Case Title: Hayes v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2104

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2104 
____________ 
 
JAMES WILLIAM HAYES, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 5, 2012] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
Peremptory challenges during jury selection are once again the subject of 
this Court‟s review.  More specifically, we address the misapplication by both the 
trial court and the First District Court of Appeal in Hayes v. State, 45 So. 3d 99 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010), of the procedure this Court set forth in Melbourne v. State, 
679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), for eliminating discrimination during the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.  In this case, the trial court erred in denying defense 
counsel‟s peremptory challenge to a female juror, notwithstanding the undisputed 
gender-neutral reason counsel proffered (her relationship to law enforcement 
officers).  The trial court mistakenly assessed defense counsel‟s reason as if it were 
 
 
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assessing a challenge for cause and failed to perform the critical third step of the 
Melbourne procedure, which requires an assessment of the genuineness of 
counsel‟s proffered reasons for the strike.  Further, the trial court erroneously 
relieved the State—the opponent of the strike—of its burden to establish that the 
reason for the challenge, despite being gender-neutral, was pretextual. 
Perpetuating these errors, the First District incorrectly deferred to the trial 
court‟s nonexistent genuineness inquiry on appeal and then improperly placed the 
burden of persuasion on the proponent of the challenge, the defendant in this case, 
to establish that his strike was being exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner.  
While deference to a trial judge‟s findings of genuineness is necessary, deference 
to a trial judge‟s ruling that lacks any record support is an invitation to produce 
arbitrary results.  As the State‟s concession of error before the First District 
recognized, the proper remedy for the trial court‟s denial of the defendant‟s 
peremptory challenge in this case was to reverse and remand for a new trial.   
Because the First District‟s decision in Hayes affirming the denial of the 
defendant‟s peremptory challenge is contrary to and results in a misapplication of 
Melbourne‟s well-established precedent, we have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 446 (Fla. 2010) 
(identifying misapplication of decisions as a basis for express and direct conflict 
under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution); Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 
 
 
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3d 1035, 1040 (Fla. 2009) (same).  For the reasons more fully explained below, we 
quash the decision of the First District. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hayes was tried on three counts of armed robbery and three counts of false 
imprisonment with a weapon or firearm.  While questioning prospective jurors 
during jury selection, the prosecutor asked the venire about whether any of the 
jurors had close friends or family who worked in law enforcement.  Juror Robin 
Haupt, a female, responded that she had two out-of-state family members who 
worked in law enforcement, but agreed that those relationships would not cause her 
any “undue bias[ ].”  Two other women, a juror and the alternate juror, also 
answered that they had family members who worked in law enforcement, but like 
juror Haupt, each acknowledged that it would not cause them to be biased or afford 
any special credibility to law enforcement officers. 
At the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel exercised two peremptory 
challenges without objection.  The court then recited the names of the six jurors 
and the one alternate juror selected, of which five were women and two were men.  
Thereafter, the State and the defense each exercised a backstrike1 of an additional 
                                         
 
1.  The term “backstriking” refers to “a party‟s right to retract his acceptance 
and object to a juror at any time before that juror is sworn.”  Dobek v. Ans, 475 
So. 2d 1266, 1267-68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); see also Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 
244, 248 (Fla. 1995). 
 
 
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juror, eliminating one man and one woman from the jury.2 
Defense counsel then moved to peremptorily backstrike juror Haupt.  The 
prosecutor objected, and the following exchange ensued: 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, is it out of line if the State 
requests a gender neutral reason? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  A what? 
[PROSECUTOR]:  A gender neutral reason for using a strike 
against this female. 
THE COURT:  Counsel? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I don‟t have a gender neutral reason.  
She has some relatives or whatnot in law enforcement.  She really 
didn‟t answer many questions, at all.  She didn‟t say much of 
anything.  To me, she‟s somewhat of an unknown quantity. 
THE COURT:  Counsel, anything else? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Nothing. 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, she did indicate that she knew 
law enforcement officers, but she indicated affirmatively that that 
would have no bearing on her potential as a juror. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Counsel, while you‟ve identified, we 
talked about—and I‟m not sure that it applies as to a gender neutral 
reason to strike a potential juror in this manner.  She did indicate she 
knew two law enforcement officers, but it created no problem for her. 
Otherwise, she had no other comments relating to this case. . . .  
. . . 
THE COURT:  All right.  Any others? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL3]:  Your Honor, not to be difficult, but 
                                         
 
2.  As a result of these backstrikes, two prospective jurors were removed 
from the panel—a man and woman.  During his colloquy with the trial court the 
following day, defense counsel stated that the prospective juror he struck prior to 
striking juror Haupt was a woman. 
 
3.  From a common-sense review of this exchange, it would appear that at 
this point in the dialogue, the court reporter actually misnamed the party speaking 
and incorrectly listed the speaker as the prosecutor.  It would be illogical for the 
prosecutor to use the pronoun “we” and then defend the basis for defense counsel‟s 
attempted strike. 
 
 
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to go back to the gender neutral reason.  If we strike that juror, the 
next juror in line was a woman, anyway.  So it wouldn‟t change the 
gender makeup of the jury. 
THE COURT:  I‟m aware of that, but each juror has the right to 
serve at their own right. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  What? 
THE COURT:  I‟m aware of that, but each juror has the right to 
serve, at their own right, absent a sufficient basis to exclude them. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Without conducting any inquiry as to the genuineness of 
defense counsel‟s explanation, and without any attempt by the State to demonstrate 
that the reason given was not gender-neutral or was pretextual, the trial court 
denied defense counsel‟s motion to use a peremptory challenge to strike juror 
Haupt. 
 
The next day, before the jury was sworn in, defense counsel again raised the 
issue of the trial court‟s denial of his attempt to peremptorily backstrike juror 
Haupt.  At that time, defense counsel provided the trial court with another 
opportunity to revisit the decision to disallow the peremptory challenge and 
pointed out his recollection that the next ten jurors after juror Haupt were all 
female:  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  . . . I‟m going to renew my objection 
about the Court‟s denial of my attempt to strike the juror during jury 
selection after the State asked for a gender neutral reason.  Do you 
want to go ahead and address that? 
THE COURT:  Your issue is preserved—well, I should say—
let me rephrase that.  Your issue was raised during the jury selection 
process, so. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Right.  I actually wanted to revisit 
that process because I don‟t believe that we followed the right 
 
 
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procedure in that situation. 
THE COURT: All right. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  There is a case called State versus 
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d 759.  It lays out a three-step procedure for 
dealing with that situation.  I don‟t think we quite followed it so I just 
wanted to clarify it.  Step one—step one of the procedure is that we—
that the State make a timely objection, which he did, so we go to the 
second step.  The second step is that I have to present a facially 
gender neutral reason for the strike.  The case law says that a reason is 
gender neutral on its face if the reason does not involve gender, and 
then the Court has to rule on whether or not my reason was gender 
neutral in the face.  I don‟t recall the Court did that or not. 
THE COURT:  I concluded that your reason was not genuine 
under the circumstances, which presumes that it was gender—or 
excuse me, a gender neutral reason—explanation.  Now that does not 
address your client‟s issue about wanting other people, but on the 
basis that was stated as the general ground, that‟s presumed in that—
going to the next step. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay, and step three was as you 
stated.  If the Court finds the reason is gender neutral, then the Court 
has to decide if it was pretext or genuine based on all the 
circumstances.  And I just want to reiterate that that—I think my 
reason was gender neutral because the juror that I had stricken before 
that was a female, the one that was going to come under the jury act 
[sic] after my strike would have been a female, and I think the next 
ten jurors were all females.  So I don‟t see how that could, with all 
due respect, possibly have been non gender neutral, or how could it 
then be [pretextual] on the basis of gender? 
THE COURT:  Do you have anything else? 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, the State would only put 
forward that all of these arguments were made at the bench at jury 
selection and the Court did make a ruling at that time. 
THE COURT:  Not all of them, but I‟ve made my observations 
and rulings.  They stand.  Thank you. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Once again, the prosecutor did not offer anything in response 
to indicate that defense counsel‟s peremptory challenge was pretextual.  The jury, 
as empanelled, was ultimately composed of six jurors—five women and one 
 
 
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man—with one female alternate. 
 
On appeal, Hayes argued that the trial court erred in denying his peremptory 
challenge of juror Haupt, warranting a new trial.4  He specifically asserted that the 
trial court‟s basis for denying the strike was inapplicable to peremptory challenges 
because it related to a challenge for cause and that the record did not support the 
court‟s finding that defense counsel‟s gender-neutral reason was pretextual under 
step three of the three-part procedure this Court set forth in Melbourne.  The State 
conceded error, agreeing with Hayes that the trial court engaged in the wrong 
inquiry and urging the First District to remand for a new trial.  The State candidly 
acknowledged in its brief that 
[i]n the case at bar, it is clear that the trial court mistakenly considered 
the challenge as if it were a challenge for cause not a peremptory 
challenge.  Because knowing people in law enforcement is a gender 
neutral reason and there is nothing in the record to support a finding 
that the reason was not genuine, this case must be remanded for a new 
trial. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Without referencing either Hayes‟s contention or the State‟s concession that 
the trial court mistakenly considered the challenge as if it were one for cause, the 
First District affirmed the trial court‟s decision to disallow defense counsel‟s strike 
                                         
 
4.  Hayes also argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to 
introduce inadmissible hearsay.  The district court affirmed the trial court‟s ruling 
on this issue without elaboration, and Hayes does not raise that issue in this Court. 
 
 
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of juror Haupt.  Hayes, 45 So. 3d at 104.  In doing so, the district court initially 
noted that the trial court complied with the first two steps of the Melbourne 
procedure because the prosecutor requested a gender-neutral reason for the 
peremptory strike of juror Haupt (step one), and defense counsel offered a facially 
gender-neutral explanation after the trial court requested that he do so (step two).  
Id. at 103 (citing Rojas v. State, 790 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), for 
the proposition that a prospective juror‟s relationship to a law enforcement officer 
is a gender-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike).   
In turning to step three—the trial court‟s assessment of the genuineness of 
the reason given for the strike—the First District rejected the State‟s concession of 
error and affirmed the trial court‟s decision to disallow defense counsel‟s challenge 
since, in the district court‟s view, it was not clearly erroneous under the Melbourne 
standard of review.  Id. at 103-04.  The district court recognized that under 
Melbourne, a determination of genuineness turns primarily on credibility and takes 
into account “all the circumstances surrounding the strike.”  Id. at 103 (quoting 
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764).  The First District faulted Hayes for failing to 
demonstrate a lack of discriminatory intent, ostensibly deferring to the trial court‟s 
credibility determinations, and reasoned as follows: 
We cannot definitively say the trial court‟s ruling is clearly 
erroneous and wholly unsupported by the record.  The transcript of 
voir dire reveals nothing about the jurors the defense successfully 
removed by peremptory challenge prior to the attempted strike of 
 
 
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juror Haupt.  Thus Mr. Hayes cannot demonstrate, for example, the 
prior strikes included few or no women.  But the transcript does show 
defense counsel‟s initial response to the request for a gender-neutral 
justification for removing juror Haupt was “I don‟t have a gender-
neutral reason.”  And although counsel recovered with “She has some 
relatives or whatnot in law enforcement,” two other individuals with 
family in law enforcement remained on the jury.  These 
circumstances, together with the court‟s assessment of defense 
counsel‟s credibility (which we are not in a position to second guess) 
tend to support the denial of the peremptory challenge. 
 
Id. at 104.  The district court affirmed Hayes‟s convictions.  Id. 
 
Judge Kahn dissented, finding the State‟s concession of error in this case to 
be “both highly professional and highly perceptive.”  Id. (Kahn, J., dissenting).  In 
Judge Kahn‟s view, the majority‟s deference to the trial court‟s disallowance of the 
challenge was an invitation to produce arbitrary results, especially in a case where 
a prospective juror‟s relationship with law enforcement officers was the proffered 
reason for exercising a peremptory strike.  See id.  From his review of the record, 
Judge Kahn believed that defense counsel‟s initial statement that he did not have a 
gender-neutral reason “more or less came out because defense counsel was 
completely surprised by the prosecution‟s objection, and, most likely, had never 
even considered in his own mind that he was focusing on the gender of the 
prospective witness, rather than upon her relationship with the law enforcement 
officers.”  Id. 
 
Hayes petitioned this Court to review the First District‟s decision, arguing 
that the district court misapplied the principles this Court enunciated in Melbourne 
 
 
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and its progeny, and we accepted jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
Hayes‟s position centers on the trial court‟s denial of his peremptory strike 
on the basis of pretext, focusing on the third step of the simplified three-step 
procedure this Court articulated in Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 
1996)—the trial court‟s genuineness inquiry.  Hayes argues that the First District 
applied the clearly erroneous standard of review arbitrarily and ignored what the 
record actually reflected in order to affirm the trial court.  The State, on the other 
hand, contends that the district court adequately analyzed the evidence that was 
available in the record and gave proper weight to the trial court‟s findings due to 
the trial court‟s superior vantage point.  To resolve this issue, we review our 
precedent regarding peremptory challenges, discuss the applicable standard of 
review, and then apply our precedent to the facts of this case.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we conclude that both the trial court and the First District 
misapplied Melbourne‟s well-established precedent.  
Peremptory Challenges and the Right to a Fair and Impartial Jury 
A practice of ancient origin, the peremptory challenge is “part of our 
common law heritage” and has “very old credentials.”  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (O‟Connor, J., dissenting)); see 
 
 
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also Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 97 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 202, 212 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986)).  While there is no freestanding constitutional right to exercise 
peremptory challenges at either the state or federal level, this Court has long 
recognized that “such challenges are „nonetheless one of the most important of the 
rights secured to the accused.‟ ”  Smith v. State, 59 So. 3d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2011) 
(quoting Busby, 894 So. 2d at 98).  The central function of peremptory challenges 
is to “enabl[e] each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial 
toward the other side.”  Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (citing 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 91).  Recognizing the interplay between voir dire and 
peremptory challenges in American trials, the United States Supreme Court has 
noted that jury selection “operat[es] as a predicate for the exercise of 
peremptories,” the persistence and extensive use of which “demonstrate the long 
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by 
jury.”  Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. 
Indeed, peremptory challenges, as well as challenges for cause, are the 
primary tools by which parties remove unfavorable jurors from the jury panel.  
Peremptory and for-cause challenges constitute “distinct, but complementary, 
methods to aid those facing criminal charges in achieving the constitutional right 
of trial by an impartial jury.”  Busby, 894 So. 2d at 99; see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 
 
 
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219-20 (“[T]he very availability of peremptories allows counsel to ascertain the 
possibility of bias through probing questions on the voir dire and facilitates the 
exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror‟s 
hostility through examination and challenge for cause.”).  While the two types of 
challenges work in tandem to permit the removal of a potential juror in whom the 
striking party perceives a certain bias or hostility, peremptory challenges differ 
considerably from challenges for cause. 
Challenges for cause, while unlimited in number, allow the removal of panel 
members only on certain enumerated grounds, including a potential juror‟s lack of 
impartiality.  Busby, 894 So. 2d at 99.  The necessity of excusing a juror for cause 
arises where “any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror possesses an 
impartial state of mind.”  Id. at 95.  Peremptory challenges, in contrast, are limited 
in number and have traditionally been exercised according to a party‟s unfettered 
discretion.  Id. at 99 (recognizing that peremptory challenges “can be used to 
excuse a juror for any reason”).  Given the considerable freedom parties possess 
when utilizing peremptory challenges, it is clear that a party‟s reasons for 
exercising a peremptory challenge “need not rise to the level justifying a challenge 
for cause,” State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988), receded from on other 
grounds by Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 765, and “can be used when defense counsel 
cannot surmount the standard for a cause challenge,” Busby, 894 So. 2d at 100. 
 
 
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Affording a criminal defendant the full use of his or her allotted peremptory 
challenges is an essential part of securing a fair and impartial jury under Florida‟s 
constitution, and his or her use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule 
that such challenges may not be used to exclude prospective jurors because of their 
race, ethnicity, or gender.  Smith, 59 So. 3d at 1111; see also Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that the U.S. Constitution prohibits a 
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the 
exercise of peremptory challenges); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 
(Fla. 1997) (“Under Florida law, a party‟s use of peremptory challenges is limited 
only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a 
„distinctive group.‟ ”).  As this Court explained in State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 
(Fla. 1984), receded from on other grounds by State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 
1321 (Fla. 1993): 
The primary purpose of peremptory challenges is to aid and assist in 
the selection of an impartial jury.  It was not intended that such 
challenges be used solely as a scalpel to excise a distinct racial group 
from a representative cross-section of society.  It was not intended that 
such challenges be used to encroach upon the constitutional guarantee 
of an impartial jury. 
 
Id. at 486 (emphasis added).   
Thus, to strike the appropriate balance between a party‟s right to exercise 
peremptory challenges and the attempt to eliminate invidious discrimination in 
juror selection, this Court in Melbourne enunciated a three-step procedure to be 
 
 
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followed when a party objects to the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the 
ground that it was made on a discriminatory basis.5  First, the objecting party must 
make a timely objection, show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct 
protected group, and request that the trial court ask the striking party to provide a 
reason for the strike.  Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764.  Second, if these initial 
requirements are met, the court must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the 
reason for the strike, and the burden shifts to the proponent to come forward with a 
race-, ethnicity-, or gender-neutral explanation.  Id.  Third, if the explanation is 
facially race-, ethnicity-, or gender-neutral, the court must determine whether the 
explanation is a pretext “given all the circumstances surrounding the strike,” with 
the focus of this inquiry being the genuineness of the explanation.  Id.   
When enforcing the above guidelines, courts begin with the premise that 
peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.  Id.  Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the 
opponent of the strike to prove purposeful discrimination.  Id. 
The law governing this process is well-defined.  As we have previously 
explained: “Melbourne establishes a simple, precise, and easy-to-administer 
procedure for challenging a litigant‟s suspected use of a peremptory challenge to 
                                         
 
5.  Melbourne involved race-based discrimination during jury selection.  
These same guidelines apply to claims of gender-based discrimination.  See Welch 
v. State, 992 So. 2d 206, 210-13 (Fla. 2008). 
 
 
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discriminate based on race or other impermissible factors . . . .  The „simplified 
inquiry‟ adopted by this Court recognizes that little is required to request, and 
evaluate, a neutral explanation . . . .”  Welch, 992 So. 2d at 213 (quoting State v. 
Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1130 (Fla. 2008) (Pariente, J., concurring)).  Compliance 
with each step is not discretionary, and the proper remedy when the trial court fails 
to abide by its duty under the Melbourne procedure is to reverse and remand for a 
new trial.  See Welch, 992 So. 2d at 211-13 (reversing for new trial where, 
following the opponent‟s step-one objection, the trial court focused on the grounds 
for the opponent‟s objection instead of following the Melbourne procedure, which 
requires the trial court to request the proponent‟s reason for the strike); see also 
Johans, 613 So. 2d at 1322 (“[W]e hold that the proper remedy in all cases where 
the trial court errs in failing to hold a [peremptory challenge] inquiry [on the basis 
of alleged discrimination] is to reverse and remand for a new trial.”). 
In this case, the parties do not contest that there was full compliance with 
steps one and two of the Melbourne procedure.  Rather, the parties take issue with 
the third step, which we examine in turn. 
The Third-Step Genuineness Inquiry 
As stated above, in applying the third step, the trial court must satisfy itself 
that the explanation is not a pretext.  Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764.6  It has been 
                                         
