Case Title: Va. Society for Human Life v. Caldwell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 972659

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
VIRGINIA SOCIETY FOR HUMAN LIFE, 
 INCORPORATED, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 972659 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
DONALD S. CALDWELL, ATTORNEY FOR 
 THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA FOR 
 THE CITY OF ROANOKE, ETC., ET AL. 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
Pursuant to our Rule 5:42, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of Virginia 
law to this Court which we accepted by order entered January 16, 
1998.  The question involves the construction of various 
provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (the Act), 
Code §§ 24.2-900 to -930, and Code § 24.2-1014, a penalty 
provision applicable to certain activities governed by the Act. 
 
The Act, in pertinent part, requires certain individuals or 
organizations that give money and services of any amount, and 
any other thing of value over $100, “for the purpose of 
influencing the outcome of an election,” Code § 24.2-901, to 
file a statement of organization, Code § 24.2-908, and to report 
their expenditures toward that purpose to the State Board of 
Elections, Code § 24.2-910.  In addition, any writing made “for 
the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election for public 
office” is required to include an identification of the author 
under Code § 24.2-1014.  This statute further provides civil and 
criminal penalties for the failure to identify the author of 
such writings. 
 
The following facts are set forth in the order of 
certification from the Court of Appeals.  The Virginia Society 
for Human Life, Incorporated (VSHL) is a nonprofit organization 
that conducts issue advocacy by periodically preparing and 
distributing “voter guides” that do not expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of any candidate but, rather, state the views 
of candidates on public issues.1  In an initial 1995 complaint 
asserting that these statutes, as enacted prior to 1996, have 
been used in the past to impose unconstitutional prior 
restraints on issue advocacy, VSHL sought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, to bar their future enforcement through declaratory and 
injunctive relief from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia.2  VSHL contended that these 
statutes placed an impermissible burden on its First Amendment 
                     
1For purposes of this opinion, we adopt the assumption of 
the Fourth Circuit that VSHL “conducts only issue advocacy.” 
 
2Andrea Sexton, a Virginia resident and a member of VSHL, 
was also a plaintiff in the suit.  The suit was filed against 
Donald S. Caldwell, Attorney for the Commonwealth of Virginia 
for the City of Roanoke, in his official capacity as a 
representative of the class of Attorneys for the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, and Pamela M. Clark, Dr. George M. Hampton, Sr., and 
M. Bruce Meadows, in their official capacities as officers of 
the State Board of Elections. 
 
2
rights.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78-80 (1976)(per 
curiam); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 
357 (1995). 
 
While the complaint was pending in the district court, the 
Virginia General Assembly enacted amendments to the specific 
statutes in question during its 1996 session.  Following the 
filing of an amended complaint challenging these statutes as 
amended, the district court ruled that the current statutes 
could be narrowly construed so as to avoid any constitutional 
infirmity by limiting their application to individuals or 
organizations advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.  Based upon 
this construction of the statutes, the district court ruled that 
because VSHL engaged only in issue advocacy, it lacked standing 
to challenge the enforcement of the statutes and dismissed the 
suit on that ground. 
 
VSHL appealed the ruling of the district court to the Court 
of Appeals which, seeking an authoritative construction of the 
statutes in question, certified the following question of law to 
this Court: 
Whether Va. Code Ann. §§ 24.2-901, -908, -910 & -1014 
apply to issue advocacy groups, or whether the use of 
the phrase “for the purpose of influencing the outcome 
of an election” and related phrases limits the 
application of those statutes to groups that expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a particular 
candidate. 
 
3
 
In light of certain concerns expressed in the order of 
certification and in order to conform to our policy of 
responding to certified questions in the affirmative or the 
negative, we will exercise our discretion under Rule 5:42(d) to 
restate the question as follows: 
Whether the use of the phrase “for the purpose of 
influencing the outcome of an election” in Code 
§§ 24.2-901, -908, -910, and –1014 may be narrowly 
construed to limit the application of those statutes 
to groups that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 
 
 
Within the statement supporting the determinative nature of 
the certified question, Rule 5:42(b)(6), the Court of Appeals 
has expressed grave doubts as to the method used by the district 
court in arriving at the narrowing construction of these 
statutes.  The district court found that the phrase “for the 
purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” as used in 
these statutes “is a term of art whose well-established meaning 
excludes issue advocacy” based upon the rationale of Buckley. 
 
Citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988), the Court 
of Appeals notes that federal courts may not “‘adopt a narrowing 
construction of a state statute unless such a construction is 
reasonable and readily apparent.’”  Continuing, the Court of 
Appeals expressed doubts that a narrowing construction of these 
statutes is readily apparent and that the structure and history 
of the Act suggest that it applies to issue advocacy groups such 
 
4
as VSHL.  The Court of Appeals correctly notes, however, that 
under the broader rules of statutory construction available in 
this Court we “may impose a narrowing construction upon these 
statutes if [we determine] that such a construction would be 
correct.”  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that such is 
the case here. 
 
The rules of statutory construction pertinent to our 
analysis here are firmly settled.  Principal among these rules 
is that we determine, and adhere to, the intent of the 
legislature reflected in or by the statute being construed.  As 
an initial and primary proposition, that intent is to be 
determined by the words in the statute.  See Marsh v. City of 
Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987).  Where the 
words used in the statute are not sufficiently explicit, we may 
determine the intent of the legislature “from the occasion and 
necessity of the statute being passed [or amended]; from a 
comparison of its several parts and of other acts in pari 
materia; and sometimes from extraneous circumstances which may 
throw light on the subject.”  Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 
688, 691, 77 S.E. 470, 471 (1913). 
 
Additionally, when, as here, the constitutionality of a 
statute is challenged, our determination of legislative intent 
is guided by the recognition that “[a]ll actions of the General 
Assembly are presumed to be constitutional.”  Hess v. Snyder 
 
5
Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 49, 52, 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990).  Thus, 
“a statute will be construed in such a manner as to avoid a 
constitutional question wherever this is possible."  Eaton v. 
Davis, 176 Va. 330, 339, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940); see also 
Jacobs v. Meade, 227 Va. 284, 287, 315 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1984).  
In this context, we will narrowly construe a statute where such 
a construction is reasonable and avoids a constitutional 
infirmity.3  Pedersen v. City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 1065, 
254 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1979). 
 
The parties do not dispute, and it is readily apparent, 
that absent a narrowing construction of the phrase “for the 
purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” as used by 
the General Assembly in the statutes in question, these statutes 
would apply to individuals and groups that engage solely in 
issue advocacy, and, thus, would be unconstitutionally 
                     
3VSHL asserts that without an ambiguity in the language of 
the statutes in question we may not resort to extrinsic aids of 
construction.  See Wall v. Fairfax County School Board, 252 Va. 
156, 159, 475 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1996).  This assertion is without 
merit in the present case.  While an ambiguity of language may 
serve as the basis for rejecting an unconstitutional 
interpretation of a statute in favor of one that survives 
constitutional scrutiny, see, e.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 172 
Va. 639, 648, 2 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1939), a finding of ambiguity 
is not a prerequisite for applying a narrowing construction to 
preserve a statute’s constitutionality.  To the contrary, we may 
construe the plain language of a statute to have limited 
application if such a construction will tailor the statute to a 
constitutional fit.  Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 
(1972). 
 
6
overbroad.  However, a narrowing construction is reasonable 
because it is consistent with the manner in which the United 
States Supreme Court construed very similar federal election 
statutes in Buckley.  Moreover, a narrowing construction avoids 
a constitutional infirmity and is consistent with the 
legislative intent that we are able to determine from the words 
used by the General Assembly under the circumstances existing at 
the time these statutes were enacted or amended. 
 
Each of the statutes in question has either been enacted or 
amended subsequent to the decision in Buckley.  Without 
question, the General Assembly is presumed to have knowledge of 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on constitutional 
issues that bind actions of the states when enacting statutes 
that potentially invoke such issues.  Accordingly, here the 
General Assembly is presumed to have had knowledge that the 
Buckley decision narrowly construed the phrase “for the purpose 
of influencing” as used in federal election laws to apply only 
to expenditures used to advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate and, thus, to exclude groups that 
engage solely in issue advocacy.  Similarly, that presumption of 
knowledge extends to the more recent McIntyre decision that a 
state statute cannot constitutionally prohibit anonymous issue 
advocacy by groups that engage solely in issue advocacy. 
 
7
 
Additionally, the General Assembly, when amending a 
statute, is presumed to have knowledge of the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of that statute in its existing form.  See Lee 
Gardens Arlington Limited Partnership v. Arlington County Board, 
250 Va. 534, 540, 463 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1995).  In 1995, the 
Attorney General, in response to an inquiry concerning the 
constitutionality of Code § 24.2-1014 in light of the McIntyre 
decision, issued a formal opinion, consistent with prior 
opinions on related issues, expressly construing the phrase “for 
the purpose of influencing” as having the same definition as 
that adopted in Buckley.  See 1995 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 170. 
 
In light of the General Assembly’s knowledge of the 
opinions in Buckley and McIntyre and the Attorney General’s 
opinion adopting a narrowing construction of the broad sweep of 
the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” at the time the 
General Assembly enacted or amended the statutes in question, we 
conclude that the General Assembly intended to limit that phrase 
and related phrases so as to have no application to individuals 
or groups that engage solely in issue advocacy and that do not 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate. 
 
We now consider the effect of this narrowing construction 
on each of the statutes in question.  In doing so we will 
 
8
address only those provisions of the Act pertinent to the 
present case. 
 
Code § 24.2-901(A) provides definitions for various terms 
used throughout the Act that control the meaning of specific 
sections.  “Contribution” is defined as “money . . . given . . . 
for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” and 
“Expenditure” is defined as “money . . . paid . . . for the 
purpose of influencing the outcome of an election.”  
“Independent expenditure” is defined as “an expenditure made by 
any person or political committee which is not made to . . . a 
candidate” or generally on behalf of a candidate.  “Political 
committee” is defined as a “person or group of persons which 
receives contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of 
influencing the outcome of any election.” 
 
We first apply these definitions to Code § 24.2-908, which 
requires a “political committee which anticipates receiving 
contributions or making expenditures in excess of $200 in a 
calendar year” to file a statement of organization with the 
State Board of Elections.  As narrowly construed, a group that 
engages solely in issue advocacy and does not receive 
“contributions” or make “expenditures” to expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate is not a 
“political committee” as defined in Code § 24.2-901(A), and, 
consequently, is not included in the mandate of Code § 24.2-908.  
 
9
The same rationale applies to the provisions of Code § 24.2-
910(B) that require any group that “is not a political committee 
and who makes independent expenditures” to report these 
expenditures to the State Board of Elections.  An “independent 
expenditure” contemplated by this section and as defined in Code 
§ 24.2-901(A) excludes expenditures made solely for issue 
advocacy.4  Similarly, Code § 24.2-1014, when narrowly construed 
in this manner, requires identification of authorship only on 
writings “made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an 
election for public office” and excludes writings that are 
limited to issue advocacy. 
 
Finally, we consider the terms of Code § 24.2-901(B) that 
have evoked express concerns by the Court of Appeals in its 
order of certification and are asserted by VSHL to prohibit the 
narrowing construction we adopt in this case.  For the purpose 
of applying the filing requirements of Code § 24.2-908 and the 
reporting requirements of Code § 24.2-910, Code § 24.2-901(B) 
expressly excludes from the definition of a “political 
committee” “an organization holding tax-exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code which, in 
providing information to voters, does not advocate or endorse 
                     
4Because we construe Code § 24.2-910(B) to exclude 
expenditures made solely for issue advocacy, we find no 
inconsistency in the language of subsections (B)(1) and (B)(2). 
 
10
the election or defeat of a particular candidate, group of 
candidates, or the candidates of a particular political party.” 
 
Citing the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
that is, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another, the Court of Appeals questions whether this express 
statement would not result in the definition of a “political 
committee” necessarily including organizations, such as VSHL, 
which do not have § 501(c)(3) status, but which nonetheless 
provide information to voters that “does not advocate or endorse 
the election or defeat of a particular candidate, group of 
candidates, or the candidates of a particular political party.”5  
Assuming that this is a correct application of this maxim of 
construction, it does not preclude the application of a 
narrowing construction to the definition of a “political 
committee” as contemplated by the General Assembly.  Thus, we 
conclude that even if organizations lacking § 501(c)(3) status, 
such as VSHL, are subsumed within that definition, under the 
narrowing construction such groups would be subject to its 
application elsewhere in the Act only if their activities were 
to exceed the bounds of issue advocacy. 
                     
5VSHL does enjoy tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4) of the 
United States Internal Revenue Code. 
 
 
11
 
Accordingly, we hold that the phrase “for the purpose of 
influencing the outcome of an election,” as used in Code 
§§ 24.2-901, -910, and –1014, as well as its implication for 
terms used in Code § 24.2-908, may be narrowly construed to 
limit the application of those statutes to groups that expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate. 
Certified question answered in the affirmative. 
 
12