Case Title: Victor K. Borden, Et Al. v. East-European Insurance Company, Et Al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC04-1737

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1737 
____________ 
 
VICTOR K. BORDEN, et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
EAST-EUROPEAN INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[January 19, 2006] 
 
PARIENTE, C.J. 
 
We have for review the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in East-
European Insurance Co. v. Borden, 884 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), which 
certified conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Winterthur 
International Ltd. v. Palacios, 559 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA), review dismissed, 
564 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1990).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const.  The certified conflict involves an issue of statutory construction: whether 
as a matter of law section 626.906(4), Florida Statutes (2005),1 of Florida’s 
                                          
 
 
1.  The current version of section 626.906 is in all material respects the same 
as the 1987 and 2000 versions of the statute construed in Borden and Winterthur.  
The statute was amended in 2003 to change the authorized process agent.  See ch. 
 
 
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Unauthorized Insurer’s Process Law (UIPL), which specifies the acts that will 
subject unauthorized foreign insurers to the jurisdiction of Florida courts, is 
available only to Florida residents.  We conclude that the Second District in 
Borden correctly interpreted this statute, and hold that only Florida residents are 
entitled to utilize the provisions of section 626.906, including subsection (4), to 
obtain personal jurisdiction over an insurer who is not otherwise authorized to do 
business in Florida.  We approve the decision reached in Borden and disapprove 
Winterthur.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case arises out of an insurance claim filed by Victor Borden, a resident 
of Honduras, for the loss of one of his fishing vessels that sank in international 
waters.  Through a chain of brokers, Borden obtained a marine insurance policy 
from East-European Insurance Company and its successor, Alfa Insurance PLC 
(collectively referred to as “Alfa”), a Russian corporation.  Borden’s efforts to 
procure the insurance policy covering his three fishing vessels began when his 
daughter, who resides in Florida,2 contacted Ocean Insurance Management, Inc. 
                                                                                                                                        
2003-261, § 1010, at 1986, Laws of Fla.  Under the amended version of the statute, 
the Chief Financial Officer, not the Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer or his 
or her successor(s) in office, is the authorized process agent.   
 
 
 
2.  In an affidavit filed in the trial court, Borden’s daughter, Sylvia Borden, 
stated that she is her father’s business manager.  Her duties in this capacity include 
 
 
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(Ocean), a Florida insurance brokerage firm.  Ocean in turn contacted Barnhardt 
Marine Insurance, Inc. (Barnhardt), also a Florida insurance brokerage firm, which 
in turn contacted Marine Insurance Consultants International (MICI), an insurance 
brokerage firm located in Britain.  MICI then contacted Southern Seas (UK) 
Limited (Southern Seas), also an insurance brokerage firm located in Britain.  
Southern Seas then contacted 2K Shipping & Trading Limited (2K), an insurance 
brokerage firm located in Turkey.  2K then contacted Alfa, which eventually 
issued an insurance policy.3    
 
After the insurance policy was issued to Borden, one of the fishing vessels 
covered under the policy sank in international waters.  Borden filed a claim with 
Alfa seeking to recover for the loss of this vessel.  Alfa denied coverage on the 
basis that the vessel sank in international waters, outside the coverage area.  
Thereafter, Borden filed suit in Florida state court against Alfa, Ocean, Barnhardt, 
and Southern Seas.  Borden later filed an amended complaint that dropped 
Southern Seas as a defendant.  Barnhardt filed a notice of removal of the case to 
                                                                                                                                        
representing Borden and obtaining insurance coverage for Borden’s fishing 
vessels.  
 
 
3.  It is a disputed question of fact as to whether the applicable insurance 
policy in this case is the insurance policy prepared and issued by Alfa or a cover 
note prepared and issued by Barnhardt. 
  
 
 
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federal court to which Alfa, Barnhardt’s codefendant, consented.4  The case was 
removed to federal court but, based on Borden’s unopposed motion, was remanded 
back to Florida state court. 
 
