Case Title: State v. Roberts

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122837

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 122,837 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY ROBERTS JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
An appellate court reviews an instructional error claim in multiple steps. First, the 
court decides whether the issue was properly preserved. Second, it considers whether the 
instruction was legally and factually appropriate. In doing so, the court exercises 
unlimited review of the entire record and views the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the requesting party. And, finally, when the reviewing court finds error, it determines 
whether that error is reversible. 
 
2. 
The doctrine of invited error precludes a party from asking a district court to rule 
in a given way and then challenging that ruling on appeal. The doctrine's application 
turns on whether the record reflects the party's action in fact induced the court to make 
the claimed error. 
 
3. 
 
There is no error in failing to give a jury instruction that is not legally appropriate.  
 
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4. 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of 
review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational fact-finder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations.  
 
Appeal from Douglas District Court; SALLY D. POKORNY, judge. Opinion filed February 4, 2022. 
Affirmed.  
 
Danielle N. Davey, of Sloan, Eisenbarth, Glassman, McEntire & Jarboe, L.L.C., of Topeka, 
argued the cause, and Shaye L. Downing, of the same firm, of Lawrence, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney 
general, was with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STANDRIDGE, J.:  Following a fatal shooting in downtown Lawrence, a jury 
convicted Anthony Roberts Jr. of two counts of first-degree felony murder and one count 
each of intentional second-degree murder and attempted intentional second-degree 
murder. Roberts appeals his convictions, alleging jury instruction error and challenging 
the sufficiency of the State's evidence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Roberts' 
convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
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FACTS 
 
In the early morning hours of October 1, 2017, Lawrence Police Sergeant Michael 
McLaren and Officer Tyler Haney were patrolling downtown Lawrence to monitor the 
growing crowds as bars were closing and a concert at the Granada Theater was ending. 
Around 1:30 a.m., McLaren and Haney were in a parking lot at the intersection of 11th 
and Massachusetts Streets when they heard 12 to 15 rounds of gunfire coming from the 
northwest corner of the intersection in front of the Watkins Museum of History. After a 
pause in the gunfire, they saw a Black male wearing a green shirt get up off the ground, 
shoot a black semiautomatic handgun four or five times to the north, and then run west on 
11th Street.  
 
The incident left three people dead from gunshot wounds. Leah Brown died at the 
scene; Colwin Henderson III and Tre'Mel Dean later died at the hospital. Two other 
shooting victims survived. Tahzay Rayton had gunshot wounds in his left hip and pelvic 
area. Royelle Hunt was shot in his right leg.  
 
Law enforcement was unable to locate any suspects leaving the scene in the 
crowded and chaotic aftermath of the shooting. Lawrence Police Officer Ian McCann was 
on patrol on the west side of town when he heard about the shooting and the suspect 
description of a Black male wearing a green shirt. McCann parked on west 6th Street, a 
location which provided access to Topeka by multiple routes to the west. McCann 
observed a black Kia Sportage and a dark black Pontiac driving west. The Pontiac was 
following closely behind the Kia. Based on his training, this led McCann to believe that 
the Pontiac was attempting to keep the Kia from being detected. The Kia had a license 
plate that was hanging by one screw. After McCann ran a records check and learned that 
the Kia's license plate was invalid, he initiated a traffic stop. Four Black males were 
inside:  Roberts was driving and Marvel Miller, Dominique McMillon, and Ahmad 
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Rayton were passengers. None of the men were wearing a green shirt, but Ahmad Rayton 
was not wearing a shirt at all. The rear passenger window next to Rayton was down, and 
he was sweating profusely. Roberts was breathing heavily and had a gun on his right hip. 
Roberts said that he was the lawful owner of the gun and that he was carrying it for 
protection. McCann removed Roberts' gun from his person and verified that the gun—a 
fully loaded Glock 26 9-millimeter handgun—had not been stolen. McCann informed 
Roberts that law enforcement was looking for suspects from a downtown shooting. 
Roberts and Miller both advised McCann that they had come from Topeka to see Roberts' 
aunt and Miller's mother, Felicia Brooks, and denied that they had been downtown. 
Lacking any information that would allow him to search the vehicle or otherwise 
continue the detention, McCann allowed the men to leave.  
 
