Case Title: Stanberry v. State

Citation: 343 Md. 720

Docket Number: 107/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Labaron Stanberry v. State of Maryland, No. 107, September Term,
1995
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES--Abandonment of luggage may not be inferred
from bus passenger's mere failure to assert ownership in response
to police questioning during a drug interdiction.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES--Individual possesses legitimate expectation
of privacy in contents of his or her luggage.  Briefly
relinquishing control of luggage does not necessarily amount to
abandonment.
      
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 107
                       September Term, 1995
                                                              
LABARON STANBERRY
   v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                      
    
*Murphy, C.J.
 Eldridge
 Rodowsky
 Chasanow
 Karwacki
 Bell
 Raker
JJ.
                                    
Opinion by Raker, J.
                                    
Filed:  November 12, 1996
                              *Murphy, C.J., now retired, 
participated in the hearing and 
conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after  
being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A,
3
he also participated in the decision
and the adoption of this opinion.
       The troopers did not count the passengers as they
1
disembarked at the rest stop.
We granted Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari to
answer the following question:
Did 
the 
lower 
court 
err 
in 
denying
Petitioner's motion to suppress the contents
of his suitcase which was left on a Greyhound
bus during a twenty minute stop at the
Maryland House and which was searched in
Petitioner's absence after police officers
held it up and asked the passengers on the bus
whether it belonged to them and received no
response?
I.
  
On August 16, 1993, the Maryland State Police were monitoring
Greyhound buses at the Maryland House rest stop on Interstate I-95
as part of a routine drug interdiction investigation.  At
approximately 8:55 p.m., Petitioner's bus arrived at the rest stop
from Newark, New Jersey for a twenty-minute rest stop.  Two state
troopers, who were in plain clothes and were not displaying
weapons, contacted the bus driver and arranged to board the bus and
conduct the interdiction procedure once all of the passengers
reboarded.   At approximately 9:20 p.m., the bus driver counted the
1
passengers and concluded, erroneously, that everyone had returned
to the bus.  Two of the troopers then boarded the bus, identified
themselves, and informed the passengers that they were performing
a "drug interdiction."  The troopers stated that the purpose of the
interdiction was to prevent the flow of drugs into the State, and
2
they requested the cooperation of the passengers.  A third trooper
remained outside the bus throughout the interdiction.
The two troopers proceeded to opposite ends of the bus and
began asking passengers to identify their baggage.  In the overhead
rack, Trooper Burnette located a black suit bag that was not
claimed by any of the passengers seated near it.  He continued
questioning passengers, and after completing his section of the
bus, Trooper Burnette returned to the black bag and again asked the
nearby passengers if the bag belonged to any of them.  No one
claimed the bag.  Finally, after all of the other baggage had been
claimed, Trooper Burnette took the suit bag to the front of the
bus, held the bag overhead, and asked all of the passengers if
anyone owned the bag.  No one claimed the bag.
The troopers removed the bag from the bus, opened it, and
searched it.  The contents included a white shopping bag which
contained four smaller plastic bags.  One of the smaller bags
contained cocaine, and each of the other three bags contained
approximately one hundred baggies of heroin.  The troopers closed
the suit bag, left it beside the bus door, and proceeded to
question some of the passengers.  The third trooper remained
outside the bus to watch the bag. 
Petitioner then returned to reboard the bus.  The bus driver
initially stopped Petitioner from reboarding, but then realized
that he had miscounted the number of people on the bus before the
interdiction began, and that Petitioner was a passenger.  Before
3
Petitioner reboarded, the trooper stationed outside the bus asked
him if the black suit bag belonged to him.  Petitioner initially
claimed ownership of the bag, but immediately contradicted himself
and stated that it did not belong to him.  Petitioner then told the
trooper that he was transporting the drugs to Richmond, Virginia in
return for $300.  The troopers arrested Petitioner.
Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Harford County
with one count of bringing a controlled dangerous substance into
the State, one count of possession of a controlled dangerous
substance with the intent to distribute, and one count of
possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, §§ 286(a)(1),
286A, and 287(a).  Petitioner moved to suppress both the drugs
taken from his baggage and his statement to the police.  He
contended that the police search of his luggage violated his
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and that his
subsequent statement to the police should be suppressed as "fruit
of the poisonous tree" because it resulted from the unlawful
search.
  At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the
State contended that the search of Petitioner's bag was permissible
because the troopers reasonably believed that the bag was
abandoned.  The State also maintained that the search was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
4
       We shall use the term "property owner" throughout this
2
discussion to denote the person in possession of the property at
the time of the search.  As we shall discuss infra, however, the
property law concept of "ownership" does not determine the extent
of Fourth Amendment protection. 
At the suppression hearing, Petitioner testified that he had
not abandoned his bag.  He maintained that he had merely left it on
the bus for a few minutes while he used the facilities at the rest
stop.  He testified that he left his bag when he went into the
Maryland House but that he did not intend to abandon the bag.
Petitioner stated that he intended to and did return to the bus to
continue his trip.  Petitioner maintained that in order to
determine whether property is abandoned for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the court should consider the subjective intent of the
property owner  and evaluate whether the owner relinquished any
2
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property.  Applying this
standard, Petitioner claimed, the property was not abandoned.
Petitioner also argued that the troopers' belief that the bag was
abandoned was not reasonable.  
The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, concluding
that although Petitioner did not in fact abandon his suit bag, the
troopers reasonably believed that the bag was abandoned.
Petitioner then proceeded to trial before the court with an agreed
statement of facts in response to the charge of transporting a
5
      The State elected not to prosecute Petitioner on the
3
remaining charges.
controlled dangerous substance into the state.   The court found
3
Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment
with all but three years suspended followed by two years of
supervised probation.  
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals, presenting the single issue that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.  The Court of Special Appeals
concluded that the troopers' belief that Petitioner's bag was
abandoned was reasonable, and thus the search was lawful.  The
court stated:
In the instant case, the bus driver
indicated to the officers that all the
passengers had reboarded the bus.  It was not
until then that the officers began the
interdiction process.  Upon finding the bag
and 
prior 
to 
opening 
it, 
the 
officers
repeatedly inquired as to which of the
passengers it might belong.  These inquiries
went unanswered.  In [the troopers'] objective
opinion, 
because 
they 
believed 
all 
the
passengers that might have claimed ownership
of the bag were present on the bus, they
believed the bag had been abandoned.  The
trial court did not clearly err in stating
that, although actual abandonment had not
occurred, 
the 
officers, 
based 
on 
their
knowledge and experience, acted reasonably in
presuming the bag had been abandoned, based
generally and on their knowledge at the
specific time of the search.  Moreover, "[t]o
suppress the evidence in the face of such
subdued official conduct would render all such
interdiction 
programs 
suspect. 
. 
. 
."
Flowers, 912 F.2d at 712.
6
On the facts presented by this case, the
officers' reasonable and objective basis for
concluding that the bag had been abandoned was
"much more than a calculated guess and cannot
be described as an effort to conduct a fishing
expedition. . . . The extreme sanction of
exclusion would be inappropriate. . . ."
Owens, 848 F.2d at 466.  That is not to say,
however, that searches of this type will not
be invalidated.  While close scrutiny of
interdiction claims of "reasonableness" is
required by the Fourth Amendment to guard
against contrived situations, our independent
examination of the facts here present leads us
to conclude, as did the trial court, that the
officers acted reasonably.  There may be many
interdiction situations in which the intrusion
on Fourth Amendment protections will be
unreasonable.  This, however, is not such a
case.
Stanberry v. State, 105 Md. App. 200, 214-15, 659 A.2d 333, 340-41
(1995).  We granted Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari.
II.
In this case, we must consider the constitutionality of a
search for narcotics conducted on a bus during a "drug
interdiction."  This is a matter of first impression in Maryland.
Drug interdictions have become a widely used tool in fighting the
"war on drugs."  As the Supreme Court explained in Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389
(1991):
Drug interdiction efforts have led to the
use of police surveillance at airports, train
stations, and bus depots.  Law enforcement
officers stationed at such locations routinely
approach individuals, either randomly or
7
      Professor Guerra describes three basic methods of conducting
4
drug interdictions:
The typical method used in sweeping buses
involves the officers' boarding the bus and
questioning everyone, requesting consent to
search from some.  The agents usually proceed
to the back of the bus and work their way
forward. The agents identify themselves and
sometimes explain that they are seeking the
public's 
cooperation 
in 
their 
drug
interdiction efforts.  In some cases, officers
request a passenger's consent to answer some
questions, but in most cases, they simply
proceed to pose questions.  The officers ask
the passenger's name and itinerary, and then
request to see identification and bus tickets.
Officers then often request consent to search
the passenger's person or belongings.  In some
cases, officers advise a person that consent
to search may be refused.
Alternatively, officers may sweep a bus
by asking passengers to identify their luggage
on the overhead racks or beneath the seats.
If 
a 
particular 
piece 
of 
luggage 
goes
unclaimed, the officers will inquire of the
person sitting closest to it, and then of all
the passengers, to determine its owner.  If no
one claims possession of it and if all the
passengers are on board, the officers will
then 
proceed 
to 
search 
the 
"abandoned"
luggage.  They often discover evidence that
one of the nearby passengers owns the piece of
luggage and, presumably, whatever contraband
may be found inside.
(continued...)
because they suspect in some vague way that
the individuals may be engaged in criminal
activity, 
and 
ask 
them 
potentially
incriminating questions.
The police have developed varying methods of conducting drug
interdictions.  S. Guerra, Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations:
Finding the Balance, 82 J. CRIM. L. 1109, 1127-28 (1992).4
8
(...continued)
In some other cases, officers board a bus
and randomly select a few passengers to
interview 
and 
from 
whom 
to 
request
identification and bus tickets.  In one
reported case, the officers admittedly boarded
the bus and then selected suspicious people or
people who were "unduly nervous," obviously
based only on their appearance and demeanor,
and investigated only those people.  These
interviews invariably culminate in a request
to search either the person or the passenger's
belongings.  In these cases, too, passengers
often disclaim ownership of their baggage.
Guerra, supra, at 1127-28.
Numerous courts have considered the constitutionality of
searches 
and 
seizures 
conducted 
during 
drug 
interdiction
investigations.  See, e.g., Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; United States v.
Flowers, 912 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1253
(1991); United States v. Garcia, 909 F. Supp. 334, (D. Md. 1995).
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a drug
interdiction in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429.  In Bostick, the
Court considered whether a defendant questioned by police in the
course of a drug interdiction on a bus had been illegally seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Rejecting the Florida
Supreme Court's  per se rule barring drug interdictions on buses,
see Bostick v. Florida, 554 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, 501 U.S.
429 (1991), the United States Supreme Court reasoned that:
[E]ven when officers have no basis for
suspecting a particular individual, they may
generally ask questions of that individual,
9
ask 
to 
examine 
the 
individual's
identification, and request consent to search
his or her luggage--as long as the police do
not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35 (citations omitted).  Although the
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether, on the
particular facts of the case, Bostick was seized, the Court
rejected the view of the Florida Supreme Court that any drug
interdiction conducted on a bus resulted in an unconstitutional
seizure of the passengers. Id. at 437, 439-40.    
Although the Court concluded in Bostick that bus drug
interdictions are not per se unconstitutional, the Court further
explained that if the police indicate that compliance with their
requests is required "by means of physical force or show of
authority," then the encounter may amount to an unlawful seizure of
the person. Id. at 434.  Thus, the applicability and extent of
Fourth Amendment protections depend on the specific procedures used
by the police.  See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 909 F.2d 470
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d
1057 (Idaho 1988). 
In the instant case, the drug interdiction search led police
to conclude that a piece of baggage was abandoned, resulting in a
warrantless search of the bag containing narcotics.  Petitioner
10
acknowledges that abandoned property is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment, but he maintains that the property at issue in this
case, his black suit bag, was not abandoned.  Petitioner contends
that he did not intend to abandon his property, and furthermore,
that he did nothing to manifest any intent to abandon his bag.
Thus, he asserts that the warrantless search of his bag was
impermissible.  The State responds that even if the police
mistakenly believe that property is abandoned, their search of the
property does not violate the Fourth Amendment provided they
reasonably believe the property is abandoned.  In this case, the
State maintains that Petitioner's bag appeared to be abandoned, and
therefore the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the State advocates extending the "good faith" doctrine of
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d
677 (1984), to this warrantless search.
11
III.
The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.  The scope of the protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment is defined in terms of the individual's
"legitimate expectation of privacy."  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967);
Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 625, 589 A.2d 59, 63, cert. denied,
502 U.S. 973 (1991).
Fourth Amendment protection, however, does not extend to
property that is abandoned.  Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
241, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1959); Morton v. State, 284
Md. 526, 531, 397 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1979); Everhart v. State, 274
Md. 459, 483, 337 A.2d 100, 114 (1975).  By abandoning property,
the owner relinquishes the legitimate expectation of privacy that
triggers Fourth Amendment protection.  Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47,
59, 367 A.2d 949, 956, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).  We have
previously articulated a two-part test to determine when Fourth
Amendment protection applies:
12
[F]irst . . . a person [must] have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that . . . expectation [must] be
one that society is prepared to recognize as
`reasonable.'
Venner, 279 Md. at 52, 367 A.2d at 952 (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)); see also California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988).  We have
also noted, in accord with a number of other courts and
commentators, that the test for whether property is abandoned for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment differs from the property law
13
       For example, in Venner, we quoted United States v. Wilson,
5
472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868
(1973), for the proposition that:
"The proper test for abandonment is not
whether all formal property rights have been
relinquished, but whether the complaining
party retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy 
in 
the 
articles 
alleged 
to 
be
abandoned."
Venner, 279 Md. at 53, 367 A.2d at 952; see also United States v.
Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,   U.S.   , 115 S.
Ct. 148 (1994); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1302 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir.
1986); 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.6(b), at 464 (2d ed. 1987
& 1995 Supp.); C. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 827-28 (1994); Note, From Katz to Greenwood:
Abandonment Gets Recycled from the Trash Pile--Can Our Garbage Be
Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581,
589-92 (1991).  Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53, 88
S. Ct. 507; 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) ("[A]t one time. . . [the
Fourth] Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures
of tangible property.  But `[t]he premise that property interest
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited.'")(quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304, 87 S.
Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967)) (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted).
concept of abandonment.   Owens, 322 Md. at 625, 589 A.2d at 63;
5
Venner, 279 Md. at 53, 367 A.2d at 952.
Although the Fourth Amendment abandonment inquiry focuses on
the property owner's actual expectation of privacy, a subjective
question, courts must frequently rely on objective indications of
the owner's intent.  As Chief Judge Murphy wrote for this Court in
Morton v. State, 284 Md. at 531, 397 A.2d at 1388-89:
Whether property has been "abandoned is
generally a question of fact based upon
evidence of a combination of act and intent."
Intention is a prime factor in considering
14
whether there has been an abandonment;  it is
to be ascertained from what the actor said and
did since intent, although subjective, is
determined from objective facts at hand.
(citations omitted).  See also Duncan and Smith v. State, 281 Md.
247, 262, 378 A.2d 1108, 1118 (1977); Everhart v. State, 274 Md.
459, 483, 337 A.2d 100, 114 (1975); United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d
806, 810 & n.2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993).
We have analyzed a variety of objective factors to determine
whether property is abandoned.  Among other considerations, we have
evaluated the location of the property and assessed whether the
area is secured.  Owens, 322 Md. at 630-31, 589 A.2d at 66; see
also United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666-67 (6th Cir. 1986).  We
have also assessed how long the property remained in the location
prior to the search and the condition of the property at the time
of the search.  Morton, 284 Md. at 534, 397 A.2d at 1390; Duncan
and Smith, 281 Md. at 263-64, 378 A.2d at 1118-19.  In addition, we
have considered whether the owner requested a third party to watch
or protect the property.  Owens, 322 Md. at 630, 589 A.2d at 65-66.
Finally, we have considered whether the owner disclaimed or failed
to claim the property when questioned by police.  Faulkner v.
15
      The police  frequently rely on the owner's disclaimer of
6
ownership to indicate abandonment.  See, e.g., United States v.
Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Lee,
916 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Tolbert, 692
F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933
(1983); United States v. Garcia, 909 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D. Md.
1995).  Disclaimers of ownership are particularly important in the
drug interdiction context, because drug interdiction procedures
frequently involve asking passengers to identify their baggage.
See Guerra, supra, at 1128.
Like consent, however, a disclaimer of ownership must be
voluntary to be effective.  See McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272,
284-85, 600 A.2d 430, 436 (1992).  Therefore, a disclaimer of
ownership does not support a finding of abandonment when the
disclaimer results from illegal police conduct.  Duncan and Smith,
281 Md. at 263, 378 A.2d at 1118; United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d
1526, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992).  
State, 317 Md. 441, 451, 564 A.2d 785, 789-90 (1989); Morton, 284
Md. at 534, 397 A.2d at 1390.6
 
Applying these general principles of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to cases involving luggage, we note first that the
Supreme Court has recognized that an individual possesses a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her
luggage.  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct.
2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
762, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979) ("[L]uggage is a
common repository for one's personal effects, and therefore is
inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.").  In
addition, because the operative issue, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, is whether the property owner relinquished any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property, briefly relinquishing
16
     Professor LaFave also observes that: 
7
It should not be assumed . . . that in
every 
instance 
in 
which 
a 
defendant
relinquishes possession or control, albeit
briefly, an abandonment for Fourth Amendment
purposes has occurred.  The fundamental
question 
is 
whether 
the 
relinquishment
occurred under circumstances which indicate he
retained no justified expectation of privacy
in the object.
1 LAFAVE, supra, § 2.6(b), at 467 (emphasis added).  
control of the property, e.g., by checking baggage, does not always
amount to abandonment.   See Morton, 284 Md. at 533, 397 A.2d at
7
1389-90; cf. Venner, 279 Md. at 51, 367 A.2d at 952. 
 
Moreover, courts have found that temporarily leaving luggage
in a secured area does not indicate abandonment.  United States v.
Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Most, 876 F.2d at
198-99 (leaving shopping bag with store clerk, as required by store
policy, does not constitute abandonment).  For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that:
When checked luggage is left for a short
period in the custody of an airline, it is
presumed that the luggage is stored in a
secure 
area 
and 
is 
safeguarded 
against
intrusion. 
 
Thus, 
the 
luggage 
owner's
expectation of privacy remains undiminished,
even though he fails to promptly retrieve his
bag.  However, this presumption can certainly
be 
overcome 
when 
other 
objective 
facts
demonstrate the owner's intention to abandon
his property.
17
Lee, 916 F.2d at 818 (citations omitted).  Thus, "[f]ailure to
retrieve a checked suitcase from a baggage claims area does not
automatically constitute abandonment."  United States v. Rem, 984
F.2d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Tolbert,
692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).
As Chief Judge Wald observed, writing for the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
[A]n individual need not shut himself off from
the world in order to retain his fourth
amendment rights. 
* * * * * *  
When 
an 
individual, 
by 
abandoning 
his
property, leaves it within the reach of the
public generally, there would be little point
in 
requiring that 
the 
police 
alone 
be
excluded.  Such a rule would impede effective
law enforcement while adding little to the
individual's interest in privacy.  It is quite
another matter, however, to suggest that an
individual forfeits his expectation of privacy
simply by entrusting his possessions to one
other person. . . .  In a variety of
circumstances, we are all forced to surrender
our possessions temporarily to the custody of
others.  We leave our bags with clerks at
stores, museums, and restaurants; we check our
luggage when we travel by train or by air;  we
park our cars at commercial garages.  The
suggestion that police in these situations may
conduct warrantless searches of our belongings
finds no support in precedent or in logic.
Most, 876 F.2d at 198 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
Although courts should generally consider all relevant facts
in assessing whether property was abandoned, we believe that the
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111
18
S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991), as discussed above,
precludes the courts, or the police, from inferring abandonment
from the owner's failure to assert ownership of luggage in response
to police questioning during a drug interdiction.  An affirmative
disclaimer of ownership is markedly different from passive failure
to claim one's property.  United States v. Rush, 890 F. 2d 45, 48
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1346-47
(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sanders, 719 F.2d 882, 885-86
(6th Cir. 1983); State v. Joyner, 669 P.2d 152, 153 (Haw. 1983);
State v. May, 608 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 1992) ("Although a number of
courts have held that abandonment may arise out of an express
disclaimer of ownership . . . , abandonment cannot be similarly
inferred from mere silence in response to police questioning.");
cf. United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir.
1992) (in assessing whether third party validly consented to search
defendant's property, "[c]ourts consider . . .  whether the
consenter explicitly disclaimed ownership or whether the defendant
was present but did not claim ownership").
Bostick requires that "a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter."  501 U.S. at 436.  The Supreme Court further explained:
"We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without
more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification
needed for a detention or seizure."  Id. at 437.  To construe a
19
refusal to cooperate with the police conducting a drug interdiction
as an indication that property is abandoned, thereby justifying a
warrantless search or seizure, would contradict the holding of
Bostick.
In Commonwealth v. Holloway, 384 S.E.2d 99 (Va. Ct. App.
1989), the Virginia Court of Appeals considered the issue of
whether, in light of Bostick, failure to assert ownership in
response to police questioning may be interpreted to indicate
abandonment.  The court reasoned that:
The defendant's failure to respond to the
agent's inquiry concerning ownership of the
luggage 
need 
not 
be 
interpreted 
as
abandonment.  Having been advised by the agent
that he was investigating for illegal drugs on
board 
the 
train, 
the 
defendant, 
whose
assertion 
of 
ownership 
may 
have 
been
incriminating, chose to remain silent in the
face of police questioning.  He had a right to
remain silent.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L. Ed. 2d
229 (1983).  The failure of other passengers
in the vicinity to claim ownership is not
evidence of the defendant's abandonment of
ownership nor is it evidence that the true
owner had abandoned the luggage.  The luggage
was in a proper place for storage, and the
owner may not have chosen to answer or been
available 
when 
the 
agent 
inquired 
of
passengers in the vicinity.
Holloway, 384 S.E.2d at 104.  The appellate court determined that
the trial court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the
defendant's luggage was not abandoned.  Id. 
In sum, we conclude that in determining whether property is
abandoned, the Fourth Amendment requires that we consider whether
20
the owner has relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in
the property.  While the owner's intent to abandon the property may
be relevant in determining whether the owner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, subjective intent alone is not dispositive.
See United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846-47 & n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1989); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra, § 2.6, at 111 n.48 (1995 Supp.).
Intent to abandon must ordinarily be assessed based on external
manifestations, such as the owner's words and actions.  Duncan and
Smith, 281 Md. at 264-66, 378 A.2d at 1119-20.  An owner's
affirmative disclaimer of ownership, if voluntary, ordinarily
constitutes abandonment.  But when police are conducting a drug
interdiction, when the interdiction protocol is the sole basis for
the citizen inquiry and reasonable suspicion or probable cause is
otherwise lacking, police may not infer abandonment from the
owner's passive failure to claim property.  
IV.
Applying the factors outlined above to the present case, we
note at the outset that the police entered the bus without
articulable suspicion or probable cause, and they subsequently
searched Petitioner's luggage without a warrant.  Under the
circumstances of this case, we conclude that the objective
manifestations of Petitioner's intent did not support the troopers'
conclusion that Petitioner's bag was abandoned.  
21
We first observe that Petitioner possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his baggage.  In addition, although
Petitioner may have reduced his expectation of privacy by placing
his bag on the overhead luggage rack, Petitioner did not surrender
his expectation of privacy merely by placing his bag where it was
accessible to other passengers.   Nor did Petitioner forego his
expectation of privacy by leaving the bag on the bus when he
disembarked at the rest stop.  The area was to some extent secure,
because no one could board the bus without the permission of the
driver.  Petitioner did not ask another passenger to watch the bag
or otherwise give control of his property to anyone else.
Petitioner merely left his bag on the bus for a brief period while
he used the facilities at a scheduled rest stop.
Moreover, recognition of Petitioner's subjective expectation
of privacy in his luggage is reasonable.  See Morton, 284 Md. at
534, 397 A.2d at 1390.  As the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia stated, "[t]he law obviously does not
insist that a person assertively clutch an object in order to
retain the protection of the fourth amendment."  United States v.
Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
Because we conclude that Petitioner possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his luggage, triggering Fourth Amendment
protection, we must next consider whether the police could
reasonably have concluded that Petitioner's bag was abandoned.  As
22
       The record reflects that the police were aware of the
8
principles articulated in Bostick governing the administration of
(continued...)
stated in Section III, we shall consider not only Petitioner's
subjective intent, but also whether, under the circumstances of
this case, the troopers could legitimately have inferred from
objective indications that Petitioner's bag was abandoned.
The record indicates that the police concluded that the bag
was abandoned because no one claimed it in response to their
questioning.  This is reflected by the following exchange during
the State's direct examination of Trooper Burnette at the
suppression hearing:
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Now with regard to--and I
am asking for your knowledge, your thought
processes--what made you believe that the
overhead suit bag was abandoned at the time
that you describe that it was?
[TROOPER]:  Nobody claimed it as being theirs,
after several announcements.  And it's been my
experience that when a bag is not claimed that
there [are] . . .  possibly illegal substances
in the bag.
  
We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
troopers should not have inferred abandonment from the passengers'
silence.  As we stated above, in accord with the Supreme Court
mandate in Florida v. Bostick, in order for the drug interdiction
search to meet constitutional requirements, a passenger must feel
free to refuse to comply with police requests, to remain silent in
response to police questions, and to leave the bus if desired.8
23
(...continued)
drug interdictions.  For example, on cross-examination of Trooper
Burnette, the following exchange occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Trooper, [the State's Attorney] . . . asked
you whether during the course of your interdiction where you
are going down the aisle, are passengers restrained from
leaving the bus . . . [a]nd I think you indicated they are
not?
[TROOPER]:  That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I guess the purpose--is it fair to
say that the purpose is to put the people at ease?
[TROOPER]:  Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  To make the whole episode as
convenient as possible?
[TROOPER]:  Right.  We try not to pressure anyone or show
any authority.  They know we are the police, but we don't
wear uniforms.  We try to make them as comfortable as
possible.  We don't want any indication or don't want
anyone to think they are scared or coerced into
cooperating with us.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And you say they frequently do smoke
a cigarette or whatever --- step off of the bus?  
[TROOPER]:  Yes, they do.
* * * * * *
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  As you are conducting your
interdiction process, how did you keep track of
passengers going on and off of the bus to have a
cigarette?
[TROOPER]:  We don't really try to keep track of them.
If one gets off we may observe them get off of the bus.
We don't really keep track.
* * * * * *
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Now is it also possible that one of
(continued...)
24
(...continued)
them could be off of the bus smoking a cigarette or have
returned to the Maryland House for some purpose when a
bag is identified?
[TROOPER]:  Not in my experience.  Usually once we have
[passed] . . . an area-- I never had one get off of the
bus before they had acknowledged that was a bag they had.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But you said you wouldn't stop them?
[TROOPER]: No, I wouldn't.
      Although Petitioner initially claimed ownership of the bag,
9
then immediately disclaimed ownership of his bag, the disclaimer
did not occur until after the troopers had searched his bag. 
Under these circumstances, this after-the-fact disclaimer may not
be 
used 
as 
a 
post 
hoc 
justification 
for 
an 
otherwise
unconstitutional search.  Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660, 663
(Ind. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); Franklin v. State,
913 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
In sum, under these circumstances, it was not reasonable to
conclude that the luggage was abandoned.  Hence, the Fourth
Amendment applied to the drug interdiction search.  As previously
stated, subject to a few well-delineated exceptions, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable.  McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272,
281, 600 A.2d 430, 434 (1992); Ricks v. State, 322 Md. 183, 188,
586 A.2d 740, 743 (1991).  In this case, the State failed to
establish that any recognized exception to the warrant requirement
applied. .
9
The State, relying on a theory of "apparent abandonment,"
argues by analogy to Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.
25
Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990), that the search should be
upheld because the troopers reasonably relied on objective facts
indicating that the luggage was abandoned, although it was not in
fact abandoned.  In Rodriguez, the police conducted a warrantless
search of the defendant's apartment, relying on the defendant's
girlfriend's apparent authority to consent to the search.  Id. at
179-80.  Although the police subsequently learned that the
girlfriend lacked actual authority to consent, the Supreme Court
held that if the police acted "reasonably" in light of the
objective indications that the girlfriend possessed common
authority 
over 
the 
premises, 
then 
the 
search 
was 
not
unconstitutional.  Id. at 182-89.  Our result is consistent with
Rodriguez.  As we have explained, in light of Bostick, the troopers
in this case could not reasonably have concluded that the bag was
abandoned from the mere fact that the passengers were silent when
asked if anyone owned the bag.
The State argues that we should extend the "good faith"
doctrine articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.
Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), to warrantless searches, thereby
precluding application of the exclusionary rule where the police
act in good faith.  The record reflects that the police were
clearly aware of the passengers' right to remain silent or to leave
the bus during the interdiction.  Therefore, we need not reach this
26
issue because we conclude that the police could not, in good faith,
have inferred abandonment from the passengers' silence.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court
erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress the drugs.  In
addition, Petitioner's subsequent statement to the troopers should
have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441
(1963); Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 8-9, 668 A.2d 22, 26 (1995).
We recognize the gravity of the drug problem and acknowledge
the need for investigatory techniques that respond to the
increasingly sophisticated methods employed by drug traffickers.
As Justice Powell wrote in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 561-62, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 497 (1980) (Powell, J.
concurring):
The public has a compelling interest in
detecting those who would traffic in deadly
drugs for personal profit.  Few problems
affecting the health and welfare of our
population, particularly our young, cause
greater concern than the escalating use of
controlled substances.  Much of the drug
traffic is highly organized and conducted by
sophisticated 
criminal 
syndicates. 
 
The
profits are enormous.  And many drugs . . .
may be easily concealed.  As a result, the
obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may
be unmatched in any other area of law
enforcement.
We note, moreover, that not every encounter between police and
private citizens during drug interdictions triggers Fourth
27
Amendment scrutiny.  As the Supreme Court stated in Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983):
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an
individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to
answer some questions, by putting questions to
him if the person is willing to listen, or by
offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution
his voluntary answers to such questions.  Nor
would the fact that the officer identifies
himself as a police officer, without more,
convert the encounter into a seizure requiring
some level of objective justification.
Id. at 497 (citations omitted); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
555 (person is not seized where plainclothes agents asked for
identification and ticket, and she agreed to cooperate, even if
agents did not expressly tell respondent she was free not to
cooperate).  Thus, police may approach private citizens and ask
questions or ask for identification without individualized
suspicion or probable cause, provided the encounter is consensual.
Furthermore, if, as a result of these inquiries, police ask for and
receive voluntary consent to search a citizen or his possessions,
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 559.
Although the facts of the drug interdiction search at issue in this
case render it unlawful, many drug interdictions may be conducted
without violating the Fourth Amendment.  See Guerra, supra.
Moreover, although we find today that, under the circumstances
presented in the instant case, the police search of Petitioner's
luggage was unlawful, we stress that our holding is limited to the
28
conduct of the police when they are acting in their criminal
investigatory capacity.  As the Iowa Supreme Court stated in
discussing the rationale for the emergency-aid exception to the
warrant requirement: 
In essence police officers function in one of
two roles:  (1) apprehension of criminals
(investigative function); and (2) protecting
the public and rescuing those in distress
(caretaking function).  Courts have noted that
preservation of human life is paramount to the
right of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment.  Thus the emergency-aid exception
is justified because the motivation for the
intrusion is to preserve life rather than to
search for evidence to be used in a criminal
investigation.
State v. Carlson 548 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Iowa 1996) (citations
omitted).  Our holding does not apply to situations in which the
police are acting to protect public safety pursuant to their
community caretaking function, e.g., by attempting to identify a
package that might contain a bomb.  See Gadson, 341 Md. at 17-18,
668 A.2d at 30-31.  Although there are situations in which an
unclaimed package or piece of luggage may arouse suspicions of an
explosive, in the case before us, the police relied solely on the
drug interdiction protocol and articulated no suspicion or belief
that the luggage might contain an explosive.
Where the police act in their investigative capacity, their
actions must comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
As the Supreme Court stated in Bostick: 
29
This Court. . . is not empowered to suspend
constitutional 
guarantees 
so 
that 
the
Government may more effectively wage a "war on
drugs."  If that war is to be fought, those
who fight it must respect the rights of
individuals, whether or not those individuals
are suspected of having committed a crime.
501 U.S. at 439 (citations omitted).  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HARFORD COUNTY FOR A NEW TRIAL.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY HARFORD COUNTY.