Case Title: Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
OLSTEN KIMBERLY QUALITY CARE v. Cheri PETTEY

97-13                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                  Opinion delivered May 5, 1997


1.   Workers' compensation -- review of Commission's decision --
     factors on review. -- In reviewing appeals from the Workers'
     Compensation Commission, the supreme court views the evidence
     and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
     favorable to the Commission's decision and affirms that
     decision when it is supported by substantial evidence;
     substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person might
     accept as adequate to support a conclusion; the Commission's
     decision will be affirmed unless fair-minded persons presented
     with the same facts could not have arrived at the conclusion
     reached by the Commission. 

2.   Workers' compensation -- compensable injury defined -- when
     employee is acting within course of employment. -- Arkansas
     Code Annotated Section 11-9-102(5)(A) defines "compensable
     injury" as "an accidental injury causing internal or external
     physical harm arising out of and in the course of employment"; 
     the test for determining whether an employee was acting within
     the "course of employment" at the time of the injury requires
     that the injury occur within the time and space boundaries of
     the employment, when the employee is carrying out the
     employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interests
     directly or indirectly. 
 
3.   Workers' compensation -- going-and-coming rule -- employee
     generally not considered to be within course of employment
     while traveling to or from his job. -- An employee is
     generally said not to be acting within the course of
     employment when he or she is traveling to and from the
     workplace; this "going and coming" rule ordinarily precludes
     recovery for an injury sustained while the employee is going
     to or returning from his place of employment. 

4.   Workers' compensation -- exception to going-and-coming rule -- 
     journey itself may be considered part of service provided by
     employee. -- One of the recognized exceptions to the going-
     and-coming rule is where the journey itself is part of the
     service; traveling men are generally within the course of
     their employment from the time they leave home on a business
     trip until they return for the self-evident reason that the
     traveling itself is a large part of the job; this is also true
     where the employee must travel from jobsite to jobsite,
     whether or not he or she is paid for that travel time. 

5.   Workers' compensation -- exception to going-and-coming rule --
     whether employee required to furnish his own conveyance a
     determinative factor. -- An additional factor determinative of
     whether an employee's travel is within the course of
     employment is whether the employee is required to furnish his
     own conveyance; if the employee as part of his job is required
     to bring with him his own car, truck, or motorcycle for use
     during his working day, the trip to and from work is by that
     fact alone embraced within the course of employment. 

6.   Workers' compensation -- nature of appellee's job required her
     to travel to patient's homes -- Commission's decision to award
     benefits affirmed. -- Appellee was acting within the course of
     her employment with appellant at the time her injuries were
     sustained where the facts clearly demonstrated that travel was
     a necessary part of her employment; such travel was clearly
     for the benefit of appellant as its business livelihood
     depended upon the in-home care of patients provided by its
     nursing assistants; although appellee was not directly
     compensated for driving to patients' homes, the payment of
     compensation is not conclusive to the question of whether
     employment services are being performed; the decision of the
     Commission to award benefits to appellee was affirmed. 



