Case Title: Moore v. Commissioner of Employment Security

Citation: 273 S.W.2d 703

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1954-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
273 S.W.2d 703 (1954) Basil A. MOORE v. COMMISSIONER OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 16, 1954. *704 William L. Moore, Nashville, for appellant, Commissioner. Harry L. Garrett, of Kingsport, for appellee, Claimant. BURNETT, Justice. Basil Moore filed a claim for unemployment compensation which was heard by the Appeals Referee. The Referee denied the claim. On appeal to the Board of Review that body, after hearing additional evidence of the claimant, likewise denied compensation. As a result of these two findings the present suit was instituted against the Commissioner of the Department of Employment Security and the last employer of Moore, Holston Defense Corporation. This suit was brought in the Chancery Court by petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security above referred to. The case was heard before the Chancellor on this petition for certiorari and the separate answers of the Commissioner and employer and the certified record of the Board of Review filed in accordance with the writ mentioned. At the conclusion of the hearing the Chancellor put down a decree holding in effect that there was no evidence in this record to sustain the finding of the Board of Review and that the record showed that the claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, and he, therefore, reversed the decision of the Board of Review. From this decree of the Chancellor the present appeal comes and we now have the matter for disposition. The first contention is that the Chancellor went beyond his duty and function under the law in reviewing this proceeding. It is the contention of the appellant, Commissioner, that the only function of the Chancellor in cases of this kind is to review the record of the proceedings before the Board of Review, and to determine therefrom if there was any evidence in such record to sustain the Board's finding of fact, and, if so, that then it is the duty of the court, Chancellor in this instance, to apply the applicable law to such findings. Code Section 6901.6 (i) provides in part as follows: In a number of cases this Court has dealt with the question here before us. Probably the most lucid statement of the application to be given this statutory provision is a statement of this Court in the case of Milne Chair Company v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 403, 230 S.W.2d 393, 396, wherein this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tomlinson, said: Numerous other cases to the same effect are Adams v. American Lava Corporation, 188 Tenn. 69, 216 S.W.2d 728; Ezell v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 319, 198 S.W.2d 809; Reese v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 423, 199 S.W.2d 569; Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889, and Miller v. Wiley, 190 Tenn. 498, 230 S.W.2d 979. This being the law what is the condition of the record that was before the Chancellor? The Appeals Referee found on certain statements that were introduced before him, along with the depositions of the claimant which were taken before him, that the claimant "was not available for work." This decision as said was appealed to the Board of Review and that Board reviewed the record before it as was heard by the Appeals Referee and then heard the claimant again. From this testimony that Board found that the claimant Then in a statement which is filed in the record the claimant said "I could not work shift work due to my health". And in another place he said "I am able, available and willing to work day shift." Then on being questioned he very clearly says that he is willing to do day shift only and that he would not do this swing-shift. This record likewise shows that he had been doing the kind of work for some 18 months when he quit because he felt that his health was injured by having to do this night work. It clearly appears to us from reading this record that the man quit his work because he was put on night work when he thought he was going to be able to work in the daytime all the time. It seems to us that clearly under these statements then that the man makes himself not available for work. This being true there is ample evidence in the record to support the finding of the Board of Review and the Appeals Referee. This being true, the trial court had no right to go beyond this and make an additional and different finding of fact. Under Code Section 6901.4(c) for a claimant to be entitled to unemployment compensation he must be "able * * * and * * * available for work. * *" When we, as did the Board of Review, examine this evidence that was taken before them, it appears to us that by the limitation *706 the claimant put on his work, that is, when he would work, that he has made himself unavailable for work. In other words the claimant by putting this check on when he would work, has made himself unemployable. The requirements of our statute that a claimant must be "able and available for work" are, as far as we can find and know, a universal requirement of the Unemployment Compensation laws now in effect in the United States. There have been numerous cases dealing with this very question and so far as we can find they are uniform in their holdings. In a very recent case (December, 1953) the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., Minn., 61 N.W.2d 526, 531, had the identical factual question before it in reference to availability for work that we have here. The Minnesota Court speaking through its Chief Justice reviewed decisions from many other courts all of which were to the same effect as the conclusion that we have reached here. The Minnesota Court among other things said: In the case presently before us the claimant quit his job with his employer because, according to his statements, it was making him nervous to work on shift work and he could not eat, although no doctor's statement, or any other medical evidence that the work was the cause of this, was presented by the claimant. And it seems to us that the evidence showed that the man was just insisting that he have day work and that the weight of the evidence clearly is that by shifting to another shift was not making any change in the nature of the work that he was doing. In view of what we have said above it is necessary that the decree of the Chancellor be reversed and the suit dismissed at the cost of the appellee, Basil A. Moore, and the sureties on his prosecution bond.