Case Title: Glover v. Giraldo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Glover v. Giraldo1992 WY 7824 P.2d 552Case Number: 91-54Decided: 01/22/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
William GLOVER, III, and 
Sheila Kay Glover,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Lucino GIRALDO, a/k/a 
Luciano Giraldo, Alberta Giraldo, James W. Rudd,

 C. Eileen Rudd, and City of Casper, 
Wyoming, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Donald R. 
Winship of Donald R. Winship & Associates, P.C., Casper, for 
appellants.

Larry W. 
Harrington, Casper, for appellees Giraldo and Rudd.

Robert L. 
Mullen, City Atty., Casper, for appellee City of Casper (no argument was 
presented for City of Casper).

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants 
William and Sheila Glover appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment, 
nunc pro tunc, in this dispute concerning property interests in land 
adjoining a non-navigable stream. At issue is the interpretation of the legal 
property description and an alternative claim of adverse 
possession.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
orders granting summary judgment, nunc pro tunc, as to the interpretation 
of the legal description and reverse and remand on the claim of adverse 
possession.

FACTS

[¶3]      William and 
Sheila Glover sought to quiet title in property lying between the West bank and 
the thread or center of the North Platte River at a point near Casper, Wyoming, 
where the river is unnavigable. Appellants' claim is based on separate theories 
of an unbroken chain of title or, in the alternative, adverse 
possession.

[¶4]      The property in 
dispute is described by a 1940 deed from S.H. Willey et ux to Elsie E. Robertson 
and identified as:

A tract of land in the 
West Half of the Northwest Quarter (W 1/2 NW 1/4) of Section Twenty-three * * * 
containing all that portion between the West Boundary line of the said 
subdivision and the North Platte River, more particularly described as follows: 
* * * Thence N.09°08'E. along the left bank of said river a distance of 88.7 
feet.

The deed then 
references "along the left bank of said river" through eleven more survey 
calls.

[¶5]      Appellants claim 
this property description identifies boundaries as extending to the middle 
thread of the non-navigable North Platte River and includes title to the 
riverbed. Appellants argue as successors in title of the deed to Robertson and 
claim all interests and rights to the land described in the conveyance. 
Alternatively, appellants assert that each of their predecessors in interest to 
the described property were in actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, 
and hostile possession under a claim of right for more than ten consecutive 
years. This adverse title which vested in Robertson is said to have passed to 
appellants on March 20, 1987.

[¶6]      Appellees present 
conflicting claims of ownership to the middle thread of the river through a 1952 
deed originating from S.H. Willey to J. Linden Heaton. This deed describes land 
on the Eastern side of the North Platte River and also references the riverbed 
and shoreland on the westerly or left bank of the river by survey calls. A later 
deed in 1955 from Heaton to Paradise Valley Development Company used the West 
bank description and the meander of the left bank as the West boundary line. 
These same reference points along the West bank are given in the 1940 deed to 
Robertson. Paradise Valley Development subdivided and platted the property 
described in the 1955 deed and appellees, Lucino and Alberta Giraldo, and James 
W. and Eileen Rudd are legal title holders of Lots 19 and 21 of Block 27 within 
the subdivision.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶7]      This court's 
standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment is well known and need not be 
repeated here. Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting 
Zmijewski v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991)).

Legal 
Description of the Property

[¶8]      The trial court's 
grant of summary judgment on the legal description of appellants' property is 
based on interpretation of the Willey to Robertson deed as intending to convey 
property only to the left bank of the river. The deed generally describes "A 
tract of land * * * between the West boundary line of the said subdivision and 
the North Platte River" followed by a more particular description referencing 
many calls to "the left bank of said river."

[¶9]      Whether the grant 
of summary judgment is proper depends on the grantor's intent as ascertained 
from specific language of the deed. To determine the intent of parties to the 
conveyance we begin by looking to the instrument itself. Samuel Mares Post No. 
8, American Legion, Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Converse County, 697 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1985). "The deed must be considered 
as a whole and the intent of the parties gathered from the plain and unambiguous 
language contained therein." Gasaway v. Reiter, 736 P.2d 749, 751 (Wyo. 1987) 
(citing Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973)). If intent of the parties can 
be gathered in this manner, it should be done so as a matter of law. Knadler v. 
Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1053 (Wyo. 1983) (citing Dawson).

[¶10]   Where a deed describes land bounded 
by a non-navigable stream and names the stream as a monument, a presumption 
exists that the grant extends to the center and the thread of the stream is the 
true boundary. Hanlon v. Hobson, 24 Colo. 284, 51 P. 433, 435 (1897); State ex 
rel. Davis v. Superior Court for Cowlitz County, 84 Wn. 252, 146 P. 609, 611 
(1915); Knutson v. Reichel, 10 Wn. App. 293, 518 P.2d 233, 235, 78 A.L.R.3d 598, 
602 (1973). The grant will give title so far as the grantor owns, unless the bed 
of the stream is expressly reserved from the grant. Knutson, 518 P.2d  at 235 
(citing Wardell v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1 of King County, 80 Wn. 495, 
141 P. 1045 (1914). This rule is based on a presumption of the grantor's intent. 
Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437, 439, 31 A.L.R. 960 
(1923).

[¶11]   The presumption is rebuttable by 
any words which clearly indicate an intention of the grantor to restrict the 
grant to the edge, shore, or some point other than the thread of the stream. 
Walter G. Robillard & Lane J. Bouman, Clark on Surveying and Boundaries, § 
25.12 (5th ed. 1987); 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries § 23 (1987). Where the description 
is specific in its language, naming the bank of the stream as the boundary of 
the land conveyed, the grantee's rights will not extend beyond such specified 
boundary. Commissioners, Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2, King County v. Seattle 
Factory Sites Co., 76 Wn. 181, 135 P. 1042, 1047 (1913).

[¶12]   Appellants argue that reference to 
the "North Platte River" shows Willey's intent to transfer ownership of the bed 
of the stream and that the deed carries title to the grantee as far as the 
grantor owns unless expressly reserved from the grant. Wardell, 141 P.  at 
1046.

[¶13]   The trial court relied on the 
Knutson case. There, a deed referencing a river as one of its calls with no 
express reservation of the shorelands or bed was found to pass title to the 
center. Knutson, 518 P.2d  at 236. Acknowledging as crucial the difference 
between conveyances "to the river" and "to the bank," the trial court 
distinguished Knutson, and concluded the Willey deed describing "to the bank" 
did not pass title to the bed.

[¶14]   When the entire instrument is 
viewed as a whole, it is clear that the grant by Willey is inconsistent with the 
general rule and presumption of intent. More v. Johnson, 193 Colo. 489, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (1977). Where a deed contains references of both a general and 
particular nature, the particular description is preferred and will control over 
or limit a more general description. 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries § 64 (1964). The 
more particular references to "the left bank of said river" control and the 
grant must be interpreted as intending to convey only to the bank of the North 
Platte River. This departure from the general rule is readily apparent from the 
face of the deed and the specific language naming the bank as the boundary does 
not extend rights to the bed of the stream. Seattle Factory Sites, 135 P.  at 
1047.

[¶15]   Appellants' argument that Wardell 
requires an express reservation to overcome the presumption of a grant to the 
thread cannot be given effect in light of the numerous references in the deed to 
"the left bank of said river." The intent is clear to limit the grant to the 
shoreline or bank of the North Platte River.

Adverse 
Possession

[¶16]   Following the grant of summary 
judgment on the legal description of appellants' property, the trial court 
refused appellants' request for trial on the adverse possession claim. The trial 
court stated:

An essential element of 
adverse possession is that the claimants are not the record title holders but 
have title by virtue of possession on property which is owned by others. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court has said on a number of occasions that parties cannot 
assert inconsistent positions of this type.

[¶17]   The Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure afford general rules for pleading.

(a) Claims for relief. - 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, (2) 
a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded.

*           
*           
*      
     *           
*           
*

(e) Pleading to be 
concise and direct; consistency.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(2) A party may 
set forth two (2) or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one (1) count or defense or in separate counts or 
defenses. When two (2) or more statements are made in the alternative and one of 
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. 
A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has 
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds 
or on both.

W.R.C.P. 8 
(emphasis added).

[¶18]   Even before adoption of the current 
rules, Wyoming recognized that alternative allegations should be allowed where a 
"pleader has no knowledge as to which two sets of facts should be alleged, and 
the opposing party would be equally liable under either." Glover v. Berger, 75 
Wyo. 191, 201, 294 P.2d 793, 796, 60 A.L.R.2d 583, 589 (1956). See also, 61A 
Am.Jur. Pleading § 49 (1981). This court identified as fundamental the 
obligation of every pleader to apprise his adversary of the nature of the claim 
against him. Glover, 75 Wyo. at 201, 294 P.2d  at 796, 60 A.L.R.2d at 589. The 
problem becomes not whether a pleading must have a theory, but "whether a theory 
originally chosen as a step in the process of convincing the court of the 
soundness of the client's case may be abandoned for another theory chosen for 
the same purpose. Viewed as merely a step in the entire process, such a shift, 
at least where not too drastic, is not unfair to the opponent." Charles E. 
Clark, Clark on Code Pleading § 43 at 179 (1928).

[¶19]   The Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
8(e)(2) is identical in both. Frank J. Trelease, Wyoming Practice, 12 Wyo.L.J. 
202 (1958). Under F.R.C.P. 8(e)(2), a pleader may "set forth inconsistent legal 
theories in his pleading and will not be forced to select a single theory on 
which to seek recovery." 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 1283, at 533-35 (2d ed. 1990). The pleader is not 
required to elect between inconsistent remedies at the pleading stage of 
litigation. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Magna Systems, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 1185, 
1190-91 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (though plaintiff cannot recover under theories of both 
quantum meruit and express written or oral contract, Rule 8(e)(2) provides for 
inconsistent claims); Kilday v. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp., 516 F. Supp. 162, 163 (E.D.Tenn. 1981) (plaintiff may assert allegations for rescission of 
contract and recovery of damages for breach at the same time); McAndrews v. 
Goody Company, 460 F. Supp. 104, 106 (D.NE. 1978) (plaintiff may plead under 
8(e)(2) theories of specific acts of negligence and res ipsa 
loquitur).

[¶20]   Alternative and inconsistent 
pleading, permitted under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, articulates the 
philosophy that parties who are given the capacity to present their entire 
controversies should in fact do so. Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 662 P.2d 419, 423 (Wyo. 1983). This court has acknowledged the presentation of 
alternative and inconsistent claims. Under W.R.C.P. 8(e), a plaintiff in a 
recent case was not estopped from alleging a county employee acted outside the 
scope of his duties while also claiming injury from the same employee through 
acts within the scope and course of employment. Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 378 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶21]   Appellants' effort to quiet title 
to the middle thread of the stream met demise through summary judgment. The 
alternative claim to title by adverse possession was neither placed at issue in 
the motion nor decided by the order granting summary judgment. The adverse 
possession claim survives and requires that the trial court consider this 
issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶22]   The trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Giraldo and Rudd on the legal description of appellants' 
property is affirmed, nunc pro tunc. Dismissal of Appellants' claim of 
adverse possession is reversed and remanded to the district court for 
trial.