Case Title: Kienker v. Bauer.

Citation: 110 Haw. 97

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘***P0R PUBLICATION**#*

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000:

 

 

JEFFREY LLOYD KIENKER and JANET LEE KIENKER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellees

DANIELLE BAUER, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant
and
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Defendant -Appellant /Cross~Appellee
and

COUNTY OF HAWAI'I, Defendant

No. 25856

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 98-033K)

 

MARCH 14, 2006

LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

MOON, C. Jey

QPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA,
(HRS) § 663-10.5

We hold that Hawai'i Revised statutes
(Supp. 2005),? which abolishes joint and several liability for

government entities, did not supercede or impliedly repeal

 

 

+ the text of Ha

4s reproduced intsa:

ons

4 Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-10.5 (Supp. 2005)
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
(2) HRS § 663-10.9(4) (Supp. 2005),? which expressly allows for

recovery of noneconomic damages in motor vehicle accidents
involving the maintenance and design of highways, or (2) HRS

§ 663-10.9(1), that provides for the recovery of economic damages
against joint tortfeasors in actions involving injury or death to
persons, In light of these premises, we affirm the May 12, 2003
final judgment of the circuit court of the third circuit (the
court)? in which noneconomic damages were awarded to Plaintiffs-
Appellees/Cross-Appellees Jeffrey Lloyd Kienker (Jeffrey) and

Janet Lee Kienker [collectively, the Kienkers] against Defendant-

 

Appellant /Cross-Appellee State of Hawai'i (the State) and
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Danielle Bauer (Bauer) as
joint tortfeasors pursuant to HRS § 663-10.9(4). However,
inasmuch as the court erred in failing to grant economic damages
to the Kienkers as allowed under HRS § 663-10.9(1), we order that
such economic damages be awarded. We also affirm the judgment
insofar as it adjudged the State as 208 at fault and Bauer as 604

at fault in the subject motor vehicle accident.

 

on July 5, 1997, Jeffrey was driving northbound on
Queen Kazhumanu Highway on the island of Hawai"i when Bauer,
traveling southbound, struck Jeffrey head on. Immediately prior

to the accident, there was a motor vehicle stopped in the

 

* the relevant provisions of HRS § 663-10.9 (Supp. 2005),
subsections (1),(3], and (4), are reproduced antza.

 

> the Honorable Ronald Ibarra presided.

2
‘**#POR PUBLICATION*#*
ee

southbound lane in which Bauer was traveling. This stationary
vehicle was attempting to make a left turn onto the Police
Station Access Road. Three to four other vehicles were stopped
behind the left turning vehicle. The car in front of Bauer cane
to an abrupt halt. Bauer began to veer to the right, but finding
the shoulder of the road blocked, swerved her automobile to the
left, crossing the centerline of Queen Kaahumanu Highway and
colliding with the vehicle driven by Jeffrey. The area of impact
was 108 feet north of the intersection of the Police Station
Access Road and Queen Kaahumanu Highway.

Queen Kashunanu Highway is and was at the time of the
accident a two-lane highway maintained by the State. The court
found that prior to the accident involving Jeffrey, the
Antersection of Queen Kaahumanu Highway and Police Station Access

Road wae operal

 

ng at an overcapacity that hindered:movement of
vehicles because a left turn lane or other appropriate
channelization was not provided. ‘The court also found that prior
to July 5, 1997, there had been an overall increase in traffic
volume on Queen Kashumanu Highway, as well as an increase in the
nunber of left turns from the highway onto the Police Station
Access Road. This increase resulted from development of
facilities in the area served by the Road, including the
construction of the police station in 1988 to 1989, expansion of
‘an animal shelter, and development of @ solid waste transfer

station and recycling center.
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

qn.

The Kienkers filed suit on February 6, 1998, seeking
econonic! and nonecononic* damages. In addition to naming Bauer
in the Complaint, the Kienkers also sued the State for
negligently failing to install a left turn lane at the
intersection.

A

on July 5, 2000, a jury-waived trial on the issue of

Liability was held. On September 14, 2000, the court entered the

following relevant conclusions of law:

9. Defendant state's breach of its duty to
jonably design, operate and saineain the Queen

homane] Highusy/pelice station access road intersection
was a legal cause of plaintiffs’ damage(s)

 

 

14! " Gefendant Sauer was going about 60 miles per
hour prigr to braking. This was an unsafe speed for the
conditions existing on the highway.

28. “defendant Bauer breached her duty of due care by
being inattentive and traveling at an unsafe speed causing
her ear to cross the center Line and striking (Jeffrey's)

 

 

16, The negligence of Danielle Bauer was a legal
cause Of  [seffrey's) injuries.

3h. patengsns

Te. “Gefengant Sauer Te #80-at fault for the duly §,
9071) incident resulting in [the Feenkers" 1 damages

(Emphases added.)

   

1¢ “economic damage” 18 not defined in HRS chapter 663.
ive history to HRS § 6€5-10.9 indicates that “Lost wages,
Redical expenses, lost future wages, and future medical expenses”

Seconenie damages." Hse. Stang. Comm. Rep. No. 486, in 1986. Spec:
House Journal, at 43, This court has noted that econonic damages are
Sctherxise known 28 ‘out-of-pocket’ danages(.]”

Bankers £ Inge, Lts., 102 Hawas's 189, 201, 7¢ P.3a 12, 28 (2003).

HRS § 663-8.5 (1993) defines “nonecononic damages” as “damages for
pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurenent, loss of enjoyment of life,
[ees of consortium, and ail other nonpecumiary losses or claims.”

 

 

Seseion

 

 

 

 

4
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a

‘The Kienkers moved to amend these original conclusions
of law, requesting the court to (1) alter its conclusion of law
no. 17 to find the State 25¢ rather than ist, at faults and

(2) add 2 conclusion that the State was jointly and severally
Liable for the Kienkers’ noneconomic damages under HRS § 663-
10.9(4)£. In support of their motion, the Kienkers argued that
‘there were at least two prior accidents which would be ‘a prior

occurrence under similar circumstances’ under HRS § 663-10.9(4).”

 

© us § 663-10. (Supp. 2005) provides for the abolition of joint
and several iiability for Joint Cortfeasors except under certain circurstances
ae it states in relevant part:

(1) for the recovery of economic damages against

io -persone

ia} for the recovery of noneconcnic damages in
actions, other than those enumerated in paragraph (2),
{nvolving injury or death £0 persons against. those.
Lorefeasers whose individual Gegree of negligence is
found to ke twenty-five per cent of more under section
beara.” Where a torteaser's Gegree of negligence 1s
Jess than twenty-five per cent, then the amount
Fecoverable against that tortfeasor for noneconomic
Sonages shall be in dizect proportion to the degree of
hegligence assigned: and

(a) "for recovery of dana

 

 

nee on Tneluding actions
Trvolving gosrdraiis, otilsty poles, street and directional
signs, and-any other highvay-related device

Eee ins eetetses Saint tort fessor wae given reasonable

Eirumtanses 12 the-cocurrence upon which the tort claim is
Bosed. In-actione in which the affected joint tortfeasor
hes not been shown to have had such reasonable prior notice,
the recovery of noneccnomic danages shall be as provided in
paragraph (3)

(Emphases added.)

 

Paragraph (2) of RRS § 663-10.9 refers to the Liability of joint
tortfeasors in intentional torts, environmental pollution, toxic and asbestos
torts, torts involving aircraft accidente, strict and products Liability
forts, and cores relating to moter vehicle accidents not falling within
Subsection (i), ail of wnich are not relevant to the instant case. Also of no
fmport to thie case ie BRE § 663-31 (1993), which pertains to contributory and
comparative negligence.

 
‘**sFOR PUBLICATION*#*

The Kienkers also contended that “other prior accidents at or
near the police station intersection which would be ‘generally
similar to the instant case . . . would give further notice to
[the State] that the intersection presented = dangerous
condition{,]/" and listed seven motor vehicle accidents occurring
between May 24, 1990 and July 20, 1993. According to the
Kienkers’ highway and traffic engineering expert, the majority of
the intersection-related accidents occurred while traffic waited
for a left turn by a vehicle to take place.

on March 6, 2001, the court granted in part the
Kienkers’ motion and amended its findings and conclusions to:

AWENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

iz “mere nave been some prior accidents et and on
tthe section of highway nest the Queen K[eahunaru) and Police
hesess Koad intersection. These accidents involved cars
traveling south and being reaf-ended while stopped.

(2h. On Bebeuary 12, 1999, there wag 2 similar

428. The Eebrusry 12, 1992 accident gave the state
Eitsunstances to tne sccigent.

t2c.- The other rear-end collisions also aave the
state re i prier .

a3.

considered then contemplating whether or not to instal: &
Sete-turn lane at an sntersection.

‘Inaddition to accident history, the state alae
had notice of problems existing at the intersection of Queen

‘Klashunanul Mahwey and the police station access road by
Eeans of ite representatives attending neetines of the Kona
Traitic Safety Committee,

46. “concerns with respect to the intersection were
expressed to State officials by the Kona Traffic safety,
Committee in 1395 2

46. ‘afer the Kona Traffic Safety Committee expressed
ite concerns and recomendations to the State officials
nothing was done to correct problens with the intersection

{o. The dangerousness. and defective condition of the
intersection should have been kow to the State based on
fhe combinsticn of the increase in traffic volume, the

 
‘***POR PUBLICATION**+*

ee
0 lente in ene

(Emphases added.) No findings were made with respect to the

State’s liability for economic damages.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

5.” thd faiture of the State to correct the defective
and dangerous condition prior to July 5, 1997, constituted a
breach of duty by the state.

‘é:, The State was negidgent in its failure to correct
the defective and/or dangerous condition at the Qu
KTsahomano]_Hsghway/police, station access, road intersection.

z 4

 

 

in eis t_for
Te befencant Bauer is G00 at fault for the July 5,
19971) Aneident resulting in [the Kienkers’) damages.
30)” [ins] section 663-10,914) provides that:
cabolition of joint and several Liability: exceptions:

eint and several Léshility for joint cortssasors = ~~
. i

ij
ver noni ai nator ven
Epvoiving tore actions Feiating to the maintenance and

je.
ae
design of Bighwaye ed

Fi Since Defendant State had notice of a similar”

previous aceident, [the
fable w ant Bay jeconanie

(Emphases added.) The amended conclusions were silent with
respect to the State’s liability for economic damages.

The parties stipulated to the Kienkers’ damages in the
amount of $200,000 for special (“economic”) damages and $900, 000
for general (“noneconomic”) damages. On Novenber 26, 2001, the
court entered the first version of the final judgment in favor of
the Kienkers and against the State and Sauer, jointly and
severally, for the Kienkers’ total $1.1 million damages award.

5

On December 5, 2001, the State filed a motion for
‘***F0R PUBLICATION**#

reconsideration of the November 26, 2001 judgment, arguing that
HRS § 663-10.5 had abolished the State’s joint and several
Liability. on January 23, 2002, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration, and in its order ruled that, “[HRS] Section 663-
10.9(4) allows for joint and [several] liability where the
affected joint tortfeasor was given reasonable prior notice of a
prior occurrence under similar circumstances to the occurrence
upon which the tort claim is based. (HRS) Section 663-10.5 did
not supercede (HRS) Section 663-10.9(4).”

The State filed its notice of appeal on February 12,
2002. on April 19, 2002, during the pendency of the State's
appeal, the State filed a motion for partial relief fron judgment

under Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60° ("Rule 60

 

* Rs § 662+10.5 (Supp. 2005) provides for the abolition of joint
and several liability for government entities, in pertinent part, as follow

Gcovernsent entity at a tortfeaser; abolition of joint
and several liability. Notwithstanding sections 663-11 to
Ge3-13, 663-16, 663-17, and section GES-31, in any case
there a government entity is determined to be a tortfeasor
song with one or more other tort feasers, the government
entity shall be iiable for no sore then that percentas
Share of the damages attributable to the government entity.

 

 

Section 3 of Act 213, engcting HRS § €63-10.5, states that the
statute “lalpolies only to causes of action based uponacts ox omissions
geeurting on-or-after (June-22e 19041" 199 Haws Sess. Le Act 213, $3 at
S37 temphasis added) -

+ gee Rule 60 (2006) supplies 2 mechanism for the correction of
mistakes in judgments, orders, of other parts of the record as follows:

 

(a) Clerical Mistakes, Clerical mistakes in

judgments, orders of other parts of the record and errors

therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected

by the court ae any time of its ow initiative or on the

notion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the

Court orders, "During the pendency of an appeal, such

Eistakes may be #0 corrected before the appeal is docketed

Th the supreme court, and thereafter while the appeal 2
(continued...)

 

 

 
*+++FOR PUBLICATION®**

—

motion").

According to the State, “the (fJinal [j]udgment [filed

November 26, 2001) appears to have parted company with the

[almended

[findings of fact and conclusions of law filed March 6,

2001,} and to have unintentionally overstated the [State’s] share

of the stipulated damages award by imposing joint and several

Liability for both noneconomic and economic damages.” The State

argued that such discrepancy qualified as a “clerical mistake”

under Rule 60(a) or as a “mistake” or “inadvertence” under Rule

60(b) (2).

According to the State, the mistake or inadvertence

had the effect of imposing additional liability of $160,000 in

economic damages for which it was not liable.

 

 

continued)

‘Pending may be a0 corrected with leave of the suprene court.
‘el Mistakes; inadvertence; Excusable Neglect Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Ete. On motion and upon such
terms as ere just, the court ney relleve a party oF
egal representative from = finsi judgeent, order,
‘ding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,

 

      

oF proc
Thabvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
Been discovered in tine to move for a new trial under Rule
Seid); (2) fraud. whether heretofore denominated intrinsic
Or extrinsic], misrepresentation, oF other misconduct of an

 

Saverse partys [4] the dudgment ie void; (S) the Judgment
hes been’ sat iotied, released, or discharged, or a prior
Jodanent upon which it is based has been reversed or
Otherxise vacated, of it is no longer equitable that the
Sougment should have prospective application; or (6) any
ather reason Sustafying relief from the operation of the
Sougnent, The motion shall be made within a reasonable
Eine, and for ressons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one
year’ after the Judgment, Grder, oF proceeding was ente:
Uken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not a:
the finality of # judgnent or suspend its operation. This
Tule does not limit the power of 2 court to entertain en
Independent. action to relieve s party from a judgnent,
order, or proceeding, or to set aside 2 judgment for fraud
Gpon the court. Write of corsm nobis, corem vobis, auaita
Guerela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a
Bill of’ review, are abolished, and the procedure for
‘obtaining any relief from « judgment shail be by motion as
Prescribed in these rules or by an independent action

 

 

 

   

3
‘***F0R PUBLICATION***

 

on June 12, 2002, this court dismissed the State's
appeal for failure to comply with HRCP Rule 58.? On June 25,
2002, the court subsequently granted the State’s Rule 60 motion.
Bauer moved the court to reconsider its order and, inter alia,
argued that under HRS § 663-10.9(1)"" the State also should be
jointly and severally liable for the Kienkers’ economic damages.
The court denied Bauer's motion.

on August 22, 2002, the court entered a second version
of the final judgment. That judgment, in pertinent part, stated

as follow:

 

4. JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of [the
Ksenkers) and against (Bauer) and the State pursuant to the
Jrendea Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
‘Stipulation re: Danages as follows

teas 'to counts I and IIT of the Complaint, (Bauer)
Ae jointly and severally liable for (the Kienkers'} past and
EGtare general damages totaling $900,000 (~noneconomle
Ganages"), and for [the Kienkers") past and future special
Gamages toeal ing $200,000 ("econonse damages”)

 

   

 

* RCE Role $8 (2006) states the rule for entry of judgments in the
following manner:

Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the
provisions of Rule S4(b), judgnent upon the verdict of @
Jery shall be entered forthwith by the clerk; bat the court
Bhall direct the oppropriate Judgment to be entered upon a
Special verdict or upon a general verdict accompanied By
answers to interrogatories returned by = jury pursuant to
Rule 43." when the court directs that « party recover only
money of costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall
enter judgaent forthwith upon receipt by him of the
Sirection; But when che court Gizects entry of judgeent for
Other relief, the judge shall promptly settle o approve the
form of the judgment and direct that it be entered by the
Clerk. The filing of the judgnent in the office of the
Clerk constitutes the entry of the judgment; and the
Sodanent is not effective Before such entry. The entry of
the Jodgnent’ shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs.
Beery judguent shall be set forth on a separate document.

 

 

ag noted before, HRS § 663-10.5(1) retains joint and several
Liability for Joint tortfeasors where plaintiffs seek recovery of economic
Ganages "in actions involving injury of desth to persons{«]”

10
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ee

b, As to Counts II and ITT of the Complaint, the

state $5
io Jointly and severally Liable for ithe Kenkers’ 1
on cana Lin pana
the, biable Zor ite ssrcentace share-of the
Keenkers’ 1 £0 ae ao o0oL

(emphases added.) ‘The State moved the court to reconsider, but
the court denied the State’s motion on September 19, 2002. On
october 16, 2002, the State filed a second appeal based on the
August 22, 2002 judgment. This second appeal was also dismissed
by this court because the August 22, 2002 judgment did not comply
with the requirenents of HRCP Rule 5¢
on May 12, 2003, the court entered its third and final
version of the judgment. That judgment mirrored the second
judgment with regard to the apporticnment of damages. On May 27,
2003, the State filed a notice of appeal. Bauer filed her notice
of cross-appeal on June $, 2003.
mt
a
On appeal, the State first argues that the court erred
in interpreting HRS § 663-10.9(4) as authorizing joint and
several liability against the State because HRS § 663-10.5
abolishes joint and several liability for all government
entities." secondly, the State argues that the court abused its

the State maintaine that the court made this error in (1) the May
12, 2003 final judgnent, in which the court incorporated the amended findings
and conclusions ané determined the State jointly and severally liable for the
Klenkers' noneconcnic damages; (2) conclusion no. 21 of the March 6, 2001
Seended findings and conclusions, -elding the State jointly and severally
ifsble tor noneconesse damages; {3} the January 23, 2002 order denying the
Btete’s motion fer reconsideration of the Novenber 26, 2001 judgment, holding
the state jointly and severally Liable for all of the Kienkers’ danages: and
(continued. =)

 

sty
‘**+FOR PUBLICATION***
discretion when it amended conclusion no. 17 on March 6, 2001,

and increased the percentage of fault attributed to the state
from 15% to 208. The court amended conclusion no. 17 after
making additional findings that indicate the State had prior
notice of the dangerous or defective conditions existing prior to
the incident at issue.

In response, Bauer argues that (1) HRS § 663-10.5 does
not insulate the State from joint and several liability because
the State’s negligent acts occurred prior to June 22, 1984, the
effective date of HRS § 663-10.5; (2) HRS § 663-10.5 does not
supercede HRS § 663-10.9(4): and (3) the State cannot satisfy the
standard of review necessary for this court to overturn the
court’s findings on percentage of fault. The Kienkers argue that
(2) conclusions nos. 17 and 21 are unchallenged conclusions which
are binding on this court and that the State’s appeal should
therefore be dismissed; (2) the State's argunents on appeal
should be stricken because the court ordered that presentation of
arguments which could have been presented in earlier proceedings
were precluded and the State had not availed itself of such

Presentation;!? (3) HRS § 663-10.5 does not supercede HRS § 663-

 

continued)
(4) the Septenber 19, 2002 order denying the State's motion for
reconsideration of the August 22, 2002 Judgsent, holding the State jointly and
severally liable for nonecononic’ danages under ARS $ G63-10.9(4)

 

‘This argument consists of one paragraph and neither cites law nor
contains cites to the record. The appellate courts are not obligated te
Search the record to crystallize the parties’ ergunents. See Lanai
Yoclind Use Comma, 105 Hawai'i 296,309.31, 97 P.3d 372, 385 n. 31 (2008)
(stating that “(t]ais court is not obligated ‘to sift through the voluminous
record to verify an appellant’ s inadequately documented contentions”)
(Continued...)

 

12
‘+*4FOR PUBLICATION***
eee

10.914); and (4) the State has admitted by its pleadings to be
Liable for 208 of the damages and, moreover, the court did not
abuse its discretion in increasing the State’s percentage of
fault to 208.

‘The State replies (1) that the nonretroactivity clause
of HRS § 663-10.5 does not apply to this case and (2) that HRS
§ 663-10.5 controls in this case. The State requests that this
court reverse the final judgment and renand the case with
instructions for the court to enter a new judgment consistent
with the holding that (1) under HRS § 663-10.5, the State is
Liable only for its percentage share of the Kienkers’ nonecononic
and economic damages; and (2) the State is 15%, not 20%, at
fault.

8,

on cross-appeal, Bauer argues that (1) the court was

Without jurisdiction to issue its June 25, 2002 order granting

the State's Rule 60 motion, and, alternatively, the court abused

 

its discretion in granting partial relief from judgment; (2) the
court erred in its August 9, 2002 order denying Bauer's motion
for reconsideration or clarification of the June 25, 2002 order
granting the State's motion for partial relief from judgment; and
(3) the court erred in its May 12, 2003 final judgment that
exempted the State from joint and several Liability for economic

damages.

 

continued)
this argunent is not considered.

13

 
‘+*#FOR PUBLICATION*#*

The State answers that (1) the court had jurisdiction
to grant the State’s Rule 60 motion; (2) the court did not err
when it granted the State’s motion pursuant to Rule 60(a) and
(b)s (3) HRS § 663-10.5 supersedes the common law; and (4) the
court never ruled on whether HRS § 663-10.5 supercedes HRS 663-
10.911).

In reply, Bauer argues that (1) the State failed to
appeal the procedural basis for the court’s rejection of its
argument on HRS § 663-10.5 and the amended findings and
conclusions satisfy HRCP Rule 52, and (2) the amendment of a
Judgment pursuant to HRCP Rule 60 requires a clear error. Bauer
requests that this court (1) vacate the court’s June 25, 2002
order granting the State's Rule 60 motion; (2) vacate the court's
August 9, 2002 order denying Bauer’s motion for reconsideration
or, in the alternative, clarification of order granting the
State’s Rule 60 motion: and (3) vacate the May 12, 2003 final
judgment and remand it for amendment and reformation consistent
with this court's holding, wherein Sauer asks that the final
judgnent be reformed to provide that the State is jointly and
severally liable for the Kienkers’ economic and noneconomic
damages.

Ww.

This court views conclusions of law de nove under the
“right (or) wrong” standard. Roxas vs Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91,
115, 969 P.2d 1203, 1233 (1998) (reviewing conclusions of law de

u
***F0R PUBLICATION*#*
novo under the right ox wrong standard); State v. Camara, 61
HawaS't 324, 328, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (reviewing the

interpretation of a statute de novo). Findings of fact are

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Child Support

nforcement Agency v. Roe, 96 Hawai'i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70
(2001). “[A finding of fact] . . . is clearly erroneous when

(2) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding
or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to support
the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Id. (quoting Ince Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97,
119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000)).

vy.

As mentioned before, on March 6, 2001, the court
amended its conclusions, including conclusion no. 17, which
increased the State’s fault from 15% to 208, and conclusion no.
21, which held the State jointly and severally liable for the
Kienkers’ noneconomic damages. On January 23, 2002, the court
had denied the State's motion for reconsideration on the basis
that the State did not present new evidence or arguments that
could not have been presented during the earlier proceeding. The
Kienkers’ position, then, is that the State would be barred from
arguing that HRS § 663-10.5 abolished joint and several liability

for the State, that the court erred in ruling that HRS § 663-

as
‘+##F0R PUBLICATION***
10.9(4) was applicable, and that Tavlor-Rice v. State, 91 Hawai"L
60, 979 P.2d 1086 (1999), was not relevant.'?

vi.

As noted earlier, the State’s first argument is that
the court erred in relying on HRS § 663-10.9(4) to impose joint
and several liability against the State because HRS § 663-10.5
abolishes joint and several liability for all government
entities. Bauer's first response to this argument is that this
court need not reach that question because HRS § 663-10.5
contains @ nonretroactivity clause limiting its application “only
to causes of action based upon acts or omissions occurring on or
after June 22, 1994." 1994 Haw. Sess. L. Act 213, § 4 at 517.
Bauer asserts that the “key negligent acts or omissions” occurred
in 1992, before the effective date of June 22, 1994, and, thus,
HRS § 663-10.5 does not apply in this case.

This court has previously examined the nonretroactivity
clause of HRS § 663-10.5 in Doe Parents No, 1 v, State Dep't of
Educs, 100 Hawai'i 34, 98 P.3d 545 (2002). In Doe Parents No. 1,
the parente of school children who had been molested by a teacher
(orton) in 1995 ued the Department of Education (the DOE) for

negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.

 

© the state argues that the court relied solely on this court’s
holding in ZavlorsRice vy State, 91 Hawai'i 60, 979 P.24 1086 (1999), but
failed to consider the effect of HAS $ 663-10.5. In that case, this court
held’ that HRe § €63°10.9(4) was applicable to the State ins motor vehicle
accident case. This court did not entertain a challenge regarding the
Gpplication of HRE § Ge3-10.5 because that statute was enacted after the
automobile accident in that case. Id. at 75-80, 979 P.Zd at 1105-06.

 

16
+*#POR PUBLICATION*+*
SSS

at 41, 51, 58 P.3d at $52, 562. Tt was concluded that the DOB
was liable for (1) its negligent retention of Norton in 1993,

(2) its negligent supervision of Norton from 1993 to the acts of
molestation in 1995, (3) its interrogation of the children in
1995, and (4) its failure to inform the children’s parents of
their molestation accusations. Id. at 87, 58 P.3d at 598.

Given that the nonretroactivity clause made the statute
applicable to “causes of action based upon acts or omissions”
occurring on or after June 22, 1994, the plaintiffs had contended
that the “key negligent act” of the DOE occurred in 1993 upon the
retention of Norton after he had been acquitted in connection
with a prior allegation of molestation. Id. This court agreed
with the plaintiffs and stated that the nonretroactivity clause
“requires a determination of when @ government entity's employee
engaged in the act or omission for which the entity is being held
Liable.” Id. Thus, HRS § 663-10.5 was ruled inapplicable to the
plaintiffs’ claims to the extent the claims were based upon the
DOE’ s negligent retention of Norton.

In the instant case, Bauer argues that key negligent
acts and omissions by the State occurred before June 22, 1994.
Specifically, she points to (1) the identification of the portion
of the highway where Jeffrey's accident occurred as deficient én
design by 1992 because of increasing traffic volunes (2) the
development of several facilities on the Police Station Access

Road that led to an increase in the nunber of left turns that

uv
+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*

would be made from Queen Kaahumanu Highway; and (3) a February
12, 1992 accident at the intersection of Queen Kaahunanu Highway
and the Police Station Access Road that had given the State
reasonable prior notice of an accident under circumstances
similar to the one involving Jeffrey.

‘The State responds that the nonretroactivity clause of
HRS § 663-10.5 does not apply because the 1992 accident was not
the key act or omission on which the Kienkers based their cause
of action. As indicated in its March 6, 2001 amended findings,
the court found that (1) “[a]ccident history is not the only
factor to be considered”; (2) “[i]n addition to accident history,
the State also had notice of problems” through meetings of the
Kona Traffic Safety Committee; (3) concerns “were expressed to
State officials by the . . . Committee in 1995, 1996, and 1997"
(4) after the Committee "expressed its concerns and
reconmendations to the State officials nothing was done to
correct the problems;” and (5) “[t]he dangerousness and defective
condition of the intersection should have been known to the State
based on the combination of the increase in traffic volume, the
development of the area served by the police station access road,
prior accidents and the queuing condition at the intersection.”
(Emphasis added.)

‘Thus, the court did not expressly find any one event,
such as the 1992 accident, to be a key negligent act or omission

occurring before June 22, 1994. Rather, based on its amended

ae
++#FOR PUBLICATION*#*
findings of fact, it is apparent thet the court considered motor
vehicle incidents that occurred prior to June 22, 1994,
specifically the motor vehicle accidents between May 24, 1990 and
guly 20, 1993, and factors before and after 1994, in ultimately
finding that the State was negligent in 1997. The State does
not dispute that these incidents occurred. Because the court's
Findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence as related
above, we conclude that no clear error exists to disturb such
findings.
vit.

The Kienkere’ third argument is that HRS § 663-10.5
does not supercede HRS § 663-10.9. On the other hand, the State
replies that both the plain language and the legislative history

of HRS § 663-10.5 demonstrate that that section prevails.

‘The legislature enacted HRS § 663-10.9 in 1986, before

it enacted HRS § 663-10.5. 1986 Haw. Sp.

 

Sess. L. Act 2, § 17
fat 10-11. To reiterate, HRS § 663-10.9(3) and (4) provide, in
pertinent part, as follows:

joint ond tis

Joint and several Liability for joint tort:
Section 663-11 2 abolished except in the following circumstances:

     

is)” For the recovery of noneconomic damages in
actions, other than those enumerated in

te may be noted that in ite original Septenber 14, 2000 findins
and conclusions, the court did not renser a finding thet notice to the State
Of a prior siniiar act occurred in 1992, lending sone weight to the conclusion
Chet fe wes the conbinstion of events spanning 1988 through 1987 that. the
court relied on in finding the State negligent.

19

   
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

OO

paragraph (2), involving injury or death to
Persons agoinst those tortfeasers whose

Thatvidual degree ef negligence is found to be
tuenty-five per cent or more onder (§] 663-31

 

ise than tuenty=fiv hen the
neon seh act
(4) For recovery of noneconomic danaaes in sotcr

‘upon a showing that the affected
rvas given ceasonable prior

= To The occurrence upon which the
fore cisim is bases. «

   

(Emphases added.) The legislative history of HRS § 663-10.9
Indicates that the fourth exception, which relates to noneconomic
damages in motor vehicle accidents arising from the maintenance
and design of highways was intended to “place governmental and
nongovernmental agencies responsible for the design and
maintenance of highways within the twenty-five percent rule of
the third exception despite the exception for motor vehicle
accidents ior was exist =

x ve sn.” Sen. Stand. Comm.

Rep. No. $5-86, in 1986 Senate Journal, at 29 (emphasis added).
Eight years later the legislature enacted HRS § 663-
10.5, 1994 Haw. Sess. L. Act 213, §§ 1-4 at 516-17. As related
before, that statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Government entity as a tortfeasor; abolition of icint
ee ty. Motwithstandine dection G6i-]1 to
Bess, ee3-1€, 662-17, ana section 665-31, ip any case
Elong with one of Bore other tortfessors, tne government
f@neity shail be Liable for no pore than that percentage
Shire’? the Ganages sttsinutable To the covermnent ent
(Emphases added.)

   

20
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION***

 

When interpreting a statute, the court’s sole duty is
to give meaning to the legislature's intent, which should “‘be
obtained primarily fron the language contained in the statute
itself.‘” State v. Putnam, 93 Hawai'i 362, 367, 3 P.3d 1239,
1244 (2000) (quoting Grav v. Admin, Dir. of the Court, @4 Hawaii
138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, $90 (1997) (other citations omitted).
The State asserts that because HRS § 663-10.5 excludes the
provisions of BRS § 663-11 (1993) relating to joint tortfeasors
and states that HRS § 663-10.5 applies “in any case” in which the
government is a tortfeasor, the legislature communicated its
intention to exclude the State from joint and several liability
under chapter 663.

However, HRS § 663-11 merely defines the term “joint
tortfeasors.” Under HRS 663-11 the term means “two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury
to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered
against all or some of then.” In Petersen v. City & County of
Honolulu, $1 Haw. 494, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969), this court noted
that HRS $$ 663-11 to 663-17, which were derived from the Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, “provide(] for

apportionment of the common liability of joint tortfeasors as

among thenselves, affect the joint and sev
Liability of each defendant.” Id, at 485, 462 P.2d at 1008

(emphasis added). The Commissioner's Note to Section 2(4) of the

Uniform Act was cited as follows:

 

21
‘***F0R PUBLICATION*#*

Ithe section) would permit apportionment of pro rata shares
Gf liability of the Joint tortfeasors as anong thenselves.

3 person, Th
that there Ts a very strong ¢
the common Liability as anong the tortfeasors wher
Gvidence clearly indicates that one oF more of thi
tortfessors wes much nore at

others. At the sane tine they wish to soint out that each
Eoreteascr Le stils completely and fully liable Somard the
‘inured person.

 

ipaftamen of the Act feel
to be made for apportioning
the

 

 

 

 

 

Ida at 485 n.1, 462 P.2d at 1008 n.1 (emphases added). Thus, the
State's argument that the express mention of HRS § 663-11 in HRS
§ 663-10.5 is indicative of the legislature's intent to exclude
the government’s joint and several liability in every instance is
not persuasive.

Moreover, the fact that HRS § 663-10.5 states that it
applies “in any case” does not avoid the fact that an exception
can still co-exist with the application of § 663-10.5. The
legislative intent was to impose joint and several liability
where the government had reasonable prior notice of any dangerous
or defective condition, as discussed in Section VIII, infra.

5

‘The highway accident exception to abolition of joint
and several Liability Listed in Section 663-10.9(4) established
the joint and several Liability of the State to the Kienkers for
highway design torts. We may presune that the legislature was
aware of the existing exceptions to the abolition of joint and
several Liability listed in HRS $ 663-10.9 at the time st
subsequently enacted HRS § 663-10.5. See Reefshare, Ltd. v
Nagata, 70 Haw. 93, 98, 762 P.24 169, 173 (1988) (stating that

22
‘+*+FOR PUBLICATION*#*
ee

“courts will not presume an oversight on the part of the
legislature where such presumption is avoidable”); Marsland v.
Bang, 5 Haw. App. 463, 485, 701 P.2d 175, 192 (1985) (assuming
that the legislature was aware of the state of the law of
nuisance abatement at the time it enacted another nuisance
statute).

The express language of HRS § 663-10.5 lacks any
mention of Section 663-10.9. Although HRS $ 663-10.5 was enacted
after HRS § 663-10.9, HRS § 663-10.5 does not state that it
supercedes HRS § 663-10.9(4). That such language is lacking is
significant, and one must assume, intended. See First Ins. Co.
of Havaii vs Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i 2, 8, 881 P.2d 489, 495,
(holding that provisions in a statute in derogation of principles
of common law tort Liability “Ymust be strictly construed and,
where it does not appear that there was a legislative purpose in
the statute to supersede the common law, the common law applies’”
(quoting Doi vs Hawaiian Ing, & Guar, Co., 6 Haw. App. 456, 465,
890 (1986)), reconsideration denied, 77 Hawai'i
373, 884 P.2d 1149 (2994) of, Hill v. Halmbuber, 9 $.W.2d 55,

56-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928) (noting that when a statute is in

727 P.2d 88

 

derogation of the common law, the intention of the legislature
will not be presumed to repeal the common law or a prior statute
unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended to cover
the whole subject). Thus, the fact that the legislature did not

expressly address the exceptions listed in HRS § 663-10.9 is

23
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
indicative of an intent to retain the exception in Section 663-

10.9(4), with respect to HRS § 663-10.5.

iad the legislature intended that HRS $ 663-10.5 should
supercede HRS § 663-10.9 or exenpt the State from joint and
several liability for tortious maintenance and design of
highways, it could have easily and clearly said so by including
Section 663-10.9(4) in the introductory “Notwithstanding” clause
of Section 663-10.5. The legislature could also have enployed
broader exclusionary language in the introduction to HRS § 663
10.5.

Words such as “notwithstanding any other law to the
contrary,” which would have the effect advocated by the State and
that have been utilized in other statutes, were not adopted. See
State vs Rice, 66 Haw. 101, 102, 657 P.2d 1026 (1983) (holding
that the “notwithstanding any law to the contrary” clause in
Section 72-1200(4) removes the court’s discretion to grant
deferred acceptance of guilty pleas under HRS § 853-1). Thus,
the plain language of Section 663-10.5 did not express any
legislative intent that Section 663-10.9(4) be superceded or that
the State be exempted from joint and several liability in a

situation where Section 663-10.9(4) applied.'*

 

the State alse maintains that Sf Section 663-10.9(4) controls,
then Section €63-10.5 Becenes meaningless. However, we must reject the
State's argument inasmuch se "we mst assume that the legislature would not
enact superfiucus Languaget.)” .
Uenturg, 78 Hawai'd 351, 355, 693 F.2d 779, 782 (1999)

24
‘***FOR PUBLICATION®#*

 

c.

Furthermore, it may be observed that HRS § 663-10.5 and
HRS § 663-10.9 are statutes that overlap on the question of joint
and several liability. Each statute refers to the abolition of
joint and several Liability. HRS § 663-10.5 states broadly thet
“the government entity shall be liable for no more than that
percentage share of the damages attributable to the government
entity.” On the other hand, HRS § 663-10.9 enumerates exceptions
to the abolition of joint and several liability. Where two
statutes overlap in their application effect can be given to
both. See Richardson v. City & County of Honclulu, 76 Hawai'i
46, 55, 868 2.24 1193, 1202 (1994) (stating that “where there is
‘a plainly irreconcilable conflict between a general and a
specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific
Will be favored! but] where the statutes simply overlap in their
application, effect will be given to both if possible, as repeal
by implication is disfavored” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). Here, it is possible to give effect to both
statutes inasmuch as the broad language of HRS § 663-10.5 may be
construed as abolishing the government’s joint and several
Liability unless an exception such as that embodied in HRS § 663-
10.9 applies.

>.
The State contends, however, that Section 663-10.5 is

the more specific statute, and therefore should control, citing

Littleton v. state, 6 Haw. App. 70, 73, 708 P.2d 829, 832 (1985),

25
+##FOR PUBLICATION***
ee

for the proposition that a statute explicitly referring to the

State’s liability is more “specific” for purposes of statutory

construction. But the result in Littleton is not inapposite. In
rs on, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) decided that

MRS § 478-2 (Supp. 1984) did not impliedly repeal HRS § 662-8
(1976). Ida at 72, 708 P.2d at 632.

HRS § 478-2 (Supp. 1984) provided, in relevant part,
that “[{)nterest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more,
shall be allowed on any judgment recovered before any court in
the State, in any civil suit.” Littleton, 6 Haw. App. at 72 n.3,
708 P.2d at 831 n.3. Conteastingly, HRS § 662-8 was viewed as
the specific statute. Id. HRS $ 662-8 (1976) stated in
pertinent part, that “[oJn all final judgments rendered against
the State . . . interest shail be computed at the rate of four
per cent a year... .” Id, The ICA concluded that HRS § 662-8
“carved out of the general subject of judgment interest a
specific exception relating to judgments against the State.” id.

Assuming, arguendo, that “there is a plainly
irreconcilable conflict between a general statute and a specific
statute concerning the same subject matter,” Richardson, 76
Hawai'i at 55, 868 P.2d at 1202, HRS § 663-10.5 is the general
statute insofar as it provides for the abolition of joint and
several liability for a government entity generally, and lists no
‘exceptions in its provisions. On the other hand, HRS § 663-10.9
expressly refers to “exceptions” to the abolition of joint and
several liability, as indicated in its title. See Spears vw.
Honda, 51 Haw. 1, 17, 449 P.2d 130, 139 (1968) (stating that

26
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION***
“[4ln construing an act, the title may be resorted to for the

purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the act”). HRS § 663-
10.9, then, is more specific with regard to determining the
State's liability, particularly with respect to the maintenance
and design of highways.

Littleton does not stand for a general rule that any
time a statute relates to the State’s liability it is more
“specific” for purposes of statutory construction, but that the
statutes at issue mist be analyzed on a case by case basis. In
the situation here, it is evident as it pertains to the state
that HRS § 663-10.5 is the general statute, and HRS § 663-10.9,
which Liste exceptions to the general abolition of joint and
several liability, is the specific statute which describes the
State’s potential liability in cases involving “the maintenance
and design of highways . . . and any other highway-related device
upon a showing that the affected joint tortfeasor was given
reasonable prior notice of a prior occurrence . . . .”
Therefore, under rules of statutory construction, the specific
statute, in this case HRS § 663-10.9(4), would be given effect.

5,

Citing to Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown 6 Williamson

Tobacco Corp., $29 U.S. 120 (2000), the State also maintains that

 

because HRS § 663-10.5 is the later enacted statute, it is
favored, But that case did not indicate that 2 later-enacted
statute always controls. In Brown & Williamson, the Supreme
court grappled with a regulatory scheme based upon six statutes

enacted over a thirty-five year period. Id. at 143. Upon the

2
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*
observation that a “distinct regulatory scheme” exists, the Court

concluded under the circunstances that “a specific policy
embodied ina later federal statute should control our
construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it hals) not
been expressly amended.” Id. at 143-44 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Such a scheme or history of legislation
is not present in the instant case, and, thus, Brown & Williamson
does not aid in determining whether HRS § 663-10. supercedes HRS
§ 663-10.9.%

vant.

Additionally, the legislative history of HRS § 663-10.5
supports the conclusion that the statute was not intended to
supersede or impliedly repeal HRS § 663-10.9. House Bill No.
1088, introduced in 1993 as @ short form bill, and reintroduced
in 1994, eventually became HRS § 663-10.5. 1994 Haw. Sess. L.
Act 213, §§ 1-4 at 516-17. As proposed in 1993, the purpose of
H.B. 1088 was to “abolish joint and several liability for a joint
tortfeasor where that tortfeasor’s degree of fault is less than
or equal to the degree of fault of the person seeking recovery of
damages.” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 496, in 1993 House Journal,
at 1173. The House Judiciary Committee apparently referred
favorably to the exception under HRS § 663-10.9(4) created for
highway cases where the government had no prior notice of a

defect:

 

ie do, however, agree with the state that Tavlor-Rice is not
controlling of our inguiry. ‘Although that case held that Section 6€3-10.9(4)
Was applicable to the State, as mentioned before, the case is not helpful to
Sur decision heredn inasmuch as Section 663-10.5 was enacted afeer the
Sutonedile accident in that case. 91 Hawaii at 79-80, 979 P.2a at 1105-06.

28

 
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

(v)our Committee believes that it is appropriate, in very
Linites circumstances and because of the unique

Fecponsibilities cf the government, £0 contique the practice
sioroviding sone shielding to the covexonent {rom ioint ang

 

Soraxiaant has had no notice of a defect.
Hise. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 654, in 1993 House Journal, at 1240
(emphasis added) .

Moreover, a 1993 Senate Committee report also seemingly
confirmed that the legislature desired to retain HRS § 663-
10.9(4) which had been previously enacted in 1986:

$00 = of
ns wave, but has amended the

provision affecting Joint tortfeasor who have had
Pessonable prior notice of dangerous conditions, since
public policy ie better served by holding tortfeasors who
know of dangerous conditions responsible for their
negligence in failing £0 take reasonable precautions to
prevent injury or death to others.

‘Your Committee finds that the provisions enacted in
1986 relating to the sbolition of Joint and several
Liability were a good start in addressing the issue and hi
worked reasonably well in preventing any crisis involving
Joint end several Liability

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sen. Stand, Comm. Rep. No. 1350, in 1993 Senate Journal, at 1259
(enphasis added) «

‘The legislature ultimately decided against amending HRS
§ 663-10.9(4)," and adopted HRS § 663-10.5. Thus, in 1994,
instead of adopting the 1993 proposal, the legislature sought to

Limit a governmental entity’s liability to “no more than that

 

© qn 1993, the legislature originelly stated that 4.8. 1088 anended
Section 662-10.3, but in 1994, when the Dill passed, the legislature had
Geleted thot language from its report. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1350, in
{993 Senate Journal, at 1288) Hse. Cont. Comm, Rep. No. 48, in 1994 Hou!
Soornel, at 803.

 

23
+#*FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

percentage share of the damages attributable” to it." In doing
s0, the Committee noted that “(HRS § 663-10.5] is necessary to
ensure fairness and equity for government entities who, because
of their ‘deep pockets’, may be otherwise required to pay more
than their fair share when determined to be a joint tortfeasor.”
Hise. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 48, in 1994 House Journal, at 803.
Nevertheless, it is evident from the history of H.B. 1088 that
the intent of the legislature was to “retain[]” HRS § 663-

10..9(4).

 

n. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1350, in 1993 Senate
Journal, at 1258-59.

In addition, it 4s significant that in 1995, the
legislature, after enacting HRS § 663-10.5, made HRS § 663
10,914) @ permanent law by deleting the provision providing for
its repeal as of October 1, 1995. 1995 Haw. Sess. L. Act 130, 96
1-3 at 208. Thus, the legislature evinced its intention to
continue Section 663-10.9(4) in force even after it enacted

Section 663-10.5.

 

ae proposed in 1994, HRS § 663-10.5 stated as follows!

$ 665- Government entity as a tortfeasor; abolition
of Joint ands

 
 

En any case where 2 government
tortfeasor along with one or nore other tortfeasers, the
goverment entity shall be liable for no more than that
Percentage ‘attributable to the
government

 

 

15994 Haw. Sess. L. Act 213, § 2 at 516-17.

% the Act removed the sunset provision initially enbedied in Section
Ling the bracketed materisl es follows: "*Section 31. This Act

fe effect upon its approval, and Sections 2, & 5, 6, 7, and 20 shall

be repealed on October 1, 1995]."" 1995 Haw. Sess. L, Act'130, §§ 1-3 at 208.

30

   
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*

‘The State asserts that the court “substituted its own

policy preferences for those of the legislature's” and that the
Kienkers here are looking to the “deep pocket” of the State.

However, we note that the legislature’s intent regarding H.B.

 

1088 focused on “fairness

Ins between an innocent plaintiff end defendant who bears
fault, public policy should tilt towards the innocent
injured plaintiff, wbile at the sane tine recognizing that
ro defendant should be required te bear a disproportionate
Share of the Judgment when that defendant shoulders less
lane than the plaintiff.

Your Connittee believes the solution proposed in this
bill represents a logically consistent approach to the
problem of fairness... If the defendant's degri
Fault is more than that of the (pllaintiff, public policy
tilts toward protecting the interests of the less
bleseworthy injured (plaintiff, and the defendant is
Jointly and severally liable.

Your Committee believes the sane concest should axoly
othe government, both as plaintiff or defendant, yet your

 

 

 

Comittee believes that it is at a vers
he covers nue the rovidin
‘abigiding to the covernsent tros ieint and several Liability
fn sertein highway cases where the covernment has fed no
hotice of a detect.

Hse. Stand, Comm. Rep. No. 654, in 1993 House Journal, at 1240
(emphases added). H.B. No. 1088 eventually passed in 1994 to
become HRS § 663-10.5 with, as earlier indicated supra,
modifications in its “notwithstanding” language. Therefore, as
demonstrated by the legislative history of HRS § 663-10.5, in
order to achieve fairness, the legislature found it appropriate
to shield the State from joint and several liability “in very
Limited circumstances . . . in certain highway cases where the
government has had no notice of a defect.” Hse. Stand. Conm.

Rep. No. 654, in 1993 House Journal, at 1240 (emphases added).

Hence, the legislature did not envision that the State would be

31
‘+4¥FOR PUBLICATION*#*
completely shielded from joint and several Liability where it had
vpricr notice” of highway defects. We conclude that HRS § 663+
10.5 does not supercede or impliedly repeal HAS § 663-10.9."

Ix,

As stated previously, the State’s second argunent is
that the court abused its discretion in amending conclusion no.
17 on Mach 16, 2001, by increasing the percentage of fault
attributed to the State from 15% to 208. The State declares that
HRCP Rule 52(b) to “secure

 

the court allowed the Kienkers to ui
a rehearing on the merits,” in violation of that rule, HRCP Rule
52(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “the court may amend its
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment
accordingly.”

The State points out that in the Kienkers’ motion to

amend to find the State as 25% at fault and Bauer as 75% at

 

fault, the Kienkers presented two arguments. These arguments
were (1) under Tavlor-Rice, the State should be found more at
fault for the accident and (2) under HRS § 663-10.9(3),” if the

 

© ‘The State also maintains that Section 663-10.5 1s 2 limitation on
the legielature’s waiver of the State’ sove HRS § 662-2.
ie need not reach this argument because it wi the court

 

 

“asa general rule, if 3 party does not reise an argunent at triel, thet
argument will be deemed to have Been weived on appeal) this rule applies in
Both criminal and civil cases.” State v Moses, 102 Hawai'i 445, 456, 77 F.3d
940, 947" (2003).

As previously noted, HRS § 663-10.9(3) provides an exception to
the abelition of Joint and several Liability, Unless covered by ceses under
Subsection (2), HRS § 663°10-9(3) permits the recovery of nonecononic canages
involving injury of death to persons, where the tortfeasor’s individual degree
of negligence is found to be greater than 258.

32

 

 
‘+*#P0R PUBLICATION®#*

court found the State at least 25% at fault, the State would be
potentially liable for the entire noneconomic damages award. The
State contends that because these were the game arguments the
Kienkers and Bauer had presented during the trial on liability,
they presented no new evidence or law in the motion to amend.
‘The State argues that therefore the court entered no new findings
but only findings detailing notice the State had received of
prior similar occurrences.

However, according to the motion to amend, the Kienkers
requested the judgment be amended because the “State knew of the
dangerousness and defective condition of the intersection, had an
opportunity to correct it and failed to do so.” In their motion,
the Kienkers referred to prior accidents which the court had
previously failed to mention in its findings. Thus, the court
made amended findings at paragraphs 42A, 428, and 42C regarding
the accident in 1992 and “the other rear-end collisions” which
“also gave the State reasonable notice of prior occurrences.”

A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
amend is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Roxas,
89 Hawai'i at 115, 969 P.2d at 1233. “*An abuse of discretion
occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of
reason or has disregarded rules or principles of law or practice
to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.’” Id. (quoting
State v, Davia, 87 Hawai'i 249, 253, 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1988).

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 52 is substantially

33
‘+*4FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
similar to HRCP Rule $2(b).%* “Where a Hawai" rule of civil

procedure is identical to the federal rule, ‘the interpretation

of this rule by federal courts is highly persuasive.’" Collins

vs S. Seas Jeep Eacle, 87 Hawai'i 86, 88, 952 P.2d 374, 376
(2997) (quoting Shaw v. N. Am Title Co., 76 Hawai"! 323, 326,

876 P.2d 1291, 1294 (1994)). In that regard, the purpose of FRCP
Rule 52(b) is for the trial court to “correct manifest errors of
law or fact.” See Lyons v, Jefferson Bank & Trust, 793 F. Supp.
989, 990-91 (D. Colo, 1992) (denying defendant bank's motion to
amend findings of fact to support theories raised in post-trial
motions) «

under FRCP Rule 52(b), the trial court may amend its
findings under the Rule even if doing so would effectively
reverse the judgment. See Nat/] Metal Finishing Co, v, Barclavs
Amex /Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1990)
(disagreeing with plaintiff’s contention that FRCP Rule $2(b)
does not allow a court “to so thoroughly alter its findings as to
reverse completely the prior judgment” and holding that the
purpose of FRCP Rule 52(b) is “to permit the correction of any
manifest errors of law or fact” even if the errors require
reversal of a previous judgment).

In light of the construction given FRCP Rule 52(b),
HRCP Rule 52(b) authorized the court to amend its findings and
alter its judgment. The facts concerning other collisions

occurring between 1990 and 1993 revealed the degree of prior

 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 52(b) provides, in
pertinent pares that "the court may amend its findings--or make additional
"indinges-snd may amend the judgment accordingly.”

34

 
‘+*4P0R PUBLICATION®#*

notice the State had of similar occurrences. An objective basis
for the court's decision to alter its ruling on the state's
percentage of fault thus existed. Hence, it cannot be concluded
that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason in
increasing the State’s percentage of fault. The court therefore

did not abuse its discretion.”

 

AL

on cross-appeal Bauer first challenges the June 25,
2002 order of the court granting the State’s Rule 60 motion. As
arlier stated, the gist of the State’s motion was that 2
discrepancy existed between the March 26, 2001 findings of fact
and conclusions of law and the Novenber 26, 2001 final judgment
insofar as the final judgment indicated that the State was
jointly and severally liable for economic damages. Inasmuch as
the State's motion was made pursuant to HRCP Rule 60, the court’s
order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and not @
de nova standard of review, as Bauer seeks. Benefi
Inc. vs Casey, 98 Hawai'i 159, 164, 45 P.3d 359, 364 (2002)
(stating that the abuse of discretion standard applies to a Rule
60(b) motion); Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai'i 152, 160, 977 P.2d
160, 168 (1999) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to a
Rule 60 motion).

Bauer contends that the court’s order should be

reversed because the court lacked jurisdiction under HRCP Rule

% —pecause we come to thie conclu
Kienkers! argument that the State le bound by ite pleadings

35

 

che
‘+##F0R PUBLICATION***
ee
60(a) oF (b) to grant the relief requested, and, alternatively,

the court abused its discretion in granting partial relief from
judgment. The court did not state whether its decision to grant
the Rule 60 motion was founded upon Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b).

‘Thus, each is examined.

 

As earlier noted, HRCP Rule 60(a) provides:

(a) Clerical Mistakes, Clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
Gherein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
by the court st any tine of its own initiative or on the
notion of any party and after such notice, Sf any, a the

 

Court ceders. During the pendency of an ancesl, such
he 20 = a

‘ending may beso corrected with leave of the sunrene court.
(Emphasis added.)

Also, as indicated before, the State filed its appeal
with this court on February 12, 2002, The court’s order granting
the State's motion for partial relief from judgment was entered
on June 25, 2002, Bauer asserts that under Rule 60(a), the court
could only adopt corrections with leave of this court and the
court lacked such leave when it granted the State’s motion.
However, the court did have jurisdiction under Rule 60(a) because
this court had dismissed the State’s appeal on June 12, 2002.
‘Thus, the appeal was no longer “pending” at the time the court
granted the State's motion. Accordingly, the court was vested
with jurisdiction to grant the motion pursuant to Rule 60(2).

Bauer next argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to
grant the motion under HRCP Rule 60(b) because the court did not
follow the procedure set out in Life of the land v, Arivoshi, $7
Haw. 249, 553 P.2d 464 (1976). In Brivoshi, this court stated

36
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that, “[JJurisdiction is in this court while the appeal is

pending . . . . Nevertheless, the [Rule 60(b)] motion may be made
and considered in the circuit court. If that court indicates
that it will grant the motion, the appellant may then move in
this court for a remand of the case.” Id. at 252, 553 P.2d at
466. Again, however, the appeal was not pending in this court at
the time the State's motion was granted. ‘Therefore, the court

had jurisdiction to grant the State’s motion under Rule 60(b).

