Case Title: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hylton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 992091

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
Record No. 992091 
 
CLARENCE E. HYLTON, ET AL.  
 
 
 
           OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
CLARENCE E. HYLTON 
 
v. 
Record No. 992106 
 
MARK DANIEL DEHART 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 
David V. Williams, Judge 
 
I. 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether a judgment in a 
tort action may be entered against an insurance company that 
issued an automobile liability insurance policy even though 
the insurance company was not a defendant in the circuit court 
proceedings; and whether a plaintiff's tort claims against a 
defendant, who was a state trooper, are barred by the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. 
II. 
 
Plaintiff, Clarence E. Hylton, filed his motion for 
judgment against Mark Daniel DeHart.  A copy of the motion for 
judgment was served upon Robert C. Wetzel, registered agent 
for Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide).  Hylton 
alleged in his motion for judgment that he was injured as a 
result of DeHart's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  
DeHart, a Virginia State Trooper, filed a grounds of defense 
and a plea of sovereign immunity.  DeHart asserted that while 
he was operating his police cruiser, he observed an 
unidentified driver of a truck commit a traffic violation, 
that he made a decision to apprehend the violator, and that he 
was in the process of determining the manner in which to 
proceed when he was involved in the accident with Hylton.  The 
circuit court considered evidence relating to the plea of 
sovereign immunity on the morning of the scheduled trial and 
sustained the plea. 
 
After sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity, the 
circuit court permitted Hylton to proceed with his lawsuit 
against Nationwide, which had issued an automobile liability 
policy of insurance to Hylton that was in effect when the 
accident that was the subject of Hylton's motion for judgment 
occurred.  Hylton did not name Nationwide as a party in his 
motion for judgment, and Nationwide did not file any 
pleadings.  DeHart's counsel informed the circuit court that 
he did not represent Nationwide, but was counsel of record 
only for DeHart. 
 
Hylton argued that Nationwide was in default, and since 
DeHart's plea of sovereign immunity had been sustained, 
neither DeHart nor his counsel had the right to participate in 
 
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the trial of the case.  The circuit court rejected Hylton's 
arguments.  Hylton presented evidence, the jury was 
instructed, and counsel for Hylton and DeHart made closing 
arguments.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hylton in 
the amount of $100,000, and the circuit court entered a 
judgment confirming the verdict. 
 
Once Nationwide learned that a judgment had been entered 
against it, Nationwide filed a motion requesting that the 
circuit court set aside that judgment because, among other 
reasons, Nationwide was not a named defendant or party to the 
tort action.  Hylton opposed Nationwide's motion, and the 
circuit court apparently took no action on the motion.  
Nationwide appeals the circuit court's judgment confirming the 
jury's verdict.  Hylton appeals that portion of the judgment 
sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity. 
III. 
 
Code § 38.2-2206(F) states: 
 
"If any action is instituted against the owner 
or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor 
vehicle by any insured intending to rely on the 
uninsured or underinsured coverage provision or 
endorsement of this policy under which the insured 
is making a claim, then the insured shall serve a 
copy of the process upon this insurer in the manner 
prescribed by law, as though the insurer were a 
party defendant.  The provisions of § 8.01-288 shall 
not be applicable to the service of process required 
in this subsection.  The insurer shall then have the 
right to file pleadings and take other action 
allowable by law in the name of the owner or 
 
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operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor 
vehicle or in its own name.  Notwithstanding the 
provisions of subsection A, the immunity from 
liability for negligence of the owner or operator of 
a motor vehicle shall not be a bar to the insured 
obtaining a judgment enforceable against the insurer 
for the negligence of the immune owner or operator, 
and shall not be a defense available to the insurer 
to the action brought by the insured, which shall 
proceed against the named defendant although any 
judgment obtained would be enforceable against the 
insurer and any other nonimmune defendant.  Nothing 
in this subsection shall prevent the owner or 
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle from 
employing counsel of his own choice and taking any 
action in his own interest in connection with the 
proceeding." 
 
 
Nationwide argues that a plaintiff who has filed an 
action against a tortfeasor may not recover a judgment against 
an automobile liability insurance carrier in that tort action.  
Continuing, Nationwide asserts that even though Code § 38.2-
2206(F) gives it a right to file pleadings in an action 
against an uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor, this statute 
does not authorize the entry of a judgment against an 
insurance company that issued a policy of insurance that may 
satisfy a judgment that may be entered against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle.  
Responding, Hylton asserts that Nationwide voluntarily failed 
to take advantage of its right and opportunity to appear 
conferred upon it by Code § 38.2-2206(F) and, therefore, 
Nationwide has no right to complain of the judgment entered 
against it.  We disagree with Hylton. 
 
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We have held that a plaintiff who files a tort action for 
injuries caused by an owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle cannot recover a judgment in that action against the 
liability insurance company that may have a duty to pay the 
judgment.  We stated in Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 515, 125 
S.E.2d 159, 164 (1962): 
"This is not an action arising ex contractu to 
recover against the insurance company on its 
endorsement.  The insurance company is not a named 
party defendant and judgment cannot be entered 
against it in this action.  This is an action ex 
delicto, since the cause of action arises out of a 
tort, and the only issues presented are the 
establishment of legal liability on the unknown 
uninsured motorist, John Doe, and the fixing of 
damages, if any." 
 
See also Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140, 143, 129 S.E.2d 828, 
830 (1963).  Rather, the question whether an automobile 
insurance company has a legal obligation to a plaintiff "may 
be decided in an action ex contractu brought on the policy by 
the interested judgment plaintiff, or in a declaratory 
judgment proceeding to determine the rights of the parties."  
Id.
 
Even though Code § 38.2-2206(F) gave Nationwide the right 
to file pleadings and take any other action allowable by law 
in the name of the owner or operator of the uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle or in its own name, this statute 
does not permit Hylton to obtain a judgment in this tort 
 
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proceeding against Nationwide.  And, the fact that 
Nationwide's registered agent received a copy of the motion 
for judgment does not permit the circuit court to enter a 
judgment against Nationwide.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
circuit court erred by entering a judgment against Nationwide 
in this proceeding. 
IV. 
A. 
 
DeHart adduced the following evidence at the pretrial 
hearing on his plea of sovereign immunity.  DeHart was 
employed as a Virginia State Trooper on August 2, 1996.  In 
that capacity, he was required to patrol Henry County in his 
police cruiser, enforce criminal laws, respond to requests for 
assistance, issue citations for traffic violations, obtain and 
execute search warrants, and perform special assignments. 
 
DeHart was operating his police cruiser on August 2, 
1996, while on duty.  He was traveling south on Route 220 near 
the intersection of Route 220 and Commonwealth Boulevard in 
Henry County.  The intersection is controlled by a traffic 
light.  When the traffic light was red, DeHart stopped his 
vehicle behind a truck, which was operated by Hylton.  When 
the traffic light turned green, Hylton drove his truck through 
the intersection, three or four car lengths in front of 
DeHart's cruiser. 
 
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As DeHart slowly proceeded through the intersection, he 
saw an unidentified individual operating a pickup truck.  The 
unidentified driver of the pickup truck proceeded through a 
red light and made a "wide right turn" onto Route 220.  DeHart 
testified that he observed the unidentified operator of the 
pickup truck drive onto Route 220  
"and that lane would have had a red light.  [The 
unidentified driver] came out and did not slow down 
very much, came into the right lane and made a wide 
turn. 
 
"At that point I was looking in my rear view 
mirror to get over in the right lane.  I was going 
to stop that vehicle, and at that point I heard 
tires squeal in front of me.  I saw the vehicle stop 
abruptly in the left lane and I proceeded to try to 
stop, but did not have enough distance and impacted 
with Mr. Hylton." 
 
 
Sergeant C. William Murphy, DeHart's supervisor, 
testified that DeHart's duties were to enforce traffic and 
criminal laws in Henry County as well as elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  DeHart testified that he exercises 
discretion and judgment when deciding whether to pursue 
traffic violators. 
B. 
 
Hylton argues that the circuit court erred by sustaining 
DeHart's plea of sovereign immunity because he was merely 
operating his motor vehicle and that such act does not "clothe 
[him] with the defense of sovereign immunity."  We disagree. 
 
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In Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 128-29, 400 S.E.2d 184, 
186-87 (1991), we discussed the test that we apply when 
determining whether a governmental employee is entitled to the 
protection of sovereign immunity.  We held that we must 
consider "(1) the nature of the function the employee 
performs; (2) the extent of the government's interest and 
involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and 
direction exercised over the employee by the government; and 
(4) whether the act in question involved the exercise of 
discretion and judgment."  Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 186-87.  
See also Gargiulo v. Ohar, 239 Va. 209, 212, 387 S.E.2d 787, 
789 (1990); Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 82, 372 S.E.2d 608, 
610 (1988); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 313, 321 S.E.2d 
657, 663 (1984); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 
864, 869 (1980). 
 
In Colby, we applied this test to determine whether a 
police officer, who was involved in an accident while in 
pursuit of a traffic violator, was entitled to the bar of 
sovereign immunity to defeat the tort claims asserted by a 
plaintiff who was injured in the accident.  We stated: 
"Enforcement of traffic laws is not only a primary 
governmental function of a municipality, but one in 
which the municipality is inextricably involved 
through financial, personnel, and policy 
initiatives.  A municipality enjoys sovereign 
immunity for acts undertaken in furtherance of this 
function.  [The police officer] was involved in the 
 
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performance of this function for the City of 
Virginia Beach at the time of the accident, thereby 
satisfying the first two elements of the test. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
"Unlike the driver in routine traffic, the 
[police] officer must make difficult judgments about 
the best means of effectuating the governmental 
purpose by embracing special risks in an emergency 
situation.  Such situations involve necessarily 
discretionary, split-second decisions balancing 
grave personal risks, public safety concerns, and 
the need to achieve the governmental objective.  The 
exercise of discretion is involved even in the 
initial decision to undertake the pursuit . . . ." 
 
Colby, 241 Va. at 129-30, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  We concluded 
that the circuit court properly ruled that the police officer 
in Colby was entitled to the bar of sovereign immunity. 
 
We hold that DeHart is entitled to the bar of sovereign 
immunity.  DeHart was involved in the enforcement of traffic 
laws, which is a governmental function.  And, the circuit 
court implicitly made a finding of fact that when DeHart's 
police cruiser collided with Hylton's vehicle, DeHart had made 
a decision to pursue the unidentified motor vehicle operator 
who had committed a traffic infraction, and DeHart had begun 
to undertake the pursuit. 
 
Contrary to Hylton's assertions, DeHart was not involved 
merely in the simple operation of an automobile when DeHart's 
vehicle collided with the rear of Hylton's vehicle.  In Heider 
v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143, 145, 400 S.E.2d 190, 191 (1991), we 
 
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held that a deputy sheriff, who was involved in an accident 
while driving his car, was not entitled to the bar of 
sovereign immunity.  The deputy sheriff had served process at 
a residence in Fairfax, returned to his automobile, drove onto 
a street, and collided with a motorcycle.  The driver of the 
motorcycle filed a negligence action against the deputy 
sheriff, who pled the affirmative defense of sovereign 
immunity.  Id. at 144, 400 S.E.2d at 190. 
 
Rejecting the deputy sheriff's assertion of the defense 
of sovereign immunity in Heider, we stated: 
"While every person driving a car must make myriad 
decisions, in ordinary driving situations the duty 
of due care is a ministerial obligation.  The 
defense of sovereign immunity applies only to acts 
of judgment and discretion which are necessary to 
the performance of the governmental function itself.  
In some instances, the operation of an automobile 
may fall into this category, such as the 
discretionary judgment involved in vehicular pursuit 
by a law enforcement officer.  See, e.g., Colby v. 
Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 400 S.E.2d 184 (1991) . . . .  
However, under the circumstances of this case, the 
simple operation of an automobile did not involve 
special risks arising from the governmental 
activity, or the exercise of judgment or discretion 
about the proper means of effectuating the 
governmental purpose of the driver's employer." 
 
Id. at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 191.  See also Wynn v. Gandy, 170 
Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938) (defense of sovereign immunity 
not available to school bus driver whose duty of driving a bus 
to transport children did not involve judgmental discretion, 
but was purely ministerial).  In contrast to the deputy 
 
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sheriff in Heider, DeHart was not merely engaged in routine 
driving activities.  Rather, at the time of the accident that 
is the subject of this litigation, DeHart had made a decision 
to apprehend a traffic violator, and DeHart was required to 
exercise discretion and judgment in executing that action. 
V. 
 
Finding no merit in Hylton's remaining arguments, we will 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court in Hylton's action 
against DeHart.  Also, we will reverse the circuit court's 
judgment in Hylton's action against Nationwide and enter final 
judgment here in favor of Nationwide. 
Record No. 992091 — Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
 
Record No. 992106 — Affirmed. 
 
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