Case Title: People v. Fuentes

Citation: 

Docket Number: S219109

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 7/21/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S219109 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G048563 
ALEXIS ALEJANDRO FUENTES, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 13NF0928 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The issue presented here is whether a trial court has the discretion under 
Penal Code1 section 1385, subdivision (a) (section 1385(a)) to dismiss a 
sentencing enhancement allegation for a gang-related offense (§186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1) (section 186.22(b)(1))), or if the court is limited to its authority 
under section 186.22, subdivision (g) (section 186.22(g)), which provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment 
for the enhancements provided in this section.”  In other words, by enacting 
section 186.22(g), did the Legislature eliminate a trial court‟s section 1385(a) 
discretion to dismiss or strike entirely a section 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement?  
For reasons that follow, we conclude that a trial court has the discretion to 
strike the gang enhancement altogether under section 1385(a). 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
2 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In March 2013, the Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) 
charged defendant Alexis Alejandro Fuentes with the unlawful taking of a vehicle 
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d, 
subd. (a)).  The two-count felony complaint also alleged as an enhancement that 
defendant committed the charged offenses “for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
and in association with . . . a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to 
promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by members of that gang.”  (See 
§ 186.22, subd. (b).)  This gang enhancement allegation exposed defendant to up 
to an additional four years in prison.  (Ibid.)  
On May 2, 2013, after an off-the-record conference in chambers, the trial 
court indicated the following:  if defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 2, the 
court would dismiss the gang enhancement allegation (§ 186.22(b)(1)), pursuant to 
its discretion under section 1385(a).  The prosecutor, however, objected to the 
indicated sentence, arguing that the court lacked discretion to dismiss the 
enhancement and that its authority was limited to striking the additional 
punishment under section 186.22(g).  Defendant moved to dismiss the gang 
enhancement allegation under section 1385(a).   
As part of the agreement in which defendant pleaded guilty to the charges, 
he offered the following statements as a basis for his plea:  “[O]n 3-14-13, I 
willfully took a car with the intent to deprive the owner of it and without consent 
of the owner.  I was also in possession of such vehicle.”  Over the District 
Attorney‟s objection, the trial court accepted the defense invitation to dismiss the 
gang enhancement allegation under section 1385(a).  The court orally stated its 
reasons for dismissing the enhancement allegation; however, those reasons are not 
reflected in the court minutes.  The trial court pronounced judgment and placed 
defendant on three years‟ probation with additional terms and conditions.    
3 
The District Attorney appealed.  He argued that the phrase 
“[n]otwithstanding any other law” in section 186.22(g) shows the Legislature 
intended that section to replace or supplant the court‟s general authority under 
section 1385(a) to strike or dismiss gang allegations.  For that reason, the trial 
court had the authority to strike the additional punishment for the enhancement, 
but not the enhancement itself.  Disagreeing with a decision from a different 
division within its district (People v. Campos (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 438), the 
Court of Appeal here stated that the “[n]otwithstanding any other law” phrase 
supports the District Attorney‟s interpretation only if section 186.22(g) is 
“contrary to, in conflict with, or inconsistent” with section 1385(a).   It concluded 
section 186.22(g) was not.  Therefore, under section 1385(a), the trial court had 
the discretion to dismiss the gang enhancement allegation altogether, and it was 
not limited to striking the additional punishment for the enhancement under 
section 186.22(g). 
Because the trial court failed to state its “reasons for the dismissal . . . in an 
order entered upon the minutes,” as section 1385(a) mandated at the time (see 
Stats. 2000, ch. 689, § 3, p. 4558), the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the 
trial court to allow it to do so.  (See People v. Bonnetta (2009) 46 Cal.4th 143, 151 
[§ 1385‟s “mandatory requirement” for court‟s written minute order].)2  It 
affirmed the trial court‟s judgment in all other respects. 
We granted the District Attorney‟s petition for review. 
                                              
2 
Effective January 1, 2015, section 1385(a) no longer requires a written 
order in all cases.  (Stats. 2014, ch. 137, § 1.)  As amended, section 1385(a) 
provides that the trial court‟s reasons for dismissal “shall be stated orally on the 
record,” and that a written order must be entered upon the minutes only “if 
requested by either party or in any case in which the proceedings are not being 
recorded electronically or reported by a court reporter.”  
4 
DISCUSSION 
Under the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 
enacted in 1988 (STEP Act; § 186.20 et seq.), a defendant who commits a felony 
in furtherance of criminal street gang activity is subject to increased punishment. 
(People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 609-610; § 186.21 [legislative findings 
and declarations].)  For example, section 186.22, subdivision (b) increases the 
punishment for the underlying conviction in several different ways.  Section 
186.22(b)(1), which is at issue here, is a sentencing enhancement and imposes an 
additional determinate term of two to 10 years for most underlying felonies.  
(§§ 186.22(b)(1)(A) [two, three, or four years for an ordinary felony in court‟s 
discretion], 186.22(b)(1)(B) [five years for a serious felony under § 1192.7, subd. 
(c)], 186.22(b)(1)(C) [10 years for a violent felony under § 667.5, subd. (c)]; see 
People v. Jones (2009) 47 Cal.4th 566, 571.)  As discussed in greater detail below, 
subdivision (b)(4) and subdivision (b)(5) of section 186.22 each serves as an 
alternate penalty provision — section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) imposes a life 
sentence if the underlying felony is an enumerated crime, and section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(5), which imposes a minimum prison confinement of 15 years 
before a defendant is eligible for parole, applies when the underlying felony by its 
own terms provides for a life sentence.  Section 186.22, subdivision (d), which the 
electorate later added in 2000, is also an alternate penalty provision and gives a 
trial court discretion to treat a misdemeanor as a felony for purposes of sentencing.  
(§ 186.22, subd. (d), added by initiative, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) [Prop. 21, § 
4].)   
Since its inception nearly three decades ago, the STEP Act has provided 
trial courts with the discretion to “strike the additional punishment for the 
enhancements provided in” section 186.22.  (§ 186.22, former subd. (b)(4) [now 
§ 186.22(g)]; Stats. 1988, ch. 1242, § 1, pp. 4127-4130.)  After several 
5 
amendments,3 section 186.22(g) currently provides in full:  “Notwithstanding any 
other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements 
provided in this section or refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence for 
misdemeanors in an unusual case where the interests of justice would best be 
served, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the 
circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by that 
disposition.”  (Italics added.)  Under section 186.22(g), a trial court‟s discretion is 
limited to striking any additional punishment for an enhancement provided in 
section 186.22(b)(1), and to refusing to impose a minimum jail sentence for 
section 186.22(d), in “the interests of justice.”  It does not authorize striking the 
enhancement itself. 
In contrast, section 1385(a), which was enacted in 1872, gives trial courts 
discretion “in furtherance of justice [to] order an action to be dismissed.”  (See 
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 520 (Romero) 
[dismissal in furtherance of justice has existed since 1850]; Stats. 1850, ch. 119, 
§ 629, p. 323.)  “The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered 
upon the minutes.  No dismissal shall be made for any cause which would be 
ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading.”4  (§ 1385(a), as amended by Stats. 
2000, ch. 789, § 3, p. 4558.)  A trial court‟s discretion to dismiss an “action” under 
                                              
3  
In 1989, the Legislature amended the provision to give trial courts authority 
to “refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence for misdemeanors,” and 
designated section 186.22, former subdivision (b)(4) as section 186.22, 
subdivision (d).  (Stats. 1989, ch. 144, § 1, pp. 1095-1097.)  After it deleted the 
words “provision of” in 1993, the Legislature in 2001 designated section 186.22, 
subdivision (d), as section 186.22(g), which read as it does today.  (Stats. 1993, ch. 
611, § 3.09, pp. 3486-3488; Stats. 2001, ch. 854, § 22, pp. 6983-6986.) 
4  
  As noted above (see ante, at p. 3, fn. 2), section 1385(a) no longer requires 
that the court‟s reasons be set out in the minutes in all cases.  
6 
section 1385(a) encompasses the power to strike or dismiss a sentencing 
enhancement allegation.  (In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1137 [“ „action‟ ” 
means “ „individual charges and allegations in a criminal case‟ ”]; People v. Burke 
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, 51 [“authority to dismiss the whole, includes, of course, the 
power to dismiss or „strike out‟ a part”].)  Further, subdivision (c)(1) of section 
1385 (section 1385(c)(1)), which was added in 2000, expressly provides that a trial 
court may “instead strike the additional punishment” for an enhancement that it 
may otherwise dismiss or strike under subdivision (a).  (Stats. 2000, ch. 689, § 3, 
pp. 4558-4559; but see § 1385, subd. (b) [court may not strike prior conviction of 
a serious felony for purposes of enhancement under § 667].) 
Generally speaking, sentencing enhancements “derive their vitality from 
and form a part of the crime to which they are attached and alter the consequences 
the offender may suffer.  The most direct consequence is additional punishment.”  
(In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1445.)  In the present case, the 
section 186.22(b)(1) enhancement exposed defendant to up to an additional four 
years in prison.  (See ante, at p. 2.)  There is no real dispute that had the court not 
dismissed the enhancement allegation, and had the allegation either been proven 
by evidence or admitted by defendant, the finding or admission could negatively 
impact defendant in future criminal cases as well.  (See People v. Shirley (1993) 
18 Cal.App.4th 40, 46 [defendant‟s admission of great bodily injury enhancement 
may be used to “enhance subsequent, new crimes”].)  Specifically, if a defendant 
commits a felony that is gang related under section 186.22(b)(1)5 and the 
defendant later reoffends, section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(28), turns that “prior 
                                              
5  
Consistent with our prior cases, we use the term “gang related” as meaning 
“for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with” a street gang (§ 
186.22(b)(1)).  (People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 622.) 
7 
gang-related felony offense into a strike.”  (People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
451, 465.)  Moreover, as relevant here, even if the punishment is struck, an 
enhancement finding could impact defendant in a future case:  “Striking an aspect 
of an enhancement does not „operate to defeat the factual finding of the truth of 
the [allegation], instead, such act merely serves to prohibit a certain purpose for 
which the [allegation] may be used.‟ ”  (In re Pacheco, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1445; see Couzens et al., Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2015) 
§ 12.5 [striking an enhancement‟s punishment “would retain the fact of the 
enhancement in the defendant‟s criminal record, but would not add any 
punishment”]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.428 [if trial court exercises 
discretion to strike the enhancement‟s punishment under § 1385(c), it “should not 
strike the allegation of the enhancement”].)  
Defendant maintains that a trial court‟s discretion is not limited to section 
186.22(g) in this context.  He asserts that while section 186.22(g) contains the 
phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” it does not specifically refer to section 
1385, which would have demonstrated the Legislature‟s unmistakable intent to 
divest a trial court‟s section 1385 discretion with respect to gang-related 
sentencing allegations.  He points to various statutes that include the phrase, 
“Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law,” which clearly 
indicates that the particular statute overrides or displaces the trial court‟s general 
discretion under section 1385.  (E.g., §§ 667.61, subd. (g), 667.71, subd. (d), 
12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h).)  
We agree with defendant that there must be “ „a clear legislative 
direction‟ ” eliminating the trial court‟s section 1385 authority.  (Romero, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 518; see People v. Fritz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 227, 230 (Fritz); People 
v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470 (Williams).)  However, “it is not necessary that 
the Legislature expressly refer to section 1385 in order to preclude its operation.”  
8 
(People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 211 (Thomas); see People  v. Rodriguez 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1005, 1019 [§ 1385 may be inapplicable “in the face of [a] more 
specific proscription on the court‟s power”]; see also Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 518.)   
For instance, in Thomas, the Legislature in 1989 had deleted a firearm use 
enhancement (§ 12022.5) from a list of statutory enhancements that a trial court 
had the discretion to strike, if it found sufficient “circumstances in mitigation” 
(former § 1170.1, subd. (h) (former section 1170.1(h))).6  (Thomas, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at p. 209.)  The question arose whether the court nonetheless retained its 
discretion to strike the section 12022.5 enhancement under section 1385.  
(Thomas, at p. 211.)  We concluded it did not retain such discretion.  We first 
determined that former section 1170.1(h)‟s “circumstances in mitigation” standard 
was “essentially identical” to section 1385‟s standard of “in furtherance of 
justice.”  (Thomas, at p. 212.)  Next, based on the relevant legislative history of 
former section 1170.1(h), we discerned from the Legislature‟s deletion of section 
12022.5 a “ „clearly evidenced‟ ” intent “to divest the courts of their statutory 
authority to strike firearm use enhancements, whether such power be exercised 
under section 1170.1, subdivision (h), or under section 1385.”  (Thomas, at 
pp. 211-212.)  We added that because the amendment to former section 1170.1(h) 
was included in a “ „package‟ of provisions aimed at enhancing criminal liability 
for unlawful firearm use,” we found it “highly unlikely” that the Legislature 
nevertheless intended to preserve a court‟s broad discretion under section 1385.  
(Thomas, at p. 213; see People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 519-521.) 
                                              
6  
As discussed further below (see post, at pp. 10-11), former section 
1170.1(h) was repealed in 1997.   
9 
Even though an express reference to section 1385 is not required, Thomas 
recognized that any legislative intent to abrogate a trial court‟s section 1385 
discretion must be clear.  (Thomas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 208 [“we find clear 
legislative intent to withhold such authority”].)  This clear expression of intent 
may be found either in the relevant statutory language or in the statute‟s legislative 
or initiative history.  (Thomas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 211-213; see Romero, supra, 
13 Cal.4th 497; Fritz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 230; Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 
484.) 
With respect to section 186.22(g) at issue here, the People maintain that the 
legislative intent to withhold a trial court‟s section 1385 authority is reflected in 
section 186.22(g)‟s prefatory phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” which has 
been described as “ „a “ „ term of art‟ ” [citation] that declares the legislative intent 
to override all contrary law.‟ ”  (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 
983, quoting Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 5, 13, 
italics added in Arias.)  This “[n]otwithstanding” phrase means that “only those 
provisions of law that conflict with” section 186.22(g) — “not . . . every provision 
of law”— are inapplicable.  (Arias, at p. 983; cf. People v. Campos, supra, 196 
Cal.App.4th at p. 452.)  The People argue that such conflict does exist between 
section 186.22(g) and section 1385 because of their overlapping scope of authority 
when section 186.22(g) was enacted in 1988.  Defendant counters that “[s]ection 
186.22 was never intended to impact section 1385 powers and the latter are fully 
intact as against section 186.22 allegations.”     
In 1988, defendant maintains, section 1385 did not specifically allow a trial 
court to dismiss only the punishment for an enhancement; that express authority 
came over a decade later with the Legislature‟s enactment of section 1385(c)(1).  
(Stats. 2000, ch. 689, § 3, pp. 4558-4559.)  Thus, when enacted, section 186.22(g) 
(originally codified as § 186.22, subd. (d)), “complemented, rather than displaced, 
10 
section 1385(a) by granting the trial court such additional power.”  The People, 
however, describe this reasoning as based on a “technicality” and one that is 
“illusory,” and maintain a conflict did exist between section 1385 and section 
186.22 in 1988.  Notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of section 1385(c)(1), 
the People counter that section 1385(a), at all times relevant here, also included 
the discretion to strike just the punishment of an enhancement.  That discretion 
was also set out in former section 1170.1(h) with respect to certain enumerated 
enhancements, until it was repealed in 1997.  We briefly recount the relevant 
history below. 
When enacting section 1385(c)(1) in 2000, the Legislature explained that 
the legislation “would specifically confirm the discretion of the court to strike the 
punishment for an enhancement in the interests of justice pursuant to Penal Code 
section 1385.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1808 
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 31, 2000, p. 3, italics added (Analysis 
of Assembly Bill No. 1808).)  It would “clarif[y] that judges have power under 
Penal Code section 1385 to strike the punishment for an enhancement.”  (Id. at 
p. 7, italics added.)  Notwithstanding the existing discretion to strike an 
enhancement‟s punishment, the Legislature underscored it was necessary to 
“specifically set out” this authority within section 1385 because of lingering 
confusion caused by former section 1170.1(h) and its repeal several years earlier 
in 1997.  (Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1808, supra, at pp. 2, 7; see Stats. 1997, ch. 
750, § 3 [repealing § 1170.1(h)].) 
The Legislature explained that former section 1170.1(h) was “confusing, as 
it truly added little or nothing to a court’s power, since the court could dismiss 
punishment under Penal Code section 1385.”  (Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1808, 
supra, at p. 7, italics added; see Stats. 1997, ch. 750, § 9, p. 5069 [uncodified 
provision stating legislative intent is not to “alter the existing authority and 
11 
discretion of the court to strike those enhancements or to strike the additional 
punishment . . . pursuant to Section 1385].”)  The Legislature further found that, 
despite the repeal of former section 1170.1(h), trial courts may have nonetheless 
misunderstood this provision as “limiting their power to strike punishment for an 
enhancement that was not listed in section 1170.1.”  (Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 
1808, supra, at p. 7.)  This confusion seemingly persisted, warranting legislative 
clarification three years after the repeal.  (See People v. Bradley (1998) 64 
Cal.App.4th 386, 401.) 
Based on this legislative history, we agree with the People that trial courts 
already had the authority to strike just the punishment of a sentencing 
enhancement, even before section 1385(c)(1) was added in 2000.  Though this 
expression of intent came years after section 1385(a)‟s enactment, there is little 
doubt as to the Legislature‟s understanding that trial courts in 1988 had this 
authority.7  (See Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 
244 [court may use “ „subsequent expression of the Legislature as to the intent of 
the prior statute‟ ” to determine prior act‟s effect].)  However, even assuming that 
this legislative history shows that section 186.22(g) and section 1385 overlapped 
in terms of the scope of a trial court‟s discretion, it does not follow — as the 
People contend — that these provisions are “necessarily inconsistent” and that 
section 186.22(g) controls to the exclusion of section 1385.  (Romero, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 524; see Thomas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 213 [barring application of 
                                              
7  
Though this history does not reveal if the discretion to strike just the 
enhancement‟s punishment has implicitly existed since section 1385(a)‟s 
inception, the inference that this discretion could be recognized at least by the time 
the Legislature enacted the STEP Act is not unreasonable — section 1385 had 
remained unchanged from 1986 until 2000.  (Compare Stats. 2000, ch. 689, § 3, 
p. 4558 with Stats. 1986, ch. 85, § 2, p. 211.) 
12 
§ 1385 that “could effectively negate” Legislature‟s previous amendment of 
former § 1170.1(h)].)   
 
Relying on the statutory maxim that “ „the expression of one thing in a 
statute ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things‟ ” (People v. Guzman 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 588), the People assert that by virtue of delineating specific 
powers of the court to “strike the additional punishment for the enhancement” or 
“refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence” in 186.22(g), the Legislature 
provided direction to limit a court‟s general discretion over all gang 
enhancements.  (See Martello v. Superior Court (1927) 202 Cal. 400, 405 [with 
grant of powers “ „there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than 
the expressly granted power passes by the grant‟ ”].)  We rejected this very 
argument in Romero, declining to interpret any statute defining punishment for a 
crime “as implicitly eliminating” the court‟s discretion under section 1385.  
(Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 518, italics added.)  “This is because the statutory 
power to dismiss in furtherance of justice has always coexisted with statutes 
defining punishment and must be reconciled with the latter.  (See Stats. 1850, 
ch. 119, § 629, p. 323.)”  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 518.)  Thus, while 
helpful in ascertaining legislative intent in most cases, statutory maxims have 
limited utility in this context; these tools of interpretation cannot take the place of 
the “ „clear legislative direction‟ ” that trial courts are divested of their section 
1385 discretion.  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.)  In sum, we conclude that 
the Legislature‟s inclusion in 186.22(g) of the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other 
law,” together with the provision‟s specific punishments for certain gang 
13 
enhancements and alternate penalty provisions, “falls short” of the requisite clear 
direction.  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.)8  
 
This conclusion appears inescapable when we consider the “long history of 
dispute among the various branches of state government over the application of 
section 1385 to sentencing allegations.”  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 521-
522.)  For example, our decisions in Williams and Fritz — which were both 
decided shortly before the STEP Act‟s enactment — provide unique insight into 
the issue here.  (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 
43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [considering “the wider historical circumstances of 
[statute‟s] enactment” to determine legislative intent].)  These decisions, as we 
explain, underscore that in light of section 1385‟s “prominent and contentious 
history” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 521), it is critical and even “demanded,” 
that the legislative intent to divest a court of its section 1385 discretion be 
abundantly clear.  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 518-519.)  
In Williams, a 1981 decision, this court held that trial courts had discretion 
under section 1385 to dismiss a special circumstance finding under the 1978 death 
penalty statute (former §§ 190-190.5) in order to modify a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole.  (Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 482 [“Section 
1385 permits dismissals in the interest of justice in any situation where the 
Legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent.”].)  We found no 
“ „unmistakable clarity‟ ” within the death penalty statute to limit a trial court‟s 
section 1385 power to dismiss special circumstance findings.  (Williams, at 
                                              
8  
We disapprove People v. Campos, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 438, to the 
extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.  (See id. at pp. 451-452 [“the enactment 
of section 186.22, subdivision (g) provides the clear legislative direction needed to 
eliminate courts‟ power to use section 1385 to dismiss or strike gang allegations 
and enhancements and to refuse to impose gang alternate penalties”].)    
14 
p. 484.)  Further, we discerned “no indication of contrary legislative intent” (ibid.), 
nor anything “unique to this death penalty statute which prevents the application 
of section 1385.”  (Id. at p. 485.)9    
Several years later, we held in Fritz that trial courts had authority to strike 
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) — which mandated a five-year 
enhancement for each conviction — in “furtherance of justice” pursuant to section 
1385.  (Fritz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 229.)  In so holding, we explained that our 
then-recent opinions “sent an unmistakable signal to drafters of sentencing 
provisions of the need to include clear language eliminating a section 1385 
authority whenever such elimination is intended.  Williams explains that absent a 
clear expression of legislative intent in this regard, a sentencing statute will not be 
construed to abrogate a trial court‟s general section 1385 power to strike.”  (Fritz, 
supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 230; see Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d 470.)  We found no 
such “clear expression” abrogating a trial court‟s section 1385 discretion within 
the provisions at issue, section 667 and California Constitution, article I, section 
28, former subdivision (f).  (Fritz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 230.)  The next year, the 
Legislature responded decisively by adding subdivision (b) to section 1385:  “This 
section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious felony 
for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section 667.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 
85, § 2, p. 211; see id., § 3, pp. 211-212.)  “Section 1385(b) was enacted by the 
Legislature „expressly for the purpose of abrogating People v. Fritz.‟ ”  (Romero, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 526.) 
                                              
9  
Almost a decade later, however, the electorate limited, but did not abolish, 
this power to dismiss a special circumstance allegation by adding section 1385.1, 
which prohibits trial courts from striking a special circumstance after it has been 
admitted or found true.  (§ 1385.1, added by initiative, Primary Elec. (June 5, 
1990) [Prop. 115, § 26]; see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 521.) 
15 
These pre-STEP Act decisions emphasize that the Legislature understands 
its obligation, and certainly knows how to achieve its goal, if it wishes to divest  
trial courts of their section 1385 discretion.  Significantly, the Legislature did not 
provide the clear direction necessary to abrogate this discretion when it enacted 
section 186.22(g)‟s predecessor.  We therefore conclude that trial courts possess 
the section 1385 discretion to strike a gang-related enhancement alleged under 
section 186.22(b).  (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.)  
The People maintain that allowing trial courts to strike gang enhancements 
entirely, instead of striking just the enhancements‟ punishment, will undermine the 
efficacy of the STEP Act, making it harder for the prosecution to prove patterns of 
criminal gang activity.  Because “legislative intent is the governing consideration” 
here (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 527), and we have found no intent to divest 
trial courts of their section 1385 authority, these public policy arguments are best 
directed to the Legislature.  The People do not point to anything in the STEP Act‟s 
legislative history, nor anything “unique to this [statutory scheme] which prevents 
the application of section 1385.”  (Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 485.)  We are 
confident that in STEP Act cases, as in other cases,“[t]he wise use of [the section 
1385] power will promote the administration of justice by ensuring that persons 
are sentenced based on the particular facts of the offense and all the circumstances.  
It enables the punishment to fit the crime as well as the perpetrator.”  (Williams, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 489.)  
CONCLUSION 
As noted, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court had discretion 
to dismiss the gang enhancement allegation under section 1385(a), but remanded 
the matter to allow the trial court to provide written reasons for the dismissal in the 
court‟s minutes.  Though we affirm the Court of Appeal‟s judgment, we conclude 
that remand to the trial court is unnecessary.  “ „If the judgment is not yet final 
16 
because it is on appeal, the appellate court has a duty to apply the law as it exists 
when the appellate court renders its decision. [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Jones 
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 92, 96 [concluding remand not required under current 
version of § 1385(a)].)  The current version of section 1385(a) does not require a 
trial court to place its reasons in an order entered upon the minutes at the time of 
sentencing, unless a party so requests or if the proceeding is unrecorded or 
unreported.  (See ante, at p. 3, fn. 2.)  Because the trial court orally stated its 
reasons for dismissing the gang enhancement on the record, which was 
transcribed, and no party requested that the reasons be placed in the minutes, 
remand is not required.  (People v. Jones, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.) 
We affirm the Court of Appeal‟s judgment and remand the matter with 
directions to affirm the trial court‟s judgment.  
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Fuentes 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 225 Cal.App.4th 1283 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219109 
Date Filed: July 21, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Nicholas S. Thompson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, 
Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Steven T. Oetting, Lise Jacobson and Kristen Kinnaird 
Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General; Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and David R. Gallivan, Deputy 
District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Frank Ospino, Public Defender, Jean Wilkinson, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Mark S. Brown, Assistant 
Public Defender, and Miles David Jessup, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 525-4232 
 
Miles David Jessup 
Deputy Public Defender 
14 Civic Center Plaza 
Santa Ana, CA  92701-4029 
(714) 834-2144