Case Title: Commonwealth v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12529

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12529 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JONATHAN E. BROWN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 2, 2018. - December 11, 2018. 
 
Present (Sitting at Worcester):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Deriving Support from Prostitution.  Statute, Construction.  
Constitutional Law, Vagueness of statute.  Practice, 
Criminal, Instructions to jury, Request for jury 
instructions, Argument by prosecutor.  Words, "Pimping." 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lynn Division of the 
District Court Department on June 22, 2012. 
 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 
1107 (2016), the case was tried before Michael A. Patten, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
David M. Osborne for the defendant. 
 
Emily R. Mello, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Maria Granik, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  For over a century the Commonwealth has 
outlawed living off of or otherwise sharing in money earned by a 
known prostitute.1  Historically, "pimps or purveyors" have been 
understood to be the objects of this prohibition, although no 
definition of either "pimp" or "purveyor" has ever appeared in 
the statutory text, currently codified at G. L. c. 272, § 7.2  
Claiming that, without further clarification, the language of 
this statute is unconstitutionally vague and that he suffered 
prejudice from jury instructions tracking such language, the 
defendant, Jonathan E. Brown, seeks reversal of his conviction 
on a single count of deriving support from prostitution under 
G. L. c. 272, § 7.  We disagree and affirm. 
We conclude that G. L. c. 272, § 7, is constitutional, as 
we construe it to target those who, with the intent to profit 
from prostitution, live or derive support or maintenance from, 
or share in the earnings or proceeds of, the known prostitution 
                                                          
 
 
1 Throughout this opinion we use the term "prostitute" to 
refer to a person who engages or offers to engage in sexual 
conduct with another person for a fee because that term appears 
in the statutory text. 
 
 
2 The statute provides that "[w]hoever, knowing a person to 
be a prostitute, shall live or derive support or maintenance, in 
whole or in part, from the earnings or proceeds of his [(i.e., 
that person's)] prostitution . . . or shall share in such 
earnings [or] proceeds . . . shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for a period of five years . . . .  The 
sentence of imprisonment . . . shall not be reduced to less than 
two years . . . ."  G. L. c. 272, § 7. 
3 
 
 
of others.  We reach this conclusion from reading the statutory 
language in the context of common understanding and ordinary 
usage, as well as the statute's legislative history and severe 
penalty provisions, all of which demonstrate with sufficient 
clarity that G. L. c. 272, § 7, is directed at so-called 
"pimping."  Because a pimp knowingly and intentionally profits 
from the prostitution of another, he or she differs from the 
child of a sex worker, a local merchant who sells food to a 
known sex worker, or a medical professional who provides a sex 
worker with counselling services; the literal language of the 
statute may reach all of these individuals, but, unlike a pimp, 
they lack the intention to profit from the prostitution of 
another. 
Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude 
that the defendant -- who accompanied a woman to a prearranged 
prostitution transaction and was caught, immediately after 
leaving the scene with that woman, with the entire proceeds of 
the transaction hidden in his shoe -- knowingly and 
intentionally profited from the prostitution of another, and 
therefore engaged in pimping within the meaning of G. L. c. 272, 
§ 7.  While we prospectively clarify the jury instructions to 
avoid any possible confusion that this statute might apply to 
those who lack such an intent, we discern no prejudicial or 
other reversible error in the instant case. 
4 
 
 
1.  Facts.  The facts, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, are as follows.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
 
On June 21, 2012, as part of a national antiprostitution 
"sting" operation, law enforcement officers arranged to meet two 
women at a hotel in Saugus after responding to Internet 
advertisements for female prostitution.  Police were instructed 
to watch for two women arriving at the Saugus hotel, and that 
evening, a police surveillance team observed two women, the 
defendant, and another man arrive at the hotel in a black motor 
vehicle.  The two men waited in the vehicle in the rear parking 
lot of the hotel while the women went inside to a hotel room.  
There, another surveillance team observed as an undercover 
officer, posing as a customer, agreed with one of the women to 
have sex for $250.  The officer handed the woman $250 in cash, 
after which he answered a prearranged telephone call and told 
the two women they had to leave.  The women returned to the 
vehicle and were driven away with the defendant.3  The police 
stopped the vehicle and, after frisking the defendant, found the 
                                                          
 
 
3 On direct examination, a police officer identified the 
defendant as the driver of the vehicle, but on cross-
examination, after having his memory refreshed from testimony at 
an earlier proceeding, he explained that the defendant was in 
either the driver's seat or the front passenger's seat. 
5 
 
 
same $250 that the officer had given the woman as payment for 
sex hidden in the defendant's shoe. 
 
The defendant was subsequently charged and convicted at a 
bench trial of deriving support from prostitution under G. L. 
c. 272, § 7,4 but his conviction was reversed by the Appeals 
Court in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its 
rule 1:28 due to the prosecution's errors in its closing 
argument.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 
(2016).  Before his second trial, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the charge, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional for 
vagueness.  That motion was denied.  At the second trial, which 
was tried before a jury, the defendant moved for a required 
finding of not guilty, relying on the Appeals Court decision in 
Commonwealth v. Thetonia, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 783 (1989), which 
examined the meaning of the terms "pimp or purveyor" as set out 
in the statute's legislative history.  That motion was also 
denied.  Finally, relying again on Thetonia, the defendant 
sought supplementary instructions that would change Instruction 
7.140 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the 
District Court (2009) (model jury instruction 7.140).  The 
defendant's requested instruction, based on model jury 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant was also charged with trafficking of a 
person for sexual servitude in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a), but this charge was dismissed before the first trial, 
and a nolle prosequi was entered before the second trial. 
6 
 
 
instruction 7.140, with his requested supplementary language 
emphasized, is as follows: 
"Deriving Support from Prostitution 
 
"The defendant is charged with knowingly deriving 
support from the earnings of a prostitute.  This is 
commonly known as the 'pimping' statute.  Chapter 7 of 
Section 272 of our General Laws provides as follows:  
'Whoever, knowing a person to be a prostitute, shall 
live or derive support or maintenance, in whole or in 
part, from the earnings or proceeds of his 
prostitution . . . or shall share in such earnings or 
proceeds . . . shall be punished.' 
 
"In order to prove the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the Commonwealth must prove three [(and with 
the requested changes, four)] things beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
 
"First, that a particular person was engaged in 
prostitution.  A prostitute is a person who engages in 
common, indiscriminate sexual activity for hire. 
 
"Second, The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew [(emphasis in 
original)] that such person was a prostitute; and 
 
"Third, The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant shared in some 
substantial way in the earnings or proceeds from that 
person's prostitution. 
 
"Fourth, The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant played a 
substantial role in facilitating this person's 
prostitution.  For example, it is not enough if the 
Defendant simply drove the prostitute to a job."  
 
The judge denied the requested supplementary instructions and 
gave model jury instruction 7.140.  The jury found the defendant 
guilty under G. L. c. 272, § 7, and this appeal followed. 
7 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Purpose of G. L. c. 272, § 7.  To 
determine the meaning of G. L. c. 272, § 7, we begin, as we 
must, with the statutory language, interpreted in light of 
"ordinary and approved usage" and "sound reason and common 
sense" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 
163, 166-167 (2018).  The text of G. L. c. 272, § 7, imposes 
criminal liability when a person (1) knows another person is a 
prostitute; and (2) lives off or otherwise shares in money that 
the prostitute earned from prostitution activities or received 
from a brothel or its employees.  In other words, the statute 
plainly targets third parties who knowingly derive their 
livelihood or otherwise profit from prostitution.  In common 
vernacular and understanding, the statute appears to target 
"pimps." 
 
The legislative history confirms such an understanding of 
this century old provision.  See Commonwealth v. Bundy, 465 
Mass. 538, 545 (2013), quoting Perry v. Commonwealth, 438 Mass. 
282, 285 (2002) ("We cannot interpret statutory language in a 
vacuum, ignoring the Legislature's purpose in enacting the 
statute and oblivious to 'the time in which [the language] is 
used'").  It expressly informs us that the statutory purpose of 
G. L. c. 272, § 7, is to target "pimps" who profit from "the 
business of commercialized prostitution."  Report of the 
Commission for the Investigation of the White Slave Traffic, So 
8 
 
