Case Title: Khalifa v. Shannon

Citation: 404 Md. 107

Docket Number: 56/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Afaf Nassar Khalifa, et al.v. Michael Shannon, No. 56, September Term, 2008.
TORT LAW/FAMILY LAW – INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY
AND VISITATION RIGHTS
A jury for the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County awarded Michael Shannon
$3,017,500 in compensatory and punitive damages against his former wife, Nermeen Khalifa
Shannon, and her mother, Afaf Nassar Khalifa, after both fled to Egypt with the couple’s
two minor children and have not returned.  At the time of the abduction, Michael Shannon
was the custodial parent of the oldest child and the visitation parent for the younger child.
Appellants noted a timely appeal, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to any
proceedings in the intermediate court to address whether Maryland recognizes the tort of
interference with custody and visitation rights of children and whether the damage award
was excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Court concluded that the tort of
interference with parent-child relations was established previously in Hixon v. Buchberger,
306 Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 (1986).  The Court also held that loss of a child’s service was not
a necessary element of the tort and that a visitation parent could bring the cause of action so
long as the interference with visitation was a “major and substantial” one.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 56
September Term, 2007
                                                                   
AFAF NASSAR KHALIFA, ET AL.
v.
MICHAEL SHANNON
                                                                   
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
                                                                  
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Raker, J., Concurs.
                                                                  
Filed:    April 9, 2008
1
Because we hold that the tort of interference with custody and visitations rights
is recognized in Maryland, we need not reach the second question.  A recent case, Lloyd v.
General Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 154, 916 A.2d 257, 284 (2007), discussed the elements
of the tort of civil conspiracy.
The issue in this case is whether a cause of action for intentional interference with
custody and visitation rights is sustainable by a father, Michael Shannon, against his former
wife, Nermeen Khalifa Shannon, and her mother, Afaf Nassar Khalifa (“Appellants”), both
of whom fled to Egypt with the couple’s two minor children, who remain there.  Appellants
moved to dismiss the father’s complaint, arguing that interference with custody and
visitation rights is not a cognizable cause of action in Maryland, and alternatively, that even
if Maryland recognizes the tort, the Complaint fails to allege a loss of the children’s services,
which is a required element.  The trial court disagreed, and after a trial, the jury awarded
$3,017,500 in compensatory and punitive damages.  Appellants noted an appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals, and prior to any proceedings in that court, we issued a writ of certiorari
on our own initiative, Khalifa v. Shannon, 400 Md. 647, 929 A.2d 889 (2007), to address
the following issues:  
I.  Did the trial court commit reversible error when it denied the
defendant-appellants’ motion to dismiss Count One of the
Complaint by recognizing the tort of interference with custody
and visitation rights of children?
II.  Did the trial court commit reversible error when it denied
the defendant-appellants’ motion to dismiss Count Two of the
Complaint by recognizing the tort of civil conspiracy?[1]
III.  Did the trial court commit reversible error when it denied
the defendant-appellants’ motion for a new trial, and/or for
remittur, because the punitive damages awarded by the jury
2
were grossly excessive and there was no evidence on the record
of defendant-appellants’ ability to pay?
We shall hold that the trial court did not err in denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss
Count I relating to interference with custody and visitation rights because we have
heretofore recognized the tort without requiring the loss of services of the child to be pled.
We also shall hold that the trial court did not err when denying Appellants’ post-trial
motions regarding damages.
I. Facts
Michael Shannon initiated the instant civil suit against his ex-wife, Nermeen Khalifa
Shannon, her mother, Afaf Nassar Khalifa, her father, Mohammed Osama Khalifa, and her
older sister, Dahlia Khalifa, in March of 2004.  The Complaint contained four counts: Count
I, Interference with Custody and Visitation Rights of Children; Count II, Civil Conspiracy;
Count III, Loss of Society of Children; and Count IV, False Imprisonment, with the
following factual allegations:
8.  Mr. Shannon married Defendant Nermeen Khalifa Shannon
on March 3, 1996.
9.  Adam Osama Shannon was born on February 9, 1997.
10.  Jason Osama Kalifa [sic] was born on January 10, 2001.
11.  Mr. Shannon and defendant Nermmen Khalifa Shannon
separated in January 2000.
12.  In February 2001 this Court entered a consent order that
granted Mr. Shannon custody of Adam; and Nermeen custody
of Jason.
3
13.  Each parent also had visitation rights with their non-
custodial child.
14.  On August 18, 2001, Defendant Afaf Nassar Khalifa flew
to Washington, D.C. from Egypt and stayed with Nermeen
Shannon in her apartment.
15.  Mr. Shannon agreed that both boys could visit a cousin in
Brooklyn, New York with Defendants, Nermeen Khalifa
Shannon and Afaf Nassar Khalifa, as long as the boys were
returned to him by Sunday night, August 26, 2001.
16.  The boys were not returned to Maryland.
17.  The Defendants had previously and calculatedly arranged
to put the boys on an airplane to Egypt.
18.  The Defendants did put the boys on an airplane to Egypt
and Mr. Shannon has not seen his American sons since August
2001.
19.  Defendant, Afaf Nassar Khalifa was extradited to
Maryland.
20.  Defendant, Afaf Nassar Khalifa was sentenced to a ten year
prison term.  That sentence was later revised to a three year
sentence.
21.  The abductions and kidnapping [sic] of the children are ongoing.
* * *
23.  At the time of the abductions. Mr. Shannon was legally
entitled to custody of Adam and visitation with Jason.
24.  The Defendants intentionally interfered, and continue to
interfere with Mr. Shannon’s custody and custody [sic] and
visitations rights by abducting the children to Egypt and
refusing to return them.
2
We affirmed her conviction in Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 855 A.2d 1175
(2004).
3
We note that no Answer was ever filed, and no default judgment was ever
requested or entered.  Appellants, however, have not been adversely affected by their failure
to file an Answer because the case was tried on the merits.
4
25.  The Defendants intentionally interfered, and continue to
interfere with Mr. Shannon’s custody and visitation rights by
knowingly and intentionally refusing to allow Mr. Shannon to
see or communicate in any manner with his sons.
26.  As a result of the Defendants’ ongoing and continuing
intentional interference with Mr. Shannon’s custody and
visitation rights, Mr. Shannon has suffered damages.
Afaf Nassar Khalifa was served with the Complaint and a writ of summons while
serving a three-year sentence, after she had been convicted of conspiracy and abduction
under Section 9-305 (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), and amended Section 9-305 (1984, 1999 Repl.
Vol., 2002 Supp.) of the Family Law Article.2  Her attorney moved to dismiss the Complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process, which the court
denied.  
After numerous attempts to serve Nermeen Khalifa Shannon, the court ordered
alternate service by mail and by publication in The Cairo Times.  Nermeen Khalifa, through
the same attorney, subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
insufficiency of service of process, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, which the trial court denied.3  The complaints
against the father-in-law and sister-in-law were later dismissed.
5
The case went to trial in December of 2006.  At the close of argument, the court
dismissed the false imprisonment and loss of society counts.  After deliberating over the
remaining counts of interference with custody and visitation rights and civil conspiracy and
completing a special verdict form, the jury awarded Shannon $17,500 in attorney fees and
costs; $500,000 in compensatory damages against each defendant; $900,000 in punitive
damages against Afaf Nassar Khalifa and $1,100,000 million in punitive damages against
Nermeen Khalifa Shannon.  Appellants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
a new trial, and for remittur, arguing grossly excessive damages, all of which the Circuit
Court denied.  Appellants noted their appeal to the Court of the Special Appeals, and we
issued a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court.
Khalifa, 400 Md. at 647, 929 A.2d at 889.
II. Background
Appellants contend that the Circuit Court erred when it denied their Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because
Maryland does not recognize the tort of interference with custody and visitation.  Appellants
alternatively posit that if Maryland recognizes the tort of interference with custody and
visitation, the lower court erred when it refused to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim because a parent must plead and prove a child’s services to maintain the cause of
action, which did not occur in the present case, and also contend that if this Court accepts
4
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700, Comment d, states:
d. Necessity of loss of service. Under the rule stated in this
Section, loss of service or impairment of ability to perform
service is not a necessary element of a cause of action. The
temporary absence of a child who is too young to perform
service or the abduction of a hopeless invalid is actionable as
well as the abduction of a child who actually renders service to
the parent. The deprivation to the parent of the society of the
child is itself an injury which the law redresses.
5
Although Appellants discuss bifurcation of evidence in their brief when
challenging the excessiveness of the punitive award, we shall not address it because it was
not included as a question in their brief.
6
Comment d to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700 (1977),4 which states that the
loss of service element is not necessary, it will be creating new law, which cannot apply
retroactively.  Appellants, further, contend that the jury’s punitive damage award was
excessive, because Shannon “placed no evidence whatsoever on the record of [Appellants’]
ability to pay $900,000 and $1,100,000 in punitive damages, respectively;” because the
punitive damage award “far exceeded [the $5,000] maximum monetary fine imposed by the
Maryland Family Law Article for the same conduct;” and because the punitive damage
award is not commensurate with other punitive awards in the State.5
Shannon counters each of these arguments.  He contends that Maryland recognizes
the tort of interference with custody and visitation rights, and that loss of services, as
referred to in the Restatement, has not been included as a necessary element in the tort under
our jurisprudence.  With respect to damages, Shannon argues that the punitive damages
award is not excessive because it is only twice as great as the compensatory award, it is
7
commensurate with the heinousness of Appellants’ conduct, and it is inapposite to compare
a criminal fine, where the primary punishment is imprisonment, to punitive damages.
Shannon also counters that he provided clear, convincing and uncontroverted evidence of
the Khalifa’s substantial wealth.
III. Discussion
A. Interference with Parent-Child Relations
This case presents issues regarding whether the tort of interference with custody and
visitation rights exists, and whether a parent, who has both legal custody and visitation rights
under court order at the time of the abduction and harboring of minor children, has to plead
and prove that he or she has suffered an economic loss as a result of the abduction and
harboring.  As we have stated, “[t]he viability of a legal cause of action is clearly a question
of law which, as with all questions of law, this Court shall review de novo.”  Wholey v. Sears
Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 48, 803 A.2d 482, 487 (2002).  
In the present case, as in any other, when “‘considering the legal sufficiency of [a]
complaint to allege a cause of action for tortious interference, we must assume the truth of
all relevant and material facts that are well pleaded and all inferences which can be
reasonably drawn from those pleadings.’” Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108,
121, 916 A.2d 257, 264 (2007) (alteration in original); Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d 492, 499-500 (1986).  “Mere conclusory charges that
are not factual allegations may not be considered.”  Lloyd, 397 Md. at 121, 916 A.2d at 264-
8
65, citing Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 531, 667 A.2d 624, 631
(1995); Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443, 620 A.2d 327, 331 (1993).  “Moreover, in
determining whether a petitioner has alleged claims upon which relief can be granted,
‘[t]here is . . . a big difference between that which is necessary to prove the [commission of
a tort] and that which is necessary merely to allege [its commission],’ and, when that is the
issue, the court’s decision does not pass on the merits of the claims; it merely determines the
plaintiff’s right to bring the action.”  Lloyd, 397 Md. at 121-22, 916 A.2d at 265 (alterations
in original), quoting Sharrow, 306 Md. at 770, 511 A.2d at 500.  “Furthermore, the court
must view all well-pleaded facts and the inferences from those facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 122, 916 A.2d at 265, citing Board of Education v. Browning, 333
Md. 281, 286, 635 A.2d 373, 376 (1994).
This Court apparently first explicitly recognized the torts of abduction of a child from
a parent and harboring in Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot, 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601 (1905).  In
Baumgartner, an aunt, who had legal guardianship over a teenage girl, sued a husband and
wife with whom the girl had chosen to live, alleging that they had abducted the child and
harbored her after she had been so abducted.  The complaint specifically alleged that
defendants abducted and knowingly deprived the aunt of the young woman, that the aunt
“became greatly attached to her,” and that the aunt “derived great comfort from [the child’s]
society as she grew to be larger,” thereby incurring non-economic losses.  Id. at 509, 60 A.
at 601.  The trial judge had directed a verdict because of insufficiency of the evidence, and
6
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, in the section subsequent to
that cited by the court in Baumgartner, included the following:
IV.  ABDUCTION OF CHILD–1. Rights of Parents–General
Rule.– A father has a right of actions against every person who
knowingly and wittingly interrupts the relation subsisting
between himself and his child by enticing or abducting such
child away from him, or by harboring the child after he has left
the father’s house.
* * *
2. Gist of the Action–The gist of the action for the abduction
of a child would seem to be not the loss of service, but the loss
to the parent of the comfort and society of the child, though the
authorities are not in harmony upon the question.
9
we affirmed, opining that the evidence was not sufficient to meet the elements of abduction
and harboring, which we declared were tortious acts:  
“Abduction, in its broadest legal sense, signifies the act of
taking and carrying away by force, which may be by fraud,
persuasion, or open violence, a child, ward, wife, etc. In its
more restricted sense it is confined to the taking of females for
the purpose of marriage, concubinage, or prostitution.”
Id. at 513, 60 A. at 603, quoting 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure 141 (1901), as well
as:
“Abduction is the unlawful taking or detention by force, fraud,
or persuasion of a person, as a wife, a child or a ward, from the
possession, custody, or control of the person legally entitled
thereto.” 
Id., quoting 1 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 163 (2d ed. 1896), and finally:6
“In the law of torts, to harbor is to receive, clandestinely or
without [legal] authority, a person for the purpose of so
10
concealing him, that another having the right to the [legal]
custody of such persons shall be deprived thereof; . . . or, in a
less technical sense, it is a reception of persons improperly.”
Id. (alteration in original), quoting 15 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 285 (2d
ed. 1900).  After iterating the rule for abduction, we determined that the evidence was
insufficient to meet the elements of abduction and harboring:
Now, in all this there is not an element of abduction as it has
been defined in the authorities cited in an earlier part of this
opinion. Confessedly there was no force used. There was no
fraud. There was no open violence and there is no evidence to
indicate that there was persuasion of any kind. It would be
going a long distance beyond what any case has held to say that
the facts we have heretofore given in detail fasten upon the
defendants or either of them the charge of abduction. And as to
the second count of the declaration there is not any evidence
whatever to show that Matilda was received clandestinely for
the purpose of concealing her from the plaintiff nor is there
anything to indicate that her reception by the defendants was in
any sense improper.
We conclude, then, from this review of the evidence in the
record that the court below was entirely right in declining to
permit this case to go to the jury. As we find no error in any of
its rulings the judgment which was rendered in favor of the
defendants will be affirmed with costs.
Id. at 516, 60 A. at 604.  
By doing so, we held that a cause of action was viable against one who abducted a
child from a custodian and harbored her.  Clearly, the definitions of the torts and our
acknowledgment of their existence were “pivotal” and necessary premises upon which our
ultimate conclusion was based, and thus, were holdings in the case.  See Black’s Law
11
Dictionary 749 (8th ed. 2004) (A holding is a “court’s determination of a matter of law
pivotal to its decision” or a “ruling on evidence or other question presented at trial.”).  See
also Howell v. Howell, 78 S. E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1913) (Baumgartner “held that if the child
was kept in defendant’s custody in a clandestine manner an action would lie”).  
Our acknowledgment of the torts of abduction and of harboring in Baumgartner,
furthermore, was consistent with substantial authority from many of our sister states, who
also were original American colonies, facing the same question.  In what appears to be the
earliest known and most frequently cited American case on abduction, the South Carolina
Court of Law in Kirkpatrick v. Lockhart, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 276 (1809), although primarily
concerned with whether it was appropriate to plead abduction in trespass vi et armis or in
trespass on the case, relied primarily on the English case, decided in 1600, Barham v.
Dennis, 78 Eng. Rep. 1001, and held that a father could sustain an abduction action not only
for his son and heir, but for the abduction of any one of his children:
It has been decided, that a father may maintain an action of
trespass vi et armis, for entering his house, assaulting his
daughter, and getting her with child, per quod, 3 Wils. 18. So,
an action on the case lies for debauching his daughter, per quod
servitium amisit, though she be above the age of twenty-one
years, where acts of service are proved. 2 D. and E. 166 and
seq. It was always held to lie where the daughter is under
twenty-one, though no acts of service are proved, 2 D. and E. 4,
5; and other evidence, besides what applies to loss of service, is
admissible. 3 Esp. R. 119. 8 D. and E. 534. I mention these
cases, to exhibit the true foundation of these kinds of actions .
. . .
* * *
12
The true ground of action cannot be the loss of service, for a
child may be of an age so tender, or of a constitution so delicate,
as to be incapable of rendering any service. The true ground of
action is the outrage, and deprivation; the injury the father
sustains in the loss of his child . . . .
Years later, in Howell, 78 S.E. at 222, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, when
presented with facts remarkably similar to the instant case, also recognized the tort of
abduction.   In Howell, a father and mother entered into a contract prior to divorce, under
which their daughter would remain in the mother’s custody until the age of six, at which
time the father would become the custodian.  Shortly before the child attained the age of six,
the mother and her partner abducted the child, and the father sued for damages.  In reversing
the trial court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
discussed at considerable length the history of the tort of abduction in English common law,
including Barham, and held that the torts of abduction and harboring were recognized and
that a father could bring the cause of action for any of his children:
At the common law, abduction of a child was not an offense.
State v. Rice, 76 N. C. 194. But Blackstone, 3 Com. 140, holds
that a civil action lay therefor, and that a father could recover
damages, though he says it was a doubtful question, on which
the authorities were divided, whether a father could recover for
the abduction of any other child than the oldest son and heir. In
Barham v. Dennis, Cro. Eliz. 770, it was held that he could not.
But later cases held that an action would lie for taking away any
of the children because the parent “had an interest in them all.”
It is interesting to quote the reasoning of the courts at common
law as given in Barham v. Dennis, supra.  Anderson, Walmsley,
and Kingsmil, JJ., said:  “The father should not have an action
for the taking of any of his children, which is not his heir; and
13
that is by reason the marriage of his heir belongs to the father,
but not of any other his sons or daughters; and by reason of this
loss only, the action is given unto him; the writ in the Register
is for the son and heir, or daughter and heir only; which proves
that the law has always been taken, that the action lies not for
any other son or daughter.  And although it hath been said that
a writ of trespass lies for divers things whereof none of them are
in the Register; and it hath been adjudged that it lies for a
parrot, a popinjay, a thrush, and as in 14 Henry VIII for a dog;
the reason thereof is, because the law imputes that the owner
hath a property in them. . . . But for the taking of a son or
daughter not heir, it is not upon the same reason, and therefore
not alike. Here the father hath not any property or interest in the
daughter which the law accounts may be taken from him.”
Glanville, J., dissenting, said:  “The father hath an interest in
every of his children to educate them, and to provide for them,
and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not reasonable
that any should take them from him, and to do him such an
injury, but that he should have his remedy to punish it.”  The
majority of the court are sustained by the form of the writ as
preserved in Fitz-Herbert’s Natura Brevium 90 H., which was
of date 12 Hen. IV, 16. But Judge Glanville based his dissent
upon reason and justice and has been sustained by subsequent
cases.
Id. at 223-24 (ellipsis in original).
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York conducted an extensive analysis of
American and English common law in Pickle v. Page, 169 N.E. 650, 651 (N.Y. 1930): 
An action of trespass for the abduction of a child was originally
maintainable by a father where the child abducted was the son
and heir and not otherwise.  Barham v. Dennis, 2 Cro. Eliz. 770.
This was “by reason the marriage of his heir belongs to the
father, but not of any other his sons or daughters;” and,
although it had been adjudged that the writ of trespass lay “for
a parrot, a popinjay, a thrush, and, as 14 Hen. 8 is, for a dog; the
reason thereof is, because the law imputes that the owner hath
a property in them,” whereas “the father hath not any property
14
or interest in the daughter, which the law accounts may be taken
from him.”  Later it was held that an action of trespass was
maintainable by a father per quod servitium amisit where a child
old enough to do him service, other than the heir, was abducted.
For the abduction of any other child the action did not lie.  Gray
v. Jefferies, 1 Cro. Eliz. 55; Hall v. Hollander, 4 Barn. & C.
660. In the latter case it was said: “It is clear that in cases of
taking away a son or daughter, except for taking a son and heir,
no action lies, unless a loss of service is sustained, Gray v.
Jefferies, supra; Barham v. Dennis, supra.  The mere
relationship of the parties is not sufficient to constitute a loss of
service.”  In the case of an injury inflicted upon a child so
immature that it was incapable of rendering service, the parent
might have no remedy against the person inflicting the injury.
Hall v. Hollander, supra.
The principle that the abduction of a child, not the heir, or not
capable of rendering service, was a wrong for which the law
furnished no civil remedy, was not adopted without protest, nor
has it received unqualified approval. Thus in Barham v. Dennis,
supra, Glanville uttered a strong dissent, saying: “For the father
hath an interest in every of his children to educate them, and to
provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore
it is not reasonable that any should take them from him, and to
do him such an injury, but that he should have his remedy to
punish it.”  Blackstone was of the opinion that for the abduction
of a child, other than the heir, a father might maintain an action,
stating that such a wrong was “remediable by writ of ravishment
or action of trespass vi et armis, de filio, vel filia, rapto vel
abducto; in the same manner as the husband may have it on
account of the abduction of his wife.”  Bl. Comm. 140.
Based on this, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the cause of action for
abduction and harboring existed irrespective of loss of services:
In the absence of any New York authority upon the subject [of
abduction and harboring] . . . we are disposed to hold broadly,
as have courts of North and South Carolina, that in actions for
the abduction of immature children from the custody of their
7
We recognized the common law tort action of enticement in Kenney v.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 101 Md. 490, 61 A. 581 (1905), and Loomis v. Deets, 30
A. 612 (Md. 1894).
15
lawful custodians, parents, or foster parents, no loss of service
need be alleged or proven; that for the direct injury done, a
direct recovery may be had without resort to the fiction that a
loss of service has been occasioned.
Id. at 653.
In a more recent case, Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340
(Mass. 1991), which cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the torts of abduction, harboring and enticement
also were recognized causes of action under Massachusetts law and explained how these
common law torts formed the basis for the single contemporary tort of interference with
parent-child relations:7
“The common law has traditionally recognized a parent’s
interest in freedom from tortious conduct harming his
relationship with his child,” and the parent “may be
compensated therefor when there is interference with the
normal parent-child relationship.”  The tortious conduct referred
to [in previous Massachusetts cases] includes the abduction,
enticement, and harboring and secreting of minor children from
their parents, or in other words, the intentional interference with
parental interests or rights.  The elements of these causes of
action are well established. Abduction is the physical taking of
a minor child from the parent having legal custody.  An action
for enticement will lie where one, through an “active and
wrongful effort” and knowing that the parent does not consent,
induces a child to leave the parent’s home.  One “harbors” a
minor child by inducing or encouraging a child, who is away
from the parent without the parent’s consent, to remain away
16
from the parent.
* * *
We therefore acknowledge the tort of intentional interference
with the parent child relationship as a contemporary expression
encompassing actions for abduction, enticement, harboring, and
secreting of a minor child from the parent having legal custody.
Id. at 351, 352 (citations omitted).
In total, the torts of abduction and harboring have been recognized in at least eight
of the other original American colonies.  See, e.g., Selman v. Barnett, 61 S.E. 501, 502 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1908) (holding that one standing in loco parentis can seek general and punitive
damages for the abduction and harboring of her child); Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299,
1301-02 (N.H. 1983) (referencing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700 through
common law torts of abduction and harboring); Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1858) (holding that a father could recover for the emotional harm caused by the
abduction of his child); Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302 (Pa. 1838) (holding that one
standing in loco parentis may maintain an action for the abduction of his daughter’s
illegitimate offspring).  What we glean from these cases, and in particular those cases
discussing the English common law, is that the torts of abduction and harboring existed in
England prior to 1776, and that, therefore, we adopted them as part of our common law
under Article V of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states in pertinent part that
“the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England . . . according to
the course of that Law, and to the benefit of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day
17
of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six.”
Nevertheless, this Court was not called upon to address whether abduction and
harboring could be the basis of a cause of action for interference with parent-child relations
until Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 (1986), when asked to confront the
question of whether, under the common law of Maryland, a cause of action exists, or ought
to be recognized, for money damages resulting from the intentional tortious interference by
a non-custodial third-party with the visitation rights of a parent.  Hixon was the non-
custodial parent of a child born out of wedlock who complained of interference with his
relationship with the child by the mother’s fiancé, Buchberger, who allegedly made
belligerent statements to him in the child’s presence, made it physically difficult “at times”
for Hixon to take the child with him, and intended “to supplant Hixon in the child’s mind
as the child’s father”; id. at 74, 75, 507 A.2d 608;  Hixon never alleged that he was
physically prevented from taking the child.  Based on these allegations, the trial judge
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In responding to the question posed to this Court by Hixon, Judge Lawrence F.
Rodowsky, writing for this Court, analyzed the various causes of action that could have been
implicated by the factual averments and concluded that Hixon’s allegations were insufficient
to sustain a cause of action for assault, battery or the intentional infliction of emotional
distress:
While Hixon’s point is that Buchberger’s conduct is a tort for
which money damages will lie, Hixon does not allege that the
18
interference constituted an assault or a battery. The complaint
does not undertake to describe conduct which is “‘so outrageous
in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,’” Harris v.
Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965)), and
Hixon does not argue that Buchberger committed an intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 
Id. at 77, 507 A.2d at 609.  Judge Rodowsky immediately then opined that  “[o]ur decisions
involving interference with the relationship between parent and child do not assist Hixon’s
position,” and recognized that abduction and enticement were the precursor causes of action
for interference with parent-child relations.  Id. at 77, 507 A.2d at 609, citing Kenney v.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 101 Md. 490, 61 A. 581 (1905) (suit dismissed for
insufficient evidence of enticement or service), Baumgartner, 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601, and
Loomis v. Deets, 30 A. 612 (Md. 1894) (insufficient evidence of enticement or harboring).
He then quoted with approval from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in which the elements
of the tort are elucidated:
[O]ne who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent,
abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave
a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the
parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the
parent.
Id. at 78, 507 A.2d 610.
He continued the discussion with citation to the primary cases upon which Hixon
relied, one being Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D.Mo. 1984), in which a
19
mother sued the government for tortious interference with the parent-child relationship when
the government suddenly removed her child with his father and placed both in the Witness
Protection Program in violation of her ongoing visitation rights.  The mother alleged that she
had habitually seen her child after school each day, that on the day of removal her child
simply disappeared, and that she lost all contact with the child for nearly four years.  Over
the government’s contentions that Missouri did not recognize a tort for interference with a
parent’s visitation rights, the United States District Court Judge determined that under state
law a parent with either custody or visitation rights could pursue a cause of action for
interference with the parent-child relationship.  Id. at 713.  See also Raftery v. Scott, 756
F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a money judgment in favor of a non-custodial father for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress when the child’s mother moved from New York to Virginia with the
child, and the father did not discover the child’s whereabouts for over four years; L.S.J. v.
E.B., 672 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), permitting a non-custodial mother to
counterclaim for damages for tortious interference when a child’s foster parents brought an
action to terminate the mother’s parental rights in violation of the foster parent’s agreement
with the governing state agency; Bartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984),
allowing damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on wrongful
enticement and harboring of a child away from the parent.
After elucidating the possible causes of action and discussing these cases, we
8
In Lapides v. Trabbic, 134 Md. App. 51, 65, 758 A.2d 1114, 1121 (2000),
similarly, the Court of Special Appeals relied substantially on Hixon, and held that mere
assertions that a defendant engaged in a course of conduct designed to win the affections of
(continued...)
20
concluded that Hixon failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because
Hixon’s factual allegations were insufficient, when juxtaposed against those allegations
determined to be sufficient in other cases involving the tort of interference with parent-child
relations:
It is apparent from the foregoing review that the interference
alleged here falls short, by a considerable distance, of the more
substantial interferences presented in many of the cases relied
upon by Hixon. The belligerent words described by Hixon are
a relatively minor interference. Indeed, the nature of the
interference alleged here is so minor that it is doubtful whether
most courts would recognize it as mounting up to a tortious
interference with custody rights, remediable by damages, were
the same verbal exchange to have taken place when a custodial
parent might be picking up a child at the end of a visit with a
noncustodial parent.  Consequently we need not decide in this
case whether, or, if so, under what circumstances a damage
action might lie for interference with visitation rights.  We hold
simply that a parent or that parent’s ally who, without
committing any tort presently recognized in Maryland, speaks
hostilely to the other parent about that parent’s exercise of
custody or visitation rights does not thereby become liable in
damages.
Id. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612.  In concluding that Hixon’s allegations were insufficient when
compared to “the more substantial interferences presented in many of the cases relied upon
by Hixon,” we not only recognized that the tort of interference with parent-child relations
was extant, but also defined the elements and applied them to the factual allegations.8  Id.
8(...continued)
his daughter and undermine his parental authority were insufficient to sustain the cause of
action of intentional interference with custody and visitation rights primarily because a
parent must be physically deprived of the child.  In so holding, the intermediate appellate
court distinguished Section 700 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, from Section 699,
which states that allegations of alienation of affection are insufficient to sustain a cause of
action.  Id. at 58-59, 758 A.2d at 1117-18.
21
In the present case, Shannon’s Complaint is sufficient to have survived a motion to
dismiss.  He alleged that the Appellants abducted and harbored his children in knowing
interference with his custody right, when to obtain his consent they led him to believe that
they were taking the boys to New York “to visit relatives” and would return them on
Sunday, August 26, 2001, but in reality, they intentionally and “calculatedly” had planned
to, and did, abduct the boys and harbor them in Egypt.  Shannon also averred that he was
entitled to custody of the boys at the time when they were abducted and harbored because
he had been granted legal custody of Adam and because with respect to Jason, he had a
specific visitation planned for the night of August 26, 2001, and a right to ongoing visitation
with him thereafter.  Assuming the truth of all well-pleaded, relevant, and material facts in
the complaint and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, we conclude that
Shannon sufficiently alleged the elements of the tort of interference with parent-child
relations and that the trial court did not err when denying the motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
B. Loss of Services
Whether a parent must allege economic loss of the child’s services to maintain an
9
In 1856, the Maryland Legislature enacted the “simplification statute” which
said in part:
The forms of the pleadings which follow, shall be sufficient;
and those and the like forms may be used, with such
modifications as may be necessary to meet the facts of the case:
but nothing herein contained shall render it erroneous or
irregular to depart from the letter of such forms, so long as
substance is expressed without prolixity.
1856 Md. Laws, Chap. 112.
In 1870, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 420, a precursor to Maryland Rule
2-303(b), to add the following provision, which closely approximates current Maryland law:
Any declaration which contains a plain statement of the facts
necessary to constitute a ground of action shall be sufficient,
and any plea necessary to form a legal defense shall be
sufficient without reference to mere form.
22
action for the interference with parent-child relations when the parent has custody and
visitation rights regarding the children at the time the suit was brought is the next issue that
we address.  Although this Court’s discussion in Hixon may have given the impression that
loss of economic services was a mandatory element of the substantive tort of abduction, a
focused analysis reveals that loss of services has never been an element of the tort itself, but
rather, arose from common law pleading requirements in force in England, and Maryland,
the latter at least until 1870.9  When pleading was by form rather than by fact, a cause of
action had to be alleged within the narrow constructs of predefined pleadings forms.  See
Paul Mark Sandler & James K. Archibald, Pleading Causes of Action in Maryland, at
Prologue xx (3d ed. 2004), quoting Alan H. Fisher, Essentials of Maryland Pleading 31 (2d
10
This Court has cited Poe as authoritative most recently in Hanna v. ARE
Acquisitions, LLC, 400 Md. 650, 661 n.4, 929 A.2d 892, 899 n.4 (2007).
23
ed. 1922), in turn quoting Andrew’s Stephen, Section 240 (“[W]hen special pleading was
at its height, the rule was that all pleadings should be stated according to ancient and
approved forms.”).  In the instance of interference with parent-child relations at common
law, a parent seeking damages to redress the seduction, economic enticement, or abduction
of a child had to plead their cause of action in trespass, which contained two subcategories:
trespass on the case, or “case”; and trespass vi et armis (literally “with force and arms”), or
simply “trespass.”  Poe, in 1 Pleading and Practice in Courts of Common Law, Section 158,
at 115-16 (5th ed. 1925),10 defined and distinguished case from trespass:
Trespass lies to recover damages for an injury committed with
force, either actual or implied by law, where the injury is direct
and immediate, and where it is committed either upon the
person of the plaintiff, or upon his tangible and corporeal
property, whether real or personal.  Case, on the other hand, lies
to recover damages for any wrong or cause of complaint to
which covenant,  assumpsit or trespass will not apply.  Or to
adopt another definition, more sharply contrasting it with
trespass, it lies generally to recover damages for torts not
committed with force, actual or implied; or, if committed with
force, where the injury is not immediate but consequential; or,
where the matter effected is not tangible . . . .  An injury is
considered immediate where it is occasioned by the act
complained of itself, and not merely by a consequence of that
act.  In all other cases it is consequential.
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
When a cause of action for interference with parent-child relations was on the case,
24
the basis for the parent’s, or more specifically, the father’s recovery lie per quod servitium
amisisit or in the right of a master in trespass to sue for injury to his servant.  Damages,
therefore, in such a per quod action were based on the injury to the master consequent from
the injury to the servant, and a plea and proof of loss of the servant’s services was thereby
required.  See Mercer v. Walmsley, 5 H. & J. 21, 27 (Md. 1820).  See generally 1 W. Blake
Odgers & Walter Blake Odgers, The Common Law of England 561-64 (2d ed. 1920).  
An action in trespass, on the other hand, was premised on a direct injury to the father.
A cause of action alleging abduction in trespass, therefore, included allegations that the father
was directly wronged by the abduction because he was deprived of the comfort and society
of the child, which as lawful custodian he had the right to expect and enjoy.  Because this
action was direct, the father pursuing the action in trespass was not required to prove loss of
services, and he could be compensated for other damages both pecuniary and emotional.
Kirkpatrick, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) at 279 (“The true ground of action is the outrage, and
deprivation; the injury the father sustains in the loss of his child; the insult offered to his
feelings; the heart-rendering agony he must suffer in the destruction of his dearest hopes, and
the irreparable loss of that comfort, and society, which may be the only solace of his declining
age.”).
Although in Maryland there is a dearth of authority addressing interference with
parent-child relations when an abduction action was brought in trespass, this Court has
decided a plethora of cases when the father either has brought the interference action on the
25
case per quod servitum amisit, seeking damages for the seduction of his daughter, or when
the father sought pecuniary damages flowing from the wrongful enticement of the son by an
employer.  In cases when a father brought an action for the seduction of his daughter, we
explicitly required that the action be pled on the case per quod servitum amisit, stating that
the father’s right to consequential damages rested solely upon his legal right to the daughter’s
lost services.  See Lamb v. Taylor, 67 Md. 85, 91, 8 A. 760, 761-62 (1887) (noting that loss
of services is required in a seduction action because the right of action is based on the loss
of service sustained by the plaintiff, not as father, but as master, in consequence of the
seduction of his daughter and servant by the defendant); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md.
369, 373 (1868) (holding in an action on the case that a master-servant relationship must exist
and that loss of services is the gist of the seduction cause of action); Keller v. Donnelly, 5
Md. 211, 214 (1853) (holding the right to maintain the seduction action is on the case in per
quod servitum amisit and that “[t]he relationship of master and servant must exist either
actually; that is, where the party seduced is rendering service to the plaintiff . . . or
constructively; that is, where the plaintiff has a legal right to demand and have the services
of the party seduced at the time of the seduction.”); Mercer, 5 H. & J. at 26 (requiring the
action be brought on the case and loss of services to be pled, but stating that the law implies
the master-servant relationship from the father living with the daughter and that therefore
“any slight service will be sufficient to raise the inference . . . that she was his servant”).  
When, similarly, a father brought an action for the enticement of his son into the
11
The requirement that the torts of economic enticement into employment and
seduction, as opposed to abduction, must be brought on the case and that therefore loss of
services must be shown, is consistent with the jurisprudence of other original colonial states.
E.g. Caughey v. Smith, 47 N.Y. 244, 250 (1872) (“[T]o maintain an action for enticement
. . . it must appear that the child . . . was at the time in the actual service of the parent or
master.”); Lipe v. Eisenlerd, 32 N.Y. 229, 238 (1865) (requiring master-servant relationship
and loss of services in a seduction action); Butterfield v. Ashley, 60 Mass. 249, 251-52
(1850) (requiring loss of services in an enticement action brought on the case by a father
against a son’s employer).
26
employment of another, we also explicitly held that loss of services was a requisite element,
either because the alleged damages were purely economic, Loomis, 30 A. at 613 (recognizing
loss of service, but dismissing father’s action for pecuniary damages primarily because the
father originally consented to the son’s employment and the employer did not harbor the son
because he did not force the son to stay), or because the harm to the father was merely
consequent to the death of the son.  Kenney, 101 Md. at 493, 61 A. at 582 (holding
insufficient evidence of loss of services when father sought damages consequent to losing
the son’s services when the son was crushed and killed by an engine while working in
defendant’s machine shop).  See also Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 286, 623 A.2d 656, 662
(1993) (“[I]n tort actions where a family member is injured, the marital entity has a claim for
damages for loss of a spouse’s consortium, but parents and children do not have a claim for
loss of each other’s consortium.  Parents have a limited common law claim for the economic
value of the loss of an injured child’s services, but children have no reciprocal claim for loss
of an injured parent’s services.”).11
Although we have not had the opportunity to determine whether an abduction action
12
We recently have commented on the abandonment of form-based pleading in
Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 Md. 669, 696-97, 843 A.2d 758, 773-74 (2004).  See also
Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 27-28, 690 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1997) (noting that “Maryland
abandoned the formalities of common law pleading long ago” and that Maryland Rule
2-303(b) establishes that “[a] pleading shall contain only such statements of fact as may be
necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to relief or ground of defense”).
27
would lie in trespass before the arcane common law pleading requirements were abolished
in favor of fact-based pleading, where the type of action is based on the remedies sought,12
numerous of our sister states, other original American colonies, have been presented with
such an opportunity and have found strong support in the common law for permitting an
abduction action to be brought in trespass.  In a very early case, the South Carolina Court of
Law, in Kirkpartick, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) at 276, analyzed the English common law and held
that a father could bring an action in trespass for the abduction of any of his children.  In
Kirkpatrick, a father brought an action in trespass for the abduction of his daughter, who was
a minor.  The defendant asserted that the cause of action for abduction could not be brought
in trespass, except in the instance of the father’s son and only heir and moved to dismiss,
arguing that the plaintiff’s action must be brought “on the case” and that loss of services was
required.  Id. at 277.  In rejecting the abductor’s contentions and permitting the cause of
action to be brought in trespass, the South Carolina Court summarized the debate at common
law:
[There] seems to have been a matter of some doubt, formerly, as
appears from Cro. Eliz. 770. . . . Mr. Justice Glanville, in
opposition to the other judges, held that an action was
maintainable, because a parent has an interest in all his children
28
to provide for their education; and that the remedy ought not to
be confined to the eloignment of the heir only. It does not appear
that the question was ever settled; and there is reason to believe
the other judges, who differed from Glanville, hesitated, and
entertained doubts, and therefore declined deciding the question,
without further consideration. The correct and judicious Sir Wm.
Blackstone, seems to adopt the opinion held by Glanville, and
says, “the remedy is by writ of ravishment of ward, or action of
trespass vi et armis, de filio, vel filia, rapto, vel abducto,” and
refers to Fitzherbert’s Natura Brevium, 90, for the form of the
writ. That able lawyer, Mr. Wooddeson, in his Lectures, vol. 1,
p. 451, 2, says, “a father cannot sue for an assault and battery,
committed on his son, but the son only must be the plaintiff.  But
if the father can allege, and prove, that his son was also his
servant, and that by reason of the outrage he lost the profits of
his labor, . . . the action would be maintainable. And in like
manner,” says he, “it seems just, that a father might sue for the
abduction of any of his children, as well as of the heir, upon the
suggestion, and proof, that by means thereof, . . . or, indeed,
without that harsher allegation, it is but reasonable that he might
bring such action, in respect of the comfort and delight he has in
them, his anxiety for their loss, and his interest in their
education; which considerations could hardly be recompensed by
pecuniary damages.” It has been decided, that a father may
maintain an action of trespass vi et armis, for entering his house,
assaulting his daughter, and getting her with child . . . . 3 Wils.
18.  So, an action on the case . . . was always held to lie where
the daughter is under twenty-one, though no acts of service are
proved, 2 D. and E. 4, 5; and other evidence, besides what
applies to loss of service, is admissible. 3 Esp. R. 119. 8 D. and
E. 534.
Id. at 278 (emphasis in original).  Accordingly, the South Carolina Court concluded that a
father could recover monetary damages in trespass solely to compensate him for the
emotional loss, irrespective of whether the child performed any actual services:
The true ground of action cannot be the loss of service, for a
child may be of an age so tender, or of a constitution so delicate,
29
as to be incapable of rendering any service. The true ground of
action is the outrage, and deprivation; the injury the father
sustains in the loss of his child; the insult offered to his feelings;
the heart-rendering agony he must suffer in the destruction of his
dearest hopes, and the irreparable loss of that comfort, and
society, which may be the only solace of his declining age.
Id. at 279.
Further, in Pickle v. Page, 169 N.E. at 650, the Court of Appeals of New York also
concluded that at common law an action for abduction could be maintained in trespass and
that loss of services was not a prerequisite element.  In so concluding, the Court described
the vigorous debate in older English cases over whether the right to bring an abduction action
in trespass was limited to the first-born heir or whether it extended to the father’s other
children:
An action of trespass for the abduction of a child was originally
maintainable by a father where the child abducted was the son
and heir and not otherwise.  Barham v. Dennis, 2 Cro. Eliz. 770.
. . . Later it was held that an action of trespass was maintainable
by a father per quod servitium amisit where a child old enough
to do him service, other than the heir, was abducted. For the
abduction of any other child the action did not lie. Gray v.
Jefferies, 1 Cro. Eliz. 55; Hall v. Hollander, 4 Barn. & C. 660.
In the latter case it was said: “It is clear that in cases of taking
away a son or daughter, except for taking a son and heir, no
action lies, unless a loss of service is sustained.”  Gray v.
Jefferies, supra; Barham v. Dennis, supra.
* * * 
The principle that the abduction of a child, not the heir, or not
capable of rendering service, was a wrong for which the law
furnished no civil remedy, was not adopted without protest, nor
has it received unqualified approval.  Thus in Barham v. Dennis
30
(supra) Glanville uttered a strong dissent, saying: “For the father
hath an interest in every of his children to educate them, and to
provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it
is not reasonable that any should take them from him, and to do
him such an injury, but that he should have his remedy to punish
it.”  Blackstone was of the opinion that for the abduction of a
child, other than the heir, a father might maintain an action,
stating that such a wrong was “remediable by writ of ravishment
or action of trespass vi et armis, de filio, vel filia, rapto vel
abducto; in the same manner as the husband may have it, on
account of the abduction of his wife.”  Bl. Comm. 140. . . . It is
to be noted, also, that Sir Frederick Pollock, without
qualification, makes the broad statement:  “The common law
provided a remedy by writ of trespass for the actual taking away
of a wife, servant, or heir, and perhaps younger child also;” and
follows the statement by the further assertion that an action of
trespass also lies for wrongs done to a plaintiff’s wife, or servant
or child, regarded as a servant, whereby the society of the former
or the services of the latter are lost; the language of the pleading
being per quod consortium, or servitium amisit.  Pollock, The
Law of Torts, p. 226.
Id. at 476-478 (emphasis in original).  After so describing the debate at common law, the
Court concluded, as discussed above, that abduction was a recognized cause of action in New
York and then noted that on policy grounds it would be inapposite to strictly adhere to the
legal fiction of loss of services:
It would be a reproach to our legal system if, for the abduction
of a child in arms, no remedy ran to its parent, although “for a
parrot, a popinjay, a thrush,” and even “for a dog” an ample
remedy is furnished to their custodian for the loss of their
possession.
Id. at 653.  The Court then distinguished abduction actions from seduction actions or actions
to recover damages stemming from the physical injury of a child and determined that at
31
common law loss of services was not required in abduction actions because the injury was
directly inflicted upon the father and therefore was in trespass, and conversely that loss of
services was required in seduction actions or in actions to recover economic damages
stemming from physical injury because under those circumstances the injury to the father was
consequent to the injury to the child and thus was on the case:
It is undoubtedly true that the gravamen of an action brought by
a parent for the seduction of a daughter is loss of service.  Moran
v. Dawes, 4 Cow. 412; Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459, 20 Am.
Dec. 639; Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. 79; Badgley v. Decker, 44
Barb. 577; Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413; Lipe v. Eisenlerd, 32
N. Y. 229; Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N. Y. 239, 29 N. E. 267, 14
L. R. A. 700, 27 Am. St. Rep. 521.
* * *
It is [also] true that for a loss of service resulting from a physical
injury to a child . . . neither damages for wounded feelings nor
punitive damages may be awarded to a parent.  Whitney v.
Hitchcock, 4 Denio, 461; Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N. Y. 422, 122 N.
E. 247, 3 A. L. R. 1145.
* * *
The rule is otherwise where the damage is not consequent but
direct; where it results not intermediately from a physical injury
to a third person, as a child, wife, or servant, but immediately
from the wrong itself, as in case of the enticement away of a
servant (Smith v. Goodman, 75 Ga. 198; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.
H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475); the enticement away of a slave
(Tyson v. Ewing, 3 J. J. Marsh. [Ky.] 186); as in an action for
criminal conversation with a wife (Matheis v. Mazet, 164 Pa.
580, 30 A. 434); or for the alienation of a husband’s affection
Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 P. 614).  In all these cases
. . . damages for wounded feelings and punitive damages may be
awarded.  That they may be awarded in actions brought by a
32
father for the abduction of a child was definitely held in Magee
v. Holland, supra. That decision was cited with approval in
Stowe v. Heywood, 7 Allen (Mass.) 118, the court saying:  “In
an action for forcible abduction of children, the father is entitled
to damages for the injury done to his feelings.”  We hold that
they were recoverable here, and that no error was committed
when the trial judge instructed the jury that such damages might
be considered and awarded by it.
Id. at 651, 653.
In Howell, 78 S. E. at 224, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the lower
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim and held that abduction had been recognized at
common law and loss of services was not required:
The most usual cases in which this action is brought have been
upon the abduction of a daughter for marriage or immoral
purposes. But the modern authorities, as we have said, have
advanced, and now the parent can recover damages for the
unlawful taking away or concealment of a minor child, and is not
limited to cases in which such child is heir or eldest son, nor to
cases where the abduction is for immoral purposes; nor are the
damages limited to the fiction of “loss of services.”  This court
pointed out, in Hood v. Sudderth, 111 N. C. 215, 16 S. E. 397,
and Willeford v. Bailey, 132 N. C. 402, 43 S. E. 928, that this is
“an outworn fiction” even in actions for seduction.  The real
ground of action is compensation for the expense and injury and
“punitive damages for the wrong done him in his affections and
the destruction of his household,” as said in Scarlett v. Norwood,
115 N. C. 885, 20 S. E. 459; Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N. C. 99,
31 S. E. 268; Snider v. Newell, 132 N. C. 614, 623, 624, 44 S.
E. 354.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reached a very similar conclusion in Selman, 61 S.E.
at 502.  There, Selman, a grandmother who stood in loco parentis to her grandchild, sued
Barnett for taking and carrying the child away and for harboring the child at Barnett’s farm.
33
Selman complained that as a result of the abduction she suffered severe emotional distress
believing, among other things, that the child had been killed.  The lower court dismissed
Selman’s action for failure to state a claim, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.  In
so doing, the court held that the abducting and harboring of a child from one legally entitled
to her is a harm inflicted directly upon the person bringing the abduction action and that,
therefore, general damages, as opposed to specific economic damages, were recoverable.  See
id. at 502. 
In more recent cases in which arcane pleading requirements have been abandoned, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700, has been cited, and the courts have noted that
requiring loss of services is both outmoded, Plante, 469 A.2d at 1301 (N.H. 1983), and
inconsistent with the common law understanding of the tort of abduction.  Murphy, 571
N.E.2d at 352, citing  Rice v. Nickerson, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 478 (1864) (recognizing
abduction as a tort committed directly against the father and awarding damages for costs
incurred in regaining possession of the child without requiring a showing of lost services
when a defendant wrongfully abducted the child from school and harbored the child away
from the father thereafter).
Clearly abduction, the precursor to interference with parent-child relations, could have
been brought in trespass or on the case at English and early American common law, and loss
of services was not required when the action was pled in trespass.  We recognized this in
Hixon, when we acknowledged that economic loss may be an element of damages but that
13
Subsequent to the time when the children were taken to Egypt, Michael
Shannon was granted custody of Jason Shannon.
34
it is not required to be pled in order to maintain the cause of action; we stated that “[u]nder
the rules for this tort espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), ‘loss of service
or impairment of ability to perform service is not a necessary element of a cause of action,’”
and “[u]nder § 700, a custodial parent who suffers the tort can recover damages for the loss
of society of the child, for emotional distress resulting from the abduction or enticement, for
loss of service, and for the reasonable expenses of regaining the child and in treating any
harm suffered by the child as a result of the tortious conduct.” Id. at 77-78, 507 A.2d at 609-
10.  As we reflected in Hixon, without the artificial divisions, which in other times required
a father to choose between damages directly related to the loss of a child’s comfort and
society and damages consequent to the loss of services, pleading requirements no longer
serve to define the elements of the tort of interference with parent-child relations and loss of
services was never a substantive element.
C. Visitation
The third issue in this case relating to the tort of interference with parent-child
relations involves who can bring the cause of action; Michael Shannon was the custodial
parent of Adam but also the visitation parent of Jason at the time of the abduction in 2001
and throughout the ongoing harboring.13  A parent with custodial rights clearly can initiate
a cause of action for interference with parents-child relations.  See id. at 78, 507 A.2d at 610;
35
Baumgartner, 100 Md. at 508-09, 60 A. at 601; Murphy, 571 N.E. at 352.  The question of
whether a visitation parent can sue for the tort and receive damages necessarily was addressed
in Hixon, in which the relevant question before us was whether, under the common law of
Maryland, a cause of action exists (or ought to be recognized) for money damages resulting
from the intentional tortious interference by a non-custodial third-party with the visitation
rights of a parent.  In Hixon, before determining whether a plaintiff could assert a tort claim
for interference with visitation rights in Maryland, we had occasion to discuss Ruffalo, 590
F. Supp. at 706, the primary case upon which Hixon relied.  In Ruffalo, a mother, who by
agreement had visitation rights and one weekend day of “possession” of a child, sued the
federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for interference with parent-child
relations when the government placed the child and father in the Witness Protection Program
because the father had cooperated with federal agents who were investigating a Kansas City
crime organization.  The Ruffalo Court was called upon to determine, among other things,
whether the government was subject to state law liability for interference with “visitation and
communication” rights.  Id. at 708.  The court concluded that the claim was cognizable:
Assuming visitation rights to be mandated by state law . . . this
means that entry into the [Witness Protection Program] . . . has
had the effect of destroying a pre-existing legal right.  Intentional
interference with visitation rights may therefore be imputed to
the government sponsor of the Witness Protection Program. 
Id.  After so holding, the court addressed the government’s argument that such an imputation
would be to “encourag[e] damage claims for petty infractions of parental rights.”  Id. at 712.
36
The court noted that “state courts could well restrict this type of claim to situations that are
not ‘insubstantial in duration and effect,’” but went on to state:
In any event, trifling departures from court orders relating to
visitation doubtless already plague the state courts in contempt
cases, and the possibility of truly petty damage suits does not
argue persuasively against recognition of a right to sue.  [On] the
contrary, there are specialists in family law who view the
potential of damage suits as a useful deterrent to lawless
conduct.
Id.  The Ruffalo Court, therefore, held both that the tort of interference with visitation was
recognized in Missouri and also that the severity of the alleged interference was not an aspect
of liability but only of damages.  Id. at 711. (“While the injury to parental rights may be less
severe in a case involving what is usually called visitation, that is a matter of degree that
logically relates to damages rather than liability.”)
In Hixon, we accepted that part of the Ruffalo Court’s ruling that recognized
interference with visitation rights as a cognizable claim, but rejected the Ruffalo Court’s
conclusion that even the most trivial departures from court-ordered visitation could create a
sustainable cause of action:
This Court does not accept “that portion of the reasoning in
Ruffalo which indicates that, because they deter (or might deter)
illegal conduct, damage suits are a desirable remedy, even for
relatively minor interferences with visitations rights.”
Hixon, 306 Md. at 83, 507 A.2d 612-13 (emphasis added).  Based on this understanding, we
distinguished minor interferences with visitation from more substantial ones and held that
Hixon failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the interferences
37
alleged fell short of the more substantial interferences complained of in Ruffalo and the other
cases upon which Hixon relied:
It is apparent from the foregoing review that the interference
alleged here falls short, by a considerable distance, of the more
substantial interferences presented in many of the cases relied
upon by Hixon.  The belligerent words described by Hixon are
a relatively minor interference. Indeed, the nature of the
interference alleged here is so minor that it is doubtful whether
most courts would recognize it as mounting up to a tortious
interference with custody rights, remediable by damages, were
the same verbal exchange to have taken place when a custodial
parent might be picking up a child at the end of a visit with a
noncustodial parent.
Id. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, by dismissing Hixon’s complaint
as insufficient, we determined that Maryland recognizes a cause of action for interference
with visitation rights so long as the alleged interference is not minor.  Id. 
Clearly, the Complaint in the present case alleges a major and substantial interference
with visitation rights because Shannon stated that he has been deprived of his right to
visitation from August 26, 2001, to the present.  To be sure, the allegations of the abduction
and harboring of Jason since August 26, 2001, are precisely the type of substantial
interference contemplated by Hixon.  The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying the
motion to dismiss.  In reaching this conclusion, however, we emphasize our admonition in
Hixon that allegations of less than a major or substantial interference with visitation rights
will not suffice to state a cause of action.
D. Damages
38
Appellants also challenge the trial court’s dismissal of their post-trial motions, arguing
that the jury’s punitive damage award was excessive. In determining whether an award of
punitive damages is appropriate, we have recognized that “[t]he factors limiting the size of
punitive damages awards . . . are principles of law,” Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 47,
710 A.2d 267, 288 (1998), and “decisions on matters of law . . . are reviewed de novo.”
Renbaum v. Custom Holding, Inc., 386 Md. 28, 43, 871 A.2d 554, 563 (2005); Davis v.
Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004) (interpretations of the Maryland Code
and the Maryland Rules are reviewed de novo); Nesbit v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md.
65, 72, 854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004) (interpretations of Maryland statutory and case law are
conducted under a de novo review).
We generally review punitive damages in light of nine, non-exclusive, legal principles
articulated by Judge John C. Eldridge, speaking on behalf of this Court in Bowden, 350 Md.
at 27-41, 710 A.2d at 278-85.  In describing these factors we explained “‘that the factors are
not criteria that must be established but, rather, guideposts to assist a court in reviewing an
award,’” and that “not all . . . are pertinent in every case involving court review of punitive
damages awards.”   Id. at 41, 710 A.2d at 285.  In addition, we stated that the nine principles
are “not intended to be exclusive or all-encompassing,” and “[o]ther principles may
appropriately be applicable to judicial review of punitive damages awards under particular
circumstances.” Id.  Seven of the nine Bowden factors are relevant to the instant review: (1)
the defendant’s ability to pay; (2) the relationship of the award to statutorily imposed criminal
14
The other two factors from Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 33-34, 710
A.2d 267, 281-82 (1998), whether “evidence of other final and satisfied punitive damages
awards against the same defendant for the same conduct” should be considered; and, if
separate torts are implicated, whether they grew out of the same occurrence or episode; are
not implicated in the present case.
39
fines; (3) the amount of the award in comparison to other final punitive damage awards in
the jurisdiction and, in particular, in somewhat comparable cases; (4) the gravity of the
defendant’s conduct; (5) the deterrent value of the award both with respect to the defendant
and the general public; (6) whether compensatory damages, including litigation expenses,
sufficiently compensate the plaintiff, and (7) whether a reasonable relationship exists between
compensatory and punitive damages.14  We will address the first three factors individually,
as Appellants do, and the remaining factors collectively.
In Bowden we recognized that the “amount of punitive damages ‘should not be
disproportionate to . . . the defendant's ability to pay’” because “[t]he purpose of punitive
damages is not to bankrupt or impoverish a defendant.”  Id. at 28, 710 A.2d at 278.  In
Darcars Motors of Silver Springs, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 275-76, 841 A.2d 828, 843-
44 (2004), however, we explicated:
Sound reasoning supports our view that a plaintiff has no
obligation to establish a defendant’s ability to pay punitive
damages. Compelling a plaintiff seeking punitive damages to
present evidence of a defendant’s financial condition could, on
the one hand, require a plaintiff with limited financial resources
to wage a complicated discovery campaign against a monetarily
sated defendant. On the other hand, it would license the plaintiff
to conduct extensive pre-trial discovery of the defendant’s
finances to support a measure of damages that may never be
40
awarded.  Not only could the latter result in a severe invasion of
the defendant’s privacy, but it could also unnecessarily cost the
defendant a great deal of time and money to compile all of its
financial information.
Moreover, placing a burden on plaintiff to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s financial condition will enhance the risk that a jury
will place undue emphasis on the defendant’s wealth. If that
should occur, the jury may become more prone to use
information of a wealthy defendant’s finances to justify an award
of punitive damages disproportionately higher than the gravity
of the defendant’s wrongdoing.  As we stated in Bowden,
“merely because a defendant may be able to pay a very large
award of punitive damages, without jeopardizing the defendant’s
financial position, does not justify an award which is
disproportionate to the heinousness of the defendant’s conduct.”
350 Md. at 28, 710 A.2d at 279.
Based on these reasons, we see no reason to alter the way in
which evidence of a defendant’s ability to pay is presented.
Consequently, a plaintiff does not bear a burden to present
evidence of a defendant’s financial condition in support of its
pursuit of punitive damages.
The Appellants, nevertheless, argue that an award totaling $2,000,000 in punitive
damages and $1,017,500 in compensatory damages cannot stand because there was no
evidence at all on this record of their ability to pay damages.  Their assertion, however, that
there is nothing whatsoever in the record to provide a “guidepost” for determining their
ability to pay punitive damages is rebuffed by Michael Shannon’s uncontroverted  testimony
on direct examination:
Q
. . . Where does Afaf Khalifa maintain different
residences?
A
I stayed for four days at a beach house with Spanish
41
marble in Al-Alemein on the Mediterranean coast.  She
told me it was valued at three million dollars.  They have
apartments in Alexandria, [Egypt] which is also on the
Mediterranean coast about 50 miles to the east.  We
stayed there for one night.  They have a 400-acre farm
home, a farm in Giza with a three-story farmhouse that
grows mangos and plantains and other vegetables and it’s
worked.
They also have a chalet outside Zurich, Switzerland.  On
the way to Egypt we stopped there for two days.  It’s in
Coor, south of Zurich.  They own a chalet there.  And
I’ve been to a home they own in San Marcos, California,
just north of San Diego on the coast.  So, I’ve been in six
properties that they own.  
Q
How many cars to your personal knowledge have you
seen at those residences?
* * *
A
At the one in Al-Almein, there were two Mercedes and
then four cars were kept at the Heliopolis complex.
Although the likelihood that the damages will bankrupt Appellants is a relevant
consideration, we do not require Shannon to prove that appellants can pay nor do we require
him to prove that the referenced properties were titled under their names.  Shannon’s
uncontroverted testimony concerning the Khalifas’ wealth is sufficient to conclude that the
jury’s $2,000,000 award is neither disproportionate nor excessive with respect to the
Khalifa’s ability to pay.
Appellants also argue that the damages are excessive because the punitive damages
imposed total 180 times the maximum criminal fine of $5,000.  In Bowden, 350 Md. at 30-31,
710 A.2d at 279-80, when setting forth the relationship of punitive damages to the criminal
42
fine as a factor, we primarily relied on Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 242-
43 n.13, 652 A.2d 1117, 1130 n. 13 (1995), in which we offered that in the context of
commercial activity, the cap on criminal fines of $1,000,000 for drug kingpins, $500,000 for
commercial crimes in the antitrust area, and $10,000 for fraud may serve as a guide for
legislative intent on punitive damage awards.  We, however, also noted in Bowden, 350 Md.
at 31, 710 A.2d at 280, that under other circumstances, such as when the principal sanction
is imprisonment, the criminal fine may not be helpful:
Under some circumstances, the maximum criminal fine for
comparable conduct should not be given very much weight in
reviewing a punitive damages award for excessiveness. There
are many serious criminal offenses chiefly aimed at individuals,
rather than corporate entities, where the principal sanction is
imprisonment, and the monetary penalty is relatively small.
Section 9-307(d) of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1999, 2006 Repl. Vol.), states
that a person convicted of child abduction “is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject
to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or both.”  This crime
is chiefly aimed at individuals and the severity of the three-year prison sentence, rather than
the nominal $5,000 fine is the legislature’s principal method of deterrence.  This crime is also
distinct from those commercial crimes described in Ellerin, where the fine is aimed at a
corporate entity or ringleader, where the principal reason for engaging in the conduct is
monetary gain, and where the fine generally is imposed to extract from defendants at least the
amount by which they profited from the illegal activity.  Because the fine called for under
Section 9-307(b) of the Family Law Article bears no relationship to the purpose for
43
committing the crime of abduction, which is aimed at individuals, and the fine is nominal in
relation to the three-year prison sentence, it is not helpful in determining the appropriateness
of punitive damages here.
Appellants, citing Bowden, 350 Md. at 31-33, 710 A.2d at 280-81, next assert that the
$1,100,000 in punitive damage awarded against Nermeen Khalifa Shannon, and the $900,000
in punitive damages awarded against Afaf Khalifa are excessive in comparison to other
punitive awards: 
Another appropriate consideration in judicially reviewing an
award of punitive damages is to compare the award with other
final punitive damages awards in the jurisdiction, and
particularly with awards in somewhat comparable cases.  See,
e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra, 701 So.2d at
515 (“For guidance in determining the amount of punitive
damages that would be proper, we have looked to comparable
cases”). See also Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
supra, 499 U.S. at 20-21, 111 S.Ct. at 1045, 113 L.Ed.2d at 21
(pointing to judicial review “undertak[ing] a comparative
analysis” as an “additional check on the jury’s . . . discretion”);
Edwards v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 911 F.2d 1151,
1154 (5th Cir. 1990).
In Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc.,
Inc., 88 Md. App. 672, 720, 596 A.2d 687, 710-711 (1991), cert.
denied, 326 Md. 435, 605 A.2d 137 (1992), Chief Judge Wilner
for the Court of Special Appeals, in vacating an extremely large
punitive damages award, stated:
On this record, we do not believe that a $12.5
million punitive award comports with [the law].
Although we cannot say with complete certainty
that it is the largest punitive award rendered by a
Maryland court, it is the largest, by far, of which
we are aware.  The nearest in amount was
44
$7,500,000 rendered in 
Potomac Electric v. Smith,
79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768 (1989), and the
nearest to that was $1,000,000, which we vacated
in Edmonds v. Murphy, supra, 83 Md. App. 133,
573 A.2d 853. Most of the punitive awards to date
have been well under $100,000; other than the
award in Potomac Electric, the highest allowed to
stand was $910,000 against Exxon Corporation in
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516
A.2d 990 (1986).
[T]he $12.5 million allowed by the court [is]
extraordinary in terms of Maryland history . . . .
The cases in which punitive damages awards have been upheld
by this Court are even more striking. Apparently the largest
award of punitive damages which has ever been upheld by this
Court was $700,000, and in that case the size of the award was
not an issue before this Court.  Franklin Square Hosp. v.
Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 617-618, 569 A.2d 693, 694-695 (1990).
The next ten highest awards of punitive damages upheld by us
seem to be as follows:  $107,875 (St. Luke Church v. Smith, 318
Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990)); $100,000 each for two plaintiffs,
based on two separate acts of fraud (Nails v. S. & R., 334 Md.
398, 639 A.2d 660 (1994)); $82,000 (Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md.
194, 647 A.2d 429 (1994)); $50,000 (Macklin v. Logan, 334 Md.
287, 639 A.2d 112 (1994)); $40,000 (Embrey v. Holly, supra,
293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966); $36,000 (Drug Fair of Md., Inc.
v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971)); $35,000 (General
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977));
$30,000 (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261
A.2d 731 (1970)); $25,000 (Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975)); $25,000
(American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962)).
Moreover, in most of these cases no argument was made that the
punitive awards were excessive.
Id. (alterations in original).  Although Appellants, following Bowden, cite cases regarding
punitive damage awards, none of those cases involve the abduction and ongoing harboring
45
of minor children from their father.  
One jurisdiction has encountered similar circumstances and has affirmed a punitive
damage award of $53,000,000 in favor of a mother when the children’s father, with the help
of his siblings and friends, who were also named as defendants, abducted and harbored their
children in England.  Smith v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 586, 590-91 (Tex. App. 1986).  We do not
believe that $1,100,000 in punitive damages awarded against Nermeen Khalifa Shannon nor
the $900,000 in punitive damages awarded against Afaf Khlalifa are excessive.
We also conclude that the final four Bowden factors, the gravity of the defendant’s
conduct, the deterrent value of the award both with respect to the defendant and the general
public, whether compensatory damages, including litigation expenses, sufficiently
compensate the plaintiff, and whether a reasonable relationship exists between compensatory
and punitive damages, justify the imposition of $1,100,000 and $900,000 in punitive
damages.  First, the evidence shows that Appellants activity is particularly heinous.  In 2001,
Appellants told Shannon that they were taking his sons Adam and Jason to New York and
that they would return them thereafter; in reality, they put the young boys on a plane for
Egypt, never to return.  It is clear from the record that Appellants consciously and knowingly
have deprived a father of the love and comfort of his two children for an extended period of
time.
There is no evidence, furthermore, that Appellants have taken any action to rectify the
situation.  In Bowden, 350 Md. at 29, 710 A.2d at 279, when discussing the deterrent value
46
of punitive awards, we noted that “a defendant’s taking of remedial or corrective action,
promptly after the misconduct giving rise to the award of punitive damages, obviously should
be a mitigating factor.”  Rather, Appellants have done quite the opposite, because as each day
passes, Shannon is deprived of contact with the boys, who are now eleven and eight.  We
view Appellants’ ongoing harboring of Shannon’s children in Egypt as an aggravating factor,
and a high punitive award is appropriate to deter others from engaging in similar conduct.
Evidence of the ongoing absence of the children also indicates to us that Shannon will never
be fully compensated for the loss of society and companionship that he has suffered at the
hands of the Appellants.  
The punitive damages, finally, bear a reasonable relationship to the compensatory
damages.  In Franklin Square Hospital v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 624, 569 A.2d 693, 697
(1990), for example, we affirmed an award of $700,000 in punitive damages and $300,000
in actual damages, a ratio of exactly 2.33 to 1.  Here, the jury awarded $1,100,000 in punitive
damages and $500,000 in compensatory damages against Nermeen Khalifa Shannon, a 2.2
to 1 ratio, and $900,000 in punitive damages versus $500,000 in compensatory damages
against Afaf Khalifa, a less than 2 to 1 ratio.
In light of all of the factors, we conclude that the punitive damage award is neither
excessive nor disproportionate.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANTS.
In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. 02-C-04-096644
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 56
September Term, 2007
AFAF NASSAR KHALIFA, ET AL.
v.
MICHAEL SHANNON
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Concurring Opinion by Raker, J.
Filed:   April 9, 2008
1
Raker, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment because I believe that this Court has the power to recognize
a new cause of action in tort.  I do not join the majority opinion because I believe that this
Court has not heretofore recognized the cause of action in tort for interference with parent-
child relations as finally stated by the majority. 
I disagree with the Court’s reading of Hixon.  In my view, we did not recognized a
cause of action in tort as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 700.  In Hixon, this
Court observed that the belligerent words described by plaintiff were a relatively minor
interference—indeed so minor that we doubted whether most courts would recognize it as
amounting to a tortious interference with custody rights, remediable by damages.  We held
as follows:
“Consequently we need not decide in this case whether, or, if so,
under what circumstances a damage action might lie for
interference with visitation rights.  We hold simply that a parent
or that parent’s ally who, without committing any tort presently
recognized in Maryland, speaks hostilely to the other parent
about that parent’s exercise of custody or visitation rights does
not thereby become liable in damages.”  
Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 83, 507 A.2d 607, 612 (1986).  The Court in Hixon’s
quotation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 700 does not stand for the proposition that
the Court adopted the tort as set out in that section.  In fact, the Maryland cases cited by the
Hixon court “state the prerequisites of that tort to be that the parent have the right to custody
and that actual service have been rendered by the child to the parent which the parent lost due
2
to the abduction, enticement, or harboring by the defendant.”  Id. at 77, 507 A.2d at 609.
In sum, if this Court chooses to recognize a new cause of action, we can do so, but we
should say that is what we are doing, and why we are doing it.  Otherwise, we should leave
these policy decisions to the General Assembly, particularly in an area that has potentially
far-reaching social and legal consequences and where the Legislature has previously acted.
See, e.g., §§ 9-304 to -307 of the Family Law Article, Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.).