Case Title: Sheridan Race Car Ass'n v. Rice Ranch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sheridan Race Car Ass'n v. Rice Ranch1993 WY 145864 P.2d 30Case Number: 93-75Decided: 11/19/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHERIDAN 
RACE CAR ASSOCIATION; 

and 
Howard Jorgenson for the Howard W. Jorgenson Trust, 

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

RICE 
RANCH; and Sheridan County Commissioners, 

Appellees 
(Respondents).

Appeal 
from The District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Sheridan 
County.

James 
P. Castberg, Sheridan, for appellant Sheridan Race Car 
Ass'n.

Robert 
E. Holstedt, Sheridan, for appellant Howard Jorgenson 
Trust.

Matthew 
F. Redle, County & Pros. Atty., Sheridan, for appellee Sheridan Bd. of 
County Com'rs.

Debra 
J. Wendtland, Sheridan, for appellee Rice Ranch.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal has 
been certified pursuant to Wyo.R.App.P. 12.09 and requires that we consider an 
administrative agency's zoning decision. Appellant Sheridan Race Car Association 
(SRCA) contests the decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan 
County (County) to revoke its conditional zoning variance and seeks 
reinstatement of the zoning variance. SRCA asserts that the failure of appellee 
Rice Ranch (Rice), an adjacent landowner, to present any witnesses at the 
hearing causes the County's decision to be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of 
discretion. We affirm the County's decision.

[¶2]      SRCA raises the 
following issues on appeal:

I. 
The Board of County Commissioners erred in its Conclusion of Law VI [in that] a 
variance granted to allow a race car track and operation in an area zoned as 
A-Agricultural by the planning commission does promote the public health, 
safety, and general welfare of the county and is not a distinct departure from 
the use and purpose of all adjacent territory.

II. 
The Board of County Commissioners erred in its Conclusion of Law VII [in that] 
the variance granted to allow a race car track and operation in area zone as 
A-Agricultural by the planning commission was in harmony with the intent and 
purpose of the zoning resolution or the comprehensive plan and would not be 
injurious to the neighborhood.

III. 
The Board of County Commissioners erred in its Conclusion of Law IX in that 
there are in fact special conditions or circumstances which are peculiar to the 
land for which the variance was sought and there are in fact special conditions 
or circumstances such that the strict application of the zoning resolution would 
deprive the owner of the reasonable use of the land.

[¶3]      The Board of 
County Commissioners and Rice Ranch did not present a statement of 
issues.

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant SRCA is 
a non-profit organization located in Sheridan, Wyoming, whose members engage in 
and promote automobile races. SRCA planned to build a race car track and had 
proposed to locate the track site on a tract of land in Sheridan County leased 
from the Howard Jorgenson Trust. The proposed track site lies east of Highway 
I-90 at the Decker Interchange. It is adjacent to Rice.

[¶5]      The Jorgenson 
property is zoned A-Agricultural. The county's zoning regulations required SRCA 
to seek a zoning variance from the County Planning Commission. Zoning variance 
decisions by that commission are subject to final approval by the Board of 
County Commissioners. SRCA applied for the zoning variance from the County 
Planning Commission, and surrounding property owners were notified. SRCA had 
determined Rice was an affected landowner, and Rice had been notified of the 
proposed variance. Concerns expressed to the planning commission by the other 
landowners caused the planning commission to grant a conditional variance. The 
six conditions to the variance were:

1. 
That the operators of the facility must not allow the noise level to exceed 80 
decibels at one quarter (1/4) mile from the edge of the 
track.

2. 
That a sound wall fence be constructed before any racing 
commences.

3. 
That no alcohol will be sold on site.

4. 
That there be adequate trash collection to prevent the accumulation and blowing 
of trash.

5. 
That the variance will expire January 1, 1994, by its own 
terms.

6. 
That the Lease between the Howard Jorgenson Trust and the Sheridan Race Car 
Association is contingent upon the conditional variance and will expire January 
1, 1994, if the variance is denied or not renewed.

[¶6]      Rice appealed the 
granting of the variance and a contested case hearing was held before a hearing 
officer and the Board of County Commissioners. Rice did not present any 
witnesses of its own but relied upon an opening statement, a statement that 
summarized the evidence SRCA had presented to the planning commission, and 
cross-examination of appellant's witnesses. Both sides presented closing 
arguments.

[¶7]      The direct 
testimony of SRCA's witnesses focused on the track's probable boost to the 
Sheridan economy and SRCA's plans to comply with the conditions of the variance. 
Cross-examination testimony elicited deficiencies in SRCA's plans to control 
crowds, traffic, dust, trash and fire; deficiencies in the plan to provide water 
for sanitation; and deficiencies in the reliability of the profitability 
projections for the track.

[¶8]      The record before 
the Commissioners included the information considered by the planning 
commission, the Sheridan County Zoning Resolution, and the testimony and 
evidence presented at the hearing. On February 16, 1993, the Commissioners 
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and revoked the conditional 
zoning variance. SRCA appealed to the district court and that court certified 
the matter to us.

[¶9]      Having reviewed 
the record and the briefs and oral arguments of both parties, we must consider 
whether the County's decision revoking the variance was arbitrary, capricious, 
and characterized by an abuse of discretion because it was not supported in the 
record by substantial evidence.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶10]   Our standard of review in a 
certified case is to examine the decision of the administrative agency as if we 
were the reviewing court of the first instance. Montana Dakota Utilities v. PSC, 
847 P.2d 978, 982 (Wyo. 1993) A reviewing court has authority 
to:

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990); Montana Dakota Utilities, 847 P.2d  at 
983.

[¶11]   In determining whether an agency 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion, a 
court must review the record taken as a whole and ascertain whether the decision 
is supported by the evidence in the record. Palmer v. Crook County Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 785 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶12]   It is well established that this 
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency if 
the record establishes that the agency decision is supported by substantial 
evidence. Montana Dakota Utilities, 847 P.2d  at 983; Palmer, 785 P.2d  at 1163. 
Substantial evidence is defined as

"such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Such evidence may be less than the weight of the evidence, but 
cannot be clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It is 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence or suspicion of a fact to be 
established.

Montana 
Dakota Utilities, 847 P.2d  at 983 (quoting Mountain Fuel Sup. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (1983)) (citations omitted).

[¶13]   It is SRCA's burden to demonstrate 
that the County's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Montana 
Dakota Utilities, 847 P.2d  at 983. The ultimate weight to be given the evidence 
before the County, as the trier of fact, is to be determined by the County. Id. 
Because SRCA complains that Rice presented the bulk of its case by 
cross-examination of SRCA witnesses, we note that "the testimony of a witness is 
no stronger than as shown by cross-examination." Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 
110 P.2d 260, 272 (1941).

DISCUSSION

[¶14]   WYO. STAT. §§ 18-5-201 and 18-5-203 
require the County to assure that land usage complies with the zoning 
regulations then in effect and authorize it to grant a variance only if doing so 
would promote the "public health, safety, morals and general welfare." WYO. 
STAT. § 18-5-201 (1977). The stated purpose of Sheridan County's Comprehensive 
Plan and Zoning Resolution is to promote the public health, safety and general 
welfare of the county.

[¶15]   The record establishes that the 
County's decision to revoke the variance was based on evidence showing there 
would not be sufficient water to control dust and fire; there was no basis or 
foundation for conclusions of an economic impact study which SRCA proposed to 
present; and the evidence SRCA presented at the hearing had greatly changed from 
the evidence it had presented to the planning commission which had originally 
granted the variance. These changes included: increased spectator attendance 
numbers; a longer racing season; larger racing vehicles; and available water 
rights which were too limited to serve the track's needs.

[¶16]   SRCA's first argument only 
summarizes the evidence already presented at the hearing and does not support 
its allegation that the County "wrongfully ignored the testimony and evidence 
presented by the Appellant." The record indicates that the County did not ignore 
SRCA's evidence and testimony since three of appellant's four witnesses were 
questioned about their direct testimony by the commissioners and the hearing 
officer. Their questions sought to clarify and expand the testimony of the 
witnesses.

[¶17]   The record contains relevant 
evidence which reasonably supports the County's conclusion that permitting a 
race track on that particular location by this particular racing association 
would not promote the public health, safety, and general welfare and would be 
injurious to the neighborhood. SRCA concedes that the planning commission placed 
conditions on the variance because of possible construction problems. The record 
establishes that SRCA's witnesses presented different information at the hearing 
than was before the planning commission when it granted the conditional 
variance. Our review of the effect of this different information indicates the 
County rationally concluded a race track construction and operation would be 
injurious to the neighborhood.

[¶18]   SRCA's argument that a race car 
track is in harmony with the intent and purpose of the zoning resolution is not 
supported by the mere allegation that the County's ruling "effectively casts in 
stone for all time the zoning as it existed at the time of the adoption of the 
original zoning resolution." Our review of the record indicates SRCA did not 
present any evidence that a race track would be harmonious with the intent and 
purpose of the zoning resolution. Since this argument cannot be considered for 
the first time by this court, we find that the record reasonably supports the 
County's conclusion. Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1991), Trout v. 
Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1053 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶19]   Finally, SRCA urges there was no 
rational basis for the County to conclude the owner of the land on which the 
proposed track is to be located is not deprived of the reasonable use of the 
land by the strict application of the zoning resolution. SRCA argues the 
deprivation occurs if that variance is not granted because "the tract of land 
had no agricultural value whatsoever" since it is isolated by highways on the 
north and west. Although SRCA presented testimony at the hearing that this tract 
was isolated, this information was offered to explain that the isolation would 
lessen racing noise. SRCA did not present evidence that this isolation rendered 
the land valueless. One of appellant's witnesses did testify the land had no 
agricultural value; however, the testimony was discredited when the witness was 
unable to offer any factual basis for that opinion. The record reasonably 
supports the County's conclusion.

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   Our review of the entire record 
satisfies us there was substantial evidence for the County to conclude the SRCA 
race track would not promote the public health, safety and general welfare as 
required by the zoning resolution. The County's decision is 
affirmed.