Case Title: TAYLOR v DEPT OF FISH WILDLIFE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-244

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-244 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1983 C O U R T N E Y L. TAYLOR, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, DEPARTMENT O F FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS, STATE O F M O N T A N A , and JAMES W. FLYNN, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robinson, Doyle & B e l l ; John Doyle argued, Hamilton, Montana For Respondent: Kevin C. Meek argued, Dept. F i s h , W i l d l i f e and Parks, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 5 , 1983 Decided : J u l y 1 4 , 1983 F i l e d : Clerk Mr. Chief Justice Frank 1. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Courtney Taylor appeals the District Court decision dismissing his action against the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to void his forced retirement at age sixty and reinstate him to his position as game warden with attorney fees, costs and backpay. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Taylor has been employed as a state game warden by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks since 1952. On August 7, 1979, he reached the age of sixty. Pursuant to section 19-8-601 (2), MCA, of the Game Wardens Retirement Act, he was compulsorily retired. On November 15, 1978, Taylor began investigating what action he might take to avoid compulsory retirement. He informed the Department on December 29, 1978, that he was not considering retirement. On June 22, 1979, Taylor informed the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Opportunity Cornmission of his intention to bring an action against the Department for violation of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. S S 621-634. In February 1979 he was informed by the Administrator of the Public Employee Retirement Systems Division that he was compelled to enforce the Game Wardens Retirement Act as written. Taylor filed a complaint of discrimination with the Montana Human Rights Commission on August 6, 1979, the day before his retirement. On November 26, 1979, the Human Rights Division ruled in favor of the State. It held: ". . . Charging Party has no remedy under Montana statutes. It is possible, of course, that his forced retirement may be in violation of federal law. However, that is not a question for the Montana Human Rights Commission to decide. In- deed, it is not even a deferral agency for EEOC complaints which allege age discrimination. "Likewise, it would be an abuse of dis- cretion for this administrative agency to rule on the constitutional question. "Therefore a finding of no jurisdiction must be made insofar as the complaint alleges federal statutory and constitu- tional violations. To the extent that Montana age discrimination statutes are in issue, a finding of no reasonable cause is required." This ruling was made final December 18, 1979. By a letter dated November 26, 1979, appellant was advised: "The complainant has the right to make a written request for an informal confer- ence with the division administrator why the investigator's findings should not have been accepted. If the determination is not altered as a result of such a conference, the complainant has the right to formally request a hearing on the no cause finding. At such a hearing, the issue for consideration is the adequacy of the investigation, not the liability of the respondent. If such a hearing is requested, you wlll have the right to be present with or without counsel and to participate. However, you would not be required to do so, and no legal conse- quences would follow from your decision not to participate. You will be informed of any request for an informal conference or for a hearing in this matter." Thirty days after the Human Rights Commission ruling was made final, Taylor brought an action against the State in United States District Court, Missoula Division, for violations of section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. S 626(b), and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion. The Department was awarded summary judgment on October 6, 1981. On November 25, 1981, Taylor filed an action in District Court of Lewis and Clark County. He alleged that the enforcement of the game warden retirement statute vio- lates the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitu- z r ($4 tion, Art. & Section 4. Essentially, Taylor claimed that the retirement statute is not based on a bona fide occupa- tional qualification as the State does not require physical conditioning as a prerequisite for the job during a game warden's course of employment. He asked that the statute be declared unconstitutional, that he be reinstated as a game warden, and that he recover backpay, attorney fees, and costs. The District Court granted the Department's motion to dismiss. The court's action