Case Title: Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp.1986 WY 104718 P.2d 879Case Number: 84-273Decided: 04/29/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF John C. CANNON, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

FMC CORPORATION, Appellee 
(Employer-Respondent).

Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, J. 

K. Craig 
Williams, Rawlins, for 
appellant.

Gary M. 
Greenhalgh of Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rossetti, Rock Springs, and Terry 
J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the district court's denial of a permanent total disability claim. John Cannon, 
appellant, applied for a modification of his permanent partial disability award 
of two and one-half percent, claiming that he had become totally disabled. The 
district court modified the award, finding that appellant suffered a thirty 
percent disability.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In December, 1979, 
while employed as a janitor by appellee, FMC Corporation, appellant injured his 
back when he leaned over to pick up some paper. He continued working and 
reinjured his back in March, 1980. After this reinjury appellant underwent back 
surgery and returned to his janitorial job. In September, 1983, appellant left 
his job claiming his back pain was unbearable.

[¶4.]     Appellant was awarded 
permanent partial disability benefits of two and one-half percent on March 2, 
1983. After he left his job in September, 1983, appellant submitted a claim for 
permanent total disability, based upon a letter from his treating physician, Dr. 
Chris Jabour. Appellee contested this claim and a hearing was held in July, 
1984.

[¶5.]     Before the hearing, 
appellant, at the request of the state's Worker's Compensation Division, was 
examined by a panel of three doctors: Dr. Meade O. Davis, an orthopedic surgeon, 
Dr. Stephen H. Martin, a neurosurgeon, and Dr. Pat Fleming, a psychologist. 
Depositions from these three doctors were introduced in evidence at the hearing. 
In addition, appellant and Mrs. Eunice Kiernan, manager of the local JobServiceCenter, testified at the 
hearing.

[¶6.]     Appellant testified as 
to the cause of his injury and the resulting pain. He also established his 
educational background and past work experience. He had attended school through 
the eighth grade and later received the equivalent of a high school diploma. 
Appellant's work history was extensive, including: delivery person, paratrooper 
and medical aide in the military service, carpenter, forklift operator, truck 
driver, construction worker, police officer and janitor. There were a number of 
other jobs, all of which involved to some extent, manual 
labor.

[¶7.]     Evidence concerning the 
general availability of jobs in the area was provided by Mrs. Kiernan. She 
identified a number of available jobs for which appellant met the required 
educational and experience standards. Counsel for appellee asked Mrs. Kiernan 
whether there was a suitable job available for a person "who had a lift/push 
limitation of twenty to thirty pounds, and also was restricted from sitting or 
standing in one position for more than sixty minutes, or was limited from two 
hours of driving * * *." Mrs. Kiernan's response was: "Well, given his desire to 
work or her desire to work, yes, I think there would be work." Mrs. Kiernan 
later admitted, however, that appellant never applied to the Job Service; thus, 
his physical limitations were not known to her, so she could not definitely 
state whether he could hold any of the available jobs.

[¶8.]     Medical evaluations 
concerning appellant's injury were provided by a letter from Dr. Jabour. In his 
letter, Dr. Jabour stated that he had earlier provided a partial disability 
figure of seven percent and that this figure was purely a physical impairment 
figure found in an orthopedic surgeon's manual which is used in evaluating 
permanent physical impairment. He went on to state his opinion that appellant 
"is totally disabled with regards to future manual work."

[¶9.]     Other medical evidence 
was provided by the depositions of Drs. Davis, Martin and Fleming. Dr. Davis 
stated that appellant had a physical impairment of fifty percent; Dr. Martin 
stated that there was a thirty percent impairment; and Dr. Fleming tested 
appellant's mental capacity and concluded that appellant had good, average 
intelligence, and such capacity would enable him to compete with the average 
person.

[¶10.]  From the above evidence the trial court 
held that appellant had a permanent partial disability of thirty percent. In his 
opinion letter the trial court stated that three physicians testified appellant 
could hold a job despite his disability; yet appellant made no attempt to seek 
employment although there were several job openings which fit appellant's 
capabilities. This led the court to conclude appellant was not "too eager" to 
get a job. In addition, the court specifically noted that testimony disclosed 
appellant's "degree of disability" had increased "from a maximum of 7% to a 
figure from 30% up to 50%."

[¶11.]  Appellant brings this appeal from the 
order granting thirty percent permanent partial disability and denying permanent 
total disability. Three issues are presented according to 
appellant.

"I

"Did the district court 
err by failing to take into consideration in its determination of disability the 
inability of the employee-claimant to continue to perform work for which he was 
reasonably suited by experience or training prior to the 
injury?

"II

"On the evidence before 
the district court, was the employee-claimant entitled to permanent total 
disability under the odd-lot doctrine set forth by this court in Schepanovich v. 
United States Steel, [Wyo.], 669 P.2d 622 [522 (1983)]? 

"III

"Does the odd-lot 
doctrine continue to have validity in the State of Wyoming after the 1975 
amendment to Wyoming Statute § 27-12-405(a)?"

[¶12.]  Appellee restates the issues in an 
argumentative fashion but appears to agree with appellant's 
statement.

I

[¶13.]  We are concerned, primarily, with two 
statutes. Section 27-12-403, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), concerns 
permanent partial disability. It provides in part:

"(a) Permanent partial 
disability means the loss or permanent impairment of a limb or sense, or any 
other injury known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent impairment of 
a bodily function."

After dealing 
with partial disability for the loss of various body parts not relevant here, 
the statute provides in subsection (h):

"(h) For any other injury 
known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent partial disability, the 
employee shall receive compensation in the amount proportional to the extent of 
permanent partial disability based as near as may be upon the foregoing 
schedule. One (1) factor to be considered is the ability of the employee to 
continue to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training prior to the injury."

The other 
relevant statute for our purposes is § 27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977, which is set out 
in Part II of this opinion.

[¶14.]  Our standard of review is well settled. 
"[Q]uestions regarding the extent and duration of a claimant's disability are 
questions of fact to be determined by the trial court and shall be reviewed as 
such. * * *" Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1985). We review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, and when 
there is substantial evidence to support the facts found by the court, its order 
will not be disturbed. Pacific Power and Light v. Parsons, Wyo., 692 P.2d 226 
(1984). In making the factual determination of the extent of the claimant's 
injury, the trial court is not bound by medical testimony; nonmedical witnesses 
and other evidence may be relied on. McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Company, 
Wyo., 694 P.2d 93 (1985).

[¶15.]  Appellant maintains that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. He contends § 
27-12-403(h) requires that the trial court consider his ability to continue to 
perform work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or training prior 
to his injury, but that the court failed to consider this factor. In support of 
this contention appellant states that Doctors Jabour, Martin and Davis gave 
"physical impairment" figures of seven, thirty, and fifty percent respectively, 
and although at times they labeled these percentages as disability figures, the 
percentages referred only to physical impairment and not disability. According 
to appellant, there was no discrepancy in the amount of disability determined by 
the doctors when they took into consideration the statutory vocational factor. 
Appellee claims "[a]ll of the doctors agree that Mr. Cannon cannot return to the 
type of work for which he is qualified by virtue of his training and 
experience." Yet, appellant claims the trial court based its perception of the 
doctors' opinions on their incorrect use of the term "disability" when they had 
meant "physical impairments." This resulted in the erroneous conclusion of 
thirty percent disability in appellant's view.

[¶16.]  Initially, we do not agree that the 
doctors were uniform in their rating of appellant's disability. Nor are we 
convinced that the trial court failed to consider the vocational factor stated 
in § 27-12-403(h). Instead, we think it is clear from the court's opinion letter 
that the thirty percent award was arrived at by considering the physical 
impairment figures along with the evidence provided by the depositions of 
Doctors Martin, Davis and Fleming and the testimony of Mrs. Kiernan, and 
concerned appellant's ability to obtain work for which he was reasonably 
suited.

[¶17.]  Dr. Jabour unequivocally stated, in a 
letter to the clerk of the district court, that appellant was completely 
disabled with regard to future manual work because of the persistence and 
severity of his back pain. However, this opinion is accompanied by a seven 
percent physical impairment figure taken from an orthopedic surgeon's manual 
used to evaluate such impairments. In addition, Dr. Jabour's opinion as to 
appellant's "disability" is found in a letter written in response to a request 
from appellant's counsel asking Dr. Jabour to clarify that the seven percent 
figure was in fact a physical impairment figure. The trial court may have found 
the statements as to disability made by the deposed doctors more 
credible.

[¶18.]  Dr. Davis could not say whether appellant 
could perform the functions of a custodian. He explained that while appellant 
might not be able to do all of the tasks one envisions the typical janitor 
performing, there could be light janitorial jobs, such as cleaning windows and 
pick-up work, which appellant was capable of doing. In addition, Dr. Davis 
believed appellant could possibly perform the job of a dispatcher for a police 
department. In a letter to the Worker's 
Compensation Division Dr.Davis
 stated that appellant has a "50 percent 
permanent partial disability of the body," and in his deposition stated that 
this was a physical impairment figure.

[¶19.]  Dr. Martin refused to assign a disability 
figure to appellant although he assigned an impairment figure of thirty percent. 
He recognized a distinction between physical impairment and disability but stated 
that he would use the two synonymously.1 Dr. Martin was not familiar with 
appellant's employment background. He did state, however, that a person with 
appellant's injury could not do manual labor, but could hold the jobs of a radio 
dispatcher, sales-person, or clerk.

[¶20.]  We cannot reconcile the above statements 
with appellant's claim that the doctors all agreed appellant was totally 
disabled from doing the work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training. Nor can we accept appellant's claim that the trial court failed to 
consider his ability to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by 
experience or training. Appellant claims that the trial court based its finding 
of disability solely on the doctor's physical impairment figures. He reaches 
this conclusion from the trial court's reference, in its opinion letter, to the 
physical impairment figures as "degree of disability" and from the fact that the 
award equals the physical impairment level given by Dr. 
Martin.

[¶21.]  In our review, however, we are not 
concerned with possible erroneous approaches the trial court might have taken in 
arriving at its conclusion. Rather, we review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's finding to determine whether it is supported by 
substantial evidence. See Yates v. Yates, 
Wyo., 702 P.2d 1252 (1985); Lebsack v. 
Town of Torrington, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1141 (1985); Scott v. Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805 
(1984).

[¶22.]  We have set forth the evidence in the 
case above. From this the trial court reached its determination. Although 
appellant claims the court failed to consider the factor stated in § 
27-12-403(h), its opinion letter specifically stated: "Factually, three 
physicians have testified that Mr. Cannon could hold a regular job, despite his 
present disability." The trial court also noted that Mrs. Kiernan testified that 
there were several job openings which fit Mr. Cannon. These statements indicate 
that the court did consider appellant's ability to perform work for which he was 
reasonably suited.

[¶23.]  Appellant argues strenuously that this 
court's decision in State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. 
Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984) compels our finding that the trial court's 
award cannot be supported by the evidence. In Colvin, this court upheld a 
finding that the partial disability of the claimant was fifty percent loss of 
the right arm above the elbow, even though the medical testimony assigned a 
thirty-four percent loss of function. In affirming the trial court's finding we 
stated that § 27-12-403(h) allowed the court to consider the work for which the 
claimant was suited before the injury and how he was impaired in performing that 
work after the injury when determining the compensation a claimant should 
receive. Colvin does not stand for the proposition that the trial court may 
consider only the claimant's decreased ability to perform the work he held 
before the injury. Rather, it is the claimant's ability to continue to perform 
work for which he is reasonably suited, which is one factor to be 
considered.

[¶24.]  Rose v. Westates Construction Company, 
Wyo., 703 P.2d 1084 (1985), is on point. There, the claimant also had an eighth grade education 
with a General Education Diploma, and had worked as a police officer and manual 
laborer throughout his career. Because of a lower back injury he could not sit 
or stand for any lengthy period of time and had to refrain from bending or heavy 
lifting. Doctors assigned the claimant a physical impairment of twenty percent, 
but stated that he was "effectively prevented from returning to the type of work 
that he was doing at the time of the injury" and that he was 100 percent 
functionally impaired. This court upheld the trial court's award of twenty 
percent permanent disability despite the worker's contention that the award was 
not supported by substantial evidence. We upheld the determination in Rose, as 
we do here, because § 27-12-403(h) states that "the ability of the worker to 
continue to perform work for which he is suited" is only one factor to be 
considered; and because the determination of partial disability is a question of 
fact for the trier of fact, who is not bound by the loss assigned by the 
physician. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Colvin, 
supra; and McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Company, supra.

[¶25.]  Given the evidence of potential jobs 
appellant could perform and the physical impairment rates of seven, thirty and 
fifty percent, the trial court's determination of thirty percent permanent 
disability is supported by substantial evidence.

II

[¶26.]  Appellant next contends that the evidence 
established that he was entitled to permanent total disability under the odd-lot 
doctrine.

[¶27.]  Section 27-12-405(a) provides for 
permanent total disability awards. It states:

"Permanent disability 
means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, paralysis or 
other conditions permanently incapacitating the employee from performing any 
work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience 
or training."

[¶28.]  In Rose v. Westates Construction Company, 
supra, 703 P.2d  at 1087, we noted that "[t]his statutory definition is 
compatible with the odd-lot doctrine which this court first recognized in In re 
Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941). * * *" Under the odd-lot doctrine, total 
disability may be found in workers who, although not altogether incapacitated, 
are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-known 
branch of the labor market. 2 Larson's Worker's Compensation § 57.51 P. 10-164.49 (1983).

[¶29.]  In Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522, 528 (1983), this court 
held that the

"burden of proof 
initially is assigned to the injured worker who is seeking to qualify as 
permanently totally disabled under the `odd-lot doctrine' to demonstrate that he 
is incapacitated `from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which 
he is reasonably suited by experience or training.' * * *"

[¶30.]  More recently we have said that in order 
to come within the odd-lot doctrine, 

"it is the burden of the 
employee to establish not only that he is no longer capable of working at the 
job in which he was employed at the time of his injury, but that the degree of 
obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts, such as mental capacity, 
education, training, or age, must prima facie place him in that category." City 
of Casper v. Bowdish, Wyo., 
713 P.2d 763 (1986).

Professor Larson 
notes that if the worker has the burden to establish unavailability of work to a 
person in his circumstance, this normally would require a showing that he made 
reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment. 2 Larson's Worker's 
Compensation Law § 57.61 P. 10-164.114 (1983).

[¶31.]  Appellant contends he demonstrated that 
he is incapacitated from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which 
he is reasonably suited by experience and training. He claims that his testimony 
concerning his pain and evidence of his numerous medical bills established that 
looking for employment would have been futile. This, he contends, qualifies as 
an exception to the normally required showing of reasonable efforts to secure 
suitable employment.

[¶32.]  First we note the applicable standard of 
review.

"Whether the evidence of 
the degree of obvious physical impairment coupled with such other facts [mental 
capacity, education, training and age] places an injured employee prima facie in 
the odd-lot category is a factual determination to be made by the trial court." 
City of Casper 
v. Bowdish, supra.

If there is 
substantial evidence to support that factual determination we will not change 
such determination on appeal.

[¶33.]  The depositions from Dr. Martin and Dr. 
Davis establish, at most, that appellant could not perform the manual labor 
required in his current job and many others. Yet, as noted earlier, Dr. Martin 
stated that a person with appellant's injuries could hold a number of jobs, and 
Dr. Davis stated that appellant could perform light janitorial work and possibly 
the job of a dispatcher. Although it might be said that appellant showed that he 
could not continue his current employment, he was also required to show there 
was no other available employment for which he was suited by experience or 
training. As the district court in the Schepanovich case noted, we must look at 
all of the skills one accumulates when considering jobs for which the worker is 
reasonably suited by experience and training. See also, Rose v. Westates 
Construction Company, supra. Certainly appellant cannot claim to be unsuited for 
light janitorial work. His past experience as a police officer would seem to 
qualify him for more sedentary jobs with a police force. He is fifty-two years 
of age. He has the equivalent of a high school diploma and a vast amount of work 
experience. Although he suffers a painful injury which limits the time he can 
stand or sit without moving, as well as the amount he can lift, we cannot say 
that the trial court's factual determination is not supported by substantial 
evidence.

[¶34.]  We note that although appellant had the 
burden of establishing the unavailability of employment, a burden which normally 
requires reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment, he admits that he did 
not seek employment from anyone other than appellee between the time he left his 
job until the hearing. He argues, however, that because he believed his injury 
and the accompanying pain would make his search futile, the normal requirement 
is not applicable. Appellant's prediction of futility is not enough to relieve 
him of the burden of showing reasonable efforts to secure employment. In fact 
appellant's prediction apparently was wrong since the evidence showed that there 
were a number of available jobs that one with appellant's injury quite possibly 
could hold.

[¶35.]  We find no error in the trial court's 
conclusion that appellant did not establish he was entitled to permanent total 
disability under the odd-lot doctrine. 

III

[¶36.]  Perhaps recognizing the futility of his 
second argument, appellant argues that this court should eliminate the odd-lot 
doctrine from the worker's compensation laws of this state. He points to the 
fact that this court adopted the doctrine in In re Iles, supra, decided in 1941, 
and that in 1975 the legislature changed the language of the pertinent statute 
so that the doctrine is no longer applicable. Appellant makes this claim despite 
our application of the doctrine to numerous cases decided after the statutory 
amendment. See e.g., Schepanovich v. United States Steel Corporation, supra; 
Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862 (1979).

[¶37.]  Basically, appellant's argument is that 
the statute spoke of "permanently incapacitating the workman from performing any 
work at any gainful occupation" when the Iles case was decided. See § 
124-120(b), Wyo.Rev.Stat. (1931). The legislature has since added the phrase 
"for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training" after the word 
"occupation." Because of this change, appellant contends the clear language of 
the statute is violated if an employer is allowed to defeat a claim for total 
disability by showing that there is light work available to the claimant for 
which he is not reasonably suited by experience and training. Appellant's claim, 
however, was not defeated by appellee's showing of any light work available; 
rather appellee showed available work for which appellant was reasonably 
suited.

[¶38.]  After the briefs had been submitted in 
this case we further clarified the odd-lot doctrine as it applies in this state. 
In Rose v. Westates Construction Company, supra, 703 P.2d  at 1088 we 
said:

"* * * Our statutory 
definition with respect to the odd-lot doctrine is limited to those gainful 
occupations for which the employee is reasonably suited by experience or 
training at the time of the injury * * *."

[¶39.]  So defined, it is clear that the relevant 
jobs are those for which the worker is reasonably suited at the time of injury. 
If the burden is shifted, the employer must show that light work of a special 
nature which the injured worker could perform but which is not generally 
available is in fact available to him. The words "could perform" encompass the 
restriction that the worker can perform, given his experience and training at 
the time of the injury. This is consistent with the language of § 
27-12-405(a).

[¶40.]  The odd-lot doctrine as applied by this 
court is consistent with § 27-12-405(a). There is substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion that appellant did not establish that he 
was incapacitated from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which 
he is reasonably suited by experience or training. Finally, there was 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that appellant 
suffers a thirty percent permanent disability.

[¶41.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Physical impairment is used to denote a 
defect or infirmity limiting or making useless a member or limb of the body. 
See, e.g., Candelaria v. Hise Construction, 98 N.M. 763, 652 P.2d 1214 (1981), 
while the disability concept is a 
blend of two ingredients: "The first ingredient is disability in the medical or 
physical sense, as evidenced by obvious loss of members or by medical testimony 
that the claimant simply cannot make the necessary muscular movements and 
exertions; the second ingredient is de facto inability to earn wages * * *." 2 
Larson's Worker's Compensation § 57.51, pp. 10-6 to 10-7 
(1983).