Case Title: State v. Ruffing

Citation: 105 N.W.2d 541

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1960-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
105 N.W.2d 541 (1960) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph John RUFFING, Defendant and Appellant. No. 9838. Supreme Court of South Dakota. October 21, 1960. Dudley R. Herman, Gregory, for defendant and appellant. Parnell J. Donohue, Atty. Gen., Charles Poches, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent. HANSON, Judge. Joseph John Ruffing was charged with and tried for the crime of second degree rape in the Circuit Court of Gregory County. He was found guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to *542 commit rape upon which verdict he was sentenced to five years in the State Penitentiary. Sentence was imposed and judgment entered on December 18, 1958. Later the same day the State's Attorney filed a supplemental information alleging that defendant had previously been convicted of the following felonies: Escape, Obtaining Money Under False Pretenses, and Grand Larceny. Upon his plea of guilty defendant's sentence was increased to ten years and the previous five-year sentence vacated. He appeals. Defendant's principal contention is that he was not fully and properly advised of his rights in the supplemental proceedings in which his sentence was enhanced. Our habitual criminal statute does not create a new or separate offense. It merely authorizes enhanced penalties for habitual offenders in the discretion of the trial court. Proceedings thereunder are prescribed by Subsection 3 of SDC 13.0611 as follows: At his trial defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel, William C. Grady. Such counsel, however, did not appear or represent defendant at the supplemental arraignment. The record of such arraignment shows the following proceedings: Thereafter the court questioned defendant about the alleged prior convictions. Defendant readily admitted the same and that he was the same person as charged in such information with reference to each prior crime. Thereupon the court informed defendant the five-year sentence was vacated and he would be subject to the ten-year sentence. Such action is reflected in the subsequent judgment entered by the court. Manifestly the provisions of our habitual criminal statute were not followed. Before defendant's sentence was enhanced he was not informed "of the allegations contained in such information" or "of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law" and he was not requested to say whether he was "the same person as charged in such information or not." However, compliance with such statutory requirements may be waived, either expressly or by implication. People v. Gowasky, 244 N.Y. 451, 155 N.E. 737, 58 A.L.R. 9. *544 In the absence of a waiver it is the mandatory duty of the trial judge to inform an accused, without counsel, of his rights under our statute. State v. Hillerud, 76 S.D. 476, 81 N.W.2d 130. The defendant in the present case was 31 years of age and no stranger to criminal procedures. He was afforded an opportunity to, and did, confer with counsel. In the presence of such counsel he voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information and readily admitted all of the alleged prior convictions. No objections were made and no legal cause shown by defendant or his counsel why the former judgment should not have been vacated and sentence enhanced. Under the circumstances strict compliance with the requirements of our habitual criminal statute were waived. The other two assignments of error relate to exclusionary rulings of the trial court during defendant's cross-examination of the prosecutrix and the Sheriff of Gregory County. The scope and extent of cross-examination rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. State v. Rasmusson, 72 S.D. 400, 34 N.W.2d 923. In our opinion the record does not show an abuse of discretion in this regard. Affirmed. All the Judges concur.