Case Title: Negron v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 569, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GAMALIEL NEGRON, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 569, 2008 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
ID No. 0802019689 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 22, 2009 
   Decided:  August 24, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 24th day of August 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and their contentions at oral argument, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant-Appellant Gamaliel Negron appeals from his Superior 
Court conviction of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  Negron contends that 
the court erred as a matter of law in upholding his arrest and ensuing search, 
because police lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in 
criminal activity.  We find no merit to Negron’s argument and affirm. 
(2) 
At about 9:20 p.m. on February 15, 2008, Officers Mark Satterfield 
and Mark Henry of the Wilmington Police Department were on patrol on Fifth 
 2
Street near Clayton Court Apartments in Wilmington.  One of the apartment 
buildings faced Fifth Street, while the other buildings faced inward to create a 
courtyard.  The officers had not received a complaint about any suspicious activity 
in the area; however Officer Satterfield got out of his car and entered the courtyard.  
At the suppression hearing, Officer Satterfield indicated he did so simply because, 
this area was a “high crime area” that was “more intense.” 
(3) 
The courtyard was well lit by floodlights and, once inside, Officer 
Satterfield observed Negron standing twenty yards away, “about five feet away 
from the front door of one of [the apartment] buildings.”  He was “turned away 
from the courtyard area, facing the wall, in bushes.”  Although Negron’s pants 
were up and Officer Satterfield did not observe either his exposed penis or a urine 
stream, he concluded Negron had been urinating because he “did the shake to 
finish it,” and then zipped up his pants.1 
(4) 
Officer Satterfield approached Negron and asked him to come closer.  
He advised him that public urination was a crime and Negron responded, “I know.”  
Officer Satterfield then asked Negron for identification.  When Negron could not 
produce any, Officer Satterfield detained him and placed him in handcuffs.  Officer 
Satterfield stated that at this point, he intended to charge Negron with disorderly 
conduct for urinating in public. 
                                          
 
1 The court did not permit Officer Satterfield to demonstrate the motion, acknowledging that, by 
virtue of common sense and experience, he was aware of what the act entailed. 
 3
(5) 
Once Negron was in custody, Officer Satterfield frisked him.  During 
the frisk, Officer Satterfield felt an object in an outside jacket pocket, but could not 
tell whether it was a cell phone or some other object.  He also felt what he believed 
was a larger bag containing smaller bags in an inside jacket pocket.  Based on his 
previous experience, Officer Satterfield believed it was packaged marijuana.  He 
reached into the inside jacket pocket and seized the bag which contained sixteen 
smaller bags containing a substance that was later determined to be marijuana.  
Officer Satterfield then turned Negron over to Officer Henry, who escorted him to 
the patrol car.  While searching Negron before putting him in the patrol car, 
Officer Henry discovered a loaded handgun and ammunition. 
(6) 
On March 17, 2008, Negron was indicted on disorderly conduct, 
possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance 
within 300 feet of a park, possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony (“PFDCF”), and carrying a concealed deadly weapon (“CCDW”).  Negron 
filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied after a hearing.  After a 
stipulated bench trial, Negron was found guilty of PWID and PFDCF.  The State 
entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges.  Negron was sentenced to a 
mandatory term of three years at level V followed by two years at decreasing 
levels of supervision.  This appeal followed. 
 4
(7) 
Negron contends that the police lacked reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity; thus, the Superior Court erred 
as a matter of law in upholding his arrest and search that flowed from the officer’s 
conclusion, based on wholly innocent behavior, that Negron had urinated in public.  
Negron argues that public urination is not a crime and there was no reasonable 
suspicion that he was engaged in any crime. 
(8) 
We review the grant or denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of 
discretion.2  To the extent the trial judge’s decision is based on factual findings, we 
review for whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in determining 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings, and whether those 
findings were clearly erroneous.3  To the extent that we examine the trial judge’s 
legal conclusions, we review them de novo for errors in formulating or applying 
legal precepts.4  Where, as here, we are reviewing the denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence based on an allegedly illegal search and seizure, we conduct a 
de novo review to determine whether the totality of the circumstances, in light of 
                                          
 
2 Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 214 (Del. 2008); Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 
(Del. 2008); Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008); Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 515 
(Del. 2006); McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Del. 2002). 
3 Williams, 962 A.2d at 214; Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d as 1285; Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282, 
286 n.15 (Del. 2008); McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1123. 
4 Williams, 962 A.2d at 214; Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d as 1284-85; Chavous, 953 A.2d at 286 
n.15; Flonnory, 893 A.2d at 515; McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1123. 
 5
the trial court’s factual findings, support a reasonable and articulable suspicion for 
the stop or probable cause for a warrantless arrest.5 
(9) 
A police officer may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor 
“whenever the officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be 
arrested has committed a misdemeanor … in the officer’s presence….”6  This 
Court has held that “the phrase ‘reasonable ground to believe’ is also the legal 
equivalent of ‘probable cause’ and should be accorded the same meaning.”7  Police 
officers have probable cause to make warrantless arrests when “at that moment the 
facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that 
[the defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.”8 
(10) The State argues that Negron committed the misdemeanor of 
disorderly conduct by urinating in a public courtyard near a public entrance to a 
residential building.  Pursuant to Title 11, Section 1301(f) of the Delaware Code, a 
person is guilty of disorderly conduct when “[t]he person intentionally causes 
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to any other person, or creates a risk 
                                          
 
5 Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d as 1285; see also Coley v. State, 886 A.2d 1277, 2005 WL 2679329, 
at *2 & n.9 (Del. Oct. 18, 2005) (Table). 
6 11 Del. C. § 1904; accord Coley, 2005 WL 2679329, at *2. 
7 Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988). 
8 Coley, 2005 WL 2679329, at *2 (citing Thompson, 539 A.2d at 1055); see also Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). 
 6
thereof by: … Creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition which serves 
no legitimate purpose….”9 
(11) Whether public urination can satisfy Section 1301(f) appears to be an 
issue of first impression in Delaware; however it is in conformity with the type of 
conduct that statute is intended to prohibit.  The Commentary to the Criminal Code 
indicates that “Paragraph (f) is a recognition that the limits of offensive behavior 
are unpredictable.  It would apply to the use of “stink bombs”, strewing garbage or 
other noxious substances in public passages, and turning off the lights in a public 
hall, for three examples.”10 
(12) New York has interpreted its disorderly conduct statute as prohibiting 
public urination.11  Section 1301 is patterned on New York Penal Law § 240.20.  
Because the two statutes are substantively similar, New York’s interpretation of its 
statute carries weight.12  In People v. Cooke,13 the defendant urinated outside a 
                                          
 
9 11 Del. C. § 1301(f). 
10 DELAWARE CRIMINAL CODE WITH COMMENTARY § 1301, 387 (1973). 
11 People v. Cooke, 578 N.Y.S.2d 76 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1991). 
12 In Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351, 355 (Del. 1996), we recognized the connection between 
certain provisions of the Delaware Criminal Code and the Model Penal Code and New York’s 
Penal Law by using Appendix C to the PROPOSED DELAWARE CRIMINAL CODE WITH 
COMMENTARY (1967).  Appendix C provides a “Table of Sources of Proposed Delaware 
Criminal Code” “offered to assist the Bench and Bar in interpreting the provisions of the Code.”  
Id. app. C.  The drafters “expect[ed] that case law in other jurisdictions using similar sources will 
be helpful aids in construing the proposed provisions.”  Id.  The appendix indicates that New 
York Penal Law § 240.20 was the source of our current disorderly conduct statute.  Id.  Compare 
11 Del. C. § 1301 with N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20.  Section 240.20 provides, in pertinent part: 
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: … He 
 7
neighborhood tavern while in public view.  He was observed by a police officer, 
who arrested him for disorderly conduct.  The defendant moved to dismiss the 
charges.  The court noted that “the most difficult issue of law in the present case is 
whether by his conduct the defendant created the ‘physically offensive condition’ 
that Penal Law 240.20(7) requires for conviction.”14  After a detailed analysis of 
the legislative purpose behind the statute, the court concluded that public urination 
creates a physically offensive condition.15  The court further emphasized that it was 
irrelevant whether anyone other than the police officer saw Cooke urinating, since 
“the issue is solely ‘the objective standard of public disturbance,’ i.e., whether ‘a 
reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not tolerate’ the conduct.  It is 
the annoyance of ‘a neighborhood or the public,’ or the risk thereof, that must be 
shown, and was sufficiently demonstrated here.”16 
(13) The New York statute was itself derived from, and nearly identical to, 
Model Penal Code § 250.2.17  Pennsylvania’s disorderly conduct statute was also 
                                                                                                                                        
creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose. 
N.Y. Penal Code § 240.20(7). 
13 578 N.Y.S.2d at 77. 
14 See id. at 78. 
15 See id. at 78-79. 
16 Id. at 79. 
17 Id. at 78; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(1), which provides: “A person is guilty of 
disorderly conduct if, with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (c) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by 
an act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 
 8
derived from that section of the Model Penal Code and is also substantively similar 
to Delaware’s statute.18  As a result, Pennsylvania’s interpretation of its statute is 
also persuasive.  In Commonwealth v. Williams,19 the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
addressed a case very similar to this one.  A police officer observed the defendant 
urinating against a building.  He had no identification, but told the officer he was 
from a neighboring borough.  The officer informed the defendant that he would be 
issued a citation for disorderly conduct, but would have to go to the police station 
in order to verify his name and address.  On patting the defendant down before 
putting him in the police car, the officer felt a long hard object he believed was a 
knife.  When he removed it from the defendant’s pocket, it was revealed to be a 
row of eleven packets of cocaine lined up along the bottom of the coat pocket.  The 
officer arrested the defendant, who was charged with possession and PWID.  The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied, and he was convicted.20 
(14) On appeal, the defendant claimed the officer did not have grounds to 
arrest and search him.  The court distilled the exclusionary rule down to a “simple 
proposition—if the appellant’s arrest for the summary offense was lawful, then the 
subsequent search of his person must have been reasonable, and therefore any 
                                          
 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5503(a) (providing that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct when 
he “creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate 
purpose of the actor”). 
19 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
20 Id. at 1281-82. 
 9
evidence derived from the search was properly admitted against him.”21  Because 
the officer observed the defendant urinating in public, “conduct which 
incontrovertibly constitutes disorderly conduct,” the officer was authorized to stop 
the defendant.22  Since the defendant had no identification, the officer was 
permitted to take him into custody in order to verify his identity.  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the defendant’s arrest was lawful and, consequently, that the 
search was reasonable and the evidence admissible.23 
(15) Based on the language of Section 1301, the type of offensive behavior 
contemplated in the Commentary, and the interpretation afforded to disorderly 
conduct by New York and Pennsylvania, we conclude that public urination may 
constitute “a hazardous or physically offensive condition which serves no 
legitimate purpose” within the meaning of the statute.  In the instant case, Officer 
Satterfield observed Negron standing in a well-lit public courtyard near a public 
entry to a residential building.  He was partially obscured by a bush and facing 
away from the courtyard, but only five feet from the building entrance.  Officer 
Satterfield was able to observe him “shake” and zip up his pants.  These factors 
were sufficient to constitute probable cause that Negron was committing or had 
                                          
 
21 Id. at 1283. 
22 Id. at 1288. 
23 Id.; accord Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884,890 n.5 (Pa. 2000) (citing Williams, 568 
A.2d 1281) (“The arresting officer testified that he observed [the defendant] and his companion 
urinating beside a public roadway adjacent to a farm property, which, under prevailing 
precedent, may be treated as the predicate for the summary offense of disorderly conduct.”). 
 10
just committed the offense of disorderly conduct.  Because Officer Satterfield had 
probable cause to believe Negron had committed a misdemeanor in his presence, 
he was permitted to effect a warrantless arrest of Negron pursuant to Section 1904. 
(16) Negron also contends that Officer Satterfield violated Title 11, 
Section 1903 because he did not make a showing that he believed Negron to be 
armed and dangerous.24  This argument is without merit.  Once the arrest had 
occurred, Officer Satterfield could lawfully search Negron incident to that arrest.25  
A showing under Section 1903 was not necessary.26 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
24 See 11 Del. C. § 1903 (“A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom 
the officer has stopped or detained to question as provided in § 1902 of this title, whenever the 
officer has reasonable ground to believe that the officer is in danger if the person possesses a 
dangerous weapon.”). 
25 Williams, 962 A.2d at 222; Harris v. State, 880 A.2d 1047, 2005 WL 2219212, at *2 (Del. 
Aug. 15, 2005) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)); Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 
872 (Del. 1999); see also State v. Severin, 1982 WL 593131 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1982) 
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478, 488 (1963)). 
26 See U.S. v. Osife, 398 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel, 395 U.S. 752).