Case Title: Guthrie v. State

Citation: 254 Ind. 356, 260 N.E.2d 579

Docket Number: 869S176

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1970-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
254 Ind. 356 (1970)
260 N.E.2d 579
GUTHRIE
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 869S176.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 22, 1970.
Whiteleather & Whiteleather, of Columbia City, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Mark Peden, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
HUNTER, C.J.
Appellant in this case was charged by affidavit with statutory rape of a four year old girl. Upon a second trial by jury, the jury in the first trial being unable to determine *357 his guilt or innocence, appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment at the Indiana State Prison. The sole assignment of error on this appeal is the overruling of appellant's motion for new trial. In his motion for new trial, appellant alleges that errors of law occurred during the trial in the following particulars: (1) the court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the admission of certain evidence claimed to have resulted from an unlawful search of his residence; (2) the court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the admission of state's exhibit number six which was a capsule containing two slides preserving alleged vaginal smears of the rape victim in that the state failed to establish a complete chain of custody in regard to said capsule.
We turn first to the question of whether the search of appellant's residence was unlawful under Fourth Amendment protections. The search complained of was conducted by one Betty Guthrie, grandmother of the victim and sister-in-law of the appellant. Although appellant concedes that searches by private persons have been held not to fall within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protections, Burdeau v. McDowell (1921), 256 U.S. 465, 65 L. Ed. 1048; Barnes v. United States (5th Cir.1967), 373 F.2d 306; United States v. Small (D.C. Mass. 1969), 297 F. Supp. 582; United States v. Masterson (D.C.N.Y. 1966) 251 F. Supp. 937, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 833, it is his contention that Mrs. Guthrie acted upon the advice and direction of the prosecuting attorney. Appellant relies principally on the case of Machlan v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 218, 225 N.E.2d 762 for the proposition that the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment are applicable where the person conducting the search does so upon the advice and direction of a police officer. We would agree that appellant has correctly stated the holding of the Machlan case. However, it is readily apparent from the tenor of the objections made at trial that the appellant is here urging on appeal an objection of a different nature than that entered before the trial court.
*358 The background facts are as follows: Mrs. Leas, mother of the victim, upon learning that her daughter had been molested, called the police. After the police left, Mrs. Guthrie, the victim's grandmother called the prosecutor apparently to determine what would be done about the incident. The prosecutor informed Mrs. Guthrie that an arrest warrant could not be issued without more proof since the only information available at the time was mere hearsay. Soon thereafter, Mrs. Guthrie called the prosecutor a second time. Although the full content of that conversation was not disclosed at trial, it appears that at one point the prosecutor asked if there were any witnesses, whereupon Mrs. Guthrie replied that she would get one.
After this conversation, Mrs. Guthrie proceeded to walk over to visit a neighbor of appellant and inquire as to the activities of appellant during that afternoon. After this interview, Mrs. Guthrie again called the prosecutor. There is no indication as to the contents of this third discussion between the prosecutor and Mrs. Guthrie. Immediately thereafter, Mrs. Guthrie went to appellant's residence, a trailer, and conducted the "search" here complained of consisting solely of observations made upon her entry. She only remained a few minutes when it "dawned" on her that it would probably be inspected by the police later. To gain entrance to the trailer, Mrs. Guthrie had used a key in her possession; it appears from the record that her husband owned the trailer in which appellant resided.
The prosecutor, on direct examination of Mrs. Guthrie was attempting to elicit her observations of the interior condition of the trailer. Defense counsel objected on two occasions to the introduction of this testimony as follows:
Upon the overruling of defense counsel's second objection in this regard, Mrs. Guthrie proceeded to describe the appearance of the trailer's interior.
*360 It is clear from the above quoted objections entered by defense counsel that he was challenging the validity of the search on the ground that Mrs. Guthrie had no right to be in the trailer at the time she made her observations. On appeal, however, as above pointed out appellant seeks to raise an entirely new question as to the validity of the search, to wit: was Mrs. Guthrie acting at the instance and direction of the prosecuting attorney?
