Case Title: GOGGANS v WINKLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
No* 12112 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1972 T O M G O G G A N S and P H O E B E G O G G A N S , husband and wife, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, C L A R E N C E H. W I N K L E Y and D O R O T H Y I. WINKLEY, Husband and wife, and M, M . 14ANSFIELD , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : L. Lloyd Evans argued, Libby, Montana. For Respondents: Douglas and Kaufman, Libby, ~ o n t a n a . William Douglas and Leonard Kaufman argued, Libby, Montana. submitted: February 17, 1972 Decided : M R 2 1 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment for p l a i n t i f f s i n an action for damages by purchasers of land against s e l l e r s and t h e i r r e a l e s t a t e agent. The action was o r i g i n a l l y t r i e d i n the eleventh j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Lincoln and resulted i n a directed verdict for defendants. P l a i n t i f f s appealed, the judgment was vacated, and the cause remanded f o r r e t r i a l . Goggans v. Winkley, 154 Mont. 451, 452, 459, 465 P.2d 326 (hereinafter referred t o a s the f i r s t case). The r e t r i a l resulted i n judgment for p l a i n t i f f s and an award of $9,000 by verdict of a jury. Following denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the v e r d i c t and motion f o r a new t r i a l , defendants now appeal from t ha t j udgmen t . P l a i n t i f f s T o m and Phoebe Goggans about March 1, 1967, purchased a two a c r e t r a c t of land with frontage on the Libby- Jennings highway i n Lincoln County from defendants Clarence H. and Dorothy I. WinKley, through the t h i r d defendant M. M. Mans- f i e l d , a r e a l e s t a t e agent i n Libby. Here, the factsas ~ m t h e l a n d purchase a r e the same a s those s e t out i n the f i r s t case, to-wit: "Plaintiff-purchasers made an earnest money payment and signed a written purchase o f f e r on a form prepared by the r e a l e s t a t e agent which contained the following provisions: " ' A l l representations made by Broker o r its agents t o Buyer concerning said r e a l or personal property a r e believed by it and them t o be t r u e and correct and a r e made in good f a i t h but neither Broker nor any of its salesmen or agents represents or warrants any thereof t o be true. Buyer has personally inspected said premises and personal property and i s personally familiar with the loca t i o n , s i z e , and condition thereof and i s relying solely upon ~ u y e r ' s own information about and investigation of the same and a l s o a s t o any financing d t h i s sa l e contemplated by Buyer. ' "The s a l e was completed by a written contract for deed signed by plaintiff-purchasers and defendant-sellers which con- ta ined the following provision: "'It is agreed and understood between the p a r t i e s hereto t h a t t h e expense of surveying the premises herein described s h a l l be borne by second p a r t i e s , t "Plaintiff -purchasers entered i n t o possession and made c e r t a i n improvements on the property, generally cons is ting of a gas s t a t i o n , s t o r e , and t r a i l e r park. Thereafter p l a i n t i f f - purchasers were informed by agents of the Montana highway de- partment t h a t t h e i r property encroached upon the highway r i g h t - of-way approximately 40 f e e t . This action followed. "According t o plaintiff-purchasers, the r e a l e s t a t e agent made f a l s e representations which induced them t o enter i n t o the contract for deed under which they purchased the property. These generally consisted of statements t o the e f f e c t t h a t c e r t a i n stakes on the property marked i t s boundaries, t h a t such survey was accurate and the stakes marked the t r u e boundaries, and t h a t any additional survey by the purchasers would be a waste of time and money. According t o plaintiff-purchasers, they r e l i e d on these statements, obtained a drawing of the property from the rea 1 e s t a t e agent with dimensions of the property marked thereon, went t o the property and measured the distances between the stakes which checked with the dimensions on the drawing, and accordingly did not have a survey made." In reversing and remanding the f i r s t case for r e t r i a l , t h i s Court sa id : "Here purchasers have alleged and offered t o prove fraud i n the form of f a l s e representations which in- duced them t o enter i n t o the contract i n the f i r s t place. Fraud i n the inducement has always been held t o be provable by parol, notwithstanding the parol evidence rule: Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. , Inc. v. Wenholz, 80 Mont. 82, 258 P. 1085; Sathre v. Rolfe, 31 Mont. 85, 77 P. 431." This appeal is from a judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f s , following a jury verdict. Defendants enumerate a lengthy list of issues f o r review which we summarize t o reach the t h r u s t of defendants' appeal. 1. Defendants object t o the limitation of cross-examina- t i o n of the p l a i n t i f f s ' witness Vernon Borden, a s t o the d e t a i l s of h i s r e d i r e c t testimony. Defendants contend the r e d i r e c t examination of Borden sought t o enhance the s t a t u r e of the witness and emphasize h i s o f f i c i a l connection with the s t a t e highway de- pa r tmen t . 2. Defendants object t o the limitation o t cross-examina - tion of p l a i n t i f f Phoebe Goggans with respect t o a possible a c t u a l or prospective r e s a l e of the property i n dispute. 3. Defendants object t o the exclusion of evidence t h a t a federal dam i s being constructed i n the area. They contend such evidence has a decisive bearing upon the issue and amount of damages. 4. Defendants object t o the limitation of t h e number of character witnesses t o three instead of the t r i a l court r u l e of f i v e , contending t h a t since the case was i n the nature of fraud the character of defendants was i n issue and defendants were un- duly and unfairly limited i n the number of t h e i r character w i t - nesses. 5. Defendants object t o the court's refusal of a number of defendants ' offered instructions. 6. Defendants object t o the sufficiency of the evidence t o j u s t i f y the verdict and amount of damages. Issue 1. Vernon Borden is a s t a t e highway department engineer whose survey crew undertook t o e s t a b l i s h the right-of- way adjoining p l a i n t i f f s ' property. Measurements were made from the center of the existing roadway. According t o those measure- ments there was an encroachment upon the 80 foot right-of-way of 1.5 f e e t a t the southerly end and 2.2 f e e t a t the northerly end of p l a i n t i f f s ' s t o r e building. Other encroachments were noted, according t o the measurements, but they a r e not a part of t h i s proceeding. Defendants object t o t h e limitation of recross-examina- t i o n of M r . Borden. From t h e t r a n s c r i p t , it is evident t h a t prior questioning of Borden thoroughly established the measurements and encroachments, which a r e the basis of t h i s action. The d i r e c t and cross-examination of Borden examined the width of t h e right-of -way and the surveying. Redirect-examina tion of Borden again treated the matters already developed i n the record. The questioning pertained t o the width of the right-of-way, the length of time f o r leases, and surveying t o e s t a b l i s h a centerline i n the highway. On recross- examination the t r i a l court limited examination t o the scope of the redirect-examination. W e find it t o be a proper ruling. Garrison v. Trowbridge, 119 Mont. 505, 177 P.2d 464. A s t o defendants ' contention regarding t h e c r e d i b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y of the witness Borden based upon h i s s t a t u s , no record a t t r i a l presented any issue regarding h i s authority, competence, o r s t a t u s . Matters of technica 1 expertise were s u f f i c i e n t l y examined and de- fendants' argument on any alleged u n r e l i a b i l i t y is without merit. Issue 2. Defendants ' object t o the limitation of cross- examination of the p l a i n t i f f Phoebe Goggans, with respect t o a possible a c t u a l or progpective r e s a l e of the property. Defendants sought t o explore t h i s area i n an e f f o r t t o r e f u t e p l a i n t i f f s ' contention t h a t the property i s worthless i n view of the r i g h t - of-way encroachment. The t r i a l court ruled defendants could not inquire i n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' future plans regarding the property on the grounds t h a t cross-examination must be limited t o those matters brought out i n d i r e c t examination; and, t h a t the area of questioning had no relevance i n that it raised a c o l l a t e r a l issue, involving t h i r d p a r t i e s , not germane t o t h i s case. Issue 3 . Defendants contend t h a t without unlimited cross- examination p l a i n t i f f s ' testimony was speculative and conjectural regarding damages, in view of the location of p l a i n t i f f s ' property on the s i t e of a United States government dam. Defendants maintain t h e i r case was prejudiced when the court refused t o take j u d i c i a l notice of the f a c t s which form part of the common knowledge and experience. The f a c t t h a t the property may be on a government dam s i t e is irrelevant t o the issues and is conjectural concerning possible future and c o l l a t e r a l matters. A t issue here is the r i g h t of recovery from defendants. Injection of colla tera 1 matters involving transactions between others, which a r e i n t h i s case conjectural, is c o l l a t e r a l inadmissible evidence under the c o l l a t e r a l source doctrine. In the Oklahoma case, Burk Royalty Company v. Jacobs, ( ~ k l a . 1963), 387 P.2d 638, 640, the landowners brought action against o i l and gas lessee for damages t o surface of land by s a l t water and o i l pollution. A t t r i a l , the court excluded lessee's evidence t h a t the landowners had a contract with the federal government placing p a r t of t h e i r land under the provisions of the S o i l Bank Act. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held: "The above a l l e g a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e no defense t o p l a i n t i f f s ' a c t i o n f o r damages caused by flowage of s a l t water and o i l over t h e i r land. p l a i n t i f f s ' compensation by the f e d e r a l government under the contract is merely compensation from a c o l l a t e r a l source. W e have many times held t h a t a payment t o p l a i n t i f f s from a source wholly independent of and not i n behalf of t h e wrongdoer cannot inure t o the b e n e f i t of t h e wrongdoer t o lessen t h e damages recoverable from him, and t h e evidence of such pay- ment is inadmissible." Here, defendants seek t o r e l y upon t h e common knowledge of the community t h a t the property involved is s i t u a t e d on t h e government dam s i t e . The f u t u r e d i s p o s i t i o n of the property, a long with t h e speculative transactions defendants seek t o i n j e c t i n t o the case, a r e conjectural matters not i n i s s u e and not relevant here. Issue 4. Defendants object t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r character witnesses t o t h r e e , instead of t h e t r i a l court r u l e of f i v e such witnesses. They contend p l a i n t i f f s ' a l l e g a t i o n s put the character of t h e defendants i n i s s u e and defendants were unduly and u n f a i r l y limited a s t o t h e number of t h e i r character witnesses. This i s s u e is without merit. The record reveals no object- t i o n by defendants' counsel t o the l i m i t a t i o n of t h e number of character witnesses by the t r i a l c o u r t . Counsel must preserve the record t o perfect a p p e l l a t e review of an issue. Clark v . Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, 406 P.2d 822; Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48. Notice is taken of t h e a f f i d a v i t s of counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s and t h e a f f i d a v i t of the t r i a l judge s e t t i n g f o r t h the lack of objection by defendants' counsel. The t r i a l judge a l s o noted the attempt t o conduct a reasonable and expeditious t r i a l . O f prime importance i s the explanation of the t r i a l judge t h a t although p l a i n t i f f s objected t o the submission of any character witnesses nevertheless, since the case was based on a theory of constructive fraud, the court permitted defendants t o place t h e i r witnesses upon t h e stand, subject :_\to.- the court's limitation which was not objected t o by defendants ' counsel. Here, we note t h a t from the record t h e character of the defendants was not i n issue and was not impeached a t t r i a l . ~ o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t e on character testimony, section 93-1901-13, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Evidence of good character--when allowed. Evidence of t h e good character of a party is not admissible i n a c i v i l action, nor of a witness i n any action, u n t i l the character of such party or witness has been impeached, o r unless the issue involves h i s character.'' A t the very l e a s t , character testimony was not germane t o t h i s case and, advancing defendants' argument t o its f u l l e s t extent, c e r t a i n l y the three witnesses ' testimony established the good character of detendants s u f f i c i e n t l y for the jury. W e find no error. Issue 5. Defendants object t o the t r i a l court's refusal of eleven instructions proposed by defendants. Defendants' proposed Montana Jury Instruction Guide, (WIG), No. 1.04 o f f e r s the common knowledge of dam construction a s the basis of mitigation of damages against defendants. A s heretofore discussed, the injection of c o l l a t e r a l matters, independent i n nature, is irrelevant and properly excludable both i n the taking of evidence and i n summation. Kappes v. Jaap, 141 Mont. 471, 378 WIG No. 1.05 r e l a t e s t o o r a l admissions and is mandatory, t h a t however, we noteithe t r i a l court's Instruction No. 2 was adequate t o inform the jury on the weight t o be given testimony presented during t r i a l . The jury was properly apprised of its r o l e i n weighing the testimony a s i t related t o the f a c t s and circum- stances a s shown by the evidence. The general precautionary instruction given by the court was adequate. Detendants' proposed WIG instructions No. 1.06 and No. 5.01 t e s t the strength of the evidence produced a t trial, questioning the i n a b i l i t y of p l a i n t i t f s t o produce a p l a t which the p l a i n t i f f s claimed was furnished t o them and the f a i l u r e of p l a i n t i f f T o m Goggans t o appear, t e s t i f y and be cross-examined. These instruc- tions a r e inapplicable t o the evidence since the testimony of the highway department engineer, Borden, s u f f i c i e n t l y provided a u t h o r i t a t i v e expertise regarding the alleged encroachment. Further, the deposition of p l a i n t i f f T o m Goggans was read i n t o the record pursuant t o Rule 26(d) (3), M.R.Civ.P., absent objec- tion by defendants and without a motion t o suppress such deposi- tion. The evidence thus presented by way of deposition was s u f f i c i e n t t o replace T o m Goggans a s a witness. Defendants' instruction No. 2 was properly refused since the court's given Instruction No. 13. was a c l e a r statement of the law applicable t o the two theories of a c t u a l and constructive fraud. Refused instruction No. 2 represented a limited instruc- tion r e s t r i c t i n g i t s e l f t o the elements of a c t u a l fraud and deleted the theory of constructive fraud. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' proposed instruction No. 3 was adequately covered by the t r i a l c o u r t ' s given Instruction No. 10, which instructed the jury t h a t transactions a r e presumed t o have been f a i r and regular. Similarly, defendants' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 5 on the presumption of good f a i t h was contained i n the c o u r t ' s given Instructions No. 2 and No. 10, which s t a t e d t h a t witnesses a r e presumed t o speak t h e t r u t h and transactions a r e presumed t o have been f a i r and regular. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s No. 6 , 7 , and 8 p e r t a i n t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t regarding surveying. W e f i n d them t o be without merit a s t h i s Court s a i d i n t h e f i r s t case: " W e hold t h a t , i n any event, t h e survey provision i n t h e contract does not bar inquiry i n t o the question of whether purchasers got what they bargained f o r . I f c e r t a i n representations were made t o purchasers by t h e s e l l e r s ' agent r e l a t i v e t o a previous survey, the marking of t h e boundaries thereof with s t a k e s , and the measurements of the perimeter of the property and t h a t these representations were properly r e l i e d upon thereby inducing purchasers t o buy without a survey, a l l a s comprehended i n purchasers' o f f e r of proof, and it l a t e r turns out t h a t the representations a r e incorrect and t h e property is i n f a c t i n a d i f - f e r e n t location and encroaches on t h e s t a t e ' s r i g h t - of-way, then the purchasers a r e not foreclosed from attempting t o prove t h e s e f a c t s by t h e c o n t r a c t pro- v i s i o n i n question. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was i n e r r o r a t t h i s point." ~ e f e n d a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 11 is an i n s t r u c t i o n on damages and we find no e r r o r i n the c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o g r a n t such i n s t r u c t i o n , s i n c e it was i n substance adequately contained i n the c o u r t ' s given Instructions No. 7 and No. 11. W e f i n d no merit i n defendants ' i s s u e No. 5. Issue No. 6. Defendants contend tha t i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence was presented t o show (1) fraud, (2) encroachment, and (3) damages, t o support the jury v e r d i c t . Defendants have framed the f i r s t point of t h i s i s s u e i n terms of fraud, when i n f a c t the case was t r i e d on misrepresenta- t i o n i n the description of t h e boundaries 02 the property. Evidence produced a t t r i a 1 demonstrated the property was surveyed and represented t o the buyers a s containing a 40 foot s t r i p which in f a c t was part of a highway right-of-way. The testimony regarding stakes v i s i b l e on the property a t the time of s a l e i s further evidence of the representation. That there was an encroachment contained i n the description was adequately l a i d t o r e s t by the testimony describing the highway right-of-way. Plaintikfs from the outset maintained t h a t t h e i r claim rested on the misrepresentation which they were given. P l a i n t i f f s did not a t any time predicate t h e i r s u i t upon a claim of fraud on the part of defendants. W e find defendants' argument on t h i s point i s not germane t o the f a c t s . Substantial evidence of misrepresentation was adequately shown and i f believed by the jury, served a s the basis for its verdict. a 1 leged The second point i n issue No. 6 goes t o the/insufficiency of the evidence t o show encroachment. As we have noted, evidence taken a t t r i a l regarding surveying was d i r e c t l y in point t o show t h a t p l a i n t i f f s were i n f a c t not e n t i t l e d t o a 40 foot r i g h t - of-way which belonged t o the highway and which extended the f u l l length of the abutting property they had purchased. This was a reduction and an injury of the purchase, flowing out of the misrepresentation i n the description. Again, we find the jury was presented with s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence t o s o find. The t h i r d point i n issue No. 6 t e s t s the sufficiency of the evidence a s t o damages t o support the jury verdict. W e a r e directed again t o the body of evidence presented a t t r i a l outlining and the nature of p l a i n t i f f s ' business/as it was affected by the encroachment. Testimony a s t o the r e l a t i v e value of the property both with and without that s t r i p of land was brought out a t t r i a l and we find no reasonable basis t o d i s t u r b the jury's assess- ment. This Court has repeatedly held t h a t even though the evidence is i n c o n f l i c t , it w i l l only review the evidence t o determine i f there is s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence t o support the verdict. Breen v. Ind. Acc. Board, 150 Mont. 463, 436 P.2d 701; Davis v. Davis, M o n t . - P.2d - 3 - , 29 St.Rep. 65. W e find no merit i n defendants ' issue No. 6. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e i Wesley Castles .