Case Title: J.M. v. Gargett

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-611

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-611 
____________ 
 
J.M., A CHILD, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FRANK GARGETT, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 4, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in J.M. v. Gargett, 53 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).  
In its opinion, the Second District certified conflict with the decision of the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal in M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  The decisions of the 
Second and Fifth Districts are in conflict as to the sanctions that may be imposed 
under section 985.037(2), Florida Statutes (2010), when a juvenile is found to be in 
indirect contempt of court for multiple violations of a single probation order.  For 
 
 
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the reasons set forth in this opinion, we approve the decision of the Second District 
in J.M. and disapprove the decision of the Fifth District in M.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
 
Petitioner J.M., a juvenile, challenges the denial of his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus by the Second District Court of Appeal.  The facts of the case were 
set forth as follows in the opinion of the Second District: 
J.M. was placed on juvenile probation on October 13, 2010.  On 
October 25, 2010, the circuit court filed the first, second, and third 
orders to show cause.  In the first, J.M. was ordered to show cause 
why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt[1] for failing 
to follow the order of probation by violating curfew on October 15, 
2010.  The second order was directed to an October 16, 2010, 
violation of curfew, and the third was directed to an October 16, 2010, 
failure to obey household rules.  At a November 8, 2010, hearing, 
J.M. pleaded guilty to all three charges.  On that same date, the circuit 
court placed J.M. in secure detention for five days for the first offense 
of indirect criminal contempt.  However, on November 10 the circuit 
court placed J.M. in fifteen days’ secure detention for the second 
offense.  The second period of secure detention was not to commence 
until the first period had expired. 
 
J.M., 53 So. 3d  at 1246. 
On November 15, 2010, J.M. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
Second District, arguing that his sentence was illegal under section 985.037, 
                                          
 
 
1.  “ ‘Indirect’ contempt occurs when the contemptuous act is committed 
outside the presence of the court.”  A.A. v. Rolle, 604 So. 2d 813, 814 n.3 (Fla. 
1992) (citing Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1997)), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, see G.S. v. State, 709 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).    
“ ‘Direct’ contempt,” by contrast, “occurs when the act constituting the contempt is 
committed in the immediate presence of the court.”  Id. at 814 n.5. 
 
 
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Florida Statutes (2010).  The statute provides in pertinent part:  “A delinquent child 
who has been held in direct or indirect contempt may be placed in a secure 
detention facility not to exceed 5 days for a first offense and not to exceed 15 days 
for a second or subsequent offense.”  § 985.037(2), Fla. Stat. (2010).2  In his 
habeas petition, J.M. cited M.P., 988 So. 2d at 1266, in which the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal held that section 985.037 does not authorize a trial court to impose 
consecutive sentences of secure detention for multiple violations of a single 
probation order. 
In its opinion denying relief, the Second District first acknowledged that the 
facts of M.P. were nearly identical to those in J.M.’s case.  See J.M., 53 So. 3d at 
1246.  In M.P., a juvenile was charged with two counts of indirect criminal 
contempt based on two violations of a single probation order.  The trial court 
sentenced M.P. to five days’ detention for the first count, three of which were 
suspended, and fifteen days’ detention for the second count, which were fully 
suspended.  See M.P., 988 So. 2d at 1266.  M.P. appealed, challenging her 
sentence as unauthorized by section 985.037.  The Fifth District agreed with M.P. 
and reversed the trial court.   In reaching its decision, the Fifth District cited 
Williams v. State, 594 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1992), in which this Court defined 
                                          
 
 
2.  Chapter 985 defines a “[s]ecure detention center or facility” as “a 
physically restricting facility for the temporary care of children, pending 
adjudication, disposition, or placement.”  § 985.03(47), Fla. Stat. (2010). 
 
 
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“multiple probation violations” as “successive violations which follow the 
reinstatement or modification of probation rather than the violation of several 
conditions of a single probation order.”  M.P., 988 So. 2d at 1267 (quoting 
Williams, 594 So. 2d at 274 n.3).  Based on Williams, the Fifth District reasoned 
that under section 985.037(2), the trial court was permitted to impose only a single 
sentence of five days’ detention for M.P.’s violation of the probation order.  The 
Fifth District concluded, “In the event that M.P. was restored to probation after her 
release from secure detention, any future violation would be considered a ‘second 
or subsequent offense’ and could subject her to a fifteen-day placement in secure 
detention.”  M.P., 988 So. 2d at 1267.3 
In J.M., the Second District disagreed with the Fifth District’s interpretation 
of section 985.037 and instead followed the decision of the First District in K.Q.S. 
v. State, 975 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), which likewise addressed the 
sanctions that may be imposed under section 985.037, Florida Statutes (2007).  See 
J.M., 53 So. 3d at 1247.  The First District stated in K.Q.S.: 
Although section 985.037 limits a sentence for a second or 
subsequent offense to fifteen days, nothing in the statute states that 
multiple instances of direct contempt cannot be separately punished 
                                          
 
 
3.  In reaching its decision, the Fifth District followed its prior holding in 
J.D. v. State, 954 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), in which the court similarly held 
that it was error under section 985.216 for a trial court to impose consecutive 
sentences for multiple violations of a single probation order. Id. at 94 n.2 (noting 
that section 985.216 was renumbered as section 985.037, effective Jan. 1, 2007). 
 
 
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with consecutive sentences of fifteen days of confinement for each 
offense.  In fact, the statute specifically states that a sentence of fifteen 
days may be imposed for a “second or subsequent” offense.  We find 
that the plain meaning of the statute allows a trial court to impose a 
sentence of 15 days for each instance of contempt, consecutively if it 
so wishes. 
 
975 So. 2d at 538 (citation omitted). 
The Second District further disagreed with the Fifth District that M.P., 
which involved a revocation of probation proceeding in a criminal case, applied to 
violations of juvenile probation. J.M., 53 So. 2d at 1247. The Second District noted 
that proceedings concerning violations of criminal probation are initiated by the 
filing of an affidavit, whereas a juvenile contempt proceeding is initiated by an 
order to show cause as to why the juvenile should not be held in indirect criminal 
contempt.  See J.M., 53 So. 3d at 1247.  The Second District concluded: 
We do not agree with the Fifth District that the law regarding 
violations of criminal probation governs in this instance.  Instead, we 
look to the law on indirect criminal contempt.  We note that a trial 
court may, in a single proceeding, adjudicate a defendant guilty of 
multiple instances of indirect criminal contempt and may thereafter 
impose consecutive sentences for each conviction.  See, e.g., Attwood 
v. State, 687 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).  We see nothing in 
section 985.037(2) that prohibits the circuit court from doing so in the 
present case. 
 
Id. at 1247-48. 
Accordingly, the Second District denied J.M.’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and certified conflict with the Fifth District’s decision in M.P., and J.M. 
subsequently filed a petition for review in this Court.  We granted review, 
 
 
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dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.320.  See J.M. v. Gargett, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011).4 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue presented in this case is whether section 985.037, Florida Statutes 
(2010), authorizes a trial court to sentence a juvenile to consecutive periods in a 
secure detention facility where the juvenile has committed multiple violations of a 
single probation order.  The statute provides in relevant part: 
(1)  Contempt of court; legislative intent.—The court may 
punish any child for contempt for interfering with the court or with 
court administration, or for violating any provision of this chapter or 
order of the court relative thereto.  It is the intent of the Legislature 
that the court restrict and limit the use of contempt powers with 
respect to commitment of a child to a secure facility.  A child who 
commits direct contempt of court or indirect contempt of a valid court 
order may be taken into custody and ordered to serve an alternative 
sanction or placed in a secure facility, as authorized in this section, by 
order of the court. 
 
(2)  Placement in a secure facility.—A child may be placed in a 
secure facility for purposes of punishment for contempt of court if 
alternative sanctions are unavailable or inappropriate, or if the child 
has already been ordered to serve an alternative sanction but failed to 
comply with the sanction.  A delinquent child who has been held in 
                                          
 
 
4.  J.M. acknowledges in his Initial Brief that his sentence has long since 
been served in full.  He argues, however, that the case should not be dismissed as 
moot because the conflict between the district courts will likely continue to result 
in inconsistent applications of section 985.037 in future cases.  We agree.  See 
Kight v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1990) (explaining that even when a 
controversy between the parties has been rendered moot, this Court should 
nonetheless address the issue presented where it is “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review”) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988)). 
 
 
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direct or indirect contempt may be placed in a secure detention facility 
not to exceed 5 days for a first offense and not to exceed 15 days for a 
second or subsequent offense. 
 
§ 985.037(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). 
 
Because the conflict between the district courts is limited to a pure question 
of statutory interpretation, this Court reviews the issue under the de novo standard 
of review.  See Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263, 1269 (Fla. 2006) (citing Clines 
v. State, 912 So. 2d 550, 555 (Fla. 2005)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
§ 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).  “In construing statutes, [this Court] first 
consider[s] the plain meaning of the language used.  When the language is 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, that meaning controls 
unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to 
legislative intent.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 
In this case, we find that the Second District’s interpretation of section 
985.037 is in accord with the clear language of the statute.  Section 985.037(2) 
plainly states that “[a] delinquent child who has been held in direct or indirect 
contempt may be placed in a secure detention facility not to exceed 5 days for a 
first offense and not to exceed 15 days for a second or subsequent offense.”  There 
is no ambiguity on the face of the statute; trial courts are explicitly authorized to 
sentence a juvenile to up to five days in secure detention for a first act of contempt, 
and up to fifteen days in secure detention for each additional act of contempt.  As 
 
 
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made clear in section 985.037(1), “indirect contempt of a valid court order” is 
among the “offense[s]” contemplated by subsection (2).  Furthermore, each 
violation of the probation order constitutes a separate and distinct act of contempt.  
See R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1982) (approving a trial court order 
adjudicating a child guilty of two counts of indirect criminal contempt where the 
child had violated two conditions of a previous court order), overruled on other 
grounds by A.A., 604 So. 2d at 818-19.  Thus, under section 985.037, a juvenile 
who violates a court order on multiple occasions—and in doing so commits several 
acts of indirect contempt—may be sentenced to up to five days’ secure detention 
for the first offense, and up to fifteen days’ secure detention for each second or 
subsequent offense.  As the First District observed in K.Q.S., “nothing in the 
statute states that multiple instances of direct contempt cannot be separately 
punished with consecutive sentences of fifteen days of confinement for each 
offense.”  975 So. 2d at 538.5 
Moreover, the interpretation of the statute adopted by the Fifth District is 
contrary to the declared intent of the Legislature to authorize trial courts to “punish 
any child for contempt . . . for violating any provision of this chapter or order of 
                                          
 
 
5.  Although K.Q.S. involved several acts of direct contempt while the 
instant case involves acts of indirect contempt, we agree with the Second District 
that “section 985.037 does not distinguish between direct and indirect criminal 
contempt in regard to the punishment that the circuit court may impose . . . .”  J.M., 
53 So. 3d at 1247. 
 
 
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the court relative thereto.”  § 985.037(1).  The Fifth District’s decision in M.P. 
would effectively bar a trial court from sanctioning a juvenile for any violation of a 
probation order that has been committed before the juvenile has been sentenced for 
an initial violation.  As the First District explained in K.Q.S.: 
To hold otherwise would prohibit a trial judge from punishing 
individuals, such as the appellant, who repeatedly and intentionally 
disparage the integrity of the court and interfere with the course and 
conduct of proceedings before it.  A trial court would be powerless to 
impose more than twenty[6]  days of secure detention, no matter how 
many acts of contempt were committed or how egregious they were. 
 
Id. at 538. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we approve the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal denying petitioner J.M.’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.  We disapprove the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in M.P. 
to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
                                          
 
 
6.  In the instant case, the maximum penalty allowable under the reasoning 
of M.P. would be five days.  See J.M., 53 So. 3d at 1247. 
 
 
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QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
 
Because I conclude that J.M. committed only a single act of indirect 
contempt of court under section 985.037, Florida Statutes (2010), I respectfully 
dissent from the Court’s decision.  In Williams v. State, 594 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 
1992), this Court was called upon to determine whether multiple violations of 
probation by a criminal defendant could be used to justify a sentence that departed 
upward from that prescribed in the sentencing guidelines.  In addressing the 
question, we explained that “[t]he use of the term ‘multiple probation violations’ in 
[the Court’s] opinion refer[red] to successive violations which follow the 
reinstatement or modification of probation rather than the violation of several 
conditions of a single probation order.”  Id. at 274 n.3.  Thus, we recognized that 
the violation of a single probation order, even on multiple occasions, did not 
qualify as multiple offenses for the purposes of determining whether an enhanced 
sentence was permitted under the sentencing guidelines.   
Below, the Second District distinguished Williams on the ground that 
Williams involved a violation of criminal probation, which is initiated by the filing 
of an affidavit, whereas the instant case involves indirect criminal contempt, which 
is initiated by an order to show cause.  See J.M. v. Gargett, 53 So. 3d 1245, 1247 
(Fla. 2nd DCA 2011).  This distinction, however, is immaterial to the issue of the 
number of violations committed.  Here, J.M.’s violations all pertained to a single 
 
 
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probation order.  The “offense”—i.e., the act of indirect contempt for the purposes 
of section 985.037—was the violation of the order.  Prior to the “reinstatement or 
modification” of the order, Williams, 594 So. 2d at 274 n.3., J.M. could be found 
by the trial court to have committed only a single act of indirect criminal contempt.  
Because the violation of the order was a first offense, section 985.037 limited the 
trial court to imposing a maximum sentence of five days’ secure detention.  
Accordingly, the Second District erred in denying J.M.’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.  I would therefore quash the decision of the Second District below and 
approve the decision of the Fifth District in M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2008). 
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D10-5420 
 
 
(Manatee County) 
 
Larry Louis Eger, Public Defender and Gino John Lombardi, Assistant Public 
Defender, Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Sarasota, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Susan Mary 
Shanahan, and Robert Jay Krauss, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent