Case Title: Barrett v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 010686

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 
 
 
CALVIN LEE BARRETT 
       OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
v.  Record No. 010686 
November 2, 2001 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we review a trial court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to strike a prospective juror for cause.  The 
prospective juror's brother, a police officer, was a witness for 
the Commonwealth in a case involving two consolidated criminal 
charges. 
 
Calvin Lee Barrett, the defendant, was operating an 
automobile in the City of Charlottesville with an expired 
license tag and a broken left rear tail light lens when his 
vehicle was observed and stopped by Virginia State Trooper 
Joseph S. Fleming.  As soon as the defendant stopped his 
vehicle, he walked away from it, ignoring the trooper's order to 
stop.  The trooper was only able to stop the defendant by 
following him on foot and seizing his arm.  As the trooper was 
escorting the defendant to the police cruiser, the defendant 
broke away from the trooper.  In an escalating series of 
struggles, the trooper was unsuccessful in his attempt to seize 
and arrest the defendant who finally reentered his vehicle and 
sat in the driver's seat. 
 
The trooper reached in the driver's side window and seized 
the defendant with one hand.  While the trooper's arm was 
extended into the vehicle, the defendant backed his vehicle into 
the trooper's cruiser and then started driving forward.  Fearing 
that he would be killed or seriously injured if the defendant 
continued to drive forward, the trooper shot the defendant with 
his revolver, which he had drawn during the previous struggles. 
 
The defendant was charged with operating his vehicle after 
he had been declared an habitual offender, second offense, and 
an assault and battery upon Fleming, a police officer while in 
the performance of his duty.  During voir dire examination of 
prospective jurors, defense counsel questioned prospective juror 
James Wade concerning Wade's possible bias in weighing 
potentially conflicting testimony of the defendant and police 
officers. The defendant was particularly concerned with the 
expected testimony of the prospective juror's brother, Charles 
Wade, a police officer.  Relevant portions of the questions and 
answers follow: 
Question: [I]f your brother were to take the stand and 
testify for the Commonwealth, and if my client took the 
stand and testified, ... wouldn't it be natural for you to 
give your brother's testimony more weight than someone else 
you didn't know of that was accused of a crime?"  
 
Answer: I'm an impartial person. 
 
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. . . . 
 
Question: . . . My question to you is[,] recognizing that 
we all have feet of clay, and that we're human beings, 
wouldn't there be a tendency for you, no matter how hard 
you tried to be impartial, to give your brother, the police 
officer's testimony at least a little bit more credibility 
and believability than somebody like my client, Calvin 
Barrett, who you don't know and who's accused of serious 
crimes? 
 
Answer: Truthfully, yes. 
 
 
Responding to further questions variously posed by the 
court, the Commonwealth's Attorney, and defense counsel, 
prospective juror Wade testified: (1) that he would not hesitate 
to put aside his relationship with his brother and his 
acquaintance with other police officers in judging the 
credibility or believability of their testimony; (2) that he 
would not favor, or show partiality toward his brother's 
testimony over that of the defendant or defense witnesses; (3) 
that he did not think that he would have a tendency to believe 
his brother's testimony over that of somebody else he did not 
know or over the testimony of a non-police officer; and (4) that 
he would not show any partiality in favor of his brother's 
testimony. 
 
Because defendant's motion to strike James Wade for cause 
was denied, he exercised his preemptory right to strike Wade 
from the panel.  During the jury trial that followed, Charles 
Wade testified that when he arrived at the scene shortly after 
 
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the defendant was shot, he saw the trooper seated in a police 
vehicle and the defendant lying on the ground.  He also 
testified that he assisted in securing the crime scene. 
 
After the jury heard all the evidence, it found the 
defendant guilty of both charges and recommended confinement in 
the penitentiary for a period of five years on the habitual 
offender charge and three years on the charge of assaulting a 
police officer.  The court imposed the recommended sentences. 
 
In the defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals, he 
alleged that the trial court erred in failing to strike 
prospective juror Wade for cause.  A panel of the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an 
unpublished opinion.  Barrett v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1829-
99-2 (May 16, 2000).  Upon a hearing en banc, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, with four judges 
dissenting.  34 Va. App. 374, 542 S.E.2d 23 (2001).  The 
defendant appeals to this Court. 
 
As an appellate court, we must defer to a trial 
court's ruling on the issue of whether to retain or excuse 
a prospective juror for cause and that ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error 
amounting to an abuse of discretion.  Medici v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 223, 227, 532 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2000); 
Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va. 47, 50, 523 S.E.2d 502, 504 
 
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(2000); Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 
S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 
(2000). 
 
The defendant contends that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to strike prospective juror 
Wade for cause.  In support, the defendant notes the 
equivocations in Wade's responses on voir dire 
examination, his relationship to the prospective police 
officer witness, and the fact that State Trooper Fleming 
claimed he was justified in shooting the defendant.  The 
Commonwealth responds that a consideration of the juror's 
entire voir dire examination disclosed that he was not 
biased and supported the trial court's decision to retain 
him on the panel. 
 
Our consideration of prospective juror Wade's answers 
gives us no reason to question the honesty and sincerity 
of his determination to discharge his duties as a juror in 
an unbiased manner.  And we have said in the context of a 
criminal case that a juror's family relationship to a 
police-officer witness does not require dismissal per se 
of the juror if the trial court is satisfied that the 
juror can stand indifferent in the cause.  Lilly v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 569-70, 499 S.E.2d 522, 531 
(1998), rev'd on other grounds, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).  
 
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However, in the subsequent Medici and Cantrell cases, we 
recognized that in constituting the jury panel, "[p]ublic 
confidence in the integrity of the process" is also "at 
stake."  Medici, 260 Va. at 227, 532 S.E.2d at 30; 
Cantrell, 259 Va. at 51, 523 S.E.2d at 504. 
 
Thus, public confidence in the integrity of the 
process is one of the elements a trial court should 
consider when deciding whether a juror should be struck 
for cause.  In the recited circumstances of this case we 
think that a refusal to strike the prospective juror for 
cause makes it unlikely that the public would have 
confidence in the judicial process.  See Medici, 260 Va. 
at 227, 532 S.E.2d at 30-31; Cantrell, 259 Va. at 51, 523 
S.E.2d at 504. 
 
Hence, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to strike prospective juror Wade   
for cause.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of 
the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand the 
case to the Court of Appeals with direction that the case 
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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