md. 416, 423, 624 A.2d
539, 542 (1993) (interpreting a statutory notice requirement in the Maryland Tort Claims Act
to be a condition precedent to institution of a third-party action against the State); Redfern
20
v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 209 Md. 106, 111-12, 120 A.2d 370, 372-73 (1956) (finding that
statutory notice was a condition precedent to applying for payment for deaths pursuant to the
Workmen’s Compensation Act). 
We have previously defined a “condition precedent” as “a condition attached to the
right to sue at all.”  Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 59, 626 A.2d 353, 356 (1993).  It
“operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone.”  Id.,
quoting State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 480, 129 A. 793, 794 (1925).  “The liability and the
remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to
be treated as limitations of the right.”  Id.  Conversely, “a statute of limitations affects only
the remedy, not the cause of action.” Id.  A condition precedent cannot be waived under the
common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is
fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied.  This requirement of strict or substantial
compliance with a condition precedent is of course subject to abrogation by the General
Assembly, see, e.g., State v. Manck, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __ (2005) (recognizing the
legislature’s ability to enact statutes that abrogate the common law); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md.
599, 615-16, 861 A.2d 78, 87-88 (2004) (same); State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 76-77, 785 A.2d
1275, 1283-84 (2001) (same), which it has done through the creation of the “good cause”
exception to the LGTCA.  
B.  Governmental and Proprietary Activities
Before we can address Petitioner’s arguments with respect to the Equal Protection
21
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, we
must determine whether Montgomery County’s provision of health care through the
operation of a clinic and subsidization of hospital services is a governmental or proprietary
function because this conclusion will determine whether the County may properly assert
immunity as a defense in the present action.  
In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 195 A. 571 (1937),
and reaffirmed in Austin v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 405 A.2d 255
(1979), we “recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between those functions which are
governmental and those which are not, [and] established guidelines in [Blueford].”  E. Eyring
Co. v. City of Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 382-83, 252 A.2d 824, 825 (1969).  We stated, “in
truth there is no universally accepted or all-inclusive test to determine whether a given act
of a municipality is private or governmental in its nature, but the question is usually
determined by the public policy recognized in the jurisdiction where it arises.”  Blueford, 173
Md. at 275-76, 195 A. at 576.  Therefore, we crafted the following guidelines: 
Where the act in question is sanctioned by legislative authority,
is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument
inuring to the municipality, and tends to benefit the public health
and promote the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no
element of private interest, it is governmental in its nature.
Id. at 276, 195 A. at 576.  Moreover, we explained that:
[I]t is better that the adequate performance of such an act be
secured by public prosecution and punishment of officials who
violate the duties imposed upon them in respect to it than to
disburse public funds dedicated to the maintenance of such
22
public conveniences as public parks, playgrounds, hospitals,
swimming pools, and beaches maintained at the public expense
to private persons who have suffered loss through the
negligence or default of municipal employees or agents charged
with their management.
Id.  
In Gutowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 127 Md. 502, 96 A. 630 (1916),
we created a temporal means of categorizing local government action as either proprietary
or governmental in nature, and we noted that all of the cases imposing liability on
municipalities had involved proprietary functions.  Id. at 508, 96 A. at 632.    Extensive
research has revealed no case prior to Gutowski where this Court has determined that a local
government’s provision of subsidized health care to less affluent residents, or more generally
the administration of a hospital by a municipality, created liability on the part of the local
government as a proprietary function.  In fact, our cases appear to indicate the contrary.  
In Finan v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 A. 269 (1928),
we recognized that “[f]or many years there has been general statutory authority given to
municipal and county authorities in Maryland to provide hospitals or temporary places for
the reception of the sick . . . .  And during a large part of the existence of state government,
hospitals of various kinds have been maintained here by governmental agencies, and it has
generally been regarded and treated as a normal governmental activity.”  Id. at 564-65, 141
A. at 270; see also Thomas v. Bd. Of County Commissioners of Prince George’s County, 200
Md. 554, 559, 92 A.2d 452, 454 (1952) (noting that “[p]erhaps it has been assumed by
12
Although Ms. Rios paid $ 8.00 per visit to the clinic run by the Montgomery County
Health Department, we have stated that the mere receipt of a fee for a service does not
automatically convert an otherwise governmental function into a proprietary one.  Austin v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 66, 405 A.2d 255, 263 (1979).  Moreover,
in Austin, we held that where the fee is nominal, we may infer a lack of profits inuring to the
County from its collection.  Id.
23
litigants that a municipality is no more liable than a charitable corporation.  In at least two
cases in this Court, operation of a hospital is mentioned as an illustration of just such a
governmental function”);  Blueford, 173 Md. at 276, 195 A. at 576 (stating, in dicta, that
hospitals are considered governmental functions of the municipality).  
Moreover, it is beyond question that the County’s program providing prenatal health
care to low-income mothers residing therein is solely for the public benefit and tends to
benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the public.  The County’s program
enables mothers who otherwise would not be able to afford prenatal care or to have their
child delivered in a hospital to do so in an amount reduced from $5,000.00 to $1,500.00
payable solely to the hospital.12  As a result, the County’s program, “Project Delivery,” in this
circumstance is entitled to absolute governmental immunity under the terms of the LGTCA.
Therefore, Petitioner cannot prevail on the claim directly against Montgomery County due
to its governmental immunity.  Thus, the only issue remaining is the applicability of the 180-
day notice requirement with respect to Petitioner’s claim against Dr. Footer and
Montgomery County’s obligation to defend and indemnify Dr. Footer under the LGTCA.
C.  Constitutional Claims
13
Md. Code (1984), § 12-106 (b) of the State Government Article provided:
A claimant may not institute an action under this subtitle unless:
(1) the claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a
designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to the
person or property that is the basis of the claim;
(2) the Treasurer or designee denies the claim finally; and
(3) the action is filed within 3 years after the cause of action
arises.
In 1995, the General Assembly amended Section 12-106 (b) of the State Government Article
to extend the period for filing the claim from 180-days to one year.  1995 Md. Laws Ch. 437,
§ 1.  The length of the statutory period does not alter the analysis or its applicability to the
notice requirement of the LGTCA.
The Maryland Tort Claims Act was enacted by the General Assembly in 1984 for the
purpose of creating a remedy for individuals injured by tortious conduct attributable to the
State.  Md. Code (1984), § 12-102 of the State Government Article.  Both the Maryland Tort
Claims Act and the LGTCA were designed to expand the individual’s right to obtain
remuneration for injury from the government, and the purpose of both conditions precedent
were to provide notice to the government so that it may better predict liability and make
appropriate budgetary decisions.  See Faulk, 371 Md. at 298-99, 808 A.2d at 1272, quoting
Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 389-90, 754 A.2d 379, 385 (2000), quoting in turn
Jackson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 233 Md. 164, 167, 195 A.2d 693, 695 (1963).
24
Petitioner argues that the notice provision of the LGTCA as applied to minors violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, deprives him of a property
interest without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and denies him access
to the courts in violation of Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Although we
have not addressed the constitutionality of the notice provision of the LGTCA, specifically,
we recently had the opportunity to address similar issues with respect to the 180-day claim
condition precedent of the Maryland Tort Claims Act13 as applied to minors in Johnson v.
Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 628 A.2d 162 (1993), using analysis that we find
appropriate to the case at bar, because of the similarity of terminology and purpose in the two
14
Md. Code (1984, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 12-106 (b) of the State Government Article
provides:
(b) Claim and denial required. – A claimant may not institute an
action under this subtitle unless:
(1) the claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a
designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to
person or property that is the basis of the claim;
(2) the Treasurer or designee denies the claim finally; and
(3) the action is filed within 1 year after the claim is denied
finally or 3 years after the cause of action arises, whichever is
later.
25
statutes, which is to permit the governmental entity involved to better predict its potential
costs for future budgeting.  See Heron, 361 Md. at 263-64, 761 A.2d at 58-59 (adopting the
time of injury interpretation under the Maryland Tort Claims Act for the purposes of the
LGTCA).  Therefore, because the 180-day claim requirement of the Maryland Tort Claims
Act, like the 180-day notice requirement of the LGTCA, is a condition precedent to the filing
of a suit rather than a statute of limitations, we find our constitutional analysis in Johnson
equally applicable to the case sub judice.
In Johnson, the plaintiffs, minors at the time of the events at issue in the case, sued
the State for damages arising out of an automobile accident involving a State police vehicle.
Johnson, 331 Md. at 288, 628 A.2d at 163.  Thirteen months after the accident, the plaintiffs,
through their attorney, filed a notice of claim with the State Treasurer.  Id.  After the
claimants filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, the State moved to
dismiss because the claimants failed to satisfy the 180-day claim requirement set forth in the
Maryland State Tort Claims Act. 14  Id.  The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion and
15
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
26
denied the claimants’ motion for reconsideration. Id. at 288-89, 628 A.2d at 163.
In Johnson, the claimants presented arguments nearly identical to those argued by
Petitioner in the present case.  The Johnson claimants argued that the 180-day claim
requirement “arbitrarily created two classes of injured parties, namely those injured by
government torts and those damaged by private torts” in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, that the application that the claim requirement “deprive[d] them of a property right
without due process of law” because it denies them the ability to prosecute their claim against
the State, and that the claim requirement, as applied to minors, denied them “a remedy in the
courts as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”  Johnson, 331
Md. at 292, 628 A.2d at 165.  
Equal Protection Claims
In Johnson, the claimants conceded  that the classification created by the condition
precedent was not subject to strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.15   Rather, they argued that the classification had
no rational basis and thus, was unconstitutional.  Id.  In the case at bar, Petitioner also
conceded that the “rational basis” test was the appropriate standard to apply.  In Johnson, we
27
determined that because no suspect or quasi-suspect class was created and no fundamental
or important right was implicated, rational basis was the proper test.  Id. at 295-97, 628 A.2d
at 167.  Likewise, we find that rational basis remains the applicable level of scrutiny in the
case sub judice.
 We have stated that “[a] statutory classification viewed under the rational basis
standard enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality and will be invalidated only if the
classification is clearly arbitrary.”  Murphy, 325 Md. at 356, 601 A.2d at 108.  We will not
declare the statute unconstitutional “unless the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that
[the Court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational.”  Id. at 355,
601 A.2d at 108. 
The Johnson claimants relied upon the holdings in cases from a small number of
jurisdictions which adhered to the minority view that distinguishing between private and
governmental tortfeasors failed the rational basis test.  Id. at 293, 628 A.2d at 165-66.  We,
however, rejected such a position and instead agreed with “those cases holding that
administrative claim requirements, in statutes waiving state governmental tort immunity, do
not violate equal protection principles.”  Id. at 296, 628 A.2d at 167.  We noted that
“[w]hether, and to what extent there should be state governmental immunity from tort suits
has long been regarded as the prerogative of the Maryland General Assembly.”  Id.  
Moreover, we found that “the 180-day claim requirement meets the rational basis
28
test.”  Id.  We agreed that because of the State’s greater capacity for tort liability, “the
administrative requirement allows the State to predict its potential tort liability more
accurately, so that it may enact a more accurate annual budget.”  Id.  Furthermore, we found
that “the claim requirement enables the State to make early decisions on the merits of
particular claims, and allows the State to take remedial safety measures more quickly, thereby
minimizing the cost of litigation for the taxpayers.”  Id.  We held that such reasons “furnish
rational grounds for differentiating between claims against the State and claims against
private tortfeasors.”  Id.  
In the present case, Petitioner presents arguments similar to those of the Johnson
plaintiffs concerning the application of the 180-day notice requirement of the LGTCA to
minors and urges us to find that no rational basis exists for the distinction between an
employee of the local government as tortfeasor where the local government is required to
defend and indemnify the employee and private individuals, and thus, to overrule Johnson.
We decline to do so, and instead, adopt the reasoning in Johnson as equally applicable to the
notice requirement of the LGTCA where the local government is involved in a governmental
function. 
We have recognized that “[t]he Legislature thus has the power to enact a statute
requiring that, before suit for damages shall be instituted against a municipal corporation, a
written notice of the claim shall be presented to the municipal authorities within a specified
period after injury or damage is sustained.”  Neuenschwander, 187 Md. at 76, 48 A.2d at 599.
29
As we have stated previously, “the purpose of requiring notice was
to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from
meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a
mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be
apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct
its own investigation.
Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90, 754 A.2d at 385, quoting 
Bartens v. City of Baltimore, 293 Md.
620, 626, 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982).  Among other functions, the notice requirement
enables the local government to relatively accurately predict its potential tort liability and
budget accordingly.  Therefore, we conclude, consistent with our reasoning in Johnson, that
the reasons set forth herein furnish sufficient rational basis for differentiating between claims
against employees of the local government when the activity at issue is governmental and
claims against private tortfeasors.  We hold that the notice requirement of the LGTCA does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Deprivation of Due Process of Law Claims
In Johnson, we addressed claims of due process violations identical to those presented
in the present case.  Like Petitioner in the case at bar, the claimants in Johnson relied
primarily on the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns,
180 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. 1970).  Johnson, 331 Md. at 298, 628 A.2d at 168.  The court in
Grubaugh held that a 60-day administrative claim requirement, which was a condition for
bringing a tort suit against a governmental entity, was, as applied to minors, a violation of
“substantive due process.”  Grubaugh, 180 N.W.2d at 783-84.  The Grubaugh opinion was
30
based on several premises, including that the waiver of governmental immunity was intended
to put governmental entities on the same level as private tortfeasors, that the plaintiff had a
vested property right in a tort cause of action against the tortfeasor, and that the
administrative claim requirement was arbitrary.  Id.  Thus, the Grubaugh court concluded
that the claim requirement represented an arbitrary infringement on the plaintiff’s vested
property right and thus was a violation of substantive due process. Id. at 784.
Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court, in Johnson, however, rejected the Grubaugh
reasoning, stating, “[A] conditional or partial waiver of sovereign immunity certainly is not
intended to put governmental entities on exactly the same footing as private tortfeasors.”
Johnson, 331 Md. at 298, 628 A.2d at 168.  Moreover, we stated that “we cannot agree that
there is a constitutionally protected vested property right in a particular common law tort
cause of action,” id. at 298-99, 628 A.2d at 168, nor did we consider the administrative
claims requirement as arbitrary or unreasonable based upon our discussion of the plaintiffs’
other constitutional claims.  Id. at 299, 628 A.2d at 169.
We continue to remain unconvinced by the reasoning explicated in Grubaugh.  The
LGTCA cannot be considered to have been intended to put local governments participating
in governmental activities on the same footing as private tortfeasors, as the LGTCA only
requires local governments to defend and indemnify their employees if the provisions of the
LGTCA are satisfied.  Furthermore, we continue to adhere to the view that under the
circumstances of the case at bar it is not possible to have a property interest in a cause of
31
action arising out of a common law tort.  Johnson, 331 Md. at 298-99, 628 A.2d at 168;
Murphy, 325 Md. at 362-64, 601 A.2d at 112, quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2638 n.32, 57 L.Ed.2d 595, 620 n.32
(1978) (“[o]ur cases have clearly established that ‘[a] person has no property, no vested
interest, in any rule of the common law’”).  We determine, therefore, that the notice
requirement of the LGTCA does not act to deprive Petitioner of a vested property interest
without due process of law.
Claims under Article 19 of the M aryland Declaration of Rights
Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or
property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the
land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale,
fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according
to the Law of the land.
Petitioner, like the claimants in Johnson, argues that, if the 180-day notice requirement is not
tolled for minors, the requirement violates their right of access to the courts under Article 19.
Johnson, 331 Md. at 292, 628 A.2d at 165.
As we stated in Johnson, “Article 19 does guarantee access to the courts . . . .
however, a ‘statutory restriction upon access to the courts violates Article 19 only if the
restriction is unreasonable.’” Johnson, 331 Md. at 297, 628 A.2d at 168, quoting Murphy,
325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113; see e.g.,  Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 263, 863 A.2d 297,
308 (2004); Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 205-06, 808 A.2d 508, 518 (2002).
32
As with the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the General Assembly has waived the local
government’s ability to avoid responsibility for the defense and indemnification of employees
under the LGTCA, but has required timely notice as a condition of that waiver.  Prior to the
enactment of the LGTCA, the County would not have been required to defend and indemnify
its employees for wrongdoing committed during a governmental activity.  The individual
would have had no assurance that a judgment would be paid.  The LGTCA provides such
guarantees if notice is furnished within 180-days of the injury.  In so doing, we recognize that
a minor is dependent upon an adult to comply with the notice provision, but, we cannot craft
an addendum to the LGTCA to toll the requirement.  That is the prerogative of the General
Assembly.  
Nevertheless, Petitioner relies primarily on our reasoning in Piselli v. 75th Street
Medical, 371 Md. 188, 808 A.2d 508 (2002), a more recent case than Johnson, although
similarly authored by Judge Eldridge, for the argument that the 180-day notice requirement
as applied to minors violates Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  In Piselli,
the parents of a son with extensive damage to the growth plates brought a medical
malpractice action as next friend of their son five years after his injury, beyond the time
period of the statute of limitations.  Id. at 196, 808 A.2d at 512-13.  The question presented
to this Court was “whether the time limitations prescribed by [Section] 5-109 [of the Courts
16
Md. Code (1987, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 5-109 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article entitled “Actions against health care providers” states in
pertinent part:
(a) Limitations. – An action for damages for an injury arising
out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services
by a health case provider . . . shall be filed within the earlier of:
(1) Five years of the time the injury was committed; or
(2) Three years of the date the injury was discovered.
(b) Actions by claimants under age 11. – Except as provided in
subsection (c) of this section, if the claimant was under the age
of 11 years at the time the injury was committed, the time
limitations prescribed in subsection (a) of this section shall
commence when the claimant reaches the age of 11 years.
(c) Exceptions to age limitations in certain actions. – 
(1) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section may not be
applied to an action for damages for an injury:
(I) To the reproductive system of the claimant; or
(ii) Caused by a foreign object negligently left in the claimant’s
body.
(2) In an action for damages for an injury described in this
subsection, if the claimant was under the age of 16 years at the
time the injury was committed, the time limitations prescribed
in subsection (a) of this section shall commence when the
claimant reaches the age of 16 years. 
33
and Judicial Proceedings Article16], as applied to an injured minor’s claim, are unreasonable
restrictions upon a traditional remedy and the minor’s access to the courts and, therefore, are
in violation of Article 19 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights].”  Id. at 208, 808 A.2d at
519-20.  In Piselli, we found that it was “an established principle in Maryland law that time
periods for bringing suit are tolled during infancy.”  Id. at 214, 808 A.2d at 523.  We
determined that “[t]he restrictions upon a minor’s remedy and access to the courts, contained
in subsections (b), (c) and (e) of [Section] 5-109 represent a drastic departure from a
34
principle which has governed minors’ causes of action for more than 500 years.”  Id. at 215,
808 A.2d at 524.  Therefore, we concluded that the statutes of limitations contained in
Section 5-109 as applied to minors violated Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
as an unreasonable restriction.  Id.
There are significant differences between the case at bar and the facts of Piselli.
Under the facts of the case sub judice, the LGTCA does not restrict a “traditional remedy or
access to the courts” unlike the effect of Section 5-109 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  Absent the enactment of the LGTCA, local governments would not be
required to defend and indemnify their employees in suits arising out of non-constitutional
torts committed during “governmental” activities other than nuisance actions,  see, e.g.,
DiPino, 354 Md. at 47, 729 A.2d at 369-70 (“A local governmental entity is liable for its torts
if the tortious conduct occurs while the entity is acting in a private or proprietary capacity,
but, unless its immunity is legislatively waived, it is immune from liability for tortious
conduct committed while the entity is acting in a governmental capacity.”).  Therefore, the
LGTCA cannot be described as restricting a “traditional remedy or access to the courts”
when it legislatively permits plaintiffs to enforce judgments obtained from suit against the
employee against the local government.  Moreover, to hold that the reasoning in Piselli
applies would be to find that the LGTCA purports to place local governments or their
employees engaged in governmental activities in the same position legally as the private
tortfeasors in Piselli, which was not the intent of the General Assembly.  The notice
17
If, however, the injury at issue in this case had arisen from a proprietary activity by
the County, the Johnson analysis may not be the appropriate analysis to apply;  the reasoning
explicated in Piselli may be the proper standard because where the County does not have
governmental immunity as a defense, it is liable in tort for damages like any other tortfeasor.
See, e.g., DiPino, 354 Md. at 47, 729 A.2d at 369-70; Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 508 n.3, 379 A.2d 1027, 1030 n.3 (1979); Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore v. State, use of Ahrens, 168 Md. 619, 628, 179 A. 169, 173 (1935).  
35
provision of the LGTCA is a condition precedent to the right of action; limitations statutes
create defenses.  The focus of the two, i.e., notice vis a vis limitations, is very different.
Therefore, both Ms. Rios’s and Luis’s actions are barred for failing to satisfy the notice
requirement of the LGTCA.17
D.  Good Cause
Minority As Good Cause Per Se
As we stated previously, we have consistently recognized that a local government
possesses absolute governmental immunity for activities that are properly categorized as
“governmental” in nature as opposed to “proprietary,” and that the General Assembly, in
requiring that notice be provided within a specified window of time, created a condition
precedent to a suit where the local governmental entity was required to indemnify and defend
its employees by statute.  Concomitant with its power to place conditions on an individual’s
ability to maintain a suit in which the local government must act as an insurer is the General
Assembly’s ability to relax the strict applicability of that condition.  As we have stated, “the
task of abrogating or altering the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity is one to
be performed by the legislature.”  Austin v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 Md.
36
51, 58, 405 A.2d 255, 259 (1979); see also Faulk, 371 Md. at 310, 808 A.2d at 1278-79
(Cathell, J. dissenting).  Any alteration of the local government’s obligations in a tort suit,
including conditions set for requiring defense and indemnification of employees, is entirely
within the prerogative of the General Assembly.  Thus, we find no contradiction or conflict
inherent in our statements that a condition precedent must be either strictly or substantially
complied with to maintain suit, and the General Assembly’s decision to permit the condition
to be waived upon a showing of good cause under the LGTCA.
In addition to other factual circumstances pertinent to the case at bar, Petitioner argues
that his being a minority per se constitutes good cause under Section 5-304 (c). Section 5-304
(c) of the LGTCA provides for a waiver of the notice requirement stating:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, unless the
defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been
prejudiced by lack of required notice, upon motion and for good
cause shown the court may entertain the suit even though the
required notice was not given.
Md. Code (1987, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 5-304 (c) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  In Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 761 A.2d 56 (2000), we stated that
“[t]he test for whether good cause exists pursuant to section 5-304 (c) is ‘whether the
claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person
would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.’”  Id. at 271, 761 A.2d at 63,
citing Westfarm Assoc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 676-77 (4th
Cir. 1995).  Judge Raker, writing for this Court in Heron, identified four categories of good
18
In Heron, we did not decide whether ignorance of the statutory notice requirement
could constitute good cause under the LGTCA, but rather left that question open and cited
to Williams v. Montgomery County, 123 Md. App. 119, 716 A.2d 1100 (1998), in which the
Court of Special Appeals specifically rejected ignorance of the law requiring notice as good
cause. Id. at 272 n.13, 761 A.2d at 64 n.13. The question continues to remain open.
37
cause recognized by our sister jurisdictions:
Several other jurisdictions have sought to define good cause for
late filing under public tort claims acts.  While courts generally
consider a combination of factors, circumstances that have been
found to constitute good cause fit into several broad categories:
excusable neglect or mistake (generally determined in reference
to a reasonably prudent person standard), see, e.g., Viles v. State,
423 P.2d 818, 821-22 (Cal. 1967); Black v. Los Angeles County,
12 Cal.App.3d 670, 674-75 (1970); Kleinke v. Ocean City, 371
A.2d 785 (N.J. App. Div. 1977); serious physical or mental
injury and/or location out-of-state, see, e.g., Silva v. New York,
668 N.Y.S.2d 189 (App. Div. 1998); S.E.W. Friel Co., v. New
Jersey Turnpike Auth., 373 A.2d 362 (1977); Kleinke, 371 A.2d
at 788; the inability to retain counsel in cases involving complex
litigation, see, e.g., Torres v. New Jersey Med. Ctr., 356 A.2d 75
(Law Div. 1976); and ignorance of the statutory notice
requirement, see, e.g., Bell v. Camden County, 370 A.2d 886
(N.J. App. Div. 1977). 
Heron, 361 Md. at 272, 761 A.2d at 63-64.18  We have also found good cause to exist where
representations made by local government representatives are misleading.  See Moore, 371
Md. at 165, 807 A.2d at 639.  From the facts of this case, Petitioner apparently advocates
Luis’s minority standing as grounds for excusable mistake or neglect.
Petitioner urges us to find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that
Luis as a minority did not satisfy the good cause standard.  We decline to find that a person
who is a minority per se constitutes good cause, because to do so would undermine the
38
purpose of the notice requirement and would essentially rewrite the statute to include a broad
exception for minors that the General Assembly did not contemplate.  We  “are not free to
enlarge that consent to be sued which the Government, through [the General Assembly] has
undertaken to carefully limit.”  Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672, 673 (9th Cir. 1968).
“If there were a general exemption based on infancy, it would be possible for notice to be
effectively delayed for as much as 20 years until the infant had reached his majority, and the
investigation of the claim under those circumstances would be extremely difficult if not
practically impossible.”  Mullins v. Thorne, 254 Md. 434, 442, 255 A.2d 409, 413 (1969)
(examining the 180-day notice condition precedent for filing claims with the Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund as applied to minors).
This case is factually similar to the circumstances underlying our opinion in Lopez v.
Maryland State Highway Administration, 327 Md. 486, 610 A.2d 778 (1992), another case
addressing the application of the notice provision of the Maryland Tort Claims Act to minors.
In that case, Helen Lopez filed a wrongful death action as next friend of her newborn son
arising out of the death of her son’s putative father eight months prior to the child’s birth
under the Maryland Tort Claims Act.  Id. at 488-89, 610 A.2d at 779.  When the State
challenged the timeliness of the claim, we held that the 180-day period in which to file a
claim as a condition precedent under the Maryland Tort Claims Act began to run on the date
of the son’s birth because that was when his injury occurred.  Id. at 492-93, 610 A.2d at 780-
81.  We found no grounds for exempting even a newborn child from the claim requirements
39
of the Maryland Tort Claims Act. Id. at 493, 610 A.2d at 781.  We discern no meaningful
difference between the circumstances of Lopez and those of the case sub judice so as to
differentiate between the application of the notice requirement of the Maryland Tort Claims
Act to minors and that of the LGTCA to minors and Luis in particular.  Therefore, we
conclude that minority does not constitute good cause per se under the LGTCA.
Our determination is consistent with that of our sister jurisdictions which also have
declined to accept a per se rule that minority excuses compliance with a statutory condition
precedent requiring notice to a governmental defendant.  See, e.g., Rabanar v. City of
Yonkers, 736 N.Y.S.2d 93, 100 (A.D. 2 Dept. 2002) (concluding that infancy of an injured
plaintiff, standing alone, does not compel the granting of an application for leave to serve a
late notice of claim, but rather the plaintiff must show a nexus between the delay and the
infancy); Matarrese v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 633 N.Y.S.2d 837, 837
(A.D. 2 Dept. 1995) (holding that the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in
granting father’s application for leave to serve late notice of claim against city hospital
corporation eight years after alleged negligent treatment of his son at time of his birth as it
was manifestly unrelated to son’s minority); Perez By and Through Yon v. Bay Area Hosp.,
846 P.2d 405, 409 (Or. 1993) (stating that the 270-day notice period in regard to claim by
minor child against public body is not tolled pending appointment of guardian ad litem);
McNicholas v. Bickford, 612 A.2d 866, 869 (Me. 1992) (concluding minority, by itself, does
not constitute good cause for failure to file claim for injury by governmental employee within
40
180-day period); George v. Town of Saugus, 474 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Mass. 1985) (finding
that the statute which tolls statute of limitations for minors does not apply to presentment
requirement of Tort Claims Act and thus the presentment requirement must be met regardless
of age of claimant); City of Birmingham v. Weston, 172 So. 643, 645 (Ala. 1937) (stating that
statutes requiring claims against municipality to be filed or presented within certain time are
generally held not to be statutes of limitation so as to excuse minor from preening claim
within prescribed time); Davidson v. City of Muskegon, 69 N.W. 670, 670-71 (Mich. 1897)
(holding that because there was no provision excepting infants from the limitation, the
requirement applied to infants and adults alike). 
The fact that the trial court, in its discretion, was not persuaded that Ms. Rios’s limited
English proficiency or immigrant status constituted good cause does not rise to the level of
an abuse of discretion as it was not a determination that was exceptional, extraordinary, or
egregious especially under the circumstances where Spanish-speaking nurses and translated
forms were available.  Therefore, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s immigrant status or
limited English proficiency constitute good cause per se and find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in considering it with the totality of the facts in this case.
Although minority does not constitute good cause per se, our inquiry does not end
here, because Petitioner also asks us to review whether the trial judge abused his discretion
in failing to find good cause based upon an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the
failure to provide notice.  The Circuit Court considered Luis’s minority, the ten-year delay
41
in filing the claim, Ms. Rios’s limited knowledge of English, available means to investigate,
the lack of any form of investigation during the ten years after Luis’s injury, and the fact that
the County did not impede or hamper any possibility of investigation or conceal material
facts.  From all of those factors, the court concluded that good cause did not exist.  We do
not find that such a determination is beyond the view that a reasonable person would take of
the facts of the case sub judice.  As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that good cause did not exist for waiving the notice requirement
under the LGTCA.
IV.  Conclusion
We conclude that the notice requirement under Section 5-304 of the LGTCA, Md.
Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 5-304 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, is valid as applied to minors under the Federal Constitution and Article
19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights where the underlying local governmental action
was governmental, not proprietary in nature.  Moreover, we do not find that the trial court’s
determination that the facts of this case did not show good cause under Section 5-304 (c),
was an abuse of discretion.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
THE PETITIONER.