Case Title: City of Laramie v. Mengel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-12

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
City of Laramie v. Mengel1983 WY 114671 P.2d 340Case Number: 83-12Case Number: 83-12Decided: 11/04/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY 
OF LARAMIE, PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
JAN 
ALAN MENGEL AND THOMAS B. JOHNSON, RESPONDENTS.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael Sue 
Haram, Asst. City Atty., City of Laramie, and Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

 
 
No 
appearance for respondents. 

 
 
Before 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and RAPER,* JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., 
Retired.**

 
 

* 
Retired June 13, 1983, but continued to participate in the decision of the court 
in this case pursuant to order of the court entered June 13, 
1983.

 
 
** 
ROONEY, C.J., having recused 
himself, GUTHRIE, J., Retired, was 
assigned pursuant to order of the court entered January 2, 
1979.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     There are two issues 
presented in this particular case. The threshold question is whether this court 
should issue a writ of certiorari to the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie 
for the purpose of reviewing a ruling of the judges of that court on a question 
of substantive law. If such review is available, the substantive question to be 
resolved is whether the Municipal Judges of the City of Laramie erred in their 
conclusion that § 31-6-105(f), W.S. 1977, as adopted and made applicable within 
the City of Laramie pursuant to § 10.24.090, Laramie Municipal Code,1 is unconstitutional because it 
requires the accused to incriminate himself contrary to the provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Art. I, 
§ 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming.2 We will hold that review of the 
ruling of the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie can be accomplished 
pursuant to a writ of certiorari issued by this court, and that the ruling of 
the Municipal Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie that § 
31-6-105(f), W.S. 1977, is unconstitutional is incorrect. The ruling of the 
Municipal Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie therefore will be 
reversed.

 
 

[¶2.]     After this court had 
issued a Writ of Certiorari, the City of Laramie filed its brief in which it 
presents the following articulation of the substantive 
issue:

 
 
"Was 
it error for the Municipal Judges of the City of Laramie to hold that admission 
of evidence of refusal of an accused to submit to a chemical test to determine 
blood alcohol content violates the privilege against self incrimination, thereby 
declaring unconstitutional Section 31-6-105(f), W.S. 1977 (1982 Cum.Supp.), and 
its counterpart in Enrolled Ordinance No. 719, Laramie Municipal 
Code?"

 
 
The 
ruling alluded to was contained in a joint order issued on November 29, 1982, by 
both of the Municipal Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie in 
the cases of the two respondents, following independent deliberation and 
consultation between the judges. The joint order concluded that the refusal to 
submit to a chemical test was testimonial in nature, and it then 
provided:

 
 
"c. 
Any comment by the prosecution upon the Defendant's refusal to take a chemical 
test is improper, violating the Defendant's right against 
self-incrimination.

 
 
"d. 
Section 31-6-105(f), Wyoming Statutes 1977, and § 10.24.090 of the Laramie 
Municipal Code, when applied to a defendant charged with driving under the 
influence who refuses to take a blood alcohol chemical test, insofar as they 
permit evidence to be presented at any criminal action or proceedings of such 
refusal, specifically violate the right against self-incrimination provided by 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution."

 
 

[¶3.]     The underlying facts 
leading to this joint order can be stated briefly. The two respondents in this 
case were arrested on separate occasions, and each was charged with driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating beverages in violation of § 10.24.090, 
Laramie Municipal Code, and § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982). Each was 
advised of the provisions of the Implied Consent Law, §§ 31-6-101 to 31-6-106, 
W.S. 1977, and each of the respondents refused to submit to any chemical test of 
his blood, breath, or urine. See State v. 
Marquez, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1292 (1982); and State v. Chastain, Wyo., 594 P.2d 458 
(1979).

 
 

[¶4.]     On November 17, 1982, 
there was filed on behalf of the respondent Mengel a Motion in Limine, seeking 
to limit evidence presented by the city in its case in chief or in rebuttal at 
the respondent's trial. In a memorandum brief filed in support of this Motion in 
Limine the argument was submitted that the admission of evidence of the 
respondent's refusal to submit to chemical testing would violate the protection 
against self-incrimination found in both the federal and state constitutions. 
The further argument was made in the memorandum brief that such evidence was not 
relevant and was without probative value in that it did not tend to prove any 
material issue in the case and could only serve to arouse prejudice against the 
respondent. On November 19, 1982, a Motion to Suppress, similar in tenor, was 
presented on behalf of the respondent Johnson. As in the other case, it was 
argued in support of the Motion to Suppress that the Implied Consent Law, §§ 
31-6-101 to 31-6-106, W.S. 1977, provided a statutory right of refusal, and the 
exercise of that statutory right could not be used as evidence at the trial 
against the respondent. On behalf of the respondent Johnson the argument was 
made that to the extent that the Implied Consent Law permitted the admission of 
such evidence it did violate the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination and therefore could not stand.

 
 

[¶5.]     It was after the 
argument on these motions before the respective municipal judges assigned to 
hear the two cases that the order of November 29, 1982, which was quoted above, 
was issued granting the motions of the respective respondents. Further language 
of the order prohibited the City of Laramie from permitting any of its witnesses 
to comment upon the refusal of either respondent to take a blood-alcohol 
chemical test, or to comment directly or indirectly in any way concerning such 
refusal.

 
 

[¶6.]     On December 3, 1982, 
the City of Laramie filed a Notice of Action, stating that it intended to file a 
petition in the District Court for the Second Judicial District, County of 
Albany, State of Wyoming, seeking appropriate relief from the order of November 
29, 1982, by means of a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition. The notice 
stated that the City of Laramie held the view that the order of the municipal 
judges was erroneous; that the issue was one of importance which must be 
determined by a court of record with access to a final ruling by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Wyoming; urged that the order entered by the municipal 
court was invalid and unenforceable because the statutory procedures to raise 
constitutional questions regarding the validity of ordinances and statutes found 
in § 1-37-113, W.S. 1977, were not followed, with the result that the municipal 
court was deprived of any jurisdiction to invalidate the state statute; and 
argued further that because of the status of the municipal court and the 
uncertainty of rights of appeal the court was without jurisdiction to invalidate 
municipal ordinances and must be required to refer any such matters to a court 
of competent jurisdiction. The City of Laramie also requested that further 
proceedings in the pending cases and any similar cases be continued until the 
determination of the issues in the action which it intended to file. On the same 
day, the municipal judges responded to the Notice of Action in a letter in which 
the city attorney and his assistants were advised that both judges were 
convinced that their original decision was correct and that they would not 
postpone any pending cases. The letter further stated that "until such time as a 
court of greater jurisdiction decides to the contrary, the decision will stand: 
Section 10.2.090 of the Laramie Municipal Code and Wyoming Statutes 
(31-6-105(f), (1977)) are unconstitutional."

 
 

[¶7.]     On December 8, 1982, 
one of the municipal judges who had joined in issuing the order of November 29, 
1982, wrote to the city attorney and his assistants, noting that the case of South Dakota v. Neville, ___ U.S. ___, 
103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983), had been argued before the Supreme Court 
of the United States that morning. The judge advised the city that the issue of 
whether a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test is admissible apparently would 
arise in a case then pending in the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie. The 
judge stated in his letter that while he did not anticipate any change in the 
ruling which previously had been made, the City of Laramie would be free to 
again argue the issue if it so desired. Following that letter a Notice of Intent 
to File a Bill of Exceptions was filed by the city attorney, in conjunction with 
the Wyoming Attorney General, on January 4, 1983. This pleading was signed, and 
made a part of the record by the municipal court the following day, and on 
January 10, 1982, a Petition for Permission to File Bill of Exceptions was filed 
in this court by the City of Laramie, joined in by the Attorney General of the 
State of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶8.]     On January 24, 1983, 
this court issued an Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, noting that § 7-12-102 
through § 7-12-105, W.S. 1977, pertaining to bills of exceptions were not 
applicable in an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense 
against the laws of the State of Wyoming, and that this statutory proceeding was 
not available with respect to a prosecution in a municipal court for violation 
of an ordinance. City of Sheridan v. 
Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916). Because it appeared from the petition 
filed by the city that there were important constitutional issues to be decided, 
this court construed the petition of the city as a petition for writ of 
certiorari which the court is authorized to issue by Art. V, § 3, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming. See State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, Wyo., 
409 P.2d 769 (1966); Call v. Town of 
Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954); State ex rel. Loomis v. Dahlem, 37 Wyo. 
498, 263 P. 708 (1928); and City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra. As a part of that 
order a schedule for briefing and answer by the respondents was set forth. A 
writ of certiorari which commanded the municipal judges to send to this court 
the record and proceedings in the respective cases was issued simultaneously 
with the order.

 
 

[¶9.]     At this juncture we 
pause to note that the cases against the respective respondents have been 
concluded. A jury trial was held in Johnson's case on November 29, 1982, and 
even though the evidence of his refusal to submit to a chemical test was not 
admitted, he was found guilty and sentenced to ten days in jail and a fine of 
$500, with a portion of the fine and sentence suspended. The case against the 
respondent Mengel was resolved on December 6, 1982, when he appeared before the 
municipal court and changed his plea to guilty. Neither of the respondents has 
appealed from his conviction.

 
 

[¶10.]  On February 7, 1983, because of the 
stated intention of the Municipal Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of 
Laramie to apply the same rule, this court granted a motion by the city and 
entered an Order Staying Similar Proceedings until further order of this court. 
Further, on February 2, 1983, this court granted a motion presented by one of 
the municipal judges to file an amicus curiae brief supporting the position of 
the two respondents in this case.3 Despite the permission granted by 
this court, no brief from the respondents directly or from anyone as amicus 
curiae has been presented to this court for its 
consideration.

 
 

[¶11.]  We turn first to the justification for 
review by virtue of a writ of certiorari.

 
 

[¶12.]  We find that other courts have recognized 
that the writ of certiorari was a method for reviewing decisions of lower courts 
at common law. E.g., Sutterfield v. District Court In and For County of 
Arapahoe, 165 Colo. 225, 438 P.2d 236 (1968); Shoemaker v. State, Del., 375 A.2d 431 (1977); Powers v. Schwartz, Fla.App., 357 So. 2d 764 (1978); Fischer v. 
Bedminster Tp., Somerset County, 5 N.J. 534, 76 A.2d 673 (1950); Commonwealth v. 
Branch, 207 Pa. Super. 137, 215 A.2d 392 (1965); State v. Pigford, Tenn., 572 S.W.2d 921 (1978); State v. De Silva, 105 Tex. 95, 145 S.W. 330 (1912); Higgins 
v. Burton, 64 Utah 550, 232 P. 917 (1924); State v. Whitney, 69 Wn.2d 256, 418 P.2d 143 (1966); and Ashworth v. Hatcher, 93 W. Va. 323, 128 S.E. 93 (1925). We 
do not find in the precedents in this state cited above a rejection of that 
proposition. Article V, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming of 
Wyoming states in pertinent part:

 
 
"* 
* * The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, 
prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to 
the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. * * 
*."

 
 
We 
recognize that there are jurisdictions which apparently limit the function of 
the writ of certiorari to test the exercise of jurisdiction by subordinate 
courts. See Call v. Town of Afton, 
supra. In our state, as was true under the common law, this has been the 
traditional function of the writ of prohibition. Eg., Osborne v. District Court of Ninth Judicial 
District, Wyo., 654 P.2d 124 (1982); State ex rel Peterson v. District Court, 
Wyo., 617 P.2d 1056 (1980); State ex rel. 
Weber v. Municipal Court of Town of Jackson, Wyo., 567 P.2d 698 (1977). We 
then conclude that in referring to the writ of certiorari in the same phrase as 
the writ of prohibition the framers of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
must have intended some different function for the two writs and did not intend 
to limit the writ of certiorari as it had been utilized under the common 
law.

 
 

[¶13.]  In Call v. Town of Afton, supra, Justice 
Blume discussed the variations given to the scope of the writ of certiorari. 
Speaking for the court, he wrote:

 
 
"We 
thus find, on the question before us, holdings of many variegated hues. We have 
no reason to doubt that the writ of certiorari subserves a good purpose in many 
cases, particularly when an appeal is in fact not plain, speedy and adequate. 
But we shall not attempt to determine the full scope thereof and its limitations 
in this case, * * *."

 
 
Similarly 
in this case we do not feel compelled to define the full scope of the writ of 
certiorari, but paraphrasing other language quoted by Justice Blume we do 
identify an instance in which review is essential in order to prevent a failure 
of justice. 

 
 

[¶14.]  Of course the writ of certiorari is not 
one of right, but its issuance is discretionary with the court. City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra. We 
conclude that in this instance the court appropriately exercised its 
discretionary authority in issuing the writ of certiorari. The City of Laramie 
has no appeal from the order of its municipal judges, and it does not have 
available to it even the review encompassed by the statutes providing for a bill 
of exceptions. City of Sheridan v. 
Cadle, supra. The issue, further is one in which the people of the City of 
Laramie and the people of the State of Wyoming in other cities where the ruling 
of the Municipal Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie might be 
followed have an interest. The ruling itself is premised upon constitutional 
grounds and makes the issue one of constitutional magnitude. Even though these 
cases are moot, the record discloses the intention of the Municipal Judges of 
the Laramie Municipal Court to apply the same ruling in like cases, and 
consequently we can proceed to determine the issue. Cf., Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway Department, 
Wyo., 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818 (1956).

 
 

[¶15.]  The question sought to be reviewed in 
this case we perceive to be one of great public import and of first impression. 
We therefore have concluded to exercise our authority to review the issue 
pursuant to a writ of certiorari in our discretion so that the matter can be 
conclusively ruled upon. Walters v. 
Cease, Alaska, 388 P.2d 263 (1964); Genda v. Superior Court, County of Pima, 
103 Ariz. 240, 439 P.2d 811 (1968); Margolis v. District Court In and For County 
of Arapahoe, Colo., 638 P.2d 297 (1981); Lucini v. Mayhew, 113 R.I. 641, 324 A.2d 663 (1974); Boggess v. Morris, Utah, 
635 P.2d 39 (1981); and 14 C.J.S. Certiorari § 22(a), p. 
157.

 
 

[¶16.]  Addressing then the substantive question 
with respect to the admissibility of evidence that a person who has been 
arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants has refused to submit to 
a chemical blood-alcohol test, we align ourselves with the analysis and 
rationale of the Supreme Court of the United States as expressed in South Dakota 
v. Neville, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 923:

 
 
"* 
* * [T]he values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the state 
offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having 
his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, 
painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber 
[v. California], 384 U.S. [757], at 771, 86 S.Ct. [1826], at 1836 [16 L. Ed. 2d 908], that respondent concedes, as he must, that the state could 
legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given, 
then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the 
action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of 
refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is 
this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the 
option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the 
contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the 
inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far 
stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the 
test.

 
 
"We 
recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a 
blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. 
But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make 
difficult choices. See, e.g., Crampton v. 
Ohio, decided with McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 213-217, 91 S. Ct. 1454, 1470-1472, 28 L. Ed. 2d 711 
(1971). We hold, therefore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a 
police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, 
and thus is not protected by the privilege against 
self-incrimination."

 
 

[¶17.]  The admissibility of such evidence no 
more violates Art. I, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming than it 
does the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. We hold such 
evidence to be admissible in cases brought in our municipal courts for the 
violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the driving of an automobile 
while under the influence of intoxicants as well as in state prosecutions. We 
reverse the order of the Municipal Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of 
Laramie, and we dissolve the Order Staying Further Proceedings previously 
entered.

 
 

[¶18.]  It is so ordered by the 
court.

 
 

ROSE 
and BROWN, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired, filed specially 
concurring opinions.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Section 31-6-105(f), W.S. 1977, provides as follows:

 
 
"If 
a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under the provisions 
of this act, evidence of such refusal shall be admissible in any administrative, 
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed while the arrested person was driving or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree 
which rendered him incapable of safely operating said motor 
vehicle."

 
 
Section 
10.24.090 of the Laramie Municipal Code is identical to the language of § 
31-6-105(f), W.S. 1977.

 
 

2 
The pertinent portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America reads as follows:

 
 
"No 
person * * * shall be compelled, in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself * * *."

 
 
The 
parallel language of Art. I, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
states:

 
 
"No 
person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case * * 
*."

 
 

3 
Cary R. Alburn, one of the municipal judges who had issued the November 29, 
1982, order resigned from his position as municipal judge on December 31, 1982. 
In his motion to file an amicus curiae brief he explained that the respondents 
probably would not appear to argue the case because their cases already had been 
determined. He stated that the interests of justice required that this court 
have the benefit of a proper presentation by both sides of a significant 
constitutional issue. He urged that as one of the two judges who had made the 
decision he would be in a favorable position to explain the decision and justify 
it both by brief and argument.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶19.]  I agree with the holding of the majority 
that the writ of certiorari is the appropriate means by which this court should 
review the ruling of the Laramie municipal court with respect to the 
constitutionality of § 10.24.090 of the Laramie Municipal Code. I also agree 
that the ordinance in question does not violate the federal or state 
constitutions. I take exception, however, to the conclusion by the majority that 
the framers of the Wyoming Constitution, in providing for the issuance of the 
writ of certiorari, did not intend to limit the writ to its function at common 
law. 671 P.2d  at 344.

 
 

[¶20.]  In City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 
157 P. 892 (1916), one of the earliest cases in which this court considered the 
propriety of the issuance of the writ of certiorari, we 
said:

 
 
"The 
writ of certiorari is a common-law writ, and under the power conferred * * by 
the Constitution * * * it must be held that the court has authority to issue it 
* * * subject to the conditions and 
limitations controlling the writ at common law." (Emphasis added.) 157 P.  at 
894-895.

 
 
A 
petition for a writ of certiorari was before this court in Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954). There we said that this court was charged with "keeping the 
provisions of the constitution [concerning certiorari] within its proper 
limits." 278 P.2d  at 273. We noted that Wisconsin has a constitutional provision 
like ours and quoted from Wardsworth v. 
Sibley, 38 Wis. 484, 486 (1875), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
said:

 
 
"The 
constitution refers to the writ as it was used and applied in practice when the 
constitution was adopted, and did not intend to give it a scope or object 
different from its original and appropriate function."

 
 

[¶21.]  The highest courts of other states, when 
asked to rule on the availability of the writ, have determined that where the 
parameters of certiorari are not specified in statutory or constitutional 
provisions, the common-law writ applies. Sutterfield v. District Court in and for 
County of Arapahoe, 165 Colo. 225, 438 P.2d 236 (1968); Morris v. Apodaca, 66 N.M. 421, 349 P.2d 335 (1960).

 
 

[¶22.]  I reviewed the scope of the common-law 
writ of certiorari in my dissenting opinion in Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090 
(1983), and cited authority to the effect that certiorari is available where the 
lower court has proceeded illegally and no appeal or other means of review is 
permitted.

 
 
"`* 
* * [I]t can generally be stated that certiorari will lie in two classes of 
cases, (1) whenever it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal has exceeded 
its jurisdiction; (2) whenever it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal 
has proceeded illegally, and no appeal is allowed or other mode provided for 
reviewing its proceedings. 10 Am.Jur. 527, Certiorari, § 5.'" Quoting from Morris v. Apodaca, supra, 349 P.2d  at 
336. 670 P.2d  at 1111 (dissenting opinion).

 
 

[¶23.]  The common-law writ of certiorari is 
described in Works, Courts and their Jurisdiction, 2nd Ed. (1897), at 698, as 
follows:

 
 
"The 
writ of certiorari is a writ by which 
the record of a proceeding in a lower court is removed into a higher court for 
review. It is one of the means by and through which superior courts exercise and 
enforce their supervisory power and control over courts and tribunals of 
inferior jurisdiction, and lies where the party aggrieved has no adequate and 
speedy remedy by the ordinary proceedings at law, as, for example, by writ of 
error or appeal, or by motion in the court before which the action is 
pending."

 
 
The 
common-law writ is further identified in Works, supra, as a remedy designed to 
function in limited situations where review is not available or where the court 
in the first instance has exceeded its jurisdictional 
bounds:

 
 
"So 
the jurisdiction of the courts would be simple enough if the writ were regarded 
as in the nature of a writ of error, or appeal for the correction of errors of 
law, where neither of these remedies were allowed; and allowed, also, to test 
the jurisdiction of the court, and for that purpose only, whether a writ of 
error or appeal is allowed or not. It is quite evident that the common law writ 
was never intended to extend further than this. For one of these purposes it is 
in all essential respects a writ of error, and for the other a jurisdictional 
writ entirely, and only available where the judgment attacked is void for want 
of jurisdiction, either of the subject-matter or of the person." Works, supra, 
at 700-701, citing Harris v. Barber, 
129 U.S. 366, 9 S. Ct. 314, 32 L. Ed. 697 (1889).

 
 

[¶24.]  Until today this court has not deviated 
from the concept that certiorari issues "subject to the conditions and 
limitations controlling the writ at common law." City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, 157 P. 
at 895. We said in State ex rel. Pearson 
v. Hansen, Wyo., 409 P.2d 769, 771 (1966):

 
 
"Certiorari 
* * * [is] a discretionary writ issuable only where there is no other adequate 
remedy. * * *" Citing City of Sheridan v. 
Cadle, supra, and Call v. Town of 
Afton, supra.

 
 

[¶25.]  The majority say that the writ of 
certiorari, as authorized by our constitution, is not restricted to its 
common-law role. They reason that certiorari cannot be limited to testing 
jurisdiction since that "has been the traditional function of the writ of 
prohibition."

 
 
"* 
* * We then conclude that in referring to the writ of certiorari in the same 
phrase as the writ of prohibition the 
framers of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming must have intended some 
different function for the two writs and did not intend to limit the writ of 
certiorari as it had been utilized under the common law." (Emphasis added.) 
671 P.2d  at 344.

 
 
The 
fallacy in this argument is that, at common law, both writs were used to test 
jurisdiction, but a distinction was made as to the objectives of the two writs. 
The common-law writ of prohibition is preventive in nature (used to prevent an 
anticipated act in excess of jurisdiction), while certiorari is remedial (used to quash an action taken 
in excess of jurisdiction). Works, supra, at 628, 704. Thus, the two writs are 
not duplicative, and it is erroneous to say that the framers of the constitution 
intended to expand certiorari beyond its common-law function by referring to 
certiorari in the same phrase as prohibition. Moreover, as we have seen, 
certiorari can be confined to its common-law role and still permit review of 
questions of law other than jurisdiction, so long as no other means of review is 
available.

 
 

[¶26.]  In the case at bar, the City of Laramie 
has available no statutory procedure by which to obtain review of an adverse 
ruling that involves not only a question of law, but is of constitutional 
magnitude. City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 
supra. Therefore, the issuance of the writ in this case is consistent with the 
common-law function of certiorari, as contemplated by Art. 5, § 3 of the Wyoming 
Constitution. For this reason I concur in the majority holding that this court 
properly exercised its discretionary authority in granting 
certiorari.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶27.]  I agree with the majority's conclusion 
that the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie was in error when it ruled § 
31-6-105(f), W.S. 1977, unconstitutional. I also agree with the majority's 
reasoning as to why the municipal court was in error. I am not convinced, 
however, that this court properly treated the petition to file a bill of 
exceptions as a petition for a writ of certiorari.

 
 

GUTHRIE, 
Justice, Retired, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶28.]  I concur. Although it is my view that the 
issuance of a writ of certiorari should be reserved only for those most 
exceptional cases, in this case the factual situation justifies such action 
because there appears no other satisfactory remedy. If the court should abstain 
from consideration of this proceeding, it would be leaving an important question 
open and evading its duty of exercising "general supervisory control" of such 
courts. This would further serve to suggest to municipal judges that they 
hesitate to anticipate constitutional holdings which may impede and confuse the 
enforcement of municipal ordinances.