Case Title: Estate of Ellis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106461

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 106461.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
In re ESTATE OF GRACE ELLIS, Deceased (Shriners Hospitals for
Children, Appellant, v. James G. Bauman, Indiv. and as Ex’r of the
Estate of Grace Ellis, Deceased, et al., Appellees).
Opinion filed October 29, 2009.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,
Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
Grace Ellis executed a will in 1964 naming Shriners Hospitals for
Children (Shriners) as beneficiary of her estate if she died without
direct descendants. In 1999, she executed a new will naming James
G. Bauman as sole beneficiary. Bauman was the pastor of the church
of which Ellis was a member. When Ellis died in 2003, the 1999 will
was admitted to probate. It was not until 2006 that Shriners became
aware of its interest in the 1964 will. Shriners filed the instant action
to contest the 1999 will based on theories of undue influence and
fraud and included a tort count for intentional interference with an
expectancy of inheritance. The circuit court of Cook County
dismissed all counts as untimely pursuant to section 8–1 of the
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Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/8–1 (West 2006)). On appeal,
Shriners challenged only the dismissal of the tort claim. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 381 Ill. App. 3d 427.
We allowed Shriners’ petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)) and now hold that Shriners’ tort claim for intentional
interference with an expectancy of inheritance is not limited by the
six-month limitation period in section 8–1. Accordingly, we reverse
the appellate court’s judgment and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On December 3, 1964, Ellis executed a will designating her
elderly parents as the primary beneficiaries of her estate, and
designating her descendants and petitioner Shriners as contingent
beneficiaries. On August 9, 1999, Ellis executed a new will
designating Bauman as sole primary beneficiary and Ellis’ surviving
heirs at law as contingent beneficiaries of her estate.
Ellis died on October 8, 2003, at the age of 86, leaving no direct
descendants. Her estate was worth more than $2 million dollars. The
1999 will was filed with the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County
on October 9, 2003, and admitted to probate on October 29, 2003.
Bauman was named independent executor of the estate.
Shriners first became aware of its interest in the 1964 will when
Bauman filed the will with the circuit court in 2006 as part of a
separate will contest brought by several of Ellis’ heirs at law. Shriners
filed its “Petition to Contest Will and For Other Relief” on August 8,
2006. Shriners alleged that Ellis met Bauman in 1994 and became a
member of St. John’s Lutheran Church in Glenview, Illinois, where
Bauman was a pastor. Ellis subsequently gave Bauman powers of
attorney over her health care and property, changed title to more than
$1 million of her assets to Bauman, and purchased gifts and an
automobile for Bauman. Counts I and II of the petition contested the
validity of the 1999 will based on theories of undue influence and
mental incapacity. Both counts requested the vacation of the order
admitting the 1999 will to probate, and the admission to probate of
the 1964 will.
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Count III, the count that is at issue in this appeal, set forth a tort
claim for intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance.
It alleged that: (1) but for the 1999 will obtained by Bauman, Shriners
would have received Ellis’ entire estate; (2) with knowledge of the
1964 will, Bauman set forth on an intentional scheme to interfere
with Shriners’ expectancy for his personal benefit; (3) Bauman
interfered with Shriners’ expectancy by abusing his position of trust,
unduly influencing Ellis to execute a new will and to buy him gifts,
violating his fiduciary duty to Ellis, taking advantage of her age and
diminished capacity, and failing to notify beneficiaries and interested
parties after her death; and (4) but for Bauman’s actions, the bequest
to Shriners would have been received. Shriners asked that the circuit
court enter judgment against Bauman. In its prayer for relief, it
requested compensatory damages in excess of $2 million dollars, an
accounting of all inter vivos transfers and gifts, and punitive damages.
Bauman filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that it
was filed more than six months after admission to probate of the 1999
will, in violation of section 8–1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS
5/8–1 (West 2006)).
Section 8–1 provides, in relevant part:
“Within 6 months after the admission to probate of a
domestic will ***, any interested person may file a petition in
the proceeding for the administration of the testator’s estate
or, if no proceeding is pending, in the court in which the will
was admitted to probate, to contest the validity of the will.”
755 ILCS 5/8–1 (West 2006).
The circuit court granted Bauman’s motion, dismissed the entire
petition with prejudice, and denied Shriners leave to amend.
On appeal, Shriners challenged only the dismissal of the tort
claim in count III. The appellate court affirmed. 381 Ill. App. 3d 427.
The appellate court held that the allegations in Shriners’ tort claim
were virtually identical to those in its will contest count based on
undue influence. The court concluded that the legislature could not
have intended “to bar a will contest as untimely after six months yet
allow the same allegations to proceed in the tort arena.” 381 Ill. App.
3d at 431. Therefore, the appellate court held, Shriners’ tort claim
amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the order admitting
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the 1999 will to probate and was properly dismissed as time-barred
under section 8–1 of the Probate Act of 1975. 381 Ill. App. 3d at 435.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue in this appeal is the timeliness of Shriners’ tort
claim. As noted, the appellate court applied the six-month limitation
period for filing a will contest set forth in section 8–1 of the Probate
Act of 1975. This six-month limitation period is jurisdictional and not
subject to tolling by fraudulent concealment or any other fact not
expressly provided for by the Probate Act. Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41
Ill. 2d 412, 419 (1968) (interpreting section 90 of the Probate Act, a
predecessor of section 8–1). If a challenger to a will fails to initiate a
direct proceeding to contest the will within the six-month statutory
time period, the validity of the will is established for all purposes.
Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 97 Ill. 2d 174, 182-83
(1983); In re Estate of Mohr, 357 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1013-14 (2005).
Whether the six-month limitation is applicable to a tort claim is a
question of statutory construction subject to de novo review. People
v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2006).
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the legislature’s intent. Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 181 (2007). The best indication of
the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, to which we
ascribe its plain and ordinary meaning. In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 466
(2008). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it
must be applied as written, without resort to other tools of statutory
construction. Board of Education, Joliet Township High School
District No. 204 v. Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community
High School District No. 210, 231 Ill. 2d 184, 198 (2008). We will
not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature.
People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 232 Ill. 2d 179, 184-85 (2009).
Shriners contends that the appellate court’s application of section
8–1 of the Probate Act of 1975 to a tort claim for intentional
interference with expectancy of inheritance contradicts the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute and confuses the tort with a will
contest. We agree. Under the plain language of section 8–1, the six-
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month statutory limitation period applies to a “petition *** to contest
the validity of the will.” 755 ILCS 5/8–1 (West 2006). A tort action
for intentional interference with inheritance is distinct from a petition
to contest the validity of a will, in several important respects. The
single issue in a will contest is whether the writing produced is the
will of the testator. Mount v. Dusing, 414 Ill. 361, 365 (1953); Hall
v. Eaton, 259 Ill. App. 3d 319, 321 (1994). Any ground which, if
proved, would invalidate the will, including undue influence,
incapacity, fraud, or revocation, may state a cause of action. Hall, 259
Ill. App. 3d at 321. The object of a will contest proceeding is not to
secure a personal judgment against an individual defendant but is a
quasi in rem proceeding to set aside a will. In re Estate of Spaits, 104
Ill. 2d 431, 435-36 (1984); Nupnau v. Hink, 33 Ill. 2d 285, 288
(1965). See also Merrick v. Continental Illinois National Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago, 10 Ill. App. 3d 104, 114 (1973) (“An action to
set aside a will is against the will itself and not the beneficiaries”).
By contrast, in a tort claim for intentional interference with
inheritance, “[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious means
intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an
inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to
liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts §774B (1979). The “widely recognized tort” does
not contest the validity of the will; it is a personal action directed at
an individual tortfeasor. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293,
312, 164 L. Ed. 2d 480, 498, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1748 (2006) (the tort
claim “seeks an in personam judgment against [the defendant], not
the probate or annulment of a will”). Although some of the evidence
may overlap with a will contest proceeding, a plaintiff filing a tort
claim must establish the following distinct elements: (1) the existence
of an expectancy; (2) defendant’s intentional interference with the
expectancy; (3) conduct that is tortious in itself, such as fraud, duress,
or undue influence; (4) a reasonable certainty that the expectancy
would have been realized but for the interference; and (5) damages.
See In re Estate of Roeseler, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1021 (1997); In
re Estate of Knowlson, 204 Ill. App. 3d 454, 457 (1990); Nemeth v.
Banhalmi, 99 Ill. App. 3d 493, 499 (1981); Restatement (Second) of
Torts §774B (1979). The remedy for a tortious interference action is
not the setting aside of the will, but a judgment against the individual
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defendant, and, where the defendant has himself received the benefit
of the legacy, a constructive trust, an equitable lien, or “a simple
monetary judgment to the extent of the benefits thus tortiously
acquired.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §774B(e) (1979). Thus, a
tort claim for intentional interference with an expectancy is not a
“petition *** to contest the validity of the will” under the plain
statutory language of section 8–1.
Although section 8–1 does not expressly limit a tort action,
Illinois courts nevertheless have restricted the tort in certain
circumstances where a plaintiff forgoes an opportunity to file a tort
claim within the six-month period for a will contest. In Robinson,
after the will and codicil were admitted to probate, plaintiffs entered
into a settlement agreement with the estate, agreeing not to file a will
contest in exchange for $125,000. More than six months later,
plaintiffs filed a complaint for tortious interference with expectancy
of inheritance. This court held that the tort action should have been
dismissed where plaintiffs chose not to avail themselves of a will
contest remedy. Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d at 185. We stated:
“In this case, where a will has been admitted to probate and
where the plaintiffs have engaged an attorney to determine
whether they should file a will contest, have decided not to
contest the will, have entered into a settlement agreement for
$125,000 (agreeing to release the other parties to the
agreement *** from any and all claims and causes of action
arising from any will, codicil or other undertaking by the
parties), and have allowed the statutorily prescribed period in
which to contest the will to expire (thereby establishing the
validity of the will), we will not recognize a tort action for
intentional interference with inheritance.
* * *
Given the facts in this case, if we were to allow the
plaintiffs to maintain their tort action, we would be giving
them a second bite of the apple and defeating the purpose of
the exclusivity of a will contest under section 8–1.” Robinson,
97 Ill. 2d at 184-85.
See also Roeseler, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1021 (“If a will contest is
available and would provide an adequate remedy to the petitioner, no
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tort action will lie”); Knowlson, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 457-58 (same); In
re Estate of Hoover, 160 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966 (1987) (same).
This court noted in Robinson that the public policy underlying the
enactment of section 8–1 is “an attempt to make the administration of
an estate as orderly as possible because of the gravity of the interests
at stake.” Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d at 186. See also Pedersen v. Dempsey,
341 Ill. App. 141, 143 (1950) (reasons for restricting a will contest
include “the pressing importance of securing an orderly settlement of
estates, to prevent embarrassment to creditors and others, and to
avoid as much confusion as possible in the vast amount of property
rights and titles that pass through probate”). We said that to allow the
plaintiffs to maintain a tort action “which in its practical effect would
invalidate a will that has become valid under the Probate Act of 1975
*** would permit the issue of undue influence, which would have
been grounds for a will contest, to be litigated years after the will was
admitted to probate and immune from contest on this issue.”
Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d at 186.
