Case Title: JAMES MUNDEN, AKA JIM MUNDEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAMES MUNDEN, AKA JIM MUNDEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 52698 P.2d 621Case Number: 84-156Decided: 04/22/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES MUNDEN, AKA JIM MUNDEN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),
v. 
THE STATE OFWYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, WestonCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, Public Defender; Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel; and Denise Nau, 
Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen.; Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen.; John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen.; and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was tried 
before a jury and found guilty of two counts of indecent liberties with a minor, 
in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977, and found not guilty of first-degree 
sexual assault, § 6-4-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977. He was sentenced to six to ten years 
on one count and eight to ten years on the other, with these sentences to run 
consecutively. From this conviction and sentence Mr. Munden appeals, stating the 
issues as follows:

1. Whether appellant was 
denied effective assistance of counsel;

2. Whether it was plain 
error to not let the jury retire for the evening;

3. Whether the 
prejudicial effect of the introduction of nude photographs, together with other 
items in the suitcase, outweighed the probative value of such evidence; 

4. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in the imposition of appellant's sentence; 
and

5. Whether the district 
court erred in failing to credit appellant's sentence with time served in 
presentence detention.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

I

[¶3.]     Appellant bases his 
contention of ineffective assistance of counsel on the failure of his 
court-appointed public defender to do the following: give an opening statement, 
develop a theory of the case, object to juror fatigue, and move for a new 
trial.

[¶4.]     We have held that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to "effective" assistance of counsel. Spilman v. State, Wyo., 633 P.2d 183 (1981); Hoskovek v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 1366 
(1981). The standard by which we determine whether the assistance is effective 
is one of reasonableness: If the assistance rendered by counsel is that which 
would reasonably be rendered by a reasonably competent attorney under the 
circumstances of the case, then it is effective; if it is not, it is 
ineffective. Spilman v. State, supra; 
Hoskovek v. State, supra. We apply a 
presumption that counsel is effective, and thus place the burden on appellant to 
establish the ineffectiveness of his counsel. Spilman v. State, 
supra.

[¶5.]     This scheme for 
determining effective assistance of counsel has recently been approved by the 
United States Supreme Court. In Strickland v. Washington, ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), that Court said:

"* * * The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."

The Court went 
on to say that considerable deference must be given to counsel's performance, 
with every effort being made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. 
"[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance." 
Id. 104 S. Ct. 
at 2066.

[¶6.]     Going even beyond the 
presumption of reasonableness, the Court held that error by counsel will not 
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if such error had no 
effect on the judgment.

"* * * The defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. * 
* *" Id. 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.

The Court also 
went on to place the burden on the defendant to show a reasonable likelihood 
that the decision reached would have been different without the 
errors.

[¶7.]     Appellant has not met 
his burden of proving either that his attorney was ineffective or that the 
alleged deficiencies in his attorney's performance prejudiced his defense. 
Appellant finds fault with the failure of his counsel to present an opening 
statement, and asks this court to accept the proposition that such failure 
violates "prevailing professional norms." We agree that an opening statement may 
be a very useful device. However, we cannot agree that it must be given in every 
instance. One reason a defense attorney might choose not to give an opening 
statement is because to do so would commit the defense to a certain course which 
might prove disastrous as the case develops. In fact, it does not appear that 
opening statements are nearly as important as appellant would have us believe, 
as in Connecticut the trial court decides in its 
discretion whether a defendant may give an opening statement at all. 
United 
States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 
1983). That court also said:

"It is common knowledge 
that defense counsel quite often waive openings as a simple matter of trial 
strategy. Tahl v. O'Connor, 336 F. Supp. 576, 582 (S.D.Cal. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042, 
93 S. Ct. 536, 34 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1972); People v. Travis, 10 Ill. App.3d 714, 717-18, 
295 N.E.2d 325, 327-28 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 928, 94 S. Ct. 1438, 39 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1974). Such a waiver has been held to be `trivial', United States ex rel. Crispin v. Mancusi, 
448 F.2d 233, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967, 92 S. Ct. 346, 30 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1971); United States v. 
Robinson, 502 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1974), a `tactical decision', United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 
213-14 (D.C. 1979) (en banc), a `matter of professional judgment', Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 703 (5th 
Cir. 1965), `particularly within the realm of trial strategy', Commonwealth v. Tarver, 253 Pa. Super. 
185, 190, 384 A.2d 1292, 1295 (1978), and ordinarily will not form the basis for 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Finer, Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 58 Cornell L.Rev. 1077, 1093-94 (1973). * * *" Id. 701 F.2d  at 
20-21.

[¶8.]     In the case at bar, the 
victims' mother testified that they had known appellant for several years, and 
that the children had visited appellant at his residence for several days prior 
to Christmas of 1982. Susan, who was twelve years old at the time of trial and 
ten years old at the time of the incident, testified that while at appellant's 
home, with her seven-year-old brother (eight years old at the time of trial), 
appellant gave her beer to drink, then took her into the bedroom and took his 
clothes, and then her clothes, off. She said that he then forced her to pose on 
the bed while he took pictures of her, and that he then brought her brother into 
the room, removed his clothes, posed him on the bed with Susan, and took more 
pictures. She also said that her brother left the bedroom, and appellant tied 
her to the bed, fondled her, and forced his penis into her mouth. Five Polaroid 
pictures were introduced into evidence. Four of these pictures were of Susan, 
naked and posed on a bed, and one was of Susan and her brother posed naked on 
the bed. The pictures had been found in a suitcase by the side of a country 
road. The suitcase also contained several other items which appellant admitted 
were his.

[¶9.]     Appellant's defense at 
trial was that he had not taken these particular five photographs, even though 
other photographs that he admitted were his were in the suitcase. Appellant also 
testified that he did not know how his belongings had gotten into the suitcase, 
which he disclaimed, and he did not know how the suitcase came to be by the side 
of the road. The decision by appellant's counsel to not emphasize these 
inconsistencies in an opening statement can easily be viewed as a legitimate 
trial strategy.

[¶10.]  Appellant complains that his counsel was 
ineffective by not formulating a theory of the case and presenting it to the 
jury. This also does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
If there is no defense to present, counsel cannot be condemned for not 
presenting more than he or she has. Appellant testified that he did not take the 
objectionable pictures and that he did not know how his belongings came to be 
found in the suitcase with the pictures. His counsel, in closing argument, 
repeated these things, reviewed the evidence, and reminded the jury that the 
State carried the burden of proving the offenses charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Counsel also told the jury that the case boiled down to whom the jury 
believed, Mr. Munden or the victims. What else could he 
do?

[¶11.]  Appellant's brief indicates that his 
trial counsel should have identified the setting of the photographs, should have 
explained why the suitcase and its contents were left by the side of the road, 
and should have come up with an explanation for all the questions left 
unanswered by the case. We do not agree. First, if in fact the defendant was 
telling the truth at trial, and he was innocent, how could he possibly know how 
those lewd photographs ended up on the road in a suitcase with many of his 
belongings? And, thus, how could his counsel explain these questions to the 
jury? Secondly, if the defendant was lying at trial, as the jury found, then his 
counsel could not just fabricate a completely untrue scenario to explain the 
facts presented at trial. It certainly is not the duty of defense counsel to 
make up a defense where none exists. Counsel denied his client's guilt, and the 
jury found otherwise. "[T]he Constitution * * * commands a battle, but not a 
victory." Odom v. United 
States, 377 F.2d 853, 859, 22 A.L.R.3d 705 
(5th Cir. 1967).

[¶12.]  Appellant contends lastly that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to juror fatigue, and failing to 
file a motion for a new trial on the basis that juror fatigue had affected the 
deliberation. This contention rests on the fact that the jury began its 
deliberation at 4:20 p.m. after a full day of trial, and continued until past 
midnight. At 11:00 p.m., the jury sent a note to the judge. The note 
stated:

[¶13.]  "We have reached a unanimous verdict on 
one count, but remain unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the other two 
counts.

[¶14.]  "Does the court wish us to continue 
deliberation?"

The court 
responded, "Yes! Please continue."

[¶15.]  Inasmuch as this court does not find 
error in the trial court's actions with regard to the length of the jury's 
deliberation, as more fully explained infra, we cannot hold that it was 
ineffective assistance for appellant's counsel to fail to object to juror 
fatigue. We also cannot then say that appellant's counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a new trial on this basis. We hold that appellant received 
effective assistance of counsel in every respect.

II

[¶16.]  It was not plain error not to let the 
jury retire for the evening. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial 
rights may be noticed even though not brought to the attention of the court. 
Rule 49(b), W.R.Cr.P.; Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P. As the question of juror fatigue was 
not brought to the attention of the trial court, appellant must meet the 
requirements of the plain error rule in order to seek review in this court. Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981). We apply the plain error rule cautiously and only in exceptional 
circumstances. Scheikofsky v. State, 
supra.

[¶17.]  This court has developed a three-part 
test to determine when an error qualifies as plain error. First, the record must 
clearly show the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party invoking 
the plain error rule must show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated. Finally, that party must show that a substantial right was denied him 
or her and that he or she has thereby been materially prejudiced. Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161 
(1981).

[¶18.]  In an attempt to meet the first 
requirement, appellant points out that this court cited with approval the 1968 
Approved Draft of the American Bar Association of Standards Relating to Trial by 
Jury. Hoskins v. State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342, 346, 
reh. denied 553 P.2d 1390 (1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1977). Specifically, appellant draws our attention to § 5.4(b) 
which reads in part, "The court shall not require or threaten to require the 
jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable 
intervals." Appellant then asks this court to assume that because the jury 
deliberated nearly eight hours after a full day of trial, it must have been 
fatigued. We will not make this assumption. We find nothing in the record that 
indicates that the jury was fatigued. In fact, it seems evident, from the note 
that was sent from the jury to the judge, that the jury was quite aware of how 
to communicate with the judge. Had the jury been fatigued, it easily could have 
sent another note to the judge stating that it needed to break for the evening. 
It did not do so.

