Case Title: STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. COLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106299

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. COLE  STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. COLE 2009 OK 40 Case Number: 106299 Decided: 06/16/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. AL "YOGI" KELLY COLE; BANK OF AMERICA; and THE CHEROKEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants/Respondents. and STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. PAULA SISSOM and GRANVILLE ALVIN SISSOM, wife and husband; FRANK BOX and BUELLAH BOX, husband and wife; and the CHEROKEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants/Respondents. and STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. GRANVILLE ALVIN SISSOM and PAULA SISSOM, husband and wife; FRANK BOX and BUELLAH BOX, husband and wife; and the CHEROKEE COUNTY TREASURER, Defendants/Respondents. On Writs of Certiorari to Review Certified Interlocutory Orders of the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, The Honorable G. Bruce Sewell, Presiding ¶0 The Department of Transportation initiated condemnation proceedings against landowners/defendants in these three companion cases. The court clerk refused to file the defendants' initial demands for jury trials because the demands were unaccompanied by the jury fees. The landowners filed applications to withdraw funds "pending trial of the issues by jury" within title 69, section 1203's sixty-day time limit. More than sixty days after the commissioners' reports were filed, the landowners again filed demands for jury trials and paid the jury fee. The district court ruled that the applications to withdraw funds sufficed as demands for jury trials and were filed within the sixty-day time limit. The district court certified the interlocutory orders, and this Court granted certiorari. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. Jot Hartley, The Hartley Law Firm PLLC, Vinita, Oklahoma for appellant. Tim Baker, Tim K. Baker and Associates, Tahlequah, Oklahoma for the appellees. TAYLOR, V.C.J. ¶1 The first-impression issue presented to this Court on certiorari from the three interlocutory orders entered in condemnation proceedings is whether an application to withdraw funds which contains the phrase "pending trial on the issues by jury" constitutes a demand for a jury trial as required by title 69, section 1203 when the condemnor waits almost two years before filing a motion to strike the demand and only after the matter has been set on the jury sounding docket at least seven times and set for trial at least once. We answer yes. I. FACTS ¶2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts here are the same in all three of the above styled cases. On February 13, 2006, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) filed its petitions initiating condemnation proceedings against the defendant landowners in the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma. On March 30, 2006, the district court appointed the commissioners. On July 26, 2006, the commissioners filed reports assessing the just compensation for one property at $7,750.00, for the second at $5,000.00, and for the third at $8,900.00. ¶3 The defendants contend and the district court found that on August 21, 2006, the defendants' attorney tendered a Demand for Jury Trial in all three proceedings, which the court clerk refused to file "unless and until accompanied by a jury trial fee." There is no indication that the attorney left the demands with the court clerk or made any other attempt at filing the demands within sixty days after July 26, 2006, the date the commissioners' reports were filed.2 ¶4 On August 24, 2006, the defendants each filed an "Application to Withdraw Funds" in the amount of the commissioners' apprisal, "pending trial of the issues by jury. . . ." On September 27, 2006, the defendants each filed a "Demand for Jury Trial" and paid the jury fee in each proceeding. These demands were filed sixty-three days after the commissioners filed their reports. ¶5 Each case was set on the jury sounding docket at least seven times and set for trial at least once. After all three proceedings were set for jury trial, ODOT filed motions to strike each defendants' Demand for Jury Trial and to confirm the commissioners' reports. ODOT argued that the demands had not been filed within title 66, section 55's and title 69, section 1203's sixty-day statutory time limitations. The defendants responded arguing, among other things, (1) that, by tendering their demands for a jury trial on August 21, 2006, they were in substantial compliance with the sixty-day requirement for demanding a jury; (2) that the applications to withdraw funds "pending trial on the issues by jury" met the statutory demand for the jury trial requirement; and (3) that ODOT was estopped from raising the untimeliness of the demands for jury trial because it had participated in discovery and waited nearly two years before complaining. ¶6 The district court found that the sixty-day statutory time period for filing the demands for a jury trial began to run on July 26, 2006, and that the court clerk's refusal to file the demands for jury trial without the payment of the fee did not extend or waive the time period for filing the demands. It determined that the applications to withdraw funds "pending trial of the issues by jury" constituted demands for a jury trial and, having been filed within the sixty-day time period, complied with title 69, section 1203. The district court denied the motions to strike defendants' demand for a jury trial and certified the orders for immediate appeal pursuant to title 12, subsection 952(b)(3). This Court granted certiorari to review the three certified interlocutory orders. ¶7 On certiorari review, we are presented with a single issue: Whether the applications to withdraw funds, under the facts presented by the record in this Court, are properly construed as pleadings demanding jury trials under title 69, section 1203 of the Oklahoma Statutes. II. ANALYSIS ¶8 The Oklahoma Constitution affords a landowner the right to a jury trial on the issue of damages in a condemnation proceeding. Article 2, section 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution states: Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. . . . Such compensation shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. . . . Any party aggrieved shall have the right of appeal, without bond, and trial by jury in a court of record. . . . ¶9 This constitutional provision is a limitation on governmental power. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, ¶10 While the Oklahoma Constitution provides a landowner with the absolute right to a jury trial on the question of damages in a condemnation proceeding, it is the Oklahoma Legislature which determines the condemnation procedures for effectuating the right to a jury trial. See ¶11 Condemnation proceedings are initiated by one party filing a petition in the district court. ¶12 Either party may file an exception within thirty days after the commissioners' report is filed to have the court review it. ¶13 Both ODOT and the landowners cite State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Perdue, ¶14 ODOT argues the substance of the applications to withdraw funds "was to obtain monies on deposit with the court clerk and not to demand a trial by jury." Conversely, the landowners argue that all that is required for a demand for a jury trial is a written filing putting the opposing party on notice that a jury trial is being demanded. Because the applications to withdraw funds are not clearly denominated as a demand for a jury trial and their substance is not clearly a demand for a jury trial, we turn to other authority for guidance. ¶15 In 1984, the Oklahoma Legislature adopted the Oklahoma Pleading Code (1984 Code), which replaced the form pleading requirements. 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 588-628, ch. 164, §§ 1-34 (now codified at 12 O.S.2001, §§ 2001-2027). The 1984 Code governs district court procedures "in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity except where a statute specifies a different procedure." Subsection 2008(F) of the 1984 Code requires all pleadings to be "construed as to do substantial justice." Even though a special proceeding, condemnation remains civil in nature. Further, we find nothing in the condemnation statutes which is contrary to subsection 2008(F)'s rule. Just as the civil procedure rule that a pleading's meaning and effect will be determined by its substance was applicable to condemnation proceeding as addressed in Perdue, the civil procedure rule that pleadings will be construed to do substantial justice are applicable to condemnation proceedings. ¶16 The applications, although used as tools to withdraw the funds deposited by ODOT, also alerted ODOT that the landowners intended to have the issue of damages decided by a jury. The parties proceeded for almost two years as if a jury trial had been timely demanded. Given that ODOT waited almost two years after September 27, 2006, the date the jury fee was paid, to question whether the landowners had timely filed a demand for a jury trial; after the cases were set on the jury sounding docket seven times; and after they were set for trial, the trial court correctly construed the applications to withdraw funds in favor of the landowners and found they were pleadings demanding jury trials. Likewise in order to do substantial justice and under the rule that presumptions will favor the landowner, we find the applications for withdrawal of funds are properly construed as pleadings demanding jury trials. ¶17 Even though we find that the applications to withdraw funds should be construed as a demand for a jury trial in the present case, it is a risky path to rely on such a document as a pleading demanding a jury trial. The better practice in representation of landowners who wish to challenge the commissioners' assessment of damages in condemnation proceedings is to label the document as a "Demand for a Jury Trial" and to clearly state within the document that the party is demanding a jury trial. III. CONCLUSION ¶18 The substance of the applications to withdraw funds filed in each of these companion cases does not clearly demand a jury trial. Based on title 12, subsection 2008(F), the rule that the constitutional and statutory eminent domain provisions are to be construed in favor of the landowner, and the rule that presumptions in condemnation proceedings are to favor the landowner, we conclude that the applications to withdraw funds in these companion cases are properly construed as a pleading demanding a jury trial. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. EDMONDSON, C.J., TAYLOR, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, and REIF, JJ., concur. WINCHESTER, J., concurs specially. COLBERT, J., not participating. FOOT