Case Title: State v. Clyburn

Citation: 159 S.E.2d 868, 273 N.C. 284

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1968-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
159 S.E.2d 868 (1968) 273 N.C. 284 STATE v. Kelly CLYBURN, Bobby McVay and Henry Fryer. No. 248. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 20, 1968. *871 Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Deputy Atty. Gen. Harry W. McGalliard for the State. William J. Richards, Jr., Charlotte, for defendant McVay. T. O. Stennett, Charlotte, for defendant Fryer. BRANCH, Justice. Defendant McVay assigns as error the admission into evidence of his confession. The test of admissibility of a defendant's confession is whether the statement was in fact made voluntarily. State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; State v. Gosnell, 208 N.C. 401, 181 S.E. 323. Whether the statement was made voluntarily so as to be admissible before the jury is a question to be determined by the trial judge upon evidence presented to him in absence of the jury. State v. Outing, 255, N.C. 468, 121 S.E.2d 847. It is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury from evidence admitted in its presence, whether such statement was made by the defendant. State v. Guffey, 261 N.C. 322, 134 S.E.2d 619. However, the conclusions of law drawn from the facts found are not binding on the appellate courts. State v. Hines, 266 N.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 363. The procedure to be followed when objection is interposed as to the voluntariness of a confession is set forth in the case of State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1, where Lake, J., speaking for the Court, stated: Defendant contends that if he made a statement, it was involuntary since he was insistently questioned after he indicated to the officers that he did not desire to talk about the case. To support this contention, defendant relies on that part of the opinion in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, which states: The record is in sharp conflict as to this contention. Defendant offers evidence that he was questioned insistently after indicating that he did not wish to talk. The State offered evidence that defendant freely talked upon first being questioned, and only indicated that he did not wish to sign a waiver. In the case of State v. Logner, 266 N.C. 238, 145 S.E.2d 867, it is stated: See also State v. Outing, supra. Here the trial court properly excused the jury, and in the absence of the jury heard evidence from the State and defendant upon the question of the voluntariness of defendant's confession. The court thereupon made findings of fact which were incorporated into the record. The record contains substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendant's confession was voluntarily made. The jury by its verdict found that defendant made the statement. This finding is binding on appeal. Defendant McVay's assignment of error that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of nonsuit cannot be sustained. In the instant case the felonious breaking and entering of the building belonging to Brown-Rogers-Dixson Company and the felonious larceny of personal property *873 therefrom were established aliunde the confession of defendant McVay by the testimony of the witness O. K. Tesh. This evidence, when taken in connection with defendant McVay's confession, was sufficient to carry the case to the jury against defendant McVay. No prejudicial error is made to appear as against defendant McVay. Henry Fryer's sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment as of nonsuit. The State's case is entirely dependent on the testimony of the witness John Cureton to connect defendant Fryer with the offense with which he is charged. It is stated in State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395: Here the Court is not concerned with whether the evidence is competent, but the question is whether it is sufficient to carry the case to the jury. We further recognize that "It is not the function of this court to pass on the credibility of witnesses or to weigh the testimony." State v. Hanes, 268 N.C. 335, 150 S.E.2d 489. In the case of State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E.2d 679, certain well recognized principles of law pertinent to this assignment of error are clearly and concisely stated for the Court by Lake, J., as follows: Two propositions are involved in the proof of a criminal charge: (1) Proof that a crime has been committed, i.e., proof of the corpus delicti, and (2) proof that it was done by the person charged, i.e., proof of the identity of the defendant. State v. Edwards, 224 N.C. 577, 31 S.E.2d 762; State v. Bass, supra. It would be incongruous to submit the question of identity of the defendant to the jury for their determination beyond a reasonable doubt upon the sole testimony of a witness who could not "honestly say that they were the two men." *874 Considered in the light most favorable to the State and resolving all contradictions and discrepancies in its favor, the testimony of the State's witness was, at best, so equivocal and uncertain as to raise only a suspicion or conjecture as to the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The trial court erred in overruling defendant Fryer's motion for judgment as of nonsuit. As to defendant McVay: No Error. As to defendant Fryer: Reversed.