 

As related above, Bauer also argues that it is an abus:
of discretion for the court to grant relief from judgment under
HRCP Rule 60(a) where the record does not indicate a clerical

fake existed. But cases construing Rule 60(a) have generally

 

held that a judgment may be amended when the court has shown a
clear intention which the judgment neglected to reflect. see
Wibitman v. Whitman, 91 Hawai'i 468, 470, 985 P.2d 659, 661 (1999)
(holding that “obvious mathematical errors” could be corrected,
and ruling that Rule 60(a) “is used to make the judgment or
record speak the truth and. . . to make it say. . . what
originally was pronounced” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted))+ Donnelly v. Donnelly, 98 Hawai'i 260, 286, 47 P.3d
747, 753 (App) (holding that Rule 60(a) allowed amendment where
a proposed divorce decree substantively deviated from a prior
written decision and order), cert, denied, 98 Hawai'i 497, 50
P.3d 973 (2002); Davis v. Wholesale Motors, Inc., 86 Hawai'i 405,
416, 949 P.2d 1026, 1037 (App. 1997) (stating that Rule 60(a)

“permits the correction of a judgment ‘if the intention to

3
 

 

FOR PUBLICATION!
Oe
include particular provision in the judgment was clear, but the

judge neglected to include that provision[,]/" and determining
that amendnents to a judgment were proper when the record
reflected the court's intent to include amended provisions in the
original judgment (citation onitted)). Accordingly, the court
properly exercised its authority under Rule 60(a) to amend its
judgment to conform it to the amended findings and conclusions.
In addition, under the foregoing circumstances described, the

court also properly exercised its discretion under Rule 60(b),

 

wherein Rule 60(b) allows the court to correct its own mista
Donnelly, 98 Hawas't at 286, 47 P.3d at 753.

In the instant case, the court granted the State's
motion to amend the judgrent to hold the State jointly and
severally lable only for noneconomic damages pursuant to HRS
$ 663-20.9(4), While Bauer argues that there is no indication
that the court’s actual intention was that the State should be
held jointly and severally liable only for noneconomic damages,

the record demonstrates that it was the court’s intention to do

 

According to the March 6, 2001 amended findings and
conclusions, conclusion no. 21 states that “[s]ince Defendant
State had notice of a similar previous accident, State is jointly
and severally liable with Defendant Bauer for nonecononic
damages.” Notably absent in the anended findings and conclusions
is any mention of economic damages. Thus, the record reveals the
court’s intent was to find joint and several liability for

noneconomic danages and, conversely, the record does not disclose

38
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eee

any intent to hold the State jointly and severally liable for
economic danages.**
xr.

Bauer challenges® the August 9, 2002 ruling of the
court denying Bauer's motion for reconsideration or in the
alternative, for clarification of the order granting the State’s
Rule 60 motion. We review Bauer’s challenge to the motion for
reconsideration under the abuse of discretion standard, Ass'n Of

Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v, Wailea Resort Co,, 100 Hawai't
97, 110, 58 P.3d 608, 621 (2002). Bauer makes two arguments

 

(2) that the court erred when it denied Bauer's motion without
specifying whether st granted relief pursuant to Rule 60(a) or
Rule 60(b), and (2) that the court erred when it denied Bauer’s
motion “on the erroneous conclusion that [HRS §] 663-10.5
superceded [HRS §] 663-10.9(1) and exempted the State from joint
and several liability for economic damages when Defendant State
was a joint tortfeasor in an action including injury or death to
persons.”

lie have already addressed Bauer's first contention. As
previously stated, the court did not err with regard to
exercising its authority to rule under either Rule 60(a) or Rule
60(b). We address Bauer’s second argument along with her

contention that the court erred in its May 12, 2003 final

 

% This result also 4g consistent with the Kienkers’ Decenber 15,
2000 notion to amend the findings and conciusions. In the motion, the
Kienkers and Baver did not argue thet the state was jointly and severally
Liable for economic damages pursuant to HRS § €63-10.9(1)

® This discussion addresses Bauer's second and third argunents on
cross-appeal, ‘es both arguments contend that the court erred in exempting the
State from joint ond seversi Liability for economic damages.

39

 
+++FOR PUBLICATION***
a
judgnent, because both arguments are based on the assertion that
the court proceeded under the erroneous conclusion that HRS §
663-10.5 superceded HRS § 663-10.9(1).

‘The State maintains that the court never ruled on the
issue of whether HRS § 663-10.5 superseded HRS § 663-10.9(1), and
the court's decision cannot be “implied.” ‘The fact that the
court never specifically ruled on the issue of whether HRS $ 663-
10.5 supercedes HRS § 663-10.9(1) does not prohibit us from
considering the issue. In Gi 1 a
Kaubi, 53 Haw. €8, 91-92, 94, 488 P.2d 136, 139-240 (1971), this
court ruled that the circuit court did not rule on a particular
issue because the circuit Judge had erroneously deemed that issue
waived, Nonetheless, it was stated that,

ordinarily the issue would be remanded to the trial court

for les resolstion especially if in such determination

factuel issues are involved » . «inasmuch as it is @

Guestion ef lew which aust ultimately be decided by this

Sourt, we believe that in the furtherance of justice, the
fesue shold be determined by this court without remand.

 

 

 

Ida at 94, 498 F.2d at 142.
In the instant case, the question of whether HRS $ 663-
10.5 superseded HRS § 663-10.9(1) is an issue of law that can be
determined by this court without remand. Like HRS § 663-10.9(4),
HRS § 663-10.9(1) sets forth an exception to the elimination of
joint and several liability by allowing “recovery of economic
damages against joint tortfeasors in actions involving injury or
death to persons[.]” For the same reasons discussed with respect
to HRS § 663-10.9(4) in the State’s appeal, we conclude that HRS

§ 663-10.5 does not supercede or impliedly repeal HRS § 663

40
‘+*#P0R PUBLICATION*#*
10.9(2). Thus, the court erred in its final judgment and in its

order denying Bauer's motion for reconsideration or in the
alternative clarification.

‘the parties stipulated that the Kienkers incurred
$200,000 in economic damages. In the Narch 6, 2001 amended
findings and conclusions, the court decided in conclusion no. 9
that “[dlefendant State's breach of its duty to reasonably
design, operate and maintain the Queen K{aahunanu) Highway/police

ction wae a legal cause of plaintiffs’

 

station access road inte
damage.” The court also concluded in conclusion no. 16 that
“[elhe negligence of Danielle Bauer was a legal cause of
Plaintife Kienker's injuries.” After quoting HRS § 663-10.9(4),
the court declared in conclusion no. 21 that “[s]ince Defendant
State had notice of a similar previous accident, State is jointly
and severally lable with Defendant Bauer for noneconomic
damages.”

only @ joint tortfeasor is liable for noneconomic
damages under HRS § 663-10.9(4). Hence, the court decided that
the State was a joint tortfeasor. The court’s conclusion no. 16
confirms that the court found that Jeffrey sustained injuries.
As a result, the amended findings and conclusions satisfied the
elements of HRS § 663-10.9(1) to warrant recovery thereunder.
But in its May 12, 2003 final judgment, the court failed to enter
judgment against Bauer and the State jointly and severally for
the Kienkers’ econonic danages. In light of the court's findings
and conclusions and the stipulation among the parties as to

economic damages, we conclude the State is jointly and severally

a
‘+4¥FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
Liable for the Kienkers’ economic damages of $200,000, pursuant
to HRS § 663-10.9(1)-

xr.

In sum, we affirm the court’s May 12, 2003 judgment
insofar as it adjudges the State as 20% at fault and holds the
state jointly and severally liable for noneconomic damages under
HRS § 663-10.9(4). In addition, we conclude that the court erred
in failing to enter judgment for economic damages under HRS
$ 663-10.9(2) and hereby order the case be remanded to the court
with instructions to the court to amend the final judgment to
provide additionally that the State is jointly and severally
Liable to the Kienkers for $200,000 in economic damages. Thus,
we remand the May 12, 2003 final judgment for amendment and we
vacate the August 9, 2002 order denying Bauer's motion for
reconsideration or in the alternative, clarification of the order

granting the State’s motion for partial relief from judgment.

on the briefs:

Dorothy Sellers and Gp

Adina L.X, Cunningham,

Deputy Attorneys General, :

for defendant-appellant/ BleraPphicmarn—
cross-appeliee State of

Hawash Devnet addi D400

Kenneth A. Ross and
Reginauld T. Harris

(Rush Moore Craven Sutton

Morry and Beh, LLP)

Yor defendant “appelee/ enc Ralls»
cross-appellant Danielle &
Saver.

Joseph P.H. Ahuna, Jr. and
John H.W. Yuen for
plaintiffs-appellees/
eross-appellees.

42