Case Title: Commonwealth v. Aldana

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12258

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12258 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARC ALDANA. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 7, 2017. - September 19, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Destructive or Incendiary Device or Substance. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 20, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Daniel 
M. Wrenn, J., and the cases were heard by Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant. 
 
Joseph A. Simmons, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the course of arresting the defendant at his 
apartment on a default warrant, Worcester police officers saw in 
his kitchen three bags containing unknown powders.  One of the 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
bags was labeled "aluminum powder," another "red iron oxide," 
and one bag was not labeled.  An unidentified red-brown powder 
was spilled on the counter and the kitchen window sill, and 
smudged on the wall around the window.  Concerned about the 
appearance of the bags of powder, given the other circumstances 
in the apartment, one of the officers undertook an Internet 
search for information on the labeled substances.  On the basis 
of information derived from that search, a detective requested 
assistance from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (ATF), the State police, and the local fire 
department.  Representatives of these agencies arrived, seized 
the bags of powder, and removed them from the apartment.   
 
The defendant thereafter was indicted on two charges of 
possession of the ingredients to make an incendiary device or 
substance with the intent to do so, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 102 (a), and a single charge of possession of an 
incendiary device or substance, in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 102 (c). 
 
After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendant was convicted of both charges under G. L. c. 266, 
§ 102 (a), and acquitted of the charge under G. L. c. 266, 
§ 102 (c).2  In this appeal, the defendant argues that the 
                     
 
2 The defendant was not charged under G. L. c. 148, § 12, 
 
3 
 
 
ingredients seized and observations made by police during the 
search of his apartment should have been suppressed, and that 
the evidence at trial was in any event insufficient to support 
his convictions.  In the alternative, the defendant contends 
that his convictions are duplicative and that one must be 
vacated. 
 
To convict the defendant of a violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 102 (a), the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant had in his possession or 
control, without lawful authority to do so, a "substance . . . 
which, alone or in combination, could be used to make a 
destructive or incendiary device or substance" and that he 
intended to "make a destructive or incendiary device or 
substance."  To prove that what the defendant intended to make 
was a violation of the statute, the Commonwealth was required to 
establish that the device or substance was "designed or adapted 
to cause physical harm to persons or property by means of fire, 
explosion, deflagration or detonation and consisting of [a] 
substance capable of being ignited, whether or not contrived to 
ignite or explode automatically."  G. L. c. 266, § 101. 
 
We conclude that the evidence introduced at trial was not 
sufficient to establish that the defendant was without lawful 
                                                                  
which is applicable to pyrotechnics, e.g., fireworks. 
4 
 
 
authority to possess the powders themselves or the incendiary 
substance, thermite, that the Commonwealth asserted he intended 
to make.  Since the evidence at trial was insufficient to 
establish at least one critical element of the Commonwealth's 
case, the defendant's convictions cannot stand.  Accordingly, 
the matter must be remanded to the Superior Court for entry of 
required findings of not guilty. 
 
1.  Background.  After a hearing on the defendant's motion 
to suppress, a Superior Court judge denied the motion in a 
written decision containing comprehensive findings of fact.  The 
defendant thereafter was tried, jury-waived, by a different 
Superior Court judge.  All of the individuals who had testified 
at the hearing on the motion to suppress -- officers involved in 
the arrest and the building manager -- testified to essentially 
the same facts at trial.  In addition, testimony was introduced 
from another member of the Worcester police department, members 
of the State police bomb squad, a chemist and a State police 
evidence technician, two Worcester fire department lieutenants, 
and a defense expert in chemistry.  In announcing his verdicts, 
the trial judge issued limited oral findings of fact and a brief 
explanation of his reasoning.  We recite the facts the trial 
judge could have found, reserving some facts for later 
discussion. 
 
a.  Evidence at trial.  On October 15, 2013, officers of 
5 
 
 
the Worcester police departments went to the defendant's 
apartment to arrest him on a default warrant for a charge of 
disorderly conduct.  Detective Sergeant Mark Richardson of the 
Worcester police department, and other Worcester police 
officers, entered the building and went to the door of the 
defendant's apartment.  Richardson knocked on the door and 
announced the police presence several times without receiving a 
response.  After the officers heard movement inside the 
apartment and the sounds of breaking glass, Richardson ordered 
one of them to force entry into the apartment.3 
 
The defendant was arrested almost immediately upon the 
police entry.  Through the kitchen doorway, officers could see 
an open kitchen cabinet and drawers standing open.  The officers 
saw two foil bags of powder, and one unlabeled plastic bag 
containing a reddish-brown powder, on the counter and in the 
open kitchen cabinet.  One foil bag was labeled "aluminum 
powder" and the other was labeled "red iron oxide."  The 
officers did not recognize the names, and were not familiar with 
                     
 
3 In his motion to suppress, the defendant challenged, among 
other things, the propriety of the police entry, as he does 
before us.  Because of the result we reach, we do not address 
the defendant's claims concerning the forced entry, or the other 
issues raised in his motion to suppress, including whether it 
was immediately apparent that the powders were dangerous, such 
that their seizure without a warrant fell within the plain view 
exception to the warrant requirement.  We also do not reach the 
question whether the convictions were duplicative. 
6 
 
 
the appearance of the powders.  One of the officers conducted an 
Internet search on his cellular telephone and reported to 
Richardson that, when mixed together, red iron oxide powder and 
aluminum powder produce thermite, a substance Richardson 
believed posed a significant public safety concern. 
 
Thereafter, Richardson contacted ATF, the State police, and 
the Worcester fire department; at some point, he conducted a 
"sweep" of the apartment.  State police Trooper Eric Gahagan, a 
bomb squad technician, arrived and examined the three bags of 
powders.  Based on the appearance of the substance, he suspected 
that the unlabeled bag contained thermite.  He took three 
samples from each of the three bags of powder and placed them in 
glass vials.  Gahagan also performed a "sweep" of the apartment 
for signs of other possibly dangerous materials, and any means 
for lighting Thermite, and found none.  He then took the samples 
back to the State police crime laboratory for testing.  The 
remaining powders were placed in a plastic bin and transported 
to a Department of Public Works site to be destroyed by burning.  
Gahagan and an ATF agent mixed the three bags of powder 
together, at the site, and lit them remotely using a robot with 
an ignited road flare.  The mixture burned for approximately 
five minutes before it consumed all of the aluminum and burned 
itself out. 
 
A State police chemist testified regarding the steps he 
7 
 
 
took to determine whether the powders seized from the 
defendant's apartment were, indeed, thermite.  First, he 
examined samples of each of the three powders under a microscope 
and confirmed that they were aluminum, red iron oxide, and a 
mixture of aluminum and red iron oxide.  He then attempted to 
ignite the mixture with a Bunsen burner and was not able to do 
so; he did not attempt to ignite it with tools that burn at 
higher temperatures, such as a road flare or a magnesium strip. 
 
The technical evidence concerning the properties of the 
various powders seized and their testing was essentially 
undisputed.  Experts for both the Commonwealth and the defendant 
testified that thermite can be created by combining red iron 
oxide and aluminum powder, and that specific ratios are 
necessary for it to burn.  Neither iron oxide nor aluminum 
powder is ignitable individually.  The experts agreed that the 
only reason to combine red iron oxide and aluminum powder is to 
create a thermite mixture that can be ignited.  When ignited, 
thermite burns at very high temperatures, at approximately 4,000 
degrees Fahrenheit.  Thermite is not explosive, will not ignite 
spontaneously, and, because of the high temperature at which it 
burns, cannot be ignited with an ordinary flame, such as a match 
or a Bunsen burner.  To reach the high temperatures necessary to 
ignite thermite requires heat sources such as road flares, 
8 
 
 
firework sparklers, or magnesium strips.4 
 
Thermite is used in military operations to dispose of old 
equipment or to disable it in the field so that it does not fall 
into enemy hands, and in civilian operations for metal salvage.  
Thermite also is used for cutting metal, including steel; for 
welding or filling in damaged portions of railroad tracks; for 
spot welding; for cutting through locks to open doors and safes; 
and, because it is not extinguished by water, in underwater 
welding.5 
 
The sole evidence as to the licensing and permitting 
requirements applicable to thermite was introduced through 
Lieutenant Robert Mansfield of the Worcester fire department. 
Mansfield testified that he was responsible for fire hazard 
identification, inspection, and suppression in Worcester.  
Through his testimony, the Commonwealth introduced, and sought 
judicial notice of, §§ 9, 12, and 13 of G. L. c. 148, the State 
fire prevention act, and 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 (2012), a 
                     
 
4 Both Commonwealth and defense experts indicated that they 
believed thermite is relatively safe, is difficult to light, and 
is stable when unlit.  The experts also stated that, in their 
many years of experience, investigations at the State police 
crime laboratory involving thermite are quite rare. 
 
 
5 Testimony at trial also indicated that red iron oxide 
(rust) and aluminum powder, individually, have ordinary civilian 
uses.  One use for red iron oxide is as a pigment. 
9 
 
 
regulation in effect at the time of the defendant's arrest,6 
governing storage, use, and permitting of explosives, based on 
§ 13 of the statute.7  Mansfield explained that G. L. c. 148, 
§ 9,8 authorizes the fire department to require and issue permits 
to store and use certain explosive and inflammable substances 
and that G. L. c. 148, § 12,9 requires licenses for the use and 
                     
 
6 Effective January 1, 2015, the version of 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. in effect at the time of the defendant's arrest was 
repealed.  The current State comprehensive fire safety code is 
found in 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.00 (2016). 
 
7 Copies of the statutes and regulations Lieutenant Robert 
Mansfield discussed were presented to the judge and marked for 
identification.  The judge did not state explicitly whether he 
took judicial notice of them.  The parties dispute whether the 
judge also implicitly took judicial notice of 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 14.00, which then regulated the use and storage of 
certain inflammable solids, liquids, and gases.  The transcript 
establishes that, at trial, the judge was not presented with 527 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00 nor asked to take notice of it.  See 
discussion, infra. 
 
8 "The board shall make rules and regulations for the 
keeping, storage, use, manufacture, sale, handling, 
transportation or other disposition of gunpowder, dynamite, 
crude petroleum or any of its products, or explosive or 
inflammable fluids or compounds, tablets, torpedoes or any 
explosives of a like nature, or any other explosives, fireworks, 
firecrackers, or any substance having such properties that it 
may spontaneously, or acting under the influence of any 
contiguous substance, or of any chemical or physical agency, 
ignite, or inflame or generate inflammable or explosive vapors 
or gases to a dangerous extent . . . ."  G. L. c. 148, § 9. 
 
9 "No building shall be used for the manufacturing of 
fireworks or firecrackers without a license from the local 
licensing authority. No building or structure shall be used for 
the manufacturing or storage of explosive materials without a 
permit issued by the marshal."  G. L. c. 148, § 12. 
10 
 
 
storage of, inter alia, fireworks and firecrackers.  G. L. 
c. 148, § 13,10 governs the storage, manufacture, and sale of 
explosives.  The regulations concerning the manufacture, sale, 
and storage of explosives, implementing the provisions of G. L. 
c. 148, § 13, were then contained in 527 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 13.00. 
 
Mansfield testified that the fire department's authority to 
regulate the storage of thermite was derived from 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 13.00.11  Although that regulation did not mention 
thermite directly, he stated that thermite fell within its 
requirements because it explicitly incorporated 27 C.F.R. 
§ 55.23, a Federal regulation setting forth a list of explosive 
materials.12  To possess thermite in his apartment, the defendant 
                     
 
10 "No building or other structure shall, except as provided 
in [§ 14], be used for the keeping, storage, manufacture or sale 
of any of the articles named in [§ 9, defining blasting 
requirements], unless the local licensing authority shall have 
granted a license to use the land on which such building or 
other structure is or is to be situated for the aforementioned 
uses, after a public hearing . . . ."  G. L. c. 148, § 13. 
 
11 Title 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 applied to the use 
and storage of "explosives" and "explosive materials," and also 
provided that "[t]he term also includes any material determined 
to be contained in the list of explosive materials provided for 
in 27 [C.F.R. §] 55.23."  527 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.03.  
"Explosive" was defined as "any chemical compound, mixture or 
device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by 
explosion; i.e., with substantially instantaneous release of gas 
and heat."  Id.  See note 6, 8, supra. 
 
 
12 Contrary to this testimony, the then-applicable Federal 
 
11 
 
 
would have been required to have both a license from the State, 
after passing an explosives handling course, and a permit from 
the city of Worcester.  Mansfield had examined the city's 
records and found no indication that the defendant had a permit 
to possess thermite; he stated also that he would never issue 
such a permit to anyone living in a multiunit residential 
building.  He did not explain which of the statutory or 
regulatory definitions pertaining to "explosive," see G. L. 
c. 266, § 101 (defining "[e]xplosive" as "any element, compound 
or mixture that is manufactured, designed or used to produce an 
explosion"), were applicable to thermite. 
 
Mansfield testified on cross-examination, without reference 
to any applicable statute or regulation, that possession of 
aluminum powder or red iron oxide would require a permit if it 
were above "a certain amount" because they are an "inhalation 
hazard."13  No permit was required for possession of aluminum 
                                                                  
regulation listing specific explosives did not in fact contain 
any mention of thermite.  See 27 C.F.R. § 55.23; 77 Fed. Reg. 
58,410 (Sept. 20, 2012). 
 
 
13 Gahagan testified that red iron oxide and aluminum powder 
can be purchased legally, and stored lawfully in a residence.  
He also noted that the recipe for mixing thermite from the 
compounds is readily available on the Internet; he did not 
mention any requirement of a permit.  The defense expert also 
testified that these components are legally available, can be 
ordered over the Internet, and are shipped by mail; he testified 
that the only restriction he was aware of was that certain 
companies would not ship them to a college dormitory address. 
12 
 
 
oxide.  He also agreed that, under G. L. c. 148, § 13, certain 
quantities of explosives could be held without a permit or a 
license. 
b.  Trial proceedings.  At the close of the Commonwealth's 
case, the judge denied the defendant's motion for required 
findings of not guilty.  At the close of all the evidence, the 
judge found the defendant guilty of two counts of possession of 
the ingredients necessary to make a destructive or incendiary 
device or substance without lawful authority and with the intent 
to make such a device or substance, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 102 (a).  The defendant was acquitted of possession of 
an incendiary device or substance in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 102 (c). 
The judge found that the evidence proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that "the defendant was in possession of 
aluminum powder and red iron oxide," and also in possession of 
"a mixture of these two substances."  The judge explained that 
the defendant's combination of the two substances, and the 
absence of evidence that the defendant intended to use thermite 
for a legitimate purpose, demonstrated his intent to make 
thermite.  The judge did not make findings or rulings or explain 
his reasoning as to whether the defendant had lawful authority 
to possess thermite or its components. 
The judge also found that, while the evidence showed that 
13 
 
 
the mixture of the three bags combined by Gahagan and the ATF 
agent burned in a manner consistent with thermite, the evidence 
did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the mixture 
found in the defendant's kitchen would have been ignitable.  He 
noted that, before investigators disposed of the seized powders, 
all three of them had been combined into a single mixture,14 and 
that the combination burned as thermite would burn.  The judge 
determined that, because the act of combining the three bags 
might itself have created the proper ratio, this did not 
establish that the seized mixed powder would have burned in the 
same manner, if at all.  He noted in this respect that the bags 
of powders had not been weighed and the ratio of materials in 
the mixed bag had not been determined.15 
The defendant appealed, and we transferred the matter from 
the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
                     
 
14 According to the ATF agent's report, which was introduced 
in evidence and about which Gahagan testified, "The red iron 
oxide and aluminum powder were spread in a line along the 
pavement with the suspected Thermite spread on top of the 
previous two chemicals." 
 
 
15 The judge explained his decision to acquit the defendant 
of the charged violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c), as follows: 
 
 
"My reasons include among other things the lack of the 
weighing or testing or burning of the mixture separately.  
I do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mixture 
would have burned, even with a flare igniter, if done 
without the presence of the remaining aluminum powder and 
red iron oxide." 
14 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that it 
was error to deny his motion to suppress, the evidence was 
insufficient to support his convictions, and the convictions are 
duplicative.  We agree that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the convictions, and therefore do not address the 
defendant's other claims. 
 
To convict a defendant of a violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 102 (a), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
(1) possessed or controlled, (2) without lawful authority, (3) a 
"substance . . . which, alone or in combination, could be used 
to make a destructive or incendiary device or substance," and 
(4) the defendant intended to "make a destructive or incendiary 
device or substance."  To prove that the intended device or 
article fell within the meaning of a "destructive or incendiary 
device or substance," the Commonwealth was required to prove 
that the device or substance was "designed or adapted to cause 
physical harm to persons or property by means of fire, 
explosion, deflagration or detonation and consisting of [a] 
substance capable of being ignited, whether or not contrived to 
ignite or explode automatically."  G. L. c. 266, § 101. 
 
We conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to 
establish that the defendant lacked lawful authority to possess 
or control the powders seized, either individually or combined 
15 
 
 
as thermite.16  The Commonwealth offered evidence that thermite, 
operating as it does through heat and not explosion, is an 
inflammable or incendiary substance, rather than an explosive 
substance.  The Commonwealth did not offer evidence, through any 
witness or otherwise, that the possession of thermite, or, as 
here, of its component parts, is subject to regulation as an 
inflammable or incendiary substance.  Mansfield's testimony did 
not bridge the evidentiary gap.17  Because the trial evidence 
                     
16 As noted, the Commonwealth was also required to prove 
that the defendant intended to make a device or substance 
"designed or adapted to cause physical harm to persons or 
property by means of fire, explosion, deflagration or 
detonation" as defined in G. L. c. 266, § 101.  The Commonwealth 
proceeded on the theory that the possession of thermite, 
standing alone, would suffice to establish such a device or 
substance.  The issue not having been raised or briefed, we do 
not address the question of the sufficiency of the evidence in 
this regard.  But see Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 456 Mass. 411, 
431, vacated on other grounds, 562 U.S. 956 (2010), citing 
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 904 (1997) 
(distinguishing object "designed for" given use and object that 
"functions as" particular type of thing).  "[A] device that 
explodes is not covered by [a similar Federal] statute merely 
because it explodes."  United States v. Hammond, 371 F.3d 776, 
780 (11th Cir. 2004) (cardboard tube filled with explosive 
powder was not designed as weapon and therefore was not 
destructive device under Federal statute; to establish that 
explosive is weapon, and therefore prohibited destructive 
devices requires "plus" factor).  Compare United States v. York, 
600 F.3d 347, 354-355 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that, under 
similar Federal statute, Molotov cocktail is designed as weapon 
and therefore is destructive device). 
 
 
17 Mansfield did not indicate which of the statutory or 
regulatory definitions pertaining to "explosives," see G. L. 
c. 266, § 101, he believed were applicable to thermite. 
 
16 
 
 
established that thermite is not an "explosive," but, rather, an 
"inflammable" or "incendiary" substance, the regulation as to 
explosives has no apparent application to thermite. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence of absence of lawful 
authority.  In arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support a conviction under G  L. c. 266, § 102 (a), insofar as 
the Commonwealth failed to establish that he lacked lawful 
authority to possess thermite, the defendant does not challenge 
the testimony that he did not have a permit from the city of 
Worcester.  Rather, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to 
establish that such a permit was necessary.  He maintains that 
the fire safety regulations of which the judge was asked to take 
judicial notice, discussed at trial, concerned the storage of 
explosives, and therefore were not applicable to thermite, which 
is an inflammable. 
 
The defendant argues further that, even had 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 14.00 (2012), the regulation then governing the storage 
of inflammables been introduced and considered, see note 7, 
supra, the evidence did not show that thermite was a "flammable 
solid,"18 which requires permits for use and storage if the 
                     
18 General Laws c. 148, § 9, authorizes the creation of 
regulations governing "inflammable fluids or compounds."  Title 
527 Code Mass. Regs. § 14.03 then established differing storage 
and permitting requirements for flammable liquids, gases, and 
solids.  As thermite is a powder, and a compound, any regulation 
 
17 
 
 
weight of the material is beyond the amount of a regulatory 
exemption.19  Because the weights of the bags were not introduced 
at trial, there was no evidence that the powders in the 
defendant's possession exceeded the exempt amounts.  Had the 
limited quantities noted on the labeled bags been an accurate 
representation of the weights, moreover, the amounts would have 
fallen within the amount allowed by the exemption. 
 
"Because the absence of lawful authority or justification 
is an element of each of the crimes charged, the Commonwealth 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant acted 
without lawful authority or justification."  Commonwealth v. 
Cabral, 443 Mass. 171, 179 (2005). 
 
i.  Applicable regulation.  All of the regulations of which 
the judge was asked to take notice, and all of the testimony 
concerning the required permits and licensing, were applicable 
                                                                  
applicable to it would have had to fall under the regulations on 
"flammable solids," and not under the sections pertaining to 
liquids and gases.  See id. 
 
19 The then fire safety regulations on explosives also 
contained such exemptions.  See 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(1) 
(in accordance with provisions of G. L. c. 148, § 13, "the 
following quantities of explosive materials . . . shall be 
exempt from License, Registration, and Permit and may be kept, 
or stored in a building or other structure"); 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 13.04(1)(f) (exempting "[s]pecial industrial explosive 
devices when in quantities of less than [fifty] pounds net 
weight of explosives" and providing that materials falling under 
this exemption "may be kept, or stored in a building or other 
structure"). 
18 
 
 
to explosives.  The expert evidence at trial established that 
thermite is an "inflammable" or "incendiary" that operates 
through heat; it did not establish that thermite is an 
"explosive" as defined in 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.03.20  
Mansfield, the fire department lieutenant responsible for fire 
hazard identification, inspection, and suppression, testified 
that the fire department's authority to regulate the storage of 
thermite was derived from 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00, which 
then governed explosives.  Neither he nor any other Commonwealth 
witness explained which of the statutory or regulatory 
definitions pertaining to "explosives" were applicable to 
thermite, a substance which the expert evidence at trial 
established is an "inflammable" or "incendiary" that operates 
through heat. 
The Commonwealth argues in its brief that the judge could 
also have taken judicial notice, albeit implicitly, of the then 
regulation for the use and storage of inflammables, 527 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00.  That regulation was not mentioned at 
trial, and no copy of it was introduced; nor was there any 
indication at trial or in the judge's reading of the verdicts 
                     
 
20 Gahagan described ignited thermite as undergoing a 
chemical reaction which creates a new chemical compound.  The 
aluminum powder provides the fuel to the iron oxide, and they 
burn at a much higher temperature as the reaction occurs. The 
resulting reaction produces a "liquid molten metal," which cools 
to a slag left behind after the reaction has completed. 
19 
 
 
that the judge had considered it.21  Moreover, we have not 
determined that a judge may, sua sponte, take judicial notice of 
a regulation or implicitly rely on such a regulation in reaching 
a verdict; when a judge takes judicial notice at a jury trial, 
he or she must explain that determination to the jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 922 (1998); 
Mass. G. Evid. §§ 201, 202 (2017), citing Department of Revenue 
v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 69, 76 n.15 (2000) (in criminal case, 
"party has right to notice of matters that court will 
adjudicate").  In any event, because it was the Commonwealth's 
burden to establish that the defendant was without lawful 
authority to possess thermite, it was required to prove that a 
specific permit or license was necessary.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ferola, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 170, 174 & n.4 (2008) ("Even if 
Klonopin were a substance so designated in the United States 
Attorney General's regulations, see 21 C.F.R. § 1308.14 [2006], 
no such proof was adduced at trial"). 
The judge, as fact finder, was entitled to credit 
Mansfield's testimony that the defendant did not have a permit 
from the city of Worcester, a question of fact.  That, however, 
does not answer the more fundamental question whether a permit 
                     
