Case Title: Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Medical Center

Citation: 

Docket Number: S241655

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JAZMINA GERARD et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
ORANGE COAST MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendant and Respondent.  
 
S241655 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G048039 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
30-2008-00096591 
 
 
December 10, 2018 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Siggins* concurred.   
 
 
                                        
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
GERARD v. ORANGE COAST MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER 
S241655 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
The Labor Code generally provides that employees who 
work more than five hours must be provided with a 30-minute 
meal period and that employees who work more than 10 hours 
must be provided with an additional 30-minute meal period.  
(Lab. Code, § 512, subd. (a); all undesignated statutory 
references are to this code.)  An employee who works no more 
than six hours may waive the meal period, and an employee who 
works no more than 12 hours may waive the second meal period.  
(Ibid.)  A wage order of the Industrial Welfare Commission 
(IWC) permits health care employees to waive the second meal 
period even if they have worked more than 12 hours.  The 
hospital that is the defendant in this case allowed employees 
working shifts longer than 12 hours to waive the second meal 
period, and the employees who are the plaintiffs here waived 
their second meal periods.  Plaintiffs now claim that the IWC 
order permitting them to waive second meal periods for shifts 
greater than 12 hours violates the Labor Code and that the 
hospital must pay back wages and penalties for unlawfully 
permitting waiver of the second meal period.  Considering the 
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions in light of their 
history, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the IWC order 
does not violate the Labor Code. 
2 
I. 
Plaintiffs Jazmina Gerard, Kristiane McElroy, and Jeffrey 
Carl are health care workers who were formerly employed by 
defendant Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center (Hospital).  
According to their complaint, plaintiffs usually worked 12-hour 
shifts and sometimes worked shifts longer than 12 hours.  A 
Hospital policy allowed health care employees who worked 
shifts longer than 10 hours caring for patients to voluntarily 
waive one of their two meal periods, even if their shifts lasted 
more than 12 hours.  Plaintiffs alleged they signed second meal 
period waivers and occasionally worked shifts longer than 12 
hours without being provided a second meal period.  Plaintiffs 
contended that these second meal period waivers violated the 
Labor Code, and they sought penalties, unpaid wages, and 
injunctive relief for those and other violations.  Gerard alleged 
claims on her own behalf and on behalf of others in the form of 
a private attorney general action.  (Lab. Code, § 2698, et seq. 
(Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or PAGA).)  
McElroy and Carl also alleged claims on their own behalf and 
on behalf of others in the form of a class action.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 382.) 
The Hospital asserted as an affirmative defense that the 
meal period waivers had conformed to the applicable IWC wage 
order.  The Hospital moved for summary judgment against 
Gerard on all of her individual and PAGA claims, asserting that 
there was no disputed issue of material fact as to the cause of 
action for meal period violations because the plaintiffs were 
provided meal periods as required by law.  The trial court 
granted the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment and its 
subsequent motion to deny class certification.  Plaintiffs 
appealed. 
3 
As explained in greater detail below, the Court of Appeal 
initially reversed the trial court, holding that although the meal 
period waivers were obtained in conformity with the applicable 
wage order, that wage order violated a provision of the Labor 
Code generally prohibiting second meal period waivers for 
employees working shifts longer than 12 hours.  We granted the 
Hospital’s petition for review and transferred the case to the 
Court of Appeal with directions to consider recently enacted 
legislation that was potentially pertinent to the case.  The Court 
of Appeal subsequently reversed course and affirmed the trial 
court’s rulings in favor of the Hospital.  We then granted 
plaintiffs’ petition for review. 
II 
Wage and hour claims, including claims regarding the 
availability and timing of meal breaks, are “governed by two 
complementary and occasionally overlapping sources of 
authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted by the 
Legislature, and a series of 18 wage orders, adopted by the 
IWC.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 1004, 1026 (Brinker).)  “To the extent a wage order and 
a statute overlap, we will seek to harmonize them, as we would 
with any two statutes.”  (Id. at p. 1027.)  But because the 
Legislature is the source of the IWC’s authority, a provision of 
the Labor Code will prevail over a wage order if there is a 
conflict.  (See id. at p. 1026; California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. 
Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 207–209.) 
In June 1993, at the urging of the health care industry, 
the IWC amended Wage Order 5–1989 to add subdivision 11(C), 
which permitted health care employees who worked shifts 
longer than eight hours to waive a second meal period.  (Official 
4 
Notice, Amends. to §§ 2, 3, & 11 of IWC Order No. 5–89 (June 
30, 1993).)  As the IWC’s Statement as to the Basis of 
Amendments explained:  “The petitioner requested the IWC to 
allow employees in the health care industry who work shifts in 
excess of eight (8) total hours in a workday to waive their right 
to ‘any’ meal period . . . as long as certain protective conditions 
were met.  The vast majority of employees testifying at public 
hearings supported the IWC’s proposal with respect to such a 
waiver, but only insofar as waiving ‘a’ meal period or ‘one’ meal 
period, not ‘any’ meal period.  Since the waiver of one meal 
period allows employees freedom of choice combined with the 
protection of at least one meal period on a long shift, on June 29, 
1993, the IWC adopted language which permits employees to 
waive a second meal period provided the waiver is documented 
in a written agreement voluntarily signed by both the employee 
and the employer, and the waiver is revocable by the employee 
at any time by providing the employer at least one day’s notice.”  
(Ibid.) 
In 1999, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 60 (AB 
60), known as the Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace 
Flexibility Act of 1999.  This bill was passed in response to IWC 
wage orders that had eliminated overtime for employees 
working more than eight hours per day.  The legislation 
repealed five wage orders, including Wage Order No. 5 covering 
the health care industry, and required the IWC to review its 
wage orders and readopt orders restoring daily overtime.  (See 
Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1045.)  The Legislature 
amended Labor Code section 510 to explicitly provide that “[a]ny 
work in excess of eight hours in one workday . . . shall be 
compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times 
the regular rate of pay for an employee.”  (Stats. 1999, ch. 134, 
5 
§ 4; compare stats. 1982, ch. 185, § 1 [earlier version of 
section 510 without that provision].)  Section 511 was added to 
allow employers and employees to agree on an alternative 
workweek that permitted employees to work up to 10 hours per 
day within a 40-hour week without the obligation to pay 
overtime.  AB 60 also added section 512, which for the first time 
set out statutory meal period requirements.  (Brinker, at 
p. 1045.)  Subdivision (a) of section 512 (section 512(a)) states in 
relevant part:  “An employer may not employ an employee for a 
work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing 
the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 
minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 
hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent 
of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period 
was not waived.”  (Italics added.) 
Further, AB 60 added section 516, which stated:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the [IWC] may 
adopt or amend working condition orders with respect to break 
periods, meal periods, and days of rest for any workers in 
California consistent with the health and welfare of those 
workers.”  (Stats. 1999, ch. 134, § 10, italics added.)  And AB 60 
added section 517, which states in pertinent part in subdivision 
(a):  “The Industrial Welfare Commission shall, at a public 
hearing to be concluded by July 1, 2000, adopt wage, hours, and 
working conditions orders consistent with this chapter without 
convening wage boards, which orders shall be final and 
conclusive for all purposes.” 
Consistent with that mandate, the IWC adopted a new 
version of Wage Order No. 5 on June 30, 2000, and it became 
effective on October 1, 2000.  Section 11(D) of Wage Order No. 5 
essentially readopted former section 11(C) discussed above: 
6 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this order, employees 
in the health care industry who work shifts in excess of eight (8) 
total hours in a workday may voluntarily waive their right to 
one of their two meal periods.”  
After section 11(D) was adopted, but before it became 
effective, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 88 (SB 88), 
which among other things expanded the class of employees 
exempt from overtime to include certain computer software and 
nursing professionals.  (See §§ 515, subd. (f), 515.5; Stats. 2000, 
ch. 492, §§ 2–3.)  SB 88 also amended section 516 to say:  “Except 
as provided in Section 512, the [IWC] may adopt or amend 
working condition orders with respect to break periods [and] 
meal periods . . . .”  (Stats. 2000, ch. 492, § 4, italics added.) 
The present litigation challenged the validity of section 
11(D), and the Court of Appeal invalidated the provision in 
Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center (2015) 234 
Cal.App.4th 285, review granted May 20, 2015, S225205 
(Gerard I).  As the Court of Appeal here explained:  “In Gerard 
I we held . . . section 11(D) invalid to the extent it sanctions 
second meal period waivers for health care employees who work 
shifts of more than 12 hours, because it conflicts with section 
512(a) which allows such waivers only if the total hours worked 
is no more than 12 hours.  Moreover, we held the IWC exceeded 
its authority by enacting . . . section 11(D), because it created an 
additional exception for health care workers, beyond the second 
meal period waiver exception in section 512(a), all in violation 
of section 516(a).  For these reasons, we concluded hospital’s 
second meal period waiver policy violates sections 512(a) and 
516(a) and is invalid.”  (Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial 
Medical Center (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1204, 1210 (Gerard II).) 
7 
After Gerard I, the Legislature further amended section 
516 with Senate Bill No. 327 (SB 327).  The previous language 
requiring the IWC to conform to section 512 was retained but 
labeled as subdivision (a), and a new subdivision (b) was added, 
stating:  “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), or any other law, 
including Section 512, the health care employee meal period 
waiver provisions in Section 11(D) of [IWC] Wage Orders 4 and 
5 were valid and enforceable on and after October 1, 2000, and 
continue to be valid and enforceable.  This subdivision is 
declarative of, and clarifies, existing law.”  (Stats. 2015, ch. 506, 
§ 2.) 
SB 327 also stated as legislative findings:  “The 
Legislature finds and declares the following:  [¶] (a) From 1993 
through 2000, [IWC] Wage Orders 4 and 5 contained special 
meal period waiver rules for employees in the health care 
industry.  Employees were allowed to waive voluntarily one of 
the two meal periods on shifts exceeding 12 hours.  On June 30, 
2000, the [IWC] adopted regulations allowing those rules to 
continue in place.  Since that time, employees in the health care 
industry and their employers have relied on those rules to allow 
employees to waive voluntarily one of their two meal periods on 
shifts exceeding 12 hours.  [¶] (b) Given the uncertainty caused 
by a recent appellate court decision, Gerard v. Orange Coast 
Memorial Medical Center (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 285, without 
immediate 
clarification, 
hospitals 
will 
alter 
scheduling 
practices.”  (Stats. 2015, ch. 506, § 1.) 
SB 327 also contained an urgency provision:  “This act is 
an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of 
the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article 
IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect.  The 
facts constituting the necessity are:  [¶] In order to confirm and 
8 
clarify the law applicable to meal period waivers for employees 
in the health care industry throughout the state, it is necessary 
that this act take effect immediately.”  (Stats. 2015, ch. 506, § 3.) 
SB 327 was supported not only by hospitals and 
healthcare organizations but also by health care employee 
unions.  The United Nurses Association of California/Union of 
Health Care Professionals (UNAC) stated:  “Under this wage 
order provision, UNAC members have for years enjoyed the 
flexibility of alternate work schedules, which allows for greater 
staffing flexibility and better patient care.  Patient outcomes are 
dramatically improved in environments where the nurses and 
other health care professionals can place priority on the needs 
of their patients without interruption by an arbitrary meal 
period when the shift runs long.  (RNs are generally able to eat 
during work time in break rooms.)”  (Assem. Com. on Labor & 
Employment, Bill Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 327 (2015–2016 
Reg.Sess.) Sept. 8, 2015, p. 8.)  UNAC commented that “[Gerard 
I] will result in a severe disruption of the lives of our members, 
many of whom have built a schedule of work, child care, and 
other obligations around the ability to waive a second meal 
period.”  (Ibid.) 
At the same time as the Legislature was acting, the 
Hospital petitioned this court to review Gerard I, supported by 
amici letters from UNAC and Service Employees International 
Union Local 121RN.  We granted the petition and transferred 
the cause to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the 
decision and to reconsider the cause in light of the enactment of 
SB 327. 
On remand, the Court of Appeal concluded it had erred in 
Gerard I:  “The lynchpin of our analysis was the conclusion that 
9 
. . . section 11(D) conflicts with section 512(a).  However, in 
reaching this conclusion we failed to account for a subtle but 
critical distinction in administrative law—the date an agency 
regulation or order is adopted is not the same as the date it 
becomes effective.  (Compare Gov. Code, § 11346, et seq. 
