Case Title: State v. Edward A. Hammer

Citation: 2000 WI 92

Docket Number: 1998AP002900-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2900-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Edward A. Hammer,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald P. Ptacek 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Rex R. Anderegg and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Rex R. Anderegg. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2000 WI 92 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Edward A. Hammer,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Racine 
County, Gerald P. Ptacek, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case comes before us on 
certification from the District II Court of Appeals.  The 
appellant, Edward A. Hammer, seeks review of a circuit court 
decision, which allowed other acts evidence pertaining to his 
past sexual conduct to be admitted in a current sexual assault 
case against him.  Hammer also seeks review of the circuit 
court's ruling to prohibit testimony regarding the alleged 
victims' past sexual conduct, arguing that his Sixth Amendment 
right to confront witnesses and compel testimony on his behalf 
outweighed the state's interest in applying the rape shield 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
2 
statute.  Hammer argues that the circuit court's rulings on 
these issues denied his right to a fair trial. 
¶2 
The circuit court convicted Hammer of second-degree 
sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1995-
96),1 
and 
fourth-degree 
sexual 
assault 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(3m).  The court ruled that the other acts evidence 
against 
Hammer 
would 
be 
allowed 
because 
the 
evidence 
demonstrated a motive, opportunity, mode or method of operation, 
and absence of mistake under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), 
which the court found were proper purposes under the statute.  
The circuit court also decided that the other acts evidence was 
relevant, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01, and 
that under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03, the probative value of 
the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair 
prejudice against Hammer.  However, the circuit court prohibited 
testimony regarding the victims' past sexual conduct, in 
accordance with the rape shield statute, Wis. Stat. § 972.11, 
despite Hammer's argument that this violated his right to 
confront witnesses against him and compel testimony on his 
behalf under the Sixth Amendment. 
¶3 
We affirm the decision of the circuit court.  We hold 
that the evidence of Hammer's past sexual conduct is admissible 
under the three-step test set forth in State v. Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  The evidence of 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 text unless otherwise noted. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
3 
Hammer's past sexual conduct was properly admitted to prove mode 
or method of operation, and therefore, to establish identity.  
Further, the evidence is relevant and its probative value is not 
substantially 
outweighed 
by 
danger 
of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion, misleading the jury, or undue delay. 
¶4 
We also hold that the evidence of the victims' prior 
sexual conduct was properly kept from the jury in accordance 
with the rape shield statute.  The state's interest in applying 
the rape shield statute outweighed the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses and compel testimony.  
Finally, we hold that the circuit court's admission of Hammer's 
prior sexual conduct, while excluding the victims' prior sexual 
conduct, did not violate Hammer's right to a fair trial.   
I. 
 
¶5 
The record indicates that in the early morning hours 
of June 29, 1997, fourteen-year-old Mark D., seventeen-year-old 
Steven D., and their friend, sixteen-year-old Josh C., were 
staying at the home of defendant Edward A. Hammer's parents in 
Waterford, Wisconsin, where Hammer resided.  Allegedly, the 
defendant sexually assaulted all three boys during their stay at 
his parents' home. 
 
¶6 
The three boys had arrived at the home the day earlier 
accompanied by the defendant's brother, Steven Hammer.  Steven 
Hammer is the stepfather of Mark D. and Steven D.  Steven Hammer 
and the three boys had driven from Ohio to pick up Steven 
Hammer's two younger children, who had been visiting at their 
grandparents' home.   
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
4 
¶7 
The defendant is a homosexual.  (R. at 40:43-44.)  On 
the day of their arrival, but before the alleged incident, the 
boys allegedly made derogatory remarks to the defendant about 
homosexuals, even though they knew of his sexual orientation.  
Steven Hammer also intensely disapproved of his brother's 
homosexuality, but the rest of the Hammer family apparently was 
comfortable with it. 
 
¶8 
All three boys testified at trial as to their 
experiences while staying at the Hammer residence.2  In the early 
morning of June 29, 1997, the boys were asleep in the basement 
of the defendant's residence.  Steven D. slept on the bottom 
tier of a bunk bed, while Mark D. and Josh C. shared a hideaway 
bed.  The defendant had been at a wedding that night, returning 
home at approximately 3:00 a.m.  Around that time, Steven D. 
awoke because he felt someone touching his genital area with 
cold hands under his underwear and boxer shorts.  He did not 
know who had touched him, but the hands did not touch his penis. 
 He also noticed that the covers had been pulled off of him.  He 
slapped at the hands to push them away.   
¶9 
After experiencing this sensation, Steven D. got up to 
go to the restroom.  On his way to the restroom, he found the 
defendant lying on the floor next to the bed where Josh C. and 
Mark D. slept, but by the time he returned to bed, the defendant 
was gone.  He also noticed that when the boys originally went to 
                     
2 We rely primarily on the victims' testimony at trial in 
establishing the facts of this case, but supplement their 
testimony with information from the police reports.  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
5 
bed, two night-lights had been left on.  When he woke up, the 
night-lights were turned off.  Upon returning to bed, he turned 
the night-lights back on.  Shortly thereafter, Steven D. 
recalled that the defendant came back downstairs.  Steven D. got 
out of bed again, telling the defendant that he was sleepless 
and thirsty.  The defendant sat down in a chair next to the 
hideaway bed and asked Steven D. why he was unable to sleep.  He 
replied that he did not know why he was unable to sleep.  Steven 
D. procured a soda from the downstairs refrigerator and after 
drinking it, went back to bed.  As he was falling asleep, he 
heard the defendant talking to Mark D. about the wedding.  His 
next recollection was of Josh C. getting into Steven D.'s bed 
and saying that Ed had done something to Mark and him and that 
he wanted to kill Ed.  Josh C. also said that he and Mark had 
awakened Steven Hammer to tell him what happened. 
 
¶10 Mark D. testified that the defendant awoke him by 
tapping him on his forehead.  The defendant allegedly said that 
he was cold and wondered if Mark D. would move over so that the 
defendant could get into bed.  According to Mark D., while the 
defendant was in bed talking to Mark D. about football and 
wrestling, the defendant reached over and touched Josh C. in the 
hip and buttocks.  (R. at 36:205, 219-222.)  Mark D. then went 
to the restroom, and when he returned, he found the defendant 
lying in the middle of the bed next to Josh C.  Mark D. got back 
into the bed next to the defendant and fell asleep. 
 
 
¶11 Not long after Mark D. got back into bed, Josh C. said 
"quit" it and Mark D. heard Josh C. "slap something away."  (R. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
6 
at 36:206.)  Josh C. testified that he did not see who had 
touched him at that time, but later confirmed that the defendant 
was in bed with him.  He also testified that the individual 
touched his back under his t-shirt and his buttocks and legs 
over his shorts.  After slapping the individual's face and 
throwing his hands away from Josh C.'s body, Josh C. went to the 
restroom and then got into the top bunk bed.  
¶12 According to Mark D., the defendant then turned toward 
him.  The defendant touched Mark D.'s penis with his hand.  The 
defendant also grabbed Mark D.'s hand and put it on his penis 
while he sucked Mark D.'s penis.  Mark D. also testified that he 
"kept asking me if I am going to remember this in the morning." 
 (R. at 36:206.)  At first Mark D. did not respond and pretended 
to be asleep, hoping that the defendant would leave him alone, 
but when the defendant began to suck his penis, he got out of 
bed.  Mark D. woke up Josh C. and the two boys went upstairs 
together.  While Mark D. and Josh C. were conversing upstairs, 
they saw the defendant crawling up the basement stairs to go to 
his bedroom.  The boys then woke up Steven Hammer and Steven D. 
and told them what had just transpired. 
¶13 The defendant's parents were also awakened and told of 
the boys' accusations.  Mrs. Hammer found the defendant asleep 
in his own bedroom, and the defendant denied touching the boys 
improperly.  Nonetheless, Steven Hammer had the boys prepare 
written statements and summoned the police, whereupon the 
defendant was arrested.  Mrs. Hammer told the police that her 
son had confided that when he becomes intoxicated, he has 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
7 
homosexual urges upon which he acts.  The defendant's blood 
alcohol level at 7:21 a.m. was .13. 
 
 
¶14 The amended information reflects that the defendant 
was charged with (1) attempted second-degree sexual assault of 
an 
unconscious 
victim 
(Steven 
D.) 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(d); 2) fourth-degree sexual assault (of the same 
personSteven D.) under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3m); (3) second-
degree sexual assault of a child (Mark D.) under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2); and (4) fourth-degree sexual assault (of Josh C.) 
under § 940.225(3m).   
¶15 Prior to trial, the state requested permission to use 
prior acts evidence.  The state wanted to bring into evidence an 
incident that had supposedly occurred five to seven years 
earlier when the defendant was a guest at the Ohio home of Jason 
B.  The defendant awoke Jason B. by fondling Jason B.'s penis.  
Jason B. did not report the incident to the police at that time. 
 He recalled that the event took place more than four years ago. 
 Jason B. would have been twenty years old and the defendant 
eighteen.  However, the defendant's sister presented photographs 
and a letter to show that the incident actually took place in 
1990, when the defendant was a minor, at age sixteen.  
 
¶16 The circuit court, the Honorable Gerald P. Ptacek 
presiding, allowed in the evidence of this prior sexual assault, 
despite the defendant's objections at a motion hearing.  Judge 
Ptacek reasoned that the facts of the two incidents were similar 
and 
that 
the 
evidence 
was 
admissible 
to 
show 
motive, 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
8 
opportunity, mode or method of operation, and absence of 
mistake:   
 
It's clear obviously that the facts of these charges 
now pending and the offered Whitty evidence are about 
as mirror image as they could be in terms of 
similarity. 
 
The victims are males.  The assaults are alleged to 
have occurred at nighttime during sleep when the 
victims are either unconscious or asleep or not aware 
of what's happening.  They awakened to be touched.  
The manner of touching is very similar where the penis 
is touched at least in some of the counts in the 
pending charges and that's clearly what's alleged to 
have occurred in the offered Whitty evidence. 
 
Now, again, its [sic] similar in terms of sleeping 
arrangements, where the defendant is sleeping in the 
same environment as his victims either in the same 
room or close by . . . . 
 
The Whitty evidence case law that describes what is 
referred to as the greater latitude rule when it comes 
to juveniles I think has to be weighed in perspective 
because as I understand the cases [], the younger the 
victim, the more applicable is that concept. 
 
In this case, the victims are technically still 
juveniles but they are older teenagers and not young 
children who are below the teenage years . . . . That 
has some bearing on the greater latitude application. 
 
I am satisfied as it relates to the issue of mistake, 
absence of mistake . . . . This would respond to that 
in that obviously it's clear this Whitty evidence is 
an intentional act, . . . motive in the purpose of the 
touching would be sexual motivation, a method of 
operation taking a sleeping victim, approaching them 
in their sleep when they're not in a position to 
defend or respond . . . and certainly opportunity 
where opportunity is used with a sleeping victim in an 
environment of sleep in a bedroom in the privacy of a 
home.  These are all again relating to opportunity, so 
they're 
clearly 
relevant 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
relevance . . . . 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
9 
 
[I]t would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant 
certainly it's harmful to any defendant . . . but I am 
satisfied in this case in light of the . . . jury 
instructions . . . [that] protect a defendant against 
. . . improper use of evidence. 
 
I'm satisfied it would not be . . . unfairly 
prejudicial to the defendant and therefore, I will 
allow the evidence, so I'll rule the offered Whitty 
evidence can be presented. 
(R. at 33:20-23.) 
 
¶17 The circuit court revisited his ruling on the Jason B. 
prior acts evidence on the first day of trial and reiterated 
that the evidence was admissible to show motive, mode of 
operation, opportunity, and absence of mistake.  The defense 
counsel pointed out that the defense's theory would not be based 
on accident or "innocent explanation," but rather the theory 
that the defendant had never engaged in any contact with the 
boys.  The defense argued that this disqualified the court's 
earlier reasons for admitting the other acts evidence because 
the state wanted to use the evidence to contest a theory the 
defense would not raise.  The circuit court rejected the 
defendant's argument and admitted the testimony of Jason B. 
However, before Jason B. testified and at the end of the trial, 
the court read the standard jury instruction, WI-JI Criminal 
275, "Cautionary Instruction: Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, 
Acts [Required if Requested]--§ 904.02," to the jury.   
¶18 The prosecution also referred to the Jason B. evidence 
in closing.  The prosecution referred to the defendant's 
homosexuality to show that the defendant had the opportunity to 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
10
assault the boys, stating that opportunity is "a situation where 
he's in a residence with other individuals who are asleep and 
then he decides to act on these impulses of his and proceed to 
have sexual contact."  (R. at 40:152.)   
 
¶19 The circuit court did not, however, permit the defense 
to question Steven D. on cross-examination about any sexual 
contact between Mark D., Josh C., and himself.  The defendant 
sought to establish that he and his mother had witnessed the 
three boys engaging in sexually related acts the day before the 
defendant allegedly committed his acts.  He would have presented 
evidence that Josh C. attempted to put his penis into Steven 
D.'s mouth while Steven D. was taking a nap and that Mark D. 
stuck his buttocks into Steven D.'s face.  Both the defendant 
and 
his 
mother 
told 
the 
boys 
to 
stop 
this 
behavior.  
Additionally, the defendant's mother would have testified that 
she witnessed the boys pulling up their pants quickly when she 
went down to the basement.  This evidence, the defendant argued, 
would show a motive to fabricate and a pattern of conduct 
proximately related in time to his charged acts.  The state 
objected, arguing that the rape shield statute applied to 
preclude the evidence.  The circuit court balanced the rape 
shield statute against the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, 
and refused to permit the testimony. 
 
¶20 On February 13, 1998, the defendant was found guilty 
of second-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2), and fourth-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(3m)the charges relating to Mark D. and Josh C.  He 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
11
was acquitted of the charges relating to Steven D.attempted 
second-degree sexual assault of an unconscious victim under 
§ 940.225(2)(d), 
and 
fourth-degree 
sexual 
assault 
under 
§ 940.225(3m). 
II. 
 
¶21 The first issue we address is whether the circuit 
court properly admitted evidence of the defendant's prior sexual 
assault of Jason B.  We must determine whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it admitted the 
evidence.  State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1983).  We uphold a circuit court's discretion if the court 
"exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal 
standards and in accordance with the facts of record."  State v. 
Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979).  If there 
was a reasonable basis for the court's determination, then we 
will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d at 342 (citing Boodry v. Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 589, 426 
N.W.2d 503 (1964)). 
 
¶22 We conclude that the evidence of the defendant's prior 
sexual assault was admissible under the three-step analytical 
framework set forth in Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73.  In 
Sullivan we stated that we ask the following three questions in 
assessing the admissibility of other acts evidence: 
 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2), such as establishing motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident? 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
12
(2) Is 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
relevant, 
considering the two facets of relevance set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01?  The first consideration 
in assessing relevance is whether the other acts 
evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.  The 
second consideration in assessing relevance is whether 
the evidence has probative value, that is, whether the 
other acts evidence has a tendency to make the 
consequential fact or proposition more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts 
evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence?  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
Id. 
 
¶23 In a sex crime case, the admissibility of other acts 
evidence must be viewed in light of the greater latitude rule.  
The greater latitude rule was first stated in 1893 in Proper v. 
State, 85 Wis. 615, 628-30, 55 N.W. 1035 (1893).  It applies in 
a sex crime case to admit other acts evidence, particularly when 
a child victim is involved.  State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 
25, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987) (stating that the rule is especially 
useful "in both incest cases and cases involving indecent 
liberties with children.")  The rule helps other acts evidence 
to come in under the exceptions stated in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2).  State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 256, 378 N.W.2d 
272 (1985).  We have explained the rationale behind the rule in 
the following manner: 
 
"A 'greater latitude of proof as to other like 
occurrences' is clearly evident in Wisconsin cases 
dealing with sex crimes, particularly those involving 
incest and indecent liberties with a minor child.  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
13
This is not so much a matter of relaxing the general 
rule that it is not competent in a prosecution for one 
crime to introduce evidence of other offenses as it is 
a matter of placing testimony concerning other acts or 
incidents 
within 
one 
of 
the 
well 
established 
exceptions to such rule . . . ."  Hendrickson v. 
State, 61 Wis. 2d 275, 279, 212 N.W.2d 481 (1973).  
(Footnote omitted). 
Id.  We reaffirm our earlier decisions that the greater latitude 
rule facilitates the admissibility of the other acts evidence 
under the exceptions set forth in § (Rule) 904.04(2).  In State 
v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶51, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
we concluded that "in sexual assault cases, especially those 
involving assaults against children, the greater latitude rule 
applies to the entire analysis of whether evidence of a 
defendant's other crimes was properly admitted at trial."  Here, 
the greater latitude rule facilitates the admission of Jason 
B.'s testimony.     
¶24 We first consider whether the evidence of the Jason B. 
incident is offered for an admissible purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2).3  The evidence was admissible to show the 
alleged perpetrator's modus operandi, or mode or method of 
operation, through which the identity of the person who 
assaulted Steven D., Mark D., and Josh C. may be proved.  
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.04 Character evidence not 
admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. (2) Other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  
This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
14
Identity is one of the enumerated exceptions under § (Rule) 
904.04(2). 
 
Method 
of 
operation, 
while 
not 
specifically 
enumerated in § (Rule) 904.04(2), is one of the factors "'that 
tends to establish the identity of the perpetrator.'"  State v. 
Hall, 103 Wis. 2d 125, 139 n.6, 307 N.W.2d 289 (1981) (quoting 
Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 560, 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979)). 
¶25 The identity of the defendant was among the other 
elements that the state had to prove.  The defendant essentially 
concedes that because at least some of the victims did not see 
their perpetrator, "identity provided a facial basis to satisfy 
the 
first 
step 
of 
the 
three-step 
analytical 
framework."  
(Hammer's Br. at 29.)  He argues, however, that since the 
circuit court prohibited testimony relating to the boys' sexual 
conduct, identity is not an issue in the case; therefore, the 
probative value of the evidence is greatly reduced and the 
evidence should be excluded.  (Hammer's Br. at 29-30.)  In State 
v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 594-95, 493 N.W.2d 376 (1992), we 
rejected such an argument.  If the state must prove an element 
of a crime, 
then 
evidence 
relevant 
to that 
element is 
admissible, even if a defendant does not dispute the element.  
Id. 
¶26 The evidence was also admissible to prove mode or 
method of operation because of the similarity between the Jason 
B. incident and the case at hand.  See Hall, 103 Wis. 2d at 139, 
144-45 (comparing the similarity in method of operation between 
two crimes).  At trial, Jason B. testified that he awoke late at 
night to find the defendant masturbating him.  (R. at 40:15.)  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
15
In this case, there was testimony that the defendant also 
entered into the area where the victims were sleeping and woke 
them up by trying to improperly touch them.  (R. at 33.) 
¶27 While the acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2) that is the clearestmode or method of operation 
establishing identitycertainly justifies the admissibility of 
the other acts evidence, the circuit court, applying the greater 
latitude rule, did not err in admitting the evidence to show 
motive and absence of mistake.  Each of the four crimes the 
defendant was charged with under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(d), 
940.225(3m), and 948.02(2) related to "sexual contact."  "Sexual 
contact" for the purpose of this case is defined as 
 
Intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, 
either directly or through clothing by the use of any 
body 
part 
or 
object, 
of 
the 
complainant's 
or 
defendant's 
intimate 
parts 
if 
that 
intentional 
touching is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a).  Jason B.'s testimony was properly 
admitted to prove motive because purpose is an element of sexual 
contact, and motive is relevant to purpose.  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 
2d at 595-96.   
 
¶28 Similarly, 
according 
to 
the 
meaning 
of 
"sexual 
contact" under Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a), the defendant had to 
intentionally touch the victims.  The Jason B. testimony 
therefore was relevant to show that the defendant did not touch 
the victims by accident or mistake. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
16
 
¶29 The state did not argue that opportunity was a 
permissible purpose for which the circuit court could admit the 
Jason B. testimony, and as such, we do not address it.4          
¶30 We next address the relevancy of the Jason B. 
testimony, considering the greater latitude rule as Davidson 
permits us to do.  Evidence is relevant under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.01 if it relates to a fact or proposition that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action and if it has 
probative value.5  Identity was a fact of consequence to this 
case because Steven D. did not see who touched him.  Identity 
was also an issue of consequence in the case because the 
defendant denied ever being in the basement that night.  
Further, he brought in evidence that his mother woke him up in 
his own bedroom.   
¶31 The Jason B. testimony also has probative value.  "The 
measure of probative value in assessing relevance is the 
                     
4 We note that to admit other acts evidence, not all of the 
exceptions under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) must be met.  
"The exceptions listed in the statute [§ (Rule) 904.04(2)] are 
not mutually exclusive.  The exceptions slide into each other; 
they are impossible to state with categorical precision and the 
same evidence may fall into more than one exception."  State v. 
Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 662, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976) (Abrahamson, 
J., dissenting).  What is required is "one" acceptable purpose. 
  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); 
State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 729, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982).  
  
5 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.01 Definition of "relevant 
evidence".  "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
17
similarity between the charged offense and the other act."  
State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 58, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  
Similarity is demonstrated by showing the "nearness of time, 
place, and circumstance" between the other act and the alleged 
crime.  State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 305, 595 N.W.2d 661 
(1999).  Here, during each incident, the defendant awakened the 
victims in the middle of the night by improperly touching them. 
 The victims were all males, and with the exception of the 
fourteen year-old victim, were approximately the same age. 
¶32 The defendant argues that the Jason B. evidence is not 
probative because Jason B. was an adult and the defendant was a 
child when the incident occurred.  In contrast, he argues, the 
victims in this case were children and the defendant was an 
adult.  We do not find this to be a significant distinction 
since, in both cases, the ages of the young people involved were 
somewhat near the age of majority.  Jason B. was between 18 and 
20 years old when the incident occurred in Ohio, and the 
defendant was between 16 and 18 years old.  Here, the defendant 
was in his mid-twenties when the incident occurred, and the 
victims were in their middle to late teens.  Moreover, other 
jurisdictions have found other acts evidence admissible even 
though the victims were of different ages.  State v. Cardell, 
970 P.2d 10, 11 (Idaho 1998); Rary v. State, 491 S.E.2d 861, 863 
(Ga. App. 1997); State v. Crocker, 409 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 
1987). 
¶33 The defendant also argues that the other acts evidence 
is inadmissible because it was too remote in time, place and 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
18
circumstances.  It is within a circuit court's discretion to 
determine whether other acts evidence is too remote.  See Hough 
v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 814, 235 N.W.2d 534 (1975).  There is 
no precise point at which a prior act is considered too remote, 
and remoteness must be considered on a case-by-case basis.  
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 25.  Even when evidence may be 
considered too remote, the evidence is not necessarily rendered 
irrelevant if the remoteness is balanced by the similarity in 
the two incidents.  See State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 429 
N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Sanford v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 
72, 81, 250 N.W.2d 348 (1977)).  This court has in other cases 
upheld the admission of other acts evidence that was more remote 
in time than the five to seven year time span in this case.  
Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596 (upholding the admissibility of 
thirteen-year-old evidence); State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 
749, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991) (upholding the admissibility of 
sixteen-year-old evidence).  We conclude that the other acts 
evidence was not too remote, and certainly is balanced by the 
similarity between the two events. 
¶34 We note that the circumstances and place of the two 
incidents also share common characteristics.  While one incident 
took place in Ohio and the other in Wisconsin, both occurred in 
a home during an overnight visit.  In both instances the 
defendant knew the victim.  In sum, we conclude that the Jason 
B. incident was relevant evidence, because it related to a fact 
of consequence in this case and it had probative value. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
19
¶35 Finally, we address whether the probative value of the 
other acts evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03.6  Again, we keep in 
mind the greater latitude rule when balancing probative value 
against unfair prejudice.  The probative value of evidence must 
not be outweighed by unfair prejudice, which is the "potential 
harm of a jury reaching the conclusion that because the 
defendant committed a bad act in the past, the defendant 
necessarily committed the current crime."  Mink, 146 Wis. 2d at 
17 (citing Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 261-62). 
¶36 The circuit court recognized the danger of prejudice 
in this case, but concluded that the evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial.  (R. at 33:22-23.)  See Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 64 
(requiring that, to prevent admissibility, the probative value 
of the evidence must be outweighed by unfair prejudice, and not 
be merely prejudicial).  Here, the court offered a cautionary 
instruction both before Jason B. testified and at the close of 
the case.7  Cautionary instructions eliminate or minimize the 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.03 Exclusion of relevant 
evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.  
7 Before Jason B. testified, the court offered the following 
cautionary instruction to the jury: 
 
Evidence will be received regarding other conduct 
of the defendant for which he is not on trial.  
Specifically, evidence will be received that the 
defendant engaged in sexual contact on another date.  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
20
potential for unfair prejudice.  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596-
97.  See also State v. Landrum, 191 Wis. 2d 107, 122, 528 N.W.2d 
36 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995). 
 
Here, 
the 
cautionary 
instruction 
specifically stated that the jury should not conclude from the 
evidence that the defendant was a "bad person."  This is the 
                                                                  
If you find that this conduct did occur, you should 
consider it only on the issues of motive, opportunity, 
absence of mistake or accident, and mode of operation. 
 
You may not consider this evidence to conclude 
that the defendant has a certain character or a 
certain character trait and that the defendant acted 
in conformity with that trait or character with 
respect to the offenses charged in this case. 
 
The evidence was received -– or will be received 
only on the issues of motive, opportunity, absence of 
mistake or accident, and mode of operation.  That is, 
motive, that means whether the defendant had a reason 
to desire the result of a crime; opportunity, that is, 
whether the defendant had the opportunity to commit 
the offense charged; absence of mistake or accident, 
that is, whether the defendant acted with the state of 
mind required for this offense; and mode of operation, 
the manner in which the defendant committed the 
offense with which he is charged. 
 
You may consider this evidence only for the 
purposes I've described, giving it the weight you 
determine it deserves.  It is not to be used to 
conclude that the defendant is a bad person or that – 
or for that reason is guilty of the offenses charged. 
 
(R. at 40:9-10.)  The circuit court also gave a similar 
instruction at the close of the trial.  (R. at 40:130-31.) 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
21
type of cautionary instruction that was affirmed in Fishnick, 
127 Wis. 2d at 262, and Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 65.8 
¶37 In sum, we affirm the circuit court's decision to 
admit Jason B.'s testimony because it satisfies the three-part 
Sullivan test for admissibility of prior acts evidence. 
III. 
 
¶38 We next consider whether the rape shield statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11,9 applies in this case to exclude testimony of the 
                     
8 The defendant points out that in Sullivan, the cautionary 
instruction did not cure the unfair prejudice.  However, 
Sullivan is distinguishable because in that case, the cautionary 
instruction was broadly stated and the prosecutor frequently 
referred to the prior acts evidence in both opening and closing. 
 Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 791.  In this case, however, the 
prosecutor did not refer to the Jason B. incident during his 
opening statement (36:131-38), and only minimally referred to it 
during his closing statement. (40:132-55.)  Moreover, the 
cautionary instructions in this case were tailored to prevent 
unfair prejudice.   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11 Evidence and practice; civil 
rules applicable.  (2)(a):  In this subsection, "sexual conduct" 
means any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of 
the complaining witness, including but not limited to prior 
experience of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, use of 
contraceptives, living arrangement and life-style. 
(b) 
If the defendant 
is 
accused 
of 
a 
crime 
under 
§ 940.225 . . . , 
any 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
complaining 
witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions of the witness's 
prior sexual conduct and reputation as to prior sexual conduct 
shall not be admitted into evidence during the course of the 
hearing or trial, nor shall any reference to such conduct be 
made in the presence of the jury, except the following, subject 
to § 971.31(11): 
1. 
Evidence of the complaining witness's past conduct 
with the defendant. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
22
victims' alleged prior sexual conduct.  We conclude that it 
does. 
 
¶39 There are four primary policy interests furthered by 
the rape shield statute: 
 
First, [the rape shield statute] promotes fair trials 
because it excludes 
evidence which is 
generally 
irrelevant, or if relevant, substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect.  Second, it prevents a 
defendant 
from 
harassing 
and 
humiliating 
the 
complainant. . . .  Third, the statute prevents the 
trier of fact from being misled or confused by 
collateral issues and deciding a case on an improper 
basis.  Fourth, it promotes effective law enforcement 
because victims will more readily report such crimes 
and testify for the prosecution if they do not fear 
that their prior sexual conduct will be made public. 
State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 647, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). 
 
¶40 The defendant wanted to present evidence that on the 
day before the defendant's alleged sexual assaults, while Steven 
D. was napping, Josh C. tried to put his penis in Steven D.'s 
mouth, and Mark D. attempted to put his buttocks in Steven D.'s 
face.  The defense would have alleged that the boys were told to 
stop by both the defendant and his mother.  The defendant also 
sought to present testimony from the defendant's mother that she 
caught the boys in the basement quickly pulling their pants up. 
 The defendant would have further claimed that the boys did not 
                                                                  
2. 
Evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct 
showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for 
use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of 
injury suffered. 
3. 
Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual 
assault made by the complaining witness.   
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
23
refute a statement made in their presence about trying to put 
their penises in Steven D.'s mouth and generally acting 
inappropriately.  (R. at 37:6.) 
 
¶41 The defendant argued that this evidence was needed to 
substantiate his claim that the victims engaged in acts 
virtually identical to those for which he was charged, thus 
demonstrating a motive to fabricate and bias by the victims.  
The circuit court ruled the evidence inadmissible after taking 
into account the six-part test in State v. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d 
91, 122-23, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 456 N.W.2d 
325 (1990), which was later modified to a five-part test by this 
court in Pulizzano.10 
 
¶42 The right to confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process is vital to insuring an objective and fair 
trial.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).  The 
confrontation clause gives defendants the right to "effective 
cross-examination" of witnesses presenting adverse testimony.  
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).  The compulsory 
process clause gives defendants the right to present favorable 
testimony.  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.  However, defendants 
cannot present irrelevant evidence.  State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 
2d 315, 332, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). 
                     
10 The defendant argued that the circuit court's application 
of the sixth part of the Herndon test amounted to abuse of 
discretion; however, because the defendant's evidence did not 
meet all five of the Pulizzano factors, his rights were not 
violated despite consideration of the sixth factor.  
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
24
 
¶43 "A circuit court has broad discretion in determining 
the relevance and admissibility of proferred evidence."  State 
v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 140, 438 N.W.2d 580 (1989) 
(citing State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 320, 421 N.W.2d 96 
(1988)).  In determining the admissibility of evidence, the 
standard of review is whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 342.  "The 
question on appeal is not whether this court, ruling initially 
on the admissibility of the evidence, would have permitted it to 
come in, but whether the trial court exercised its discretion in 
accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with 
the facts of record."  Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d at 464.  An erroneous 
exercise of discretion will not be found if there is a 
reasonable basis for a circuit court's decision.  Boodry v. 
Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 589, 126 N.W. 503 (1964).  However, 
questions of constitutional significance, such as a defendant's 
rights to confrontation and compulsory process, may be reviewed 
without deference to the circuit court.  See Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 
2d at 648. 
 
¶44 The 
rape 
shield 
statute 
impermissibly 
denies 
a 
defendant's rights to confrontation and compulsory process if 
the evidence the defendant seeks to present satisfies the five-
factor test of Pulizzano.  In Interest of Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 
2d 713, 736, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993).  To satisfy the five-factor 
test, a defendant must show all of the following through an 
offer of proof: 
1) The prior act clearly occurred. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
25
2) The act closely resembles that in the present case. 
3) The prior act is clearly relevant to a material issue. 
4) The evidence is necessary to the defendant's case. 
5) The probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 656.  The offer of proof should state 
an evidentiary hypothesis bolstered by a statement of fact 
sufficient to justify the conclusion or inference the court is 
asked to accept.  Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 284, 272 
N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978).  In reviewing the circuit court's 
evidentiary rulings, this court concentrates on the correctness 
of the decisions, not the expressed rationale of the circuit 
court, and it upholds rulings supported by the record.  State v. 
Horn, 139 Wis. 2d 473, 490-91, 407 N.W.2d 854 (1987).  If the 
circuit court does not give reasons for its discretion, this 
court will independently review the record to determine if there 
is a basis for the circuit court's decision.  State v. Lindh, 
161 Wis. 2d 324, 361 n.14, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991) (citing Pharr, 
115 Wis. 2d at 343). 
 
¶45 In this case, the circuit court determined that the 
defendant's offer of proof did not satisfy four of the five 
Pulizzano factors.  As to the first factor, the circuit court 
concluded that the offer of proof was insufficient to show that 
the prior acts occurred, because it was unclear what the victims 
would say about the allegations, and the defendant was relying 
on only the testimony of himself and his mother, who would be 
biased in the matter. 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
26
¶46 The circuit court found that the second factor was 
satisfied because the alleged acts were similar to those charged 
to the defendant.  However, the court determined that the third 
factor, that the prior act is clearly relevant to a material 
issue, was not satisfied, reasoning that the fact that someone 
engaged in a sexual act at some earlier time, even within four 
hours, did not relate to any material issue, such as intent. 
¶47 As to the fourth factor, the circuit court concluded 
that the evidence was not necessary to the defense, reasoning 
that there was already evidence that the boys and their 
stepfather had a strong bias against homosexuals.  Also, 
regarding the issue of identity, since there were other people 
in the dark basement, the evidence was not needed to show that 
someone other than the defendant may have touched the victims. 
 
¶48 Finally, the circuit court decided that the evidence 
would be prejudicial to the state because it was raised for the 
first time during trial, thus not giving the prosecution a 
chance to investigate the allegations. 
¶49 The 
circuit 
court 
appropriately 
exercised 
its 
evidentiary 
discretion 
in 
accordance 
with 
accepted 
legal 
standards and the facts of the record.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the rape shield statute did not deprive the defendant of 
his rights to confrontation and compulsory process, because he 
failed to satisfy all of the Pulizzano criteria. 
IV. 
¶50 We affirm the decision of the circuit court.  We find 
that the evidence of Hammer's other sexual conduct is admissible 
No. 98-2900-CR 
 
27
under the three-step test set forth in State v. Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  The evidence of 
Hammer's past sexual conduct is admissible to prove mode or 
method of operation, and thus establish identity in accord with 
the exceptions in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  The evidence 
is relevant under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01, and its probative 
value is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, or undue delay 
considerations under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
¶51 We also conclude that the evidence of the victims' 
prior sexual conduct was properly kept from the jury in 
accordance with the rape shield statute.  The state's interest 
in applying the rape shield statute outweighed the defendant's 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
confront 
witnesses 
and 
compel 
testimony.  As such, the circuit court's admission of Hammer's 
prior sexual conduct, while excluding the victims' prior sexual 
conduct, did not violate Hammer's right to a fair trial. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98-2900-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶52 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The majority's 
application of the greater latitude rule to establish proof of 
Hammer's identity is inconsistent with the law that proof of 
identity through other acts evidence requires a more stringent 
standard 
of 
admissibility. 
 
The 
majority 
fails 
even 
to 
acknowledge the heightened standard for proof of identity.  
Instead, it ignores the analytical inconsistency of raising the 
standard 
while 
at 
the 
same 
time 
lowering 
the 
standard, 
predictably 
concluding 
that 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
is 
admissible.  
¶53 Originally, the application of the greater latitude 
rule in child sexual assault cases was narrowly tailored to 
admit evidence of prior sexual acts directly involving the 
alleged victim.  See Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 629, 55 N.W. 
1035 (1893).  Here, the majority recognizes that the greater 
latitude rule "facilitates the admissibility of the other acts 
evidence under the exceptions set forth in § (Rule) 904.04(2)." 
 Majority op. at ¶23.  Yet the majority then extends the rule to 
"the entire analysis of whether evidence of a defendant's other 
crimes was properly admitted at trial" in a child sexual assault 
case.  Id. (citing State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶51, __ Wis. 
2d __, __ N.W.2d __).  
¶54 The majority's application of the greater latitude 
rule in admitting Hammer's prior act to prove his identity 
conflicts with an elevated standard for proof of identity that 
has been recognized in Wisconsin law.  See, e.g., State v. 
Anderson, 230 Wis. 2d 121, 131 n.6, 600 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 
98-2900-CR.awb 
 
2 
1999).  Other acts evidence may be admitted to show identity if 
this evidence has "such a concurrence of common features and so 
many points of similarity with the crime charged that it 'can 
reasonably be said that the other acts and the present act 
constitute the imprint of the defendant.'"  State v. Gray, 225 
Wis. 2d 39, 51, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999) (quotations omitted).  See 
also State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 263-64, 378 N.W.2d 272 
(1985). 
¶55 Such an imprint was present in Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 
2d 807, 235 N.W.2d 534 (1975).  In that case, the prosecution 
offered other acts evidence in the form of a threat made by the 
defendant to a fifteen-year-old girl stating that he planned to 
rape her because she was a virgin.  During the commission of the 
sexual assault for which the defendant was on trial, he had 
terminated his act of sexual intercourse with the victim because 
at that point he believed she was not a virgin.  This court held 
that the prior threat was admissible other acts evidence under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) to show identity because the 
predilection 
for 
intercourse 
with 
virgins 
represented 
a 
"particular quirk in the assailant's makeup."  Id. at 814.   
¶56 Likewise, in Sanford v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 72, 250 
N.W.2d 348 (1977), evidence of a prior sexual assault was held 
admissible to prove the defendant's identity because of the 
existence of seven "[s]triking similarities" between the offense 
charged and the prior act.  These similarities included that in 
both assaults the defendant had the victim lie on a jacket on a 
garage floor, that he initially approached each victim at a bus 
98-2900-CR.awb 
 
3 
stop, and that he threatened each victim with the use of a gun. 
 Id. at 80-81.  This court determined that the similarities 
between the prior act and the charged offense were of "a like or 
unique nature."  Id. at 81. 
¶57 Here the majority sets forth the similarities between 
Hammer's prior act and the charged offense to include: 1) that 
Hammer awakened the victims at night by improperly touching 
them; 2) that the victims were of the same sex; 3) that they 
were between the ages of fourteen and twenty; 4) that both 
incidents occurred at a home; and 5) that Hammer knew the 
victims. 
 
Without 
acknowledging 
the 
higher 
standard 
of 
admissibility to prove identity, and by applying instead the 
greater latitude rule, the majority concludes that these 
similarities suffice for the admission of Hammer's prior act. 
¶58 The facts surrounding the prior act in this case are 
unfortunately all too common in sexual assaults and do not 
demonstrate Hammer's unique imprint as required by the higher 
standard of admissibility based on identity.  Whether it be the 
time of night, place of private residence, or circumstance 
involving victims of the same sex, age range, and familiarity 
with Hammer, these facts fail to reveal a nearness that would 
constitute a particular "quirk" or imprint of the defendant to 
prove his identity. 
¶59  In each of the three steps of its other acts 
analysis, the majority explains that it is applying the greater 
latitude rule, citing to Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶51.  Engaging in 
such a nuanced approach to the greater latitude rule seems 
98-2900-CR.awb 
 
4 
unnecessary because the bottom line is that, whether for one 
step or for all three, the majority will admit other acts 
evidence in child sexual assault cases.  To apply the rule 
separately 
to 
each 
step 
simply 
lengthens 
the 
majority's 
discussion to arrive at the predictable conclusion that prior 
acts have been admitted properly under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2). 
¶60 There are times when the admission of other acts 
evidence is appropriate.  However, these acts must be specific 
as to the particular purpose for which they are offered, and the 
proponent of such evidence must clearly articulate the purposes 
for which it is intended.  In delivering its cautionary 
instruction, a court should be careful to advise the jury of the 
specific statutory purpose for which the other act has been 
introduced rather than reciting the laundry list of purposes set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). 
¶61 The dangers underlying the admission of other acts 
evidence are well established.  In Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 
278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), this court noted the dangers 
that result from the inadequate balancing of the probative value 
of prior acts evidence against the harm to the defendant, 
including: 1) the overwhelming tendency to presume the defendant 
guilty because he is a person likely to commit such acts; 2) the 
tendency to condemn not because of the defendant's actual guilt 
but because he may have escaped punishment for previous acts; 3) 
the injustice in attacking a person who is not prepared to show 
that the evidence used for attack is fabricated; and 4) the 
98-2900-CR.awb 
 
5 
confusion of issues that may result from the introduction of 
other crimes.  Id. 
¶62 The majority's result underscores that it seemingly 
matters little whether the greater latitude rule applies to the 
first prong, second prong, third prong, or to all three prongs 
of the other acts analysis.  It matters little whether it is a 
rule of greater latitude or higher altitude or enhanced 
longitude, or any other rule.  Even when the rule is 
inconsistent with another evidentiary principle or requirement, 
the prior act is allowed into evidence.  The application of the 
greater latitude rule in this case seemingly nullifies a more 
stringent standard for proof of identity.  Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this dissent. 
 
98-2900-CR.awb 
 
1