Case Title: Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hospital Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12991

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12991 
 
KEHLE OSBORNE-TRUSSELL  vs.  THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
CORPORATION.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 4, 2021. - August 25, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Domestic Violence and Abuse Leave.  Employment, Termination, 
Retaliation.  Harassment Prevention.  Notice.  Unlawful 
Interference.  Public Policy.  Practice, Civil, Complaint, 
Motion to dismiss.  Words, "Employee." 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 8, 2019. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Michael L. Mason for the plaintiff. 
Richard J. Riley (Peter C. Kober also present) for the 
defendant. 
Naomi R. Shatz, Rebecca Pontikes, & Naitasia Hensey, for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Doing business as Boston Children's Hospital. 
2 
 
Alyssa Z. Bloom, Nicole R.G. Paquin, & Andrea C. Kramer, 
for Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case presents our first opportunity to 
consider the elements needed to state a claim for relief 
pursuant to the nonretaliation and noninterference provisions of 
the Domestic Violence and Abuse Leave Act, G. L. c. 149, § 52E 
(DVLA).  Enacted in 2014, see St. 2014, c. 260, § 10, the DVLA 
is designed to support victims of abuse and harassment by easing 
the additional burdens that often are visited upon them when 
they undertake to stop the abuse, pursue legal action against 
their abusers, and rebuild their lives.  Thus, the DVLA 
prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against, or 
otherwise discriminating against, an employee who exercises 
rights under the DVLA, such as taking leave from work to attend 
doctors' appointments or to go to court hearings involving the 
harassment or abuse.  The DVLA also prohibits employers from 
interfering in an employee's exercise, or attempted exercise, of 
these statutorily protected rights.  Employees, in turn, are 
required to provide employers with "appropriate advance notice" 
of the leave they may need.  See G. L. c. 149, § 52E (d). 
The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
against the Children's Hospital Corporation (CHC), alleging 
that, in contravention of the DVLA, it terminated her employment 
3 
 
after she disclosed to CHC that her abuser, who had been 
stalking, harassing, and threatening her, had violated the terms 
of a harassment prevention order (HPO), and that the plaintiff 
had reported the violation to the police.  The complaint also 
alleged that CHC's termination of her employment contravened the 
Commonwealth's public policy to protect victims of abusive 
behavior and to encourage enforcement of protective orders.  
CHC's motion to dismiss was allowed.  Because we conclude that 
the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for which relief may be 
granted, the order dismissing the complaint must be reversed 
with respect to all counts in the complaint with the exception 
of the public policy claim, and the matter remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings.2 
 
Background.  We summarize the factual allegations set forth 
in the complaint and in the undisputed documents incorporated by 
reference in the complaint.  See Sudbury v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 485 Mass. 774, 776 n.4 (2020); Calixto v. 
Coughlin, 481 Mass. 157, 158 (2018) (in reviewing allowance of 
motion to dismiss, we accept as true all well-pleaded facts 
alleged in complaint). 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association and the Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts. 
4 
 
 
The plaintiff is a registered nurse and the victim of 
"repeated stalking, threats, harassment, abuse, and overt 
threats."  In December 2018, the plaintiff obtained an HPO 
against the abuser, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E.3  The HPO barred 
the abuser from "directly or indirectly contacting [the 
plaintiff], ordered [the abuser] to remain away from [the 
plaintiff's] home or place of work, and prohibited [the abuser] 
from making any social media postings that reference [the 
plaintiff]."4 
 
In February 2019, the plaintiff applied for employment with 
CHC.  CHC "aggressively" recruited her; it invited her to "a 
number of interviews," contacted her references, and ordered a 
background check.  CHC tendered the plaintiff a formal job 
offer, which she accepted.  On February 14, 2019, CHC sent the 
plaintiff a letter memorializing her acceptance of CHC's offer 
 
3 In order to obtain an HPO under G. L. c. 258E, § 3, an 
individual must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that, inter alia, the perpetrator committed "harassment," which 
is defined in relevant part as "[three] or more acts of willful 
and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with 
the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to 
property that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or 
damage to property."  Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 37 
(2016), quoting G. L. c. 258E, § 1.  See F.K. v. S.C., 481 Mass. 
325, 332 (2019). 
 
4 For ease of reference, and in view of our obligation at 
this stage in the litigation to accept as true the factual 
allegations in the complaint, we refer to the subject of the HPO 
as the "abuser."  See Calixto v. Coughlin, 481 Mass. 157, 158 
(2018).  The subject of the HPO is not a party to the case. 
5 
 
of employment.  This letter began, "We are delighted that you 
have accepted our offer for the Staff Nurse I position in the 
Orthopedic/General Surgery Unit . . . in Patient Services-
Nursing."  The letter stated that the plaintiff's position was 
full time, with salary and benefits, and that her "start date" 
was to be March 18, 2019.5  The letter also explained that the 
plaintiff's employment was "at will" and subject to termination 
at any time, and was contingent on the successful completion of 
reference, background, and licensure checks, a "pre-employment 
fitness for duty assessment," and a number of administrative 
tasks, as well as receiving a score of at least eighty-six 
percent on a "medication assessment test given as part of [her] 
new hire clinical orientation."  CHC subsequently issued the 
plaintiff a photograph identification card identifying her as a 
CHC "staff nurse," provided her with a CHC employee 
identification number, and assigned her a training schedule. 
 
On February 28, 2019, the plaintiff's abuser posted threats 
and false statements about the plaintiff on social media, in 
 
 
5 The plaintiff did not append the letter to her complaint.  
The complaint, however, refers to the substance of the letter, 
and neither party disputes its existence or substance.  
Therefore, "this court may properly consider it in connection 
with the complaint."  Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 
483 Mass. 612, 614 n.5 (2019). 
 
6 
 
violation of the HPO.  The post also "tagged"6 the social media 
profile "Children's Hospital," in an apparent attempt to bring 
the falsehoods to CHC's attention.  The plaintiff reported the 
violation of the HPO to the Merrimac police department.  
Additionally, she informed CHC's human resources department 
about the HPO and her abuser's past abusive behavior.  The 
plaintiff provided CHC with copies of the HPO and told CHC that 
"she was pursuing enforcement of the [HPO]."  CHC requested 
additional information about the abuser, and CHC's human 
resources representative told the plaintiff that he "intended to 
speak with [the abuser] to hear her side of the story." 
Less than two weeks later, and approximately one week 
before she was scheduled to begin orientation, CHC sent the 
plaintiff a termination letter stating that her "employment 
offer for the Staff Nurse position at Boston Children's Hospital 
has been rescinded effective March 12, 2019."7  The termination 
letter continued, "the work clearance process is not able to be 
 
6 "To 'tag' another user on a social media platform means to 
mention that user and create a link to his [or her] profile.  
The user tagged will generally receive a notification of the tag 
and the tag will be associated with his [or her] profile" 
(citation omitted).  Goldman v. Reddington, 417 F. Supp. 3d 163, 
169 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 
 
7 As with the February 14 welcome letter, the termination 
letter was not appended to the complaint.  For essentially the 
same reasons as with the welcome letter, see note 5, supra, we 
consider the substance of the termination letter in connection 
with the plaintiff's complaint. 
7 
 
initiated, so we are unable to complete the onboarding process 
at this time."  In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that CHC 
took this action "in order to avoid having to offer [the 
plaintiff] protections" of the DVLA. 
 
The plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against CHC in 
the Superior Court, asserting that her termination violated the 
DVLA and public policy.  The complaint alleged that CHC 
terminated and discriminated against the plaintiff in violation 
of the nonretaliation provision of the DVLA, which states: 
"No employer shall discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee for exercising the 
employee's rights under this section." 
 
G. L. c.  149, § 52E (i).  The complaint also asserted that CHC 
violated G. L. c. 149, § 52E (h), the noninterference provision 
of the DVLA.  Under that provision, 
"[n]o employer shall coerce, interfere with, restrain or 
deny the exercise of, or any attempt to exercise, any 
rights provided under this section or to make leave 
requested or taken hereunder contingent upon whether or not 
the victim maintains contact with the alleged abuser." 
 
Lastly, the complaint alleged that CHC's termination of the 
plaintiff's employment violated public policy. 
In its motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), CHC argued that 
because the plaintiff had never commenced her employment with 
CHC, the plaintiff was not an "employee" within the meaning of 
the DVLA and was not entitled to its protections.  CHC also 
8 
 
asserted that, even if the plaintiff had been an employee, her 
complaint failed to allege that she had provided CHC with notice 
that she was requesting leave under the DVLA; that such request 
was for any of the purposes set forth in G. L. c. 149, 
§ 52E (b) (ii); or that she intended to undertake any of the 
statutorily protected actions.  In addition, CHC argued that the 
complaint did not state a valid claim for a violation of public 
policy. 
Following a hearing at which the plaintiff was given the 
opportunity to amend her complaint, something she ultimately did 
not do, the judge allowed CHC's motion to dismiss.  While the 
judge determined that the plaintiff was an "employee" within the 
meaning of the DVLA, he dismissed the claims for discrimination 
and for noninterference because the plaintiff had not alleged 
that she had sought leave from work "for any of the purposes set 
forth in [G. L. c. 149, § 52E (b) (ii)], or that she actually 
did, or had had plans to do, any of the enumerated actions in 
that subsection."  The judge also concluded that, given the 
broad coverage and the detailed provisions of the DVLA, there 
was "no need and no reason to recognize" the plaintiff's public 
policy claim under common law.  The plaintiff appealed, and we 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review the 
allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all 
9 
 
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint."  Ryan v. Mary Ann 
Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 (2019).  We "draw all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and determine 
whether the allegations 'plausibly suggest' that the plaintiff 
is entitled to relief on that legal claim" (citation omitted).  
Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 
17 (2018).  To survive a motion to dismiss, the "[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the 
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in 
fact)."  Sudbury, 485 Mass. at 779, quoting Iannacchino v. Ford 
Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).  The facts alleged must 
"plausibly suggest[] (not merely [be] consistent with) an 
entitlement to relief" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Iannacchino, supra.  See Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 
476 Mass. 591, 609 (2017) (complaint survives motion to dismiss 
"if it includes enough factual heft" to raise basis for relief 
above level of speculation). 
2.  Statutory interpretation.  The DVLA affords victims of 
harassment and abuse the right to take up to fifteen days of 
leave per year, see G. L. c. 149, § 52E (b), for the purpose of 
addressing, among other things, "issues directly related to the 
abusive behavior against the employee or family member of the 
employee," G. L. c. 149, § 52E (b) (ii).  Where, as in the 
10 
 
present case, statutory interpretation is necessary, "[o]ur goal 
is 'to determine the intent of the Legislature in enacting the 
statute, "ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."'"  Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810 
(2013), quoting Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628–629 (2010). 
We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction 
that, "[o]rdinarily, where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent."  
Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 788 (2015), quoting Thurdin 
v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  If the statutory 
language is clear, "courts must give effect to its plain and 
ordinary meaning and . . . need not look beyond the words of the 
statute itself."  Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 487, 
491 (2020), quoting Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 756 (2001). 
"To the extent there is any ambiguity in the statutory 
language, we turn to the legislative history" as a guide to 
legislative intent.  Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 182 
(2017), cert. denied sub nom. Oath Holdings, Inc. v. Ajemian, 
138 S. Ct. 1327 (2018).  "In addition, our respect for the 
Legislature's considered judgment dictates that we interpret the 
11 
 
statute to be sensible, rejecting unreasonable interpretations 
unless the clear meaning of the language requires such an 
interpretation."  Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 
465 Mass. 607, 620 (2013), quoting DiFiore v. American Airlines, 
Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490-491 (2009). 
 
a.  Employment status.  General Laws c. 149, § 52E (a), 
defines "employees" as "individuals who perform services for and 
under the control and direction of an employer for wages or 
other remuneration."  CHC maintains that the plaintiff was not 
an "employee" within the meaning of the DVLA because her "offer 
of employment" was "'contingent' upon the fulfillment of 
specifically identified conditions"8 that the plaintiff was still 
in the process of completing.  As such, she was an individual 
who had "yet to perform services" for CHC, and who was not under 
its "current 'control or direction.'" 
 
CHC's argument rests, in part, on a challenge to the 
factual allegations in the complaint.  The complaint alleges 
that the plaintiff "successfully [had] gone through the entire 
application, interview and onboarding process" when CHC 
terminated her employment.  In reviewing a decision on a motion 
to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in the 
 
8 According to CHC, the remaining contingencies included a 
background investigation, a review of the plaintiff's references 
and licensing credentials, a "fitness for duty" evaluation, a 
proficiency examination, and a number of administrative tasks. 
12 
 
complaint.  See Calixto, 481 Mass. at 158.  Here, the complaint 
alleges that the contingencies of the "onboarding process" had 
been resolved, that CHC had issued the plaintiff an 
identification badge showing her to be its staff nurse, that she 
had been given an employee identification number, and that she 
had been assigned a training schedule. 
Assuming, as we must, that these factual allegations are 
true, we consider what remains of CHC's argument –- namely, that 
the term "employees" within the meaning of the DVLA includes 
only "current" employees who are performing services for the 
employer, and excludes individuals, like the plaintiff, who have 
yet to perform such services (including those who are terminated 
in advance of their start date).  Because the language of the 
statute alone does not resolve the question, we turn to the 
legislative history for guidance. 
In enacting the DVLA, the Legislature sought "to create 
innovative programs and help victims in combatting domestic 
violence."  State House News Service (Senate Sess.), July 31, 
2014 (statement of Sen. Karen E. Spilka).  When the Senate voted 
to adopt the bill, its president noted that "[v]ictims of 
domestic violence continue to face barriers in their recovery 
and protecting themselves from future attacks, and we have an 
obligation to change that . . . .  This bill will increase the 
rights and protections of victims."  Senate Passes Domestic 
13 
 
Violence, Parental Leave Bills, State House News Service, Oct. 
24, 2013 (quoting Sen. Therese Murray).  One of the 
Legislature's specific goals in adopting the DVLA was to protect 
employees who were experiencing the effects of domestic violence 
from adverse consequences at work.  The bill's sponsor, Senator 
Cynthia Stone Creem, said that "[employees] should not need to 
choose between health and employment.  This not only increases 
victim safety and financial security, but helps with increased 
productivity, lower health care costs and employee turnover."  
State House News Services (Senate Sess.), Oct. 24, 2013. 
The DVLA thus is a remedial statute, centered on protecting 
victims of abuse and harassment in many contexts.9  "Generally, 
remedial statutes such as the [DVLA] are 'entitled to liberal 
construction.'"  Depianti, 465 Mass. at 620, quoting Batchelder 
v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822 (1985).  "Employment 
statutes in particular are to be liberally construed, 'with some 
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.'"  Depianti, 
supra, quoting Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 
553 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915). 
 
9 A statute is remedial where it is "intended to address 
misdeeds suffered by individuals," rather than to punish public 
wrongs."  Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 
607, 620 (2013), quoting Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Fray-Witzer, 449 
Mass. 406, 420 (2007). 
14 
 
Limiting the term "employees" as CHC proposes would foil 
these broad, remedial purposes.  It would allow employers to 
discriminate against an individual who, prior to his or her 
start date, notified an employer of a situation, such as a 
violation of an HPO, that might require leave to address the 
collateral consequences of harassment or abuse.  Such an 
individual would have no recourse when, perhaps on the verge of 
achieving a measure of financial security, he or she were 
stripped of it by an employer who determined it would be 
inconvenient to accommodate the individual's protected rights to 
leave.  A construction that excludes from the definition of 
"employees" those who have accepted employment but have not yet 
begun work would be directly contrary to the clear intent of the 
DVLA to allow employees to attend to the consequences of the 
abuse without risking loss of their jobs, and to prevent future 
harassment and abuse when victims step forward to confront their 
abusers. 
The narrow view of the term "employees" suggested by CHC 
also would be inconsistent with other provisions in the DVLA in 
which the Legislature has defined terms using the temporal 
restrictions CHC asks us to read into the term "employees."  See 
Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 
312–313 (1949) ("All the words of a statute are to be given 
their ordinary and usual meaning, and each clause or phrase is 
15 
 
to be construed with reference to every other clause or phrase 
without giving undue emphasis to any one group of words, so 
that, if reasonably possible, all parts shall be construed as 
consistent with each other so as to form a harmonious enactment 
effectual to accomplish its manifest purpose"). 
For instance, the phrase "domestic violence," as used in 
the DVLA with respect to potential perpetrators, refers to a 
possible perpetrator as being, inter alia, "a current or former" 
spouse, a person who "is cohabitating with or has cohabitated 
with" the victim of the abuse, or a person with whom the 
individual or the individual's family member "has or had" a 
dating relationship or had been engaged.  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 52E (a).  The absence of similar temporal qualifications in 
the definition of "employees" suggests that the Legislature did 
not intend to restrict the protections of the DVLA to current 
employees.  "In light of the statute's broad remedial purpose, 
'it would be an error to imply . . . a limitation where the 
statutory language does not require it.'"  Depianti, 465 Mass. 
at 621, quoting Psy–Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 708 
(2011).  See Depianti, supra at 620-625 (noting that statutes 
are to be interpreted "sensibl[y]" and in light of their 
remedial purposes, and concluding that employee status under 
misclassification statutes applied even where putative employee 
and employer did not have contract); Canton v. Commissioner of 
16 
 
the Mass. Highway Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 794 (2010) ("We do not 
read into [a] statute a provision which the Legislature did not 
see fit to put there, nor add words that the Legislature had an 
option to, but chose not to include" [citation omitted]). 
It is instructive that, in related contexts involving 
employee leave to exercise rights afforded under specific 
statutory provisions, courts in other jurisdictions have 
concluded that the term "employee" encompasses individuals who 
have yet to perform services for the employer, where the statute 
lacked any explicit language to the contrary.  See Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341-342, 345 (1997) (holding that 
term "employee" in context of Title VII of Civil Rights Act 
includes former employees where statutory language did not 
temporally limit employee status to "current" employees and in 
light of remedial purpose of statute); National Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87, 98 (1995) 
(agency construction of term "employee" in National Labor 
Relations Act was lawful, where construction included 
prospective employees and did not exclude paid union 
organizers); Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 9-
11 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding agency construction of right of 
action under Family Medical Leave Act [FMLA] to include 
employees who have not yet performed services, where "[t]he 
statute does not plainly limit the term to current employees").  
17 
 
Contrast 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (one year of work is required 
before employee is eligible to take FMLA leave); G. L. c. 149, 
§ 105D (requiring completion of probationary period or three 
months of work performed for employee to gain right to parental 
leave); G. L. c. 149, § 148C (d) (1) (granting sick leave to 
employees based on number of hours they have worked). 
In support of its argument that the term "employees" in the 
DVLA is limited to individuals who currently are performing 
services for an employer, CHC points to a different provision of 
the DVLA, G. L. c. 149, § 52E (g), which requires that "[a]n 
employee seeking leave under this section shall exhaust all 
annual or vacation leave, personal leave and sick leave 
available to the employee, prior to requesting or taking leave 
under this section, unless the employer waives this requirement" 
(emphasis added).  CHC maintains that the plaintiff had not yet 
accrued any leave hours at the time of her dismissal, and thus 
could not have exhausted all other types of accrued leave, as 
required under G. L. c. 149, § 52E (g), before being entitled to 
use the leave afforded under this section.  Therefore, CHC 
urges, it follows that she was not entitled to leave under the 
DVLA when she informed CHC of the HPO. 
General Laws c. 149, § 52E (g), however, states that an 
employee must exhaust all other leave "available to the 
employee."  The statutory provision thus does not make the 
18 
 
availability of other, non-DVLA-afforded leave a precondition of 
being an "employee" within the meaning of the DVLA.  Compare 
G. L. c. 149, § 105D (statutory right to parental leave accrues 
only after employees have completed their probationary period or 
worked for employer for three months); G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148C (d) (1) (statutory sick leave is dependent on number of 
hours employee has worked).  To interpret the leave provision of 
the DVLA as imposing a precondition that, in order to make use 
of the leave it affords, an employee first must accrue and have 
available some period of another form of leave not only would 
contravene the plain statutory language, but also would 
frustrate the protective purpose of providing leave to employees 
who are victims of abusive behavior for the enumerated purposes 
tied to the harassment or abusive behavior. 
Accordingly, we reject a construction of the term 
"employees" that would exclude individuals who have been hired 
but have yet to perform services for their employers.  Under the 
broader view we adopt, the plaintiff's complaint alleges 
sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that she was CHC's 
employee.  The complaint asserts that CHC had extended an offer 
of employment to the plaintiff, which she had accepted.  This 
relationship was memorialized in a written letter welcoming the 
plaintiff to CHC and setting forth CHC's mission.  The letter 
described the position for which the plaintiff was hired ("Staff 
19 
 
Nurse I"), the particular "surgery unit" into which she was 
hired, the supervisor to whom she would be reporting, the start 
date, and the applicable compensation and benefits.  The 
complaint alleges that the plaintiff had "successfully gone 
through the . . . onboarding process" and that CHC had issued 
her an identification badge, identifying her as a "staff nurse," 
and provided her with a CHC employee identification number.  CHC 
also had placed the plaintiff on a training schedule for new 
employees.  Taken together, these allegations are sufficient 
plausibly to suggest that, although she had not yet commenced 
her orientation, the plaintiff was in an employment relationship 
with CHC, whereby she was to perform services for CHC under its 
control and direction.  Accordingly, she was an "employee" for 
purposes of the DVLA. 
 
b.  Retaliation claim.  In her complaint, the plaintiff 
also asserted a claim for unlawful retaliation, in violation of 
G. L. c. 149, § 52E (i).  That provision states, in pertinent 
part, "No employer shall discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee for exercising the employee's 
rights under this section."10  CHC contends that the complaint 
 
10 General Laws c. 149, § 52E (i), provides in full: 
 
"No employer shall discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee for exercising the 
employee's rights under this section.  The taking of leave 
under this section shall not result in the loss of any 
20 
 
fails to set forth sufficient facts plausibly suggesting a claim 
under this provision of the DVLA. 
 
We have not previously addressed the requirements of a 
prima facie case of retaliation under the DVLA.  To assess the 
merits of CHC's argument, we turn to the prima facie case for 
claims of retaliation under roughly analogous provisions of the 
Federal FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.,11 as well as other 
contexts involving claims of retaliation in employment.  See 
Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 
474 Mass. 382, 407-409 (2016) (analyzing prima facie elements in 
retaliation claim in case of unlawful demotion and termination 
based on claimed gender discrimination); Mole v. University of 
 
employment benefit accrued prior to the date on which the 
leave taken under this section commenced.  Upon the 
employee's return from such leave, the employee shall be 
entitled to restoration to the employee's original job or 
to an equivalent position." 
 
 
11 The FMLA prohibits employers from retaliating against 
employees for exercising their rights to leave under the FMLA to 
care for ill family members or newly arrived children.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) ("It shall be unlawful for any employer 
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this 
subchapter").  To establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
under the FMLA, an employee must show that "(1) he [or she] 
availed [him- or herself] of a protected right under the FMLA; 
(2) he [or she] was adversely affected by an employment 
decision; (3) there is a causal connection between the 
employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse 
employment action."  Chase v. United States Postal Serv., 843 
F.3d 553, 558 (1st Cir. 2016), quoting Hodgens v. General 
Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 161 (1st Cir. 1998). 
21 
 
Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 591–592 (2004) ("To make out his prima 
facie case [for retaliation under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, the 
plaintiff] had to show that he engaged in protected conduct, 
that he suffered some adverse action, and that a causal 
connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse 
action" [quotation, citation, and footnotes omitted]).  Drawing 
on this related jurisprudence, we conclude that, to state a 
claim under G. L. c. 149, § 52E (i), an employee must allege 
that (1) the employee availed him- or herself of a protected 
right under the DVLA; (2) the employee was adversely affected by 
an employment decision; and (3) there is a causal connection 
between the employee's protected activity and the employer's 
adverse action. 
 
While "[t]he prima facie standard is an evidentiary 
standard, not a pleading standard," reference to the elements of 
the prima facie case nonetheless "help[s] a court determine 
whether the 'cumulative effect of the complaint's factual 
allegations' [constitutes] a plausible claim for relief."  
Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 
718 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-
Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2013).  See Lopez v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 701, 713-714 (2012) (analyzing 
whether facts pleaded demonstrated plausible claim for relief by 
looking to elements of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 [5]).  In its motion 
22 
 
to dismiss, CHC contended that the plaintiff failed to allege 
facts plausibly suggesting the first and third prongs of the 
prima facie case for retaliation.12  We address each in turn. 
i.  Rights protected under the DVLA.  CHC contends that 
dismissal of the retaliation claim was proper because the 
complaint did not allege that the plaintiff had availed herself 
of the leave provisions of the DVLA, as she neither notified CHC 
that she required leave nor requested time off for any 
particular date.  General Laws. c. 149, § 52E (d), the notice 
provision of the DVLA, states that, "[e]xcept in cases of 
imminent danger to the health or safety of an employee, an 
employee seeking leave from work under this section shall 
provide appropriate advance notice of the leave to the employer 
as required by the employer's leave policy."  The plaintiff 
maintains that, by communicating a qualifying reason for leave 
to be afforded under the DVLA –- namely, that her abuser had 
violated the HPO and that she was engaging with law enforcement 
 
12 CHC does not contest that the plaintiff adequately 
pleaded the second prong of the retaliation claim, i.e., that 
CHC's termination of the plaintiff's employment constituted an 
"adverse action."  See Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, 
Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 407 (2016); McInerney v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 463 Fed. Appx. 709, 716 (10th Cir. 2011) 
("Termination of employment is 'clearly an adverse employment 
action'" [citation omitted]); Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 
773, 780 (7th Cir. 2006).  Instead, CHC maintains that because 
the plaintiff was never its employee, it could not have engaged 
in retaliation against her. 
23 
 
to enforce the provisions of the HPO -– she provided CHC with 
the requisite notice.  In essence, CHC's position is that the 
plaintiff is not protected by the DVLA because she did not state 
in haec verba, "I request leave," and instead notified CHC of a 
condition that might trigger the need for leave in the future. 
While the DVLA requires "appropriate advance notice," it 
does not define the phrase.  See G. L. c. 149, § 52E (d).  
Accordingly, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of each 
of the individual words it contains.  See Commonwealth v. 
Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012) (if words used in statute are 
not otherwise defined within it, we afford words their plain and 
ordinary meaning).  In common usage, "appropriate" means 
"suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, person, occasion, 
etc."  Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 103 (2003).  
In ordinary understanding, "advance" means "given ahead of 
time."  Id. at 28.  A "notice" ordinarily means "an announcement 
or intimation of something impending."  Id. at 1326.  Therefore, 
"appropriate advance notice" of the requested leave requires 
that a "suitable announcement or intimation given ahead of the 
impending leave" is needed.  The plain and ordinary meaning of 
the phrase thus suggests that the content of the notice, as well 
as its timing, will depend on the circumstances of each case.13 
 
13 The DVLA contains no requirement for a specific form of 
words to satisfy the notice requirement.  Compare, e.g., Boston 
24 
 
Consistent with this understanding, we conclude that the 
facts, as alleged in the complaint, show that the plaintiff 
provided the requisite "appropriate" and "advance" notice when 
she informed CHC that her abuser had violated the HPO and that 
she was cooperating with law enforcement in connection with 
enforcing it.  Based on the notice provided, CHC was aware that 
the plaintiff might need the leave afforded under the DVLA, and 
also was able to exercise its own rights under the statute when 
it asked the plaintiff for additional details concerning the 
HPO.14  Rather than forestalling notice until she had been 
provided a date certain when she might need leave to address the 
violation, the plaintiff did not delay in providing CHC with the 
information regarding the violation and her enforcement efforts.  
 
Hous. Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 845–848 (2009) 
(tenant's actions combined with his assertions at trial 
"amounted to a request for an accommodation"; "no 'magic' words 
[were] required" to invoke rights to statutorily mandated review 
of whether disability could be accommodated before ordering 
eviction).  Cf. Psychemedics Corp. v. Boston, 486 Mass. 724, 
732, 736 (2021) (in indemnity contract, requiring, but not 
defining, "notice"; "a simple statement of the existence of 
allegations of conduct covered by the indemnification provision 
would suffice to provide notice;" no "formal [or] explicit 
demand" was required beyond alerting indemnitor to existence of 
claim [citation omitted]). 
 
14 Pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 52E (e), "[a]n employer may 
require an employee to provide documentation evidencing that the 
employee . . . has been a victim of abusive behavior and that 
the leave taken is consistent with the conditions [set forth in 
the statute]."  Here, CHC requested, and the plaintiff provided, 
documentation of the HPO. 
25 
 
It was sufficient, as alleged in the complaint, that the 
plaintiff notified CHC, two weeks before her start date, that 
her abuser had violated the HPO and that she was working with 
law enforcement authorities.  This disclosure was enough to put 
CHC on notice that, while the plaintiff did not then know of any 
specific date on which she would require leave, she might need 
to exercise the leave provisions of the DVLA and was invoking 
her rights to leave under it.15 
A contrary conclusion would be at odds with the remedial 
purposes of the DVLA to encourage appropriate advance notice and 
to "create a situation in which abuse is not something to remain 
silent about."  State House News Service, Senate Sess., July 31, 
2014 (statement of Sen. Karen E. Spilka).  Under CHC's narrow 
view of the notice provision, an employer could preclude an 
employee from exercising the rights provided under the DVLA by 
preemptively terminating an employee who discloses her abuser's 
violation of a protective order before a date certain for leave 
is known.  Compare Duckworth, 152 F.3d at 10 (interpretation of 
FMLA's notice provision to permit employer to terminate employee 
who provides notice of FMLA leave before she was eligible to use 
 
 
15 The request for leave afforded by the statute itself 
constitutes the exercise of a right under the statute.  Compare 
Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 793 (1st Cir. 
2011) (making request for FMLA leave constitutes exercise of 
protected right under statute). 
26 
 
it "would conflict with the [FMLA's] basic purpose of enhancing 
job security by protecting the right of eligible employees to 
take leave").  Rather than encouraging a dialogue about abuse 
prevention, such a narrow construction would forestall employees 
from advising their employers of the known circumstances that 
might require leave, and perhaps discourage them from pursuing 
enforcement actions against their abusers.  Compare id. (noting 
that if employees who provide notice before they became eligible 
to take leave were not protected by FMLA, statute would "provide 
less protection for new employees or applicants who notify their 
employers of a need for future leave than those who conceal a 
need for leave").  At the same time, CHC's narrow construction 
would work to the detriment of employers' legitimate interest in 
early notice, which may assist employers in planning to 
accommodate an employee's leave or, as here, notify the employer 
that the violation of the HPO included a public reference to the 
employer.  See id. (recognizing employers' "legitimate 
interests" in early notice, which is satisfied by notice of 
qualifying condition under FMLA [citation omitted]). 
Like an employee who tells her employer that she is 
pregnant but does not make a specific request for leave under 
27 
 
the FMLA,16 the plaintiff did enough to provide appropriate 
advance notice that she was invoking the protections of G. L. 
c. 149, § 52E, by informing CHC of the existence of the HPO, the 
violation by the social media posting, and the enforcement 
efforts she had undertaken.  These were the conditions precedent 
to her need for the leave afforded by the DVLA. 
ii.  Causal connection.  CHC also maintains that, assuming 
the plaintiff were an employee at the times alleged, dismissal 
of her nonretaliation claim was appropriate because the 
plaintiff's complaint did not assert a causal connection between 
her invocation of her rights to leave under the DVLA and CHC's 
adverse employment action.  CHC argues that such a causal 
connection cannot reasonably be inferred from the temporal 
proximity between the plaintiff's notice to CHC and her 
termination. 
While proximity alone in general is not enough,17 in some 
circumstances, where adverse employment actions follow "very 
 
16 Under the FMLA, an employee provides adequate notice to 
an employer by providing notice of a covered condition, such as 
pregnancy.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). 
 
17 See, e.g., Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía 
Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 720 (1st Cir. 2014) (while "temporal 
proximity is one factor from which an employer's bad motive can 
be inferred, by itself, it is not enough"); Huskey v. San Jose, 
204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation cannot be 
inferred from temporal proximity alone because to do so "would 
be to engage in the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter 
hoc, literally, 'after this, therefore because of this'"). 
28 
 
close[ly]" on the heels of protected activity, a causal 
relationship may be inferred.  Mole, 442 Mass. at 595, quoting 
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001).  
See generally Mickey v. Ziedler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 
523-525 (6th Cir. 2008). 
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff had been 
aggressively recruited by CHC.  She had undergone further 
vetting, had accepted CHC's offer of employment, and had been 
issued an identification badge and employee identification 
number.  She was scheduled to begin training.  She then provided 
notice to CHC.  Within two weeks and, as alleged in the 
complaint, in an otherwise inexplicable about face, CHC 
terminated her employment.  In these circumstances, the adverse 
employment action "very close" to the protected activity was 
sufficient, for purposes of pleading, to suggest the requisite 
"but for" causation.  Compare, e.g., Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep't 
of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 
c.  Interference claim.  The complaint also alleges that 
CHC's termination of the plaintiff's employment unlawfully 
interfered with the exercise of her statutory rights to leave.  
General Laws c. 149, § 52E (h), provides that "[n]o employer 
shall coerce, interfere with, restrain or deny the exercise of, 
29 
 
or any attempt to exercise, any rights provided under this 
section."18 
CHC's contention that the interference claim failed to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted is based on the 
same arguments discussed supra:  that the plaintiff was not an 
employee and that she did not provide "appropriate advance 
notice of the leave."  The argument that the interference claim 
properly was dismissed thus is unavailing, for the reasons 
discussed supra. 
 
3.  Public policy.  The plaintiff also claims that her 
termination was against public policy.  In light of the specific 
protections of the DVLA, that claim properly was dismissed.  The 
well-established principle that "an at-will employee has a cause 
of action for wrongful discharge if the discharge is contrary to 
public policy," DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. 205, 210 
(1986), is narrow, see Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 
477 Mass. 456, 471 (2017), and does not apply where "the 
Legislature has also prescribed a statutory remedy," Mello v. 
Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 557 (1988).  See Melley v. 
 
