Case Title: Jackson (Jerry T.) v. Warden (order)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042751

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA:
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme 
Court Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 24th 
day of March, 2006. 
 
 
Jerry Terrell Jackson, 
Petitioner, 
 
     against 
Record No. 042751 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
Respondent. 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed January 4, 2005, the respondent’s 
motion to dismiss, and the petitioner’s reply to that 
motion, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should 
be granted and the writ should not be issued. 
Jerry Terrell Jackson was convicted in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Williamsburg and James City County of 
one count each of statutory burglary, robbery, rape, petit 
larceny and two counts of capital murder for the 
premeditated killing of Ruth Phillips during the commission 
of a rape, and during the commission of a robbery.  Finding 
that the Commonwealth had proven the aggravating factor of 
“future dangerousness” beyond a reasonable doubt, see Code 
§ 19.2-264.2, the jury fixed Jackson’s sentence at death on 
each of the capital murder convictions and fixed sentences 
totaling two life sentences plus 20 years’ imprisonment and 
 
1
12 months in jail for the non-capital convictions.  The 
trial court sentenced Jackson in accordance with the jury’s 
verdict.  This Court unanimously affirmed Jackson’s 
convictions and the sentences of death.  Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 208-09, 590 S.E.2d 520, 537 
(2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 891 (2004). 
In claim I(A), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel relied 
on impermissible and unreasonable factors in determining 
which questions to ask individual jurors during voir dire.  
Counsel did not ask four potential jurors, Lewis Samuels, 
Alfonso LaFalce, June Brown, and Joyce Griffith: (1) 
whether they believe death is the appropriate punishment 
for murder unless the defendant convinces them otherwise; 
(2) whether they believe everyone who commits murder will 
be dangerous in the future; and (3) whether they would 
automatically vote to impose death on a person they 
determined to be a future danger.  Petitioner contends that 
in determining not to pose these questions to these four 
potential jurors, counsel unreasonably relied on racial 
stereotypes, geographic stereotypes, and “tips” from the 
bailiff.  Petitioner further asserts that had counsel asked 
the questions, there was a reasonable probability that one 
 
2
of the jurors would have revealed that he or she was 
unqualified to serve. 
The Court holds that claim I(A) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984).  The record, including the trial transcripts 
and affidavit of trial counsel, demonstrates that the court 
asked significant voir dire questions and the four jurors, 
along with other members of the venire, demonstrated that 
they would be fair and impartial.  Counsel averred that, 
based upon the court’s questioning and the information 
obtained as to each of the jurors, counsel made a strategic 
decision not to ask these jurors any additional questions.  
Furthermore, petitioner does not allege that any of these 
jurors were, in fact, unqualified or that any of these 
jurors failed to follow the instructions given to them by 
the trial court.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  See id. at 687, 694. 
In claim I(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
violated the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
 
3
(1986) when he chose not to exercise a peremptory strike as 
to juror Holly Minkins because she was an African-American 
woman.  Petitioner acknowledges that counsel’s decision to 
retain Minkins was a tactical decision but nevertheless 
contends that Minkins’ answers during voir dire 
demonstrated that she was not qualified to serve on the 
jury.  Thus, counsel’s decision to retain Minkins was 
unconstitutional because it was based solely on Minkins’ 
race.  Petitioner further contends that counsel’s failure 
to strike Minkins is presumptively prejudicial.  However, 
even if prejudice is not presumed, petitioner claims he can 
demonstrate prejudice because absent counsel’s error, the 
composition of the jury would have been different.  
Petitioner argues that, in light of the scant evidence on 
the issue of premeditation and the fact that the jury 
conducted sentencing deliberations for two days, there is a 
reasonable probability that a difference in the jury 
composition would have resulted in a different outcome. 
The Court holds that claim I(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  First, counsel’s failure to 
strike Minkins is not a “structural error.”  As this Court 
stated in Morrisette v. Warden of the Sussex I State 
Prison, 270 Va. 188, 613 S.E.2d 551 (2005): 
 
