Case Title: Bouwkamp v. McNeill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bouwkamp v. McNeill1995 WY 162902 P.2d 725Case Number: 94-243Decided: 09/21/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Marvin 
BOUWKAMP and Marcia Bouwkamp, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Bob 
G. McNEILL, Dorothy O. McNeill, R. Micheal Reile, and Donna 
Reile,

 Appellees (Defendants).

L.B. 
Cozzens and Leonard H. Smith (argued), Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & 
Dietrich, Billings, MT, for appellants.

Teresa 
M. McKee (argued), Moffat & McKee, P.C., Lander, for 
appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      We review Marvin 
and Marcia Bouwkamp's contention that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on their claims arising from their eviction from a leased 
restaurant business. The appellees, Bob G. McNeill, Dorothy O. McNeill, R. 
Micheal Reile, and Donna Reile, exercised their rights under a lease agreement 
to reenter and take possession of the business because they concluded that the 
Bouwkamps had breached the lease agreement in several significant 
ways.

[¶2]  We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶3]      Bouwkamps state 
their issue in a very general way:

Are 
there genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment in favor 
of the Appellees on any of the claims asserted by the Appellants?

[¶4]      Appellees have 
rephrased those issues with more precision:

1. 
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Lessors on the issue of breach of contract when the "lease agreement" which was 
drafted by Lessees' attorney contained an express unambiguous provision allowing 
the Lessors to reenter the leased premises without notice upon any breach by 
Lessees?

2. 
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Lessors on the 
issue of wrongful eviction because an express provision of the parties' lease 
agreement allowed the Lessors to reenter the leased premises without notice upon 
a default by Lessees and Lessees defaulted?

3. 
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Lessors on the 
issue of conversion because Lessees did not meet the necessary elements for 
conversion and removed their property and inventory from the leased premises 
after receiving a notice to quit?

4. 
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Lessors on the 
issue of intentional interference with prospective business relations because 
the Lessors are free to compete in the restaurant business?

5. 
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Lessors on the 
issue of punitive damages because there are no genuine material facts that give 
rise to a punitive damage claim?

FACTS

[¶5]      By lease 
agreement dated May 6, 1989, the Bouwkamps leased from appellees a 
bar/restaurant/liquor store business known as "The Timbers." The agreement, 
which was drafted by the Bouwkamps, included this provision:

15. 
In the Event of:

A. 
Any default by Lessee in the payment of rent or in the performance of any 
obligations to be kept or performed by Lessee under the terms of this Lease, 
Lessor may, after three (3) days, and without notice re-enter the 
property[.]

[¶6]      On May 18, 1990, 
appellees served the Bouwkamps with a "Notice to Quit Premises." The notice was 
signed and dated on May 14, 1990, and gave no reason, or reasons, why the notice 
to quit was issued. The parties met on May 21, 1990, and the matter of the 
notice was discussed. The Bouwkamps claim they did not know the reason(s) for 
their eviction; but, at the May 21 meeting, they brought a cashier's check to 
reimburse appellees for the liquor license fee which appellees had paid as well 
as proof that they had obtained all insurance coverages required by the lease. 
The appellees refused to allow the Bouwkamps to cure and insisted on occupying 
the premises. The Bouwkamps, who had prepared for the occasion, then moved most 
of the inventory and personal property belonging to them from "The Timbers," and 
the appellees changed the locks and reassumed possession.

[¶7]      On October 18, 
1991, the Bouwkamps filed suit alleging: (1) that appellees converted the 
restaurant business, as well as some of their personal property; (2) wrongful 
eviction; (3) breach of the lease agreement; and, (4) intentional interference 
with prospective business relations. Appellees filed a motion for summary 
judgment, asserting that the Bouwkamps did not pay the rent due on May 6, 1990, 
until May 14 and the Bouwkamps' liquor liability policy was to expire on May 14, 
1990. Additionally, appellees alleged that, at the time of reentry, the 
Bouwkamps: (1) had no general public liability insurance and no property damage 
insurance; (2) had failed to timely pay the fee for the county liquor license; 
and, (3) failed to make repairs. All of those responsibilities were assigned to 
the Bouwkamps by the lease agreement.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material 
fact exists if it would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential 
element of the cause of action or a defense. Of course, we examine the record 
from the vantage point of the party who opposes the motion, and we give to that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. We will sustain a summary judgment on any legal ground appearing in the 
record. Bidache, Inc. v. Martin, 899 P.2d 872, 873-74 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶9]      The Bouwkamps 
assert they had cured, or attempted to cure, all violations of lease covenants 
on May 21, 1990, and, therefore, the appellees had no right to reenter and take 
possession of the premises.1 Appellees' acceptance of the late 
rent payment in May 1990 may have operated to cure that default, System Terminal 
Corp. v. Cornelison, 364 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 1961); Larsen v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 
447, 226 P.2d 177, 183 (1951), and the district court ruled that the timeliness 
of payment of the license fee presented an issue of fact "as to the definition 
of the actual due date." However, the failure of the Bouwkamps to have 
maintained the insurance coverages required by the unambiguous terms of the 
lease were obviously material breaches of the lease. These are not trivial, 
inadvertent, or technical problems but are violations which went to the heart of 
the agreement between the parties. These failures resulted in appellees having a 
right to terminate the lease in accordance with its express terms. See Howe v. 
Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 164 (Utah App. 1992); Riverside Dev. 
Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657, 665-66 (1982). The terms of this 
lease with regard to breach and right of reentry are harsh. However, not only 
did the Bouwkamps agree to those terms, they drafted the lease. Within the 
confines of this record, we can see no reason to relieve the Bouwkamps of their 
failure to abide by the agreement's plainly stated terms. See Quin Blair 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const. Co., 597 P.2d 945, 952 (Wyo. 1979). We hold 
that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
appellees on the basis that the agreement between the parties required that 
result.

[¶10]   Our holding that the Bouwkamps 
breached the lease agreement and that the appellees properly reentered and took 
possession of the premises obviates the need to consider the claim of wrongful 
eviction. Further, we note that this claim of error was not supported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority. It is not a function of this court to frame a 
party's argument. See e.g., Campbell v. Dep't of Family Serv., 881 P.2d 1066, 
1069, n. 2 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶11]   The Bouwkamps' claim of conversion 
also must fail because of our holding that the appellees had the right to 
reenter and reassume possession of "The Timbers." Given our holding above, the 
primary element of conversion, right to possession, is lacking. See Frost v. 
Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141, 144 (Wyo. 1981); Vissenberg v. Bresnahen, 65 Wyo. 367, 
202 P.2d 663, 666-70 (Wyo. 1949). Although we have not found it necessary to 
consider the issue of whether the Bouwkamps voluntarily surrendered the leased 
premises, the Bouwkamps' own evidence demonstrated that they removed all of 
their personal property from "The Timbers" except for some incidental pots and 
pans inadvertently left behind. The conversion claim actually relates to the 
right to enjoy possession of the restaurant business and, as we have held above, 
that was forfeited as a result of their breaches of the lease 
agreement.

[¶12]   The Bouwkamps' claim for 
intentional interference with prospective business relations also fails because 
of our holding that there was a breach of the lease agreement and a proper 
reentry by the appellees to protect their economic interests in the property. 
See Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238-39 (Wyo. 1991) 
(and cases cited therein).

[¶13]   Finally, the Bouwkamps' claim for 
punitive damages must fail since we have determined that the appellees' actions 
in terminating the lease and reassuming possession were entirely proper under 
the terms of the governing contract.

[¶14]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
The Bouwkamps rely heavily on our precedents which hold that forfeitures are not 
favored. See e.g., Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. REB, Inc., 577 P.2d 645, 650 (Wyo. 
1978); May v. Shields, 393 P.2d 319, 324 (Wyo. 1964); Parkinson v. Roberts, 78 
Wyo. 478, 329 P.2d 823, 827 (1958); Baker v. Jones, 69 Wyo. 314, 240 P.2d 1165, 
1171-72 (1952). We do not retreat from the holdings of those cases in reaching 
this decision. A careful review demonstrates that they are not applicable 
because of the specific and unambiguous language contained in the contract which 
governs in this case.