Case Title: NESTLE FOOD CO. v. CREWS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92858

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
NESTLE FOOD CO. v. CREWS  NESTLE FOOD CO. v. CREWS 2000 OK 58 11 P.3d 205 71 OBJ 1897 Case Number: 92858 Decided: 07/18/2000 Mandate Issued: 09/15/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma NESTLE FOOD COMPANY and CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE COMPANY, a subsidiary of Travelers Property Casualty Corp., Plaintiffs/Appellants v. PATRICIA L. CREWS and AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants/Appellees ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV ¶0 Terminated by dismissal in the District Court, Oklahoma County, Carolyn Ricks, trial judge, was an action by an employer and its workers' compensation carrier against a claimant/employee and a third-party tortfeasor's insurer. Treating the claim as one for subrogation, the nisi prius court declared it to be time-barred. The employer and its workers' compensation carrier appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On certiorari previously granted upon the petition brought by the employer and its workers' compensation carrier, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL ORDER IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS PRONOUNCEMENT Mark T. Koss, McNulty, Koss & Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the appellants. Mark E. Bialick and Rodney D. Stewart, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the appellee. ¶1 The issue presented on certiorari is whether the statute-based district court claim brought against the torfeasor's insurer by the employer and its workers' compensation carrier was erroneously dismissed as time-barred. We answer in the affirmative. I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 In an action by Nestle Food Company (Employer or Nestle) and its workers' compensation carrier, Constitution State Service Company (CSSC), against the insurer of a third-party tortfeasor, American States Insurance Company (tortfeasor's insurer, ASIC) and against the claimant-employee,2 the procedural posture of the claim now before us is virtually identical to that recently addressed in ACCOSIF v. American States Insurance Co.3 Like the claim in ACCOSIF, this demand also falls within the provisions of 85 O.S.1991 § 44(a).4 Nestle and CSSC seek to recover a portion of the amount paid to an employee/claimant in an earlier compensation claim's settlement. As in ACCOSIF, the correct theory of the pressed claim against the claimant is that of the compensation carrier's statutory pro tanto recoupment of claimant's tort recovery. As against the tortfeasor's insurer (ASIC), the demand stems from wrongful payout.5 The terms of 85 O.S.1991 § 44(a) explicitly provide a remedy against a tortfeasor's insurer's wrongful payout in breach of its duty to a known statutory assignee of a chose in [11 P.3d 208] action6 still in insurer's hands.7 Both here and in ACCOSIF the "theoretical underpinnings" of the actionable statute_based demand against the third-party actor's insurer are "akin to those advanced in Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers8 and in a trilogy of attorney's lien cases."9 ¶3 Patricia Crews (Crews or claimant), while working for Nestle, was involved in a vehicular accident on 25 August 1993, which is alleged to have resulted from the negligence of a third party. The latter was insured by ASIC at the time of the collision. Soon after the accident, the employer notified ASIC by letter of its subrogation interest and subsequently received an acknowledgment of notice coupled with denial that ASIC's insured bore any responsibility. ¶4 Crews, who sought workers' compensation benefits for her injuries, was paid $70,317.07 by CSSC, the employer's carrier. Exactly one day before the two-year statute of limitation would have expired, Crews sued the third-party actor and his insurer, ASIC, to recover in tort.10 History of Present Litigation ¶6 Declaring it time-barred as a subrogation claim, ¶7 We granted certiorari to provide, once again, precedential guidance for the correct analysis of the claim in contest. [11 P.3d 209] II AS IN ACCOSIF V. AMERICAN STATES INS. CO., THIS ACTION, WHICH FALLS WITHIN THE TERMS OF ¶8 As this case presents a fact pattern which is strikingly similar to that in ACCOSIF, the same analysis must be applied. ¶9 The terms of 85 O.S.1991 § 44 ¶10 Neither CSSC's non-joinder in the claimant's tort litigation nor its nonparticipation in the claimant's subsequent settlement with the third-party tortfeasor can operate here as a bar to CSSC's pursuit of its present demand for the legislatively_sanctioned portion of Crews' settlement. ¶11 Because the CSSC's claim cannot be characterized as one for subrogation, the two-year time bar that would have been triggered by the date of the on-the-job accident does not extinguish CSSC's remedy now pressed before us. III THE THREE-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD PROVIDED BY THE TERMS OF ¶12 Simply because the face of the CSSC's petition alludes to subrogation does not confine its actionable demand to that theory, nor does it operate to forfeit the insured employer's (Nestle's) opportunity to recover on the theory of statutory pro tanto recoupment. [11 P.3d 210] ¶13 In short, ASIC is not protected (from liability to CSSC) by the time bar on which the nisi prius dismissal was rested. As stated in ACCOSIF, "The terms of § 44(a) ¶15 The ACCOSIF decision settled a point of law that, though somewhat elusive and perhaps difficult to analyze, is nonetheless governed by a clearly-worded statute. The text of 85 O.S.1991 § 4424 pertinent to this controversy has remained the same since its enactment in 1915. The underlying common-law concept embodied in the § 44 language, which operates as an ex lege assignment of a compensation claimant's chose in action to the compensator_employer (or to its carrier), has never been an instrument of confusion.25 V SUMMARY OF TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT ¶16 The claim was ill-classified (at nisi prius and by COCA) as a time-barred subrogation demand. The dismissal must be reversed insofar as it adversely affects the appealing employer (and its workers' compensation carrier), and the cause be remanded. ¶17 The so-called Conley26 test also [ 11 P.3d 211 ] invoked in ACCOSIF27 teaches that a petition "must not be dismissed for failure to state a legally cognizable claim unless the allegations indicate beyond any doubt that the pleader can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief."28 It cannot be said here that the plaintiff's claim stands barred if it must be viewed as an action for a compensation insurer's statute-based pro tanto share of its § 44(a) assignment. After remand, the trial court, on due consideration of the law pronounced herein, must rule whether (a) the Conley29 test is satisfied and (b) its shield protects the claim from dismissal.30 On remand, the trial court must revisit the issues before it in a manner consistent with the pronouncement of an appellate tribunal. See, e.g., Seymour v. Swart, 1985 OK 9, ¶8, 695 P.2d 509 , 513 (when judgment is reversed and cause remanded for new trial, the case stands at nisi prius as if no disposition had ever been made except for questions of law settled by the appellate pronouncement). ¶18 On certiorari previously granted upon the petition brought by the employer and its workers' compensation carrier, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated; the trial court's dismissal order is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings to be consistent with this pronouncement. ¶19 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, OPALA, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur; ¶20 KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part; ¶21 HODGES, J., disqualified. FOOT