Case Title: Green v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
B. Marie Green, Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County v. Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, No. 35, September Term 2012
REAL PROPERTY TAXATION — EXEMPTIONS — PROPERTY OWNED BY
RELIGIOUS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS — DEFINITION OF CONVENT —
Maryland Code (2001, 2012 Repl Vol.), § 7-204(2) of the Tax-Property Article exempts from
taxation property that is owned by a religious group or organization and is used exclusively
as a parsonage or a convent.  Tax exemptions are to be strictly construed and any doubts
about whether a property is eligible for an exemption are to be resolved in favor of the State.
Words within a property tax exemption statute are to be given their plain meaning, however,
and exemptions related to religious institutions must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner that does not inappropriately advance or inhibit any particular faith.  The term
convent must be interpreted based on its general definition, and not within the specific
context of certain forms of Christianity.  Under these criteria, a convent is a community of
people who live together, follow strict religious vows, and devote themselves full-time to
religious work.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Civil No. 330398-V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 35
September Term, 2012
B. MARIE GREEN, SUPERVISOR OF
ASSESSMENTS OF MONTGOMERY
COUNTY
v.
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Filed:   January 23, 2013
1 § 7-204.  Religious groups or organizations.
Property that is owned by a religious group or organization is not subject to property
tax if the property is actually used exclusively for:
(1) public religious worship;
(2) a parsonage or convent; or
(3) educational purposes.
All references hereinafter to the Maryland Code are to the Tax-Property Article.  
2 According to the official website of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
the word “day” in “Latter-day Saints” is not capitalized.  We shall use the Church’s preferred
style, except when citing to case names outside of Maryland that do not follow this
convention.
Maryland’s Property Tax Code provides that a “religious group or organization is not
subject to property tax if the property is actually used exclusively for,” inter alia, “a
parsonage or convent.”  Md. Code (2001, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 7-204 of the Tax-Property
Article.1  We are asked in the present case to interpret and apply to conceded facts the terms
“parsonage” and “convent” as they are employed in § 7-204.
The case has its genesis in the request of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints2 (“the Church”) that it be exempt from paying property tax on an apartment complex
in Montgomery County, Maryland.  The Church owns and uses the complex to house a
revolving group of workers who perform religious ceremonies full-time for a two-year period
at the Church’s Washington, D.C. Temple.  The Church seeks to reacquire a property tax
exemption that once was granted to the complex but later was rescinded following a periodic
review by the Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County.  The Supervisor of
Assessments has taken the position that the apartment complex does not qualify for a
property tax exemption under § 7-204 because the complex is not exclusively used as a
3 Neither party argues that the apartment complex is used exclusively as a place of
“public religious worship,” or for “educational purposes,” so we do not address these
portions of § 7-204.
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parsonage or a convent.3  The Maryland Tax Court agreed with the Supervisor of
Assessments, but the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversed, holding that the
complex should be granted the exemption because it qualified as both a parsonage and a
convent.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Tax Court applied the wrong standard
in assessing whether the apartment complex constitutes a convent, so we remand the case for
the Tax Court to issue an order granting the exemption consistent with the standards we set
forth in this opinion.  In light of our disposition of the case, we do not opine on whether the
apartment complex also constitutes a parsonage.
I.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, informally known as the Mormon
Church, was founded in 1830 by Joseph Smith.  In the years since its founding, the Church
has grown to a worldwide membership of roughly 14.4 million people.  At a local level,
church members are divided geographically into wards, which are comparable to parishes or
congregations in other faiths.  Each ward is supervised by a bishop, who conducts weekly
services for members of the ward at a local chapel.  Each ward is part of a larger grouping,
called a stake, and each stake is comprised of about ten wards.  The stakes, in turn, are a part
of a temple district, overseen by a temple president.  The Washington, D.C. Temple District
is made up of 42 stakes, divided into 425 wards, and covers Maryland, Virginia, the District
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of Columbia, Pennsylvania, and parts of Ohio, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York.
The Temple is considered to be a sacred site and only members of the Church who are
in good standing may visit it.  This permission to enter the Temple is referred to as a temple
recommend, and it is granted for a limited time to members who strictly follow the Church’s
teachings.  Within the Temple, special religious sacraments, referred to as ordinances, are
performed.  These ordinances may take place only within the Temple, and they may be
performed only by specific Church members, who are called ordinance workers.  The
ordinances include marriages, baptisms, and confirmations.
The Church is run by lay ministers, rather than paid clergy.  Bishops, stake presidents,
and ordinance workers are all called into service by the Church and perform their duties
without compensation.  Ordinance workers generally serve for a period of two years and
rotate through different assignments at the Temple.  They spend most of their time
performing ordinances, but they also teach, instruct, minister, and counsel members of the
Church within the Temple.  A strict religious code is demanded of ordinance workers, and,
if they do not follow it, they can be dismissed from service.  Approximately 400,000
ordinances are performed in the Washington, D.C. Temple in an average year, or roughly
1,600 per day.
The D.C. Temple opened in Kensington, Maryland in 1974.  The Temple is generally
open 14 hours a day, five days of the week, serving the roughly 145,000 members who live
within the D.C. Temple District.  The ordinance workers who serve at the Temple mostly
come from outside the D.C. area.  In order to accommodate ordinance workers from out-of-
4 The exemption in place at the time covered the following property:
Property owned by a religious group or organization and actually used
exclusively for public religious worship, including parsonages and convents,
and property owned by any such group or organization and actually used
exclusively for educational purposes.”
Md. Code (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.), Article 81, § 9(c). 
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town, the Church purchased a 44-unit apartment complex for them to live in, located in
Kensington about a mile from the Temple.  Between 50 to 60 ordinance workers live in the
complex, the majority of whom are retired, married couples.  The ordinance workers worship
together as a ward each Sunday at a chapel located on the Temple grounds.  The Church
charges the ordinance workers below-market-value rent as a means of off-setting the
operating expenses of the complex.  
The 1980 property tax exemption
The Church sought a property tax exemption for the apartment complex in 1979 and
was turned down by the Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County.  The Church
sought the exemption pursuant to Article 81, Section 9(c), the then-applicable provision of
the Maryland Code that permitted an exemption for properties that were used exclusively for
religious purposes.4  The decision of the Supervisor of Assessments was overturned on April
30, 1980, by a majority vote of the Property Tax Assessment Appeals Board for Montgomery
County. 
The appeals board stated that it was “persuaded that the apartments are used
exclusively to house volunteers who are brought to this area to work exclusively at the
Temple, and that the apartments are used to foster this religious purpose.”  The board noted
5 The Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County is the named party in this
action.  We note, though, that the supervisors of each of Maryland’s 24 subdivisions consult
with an official at the State Department of Assessments and Taxation when considering an
exemption.  Except in routine matters, an official at the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation makes a final decision on whether to grant an exemption, in part to ensure
uniformity of decisions across Maryland.  At the time of the 2008 letter to the Church
rejecting its request for an exemption, John W. Brennan was the Supervisor of Assessments
of Montgomery County.  B. Marie Green, the named party in this action, currently holds that
title.  
6 In creating the Tax-Property Article, the revisors noted that § 7-204 was “derived
without substantive change” from the earlier Article 81, § 9(a) and (c).  Md. Code (1986),
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that the rents charged to the ordinance workers were “so low as to be considered at least a
partial subsidy of their housing” and this subsidy was in line with the subsidized housing
found in parsonages and convents.  The board found the language of the statute to be
“somewhat ambiguous” but determined that the purpose of the exemption was to benefit the
“residences of persons directly and exclusively involved [in] and dedicated to the
perpetuation of public religious worship.” 
The Church received the exemption until 2008, when the Supervisor of Assessments
of Montgomery County did a periodic review of exempt properties in the county.  Upon
review, it was determined that the apartment complex should not receive a tax exemption.5
The Church received a letter on June 20, 2008, informing it of the decision, but without any
explanation for why the exemption was being withdrawn, aside from the assertion that there
were “no legal grounds” to support the exemption.  The General Assembly had revised the
language of the exemption when it created the Tax-Property Article in 1985, but the
provision has continued to allow for a tax exemption for a parsonage or convent.6
§ 7-204.  The previous wording of the exemption provision applied to property “actually used
exclusively for public religious worship, including parsonages and convents . . .”  This
wording at least suggests that, under that earlier version of the statute, a parsonage or convent
had to be used “exclusively for public religious worship.”  Regardless, the current version
of the statute makes it plain that public religious worship is one of three uses of property
owned by a religious group or organization that may qualify it for an exemption. 
7 Young later was appointed the Director of the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation.  
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The current tax exemption dispute
The Church appealed the decision to the Property Tax Assessment Appeals Board for
Montgomery County, which affirmed the decision of the Supervisor of Assessments, again
without explanation.  The Church appealed the decision of the board to the Maryland Tax
Court, which held a hearing on the matter on June 3, 2009.  The Church offered testimony
from three Church officials, including a former ordinance worker, who described the
organization of the Church, elaborated on the duties of ordinance workers, and provided
details about the apartment complex.  Other Church officials testified about how the rents
typically have not covered the operating costs of the apartment complex and the Church’s
view on what should constitute a parsonage and convent. 
Robert Young, the Associate Director of the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation,7 testified on behalf of the Supervisor of Assessments.  Young said that he consulted
with the Supervisor of Assessments in deciding that the apartment complex was not entitled
to a property tax exemption as either a parsonage or convent.  
Young said that he used the ordinary dictionary definition of the word parsonage, as
8 In East Coast Conference of the Evangelical Covenant Church of America, Inc. v.
Supervisor of Assessments, the intermediate appellate court set out a definition of parsonage
as “a house supplied to a parish minister by the parish congregation or church.”  40 Md. App.
213, 215-16 (1978).  Young interpreted East Coast Conference as requiring that a minister
who lives in the parsonage must have an identifiable, local congregation.  In applying that
definition, Young said he looked to the specific duties of a minister to determine if he or she
is a church’s main spiritual counselor and to the training the person received to be a minister.
Young testified that the administrative practice of the department has been to require that a
church supply the parsonage free of charge in order to qualify for the exemption.
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well as the description offered by the Court of Special Appeals in East Coast Conference of
the Evangelical Covenant Church of America, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 40 Md.
App. 213 (1978).8  As for the definition of convent, Young sought guidance from a 1970
report of the Maryland Legislative Council Committee on Taxation and Fiscal Matters.  The
legislative intent as evidenced by that report was to allow an exemption for religious orders,
including monasteries.  Young interpreted that information as follows: 
And so based on that reading and based on the common ordinary
dictionary meaning my definition of a convent or monastery is where a group
of men or women take certain vows:  Poverty, celibate chastity and obedience
to a superior, an abbot or a prioress.  And then they live in a convent building
or they live in a monastery building.
Young stated he took additional support from a Tax Court case, Life in Jesus, Inc. v.
Supervisor of Assessments, No. 06-MI-FR-0610 and Cross-Appeal No. 06-MI-FR-0621 (Md.
Tax Court Dec. 31, 2008), in which the Tax Court affirmed a denial of a monastery
exemption.  Young noted that convents historically have housed groups of unmarried men
or women who take lifelong vows of poverty, celibate chastity, and obedience, and live
together in a communal lifestyle.  He added that not all of these elements are required, as the
9 The Tax Court found that it was clear that an apartment complex could not be a
parsonage and the ordinance workers, although engaged in performing church sacraments,
did not qualify as ministers.  Moreover, the Tax Court ruled that the multi-state area served
by the Temple did not meet the definition of a local, identifiable congregation, as required
under East Coast Conference. 
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office applies a “totality of the circumstances” approach in deciding whether to grant an
exemption.  Exemptions have been granted for Hindu and Buddhist monasteries or convents.
Young acknowledged, however, that the office purposely does not maintain any published
guidelines containing definitions of these terms and giving guidance to local assessors on
how to apply the convent and parsonage property tax exemptions. 
The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the decision of the Property Tax Assessment
Appeals Board denying an exemption to the apartment complex.  The Tax Court decided that
the complex does not qualify as a parsonage or a convent under the “ordinary and usual
meaning of the words in the statute.”9  As to whether the apartment complex constituted a
convent, the court stated the following:
In defining the common ordinary dictionary meaning for the term
convent or monastery, this Court has employed a similar analysis as it did in
defining a parsonage.  The dictionary definitions of convent and monastery do
not include married men and women and single persons living separate lives
in separate households.  Ordinance workers do not take vows of poverty,
chastity and obedience to a superior as do[es] a typical monk or nun.
Ordinance workers do not make lifetime commitments like nuns and monks
and do not keep a common purse or share things in common.  Moreover, as is
the case with supplying a house to a minister or supplying a place to live in a
convent, nuns and ministers do not pay rent to the Church for a home in which
to live.
The Tax Court concluded that the definitions of parsonage and convent used by the
10 As to the meaning of parsonage, the Circuit Court found that the Tax Court erred
in interpreting East Coast Conference as requiring that a minister living in a parsonage have
a “local” congregation, noting that East Coast Conference dealt with a minister who had no
congregation in the area at all.  The Circuit Court also faulted the Tax Court for concluding
without any basis that the ordinance workers did not constitute ministers because they were
lacking “in terms of their training, background, and responsibilities.” 
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Supervisor of Assessments did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.  The Tax Court found that the State was not discriminating among
religions, but rather applying a neutral statute with a secular purpose in a manner that did not
advance or inhibit religious belief. 
The Church filed a petition for judicial review by the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, which held a hearing on the matter on December 14, 2010.  In an order issued
August 31, 2011, the Circuit Court reversed the decision of the Tax Court and ruled that the
apartment complex qualified both as a parsonage and a convent and should be granted a tax
exemption.10
In ruling that the apartment complex qualified as a convent, the Circuit Court reasoned
that the ordinance workers “live in a communal style” by worshiping together on Sundays,
providing guidance to one another, studying scripture as a group, and working together in the
Temple on a regular basis.  The Circuit Court found that the Tax Court erred by defining
members of a convent in terms of a “typical monk or nun,” as this wording does not appear
in the exemption statute.  “The Ordinance Workers do take vows of marital chastity, they
cannot work or earn income while providing services to the Temple, and they are devoted
to a superior being,” the Circuit Court observed.  The fact that the ordinance workers live in
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separate apartments is not dispositive, as the Circuit Court noted that a Hindu church was
given a property tax exemption for several single-family homes that were viewed as being
a convent.  
On the question of whether the statute violates the Establishment Clause, the Circuit
Court ruled that “[t]he law could not constitutionally require that to qualify for an exemption
a religious organization have an organizational structure exactly parallel to that found in
other religions, denominations, or churches, Christian or otherwise.”  The Circuit Court
observed that the Church has a different structure than other religions, and that certain rites
may only be performed in the Temple and then only by ordinance workers.  The ordinance
workers are trained in their duties, serve “a discrete group who reside within that District,”
and live in housing furnished by the Church.  The Circuit Court concluded that it could not
be a requirement of the law that all religions must establish the same type of organizational
structure in order to receive a tax benefit.  
The Supervisor of Assessments noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on
September 23, 2011.  This Court, on its own motion, granted a writ of certiorari in the case
on June 21, 2012.  Green v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 427 Md. 62 (2012).
II.
We analyze the decisions of the Tax Court in the same manner as other administrative
agencies.  Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 136 (2011).  This means that
we look through the decision of the Circuit Court and evaluate directly the conclusions
reached by the Tax Court.  Id. at 136-37.  “[W]e may not uphold the final decision of an
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administrative agency on grounds other than the findings and reasons set forth by the
agency.”  Id. at 137.  Our review is “narrow,” in that we do not “substitute our judgment for
the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency.”  Id.  Instead, this
Court applies the “substantial evidence” standard, in which “we consider whether a reasoning
mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.”  Id.
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting State Ins. Comm’r v. Nat’l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters,
248 Md. 292, 309 (1967)).  
The parties here do not contest the factual findings, but the Church disagrees with the
conclusions of law drawn by the Tax Court.  The deference we accord to the agency’s factual
findings does not extend to the agency’s purely legal conclusions.  Frey, 422 Md. at 138.
Rather, the resolution of legal issues is “uniquely within the ken of a reviewing court.”  Id.;
see Supervisor of Assessments v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 208 (2001) (quoting State Dep’t of
Assessments and Taxation v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 331 Md. 68, 72 (1992)) (“In short,
a reviewing court is authorized to reverse a decision of the Tax Court, if the agency
‘erroneously determines or erroneously applies the law.’”).  With respect to an agency’s
conclusions of law, a certain amount of deference may be afforded when the agency is
interpreting or applying the statute that the agency itself administers.  Dep’t of Human
Resources v. Hayward, 426 Md. 638, 650 (2012).  Property tax exemptions certainly are
within the purview of the Tax Court; yet “[w]e are under no constraint . . . to affirm an
agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”  Pro-Football, Inc.
v. McCants, 428 Md. 270, 283 (2012) (quoting Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 420
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Md. 45, 54-55 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The present case involves the legal correctness of the Tax Court’s construction of the
words parsonage and convent as they are employed in § 7-204 (“Property that is owned by
a religious group or organization is not subject to property tax if the property is actually used
exclusively for:  . . . (2) a parsonage or convent.”).  The parties dispute whether the Tax
Court is owed any deference in its construction of those terms.  The Supervisor of
Assessments argues that we are presented with a mixed question of law and fact and,
accordingly, the conclusions of the Tax Court should be given deference.  The Church, in
contrast, argues that the Tax Court misstated the law, by applying a “novel interpretation”
of the words parsonage and convent.  As to that legal error, the Church asserts, the Tax Court
is owed no deference.  We agree with the Church.  The meaning of the words parsonage and
convent is a matter of statutory construction and thus purely a legal question.  See Marsheck
v. Bd. of Trs. of the Fire & Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. of the City of Baltimore, 358 Md.
393, 402 (2000) (noting that the meaning of the word “injury” in a retirement benefits statute
is “a solely legal issue”).  
We are aware of, but find inapplicable here, the rule of statutory construction by
which “[w]e give deference to a consistent and long-standing construction given a statute by
an agency charged with administering it.”  Stachowski v. Sysco Food Servs. of Baltimore,
Inc., 402 Md. 506, 517 (2007) (citing Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor
Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 445 (1997)).  See also Hope v. Baltimore County, 288 Md.
656, 662 (1980) (noting that “an administrative practice which has been followed by officials
11 Prior to issuing its ruling, the Tax Court heard the testimony of Young, the associate
director of the State Department of Assessments and Taxation.  Young testified that there are
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of the State for a long period of time has a very persuasive influence on the judicial
construction of the statute”).  Factors to be considered in determining the weight to be given
to the Tax Court’s interpretation include “the duration and consistency of the administrative
practice, the degree to which the agency’s construction was made known to the public . . .
[and] the extent to which the agency engaged in a process of reasoned elaboration in
formulating its interpretation and the nature of the process through which the agency arrived
at its interpretation.”  Stachowski, 402 Md. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Marriott, 346 Md. at 446).  When, however, the record does not reveal much, if anything,
about the administrative practice of an agency, then this principle is not applicable.  See
Montgomery County v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 62-63 n.2 (2011) (stating that a single workers’
compensation commission order and conflicting trends in commission cases do not provide
a strong enough record on which to apply the principle).
As to the interpretation of the word convent, there does not appear to be a record of
a long-standing practice in the Tax Court of construing the term.  Furthermore, the record
does not suggest that the Tax Court, in construing convent as it did, relied on a long-standing
practice of that court to employ such a construction.  Instead, the Tax Court appeared to rely
on case law and dictionary definitions of the word in order to ascertain the meaning of it and,
only then, applied that meaning to decide, ultimately, that the Church’s property at issue was
not a convent.11  Under these circumstances, we owe no deference to the Tax Court’s
no published guidelines or written directions to assist tax assessors in interpreting § 7-204.
The ultimate determination of whether to grant an exemption is based on the judgment of
Young, who said he conferred with the Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County
in reaching a decision in the present case.  In making his determination about the meaning
of convent, Young consulted the 1970 report of the Maryland Legislative Council Committee
on Taxation and Fiscal Matters, reviewed a decision of the Maryland Tax Court, and used
common dictionary definitions in order to reach what he termed “my definition.”  
Young testified that he was previously unaware of the apartment complex or the tax
exemption it had received because the exemption was granted before Young joined the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation.  Young stated that his definition of convent has
been applied in a “consistent” manner since late 1980, when he joined the department.  Other
than Young’s testimony, however, there is nothing in the record presented to or relied upon
by the Tax Court indicating that the Tax Court had a long-standing practice of employing the
same definition as the one employed by Young.  
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construction of this term.
Instead, we make an independent determination of the meaning of the statutory
language at issue.  In doing so, we rely on the often-cited rules of statutory interpretation to
construe the meaning of convent as the word is employed in § 7-204.  “A court’s primary
goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be
accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.”
Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 8 (2011) (quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421 (2010)).
When the words of a statute are ambiguous, we attempt to resolve that ambiguity “by
searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or
other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.”  Gardner, 420 Md.
at 9 (quoting Johnson, 415 Md. at 422).  “In every case, the statute must be given a
reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common
sense.”  Id.   As we apply those rules of construction to the present case, we remain mindful
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that “if any real doubt exists as to the propriety of [a tax] exemption that doubt must be
resolved in favor of the State.”  Keeler, 362 Md. at 209 (quoting Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 317 Md. 3, 11 (1989)).
III.
The parties offer starkly different interpretations of both parsonage and convent, as
those terms are employed in § 7-204.  We, however, need not decide what is meant by the
word parsonage because, as we shall see, the property at issue qualifies as a convent for
purposes of § 7-204.  Again, that section, “Religious groups or organizations,” provides in
its entirety:
Property that is owned by a religious group or organization is not
subject to property tax if the property is actually used exclusively for:
(1) public religious worship;
(2) a parsonage or convent; or
(3) educational purposes. 
We concur with the parties, the Tax Court, and the Circuit Court that neither the plain
language of § 7-204 nor the statutory scheme within which it fits sheds much light on the
meaning of the word convent.  The word is not defined in either § 7-204 or elsewhere in the
statute.  The parties do not point to, and our research has not disclosed, any legislative history
that suggests a meaning for the word convent at the time of the 1972 adoption of the tax
exemption or as part of the 1985 creation of the Tax-Property Article.  All that is apparent
from the statute is that a property asserted to be a convent must be affiliated with a “religious
group or organization” and not be used exclusively for public religious worship or
educational purposes, because those uses are listed separately as reasons for granting an
12 Parsonages, but not convents, were a part of the Maryland Code at the time of the
1970 report.  The language of the applicable statute at that time exempted the following
property:
(4) Churches, parsonages, etc.—Houses and buildings used exclusively for
public worship, and the furniture contained therein, and any parsonage used
in connection therewith, and the grounds appurtenant to such houses, buildings
and parsonages and necessary for the respective uses thereof. 
Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Article 81, § 9(4).
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exemption.  This narrows the meaning of the term but offers little by way of affirmative
guidance.
The 1970 report of the Maryland Legislative Council Committee on Taxation and
Fiscal Matters sheds some light on the thinking of lawmakers at the time the exemption was
created.12  The report notes that the exemption is designed to benefit “religious orders,”
including atheistic organizations, and cites two cases from this Court as part of efforts to
construe the exemption.  The report views this Court as holding in Morning Cheer, Inc. v.
Board of County Comm’rs, 194 Md. 441 (1950), that “[a]ny property actually used for
religious purposes is exempt.”  Additionally, the report summarizes this Court’s holding in
Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383 (1966), as being that the property of an
atheistic group is entitled to a tax exemption.  The Supervisor of Assessments, citing
Supervisor of Assessments v. Trustees of Bosley Methodist Church Graveyard, 293 Md. 208,
217-218 (1982), argues that the General Assembly’s intention in revamping the state’s
property tax exemptions was to narrow the range of exempt property in order to prevent the
state’s tax base from eroding.  We stated in Bosley that courts “are not at liberty to broaden
the application of tax exemptions to include property not specifically enumerated in a tax
13 The Supervisor of Assessments cites the following dictionary definitions for
convent and monastery:
Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language - Second College Ed. (1976):
Convent:  1. A community of nuns or, sometimes, monks, living under strict religious
vows.  2. The building or buildings occupied by such a group.
Monastery:  1. A place of residence occupied by a group of people, esp. monks, who
have retired from the world under religious vows.  2. Those living in such a place.
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977):
Convent: A local community or house of a religious order or congregation; esp: an
establishment of nuns.
Monastery: A house for persons under religious vows; esp: an establishment for
monks.
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985):
Convent: A local community or house of a religious order or congregation; esp: an
establishment of nuns.
Monastery: A house for persons under religious vows; esp: an establishment for
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exemption statute.”  293 Md. at 218.
There is, though, a difference between expanding a property tax exemption to include
property that was not intended by the General Assembly to be covered, and properly
construing the words of an exemption to ensure that all property entitled to an exemption
receives one.  It is to this latter end that we look to the dictionary definitions of convent
offered by both parties, as well as the definitions used by our sister courts, in an attempt to
set forth a standard that can be applied to future cases.  See Deibler, 423 Md. at 67 (citation
omitted) (noting that a dictionary definition can be a “useful starting point” for interpreting
the words of a statute).
The Supervisor of Assessments cites five dictionary definitions, all taken from various
editions of Webster’s dictionaries, some of which are also cited in support by the Church.13
monks.
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988):
Convent:  1. A community, esp. of nuns, bound by vows to a religious life under a
superior.  2.  The building or buildings occupied by a convent.
Monastery: 1. The dwelling place of a community of religious persons, esp. friars.
2. The community of friars residing in a monastery.
Webster’s II New College Dictionary - Third Ed. (2005):
Convent:  1. A community, esp. of nuns, bound by vows to a religious life under a
superior.  2. The building or buildings occupied by a convent.
Monastery: 1. The dwelling place of a community of religious persons, esp. friars. 2.
The community of friars residing in a monastery.
The Church in its brief cites with approval the latter two definitions found in Webster’s II
New Riverside University Dictionary (1988) and Webster’s II New College Dictionary -
Third Ed. (2005).
14 The Church cites the following two additional definitions:
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993):
Convent: A local community or house of a religious order or congregation.
Monastery: A house for persons under religious vows.
Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910):
Convent:  A religious house.
15 See Ass’n for Educ. Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Mo. 1976) (“a
community of persons devoted to religious life under a superior”); Diocese of Cent. New
York v. Schwarzer, 23 Misc. 2d 515, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (“an abode for persons
devoted to a particular religious life”), aff’d, 217 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961).  The
Church acknowledges that other courts have interpreted the word convent in a manner that
would arguably not include the apartment complex because of a requirement that the
religious workers be in seclusion.  See Missionary of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of
Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Wisc. 1954) (“a place where men or women bound by
vows in a religious organization live a community life in seclusion or retirement upon the
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In addition, the Church offers a definition from another edition of Webster’s and from a 1910
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.14  The Church also cites cases from outside of Maryland
where courts have applied various definitions of convent.15  Because many of these
premises”).
16 The Church cites Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993) for the
definitions of monk (“a man who is in a member of a religious order and lives in a
monastery”) and nun (“a woman belonging to a religious order”).  The Church
acknowledges, however, that within the longer definition of nun is a description of a person
who is “under solemn vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.”  
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definitions use the terms nun and monk, we must consider definitions of these terms, as
well.16
Although we construe strictly the language of property tax exemptions, we have
generally taken a common-sense approach when it comes to religious exemptions, in order
to achieve a fair construction of the statute.  See Maryland State Fair and Agric. Society, Inc.
v. Supervisor of Assessments, 225 Md. 574, 588 (1961) (noting that “tax-exemption statutes
are to be strictly construed, but a strict construction permits a fair one, so as to effectuate the
legislative intent and objectives”).  For instance, in Keeler this Court held that 16.5 open
acres of land owned by a church, that could not be developed for any purpose, could qualify
under the church’s exemption for public religious worship.  362 Md. at 222.  In deciding that
it could, this Court noted that the focus is on whether land was “being put to uses other than
the charitable, educational, or religious use which gave rise to the exemption.”  Id. at 216-17.
The acres surrounding the church “provide[d] a natural setting for the church and, thus, the
religious worship use.”  Id. at 222.  Technically speaking, the unused portion of the land
surrounding the church was not devoted exclusively to religious worship.  But this Court
took a common-sense approach in determining that a fair reading of the statute permitted an
17 We also have examined a case of the Tax Court that Young cited as being helpful
in interpreting the meaning of the word convent.  See Life in Jesus, Inc. v. Supervisor of
Assessments, No. 06-MI-FR-0610 and Cross-Appeal No. 06-MI-FR-0621 (Md. Tax Court
Dec. 31, 2008).  Young testified that the case concerned a group of married couples who
lived in separate houses, but frequently shared meals and held group Bible study sessions
together.  According to Young, their religious faith allowed for married nuns and priests.
The couples sought, but were denied, a tax exemption as a convent and the Tax Court
affirmed the denial, Young stated.  There may have been testimony during the hearing before
the Tax Court relevant to the case sub judice, but the final order of the Tax Court does not
shed any light on its interpretation of the word convent.  The only mention of convent is in
reference to a “convent of nuns” living on the property, and the Tax Court’s observation that
other portions of the property in question did not fall under the parsonage or convent
exemption.  There is no explanation for why portions of the property did not qualify as a
convent, or what definition of convent the Tax Court applied in reaching its decision.
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exemption, particularly when the land was not being used for any other purpose and was a
part of the overall parcel.
Similarly, in Morning Cheer this Court approved an exemption for a Bible study
retreat that was used for ten weeks during each summer for daily religious services, prayer
meetings, and Bible study.  194 Md. at 444, 447.  We recognized that the use was “different
from that of an ordinary church and parsonage,” and we allowed for an exemption for about
35 acres of cleared land that housed various buildings associated with the retreat because
they were necessary for public worship.  Id. at 447.  The retreat did not operate as a typical
place of public worship and remained empty for most of the year, but we looked to the
“primary objects” for which the property was used to reach our conclusion.  Id. at 446.17  
We bear in mind this common-sense approach to statutory construction as we consider
the definition of convent used by the Tax Court in denying an exemption to the Church.  The
Tax Court stated that the definitions of convent and monastery “do not include married men
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and women and single persons living separate lives in separate households.”  Additionally,
the Tax Court required “vows of poverty, chastity and obedience to a superior” in the vein
of “a typical monk or nun.”  Furthermore, the Tax Court ruled that convent members must
“make lifetime commitments like nuns and monks” and “keep a common purse or share
things in common.”  Those living in a convent “do not pay rent to the Church for a home in
which to live.”  
Reviewing the definitions offered by the parties, we find that the Tax Court’s
definition of what constitutes a convent is too narrow and should not be the exclusive
interpretation of that term.  There are two main qualities shared by most of the definitions:
a convent is (1) a community of people who are (2) bound by strict religious vows.  The
general secondary meaning of convent is the building where a community of people bound
by these vows lives together.  Marital status is not a part of these definitions.  Nor are
specific vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.  The words monk and nun are frequently
used in describing convents and monasteries, but there is no indication of what qualities a
“typical” monk or nun must possess.  The definitions also do not mention lifetime
commitments, common purses, or paying rent to a church.  
We agree with the Church that the Tax Court’s interpretation accords only with
certain religious traditions and is more closely aligned with, for instance, Roman Catholic
or Anglican traditions.  We are mindful of the dangers in adopting a definition that adheres
18 See Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada
County, 849 P.2d 83, 98 (Idaho 1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“Will only those ‘traditional’
religious organizations that have a traditional ‘parsonage’ be entitled to the statutory
exemption?  If so, the result will be to ‘establish’ these religious organizations as favored by
the state . . . .”).  
19 As noted earlier, because we hold that the apartment complex is a convent, it is
unnecessary for us to decide in this case whether the Tax Court erred in its interpretation of
the word parsonage.
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too closely to the doctrine of a single religion.18  But we are also aware that convent may be
defined in various ways and simply to disapprove of a definition offers little guidance to
future tax assessors, boards of appeal, and courts on how to proceed.
Distilling the various definitions offered by the parties and researched by this Court,
we have concluded that there are several basic qualities a convent must contain in order to
be eligible for a tax exemption:  A convent consists of a community of people who live
together, follow strict religious vows, and devote themselves full-time to religious work.
This definition does not expand impermissibly the scope of the property tax exemption, and
it avoids an unduly narrow reading of the statute.
In light of our decision as to what constitutes a convent, we conclude that the Tax
Court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining whether the apartment complex
qualified as a convent for purposes of § 7-204.19  The facts are not in dispute, and, based on
the record as developed by the parties, the apartment complex qualifies as a convent by
application of the definition set forth in this opinion.  The ordinance workers qualify as a
“community of people who live togther.”  Although the workers inhabit separate units within
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the apartment complex, they live together at one location, socialize, and worship together as
a group every Sunday.  In addition, the ordinance workers “follow strict religious vows” and
are removed from their positions working in the Temple if they forsake them.  Finally, the
ordinance workers “devote themselves full-time to religious work,” as they spend their days
each week during their two-year commitment performing religious ceremonies within the
Temple, and they hold no outside employment.  
We therefore direct a remand to the Tax Court for it to apply the definition of convent
we describe today and issue an order granting a property tax exemption to the Church for the
apartment complex.  See O’Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 509 (1981) (noting that “if an
administrative function remains to be performed after a reviewing court has determined that
an administrative agency has made an error of law, the court ordinarily may not modify the
agency order” and instead “should remand the matter to the administrative agency”).
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMERY
COUNTY 
AFFIRMED; 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REMAND THE
CASE TO THE TAX COURT FOR
F U R T H E R  
P R O C E E D I N G S
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.