Case Title: Oats v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-749

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-749 
____________ 
 
SONNY BOY OATS, JR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[December 17, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court that denied his 
motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203,1 in which he 
claimed that he is intellectually disabled2 and thus cannot be sentenced to death.  In 
                                          
 
 
1.  Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of 
death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of 
the Florida Constitution. 
 
2.  The term originally used in these proceedings was “mentally retarded.”  
This terminology was recently changed to “intellectually disabled,” as recognized 
in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5), one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists and other experts.  American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 33 
(5th ed. 2013).  Thus, both the Florida Statutes and the Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure modified their relevant provisions to conform to the change in 
 
 
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light of developments in the law since Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and 
because the circuit court erred in its legal analysis regarding the onset of Oats’s 
intellectual disability prior to the age of 18 and failed to consider all of the 
evidence presented, we reverse and remand for a full reevaluation of whether Oats 
is intellectually disabled.   
Oats’s intelligence quotient (IQ) has never been in genuine dispute.  Based 
on numerous psychological tests, Oats’s IQ is between 54 and 67, well within the 
range for an individual who has an intellectual disability.  Up until the current 
litigation, expert after expert consistently recognized that Oats has an intellectual 
disability as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM)—a fact the State previously conceded in 1990 when litigating whether trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to present mental mitigation, including Oats’s 
intellectual disability.  Recent records from prison also show that the Florida 
Department of Corrections is concerned that Oats may be intellectually disabled.   
Despite this evidence, the circuit court denied finding Oats to be 
intellectually disabled, on the basis that Oats was unable to establish that his 
intellectual disability manifested before the age of 18—one of the three required 
                                          
 
terminology.  There is no difference in the meaning of these two terms.  
Accordingly, throughout this opinion, we use the term “intellectually disabled.”  
See also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (using the new 
terminology).   
 
 
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prongs in Florida’s statutory test for determining an intellectual disability.  See § 
921.137, Fla. Stat. (2015).  In support, the circuit court relied on the lack of a full 
childhood IQ test, even though an initial screening test performed by Oats’s 
elementary school showed that Oats’s IQ was 70—a score that likewise would be 
within the range of IQ scores for a person who has an intellectual disability—and 
even though Oats presented significant evidence of childhood difficulties and 
injuries consistent with an individual with an intellectual disability.   
Our decision to reverse is based on three reasons.  First, in light of the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hall, the circuit court’s order should 
have addressed all three prongs of the intellectual disability test, rather than 
denying the claim solely because Oats allegedly did not present sufficient evidence 
to establish that his intellectual disability manifested before the age of 18.  As the 
United States Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t is not sound to view a single factor as 
dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment.”  Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.  
The United States Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding intellectual 
disability reaffirms Hall and provides further authority that all three prongs 
generally must be considered in tandem.  See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 
2278-82 (2015). 
Second, the circuit court erroneously held that Oats failed to meet his burden 
to establish his intellectual disability without even considering or weighing all of 
 
 
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the testimony that Oats presented, including the evidence submitted in prior 
postconviction proceedings from 1990 that both parties agreed was relevant and 
should be considered.  This error is of particular concern given that Oats presented 
so much evidence of an intellectual disability during the 1990 proceedings that the 
State actually acknowledged that there was “[n]o doubt” he was “in the mildly 
mentally retarded area.”3   
Third, the circuit court erroneously conflated the term “manifested” with 
“diagnosed” and held that Oats failed to satisfy one of the necessary prongs of the 
statutory test for intellectual disability because Oats was not diagnosed as a child, 
even though the applicable Florida statute requires only that the intellectual 
disability “manifested during the period from conception to age 18.”  § 921.137(1), 
Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  Further, the circuit court relied exclusively on 
testimony from a State expert witness that was based on a misreading of this 
Court’s precedent in Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)—a decision that 
was subsequently disapproved by the Supreme Court in Hall. 
We accordingly reverse the denial of Oats’s rule 3.203 motion and remand 
to the circuit court to reconsider whether Oats is intellectually disabled.  A remand 
                                          
 
 
3.  Even if not legally binding, we note that the State’s experienced Assistant 
Attorney General also recognized during the current evidentiary hearing that 
manifestation of an intellectual disability before age 18 was so clear that it was 
“not really in play” in this case.   
 
 
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of this proceeding is particularly necessary in light of the dispositive opinion in 
Hall, in which the United States Supreme Court disapproved our opinion in Cherry 
and provided additional guidance pertaining to the necessary showing under Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), for establishing ineligibility for the death penalty 
as a result of an intellectual disability.   
Based on further direction from the United States Supreme Court in Hall, 
reaffirmed in Brumfield, courts must be guided by established medical practice and 
psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of 
each of the three prongs for determining an intellectual disability.  See Hall, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1993.  In other words, in determining the definition of an intellectual 
disability, the informed assessments of medical experts cannot be disregarded.  Id. 
at 2000.  The experts review all three prongs together because determining 
intellectual disability is a “conjunctive and interrelated assessment.”  Id. at 2001.   
FACTS 
Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., was tried and convicted of the December 1979 robbery 
of a convenience store and the first-degree murder of the store clerk.  This Court 
affirmed Oats’s conviction on direct appeal but held that the trial court erroneously 
found three aggravating factors and remanded to the trial court for entry of a new 
sentencing order.  Oats v. State, 446 So. 2d 90, 95-96 (Fla. 1984).  On remand, the 
trial court reweighed the valid aggravators and reimposed the death penalty, a 
 
 
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sentence that this Court then affirmed.  Oats v. State, 472 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1985).  
This Court later affirmed the denial of Oats’s initial motion for postconviction 
relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Oats v. Dugger, 638 So. 
2d 20 (Fla. 1994).   
During the 1990 postconviction proceedings, Oats asserted that his trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present statutory and 
nonstatutory mitigation evidence at the penalty phase based on an inadequate 
investigation of the available mitigation, including evidence pertaining to Oats’s 
intellectual disability.  In addition, Oats alleged that he was resentenced when he 
was incompetent.  Numerous experts presented testimony regarding Oats’s 
intellectual disability.   
Dr. Robert Phillips testified that Oats “is a man of significantly substandard 
intellectual capacity as a result of a degree of mental retardation that is well 
documented in evaluations that have been performed by examiners of the State of 
Florida and are certainly consistent with the findings of my examination and a 
subsequent review of records.”  He further discussed Oats’s “longstanding history 
of maladaptive behavior to societal expectations which is not inconsistent with 
individuals that we find to be mentally retarded.”  Dr. Phillips concluded that Oats 
“lacks the intellectual capacity to truly formulate with any degree of specificity 
well-conceived and executed plans.  He rather tends to act far more on impulse 
 
 
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driven both by his emotion, sometimes overridden by the illicit substances which 
he may have on board but, by in large [sic], it’s a moment-to-moment kind of 
decision-making process.” 
Dr. Joyce Carbonell testified that Oats “scores in the range that’s referred to 
in general as mental deficiency.  He is in the mildly mentally retarded range of 
functioning.  His scores place him in the lowest one percent of the population in 
terms of his abilities, his intelligence compared to the rest of the population.”  She 
then opined that Oats’s full-scale IQ score was 61, his performance score was 62, 
and his verbal score was 64.  Further, Dr. Carbonell detailed how, based on reports 
from Oats’s family and his school record, his social and medical history was 
likewise consistent with possessing an intellectual disability.  Oats failed to timely 
reach numerous developmental milestones, including learning how to walk and 
talk on time; poor performance in school, with decreasing performance as he aged; 
and poor performance on an IQ screening test that was given during elementary 
school.  Moreover, he had “serious deficits in adaptive functioning,” was able to 
communicate at only a very low level, and could read at only a third-grade level.  
In addition, Oats was never able to maintain steady employment and always stayed 
with family that could take care of him. 
Dr. Frank Carrera, who had testified during the penalty phase, previously 
evaluated Oats in 1980 to determine Oats’s sanity and competency for the original 
 
 
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trial.  While Dr. Carrera believed that Oats was competent, trial counsel never 
requested Dr. Carrera to evaluate whether Oats had an intellectual disability or 
whether any statutory mitigation applied.  Dr. Carrera thereafter reviewed Dr. 
Carbonell’s testing results and did not see any errors as to her findings that Oats 
had an intellectual disability.  Moreover, he opined that Oats’s IQ testing, which 
reflected an IQ of 61, was consistent with what he observed. 
The State then called Dr. Charles Mutter, who had been retained by the State 
in the original trial proceedings to render an opinion as to several issues: (1) 
whether Oats was competent to stand trial in February 1981; (2) whether Oats’s 
waiver of his Miranda4 rights in 1979 was knowing and intelligent; and (3) whether 
Dr. Carrera’s 1980 competency evaluation was sufficient.  Dr. Mutter submitted a 
joint report with Dr. Leonard Haber and concluded that Oats was competent.  Dr. 
Mutter noted that Oats had certain intellectual limits and impairments, but nothing 
that would affect his competency.  While Dr. Mutter was not asked to perform 
testing as to whether Oats was intellectually disabled, Dr. Mutter later reviewed his 
prior test results and his contact with Oats and opined at the 1990 evidentiary 
hearing that Oats was “borderline to very mild retarded.”  He further discussed that 
                                          
 
 
4.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
- 9 - 
Oats had deficits in adaptive functioning and was unable to learn from past 
experiences in certain circumstances. 
Dr. Haber, who filed the joint report with Dr. Mutter, disagreed that Oats 
should be considered to have an intellectual disability.  Although Dr. Haber never 
performed any IQ testing to establish Oats’s intelligence, based on his in-person 
interview with Oats, Dr. Haber did not believe that Oats’s intelligence testing score 
was accurate and estimated that a more accurate IQ score was between 70 and 90.  
Dr. Haber was then asked whether, based on the three prongs set forth in the 
relevant DSM, Oats would qualify as having an intellectual disability, to which Dr. 
Haber testified, “It is fair to say that based on the scores as reported, and the school 
record as reported, that Mr. Oats would seem to fit the category.”  He further 
agreed that if the IQ test results were accepted as accurate, Oats should be 
diagnosed with an intellectual disability under the relevant DSM criteria.  Dr. 
Haber stressed that his focus was more on whether Oats understood the court 
proceedings. 
In addition to the expert testimony, defense counsel also presented lay 
witnesses, Freddie Oats and Idella Russ, who grew up with Oats while he was 
being raised by his aunt and uncle, who were his foster parents.  They testified as 
to Oats’s intellectual abilities as a child, observing that Oats was slow in learning 
new information and that they had to help Oats tremendously.  Freddie, Oats’s 
 
 
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younger brother, testified that Oats had been a grade ahead of Freddie until Oats 
was retained in the second grade.  Even after he was held back, however, Oats was 
not able to comprehend the same things as the other children in the class, so the 
teachers pulled him to the side and tried to work with him individually.  
Throughout their schooling, Freddie was in about half of Oats’s classes, and he 
helped Oats with his work.  Oats rarely passed tests on his own, so Freddie let Oats 
copy his answers.  If Freddie was not in his class, Oats would find another student 
to copy from and cheat enough to “get by.”  At home, Oats had difficulty following 
instructions and would then get punished because he did not follow the directions 
correctly.     
Idella Russ was raised in the same household as Oats and provided similar 
testimony, recalling that Oats was slow in learning something new.  Even when 
Oats tried to memorize Bible verses and would choose the shortest verse possible, 
such as “Jesus wept,” his siblings had to remind him of the verse because he kept 
forgetting it.  When Oats was called upon in class, he seemed as though he had no 
idea what the teacher was asking.  Oats liked going to school to get away from his 
foster mother’s beatings, but his performance in school was very poor.  Oats 
progressed through school by copying other people’s work and test answers.  Oats 
needed a person to sit down with him and explain how to do something before he 
 
 
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understood.  He eventually dropped out of school in the tenth grade and did not 
return.  
Further, while in the care of his foster parents, Oats was beaten severely, 
including being hit on the head with an extension cord and a hoe handle, resulting 
in scars to his head.  Once, in a fall from a tree house, a corner of plywood hit Oats 
in the head, causing profuse bleeding.  Oats was awake but so drowsy from the 
injury that he was unable to get up or move, and after his fall, he suffered terrible 
headaches.  Following an escape from his aunt’s house at age sixteen, he returned 
home to his biological parents, but fell through a porch, leading to another 
significant head injury.  Although Oats has numerous scars on his head from these 
injuries, he was not taken to a doctor for many of them.  Testimony established that 
these childhood injuries could have caused an intellectual disability. 
During the 1990 postconviction proceedings, based on all of this evidence, 
the State conceded that Oats without a doubt had an intellectual disability under the 
applicable DSM, specifically stating, “Under the DSM-III criteria, the defendant 
falls in the mildly mentally retarded area.  No doubt about that.”  However, 
according to the State, this did not entitle Oats to relief on his ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim because the jury already heard evidence that Oats had low 
intelligence, and it would not have recommended a life sentence even if the 
additional evidence had been presented.  The postconviction court denied relief on 
 
 
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the claim that defense counsel was ineffective, finding that there was not a 
reasonable possibility that either the jury’s recommendation or the ultimate 
sentence would have been different, even if trial counsel had presented all of the 
information.  These proceedings occurred prior to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Atkins. 
In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the execution of an individual with an intellectual disability.  
Relying on Atkins, Oats filed a timely motion seeking to vacate his death sentence 
on the ground that he is intellectually disabled, and, ultimately, the circuit court 
held an evidentiary hearing on Oats’s motion.   
During the evidentiary hearing in this proceeding, the parties entered into a 
stipulation to admit the transcripts from the prior 1990 proceedings, as opposed to 
recalling all of the witnesses, and the circuit court agreed.  Two additional mental 
health witnesses were presented: Dr. Denis Keyes and Dr. Harry McClaren.  Dr. 
Keyes specializes in intellectual disabilities and teaches courses on the subject.  He 
evaluated Oats in 2005, first administering the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale-
5th edition.  On this test, Oats received a nonverbal IQ score of 47, a verbal IQ 
score of 64, and a full scale IQ score of 54.  Dr. Keyes testified that Oats’s scores 
were consistent with having an intellectual disability.  
 
 
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Dr. Keyes further testified about Oats’s deficits in adaptive functioning, 
discussing Oats’s inability to hold a job on a long-term basis, his struggles to read, 
and how he always lived with family or friends who were able to assist him.  He 
concluded that Oats’s adaptive skills were deficient in practical, social, and 
conceptual ways and that his problems had existed back to his childhood. 
As to the age of onset prong, Dr. Keyes interviewed numerous witnesses 
who knew Oats as a child, including Oats’s brother and his cousin.  Dr. Keyes also 
found and questioned Oats’s fifth grade teacher, Florence McCrae, who described 
Oats as having significant intellectual deficits in virtually every area.  According to 
McCrae, Oats “clearly had difficulty in learning” and needed the one-on-one 
attention that was typically available only in special education.  He had to be 
placed in a special reading program for much younger children.   
When Oats was 13, he was given the Slosson Intelligence Test, which 
indicated that Oats’s IQ was 70—a score that qualifies as intellectually disabled.  
Based on Oats’s score on this screening test, the school district should have 
performed additional testing, but none was given.  However, as Dr. Keyes noted, 
this testing occurred prior to the federal mandate requiring state educational 
institutions to provide special accommodations for children with special needs, and 
Oats attended a socioeconomically disadvantaged school in the 1960s in Florida.  
In addition, Dr. Keyes discussed Oats’s traumatic childhood, his head injuries as a 
 
 
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child, and how Oats was denied food as a child—all of which, he explained, could 
cause an intellectual disability.   
On cross-examination, when asking about the manifestation prior to age 18 
prong, the State recognized that this prong was “not really in play here,” to which 
Dr. Keyes agreed: 
Q:  And the third component that, you know, is not really in 
play here too much either, I suppose, is the pre-18 onset, right? 
A:  Correct.   
 
In contrast to Dr. Keyes’s testimony, Dr. Harry McClaren reached a 
different conclusion.  He administered the WAIS-III to Oats in October 2005.  
Oats’s scores were similar to his prior intelligence testing scores: his verbal IQ 
score was 60, his nonverbal IQ was 72, and his full scale IQ was 62.  While Dr. 
McClaren recognized that Oats’s IQ scores had been incredibly consistent 
throughout the years, only varying by a few points, he was concerned whether the 
test was an underestimate.   
As to deficits in adaptive functioning, Dr. McClaren recognized that Oats 
was never able to maintain employment for more than a few weeks, despite several 
attempts, and had always lived with family or friends.  Further, Oats was never 
able to obtain a driver’s license.  All of these factors could be evidence of deficits 
in adaptive functioning, which would require concurrent deficits in at least two of 
the following areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal 
 
 
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skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, 
work, leisure, health, and safety.  Dr. McClaren recognized that while this is the 
definition as stated in the DSM, he did not assess this criteria under the DSM to 
determine whether Oats had deficits in two out of the ten areas.  Dr. McClaren was 
sure that Oats currently has some adaptive deficits, but opined that this could be a 
more recent decline. 
Dr. McClaren’s most significant concern was whether sufficient evidence 
existed to establish that Oats’s intellectual disability manifested prior to age 18.  
Dr. McClaren recognized that this prong is designed to differentiate an intellectual 
disability from other conditions that may also affect an individual’s intelligence 
and adaptive functioning but that occur later in life, such as dementia.  In this case, 
Dr. McClaren stressed that Oats was never “diagnosed” as having an intellectual 
disability while he was a child, testifying that there was no “psychiatric evidence 
of his subaverage intellect two standard deviations below the norm.  The closest 
thing we have is a test called the Slosson test, which is not as good, not as suitable 
for classification of people as mentally retarded or not as a Wechsler or Stanford-
Binet.”   
In discussing this prong, Dr. McClaren relied on a misreading of this Court’s 
opinion in Cherry, which is no longer good law after Hall.  Dr. McClaren 
explained his reasoning as to why the Slosson test was not sufficient to establish 
 
 
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onset prior to age 18 because, “taking into consideration we have the Cherry 
decision that talks about 70 means 70,” Oats had only a “70 on a test that is not 
appropriate for the use of diagnosis of mental retardation.”  Also, contrary to what 
the Supreme Court would later hold in Hall, Dr. McClaren further noted that he 
uses more scrutiny in determining whether an intellectual disability exists in capital 
litigation.   
Dr. McClaren did observe that this was a “very close” case, given the 
evidence of Oats’s low IQ scores presently and in the past, his poor grades in 
school, and all of the head injuries and malnutrition Oats suffered during 
childhood.  Dr. McClaren explained that whether Oats was intellectually disabled 
was unclear, though, because Oats was “undergoing pretty savage abuse and 
neglect” as a child and the environmental turmoil could have been the cause of a 
reduced performance on the Slosson Intelligence Test.  Dr. McClaren also pointed 
out that recently, the Florida Department of Corrections had concerns as to whether 
Oats had an intellectual disability and also noted that Oats had a mild to moderate 
emotional impairment.   
However, Dr. McClaren ultimately concluded that Oats does not have an 
intellectual disability, relying on Oats’s lack of diagnosis before the age of 18, his 
ability to escape from custody prior to his trial and travel to New York, his letter 
writing, and his ability to have a three-month relationship with a woman in New 
 
 
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York.  Dr. McClaren recognized, however, that questions remained as to how 
much Oats was able to accomplish by himself, as opposed to whether he was aided 
by others in accomplishing many of these tasks.  Dr. McClaren acknowledged that 
his opinion differed from the prior mental health experts but explained this 
discrepancy by saying that there is more scrutiny given now in diagnosing 
intellectual disabilities, particularly in “capital litigation.” 
The circuit court denied Oats’s motion on the basis that Oats failed to 
present sufficient evidence that his intellectual disability manifested before the age 
of 18.  Oats appealed.   
While the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court vacated this 
Court’s decision in Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 711 (Fla. 2012), holding that this 
Court erred in applying the definition of an “intellectual disability” too strictly and 
that Florida’s definition was unconstitutional because it “create[d] an unacceptable 
risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.”  Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 
1990.  This Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing to address 
whether the decision in Hall impacted this case in any manner. 
After consideration of the record, the briefs, and the supplemental briefs, we 
now conclude that the circuit court erred when it determined that Oats did not 
establish that his intellectual disability manifested prior to the age of 18.  
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the circuit court 
 
 
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to make additional findings after applying the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Hall and the correct legal standards.  
ANALYSIS 
Oats raises five issues in this Court: (1) the trial court erred in denying his 
challenge to his sentence of death based on his intellectual disability; (2) Oats was 
deprived of his constitutional rights when the expert appointed by the trial court 
communicated directly with the State and did not act as a “court expert”; (3) the 
trial court improperly curtailed Oats’s cross-examination of Dr. McClaren; (4) the 
trial court committed fundamental error by failing to act in a neutral manner during 
the evidentiary hearing; and (5) the burden of proof in section 921.137, 
determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled, is 
unconstitutional.  Because we conclude that the circuit court erred in its analysis of 
the intellectual disability claim and that Oats is entitled to a new evidentiary 
hearing with the benefit of Hall, we address only the first issue.  
In reviewing the circuit court’s determination that Oats is not intellectually 
disabled, “this Court examines the record for whether competent, substantial 
evidence supports the determination of the trial court.”  State v. Herring, 76 So. 3d 
891, 895 (Fla. 2011).  We “do[] not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the 
circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”  Brown v. State, 959 So. 
 
 
- 19 - 
2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007).  However, we apply a de novo standard of review to any 
questions of law.  Herring, 76 So. 3d at 895. 
We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant law and the impact of the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hall on Florida’s standard in 
determining whether a defendant has an intellectual disability.  We then consider 
the errors in the circuit court’s order. 
I.  Atkins & Recent Supreme Court Precedent 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 holding in Atkins, Florida 
had already implemented a prospective prohibition on imposing the death sentence 
upon an intellectually disabled defendant.  See ch. 2001-202, § 1, Laws of Fla. 
(enacting § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001)).  Based on numerous considerations, 
including the trend within various legislative bodies to eliminate capital 
punishment for intellectually disabled defendants, the United States Supreme Court 
declared in Atkins that executing a person with an intellectual disability 
contravenes the Eighth Amendment.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.  The Supreme Court 
further recognized that an intellectual disability consists of three prongs: (1) 
subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) significant limitations in adaptive skills; 
and (3) manifestation of the condition before age 18.  Id.  However, the Supreme 
Court did not elaborate as to how this standard was to be implemented and left this 
determination to the states, including “the task of developing appropriate ways to 
 
 
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enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”  Id. at 
317. 
Once the Atkins ruling extended this protection to all capital defendants, this 
Court immediately implemented procedures to ensure that defendants could 
present evidence to establish whether they were intellectually disabled.  In 
determining what constituted an intellectual disability, this Court looked to the 
statutory definition set forth in section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and 
held that in considering whether a defendant had “subaverage intelligence,” a 
defendant must establish an IQ score of 70 or less.  Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712-14.  
This Court further held that courts were precluded from considering the application 
of the standard error of measurement as to the IQ score.  Id. at 712-13.     
This Court was asked to reconsider Cherry’s holding in Hall, 109 So. 3d at 
707-08, a case that is substantially similar to the one before us now.  In that case, 
Freddie Lee Hall had been previously found to have an intellectual disability, but 
since his crime occurred prior to Florida’s statutory prohibition on imposing a 
sentence of death upon the intellectually disabled, such evidence was considered 
only as a mitigating circumstance.  Id. at 706.  Relying on the prior determination 
by the trial court that found Hall to be intellectually disabled, Hall sought relief 
after Atkins.  Id. at 706-07.  However, the postconviction court determined that 
Hall could not be considered intellectually disabled under Florida’s statutory 
 
 
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definition of the term because Hall’s IQ scores varied between 71 and 73 and thus 
did not constitute “subaverage intelligence.”  Id. at 707.  In a 4-2 decision, this 
Court affirmed the postconviction court’s finding of no intellectual disability based 
on the strict cut-off score of 70, as set forth in Cherry.  Id. at 709-10.  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall and held that the 
manner in which Florida defined an intellectual disability for capital litigation 
violated the Eighth Amendment because it “disregards established medical 
practice” and “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability 
will be executed.”  Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1995.  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
stated that Florida’s bright-line rule  
disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways.  It 
takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s 
intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other 
evidence.  It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the 
defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the 
score is, on its own terms, imprecise.   
Id. at 1995.  In determining whether an interpretation of intellectual disability 
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court relied on psychiatric and 
professional studies that elaborated on the purpose and meaning of the prong at 
issue.  Id. at 1993.  In addition, the Supreme Court stressed that a single factor 
should not be considered dispositive because the three factors must be considered 
together in an interrelated assessment.  Id. at 2001 (relying on the DSM-5, at 37 
(“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior 
 
 
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problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of 
individuals with a lower IQ score.”)).   
 
The United States Supreme Court emphasized these same principles in its 
most recent decision pertaining to the intellectual disability analysis, in which the 
Court held that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
intellectual disability claim.  See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2279.  The Supreme 
Court first reiterated that an IQ test result of 75 is “entirely consistent with 
intellectual disability,” relying on its prior decision in Hall.  Id. at 2277.  The 
Supreme Court then addressed the next two prongs, determining that the record 
contained “substantial grounds to question [the defendant’s] adaptive functioning,” 
based on numerous examples from the defendant’s childhood, including his low 
birth weight, that he was placed in special classes in the fifth grade, and that he had 
difficulty processing information.  Id. at 2280.  Further, the Supreme Court noted 
that the evidence pertaining to his low birth weight and his intellectual 
shortcomings as a child provided “ample evidence” that the defendant’s disability 
manifested before adulthood and thus required an evidentiary hearing so that the 
trial court could hear all relevant evidence and determine whether the defendant is 
intellectually disabled.  Id. at 2283.   
II.  Errors in the Circuit Court’s Order 
 
 
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Considering the circuit court’s order in light of this precedent, we reverse for 
three reasons.  First, while we recognize that the circuit court did not have the 
benefit of Hall, the Supreme Court has now stated that courts must consider all 
three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as opposed to relying on just 
one factor as dispositive.  Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.  We conclude that the circuit 
court erred in relying solely on the third prong in denying Oats’s claim.   
We caution, however, that our decision should not be interpreted as 
establishing that this will necessarily constitute a per se reversible error.  But as the 
Supreme Court has now recognized, because these factors are interdependent, if 
one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may 
still be warranted based on the strength of other prongs.  Id. (holding that this is a 
“conjunctive and interrelated assessment” and relying on the DSM-5, which 
provides as an example that “a person with an IQ score above 70 may have such 
severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is 
comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score”).   
Second, the circuit court erred in concluding that Oats failed to meet his 
burden without even considering or weighing all of the testimony that Oats 
presented.  The circuit court agreed to the parties’ stipulation to consider the 
mental health evidence presented in the 1990 proceedings pertaining to whether 
Oats had an intellectual disability, as opposed to requiring the parties to recall all 
 
 
- 24 - 
of those witnesses who testified previously regarding Oats’s intellectual disability.  
However, in reaching its decision, the circuit court stated that it “accept[ed]” the 
1990 postconviction court’s ruling and was “not in a position to reevaluate the 
credibility of the witnesses who testified or the evidence” the postconviction court 
considered in those prior proceedings.  The circuit court then denied Oats’s claim, 
concluding that “[t]here is no competent evidence that the defendant suffered from 
any mental retardation prior to the age of 18.”   
The circuit court’s refusal to consider the 1990 evidence of Oats’s 
intellectual disability was error.  The prior proceedings did not determine whether 
Oats is intellectually disabled under the statutory definition and thus ineligible for 
the death penalty, as the circuit court itself recognized.  The case was in a different 
procedural posture at that time, particularly since the bar against the execution of 
an intellectually disabled individual did not then exist.  If the circuit court, after 
reviewing the transcripts, determined that it was unable to evaluate the credibility 
of the witnesses or consider the evidence submitted in the prior postconviction 
proceedings, it was required to permit the parties to recall those witnesses in a new 
proceeding and submit the evidence so that all of the relevant evidence could be 
considered and weighed.   
In fact, in the 1990 postconviction proceedings, Oats submitted so much 
evidence establishing his intellectual disability that the State, in its written closing 
 
 
- 25 - 
argument to the postconviction court, stated, “Under the DSM-III criteria, the 
defendant falls in the mildly mentally retarded area.  No doubt about that.”  Thus, 
this evidence clearly should have been considered in the current proceeding.  
Finally, reversal is warranted because the circuit court applied the incorrect 
legal standard in analyzing whether Oats’s intellectual disability “manifested 
during the period from conception to age 18.”  § 921.137, Fla. Stat.  As the 
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities explains, an 
intellectual disability is a developmental disability and thus this prong ensures that 
there was “evidence of the disability during the developmental period.”  Am. Ass’n 
on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual Disability 
http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.VNDqAyvF-JQ (last visited 
December 2, 2015).  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that this prong simply requires that a defendant demonstrate that his “intellectual 
deficiencies manifested while he was in the ‘developmental stage’—that is, before 
he reached adulthood.”  Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2282. 
In concluding that “[t]here is no competent evidence that the defendant 
suffered from any mental retardation prior to the age of 18,” the circuit court rested 
solely upon the testimony by the State’s expert witness, Dr. McClaren, that Oats 
had a “[l]ack of diagnosis before 18”—testimony that the circuit court quoted in 
denying relief:  
 
 
- 26 - 
Well, because, first look at the onset prior to age 18.  We don’t 
have any psychiatric evidence of his subaverage intellect two standard 
deviations below the norm.  The closest thing that we have is a test 
called the Slosson, S-l-o-s-s-o-n, test, which is not as good, not as 
suitable for classification of people as mentally retarded or not as a 
Wechsler or Stanford-Binet.   
Also, that test was given at age 13, when he was by all 
accounts, undergoing pretty savage abuse and neglect and probably 
questioning his paternity and who his mother and father were. 
 
  
. . . . 
 
Lack of diagnosis before 18, even though there was some 
evidence that he had been identified with the screening tests with an 
IQ of 70.  He is able to progress through school, despite having a very 
physically abusive and probably very confusing upbringing. 
(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court did not reject the expert witness testimony 
presented by Oats in this proceeding or find that any of that testimony was not 
credible.  Instead, the circuit court simply accepted Dr. McClaren’s position that, 
although the intelligence test given to Oats as a child produced an IQ score of 70, 
this test could not be relied upon to establish the manifestation of intellectual 
disability before age 18 because this test was “not as good . . . as a Wechsler or 
Stanford-Binet” and was not suitable by itself to diagnose a person as having an 
intellectual disability.   
Contrary to the circuit court’s decision, section 921.137 requires a showing 
only that an intellectual disability “manifested during the period from conception 
to age 18.”  § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  The term “manifest” means 
“[t]o show or demonstrate plainly.”  The American Heritage Dictionary 1067 (5th 
ed. 2011).  Accepting the position that “manifested” equates to “diagnosed” would 
 
 
- 27 - 
render the first two prongs of the statutory test for an intellectual disability moot, 
as the only way to find an intellectual disability would be if the diagnosis already 
existed by the age of 18.   
Moreover, this Court has never held that the defendant must have been given 
a specific IQ test prior to the age of 18 in order to find an intellectual disability.  
That inflexible view would not be supported by the United States Supreme Court’s 
recent enunciations in Hall and Brumfield.  See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2282 
(stating that this prong merely requires that a defendant demonstrate that his 
intellectual deficiencies manifested “before he reached adulthood”); Hall, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1994 (recognizing that, based on a consensus within the medical community, 
this prong simply requires the “onset of these deficits during the developmental 
period”).  As even Dr. McClaren himself recognized, the purpose of requiring the 
manifestation of an intellectual disability prior to age 18 is to distinguish an 
intellectual disability, which a person must have had as a child, from other 
conditions that may cause an individual’s intelligence and adaptive functioning to 
decline later in life, such as dementia.  In other words, a person cannot acquire an 
intellectual disability after childhood.   
It appears that Dr. McClaren’s view may have been impacted by a 
misreading of this Court’s prior opinion in Cherry.  Specifically, when Dr. 
McClaren was asked with more specificity as to why he did not find onset prior to 
 
 
- 28 - 
age 18, Dr. McClaren testified that while Oats was given a Slosson IQ screening 
test at age 13, this was not sufficient to establish onset prior to age 18 because he 
had to “tak[e] into consideration we have the Cherry decision that talks about 70 
means 70.”  He concluded that Oats had only a “70 on a test that is not appropriate 
for the use of diagnosis of mental retardation.”  Of course, our holding in Cherry 
did not address onset before age 18, and the inflexible “70 means 70” rule of 
Cherry has now been overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Hall.    
Accordingly, as a result of these legal errors, the circuit court incorrectly 
evaluated Oats’s claim under the wrong standard.  In fact, the evidence pertaining 
to the onset prior to age 18 prong is comparable to that in Hall, another case in 
which all of the parties previously recognized that the defendant suffered from 
intellectual disability—a premise that was challenged only after Atkins barred the 
execution of those with an intellectual disability.   
Specifically, in Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990-91, as it relates to the age of onset 
prong, the United States Supreme Court noted that Hall’s teachers identified Hall 
as being intellectually disabled on numerous occasions and that his siblings 
testified that there was “something ‘very wrong’ with [Hall] as a child” and he was 
“slow with speech and . . . slow to learn.”  Moreover, in a strikingly similar manner 
to this case, Hall bore the brunt of physical abuse within the family and his mother 
constantly beat him because Hall was slow and made simple mistakes.  Id. at 1991.  
 
 
- 29 - 
Based on that type of evidence, the Supreme Court noted that the age of onset 
factor was not even “at issue” in that case.  Id. at 1994.  See also Van Tran v. 
Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 613-14 (6th Cir. 2014) (remanding for a new evidentiary 
hearing because the state postconviction court erroneously relied on the absence of 
any test of intellectual functioning before the age of 18 and discounted the fact that 
the defendant’s childhood was marked by certain impairments during the 
developmental period, including his delay in reaching various milestones, because 
a multitude of factors could have caused those delays). 
Similarly, evidence presented in this case establishes that Oats was slow to 
reach important developmental milestones, and based on accounts from Oats’s 
siblings and teachers, Oats was very slow and constantly struggled to understand 
basic concepts and needed the type of one-on-one interaction that was available 
only in special education.  Further, like in Hall, Oats was subjected to abuse based 
on his lack of ability to understand requests from his foster parents.  
In its decision in Hall, the Supreme Court clarified that the appropriate 
definition to use in determining whether an intellectual disability exists is the 
definition that is used by skilled professionals in making this determination in all 
contexts, including those “far beyond the confines of the death penalty,” such as 
special education, medical treatment plans, and access to social programs.  134 S. 
Ct. at 1993.  Based on certain aspects of Dr. McClaren’s testimony, it is unclear 
 
 
- 30 - 
whether he employed a heightened standard because this is a capital case, as 
opposed to the standard that would normally apply to determine an intellectual 
disability in other contexts.  However, the record clearly shows that Dr. McClaren 
was influenced by his misreading of Cherry and imposed additional requirements 
not recognized by the DSM—requirements that have since been explicitly 
disapproved.  Thus, we direct the circuit court to permit the parties an opportunity 
for a new evidentiary hearing so that the parties may present additional evidence, 
including whether the experts’ opinions have changed from when they initially 
made their conclusions or have been otherwise affected by Hall, Brumfield, and 
other developments in the law.   
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court erred in determining 
that Oats failed to establish onset of his intellectual disability prior to the age of 18.  
The evidence presented to the circuit court in fact strongly leads to the conclusion 
that Oats established both his low IQ and onset of an intellectual disability prior to 
the age of 18.  However, because the circuit court did not analyze the remaining 
prongs, and because neither the circuit court nor the parties and their experts had 
the benefit of Hall, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, 
including providing the parties with an opportunity to present additional evidence 
 
 
- 31 - 
at an evidentiary hearing to enable a full reevaluation of whether Oats is 
intellectually disabled.  
It is so ordered. 
 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County,  
Hale Ralph Stancil, Judge - Case No. 421980CF000016AXXXXX 
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Martin 
J. McClain, Special Assistant, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern 
Region, and Michael Chance Meyer, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and James Donald 
Riecks, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee