Case Title: Abaya v. Mantell. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 11/13/2006 [pdf], 112 Haw. 436.

Citation: 112 Haw. 176

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

00

  

 

JOCELYN ABAYA, Individually and as Next Friend of
WILLIAM PINEDA-ABAYA, CZARINA PINEDA-ABAYA, and
PHOEBE PINEDA-ABAYA, and as Special Administrator of
the ESTATE OF WILLIS ABAYA, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

RICHARD MANTELL aka RICHARD MANDELL and
TEAM HEALTH WEST, Defendants-Appellees.

 

 

 

AMERICAN CLASSIC VOYAGES, CO., Party in Interest-Appellant.

 

 

No, 27195

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. No. 03-21-0592)

 

ocToBER 24, 2006

 

20:8 WY hz 190 9002

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, 3.
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE AHN, IN PLACE OP ACOBA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
The instant appeal arises out of a determination by the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit' that a settlenent agreement
between plaintiffs-appellees Jocelyn Abaya, individually and as
next friend of William Pineda-Abaya, Czarina Pineda-Abaya, and

14S. Mexenna presided over the underlying
‘otherwise indicated.

 

ae

atte
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Phoebe Pineda-Abaya, and as special administrator of the Estate

 

 

of Willis Abaya (hereinafter, collectively, the plaintiffs]? and
defendants-appellees Richard Mantel1 aka Richard Mandell (Dr.

1th West (THW) hereinafter, collectively,

 

Mantel) and Team
the defendants] was made in good faith, pursuant to Hawai'i
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-15.5 (Supp. 2005), quoted infra.

The circuit court's good faith determination was made over

 

sparty-in-interest”-appellant Anerican Classic Voyages Company
(appellant) ‘s objection that the agreement evinced collusion
between the plaintiffs and the defendante to Appellant's
detriment.

Appellant appeals from the circuit court’s (1) February
25, 2005 order granting the plaintiffs’ petition for
determination of good faith settlement and (2) April 25, 2005
order denying Appellant's motion for relief from and for
reconsideration of the February 25, 2005 order. on appeal,
Appellant clains that the circuit court abused ite discretion in
granting the plaintiffs’ petition. specifically, Appellant
argues that the settlenent was not nade in good faith inasmuch as
the plaintiffs and the defendants “colluded in the wording" of

the settlement agreement “in order to sever or otherwise avoid"

 

on March 24, 2003, Jocelyn Abaya, Millis Abaya’s wife, moved for an
order appointing her se next friend for William Pineda-Abaya,, Clarina Pineda
Abaya, and Phoese Pineda-Absya, the Abayas’ three minor children. On the seme
Gay, the Honorable Karen N. Blondin granted the order:

 
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the effect of a written indemnity agreement between Appellant and
‘THM, thereby injuring Appellant’s interests

Based on the discussion below, we conclude that,
because Appellant failed to properly intervene in the instant
case, it is not a party to the case. Thus, Appellant lacks
standing to challenge the circuit court's orders from which this
appeal is taken. Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal

TT. BACKGROUND

At all tines relevant herein, Willis Abaya was enployed
by Great Independence Ship Company, a ‘subsidiary entity" of
Appellant, as a porter aboard the cruise ship S.8. Independence
(the ship). Appellant, in turn, owned and operated the ship.?
Appellant contracted with Quantum Healthcare Medical Associates,
Inc. (Quantum)‘ to, inter alia, operate a hospital aboard the
ship and provide a medical staff for the hospital. The
contractual provisichs are set forth in the Professional Service
Agreement (PSA) executed by Appellant and Quantum/THW. The PSA

contain an indemnification agreement, wherein Appellant and THW

 

intially agreed, inter alia, to indemnify and hold each other

harmless for the other's negligence.

2 Although Appellant indicated that it owed and cperated the ship, the
defendants stated that the ship vas ovned by Appellant but operated by
American Havai'i Cruise Line. The digeinetion, however, appears to be
inconsequential to the ingtant case.

 

+ according to Appellant, Quantum is apparently wholly omed by parent
corporation Team Health, inc. and Le now known as THM. However, accarding £0
the defendants, Quantum’ is s wholly owned subsidiary of THW. The parties
appear £0 refer to Quantum and THW interchangeably, Thue, we have done the

 
 

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Pursuant to the PSA, Quantum contracted with Dr.
Mantell to serve as an “independent contractor physician” aboard
the ship. Dr. Mantell is a medical doctor and surgeon, licensed
in the State of California, and is certified as the ship's
physician by the United States Coast Guard.
A. Factual Background

on May 23, 2001, Abaya, while working aboard the ship,
became ill and was brought to the ship’s hospital in a wheelchair
by his co-worker. According to the defendants, Abaye was brought
to the ship’s hospital at approximately 5:20 p.m.= At that time,
the ship was docked at Honolulu Harbor in the State of Hawai'i.
Upon arriving at the ship’s hospital, Abaya immediately becane
“unresponsive and went into seizure activity." Dr. Mantell
determined that Abaya was having a myocardial infarction,
commonly known as a heart attack. After the initial seizure
activity, Abaya apparently became somewhat responsive and was
able to answer certain questions posed by Dr. Mantell. At some
point later, Abaya suffered additional seizure activity. after
the additional seizure activity, Abaya became unresponsive
without any vital signs. According to the defendants, Abaya

remained unresponsive despite Dr. Mantell’s efforts.

 

on appeal, the plaintiffs state that it is “unclear when Abaya firet
arrived at che ship's howpital. Im addition, the plaintiffe state thee Abe
Becane ill “with heart attack cymptons" at 3:00 p.m.

   

 
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At some point after Abaya was brought to the ship's
hospital, the plaintiffs allege that an anbulance was called to
transport Abaya to Queen’s Medical Center (QMC), a nearby

hospital located in Honolulu. When the ambulance crew arrived at

 

the ship's hospital, Dr. Mantell apparently “would not rele:
‘Abaya to the ambulance crew. Ultimately, Abaya remained at the
ship's hospital in the care of Dr, Mantell. Thereafter, Dr.
Mantell pronounced Abaya dead at 6:12 p.m.
B. Procedural History

on March 18, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their complaint
against the defendants but not against Appellant, apparently
because Appellant was involved in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding.* The plaintiffs essentially alleged that Dr. Mantell

was negligent in the care and treatment of Abaya. The plaintiffs

 

«prior to the filing of the complaint, Appellant filed 2 voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter il of the Bankruptcy Code in the United
Blates Bankruptcy Code for the District of Delaware (the bankruptey court)
According to Appellant, the Bankruptcy court entered an “Order Approving the
Implementation of Procedures to Liguidace Certain Disputed Personal Injury
Cline” (the bankeuptey order) on Septenser 24, 2002. On April 24, 2002, the
Estate of Willis Abaya (the Eatate) apparently asserted claims aricing from
Absya's death against Appellant, pursuant to the bankruptcy order. According
to Appellant, the etate asserted “claims against [appellant,] alieging
negligence under the Jones Act ‘and the general maritime law.”
Specifically, the Estate apparently alleged that Appellant was “negligent in,
‘ahong other things, failing to provide [Abaya] with proper medical care and
failing to ensure the hospital aboard the [ship] was properly equipped.

 

 

 

 

 

According to the plaintiffs on appeal, hovever, “[b]ecause of the
bankruptcy petition filed by [Appellant], the claine against [appellant] are
pot yer detailed in a formal pleading." ‘The plaintiffs further state that,
SYolhee the automatic stay i lifted, the [estate and the survivors of Abays]
Mill be filing an action against [Appellant] to prosecute the clains against
Appellant] based on ite alleged wrongdoing and nct for any liability [it] say
have for vicarious Iiability it would otherwise be held accountable for due to
hegiigence by the [defendants]. Pinally, che plaiselfts eeate chet they
SElled « proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.”

 

 

 

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also alleged that TW was liable for (1) Dr. Mantell’s negligence
under the doctrine of respondeat superior and (2) its own
negligence. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that THW was
negligent ‘in recommending or providing [Dr.] Mantell to provide
jervices on the ship[.]" Moreover, the plaintiffe asserted that

ary informed consent

 

the defendants failed to obtain the nec
from Abaya and/or the plaintiffs

on Septenber 15, 2004, the plaintiffs and the
defendants entered into a settlement, resolving all claime
against the defendant arising from Abaya’s death. The evsential
terms of the settlement were incorporated in a document entitled
*ESSENTIAL ABAYA TERNS" (hereinafter, the Essential Terms]. The
Besential Terms was confidential, placed on the record on
September 15, 2004, and sealed.

on Novenber 8, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a “Petition
for Determination of Good Faith Settlement” hereinafter, the

petition], pursuant to HRS § 663-15.5.” The plaintiffs asserted

that the petition

7 wns § 663-15.5 provides in relevant part:

(®) Ixlny party shall petition the court for a
hearing on the issue of good faith of a settlenent entered
into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or sore
Alleged tortfeasore or co-obligore, serving notice £0 all
Other known joint tortfeasore or co-cbligors. =

‘The petition shall indicate the settling parties ang,
except fora settlement that includes « confidentiality
Agreenent regarding the case or the terns of the settlenent,
the basis, terms, and settlenest anoune

 

 

 
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ie submitted on the grounds that [the pllaineiffs have, in
good faith, entered into a settlement with [the d)efendante.
circumstances of the care, ie

   

 

‘The essential terms of the settlenent are that all of
(ene pllaiseitfe’ claine against [the dlefendants will be
feleased in return for payzent to [ehe p]isintiite of &
Confidential amount.

‘Thus, the plaintiffs requested the circuit court to determine

that the settlement was entered into in good faith and that the

 

settlement “bars all joint tortfeasors fron asserting any clains

 

against [the dlefendants for contribution and/or indemnity

arising out of the incidents which form the basis of (the

 

p)laintiffs’ claims{.]* The plaintiffs also served Appeljant

with notice of the petition, in apparent recognition of

or, pursuant to HRS

 

Appellant's status as a known joint tortf

§ 663-15.5(b). See aupra note 7.
on November 22, 2004, the plaintiffs and the defendants

filed a “stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice of all Claims
Against [Dr.] Mantell.* On Novenber 30, 2004, Appellant --
Adentitying itself as a “party in interest~ -- filed ite
objection to the petition, but did not -- at that tine, or any

time thereafter, move to intervene as a party in the instant

"HRS § 663-25.5(@) provides

(3) determination by the court that a settlenent
was made in good faith shall:

(2) Har any other joint tortfeasor or co-ebligor
rou any further claims agsinet the settling
torfeasor or co-obligor, except chore based on a

written indemnity sgreenent; and
(2) Result sn a dienigeal of ali crose-clains filed

against the settling joint tortfeasor or co”
obligor, except those based on a written
indemnity agreenent.

 

 

   

 

 
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action. Appellant contested the good faith of the settlement
agreement proposed by the plaintiffs and the defendants “to the
extent, if any, that such settlenent operates to sever or
otherwise avoid the [indemnity agreement contained in the PSA]
between (Appellant) and [the dJefendants.”? Appellant requested
the circuit court to require the plaintiffs and the defendants to
“disclose the specific basis and terms of the proposed
settlement” and, ‘if warranted, that the [eireuit court
invalidate any basis or term of settlement that operates, or
seeks to operate, to sever or otherwise avoid the [indemity
agreenent] between [Appellant] and [the dlefendants["*) as
lacking in good faith pursuant to the provisions of HRS
§ 663-15.5.°

On December 3, 2004, the defendants filed their
“substantive joiner” in the petition [hereinafter, the joinder]
and attached (1) the Essential Terms and (2) the Release,
indemnification and Settlenent Agreenent. The defendant
submitted in their joinder that *[t]here are a nunber of factors”
that would support the determination that the settlement was made

in good faith.