The concern articulated in Robinson about the “practical effect”
of allowing the plaintiffs to maintain the tort action must be read in
the context of the facts of that case. Unlike Shriners, the plaintiffs in
Robinson could have obtained complete relief had they filed a timely
will contest. Instead, they settled with the estate and agreed not to file
any further claims arising from the will and codicil. In the instant
case, we cannot say that a will contest was “available” to Shriners,
nor that a successful will contest would have furnished the relief
sought by Shriners in its tort action. The parties agree that Shriners
was unaware of its bequest in the 1964 will until more than two years
after the 1999 will had been admitted to probate. Our holding in
Robinson was limited to not recognizing the tort action where
plaintiffs have an opportunity to contest a probated will but choose
not to do so, and subsequently enter into an agreement to take no
further court action. Unlike the plaintiffs in Robinson, Shriners did
not choose to forgo an opportunity to contest the probated will. It
never had that opportunity. Once the 1999 will was admitted to
probate, and the six-month jurisdictional period had passed with no
will contest having been filed, the validity of the will was established
for all purposes. Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d at 182-83.
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The facts in the case at bar are similar to Schilling v. Herrera, 952
So. 2d 1231 (Fla. App. 2007), where a Florida appellate court
permitted the plaintiff’s tortious interference with expectancy claim
to go forward. The plaintiff was the decedent’s only heir-at-law and
was named the sole beneficiary in a 1996 will. In 2003, the defendant
convinced the decedent to execute a new will naming the defendant
as the sole beneficiary of her estate. The plaintiff did not learn of the
decedent’s death until after the defendant had petitioned the probate
court for discharge of probate on the 2003 will. Shortly thereafter, the
final order of discharge was entered by the probate court. Schilling,
952 So. 2d at 1233. The plaintiff subsequently filed his complaint for
intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance. The trial
court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint because he failed to exhaust his
probate remedies. Schilling, 952 So. 2d at 1234. The appellate court
reversed. The court acknowledged the rule in Florida that “ ‘if
adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding, then that remedy
must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be
pursued.’ ” Schilling, 952 So. 2d at 1236, quoting DeWitt v. Duce,
408 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981). The Schilling court held, however,
that because the defendant’s fraud was not discovered until after
probate, the plaintiff was allowed to bring a later action for damages
because relief in probate was impossible. Schilling, 952 So. 2d at
1236-37. Similarly, Shriners did not have a fair opportunity to pursue
a remedy in probate because it was not aware of its expectancy under
the earlier will, nor was it aware of Bauman’s allegedly fraudulent
conduct, until after the 1999 will was admitted to probate and the six-
month deadline for a will contest had expired.
Furthermore, a will contest would not have provided sufficient
relief to Shriners because it would not have extended to the alleged
inter vivos transfers of property. Shriners alleged that Bauman
depleted Ellis’ estate by inducing her to transfer assets worth more
than $1 million to him prior to her death. In a successful will contest,
Shriners could have recovered only assets that were part of the estate
upon Ellis’ death but could not have reached the assets transferred
during her lifetime.
The court in In re Estate of Jeziorski, 162 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1059
(1987), recognized under similar circumstances that a will contest
alone could not fully compensate the plaintiffs. There, the plaintiffs
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filed an action to contest the decedent’s will and also a claim for
tortious interference with an expectancy. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants had fraudulently procured inter vivos transfers from
the decedent and that substantially all of the probate assets were
outside of the estate. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion
to strike the tort claim, holding that heirs or legatees may not
maintain an action for tortious interference where a will has been
admitted to probate. Jeziorski, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 1059. The appellate
court reversed and allowed the entire complaint to proceed in the
probate division. The court rejected the defendants’ contention that
the will contest proceeding was sufficient to protect the parties’
expectancies because, even if the plaintiffs had prevailed in a will
contest proceeding, it would not have provided them the relief which
they were seeking. Jeziorski, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. Similarly, in
the case at bar, had Shriners filed a timely will contest, it would not
have provided a remedy for the alleged inter vivos transfers.
Accordingly, we find that section 8–1 does not apply to the tort
action filed by Shriners against Bauman. We emphasize that our
holding applies to the particular parties under the circumstances of
this case and does not extend to a plaintiff who fails to bring a tort
claim within the period for filing a will contest, where the will contest
remedy was available.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the
appellate court and the circuit court and remand the cause to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.