Case Title: In re Z.R.

Citation: 2015-Ohio-3306

Docket Number: 2014-0277

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Z.R., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3306.] 
  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3306 
IN RE Z.R. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Z.R., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3306.] 
Juvenile 
courts—Procedure—The 
venue 
directives 
contained 
in 
R.C. 
2151.27(A)(1) are not jurisdictional requirements—Improper venue does 
not deprive juvenile court of jurisdiction—Juvenile court did not err when 
it denied motion to dismiss for improper venue and instead determined 
that transfer was the appropriate measure. 
(No. 2014-0277—Submitted March 24, 2015—Decided August 20, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 26860, 2014-Ohio-182. 
_____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether the failure to establish proper 
venue in a child-dependency complaint requires a juvenile court to dismiss the 
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction.  We hold that the statute and rule governing 
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venue do not control the jurisdiction of a juvenile court and that a dismissal for 
improper venue therefore cannot be entered on jurisdictional grounds. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} L.R. is the biological mother of six children, including Z.R., her 
youngest child.  L.R.’s five older children were removed from her custody and 
were adjudicated dependent and neglected on February 10, 2012, in the Summit 
County Juvenile Court due to L.R.’s failure to provide adequate housing, food, 
and clothing. 
{¶ 3} There is no evidence that L.R. has ever followed the case plan 
established by Summit County Children Services (“SCCS”) to rectify the 
conditions that led to the children’s removal and subsequent adjudication as 
dependent and neglected.  In fact, none of the objectives established in the case 
plan for L.R.’s five older children were achieved.  There is no evidence that L.R. 
has regained custody of any of her children. 
{¶ 4} Between the winter of 2011 and August 2012, L.R. reported 
numerous addresses to SCCS.  SCCS was unable to verify any of those addresses.  
According to SCCS, L.R.’s last known verified address was in Summit County, 
but the agency believed that L.R. had been evicted from that residence.  The final 
entry in the siblings’ consolidated cases prior to the initiation of Z.R.’s case was 
on August 7, 2012.  At that point, L.R.’s place of residence was unknown.  But by 
the time of Z.R.’s birth, L.R. was reportedly staying with family members in 
Cleveland. 
{¶ 5} On August 23, 2012, L.R. gave birth to Z.R. at University Hospitals 
of Cleveland, in Cuyahoga County.  L.R. had been evasive with SCCS about the 
due date for Z.R.’s birth and her intended permanent residence, and the hospital 
had already received a request by SCCS to be notified in the event that L.R. gave 
birth at that location.  On August 24, 2012, the hospital submitted a referral to 
SCCS concerning Z.R. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 6} On the same day, SCCS filed a complaint in Summit County 
Juvenile Court alleging that Z.R. was a dependent child due to the ongoing, open 
cases involving L.R.’s other children and the fact that L.R. had not taken any 
steps to address the issues that had led to the dependency and neglect 
adjudications of her other children.  L.R. filed a combined motion to transfer the 
cases of Z.R.’s siblings to Cuyahoga County and to dismiss the complaint 
regarding Z.R. for lack of jurisdiction.  L.R. argued that because Z.R. was born in 
Cuyahoga County and had no connections to Summit County, the Summit County 
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain SCCS’s dependency 
complaint. 
{¶ 7} On December 6, 2012, the Summit County Juvenile Court found 
Z.R. to be a dependent child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C) and (D).  With regard to 
the motion to dismiss, the Summit County Juvenile Court ordered Z.R.’s case to 
be transferred to Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court. 
{¶ 8} L.R. objected to the Summit County Juvenile Court’s adjudication, 
arguing in part that venue was improper due to Z.R.’s lack of contacts with 
Summit County.  The Summit County Juvenile Court overruled L.R.’s objection.  
The court noted that the prior attempt to transfer Z.R.’s case had been rejected by 
the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, and it ordered that a second attempt to 
transfer the case would be made once L.R. verified her residency in Cuyahoga 
County. 
{¶ 9} L.R. appealed the juvenile court’s adjudication of dependency to the 
Ninth District Court of Appeals, raising six assignments of error.  The appellate 
court sustained L.R.’s first assignment of error, which asserted that the trial court 
erred by failing to dismiss the complaint when it was filed in an improper venue. 
{¶ 10} The appellate court looked to Juv.R. 10 and R.C. 2151.27, which 
provide that a dependency complaint may be filed in the county where the child 
resides or where the dependency occurred.  The court agreed with L.R.’s 
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contention that Z.R.’s residence and alleged dependency occurred solely in 
Cuyahoga County, and it held that SCCS had failed to establish proper venue in 
the Summit County Juvenile Court. 
{¶ 11} The appellate court then reasoned that a complaint that fails to 
comply with the venue requirements of Juv.R. 10 and R.C. 2151.27 must be 
dismissed upon a timely motion.  It acknowledged that the Summit County 
Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but it 
maintained that improper venue nevertheless defeated SCCS’s ability to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court over that particular case.  Accordingly, the appellate 
court reversed the Summit County Juvenile Court’s decision based upon L.R.’s 
first assignment of error.  The appellate court held that L.R.’s remaining 
assignments of error were moot and declined to address them. 
{¶ 12} We accepted SCCS’s discretionary appeal, which asked us to 
address whether proper venue for a dependency complaint can be based upon the 
location of prior acts involving the allegedly dependent child’s siblings and 
whether a juvenile court is required to dismiss a dependency complaint on 
jurisdictional grounds because of improper venue.  See 139 Ohio St.3d 1403, 
2014-Ohio-2245, 9 N.E.3d 1062. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 13} The second issue—whether a juvenile court must dismiss a 
dependency complaint due to improper venue—is dispositive of this case.  
Assuming arguendo that the Summit County Juvenile Court was an improper 
venue for filing the complaint in this case, we hold that dismissal of the complaint 
was not required.  Therefore, we do not reach the issue of whether venue was 
proper in this case. 
{¶ 14} Ohio’s juvenile courts are statutory courts, created by the General 
Assembly.  R.C. Chapter 2151; State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 652 N.E.2d 
196 (1995).  As a statutory court, the juvenile court has limited jurisdiction, and it 
January Term, 2015 
 
5
can exercise only the authority conferred upon it by the General Assembly.  See 
State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929), paragraph 
four of the syllabus. 
{¶ 15} Ohio’s Juvenile Rules, created by this court pursuant to Section 5, 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, were fashioned to ensure a uniform procedure 
for juvenile courts.  Linger v. Weiss, 57 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 386 N.E.2d 1354 
(1979).  It is well understood that the substantive and procedural rules that are 
applicable in the unique context of juvenile court proceedings are quite different 
from those applicable during criminal or civil proceedings in courts of general 
jurisdiction.  See In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 
1177, ¶ 65-67; In re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 15, 556 N.E.2d 439 (1990).  But it 
does not follow that the limited subject-matter jurisdiction and unique nature of 
juvenile courts, in and of themselves, transform the Juvenile Rules and statutory 
directives into jurisdictional requirements. 
{¶ 16} It is undisputed that all Ohio juvenile courts have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over dependency cases.  R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) provides that a juvenile 
court has “exclusive original jurisdiction * * * [c]oncerning any child who on or 
about the date specified in the complaint * * * is alleged * * * to be a * * * 
dependent child.”  It is not possible for this statutory grant of jurisdiction to be 
limited by the Juvenile Rules.  Linger at 100, quoting Juv.R. 44 (“ ‘[t]hese rules 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the juvenile court’ ”).  
Moreover, jurisdiction and venue are distinct legal concepts.  In re A.G., 139 Ohio 
St.3d 572, 2014-Ohio-2597, 13 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 53, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 32 
Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Venue is a 
“procedural matter,” and it refers not to the power to hear a case but to the 
geographic location where a given case should be heard.  Morrison at 87-88. 
{¶ 17} Although, as a general matter, the nature of the juvenile courts does 
not transform venue into a jurisdictional prerequisite, it is still possible for the 
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General Assembly to restrict any court’s jurisdiction over a particular case based 
on a procedural requirement such as venue.  See, e.g., Shinkle v. Ashtabula Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 135 Ohio St.3d 227, 2013-Ohio-397, 985 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 19 
(discussing the ways in which mandatory statutory requirements may require 
compliance in order to invoke the jurisdiction of a court).  This court is not wont 
to construe procedural provisions as jurisdictional barriers unless they are “clearly 
statutorily or constitutionally mandated.”  Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980).  Instead, if a procedural 
provision is more reasonably construed as directory rather than mandatory, a 
failure to comply with the provision will not preclude a court’s jurisdiction over 
the case.  In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 523, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (1999).  
Consequently, we must determine whether the venue provisions contained in R.C. 
2151.27 were put in place by the General Assembly as requirements that must be 
met in order to invoke the jurisdiction of a juvenile court. 
{¶ 18} The pertinent portion of R.C. 2151.27 provides: 
 
[A]ny person having knowledge of a child who appears to * * * be 
an unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child may file a sworn 
complaint with respect to that child in the juvenile court of the 
county in which the child has a residence or legal settlement or in 
which the violation, unruliness, abuse, neglect, or dependency 
allegedly occurred. * * * The sworn complaint may be upon 
information and belief, and, in addition to the allegation that the 
child * * * is an unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child, the 
complaint shall allege the particular facts upon which the 
allegation that the child * * * is an unruly, abused, neglected, or 
dependent child is based. 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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R.C. 2151.27(A)(1). 
{¶ 19} To determine the import of R.C. 2151.27, we must consider the 
statute in context.  See In re C.T., 119 Ohio St.3d 494, 2008-Ohio-4570, 895 
N.E.2d 527, ¶ 12.  The body of laws governing the same subject must be read in 
pari materia.  In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, 
¶ 7.  We therefore turn to the statutory scheme governing juvenile courts to decide 
the question before us. 
{¶ 20} The General Assembly has made clear that the central purpose of 
the juvenile court system is “[t]o provide for the care, protection, and mental and 
physical development of children.”  R.C. 2151.01(A); see also Children’s Home 
of Marion Cty. v. Fetter, 90 Ohio St. 110, 127, 106 N.E. 761 (1914) (recognizing 
over a century ago that the legislature established the juvenile courts “in order to 
protect children”); In re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 15, 556 N.E.2d 439 (“The mission 
of the juvenile court is to act as an insurer of the welfare of children and a 
provider of social and rehabilitative services”). 
{¶ 21} The General Assembly has also made clear that the laws governing 
the administration of the juvenile courts must be “liberally interpreted and 
construed” to effectuate the above purposes.  R.C. 2151.01.  In application, the 
goals of protecting and caring for children, in conjunction with the requirement of 
statutory flexibility in promoting those goals, result in proceedings that are less 
formal and less adversarial than in courts of general jurisdiction.  See In re T.R. at 
15.  Not surprisingly then, juvenile courts must prioritize substance over form. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) provides that any person may file a complaint 
alleging that a child is dependent “in the juvenile court of the county in which the 
child has a residence or legal settlement or in which the * * * dependency 
allegedly occurred.”  (Emphasis added.)  See also Juv.R. 10(A).  But R.C. 
2151.27 and Juv. R. 10(A) do not contain any language suggesting that a court 
must dismiss a dependency complaint filed in a county that does not meet either 
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of these two criteria.  Even R.C. 2151.27(D), a catchall provision providing that 
complaints for any other matter not addressed in the statute and over which the 
court has jurisdiction “shall be filed in the county in which the child who is the 
subject of the complaint is found or was last known to be found,” does not 
expressly require dismissal of a complaint filed in some other venue.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 23} The only place the prospect of dismissing a complaint explicitly 
appears in R.C. 2151.27 is in subsection (F), which governs consideration of a 
complaint alleging that a child is an unruly child.  R.C. 2151.27(F).  Even there, 
the statute provides only that “the court may dismiss the complaint” if the child 
completes a diversion program.  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  Given that dismissal is 
expressly contemplated elsewhere in R.C. 2151.27, the failure to couch the venue 
provisions of subsection (A)(1) in mandatory terms or to mention dismissal in that 
subsection strongly indicates that venue is not a jurisdictional requirement in the 
context of a dependency complaint. 
