Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KIRK T. BONSELL V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-273

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KIRK T. BONSELL V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISON2006 WY 114142 P.3d 686Case Number: 05-273Decided: 09/14/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KIRK T. 
BONSELL,

 
 
Appellant

(Resondent/Appellee),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISON,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner/Appellant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena James, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Bill G. 
Hibbler, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. 
Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant 
Attorney General            

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Kirk Bonsell 
challenges the district court's reversal of the Office of Administrative 
Hearings' (OAH) order awarding him permanent partial disability (PPD) 
benefits.  After reviewing the 
entire record, we conclude the hearing examiner's decision Mr. Bonsell had 
suffered a loss of earning capacity as a result of his work-related injury was 
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.  The district court improperly 
substituted its judgment when it reversed the OAH order awarding benefits.   Consequently, we reverse and 
remand.  

            

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Bonsell 
states a single issue on appeal:

 
 
            
Whether the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings holding 
that claimant, Mr. Bonsell, was entitled to a permanent partial disability 
award, is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with Wyoming 
Statute § 27-14-405(h)(i)?

 
 
The 
Division poses the following issues:

            

Issue 
I.            
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings' decision awarding 
permanent partial disability benefits to Bonsell lacks the support of 
substantial evidence and is arbitrary and capricious?

 
 
Issue 
II.            
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings' decision awarding 
permanent partial disability benefits to Bonsell is contrary to 
law?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Bonsell 
injured his back while working as a manager of a paint store in Rock Springs.  At the time of his injury, Mr. Bonsell 
was earning a wage of $9.00 per hour.  
However, he routinely worked overtime, bringing his gross monthly wage up 
to $2,145.00.  Mr. Bonsell's injury 
was deemed compensable and he received medical and temporary total disability 
benefits.     

 
 
[¶4]      Once Mr. Bonsell 
had recovered to the point of ascertainable loss, he underwent a functional 
capacity evaluation (FCE) and a physician assigned him a permanent partial 
impairment rating (PPI) of twelve percent (12%) of his whole body.  Mr. Bonsell accepted a PPI award of that 
percentage and, thereafter, applied for PPD benefits to compensate him for loss 
of earning capacity.    

 
 
[¶5]      The Division 
arranged for Mr. Bonsell to be assessed by a vocational evaluator.  The initial evaluation considered only 
employment in Texas because he had moved to 
that state after he was injured, but it was later amended with a labor market 
survey of Wyoming jobs.  The Division denied Mr. Bonsell's 
request for PPD benefits because the vocational evaluation indicated he could 
"return to an occupation at a comparable wage."  Mr. Bonsell objected to the Division's 
final determination and requested a hearing.  Prior to the contested case hearing, he 
accepted a job which paid $9.00 per hour.  
His new job did not, however, offer any opportunities for overtime; 
consequently, his post-injury gross monthly earnings were approximately 
$1,562.40.   

 
 
[¶6]      The OAH held a 
contested case hearing on June 10, 2004, and issued an order awarding Mr. 
Bonsell PPD benefits.  The Division 
filed a petition for review of the OAH decision with the district court.  The district court reversed the OAH 
order, concluding "[t]he record does not contain substantial evidence which 
connects [Mr. Bonsell's] wage reduction to his injury."  Mr. Bonsell appealed to this Court.   

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      In reviewing an 
appeal from a district court's decision on a petition for review of an 
administrative action, we afford no deference to the district court's decision 
and, instead, review the case as if it came directly from the agency.  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002).  Judicial review of agency decisions is 
limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), 
which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

 
 
            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.  

 
 
 [¶8]     In KG Construction, Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 
WY 116, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 145, 147-48 (Wyo. 2005), we explained the standard for 
reviewing an agency's factual findings:

 
 
            
The substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in 
appeals from contested case proceedings when factual findings are involved and 
both parties submit evidence.  Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 29, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 729, 732 (Wyo.2003).  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  Even if the 
factual findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate 
agency decision may still be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other 
reasons.  An appellate court does 
not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support the agency's decision, but it also must examine the conflicting evidence 
to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its finding and 
order upon all of the evidence before it.  
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 24, 49 P.3d 163, 172 
(Wyo.2002).

 
 

See 
also, Diamond B Services, Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 
WY 130, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 1031, 1037-38 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶9]      We do not defer 
to the agency's determination on issues of law; instead, we will correct any 
error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying the law.    Blommel v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Employment, Div. of Wyo.  Workers' Safety and Comp., 2005 WY 
128, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Wyo. 2005).  
"The interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act [is] a question of law over which our review 
authority is plenary."  Id.  
 

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Bonsell applied for PPD 
benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
27-14-101, et. seq. (LexisNexis 
2005).  "Permanent partial disability" is 
defined as "the economic loss to an injured employee . . . resulting from a 
permanent physical impairment[.]"   
Section 27-14-102(a)(xv).  See also, Philips v. TICThe Industrial Co. of 
Wyoming, Inc., 2005 WY 40, ¶ 29, 109 P.3d 520, 533 (Wyo. 2005).  In order to be eligible for PPD 
benefits, a claimant must demonstrate he has suffered a loss of earning capacity 
due to a work-related injury.  McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Co., 694 P.2d 93, 94 (Wyo. 1985).  An injured worker has the burden to 
prove each of the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  Abeyta v. State ex. rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div.,  2004 WY 
50, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1072, 1075 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 
[¶11]   Section 27-14-405(h) incorporates 
the "loss of earnings" concept into the statutory requirements for PPD 
benefits:

 
 
(h) 
       An 
injured employee awarded permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a 
permanent disability award subject to the following terms and 
conditions:

 
 

(i)                 
The 
injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a 
wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings 
the employee was earning at the time of injury;

 
 

(ii)               
An 
application for permanent partial disability is filed not before three (3) 
months after the date of ascertainable loss or three (3) months before the last 
scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event later than 
one (1) year following the later date;  
and

 
 
(iii)       The employee has 
actively sought suitable work, considering the employee's health, education, 
training and experience.

 
 
The 
parties stipulated all of the requirements of § 27-14-405(h) had been satisfied 
except for the "comparable wage" requirement of subsection (i).  

 
 
[¶12]   "In determining whether an employee 
has suffered a loss of earning capacity both medical and non-medical evidence 
may be relevant."  Chavez v. Memorial Hosp. of SweetwaterCounty, 2006 WY 82, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d 185, 
189 (Wyo. 2006).  See also, McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 94-95.  Although no individual factor is 
determinative, the following considerations are relevant to the loss of earning 
capacity inquiry:  the employee's 
physical impairment, including the nature and extent of his injury; age; 
education; actual earnings, including pre-injury and post-injury earnings; 
ability to continue pre-injury employment; and post-injury employment 
prospects.  Chavez, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d  at 189.  See also, State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095 
(Wyo. 1992); Whiteman v. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 
987 P.2d 670 (Wyo. 1999).  The fact finder has the discretion to 
assign weight to the individual factors.  
McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 95; Chavez, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d  at 189.  "Wages earned by the employee [are] 
material to the question of the employee's earning capacity and [are] entitled 
to whatever weight the fact finder gives to it."  McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 95.  

 
 
[¶13]   In deciding Mr. Bonsell had 
suffered a loss of earning capacity and was, therefore, entitled to an award of 
PPD benefits, the hearing examiner made the following conclusions of 
law:

 
 

8.                  
The 
Vocational Evaluation provides a list of potential jobs for the Claimant but is 
somewhat speculative.  However, the 
fact that the Claimant is currently employed provides the most realistic 
vocational analysis.  The Office 
takes the analysis in Lunde one step 
further as the Court stated there must be some basis in reality.  However, if an employee has returned to 
the work force this . . .  is most 
convincing and a determinative measure of employment.

 
 

9.                  
On 
its face, the Office looks to the hourly wage the Claimant was and is currently 
earning.  On their face, both pre- 
and post-injury wages are $9.00 per hour.  
However, the Office goes further as required by law as to what the 
Claimant's actual monthly income is.  
The Claimant was making regular overtime as manager for $2,145.00 a month 
for an hourly wage of over $11.00 an hour at the time of injury.  Accordingly the Division was paying 
$1,430.00 per month as two-thirds of his monthly wage as temporary total 
disability.  He is currently earning 
approximately $1,562.40 per month with no chance of overtime.  

 
 

10.             
Therefore, 
in light of his physical restriction and the fact that the Claimant is currently 
making less than 95% of the amount he was making at the time of the injury, and 
this decrease in income is based on the fact the Claimant cannot perform work as 
he once did because of his physical restrictions; accordingly, he has met the 
requirements of W.S. 27-14-405(h) and is entitled to a permanent partial 
disability award.

 
 
[¶14]   The Division claims the OAH 
decision awarding Mr. Bonsell PPD benefits was not supported by substantial 
evidence and was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.   Although the Division's argument is 
somewhat scattered, its primary complaints seem to be  there was insufficient evidence to 
establish Mr. Bonsell's loss of earnings was caused by his work related injury 
and the hearing examiner improperly discounted the vocational evaluation in 
reaching his decision.   

 
 
 [¶15]  We turn first to the Division's 
contention there was an insufficient causal connection between Mr. Bonsell's 
loss of earnings and his injury.  
The Division claims his loss of earnings resulted from extraneous factors 
unrelated to his injury, including the closing of the paint store and refusal of 
his current employer to allow Mr. Bonsell to work overtime.1  As the statute clearly states, the 
employee's inability to return to employment at a wage of at least 95% of his 
pre-injury monthly gross earnings must be "because of the injury" in order to 
justify a PPD award.  Section 
27-14-405(h)(i).  One of the factors 
considered in determining whether an employee is eligible for PPD benefits is 
the ability to continue in his pre-injury employment.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div. v. Savicki, 2004 WY 71, ¶ 12, 92 P.3d 294, 296 (Wyo. 2004) (claimant 
could not return to work as a drywaller for former employer); State  
ex rel. Wyo.  Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div. v. Borodine, 784 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1989) (claimant 
could not return to work as a union painter).  

 
 
[¶16]   The record establishes the paint 
store where Mr. Bonsell worked closed shortly after he was injured.  The Division claims the closing of the 
store, rather than his injury, caused Mr. Bonsell's loss in earning 
capacity.  The undisputed facts 
establish, however, regardless of whether or not the paint store closed, Mr. 
Bonsell could not return to his position as paint store manager because he was 
restricted in his ability to lift items.  
Prior to his injury, he routinely lifted large buckets of paint and 
industrial coatings, weighing as much as seventy-five pounds.  After his injury, the medical providers 
limited him to "medium" duty work and the functional capacity evaluation stated 
he could lift a maximum of twenty-five pounds from the floor to his waist and 
carry a maximum of forty-five pounds, but on a very limited basis.  The medical evidence indicated it would 
not be appropriate for Mr. Bonsell to return to a position like the one at the 
paint store because of the risk of re-injury from the heavy lifting required by 
the job.  The record contains 
substantial evidence Mr. Bonsell was not physically capable of returning to his 
prior employment; consequently, the fact the paint store closed was not the 
cause of his loss of earnings.     

 
 
[¶17]   The Division also argues Mr. 
Bonsell's new employer's refusal to allow him to work overtime, rather than his 
injury, was the cause of his loss of earning capacity.  Mr. Bonsell conducted an extensive job 
search, utilizing information from job service agencies, newspaper 
advertisements, personal contacts, and his wife's co-workers.  He testified he considered all jobs, as 
long as there was no heavy lifting requirement, and he did not rule out any jobs 
on the basis of wages.  Mr. Bonsell 
looked specifically for jobs similar to those referenced in the vocational 
evaluation.  Ultimately, he accepted 
the only job offered to him -- a bookkeeper and customer service position that 
paid $9.00 per hour.  He worked 
forty-hour weeks in his new position, and, although he was not medically 
prohibited from working overtime, the company did not allow it.  Thus, his gross monthly income in his 
new position was approximately $1,562.40, amounting to less than 95% of his 
pre-injury gross monthly income.     

 
 
[¶18]   Prior to his employment at the 
paint store, Mr. Bonsell had worked as a pre-loader for a delivery service.  The pre-loader job paid more than his 
post-injury position, but it required continuous repetitive lifting and 
movement.  Mr. Bonsell testified 
that, after his injury, he could no longer perform that type of work.  Consequently, before his injury he had 
held two jobs (paint store manager and pre-loader) which paid better than his 
post-injury position.  Mr. Bonsell 
was no longer able to perform the type of activities required by those higher 
paying jobs.  As we recognized in Borodine, a worker suffers a loss of 
earning capacity when, because of his injury, he is deprived of his ability to 
rely upon prior work experience.  In 
this case, Mr. Bonsell is no longer able to rely upon his prior experience with 
the paint store or as a pre-loader because of his back injury. Consequently, 
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion Mr. 
Bonsell's back injury resulted in a loss of earning capacity.    

 
 
[¶19]   The Division argues the OAH should 
have relied upon the vocational evaluation, which identified a number of 
positions paying wages comparable to his pre-injury wage, instead of his actual 
employment in making its "loss of earnings" determination.  The vocational evaluation was prepared 
in Texas and 
originally referenced only positions in that geographic area.  The vocational evaluator reviewed Mr. 
Bonsell's functional capacity evaluation and acknowledged he had some physical 
deficits, however, she incorrectly stated the "FCE . . . does not specify 
lifting restrictions."  The 
vocational evaluator also used his $9.00 hourly wage as the basis for her 
conclusions instead of his gross monthly earnings, including overtime pay.    

 
 
[¶20]   The initial evaluation identified 
three types of jobs Mr. Bonsell could perform: manager of a retail store, sales 
clerk or trailer rental clerk.  The 
physical demands for each of the positions were listed as "light."  The vocational evaluation did not list 
specific wage ranges for any of the positions identified, but included a general 
statement that "[t]he jobs surveyed paid an hourly wage that ranged from $7.00 
to $25.00 an hour."  An addendum was 
later made to the vocational evaluation which included a labor market survey of 
Wyoming 
jobs.    

 
 
[¶21] 
  We have explained the role of 
vocational evaluations in prior decisions.  
In Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 2000), we rejected a 
vocational evaluation that considered only jobs in California and did not take 
into account the claimant's physical disabilities.  We said:  "[I]f the Division is going to rely on a 
vocational evaluation to demonstrate current earning capacity, then that should 
be based on available jobs in Wyoming.  
In this case, as would be the case with any disabled worker, the jobs 
used in such an evaluation must be conducted with some basis in reality which 
gives recognition to the worker's disability." Lunde, 6 P.3d  at 1260.  Presumably, the Division attempted to 
comply with the Lunde requirement in 
this case by having the evaluator conduct a survey of Wyoming jobs and 
attaching it as an addendum to the vocational evaluation. 

 
 
[¶22]   The hearing examiner concluded the 
vocational evaluation was speculative and chose to rely upon Mr. Bonsell's 
actual employment rather than the theoretical vocational evaluation to determine 
whether he had suffered a loss of earning capacity.  The Division argues the hearing 
examiner's conclusion the vocational evaluation was speculative was erroneous.2  As noted earlier, the vocational 
evaluation did not refer to Mr. Bonsell's lifting restrictions and did not use 
the correct wage as the basis for its conclusions.  Instead, it simply identified three 
types of jobs available in Texas and stated, without specificity, those 
jobs paid between $7.00 and $25.00 per hour.  

 
 
[¶23]   The addendum provided greater 
specificity with regard to jobs available in Wyoming.  
However, the majority of the jobs identified in the addendum involved 
teaching or counseling children and, although Mr. Bonsell has a bachelor's 
degree in social sciences, there was no indication he has qualified for these 
positions.  In addition, some of the 
jobs listed in the supplemental evaluation had physical requirements Mr. Bonsell 
could not perform and some of the employers surveyed had no current or expected 
job openings.  

 
 
[¶24]   In considering the vocational 
evaluation and Mr. Bonsell's actual employment, the hearing examiner decided to 
give greater weight to his actual employment.  Determining the weight to be assigned to 
the evidence is the responsibility of the finder of fact.  See McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 95; Chavez, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d  at 189.  Although the evidence in this case may 
be subject to different interpretations, substantial evidence exists in the 
record to support the OAH's determination Mr. Bonsell's actual employment was a 
more reliable indicator of his ability to earn a living than the vocational 
evaluation.

 
 
[¶25]   The hearing examiner's approach was 
consistent with our recent opinion in Chavez.  We emphasized the focus of § 
27-14-405(h) is on the injured employee's true ability to earn a living.  Chavez, ¶¶ 15, 17, 138 P.3d  at 191.  In Chavez, the claimant's post-injury 
employment paid more than her pre-injury position and, consequently, we ruled 
the hearing examiner properly granted the Division's motion for summary judgment 
because, as a matter of law, she could not demonstrate a loss of earning 
capacity.  Chavez, ¶ 19, 138 P.3d  at 192.  See also, Savicki, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d  at 296.   We specifically held any issues 
concerning the validity of Ms. Chavez's vocational evaluation were irrelevant 
because she had voluntarily accepted a job that paid more than her pre-injury 
wage.  Applying the same rationale 
here, it is clear after a diligent search Mr. Bonsell was unable to find a job 
that paid a wage comparable to his pre-injury wage.  Considering his actual post-injury wage, 
together with his physical limitations, the hearing examiner's determination Mr. 
Bonsell's earning capacity was reduced because of his work-related injury is 
supported by substantial evidence and is not, in any other fashion, arbitrary, 
capricious or contrary to law.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   The district court improperly 
substituted its judgment for the fact finder's when it reversed the OAH decision 
awarding Mr. Bonsell benefits.  The 
OAH decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not otherwise 
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  
Consequently, we reverse and remand to the district court with directions 
the case be returned to the OAH for reinstatement of the order awarding benefits 
to Mr. Bonsell.

 
 
[¶27]   Reversed and 
remanded.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Division 
also suggests Mr. Bonsell may not have been able to secure a comparable job 
because he was not searching for appropriate jobs, the job market or economy 
affected his ability to get a job, and/or his resume and interview skills were 
not adequate.  These arguments are 
not well-explained in the briefs or supported by the 
record.

  

2The district court agreed 
with the Division's argument about the vocational evaluation.