Case Title: Crites v. Alston

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Crites v. Alston1992 WY 95837 P.2d 1061Case Number: 91-216Decided: 08/07/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
William Edward CRITES, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff/Respondent),

v.

Lisa Lynn ALSTON, f/k/a 
Lisa Lynn Crites, 

Appellee 
(Defendant/Petitioner).

Appeal from District 
Court, Uinta County, John D. Troughton, J.

Paul R. Skog, 
Evanston, for appellant.

Mark W. Harris 
of Harris, Morton & Cowan, P.C., Evanston, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant William 
E. Crites (father) appeals a district court order holding him in contempt and 
awarding attorney's fees and costs to his ex-wife, appellee Lisa L. Alston 
(mother). The district court found that the father, by attempting to modify 
child custody in Texas, had breached an agreement between the parents to 
maintain jurisdiction of custody matters in Wyoming. Further, the district court 
held that the father's violation of the Wyoming divorce decree constituted an 
act of indirect criminal contempt.

[¶2]      We vacate the 
district court's finding of contempt and its judgment in award of attorney's 
fees.

I. ISSUES

[¶3]      The father raises 
two issues for review:

I. Can appellant be held 
in contempt of court for a violation of a court order which was not clear, 
specific, and unambiguous in its terms?

II. Did the district 
court lack subject matter jurisdiction thus rendering its contempt order null 
and void?

[¶4]      In counterpoint, 
the mother raises three issues: 

I.

     When considering a 
willful violation of a court decree as to child custody, must the district court 
distinguish between civil and criminal contempt?

II.

     Did the district court 
lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order finding appellant in contempt 
and awarding appellee attorney's fees and costs?

III.

     Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in holding appellant in contempt for violation of a child 
custody decree and ordering appellant to pay appellee's attorney's fees and 
costs?

II. FACTS

[¶5]      William Crites 
and Lisa Alston were married on July 30, 1985, with one son, Jacob Mitchell, 
born thereto. On February 13, 1987, the father filed for divorce in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Uinta County, Wyoming. Both the father in his complaint 
and the mother in her answer sought custody of their child. However, during the 
divorce proceeding, the parents stipulated to joint custody until such time as 
either parent moved from Uinta County. The resulting divorce decree granted 
joint custody to both parents pursuant to the stipulated agreement.

[¶6]      About a year and 
one-half later, in December 1988, the mother petitioned the district court for 
modification of the divorce decree. The mother sought primary custody and 
control of the child, subject to reasonable visitation on the part of the 
father. The father responded and counter-petitioned for primary custody. 
Initially, the district court left the child's joint custody in place because 
the district court failed to recognize a material change in circumstances 
justifying a change in custody in favor of either parent. Upon further review, 
however, the district court vacated its previous decisional letter and awarded 
primary custody to the father.1 Shortly thereafter, the mother 
filed a motion for a new trial and for entry of specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The district court granted the motion for a new trial and 
scheduled the trial for July 21, 1989.

[¶7]      On the day the 
new trial was scheduled to begin, the parents entered into a stipulation for 
modification of the divorce decree. Among other things,2 the stipulation established that 
the father would have primary custodial rights until June 30, 1991, and that, 
during that time, secondary custodial and visitation rights would rest with the 
mother. As of July 1, 1991, primary custody would change to the mother and the 
father would have secondary custodial and visitation rights. The parties also 
agreed to add a new paragraph to the divorce decree:

     (13) The parties stipulate and agree that 
the district courts of the State of Wyoming shall retain jurisdiction over the 
custody of the minor child, Jacob Mitchell Crites.

[¶8]      After reviewing 
the parties' stipulation, the district court incorporated all of the essential 
stipulated items into a modified divorce decree entered by the district court on 
August 18, 1989. During the period of time that these proceedings were taking 
place in Wyoming, the father remarried and moved with his son and new wife to 
their present home in Texas.

[¶9]      Early in 1991, 
the father began having second thoughts about the impending custody arrangement 
which would require his son to rejoin his ex-wife in Wyoming on July 1st of that 
year. Consequently, the father consulted a Texas attorney, followed her advice, 
and sought modification of the modified Wyoming divorce decree in a Tarrant 
County, Texas, district court.3 The mother, who was also 
represented by Texas counsel, responded to the father's motion and raised an 
objection regarding jurisdiction. The mother sought dismissal of the father's 
motion for modification and an award of reasonable attorney's fees.4

[¶10]   The Texas court relied on that 
state's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) to decide 
the father's claim that an "automatic" shift of custody to the mother on July 1, 
1991, was "unworkable and inappropriate under existing circumstances." On June 
10, 1991, the Tarrant County, Texas, district court master entered a handwritten 
order which stated in part:

     The Court finds that 
Texas acquired jurisdiction over the child and that the State of Wyoming has not 
lost jurisdiction thus leaving both States with concurrent 
jurisdiction.