{¶ 24} Venue defects in juvenile court proceedings are generally corrected 
using Juv.R. 11, which governs the transfer of cases to another county.  See, e.g., 
In re W.W., 190 Ohio App.3d 653, 2010-Ohio-5305, 943 N.E.2d 1055, ¶ 21 (11th 
Dist.).  Juv.R. 11 addresses two scenarios.  First, when a juvenile court 
proceeding is commenced in a county outside a child’s county of residence, the 
juvenile court may transfer the proceeding to the child’s county of residence 
“upon the filing of the complaint or after the adjudicatory or dispositional hearing 
for such further proceeding as required.”  Juv.R. 11(A).  Second, when a juvenile 
court proceeding is commenced in a county outside a child’s county of residence 
and “other proceedings involving the child are pending in the juvenile court of the 
county of the child’s residence,” the juvenile court must transfer the proceedings.  
Juv.R. 11(B). 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
{¶ 25} Notably, dismissal is not provided as an option under any scenario 
within Juv.R. 11.  A number of lower courts have acknowledged this important 
and apparently intentional omission from Juv.R. 11.  See Witt v. Walker, 2d Dist. 
Clark No. 2012-CA-58, 2013-Ohio-714, ¶ 38, citing In re W.W. at ¶ 21.  Instead, 
the decision to transfer venue is generally within the juvenile court’s broad 
discretion.  In re S.M., 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 09CA5, 2009-Ohio-3118, ¶ 25; In 
re McLean, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0018, 2005-Ohio-2576, ¶ 25; In re 
Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 192-193, 648 N.E.2d 52 (3rd Dist.1994); Ackerman 
v. Lucas Cty. Children Services Bd., 49 Ohio App.3d 14, 15, 550 N.E.2d 549 (6th 
Dist.1989). 
{¶ 26} It is clear from the foregoing statutes and rules governing the 
administration of Ohio’s juvenile courts that the venue provisions included in 
R.C. 2151.27 and reflected in Juv.R. 10 are directory rather than mandatory.  See 
In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d at 523, 705 N.E.2d 1219.  Thus, the failure to satisfy 
the venue provisions of R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) in a dependency complaint would not 
remove a juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the case, and dismissal would not be 
proper on those grounds. 
{¶ 27} Our conclusion is consistent with the general practice of ensuring 
wide discretion for juvenile courts.  See In re T.W., 2012-Ohio-2843, 972 N.E.2d 
1136, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.) (“Whether a proceeding should be dismissed or reach the 
merits is within the sound discretion of the trial judge”).  Requiring juvenile 
courts to dismiss complaints filed in an improper venue is inconsistent with the 
latitude typically granted to those courts and with the General Assembly’s 
intention in creating juvenile courts.  See R.C. 2151.01(A); Children’s Home of 
Marion Cty., 90 Ohio St. at 127, 106 N.E. 761. 
{¶ 28} Moreover, strong public-policy reasons support our holding.  If we 
were to hold that dismissal is required for venue defects in a dependency 
complaint, we might foster attempts by some parents to avoid oversight by 
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deliberately moving their abused, neglected, or dependent children from one 
county to another in order to avoid adjudication, and we would ignore the reality 
that families often have to move from one county to another to secure housing or 
employment, or for other legitimate reasons.  Failure to recognize and allow for 
the sometimes transient patterns of people involved with our state’s children 
services bureaus cannot be the result the General Assembly intended for R.C. 
2151.27(A)(1), as it would directly undermine the juvenile court system’s ability 
to protect children. 
{¶ 29} In the context of R.C. Chapter 2151 as a whole, as well as the 
purposes behind the creation of the juvenile court system, we conclude that the 
venue directives contained in R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) are not jurisdictional 
requirements and that it is within a juvenile court’s sound discretion to remedy an 
alleged venue defect by transferring a case to a proper venue. 
{¶ 30} In this case, L.R. moved to dismiss SCCS’s dependency complaint 
regarding Z.R. solely on the grounds that the complaint failed to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Summit County Juvenile Court.  The motion to dismiss, which 
was combined with a motion to transfer the cases of Z.R.’s siblings to the 
Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, in no way asserted that the transfer of Z.R.’s 
case to Cuyahoga County would constitute an abuse of discretion.  Irrespective of 
the allegedly improper venue, the Summit County Juvenile Court did not err when 
it denied L.R.’s motion to dismiss SCCS’s dependency complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction and instead determined that the appropriate measure would be to 
transfer Z.R.’s case to a proper venue. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 31} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the appellate court to address 
L.R.’s five remaining assignments of error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Judgment reversed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_____________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven 
DiMartino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Denise E. Ferguson, for appellee. 
_____________________