During the investigation into the shooting, law enforcement observed video 
evidence that pointed to the presence of two shooters. And the physical evidence 
collected from the scene established that two guns were fired. Investigators recovered six 
.40 caliber shell casings in front of the Watkins Museum on the west side of 
Massachusetts Street, fifteen 9-millimeter shell casings on the south side of the museum 
on 11th Street, and several bullet fragments in the area. Law enforcement identified 
Roberts and Ahmad Rayton as potential suspects. The .40 caliber shell casings were all 
fired from the same gun, and DNA recovered from them matched Ahmad Rayton's DNA 
profile. The 9-millimeter shell casings were all fired from another gun, which 
investigators determined belonged to Roberts. Although law enforcement linked the 9-
millimeter shell casings to Roberts' gun, Roberts' DNA was not found on any of the shell 
casings. And law enforcement could not confirm or rule out Roberts' gun as the weapon 
used to fire the bullet fragments found at the scene or retrieved from the victims. But 
based on its analysis of video collected from various downtown locations, law 
enforcement believed Roberts fired the first round of gunshots that hit Dean, Brown, 
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Henderson, and Tahzay Rayton, while Ahmad Rayton fired the second round of gunshots 
to the north that hit Hunt.  
 
 
The State filed four charges against Roberts:  two counts of first-degree felony 
murder of Brown and Dean, intentional second-degree murder of Henderson, and 
attempted intentional second-degree murder of Tahzay Rayton.  
 
At Roberts' jury trial, the State introduced evidence to show that the shooting 
stemmed from a feud between two groups of people from Topeka. Roberts belonged to 
one of the groups, and Henderson belonged to the other. The State theorized that earlier 
in the evening, a fight occurred outside the Granada between Dacorey Brown, who was 
part of Roberts' group, and Jalan Richardson, who was friends with Henderson. The State 
claimed Brown went back to Topeka and then later returned to downtown Lawrence with 
Roberts, Miller, McMillon, and Ahmad Rayton. The State alleged Roberts intentionally 
shot Henderson, and while doing so, shot the other three victims, killing Brown and Dean 
and injuring Tahzay Rayton.  
 
Robert Wheeler, Henderson's cousin, testified that he and Henderson went to the 
concert at the Granada with friends. After the concert, Wheeler, Henderson, and another 
friend left the Granada around 1:30 a.m. and went across the street toward Brothers Bar 
& Grill. They saw Roberts, who was sitting on the steps of the Watkins Museum. 
Wheeler knew Roberts and the three men Roberts was with—Miller, McMillon, and 
Ahmad Rayton—from Topeka. Wheeler testified that there were "hard feelings" between 
the two groups and they did not get along. Wheeler said that as they walked by, Roberts 
got up and said, "'What's poppin'?'" while waving a black gun with an extended clip down 
by his hip. Wheeler said that in response, Henderson turned around and said, "'What's 
up?'" Seeing Roberts' gun and wanting to avoid any trouble, Wheeler urged Henderson to 
keep walking across the street, where they talked to some friends.  
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After seeing another friend nearby, Wheeler testified that he approached Roberts 
and said, "'I don't know why you're trying to call my cousin out. We already got into a 
fight years ago and this is dumb.'" Then, according to Wheeler, McMillon hit him in the 
head and they began fighting. Wheeler saw that McMillon had a gun in his waistband 
under his shirt but had dropped it during the fight. Wheeler testified that Roberts then 
started "recklessly shooting," rapidly firing about 20 shots. Wheeler saw Dean fall to the 
ground. At the same time, Wheeler said that he and Ahmad Rayton started throwing 
punches at each other and that Ahmad pulled a gun from his waistband during the fight. 
Wheeler claimed that he pushed Ahmad to the ground and ran away as bullets flew past 
his head. Wheeler was at his car when someone called to tell him that Henderson was 
shot. Wheeler returned to the scene and found Henderson on the ground across the street 
from the museum. Wheeler at first told law enforcement that Ahmad Rayton must have 
shot Henderson based on where everyone was standing. But at trial, Wheeler testified that 
he did not see Henderson get shot and did not know who shot him.  
 
Toiyonte' Hunt was with Wheeler and Henderson at the concert. Hunt testified that 
he was near the fight between Wheeler and McMillon and saw Ahmad Rayton jump into 
the fight. Hunt said that when he heard the gunshots, he ran away in the opposite 
direction and did not see who was shooting. But Hunt said that he did not believe that 
Ahmad Rayton fired the gunshots.  
 
Marvel Miller testified that he was with Roberts, McMillon, and Ahmad Rayton at 
an apartment complex in Topeka on September 30, 2017. Miller said Brown arrived 
sometime late that evening, bleeding and bruised, and then they all went to Lawrence. 
Miller claimed not to remember telling law enforcement during his interview two years 
earlier that they went to Lawrence because of what had happened to Brown at the 
Granada. Instead, Miller testified that they had already decided to go to Lawrence for a 
concert before Brown arrived. Miller testified that he saw Wheeler and Henderson at the 
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intersection of 11th and Massachusetts Streets. Miller said that he knew that Roberts 
"wasn't cool" with Wheeler. But Miller denied that Roberts ever threatened or flashed a 
gun at Wheeler or Henderson. Miller claimed that Wheeler started the fight with 
McMillon. Miller said that as he moved away from the fight, he heard gunshots behind 
him but did not see who was firing the gun. Miller admitted, however, that he might have 
told law enforcement in his interview two years before trial that he saw Roberts shooting 
to the east. After meeting Roberts, McMillon, and Ahmad Rayton at the car, Miller said 
that he asked Roberts "why he did that" and Roberts just shook his head. Miller admitted 
that he lied to law enforcement about going to his mother's house that night.  
 
Kayla Hugghis, Roberts' cousin, testified that Roberts was living with her around 
the time of the shooting. Hugghis said that sometime shortly after the shooting, Roberts 
told her that he shot Henderson, he did not mean to shoot Dean or Brown, and that he put 
his gun away after he saw Henderson fall. Hugghis quoted Roberts as saying, "'I shot 
Colwin. I didn't shoot the girl and I didn't shoot [Dean]. I shot Colwin and I put my gun 
away when I was done.'" Hugghis also testified that Roberts had planned to go to 
Lawrence earlier in the day and denied that going there was a last-minute decision. 
Hugghis admitted that she knew nothing about the incident with Brown. Hugghis said 
that Roberts always carried a gun for protection and that she believed Roberts only fired 
his gun because he was fighting for his life.  
 
Andrew Davis testified that he was incarcerated in the Douglas County Jail with 
Roberts in 2018. Davis said that Roberts talked about his case and said that the evidence 
against him was only circumstantial and that the altercation had stemmed from conflict 
over a past murder. Davis claimed Roberts said that he fired two shots, but one ended up 
hitting someone he did not intend to kill.  
 
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After the State rested its case, Roberts testified in his own defense. Roberts said 
that he and his friends decided early in the day to go to Lawrence to hang out during the 
concert, and that they made that decision well before hearing about Brown's fight at the 
Granada. Roberts admitted that he saw Brown at an apartment complex in Topeka that 
night and that Brown was bleeding but denied that he changed his plans based on what 
had happened to Brown. Roberts also claimed that he did not know who had hit Brown. 
Roberts testified that he took his gun with him to Lawrence because he always carried it 
for protection, not because he was expecting trouble that night. Roberts and his friends 
drove to Lawrence in two vehicles. Secada Adams drove Roberts' Kia with Roberts and 
Miller as passengers, while Brown drove a white SUV with McMillon and Ahmad 
Rayton as passengers. Roberts said that the Kia had a broken tail light and there was an 
issue with the license tag, so the SUV followed behind the Kia to block it from detection. 
Roberts testified that both vehicles parked at the Vermont Towers apartments, but Adams 
and Brown left soon after to go to the hospital in Topeka.  
 
Around 1 a.m., Roberts, Miller, McMillon, and Ahmad Rayton walked to 
Massachusetts Street. They could not get into Brothers Bar & Grill, so they crossed 11th 
Street and approached the Granada but did not go inside. Roberts said that he saw 
Wheeler, Henderson, and others in their group but turned around because he did not get 
along with them; Roberts then crossed the street to the Watkins Museum to talk to 
Tahzay Rayton and Dean. There, Roberts said that he went to the bathroom in an area 
north of the museum and afterward saw Wheeler and Henderson again. Roberts denied 
saying anything to them or touching his gun. Roberts claimed he merely crossed his arms 
over his chest and looked down at the gun holster on his hip, revealing that he was armed. 
Roberts said that as Wheeler and Henderson walked by, he followed them at a distance to 
get back to his friends. Once back at the museum, Roberts sat down on a rock wall on the 
north side of 11th Street, talking to his friends and other acquaintances about their plans 
for the rest of the night.  
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Roberts said that Wheeler's group of friends was standing on the south side of 11th 
Street and were giving off "bad vibes." Roberts denied making any gestures or flashing 
his gun at them. According to Roberts, Wheeler's group crossed the street and surrounded 
Roberts and his friends. Roberts testified that Wheeler exchanged words with McMillon 
and punched him, and then several other people began kicking McMillon and rushing 
toward Ahmad Rayton. Roberts said that Henderson and Hunt came toward him. Roberts 
claimed that Henderson began punching him and that Hunt was holding a gun. Roberts 
denied provoking Hunt or Henderson in any way. Citing a fear of getting shot, Roberts 
pulled out his gun from its holster and started firing as he backed away. Roberts testified 
that he was not thinking when he began shooting; he claimed he was not shooting at 
anyone in particular and did not know how many shots he was firing. Roberts said that he 
fell down and, hearing another round of gunshots, assumed that Hunt was shooting at 
him. Roberts got up, put his gun in its holster, and ran west on 11th Street to his car. 
There, he met up with Miller, McMillon, and Ahmad Rayton to drive back to Topeka. 
Roberts said that when law enforcement stopped them on their way out of town, Miller 
told everyone to say they had been at his mother's house.  
 