[¶19.]  Appellant also has not shown that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law has been violated. The general rule is that "the 
length of time a jury may be kept together for deliberation is a matter for the 
sound discretion of the trial judge." United 
States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 696 
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1076, 98 S. Ct. 1266, 55 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1978); Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311, 313 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 374 U.S. 847, 83 S. Ct. 1907, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1963); Martinez v. 
State, Okla. Cr., 569 P.2d 497, 502 (1977). However, the jury cannot be 
forced to agree upon a verdict. United 
States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 
supra.

[¶20.]  Appellant has failed to show that the 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to deliberate until 
around midnight.

III

[¶21.]  Appellant next argues that the 
prejudicial effect of the introduction of the five photographs outweighed the 
probative effect of that evidence.

[¶22.]  Rule 403 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
provides:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."

[¶23.]  Appellant claims that he was never 
adequately connected to the suitcase or its contents and there was no evidence 
to show that appellant was the only person who could have left the suitcase 
where it was found. As we have said before, a trial court's discretionary ruling 
on evidence will not be overturned except for a clear abuse. Towner v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 45, 49 (1984); Buhrle v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374 
(1981). We will not overturn a trial court's determination without a showing 
that there existed no legitimate basis for that determination. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 139 
(1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). 
Reversal is required only if the photographs had little or no probative value 
and were extremely inflammatory or introduced merely to inflame the jury. Hopkinson v. State, supra; Key v. State, Wyo., 616 P.2d 774, 776 
(1980). In this case, the photographs were probative in that they corroborated 
the victim's testimony that she had been undressed and posed on a bed, and 
pictures were taken of her and her brother. They were also linked to appellant 
in several ways. The victim testified that appellant posed her and her brother 
and he took the pictures. The pictures were found in a suitcase which also 
contained numerous items appellant admitted were his, such as bank account 
materials and a letter from the IRS, all bearing the name James Munden, a bottle 
of prescription pills that were given to appellant by his ex-wife, and several 
other pictures of a nonobjectionable nature.

[¶24.]  With this evidence in mind, and 
acknowledging that the five photographs were not pleasant, we find that the 
trial court correctly admitted the photographs into evidence, as their 
prejudicial effect was outweighed by their probative 
value.

IV

[¶25.]  Appellant's next two issues, abuse of 
discretion in sentencing and credit for presentence detention, can be dealt with 
together. Appellant was sentenced to consecutive sentences of six to ten years 
and eight to ten years. He argues that this is an abuse of discretion in light 
of the fact that he has no history of similar offenses and no record of trouble 
with the law from 1957 to the time of the present conviction. The indecent 
liberties statute provides for a penitentiary sentence of "not more than ten 
(10) years." Section 14-3-105, W.S. 1977.

[¶26.]  This court will not reverse a sentence 
which is within the statutory limits absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ventling v. State, Wyo., 676 P.2d 573 
(1984). The trial court set out fully the reasons for the sentence given. After 
making note of the fact that appellant still professed his innocence despite 
being found guilty by a jury of twelve, that the victims were not only young but 
also of limited mentality, and that the mother of the victims was also 
"functioning subnormal," the trial court stated:

"The sentence that I'm 
going to impose, Mr. Munden, is simply for incapacitation and isolation. My 
concern is the protection of society, protection of children from any further 
abuse at your hands. It does not appear to me that you - that rehabilitation, 
which, of course, is the Court's primary concern, is a very practical 
possibility in this case. You deny having committed any offense; the state 
hospital cannot help someone who - who denies having done anything wrong. They 
indicate that you were not treatable, so there is nothing, really, that we can 
do to help you and to ensure on the outside that this is not going to happen 
again.

"So, it seems to me that 
the only thing that I can do is put you in a place where I can protect the other 
children in the world from the same thing happening to 
them.

"I've considered 
probation, but I've rejected it for the reasons that I just 
stated."

[¶27.]  We do not find an abuse of discretion 
here.

[¶28.]  As to the credit for presentence 
detention, we have recently set out the applicable test. In Hedge v. State, Wyo., 696 P.2d 51 
(1985), we stated that it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or 
deny credit for time served in presentence detention if (1) the detention is not 
due to the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in 
presentence detention plus the sentence given upon conviction does not exceed 
the maximum allowable sentence. See Jones 
v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 
(1979).

[¶29.]  The State acknowledges that appellant was 
indigent and his presentence confinement was due to his indigency, and then 
wisely concedes that appellant must be given credit against his maximum 
sentences for his presentence detention. The record reflects appellant was 
arrested on January 17, 1984, and his judgment and sentence was filed on June 7, 
1984. Accordingly, he should receive credit of 142 days against his maximum 
sentence.

[¶30.]  With regard to such credit being given 
against appellant's minimum terms, we again decline to accept the proposition 
espoused by the public defender's office and hold that, "[t]here is no 
fundamental right to credit for presentence custody beyond that which will 
result in more jail time than that authorized by law." Hedge v. State, supra, 696 P.2d  at 
53.

[¶31.]  Affirmed with the mandate allowing credit 
of 142 days against appellant's maximum sentence.