Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Brent Allan Rose

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-1792

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1792
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
BRENT ALLAN ROSE,
Respondent.
[June 27, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by
Brent Allan Rose.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Brent Allan Rose alleging that he
violated various Rules Regulating the Florida Bar in representing a client in a
criminal case.  
1.  The record shows that the client was charged with two counts of capital
sexual battery and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child.  There were
two child victims in the case.  
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FACTS
After a hearing, the referee made the following findings of fact:
Rose was defending a client in a criminal case.1  The referee found that Rose
failed to report several incidents which allegedly occurred that would involve
improper contact with jurors in the case.  The referee specifically noted that he was
“not entirely persuaded that each alleged incident of improper contact actually
occurred.”  However, the referee found that, regardless, “Rose had a duty to report
the allegations of jury tampering to the trial court after they were brought to his
attention,” and Rose failed to do so.  The referee next found that Rose did not
thoroughly interview approximately fifteen defense witnesses.  Rose only briefly
met with the witnesses as a group for approximately forty-five minutes on the day
before trial.  Rose instructed the witnesses to make notes as to the testimony they
would provide, but he failed to collect the notes.  The referee also found that during
jury selection Rose referred to his client as a child molester and stated that the
reason he represents child molesters is because he gets paid for it.  Based on these
findings of fact, the referee recommended that Rose be found guilty of three
2.  The referee also recommended that Rose be found not guilty of violating
rules 4-1.2(a) (a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives
of representation) and 4-1.4(b) (a lawyer shall explain matters to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions).    The Bar
did not challenge the referee’s recommendations of not guilty as to these rules.  We
approve the referee’s recommendations as to these two rules without further
discussion.
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violations of rule 4-1.1 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (a lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client).  The referee noted that Rose’s
reference to his client as a child molester was subsequently used by the prosecutor
in closing argument and that Rose did not object.  The referee, however, did not
recommend that Rose’s failure to object be found a violation of rule 4-1.1.2  
As to discipline, the referee recommended a thirty-day suspension followed
by one year of probation, during which Rose would complete thirty credit hours of
continuing legal education in specified areas.  Further, the referee recommended that
costs be awarded to The Florida Bar in the amount of $3,902.85.  
The Bar petitioned this Court to review the referee’s report as to discipline,
arguing that a ninety-one-day suspension, along with the other conditions
recommended by the referee, is more appropriate.  Rose cross-petitioned seeking
review of the recommendations concerning the rule violations along with the
recommended discipline.
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ANALYSIS
First, Rose challenges whether the referee’s finding of fact that he was
informed of the alleged juror contacts is based on competent and substantial
evidence, and whether the referee correctly concluded that Rose’s failure to report
such alleged contact to the trial court constitutes a violation of rule 4-1.1.  This
Court’s review of such matters is limited, and if a referee's findings of fact and
conclusions concerning guilt are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the
record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that
of the referee.  Florida Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  
According to the record, one witness testified that she saw prosecutors and
prosecution witnesses talking in a smoking area outside the courthouse, and that
jurors were also in the smoking area.  She testified that she did not see anyone
speak to the jurors, but that she advised Rose of the circumstances.  A second
witness also testified as to seeing prosecution witnesses talking with prosecutors
outside the courthouse in the smoking area, approximately twenty feet from jurors,
and that she informed Rose of the occurrence.  A third witness testified concerning
an incident in the smoking area very similar to that described by the other two
witnesses, as well as an incident in which a member of the victims’ family
supposedly assisted a female juror into a van on a rainy day.  This third witness
3.  The referee stated, “Although this Court is not entirely persuaded that
each alleged incident of improper contact actually occurred, Mr. Rose had a duty to
report the allegations of jury tampering to the trial court after they were brought to
his attention, and failed to do so.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Bar even notes that the
“Referee did not find that improper contact occurred between jurors and witnesses.” 
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testified, however, that she did not tell Rose about the first event and could not even
recall telling him about the second event.  This third witness also testified that, from
a window on the second or third floor of the courthouse, she observed a person she
believed to be a member of the victims’ family speaking with two jurors outside in
the smoking area.  The third witness testified that she asked her husband to summon
Rose to look from that window, but she had no idea whether Rose ever saw the
alleged interaction.  Finally, a fourth witness testified to seeing the victims’ mother
speak to some jurors in passing in the cafeteria area during lunch as the mother
passed a table and that the mother briefly interacted with them for less than a
minute.  This fourth witness had no idea whatsoever as to words spoken or what
was said, and she testified that she did not even advise Rose that this incident
occurred.  After reviewing this testimony in the record, we note that the referee’s
recommendation of guilt is based on a novel standard.  The referee did not find that
any improper juror contacts occurred,3 but nonetheless recommended that Rose be
found to have violated a duty to report such allegations.  Thus, under this
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recommendation, Rose would be in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar for failing to report that which the evidence did not establish had even occurred.
We simply cannot agree with the referee that the facts in this record establish
a violation of rule 4-1.1.  The testimony itself indicates that Rose was not informed
of most of these alleged events.  Further, we must note that merely because people
involved in the trial were in an outdoor smoking area at the same time does not
support the conclusion that improper juror contacts occurred or that a finding of
incompetence is warranted.  With regard to the standard the referee imposed upon
Rose, we find that under this evidence Rose cannot be guilty of incompetence for
failing to advise the trial judge of events that the referee found that he had not been
persuaded even happened, especially considering many of the alleged events were
not even brought to Rose’s attention.  Therefore, based on the facts in the record,
we disapprove the referee’s recommendation as to guilt with regard to the alleged
improper juror contacts. 
Second, we consider whether Rose violated rule 4-1.1 because he allegedly
did not thoroughly interview certain witnesses.  We conclude that testimony in the
record supports the referee’s findings of fact that Rose performed the described acts
(i.e., interviewing approximately fifteen witnesses the day before trial).  However,
the determinative issue is whether Rose’s conduct constitutes a violation of rule 4-
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1.1.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in In re Wolfram, 847 P. 2d 94, 100 (Ariz.
1993), considered charges of incompetence against a criminal defense attorney and
noted “that some of Respondent’s acts and omissions, if viewed independently of
one another, are not objectionable and may be explained by legitimate lawyering
and trial strategy.”  As mentioned here, the instant disciplinary action arose from
representation rendered in a criminal case.  In Florida Bar v. Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d
583, 584 n.1 (Fla. 1992), this Court noted that “most cases of ineffective assistance
of counsel do not rise to the level of a disciplinary violation.”  These two cases
indicate that an attorney’s conduct must be somewhat egregious to be considered
incompetent and, therefore, a violation of rule 4-1.1.  Also, Wolfram and Sandstrom
reflect that when courts consider claims that an attorney’s performance was
deficient, the courts permit a certain amount of deference to an attorney’s trial
strategy or tactical decisions. 
In Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d at 583, this Court suspended an attorney for
deficiencies in representation under the former Code of Professional Responsibility,
finding that Sandstrom 
failed to take any pretrial depositions; failed to conduct a proper
investigation as related to evidence available to establish that the
proximate cause of the wife's death was medical malpractice; failed to
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timely challenge the admission of evidence relating to a search of
[defendant’s] car trunk; failed to discover that a fence, surrounding the
scene of the alleged crime and injurious to [defendant’s] defense, was
not erected until over a year after the alleged crime; failed to present a
tape recording to impeach a prosecution witness; and failed to become
familiar with or know the physical evidence in the case.
(Emphasis added.)  Sandstrom was found to have performed deficiently in providing
representation, based on numerous acts.  Although one of those acts was a failure to
conduct a proper investigation, the multiple errors in Sandstrom are significantly
more egregious than that demonstrated in this record with regard to Rose’s alleged
failure to interview these particular witnesses in the instant case.  In contrast to
Sandstrom, the instant record reflects that Rose engaged in numerous acts in
preparation for trial.  The testimony at the disciplinary hearing demonstrates that
Rose prepared for trial by traveling to Ohio to depose the victims; repeatedly
meeting with the defendant and his wife; offering various theories of defense to the
defendant; viewing videotapes showing the defendant with the victims; consulting
with a mental health professional about the videotapes; and attempting to obtain
copies of reports from the victims’ counselor.  Rose did not need to spend more
time with the approximately fifteen witnesses because the defendant’s family had
already provided information as to what the alleged witnesses would say.  Rose
actually used three or four of these witnesses at trial.  Further, there is absolutely no
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indication in this record that these alleged witnesses had relevant and admissible
evidence or what that evidence might have been.  
Although Jennings v. State, 583 So. 2d 316, 321 (Fla. 1991), involved an
analysis of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, we held there that an attorney
was not negligent for failing to present every witness who might have had
information concerning an event.  If conduct must be somewhat egregious to be
considered incompetent and the lower threshold of ineffective assistance was not
satisfied in Jennings, then, most assuredly, a similar situation in the present case of
allegedly not sufficiently interviewing certain persons, whose testimony has not
been shown to even be admissible or relevant and who would have basically
testified to the same facts as other witnesses, should not result in a finding of
incompetence here and the imposition of discipline.
Considering Sandstrom, Wolfram, and Jennings, as well as the totality of this
record and the deference that must be accorded to an attorney’s trial strategy or
tactical decisions, we do not agree with the referee’s recommended finding of a rule
4-1.1 violation based on Rose’s alleged inadequacies with regard to the interview
with certain witnesses.  
Next, we examine whether Rose violated rule 4-1.1 by the manner in which
he referred to his client, using the phrase “child molester,” during voir dire.  The
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record clearly supports the referee’s factual finding that Rose used the phrase “child
molester” in questioning during the jury selection process.  Rose argues that he
asked potential jurors, “Anybody who wants to ask me the question, ‘How can you
defend child molesters?’” in a light-hearted manner but to make a very significant
legal and factual point.  Rose testified that he knew this type of issue would be on
the minds of prospective jurors and that it was essential that he confront the subject
and demonstrate that the presumption of innocence is of critical importance, no
matter how terrible the crime allegedly committed.  It is clear that jury selection is a
dynamic process and counsel must confront the difficult issues to explore those
concealed or repressed thoughts that may later surface to the detriment of one
charged with a distasteful crime.  
We must recognize that there are certain realities a trial lawyer must confront,
especially in a case in which there are allegations of harm to children.  In the instant
case, Rose’s client was charged with two counts of capital sexual battery and two
counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child.  Such cases are often highly
emotional, and it is only natural for prospective jurors to have various feelings or
questions concerning the case, the issues, the defendant, and counsel.  In these
sensitive cases, lawyers must utilize various mechanisms to cause jurors to surface
any preconceived views or opinions the jurors might have, and to force the jurors to
4.  The Bar argues that Rose was incompetent when he failed to object to the
state attorney’s closing statement that Rose “spoke the truth when he told you . . .
that he represents a child molester.”  In the referee’s report, the referee noted that
the prosecutor used Rose’s comment during her closing argument and that Rose did
not object, but the referee did not conclude that this conduct violated rule 4-1.1.  We
note that the Bar did not allege this violation in the complaint, so we do not address
it in detail.  See Florida Bar v. Vernell, 721 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1998) (attorneys
must know the charges they face before disciplinary proceedings commence). 
However, it is clear that the failure to object to a single remark in the scope of a trial
such as that confronting Rose does not produce a disciplinary violation for which
sanctions should be imposed.  
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confront their own preconceived notions.  Further, an attorney needs to make the
point in these highly emotional cases that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty,
no matter what the charge and no matter how insidious the allegations.  There are
probably numerous ways for an attorney to challenge preconceived notions and
make this point.  The mechanism Rose selected was to confront the issue directly
and to refer to his client in the common terms of the crime with which his client was
charged.  This record does not support a finding that the mechanism and approach
Rose used during jury selection produces a violation of rule 4-1.1.4  Therefore, we
disapprove the referee’s recommended finding of a rule 4-1.1 violation in
connection with Rose’s comment. 
Because we find that this record does not support a finding of guilt for any
violations of rule 4-1.1, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation of a thirty-day
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suspension and conclude that no discipline or sanctions are warranted.  Given our
disapproval of the referee's recommendations as to guilt, we also decline to impose
the Bar's costs on Rose.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s recommendations that Brent Allan
Rose be found guilty of three violations of rule 4-1.1 and, therefore, no discipline or
sanctions should be imposed on Rose, nor should he be responsible for the Bar’s
costs under these circumstances.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Thomas E. DeBerg, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa,
Florida,
for Complainant
Scott T. Orsini of Orsini & Rose Law Firm, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida,
for Respondent