 
Called, 1914 House Doc. No. 2281, at 22 (1914 report).  A draft 
version of the original 1910 legislation, consistent with nearly 
identical contemporary legislation in other States, explicitly 
defines the prohibited conduct as "pimping."5  Also, a 1914 
report commissioned by the Legislature recommended amending the 
1910 statute to better prosecute "pimps and procurers," which it 
defined as "exploiters of women" who profit from "the business 
of commercialized prostitution." 1914 report, supra at 20, 22, 
82-83.  See St. 1914, c. 621 (enacting proposed amendment).6  
                                                          
 
 
5 "Any male person who, knowing a female person to be a 
prostitute, shall live or derive support or maintenance, in 
whole or in part, from the earnings or proceeds of the 
prostitution of such prostitute, or from moneys loaned or 
advanced to or charged against such prostitution by any keeper 
or manager or inmate of a house or other place where 
prostitution is practised or allowed, or who shall tout or 
receive compensation for touting for such prostitute, shall be 
guilty of pimping . . ." (emphasis added).  An Act relative to 
the procuring and detaining of women for immoral purposes, 1910 
House Bill No. 767, § 3.  While the draft legislation does not 
use the word "purveyor," § 1 of the draft legislation, a version 
of which is codified at G. L. c. 272, § 12, targets "pandering," 
defined as "procuring" women for prostitution purposes. See id.  
See also R.G. Latham, A Dictionary of the English Language 668 
(1870) (defining "purveyor" as a "[p]rocurer; pimp"). 
 
 
Several other States have very similarly worded statutes 
dating from the same time period that define the proscribed 
conduct as "pimping."  See 1910 Cal. Stat. 10 (39th sess., 
c. 15); 1915 Del. Laws 2095; 1916 W. Va. Acts 1221.  For the 
intense contemporary concern with forced prostitution that 
inspired State antipimping legislation around this time, see B. 
Donovan, Respectability on Trial:  Sex Crimes in New York City, 
1900-1918 at 108 (2016). 
 
 
6 Until 1977, G. L. c. 272, § 7, only applied to female 
prostitution. 
9 
 
 
Furthermore, G. L. c. 272, § 4B, which criminalizes living off 
of or sharing in the earnings of a prostitute who is a minor in 
language that parallels the language of G. L. c. 272, § 7, was 
introduced as a bill targeting "pimps."7  Finally, the title of 
the 1980 session law amending G. L. c. 272, §§ 6 and 7, is "An 
Act increasing the penalty for a so-called pimp or purveyor."  
St. 1980, c. 409. 
Our case law has also recognized that the statutory 
language of G. L. c. 272, § 7, must be read in light of its 
purpose of proscribing pimping.  We made this point in passing 
when we upheld the penalty provision of the statute in 
Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 720–721 (1984) 
(inferring legislative intent to increase penalties for deriving 
support or maintenance from prostitute "from the title of the 
act, 'An Act increasing the penalty for a so-called pimp or 
purveyor,' St. 1980, c. 409").  The Appeals Court, in Thetonia, 
further analyzed and clarified the statutory purpose of 
proscribing pimping when it reversed the conviction of a 
defendant who, while occasionally receiving small amounts of 
                                                          
 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 272, § 4B, was introduced by the same 
legislator who sponsored a 1980 amendment to G. L. c. 272, § 7, 
as "An Act establishing a mandatory prison term for a pimp so-
called, or purveyor or other who induces male and female minors 
to become prostitutes and who derives support from them."  1979 
House Bill No. 6753. 
10 
 
 
money from her friend in exchange for driving her friend to 
prostitution activities, "did not . . . engage in pimping" 
within the meaning of the statute.  Thetonia, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 786-787. 
The severity of the penalty imposed for a felony conviction 
under G. L. c. 272, § 7 -- a five-year maximum sentence with a 
two-year mandatory minimum sentence -- provides further support 
that the statute is directed at the serious crime of pimping.  
By contrast, patronizing an adult prostitute and engaging in 
prostitution are both misdemeanors punishable by less severe 
sentences.8 
The defendant is correct that G. L. c. 272, § 7, absent 
such construction, could literally be read to cover innocent 
conduct (e.g., the children of a sex worker who know what their 
parent does for a living, the local storekeeper who sells food 
or clothing to a known sex worker, or a medical professional 
providing counselling or other health care services to a sex 
worker).  We do not think, however, that the common 
understanding of the statutory text, combined with the clear and 
                                                          
