Case Title: Perel v. Brannan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031291

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
JONATHAN PEREL, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE 
BALLYSHANNON TRUST, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 031291      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 23, 2004 
SCOTT BRANNAN, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the enforcement of certain 
restrictive covenants applying to a lot in a residential 
subdivision, and the remedies for breach of these covenants. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
In 1998, Locke Lane, L.C. ("Locke Lane") purchased a 
tract of land from the Science Museum of Virginia Foundation, 
Inc. and Science Museum Foundation Real Estate, L.L.C. 
(collectively, the "Science Museum") for the purpose of 
developing a residential subdivision named "River Locke."  In 
the summer of 1998, Locke Lane and the Science Museum jointly 
requested a special use permit and approval of a subdivision 
plan from the Richmond City Council.  The plan met with 
opposition from Jonathan S. Perel ("Perel"), the sole trustee 
of the Ballyshannon Trust ("the trust"), which owned a parcel 
of land adjacent to the proposed subdivision. 
 
In November 1998, the Science Museum, Locke Lane, and 
Perel, as trustee for the Ballyshannon trust, entered into a 
Settlement Agreement.  Under the Settlement Agreement, Perel 
agreed not to object to or contest the approval by the City of 
the special use permit or subdivision plan.  In return, the 
Science Museum and Locke Lane agreed to certain restrictive 
covenants running with the land on River Locke lots abutting 
the trust's property.  The restrictive covenants are contained 
in a properly recorded document titled, "Amended and Restated 
Declaration of Rights, Restrictions, Affirmative Obligations 
and Conditions Applicable to All Property in River Locke" (the 
"Declaration").  Locke Lane also agreed "to sell Lot 4 of 
River Locke Subdivision . . . to Perel, or such entity or 
person as he may designate by assignment or otherwise."  River 
Locke Lot, L.L.C., now owns Lot 4. 
 
Part V of the Declaration contains covenants restricting 
the permissible location and type of buildings in River Locke.  
Part V, paragraph 1(c) describes the buffer, setback, and 
"[n]o [b]uilding [a]reas" that are part of each lot and 
restricts the actions that are permissible within each area.  
Part VII makes clear that the covenants and other provisions 
of the Declaration run with the land.  
 
Part I, paragraph 9 of the Declaration establishes an 
Architectural Review Committee ("ARC") composed of three 
members.  The ARC is granted the authority to "waive 
compliance with the provisions contained herein which are 
subject to architectural review (except with respect to Part 
 
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V, subparagraphs 1(c) and (d) and Part VI, paragraph 1) when 
such waiver is reasonably necessary . . . or where no other 
reasonable alternative is acceptable."  According to Part I, 
paragraph 1, a property in River Locke owner must have his or 
her plans for improvements approved by the ARC before 
construction may begin. 
 
In December 1999, William S. "Scott" Brannan and Melissa 
Brannan ("the Brannans") purchased "Lot 1" in the River Locke 
subdivision.  On June 28, 2000, Scott Brannan submitted a site 
plan for Lot 1 to the ARC and it was approved on July 12, 
2000.  The ARC approved a separate landscape plan for Lot 1 on 
September 24, 2001. 
 
Construction began on the Brannan home in the summer of 
2000, shortly after the ARC's approval of the site plan.  Due 
to the slope of the site and the location of some rock 
outcroppings, excavation was required for construction of the 
house the Brannans had chosen to build.  The excavation 
removed part of the hillside on the rear portion of the lot 
and cut into the designated setback and buffer areas.  
Substantial vegetation and eight large trees were also removed 
from the buffer area.  A retaining wall was then constructed 
in the setback area to stabilize the remaining soil.  Between 
the back of the house and the retaining wall, the Brannans 
installed a patio.  A covered porch extended from one corner 
 
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of the house into the setback area but was altered just before 
trial to remedy the encroachment. 
 
Perel and River Locke Lot, L.L.C. (collectively, "Perel") 
filed an amended bill of complaint against the Brannans, Locke 
Lane, and the three members of the ARC, in their individual 
capacities,1 on March 15, 2002, alleging that the Brannans' 
porch and retaining wall encroached on the setback area of Lot 
1 in violation of the covenants and that the excavation and 
removal of vegetation performed by the Brannans also violated 
the covenants.  Perel asked the trial court for an injunction 
preventing the Brannans from further encroachment on the 
buffer and setback areas; an order requiring the Brannans to 
restore the buffer and setback areas "to their prior state;" 
and an "order that the Brannans must modify their rear porch." 
 
In the same amended bill of complaint, Perel accused 
Locke Lane of breaching "its contractual obligation to enforce 
the covenants, conditions, and restrictions contained in the 
Settlement Agreement and the Amended Declaration."  He asked 
the court to order Locke Lane to enforce the covenants against 
the Brannans.  Perel also asked for compensatory damages 
against the Brannans and Locke Lane but withdrew the request 
                     
1 The ARC members successfully demurred and have been 
dismissed from the suit. 
 
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shortly before trial.  All parties eventually sought 
attorneys' fees. 
 
Three days before trial, the Brannans sought to amend 
their response to a request for admissions submitted by Perel 
three months earlier and completed by the Brannans three weeks 
after the request was submitted.  In their response to the 
request for admissions, the Brannans admitted "that they 
caused eight trees to be removed from the Lot 1 Buffer before 
August 20, 2001 after receiving approval from the ARC to do 
so."  The Brannans moved the trial court to permit them to 
change their response to deny that they had caused eight trees 
to be removed from the buffer area, characterizing their 
original admission as "inadvertent."  The trial court denied 
the Brannans' motion. 
 
Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the 
Brannans had violated the covenants by removing "the eight 
trees and other vegetation from the buffer area" and 
constructing a below-grade patio in the setback area.  
However, the trial court found that the Brannans' excavation 
on Lot 1 and construction of the retaining wall did not 
violate the covenants.  The trial court denied both parties' 
requests for attorneys' fees; ordered the Brannans to replace 
the vegetation that had been removed, except the eight large 
trees, because of feasibility concerns; and ordered the 
 
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Brannans "to remove the patio and any other improvements in 
the setback area." 
 
Perel appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court, 
assigning error to:  the trial court's holding that the 
retaining walls do not violate the covenants; the trial 
court's refusal to order the Brannans to replace the eight 
trees that were removed; the trial court's holding that Locke 
Lane has no contractual duty to enforce the covenants; and the 
trial court's denial of attorneys' fees.  The Brannans and 
Locke Lane responded with five assignments of cross-error, 
assigning error to:  the trial court's refusal to permit them 
to amend their response to Perel's request for admissions; the 
trial court's order requiring removal of the patio; the trial 
court's finding that the patio breached the covenants; the 
trial court's failure to give the approval of the Brannans' 
plans by the ARC sufficient weight in its decision; and the 
trial court's rejection of the argument that Perel was 
precluded from receiving equitable relief under the "unclean 
hands" doctrine. 
II.  Standard of Review 
 
The trial court's judgment in this case involves both 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  As to purely factual 
determinations made by the trial court, we will not disturb 
those findings unless they are plainly wrong or without 
 
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evidence to support them.  However, we review the trial 
court's interpretation of covenants and other written 
documents de novo.  See Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187-
88, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984). 
III. Analysis 
A.  Removal of the Retaining Wall 
 
In its letter opinion, the trial court held that "[t]he 
retaining wall was a necessary adjunct to the permitted 
excavation to prevent the collapse of the soil and rock which 
remained after the cut was complete," apparently holding that 
necessity is an exception to the restrictions on development 
in the setback area enumerated in the Declaration.  The trial 
court also noted, "[p]arenthetically, should the excavation 
have been determined to violate the covenants, there is no 
evidence on which the court could prepare an enforceable order 
that the excavated area be returned to its pre-excavation 
state" implying that even if the retaining wall was a 
violation of the covenants, the trial court would not order 
removal of the wall. 
 
The Brannans concede that the retaining wall lies in the 
rear and side setback areas of Lot 1.  Part V, paragraph 1(c) 
of the Declaration states in part: 
 
No building, structures or other 
improvements other than a fence or a driveway 
. . . may be permanently or temporarily 
 
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constructed or erected in any buffer area or 
rear building setback area . . . except as 
follows: 
. . . . 
 
(ii) Rear and Side Yard Setback Areas.  
Within the portion of the rear and side yard 
setback areas outside of the buffer areas on 
the Restricted Lots, clearing, at grade patios 
and walkways are permitted, and children's play 
equipment and swing sets, properly screened so 
as not to be visible from contiguous property 
presently owned by the Adjoining Owner, are 
permitted. 
Walls of any type are absent from the list of permitted 
structures and improvements.  We conclude that no walls are 
permitted in the setback areas for any reason and the 
retaining wall erected by the Brannans, therefore, violates 
the covenants.  The language in Part V, paragraph 1(c)(i) of 
the Declaration, permitting "privacy fences or walls" in 
buffer areas, cannot save the Brannans' retaining wall because 
that language does not apply to the setback area. 
While the retaining wall is clearly in violation of the 
covenants, Perel is not automatically entitled to have the 
retaining wall removed.  When parties have a dispute over an 
alleged violation of a restrictive covenant, the plaintiff, or 
covenantee, may file suit in the court for equitable 
enforcement of the restrictive covenant.  A restrictive 
covenant may be enforced by injunctive relief or through 
specific performance.  The party seeking enforcement of the 
 
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restrictive covenant bears the burden of proving the validity 
and meaning of the covenant.  Mid-State Equipment Co. v. Bell, 
217 Va. 133, 140, 225 S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976); Sonoma 
Development, Inc. v. Miller, 258 Va. 163, 167-69, 515 S.E.2d 
577, 579-81 (1999).  The party seeking enforcement must also 
establish that the restrictive covenant has been violated by 
the acts of the defendant, Hening v. Maynard, 227 Va. 113, 
117, 313 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1984); Forbes v. Schaefer, 226 Va. 
391, 400, 310 S.E.2d 457, 463 (1983), and request a remedy. 
Once the plaintiff satisfies proof requirements, he or 
she is entitled to the remedy requested unless the defendant 
can establish one of several defenses or the court finds 
enforcement unusually difficult.  See Bond v. Crawford, 193 
Va. 437, 444, 69 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1952) ("Generally, where a 
contract respecting real property is in its nature and 
circumstances unobjectionable, it is as much a matter of 
course for courts of equity to decree specific performance of 
it, as it is for a court of law to give damages for a breach 
of it."); Spilling v. Hutcheson, 111 Va. 179, 183, 68 S.E. 
250, 252 (1910) ("The injunction in this case is granted 
almost as a matter of course upon a breach of the covenant.  
The amount of damages, and even the fact that the plaintiff 
has sustained any pecuniary damages, are wholly immaterial."). 
 
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A defendant may avoid imposition of the remedy requested 
if such a remedy would create a hardship or injustice that is 
out of proportion to the relief sought,2 if performance by the 
defendant would be impossible,3 or if the enforcement of the 
decree would be unusually difficult for the court.4  However, 
on the questions of hardship, injustice, or impossibility, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving the elements of the 
defense.  See Harper v. Virginian Ry., 86 S.E. 919, 922 
(W. Va. 1915) ("In suits to enforce specific performance of a 
contract like the one involved here it is for the defendant to 
show by way of defense that it is no longer able to perform 
the covenant consistently with its duty to the public in 
general, or that performance thereof will be burdensome and 
oppressive or otherwise inequitable."). 
In order to establish the hardship defense, a defendant 
must show that specific performance would create a hardship or 
injustice that is out of proportion to the relief sought.  
Spinger v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 541, 2 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1939); 
Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 39, 138 S.E. 545, 549 (1927).  
The defendant must prove a level of hardship beyond 
                     
2 Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 541, 2 S.E.2d 355, 358 
(1939); Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 39, 138 S.E. 545, 549 
(1927). 
3 Shepherd v. Colton, 237 Va. 537, 541, 378 S.E.2d 828, 
830 (1989); Jones v. Tunis, 99 Va. 220, 222, 37 S.E. 841, 841 
(1901). 
 
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"inconvenience."  Spilling, 111 Va. at 182, 68 S.E. at 251.  
It is not enough for the defendant to show merely that the 
loss to the defendant will be disproportionate to the benefit 
to the plaintiff, where the defendant's violation of a 
restrictive covenant "was made with full knowledge and 
understanding of the consequences" of his or her actions.  
Sonoma, 258 Va. 169-70, 515 S.E.2d at 581.  Where an assignee 
of the covenantor does not have actual or constructive notice 
of the covenant, a lesser showing of hardship may be 
acceptable.  See Springer, 172 Va. at 541, 2 S.E.2d at 358; 
Sonoma, 258 Va. 169-70, 515 S.E.2d at 581. 
Impossibility is also a defense to specific performance 
or injunctive relief requested.  Fishburne v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 
321, 328, 7 S.E. 361, 364-65 (1888).  It may be a defense even 
when the defendant "intentionally rendered himself unable to 
perform the contract."  Jones v. Tunis, 99 Va. 220, 222, 37 
S.E. 841, 841 (1901). 
Similarly, a requested remedy may be denied if it is 
impossible for the court to precisely define the specific 
actions to be performed or if the decree would necessarily be 
of the type whose enforcement would "unreasonably tax the 
time, attention and resources of the court."  John Norton 
Pomeroy, Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts § 307, 
                                                                
4 See, e.g., Rayner v. Stone, 2 Eden 128, 130 (1762). 
 
11
at 393 (2d ed. 1897).  See also Flint v. Brandon, 32 Eng. Rep. 
314 (1803) (dismissing a bill seeking specific performance of 
a covenant to fill a pit formerly used for digging gravel 
partly out of concern that "if a specific performance is 
decreed, a question may arise, whether the work is 
sufficiently performed."). 
In this case, the Brannans' construction of a retaining 
wall in the rear setback area of Lot 1 violated the 
restrictive covenants intended to benefit Perel.  Perel has 
satisfied his burden of proving a violation of the covenants 
and has requested certain relief.  Therefore, it is the 
Brannans' burden to prove, by their evidence, defenses to the 
remedy requested.  Of course, the court may disapprove of the 
remedy requested because of difficulty in enforcement. 
The trial court erred in holding that the retaining wall 
did not violate the covenant.  This matter will be remanded to 
the trial court for further evidentiary proceedings in 
accordance with the proof requirements set forth above. 
B.  Tree Removal 
The Brannans maintain that despite their admissions, the 
trial court erred in concluding that the removal of eight 
large trees from the buffer zone was a violation of the 
covenants because the ARC approved their site and landscape 
plans, including the removal of the trees, in good faith. 
 
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Part V, paragraph (1)(c)(i) of the Declaration states:  
"Notwithstanding anything in Section 1 of Part II to the 
contrary, all existing vegetation and trees within the buffer 
areas shall be preserved, except that dead, fallen or diseased 
vegetation or trees may be removed and may be replaced and 
supplemental plantings shall be permitted therein."  Part I, 
paragraph 9 states:  "The Architectural Review Committee shall 
be charged with making all interpretations, determinations and 
necessary approvals under Paragraph 1 of Part I, Paragraph 1 
of Part II, and all of Part V . . . (b) The Architectural 
Review Committee shall have the power to waive compliance with 
the provisions contained herein which are subject to 
architectural review (except with respect to Part V, 
subparagraphs 1(c) and (d) and Part VI, paragraph 1) when such 
waiver is reasonably necessary."  (emphasis added). 
The language from Part V of the Declaration is clear.  No 
trees or other vegetation are to be removed from the buffer 
area unless dead, fallen, or diseased.  There was no 
allegation that any of the trees removed were dead, fallen, or 
diseased.  Therefore, the trial court properly found that the 
removal of the trees and other vegetation violated the 
covenants. 
Despite finding that the removal of the trees was a 
violation of the covenants, the trial court declined to order 
 
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the Brannans to replace those trees with similar trees because 
Perel had not produced evidence to show that eight 80- to 100-
foot trees could be successfully replanted in the buffer area.  
As previously discussed, it is the Brannans' burden to prove 
defenses to the relief requested.  As previously stated, those 
defenses may include hardship or injustice, impossibility, or 
difficulty of enforcement by the court.  Therefore, we will 
vacate that portion of the trial court's order denying 
replacement of the trees and remand the issue to the trial 
court for further proceedings and receipt of evidence. 
C.  Locke Lane and the Duty to Enforce the Covenants 
Perel claims that the trial court ignored language in the 
Settlement Agreement when it dismissed the claims against 
Locke Lane in its final order.  Perel argues that paragraph 3 
of the Settlement Agreement imposes a duty on Locke Lane to 
enforce the covenants when it states that, "[i]mpermissible 
deviations [from the norms of uniform treatment of lots and 
lot owners] would, for example, be . . . the developer 
unilaterally modifying or arbitrarily enforcing and/or failing 
to carry out or enforce the [covenants] or by-laws once 
approved." 
There are two flaws in Perel's argument.  First, the 
Declaration, containing the covenants, limits Locke Lane's 
power of enforcement.  The only enforcement power given to 
 
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Locke Lane, by Part VI, paragraph 2(f), is the power to levy 
assessments against a property owner for failure to clean and 
paint the exterior of the house; failure to maintain the 
landscape; failure to complete the construction of a house in 
eighteen months or less; and failure to follow guidelines, 
rules, or regulations imposed by Locke Lane or the homeowners' 
association.  The covenants violated in this case do not fall 
under the types of actions that Locke Lane may remedy by 
assessment. 
Second, the Declaration specifically notes that if the 
covenants are violated, "[Locke Lane] . . . and any Property 
Owner shall have the right to proceed at law or in equity to 
compel compliance with the terms hereof or to prevent the 
violation or breach."  Having the right to sue a violator is 
not the equivalent of having a duty to enforce the covenants 
against a violator.  The trial court did not err in holding 
that Locke Lane had no legal duty to enforce the covenants 
against the Brannans. 
D.  Attorneys' Fees 
Perel argues that the trial court erred in denying River 
Locke Lot, L.L.C., attorneys' fees under the Property Owners' 
Association Act, Code §§ 55-508 through –516.2.  Perel did not 
properly plead that the property in question was subject to 
the Property Owners' Association Act or that he was entitled 
 
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to attorneys' fees under the Act.  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not err in refusing to award the fees requested by 
Perel. 
E.  Motion to Amend Response to Request for Admissions 
The trial court found, based on the Brannans' response to 
Perel's request for admissions, that the Brannans had removed 
eight large trees and other vegetation from the buffer area, 
which violated the covenants' restrictions on activities in 
the buffer area.  The Brannans had moved the court to allow 
them to amend their response to Perel's request for admissions 
to deny that the trees removed had been in the buffer area.  
The trial court overruled their motion because it "comes too 
late" and was "prejudicial to the plaintiff." 
Rule 4:11(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia states that "the court may permit withdrawal or 
amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action 
will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the 
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or 
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or 
defense on the merits."  (emphasis added).  The permissive 
word "may" makes the court's decision on the issue 
discretionary.  We, therefore, examine the trial court's 
decision not to grant permission to amend the response under 
 
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an abuse of discretion standard.  See Shaheen v. County of 
Mathews, 265 Va. 462, 475, 579 S.E.2d 162, 170 (2003). 
Rule 4:11(b) creates a two-prong test within which the 
trial court must exercise its discretion.  Shaheen, 265 Va. at 
473-74, 579 S.E.2d at 169.  Here, the trial court based its 
decision on the second prong of the test, which "requires the 
non-moving party to demonstrate that amendment or withdrawal 
of an admission will prejudice that party."  Id. at 474, 579 
S.E.2d at 170.  The requisite prejudice may occur "because of 
the sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to the 
questions previously answered by the admissions."  Id.  Perel 
argued to the trial court that the Brannans' motion to amend 
came only three days before trial and that he had not prepared 
to prove the location of the trees at trial.  In light of 
these arguments, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the Brannans' motion as prejudicial to Perel. 
F.  The Patio 
It is well-established that courts may address only those 
issues properly pled.  Rule 1:4; Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. 
Royal Alum. & Construction Co., 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 
228, 229 (1981).  In this case, Perel never mentioned the 
Brannans' patio in his amended bill of complaint.  
Accordingly, the trial court's order requiring the Brannans to 
remove the patio will be reversed. 
 
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G.  Impact of the ARC's Approval of Building Plans on the 
Trial Court's Findings of Covenant Violations 
 
The Brannans maintain that, because the ARC approved 
their landscape and site plans, they did not violate the 
covenants by building a retaining wall in the setback area or 
by removing the eight large trees from the buffer area.  The 
Brannans argue that if the trial court had shown proper 
deference to the ARC's interpretations of the covenants, it 
could not have found that their actions violated the 
covenants.  They point to Part I, paragraph 9 of the 
Declaration as granting the ARC authority to make "all 
interpretations, determinations and necessary approvals under 
Paragraph 1 of Part I, Paragraph 1 of Part II, and all of Part 
V."  However, according to Part I, paragraph 9(b) of the 
Declaration, the ARC may not waive compliance with Part V, 
paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration, which expresses the 
restrictions on activity in the setback and buffer areas.   
 
The ARC's approval of the Brannans' plans did not state 
the ARC's reasons for granting approval of the plans.  If the 
ARC approved the plans because it decided to waive the 
requirements of Part V, paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration, its 
decision is not entitled to deference because it did not have 
the authority under the covenants to waive those requirements.  
If the ARC approved the plans because it interpreted Part V, 
 
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paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration to allow the Brannans' 
construction of the retaining wall and removal of the trees, 
its interpretation was contradictory to the plain language of 
the covenants.  Even when an entity's interpretation of a 
document is entitled to deference, an interpretation of the 
document that is contrary to the plain language of the 
document may be properly rejected by the court.  Virginia High 
Sch. League v. J.J. Kelly High Sch., 254 Va. 528, 531, 493 
S.E.2d 362, 363-64 (1997) ("[W]hen bylaw language is 
unambiguous, we need not defer to an interpretation of a 
corporation's various boards and committees.").  The trial 
court did not err in finding that the Brannans violated the 
covenants by building a retaining wall in the setback area and 
removing trees from the buffer area, despite the ARC's 
approval of such actions. 
H.  Unclean Hands Doctrine 
 
The Brannans maintain that Perel is barred from seeking 
any equitable remedy for any violations of the covenants 
committed by the Brannans under the "unclean hands" doctrine.  
In Richards v. Musselman, 221 Va. 181, 187, 267 S.E.2d 164, 
168 (1980), we stated: 
[T]he maxim that a party must come into a court 
of equity with clean hands only applies to the 
particular transaction under consideration, for 
a court will not go outside of the case for the 
purpose of examining the conduct of the 
 
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complainant in other matters or questioning his 
general character for fair dealing.  The wrong 
must have been done to the defendant himself 
and must have been in regard to the matter in 
litigation. 
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).  Here, Perel's alleged 
"unclean" act was trespass upon the Brannans' property for the 
purpose of taking photographs.  Perel's alleged trespass is 
not part of the "particular transaction under consideration" 
here because it could not have encouraged, invited, aided, 
compounded, or fraudulently induced the Brannans' violation of 
the covenants.  Whether or not Perel's alleged trespass was 
proper, it does not bar him from seeking equitable relief in 
this case. 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that: 
1. 
The trial court erred in its judgment that the 
retaining walls did not violate the covenants; 
2. 
The trial court erred in its judgment, without 
evidence to support it, that replacement of the 
eight trees was not feasible; 
3. 
The trial court did not err in its judgment that 
Locke Lane has no contractual duty to enforce the 
covenants at issue; 
 
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4. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to award 
attorneys' fees and costs to Perel under the 
Property Owners' Association Act; 
5. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to permit 
the Brannans to amend their response to Perel's 
request for admissions; 
6. 
The trial court erred by ordering relief that was 
not pled, namely that the Brannans' must remove the 
patio; 
7. 
The trial court did not err in its consideration of 
the Architectural Review Committee's approval of 
the Brannans plans nor in refusing the Brannans' 
defense of "unclean hands." 
This case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings 
including receipt of evidence concerning the remedy requested 
by Perel for the encroachment of the retaining walls and the 
removal of eight large trees.  
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 and remanded. 
 
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