18 General Laws c. 149, § 52 (h), provides in full: 
 
"No employer shall coerce, interfere with, restrain or deny 
the exercise of, or any attempt to exercise, any rights 
provided under this section or to make leave requested or 
taken hereunder contingent upon whether or not the victim 
maintains contact with the alleged abuser." 
30 
 
Gillette Corp., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 513 (1985), S.C., 397 
Mass. 1004 (1986) ("We think that where, as here, there is a 
comprehensive remedial statute, the creation of a new common law 
action based on the public policy expressed in that statute 
would interfere with that remedial scheme"). 
 
The DVLA represents the Legislature's measured judgment 
with respect to the necessary relief for victims of abusive 
behavior regarding leave from their employment in order to 
address the effects of that abuse, and the mechanisms of 
enforcement against employers who interfere with or retaliate 
against an employee's use of its statutory protections.  
Accordingly, a separate public policy ground for relief is 
unavailable. 
Conclusion.  So much of the Superior Court judge's order 
that allowed the motion to dismiss count three of the 
plaintiff's complaint is affirmed.  With respect to the other 
counts, the allowance of the motion to dismiss is vacated and 
set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  I agree that the employee's claim 
should be permitted to proceed, although on public policy 
grounds rather than pursuant to the statute.  I agree with my 
dissenting colleague, Justice Georges, that the employee did not 
plead sufficient facts to satisfy the statute.  It appears to me 
that on the facts before us the plaintiff would not have a 
common-law claim that would mirror her statutory claim.  See 
G. L. c. 149, § 52E. 
When considering whether public policy prohibits a 
termination, "[t]he question is whether a well-established 
public policy is served by denying the employer the right freely 
to discharge an employee for engaging in particular conduct."  
Shea v. Emmanuel College, 425 Mass. 761, 762 (1997).  A 
termination violates public policy where it is based on an 
employee's decision to (1) assert a legal right, (2) do what the 
law requires, (3) refuse to do that which the law forbids, or 
(4) perform important public deeds.  Flesner v. Technical 
Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 810-811 (1991) (cooperating 
with governmental investigation).  See Shea, supra at 763 
(reporting criminal activity); Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent 
of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 149-150 
(1989) (filing worker's compensation claim). 
The Commonwealth has a well-established public policy 
against domestic abuse.  This policy has been recognized in case 
2 
 
law.  Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 327 (1999).  The 
Legislature has expressed this public policy through the many 
statutes punishing domestic abuse and protecting victims of such 
abuse.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 276A, § 4 (defendant charged with 
assault or assault and battery on household member, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13M, not eligible for pretrial diversion); G. L. 
c. 209A (abuse prevention order); G. L. c. 258E (harassment 
prevention order).  And the executive branch has issued numerous 
orders concerning domestic violence.1 
If an employee has a statutory remedy, then there is no 
cause of action based on public policy.  Barbuto v. Advantage 
Sales & Mktg., LLC, 477 Mass. 456, 471 (2017).  Here, however, 
it does not appear that there is a statutory remedy for a 
termination made after an employee advises an employer that she 
will be asserting her legal rights in enforcing a harassment 
prevention order but does not yet need leave or does not request 
future leave.  Merely because there is a statutory remedy for 
one aspect of a public policy does not mean that an employee 
 
1 See Executive Order No. 586 (Apr. 10, 2019); Executive 
Order No. 563 (Apr. 27, 2015); Executive Order No. 486 (May 25, 
2007); Executive Order No. 450 (May 7, 2003); Executive Order 
No. 357 (July 8, 1993); Executive Order No. 334 (Apr. 10, 1992).  
Various of these executive orders have declared a state of 
emergency "resulting from the unacceptable frequency and 
severity of domestic violence."  Executive Order No. 334 
(revoked and superseded by Executive Order No. 357).  Executive 
Order No. 450 (revoking and superseding Executive Order No. 
357). 
3 
 
cannot seek the protection of the public policy exception for 
violations of the public policy that the statute does not cover.  
Rather, "the common law public policy exception is not called 
into play" when there is an express statutory remedy for 
termination.  King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 584 n.7 (1994), 
S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996).  In this case, the employee was 
availing herself of her legal rights and was attempting to 
protect herself from harassment.  I think that her pleading was 
sufficient to invoke the public policy exception. 
GEORGES, J. (dissenting, with whom Gaziano, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that the plaintiff's complaint alleged 
sufficient facts to establish that she was an "employee" under 
the Domestic Violence and Abuse Leave Act (act), G. L. c. 149, 
§ 52E (§ 52E).  See ante at    .  For purposes of the defendant 
Children's Hospital Corporation's (CHC's) motion to dismiss, we 
must accept these factual allegations as true.  See Ryan v. Mary 
Anne Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 (2019).  In 
addition, I agree that because the act already provides 
employees with a statutory cause of action to vindicate their 
leave rights, a separate public policy ground for relief thus is 
unavailable here. 
However, I believe a plain reading of the act requires us 
to conclude that the plaintiff did not provide CHC with 
"appropriate advance notice" of any request for leave, see G. L. 
c. 149, § 52E (d), which is a prerequisite for any claim of 
retaliation or unlawful interference under the statute.  
Accordingly, because I would hold that the plaintiff's complaint 
did not state a claim under the act for which relief may be 
granted, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Statutory interpretation.  When interpreting a statute, as 
here, this court adheres to the familiar principle that "[t]he 
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in 
the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, 
2 
 
. . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms."  Commonwealth v. Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 11 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Soto, 476 Mass. 436, 438 (2017).  In 
doing so, we often look "to the language of the entire statute, 
not just a single sentence, and attempt to interpret all of its 
terms 'harmoniously to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature.'"  Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 745 
(2009).  Importantly, "[w]e do not 'read into [a] statute a 
provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put there, 
whether the omission came from inadvertence or of set purpose.'"  
Doe v. Board of Registration in Med., 485 Mass. 554, 562 (2020), 
quoting Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 129 
(2014).  See Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 
710, 712-713 (2018) (declining to broaden scope of term "wages" 
under Wage Act to encompass "sick pay" because "ordinarily we 
will not add language to a statute where the Legislature itself 
has not done so"). 
The act provides victims of harassment and abuse with the 
right to take leave from work for reasons related to harassment 
or abusive behavior.  Specifically, the statute affords up to 
fifteen days of leave per year to employees who are victims of 
harassment or abuse, G. L. c. 149, § 52E (b) (i), for the 
purpose of addressing, among other things, "issues directly 
3 
 
related to the abusive behavior against the employee or family 
member of the employee," G. L. c. 149, § 52E (b) (ii).  The 
statute also provides for various causes of action against 
employers who violate this employment leave entitlement, 
including for retaliation1 and unlawful interference.2 
By its plain language, the act affords employees leave 
protections only when an employee specifically gives 
"appropriate advance notice of the leave to the employer."  
G. L. c. 149, § 52E (d).3  Generally, such notice is to be given 
 
1 General Laws c. 149, § 52E (i), states, in pertinent part:  
"No employer shall discharge or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee for exercising the employee's rights under 
this section." 
 
2 General Laws c. 149, § 52E (h), provides:  "No employer 
shall coerce, interfere with, restrain or deny the exercise of, 
or any attempt to exercise, any rights provided under this 
section or to make leave requested or taken hereunder contingent 
upon whether or not the victim maintains contact with the 
alleged abuser." 
 
3 General Laws c. 149, § 52E (d), provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
"Except in cases of imminent danger to the health or safety 
of an employee, an employee seeking leave from work under 
this section shall provide appropriate advance notice of 
the leave to the employer as required by the employer's 
leave policy. 
 
"If there is a threat of imminent danger to the health or 
safety of an employee or the employee's family member, the 
employee shall not be required to provide advanced notice 
of leave; provided, however, that the employee shall notify 
the employer within [three] workdays that the leave was 
taken or is being taken under this section." 
4 
 
prior to taking the leave, although if "there is a threat of 
imminent danger to the health or safety of an employee or the 
employee's family member," the notice may be provided within 
three work days after the leave was taken.  Id.  Although the 
act does not expressly define the phrase "appropriate advance 
notice," we adhere to the familiar principle that "[w]ords are 
to be accorded their ordinary meaning and approved usage."  
Boston Hous. Auth. v. National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, 
Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 162 (2010).  As the court notes, the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the words "appropriate," 
"advance," and "notice," together in this context, are 
understood to mean a "suitable announcement or intimation given 
ahead of the impending leave is needed" (quotation omitted).  
Ante at    . 
The plaintiff's complaint did not allege, however, that she 
ever requested any leave to enforce her harassment prevention 
order (HPO), that she told CHC that she would need leave to do 
so, or that she intended to request leave for any other 
protected purpose under subsection (b) (ii) of the act.4  Rather, 
 
4 Specifically, G. L. c. 149, § 52E (b) (ii), provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
"(b) An employer shall permit an employee to take up to 
[fifteen] days of leave from work in any [twelve] month 
period if: 
 
". . . 
5 
 
the complaint alleged only that the plaintiff reported the 
abuser's violation of the HPO to police "so they could begin 
enforcement proceedings" and that the plaintiff "informed [CHC] 
that she was pursuing enforcement of the [HPO]."  Based on these 
allegations, CHC had notice that the plaintiff intended to 
enforce the HPO against her abuser, but it did not have notice 
that she requested (or intended to request) any leave in order 
to do so.  Indeed, the court all but concedes that the plaintiff 
had not requested any leave before she was terminated.  See ante 
at    (plaintiff's "disclosure was enough to put CHC on notice 
that, while the plaintiff did not then know of any specific date 
on which she would require leave, she might need to exercise the 
leave provisions of the [act]").  In my view, where an employee 
announces simply that he or she is taking action generally to 
enforce an HPO, it does not follow that the employee intends to 
take, or necessarily would need to take, a leave from work to do 
so. 
 
 
"(ii) the employee is using the leave from work to:  seek 
or obtain medical attention, counseling, victim services or 
legal assistance; secure housing; obtain a protective order 
from a court; appear in court or before a grand jury; meet 
with a district attorney or other law enforcement official; 
or attend child custody proceedings or address other issues 
directly related to the abusive behavior against the 
employee or family member of the employee . . . ." 
6 
 
The plaintiff argues that she provided CHC with 
"appropriate advance notice" of her request for leave when she 
informed its human resources officer that she was "engaged in 
efforts with the police to enforce the HPO."  For support, the 
plaintiff analogizes the act's notice requirement in § 52E (d) 
to the regulations implementing the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), under which employees need only state an "FMLA-
qualifying reason" for leave in order properly to invoke its 
leave protections.  29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c).  The plaintiff 
contends, and the court agrees, that an employee's provision to 
her employer of the existence of an HPO, or merely the existence 
of an abusive relationship for which an employee is seeking 
assistance, affords an employer notice of a "condition 
precedent" that is sufficient to invoke the act's leave 
protections, even in the absence of any discernable request for 
any amount of leave.  See ante at    . 
The problem is that the act and the FMLA are written, and 
indeed are structured, quite differently.  The act expressly 
requires that, in order for an employee to invoke properly his 
or her leave rights under the statute -- such as taking leave to 
enforce an HPO by appearing in court -- the employee first must 
give his or her employer notice of a request for leave.  That 
the focus of the notice is on the leave itself, and not simply a 
reason that could support an eventual request for leave, is 
7 
 
confirmed by other provisions of the statute.  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 52E (g) (employee must exhaust all other available leave 
"prior to requesting or taking leave under this section, unless 
the employer waives this requirement" [emphasis added]); G. L. 
c. 149, § 52E (i) ("The taking of leave under this section shall 
not result in the loss of any employment benefit accrued prior 
to the date on which the leave taken under this section 
commenced").  Reading the act's notice requirement in the 
context of the statute as a whole, an employee's "appropriate 
advance notice" may come in the form of a specific request for 
time off on a particular date, or a statement of the need for 
some number of days of leave time within the next thirty days.  
See G. L. c. 149, § 52E (d) ("If an unscheduled absence occurs, 
an employer shall not take any negative action against the 
employee if the employee, within [thirty] days from the 
unauthorized absence," furnishes qualifying documentation 
pursuant to § 52E [e]). 
In contrast, the regulations implementing the FMLA's notice 
requirements reflect that the FMLA contains a much broader leave 
provision, and more general notice requirements, than the act.  
The FMLA contains statutory leave protections for specific 
"foreseeable leave" conditions, such as pregnancy, adoption, or 
planned medical treatment for a "serious health condition."  29 
U.S.C. § 2612(a), (e)(1)-(2).  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a) 
8 
 
("serious health condition" involves inpatient care or 
continuing treatment).  The implementing regulations of the FMLA 
state expressly that notice of an FMLA-qualifying reason itself 
is sufficient to trigger its statutory protections and that "the 
employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even 
mention the FMLA" when requesting leave for the first time.  See 
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). 
The foreseeable leave notice provisions are reasonable 
given the nature of FMLA leave, which contemplates, among other 
things, up to twelve weeks of leave (or twenty-six weeks for 
military service), 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)-(3); the employee's 
absence from work during the leave period due to one or more 
qualifying conditions, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(E); and the 
understanding that the leave generally may not be taken 
intermittently, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1).  Even for a condition 
such as pregnancy or adoption, to which the foreseeable leave 
provisions of the FMLA are applicable, an employee seeking leave 
under the FMLA must still, at a minimum, communicate to the 
employer an "intention" to take such leave, generally at least 
thirty days before doing so.5 
 