4
A  “structural error” is a “defect affecting the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather 
than simply an error in the trial process 
itself.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
310 (1991); see Emmett v. Warden, 269 Va. 164, 
168, 609 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2005).  As such, it is 
the constitutional magnitude of the error that 
defies “harmless error review.”  Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).  Examples of errors 
which affect the framework of a trial include the 
denial of a public trial, the denial of counsel, 
the denial of an impartial trial judge, the 
systematic exclusion of members of the 
defendant’s race from the grand jury, the 
infringement upon a defendant’s right to 
represent himself, and the improper instruction 
to a jury as to reasonable doubt and the burden 
of proof.  See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 466-67 (1997) (discussion of “limited class 
of cases” in which structural error found); Green 
v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 611-12, 571 S.E.2d 135, 
140 (2002) (holding an instruction stating the 
jury shall find the defendant guilty if the 
Commonwealth failed to prove each element beyond 
a reasonable doubt to be structural error). 
 
Id. at 192, 613 S.E.2d at 556.  Thus, any prejudice is 
not presumed. 
The record, including the trial transcript of the voir 
dire of Minkins, also demonstrates that Minkins was 
qualified to serve on the jury.  The holding in Batson 
applies to the impermissible exclusion of members of a 
particular race from a jury pursuant to the exercise of a 
peremptory strike.  476 U.S. at 87-88.  Petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s tactical decision 
regarding the selection of jurors was of a constitutional 
dimension, as petitioner does not claim that counsel 
 
5
excluded members of a particular race in violation of 
Batson.  Furthermore, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that the empanelled jury was not impartial.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim II(A), petitioner alleges that the trial 
court failed to ensure the selection of an impartial jury 
because the court did not inform the venire that the victim  
was 88 years old and did not inform the venire of “other 
circumstances of her life.”  Petitioner contends that 
without this information, the court could not determine 
whether the venire, which included several venire persons 
who were 65 and older, could be impartial.  The Court holds 
that claim II(A) is procedurally defaulted because this 
non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial 
and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 
215 Va. 27, 29-30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
In claim II(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
 
6
to object to the inadequacy of the information given to the 
venire and failed to cure the trial court’s error.  
Petitioner contends that the “facts” were undisputed and 
did not go to any element of any offense that was charged.  
Petitioner asserts that had counsel ensured that the 
victim’s age and other circumstances were provided to the 
venire, there is a reasonable probability that one of the 
potential jurors would have revealed that he or she was 
unqualified. 
The Court holds that claim II(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
trial transcripts, demonstrates that counsel asked the 
jurors whether any sorrow or sympathy they might feel 
towards the victim would affect their ability to judge the 
case fairly.  Moreover, the court instructed the jurors,  
“You must not be influenced in any degree by any personal 
feeling of sympathy for or prejudice against any party.” 
Petitioner also fails to identify any information, 
other than the victim’s age, that he contends should have 
been provided to the venire.  Moreover, petitioner does not 
allege that he was actually denied an impartial jury or 
that any of the jurors seated would have been deemed 
unqualified to serve had the victim’s age and other unknown 
 
7
information been provided to them.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim III, petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to adequately redact portions of the videotaped police 
interrogation of the petitioner and failed to adequately 
redact portions of the interrogation transcript.  
Petitioner contends that counsel failed to redact 
references to home burglaries, suspicion that petitioner 
“hung out with” drug dealers, petitioner’s heavy 
consumption of alcoholic beverages, petitioner’s confession 
to a break-in at the victim’s apartment complex the night 
prior to the victim’s murder, and police suspicion that 
petitioner had committed an unrelated rape.  Petitioner 
further contends that counsel’s performance was 
“explosively prejudicial” because there was a reasonable 
probability that “the jurors found [him] guilty of capital 
murder because of his prior crimes.” 
The Court holds that claim III satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
 
8
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
trial transcripts, demonstrates that petitioner’s counsel, 
Patrick D. Kelley, reviewed the videotape, provided the 
Commonwealth with proposed redactions prior to opening 
statements, discussed the proposed redactions on the record 
prior to the videotape being introduced into evidence, and 
finally agreed to a satisfactory redacted version.  The 
record further demonstrates that petitioner’s other 
counsel, Andrew A. Protogyrou, reviewed the transcript and 
objected to the use of the transcript.  Furthermore, the 
unredacted portions of the videotape support the 
petitioner’s theory of defense that he was a burglar, not a 
rapist or a murderer, and that he did not intend to commit 
murder when he entered the victim’s apartment.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim IV(A), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose the exculpatory information 
that Alex Meekins and Jasper Meekins are only half brothers 
and falsely argued that because mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) 
analysis evidence excluded Alex as a contributor of the 
 
9
hairs found on the victim’s body, Jasper was also excluded.  
Petitioner contends that if Alex and Jasper are not from 
the same maternal line, they would have different mtDNA, 
and the exclusion of Alex would have provided no meaningful 
information about Jasper.  The Court holds that claim IV(A) 
is procedurally defaulted.  Petitioner concedes that Andrew 
Protogyrou’s trial notes confirm that trial counsel were 
aware that Alex and Jasper were half brothers.  
Furthermore, Alex Meekins had been subpoenaed to appear at 
trial and could have verified his lineage.  Thus, the 
allegedly exculpatory information concerning both Meekins’ 
parental history was available to petitioner at trial.  
Because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been 
raised at trial and on direct appeal, it is not cognizable 
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 
Va. at 29-30, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim IV(B), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and to 
inform the jury that Alex and Jasper Meekins are only 
half brothers.  Petitioner contends that counsel 
should have called Alex to testify that he and Jasper 
were half brothers and should have sought DNA testing 
of Jasper.  Petitioner asserts that counsel’s errors 
 
10
prevented counsel from arguing that another person 
raped and killed the victim after petitioner left.  
Thus, petitioner contends that he was prejudiced 
because the jury was left with an impression that 
petitioner was the only person that could have left 
the pubic hairs found on the victim’s body. 
The Court holds that claim IV(B) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including expert testimony at trial and the 
certificates of analysis entered into evidence, 
demonstrates that mtDNA testing excluded Alex Meekins 
as a contributor of the pubic hairs found on the 
victim’s body and in her bed.  According to the expert 
testimony presented at trial, mtDNA is shared, 
identically, by a mother and her offspring.  Juvenile 
records, submitted by the Warden in this proceeding, 
for both Alex and Jasper Meekins demonstrate that the 
brothers share the same mother.  Consequently, 
petitioner’s claim that Jasper would have different 
mtDNA than his half brother is factually without 
merit. 
The record further demonstrates that petitioner 
admitted to raping the victim and that mtDNA testing 
 
11
of the pubic hairs found on the victim were determined 
to be consistent with the petitioner’s mtDNA to the 
exclusion of 99.998% of the population with a 95% 
degree of confidence.  In light of the petitioner’s 
confessions to police and counsel’s theory that the 
killing was accidental, counsel engaged in sound trial 
strategy when they chose not to argue that some 
unidentified individual killed the victim.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim V(A), petitioner alleges that the prosecutor 
improperly used demonstrative evidence in his closing 
argument when he impermissibly demonstrated the manner in 
which petitioner held the pillow down over the victim.  
Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s demonstration was 
improper because no evidence was presented at trial to 
prove petitioner pressed the pillow down continuously with 
both hands, at a steep angle, with force, or “with [a] 
single-minded fixation.”  The Court holds that claim V(A) 
is barred because this issue was raised and decided on 
direct appeal from the criminal convictions, and therefore, 
 
12
it cannot be raised on habeas corpus.  Henry v. Warden, 265 
Va. 246, 249, 576 S.E.2d 495, 496-97 (2003). 
In claim V(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably failed to raise an appropriate objection to 
the pillow demonstration and failed to request a curative 
instruction.  Although petitioner does not dispute the 
prosecutor’s right to use the pillow to demonstrate the 
passage of time necessary to cause death by suffocation, 
petitioner claims the prosecutor was not permitted to 
“present a concocted portrayal” of the petitioner’s 
conduct.  Petitioner contends that had counsel objected to 
the prosecutor’s improper demonstration, there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would not have 
unanimously found that the killing was willful. 
The Court holds that claim V(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  On direct appeal, this 
Court reviewed the record of petitioner’s trial and held 
that “the Commonwealth’s demonstration did not distort the 
evidence concerning the manner of Mrs. Phillips’ death.”  
Jackson, 267 Va. at 203, 590 S.E.2d at 534.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
 
13
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In a portion of claim VI(A), petitioner alleges that 
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel unreasonably failed to object to the substance of 
Richard Phillips’ testimony during the penalty phase of the 
trial.  Following his testimony during the guilt phase, 
Richard Phillips, the victim’s son, was permitted to remain 
in the courtroom.  At that time, the prosecutor stated that 
he did not intend to have Mr. Phillips testify again.  The 
trial court allowed Mr. Phillips to testify a second time, 
however, during the sentencing phase and over counsel’s 
objection, finding that Mr. Phillips did not hear anything 
“during the trial on guilt or innocence that would change 
his [victim impact] testimony.”  Petitioner contends that 
the content of Mr. Phillips’ testimony was, in fact, 
altered by what he had heard during the guilt phase of the 
trial and that counsel should have objected when Mr. 
Phillips commented how impressed he was with the jury 
process and that he could not imagine how the jurors could 
listen to something that would remain with them all of 
their lives. 
 
14
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(A) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  In 
petitioner’s direct appeal, this Court held that, pursuant 
to Code § 19.2-265.01, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing Mr. Phillips to testify during the 
penalty phase even though he had remained in the courtroom 
after his guilt phase testimony.  Jackson, 267 Va. at 205, 
590 S.E.2d at 535.  This Court noted that Mr. Phillips did 
not learn anything that affected his victim impact 
testimony and held that the defendant was not prejudiced by 
Mr. Phillips’ penalty phase testimony.  Id.
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 
petitioner has presented Mr. Phillips’ comments about the 
jury process in an incomplete fashion.  When considered in 
context, Mr. Phillips’ comments were not comments on 
evidence he heard as to petitioner’s guilt, were not 
objectionable, and were not prejudicial.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 694. 
 
15
In another portion of claim VI(A), petitioner alleges 
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
because counsel failed to object to the exclusion of 
Jackson’s family from the courtroom during the guilt phase.  
Since Jackson’s family members were expected to testify 
during the penalty phase, the trial court excluded 
petitioner’s family from the courtroom during the guilt 
phase.  Petitioner claims that counsel’s failure to object 
sent a false message that petitioner’s family did not care 
enough to be with petitioner during his trial. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(A) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Petitioner cannot demonstrate that an objection would have 
been successful because Code § 19.2-265.01 does not provide 
an exemption that would have allowed petitioner’s family 
members to remain in the courtroom during the guilt phase 
of the trial and later testify at the penalty phase.  In 
addition, petitioner has not alleged that any juror 
actually believed his family “did not care” or that the 
presence of any members of his family during trial would 
have affected the jury’s determination.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
 
16
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim VI(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably failed to object to Mr. Phillips’ testimony at 
the post-verdict sentencing hearing held before the trial 
court on April 3, 2003 pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5.  
Petitioner claims counsel should have objected that Mr. 
Phillips’ testimony exceeded the scope of permissible 
victim impact evidence and improperly referred to 
petitioner’s other crimes. 
The Court holds that claim VI(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The limitations and 
requirements relating to victim impact evidence do not 
apply at the post-verdict sentencing hearing and the trial 
court has the discretion to determine the admissibility of 
such evidence.  Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 
354-55, 551 S.E.2d 620, 633 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 
1062 (2002).  Moreover, evidence regarding the other crimes 
to which Mr. Phillips briefly referred had been admitted 
into evidence during the guilt and penalty phases of the 
trial.  Therefore, petitioner fails to demonstrate that 
 
17
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
In claim VI(C), and in a portion of claim VI(D), 
petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel unreasonably failed 
to object to additional, cumulative victim impact evidence 
presented by Richard Phillips at the post-verdict 
sentencing hearing.  The Court holds that claim VI(C) and 
this portion of claim VI(D) satisfy neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner argues that the 
victim does not have a statutory “right” to testify at the 
post-verdict sentencing hearing; however, he does not 
provide any authority for his claim that victim impact 
testimony during the post-verdict sentencing hearing is 
impermissible.  Furthermore, petitioner does not attempt to 
demonstrate how the cumulative nature of the evidence 
prejudiced him during the post-verdict sentencing 
proceeding. 
As opposed to the jury’s sentencing role, see Code 
§ 19.2-264.4, in a post-verdict sentencing proceeding, the 
trial court’s role is to determine whether good cause 
 
18
exists to reduce a jury’s verdict of death.  Code § 19.2-
264.5.  The record, including the transcripts of 
petitioner’s trial and sentencing hearings, demonstrates 
that the trial court exercised its discretion to determine 
the relevance and admissibility of the evidence and that 
the trial court’s sentence of death was based upon that 
court’s consideration of the evidence in mitigation and 
aggravation, including petitioner’s significant criminal 
history.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In another portion of claim VI(D), petitioner alleges 
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
the jury was permitted to hear victim impact evidence from 
Mr. Phillips twice.  Petitioner contends that there is a 
reasonable probability that if defense counsel had properly 
objected to Mr. Phillips’ second testimony during the 
penalty phase at least one juror would have held out for a 
life sentence. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(D) is 
without merit.  The record, including the guilt and penalty 
phase transcripts, demonstrates that Mr. Phillips guilt 
 
19
phase testimony was factual testimony concerning the 
circumstances surrounding his discovery of his mother’s 
body and did not constitute “victim impact evidence.”  
Thus, the jury did not twice hear victim impact evidence 
from Mr. Phillips. 
In another portion of claim VI(D), petitioner alleges 
counsel’s failure to object to victim impact evidence at 
the sentencing phase and at the post-verdict sentencing 
hearing cumulatively prejudiced petitioner.  The Court 
holds that this portion of claim VI(D) is without merit.  
“Having rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, 
there is no support for the proposition that such actions 
when considered collectively have deprived petitioner of 
his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel.”  Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 267 
Va. 318, 340, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305 (2004). 
In claim VII(A)(1), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to adequately investigate and present available 
mitigation evidence concerning his childhood abuse, in 
particular, testimony from petitioner’s siblings.  
Petitioner contends that it is unreasonable to believe that 
petitioner’s parents, as the alleged abusers, would have 
offered substantial evidence of child abuse, and yet 
 
20
counsel called only petitioner’s parents to testify as to 
this issue.  Petitioner has attached several affidavits to 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in support of his 
contention that counsel should have called additional 
witnesses to testify as to this issue.  Petitioner contends 
that counsel’s failure to elicit testimony on this issue 
from other sources prevented the jury from hearing “how or 
why Jackson’s abusive childhood extenuated his moral 
culpability.” 
The Court holds that claim VII(A)(1) does not satisfy 
the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  The record, including the guilt and penalty 
phase transcripts and the affidavit of trial counsel, 
demonstrates that counsel presented ample evidence, 
including the testimony of physicians, psychologists, 
social workers, and a pastor who had treated, evaluated, 
and/or counseled petitioner and his family, to substantiate 
that petitioner was the victim of child abuse.  This 
evidence included information that petitioner’s stepfather 
received a suspended jail sentence for physically abusing 
petitioner; hospital and doctor’s office records indicating 
petitioner had been physically disciplined with a belt 
resulting in lasting bruises; records that petitioner had 
suffered various fractures of unknown origin to his 
 
21
extremities; that petitioner often appeared bruised; that 
reports of abuse were made to the James City County 
Department of Social Services and that twice the abuse was 
determined to be “founded;” that petitioner was allowed to 
drink beer as a young child; that petitioner and his 
stepfather had a bad relationship and that, even during 
counseling, petitioner’s stepfather constantly berated 
petitioner by calling petitioner “evil;” that petitioner’s 
“problems were compounded by the weakness of [his] parental 
subsystem” and lack of “material resources” which required 
petitioner to be left unsupervised; that petitioner’s 
family did not follow through with counseling or 
recommendations; and that on at least one occasion, 
petitioner had been sexually abused.  In addition, counsel 
elicited testimony from the police officer who investigated 
the charges of child abuse against petitioner’s stepfather 
and from several of petitioner’s neighbors, friends, and 
family members, including his mother, father, and 
stepfather. 
The evidence that petitioner contends counsel should 
have presented is largely cumulative of that considered by 
the jury.  The only new information proffered by petitioner 
consists of anecdotal evidence of specific instances of the 
abuse from the perspective of petitioner’s siblings.  The 
 
22
affidavit of trial counsel demonstrates that counsel made a 
strategic decision not to call petitioner’s brother, Damien 
Jackson, to testify because Damien’s successful transition 
from the abusive environment into a military career would 
have diminished the mitigating effect of petitioner’s 
abusive upbringing.  Counsel were aware of the child abuse 
suffered by the petitioner when counsel decided not to call 
Damien as a witness.  Nothing in the record demonstrates 
that counsel’s decision would have been altered by knowing 
the specific details of the abuse that petitioner’s 
siblings now provide.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim VII(A)(2), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to adequately investigate and present available 
mitigation evidence concerning his good character.  
Petitioner contends that Marie Simons, petitioner’s 
girlfriend, and Constance Howard, another friend, were 
available to testify as character witnesses and would have 
testified that petitioner was a good man who was kind, had 
dreams and aspirations, and was devoted to his grandmother.  
 
23
Petitioner further contends that, as a result of counsel’s 
failure to call these witnesses, the jurors did not hear 
testimony that Jackson responded in a positive manner when 
he was not living in a traumatic and threatening 
environment, and had the jurors heard this information, the 
jury may have returned a verdict of life imprisonment. 
The Court holds that claim VII(A)(2) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
transcript of the sentencing phase, demonstrates that the 
jury heard evidence of petitioner’s good qualities, 
including evidence that petitioner was well-mannered and 
cooperative, followed directions, was motivated and 
ambitious, and had positive relationships outside of his 
immediate family environment.  In addition, counsel 
elicited testimony that despite two particularized 
incidents, petitioner had adjusted positively to 
confinement.  Petitioner has not attempted to demonstrate 
how additional evidence of his good character, such as his 
love for his grandmother and his desire that his parents 
reunite, would have affected the jury’s determination.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
 
24
result of the proceeding would have been different.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim VIII(A), the petitioner claims that jurors 
Wendy Berube and Dana Metheny indicated that they would not 
consider age and background as mitigation evidence unless 
the trial court instructed them to do so.  Petitioner 
contends that both jurors were not qualified to sit because 
the court failed to give such an instruction or to excuse 
them.  The Court holds that claim VIII(A) is procedurally 
defaulted because this non-jurisdictional issue could have 
been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Slayton, 215 Va. at 29-30, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim VIII(B), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably failed to request the trial court to give the 
necessary instruction regarding age and background as 
mitigation evidence, failed to object when the court did 
not give the instruction, and failed to move to dismiss 
jurors Berube and Metheny as unqualified.  Petitioner 
further claims that prejudice is presumed under these 
circumstances and that if the jurors had been given the 
necessary instruction, there is a reasonable probability 
 
25
that one of the jurors would have voted for a life 
sentence. 
The Court holds that claim VIII(B) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner’s contention 
that qualification of these jurors was “conditioned” upon 
the giving of a specific instruction is not supported in 
fact or in law.  Both jurors were qualified upon the trial 
court’s determination that they would be fair and 
impartial.  Petitioner is unable to establish that 
counsel’s failure to seek the particular instruction at 
issue was unreasonable because an instruction emphasizing 
individual mitigating factors would have been properly 
refused.  George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 283, 411 
S.E.2d 12, 23 (1991); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 
564, 595, 304 S.E.2d 644, 661 (1983).  Furthermore, the 
record demonstrates that the jury was instructed to 
consider petitioner’s history, background, and mitigating 
factors in determining whether petitioner posed a future 
danger to society and, if so, whether to impose a sentence 
of life imprisonment or death.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
 
26
would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687, 694. 
In claim VIII(C), petitioner alleges that the 
prosecutor engaged in “misconduct” by failing to ensure 
Berube remained qualified.  Petitioner contends that 
because the prosecutor opposed counsel’s motion to strike 
Berube, arguing that she would be qualified if instructed 
to consider petitioner’s age and background in mitigation, 
the prosecutor had a duty to ensure that Berube received 
the instruction.  The Court holds that claim VIII(C) is 
procedurally defaulted because this non-jurisdictional 
issue could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal 
and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29-30, 205 S.E.2d at 
682. 
In claim IX(A), petitioner alleges that the penalty 
phase instructions interfered with the jurors’ ability to 
give full effect to mitigating evidence.  Petitioner 
contends that his right to a reliable determination of 
punishment was violated by the trial court’s instruction 
that “[a]ny decision you make regarding punishment must be 
unanimous” and the court’s failure to instruct jurors that 
their findings on mitigation did not have to be unanimous.  
The Court holds that claim IX(A) is procedurally defaulted 
 
27
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been 
raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id.
In claim IX(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to request an instruction stating that findings regarding 
mitigating factors did not have to be unanimous.  
Petitioner alleges that counsel should have objected when 
the trial court instructed the jurors that they had to be 
unanimous in their decision regarding punishment and should 
have argued that the Constitution required the trial court 
to instruct the jurors that their determination of 
mitigating factors did not have to be unanimous.  
Petitioner contends that if the jurors had known that they 
did not have to be unanimous as to the mitigating factors, 
there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror 
would have held out for a life sentence. 
The Court holds that claim IX(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  “[T]he Virginia sentencing 
scheme does not require juries to make findings as to 
specific mitigating factors.  Instead, juries are 
instructed to consider all possible mitigating 
circumstances before rendering their sentence decision.”  
 
28
Roach v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 210, 223 (4th Cir. 1999).  In 
this case, the trial court instructed the jury to “consider 
any mitigation evidence presented of circumstances which do 
not justify or excuse the offense but which in fairness or 
mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral 
culpability and punishment.”  The trial court’s instruction 
that the jury’s decision regarding punishment must be 
unanimous did not preclude the jury from considering 
mitigating evidence.  Id.  Counsel are not unreasonable for 
failing to request an instruction that was not necessary or 
required.  Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 90-91, 452 
S.E.2d 862, 870 (1995).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687, 694. 
In claim X(A), petitioner alleges that the verdict 
forms were defective because they did not state that life 
imprisonment meant life imprisonment “without the 
possibility of parole.”  Petitioner concedes that jurors 
were twice instructed that life imprisonment meant life 
without the possibility of parole, but, nonetheless, 
contends that the verdict forms denied him the right to due 
 
29
process of law and a fair trial.  The Court holds that 
claim X(A) is procedurally defaulted because this non-
jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on 
direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29-30, 
205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim X(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably failed to object to the verdict forms on the 
grounds that they did not contain the language qualifying 
the definition of life imprisonment as life without the 
possibility of parole.  The Court holds that claim X(B) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record demonstrates, and petitioner concedes, that the jury 
was properly instructed that “imprisonment for life” meant  
“imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.”  
As required by statute, the verdict forms included all the 
requisite options.  Code § 19.2-264.4; Morrisette, 270 Va. 
at 202-03, 613 S.E.2d at 562.  There is no requirement that 
a verdict form contain the instruction that imprisonment 
for life means “imprisonment for life without the 
possibility of parole.”  Lenz, 267 Va. at 324 n.1, 593 
S.E.2d at 295 n.1.  Thus, counsel’s failure to make a 
 
30
meritless objection was not deficient, and petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim XI(A), petitioner alleges that the 
prosecutor’s argument improperly nullified the effect of 
petitioner’s mitigation evidence.  The Court holds that 
claim XI(A) is procedurally defaulted because this non-
jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on 
direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29-30, 
205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim XI(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument 
regarding the mitigation evidence.  Petitioner contends 
that the prosecutor improperly nullified the mitigation 
evidence when he argued that petitioner and his brother 
grew up in the same environment and petitioner’s brother 
“corrected himself,” inferring that petitioner also could 
have overcome his adverse childhood environment if he had 
wanted to do so.  Petitioner further contends that counsel 
unreasonably failed to investigate his brother’s 
 
31
circumstances and was, therefore, unprepared to rebut the 
prosecutor’s argument.  Petitioner claims that there is a 
reasonable probability that had counsel been prepared to 
object to or rebut the prosecutor’s argument, the jurors 
would have given full consideration to the mitigation 
evidence and at least one juror would have voted for life. 
The Court holds that claim XI(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that the prosecutor merely 
reminded the jurors of the evidence that petitioner’s 
brother had overcome his childhood environment, while 
petitioner did not.  The prosecutor has “a right to combat, 
and to argue the evidence and the fair inferences from it 
with respect both to the defendant’s guilt and to a fitting 
punishment.”  Martinez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 557, 559-
60, 403 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1991), (quoting Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 664, 70 S.E.2d 322 (1952)).  The 
affidavit of counsel demonstrates that counsel, aware that 
petitioner’s brother had a successful adult life, chose not 
to subpoena the brother in order to minimize the contrast 
between the brother and petitioner.  Moreover, petitioner 
has failed to establish that the jurors did not give the 
mitigation evidence full effect despite the prosecutor’s 
 
32
argument.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim XII(A), petitioner alleges that this Court 
unreasonably and erroneously induced counsel to withdraw on 
direct appeal his Assignment of Error Number Eight, which 
stated that “[t]he trial court erred in denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss capital murder indictment for failure to 
allege aggravating elements.”  Petitioner contends that 
this Court violated his rights to due process and the 
effective assistance of counsel when it improperly elicited 
a withdrawal of Assignment of Error Number Eight during 
oral argument, and when the Court, thereafter, failed to 
address the Assignment of Error in its opinion.  The Court 
holds that claim XII(A) is procedurally defaulted because 
this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised in a 
petition for rehearing and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 
29-30, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim XII(B), petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably withdrew Assignment of Error Number Eight and 
 
33
unreasonably failed to correct his error.  Petitioner 
contends that counsel was unfamiliar with the contents of 
the petition for appeal and was therefore unprepared to 
adequately argue that petitioner actually had made an 
argument for Assignment of Error Number Eight.  Petitioner 
further contends that had counsel not waived this issue, 
the Court would have ruled in petitioner’s favor and 
petitioner would have prevailed on appeal. 
The Court holds that claim XII(B) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  Even if counsel had properly preserved this 
assignment of error, there is not a reasonable probability 
that the result of the appeal would have been any 
different.  Petitioner asserted in Assignment of Error 
Number Eight that “[t]he trial court erred in denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss capital murder indictment for 
failure to allege aggravating elements.”  There is no 
constitutional requirement that a capital murder indictment 
include allegations concerning aggravating factors.  Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n.4 (2002)(noting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment has not been construed to include the 
Fifth Amendment right to “presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 n.3 
(2000). 
 
34
Furthermore, this Court has held that a defendant 
charged with capital murder is not entitled to a bill of 
particulars delineating the Commonwealth’s intended 
aggravating factors when the indictment specifying the 
crime gives the defendant notice of the nature and 
character of the offense charged.  Roach v. Commonwealth, 
251 Va. 324, 340, 468 S.E.2d 98, 107 (1996).  The 
indictment in this case gave petitioner notice of the 
nature and character of the offense.  Thus, the trial court 
correctly denied counsel’s motion to dismiss the indictment 
and counsel cannot be held ineffective for withdrawing, 
even unintentionally, a frivolous argument.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim XIII, petitioner alleges that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably waived Assignment of Error Number Seven on 
direct appeal.  Assignment of Error Number Seven alleged, 
“[t]he trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to 
transfer venue.”  Counsel waived arguing this assignment of 
error in favor of raising the venue issue in conjunction 
with the appellate argument that petitioner’s sentence was 
 
35
the result of passion and prejudice.  Petitioner further 
contends that had counsel not waived this assignment of 
error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of 
the appeal would have been different. 
The Court holds that claim XIII satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates 
that counsel’s decision to argue venue as part of the 
prejudice and passion argument was a matter of appellate 
strategy.  “[T]he process of ‘winnowing out weaker claims 
on appeal and focusing on’ those more likely to prevail, 
far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of 
effective . . . advocacy.”  Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 
784 (1987); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 
(1986) (what claims to raise on appeal, and how to raise 
them, are matters entrusted to the discretion of appellate 
counsel).  Furthermore, this Court noted that the trial 
court was able to seat a jury with relative ease.  Jackson, 
267 Va. at 207 n.8, 590 S.E.2d at 537 n.8.  The ease with 
which a jury is selected is a critical element in 
determining whether venue is proper.  Jackson, 267 Va. at 
207 n.8, 590 S.E.2d at 537 n.8; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 
Va. 216, 231, 559 S.E.2d 652, 660 (2002).  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
 
36
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 694. 
In claim XIV, petitioner alleges that the cumulative 
character of counsel’s performance and resulting 
prejudicial impact deprived him of his constitutionally 
guaranteed assistance of counsel.  The Court holds that 
claim XIV is without merit.  As addressed previously, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that petitioner suffered 
prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged errors.  “Having 
rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, there is 
no support for the proposition that such actions when 
considered collectively have deprived petitioner of his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.”  
Lenz, 267 Va. at 340, 593 S.E.2d at 305. 
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 
 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk 
 
37