 

© we note that Appellant states that che subject indesnity agreenent
(contained in the PSA) was entered inte between it and cthe defendants,” Luca,
TH and Dr. Mantell. However, as previcusly mentioned, the PSA was entered
into between Appellant and Quantun/TiW. Dr. Nantel},
contracting party to the PSA.

 

 

 

* see aupra note 9.

 
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On December 6, 2004, a hearing was held on the

petition. On February 25, 2005, the circuit court entered its
order granting the petition [hereinafter, the order]. The

circuit court stated in relevant part

2. The [circuit] court determines and orders that
[ene pliaintiffe’ settienent with (the defendants was
tneered into in good faith, considering the various factors
fet forth in Troyer v. Adats, [102 Hawai'i 299,] 77 P34 83
12003}]. this includes the expenses, including expert
teetinony, for (the p)iaintifee(] to present a case ageinst
the [diefendants herein, and the strengths and weaknesees of
the case against the (@jefendante herein.

 

 

2, __tn that there is no opposition to the [petition)
by anyone other than [appellant], the (circuit) court hereby
Geeervines that, with the exception of iappellant), the
Gettlenent bare all joint torefeasors from asserting any
Claims against. (the defendants for contribution and/or
Sndemnity arising out of the incidents which form the basis
of [the p)iaineiffe’ claims herein.

 

 

 

3. With respect to [Appellant], the (circuit) court
reiterates ite finding and determination that (the
plisintisfe’ eettlenent with [the djefendants vas entered
Theo in good faith. The [circuit] court makes no
determination regarding the effect of HRS" S 663-

Ys.s(a) GQ) ("] or whether any of the rights of [Appellant]
Agsinet the [dJefendants herein based upon a written
[ndennicy soreenent vould be affected by the certlenent.
Any claine by (Appellant) against any of the (dlefendant
herein other than [those] based upon a written indemnity
igreenent are barred. To the extent any of the provisions
Of the settlement conflict with MRS § 663-15.5(d) (1), the
statute would control.

 

 

 

(pnphasis added.) The order was served on Appellant and the

defendants on March 8, 2005. On March 28, 2005, Appellant filed

 

As previously tated, ARE § 663-15-5(d) (1) provides:

(4) A determination by the court that 2 settlenent
wae made in good faith shall:
a)” Bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor

from any further claims against the settling

torfeascr oF co-obligor, except those based on

writen indemnie Bet)

(emphasis added.)

 
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its notice of appeal pursuant to, inter alia, HRS

 

§ 663-15.5(
on the same day, Appellant filed a motion for relief

from and for reconsideration of the order (hereinafter, motion

for reconsideration]. Appellant requested reconsideration of the

order on the basis that, because the terms of the settlement

agreement were not timely disclosed to Appellant, it could not

present an effective argument at the December 6, 2004 hearing on

the petition.
on April 13, 2005, the circuit court orally denied

Appellant's motion for reconsideration. Appellant filed an

amended notice of appeal on April 15, 2005. on April 25, 2005,

the circuit court entered ite written order denying Appellant’s

motion for reconsideration.

ums § 662-25.5(e) provides:

fe) | A-nurty agarieved by a court determination on
the _igsue_of good faith may appeal the determination. me

sritten notice of the detersinstion. or within aay

Additional time not exceeding twenty days as the court may
allow.

(pephases added.) We note that the March 8, 2005 service date is documented
inva letter from Appellant’s counsel to the plaintiffs’ counsel. None of the
parties dispute that the written notification of the circuit court's order was
srved on the parties pricr to March 8, 2005, and the record does net contain
nce dieputing the March 8, 2005 service date. Thus, because
(e'e Mazeh 26, 2005 notice Of appeal was filed within twenty days after
the March 8, 2005 gervice of the written notice of the order, Appellant's

 

    

March 28, 2605 notice of appeal was timely filed

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TIT. STANDARD OF REVIEW
on appeal, the issue of standing is reviewed de nove
under the right/wrong standard. State ex rel. Office of Consumer
Prot univ. of set .
110 Hawai‘ 504, 513, 138 P.3d 113, 122 (2006) (citing Mottl
Mivahira, 95 Hawai'i 381, 388, 23 P.3d 716, 723 (2001).
IV. DISCUSSION
Before this court can address Appellant's assertion
that the settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the
defendants was not made in good faith, we must initially
determine whether Appellant has standing to appeal in the first
instance. We conclude that it does not.
‘This court has stated that:

Generally, the requirenents of standing to appeal are:

fon of the order oF judgment
mat have had standing to oppose it in the erial court; and
(G) euch person mist be aggrieved by the ruling, Lie. the
person must be one who ie affected or prejudiced by the

. Eppealable order

 

    

 

Kepo'o v. Watson, 87 Hawai'i 91, 95, 952 P.2d 379, 383 (1998)
(quoting Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc, v. Kinkai Prope,, Ltd. prehip,

mphasis added)

 

75 Haw. 370, 393, 862 P.24 1048, 1062 (2993))
(internal quotation marke and brackets omitted); see also Stewart
Propa., Inc. v , @ Haw, App. 431, 433, 807 P.2d 606, 607
(1991) (stating that *[a] well-settled rule is that only parties
toa lawsuit . . . may appeal an adverse judgment”) (citation

omitted) (ellipsis in original). “In other words, nonparties,

ou
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au could not intervene,

standing to appeal." Id, (citing 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & B.
cooper, Fed. Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3902, at 407
(1976)) (footnote, brackets, and internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).

‘This court recently held in Bacerra v. MacMillan, 111
Hawai'i 117, 138 P.3d 749 (2006), that an entity that did not
move to intervene, but merely filed a notice of lien, in an
underlying medical malpractice action lacked standing to appeal
the circuit court's order dismissing such notice of lien. ‘Id. at
319-20, 138 P.3d at 751-52. In the underlying action, the
plaintiffs (a father, a mother, and their child represented by
the mother) filed a medical malpractice conplaint against the
defendants (the attending physician and the hospital),
essentially alleging that, as a result of the defendants’
negligence, the child sustained severe brain damage during his
birth. Id. at 118, 136 P.3d at 750. The medical expenses
incurred as a result of the child’s extensive medical care and
treatment were paid by the nonparty entity (a trust fund that
provided medical coverage to the plaintiffs) and the state of
Hawaii's Department of Hunan Services (DHS). id, Ultimately,
the plaintiffs reached a settlement with the physician, as
evinced by their “Petition for Approval of Good Faith
Settlement." Id. Subsequently, the circuit court issued an
vorder for Attendance of Persons/sntities at Further Settlement

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conference,” mandating the attendance of the nonparty entity at a

Id. The order was the first

 

further settlement conferencé
notification to the nonparty entity that the child's condition
may have been caused by a third-party against whom the plaintiffs

4d. Consequently,

 

were pursuing an action to recover damag
the entity filed a notice of lien, asserting its right of
reimbursement for paymente made by it on behalf of the child.
Id. The entity, however, did not file a motion to intervene as a
party in the action. Id. at 119, 138 P.3d at 751. the
plaintiffs thereafter moved to dismiss the notice of lien on the
basis that the entity's lien action was preempted by the Federal
Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, commonly known
as ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq, Id, The circuit
court, over the objection of the entity, dismissed the notice of
lien. Id.
on appeal, this court stated that “the act of filing of

a notice of lien, in and of itself, does not make the lienor a
party to the case." Id. Specifically, this court stated that:
im in the instant case, the
race van independent action”
‘S perty in the inetant case, pursuant co
Jf Givi Procedure (HRCP)] Rule 24 (2008).
faving fatied co do ao, the Tentity) dove not weet. che first
prong of the standing requirements recited in Kepo'o,
ihe person must first have Deen a party to the action"

7 Hawaii at 95, 952 P24 at 363 (citation omitted)

Her therefore, hold that, because the [entity] was not made
Z'party to the instant case, it lack standing to appeal,

    

(avai Run

 

 

 

 

      

FN 3: HRCP Rule 26 provides in relevant part:

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(a) Intervention of risht- Upon timely
applicstion|,) anyone snail be permitted to
Sntervene in an action: (2) when a stacute
confers an unconditionel right £0 intervene: oF
(2) when the applicant claims an interest

 

 

hhey'as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant's ability to protect that interest,
Ubleas the applicant's interest ie adequately
represented by existing parties.

ic) Eocedure. A person desiring to intervene
shall serve s notion to Intervene upon the
parties as provides in Rule 5. The motion shall
Etate the grounds therefor and shall be
Accompanied by a pleading setting forth the
Claim or Gefence for which intervention is,

fought.

