Case Title: Ex parte Sean Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc., & FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190276

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel:  June 5, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1190276
____________________
Ex parte Sean Michael Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc.,
and FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Dionne Drisker
v.
 Sean Michael Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc., and FedEx
Ground Package System, Inc.)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-19-900134)
1190276
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Following an automobile accident in Lee County between
Dionne Drisker and Sean Michael Allen, Drisker sued Allen, One
Bonehead 
Trucking, 
Inc. 
("Bonehead"), 
and 
FedEx 
Ground 
Package
System, Inc. ("FedEx"), in Macon County, where Drisker
resides.  The defendants seek a writ of mandamus directing the
Macon Circuit Court to transfer this case to the Lee Circuit
Court under the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non
conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975.  We grant the
petition.
I. Facts
On August 7, 2019, Drisker and Allen were involved in a
car accident in Lee County.  Drisker sued  Allen alleging
negligence and wantonness and sued Allen's employer, FedEx,
and the owner of the vehicle that Allen was driving, Bonehead,
under theories of vicarious liability.  Drisker filed the
action in Macon County, where she resides.  Allen is a
resident of Russell County, and FedEx and Bonehead are foreign
corporations.
The defendants filed a motion to transfer the action to
Lee County on the basis of forum non conveniens.  They
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1190276
supported their motion with the Alabama Uniform Traffic Crash
Report, which stated that the Auburn Police Department in Lee
County 
conducted the 
investigation; that 
Drisker's 
vehicle 
was
towed to a facility in Lee County; and that Drisker was
employed in Auburn.  The defendants also filed an affidavit of
Randy Jensen, the only nonparty eyewitness noted on the crash
report, stating that he resides in Lee County and that it
would be inconvenient for him to travel to Macon County for
court proceedings.  
Drisker responded to the motion for a change of venue,
attaching her own affidavit stating that "[t]ravel to Lee
County to pursue this case would be significantly inconvenient
for [her]."  She stated that she no longer traveled to Lee
County for work and that she was dependent on relatives for
transportation.  She also stated that she was receiving
treatment from two doctors who had offices in Montgomery and
that one of them also had an office in Tuskegee, in Macon
County.  
After a hearing, the Macon Circuit Court denied the
motion for a change of venue.  The defendants petition this
Court for mandamus review. 
II. Standard of Review
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1190276
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a denial of
a motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to
petition for the writ of mandamus.'"  Ex parte Kane, 989 So.
2d 509, 511 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins.
Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998)).  A petitioner is
entitled to a writ of mandamus upon a showing of "(1) a clear
legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."  Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc.,
823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).  In determining whether a 
petitioner challenging venue has a clear legal right to the
order sought, "this Court reviews ... a ruling on venue on the
basis of forum non conveniens by asking whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion."  Kane, 989 So. 2d at 511.  The
discretion of the trial court has been bounded by the
Legislature, which, in enacting the forum non conveniens
statute, mandated that the court "transfer a cause when 'the
interest of justice' requires a transfer."  Ex parte First
Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 660 (Ala. 1998). 
III. Analysis   
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1190276
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is codified at §
6–3–21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975: 
"With respect to civil actions filed in an
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action or any claim in any civil action to any court
of general jurisdiction in which the action might
have been properly filed and the case shall proceed
as though originally filed therein. ..."  
A party seeking a transfer under this statute has the initial
burden of showing either "(1) that the transfer is justified
based on the convenience of either the parties or the
witnesses, or (2) that the transfer is justified 'in the
interest of justice.'"  Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc.,
10 So. 3d 536, 539 (Ala. 2008).
Here, the defendants primarily argue the interest-of-
justice prong.  This prong looks at the connection between the
case and the forum county and asks whether that connection is
"strong enough to warrant burdening the plaintiff's forum with
the action."  Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994
So. 2d 906, 911 (Ala. 2008).  
An important factor in this strength-of-connection
analysis is the location of the injury.  "'Although it is not
a talisman, the fact that the injury occurred in the proposed
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1190276
transferee county is often assigned considerable weight in an
interest-of-justice analysis,'" Ex parte Southeast Alabama
Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371, 375 (Ala. 2012)
(quoting Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d 570, 573-74
(Ala. 2011)), because "litigation should be handled in the
forum where the injury occurred," Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d
414, 416 (Ala. 2006).  Specific reasons for focusing on the
location of the injury include "the burden of piling court
services and resources upon the people of a county that is not
affected by the case and ... the interest of the people of a
county to have a case that arises in their county tried close
to public view in their county."  Ex parte Smiths Water &
Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007).  Here, the
accident occurred and Drisker's injuries were sustained in 
Lee
County. 
There are other factors as well, including the location
of witnesses and evidence.  Here, the nonparty eyewitness, the
responding police officers, and the towing company are all
located in Lee County. This Court has often held that the
connection to a county in which a party merely resides is weak
in comparison with the connection to a county where the
accident occurred and was investigated and where witnesses
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work or reside.  See, e.g., Ex parte Reed, [Ms. 1180564,
September 13, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2019); Ex parte Tier
1 Trucking, LLC, 222 So. 3d 1107 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte Autauga
Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745 (Ala. 2010); Ex parte
Kane, 989 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 2008).
For example, in Indiana Mills, supra, an automobile
accident occurred in Lee County, but the plaintiff brought
suit in Macon County, where one of the defendants resided and
another defendant conducted business.  This Court observed: 
"The accident made the basis of this case
occurred in Lee County, and the accident was
investigated by Lee County authorities.  We see no
need for Macon County, with its weak connection with
this case, to be burdened with an action that arose
in Lee County simply because one of several
defendants resides there." 
10 So. 3d at 542.  Similarly, in Alabama Timber, an automobile
accident occurred in Lee County, but the plaintiff filed the
action in Chambers County, where one of the defendants
resided. The emergency personnel who responded to the 
accident
worked in Lee County, the only nonparty eyewitness lived and
worked in Lee County, and the plaintiff herself, at the time
of the accident, lived and worked in Lee County. In the
interest of justice, this Court held that the case was
required to be transferred to Lee County. 94 So. 3d at 377. 
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1190276
Likewise, here the investigation was conducted by the
Auburn Police Department, the vehicle was towed to a Lee
County facility, and the only nonparty eyewitness lives and
works in Lee County.  Furthermore, at the time of the
accident, Drisker also worked in Lee County.  Although one of
Drisker's doctors has an office in Macon County, there is no
indication that witnesses, medical records, documents, or
other evidence are located there.  The only connection Macon
County has to this case is that Drisker resides there.  Thus,
Macon County has a weak connection to the case, and Lee County
has a strong one.  Therefore, transfer of the case from Macon
County to Lee County is in the interest of justice.
Drisker argues that Alabama courts at times "have refused
to transfer an action to the forum in which the accident
occurred."  In support, she cites Ex parte Yocum, 963 So. 2d
600 (Ala. 2007), Ex parte Johnson, 638 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1994),
and Ex parte Siemag, Inc., 53 So. 3d 974 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010).1  We find those cases distinguishable. 
1Drisker also cites Ex parte Suzuki Mobile, Inc., 940 So.
2d 1007, 1009 (Ala. 2006), and Ex parte Thomasville Feed &
Seed, Inc., 74 So. 3d 940, 943 (Ala. 2011). Those cases
addressed improper venue under § 6–3–7, not forum non
conveniens under § 6–3–21.1, and are therefore inapposite.
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We distinguished Yocum in Alabama Timber, on a basis that
bears repeating here: 
"In Yocum, the plaintiff, a resident of Dallas
County, filed her action in Jefferson County, the
residence or principal place of business of two of
the defendants.  Several defendants who resided in
Dallas County filed a motion to transfer the action
to Dallas County on the basis of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. The Jefferson Circuit Court
denied the motion to transfer, and this Court denied
the defendants' subsequent petition for a writ of
mandamus. Unlike this case, Yocum involved a
contract dispute in which the claims against the
Jefferson 
County 
defendants 
included 
fraud,
suppression, conversion, and interference with
business relations.  This Court concluded that the
Jefferson 
Circuit 
Court 
did 
not 
exceed 
its
discretion in denying the motion to transfer
'[b]ecause of the nexus between Jefferson County and
the alleged participation of the two Jefferson
County 
defendants 
in 
the 
alleged 
scheme 
to
overcharge Cahaba Timber so as to deflate its
profits and hence the amount due [the plaintiff].'
Ex parte Yocum, 963 So. 2d at 603.  Thus, this Court
denied the petition for a writ of mandamus seeking
a transfer of the case from Jefferson County not
simply because two of the defendants resided or had
a principal place of business in Jefferson County,
but because Jefferson County had a substantial
connection to the matters giving rise to the
action."
94 So. 3d at 376.  The same distinction is present in this
case: Unlike in Yocum, here the forum county's only connection
to the case is the fact that the plaintiff resides there. 
Likewise, Johnson is distinguishable.  The plaintiff in
Johnson, an automobile-accident case, filed an action in a
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1190276
defendant's county of residence.  The defendants moved to
transfer the case to the county where the accident occurred,
which was also the plaintiff's county of residence.  The trial
court granted the motion to transfer on the basis that the
county where the accident occurred was more convenient for the
parties and witnesses.  This Court granted mandamus relief,
explaining: 
"[T]he [order] to transfer was issued on a motion
that was not verified and to which the defendants
attached no supporting evidentiary material. The
burden of proof was on the movants.  The unverified
allegations 
presented 
by 
the 
defendants 
were
insufficient 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
defendants'
inconvenience and expense in defending the action in
the venue selected by the plaintiff are so great as
to overcome the plaintiff's right to choose the
forum."
638 So. 2d at 774.  Thus, although Drisker cites Johnson in
support of her argument regarding the interest-of-justice
prong of § 6-3-21.1, that case addressed only the convenience
prong.  Furthermore, unlike the defendants in Johnson, the
defendants here did not rely on unsupported assertions but
rather submitted the crash report and Jensen's affidavit. 
Siemag is also inapposite.  The suit in Siemag stemmed
from the plaintiff's workplace injury -- amputation of both
arms -- while he was working in a coal mine.  Although the
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1190276
mine was in Tuscaloosa County, the plaintiff filed his
complaint in Walker County, where he resided.  The plaintiff's
doctor testified that, because of the plaintiff's numerous
medical conditions, it would be far more appropriate for him
to attend court in Walker County than in Tuscaloosa County. 
The Court of Civil Appeals noted that both Tuscaloosa and
Walker Counties were coal-mining communities.  For those
reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the interest of
justice did not require transferring the case to Tuscaloosa
County.  Although we have never addressed the validity of the
Court of Civil Appeals' reasons in Siemag, neither of them
would apply in this case.  There was no evidence that
requiring Drisker to travel to Lee County would be medically
inappropriate.  And Drisker's alleged injury occurred in a car
accident, not a type of accident particular to a locale.    
Next, Drisker argues that venue is proper in Macon County
because all the defendants were properly joined under Rule
82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  However, Drisker conflates the issue
of improper venue with the doctrine forum non conveniens. 
There is no question that venue is proper in Macon County. 
Rather, the issue is whether, despite proper venue in Macon
County, the case must be transferred to Lee County based on
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forum non conveniens.  Indeed,  the forum non conveniens
statute applies only to actions filed "in an appropriate
venue."  § 6–3–21.1(a). 
Finally, Drisker argues that, "as the plaintiff, [she]
has a right to choose the forum for her litigation, and that
choice is deserving of deference."  Although Drisker is
correct, her choice will not stand if "the defendant
demonstrates ... that the action should be transferred to
another county under the doctrine of forum non conveniens."  
Ex parte Jet Pep, Inc., 106 So. 3d 413, 415 (Ala. Civ. App.
2012).  Because the defendants have demonstrated that it is in
the interest of justice to transfer this case to Lee County,
the forum non conveniens statute overrides Drisker's choice.
IV. Conclusion
Because the defendants have demonstrated that the
connection between this case and Macon County is weak and that
the connection between this case and Lee County is strong, the
trial court exceeded its discretion by denying the 
defendants'
motion to transfer the case to Lee County. We therefore direct
the trial court to transfer this case to Lee County. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
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1190276
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur. 
Sellers and Stewart, JJ., concur in the result.
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