Case Title: FENDER v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-29

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
FENDER v. STATE2003 WY 9674 P.3d 1220Case Number: 02-29Decided: 08/19/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

EDWARD 
A. FENDER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Will Bierman, Deputy Public Defender.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; 
GOLDEN, 
Justice, filed a dissenting opinion.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Edward A. Fender 
(appellant) entered a conditional "no contest" plea to possession of marijuana 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2003), a 
misdemeanor.  On appeal, appellant 
challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress a baggie of 
marijuana seized from his pants pocket.  
We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant phrases 
the issues on appeal as follows:

 

Whether 
the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Fender's motion to suppress because (1) 
his presence as a passenger in a car in which two other occupants were arrested 
on outstanding warrants for failure to appear did not provide reasonable 
articulable suspicion to warrant a pat-down search and (2) the pocket bulge seen 
and felt by the officer could not have appeared to be a 
weapon?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      At approximately 
7:19 p.m. on June 30, 2001, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Douglas Deskin 
(Deskin) stopped a gold Chrysler Sebring for speeding on Wyoming Highway 113 in 
Crook County.1  The vehicle contained four male 
occupants.  Deskin contacted the 
driver, Michael Stensland (Stensland), age eighteen, who informed the officer 
that he did not have a driver's license with him, but provided the officer his 
name and date of birth.  Deskin 
noticed a "slight odor" of alcohol about Stensland, and in determining whether 
Stensland had a valid driver's license, Deskin discovered an active "failure to 
appear" warrant for Stensland's arrest in Crook County.  Deskin requested backup assistance, and 
once another officer arrived, Deskin approached Stensland, informed him of the 
warrant, arrested him, and placed him into Deskin's patrol 
vehicle.

 

[¶4]      Stensland stated 
that he wanted the Sebring's right rear passenger to drive the Sebring in 
Stensland's absence.  That 
passenger, Nathan Luth (Luth), age nineteen, provided Deskin a driver's license, 
and in determining whether the license was valid,2 Deskin discovered an active 
"failure to appear" warrant for Luth's arrest in Campbell County.  Deskin noticed a "smell" of alcohol 
about Luth, informed him of the warrant, and arrested him.  In searching Luth's person, Deskin 
discovered ZigZag paper and a  
"warm" tin can containing a green leafy substance Deskin believed to be 
marijuana and the endings of three joints, a "little smoke coming off of the 
butts as if they were just smoked."  
Deskin had Luth sit on the ground near the right front of Deskin's patrol 
vehicle.

 

[¶5]      For "officer 
safety," Deskin then contacted the Sebring's left rear passenger, appellant, age 
twenty-one, while the other officer simultaneously contacted the Sebring's right 
front passenger, Rickie Fischer (Fischer).  
Appellant gave Deskin a South Carolina driver's license.  Deskin asked appellant to "step out" of 
the vehicle and at some point placed appellant in handcuffs for "officer 
safety."  Deskin then overheard that 
the other officer had discovered an active "failure to appear" warrant for 
Fischer's arrest in Campbell County.

 

[¶6]      Deskin decided to 
initiate a "pat down search" of appellant "to see if he had any weapons or 
anything that could" be "used against" the officers.  Deskin visually noticed a bulge in 
appellant's left front pocket.  
Deskin testified as follows regarding his pat-down of appellant's 
pants:

 

Q.        What 
did you feel when you did that?

 

A.        There 
was a bulge in the front of his pants that could have been almost anything.  It could resemble anything from loose 
change to something within his pants to a knife.  I had no idea what it 
was.

 

Q.        So 
what did you do?

 

A.        I 
reached inside to determine what was inside of his pants and pulled out a baggy 
full of green leafy material which I recognized from my training as 
marihuana.

 

Appellant 
was ultimately arrested.  A search 
of the vehicle yielded two twelve-packs of beer, a marijuana pipe or 
paraphernalia, and a baggy containing a crystal substance later identified as 
tree resin.  According to Deskin, 
appellant admitted that the pipe was his.

 

[¶7]      Appellant moved 
to suppress the baggie Deskin discovered in appellant's pants pocket.  After a hearing, during which hearing 
the district court heard Deskin's testimony and trial counsel's argument based 
on that testimony, the district court denied the motion.  The district court found that the search 
"for weapons was a reasonable search under the circumstances" and, relying on 
Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158 (Wyo. 1996), 
stated that the "concern for officer safety in the context of a lawful arrest 
allows an officer the right to frisk companions of an arrestee for the possible 
concealment of weapons."

 

[¶8]      Appellant 
subsequently entered a conditional "no contest" plea (preserving his right to 
appeal the district court's suppression ruling) to possession of marijuana in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A), a misdemeanor, and appeals 
from the judgment and sentence issued pursuant to that 
plea.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      Our standard of 
review is as follows:

 

Findings 
on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress 
are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
218 (Wyo.1994).  Since the district 
court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional 
rights, is reviewed de novo.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo.1997).

 

McChesney 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   Appellant argues that Deskin's 
pat-down of appellant was based on "no more than [appellant's] association" with 
the vehicle's other occupants, not a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
appellant was armed or dangerous, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4.  A great deal of appellant's argument 
concerns the propriety of evaluating the circumstances of the instant case 
according to what appellant characterizes as a literal or categorical 
application of the so-called "automatic-companion rule'" referenced in 
Perry, 927 P.2d 1158, 
as opposed to a "totality of the circumstances" approach, which approach 
appellant advocates.  However, the 
State does not argue that the pat-down of appellant was justified by a literal 
or categorical application of the automatic companion rule, but rather that the 
pat-down was reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances.

 

[¶11]   We will first resolve appellant's 
arguments regarding Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4.3  "A state constitutional analysis is 
required unless a party desires to have an issue decided solely under the 
Federal Constitution."  Damato v. 
State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003).  Appellant argues that a "categorical" 
approach based on the automatic companion rule is inconsistent with Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 4 because in Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 
1999), 
this Court interpreted that section to provide greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and rejected a bright-line or 
categorical approach in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach.  Since the State has not advocated for 
such a categorical approach, we need not address this 
argument.

 

[¶12]   Appellant also summarily argues 
that merely because Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 has been interpreted to provide 
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
based on the issues presented in Vasquez, Deskin's pat-down in the 
instant case violated the Wyoming Constitution.  Appellant's analysis on this issue does 
not constitute the "precise, analytically sound approach [required] when 
advancing an argument to independently interpret the state constitution."  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 
484.  A failure to present proper argument 
supporting "adequate and independent state grounds,' . . . prevents this court, 
as a matter of policy, from considering other than the federal constitutional 
principles at issue . . .."  
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 
(1983)).  See also Meek v. State, 2002 WY 
1, ¶ 7 n.2, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 n.2 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶13]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures 
. . .."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Generally, the "three tiers of 
police-citizen encounters" include

 

"communication 
between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore 
without the compass of the Fourth Amendment, brief seizures' that must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion, and full-scale arrests that must be supported 
by probable cause."

 

Perry, 
927 P.2d at 1163 (quoting United States v. 
Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982)).

 

An 
investigatory or Terry stop represents a seizure which implicates the 
Fourth Amendment, requiring the presence of specific, articulable facts and 
rational inferences giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed or may be committing a crime.  
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo.1994) (citing Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)); see also 
McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).  There is a dual inquiry for evaluating 
the reasonableness of an investigatory stop:  (1) whether the officer's actions were 
justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
instance.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  
at 223 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985) and Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at 
1879)).  The conduct of an officer 
is judged by an objective standard which takes into account the totality of the 
circumstances.  Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 
965 (10th Cir.1996).

 

Putnam 
v. State, 
995 P.2d 632, 637 (Wyo. 2000).  Appellant does not question the 
propriety of the initial stop or whether Deskin's actions were justified at the 
inception of the encounter.

 

[¶14]   In making a routine traffic 
stop,

 

"a 
law enforcement officer may: request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration; run a computer check; and issue a citation."  Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo.1998) (citing United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 
(10th Cir.1997)); see also, Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
224.  Generally, the driver must be 
allowed to proceed without further delay once the officer determines that the 
driver has a valid license and is entitled to operate the vehicle.  Burgos-Seberos, 969 P.2d  at 
1133.  "In the absence of the 
particular individual's valid consent, an officer may expand an investigative 
detention only if there exists an objectively reasonable and articulable 
suspicion' that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring."  United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 
122 S. Ct. 1610, 152 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2002) (citing United States v. 
Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.1998)).  . . .

 

. 
. . [A]n officer . . . may conduct a pat-down search if he or she harbors an 
articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and 
dangerous.  Knowles v. Iowa, 
525 U.S. 113, 117-18, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998) (citing 
[Pennsylvania v.] Mimms, 434 U.S. [106] at 111, 98 S.Ct. [330] at 
334-35 [54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977)], and Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 
1883).  . . .

 

. 
. .

 

We 
find that the analysis of the factors supporting reasonable suspicion should be 
governed by United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th 
Cir.1997).  As the Tenth Circuit 
stated in Wood, we must determine if the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrates the existence of objectively reasonable suspicion . . ..  Id. at 946.

 

"The 
whole picture' must be taken into account.  Common sense and ordinary human 
experience are to be employed, and deference is to be accorded a law enforcement 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.  Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized 
hunches, however, do not provide reasonable suspicion.  Even though reasonable suspicion may be 
founded upon factors consistent with innocent travel, some facts must be 
outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations as 
to be innocuous.  We therefore 
examine, both individually and in the aggregate, the factors found by the 
trooper and the district court to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain . 
. .."

 

                        
Id.  . . 
.

 

The 
Court has said:

 

"Articulating 
precisely what reasonable suspicion' and probable cause' mean is not 
possible.  They are commonsense, 
nontechnical conceptions that deal with "the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act."'  Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) 
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 
1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)); see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
7-8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585-1586, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).  As such, the standards are not readily, 
or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'  Gates, supra, at 232, 103 S. Ct.  at 2329.  We have described 
reasonable suspicion simply as "a particularized and objective basis" for 
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-696, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 
(1981), and probable cause to search as existing where the known facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the 
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, see 
Brinegar, supra, at 175-176, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-1311; Gates, 
supra, at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 2332."

 

Ornelas 
v. United States, 
517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 
(1996).

 

            
The Tenth Circuit has recently distinguished between reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause:

 

"Reasonable 
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense 
that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different 
in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also 
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less 
reliable than that required to show probable cause."

 

United 
States v. Tuter, 
240 F.3d 1292, 1296 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 886, 122 S. Ct. 195, 151 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2001) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)).

 

Damato, 
2003 WY 13, ¶¶ 13-18, 64 P.3d  at 706-08.

 

[¶15]   Deskin stopped the vehicle, 
containing four male occupants traveling together, for speeding at an evening 
hour on what appears to have been a rural highway in Crook County.  The officer determined that the driver, 
age eighteen, and the right rear passenger, age nineteen, were both subjects of 
active arrest warrants.  Both 
individuals also smelled of alcohol, and the right rear passenger possessed a 
tin can containing suspected marijuana and the endings of three "joints" with 
"smoke coming off of the butts as if they were just 
smoked."

 

[¶16]   Deskin asked appellant, the left 
rear passenger, to step out of the vehicle and appellant produced a South 
Carolina driver's license.  An 
"officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car 
pending completion of the stop."  
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).

 

On 
the public interest side of the balance, the same weighty interest in officer 
safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a 
driver or passenger.  Regrettably, 
traffic stops may be dangerous encounters.  
. . . In the case of passengers, the danger of the officer's standing in 
the path of oncoming traffic would not be present except in the case of a 
passenger in the left rear seat, but the fact that there is more than one 
occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources of harm to the 
officer.

 

On 
the personal liberty side of the balance, the case for the passengers is in one 
sense stronger than that for the driver.  
There is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor 
vehicular offense, but there is no such reason to stop or detain the 
passengers.  But as a practical 
matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the 
vehicle.  The only change in their 
circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they 
will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car.  Outside the car, the passengers will be 
denied access to any possible weapon that might be concealed in the interior of 
the passenger compartment.  It would 
seem that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary 
reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that 
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.  And the motivation of a passenger to 
employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as 
that of the driver.

 

. 
. .

 

In 
summary, danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when 
there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.  While there is not the same basis for 
ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, 
the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.

 

Id. 
at 413-15 (footnote omitted).

 

[¶17]   At some point thereafter, Deskin 
also placed appellant in handcuffs for "officer safety."  Appellant does not argue that placing 
appellant in handcuffs transformed the encounter to that of a full-scale arrest 
and, except for one isolated, conclusory statement in his appellate brief, 
appellant does not otherwise question the officer's use of 
handcuffs.

 

In 
Terry, the Supreme Court of the United States forcefully relied upon the 
necessity to preserve officer safety in potentially explosive 
situations:

 

"In 
addition [to the government's interest in investigating crime], there is 
the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to 
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a 
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.  Certainly it would be unreasonable to 
require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their 
duties."

 

Terry, 
392 U.S.  at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881[.]

 

Perry, 
927 P.2d at 1164 (emphasis in original).  "Since police officers should not be 
required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are 
"authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their 
personal safety and maintain the status quo during the course of [a 
Terry] stop."'"  
Putnam, 995 P.2d at 637-38 (quoting United States v. 
Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 966 (10th Cir. 1996)); 
see also United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th 
Cir. 1996).  Because "safety may require the police 
to freeze temporarily a potentially dangerous situation, both the display of 
firearms and the use of handcuffs may be part of a reasonable Terry 
stop."  United States v. 
Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993).

 

"[T]he 
use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques does not necessarily 
transform a Terry detention into a full custodial arrestfor which 
probable cause is requiredwhen the circumstances reasonably warrant such 
measures."  United States v. 
Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir.1994) . . ..  Such measures are warranted however, 
only if "the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate."  Id. . . ..

 

Shareef, 
100 F.3d  at 1502; 
see also Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, ¶ 16, 67 P.3d 635, 640 (Wyo. 
2003); 
Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997); 
and United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1993).  In determining whether an officer's 
conduct during an investigatory stop is reasonable, a court "should take care 
to consider whether police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in 
such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.'"  Shareef, 100 F.3d at 
1505 (quoting United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.E.2d 605 
(1985)).  A "Terry investigation . . . 
involves a police investigation at close range,' Terry, 392 U.S., at 24, 
when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a 
full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a quick 
decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger . . 
..'"  Long, 463 U.S. at 
1052 (emphasis in 
original).

 

[¶18]   Considering the totality of the 
circumstances at this point in the encounter, and especially appellant's lack of 
cogent argument on the issue, we do not feel compelled to second-guess the 
officer's decision in the instant case that his safety required briefly 
handcuffing appellant.  We also note 
how apparently swiftly the situation developed from a stop for a speeding 
violation to one involving alcohol consumption, evidence of marijuana use and 
possession, and the officer's discovery that first the driver, and also the 
right rear passenger, were the subjects of active arrest warrants.  Our consideration of these circumstances 
does not mean that law enforcement is automatically authorized to employ 
restrictive procedures of this nature in every investigatory 
detention.

 

[¶19]   Deskin then learned that the right 
front passenger, too, was the subject of an active arrest warrant, and also 
visually noticed a suspicious bulge in appellant's left front pocket.  By this time, the existing circumstances 
included the following:

 

1.         
Deskin stopped the vehicle for speeding at an evening hour on what 
appears to have been a rural highway.

 

2.         
The vehicle contained four male occupants.  Until appellant was ultimately arrested 
for the instant offense, only two law enforcement officers were present during 
the encounter with the vehicle's four occupants.

 

3.         
The four occupants were traveling together in the confined space of the 
vehicle and were expecting "a good evening at the lake . . .."  The driver, age eighteen, and the right 
rear passenger, age nineteen, smelled of alcohol.  The right rear passenger possessed a 
"warm" can containing suspected marijuana and the ends of three 
"joints" with smoke coming off them "as if they were just smoked." Appellant was 
the left rear passenger. 4

 

4.         
The vehicle's driver, right front passenger, and right rear passenger 
were the subjects of active arrest warrants for failure to 
appear.

