Case Title: FLAKE v AETNA LIFE CASUALTY CO

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Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-12-13T00:00:00Z

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No. 13526 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF P40MTANA 1977 VIRGINIA FLAKE, Claimant and Appellant, -vs- ST. VINCENTS'S HOSPITAL, Employer, and AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judqe presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Kelly and Foley, Billings, Montana William T. Kelly argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete and Brown, Billings, Montana Weymouth D. Symmes argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: September 20, 1977 Decided: QEC 1 3 j m Filed: der 2 s M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a decision of the workers' compen- sation court, Billings, that claimant sustained a 12% permanent p a r t i a l disability and awarding a lump sum payment i n the amount of $2,431.20. Virginia Flake, claimant and appellant, is a licensed practical nurse. She suffered an injury t o her lower back i n the course of her employment a t St. Vincent's Hospital in Billings on March 3, 1974. Prior t o her injury, she was employed part-time, working an average of three eight hour days per week. The record reveals claimant worked one f u l l forty hour week just prior t o her injury. Following the injury, claimant continued t o work u n t i l March 30, 1974, when the paid of the injury forced her t o discontinue her work. D r . D. R. Huard performed a laminectomy on claimant in August 1974. The workers' Compensation Division paid a l l b i l l s and l o s t wages during the period of claimant's nonemployment. O n November 18, 1974, claimant resumed work a t St. Vincent's. She was unable to do l i f t i n g because of the injury. However, she was able to work three t o four days per week and has, in fact, worked several forty hour weeks subsequent t o the injury. Her wages have increased approximately eightycents per hour, primarily due t o across the board cost of living increases, so she makes somewhat more money now than before the injury. O n August 29, 1974, D r . Huard submitted a report stating: "* * 9 : I believe there is a p a r t i a l permanent impair- ment. This following r e s u l t of laminectomy would be 20% of her spine, which converts t o 12% of the man a s a whole. * * *" The insurance c a r r i e r f o r St. Vincent's, defendant and respondent Aetna Life & Casualty Company concluded the 12% impairment factor limited i t s l i a b i l i t y under the ~ o r k e r s ' Compensation Act t o 12% o r 60 of the possible 500 weeks of maximum benefit. Multiplying 60 weeks by the weekly compensa- tion r a t e of $40.52 yielded $2,431.20, which sum was offered t o claimant. Claimant rejected the o f f e r and, on September 4, 1975, sought a de termination before the workers ' compensation court. During the hearing of November 5 , 1975, pursuant t o claimant's p e t i t i o n , claimant submitted evidence of her i n a b i l i t y t o perform c e r t a i n types of work, such a s l i f t i n g , as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of her injury. The court, by i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law dated August 23, 1976, accepted the c a r r i e r ' s computation of $2,431.20, upon a finding of no substantial loss of earning capacity, based upon claimant's work records and the 12% impairment rating. Claimant appeals the c o u r t ' s conclusions. The issue presented by t h i s appeal i s whether the workers' compensation court erred i n arriving a t a 12% permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y rating, given the f a c t s of record. W e hold it did not. Claimant contends the court should not have determined d i s a b i l i t y solely upon the basis of the doctor's medical impairment rating b u t , r a t h e r , t h a t d i s a b i l i t y should be com- puted upon a consideration of "loss of earning capacity". I n making such computation, the court should properly evaluate the d i s a b i l i t y i n view of claimant's age, education, work experience, pain and d i s a b i l i t y , a c t u a l wage l o s s , and loss of future earning a b i l i t y . Here, claimant's i n a b i l i t y t o perform more than three o r four days of work should be con- sidered strong evidence of a loss of earning capacity. I n t h i s regard, claimant submits the Workers ' Compensation Act should be l i b e r a l l y construed i n favor of recovery. Respondent, however, s t r e s s e s t h a t claimant is presently working a t l e a s t a s many hours and, i n f a c t , i s earning more a f t e r than before the injury, therefore there being no actual wage l o s s there i s no loss of earning capacity. Claimant sus- tained a "bodily functional impairment" only, f u l l y compensable by the settlement offered by respondent insurance c a r r i e r . The court properly based i t s award on the percentage of such i m - pairment, t h i s being the only substantive evidence of d i s a