Case Title: In re Estate of Graves

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0126

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:  ANDREW T. GRAVES, Deceased. BEIT HANINA ENTERPRISES, INC., a California corporation, by and through its Chief Executive Officer, Sharif Silmi v. J. DENNY MOFFETT, as personal representative of the Estate of Andrew T. Graves2011 WY 165Case Number: S-11-0126Decided: 12/20/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:  ANDREW 
T. GRAVES, Deceased.BEIT HANINA ENTERPRISES, INC., a California corporation, 
by and through its Chief Executive Officer, Sharif Silmi,Appellant 
(Claimant),v.J. DENNY MOFFETT, as personal representative of the 
Estate of Andrew T. Graves,Appellee (Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Leonard 
R. Carlman of Hess Carlman & D’Amours, LLC, Jackson, 
WY.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Clay 
D. Geittmann of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, LLC, Jackson, 
WY.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Creditor 
(California corporation “Beit Hanina Enterprises, Inc.,” hereinafter referred to 
as “BHE”) challenges a Wyoming probate court’s “Order Finding Creditor Time 
Barred from Challenging Denial of Claim” and argues on appeal that the probate 
court erred in refusing to find peculiar circumstances entitling BHE to 
equitable relief from strict application of the Wyoming Probate Code’s 30-day 
statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 (LexisNexis 
2011).  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      BHE presents one 
issue:
 
Whether 
the District Court erred when it declined to provide to [BHE] the equitable relief available at W.S. 
§ 2-7-703(c), which states, 
“This section [regarding filing claims] shall not bar: (i) Claimants entitled to 
equitable relief due to peculiar 
circumstances, if so found by the court in adversary proceedings.”  (Emphasis 
added.)
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In 2008, the 
decedent, Andrew T. Graves, as CEO of Wireless Technology Solutions, Inc., 
purchased a cell phone retail outlet from BHE.  
As part of the purchase, BHE accepted a promissory note from Wireless 
Technology Solutions, in the amount of $663,563.00.  Graves signed the note as personal 
guarantor, but he died one day before the first installment payment was due on 
the note.
 
[¶4]      Two closely 
related legal actions followed – a California civil suit and this Wyoming 
probate action.  On July 22, 2010, 
BHE filed a breach of contract action in 
California against Wireless Technology Solutions.  BHE anticipated naming Graves’ estate as a 
defendant, so BHE named “Does 
1-10” as co-defendants.
 
[¶5]      On June 10, 2010, 
the Wyoming probate court admitted Graves’ estate to probate with J. Denny 
Moffett appointed as the personal representative.  On August 25, 2010, “Notice of Probate” 
was mailed to BHE.  
On September 1, 8, and 15, 2010, public notice of the probate was 
published in the Jackson Hole News & 
Guide.  Under 
§ 2-7-703(a), 
BHE had three months after 
September 1, 2010, to file a claim with the Estate.
 
[¶6]      In accordance 
with the statutory requirements, BHE filed a timely claim with the Estate.  On September 21, 2010, the Estate’s 
attorney mailed a “Notice of Rejection of the Claim.”  After correcting a procedural flaw in the 
first claim, on October 4, 2010, BHE filed a second claim with the Estate.  The Estate did not issue a separate 
rejection for the second claim.  
Under § 2-7-718, a 
creditor must “bring suit” within 30 days after the date of mailing of the claim 
rejection notice.  If the creditor 
fails to do so, his claim is, according to the statute, “forever barred.”  Here, the 30-day period for bringing suit 
expired on October 21, 2010 – 30 days after the rejection of the claim. 

 
[¶7]      Back in 
California, on October 15, 2010, BHE filed an “Ex Parte Application for Amendment 
to Complaint and [Proposed] Order.”  
Through that pleading, BHE sought to replace the fictitious name of 
“Doe 1” with “the Estate of Andrew T. Graves, by and through J. Denny Moffett, 
Personal Representative.”  The 
California court did not sign the proposed order on October 15, 2010.  Rather, a clerk of the California court 
indicated that BHE’s pleading did not comply with court rule amendments that had 
gone into effect on January 1, 2010.  
The pleading apparently lacked a supporting declaration and the proper 
fee.  On November 12, 2010, the 
California court held a hearing and entered an “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex 
Parte Application to Amend Complaint,” which added the Estate as a defendant in 
the action.
 