   

 

Id. at 120, 136 P.3d at 752 (emphases and citation omitted).
‘The instant case was filed solely in the names of the

plaintiffs, who, in turn, naned only Dr. Mantell and THW a

defendants, Indeed, Appellant expressly states on appeal that it

‘was not made a party to the underlying action{.]* As previously

stated, the plaintiffs served Appellant with notice of the
petition, in apparent recognition of Appellant’s status as a
vknown joint tortfeasor,” pursuant to HRS § 663-15.5(b).

Moreover, Appellant was permitted to object to the plaintiffs’

petition, also pursuant to HRS § 663-15.5(b). HRS § 663-15.5

provides in relevant part:

(a) A release, disniseal with or without prejudice,
or a covenant not to sue oF not to enforce a judgnent that
ge given in good faith under subsection (b) to one oF nore
joint tortfeasore, or to one or nore co-obligors who are
itually subject Co contribution rights, shall

(2) Rot discharge any other joint tortfeasor or co-

ebliger not released from Iiability unless ies
ferns co provides

 

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(2) Reduce the clains against the other joint
tortfeasor or co- obligor not veleased in the
ancunt stipulated by the release, Gistissal, or
Covenant, or in the amount of ene consideration
paid for it, whichever is greater; and

(2) Biecharge the party to whom it is given from all
Tisbiliey for Say contribution to any other
joint tortfeasor or co-obliger.

‘this eubsection shall not apply C0 co-obligors who have
Guprensly agreed in writing to an spportionent of Tiability
{or losee ex claims among thenselves

ib), “For purposes of subsection (a), amy party shall
petition the court fora hearing on the issue of good faith
bf a gectlenent entered into by the plaintitt or other
Claimant and one or nore slleged tort fessors or co-0bligort
Spligara. Upon a enowing of good cause, the court may
Shbreen the tine for giving ene required notice to permit
the determination of the issue before the commencement of
the trial of the action, of before the verdict or judgment
[Pestelement is made efter ene trial has commenced.

‘The petition shall indicate the settling parties and,
except fora settlenent that includes a confidentiality’
Soreenent regarding the case or the ters of the settlenent,
tfe basis, terms, and settiement amount

‘The notice, petition, and proposed order shall be
served as, provided by rules of court or by certified mail,
feturn receipt requested. Proof of service shall be filed
with the court. " i
he not ston a sed

eat thi Teinone of the
honsettiing alleged joint tortfeasors or co-obligors files

‘objection within the twenty-five days, the court may
Gpprove the settlement without a hearing. An objection by a
honsettling alleged joint tortfeasor or co-obligor shall be
Served upon all parties. A nossettling alleged Joint
tortfeasor or co-cbliger asserting lack of good faith
hall have the Burden of proof on that issue

Where a confidentiality agreenent has been entered
into regarding the claim or settlement terms, the court
shail hear the satter in a manner consistent with preventing
public disclosure of the agreement while providing other
Joint tortfeasors and co-obligors sufficient information to
abject to a proposed sertlenent.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ig) A determination by the court that a settlement was

made in good faith shall:

(a) ear any other joint tortfeasor or co-cbligor
fron any further claine against the settling
torefeator oF co-obliger, except those based on
a written indemnity agreomext; and

(2) Result in a dlemissal of all cross-clains filed
Againet the settling joint tortfeasor or co-
Sbligor, except those based on a written
Sndennity agreement

 

 

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(e) | Amarty ssarieved by a court determination on
the issue of good faith nav abpeal the determination. The
appeal shall be filed within twenty Gays after service of
Mriteen notice of the determination, or within any
additional tine not exceeding twenty Gays as the court may
aTow.

 

(emphases added.) According to the plain language of HRS
§ 663-15.5(b), Appellant need not have been *a party" to file its
objection to the petition in the instant case; rather, Appellant
need only have been *a nonsettling alleged joint tortfeasor or
co-obligor.* However, as HRS § 663-15.5(e) unequivocally
indicates, only “[al party aggrieved by a court determination on
the issue of good faith nay appeal the determination.

added.) In fact, the 2003 amendments to HRS § 663-15.5, as

 

(Emphases

originally enacted in 2001, support the notion that the
legislature recognized that a distinction may exist between “a
party" and “a nonsettling alleged joint tortfeasor or co-
obligor.” In 2003, the legislature amended, inter alia, HRS
§ 663-15.5(a) and (b) by substituting “joint tortfeasor or co-
obligor” in place of “party” as follows (bracketed language

stricken; underscored language added) :

(a) A release, dismissal with or without prejudice,
or & covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgnent that
Ge given in good faith under subsection (b) to one oF nore
joint tortfeasore, or to one or more co-obligore who are
mutually subject to contribution Fights, shall:

(2) Rot aischarge any other (pecey] joint tort
oxco-obligor not released from liability uniess
ite terns so provide;

(2) Reduce the clains against the other [perey)

For 0% not released in
The amount stipulated by the release, dismissal,
or covenant, or in ene anoust of the
Consideration paid for it, whichever is greater;
fan

 

 

 

 

 

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(3) Discharge the party to whom it ie given from all
Liabiiiey for any contribution to any other

[perty] joint tortfeasor or co-obliger-

iwi :
isthin’ twenty-five days of the nailing of the
petition, and proposed order, a nonsettling (perey!
. ‘say file an objection
fo content the good faith of the settlenent. if none of the
nonsettling [parties] alleged soint tortfeazore or co-
ebligera files an objection within the twenty-five days
Court say approve the settlement without 2 hearing. AR
objection by  nonsattiing [perey)
or co-bligor shal! be served upon all (ether) parties.

 

 

ee

   

 

Ste pee
abliger asserting s lack of good faith shall have the burden
Of proof on that issue.

2003 Haw. Sess. L. Act 146, § 1 at 342-48 (bold enphases added).
The legislature, however, did nok anend HRS § 662-15.5(e), which,
as previously stated, provides that only “fal party aggrieved by
a court determination on the issue of good faith may appeal the

onably can be said that the

 

determination.” As such, it re
legislature intended only parties, not_mexely non-settling
alleged joint tortfeasors, to have the right to appeal a court

determination on the issue of good faith. Thus, for purposes of
appeal, Appellant was required to intervene as a party in the
instant case, pursuant to HRCP Rule 24. Having failed to do 0,
Appellant does not neet the first prong of the standing
requirements recited in Kepo‘o, that is, “the person must first
have been a party to the action.” Keno'o, 87 Hawai'i at 95, 952
P.ad at 383 (citation omitted). Accordingly, because Appellant
was not made a party to the instant case, it lacks standing to

appeal. See Bacerra, 111 Hawai'i at 120, 138 P.3d at 72;

Chierighino v. Bowers, 2 Haw. App. 291, 295, 631 P.2d 183, 186

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(1982) (holding that, because the appellant was not a party to

 

the action, his appeal mst be dismissed) .

Vv. coxcuusION

Based on the foregoing, we dismiss Appellant's appeal.

on the briefs: fpr
Normand R. Lezy (of Leong
Kunthire Leong & Lezy), aRihornae—
for party in interest-
appellant American Classic Dei Camco er
Voyages co.

R. Patrick Jaress, for :
plaintiffs-appellees

 

Elton John Bain and €
E. Mason Martin, TIT

(of Kessner Duc Umebayashi

Bain & Matsunaga), for
defendants-appellees

oie.