Case Title: Grams v. Environmental Quality Council

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Grams v. Environmental Quality Council1986 WY 217730 P.2d 784Case Number: 86-122Decided: 12/19/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARY GRAMS AND LEROY 
GRAMS, APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS),

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING AND AMAX COAL COMPANY, APPELLEES 
(RESPONDENTS).

Petition for review from 
the District Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Randall T. Cox 
of Omohundro and Palmerlee, Buffalo, for appellants 
(petitioners).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Steve R. Shanahan, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Phil Tabor, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Michael N. Patchen, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee (respondent) Environmental 
Quality Council.

Edward W. Harris 
and Marilyn S. Kite of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, and Steven R. Youngbauer, Gillette, 
for appellee (respondent) Amax Coal 
Co.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the decision of appellee Environmental Quality Council (EQC) granting a permit 
to mine coal to appellee AMAX Coal Company (AMAX). Appellants Mary Grams and 
Leroy Grams objected to the permit application filed by AMAX. After a hearing 
was held, the EQC's order issued directing that a mining permit issue to 
AMAX.

[¶2.]     Appellants raise the 
following issues on appeal:

I.

"(a) Whether the 
Environmental Quality Council's orders, findings and conclusions were adopted 
without observance of procedure required by law.

"(b) Whether the conduct 
of the Environmental Quality Council, its hearing examiner and the Department of 
Environmental Quality in the proceedings subject to review herein were 
arbitrary, capricious or deprived the appellants of their constitutional and 
statutory rights of due process of law."

II.

"(a) Whether the 
application of AMAX Coal company for a permit to surface mine coal was complete 
as of May 21, 1985, and therefore whether the Environmental Quality Council had 
statutory authority to direct the Department of Environmental Quality to issue a 
permit.

"(b) Whether the 
Environmental Quality Council's ultimate findings of fact are unsupported by 
substantial evidence and are not accompanied by findings of underlying facts and 
thus should be set aside."

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Appellants own land 
adjacent to the AMAX coal mining area. They are concerned that the mining 
operations will cause damage to their land. Specifically, appellants are 
concerned that the mining operations will have an adverse affect upon the 
wildlife, alluvial valley floors, and the lateral and subjacent support. 
Appellants also raised concern regarding toxic materials, proper hydrologic 
balance outside the area, and the blasting operations.

[¶5.]     AMAX applied to the 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Land Quality Division (LQD) for a 
permit to mine coal pursuant to § 35-11-406, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum.Supp.). See, 
generally, Kite, "The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: An 
Overview of Reclamation Requirements and Implementation," XIII Land & Water 
L.Rev. 703 (1978). This mine is presently active and this application is 
necessary to continue its operation. The LQD determined that the application was 
complete in January, 1984, and notice of the filing was published on February 8 
and 15, 1984. On May 21, 1985, the LQD advised AMAX that the application was 
complete and suitable for publication under § 35-11-406(h). Thereafter, AMAX 
published notice of the LQD's determination of completeness in the Gillette 
News-Record on June 21, June 25, July 2 and July 9, 1985. Additionally, 
appellant Leroy Grams was served notice of the application by certified mail on 
June 29, 1985, and appellant Mary Grams was served notice by certified mail on 
July 5, 1985. On August 5, 1985, the appellants submitted their 
objections.

[¶6.]     As a result of 
appellant's objections, the EQC was required to hold a hearing within twenty 
days from the final date of filing objections under § 35-11-406(k), unless the 
parties stipulate to a continuance. AMAX would not stipulate to a continuance, 
so the EQC was required to hold a hearing on or before August 28, 
1985.

[¶7.]     A prehearing conference 
was held on August 27, 1985. The next day, August 28, 1985, a hearing was held. 
At the hearing, appellant Leroy Grams appeared pro se. Appellant Mary Grams did 
not appear, nor was she represented by counsel. Appellant Leroy Grams 
cross-examined the witnesses for AMAX, made a sworn statement and presented 
evidence as to what his mother, appellant Mary Grams, would have said in support 
of appellant Leroy Grams' protest.

[¶8.]     On November 19, 1985, 
the EQC entered its order directing the LQD to issue a mining permit to AMAX. On 
December 17, 1985, appellants filed a petition for review in the Campbell County 
District Court. The petition for review was certified to this court on May 7, 
1986.

[¶9.]     We begin by setting 
forth our applicable standard of review. In Citizens of Otto v. Wyoming State 
Committee for School District Organization, Wyo., 705 P.2d 831, 833 (1985), we 
stated:

"When reviewing an 
administrative agency's decision on appeal, § 16-3-114, W.S. 1977 (October 1982 
Replacement) mandates that we review the entire record, or those portions cited 
to us, to determine if the agency's actions are supported by substantial 
evidence. Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 662 P.2d 878 (1983). If it is determined 
that the agency's action is supported by substantial evidence, we are not at 
liberty to substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1135 (1985); and McCulloch Gas Transmission 
Company v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173 (1981). Substantial 
evidence has been defined `as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161, 1178 (1976), quoting Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966). The burden of proving a lack of substantial evidence rests upon the 
party attacking the agency's decision. Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Industrial Siting Council, Wyo., 588 P.2d 1241 
(1978); and Wyoming Bancorporation v. 
Bonham, Wyo., 527 P.2d 432 
(1974)."

I.

A. Adequate 
Notice.

[¶10.]  Appellants ask whether proper procedure 
was followed by the EQC and AMAX in this case. Appellants claim that there was 
insufficient notice given pursuant to statutory law.

[¶11.]  Notice of filing the application is first 
required after the application is determined to be complete under § 
35-11-406(g). This section then requires that "* * * the applicant shall publish 
a notice of the filing of the application once each week for two (2) consecutive 
weeks * * *" in a local newspaper. This notice was published by AMAX in the 
Gillette News-Record on February 8 and 15, 1984. It should be noted that 
appellants regularly received this newspaper at all times relevant 
hereto.

[¶12.]  After the application has been reviewed, 
a determination is made whether the application is suitable for publication. If 
the application is not found to be deficient or is not denied, then it is deemed 
suitable for publication. § 35-11-406(h). At this point, the applicant (AMAX) 
must then publish notice of the application in a local newspaper pursuant to § 
35-11-406(j), which provides:

"The applicant shall 
cause notice of the application to be published in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the locality of the proposed mining site once a week for four (4) 
consecutive weeks commencing within fifteen (15) days after being notified by 
the administrator. The notice shall contain information regarding the identity 
of the applicant, the location of the proposed operation, the proposed dates of 
commencement and completion of the operation, the proposed future use of the 
affected land, the location at which information about the application may be 
obtained, and the location and final date for filing objections to the 
application. The applicant shall mail a copy of the notice within five (5) days 
after first publication to all owners of record of the surface and mineral 
rights of the land within the permit area, to the owners of record of the 
surface rights of immediately adjacent lands and to any other persons with 
one-half (1/2) mile having a valid legal estate of record. Proof of notice and 
mailing shall be attached to and become part of the 
application."

[¶13.]  In this case, AMAX received notification 
from the administrator that the application was suitable for publication on May 
23, 1985. The first notice was published by AMAX on June 21, 1985, obviously 
longer than fifteen days after receiving notice of suitability for publication. 
The notices were published in the Gillette newspaper on June 21, June 25, July 2 
and July 9, 1985.

[¶14.]  We have stated that the main 
consideration is the gravity of the error, not its mere occurrence, and that the 
onus is placed upon the appellant to show how the error was prejudicial. State 
Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Joe Miller 
Land Company, Wyo., 467 P.2d 450, (1970). Furthermore, we 
have recognized that an error must be prejudicial and affect the substantial 
rights of the appellant to warrant reversal. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981); and Tomkins v. Byrtus, 72 Wyo. 537, 267 P.2d 753 
(1954).

[¶15.]  Here, appellants have not shown how 
AMAX's failure to commence publication within fifteen days substantially 
prejudiced them. Any interested party has thirty days after the last publication 
of the notice in which to file written objections. § 35-11-406(k). Therefore, 
appellants were given more time in which to file their objections, and we think 
the error was harmless. Rule 61, Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure; and Rule 7.04, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. We will 
not reverse an agency's action based on harmless error. Gore v. John, 61 
Wyo. 246, 157 P.2d 552 (1945).

[¶16.]  Appellants also complain that only 
eighteen days elapsed between the first and last publication of the notice. As 
cited above, § 35-11-406(j) requires that the notice be published "* * * once a 
week for four (4) consecutive weeks * * *."

[¶17.]  In the case of Hay v. Hudson, 31 Wyo. 
150, 165, 224 P. 840 (1924), this court held that a statute requiring notice of 
a foreclosure sale to be published at least once a week for three consecutive 
weeks prescribed only the number of publications, not the duration of the 
notice. Accord, Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Diefenderfer, 57 Wyo. 13, 112 P.2d 563 
(1941).

[¶18.]  Amax published the notice of their 
application on June 21, June 25, July 2 and July 9, 1985. This fulfilled the 
statutory requirement of publishing the notice once a week for four consecutive 
weeks under § 35-11-406(j).

[¶19.]  It should also be noted that AMAX did 
mail a copy of the notice to both appellants on June 25, 1985, within the five 
days after first publication under § 35-11-406(j) quoted above. While it is true 
that appellant Leroy Grams received his notice on June 29, 1985, and appellant 
Mary Grams received her notice on July 5, 1985, both notices were initially 
mailed within five days of the first publication (June 21, 
1985).

[¶20.]  In the case of Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming v. Young, Wyo., 713 P.2d 198, (1986), this court recently 
recognized that there is a rebuttable presumption that delivery of mail occurs 
when it is properly addressed, stamped and mailed. Such presumption is based 
upon the probability that the postal service properly performs its duty in 
sending and delivering the mail.

[¶21.]  In this case, the notices were sent to 
appellant via certified mail within the proper time period. Appellant Leroy 
Grams received his notice five days after it was sent. The first notice sent to 
appellant Mary Grams was returned as non-deliverable. When her correct address 
was discovered, AMAX immediately sent a second notice to appellant Mary Grams, 
which she received on July 5, 1985. From this date, appellants still had some 
thirty-four days in which to file written objections. And appellants were able 
to timely file such objections.

[¶22.]  Furthermore, the record reflects that 
appellants were aware of their right to protest as early as April, 1985, well 
before they received official notice. And, as noted earlier, appellants 
regularly received the Gillette News-Record at all times pertinent to this 
case.

[¶23.]  Therefore, we are unable to see, nor have 
appellants shown, how any such error substantially prejudiced 
them.

B. Motion for 
Continuance.

[¶24.]  Appellants also complain that the hearing 
in this matter was held too soon and that the EQC's denial of their motions for 
continuance constituted an abuse of discretion. However, it is noted § 
35-11-406(k) provides that: "* * * An informed conference or a public hearing 
shall be held within twenty (20) days after the final date of filing objections 
unless a different period is stipulated to by the parties. * * *" As noted 
above, counsel for AMAX declined to stipulate to a continuance since counsel 
determined such was not in the best interests of his client. The final date for 
filing objections was August 8, 1985. Therefore, the final day for holding the 
hearing was on August 28, 1985, the day the hearing was held. We cannot find an 
abuse of discretion since the EQC complied with the time specified in § 
35-11-406(k).

C. Right of 
Discovery.

[¶25.]  Appellants complain that their right of 
discovery was denied. The crux of this argument is not completely clear, but 
apparently appellants made a discovery motion on August 26, 1985, two days 
before the scheduled hearing. Appellants do not specify on appeal exactly what 
they wished to discover or how the failure to so discover adversely affected 
them. We need not consider issues on appeal which are not supported by cogent 
argument or persuasive authority. Heier v. State, Wyo., 727 P.2d 707 
(1986).

[¶26.]  However, we have previously decided in 
this opinion that appellants did have adequate notice of the hearing and their 
failure to conduct proper discovery until two days before the hearing cannot be 
charged to anyone's account other than their own. 

D. Revision of 
the Permit Application.

[¶27.]  After AMAX's application was deemed 
suitable for publication on May 21, 1985, pursuant to § 35-11-406(h), the 
application was revised and minor omissions corrected. Appellants contend that 
this constituted improper ex parte communication between AMAX and the 
LQD.

[¶28.]  Once an application is deemed suitable 
for publication, notice is then published to commence formal public 
participation. § 35-11-406(h). A deficient application is defined as one having 
"* * * an omission or lack of sufficient information serious enough to preclude correction or compliance by 
stipulation in the approved permit to be issued * * *." (Emphasis added.) § 
35-11-103(e)(xxiv). Conversely, an application that is not deficient is one that 
is correctable by stipulation. That is what occurred here. The LQD determined 
that the application was suitable for publication because any omissions were 
correctable by stipulation.

[¶29.]  It should also be noted that the 
subsequent correspondence between AMAX and the LQD raised no new issues. The 
purpose of this correspondence was to supply any omissions or make any necessary 
corrections to make the application more complete.

E. Other 
Concerns.

[¶30.]  Appellants raise a number of other 
alleged procedural errors which we will briefly address.

[¶31.]  Appellants contend that the entire EQC 
did not consider and decide the matter since they received the council's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law signed by the hearing examiner, not the 
chairman of the EQC.

[¶32.]  The hearing in this case was presided 
over by Edgar Langrand, a member of the EQC. And contrary to appellant's 
assertion, the record does indicate the full council considered the matter. The 
EQC's final order states:

"The application of Amax 
Coal Company for a surface coal mining permit and the objections thereto of 
LeRoy Grams and Mary H. Grams were considered by the Environmental Quality 
Council at a public meeting in Jackson, 
Wyoming, on September 30, 1985, following an 
evidentiary hearing held in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on August 28, 1985. Amax Coal Company 
appeared and was represented by Steven R. Youngbauer of Amax Coal Company. Mary 
H. Grams did not appear and was not represented at the hearing, and LeRoy Grams 
appeared pro se. The Land Quality Division of the Department of Environmental 
Quality appeared and was represented by Weldon S. Caldbeck, an Assistant 
Attorney General. Having considered the 
evidence presented at the hearing and the arguments of counsel, the 
Environmental Quality Council hereby finds and concludes as follows." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶33.]  Appellants have not shown any wrongdoing 
by the agency, as is their burden. Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 
Wyo., 527 P.2d 432 
(1974).

[¶34.]  Appellants also complain that the burden 
of proof was improperly placed upon them instead of the applicant AMAX. It is 
true that the burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show that the 
application is in compliance with applicable law. § 35-11-406(n). The record 
reveals that AMAX recognized this in its prehearing memorandum, as did the EQC 
when it stated in its final conclusion of law that "AMAX Coal Company has met 
its burden of proof demonstrating that the Eagle Butte Mine is in compliance 
with W.S. § 35-11-406(n), and all other applicable state 
laws."

[¶35.]  Appellants also contend that it was 
improper for the Department of Environmental Quality not to send them a copy of 
the mining permit ultimately granted to AMAX. Such argument is without merit. 
Appellants did receive a copy of the EQC's decision directing the LQD to grant a 
permit to AMAX. The fact that appellants did not receive a copy of the actual 
permit is inconsequential. 

II.

[¶36.]  Having determined that there were no 
procedural errors constituting prejudice to the appellants, we now turn our 
attention to a review of the EQC's decision. When reviewing an agency decision, 
§ 16-3-114(c), W.S. 1977, October 1982 Replacement, directs as 
follows:

"(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

[¶37.]  Appellants contend that AMAX's 
application was incomplete as of May 21, 1985, and that such determination of 
completeness constituted error. The contention is not well taken. Appellants 
were mistaken when they claim the application was complete as of May 21, 1985. 
The LQD determined that the application was complete pursuant to § 35-11-406(e) 
on January 30, 1984. This section provides:

"The administrator shall 
notify the applicant within sixty (60) days of submission of the application 
whether or not it is complete. If the administrator deems the application 
incomplete, he shall so advise and state in writing to the applicant the 
information required. All items not specified as incomplete at the end of the 
first sixty (60) day period shall be deemed complete for the purpose of this 
subsection."

[¶38.]  The LQD then engaged in further review of 
the application. On May 21, 1985, the LQD determined that the application was 
suitable for publication under § 35-11-406(h) which provides in 
part:

"The administrator shall 
review the application and unless the applicant requests a delay advise the 
applicant in writing within one hundred fifty (150) days from the date of 
determining the application is complete, that it is suitable for publication 
under subsection (j) of this section, that the application is deficient or that 
the application is denied. * * *"

[¶39.]  Therefore, the application was considered 
complete in January, 1984. On May 21, 1985, after further review had taken 
place, the application was considered suitable for publication. This is in 
compliance with the statutory definition of a complete application, § 
35-11-103(e)(xxii), W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum.Supp.), which 
states:

"`Complete application' 
under W.S. 35-11-406(e) means that the application contains all the essential 
and necessary elements and is acceptable for further review for substance and 
compliance with the provisions of this chapter."

[¶40.]  There was no error committed in the LQD's 
determination of "completeness" and "suitable for 
publication."

[¶41.]  The record in this case constitutes some 
seven volumes consisting of thousands of pages of highly technical material. 
From this record, as well as the hearing held on August 28, 1985, the EQC made 
some 30 findings of fact, 21 of which were directly related to the written 
objections filed by appellants. It appears that all of appellants' issues were 
addressed by the EQC. 

[¶42.]  Furthermore, our review of the 
application submitted by AMAX is in conformity with the EQC's decision that such 
was complete according to law. The application adequately contained information 
regarding evaluations of wildlife impact, alluvial valley floor restrictions, 
lateral and subjacent support considerations, the safe handling of any toxic and 
acidic materials, maintenance of hydrologic balance outside the permit area, and 
compliance with law on a detailed blasting plan.

[¶43.]  Therefore, we are unable to conclude, nor 
have appellants adequately demonstrated, that the decision of the EQC was 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law. We 
find the decision is adequately supported by substantial evidence. The decision 
of the EQC is affirmed in all respects.

[¶44.]  Affirmed.