Case Title: Miller v. Superior Court

Citation: 356 P.2d 699, 88 Ariz. 349

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1960-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
88 Ariz. 349 (1960) 356 P.2d 699 Virginia Greene Sturdivant MILLER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona IN AND FOR COUNTY OF PIMA and the Honorable Herbert F. Krucker, Presiding Judge Thereof, Respondents. No. 7145. Supreme Court of Arizona. November 17, 1960. Rehearing Denied December 13, 1960. *350 Darrow, D'Antonio, Hayes & Morales, Tucson, for petitioner. A.S. Johnston, III, McKesson & Renaud, Phoenix, for respondents. LESHER, Justice. Certiorari to review an order of the Pima County Superior Court, removing the trustee of an inter vivos trust. The trust had earlier been created by petitioner, Virginia Greene Sturdivant Miller, who named herself as beneficiary and Robert L. Sharp as trustee. Tucson Title Insurance Company subsequently became trustee. Upon her death the trust was to end and the principal to be paid to her three children, of whom respondent Mary Helene Sturdivant Barmann is one. In March, 1960, at the insistence of petitioner, Tucson Title Insurance Company was removed as trustee, and Ashland Corporation was appointed in its place. Respondent appealed to this Court from the order appointing Ashland, claiming, among other things, that she had had no legal notice of the proceedings in which that appointment was made. Thereafter, in June, 1960, respondent Mary Helene Sturdivant Barmann moved the superior court for an order removing Ashland as trustee, on the ground that it was a foreign corporation, organized under the laws of Liberia, never authorized to do business in Arizona, and hence ineligible to appointment as trustee under the provisions of A.R.S. § 10-484, subd. E: After a hearing on that motion, and the Superior Court finding that Ashland Corporation was in fact unqualified to act as trustee, an order was entered on July 1, 1960, removing Ashland and directing it to render an accounting of the trust. It is that order of July 1, 1960, that is sought to be reviewed. Petitioner first contends that since on July 1, 1960, Ashland's appointment had already been appealed to this Court, the superior court had no further jurisdiction in connection with the trust except in aid of that appeal, and, specifically, no jurisdiction to entertain the motion for an order removing Ashland. We do not decide this issue, however, since other considerations control our disposition of the case. This proceeding is governed by A.R.S. § 12-2001: It is clear that there are two conditions precedent to the granting of a writ of certiorari: First, an inferior tribunal must exceed its jurisdiction; Second, there must be no appeal from the judgment or order entered. Hunt v. Norton, 68 Ariz. 1, 198 P.2d 124, 5 A.L.R.2d 668; Metropolitan Lines v. Brooks, 70 Ariz. 344, 220 P.2d 480; Hazard v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 211, 310 P.2d 830. We thus come down to this question: Granting, for the purpose of argument, that the order removing Ashland was outside the scope of the court's jurisdiction, was it appealable? Although authority elsewhere is divided, a majority of the courts which have considered the question have held the removal of a trustee to be an appealable order. See Annotation, 37 A.L.R.2d 751 et seq. Our controlling statute is A.R.S. § 12-2101, which reads, in part, as follows: Whether it be considered as final or interlocutory, the act of a trial court which *352 removes a trustee affects the substantial rights of the parties to the proceeding; it also, insofar as those proceedings are concerned, determines those rights. Guided by the language of the statute, and consistent with the bulk of authority elsewhere, we hold that the order of July 1, 1960, removing Ashland Corporation as trustee, was appealable. This being true, certiorari will not lie to review that order. The alternative writ is therefore quashed, and the petition is denied. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and PHELPS, BERNSTEIN, and UDALL, JJ., concurring.