Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KEITH HUNTINGTON v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-237

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:  KEITH HUNTINGTON v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION2007 WY 124163 P.3d 839Case Number: No. 06-237Decided: 08/03/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:KEITH 
HUNTINGTON,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE 
OFWYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

David M. 
Gosar of Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Keith Huntington, appeals a district court order affirming the Office of 
Administrative Hearings' (OAH) denial of workers' compensation benefits.  He argues that his current medical 
problems are a direct result of a 1999 workplace injury.  We find that the OAH properly determined 
that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proof and, therefore, 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the OAH act 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied benefits for the appellant's current 
medical problems?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 1985, the 
appellant suffered a workplace back injury as a result of some heavy lifting 
while employed in Nevada.  
The appellant again injured his back the next year and, in August 1987, 
his physician, Dr. Thomas Bauman, recommended that the appellant no longer 
engage in "labor work."  The 
appellant underwent two spinal fusion surgeries in 1989 and 1991 as a result of 
his back injuries.  After the second 
surgery, Dr. Bauman assigned the appellant a 25% whole person impairment rating 
and determined that he was "permanently disabled for hard rock mining, heavy 
labor, and the type of work that he was doing before."

 
 
[¶4]      In May 1999, the 
appellant suffered another back injury while working in Wyoming when he attempted 
to prevent an oxygen container from tipping over in a stairwell.  The Workers' Compensation Division (the 
Division) awarded the appellant permanent disability benefits for this 
injury.  After this injury, Dr. 
Bauman noted that (1) the appellant could return to work but should not engage 
in any "heavy work"; (2) he had "progression of degenerative wearing out of his 
disks" above his previous spinal fusion; (3) he did not require a further spinal 
fusion surgery; and (4) he could return to the workforce, subject to the "heavy 
work" restriction.

 
 
[¶5]      Thereafter, in 
2001, the appellant secured various jobs as an iron worker, constructing 
underground bunkers, and in metal fabrication.  In May 2003, the appellant suffered two 
further, non-work-related back injuries, one when his "foot slipped" off a curb 
and he "felt something pop" in his back, and another when he attempted to move a 
rock using a shovel on ranchland he owns.  
After these injuries, the appellant's doctors believed that the appellant 
would require further fusion of his lower back.

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
sought workers' compensation benefits for the treatment related to his May 2003 
injuries and for future medical costs which, he argued, all arose from the 
compensable 1999 injury.  The 
Division denied the appellant's application for benefits, reasoning that his 
current spinal problems were related to his 1985 injury, not "the lumbar sprain 
on May 26, 1999."  The appellant 
requested a hearing on his claim, which hearing was held before the OAH on 
December 22, 2004.  The OAH denied 
the appellant benefits and, on appeal to the district court, that denial was 
affirmed.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The OAH 
determined that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that his 
current condition was work related or causally related to his 1999 workplace 
injury.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2007) governs our review of agency actions.  Spletzer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 90, ¶ 9, 116 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Wyo. 
2005).  Under that statute, where 
there is a finding that a claimant has failed to meet his or her burden of 
proof, our review focuses on whether the OAH acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. 
Div. v. Slaymaker, 2007 WY 65, ¶ 11, 156 P.3d 977, 980-81 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
"Under 
the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion standard, we are charged with 
examining the entire record.  In our 
examination and review of a hearing examiner's determination, we defer to the 
hearing examiner's findings of fact. We will examine conflicting and 
contradictory evidence to see if the hearing examiner reasonably could have made 
its findings based on all the evidence before it. The findings of fact may 
include determinations of witness credibility, as the hearing examiner is 
charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses. In our review, we 
will not overturn the hearing examiner's determinations regarding witness 
credibility unless they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence."

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Brees v. Gulley Enters., 
Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 132 (Wyo. 2000)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      At the outset, it 
is important properly to frame the issue in the instant case.  This is not a direct appeal based on the 
appellant's initial injury.  Since 
the appellant applied for benefits in the instant case in 2003 and the discrete 
workplace injury occurred on May 26, 1999, such a claim would clearly be time 
barred if benefits were sought for the primary injury.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503 
(LexisNexis 2007) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations period for 
claims based on injuries that are "the result of a single brief 
occurrence").  Instead, the 
appellant seeks benefits for the continued deterioration of his back, which 
deterioration, he argues, was caused by the 1999 injury, and not by his 
preexisting fusion, subsequent work activities, or the injuries in 2003.  

