Case Title: State v. Wigg

Citation: 179 Vt. 65, 2005 VT 91, 889 A.2d 233

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Wigg (2003-501); 179 Vt. 65; 889 A.2d 233

2005 VT 91

[Filed 29-Jul-2005]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 06-Oct-2005]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2005 VT 91

                                No. 2003-501


  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

  Donald J. Wigg	                         February Term, 2005


  Karen R. Carroll, J.

  David W. Gartenstein, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro,
    for  Plaintiff-Appellee.	
  
  Kimberly B. Cheney of Cheney, Brock & Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, and Jeffrey
    C. Kestenband and William H. Paetzold of Moriarty, Paetzold & Babcock,
    L.L.C., Glastonbury, Connecticut, for Defendant-Appellant.	
  	

  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.  Defendant, Donald Wigg, appeals a jury conviction
  for lewd and lascivious conduct.  He claims that: (1) his
  constitutionally-based presumption of innocence was violated when the trial
  court permitted a police detective to repeatedly refer to the complainant
  as the "victim" during testimony; (2) the trial court abused its discretion
  in excluding testimony from his expert witness on how the interviews of the
  complainant failed to satisfy the scientifically-suggested protocol for
  best ensuring accurate interview responses; and (3) he is entitled to
  acquittal because the jury's verdict convicting him of lewd and lascivious
  conduct, while acquitting him of sexual assault, is inherently
  inconsistent.  While we find the trial court erred in permitting the police
  detective to refer to the complainant as the "victim" and in categorically
  excluding defense expert's case-specific testimony, we hold both errors to
  be harmless.  Additionally, we find no inconsistency in the jury's
  verdicts.  We therefore affirm the trial court's decision.

       ¶  2.  In late January 1999, complainant B.M.Y, an eleven-year-old
  female, accompanied defendant, a thirty-five-year-old male, on a weekend
  ski vacation from their home state of Connecticut to Mount Snow in West
  Dover, Vermont.  At the time, defendant's brother was dating complainant's
  mother, and the two families had recently taken a ski vacation together. 
  On this occasion, complainant's mother permitted her to accompany defendant
  alone.  Complainant testified that she took a shower after she and
  defendant arrived at Mount Snow late in the day.  After her shower, she
  claims that defendant removed her towel, rubbed lotion on her back and
  legs, and opened her vagina with his fingers and stuck his tongue inside
  her vagina.  Later that same night, after watching television and going to
  bed, she further alleges that defendant unzipped her pajamas and sucked on
  her breasts.
   
       ¶  3.  B.M.Y. did not tell anyone about the incidents at Mount Snow
  until September 2000, when her mother's new boyfriend confronted her after
  becoming suspicious that something inappropriate had occurred between
  B.M.Y. and defendant.  After B.M.Y. disclosed the details of the trip to
  her mother's boyfriend, he reported the incident to the Connecticut State
  Police.  Trooper Francis Budwitz responded to the complaint and conducted
  an initial interview of B.M.Y.  After finding the alleged assault occurred
  in Vermont, he turned the investigation over to Detective Rich Werner of
  the Dover, Vermont police department.  Detective Werner traveled to
  Connecticut and interviewed the complainant on two separate occasions in
  late 2000.

       ¶  4.  The State charged defendant with lewd and lascivious conduct
  with a minor in violation of 13 V.S.A.   2602 for sucking on complainant's
  breasts and with sexual assault on a minor in violation of 13 V.S.A.  
  3252(a)(3) for inserting his tongue in her vagina.

       ¶  5.  At trial, the State presented seven witnesses, including
  complainant, her mother's boyfriend, Trooper Budwitz and Detective Werner. 
  The complainant testified at length to the nature of her relationship with
  defendant, the events leading up to the ski trip she took alone with
  defendant, what occurred during the trip, and why she delayed reporting the
  incidents of abuse. Trooper Budwitz and Detective Werner testified
  regarding their investigation, the procedures they utilized in interviewing
  the child complainant, and what the complainant revealed to them regarding
  the incidents of abuse.  Detective Werner, the lead investigator on the
  case, repeatedly referred to complainant as the "victim" during his
  testimony.  Despite defense's timely objection, the trial judge permitted
  the detective to continue using the reference, ruling that use of the term
  was not highly prejudicial. 
   
       ¶  6.  Defendant did not testify.  He advanced his main defense-that
  the complainant's accusations were untruthful-through cross-examination of
  each of the State's witnesses and by calling Dr. Philip Kinsler, a
  psychologist qualified as an expert in interviewing children suspected of
  being victims of sexual abuse.  In his proffer, defendant's attorney
  explained that Dr. Kinsler would testify to the interview techniques that
  are most likely to produce accurate responses as well as those techniques
  most likely to produce inaccurate responses.  Defendant also intended to
  have Dr. Kinsler testify about the investigatory interviews conducted by
  Trooper Budwitz and Detective Werner, in order to give an opinion on
  whether  they were conducted in a manner that was consistent with these
  suggested techniques.  After listening to the expert's intended testimony
  in camera, the trial judge permitted him to testify about general
  interviewing techniques, but excluded testimony analyzing the specific
  interviews conducted by the police in this case. 

       ¶  7.  In its verdict, the jury acquitted defendant of the more
  serious sexual assault charge, but convicted him of the charge of lewd and
  lascivious conduct with a minor.  This appeal followed.

       ¶  8.  Defendant first contends that the trial court violated his
  constitutionally-based presumption of innocence when it permitted the lead
  police investigator, over objection, to repeatedly refer to the complainant
  as the "victim" during his testimony.  In overruling defendant's objection,
  the trial court determined that the detective's reference to the
  complainant as the "victim" was not "highly prejudicial" because "the jury
  knows [the State's attorney] wouldn't be here if the State didn't believe
  this act occurred."  We agree with defendant's contention that, where the
  commission of a crime is in dispute and the core issue is one of the
  complainant's credibility, it is error for a trial court to permit a police
  detective to refer to the complainant as the "victim."  Based on the facts
  of this case, however, we do not find a violation of defendant's rights,
  and hold that the error was harmless.

       ¶  9.  The trial court may exclude testimony if the probative value
  "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
  of the issues, or misleading the jury."  V.R.E. 403.  The trial court has
  discretion to balance the factors in Rule 403, and "we will not disturb the
  trial court's ruling absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion." 
  State v. Webster, 165 Vt. 54, 56,