Case Title: Brown v. Avery

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brown v. Avery1993 WY 55850 P.2d 612Case Number: 91-249Decided: 04/09/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Teresa 
BROWN,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Officer AVERY; and City 
of Laramie, Wyoming, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

Mary T. 
Kloeckner, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Dennis Coll, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee Avery. 

C.M. Aron, Aron 
& Hennig, Laramie, for appellee City of Laramie.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J., 
Retired.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The issues in 
this case evolve from the failure of a police officer to arrest a driver whom 
the officer had stopped for a traffic violation and whom the officer realized 
had consumed alcoholic beverages. The significant legal question relates to 
whether there was a causal relationship, qualifying under the concept of 
proximate cause, between the failure to arrest and a roll over of the vehicle 
driven by the individual who was not arrested. The case was decided by a summary 
judgment and presents the usual threshold question of whether a genuine issue of 
material fact is found in the record. Collateral issues are raised with respect 
to whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a 
continuance to permit the deposition of a nonmoving party, and whether the trial 
court committed a second abuse of discretion in failing to grant a motion for a 
change of judge. Our review of the record persuades us there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, and the trial court correctly concluded that the police 
officer and his employer, the City of Laramie, were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. In addition, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to grant the continuance sought or in refusing to grant the motion 
for a change of judge. The summary judgment entered by the trial court is 
affirmed.

[¶2]      The appellant, 
Teresa Brown (Brown), sets forth the issues for review in her brief in this 
way:

I. Whether summary 
judgment was improper because:

a. there was non-existent 
and/or insufficient factual basis;

b. genuine question of 
material fact existed; or,

c. the court below did 
not properly apply the law.

II. Whether the court 
below abused its discretion in denying the non-moving party's request for an 
extension of time to obtain the deposition of moving party.

III. Whether the court 
below properly denied Appellant's motion for a change of judge.

In his Brief of 
Appellee, the police officer states the issues in this way:

I. Summary judgment was 
properly entered by the lower court as there was no genuine issue of any 
material fact.

II. The lower court 
granted the nonmoving parties ample time to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment.

III. There was no reason 
whatsoever for the court below to change judges.

The City of 
Laramie, in its separate brief as an appellee, sets forth the issues in this 
way:

1. Was there a genuine 
issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment?

2. Is summary judgment 
proper concerning the issue of proximate cause in the circumstances of this 
case; specifically,

a. Is a police officer's 
failure to arrest a driver a remote cause or a proximate cause of the driver's 
accident more than one hour later?

b. After a police stop, 
is the drinking of beer and vodka by a driver an efficient intervening cause of 
an automobile accident?

3. If a police officer 
observes signs of drinking by a driver, does the officer have a duty to perform 
sobriety tests or blood alcohol tests when he does not have probable cause to do 
so?

4. Was the appellant 
denied reasonable time for discovery?

5. Was the appellant 
entitled to a change of judge?

[¶3]      On the night of 
August 31-September 1, 1987, Timothy Mendoza (Mendoza) had been at a party where 
he drank beer and either gin or vodka. Mendoza left the party accompanied by 
Brown, Brown's sister, and another man. They went to a liquor store where they 
purchased a twelve-pack of beer and a bottle of either vodka or gin. They drove 
around Laramie, and Mendoza continued to drink from the bottle of 
liquor.

[¶4]      The police 
officer, then employed by the City of Laramie in its police department, was on 
duty during the early morning hours of September 1, 1987. While on routine 
patrol, in Laramie, at 1:53 A.M., the officer watched a red 1973 Plymouth Duster 
ease slowly into the intersection at Ninth Street and Reynolds Street against a 
red light. The vehicle encroached approximately one-fourth to one-half its 
length into the intersection. The police officer stopped that vehicle at the 
intersection of Ninth Street and West Hill. The driver, Mendoza, got out of his 
vehicle at the same time the police officer got out of his car. When he was five 
to six feet from Mendoza, the officer explained why he had stopped Mendoza and 
asked to see his driver's license. Mendoza told the officer the driver's license 
was in the jockey box, and he then walked around the vehicle to the passenger's 
side and retrieved his wallet. He turned around, walked to within two or three 
feet of the officer, and produced his driver's license.

[¶5]      With Mendoza 
within three feet, the officer could smell alcohol on his breath. He studied 
Mendoza carefully, paying close attention to his balance, eyes, and speech. The 
officer observed Mendoza's speech was not slurred or strained, his eyes were not 
glassy or bloodshot, and his balance was not impaired. The police officer did 
not check the status of Mendoza's driver's license, and he did not subject 
Mendoza to any field sobriety test. He did check for outstanding warrants 
against Mendoza and, learning there were none, he released him without issuing a 
citation. Brown testified she heard the officer tell Mendoza to "take the car 
home and park it now" when he released him.

[¶6]      Following the 
stop by the police officer, Mendoza and his passengers went to a convenience 
store where they purchased potato chips. Between the time he was stopped by the 
officer and the time of the accident, Mendoza drank an unknown quantity of the 
vodka or gin. At 3:00 A.M., Mendoza was traveling west on Interstate 80, just 
east of Laramie, when he lost control of the vehicle and drove onto the median. 
The vehicle was airborne for some forty feet before landing and rolling over 
twice. Brown was injured in the accident, and Mendoza and Brown's sister were 
killed. The third passenger suffered minor injuries.

[¶7]      Brown filed a 
complaint against Mendoza's estate, Mendoza's father, the police officer, and 
the City of Laramie. Her complaint against the police officer and the City of 
Laramie alleged the failure of the officer to administer a sobriety test when he 
stopped Mendoza and asserted this constituted negligence that had proximately 
caused Brown's injuries. Brown's contention is that, had the officer tested 
Mendoza, he would have realized Mendoza was intoxicated; he would have arrested 
Mendoza for driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages; and, 
thus, the accident would not have occurred. The district court dismissed Brown's 
claim against Mendoza's estate because the estate did not exist, and the court 
ordered Brown's attorney to pay attorney fees incurred in the defense of the 
action on behalf of Mendoza's estate. Later, the district court granted a 
summary judgment to Mendoza's father to which Brown agreed by stipulation. A 
little over one month later, the district court, ruling there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and holding that, as a matter of law, the officer's 
failure to administer a sobriety test to Mendoza did not proximately cause 
Brown's injuries, entered a summary judgment in favor of the police officer and 
the City of Laramie. Brown appeals from that summary judgment.

[¶8]      In reviewing the 
propriety of a summary judgment, we examine the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 1992); Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704 
(Wyo. 1987). Even in cases arising out of alleged negligent conduct, a summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1991); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). An issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute 
an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. 
McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59 (Wyo. 1989); Johnson v. Soulis, 
542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1975).

[¶9]      In its facts, as 
disclosed by the record, this case resembles Keehn. In Keehn, we analyzed the 
conduct of the police officers under traditional negligence principles, and we 
held a police officer's duty in assessing a person's fitness to drive a vehicle 
is to act as a reasonable police officer under the existing 
circumstances.

[¶10]   The record discloses the officer 
detected alcohol on Mendoza's breath, but after observing Mendoza closely, he 
exercised his judgment and concluded Mendoza was not impaired. As we noted in 
Keehn, a person can legally drink and drive in Wyoming, and the odor of alcohol 
on a driver's breath by itself is not a ground for arrest of that driver. Keehn. 
Furthermore, we do not perceive it is within our judicial prerogatives to 
require that a police officer administer a field sobriety test in every instance 
in which he stops a vehicle and detects the odor of alcohol on the driver's 
breath.

[¶11]   In Keehn, we noted "[p]eace 
officers are encouraged, if not constitutionally obliged, to employ `the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion 
in a short period of time.'" Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 116 (citing Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (plurality)). We went on to 
comment:

As to the factual 
realities, governments simply do not have the resources to protect all citizens 
at all times from the consequences of all illegal or tortious activity. 
Consequently, law enforcement agencies and personnel must be afforded some 
discretion as to how to marshal their time, talents, and assets to achieve the 
greatest overall good.