b i l i t y . Claimant's p e t i t i o n for workers' compensation benefits pro- ceeded under and i s governed by the workers' Compensation Act, section 92-703.1, R.C.M. 1947. This section provided p r i o r t o amendment i n 1975: "Compensation f o r i n j u r i e s causing p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y . Weekly compensation benefits f o r injury producing p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y s h a l l be sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the difference between the wages received a t the time of the injury and the wages the injured employee is capable of earning thereafter, sub- jece. t o a maximum compensation of s i x t y d o l l a r s ($60.00) a week. Section 92-703.1 "* * * bases the benefit upon a c t u a l l o s s of earning capacity resulting from the injury * * *.I' McAlear v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., - Mont . - 9 558 P.2d 1134, 33 St. Rep. 1.337, 1341 (1976). It i s manifest from a reading of section 92-703.1 t h a t the t e s t f o r such l o s s of earning capacity under the Workers' Compensation Act is "the difference between the wages received a t the time of the injury and the wages the injured employee is capable of earning thereafter yc + ; *.'I Also see: Olson v. Manion's, Inc., 162 Mont. 197, 202, 510 P.2d 6 (1973). Claimant r e l i e s on decisions of t h i s Court adopting the "loss of earning capacity" t e s t . Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340 (1953); Lind v. Lind, 142 Mont. 211, 383 P.2d 808 (1963); Graham v. Tree Farmers, Inc., 142 Mont. 483, 385 P.2d 83 (1963). Claimant draws support primarily from the related r u l e emerging from such cases, t h a t loss of earning power a s a r e s u l t of an injury i s not necessarily proportional t o bodily functional impairment. It i s argued t h a t t o equate a percentage bodily functional impairment rating with a percentage d i s a b i l i t y rating f o r purposes of compensation under section 92-703.1, is t o make wholly a r b i t r a r y the concept of "compensable disability". While we agree a small percentage of bodily functional impairment can r e s u l t i n a substantial loss of earning capacity and a greater compensation award i n some cases, the evidence adduced a t the hearing i n the instant case leads t o the opposite conclusion. Claimant was shown t o be working a t l e a s t a s oisny hours a f t e r the injury a s before. The f a c t claimant may have worked more hours, earned more pay, o r been promoted i n her employment had it not been for the injury, i s immaterial t o a determination of compensable d i s a b i l i t y especially where, d s here, the record i s devoid of evidence i n support of such ~ ~ o n c l u s i o n . Olson v. Manion's, Inc., supra. The s a l i e n t tact remains claimant was a part-time employee before and axter the injury. To base an o r i g i n a l compensation award upon any other c r i t e r i o n would be t o do violence t o the l i t e r a l Language of section 92-703.1. Finally, we note the medical report submitted by D r . Huard was the sole evidence i n the record substantiating the percentage of claimant's impairment. W e find the workers' zon~pensation court had no a 1 ternative, based upon the f a c t s L n the record, than t o ground the award on the impairment rating i n the l i g h t of claimant's work records and, i n so doing, accepting the settlement figure offered by respondent insurance c a r r i e r . The decision of the workers' compensation court i s a f - tirmed. i4e Concur: - f L - J u s t i c e s . M r . Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield concurs in the r e s u l t , but not i n a l l the discussion. i e f Justice. - 6 - M r . Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I respectfully dissent. This claimant was performing part-time employment before her injury i.e., there was only three or four days a week available t o her. Since her operation she i s only - able to work three or four days a week even though there is more work now available t o her. There is no doubt claimant may be earning the same number of dollars or even more but t h i s is not m y understanding of the standard t o be applied when determining her right t o be paid under section 92-703.1 for diminished earning capacity. The number of dollars earned and hours spent performing her employment create a presumption of earning capacity compatible with her stated disability. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that shows her post-injury dollars earned and time spent t o be an unreliable basis for the determination of earning capacity. Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 213, 259 P.2d 340,342 (1953). Here, there seems t o be a loss of capacity t o perform as well as before the injury and a loss of a b i l i t y t o compete and earn i n the open labor market. This would bring claimant within section 92-703.1, R.C.M. 1947. . . . . . . . . . M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I concur i n the above dissent of M r . Justice Daly.