 

5.         
In close proximity to appellant, Deskin visually noticed a suspicious 
bulge in appellant's left front pocket. 5

 

[¶20]   We find that the totality of the 
circumstances, and the rational inferences accompanying them, objectively 
demonstrate the requisite level of suspicion for Deskin to have determined 
whether appellant indeed possessed a weapon of some kind.  Such a pat-down "necessitates a limited 
intrusion extending to the officer the power to take necessary measures to 
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the 
threat of physical harm.'"  
Perry, 927 P.2d at 1164 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).  Accordingly, Deskin acted reasonably in 
conducting the pat-down of appellant's pants, and it did not exceed the scope of 
the circumstances which justified the interference.

 

"The 
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue 
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in 
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.  . . .  And in determining whether the officer 
acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given . . . to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience."

 

Putnam, 
995 P.2d at 637 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
27).

 

[¶21]   Appellant next argues that even if 
Deskin acted reasonably in conducting the pat-down, the officer "had no basis to 
extend that into a search of [appellant's] pocket and a seizure of its 
contents."  According to appellant, 
neither Deskin's "description of what he felt, nor what he actually removed from 
[appellant's] pocket, supports the conclusion that before he searched the 
pocket he believed it contained a weapon."  
(Emphasis in original.)

 

[¶22]   In Perry, 927 P.2d  at 
1164-65, 
we stated the following:

 

The 
pat-down search itself, however, must "be confined in scope to an intrusion 
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments 
for the assault of the police officer."  
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 29, 88 S. Ct.  at 1884.

 

The 
law does not require the officer to be absolutely certain the object felt is a 
weapon.  A leading treatise sets out 
the appropriate standard.

 

"Under 
the better view, then, a search is not permissible when the object felt is soft 
in nature.  If the object felt is 
hard, then the question is whether its size or density' is such that it might 
be a weapon.  But because weapons 
are not always of an easily discernable shape,' it is not inevitably essential 
that the officer feel the outline of a pistol or something of that nature.  Somewhat more leeway must be allowed 
upon the feeling of a hard object of substantial size, the precise shape or 
nature of which is not discernible through outer clothing,' * * 
*."

 

Wayne 
R. Lafave & Jerold H. Israel, Search and Seizure § 9.5(c) (3d 
ed.1996).

 

In 
Perry, the officer "encountered a hard object, approximately five inches 
long and three-quarters of an inch wide" and testified that he "didn't know" if 
the object was a weapon.  
Perry, 927 P.2d  at 1164.  We found that because the object the 
officer encountered was "a hard object of substantial size" with an imprecise 
shape or nature "not discernable through outer clothing," the object "reasonably 
could have been a weapon" and the officer was "justified in determining whether 
it was or not."  Id. at 
1165.

 

[¶23]   The district court found in the 
instant case that Deskin discovered a "large bulge" in appellant's left front 
pocket.  Deskin did not testify that 
the bulge was "large" per se, but that the bulge he felt "could resemble 
anything from loose change to something within his pants to a knife."  Although more precise testimony would 
have been helpful in evaluating this issue, it is rational to infer from the 
officer's testimony that the object in appellant's pants pocket was hard (the 
object felt as if it could have been loose change or a knife, both of which 
items possess characteristics indicative of a hard object), was of a size or 
density that it could have been a knife, and that the object's precise shape or 
nature was not discernible through appellant's clothing.  Based on the facts presented in the 
instant case, we conclude that the object reasonably could have been a weapon 
such as some form of a knife, and Deskin was justified in determining whether it 
was indeed a weapon.

 

[¶24]   Affirmed.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., 
dissenting.

 

[¶25]       
Although 
I agree with the Court's opinion on the first issue, I respectfully disagree 
with its opinion on the second issue.  
Officer Deskin testified that when he patted down Mr. Fender he felt "a 
bulge . . . that could have been almost anything . . . from loose change to 
something within his pants to a knife.  
I had no idea what it was."  
Without further probing the contour or mass of the unseen but felt object 
until he negated the possibility that Mr. Fender possessed a knife or some other 
such obvious weapon that Mr. Fender could use to harm the officer, which 
additional probing is not prohibited by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993), Officer Deskin reached into Mr. 
Fender's pocket and pulled out a baggy containing a green leafy 
substance.

 

[¶26]       
I 
agree with the Court's statement that "more precise testimony would have been 
helpful in evaluating this issue."  
I disagree with the Court's statement that "it is rational to infer from 
the officer's testimony that the object in [Mr. Fender's] pants pocket was hard 
(the object felt as if it could have been loose change or a knife, both of which 
items possess characteristics indicative of a hard object), was of a size or 
density that it could have been a knife . . . ."  I disagree that it is rational to infer 
from the officer's ambiguous and equivocal testimony that the object was 
hard.  The officer testified that 
the bulge "could have been almost anything from . . . loose change to 
something within his pants to a knife.  I had no idea what it was."  (Emphasis supplied).  The officer's testimony reveals nothing 
about the object's size, shape, density or rigidity.  Because the test is an objective one, I 
am unable to conclude from such ambiguous and equivocal testimony that a 
reasonable officer in those circumstances would have believed that the item 
could likely be a weapon.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1According to Deskin, due to a 
fireworks display at Keyhole Reservoir on that date, he was patrolling Highway 
113 with stationary radar.  Highway 
113 is a "byway from U.S. 14 to Pine Haven or also to the 
reservoir."

  2Deskin "wanted to make sure he has a 
valid driver's license so that he can drive the car.  I didn't want somebody who was suspended 
or had an expired license to operate that vehicle."

  3Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 
provides:

 

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 

  4"It is logical and completely 
reasonable to infer that a person under the influence may be more likely to 
commit an impulsive violent act against a police officer than one who is 
sober."  State v. McGill, 
2000 WI 38, ¶ 31, 234 Wis.2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795, 803, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 906 (2000).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court went on to 
state that the "odor of intoxicants and marijuana (and the commonsense inference 
that the defendant was under the influence and therefore potentially more 
dangerous to the officer) represents only one piece of the total factual picture 
here and therefore only part of the . . . justification for this frisk."  Id., 2000 WI 38, ¶ 31 n.3, 609 N.W.2d  at 803 n.3.  Similarly, if an 
individual had been consuming alcoholic beverages, "his judgment might have been 
impaired and his inhibitions reduced.  
In such a state [he] might be more likely to resort to violence as a 
perceived solution to the apparent impending . . . investigation."  United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 955, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993).

 

            
See generally United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 570-71 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 908 
(2001) and People v. Hardrick, 60 P.3d 264, 267-68 (Colo. 2002) ("although no weapons were found at the 
scene, drugs were found, thus increasing the risk of 
violence").

5

But 
assume arguendo that we were now to hold that, under Terry, the police 
could not frisk [an individual] once he was handcuffed; and further assume that 
the police could not otherwise develop probable cause sufficient to arrest him, 
but that they still had reasonable grounds to believe that he was armed and 
presently dangerous.  What options 
would remain?  Clearly, the police 
could not keep [the individual] handcuffed indefinitely.  But neither could they simply remove the 
handcuffs, for then the danger would return in full force, again justifying the 
officers' frisking of [the individual] for weapons.  Continuing, if the officers were again 
to handcuff [the individual] so that they could accomplish the frisk in relative 
safety, the danger justifying a frisk would again cease to exist.  The circular nature of this premise is 
obvious and need not be pursued ad absurdum, for it is built on a flawed 
foundation.

 

[The] 
argument is entirely dependent on the assumption that, by handcuffing a suspect, 
the police instantly and completely eliminate all risks that the suspect will 
flee or do them harm.  As is sadly 
borne out in the statistics for police officers killed and assaulted in the line 
of duty each year, however, this assumption has no basis in 
fact.

 

Handcuffs 
are a temporary restraining device; they limit but do not eliminate a person's 
ability to perform various acts.  
They obviously do not impair a person's ability to use his legs and feet, 
whether to walk, run, or kick.  
Handcuffs do limit a person's ability to use his hands and arms, but the 
degree of the effectiveness of handcuffs in this role depends on a variety of 
factors, including the handcuffed person's size, strength, bone and joint 
structure, flexibility, and tolerance of pain.  Albeit difficult, it is by no means 
impossible for a handcuffed person to obtain and use a weapon concealed on his 
person or within lunge reach, and in so doing to cause injury to his intended 
victim, to a bystander, or even to himself.  Finally, like any mechanical device, 
handcuffs can and do fail on occasion.

 

Sanders, 
994 F.2d at 209 (footnotes 
omitted).