Keehn, 834 P.2d  
at 116.

[¶12]   The trial judge concluded that, on 
the basis of this record, even if one assumed negligence on the part of the 
police officer, his conduct was not the proximate cause of this accident. The 
court was aware of the time elapsed between the contact by the officer and the 
accident, and also noted the continued consumption by Mendoza of alcoholic 
beverages. We agree the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify a 
finding of a causal relationship between the police officer's contact and his 
decision not to arrest Mendoza and the accident.

[¶13]   In Brown's second claim of error, 
she asserts the trial court erroneously denied her request for an extension of 
time to depose the police officer. Brown filed her action on August 15, 1990, 
and an amended complaint was presented on November 7, 1990. On June 13, 1991, 
ten months after Brown filed her original complaint and seven months after the 
amended complaint, the officer submitted his motion for summary judgment which 
was supported by his affidavit. On July 1, 1991, Brown requested an extension of 
time to depose the officer to "pierce the allegations" of his affidavit. On 
August 13, 1991, the trial court granted Brown an extension of time in which to 
file her own affidavit, but it denied her request for an extension of time to 
depose the police officer. On August 21, 1991, the district court entered its 
order setting a hearing on motions for summary judgment for September 6, 1991, 
at which time those motions were heard. On October 17, 1991, the district court 
issued its decision letter announcing it would grant the motions for summary 
judgment, and the order granting the summary judgment was entered on October 31, 
1991.

[¶14]   We have held that, under the plain 
language of Wyo.R.Civ. P. 56, the entry of summary judgment is permissible only 
after there has been adequate time for discovery. Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 
(Wyo. 1987). Wyo.R.Civ. P. 56(f) grants to the district court discretion to 
order a continuance to permit further discovery prior to its ruling on any 
motion for summary judgment. The court can permit the taking of depositions, if 
the court finds that such an order is just. The rule provides:

Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. Wyo.R.Civ. P. 56(f).

Brown relies on 
Pace in submitting her argument that there was an abuse of the district court's 
discretion in denying the continuance. We conclude there was no such abuse of 
discretion.

[¶15]   On its facts, Pace is 
distinguishable from this case. The non-moving party in Pace had only about 
sixty days from the time the complaint was filed to respond to the moving 
parties' motion for summary judgment. We there held the entry of summary 
judgment violated the mandate of Wyo.R.Civ. P. 56 to provide time for adequate 
discovery before the judgment was entered. By contrast, Brown had at least ten 
months in which she could have developed her case through discovery, including 
taking the deposition of the police officer. In view of the length of time 
involved, we are unable to say that the district court here abused its 
discretion by denying Brown's request for additional time to depose the 
officer.

[¶16]   Brown also contends that the 
district court erred in denying her motion for a change of judge under 
Wyo.R.Civ. P. 40.1(b)(2). Brown argues that the following series of actions of 
the district court judge demonstrated a pre-determined hostility toward Brown or 
her attorney:

a. The court improperly 
held a hearing on and granted defendant Cipriano Mendoza's motion for a 
protective order when Brown's counsel had only six hours notice of the hearing 
and was unable to participate in person or by phone.

b. The court grounded its 
decision to grant the protective order in part on the fact that Brown's counsel 
had not complied with the court's order to pay attorney fees entered five months 
earlier.

c. The district court 
judge was unmindful of Canon 3 of the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct when it 
considered the motion for the protective order without the presence of Brown's 
counsel.

In short, Brown 
asserts that the trial court was biased either against her or her 
attorney.

[¶17]   Our definition of bias is that it 
connotes a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another. 
TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204 (Wyo. 1990); Cline v. Sawyer, 
600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1979), appeal after remand, 618 P.2d 144 (1980). In order to 
constitute a ground for disqualification, the bias of the trial judge must be 
personal.

[I]t must be such a 
condition of the mind which sways judgment and renders the judge unable to 
exercise his functions impartially in a given case or which is inconsistent with 
a state of mind fully open to the conviction which evidence might produce. 
Cline, 600 P.2d  at 729.

Here Brown has 
not appealed the decision of the trial court to enter the protective order nor 
has she argued the substance of any purported violation of the Wyoming Code of 
Judicial Conduct. We uniformly hold we will not address issues on appeal that 
are unsupported by cogent authority or argument.1 For that reason, we do not review 
the actions by the district court at the time it ruled on the protective 
order.

[¶18]   This leaves only the question of 
whether the mere entry of the protective order by the trial court constitutes 
bias against Brown as we have defined it. To demonstrate judicial bias, the 
party must show more than the fact the trial court ruled against a party, 
correctly or incorrectly, on a particular motion, objection, or any other 
matter. If the mere showing of an unfavorable ruling sufficed to establish bias, 
disputes seldom would be resolved by a single judge. Brown has failed to show 
anything more than this, and this claim of error must be rejected.

[¶19]   The order granting summary judgment 
entered by the district court is affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶20]   I perceive an additional reason 
that the summary judgment in this case should be affirmed. As the majority 
opinion notes:

The issues in this case 
evolve from the failure of a police officer to arrest a driver whom the officer 
had stopped for a traffic violation and whom the officer realized had consumed 
alcoholic beverages. Op. at ___.

I believe there 
is a significant legal question relating to the application of the doctrine of 
qualified immunity to the facts in this case. I am satisfied the doctrine of 
qualified immunity should be invoked to shield the officer and his employer from 
liability as a matter of law, in the absence of bad faith or outrageous 
conduct.

[¶21]   In Keehn, we did not address any 
rule of law relating to immunity. I would now extend the concepts articulated in 
Keehn, and hold a police officer's decision with respect to an arrest of a 
driver, who has consumed alcoholic beverages, and the officer's assessment of 
the person's ability to operate a vehicle safely are discretionary functions. 
When a police officer performs such discretionary functions reasonably and in 
good faith, the rule of qualified immunity shields him from 
liability.

[¶22]   In Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983), we invoked the concept of qualified immunity in 
connection with activities of police officers. In that case, qualified immunity 
was extended to officers who reasonably and in good faith made an arrest under a 
facially valid warrant. Relying upon Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983), we 
articulated this general rule:

[A] qualified immunity is 
available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being 
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and 
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on 
which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds 
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled 
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive 
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.

Kimbley, 663 P.2d  at 878 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)).

[¶23]   Our definition of good faith is 
that it encompasses an honest, lawful intent, and actions taken without 
knowledge of fraud and without any intent to assist in any fraudulent or 
otherwise unlawful scheme. Kimbley. We have defined what is reasonable as that 
"having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the 
influence of reason; thinking, speaking, or acting rationally, or according to 
the dictates of reason; agreeable to reason; just; rational." Kimbley, 663 P.2d  
at 879 (citing Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 516, 133 P. 1055, 1056 (1913)). 
We do not unfairly invoke hindsight in assessing official actions challenged in 
litigation, and the conduct of an officer must be outrageous to justify loss of 
the qualified immunity otherwise bestowed. Kimbley.

[¶24]   We considered the concept of 
qualified immunity in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986), and we there 
declined to extend it to the conduct of police officers who negligently perform 
operational duties such as driving a patrol car. Our holding was that qualified 
immunity is available only with respect to discretionary or policy-making 
functions and does not extend to those activities identified as operational 
duties. DeWald. The categorization of the situation in DeWald as involving 
operational duties serves to distinguish that case from this case.

[¶25]   We have not yet considered the 
question of whether a determination by a police officer of a person's fitness to 
drive and his decision with respect to the arrest of a person who is driving 
after consuming intoxicating beverages are discretionary or operational 
functions. Other courts, where this issue has been considered, have ruled these 
activities are discretionary functions. Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 
1985); Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982); 
Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985); Rubinow v. County of San 
Bernardino, 169 Cal. App. 2d 67, 336 P.2d 968 (1959).

