Case Title: People v. Coleman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89159

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89159-Agenda 1-March 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DEDRICK COLEMAN, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Dedrick Coleman, was convicted of the April 26, 1989,
first degree murders of Lance Hale and Avis Welch. He was also
convicted of armed robbery and home invasion. Defendant waived
the right to be sentenced by a jury and the circuit court
subsequently sentenced him to death for the murders. Defendant
received prison sentences for his other convictions. This court
affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence on direct
appeal (People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319 (1994)) and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari (Coleman v. Illinois, 513 U.S. 881, 130 L. Ed. 2d 143, 115 S. Ct. 215 (1994)). In 1995,
defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)), which
the circuit court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. On
appeal, this court reversed that decision and remanded the cause
for an evidentiary hearing on certain issues raised in the petition.
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998). Following an
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the petition and this
appeal followed (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a); 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(3)).
BACKGROUND
Trial Proceedings
	The murders of Lance Hale and Avis Welch occurred in the
first-floor apartment of a two-flat home in Chicago on April 26,
1989. The first-floor apartment was a known "drug house" owned
and operated by Alex McCullough. Defendant knew McCullough
through his employment in McCullough's drug operation.
McCullough was also the boyfriend of defendant's sister. About
one month before the murders, defendant and McCullough had
argued about defendant's alleged theft of cocaine and $2,000.
	At trial, Aldene Lockett, who lived in the second-floor
apartment of the two-flat, testified that at around 5:30 a.m. on
April 26, 1989, she heard voices coming from the first-floor
apartment. A short while later, she heard a gunshot and something
falling. Two more shots later rang out, and Lockett heard a door
open. At this time, she looked out her window and saw a
dark-complected young black man between 5 feet 6 inches and 5
feet 8 inches tall leave the apartment. The man was wearing all
black clothing and sunglasses. Lockett later related what she had
seen to police officers investigating the murders.
	Eventually, police connected defendant to the drug-house
murders, due, in large part, to defendant's shooting of McCullough
five days later on May 1, 1989. Several persons were present at the
time of the McCullough shooting, and defendant told them he
wanted it said that he shot McCullough in self-defense.
Nevertheless, some of these witnesses later turned themselves in
to the police and informed them of defendant's true role in
McCullough's shooting, as well as his involvement in the double
homicide at the drug house. As a result, defendant participated in
a lineup that was viewed by Aldene Lockett on May 2, 1989. At
trial, Lockett testified that one of the lineup participants "looked
like he fit the height and description" of the man she had seen
leave the drug house. Lockett further told police that the man had
been wearing sunglasses. The police then asked each of the lineup
participants to put on sunglasses. All but one of the participants
complied. According to Lockett, the participant who did not put on
the sunglasses was the same participant who had the weight and
height of the man she had seen leave the drug house. On
cross-examination, Lockett stated that she did not positively
identify anyone from the lineup, but merely told the police that the
man who did not put on the glasses "could have been" the same
man she had seen leave the murder scene because "he had the
same height, and build, and color."
	Chicago police detective Tony Maslanka testified that he and
his partner, Detective Carroll, conducted the lineup that Lockett
viewed. According to Maslanka, Lockett told him that one of the
men in the lineup, identified by Maslanka as defendant, "looked
like the individual she saw leave the first-floor apartment *** in
regard to height, complexion, and physical build." Maslanka stated
that because Lockett had seen the suspect leave the building
wearing sunglasses, each of the lineup participants was asked to
put on a pair of sunglasses. All of the participants in the lineup
complied, with the exception of defendant. Lockett again stated to
Maslanka that the man who did not put on the sunglasses "was the
individual whom she saw that day in question with regard to
height, physical build, and complection [sic]." On
cross-examination, Maslanka admitted that Lockett did not
positively identify defendant as the man she had seen leave the
scene of the murders. Rather, Maslanka characterized her
identification as "tentative" because Lockett had told him that she
had not been wearing her glasses when she saw the suspect leave
the building and that she was nearsighted. As stated, defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death for the murders.
Post-Conviction Proceedings
	In his post-conviction petition, defendant alleged that the
State violated his right to due process and a fair trial by concealing
material evidence that was favorable to the defense and by using
perjured testimony to obtain the convictions. In support of this
claim, defendant attached to his petition the affidavit of Aldene
Lockett. In this 1995 affidavit, Lockett states that she saw the
gunman's face as he was leaving the first-floor apartment and that
she remembers "recognizing it from the neighborhood." At a later
date, Lockett saw a man "on the block" who looked like the
gunman. According to the affidavit, while at the lineup, Lockett
"felt that the police were trying to get [her] to single out the male
who refused to put on the shades, because they went back to him
in the lineup and told [her] that this was the guy [they] picked up
for the murders. [She] told them that this guy was not dark enough
to be the guy who had come out of the downstairs apartment."
Lockett also states in her affidavit that she does not "remember
seeing the guy who refused to wear the shades during the police
lineup in the neighborhood before" and that she remembers
"telling the States Attorney, Michael Kelly, about how this guy in
the lineup didn't look like the guy [she] saw come out of the
downstairs apartment, but [Kelly] would always say something to
try and convince [her] that he was the right guy." Finally, Lockett
states that Assistant State's Attorney Kelly and his investigators
"would call me every two or three days to go over my story to
make sure it didn't change." In exchange for her trial testimony,
the investigators promised to move her to her home state of
Alabama or to find her a new residence in Chicago. After one year
had passed and Lockett was ready to move, she called the State's
Attorney's office but was told that Kelly no longer worked there.
Lockett's affidavit further states that no one from the defense team
ever contacted her. Defendant's amended petition also alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel based on this affidavit, in addition
to counsel's failure to interview Lockett. 	On appeal from the
circuit court's order dismissing defendant's petition without an
evidentiary hearing, this court determined that, since the State had
filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition, the factual
allegations of Lockett's affidavit must be taken as true, and that
the circuit court had failed to do so in its dismissal of the petition.
Accordingly, this court remanded the cause for an evidentiary
hearing as to defendant's claim regarding Lockett's trial testimony
and as to his claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel regarding the
alleged failure to interview Lockett.
	On remand, defendant's post-conviction counsel filed a
motion for discovery, requesting that the State turn over (1) its file
on the case, (2) any and all exculpatory evidence in the State's
possession, and (3) the personnel files of John Hynes and Michael
Kelly, the assistant State's Attorneys who prosecuted defendant.
The circuit court granted the motion as to (1) and (2), but denied
it as to (3). Defendant's counsel also issued subpoenas to the
Office of Professional Conduct (OPS) for its files on Maslanka.
The City's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. At a
hearing on the motion, the City's counsel revealed that the
subpoenaed records contained eight complaints against Maslanka,
five of which were not sustained and three of which were
completely unfounded. The circuit court granted counsel's motion
to quash, finding no basis for reviewing Maslanka's file. The court
also denied post-conviction counsel's request to take the
depositions of Maslanka, Hynes, Kelly, and Nicholas Panarese,
defendant's trial attorney.
	At the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel asked
Lockett to review her entire affidavit and then asked if the
affidavit was true. Lockett replied that it was. On cross-examination, Lockett testified that the morning of the shooting
was "gloomy" and that she saw the gunman's face for less than a
second. She could tell that he was a dark-skinned black male of
medium height and build. Lockett testified that she is nearsighted
and was not wearing her glasses when she saw the man walk out
of her building. When asked if she remembered telling a detective
who interviewed her the next day that she had never before seen
the man who walked out of the downstairs apartment, Lockett
stated that she could not remember. The prosecutor noted
paragraph 10 of Lockett's affidavit, which stated that at a later
date, Lockett remembered seeing a man on the block who looked
like the man she saw after the shootings. Lockett admitted that, in
a 1999 videotaped interview she gave to post-conviction counsel,
she said that she did not remember that part of her affidavit.
	Regarding the lineup that Lockett viewed after the shooting,
she testified that she did not tell Maslanka that defendant was of
the same height, build, and color as the man she saw walk out of
her building. Lockett admitted that she could have so testified at
the trial, but she did not know why she would have done so, as the
man who walked out of her building after the shooting was darker
than defendant. Lockett remembered testifying at defendant's trial
that in the lineup she saw "one young man that looked like he fit
the height and description." She also remembered that she testified
that the man who refused to put on the sunglasses matched the
height and weight of the man she saw leave her building. Lockett
did not recall testifying that she thought the man she picked out of
the lineup was the gunman; she said he "could have been" and he
had the same "height, build and color." Lockett stated that the
reason she did not testify at the trial that the gunman had a darker
skin color than the man she picked out of the lineup was because
"[they] didn't ask [her]." Lockett then said, "I don't know. I can't
remember ten years ago. It's been a long time."
	Lockett recalled that at defendant's trial, she was asked if the
police said anything to her prior to viewing the lineup. She
answered that they told her not to be afraid, that the men could not
see her, and to wait until the men "came into the screen" before
making any identification. Lockett testified at the evidentiary
hearing that she called the State's Attorney's office about a year
after she testified at trial, seeking Kelly's help on relocating to
another apartment. However, Kelly was no longer an assistant
State's Attorney and no one from the State's Attorney's office
helped her relocate. Regarding her statement in her affidavit that
she was never contacted by any attorneys or investigators working
for the defense, she admitted at the evidentiary hearing that in her
1999 videotaped interview with post-conviction counsel, she
"probably" stated that she was uncertain to whom she had spoken
to 10 years ago. She testified that she could not remember talking
to anyone other than Kelly. Lockett stated that she could have
spoken to others, but she does not remember now. She also
testified at the evidentiary hearing that she "could have" stated in
her affidavit that she remembered recognizing the gunman from
the neighborhood. She told post-conviction counsel in the
videotaped interview that she did not remember saying that in her
affidavit. In her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Lockett
stated that she saw this man a few months after the trial and she
became afraid. However, she did not call the police or Kelly.
	Vernon Jasper, former investigator for the Cook County
public defender's office, testified that he assisted defense counsel
in defendant's trial. He does not recall interviewing Lockett during
his investigation or being requested to do so by defense counsel.
Jasper testified that he has no recollection of working on
defendant's case. He could have interviewed Lockett and forgotten
about it.
	Maslanka, a 24-year veteran of the Chicago police
department, testified that he and his partner were assigned to do a
lineup for Lockett that included defendant. After viewing the men
in the lineup, Lockett told Maslanka that defendant had the same
physical appearance and complexion as the gunman. Maslanka
denied saying anything to try to get Lockett to pick defendant out
of the lineup.
	 On the next hearing date, post-conviction counsel moved to
reopen his cross-examination of Maslanka on the grounds of
newly discovered material relating to certain judgments against the
City of Chicago resulting from incidents in which Maslanka
allegedly "tortured victims." Counsel alleged that at least two
settlements had been obtained against Maslanka and/or the City of
Chicago. Counsel alleged that Maslanka had been investigated by
the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) at least once and that
he had been suspended by the Chicago police department for
misconduct in one case. When the circuit court asked counsel what
relevance this had to defendant's case, counsel replied that the
issue is whether Maslanka falsified his police report to leave out
what Lockett had told him and, in these other cases, Maslanka
omitted from his police reports the fact that he had participated in
the torture of several suspects. The circuit court characterized
counsel's allegations against Maslanka as conclusory and
irrelevant and denied the motion.
	In his motion for additional discovery regarding Maslanka,
defendant identified six incidents of alleged physical abuse of
subjects in custody. The motion alleged that lawsuits had been
filed and that at least two judgments were obtained against
Maslanka and/or the City of Chicago. Defendant alleged that
Marcus Wiggins' lawsuit alleged torture and police report
falsification and that Wiggins obtained a settlement of the suit.
Defendant also alleged that Donald Torrence filed suit for physical
abuse and failure to follow established procedures and obtained a
settlement. In addition, defendant alleged that others, including
Tyrone Burnett, sued Maslanka and the City of Chicago for false
arrest and malicious prosecution and obtained a settlement.
Defendant further alleged that Maslanka was suspended for
"misconduct" in the Wiggins case. Defendant alleged that the
State had committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963), by
failing to turn over this evidence prior to Maslanka's testimony at
the evidentiary hearing.
	In an affidavit filed by post-conviction counsel, Torrence
stated that in 1988 Maslanka and another officer accosted him at
his home and that Maslanka struck him on the head with his gun
while Torrence was in handcuffs. Torrence filed suit and settled
the case for $2,100. In another affidavit, Raymond Mack stated
that Maslanka and another officer forced him to don sunglasses
and a cap during multiple lineups. Mack stated that, after doing so,
he did not look like anyone else in the lineup. Tyrone Burnett
stated in an affidavit that he was arrested in July 1996 and that
Maslanka deliberately drove his police car into Burnett, causing
serious injuries. Burnett filed a lawsuit that was later settled. The
circuit court denied defendant's motion.
	At the continued evidentiary hearing, Nicholas Panarese,
defendant's trial counsel, testified that he tried numerous times to
interview Lockett. On the first attempt, Panarese went with his two
investigators, Vernon Jasper and Mort Smith, to Lockett's
apartment. Lockett declined to talk to them. Panarese called
Lockett on the telephone two or three times, attempting to
interview her. However, as soon as he identified himself, Lockett
would refuse to talk to him. Panarese did not make any written
memoranda of his failed attempts to interview Lockett. He did not
question Lockett at the trial about her refusal to talk to him about
the case. Neither did he question Lockett about the State's offer to
relocate her. Panarese did not want to "get into the fact that she
may or may not have been threatened." Panarese denied being
angry at defendant for filing a complaint against him with the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Post-conviction counsel also questioned Panarese about his bill for
services rendered on defendant's behalf, noting that Panarese had
requested approximately $23,000 and that this amount had been
reduced by the trial judge. Panarese testified that approximately
$7,600 of this amount was requested to reimburse his
investigators. Panarese did not make note on his bill of the time he
spent trying to interview Lockett because he was not able to talk
to her. The circuit court sustained objections to further questioning
about Panarese's bill and about whether any court had previously
found that Panarese had provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
	Former Assistant State's Attorney Michael Kelly testified that
Lockett gave him no exculpatory information during his interviews
with her prior to the trial. She did not tell him that defendant's
complexion was not as dark as that of the gunman. She did not tell
Kelly that she recognized the gunman from her neighborhood.
Kelly did not suggest to Lockett in any way how she should testify.
Lockett told him that she had been threatened and he relayed that
information to Panarese. On cross-examination, Kelly testified that
he did not recall asking Lockett if she had any evidence that would
tend to show defendant's innocence. The circuit court sustained
the State's objections to questions asking whether Kelly had a
"drill" for interviewing witnesses and whether it would have been
customary to ask Lockett if she had evidence that would tend to
show defendant's innocence. Objections were also sustained to
post-conviction counsel's asking questions of Kelly as to whether
(1) he asked police witnesses in defendant's case if they had any
evidence tending to show defendant's innocence, (2) it was Kelly's
practice to do so, and (3) it was part of the office policy of the
State's Attorney to ask police officers if they had any exculpatory
evidence. Objections were also sustained to post-conviction
counsel's questions as to whether Kelly would have told Panarese
if Lockett had told Kelly that defendant's complexion was not as
dark as that of the gunman.
	Defendant filed a petition for post-judgment relief under
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1401 (West 2000)) in which he alleged that on November 5,
1999, post-conviction counsel discovered new evidence that John
Hynes, a prosecutor at defendant's trial and now an associate
judge, had a record of bias in jury selection stemming from two
cases Hynes tried prior to defendant's case. Defendant's source for
this newly discovered evidence was an article appearing in the
Chicago Tribune. That article noted Hynes had failed to reveal on
his application for Cook County associate judge two appellate
court decisions reversing defendants' convictions due to violations
of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), by the prosecution. Defendant alleged that Hynes
was one of the prosecutors in both cases. One of the appellate
decisions mentions Hynes in a quotation. The other decision does
not mention Hynes by name. In his petition, defendant alleged that
this newly discovered evidence was admissible to show Hynes'
modus operandi, motive, intent, identification, or absence of
mistake. At defendant's trial, the prosecution used 13 peremptory
challenges, 6 against white venirepersons, 6 against black
venirepersons, and one against an Asian female. The petition
alleged that the personal characteristics of three black females and
the Asian female who were excluded from the jury were
indistinguishable from those of five white females who served on
the jury and two white females who served as alternates. The jury
ultimately consisted of 10 Caucasians and 2 black males. The
petition requested (1) vacatur of defendant's convictions and death
sentence, (2) a hearing on his claims, (3) leave to amend or
supplement the post-conviction petition to add additional claims,
and (4) transcripts of jury selection and Batson hearings in the two
cases mentioned in the newspaper articles.
	 The State filed a motion to dismiss the section 2-1401
petition. At the hearing on the State's motion, the State argued that
the petition was untimely where defendant's trial was concluded
in 1990, the petition was filed in 1999, and defendant had alleged
no grounds to toll the two-year statute of limitations of section
2-1401. The State also argued that the purpose of section 2-1401
is to allow a party to raise factual matters that were unknown to
the court at the time of the judgment that, had they been known,
would have prevented rendition of the judgment and that an
alleged Batson violation is not a valid basis for a section 2-1401
petition. Defendant argued that the circuit court could consider the
Batson issue as a Brady matter. The circuit court granted the
State's motion to dismiss. 	Following the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel
filed a motion asking the circuit court to reconsider its rulings as
to the scope of the evidentiary hearing to include the allegations
against Maslanka and the alleged Batson violations by former
prosecutor Hynes. In the prayer of his motion, counsel requested
leave to amend defendant's post-conviction petition to include
an allegation that the State had committed Brady violations,
thus depriving defendant of his right to due process and a
fundamentally fair trial. The circuit court found that no Brady
violations had occurred and denied the motion. After hearing
arguments of counsel, the circuit court denied defendant's post-conviction petition, stating that it had considered the testimony
of the witnesses and that Lockett's testimony was not credible,
noting that her "memory and manner while testifying here was
poor."
ANALYSIS
I. Post-Conviction Petition
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2000)) provides a remedy whereby defendants may
challenge their convictions or sentences for violations of federal
or state constitutional law. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502
(1998); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1997). A
post-conviction action is a collateral proceeding and not an appeal
from the underlying judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55,
62 (1999). The purpose of the proceeding is to allow inquiry into
constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that
were not, and could not have been, determined on direct appeal.
People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73 (1997); People v.
Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1995). Thus, res judicata bars
consideration of issues that were raised and decided on direct
appeal, and issues that could have been presented on direct appeal,
but were not, are considered waived. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03.
	At an evidentiary hearing, the burden is on the defendant to
make a substantial showing of a deprivation of constitutional
rights and the circuit court's decision will not be disturbed unless
it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174
(2000); People v. Griffin, 109 Ill. 2d 293, 303 (1985). The term
"manifest error" means error that is "clearly evident, plain, and
indisputable." People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997).
A. Scope of Evidentiary Hearing
	Defendant argues that he was denied his right to due process
by the circuit court's failure to afford him a full and fair
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction petition. He argues that
his cross-examination of the State's witnesses was improperly
limited by the court. He also argues that the circuit court erred in
refusing post-conviction counsel's requests for discovery.
Detective Maslanka
	Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by
not reopening cross-examination of Maslanka to allow post-conviction counsel to question him about allegations of
misconduct in other cases. Defendant claims that the evidence of
the alleged misconduct was admissible to show that Maslanka's
modus operandi was to use whatever means were necessary to
convict his victims, including "torture, suggestive lineups, false
police reports, and perjury."
	We note that the circuit court has wide discretion to limit the
type of evidence it will admit at a post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. People v. Montgomery, 162 Ill. 2d 109, 113 (1994). A
criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him and this includes the right to
conduct a reasonable cross-examination. The defendant has the
right to inquire into a witness' bias, interest, or motive to testify
falsely. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 337 (1998). The evidence
used to impeach, however, must give rise to an inference that the
witness has something to gain or lose by his testimony.
Accordingly, the evidence must not be remote or uncertain. People
v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 206 (1998).
	In People v. Davis, 193 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (1990), a police
officer kicked defendant in the groin in what the officer said was
an attempt to protect himself from defendant, who was resisting
the officer's attempt to arrest him. At trial, the defendant
attempted to cross-examine the officer concerning one prior and
one pending civil rights suit alleging that the officer used
excessive force in making an arrest. The officer had received no
suspension or reprimand from the police department. The circuit
court sustained the State's objection to this questioning because
there had been no disciplinary action taken against the officer in
the suit that had been settled and the pending suit was not related
to the defendant's case. Davis, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 1003. On
appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court erred in restricting
his cross-examination of the officer, noting that he had a
constitutional right to impeach the officer on the issues of bias or
motive to testify falsely. The appellate court noted that evidence
showing bias must be direct and positive, not remote or uncertain.
The court observed that the officer had not been suspended or
reprimanded regarding the allegations in the two civil suits. Mere
evidence of a civil suit against an officer charging some breach of
duty unrelated to the defendant's case is not admissible to impeach
the officer. Davis, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 1005.
	In another case, People v. Cameron, 189 Ill. App. 3d 998
(1989), the defendant sought to use a pending civil suit against a
police officer to impeach the officer's testimony. In the civil suit,
the plaintiff had accused the officer of misidentifying him as the
person who had delivered a controlled substance to a confidential
informant. The defendant contended that the pendency of the suit
showed bias on the officer's part to gain favor from the State by
testifying favorably to it. Cameron, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1002. The
appellate court noted that, while it has been held to be error to
refuse a defendant's request to impeach a State's witness with
evidence of pending but unproved criminal charges to show bias,
no case had held the same regarding the mere pendency of a civil
suit against a law enforcement officer charging misconduct
unrelated to the defendant's case. The court found that any alleged
incentive on the officer's part to give favorable testimony because
of the pending civil suit was remote and uncertain. Likewise,
evidence of the suit would be inadmissible to show the officer's
propensity to perjure himself. Only convictions may be used to
impeach a witness; evidence of the actual commission of the
offense is inadmissible. Cameron, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1002-03.
	The impeachment material sought to be used in Davis and
Cameron is similar to that which defendant proposed to use here
in cross-examining Maslanka. In contrast, defendant cites cases
that we conclude are distinguishable from his case. In People v.
Phillips, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1013 (1981), the defendant was charged
with attempted murder and other offenses against an off-duty
police officer. The defendant contended that he shot the officer
because the officer was brandishing his weapon at the defendant's
brother and the defendant feared that the officer would shoot.
Evidence at the trial showed that the officer was intoxicated. The
circuit court denied the defendant's request to cross-examine the
officer about his 15 prior suspensions from the police department.
The defendant had argued that this was relevant to whether the
officer was justified in displaying his weapon and whether the
officer's account of the shooting was true. Phillips, 95 Ill. App. 3d
at 1019. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial,
finding error in the refusal to allow the defendant to question the
officer about his prior suspensions. The court rejected the State's
argument that evidence of the suspensions was remote and
unrelated to the defendant. The court noted that the officer could
have been motivated by a desire to avoid another suspension or
possibly termination. Also, given the officer's severe injuries, he
could have been motivated to testify falsely to retain his medical
insurance coverage and compensation. Phillips, 95 Ill. App. 3d at
1021.
	Defendant also relies on People v. Robinson, 56 Ill. App. 3d
832 (1977), in which the defendant was convicted of striking a
police officer. The circuit court denied the defendant's request to
cross-examine the officer concerning evidence that the FBI was
investigating charges that the officer frequently used excessive
force, especially against black persons. The defendant also wished
to question the officer about evidence of specific instances in
which the officer had allegedly employed excessive force and
evidence that during the previous year, the officer had been
suspended by the police department for conduct unbecoming an
officer. Robinson, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 834. The appellate court
rejected the defendant's argument concerning evidence of the
FBI's investigation and of the officer's specific past violent acts.
However, it held that the defendant should have been permitted to
introduce evidence concerning the fact that the officer had been
suspended from his duties at the time of trial for committing an act
of violence and was scheduled to resume active duty a few days
later. This fact may have given the officer a motive to testify
falsely to avoid further suspension or other disciplinary measures.
The court held, however, that the error was harmless. Robinson, 56
Ill. App. 3d at 840.
	Finally, defendant cites People v. Adams, 259 Ill. App. 3d 995
(1993), in which the defendant was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance. The circuit court denied defendant's request
to cross-examine a police officer who had given an affidavit for a
search warrant based upon information received from a
confidential informant. The defendant contended that the officer
had perjured himself in his affidavit. The defendant was barred
from questioning the officer about any action by the police
department against him, any lawsuit currently pending in federal
court, or any drug testing he completed approximately one month
after the defendant's arrest. The officer had tested positive for the
presence of cocaine and amphetamines. He was suspended from
the police force at the time of the trial. Adams, 259 Ill. App. 3d at
1000-01. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new
trial. The court held that the defendant should have been allowed
to question the officer concerning his illegal drug use, his
suspension from the police department, and the pending civil suit
against him. The court noted that it is well established in Illinois
that drug addiction has an important bearing upon the credibility
of a witness and that evidence that the officer was presently
suspended from the police department may provide him with a
motive to testify falsely to avoid further disciplinary action.
Adams, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 1004.
	The relevance of the proposed cross-examination of the police
officers involved in Phillips, Robinson, and Adams contrasts
sharply with defendant's desired cross-examination of Maslanka.
In this case, the complaints against Maslanka and the lawsuits
naming him as a defendant did not provide any inference that
Maslanka had a motive to testify favorably to the State or to
perjure himself at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant has not
alleged that Maslanka physically abused him in any manner.
Maslanka's only duty was to conduct the lineup for Lockett. The
civil suits defendant wishes to explore do not concern Maslanka's
actions in conducting lineups. Likewise, the affidavits submitted
by Raymond Mack, Donald Torrence, and Tyrone Burnett, which
alleged misconduct on Maslanka's part, are not relevant to
Maslanka's credibility. Only Mack alleged that Maslanka had
placed him in a suggestive lineup by forcing him to put on
sunglasses and a cap. Mack stated that after doing so, he did not
look like anyone else in the lineup. Mack's situation is different
from the one before us, where Maslanka placed sunglasses on all
the men in the lineup and only defendant refused to put them on.
We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to reopen Maslanka's cross-examination so
that defendant could question him about these irrelevant matters.
Trial Counsel Panarese
	Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to
allow him to cross-examine Panarese as to (1) the reduction in his
bill for services rendered at the trial, (2) his failure to bill for or
make any note of his alleged attempts to call Lockett prior to trial,
or (3) whether any court had found that Panarese provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. In making his argument,
defendant relies on the same three cases (Phillips, Robinson, and
Adams) he cited regarding the circuit court's refusal to reopen
Maslanka's cross-examination. These cases are inapplicable. The
matters that the defendants in those cases sought to raise were
directly relevant to the issues in those cases. Here, defendant has
failed to show how the reduction in Panarese's bill for his trial
work had anything to do with the issue of whether Panarese failed
to interview Lockett. It is not unusual for a trial court to reduce a
fee request made by appointed counsel. The fact that the trial judge
in defendant's case reduced Panarese's bill has no relevance to the
issues raised at the evidentiary hearing. Similarly, the fact that
Panarese failed to bill for or make a note of his alleged attempts to
contact Lockett does not give rise to an inference that Panarese
testified falsely that he tried but was unable to contact Lockett. It
must be noted that Lockett testified at the evidentiary hearing that
she could not remember talking to anyone except Kelly, the then
assistant State's Attorney who was handling the case. Lockett did
not testify that she did not talk to Panarese, only that she could not
remember talking to him. Further, post-conviction counsel did, in
fact, question Panarese about the reduction of his fee and his
failure to charge for unsuccessful telephone calls and Panarese
answered these questions. Trial courts have discretion to restrict
cross-examination that is repetitive or unduly harassing. People v.
Prevo, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1048 (1999).
	As to defendant's complaint that the circuit court should have
allowed him to question Panarese regarding any prior findings of
ineffectiveness, this was a collateral matter having no relevance to
the issues at the evidentiary hearing. We fail to see how such
evidence would give rise to an inference that Panarese was
ineffective in this case. To establish ineffectiveness of counsel,
defendant must meet the Strickland standard, i.e., he must show
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that defendant was prejudiced thereby. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). Defendant
failed to meet this standard. We also reject defendant's argument
that had he been allowed to question Panarese on these matters,
Panarese would have been discredited and Lockett's credibility
increased. Lockett did not testify unequivocally that she did not
talk to Panarese or his investigators. She testified that she may
have talked to others, in addition to Kelly. Lockett's credibility
would not have been enhanced had post-conviction counsel been
allowed to delve into these collateral matters.
Assistant State's Attorney Kelly
	Defendant argues that the circuit court improperly restricted
his cross-examination of Kelly as to (1) whether Kelly considered
it exculpatory that Lockett could not positively identify defendant
as the perpetrator, (2) whether there was a policy in the State's
Attorney's office to ask witnesses if they had evidence that would
be exculpatory, and whether Kelly himself had such a policy, and
(3) Kelly's understanding of his obligation under United States
Supreme Court cases and our Rule 412 (188 Ill. 2d R. 412).
Defendant contends that, had he been allowed to question Kelly on
these matters, Kelly's credibility would have been discredited and
Lockett's credibility enhanced. We disagree.
	In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution is
required to turn over to the defense upon request any evidence that
is favorable to the accused and a failure to do so results in a denial
of due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to
punishment. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 351, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (1976), the Court held that the
duty to disclose applies even where there has been no request for
exculpatory evidence. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 490, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985), the
Court held that the duty to disclose includes impeachment
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Brady also applies to
exculpatory information known only to the police and not to the
prosecutor. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 505, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995). The Brady rule also
requires the individual prosecutor to learn of any favorable
evidence known to others acting on behalf of the government in
the case. Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 437, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 508, 115 S. Ct. 
at 1567. Evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists
that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 
at 494, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383.
	Rule 412 governs the disclosure of information by the
prosecution to the defense. Under Rule 412(f), the prosecution
must ensure a free flow of information between investigative
personnel and its office sufficient to place within its possession all
information relevant to the accused and the offense charged. 188
Ill. 2d R. 412(f). Defendant contends that Kelly had an obligation
to look for exculpatory evidence and that Kelly's understanding of
his obligations under Brady and Rule 412 went to the heart of
defendant's post-conviction case. However, defendant fails to
explain how his proposed questioning of Kelly would have been
relevant to the issue of Lockett's credibility at the evidentiary
hearing. Lockett did not testify that she gave any exculpatory
evidence to Kelly. Kelly testified that Lockett's interviews were
consistent with the information in the police reports. Lockett told
both the police and Kelly that the man she identified in the lineup
had the same height, build, and color as the perpetrator. Defendant
asserts that further questioning of Kelly would have discredited
him and tended to show that a Brady violation occurred. This
statement is baseless. Nothing in the record remotely suggests that
the prosecution committed a Brady violation. Defendant's
attempts to question Kelly on these collateral matters were
properly rebuffed by the circuit court.
Discovery Rulings
	Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
motions for discovery regarding Maslanka's alleged misconduct
in other cases, ineffective-assistance claims against Panarese, and
Brady violations by the trial prosecutors.
			"The discovery rules for neither civil nor criminal cases
apply to proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. [Citation.] Nonetheless, the circuit court has inherent
discretionary authority to order discovery in
post-conviction proceedings. [Citation.] Circuit courts,
however, must exercise this authority with caution
because post-conviction proceedings afford only limited
review of constitutional claims not presented at trial, and
there is a potential for abuse of the discovery process in
post-conviction proceedings. [Citation.] As a result, the
circuit court should allow discovery only after the moving
party demonstrates 'good cause' for a discovery request.
[Citation.] We will not disturb a circuit court's denial of
a request for discovery in post-conviction proceedings
absent an abuse of discretion." People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264-65 (2000).
	Defendant argues that he demonstrated good cause with the
evidence showing Maslanka's misconduct, Panarese's padding of
his bill, and evidence that Kelly did not understand his Brady and
Rule 412 obligations. However, we have already held that this
allegedly impeaching material was irrelevant and collateral to the
issue of Lockett's credibility. Accordingly, this evidence did not
provide good cause for further discovery.
B. Alleged Brady Violation
	Defendant complains that the State did not turn over to his
trial counsel the allegations against Maslanka in unrelated cases
concerning torture, police report falsification, failure to follow
established procedures, and lineup suggestiveness that existed at
the time of the trial, or allegations that came to light after the trial
concluded. In the prayer of his motion to reconsider the scope of
the evidentiary hearing, defendant sought leave to amend his post-conviction petition to include a claim that the State committed a
Brady violation in failing to reveal the allegations regarding
Maslanka. In denying the motion, the circuit court ruled that no
Brady violation had occurred.
	Defendant repeats the same argument on this issue that he
made earlier regarding the impeachment value of this material. As
we have already held, the evidence concerning these allegations
was irrelevant and collateral to the issues identified by this court
in its remand for an evidentiary hearing. Questioning Maslanka at
trial or at the evidentiary hearing concerning these allegations
would not have tended to impeach his testimony about the lineup
he conducted for Lockett. Most of the allegations involved alleged
physical abuse of suspects in custody. Defendant has never alleged
that he was mistreated by Maslanka. Although Raymond Mack
alleges in his affidavit that Maslanka put him in a suggestive
lineup where he was the only person forced to wear sunglasses and
a cap, in the instant case all the men in the lineup were asked to
put sunglasses on, because Lockett told the police that the man she
saw leaving the scene of the shooting wore sunglasses. All the
men complied with the request except defendant. Thus, any
suggestiveness that may have infected the lineup was not due to
Maslanka, but to defendant's refusal to put on the sunglasses. A
Brady violation occurs only where the evidence is material to guilt
or to punishment. Materiality is shown where a reasonable
probability exists that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S.  at
682, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383. As the allegations
against Maslanka were irrelevant to any issue involved in
defendant's case, the State had no duty to reveal any of this
information. We therefore conclude that the circuit court did not
err in denying defendant's motion.
II. Section 2-1401 Petition
	Although a section 2-1401 petition is usually characterized as
a civil remedy, it may also be used in criminal cases. People v.
Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 460-61 (2000). Section 2-1401 provides
a statutory procedure permitting vacatur of final judgments and
orders after 30 days from their entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West
1998). A proceeding under section 2-1401 is a forum in which
" 'to correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a
cause, unknown to the petitioner and court at the time of trial,
which, if then known, would have prevented the judgment.' "
People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 314 (1978), quoting Ephraim v.
People, 13 Ill. 2d 456, 458 (1958) (construing section 72 of the
former Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 72)).
The petition must be filed within two years following entry of the
challenged judgment, unless the petitioner makes a clear showing
that he was under a legal disability or duress or the grounds of
relief were concealed. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 210-11
(1997); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998). To be entitled to
relief under section 2-1401, a petitioner must set forth allegations
supporting: (1) the existence of a meritorious claim or defense; (2)
due diligence in presenting the claim or defense to the circuit court
in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the section
2-1401 petition for relief. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209,
220-21 (1986); Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Weaver, 226 Ill.
App. 3d 783, 785 (1992). When reviewing a circuit court's ruling
on a section 2-1401 petition in a criminal case, the appropriate
standard of review is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 461.
	After the evidentiary hearing began, defendant filed a section
2-1401 petition, alleging newly discovered evidence supporting a
claim under Batson. Defendant claimed that he discovered,
through an article in the Chicago Tribune, that the appellate court,
in two separate cases, found Batson violations involving former
Assistant State's Attorney John Hynes, one of the prosecutors at
defendant's trial. In one of these cases, People v. Walls, 220 Ill.
App. 3d 564 (1991), the defendant alleged Batson violations
involving four black venirepersons. Prosecutors had used
peremptory challenges on a total of six persons, four of whom
were black. The appellate court found that the prosecutors'
explanations for these challenges were pretextual. Walls, 220 Ill.
App. 3d at 574. Hynes' name is mentioned in a quote once in the
appellate court decision. Walls, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 572. In the
second case, People v. Morales, 308 Ill. App. 3d 162 (1999), the
State exercised 9 of its 16 peremptory challenges against minority
venirepersons. On appeal after remand, the defendant challenged
seven of the State's peremptory challenges as violating Batson.
The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding
that two of the seven challenges were Batson violations. Morales,
308 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79. There is no mention of Hynes in the
appellate court's reported decision. Defendant contends that Hynes
failed to disclose these reported decisions in his application for an
associate judgeship.
	On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to a Batson
hearing. He argues that the personal characteristics of the five
black women and the Asian woman stricken from the jury by the
State's use of its peremptory challenges were "indistinguishable"
from those of the five white women who served on the jury and
the two white women who served as alternates. Defendant further
argues that this fact raised an inference that the State used its
peremptory challenges to exclude the black and Asian
venirepersons on the basis of their race and gender. We note that
defendant's trial counsel did not raise a Batson objection to the
State's use of its peremptory challenges. Appellate counsel did not
raise the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in the direct
appeal. Although post-conviction counsel raised the issue, that
claim was not pursued on appeal from the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.
	Defendant argues that Hynes' failure to disclose the Walls and
Morales decisions on his judicial application constituted
fraudulent concealment, thus tolling the two-year statute of
limitations of section 2-1401. To make a successful showing of
fraudulent concealment, the defendant must "allege facts
demonstrating that his opponent affirmatively attempted to prevent
the discovery of the purported grounds for relief and must offer
factual allegations demonstrating his good faith and reasonable
diligence in trying to uncover such matters before trial or within
the limitations period." People v. McLaughlin, 324 Ill. App. 3d
909, 918 (2001). It is well established that fraudulent concealment
sufficient to toll the two-year limitation period of the statute
requires "affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent
discovery of the cause of action or ground for relief." Crowell v.
Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980) (construing section 72 of the
former Civil Practice Act).
	In his section 2-1401 petition, defendant alleged that he could
not have discovered the Walls and Morales decisions earlier,
because Hynes' name was not mentioned in either published
opinion. However, Hynes' name is in fact mentioned in a quote in
Walls which identifies him as one of the prosecutors in that case.
Defendant was sentenced in 1990. The Walls decision was
published a year later. Defendant offers no reason why this
decision could not have been discovered within the two-year
limitations period of section 2-1401. The alleged concealment
took place nine years after defendant was tried, convicted, and
sentenced. It cannot be said that Hynes was attempting to conceal
anything from defendant at that point.
	In his reply brief, defendant argues that even if Hynes engaged
in no affirmative acts to conceal his role in the two appellate
opinions, an exception to this requirement exists where a fiduciary
relationship is clearly established. See Crowell, 81 Ill. 2d  at 428.
Defendant asserts that Hynes, as a prosecutor, had a fiduciary duty
to disclose his involvement in the Walls and Morales cases. We
need not address this argument, because defendant's section
2-1401 petition did not allege the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between himself and Hynes. A petition under section
2-1401 will not be considered if it is filed more than two years
following entry of the judgment, unless the petitioner makes a
clear showing of legal disability, duress, or that the grounds for
relief were concealed. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d  at 210-11. Defendant
has failed to make such a showing here. Thus, we conclude that
the circuit court did not err in dismissing defendant's section
2-1401 petition.
CONCLUSION
	Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment denying
defendant's post-conviction petition and its judgment dismissing
defendant's section 2-1401 petition. The clerk of this court is
directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, January 15, 2003, as
the date on which the sentence of death entered in the circuit court
of Cook County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed
in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000)).
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate
to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where
defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe that
defendant's convictions and sentence should be set aside because
the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the
new supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my
dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's
adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not
sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For this
reason, the new rules should be applied retroactively. See People
v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.