Case Title: Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs

Citation: 954 P.2d 1035

Docket Number: S-7257

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
954 P.2d 1035 (1998) Joni GATES, Appellant, v. CITY OF TENAKEE SPRINGS, Appellee. No. S-7257. Supreme Court of Alaska. March 13, 1998. Joni Gates, pro se, Petersburg. William T. Council, Council & Sanders, Juneau, for Appellee. Before COMPTON, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH and FABE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Joni Gates appeals the superior court's order on remand denying her motion for relief from judgment. We affirm. This is the third time that this case has come before this court. The following facts are taken from Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, Mem. Op. & J. No. 0744 (Alaska, October 26, 1994) (Gates II): Id. at 1-4 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). The superior court treated Gates's motion to reschedule the trial as a motion to set aside judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). Id. at 4. The court denied the motion without making any findings on whether Gates experienced a medical emergency. Id. at 4, 7. In Gates II, we held that "a party's failure to appear at a scheduled proceeding because of a medical emergency can be considered excusable neglect under Civil Rule 60(b)(1), if in fact the party had a medical emergency." Id. at 6. We declined to review the superior court's denial of Gates's motion because the *1037 superior court failed to enter findings. Id. at 7. It was unclear to us whether the superior court's denial of Gates's motion "meant that Gates failed to submit enough evidence supporting the fact that she had a medical emergency, or whether in light of the evidence submitted by Tenakee Springs, the court meant that it did not believe Gates' version of the events." Id. We remanded the case "for entry of findings of fact supporting the trial court's conclusion." Id. On remand the superior court made the following findings: On the basis of these findings, the court again denied Gates's motion. The order entering the findings and denying the motion was signed on March 2, 1995, by Judge Thomas Jahnke "at [the] direction [of] Thomas E. Schulz/Superior Court Judge Retired." This appeal followed. Gates's primary argument on this appeal is that Judge Schulz lacked the authority to enter findings on remand because he "had been a resident of California for three years." According to Gates, because Judge Schulz lacked authority to enter findings on remand, his findings must be set aside and Gates is entitled to a new hearing on the issue of whether she suffered a medical emergency on October 30, 1992. Before considering this argument, we note that, apart from the residency question, entry of the order and findings of March 2, 1995, was appropriate. Judge Schulz was properly appointed superior court judge pro tempore by Special Order of Chief Justice Daniel A. Moore.[1] Judge Schulz had the authority under this order to enter findings on remand clarifying his denial of Gates's motion,[2] and Judge Jahnke could properly endorse those findings at his predecessor's direction.[3] Moreover, since Gates's claim that she was entitled to relief from judgment was based entirely on her medical emergency argument, see Gates II at 5-6, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gates's motion for relief from judgment *1038 under Civil Rule 60(b). The superior court's finding that Gates was not prevented from appearing in court by a medical emergency is supported by the affidavits of Dr. Blair, Dr. Jones, Albert Lodovici, and others, see Gates II at 2-4, and Gates failed to present any evidence to refute these affidavits, or to otherwise support her claim of medical emergency. Against this backdrop, we proceed to consider Gates's argument that Judge Schulz lacked authority to enter findings, in response to our remand in Gates II, because he "ha[d] been a resident of California for three years."[4] Gates is correct that, assuming Judge Schulz "ha[d] been a resident of California for three years," it was inappropriate for him to serve as a pro tempore judge.[5] Alaska Statute 22.10.090 provides that "[a] judge of the superior court shall be a citizen of the United States and of the state, a resident of the state for five years immediately preceding appointment...." But Gates is mistaken that the fact that Judge Schulz may have been a California resident entitles her to relitigate her medical emergency claims. Neither AS 22.10.090 nor any other Alaska statute or case indicates that Gates is entitled to such relief. Authority in other jurisdictions holds that an acting judge (such as Judge Schulz) who has colorable authority due to his or her appointment is a de facto officer whose acts are legally valid and binding on the public and on third persons if done within the scope and by the apparent authority of his or her office, even though the judge's actual authority suffers from a procedural defect. See, e.g., Am.Jur.2d Judges § 242 (1994) (stating that the de facto judge doctrine has been uniformly applied throughout the country to prevent collateral attacks based on a procedural defect in the judge's authority); People v. Bowen, 231 Cal. App. 3d 783, 283 Cal. Rptr. 35, 39 (1991) (applying the doctrine to preclude a criminal defendant from collaterally attacking the superior court judge's authority to try him where the judge did not meet county residency requirement); Humel v. Hoogendorn, 5 Alaska 25, 25 (Alaska 1914) (recognizing that judge who continued to function after end of term was a de facto judge whose actions could not be collaterally attacked). We perceive no compelling reason to deviate from the approach of these courts and to engraft the remedy that Gates requests onto AS 22.10.090. Requiring relitigation of matters decided by a competent, unbiased judge who, except for the matter of residency, was duly appointed is a poor use of valuable judicial and private resources. Cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 64, 114 S. Ct. 492, 506, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1993) ("[T]here is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.") (quoting United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S. Ct. 2072, 2077, 109 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1990)). In addition, procedural defects in a judge's qualifications do not affect the fairness of the proceedings. See Bowen, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (stating that the issue of whether the judge met county residency requirement was "wholly removed from the question of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence or the fairness of the trial.").[6] Furthermore, the de facto judge doctrine protects *1039 third parties and the public in their dealings with the judicial system. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Policyholders & Members v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ark. 350, 952 S.W.2d 675, 676 (1997). Gates argues that the de facto judge doctrine does not apply to pro tempore judges. However, several cases have held that the doctrine applies to judges pro tempore. See, e.g., Survance v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1076, 1081-82 (Ind. 1984); Giles v. State ex rel. Giles, 191 Tenn. 538, 235 S.W.2d 24, 29 (1950); Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 561, 221 S.W.2d 82, 84 (1949). We agree with these cases, because the policy considerations previously discussed apply with equal force to judges pro tempore. In addition, just as with regularly appointed judges, judges pro tempore act under color of authority. See State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678, 564 P.2d 841, 843 n. 1 (1977) (holding that where a judge pro tempore is in actual possession of the office and discharging its duties, he or she acts under color of title and is a judge de facto); see also Pickens v. Johnson, 42 Cal. 2d 399, 267 P.2d 801, 805, 808 (1954) (holding that the appointment of a pro tempore judge "vest[s] in [him or her] the powers of a judge of the [] court during the period specified in the assignment."). Here, Judge Schulz was appointed as a judge pro tempore for a specific period of time and to a particular office, so he was acting under color of authority in a de jure office. We thus hold that even if he failed to meet the state residency requirement, he was a de facto judge, and had authority to enter the findings on remand. The order on remand is AFFIRMED. [1] Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 3043 (December 21, 1992). The Alaska Constitution provides that retired judges "shall render no further service on the bench except for special assignments as provided by court rule." Alaska Const. art. IV, § 11. Alaska Administrative Rule 23(a) authorizes the chief justice to appoint a retired superior court judge to sit pro tempore "where such assignment is deemed necessary for the efficient administration of justice." Pro tempore appointments "may be made for one or more cases or for a specified period of time up to two years, except that a pro tempore judge or justice may complete a trial or appeal in progress at the time of the conclusion of the appointment." Id. [2] The appointment term ran from January 4, 1993 through March 31, 1993, continuing "through any additional time necessary to reasonably complete" any assigned matters. Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 3043 (December 21, 1992); see also Alaska R. Admin. P. 23(a). [3] See Alaska R. Civ. P. 63(c); Pollastrine v. Severance, 375 P.2d 528, 530 (Alaska 1962) ("The two oral opinions of the trial judge are comprehensive and yet particularized to a degree sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the trial judge's ultimate conclusion.... [Therefore] it is concluded that the successor superior court judge had authority to file the April 18, 1961 decree in this cause."). [4] At the request of this court, the parties briefed the issue of whether, assuming that Judge Schulz failed to meet the state residency requirement, he still had authority to enter the findings on remand pursuant to the de facto judge doctrine. [5] It was inappropriate for Judge Schulz to serve as a pro tempore judge if he was a California resident either at the time of his initial appointment or at the time he entered his Gates II findings on remand. [6] We reject Gates's argument that a violation of a state residency requirement is a substantive instead of a procedural defect. Several cases have applied the de facto judge doctrine to judges who fail to meet residency requirements. See, e.g., Bowen, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (applying doctrine where judge failed to meet county residency requirement); Hovanec v. Diaz, 272 Ind. 342, 397 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (1979) (applying doctrine where judge failed to meet city residency requirement). In addition, residency requirements, whether state, county, or city, are procedural requirements that do not affect the fairness of the trial.