Case Title: McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-73-02

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On April 11, 2001, the New Jersey Legislative Apportionment Commission (Commission) adopted the Bartels redistricting plan, after the appointment of an independent eleventh member, Dr. Larry Bartels, following an impasse on the plans initially submitted by the Republicans and Democrats. Like the initial plans, the Bartels plan divided Newark and Jersey City into three districts each. Two federal suits followed. In the first, Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001), Republicans and others alleged that the plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) and plaintiffs Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and that the plan would dilute the minority vote. In the second suit, Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.N.J. 2001), plaintiffs alleged that the Bartels plan resulted in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On May 7, 2001, the Page court upheld the Bartels plan under the Voting Rights Act as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Robertson court upheld the plan on June 18, 2001, concluding that it satisfied all applicable federal and state criteria for redistricting. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Robertson on January 22, 2002. The general election in 2001 and the primary election in 2003 were conducted under the Bartels plan. On May 9, 2001, a third challenge to the Bartels plan was filed, alleging that because the plan carved Newark and Jersey City into three legislative districts each, it violated the political boundary requirement of Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled, among other things, that the Commission was not bound by the boundary restrictions, holding that the abrogation of the county-line mandate, announced first in Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 60 N.J. 483 (1972), and subsequently reexamined and reaffirmed in Davenport v. Apportionment Commission, 65 N.J. 125 (1974) (Davenport II), released the Commission from the necessity of adhering to the whole-municipality concept in cases of large municipalities such as Newark and Jersey City. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case to the Commission for creation of a redistricting plan that conforms with Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Supreme Court granted the Commission s petition for certification and stayed the Appellate Division judgment. HELD: The New Jersey Constitution s political boundary requirement may not be validly enforced with respect to Newark and Jersey City without violating the Supremacy Clause. 1. The history and evolution of our state constitutional provision pertinent to legislative reapportionment and redistricting are informative of our disposition of this case. In a series of cases, including the Jackman v. Bodine cases (Bodine I to Bodine VIII), Scrimminger, supra, and culminating with Davenport II, supra, this Court has tackled the issue of apportionment and districting. In Bodine I the Court concluded that, based on the one person, one vote principle first enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Equal Protection Clause demands that in a bicameral state legislature, the seats of both houses must be apportioned substantially based on population. Following Bodine VIII (1970), which addressed departures from mathematical equality among districts and held that tolerances were still permissible under Reynolds, the Court decided Scrimminger, supra, which invalidated the redistricting plan based on the 1970 census, finding that the plan violated the permissible population deviation required to satisfy the one person, one vote mandate of Reynolds. In effect, Scrimminger released the Commission from the necessity of adhering to the whole-municipality concept in cases of large municipalities such as Newark and Jersey City. Davenport II, supra, reaffirmed the Court s holding in Scrimminger. We reaffirm this Court s pronouncements in Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II that the literal language in our State Constitution with respect to political boundaries for counties and the two largest municipalities has to be breached based on the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI. cl. 2, in order to comply with the VRA. The Law Division correctly concluded that the New Jersey Constitution s municipal boundary requirement, as interpreted by this Court for more than a quarter of a century, is not enforceable against Newark and Jersey City. (Pp. 7-18) 2. Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II did not directly address the enforceability of the two-district limitation of our State Constitution. The two-district limitation is unenforceable not only because of the principles we articulated in those opinions. The source of federal preemption lies not only in the federal constitutional mandate of one-person one-vote, but also in the VRA, which is designed to protect and advance the opportunity of minorities for full participation in the electoral process and their opportunity to elect representatives of their choosing. States have at their disposal a number of tools designed to meet the one person, one vote mandate of the VRA: Unpacking, or distributing the voting strength of minority groups not only into majority or safe districts but also into coalition or influence districts, is as much a tool of legislative apportionment, meeting the mandate of Section 2 of the VRA, as is packing, or creating only safe majority districts. Depriving the Commission of the unpacking tool would constitute an undue restraint on its reapportionment planning in contravention of the aims and policies of the VRA. In other words, to pack all of Newark and Jersey City residents into two districts each after nearly forty years of having three districts each, thereby reducing the Senators and Assemblypersons representing those two cities by one-third, would result in vote dilution, and violate the VRA. The Supremacy Clause interdicts that result. (Pp. 18-27) 3. Based on the decisional law, and the long-standing, unchallenged history of certifying redistricting plans that divided Newark and Jersey City into three or more districts notwithstanding our State Constitution s political boundary requirements, we find the doctrine of contemporaneous and practical construction to be applicable. The doctrine holds that when construing a constitutional provision, the long and unchallenged usage and practical interpretation by those charged with implementation, enforcement, and administration of the provision will prevail over the strict construction of the provision when there is good reason to question the viability and continued validity of that provision. Application of that doctrine to the present case would support the conclusion that the common and unanimously agreed-upon understanding of this Court, and the legal and political communities of this State as well, is that the two-district limitation for Newark and Jersey City must be ignored. Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II so discredited the constitutional scheme that once the apportioners were freed, by reason of the size of Newark and Jersey City, from the municipal-boundary preservation, they reasonably regarded themselves as free to apply well-accepted general apportionment principles, not the two-district limitation, to those cities. (Pp. 27-33) 4. The present litigation could have been terminated based on the claim preclusion doctrine, the concept that a party is required to bring all possible claims in one proceeding, as embodied in the closely linked concepts of res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine. In Page and Robertson, Republican legislators and voters twice have challenged the Bartels redistricting plan in the federal district court and the claims have twice been rejected. Despite the use of differing litigation strategies by the parties, this state court action should be precluded. Plaintiffs seek essentially the same remedy as the Page plaintiffs - invalidation of the Bartels redistricting plan - and plaintiffs either took part in Page or were in privity with the Page plaintiffs. Moreover, legally there has been a final decision on the merits respecting the McNeil plaintiffs claim because their state constitutional claim should have been raised in the federal proceeding pursuant to the doctrine of pendent (supplemental) jurisdiction. The voters and duly-elected legislators from the six districts that include Newark and Jersey City under the Bartels plan deserve an end to this litigation. (Pp. 33-44) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of the Law Division dismissing the complaint is REINSTATED. JUSTICES VERNIERO and ALBIN filed a joint dissenting opinion stating that on the present record, they could not determine the validity of the 2001 apportionment plan. They would remand the matter to the Law Division, giving the current map a presumption of validity. The challengers should have an opportunity to demonstrate, with substantial certainty, whether an alternative apportionment plan can pass muster under federal law consistent with the New Jersey Constitution. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, dissenting opinion disagreeing with the majority's presumption of a prior invalidation of a state constitutional provision based on past decisions of this Court. She also concluded that the record does not support the majority's position that Supremacy Clause concerns require the Court to declare the pertinent constitutional provision unenforceable. In addition, she argues that the majority misperceives the interplay between the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C.A. 1973, and our State Constitution. JUSTICES LONG and ZAZZALI and JUDGE PRESSLER (t/a) join in JUSTICE COLEMAN s opinion. JUSTICES VERNIERO and ALBIN filed a joint dissenting opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 73 September Term 2002 ANNE M. MCNEIL, THOMAS E. WILLIAMS, ROSEANNA SIEBERT, PAUL DIGAETANO and KEVIN O'TOOLE, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant, and REGENA L. THOMAS, Secretary of State of New Jersey and PETER C. HARVEY, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents. Argued April 28, 2003 Decided July 31, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 357 N.J. Super. 74 (2003). Sam Hirsch, a member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars and Leon J. Sokol argued the cause for appellant (Sokol, Behot and Fiorenzo, Scarinci & Hollenbeck and Genova Burns & Vernoia, attorneys; Mr. Hirsch and Paul M. Smith, a member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars, of counsel; Mr. Sokol, Steven N. Siegel, Donald Scarinci, Robert E. Levy, Nomi Irene Lowy, Angelo J. Genova, Celia S. Bosco and Laura H. Corvo, on the briefs). Allison E. Accurso, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents Regena L. Thomas and Peter C. Harvey (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Donna Kelly, Senior Deputy Attorney General, on the letters in lieu of brief). Kevin B. Riordan argued the cause for respondents Anne M. McNeil, Thomas E. Williams, Roseanna Siebert, Paul DiGaetano and Kevin O Toole (Berry, Sahradnik, Kotzas, Riordan & Benson, attorneys). Michael A. Armstrong submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Black Ministers Council of New Jersey (Mr. Armstrong, attorney; Mr. Armstrong and Darrin Howard, on the brief). Lawrence S. Lustberg and Shavar D. Jeffries submitted a letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Conference of Branches of the National Association for the Advancement for Colored People. JoAnne Y. Watson, Corporation Counsel, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of amicus curiae City of Newark. The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. No redistricting plan adopted in New Jersey since the inception of the one person, one vote doctrine in 1964 has conformed with our State Constitution s political boundary requirement for the State s two largest municipalities. Since that time, Newark and Jersey City have been divided into at least three districts each. The issue raised in this appeal is whether the New Jersey Constitution s political boundary requirement now can be validly enforced with respect to Newark and Jersey City. We conclude that it may not without violating the Supremacy Clause. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. [ 42 U.S.C.A. 1973.] We therefore reaffirm this Court s pronouncements in Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II that the literal language in our State Constitution with respect to political boundaries for counties and the two largest municipalities has to be breached based on the Supremacy Clause in order to comply with the federal law. That has been the position of this Court since Bodine VII was decided in 1969, only three years after the 1966 constitutional amendments at issue here, and that position was reaffirmed in 1970 in Scrimminger. Consequently, the Law Division correctly concluded that the New Jersey Constitution s municipal boundary requirement, as interpreted by this Court for more than a quarter of a century, is not enforceable against Newark and Jersey City. Section 5 does not dictate that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting over another. Either option will present the minority group with its own array of electoral risks and benefits, and presents hard choices about what would truly maximize minority electoral success. Thornburg v. Gingles, supra,[478 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. at 2786, 92 L. Ed 2d at ___] (O Connor, J., concurring in judgment). On one hand, a smaller