5 Title 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) provides: 
 
"In any case in which the necessity for leave . . . is 
foreseeable based on an expected birth or placement, the 
employee shall provide the employer with not less than 
[thirty] days' notice, before the date the leave is to 
9 
 
The plain terms of the act, however, contain no analogously 
general provision for "foreseeable leave" conditions.  Rather, 
the act requires that an employee give his or her employer 
notice of the leave requested in order to trigger the statutory 
protections, and not simply provide a reason that leave may (or 
may not) be needed at some unknown future point in time.  See 
G. L. c. 149, § 52E (d) ("an employee seeking leave from work 
under this section shall provide appropriate advance notice of 
the leave to the employer" [emphasis added]).  Furthermore, and 
in contrast to the FMLA, leave under the act is measured in 
days, not weeks, and it is provided to allow employees to 
participate in legal proceedings, meet with law enforcement 
officers, obtain or enforce HPOs, or "address other issues 
directly related to the abusive behavior."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 52E (b) (ii). 
Unlike a qualifying condition under the FMLA, which 
necessitates that the employee be absent from his or her 
position, the existence of an HPO, alone, or its enforcement, 
does not necessarily mean that an employee will need to be 
absent from work.  This is because the nature and scope of any 
 
begin, of the employee's intention to take leave . . . , 
except that if the date of the birth or placement requires 
leave to begin in less than [thirty] days, the employee 
shall provide such notice as is practicable" (emphases 
added). 
10 
 
judicial proceedings to enforce the plaintiff's HPO would be 
shaped by events that were yet to occur, may not happen, and may 
be able to proceed without the plaintiff's presence.  When the 
plaintiff informed CHC of the existence of the HPO and her 
intention to enforce it, it was far from clear whether her 
efforts would require her to take time off from work and, if so, 
approximately when or for roughly how long.6  Simply put, I am 
not persuaded that the plaintiff's complaint contained enough 
"factual heft," Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 
591, 609 (2017), to support the conclusion that the plaintiff 
had requested leave, or that she had any intention of requesting 
leave.7 
 
6 This key fact is also what distinguishes this case from 
Federal cases holding that an employer had "reasonably adequate" 
notice of an employee's need for leave under the FMLA.  See, 
e.g., Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 403 
(3d Cir. 2007) (defendant employer had sufficient notice of 
leave because plaintiff "missed approximately six weeks of work" 
for surgery, "informed his supervisor of his need for monitoring 
and possible additional surgery," and "made it clear to his 
employer that his health problems were continuing"); Mascioli v. 
Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 419, 435 (W.D. 
Pa. 2009) (defendant employer had sufficient notice of leave 
under FMLA because "[p]laintiff communicated her medical 
condition to defendant, and conveyed that future time off may be 
necessary because of her medical condition"). 
 
7 The plaintiff also contends, and the court agrees, that 
CHC understood her disclosure as an implied request for leave 
because CHC requested "additional details" from her regarding 
the HPO pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 52E (e) (§ 52E [e]).  See 
ante at    .  That provision states that "[a]n employer may 
require an employee to provide documentation evidencing that the 
employee . . . has been a victim of abusive behavior and that 
11 
 
Furthermore, interpreting the act's notice requirement 
according to its plain terms "would not lead to an 'absurd 
result,' or contravene the Legislature's clear intent."  
Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 376 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 689 (2015).  Interpreting 
the act to require that employees make an affirmative request 
for leave would not "discourage [employees] from pursuing 
enforcement actions against their abusers," ante at    , but 
rather would ensure that employers have a clear understanding of 
when an employee needs to take advantage of his or her statutory 
leave rights.  Even in an emergency situation where the 
employee's health or safety is in imminent danger, the employee 
is not placed in danger by the notice requirement, as the 
employee is permitted to first take the necessary leave and then 
 
the leave taken is consistent with the conditions [set forth in 
the statute]."  G. L. c. 149, § 52E (e). 
 
However, the complaint did not allege that CHC exercised 
any of its rights under the act.  The complaint alleged only 
that "[the plaintiff] provided [CHC] with copies of the [HPO]" 
and that "[CHC] responded to [the abuser's] false post by 
requesting more information from [the abuser] about [the 
plaintiff]."  The complaint did not allege that CHC requested a 
copy of the HPO from the plaintiff, let alone required her to 
furnish the document as contemplated by § 52E (e).  In any 
event, CHC's request for more information regarding the abuser's 
false social media post is in no way indicative of whether the 
plaintiff did, or would have, requested leave for any purpose 
enumerated in § 52E (b) (ii). 
12 
 
provide notice to the employer within three days thereafter.8  
See G. L. c. 149, § 52E (d). 
If the Legislature intended for an employee's provision of 
a "condition precedent" for leave, without more, to satisfy the 
act's notice requirement, then the FMLA is a clear example of 
how the Legislature could have written the statute to effectuate 
that intent.  Because the two statutes are distinguishable 
readily in both language and structure, however, I believe 
enforcing the act's notice requirement according to its plain 
 
 
8 Relatedly, while CHC was within its rights to communicate 
with the plaintiff's abuser, I wish to emphasize that doing so 
could have posed a significant risk to the plaintiff's safety, 
which the HPO was intended to protect.  In light of the risk of 
future incidents of abuse or harassment that could be inflicted 
by perpetrators, victims often will not want a perpetrator to 
have any information about the victim's whereabouts or efforts 
to enforce a protective order.  I believe the Legislature 
clearly has recognized these concerns.  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 52E (f) ("All information related to the employee's leave 
under this section shall be kept confidential by the employer 
and shall not be disclosed," save for certain enumerated 
exceptions). 
 
 
In this case, even though I would conclude that the 
plaintiff did not request or attempt to request leave under the 
act, I nonetheless believe CHC's efforts to "hear [the abuser's] 
side of the story" unwittingly could have provided the abuser 
with information about the plaintiff's location and a renewed 
opportunity to inflict further harassment, thereby undermining 
the protective purposes of the HPO.  To avoid such risks, I 
believe it behooves employers in CHC's position, who seek to 
investigate the backgrounds of new or potential employees, to 
exercise the utmost caution in their approach, including in 
determining in the first instance whether direct contact with 
the subject of the HPO is necessary or appropriate. 
13 
 
terms does no more (and no less) than simply abide by the 
Legislature's measured judgment in enacting the act. 
In sum, while our review of a decision on a motion to 
dismiss requires us to accept all of the plaintiff's allegations 
as true, and to draw all reasonable inferences in her favor, I 
believe the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff requested any leave as required 
to invoke the act's statutory protections.9  Accordingly, I would 
hold that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for either 
retaliation under G. L. c. 149, § 52E (i), or unlawful 
interference under G. L. c. 149, § 52E (h). 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the 
Superior Court judge's allowance of CHC's motion to dismiss.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
9 Despite given the opportunity to do so, the plaintiff did 
not amend her complaint to allege additional facts showing that 
she actually requested leave, or that she notified CHC that she 
intended to request leave.  In my view, this fact is indicative 
of the plaintiff's own realization that her claims were 
unfounded.