Case Title: Matter of Chrichlow

Citation: 

Docket Number: 269, 2019

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PETITION OF KEINO CHRICHLOW 
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
§ 
§  No. 269, 2019 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: 
July 12, 2019 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: 
September 16, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for an extraordinary writ of mandamus 
and the State’s answer and motion to dismiss, it appears to the Court that:  
(1) 
The petitioner, Keino Chrichlow, seeks to invoke the original 
jurisdiction of this Court, under Supreme Court Rule 43, to issue a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Superior Court to grant him a new trial.  We conclude that 
the petition is without merit and must therefore be denied. 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in June 2007, a Superior Court jury found 
Chrichlow guilty of sixteen counts of first degree robbery, two counts of possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and one count of second degree 
conspiracy.  The convictions stemmed from an orchestrated bank robbery in which 
Chrichlow and his co-defendants, Andre Bridgers and Craig Hunter, participated.  
Bridgers directed the robbery, Hunter held the bank customers at gunpoint, and 
Chrichlow drove the getaway vehicle. 
(3) 
Post-trial and pre-sentencing, Chrichlow and Bridgers moved for 
judgment of acquittal, arguing that, as a matter of law, threatening bystanders while 
 
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taking money from a bank and its employees did not support a separate robbery 
count for each person so threatened.  On October 19, 2007, the Superior Court 
granted the motion in part, holding that “someone who is merely a threatened 
bystander has not been robbed.”1  Accordingly, the Superior Court reduced the nine 
first degree robbery convictions relating to the bystanders to convictions for the 
lesser-included offense of aggravating menacing. 
(4) 
The Superior Court also considered the question of whether the 
robbery convictions relating to two bank employees—Carmela Gleason, whom 
Bridgers forced to order the tellers to leave their stations in order to facilitate the 
robbery, and Andrew Kirk, whom Bridgers ordered out of his office and frog-
marched across the bank to where Hunter was holding the customers at bay—were 
legally sound.  Ultimately, the court decided that “it is reasonably possible that had 
the jury been instructed more precisely as to Gleason and Kirk, it would have found 
[Chrichlow and Bridgers] guilty of aggravating menacing, not robbery.”2  The court 
gave the State the option of asking for a new trial on the robbery charges involving 
Gleason and Kirk or stipulating to the Superior Court’s order’s entry, thus 
preserving the State’s right to appeal the court’s order.  If the State opted to stipulate 
to the order’s entry, the court would reduce the robbery convictions involving 
Gleason and Kirk to aggravating menacing. 
                                                 
1 State v. Bridgers, 988 A.2d 939, 944 (Del. Super. 2007), aff’d 2009 WL 824536 (Del. 
Mar. 30, 2009). 
2 Id., at 945. 
 
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(5) 
By way of letter dated October 26, 2007, the State indicated it would 
not be seeking a new trial on the Gleason and Kirk robbery charges.  The case 
proceeded to sentencing and, in accordance with the Superior Court’s October 19, 
2017 order, Chrichlow was sentenced on five counts of first degree robbery, eleven 
counts of aggravated menacing, two counts of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony, and one count of second degree conspiracy. 
(6) 
This Court has authority to issue a writ of mandamus when the 
petitioner can demonstrate he has a clear right to the performance of a duty, that no 
other adequate legal remedy is available, and that the trial court arbitrarily failed or 
refused to perform its duty.3  When invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction to 
issue extraordinary relief, the burden is on the petitioner to establish clear 
entitlement to that relief and that no other adequate remedy is available.4 
(7) 
There is no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case.  
The Superior Court never ordered a new trial.  While the court held Chrichlow was 
entitled to a new trial as to the victims Gleason and Kirk because it was possible the 
jury would have found him guilty of aggravating menacing—as opposed to 
robbery—if more precisely instructed, the court offered the State the option to 
stipulate to the court’s entry of a reduction of those convictions to aggravated 
menacing.  The State so opted and Chrichlow was sentenced accordingly.  
Chrichlow has not shown that the Superior Court arbitrarily failed or refused to 
                                                 
3 In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988). 
4 In re Wittrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994). 
 
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perform a duty owed to him, or that he was without an adequate remedy to address 
the claim he raises in his mandamus petition. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED.  Chrichlow’s petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is 
DISMISSED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice