Case Title: State v. Crumm

Citation: 232 Kan. 254, 654 P.2d 417

Docket Number: 53,737

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1982-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
232 Kan. 254 (1982)
654 P.2d 417
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JAMES K. CRUMM, JR., a/k/a JAMES M. HOBSON, Appellant.
No. 53,737

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 3, 1982.
Edward V. Byrne, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
David D. Belling, county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
This is an appeal by James K. Crumm, Jr., from his conviction of first-degree murder, K.S.A. 21-3401. He was convicted by a jury in Miami District Court of the shotgun slaying of his stepbrother, Christen A. Hobson. The only defense asserted was that of insanity. On appeal, defendant claims error in the exclusion of evidence, error in the cross-examination of one of the *255 defense medical witnesses, and error in refusing a requested instruction.
Since the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, a brief statement of the facts will be sufficient. On April 17, 1980, Ed Hobson reported to the Overland Park police department that his 13-year-old son, Christen, was missing. A few days later, Christen's wallet was found in the Metcalf South shopping center. No further clues were found as to Christen's whereabouts until May 3, 1980, when two young fishermen found a body in a shallow grave near Bull Creek in rural Miami County. Within hours the body had been identified as that of Christen Hobson. Three people were taken into custody and charged with the homicide: the defendant, James Crumm, his mother, Sueanne Hobson, and his friend, Paul Sorrentino. Defendant gave a detailed statement to the officers, admitting that he and Sorrentino, at the urging of Sueanne Hobson, took Christen from his Overland Park home, drove him to Miami County, caused him to dig his own grave, shotgunned him down at close range, and covered the body with earth. Defendant and Sorrentino then returned to Johnson County. Defendant disposed of the shovel used to dig and cover the grave, and he disposed of his stepfather's shotgun which he had taken earlier that day. Defendant also stated that his mother promised to buy him a car and to pay for repairs for Sorrentino's motorcycle as their payment for killing Christen. The extensive psychiatric testimony presented at trial dealt with defendant's history, his suggestibility, his severe alcoholism, his perplexing relationship with his mother, and practically every other aspect of his personality. Three psychiatrists testified for the defense and expressed opinions that the defendant did not know the difference between right and wrong at the time of the homicide. Two psychiatrists testified for the State, and each expressed the opposite opinion: that the defendant was sane at the time of the homicide, knew the difference between right and wrong, understood the nature and quality of his acts, and knew that the killing was wrong. The jury brought in a verdict of guilty as charged.
Defendant's first claim of error is that the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony of witnesses Sueanne Hobson, Gerald A. Colwell, and Jane Young. We will consider the testimony of Sueanne Hobson, defendant's mother, first. Mrs. Hobson *256 had been arrested, questioned, and charged originally, but the charges had been dismissed and she was not charged with any offense at the time of this defendant's trial. She was, however, aware that she could still be charged with the murder of her stepson, and in fact she was later charged and convicted of that offense. When she was called by the defendant as a witness at this trial, she was accompanied by her attorney, Hugh Kreamer, of Olathe. Counsel, including Mr. Kreamer, met in chambers and took up a motion in limine filed by the State, in which the State sought to have the court instruct defense counsel not to ask Mrs. Hobson about any matters which might incriminate her and which might be within her Fifth Amendment privilege. Mr. Kreamer stated emphatically that Mrs. Hobson would not testify as to any of the events leading up to the murder and that Fifth Amendment objections would be raised to any questions along that line. The trial court sustained the State's motion and no such questions were asked. Mrs. Hobson did testify in the defendant's behalf, but her testimony concerned defendant's early life and did not touch on the events immediately prior to or connected with the homicide.
Defendant now contends that the six-hour statement which Sueanne Hobson gave to the Overland Park Police Department should have been received in evidence. Included in the record before us is what appears to be a partial transcription of that statement; it consists of about nine letter-sized pages and is obviously but a small part of her statement. Neither the complete statement nor this partial transcription were ever marked as an exhibit in this trial; neither was ever offered in evidence; neither was ever identified. Neither the officers who took the statement nor the transcriber were ever called as witnesses. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not commit error in failing to receive the statement into evidence.
Defendant also contends that his counsel should have been permitted to question Mrs. Hobson about her statement and about the facts leading up to the homicide. There are several reasons why defendant's argument in this regard is not persuasive. Mrs. Hobson was not charged with the murder of her stepson at the time of this trial, but the possibility of charges being brought against her was very real. The statement which she allegedly gave was not offered in evidence, and it was not shown *257 to be a free and voluntary statement. No witnesses were called to testify about it. She had not been tried and convicted of homicide; she had not pleaded guilty to any charge; she had not acknowledged that her statement was voluntary; and no court had determined that it was admissible against her. The trial judge was aware of and indeed necessarily sensitive to the right of the witness to decline to answer questions which might well incriminate her. In ruling on the motion, the judge said:
The witness, through counsel, had clearly informed the judge and trial counsel that the witness would not answer any questions which might incriminate her, but would refuse to answer, based on the Fifth Amendment. The effect of questioning by counsel would have been to require the witness to invoke her privilege in open court before the jury. Clearly, this would have been improper.
In State v. Day, 400 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981), the State sought to interrogate the defendant's wife after she had informed court and counsel that she did not want to testify against her husband. The trial court ruled that Mrs. Day had to exercise her privilege in front of the jury. Defendant, on appeal, claimed that this was error. The Louisiana Supreme Court said:
Similarly, when a defendant wished to call a witness and require the witness to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury, the Louisiana court held that it was not error for the trial court to examine the witness outside the presence of the jury, and not require the witness to invoke the privilege before the jury. In that case, State v. Johnson, 404 So. 2d 239 (La. 1981), the court said:
In Chambliss v. State, 633 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1982), the defendant claimed error because the trial court refused to permit him to call a codefendant to testify, after the codefendant indicated that he would assert his privilege against self-incrimination. The court said:
A Massachusetts case discusses the interrelationship between the right of a defendant to call witnesses in his behalf, and the right of the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment. In Com. v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 434 N.E.2d 1238 (1982), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
....
The rule is also followed in New York where, in People v. Diaz, 111 Misc.2d 1083, 445 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1981), it is said:
And see Matter of Tyrone S., 91 Misc.2d 1055, 399 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1977).
The courts of our sister state of Missouri hold that it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a witness who the court knows intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege should be permitted to take the stand. See State v. Benson, 633 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Mo. App. 1982); State v. Hustead, 615 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Mo. App. 1981); and State v. Wright, 582 S.W.2d 275, 282 (Mo. 1979).
Upon examination of the record before us, it is readily apparent that Sueanne Hobson had the right, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to refuse to answer questions which would incriminate her. The questions proposed by defense counsel were such that the witness would have had to invoke the privilege, before the jury, had the questions been propounded. *261 Forbidding defense counsel to ask questions which the witness would refuse to answer did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf. We agree with the rationale of the Louisiana, Texas, Massachusetts, New York and Missouri cases cited above. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the witness to be asked questions which she had stated that she would not answer, merely for the purpose of having the witness assert her Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. We find no error.
Additionally, we have examined the partial transcription of the witness's statement which appears among the papers forwarded to us with the record on appeal. In it, Mrs. Hobson denies domination over her son, denies that she hired her son and Sorrentino to kill her stepson, and denies that she knew beforehand that the killing was to take place. Her partial statement does not indicate or tend to show insanity on the part of the defendant. In short, that partial statement does not have substantial probative value on the question of insanity.
Next, we turn to the trial court's ruling on proffered testimony of the witnesses Gerald Colwell and Jane Young. Mr. Colwell, a counselor in Shawnee Mission South High School in Overland Park, Kansas, testified at length about many visits Mrs. Hobson made to his office with reference to her son's lack of academic progress. The defendant also wished to have this witness relate his opinion as to the relationship between Mrs. Hobson and her son, his impression of Mrs. Hobson, and his opinion as to the scholastic ability  or lack of scholastic ability  on the part of the defendant. The trial court sustained objections to this evidence. Mrs. Young, a juvenile probation officer in Johnson County, had worked with the defendant during the six weeks before the murder of Chris Hobson. She testified about her contacts with the defendant, and the trial court permitted her to testify about her observations of the defendant, but sustained an objection when the defense attempted to have her testify that she had made a recommendation that the defendant receive psychiatric evaluation and consultation.
K.S.A. 60-456(a) provides:
We have often held that this section vests a wide discretion in the trial court over the admission of lay opinion testimony. See State v. Amodei, 222 Kan. 140, 146, 563 P.2d 440 (1977), and State v. Craig, 215 Kan. 381, 383, 524 P.2d 679 (1974). The trial court apparently based his exclusion of the proposed testimony of these witnesses at least partially upon lack of proper foundation. The defendant was permitted to develop his evidence and thoroughly present his defense. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of this proffered testimony, and no error.
The defendant's next claim of error is predicated upon the following portion of the record, which occurred at the close of the State's cross-examination of Dr. G. Charles Welsh, a psychologist called by the defendant:
MR. TATUM: I will withdraw the question.
MR. BYRNE: I have nothing further.
THE COURT: You may step down, Doctor.
(Witness excused.)"
The defendant maintains that the question to which he objected seriously prejudiced him since its implication to the jury was that if the defendant were acquitted on grounds of insanity he might commit another crime and plead insanity. The defendant seeks to analogize this comment to the type of comments condemned in State v. Blake, 209 Kan. 196, 495 P.2d 905 (1972). In Blake the trial judge questioned a defense psychiatrist who had testified that the defendant was "insane" at the time of the crime. The court's examination consisted of an intensive inquiry into the likelihood of the defendant committing similar crimes in the future. 209 Kan. at 203-204. The questions were all answered *263 by the doctor and the answers indicated that future violence was possible. This was coupled with an instruction which informed the jury that a person committed to the state hospital could be released after thirty days' notice. We found reversible error, saying:
The impact of the question by the prosecutor in the case at bar does not even approach the prejudicial impact of the questioning and instructions in Blake. The question here was asked, objected to, and withdrawn. Though the inquiry was irrelevant on the issue of defendant's insanity at the time the crime was committed, the defendant has not shown substantial prejudice despite the trial court's comment indicating that the question was not improper. The trial court gave an instruction telling the jury that none of his rulings were to be taken as an expression of an opinion on the evidence. We find no prejudicial error.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give a burden of proof instruction on the insanity defense. The defendant offered the following instruction, which was refused by the trial court:
This is a correct statement of the law. See State v. Bates, 226 Kan. 277, 281, 597 P.2d 646 (1979); State v. Chase, 206 Kan. 352, 358, 480 P.2d 62 (1971); and State v. McBride, 170 Kan. 377, 381, 226 P.2d 246 (1951). We find no case, however, and we are cited none by counsel, which holds that this instruction is necessary or that it must be given in every case in which an insanity defense is raised. The Pattern Instructions for Kansas, PIK Crim. 52.08, specifically recommends that no burden of proof instruction be given relative to any asserted affirmative defense, including that of insanity.
The trial court instructed the jury that the burden of proof is on the State to prove the defendant guilty, and that if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the mental capacity of the defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, then the jury *264 should find the defendant not guilty because of insanity. The defendant admitted killing Chris Hobson; the major portion of the testimony admitted at trial dealt with the defendant's mental competency at the time the offense was committed. The instructions given properly placed the burden of proof on the State. As we said in Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437, 581 P.2d 372 (1978):
We find no instructional error.
The judgment is affirmed.