Case Title: State v. Austin

Citation: 165 Vt 389, 685 A.2d 1076

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Austin  (95-256); 165 Vt 389; 685 A.2d 1076

[Opinion Filed 9-Aug-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-256


State of Vermont                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.                                          District Court of Vermont
                                                 Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

James Austin                                     January Term, 1996


Edward J. Cashman, J.

       Howard W. Stalnaker and Diane C. Wheeler, Franklin County Deputy
  State's Attorneys, St. Albans, for plaintiff-appellee

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       GIBSON, J.   Defendant appeals an order of the Franklin District Court
  that revoked his probation and reinstated his underlying sentence for
  sexual assault.  Defendant contends that: (1) there was insufficient
  evidence to support a violation for leaving the State of Vermont without
  his probation officer's permission; (2) there was insufficient evidence to
  support a violation of the condition that he "successfully complete any
  therapy on sexual aggressiveness to satisfaction of probation officer"; and
  (3) the probation condition requiring defendant to "submit to urinalysis
  testing when requested by your probation officer" violated his
  constitutional rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable
  searches and seizures.  We reverse the determinations that defendant
  violated the travel and therapy conditions, but affirm the violation of the
  urinalysis condition.

       On April 8, 1990, defendant was charged with one count of sexual
  assault, 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(1), and two counts of custodial interference,
  13 V.S.A. § 2451.  Defendant and the

 

  State's Attorney signed a plea agreement in which defendant agreed to plead
  nolo contendere to the charge of sexual assault and the State agreed to
  dismiss the custodial interference charges and to recommend a sentence of
  one to three years, all suspended with probation.

       At sentencing, the judge accepted the plea agreement and issued a
  probation warrant that included the following conditions:

         F.  You shall remain within the State unless granted permission to
             leave by your probation officer.

             . . .

         M.  You shall not purchase, possess, or consume regulated drugs
             unless prescribed for your use by a physician.  You shall submit
             to urinalysis testing when requested by your probation officer or
             any other person authorized by your probation officer.

             . . .

         14. Defendant to attend substance abuse counseling and successfully
             complete any therapy on sexual aggressiveness to satisfaction of
             probation officer.  The order of therapy to be determined by
             counselors.


  Defendant signed the probation warrant on January 2, 1991.

       In October 1991, defendant violated probation Conditions M and 14 by
  failing to meet with his counselors and by admitting that he used
  marijuana.  He served nine days for the violations.  In December 1991,
  defendant again violated Condition 14 by continuing to miss meetings with a
  counselor and violated Condition M by refusing to submit to a urinalysis
  test. He served sixteen days in jail and signed a modified probation
  warrant that included Conditions F, M, and 14.

       In February 1995, defendant was twice charged with violating Condition
  M, first, after a urinalysis test indicated the presence of cannabinoids,
  and later, after he refused to consent to urinalysis testing.  He was also
  charged with violating Condition 14 by failing to attend substance-abuse
  counseling sessions.

       On March 17, 1995, the State charged defendant with violating
  Condition F by going to New Hampshire without permission from his probation
  officer.  Defendant was also charged

 

  with violating Condition 14 by failing to participate in sex-offender
  therapy to the satisfaction of his probation officer and by failing to "put
  into practice what [he] has learned [in therapy]."

       The court held a two-day hearing in March and April of 1995 on the
  alleged violations. In support of the Condition F violation, the State
  offered an affidavit from a Claremont, New Hampshire police officer, who
  placed defendant in New Hampshire on March 3, 1995. Defendant objected to
  the admissibility of the affidavit on the ground that it violated his right
  to confront an adverse witness.  The State did not explain why the officer
  was absent, and the objection was overruled without explanation from the
  court.  The court found that the affidavit provided sufficient evidence to
  support a violation of Condition F.

       With respect to Condition 14, defendant contended that he had actively
  participated in the sexual-aggression program and had a four-year history
  free of sexually violent behavior. Defendant's probation officer and
  therapist both acknowledged that defendant could identify his "risk
  factors," but they testified that he had not used this knowledge to change
  his life.  The court found that, despite his attendance and participation
  in treatment, defendant had failed to integrate the therapy into his life,
  and that he was therefore in violation of Condition 14.

       Finally, defendant did not contest the urinalysis results but argued
  that Condition M was invalid because it was not related to the predicate
  offense and was a violation of his right against unreasonable search and
  seizure.  The court found a clear and logical relationship between the
  condition and the underlying offense, and further noted that defendant had
  bargained for the conditions and had agreed to them on three separate
  occasions.  As a result, the court found that Condition M was valid and
  that defendant had violated it.

       On April 17, 1995, the court found that defendant's multiple probation
  violations demonstrated that probation had ceased to be helpful in
  defendant's rehabilitation.  The court therefore revoked defendant's
  probation and reinstated the underlying prison sentence.  The present
  appeal followed.

 

                                     I.


       Defendant contends that the evidence did not support a finding that he
  violated Condition F by leaving Vermont without his probation officer's
  permission.  According to defendant, the only evidence supporting the
  charge was the affidavit of a New Hampshire police officer, the admission
  of which violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.

       We have previously held that, to preserve a Confrontation Clause
  objection, a defendant must raise an objection on confrontation grounds
  with sufficient specificity to "trigger[] the consideration of a secondary
  issue, namely, whether circumstances making production of the witness
  difficult or impractical outweigh the [probationer's] need to confront and
  cross-examine the witness."  Watker v. Vermont Parole Bd., 157 Vt. 72, 78,
  596 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1991). As examples of specific objections, we have
  suggested that a probationer must apprise the trier of fact of the possible
  violation, express a desire to question the witness, ask the State to
  produce the witness or show "good cause" why the witness is not present,
  ask for a continuance, raise the confrontation issue, or object to the
  absence of the witness.  Id.  In the instant matter, when the State's
  Attorney offered the affidavit at the violation-of-probation hearing,
  defendant apprised the court of the possible violation, expressed a desire
  to question the witness, and specifically raised the confrontation issue. 
  Defendant thus preserved his Confrontation Clause objection.

       In State v. Finch, we held that "reliable hearsay can be admitted in a
  probation revocation proceeding and serve as the basis for revocation"
  without undermining the probationer's confrontation rights.  153 Vt. 216,
  218, 569 A.2d 494, 495 (1989).  In Finch, the trial court revoked the
  defendant's probation after finding that the defendant had violated a
  no-alcohol condition.  The evidence supporting the violation consisted of
  the testimony of the defendant's probation officer, who recounted
  statements made by the defendant's mother and by a police officer, and a
  report from a detoxification center documenting the defendant's admission
  and treatment.  After observing that the hearsay sources were "mutually
  supportive," and that the medical report was of the kind in which questions
  of credibility and veracity were not present,

 

  we concluded that "[t]he evidence in this case had sufficient indicia of
  reliability," and affirmed the revocation order.  Id.

       The constitutionality of our holding in Finch, however, was called
  into question when the federal district court for the District of Vermont
  granted a writ of habeas corpus to the defendant in Finch.  Finch v.
  Vermont Dist. Ct., No. 90-9, 1990 WL 312576, at *1 (D. Vt. Sept. 24, 1990)
  (unpublished mem.).  The court, in granting the writ, explicitly rejected
  this Court's determination "that indicia of reliability may alone justify
  denial of confrontation."  Id. at *4. Rather, the court held that, in a
  probation revocation hearing, a probationer has "the right . . . to
  cross-examine adverse witnesses `unless the hearing body specifically finds
  good cause for not allowing confrontation.'"  Id. at *2 (quoting Black v.
  Romano,