number of safe majority-minority districts may virtually guarantee the election of a minority group s preferred candidate in those districts. Yet even if this concentration of minority voters in a few districts does not constitute the unlawful packing of minority voters, see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-154,[ 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155-56, 122 L. Ed. 2d 500, __] (1993), such a plan risks isolating minority voters from the rest of the state, and risks narrowing political influence to only a fraction of political districts. [Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648-650, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827-28, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511, ___ (1993).] And while such districts may result in more descriptive representation because the representatives of choice are more likely to mirror the race of the majority voters in that district, the representation may be limited to fewer areas. See H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60-91 (1967). On the other hand, spreading out minority voters over a greater number of districts creates more districts in which minority voters may have the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Such a strategy has the potential to increase substantive representation in more districts, by creating coalitions of voters who together will help to achieve the electoral aspirations of the minority group. See id. at 114. It also, however, creates the risk that the minority group s preferred candidate may lose. [Georgia, supra, 539 U.S. at ___, ___ S. Ct. at ___, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___, 2 003 WL 21467204, at *13.] While we acknowledge that Section 5 of the VRA is not in issue here, we nevertheless think it plain that the methodology of creating election districts as described by Justice O Connor in Georgia v. Ashcroft necessarily serves as the predicate of a state s obligation of compliance with Section 2(a). That is to say, unpacking, or distributing the voting strength of minority groups not only into majority or safe districts but also into coalition or influence districts, is as much a tool of legislative apportionment, meeting the mandate of Section 2, as is packing, or creating only safe majority districts. In our view, therefore, depriving the Commission of the unpacking tool would constitute an undue restraint on its reapportionment planning in contravention of the aims and policies of the VRA. We also think it plain that, because Newark and Jersey City constitute the largest municipal concentration of minority voters in this State, the two-district limitation of the State Constitution would deprive the Commission of the redistricting tool of unpacking, a tool that is now recognized by the United States Supreme Court as one which the states must be free to employ if they deem it appropriate in order to protect and promote the electoral rights and interests of minority groups. The Commission here made a determination that the unpacking tool should be utilized. That plan is entitled to a presumption of validity. Davenport II, supra, 65 N.J. at 135. There can be no doubt that the Commission divided Newark and Jersey City into three districts, as it has done in the past, in order to achieve the salutary objective of unpacking by permitting the minority voters not only to elect representatives in safe districts but also by creating coalition and influence districts. To now create two districts each in Newark and Jersey City would, in the Commission s view and supported by the record, constitute packing in violation of Section 2 of the VRA. Such a retrogressive redistricting plan would create [d]ilution of racial minority group voting strength . . . caused by the dispersal of blacks [and Hispanics] into districts . . . where they constitute an excessive majority. Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at 46 n.11, 106 S. Ct. at 2764 n.11, 92 L. Ed 2d at ___ n.11. Moreover, the federal court in Page, supra, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 366, has already found that the Commission plan establishing three districts in both Newark and Jersey City did not involve vote dilution. Section 2(b) of the VRA permits consideration of [t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision in determining whether Section 2(a) has been violated. 42 U.S.C.A. 1973(b). In the 2001 general election, minorities were elected to fill approximately sixty-one percent of the Senate and Assembly seats in the six districts comprising Newark and Jersey City. To now pack all of Newark and Jersey City residents into two districts each after nearly forty years of having three districts each, thereby reducing the Senators and Assemblypersons representing those two cities by one third, would violate the VRA. The effect of two districts would now operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 1294, 16 L. Ed. 2d 376, ___ (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S. Ct. 498, 501, 13 L. Ed. 2d 401, ___ (1965)); Voting Rights Act Extension, S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 23. Clearly, the attempt to reduce the number of districts in Newark and Jersey City from three to two is to minimize the chance of democratic control of the Legislature. The demographics presented under the Bartels plan indicate that five of the six districts for Newark and Jersey City are minority-majority districts: 28th with 73.5% minorities, 29th with 79.8% minorities, 31st with 66.0% minorities, 32nd with 57.8% minorities and 33rd with 68.9% minorities. The 27th district is a minority-influence district with 44.8% minorities. Minority-majority districts are those in which minorities represent over fifty percent of the voting age population. An influence district exists when minorities make up less than a majority of the voting-age population but the minorities nonetheless are able to elect preferred candidates when the group is large enough and cohesive enough to effectively influence elections. Parker v. Ohio, 2 003 WL 21219404 at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Because the ideal population for each of New Jersey s forty legislative districts under the 2000 census is 210,359, and because Newark s and Jersey City s populations exceed that ideal number by 63,187 and 29,696 respectively, McNeil, supra, 357 N.J. Super. at 80, limiting each of those municipalities to only two districts will, of necessity, reduce the number of minority-majority districts and/or the influence district. Although the Supreme Court has heretofore declined to decide whether an influence dilution claim is cognizable under the VRA See footnote 2, we believe that Georgia v. Ashcroft supports our conclusion that such claims are permitted. After all, Congress enacted the VRA for the remedial purpose of rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination in voting. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315, 86 S. Ct. 803, 812, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769, __ (1966). The VRA should be interpreted in a manner that provides the broadest possible scope in eliminating discrimination against minority voters. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567, 89 S. Ct. 817, 832, 22 L. Ed. 2d 1, __ (1969). Those principles were reaffirmed recently when the Court restated that [t]he purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to prevent discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster our transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race. . . . [T]he Voting Rights Act, as properly interpreted, should encourage the transition to a society where race no longer matters. Georgia v. Ashcroft, supra, 539 U.S. at ___, ___ S. Ct. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 2 003 WL 21467204 at *18 (citations omitted). Influence dilution claims will hasten the time when race will not matter. We agree with Judge Gwin, a member of the Ohio Federal District Court three-judge panel that decided the Parker redistricting case, who stated: Most important, nothing suggests that Congress intended to limit Section 2 claims to ones involving districts where minorities were a majority of voters. The Supreme Court has also suggested that a minority influence claim may be sufficient to sustain a Section 2 results claim. In Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380[, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348] (1991), the Court stated that to establish a Section 2 claim, the plaintiffs must show both that they have less opportunity to participate in the political process and that they have less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that this reading of Section 2 would leave minorities who form such a small part of the electorate in a particular jurisdiction that they could on no conceivable basis elect representatives of their choice entirely without Section 2 protection. Id. at 409. He further reasoned that such minorities could therefore be denied equal opportunity to participate in the political process with impunity. Id. The majority responded to Justice Scalia s dissent by pointing out that his argument rested on the erroneous assumption that a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of an election. Id. at 397 n.24. Thus, the Court suggested that influence claims can be valid under Section 2 of the Act. [Parker, supra, 2 003 WL 21219404 at *12 (Gwin, J., concurring).] Additionally, one commentator in the Senate Report regarding Voting Rights Act violations asserted that influence dilution claims would be consistent with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act since [p]olitical effectiveness . . . not only includes the power to elect, but also . . . the ability to use a group s voting strength to persuade candidates to address particular issues. Beth A. Levene, Influence-Dilution Claims Under the Voting Rights Act., 1 995 U. Chi. Legal F. 457, 468 (citing S.Rep. No. 97-417 (1982)). As noted previously, the Senate Report also asserts that the Voting Rights Act is violated when practices operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. Levene, supra, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. at 467 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 23, 28 (1982)). Another commentator has stated: Indeed, 2 refers to open participation for minority voters in the political processes leading to nomination or election as well as the opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Thus, political participation includes lobbying and coalition building in the electoral process (as well as voting) to influence an electoral outcome when a majority-minority district cannot be drawn. . . . [V]ote dilution and influence dilution are very much intertwined. . . . A reapportionment plan might pack minority voters into single-member districts to prevent them from asserting influence in surrounding districts. Such packing occurs when the minority-preferred candidate in the majority-minority district receives excessively more votes than needed to carry the election. An influence district would serve to capture those excess votes to assert minority influence in another district. [Stanley Pierre-Louis, The Politics of Influence: Recognizing Influence Dilution Claims Under 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215, 1224 (1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. 1973 (b)).] If the Bartels plan is altered such that Newark and Jersey City residents are placed in only two legislative districts each, that will result in vote dilution and therefore will violate the VRA. The Supremacy Clause interdicts that result. [Ibid.] Although the Court in Wrightson recognized the doctrine of contemporaneous and practical construction, it held that the doctrine did not apply in that case where contemporaneous construction of the constitutional provision involved there conflicted with the clear (overall) constitutional mandate. Id. at 213-14. As time progressed, the Court applied the doctrine of contemporaneous and practical construction to our State Constitution. In In re Hudson County, 106 N.J.L. 62, 64-66, 76-78 (E. & A. 1928), the doctrine of contemporaneous construction was used to determine whether the Court properly had assembled for the purpose of hearing an appeal during which the members sat en banc and decided the case. The Court commented: Said Chief Justice Gummere, speaking for this court in Commonwealth Roofing Co. v. Riccio, 81 N.J. Eq. 486, [488-89 (E. & A. 1913)]: [W]henever there is a debatable question as to the proper construction of a statutory provision, the contemporaneous and long continued exposition exhibited in the usage and practice under it requires the construction thus put upon it to be accepted by the courts as the true one. [(citations omitted)]. And this applies generally to the construction of the constitution. In State v. Kelsey, [ 44 N.J.L. 1, 21-22 (Sup. Ct. 1882), Chief Justice Beasley stated]: Under this condition of affairs, as this case is to be tried by the court upon the merits as well as the law, this court is obliged to find, and does find, as a matter of fact, that the legislation in question has received a practical construction to the effect stated for a period of time in excess of fifty years. Therefore, to consider the question as to the proper meaning of that legislation as an open one, would . . . be utterly opposed to public policy, precedent and the admitted principles of law. The legal rule is succinctly expressed in the maxim of the civil law, contemporanea expositio est fortissima. The doctrine has such prevalence that it is applicable not only in the exposition of statutes, but in the interpretation of constitutions of government. Its