Case Title: KENNETH J. ZALOUDEK, JR. v. BECKY ZALOUDEK

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0068

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
KENNETH J. ZALOUDEK, JR. V. BECKY ZALOUDEK2009 WY 140220 P.3d 498Case Number: S-09-0016Decided: 11/12/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
KENNETH 
J. ZALOUDEK, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
BECKY 
ZALOUDEK,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

William 
L. Combs, Combs Law Office, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Richard 
J. Mulligan, Mulligan Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather Noble, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Noble.

 
 
 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
In 
this appeal, Kenneth J. Zaloudek challenges the district court's property 
division.  We will affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Zaloudek states his three appeal issues as follows:

 
 
1.         
Did the trial court afford husband fundamental due process in its rulings 
surrounding the Order on Plaintiff's Motion Regarding Reimbursement of 
Hay?

 
 
2.         
Is a decree of divorce that simply adopts one party's proposal without 
offering it for approval to the other party entitled to this Court's deference 
when it contains unjust and inequitable divisions of property based on defective 
factual findings?

 
 
3.         
Does the decree of divorce unfairly divide assets and debts without 
adequate analysis of property division factors and by improperly reaching 
non-marital assets?

 
 
Ms. 
Zaloudek restates the issue more simply:  
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its divorce decree ordering 
an equitable division of the property?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Ms. Zaloudek 
began working as an airline flight attendant in 1972.  Mr. Zaloudek began working as a pilot 
for the same airline in 1973.  They 
met in 1986 when both were working on the same flight.  They began living together later that 
year in a house owned by Ms. Zaloudek in Georgia.  They were married in August of 
1990.  A short time later, Ms. 
Zaloudek sold the Georgia property, and the couple built a house in Park City, 
Utah.  They sold the Utah property 
in 1996, and moved to a home near Evanston, Wyoming.  The parties have no 
children.

 
 

[¶4]        
Ms. 
Zaloudek filed for divorce in February of 2007.  She was still working for the airline, 
but Mr. Zaloudek had taken early retirement in 2003.  Both had accumulated substantial 
retirement assets, but his were larger because his earnings as a pilot had 
exceeded those of Ms. Zaloudek as a flight attendant.  Near the date of the divorce trial, 
Mr. Zaloudek's retirement accounts were valued at approximately 
$1,700,000.00, and he also received pension payments of over $2,000.00 per 
month.  Ms. Zaloudek had a 
retirement account worth approximately $350,000.00, plus an IRA account worth a 
little more than $40,000.00.  Ms. 
Zaloudek testified that she intended to keep working and would earn an annual 
salary of $40,000.00.  She estimated 
that if she retired as of the date of the trial, she would be eligible for a 
monthly pension benefit of approximately $1,200.00 per month.  The couple's net equity in their 
Evanston property was approximately $530,000.00.  The parties owned personal property 
estimated by one of them to be worth approximately 
$120,000.00.

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
couple raised horses, and at one time kept as many as 27 horses on their 
Evanston property.  At the time the 
divorce was filed, they owned 12 or 13 horses.  After filing for divorce and moving to a 
condominium in Evanston, Ms. Zaloudek took two of the horses and kept them at a 
boarding facility.  In the autumn of 
2007, while the divorce was pending, Ms. Zaloudek filed a motion with the 
district court seeking an order allowing her to remove hay from the Evanston 
property to feed her horses at the boarding facility.  Mr. Zaloudek opposed that 
motion.  The district court held an 
unreported and unrecorded hearing on the matter.  The court did not grant Ms. Zaloudek 
permission to remove hay from the property but, instead, ordered 
Mr. Zaloudek to pay Ms. Zaloudek for hay to be purchased from another 
source.  Mr. Zaloudek was 
ordered to pay her $1,800.00 for hay, an additional $500.00 to reimburse her for 
miscellaneous horse boarding costs, and $500.00 in attorney's fees, for a total 
of $2,800.00.  The district court 
indicated that it would "consider the payment" for the hay "in determining the 
final equitable distribution of property between the parties at the time of 
trial."

 
 

[¶6]        
At 
trial, the parties largely agreed to a division of their personal property. 
 The parties also agreed that the 
Evanston property should be sold, with the net proceeds divided equally between 
them.  They did not agree on how to 
divide the retirement assets, and after trial, in accordance with the district 
court's order, the parties submitted proposed divorce decrees setting forth 
their separate proposals for dividing the retirement assets.  The proposals were detailed and rather 
complicated, but can be fairly characterized in simple terms.  Ms. Zaloudek proposed an equal split of 
the retirement assets.  To achieve 
an equal division of the property, Mr. Zaloudek would be required to pay Ms. 
Zaloudek an additional $782,659.17.  
In contrast, Mr. Zaloudek proposed that he should receive a 
substantially greater share, based in large part on the fact that each party had 
accumulated retirement assets before the marriage.  He asserted that the pre-marital assets 
should not be divided, but that the district court should divide only those 
portions of the retirement accounts and benefits that had accumulated during the 
marriage.  To achieve his proposed 
property division, Mr. Zaloudek would pay Ms. Zaloudek an additional 
$247,114.19.

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
district court rejected Mr. Zaloudek's proposed division of the retirement 
assets.  It accepted Ms. Zaloudek's 
proposal, and adopted her proposed divorce decree nearly verbatim.  Mr. Zaloudek filed a timely appeal 
challenging the district court's decisions.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]        
A 
district court's division of property in a divorce is entitled to substantial 
deference.

 

Decisions 
regarding the division of marital property are within the trial court's sound 
discretion, and we will not disturb them on appeal unless there was an abuse of 
discretion.  Davis v. Davis, 980 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 
1999).  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when the property disposition shocks the conscience of this Court and 
appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it. 
 Id.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, affording that party every reasonable 
inference which can be drawn from the record.  Id.  

 
 

Pittman 
v. Pittman, 
999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo. 2000).  

 
 

[¶9]        
When 
dividing marital property, the district court considers the factors set forth in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 
 
The 
district court has discretion to determine what weight should be given each of 
these individual factors, and to divide the property as appropriate to the 
individual circumstances of each case.  
Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 2000).  

 
 
The 
justness and fairness of a marital property division cannot be gauged with a 
simple comparison of the amount of property awarded to each party.  Rather, the disposition should be 
performed with regard to the respective merits of the parties, the condition in 
which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was 
acquired, and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either 
party.

 
 

Carter-Wallop 
v. Wallop, 
2004 WY 46, ¶ 36, 88 P.3d 1022, 1032 (Wyo. 2004).  The goal in dividing marital property 
upon divorce is to reach an equitable result.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶10]     
While 
the divorce was pending, Ms. Zaloudek sought permission from the district court 
to take some of the hay stored at the Evanston property to feed the two horses 
she was keeping.  Mr. Zaloudek 
objected, arguing that he was already bearing an unjust burden of expenses, and 
that Ms. Zaloudek had persistently violated the court's orders by coming onto 
the Evanston property and taking items of personal property.  After a hearing held by telephone, the 
district court denied Ms. Zaloudek's request for permission to take the hay 
but, instead, ordered Mr. Zaloudek to pay for hay to be purchased from another 
source.  Mr. Zaloudek filed a motion 
asking the district court to reconsider its ruling, claiming that the payment of 
money was relief that had not been sought by Ms. Zaloudek, and that the parties 
had presented no testimony or other evidence during the hearing to support the 
order.  The district court 
apparently chose to deny Mr. Zaloudek's motion to reconsider and, instead, 
issued the written order that had been prepared and submitted by Ms. 
Zaloudek.  On appeal, 
Mr. Zaloudek claims that the district court's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious, unsupported by the evidence, and contrary to law.  

 
 

[¶11]     
Mr. 
Zaloudek initially contends that the district court erred in ordering him to pay 
Ms. Zaloudek because she did not request that relief.  The record does not 
support that assertion.  In the motion, Ms. Zaloudek sought alternative 
forms of relief.  First, she asked for permission to remove hay from the 
property.  Alternatively, she requested payment for the costs of boarding 
the horses.  The relief granted by the district court falls within this 
alternative request.  Mr. Zaloudek had notice of this claim for relief and 
we find no error in the district court's consideration of this 
issue.

 
 

[¶12]     
Because 
the hearing on this motion was not reported, or otherwise recorded, it is nearly 
impossible for us to review the other challenges Mr. Zaloudek makes to the 
district court's order.  In the 
absence of a transcript, we have no way to determine what evidence the district 
court considered during the hearing, and so our review is "greatly 
restricted."  Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶ 9, 158 P.3d 694, 697 (Wyo. 2007).  Mr. Zaloudek attempted to fill this 
gap by moving to settle the record pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.  However, his request came more than a 
year after the hearing had been held, and a district court is not required to 
approve a statement of the evidence if it cannot recall the facts of a 
proceeding.  Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1097 
(Wyo. 1986).  We are therefore left 
with no record of the hearing, and without a record, we must assume that the 
trial court had sufficient evidence to support its findings.  Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget 
Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771-72 (Wyo. 1995).  Similarly, we are unable to evaluate Mr. 
Zaloudek's claims of fundamental procedural errors that denied him due process, 
because no such errors are reflected in the record.

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
trial record contains evidence relating to the hay.  The parties testified that a substantial 
amount of hay had been stored on the Evanston property when the Zaloudeks 
separated.  Mr. Zaloudek said that 
he had sold some of this hay.  
Ms. Zaloudek presented evidence of the value of this hay, along with 
receipts for expenses she had incurred in caring for the two horses she 
kept.  This evidence is more than 
sufficient to support the conclusion that the hay was marital property, and that 
Mr. Zaloudek owed Ms. Zaloudek part of the money he received when he sold 
it.

 
 

[¶14]     
We 
also note that the challenged order required Mr. Zaloudek to pay 
Ms. Zaloudek a total of $2,800.00, in the context of a divorce in which the 
value of the marital estate exceeded $2,000,000.00.  We review a district court's property 
division "from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and 
liabilities, rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular 
disposition."  Carlton, 997 P.2d  at 1032; Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 10, 
72 P.3d 276, 279 (Wyo. 2003).1  Applying this perspective, we simply 
cannot deem the district court's order an abuse of discretion, contrary to law, 
or a denial of fundamental due process rights.  

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. 
Zaloudek's next issue relates to the district court's disposition of retirement 
assets.  The district court ruled 
that all of the retirement assets should be divided equally between the two 
parties.  Mr. Zaloudek challenges 
this decision.  His arguments on 
this issue are somewhat difficult to follow, but we understand him to make two 
main points.  First, he asserts that 
he should receive a greater share of the retirement assets because many of those 
assets were accumulated by him alone, not through the couple's joint 
efforts.  Second, he contends that 
those portions of the retirement assets acquired prior to the marriage should 
not be considered marital property and should not be divided.  Neither argument persuades us that the 
district court's decision to divide the retirement assets equally was an abuse 
of discretion. 

 
 

[¶16]     
Although 
one statutory factor to be considered in dividing property in a divorce is "the 
party through whom the property was acquired," Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114, previous 
cases have established that a party is not automatically entitled to all of that 
property.  For example, in Humphrey v. Humphrey, 2007 WY 72, 
¶ 12, 157 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 2007), the property divided by the court 
included a business interest given to the husband by his parents.  The husband objected, asserting that 
this property was "not a product of the marital union."  Id.  We rejected that argument because, 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114, "all property of the parties is 
subject to distribution."  Id., ¶ 13, 157 P.3d  at 454.  We upheld the district court's decision 
to divide the business interest as part of the marital estate.  To similar effect, in Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 
16, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003), we upheld a decree granting the wife one half of 
the marital estate, even though the property was largely from gifts and 
inheritance received from the husband's parents.  Under Wyoming law, all of the Zaloudek's 
property was subject to equitable division upon divorce, and Mr. Zaloudek was 
not entitled to a larger portion of the couple's retirement assets just because 
he had earned more money than Ms. Zaloudek.

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. 
Zaloudek also asserts that some of the retirement assets were acquired before 
the marriage, and therefore not part of the marital estate.  This argument has merit, but the 
difficulty is that neither party provided any evidence of the value of the 
retirement assets at that earlier date.  
The record suggests that the parties were unsuccessful in obtaining this 
evidence, even though subpoenas were issued to the asset managers.  Without evidence of the value of the 
retirement assets at the earlier date, the district court had no basis for 
excluding the pre-marital portion from division.  The district court's refusal to 
speculate was not unreasonable, and was not an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶18]     
Mr. 
Zaloudek insists that the value of the retirement assets as of the date of the 
marriage should have been established by applying what he calls a "marital 
fraction."  Mr. Zaloudek began 
acquiring retirement assets in 1973 when he began his employment with the 
airline.  By the time of the divorce 
trial in 2008, he had owned these assets for thirty-five years.  Seventeen of those years, or 
approximately 49%, were prior to his marriage to Ms. Zaloudek.  Eighteen of those years, or 
approximately 51%, were after the marriage.  On this basis, he claims that the 
district court should have considered 49% of his retirement assets as 
pre-marital property to be retained solely by him, and 51% of the retirement 
assets as marital property to be divided between the 
parties.

 
 

[¶19]     
This 
"marital fraction" method was used by an expert witness for Ms. Zaloudek 
during the divorce trial to establish a present value of Mr. Zaloudek's 
continuing pension payments.  Mr. 
Zaloudek now claims that it was error for the district court not to apply this 
method to all of the retirement assets.  
However, the expert witness made it clear that he used this method only 
for the continuing pension payments, and explicitly stated that the method 
should not be applied to the other retirement assets.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it heeded the expert's testimony and declined to apply the 
"marital fraction" to the other retirement assets.  In addition, experience indicates that a 
person's retirement accounts are worth substantially less in the early years of 
a career, and because of compound interest and continuing contributions, are 
worth substantially more in later years.  
The "marital fraction" method advocated by Mr. Zaloudek does not 
account for these changes in value over time.  For this reason as well, we cannot 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in declining to use the 
"marital fraction" method to estimate the pre-marital value of the retirement 
assets.

 
 

[¶20]     
The 
divorce decree reflects that the district court considered the statutory 
factors.  It found that "most of the 
assets have been acquired during the marriage and . . . that those assets have 
appreciated during the marriage."  
The court determined that "an equitable distribution merits an equal 
distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities."  It further found that "an equal division 
of the parties' assets would adequately allow each party to have sufficient 
income with which to support his or her individual living expenses."  These findings and conclusions are 
sufficiently supported by the evidence of record, and are not so unfair or 
inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.   

 
 

[¶21]     
As 
a final objection, Mr. Zaloudek asserts that the district court did not follow 
proper procedure when it entered the divorce decree.  He complains that the district court 
adopted the proposed divorce decree submitted by Ms. Zaloudek, without allowing 
Mr. Zaloudek an opportunity to approve the order as to form or to assert 
any objections.  Mr. Zaloudek 
claims that this violated W.R.C.P. 58(a).

 
 

[¶22]     
His 
reliance on W.R.C.P. 58(a) is misplaced.  
That rule, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

 
 
Presentation. 
. . . [U]nless otherwise ordered by the court, written judgments or orders shall 
be presented to the court within 20 days after its decision is made known.  Before submitting the judgment or order, 
the party drafting it shall seek to secure the written approval as to form of 
the other parties.  If, within 10 
days, approval as to form is not obtained, the party drafting the form of 
judgment or order may forward the original to the court and serve a copy on the 
other parties with a notice advising objections must be made within 10 
days.  If no written objection is 
timely filed, the court may sign the judgment or order.  If objection is filed, the court will 
resolve the matter with or without a hearing.  A party objecting shall submit an 
alternative form of judgment or order with the objection.

 
 
This 
procedure is commonly used when the court orally announces a decision and asks 
one of the parties, usually the prevailing party, to draft an order reflecting 
that decision.  That is not what 
happened in the Zaloudek's divorce, and accordingly, the rule does not apply 
here.  The district court did not 
announce a decision at the end of the Zaloudek's divorce trial, and did not ask 
one of the parties to submit an order.  
Instead, it directed both parties to submit proposed divorce 
decrees.  Both parties did so.  In this way, the district court was 
reminded or made aware of the positions, arguments, and objections of both 
parties.  We find no violation of 
W.R.C.P. 58(a).

 
 

[¶23]     
We 
affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It 
is on this same basis that we decline to address in detail many of the minor 
complaints in Mr. Zaloudek's brief.