Case Title: SHOLER v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83504

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHOLER v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY  SHOLER v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 1997 OK 89 945 P.2d 469 68 OBJ 2332 Case Number: 83504, 83505 Decided: 07/01/1997 Supreme Court of Oklahoma MICHAEL SHOLER, SHARON MORALES, ANASTASIA E. DALTON, HAROLD E.KUYKENDALL, GREGORY LYNN PARHAM, WANDA JOHNSON, PATSY WEISS, CALVIN N. MCCASKELL, JR., KEVIN L. ARMSTRONG, and for themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees/Counter-Appellants, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, DAVID R. MCBRIDE, Commissioner, Appellant/Counter-Appellee. O R D E R ¶1 The Petition for Rehearing filed by the Appellant/Counter-Appellee is hereby granted for the limited purpose of addressing those arguments in the Court's Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing and is denied as to all other arguments. ¶2 DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT THIS 26TH DAY OF JUNE, 1997. ______________________ CHIEF JUSTICE ¶3 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, OPALA, WILSON, JJ. - Concur ¶4 LAVENDER, SIMMS, HARGRAVE, WATT, JJ. - Concur in part and Dissent in part [945 P.2d 478] ¶1 The Court's pronouncement holds that the Department of Public Safety's [DPS] procedure of charging and collecting multiple fees for the reinstatement of suspended drivers' licenses is an impermissible accounting procedure under the applicable statutes. The court (1) concludes that the plaintiffs' action for monies had and received is based on an obligation "implied in law" and (2) applies a three year statute of limitations. In disposing of the State's sovereign-immunity defense the court holds that the plaintiffs' claims [for monies had and received] (a) do not fall within the Governmental Tort Claims Act's [GTCA] definition of a tort claim and (b) are hence not barred because they are seeking a refund of monies overpaid the State as opposed to compensation for an agency's or employee's act or omission. By its opinion the court impliedly holds that the plaintiff's claims fall within the ambit of the sovereign-immunity waiver for actions alleging a breach of contract, first recognized in State Board of Public Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503 , 506 (Okla. 1975). This is so even though that [945 P.2d 479] jurisprudence's guidelines for extending the waiver of sovereign immunity to contract claims are not met in this case. ¶2Although I agree with the result reached by the court's pronouncement, I rescind from the court's decision that three years is the applicable limitation period. While I would allow the plaintiffs' action to prevent the State's unjust enrichment, I would hold that the common-law principles which undergird their claims lie in the substantive law of restitution. Although quasi-contractual precepts are a part of the common law of restitution,1 not all restitutionary actions are properly classified as contractual in nature.2 Such is the case here. Recognizing the plaintiffs' claims are restitutionary in character, I would grant a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity to their action and apply a five-year statute of limitation.3 I THE RELIEF AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFFS BY THE DISTRICT COURT RESTS NEITHER IN THE LAW OF TORTS NOR CONTRACTS BUT INSTEAD IS A COMMON-LAW RESTITUTIONARY REMEDY AVAILABLE AT LAW TO PREVENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT ¶3 The plaintiffs' action - for money had and received - lies not in the law of contract or tort but rather in the substantive law of restitution.4 Unlike the common law of contracts, which protects the fulfillment-of-expectation interest, and the law of torts, which protects the plaintiff from wrongfully inflicted harm, restitutionary remedies are designed to guard against unjust enrichment. In their action the plaintiffs do not seek the return of the earlier paid reinstatement fee. Rather, they seek a money judgment for that part of the charges exacted by DPS which were in excess of the fees allowed by statute. It is this fragment of the assessed sum which unjustly enriches the State at the expense of the reinstated driver. ¶4 Under the facts presented by the record the State is unjustly enriched by its use of improper accounting principles in computing the reinstatement fees owed by suspended drivers - without having committed any other civil wrong. Certainly no contract can be implied from the disclosed facts. Recognizing this truth, the court requires the State to refund the overpayments based on an implied-at-law obligation. The remedy [945 P.2d 480] applied by the court is quasi contractual.5 ¶5Where, as here, the State's liability is predicated on a finding of unjust enrichment (and not an implied-in-fact contract between the parties), the law of restitution is substantive as distinguished from remedial. ¶6In Principal Funding II COMMON-LAW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BAR RESTITUTIONARY ACTIONS ¶7Since the plaintiffs' claim has its basis in the common-law of restitution, the State's immunity from suit is in issue. ¶8Today, both legislatures and courts alike embrace the concept that citizens have a right to expect the same standard of honesty and fair dealing in their contact with the state or other political entities, which they are legally accorded in their dealings with other individuals. Reason no longer supports the use of sovereign immunity by the state to obtain unjust enrichment at the expense of a citizen. FOOT