Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mark Alan Ruppelt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000089-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP89-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mark Alan Ruppelt, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RUPPELT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 15, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Terry 
E. 
Johnson 
and 
Peterson, 
Johnson 
& 
Murray, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Paul W. Schwarzenbart and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison, 
and oral argument by Paul W. Schwarzenbart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 80
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP89-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Mark Alan Ruppelt, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This disciplinary matter comes to the 
court 
on 
Attorney 
Ruppelt's 
appeal 
of 
a 
report 
and 
recommendation of Referee James J. Winiarski.  The referee based 
his report on a stipulation between Attorney Ruppelt and the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), in which Attorney Ruppelt 
admitted 16 counts of misconduct and agreed that his Wisconsin 
law license should be suspended for one year.  In his report, 
the referee recommended a slightly longer suspension than what 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
2 
 
the parties had agreed upon:  a 15-month suspension, rather than 
the parties' stipulated one-year suspension.  Through his 
appeal, Attorney Ruppelt challenges the referee's 15-month 
suspension; 
he 
argues 
that 
it 
is 
excessive 
under 
our 
disciplinary case law, whereas the parties' stipulated one-year 
suspension is the appropriate length.  Attorney Ruppelt also 
criticizes 
certain 
characterizations 
and 
findings 
by 
the 
referee, and proposes that this court should adopt a policy by 
which the court would give deference to parties' disciplinary 
stipulations.   
¶2 
When we review a referee's report and recommendation 
in an attorney disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 
126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the 
appropriate level of discipline to impose given the particular 
facts of each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, 
but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶3 
After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 
Ruppelt's appeal, we accept the referee's factual findings and 
legal conclusions based on the parties' stipulation.  We agree 
with the referee's recommendation that a 15-month suspension is 
appropriate, 
despite 
Attorney 
Ruppelt's 
arguments 
to 
the 
contrary. 
 
We 
also 
reject 
Attorney 
Ruppelt's 
remaining 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
3 
 
arguments.  Finally, we remand this matter to the referee for 
supplemental proceedings on the issue of restitution. 
¶4 
The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with 
the filing of a five-count complaint, which it later amended in 
an 18-count complaint seeking a 15-month suspension.  Attorney 
Ruppelt filed an answer in which he denied any professional 
misconduct.  During the pre-hearing phase of this proceeding, 
the OLR dismissed two counts (Counts 15 and 16) due to 
evidentiary problems, leaving 16 counts to be resolved. 
¶5 
Shortly before the scheduled hearing in this matter, 
Attorney Ruppelt entered into a stipulation in which he admitted 
the remaining 16 counts of misconduct.  Attorney Ruppelt and the 
OLR agreed to a one-year suspension.   
¶6 
The referee's report accepted the parties' stipulation 
and determined that the stipulated facts supported legal 
conclusions that Attorney Ruppelt had engaged in the remaining 
16 counts of professional misconduct.  The referee's factual 
findings and conclusions of law are described in the following 
paragraphs. 
¶7 
Attorney Ruppelt was admitted to the practice of law 
in this state in May 1994.  He currently practices law in 
Milwaukee. 
 
Attorney 
Ruppelt 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
professional discipline on one previous occasion:  in 2014, this 
court publicly reprimanded him for engaging in improper sexual 
relations with a client and providing false information to his 
employer and the OLR regarding the nature and timing of his 
relationship 
with 
the 
client. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
4 
 
Proceedings Against Ruppelt, 2014 WI 53, 354 Wis. 2d 738, 850 
N.W.2d 1. 
¶8 
In the instant case, Attorney Ruppelt's actions fall 
into two broad categories of misconduct, both of which involve 
the same client, S.J.  The first category of misconduct concerns 
Attorney Ruppelt's conversion of $50,000 of trust account funds 
to his own use, though he later repaid that amount.  The second 
category of misconduct generally concerns Attorney Ruppelt's 
additional trust fund improprieties; his dishonest billing 
practices; his efforts to conceal his misconduct from opposing 
counsel, the circuit court, and the OLR; and his failure to 
reasonably consult with S.J.   
Misuse of $50,000 (Counts 1-5) 
¶9 
Attorney Ruppelt practiced law as a shareholder in a 
small law firm with one other shareholder.   
¶10 In approximately July 2006, S.J. hired the firm to 
represent 
him 
in 
a 
criminal 
matter 
involving 
a 
former 
girlfriend.  About two years later, the firm began representing 
S.J. in a related civil action brought by his former girlfriend.  
Attorney Ruppelt was counsel of record for S.J. in both the 
criminal and civil cases.  S.J.'s former girlfriend retained a 
lawyer to represent her in the civil action.   
¶11 Between 
August 
2006 
and 
June 
2008, 
at 
least 
$170,332.55 of S.J.'s funds were deposited into the firm's trust 
account, most of which, as directed by Attorney Ruppelt, were 
applied to pay the firm for fees and expenses for the 
representation of S.J. in his criminal and civil cases.   
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
5 
 
¶12 In approximately May 2007, Attorney Ruppelt needed 
money in connection with his and his then-wife's purchase of a 
home.  Attorney Ruppelt and the firm's other shareholder agreed 
that the firm would loan $50,000 to Attorney Ruppelt for that 
purpose.  Attorney Ruppelt directed the firm's office manager to 
disburse $50,000 from the firm's trust account to the firm; to 
attribute that payment to the S.J. matter; and to then disburse 
that $50,000 to him.  About three months later, Attorney Ruppelt 
directed the office manager to deposit $50,000 of his own 
personal funds to the firm's trust account.  During the course 
of the OLR investigation, Attorney Ruppelt provided testimony 
under oath that the $50,000 trust account disbursement was for 
legal fees earned by the firm in S.J.'s criminal and civil 
cases.  This testimony was untrue.   
¶13 The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that 
Attorney 
Ruppelt's 
actions 
described 
above 
constituted 
a 
violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)1 (Count 1); SCR 20:8.4(c)2 (Counts 
                                                 
1 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. 
Ct. Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provided:  
 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of client 
and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
6 
 
2 and 4); SCR 20:1.15(b)(3)3 (Count 3); and SCR 22:03(6),4 
enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h)5 (Count 5).  
Other conduct (Counts 6-14, 17-18)6 
¶14 As noted above, the remaining misconduct counts 
concern Attorney Ruppelt's additional trust fund improprieties; 
his dishonest billing practices; his efforts to conceal his 
misconduct from opposing counsel, the circuit court, and the 
OLR; and his failure to reasonably consult with S.J.  The 
referee made the following findings and conclusions regarding 
these counts. 
                                                                                                                                                             
connection with a representation shall be deposited in 
one or more identifiable trust accounts.   
2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation."  
3 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provided:  "No funds belonging to 
a lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay 
monthly account service charges, may be deposited or retained in 
a trust account." 
4 SCR 
22:03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's willful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions   fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
5 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.00l(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
6 As stated above, the parties stipulated to the dismissal 
of Counts 15 and 16 due to insufficient evidence.  
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
7 
 
¶15 Between January 2007 and July 2008, Attorney Ruppelt 
caused the firm to disburse as much as $104,644.68 of S.J.'s 
funds held as advanced fees in the firm's trust account in 
excess of the amounts that had been earned by the firm on S.J.'s 
cases.  The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that 
this conduct constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)7 and 
SCR 20:8.4(c) (Counts 6 and 7).   
¶16 Between August 2006 and July 2008, Attorney Ruppelt 
also caused the firm to disburse as much as $134,446.88 in fees 
from S.J.'s funds in trust, without providing S.J. with written 
notice of the disbursements at least five business days before 
making them, and without identifying the balance of S.J.'s funds 
in trust following the withdrawal of those fees.  The parties 
stipulated, 
and 
the 
referee 
agreed, 
that 
this 
conduct 
constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.15(g)(1)8 (Count 8). 
                                                 
7 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provided: 
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
8 Former SCR 20:1.15(g)(1) provided: 
At least 5 business days before the date on which 
a disbursement is made from a trust account for the 
purpose 
of 
paying 
fees, 
with 
the 
exception 
of 
contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to court order, 
the lawyer shall transmit to the client in writing all 
of the following:   
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
8 
 
