Case Title: Glen D. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville

Citation: 2009 WI 70

Docket Number: 2007AP001754

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1754 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Glen D. Hocking and Louann Hocking, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
City of Dodgeville, Laurence E. Schmit, Wallace 
Rogers, Shaun Sersch, Wendy Sersch and 
Germantown Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendants, 
Charles C. O'Rourke, Joan R. O'Rourke, American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company and Amy 
Crubaugh-Shrank, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 15, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Iowa   
 
JUDGE: 
Edward E. Leineweber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) and a reply brief filed by Sheila S. Kelley, 
Matthew Allen, Tyler T. Kieler, Christopher D. Stombaugh, and 
Kopp, McKichan, Geyer, Skemp & Stombaugh, LLP, Platteville, and 
oral argument by Christopher D. Stombaugh. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Charles C. O’Rourke, Joan 
R. O’Rourke, and American Family Mutual Insurance Company, there 
was a brief by Patricia J. Epstein, Amy B.F. Tutwiler, and Bell, 
Geirhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Amy B.F. 
Tutwiler and Patricia J. Epstein. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Amy Crubaugh-Schrank, there 
was a brief (in the court of appeals) by Rick J. Mundt and 
 
 
2 
Winner, Wixson & Pernitz, Madison, and oral argument by Rick J. 
Mundt. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carl A. Sinderbrand, 
Timothy M. Barber, and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Builders Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul G. Kent and 
Anderson & Kent, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
REALTORS® Association. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1754  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV120) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Glen D. Hocking and Louann Hocking, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Dodgeville, Laurence E. Schmit, Wallace 
Rogers, Shaun Sersch, Wendy Sersch and 
Germantown Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Charles C. O'Rourke, Joan R. O'Rourke, American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company and Amy 
Crubaugh-Schrank, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Iowa County, 
Edward E. Leineweber, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2007-08).1  Glen and Louann Hocking 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
2 
 
(hereinafter, "the Hockings") brought an action against the City 
of Dodgeville and a number of individuals for negligence, 
unlawful taking, and creating and maintaining a nuisance.  
Relevant 
to 
this 
appeal 
is 
the 
allegation 
of 
negligent 
maintenance of a nuisance against defendants Charles and Joan 
O'Rourke and Amy Crubaugh-Schrank (collectively hereinafter "the 
defendants").2  The circuit court concluded that no liability 
could arise because these defendants did not owe a duty to the 
Hockings under these circumstances.  The Hockings appealed, and 
the court of appeals certified this case to the supreme court, 
which we accepted.  
¶2 
The issue presented to us for review is whether the 
defendants in this case, who are or were uphill landowners from 
the Hockings, are liable to the Hockings for damages allegedly 
caused by surface water, i.e., storm water, running from the 
defendants' property to the Hockings' property.  We conclude 
that 
the 
defendants 
are 
not 
liable 
because, 
under 
the 
circumstances, the defendants have no duty to abate the alleged 
nuisance. 
                                                 
2 A separate appeal with respect to the City of Dodgeville 
is pending.  The circuit court dismissed all claims against the 
City of Dodgeville, the developer, and the survey engineer 
because it concluded that those claims were barred by the 
statutes of repose, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 893.89 and 893.37, 
given the suit was filed at least ten years after substantial 
completion of the development.  The Hockings did not appeal the 
circuit court's dismissal against Shaun and Wendy Sersch. 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
3 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The Hockings purchased their home in 1978, and at that 
time there were no neighbors nearby.  In 1989, Wallace Rogers 
purchased the land adjacent to the Hockings.  Rogers hired 
Laurence Schmit, a professional engineer, to develop the 
property as a residential subdivision.  In 1991, the land 
surrounding the Hockings' home, which would include the land 
uphill from the Hockings, and the streets around the Hockings' 
property, were developed by Rogers.  As a result of Rogers' 
development, the Hockings' property is now at the bottom of a 
bowl.  Prior to Rogers' development, the Hockings never had 
water leakage into their basement, but since this development 
the Hockings have had significant water problems.  The increased 
water flow allegedly has caused problems with the Hockings' 
foundation and led to mold.  Due to these problems, the Hockings 
have had to move out of their home. 
¶4 
A civil engineer consultant, Greg Stauder, inspected 
the Hockings' property and concluded that the increased storm 
water runoff flowing over the Hockings' property was due to the 
way in which Rogers developed the land.  Because of Rogers' 
development, the grading around the property has been altered 
and the land was converted from absorptive agriculture to 
impervious surfaces, but storm sewers were not installed.  The 
manner in which Rogers developed the land allegedly caused the 
Hockings' problems.   
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
4 
 
¶5 
On February 16, 2007, the Hockings filed an amended 
complaint3 against the City of Dodgeville, Wallace Rogers, 
Laurence E. Schmit and the defendants in this case.  The 
complaint alleged, in part, negligent maintenance of a nuisance.  
Relevant to this appeal are the defendants who live or once 
lived at 1104 Roelli Street, Dodgeville, Wisconsin.  The 1104 
Roelli Street property is adjacent to and directly uphill from 
the Hockings' property and is one home in the 1991 development 
of the land surrounding the Hockings' property.  Defendant 
Crubaugh-Schrank lived at 1104 Roelli Street beginning in 1999 
and defendants O'Rourke moved to 1104 Roelli Street in 2004.  
These defendant landowners did not modify the property in any 
way that could affect water drainage onto the Hockings' 
property.   
¶6 
The defendants moved the circuit court for summary 
judgment asserting that they had no duty to abate this nuisance.  
The circuit court concluded that, as a matter of law, the 
defendants could not be liable to the Hockings.  It reasoned 
that the defendants had no duty to abate this nuisance because 
they were merely "possessors and titleholders in portions of 
upgrade property from the Hockings."  Therefore, no duty to 
abate this nuisance arose.  In addition, the circuit court 
concluded that even if a duty was owed and the defendants were 
negligent, liability should be precluded by the application of 
public policy factors.  The Hockings appealed the circuit 
                                                 
3 The original complaint was filed on August 22, 2006. 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
5 
 
court's decision.  The court of appeals certified the appeal to 
this court, which we accepted.4   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
"Whether the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment is a question of law that this court reviews de novo." 
Schmidt 
v. 
N. 
States 
Power 
Co., 
2007 
WI 
136, 
¶24, 
305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294.  This court applies the same 
standards as those used by the circuit court, and these 
standards are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Id.  Whether a 
duty under the circumstances exists and the scope of such a duty 
are questions of law that we decide de novo.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I 
Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶23 n.12, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 
N.W.2d 17.   
                                                 
4 In its certification, the court of appeals inquired 
whether this case should be governed by the reasonable use 
doctrine articulated in State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 
N.W.2d 407 (1974) or the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 839 
(1979), which we referenced in Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage 
District v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶¶73, 85, and nn. 23 & 
24, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  The court of appeals 
questioned whether the reasonable use doctrine and § 839 may be 
in conflict with one another.  However, no conflict exists 
because § 839 specifically references § 822, which we have 
previously adopted, and the reasonable use doctrine is largely 
embodied within § 822.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 839 
cmt. g (referencing § 822); Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, 
Inc. v. Willemsen, 129 Wis. 2d 129, 138, 384 N.W.2d 692 (1986) 
(stating 
"[t]he 
reasonable 
use 
doctrine 
is 
substantially 
embodied in sec. 822"); Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 
Wis. 2d 636, ¶25 n.4 (stating "Wisconsin has adopted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822"). 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
6 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶8 
The Hockings assert that these defendants are liable 
for negligently maintaining a nuisance, which has allegedly 
damaged the Hockings' property.  The Hockings argue that the 
circuit court erred by conducting a duty analysis because under 
Wisconsin law a duty is owed to the world at large, and thus, 
the defendants owe a duty to the Hockings because they are 
landowners.  In addition, the Hockings also assert that public 
policy factors do not preclude liability in this case.  The 
defendants on the other hand, argue that a public policy 
analysis is unnecessary because the circuit court's duty 
analysis was appropriate.  The defendants, relying primarily on 
Hoida, reason that duty is and always has been a prerequisite to 
negligence, and as a result, duty is a relevant determination in 
this case.  We agree with the defendants and therefore affirm 
the circuit court's decision with respect to the defendants 
having no duty to the Hockings to abate this nuisance under the 
circumstances of this case. 
¶9 
To prevail on their claim of negligent maintenance of 
a nuisance, the Hockings must first show that the defendants 
were negligent, which requires that defendants failed to act 
when they had a duty to act.  See Wis JI——Civil 1920; see also 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
§§ 822, 
824, 
839 
(1979) 
(discussing nuisance actions and providing that to prevail, the 
nuisance must be "otherwise actionable" and the defendant must 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
7 
 
have a positive duty to act).  The analysis of this case centers 
on duty under the circumstances herein presented.5   
A. Negligence  
¶10 We first consider whether the Hockings can satisfy the 
fundamental elements of negligence.  "Wisconsin courts have 
engaged 
a 
four-element 
analysis 
to 
determine 
whether 
an 
actionable claim for negligence has been stated."  Hoida, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, ¶23.  The four elements are as follows: "'(1) the 
existence of a duty of care on the part of the defendant, (2) a 
breach of that duty of care, (3) a causal connection between the 
defendant's breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff's 
injury, and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the 
[breach].'"  Id. (citing Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶19, 611 N.W.2d 906). 
1. Duty under Wisconsin law 
¶11 Duty has always been a relevant element in Wisconsin's 
negligence analysis even though cases have more often been 
limited by the application of public policy factors.  Nichols v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶36, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 746 
N.W.2d 220; see also Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 
2009 WI 71, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Roggensack, J., 
                                                 
5 The concurrence is a mix of well-accepted principles and 
the chief justice's opinions.  While the concurrence prefers to 
assume duty and evaluate the viability of the claim on the basis 
of breach, the majority prefers to tackle the issue of duty 
head-on.  Here we conclude that no negligence exists because the 
Hockings do not satisfy the first element of negligence——duty.  
Thus, we need not reach the issue of breach. 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
8 
 
concurring) (discussing duty under Wisconsin negligence law).  
The prevalence of a public policy factor analysis, however, does 
not eliminate consideration of the four elements of negligence.  
See Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶23 n.12 (reaffirming that there are 
four elements to a negligence analysis).  Our focus in this case 
centers on the first element of "duty."  Under the first 
element, "duty, involves two aspects: (1) the existence of a 
duty of ordinary care; and (2) an assessment of what ordinary 
care requires under the circumstances."  Id., ¶27 (citing 
Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wis., 2005 WI 109, ¶¶17-18, 283 
Wis. 2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15).   
¶12 While Wisconsin has adopted the minority view from 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), 
which established that everyone owes a duty to the world at 
large, the duty owed to the world is not unlimited but rather is 
restricted to what is reasonable under the circumstances.  
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶¶30-32.  As a result, Wisconsin courts 
have in the past precluded negligence actions because a 
defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff under the 
circumstances.  See Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 
WI 148, ¶¶18-21, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1 (concluding that 
the architect did not have a duty to supervise the construction 
of a church because the architect's contract stated he had no 
responsibility for construction of the church); Hatleberg, 283 
Wis. 2d 234, ¶¶19-25 (concluding that a trustee of a bank did 
not have a duty to review a trust document to ascertain whether 
it worked for the stated purpose of the trust). 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
9 
 
¶13 For 
example, 
in 
Hoida, 
we 
concluded 
that 
the 
plaintiff's claims were precluded because its "claim of a breach 
[wa]s based entirely on the theory that the defendants' duty of 
ordinary care under the circumstances required them to undertake 
certain tasks that we [] concluded ordinary care under the 
circumstances did not require."  Id., ¶46.  Thus, because there 
was no duty under the circumstances, no breach occurred, and 
there was not a viable negligence claim.  Id.  In Hoida, we 
relied on contractual provisions to evaluate the circumstances 
bearing on the scope of the defendant's duty of ordinary care.  
Id., ¶¶38-39.  In the case at hand, we rely on common law 
doctrines governing surface water to ascertain the defendants' 
duty of ordinary care under the circumstances. 
2. Duty under the circumstances of this case 
¶14 This 
case 
concerns 
the 
allegation 
that 
uphill 
landowners have a duty to abate naturally occurring surface 
water that runs downhill onto the Hockings' property.  Although 
three distinct doctrines——the common enemy doctrine, the civil 
law rule,6 and the reasonable use rule——have developed over the 
years in order to analyze surface water problems, Wisconsin has 
adopted the "reasonable use" rule.  2 Robert E. Beck et al., 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin has not previously utilized the civil law rule.  
In short, "[i]t provides that drainage must be allowed to follow 
its natural courses.  The upper landowner is not allowed to 
redirect drainage artificially, and the lower landowner is 
forbidden to obstruct natural drainage."  5 Robert E. Beck, 
Waters and Water Rights § 59.02(b)(3) (1991 ed., repl. vol. 
2006)  The purpose is to preserve natural drainage and prohibit 
one landowner from taking unfair advantage over another.  Id. 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
10 
 
Waters and Water Rights § 10.03(b)(3) (1991 ed., repl. vol. 
2008); 5 Robert E. Beck, Waters and Water Rights § 59.02(b) 
(1991 ed., repl. vol. 2006).  "Over the past sixty years, many 
states have shifted from the common enemy and civil law rules to 
the reasonable use rule."  Id., § 59.02(b)(7). 
¶15 Prior to 1974, surface water cases in Wisconsin were 
governed by the common enemy doctrine.  See State v. Deetz, 66 
Wis. 2d 1, 8-10, 13-16, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974) (rejecting the 
common enemy doctrine and adopting the reasonable use rule).  
The common enemy doctrine provided: 
The right of an owner of land to occupy and 
improve it in such manner and for such purposes as he 
may see fit, either by changing the surface or the 
erection of buildings or other structures thereon, is 
not restricted or modified by the fact that his own 
land is so situated with reference to that of 
adjoining owners that an alteration in the mode of its 
improvement or occupation in any portion of it will 
cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and 
snows falling on its surface or flowing onto it over 
the surface of adjacent lots, either to stand in 
unusual quantities on other adjacent lands, or pass 
into and over the same in greater quantities or in 
other directions than they were accustomed to flow. 
Watters v. Nat'l Drive-in, Inc., 266 Wis. 432, 435-36, 63 N.W.2d 
708 (1954) (emphasis added).  Therefore, under the common enemy 
doctrine, "each landowner ha[d] a privilege to deal with, 
dispose of, block, or divert diffused surface water in any 
manner as he sees fit, without legal liability for the injurious 
consequences 
to 
his 
neighbors' 
lands." 
 
5 
Beck, 
supra, 
§ 59.02(b)(2). 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
11 
 
¶16 This court applied the common enemy rule in Watters 
where the defendant constructed a drive-in theater on property 
that adjoined the plaintiff's property.  Watters, 266 Wis. at 
433.  The defendant's property was such that some water 
percolated into the soil and the remaining ran off and onto the 
plaintiff's property.  Id.  However, as a result of the drive-in 
theater construction, which included facilities, driveways, tile 
drains, and sewage-disposal facilities, the land was graded and 
filled up so as to "change the natural contour of said land, 
which [] caused the artificial and unnatural flow of surface 
waters" to drain onto the plaintiff's property.  Id.  This 
drainage caused damage to the plaintiff's roadway and resulted 
in losing the use of some property.  Id.  This court in Watters 
concluded that "[u]nder the established law of this state[, 
i.e., the common enemy doctrine,] the plaintiffs have no cause 
of action for damages caused by drainage of surface waters, 
either because of the installation of tile drains or by changing 
the natural flow of such waters."  Id. at 436.   
¶17 While this court had applied the common enemy doctrine 
prior to 1974, in Deetz, we rejected that doctrine in favor of 
the reasonable use rule, which is embodied in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 822, adopted by this court.  Crest, 129 
Wis. 2d 
at 
138; 
Milwaukee 
Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶25 n.4.   
¶18 In Deetz, this court concluded that the reasonable use 
rule as set forth in the "Restatement of Torts better comports 
with the realities of modern society than does the common enemy 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
12 
 
doctrine."  Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 18.  Under the reasonable use 
rule, 
"'each 
possessor 
is 
legally 
privileged 
to 
make 
a 
reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface 
waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but 
incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of 
surface waters is unreasonable.'"  Id. at 14 (citation omitted).   
¶19 In Deetz, the plaintiff brought an action to abate a 
nuisance caused by an uphill landowner.  Id. at 6.  The 
defendant developed land on top of a bluff overlooking Lake 
Wisconsin.  Id.  Prior to development, the bluff land was used 
for crops and pasture, and thus the erosion and runoff was 
minimal.  Id.  However, after construction, one of the roads at 
the bottom of the bluff was covered by unusual amounts of sand 
in 
many 
places 
and 
the 
downhill 
plaintiff 
noticed 
that 
substantial sand deltas had formed along the lakeshore and in 
the lake, which led to a lake that was not navigable in some 
places.  Id.  The court, in Deetz, remanded to the circuit court 
for a determination of reasonableness.  Id. at 21.  Remand was 
necessary because the factual record was undeveloped due to the 
circuit court's dismissal under the common enemy rule.  Id.  
¶20 Accordingly, under the common enemy doctrine, no duty 
and thus no liability arose regardless of the defendants' 
actions.  In other words, under the common enemy doctrine, a 
landowner was privileged to do with his land what he wanted.  
CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 88 Wis. 2d 631, 
633, 
277 
N.W.2d 766 
(1979); 
see 
also 
5 
Beck, 
supra, 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
13 
 
§ 59.02(b)(2) (discussing the absolute freedom provided by the 
common enemy doctrine).   
¶21 However, with the adoption of the reasonable use rule 
we altered a landowner's responsibility.  Under this rule, a 
landowner must use his land reasonably, and a duty to act will 
arise if the landowner's use of his land that resulted in 
altering the flow of surface waters is unreasonable.  See 5 
Beck, supra, § 59.02(b)(4) (stating that the rule compares 
benefits and hardships with liability arising when the hardships 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
14 
 
are unreasonable under all circumstances).7  As a result, when 
the defendant's conduct is unreasonable, that defendant has a 
positive duty to act to abate the nuisance.  A positive duty to 
act must exist before liability will arise in a failure to abate 
claim such as the one presented here.  CEW, 88 Wis. 2d at 635; 
Wis JI——Civil 1920; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 824 (1979).  
Consequently, the defendants here have a positive duty to abate 
this nuisance only if the use of their property had altered the 
                                                 
7 The concurrence incorrectly asserts that the reasonable 
use 
doctrine 
applies 
only 
to 
intentional 
torts 
and 
not 
negligence cases.  Some courts have noted, "'[r]egardless of the 
category into which the defendant's actions fall [intentional 
and 
unreasonable 
or 
negligent, 
reckless, 
or 
abnormally 
dangerous], the reasonable use rule explicitly, as in the case 
of intentional acts, or implicitly, as in the case of negligent 
acts, requires a finding that the conduct of the defendant was 
unreasonable.'"  DeSanctis v. Lynn Water & Sewer Comm'n, 666 
N.E.2d 1292, 1296 (Mass. 1996) (citing Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 
S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1977)).  Moreover, we have found other examples 
of the rule being utilized in negligence cases.  See, e.g., 
Franklin County Dist. Bd. of Health v. Paxson, 787 N.E.2d 59, 
66-67 (Oh. Ct. App. 2003), DeSanctis, 666 N.E.2d at 1295-97.  
These examples, however, highlight the inconsistency with which 
courts around the country apply the rule.  For example, in 
Franklin County, an Ohio court considered the reasonable use 
rule in terms of breach, i.e., a breach occurred if the land was 
not used reasonably.  Franklin County, 787 N.E.2d at 66-67.  
Other courts, however, have failed to delineate where in the 
analysis the reasonable use rule should be considered and 
instead preclude liability if the land is used reasonably.  See 
DeSanctis, 666 N.E.2d at 1295-97.  Today, we simply conclude 
that given liability cannot arise unless there is a duty, the 
most sensible place to end the analysis is under duty since the 
landowner did absolutely nothing but live on his land and let 
the rain fall down to the earth.  We have utilized surface water 
doctrines to illuminate our analysis, but today we do not apply 
the reasonable use rule in the traditional sense of weighing the 
gravity of the harm with the utility of the act.  See Franklin 
County, 787 N.E.2d at 66-67.   
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
15 
 
flow of surface water and was an unreasonable use of their 
property. 
¶22 In the case at hand, however, the defendants' conduct 
did not involve a use of their property that altered the flow of 
surface water.  Therefore, their use is not unreasonable, and 
they have no duty to abate in the first instance.  The 
defendants merely purchased a home, lived in that home, paid 
property taxes, and established a tie to the community in which 
they live.  They are living the American dream by owning a home.  
Their conduct——living in their home——does not deviate from 
typical behavior.  They did not create the flow of rainwater or 
alter the property so to create this problem on the Hockings' 
property.  The development by Rogers allegedly caused these 
problems.  The defendants, for example, did not create a trench 
that increased the flow of water to the Hockings' property.  The 
defendants did not point oversized downspouts at the Hockings' 
property.  The defendants did not landscape in such a way so to 
unreasonably increase water flow to the Hockings' property.  
Instead, the defendants purchased a home in a development and 
lived there.  The defendants could not reasonably be required to 
take positive action that would affect rainwater runoff onto the 
Hockings' property. 
¶23 Moreover, as a practical matter, the necessary remedy 
to address the Hockings' problem could not be carried out by 
these defendants.  Even the Hockings' civil engineer asserts 
that the development of the land by Rogers allegedly caused the 
nuisance 
because 
it 
converted 
the 
land 
from 
absorptive 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
16 
 
agricultural to impervious surfaces, altered the grading around 
the Hockings' property, and altered the streets surrounding the 
Hockings' property.  According to the Hockings' own expert, the 
problem should be remedied by the installation of storm sewers, 
the construction of retention ponds, and the installation of a 
storm water collection and draining system.  These remedies 
could not possibly be carried out by the defendants——one 
neighboring landowner in an uphill development.  What duty would 
then exist for the landowners who are uphill from these 
defendant landowners?   
¶24 The defendants' conduct in this case is reasonable 
under the circumstances, and as a result, no positive duty to 
abate this nuisance arises and the Hockings' claims for 
maintaining a nuisance cannot survive. 
¶25 Still, the Hockings and the concurrence assert that a 
duty is owed to the world at large, and as a result, a duty here 
is assumed.  As we stated above, however, duty is and always has 
been relevant under Wisconsin law even though cases have 
predominantly been analyzed under the public policy factors when 
there has been an assumption that a duty exists.  The 
concurrence would conclude that mere home ownership employs a 
duty to all who could possibly be affected by the homeowner's 
property.  Such a drastic implication of homeowner liability 
should not be assumed without further analysis under the 
circumstances.  It is not the homeowner's duty to remedy every 
possible impact that could occur on a neighboring parcel.  
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
17 
 
Sometimes, there is just no such duty to act under Wisconsin 
law.    
¶26 The Hockings assert that by failing to act, one can be 
liable for continuing a nuisance even if the landowner did not 
cause the problem.  We do not disagree that there are 
circumstances where liability can be established for failing to 
abate a nuisance.  See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶63-74 (referencing the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 839 (1979)).  However, no negligence exists in this case 
because the defendants' conduct did not involve altering the 
flow of surface water, and therefore, there is no duty to abate.  
As a result, the Hockings' claim for negligent maintenance of a 
nuisance cannot survive. 
¶27 The Hockings spend significant time discussing the 
application of public policy factors in this case.  However, we 
decline to address the public policy factors and instead resolve 
this case under a duty analysis because under the circumstances 
of this case, there is no doubt that the defendants did not have 
a duty to abate this nuisance. 
¶28 Accordingly, under the reasonable use rule, a duty to 
act may arise when one uses his or her property unreasonably.  
If the property is being reasonably used, however, the landowner 
has no duty to abate the nuisance under the reasonable use rule.  
In this case, all the defendant landowners reasonably used their 
property, and as a result, they satisfied their duty of ordinary 
care under the circumstances. 
No. 
2007AP1754   
 
18 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶29 We have been asked to decide whether the defendants in 
this case, who are uphill landowners from the Hockings, are 
liable to the Hockings for damages allegedly caused by surface 
water, i.e., storm water, running from the defendants' property 
to the Hockings' property.  We conclude that the defendants are 
not liable because, under the circumstances, the defendants have 
no duty to abate the alleged nuisance. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
¶30 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. did not participate. 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I concur 
in the mandate affirming the circuit court's order granting the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing them from 
the action.  I agree that as a matter of law the defendants are 
not liable for a negligent failure to abate a private nuisance.   
¶32 The majority opinion relies on several rationales in 
concluding that the defendants are not liable, without clearly 
explaining the relationship between the rationales, without 
identifying any single rationale as sufficient, and without 
stating 
whether 
all 
are 
necessary 
to 
conclude 
that 
the 
defendants are not liable.   
¶33 The majority opinion appears to argue (1) that this is 
a case of an omission, not an affirmative act, and that in 
failing to abate the private nuisance (the omission) the 
defendants are not liable because they had no duty to abate the 
private nuisance (majority op., ¶¶10-22, 24-26); (2) that 
because the defendants did not create the private nuisance, they 
are not liable for failing to abate the nuisance (majority op., 
¶¶22, 26); (3) that the defendants did not unreasonably 
interfere with the flow of surface water and therefore are not 
liable under the "reasonable use" doctrine adopted in State v. 
Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974) (majority op., 
passim); and (4) that it is unreasonable to require the 
defendants to abate the private nuisance in view of the 
extensive work and costs involved in abating this nuisance 
(majority op., ¶23). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶34 I conclude that the defendants are not liable because 
the private nuisance is not abatable, meaning that abatement 
cannot be accomplished without unreasonable hardship or expense. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 829 cmts e & f.   
¶35 First I shall set forth what I think is the law 
applicable to the present case and then I shall point out the 
errors of the majority opinion's way. 
I 
¶36 The proper approach to this case is to recognize that 
three discrete areas of tort law converge in the instant case: 
private nuisance law,1 negligence law,2 and the tort liability of 
a possessor of property.3  When these three areas of law 
                                                 
1 Nuisance long has been treated as its own subject within 
tort law.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D ("Trespass 
and private nuisance are alike in that each is a field of tort 
liability rather than a single type of tortious conduct.").   
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, as well as leading 
treatises, address nuisance as a separate topic in the law.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 40 (§§ 821A-840E); 2 Dan B. 
Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001), ch. 34, at 1319-42; W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) ch. 
15, at 616-54. 
2 This court has remarked that although liability for a 
nuisance may be predicated on negligent conduct, "negligence and 
nuisance are distinct torts."  Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. 
Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶27 n.22, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 
N.W.2d 777. 
3 See Chapter 9, Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (Tentative Draft No. 
6, March 2, 2009), at xx (stating that "historically, land 
possessors' duties have been treated as a discrete subject" in 
the law of tort).  
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
3 
 
converge, as they do in the instant case, special rules of law 
apply.  
¶37 A private nuisance is "a condition or activity which 
unduly interferes with the use of land."4   This case involves a 
private nuisance, in contrast with a public nuisance.   
¶38 Private nuisances can be intentional or negligent.5  
Thus in the instant case principles of negligence play a role in 
private nuisance law.   
¶39 Furthermore, private nuisance law and negligence law 
are intertwined with special rules that have developed over the 
years relating to the tort liability of possessors of land.  
Like nuisance and negligence law, the law relating to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Restatement (Second) of Torts includes a separate 
chapter relating to liability based on the condition or use of 
land, Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 13 (§§ 328E-387).  The 
tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts similarly 
uses a separate chapter to "address[] the special case of the 
duty owed by land possessors."  Restatement of the Law (Third) 
Torts: 
Liability 
for 
Physical 
and 
Emotional 
Harm, 
at 
1 
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).  Leading treatises follow suit.  
See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 587-630 (2001) (relating to 
liability for owners and occupiers of law); W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 386-450 (5th ed. 1984) (same). 
4 Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 
WI 8, ¶24, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
See also Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 Wis. 2d 635, 
¶27 ("[A] private nuisance is broadly defined to include any 
disturbance of the enjoyment of property." (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
5 Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶33 
("Liability for a nuisance may be based upon either intentional 
or negligent conduct." (citations omitted)). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
4 
 
liability of land possessors has been treated as a discrete 
field of tort law.   
¶40 These three discrete areas of the law have been 
synthesized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in §§ 822-840A.  
This court has expressly adopted § 822 (stating the general rule 
subjecting a person to liability for a private nuisance)6 and has 
referred to and followed other sections, including § 824 
(describing the conduct essential to liability for a private or 
public nuisance)7 and § 839 (stating the rule governing liability 
for a possessor of land who fails to abate an artificial 
condition),8 in deciding nuisance cases.  I would use our prior 
cases that rely on the Restatement to decide the present case. 
¶41 The inquiry under the Restatement (and our prior case 
law) begins with Restatement (Second) § 822.9   
                                                 
6 State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).  
See also Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2005 WI 8, ¶25 n.4, 
277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658 ("Wisconsin has adopted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (citations omitted)); CEW 
Mgmt. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 88 Wis. 2d 631, 
634-45, 
277 
N.W.2d 766 
(1979) 
(stating 
that 
the 
court 
specifically adopted § 822 in Deetz).  
7 Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶35, 48 
(following § 824); CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 88 Wis. 2d 631, 635, 277 N.W.2d 766 (1979) (same).  
8 See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶73 
& n.23, 76 n.24, 79, 85 (following, without explicitly adopting, 
§ 839 in determining whether the City of Milwaukee could be 
liable for a private nuisance due to its failure to regularly 
dig up and inspect buried water mains).   
9 See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶32 
(relying on § 822 as a statement of the elements necessary for 
liability in a private nuisance case). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶42 Section 
822 
is 
the 
Restatement's 
general 
rule 
governing liability for a private nuisance.10  Section 822 
provides in full as follows:  
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, 
but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an 
invasion of another's interest in the private use and 
enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either 
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or 
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the 
rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless 
conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or 
activities.  
¶43 An action for the negligent failure to abate a private 
nuisance falls within § 822(b) rather than § 822(a).  Under 
§ 822(b), a person is subject to liability for the negligent 
failure to abate a private nuisance if three elements are met: 
(1) there is "an invasion of another's interest in the private 
use and enjoyment of land,"11 (2) the person's conduct is "a 
legal cause of [the] invasion," and (3) the invasion is 
"otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for 
negligent conduct."12     
                                                 
10 Section 822 is titled "General Rule" and is the first 
section appearing in a Topic titled "Private Nuisance: Elements 
of Liability."  
11 This first element simply requires that a private 
nuisance exist.  Restatement (Second) § 821D states that "[a] 
private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."   
12 See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2005 WI 8, ¶63, 277 
Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658: 
Having determined that the only actionable claim in 
this case is one for negligently failing to abate a 
nuisance, we lastly examine whether the circuit court 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶44 The first two elements are not at issue in the present 
case; the third element relating to liability for negligent 
conduct is at issue.  I therefore focus my attention on the 
third element pertaining to whether a defendant's conduct is 
actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent 
conduct.   
¶45 The comments to § 822 state that a court should look 
to Restatement (Second) § 824 for the standard used to determine 
"the type of conduct necessary to liability under the rule 
stated in [§ 822]."  See also CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 88 Wis. 2d 631, 635, 277 N.W.2d 766 (1979) 
(stating that § 824 "is controlling in the determination of 
conduct that comes within the purview of sec. 822").       
¶46 Section 824 (titled "Type of Conduct Essential to 
Liability") provides in full as follows: 
The conduct necessary to make the actor liable for 
either a public or a private nuisance may consist of 
(a) an act; or 
(b) a failure to act under circumstances in which the 
actor is under a duty to take positive action to 
prevent or abate the interference with the public 
interest or the invasion of the private interest. 
                                                                                                                                                             
properly granted summary judgment in this case.  As we 
previously discussed, in order to prevail on a claim 
of nuisance based on negligence, the plaintiff must 
prove the following elements: 1) The existence of a 
private 
nuisance——the 
interference 
with 
another's 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land; 2) 
The defendant's conduct is the legal cause of the 
private nuisance; and 3) The defendant's conduct is 
otherwise 
actionable 
under 
the 
rules 
governing 
liability for negligent conduct, including notice.  
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶47 The instant case may be viewed as a failure to act 
under § 824(b).  If so, I must determine whether under the 
circumstances of the case the defendants were under a duty to 
take positive action to abate the invasion of the private 
interest. 
¶48 Sections 838-840 of the Restatement (Second) set forth 
"the circumstances under which the law imposes a duty on a 
person to take positive action for the protection of another and 
subjects him to liability if he fails to meet the standard of 
action required in the particular case."13     
¶49 I therefore focus on §§ 838-40 to determine whether 
any of these provisions impose upon the defendants in the 
present case a duty to take positive action to abate the private 
nuisance.   
¶50 Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
§ 839, 
entitled 
"Possessor Who Fails to Abate Artificial Condition" is relevant 
to the instant case.  The plaintiffs allege that the defendants 
are liable for their failure to abate a nuisance resulting in 
part from an artificial condition on the defendants' land.  This 
court has relied upon § 839 in Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage 
District v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶¶73 & n.23, 76 n.24, 
79, 85, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  
                                                 
13 Restatement (Second) § 824 cmt. e.  See also Scope Note 
to Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 40, Topic 4 (stating that 
ch. 40, Topic 4, Title B, which encompasses §§ 838-840A, "deals 
with liability for failure to act").   
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶51 Section 839 of the Restatement imposes a duty on a 
possessor of land14 to take reasonable steps to abate an 
artificial condition on land causing a nuisance.  The scope of 
the duty depends on the circumstances.  A possessor of land has 
a duty to abate an abatable artificial condition when: (a) the 
land possessor knows or should know of the condition and the 
nuisance or unreasonable risk of nuisance involved, (b) the land 
possessor knows or should know that it exists without the 
consent of those affected by it, and (c) the land possessor has 
had a reasonable opportunity to take reasonable steps to abate 
the condition or to protect the affected persons against it.  If 
a land possessor fails to take reasonable steps under the 
circumstances stated in § 839, the land possessor's conduct is 
actionable. 
¶52 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 839 provides in full 
as follows: 
 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for a 
nuisance caused while he is in possession by an 
abatable artificial condition on the land, if the 
nuisance is otherwise actionable, and  
(a) the possessor knows or should know of the 
condition and the nuisance or unreasonable risk of 
nuisance involved, and 
(b) he knows or should know that it exists without the 
consent of those affected by it, and  
(c) he has failed after a reasonable opportunity to 
take reasonable steps to abate the condition or to 
protect the affected persons against it. (Emphasis 
added.) 
                                                 
14 The term "possessor of land" is defined in Restatement 
(Second) § 328E. 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
9 
 
 
¶53 I will discuss only those aspects of § 839 that are at 
issue and apply specifically to the present case. 
¶54 First, if the particular artificial physical condition 
is not abatable, a possessor of land who did not create the 
artificial condition is not liable.  Restatement (Second) § 839 
cmt. e.  An abatable condition is "one that reasonable persons 
would regard as being susceptible of abatement by reasonable 
means."  Restatement (Second) § 839 cmt. f.  An artificial 
condition is not abatable unless abatement can be accomplished 
without unreasonable hardship or expense.  Id.  This provision 
was cited with approval in Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage 
District, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶73 n.23.   
¶55 Second, a possessor of land may be liable under 
Restatement § 839 for failing to abate a private nuisance 
resulting 
from 
an 
abatable 
artificial 
condition 
on 
the 
possessor's land even though the possessor played no role in 
creating the artificial condition or the nuisance.  The comments 
to § 839 explain that "a vendee or lessee of land upon which a 
harmful physical condition exists may be liable under [§ 839] 
for failing to abate it after he takes possession, even though 
it was created by his vendor, lessor or other person and even 
though he had no part in its creation."  Restatement (Second) 
§ 839 cmt. d.  Liability under § 839 for the failure to abate an 
artificial condition on land causing nuisance to another "is not 
based upon responsibility for the creation of the harmful 
condition."  Restatement (Second) § 839 cmt. d.  
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶56 Third, Restatement § 839 imposes a duty of due care on 
a possessor of land.  The scope of the duty (that is, the 
standard of care) is "to do what is practicable and reasonable 
under the circumstances" to abate a private nuisance resulting 
from 
an 
artificial 
condition 
on 
the 
possessor's 
land.  
Restatement § 839 cmt. e.  A land possessor's liability under 
Restatement (Second) § 839 is based "upon the fact that [a 
possessor of land] has exclusive control over the land and the 
things done upon it and should have the responsibility of taking 
reasonable measures to remedy conditions on it that are a source 
of harm to others."  Restatement (Second) § 839 cmt. d. 
¶57 This case might be decided on a number of factors 
under § 839, but it is clear under the record in the instant 
case that the artificial condition at issue here is not abatable 
and that the defendants have not violated their duty to do what 
is practicable and reasonable under the circumstances.  Even 
viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the record does not 
support the conclusion that the defendants could have abated the 
nuisance to the plaintiffs by using reasonable means.15  As a 
matter of law, the defendants therefore did not breach their 
duty as possessors of land to do what is practicable and 
reasonable under the circumstances to abate a private nuisance 
resulting from an artificial condition on the land that they 
possess.  
                                                 
15 See majority op., ¶23. 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶58 For these reasons, I agree with the majority opinion 
that the defendants are not liable for the private nuisance in 
the present case. 
II 
¶59 Here's why the majority opinion has lost its way: 
¶60 First, the majority opinion relies too heavily on 
classifying the defendants' conduct as an omission to act and 
applying what it considers applicable rules of negligence law  
in determining that the defendants are not liable.16   
                                                 
16 Although the majority opinion distinguishes omission and 
commission 
in 
ordinary 
negligence 
law 
and 
applies 
the 
distinction to the present case to require a duty, the jury 
instruction for negligence makes no distinction between acting 
and failing to act.  Wis JI——Civil 1005 (titled "Negligence: 
Defined") states that "[a] person is not using ordinary care and 
is negligent, if the person, without intending to do harm, does 
something (or fails to do something) that a reasonable person 
would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or 
damage to a person or property." 
In contrast, Wis JI——Civil 1920 (titled "Private Nuisance: 
Negligent Conduct") follows the language of Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 824 (referring to a duty to take positive action) in 
private nuisance actions premised on negligent conduct.  Wis JI—
—Civil 1920 states that "[a] person is not using ordinary care 
and is negligent, if the person, without intending to do harm, 
acts (or fails to act under circumstances in which (he) (she) is 
under a duty to take a positive action) that a reasonable person 
would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of (invading) 
(interfering) with another's use or enjoyment of property" 
(emphasis added).   
For further discussion of the concept of duty in negligence 
law, see Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co., 2009 WI 
71, ¶52 n.5, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶61 As I have written previously, the distinction between 
omission and commission is a nebulous one.17  This case proves 
the 
point.  
The 
defendants' conduct is an omission if 
characterized as a failure to abate a private nuisance and is an 
affirmative act if characterized as maintaining a private 
nuisance.  Indeed, our nuisance cases appear to move freely 
between characterizing a defendant's conduct as a failure to 
abate a nuisance (an omission) and the maintenance of a nuisance 
(a commission).18  
¶62 Restatement § 824(b) uses language consistent with the 
commission/omission distinction, but the distinction between 
commission and omission is not outcome-determinative in the 
present case because the possessor of land has a duty relating 
                                                 
17 For further discussion of the concepts of omission and 
commission in negligence law, see Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters 
Insurance Co., 2009 WI 71, ¶¶54-55, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
18 See, 
e.g., 
Milwaukee 
Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶32-33, 35, 40, 42, 45, 48, 61, 73, 76, 80 
(referring to the maintenance of a nuisance interchangeably with 
the failure to abate a nuisance); Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. 
Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶24 n.19, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 
N.W.2d 777 (stating that in an action for "maintenance of a 
public nuisance," liability is based "on the defendant's failure 
to abate a public nuisance of which the defendant had actual or 
constructive notice"); Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 199 
Wis. 575, 227 N.W. 385 (1929), on reargument, 199 Wis. 588, 589, 
227 N.W. 385 (1929) ("One who maintains a nuisance created by 
another is liable for injuries sustained because of the danger 
incident thereto just as clearly as if he had himself created 
the danger in the first place.  'If the owner or the occupier of 
property continues a nuisance created thereon by others, he is 
liable, not because he owns or occupies the premises, but 
because he does not abate the nuisance.'" (quoting 20 Ruling 
 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
13 
 
to 
the 
maintenance 
of 
(or 
failure 
to 
abate) 
artificial 
conditions on the land.  Restatement § 839 imposes a duty upon a 
possessor of land to conform his or her conduct to a standard of 
care by doing what is reasonable and practicable under the 
circumstances to abate a nuisance resulting from an artificial 
condition on the possessor's land.   
¶63 In sum, the majority opinion errs in ignoring the 
special tort rules applicable to a case involving private 
nuisance, negligence, and possessors of land. 
¶64 Second, the majority opinion erroneously concludes 
that a possessor of land who did not create an artificial 
condition on the land causing a nuisance cannot be liable for 
merely failing to abate the condition.  The Restatement and our 
case law declare that a possessor may be liable even if the 
possessor did not create the artificial condition.19 
                                                 
19 See Restatement (Second) § 839 cmt. d (stating that under 
§ 839 "a vendee or lessee of land upon which a harmful physical 
condition exists may be liable under [§ 839] for failing to 
abate it after he takes possession, even though it was created 
by his vendor, lessor or other person and even though he had no 
part in its creation."); Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 
Wis. 2d 635, 
¶34 
(stating 
that 
when 
"otherwise 
benign 
objects . . . [change] over time and become harmful, through no 
fault of the owner of the object . . . liability is predicated 
upon the defendant's failure to remove the harmful condition 
after he has notice of its existence" (citing Brown, 199 Wis. at 
589-90)); Physicians Plus Ins. Corp., 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶24 ("'One 
who maintains a nuisance created by another is liable for 
injuries sustained because of the danger incident thereto just 
as clearly as if he had himself created the danger in the first 
place.  If the owner or the occupier of property continues a 
nuisance created thereon by others, he is liable, not because he 
owns or occupies the premises, but because he does not abate the 
nuisance.'" (quoting Brown, 199 Wis. at 590) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶65 Third, the majority opinion erroneously concludes that 
the defendants' liability is precluded by the "reasonable use" 
doctrine relating to interference with the flow of surface 
waters.   
¶66 Interference with the flow of surface water is treated 
in the Restatement as a nuisance.  Under Restatement § 833 
(titled "Interference with the Flow of Surface Waters"), "[a]n 
invasion of one's interest in the use and enjoyment of land 
[i.e., a private nuisance] resulting from another's interference 
with the flow of surface water may constitute a nuisance under 
the 
rules 
stated 
in 
§§ 821A-831," 
setting 
forth 
the 
Restatement's general provisions relating to nuisance.  Put 
another way, § 833 provides that when an interference with the 
flow of surface waters results in a private nuisance, "the same 
general rules apply in determining liability for the invasion of 
the neighbor's interest in the use and enjoyment of his land as 
apply when an invasion results through vibrations, noise, smoke 
or the pollution of waters."20 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Brown, the court determined that the complaint stated a 
claim for maintenance of a nuisance when the complaint alleged 
that the defendant permitted a tree to remain in a dangerous 
condition with notice and knowledge of the condition.  Brown, 
199 Wis. at 590.  In Physicians Plus, the court similarly 
concluded 
that 
the 
defendant 
landowners 
were 
liable 
for 
maintaining a nuisance "based solely on [the defendants'] 
failure to trim the branches of their tree, which they knew, or 
should have known to be obstructing the view of a stop sign——
their failure to abate the public nuisance."  Physicians Plus 
Ins. Corp., 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶51. 
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 cmt. b. 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prior to Deetz, the general rules for determining liability 
did not apply when a private nuisance resulted from the 
interference with the flow of surface water.  Deetz abolished 
the "common enemy" doctrine, under which "'[s]urface water is 
recognized as a common enemy, which each proprietor may fight 
off or control as he will or is able, either by retention, 
diversion, repulsion, or altered transmission; so that no cause 
of action arises for such interference, even if some injury 
occurs, causing damage.'"  State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 224 
N.W.2d 407 
(quoting 
Borchsenius 
v. 
Chicago, 
St. 
Paul, 
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 96 Wis. 448, 450, 71 N.W. 884 
(1897)). 
The Reporters' Note to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 
states that § 833 replaces the "rigid and antagonistic" rules 
(including the common enemy doctrine) that previously had 
governed when a private nuisance resulted from interference with 
the flow of surface waters. 
One of the defendants' briefs to this court argues that 
general principles of liability for a nuisance do not apply when 
the 
nuisance 
involves 
surface 
water. 
 
See 
Defendants-
Respondents' Charles C. O'Rourke, Joan R. O'Rourke, and American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company's Response Brief at 12-13 
(arguing that "surface water is a topic given distinct treatment 
in the law" and that the plaintiffs err in "seek[ing] to apply 
general 
nuisance 
principles 
in 
lieu 
of 
long-established 
standards developed by Wisconsin courts to address excess 
surface water problems").  In its certification memorandum, the 
court of appeals also asked this court to determine whether 
special rules apply in nuisance cases involving surface water. 
Comment b to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 answers 
the defendants' argument and the question posed by the court of 
appeals.  Under the rule codified in § 833 and adopted in Deetz, 
a nuisance case involving the flow of surface waters is treated 
like any other nuisance case.  See also Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 839 cmt. k (stating that a vendee or lessee of land may 
be liable under § 839 for the failure to abate a nuisance 
occurring when "an embankment on the land diverts water that 
washes away the roadbed of a railroad" or when "a gutter on a 
building discharges water upon the public sidewalk which freezes 
in cold weather and makes the walk unsafe for passage"). 
Although the majority opinion is not clear, it also seems 
to conclude that nuisance cases involving the flow of surface 
waters should be decided under the rules governing liability in 
nuisance cases generally.  See majority op., ¶5 n.5. 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶67 The Restatement adopts the reasonable use doctrine for 
intentional nuisances.  This court adopted the reasonable use 
doctrine in State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 
(1974).21  Deetz recognized that the "reasonable use" doctrine is 
codified in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 and adopted the 
reasonable use doctrine as codified in § 833.22 
¶68 Under the reasonable use doctrine, "each possessor is 
legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even 
though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes 
some harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful 
interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable."23  
¶69 The "reasonable use" doctrine codified in Restatement 
§ 833 and adopted in Deetz governs intentional invasions of the 
neighbor's interests, not negligent invasions such as in the 
present case.  Deetz concerned an intentional invasion of 
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land.  See Deetz, 
66 Wis. 2d at 19.  Accordingly, the court in Deetz relied upon 
provisions in the Restatement (Second) falling within §§ 826-
831, governing intentional nuisances.  See Deetz 66 Wis. 2d at 
19-20.  
                                                 
21 Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 18. 
22 Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 16, 18 (identifying Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 833 as "a codification" of the reasonable 
use rule; concluding that "the reasonable use doctrine as set 
forth in the Restatement of Torts better comports with the 
realities of modern society than does the common enemy doctrine 
and accords with the trend of decisions for the last thirty-five 
years"). 
23 Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 14 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶70 In other words, when a private nuisance results from 
an intentional interference with the flow of surface water, 
"liability depends upon whether the invasion is unreasonable" 
under Restatement of Torts (Second) §§ 826-831 (relating to the 
reasonableness of an intentional invasion of another's interest 
in the use or enjoyment of land).24   
¶71 In contrast, when a private nuisance results from a 
negligent 
interference 
with 
the 
flow 
of 
surface 
water, 
Restatement § 833 requires the same inquiry as Restatement 
(Second) § 822(b), setting forth the general rule of liability 
for a private nuisance based on negligent conduct.25  I applied 
§ 822(b)'s general rule in Part I of the concurrence, as well as 
the more specific rules (§ 824 and § 839) to which § 822(b) 
directs the inquiry under the circumstances of the present case.  
Although liability for the negligent maintenance of a nuisance 
depends upon whether the defendant's conduct is unreasonable,  
                                                 
24 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 cmt. b.  See also 
§ 822(a) (stating that one may be subject to liability for a 
private nuisance if the invasion of another's interest in the 
private 
use 
and 
enjoyment 
of 
land 
is 
"intentional 
and 
unreasonable"). 
25 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 cmt. b ("When the 
invasion is not intentional, the liability of the person 
harmfully interfering with the flow of surface waters depends 
upon whether his conduct has been negligent, reckless or 
abnormally dangerous, assuming that the other elements of 
liability stated in § 822 are present.").   
Compare § 822(b) (stating that one is subject to liability 
for a private nuisance if "his conduct is a legal cause of an 
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment 
of land, and the invasion is . . . (b) unintentional and 
otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for 
negligent . . . conduct . . ."). 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
18 
 
the test is not whether the defendant has interfered with the 
flow of surface waters through an unreasonable use of land. 
¶72 For the reasons set forth I conclude that the 
majority's legal analysis of the instant case is faulty.  I 
write separately to set forth what I conclude is the correct 
legal analysis. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2007AP1754.ssa 
 
 
 
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