 
 
8 Patronizing a prostitute is punishable by a $5,000 maximum 
fine or a maximum sentence of two and one-half years, G. L. 
c. 272, § 53A (b), while engaging in prostitution is punishable 
by a $500 maximum fine or a one-year maximum sentence, G. L. 
c. 272, § 53A (a).  Under G. L. c. 272, § 62, however, a "common 
nightwalker" (i.e., a prostitute who works at night on the 
street) may receive a maximum sentence of two and one-half years 
if convicted three times of that offense. 
11 
 
 
express legislative antipimping purpose, would support its 
application in instances -- such as prosecuting a child for 
taking a sandwich from his or her mother -- that do not in any 
way involve pimping and which the defendant himself 
characterizes as "absurd."  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 479 
Mass. 527, 534, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 276 (2018) ("[w]e will 
not adopt a literal construction of a statute if the 
consequences of such construction are absurd or unreasonable" 
[citation omitted]).  In any event, we do not interpret the 
prohibition on living off of or sharing in money received from a 
known prostitute to include the foregoing individuals, who may 
have knowledge of the prostitution and receive some support or 
money from the prostitute, but who, unlike a pimp, do not intend 
for the prostitution to occur.9 
In short, pimping -- which we define as knowingly and 
intentionally profiting from the prostitution of another -- is 
                                                          
 
 
9 This interpretation is consistent with the holdings of 
appellate courts of other States.  See, e.g., People v. Morey, 
230 Mich. App. 152, 164 (1998), aff'd, 461 Mich. 325 (1999) 
(statute that prohibits profiting from prostitution containing 
knowledge requirement constitutional because it "could not 
reasonably be applied to entirely innocent conduct"); State v. 
Yancy, 92 Wash. 2d 153, 157 (1979) (statute criminalizing 
"profiting from prostitution" constitutional because it does not 
reach "persons engaged in legitimate pursuits" who, while they 
may receive money from prostitute, lack "an agreement or 
understanding . . . to participate in the proceeds of 
prostitution activity"). 
12 
 
 
what the Legislature proscribed when enacting the statute that 
is now G. L. c. 272, § 7. 
 
b.  Constitutionality of G. L. c. 272, § 7.  The defendant 
contends that G. L. c. 272, § 7, is unconstitutionally vague.  
We upheld the constitutionality of an earlier version of the 
statute shortly after its passage.  Commonwealth v. Peretz, 212 
Mass. 253, 256 (1912).  See Lightfoot, 391 Mass. at 719 (holding 
penalty provision of statute constitutional); Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 372 Mass. 868, 868 (1977) (observing that statute has 
been held plainly constitutional).  We now reaffirm the 
constitutionality of G. L. c. 272, § 7. 
 
In order to prevail on a vagueness challenge, a defendant 
must show that a statute effects a due process deprivation by 
failing to provide (1) a reasonable opportunity for a person of 
ordinary intelligence to ascertain what the statute prohibits; 
and (2) comprehensible standards that limit prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion and thus avoid discriminatory or arbitrary 
enforcement.  Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 452 Mass. 97, 102 
(2008).  A statute will not be found unconstitutionally vague, 
however, "if it requires a person to conform his conduct to an 
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard" or "conveys [a] 
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and practices" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 414 (2015).  A 
13 
 
 
criminal statute will not "be construed so strictly as to defeat 
the obvious intention of the [L]egislature" (citation omitted), 
Commonwealth v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 404 Mass. 476, 480 
(1989), particularly "if its scope is substantially clear" 
despite "[u]ncertainty as to whether marginal offenses are 
included within the coverage of a statute" (citation omitted), 
McGhee, supra.  As we have often recognized, "[i]f a statute can 
be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction, 
the court is under a duty to give it that construction" 
(citation omitted).  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., supra at 482.10 
Here, we think it is sufficiently clear and definite in 
light of both common and historical understanding that G. L. 
c. 272, § 7, criminalizes pimping, that is, living off of or 
sharing in the earnings of a known prostitute with an intent to 
profit from that person's prostitution.  The defendant, citing 
what he calls "absurd" examples of third parties who might fall 
within the literal language of the statute (e.g., a child who 
                                                          
 
 
10 Indeed, through judicial construction, we have upheld 
several prostitution-related sections of G. L. c. 272 as 
constitutional.  See Aristocratic Restaurant of Mass., Inc. v. 
Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n (No. 2), 374 Mass. 564, 568 
(1978) ("immoral solicitation or immoral bargaining" provision 
of G. L. c. 272, § 26, not unconstitutionally vague); 
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 10 (1977) ("prostitute" 
provision in G. L. c. 272, § 53, not unconstitutionally vague);  
Thomes v. Commonwealth, 355 Mass. 203, 207 (1969) ("common night 
walker" provision of G. L. c. 272, § 53, not unconstitutionally 
vague). 
14 
 
 
receives a meal paid for by his or her mother's sex work), 
contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague "since on 
its face it criminalizes any financial relationship with a 
person known to be a prostitute."  We decline, however, to 
consider a challenge that a criminal statute is "facially vague" 
when the defendant's "vagueness challenge to the statute does 
not involve a claim that an overbroad statute threatens 
interests protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution."  Hendricks, 452 Mass. at 98 n.1.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walter, 388 Mass. 460, 465–466 (1983) (court 
will consider whether statute is vague as applied to particular 
defendant, not "hypothetical application" of statute to 
others).11  Here, the defendant did not raise a First Amendment 
argument.  We thus reject his facial challenge to the statute. 
Turning to the constitutionality of G. L. c. 272, § 7, as 
applied to the facts of the defendant's case, we likewise find 
no merit to that challenge.  Our analysis of the common 
understanding of the statutory language, the legislative 
history, and the severity of the statutory penalty establishes 
that, through the statute's prohibition on living off of or 
sharing in the proceeds of prostitution, the Legislature sought 
to proscribe the conduct of a pimp:  one who knowingly and 
                                                          
 
 
11 Regardless, we have discussed the hypothetical scenarios 
the defendant raises in our analysis of the statute, supra. 
15 
 
 
intentionally profits from the prostitution of another.  See, 
e.g., 1914 report, supra at 22 (describing pimp as someone 
profiting from "the business of commercialized prostitution").  
As so construed, we do not consider G. L. c. 272, § 7, to be 
"vague as applied" to the actual circumstances of the 
defendant's case.  Walter, 388 Mass. at 466.  Unlike the 
hypothetical prosecutions the defendant imagines, the conduct of 
the defendant fits within the core concern of the statute.  In 
short, the defendant can only challenge the constitutionality of 
the statute as applied to him, and consistent with our judicial 
construction of the statute to target those who intend to profit 
from the prostitution of another, we hold that G. L. c. 272, 
§ 7, is not unconstitutional as applied to this defendant. 
c.  Absence of jury instructions.  In addition to 
challenging the constitutionality of G. L. c. 272 § 7, the 
defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the trial judge's 
failure to issue his requested jury instructions.  These 
requested instructions would have supplemented model jury 
instruction 7.140, which essentially repeats the statutory 
prohibition that makes it a crime for a person, knowing another 
person to be a prostitute, to share in the earnings or proceeds 
of that person's prostitution.12  Because the defendant properly 
                                                          
 
12 The instruction also defines a prostitute as a "person 
who engages in common, indiscriminate sexual activity for hire."  
16 
 
 
preserved his objection to the judge's denial of his requested 
instructions, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  Specifically, a judge's 
failure to give a requested jury instruction "is reversible 
error only if the requested instruction was substantially 
correct; was not substantively covered in the jury charge; and 
concerns an important issue such that the failure to give the 
instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to 
present a given defense."  Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 Mass. 43, 
59 n.15 (2010).  Additionally, we consider whether the absence 
of an instruction clarifying that G. L. c. 272, § 7, expressly 
requires intent to profit from the prostitution of another 
caused a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 353 (2018) (where 
defendant does not request jury instruction at trial, reviewing 
court applies substantial risk of miscarriage of justice 
standard). 
 