The general rule was stated by Wigmore in his treatise on evidence to be as follows:
The courts in this state have applied the rule on numerous occasions. See e.g. Automobile Underwriters v. Camp (1940), 217 Ind. 328, 27 N.E.2d 370; Michigan City v. Werner (1916), 186 Ind. 149, 114 N.E. 636; Stout v. Rayl (1896), 146 Ind. 379, 45 N.E. 515. Although we do not pass lightly on the question of appellant's constitutional right, neither are we ready to expand the scope of review in this court to include anything which appellant chooses to argue on appeal. The grounds of appellant's objection at trial being of a different nature than here urged on appeal, we need not pass on the validity of the argument now presented.
We turn next to appellant's second assignment of error namely that the court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the admission of state's exhibit number six which was a capsule containing two slides preserving vaginal smears of the rape victim on the ground that a link in the chain of custody was missing.
It is further argued that lacking such a proper foundation and identification of the slides, they were not shown to be *361 relevant to the issues of the case. The crux of the issue before us, therefore, is the propriety of the trial court's admitting the exhibit since if a proper foundation be laid there can be no doubt but what the slides directly bear on the question of whether the alleged victim was in fact raped. Consequently, we shall deal only with the admissability of the slides into evidence, their relevancy being assumed if properly admitted.
The facts pertaining to the capsule are substantially as follows. The victim, Penny Sue Leas, was taken immediately after the incident to one Dr. Greenlee for treatment. During the course of his treatment, Dr. Greenlee took two vaginal smears which he gave to trooper Les Allegood of the Indiana State Police at about 6:30 P.M. Trooper Allegood delivered the capsule containing the slides to the Command Post at approximately midnight. The police officer in charge at the Command Post, one Sergeant McKowan, was asleep at the time the evidence was delivered. When he got up the next morning at about 8:00 A.M. he found the capsule on the Post Commander's desk and took it to the lab. From the time Sergeant McKowan delivered the capsule to the lab, the state was able and did account for its whereabouts up through and including analysis. Appellant, however, contends that the state's failure to positively account for the capsule's whereabouts from midnight until 8:00 A.M. the next morning raises a serious doubt as to its identity.
Recently this court, in the case of Graham v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 525, 255 N.E.2d 652, was required to pass on the introduction of certain evidence where the state had failed to establish a complete "chain of custody." That case involved a conviction for the possession and sale of heroin. The evidence there showed that the narcotic had been recovered from a person who had just bought the heroin from the defendant. At the time it was contained in a chewing gum wrapper. The evidence in that case further showed that the chewing gum wrapper and its contents had been removed from the police *362 property room prior to its analysis for a period of six days and was in the possession of at least two different policemen during that time period yet neither policeman was put on the stand to explain the whereabouts of the evidence. The rule there announced was as follows:
Appellant in the instant case makes much of the fact that Sergeant McKowan was unable to say with exact certainty whether the slides were on the Post Commander's desk the entire time from midnight until 8:00 A.M. the next morning. It should be noted that the record clearly shows that Trooper Allegood delivered the slides to the Command Post at midnight. Further, although the recollection of Officer McKowan was somewhat less than certain as to what he did with the slides the next morning, one Donald Moody testified that they were on his desk in the lab when he arrived at work at 8:00 A.M.
The precise question, therefore, is whether the state's inability to produce evidence of the capsule's exact whereabouts from midnight to 8:00 A.M. is fatal to its admissibility. To decide this question we must decide the extent to which the state must go in negating the possibilities that the evidence was tampered with. Here the state showed that the evidence was delivered to the State Police Command Post and that it was still there in the morning. Need the evidence be excluded merely because there is a possibility, regardless of how remote *363 that possibility is, that the evidence may have been tampered with?
Although the Graham case did not specifically deal with that question, it is important to note the differences between the two cases. First of all, the evidence involved in that case, heroin, was similar in form to other substances such as baking powder, sugar or powdered milk. The ease with which one might tamper with such evidence is obvious. Further, the testimony in that case clearly established that the evidence was in the hands of two different individuals for a period of six days under somewhat questionable circumstances, yet neither person was put on the stand by the state to explain or verify their possession. Finally, the evidence sought to be introduced, namely heroin, represented proof of an element essential to conviction on the charge of possession and sale of narcotics. Needless to say, extreme care is required in such a situation to insure that the composition of the evidence is not altered.
We point to these factors, not for the purpose of establishing that such considerations are determinative when passing on the question of a break in the chain of custody, but for the proposition that in certain cases the burden on the state to negate the possibilities of tampering may be greater than in others. The question was simplified in the Graham case because there was a clear break in the chain for a six day period. However, where as here, the state has introduced evidence which strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence, the issue becomes one of probabilities.
Appellee has cited several cases the holdings of which indicate that all possibility of tampering need not be excluded; upon reasonable assurance that the exhibit has passed through the various hands in an undisturbed condition its admission is proper and any remaining doubts go to its weight only. See People v. Riser (1956), 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1; Breeding v. State (1959), 220 Md. 193, 151 A.2d 743; State v. Baines *364 (Mo. 1965), 394 S.W.2d 312; Commonwealth v. White (1967), 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335. We believe such a rule is well grounded in logic and reason.
The facts in the case of State v. Smith (Mo. 1920), 222 S.W. 455, are particularly illustrative of the point here sought to be made. In that case the defendant allegedly poisoned some moonshine which was later consumed by the victim at a Fourth of July picnic. After the victim's death, his stomach was removed by a local doctor who placed it in a glass jar and gave it to the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney left the jar and contents with persons in charge of a local ice plant for approximately two days. The men in charge testified that it remained undisturbed, though it was possible that someone might have seen it while there. Later, the prosecutor picked up the jar from the ice plant and placed it in his car where it remained the rest of the day and overnight, often unattended. The court there noted:
Likewise in the case at bar. Concededly the police could have exercised a greater degree of care to insure that the capsule was not tampered with. However, there is a complete lack of evidence which suggests the remotest suspicion that anyone did in fact tamper with the evidence. The slides had been left at the State Police Command Post on the Post Commander's desk; they were still there the next morning at eight o'clock. The time period for which custody was unexplained was brief. Further the nature of the evidence here involved, slides of vaginal smears, is not the type that *365 could easily be tampered with or substituded. Under the facts in this case, we cannot say that the chain of custody was sufficiently broken to render the evidence inadmissible.
For all the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion in which DeBruler, J., concur.
JACKSON, J.
I am unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the majority opinion and dissent thereto.
Appellant's Motion for New Trial, omitting heading, formal parts and signature reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Assignment of Errors is the single specification:
For the background of appellant's objection to certain testimony of the witness Betty Guthrie, on direct examination, we refer to the record:
The majority opinion attempts to gloss over the appellant's objections to the testimony of the witness Guthrie on the theory that they were untenable and are unavailable because *369 there was another and tenable ground which might have been named but was not. Citing: I Wigmore on Evidence § 18 at 339-40 (1940). Such opinion also states, "(t)he Courts in this state have applied the rule on numerous occasions. See e.g. Automobile Underwriters v. Camp (1940), 217 Ind. 328, 27 N.E.2d 370; Michigan City v. Werner (1916), 186 Ind. 149, 114 N.E. 636; Stout v. Rayl (1896), 146 Ind. 379, 45 N.E. 515."
With reference to the above we deem it unnecessary to say more than the record discloses, that the witness called the prosecuting attorney at least three (3) times (Tr. l. 32, p. 196, Tr. l. 4, p. 197, Tr. l. 22, p. 197) before she ventured to enter and search the trailer unlawfully. The actions and evidence of this witness show with crystal clearness that she was the pawn and agent of the State as embodied in the prosecuting attorney. The court committed error in overruling the motion for new trial. Machlan v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 218, 225 N.E.2d 762.