[‘Procedure for Adoption of Regulations’ . . . ] with Gov. Code, § 
11343.4, subd. (a) [adopted regulations filed with Secretary of 
State ‘become effective’ in accordance with prescribed schedule] 
. . . ; also compare § 1173 [authorizing the IWC to ‘adopt an 
order’] with § 1184 [adopted order ‘shall be effective . . . not less 
than 60 days from the date of publication’] . . . .)  Long-settled 
case law validates the distinction between the adoption date and 
the effective date.  (See, e.g., Ross v. Bd. of Retirement of 
Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (1949) 92 
Cal.App.2d 188, 193.) 
“In this case, . . . the [SB] 88 amendment to section 516(a) 
took away the IWC’s authority to adopt wage orders inconsistent 
with the second meal period requirements of section 512(a) as of 
September 19, 2000.  But the IWC had already adopted . . . 
section 11(D) on June 30, 2000, under the [AB] 60 version of 
section 
516(a) 
which 
authorized 
the 
IWC 
to 
do 
so 
‘notwithstanding’ section 512(a).  Thus, the [SB] 88 amended 
version of section 516(a) should have been irrelevant to our 
analysis in Gerard I.  Instead, it became dispositive.  We 
concluded . . . section 11(D) is subject to the [SB] 88 amended 
version of section 516(a).  It isn’t.”  (Gerard II, supra, 9 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1210–1211.)  The court therefore concluded 
that “the IWC did not exceed its authority by adopting . . . 
section 11(D), and hospital’s second meal period waiver policy 
does not violate section 512(a).”  (Id. at p. 1211.) 
10 
To summarize this chronology:  The IWC in 1993 amended 
Wage Order 5 with section 11(C), allowing health care 
employees who work more than eight hours in a shift to waive a 
second meal period.  In 1999, AB 60 provided in Labor Code 
section 512 that employees could only waive the second meal 
period if they worked 12 hours or less, but also provided in 
former section 516 that the IWC could adopt or amend wage 
orders with respect to meal periods “notwithstanding any other 
provision of law” as long as the order was consistent with the 
health and welfare of the employees.  In 2000, the IWC adopted 
section 11(D), which, like 11(C), permitted health care workers 
who work more than eight hours to waive a second meal period.  
Also in 2000, after section 11(D) was adopted but before it went 
into effect, the Legislature enacted SB 88, which required IWC 
wage orders to be consistent with section 512.  Eight years later, 
this litigation challenged the validity of the second meal period 
waivers of health care employees working shifts greater than 12 
hours.  In Gerard I, the Court of Appeal held that such waivers 
are invalid because section 11(D) violated sections 512 and 516.  
In response, the Legislature enacted SB 327, declaring the meal 
waiver provisions for health care employees in Wage Order No. 
5 valid and enforceable.  We granted the Hospital’s petition for 
review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal.  The 
Court of Appeal in Gerard II reversed itself, and we granted 
Gerard’s petition for review. 
III. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the distinction between the 
adoption of a wage order and its effective date, or that the 
amended version of section 516 does not apply to wage orders 
that had already been adopted.  Indeed, the text of amended 
section 516 qualifies the IWC’s authority to adopt wage orders 
11 
going forward, but it contains no terms invalidating wage orders 
already adopted:  “Except as provided in Section 512, the [IWC] 
may adopt or amend working condition orders with respect to 
break periods [and] meal periods . . . .”  (Stats. 2000, ch. 492, § 4, 
italics added.)  But plaintiffs contend that the IWC lacked 
authority to adopt section 11(D) because even under the version 
of section 516 in effect at the time the wage order was adopted, 
section 512(a) limited the IWC’s authority to permit meal period 
waivers. 
Plaintiffs’ argument is based principally on section 517’s 
language that IWC wage orders adopted by July 1, 2000, must 
be “consistent with this chapter,” that is, consistent with the 
provisions of AB 60.  (Stats. 1999, ch. 134, § 11.)  “ ‘[C]onsistent 
with this chapter,’ ” plaintiffs contend, “included a requirement 
that the IWC wage order be consistent with section 512 from the 
moment the Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace 
Flexibility Act of 1999 was enacted.  Section 516 specifically 
granted the IWC authority to adopt wage orders related to meal 
periods, but did not grant authority to disregard the minimum 
standards established in the Act in section 512.”  Plaintiffs 
construe the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law” in former section 516 narrowly:  “The correct reading is that 
the IWC was authorized to adopt orders as to break periods and 
meal periods even if another law limited IWC’s authority to 
adopt such orders, not that the IWC could disregard all existing 
law in exercising its authority.” 
This reading of the statutory language is unpersuasive.  It 
ignores the broad sweep of the phrase “notwithstanding any 
other provision of law.”  (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 969, 983, italics omitted [describing “notwithstanding 
any other provision of law” as a “ ‘ “term of art” ’ [citation] that 
12 
declares the legislative intent to override all contrary law”].)  We 
need not define the outermost parameters of the phrase in order 
to conclude that there is no reason to read it in former section 
516 to exclude from its scope the law regarding meal periods 
found in section 512(a).  The two provisions were adopted 
simultaneously as part of the same legislation and in order to 
further a common purpose.  Moreover, at the time the IWC 
adopted the disputed wage order, the phrase “consistent with 
this chapter” in section 517 meant consistency not only with 
section 512(a) but also with former section 516, which by its 
terms authorized the IWC to make rules about meal periods 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.” 
The more natural way to reconcile the phrases 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” of former section 
516 and “consistent with this chapter” in section 517 is to give 
them their literal meaning.  The main purpose of AB 60, the 
Eight Hour Day Restoration Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999, 
was to restore overtime for a nonexempt employee working more 
than eight hours a day.  “[C]onsistent with this chapter” means 
that IWC orders going forward can no longer disregard daily 
overtime.  But even as AB 60 limited the discretion of the IWC 
in that and other respects, it explicitly retained in former section 
516 the IWC’s rulemaking prerogative, “notwithstanding any 
other provision of law,” with respect to “break periods, meal 
periods and days of rest,” limited only by a requirement that any 
rules be “consistent with the health and welfare” of affected 
workers.  (Stats. 1999, ch. 134, § 10.)   
Read literally, the “notwithstanding” phrase undoubtedly 
gives broad powers to the IWC.  That literal reading makes 
sense in this context.  The Legislature’s broad delegation to the 
IWC is consistent with its recognition that the IWC is 
13 
constitutionally authorized (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 1), and has 
been long understood to have the power, to adopt rules nearly 
co-equal to legislative enactments.  (See Brinker, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1027.)  Only after section 11(D) was adopted 
did the Legislature, through SB 88, further limit the IWC’s 
discretion by requiring any rules about meal periods to be 
consistent with section 512.  Accordingly, we reject Gerard’s 
statutory argument and the related argument that section 11(D) 
was beyond the scope of the authority that the Legislature 
conferred on the IWC.  (See Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 310, 321.)  
Plaintiffs cite Brinker and a Court of Appeal case for the 
proposition that the IWC may not exercise its authority under 
section 516 in ways that contravene section 512.  (Brinker, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1043; Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc. (2006) 
138 Cal.App.4th 429, 438.)  But those cases concern the meaning 
of section 516 after SB 88 went into effect, not the meaning of 
former section 516. 
Plaintiffs also cite the legislative history of SB 88.  The 
Senate Third Reading analysis of SB 88 states:  “This bill 
clarifies two provisions of the Labor Code enacted in Chapter 
134.  Labor Code Section 512 codifies the duty of an employer to 
provide employees with meal periods.  Labor Code section 516 
establishes the authority of IWC to adopt or amend working 
condition orders with respect to break periods, meal periods, and 
days of rest.  This bill provides that IWC’s authority to adopt or 
amend orders under Section 516 must be consistent with the 
specific provisions of Labor Code Section 512.” (Sen. Com. on 
Lab. & Employment, Sen. 3d Reading of Sen. Bill 88 (1999–2000 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 10, 2000, p. 5.)  According to 
plaintiffs, the word “clarifies” means that amended section 516 
14 
merely declared existing law and that it was never the 
Legislature’s intent to authorize the IWC to permit meal period 
waivers other than as provided in section 512. 
Whether an amendment represents a change in the law or 
merely a declaration of existing law is a question of interpreting 
existing law, a task that ultimately belongs to the judiciary.  
(McClung v. Employment Dev. Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 472–
474.)  A legislative statement that a statute declares or amends 
existing law is not binding on courts, which must make their 
own determination.  (Id. at pp. 473–476; see Coker v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 690.)  In this case, it is 
clear that SB 88’s amendment of former section 516 worked a 
change in the law.  Before the amendment, the IWC had the 
authority 
to 
adopt 
orders 
concerning 
meal 
periods 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law,” including section 
512.  After the amendment, the IWC could no longer deviate 
from the meal period requirements of section 512.  (See Brinker, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1042–1043.) 
Moreover, although SB 88 was an urgency statute, there 
is no indication that the reason for the urgency was to prevent 
section 11(D) from going into effect.  The restriction on the IWC’s 
authority with respect to meal period waivers was only one part 
of SB 88; the bill also addressed, among other things, the 
exemption of certain computer software professionals and a 
certain class of certified nurse midwives, nurse anesthetists, 
and nurse practitioners from overtime pay.  (Stats. 2000, 
ch. 492, §§ 2–3.)  The stated reason for the urgency legislation 
was to enact these exemptions:  “In order, at the earliest possible 
time, to protect businesses that rely on the computer industry 
as well as certain vital health care professions, it is necessary 
for this act to take effect immediately.”  (Id., § 5.) 
15 
Plaintiffs also invoke the principle that wage orders and 
statutes should be harmonized where possible.  (See Brinker, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1027.)  They propose to harmonize the 
wage order and statute as follows:  Section 512 authorizes 
second meal period waivers for shifts up to 12 hours, whereas 
wage order No. 5 authorizes waivers of second meal periods for 
shifts over 8 hours but says nothing explicitly about shifts over 
12 hours.  The way to harmonize these two provisions, they say, 
is to read the wage order as only authorizing waivers for shifts 
of 8 to 12 hours.  We find this interpretation unpersuasive.  The 
language of former section 516 (“Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the Industrial Welfare Commission may adopt 
. . . .”) already dictates the relationship between the wage order 
and the statutory scheme, directing that the order take 
precedence.  We decline to insert limitations into the wage order 
where none appear. 
The parties argue at length about the significance of SB 
327.  Plaintiffs point to SB 327’s declaration that SB 88’s 
amendment of former section 516 did not intend to countermand 
the IWC’s already adopted wage order.  This legislative 
declaration is not binding on the courts.  (See McClung, supra, 
34 Cal.4th at pp. 472–473.)  Nevertheless, for reasons discussed 
above, we independently conclude that SB 88 did not undo 
section 11(D) of Wage Order No. 5 permitting health care 
workers who work more than eight hours to waive a second meal 
period.  The Legislature, when it enacted SB 88, did not second-
guess the IWC’s determination that allowing health care 
employees to waive a second meal period is consistent with 
promoting their health and welfare. 
Since 2000, the Legislature has amended section 512 
several times to exempt various classes of employees covered by 
16 
collective bargaining agreements from the prohibition against 
the waiver of second meal periods for employees working more 
than 12 hours.  These include certain classes of bakery workers 
(Stats. 2003, ch. 207 (A.B.330), § 1), motion picture or broadcast 
employees (Stats. 2005, ch. 414 (A.B.1734), § 1), and certain 
construction employees, commercial drivers, security officers, 
and utility employees (Stats. 2010, ch. 662 (A.B.569), § 1).  Thus, 
although the Legislature has determined that waiver of a second 
meal period for employees working more than eight hours is 
generally contrary to public policy, it has not applied that rule 
inflexibly to all categories of employees.  This is consistent with 
our conclusion that the Legislature, in prospectively requiring 
IWC wage orders to be consistent with section 512(a), did not 
intend to disturb the extant exemption for health care workers 
based on the IWC’s determination that the exemption promoted 
the health and welfare of those workers. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
SIGGINS, J.*
                                        
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Franco 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 245 Cal.App.4th 679 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S233973 
Date Filed: December 10, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Roger T. Ito 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Allison H. Ting, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Louis W. Karlin and Theresa A. 
Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Allison H. Ting 
Law Office of Allison H. Ting 
1158 26th Street, #609 
Santa Monica, CA  90403 
(310) 826-4592 
 
Theresa A. Patterson 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  9013 
(213) 620-6004