Upon remand and before the filing of an answer, Alfa filed a motion to 
quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction in response to the initial 
complaint, and a renewed motion to quash service of process for lack of personal 
jurisdiction in response to the amended complaint.  Alfa asserted by affidavit that 
Florida courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the insurer because Alfa did not 
have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida.  Alfa also asserted that section 
626.906(4) of the UIPL may be invoked only by Florida residents and is therefore 
unavailable to Borden as a resident of Honduras.  In their written responses to 
Alfa’s motion to quash, Borden, Barnhardt, and Ocean argued that service of 
process and personal jurisdiction were appropriate under section 626.906(4), 
relying on the Third District’s decision in Winterthur.  Barnhardt also asserted that 
Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over Alfa under Florida’s general long-
arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005).  Specifically, Barnhardt 
argued that personal jurisdiction was available under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida 
Statutes (2005), based on Alfa’s alleged contacts with Florida. 
                                          
 
 
4.  “[T]he law is well settled that in cases involving multiple defendants all 
defendants must consent to the removal of a case to federal court.”  Russell Corp. 
v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1049 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 
 
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At the hearing on Alfa’s motion to quash, the trial court ruled that Borden 
“ha[d] satisfied the requirements for in personam jurisdiction” and denied Alfa’s 
motion to quash.  Borden, 884 So. 2d at 234-35.  On appeal, the Second District 
reversed.  The Second District first addressed Barnhardt’s assertion that Florida 
courts had personal jurisdiction over Alfa under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (1)(b), 
Florida Statutes (2005), and determined that this argument “not only has no merit 
but also was not raised below and, therefore, is waived.”  Id. at 235 n.1.  The 
Second District next addressed whether service of process and personal jurisdiction 
were available under section 626.906(4).  The Second District concluded that 
section 626.906(4) applies only to claims brought against unauthorized foreign 
insurers by Florida residents.  The Second District certified conflict with 
Winterthur, which held that section 626.906(4) applies to both residents and 
nonresidents.5   
ANALYSIS 
 
The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether as a matter of law 
section 626.906(4) of the UIPL is available only to Florida residents.  This issue 
                                          
 
 
5.  In addition to the issue of whether section 626.906(4) applies only to 
claims brought against unauthorized foreign insurers by Florida residents, Alfa 
raised the following two issues:  whether Florida courts have specific jurisdiction 
over Alfa under section 626.906(4) and whether exercising jurisdiction would 
violate the constitutional principle of fair play and substantial justice.  The Second 
District did not reach these remaining issues because the court determined that its 
conclusion that section 626.906(4) did not apply rendered these issues moot.  See 
id. at 238.  
 
 
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involves a question of statutory interpretation and thus is subject to de novo 
review.  See B.Y. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 
2004).  We begin our analysis by discussing the concepts of service of process and 
personal jurisdiction.  We then explore the pertinent provisions in Florida’s UIPL.  
Next, we review the interpretations of section 626.906(4) by the Third District in 
Winterthur and the Second District in this case.  Finally, we discuss why, as a 
matter of law, section 626.906(4) is available only to Florida residents.  
 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Process 
 
Under Florida law, service of process and personal jurisdiction are two 
distinct but related concepts.  Both are necessary before a defendant, either an 
individual or business entity, may be compelled to answer a claim brought in a 
court of law.  Personal jurisdiction refers to whether the actions of an individual or 
business entity as set forth in the applicable statutes permit the court to exercise 
jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the individual or business entity in this 
state.  See generally § 48.193; White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990); 
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1989) (stating that in 
order to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction, “due process requires that the 
defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum”).  Service of process is 
the means of notifying a party of a legal claim and, when accomplished, enables 
the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant and proceed to judgment.  See 
 
 
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Shurman v. Atlantic Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 795 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. 2001) (“It is 
well settled that the fundamental purpose of service [of process] is ‘to give proper 
notice to the defendant in the case that he is answerable to the claim of plaintiff 
and, therefore, to vest jurisdiction in the court entertaining the controversy.’”) 
(quoting State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffernan, 195 So. 145, 147 (Fla. 1940)).  Personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state is circumscribed by constitutional 
considerations of minimum contacts as stated in the seminal case of International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny.6  As explained in 
Venetian Salami, two inquiries must be made regarding personal jurisdiction over 
a nonresident:  
First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient 
jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the statute; 
and if it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient “minimum 
contacts” are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements. 
                                          
 
 
6.  The United States Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on the 
due process limitations of personal jurisdiction were in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985), and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  In Rudzewicz, the Court noted that 
although “a forum legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident who ‘purposefully directs’ his activities toward forum residents,” it 
reaffirmed its holding in International Shoe that “the constitutional touchstone 
remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the 
forum State.”  471 U.S. at 473-74.  In Asahi, a plurality agreed that the substantial 
connection “between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of 
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.” 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion). 
 
 
 
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554 So. 2d at 502 (quoting Unger v. Publisher Entry Service, Inc., 513 So. 2d 674, 
675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)).  Under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.140(b)(2), 
(b)(4), and (b)(5), lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, and 
insufficiency of service of process are defenses that may be raised either in a 
responsive pleading or by motion.  
 
B.  Florida’s Unauthorized Insurers Process Law 
 
Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2005), generally addresses foreign insurers 
who are unauthorized to do business in Florida.  Sections 626.904 through 626.912 
are collectively referred to as the “Unauthorized Insurers Process Law.”  § 
626.904, Fla. Stat. (2005).  Section 626.905 is entitled “Purpose of Unauthorized 
Insurers Process Law” and provides: 
 
The purpose of the Unauthorized Insurers Process Law is to 
subject certain insurers and persons representing or aiding such 
insurers to the jurisdiction of courts of this state in suits by or on 
behalf of insureds or beneficiaries under insurance contracts.  The 
Legislature declares that it is a subject of concern that many residents 
of this state hold policies of insurance issued or delivered in the state 
by insurers while not authorized to do business in this state, thus 
presenting to such residents the often insuperable obstacle of resorting 
to distant forums for the purpose of asserting legal rights under such 
policies.  In furtherance of such state interest, the Legislature herein 
provides a method of substituted service of process upon unauthorized 
insurers and persons representing or aiding such insurers, and declares 
that in so doing it exercises its power to protect its residents and to 
define, for the purpose of this chapter, what constitutes doing business 
in this state . . . . 
 
 
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Section 626.906 specifies the acts which will subject unauthorized foreign insurers 
to the jurisdiction of Florida courts:  
 
Any of the following acts in this state, effected by mail or 
otherwise, by an unauthorized foreign insurer, alien insurer, or person 
representing or aiding such an insurer is equivalent to and shall 
constitute an appointment by such insurer or person representing or 
aiding such insurer of the Chief Financial Officer to be its true and 
lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all lawful process in any 
action, suit, or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of an insured or 
beneficiary, arising out of any such contract of insurance; and any 
such act shall be signification of the insurer’s or person’s agreement 
that such service of process is of the same legal force and validity as 
personal service of process in this state upon such insurer or person 
representing or aiding such insurer: 
 
(1)  The issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to 
residents of this state or to corporations authorized to do business 
therein; 
 
(2)  The solicitation of applications for such contracts; 
 
(3)  The collection of premiums, membership fees, assessments, 
or other considerations for such contracts; or 
 
(4)  Any other transaction of insurance.  
 
The Legislature has defined the term “transact” as it relates to insurance to include 
any of the following: 
 
(1)  Solicitation or inducement. 
 
(2)  Preliminary negotiations. 
 
(3)  Effectuation of a contract of insurance. 
 
(4)  Transaction of matters subsequent to effectuation of a 
contract of insurance and arising out of it. 
 
§ 624.10, Fla. Stat. (2005).   
 
Section 626.907, Florida Statutes (2005), is entitled “Service of process; 
judgment by default,” and specifies the procedure by which service of process is to 
 
 
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be made for unauthorized foreign insurers subject to personal jurisdiction under 
section 626.906.  Thus, collectively sections 626.906 and 626.907 allow a Florida 
court to effectuate service of process on and exercise personal jurisdiction over an 
unauthorized foreign insurer whenever the insurer engages in one of the acts 
enumerated in section 626.906.  In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit has referred to the UIPL as a “long-arm statute . . . specifically 
designed to subject out-of-state insurers who are unauthorized to do business in 
Florida to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts.”  Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield United of Wisconsin, 181 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 1999).  The court 
noted that “[t]he statute lists a number of acts which may subject an unauthorized 
insurer to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts by allowing substituted service of 
process.”  Id.; see also Bookman v. KAH Inc., 614 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1993) (noting that the UIPL was enacted to subject certain insurers not 
authorized to do business in this state to Florida jurisdiction, and that the insurer’s 
doing of an act enumerated in section 626.906 authorizes service of process on the 
Insurance Commissioner of Florida as the insurer’s authorized agent).  
 
C.  Interpretation of Section 626.906(4), Florida Statutes (2005) 
 
Among Florida’s district courts, only the Second District in this case and the 
Third District in Winterthur have specifically construed subsection (4) of section 
 
 
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626.906 to determine whether this subsection is available to nonresidents.7  In 
Winterthur, the insured, who was a resident of Peru, obtained a medical insurance 
policy in Florida from Winterthur International, Ltd. (Winterthur).  559 So. 2d at 
1214-15.  Winterthur was a Bermuda corporation that was not authorized to do 
business in Florida.  See id. at 1215.  The insured asserted that Florida courts had 
personal jurisdiction over Winterthur under section 626.906.  See id.  Winterthur 
argued, however, that section 626.906 is available only to an insured who is a 
Florida resident, and that Winterthur had not performed any acts that would bring 
it within the reach of the statute.  See id.  The Third District rejected the assertion 
                                          
 
7.  It is noteworthy that, although not specifically referring to subsection (4), 
all of the courts that have construed section 626.906 in its entirety have concluded 
that the statute is available only to insurance policies issued to Florida residents.  
See, e.g., Walter, 181 F.3d at 1204-05 (stating that section 626.906 is limited to 
insurance policies issued to Florida residents); Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling 
Men’s Ass’n, 206 F.2d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1953) (same); American Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Eising, 673 So. 2d 493, 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“Substitute service 
on Florida’s Insurance Commissioner is permitted under the Unauthorized Insurers 
Process Law where a foreign insurer has ‘by mail or otherwise’ issued and 
delivered a contract of insurance to a resident of Florida.”) (quoting section 
626.906, Fla. Stat. (1995)); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 654 So. 2d 656, 659 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (concluding that presence in Florida of insured resident of 
another state when policy was renewed was insufficient to support in personam 
jurisdiction over insurer pursuant to sections 48.193 and 626.906); Bookman, 614 
So. 2d at 1182 (concluding that section 626.906 “only applies to policies held by 
Florida residents”); Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) 
(agreeing with precedent stating that section 626.906 is available “only to policies 
of insurance issued or delivered . . . to Florida residents by an unauthorized foreign 
insurer”); Parliament Life Ins. Co. v. Eglin Nat’l Bank, 333 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1976) (stating that section 626.906 requires “the issuance or delivery of 
contracts of insurance to residents of this State”).   
  
 
 
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that as a matter of law section 626.906(4) is limited to Florida residents, and held 
that “subsection 626.906(4) is available to a nonresident insured.”  559 So. 2d at 
1215.  The Third District observed that unlike subsections (1) through (3) of 
section 626.906, subsection (4) does not contain either an express or implied 
residency limitation.  See id. at 1215. 
 
The Third District noted that subsection (4) uses the term “transaction of 
insurance” to describe acts which subject an unauthorized foreign insurer to service 
of process and personal jurisdiction under the UIPL.  See id.  The Third District 
observed that the term “transact” with respect to insurance is statutorily defined in 
section 624.10 to include certain enumerated acts, but stated that this definition “is 
not limited, expressly or by implication, to transactions involving Florida 
residents.”  Id.  The Third District concluded therefore that “no basis appears on 
which such a limitation should be implied” in section 626.906(4).  Id.   
 