As explained above, the defendant requested three 
supplementary instructions.  First, he requested that a sentence 
be added indicating that G. L. c. 272, § 7, "is commonly known 
as the 'pimping' statute."  Second, he requested that the word 
"substantial" be added to the requirement that he have received 
                                                          
 
Instruction 7.140 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2009). 
17 
 
 
support and maintenance from the earnings of a prostitute.  
Finally, he requested that the following fourth element be 
added:  "Fourth, The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant played a substantial role in 
facilitating this person's prostitution.  For example, it is not 
enough if the Defendant simply drove the prostitute to a job."  
On appeal the defendant, relying on Thetonia, further seeks to 
limit the definition of "pimping" to procuring customers for a 
client.  See Thetonia, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 786 & n.4 (defining 
"pimp" as one "who obtains customers . . . for a . . . 
prostitute" or "cohabits with a prostitute, lives off her 
earnings and often solicits for her" [citations omitted]). 
First, we consider the defendant's request to have the jury 
instructed that G. L. c. 272, § 7, is "commonly known as the 
'pimping' statute."  We agree that this statement is correct as 
a matter of legislative history and common understanding.  As 
explained, however, we do not see the necessity for further 
emphasizing this common understanding in these circumstances.  
Moreover, without further definition of "pimping," such 
instruction would provide little additional guidance to the 
jury. 
Second, the defendant's request for an instruction that the 
Commonwealth must prove that he "shared in some substantial way" 
in the earnings of prostitution is not an accurate statement of 
18 
 
 
the law.  The key factor is the defendant's intention to profit 
from the prostitution of a known prostitute, not the 
substantiality of the defendant's gains. 
Third, we conclude that the fourth element that the 
defendant sought to add -- substantial facilitation of another's 
prostitution -- is not a necessary aspect of "pimping" 
proscribed by G. L. c. 272, § 7.  It is true that standard 
definitions of "pimping" -- including one suggested by Thetonia 
-- describe facilitation of, as well as profiting from, 
prostitution.13  Yet G. L. c. 272, § 7, makes no mention of 
facilitation of prostitution (which would include, for example, 
soliciting for customers) because the Legislature chose to 
criminalize such conduct under separate sections of G. L. 
c. 272, not as a required element of  G. L. c. 272, § 7.  See 
St. 1910, c. 424 (enacting or amending present G. L. c. 272, 
§§ 2, 6, 8, 12, and 13).  See also Commonwealth v. Alfonso, 449 
Mass. 738, 744 (2007) ("Statutes that relate to a common subject 
                                                          
 
 
13 See Commonwealth v. Thetonia, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 783, 786 
n.4 (1989) (defining "pimp" as "man who cohabits with a 
prostitute, lives off her earnings, and often solicits for her" 
[citation omitted]).  See also Oxford English Dictionary Online 
(defining "pimp" as "a man who takes a proportion of the 
earnings of a prostitute, usually in return for arranging 
clients, providing protection, etc.").  This definition of a 
pimp as one who facilitates prostitution for profit is long-
standing.  See, e.g., R. Jameson, A Dictionary of the English 
Language:  By Samuel Johnson and John Walker 286 (1828) 
(defining "fleshmonger" as "[o]ne who deals in flesh; a pimp"). 
19 
 
 
matter should be construed together so as to constitute an 
harmonious whole" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
Finally, we consider whether the jury should have received 
an instruction, consistent with the statutory interpretation 
that we provide in this decision, explaining that the 
prosecution must show that the defendant intentionally profited 
from the prostitution of another.  Although we conclude that 
such an instruction should be given prospectively, it was not 
required in the instant case.  The Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court required the jury to 
determine that another person engaged in prostitution, the 
defendant knew that the other person was engaged in the 
prostitution, and the defendant received the proceeds from that 
prostitution.  As explained above, the common understanding of 
this language would be that it targets pimping, and the factual 
scenario here did not present concerns about innocent activity 
that might otherwise meet the literal language of the statute.  
Rather, the defendant's conduct fell within the core concern of 
the statute.  In sum, we conclude that such an instruction was 
not required in the instant case. 
We do decide, however, that the jury instructions for this 
crime should be expanded prospectively beyond those included in 
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court to avoid prosecution and thus possible conviction for 
20 
 
 
conduct that could not be classified as pimping but might 
otherwise meet the literal language of the statute.  Model jury 
instruction 7.140 should be modified as follows by inserting the 
emphasized language and deleting the struck through language: 
"Deriving Support from Earnings of a Prostitute 
 
 
"The defendant is charged with knowingly 
(deriving support from) (sharing in) the earnings of a 
prostitute.  This statute makes it a crime to engage 
in 'pimping,' that is, 'knowingly and intentionally 
profiting from the prostitution of another.' 
 
 
"Chapter 7 of section 272 of our General Laws 
provides as follows: 
 
 
"'Whoever, knowing a person to be a prostitute, 
shall live or derive support or maintenance, in whole 
or in part, from the earnings or proceeds of his 
prostitution . . . or shall share in such earnings 
[or] proceeds . . . shall be punished . . . .' 
 
 
"In order to prove the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the Commonwealth must prove three things 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 
"First:  That a particular person was engaged in 
prostitution. A prostitute is a person who engages in 
common, indiscriminate sexual activity for hire. 
 
 
"Second:  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that such 
person was a prostitute had knowledge of, and intended 
to profit from, this person's prostitution; and 
 
 
"Third:  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant shared in some way 
in the earnings or proceeds from that person's 
prostitution." 
 
d.  Other arguments.  The defendant also argues that (1) 
G. L. c. 272, § 7, lacks a mens rea requirement; (2) the 
21 
 
 
evidence was insufficient to convict him; and (3) the 
prosecution committed reversible error in its closing argument. 
 
Given our holding that G. L. c. 272, § 7, requires an 
intent to profit from the prostitution of another, we reject the 
defendant's argument that this statute lacks a mens rea element. 
 
We also reject the defendant's arguments that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bin, 480 Mass. 665, 674 (2018) (reciting sufficiency of evidence 
standard).  The defendant's main insufficiency argument hinges 
on his contention that G. L. c. 272, § 7, incorporates the 
facilitation of prostitution as a necessary element, but for the 
reasons discussed supra, we reject that argument.14 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, a rational trier of fact reasonably could have 
inferred from witness testimony and circumstantial evidence that 
the defendant knowingly and intentionally profited from the 
prostitution of another.  The defendant was in the vehicle in 
which a woman was driven to a hotel in response to an online 
advertisement for sexual services, and he waited in the parking 
                                                          
 
 
14 Regardless, the jury could reasonably have found that the 
defendant facilitated the act of prostitution when he 
accompanied the woman engaged in prostitution to the place of 
prostitution and helped her conceal the proceeds of that 
prostitution. 
22 
 
 
lot while the woman went into the hotel to the prearranged 
prostitution transaction.  That woman accepted money for sex and 
then immediately gave the defendant the money, which he 
concealed in his shoe.  From this conduct the jury could infer 
that the defendant knew that the woman was a prostitute, knew 
she had received money for engaging in an act of prostitution, 
and, by taking the money from her, revealed an intention to 
profit from prostitution.  See Commonwealth v. Matos, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. 578, 589-590 (2011) (evidence sufficient to convict 
defendant under G. L. c. 272, § 7, where he accompanied 
prostitute to commercial sexual encounter at hotel arranged over 
Internet, picked her up from hotel, and took all proceeds of 
transaction). 
 
Finally, we do not agree that any errors in the 
prosecutor's closing argument require reversal.  The defendant 
makes much of one prosecution witness's equivocation as to 
whether the defendant was driving the vehicle that transported 
the two women to and from the hotel or instead may have been in 
the front passenger's seat.  See note 3, supra.  Whether or not 
the defendant was driving, as the prosecution said in its 
closing argument, the evidence still revealed that he 
accompanied the prostitute to and from the prearranged 
prostitution transaction at the hotel and received the proceeds 
from the transaction.  See Matos, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 589-590 
23 
 
 
(upholding sufficiency of evidence supporting defendant's 
conviction where he accompanied prostitute to and from hotel).  
And the prosecutor's statement that the second woman was a 
prostitute, which was not objected to below, was harmless in 
light of the ample evidence that the first woman engaged in a 
prostitution transaction. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction.  Additionally, we approve the model jury 
instructions set out above for future prosecutions under G. L. 
c. 272, § 7.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                          
 
 
15 Similar jury instructions should be used for prosecutions 
under G. L. c. 272, § 4B, the parallel antipimping statute for a 
prostitute who is a minor.