Case Title: Kopsho v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC15-1256, SC15-1762

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1256 
_____________ 
 
WILLIAM M. KOPSHO, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
_____________ 
 
No. SC15-1762 
_____________ 
 
WILLIAM M. KOPSHO, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[January 19, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
William Kopsho appeals an order of the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court denying 
his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, 
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
 
 
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For the following reasons, we vacate Kopsho’s sentence and remand for a new 
penalty phase.  See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 69 (Fla. 2016). 
The facts of this case were presented in this Court’s opinion on direct 
appeal.  See Kopsho v. State, 84 So. 3d 204, 209-10 (Fla. 2012).  After the penalty 
phase, the jury voted ten to two to impose a death sentence, and the trial court 
sentenced Kopsho to death.  Id. at 210.  On direct appeal in 2012, this Court 
affirmed Kopsho’s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 211. 
 
Kopsho filed his postconviction motion to vacate the judgment of conviction 
and sentence on November 19, 2014.  After a case management conference held on 
March 9, 2015, the circuit court determined that no evidentiary hearing was 
warranted and entered an order summarily denying Kopsho’s initial postconviction 
motion on March 23, 2015. 
 
While Kopsho’s appeal from the summary denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), holding, in short, “that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme [is] unconstitutional to the extent that it fail[s] 
to require the jury, rather than the judge, to find the facts necessary to impose the 
death sentence.”  Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 43-44 (citing Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 
619). 
 
 
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Because Kopsho was condemned to death by a vote of ten to two, we find 
that Kopsho’s sentence is the result of a Hurst v. Florida error.  We therefore must 
consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Hurst, 
202 So. 3d at 67. 
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[ v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction. 
Id. at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)). 
 
The jury in this case recommended death by a vote of ten to two.  While 
three of the aggravators in this case are such that no reasonable juror would not 
have found their existence,1 we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found 
that the aggravators outweighed the mitigation.  We can only determine that the 
jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death. 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court found the following aggravators in this case: (1) that at the 
time of the murder Kopsho was under a sentence of imprisonment or on felony 
probation; (2) that Kopsho had committed a prior violent felony; (3) that the 
murder was committed during an armed kidnapping; and (4) that the murder was 
cold, calculated, and premeditated.  Kopsho, 84 So. 3d at 210.  The evidence 
presented at trial included Kopsho’s confession that he planned to kill Lynne once 
she told him that she had slept with her former supervisor but that he had to stay 
calm until he had the opportunity.  Id. at 208.  Kopsho repeatedly referred to the 
crime as premeditated in his multiple confessions.  Id. at 209-210. 
 
 
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Because we cannot make these determinations, we cannot say that there is 
no possibility that the error did not contribute to the sentence.  We therefore 
determine that the error in Kopsho’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court’s order and remand for a 
new penalty phase.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 69. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
PERRY, Senior Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PERRY, Senior Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), 
error in this case is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, as I 
expressed in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 75 (Fla. 2016) (Perry, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), “[t]here is no compelling reason for this Court not to 
apply the plain language of section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes.”  I therefore 
dissent to the majority’s decision to remand for a new penalty phase and would 
instead remand for the imposition of a life sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 5 - 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County,  
David Brent Eddy, Judge - Case No. 422000CF003762CFAXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle 
Region, Reuben Andrew Neff, Maria Christine Perinetti, Raheela Ahmed, and 
Nicholas Arthur Whittle, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle 
Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stacey E. Kircher, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent