Case Title: Rottman v. Citizens Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Torrington, Wyo.,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rottman v. Citizens Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Torrington, Wyo.,1990 WY 146803 P.2d 98Case Number: 89-271Decided: 12/14/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Leonard E. ROTTMAN, Joan 
R. Rottman, David Rottman, Clarence Rottman, 

Susan Rottman-Bahr and 
D.C. Farms, a Wyoming Corporation, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

The CITIZENS NATIONAL 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF TORRINGTON, WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Goshen County, William A. Taylor, J.

Lisa C. Sweeney 
of Sweeney Law Office, Laramie, for appellants.

Donald E. Jones 
of Jones and Graham Law Offices, Torrington, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants 
Leonard E. Rottman, Joan R. Rottman, David Rottman, Clarence Rottman, Susan 
Rottman-Bahr, and D.C. Farms, a Wyoming corporation, (hereinafter the Rottmans) 
claim the district court abused its discretion when it adjusted the terms of the 
court-structured settlement reached between the Rottmans and Appellee Citizens 
National Bank & Trust Company of Torrington, Wyoming (hereinafter the 
bank).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      This case began 
in November of 1987 when the bank sued various members of the Rottman family 
after they defaulted on several promissory notes totaling $744,775.10. The bank 
also asked the district court to set aside numerous fraudulent transactions it 
alleged the Rottmans had made among themselves. After extended pretrial 
posturing, including a temporary restraining order, a writ of replevin, a 
contempt order, a withdrawal and substitution of counsel, a counterclaim, and a 
W.R.C.P. 11 motion for attorney's fees and sanctions, the case went to trial in 
July of 1989.1

[¶4]      Part way into the 
trial, the Rottmans asked the district court to halt the trial and assist them 
in structuring a settlement with the bank. After extensive negotiations, the 
parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement which provided, inter 
alia, that the clerk of court would turn over to the bank the $143,043.81 
recovered from the Rottmans through replevin.2 Before the district court signed 
the stipulated settlement into judgment form, it was advised that the clerk held 
$12,305.78 less than the $143,043.81 the parties had stipulated to in reaching 
their settlement. After consulting with the parties, the district court included 
the following paragraph in its August 4, 1989, "Judgment by Stipulation and 
Order of the Court":

4. Upon review of the 
stipulation, the Court finds that the parties and the Court understood the sum 
of $143,043.81 to be held by the Clerk of Court as described in paragraph 3(b) 
above;[3] however, the Court finds that such 
amount is overstated by $12,305.78 and the sum held by the Clerk to be paid over 
to the [bank] was actually only $130,078.03. The Court determines and orders 
that the difference of $12,305.78 be corrected by payment under paragraph 3 
above by an additional installment in the amount of $12,305.78 to be paid on or 
before November 13, 1989, without interest. For good cause shown, the Court will 
entertain a motion for extension of time for payment of said 
$12,305.78.

[¶5]      The Rottmans 
appeal this portion of the judgment and argue that they agreed to pay $110,0004 to settle the case and that, 
therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to include the 
$12,305.78 difference in the judgment. The Rottmans do not dispute that the 
$110,000 payment was in addition to the stipulated $143,043.81 held in replevin 
by the clerk.

[¶6]      We have outlined 
the components of the district court's discretion:

     "`A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. * * *' Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

* * * * * *

     "Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

* * * * * *

     "* * * Each case must 
be determined on its peculiar facts. * * *" Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 
896-897 (1986).

England v. 
Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶7]      We conclude that 
the Rottmans' argument is, at best, creative. They agreed that the bank would 
receive a sum certain in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit. This sum included 
the $143,043.81 held in replevin plus the $110,000 to be paid in installments. 
Before the terms of the settlement were reduced to judgment, the parties learned 
of the $12,305.78 difference between what the parties stipulated to and what the 
clerk held. After consulting with both sides, the district court drafted the 
judgment so that it accurately embodied the terms of the parties' settlement. 
Thus, the court ordered the Rottmans to pay the full amount stipulated to by the 
parties in settling their lawsuit. The district court simply gave effect to the 
terms of the parties' stipulated settlement. The district court acted 
appropriately under the circumstances, and, consequently, there was no abuse of 
discretion.

[¶8]      
Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶9]      As factually well 
illustrated in majority opinion, the creditor and debtor came to negotiate a 
settlement during an extended trial. Obviously, each party thought they had 
agreed, and clearly, the debtor paid what was intended. This majority, in 
following the trial court, now assesses an additional payment burden on the 
settling debtor because the creditor failed to know or find out what they had 
already collected. From this imposition of a payment penalty on the debtor, 
which is derived from an obvious mistake of the creditor and which is in clear 
contravention of a term of the stipulation for explicit payment, I 
dissent.

[¶10]   The antipathy of my dissent is 
further engendered from personal experience and past precedent where a creditor 
or its attorney makes a mistake and the besieged debtor is ordered to become the 
guardian angel for further payment. Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, 750 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 1988); Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, 713 P.2d 228 
(Wyo. 1986).

[¶11]   In this case, without a shadow of a 
doubt, the debtor offered to divvy up $110,000, which was to be gathered 
together to achieve a loan balance settlement. The fact that the creditor, as it 
came to be recognized by the trial court at a later date, had $12,305.78 less 
collected than expected, was the creditor's mistake and not that of the debtor 
in offering $110,000 as complete and final settlement.

[¶12]   I take no comfort in analyzing this 
case for affirmation that the debtor did not reject the creditor's figures in 
computation directed to approve the $110,000 cash payment settlement. This 
decision directly places responsibility in assessing obligation to the debtor 
for a mistake of the creditor which, unfortunately, could have been corrected in 
the courthouse by a walk down the hallway to the clerk's office or, in the bank 
or the law firm's office, by a telephone call.

[¶13]   Sequentially, creditor, by replevin 
and execution, gathered together a fund from the debtor which was on deposit 
with the clerk of court. For whatever combination of circumstances, either 
creditor or counsel neglected to compute or recall that a portion of the 
replevin funds had been repaid to an uninvolved third party in the amount of 
$12,305.78 so that the amount held by the clerk of court, easily determinable by 
casual inquiry, was only $130,078.03 instead of the initial 
$143,043.81.

[¶14]   This court reassesses that factual 
record to establish that the debtor agreed to pay $253,043.81 instead of the 
$110,000 and whatever the creditor had already collected. I agree with the 
majority that the debtor agreed to sweeten the pot by $110,000 explicitly and 
expressly, but not $110,000 in addition to a non-existent sum attested to by the 
creditor, of which part had been lost from its proceeds in replevin actions. No 
one can realistically question that the bank made the calculation mistake. 
Otherwise, if they wanted more money, they would have set the payment horizon of 
an additional $12,000, give or take.

[¶15]   Rational knowledge of business 
negotiations and the specific evidence in this record gain credence from the 
testimony found in the record itself where the procedure for payment of the cash 
consideration of $110,000 was considered in detail for security status and 
installment payment scheduling. It is a curiosity of these events that this 
majority completely ignores the specificity of what happened:

     MR. ARON [one of the 
defendants' attorneys]: What I'm trying to avoid is anything unexpected. 
Throughout the case people have filed things. I'm just saying take no action 
without Court approval as to the secured assets, except the bank shall have the 
right to inspect.

     MR. JONES [plaintiff's 
attorney]: Through the Sheriff.

     MR. ARON: Through the 
Sheriff of Goshen County.

     One other paragraph. 
Upon full payment of the $110,000 together with the interest thereon, that there 
shall remain no claims by plaintiff Citizen's National Bank or the Farmers Home 
Administration based upon the notes identified in this action as numbers 1260, 
1270, 1280, and 2230 and all disputes between the parties arising from this 
action will have been settled and resolved.

     MR. JOHNSON [another 
attorney of composite defendants]: Upon final payment, the FHA note is returned 
to the defendants and that the bank will release all secured agreements and 
financing statements filed anywhere with regards to the fourth promissory note 
which are the subject matter of the litigation.

     MR. JONES: I have one 
other thing with regard to Farmers Home Administration. This stipulation is 
subject to approval of the Farmers Home Administration, which plaintiff's 
counsel gives his assurance that it is his belief that it is within the realm of 
his authority to make this stipulation subject to the further condition that the 
defendants represent to the Court and to the plaintiff and Farmers Home 
Administration that they have disclosed all assets which have been derived and 
are possessed by them in the operation of the Rottman farm and ranch during the 
period of this litigation.

     MR. JOHNSON: My question is 
are we settling the damn thing or aren't we? We are paying the 110,000 bucks and 
it's over with.

     THE COURT: We are 
settling it. I can understand Don's concern but what we are doing here is 
settling a lawsuit. I think through the discovery and everything else, if we 
haven't found it all, I don't know what to say.

[¶16]   Unfortunately even after this 
occurred, upon finding that it had a short pot in dollars deposited at the 
clerk's office, creditor bank requested the debtor make up for its own 
miscomputation, which by then had been stated in the stipulation for settlement. 
It was the bank's mistake and the debtor should not be assessed a further burden 
for what was determinable by the bank in advance with only a simple telephone 
call or any personal inquiry. This record reflects, and I would agree, that the 
offer was a specific dollar settlement which was accepted and left no right 
remaining for the creditor to later recompute by reshuffling the cards after 
both hands had been turned face up. Even though the creditor may have hoped, or 
even expected, to receive $253,043.81, the debtor stipulated to and clearly 
agreed only to settle for $110,000, which amount was then accepted. I dissent 
from this curative judicial action to correct a creditor's mistake at the 
unjustified expense of the settling debtor. The decision is especially egregious 
since the creditor is permitted to renege from settlement for $110,000 and the 
debtor is not only bound to his payment agreement, but later dragnetted for 
$12,305.78 more. 

 FOOTNOTES

1 The case has lost none 
of its acrimonious flavor; another W.R.C.P. 11 motion for attorney sanctions has 
been filed in this appeal.

2 The parties agreed that, 
in addition to the $143,043.81 recovered by the bank through replevin, the bank 
would receive $110,000, to be paid by the Rottmans in installments.

3 Paragraph 3(b) stated 
that the bank was to receive the following sum:

$143,043.81 recovered by 
replevin in this action and paid to the Clerk of Court, which sum shall be paid 
over to the [bank], together with any accumulated interest on said 
deposit.

4 See supra note 
2.