Case Title: F.V.O. v. Coffee County Department of Human Resources

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120536

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 09/27/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
_________________________
1120536
_________________________
Ex parte F.V.O.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  F.V.O.
v.
Coffee County Department of Human Resources)
(Coffee Juvenile Court, JU-09-149.01; JU-09-150.01; 
and JU-09-151.01;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2110398)
PER CURIAM.
1120536
F.V.O., the respondent in a dependency action in the
Coffee Juvenile Court, appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals
from orders entered by the trial court after a dispositional-
review hearing in a dependency case.  A majority of the Court
of Civil Appeals affirmed the orders; this Court granted
certiorari review.  We reverse and remand.  
The Coffee County Department of Human Resources ("DHR")
filed petitions in the Coffee Juvenile Court on April 10,
2009, asserting that M.A.H., A.H., and B.H.V. 
("the 
children") 
were dependent and in need of care and supervision.  DHR
alleged that M.A.H. had been sexually molested and that the
children had been removed from the home of F.V.O. ("the
mother") and E.H.A. ("the father").  DHR requested an award of
custody to protect the children while it completed an
investigation.  After a hearing on April 10, 2009, the trial
court awarded custody of the children to DHR.  The father was
later arrested and charged with sexual abuse of M.A.H.; DHR
determined that the mother could not protect the children.  
On August 27, 2010, the trial court entered orders
finding, among 
other things, that the children 
were dependent,
that DHR had made reasonable efforts to prevent removing the
2
1120536
children from their home and that those efforts had failed,
that placement of the children in the home with the mother
would be contrary to the children's best interests, that DHR
was to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunite the
children with the mother and to restore custody of the
children to her, and that DHR was not required to make any
further efforts to reunite the children with the father.  The
trial court entered similar orders after a dispositional-
review hearing held on February 2, 2011. 
The 
trial 
court 
held 
another 
dispositional-review 
hearing
on August 4, 2011.  DHR requested that the permanency plan for
the children be changed to "adoption with unidentifiable
resources."  Amanda Wallace, a foster-care worker with DHR,
testified that DHR had exhausted its investigation of all
potential relative resources.  She stated that DHR could not
approve any of the maternal relatives identified as possible
relative resources, that reunification with the mother had
been unsuccessful, and that the mother had not met the goals
DHR had given her in working toward reunification.  The trial
court entered three orders on January 3, 2012, one as to each
3
1120536
child.  Other than the name of the child, the orders were
identical.  The trial court concluded in each order:
"This case comes before the Court for a
dispositional review hearing on August 4, 2011. 
Present at the hearing were Letitia Myers, guardian
ad litem, Jodee Thompson, attorney for [DHR],
[F.V.O.], mother of the child, Mary Katherine Head,
attorney for the mother, and Gary Bradshaw, attorney
for 
the 
father. 
 
The 
father, 
[E.H.A.], 
is
incarcerated 
in 
the 
Alabama 
Department 
of
Corrections, and was not present at the hearing.
"Pursuant to Public Laws [Act No.] 96-272 and §
12-15-312 of the Code of Alabama [1975], review of
the 
Department 
of 
Human 
Resources['] 
report,
testimony and other evidence presented, the Court
finds as follows:
"1) Placement of the child in [ his or her] home
continues to be contrary to the best interest and
welfare of the child. 
"2) 
Reasonable 
efforts 
have been made to 
reunite
the mother and child and said efforts have failed. 
"3) On June 9, 2010, [E.H.A.] plead[ed] guilty
to Sexual Abuse of a Child less than twelve, in the
Circuit Court of Coffee County, Enterprise Division,
case number CC-2009-617.  Therefore, pursuant to §
12-15-312(c) of the Code of Alabama [1975],
reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the
father, [E.H.A.,] shall no longer be required.
"4) The most appropriate permanency plan is
adoption.
"5) Reasonable efforts have been made to
finalize a permanency plan.
4
1120536
"6) Custody shall remain with the Coffee County
Department of Human Resources.
"7) The Coffee County Department of Human
Resources shall have discretion in planning and
placement, with the concurrence of the guardian ad
litem.  
"8) The Department of Human Resources shall not
change the placement of a child without the prior
approval of the [g]uardian ad litem, except in
emergency circumstances, in which case, the guardian
ad litem shall be immediately notified of the change
and the reason for the change."
The mother appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals from
the three orders entered on January 3, 2012.  A majority of
the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the orders
were final, appealable judgments but that the mother had
failed to preserve her arguments on the merits for appellate
review.  F.V.O. v. Coffee Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., [Ms.
2110398, December 7, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2012).  Presiding Judge Thompson dissented from the majority
opinion.  F.V.O., ___ So. 3d at ___ (Thompson, P.J.,
dissenting).  He concluded that the orders from which the
mother's appeal was taken were nonfinal orders and that the
appeal should therefore be dismissed.  This Court granted
certiorari review.  
5
1120536
The mother argued to the Court of Civil Appeals and
argues in her petition for certiorari review that (a) "the
juvenile court erred in determining that adoption is the most
appropriate permanency plan" because this finding was not
supported by the evidence, and (b) "the juvenile court erred
in concluding that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunite
the mother with the children."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  The
pertinent language of the trial court's orders of January 3,
2012, provides:
"2) 
Reasonable 
efforts 
have been 
made to 
reunite
the mother and child and said efforts have failed.
"....
"4) The most appropriate permanency plan is
adoption."
(Emphasis added.)  Neither of the above findings challenged by
the mother is an adjudication of grounds from which an appeal
would lie.  
First, as to the finding by the trial court regarding the
efforts made to date by DHR to reunite the mother and the
children, this was simply a finding as to an historical fact. 
DHR had made efforts at reunification up to that point, and
those efforts had failed.  As to the mother, the January 3,
6
1120536
2012, orders contain no language expressly relieving DHR of
its legal obligation to make reasonable efforts toward her
rehabilitation and reunification with the children going
forward.  The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that a finding
that DHR is statutorily relieved of its obligation to make
reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her children is
implicit in the January 3, 2012, orders; we do not agree.  The
trial court found only that "[r]easonable efforts have been
made to reunite the mother and child and said efforts have
failed," a finding that did not relieve DHR of continuing
those reasonable efforts and a finding that was not an
adjudication of substantive rights from which an appeal would
lie.1
Second, the trial court's announcement of a new
permanency plan, i.e., adoption, does not adjudicate any
rights of the mother and, more particularly, does not relieve
DHR from the burden of proving at the time of any subsequent
termination hearing that all the elements necessary under our
statutes for any such termination are in place.  See, e.g., Ex
We note that, as to the father, the trial court found
1
that DHR was no longer required to make reasonable efforts to
reunite the children with the father, thus relieving DHR of
that obligation as to the father. 
7
1120536
parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 2007) (quoting D.O. v.
Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 859 So. 2d 439, 444 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2003)).  Under the facts of this case, the
announcement of adoption as the permanency plan as presented
in the trial court's orders was in the nature of an
administrative matter and did not of itself actually
constitute an adjudication of any right of the mother from
which an appeal would lie.  F.V.O., ___ So. 3d at ___
(Thompson, P.J., dissenting).  
After considering the record in this case, the briefs of
the parties, the main opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals,
and Presiding Judge Thompson's dissent, we conclude that the
orders entered by the trial court on January 3, 2012, as to
the mother are not final judgments.  See Ex parte T.C., 96 So.
3d 123, 129-30 (Ala. 2012).  Both arguments presented by the
mother–-regarding the finding by the trial court as to the
efforts made to January 3, 2012, by DHR to reunite the mother
and the children and the announcement of a new permanency plan
(i.e., adoption)--fail to adjudicate any rights of the mother
from which an appeal would lie.  We reverse the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals and  remand the case for the Court
8
1120536
of Civil Appeals to dismiss the mother's appeal and to remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur. 
Murdock, J., concurs specially.  
Stuart, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ., dissent.  
Bryan, J., recuses himself.*
*Justice Bryan was a member of the Court of Civil Appeals
when that court considered this case.
9
1120536
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion and write separately to
further explain my reasons for doing so.
I begin by noting the unique language of § 12-15-601,
Ala. Code 1975:
"A 
party, 
including the 
state 
or 
any 
subdivision
of the state, has the right to appeal a judgment or
order from any juvenile court proceeding pursuant to
this chapter. The procedure for appealing these
cases shall be pursuant to rules of procedure
adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama. All appeals
from juvenile court proceedings pursuant to this
chapter shall take precedence over all other
business of the court to which the appeal is taken."
(Emphasis added.)  Obviously, the emphasized language was not
intended by the legislature to give a right of appeal from any
order by a juvenile court in a juvenile proceeding because,
among other things, such orders would include nonsubstantive
administrative orders regarding scheduling and other matters. 
It is, however, an effort by the legislature to recognize that
juvenile 
proceedings 
are 
different 
and 
that, 
unlike
conventional civil cases, typically do involve a number of
intermediate "juvenile court proceedings" that result in
judgments from which a party should be able to appeal because
those judgments decide the rights of the parties to custody,
10
1120536
visitation, and other significant matters that the parent and
the child -- and the State -- must live by until the next
hearing. 
Accordingly, against the backdrop of the emphasized
language, this Court and the Court of Civil Appeals have 
recognized the 
unique 
nature of juvenile proceedings that make
an appeal appropriate from any one of multiple judgments that
may be entered during the life of a juvenile case.  Citing the
Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in C.L. v. D.H., 916 So. 2d
622 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), we stated in Ex parte T.C., 96 So.
3d 123, 130 (Ala. 2012), that,
"unlike 
other 
civil 
cases, 
dependency 
and
termination-of-parental-rights 
proceedings 
may
involve multiple 'final' appealable orders before
the juvenile case is closed. For example, temporary
custody orders are treated as final, appealable
orders.  See, e.g., C.L. v. D.H., 916 So. 2d 622
(Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (holding that order awarding
maternal grandmother primary physical custody of a
child in a dependency case was a final appealable
order as opposed to a pendente lite order)."2
Unlike in C.L., the juvenile judge in Ex parte T.C. made
2
it clear that she was interrupting the hearing simply to allow
the maternal grandparents to receive notice of and to
participate in the hearing.  She scheduled the resumption of
the hearing for a date three weeks later and announced that
she would finish receiving the evidence at that time.  She
made it clear that, in the meantime, she was not making a
custody award based on the evidence heard up to that point but
11
1120536
Unlike normal civil cases in which a fixed set of facts
is at issue, the facts of juvenile cases are dynamic: 
children grow from month to month, and the facts regarding the
parents' 
rehabilitation 
and 
suitability 
are 
subject 
to 
change. 
In effect, each review of the dependency and custody of the
child represents a new "case."  Each resulting judgment
adjudicates the issue of dependency and custody in relation to
the extant facts and establishes the rights —- or lack thereof
—- of a parent to his or her child for a period  following
that particular judgment.
In contrast to the judgment at issue in Ex parte T.C.,
the judgment of the trial court at issue in C.L. was one that
was intended to fully adjudicate the dependency vel non of the
child based on the state of the facts as they existed at the
time of the hearing, not to put things "on hold" with a
pendente lite custody order pending the completion of hearing
to 
allow 
grandparents time to present some additional 
evidence
regarding the state of those facts.  The Court of Civil
was merely maintaining in place the pendente lite custody
arrangement ordered at an earlier date in that juvenile
proceeding.
12
1120536
Appeals explained in C.L. that juvenile cases are unique for
the reasons stated above:
"The setting of the case for a 'review'
approximately four months later does not make the
juvenile court's May 28 judgment a pendente lite
order. The juvenile court's judgment does not
indicate that the purpose of the September 2004
'review' hearing would be to finish receiving
evidence as to the extant facts as of May 2004. To
the contrary, the record and the juvenile court's
May 28 judgment fully indicate that it had already
heard that evidence and was entering a judgment
based thereon. Instead, the judgment indicates that
the juvenile court would at its 'review' consider a
modification of the custody of the child based on
whatever new facts might come into existence between
the time the juvenile court entered its judgment on
May 28, 2004, and the scheduled 'review' on
September 15, 2004. Cf. Hodge v. Steinwinder, 919
So. 2d 1179 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2005)] (holding that
the issue of the finality of an order in a
child-custody case was controlled by the fact that
the trial court's judgment was final as to the facts
presented at trial and would only be modified in the
event 
that 
new 
facts 
subsequently 
developed
justifying a modification of that judgment).
"In other words, the setting of the September
'review' hearing was not a function of a need for
the 
parties 
to 
complete 
the 
gathering 
and
presentation to the court of the evidence of the
facts already in existence [as we subsequently held
to be the case in Ex parte T.C.]. The court's
expressed willingness to consider a change in the
custodial placement of the child was made in
contemplation of new facts -- i.e., developments in
the lives of the mother and the child and their
relationship that might occur after the court
entered its order.
13
1120536
"Consistent 
with 
the 
general 
principles
discussed above, orders such as the one at issue
here have been held in dependency cases to be
appealable. 
In 
Morgan 
v. 
Lauderdale 
County
Department of Pensions & Security, 494 So. 2d 649
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986), the trial court entered an
order dated February 17, 1984, adjudicating children
to be dependent and awarding their temporary custody
to the Department of Pensions and Security ('DPS').
Like the review contemplated by the juvenile court
in this case (indeed, in most dependency cases), the
case was periodically 'reviewed' by the trial court
(once on May 10, 1984 (approximately two months
after 
the 
trial 
court's 
initial 
dependency
adjudication), and again on November 21, 1984
(approximately six months later)). After each of
those subsequent 'reviews,' the trial court entered
an order finding that the child remained dependent
and making a custodial disposition of that child
until the next review hearing. As in the present
case, the setting of those subsequent review
hearings gave the mother an opportunity to improve
herself or her condition and to regain custody of
the children -- i.e., to change the 'facts' and
present a 'new case' to the court, not to present
new evidence of already existing facts. As this
court explained, each of '[t]he three 1984 judgments
of the juvenile court which removed and maintained
temporary custody of the children away from the
mother [were] treated as appealable orders.' Morgan,
494 So. 2d at 651. See State Dep't of Human Res. v.
R.E.C., 899 So. 2d 251, 265 n. 16 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) ('the fact that the order was therefore
"temporary" or "interlocutory" in the sense that it
did not bring closure to the dependency proceeding
does not prevent the order from being appealable'),
rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte R.E.C., 899 So. 2d
272 (Ala. 2004); and Ex parte D.B.R., 757 So. 2d
1193, 1195 (Ala. 1998) (approving of this court's
holding in Potter v. State Department of Human
Resources, 511 So. 2d 190, 192 (Ala. Civ. App.
1986), 'that a decision of a juvenile court finding
14
1120536
that children were dependent and awarding temporary
custody to the children's maternal grandparents and
the state, constituted a "final judgment, order, or
decree" for the purposes of the rule giving parents
14 days from the entry of a "final judgment, order,
or decree" in which to file a notice of appeal').
And well they should have been, for each of those
orders constituted an adjudication of the mother's
rights pending not the preparation of the case and
the scheduling of the case for trial, and the
unavoidable delay attendant to that process, but
pending the passage of a fixed period of time set
aside by the trial court specifically for the
purpose of allowing different facts, to have an
opportunity to develop. Cf. Hodge v. Steinwinder.
Each of those orders was final as to that period of
time and therefore was appropriately appealable.
".... 
"Consistent with the well-established principle
that 
an 
adjudication 
of 
dependency 
and 
an
accompanying custodial placement of a child in a
dependency proceeding is an appealable order, the
juvenile court in the present case stated in its May
28, 2004, judgment that 'any party may appeal this
decision within 14 days.' The juvenile court was
right. We therefore proceed to consider this appeal
on its merits."
C.L. v. D.H., 916 So. 2d at 624-26 (emphasis added).
The Court of Civil Appeals' explanation of the issue in
T.C. v. Mac.M., 96 So. 3d 115, 117 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), also
is helpful:
"This court has explained the circumstances
under which a juvenile court's order or judgment is
sufficiently final to support an appeal:
15
1120536
"'Although a juvenile court's orders
in a dependency case are, in one sense,
never "final" because the court retains
jurisdiction to modify its orders upon a
showing of changed circumstances, see C.L.
v. D.H., 916 So. 2d 622 (Ala. Civ. App.
2005); Committee Comments, Rule 4, Ala. R.
App. P., this court has always treated
formal dependency adjudications as final
and appealable judgments despite the fact
that they are scheduled for further review
by the juvenile court.'
"D.P. v. Limestone Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 28 So.
3d 759, 762 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that an
order finding, with regard to the father, that
reasonable efforts at reunification were no longer
required of the Department of Human Resources was a
permanency order that was sufficiently final to
support an appeal; that order also expressly left in
place previous awards of legal custody incident to
dependency findings)."
Fully in keeping with the "well established" principles
upon which C.L. was decided, the Court of Civil Appeals also
explained as follows in J.J. v. J.H.W., 27 So. 3d 519, 521-22
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008):
"The first issue raised by both the mother and
by the maternal grandparents is whether the judgment
under review is final. In its August 2007 judgment,
the juvenile court determined that the children
remained 
dependent, 
denied 
the 
maternal
grandparents' 
request 
for 
termination 
of 
the
parents' parental rights, and made a disposition of
the children's custody. Under our caselaw, a formal
determination by a juvenile court of a child's
dependency coupled with an award of custody incident
to that determination will give rise to an
16
1120536
appealable final judgment even if the custody award
is denominated as a 'temporary' award and further
review of the case is envisioned. See Potter v.
State Dep't of Human Res., 511 So. 2d 190, 192 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1986); see also C.L. v. D.H., 916 So. 2d
622, 625–26 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). We thus reject
the appellants' challenges to the finality of the
judgment under review."
27 So. 3d at 521-22 (emphasis added).3
In the present case, the judgments at issue did make
appealable adjudications as to two matters: (1) that the
children continued to be "dependent" at the time of the
judgment, i.e., based on the facts existing at that time, and
would continue to be treated that way until the next hearing,
and (2) that, at least until the next hearing, the mother
would have no right to custody of the children and that the
Coffee County Department of Human 
Resources ("DHR") would have
that right.  Clearly, the aspects of the judgments finding
that the children were dependent as of the date of the January
3, 2012, judgments and that custody would continue in the
I note the absence in J.J. of any requirement that the
3
award of custody to the State going forward has to involve a
custody award that differs from an award included in some
prior judgment.  As noted above, the trial court's order held
to be appealable in D.P. v. Limestone County Department of
Human Resources, 28 So. 3d 759 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009),
expressly left in place previous awards of legal custody
incident to dependency findings.
17
1120536
State after that date constituted a final adjudication of
those matters for the period following the judgments, just as
similar adjudications in the 
cases 
discussed above 
were deemed
final and appealable.  In other words, orders adjudicating
such matters are within the uniquely worded ambit of § 12-15-
601.4
   
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Presiding Judge Thompson
argued in the Court of Civil Appeals for the correct result in
this particular case because the mother was not, in fact,
appealing from either of the aforementioned dependency and
custody adjudications.  Neither does she appeal from a
decision by the trial court that the State need no longer
provide services to her or engage in reasonable efforts to
reunite her with the child or locate alternative placement
I 
therefore 
disagree 
with 
Presiding 
Judge 
Thompson's 
view
4
that the January 3, 3012, orders were not appealable because
"the custodial arrangement for the children has not changed." 
F.V.O. v. Coffee Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.,  [Ms. 2110398,
Dec. 7, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)
(Thompson, P.J., dissenting).  Indeed, adopting Judge
Thompson's position would require this Court to overrule
substantial well established and sound precedent, some of
which is discussed above.
18
1120536
resources, although the main opinion in the Court of Civil
Appeals infers otherwise.  
5
If the Court of Civil Appeals was correct and such
5
adjudications had in fact been made in this case, they could
have a real physical impact on the mother and/or create a
real-life trajectory that would make it more difficult for her
to improve her circumstances or otherwise to prevail in an
eventual termination-of-parental-rights case.  For that
reason, if no other, such adjudications (assuming also the
mother had actually argued them in her appeal), would have
fallen within the well established view of precedent as to the
uniquely worded provision in § 12-15-601 for appeal from a
"judgment or order from any juvenile proceeding."  As the
Court of Civil Appeals aptly explained in L.M. v. Jefferson
County Department of Human Resources, 68 So. 3d 859, 860 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2011):
"Initially, we note that the juvenile court's
July 15, 2010, judgment finding that the mother had
abandoned the children and relieving DHR from making
further reasonable efforts at reunification is a
final judgment that will support an appeal.  See
M.H. v. Jefferson County Dep't of Human Res., 42 So.
3d 1291, 1293 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) ('In D.P. [ v.
Limestone County Department of Human Resources, 28
So. 3d 759, 764 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009),] this court
held that a permanency order relieving DHR of the
duty to use reasonable efforts to reunite a parent
with a dependent child constitutes a final judgment
that will support an appeal.'); and D.P. v.
Limestone County Dep't of Human Res., 28 So. 3d 759,
764 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) ('We hold that it is
immaterial, 
for 
purposes 
of 
finality 
and
appealability, 
that 
a 
juvenile 
court's 
order
emanates from the permanency-plan hearing rather
than from the periodic review of a dependency
determination.  If the order addresses crucial
issues that could result in depriving a parent of
the fundamental right to the care and custody of his
or her child, whether immediately or in the future,
19
1120536
Instead, as the main opinion here notes, the pertinent
language of the January 3, 2012, orders of the trial court
from which the mother appeals merely states as follows:
"2) 
Reasonable 
efforts 
have been made to 
reunite
the mother and child and said efforts have failed.
"....
"4) The most appropriate permanency plan is
adoption."
(Emphasis added.)  Further, according to the main opinion in
the Court of Civil Appeals, the mother's arguments on appeal
were limited to arguments (a) that "the juvenile court erred
in determining that adoption is the most appropriate
the order is an appealable order.')." 
(Emphasis added.)
Because such adjudications were not made in the present
case, we also need not decide today the "debate" between Judge
Moore, the author of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, and
Presiding Judge Thompson as to the further issue whether these
adjudications would have a formal collateral estoppel effect
in 
any 
subsequent 
termination-of-parental-rights 
proceeding 
in
which the trial court must decide whether there are at that
time grounds for termination and/or "viable alternatives" to
termination.  As explained by the Court of Civil Appeals, the
approval by the trial court of DHR's new plan to pursue
termination of the mother's parental rights and an adoption of
the children is not itself, at least not as presented in this
case, an appealable adjudication of the mother's substantive
rights.
20
1120536
permanency plan" because this finding was not supported by the
evidence, and (b) that "the juvenile court erred in concluding
that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother
with the children."  ___ So. 3d at ___. 
To the extent the mother challenges the trial court's 
announcement of a new permanency plan (i.e., adoption), the
particular announcement found in the orders of the trial court
in this case is not appealable.  As worded, it does not
adjudicate any rights of the mother, and, specifically, it
does not relieve the State from the burden of proving at the
time of a subsequent termination hearing that all the elements
necessary under our statutes for such a termination are in
place at that time.   As a corollary, neither does this
6
announcement of a new "direction" relieve the State of any
continuing obligations it might have to the mother leading up
to any such termination hearing, including, for example, the
investigation of alternative placements or other viable
See D.V. v. Colbert Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., [Ms.
6
2110590, Dec. 14, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)
(noting that a termination of parental rights must be based on
the existence of conditions or conduct relating to a parent's
inability or unwillingness to care for his or her children at
the time of the termination);  D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of
Human Res., 859 So. 2d 439, 444 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (to same
effect). 
21
1120536
alternatives to the termination of her parental rights that
might be presented.  I agree with Presiding Judge Thompson, at
least in regard to the facts of this case, that the
announcement of adoption as the permanency plan as presented
in the trial court's orders was in the nature of an
administrative matter and did not of itself actually
constitute an adjudication of any rights of the mother from
which an appeal would lie.  F.V.O., ___ So. 3d at ___
(Thompson, P.J., dissenting).  
Similarly, the above-quoted finding by the trial court
regarding the efforts made to date by DHR to reunite the
mother and the children were not an adjudication of
substantive rights of the mother from which an appeal would
lie.  I agree with the main opinion that, as presented by the
trial court in this case, this was only a finding as to
historical fact; that DHR had made such efforts up to that
point; and that the efforts it had made thus far had in fact
failed.  As to the mother, the January 3, 2012, judgments
contain no language expressly relieving DHR of its legal
obligation 
to 
make 
reasonable 
efforts 
toward 
her
rehabilitation and reunification with the children going
22
1120536
forward.   Any doubt as to the import of the trial court's
7
judgments in this regard is largely alleviated in this case by
the mother's position in her brief to this Court that we
should consider only what is set out in the trial court's
written orders and that those orders "did not make any finding
that would cause DHR to be statutorily relieved of its
obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite the mother
with her children."  Mother's brief, at 16.  Although the
Court of Civil Appeals' opinion concludes that such findings
are implicit in the judgments, Presiding Judge Thompson makes
a reasonable argument that they are not.  F.V.O., ___ So. 3d
at ___ n.5.  In light of the mother's position on this issue
in this Court, we are not at liberty to conclude other than
does Judge Thompson for purposes of the present review. 
Because in this particular case the mother did not
challenge on appeal any appealable adjudication by the trial
court, I agree that the mother's appeal should have been
dismissed.  I therefore concur in the main opinion.   
8
By contrast, the juvenile court specifically stated in
7
the January 3, 2012, orders that "reasonable efforts to
reunite the child with the father ... shall no longer be
required."
In so doing, I do not wish to  be understood as agreeing
8
with all the views expressed by Judge Thompson in his
dissenting opinion.
23
1120536
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
The main opinion would reverse the judgment entered by
the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the orders entered by the
Coffee Juvenile Court following a permanency hearing on the
ground that those orders were nonfinal and therefore would not
support an appeal.  I disagree with the conclusion that the
orders appealed from were nonfinal, and I 
accordingly 
dissent.
Section 12-15-601, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in relevant
part, that "[a] party, including the state or any subdivision
of the state, has the right to appeal a judgment or order from
any juvenile court proceeding pursuant to this chapter."   In
Ex parte T.C., 96 So. 3d 123, 129 (Ala. 2012), we explained
that this language does not grant the parties to a juvenile-
court proceeding a right to immediately appeal any judgment or
order entered in such a proceeding; rather, § 12-15-601
provides a basis for appealing only those judgments or orders
entered by a juvenile court that are considered "final."  We
have elsewhere explained that a final judgment is one which
"'conclusively determines the issues before the court and
ascertains and declares the rights of the parties.'"  Queen v.
Belcher, 888 So. 2d 472, 475 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Palughi v.
Dow, 659 So. 2d 112, 113 (Ala. 1995)).
24
1120536
Juvenile-court proceedings, however, are unique and,
unlike other civil cases, "may involve multiple 'final'
appealable orders before the juvenile case is closed."  Ex
parte T.C., 96 So. 3d at 130.  In D.P. v. Limestone County
Department of Human Resources, 28 So. 3d 759, 762-64 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2009), the Court of Civil Appeals discussed the
unique nature of juvenile-court cases and further described
when judgments and orders entered in these proceedings may be
appealed:
"Although a juvenile court's orders in a
dependency case are, in one sense, never 'final'
because the court retains jurisdiction to modify its
orders upon a showing of changed circumstances, see
C.L. v. D.H., 916 So. 2d 622 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005);
Committee Comments, Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P., this
court 
has 
always 
treated 
formal 
dependency
adjudications as final and appealable judgments
despite the fact that they are scheduled for further
review by the juvenile court.
"....
"In H.H. v. Baldwin County Department of Human
Resources, 989 So. 2d 1094, 1108 (Ala. Civ. App.
2007) (opinion on return to remand) (authored by
Moore, J., with two judges concurring in the
result), this court explained that a permanency
hearing is statutorily mandated as the means by
which the juvenile court is to determine the
'permanent disposition' of the child.  In two other
recent cases, Judge Moore issued special writings
outlining a shift in procedure with respect to
dependency/termination-of-parental-rights 
cases
that, he perceived, had been accomplished by our
legislature's amendment of the Alabama Juvenile
Justice Act of 1990 ('the former AJJA'), § 12–15–1
25
1120536
et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and the Child Protection
Act ('CPA'), § 26–18–1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, in
order to comply with federal legislation known as
the Adoption and Safe Families Act ('ASFA'), 42
U.S.C. § 671 and § 675; in separate special writings
in those cases, Judge Bryan and Judge Thomas agreed
with Judge Moore as to this issue.  See T.V. v.
B.S., 7 So. 3d 346 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), and
A.D.B.H. v. Houston County Dep't of Human Res., 1
So. 3d 53 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
"'In a permanency hearing, the juvenile
court is to "determine" which of several
custodial arrangements –– return to the
parent, 
referral 
for 
termination 
of
parental rights and adoption, or placement
with a relative or other legal custodian ––
"shall be" the permanency plan.  Id.  The
purpose 
of 
requiring 
the 
12–month
permanency hearing is to comply with the
policy behind the ASFA to ensure "that
children are provided a permanent home as
early as possible."  Kurtis A. Kemper,
Annotation, 
Construction 
and 
Application 
by
State Courts of the Federal Adoption and
Safe Families Act and Its Implementing
State Statutes, 10 A.L.R. 6th 173, 193
(2006).'
"A.D.B.H., 1 So. 3d at 69 (Moore, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the result) (footnotes
omitted).
"The ASFA and the amendments to the former AJJA
and the CPA placed new emphasis on the permanency
hearing 
as 
a 
'vitally 
important' 
step 
in
d e p e n d e n c y / t e rm i n a t io n - of - pa rental- r i gh t s
proceedings.  See A.D.B.H., 1 So. 3d at 68 (Thomas,
J., concurring specially).  T.V. and A.D.B.H. make
it clear that issues such as DHR's plan to reunify
a family, the reasonableness of DHR's efforts to
rehabilitate a parent, and the possible placement of
a child with a relative are meant to be aired and
resolved at a permanency hearing.  To the extent
that a juvenile court's permanency order resolves
26
1120536
crucial issues, therefore, it is reasonable to
expect that a parent has the right to judicial
review of the juvenile court's decision with respect
to those issues.  See T.V. v. B.S., 7 So. 3d at 361
(Moore, J., concurring in the result) (stating that
'[i]f the mother had had any complaint about the
reasonableness of DHR's efforts to reunite the
family, the finding that her efforts to rehabilitate
had been unsuccessful, the placement of the child
with [a relative] without consideration of other
relatives, or the terms of her visitation, the
mother's remedy was to appeal the judgment entered
after the permanency hearing').
"Accordingly, 
we 
have 
treated 
a 
juvenile 
court's
permanency order as final and appealable when it
results in depriving a parent of the care, custody,
or visitation with his or her child.  See R.J.L. v.
Lee County Dep't of Human Res., 976 So. 2d 455, 456
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (appeal of a permanency order
transferring 'physical custody of ... the mother's
two-year-old son[] from the child's foster parents
in Alabama to the mother's cousins ... in Watertown,
New York'), and D.B. v. Madison County Dep't of
Human Res., 937 So. 2d 535, 536 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006) (appeal of a permanency order awarding legal
and physical custody of the child to the maternal
aunt).
"In 
determining 
whether 
any 
juvenile-court 
order
that is subject to revision is appealable, we
consider that the focus should be on whether the
order addresses crucial issues that, if not objected
to by the aggrieved party, are thereafter precluded
from appellate review.  This court has long
considered dependency determinations to be final and
appealable, but there is nothing magic about
dependency determinations as opposed to permanency
orders.  We hold that it is immaterial, for purposes
of finality and appealability, that a juvenile
court's order emanates from the permanency-plan
hearing rather than from the periodic review of a
dependency determination.  If the order addresses
crucial issues that could result in depriving a
parent of the fundamental right to the care and
27
1120536
custody of his or her child, whether immediately or
in the future, the order is an appealable order.
"Turning to the permanency order in the present
case, we consider that it addresses crucial issues
with respect to both parents.  The court approved
the permanency plan for the mother as 'reunification
with a parent'; thus, the mother had no reason to
appeal.  However, had the permanency plan been
termination of parental rights or permanent relative
placement, the mother's remedy would have been 'to
appeal the judgment entered after the permanency
hearing.'  T.V. v. B.S., 7 So. 3d at 361 (Moore, J.,
concurring in the result).  The permanency order in
the present case addressed a crucial issue with
respect to the father because it removed his
entitlement to rehabilitation or reunification
services provided by DHR.  We hold that the
permanency order was final and appealable with
respect to both parties; therefore, there was no
need for the juvenile court to certify the judgment
as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
before we could entertain the father's appeal."
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, as D.P. explains, a parent may
immediately appeal an issue that is resolved in a permanency
hearing if the resolution of that issue could result in
depriving the parent of his or her fundamental right to care
for and have custody of his or her child.
In the instant case, the mother appeals the findings made
by the juvenile court in its January 3, 2012, orders entered
following the August 4, 2011, permanency hearing (1) that
adoption was the most appropriate permanency plan, and (2)
that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother
28
1120536
with the children.   The Court of Civil Appeals described the
9
effects of these findings as follows in its opinion affirming
the juvenile court's judgments:
"[W]hen a juvenile court orders that a child be
placed for adoption with an unidentified resource,
the law requires DHR to file a petition to terminate
the parental rights of the parents of the child. 
See 12-15-315(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975 (stating that
DHR 'shall' file a petition to terminate parental
rights when the permanency plan calls for adoption
by an unidentified resource or a foster parent). 
Thus, unless the juvenile court provides for
concurrent permanency planning, see § 12-15-315(b),
Ala. Code 1975 (authorizing concurrent permanency
planning), which the judgments at issue in this
appeal did not do, the approval of a permanency plan
of adoption, without any express direction for DHR
to continue to make reasonable family-reunification
efforts, necessarily implies that the juvenile court
has turned its focus away from family reunification
and toward the severance of the parent-child
relationship.  Accordingly, the judgments at issue
in this case relieved DHR of continuing to make
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the mother or to
reunite her with the children.
"The judgments also relieved DHR of continuing
to make efforts to locate relatives 'qualified to
receive and care for the child[ren].'  § 12-15-
314(a)(3)c., Ala. Code 1975.   When a permanency
plan establishes a goal of relative placement, the
juvenile court and DHR have a duty to make
reasonable efforts to accomplish that goal.  See §
12-15-312(b), Ala. Code 1975.  In this case, DHR
presented evidence indicating that, after nearly
In 
orders 
entered 
following 
previous 
permanency 
hearings,
9
the juvenile court had held that DHR should continue to make
reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the mother and
that the most appropriate permanency plan for the children was
placement with a relative. 
29
1120536
three years of intensive investigation, it could not
locate a willing relative fit to care for the
children.  After receiving that evidence, the
juvenile court changed the previous permanency plan
from placement with a relative to adoption.  That
determination implies that the juvenile court found
that none of the relatives proffered by the mother
would be suitable custodians for the children or
that it would otherwise be in the best interests of
the children to be adopted by an unidentified
resource rather than to be placed in a relative's 
custody.  As such, the juvenile court, in effect,
directed DHR to cease its efforts to locate a
qualified relative to receive the children and to
redirect its efforts toward adoption with a
termination of the mother's parental rights." 
F.V.O. v. Coffee Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., [Ms. 2110398,
December 7, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)
(footnotes omitted).  Thus, the import of the juvenile court's
judgments is that DHR may cease its efforts both to
rehabilitate the mother and to locate a qualified relative to
take custody of the children.  These are crucial issues, and
the juvenile court's resolution of these issues could result
in depriving the mother of her fundamental right to care for
and have custody of her children.  Accordingly, the mother
should be entitled to seek immediate appellate review of the
juvenile court's judgments.  
I am not persuaded by the suggestion in the main opinion
that the mother may subsequently relitigate these issues in a
termination-of-parental-rights 
proceeding 
or 
in 
an 
appeal 
from
30
1120536
a later judgment entered following such a proceeding.  As
explained by the Court of Civil Appeals, the relevant statutes
indicate 
that 
parent-rehabilitation 
and 
relative-
identification-and-placement issues are meant to be resolved
in the context of permanency hearings, and it is logical and
consistent with those same statutes that appellate review of
those issues takes place following the permanency 
order 
making
those determinations, not following an entirely separate
termination-of-parental-rights action:
"Section 12-15-319[, Ala. Code 1975,] requires a
juvenile court, when deciding whether grounds for
termination [of parental rights] exist, to consider
whether DHR's reasonable parental-rehabilitation
efforts have failed.  However, nothing in § 12-15-
319 requires the juvenile court to relitigate the
issue of the reasonableness of DHR's efforts during
the adjudicatory phase of a termination-of-parental-
rights proceeding.  By that point, in an ordinary
case like this case, the legislature intended that
any questions regarding the reasonableness or
success of DHR's rehabilitation efforts would have
long ago been decided in a permanency hearing. 
D.P., supra.  Although a juvenile court must
consider 
the 
failure 
of 
reasonable 
family-
reunification efforts, it should do so only by
taking judicial notice of its prior judgment.  See
generally Ex parte State Dep't of Human Res., 890
So. 2d 114 (Ala. 2004) (authorizing juvenile court
to take judicial notice of its own records but not
of court reports containing inadmissible hearsay
evidence).  Otherwise, allowing a parent to raise
the issue at such a late stage would not only be
duplicative and a waste of judicial resources but
could cause an unwarranted delay in the final
determination of the termination-of-parental-rights
petition.  See T.V. v. B.S., 7 So. 3d 346, 361 (Ala.
31
1120536
Civ. App. 2008) (Moore, J., concurring in the
result). 
"In Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala.
1990), the supreme court held that, under former §
26-18-7, Ala. Code 1975, the predecessor statute to
§ 12-15-319, a juvenile court could not terminate a
parent's parental rights without exhausting viable
alternatives.  After Beasley was decided, our
legislature amended the former Alabama Juvenile
Justice Act, former 12-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
to comply with the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671 and §  675, by, among
other things, mandating that juvenile courts decide
the merits of relative placement at permanency
hearings.  See A.D.B.H. [v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of
Human Res.], 1 So. 3d [53,] 69 [(Ala. Civ. App.
2008)] (Moore, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the result).  Those legislative changes did not
abrogate the need for juvenile courts to exhaust
viable alternatives, which is mandated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, see Roe v. Conn, 417 F.
Supp. 769, 779–80 (M.D. Ala. 1976), but established
a new judicial procedure for implementing that
standard, at least for children in foster-care
placement.  Instead of awaiting the adjudicatory
hearing to determine whether placement with a
relative 
could 
be 
accomplished 
as 
a 
viable
alternative to termination of parental rights, the
legislature decided that the issue would be decided
in a separate permanency hearing to take place
before 
the 
termination-of-parental-rights
adjudicatory hearing.  See § 12-15-315.  Thus,
contrary to Presiding Judge Thompson's dissent, ___
So. 3d at ___, it would not be 'premature' to
consider any issue regarding relative placement on
an appeal from a permanency judgment; it would, in
fact, be too late to consider those issues on an
appeal from a judgment terminating a parent's
parental rights.
"In D.P., this court held that a dependency
order should be considered final and appealable if
it decides crucial issues regarding the fundamental
32
1120536
rights of parents that would otherwise evade
appellate review.  38 So. 3d at 764.  The judgments
in this case decide issues that adversely affect the
fundamental rights of the mother.  Unless we allow
this appeal, the mother generally will be precluded
from raising those same issues in any subsequent
appeal.  Hence, the holding in D.P. only reinforces
our conclusion that the judgments at issue are final
and appealable.  We note Presiding Judge Thompson's
concern that allowing appeals from permanency-
hearing judgments may slow down the progress toward
termination of parental rights in some cases.  ___
So. 3d at ___.  However, we cannot overlook the
stated legislative intent that certain issues be
adjudicated in permanency hearings or ignore that
parents have a statutory right to raise those issues
on appeal from the judgment in which they were
decided, see § 12-15-601, and not from a later
judgment in a totally separate action."
F.V.O., ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added).  I believe the
orders entered by the juvenile court following the August 4,
2011, permanency hearing were final and that the mother
accordingly had a right to appeal those orders pursuant to §
12-15-601.  I therefore respectfully dissent.
Bolin and Shaw, JJ., concur.
33