Case Title: SHAWN M. HAYZLETT V. TIMOTHY L. HAYZLETT

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0040

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHAWN M. HAYZLETT V. TIMOTHY L. HAYZLETT2007 WY 147167 P.3d 639Case Number: S-07-0040Decided: 09/18/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
SHAWN 
M. HAYZLETT,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.

TIMOTHY 
L. HAYZLETT,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Shawn M. Hayzlett Rice, pro 
se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Richard Allen Erb, Jr., Richard A. 
Erb, Jr., P.C., Gillette, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Appellant, Shawn Hayzlett (Mother), 
challenges the district court's order modifying custody.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion when it modified the divorce decree and 
awarded custody of the minor children to Father?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
At the 
outset, we note that the 
custody hearing relating to the order from which Mother now appeals was not 
reported.  The record was settled 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, though for reasons not explained by the parties, it 
was settled after they filed their appellate briefs.  The settled record summarizes the 
hearing testimony of the only three witnesses: Mr. Hayzlett (Father), Mother, 
and Bill Rice.1

 
 

[¶4]           
Mother 
and Father were married in 1994 in Gillette, Wyoming.  
During the marriage, Father adopted Mother's two children, a son RH, born 
in 1989, and a daughter SH, born in 1993.  
The marriage produced two more daughters, AH, born in 1995, and DH, born 
in 1997.  The parties divorced in 
November 2000.  In the divorce 
decree, the district court awarded primary custody of all four children to 
Mother, subject to Father's visitation rights.  At the time of the divorce, Father and 
Mother still lived in Gillette.  
Notwithstanding the decree's custody provisions, the parties agreed 
shortly after the divorce that RH would live with Father and he has resided with 
Father since that time.  

 
 

[¶5]           
Between 
2000 and 2005, Mother frequently left the daughters in her sister's care.  Approximately three years before the 
December 2006 hearing, her sister's son sexually abused one of the daughters at 
the sister's home.  Mother continued 
to leave the daughters in her sister's care, believing there was no longer any 
danger to them because her nephew no longer resided in the household.  There was, however, a second incident of 
sexual abuse at the sister's home.  
This time the sister's husband was the offender.  This incident occurred in February 2005, 
and the brother-in-law was prosecuted for his actions.  The 2005 abuse incident was the impetus 
for Mother's July 2005 move to New 
Mexico, which in turn, precipitated the current custody 
dispute.  The record shows that the 
two younger daughters moved to New 
Mexico with Mother, but SH did not move with them.  Instead, SH, who was 12 years old at the 
time, lived with Father through the summer and resumed school in Gillette in the 
fall.  

 
 

[¶6]           
In 
October 2005, Father filed a petition seeking formal custody of RH and SH.  He later amended the petition to include 
all four children.  At trial, which 
took place in December 2006, Mother offered no objection to Father's petition 
for custody of RH.  Mother did not 
deny that the two incidents of molestation occurred.  Mother described SH as a "normal and 
relatively mature child."  Mother 
conceded that SH had "expressed on a number of occasions her continuing desire 
to live with [Father]."  It was 
undisputed that SH was doing well in school in Gillette.  Both parents testified that the other 
parent had interfered with their relationships with the children.  For example, Father testified that 
Mother had discouraged both telephone and personal contact, and blocked Father's 
efforts to obtain his two younger daughters' school records.  Mother, in turn, testified that Father 
failed to cooperate when Mother tried to get the children back after Father's 
summer visitation.  Mr. Rice's 
testimony generally supported Father's position.  The district court determined that a 
material change in circumstances had occurred and also found that it was in the 
best interests of the children to award custody of the children to Father, 
subject to Mother's visitation rights.  
An Order Modifying Decree of Divorce was entered on January 23, 
2007.  Mother filed this timely 
appeal.

 
 

Standard of Review

 
 

[¶7]           
We 
review a trial court's custody decisions for abuse of discretion.  Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 
45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002).  We 
have said that "[j]udicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which 
are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment 
exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003).  If the 
record includes sufficient evidence to support the district court's exercise of 
discretion, we uphold its decision.  
In re KJD, 2002 WY 26, ¶ 21, 
41 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2002).

  

Discussion

 
 

[¶8]           
Mother 
insists that the district court's decision to award custody of the three 
daughters to Father was contrary to the evidence, though she does not take issue 
with RH's placement with Father.  In 
particular, she claims that the facts considered in light of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201 support an award of custody to her, not to Father.  In essence, she is asking us to reweigh 
the evidence considered by the trial court.  This Court, however, does not reweigh 
evidence.  Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 15, 125 P.3d 284, 289 (Wyo. 2005).  Instead, 
we view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.  Boyle v. Boyle, 2006 WY 124, ¶ 10, 143 P.3d 368, 
371 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

[¶9]           
Pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c), modification of child custody is a two-step 
process.  In re TLJ, 2006 WY 28, ¶ 8, 129 P.3d 874, 876 (Wyo. 2006).  The first 
step involves a showing of "a material change in circumstances since the entry 
of the order in question."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2007); TLJ, ¶ 8, 129 P.3d  at 876.  The second step requires the court to 
determine whether a modification will be in the best interests of the 
children.  Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-204(c).  The district court 
must consider the following non-exclusive list of factors, detailed in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2007):

 
 

(i)                 
The 
quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

(ii)               
The 
ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each 
period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as 
needed;

(iii)             
The 
relative competency and fitness of each parent;

(iv)             
Each 
parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a 
willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish 
care to the other parent at specified times;

(v)               
How the 
parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with each 
other;

(vi)             
How the 
parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such 
interaction and communication may be improved;

(vii)           
The 
ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care 
without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, 
including the right to privacy;

(viii)         
Geographic 
distance between the parents' residences;

(ix)             
The 
current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each 
child;

(x)               
Any 
other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

 
 

Additionally, 
the court must consider evidence of spousal or child abuse.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c).  Under the tenth factor, we have allowed 
district courts to consider a broad range of circumstances depending on the 
particular facts of each case.  
Among these, we have expressed a 
preference "toward preservation of sibling relationships."  Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, ¶ 26, 104 P.3d 756, 764 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶10]       
No single 
factor is determinative.  "Depending 
on the case, different factors will present a greater need for emphasis. . . . 
The one constant . . . is that the resolution must be in the best interests of 
the children in that particular family."  
Pahl v. Pahl, 2004 WY 40, ¶ 
10, 87 P.3d 1250, 1254 (Wyo. 2004).  
Furthermore, 
failure to explicitly comment on a statutory factor in the district court's 
opinion letter or order does not necessarily indicate that the court failed to 
consider that factor.  See Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, ¶ 
16, 104 P.3d 765, 770 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶11]       
Bringing 
these principles to bear on the current case, there is no serious question that 
circumstances had changed from the time of the original divorce decree, and 
Mother does not appear to dispute that there was a material change in 
circumstances.  At the time of the 
original decree, Mother was awarded custody of all four children.  RH moved in with Father shortly 
thereafter.  Two incidents of sexual molestation, 
involving the children, were committed by Mother's relatives while the children 
were in Mother's custody.  When Mother moved to New Mexico in 2005, SH 
remained in Gillette.  SH had 
resided with Father for over a year at the time of trial.  As a result of Mother's move to 
New Mexico, 
the two younger daughters were separated from SH.  These facts support the district court's 
determination that there was a material change in 
circumstances.

 

[¶12]       
The same 
facts that support a material change in circumstances are also factors 
supporting the district court's conclusions that the children's best interests 
are served by being in Father's custody.  
Additionally, the evidence indicated that Father is in a "very stable" 
marriage and lives in a four-bedroom home in a nice neighborhood in 
Gillette.  He has a good job and his 
workplace is only a few miles from home.  
The district court noted that SH had improved her school performance 
since moving in with Father and was well-integrated socially in the school.  The court also noted SH's clear 
preference toward being in her Father's custody and recognized that if SH were 
required to go to New Mexico with Mother, she would have to be socially 
integrated into a new school.  
Finally, the district court found that it would not be in the younger two 
children's best interests to be separated from the older two.  In doing so, it properly weighed our 
preference "toward preservation of sibling relationships."  Aragon, 
¶ 26, 104 P.3d  at 764.

  

[¶13]    
Of 
course, the record also contains evidence favorable to Mother.  For example, she testified to living in 
a comfortable home in rural New 
Mexico, where she has a job and family support from her 
mother and aunt.  Certainly 
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about which parent's custody 
would be in the best interests of the children, but that is true in most divorce 
cases.

  

Seldom 
if ever does a divorce court have a choice between a parent who is all good on 
one side and a parent who is all bad on the other side.  The matter of awarding custody is a 
comparative proposition wherein the court exercises its best judgment and 
discretion and awards custody to one parent or to the other, according to what 
the court thinks is for the best interest and welfare of the 
children.

 
 

Wilson v. 
Wilson, 473 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo. 1970).  Because the record includes sufficient 
evidence to support the district court's decision, we can find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's award of custody to 
Father.

 
 

[¶14]       
We next 
address Father's claim that we should impose sanctions on Mother because she did 
not cite the record in her brief, and her Notice of Appeal lacked the appendix 
required under W.R.A.P. 2.07(b).  
While we always require reasonable compliance with our procedural rules, 
"we afford pro se litigants some 
leniency from the stringent standards applied to formal pleadings drafted by 
attorneys."  Kinstler v. RTB South Greeley, Ltd., 
2007 WY 98, ¶ 12, 160 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Wyo. 2007).  In our discretion, we have reached the 
merits in cases as long as we were still able to conduct a meaningful 
review.  See id., ¶ 12, 160 P.3d at 1128-29; Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 13, 61 P.3d 1221, 
1224-25 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
deficiencies in Mother's brief and Notice of Appeal are not jurisdictional and 
do not preclude meaningful review.  
Furthermore, the late filing of the settled record does not appear to be 
the fault of either party.  However, 
as a result of the late filing, neither brief includes citations to the settled 
record.  Under the circumstances, we 
choose to exercise our discretion and decline Father's invitation to impose 
sanctions on Mother.

 
 

[¶15]       
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Rice and Mother began living 
together in July 2000.  They lived 
together for approximately two years and then married.  They separated in July 2005, and the 
record suggests that they divorced prior to the December 2006 custody 
hearing.