Case Title: Pula v. Pula-Branch

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2896

Docket Number: 20100985

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Pula v. Pula-Branch, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2896.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2896 
PULA ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. PULA-BRANCH, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Pula v. Pula-Branch, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2896.] 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — R.C. Chapter 3115 — Domestic 
relations courts are authorized to decide cases brought under UIFSA — 
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. 
(No. 2010-0985 — Submitted April 6, 2011 — Decided June 22, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93460, 
2010-Ohio-912. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case concerns which courts have jurisdiction to address 
interstate petitions of child support brought under the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (“UIFSA”), R.C. Chapter 3115.  The specific issue is whether the 
domestic relations division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court  has 
subject matter jurisdiction over an interstate support order when the order is 
unrelated to a divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or annulment.  
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We hold that the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court does have subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Appellant Ruby K. Pula is a resident of Hawaii and the custodian 
and maternal grandmother of K.G.P., a minor child born out of wedlock.  K.G.P. 
resides with Pula; appellee, Adrienne Haunani Pula-Branch, K.G.P.’s birth 
mother, lives in Cleveland.  On November 18, 2008, on Pula’s behalf, appellant 
Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) filed in the domestic relations 
court a petition for child support and medical coverage against Pula-Branch. 
{¶ 3} On May 15, 2009, the trial court issued a child-support order, but 
CSEA timely appealed to the Eight District Court of Appeals, challenging the trial 
court’s calculation of child-support obligations.  On January 20, 2010, the 
appellate court sua sponte raised the issue of the domestic court’s jurisdiction over 
the underlying action and ordered briefing.  The court ultimately concluded that 
the domestic relations court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.  
The court held that the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court’s jurisdiction 
was limited by R.C.  2301.03(L)(1) to matters involving “a divorce, dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation, or annulment” and reasoned that since this case 
involved none of the actions set forth in R.C. 2301.01(L)(1), the Cuyahoga 
County Domestic Relations Court had no jurisdiction to address a UIFSA support 
order.  Pula v. Pula-Branch, Cuyahoga App.No. 93460, 2010-Ohio-912, ¶ 8.  The 
court noted that the case would be properly brought in juvenile court pursuant to 
R.C. 2151.23(B)(3), which states that the juvenile court has original jurisdiction 
under the UIFSA. Id. at ¶ 14, fn. 4.  The appellate court ordered the Cuyahoga 
County Domestic Relations Court to vacate its order for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Pula at ¶ 14. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 4} CSEA appealed.  The cause is before this court upon the 
acceptance of a discretionary appeal. Pula v. Pula-Branch 126 Ohio St.3d 1581, 
2010-Ohio-4542, 934 N.E.2d 354. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 5} The UIFSA is codified in Ohio in R.C. Chapter 3115.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 3115.16(B)(1), a “responding tribunal” that receives a complaint from an 
initiating state may issue or enforce a support order “to the extent otherwise 
authorized by law.”  R.C. 3115.01(R) defines “[r]esponding tribunal” as “the 
authorized tribunal in a responding state”; the definition of “[t]ribunal” in R.C. 
3115.01(X) includes “any trial court of record in this state.”  There is no dispute 
that the domestic relations court is a tribunal under the statute.  The central issue 
of this case is whether that court is “authorized”; the appellate court held that the 
Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court is authorized to hear and decide only 
cases that relate to a divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment of a 
marriage. Pula, 2010-Ohio-912, ¶ 14.  We disagree that the court’s jurisdiction is 
so limited and therefore reverse the judgment of court of appeals. 
{¶ 6} The General Assembly defines the jurisdiction of the courts of 
common pleas and their respective divisions.  Sections 4(A) and (B), Article IV, 
Ohio Constitution.  R.C. 2301.03 establishes the jurisdiction of the state's 
domestic relations courts in separate subsections; their jurisdiction can vary by 
county.  R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) applies specifically to the judges of Cuyahoga 
County Domestic Relations Court.  That statute sets forth that the judges of that 
domestic relations court “shall * * * exercise the same powers and jurisdiction * * 
* as other judges of the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county and shall be 
elected and designated as judges of the court of common pleas, division of 
domestic relations.  They shall have all the powers relating to all divorce, 
dissolution of marriage, legal separation, and annulment cases, except in cases 
that are assigned to some other judge of the court of common pleas for some 
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special reason.”  R.C.2301.03(L)(1) grants all the power in marriage-related cases 
to the domestic relations division, thus limiting the ability of other common pleas 
judges to preside over those cases.  Conversely, there is no limiting language 
preventing domestic relations judges from having jurisdiction over other cases – 
they retain “the same powers and jurisdiction * * * as other judges of the court of 
common pleas.”  Thus, R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) is not a limiting provision, but rather a 
specific grant of authority. 
{¶ 7} The appellate court held that Pula’s petition should have been filed 
in juvenile court. Pula, 2010-Ohio-912, ¶ 14, fn. 4.  R.C. 2151.23(B), which deals 
with the original jurisdiction of juvenile courts, states that juvenile courts have 
original jurisdiction “[u]nder the uniform interstate family support act in Chapter 
3115. of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.23(B)(3).  But that jurisdiction is not 
exclusive.  R.C. 2151.23(A) sets forth the exclusive original jurisdiction of 
juvenile courts, and UIFSA cases are not listed among the matters over which 
juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction.  This court has held that the distinction 
between exclusive original jurisdiction and nonexclusive original jurisdiction is 
crucial.  In Brookbank v. Gray (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 279, 658 N.E.2d 724, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, this court held that the issue of an illegitimate 
child's paternity may be litigated in a wrongful-death case in the court of common 
pleas.  We held that although the “juvenile court has been given ‘original 
jurisdiction’ to determine the paternity of children born out of wedlock[,] * * 
*[t]his is in contrast to the ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ given to the juvenile 
court over other matters.” Brookbank, 74 Ohio St.3d at 293, quoting R.C. 
2151.23(A) and (B)(3). 
{¶ 8} Indeed, cases brought pursuant to Chapter 3115 are explicitly 
excluded from the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction.  R.C. 2151.23(A)(11) 
grants exclusive jurisdiction to juvenile courts to “hear and determine a request 
for an order for the support of any child if the request is not ancillary to an action 
January Term, 2011 
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for divorce, dissolution of marriage, annulment, or legal separation, * * * or an 
action for support brought under Chapter 3115. of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis 
added.)  Thus, if the sought-after support order arises in a domestic relations case 
or a Chapter 3115 case, the juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction 
over support orders.  Since juvenile courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction 
under R.C. Chapter 3115 claims, other courts may hear those cases. 
{¶ 9} The UIFSA is remedial legislation and as such, pursuant to R.C. 
1.11, must be “liberally construed in order to promote [its] object and assist the 
parties in obtaining justice.”  The facilitation of interstate support orders would 
not be promoted by foreclosing the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court 
from considering UIFSA cases that do not arise from a marriage.  The Cuyahoga 
County Domestic Relations Court is a trial court of record in Ohio, one attuned to 
crafting support orders.  The Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations division’s 
jurisdiction is not limited by statute to cases involving marriage, divorce, 
separation, or annulment; those judges “exercise the same powers and jurisdiction 
* * * as other judges of the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county.” R.C. 
23010.03(L)(1).  Finally, jurisdiction over an action for support brought under 
R.C. Chapter 3115 is not exclusive to juvenile courts. R.C. 2151.23(A)(11). 
{¶ 10} Therefore, we hold that the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations 
Court does have jurisdiction over an action for support brought pursuant to R.C. 
Chapter 3115, even if the action does not arise from a divorce, dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation, or annulment.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and remand the case to the appellate court for further 
determination consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
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__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kestra 
Smith and Joseph Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant 
Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency. 
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, Alexandra Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Emily S. Schlesinger, Deputy Solicitor, and Alana R. Shockey, Assistant 
Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
______________________