6.  Case law illustrates that where the defendant argues on appeal that a trial 
 
 
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observed that “[t]he genuineness of the explanation is the yardstick with which the 
trial court will determine whether or not the proffered reason is pretextual.”  Davis 
v. State, 691 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).  Melbourne teaches that to 
assess genuineness, the trial court must consider all relevant circumstances 
surrounding the strike in determining whether the proffered reason for the strike is 
genuine.  Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8.  This Court explained in Murray v. 
State, 3 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. 2009), that 
[i]n determining whether or not a proffered race-neutral reason for a 
peremptory strike is a pretext, the court should focus on the 
genuineness of the race-neutral explanation as opposed to its 
reasonableness.  
In making a genuineness determination, the court may consider 
all relevant circumstances surrounding the strike.  “Relevant 
circumstances may include—but are not limited to—the following: 
                                                                                                                                   
court erred with respect to a party‟s peremptory strike on the question of 
genuineness, the appellate court is generally confronted with two Melbourne 
scenarios.  The first arises when the defendant objects to the State‟s exercise of a 
peremptory strike, but the trial court allows the strike.  See, e.g., Alonzo v. State, 
46 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), review denied, 70 So. 3d 586 (Fla. 2011); 
Tetreault v. State, 24 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Watson v. State, 841 So. 
2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Shuler v. State, 816 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).  
In this situation, the defendant, as the opponent of the strike, carries the burden of 
persuasion to demonstrate purposeful discrimination and must overcome the 
presumption that the State‟s strike was exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner.  
Under the second, the State objects to the defendant‟s exercise of a peremptory 
strike, but the trial court disallows the strike and permits the juror to sit as a 
member of the jury.  See, e.g., Lidiano v. State, 967 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007); Sharp v. State, 789 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  In this situation, the 
State, as the opponent of the strike, carries the burden of persuasion to prove 
purposeful discrimination and must demonstrate that it has overcome the 
presumption that the defendant‟s strike was exercised in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.  The case under review involves the latter of these two issues. 
 
 
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the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the 
same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an 
unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” 
[Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 
18 (Fla. 1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 
2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may 
consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a 
peremptory challenge is genuine . . . .” (citing Melbourne, 679 So. 2d 
at 764 n.8)). 
 
Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1120 (citations omitted). 
The proper test under Melbourne requires the trial court‟s decision on the 
ultimate issue of pretext to turn on a judicial assessment of the credibility of the 
proffered reasons and the attorney or party proffering them, both of which “must 
be weighed in light of the circumstances of the case and the total course of the voir 
dire in question, as reflected in the record.”  Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22; see also 
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764; Young v. State, 744 So. 2d 1077, 1082 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1999) (“[I]dentifying the true nature of an attorney‟s motive behind a 
peremptory strike turns primarily on an assessment of the attorney‟s credibility.”).  
We have consistently held that the trial court‟s assessment will be affirmed on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous.  Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764-65; see also 
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 41 (Fla. 2000) (noting that because the validity 
of a peremptory strike rests on the trial court‟s assessment of credibility, an 
appellate court should affirm unless the determination is clearly erroneous).   
Despite the need of appellate courts to defer to a trial court‟s credibility 
 
 
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assessment, this Court has recognized that the clearly erroneous standard is not a 
mechanism through which appellate courts can simply rubber-stamp the trial 
court‟s ruling.  For instance, in Nowell v. State, 998 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2008), when 
reversing a trial court‟s finding of genuineness because it was unsupported by the 
record, we explained that although “the trial court is in the best position to assess 
the genuineness of the reason advanced, and the decision will be affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous . . . „deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of 
judicial review,‟ . . . because „[d]eference does not by definition preclude relief.‟ ”  
Id. at 602 (quoting Dorsey v. State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 1200 (Fla. 2003); Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). 
We acknowledge that the Melbourne procedure does not require the trial 
court to recite a perfect script or incant specific words in order to properly comply 
with its analysis under step three.  Indeed, there “is no requirement that the trial 
court specifically use the word „genuine.‟ ”  Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 12 
(Fla. 2007); see id. (holding that the trial court applied correct standard in step 
three analysis even though trial court used the term “real” as this term was 
synonymous with word “genuine”).  Nevertheless, “Melbourne does not relieve a 
trial court from weighing the genuineness of a reason just as it would any other 
disputed fact.”  Dorsey, 868 So. 2d at 1202. 
After the trial court determines that the proponent has proffered a race-, 
 
 
- 19 - 
ethnicity-, or gender-neutral reason and then proceeds to evaluate that reason‟s 
genuineness, the trial court can easily inquire of the opponent of the strike, who at 
that point bears the burden of persuasion, to demonstrate why the reason was not 
genuine.  But where the opponent of the strike fails to provide the trial court with 
an explanation as to why the reasons given were pretextual, and the trial court 
thereafter fails to undertake an on-the-record genuineness inquiry, the reviewing 
court is unable to engage in meaningful appellate review.  See id. at 1200 
(emphasizing that a trial court record is necessary for “meaningful appellate 
review”).  This is because “the appellate court is not a forum for conducting an 
after-the-fact . . . inquiry,” and where “no inquiry is conducted, „[d]eference cannot 
be shown to a conclusion that was never made.‟ ”  Hall v. Daee, 602 So. 2d 512, 
515-16 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300, 1302 (Fla. 1991)). 
An appellate court‟s inability to review a trial court‟s genuineness inquiry is 
of particularly great concern when the trial court prohibits a party from striking a 
juror despite the absence of evidence of discriminatory intent.  A trial court‟s 
refusal to permit a peremptory challenge is tantamount to a finding that the strike 
was being exercised for a discriminatory purpose.  Yet, in Melbourne, this Court 
emphasized the presumption that peremptory challenges are exercised in a 
nondiscriminatory manner and that the burden of persuasion is on the opponent of 
the strike to establish support for purposeful discrimination. 
 
 
- 20 - 
Therefore, where the record is completely devoid of any indication that the 
trial court considered circumstances relevant to whether a strike was exercised for 
a discriminatory purpose, the reviewing court, which is confined to the cold record 
before it, cannot assume that a genuineness inquiry was actually conducted in order 
to defer to the trial court.  This same reasoning applies to instances where the 
record affirmatively indicates that the trial court engaged in the wrong legal 
analysis.  Deferring to the trial court‟s genuineness determination on appeal when 
no such determination has been made invites an arbitrary result. 
  Interpreting our jurisprudence on this issue, Florida‟s appellate courts have 
fairly consistently reversed for a new trial where the record provides no indication 
that the trial court engaged in the required genuineness inquiry.7  Conversely, 
                                         
7.  See, e.g., Siegel v. State, 68 So. 3d 281, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) 
(reversing for new trial where the record was devoid of any indication that the trial 
court actually engaged in requisite genuineness analysis of the defendant‟s reason 
for peremptory strikes since there was no proof of consideration of any 
circumstances relevant to this inquiry); Tetreault, 24 So. 3d at 1243-44 (reversing 
where the trial court did not make express rulings explaining why it found the 
State‟s reasons for striking prospective jurors were genuine, indicating that the 
court bypassed the third step in the Melbourne analysis and focused solely on the 
State‟s reasons as being gender-neutral); Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2006) (reversing on same grounds as in Tetreault and distinguishing from 
prior cases where appellate courts affirmed, given that record did not disclose that 
the trial court ever reached step three); Agro Distrib., LLC v. Rowe, 876 So. 2d 
709, 710-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that the trial court reversibly erred by 
disallowing the defense‟s strike when the determination was based solely on the 
credibility of the prospective juror, who had indicated that “she could be perfectly 
fair”); Jones v. State, 787 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[W]here a gender 
or race neutral reason was advanced for the strike, the reason advanced is itself 
 
 
- 21 - 
where the record supports the conclusion that the trial court has actually considered 
relevant circumstances surrounding the strike, it is proper for the reviewing court 
to conclude that a finding has been made, notwithstanding that the trial court did 
not recite a perfect script or incant “magic” words.  See Sutton v. State, 976 So. 2d 
643, 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that the trial court applied the correct law 
during step three because “[w]hen the trial court‟s ruling [was] read in its entirety, 
it [was] apparent that the trial judge understood that he was making the ruling 
required for step three and that he was actually ruling that the facially race-neutral 
explanation was not genuine”); Watson, 841 So. 2d at 661 (rejecting the 
defendant‟s argument that the trial court failed to conduct a genuineness inquiry 
where the record showed that immediately after striking the potential juror, the 
court noted there was another African American on the venire, indicating that the 
court was considering the makeup of the panel). 
Misapplication of Melbourne 
                                                                                                                                   
reasonable, and the record is devoid of any indication that the trial judge 
considered the relevant circumstances surrounding the strike in concluding that it 
was motivated by improper purposes, we must conclude that the trial judge failed 
to adequately engage in the „genuineness inquiry‟ mandated by Melbourne.”), 
review denied, 817 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2002); Anderson v. State, 750 So. 2d 741, 
742-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing for a new trial after agreeing with the 
State‟s concession of error on appeal that the trial court did not properly adhere to 
the three-step analysis of Melbourne because although full compliance with steps 
one and two was shown, nothing in the record indicated that the court engaged in a 
step-three determination where court only made the comment that it had been four 
years since the juror‟s last victimization). 
 
 
- 22 - 
In the present case, we conclude that the trial court‟s misapplication of 
Melbourne is twofold.  First, when evaluating defense counsel‟s strike, the trial 
court employed a for-cause analysis rather than undertaking a peremptory-
challenge analysis.  Then, the trial court failed to adequately engage in the 
genuineness inquiry mandated by the third step of the Melbourne procedure.  On 
appeal, the First District perpetuated the trial court‟s errors by first deferring to the 
court‟s nonexistent genuineness inquiry under the clearly erroneous standard of 
review and then by improperly placing the burden on Hayes, the proponent of the 
strike, of disproving purposeful discrimination given the lack of record support. 
The record shows that step one of the Melbourne procedure was satisfied 
because the State requested that the trial court inquire of defense counsel as to a 
gender-neutral reason for striking juror Haupt.  Subsequently, the trial court 
satisfied step two when it asked defense counsel to explain his reason for the strike.  
The reason proffered by defense counsel was that juror Haupt had relatives in law 
enforcement.  Courts have universally considered a prospective juror‟s familial 
relationship with someone in law enforcement to be a valid and facially neutral 
reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.  See, e.g., Simmons, 940 So. 2d 
at 583 (recognizing that a juror‟s spouse being a law enforcement officer was race-
neutral on its face); Russell v. State, 879 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) 
(stating that a potential juror having a relative in law enforcement “has been 
 
 
- 23 - 
repeatedly found to be a valid, race neutral or gender neutral reason for a 
peremptory strike”); Chambers v. State, 682 So. 2d 615, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) 
(“[T]he law enforcement background of a juror‟s spouse is a properly neutral 
reason for a peremptory challenge . . . .”); Czaja v. State, 674 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1996) (“A close relationship between the juror and a law enforcement 
officer is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike.”). 
Since the reason defense counsel offered was facially gender neutral, the 
trial court was then required to engage in step three—the genuineness analysis.  At 
this juncture, the prosecutor argued that juror Haupt “did indicate that she knew 
law enforcement officers, but [also] indicated affirmatively that [it] would have no 
bearing on her potential as a juror.”  The trial court disallowed the strike and made 
the following statement: 
THE COURT:  Counsel, while you‟ve identified, we talked about—
and I‟m not sure that it applies as to a gender neutral reason to strike a 
potential juror in this manner.  She did indicate she knew two law 
enforcement officers, but it created no problem for her.  Otherwise, 
she had no other comments relating to this case. 
 
The next day, when defense counsel apprised the trial court of its inadequate 
Melbourne analysis, the trial court simply noted that it had concluded the day 
before that defense counsel‟s “reason was not genuine under the circumstances.”  
Neither the State nor the trial court set forth any other observations. 
Based on this exchange, we conclude that both Hayes and the State, which 
 
 
- 24 - 
conceded error below, were correct in the First District.  By focusing merely on 
whether juror Haupt‟s relationship with two law enforcement officers “created no 
problem for her” (i.e., whether she could be fair), the trial court mistakenly 
considered defense counsel‟s challenge as one for cause, thereby imposing a higher 
burden upon defense counsel.  Since the record is completely devoid of any 
indication that the trial court complied with its obligation to properly consider the 
issue of genuineness, the First District, which was confined to the record before it, 
improperly assumed that a genuineness inquiry was in fact conducted by deferring 
to the trial court, which had utilized the wrong standard. 
Given that no genuineness inquiry was ever conducted, the First District 
speculated as to the reasons the trial court disallowed the strike and essentially 
treated the situation as if it were the defendant who was challenging the State‟s 
strike.  The district court reasoned that Hayes failed to demonstrate that the 
peremptory strikes defense counsel raised before the attempted strike of juror 
Haupt included few or no women given that the record was silent on this point.  
See Hayes, 45 So. 3d at 104.  In doing so, the district court did not consider the 
proper effect of the lack of record support for the trial court‟s ruling and 
improperly placed the burden of persuasion on Hayes—the proponent of the 
strike—to disprove a finding of purposeful discrimination.  However, since it was 
the State‟s burden in this scenario, as the opponent of the strike, to overcome the 
 
 
- 25 - 
presumption of nondiscrimination and to prove discriminatory intent, the State was 
the party responsible for establishing record support for that position at the trial 
level.  Cf. Dorsey, 868 So. 2d at 1202-03 (reasoning that because the proponent of 
the strike has the burden to set forth a facially neutral reason under step two of the 
Melbourne procedure, the State as the proponent never satisfied its burden of 
production by proffering a race-neutral reason that was either observed by the trial 
court or otherwise supported by the record). 
By requiring Hayes to disprove the State‟s assertion of discriminatory intent 
in the absence of record support, the First District disregarded the presumption of 
nondiscrimination, relieved the State of its burden of proof, and erroneously 
faulted Hayes for the State‟s inability to meet its burden.  This allocation of 
burdens is directly contrary to Melbourne. 
No Evidence of Purposeful Discrimination 
In holding that there was evidence to support the conclusion that defense 
counsel‟s motive in exercising the strike was discriminatory, the First District set 
forth the following reasoning: 
[T]he transcript does show defense counsel‟s initial response to the 
request for a gender-neutral justification for removing juror Haupt 
was “I don‟t have a gender-neutral reason.”  And although counsel 
recovered with “She has some relatives or whatnot in law 
enforcement,” two other individuals with family in law enforcement 
remained on the jury. 
 
Hayes, 45 So. 3d at 104.  Having reviewed the record, we conclude this reasoning 
 
 
- 26 - 
was in error. 
While not dispositive of the issue, we initially note that the record before us 
affirmatively indicates that Hayes‟s six-person jury was composed of five women, 
and the alternate juror was also a woman.  Defense counsel also pointed out his 
unrebutted recollection that the next ten prospective jurors in the venire after juror 
Haupt were women as well.  See Knight v. State, 919 So. 2d 628, 633 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2006) (affirming the trial court‟s decision to allow State to exercise 
peremptory strike against a female juror given that the record indicated four 
females were picked as jurors and two females were picked as alternates, thereby 
supporting the trial court‟s decision that a peremptory challenge was not 
pretextual). 
The State conceded in the court below that there was “nothing in the record 
to support a finding that [defense counsel‟s] reason was not genuine.”  The First 
District did not accept the State‟s concession, relying in part upon defense 
counsel‟s initial response for removing juror Haupt:  “I don‟t have a gender neutral 
reason.”  After this statement, defense counsel immediately gave a gender-neutral 
reason, which the State did not contest.  Instead, the State suggested that juror 
Haupt had indicated that she could be fair—a justification relevant to a for-cause 
analysis.  Regardless of whether defense counsel‟s statement was inadvertent or 
was actually meant to convey that juror Haupt‟s relationship with law enforcement 
 
 
- 27 - 
officers was a neutral reason, just not specifically gender neutral, it is 
unquestionable that case law supports the conclusion that such a relationship 
presents a valid and neutral basis for exercising a peremptory challenge. 
The First District also reasoned that two other individuals with family 
members in law enforcement remained on the jury.  Certainly, disparate treatment 
of similarly situated jurors can give rise to a finding of pretext.  See Melbourne, 
679 So. 2d at 764 n.8.  However, the State did not raise this to the trial court.  Had 
the State done so, the trial judge would have been able to pursue this inquiry and 
demand a response from the defense relating to the suggestion of pretext.  
Furthermore, the trial court gave no indication that this served as a basis for 
denying the strike. 
Based on the record before us, there is absolutely no evidence to support a 
conclusion that defense counsel was motivated by anything even tenuously related 
to invidious discrimination.   
CONCLUSION 
It is critical that in cases dealing with a party‟s challenge to jurors during the 
jury-selection process, we bear in mind that the reason for the Melbourne inquiry is 
to prevent discrimination against distinct groups of individuals through the use of 
peremptory challenges.  If the Melbourne procedure is not followed, there is a 
danger that the purpose for which the procedure was established—to prevent 
 
 
- 28 - 
discrimination—will erode.  Therefore, those involved at every level—the parties, 
the trial court, and the appellate court—should be vigilant to remember all three 
steps in the Melbourne procedure.  We emphasize that under the final step, the step 
at issue in this case, if the proponent‟s reason for the challenge is race-, ethnicity-, 
or gender-neutral, then the trial court should inquire of the opponent of the strike.  
At this point, the opponent of the strike bears the burden of persuasion to establish 
that the reason is a pretext for discrimination, and the trial court has the 
responsibility to determine the issue of genuineness based on the record before it.  
The trial court should request that the opponent advise why the reason is not 
genuine, and how, given all the circumstances, the explanation is a pretext. 
Where there is no evidence that a peremptory challenge is being exercised in 
a discriminatory manner to exclude a person on the basis of her gender, the very 
purpose for the Melbourne procedure is undermined if the strike is denied.  Here, 
although the defendant sought to strike a juror who had ties to law enforcement, 
that juror remained on the jury panel.  Thus, the defendant‟s right to exercise a 
peremptory challenge was denied absent a concomitant benefit of preventing 
discrimination in jury selection.  Because it misapplied and frustrated the original 
purpose of Melbourne, we quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal 
in Hayes. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
- 29 - 
QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in result only. 
 
 
The State properly conceded error before the First District.  The initial 
statement by defense counsel that “I don‟t have a gender neutral reason,” relied on 
by the majority opinion below, was cured by defense counsel raising the issue 
again the next day and objecting to the process.  See Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 
312, 319 (Fla. 2007) (“[R]enewing an objection . . . gives the trial court one last 
chance to correct a potential error and avoid a possible reversal on appeal.  It also 
allows counsel to reconsider the prior objection  . . . .”).  In that subsequent 
proceeding, defense counsel argued again the gender neutral reasons why the 
peremptory strike should be permitted, thereby clarifying any possible confusion 
created by the initial statement. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D08-4011 
 
 
(Escambia County) 
 
 
- 30 - 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Gail E. Anderson, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent