Case Title: State v. Lambert

Citation: 175 Vt. 275, 2003 VT 28, 830 A.2d 9

Docket Number: 2001-390

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Lambert (2001-390); 175 Vt. 275; 830 A.2d 9

2003 VT 28

[Filed 28-Mar-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 28

                                No. 2001-390

  State of Vermont	                        Supreme Court

                                                On Appeal from
       v.	                                District Court of Vermont,
                                                Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Felicia Lambert	                        May Term, 2002

  Ben W. Joseph, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Bradley S. Stetler of Stetler, Allen & Kampmann, Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1), Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Felicia Lambert appeals from a
  judgment of conviction, based on a jury verdict, of domestic assault and
  cruelty to a child under the age of ten.  She contends the trial court
  erroneously: (1) denied her right to a fair and impartial jury by
  improperly dismissing one of the jurors after impanelment; (2) failed to
  instruct the jury on all of the elements of the crime of cruelty to a
  child; and (3) imposed a sentence with no minimum term.  We affirm the
  judgment of conviction, reverse the sentence for cruelty to a child, and
  remand for resentencing.
   
       ¶  2.  Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated domestic
  assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1043, and one count of cruelty to a
  child under ten years of age, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1304.  The
  charges stemmed from an incident involving her son.  Additional facts will
  be stated where pertinent to the claims on appeal.

       ¶  3.  Jury selection was held, and fourteen jurors were selected,
  two to serve as alternates.  On the first day of the trial, before the jury
  was sworn, one juror was excused at her own request and without objection
  because her daughter had been involved in a serious accident.  The State
  then requested that an additional juror be struck because of facts that had
  been brought to the prosecutor's attention following jury selection. 
  Specifically, a local reporter had told the prosecutor that this particular
  juror was an officer of a church that ran a day care center.  The reporter
  stated that the church's day care provider had recently been accused of
  pinching some of the children in her care, that the juror had attended the
  daycare provider's sentencing hearing on another charge of child abuse with
  respect to a foster child in her care, and that the juror had expressed
  surprise to the reporter that what the daycare provider had done was
  considered a crime.
   
       ¶  4.  The trial judge called the juror into the courtroom and
  questioned him about the allegations.  The juror acknowledged attending the
  sentencing hearing, but denied knowing the defendant in the case.  He
  explained that he had attended only out of curiosity because he had been
  called for jury duty in a child abuse case.  He acknowledged that he had
  talked with the reporter, but recalled that he had expressed surprise only
  that the media was interested in the case.  When asked whether he
  understood that child abuse is a crime, he responded, "Oh, absolutely." 
  When asked whether he "support[ed]" child abuse being a crime, the juror
  appeared to construe the question as pertaining to a particular case,
  responding that his opinion would depend on the evidence.  When asked
  whether he supported the sentencing in the case that he had observed, he
  responded that he could not answer because he knew nothing about the case. 
  Defense counsel declined the court's offer to question the juror, but
  opposed the State's request that he be excused.

       ¶  5.  The court dismissed the juror, explaining that the decision
  was based on a concern the juror had "formed some opinions" and had not
  previously disclosed his attendance at the sentencing hearing, which would
  have would have afforded the State the opportunity to seek dismissal for
  cause, or to exercise a peremptory challenge.  No additional jurors were
  selected so the trial proceeded through to verdict with the twelve
  remaining jurors.

       ¶  6.  At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury
  on the charged crimes, including instructions on accomplice liability,
  attempt, and any lesser included offenses.  The court also provided the
  jury with a written copy of the instructions for reference during
  deliberations.  Defendant made no objection following the instructions. 
  The jury found defendant guilty of domestic assault and cruelty to a child. 
  Following a contested sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to
  serve twenty-four months on the charge of cruelty to a child, and one to
  twelve months on the charge of domestic assault, to be served
  consecutively.  This appeal followed.

       ¶  7.  Defendant first contends the trial court committed reversible
  error by allowing the State to challenge a juror after the jury had been
  impaneled and granting the challenge on inadequate grounds, thereby
  depriving her of the right to a fair and impartial jury by the particular
  tribunal she had selected.  See State v. Villeneuve, 155 Vt. 360, 363, 584 A.2d 1123, 1125 (1990) (recognizing defendant's "valued right to have his
  trial completed by a particular tribunal" once jeopardy attaches) (internal
  quotation marks and citations omitted).  The State responds that dismissal
  of the juror was in, effect, a peremptory challenge by the State, which it
  argues may be exercised at any time prior to the jury being sworn.
   
       ¶  8.  We need not reach the merits of defendant's argument.  We
  will not reverse a criminal conviction for an error we find to be harmless. 
  See V.R.Cr.P. 52(a); State v. Kinney, 171 Vt. 239, 244,