     The Court finds that 
the Decree of Wyoming is entitled to full faith & credit.

     The Court finds the 
parties['] Agreement to maintain jurisdiction of the child in Wyoming is valid 
& not contrary to public policy.

     The Court finds the 
parties['] Agreement does not confer jurisdiction on Wyoming as Wyoming 
originally had & still does have jurisdiction of the child.

     The Court finds the 
parties['] Agreement to maintain jurisdiction over custody matters in Wyoming 
was made in contemplation of further litigation; that the Agreement is valid on 
its face; & that such agreement of forum selection is prima facie 
valid.

* * * * * *

     The Court finds that 
11.64 of the [Texas Family Code] does not permit Texas to modify the custody 
decree as yet because Wyoming still has jurisdiction by an Agreement 
recognizable under the Texas UCCJA and because Wyoming has not yet declined to 
assume its jurisdiction.

     The Court finds that 
whichever forum assumes jurisdiction over the custody issue will cause an 
inconvenience to one of the parties. In the instant case the father is not only 
trying to circumvent the forum selection agreement but is also trying to modify 
the entire custody agreement of the parties while the mother has abided by the 
agreement & continually maintained her residence in the agreed forum State 
of Wyoming. The majority of the prospective witnesses for each party will 
probably come from their respective home states. In such an instance the burden 
of inconvenience should fall upon the person seeking to breach the 
agreements.

     Accordingly, it is 
Ordered that the [mother's] Plea To The Jurisdiction is sustained, this cause is 
abated, and the State of Texas defers its jurisdiction to the State of 
Wyoming.

The order was 
silent as to the mother's request for attorney's fees. Because this record does 
not contain a transcript of the hearing to determine Texas' jurisdiction to 
modify custody, we are uncertain what discussion, if any, took place regarding 
the requested attorney's fees. More importantly, however, it is not our place 
nor is it necessary for us to make that determination prior to reaching a 
decision in this appeal.

[¶11]   While the Texas proceeding was 
on-going, the mother began a concurrent action which creates this appeal by 
filing in the Uinta County, Wyoming, district court a petition for an order 
requiring the father to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for 
failure to abide by the terms of the 1989 modified Wyoming divorce decree. The 
mother included a request for reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by 
her in bringing the Wyoming show cause petition and included the stock request 
of "other relief as the court deems proper."

[¶12]   The Wyoming district court issued 
an order for the father to show cause and directed him to appear for a 
rescheduled hearing on July 2, 1991. On May 24, 1991, the mother followed the 
show cause petition with another petition requesting modification of the 
modified divorce decree, termination of the joint custody relationship, and sole 
custody of the child. The mother supported these two petitions with an extensive 
and detailed memorandum regarding jurisdiction and child custody.

[¶13]   The father submitted a written 
answer to the mother's modification petition and a counter-petition claiming 
that it would be in the child's best interest if joint custody were terminated 
and sole custody were awarded to him subject to reasonable visitation for the 
mother. Essentially, as he had done in Texas, the father contended that the 
"automatic" shift in custody to the mother on July 1, 1991, would be detrimental 
to the child's best interests. The mother answered the father's counter-petition 
by arguing his lack of "clean hands" barred any proper assertion of a claim for 
sole custody.

[¶14]   Both parents, represented by 
counsel, appeared and testified in the Wyoming district court on July 2, 1991. 
Following the hearing, the district court filed its decision letter in which it 
reiterated the modified divorce decree provision stating that primary custodial 
rights were to transfer from the father to the mother on July 1, 1991. The court 
cited paragraph 13 of the modified divorce decree:

     (13) The District 
Courts of the state of Wyoming shall retain jurisdiction over the custody of the 
minor child, Jacob Mitchell Crites.

The decision 
letter also freely quoted from the Texas master's order determining that Wyoming 
had jurisdiction to determine custody, and then in its own conclusions, 
stated:

The [father] has not only 
attempted to circumvent the forum selection agreement but he has also attempted 
to modify the entire custody agreement of the parties while the mother has 
abided by the agreement and continually maintained her residence in the agreed 
forum state of Wyoming. This Court agrees the majority of the prospective 
witnesses for each party will probably come from their respective home states; 
and that in such an instance, the burden of inconvenience should fall upon the 
person seeking to breach the agreement.

Finally, the Court finds 
and concludes that the actions of the [father] in this case were not only in 
breach of the agreement of the parties, but in addition the actions were in 
violation of the Decree of this Court. The Court finds and concludes that the 
[father] has committed an act of indirect criminal contempt.

[¶15]   W.S. 20-2-113 provides in pertinent 
part:

"The court may, in 
addition to any assessment it may impose upon a finding that the parent is in 
contempt of court, award attorney's fees, costs, and such other and further 
relief as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances, to the parent 
aggrieved by the violation of the court's decree, in order to enforce and 
require future compliance with its decree."

Accordingly, the [father] 
shall pay a fine in the sum of $1.00 payable to the Clerk of Court to be 
credited to the school fund for his acts of indirect criminal contempt. In 
addition, for his breach of the agreement of the parties, and to encourage 
future compliance with the agreement and decree, the [father] shall pay the 
[mother] the sum of $4,457.00 costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred by the 
[mother] in meeting the burden of defending against [father's] breach of the 
agreement.[5]

[¶16]   The resulting August 21, 1991 court 
order finding contempt and awarding attorney's fees and costs to the mother 
followed the decision letter in text and provides the basic issues for this 
appeal by the father.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶17]   We follow the same standard of 
review enunciated in other child custody and domestic relations contempt cases. 
In Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 313 (Wyo. 1989), we said that "[w]e will not 
disturb the decision of the trial court * * * in the absence of some serious 
procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse 
of discretion." See also Deen v. Deen, 774 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1989) and Fanning v. 
Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986). On questions of law, we accord no special 
deference to, and are not bound by, a district court's decision. Farr v. Link, 
746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987). In Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 341-42 (Wyo. 
1989), we defined "judicial discretion" as it relates to a contempt finding in a 
post-divorce proceeding. Judicial discretion is "`"a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously * * *."'" Id. (quoting Igo v. Igo, 
759 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1988) and Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶18]   Following more than two hours of 
testimony and discussion at the July 2, 1991 show cause hearing, the Wyoming 
district court focused attention on its primary task, determining whether or not 
it had jurisdiction to hold the father in contempt for his futile attempt to 
modify child custody in a Texas court. After telling the mother's attorney that 
he needed to respond to the jurisdictional issue, the following colloquy took 
place:

     THE COURT: * * * 
[T]hat's really what is on my mind is whether or not I can make a finding in 
this case of a willful disregard of court orders. Because that's the nub of it. 
That's the foundational finding that I have to make. And I'm uncertain about 
that right now. I'm uncertain about it because of the language of this 
stipulation [paragraph 13 of the modified divorce decree - "The parties 
stipulate and agree that the district courts of the State of Wyoming shall 
retain jurisdiction over the custody of the minor child, Jacob Mitchell 
Crites."] - 

     [THE MOTHER'S 
ATTORNEY]: Do you want me to do that -

     THE COURT: - because 
of the reasons I've enunciated on behalf of [the father's attorney]. Those 
reasons being that one interpretation is that the parties knew and recognized 
that under Wyoming law, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, six 
months out of the state makes Texas the home jurisdiction for purposes of child 
custody decisions. And in order to give Wyoming at least equal standing with 
Texas, this language of the stipulation had to be inserted otherwise [the 
mother] was going to find herself in Texas. And it's one thing to give her some 
protection about going to Texas and another thing from prohibiting [the father] 
from starting there in the first place.

     [THE MOTHER'S 
ATTORNEY]: Right.

     THE COURT: It's one 
thing to give her a basis to object to Texas jurisdiction or to object to Texas 
exercising jurisdiction and another thing entirely to say, "You're prohibited 
from going to Texas courts, [father]."

[¶19]   We agree with the district court's 
identification of the dispositive issue - whether the district court could find 
the father in contempt for "willfully violating" a Wyoming court decree when he 
instituted the Texas custody proceeding. We disagree, however, with the district 
court's denouement. We do so for two primary reasons: (1) the district court 
erred as a matter of law in characterizing paragraph 13 of the modified divorce 
decree as a valid "forum selection clause" and (2) a basis for award of 
attorney's fees is not provided in this case in either the Texas or subsequent 
Wyoming proceedings.

A. Forum Selection 
Clause

[¶20]   In the district court's Order 
Finding Contempt and Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, the district court 
stated eight conclusions of law. Of the eight, four dealt with the parents' 
stipulation (paragraph 13 of the modified divorce decree) to maintain 
jurisdiction over child custody in Wyoming:

     2. The parties['] 
agreement to maintain jurisdiction of the minor child in Wyoming is valid and 
not contrary to public policy.

     3. The parties['] 
agreement does not confer jurisdiction in the State of Wyoming as the State of 
Wyoming originally had, and still has, jurisdiction of the minor 
child.

     4. The parties['] 
agreement to maintain jurisdiction of custody matters in Wyoming was made in 
contemplation of further litigation; the agreement is valid on its face; and 
such agreement of forum selection is prima facie valid.

     5. The [father] has 
not only attempted to circumvent the forum selection agreement but has also 
attempted to modify the entire custody agreement of the parties while the 
[mother] abided by the agreement and continually maintained her residence in the 
agreed forum, the State of Wyoming.

[¶21]   Beyond the bare assertion that the 
parents' stipulation (paragraph 13) created a valid forum selection agreement, 
the district court did not set forth a legal basis for its "forum selection" 
characterization. However, from our review of the record in this case, it 
appears that the district court was influenced by a 1989 Illinois case cited and 
discussed by the mother in a memoranda submitted to the district court prior to 
the July 2, 1991 hearing.6

[¶22]   The case, In re Marriage of 
Hilliard, 178 Ill. App.3d 620, 127 Ill.Dec. 671, 533 N.E.2d 543 (1989), involved 
an Illinois divorce with subsequent joint custody of two children. The father, 
who filed for the divorce in Illinois and continued to reside in that state, and 
the mother, who had moved to California shortly before the divorce and continued 
to reside there, stipulated to the following provision in their divorce 
decree:

The parties agree that, 
provided [the father] is residing in Illinois, any further post-decree 
proceedings with respect to the rights and duties of the parties herein, 
including custody, support, property, indebtedness, or modification thereof, or 
otherwise, shall only be filed in Illinois.

Id. 127 Ill.Dec. 
at 672, 533 N.E.2d  at 544.

[¶23]   Two years after the divorce, the 
mother attempted to transfer jurisdiction of a modification proceeding brought 
by the father in Illinois to a court in California. The Illinois court refused 
the mother's request and, on appeal, the Illinois appellate court affirmed. The 
In re Marriage of Hilliard court stated:

     We find that the trial 
court's order refusing to transfer jurisdiction is correct because the parties' 
settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, 
provides that any further post-decree proceedings shall only be filed in 
Illinois, provided [the father] resides in Illinois. The rules regarding the 
interpretation of settlement agreements are the same as those which apply to 
contracts generally, and the primary objective is to give the agreement its 
plain and ordinary meaning according to the intent of the parties. * * * A forum 
selection clause is prima facie valid and should be enforced unless the 
opposing party shows that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable under 
the circumstances and would essentially deprive him of his day in court. * * * 
If both parties freely entered into the agreement contemplating such 
inconvenience should there be a dispute, one party cannot successfully argue 
inconvenience as a reason for rendering the forum clause 
unenforceable.

Id. 127 Ill.Dec. 
at 672-73, 533 N.E.2d  at 544-45.

[¶24]   In this case, we find that the 
district court's presumed reliance on In re Marriage of Hilliard is misplaced. 
Although the quoted portion of the In re Marriage of Hilliard opinion accurately 
reflects general principles of forum selection law, it does not follow that the 
decidedly different wording stipulated to by the parties in paragraph 13 in this 
case falls under the In re Marriage of Hilliard umbrella.

[¶25]   We find support in In re Marriage 
of Bueche, 193 Ill. App.3d 594, 140 Ill.Dec. 566, 550 N.E.2d 48 (1990), a 
post-In re Marriage of Hilliard Illinois decision which dealt with a mother's 
attempted modification of a joint custody arrangement. In In re Marriage of 
Bueche, the court considered the effect of a "retention of jurisdiction" clause 
in a Michigan divorce decree.7 Specifically, the court determined 
that the clause would not prevent an Illinois trial court from exercising 
jurisdiction in order to modify visitation.

     Finally, [father] 
argues that the retention of jurisdiction clause in the original judgment acts 
as a forum selection clause and constitutes an agreement that the Michigan 
circuit court would be the only court invoked to resolve disputes arising from 
the agreement. [Father] notes a forum selection clause was upheld in In re 
Marriage of Hilliard, * * *.

     We do not find 
Hilliard controlling in this case. In Hilliard, the Illinois circuit court 
upheld the forum selection clause of an Illinois decree by noting that an 
Illinois court retains jurisdiction over custody determinations unless it 
concedes jurisdiction (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987 ch. 40, par. 2104(b) (the Marovitz 
Amendment)). Since the Marovitz Amendment is not part of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act but strictly an Illinois enactment, it would not apply 
to a Michigan court modifying a Michigan decree where the Michigan court would 
have otherwise lost jurisdiction. Moreover, even a State designated in a forum 
selection clause could decline jurisdiction if it no longer had sufficient 
contacts to support jurisdiction. * * * Nor would the Marovitz Amendment 
preclude a transfer of jurisdiction under forum non conveniens. * * * 
Although a forum selection clause is a factor in a forum non conveniens 
determination * * *, the clause in the parties' decree is not a forum 
selection agreement but merely a retention of jurisdiction clause. By contrast, 
the clause in Hilliard was an explicit agreement by which the parties bound 
themselves to file all post-decree proceedings in Illinois 
only.

In re Marriage 
of Bueche, 140 Ill.Dec. at 569-70, 550 N.E.2d  at 51-52 (emphasis 
added).

[¶26]   Had the mother in the present case 
no longer been living in Wyoming when the father sought to modify custody in the 
Texas proceeding, then Texas would have had exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
child custody on the basis of its "home state" status, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1) 
& (2)(A)(i) (the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)),8 and the fact that Wyoming's 
continuing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) would have lapsed. As a 
simple "retention of jurisdiction" provision, paragraph 13 of the parties' 
modified divorce decree would not provide a Wyoming court with jurisdiction to 
make a custody determination unless the child or one of his parents 
continued to reside in the state and/or maintain the necessary "significant 
connections" to sustain subject matter and in personam jurisdiction.

[¶27]   We hold that the district court's 
finding that paragraph 13 constitutes a valid forum selection provision is 
erroneous as a matter of law.

B. Wyo. Stat. § 
20-2-113(a) (Supp. 1992)

[¶28]   Having determined that paragraph 13 
was not a valid forum selection provision, we look next at the district court's 
authority to find the father in contempt. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) states in 
part:

The court has continuing 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children requires. The court 
may, upon its own motion or the motion of either parent, require a parent to 
appear before the court and show just cause why the parent should not be held in 
contempt of the court, upon a showing that the parent has willfully violated 
the court's decree as to the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of 
the children.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶29]   The father draws our attention to 
numerous cases from other jurisdictions standing for the proposition that before 
there can be a "willful violation" of a court decree, there must first exist a 
valid court order which is "clear, specific and unambiguous." We find support 
for the father's argument in several cases referenced in his appellate brief. 
For example, in Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., In 
and For Clark County, 102 Nev. 551, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 (1986), the Nevada 
Supreme Court stated:

     An order on which a 
judgment of contempt is based must be clear and unambiguous, and must spell out 
the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the 
person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed on 
him.

 Similarly, 
in Southwest Gas Corp. v. Flintkote Co.-U.S. Lime Div., 99 Nev. 127, 659 P.2d 861, 864 (1983) (quoting Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967)), the 
same court stated:

     Generally, an order 
for civil contempt must be grounded upon one's disobedience of an order that 
spells out "the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms 
so that such person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are 
imposed on him."

[¶30]   In this case, paragraph 13 of the 
modified divorce decree simply stated that "[t]he District Courts of the state 
of Wyoming shall retain jurisdiction over the custody of the minor child, Jacob 
Mitchell Crites." This statement, as a portion of the divorce decree, did not 
impose upon the father an affirmative obligation or duty to attempt custody 
modification only in a Wyoming court; nor did the provision impose an 
affirmative obligation or duty not to attempt to modify child custody in 
a state other than Wyoming. We hold as a matter of law that paragraph 13 cannot 
be construed as a clear, specific and unambiguous court order or decree. 
Consequently, a "violation" of paragraph 13, whether "willful" or otherwise, 
cannot be enforced with the district court's contempt power.

[¶31]   Further, preventing the father in 
this case from attempting to modify custody in Texas would contradict the type 
of parental behavior and legal proceedings we endorsed in Quenzer v. Quenzer, 
653 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). Quenzer involved a mother and father divorced in Texas who, over 
time, fought custody modification battles in several different states. When the 
Wyoming modification proceeding began, the mother and children were living in 
Wyoming and the father was living in Texas; thus, Wyoming was the "home state" 
and the mother was seeking to modify a Texas modified divorce decree in Wyoming. 
In that narrow respect, Quenzer is the factual mirror image to this case. In 
deciding Quenzer, we found nothing wrong with the mother's behavior in 
attempting to modify custody in the present "home state."

[¶32]   At the time the father sought 
custody modification in Texas, Texas was the child's "home state" for purposes 
of custody determination under both federal and state law. 28 U.S.C. § 
1738A(b)(4)9; V.T.C.A., Family Code § 11.52(5) 
(1986); Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-103(a)(v) (1987). However, "home state" status alone 
is not sufficient to confer modification jurisdiction on a state that was not 
the original decree state when one of the parties continues to reside in the 
original decree state.10 Assessment by the Wyoming district 
court of contempt for institution of the Texas home state petition to modify 
under these circumstances was legally unjustified and will be reversed. It may 
have been a losing effort, but it did not constitute indirect criminal 
contempt.

C. Assessment of Texas 
and Wyoming Attorneys' Fees and Costs Against the Father in This 
Proceeding

[¶33]   In its eighth and final conclusion 
of law in the Order Finding Contempt and Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, the 
district court stated:

     8. The Court has the 
power, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Section 20-2-113 (1977, as amended), in addition 
to any assessment it may impose upon the [father] for being in contempt of 
court, to award attorney's fees, costs and such other and further relief as the 
Court may deem necessary under the circumstances of the case to a parent 
aggrieved by a violation of the Court's Decree in order to enforce and require 
future compliance with its decree.

[¶34]   Since we reverse the district 
court's finding of contempt, we are left with the question of whether attorney's 
fees and costs can be charged to the father in the absence of a contempt 
finding. The relevant portion of Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) states:

The court may, in 
addition to any assessment it may impose upon a finding that the parent is 
in contempt of court, award attorney's fees, costs, and such other and further 
relief as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances, to the parent 
aggrieved by the violation of the court's decree, in order to enforce and 
require future compliance with its decree.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶35]   The mother argues that under this 
sentence in Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a), it is not necessary to find a parent in 
contempt prior to awarding attorney's fees and costs. She suggests that if the 
wording between the first two commas is deleted, then the result allows courts 
discretionary statutory authority to award attorney's fees, costs and other 
necessary relief to an aggrieved parent.

[¶36]   A careful analysis of the total 
amount of legal fees approved by the district court to be charged to the father 
include:

1. Texas attorney's fees 
and costs to defend the father's Texas modification  proceeding;

     2. The Wyoming 
attorney's fees and costs to assist the Texas attorney in defending against the 
father's Texas modification proceeding;

     3. The Wyoming 
attorney's fees and costs to bring this contempt proceeding to show cause to 
collect for attorney's fees and costs incurred in Texas; and

     4. The Wyoming 
attorney's fees and costs to pursue the Wyoming decree modification 
proceeding.

[¶37]   This record is non-informing about 
action of the Texas judge in either expressly approving or denying the requested 
attorney's fees in any aspect of the Texas modification litigation. See n. 4, 
supra. Essentially, this Wyoming proceeding superimposes the mother's request 
for a sequential Wyoming district court award of attorney's fees that could have 
been, and may even have been, adversely decided by the Texas district court. In 
the absence of at least a properly determined status of contempt as one possible 
vehicle for attorney's fees assessment, we find no jurisdictional basis in 
Wyoming to award attorney's fees for the Texas proceeding to either the Texas or 
Wyoming attorneys.11 

[¶38]   Since we have determined that a 
legal right to pursue change of custody in the home state did exist sufficient 
to insulate the litigant from contempt retribution in Wyoming, we determine that 
if the effort fails, assessment of attorney's fees should be resolved by the 
Texas court and not in a subsequent Wyoming proceeding unless a proper contempt 
determination (e.g., indirect criminal contempt) is to be established in this 
jurisdiction.

[¶39]   With reversal of the Wyoming 
contempt determination, a basis for assessment of the Wyoming attorney's fees in 
the Wyoming show cause proceeding also fails. The last item is Wyoming 
attorney's fees for the mother to attempt Wyoming modification. Although lack of 
itemization and differentiation within this record would cause some assessment 
difficulty in any event, we fail to find a legal basis for award since 
apparently the Wyoming district court did not order the relief requested of 
further child custody decree modification.

D. Procedural 
Sufficiency of Contempt Determinations

[¶40]   With recognition of our disposition 
of the primary contempt determination issues in this case, we do not reach the 
question of whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to 
insufficient criminal procedural safeguards in a criminal contempt proceeding. 
We simply note in passing that the district court found the father in indirect 
criminal contempt. Having examined the record and recognizing the conspicuous 
absence of procedural safeguards, we are reminded of the concluding paragraph in 
United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 
1284 (Wyo. 1989):

     Our analysis of 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) and these cases leads us to conclude the district court failed 
to follow the necessary procedure in issuing the contempt citations to the 
individual contemnors and the union contemnors. This was, as we have found, a 
criminal contempt proceeding and should have been conducted as an independent 
criminal action. It was not, and the district court, therefore, never obtained 
jurisdiction to proceed. We hold the contempt orders against the individuals and 
the unions null and void.

See, e.g., 
W.R.Cr.P. 42 (formerly W.R.Cr.P. 41).

V. CONCLUSION

[¶41]   Having fully examined the record in 
this case, we find nothing to demonstrate that the father was in willful 
violation of a valid court decree.12 Similarly, we have determined that 
the district court lacked a proper basis for the award of attorney's fees and 
costs in the absence of a finding of contempt.

[¶42]   The district court's finding of 
contempt and its judgment in award of attorney's fees are 
vacated.

FOOTNOTES

1 It appears from the 
record that a final order was never entered regarding the father's primary 
custody at that stage of the proceeding.

2 The parents also 
stipulated to decree modification regarding child support, medical expense 
obligations and allocation of federal tax deductions.

3 The record in this case 
is practically devoid of helpful documentation relating to what was filed and 
what transpired in the Texas modification proceeding. The record contains only 
two relevant items: (1) a copy of a handwritten document entitled Master's 
Recommendation for Modification & Plea to the Jurisdiction and (2) a copy of 
the father's Motion to Modify Modified Decree of Divorce. Though the first 
document was signed and dated by the master who conducted the jurisdictional 
hearing in Tarrant County, Texas, it does not appear to have been file-stamped 
and, in that regard, its authenticity is subject to question.

     Adding greater 
confusion to this case, the father's motion for modification, though signed by 
the father's Texas attorney and apparently having been file-stamped, was 
captioned "In the Interest of Jacob Mitchell Crites, A Minor Child, in the 
District Court of Denton County, Texas, 322 Judicial District." Without 
explanation and absent a request to supplement the record, the father has 
attached to his appellate brief copies of his signed and file-stamped Motion to 
Modify Modified Decree of Divorce as filed in the Tarrant County District Court 
as well as the mother's file-stamped but unsigned response entitled Respondent's 
Original Answer Subject to Special Appearance.

     Although inclusion of 
documentation connected with the Texas proceeding within this appellate record 
is not essential to our disposition of this case, we remind counsel that 
ordinarily we will not consider that which is not properly contained within the 
record. See Barron v. State, 819 P.2d 412, 417 (Wyo. 1991); see also Chew v. 
Chew, 821 P.2d 582, 583 (Wyo. 1991). Attaching copies of the Texas pleadings to 
the appellant's brief does not satisfy the explicit requirements of W.R.A.P. 
4.01. Counsel should not come to rely on documents attached to appellate briefs 
as a means of circumventing the express rules for making a record for purposes 
of appeal.

4 Cognizant of our 
admonition in the preceding footnote, we take judicial notice of the mother's 
request for attorney's fees contained in the copy of Respondent's Original 
Answer Subject to Special Appearance found attached to the father's brief. 
W.R.E. 201(f).

5 The district court's 
finding that the mother had incurred approximately $4,457 in costs and 
attorney's fees in defending the Texas action is anomalous since the figure is 
approximately $300 less than the amount actually billed by the mother's 
attorneys. The documentation of costs and attorney's fees submitted to the 
district court at the July 2, 1991 show cause hearing reflected total costs in 
the mother's behalf of $4,756.57. Of the $4,756.57 amount, $3,208.32 was billed 
by the mother's Texas attorney and $1,548.25 was billed by the mother's Wyoming 
attorney. The father's Wyoming attorney stipulated to the reasonableness and 
accuracy of the fees and costs. We find no explanation in the record for the 
$300 discrepancy between the amount billed by the attorneys and the lesser 
amount charged to the father by the district court judge.

     It also appears from 
the record that the "lumping together" of fees pertaining to the Texas 
proceeding included charges by the mother's Wyoming attorney for the preparation 
of documents filed in the Wyoming district court - specifically, the mother's 
April 26, 1991 petition to show cause; her May 24, 1991 petition to modify the 
modified divorce decree; and her May 30, 1991 memorandum regarding jurisdiction 
concerning child custody.

6 Neither of the parties 
cited In re Marriage of Hilliard, 178 Ill. App.3d 620, 127 Ill.Dec. 671, 533 N.E.2d 543 (1989) in appellate briefing and the case was not mentioned at oral 
argument.

7 Although the In re 
Marriage of Bueche opinion does not set forth the specific wording of the 
"retention of jurisdiction" clause, it does describe the provision by 
stating:

The decree also provided 
that the Michigan court would retain jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter until all provisions of the decree were performed.

In 
re Marriage of Bueche, 140 Ill.Dec. at 567, 550 N.E.2d  at 49.

     By comparison, 
paragraph 13 of the parents' modified divorce decree appears to be even less 
substantial, explicit and exacting than the "retention of jurisdiction" clause 
argued unsuccessfully in In re Marriage of Bueche.

8 28 U.S.C. § 1738A 
provides in part:

(c) A child custody 
determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of 
this section only if -

(1) such court has 
jurisdiction under the law of such State; and

(2) one of the following 
conditions is met:

(A) such State (i) is the 
home State of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or 
(ii) had been the child's home State within six months before the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because 
of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a 
contestant continues to live in such State[.]

9 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) 
defines "home state" to mean:

[T]he State in which, 
immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a 
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and 
in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child 
lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any 
of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other 
period[.]

Both the Texas and 
Wyoming versions of the UCCJA define "home state" in substantively identical 
terms. See V.T.C.A., Family Code § 11.52(5) and Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-103(a)(v) 
(1987).

10 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) 
states:

The 
jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination 
consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the 
requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such 
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.

28 
U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1)(E) states:

(c) A child custody 
determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of 
this section only if -

(1) such court has 
jurisdiction under the law of such State; and

* * *

(E) the court has 
continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.

The 
Texas and Wyoming versions of the UCCJA do not contain provisions comparable to 
the PKPA "continuing jurisdiction" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 
1738A(c)(1)(E):

     28 U.S.C. § 
1738A(c)(1)(E) thus creates exclusive continuing jurisdiction in the original 
decree state - in this case, Wyoming since the mother continued to reside in 
Wyoming following entry of the divorce decree.

     We do not consider 
here the differing effect on basic jurisdiction to modify under PKPA if 
neither party continued to reside in the original decree state. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(d).

     A further complexity 
may be engendered by a recent Texas appellate case which, in a reverse fashion, 
may call into question the explicit validity of the district court decree in 
this case. See Reppond v. Blake, 822 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 1992). In a footnote, 
the appellate court stated in reference to Texas custody law where Texas was 
forum, "once the child establishes a new home state, the continuing jurisdiction 
of the Texas court making a prior custody determination ceases." Id. at 760 n. 
1.

11 The litigants have 
actively briefed and argued whether, under Wyoming law, a finding of contempt 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) is a requirement for the district court to 
make an award of attorney's fees in divorce/child custody post-divorce decree 
litigation. We decline the invitation to decide that broad issue in this case 
and under these facts by analysis which could extend to circumstances widely 
different in future cases.

12 We note, however, that 
in the Order Finding Contempt and Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, the 
district court never actually stated that the father willfully violated the 
divorce decree. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) specifically states that the parent may 
be held in contempt "upon a showing that the parent has willfully violated the 
court's decree as to the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the 
children." The district court's only reference to the father's "violation" of 
the divorce decree tends to equate the father's Texas custody modification 
filing with both "breach of agreement" and "violation of the decree." It goes 
without saying that "breach of agreement" may well occur in a situation absent 
the requisite "willfulness." Exercise of a constitutional right to litigate may 
not necessarily create the breach of agreement in itself either.