Case Title: In re Olchowski

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12730

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12730 
 
IN THE MATTER OF GREGORY M. OLCHOWSKI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 11, 2020. - October 1, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Board of Bar Overseers.  Treasurer and Receiver General.  
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Client funds.  
Abandoned Property. 
 
 
 
 
Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk on September 21, 2012. 
 
 
A motion to remit funds, filed on October 18, 2018, was 
reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
Maureen Mulligan (Kristyn M. Kelley also present) for 
Massachusetts IOLTA committee. 
Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, for Treasurer 
and Receiver General. 
Robert M. Daniszewski, Assistant Bar Counsel, was present 
but did not argue. 
 
Michael J. Serduck, for the respondent, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Karen D. O'Toole for Massachusetts Clients' Security Board 
& another. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case and authored this opinion prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
Jeffrey D. Woolf for Board of Bar Overseers. 
 
Mary K. Ryan, Micah W. Miller, Martin W. Healy, Thomas J. 
Carey, Jr., & Francis C. Morrissey for Boston Bar Association & 
others. 
 
Georgia D. Katsoulomitis, Jacquelynne Bowman, Jonathan 
Mannina, Elizabeth A. Soule, George Weber, Susan Nagl, Richard 
Dubois, Elizabeth Matos, John A. Froio, Jay McManus, Kathleen B. 
Boundy, Cathy Costanzo, & Janine Solomon for Massachusetts Law 
Reform Institute & others. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The question presented in this case concerns 
the proper disposition of unidentified client funds on deposit 
in an Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA or IOLTA 
account):  should they be remitted to the Commonwealth's general 
fund under the abandoned property statute, G. L. c. 200A, or to 
the IOLTA committee pursuant to this court's inherent authority 
to govern the conduct of Massachusetts attorneys?  We conclude 
that trust funds on deposit in an IOLTA account do not fall 
within the statutory definition of "abandoned property" and 
therefore the disposition of these funds is not governed by 
G. L. c. 200A.  We also conclude that unidentified IOLTA funds 
should be transferred to the IOLTA committee for disposition, as 
set forth in this opinion.2 
                                                          
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Board of 
Bar Overseers; the Massachusetts Clients' Security Board and the 
Massachusetts Clients' Security Fund; the Boston Bar 
Association, the Massachusetts Bar Association, and the Real 
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc.; and the 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute. 
3 
 
 
Background.  We recite the facts of this case as stated in 
the parties' joint statement of undisputed facts.  On November 
23, 2012, this court issued an order temporarily suspending 
Gregory M. Olchowski from the practice of law.  As part of this 
order, in accordance with our rules governing bar discipline and 
clients' security protection, Olchowski was directed to notify 
each of his clients that he had been suspended from the practice 
of law and could no longer represent them, to make all files 
available to clients, to refund fees not earned, to close every 
IOLTA, client, trust or other fiduciary account, and to disburse 
all client and fiduciary funds in his possession.  See S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 17 (1), as amended, 426 Mass. 1301 (1997). 
 
At the time of Olchowski's temporary suspension, he 
maintained two IOLTA accounts, one with Bank of America and one 
with Citizens Bank, which held a combined total of $29,927.  
Olchowski was unable to identify the owners of the funds in the 
IOLTA accounts, so Olchowski's accountant, a Massachusetts-
certified public accountant, undertook to try to identify the 
owners of the unidentified funds.  However, the accountant was 
unable to discover the identity of any of the owners of the 
funds in Olchowski's IOLTA accounts.3 
                                                          
 
3 In May 2013, we issued a judgment disbarring Gregory M. 
Olchowski, retroactive to November 23, 2012. 
4 
 
 
On December 11, 2017, Olchowski's attorney notified the 
Office of Bar Counsel (bar counsel) that there were unidentified 
funds in Olchowski's IOLTA accounts.  Subsequently, a financial 
investigator from the office examined Olchowski's IOLTA accounts 
to try to determine the owners of the funds.  Bar counsel 
obtained the records for the two IOLTA accounts from the office 
of Olchowski's former accountant and subpoenaed records from the 
two banks where the accounts were opened.  After reviewing these 
records, the investigator was unable to determine the owner or 
owners of the unidentified funds in either of Olchowski's IOLTA 
accounts. 
 
While efforts were being made to identify the owners of the 
funds, Olchowski's attorney transferred the unidentified funds 
from the IOLTA accounts into an escrow account.  At the time 
briefs were filed in this case, the escrow account balance was 
$29,952, including the unidentified funds and twenty-five 
dollars deposited to open the account.  Automatic withdrawals 
transferring monthly interest payments to the IOLTA committee 
continued to be made from this account. 
 
In October 2018, Olchowski's attorney moved that the single 
justice order the transfer of the unidentified funds from 
Olchowski's two IOLTA accounts to the IOLTA committee.  The 
motion was served on the director of the unclaimed property 
division of the office of the Treasurer and Receiver General 
5 
 
(Treasurer), and the director of the IOLTA committee.  The 
Treasurer moved to intervene and requested that the funds be 
remitted to the treasury as "abandoned property" under G. L. 
c. 200A.  The IOLTA committee then moved to intervene and 
requested that the funds be remitted to it.  Bar counsel took 
"no position on the issue of whether IOLTA funds whose owners 
cannot be identified . . . should escheat to the [Treasurer] or 
be remitted to the IOLTA [c]ommittee," but requested that it be 
notified of the existence of unidentified funds and have the 
opportunity to complete "any investigation and review it deems 
necessary" to determine whether the attorney responsible for the 
IOLTA accounts should be disciplined and "to ensure that the 
owners in fact are unknown." 
 
The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the 
full court, stating that "[t]he ultimate question for the court 
to decide is where these particular unidentified client funds 
should go" -- either to the Commonwealth as unclaimed property 
or to the IOLTA committee.  Additionally, the single justice 
noted that in answering this ultimate question, we would likely 
have to address three subsidiary questions:  (1) "Do 
unidentified client funds on deposit in an IOLTA account fall 
within the statutory definition of 'abandoned property' under 
G. L. c. 200A?"; (2) "Does Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, [as appearing 
in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015),] or any other rule of this court, 
6 
 
govern the disposition of such funds?"; and (3) "Are any 
constitutional issues raised by the parties' proposed 
disposition(s) of the funds?" 
 
Discussion.  1.  Supreme Judicial Court's superintendence 
authority over the practice of law.  To address these issues, we 
first explain our governance of the bar and the practice of law.  
Among the inherent superintendence powers of the Supreme 
Judicial Court is the authority to govern the conduct of 
attorneys in the practice of law.  See Collins v. Godfrey, 324 
Mass. 574, 576 (1949) ("It must now be regarded as settled that 
in the distribution of powers under art. 30 [of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] the ultimate power of 
general control over the practice of law by its own officers 
fell to the judicial department").  See also Opinion of the 
Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 813 (1978) ("As to attorneys admitted 
to practice before the courts of the Commonwealth, we retain the 
ultimate authority to control their conduct in the practice of 
law").  This superintendence authority includes determining who 
is qualified to be admitted to the bar to practice law, 
controlling the practice of law through rules of professional 
conduct, disciplining attorneys who violate those rules, and 
suspending and disbarring those attorneys who are no longer fit 
to practice law.  See Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 
609–610 (1932) ("It is an inherent power of [the judicial] 
7 
 
department of government ultimately to determine the 
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its 
courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this 
respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, 
and those not possessing good moral character"). 
 
In the exercise of this superintendence authority, we have 
promulgated several rules, including S.J.C. Rule 3:07, as 
amended, 480 Mass. 1315 (2018) (Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct), which governs the conduct of attorneys; 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, which governs bar discipline, and establishes 
the Board of Bar Overseers (board) to adjudicate disciplinary 
matters and bar counsel to investigate and prosecute such 
matters; and S.J.C. Rules 4:04 through 4:06,4 which establish the 
Clients' Security Board to reimburse clients for losses arising 
from the misappropriation of funds by members of the bar acting 
either as attorneys or fiduciaries.  In short, this court has 
established a series of rules that together govern the conduct 
of attorneys, provide for the discipline of attorneys who 
violate the rules of professional conduct, and protect clients 
from losses arising from defalcations by members of the bar. 
                                                          
 
4 S.J.C. Rule 4:04, as appearing in 482 Mass. 1301 (2019); 
S.J.C. Rule 4:05, as appearing in 482 Mass. 1303 (2019); and 
S.J.C. Rule 4:06, as appearing in 482 Mass. 1304 (2019). 
8 
 
2.  IOLTA accounts.  Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules 
of Professional Conduct governs the safekeeping of property 
entrusted to an attorney.  An attorney in possession of "trust 
property," defined as the "property of clients or third persons 
that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation," is required to hold it "separate from [his or 
her] own property," and deposit trust funds in a "trust 
account."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) (1), (b) (1). 
An attorney must deposit trust funds in one of two types of 
interest-bearing trust accounts:  (1) where, in the judgment of 
the attorney, the trust funds "are nominal in amount, or are to 
be held for a short period of time," the attorney must deposit 
trust funds into an IOLTA account; or (2) where the amount of 
money is more than nominal and is to be held for longer than a 
short period of time, an attorney must deposit the money into an 
individual trust account.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (6).  With 
an individual trust account, the identity of the beneficial 
owner should always be known because the account is held in a 
client's name, with all accruing interest paid to the client.  
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (3), (6).  But an IOLTA account is a 
"pooled account" that may hold deposits from multiple clients 
and third persons at the same time.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 
(e) (6).  A bank holding an IOLTA account does not receive any 
9 
 
identifying information about the client or third person whose 
funds may be pooled in the attorney's account. 
Funds deposited into an IOLTA account may be retainers or 
advances paid by clients for legal fees that have yet to be 
actually earned by the attorney, client funds that are awaiting 
disbursement following judgment or a settlement, or third-party 
funds that are awaiting distribution, such as the funds 
distributed after a closing on the sale of real property.  See 
Tyrrell and Casey, Managing Clients' Funds and Avoiding Ethical 
Problems, at 4-5 (Jan. 2018).  Because an IOLTA account is 
"pooled," because the bank holding the account does not know to 
whom the funds in an IOLTA account belong, and because an 
attorney is responsible to "promptly deliver to the client or 
third person any funds or other property that the client or 
third person is entitled to receive," Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 
(c), an attorney is required to adhere to strict record-keeping 
and reconciliation requirements for an IOLTA account.  See Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f).  An attorney with an IOLTA account is 
required to keep a ledger for each client matter that identifies 
every receipt or disbursement of trust funds for that matter, so 
that the attorney knows at all times how much money in the IOLTA 
account is beneficially owned by each client and third person.  
See id.  And the attorney is required to prepare a 
reconciliation report no less than every sixty days to verify 
10 
 
the balance for each client and third person.  See Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (C), (E), (F). 
Where an attorney fails to keep careful records and prepare 
periodic reconciliation reports, the risk arises that he or she 
may not know who is entitled to the trust funds in an IOLTA 
account, and that the clients and third persons who beneficially 
own these funds will be deprived of them.  Because attorneys are 
not routinely required to submit reconciliation reports to 
anyone, neither a bank nor bar counsel will immediately learn if 
an attorney has failed to keep proper records.  In order to 
assist with oversight of attorney record-keeping, financial 
institutions accepting IOLTA deposits must agree to report any 
dishonored checks on IOLTA accounts to the board.  Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15 (h) (1).  Because a dishonored check in an IOLTA 
account may reflect an attorney's failure properly to manage an 
IOLTA account, receipt of such notice may trigger an 
investigation by bar counsel into the attorney's management of 
his or her IOLTA account, and a request for account 
documentation and reconciliation reports as part of that 
investigation.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (h). 
When an attorney is suspended from the practice of law, 
disbarred, or placed in disability inactive status, or resigns 
from the bar during a disciplinary investigation, the attorney, 
among other obligations, must within fourteen days close every 
11 
 
individual trust and IOLTA account, properly disburse or 
transfer all funds in those accounts, and refund any legal fees 
that were paid in advance but had not been earned.  See S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 17 (1) (f), (g).  And the attorney within twenty-
one days must furnish bar counsel with an affidavit attesting to 
compliance with these obligations and provide "a schedule 
describing the lawyer's disposition of all client and fiduciary 
funds in the lawyer's possession."  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 17 (5) (c).  If an attorney's poor record-keeping was not the 
impetus for bar discipline, an attorney's inability to identify 
the beneficial owners of IOLTA funds will become apparent when 
the attorney's IOLTA accounts are closed.  Similarly, IOLTA 
funds may be unidentified where an attorney who is a sole 
practitioner is placed on disability inactive status, 
disappears, or dies, and has made no provisions for the transfer 
of IOLTA account documents and reconciliation reports, or for 
the disbursement of funds in an IOLTA account. 
Where there are unidentified IOLTA funds arising from a bar 
disciplinary matter, bar counsel may conduct a forensic 
investigation to attempt to identify the owners of the funds, as 
happened in this case.  Because the records in the custody of 
the bank holding the IOLTA account may not disclose the 
ownership of these funds, or the amount owned, bar counsel's 
investigation might require a confidential examination of the 
12 
 
attorney's records, including privileged attorney-client 
communications and attorney work product.  Where unidentified 
IOLTA funds arise from the death, disability, or disappearance 
of an attorney, and where no partner, executor, or other 
responsible person is capable of conducting the attorney's 
affairs, a single justice of the county court may appoint a 
commissioner to make an inventory of the attorney's files and 
protect the interests of the attorney's clients, which includes 
identifying the owners of the unidentified funds.  See S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 14 (1), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1318 (1997).  The 
commissioner's examination of the attorney's files is 
confidential; the commissioner "shall not disclose any 
information contained in any files listed in such inventory 
without the consent of the client to whom such file relates 
except as necessary to carry out the order of this court to make 
such inventory."  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 14 (2). 
Where bar counsel or a court-appointed commissioner 
identifies the owners of previously unidentified funds in an 
attorney's IOLTA account, the funds are provided to their 
rightful owner, assuming the owner can be located.  When the 
owner of funds cannot be identified, it can be inferred that one 
or more unknown clients or third parties who had entrusted funds 
to the attorney who was responsible for the IOLTA account have 
been deprived of funds that are rightfully theirs.  Clients who 
13 
 
can establish that they suffered losses arising from 
defalcations by members of the bar can seek reimbursement from 
the Clients' Security Board.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:05, as appearing 
in 482 Mass. 1303 (2019).  But where the true owner of IOLTA 
funds cannot be identified, he or she cannot be informed that 
the mismanagement of the attorney's IOLTA account might have 
caused him or her to suffer losses arising from an attorney's 
defalcation. 
Under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (g), the interest on IOLTA 
accounts is distributed to the IOLTA committee, whose members 
are appointed by this court to oversee the operation of the 
IOLTA program.  The IOLTA committee, in turn, disburses sixty-
seven percent of all IOLTA-generated funds, net of expenses, to 
the Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation and the remaining 
thirty-three percent to "other designated charitable entities," 
in proportions ordered by this court, to improve the 
administration of justice and deliver legal services to those 
who cannot afford them.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (g) (4) (i).  
But neither rule 1.15 nor any other rule promulgated by this 
court declares what happens to the principal in IOLTA accounts 
when a true owner cannot be identified. 
3.  Abandoned property law.  The Treasurer contends that 
the disposition of unidentified funds in an IOLTA account is 
governed by the abandoned property law, G. L. c. 200A.  The 
14 
 
abandoned property law, first enacted in St. 1950, c. 801, "sets 
forth a comprehensive scheme governing the disposition of 
abandoned property."  Biogen IDEC MA, Inc. v. Treasurer & 
Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174, 176 (2009).  The legislative 
purposes of the law are threefold:  "protecting true owners' 
rights, bringing additional revenues to the treasury, and 
providing a procedure for the transfer of abandoned property."  
Id. 
The law requires every "person"5 holding presumptively 
abandoned funds annually to furnish the Treasurer with a report 
identifying the name and last known address appearing in its 
records of the owner of any presumptively abandoned funds of one 
hundred dollars or more, and transfer those funds to the 
treasury.  G. L. c. 200A, §§ 7, 8A.  Sixty days before filing 
the report, the holder of the presumptively abandoned funds must 
send a notice to the apparent owner of the funds, at the last 
known address in the holder's records, informing the owner "of 
the process necessary to rebut the presumption of abandonment."  
G. L. c. 200A, § 7A.  If the owner does not timely come forward 
                                                          
 
5 The statute defines "person" broadly to include "any 
individual, corporation, . . . trust, partnership, 
association, . . . savings bank, . . . national 
banks, . . . bank holding companies and bank subsidiaries."  
G. L. c. 200A, § 1. 
15 
 
to rebut the presumption, the funds are included in the holder's 
abandoned property report and transferred to the treasury. 
Once abandoned property is reported and delivered, the 
Treasurer's unclaimed property division (division) takes various 
steps to reunite property with its true owner.  The division 
manages an online database (findmassmoney.com) where individuals 
can search for abandoned property.  The search tool displays, 
among other information, the apparent owner's name and last 
known address and the holder who reported the property 
abandoned.  The division also publishes the apparent owners' 
names in Statewide newspapers twice per year.  Consistent with 
the statute's purpose to reunite property with its true owner 
whenever possible, there is no statute of limitations for a 
putative owner of abandoned property to make a claim to the 
treasury; a person making such a claim may do so "at any time" 
after the property has been surrendered to the Treasurer.  G. L. 
c. 200A, § 10 (a). 
4.  Application of the abandoned property law.  Chapter 
200A would govern unidentified funds in IOLTA accounts only if 
such funds constitute "abandoned property" under the law. 
"Abandoned property" is defined in G. L. c. 200A, § 1, as 
"property presumed unclaimed and abandoned pursuant to this 
chapter."  For funds to be deemed "abandoned property" under 
c. 200A, they must satisfy two sets of statutory conditions.  
16 
 
First, "the conditions for presumption of abandonment" stated in 
one of eight enumerated sections in c. 200A must "exist."6  G. L. 
c. 200A, § 1A.  Second, one of the four conditions in § 1A must 
be met.7  See id.  As to the first set of required statutory 
                                                          
 
6 The eight enumerated sections are G. L. c. 200A, § 3 
(abandonment of deposits of property); G. L. c. 200A, § 4 
(abandonment of security deposits); G. L. c. 200A, § 5 
(abandonment of instruments, documents, and money); G. L. 
c. 200A, § 5A (abandonment of life insurance proceeds and the 
like); G. L. c. 200A, § 5B (abandonment of dividends, 
distributions, and interest in business); G. L. c. 200A, § 6A 
(abandonment of distribution due in liquidation); G. L. c. 200A, 
§ 6B (abandonment of traveler's checks and other guaranteed 
instruments); and G. L. c. 200A, § 6D (abandonment of property 
payable from insurance company demutualization). 
 
7 The four conditions in G. L. c. 200A, § 1A, are the 
following: 
 
"(a) the last known address of the apparent owner is in the 
commonwealth as shown on the records of the person in 
possession of property; 
 
"(b) no address of the apparent owner appears on the 
records of the person in possession of the property and 
 
"(1) the last known address of the apparent owner is in the 
commonwealth, or 
 
"(2) the person in possession of property subject to this 
chapter is domiciled in the commonwealth and has not 
previously paid the property to the state of the last known 
address of the apparent owner, or 
 
"(3) the holder is a government or governmental subdivision 
or agency of the commonwealth and has not previously paid 
the property to the state of the last known address of the 
apparent owner; 
 
"(c) the last known address, as shown on the records of the 
person in possession of property, is in a state that does 
not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of 
17 
 
conditions, none of the designated sections specifically 
addresses IOLTA accounts, but the Treasurer contends that § 3, 
which concerns "deposits" of funds, applies to the unidentified 
funds in IOLTA accounts.  We disagree.  A careful review of this 
section reveals that attempting to apply § 3 to IOLTA accounts 
would be the legal equivalent of trying to fit a square peg into 
a round hole. 
 
Section 3 provides that a deposit of funds in a bank shall 
be presumed abandoned unless the "owner" within three years has 
"[c]ommunicated in writing with the person concerning the 
deposit," "[b]een credited with interest on a passbook or 
certificate of deposit at his request," or otherwise done some 
act with respect to the account, such as depositing or 
withdrawing funds, transferring funds, or engaging in some 
transaction regarding the account.8  Under § 3, the "owner" of 
                                                          
 
such property and the person in possession of property is 
domiciled in the commonwealth or is a government or 
governmental subdivision or agency of the commonwealth; or 
 
"(d) the last known address, as shown on the records of the 
person in possession of property, of the apparent owner is 
in a foreign nation and the person in possession of 
property is domiciled in the commonwealth or is a 
subdivision or agency of the commonwealth." 
8 The full text of G. L. c. 200A, § 3, provides: 
 
"Any deposit of property with a person having a residence 
or place of business in the commonwealth, or authorized to 
do business therein, together with the increments thereon, 
shall be presumed abandoned unless the owner has, within 
18 
 
the funds in the account is the person named on the account who 
is also presumed to be the person who actually owns the funds in 
the account.  In fact, the Treasurer's regulations define an 
"owner" as "[a] person or entity having a legal or equitable 
claim to abandoned property."  960 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.02 
(2004).  But with an IOLTA account, the attorney named on the 
                                                          
 
three years next preceding the date as of which reports are 
required by [G. L. c. 200A, § 7]: 
 
"(1) Communicated in writing with the person concerning the 
deposit; or 
 
"(2) Been credited with interest on a passbook or 
certificate of deposit at his request; or 
 
"(3) Had a transfer, disposition of interest or other 
transaction noted of record in the books or records of the 
person; or 
 
"(4) Increased or decreased the amount of deposit; or 
 
"(5) Owned other property for which clause (1), (2), (3) or 
(4) is applicable; provided, however, that the holder 
communicates in writing with the owner with regard to such 
property that would otherwise be presumed abandoned under 
this section at the address at which communications 
regarding such other property regularly are received; or 
 
"(6) Had another relationship with the holder concerning 
which the owner has: 
 
"(i) communicated in writing with the holder, or 
 
"(ii) otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a 
memorandum on file prepared by an employee of the holder; 
provided, however, that if the holder communicates in 
writing with the owner with regard to the property that 
would otherwise be presumed abandoned under this section at 
the address at which communications regarding the other 
relationship regularly are received." 
19 
 
account is not the true owner of the funds; those funds are the 
property of the clients or third persons who entrusted those 
funds to the attorney.  See Matter of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 565 
n.7 (2011).  See also ZVI Constr. Co. v. Levy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 
412, 419 (2016), quoting Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 
524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) ("the principal held in IOLTA trust 
accounts is the 'private property' of the client"). 
The bank has no way to learn the identity of the true 
owners of the funds, and therefore no way to provide them with 
the advance notice required under § 7A to prevent these funds 
from being deemed presumptively abandoned and included in the 
bank's report of abandoned property it must provide to the 
Treasurer under § 7.  Additionally, § 7 (b) (1) requires the 
bank in its report to provide the name and last known address of 
"each person appearing from the records of the holder to be the 
owner of any property of the value of one hundred dollars or 
more presumed abandoned under this chapter," but the bank's 
records will reveal only the attorney's name and address, not 
the name and address of the true owner of the funds in the IOLTA 
account.  Therefore, if IOLTA accounts could be deemed 
"abandoned property" under § 3, the true owners of these funds 
would not receive notice by the bank that the account was to be 
reported abandoned (that notice would go only to the attorney 
whose name is on the IOLTA account), nor be able to take one of 
20 
 
the six listed actions in § 3 to prevent their IOLTA funds from 
being presumed abandoned by the bank. 
The claims process established by the Treasurer to allow 
true owners of presumptively abandoned property to claim those 
funds also does not fit the unique nature of IOLTA accounts.  
Under the Treasurer's regulations, "the original owner" of the 
funds is required to submit documentation in support of his or 
her claims.  See 960 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.04(1), (2) (2004).  
But the usual required documentation, such as the monthly 
statement of the bank or the holder's certification, is not 
applicable to an IOLTA account because these documents would not 
establish a purported owner's beneficial ownership of the funds.  
The attorney named on the IOLTA account may make a claim on 
behalf of the true owner, but only if he or she is the "legal 
representative" of the owner, which is defined as an executor or 
administrator of an estate, a conservator or guardian, "or an 
authorized agent appointed in accordance with a properly-
executed power of attorney."  960 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 4.02, 
4.04(2)(b). 
 
In short, the careful procedures established by c. 200A to 
identify presumptively abandoned funds, report and remit those 
funds to the treasury, and allow the true owner of those funds 
to reclaim them by proof of ownership simply do not fit when 
applied to IOLTA accounts.  This is not a criticism of the 
21 
 
Legislature; there were no pooled IOLTA accounts in 1950 when 
the law was enacted, and although the law has since been 
amended,9 none of the amendments addresses the unique nature of 
an IOLTA account.10 
                                                          
 
9 See, e.g., St. 1958, c. 283; St. 1969, c. 377; St. 1975, 
c. 277; St. 1975, c. 608; St. 1980, c. 130, §§ 3, 4, 7; 
St. 1984, c. 458; and St. 2000, c. 198. 
 
10 The IOLTA committee contends that G. L. c. 200A, § 3, 
does not apply to IOLTA accounts because, under Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.15 (g) (2) (i), banks must remit interest to the committee 
no less than quarterly, so the account may never be presumed 
abandoned where G. L. c. 200A, § 3 (2), provides that a bank 
account is not to be presumed abandoned if the account each 
quarter has "[b]een credited with interest on a passbook or 
certificate of deposit at his request."  This argument ignores 
the phrase, "at his request," which requires some act by the 
owner of the account (here, the attorney) to request the credit 
of interest.  If the passive receipt of automatic interest 
payments was sufficient to show that a bank account was not 
presumptively abandoned, any bank account with an established 
automatic transfer schedule would never be considered abandoned 
under the statute nor ever be remitted to the treasury -- 
undermining the statute's aim to "provide a smooth and simple 
procedure for transferring such property into the state treasury 
and out of the hands of those in unjust possession."  Treasurer 
& Receiver Gen. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 
410, 423 (1983), quoting 1950 Senate Doc. No. 1, at 22.  
Moreover, the Treasurer's regulations reflect that an owner's 
property should not be deemed presumptively abandoned where "the 
owner maintains an active relationship with a holder with 
respect to any property of the same owner."  960 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 4.03(11) (2004). "Activity" is defined in the 
regulations as an "[a]ction taken by an owner with respect to 
his or her property which indicates that the owner intends for 
the property not to be presumed abandoned."  960 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 4.02.  The passive receipt of interest is not an 
"activity" and is insufficient to rebut a presumption of 
abandonment. 
22 
 
 
The Treasurer seeks to fit IOLTA accounts into § 3 by 
arguing, in the alternative, that the definition of "person" 
holding unclaimed property who is required to report and 
transmit the property to the treasury is broad enough to include 
the attorney responsible for the IOLTA account.  It is certainly 
true that the definition of "person" under the abandoned 
property law is broad enough to include an attorney or law firm 
holding funds on behalf of a client or third person.  See G. L. 
c. 200A, § 1 ("person" includes "any individual" or 
"partnership").  However, in the context of § 3, this would 
require the attorney responsible for the account, and not the 
bank, to report to the Treasurer that the funds in an IOLTA 
account are presumptively abandoned where the client or the 
third person who is the beneficial owner of the funds has not 
communicated with the attorney for three years regarding the 
funds.  There are two problems with this alternative argument. 
 
First, G. L. c. 200A, § 7, requires the "holder" of funds 
deposited in a bank that are presumptively abandoned to file a 
report based on "the records of the holder."  There is nothing 
in the Treasurer's regulations or in the record to suggest that 
the Treasurer has informed banks that, with regards to IOLTA 
accounts, the attorney is the holder of the funds, not the bank.  
Under the Treasurer's regulations, "holder" is defined as "[t]he 
entity that has custody of abandoned property," which suggests 
23 
 
that, at least with respect to bank deposits, the holder is 
expected to be an entity rather than an individual attorney.  
960 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.02.  Nor is there any language in 
c. 200A or the regulations to suggest that there may be multiple 
"holders" of the same funds, and any such suggestion would be a 
recipe for confusion, because it would mean that multiple 
reports would be filed regarding the same abandoned funds.  To 
be sure, law firms and legal service agencies at times have 
filed abandoned property reports regarding an IOLTA account with 
the Treasurer, but the vast majority of such reports are filed 
by banks.  According to the director of audit and compliance for 
the division, as of December 1, 2019, 572 "IOLTA-type 
properties" were unclaimed in the abandoned property database, 
but only thirteen of the submitted reports were from law firms; 
one was from a legal aid organization. 
 
Second, if the attorney responsible for an IOLTA account is 
deemed the "holder" of the account, the Treasurer or her agents 
"may at any reasonable time and upon reasonable notice examine 
or audit a holder's books, papers or other records to verify 
proper compliance with the reporting requirements of [c. 200A]."  
960 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.07 (2004).  Section 3 cannot be 
reasonably understood to mean that, by opening an IOLTA account, 
which an attorney may be required to do under our rules of 
professional conduct, the attorney opens the door to treasury 
24 
 
agents examining all of his or her books, papers, and other 
records, which may contain confidential client information, 
attorney-client communications, or attorney work product.  
Allowing that to happen in the ordinary course might result in a 
breach of an attorney's obligations to his or her client.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 851 (2008) ("It is 
axiomatic that among the highest duties an attorney owes a 
client is the duty to maintain the confidentiality of client 
information" [citation omitted]); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 comment 
2, as amended, 474 Mass. 1301 (2016) ("A fundamental principle 
in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the 
client's informed consent or as otherwise permitted by these 
Rules, the lawyer must not reveal confidential information 
relating to the representation. . . .  This contributes to the 
trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship"); 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (providing for protection of confidential 
client information). 
 
We therefore conclude, given the incongruent fit between 
§ 3 and IOLTA accounts, that G. L. c. 200A, § 3, does not apply 
to unidentified funds deposited in IOLTA accounts.  Where the 
Treasurer does not contend that any of the other seven 
enumerated sections in c. 200A apply to these funds, we conclude 
25 
 
that IOLTA accounts fall outside the scope of the abandoned 
property law.11 
 
5.  Identification, investigation, and disposition of 
abandoned IOLTA funds.  Our conclusion that c. 200A does not 
govern IOLTA accounts does not mean that there will be no 
process to identify abandoned funds in IOLTA accounts, to 
investigate bank and attorney records to determine the true 
owners of those funds, to restore the funds to those true 
owners, and to transfer any funds whose true owner cannot be 
identified despite diligent investigation.  It simply means that 
we must put that process in place through our superintendence 
authority over the bar and the practice of law.  We do so here, 
and direct this court's standing advisory committee on the rules 
of professional conduct (standing committee) to propose 
amendments to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 to incorporate the 
following guidance into our rule. 
 
Just as a dishonored check in an IOLTA account is an 
indicator of a possible disciplinary violation by an attorney 
regarding his or her management of an IOLTA account, so, too, is 
the absence of any activity in an IOLTA account over an extended 
                                                          
 
11 Because we conclude that the first set of required 
statutory conditions is not met, we need not address whether 
unidentified funds in IOLTA accounts meet the second set of 
required conditions in § 1A for the funds to be "presumed 
abandoned" under the statute. 
26 
 
period of time.  We currently require lawyers to maintain IOLTA 
accounts only in financial institutions that agree to notify the 
board when a check is dishonored for insufficient funds.  See 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (h).  See also Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. 
Citizens Bank of Mass., 463 Mass. 50, 60 (2012).  Such 
notification permits bar counsel to investigate the attorney to 
determine whether the dishonored check arises from a 
disciplinary violation regarding the attorney's management of 
client funds, from financial mismanagement that could be 
remedied with appropriate guidance or supervision, or from a 
simple careless mistake.  We shall now require similar 
agreements to impose an obligation on financial institutions to 
notify the board when there is no activity in an IOLTA account 
for more than two years, apart from automatic interest payments 
to the IOLTA committee.12  This notification will allow bar 
counsel, where appropriate, to conduct a forensic examination of 
the attorney's IOLTA account records, and other books and 
records, to ascertain whether the funds are abandoned and 
determine the true owner of any such funds so that they may be 
disbursed.  In addition, such notice will allow bar counsel to 
                                                          
 
12 This court's standing advisory committee on the rules of 
professional conduct, in proposing amendments to Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.15, may consider whether a different time period is more 
appropriate to accomplish our purpose for requiring such 
notification. 
27 
 
determine whether the prolonged inactivity of the account is a 
sign of possible disciplinary violations or financial 
mismanagement by the attorney. 
 
Of course, bar counsel need not wait for two years of IOLTA 
account inactivity to examine whether there are presumptively 
abandoned funds in certain IOLTA accounts.  As discussed supra, 
Supreme Judicial Court rules are already in place requiring an 
attorney who is suspended from the practice of law, disbarred, 
or placed on disability inactive status, or has resigned from 
the bar during a disciplinary investigation, to close every 
IOLTA account, disburse or transfer all IOLTA funds, and report 
to bar counsel the disposition of all such funds, which should 
reveal the existence of any unclaimed or unidentified funds.  
See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17 (1), (5) (c).  And where an attorney 
dies, disappears, or becomes inactive because of disability, and 
where no partner, executor, or other responsible person 
disburses or transfers the funds in the attorney's IOLTA 
account, a single justice of the county court may appoint a 
commissioner to identify the owners of the funds in the IOLTA 
accounts and disburse the monies.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 14 (1).  With vigilant bar counsel and commissioners, the 
number and dollar amount of unidentified IOLTA funds should be 
minimized. 
28 
 
 
But as this case demonstrates, there will still be 
unidentified funds in IOLTA accounts that, despite exhaustive 
forensic investigation, will elude all reasonable efforts to 
determine and locate their true owner.13  There are two 
reasonable alternative dispositions of these funds:  the 
Commonwealth's general fund, where abandoned property within the 
scope of G. L. c. 200A is ultimately transferred pursuant to 
G. L. c. 200A, § 9 (e); or the IOLTA committee, where the 
interest on IOLTA accounts is transferred, which is in turn 
distributed pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (g) to entities 
that will deliver civil legal services to those who cannot 
afford them or improve the administration of justice.  Some 
                                                          
 
13 We are of course concerned about the 572 "IOLTA-type 
properties" currently unclaimed in the abandoned property 
database.  It is unclear whether bar counsel was alerted to 
their existence before this litigation, or how bar counsel would 
otherwise be alerted to abandoned IOLTA accounts in order to 
begin an investigation or disciplinary proceeding.  It is also 
unclear whether bar counsel has conducted, or will be able to 
conduct, investigations into whether the funds in these 572 
accounts are truly unidentified or simply unclaimed. 
 
29 
 
States have chosen the first alternative.14  Others have chosen 
the second alternative.15 
 
Even though the disposition of these funds is not governed 
by c. 200A because IOLTA funds fall outside the scope of the 
abandoned property law, we recognize and respect the legislative 
purpose that all abandoned property be transferred to the 
general fund.  We would, pursuant to our superintendence 
authority, transfer these funds to the general fund out of 
respect for that legislative purpose if funds deemed abandoned 
could never be claimed by their rightful owner.  But such claims 
may be made, with no limitations period, and therein lies the 
rub. 
 
If we were to determine that unidentified IOLTA funds 
should be transferred to the Treasurer, we would expect the 
Treasurer to apply the same claims process to IOLTA funds, which 
fall outside the scope of c. 200A, as she applies to abandoned 
                                                          
 
14 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Association Ethics Opinion No. 90-3 
(1990); State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinion No. 97-03 (1997); 
State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2 (1998); 
State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion No. RI-38 (1989); 
Mississippi Ethics Opinion No. 178 (1990); N.C. R. Prof. C. 
1.15-2(r); Washington Bar Association, Ethics FAQ ("What do I do 
with unclaimed trust account funds?"), citing Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 63.29, https://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/ethics 
/ethics-faqs#unclaimed [https://perma.cc/2R3H-GUFW]. 
 
15 See, e.g., Ark. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c)(1)-(2); Colo. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15B(k); Ill. R. Prof. C. 1.15(i); La. R. Prof. C. 
1.15(g)(7)-(8), (h); N.J. Court Rule 1:21-6(j); N.Y. R. Prof. C. 
1.15(f); Pa. R. Prof. C. 1.15(v). 
30 
 
funds that are within the scope of c. 200A.  Under that process, 
when someone claims an interest in property surrendered to the 
State, the Treasurer has "full and complete authority to 
determine all such claims" and, in doing so, may take testimony 
under oath, subpoena the attendance of witnesses, and subpoena 
the production of all "books, papers and documents which may be 
pertinent to such hearing."  G. L. c. 200A, § 10 (b)-(c).  This 
is precisely the type of inquiry that we are reluctant to 
relinquish to the Treasurer should a claim be made on 
unidentified IOLTA funds by an attorney's client.  Attorney 
records concerning IOLTA accounts are necessarily intertwined 
with attorney-client confidences.  Any such inquiry by the 
Treasurer poses the risk of impermissible disclosure of 
confidential client information, attorney-client communications, 
and attorney work product. 
 
We conclude that there is a better approach that is more 
protective of the confidential information so fundamental to the 
attorney-client relationship:  where bar counsel determines 
after reasonable investigation that the owner of IOLTA funds 
cannot be identified or located, bar counsel should request the 
single justice of the county court to find that the funds are 
presumptively abandoned and to order the transfer of the 
31 
 
abandoned funds to the IOLTA committee.16  The transfer of these 
funds to the IOLTA committee, in order to avoid constitutional 
concerns, carries with it an obligation by the committee to 
return those funds to their true owner, with interest, if the 
true owner establishes ownership at any time.  Therefore, we 
will revise our rules of professional conduct to memorialize 
that obligation after considering language recommended by our 
standing committee.17  Where such a claim is made, the 
investigation of its merits should be conducted by bar counsel, 
whose obligation to maintain the confidentiality of information 
arising from an investigation is already established by rule.  
See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 20, as amended, 438 Mass. 1301 (2002).  
                                                          
 
16 Where the owner of the IOLTA funds has been identified 
but cannot be located, the Board of Bar Overseers shall publish 
the name on a webpage on its website to allow the missing client 
or third person to reclaim his or her abandoned funds from the 
IOLTA committee.  Nothing in this opinion is intended to prevent 
the board from seeking the agreement of the Treasurer to include 
these names on her abandoned property website, with the proviso 
that any persons claiming ownership of such property will be 
referred to bar counsel for investigation. 
17 The Treasurer does not allege that there is any 
constitutional bar to the transfer of funds to the IOLTA 
committee but instead contends that "constitutional problems 
could arise" under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment or 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, if 
the transfer were deemed compelled speech.  The Treasurer does 
not have standing to raise such claims, see Tax Equity Alliance 
for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 715–716 
(1996), and in any event she recognizes that the weight of these 
claims is diminished if a claimant who can establish ownership 
of previously unidentified IOLTA funds will be able to recover 
those funds from the IOLTA committee, with interest, at any 
time. 
32 
 
Any dispute concerning the adjudication of ownership shall be 
resolved by the single justice. 
 
Conclusion.  In answer to the questions posed by the single 
justice in his reservation and report, we conclude that 
unidentified client funds on deposit in an IOLTA account do not 
fall within the statutory definition of "abandoned property" 
under G. L. c. 200A; that neither Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 nor any 
other rule of this court presently governs the disposition of 
such funds; and that such funds shall be transferred to the 
IOLTA committee for disposition under the conditions set forth 
in this opinion, which shall later be incorporated in revisions 
to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (dissenting).  The court holds, without an 
adequate factual record to support it, that Interest on Lawyers' 
Trust Accounts (IOLTAs or IOLTA accounts) fall outside the 
abandoned property act (act), in part because the alternative 
would allow the Treasurer and Receiver General (Treasurer) to 
inspect attorneys' records in a manner that could allow the 
Treasurer to maintain and to investigate IOLTA accounts, as she 
does with other abandoned property.  This, according to the 
court, would improperly risk "disclosure of confidential client 
information, attorney-client communications, and attorney work 
product," all of which fall under the attorney-client privilege 
governed by the judicial branch.  Ante at    .  Because the 
court concludes as such, it avoids having to decide whether 
classifying orphaned IOLTA funds as abandoned property would 
impede upon the judiciary's authority under art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to regulate the practice of 
law, or whether keeping unclaimed IOLTA accounts within the 
province of the judiciary would unduly interfere with the 
executive or legislative powers as outlined in art. 30. 
 
I, on the other hand, believe that the plain meaning and 
legislative intent of the act require categorizing unclaimed or 
orphaned IOLTA funds as abandoned property, a conclusion that 
prevents us from avoiding the lurking separation of powers 
issues.  I therefore do not believe that we should draw any 
2 
 
definitive conclusions from the bare factual record.  Instead, 
we should remand to a trial court to develop a more complete 
record. 
 
First, orphaned IOLTA funds, at least based on this limited 
record, seem to fit within the act's definition of abandoned 
property, specifically as intangible property, property on 
deposit in a bank, or, perhaps, as security deposits.18  See 
G. L. c. 200A, §§ 1A, 3, 4.  Because IOLTA funds are deposited 
into "trust accounts" in a bank by attorneys operating on behalf 
of their clients in a fiduciary capacity, such funds facially 
qualify as abandoned property under the act absent some 
compelling factual or legal reason to the contrary.  See Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015).  Aside 
from plain meaning, the Legislature intended the act to "set[] 
forth a comprehensive scheme governing the disposition of 
abandoned property," Biogen IDEC MA, Inc. v. Treasurer & 
Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174, 176 (2009), including "all kinds" 
                                                          
 
 
18 The Treasurer contended that IOLTA accounts fall within 
G. L. c. 200A, § 3, and the court cabined its analysis to that 
section of the act.  In whole, G. L. c. 200A, § 4 states:  
"Subject to the provisions of section one A, any deposit of 
property made to secure payment for services rendered or to be 
rendered, or to guarantee the performance of service or duties, 
or to protect against damage or harm, and the increments 
thereof, shall be presumed abandoned, unless claimed by the 
person entitled thereto within three years after the occurrence 
of the event that would obligate the holder or depository to 
return it or its equivalent." 
3 
 
of unclaimed property "whose owner is unknown or had neglected 
to claim it during a specific number of years," Treasurer & 
Receiver Gen. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 410, 
412-413, 423 (1983).  Whether one conceives of the owner as the 
attorney who opened the IOLTA account or the clients whose funds 
constitute the account, the legislative intent facially captures 
IOLTA accounts. 
 
The court argues that "attempting to apply § 3 to IOLTA 
accounts would be the legal equivalent of trying to fit a square 
peg into a round hole."  Ante at    .  Statutory interpretation, 
however, does not pursue a perfect fit when effectuating 
legislative intent, and some square pegs can fit into round 
holes.  See Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019).  To that end, the court 
contends that orphaned IOLTA funds do not qualify as abandoned 
property because the true owner is the client, not the attorney 
listed on the account, and the holder of the account, the bank, 
could not therefore notify the true owner in advance of deeming 
the property presumptively abandoned.  See G. L. c. 200A, 
§ 7 (b) (1) (bank must report name and last known address of 
"each person appearing from the records of the holder to be the 
owner"); G. L. c. 200A, § 7A (if holder has accurate address of 
"apparent owner" of property presumed abandoned, then holder 
4 
 
must send notice "of the process necessary to rebut the 
presumption of abandonment"). 
 
This apparent "square peg" actually fits quite nicely into 
the act, even though the statute does not define "owner," see 
G. L. c. 200A, § 1, because attorneys acting as fiduciaries have 
a "legal . . . claim to abandoned property" on behalf of their 
clients and therefore qualify as "owners" under the Treasurer's 
regulations.19  960 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.02 (2004).  See Matter 
of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 565 n.7 (2011) (explaining ways that 
attorney must act as fiduciary for trust accounts).  See also 
Biogen IDEC MA, Inc., 454 Mass. at 186-187 (in absence of clear 
statutory language to contrary, we must defer to Treasurer's 
regulations).  Because the attorney is the owner of the IOLTA 
account, I am not convinced on this record that the bank could 
not comply with its statutory obligations to notify the owner in 
advance of reporting the IOLTA account as abandoned property.20  
See G. L. c. 200A, §§ 7 (b) (1), 7A. 
                                                          
 
 
19 I presume that, in the context of this case, Gregory M. 
Olchowski's counsel, who requested the transfer of the IOLTA 
account, would have legal claim to the property. 
 
 
20 The court seems to recognize that attorneys acting as 
fiduciaries for IOLTA funds are owners of those accounts when 
refuting an argument made by the IOLTA committee that trust-
bearing accounts cannot qualify as abandoned property under the 
act.  Under the act, earning interest rebuts the presumption of 
abandonment only "at his request," which, according to the 
court, "requires some act by the owner of the account (here, the 
5 
 
 
Moreover, the regulations appear to account for 
circumstances where an attorney or other fiduciary may be the 
"owner" of an account that becomes abandoned for which the "true 
owners" of the funds, the clients, can file to reclaim property 
that was abandoned due to their fiduciaries' irresponsibility.  
See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 388 Mass. at 426 ("The 
focus of the statute is to reunite the owners with their 
property, and therefore it is irrelevant that John Hancock does 
not own [or control] the property").  The Treasurer's 
regulations outlining the claims process note that only the 
"original owner" can make a claim by presenting certain 
documents, such as a "monthly statement, if applicable."  960 
Code Mass. Regs. § 4.04(2)(a) (2004).  Although clients may not 
have documents, such as the specific IOLTA account information, 
they could still make a claim by presenting "other documentation 
as may be required by the [unclaimed property division] to 
substantiate the validity of the claim," since the Treasurer 
would likely recognize that those other documents were not 
"applicable."  Id.  Alternatively, the owner's "legal 
representative" may make a claim on behalf of the client.  960 
Code Mass. Regs. § 4.04(2)(b).  The record shows that banks and 
law firms have transferred 572 IOLTA accounts to the Treasurer 
                                                          
 
attorney) to request the credit of interest."  Ante at note 10, 
quoting G. L. c. 200A, § 3 (2). 
6 
 
as abandoned property, but the record does not reflect the 
claims process to which clients with funds in those accounts 
have adhered.  The existing framework seems capable of handling 
claims by the true owners of funds within IOLTA accounts. 
 
The court next alleges that it would be improper for an 
attorney to be a "holder" under the act -- the individual who 
would have to file reports about presumptively abandoned 
property -- even though the statute's definition of a person who 
can hold property is broad enough to encompass an attorney 
acting as the fiduciary for IOLTA funds.  See G. L. c. 200A, 
§ 1.  The court worries that this would create an unmanageable 
scenario with multiple persons with statutory responsibilities 
as holders of one pool of property under the act.  To the 
contrary, it is perfectly plausible that the bank would be a 
holder for the IOLTA account and the attorney would be a holder 
for the apportioned IOLTA funds within the account.  In fact, it 
makes logical sense that responsible attorneys would report 
abandoned IOLTA funds to the Treasurer as abandoned property if 
they could not contact clients for three years, and that the 
bank would report the entire IOLTA account if it qualified as 
presumptively abandoned under the act.  See 960 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 4.02.  Although the court claims that this scenario "would be 
a recipe for confusion," ante at    , the factual record 
provides no indication of such confusion, especially considering 
7 
 
that some attorneys and law firms have reported IOLTA funds as 
abandoned property.  We simply need more information. 
 
Even if I were to agree with the court's statutory 
analysis, my foundational concern about the inadequate record 
remains for the court's apparent primary concern:  that the 
Treasurer might need to investigate attorneys' books to 
determine to whom the unclaimed IOLTA funds belong, see G. L. 
c. 200A, § 10 (b)-(c), or to ensure that attorneys complied with 
their requirements as holders.  See 960 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.07 
(2004).  The court raises the understandable concern that 
"[a]llowing [such an investigation] to happen in the ordinary 
course might result in a breach of an attorney's obligations to 
his or her client," ante at    , but only hints at the second-
level implication of that statement; allowing the Treasurer such 
access as the statute would require might invade upon the 
judiciary's art. 30 power to protect attorney-client privilege 
and attorney confidentiality as part of its power to regulate 
the practice of law. 
 
Of course, the court does not need to reach whether those 
fears would come true, because its version of statutory 
interpretation keeps IOLTA accounts outside the realm of 
abandoned property and therefore out of the possible reach of 
the Treasurer.  The court accordingly has no obligation to 
provide evidence that such breaches occur or that investigations 
8 
 
by the Treasurer would impede upon our art. 30 authority.  I 
view the matter differently. 
 
Because I conclude that orphaned IOLTA funds qualify as 
abandoned property under the act, we can only keep the Treasurer 
from exercising her statutory obligations regarding those funds 
based on some interpretation of our constitutional authority to 
regulate the practice of law.  We could hold that the act is 
unconstitutional as applied to orphaned IOLTA funds, or we could 
craft an alternative solution that gives the Treasurer control 
over the orphaned IOLTA funds without unduly impeding the 
attorney-client privilege.  Either solution necessarily 
implicates separation of powers concerns, as both could 
interfere with the Legislature's and the executive branch's 
powers under art. 30.  In sum, concluding that unclaimed IOLTA 
funds constitute abandoned property requires me to consider how 
the court's proposed solution, one that still might be 
constitutionally or statutorily permissible even though I 
determined that IOLTA accounts are abandoned property under the 
act, affects art. 30, and to consider whether it does so 
appropriately on the facts before the court. 
 
Before we reach such a significant decision, I believe that 
we need a factual record to help answer critical questions 
beyond the bare joint statement of facts presented to the single 
justice.  The record does not reflect whether investigating 
9 
 
unclaimed funds in IOLTA accounts would necessarily violate the 
attorney-client privilege.  The amicus briefs presented by the 
Boston Bar Association and others and by the Board of Bar 
Overseers (BBO) suggest that it does, but the factual record 
only explains that a financial investigator subpoenaed records 
from banks and examined records held by Gregory M. Olchowski's 
former accountant.  There is no indication that the 
investigation necessarily pierced the veil of attorney-client 
privilege, which, if accurate, would lessen the art. 30 concerns 
for orphaned IOLTA funds constituting abandoned property because 
the Treasurer would not therefore be impeding upon the 
judiciary's art. 30 authority to regulate the practice of law.21 
 
Moreover, there might be an alternative path that neither 
ignores the act's plain meaning nor imposes on or interferes 
with our art. 30 obligations, and that simultaneously respects 
the Legislature's and executive branch's powers.  However, the 
parties only briefed opposing absolutes:  the Treasurer claimed 
complete authority to investigate and to manage orphaned IOLTA 
                                                          
 
 
21 As stated supra, the record notes that entities have 
transferred 572 IOLTA accounts to the Treasurer as abandoned 
property.  The record makes no reference to whether the 
Treasurer has investigated these properties to determine the 
true owner and, if so, whether those investigations pierced the 
veil of attorney-client privilege.  Moreover, the record does 
not reflect whether investigations into other types of abandoned 
property, such as trust funds or remainders of estates, which I 
presume are under the authority of the Treasurer, would also 
pierce the veil of attorney-client privilege. 
10 
 
accounts, no matter attorney-client privilege, while the IOLTA 
committee and Olchowski, who the court largely followed, put the 
power squarely with the judiciary.  I agree with the court that 
it is possible that classifying IOLTA accounts as abandoned 
property could interfere with the judiciary's art. 30 authority 
to regulate the practice of law.  On the other hand, mitigating 
that concern by following the court's chosen path, which would 
transfer abandoned IOLTA funds to the judiciary's control rather 
than to the general fund, or by ordering the Treasurer to 
respect attorney-client privilege could also offend art. 30 by 
unduly interfering with legislative or executive authority.22 
 
We simply need to know more before we meddle with the 
separation of powers, a principle that is the foundation of our 
                                                          
 
 
22 The court contemplates that someone will have to review 
attorney-client privileged materials to determine the true 
owners of the IOLTA funds, but it does not discuss any precise 
procedures for doing so beyond keeping the funds within the 
judiciary and having the BBO conduct an inquiry in a manner 
similar to how it assesses attorney accounts during disciplinary 
procedures.  There may be alternatives.  For example, it may be 
constitutionally permissible to require that the Treasurer 
transfer investigatory responsibilities to an agent of the 
judiciary, namely the BBO, if an examination of orphaned IOLTA 
accounts threatened to pierce the veil of attorney-client 
privilege.  It also might be possible to maintain the privilege 
if the BBO hired outside counsel to conduct the review.  It may 
even be possible to rely on an interpleader action, with the 
Treasurer and the IOLTA committee as nominal parties, so that 
the unclaimed IOLTA funds are deposited with the court until 
appropriate disposition of the matter.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 67, 
365 Mass. 835 (1974).  Perhaps these ideas would not be possible 
or constitutionally permissible, but the parties understandably 
did not brief this matter. 
11 
 
constitutional system.  I therefore dissent and recommend that 
we remand to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court for assignment 
of the case to create a more thorough factual record.