On motion for rehearing, the Third District acknowledged that the protection 
of Florida residents is one of the objectives of the UIPL, but explained that this 
objective is not its sole purpose.  See id. at 1216-17.  Rather, the Third District 
determined that the UIPL has a broader statutory purpose in that it was enacted to 
subject unauthorized foreign insurers to the jurisdiction of Florida courts in suits 
brought by or on behalf of insureds or beneficiaries arising out of the insurer’s 
business transactions in this state.  See id. at 1217.  The Third District concluded 
 
 
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that applying section 626.906(4) to nonresidents is consistent with this broader 
purpose.  See id.  
 
Directly contrary to Winterthur, the Second District in this case held that 
“subsection (4) of section 626.906 is available only to Florida residents.”  Borden, 
884 So. 2d at 238.  The Second District reasoned that the Legislature “has 
expressly stated that section 626.906 (as a whole) was meant to protect Florida 
residents.”  Id. at 236.  In disagreeing with Winterthur’s interpretation of section 
626.906(4), the Second District explained that “[s]ubsections (1)-(3) place a 
residency limitation on the very activities that are encompassed within section 
624.10’s definition of ‘transact.’”  Id. at 238.  The Second District concluded that 
to “construe subsection (4) to include, without limitation, the same activities 
subject to the residency limitation of subsections (1)-(3) is to render subsections 
(1)-(3) meaningless.”  Id.  Further, the Second District noted that subsequent to 
Winterthur, the Third District in Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel, Ltd. v. Plastigone 
Technologies, Inc., 623 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), explicitly stated 
that section 626.906 “applies only to insurers that issue policies ‘held by Florida 
residents.” (quoting Bookman).  In Hassneh, the Third District failed to refer to or 
distinguish its previous decision in Winterthur. 
 
D.  Statutory Construction 
 
 
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Our task is to determine whether, based on the language of the statute, the 
Legislature intended to limit section 626.906(4) to Florida residents.  It is a 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that legislative intent is the 
“polestar” that guides this Court’s interpretation.  See State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 
105, 109 (Fla. 2002); Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 2002).  We 
endeavor to construe statutes to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.  See White, 
568 So. 2d at 889.  To discern legislative intent, we look “primarily” to the actual 
language used in the statute.  See Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561, 564 
(Fla. 2000).  Further, “[w]hen the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not 
look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of 
statutory construction to ascertain intent.”  Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 
2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005).  
 
Borden asserts that the ambiguity in this case occurs because subsection (4) 
of section 626.906 refers to “[a]ny other transaction of insurance.”  There is no 
question that subsections (1) through (3) of section 626.906 are available by their 
plain terms only to residents of the state.  Subsection (1) specifically refers to 
“[t]he issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this state” and 
subsections (2) and (3) refer to “such contracts.”  § 626.906(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. 
(2005) (emphasis supplied).  Because subsection (4) does not refer to “such 
contracts,” it is not clear whether subsection (4) is limited to Florida residents in 
 
 
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the same manner as subsections (1) through (3).  We therefore resort to principles 
of statutory construction.  Cf. Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So. 2d 1224, 
1230 (Fla. 2004) (stating that only when statutory language is ambiguous will the 
Court resort to rules of statutory construction to discern legislative intent).  To 
accept Borden’s interpretation would require us to read subsection (4) as a 
freestanding provision.  However, it is a well-settled principle of statutory 
construction that “all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a 
consistent whole.”  Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 
So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis omitted).   
 
To construe subsection (4) to cover all transactions of insurance without 
regard to whether these transactions involve Florida residents or nonresidents 
would render subsections (1) through (3) of section 626.906 meaningless.  It is also 
a basic rule of statutory construction that “the Legislature does not intend to enact 
useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a 
statute meaningless.”  State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002).  As 
recognized by the Second District, section 624.10 encompasses some of the same 
transactions enumerated in subsections (1) through (3).  For example, section 
624.10, which provides section 626.906(4) with its definition of “transaction of 
insurance,” includes within the definition of “transact” the solicitation or 
inducement of an insurance policy, the effectuation of an insurance policy, and the 
 
 
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transaction of matters subsequent to effectuation of the insurance policy and 
arising out of it.  Similarly, subsections (1) through (3) refer to the issuance or 
delivery of an insurance policy; the solicitation of applications for an insurance 
policy; and the collection of premiums, membership fees, assessments, or other 
considerations for an insurance policy.  § 626.906(1)-(3).  It would be unnecessary 
for the Legislature to impose a residency requirement when service of process and 
personal jurisdiction are asserted under subsections (1) through (3) based on a 
foreign insurer’s unauthorized acts if the insurer could be subject to service of 
process and personal jurisdiction under subsection (4) for engaging in these same 
acts even if the insured is not a Florida resident. 
Reading section 626.906 as a whole, we conclude that subsection (4) was 
intended to operate not as a freestanding provision but rather to address “[a]ny 
other transaction of insurance” not covered under subsections (1) through (3).  
Therefore, the “transaction of insurance” to which subsection (4) applies should be 
interpreted to complement the acts that encompass subsections (1) through (3).  
Because subsections (1) through (3) are clearly available only to Florida residents, 
subsection (4) should be interpreted as being available only to Florida residents as 
well.     
 
Further, the Legislature has clearly stated in section 626.905 that the 
“purpose” of the UIPL is to “protect” Florida residents because it is “a subject of 
 
 
- 17 -
concern that many residents of this state hold policies of insurance issued or 
delivered in the state by insurers while not authorized to do business in this state, 
thus presenting to such residents the often insuperable obstacle of resorting to 
distant forums for the purpose of asserting legal rights under such policies.”  Thus, 
with regard to claims arising out of insurance policies issued in Florida by 
unauthorized foreign insurers, section 626.905 reflects legislative intent that the 
UIPL serve as a mechanism to protect Florida residents by providing for the 
litigation of these claims in this state.  Construing section 626.906(4) as being 
available to nonresidents is not consistent with the Legislature’s stated intent in 
section 626.905 to protect Florida residents through the UIPL.  In addition, section 
626.909(1), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically explains that the UIPL was 
enacted to fulfill the “obligation and duty of the state to protect its residents.”  
(Emphasis supplied.)     
In accord with the stated intent of the Legislature and statutory construction 
principles, we conclude that as a matter of law section 626.906(4) is available only 
to Florida residents.  In this case, it is undisputed that Borden is not a Florida 
resident.  Thus, Alfa is not subject to service of process and personal jurisdiction 
under section 626.906(4) because that statute is not available to Borden.  Having 
concluded that section 626.906(4) is inapplicable in this case, we need not address 
the issue of whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Alfa violates 
 
 
- 18 -
constitutional due process requirements.  Our resolution of the certified conflict 
issue renders the constitutional issue moot.8   
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that section 626.906(4) is available as a matter of law only in 
lawsuits brought against unauthorized foreign insurers by Florida residents.  We 
approve the decision reached by the Second District in this case, and disapprove 
the Third District’s decision in Winterthur.    
 
It is so ordered.    
WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
8.  We also decline to address Barnhardt’s assertion that the Second District 
erred in determining that Barnhardt’s argument that Alfa is subject to personal 
jurisdiction under section 48.193 has been waived and, if not waived, has no merit.  
This issue is beyond the scope of the certified conflict.  See Kelly v. Community 
Hosp. of the Palm Beaches, 818 So. 2d 469, 470 n.1 (Fla. 2002) (declining to 
address issues that were beyond the scope of the basis for the Court’s conflict 
jurisdiction).  
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D03-5145 
 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
Nathan G. W. Pieper and David F. Pope of Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley and 
McCreadie, P.A., Tampa, Florida; John Bond Atkinson and Rebecca A. Brownell 
of Atkinson and Brownell, Miami, Florida; David W. Henry and Barbara R. Smith 
of Allen, Dyer, Doppelt, Milbrath and Gilchrist, Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Steven L. Brannock, Paul Parrish and Maegen E. Peek of Holland and Knight, 
LLP, Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Respondents