[¶26]   In Hildenbrand, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa recognized that, in investigating accidents and determining the manner 
in which they will enforce the laws, police officers necessarily exercise broad 
discretion. That was not the only ground upon which the court based its 
decision, however; it also analyzed the arrest and driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating beverages statutes adopted in Iowa and found the use 
of the term "may" in the statute rather than "shall" conferred discretion on the 
officers with respect to a decision as to whether an arrest to a decision as to 
whether an arrest should be made. Hildenbrand. Invoking similar reasoning, the 
Supreme Court of California, in Rubinow, denied the relief sought citing the 
failure of the plaintiff to demonstrate that the state statute created a 
mandatory duty the officer was obliged to perform.

[¶27]   My review of the applicable Wyoming 
statutes persuades me a police officer's evaluation of the fitness of a person 
to operate a motor vehicle and his decision as to whether an arrest should be 
made are discretionary activities. Like the Iowa statutes, the Wyoming statutes 
invoke the term "may" rather than the word "shall" in describing the officer's 
duty to arrest, both in general and in relation to motor vehicle violations.1 "Generally, the verb `may' when 
used in a statute makes that statute directory instead of mandatory." In 
Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wyo. 1990) (citing Mayor v. Bd. of Land 
Comm'rs, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, reh'g denied, 64 Wyo. 430, 195 P.2d 752 
(Wyo. 1948)). I find it significant that the legislature, when referring to 
typically ministerial duties of police officers, has invoked and used the 
mandatory term "shall."2

[¶28]   After reviewing the facts of this 
case in the light of our rule of qualified immunity and our usual standard of 
review, I conclude the district court's grant of the summary judgment also is 
sustainable under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Brown failed to allege any 
facts sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity extended to the police 
officer. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate the officer behaved 
unreasonably, without good faith or in an outrageous manner.

[¶29]   The record discloses the officer 
detected alcohol on Mendoza's breath, but after observing Mendoza closely, he 
exercised his judgment and concluded that Mendoza was not impaired. As we noted 
in Keehn, a person can legally drink and drive in Wyoming, and the odor of 
alcohol on a driver's breath by itself is not a ground for arrest of that 
driver. Keehn. Furthermore, I do not perceive it is within our judicial 
prerogatives to require that a police officer administer a field sobriety test 
in every instance in which he stops a vehicle and detects the odor of alcohol on 
the driver's breath.

[¶30]   Brown alleged nothing more to 
establish bad faith than the claimed existence of a relationship of friendship 
between the police officer and Mendoza's family. Brown contends the officer knew 
Mendoza and his family and asserts this is evidence of his bad faith in failing 
to carry out his duties by arresting Mendoza. Without more, this assertion is 
insufficient to serve as a basis for a charge of bad faith. I find nothing else 
in the facts of this case, even read in the light most favorable to Brown, that 
would serve to take away the qualified immunity of the officer.

[¶31]   The Supreme Court of Connecticut 
has described quite aptly the policy reasons for limiting the exposure of a 
police officer to liability:

The adoption of a rule of 
liability where some kind of harm may happen to someone would cramp the exercise 
of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society. Should the 
officer try to avoid liability by removing from the road all persons who pose 
any potential hazard, he may find himself liable in many instances for false 
arrest. We do not think that the public interest is served by allowing a jury of 
laymen with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a 
policeman's discretionary professional duty. Such discretion is no discretion at 
all.

Shore, 444 A.2d  
at 1384.

[¶32]   In Keehn, we expressed similar 
concerns. We noted "[p]eace officers are encouraged, if not constitutionally 
obliged, to employ `the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 
dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.'" Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 
116 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (plurality)). We went on to comment:

As to the factual 
realities, governments simply do not have the resources to protect all citizens 
at all times from the consequences of all illegal or tortious activity. 
Consequently, law enforcement agencies and personnel must be afforded some 
discretion as to how to marshal their time, talents, and assets to achieve the 
greatest overall good.

Keehn, 834 P.2d  
at 116.

[¶33]   This language captures a 
recognition that the proper planning and implementation of a viable system of 
law enforcement for any governmental entity must involve the exercise of 
discretionary powers at several levels, including those exercised by judges, 
prosecutors, arresting officers, and other officials in the justice system. 
Everton, 468 So. 2d 936. It is indeed appropriate to strike a balance between 
detrimental interference with the provision of this essential public service and 
the natural desire to compensate victims of officials' wrongdoing. Cynthia 
Zellner MacKinnon, Note, Negligence of Municipal Employees: Redefining the Scope 
of Police Liability, 35 U.Fla.L.Rev. 720 (Fall 1983) (recognizing the qualified 
immunity from liability extended to a police officer in performing discretionary 
functions achieves this balance). The officer may not perform those 
discretionary functions in an outrageous manner or in bad faith but, when he 
invokes his professional judgment and acts on it in good faith, he will not be 
subjected to liability.

[¶34]   I do not disagree with, nor in any 
way denigrate, the decisional basis of the trial court. The trial judge 
concluded that, on the basis of this record, even if one assumed negligence on 
the part of the police officer, his conduct was not the proximate cause of this 
accident. The court was aware of the time elapsed between the contact by the 
officer and the accident, and also noted the continued consumption by Mendoza of 
alcoholic beverages. I agree the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
justify a finding of a causal relationship between the police officer's contact 
followed by his decision not to arrest Mendoza and the accident. I would adopt 
the qualified immunity doctrine, however, because it is broader than the rule of 
causal connection encompassed in the trial court's decision. In Keehn, for 
example, there was no evidence of a continued consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, and the absence of a causal connection in that case had to depend 
only upon the lapse of time. It follows there will be instances in which a trial 
will be required with respect to causation, in which the trial would not be 
necessary if the doctrine of qualified immunity were invoked. I prefer a legal 
rule to address such situations rather than the potential of ad hoc resolutions 
of a causal connection, which, after all, ordinarily is a question of fact. 
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).

FOOTNOTES

1 Matter of Adoption of 
BBC, 831 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1992); State Farm v. Wyoming Ins. Dep't., 793 P.2d 1008 
(Wyo. 1990); Burg v. Ruby Drilling Co., Inc., 783 P.2d 144 (Wyo. 1989); Clouser 
v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 1974).

 

Footnotes for Concurring Opinion

1 Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-102 
(1987) reads:

(a) 
A peace officer may arrest a person when:

(i) 
He has a warrant commanding that the person be arrested; or

(ii) He has reasonable 
grounds for believing that a warrant for the person's arrest has been issued in 
this state or in another jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)

Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-103 
(1987) reads, in part:

(a) 
A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant and detain that person 
until a legal warrant can be obtained when:

(i) 
Any criminal offense is being committed in his presence by the person to be 
arrested;

(ii) He has probable 
cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be 
arrested has committed it; or

(iii) He has probable 
cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, that the person to be 
arrested has committed it and that the person, unless immediately 
arrested:

(A) 
Will not be apprehended;

(B) 
May cause injury to himself or others or damage to property; or

(C) 
May destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
misdemeanor.

(b) 
A peace officer may issue a citation to a person in lieu of arrest for a 
misdemeanor if:

(i) 
The misdemeanor is committed by the person in the officer's presence; 
or

(ii) The peace officer 
has probable cause to believe a misdemeanor has been committed and that the 
person to be issued a citation has committed the misdemeanor. (Emphasis 
added.)

Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-1204 
(1989) reads, in part:

(a) 
The authority of a police officer to make an arrest is the same as upon an 
arrest for a felony when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that the person arrested has committed any of the following offenses and 
the manner of making arrests shall be as in misdemeanor cases:

* * 
* * * *

(ii) Driving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any 
substance as prohibited by W.S. 31-5-233; * * *.

2 See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. § 
31-5-1211 (1989) which reads, in part:

(a) 
Every traffic enforcement officer * * * shall deposit the original or a copy of 
the traffic citation with a court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense 
or with its traffic violations bureau. (Emphasis added.)