¶17 In 2008, Attorney Ruppelt used a general durable power 
of attorney from S.J. to liquidate S.J.'s life insurance policy 
without consulting with S.J.  Attorney Ruppelt then deposited an 
$18,779.51 check payable from the life insurance company to S.J. 
in the firm's trust account, endorsing the check using S.J.'s 
power of attorney.  The deposit of funds from the insurance 
company does not appear in S.J.'s client ledger.  The parties 
stipulated, 
and 
the 
referee 
agreed, 
that 
this 
conduct 
constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)9 (Count 9). 
¶18 Both 
before 
and 
after 
Attorney 
Ruppelt's 
representation of S.J. ended, S.J. sent several letters to 
Attorney Ruppelt stating that he did not know how much of his 
money remained in the trust account.  Attorney Ruppelt failed to 
provide S.J. with a full accounting for the funds received in 
trust either during or after the representation.  The parties 
stipulated, and the referee agreed, that by failing to provide 
S.J. with a full, written accounting for his funds at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
a. an itemized bill or other accounting showing 
the services rendered;  
b. notice of the amount owed and the anticipated 
date of the withdrawal; and  
c. a statement of the balance of the client's 
funds 
in 
the 
lawyer 
trust 
account 
after 
the 
withdrawal.  
9 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides: "A lawyer shall reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished." 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
9 
 
termination of the representation, Attorney Ruppelt violated SCR 
20:1.15(d)(2)10 (Count 10). 
¶19 In the civil action brought by S.J.'s girlfriend 
against S.J., Attorney Ruppelt produced in discovery, pursuant 
to a circuit court order, twelve invoices dated between February 
of 2007 and October of 2009, when those bills were either 
altered in June of 2010 or not generated until June of 2010.  
The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that this 
conduct constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count 11).   
¶20 Also in the civil action brought by S.J.'s girlfriend 
against S.J., Attorney Ruppelt filed an affidavit stating that 
"No funds have been expended for any reason other than the 
criminal defense of [S.J.]."  This statement was untrue given 
that $50,000 of S.J.'s funds had been temporarily used to assist 
Attorney Ruppelt in the purchase of a new home, and Attorney 
Ruppelt had repeatedly withdrawn funds from the trust before 
they had been earned.  The parties stipulated, and the referee 
agreed, 
that 
this 
conduct 
constituted 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(l)11 (Count 12). 
                                                 
10 Former 
SCR 
20:15(d)(2) 
provided: 
 
"Upon 
final 
distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client 
or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, the 
lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding 
the property."   
11 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
10 
 
¶21 Also in the civil action brought by S.J.'s girlfriend 
against S.J., Attorney Ruppelt failed to respond to discovery 
requests for retainer contracts, billing statements, and S.J.'s 
trust account ledger, necessitating two court orders to compel 
discovery.  Attorney Ruppelt ultimately produced a retainer 
agreement, which was dated July 9, 2006, but had actually been 
signed by S.J. in early July 2010.  Attorney Ruppelt also 
produced a trust account ledger that omitted the $50,000 
disbursed to Attorney Ruppelt in connection with his purchase of 
a new home, his replacement of that $50,000 several months 
later, and his deposit of the proceeds of S.J.'s life insurance 
policy.  The parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, that 
this conduct constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and 
SCR 20:3.4(d)12 (Counts 13 and 14). 
¶22 During the course of his legal work for S.J., Attorney 
Ruppelt charged S.J. $395 per hour for work performed by an 
associate, whose hourly rate was then $200, as well as for work 
performed by his legal assistant.  The parties stipulated, and 
the referee agreed, that this conduct constituted a violation of 
SCR 20:1.5(a)13 (Count 17). 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:3.4(d) provides:  "A lawyer shall not in pretrial 
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 
discovery request by an opposing party." 
13 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:   
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
11 
 
¶23 During the course of the OLR investigation, Attorney 
Ruppelt represented to the OLR that he had provided S.J. with 
billing statements showing the work performed by the firm, when 
this was not in fact true.  Attorney Ruppelt also falsely 
represented to the OLR he had provided an accurate trust account 
ledger both to opposing counsel in S.J.'s civil matter and to 
S.J. at the termination of representation.  The parties 
stipulated, 
and 
the 
referee 
agreed, 
that 
this 
conduct 
constituted a violation of SCR 22:03(6), enforceable via SCR 
20:8.4(h) (Count 18). 
                                                                                                                                                             
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;   
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;   
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;   
(6) the nature and length of the  professional 
relationship with the client;   
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and   
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.   
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
12 
 
¶24 In his report, the referee recommended that the court 
suspend Attorney Ruppelt's license for 15 months, as opposed to 
the one year to which the parties had stipulated.  In making 
this 
recommendation, 
the 
referee 
considered 
a 
number 
of 
aggravating factors.  Among other things, the referee found that 
Attorney Ruppelt deliberately and repeatedly failed to follow 
trust account rules, apparently believing that he would never 
get caught; that he took advantage of a vulnerable client; and 
that he engaged in a variety of misleading and deceptive 
behaviors in an attempt to conceal his misconduct.   
¶25 The referee recommended that Attorney Ruppelt should 
be required to pay the full costs of this proceeding.  The OLR's 
statement of costs discloses that as of April 28, 2017, the 
costs of this proceeding were $16,743.46. 
¶26 The referee did not recommend restitution, nor did the 
OLR request it, explaining that there were no reasonably 
ascertainable restitution amounts. 
¶27 We now turn to the merits of Attorney Ruppelt's 
appeal.  Attorney Ruppelt argues that the referee's recommended 
15-month suspension is excessive.  He argues that analogous 
disciplinary cases best support the parties' stipulated one-year 
suspension——not the referee's recommended 15-month suspension.  
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Biester, 2013 
WI 85, 350 Wis. 2d 707, 838 N.W.2d 79 (one-year suspension for 
30 counts of misconduct in six client matters; misconduct 
included misuse of client funds, trust account violations, and 
neglect of client matters); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
13 
 
Against Raneda, 2012 WI 42, 340 Wis. 2d 273, 811 N.W.2d 412 
(one-year suspension for 14 counts of misconduct in two client 
matters; misconduct included trust account violations, lack of 
candor toward a tribunal, and neglect of client matters). 
¶28 Attorney Ruppelt further argues that this court should 
adopt a policy of awarding deference to parties' disciplinary 
stipulations.  Attorney Ruppelt reasons that the parties know 
more about their case, the strength of the evidence, and the 
implications that evidence would have for discipline than the 
referee or this court.  Attorney Ruppelt also stresses that 
respondent lawyers in disciplinary proceedings would greatly 
benefit from having some certainty that this court will approve 
reasonable disciplinary stipulations entered into with the OLR. 
¶29 Attorney Ruppelt also complains that the referee's 15-
month suspension is erroneously based on supposition and 
conjecture.  He claims that certain of the referee's factual 
findings about Ruppelt's conduct were not expressly included 
within the parties' stipulation and thus were not an appropriate 
basis for increased discipline.  In particular, Attorney Ruppelt 
takes issue with the referee's statements that his conduct was 
premeditated and well planned; that he appeared to believe his 
misconduct would never be detected; that he apparently felt that 
S.J. was desperate and vulnerable; that he would never have 
taken these liberties with a corporate or government client; and 
that the referee had to assume that the parties' stipulation 
captured all of the improper disbursements from S.J.'s funds in 
trust.   
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
14 
 
¶30 We disagree with Attorney Ruppelt's arguments.  To 
begin with, we agree with the referee that Attorney Ruppelt's 
actions merit a 15-month suspension, as opposed to the one-year 
suspension called for in the parties' stipulation.  Although 
this court often imposes the disciplinary sanctions that parties 
jointly request, we are free to reject such agreements as 
circumstances 
require. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Schreier, 2013 WI 35, 347 Wis. 2d 92, 829 
N.W.2d 744 (rejecting the referee's recommendation, which was 
based upon the parties' stipulation, for a two-year suspension 
with no conditions for reinstatement, and instead imposing a 30–
month suspension with conditions for reinstatement).  This 
discretion flows from the fact that in lawyer disciplinary 
cases, this court is obligated to act as a protector of the 
public, the court system, and the integrity of the bar——not as a 
scribe charged with formalizing the parties' mutual wishes.  
Although this court fully appreciates the efficiency attained 
through stipulations, we will not allow the goal of efficiency 
to take precedence over the necessity of effecting the core 
functions of the lawyer disciplinary system.  Sometimes, then, a 
departure from a joint stipulation is necessary. 
¶31 This is one of those cases.  We agree with the referee 
that the parties' stipulated one-year suspension does not 
adequately take into account the duration and severity of 
Attorney Ruppelt's misconduct.  We note in particular the 
referee's observations that Attorney Ruppelt deliberately and 
repeatedly "ignore[d] all trust rules and used trust funds as 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
15 
 
though they were his own"; that he displayed a willingness to 
cover-up his misconduct and deceive those who inquired about it; 
that his liquidation of S.J.'s life insurance policy without 
S.J.'s knowledge or consent was "most disturbing"; and that he 
exhibited "a total lack of professionalism and the moral 
character required of a licensed attorney."  On these facts, 
which we deem justified by the record, our cases readily support 
the 15-month suspension called for by the referee.  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Edgar, 230 Wis. 2d 205, 
601 N.W.2d 284 (1999) (two-year suspension for conversion of 
$11,000 from escrow account, misrepresentations, and trust 
account violations).   
¶32 We acknowledge here, as we have in the past, that "the 
imposition of discipline in attorney disciplinary cases is not 
an exact science."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Siderits, 2013 WI 2, ¶33, 345 Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812.  This 
case certainly proves the point.  To define with precision the 
boundary between conduct that merits a one-year suspension, as 
the parties requested, versus conduct that merits a 15-month 
suspension, as we deem appropriate, is virtually impossible; 
both terms are of significant length, both terms will greatly 
impact the respondent lawyer's practice, and both terms will 
require the respondent lawyer to successfully complete the 
formal reinstatement procedure set forth in SCRs 22.29 through 
22.33.   
¶33 On these particularly troubling facts, however, we are 
confident that a fifteen-month suspension is needed to impress 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
16 
 
upon Attorney Ruppelt and other lawyers in this state the 
seriousness of the professional misconduct at issue here, and to 
protect the public from similar misconduct in the future.   
¶34 We 
reject 
the 
remainder 
of 
Attorney 
Ruppelt's 
arguments.  As foreshadowed by the above discussion, we will not 
adopt, through case law, a policy by which the court will defer 
to parties' disciplinary stipulations, as Attorney Ruppelt 
requests.  Due to our overarching duty to protect the public and 
the bar, we must remain the ultimate arbiter of the appropriate 
level of discipline, owing no deference on this subject to 
either the parties or the referee.  To be sure, parties' and 
referees' 
opinions 
on 
disciplinary 
sanctions 
are 
highly 
informative, but they are just that——opinions, not authorities 
to which we must defer.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Roitburd, 2016 WI 12, ¶20, 368 Wis. 2d 595, 882 
N.W.2d 317 
(stating 
that 
"it 
is 
ultimately 
this 
court's 
responsibility" 
to 
determine 
appropriate 
disciplinary 
sanctions). 
¶35 Neither do we agree with Attorney Ruppelt's argument 
that a referee may not make any factual findings outside of the 
facts expressly included within the parties' stipulation.  As a 
factfinder, the referee may draw any reasonable inferences from 
the evidence introduced——here, the stipulated facts——just as a 
circuit court may do when operating as a factfinder.  See 
SCR 22.16 (providing that a referee has the powers of a judge 
trying a civil action); see also Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls 
Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 250, 274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979) (when the 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
17 
 
trial judge acts as the finder of fact, it is within the trial 
judge's authority to draw reasonable inferences from the 
credible evidence).   
¶36 It can be no other way.  To illustrate the point, 
consider 
the 
number 
of 
factors 
relevant 
to 
disciplinary 
recommendations that referees must frequently infer.  See 
generally American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22 (including, as potential aggravating 
factors to consider in evaluating discipline, the respondent 
lawyer's dishonest or selfish motive, bad faith obstruction of 
the disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge wrongful 
nature of conduct, and indifference to restitution).  It would 
be an unusual lawyer indeed who would explicitly stipulate to 
any of these behaviors or attitudes.  Simply put, some facts are 
inferential rather than empirical, and referees, like circuit 
courts, are empowered to infer them.  We therefore reject 
Attorney Ruppelt's argument. 
¶37 We turn next to the issue of costs. Our general 
practice is to impose full costs on attorneys who are found to 
have committed misconduct.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  Attorney Ruppelt 
has not claimed that there are reasons to depart from that 
practice in this matter, and we have not found any reason to do 
so.  We therefore impose full costs.  
¶38 Finally, we turn to the issue of restitution.  In 
response to a concern expressed by the referee in reviewing the 
parties' stipulation, the parties informed the referee that no 
restitution 
was 
due 
because 
there 
was 
no 
reasonably 
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
18 
 
ascertainable restitution amount.  The referee deferred to this 
view, though he expressed concern in his report that the 
parties' stipulation was "unclear" on "whether [Attorney] 
Ruppelt ultimately accounted to his client for his time and all 
funds taken by [Attorney] Ruppelt out of the trust account," and 
shed no light on "whether the client was satisfied with any 
accounting that was rendered or . . . with the overall fees 
charged." 
¶39 We share the referee's concerns.  On this record, it 
seems that the amount of restitution owed, if any, is not so 
much unknowable as it is simply unknown.  Attorney Ruppelt has 
stipulated that he prematurely disbursed $104,644.68 of S.J.'s 
advanced fees, and that he overstated the hourly rate of his 
associate and his legal assistant for the time they billed to 
S.J.'s cases.  Based on statements made to the referee, it 
appears to be Attorney Ruppelt's position that, despite these 
billing improprieties, his firm ultimately provided sufficient 
legal services to justify all collected fees.  Whether this 
proposition is true or not is a determinable fact, to be 
determined based on more than Attorney Ruppelt's mere say-so. 
¶40 We are not, however, a fact-finding court.  We 
therefore remand this matter to the referee for further 
proceedings on the issue of restitution.  The referee is to file  
a supplemental report on this issue within 120 days.   
¶41 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Mark Alan Ruppelt to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of fifteen 
months, effective August 18, 2017.   
No. 
2015AP89-D   
 
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¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Alan Ruppelt shall 
comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties 
of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Mark Alan Ruppelt shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$16,743.46 as of April 28, 2017. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 120 days of the date 
of this order, the referee shall file a supplemental report on 
the issue of restitution, which shall include a recommendation 
on how the costs of the referee's supplemental review should be 
paid. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
No.  2015AP89-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
per curiam opinion.  I write about deferring to parties' 
stipulations.   
¶47 Attorney 
Ruppelt 
proposes 
that 
the 
court 
give 
deference to parties' disciplinary stipulations.  I disagree 
with his proposal.         
¶48 I wholeheartedly agree with the per curiam opinion 
stating that the court will not act as a "scribe charged with 
formalizing the parties' mutual wishes" and that the court will 
not give deference to the parties' stipulations:   
Although this court fully appreciates the efficiency 
attained through stipulations, we will not allow the 
goal of efficiency to take precedence over the 
necessity of effecting the core functions of the 
lawyer discipline system [namely to protect the 
public, the court system, and the integrity of the 
bar].  
. . . . 
Due to our overarching duty to protect the public and 
the bar, we must remain the ultimate arbiter of the 
appropriate level of discipline, owing no deference on 
this subject to either the parties or the referee.   
Per curiam op., ¶¶30, 35.     
¶49 That said, when the per curiam opinion refers to 
departure from a joint stipulation when "necessary," per curiam 
op., ¶30, it means when a departure from a joint stipulation 
would help protect the public, the court system and the 
integrity of the bar.   
¶50 For the reason set forth, I write separately.    
 
No.  2015AP89-D.ssa 
 
 
 
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