With reference to the cases cited in the majority opinion following the citation from Wigmore, I point out that they are civil cases where a different rule applies that in criminal cases. Their use here is inappropriate, of no value, and add nothing to the opinion.
We now turn our attention to the second specification of the motion for a new trial, the admission into evidence of State's Exhibit No. 6 and the admission of testimony of the findings of Sergeant Young on his tests of Exhibit No. 6.
Appellant's contention that the court erred in overruling his objection to State's Exhibit No. 6 in evidence and in not striking the testimony of Sergeant Young is as follows:
This Court has, in the case of Stallings v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 110, 235 N.E.2d 488, set forth the applicable rules and *375 interpretations of the evidentiary terms, "materiality" and "relevancy," namely that "The facts which the evidence tends to prove or disprove, in order to be material must relate to an issue in the case" and "the offered evidence must logically tend to prove a material fact." Stallings v. State, supra. Using said rules and their requirements of admissibility as a test and standard to the evidence in the case at hand, appellant contends that Exhibit #6 and the testimony of witness Young were not material or relevant to the issues of the case for the reason that a sufficient foundation showing a complete chain of evidence establishing the identification of said Exhibit #6 was not shown or proved in order to establish, correctly, that the said Exhibit #6 was related to any issue in this case. More specifically, the appellant contends that by certain deficiencies to be discussed the appellee did not properly identify, and thus sufficiently show, that the contents of said Exhibit No. 6, namely the capsule and two slides preserving the vaginal smears, as introduced and admitted into evidence, were the same contents as placed in the capsule by the originator of same, Dr. Joe Greenlee, and/or were vaginal smears of a person connected with the case, and lacking said proper identification, the contents as admitted and the tests made on said contents were irrelevant, and too remote, uncertain and conjectural to the issues of the case to be properly admitted into evidence. Stallings v. State, supra; State v. Lee (1949), 227 Ind. 25, 83 N.E.2d 778.
In order to provide the proper and adequate predicate or foundation for introducing said exhibit and test findings into evidence, the appellee was required to establish, at least as far as practicable, a complete chain of evidence, tracing possession *376 of the capsule and contents from the time the specimen was taken from the body of the alleged rape victim to the final custodian by whom it was analyzed, witness Young. Robinson v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co. (1961), 255 N.C. 669, 122 S.E.2d 801. Also, 21 A.L.R.2d 1231, said annotation being entitled "Proof Of Identity Of Person Or Thing Where Object, Specimen, Or Part Is Taken From A Human Body, As Basis For Admission Of Testimony Or Report Of Expert Or Officer Based On Such Object, Specimen, Or Part."
In order to prove a proper identification of Exhibit #6, the capsule must be properly identified by each of the five witnesses through whose hands and custody the capsule passed, so as not to leave any links missing in the chain of evidence. There can be no hiatus to any extent in the chain of evidence, if so proper identification has not been shown. State v. Boehne (1968), 71 Wash. 2d 621, 430 P.2d 527.
In addition, not only can it not be presumed that witness McKowan performed his official duty and had the proper custody and possession of the Exhibit #6 and delivered it to witness Moody, but rather the testimony of witness McKowan points out that he did not perform his official duty in the early morning hours of September 2, 1967. This witness testified that it is normal State Police procedures to keep a record of the handling and custody of any evidence, (Tr. p. 276, l. 30), and that on this record would be placed the information, if any, of when the evidence went from one unit to another unit, from a unit to the evidence room, or from one officer to another (Tr. p. 277, l. 3). Even more specifically, witness McKowan testified that when an object is brought into the State Police Post, the record should show who had the custody of it and where the custody of the object was at all times. (Tr. p. 277, l. 11) Yet witness McKowan admitted that he never recalled signing anything or placing his identification on the record or custody paper (Tr. p. 277, l. 15), and no custody paper or record was ever introduced by the appellee into evidence at the trial. Therefore, even if it would be valid *377 to allow a presumption as to the performance of official duty, witness McKowan's testimony points out the very fact that this official duty was not performed from the time of midnight on the night of September 1, 1967, until 8:00 a.m. on September 2, 1967.
In summary of the three points of argument of the appellant pertaining to the testimony of witness McKowan, supra, there is a definite missing link or hiatus in the chain of evidence establishing the identification of Exhibit #6, and as a result of this missing link and insufficient identification, the exhibit as offered and admitted into evidence was irrelevant to the issues of this case, it was too remote, too uncertain, and too conjectural to be properly admitted into evidence, as was the testimony of witness Young regarding the tests which he made on the contents of the capsule which he received at the end of the chain of evidence. Stallings v. State, supra.
In connection with the requirement of the chain of evidence method of establishing identification is the question of what degree of proof is required of the party attempting to prove such identification. Certainly, the burden of proof rests upon the proving party, in this case the appellee, and in that this is a criminal case, the identification of Exhibit #6 must have been made and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because the identification and tests resulting therefrom were offered and received as evidence constituting proof of the necessary essential, and constituted elements of the crime charged. Easton v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 338, 228 N.E.2d 6. In the case of Easton v. State, supra, at page 343, this Court stated that a material allegation or an issuable fact in a criminal prosecution requires more evidence than proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence. The Court's consideration is also called to the ruling in the case of Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 413, 176 N.E.2d 757, at page 760 where the Court had before it the issue of whether the foundation required to admit the analysis of a blood test into evidence was the same in both civil and criminal cases. *378 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in that case that a different degree of proof is required in civil cases than in a criminal case, namely, that in a criminal case, the State must prove its case and each and every element therein beyond a reasonable doubt. Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., supra. The Court's ruling would indicate that the specific question of the proper foundation required for the admission into evidence of a specimen taken from a human body requires proof of a proper identification of said object beyond a reasonable doubt. In relation to the case at hand, appellant contends that appellee was required to prove the identification of Exhibit #6 by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which standard of proof was not met by the appellee, taking into consideration only that evidence most favorable to the appellee.
The appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting said exhibit into evidence and not striking the testimony of witness Young because of a lack of proper identification of said Exhibit #6 in this three of the five witnesses in the chain of custody could not identify the contents of the capsule, namely, the two slides, and state with any certainty that the slides as contained in said capsule at the time of the trial were the same contents and slides as in the capsule at the time that the witness had the custody and possession of same.
The witness Allegood admitted that he did not know whether the contents that were in the capsule at the time of the trial were the same contents that were in the capsule on the evening of September 1, 1967, while in his possession. (Tr. p. 273, l. 23). Witness McKowan did not even actually recall the capsule, let alone the contents of the capsule at the time of trial being the same contents as in the early hours of September 2, 1967. Witness Moody also could not identify the contents of the capsule and state that the slides contained in said capsule on his desk on the morning of September 2, 1967, were the same contents and slides as in the capsule placed before him for identification at the time of the trial. (Tr. p. 282, l. 24) *379 As a result, only two of the five witnesses, Dr. Joe Greenlee and Keith J. Young, testified as to the contents of the capsule at the time of trial being the same contents as in the capsule at the time that they had the custody and possession of same. Appellant, therefore, argues that when only two of the five individuals constituting a chain of evidence can properly identify the contents of the object or exhibit at the time of trial as being the same contents as when they had the original custody and possession of same, that the identification is faulty and not sufficient in lieu of the requirements and rules as set forth in Stallings v. State, supra, and McGowan v. Los Angeles, supra.
In summary, because of the hiatus in the chain of evidence and other insufficiencies in the establishing of a proper foundation for the identification of appellee's Exhibit #6, the same should not have been admitted into evidence, and the testimony of Keith J. Young regarding his tests made on same should have been stricken from the evidence by the trial court in that the relevancy of said Exhibit #6 and testimony of Keith J. Young to the issues of the same was not shown.
The cause should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to sustain appellant's Motion for a New Trial.
DeBruler, J., concurs.
NOTE.  Reported in 260 N.E.2d 579.