21 In support of this argument, the Commonwealth notes that 
the regulation on inflammables was mentioned in its opposition 
to a motion to dismiss.  That motion, however, was heard by a 
different judge, more than a year before trial. 
20 
 
 
was required in these circumstances.  Such a determination is a 
question of law -- the applicable regulation and the meaning of 
its terms -- which a reviewing court considers de novo.  See, 
e.g., Ivey v. Commissioner of Correction, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 
23 (2015).22  See also Town Fair Tire Ctrs., Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, 454 Mass. 601, 604-605 (2009). 
ii.  Whether a permit would have been required under 527 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00.  The judge did not explain his 
determination that the defendant lacked authority to possess 
thermite.  Had 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00 been proffered and 
considered, however, the evidence was insufficient in any event 
to establish the necessity of a permit.  The evidence did not 
show that thermite fell within the definition of those 
inflammable materials then regulated under 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 14.00.  Further, even were we to assume that thermite 
did fall within the definition of "flammable solid" in that 
regulation, the evidence did not establish that the amount of 
the substances the defendant possessed would have exceeded the 
                     
 
22 "'The interpretation of a regulation is a question of law 
which we review de novo,' Commonwealth v. Hourican, 85 Mass. 
App. Ct. 408, 410 (2014), applying 'the traditional rules of 
statutory construction,' Young v. Patukonis, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 
907, 908 (1987).  'This is so because a properly promulgated 
regulation has the force of law . . . and must be accorded all 
the deference due to a statute.'  Borden, Inc.[ v. Commissioner 
of Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 723, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 
(1983)]."  Ivey v. Commissioner of Correction, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 
18, 23 (2015). 
21 
 
 
one hundred pound exemption from the permit requirement set 
forth in the regulation. 
A.  Inflammable solid.  As stated, had 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 14.00, then regulating the storage and use of 
"flammable and combustible liquids, flammable solids or 
flammable gases," been considered, the evidence was insufficient 
to establish that it would have been applicable to thermite.  
There was neither expert testimony nor other evidence introduced 
that thermite (a solid, not a liquid or a gas)23 met the 
definition of "flammable solid" under 527 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 14.02.  See Commonwealth v. Green, 408 Mass. 48, 50-51 
(1990) ("The Commonwealth could have easily met its burden of 
proof that codeine was a derivative of opium by presenting 
expert testimony").  The evidence that was introduced as to the 
properties of thermite, moreover, shows that it has none of the 
qualities set forth in the regulatory definition of "flammable 
solid" then applicable. 
Pursuant to 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 14.02, a flammable solid 
was "[a] solid substance, other than one classified as an 
explosive, which is liable to cause fires through friction, 
through absorption of moisture, through spontaneous chemical 
changes, or as a result of retained heat from manufacturing or 
                     
23 The experts testified that thermite is a combination of 
very fine powders. 
22 
 
 
processing."  Undisputed expert testimony at trial established 
that thermite does none of these things.  It can be soaked in or 
made to float on water without any problem.  It does not ignite 
through friction or spontaneous chemical changes.  The act of 
mixing iron oxide and aluminum powder together does not generate 
or retain heat.  Indeed, expert testimony indicated that it is 
very difficult to ignite thermite and that to do so requires a 
very particular type of high intensity external source.  Even if 
poured on top of each other, and then lit, the particles of red 
iron oxide and aluminum powder that make up the thermite 
compound may not be in close enough contact with each other to 
burn.24,25 
B.  Exemptions for limited amounts.  Even if we were to 
assume that thermite is an inflammable solid, nothing at trial 
suggested that the weight of the powders in the defendant's 
kitchen exceeded the regulatory exemption for individuals 
                     
 
24 There was expert testimony that, when using thermite in 
the "field" to cut or weld, a binding agent such as clay, 
plastic, or putty is generally used to hold the particles 
closely together so that they do not separate; if the individual 
particles of the two substances become separated, even in the 
same bag or pile, the mixture will not burn. 
 
 
25 We recognize that, in the right circumstances, thermite 
could pose a significant hazard once lit.  The Legislature is of 
course free to modify the relevant statutes to incorporate 
thermite should it deem such modification necessary. 
23 
 
 
possessing only limited amounts of an inflammable solid.26 
As the fire safety regulations for using and storing both 
explosives and inflammable materials then contained exemptions 
for limited amounts of the explosives and inflammable materials 
that they regulated, and provided that amounts that fell within 
these exemptions may be used and stored without a license or 
permit, the weight of the substances seized from the defendant's 
kitchen was essential to a determination whether a permit was 
required or whether the lack of a permit established the absence 
of lawful authority. 
There was no evidence at trial concerning the weight of any 
of the three bags, other than as to the labeled weights on two 
of the bags.  Even assuming that the open labeled bags contained 
the five and two pounds of materials indicated on their labels, 
however, and the entire contents of the three bags of powder 
were combined, the resulting seven-pound mixture would appear to 
be far below the exempted weight of one hundred pounds for an 
inflammable solid.  The Commonwealth did not prove that the 
powders, combined, exceeded the statutory exemption. 
b.  Pyrotechnics.  Finally, as the Commonwealth notes, the 
experts at trial agreed that, in chemical terms, thermite is 
                     
 
26 See 527 Code Mass Regs. § 14.03(2) (exempting, at time of 
trial, one hundred pounds of flammable solids from any license 
or permit requirement). 
24 
 
 
also considered to be a "pyrotechnic compound" or "composition."  
Based on this, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant could 
have been found guilty under G. L. c. 148, § 12, which prohibits 
the manufacturing of fireworks in a building without a license.  
There are two flaws in this argument.  First, the defendant was 
not charged with having violated that statute.  Second, insofar 
as the Commonwealth now argues that possession of a pyrotechnic 
without a license would separately subject the defendant to 
criminal penalties under G. L. c. 266, § 102, we note that 
pyrotechnics are excluded from the definition of "explosives" 
applicable to that statute.  See G. L. c. 266, § 101 ("Explosive 
shall not include a pyrotechnic . . .").27 
                     
 
27 For purposes of G. L. c. 266, § 101, and G. L. c. 148, 
§ 12, a pyrotechnic is "any commercially manufactured 
combustible or explosive composition or manufactured article 
designed and prepared for the purpose of producing an audible 
effect or a visible display and regulated by chapter 148 
including, but not limited to:  (i) fireworks, firecrackers; 
(ii) flares, fuses and torpedoes, so-called, and similar 
signaling devices." 
 
 
Both Commonwealth and defense experts testified that, while 
thermite is defined in chemical terms as a "pyrotechnic 
compound" or "composition," it is not a pyrotechnic in the 
ordinary understanding of a firework or pyrotechnic.  It also 
does not meet the statutory definition under G. L. c. 266, 
§ 101, or G. L. c. 148, § 12.  In those definitions, a 
pyrotechnic is designed to create a visible and audible effect 
by explosive or combustive burning.  Thermite does not do 
either.  Indeed, the Commonwealth's expert testified that 
thermite is used by the military to disable equipment precisely 
because it is silent and can be used without disclosing one's 
position. 
 
25 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Because the evidence at trial was not 
sufficient to establish every element of the Commonwealth's 
case, the defendant's convictions cannot stand.  The defendant's 
convictions are vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded 
to the Superior Court for entry of required findings of not 
guilty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                  
 
 
We note also that the statutes regulating pyrotechnics 
contain another requirement -- that a pyrotechnic be 
commercially fabricated -- which makes the definition 
inapplicable to the apparently hand-mixed substance found in the 
defendant's kitchen.  See G. L. c. 266, § 101; G. L. c. 148, 
§ 12.