     Petition for Review from the Arkansas Court of Appeals;
affirmed.
     Laser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Frank B. Newell, for
appellants.
     The Whetstone Law Firm, P.A., by:  Robert H. Montgomery, for
appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice. 
     Appellant Olsten Kimberly Quality Care appeals the decision of
the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission holding that
Appellant is liable for benefits to its employee, Appellee Cheri
Pettey, for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on
April 21, 1994.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission's decision.  Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55
Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996).  We granted Appellant's
petition for review of that decision pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
1-2(e) (as amended by per curiam July 15, 1996).  When we grant
review following a decision by the court of appeals, we review the
case as though the appeal was originally filed with this court. 
Stucco Plus, Inc. v. Rose, 327 Ark. 314, 938 S.W.2d 556 (1997).  We
affirm the decision of the Commission.
     The Commission's opinion together with the parties'
stipulations reveal the following facts.  Appellee was employed by
Appellant as a nursing assistant and was required to travel to the
patients' homes to provide nursing services.  Appellee was not
required to report to Appellant's office each day, though she did
take reports to and pick up supplies from Appellant's office on a
regular basis.  Appellee was compensated by Appellant according to
the time actually spent at each patient's home.  Appellee used her
own vehicle to travel to the patients' homes, but she did not
receive compensation for travel expenses.  On April 21, 1994,
Appellee was injured in a one-vehicle accident while she was
traveling to the home of the first scheduled patient in Hot Springs
Village.  Prior to that, Appellee had reported to Appellant's
office, located in the mall in Hot Springs, in order to drop off
some reports and pick up supplies.  After she had left Appellant's
office, Appellee did some window shopping and talked to a friend
before departing from the mall.  Appellee then left the mall
en route to her first patient's home.  Two blocks from the
patient's home, Appellee lost control of her automobile and
overturned.   
     Appellee's initial claim for benefits was rejected by the
administrative law judge on the grounds that her injuries did not
arise out of and during the course of her employment with Appellant
and that Appellee was not performing "employment services" at the
time of the accident.  Appellee appealed the decision of the
administrative law judge to the full Commission, which found in
favor of Appellee.  
     In its opinion, the Commission acknowledged that Appellee's
claim was controlled by Act 796 of 1993, which amended the Workers'
Compensation Act by excluding from the definition of "compensable
injury" any injuries sustained at a time when employment services
were not being performed.  See Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-102(5)(B)(iii)
(Repl. 1996).  The Commission likewise acknowledged that the
amended act provides for strict statutory construction of the
workers' compensation laws.  See Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-704(c)(3)
(Repl. 1996).  Act 796 did not, however, define the term
"employment services."  In construing the meaning and scope of that
term, the Commission stated:
     [C]onsidering the ordinary and usually accepted meaning
     of this term in common language, we find that an employee
     is performing employment services when she is engaging in
     an activity which carries out the employer's purpose or
     advances the employer's interests.  Obviously, an
     employee carries out the employer's purpose or advances
     the employer's interests when she engages in the primary
     activity which she was hired to perform.  However an
     employee also carries out the employer's purpose or
     advances the employer's interests when she engages in
     incidental activities which are inherently necessary for
     the performance of the primary activity.
Furthermore, in concluding that Appellee was performing employment
services at the time of her accident, the Commission held:
     However, under the prior law, employees were considered
     to be in the course of their employment when they were
     traveling if the travel was an inherent and necessary
     incident of a required employment activity.  Likewise,
     applying the amended law, we find that employees are
     performing employment services when they are engaged in
     travel which is an inherent and necessary incident of a
     required employment activity.  [Citations omitted.] 
     [Emphasis added.]

     Appellant appealed the decision of the Commission to the court
of appeals, which affirmed on the basis that travel was an inherent
and necessary incident of Appellee's required employment activity. 
Correspondingly, the court of appeals rejected Appellant's argument
that Appellee was not performing employment services at the time of
her accident because she was not being compensated either for her
travel time and expenses or for her nursing duties.
     In reviewing appeals from the Workers' Compensation
Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision
and affirm that decision when it is supported by substantial
evidence.  Gansky v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790
(1996).  Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Crawford v. Pace
Indus., 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996).  The Commission's
decision will be affirmed unless fair-minded persons presented with
the same facts could not have arrived at the conclusion reached by
the Commission.  Gansky, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790.  
     As was the Commission and the court of appeals, we are faced
with the issue of what is meant by the term "employment services." 
Appellant asserts that the Commission erred in broadly defining
"employment services" to encompass Appellee's injuries.  Relying on
the two aforementioned amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act,
Appellant argues that the mandate of strict statutory
interpretation and the description of those injuries which do not
constitute "compensable injury" prohibit Appellee from collecting
benefits from Appellant.  We disagree.
     Section 11-9-102(5)(A) defines "compensable injury" as "[a]n
accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm . . .
arising out of and in the course of employment[.]"  The test for
determining whether an employee was acting within the "course of
employment" at the time of the injury requires that the injury
occur within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when
the employee is carrying out the employer's purpose or advancing
the employer's interests directly or indirectly.  Pilgrims Pride
Corp. v. Caldarera, 54 Ark. App. 92, 923 S.W.2d 290 (1996).  
     Conversely, an employee is generally said not to be acting
within the course of employment when he or she is traveling to and
from the workplace.  This "going and coming" rule ordinarily
precludes recovery for an injury sustained while the employee is
going to or returning from his place of employment.  Lepard v. West
Memphis Mach. & Welding, 51 Ark. App. 53,