Case Title: Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Hernandez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12439

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12439 
 
OXFORD GLOBAL RESOURCES, LLC  vs.  JEREMY HERNANDEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 8, 2018. - September 7, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Employment, Agreement not to compete, Choice of forum 
clause.  Jurisdiction, Forum non conveniens.  Practice, 
Civil, Choice of forum, Attorney's fees, Costs. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 21, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
David G. Thomas for the plaintiff. 
 
Barry S. Scheer (Lisa M. Scalisi also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Philip J. Gordon & Benjamin Flam, for Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant was employed in California by 
the plaintiff company, which is headquartered in Massachusetts.  
2 
 
As a condition of employment, he signed a confidentiality, 
nonsolicitation, and noncompetition agreement (agreement) that 
declared that the agreement would be governed by the laws of 
Massachusetts and that all lawsuits arising from the agreement 
would be brought in a Massachusetts court.  After the employee 
left to work for a competitor in California, and allegedly 
violated the nonsolicitation and confidentiality provisions of 
the agreement in performing his new job, his prior employer 
filed suit against the employee in the Massachusetts Superior 
Court.  The issue on appeal is whether the judge abused his 
discretion by allowing the employee's motion to dismiss on the 
ground of forum non conveniens. 
 
We conclude that the Massachusetts choice of law provision 
in the agreement is not enforceable, where California 
substantive law would apply under our choice of law principles, 
and where the application of Massachusetts substantive law would 
violate the fundamental public policy of California favoring 
open competition and employee mobility.  We also conclude that 
the Massachusetts forum selection provision in the agreement 
does not bar the employee from moving to dismiss on the ground 
of forum non conveniens.  Finally, we conclude that the judge 
did not abuse his discretion in deciding, after consideration of 
the relevant private and public concerns, that in the interest 
of substantial justice this action should be dismissed on the 
3 
 
ground of forum non conveniens so that the case can be resolved 
in a California court.1 
 
Background.  The plaintiff, Oxford Global Resources, LLC 
(Oxford), is a recruiting and staffing company that places 
consultants who have specialized technical expertise with 
corporate and individual clients.  It presently has twenty-four 
offices throughout the United States and Europe, with three 
offices in Massachusetts, including its headquarters in Beverly, 
and four offices in California.2  Oxford's account managers 
supervise relationships with Oxford's clients and client 
managers, and assist Oxford's recruiters and recruiting managers 
in placing consultants with clients.  In its amended complaint, 
Oxford alleges that it devotes a substantial amount of time and 
resources in developing the "Oxford Database," a secure database 
of detailed client information, to which employees have access, 
with some restrictions. 
 
The defendant, Jeremy Hernandez, was offered an entry-level 
position as an account manager with Oxford in its Campbell, 
California, office in May, 2013, and commenced working for 
Oxford several months later.  Before beginning his employment, 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
 
2 Oxford's parent company, On Assignment, Inc., has a 
principal place of business in Calabasas, California. 
4 
 
Hernandez signed an offer letter in which he agreed to "sign and 
strictly abide by [Oxford's] Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation 
and Non-Competition Agreement"; he also signed that agreement. 
 
Under that agreement, as to confidentiality, Hernandez 
agreed, among other things, that he would never, "directly or 
indirectly, use or disclose to anyone . . . any of the 
Confidential Information revealed to or learned by [him], unless 
such use or disclosure [was] both consistent with the Company's 
obligations and for the sole purpose of carrying out [his] 
duties to the Company."  "Confidential Information" is a defined 
term in the agreement and includes a vast amount of company 
information, "whether or not meeting the legal definition of a 
trade secret."3  As to nonsolicitation, Hernandez agreed that, 
                                                          
 
 
3 Under the "Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Non-
Competition Agreement" (agreement) that Hernandez entered into 
with Oxford Global Resources, Inc. (Oxford), "Confidential 
Information includes any and all information . . . concerning:  
(a) the Company's business plans, strategic plans, forecasts, 
budgets, sales, projections and costs; (b) the Company's 
personnel and payroll records and employee lists; (c) candidates 
and Consultant/Contractors, including lists, resumes, 
preferences, transaction histories, rates and related 
information; (d) the Company's customers and prospective 
customers, including their identity, special needs, job orders, 
preferences, transaction histories, contacts, characteristics, 
agreements and prices; (e) marketing activities, plans, 
promotions, operations, and research and development; (f) 
business operations, internal structures and financial affairs; 
(g) systems and procedures; (h) pricing structure; (i) proposed 
services and products; (j) contracts with other parties; (k) 
Oracle customer identification numbers; (l) solutions to 
Company's customer's technical problems; and (m) Company 
customer history and technical information."  The agreement 
5 
 
for twelve months following the termination of his employment, 
he would not, among other things, solicit or seek to employ or 
retain the services of any person who was an employee or 
independent contractor of Oxford within the previous twelve 
months, or use his knowledge of Oxford's customers and 
prospective customers to solicit or provide services to those 
customers or persuade them to reduce their use of services from 
Oxford.4  As to noncompetition, the agreement only barred 
Hernandez from competing with Oxford during his employment with 
Oxford; it did not prohibit him from working for a competitor 
after the termination of his employment. 
                                                          
 
specifically provides that Oxford may allow the publication of 
"Confidential Information" on a social media site but doing so 
does not waive Oxford's "rights to assert control or ownership 
of the Confidential Information." 
 
 
4 The agreement provided that, during the term of employment 
and for a period of twelve months following termination, the 
employee was barred from "directly or indirectly" making use of 
Oxford's "trade secret information including, without 
limitation, the identity of [Oxford's] customers or prospective 
customers, . . . special needs, job orders, preferences, 
transaction histories, contacts, characteristics, agreements and 
prices" to either (1) "solicit or seek to provide services to 
any customer for or on behalf of any entity engaged in or 
seeking to be engaged in [Oxford's] [b]usiness," or to (2) 
"persuade, induce or attempt to persuade or induce any such 
entity to alter or reduce its use of services from [Oxford]."  
Largely similar restrictions applied to barring the employee 
from making use of Oxford's "trade secret information including, 
without limitation, the identity of [Oxford's] candidates or 
prospective candidates" -- that is, the current or prospective 
contractors whom Oxford placed with customers. 
6 
 
 
As to choice of law, the agreement provides that "this 
Agreement will be governed by the laws of Massachusetts, without 
giving effect to the conflict of laws provisions thereof."  As 
to forum selection, it provides: 
"All suits, proceedings and other actions relating to, 
arising out of or in connection with this Agreement will be 
submitted to the in personam jurisdiction of the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
. . . or to the courts of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, if the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to 
hear the matter or if Oxford so chooses.  Venue for all 
such suits, proceedings and other actions will be in 
Massachusetts.  Employee hereby waives any claims against 
or objections to such in personam jurisdiction and venue." 
 
 
In March, 2016, Hernandez voluntarily terminated his 
employment with Oxford and, the following month, commenced work 
as an account manager for MindSource, Inc. (MindSource) -- an 
Oxford competitor located in Mountain View, California.  In 
November, 2016, Oxford received an anonymous memorandum by mail 
alleging that Hernandez had "retained proprietary information 
including call lists, manager names etc. from when he worked at 
Oxford" and "used th[at] confidential information" at MindSource 
to solicit clients located in California.  The memorandum was 
accompanied by what appeared to be images of Oxford's "Manager 
Lead Sheets," which are confidential forms located in the Oxford 
Database that identify Oxford's client and client manager 
contacts and prospects, and an image of a message from Hernandez 
attempting to solicit a former client from Oxford.  Oxford 
7 
 
alleged that it then came to learn that Hernandez was 
communicating with a number of Oxford's current and prospective 
clients and consultants, and sending invitations to others to 
contact him through a social networking Web site. 
 
In its amended complaint, filed in January, 2017, Oxford 
alleged that Hernandez violated the agreement when he 
"misappropriated and disclosed Oxford's trade secrets and/or 
confidential information, solicited Oxford's customers and 
consultants, and improperly competed with Oxford on behalf of 
himself and [MindSource]."  The four counts of its amended 
complaint claim alleged (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) 
tortious interference with contractual or advantageous relations 
between Oxford and Oxford's clients; and (4) statutory and 
common-law misappropriation of Oxford's trade secrets. 
 
Hernandez moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the agreement's 
forum selection provision was "inoperative" and that the 
interest of substantial justice required that the case be tried 
in California.  Oxford opposed the motion, arguing that the 
parties had entered into an enforceable agreement that provided 
that the agreement would be governed by the laws of 
Massachusetts, and that any disputes arising from that agreement 
would be litigated in a Massachusetts court. 
8 
 
 
The judge allowed Hernandez's motion to dismiss on the 
ground of forum non conveniens and ordered the dismissal of all 
claims without prejudice.  The judge characterized the agreement 
as a contract of adhesion, finding that "Hernandez had neither 
the opportunity nor the bargaining power to negotiate over 
whether California or Massachusetts law would govern his non-
competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality agreements."  
Noting our general rule that contracts of adhesion "are 
enforceable unless they are unconscionable, offend public 
policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular 
circumstances," McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC, 466 Mass. 256, 266 
(2013), quoting Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 684 n.16 
(2007), the judge determined that the agreement's "choice-of-law 
provision is not enforceable because it would result in 
substantial injustice to Hernandez by depriving him of the 
freedom to compete against Oxford in California that is 
guaranteed under the California law, and it would do so based 
solely on a contract clause that Hernandez had no meaningful 
opportunity to negotiate when he was hired."  In the absence of 
an enforceable choice of law provision, the judge reasoned that 
"the Agreement is therefore governed by California law."  
Applying California substantive law, he held that, "where a 
forum selection clause is combined with a choice-of-law 
provision that would bar a claim or defense in violation of 
9 
 
California public policy, the forum selection provision is also 
'unenforceable as against public policy.'"  See Verdugo v. 
Alliantgroup, L.P., 237 Cal. App. 4th 141, 154-157 (2015).  In 
the absence of an enforceable forum selection provision, the 
judge weighed the relevant public and private interests and 
determined that both "strongly favor trial in California."  
Oxford appealed from the judge's ruling, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  "We review a court's 'interpretation of the 
meaning of a term in a contract,' a question of law, de novo."  
Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017), quoting 
EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 473 Mass. 540, 549 (2016).  But we 
review the allowance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of 
forum non conveniens for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Gianocostas v. Interface Group-Mass., Inc., 450 Mass. 715, 723 
(2008).  Oxford objects to the judge's characterization of the 
agreement as a contract of adhesion, contending that there was 
not an adequate evidentiary basis to make that finding.  We 
therefore begin our analysis by putting aside the judge's 
finding that the contract was one of adhesion, and will address 
it only if it becomes necessary to our resolution of this 
appeal. 
 
1.  Choice of law.  We consider the enforceability of the 
Massachusetts choice of law provision before turning to the 
10 
 
forum non conveniens analysis because the determination as to 
which State's substantive law shall govern the dispute has a 
bearing on the forum non conveniens analysis.  Under 
Massachusetts choice of law principles, if the agreement here 
were silent as to choice of law, the rights of the parties would 
be "determined by the local law of the state which, with respect 
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties."  Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon 
Co., 393 Mass. 622, 632 (1985), quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 188(1) (1971). 
 
In identifying the State with the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties, we evaluate:  
"(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of 
the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of 
the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties."  Bushkin Assocs., Inc., supra, quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, supra at § 188(2). 
 
Here, Hernandez interviewed for the position in California, 
signed the agreement in California, trained in California, and 
performed all of his job duties in California.  The subject 
matter of the contract -- Hernandez's employment with Oxford -- 
was located exclusively in California.  Moreover, Hernandez 
allegedly committed a breach of the agreement in California by, 
11 
 
among other things, soliciting clients located in California 
while employed at MindSource in California.  Although Oxford is 
headquartered in Massachusetts and incorporated in Delaware, the 
only office where Hernandez worked for Oxford is located in 
California, and the record does not reflect any instance where 
Hernandez conducted Oxford-related business in Massachusetts.  
Accordingly, in the absence of a choice of law provision, 
Massachusetts choice of law principles would apply California 
substantive law to this dispute because California undoubtedly 
has the most significant relationship to the agreement and the 
parties. 
 
The choice of law provision in the agreement, by declaring 
that "this Agreement will be governed by the laws of 
Massachusetts, without giving effect to the conflict of laws 
provisions thereof," expressly provides that Massachusetts 
substantive law will govern the agreement even if a 
Massachusetts choice of law analysis might lead to the 
application of the substantive law of another State (namely, 
California).5  Where, as here, "the parties have expressed a 
                                                          
 
 
5 Because the agreement's choice of law provision expressly 
excludes the application of Massachusetts conflict of laws 
principles, we need not determine whether a choice of law 
provision alone implicitly excludes the application of those 
principles.  Cf. IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., 
S.A., 20 N.Y.3d 310, 316 (2012) ("The Restatement [Second] of 
Conflict of Laws supports our conclusion that an express 
exclusion of New York's conflict-of-laws rules is unnecessary"). 
12 
 
specific intent as to the governing law, Massachusetts courts 
will uphold the parties' choice as long as the result is not 
contrary to public policy."  Hodas v. Morin, 442 Mass. 544, 549-
550 (2004), quoting Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 
253, 260 (1977).  See Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 385 Mass. 672, 674 
(1982) ("Massachusetts law has recognized, within reason, the 
right of the parties to a transaction to select the law 
governing their relationship"). 
 
In deciding whether the result of a choice of law agreement 
is contrary to public policy, we conduct the two-tiered analysis 
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
§ 187(2) (1971).  See Hodas, 442 Mass. at 550.  We will not 
honor the parties' choice of law where "'(a) the chosen state 
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the 
parties' choice, or (b) [where] application of the law of the 
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a 
state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen 
state [in the determination of the particular issue]' and is the 
State whose law would apply . . . 'in the absence of an 
effective choice of law by the parties.'"  Id., quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, supra. 
 
Applying that two-tiered analysis, the choice of law 
provision survives the first tier because, where Oxford is 
13 
 
headquartered here, Massachusetts has a "substantial 
relationship" to the transaction.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(a).  See also Taylor v. Eastern 
Connection Operating, Inc., 465 Mass. 191, 197 (2013).  But the 
choice of law provision does not survive the second tier of the 
analysis because the application of Massachusetts substantive 
law to this employment dispute would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of California, which has a materially greater 
interest in the dispute than Massachusetts, and which is the 
State whose law would apply if there had been no choice of law 
provision in the agreement. 
 
California has a "settled legislative policy in favor of 
open competition and employee mobility," Edwards v. Arthur 
Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 (2008), reflected in Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600, which provides, with statutory 
exceptions not applicable here, that "every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, 
trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."  As 
interpreted by California appellate courts, § 16600 renders void 
not only any covenant not to compete, but also any covenant 
barring an employee from soliciting the customers of a prior 
employer.  See Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 
4th 564, 575 (2009) (broadly worded nonsolicitation clause that 
prevents employees for period of eighteen months postemployment 
14 
 
from "soliciting any business from, selling to, or rendering any 
service directly or indirectly to any of the accounts, customers 
or clients with whom they had contact during their last [twelve] 
months of employment" is "void and unenforceable under [§] 
16600"); Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 
1238 (2009) ("[§] 16600 bars a court from specifically enforcing 
[by way of injunctive relief] a contractual clause purporting to 
ban a former employee from soliciting former customers to 
transfer their business away from the former employer to the 
employee's new business").6  Moreover, an employer's inclusion of 
noncompetition or nonsolicitation provisions in an agreement 
                                                          
 
 
6 In the past, California law has recognized a common-law 
exception to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 when the enforcement 
of a noncompetition covenant is necessary to protect an 
employer's trade secrets.  See, e.g., Muggill v. Reuben H. 
Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965) (§ 16600 
"invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an 
employee from working for a competitor after completion of his 
employment . . . unless [the provisions] are necessary to 
protect the employer's trade secrets").  But the continued 
viability of that common-law exception to § 16600 is in doubt.  
See Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 577 
(2009) ("we doubt the continued viability of the common law 
trade secret exception to covenants not to compete").  See also 
Aspect Software, Inc. v. Barnett, 787 F. Supp. 2d 118, 126 n.6 
(D. Mass. 2011), and cases cited ("More recently, some 
California courts have questioned the vitality of the Muggill 
line of cases defining the trade secrets exception to Section 
16000").  We need not decide whether this common-law exception 
to § 16600 continues to exist under California law because, even 
if it did, it would not apply here, where "the noncompete and 
nonsolicitation clauses in the agreements are not narrowly 
tailored or carefully limited to the protection of trade 
secrets, but are so broadly worded as to restrain competition."  
Dowell, supra. 
15 
 
with an employee is actionable as an "unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice," in violation of Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code § 17200.  See Dowell, supra.  See also Saunders v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 839 
(1994). 
 
Massachusetts presently has no comparable legislative 
policy favoring open competition and employee mobility, and no 
statute akin to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.  In 
Massachusetts, the common-law principles governing the 
enforceability of noncompetition agreements are less categorical 
than the absolute prohibition under California law.  A 
noncompetition agreement in Massachusetts "is enforceable only 
if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, 
reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the 
public interest."  Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 442 Mass. 
635, 639 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 922 (2005).  Any such 
noncompetition agreement must be reasonable under the 
circumstances and no broader than "necessary to protect [an 
employer's] legitimate business interest[s]," which include the 
protection of trade secrets, confidential information, and good 
will.  See id. at 639, 641.  See also All Stainless, Inc. v. 
Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 778 (1974).  Although these cases 
considered only noncompetition agreements, Superior Court judges 
have applied these same principles to employee nonsolicitation 
16 
 
agreements.  See Getman vs. USI Holdings Corp., Mass. Super. 
Ct., No. 05-3286-BLS2 (Suffolk County Sept. 1, 2005), quoting 
Marine Contrs. Co. v. Hurley, 365 Mass. 280, 287 (1974) ("a 
[nonsolicitation] provision, like an employee covenant not to 
compete, generally is enforceable only to the extent that it is 
'necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of the 
employer,'" and is also "[]reasonable in its time, space, [and] 
scope").  See also BNY Mellon, N.A. vs. Schauer, Mass. Super. 
Ct., No. 201001344BLS1 (Suffolk County May 14, 2010) (applying 
enforceability analysis of noncompetition provisions to 
determine enforceability of nonsolicitation provision). 
 
Oxford's amended complaint specifically alleged that 
Hernandez "breached the non-solicitation provisions of the 
Agreement by using Oxford's Confidential Information to solicit 
or seek to place Oxford's customers on behalf of himself and 
MindSource or persuade, induce, or attempt to persuade or induce 
Oxford's customers to refrain from providing services to Oxford 
or Oxford's customers."  If Massachusetts law were to govern the 
agreement, the enforceability of the nonsolicitation provision 
barring Hernandez from soliciting customers would be governed by 
different legal principles from those that would govern if 
California law were to govern the agreement.  And, if this 
nonsolicitation provision were deemed void, California law 
provides the employee with a statutory remedy that is not 
17 
 
available under Massachusetts law in the context of employment.  
See, e.g., Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 Mass. 8, 14 (1983) (because 
"[a]n employee and an employer are not engaged in trade or 
commerce with each other . . . disputes arising from an 
employment relationship between an employee and the organization 
that employs him . . . are not covered by the [G. L.] c. 93A 
remedies afforded in commercial transactions").  As a result, if 
Massachusetts law were to apply to the nonsolicitation 
provision, the fundamental public policy of California favoring 
open competition and employee mobility would not be honored with 
respect to an employment agreement in a case where California 
has a materially greater interest than Massachusetts because 
Hernandez executed, performed, and allegedly committed a breach 
of the agreement in California. 
 
In Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 181 (2012), we 
held that a New York court, applying New York's choice of law 
rules, "would certainly recognize that the interests of the 
Commonwealth are implicated and would apply Massachusetts law" 
to claims brought by an employee against his employer under the 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Just as we expected a New York court to 
honor the fundamental public policy of Massachusetts as 
reflected in the Wage Act in Melia, see id., here we honor the 
fundamental public policy of California as reflected in Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600, and apply California law -- despite 
18 
 
the parties' agreement to apply Massachusetts law.  Cf. Aspect 
Software, Inc. v. Barnett, 787 F. Supp. 2d 118, 126-127 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (Massachusetts choice of law provision in employment 
agreement was enforceable against California defendant because 
noncompetition clause was "tailored in such [a] way as to avoid 
implicating California's fundamental policy against broad non-
competition agreements").  Without such a commitment to honor 
the fundamental public policy of another State regarding open 
competition and employee mobility, an employer might 
successfully execute an "end-run" around that policy by 
including a choice of law provision in its employment 
agreements. 
 
In sum, the Massachusetts choice of law provision here bars 
a court from engaging in a choice of law analysis that, as a 
matter of public policy, should lead to the application of 
California substantive law.  Accordingly, to the extent that the 
choice of law provision here requires Massachusetts law to apply 
to the enforcement of the customer nonsolicitation provisions in 
the agreement, we declare the choice of law provision 
unenforceable.7  And because Oxford's other claims (including the 
                                                          
 
 
7 If the damages in this case had rested solely on the 
allegation that Hernandez misappropriated Oxford's trade 
secrets, we recognize that it would be a closer call whether to 
enforce the Massachusetts choice of law provision, because both 
Massachusetts and California have an interest in protecting 
companies from the misappropriation of trade secrets by 
19 
 
claim of breach of the agreement's confidentiality provisions) 
are interwoven with the claim of breach of the nonsolicitation 
provisions, we conclude that the substantive law of California 
must be applied to all claims in Oxford's amended complaint. 
 
2.  Motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.  The well-
established common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens provides 
that, "where in a broad sense the ends of justice strongly 
indicate that the controversy may be more suitably tried 
elsewhere, then jurisdiction should be declined and the parties 
relegated to relief to be sought in another forum."  
Gianocostas, 450 Mass. at 723, quoting Universal Adjustment 
Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 313 (1933).  The 
statutory formulation of forum non conveniens mirrors the 
common-law doctrine and provides that, "[w]hen the court finds 
that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be 
heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action 
in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just."  G. L. 
c. 223A, § 5.  A court evaluating a motion to dismiss on the 
ground of forum non conveniens will look to whether "there is an 
                                                          
 
departing employees.  But because the damages in this case rest 
mostly, if not entirely, on Hernandez's alleged solicitation of 
Oxford clients, the crux of the case is the enforceability of 
the nonsolicitation provisions in the agreement.  And, as 
discussed above, there is a significant disparity between how 
California and Massachusetts enforce nonsolicitation provisions 
in employment contracts. 
20 
 
alternative forum in which justice may be had, and if the 
balance of private and public concerns strongly favor the 
defendant's motion."  Gianocostas, supra.  "A decision whether 
to dismiss an action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
involves the discretion of the motion judge, cannot be made by 
applying a universal formula, and depends greatly on the 
specific facts of the proceeding before the court."  W.R. Grace 
& Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 407 Mass. 572, 577 (1990). 
 
Because the doctrine of "forum non conveniens is not a 
substantive right of the parties, but a procedural rule of the 
forum," American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 454 n.4 
(1994), a Massachusetts forum must apply its own procedural law 
when reviewing a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non 
conveniens, even if it would have applied the substantive law of 
California to adjudicate the merits of the case.  See generally 
Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de 
Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990), quoting Sibaja v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218-1219 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985) ("forum non conveniens 'is a rule of 
venue, not a rule of decision,'" and "[t]he doctrine derives 
from the court's inherent power . . . to control the 
administration of the litigation before it and to prevent its 
process from becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice and 
oppression"). 
21 
 
 
We recognize that Oxford brought this action in 
Massachusetts in accordance with the forum selection provision 
in the agreement, that Hernandez does not challenge either 
personal jurisdiction or venue, and that, "unless the balance is 
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of 
forum should rarely be disturbed."  W.R. Grace & Co., 407 Mass. 
at 578, quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Estes, 353 Mass. 90, 
95 (1967).  We note at the outset that the forum selection 
provision in the agreement does not preclude Hernandez from 
moving for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.  
Under that provision, Hernandez waived any objection to personal 
jurisdiction and venue if a suit under the agreement is brought 
in a Massachusetts court, but he makes no such objection here. 
 
Even if the forum selection provision had specifically 
included language waiving any objection to the choice of forum, 
we would not construe that contractual provision to deprive a 
defendant of his or her ability to move to dismiss on the ground 
of forum non conveniens.  See generally W.R. Grace & Co., 407 
Mass. at 580-581 (dismissal on ground of forum non conveniens 
not precluded by "service of suit" clause in excess coverage 
policy that, while not technically forum selection provision, 
compelled insurers to accept Massachusetts forum for disputes).  
Forum non conveniens considers both public concerns, such as 
"administrative burdens caused by litigation that has its 
22 
 
origins elsewhere and the desirability of the trial of a case in 
a forum that is at home with the governing law," and private 
concerns, such as the "practical problems that do or do not make 
a trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, such as the ease of 
access to proof, the availability of compulsory process, and the 
cost of attendance of witnesses."  Id. at 578.  See New 
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 353 Mass. at 95-96.  These are matters 
affecting the "interest of substantial justice," G. L. c. 223A, 
§ 5, that a court cannot ignore regardless of any prior 
agreement between the parties.  Moreover, when the parties enter 
into an agreement regarding the choice of forum, they cannot 
foresee the particular circumstances of future litigation and 
predict at that time whether the interest of substantial justice 
might require the litigation to be tried in a more convenient 
forum. 
 
A forum selection provision, however, has some bearing on 
the consideration by a judge of the private factors insofar as, 
by agreeing to a particular forum, the defendant waives any 
objection to the forum based on the inconvenience of the forum 
to him or her.  See W.R. Grace & Co., 407 Mass. at 580 ("service 
of suit clause bars an insurance company from relying on its own 
inconvenience to assert a claim of forum non conveniens").  But 
we do not believe that a defendant's agreement to a forum waives 
an objection to the forum based on any other private factor, 
23 
 
including the convenience of witnesses.  Witnesses to be called 
by a party are not "their witnesses" in the sense that they are 
invariably agents of the party or persons whose concerns about 
inconvenience can be waived by the party, especially where the 
party is unlikely to know who these witnesses will be and the 
extent of their inconvenience when the party agrees to a choice 
of forum.8 
 
In determining whether the judge abused his discretion in 
allowing Hernandez's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum 
non conveniens, we consider first whether "there is an 
                                                          
 
 
8 In so holding, we recognize that we depart from the 
guidance given to Federal District Courts by the United States 
Supreme Court where there is a valid forum selection provision 
and a defendant moves to dismiss or transfer venue pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which codifies the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens where the transferee forum is within the Federal 
court system.  In Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States 
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 64 (2013), the 
Supreme Court declared, "When parties agree to a forum-selection 
clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum 
as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their 
witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.  A court 
accordingly must deem the private-interest factors to weigh 
entirely in favor of the preselected forum."  We are not bound 
by the Supreme Court's guidance -- it interprets the Federal 
motion to transfer venue statute, and applies only to cases 
tried in Federal court.  In contrast, our analysis is concerned 
with the State's forum non conveniens statute and common-law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens and, accordingly, is a 
procedural doctrine that applies only to cases tried in a 
Massachusetts State court.  We add that, even if we were to 
apply the Federal guidance under Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., 
the result in this case would be the same, given the strength of 
the public concerns that support the allowance of Hernandez's 
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, as discussed infra. 
24 
 
alternative forum in which justice may be had."  Gianocostas, 
450 Mass. at 723.  Here, California is certainly an alternative 
forum where justice may be had.  Having decided that California 
substantive law applies to this case, a California court is at 
least as capable as a Massachusetts court to hear this matter 
and fairly decide it.  The only potential impediment to justice 
here is if one or more of Oxford's claims would be barred by the 
statute of limitations if the case were dismissed in 
Massachusetts and refiled in California.  However, Hernandez has 
represented that he is willing to waive any defense based on the 
statute of limitations to obviate this possible impediment to 
litigating in California. 
 
We consider next whether "the balance of private and public 
concerns strongly favor the defendant's motion."  Id.  The judge 
here found that "the relevant private interests weigh heavily in 
favor of litigating this case in California."  In support of 
this finding, he noted that "everything relevant to this case 
happened in California."  He found that "all relevant witnesses 
are located in California and cannot be compelled to testify in 
Massachusetts," that all relevant evidence is either located in 
California or available electronically, that "[i]t will be 
easier and more efficient for both Hernandez and Oxford to try 
this case in California," and, most significantly, that 
"Hernandez will be unable adequately to defend himself unless 
25 
 
the case is litigated in California."  The judge appeared to 
give little, if any, weight to the inconvenience to Hernandez 
himself in having this case tried in Massachusetts, which, 
assuming the forum selection provision was enforceable, is the 
only factor that was waived by Hernandez when he executed the 
agreement. 
 
With respect to the public concerns, the judge found that 
"California has a much stronger interest than Massachusetts in 
deciding whether Hernandez breached his contract or committed a 
tort in trying to convince some of Oxford's customers or 
consultants in California to use a competitor instead."  In 
support of this finding, he noted that Hernandez was a 
California resident and that the business operations that Oxford 
claimed were harmed are located in California and serve 
California customers.  In contrast, he noted that "Massachusetts 
has very little interest in the outcome of this lawsuit." 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
deciding, after fair consideration of the private and public 
concerns, that in the interest of substantial justice this 
action should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens 
so that the case can be resolved in a California court.  We add 
only that, because dismissal on the ground of forum non 
conveniens requires the availability of another suitable forum 
in California, the dismissal of Oxford's claims ought to be 
26 
 
conditioned on Hernandez affirmatively waiving any defenses 
available to him based on the applicable statute of limitations.  
See Gianocostas, 450 Mass. at 727. 
 
We note two other public concerns not mentioned by the 
judge that support dismissal on the ground of forum non 
conveniens.  First, the California Legislature recently enacted 
Cal. Lab. Code § 925, which prohibits employers from requiring 
employees who primarily reside and work in California, as a 
condition of employment, to agree to a provision in an 
employment agreement that would require the employee to 
adjudicate outside California a claim arising in California, or 
that would deprive the employee of the substantive protection of 
California law with respect to a controversy arising in 
California.  See Cal. Lab. Code § 925(a).  Any such provision in 
an employment contract is voidable by the employee.  See Cal. 
Lab. Code § 925(b).  Although this statute applies only to 
contracts entered into, modified, or extended on or after 
January 1, 2017, see Cal. Lab. Code § 925(f), and consequently 
does not affect the agreement here, the enactment of the statute 
reflects a California public policy to protect employees who 
reside and work in California from being induced by an employer 
to agree to litigate in a forum outside of California. 
 
Second, the agreement in this case includes a broad range 
of information within the definition of confidential information 
27 
 
that might not constitute a trade secret under California law.  
See Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d) (under California law, "'[t]rade 
secret' means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, 
that:  (1) [d]erives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to the public or to 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use; and (2) [i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy").  Although 
California law plainly recognizes that § 16600 typically bars 
nonsolicitation agreements as well as noncompetition agreements, 
it is unclear whether, and to what extent, § 16600 will be 
interpreted to prohibit or limit the scope of confidentiality 
provisions that bar the disclosure of information that does not 
constitute a trade secret, and whose enforcement might impinge 
on an employee's ability successfully to perform his or her work 
for a competitor of a former employer.  See Golden v. California 
Emergency Physicians Med. Group, 782 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 
2015) (there is "no reason to believe that [California] has 
drawn [§] 16600 simply to prohibit 'covenants not to compete' 
and not also other contractual restraints on professional 
practice").  While a Massachusetts court is capable of applying 
California substantive law to resolve disputed issues of 
California law, it is preferable for the evolution of California 
28 
 
law that such disputes be resolved by a California court, where 
appeals from such decisions can be resolved in a California 
appellate court.  See, e.g., Interface Partners Int'l Ltd. v. 
Hananel, 575 F.3d 97, 106-107 (1st Cir. 2009) ("Although the 
district court correctly acknowledged that federal courts, if 
necessary, are capable of interpreting Israeli law, here, the 
district court did not err in concluding that Israel is the 
preferable forum given Israel's stronger connection to the 
instant case"); Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 953 
(1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992) (case 
properly dismissed on forum non conveniens ground where 
"plaintiff's claims implicate duties the defendants owed to the 
corporation and its shareholders under Canadian law" and "at 
least some significant portion of the adjudication of [the 
defendant's] case will involve tasks most easily and 
appropriately handled by a Canadian court:  interpreting 
primarily Canadian law and applying it to matters principally of 
concern to Canada and Canadians"). 
 
3.  The appropriateness of appellate attorney's fees and 
costs.  Hernandez contends that he is entitled to appellate 
attorney's fees and costs on the grounds that "Oxford has based 
its appeal on inapplicable standards, outdated case law, 
nonexistent issues, and conclusions that the judge never 
reached."  "If [an] appellate court shall determine that an 
29 
 
appeal [in a civil case] is frivolous, it may award just damages 
and single or double costs to the appellee, and such interest on 
the amount of the judgment as may be allowed by law."  Mass. 
R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 376 Mass. 949 (1979).  See G. L. 
c. 211, § 10.  "An appeal is frivolous '[w]hen the law is well 
settled, [and] when there can be no reasonable expectation of a 
reversal . . . .'"  Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455 (1993), 
quoting Allen v. Batchelder, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 453, 458 (1984).  
"Unpersuasive arguments do not necessarily render an appeal 
frivolous" and determining "whether an appeal is frivolous is 
left to the sound discretion of the appellate court."  Marabello 
v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 400 (2012). 
 
Although we affirm the order of dismissal on the ground of 
forum non conveniens, we do not conclude that Oxford's appeal is 
frivolous.  Oxford focused much of its energy in this appeal on 
the judge's finding that the agreement was an adhesion contract, 
and that, in part for that reason, the choice of law and forum 
selection provisions in the agreement were not enforceable.  We 
did not need to reach the adhesion contract issues, because we 
affirmed the dismissal on a different ground.9  Where the 
                                                          
 
 
9 No inference should be drawn regarding our view of the 
merits of the judge's finding that the agreement was an adhesion 
contract, or regarding the consequences he gave to that finding, 
from our failure to address those issues.  We did not reach 
those issues because it was not necessary to do so in order to 
decide this appeal. 
30 
 
challenge to the judge's reasoning in reaching his decision was 
not frivolous, we conclude that Hernandez is not entitled to 
appellate attorney's fees and costs under Mass. R. A. P. 25. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the order of dismissal on the ground 
of forum non conveniens.  The case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion, 
which shall be conditioned on Hernandez affirmatively waiving 
any defenses available to him based on the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.