Case Title: Polacek and Polacek

Citation: 

Docket Number: S058307

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 2, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
PEGGY ANN POLACEK,
Respondent on Review,
and
GARY MICHAEL POLACEK,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 15-05-13716; CA
A138599; SC S058307)
En Banc
On respondent on review's petition for attorney
fees filed June 30, 2010; considered and under advisement on August 10, 2010.
Jeffrey E. Potter, Eugene, filed the petition
for attorney fees for respondent on review and the reply to petitioner on
review's objections.
Andrey B. Filipowicz, Law Offices of Jeffery M.
Leving, Ltd., Chicago, filed the objections to respondent on review's petition
for attorney fees and a request for findings.  With him on the filings was
George W. Kelly.
DURHAM, J.
The petition for attorney fees is denied.
DURHAM, J.
This matter is
before the court on the petition of respondent on review (mother) for an award
of attorney fees for her lawyer's services in opposing father's petition for
review in this court.  Father has filed objections.  For the reasons set out
below, we deny the petition.
Father and mother
were married and had three children, but separated in 2005.  In 2006, the
parties stipulated to a judgment dissolving their marriage and awarding sole
custody of the children to mother.  One year after entry of the judgment,
father filed a motion under ORS 107.135(1)(a) to modify the judgment.(1)  The trial court
conducted a hearing and denied father's motion.
Father appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, in a written opinion, affirmed.  Polacek and Polacek,
232 Or App 499, 222 P3d 732 (2009).  In a separate order, the Court of Appeals
granted mother's petition for attorney fees, in the full amount requested, for
services rendered in the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Father petitioned
for review in this court.  Mother filed a response opposing the petition.  This
court denied review.  Polacek and Polacek, 348 Or 414, 233 P3d 817
(2010).
Mother has now filed
a petition for attorney fees to recover the cost of her lawyer's services,
totaling $4,260, in opposing the petition for review.  Mother asserts that
father acted in bad faith in petitioning this court for review.  In his
objections to the petition for attorney fees, father argues generally that he
filed his petition for review in good faith and supported the petition with
relevant (if not ultimately persuasive) legal authority.  Father's objections
do not challenge the court's authority to award attorney fees or the
reasonableness of the services rendered and the hourly rate charged by mother's
lawyer.
This court
ordinarily resolves disputed claims for attorney fees by addressing the
objections filed under ORAP 13.10(6) ("Objections to a petition shall be
served and filed within 14 days after the date the petition is filed.").  See
Kahn v. Canfield, 330 Or 10, 13-14, 998 P2d 651 (2000) ("[W]hen an
attorney fees petition comports with the requirements of ORAP 13.10(5), * * *
our inquiry into the request generally will be limited to the objections that
are filed by the party opposing the petition.").  ORAP 13.10(9) identifies
an exception to that rule:
"In the absence of timely filed objections
to a petition under this rule, the Supreme Court * * * will allow attorney fees
in the amount sought in the petition, except in cases in which:
"* * * * *
"(b) The Supreme Court * * * is without
authority to award fees."
Because authority to award attorney fees is
a prerequisite to awarding the attorney fees sought in mother's petition, we
turn first to that question even though father's objections do not question the
court's authority to award the requested attorney fees.
Of the potentially
available sources of authority, see Lehman v. Bradbury, 334 Or 579, 54
P3d 591 (2002) (discussing sources of judicial authority to award attorney
fees), only a statute could permit or require an award of attorney fees in the
context of this case.(2) 
Two statutes pertain to this court's authority to award the attorney fees
sought in the petition.  ORS 107.135(8) is a part of the statute that authorized
father's motion to modify the dissolution judgment.  That subsection provides:
"In a proceeding under subsection (1) of
this section, the court may assess against either party a reasonable attorney
fee and costs for the benefit of the other party.  If a party is found to have
acted in bad faith, the court shall order that party to pay a reasonable
attorney fee and costs of the defending party."
ORS 107.135(8)
authorizes the trial court to award attorney fees in this case.  That statute
is silent, however, regarding the authority of an appellate court to award
attorney fees on appeal or review from a trial court proceeding under ORS
107.135(1).
The legislature has
addressed that potential gap in judicial authority by enacting ORS 19.440,
which provides:
"Any statute law of this state that
authorizes or requires the award or allowance of attorney fees to a party in a
civil action or proceeding, but does not expressly authorize or require that
award or allowance on an appeal in the action or proceeding and does not
expressly prohibit that award or allowance on an appeal, shall be construed as
authorizing or requiring that award or allowance on an appeal in the action or
proceeding."
In Williams v. Cabinet Masters, Inc., 335 Or 49, 57 P3d 145 (2002), this court construed
ORS 19.440 in a proceeding involving a claim by the defendants for attorney
fees incurred in successfully opposing plaintiffs' petitions for review.  A
statute, ORS 36.425(4)(b), required the trial court to award attorney fees to
the defendants, but subsection (5)(b) of that statute limited the potential
award to ten percent of the amount claimed in the complaint.  The question on
appeal was whether and how the cap on attorney fees applied to the defendants' claim
for attorney fees.  This court stated in regard to ORS 19.440:
"That statute is an interpretive rule that directs
courts to 'construe' certain statutes that provide for 'the award or allowance
of attorney fees' to authorize 'that award or allowance' to include fees incurred
on appeal.  We agree with defendants that ORS 19.440 requires us to construe
the statutory authorization for the award of attorney fees found in ORS
36.425(4)(b) also to allow the award of attorney fees incurred 'on an appeal in
the action or proceeding.'
"* * * * *
"* * * As noted, ORS 19.440 applies only when another
statute requires 'the award or allowance of attorney fees' but the other
statute fails to specify whether 'that award or allowance' applies to trial or
appellate court fees.  In such circumstances, ORS 19.440 instructs courts to
interpret the statute to authorize 'that award or allowance on an
appeal.'  ORS 19.440 uses the phrase 'that award or allowance' three times. 
The relative pronoun 'that' makes it apparent that each use of the phrase 'that
award or allowance' refers to the initial phrase in ORS 19.440 of 'the
award or allowance of attorney fees' authorized by another attorney fee
statute, rather than to any new or different 'award or allowance' separately
authorized by ORS 19.440.  ORS 19.440 thus is not, standing alone, a source of
law for an award of attorney fees on appeal; attorney fees on appeal can be
awarded under ORS 19.440 only to the extent that another statute authorizes
'the award or allowance' of fees."
Id. at 54-55
(footnote omitted; emphases in original).  Williams noted that ORS
19.440 was part of a legislative amendment adopted in 1981 that had modified
dozens of statutes relating to attorney fee claims by inserting the existing words
"at trial and on appeal" after the words "a reasonable attorney
fee."  Id. at 55 n 2 (discussing Oregon Laws 1981, chapter 897). 
After noting the array of statutes that were subject to that type of amendment,
the court stated:
"Nothing in ORS 19.440 or chapter 897 suggests that the
legislature intended to change in any substantive way the existing statutes
that authorized an award of fees, other than to permit recovery of a party's
appellate attorney fees as authorized and as limited by the underlying attorney
fee statute."
Id.
We interpret ORS
19.440 (as construed in Williams) and ORS 107.135(8) together to
determine this court's authority to award attorney fees to mother after this
court has denied father's petition for review.  The question presented here
concerns the legislature's intent in extending the trial court's authority to
award attorney fees, ORS 107.135(8), to an appellate court "on an
appeal," ORS 19.440.
When construing a
statute, our goal is to determine the legislature's intent in enacting the
statute.  In doing so, we begin with the statutory text and context, which are
the best evidence of the legislature's intent.  State v. Gaines, 346 Or
160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) ("[A]s this court and other authorities long
have observed, there is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the
legislature than 'the words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes.'"  (Quoting prior case law; citation omitted.)). 
Where the words in a statute have acquired a well-defined legal meaning, we
apply that legal definition.  Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District,
341 Or 401, 143, 144 P3d 918 (2006).  A statute's context includes other
provisions of the same or other related statues, the pre-existing statutory
framework within which the statute was enacted, and prior opinions of this
court interpreting the pertinent statutory wording.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. City of Central Point, 341 Or 393, 397, 144 P3d 914 (2006); Dept. of
Transportation v. Stallcup, 341 Or 93, 99, 138 P3d 9 (2006).
