Case Title: State vs. Yeargan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01S01-9604-CC-00080

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
1"Because the investigatory stop in t his case was based upon reasonable suspicion, it was valid under both the federal and state constitutions.” Majority Opinion at _____ [slip op. at 16]. Particularly alarming is t he statement: “Indeed, the availabil ity of less intrusive invest igatory techniques does not vitiat e the constitutional validity of a stop which is supported by reasonable suspicion.” Id. FILED November 24, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk FOR PUBLICATION 1 2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 3 4 AT NASHVILLE 5 6 HEARD AT COOKEVILLE 7 8 9 10 11 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( 12 ( 13 Plaintiff-Appellee, ( 14 ( Coffee Criminal 15 ( 16 v. ( Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., 17 ( Judge 18 ( 19 WAYNE LEE YEARGAN, ( No. 01S01-9604-CC-00080 20 ( 21 Defendant-Appellant. ( 22 23 24 25 26 C O N C U R R I N G I N R E S U L T S 27 28 29 30 31 I agree that the motion to suppress the evidence be 32 denied. I write separately because the language of the majority 33 opinion reduces the constitutional standard for search and seizure 34 to “reasonable suspicion.”1 The majority misconstrues Terry v. 35 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme 36 Court case which recognized the validity of investigative stops 37 based on exigent circumstances, and ignores Whren v. United States, 38 _____ U.S. _____, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996), the most recent United 39 2Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 (1993). 3Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504 (1993). -2- States Supreme Court case discussing the requirements for probable 1 cause. The majority also fails to follow, or even mention, the 2 holdings in Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979) and State 3 v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993) in which this Court discussed 4 in detail the rationale and requirements for an investigative stop. 5 6 7 I 8 9 The appeal is from convictions of driving under the 10 influence of an intoxicant, second offense,2 and driving a motor 11 vehicle with a revoked driver license,3 entered upon the 12 defendant's pleas of guilty, reserving a dispositive question of 13 law. 14 15 On Thursday, January 28, 1993, at approximately 2:20 16 p.m., Tullahoma Police Officer Jason Ferrell observed the 17 defendant, Wayne Lee Yeargan, driving a pickup truck on a public 18 street in Tullahoma. Previously, Officer Ferrell had arrested the 19 defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and had 20 been present in the general sessions court on July 2, 1992 when the 21 defendant pleaded guilty to the offense and was sentenced to 11 22 months and 29 days in jail, a fine of $250, and the revocation of 23 his driver license for one year from the date of the judgment. 24 25 -3- When the officer began following the defendant's truck, 1 the defendant, according to the officer's testimony, "sped up some, 2 he wasn't going at a high rate of speed, but he accelerated." In 3 the officer's view, the defendant "attempted to put some traffic 4 between us." The defendant then drove into the parking lot of 5 Ruby’s Lounge, a local bar; the officer followed and put on his 6 blue lights. The defendant parked and got out of his truck. The 7 officer asked to see his driver license, and he produced a 8 restricted license issued pursuant to a court order which permitted 9 the defendant to drive “in Coffee County only as necessary to 10 complete job tasks” between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The 11 defendant’s employment was listed on the order granting the 12 restricted license as farming and "rental property owner." The 13 officer testified that when he asked the defendant why he had 14 driven to the bar, the defendant replied that he “had come to the 15 bar to meet a guy about a cow.” Based on his observations and a 16 field sobriety test, the officer concluded that the defendant was 17 under the influence of an intoxicant and arrested him for driving 18 under the influence and driving on a revoked license. The police 19 officer admitted that he was aware of the availability of 20 restricted licenses for driving offenders. However, he testified 21 that if he had tried to establish the status of the defendant’s 22 license before stopping him, it would have taken approximately 15 23 minutes for the police radio operator to determine whether the 24 defendant had a restricted license. 25 26 The Court of Criminal Appeals found that "a prudent 27 -4- officer could reasonably have believed that the appellant was 1 driving on a revoked license" and held that the officer had 2 "probable cause to conduct an investigative stop." In reaching 3 that conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Terry v. 4 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) and State v. Watkins, 827 5 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. 1992). 6 7 II 8 9 This Court recently clarified the standard of review 10 under which a trial court’s findings of fact on suppression issues 11 are to be reviewed: 12 13 Questions of credibility of the 14 witnesses, the weight and value of the 15 evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the 16 evidence are matters entrusted to the trial 17 judge as the trier of fact. The party 18 prevailing in the trial court is entitled to 19 the strongest legitimate view of the evidence 20 adduced at the suppression hearing as well as 21 all reasonable and legitimate inferences that 22 may be drawn from that evidence. So long as 23 the greater weight of the evidence supports 24 the trial court’s findings, those findings 25 shall be upheld. In other words, a trial 26 court’s findings of fact in a suppression 27 hearing will be upheld unless the evidence 28 preponderates otherwise. We also note that 29 this standard of review is consistent with 30 Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), which provides that in 31 civil cases, findings of fact by a trial court 32 are presumed correct “unless the preponderance 33 of the evidence is otherwise.” Hereafter, the 34 proper standard to be applied in reviewing 35 suppression issues is the “preponderance of 36 the evidence” standard. 37 38 39 State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of 40 4The Fourth Amendment states, Unreasonable searches and seizures. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per sons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961). Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution states, Unreasonable searches and seizures - General warrants. - That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not particularl y described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. -5- the law to the facts found by the trial court, however, is a 1 question of law which this Court reviews de novo. Beare Co. v. 2 Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993). 3 4 III 5 6 A. 7 8 The relevant constitutional provisions are the Fourth 9 Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 7, of the Tennessee Constitution.4 The Fourth Amendment "exists, 11 primarily, for the benefit of the citizen; its origin and history 12 clearly manifest that the Fourth Amendment was intended as a 13 restraint upon the activities of the sovereign authority to the 14 -6- extent that a citizen may be secure in the unmolested enjoyment of 1 home and possessions, except by virtue of process duly issued." 2 State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tenn. 1996). The Court 3 recently reaffirmed this historic principle: 4 5 [B]oth the Fourth Amendment to the United 6 States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit 8 "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The 9 State may not invade this personal 10 constitutional right of the individual citizen 11 except under the most exigent circumstances. 12 13 . . . 14 15 A warrantless search and seizure, 16 therefore, is presumed unreasonable unless it 17 falls into one of the narrowly defined 18 exceptions, or exigent circumstances, to the 19 warrant requirement. The mere existence of 20 these circumstances does not necessarily 21 validate a warrantless search. As pointed out 22 in [United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 885 23 (6th Cir. 1972)], exceptions are jealously and 24 carefully drawn." There must be a showing by 25 those asserting the exception that the 26 exigencies of the situation made the search 27 imperative. The burden is on those seeking 28 the exception to show the need. 29 30 31 32 State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tenn. 1996) (citations 33 omitted). 34 35 The stop of the defendant’s vehicle in this case 36 implicates the protection of both the state and federal 37 constitutions: "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop 38 of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and 39 for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within 40 the meaning of this provision." Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. 41 5The correct spelling of the defendant's name is "Pulley"; however, it is cited by West Publishing Company as "Pully." -7- ____,___, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 1 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979). 2 3 When an officer turns on his blue lights, he 4 or she has clearly initiated a stop. See 5 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 6 105 S. Ct. 675, 679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); 7 Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1,4 n. 3, 101 8 S. Ct. 42, 44 n. 3, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980). 9 Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court 10 observed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 11 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), 12 “[i]t must be recognized that whenever a 13 police officer accosts an individual and 14 restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 15 ‘seized’ that person.” See also United States 16 v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 17 S. Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 18 19 20 State v. Pully,5 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993). "An automobile 21 stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not 22 be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Whren v. United 23 States, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1772; see State v. Downey, 24 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997). 25 26 The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 require 27 the existence of “probable cause” for making an arrest without an 28 arrest warrant. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 29 (1964); State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982), cert. 30 denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770 (1983). In order to have 31 probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, at the moment of 32 the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the 33 -8- officers, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, 1 must be “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 2 [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. 3 Ohio, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S. Ct. at 225; Melson, 638 S.W.2d at 350. 4 5 Although probable cause is the only basis on which a 6 person may be arrested without a warrant, under certain 7 circumstances, a person may be detained briefly by a police officer 8 without a warrant or probable cause. Under exigent circumstances, 9 "a police officer may make an investigative stop of a motor vehicle 10 when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific 11 and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about 12 to be committed." State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 13 1992); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 14 (1968)). 15 16 The motion to suppress is directed to evidence of the 17 defendant's intoxication, which was apparent to the officer upon 18 observing his appearance and demeanor, consequently, the 19 admissibility of the evidence depends entirely upon the legality of 20 the stop. The stop was permissible and the evidence admissible if 21 there was probable cause for an arrest or if there were grounds for 22 an investigative stop. 23 24 Two distinct but closely related issues, both governed 25 by the Fourth Amendment and Art. I, Section 7, are presented in 26 this case. The facts and circumstances of the case must be 27 -9- examined first to determine if they constitute grounds justifying 1 the defendant's arrest. If the facts and circumstances do not 2 warrant the reasonable belief that a crime has been or is being 3 committed and, therefore, there is no probable cause for arrest, 4 then secondly, those facts and circumstances may be examined to 5 determine if they permit an investigative stop. 6 7 B. 8 9 Although the determination of probable cause turns on 10 the facts and circumstances of each case, the framework within 11 which that determination is made is well settled. Significant 12 aspects of that framework are set forth in the following material 13 in 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b), pp. 6, and § 14 3.2, p. 22 (3d ed. 1996): 15 16 It is generally assumed by the Supreme 17 Court and the lower courts that the same 18 quantum of evidence is required whether one is 19 concerned with probable cause to arrest or 20 probable cause to search. For this reason, 21 discussions by courts of the probable cause 22 requirement often refer to and rely upon prior 23 decisions without regard to whether these 24 earlier cases were concerned with the grounds 25 to arrest or the grounds to search. . . . 26 27 . . . . 28 29 Notwithstanding the frequency with which 30 police, lawyers and judges must decide whether 31 a given set of facts amounts to probable 32 cause, it remains "an exceedingly difficult 33 concept to objectify." As noted in United 34 States v. Davis: 35 36 The contours and salient principles 37 of probable cause have been 38 -10- faithfully catalogued in a surfeit of 1 decisional law. Probable cause 2 exists when known facts and 3 circumstances are sufficient to 4 warrant a man of reasonable prudence 5 in the belief that an offense has 6 been or is being committed. . . . A 7 significantly lower quanta of proof 8 is required to establish probable 9 cause than guilt. . . . Probable 10 cause does not emanate from an 11 antiseptic courtroom, a sterile 12 library or a sacrosanct adytum, nor 13 is it a pristine "philosophical 14 concept existing in a vacuum," . . . 15 but rather it requires a pragmatic 16 analysis of "everyday life on which 17 reasonable and prudent men, not legal 18 technicians, act." . . . It is to be 19 viewed from the vantage point of a 20 prudent, reasonable, cautious police 21 officer on the scene at the time of 22 the arrest guided by his experience 23 and training. . . . It is "a plastic 24 concept whose existence depends on 25 the facts and circumstances of the 26 particular case." . . . Because of 27 the kaleidoscopic myriad that goes 28 into the probable cause mix "seldom 29 does a decision in one case handily 30 dispose of the next." . . . It is 31 however the totality of these facts 32 and circumstances which is the 33 relevant consideration. . . . Viewed 34 singly these factors may not be 35 dispositive, yet when viewed in 36 unison the puzzle may fit. 37 38 39 40 The most recent decision by this Court considering 41 probable cause to arrest is State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 42 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770 (1982). In that 43 case, the Court found that the information given to police officers 44 immediately after the homicide was committed, the defendant's 45 presence nearby, and the blood spots on the defendant's clothing, 46 constituted probable cause for the defendant's seizure and arrest, 47 -11- stating, 1 2 Since there was no warrant, we must pass 3 upon the validity of the arrest under the 4 statute permitting an officer to make a 5 warrantless arrest when a felony has been 6 committed and he has reasonable or probable 7 cause to believe that the arrestee committed 8 the felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-803(3). It 9 is conceded that probable cause must be more 10 than mere suspicion, West v. State, 221 Tenn. 11 178, 425 S.W.2d 602 (1968), but neither must 12 it be absolute certainty, Grey v. State, 542 13 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1976). Reasonable 14 or probable cause consists of grounds which 15 would lead a reasonable man to believe that 16 the person arrested was guilty of the felony, 17 Davis v. State, 2 Tenn. Cr. App. 297, 453 18 S.W.2d 438 (1969). In Davis, we quoted from 19 Jones v. State, 161 Tenn. 370, 33 S.W.2d 59 20 (1930), wherein it was stated: 21 22 "In Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 23 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 24 142 (1964), the [United States 25 Supreme] Court stated: 26 27 'Whether that arrest was 28 constitutionally valid depends . . . 29 upon whether, at the moment the 30 arrest was made, the officers had 31 probable cause to make it--whether at 32 that moment the facts and 33 circumstances within their knowledge 34 and of which they had reasonable 35 trustworthy information were 36 sufficient to warrant a prudent man 37 in believing that the petitioner had 38 committed . . . an offense.'" 39 40 453 S.W.2d at 440. 41 42 43 Id. at 350-51. Thus, probable cause is established when the facts 44 and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which 45 he has reasonably trustworthy information warrant a prudent person 46 in believing the defendant has committed or is committing an 47 -12- offense. 1 2 The Supreme Court of the United States recently 3 emphasized that where there is probable cause, the “reasonableness” 4 of the search and seizure required by the Fourth Amendment is 5 established. In Whren v. United States, _____ U.S. _____, 116 6 S. Ct. 1769 (1996), police officers observed the defendant 7 violating several traffic ordinances. They pursued the defendant's 8 vehicle and an officer approached the vehicle while it was stopped 9 at a traffic light. The officer, who was not in uniform, 10 identified himself to the defendant as a police officer and 11 directed the defendant to put the vehicle in park. The officer saw 12 the defendant openly holding contraband in his hands. The 13 defendant in Whren pressed the Supreme Court to suppress the 14 evidence obtained on the ground that the stop was pretextual. The 15 defendant insisted that the officer used the traffic violations as 16 a pretext for stopping the defendant when his real purpose was to 17 find evidence of illegal drug activity. Instead, the Court held 18 that the ulterior motives of the officer do not invalidate police 19 conduct that is justified on the basis of probable cause. 20 21 It is of course true that in principle 22 every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns 23 upon a “reasonableness” determination, 24 involves a balancing of all relevant factors. 25 With rare exceptions not applicable here, 26 however, the result of that balancing is not 27 in doubt where the search or seizure is based 28 upon probable cause. That is why petitioners 29 must rely upon cases like Prouse to provide 30 examples of actual “balancing” analysis. 31 There, the police action in question was a 32 random traffic stop for the purpose of 33 -13- checking a motorist’s license and vehicle 1 registration, a practice that ... involves 2 police intrusion without the probable cause 3 that is its traditional justification. 4 5 6 7 Id. at _____, 116 S. Ct. at 1776 (1996) (emphasis in original). 8 See also Ohio v. Robinette, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 117 S. Ct. 417, 9 420-21 (1996). The Supreme Court did not specifically discuss 10 investigative stops authorized by Terry and its progeny, but its 11 holding validates, under federal law, all detentions authorized by 12 probable cause. 13 14 Where probable cause has existed, the 15 only cases in which we have found it necessary 16 actually to perform the “balancing” analysis 17 involved searches or seizures conducted in an 18 extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an 19 individual’s privacy or even physical 20 interests - such as, for example, seizure by 21 means of deadly force .... The making of a 22 traffic stop out-of-uniform does not remotely 23 qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is 24 governed by the usual rule that probable cause 25 to believe the law has been broken 26 “outbalances” private interest in avoiding 27 police contact. 28 29 Whren v. United States, _____ U.S. at _____, 116 S. Ct. at 1776-77. 30 Consequently, a balancing analysis under Terry is not necessary 31 where there is probable cause. 32 33 C. 34 35 However, as recognized in Whren, the most recent 36 decision by the United States Supreme Court on this issue, where 37 there is no probable cause there must be “detailed ‘balancing’ to 38 6The majority states that Whren does not support the proposition that balancing is necessary in the absence of probable cause where a reasonable suspicion is present. See Majority Opinion at _____. [Slip op. at 8, n. 8]. Whren specifically states, “What is true of Prouse is also true of other cases that engaged in det ailed “balancing” to decide the constitutionalit y of automobile stops, . . . the det ailed “balancing” analysis was necessary because they involved seizures without probable cause.” Id. at _____, 116 S. Ct. at 1776. -14- decide the constitutionality of automobile stops” involving 1 sufficient, specific, identified facts in order to justify even a 2 limited intrusion.6 Id. at _____, 116 S. Ct. at 1776. 3 4 The validity of an investigative stop under exigent 5 circumstances was first recognized by the United States Supreme 6 Court in Terry v. Ohio. In that case, the Court addressed the 7 issue of whether the police have the right to stop and question an 8 individual in the absence of probable cause. In Terry, a policeman 9 became suspicious of two men who separately walked up and down a 10 street several times peering into a store, talked to a third man 11 and followed him up the street a short time later. A police 12 officer followed the suspects, confronted and searched them, and 13 found a pistol on two of them. Terry, charged with the crime of 14 carrying a concealed weapon, moved to suppress the weapon as 15 evidence. The Court held: 16 17 Each case of this sort will, of course, have 18 to be decided on its own facts. We merely 19 hold today that where a police officer 20 observes unusual conduct which leads him 21 reasonably to conclude in light of his 22 experience that criminal activity may be afoot 23 and that the persons with whom he is dealing 24 may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 25 the course of investigating this behavior he 26 identifies himself as a policeman and makes 27 reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the 28 -15- initial stages of the encounter serves to 1 dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 2 others’ safety, he is entitled for the 3 protection of himself and others in the area 4 to conduct a carefully limited search of the 5 outer clothing of such persons in an attempt 6 to discover weapons which might be used to 7 assault him. 8 9 10 11 Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85. 12 13 The majority opinion states that Terry requires only a reasonable 14 suspicion supported by specific and articulated facts that a 15 criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. However, 16 Terry specifically limited its holding to allow a stop where the 17 officer has not only a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity 18 may be afoot,” but also a reasonable suspicion that the persons 19 “may be armed and presently dangerous,” and to allow a search where 20 after reasonable inquiries, nothing “serves to dispel his 21 reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety.” Terry v. State of 22 Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85. The requirement of 23 exigent circumstances is not included in the rule announced by the 24 majority. 25 26 Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the holding in 27 Terry that investigative stops are limited to extraordinary 28 situations. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court found the 29 stop to be constitutionally unreasonable. The Court held that a 30 stop to check a license and registration is unreasonable "except in 31 those situations in which there is at least articulable and 32 reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an 33 automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an 34 7See also Tenn. Code Ann. §40-7-103 (Supp.1996)(setting forth grounds for arrest by an officer wit hout a warrant). The issue of whether section 40-7-103 was complied with in this case is not bef ore the Court. -16- occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law.”7 1 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979). 2 In Delaware v. Prouse, a police officer stopped an automobile 3 though “he had observed neither traffic or equipment violations nor 4 any suspicious activity.” Id. at 651, 99 S. Ct. at 1394. The stop 5 was made solely to check the driver’s license and registration 6 because the officer “saw the car in the area and wasn’t answering 7 any complaints ....” Id. Upon approaching the vehicle, the 8 officer smelled marijuana, and seized marijuana in plain view on 9 the floor of the car. The Court suppressed this evidence because 10 there was no reasonable basis for the stop. 11 12 The majority relies on Prouse to support its position. 13 In Prouse, the Court first discussed United States v. Brignoni- 14 Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975) and United States v. 15 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976), where the 16 Court upheld checkpoint stops and disallowed roving patrol stops. 17 These determinations were based on the exigent circumstances 18 surrounding illegal aliens. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656, 99 S. Ct. at 19 1397. The Prouse Court found that in the case of other random 20 stops which were not based on any suspicion of a violation of the 21 law, no interests (or exigent circumstances) existed to justify the 22 intrusion. The majority interprets the holding to support the 23 conclusion that in the presence of a reasonable suspicion, a stop 24 8Nor do the cases of Michigan v. Sitz or State v. Downey, holding constitutional sobriety checkpoints, support the majority’s position. In both of those cases, the Court vividly i llustrates the exige nt circumstances surrounding the drunken driving problem which prompted the decisions. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 455, 451, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485-86 (1990); State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. 1997). -17- is always constitutional. See Majority Opinion _____ [slip op. at 1 11]. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the language in 2 Prouse specifically limiting its holding: “We hold only that 3 persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason 4 alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the 5 unbridled discretion of police officers.” Id. at 664, 99 S. Ct. at 6 1401.8 7 8 Guidance as to the circumstances in which an 9 investigative stop is justified is found in Justice Jackson’s 10 dissent in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183, 69 S. Ct. 11 1302, 1314 (1949): 12 13 If we assume, for example, that a child is 14 kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock 15 about the neighborhood and search every 16 outgoing car, it would be a drastic and 17 undiscriminating use of the search. The 18 officers might be unable to show probable 19 cause for searching any particular car. 20 However, I should candidly strive hard to 21 sustain such an action .... But I should not 22 strain to sustain such a roadblock and 23 universal search to salvage a few bottles of 24 bourbon and catch a bootlegger. 25 26 27 28 In balancing public and private interests, exigent 29 circumstances are necessary to justify the intrusion. The Terry 30 decision as developed by other cases which have allowed short term 31 -18- seizures without a probable cause for arrest, created a balancing 1 analysis which has been summarized by this Court as follows: 2 3 In general, although the Fourth Amendment 4 requires “probable cause” before an arrest is 5 deemed to be reasonable, the reasonableness of 6 seizures less intrusive than a full-scale 7 arrest is judged by weighing the gravity of 8 the public concern, the degree to which the 9 seizure advances that concern, and the 10 severity of the intrusion into individual 11 privacy. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 12 47, 50, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 13 (1979). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 14 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80, the United States 15 Supreme Court acknowledged police officers’ 16 need for “an escalating set of flexible 17 responses, graduated in relation to the amount 18 of information they possess.” Id. at 10, 88 19 S. Ct. at 1874. The Terry Court held that to 20 justify a stop, “the police officer must be 21 able to point to specific and articulable 22 facts which, taken together with rational 23 inferences from those facts, reasonably 24 warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 25 at 1880. 26 27 28 29 State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d at 30. 30 31 32 33 This Court has, in several decisions, addressed the 34 constitutional validity of investigative stops. In Hughes v. 35 State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 309 (Tenn. 1979), after reviewing the United 36 States Supreme Court decisions on investigative stops, the Court 37 stated: 38 39 A citizen has a constitutionally ordered right 40 to be secure in his person and possessions and 41 to be free from “arbitrary invasions solely at 42 the unfettered discretion” of the police. 43 44 45 -19- In that case, the defendant and a companion drove to a store, the 1 defendant dropped off his companion at the store and left. The 2 companion bought some snacks which he consumed while reading 3 magazines at the magazine rack. The proprietor contacted the 4 police, related these facts and concluded that the defendant was 5 “acting a little strange or suspicious.” Id. at 299. When 6 officers arrived at the store, they restrained the companion in the 7 rear seat of the patrol car while it was determined that he had no 8 criminal record. The officers began searching for the defendant, 9 who was then returning to the store parking lot. The defendant 10 rolled down the window when an officer approached the automobile 11 and asked for his driver license. Because the officer smelled 12 burning marijuana when the window was lowered, the officer searched 13 the automobile and discovered the contraband. In Hughes, the Court 14 held that the seizure was not based on information which contained 15 “specific and articulable facts or inferences from facts, 16 sufficient to generate a reasonable conclusion that a crime had 17 been, was, or was about to be committed.” Id. at 308. 18 19 In State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992), 20 the officer, who had made an investigative stop, testified at the 21 suppression hearing that he had personal knowledge that a capias 22 was outstanding for the defendant’s arrest, that other police 23 officers had informed him that the defendant often drove a black 24 Cadillac inscribed with the words “The Duke,” and that when he saw 25 this car, because of the outstanding capias, the officers stopped 26 the vehicle. This Court found that the police officers had the 27 9Although the charge on which the capias had issued for Watkins is not stated in the opinion, it apparently was a major factor on which the Court relied in finding the stop justified. Even though the stop which resulted in the defendant's ar rest was sustained as an investigati ve stop, the facts and circumstances als o would support a finding of probable cause, which issue was not discussed in the opinion. -20- required reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and 1 articulable facts, to withstand the constitutional challenge to the 2 stop. Id. at 295. The Court stated that, 3 4 In determining whether a police officer’s 5 reasonable suspicion is supported by specific 6 and articulable facts, a court must consider 7 the totality of the circumstances United 8 States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 9 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981). 10 This includes, but is not limited to, 11 objective observations, information obtained 12 from other police officers or agencies, 13 information obtained from citizens, and the 14 pattern of operation of certain offenders. 15 Id., 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S. Ct. at 695, 66 16 L.Ed.2d at 629. A court must also consider 17 the rational inferences and deductions that a 18 trained police officer may draw from the facts 19 and circumstances known to him. Terry, 392 20 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 21 906. 22 23 Id. at 294.9 24 25 26 27 In State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993), the 28 officer received an anonymous radio report that the defendant was 29 in a yellow Ford in a trailer park, was armed with a shotgun, and 30 was “supposed to shoot someone.” Id. On the way to the trailer 31 park, the officer received another similar report. The officer did 32 not find the defendant at the trailer park; he then drove to a gas 33 station where the defendant was parked in a yellow Ford. The 34 officer turned on his blue lights, asked the defendant to get out 35 -21- of the car, and saw a shotgun on the front floorboard of the car. 1 He arrested the defendant for driving on a revoked license, for a 2 second offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, and for 3 possessing a loaded weapon, a hunting knife, and a billy club. The 4 trial court suppressed the weapons and the results of the 5 blood/alcohol test on the grounds that the officer had no 6 reasonable suspicion that the defendant had or would commit a 7 crime. This Court reversed that decision, analyzing the tests for 8 determining the reliability of informants’ tips in the context of 9 “probable cause” determinations, and stating, 10 11 In this case, the public interest served by 12 the stop was the prevention of violent crime. 13 The scope of the intrusion was minor; it was 14 intended to be only a temporary stop of the 15 defendant’s car. Finally, the “indicia of 16 reliability” were sufficient in light of these 17 other considerations to warrant a brief 18 investigatory stop. .... Although the 19 reliability of the tip would certainly not 20 establish probable cause to search or arrest, 21 and would not furnish reasonable suspicion to 22 stop the defendant in all circumstances, we 23 conclude that, given the threat of violence, 24 the police had “specific and articulable 25 facts” to warrant the investigatory stop in 26 this case. 27 28 29 30 Id. at 34. 31 32 33 34 This Court recently balanced public interest against 35 private rights in deciding that sobriety roadblocks do not per se 36 violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 7. The Court 37 stated: 38 39 -22- In order for us to determine whether a 1 seizure which is less intrusive than a 2 traditional arrest is reasonable, we must 3 balance the public interest served by the 4 seizure with the severity of the interference 5 with individual liberty. 6 7 8 9 State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. 1997). 10 11 12 13 Recognition that an investigative stop may be 14 constitutionally reasonable, even though an arrest would not be 15 constitutionally reasonable, was not intended to be a relaxation of 16 constitutional protection against intrusions by the State. See 17 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 18 (1993); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 19 (1972). Instead, it is a recognition that a limited intrusion 20 under exigent circumstances may be justified as constitutionally 21 reasonable. Two essential conditions characterize a valid 22 investigative stop, exigent circumstances and limited intrusion. 23 After reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions in which 24 investigative stops were found to be justified, the Court in Pully 25 stated: "These cases show that the gravity of the perceived harm 26 is a crucial element in assessing the reasonableness of an 27 investigative Terry stop." Pully, 863 S.W.2d at 33. The Court 28 then approved this statement from a concurring opinion in United 29 States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 561, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 30 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring): 31 32 The reasonableness of a stop turns on the 33 facts and circumstances of each case. In 34 particular, the Court has emphasized (i) the 35 -23- public interest served by the seizure, (ii) 1 the nature and scope of the intrusion, and 2 (iii) the objective facts upon which the law 3 enforcement officer relied in light of his 4 knowledge and experience. 5 6 7 8 State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d at 34. 9 10 11 12 The burden is on the State to show that exigent 13 circumstances make the search imperative. State v. Bartram, 925 14 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 15 (Tenn. 1992). 16 17 D. 18 19 As stated previously, the record will be examined first 20 to determine if there was probable cause to arrest the defendant in 21 this case. The facts and circumstances show that Officer Ferrell 22 had probable cause to believe that the defendant was violating the 23 law. Initially, the officer's knowledge that the defendant's 24 driver license had been revoked for a year was not reasonable cause 25 to believe that the defendant was committing an offense. Since he 26 also knew that restricted licenses were available for business 27 purposes, his observation of the defendant, who was a farmer, 28 driving a pickup truck during working hours, would reasonably 29 support nothing more than a suspicion that the defendant was 30 driving without authority. Stated another way, he did not have 31 reasonable cause to believe the defendant had not applied for or 32 had been denied a restricted license. However, the officer knew 33 -24- that a restricted license would not authorize a farmer to drive to 1 a bar. The defendant's furtive driving behavior and his stopping 2 at the bar were sufficient to elevate suspicion to probable cause. 3 Had the defendant not been in violation of the restricted license 4 by driving while drinking intoxicants, there was no obvious reason 5 to avoid Officer Ferrell. Also, had the defendant been about his 6 business purposes, he would not have violated the restricted 7 license by stopping at a bar. These facts and circumstances were 8 sufficient to support a finding of probable cause justifying the 9 stop and the subsequent arrest. 10 11 E. 12 13 Even though Officer Ferrell had probable cause to stop 14 the defendant’s vehicle, it should be observed that the stop would 15 fail the balancing test that must be applied to the facts and 16 circumstances where there is reliance on an investigative stop. As 17 stated in Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d at 303: 18 19 Thus, in the context of a "stop and 20 frisk" situation, the Court freed Fourth 21 Amendment analysis from the rigidity of the 22 probable cause standard but in so doing it 23 imposed a standard of specific and articulable 24 facts. The detection and prevention of crime 25 and the safety of the officer are balanced 26 against the nature and extent of and the 27 reasons for the intrusion. 28 29 30 31 The decisions require an articulable and reasonable suspicion that 32 the vehicle or the occupant is subject to seizure for a violation 33 -25- of the law, and, further, “‘that a seizure must be based on 1 specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate 2 interests require the seizure of the particular individual.” Id. 3 at 307 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 4 2640 (1979)). The facts and circumstances of this case support the 5 first requirement, reasonable suspicion (and even probable cause). 6 However, those facts and circumstances do not show exigent 7 circumstances requiring that the defendant be seized. Officer 8 Ferrell had no basis on which to suspect that the defendant was 9 intoxicated. The defendant was not speeding, nor was he, to the 10 officer's observation, violating any traffic regulations. His 11 observable operation of the vehicle posed no danger to the public. 12 The only suspected violation was driving on a revoked license. The 13 public's interest in enforcing the law could as well have been 14 protected by checking the records regarding the status of the 15 defendant's license and procuring a warrant for his arrest or 16 making an accusation to the grand jury. The purpose of the stop 17 was not limited to insuring the officer's safety or the protection 18 of the public. In contrast to this situation, the exigent 19 circumstance in Pully was that the officer had reliable information 20 that the defendant was in possession of a shotgun and "was supposed 21 to shoot someone." Pully, 863 S.W.2d at 29. The cases relied upon 22 in Pully to justify the stop involved situations where the officer 23 reasonably suspected that the person stopped was in the possession 24 of a concealed weapon, or items taken from the victim of a recent 25 10For additional decisions based on exigent circumstances, see 4 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 717, p. 826 (14th ed. 1987). -26- murder. Pully, 863 S.W.2d at 33-34.10 Consequently, the evidence 1 does not support a finding of exigent circumstances. 2 3 The majority states that a brief investigatory stop is 4 constitutionally permissible if the officer has a reasonable 5 suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a 6 criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. Majority 7 Opinion at _____ [slip op. at 14]. As a practical matter, the 8 language of the majority would allow the detention and at least a patdown 9 search of any person suspected of possessing illegal drugs or other 10 contraband. The majority, then, would eliminate the need for 11 exigent circumstances and allow officers to proceed only on 12 “reasonable suspicion,” only. The language of the majority would 13 allow detention upon mere suspicion. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 14 508 U.S. 366, 381, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140 (1993). Such an 15 interpretation of the law contradicts the consistent holdings under 16 Terry and this Court that each case must be decided on its own 17 facts and that the “exigencies of the situation [must make] the 18 search imperative.” State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 19 (Tenn. 1996); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. 20 21 IV 22 23 The conclusion is that because the officer had probable 24 cause to arrest the defendant, I agree that the motion to suppress 25 -27- should be denied. 1 2 _____________________________ 3 Reid, J. 4