Case Title: Davis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 476, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
HOWARD L.  DAVIS,
    §
    §
No.  476, 2000  
Defendant Below,
    §
Appellant,
    §
Court Below—Superior Court of the
    §
State of Delaware in and for Kent
v.
    §
County in IK96-10-0247-R1.
    §
STATE OF DELAWARE,
    §
    §
Plaintiff Below,
    §
Appellee.
    §
Def.  ID No.  9610008845
Submitted: April 5, 2001
Decided:
May 24, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.  
O R D E R
This 24th day of May 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief
and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears
to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Howard L. Davis, has appealed from the Superior
Court’s denial of Davis’ motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to
1Supr.  Ct.  R.  25(a).
2Davis v.  State, Del.  Supr., No.  119, 1998, Berger, J., 1999 WL 86055 (Jan.  20,
1999) (ORDER).
2
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the
face of Davis’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.
(2)
In June 1997, after a three-day jury trial in the Superior Court, Davis
was convicted of Assault in the Second Degree.  After a hearing, the Superior Court
declared Davis to be a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and
sentenced him to 10 years in prison followed by probation.
(3)
On direct appeal, Davis alleged that the Superior Court erred when it
(i) denied Davis’ motion for judgment of acquittal; (ii) admitted a highly prejudicial
and inflammatory videotape; (iii) overruled Davis’ objections to improper statements
made by the prosecutor during closing argument; and (iv) instructed the jury with
an Allen charge over Davis’ objection.  This Court concluded that Davis’ arguments
were without merit and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.2
(4)
In his motion for postconviction relief, Davis raised the same four
claims that he had raised in his direct appeal.  In addition, Davis claimed that his
waiver of grand jury indictment was not knowing and voluntary, and that his trial
counsel was ineffective.  By report dated June 26, 2000, a Superior Court
3Somerville v.  State, Del.  Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997).
4Outten v.  State, Del.  Supr., 720 A.2d 547, 551 (1998).
5Younger v.  State, Del.  Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
3
Commissioner recommended that Davis’ postconviction motion be dismissed as
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) and (4).  By order dated September 12,
2000, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and denied Davis’
motion for postconviction relief.  This appeal followed.
(5)
In his opening brief on appeal, Davis raises only one of the claims that
he raised in his postconviction motion.  Davis alleges that the Superior Court erred
when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.  To the extent Davis has failed
to brief his other postconviction claims, those claims are deemed abandoned and will
not be addressed by this Court.3
(6)
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction motion under
Rule 61 for abuse of discretion.4  The Court first must consider the procedural
requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.5  Davis claims that
the evidence used to convict him was insufficient, and that the Superior Court erred
when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.  This claim was resolved against
Davis on direct appeal.  Consequently, the claim is procedurally barred unless
6Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(4).
7Supr.  Ct.  R.  8.  See Trump v.  State, Del.  Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 971 (2000) (citing
Wainwright v.  State, Del.  Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986)) (providing that plain error is
error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and
integrity of the trial”).
811 Del.  C. § 612.
911 Del.  C.  § 4205(b)(4).
4
reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.6  We have
reviewed the record in this case and conclude that there is no basis for
reconsideration of Davis’ claim.
(7)
In his opening brief on appeal, Davis raises one new claim that he did
not raise in his postconviction motion.  Davis challenges the 10-year sentence
imposed by the Superior Court for his Assault in the Second Degree conviction.
Davis claims that the sentence is too harsh.  Because Davis did not raise this claim
in his postconviction motion, we will review the claim now only for plain error.7
(8)
Davis was convicted of Assault in the Second Degree, which is  a Class
D felony.8  The maximum penalty for a Class D felony is eight years at Level V.9
Davis, however, was properly declared to be a habitual criminal pursuant to 11 Del.
C. § 4214(a).  Section 4214(a) explicitly grants the sentencing court the discretion
to “impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment.”  Accordingly, the Superior Court
5
committed neither plain error nor an abuse of discretion when it sentenced Davis to
10 years in prison for Assault in the Second Degree.
(9)
It is manifest on the face of Davis’ opening brief that the appeal is
without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware
law, and to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no
abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice