Case Title: Winegardner v. Burns

Citation: 361 So. 2d 1054

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1978-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
361 So. 2d 1054 (1978)
Roy E. WINEGARDNER and Catherine B. Hickman
v.
The William J. BURNS, International Detective Agency, Inc., a New York Corporation.
SC 2794.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 1, 1978.
*1055 Currun C. Humphrey of Humphrey & Smith, Huntsville, for appellants.
James B. Schrimsher of Morring & Schrimsher, Huntsville, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
Winegardner and Hickman, appellants, sued The William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., (Agency) for breach of contract seeking recovery for damages suffered as the mortgagees in possession of the Townhouse Motel in Huntsville. After a trial without a jury the circuit court entered judgment for the Agency. The issue is whether the court erred in its refusal to allow the appellants to introduce evidence of a subsequent oral modification of the written contract between the parties. We hold it did and reverse.
In August, 1969, the Townhouse Motel closed and the appellants entered into a written contract dated August 6, 1969, with the Agency in which the Agency agreed to provide security for the premises. The contract provides that it is operative on a month-to-month basis. A portion of the contract is as follows:
Protection signs will be furnished for outside use.
In October, 1969 the appellants activated the heating unit. The heating system pumped hot water through pipes located throughout the motel. In January, 1970 the heating system failed. The water pipes burst during freezing weather causing extensive water damage.
The written contract was supplemented or modified by an alleged oral agreement reached in October, 1969, which provided that the Agency would check on a regular basis the boiler pressure, boiler temperature, *1056 and pump to assure that the heating system was functioning properly. Appellants sought to prove the oral agreement by offering evidence of a conversation between Eddie T. Kidwell, an engineer and agent of appellants, and Jimmy Lee Hancock, supervisor of the Agency. The trial court refused to allow this evidence and held that the Agency was under no contractual duty to check the motel heating system.
The Agency argues that Hancock had no authority to contract and consequently could not bind the Agency. W. W. Casey, who was Hancock's immediate supervisor with the Agency, testified that he had authority to contract but Hancock did not. We quote from portion of the record of Casey's testimony:
Q Well, right now, though, in your best judgment, did Mr. Hancock supervise the preparation?
A The way Hancock did business, sent it out without having me sign it.
A That's his way of doing business, that's the reason he was relieved."
It appears from the record that if Casey didn't approve the contract then it must have been approved by Hancock. The record is clear that Hancock was the only person with whom appellants dealt. The contract was not signed by anyone from the Agency. The Agency admits the contract was binding, consequently it appears Hancock was the only person who could have bound the Agency. If in fact Hancock did not have actual authority to contract for the Agency, then clearly under these circumstances he had apparent authority.
The Agency contends there was no consideration for the oral agreement and the trial court should be affirmed. Appellants claim only mutual assent is required to support the modification.
A written contract may, in the absence of statutory provisions requiring a writing, be modified by a subsequent oral agreement. Commercial Credit Co. v. Perkins, 236 Ala. 616, 184 So. 178 (1938); Moore v. Williamson, 213 Ala. 274, 104 So. 645 (1925).
Whether the modification of a contract must be supported by a new consideration other than mutual assent has been, in times past, the object of exhaustive judicial opinions in Shriner v. Craft, 166 Ala. 146, 51 So. 884 (1910), and Moore v. Williamson, supra. While we do not intend to undertake another lengthy review of the principles and authorities involved, we are of the opinion that the rule applicable to this case is that an executory agreement may be modified by the parties without any new considerations other than mutual assent. Watson v. McGee, 348 So. 2d 461 (Ala., 1977); Allied Mills, Inc. v. St. John, 275 Ala. 69, 152 So. 2d 133 (1969); Moore v. Williamson, supra. The written contract, operative on a month to month basis was, at least to future months, executory and thus subject to oral modification upon mutual consent of the parties.
We are particularly impressed with the rule stated in Moore v. Williamson, supra:
Designations [4], [5] and [7] in the above quoted rule are applicable to the facts in this case. In regard to designations [4] and [5] the written contract provided that the patrolmen will check for "such other irregularities as may come to their attention." It could be argued that this oral agreement was a change in an unimportant detail without impairing the main obligation in the written contract, and also that it tended to explain a possible ambiguous provision. In either instance the original consideration would be sufficient. Designation [7] is based on the doctrine of estoppel. Hancock agreed to check the heating system and posted instructions to that effect in the room where the system was located. This could have lead Kidwell to rely on Hancock's agreement to check the system. If Hancock had refused to check the system it is not unreasonable to assume that the appellants would have considered obtaining security services elsewhere.
Under all the circumstances we are of the opinion that the trial court's exclusion of the conversation between Kidwell and Hancock relative to the oral agreement was erroneous.
Appellant sought to introduce evidence of freezing weather conditions during January, 1970, through an official publication of the United States Department of Commerce. The document is certified to be an official publication compiled from government climatological records. Seemingly, the trial court refused admission of the evidence on the ground that the document was not attested to by a person purporting to be the officer having legal custody of the record, or his deputy.
Rule 44(a)(1), ARCP, provides that such records, if admissible for any purpose:
The publication should have been admitted. Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2433.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., concur.