Case Title: Ex Parte Payne

Citation: 683 So. 2d 458

Docket Number: 1941815

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
683 So. 2d 458 (1996)
Ex parte Max Landon PAYNE.
(Re Max Landon Payne v. State).
1941815.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 2, 1996.
Rehearing Denied October 18, 1996.
*459 Larry Collins, Cullman, for Petitioner.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Cedric B. Colvin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Respondent.
KENNEDY, Justice.
Max Landon Payne was convicted on three counts of capital murder (all relating to one killing): count one charged Payne with intentional murder committed during an abduction with the intent to accomplish or aid the commission of robbery or flight therefrom, pursuant to § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975; count two charged Payne with intentional murder during an abduction with the intent to inflict serious physical injury, pursuant to *460 § 13A-5-40(a)(1); and count three charged Payne with intentional murder during a robbery in the first degree, pursuant to § 13A-5-40(a)(2). After the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury recommended the death penalty. The trial court accepted the recommendation and sentenced Payne to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Payne v. State, 683 So. 2d 440 (Ala.Crim.App.1995).
Payne raises four issues on appeal: (1) Did the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly hold that certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments did not infringe upon Payne's right to remain silent? (2) Did the trial court err in failing to give certain jury charges requested by Payne? (3) Was Payne denied his right to a speedy trial? and (4) Did the trial court commit reversible error by admitting evidence obtained during what Payne says was an illegal search of his automobile?
The Court of Criminal Appeals set out the facts in its opinion. However, we feel it necessary to recite the facts as stated by that court in order to better present the issues.
683 So. 2d  at 443-47.
Payne argues that comments made by the State in its closing arguments prejudiced him; he contends they were directed at his constitutional right not to testify. He says the comments by the State led the jury to believe that people are more likely to be innocent if they themselves testify rather than rely on the testimony of other persons. The State argues that the comments, taken in the context of the entire closing arguments, do not constitute reversible error.
The United States Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965), that a prosecutor's direct comment on the defendant's failure to testify violates the defendant's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Also, an indirect statement, one of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, violates the defendant's constitutional rights. Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S. Ct. 534, 102 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1988). Also, such a statement violates the defendant's rights under the Alabama Constitution. Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 320 So. 2d 727 (1975).
Because Payne did not object at trial to the comments he now complains of, we must review the statements under the plain error rule and take appropriate action if plain error is evident, even though the error was not complained of at trial. Rule 45A, A.R.App. P.; Powell v. State, 631 So. 2d 289 (Ala.Crim. App.1993). The plain error rule requires not only that the claimed error seriously affected substantial rights of the defendant, but also that the error had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jurors' deliberations. United *465 States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985).
At trial, Payne's defense was that a man named James Beavers committed the crime. In discussing this defense, the prosecutor asked the jury to compare the evidence against Beavers with the evidence that Payne committed the murder:
R.T. 747 (emphasis added).
We note that defense counsel's failure to object to these comments does not prevent our review. However, the failure to object should be weighed as part of our evaluation of the comments, because the failure to object may suggest that the defense did not consider the comments to be particularly harmful. Ex parte Kennedy, 472 So. 2d 1106 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975, 106 S. Ct. 340, 88 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1985).
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1094-95 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2724, 129 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1994), is persuasive regarding the interpretation of the prosecutor's comments. In Chandler, the court reviewed the prosecutor's statement that the defendant, Chandler, was more culpable than one of his cohorts, Charles Ray Jarrell, who testified for the prosecution. In that argument, the prosecutor made the following comments:
Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
In reviewing these remarks, the court stated:
Id. at 1095.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the prosecutor's comment did not constitute an impermissible comment on Payne's right to remain silent. The comment, read in context, was not a direct or indirect comment on Payne's failure to testify. A jury would not naturally and necessarily infer that this was a comment on Payne's failure to testify. *466 Rather, it was a summation of the defense's case versus the evidence presented by the State, Payne's defense being that someone else killed Brown.
This case is similar to Dill v. State, 600 So. 2d 343 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 600 So. 2d 372 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 113 S. Ct. 1293, 122 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1993), wherein the prosecutor stated that the defendant's brother was the only one from whom the jurors had heard; the statement was held not to be a comment on the defendant's silence. The comment, read in context, was that the defendant's brother, who testified for the prosecution, was the only one who told the truth. The prosecutor then went through a lengthy summation of the testimony that supported the brother's testimony. This was made in response to defense counsel's closing argument, which had attacked the brother's credibility; the comment was held not to amount to plain error.
Payne argues that the following comments by the prosecutor were also an impermissible reference to his right not to testify:
R.T. 755-57. (Emphasis added.)
As with the earlier comments, Payine's counsel apparently did not find these statements to be particularly harmful, because he did not object. Again, we must review them under the plain error rule and weigh the lack of an objection as part of our evaluation of the comments.
Before making these comments, the prosecutor told the jury that witnesses had been presented by both sides and that it was the jury's duty to determine which, if any, statements made by a witness it believed. He also told them that in closing arguments both sides may make inferences from the evidence and that the jury could agree or disagree with those inferences. He also stated that it was the prosecutor's job to re-create through the testimony of witnesses what the circumstances were on the day of the murder. He also for some of his argument uses the term "we," e.g., "we assume that ..." and "there's no way we could rebut that." As for the use of the word "we," the prosecutor was referring to the fact that more than one prosecutor tried the case.
Viewing the comments Payne claims are improper in light of earlier comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments, we conclude that no error occurred. The prosecutor was merely summarizing the case and commenting on inferences from the evidence presented. That is, the prosecutor was merely commenting that even though the prosecution had not been able to reconstruct every event of the evening, one could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Payne was guilty.
*467 It is well settled that the State can comment on the fact that its evidence is uncontradicted or has not been denied. Ex parte Wilson, 571 So. 2d 1251 (Ala.1990); Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d 852 (Ala.1984). However, the prosecutor cannot make comments that invade the right of the defendant not to testify. Id. We hold that the prosecutor's comments did not invade that right.
Also, we note that in his closing arguments Payne's counsel used these same inferences drawn from the prosecutor's inability to reconstruct every event of the evening. He commented on the fact that the State did not know what had happened on the bridge and did not prove what happened, or who did what, to the victim. He also commented on what Beavers could have been doing at the time at which the State says the jury could infer that Payne was committing the murder. Payne's counsel stated that the State said "maybe this happened or maybe that happened," but that a guilty verdict was "too important to be based on speculation."
Payne requested the following jury instruction:
The court denied this charge and instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
R.T. 815-17 (emphasis added).
Payne argues that "inference," as that term is used in the court's jury charge, does not mean substantially the same as "hypothesis," as used in Payne's requested jury charge. The State contends that there was no need for the trial court to give the jury charge requested by Payne because, it argues, the charge given by the trial court substantially covered the same subject matter.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Criminal Appeals that "the state is not asked to eliminate every single hypothesis inconsistent with the defendant's guilt," rather "only such hypotheses as are reasonable, springing from a consideration and comparison of the entire evidence." 683 So. 2d  at 452, quoting Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214 (1896), and Cox v. State, 373 So. 2d 342, 345 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).
*468 Black's Law Dictionary 743 (6th ed.1990), defines "hypothesis" as "A supposition, assumption, or theory; a theory set up by the prosecution, on a criminal trial, or by the defense, as an explanation of the facts in evidence, and a ground for inferring guilt or innocence, as the case may be, or as indicating a probable or possible motive for the crime." (Emphasis added.)
In support of his argument, Payne cites Ex parte Smiley, 655 So. 2d 1091 (Ala.1995), for the proposition that the judge should have used the word "hypothesis" rather than "inference." However, Smiley differs from this case in that it did not address a jury charge; rather it addressed the sufficiency of the evidence in a murder case. We stated in Smiley that a person's presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to justify a conviction for the crime, but that the person's presence at the scene, taken along with other facts and circumstances tending to connect that person with the crime, may be enough to support a conviction. 655 So. 2d  at 1094. We also set out in Smiley the applicable test:
655 So. 2d  at 1094. (Emphasis added.) The test in Smiley states that an inference or a hypothesis of innocence must be a reasonable one.
The refusal of a requested written instruction is not a cause for reversal, even if the requested charge is a correct statement of the law, so long as it appears that the same rule of law was substantially and fairly given to the jury in the court's oral charge or in other charges given at the request of the parties. Rule 21.1, Ala.R.Cr.P.; Marek v. State, 556 So. 2d 383 (Ala.1989) (if requested charge is subsumed in the court's oral charge, the refusal of the charge is not error under Rule 14, Temp. Ala.R.Cr.P.).
We hold that the charge given in this case did substantially and fairly state the same rule of law that was stated in the charge Payne requested. In summary, the trial court's charge refers to the use of circumstantial evidence in the case; it clearly indicates that the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; and, finally, it states that the defendant cannot be convicted if the evidence leads to an inference consistent with innocence.
Payne argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because there was a 25-month delay between his indictment and his trial. Payne contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its application of the following factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), for a court to consider when analyzing a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) when the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice that the defendant has suffered because of the delay.
Payne argues that the court erred in weighing the Barker factors by not including in the "length of the delay" the six months it took to "find a judge to hear the case." He contends that the six months that passed between the retirement of one judge and the appointment of another should have been weighed against the State.
The procedural history of Payne's case is as follows:
March 25, 1992Payne was arrested in Dade County, Florida. (C.R.49.)
April 16, 1992Payne was indicted by a Cullman County grand jury on three counts of capital murder. (C.R.2.)
April 22, 1992Payne made his initial appearance in court. (C.R.3-4.)
April 29, 1992Payne moved to dismiss the indictment. (C.R.17-18.)
April 30, 1992Payne filed 4 motions: (1) a motion to compel the state to elect whether to proceed on the first, the second, or the *469 third count of the indictment; (2) another motion to dismiss the indictment; (3) a petition for psychiatric evaluations to determine his competency at the time of the offense and his competency to stand trial; and (4) a motion to vacate the State's discovery order and for a protective order, requesting that the State be prohibited from taking hair, blood, saliva, and urine samples. (C.R.20-30.)
May 6, 1992Payne moved for a continuance on his motion for psychiatric evaluations, which was scheduled to be heard on May 7, 1992; Payne moved for a change of venue and requested a hearing on this issue. (C.R.34-35.)
May 7, 1992Payne filed an ex parte application for investigative expenses, requesting a hearing on the issue; Payne also moved for permission to file other motions. (C.R.38-48.)
May 8, 1992Payne moved to suppress his statement and requested a hearing on this issue. (C.R.49-54.)
May 13, 1992Payne moved to suppress certain physical evidence and requested a hearing on this issue. (C. 55-58.)
May 14, 1992Payne moved to continue the trial, which was set for May 18, 1992. (C.R.59-59A.)
June 10, 1992Payne moved to continue the the psychiatric evaluation and change of venue hearings. (C.R.60-61.)
July 15, 1992Payne again moved to continue the hearings on the psychiatric evaluation and change of venue. (C.R.62-63.)
September 3, 1992The hearing on Payne's motion for psychiatric evaluation and change of venue was held. The trial court ordered psychiatric evaluations for Payne and denied the change of venue motion. (Supp.vol.3, 1-84.) (C.R.64-65.)
October 26, 1992The trial court found Payne competent to stand trial and set trial for December 14, 1992. (C.R.66-67.)
November 30, 1992Payne requested to individually voir dire the jury and to sequester those who had been questioned individually from those who had not. (C.R.68-80.)
December 1, 1992The State moved to continue the trial, which was set for December 14, 1992, because the blood-type analysis had not been completed. (C.R.81-82.)
December 17, 1992Payne moved for a pretrial determination of the admissibility of certain evidence, specifically requesting a hearing 60 days before trial. (C.R.85-86.)
December 18, 1992The trial court set a hearing for a pretrial determination of the admissibility of evidence, for January 7, 1993. (C.R.210.)
January 7, 1993At the hearing, the trial court ordered the State and Payne to file briefs on the legal issues presented regarding the admissibility of certain evidence. (Supp.vol.4, pp. 1-205.) (C.R.208.)
January 20, 1993The State moved to extend the time for filing the requested briefs. (C.R.87-88.)
January 21, 1993The trial court extended the time to file briefs, to February 10, 1993. (C.R.208.)
February 5, 1993Payne moved to further extend the time for filing briefs; the trial court extended the time to March 10, 1993. (C.R.89-90, 208.)
March 19, 1993The State moved to continue the trial, which had been set for March 22, 1993, because DNA testing had not been completed. (C.R.90-91.)
March 25, 1993The trial court denied Payne's motion to suppress his statement and certain evidence seized from his automobile. (C.R.97-98.)
April 10, 1993Payne petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his statement and evidence seized from his car. (C.R.208.)
April 12, 1993Payne filed an ex parte request for investigative expenses. (C.R.91-97.)
April 13, 1993The trial court granted Payne's request for investigative expenses. (C.R.211.)
April 23, 1993The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Payne's petition for the writ of mandamus. Ex parte Payne, 626 So. 2d 651 *470 (Ala.Crim.App.1993); Payne petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. (C.R.97-98.)
May 14, 1993Payne moved for a continuance pending this Court's ruling on the mandamus petition. (C.R.99-100.)
June 9, 1993the trial court continued the trial, pending this Court's review of Payne's petition and pending resolution of Payne's motion concerning out-of-state witnesses. (C.R.101-02.)
June 14, 1993This Court denied the writ of mandamus. (C.R.103.)
August 30, 1993Payne moved for production of witnesses, an incarcerated person; he also petitioned for certification of the materiality of out-of-state witnesses. (C.R.103-108.)
September 10, 1993The presiding judge in the circuit denied both of the motions filed on August 30, 1993, noting that the trial date had not been set, because of the retirement of Judge Riley. (C.R.108-09, 211.)
November 10, 1993Payne moved for a speedy trial. (C.R.112.)
November 12, 1993Payne again moved for production of witnesses and a certification of materiality of out-of-state witnesses. (C.R. 113-19, 122.)
January 12, 1994Newly appointed Circuit Judge Frank Brunner recused because he had previously been appointed guardian ad litem for the victim's minor daughter. (C.R. 211.)
January 14, 1994Payne again moved for a speedy trial. (C.R.124-25.)
January 24, 1994The presiding circuit judge recused because he had just had surgery and was still recuperating. (C.R.211.)
January 25, 1994The presiding circuit judge notified the Chief Justice of this Court of his recusal and requested that the case be assigned to another circuit judge. (C.R.126.)
January 28, 1994Payne filed a motion for the court to reconsider all previously filed motions. (C.R.127.)
February 3, 1994This Court entered an order appointing Judge Robert Austin to hear the case. Judge Austin set a pretrial conference for February 14, 1994. (C.R.129-130.)
February 14, 1994Payne made a motion in limine. (C.R.131-34.)
March 7, 1994Payne moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging a failure to give him a speedy trial. (C.R.136-38.)[1]
March 11, 1994The motion to dismiss was denied and trial was set for May 23, 1994. (C.R.138-39.)
May 3, 1994Payne moved for production of witnesses and a certification of the materiality of an out-of-state witness, for the third time. (C.R.140-143.)
May 23, 1994The trial began. (R.T. 1.)
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the delay of 25 months between indictment and trial was not presumptively prejudicial, because much of the delay was due to the problem of finding a judge to hear the case. That court wrote, "This delay is not attributable to either the prosecution or Payne." 683 So. 2d  at 452. The court reviewed the remaining Barker factors and found no violation of Payne's right to a speedy trial.
Payne contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals should have weighed against the State the delay due to the problem of finding a judge to hear the case. The United States Supreme Court has written:
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192.
We must consider the Barker factors. There were 25 months between indictment *471 and trial. There were several reasons for the delay of the trial: From Payne's April 16, 1992, indictment to the first setting of trial for May 18, 1992Payne filed at least 9 motions, including a motion for a continuance. From June 10, 1992, to September 3, 1992, Payne filed several motions, including a motion for a psychiatric evaluation and for a hearing on that motion. On October 6, 1992, the trial court found Payne competent to stand trial and set trial for December 14, 1992. On December 1, 1992, the State made its first motion for a continuance. On December 17, 1992, Payne moved for a pretrial hearing on whether to suppress certain evidence. The requested hearing was set for January 7, 1993.
At the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to file briefs. Subsequently, both the State and Payne requested additional time to file their briefs. On March 19, 1993, the State moved for a continuance because DNA testing was not complete. On March 25, 1993, the trial court denied Payne's motion to suppress. In April 1993, Payne asked for investigative funds, which the trial court granted. Also in April, Payne petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus regarding the suppression issue. The writ was denied on April 23, 1993. Payne then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus regarding the suppression issue. On May 14, 1993, Payne moved for a continuance pending this Court's ruling on the mandamus petition. The trial court granted the continuance on June 9, 1993. On June 14, 1993, this Court denied the writ.
The delay caused by the retirement of one judge and the recusal of two others began in September 1993 and ended on February 3, 1993, when this Court appointed a judge to hear the case. On September 10, 1993, the presiding circuit judge denied two of Payne's motions regarding witnesses because the trial judge sitting on the case had retired. Two months later, on November 10, 1993, Payne moved for a speedy trial. Until November 1993-19 months after the indictment Payne had not asserted his right to a speedy trial. On November 12, 1993, Payne filed another motion regarding witnesses.
The next action in the case occurred on January 12, 1994, when a new judge was appointed for the circuit in which Payne had been indicted. That same day, the new judge recused, because of a conflict of interest arising from the fact that he had been guardian ad litem for the victim's minor daughter. On January 14, 1994, Payne again moved for a speedy trial. On January 24, 1994, the presiding judge in the circuit recused because of health problems. On January 25, 1994, he notified the Chief Justice of his recusal, and on February 3, 1994, this Court appointed another judge to hear the case. On that same day, the trial judge set a pretrial hearing for February 14, 1994. On March 7, 1994, Payne filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a denial of a speedy trial[2] that motion was denied on March 11, 1994. The trial began on May 23, 1994.
Payne contends that it should be presumed that he suffered some prejudice by the 25-month delay. He argues that there was no need for him to present any evidence of prejudice, arguing that under Barker a showing of prejudice comes from the fact of "pretrial incarceration" and from witnesses'"loss of memory" occurring because of the length of time, citing Barker 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.
Whether a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be determined by an inflexible rule, but must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In determining that question, a court must weigh the conduct of the prosecution and the conduct of the defense. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 2191-92.
Looking at the Barker factors and the facts presented in this case, we cannot say that Payne was denied his right to a speedy trial. Weighing any presumed prejudice from the 25-month delay and attributing to the State the 6-month delay caused by the lack of a trial judge, we must conclude that Payne was not denied a speedy trial. It is *472 undisputed that Payne did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 19 months after the indictment had been filed. The State did not purposefully attempt to delay the trial, and any delay caused by the lack of a judge should be weighed less heavily against the State than a purposeful delay, according to Barker.
In weighing any prejudice Payne might have suffered, we consider the interests the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect, i.e., preventing oppressive incarceration, minimizing the defendant's anxiety, and, most important, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker. Because Payne presented no specific incidents of prejudice or impairment to his defense, we have looked at any presumed prejudice to Payne. Although between the indictment and the trial Payne spent 25 months in jail and certainly was anxious as to the outcome of his case, we cannot say that this alone is enough to outweigh the other factors. Payne contends that witnesses' loss of memory also prejudiced him. However, Payne does not point to any specific witness who failed to remember the events of the alleged offense. Even presuming some prejudice based on loss of memory as loss of memory, given that loss of memory is rarely reflected in the record, we cannot say that this factor would outweigh the other factors. We note that the State's case would also be affected by witnesses' loss of memory occurring because of the delay in trial; however, this loss of memory can work to the defendant's favor.
We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in determining that Payne was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue, and we adopt it as our own:
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, INGRAM, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
[1]  In his motion to dismiss filed March 7, 1994, Payne claims that he first asserted his right for a speedy trial in "July 1993." However, nothing in the record indicates that to be the case; Payne does not dispute, in his briefs to this Court, that his first motion for a speedy trial was filed on September 20, 1993.
[2]  The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that Payne filed his third speedy trial motion on February 14, 1994. 683 So. 2d  at 451. However, the record indicates that it was filed on March 7, 1994, and Paine does not dispute this.