was based upon failure to bring the administrative appeal within thirty days of the conclu- sion of the agency proceeding in violation of section 2-4- 702, MCA. Taylor appeals the District Court dismissal. Five issues have been raised for our consideration: 1. Does Dolan v. School District #lo, Deer Lodge (1981) , Mont . , 636 P.2d 825, 38 St.Rep. 1903, require voiding the game warden retirement statute because of an irreconcilable conflict with the anti-discrimination provisions in the Human Rights Act? 2 . Must appellant exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief? 3. Should an evidentiary hearing be conducted to determine whether there is a basis for age discrimination in Montana and to determine the appellant's damages, if any? 4. Is appellant's claim barred by the statute of limitations? 5. Is the United States Supreme Court case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming, Cause No. 81- 554 (decided March 2, 1983), applicable to this case? Taylor argues that the irreconcilable conflict between tne game warden retirement statute and certain provisions of the Human Rights Act requires the retirement provision to be declared void. He contends that the clear intent of the legislature to abolish age discrimination in employment as expressed in Dolan, supra, mandates this result. The Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks asserts that Dolan does not state that all age qualifications are invalid. Counsel admits the Department has a great burden to prove that the mandatory retirement age is related to job performance; it should be given the opportunity to meet that burden. Under the authority of Dolan, we conclude that the Human Rights Act necessarily repeals the game warden retire- ment statute to the extent of any irreconcilable conflict or inconsistency. See also, Kuchan v. Harvey (1978), 179 Mont. 7, 585 P.2d 1298; State Aeronautics Comm. v. Board of Examiners (1948), 121 Mont. 402, 194 P.2d 633. Mary Dolan was a school teacher who, in March 1977, was compulsorily retired pursuant to section 20-4-203(2), MCA. She wanted to continue teaching and proceeded through the proper adminis- trative channels where her forced retirement was affirmed. She filed an action in District Court, and it ruled that section 20-4-203(2), MCA, violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Montana Consti- tutions and was repealed by the enactment of sections 49-2- 303(1) and 49-3-201, MCA, of the Human Rights Act. On appeal this Court affirmed the District Court deci- sion. We determined that the appeal could be decided on statutory grounds without reaching constitutional considera- tions. It was recognized that the Court should not pass on the constitutionality of any act of the legislature unless required for a decision of the case. State v. King (1903), 28 Mont. 268, 277, 72 P. 657, 658. The Court applied the rule of statutory construction that requires repeal of an earlier statute that conflicts with a later one. This was done to effectuate the clear intent of the legislature to abolish discrimination in employment based solely on age. To hold otherwise would materially dilute the effect of Montana's anti-discrimina- tion legislation. We noted that Title 49 contains very broad anti-discrimination prohibitions and very limited exceptions to such prohibitions. This indicates the legislature intended to abolish all discrimination in employment except under the most limited circumstances. In Dolan the tenure statute violated this intention because it allowed discrimination based solely on age. No qualifying or justifying reasons were included in the statute which would place the forced retirement within the purview of the exceptions in Title 49. We thereby concluded that the statute was impliedly repealed by Title 49. The present case is quite similar to Dolan. In both cases the constitutionality of mandatory retirement statutes is challenged. In this case, as in Dolan, we must decide the case on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds, if possible. Dieruf v. City of Bozeman (1977), 173 Mont. 447, 563 P.2d 127; State ex rel. Hammond v. 160 Mont. 391, 503 P.2d 52; S t a t e ex r e l . Konen v. C i t y of B u t t e ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 144 Mont. 95, 394 P.2d 753; A p p l i c a t i o n of B a k e r S a l e s B a r n ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 140 Mont. 1, 367 P.2d 7 7 5 ; Yellowstone Bank v. S t a t e Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 137 Mont. 198, 351 P.2d 904; S t a t e ex r e l . Burns v. Lacklen ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 129 Mont. 243, 284 P.2d 998; Monarch Mining Co. v. S t a t e Highway Comm. ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 128 Mont. 65, 270 P.2d 738; Yale O i l Corp. v. Plentywood Farmers O i l ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 98 Mont. 582, 4 1 P.2d 1 0 ; S t a t e v. T e s l a e t a l . ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 69 Mont. 503, 223 P. 107. W e r e c o g n i z e t h e r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n which p r o v i d e s t h a t s p e c i a l s t a t u t e s w i l l p r e v a i l over g e n e r a l s t a t u t e s . Kuchan v. Harvey ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 7 , 585 P.2d 1298; B r y a n t v. B a l l e t a l . ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 28, 482 P.2d 147; Teamsters, e t a l . , Local 45 v. Montana Liquor C o n t r o l Board ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 300, 471 P.2d 541; Monarch Lumber Co. v. Haggard ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 105, 360 P.2d 794; I n r e K e s l ' s E s t a t e ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 117 Mont. 377, 1 6 1 P.2d 641; I n r e S t e v e n s o n ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 486, 289 P. 566. T i t l e 49 is a g e n e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e enactment t h a t d e a l s w i t h employment whereas t h e game warden r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e is a s p e c i a l s t a t u t e a f f e c t i n g o n l y game wardens. I n Dolan, on t h e o t h e r hand, we a p p l i e d t h e r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t r e q u i r e s s t r i k i n g a p r i o r s p e c i a l s t a t u t e t h a t i r r e c o n c i l a b l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h a l a t e r g e n e r a l s t a t u t e because t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o e f f e c t a r e p e a l is c l e a r l y m a n i f e s t e d . Dolan, 636 P.2d a t 828, 38 St.Rep. a t 1907; see a l s o , Kuchan v. Harvey, s u p r a ; S t a t e A e r o n a u t i c s Comm. v. Board o f Examiners, s u p r a . W e a l s o a p p l y t h i s r u l e h e r e . The particular provisions of the Human Rights Act are in direct conflict with the retirement statute. Section 49-2-303(1)(a), MCA, reads: "Discrimination in employment. (1) It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for: "(a) an employer to refuse employment to a person, to bar him from employment, or to discriminate against him in compensa- tion or in a term, condition, or privi- lege of employment because of his race, creed, religion, marital status, color, or national origin or because of his age, physical or mental handicap, or sex when the reasonable demands of the position do not require an age, physical or mental handicap, or sex distinction;" Section 49-3-201, MCA, reads: "Employment of state and local government personnel. (1) State and local government officials and supervisory personnel shall recruit, appoint, assign, train, evalu- ate, and promote personnel on the basis of merit and qualifications without regard to race, color, religion, creed, political ideas, sex, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, or national origin. "(2) All state and local governmental agencies shall: " (a) promulgate written directives to carry out this policy and to guarantee equal employment opportunities at all levels of state and local government; "(b) regularly review their personnel practices to assure compliance; and "(c) conduct continuing orientation and training programs with emphasis on human relations and fair employment practices. "(3) The department of administration shall insure that the entire examination process, including appraisal of qualifi- cations, is free from bias." The game warden retirement statute reads: "(2) Retire- ment shall be compulsory at age 60." Section 19-8-601(2), MCA. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e l a t e r s t a t u t e ( e . , t h e Human R i g h t s A c t ) i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l s t h e r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e t o e f f e c t u a t e t h e c l e a r i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Dolan, Kuchan, and S t a t e A r e o n a u t i c s Comm., s u p r a . A s e x p r e s s e d i n Dolan, t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n p a s s i n g t h e Human R i g h t s Act was t o p r e v e n t a l l a g e d i s - c r i m i n a t i o n i n employment u n l e s s a g e is r e l a t e d t o j o b performance. C e r t a i n s p e c i f i c e x c e p t i o n s were e n a c t e d p e r - m i t t i n g age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; however, Dolan p o i n t s o u t t h e r e must be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t o b r i n g it i n t o t h e purview of t h e s e e x c e p t i o n s . 636 P.2d a t 829, 38 St.Rep. a t 1908. Furthermore, s e c t i o n 49-2-303(2), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t such s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s must be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d . I n t h i s c a s e , t h e game warden r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p r o v i d e any j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r compulsory r e t i r e m e n t b u t simply r e t i r e s e v e r y p e r s o n reach- i n g a g e s i x t y . T i t l e 4 9 i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o a b o l i s h such r e s u l t and, s i n c e no q u a l i f i c a t i o n o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n b r i n g s t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of t h e e x c e p t i o n s , t h e s t a t u t e h a s been i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l e d by T i t l e 49. The Department a r g u e s s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e exhaus t i o n d o c t r i n e should p r e c l u d e Taylor from j u d i c i a l r e d r e s s . W e h o l d t h a t T a y l o r a c t e d p r o p e r l y i n b r i n g i n g h i s c a s e d i r e c t l y t o D i s t r i c t Court. F i r s t of a l l , t h i s Court h a s h e r e t o f o r e h e l d t h a t t h i s c a s e is an " o r i g i n a l a c t i o n , " n o t a j u d i c i a l review of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n . Thus, t h e d o c t r i n e simply d o e s n o t a p p l y Second, i n t h e a r e a of t a x a p p e a l s , t h i s Court e s t a b - lished an exception to the exhaustion doctrine in Keller v. Dept. of Revenue (1979), 182 Mont. 478, 597 P.2d 736. In Keller taxpayers sought to appeal a ruling by the Department of Revenue to the District Court. The District Court held that they must exhaust their remedies with the State Tax Appeal Board. We held that the particular Department of Revenue ruling was an interpretation of law that must be made by the judiciary and, thus, the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable. The same applies here. Next, Taylor asserts that a fact-finding hearing should not be conducted to determine whether there is a basis for age discrimination. Since no qualifying reasons for discrimination are found in the game warden retirement statute, the statute is violative of the Human Rights Act on its face and should be stricken. The Department argues that it should be allowed to offer proof that a game warden's age is related to his job performance. Further, a hearing should be held to determine the amount Taylor's backpay award should be offset by his wages earned since retirement and to determine the fairness o i attorney fees. The compulsory retirement statute does not condition retirement on qualifications or justification which could place such discrimination in Title 49 exceptions. We hold tnat the statute facially conflicts with the Human Rights Act. The judiciary should not interfere with the legisla- tive function of establishing employment and retirement qualifications. To determine if a basis for age discrimination exists, the court, in essence, would be rewriting the statute. It would have t o add q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t o t h e compulsory r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t a game warden's age is r e l a t e d t o j o b performance, t h e r e b y b r i n g i n g t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s . T h i s would be i n e x c e s s of t h e c o u r t ' s a u t h o r i t y . W e h e l d i n Chennault v. Sager ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 610 P.2d 173, 37 St.Rep. 857, t h a t t h e r o l e of a c o u r t i n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e is simply t o a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e its s u b s t a n c e and n o t t o i n s e r t what h a s been o m i t t e d . The s t a t u t e s i n ques- t i o n omit any bona f i d e o c c u p a t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r game wardens o r any b a s i s f o r age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n such employ- ment. Furthermore, d e t e r m i n i n g t h e b a s i s f o r age d i s c r i m i n a - t i o n i n Montana w i l l e n t a i l a g r e a t f a c t - f i n d i n g e f f o r t . T h i s might i n c l u d e , among o t h e r t h i n g s , a s t a t u t o r y s u r v e y , hearing e x p e r t testimony r e g a r d i n g i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a t i o n s i n a g e p r o g r e s s i o n and s p e c i f i c s a b o u t t h e o c c u p a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . The l e g i s l a t u r e , n o t t h e c o u r t s , h a s t h e p r o p e r r e s o u r c e s t o assume such an undertaking. A d d i t i o n a l l y , p u b l i c p o l i c y i s s u e s a r e b e s t r e s o l v e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e . S i n c e t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d i n f a v o r of t h e Depart- ment, no h e a r i n g was h e l d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e amount of awards f o r p a s t wages, b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s . W e must remand t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r a n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g on t h e s e i t e m s . During o r a l argument b e f o r e t h i s Court t h e Department r a i s e d , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e d e f e n s e t h a t T a y l o r ' s c l a i m was b a r r e d by t h e two-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s f o r t o r t a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g p r o p e r t y . S e c t i o n 27-2-207, MCA. W e a l l o w e d s u p p l e m e n t a l b r i e f i n g on t h i s i s s u e . T a y l o r c o n t e n d s t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o l o n g s t a n d i n g case l a w i n Montana, Rule 8 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., r e q u i r e s a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e t o be p l e a d a f f i r m a t i v e l y , a n d , i f n o t , it 1s waived a s a d e f e n s e . Here, t h e Department r a i s e s t h i s i s s u e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a t o r a l argument on a p p e a l . The Department c l a i m s t h a t t n e d e f e n s e of s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s can be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t time on a p p e a l a c c o r d i n g t o R i e r s o n v. Board o f A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of PERS ( 1 9 8 1 I Mont . , 622 P.2d 195, 38 St.Rep. 3 . I n R i e r s o n t h e a p p e l l a n t f i r s t r a i s e d t h e i s s u e of s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i n h i s p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g i n t h e Supreme Court. T h i s C o u r t a d d r e s s e d and d e c i d e d t h e i s s u e a d v e r s e t o a p p e l l a n t . The Department a r g u e s t h a t t h i s is i m p l i e d a u t h o r i t y t o a d d r e s s t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e on a p p e a l even though it was n o t r a i s e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e h o l d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e h a s been waived and, t h u s , c a n n o t be r a i s e d h e r e . Rule 8 ( c ) , M.K.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s t h a t a d e f e n s e of t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s is a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e and c a n o n l y be r a i s e d by answer. The law is c l e a r t h a t i f t h e d e f e n s e is n o t p l e a d a f f i r m a t i v e l y , it is waived. B u t t e Country Club v. M e t r o p o l i t a n D i s t . ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 75, 519 P.2d 408; ilansen v. Keirnan e t a1. ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont. 448, 499 P.2d 787; Turner v. Powell ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 85 Mont. 241, 278 P. 512; S t a t e ex rel. Kolbow V. D i s t . C o u r t ( 1 9 0 9 ) , 38 Mont. 415, 0 ' - c- q " . 100 P. 207; GrogRn &. V a l l e y T r a d i n g Co. ( 1 9 0 4 ) , 30 Mont. The Department d i d n o t r a i s e s e c t i o n 27-2-207, MCA, as a d e f e n s e i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court; hence, t h e d e f e n s e h a s been waived. There is no language i n Rierson t h a t would a l l o w a p a r t y t o r a i s e a d e f e n s e on a p p e a l t h a t h a s been waived due t o a f a i l u r e t o a s s e r t it a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l . There is simply no holding i n Rierson t h a t o v e r r u l e s many y e a r s of case l a w r e g a r d i n g t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e . W e a l s o ordered supplemental b r i e f i n g on t h e a p p l i c a - b i l i t y o f E q u a l Employment O p p o r t u n i t y Commission v . Wyoming, s u p r a , t o t h e p r e s e n t case. Both p a r t i e s a s s e r t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court c a s e h a s no a p p l i c a - t i o n . W e agree. The c a s e s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . EEOC addressed t h e i s s u e of whether t h e F e d e r a l Age Discrimina- t i o n i n Employment A c t a p p l i e d t o t h e Wyoming s t a t e game warden r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e . The p r e s e n t c a s e d e a l s w i t h t h e Montana Human R i g h t s A c t and its a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e Montana game warden compulsory r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e . I n EEOC, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court a p p l i e d a f e d e r a l a c t t o a Wyoming s t a t u t e , whereas h e r e w e a r e applying Montana's Human R i g h t s A c t t o M o n t a n a ' s game warden r e t i r e m e n t s t a t u t e . R e v e r s e d a n d remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . '?A&d. Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: