Case Title: Ex Parte Hodges

Citation: 856 So. 2d 936

Docket Number: 1010619

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
856 So. 2d 936 (2003)
Ex parte Melvin G. HODGES.
(In re Melvin Gene Hodges v. State of Alabama).
1010619.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 14, 2003.
*938 Floyd Likins, Jr., Opelika, for petitioner.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Anne C. Adams and A. Vernon Barnett IV, asst. attys. gen., for respondent.
Bryan A. Stevenson, Angela L. Setzer, and Charlotte R. Morrison, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, in support of the petitioner.
LYONS, Justice.
Melvin G. Hodges was convicted in June 1999 of murder made capital because the murder was committed during the course of a robbery in the first degree. See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. Hodges and others robbed a Golden Corral Restaurant in Opelika on January 4, 1998. After the robbery, Elizabeth "Beth" Seaton, a supervisor at the restaurant, was taken from the restaurant at gunpoint and later was beaten and run over by a vehicle. She died as a result of her injuries. The jury, by a vote of 8-4, recommended that Hodges be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, but the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Hodges to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals initially remanded the case for the trial court to correct specified errors and deficiencies in its sentencing order. Hodges v. State, 856 So. 2d 875 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) ("Hodges I"). On remand, the trial court complied with the Court of Criminal Appeals' directives, entered a new sentencing order, and again sentenced Hodges to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals then affirmed Hodges's conviction and sentence. Hodges v. State, 856 So. 2d 875, 894 (Ala. Crim.App.2001) ("Hodges II"). This Court granted certiorari review only as to the following two issues regarding Hodges's sentence:
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated the facts of this case as follows:
Hodges II, 856 So. 2d  at 895-96 (footnote omitted).
Concerning the trial court's sentencing order, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Hodges II, 856 So. 2d  at 930-33.
In Ex parte Waldrop, [Ms. 1001194, November 22, 2002] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2002), we addressed the same arguments Hodges makes here concerning the constitutionality of the judicial-override provision in Alabama's capital sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002).[1] We upheld the judicial-override in Waldrop.
*943 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S.  at 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348. In Ring, the defendant was convicted of a murder committed during the course of a robbery. However, under Arizona's statutory scheme, unlike Alabama's, only the trial court heard the evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing. The trial court determined which aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances existed, weighed those circumstances, and sentenced Ring to death. The Supreme Court concluded that because "Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,'" those factors must be found by a jury. 536 U.S.  at 609, 122 S. Ct.  at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348). Because the trial judge and not the jury made the factual findings required to sentence Ring to death, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Id.
In Waldrop, we first addressed Waldrop's argument that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death in Alabama unless a jury finds both that a defendant is guilty of a capital offense and that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. We concluded:
___ So.2d at ___. Likewise, in Hodges's case, because the jury convicted him of murder made capital because it was committed during a first-degree robbery, the jury, not the trial court, determined the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance that exposed Hodges "to a range of punishment that had as its maximum the death penalty." ___ So.2d at ___.
We next addressed in Waldrop his argument that the process of deciding whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is a factual finding that must be made by the jury and not the trial court. We concluded:
Finally, we addressed Waldrop's argument that the existence of the aggravating circumstance that a murder is "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital offenses," § 13A-5-49(8), Ala.Code 1975, is a factual finding that must be made by the jury, not the trial court. We concluded:
___ So.2d at ___. Likewise, Hodges became eligible for the death penalty when the jury found that he committed the murder while he was engaged in a robbery in the first degree, and the trial court's subsequent finding that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" is implicated only in the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002), released the same day as Ring, stated: "Basing a 2-year increase in the defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of brandishing does not evade the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 536 U.S.  at 568, 122 S. Ct.  at 2420.
A dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, observed:
536 U.S.  at 574, 122 S. Ct.  at 2423 (Thomas, J., dissenting). At a later point the dissenting opinion states:
536 U.S.  at 576, 122 S. Ct.  at 2424. Until the dissenting opinion in Harris becomes the law of the land, we reject Hodges's argument that the trial court's finding that the offenses were "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital *945 offenses" is a finding of fact that must be determined by a jury.
Hodges argues that the trial court improperly restricted the presentation of mitigating evidence on his behalf provided by his mother during the penalty phase of his trial, and that the trial court improperly commented in the presence of the jury that certain of that evidence was irrelevant. Hodges's mother, Cora Cobb, was the only witness who testified at the penalty phase of his trial. She testified as to the abuse she endured from Hodges's father and from subsequent husbands, the poverty the family endured, Hodges's emotionally abusive treatment by a mentally ill stepfather, frequent moves by the family as a result of poverty and spousal abuse, and Hodges's search as a teenager for his father and his disappointment upon locating his father. At one point during her testimony, the following occurred:
The trial court then held a bench discussion with the lawyers out of the jury's presence regarding the mitigating evidence being offered through the mother's testimony. The trial court expressed chagrin over testimony it characterized as "a narrative of this lady and her travels without any reference to what effect, if any, it has on this defendant," and stated to defense counsel that the court would "give [him] a lot of leeway, ... but I don't think we ought to be wasting a juror's time on things that don't seem to have much relevance at all." The following then occurred:
Thereafter, defense counsel had the opportunity to go into evidence concerning the instability of Hodges's family during his childhood. Although defense counsel did not specifically question the witness further about the frequency of the family's moves, he did ask general questions, without objection from the State, about various stepfathers who came and went from the home, from which the jury could have inferred that moves took place. Obviously, the bench discussion persuaded the trial court to reconsider its view as to the relevance of testimony about the family's moves. Nevertheless, defense counsel did not object to the trial court's previous remarks in the presence of the jury concerning the lack of relevance of evidence indicating that the family had moved from place to place and he did not request a curative instruction on that issue.
In discussing the testimony of Hodges's mother, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Hodges I, 856 So. 2d  at 892 n. 4. The Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that a difficult family history is a mitigating circumstance, but that the weight to be accorded that circumstance depends upon the facts of the case and the defendant's age. Id. We note that Hodges was 27 years old at the time this murder was committed.
Hodges argues that even though he was eventually able to present most, if not all, of the mitigating evidence he wanted the jury to hear, the trial court erred in stating in the presence of the jury, while ruling *947 on an objection during the testimony, that the evidence regarding the family's many moves was not relevant. That error, Hodges argues, might have affected the number of jurors who voted for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole instead of death. Had more jurors voted for life imprisonment, Hodges reasons, the trial court might have been more reluctant to override the jury's verdict.
Hodges is correct that the number of jurors voting for life imprisonment is a factor this Court now requires a trial court to consider in weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances in a case in which a sentence of death is a possibility. In Ex parte Carroll, 852 So. 2d 833 (Ala.2002), this Court held:
852 So. 2d  at 836 (footnote omitted).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Hodges was able to present to the jury the evidence regarding his difficult, unstable, and impoverished childhood. The trial court initially sustained the prosecutor's objections as to the family's frequent moves and commented in the presence of the jury that such evidence was not relevant. The evidence was, however, relevant. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 (Ala.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S. Ct. 1966, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (2002); Powell v. State, 796 So. 2d 404 (Ala.Crim. App.1999), aff'd, 796 So. 2d 434 (Ala.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 904, 122 S. Ct. 236, 151 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2001); Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Smith v. State, 756 So. 2d 892, 954 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 756 So. 2d 957 (Ala.2000). Nevertheless, as the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly noted, the evidence of the Hodges family's frequent moves was ultimately admitted. The question before us, then, is whether the trial court's erroneous comments about the relevancy of the evidence require us to reverse Hodges's sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.
Because Hodges's defense counsel did not object to the trial court's comments or request a curative jury instruction, we review this issue pursuant to the plain-error rule. Because Hodges was sentenced to death, the failure to object at trial does not bar appellate review of this issue, but it does weigh against any claim of prejudice he makes on appeal. This Court recently addressed the application of the plain-error rule in capital cases in Ex parte Bryant, [Ms. 1990901, June 21, 2002] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2002), where we stated:
___ So.2d at ___ (emphasis added).
Hodges contends that without the trial court's comment that evidence of the family's frequent moves was irrelevant, the jury might have returned a recommendation in favor of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole by a vote of greater than 8-4. As previously stated, the evidence regarding the frequent moves Hodges's family made when he was a child was relevant, and the trial court should not have commented in the presence of the jury on the relevancy of the evidence of the frequency of the moves. However, the assumption that had those comments not been made the jury might have returned a vote more favorable to Hodges and, thereafter, that the trial court might have declined to override the jury's recommendation, is too tenuous a foundation upon which to base plain error. After reviewing all of the evidence in this case, especially the manner in which the 27-year-old Hodges murdered the victim, we conclude that the trial court's comments concerning the lack of relevance of the evidence of the frequency of moves made in the midst of the testimony from Hodges's mother to which there was no objection, followed by a bench conference that led to permission to pursue this avenue of inquiry, do not rise to the level of "plain error." We confine the operation of the plain-error rule to those cases where the error "has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the appellant." Rule 39(a)(2)(D), Ala. R.App. P. (emphasis added). We use it "sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982). Speculation as to what would have happened absent the unobjected-to remarks concerning the relevancy of the evidence of the frequency of the family's moves after which general testimony about the instability of Hodges's family life was permitted does not rise to the level of error that had or probably had adversely affected Hodges's substantial rights so as to permit the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice occurred.
Based on our independent weighing of the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances in this case, and treating the jury's recommendation as a mitigating circumstance in this case, we *949 conclude that the trial court's override of the jury's recommended sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and that court's subsequent sentence of death were proper under the circumstances presented here. See § 13A-5-53(a) and (b), Ala.Code 1975. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals as to Hodges's sentence.[2]
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, BROWN, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., concurs specially.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring specially).
This Court granted the writ of certiorari to review only the two issues addressed by the main opinion. Because the main opinion has correctly addressed both of those issues, I concur fully.
I do not want my concurrence to be misconstrued, however, as any expression of approval of what I regard as some dicta in the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case, Hodges v. State, 856 So. 2d 875, 894 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (opinion on return to remand)a number of statements to the effect that any error by the trial court in denying the defendant's challenges of venirepersons for cause was later rendered harmless by the defendant's exercising peremptory challenges to keep these same venirepersons off the jury. I adhere to the views I expressed, and I insist on the authorities I cited, in my special writing in Bethea v. Springhill Memorial Hospital, 833 So. 2d 1, 9-11 (Ala. 2002), for the proposition that the erroneous denial of a valid challenge for cause is reversible error. The reason that the denials of defendant's challenges for cause in the case now before us are not reversible is that those denials were not erroneous.
[1]  The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring on June 24, 2002. As we explained in Waldrop, even though Hodges was convicted before the Supreme Court decided Ring, it applies to Hodges's case.

"`[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.' Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987). `By "final," we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.' Griffith, 479 U.S.  at 321 n. 6, 107 S. Ct. 708."
___ So.2d at ___ n. 1. Because Hodges's case was pending on certiorari review when the Supreme Court decided Ring, the new rule announced in that case is applicable to Hodges.
[2]  We have addressed only those issues relating to Hodges's sentence, because his petition for certiorari review does not raise questions relating to his conviction.