The legislature
enacted what is now ORS 19.440 in 1981.  Or Laws 1981, ch 897, § 107 (enacting
ORS 19.220, renumbered as ORS 19.440 (1997)).  The legislature did not
specifically define the term "appeal" in that statute, but that term had,
and still has, a well-defined legal meaning.  When the legislature acted in
1981, a legal dictionary defined "appeal" to mean "[r]esort to a
superior (i.e., appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e.,
trial) court or administrative agency. * * * "  Black's Law Dictionary
88 (5th ed 1979).(3)
Both this court and
the Court of Appeals are a "superior" court within that definition. 
However, we must review other contextual sources to determine whether the
legislature intended the phrase "on an appeal" in ORS 19.440 to refer
to a proceeding that consists only of a party's unsuccessful effort to petition
this court for review.
ORS 2.516 grants
exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals (except in two circumstances not
relevant here) to the Court of Appeals.  That statute provides:
"Except where original jurisdiction is
conferred on the Supreme Court by the Oregon Constitution or by statute and
except as provided in ORS 19.405 and 138.255, the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals."
ORS 2.520 authorizes
a party aggrieved by a Court of Appeals decision to petition this court for
review as provided by the rules of the Supreme Court.  That statute provides:
"Any party aggrieved by a decision of the
Court of Appeals may petition the Supreme Court for review within 35 days after
the date of the decision, in such manner as provided by rules of the Supreme
Court."
The Oregon Rules of
Appellate Procedure (ORAP), to which ORS 2.520 refers, make it clear that this
court has the inherent authority to decide, in its discretion, whether to allow
or deny a petition for review.  ORAP 9.07 sets out a lengthy list of factors
that this court may consider in deciding whether to allow a petition for
review, but provides that this court retains complete discretion to allow or
deny a petition for review:
"The Supreme Court considers the items set out below to
be relevant to the decision whether to grant discretionary review.  * * *  They
are neither exclusive nor binding.  The court retains the inherent authority
to allow or deny any petition for review."
(Emphasis added.)
This court's rules
consistently refer to appellate litigation as "on review," not
"on appeal," after a party has filed a petition for review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.  See, e.g., ORAP 9.17(1) ("After
the Supreme Court allows review, the parties to the case on review may file
briefs on the merits of the case * * *."); ORAP 9.20(2) ("If the
Supreme Court allows a petition for review, the court may limit the questions
on review."); ORAP 9.20(5) ("The record on review shall consist of
the record before the Court of Appeals.").  Those references in the
appellate rules suggest that a distinction exists between appellate litigation
"on review" and "on appeal," but they do not explicitly
rule out the possibility that a matter pending "on review" is in some
sense also "on an appeal."  This court's case law supplies a helpful resolution
of that conundrum.
In U-Cart
Concrete of Eugene, Inc., v. Farmers Ins., 290 Or 151, 619 P2d 882 (1980),
the plaintiff lost at trial and before the Court of Appeals, and filed a
petition for review in this court.  The defendants filed a response to the
petition, urging this court to deny it.  This court denied review.
The defendants then
filed a bill of costs and disbursements, seeking a prevailing party fee of $75
and $32.50 for the expense of printing their response.  To determine its
authority in the circumstances, the court examined three pertinent statutes.
The first, ORS
20.010 (1979), authorized an award of costs to the prevailing party in the
judgment or decree.  The second, ORS 20.070(1) (1979), stated the amount of
costs allowable to the prevailing party "on an appeal" in this court
or the Court of Appeals as $75.  The third, ORS 20.100 (1979), authorized an
award of costs, in the discretion of the court, if the statutes failed to
provide for the allowance of costs in the particular action, suit, or
proceeding.
The court assumed,
without deciding, that ORS 20.100 (1979) applied and stated, "we exercise
the discretionary power not to allow costs in this instance."  Id.
at 154.  Explaining the basis for that conclusion, the court determined that,
on denial of a petition for review, the respondent has not
"prevailed," and the court's action does not constitute a decision
"on an appeal."
"In a case in which this court affirms or
reverses a judgment, there is a prevailing party and a judgment to support the
award of costs.  In denying a petition for review, we neither affirm nor
reverse a judgment.  We do not even implicitly decide that the respondent's
position is correct or that the Court of Appeals properly decided the case.
"When a petition for review is denied, the
respondent has not prevailed 'on an appeal' in this court.  Rather, the court
has chosen not to entertain an 'appeal.'  There is no basis for awarding costs
'on an appeal.'
"With respect to the matter before us,
therefore, we find there is no judgment of this court to support an award of
costs and there is no appeal before the court.  We hold that there is no basis
for an award of costs under the statutes."
Id.  (citation
omitted).
U-Cart is pertinent to our interpretation of ORS 19.440 because the court
concluded that the key phrase "on an appeal" did not include a
determination by this court to deny review.(4) 
This court decided U-Cart on November 18, 1980, just months before the
legislature enacted the predecessor of ORS 19.440.  As noted, we assume that
the legislature was aware of this court's interpretation of the phrase "on
an appeal" when it used those words in the predecessor to ORS 19.440. 
Nothing in the text, context, or legislative history of ORS 19.440 leads us to
think that the legislature, in using that phrase, meant something different
than what this court stated in U-Cart.
On the basis of the
foregoing discussion, we conclude that the legislature's intent regarding the
applicability of ORS 19.440 in this context is clear.  That statute does not
authorize this court to award attorney fees to mother.  Her lawyer's services,
principally the preparation and filing of a brief urging this court to deny the
petition for review, were not rendered "on an appeal" within the
meaning of ORS 19.440.
We recognize that,
as a consequence of our interpretation of ORS 19.440, mother may not look to
father to recover the cost of her lawyer's services in this court.  If the
legislature wishes to alter this court's authority to award attorney fees in
that context, it may revisit that question whenever it desires.(5)
The petition for
attorney fees is denied.
1. ORS
107.135(1)(a) provides, in part:
"(1) The court may at any time after a
judgment of * * * dissolution of marriage * * * is granted, upon the motion of
either party and after service of notice on the other party in the manner
provided by ORCP 7, and after notice to the Division of Child Support when
required under subsection (9) of this section:
"(a) Set aside, alter or modify any portion
of the judgment that provides * * * for the custody, parenting time,
visitation, support and welfare of the minor children and the children
attending school, as defined in ORS 107.108  * * *."
2. To
determine this court's authority to award attorney fees, we examine the
pertinent statutes, not the procedural rules adopted by this court that guide
or control appellate litigation concerning claims for attorney fees.  Some of
this court's appellate court rules of procedure might be read (erroneously, in
our view) as a source of substantive entitlement to attorney fees.  For
example, ORAP 13.10(4) provides:
"When the Supreme Court denies a petition
for review, a petition for attorney fees for preparing the petition for review or
a response to the petition for review shall be filed in the Supreme Court."
That rule, however, "governs the procedure for
petitioning for attorney fees[.]"  ORAP 13.10(1).  Statutory authority to
award the attorney fees requested here must be found elsewhere.
3. The
current edition of that legal dictionary provides a similar definition.  An
"appeal" is:
"[a] proceeding undertaken to have a decision
reconsidered by a higher authority; esp., the submission of a lower court's or
agency's decision to a higher court for review and possible reversal * * *."
Black's Law Dictionary
112 (9th ed 2009).
4. U-Cart
recognized implicitly that a proceeding on review in this court may ripen into
an appeal if the court grants review.  The court in that circumstance will
either affirm or reverse a judgment and one party will prevail:
"In a case in which this court affirms or
reverses a judgment, there is a prevailing party and a judgment to support the
award of costs."
Id. at 154.  This case, however, is not in that
procedural posture.
5. For
example, ORS 20.310(1) specifically addresses this court's authority to award
costs and disbursements in connection with the denial of a petition for
review.  That subsection provides, in part:
"In any appeal to the Court of Appeals or
review by the Supreme Court, the court shall allow costs and disbursements to
the prevailing party, unless a statute provides that in the particular case
costs and disbursements shall not be allowed to the prevailing party or shall
be allowed to some other party, or unless the court directs otherwise. * * * On
the same terms and conditions, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for
review, the respondent on review is entitled to costs and disbursements
reasonably incurred in connection with the petition for review."
(Emphasis added.)  Although this case does not call for a
detailed interpretation of ORS 20.310(1), that statute demonstrates that, when
the legislature desires to grant this court authority to order the
reimbursement of certain litigation expenses to a party after the denial of a
petition for review, it knows how to do so.