Case Title: MARK A. DORR v. SMITH, KELLER & ASSOCIATES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0249

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK A. DORR v. SMITH, KELLER & ASSOCIATES2010 WY 120238 P.3d 549Case Number: S-09-0249Decided: 08/24/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

MARK 
A. DORR,Appellant(Defendant),v.SMITH, KELLER & 
ASSOCIATES,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Greg 
L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

W. 
Perry Dray and Timothy L. Woznick of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

            

Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mark A. Dorr 
appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to declare Smith, Keller 
& Associates' (SKA) judgment against him satisfied.  He challenges the district court's 
rulings that posting a supersedeas bond did not stop interest from accruing on 
the judgment and he was not entitled to credit against the judgment for 
settlements made by third parties in related actions.  

 
 
[¶2]      Finding no error, 
we affirm.     

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Dorr 
articulates two appellate issues:

 
 

I.              
Whether 
the District Court erred when it ruled that the posting of a supersedeas bond 
does not toll the accrual of interest on a judgment.

 
 

II.            
Whether 
the District Court erred when it ruled that Mark Dorr was not entitled to 
credits against the original judgment amount for settlement payments made by 
other parties.

 
 
SKA 
maintains that the district court properly denied Mr. Dorr's motion to declare 
the judgment satisfied because posting a supersedeas bond does not stop interest 
from accruing on a judgment and Mr. Dorr was not entitled to credit against the 
judgment for the third party settlements.    

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      This appeal is 
the most recent stop on a long and tortured path toward dissolution and 
termination of an ill-fated and short-lived accounting partnership.  Many of the underlying facts are not 
relevant to our decision here, but are set out in detail in our four earlier 
decisions in this case.  Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, 
Bentley & Pecha, 841 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1992) (Dorr I); Smith, 
Keller & Associates v. Dorr & Associates, 875 P.2d 1258 (Wyo. 1994) (Dorr II); Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 
942 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1997) (Dorr III) and Smith, Keller & Associates v. Dorr, 
4 P.3d 872 (Wyo. 2000) (Dorr IV).  We will limit our recitation of the 
facts to those relevant to this particular appeal.

 
 
[¶5]      In 1988, two 
accounting firms, Dorr and Associates of Gillette and SKA of Cheyenne formed a 
third accounting firm named Dorr, Keller, Bentley and Pecha (DKBP).  Difficulties soon arose between the 
partners, and SKA notified Dorr and Associates that it intended to dissolve the 
DKBP partnership in May 1989.  In 
accordance with the terms of the partnership agreement, the parties submitted 
their disputes to arbitration.  Dorr I, 841 P.2d  at 813.  The arbitration order awarded 
$105,163.78 in damages to SKA for unpaid compensation and violation of the 
dissolution provisions of the partnership agreement.  Dorr I, 841 P.2d  at 813 n.1.  The arbitration award also 
provided:

In 
addition to and exclusive of the foregoing, Dorr is directed to deliver to 
Keller all sums in [a bank account].

 
 
Dorr 
is further directed to deliver to Keller all accounts receivable existing as of 
May 4, 1989, and to pay to Keller any sums paid for said accounts receivable 
hereafter.

 
 
Dorr 
is further directed to return to Keller all computer software in Dorr's 
possession which was brought into the partnership and/or owned by Keller as of 
May 4, 1989.

 
 

Id. 
 The district court confirmed the 
arbitration award.   

 
 
[¶6]      In 1996, Mr. Dorr 
and his associates posted a $120,000 supersedeas bond to stay execution on the 
judgment.  We ultimately ordered the 
district court in Dorr IV, 4 P.3d  at 
876, to:

[E]nter 
a judgment against Mark Dorr and Steven Bentley, jointly and severally, for the 
arbitration award in the amount of $105,163.78, plus interest thereon from and 
after August 24, 1989; enter a judgment against Mark Dorr and Steven Bentley, 
jointly and severally, for the work in process in the amount of $1,451.96, plus 
appropriate interest; and direct the Clerk of the District Court to pay over to 
SKA all funds held on behalf of D & A, the Dorr faction, or members thereof, 
in partial satisfaction of the judgment.

 
 
The 
bond was released to SKA and, apparently, it took no further action to execute 
on the judgment for several years.    

 
 
[¶7]      On April 30, 
2007, SKA filed a motion to revive the judgment pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-16-502 (LexisNexis 2009).1  The motion represented that over $64,000 
on the judgment principal and $43,000 in interest remained unpaid.  In response, Mr. Dorr filed a motion to 
declare the judgment satisfied.  Of 
relevance to this appeal, Mr. Dorr claimed that the accrual of interest ceased 
when he posted the supersedeas bond and he was entitled to credit against the 
judgment for two settlements made by third parties Bill Dorr (Mr. Dorr's father) 
and First Interstate Bank in a related fraudulent conveyance action.    

 
 
[¶8]      After conducting 
hearings on the motion, the district court ruled that interest did not stop 
accruing when Mr. Dorr posted the supersedeas bond and Mr. Dorr had not met his 
burden of proving that he was entitled to set off the two settlements against 
SKA's outstanding judgment.  Mr. 
Dorr appealed.  

 

DISCUSSION

 
 

1.    
Accrual 
of Interest on Judgment After Posting Supersedeas 
Bond

 
 
[¶9]      SKA secured a 
monetary judgment against Mr. Dorr and, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-16-102(a) (LexisNexis 2009), interest accrued on that 
judgment:

 
 
            
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, all 
decrees and judgments for the payment of money shall bear interest at ten 
percent (10%) per year from the date of rendition until 
paid.

 
 

Id.  

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Dorr posted a supersedeas bond 
to prevent SKA from executing on the judgment while the case was on appeal.  W.R.A.P. 4.02 governs supersedeas bonds 
and provides in pertinent part:

 
 

            
(a) 
Whenever an appellant so entitled desires a stay on appeal, appellant may 
present to the trial court a supersedeas bond in such amount as shall be fixed 
by the trial court and with surety or sureties to be approved by the court or by 
the clerk of court. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the 
judgment in full together with costs, interest, and damages for delay, if for 
any reason the appeal is not perfected or is dismissed, or if the judgment is 
affirmed, and to satisfy in full such modification of the judgment and such 
costs, interest, and damages as the appellate court may adjudge and 
award.

 
 

            
(b) 
When the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount 
of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the 
judgment remaining and unsatisfied, costs on appeal, and interest, unless the 
court, after notice and hearing and for good cause shown, fixes a different 
amount or orders security other than the bond.   

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Dorr claims that when he posted 
the bond, interest stopped accruing on the judgment and release of the bond to 
SKA satisfied the judgment.  
Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the above-referenced 
statute and court rule.  We interpret statutory provisions by 
employing the following standards:

 
 
The 
paramount consideration is to determine the legislature's intent, which must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. We look 
first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute 
is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and 
predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to 
be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 
 

Kennedy 
Oil v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2008 WY 154, ¶ 10, 205 P.3d 999, 1003 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 

Morris 
v. CMS Oil and Gas Co., 2010 
WY 37, ¶ 26, 227 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2010).  Court rules are construed by applying the 
same principles.  MM v. State of Wyoming, Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2009 WY 28, ¶ 11, 202 P.3d 409, 413 (Wyo. 2009).  See also, Cotton 
v. McCulloh, 
2005 WY 159, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d 252, 257-58 (Wyo. 
2005).  All of these determinations involve 
issues of law and are reviewed de 
novo on appeal.  Morris, ¶ 26, 227 P.3d  at 333; Nickle v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Platte 
County, 2007 WY 115, ¶ 16, 
162 P.3d 1208, 1213 (Wyo. 2007) (interpreting court rule).  

 
 
[¶12]   Section 1-16-102(a) states that 
interest accrues "from the date of rendition until paid" and Rule 4.02(a) 
indicates that the bond should be conditioned to account for "interest" and 
"damages for delay."  In V-1 Oil Co. v. People, 799 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wyo. 1990), we 
confirmed that posting a supersedeas bond "does not constitute accomplished 
payment until an unqualified right to the proceeds accrues after the judgment is 
affirmed on appeal."  If the 
legislature intended for the filing of a supersedeas bond to stop interest from 
accruing on the judgment, it would have specified that and not simply stated 
that interest accrues until the judgment is "paid."  Section 1-16-102(a).  Because payment of the judgment is not 
achieved by posting a supersedeas bond, the district court properly determined 
that, under the clear language of § 1-16-102 and Rule 4.02, interest continued 
to accrue on SKA's judgment after Mr. Dorr posted the bond.  

   

[¶13]   This interpretation is consistent 
with the stated purpose of post-judgment interest which is to "compensate the 
successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the 
time between the ascertainment of the damages and the payment by the 
defendant.'"  Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. 
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835-36, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1589, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842 
(1990), quoting Poleto v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d Cir. 1987).  See also, Rufer v. Abbott Laboratories, 
114 P.3d 1182, 1193 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (stating that interest is not 
imposed as a punishment on the judgment debtor but rather a form of compensation 
for the judgment creditor).  If 
interest did not continue to accrue after a supersedeas bond was posted, the 
judgment creditor would not be fully compensated and the purpose of the 
statutory interest requirement would not be served.

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Dorr maintains that, if a 
judgment creditor is allowed to collect interest during the appeal, he will have 
an incentive to prolong the proceedings by filing additional appeals in order to 
collect more interest.  This 
argument is unconvincing.  First, 
there is nothing to prevent a judgment debtor from paying the full amount of the 
judgment during the appeal which would stop the interest from accruing.  In fact, we ruled in Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 527-28 (Wyo. 1995), 
that payment of the entire judgment amount into the court after the plaintiff 
refused to accept payment pending appeal absolved the defendant from further 
accrual of interest.  See also, Crawford v. Amadio, 932 P.2d 1288, 1295 (Wyo. 1997); Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314, 
1317-18 (Kan. 1972) (holding that when the full amount of a judgment is paid 
into court, interest is no longer recoverable from the judgment debtor).  Unlike when the judgment amount is paid 
into the court, a supersedeas bond is not available to the judgment creditor 
and, consequently, interest continues to accrue on the judgment principal to 
compensate him for the loss of use of the money.

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Dorr also asserts that the 
language of Rule 4.02 indicates that payment of the bond should be considered 
full satisfaction of the judgment, even if it does not fully cover the accrued 
interest.  He correctly points out 
that Rule 4.02 states that the amount of a supersedeas bond shall be sufficient 
to cover the judgment, costs, interest, and other damages as a result of the 
delay.  See also, 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 402 (2010) ("the 
amount of a supersedeas bond typically takes into account the amount needed to 
satisfy the judgment appealed from, as well as costs, interest, and any damages 
which might be caused by the stay pending appeal").  

 
 
[¶16]   However, the fact that the bond 
should be set in an amount sufficient to cover all aspects of the judgment 
creditor's damages does not mean that the judgment creditor will be limited to 
recovery of the amount of the bond.  
The "purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect nonappealing parties by 
maintaining the status quo during the appeal and insuring that those who have 
obtained the judgment under review will not be prejudiced by a stay of the 
judgment pending final determination of the appeal."  Id.  In order to prevent the judgment 
creditor from being prejudiced, he must be allowed to collect the full amount of 
accrued interest even if the bond amount is insufficient.  In fact, we recognized that additional 
interest may be due SKA in our remand in Dorr IV when we directed "the Clerk of the District 
Court to pay over to SKA all funds held on behalf of [Dorr] in partial satisfaction of the 
judgment."  Dorr IV, 4 P.3d  at 876 (emphasis 
added).  

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Dorr argues that Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382 (Wyo. 1977) (Bonham II) 
applies here and dictates that the judgment creditor's recovery is limited 
to the amount of the bond.  In Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1974) (Bonham I), we 
affirmed the state examiner's decision to issue a bank charter to Wyoming 
Security Bank of Sheridan.  During 
the course of that appeal, Wyoming Bancorporation asked for and received a stay 
on the issuance of the charter pending appeal.  The stay prevented Security Bank from 
moving forward with the opening of its bank during the appeals process.  The district court heard evidence on the 
damages Security Bank would suffer as a result of the delay in issuance of the 
charter and ordered Wyoming Bancorporation to file a $100,000 bond.  Bonham II, 563 P.2d  at 1384.  Security Bank did not seek modification 
of the bond amount during the pendency of the appeal.  Id. at 1390-91.  

 
 
[¶18]   After prevailing on appeal, 
Security Bank filed a motion under the rules of civil procedure pertaining to 
injunctions and bonds2 requesting that the district court 
award it $89,269 in addition to the $100,000 bond to cover its actual damages 
resulting from the delay in the issuance of the charter.  Id. at 1388-89.  
After a hearing, the district court ordered Wyoming Bancorporation to 
pay Security Bank $162,488.96.  Id. at 1384.  

 
 
[¶19]   On appeal in Bonham II, Wyoming Bancorporation argued 
that Security Bank's recovery was limited to the bond amount.  We agreed, reasoning that the bond 
obligation was contractual and, because Security Bank had not objected to the 
amount of the bond, had not requested modification of the bond amount during the 
appeal period, and elected to proceed under the abbreviated procedures for 
recovering under the bond instead of bringing an independent action for damages, 
its recovery was limited to the amount of the bond.  Id. at 1388-91.  

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Dorr asserts that the 
principles employed in Bonham II and 
injunction bond cases from other jurisdictions3 should be applied to post-judgment 
supersedeas bonds and payment of a supersedeas bond to the judgment creditor 
should be considered full satisfaction of the judgment.  The district court aptly noted that the 
two circumstances are different.  In 
the case of an injunction bond, the amount of damages the enjoined party will 
suffer as a result of the appeal is not clear.  As in Bonham II, the court may hold an 
evidentiary hearing when setting the bond to attempt to estimate the damages 
which may arise from the injunction.  
Nevertheless, the amount due to the enjoined party if the injunction is 
eventually found to have been issued in error is still subject to differences of 
opinion.  We recognized in Bonham II that, in the event the bond 
does not cover the injured party's damages, he can institute an independent 
action for tort damages.  Id. at 1389-90.  

 
 
[¶21]   In contrast, a judgment creditor is 
entitled, pursuant to § 1-16-102(a), to a specific amount of interest, costs, 
etc.  In setting the supersedeas 
bond, the court and parties are aware of the amount of the judgment and have 
only to estimate the interest and costs which will accrue during the 
appeal.  Unlike in the case of an 
injunction bond, the total amount owed the judgment creditor is liquidated, 
subject to easy calculation after the appellate ruling is rendered, and a 
separate tort action is not available to the judgment creditor to collect the 
delay damages.  Moreover, to hold, 
as Mr. Dorr advocates, that the filing of a supersedeas bond prevents a judgment 
creditor from collecting interest during the pendency of the appeal would 
undermine the purpose of post-judgment interest and would deprive the judgment 
creditor of the value of the money he is owed.  The district court properly concluded, 
as a matter of law, that filing a supersedeas bond does not toll the accrual of 
interest on a judgment and the judgment creditor's recovery is not limited to 
the bond amount.  

 
 

2.    
Credit 
for Third Party Settlements

 
 
[¶22]   In a separate action commenced in 
1990, SKA alleged that Mr. Dorr and his associates had fraudulently conveyed 
property in which it had an interest to Bill Dorr (Mr. Dorr's father) and First 
Interstate Bank, among others.  Bill 
Dorr paid SKA $10,000 to settle the claim and First Interstate Bank paid 
$40,000.  Mr. Dorr argues that the 
district court erred by refusing to credit the settlement amounts against SKA's 
$105,163.78 monetary judgment. 

 
 
[¶23]   As Mr. Dorr correctly points out, 
Wyoming law does not favor double recoveries for the same legal injury.  See, e.g., Miller v. Campbell County, 901 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Wyo. 1995); UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. 
Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 592 
(Wyo. 1989).  A judgment debtor is, 
therefore, entitled to credit against a judgment for a settlement that pertains 
to claims included in the judgment, but is not entitled to credit for settlement 
of claims that were not part of the judgment.  See, Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 
WY 36, ¶ 146, 226 P.3d 889, 
934-35 (Wyo. 2010).  The party 
asserting satisfaction of a judgment has the burden of proof.  47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 812 (2010).  See also, Redwine v. Rohlff Lumber & Supply Co., 
54 Wyo. 253, 91 P.2d 49, 
51-52 (Wyo. 1939).  

 
 

[¶24]   The decision about whether a credit 
against an outstanding judgment should be allowed is "controlled by principles 
of equity."  Ultra,  ¶ 145, 226 P.3d  at 934, quoting 
Cargill, 
Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 
891 P.2d 57, 67 (Wyo. 
1995). 
 The district court has discretion 
in determining whether to allow a set off.  
Id.  We, therefore, apply the abuse of 
discretion standard when reviewing a district court's decision on a request for 
a set off.  Id.

 
 
[¶25]   The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the set off matter.  
It issued a comprehensive decision letter detailing the course of 
proceedings in the relevant actions and making numerous factual findings about 
those proceedings.  It noted that 
the arbitration award rendered against Dorr and Associates in favor of SKA, 
which was confirmed by the district court and this Court, contained two 
components:  1) it awarded SKA 
$105,163.78 for unpaid compensation for 1988 and the portion of 1989 before 
dissolution and for violation of the dissolution provisions of the partnership 
agreement; and 2) it directed Dorr and Associates to return to SKA "the proceeds 
of a particular bank account, all accounts receivable existing as of May 4, 
1989, as well as any sums paid on those accounts afterward, and all computer 
software."    

 
 
[¶26]   The district court also described 
SKA's separate fraudulent conveyance action which led to the Bill Dorr and First 
Interstate Bank settlements.  Ruling 
that the disputed settlements did not pertain to the monetary award included in 
the arbitration order, the district court stated:

 
 
            
The Court is convinced that [Dorr] is not entitled to credit for these 
payments.  The original arbitration 
award provided for both a monetary award and for a return to [SKA] of certain 
property it had contributed to the partnership.  [SKA] filed a fraudulent conveyance suit 
to recover portions of that property.  
Bill Dorr and First Interstate Bank paid money to buy their peace.  The settlement probably represented at 
least a part of the non-monetary award, although there is no way at this point 
in time to determine what additional actual and potential exposure each settling 
party paid money to avoid.  . . . It 
is sufficient to conclude that the funds were paid by strangers to the original 
partnership to settle claims which had nothing to do with the original monetary 
award, and that [Dorr] has not met its burden of proving credit should be 
given.  Redwine [v. Rohlff Lumber & Supply Co., 
91 P.2d 49, 51-52 (Wyo. 
1939)].  Credit for these settlement 
amounts will therefore be denied.

 
 
[¶27]   In support of his argument that the 
district court abused its discretion by concluding that the Bill Dorr and First 
Interstate Bank settlements were not connected to the monetary judgment against 
Dorr and Associates, Mr. Dorr directs us to SKA's fraudulent conveyance 
complaints and subsequent amendments which were attached to his district court 
brief addressing the set off issue.  
He asserts that the documents show that SKA believed that its fraudulent 
conveyance claims were inseparable from the claims which led to the monetary 
award.  While there are aspects of 
the complaints that could possibly be interpreted as Mr. Dorr advocates, we are 
not convinced the complaint allegations necessarily tie the fraudulent 
conveyance action to the monetary award.  
Instead, the documents seem to include broad, general allegations about 
the arbitration award.  

 
 
[¶28]   The judgment at issue here covered 
the monetary portion of the arbitration order awarding damages to SKA for unpaid 
compensation and violation of the dissolution provisions of the partnership 
agreement.  Mr. Dorr has not 
directed us to any evidence showing that the fraudulent conveyance action was 
specifically directed at recovering for the claims covered by the monetary 
judgment.  The district court 
concluded that Mr. Dorr did not meet his burden of proving the requisite 
connection between the settlements and the monetary judgment; rather, the 
evidence showed that the fraudulent conveyance settlements pertained to the 
portions of the arbitration award not included in the $105,163.78 monetary 
judgment.  

 
 
[¶29]   Mr. Dorr did not provide us with a 
transcript of the evidentiary hearing, so we do not know what evidence was 
actually presented on his set off claims.  
Accordingly, we must assume that the evidence presented at the hearing 
supported the district court's factual findings.  See Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A., 
2005 WY 138, ¶ 21 n.5, 121 P.3d 783, 789 n.5 (Wyo. 
2005).  Taking the district court's 
factual findings as true, we agree that Mr. Dorr did not satisfy his burden of 
proving that the settlements were related to the monetary judgment.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to credit the Bill Dorr and First Interstate Bank 
settlements against SKA's judgment.

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.      

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Section 1-16-502 
states:

 
 
            
When a judgment, including judgments rendered by a circuit court, a 
transcript of which has been filed in the district court for execution, becomes 
dormant, it may be revived in the same manner as prescribed for reviving actions 
before judgment or by action. When either party to the dormant judgment, his 
agent or attorney, makes affidavit showing that the adverse party is a 
nonresident of the state and that the judgment remains unsatisfied in whole or 
in part and the amount owing thereon, service may be made by publication as in 
other cases. If sufficient cause is not shown to the contrary, the judgment 
shall stand revived for the amount which the court finds to be due and 
unsatisfied thereon. The lien of the judgment for the amount due shall be 
revived and shall operate from the time of the entry of the conditional order or 
the filing of the motion.

 
 

2See, 
e.g., W.R.C.P. 
62, 65, 65.1; and 72.1 and 73 (superseded in 1978).  

3Mr. Dorr cites to Fu Sheng 
Industrial Co., Ltd. v. T/F Systems, Inc., 690 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1997); Edlin v. M/V Truthseeker, 69 F.3d 392 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Ridgemont 
Apartment Associates, LTD, 127 B.R. 934 (N.D. Ga. 1991).