Case Title: MTA v. King

Citation: 369 Md. 274

Docket Number: 17/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 17, September Term, 2001
Maryland Transportation Authority v. Wyatt King
[Involves The Appropriate Role Of A Court In Judicially Reviewing An Adjudicative
Administrative Proceeding]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 17
September Term, 2001
___________________________________________
MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
v.
WYATT KING
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.,
        
Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
 
                                         JJ.
___________________________________________
                         Opinion by Eldridge, J.
Wilner and Harrell, JJ., concur
 __________________________________________
Filed:   June 10, 2002
In this action for judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative decision, a
former employee of the Maryland Transportation Authority challenges the administrative
decision terminating his employment with the Authority.  The former employee claims
that the Authority, in discharging him instead of imposing a lesser sanction for his
misconduct, failed to follow its own regulations.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City
rejected the former employee’s arguments and upheld the decision terminating his
employment.  The Court of Special Appeals, however, held that the Authority had not
“complied with its own regulations,” that “the penalty imposed, i.e., termination, was
disproportionate to the offense,” and that the misconduct was not “so serious as to
warrant dismissal.”  The appellate court  directed that the trial “court impose a sanction
less severe than termination.”  We shall hold that the Court of Special Appeals’ decision
in this case went beyond the proper role of a court in reviewing the action of an
administrative agency.  Accordingly, we shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals’
decision and direct that the Circuit Court’s judgment be affirmed.
I.
The Maryland Transportation Authority is a unit of the Maryland Department of
Transportation, which is a cabinet-level principal department in the executive branch of
the state government and is headed by the Secretary of Transportation.  In 1987, the
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respondent Wyatt E. King commenced employment in the Traffic Management and
Police Services Division of the Maryland Transportation Authority as a Police
Communications Operator I.  The Authority promoted King to the position of
Telecommunications Supervisor I in 1989, and he remained in that capacity until his
discharge from employment.  King’s duties in the position included accessing
confidential information from the Criminal Justice Information System and the Motor
Vehicle Administration records.
In June 1997, the Executive Secretary of the Authority requested an Assistant
Attorney General to conduct an investigation into various allegations of misconduct
within the Traffic Management and Police Services Division.  As a result of this
investigation and the Assistant Attorney General’s report, the respondent King on
February 2, 1998, was suspended from his position as a Telecommunications Supervisor
I pending charges for termination of his employment with the Authority.  King appealed
the suspension, and a suspension hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) of the Office of Administrative Hearings.  A final administrative decision was
rendered on March 10, 1998, by the Department of Budget and Management, upholding
King’s suspension.
In the meantime, the administrative proceedings for termination of King’s
employment had commenced.  The Authority, on February 17, 1998, filed charges against
King and sought both termination of his employment and an order disqualifying him from
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future employment with the Authority.  The charges were filed under COMAR
11.02.08.06, Termination of a Career Service Employee, which in pertinent part provides:
“B. Cause for Termination.  One or more than one of the following
causes is sufficient reason for termination, though termination may
be for a cause or causes other than those enumerated:
* * *
(6)
The employee has violated any statute, regulation,
executive order, written policy, written directive, or
written rule;
* * *
(11)
The employee has been wantonly offensive toward other
employees, supervisors or members of the public;
* * *
(16)
The employee has willfully made a false official statement
or report;
* * *
(21)
The employee has engaged in conduct that has brought
the Department (Authority) into public disrepute.”
The specific factual allegations against King were as follows:
“(6) It is alleged that, on or about February 20, 1997, while on
duty, Wyatt E. King made one or more unauthorized inquiries into
the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) in order to learn the
birth date of a fellow employee, Michelle Battle.
“ . . . (11)a.  The agency alleges that, on or about May or June
1997, Wyatt E. King conspired with a non-employee, Maria Medley,
to make a false accusation of misconduct against a fellow employee,
Grace DeShazo.
(11) b.  The agency alleges that, on or about May 26, 1997,
Mr. Wyatt E. King threatened to physically harm Grace DeShazo.
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(11) c.  The agency alleges that, on or about May or June
1997, Wyatt E. King reported to TS Michelle Nolan, Grace
DeShazo’s supervisor, that DeShazo was emotionally unstable and
on the verge of a breakdown.
(11) e.  The agency alleges that, on or about August 1997,
Wyatt E. King accused a fellow employee, Aurora Bullock, of being
neglectful in her duties with regard to the receipt of an official
facsimile, when in fact, it was Mr. King who failed to take the
appropriate action with respect to the facsimile.
(16) b.  The agency alleges that, on or about September
1997, Wyatt E. King accused a fellow employee, Aurora Bullock, of
being neglectful in her duties with regard to the receipt of an official
facsimile, when in fact, it was Mr. King who failed to take the
appropriate action with respect to the facsimile.
“ . . . (21) a.  The agency alleges that beginning in October 1996,
and continuing for several months thereafter Wyatt E. King brought
the Authority into public disrepute in the nature of his interactions
with Detective Reiland of the Baltimore City Police Department who
was conducting a criminal investigation arising from an incident in
which Mr. King was shot.  This conduct included, but was not
limited to, the offering of conflicting statements by Mr. King and the
false identification of himself as a ‘Supervisor of the Tunnel
Police.’”
The charges against King were initially heard by an ALJ of the Office of
Administrative Hearings in October 1998.  After the hearing, however, it was discovered
that the audiotape record of the hearing was incomplete because of a malfunction in the
recording equipment.  Therefore a second de novo hearing, before a different ALJ (Judge
Joan C. Ross) took place in June 1999.  
In September 1999, ALJ Ross filed a comprehensive opinion, containing detailed
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findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which she found that the Authority had proven
all of the charges except for the charge under COMAR 11.02.08.06B(21), relating to
King’s interactions with the Baltimore City Police Department growing out of the
shooting incident.  The ALJ concluded that King’s employment should be terminated and
that he should be disqualified from future employment with the Authority.  As to King’s
argument that the applicable regulations provided for progressive discipline prior to
termination, Judge Ross stated:
“The Appellant asserts that the MdTA [Maryland Transportation
Authority] failed to follow its own policy by failing to afford the
Appellant progressive discipline prior to termination.  The Appellant
cites as the basis of his position Transportation and Human
Resources Policy 7G – Disciplinary Action, which states at § 1.1 ‘It
is the policy of the Maryland Department of Transportation to apply
progressive discipline where warranted and circumstances permit.’
This argument must fail in that the same Human Resources policy
cited by the Appellant, also states at § 4.4 that ‘[s]ome forms of
misconduct, unacceptable performance or violations may result in
immediate termination without application of any other form of
discipline.’  COMAR 11.02.08.06 specifically sets forth causes that,
in and of themselves, constitute grounds for termination.  As
testified to by Ms. Lechowicz, known violations of CJIS had been
consistently resolved by termination of the employee.
“The nature of the charges that have been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, are such that reflect that the
Appellant’s integrity, honesty, and reliability cannot be depended
upon, and support his disqualification from future employment.”
Subsequently, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and “concur[red] with Judge
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1
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954).
Ross’s determination that such behavior [by King] is sufficient to warrant removal . . .
and disqualification from future employment.”  A final order to this effect was issued by
the Department of Budget and Management.
King filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City an action for judicial review of
the administrative decision, pursuant to the judicial review provisions of the Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 of the
State Government Article.  Following oral argument, the Circuit Court (Heller, J.) issued
an opinion and order which rejected King’s legal arguments, held that the administrative
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the administrative
decision.
King took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the
ALJ’s findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence, that the administrative
decision was arbitrary and capricious, and that termination of his employment instead of
a lesser sanction was inconsistent with the agency’s progressive discipline regulation and,
consequently, violated the so-called Accardi doctrine.1  The Court of Special Appeals,
in an unreported opinion, rejected King’s arguments that the ALJ’s findings of fact were
unsupported by substantial evidence and that the administrative decision was arbitrary
or capricious.  Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate court agreed with King that the
Authority failed to follow its progressive discipline regulation, and that such failure
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violated the Accardi doctrine.  Based on this conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for
that court to impose a lesser sanction.  The appellate court’s reasoning, as set forth in its
opinion, was as follows:
“As we shall discuss . . . infra, we are persuaded nonetheless,
because of the manner in which the investigation was conducted and
concluded, that the penalty imposed, i.e., termination, was
disproportionate to the offense.
* * * 
Appellant included in his brief the following MTA Disciplinary
Policies:
‘1.1
It is the policy of the Maryland Department of
Transportation to apply progressive discipline where
warranted and circumstance permits.
1.2
The penalties that may be applied in progressive
discipline include, but are not limited to the following:
– 
ORAL REPRIMAND
– 
WRITTEN REPRIMAND
– 
LOSS OF LEAVE
– 
SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
– 
INVOLUNTARY DEMOTION
– 
REMOVAL
– 
REJECTION ON PROMOTIONAL
PROBATION
– 
DISQUALIFICATION FROM FUTURE
EMPLOYMENT IN THE DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION
* * *
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4.1
The supervisor is responsible for correcting an
employee’s misconduct or unacceptable performance
by imposing appropriate discipline as warranted.
4.2
In most situations, the supervisor will first hold a
discussion to review the facts and advise the employee
of the area in which improvement is needed as well as
the future consequences of failing to improve.
4.3
In some cases, a particular form of discipline may be
bypassed, depending on the severity or number of
violations, documentation provided, or the employee’s
work history.
4.4
Some forms of misconduct, unacceptable performance
or violations may result in immediate termination
without application of any other form of discipline.’
“We said, in Hopkins v. Md. Inmate Griev. Comm’n, 40 Md. App.
329, 335 (1978):
‘It is well established that rules and regulations promulgated
by an administrative agency cannot be waived, suspended or
disregarded in a particular case as long as such rules and
regulations remain in force. . . .  This rule has been
recognized in federal and state jurisdictions and has become
known as the “Accardi doctrine” since it was announced in
U.S. ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
There the Supreme Court vacated a deportation order of the
Board of Immigration of Appeals because the Board and the
Attorney [G]eneral failed to follow their own regulations.’
“Pleading that the instant case cries out for progressive
discipline, appellant complains that ‘ . . . the charges involve
allegations which go back, in some cases to 1996.  Even the most
recent incidents referenced in the allegations occurred in August,
1997, nearly six months before appellant was terminated in
February, 1998.’  The Authority responds by reminding us that
Transportation and Human Resources Policy Section 7G, paragraph
1.1 provides that ‘[i]t is the policy of the Maryland Department of
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Transportation to apply progressive discipline where warranted and
circumstance permits.”
“Appellee, in its brief, alludes to the initiation of ‘a broad
investigation’ after which it was determined that there were grounds
for termination of appellant, ‘based on several different incidents.’
Concomitant with our discussion in the preceding two sections of
this opinion, we believe that, under appropriate circumstances – and
probably most – the Agency would have been justified in terminating
the employee without affording him or her the benefit of progressive
discipline when it is asserted that there was an improper use of the
CJIS system.  In this case, however, appellee responded at oral
argument to our inquiry about the timing of appellant’s termination
by pointing to the time necessary to complete the investigation of the
allegations.  Our concern was grounded in the apparent logic in, at
the very least, seeking a suspension of appellant . . . while the
investigation was ongoing if indeed the charges were deemed by the
Agency to be as grave as it now avers.
“Our review of the record and consideration of the positions of
the parties at oral argument and in their briefs, persuades us that,
whether it be termed ‘progressive discipline’ or simply ‘prompt and
speedy disposition of the charges,’ appellee has not, in this case,
complied with its own regulations.  Had it done so, appellant would
have been in a better position to prepare a defense at a time when
recollection of the subject events was fresh in the minds of all
involved.  Simply put, we do not believe that appellee can credibly
say that the offense(s) were so serious as to warrant dismissal and
yet were not so grave that appellant was permitted to remain in a
position to repeat the alleged violations.  We shall, accordingly,
remand this case with directions that the court impose a sanction less
severe than termination.” 
The Maryland Transportation Authority filed in this Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari, challenging both the Court of Special Appeals’ adoption of the Accardi
doctrine and the intermediate appellate court’s application of the doctrine in this case.
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King did not file a cross-petition or conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari
contesting the Court of Special Appeals’ holdings that the administrative findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence and that the administrative decision was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.  This Court granted the Authority’s petition, Maryland
Transportation Authority v. King, 363 Md. 661, 770 A.2d 169 (2001).
In its petition and briefs, the Authority points out that this Court has never
previously cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra, 347 U.S.
260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681, and that we should “decide when, if at all, the Accardi
doctrine applies to an executive agency’s actions.”  (Certiorari petition at 6).  The
Authority further argues that there was no violation of the agency’s regulation in this
case, that the determination of the appropriate sanction to be imposed on King was a
“discretionary decision” for the agency to make, and that the Court of Special Appeals
improperly “reversed on the ground that it would not have exercised its judgment in the
same way” as the agency did.  (Id. at 7-8).  
King maintains that this Court should adopt the Accardi doctrine.  He also
contends that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the Authority violated its
regulations.  He points to paragraph 4.4 of the regulations, on which the Authority chiefly
relied, and which provides that “some forms of misconduct . . . may result in immediate
termination without application of any other form of discipline.”  (Emphasis added).
According to King, the word “immediate” means that, if the Authority intends to
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terminate the employee rather than impose a lesser sanction, it must do so as soon as the
evidence of misconduct is known to the agency.  King maintains that the agency may not,
when it receives evidence of misconduct, retain the employee pending an investigation
and then suspend the employee pending resolution of the charges.  King’s position is that
“[t]here was no immediacy at all in the way in which the Agency approached Mr. King’s
termination . . . .”  (Respondent’s brief at 6-7).
II.
Initially, we shall briefly comment upon the parties’ arguments concerning the so-
called Accardi doctrine.
In Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra, 347 U.S. at 268, 74 S.Ct. at 504, 98 L.Ed. at
687, the Supreme Court of the United States held that an administrative decision is
subject to invalidation because of the agency’s “failure to exercise its own discretion
contrary to existing valid regulations.”  (Emphasis in original).  Subsequently in a series
of cases, the Supreme Court, relying on the Accardi case, has recognized a rule of federal
administrative law that, with some exceptions, an administrative agency is required to
follow its own procedures or regulations.  See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741, 751 n.14, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 1471 n. 14, 59 L.Ed.2d 733, 743 n.14 (1979) (while a
violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions under the
circumstances, “[i]t does not necessarily follow, however, as a matter of either logic or
law, that the agency had no duty to obey them”); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235, 94
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S.Ct. 1055, 1074, 39 L.Ed.2d 270, 294 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are
affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures.  This is so even
where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be
required”); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1157, 1 L. Ed.2d 1403,
1410 (1957) (“[R]egulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are
binding upon him as well as the citizen, and . . . this principle holds even when the
administrative action under review is discretionary in nature”).  But, cf. American Farm
Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 538-539, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 1292-1293,
25 L.Ed.2d 547, 552-553 (1970).
The Court of Special Appeals has recognized or applied the Accardi doctrine in
numerous opinions.  See, e.g., Anastasi v. Montgomery County, 123 Md. App. 472, 491,
719 A.2d 980, 990 (1998); G&M Ross v. License Comm issioner, 111 Md. App. 540, 543,
682 A.2d 1190, 1192 (1996); Board of School Commissioners v. James, 96 Md. App.
401, 421-422, 265 A.2d 361, 366-367, cert. denied, 332 Md. 382, 631 A.2d 452 (1993);
Board of Education of Baltimore Co. v. Ballard, 67 Md. App. 235, 239-243, 507 A.2d
192, 194-196 (1986); Board of Education v. Barbano, 45 Md. App. 27, 41-42, 411 A.2d
124, 131-132 (1980); Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, 40 Md. App.
329, 335-338, 391 A.2d 1213, 1216-1217 (1978).  The Court of Special Appeals has
taken the position that, in situations where the Accardi doctrine is applicable, it does not
matter whether one was prejudiced by the failure of the agency to follow its procedures
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or regulations.  See, e.g., Board of Education of Baltimore Co. v. Ballard, supra, 67 Md.
App. at 239 n.2, 507 A.2d at 194 n.2.
Although this Court has not previously discussed the Accardi doctrine as such, or
even cited Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681, it
is clear that, at least to some extent, a similar doctrine is reflected in Maryland
administrative law.  Thus, the judicial review section of the Maryland Administrative
Procedure Act provides that a reviewing court may “reverse or modify the
[administrative] decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been
prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision . . . (iii) results from an unlawful
procedure [or] (iv) is affected by any other error of law . . . .”  Code (1984, 1999 Repl.
Vol.), § 10-222(h)(iii) and (iv) of the State Government Article.
Moreover, numerous opinions of this Court have involved the review of agency
action to determine if the agency complied with its regulations and required procedures.
See, e.g., Board of Physicians v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 206-207, 725 A.2d 1027, 1036-
1037 (1999) (An agency’s violations of procedures which do not “compromise the
accused’s opportunity for a full and fair hearing on the charges,” or which were not
raised during the administrative proceedings, furnish no basis to invalidate the agency’s
decision); Dept. of Corrections v. Howard, 339 Md. 357, 369-370, 663 A.2d 74, 80
(1995) (The failure of an agency to complete an investigation within the time set forth
in a regulation did “not reflect any prejudice . . . that was caused by the delay,” and
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therefore the administrative decision was affirmed); Ward v. Dept. of Public Safety, 339
Md. 343, 353, 663 A.2d 66, 71 (1995) (Where the suspension of an employee was not
authorized by the agency’s regulation, the suspension was vacated); Heft v. Md. Racing
Commission, 323 Md. 257, 265, 592 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1991); Resetar v. State Board of
Education, 284 Md. 537, 550, 399 A.2d 225, 232, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838, 100 S.Ct.
74, 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979).  In addition, we have recognized that, under some
circumstances, mandamus or other traditional actions may lie to enforce administrative
compliance with procedural requirements or duties.  Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections
Board, 345 Md. 477, 496-500, 693 A.2d 757, 767-769 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1053, 118 S.Ct. 702, 139 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998), and cases there cited; Md.-Nat’l Cap. P.
& P. Comm’n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 17, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986).
In the present case, however, we need not further explore the Accardi doctrine and
the extent of its applicability to Maryland administrative proceedings.  This is because
of our conclusion, explained below, that the Maryland Transportation Authority did not
violate any of its regulations. 
III.
It is undisputed that the pertinent regulations authorize the Authority to terminate
an employee for some types of misconduct in lieu of applying a lesser sanction.
Nonetheless, King argues, and the Court of Special Appeals seemed to hold, that the
word “immediate” in paragraph 4.4 of the agency’s disciplinary policy means that, when
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the agency first learns of alleged misconduct deemed to be sufficiently serious to require
termination, the agency must at that time remove the employee from the workplace by a
suspension or termination.  King points out that his alleged misconduct occurred during
the period from August 1996 to June 1997, that the Assistant Attorney General’s
investigation began in June 1997, but that King was not suspended until February 2,
1998.  According to King, allowing him to remain in his job “spanning a period of over
a year” from the time of his alleged misconduct violated the “immediate termination”
language of paragraph 4.4.  (Respondent’s brief at 8-9).  The Authority, on the other
hand, argues that the word “immediate” in paragraph 4.4 “simply mean[s] that
termination may be sought . . . without resorting to any other ‘particular form of
discipline.’” (Petitioner’s reply brief at 2).
Paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 of the disciplinary policy provide as follows (emphasis
added):
“4.3
In some cases, a particular form of discipline may be
bypassed, depending on the severity or number of
violations, documentation provided, or the employee’s
work history.
“4.4
Some forms of misconduct, unacceptable performance or
violations may result in immediate termination without
application of any other form of discipline.”
When viewed in context, it seems clear that the word “immediate” means without first
resorting to other discipline.  The language of both of the above-quoted paragraphs, taken
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together, simply states that lesser forms of discipline may be bypassed.  King’s
interpretation of “immediate termination” is based on taking those words out of context
and ignoring the next eight explanatory words, “without application of any other form of
discipline.”
Furthermore, our reading of the regulation is confirmed by the principle that a
great deal of deference is owed to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation.  Judge Chasanow for this Court, in Ideal Federal v. Murphy, 339 Md. 446,
461, 663 A.2d 1272, 1279 (1995), set forth the principle as follows:
“In Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13
L.Ed.2d 616, 625 (1965), the Supreme Court of the United States
noted that:
‘When faced with a problem of statutory construction,
this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.
* * *
‘When the construction of an administrative regulation rather
than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in
order.’
“See also First Gibraltar Bank, FSB, 19 F.3d at 1047.  Additionally,
an agency’s interpretation of an administrative regulation is ‘of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.’  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700, 1702 (1945).”
In Md. Comm’n On Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel, 295 Md. 586, 592-593, 457
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A.2d 1146, 1149-1150 (1983), Judge Davidson for the Court explained:
“This Court has recognized that the interpretation of an agency rule
is governed by the same principles that govern the interpretation of
a statute.  See, e.g., Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 176, 416 A.2d
739, 747 (1980); Messitte v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. Assocs.,
Inc., 287 Md. 289, 293, 411 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1980).  More
important, agency rules are designed to serve the specific needs of
the agency, are promulgated by the agency, and are utilized on a day-
to-day basis by the agency.  A question concerning the interpretation
of an agency’s rule is as central to its operation as an interpretation
of the agency’s governing statute.  Because an agency is best able to
discern its intent in promulgating a regulation, the agency’s expertise
is more pertinent to the interpretation of an agency’s rule than to the
interpretation of its governing statute.”
For recent cases setting forth the principle that deference should be given to agency
interpretations, see, e.g., Division of Labor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 416-417, 784 A.2d
534, 539-540 (2001); Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172-173, 783 A.2d 169, 177-178
(2001); State Ethics Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 446-447, 780 A.2d 1154,
1165-1166 (2001); Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, 359 Md. 238, 266, 753
A.2d 501, 516 (2000); Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69,
729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999); Lussier v. Md. Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-697,
684 A.2d 804, 811-812 (1996).
The Authority’s interpretation of the regulation also makes more sense than King’s
interpretation.  Allegations of serious misconduct or some evidence of serious possible
misconduct by an employee may come to the Authority’s attention, but there may be a
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substantial question concerning the truth of the allegations or whether the misconduct
actually occurred.  While not required, it may be fairer to the employee for him or her to
remain on the job while the allegations or evidence are being investigated.  If it turns out
that the allegations were false, or that no misconduct took place, the employee will not
have been harmed by a suspension.  The Court of Special Appeals, as well as King,
seemed to suggest that a suspension with pay could be imposed during the investigation.
A suspension with pay is not expressly authorized by paragraph 1.2 of the disciplinary
policy.  Assuming, however, that the Authority is so authorized, a suspension can harm
an employee even if it is with pay.  Moreover, the choice would properly be for the
agency to make, not the courts.
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Special Appeals also stated that termination of
King’s employment “was disproportionate to the offense” and that King’s misconduct
was not “so serious as to warrant dismissal.”  This language may suggest that judicial
review of an administratively imposed sanction encompasses proportionality review or
that courts may review administrative decisions for abuse of discretion.  Neither the
Administrative Procedure Act nor general Maryland administrative law principles
authorize such review.
The Administrative Procedure Act, in § 10-222(h) of the State Government
Article, sets forth the standards for judicial review of contested cases as follows:
“(h) Decision. – In a proceeding under this section, the court
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may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of
the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding,
conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v)  is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.”
These provisions reflect the standards, set forth in this Court’s opinions, for judicial
review of adjudicatory administrative decisions generally, whether or not the review is
pursuant to the state Administrative Procedure Act.  See Board of License Comm. v.
Corridor, 361 Md. 403, 411, 761 A.2d 916, 920 (2000); Pollock v. Patuxent Institution,
358 Md. 656, 661, 668-669, 751 A.2d 496, 499, 503-504 (2000); Prince George’s County
v. Beretta, 358 Md. 166, 176 n.3, 747 A.2d 647, 652 n.3 (2000); Bucktail v. Talbot
County, 352 Md. 530, 549-558, 723 A.2d 440, 449-453 (1999), and cases there cited.
The grounds set forth in § 10-222(h) for reversing or modifying an adjudicatory
administrative decision do not include disproportionality or abuse of discretion.  As long
as an administrative sanction or decision does not exceed the agency’s authority, is not
unlawful, and is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence, there can be
no judicial reversal or modification of the decision based on disproportionality or abuse
-20-
2
We also note another problem with the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment.  The intermediate
appellate court directed the trial court to impose a sanction less than termination.  If the sanction of
termination were unlawful or unsupported by substantial evidence or arbitrary or capricious, and a
range of lesser sanctions would be permissible, it would be for the agency and not the reviewing
court to determine the appropriate permissible sanction.  See Travers v. Baltimore Police
Department, 115 Md. App. 395, 427, 693 A.2d 378, 393 (1997); Warner v. Town of Ocean City, 81
Md. App. 176, 199, 567 A.2d 160, 172 (1989).
of discretion unless, under the facts of a particular case, the disproportionality or abuse
of discretion was so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly deem
the decision to be “arbitrary or capricious.”  In the case at bar, the Court of Special
Appeals rejected King’s argument that the administrative decision was arbitrary or
capricious, and King did not seek certiorari review of that holding.  In addition, even
assuming arguendo that termination was disproportionate to King’s misconduct, it was
clearly not so disproportionate as to be “arbitrary or capricious” within the meaning of
§ 10-222(h)(vi). 2  
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court, upholding the
administrative decision, should have been affirmed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
REVERS ED, 
AND 
C ASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT
O F  
T H E  
C I R C U I T  
C O U R T  
F O R
BALTIMORE CITY.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID  
BY 
THE
RESPONDENT WYATT KING.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 17
September Term, 2001
______________________________________
MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY
v.
WYATT KING
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   June 10, 2002
I concur in the result reached by the Court and in most of Judge Eldridge’s opinion.
The one part of the opinion with which I take issue is the suggestion that there is some
substantive difference between an abuse of discretion and an arbitrariness and
capriciousness standard of review and the conclusion flowing from that suggestion that,
unless the reviewing court declares the ruling or decision under consideration to be
arbitrary or capricious, it may not reverse that ruling or decision even upon a finding that
the ruling or decision (1) is prejudicial to the complainant, and (2) so exceeds the bounds
of the agency’s discretion with respect to the matter as to constitute an abuse of the
agency’s discretion.  For one thing, this is a matter that need not be addressed in this
case; whether there is some definable distinction between abuse of discretion and
arbitrariness is not before us.  In any event, the Court seems to be suggesting a distinction
that really does not exist.
The Court seems disturbed because the Court of Special Appeals, in its opinion, made
the comment that termination of King’s employment was “disproportionate to the
offense.”  I agree that, as a general proposition, a reviewing court may not reverse or
modify an agency decision because it believes that a sanction imposed by the agency was
“disproportionate.”  Proportionality review is not for the court unless it reaches the point
of the decision exceeding the bounds of the agency’s lawful authority or discretion and,
for that reason, being arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful.  The imposition of
sanctions for violations of laws administered by the agency is a matter committed by the
Legislature to the Executive Branch agency, not to the courts, and so long as the sanction
-2-
imposed is one that was within the Constitutional and statutory authority of the agency
to impose and was not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, the court has no business
second-guessing the agency’s decision.  That is really all we need to say, if we need to
say anything.
To declare the much broader principle that a Circuit Court may not reverse an agency
decision or ruling that the court finds constitutes an abuse of the agency’s discretion is
both unnecessary and, in my view,  misleading.  That goes far beyond the matter of
proportionality review of sanctions.  The fact that the words “abuse of discretion” do not
appear in the judicial review section of the Maryland APA does not mean that agencies
are immune from judicial review when, in fact, they abuse their allowable discretion,
either under common law principles or under the APA.  In a nutshell, this is, to me, a
semantic matter, of what language the court should use.  The challenge by the
complaining party should be stated in the statutory language, that the ruling or decision
is arbitrary or capricious, and the court’s ruling on the challenge should also use that
terminology.  That is not to say, however, that there is some difference between the two
concepts.  It seems to me that a decision or ruling that exceeds the bounds of the agency’s
discretion is, for that reason, either arbitrary or otherwise unlawful, and, in either event,
if prejudicial, is subject to reversal by a reviewing court.
The issue of whether an agency decision or ruling may be reversed for abuse of
discretion does not depend on how much discretion the agency actually has in the matter.
-3-
That is generally a matter of substantive law.  The scope or range of discretion varies,
depending on the subject matter and the effect of the ruling.  Whether the scope of
discretion is broad or narrow, however, the judicial review issue emerges only when the
agency has abused whatever discretion it has and the ruling resulting from that abuse is
prejudicial to the complaining party.
The judicial review provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (title 5
U.S.C. § 706) directs a reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be:
“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
 (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
 (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of
statutory right;
 (D) without observance of procedure required by law;
 (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title [when evidentiary hearing is required] or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
 (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to de
novo trial by the reviewing court.”
(Emphasis added).
The judicial review provision of the Maryland APA (Md. Code, § 10-222(h) of the
State Government Article) covers much the same ground but is worded differently.  It
authorizes a reviewing court to reverse or modify the agency decision if any substantial
-4-
right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or
decision:
“(i) is unconstitutional;
 (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision
maker;
 (iii) results from unlawful procedure;
 (iv) is affected by any other error of law;
 (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light
of the entire record as submitted; or
 (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.”
(Emphasis added).
The Court concludes from the fact that the words “abuse of discretion” do not appear
in § 10-222(h), as they do in § 706 of the Federal Act, that rulings constituting an abuse
of the agency’s discretion are beyond judicial remediation unless they also are arbitrary
or capricious.  That suggests that there is some difference between the two concepts –
that a ruling may constitute an abuse of discretion yet not be arbitrary or capricious.  Such
a notion finds no support in the law, however, which regards the terms “abuse of
discretion” and “arbitrary or capricious” as meaning the same thing – the one often being
defined by reference to the other.
In Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 n.7, rehearing denied, 979
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1992), appeal after remand, 35 F.3d 560 (1994), the court declared
-5-
outright that the difference between an “abuse of discretion” standard and an “arbitrary
and capricious” standard was semantic, not substantive.  In reviewing the decision of a
plan administrator under ERISA, the court noted that the District Court had referred to
an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, rather than the “abuse of discretion”
standard that the Fifth Circuit court had used, but concluded that there was “only a
semantic, not a substantive difference” between the two labels.  Id., at 635 n.7.  To the
same effect are Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 n.5 (8th Cir. 1995); Canseco v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 93 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1996); and Chambers
v. Family Health Plan Corp., 199 F.3d 818, 825 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996).  See also United
States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (abuse of discretion means
action which is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable); Torrance v. Caddo Parish
Police Jury, 119 So. 2d 617, 619 (La. App. 1960) (abuse of discretion results from
conclusion reached capriciously or in an arbitrary manner); N.L.R.B. v. Guernsey-
Muskingum Electric Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 110 (6th Cir. 1960) (in review of agency
decision, abuse of discretion equated with arbitrary action not justifiable in view of
situation and circumstances); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 998 F.2d 931, 936
(Fed. Cir. 1993) ( abuse of discretion occurs when decision is clearly unreasonable or
arbitrary); Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 12 F.3d 1090, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (abuse
of discretion occurs when decision is simply arbitrary and unjustifiable in view of the
circumstances); Heat and Control, Inc. v. Hester Industries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022
-6-
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (abuse of discretion occurs when decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
fanciful); State v. Barton, 441 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1994);  Aero-Lite Window Co. v.
Jackson, 184 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Ohio App. 1962).  Some courts have defined “abuse of
discretion” as occurring when “no reasonable person could take the view” adopted by the
lower tribunal, which, to me, is the same as saying when the decision is arbitrary.  See
United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1995).  In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), the
Supreme Court looked at the components of § 706(2)(A) together, as if they articulated
one standard.
I cannot conceive of a ruling or action that legitimately could be found to result from
an abuse of the agency’s allowable discretion and yet not be arbitrary or capricious.  If
there is such a range, what is it and how would one define it?  Even if one could conjure
up a setting in which a ruling or action could be regarded as constituting an abuse of
discretion but yet not be arbitrary or capricious, it surely would result from an unlawful
procedure, be affected by “any other error of law,” or be unsupported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence, and be reversible on one of those grounds.  The Court,
I fear, has, quite unnecessarily, injected an area of uncertainty in this already difficult
area of law.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 17
September Term, 2001
______________________________________
MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY
v.
WYATT KING
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring opinion by Harrell, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   June 10, 2002
Like Judge Wilner, I concur in the result reached by the Court and most, if not all,
of the Court’s opinion.  Also, I agree with Judge Wilner’s point in his concurring opinion
that the Court’s opinion unnecessarily imagines a sub-issue pitting the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review in the Maryland APA (Md. Code, § 10-222 (h)(vi) of the
State Government Article) against a strawman “abuse of discretion” standard (slip op. at
18-20).  Unlike Judge Wilner, however, I would stop at that and decline to address or
ponder further on the merits of this illusory sub-issue, at least in the present case.
The Court’s opinion introduces the specter of potentially divergent standards of
judicial review based on its perception that the Court of Special Appeals, in its
assessment of King’s proportionality challenge, may have “suggest[ed]” that it reviewed
the Maryland Transportation Authority’s action based on an abuse of discretion standard
(slip op. at 18).  It is clear from my reading of the opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals, however, that the intermediate appellate court did not utilize an abuse of
discretion standard in its analysis of King’s Accardi contention.  To the contrary, the
court, in its unreported, per curiam opinion, appears to have viewed, under an
arbitrariness test, the question of the agency’s application (or not) or its rules and
policies.  I glean this from the court’s threshold mention of Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 103 Md.
App. 694, 718 (1995), advanced in King’s argument in his brief before that court, where
agency arbitrariness is referred to as the underlying evil intended to be remedied by
proper application of the Accardi doctrine.  I could find nothing in that court’s analysis
of King’s proportionality challenge from which to infer that the court was basing its
1
For example, at the 7 April 1992 meting of the Governor’s Commission To Revise The APA,
Judge Eldridge, then a member of the Commission, after reciting the extant language of the “Judicial
Review” section of the State APA, explained:
‘(g) Decision - In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1)remand the case for further proceedings;
(2)affirm the decision of the agency; or
(3)reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been
prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision of the agency:
(i)
is unconstitutional;
(ii)
exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
(iii)
results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv)
is affected by any error of law;
(continued...)
-2-
otherwise erroneous conclusion, semantically or substantively, on abuse of agency
discretion, separate from or commingled with agency arbitrariness.  Accordingly, I would
not engage, as Judge Wilner does in his concurrence, in any meaningful consideration of
the difference (if any) between “arbitrary and capricious” and “abuse of discretion.”  The
question simply is not presented (nor briefed or argued) in this case.
By the same token, I have some concern that portions of the Court’s opinion could
be misconstrued by any who give it a less than careful reading regarding the sweep of its
observations regarding the role abuse of discretion may (or may not) play in any legal
modality in which a court properly considers a challenge to action taken by an
administrative agency.  Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, certainly is correct that, as
such, “arbitrary and capricious” has been a Maryland standard for review of agency
actions in statutorily-authorized judicial review situations governed by the Maryland
APA.1  He also is correct that the same standard has been construed as applying in other
1
(...continued)
(v)
is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the
entire record as submitted; or
(vi)
is arbitrary or capricious.’
Judge Eldridge stated that this is standard language and also contains a remand provision.
Basically, the same authority and provisions apply to all agencies with the exception of the Liquor
Boards.
Judge Eldridge summarized § 215 stating that the wording is substantially standard throughout
the country and is essentially the same in virtually all APAs.  It seems to be all encompassing and
embodies what courts were saying in common law decisions before the APA was enacted.
Judge Eldridge saw no reason to change the standards of judicial review; he was not sure how
much could be changed without raising a constitutionality issue.
Governor’s Commission To Revise The APA, Minutes, 7 April 1992.
The Commission subsequently neither discussed nor recommended any change in the language of
the APA as to the arbitrary and capricious standard.
2
Judge Eldridge resigned from the Commission on 21 July 1992, prior to publication of its final
Report.
-3-
statutorily-authorized judicial review cases not governed by the state APA (slip op. at
19).  To the extent, however, that his words would be construed as suggesting that “abuse
of discretion” in no way plays a role in review by courts of agency action through legal
modalities other than a petition for judicial review,  I would caution the reader.
In the final Report of the Governor’s Commission To Revise the APA, dated 1
September 1992,2 the Commission, in the section entitled “Judicial Review of Agency
Actions,” stated:
VII.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS
It has long been established that Maryland courts have inherent power
-4-
to correct abuses of discretion and arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or
unreasonable acts of administrative agencies by mandamus, injunction or
otherwise.  Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945).  When judicial
review or a statutory appeal process is provided by statute, the statutory
method of review is exclusive and the court may not exercise its inherent
powers to review the administrative decision by a mandamus proceeding.
The jurisdiction of the court on appeal is limited to that conferred by the
statute.  Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 435
A.2d 747 (1981); Lee v. Secretary of State and Mahoney, 251 Md. 134, 246
A.2d 562 (1968).  (Emphasis supplied).
Heaps v. Cobb embraces language from a slightly earlier case, Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md.
271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945):
In the last analysis, the question as to what decisions of
an administrative agency are reviewable must turn upon the
statute creating it, and upon the type and degree of discretion
conferred upon the particular agency.  Courts have the
inherent power, through the writ of mandamus, by injunction,
or otherwise, to correct abuses of discretion and arbitrary,
illegal, capricious or unreasonable acts; but in exercising that
power care must be taken not to interfere with the legislative
prerogative[,] or with the exercise of sound administrative
discretion, where discretion is clearly conferred.
Heaps, 185 Md. at 379, 45 A.2d at 76 (quoting Hecht, 184 Md. at 280-81, 40 A.2d at
677).
Therefore, non-APA, non-statutory forms of court  review of administrative agency
action include abuse of discretion, in addition to arbitrary and capricious, as a standard
of review.  The Court’s opinion and observations in the present case with regard to abuse
of discretion are confined to statutorily-authorized avenues of judicial review (the old
-5-
“administrative appeal”), regardless of whether the State APA applies.