Case Title: Greene v. Greene

Citation: 

Docket Number: 573, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CASSIDY A. MOORE GREENE,1 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 573, 2013 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Family Court of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
State of Delaware in and for
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
FRANK W. GREENE,  
 
§ 
File No. CN13-01243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Pet. No. 13-01500   
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: September 12, 2014 
Decided: 
November 25, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 25th day of November 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Cassidy A. Moore Greene (hereinafter “Wife”), 
filed this appeal from the Family Court’s August 27, 2013 order that decided 
issues of property division and alimony ancillary to the parties’ divorce.  
Wife also appeals the Family Court’s September 24, 2013 order that granted 
in part and denied in part Wife’s motion for reargument.  Having found no 
merit to the appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Family Court. 
                                          
 
1 By Order dated October 22, 2013, the Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the 
parties.  Del. Supr. Ct. R. 7(d).  
2 
 
(2) 
In an appeal from an order dividing marital property and 
determining alimony, this Court reviews the facts and the law as well as the 
inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.2  We will not disturb 
findings of fact unless they are clearly wrong and justice requires that they 
be overturned.3  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.4  If the Family 
Court has correctly applied the law our standard of review is abuse of 
discretion.5    When the determination of facts turns upon the credibility of 
witnesses who testified under oath before the trial judge, this Court will not 
substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge.6 
(3) 
The parties in this case married in February 2011, separated in 
July 2012, and divorced in March 2013.  It was the second marriage for 
both.  The appellee, Frank W. Greene (hereinafter “Husband”), testified that 
he was married to his former wife for forty-one years until her death in 2009.  
Wife testified that she was previously married to a West African prince and 
was divorced in 1982. 
(4) 
The Family Court held a hearing on August 13, 2013.  In the 
August 27, 2013 order that followed, the court (i) denied Wife’s request for 
                                          
 
2 Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 179 (Del. 2008). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
3 
 
alimony, (ii) valued and divided the parties’ interests in a condominium 
(hereinafter “condo”), and (iii) allocated responsibility for the payment of a 
$152,000.00 home equity loan. 
(5) 
In her motion for reargument of the August 27, 2013 order, 
Wife claimed that the Family Court erred (i) when denying her request for 
alimony, (ii) when placing a value on the condo in the absence of an expert 
opinion, (iii) when awarding her only 5% interest in the condo, and (iv) 
when holding her responsible for half of the home equity loan.  Also, Wife 
claimed that the court did not address her request for personal property.  In 
its order of September 24, 2013, the Family Court denied all of Wife’s 
claims except one.  Agreeing that it erred when valuing the condo, the court 
revalued the condo and amended the August 27, 2013 order accordingly. 
(6) 
In her first claim on appeal, Wife argues that the Family Court 
erred when ruling that she was ineligible for alimony.  To receive alimony, a 
person must prove that “he or she is a dependent party” under title 13, 
section 1512 of the Delaware Code.  Under that section, a person may be 
awarded alimony only if the person “[l]acks sufficient property, including 
any award of marital property made by the Court, to provide for his or her 
reasonable needs”7 and “[i]s unable to support himself or herself through 
                                          
 
7 13 Del. C. § 1512(b)(2). 
4 
 
appropriate employment.”8  Also, absent unusual circumstances not present 
here, a person receiving alimony must make affirmative, good faith efforts to 
seek such employment.9 
(7) 
In this case, the Family Court determined that Wife was not 
dependent and therefore was not eligible for an award of alimony.  The court 
made its dependency determination based, in part, on Wife’s testimony 
about her income circumstances, which the court found “vague, very general 
and unspecific.”  The court summarized Wife’s testimony as follows: 
According to Wife, she currently resides in an 
apartment leased by Husband in Washington, DC 
with a monthly rental of $2,175.00.  Wife reports 
that she is currently not employed but would like 
to open a paint-your-pet business.  In the past, she 
claims to have been married to a Prince and 
worked in Beverly Hills, California, as a medical 
referral person.  Apparently, she referred patients 
to certain medical centers and physicians.  She was 
friends with prominent entertainers and celebrities.  
Her most recent position was as a broker working 
with both lenders and investors for improvements 
on the infrastructure of African countries and 
Jamaica.  She stated she had personal contacts with 
the World Bank and has some projects pending for 
which 
she 
hopes 
to 
receive 
significant 
commissions. 
 
When questioned how she has been supporting 
herself since these parties separated, she reported 
                                          
 
8 13 Del. C. § 1512(b)(3). 
9 13 Del. C. § 1512(e). 
5 
 
that she has received help from her mother and her 
sister.  Wife testified that her sister is married to 
the Prince of Zaire who she reported to be the third 
wealthiest person in the world.  She also stated that 
she and her mother are raising her sister’s children 
in America where they attend school.  Wife argues 
that it is not fair for her family to support her. 
 
(8) 
When denying Wife’s request for alimony, the court found that 
Wife was “more than capable of supporting herself,” and that she had “made 
no effort [to become self-supporting], other than whatever she is doing in her 
brokerage business, since her separation slightly over one year ago.”  
Moreover, the court found that “Wife should have considerable funds 
remaining from her home equity loan withdrawals,” noting that it had 
“allowed her to retain $76,000.00.” 
(9) 
Under title 13, section 1512, the Family Court has broad 
powers to determine what, if any, alimony is to be awarded.10  Having 
reviewed the parties’ positions on appeal and the Family Court record, we 
conclude that Wife’s claims challenging the denial of alimony are without 
merit.  There is no basis for disturbing the factual findings of the Family 
Court and no errors of law.   The court’s denial of alimony reflects due 
consideration of the governing statute, and the court’s deductions and 
inferences are the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process.  On 
                                          
 
10 Thomas v. Thomas, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 4854202, at *2 (Del. Oct. 1, 2014). 
6 
 
appeal, Wife has failed to identify any factual findings or inferences made 
by the Family Court that are clearly wrong, unsupported by the record or 
illogical. 
(10) In her second claim on appeal, Wife argues that the Family 
Court erred when holding her responsible for repaying half of the parties’ 
home equity loan.  Wife argued in the Family Court that her access to, and 
use of, the credit were a gift from husband.  On appeal, Wife further argues 
that Husband “is in a far better position to repay the loan, since [she] was 
unemployed and making no income when the debt was incurred.”  Also, 
Wife argues that the Family Court had no authority to hold her responsible 
for the home equity loan because the loan was secured by out-of-state non-
marital property that was owned by Husband and his daughter. 
(11) Under title 13, section 1513 of the Delaware Code, the Family 
Court has broad powers to allocate assets and debts ancillary to a divorce.11  
In this case, the court ruled that both Husband and Wife were responsible for 
repaying the home equity loan because both parties signed the loan 
documents.  Moreover, the court determined that the home equity loan, 
which was “signed for by both parties but totally utilized by Wife . . . for her 
sole use and enjoyment,” must be repaid 50% by Wife and 50% by Husband, 
                                          
 
11 Id. 
7 
 
because Husband had “gifted [Wife] access to the funds.  Each owes 
$76,000.00 to the [the lender].” 
(12) Having reviewed the parties’ positions on appeal and the 
Family Court record, we conclude that Wife’s claims related to the 
allocation of responsibility for the home equity loan are without merit.  
There is no basis for disturbing the factual findings of the Family Court and 
no errors of law.  The court’s ruling reflects due consideration of the 
governing statute, and the court’s deductions and inferences are the product 
of a logical and deductive reasoning process.  On appeal, Wife has failed to 
identify any factual findings or inferences made by the Family Court that are 
clearly wrong, unsupported by the record or illogical. 
(13) Wife’s third claim on appeal challenges the Family Court’s 
valuation and division of the condo.  Wife claims that the Family Court 
erred when valuing the condo in the absence of an expert opinion and when 
awarding her only 5% interest in it. Wife also claims that the court erred 
when it ruled that Husband could defer paying Wife for her share in the 
condo until August 1, 2014, and, if necessary, use Wife’s share in the condo 
to partly pay off Wife’s share of the home equity loan. 
(14) The record reflects that Husband purchased the condo with his 
former wife in 2008.  Husband added Wife’s name to a new deed in 2011.  
8 
 
When valuing the condo and determining the parties’ interests in it, the 
Family Court ruled:   
It is undisputed . . . that 100% of the purchase 
price for the [condo] came from Husband.  
Husband has also been solely responsible for all 
taxes and condominium fees since 2008 and for the 
slightly over one year that these parties actually 
resided together.  In light of the marriage’s short 
duration and Husband’s sole contribution toward 
purchasing and maintaining this vacation home, 
the Court awards Husband 95% of the equity in 
this property.  In recognition of the gift made by 
husband to Wife . . . the Court awards her 5%.  
The only evidence of fair market value is 
Husband’s 
reported 
value 
of 
$700,000.00.  
Husband, therefore, owes Wife $35,000.00 for her 
interest in the property. 
 
(15) Later, when ruling on Wife’s motion for reargument, the court 
amended its $700,000.00 valuation, after determining that it had overlooked 
Wife’s reported value of $1,000,000.00.  In the absence of an appraisal the 
court “[found] it fair to split the difference between the two opinions of the 
parties and revalue [the condo] at $850,000.00,” which “increase[d] Wife’s 
interest in the property to $42,500.00.” 
(16) The court also granted Husband the right to defer paying Wife 
for her share of the condo until August 1, 2014.  The court ruled that if, prior 
to August 1, 2014, the lender sought the full amount of the $152,000.00 
home equity loan from Husband or foreclosed on Husband’s property that 
9 
 
was pledged as collateral, Husband could use Wife’s $42,500.00 interest in 
the condo to partly pay Wife’s $76,000.00 share of the home equity loan. 
(17) Having reviewed the parties’ positions on appeal and the 
Family Court record, we conclude that Wife’s claims related to the valuation 
and distribution of the condo, and Husband’s right to defer payment and to 
use Wife’s interest in the condo to partly pay her share of the home equity 
loan, are all without merit.  There is no basis for disturbing the factual 
findings of the Family Court and no errors of law.   The Family Court’s 
decision reflects due consideration of the governing statute, and its 
deductions and inferences are the product of a logical and deductive 
reasoning process.  On appeal, Wife has failed to identify any factual 
findings or inferences made by the Family Court that are clearly wrong, 
unsupported by the record or illogical. 
(18) In her last claim on appeal, Wife contends that the Family 
Court failed to consider and rule on her claim for “personal property.”  The 
hearing transcript reflects that Wife asked for property that she said was in 
Husband’s possession, namely clothing, jewelry, bedroom furniture, and a 
Steinway baby grand piano that Wife claims she and Husband bought 
together in Delaware.  Wife testified that the clothes, jewelry, and piano 
10 
 
were at the house she shared with Husband in Wilmington, and that the 
bedroom furniture was in the condo. 
(19) Husband disputed Wife’s testimony in toto.  Denying that he 
and Wife shared a house in Wilmington, Husband testified that he and Wife 
lived in separate residences during the course of their marriage, he in a 
house in Wilmington, and she in an apartment in DC.  Husband denied 
having any of Wife’s personal property at the house in Wilmington, and he 
denied that there was bedroom furniture that was marital property at the 
condo.  Husband testified that the bedroom furniture in the condo was the 
same bedroom furniture that he had prior to the marriage.  Husband also 
denied that Wife had any claim to the Steinway baby grand piano.  Husband 
testified that he purchased the piano thirty years ago in California. 
(20) Noting the discrepancy in the parties’ testimony about the 
piano, the Family Court advised Wife that she had the burden of proving her 
claim that the piano was marital property, and that she had not sustained that 
burden.12  We agree with the Family Court’s ruling on the piano and further 
conclude that Wife did not sustain her burden of proof with respect to the 
clothes, jewelry, and furniture.  With the parties’ testimony in equipoise, and 
                                          
 
12 In the equitable division of marital property, the party making a request for property 
has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  Husband R.T.G. v. Wife 
G.K.G., 410 A.2d 155, 159 (Del. 1979). 
11 
 
in the absence of any competent credible evidence in support of Wife’s 
personal property claim, we conclude that the Family Court’s implicit ruling 
maintaining the status quo of the parties was not an abuse of discretion.13 
(21) Finally, Wife’s contention that the Family Court failed to rule 
on her personal property claim is not supported by the record.  As previously 
noted, Wife’s personal property claim was one of several claims that the 
Family Court rejected as without merit when ruling on her motion for 
reargument.14 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
13 Accord Jorett v. Jorett, 1994 WL 665246 (Del. Nov. 21, 1994) (awarding parties the 
assets each possessed at the time of the hearing after concluding that parties had failed to 
provide the court with evidence to grant ancillary relief beyond the status quo at the time 
of the hearing). 
14 See supra ¶ (5).