Case Title: State ex rel. Kerr v. Collier

Citation: 2020-Ohio-457

Docket Number: 2019-0888

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Kerr v. Collier, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-457.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-457 
THE STATE EX REL. KERR, APPELLANT, v. COLLIER, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Kerr v. Collier, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-457.] 
Prohibition—Court of common pleas had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter 
charging order and appoint receiver—Court of appeals’ judgment 
dismissing complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2019-0888—Submitted November 13, 2019—Decided February 13, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Henry County, No. 7-19-05. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This appeal involves a request by appellant, Jeremy Kerr, for a writ 
of prohibition to vacate charging orders and receivership orders concerning Kerr’s 
membership interests in two limited-liability companies.  The Third District Court 
of Appeals dismissed Kerr’s complaint, concluding that appellee, Henry County 
Court of Common Pleas Judge John Collier, did not patently and unambiguously 
lack jurisdiction to issue the orders.  After Judge Collier did not file a merit brief in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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this appeal, Kerr filed two motions asking this court to reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment under S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.07(B).  We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment 
and deny Kerr’s motions as moot. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In 2011, Kerr Buildings, Inc., of which Kerr was the president, sued 
Scott Bishop regarding a contract dispute in the Henry County Court of Common 
Pleas, with Judge Collier presiding.  Bishop asserted a counterclaim against Kerr 
Buildings and a third-party complaint against Kerr individually, and the lawsuits 
resulted in a monetary judgment of almost $80,000 against Kerr Buildings and Kerr.  
In May 2013, at Bishop’s request, Judge Collier entered a charging order concerning 
Kerr’s membership interests in two limited-liability companies.  See R.C. 1705.19.  
The charging order required that any payments to which Kerr would be entitled from 
the limited-liability companies be paid to Bishop.  In January 2018, Judge Collier 
entered a nunc pro tunc charging order.  In August 2013, also at Bishop’s request, 
Judge Collier appointed a receiver over Kerr and Kerr Buildings.  In March 2014, 
Kerr filed a motion asking Judge Collier to set aside the receivership order, arguing 
that the order violated Kerr’s due-process rights because he was not properly served 
with Bishop’s motion asking for the order.  Judge Collier denied the motion, and the 
Third District affirmed.  See Kerr Bldgs., Inc. v. Bishop, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-14-07, 
2014-Ohio-5391. 
{¶ 3} In April 2018, Judge Collier entered an order titled “Amended Orders 
to Receiver.”  Kerr alleges that he filed multiple motions asking Judge Collier to 
vacate the amended receivership order and that he appealed Judge Collier’s decisions 
denying those motions.  He alleges that the court of appeals dismissed his appeals 
sua sponte as improper requests for reconsideration.  In April 2019, Kerr filed in the 
Third District a complaint for a writ of prohibition against Judge Collier seeking to 
invalidate the charging order, the nunc pro tunc charging order, the receivership 
order, and the amended receivership order.  In general terms, Kerr’s complaint 
January Term, 2020 
 
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alleges that the orders were entered in violation of his due-process rights, that some 
of the powers granted to the receiver are unauthorized by law, and that the charging 
orders exceed Judge Collier’s authority under R.C. 1705.19. 
{¶ 4} Judge Collier moved to dismiss Kerr’s complaint under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6).  The court of appeals granted the motion, holding that Judge Collier did 
not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to enter a charging order or to 
appoint a receiver. 
{¶ 5} Kerr appealed to this court as of right. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.”  Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown 
Mgt., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11.  Dismissal 
of a prohibition complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate “if, after presuming 
the truth of all factual allegations of the complaint and making all reasonable 
inferences in [the relator’s] favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set 
of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary writ of prohibition.”  State ex 
rel. Hemsley v. Burnham Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 
1014, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator generally must show that 
a court is about to exercise judicial power without authority and that there is no 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham 
Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7.  But Kerr argues 
that he need not show that he lacks an adequate remedy at law because Judge Collier 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders.  See State ex rel. 
Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 
N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.  Therefore, based on the allegations in the complaint, Kerr’s 
prohibition claim can succeed only if he establishes that Judge Collier patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 8} Kerr challenges the propriety of the charging orders and the 
receivership orders, but even if certain aspects of the orders are improper, he has not 
shown that Judge Collier patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter 
them.  R.C. 1705.19(A) authorizes a common pleas court to enter a charging order 
against a judgment debtor’s membership interest in a limited-liability company.  And 
R.C. 2735.01(A)(4) authorizes a common pleas court to appoint a receiver “after 
judgment, to carry the judgment into effect.”  “Typically, a court will deny relief in 
prohibition when a respondent judge has general subject-matter jurisdiction and will 
deem any error by the judge to be an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.”  State ex 
rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089,  
¶ 24. 
{¶ 9} Because Judge Collier had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a 
charging order and to appoint a receiver, Kerr has not shown that the judge patently 
and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.  The court of appeals, therefore, correctly 
dismissed Kerr’s complaint. 
{¶ 10} As a final matter, Kerr filed two motions asking us to reverse the 
court of appeals’ judgment because Judge Collier did not file a merit brief in this 
case.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.07(B) provides that if the appellee fails to timely file a merit 
brief, we “may accept the appellant’s statement of facts and issues as correct and 
reverse the judgment if the appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain reversal.”  
Because Kerr has not shown that we should reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, 
we deny his motions as moot. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Jeremy Kerr, pro se. 
_________________