 
 
[¶9]      The Division 
submitted minimal evidence in the contested case hearing, which evidence mainly 
consisted of paperwork and a copy of the initial denial of benefits.  In contrast, the appellant personally 
testified and submitted numerous reports from various doctors who had either 
personally examined him regarding the instant case and in the past, or doctors 
who had conducted a review of his medical records.  The OAH found that the appellant did not 
demonstrate a causal connection between his 1999 workplace injury and his 
current medical condition in part because the physicians who believed the 
appellant's current injuries were caused by his previous injury did not discuss 
the relevance of the appellant's intervening employment involving physical labor 
or the contribution that his May 2003 injuries had on his current 
condition.

 
 
[¶10]   A claimant in a workers' 
compensation case must prove all elements of his or her claim for 
benefits by a preponderance of the evidence.  Thornberg v. State 
ex rel.    Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 
913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996).  We have 
recognized that causation is "embedded in the definition of 
injury[.]'"  Id.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(LexisNexis 2007) defines "injury" as follows:

 
 
"Injury" 
means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out 
of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

 
 
A causal 
connection exists between a claimant's injury and his or her employment when 
"there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment 
or requirement of the employment."  
Sanchez v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 64, ¶ 10, 134 P.3d 1255, 1259 
(Wyo. 2006) (quoting Sinclair Trucking v. 
Bailey, 848 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Wyo. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Newman 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo. 2002)).  In the instant 
case, we find that the OAH did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it found 
that the appellant's medical evidence failed to establish the necessary causal 
link between his current condition and his previous employment.  

 
 
[¶11]   Regarding the opinions of medical 
experts, we have said

 
 
the 
causal connection between an accident or condition at the workplace is satisfied 
if the medical expert testifies that it is more probable than not that the work 
contributed in a material fashion to the precipitation, aggravation or 
acceleration of the injury.  Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 105 
(Wyo. 
1991).  We do not invoke a standard 
of reasonable medical certainty with respect to such causal connection.  Kaan v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div., 689 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Wyo. 1984) (citing 
Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979)).  Testimony by the medical expert to the 
effect that the injury "most likely," "contributed to," or "probably" is the 
product of the workplace suffices under our established standard.  Kaan, 689 P.2d  at 
1389.

 
 

Pino v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 996 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo. 2000).  However, 
deference is afforded to the trier of fact in determining the credibility of 
witnesses and interpreting the evidence.  
Morgan v. Olsten Temp. Servs., 
975 P.2d 12, 15 (Wyo. 1999).  

 
 
If the 
hearing record demonstrates ambiguities or inconsistencies that require weighing 
the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses, the trier of fact has 
the sole responsibility for those functions.  They are not the prerogative of the 
reviewing court.  Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d [1233,] 1238 
[(Wyo. 1996)]; Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 
902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995).  In this regard, we have said, 
"[f]urthermore, [w]hen the inconsistencies in the evidence and the claimant's 
testimony make it impossible for the hearing examiner to determine whether the 
accident arose out of [and] in the course of his employment, the claimant has 
failed to sustain his burden.'"  Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Thornberg, 913 P.2d 863, 870 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Latimer, 902 P.2d at 711). 

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
. . 
.  The finder of fact is not 
necessarily bound by the expert medical testimony, however.  Forni [v. Pathfinder Mines], 834 P.2d [688,] 
693 [(Wyo. 
1992)].  It is the hearing 
examiner's responsibility, as the trier of fact, to determine relevancy, assign 
probative value and ascribe the relevant weight given to medical testimony.  Clark [v. State ex rel.      Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.], 934 
P.2d [1269,] 1271 [(Wyo. 1997)] (citing Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim 
of Thornberg, 913 P.2d at 867).  
"The hearing examiner [is] also in the best position to judge the weight 
to be given to the medical evidence."  
Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 
1237; Latimer, 902 P.2d  at 711.  "The trier of fact may disregard an 
expert opinion if he finds the opinion unreasonable or not adequately supported 
by the facts upon which the opinion is based."  Clark, 934 P.2d  at 
1271.

 
 

Id. at 
15-16.

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant relies heavily on the 
opinion of Dr. Bauman to establish a causal connection between his condition in 
2003-2004 and his injury in 1999.1   In May 2004, Dr. Bauman stated in 
a letter:

 
 
            
[The appellant] did have a preexisting condition prior to the injury of 
May 26, 1999.  This was a previous 
back injury resulting in spinal fusion from L4 to the sacrum.  Spinal fusion does cause some increased 
stress on the disks above the spinal fusion.  I do feel, however, that the injury of 
May 26, 1999, in high probability, caused the acute damage to the L3-4 disk at 
that time.  This disk has now gone 
on to degenerate even more significantly.  
I feel that [the appellant] has reached maximum medical improvement and 
that his prognosis for return to heavy work is poor.  He will probably at some time in 
his life need an extended fusion above the L3-4 level to add on to his previous 
fusion.  If and when he needs the 
surgery, I think that it will be primarily due to his injury of May 26, 1999, 
but some people who have fusions from L4 to the sacrum would slowly and 
continually wear out the L3-4 level even without a specific injury.  The fact that [the appellant] was 
working and doing fairly well until he lifted the oxygen bottle back in 1999 
would suggest that most of the initial injury and certainly a great deal of the 
wearing now of the L3-4 disk is secondary to the second injury.  Certainly, 100% of the problem at L3-4 
disk is due to a combination of the two injuries, the first one requiring fusion 
of L4 to the sacrum and the second one injuring and speeding up the degeneration 
and damage to the L3-4 disk above the previous fusion.

 
 
The OAH 
clearly found this opinion unpersuasive and we will affirm that finding.  On January 3, 2000, Dr. Bauman stated in 
a letter written on the appellant's behalf that he

 
 
is not 
bad enough at this point to need another fusion and indeed I would try at all 
costs to avoid fusing further up his back.  
I think part of this avoidance of 
further back surgery would be to have him avoid heavy 
work.

 
 
. . . . 
He would not be disabled for complete sedentary work involving basically no 
bending, lifting or twisting, and intermittent sitting and standing. . . .  [C]ertainly any type of labor job I think 
should be avoided at this time to try to avoid ongoing progressive wearing out 
of the disks above his previous fusion.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Against this advice, the 
appellant admittedly obtained one job that required some lifting and another 
that required him to stand on a hard floor that "bother[ed his] back."  Further, the appellant subsequently 
suffered two additional injuries that required medical attention.  An emergency department report from 
LDSHospital on May 27, 2003 notes that "[t]wo 
days ago [the appellant] was stepping off a curb and landed hard on his 
feet.  He jarred himself and fell 
over but did not fall to the ground.  
Since then he has had worse pain in the low back, wrapping around and 
going towards his groin."

 
 
[¶13]   Even though Dr. Bauman believed in 
January 2000, that continued labor would hasten the progress of the appellant's 
degenerative condition, and it is clear from the emergency report that the 
appellant's accident in May 2003 caused additional pain, Dr. Bauman's medical 
diagnosis failed to take these activities into account.  As we noted above, an "unreasonable or 
not adequately supported" opinion is grounds for disregarding a medical 
opinion.  Morgan, 975 P.2d  at 16.  The OAH could correctly conclude that, 
faced with the evidence of other potential causes for the appellant's increasing 
back pain, the appellant had not met his burden of proving that the 1999 injury 
caused his current condition because the appellant's medical reports did not 
attempt to determine the contribution that the subsequent injuries and work 
history had on the appellant's condition.  
Indeed, the evidence submitted from Dr. Bauman does not even acknowledge 
the existence of the subsequent work history or accidents.  Instead, Dr. Bauman merely concluded that 
"100% of the problem at L3-4 is due to a combination of the two injuries."  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   The OAH did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in denying the appellant worker's compensation benefits in the 
instant case because the appellant's medical evidence failed to address the 
impact that working against medical advice and subsequent injuries had on the 
appellant's medical condition.  
Absent such evidence, the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving 
the essential element of causation.

 
 
[¶15]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
appellant emphasizes a variety of other medical reports from different 
doctors.  To the extent that many of 
these reports were written soon after the appellant's 1999 injury, they are of 
no relevance to the dispositive issue in this appeal, namely whether the 
appellant established a direct causal link between his 1999 injury and his 
current condition.  The appellant 
sought a "second opinion" from Dr. Mattsson in March 2004.  Dr. Mattsson concluded that "very 
dramatic instability" existed in the appellant's back and recommended that "he 
get the screws and hooks out" and undergo further "surgery at L3-4."  Dr. Mattsson also noted that spinal 
fusion "produces added stress to the next level above" the fusion.  On the issue of causation, however, Dr. 
Mattsson was unable to give an opinion because he had not been treating the 
appellant in 1999.