Case Title: Route 4 Assoc. v. Sherburne Planning Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-188


Route 4 Associates                           Supreme Court

    v.                                       On Appeal from
                                             Rutland Superior Court
Town of Sherburne Planning
Commission and Town of Shelburne             May Term, 1990



Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

Donald R. Powers and Geoffrey Commons of Kelley, Meub, Powers & English,
   Ltd., Middlebury, for plaintiffs-appellants


Liam L. Murphy and Deborah L. Markowitz of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool,
   Burlington, for defendant-appellee



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   Petitioner Route 4 Associates appeals from a decision of
the superior court denying an application for a planned unit development
(PUD) in the Town of Sherburne.  We affirm.
     Petitioner seeks PUD approval for construction of a 100-unit hotel on
property separated by a privately owned strip of land approximately 50 feet
in width and 450 feet in length.  The separated lots are 3.8 acres and 2.39
acres in size.  The Town of Sherburne Planning Commission denied petition-
er's application on the ground that neither parcel met the five-acre
minimum-lot-size requirement set forth in the town's zoning ordinance.  On
appeal, the superior court conducted a de novo review and, with the consent
of the parties, addressed the threshold question of whether petitioner's
two lots are "contiguous" and, thus, one unit pursuant to the zoning
regulations.  The court found that the titleholder of the privately owned
strip of land separating petitioner's property was neither a subscriber nor
a party to the PUD application, and concluded that, since the two lots do
not touch each other, the application does not meet the zoning ordinance's
five-acre minimum-lot-size requirement.  In its appeal to this Court,
petitioner argues that (1) the word "contiguous" may be interpreted to
include parcels not in actual physical contact, and (2) the town regulation
stating that words undefined in the regulations shall be used as defined in
a specified dictionary is an impermissible delegation of the town's
authority.
     We conclude that the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous,
arbitrary, or capricious.  See Application of McDonald's Corp., 151 Vt. 346,
348-49, 560 A.2d 362, 364 (1989).  The Sherburne Zoning Regulations require
a PUD to have a minimum lot area of five acres.  { 240.6.  "Lot area" is
defined as the "[t]otal contiguous area within the property lines of a lot,
calculated by horizontal projection, but excluding any part thereof lying
within the boundaries of a public or non-public vehicular right-of-way,
existing or proposed."  Id. { 120.2.  Although the regulations do not define
"contiguous," "[w]ords not specifically defined [in the regulations] shall
be used as defined in a Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary no more than 5
years old."  Id. { 120.1.  Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary,
copyrighted in 1986, defines "contiguous" as follows:
          1 : being in actual contact: touching along a boundary
          or at a point  2 of angles : ADJACENT  3 : next or near
          in time or sequence  4 : COTERMINOUS
     When construing the meaning of the word "contiguous" as applied to
ownership of land, most courts, including this Court, have accorded the word
its primary, ordinary meaning of touching.  See, e.g., Bullis v. Town of
Grand Isle, 151 Vt. 503, 504, 561 A.2d 1359, 1360 (1989) (construing tax
assessment statute and recent opinion, Court held that "properties that do
not share a common border are not contiguous"); Ehle v. Tenney Trading Co.,
56 Ariz. 241, 245, 107 P.2d 210, 212 (1940) (construing homestead statute,
court held that "contiguous" requires actual contact in accordance with
common meaning of word); Seckman v. Georgia Power Co., 155 Ga. App. 204,
205,