Case Title: State v. Brian C. Wulff

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP001732-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-1732-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Brian C. Wulff, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  200 Wis.2d 318, 546 N.W.2d 522 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED  
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 30, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
December 3, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
LaCrosse 
 
JUDGE: 
 
JOHN J. PERLICH 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Stephen Hurley, John Hyland and Hurley, Burish & 
Miliken, Madison; of counsel, James Geis and James Geis Law 
Office, Chicago, IL, and oral argument by James Geis. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sharon 
Ruhly, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1732-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
      
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Brian C. Wulff, 
 
      
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 30, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded with directions. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  The issue in this case is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant, 
Brian C. Wulff, of the version of the offense the jury was 
instructed to deliberate, attempted second-degree sexual assault 
by attempted genital or anal intrusion.   
¶2 
We hold that there was insufficient evidence presented 
at trial to support a finding of guilt on attempted vaginal or 
anal intrusion.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' 
decision and remand to the circuit court with instructions to 
enter a judgment of acquittal based on United States v. Burks, 
437 U.S. 1 (1978).  In Burks, the Court held that "once a 
reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the 
only just remedy available for that court is the direction of a 
judgment of acquittal."  Id. at 18.  To subject Wulff to a new 
trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1  Id.  There were 
two other issues presented in this case.  However, because our 
insufficiency of evidence determination is dispositive, this 
court need not reach these other issues.  
¶3 
The State filed an information charging Brian Wulff 
with the offense of attempted second-degree sexual assault.  The 
trial was before the La Crosse County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable John J. Perlich.  The jury was instructed in part that 
the crime of second-degree sexual assault is committed when a 
person has sexual intercourse with someone who the defendant 
knows is unconscious.  The jury was further instructed that 
"'sexual intercourse' means any intrusion, however slight, by 
any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or 
anal opening of another." Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(b) and (c).  
The jury returned a general verdict finding Wulff guilty as 
charged in the information.  He was sentenced to probation for a 
period of four years, with the condition that he be incarcerated 
for four months with Huber privileges.   
 
¶4 
Wulff filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the 
circuit court.  In addition to requesting a new trial because of 
alleged trial errors, Wulff complained that after the verdict it 
became known that at least one of the jurors had reached her 
                     
1 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb. . . ."  U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
verdict by relying on a definition that was interjected into the 
deliberations from an outside source.  Wulff also asserted in 
his motion that the State impermissibly referred to his 
invocation 
of 
the 
right 
to 
remain 
silent 
during 
police 
questioning.  The judge denied the motion.   
¶5 
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding 
it irrelevant that the State failed to prove each of the 
theories of Wulff's guilt advanced at trial.  State v. Wulff, 
200 Wis. 2d 318, 546 N.W.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1996).  The court of 
appeals also rejected all of Wulff's other challenges to the 
conviction.     
¶6 
Carrie D., the victim, was 22 years old when she 
testified.  In the early morning hours of September 17, 1993, 
the victim and the defendant encountered one another outside a 
bar in La Crosse, Wisconsin. The victim and the defendant knew 
each other from their high school days and had run into one 
another occasionally while living in LaCrosse.  The two began to 
talk, and Carrie became separated from her friends.  After an 
unsuccessful search for her friends, the victim told the 
defendant she was about to walk home because she was too drunk 
to drive.  The defendant agreed to walk with her.  What happened 
after they began to walk together to Carrie’s apartment is 
disputed.   
 
¶7 
According to the victim, Wulff repeatedly tried to 
kiss her during the hour-long walk to her apartment but she only 
permitted him to do so once.  When they reached her apartment at 
about 3:00 a.m., she agreed that Wulff could stay overnight if 
he slept on the couch.  After they entered the apartment she 
showed him the couch in the living room and she went to her 
bedroom to sleep.   
 
¶8 
Carrie testified she did not remove her sweatshirt, 
bra, underwear, or socks before she went to sleep.  However, 
when she awoke she was completely naked and Wulff was sitting on 
top of her, facing her, and trying to open her mouth with one 
hand and force his erect penis into her mouth. She screamed, and 
Wulff got off her.  He kept repeating: “nothing happened, don’t 
worry.”  Wulff then grabbed his clothes and left. Carrie could 
not recall how her clothes came off or how a tampon she 
remembered having in when she fell asleep had been removed. 
 
¶9 
An examination at the hospital revealed the victim had 
suffered a superficial abrasion on the inner part of her lip.  
However, there was no semen found on the tampon she had inserted 
prior to the examination or on the vaginal, cervical, oral, or 
anal swabs or smears taken from the victim.  Additionally, there 
were no strands of the defendant's hair found in combings taken 
from the victim, and no strands of the victim's hair were found 
in combings taken from the defendant.     
 
¶10 According to the defendant’s version of the incident, 
the walk back to Carrie's apartment was marked with interludes 
of consensual kissing and petting.  Wulff also testified that as 
they approached her apartment, Carrie invited him to spend the 
rest of the night with her.   
 
¶11 Wulff further testified at trial that upon arriving at 
Carrie's apartment, they went into her bedroom and began to pet 
heavily and remove their clothes.  They abruptly stopped what 
they were doing when they were startled by a noise.  Shortly 
after they had determined that no one was walking in on them, 
she passed out.   
 
¶12 Wulff claims that he was unable to fall asleep, so he 
tried to awaken Carrie to say goodbye.  When she awoke, he 
claimed, she was disoriented and confused.  At trial, Wulff 
asserted that Carrie misconstrued the events of that evening 
because she had too much to drink. 
¶13 The information charged Wulff in the precise language 
of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(d).2  It alleged that Wulff had 
committed the attempted second-degree sexual assault because he 
had “sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the 
defendant knows is unconscious.”   
 
¶14 The terms “sexual contact” and “sexual intercourse” 
are both specifically defined in Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(b) and 
(c). The statutory definition of sexual intercourse is:   
 
(b) 
"[s]exual 
intercourse" 
includes 
the 
meaning 
assigned under sec. 939.22(36) [vulvar penetration] as 
well as cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse 
between persons or 
any 
other intrusion, 
however 
slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any 
object into the genital or anal opening either by the 
defendant or upon the defendant's instruction.  The 
emission of semen is not required.  
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(c).  The jury instructions, however, did 
not 
provide 
the 
complete 
statutory 
definition 
of 
sexual 
intercourse.   The relevant jury instructions were: 
                     
2 Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(d) provides that whoever "[h]as sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the defendant 
knows is unconscious" shall be guilty of a Class C felony. 
 
Take the law as it is given in the jury's instructions 
and apply the law to the facts in the case which are 
properly proven by the evidence.  Consider only the 
evidence received during this trial and the law as 
given to you by these instructions and from these 
alone, guided by your soundest judgment, reach your 
verdict.  
 
The crime of second degree sexual assault is committed 
by: 
A person who has sexual intercourse with a person the 
defendant knows is unconscious.  
 
The first element requires that the defendant had 
sexual intercourse with Carrie D. 
 
"Sexual intercourse" means any intrusion, however 
slight, by any part of a person's body or of any 
object, into the genital or anal opening of another.  
Emission of semen is not required.  
 
 
¶15 The jury's verdict was that Brian Wulff was "Guilty of 
sexual assault as charged in the Information."  Wulff asks this 
court to reverse his conviction because he claims that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt for 
attempted genital or anal intrusion. 
¶16 This court should only reverse the conviction if the 
evidence, after being viewed most favorably to the prosecution, 
still has insufficient probative value to prove the theory of 
guilt submitted to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 
¶17 One 
can 
commit 
attempted 
sexual 
intercourse 
in 
different ways.  Although each of the different ways of 
accomplishing sexual intercourse is conceptually similar, each 
one constitutes a separate crime when done in a manner 
proscribed by the statute. State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 291 
N.W.2d 800 (1980). In closing argument, the prosecution advanced 
three theories: attempted sexual contact, attempted sexual 
intercourse by fellatio, and attempted sexual intercourse by 
vulvar penetration.  However, the court did not instruct the 
jury to consider all of these theories of culpability.  The jury 
was instructed to convict if it found that Wulff had committed 
attempted second-degree sexual assault by attempting a single 
version of sexual intercourse—genital or anal intrusion.  The 
State did not produce sufficient evidence of attempted genital 
or anal intrusion during the course of the trial.  
 
¶18 Wulff relies on this court's decision in State v. 
Crowley, 143 Wis. 2d 324, 422 N.W.2d 847 (1988), to assert that 
the conviction must be reversed because it is unclear what 
theory the jury relied on in reaching its guilty verdict—the 
theory of attempted fellatio advanced at trial, or the theory of 
attempted genital or anal intrusion presented in the jury 
instructions. 
 
¶19 In Crowley, alternative theories of the defendant's 
guilt were presented to the jury.  The jury returned a guilty 
verdict, but it was unclear as to which ground the jury used to 
convict.  This court explained, as follows, the proper means by 
which to review such situations: 
We conclude that, when alternative methods of proof 
resting upon different evidentiary facts are presented 
to the jury, it is necessary, in order to sustain a 
conviction, for an appellate court to conclude that 
the evidence was sufficient to convict beyond a 
reasonable doubt upon both of the alternative modes of 
proof. 
 
Id. at 329.  Wulff argues that Crowley stands for the 
proposition that a general jury verdict can be sustained only if 
the trial testimony was sufficient to sustain the conviction 
under any and all theories submitted to the jury.   
 
¶20 Wulff contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a guilty verdict on the theory of genital and anal 
intrusion.  To allow such a conviction based on evidence that is 
unrelated to the jury instructions violates the fundamental 
right to trial by jury in two ways: 1) it makes the jury 
instructions defining the offense superfluous, and 2) it 
violates the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict.3   
 
¶21 The State argues that the opinion in Crowley has been 
called into doubt by the Supreme Court case Griffin v. United 
States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), reh'g denied, 502 U.S. 1125 (1992). 
 In Griffin, the instructions given told the jury that it could 
return a verdict of guilty against the defendant if it found her 
to have participated in either one of the two objects of the 
drug conspiracy.  Griffin, 509 U.S. at 48.  The Court held that, 
in a federal prosecution, the Due Process Clause does not 
require that general guilty verdicts in a multiple-object 
conspiracy be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to 
support a conviction as to one object.   
¶22 The State argues that based on Griffin, Wulff's 
conviction must stand.  We disagree.  In Griffin, the jury was 
told that it could return a verdict of guilty if it found 
Griffin guilty of either one of the two objects of the 
conspiracy.  In the case at bar, the jury was not instructed 
that it could return a verdict of guilty if it found Wulff 
                     
3 The right to a unanimous verdict is secured under Article I, 
guilty of either attempted anal or genital intrusion or 
attempted fellatio.  The issue here is not determined by 
discussing that "[j]ury unanimity in the determination of the 
mode of committing a single crime is not required."  State v. 
Crowley, 143 Wis. 2d at 333.  Nor is the court's holding that 
when 
alternative 
means 
of 
committing 
sexual 
assault 
are 
conceptually similar, the jury need not be unanimous as to which 
specific act the defendant committed.  State v. Gustafson, 119 
Wis. 2d 676, 695, 351 N.W.2d 653 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1056 (1985), citing State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 598, 335 
N.W.2d 583 (1983).   
¶23 Here, 
the 
issue 
of 
attempted 
fellatio 
was 
not 
submitted to be decided by the jury.  Therefore, the jury was 
not told to consider fellatio as an alternative means of 
committing sexual contact.  It was instructed only on the charge 
of attempted anal or genital intrusion, and we can uphold this 
conviction 
only 
if 
the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
was 
sufficient to uphold this charge.     
 
¶24 The only facts presented to the jury on the State's 
theory of an attempted act of genital intrusion were that 1) 
when Carrie D. went to bed she was dressed and when she became 
aware of Wulff on top of her, she was undressed, and 2) she 
believes she had a tampon inserted and when she came to there 
was no tampon.  The police could not find it any place on the 
premises. The evidence of attempted genital intrusion is 
insufficient to support a conviction on this charge.  
                                                                  
sections 5 and 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
 
¶25 Although there was no evidence to prove an attempted 
genital or anal intrusion, admittedly there was evidence 
sufficient to sustain a conviction on review if the jury had 
been instructed to deliberate the fellatio intercourse or sexual 
contact theories of culpability.  However, in Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980), the Court stated "we 
cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not 
presented to the jury.  Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 
814 (1971); see Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 
(1979)."   
 
¶26 The Illinois Court of Appeals recently decided this 
issue in a case with facts analogous to those in Wulff.  In 
People v. Scott, 648 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. App. 1994), the state 
produced evidence of penetration with an object in a sexual 
assault case, but the court gave the jury an instruction on a 
different theory that was not supported by the evidence.  The 
court of appeals reversed the conviction because the evidence 
had nothing to do with the theory of the offense submitted to 
the jury.  The court explained: "The instruction offered to the 
jury on defining penetration had nothing to do either with 
penetration by object or with the manner accomplished by Scott. 
 Thus, the jury could not have found Scott guilty on the record 
before us, and we are uncertain upon what theory the jury found 
guilt."  Scott, 648 N.E.2d at 90.   
¶27 The situation in this case is similar to that in 
Scott.  The evidence before the jury did not support a finding 
of guilt on attempted genital or anal intrusion, and the general 
verdict leaves us uncertain as to under what theory the jury 
found guilt.  We can uphold Wulff's conviction only if there was 
sufficient evidence to support guilt on the charge submitted to 
the jury in the instructions.  
 
¶28 The instructed definition of "sexual intercourse," did 
not include the term "fellatio" or the words "oral intercourse." 
 There was sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, to find 
the defendant guilty of fellatio.  However, the jury was not 
instructed on that charge, so we cannot affirm Wulff's criminal 
conviction based on the theory of attempted fellatio.   
¶29 As to attempted 
genital 
intrusion 
evidence, the 
"appellate court may not reverse a conviction unless the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, 
is so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be 
said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting 
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 501.  The court limited jury 
deliberations 
by instructing 
only 
that 
sexual 
intercourse 
includes the intrusion of one part of a person's body into the 
genital or anal opening of another.  The instructions did not 
include a reference to oral intrusion, and we conclude that no 
jury could have found Wulff guilty of attempted genital or anal 
intrusion beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence 
presented at trial. Based on Burks, we conclude that this court 
cannot remand for a new trial based on attempted fellatio 
because to do so would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
Instead, because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
genital 
or 
anal 
intrusion 
conviction, 
and 
because 
facts 
regarding the attempted fellatio were submitted to the jury 
without instructions as to the relevant law, this court directs 
the entry of a judgment of acquittal.    
 
¶30 We hold that there was insufficient evidence presented 
at trial to support a finding of guilt on attempted vaginal or 
anal intrusion.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' 
decision and remand to the circuit court with directions to 
enter a judgment of acquittal.  There are two other issues 
presented. 
However, 
since 
our 
insufficiency 
of 
evidence 
determination is dispositive, we need not address these issues.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a 
judgment of acquittal.