[¶8]      Returning to the 
Wyoming probate action, the Estate, on December 30, 2010, filed a “Notice of 
Claim Dispositions.”  The Estate 
persisted in its denial of BHE’s claim.  
The same day, the Estate also filed a “Motion for Hearing on Creditor’s 
Capacity to Challenge Denial of Claim.”  
On February 4, 2011, the probate court held a hearing on that motion, and 
on April 11, 2011, entered its “Order Finding Creditor Time Barred from 
Challenging Denial of Claim.”  
First, the court ruled BHE’s
 
attempt 
to include the Estate in its ongoing lawsuit on October 15, 2010, was in 
compliance with Wyo. Stat. § 
2-7-717, which requires that a claimant 
not bring or pursue a suit to 
judgment until the claim has been filed and rejected by the personal 
representative.
 
Second, 
the court ruled BHE had not complied with § 2-7-718, which requires that a claimant must 
bring suit within 30 days after mailing of the claim rejection notice, and that 
the Estate “was not added to the ongoing California lawsuit until November 12, 
2010 – after the filing window had closed.”  Both of those rulings go unchallenged 
before this Court.
 
[¶9]      In its ruling, 
the court considered whether BHE should receive equitable relief from strict 
application of § 2-7-718.  The court noted that sections of the 
Probate Code, as well as this Court’s rulings, suggest that equitable relief may 
be available, and stated as follows:
 
In 
considering the entire circumstances of the case, the Court finds no “peculiar” 
occurrences or any situation that would warrant equitable relief for 
[BHE].  
It appears that attorneys for [BHE] made procedural errors in amending [BHE’s] 
claim in the California court by not complying with the 2010 rules.  These errors – and not an unusual 
happenstance or some action attributable to the personal representative – led to 
the potential bar to [BHE’s] suit in California.  In the absence of some peculiar 
circumstance or evidence of manipulation on the part of the personal 
representative in this case, the Court holds attorneys for [BHE] to strict compliance with the Probate 
Code.
 
[¶10]   This appeal 
followed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]   We review this case for an abuse of 
discretion because rather than looking at statutory construction, this Court is 
reviewing the appealable order through an equitable lens.  An abuse of 
discretion occurs when a court acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Steiger v. Happy Valley 
Homeowners Ass’n, 2010 WY 158, ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 269, 273 (Wyo. 2010).  
In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did.  Id.
 
DISCUSSION
[¶12]   BHE argues on appeal that the 
probate court erred in declining to provide equitable relief due to peculiar 
circumstances under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(c) (LexisNexis 2011).  BHE concedes that the probate court was 
correct in ruling that BHE did not bring suit within 30 days of claim denial, as 
required by § 2-7-718, but BHE argues that the probate court abused its 
discretion when it found no peculiar circumstances that would warrant relief for 
BHE.  BHE complains that the probate 
court’s focus was too narrow, in that it examined only whether there was some 
unusual action attributable to the Estate.  
BHE insists peculiar circumstances existed because the Estate was aware 
of the California litigation, that the California court provided little notice 
of its rule changes and even continued with the old procedures after the rule 
changes took effect.
 
[¶13]   In response, the Estate addresses 
both of BHE’s claims, and asserts that the first claim was timely filed and 
timely rejected.  As to the second 
claim, the Estate argues the probate court was correct that the second claim had 
no effect on the statutory time for filing suit, inasmuch as the same claim had 
been earlier and timely rejected.  
The Estate argues that the peculiar circumstances provision of 
§ 2-7-703(c) does not apply to § 2-7-718.  The Estate points out that 
§ 2-7-703 pertains to the original filing of a creditor claim whereas 
§ 2-7-718 is a statute of limitations for bringing a 
suit.
 
[¶14]   We agree with the Estate.  In doing so, we begin by looking to the 
Wyoming statutes.  The requirements 
of the probate code are of paramount importance here.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 
(LexisNexis 2011) states:
 
When 
a claim is rejected and notice given as required, the holder shall bring suit in 
the proper court against the personal representative within thirty days after 
the date of mailing the notice, otherwise the claim is forever 
barred.
 
Once 
notice of probate has been provided, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703 (LexisNexis 
2011) sets forth filing requirements for creditors wishing to make a claim 
against a probate estate:
 
(a)  Except 
as otherwise provided in this section, all claims whether due, not due or 
contingent, shall be filed in duplicate with the clerk within the time limited 
in the notice to creditors and any claim not so filed is barred forever. Any 
claimant to whom the personal representative has mailed a notice pursuant to 
W.S. 
2-7-205(a)(ii) shall file his claim within three 
(3) months after the date of first publication of the notice in the newspaper, 
or before the expiration of thirty (30) days after the mailing, whichever date 
is later, and any claim not so filed is barred forever. If only one (1) copy of 
a claim is filed, the clerk shall make a duplicate and shall charge the claimant 
a reasonable fee not to exceed two dollars ($2.00) per 
page.
(b)  The 
clerk shall forthwith transmit to the personal representative one (1) copy of 
each claim when and as filed.
(c)  This 
section shall not bar:
(i)  Claimants 
entitled to equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances, if so found by the 
court in adversary proceedings; or
(ii)  A 
claimant to whom no notice was mailed pursuant to W.S. 
§2-7-205(a)(ii), if the court in adversary 
proceedings finds that the identity of the claimant was reasonably ascertainable 
by the personal representative within the time limited in the notice to 
creditors published pursuant to W.S. § 2-7-201.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 (LexisNexis 2011), which is titled, “Action precluded 
until claim rejected; exception,” states:
 
No 
holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless 
the claim is first rejected in whole or in part by the personal representative 
and the rejection filed with the clerk, except an action may be brought by any 
holder of a mortgage or lien, including liens under W.S. 42-4-207, to enforce 
the same against the property of the estate subject thereto where all recourse 
against the other property of the estate is expressly waived in the complaint or 
no claim for deficiency is made in proceedings for foreclosure by advertisement 
and sale under W.S. 34-4-101 through 34-4-113.
 
We 
have discussed the above statutes before.  
In Harris v. Taylor, 969 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1998), we stated:
 
The 
legislature requires the personal representative to publish notice of admission 
of an estate to probate, Wyo. 
Stat. § 2-7-201(1997), and to mail that notice to 
heirs, beneficiaries, and creditors, Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-205(a) (1997). Actual notice to a known or reasonably 
ascertainable creditor is constitutionally required.  Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 176 (Wyo. 1989).  In this case, the personal representative 
knew that Harris intended to file a personal injury suit against his wife's 
estate; therefore, Harris was a known creditor entitled to actual notice under 
Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-205(a)(1997).  When the personal representative has 
given proper notice, Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-706 
(1997) requires a creditor to then file a claim against the estate within the 
time limits set out in Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-703(a)(1997).  Only 
when these conditions are met and the claim rejected by the personal 
representative may suit be filed.  See Matter of Estate of 
Campbell, 950 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1997); 
Scott [v. 
Scott], 918 P.2d [198] at 201 [(Wyo. 1996)].
 
Once 
notice of the claim is filed with the personal representative and rejected, 
under the statute of limitations set out in Wyo. 
Stat. § 2-7-718 (1997), the creditor has thirty 
days to file an action in district court. Estate of Campbell, 950 
P.2d [557] at 560 [(Wyo. 1997)].  A creditor’s failure to comply with this 
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to an action filed after the 
deadline. Id.  We have held 
that unless there has been strict compliance with the notice requirements of 
Wyoming’s Probate Code, its statutes of limitation are not triggered.  Matter of Estate of Reed, 
768 P.2d 566, 572 (Wyo. 1989).  We will extend this rule to say that 
unless the personal representative has strictly complied with the notice 
requirements of the code, conditions precedent are not 
triggered.
 
Also, 
in Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 239-40 (Wyo. 1986), we 
acknowledge the availability of equitable estoppel in 
probate:
 
Wyoming 
recognizes that equitable estoppel can foreclose the raising of statutes of 
limitations defenses. Bauer 
v. State, 
ex rel. Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048 (1985); Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., Wyo., 696 P.2d 1294 
(1985); Turner v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d 600 (1978).  The alleged forgery of the will and its 
probate cannot estop the appellees from asserting the bar of the statutes of 
limitations because “[i]n order to subject a decree of final distribution or 
settlement to collateral attack the fraud alleged must be of a type which 
prevented the dissatisfied party from having had his or her day in court.” 
Pike v. Markman, 
supra, 633 P.2d [944] at 948, n.1 [(Wyo. 1981)].
 
In 
Pike 
v. Markman, 
supra, no claim was made that the defendant had 
fraudulently prevented the plaintiff from raising the objections before the 
final settlement decree was entered.  In this case there is no claim that 
Gilbert B. Taylor did anything which prevented the appellant from discovering 
the forgery and raising the question in the probate proceedings.  The appellant was not denied his day in 
court in connection with the probate proceedings by virtue of any extrinsic 
conduct of Gilbert B. Taylor or any other of the appellees.  We hold that in asserting estoppel, as in 
asserting the exception for fraud to permit collateral attack of the decree of 
final distribution or settlement,  “'[T]he fraud relied upon must be 
extrinsic or collateral to the issues tried in the original proceeding, that is 
to say, the fraud on the part of the prevailing party must have been such as 
deprived the unsuccessful party of a fair hearing upon the original 
controversy.’”  Ryan v. 
Plath, 18 Wash. 2d 839, 140 P.2d 968 (1943), quoting from Farley v. 
Davis, 10 Wash. 2d 62, 116 P.2d 263 (1941), which in turn was quoted with 
approval in Pike v. Markman, supra, 633 P.2d  at 947, 948, 
n.1.  The appellant must demonstrate some 
conduct by the appellees other than the fraud asserted with respect to the will 
which was probated in order to raise an estoppel of the claim of the bar of the 
statutes of limitations.
 
The 
only extrinsic conduct alleged here is Gilbert B. Taylor’s premise to provide 
for the appellant through his will.  In Turner 
v. Turner, 
supra, 582 P.2d  at 602, the elements required to 
establish the estoppel are set forth.  The delay in filing the action must be 
induced by the defendant; the defendant must have misled the plaintiff; and the 
plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that 
he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner.  The question of whether the plaintiff has 
been lulled ordinarily is one of fact, but in certain cases it is one for the 
courts.  Olson v. A.H. 
Robins Company, 
Inc., supra; Turner v. 
Turner, supra.  In Turner 
v. Turner the court pointed out that the defendant made no representations 
that he would settle the court claim without action; the plaintiff did not rely 
on any offers of the defendant; there was no inducement to not bring the suit 
within the period of limitations; and there was no promise that the statutes of 
limitations would not be asserted.
 
[¶15]   In this case, the first BHE claim 
was timely filed under § 2-7-703(a) and was then properly rejected by the 
Estate pursuant to § 2-7-718.  
BHE’s sole and exclusive remedy was to comply with § 2-7-718 and 
bring suit in a proper court against the Estate within thirty (30) days after 
the date of mailing of the “Notice of Rejection of Claim,” otherwise the claim 
would be forever barred.  As noted 
by the district court, BHE failed to include the Estate in the California 
litigation before the October 21, 2010, statute of limitations ran under 
§ 2-7-718.  The procedural 
errors in amending the claim in the California court by not complying with the 
2010 rules led to the potential bar of the suit in California.  In Zmijewsky v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1991), this Court examined cases in other 
jurisdictions where the court allowed a claim to proceed based upon an estoppel 
concept.  We noted that in those 
cases the estoppel argument was permitted to prevent a personal representative 
from profiting because of his own delays or failures.  Zmijewsky, 809 P.2d  at 284 (citing Gladman v. Carns, 223 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 
App.2d 1964); McKenney v. McNearney, 
435 P.2d 358 (Idaho 1968)).  Here, 
no missteps or delays are apparent on the part of the Estate and personal 
representative that would have interfered with BHE’s ability to timely comply 
with the requirements of the Wyoming Probate Code in seeking a claim against the 
estate.
 
[¶16]   As in Taylor, BHE, as claimant, failed to 
prove conduct on the part of Moffett or the Estate that would entitle BHE to 
equitable relief from application of the statute of limitations found in 
§ 2-7-718.  The “peculiar 
circumstances” provision does not apply in this instance.  On a final note, because BHE limited the 
issues on appeal to reliance on § 2-7-703(c), we have tailored our 
discussion accordingly.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶17]   The district court did not commit 
error when it declined to provide BHE relief due to any peculiar circumstances 
under § 2-7-703(c).  This Court 
agrees that no such peculiar circumstances exist here.  Affirmed.