antiquity with respect to the English law is evidenced by the comment of Lord Coke, who says: Great regard ought, in construing a statute, to be paid to the construction which the sages of the law who lived about the time, or soon after, it was made, put upon it, because they were best able to judge of the intention of the makers at the time the law was made. [Id. at 75.] In Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200 (1956), the Court recognize[d] fully that resort may be had to contemporaneous and practical constructions for whatever aid they may fairly afford in ascertaining the true sense and meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. at 210. The Court referred to Justice Heher s remarks in In re Roche s Estate, 16 N.J. 579, 587 (1954), that [t]he meaning of [an enactment] is not ruled by [its] strict letter, but rather by the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context, and in Caputo v. The Best Foods, Inc., 17 N.J. 259, 264 (1955), that the lawgivers intention emerges from the spirit and policy of the statute rather than the literal sense of particular terms. Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 205-06. Those principles were reaffirmed in New Jersey Assoc. on Correction v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 215 (1979). Recently, the Court has rejected a literal reading of a statutory amendment in favor [of] a narrower and more practical construction consistent with the amendment s intended meaning. State v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., 160 N.J. 505, 527-29 (1999); see also State v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., 314 N.J. Super. 651, 661 (Law Div. 1997) (stating in the words of Judge Learned Hand, there is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally ) (citing Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 205), aff d, 314 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1998), aff d, 160 N.J. 505 (1999)(citation omitted)). The Court relied on the legislative history and the contemporaneous and practical construction of the amendment that had gone unchallenged for approximately twenty years, to ascertain the intent and proper construction of the legislation. Trump Hotels, supra, 160 N.J. 527-29; Trump Hotels, supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 661, 672; Atlantic City Racing Ass n v. Attorney General, 98 N.J. 535, 548 (1985); Lan, supra, 80 N.J. at 215; Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 206; In re Hudson County, supra, 106 N.J.L. at 75. The trial court in Trump Hotels concluded that where contemporaneous and practical interpretation has stood unchallenged for a considerable period of time, such may be regarded as of great importance in arriving at a proper construction of a statute or constitutional provision. Trump Hotels, supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 662 (citations omitted). The doctrine holds that when construing a constitutional provision, the long and unchallenged usage and practical interpretation by those charged with implementation, enforcement, and administration of the provision will prevail over the strict construction of the provision when there is good reason to question the viability and continued validity of that provision. See State v. Trump, supra, 160 N.J. at 527-29; cf. Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 122 N.J. 202, 212 (1991) (discussing contemporaneous construction of legislation by administrative agencies). After this Court s decisions in Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II, the only ambiguity remaining in the literal language of Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution was whether the municipal boundaries of the 564 municipalities that are smaller than Newark and Jersey City would have to be breached when redistricting. That issue is not presented in this case and should not be addressed. Even if some ambiguity existed in respect of whether the municipal boundaries of Newark and Jersey City had to be breached, such ambiguity is a proper predicate for the application of the contemporaneous construction doctrine. Application of that doctrine to the present case would support the conclusion that the common and unanimously agreed-upon understanding of this Court, and the legal and political communities of this State as well, is that the two-district limitation for Newark and Jersey City must be ignored. The municipal boundary requirement for Newark and Jersey City has been silently superceded by this Court for more than a quarter of a century in order to preserve the one-person, one-vote mandate. This Court must continue to depart from the narrow interpretation of the challenged constitutional provision in favor of a contemporaneous and practical construction of the language. For nearly forty years, the division of Newark and Jersey City into three or more districts has gone unquestioned. Once the boundaries of Newark and Jersey City are disregarded, the question is whether they need to be observed in any particular way, i.e. as two-district maximums. Our view is that Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II so discredited the constitutional scheme that once the apportioners were freed, by reason of the size of Newark and Jersey City, from the municipal-boundary preservation, they reasonably regarded themselves as free to apply well-accepted general apportionment principles, not the two-district limitation, to those cities. Given the totality of the circumstances, that decision was entirely justified by what had to be a legitimate question as to how much of the constitutional dictate continued to apply after Bodine VII, Scrimminger, and Davenport II. When the decision of the Commission is viewed within the framework of the contemporaneous and practical construction doctrine, and the totality of the circumstances as required by the VRA, it becomes clear that to construe strictly the language of Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 would result in inequalities due to the packing of minorities into fewer districts. Packing, in turn, would dilute minorities ability to elect representatives of their choice and thus would violate Section 2 of the VRA. Under the Supremacy Clause, the New Jersey State Constitution must yield to federal law. [Davis, supra, 478 U.S. at 147, 106 S. Ct. at 2818, 92 L. Ed 2d at ___ (O Connor, J., concurring).] We believe, therefore, that the present litigation could have been terminated based on the claim preclusion doctrine and the virtual representation rule. The genesis of the claim preclusion doctrine predates our 1947 Constitution. As early as 1933, the highest Court in this State declared that [n]o principle of law is more firmly established than that a single or entire cause of action cannot be subdivided into several claims, and separate actions maintained thereon. Smith v. Red Top Taxicab Corp., 111 N.J.L. 439, 440-41 (E. & A. 1933). That concept was incorporated into the Judicial Article of the 1947 Constitution. It provides: Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined. [N.J. Const. art. VI, 3, 4.] Seven years after adopting the 1947 Constitution, and twelve years before adopting the constitutional amendment involved in this appeal, this Court observed that the Judicial Article and implementing Court Rules adopted by this Court were intended to provide a simple and flexible procedural framework designed and purposed for the just and expeditious determination in a single action of the ultimate merits of an entire controversy between litigants. Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 485 (1954) (emphasis added). To implement that constitutional provision, our courts have held that a party who has elected to hold back from the first proceeding a related component of the controversy [will] be barred from thereafter raising it in a subsequent proceeding. Wm. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super. 277, 292-93 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 (1977). The concept that a party is required to bring all possible claims in one proceeding is embodied in the closely linked concepts of res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine. See Long v. Lewis, 318 N.J. Super. 449, 459 (App. Div. 1999) ( The claim preclusion aspect of the entire controversy doctrine is essentially res judicata by another name. ). Under both federal law and this State s law, claim preclusion requires that (1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. [Watkins v. Resorts Int l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991) (citations omitted).] Claim preclusion applies not only to matters actually determined in an earlier action, but to all relevant matters that could have been so determined. Ibid. (citing Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-93, 67 S. Ct. 657, 662, 91 L. Ed. 832, 838-39 (1947); Culver v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 463 (1989)). [C]auses of action are deemed part of a single claim if they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. If, under various theories, a litigant seeks to remedy a single wrong, then that litigant should present all theories in the first action. Otherwise, theories not raised will be precluded in a later action. [Id. at 413 (citations omitted); see Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336, 338 (1995); Giudice v. Drew Chemical Corp., 210 N.J. Super. 32, 41-42 (App. Div. 1986).] It does not matter whether the two claims were filed in two different forums. Blazer Corp. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 199 N.J. Super. 107, 112 (App. Div. 1985). Republican legislators and voters twice have challenged the Bartels redistricting plan in the federal district court, which has twice rejected their claims. Page, supra, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 346; Robertson, supra, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 443, summarily aff d, 534 U.S. 1110, 122 S. Ct. 914, 151 L. Ed. 2d 881 (2001). The plaintiffs in Page who filed their complaint on April 12, 2001, were African-American and Hispanic voters from districts that included Newark and Jersey City, and the Republican majority in the New Jersey Senate and General Assembly. Page, supra, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 349-50 & n.3. They sought to prevent implementation of the Bartels plan because it allegedly violated Section 2 of the VRA, their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection under the 14th Amendment, and their rights under the 15th Amendment by diluting the minority vote. Id. at 349-50, 353. The court upheld the plan on May 7, 2001. Id. at 369. Republican elected officials and two individuals seeking election filed a separate challenge to the Bartels plan on April 27, 2001. Robertson, supra, 148 F. Supp 2d at 446. Two of the seven Robertson plaintiffs, one Senator and one Assemblyman, were also plaintiffs in the Page litigation. Although neither the entire group of plaintiffs nor the claims in Robertson were identical to those in Page, the court granted the Commission s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 452-53. The court recognized that plaintiffs shared a clear commonality of interests and all stood to benefit if the plan were declared invalid. Id. at 451. The court also found that the Robertson plaintiffs engaged in tactical maneuvering to file their own claim rather than joining the Page litigation. Id. at 451-52. Also, because the ultimate goal of the Page and Robertson plaintiffs was the same, the court held that the Robertson plaintiffs received adequate representation from the Page plaintiffs notwithstanding the fact that the two groups used different arguments with respect to whether the redistricting plan violated the VRA and the Constitution. Id. at 452. Finally, the court noted its concern that the issue of racial gerrymandering in redistricting could assume immortality, and held that there was privity between the Page and Robertson plaintiffs. Id. at 452-53 (citation omitted). Significantly, the court interpreted the res judicata test broadly because the issue implicated public rather than private rights. Id. at 450, 452. Because each plaintiff in a public law case has an indirect interest in the outcome, due process concerns are lessened[.] Id. at 450 (citing Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 803, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1768, 135 L. Ed. 2d 76, ___ (1996)). Additionally, because of the potentially large number of plaintiffs with standing in public law cases, were they allowed to raise issues continually, public law claims would assume immortality. Ibid. (quoting Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 741 (9th Cir. 1984)). Courts therefore have wide latitude to use claim preclusion in public law cases such as this one. Ibid. (citation omitted). The McNeil plaintiffs assert in their state-law claim that anything except a two-district plan for Newark and Jersey City would violate Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution. We also could preclude plaintiffs from proceeding with this litigation based on the doctrine of res judicata. First, the McNeil plaintiffs seek essentially the same remedy as the Page plaintiffs invalidation of the Bartels redistricting plan. As the federal court in Robertson recognized, such suits that seek identical relief through alternate means arise from the same transaction for claim preclusion purposes. Robertson, supra, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49. Second, the McNeil plaintiffs either took part in Page or were in privity with the Page plaintiffs. Although the Page and McNeil plaintiffs offer different theories in respect of why the redistricting plan is unlawful (one group using the federal and one using the State Constitution), it is clear that both seek the same remedy. See Robertson, supra, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (finding that privity existed between the Page and Robertson plaintiffs pursuant to the doctrine of virtual representation). Furthermore, legally there has been a final decision on the merits respecting the McNeil plaintiffs claim because their state constitutional claim should have been raised in the federal proceeding pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Reid v. Reid, 310 N.J. Super. 12, 23-24 (App. Div. 1998) ( [I]f a federal court in a prior action would have exercised pendent jurisdiction over related state claims that were not asserted, a final judgment on the merits by the federal court precludes raising those claims in a subsequent action in state court. (quoting Watkins v. Resorts Int l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 413 (1991)); Ferger v. Local 483 of the Int l Ass n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 94 N.J. Super. 554, 564 (Ch. Div. 1967) (holding that, where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiff s fraud in federal court, defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court). The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is now called supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. 1367; Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 539-40, 122 S. Ct. 999, 1004, 152 L. Ed. 2d 27, ___ (2002). Federal courts have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that derive from a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, ___ (1966). In this case, plaintiffs state law claim that the redistricting plan violates the New Jersey Constitution derive[s] from a common nucleus of operative fact with the Equal Protection claim raised in federal court: both challenges involve the Bartels plan s unique effect on the State s two largest municipalities, which have a high concentration of minority voters. Baker v. Carr, supra, 396 U.S. at 199-200, 82 S. Ct. at 700-01, 7 L. Ed 2d at ___, made clear that federal courts have jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of state apportionment plans for state legislative elections. We are persuaded that the federal court would have exercised jurisdiction over plaintiff s state constitutional claim because the packing of minority voters into two districts after nearly a forty-year history of having three districts each implicates Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. It is highly likely that the federal court would have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim in order to resolve the entire redistricting controversy at once. See Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S. Ct. at 1139, 16 L. Ed 2d at _ ( [The] justification [for supplemental jurisdiction] lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants . . . . ) Therefore, this state court action should be precluded. Reid, supra, 310 N.J. Super. at 23-24. Finally, although defendants did not explicitly raise res judicata as a defense, the Commission s brief impliedly raised the issue when it stated that this is the fourth case in which plaintiffs have attacked the Commission plan. That brief, however, cites none of the relevant cases. Although res judicata is an affirmative defense that may be deemed waived if not asserted, R. 4:5-4; Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J. Super. 372, 384 (App. Div. 1986), the pleading requirement is not absolute. It may be disregarded for public policy reasons or in the interest of substantial justice. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:5-4 (2003). Moreover, affirmative defenses have been permitted to be raised either sua sponte or untimely by a party when the interests of justice or public policy were at stake. See, e.g., Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 281-82 (1961) (contributory negligence); Jackson v. Hankinson, 94 N.J. Super. 505, 513-14 (App. Div. 1967) (governmental immunity raised sua sponte). This case cries out for the sua sponte application of res judicata. The McNeil plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on May 9, 2001, insisting that Newark and Jersey City each should be limited to two districts only two days after their privities in Page had argued unsuccessfully that each of those municipalities should have three districts, but that the district lines drawn by the Commission should be changed. There is an infinite number of plaintiffs who could be enlisted by either political party to contest this or future redistricting plans. The philosophy that undergirds res judicata, which elevates the needs of the public over the litigation choices of the parties, supports this approach. As the courts of this State have observed: The doctrine of res judicata is primarily one of public policy and only secondarily of private benefit to individual litigants. . . . [I]ts roots lie in the principle that public policy and welfare require a definite end to litigation when each of the parties has had a full, free and untrammeled opportunity of presenting all of the facts pertinent to the controversy. The primary object of res judicata (public policy) is based upon the maxim reipublicae ut sit finis litium it concerns the commonwealth that there be a limit to litigation. [(citations omitted).] [Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 484 (Ch. Div. 1970) (quoting Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. Super. 96, 107 (Cty. Ct. 1967)(quoting Coca-Cola v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260 (Del. 1934)))]. The voters and duly-elected legislators from the six districts that include Newark and Jersey City under the Commission plan deserve an end to this litigation. By rewarding the McNeil plaintiffs for their use of different litigation strategies than those used by their privities in federal court, this Court would be assisting all aggrieved political organizations and voters to challenge redistricting plans with a never-ending stream of plaintiffs, a giant step toward the Robertson court s fear that McNeil-like cases could achieve immortality. The virtual representation rule could be applied to preclude multiple litigation of the same or similar issues previously raised or should have been raised in prior proceedings. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 73 September Term 2002 ANNE M. MCNEIL, THOMAS E. WILLIAMS, ROSEANNA SIEBERT, PAUL DIGAETANO AND KEVIN O TOOLE, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant, and REGENA L. THOMAS, Secretary of State of New Jersey, and PETER C. HARVEY, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents. VERNIERO, ALBIN, JJ., dissenting. Pursuant to Article IV, section 2 of the New Jersey Constitution, Newark and Jersey City can be divided into no more than two State legislative districts each. The majority declares that following that constitutional mandate would violate the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) and, on that basis, upholds the current legislative apportionment map. We cannot determine whether the majority s position is correct based on the present record. We thus would remand this matter to the Law Division, giving the current map a presumption of validity. We would allow the challengers the opportunity to demonstrate, with substantial certainty, whether an alternative apportionment plan can pass muster under federal law consistent with the New Jersey Constitution. We do not accept the majority s conclusion that past departures from Article IV, section 2, paragraph 3 effectively have written that provision out of the State s constitution. The cases that arguably support the Court s holding were decided under circumstances not present here. Accordingly, we would not import the rationale of those decisions to this case. Simply put, Article IV, section 2 of our State s constitution remains in effect and need only yield to superior federal voting-rights principles. The recently-decided Georgia v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ____, 123 S. Ct. 2498, ___ L. Ed.2d ___ (2003), addresses a section of the VRA that is not implicated in this case. Accordingly, Ashcroft does not resolve the issues before us. Contrary to the Appellate Division, we also are not prepared at this juncture to hold that Article IV, section 2 invalidates the Commission s 2001 plan, which otherwise is presumed valid. Davenport v. Apportionment Comm n, 65 N.J. 125, 135 (1974). Neither the Commission nor the Law Division explicitly tested the notion whether Newark and Jersey City can be divided into two districts each consistent with federal law. In sum, we cannot determine the validity of the 2001 apportionment plan on the present record. We respectfully dissent. ANNE M. McNEIL, THOMAS E. WILLIAMS, ROSEANNA SIEBERT, PAUL DIGAETANO AND KEVIN O TOOLE, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant, and REGENA L. THOMAS, Secretary of State of New Jersey, and PETER C. HARVEY, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents. LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. Article IV, 2, 3 of the New Jersey Constitution was, until today, a vital provision of our law. A majority of the Court is content to jettison the provision based on a perceived Supremacy Clause concern. I disagree with the Court s presumption of a prior invalidation of the state constitutional provision based on past decisions of this Court. I also disagree that the record supports the majority s conclusion that, in any event, Supremacy Clause concerns require our constitutional provision to be declared unenforceable in this instance. In my view, the majority misperceives the interplay between the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C.A. 1973, and our State Constitution. No one disputes that application of that mathematical formula would divide Newark and Jersey City into two legislative districts each. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled, among other things, that the Commission was not bound by the restrictions set forth in Article IV, 2, 3. The court held that the abrogation of the county-line mandate, announced first in Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 60 N.J. 483 (1972), and reexamined and reaffirmed in Davenport v. Apportionment Comm n, 65 N.J. 125 (1974), freed the Commission from the necessity of adhering to the whole-municipality concept in cases of large municipalities such as Newark and Jersey City. The court, therefore, granted summary judgment to the Commission. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring that the language of Article IV, 2, 3 that requires dividing Newark and Jersey City into two districts never was invalidated under our prior case law but remains the starting point for legislative reapportionment. McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm n of State of N.J., 357 N.J. Super. 74, 86 (2003). The court, in effect, granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, remanding the case to the Commission for creation of a reapportionment plan that conforms with our Constitution. Id. at 93. We stayed the Appellate Division order, permitting the Commission s plan to remain in effect. 176 N.J. 71 (2003). I agree with the Appellate Division to the extent that it concluded that the constitutional provision at issue remains operable, and need only give way in the face of superior federal voting-rights principles. In other words, every legislative apportionment initiative should begin with our Constitution and if our Constitution can be adhered to consistent with federal law, it should be. I do not subscribe to the majority s conclusion that past departures from Article IV, 2, 3 effectively have rendered that provision a nullity. I interpret our prior cases as having been decided on their unique facts and not within the context of the present dispute. The Court addressed Article IV, 2, 3, as it applies to counties, in Scrimminger, supra. The 1970 census revealed that the twenty-one counties in New Jersey had significantly different populations. Scrimminger, supra, 60 N.J. at 495. Because of the disparity in population, the counties, under the present distribution of the State s population, [could not] constitute separate districts. Nor [were] they suitable building blocks for the formation of meaningful districts. Id. at 487. Adherence to county lines was determined to result in a violation of the one-man one-vote principle, in that constitutionally unacceptable deviations in population would occur between districts. Id. at 498. Thus, in respect of counties, it was plain that this limit in our State Constitution exceeds what the Federal Constitution permits. Id. at 489. In determining that county-line adherence was impossible, the Court had this to say about municipalities: Municipal lines should be observed, if possible, for if they are followed, dividends may be expected in terms of furthering the relationship of these political subdivisions and the State and also in terms of restraining to some extent the opportunities for drawing lines for partisan advantage. Municipalities are thus appropriate building blocks for the creation of districts. The boundaries of larger municipalities will of course have to be breached, and in this regard, the Commission may have to depart from the direction in Art. 4, II, 3, concerning the division of a municipality. NO. A-73 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court ANNE M. MCNEIL, THOMAS E. WILLIAMS, ROSEANNA SIEBERT, PAUL DIGAETANO and KEVIN O TOOLE, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 31, 2003 Justice Coleman PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINIONS BY : JJ. Verniero/Albin; J. LaVecchia