Case Title: Meyer v. Rodabaugh

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-173

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Meyer v. Rodabaugh1999 WY 85982 P.2d 1242Case Number: 98-173Decided: 06/21/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
LINDA J. MEYER, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Joseph Wayne Lowder, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

LOIS RODABAUGH, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Uinta County The Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge

Tammy A. Burt of 
Harris Law Firm, P. C., Evanston, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.

Dennis W. 
Lancaster of Phillips & Lancaster, P. C., Evanston, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The only issue 
before this Court is whether the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion in 
admitting the testimony at trial of two witnesses over the objection of Linda J. 
Meyer (Meyer) that there had been late notification by Lois Rodabaugh 
(Rodabaugh) of the identity of the witnesses and the substance of their 
testimony. The case was tried by the judge without a jury, and Meyer was offered 
additional time to investigate the witnesses and prepare for cross-examination. 
Under these circumstances, it is so clear that there was no abuse of discretion 
that this Court must certify that there was no reasonable cause to pursue this 
appeal. The Judgment entered in the trial court is affirmed, and, upon proper 
motion and affidavit setting forth reasonable attorney fees and damages, this 
Court will award reasonable attorney fees and damages to 
Rodabaugh.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed by Meyer, the single issue that is raised 
is:

A. Did the 
District Court abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of witnesses Joe 
Loftin and Jack Richardson?

This Statement 
of the Issue is found in Appellee Lois Rodabaugh's Brief:

A. Whether the 
district court's ruling allowing the testimony of witnesses Joe Loftin and Jack 
Richardson was an abuse of discretion by the district 
court.

[¶3]      Meyer's father 
lived with Rodabaugh for approximately seven years before he died at age 
seventy-one. After his death, Meyer brought this action against Rodabaugh 
seeking to recover $50,000.00 which Meyer alleged had belonged to her father; 
was part of his intestate estate; and was in the possession of Rodabaugh. At 
trial, Meyer presented evidence that during a visit to her father, he had 
informed her of his intentions to give her some money that he kept in 
Rodabaugh's safe. Meyer and her common-law husband both testified that they 
believed the money existed, and they told about Rodabaugh opening her safe to 
show Meyer an envelope which they believed contained the money. When Rodabaugh 
testified, she stated that she never did show Meyer an envelope containing 
$50,000.00 in cash and that she did not have such a sum in her 
possession.

[¶4]      After Meyer 
rested her case, Rodabaugh called two additional witnesses. Meyer objected to 
the testimony from these two witnesses because the cutoff for discovery had 
passed, and Meyer said she had not been notified about the testimony of these 
two witnesses until one week prior to trial. Meyer's position was that she did 
not have an adequate opportunity to exercise discovery and depose the witnesses. 
Rodabaugh's attorney explained that Rodabaugh, who then was seventy-nine years 
old, had been ill during trial preparation and that the attorney had discovered 
the information about these witnesses only five business days prior to the 
trial. Upon learning about the witnesses, Rodabaugh's attorney immediately 
notified Meyer's attorney of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the 
witnesses, and a summary of their testimony was provided. 

[¶5]      There was no 
pretrial order requiring that witnesses be identified ten days prior to the 
first day of trial, which was the usual practice of the court. The trial judge 
ruled that the testimony of the witnesses would be received, but he explained to 
Meyer's attorney that she would be given ample opportunity to prepare for 
cross-examination. This colloquy between the trial court and counsel for Meyer 
appears in the record:

THE COURT: * * 
*

* * * If you 
feel that you need additional time to investigate the testimony of the witnesses 
and additional time to prepare cross-examination, then I'll adjourn the trial 
after we've finished with all of the witnesses who are available here today and 
we'll come back at a later time for you to present B for you to do your 
cross-examination as well as to present any kind of rebuttal testimony or 
evidence that you might be able to find in the interim time * * *. And I think 
that's the fairest and best way to proceed and that's my 
ruling.

Any questions 
about it * * *?

[COUNSEL FOR 
MEYER]: Acknowledging the Court's ruling, your Honor, and simply for the record, 
it's the Plaintiff's request that the Court prohibit these witnesses from 
testifying. We do not want a continuance at this time. Simply for the record, we 
can proceed.

Meyer's attorney 
did not ask for a continuance, but relied on the objection to the testimony of 
the witnesses.

[¶6]      The tenor of the 
testimony of one of the two witnesses was that Meyer's father had been living in 
a trailer house with another individual and that individual's wife and two 
children before he began living with Rodabaugh. The witness testified that 
Rodabaugh had bought Meyer's father an old dump truck with a personal check. The 
other witness testified that Meyer's father had tried to borrow $500.00 from him 
before he moved in with Rodabaugh.

[¶7]      After hearing all 
the evidence, including the testimony of the witnesses to whom Meyer objected, 
the trial judge ruled against Meyer's claim, awarding her judgment only for 
$995.00, as to which Rodabaugh had made an offer of judgment. Meyer appeals the 
judgment, contending that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion when 
it permitted testimony from the two witnesses who were not disclosed until 
approximately five business days before trial.1

[¶8]      Our rule is that 
Aquestions of admissibility of evidence generally are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and its decisions will not be overturned absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. " Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 705 (Wyo. 1992). 
When we are concerned with a question of abuse of discretion, we follow the 
standard recently articulated in Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) 
(quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)): 

"Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. 
Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 
1985)."

[¶9]      Meyer rests her 
argument upon the proposition that the trial judge committed an abuse of 
discretion by allowing testimony of witnesses when she was not notified about 
them until only five business days prior to the start of the trial. She contends 
that her ability to properly prepare for cross-examination was inhibited by the 
late notification. The trial judge listened to arguments from both attorneys 
before making the decision as to whether to admit the testimony of the two 
witnesses. In addition, he provided to Meyer the opportunity to adjourn the 
trial and return to complete the trial after her attorney had been afforded 
adequate opportunity to prepare. It has long been the rule in Wyoming that the 
admissibility or exclusion of evidence is committed to the discretion of the 
trial court. Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 146 (Wyo. 1998); State v. 
Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831, 838 (1958), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850 
(1960). We do not disturb those rulings in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion. Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 (Wyo. 1998); Hayes v. State, 
935 P.2d 700, 702 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶10]   On this record, we would not be 
able to conclude that the trial judge did not exercise sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily 
and capriciously. Of more import, however, is whether Meyer is in a position to 
attack the discretionary ruling. "[T]he appropriate response from a surprised 
party who wishes to counter testimony is a request for a continuance, and the 
failure to request one precludes a claim of prejudice. " Betts v. Crawford, 965 P.2d 680, 685 (Wyo. 1998); see also White v. Board of Trustees of Western 
Wyoming Community College Dist., 648 P.2d 528, 537 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1107 (1983). The trial court, in this instance, clearly provided to 
Meyer the option of a continuance, but counsel refused to accept that 
opportunity. Consequently, Meyer must be deemed to have waived her right to 
appeal the ruling with respect to the admission of the testimony on the ground 
of unfair surprise. See Matter of Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 276 (Wyo. 1988) 
(failure to request a continuance of a summary judgment hearing waived the claim 
of error based upon the consideration of late filed depositions); see also 
Pacific Power & Light v. Heermann, 872 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wyo. 1994) (failure 
to assert a right to make a closing argument in a contested case hearing 
constituted a waiver of that claim of error).

[¶11]   We hold that Meyer waived the 
claimed ground for appeal because she did not take advantage of an offer of a 
continuance when she complained about having only five days notice prior to 
trial of the testimony of two additional witnesses. Meyer concluded that the 
offer of the continuance should not be accepted, and it is clear that the trial 
court acted reasonably and fairly in proposing that remedy. Meyer stood on her 
claim that the witnesses should be prohibited from testifying, and went ahead 
with the trial despite her claim of lack of adequate preparation. That conduct 
foreclosed appeal of the discretionary ruling of the trial court on the 
admissibility of testimony.

[¶12]   Normally, sanctions are not imposed 
when an appeal attacks a discretionary ruling of the trial court. Russell v. 
Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo. 1997); James S. Jackson Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 
677 P.2d 835, 839 (Wyo. 1984). This case is different, however, because Meyer is 
deemed to have waived her opportunity to remedy the lack of opportunity to 
prepare. Because of that waiver, we must conclude that she has needlessly 
expended the time of this Court in her effort to remedy that problem, and, under 
the circumstances, no reasonable cause exists for this appeal. W.R.A.P. 10.05 
provides, in part:

If the court 
certifies there was no reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for 
attorneys' fees and damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate 
court and taxed as part of the costs in the case.

 

We said in Amen, 
Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997):

Generally, we 
are reluctant to grant sanctions and will do so only in those rare circumstances 
where an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent 
authority to support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to 
adequately cite to the record.

[¶13]   We conclude, however, that 
sanctions are appropriate in this case for two reasons. The first is that there 
is no reasonable cause for Meyer's appeal. Having rejected the continuance that 
the trial court offered, she cannot produce any pertinent authority to support 
her claim of prejudice. Second, no cogent argument has been mounted to support 
her claim. In the absence of cogent argument or pertinent authority, this Court 
appropriately imposes the sanctions provided in W.R.A.P. 10.05. We hold that 
Rodabaugh is entitled to recover costs and attorney fees in defending this 
appeal, and counsel shall submit a statement of costs and attorney fees to this 
Court. We then will be in a position to enter an order making an appropriate 
award to Rodabaugh.

[¶14]   The Judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed with the proviso for sanctions under the rule.

Footnotes

1 None of the 
pleadings were included in the designated record on appeal. The course of the 
proceedings is somewhat difficult to follow other than as it appears in the 
transcript of the testimony in the trial proceedings. The responsibility for 
providing an adequate record for this Court to perform its function of review is 
assigned to an appellant. Nicholls v. Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 
1986).