Roberts testified that he did not intend to hurt or kill anyone and denied that he 
went to Lawrence looking for a fight. Roberts said it never occurred to him that he had 
shot anyone because there were multiple people with weapons that night. Roberts 
claimed that he did not know anyone was shot or killed and that he first found out 
through social media. Roberts said it made sense that Henderson had died, however, 
because Henderson had been right in front of him. Roberts denied telling Hugghis that he 
did not stop firing until he saw Henderson fall. Despite his claim of self-defense, Roberts 
admitted that he did not try to find law enforcement after the shooting and instead tried to 
avoid detection by leaving town and lying about his whereabouts when law enforcement 
pulled him over. Roberts acknowledged that he did not return home for two nights after 
the shooting and instead went to Kansas City, Missouri. Roberts also conceded that he 
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was dishonest in later interviews with the police but claimed that he was under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol then.  
 
During closing arguments, defense counsel alleged that the forensic evidence did 
not establish that Roberts had shot any of the victims. But even if it did, counsel argued 
that Roberts did not intend to kill Henderson and urged the jury to consider several lesser 
included offenses instead of the second-degree murder and attempted second-degree 
murder charges. Counsel also asked the jury to consider whether Roberts had acted in 
self-defense.  
 
The jury rejected these arguments and found Roberts guilty as charged. The 
district court imposed a controlling sentence of 226 months in prison plus two 
consecutive hard 25 life sentences. Roberts filed this timely appeal.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Roberts raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as an additional underlying felony 
of felony murder. Roberts acknowledges that he did not request the voluntary 
manslaughter felony-murder instruction. Second, Roberts alleges that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his convictions, claiming the State failed to prove that he intended 
to kill Henderson—a required element of each conviction. We address Roberts' issues in 
turn.   
 
 
 
 
 
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1. Felony-murder instruction  
 
In counts 1 and 2, the State charged Roberts with felony murder for the deaths of 
Brown and Dean. In count 3, the State charged Roberts with the intentional second-
degree murder of Henderson.  
 
Felony murder is statutorily defined as the killing of a human being "in the 
commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony." 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5402(a)(2). The felony-murder charges depended on the 
underlying felony of intentional second-degree murder, which is expressly designated in 
the statute as an inherently dangerous felony. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5402(c)(2)(B).  
 
Consistent with the statutory definition, the district court issued instruction No. 16: 
 
"In Count 1, the defendant is charged with murder in the first degree of Leah Brown. The 
defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must 
be proved: 
1. The defendant killed Leah Brown. 
2. The killing was done while defendant was committing the crime of murder in the 
second degree of Colwin Henderson III. 
3. This act occurred on or about the 1st day of October, 2017, in Douglas County, 
Kansas. 
The elements of murder in the second degree are as follows: 
1. The defendant intentionally killed Colwin Henderson III. 
2. This act occurred on or about the 1st day of October, 2017, in Douglas County, 
Kansas. 
"The State must prove that the defendant committed the crime intentionally. A 
defendant acts intentionally when it is the defendant's desire or conscious objective to do 
the act complained about by the State."  
 
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Instruction No. 17 contained identical language but listed the felony-murder victim as 
Dean instead of Brown.  
 
The district court separately instructed the jury on the charge alleged in count 3 of 
the complaint, the intentional second-degree murder of Henderson. Although the State 
elected to charge Roberts only with intentional second-degree murder, the court 
instructed the jury on several lesser included offenses it could consider on this charge if it 
did not unanimously agree that Roberts was guilty of second-degree murder. Voluntary 
manslaughter was one of the lesser included offenses the jury could consider.  
 
Roberts argues that because the jury could consider voluntary manslaughter as a 
lesser included offense to the second-degree murder charge in count 3, the court should 
have given felony-murder instructions for counts 1 and 2 that allowed the jury to consider 
voluntary manslaughter as an alternative underlying felony to intentional second-degree 
murder. Roberts claims that if the court had included a voluntary manslaughter felony-
murder instruction, the jury would have been more inclined to convict him of voluntary 
manslaughter on the underlying offense, rather than second-degree murder. Roberts 
acknowledges that he did not request the felony-murder voluntary manslaughter 
instruction.  
 
The State contends that the doctrine of invited error precludes Roberts from 
raising this argument. In the alternative, the State contends Roberts' argument fails on the 
merits.  
 
"When analyzing jury instruction issues, we follow a three-step process: 
 
'(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the 
issue, i.e., whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve 
the issue for appeal; (2) considering the merits of the claim to determine whether 
13 
 
 
 
error occurred below; and (3) assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.e., 
whether the error can be deemed harmless.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 
409 P.3d 1 (2018). 
 
The first and third step are interrelated: the standard of review for reversibility at 
the third step depends on whether a party has preserved the jury instruction challenge in 
the first step. 307 Kan. at 317; see K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3414(3) ("No party may assign 
as error the giving or failure to give an instruction . . . unless the party objects thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict . . . unless the instruction or the failure to 
give an instruction is clearly erroneous."). At the second step, we consider whether the 
instruction was legally and factually appropriate. 307 Kan. at 318. Appellate courts use 
unlimited review to determine whether an instruction was legally appropriate. State v. 
Johnson, 304 Kan. 924, 931-32, 376 P.3d 70 (2016). To be factually appropriate, there 
must be sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the 
requesting party, to support the instruction. State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 585, 598-99, 363 
P.3d 1101 (2016). 
 
Step one: preservation and invited error 
 
The State contends that the doctrine of invited error precludes this court from 
reviewing Roberts' claim of instructional error. See State v. Fleming, 308 Kan. 689, 695, 
423 P.3d 506 (2018) (concluding invited error precluded review of asserted jury 
instruction error on facts presented). 
 
Before trial, Roberts submitted proposed jury instructions, which included the 
following instruction for both counts of first-degree felony murder:  
 
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"The defendant is charged in [Count 1] [Count 2] with murder in the first 
degree—felony murder—of [Leah Brown] [Tremel Dean]. The defendant pleads not 
guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
1. The defendant killed [Leah Brown] [Tremel Dean]. 
2. The killing was done while defendant was committing the crime of murder in 
the second degree. 
3. This act occurred on or about the 1st day of October, 2017, in Douglas County, 
Kansas.  
"The elements of murder in the second degree are listed in Instruction No. ___.  
 
"In determining whether a killing occurs in the commission of the underlying 
felony, factors to be considered are time, distance, and the causal relationship between 
the underlying felony and the killing. State v. Kaesontae, 260 Kan. 386, 920 P.2d 959 
(1996)."  
 
During the instructions conference, the parties discussed the felony-murder 
instructions and the language setting forth the elements of felony murder. Defense 
counsel stated, "Number two should say, the killing was done while the defendant was 
committing the crime of murder in the second degree of Colwin Henderson, III." Defense 
counsel did not request any other language on the elements or otherwise ask the court to 
instruct on voluntary manslaughter as an alternative underlying felony.  
 
After the district court read the instructions to the jury, it called counsel to the 
bench to discuss corrections to some of the instructions.  
 
"THE COURT:  We don't have the homicidal act Instruction for Number 16 with 
Leah Brown. 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We are not supposed to. The State's theory is that it 
was intentionally to kill Colwin Henderson, and that it did actually kill Colwin 
15 
 
 
 
Henderson. There is no theory that it was a bullet aimed for somebody else. There is no 
lesser included, so the State's theory is that they were never—Mr. Roberts was never 
intending to strike [Brown]. He was only intending to strike Colwin Henderson, and so 
they have to prove that for the second degree murder. A separate instruction is not 
necessary."  
 
The State relies on defense counsel's statements during and after the instruction 
conference to claim that the doctrine of invited error precludes review of Roberts' alleged 
instructional error. The invited error doctrine dictates that "'a litigant who invites and 
leads a trial court into error will not be heard on appeal to complain of that action.'" 
Fleming, 308 Kan. at 696. In the context of jury instructions, there is no bright-line rule 
for its application. Rather, to determine whether the doctrine bars consideration of the 
alleged error, appellate courts must carefully examine the complaining party's actions that 
allegedly induced the court to make the claimed error and the context in which those 
actions occurred. See 308 Kan. at 702 (explaining that "the nature of the error . . . and the 
circumstances surrounding the drafting of instructions" are critical to an invited-error 
analysis). A mere failure to request an instruction does not trigger invited error. But 
"when a defendant actively pursues what is later argued to be an error, then the doctrine 
most certainly applies." State v. Sasser, 305 Kan. 1231, 1236, 391 P.3d 698 (2017). 
 
We recently harmonized our caselaw on jury instruction invited error in State v. 
Douglas, 313 Kan. 704, 707-08, 490 P.3d 34 (2021). In Douglas, the issue was whether 
defense counsel's statement during the jury instruction conference that "'I am not 
requesting any lesser included offenses'" was a mere failure to request an instruction, 
which does not trigger invited error, or something more. 313 Kan. at 707. In analyzing 
this issue, we found "the doctrine's application turns on whether the instruction would 
have been given—or omitted—but for an affirmative request to the court for that 
outcome later challenged on appeal. . . . The ultimate question is whether the record 
16 
 
 
 
reflects the defense's action in fact induced the court to make the claimed error." 313 
Kan. at 708. We then turned to the record: 
 
"The court simply asked defense counsel, 'Do you believe any lesser included offenses 
are applicable or are you requesting any?' Counsel replied:  'I know that I am not 
requesting any lesser included offenses and indeed there may not be any applicable ones 
either.' The State then confirmed it was not asking for any lesser included instructions, 
and the court ruled, 'Based on the facts that we have today, I do not believe that there is 
any applicable lesser [included offenses], so I concur with your comments.'" 313 Kan. at 
707-08. 
 
We found the facts in Douglas failed to show that defense counsel induced the district 
court to refrain from giving the lesser included offense instructions. 313 Kan. at 709. 
 
Likewise, the facts here do not show the district court would have given the 
voluntary manslaughter felony-murder instructions absent defense counsel's statements. 
During the instruction conference, defense counsel merely failed to request the alternative 
felony-murder instructions.  
 
We conclude defense counsel's statements did not induce the district court to 
refrain from giving a voluntary manslaughter felony-murder instruction. For these 
reasons, Roberts did not invite the claimed error. See Douglas, 313 Kan. at 707-08 
(invited instructional error question turns on whether the record reflects the defense's 
action in fact induced the court to make the claimed error).  
 
Step two: instructional error 
 
At the second step, we consider whether the voluntary manslaughter felony-
murder instruction would have been legally and factually appropriate. We first address 
17 
 
 
 
the legal propriety of the instruction proposed by Roberts because, if an instruction is not 
legally appropriate, there is no error in failing to give it and the analysis ends. See State v. 
Broxton, 311 Kan. 357, 363, 461 P.3d 54 (2020).   
 
Roberts argues the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter as an additional underlying felony of felony murder. Because the State did 
not charge Roberts with voluntary manslaughter, however, a felony-murder instruction 
based on voluntary manslaughter was not legally appropriate in this case. Kansas law 
allows the State to charge a defendant in several counts of a complaint or information for 
"the same offense committed in different ways or by different means to the extent 
necessary to provide for every possible contingency in the evidence." State v. Saylor, 228 
Kan. 498, 503-04, 618 P.2d 1166 (1980) (prosecutor may charge defendant in the 
alternative under those subsections of same statute "which may possibly be established 
by the evidence"). Here, the State charged Roberts with intentional second-degree murder 
of Henderson and a single count of felony murder for each victim, alleging the intentional 
second-degree murder of Henderson as the sole underlying felony. Although the State 
elected to charge Roberts only with intentional second-degree murder, the court 
instructed on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter for the jury to 
consider in case it did not unanimously agree that Roberts was guilty of second-degree 
murder. But instructing on a lesser included offense of the underlying crime charged does 
not make that lesser included offense a legally appropriate underlying crime in a felony-
murder instruction.  
 
Roberts' confusion on this issue appears to stem from the fact that voluntary 
manslaughter is one of the crimes expressly designated by statute as an inherently 
dangerous felony. But the State did not charge Roberts with any alternative counts of 
felony murder or otherwise amend the complaint at any time during trial or before the 
jury's verdict to include voluntary manslaughter as an alternative underlying felony. See 
18 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5402(c)(2)(C). Thus, the court could instruct the jury only on 
felony murder with intentional second-degree murder as the underlying felony. See 
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S. Ct. 270, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1960) ("[A] 
court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment 
against him."); State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 210, 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The State is 
bound by the wording of its complaint and limits itself to pursue only that 'version of the 
offense' or 'theory' of the case at trial."). If the district court had instructed the jury that it 
could convict Roberts of felony murder with voluntary manslaughter as the underlying 
felony, Roberts could have argued that the instruction was overbroad. See State v. Hart, 
297 Kan. 494, 508, 301 P.3d 1279 (2013) ("An overbroad instruction is erroneous 
because the charging instrument sets out the specific offense alleged to inform the 
defendant of the nature of the accusation, to permit the development of a defense to meet 
that accusation, and to protect against conviction based on facts not contemplated in the 
accusation."); State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 802, 217 P.3d 15 (2009) ("A jury 
instruction on the elements of a crime that is broader than the complaint charging the 
crime is erroneous.").  
 
Roberts' claim of jury confusion based on its ability to consider lesser included 
offenses for the crime of intentional second-degree murder alleged in count 3 of the 
complaint is equally unavailing. Appellate courts consider "'jury instructions as a whole, 
without focusing on any single instruction, in order to determine whether they properly 
and fairly state the applicable law or whether it is reasonable to conclude that they could 
have misled the jury.' [Citation omitted.]" State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 843, 416 P.3d 
116 (2018). That the court instructed the jury on lesser-included offenses of intentional 
second-degree murder related to count 3 is irrelevant to the felony-murder charges in 
counts 1 and 2. Indeed, the court instructed the jury to consider each count separately, 
independent of its decision on any other charge: 
 
19 
 
 
 
"Each crime charged against the defendant is a separate and distinct offense. You must 
decide each charge separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by 
your decision as to any other charge. The defendant may be convicted or acquitted on any 
or all of the offenses charged."  
 
We presume the jury followed the instructions given by the district court. See 
State v. Hachmeister, 311 Kan. 504, 513, 464 P.3d 947 (2020).  
 
The district court's instructions on felony murder properly stated the law and 
reflected the charges set forth in the complaint. And the voluntary manslaughter felony-
murder instruction proposed by Roberts on appeal was not legally appropriate. Because 
we find no instructional error, there is no need to address factual appropriateness or 
reversibility.    
 
2. Sufficiency of the evidence 
 
 
Roberts challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. 
Roberts alleges the State failed to establish that he intentionally killed Henderson, an 
element required to prove all four of his convictions. Our standard of review for this issue 
is well known: 
 
 
"'When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard 
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational fact[-]finder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations.' [Citation 
omitted.]" State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018). 
 
In count 3 of the complaint, the State charged Roberts with the intentional second-
degree murder of Henderson. Counts 1 and 2 charged Roberts with felony murder of 
20 
 
 
 
Brown and Dean based on the underlying felony of the intentional second-degree murder 
of Henderson. And count 4 of the complaint charged Roberts with attempted intentional 
second-degree murder of Tahzay Rayton based on Roberts' intent to kill Henderson. 
Thus, Roberts' convictions each turn on sufficient proof of his intent to kill Henderson.  
 
Second-degree murder, as relevant here, is defined as "the killing of a human 
being committed:  (1) [i]ntentionally." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5403(a). "A person acts 
'intentionally,' or 'with intent,' with respect to the nature of such person's conduct or to a 
result of such person's conduct when it is such person's conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5202(h). The district 
court instructed the jury accordingly, requiring the State to prove that Roberts acted with 
the conscious objective or desire to kill Henderson to obtain a conviction on each charge.  
 
"Intent is difficult, if not impossible, to show by definite and substantive proof. 
Thus, it is agreed that criminal intent may be shown by proof of the acts and conduct of 
the accused, and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom." State v. Woods, 222 Kan. 179, 
185, 563 P.2d 1061 (1977). In making those inferences, the jury presumes that a person 
intends all the natural consequences of his or her acts. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 
525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014), overruled on other grounds by State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 
375 P.3d 332 (2016). Intent can be, and usually is, inferred from circumstantial evidence. 
State v. Thach, 305 Kan. 72, 83-84, 378 P.3d 522 (2016). Circumstantial evidence, to be 
sufficient, need not exclude every other reasonable conclusion. And a conviction of even 
the gravest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Logsdon, 
304 Kan. 3, 25, 371 P.3d 836 (2016). It is the jury's prerogative to determine the weight 
to give the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. State v. 
Gibson, 246 Kan. 298, 303, 787 P.2d 1176 (1990). 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
To establish proof of Roberts' intent to kill Henderson, the State introduced 
evidence that their groups of friends did not get along and that there were "hard feelings" 
between them. Roberts himself admitted that he did not get along with Henderson's group 
of friends. The State also introduced evidence that the animosity between the two groups 
was triggered by a fight between Brown and Richardson before the concert at the 
Granada, and that Brown went back to Topeka and later returned to Lawrence with 
Roberts and their friends.  
 
Roberts suggests that the evidence cited above is weak and insufficient to support 
a finding that he intended to kill Henderson. Contrary to Roberts' assertion, however, this 
evidence provides a motive for Roberts' alleged actions. And evidence of motive may 
support proof of intent: 
 
"Motive supplies the jury with some degree of explanation, responding to a juror's natural 
tendency to wonder why a defendant behaved in the manner described by the State. Often 
it is a prominent feature of the State's theory of its case. Motive makes some sense out of 
what otherwise appear to be completely senseless crimes." State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 
113, 128, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). 
 
The State also presented evidence that Roberts waved his gun and said, "'What's 
poppin'?'" to Wheeler and Henderson, which the jury could have viewed as a display of 
aggression. Roberts also testified that he followed Wheeler and Henderson after revealing 
that he was armed. And Hugghis testified that Roberts admitted to shooting Henderson 
and firing his gun until he saw Henderson fall.  
 
Roberts challenges the State's theory that he went to Lawrence armed with a gun 
in response to Brown's fight, claiming that he had decided to go well before then and that 
he always carried his gun. Roberts also asserts that his actions upon arrival in Lawrence 
did not support an intent to kill Henderson. For support, Roberts implies that he could 
22 
 
 
 
have shot Henderson from other locations with no witnesses but instead chose to make 
his presence known to Henderson and his group without making any statements or 
gestures suggesting that he intended to use his gun against them. Rather than engaging in 
the fight that broke out among the group, Roberts maintains that he merely reacted to the 
fight by firing his gun without looking in any direction. Roberts observes that people who 
were not immediately near Henderson were struck by bullets, claiming this fact 
demonstrates that he lacked the intent to shoot anyone in particular, including Henderson. 
And Roberts challenges Hugghis' testimony as evidence of intent because she did not 
testify that Roberts ever said that he intended to shoot Henderson. Roberts also complains 
that no forensic evidence established that he actually shot any of the victims.  
 
We first note that forensic evidence is not required to sustain Roberts' convictions. 
See Logsdon, 304 Kan. at 25 (A conviction of even the gravest offense can be based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence.). And Roberts' remaining arguments are essentially 
an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Chandler, 307 Kan. at 
668 ("'Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make 
witness credibility determinations.'"); Gibson, 246 Kan. at 303 (It is the jury's prerogative 
to determine the weight to give the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from 
it.).  
 
Finally, Roberts suggests that the district court's decision to issue lesser included 
offense instructions shows that the court recognized there was a lack of evidence 
establishing the specific intent to kill. And he questions whether the jury's findings are 
even reliable "given the impossible position that the erroneous jury instructions placed 
the fact finders in."  
 
We are not persuaded by Roberts' argument. The district court's decision to 
provide the jury with lesser included offense instructions does not mean the court 
23 
 
 
 
believed that evidence of intent was lacking. Rather, the court provided these instructions 
under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3414(3), which requires courts to instruct a jury on lesser 
included offenses "where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a 
conviction of some lesser included crime." This duty to instruct applies even if the 
evidence is weak or inconclusive. State v. Maestas, 298 Kan. 765, 778-79, 316 P.3d 724 
(2014). Providing lesser included offense instructions allows a jury to consider the full 
range of possible verdicts supported by the evidence.  
 
Viewing the evidence outlined above in the light most favorable to the State, there 
is sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Roberts had the 
conscious objective or desire to kill Henderson. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5202(h).  
 
Affirmed.