Case Title: Louis B. Gaskin v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-2025

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-2025
____________
LOUIS B. GASKIN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[June 13, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Louis B. Gaskin, a prisoner under the sentence of death, appeals an order
entered by the trial court denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of postconviction relief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The facts of this case are set forth in Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917, 918
(Fla. 1991).  The procedural history in this case is set forth in Gaskin v. State, 737
1.  The four ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleged the following: (1)
counsel failed to investigate and present important mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase; (2) counsel failed to give the defense mental health expert, Dr. Krop,
the background information that he requested; (3) counsel failed to mention the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase closing arguments;
and (4) counsel had a conflict of interest arising from his status as a deputy sheriff. 
See Gaskin, 737 So. 2d at 514-517.
2.  Gaskin does not appeal the trial court’s denial of the claim that counsel
was ineffective due to a conflict of interest arising from his status as a deputy
sheriff.  
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So. 2d 509, 511-12 (Fla. 1999).  In that case, we found that the trial court erred by
summarily denying what were essentially four ineffective assistance of counsel
postconviction claims, and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on
those claims.  See id. at 518.1  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
entered an order denying Gaskin relief as to all of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.  Gaskin appeals the trial court’s denial of three of those claims.2
3.850 APPEAL
Gaskin’s claims on appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion are
paraphrased as follows: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate and present important mitigating evidence; (2) counsel was ineffective
for failing to provide experts with sufficient background information so that they
could properly assess Gaskin’s mental condition; and (3) counsel was ineffective
for failing to address aggravating and mitigating factors in the penalty phase closing
3.  It is important to note that the reasonable probability language used herein
is not synonymous with the “more likely than not” standard invoked when a
defendant asserts entitlement to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.  In rejecting the higher standard placed on newly discovered evidence
cases, the Strickland court explained, “[W]e believe that a defendant need not show
that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the
case.”  466 U.S. at 693.  As Justice Souter has noted: “Despite our repeated
explanation of the shorthand formulation in these words, the continued use of the
term ‘probability’ raises an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into treating it as
akin to the more demanding standard, ‘more likely than not.’”  Strickler v. Greene,
-3-
argument to the jury.
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must establish two elements:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To establish prejudice, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”  Id. at 694.3  When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims on
527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  All
involved in the criminal justice system should take note of Justice Souter’s
cautionary warning.
4.  In its order denying relief, the trial court summarized the mitigating
evidence that Gaskin alleged trial counsel should have presented to the jury:
(1) [T]hat his mother was an unwed teenager; (2) that he was raised by
his elderly great-grandparents who abused him and forced him to eat
off the floor; (3) that at the age of 13, he would hide under the bed and
had to be physically pulled out, and, one time, during which he was
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appeal, this Court will evaluate whether the alleged errors undermine our confidence
in the outcome of the proceedings.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 574 (Fla.
1996).  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law
and fact subject to plenary review based on the Strickland test.  See Stephens v.
State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).  This requires an independent review of
the trial court’s legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court’s factual
findings.  See id.
MENTAL MITIGATION EVIDENCE
Gaskin argues that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his
trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating testimony of mental health
experts and additional lay witnesses.  Gaskin alleges trial counsel should have
presented more penalty phase witnesses to testify about Gaskin’s problems in
school, his mental health problems, and his environmental problems.4  To prevail
foaming at the mouth; (4) that he was exposed to incestuous sexual
activity at a young age; (5) that as a teenager, he was arrested for
stealing a bicycle and exhibited suicidal tendencies by playing with
dangerous snakes and playing Russian Roulette with a loaded
revolver; (6) that he failed the third and sixth grades and dropped out
of school after the eighth grade; (7) that he suffers from longstanding,
severe mental health disorders including organic brain damage,
schizotypal personality disorder, and schizophrenia.
5.  See supra note 3 (discussing Justice Souter’s caution in Strickler).
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on this claim, Gaskin must demonstrate that but for counsel’s errors, he probably
would have received a life sentence.  See Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109
(Fla. 1995).  Such a demonstration is made if “counsel’s errors deprived
[defendant] of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.”  Id. at 110.5  Trial counsel has
a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation into the defendant’s background for
possible mitigating evidence.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996). 
However, we have also stated, “The failure to investigate and present available
mitigating evidence is a relevant concern along with the reasons for not doing so.” 
Rose, 675 So. 2d at 571 (citing Hildwin).  
In the order denying relief, the trial court addressed Gaskin’s allegation that
trial counsel should have called mental health experts to testify at the penalty phase
about mental mitigation.  The trial court noted that Dr. Krop, one of the defense
mental health experts at trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he expressly
6.  Although the State’s mental health expert, Dr. Rotstein, opined in his
report that Gaskin’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired,
counsel considered calling Dr. Rotstein to testify, but decided against it.  Trial
counsel took the court reporter into the holding cell to make this conversation with
his client part of the record before the penalty phase.  Trial counsel advised Gaskin
that he did not want to call Dr. Rotstein to testify because he did not want the jury
to hear on cross-examination about Gaskin’s sexual deviancy and prior crimes. 
Gaskin agreed that Dr. Rotstein should not be called to testify.
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told counsel before trial that he would not be of much help to the defense because
he would have to testify about Gaskin’s extensive history of past criminal conduct,
sexual deviancy, and lack of remorse.  The trial court also stated that trial counsel
testified at the hearing that he made a strategic decision not to present mental health
experts precisely because Gaskin’s background contained many negatives
(including Dr. Krop’s proposed testimony).6  
The trial court denied relief as to this claim, stating:
This Court finds that counsel was not deficient because counsel did
conduct a reasonable investigation of mental health mitigation prior to
trial and made a reasonable, strategic decision not to present this
information to the jury and not to present Dr. Krop’s findings to the
judge.  Therefore, this claim is also legally insufficient.
In the order denying relief, the trial court also addressed Gaskin’s allegation that
additional lay witnesses should have been called during the penalty phase to testify
about mitigating evidence.  At the evidentiary hearing Gaskin presented the
testimony of friends, family members, former teachers, and school administrators.
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Their testimony revealed the following facts as related by the trial court:
[T]here was testimony regarding the Defendant sexually forcing
himself on a six-year-old boy, the Defendant’s consensual, incestuous
relationships and sexual deviancy, including bestiality, the Defendant’s
violent attempt to sexually force himself on his former girlfriend, the
Defendant’s admission that he loved to kill and that he killed cats and
snakes, and his history of stealing at school and from his great-
grandparents. 
The trial court remarked in its order that trial counsel testified at the evidentiary
hearing that he purposely chose to keep Gaskin’s past violent and criminal conduct
from the jury because he felt that the jury would consider Gaskin’s past (including
school records) as aggravating circumstances.  Thus, the trial court found “that
counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to present this nonstatutory, non-
mental health mitigation.” 
Trial counsel will not be held to be deficient when she makes a reasonable
strategic decision to not present mental mitigation testimony during the penalty
phase because it could open the door to other damaging testimony.  See Ferguson
v. State, 593 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1992) (finding that counsel’s decision to not put
on mental health experts was a “reasonable strategy in light of the negative aspects
of the expert testimony” because the experts had indicated that they thought that the
defendant was malingering, a sociopath, and a very dangerous person); see also
State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 1987) (holding that “[s]trategic
-8-
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action
have been considered and rejected”).  It is apparent from the record that the
witnesses who Gaskin alleges should have testified on his behalf were subject to
being cross-examined about disturbing information about Gaskin, which would
have defeated trial counsel’s strategy.  We find no error in the trial court’s
conclusion that counsel acted reasonably by not putting on evidence that would
open the door to other damaging testimony about Gaskin.  See Robinson v. State,
707 So. 2d 688, 697 (Fla. 1998) (noting that the trial court could have concluded
that trial counsel was not ineffective in not opening the door to potentially
devastating rebuttal evidence); Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 298 (Fla. 1990)
(finding no ineffectiveness for counsel’s choice not to present witnesses who
would have opened the door for the State to cross-examine them about the
defendant's violent past).
However, even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate mental
mitigation more thoroughly or to present mental mitigation in this case, Gaskin is
unable to meet the Strickland prejudice prong in this claim.  As we stated in Rose,
“[S]evere mental disturbance is a mitigating factor of the most weighty order, and
the failure to present it in the penalty phase may constitute prejudicial
ineffectiveness.”  675 So. 2d at 573 (citations omitted).  In this case, the trial court
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also concluded that Gaskin had not met the Strickland prejudice prong, stating:
[I]n light of the eight-to-four vote recommending death without hearing
about the Defendant’s prior violent and criminal conduct, sexual
deviancy, and lack of remorse, there is no reasonable probability that
Dr. Krop’s testimony regarding nonstatutory mitigation would have
outweighed the substantial and compelling aggravation of prior violent
felonies, commission during a robbery or burglary, CCP, and HAC.
Due to the fact that most of the witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing
admitted on cross-examination that they were aware of other, very negative
information about Gaskin, we agree with the trial court that Gaskin has not
demonstrated that he was deprived of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.  See
Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. 1997) (stating that the presentation of
lay witnesses to address Breedlove’s father’s drug addiction and his beatings of
Breedlove would have allowed cross-examination and rebuttal evidence that would
have countered any value of that information); Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 295
(Fla. 1993) (“In light of the harmful testimony that could have been adduced from
Rose's brother and the minimal probative value of the cousins' testimony, we are
convinced that the outcome would not have been different had their testimony been
presented at the penalty phase.").  We also note the trial court’s conclusion that the
statutory aggravators that were found in this case would have overwhelmed any
mitigating testimony that the lay witnesses would provide.  See Breedlove, 692 So.
7.  The trial court found the following aggravators in this case: (1) both
murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner; (2)
Gaskin had previously been convicted of another capital offense or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence; (3) the murders were committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or burglary; and (4) the
murder of Mrs. Sturmfels was “especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.”  See
Gaskin, 591 So. 2d at 919.  
-10-
2d at 878.7 
Further, despite what Gaskin characterizes as counsel’s deficient
performance for failing to investigate and present mental mitigation, the trial court
did find two mental mitigators: the murders were committed while Gaskin was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and Gaskin had a
deprived childhood.  At the evidentiary hearing, defense expert Dr. Toomer
testified that if he had testified at trial, he would have expressed his opinion that
Gaskin lacked the ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the murders.  However,
State expert Dr. Rotstein previously opined that the same mitigator applied in this
case.  Dr. Rotstein’s report was presented to the trial court during the penalty
phase, yet the trial court chose to reject this mitigator.  See Gaskin, 591 So. 2d at
921-22.  
We have held that counsel’s reasonable mental health investigation is not
rendered incompetent “merely because the defendant has now secured the
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testimony of a more favorable mental health expert.”  Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d
974, 986 (Fla. 2000).  In this case, Dr. Toomer’s testimony represents not only a
recent and more favorable defense expert opinion, but a cumulative opinion to one
that was already presented to the trial court.
The trial court was also not convinced that Gaskin would have received a life
sentence if the evidentiary hearing testimony had been presented at trial because the
new evidence merely included much cumulative information that had already been
considered and rejected by the trial court, and the new information painted a much
more negative and prejudicial picture of Gaskin.  The fact that mental health experts
and more lay witnesses were not called during the penalty phase does not
undermine our confidence in the outcome of this proceeding.  Thus, we affirm the
trial court’s denial of relief as to this claim.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In Gaskin’s second claim, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to provide Dr. Krop with requested background information.  The trial court
denied relief on this claim, stating:
Dr. Krop testified that the school records were the only information he
was unaware of for his initial evaluations and diagnosis of the
Defendant. . . .  Dr. Krop also testified that his diagnosis of the
Defendant would be the same as it was originally on June 8, 1990, only
four (4) days after his deposition, with the addition of the opinion that
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the Defendant suffers from a learning disability, attention deficit
disorder, based on the school records. 
The trial court found that Gaskin did not establish that he suffered any actual
prejudice from counsel’s failure to give Dr. Krop school records.  The trial court
held: “[I]n light of Dr. Krop’s postconviction testimony, there is not a reasonable
probability that Dr. Krop’s diagnosis would have been different; it was the same
with only one minor addition–a learning disability, a nonstatutory mitigator.”
We find no error in the trial court’s determination that Gaskin has not
suffered prejudice from counsel’s alleged deficient performance.  As the trial court
noted, because Dr. Krop testified at the evidentiary hearing that his diagnosis of
Gaskin would have changed little if counsel had given him Gaskin’s school
records, Gaskin has not met his burden of showing that but for counsel’s alleged
deficiency, the result of the penalty phase would have been different.  See
Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. 1997) (holding that because the
psychologists testified that their opinions would remain unchanged even
considering the additional information, there was not a reasonable probability that
the result of the penalty phase would have been different); see also Brown v. State,
755 So. 2d 616, 636 (Fla. 2000) (holding that trial counsel’s performance was not
deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the
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expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have
changed his testimony).  The fact remains that even if Dr. Krop had the benefit of
the school records, he still possessed a wealth of damaging information about
Gaskin that counsel did not want the jury to hear.  The fact that trial counsel did not
give Dr. Krop school records, which indicated that Gaskin suffered from a learning
disability, does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the proceedings
when considered in light of all the information before the trial court.  Thus, we
affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT
In Gaskin’s third and final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he alleges
that trial counsel was ineffective for the way he delivered the closing argument
during the penalty phase.  Gaskin alleges that trial counsel was deficient because he
gave an extremely short argument, did not discuss the aggravators, only briefly
mentioned mitigation, and characterized Gaskin as a “sociopath.” 
In its order denying relief, the trial court found that trial counsel appealed to
the jury to spare Gaskin’s life and that he brought up Gaskin as a sociopath just to
point out that there was no evidence in the record to support that Gaskin was a
sociopath.  The trial court denied relief as to this claim, stating: 
This Court finds that, in light of counsel’s reasonable strategy
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to keep out the Defendant’s past violent and criminal conduct, sexual
deviancy, and lack of remorse by not presenting extensive mitigation
evidence, and in light of the State’s closing argument, as well as the
evidence presented regarding the manner in which the murders were
committed, counsel’s performance during closing argument was not
deficient. . . .  [T]here is not a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the penalty phase proceeding would have been different if counsel,
during closing argument, would have fully addressed all of the
statutory aggravators and stated more regarding the mitigation
evidence that was presented, especially in light of the compelling and
substantial aggravators proven beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e. prior
violent felonies, commission during a robbery or burglary, CCP, and
HAC.  
Although Gaskin now states that he would have wanted counsel to discuss the
relevant aggravators and mitigators at more length, this does not necessarily render
trial counsel ineffective.  See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995)
(“The standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but
rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability
of a different result.”); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“Even the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”).  
We
find no error in the trial court’s rejection of this claim in light of the defense strategy
to emphasize the positive facts about Gaskin, and to de-emphasize the negative
aspects about him.  See Ferguson v. State, 593 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1992),
(“Although in hindsight one can speculate that a different argument may have been
more effective, counsel’s argument does not fall to the level of deficient
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performance simply because it ultimately failed to persuade the jury.”).
Again, however, even if we were to conclude that trial counsel was deficient
for giving the allegedly poor closing argument, Gaskin has not fulfilled the
Strickland prejudice prong in this claim.  This is not a case in which trial counsel
essentially argued that the jury had no alternative but to recommend a death
sentence.  Cf. Clark v. State, 690 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 1997).  When considered
within the context of the entire penalty phase closing argument, trial counsel’s
statements during closing argument were not disparaging of his client, as evidenced
through his statements that Gaskin was not a sociopath, that he was normal and
“intelligent,” and that Gaskin’s becoming violent was a “tragedy,” but that society
would not be better by killing him.  In view of the extreme aggravation established
in this case, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that counsel’s decision
not to further discuss the four aggravators during closing arguments was not so
deficient as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.  
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 3.850 relief.
It is so ordered. 
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,
William C. Johnson, Jr., Judge - Case Nos.  95-34327-CFAES; & 90-001-CFA
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle; Dwight M. Wells,
Assistant CCRC, and Carol C. Rodriguez, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral
Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee