Case Title: Herrmann v. Attorney General

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13361

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13361 
 
ROBERT HERRMANN & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & another2 
(and a consolidated case3). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 6, 2023. - May 16, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition, Political 
contributions.  Elections, Political contributions.  
Political Committee.  Moot Question.  Attorney General. 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 24, 2022. 
 
After consolidation, the cases were reported by Wendlandt, 
J. 
 
 
Lawrence Lessig (Thomas O. Bean also present) for David C. 
Baxter & others. 
Ronald A. Fein (Courtney M. Hostetler & John C. Bonifaz 
also present) for Robert Herrmann & others. 
Anne Sterman, Assistant Attorney General (Adam Hornstine, 
Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Attorney 
General & another. 
 
1 Lars Mikkelsen, Joshua Redstone, and Graeme Sephton. 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth. 
 
3 David C. Baxter & others  vs.  Attorney General & another. 
2 
 
Thaddeus A. Heuer, for Fiscal Alliance Foundation, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The plaintiffs seek review of the Attorney 
General's decision not to certify their initiative petition.4  
The plaintiffs' proposed law would have instituted limits on 
contributions to independent expenditure political action 
committees, more commonly known as "Super PACs."  The Attorney 
General determined that the proposed law conflicted with the 
right of free speech protected by the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights and that it therefore addressed an excluded subject 
under art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, which sets out the procedures for the popular 
initiative.  See art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 2.  In so 
ruling, the Attorney General determined that United States 
Supreme Court precedent precludes this type of limitation on 
campaign contributions under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and that the State constitutional right of 
free speech must extend at least as far as the cognate right 
under the Federal Constitution.  See 1A Auto, Inc. v. Director 
 
4 The single justice consolidated two complaints from two 
separate groups of plaintiffs.  Each plaintiff was one of the 
ten initial sponsors of the initiative petition.  As explained 
infra, the two plaintiff groups seek identical relief but under 
different theories for why the proposed law is constitutional. 
3 
 
of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 480 Mass. 423, 440 
(2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2613 (2019). 
 
After the plaintiffs brought these appeals challenging the 
denial, the Attorney General offered to agree to a stipulated 
order with the initiative proponents that would have allowed 
them to gather the initial round of voter signatures required by 
art. 48 during their appeals, despite the Attorney General's 
conclusion that the initiative addressed an excluded subject.  
See Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 485 (2014).  The 
proponents, however, refused to agree to such an order.  The 
Attorney General now contends that the appeals are moot, as the 
proponents did not gather the first round of signatures by the 
deadline required by art. 48. 
 
We conclude that the cases are moot.  When the petition was 
filed in June 2022, the proponents initiated a streamlined 
governmental process involving numerous State actors, including 
the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the 
General Court.  The petitioners' filing with the Attorney 
General was timely, as it was submitted "not later" than August 
2022, as required by art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74 of the Amendments.  By filing at that 
particular time, they established the particular assembling of 
the General Court, and thus the legislative session, into which 
they would have needed to introduce the petition:  the 2023 
4 
 
session.  It was not then within the control of the petitioners 
to stop and restart the process, as they contend.  They were 
required to meet the subsequent deadlines.  They did not, 
however, meet the December 2022 deadline to file additional 
signatures with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.  Thus, the 
cases are now moot. 
Because the cases are moot and raise constitutional 
questions, including Federal constitutional questions, we 
decline to consider the merits.  Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 
Mass. 780, 782 (1984).  As a general matter, we avoid resolving 
moot questions, unless they are important, likely to recur, and 
otherwise avoid review.  See Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 583 
(2022); Lockhart, supra at 783-784.  Whether this issue is 
likely to recur is a matter of speculation.  At this point, only 
the ten initial proponents have indicated their support for the 
initiative.  They gathered no additional signatures.  Thus, it 
is far from clear whether the proponents would, in a future 
year, collect sufficient signatures to make the question a live 
issue.  The question, albeit important, is also one of 
constitutional law.  We are particularly reluctant to decide 
constitutional questions in moot cases.  See Murrell, supra at 
584, quoting Lockhart, supra at 784.  Finally, the issue 
presented raises Federal as well as State constitutional issues, 
requiring us to review and decide Federal constitutional 
5 
 
questions best left to the Federal judiciary.  For all these 
reasons, we decline to address the merits in these moot cases.5 
 
Background.  According to campaign finance law, political 
action committees (PACs) that make expenditures that are 
uncoordinated with political candidates are known as 
"independent expenditure PACs" or "Super PACs."  See G. L. 
c. 55, § 18A (d).  In June 2022, proponents of a law that would 
limit individual contributions to independent expenditure PACs 
submitted an initiative petition to the Attorney General.  The 
Attorney General declined to certify the petition in September 
2022, as she determined that it was inconsistent with the right 
of free speech protected by the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and thus addressed an excluded subject under art. 48.  
She relied on Federal cases concluding that the First Amendment 
precluded such limitations.  In October 2022, the ten 
proponents, split between two groups of plaintiffs, filed 
complaints in the county court challenging the Attorney 
General's decision not to certify the petition.  The two groups 
seek identical relief but have different theories for why the 
proposed law is constitutional. 
The Attorney General indicated to the plaintiffs that they 
would need to submit additional signatures by December 2022, or 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Fiscal 
Alliance Foundation. 
6 
 
their appeals would become moot.  To that end, she offered to 
move for an order allowing the proponents to collect signatures 
in advance of a judicial ruling on her denial, but the 
proponents declined.6  Thus, they have not yet demonstrated 
support from voters beyond the ten initial signers of the 
petition.  They contend that, because they intend to have their 
petition considered by the Legislature in January 2024, not 
January 2023, they have until December 2023 to collect 
additional signatures. 
 
The plaintiffs seek judgments under G. L. c. 231A, § 1, 
declaring that they are not required to submit additional 
signatures until December 2023 and that the Attorney General 
erred in declining to certify the petition because the proposed 
initiative does not violate the First Amendment or art. 16 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  In November 2022, the 
defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that because the plaintiffs 
admitted that they would not gather the required signatures 
before December, their claims were (or would soon become) moot.  
A single justice granted the parties' joint motion to 
consolidate the cases and reserved and reported the cases to the 
 
6 Such orders are consistent with the long-standing practice 
of the Attorney General and this court.  See, e.g., Abdow, 468 
Mass. at 485; Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 593, 595-596 
(1983). 
7 
 
full court.  In the meantime, the proponents did not submit the 
required signatures by December 2022. 
Discussion.  1.  Article 48 time frame.  The first issue to 
be decided is the time frame for compliance with the initiative 
petition process.  Article 48 contains a series of interrelated 
and tightly defined time periods for different governmental 
actors to perform their respective functions regarding the 
proposed law, while simultaneously imposing on proponents 
requirements to gather an increasing number of signatures if 
they want these governmental actors -- and ultimately the voters 
-- to consider the initiative.  See Bogertman v. Attorney Gen., 
474 Mass. 607, 610-611 (2016) (describing process). 
At issue are three specific deadlines.  First, ten 
qualified voters may submit an initiative petition "to the 
[Attorney General] not later than the first Wednesday of the 
August before the assembling of the [G]eneral [C]ourt into which 
it is to be introduced."  Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74.  This deadline provides the Attorney General 
time to determine whether the initiative petition is valid, 
including whether it contains excluded matters, before the 
signature gathering process commences.  Second, "[a]ll 
initiative petitions . . . shall be filed with the [S]ecretary 
of the [C]ommonwealth not earlier than the first Wednesday of 
the September before the assembling of the [G]eneral [C]ourt 
8 
 
into which they are to be introduced."  Id.  After this filing, 
the proponents may begin gathering signatures from supporters.  
Then, third, "the remainder of the required signatures shall be 
filed not later than the first Wednesday of the following 
December."  Id.  By this point, the petition must have voter 
signatures totaling at least "three per cent of the entire vote 
cast for [G]overnor at the preceding biennial [S]tate election."  
Art. 48, The Initiative, V, § 1, as amended by art. 81 of the 
Amendments. 
After these three initial steps, the initiative is 
transmitted to the Legislature in the following year.  Art. 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 4.  The Legislature then has until May to 
take action itself: 
"If the [G]eneral [C]ourt fails to enact such law before 
the first Wednesday of May, and if such petition is 
completed by filing with the [S]ecretary of the 
[C]ommonwealth, not earlier than the first Wednesday of the 
following June nor later than the first Wednesday of the 
following July, a number of signatures of qualified voters 
equal in number to not less than one half of one per cent 
of the entire vote cast for [G]overnor at the preceding 
biennial [S]tate election, in addition to those signing 
such initiative petition, which signatures must have been 
obtained after the first Wednesday of May aforesaid, then 
the [S]ecretary of the [C]ommonwealth shall submit such 
proposed law to the people at the next [S]tate election." 
 
Art. 48, The Initiative, V, § 1, as amended by art. 81.  The 
Legislature may also pass a "legislative substitute" to appear 
on the ballot at the same time as the initiative, but may do so 
9 
 
after the May deadline.  See Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass. 
869, 877 (1976). 
The Attorney General interprets these provisions to create 
a continuous process of filing and signature gathering during a 
concentrated time period.  As the petition in these cases was 
filed with the Attorney General in June 2022, it must be filed 
no earlier than September 2022 with the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.  Then, the signatures necessary for legislative 
action must be filed no later than December 2022, with follow-up 
signatures for placement on the ballot by July 2023, even though 
the election would not take place until November 2024. 
By contrast, the proponents argue that the two-year 
election cycle provides them more choice and flexibility.  They 
contend that because they filed with the Attorney General by 
August 2022, either they can follow the process outlined above, 
or they can start the process and then choose to delay a year, 
either for strategic reasons or, as in these cases, to pursue an 
appeal from the Attorney General's denial of certification.  In 
this alternate timeline, if we dispose of these appeals in their 
favor, they would file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth by 
September 2023, gather the necessary signatures for legislative 
action by December 2023, and finally (if the Legislature does 
not pass the law by May 2024) gather follow-up signatures by 
July 2024 for the November election.  The proponents contend 
10 
 
that this more relaxed calendar would allow buffer time for 
judicial review of the Attorney General's certification 
decision, so that they would not have to collect signatures 
under a cloud of legal uncertainty.7 
"In interpreting any statutory or constitutional provision, 
including [art. 48], the starting point of our analysis is its 
plain language . . . ."  Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 
189, 191 (2006).  With regard to the mandatory deadlines in art. 
48, we have also said:  "It is not possible to treat these words 
of the amendment as precatory or merely directory.  They are an 
explicit command from the people."  Opinion of the Justices, 237 
Mass. 589, 590-591 (1921).  The key dispute between the parties 
is how to interpret the event to which the three interconnected 
deadlines are keyed:  the "assembling of the [G]eneral [C]ourt 
into which [the petition] is to be introduced," that is, the 
annual session in which the Legislature will consider the 
initiative.8  Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by 
art. 74.  Under the Attorney General's interpretation, this 
 
7 This rationale -- that "a contest over the validity of a 
proposed initiative has an adverse effect on efforts to obtain 
the necessary signatures" -- was not found persuasive in 
Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 782. 
 
8 See art. 64, § 2, of the Amendments, as amended by art. 82 
of the Amendments ("The general court shall assemble every year 
on the first Wednesday in January").  Thus, the "assembling of 
the [G]eneral [C]ourt" refers to an annual legislative session. 
11 
 
session must be the one immediately following the date that she 
receives the filing.  The proponents contend instead that they 
can choose the assembling in which they intend the Legislature 
to consider their petition after they file with the Attorney 
General, as long as they meet the August deadline in an even-
numbered year (thus allowing two possible opportunities for 
legislative consideration before the next election). 
We conclude that the Attorney General's interpretation is 
correct.  A close reading of the text establishes that art. 48 
creates a continuous, time-delimited process that occurs from 
the initial filing of the petition no later than the first 
Wednesday in August to the filing of the final round of 
signatures by no later than the first Wednesday in the following 
July.  See Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass. at 875 ("the 
deadline . . . was fixed to permit sufficient time for the 
taking of the additional steps to have the initiative measure 
appear on the ballot at the next State election").  Fixed time 
points in August, September, and December of the same year, and 
not different years, are identified, as well as the following 
May and July.   The timing provisions are tightly 
interconnected, identifying a series of actions involving 
different governmental actors that must occur within a 
relatively short period of time.  Within that concentrated 
period of time, the petition is evaluated for legality, 
12 
 
sufficient signatures are required to demonstrate significant 
support for the initiative to merit further consideration, and 
the Legislature is provided with the ability to weigh in with a 
substitute proposal.  The process thereby provides for a timely 
and efficient governmental review for proposals that demonstrate 
sufficient public support.  Stale or outdated interpretations of 
law by the Attorney General and unnecessary decisions by this 
court are thereby avoided.  A governmental process that 
petitioners can stop and start without demonstrating sufficient 
public support is inconsistent with this structure.  Cf. Unger 
v. Rosenblum, 362 Or. 210, 225 (2017) ("the tightly crafted, 
interconnected series of deadlines" in State initiative process 
suggests that proponents may not delay for "an indefinite amount 
of time"). 
Previously, we relied on the interconnected nature of the 
art. 48 timeline to determine the deadline for the Governor's 
approval or veto of an initiative passed by the Legislature.  
Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass. at 874.  We summarized the 
timing requirements, and then explained that 
"in order to give effect to these provisions, which set 
forth a timetable for taking the steps necessary to have a 
proposed law placed on the ballot, we conclude that all 
constitutional steps for passage of a law, including the 
Governor's approbation or legislative action after veto of 
the measure, must occur before the first Wednesday of May." 
 
13 
 
Id. at 875.  Article 48 thus creates a strict calendar that must 
be adhered to for a proposed law to make it to the ballot. 
Once the initial petition is filed, the clock begins to 
tick.  By filing in August of a particular year, initiative 
proponents are identifying the particular "assembling of the 
[G]eneral [C]ourt into which [the petition] is to be introduced" 
as the next one that will occur following the filing.  If the 
Attorney General denies their petition, they cannot then delay 
by claiming that they now intend to submit a petition into the 
"assembling" that will occur a year later. 
We recognize that when art. 48 was originally passed and 
the deadlines set out above were established, the Commonwealth 
had annual elections, making the deadlines straightforward and 
simpler to interpret.  See Opinion of the Justices, 291 Mass. 
578, 585 (1935) (art. 48 "was framed, approved and voted to be 
submitted to the people by the Constitutional Convention in 1917 
at a time when there were annual elections for the choice of 
members of the General Court.  Its words doubtless were adapted 
to that situation").  Today, this process occurs in the context 
of biennial elections.  Although the interpretation of art. 48 
is less obvious in this context, the article, read as a whole, 
creates a continuous, concentrated governmental process that 
commences with the initial filing.  Regardless of which year the 
petition is filed, the governmental process continues unabated.  
14 
 
What results is that proponents who file in an even-numbered 
year have a full year to campaign after they submit their final 
set of signatures, while proponents who file in an odd-numbered 
year (most of them, according to the Attorney General) go 
straight to the election.  The petitioners thereby control how 
long they have to campaign but not other aspects of the 
governmental process. 
2.  Constitutional questions.  Because the proponents did 
not submit any signatures to the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
by December 2022, these cases are moot.  See Lockhart, 390 Mass. 
782.  Although this court may decide important moot questions 
that are likely to recur and otherwise avoid review, we are 
particularly reluctant to resolve moot questions of 
constitutional law, especially ones raising Federal as well as 
State constitutional law.  As these moot cases raise such 
constitutional questions, we decline to address the merits. 
Despite mootness, "where the proceedings raise an issue 
that is of public importance, worthy of decision by an appellate 
court, and is capable of repetition yet evading review, a court 
may in its discretion choose to decide the case."  Harmon v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 471-472 (2021).  See 
Murrell, 489 Mass. at 583.  Here, however, it is far from clear 
that this issue is likely to recur.  The proponents have not 
demonstrated that they have the requisite support to satisfy the 
15 
 
different signature gathering obligations set out in art. 48 
necessary to make this an issue requiring judicial resolution.  
So far, they have only indicated that they themselves support 
the petition.  Thus, "it is not clear that the issues will arise 
again in the same form or in any form."  Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 
784. 
We have also emphasized that we are particularly reluctant 
to decide moot constitutional questions.  As this court 
explained in Lockhart, another case involving the Attorney 
General's declining to certify a petition and the failure of the 
petitioners to gather the necessary number of signatures, we 
have a "long tradition of not unnecessarily deciding 
constitutional questions."  Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 784.  See 
also Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. C.R., 484 Mass. 472, 488 (2020) 
("We do not . . . decide constitutional questions unnecessarily 
or prematurely").  When the case is moot, we exercise "'judicial 
restraint,' especially regarding purported constitutional 
claims."  Lockhart, supra, quoting Blake v. Massachusetts Parole 
Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 707 (1976). 
It is even more important for us to exercise such restraint 
when the moot question that we are asked to decide is one based 
on Federal constitutional law, as it is here.  See Breese v. 
Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1972) ("avoidance of the 
federal thicket is the better course"); Portland v. Jacobsky, 
16 
 
496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985) ("policy of judicial restraint 
impels us to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional 
questions").  While the question whether a proposed law bears on 
an excluded subject under art. 48 is by its terms a question of 
State constitutional law, see Associated Indus. of Mass. v. 
Attorney Gen., 418 Mass. 279, 284 (1994), in the instant cases, 
the question to be decided ultimately revolves around Federal 
constitutional law.  This is because we cannot provide less 
protection under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights for 
political contributions than that provided for such 
contributions under the First Amendment, and at least in regard 
to political contributions by corporations, we have stated:  "We 
see no reason to conclude that art. 16 or 19 gives corporations 
greater rights of political participation than they enjoy under 
the First Amendment."  1A Auto, Inc., 480 Mass. at 440.  
Recognizing the significant protections found so far by the 
Federal courts for political contributions, the Attorney General 
therefore turned to Federal constitutional law and the Federal 
courts for guidance on what was precluded by the Federal 
Constitution and thus art. 48 as well.  If we were to decide 
this now moot question, we would have to do the same, deciding 
unnecessarily a question best left to the Federal judiciary.  
17 
 
Exercising judicial restraint for the reasons explained supra, 
we decline to do so.9 
Conclusion.  Article 48 requires proponents to collect 
signatures in the months immediately following the proponents' 
filing of an initiative petition with the Attorney General.  
Because the plaintiffs in the instant cases did not follow this 
timeline, these cases are moot.  We also decline to exercise our 
discretion to resolve a moot issue, as this matter has not been 
demonstrated to be one of those rare issues that are likely to 
recur and yet avoid review.  Harmon, 487 Mass. at 471-472.  
Finally and importantly, this court exercises judicial restraint 
and does not unnecessarily resolve State and Federal 
constitutional questions in a moot case.  For all of the reasons 
stated supra, these cases are dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
9 We also note that if, in the future, we are required to 
revisit whether limitations on contributions to independent 
expenditure PACs conflict with the Federal right to free speech, 
the United States Supreme Court itself may, by that time, have 
ruled on the exact issue presented.