Case Title: Scott v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-C-2942

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
VINCENT JAMES SCOTT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 86Case Number: S-11-0150This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
VINCENT 
JAMES SCOTT,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Attorney General; David Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Travis J. Kirchhefer, 
Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  A jury convicted Vincent James Scott of 
first degree sexual assault, aggravated assault and child abuse.  He appeals, claiming the district court 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial and imposed an 
illegal sentence.  We affirm. 

 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]  Mr. Scott states the issues for our 
consideration as follows:
 
I.          
Did the trial court arbitrarily deny Vincent Scott his constitutional 
right to represent himself during the criminal proceedings against 
him?
 
II.         
By running misdemeanor sentences concurrent with consecutive felony 
sentences, did the trial court create an impossible sentencing arrangement which 
is therefore illegal?
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as:
 
I.          
Should Scott be denied the opportunity to represent himself at 
trial?
 
II.         
Did the district court impose an illegal sentence when it ordered Scott 
to serve three misdemeanor terms concurrently with three consecutive felony 
terms of incarceration?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]  On November 8, 2009, the Sheridan Police 
Department responded to a report of domestic violence at a residence in 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  They found Mr. 
Scott’s ex-wife, CS, and child at the residence.  CS reported that Mr. Scott had beaten 
her, held a knife to her throat and forced her to have sex with him.  The child tried to intervene and Mr. 
Scott pushed him down some stairs.  
At the time, there was a protection order in place prohibiting Mr. Scott 
from having contact with CS.  During 
the assault, CS was able to call 911 but Mr. Scott interrupted the call by 
taking the phone away from her. 
 
[¶4]  Mr. Scott was charged with three 
felonies:  first degree sexual 
assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-2-302(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011), aggravated 
assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009) 
and child abuse under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).  He was also charged with three 
misdemeanors:  domestic battery 
pursuant to § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 2011), interference with a 911 call in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-212(a) (LexisNexis 2011) and violation of a 
protection order under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-404(a) (LexisNexis 2011).  A public defender was appointed to 
represent Mr. Scott and his case was set for trial.  One week before the trial was to begin, 
defense counsel moved to suspend the proceedings and for an order directing Mr. 
Scott to submit to a competency evaluation at the state hospital.  The district court granted the 
motion.  Upon completion of the 
evaluation and a determination that Mr. Scott was competent to proceed, the 
district court set a new trial date.   

 
[¶5]  One week before the second trial date, 
Mr. Scott’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw on the ground that she was no 
longer a contract attorney for the State of Wyoming Public Defender.  Another attorney with the public 
defender’s office filed an entry of appearance on Mr. Scott’s behalf and moved 
for a continuance of the trial date.  
The district court denied the motions to withdraw and for continuance and 
re-appointed the original attorney as a private attorney to represent Mr. 
Scott.  In its order, the district 
court noted that the trial had already been postponed once to allow Mr. Scott to 
undergo a competency evaluation, the second trial date was only five days away, 
Mr. Scott had not waived his right to a speedy trial, the attorney originally 
appointed to represent him was qualified and competent, and requiring her to 
continue her representation would provide consistency, prevent the need for a 
continuance and avoid resulting prejudice to Mr. Scott.   
 
[¶6]  Three days later, and a day and a half 
before trial, the court convened a status hearing.  At that time, defense counsel informed 
the district court that Mr. Scott wished to waive his right to counsel and 
represent himself at trial.  After 
inquiring of Mr. Scott whether he knew how to conduct a jury trial, the district 
court denied his request, finding that his attempt to waive his right to an 
attorney was not the result of a knowing and intelligent decision.  The case proceeded to trial with Mr. 
Scott represented by counsel.  

 
[¶7]  Following a two day trial, and after 
deliberating for three hours, the jury found Mr. Scott guilty on all 
charges.  The district court 
sentenced him to 35 to 50 years on the sexual assault conviction, eight to ten 
years for aggravated assault and four to five years for child abuse.  The court ordered the felony sentences 
to be served consecutively.  The 
district court imposed sentences of six months on each misdemeanor charge and 
ordered them to be served concurrently with the felony sentences.    
   
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8] 
Like the right to counsel, the right of self representation is protected by the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); Ash 
v. State, 555 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1976).  Claims that a constitutional right has 
been violated involve questions of law which we review de novo.  Rodriguez v. State, 2010 WY 61, ¶ 6, 230 P.3d 1111, 1113 (Wyo. 2010).  Claims 
that a district court imposed an illegal sentence also involve questions of law 
subject to de novo review.  Center v. State, 2011 WY 73, ¶ 6, 252 P.3d 963, 966 (Wyo. 2011). 
 
DISCUSSION
 
1.    
Sixth 
Amendment Right to Self Representation
 
[¶9]  In his first issue, Mr. Scott asserts 
the district court denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at 
trial.  He contends the district 
court is charged only with providing a defendant with sufficient information so 
that he understands the consequences of proceeding pro se.  He asserts the district court committed 
reversible error when it forced him against his will to be represented by 
appointed counsel after he acknowledged that if he elected to proceed without 
counsel, he would be responsible for conducting the trial.  The State responds that the district 
court properly denied Mr. Scott’s request to represent himself at trial because 
the request was untimely and he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his 
right to counsel.
     
[¶10]  A defendant has a clear right to choose 
to defend himself.  Miller v. State, 560 P.2d 739, 741 (Wyo. 
1977), citing Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 
95 S. Ct. 2525.  The right to self 
representation, unlike other constitutional guarantees, has as its primary 
purpose the defendant’s freedom of choice, even though such a choice may operate 
to his detriment.  Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 931 
(Wyo. 1999), citing Williams v. 
State, 655 P.2d 273, 274 (Wyo. 1982).  
Reversible error may occur if a trial court attempts to force an attorney 
on an unwilling defendant.  Ash, 555 P.2d  at 224; Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 797 (Wyo. 
1983).  
 
[¶11]  A defendant who chooses to proceed pro se, however, must act knowingly and 
intelligently in giving up the benefits associated with the right to 
counsel.  Faretta, 422 U.S.  at 835, 95 S. Ct.  at 
2541; Large v. State, 2011 WY 159, ¶ 
32, 265 P.3d 243, 251 (Wyo. 2011).  
Before allowing a defendant to proceed without counsel, the court must 
make him aware of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.  Id.  “Ideally, the trial judge should conduct 
a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the defendant on the record to 
demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges, the range 
of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is fully informed of the 
risks of proceeding pro se.”  Id., quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 
1388 (10th Cir. 1991).  “[A] 
defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order 
competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.”  Id., quoting Faretta, 422 U.S.  at 835, 95 S. Ct.  at 
2541.  However, for a defendant’s 
decision to proceed pro se to be 
valid, the trial judge must ensure that the waiver of counsel is “an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”  Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230, 234 
(Wyo. 1994), quoting Willie, 941 F.2d  
at 1388.  In deciding whether the 
right to counsel has been waived, we indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver.  Rodriguez, ¶ 10, 230 P.3d  at 1113.  We review the record as a whole to 
determine if the right to counsel has been voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived.  Id.  
 
[¶12]  In the present case, after defense 
counsel informed the district court at the pretrial status hearing that Mr. 
Scott wanted to represent himself at trial, the following exchange 
occurred:
 
THE 
COURT:            
Now, you also have the right to waive your right to counsel.  In order to do that I need to make sure 
that you are doing it voluntarily and knowingly and intelligently.  Do you understand that?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Is it your desire to go forward without any 
attorney?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
You realize that is a  -- In 
my belief that is a mistake.  There 
are many legal issues to be addressed, and going forward without an attorney 
would be haphazard and a mistake.  
You are nodding your head, yes, you understand that.  Do you understand 
that?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Do you understand if you go forward without an attorney you will be held 
to the same standard as an attorney?
 
[MS. 
SCOTT]:            
Yes, I knew that.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Do you have any idea how to prepare and participate in a jury 
trial?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
I have been watching TV and, you know.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Well, TV is not how it works.  
If you think by watching TV that shows you how to do it, then you are 
sorely misguided.
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Well, I will try my best, man.
 
THE 
COURT:            
What is that?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
I said I will do my best.
 
THE 
COURT:            
You understand the charges against you are very 
serious?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
And first degree sexual assault carries a minimum of five years and a 
maximum of fifty years?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
And your going forward without an attorney –
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
-- may severely jeopardize your ability to be adequately represented and 
present your case in front of a jury?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
You know that?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yeah.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Have you thought about how you are going to present your 
case?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
No.  We will just handle it 
when we get there.
. 
. . .
 
THE 
COURT:            
Have you ever sat through a jury trial?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
. . . .  No, 
sir.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Have you ever selected a jury?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
No, sir.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Have you ever cross examined a witness under oath?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
No, sir.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Have you ever studied any legal documents?  You have a ninth grade 
education?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yes.
 
THE 
COURT:            
Have you had any education in the field of legal 
issues?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
No.
 
THE 
COURT:            
And you have not prepared for your trial?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
No.  I just started working 
with [defense counsel] . . . last week.  
. . . .
 
THE 
COURT:            
So you were refusing to work with [defense counsel] until last 
week?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Yes, sir.
 
THE 
COURT:            
And that was your own choice?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
That was my choice from the beginning.
 
THE 
COURT:            
What is your plan to go forward without an attorney?  You don’t have to give me a lot of 
details but I need some indication of what you are 
planning.
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
I don’t want to tell you my plan.
 
THE 
COURT:            
In fact, you told me earlier you don’t have a plan, is that 
right?
 
[MR. 
SCOTT]:            
Exactly.
 
[¶13]  From this colloquy, it is clear that Mr. 
Scott’s desire to proceed without counsel resulted from an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.  He 
knew he had the right to an attorney and voluntarily made the decision that he 
wanted to proceed without one.  It 
is also clear that the district court made him aware of the disadvantages and 
dangers of self-representation and conducted a thorough inquiry to inform him of 
the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments, and the risks of 
proceeding pro se.  
 
[¶14]  At the time of the hearing, Mr. Scott 
was twenty-six years old and had a ninth grade education.  His only knowledge about how to prepare 
for and participate in the trial came from television.  He conceded that he had not given any 
thought about how to present his case as of the time of the status hearing less 
than two days before trial but intended to do his best and handle it when he got 
there.  These facts distinguish Mr. 
Scott’s case from Van Riper, 882 P.2d  
at 234-35, where this Court concluded the defendant’s decision to proceed 
without counsel was made knowingly and intelligently because he had been 
involved in a prior legal proceeding without the assistance of counsel, had 
three prior convictions for related offenses, and had filed twenty-six motions 
and other documents on his own before trial, including a notice that he would 
represent himself in which he stated that he was forty-five years old, college 
educated and had completed a paralegal course.  
 
[¶15] 
 Notwithstanding Van Riper, Mr. Scott’s lack of education 
and technical legal knowledge are not grounds for concluding that his desire to 
provide his own defense was made unknowingly and unintelligently.  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Mr. Scott was unable to reach the level of appreciation needed for 
a knowing and intelligent waiver.  
Under Faretta and the majority 
of cases from other courts, with a proper explanation by the trial judge, a 
defendant who is capable of managing his own affairs, not under any legal 
disability and mentally competent can make an intelligent and knowing 
waiver.  LaFave, Israel, King and 
Kerr, 3 Criminal Procedure § 11.5(d) (2007).  Moreover, the law is clear that the 
degree of competence necessary for a defendant to waive counsel is the same 
degree of competence required for him to stand trial.   Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 17, 36 P.3d 597, 602 (Wyo. 2001), citing Godinez 
v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2686-87, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993).  As noted previously herein, prior to the 
status hearing at which he waived his right to counsel, Mr. Scott was evaluated 
and deemed competent to stand trial.  
He was, therefore, competent to waive his right to representation by 
counsel.  The district court erred 
in concluding Mr. Scott’s waiver of counsel was not the result of a knowing and 
intelligent decision.  This 
conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry.
 
[¶16]  In Faretta, 422 U.S.  at 807, 95 S. Ct.  at 
2529, the Court stressed that the defendant’s request to proceed pro se was made “well before the date of 
trial.”  Some courts deem requests 
timely as long as they are made before trial.  State v. Mixon, 998 P.2d 519 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1997); State v. Torkelsen, 752 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 2008); Dearybury v. 
State, 625 S.E.2d 212 (S.C. 2006).  
In Williams, 655 P.2d  at 276, 
however, this Court held that a defendant’s request for self representation made 
on a Friday before a Monday trial was untimely.  The Court further held that when a 
defendant fails to make a timely request to proceed pro se, it is within the trial court’s 
discretion to decide whether to allow the defendant to exercise the right.  Id.  The Williams decision cited with approval 
the following rules for determining whether the decision to allow a defendant to 
proceed pro se is a matter left to 
the trial court’s discretion: 
 
            
(a) if made well before the trial or hearing and unaccompanied by a 
motion for continuance, the right of self-representation exists as a matter of 
law;  (b) if made as the trial or 
hearing is about to commence, or shortly before, the existence of the right 
depends on the facts of the particular case with a measure of discretion 
reposing in the trial court in the matter;  
and (c) if made during the trial or hearing, the right to proceed pro se 
rests largely in the informed discretion of the trial 
court.
 
Id., 
quoting State v. Fritz, 585 P.2d 173, 178 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978).  
            

[¶17]  Mr. Scott’s trial was set to begin at 
9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, October 6, 2010.  
He made his request to represent himself at 2:00 p.m. on Monday, October 
4, 2010, less than 48 hours before his trial was to commence.  At that point, one trial date had 
already been suspended and Mr. Scott had attempted through counsel to obtain a 
continuance of the October trial setting.  
We do not know from the record whether Mr. Scott would have requested 
another continuance if his motion to represent himself had been granted.  It is clear, however, that he was not 
prepared to offer a defense and the trial was less than two days away.  We conclude the district court in the 
present case had the discretion to deny Mr. Scott’s untimely request to proceed 
without counsel.   Although it 
erred in denying the request on the grounds that Mr. Scott’s decision was not 
knowing and intelligent, the record and our precedent support denial of the 
request as untimely.  On those 
grounds, we affirm the district court’s denial.
 
2.    
Illegal 
Sentence     

 
[¶18]  Mr. Scott next contends that the 
sentence the district court imposed is illegal.  Specifically, he asserts that it is not 
possible for him to serve six month misdemeanor sentences concurrently with 
three consecutive felony sentences because he will have served the misdemeanor 
sentences before he completes his sentence on the first felony and there will be 
no time left to serve on the misdemeanors concurrently with the second and third 
felony sentences.   Because the 
sentencing scheme is impossible, he argues it is illegal.  The State asserts the sentence is not 
illegal and, in any event, the 516 days awarded for time Mr. Scott served prior 
to sentencing essentially extinguished the misdemeanor sentences.  
 
[¶19]  In Wyoming, credit for time served is 
applied against all concurrent sentences imposed in a single prosecution.  Weedman v. State, 792 P.2d 1388, 1389 
(Wyo. 1990).  When the district 
court in this case awarded 516 days credit, the three concurrent six month 
sentences were extinguished and Mr. Scott had nothing left to serve on the 
misdemeanors.  Under these 
circumstances, the sentence imposed is not impossible and not 
illegal.
 
[¶20]  We affirm Mr. Scott’s conviction and 
sentence.