Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Pollock

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5752

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pollock, 100 Ohio St.3d 280, 2003-Ohio-5752.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. POLLOCK. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pollock, 100 Ohio St.3d 280, 2003-Ohio-5752.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension with six months of 
sanction stayed on condition that no further misconduct be committed 
during that period — Exceeding bounds of zealous advocacy while 
representing clients. 
(No. 2003-0398 — Submitted June 24, 2003 — Decided November 12, 2003.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-17. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Harold Pollock of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0009271, was admitted to the practice of law in 1976.  In a 
complaint filed April 8, 2002, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent with professional misconduct committed while respondent pursued at 
least 20 lawsuits on behalf of several clients embroiled in disputes stemming 
mainly from their plans to develop property.  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) 
heard the cause and made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
recommendation.  The panel’s findings of fact as to the underlying misconduct 
are based principally on the parties’ stipulations. 
{¶2} 
In December 1993, respondent agreed to represent Dr. John 
Master, an elderly, retired physician, and John H. Nix, who had befriended Master 
through his acquaintance with Master’s housekeeper.  Master, who lived in an 
established Cleveland neighborhood, had no children and had lost his wife, Dr. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Anne Master, in 1991.1  By the end of 1993, Nix had moved into Master’s home 
and had formed a partnership between them and the housekeeper, to which Master 
had conveyed all of his real property, which included eight parcels adjacent to 
Master’s home that the partnership planned to develop. 
{¶3} 
Respondent had previously performed legal work for Nix, and Nix 
sought respondent’s services again after Patrick J. O’Malley, who served on 
Cleveland City Council representing the ward in which the partnership property 
was located, declined Nix’s request for support of a tax-abatement plan to aid the 
development.  Nix also knew that some neighboring residents opposed the 
project. 
{¶4} 
Apparently some of these residents had also consulted O’Malley to 
voice their concerns about the development, including the possibility that Master 
was incompetent and being exploited by Nix.  Respondent claims that O’Malley 
asked the Cleveland police to investigate Master’s household, a course of action 
police abandoned after Master appeared to be in sound mental health.  A probate 
court investigator also found no reason to pursue proceedings for Master’s 
protection. 
{¶5} 
On or about December 12, 1993, various residents met in the home 
of Jack and Carole Sword, who lived across the street from the Master residence.  
O’Malley also attended the residents’ meeting, to which neither Master nor Nix 
was invited.  Events before and during this meeting would later be the subject of 
considerable controversy and, under respondent’s direction, much litigation. 
{¶6} 
Also in late 1993, Nix apparently asked the FBI to investigate the 
disappearance of bearer bonds that had belonged to Master’s wife.  The bearer 
bonds had disappeared while attorney Paul P. Chalko, who would later oversee 
                                                 
1. 
Dr. Anne Master was survived only by her husband, her sister, and a grandniece. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
the administration of the wife’s estate, represented the couple.  Respondent’s 
efforts to recover the missing bearer bonds also generated much litigation. 
{¶7} 
In January 1994, respondent filed a lawsuit against the Swords on 
behalf of Master and Nix, asserting claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The complaint included the 
allegations that (1) the Swords had informed O’Malley that Nix was attempting to 
defraud Master of his assets and (2) at the December 12, 1993 meeting, the 
Swords had told attendees that Master was incompetent and that Nix was 
defrauding him.  Respondent deposed 13 people, including the Swords and other 
residents of the neighborhood, during discovery.  All failed to confirm the 
allegations of defamation, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the 
Swords.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, notwithstanding 
respondent’s contention that issues of credibility requiring a trial remained.  See 
Master v. Sword (Nov. 9, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68297, 1995 WL 662108. 
{¶8} 
In early January 1994, Dr. Anne Master’s grandniece, Cleveland 
police officer Sue Sazima, contacted Chalko and asked him to apply in probate 
court for her appointment as Master’s guardian.  Represented by another attorney, 
Master filed an application to have Nix appointed as his conservator.  Sazima 
ultimately withdrew her request for guardianship, and the court appointed Nix as 
conservator. 
{¶9} 
Then, in February and March 1994, one or more individuals 
intercepted and taped telephone conversations made from or received by the 
Master/Nix residence.  The interceptor(s) acted without a warrant and without the 
consent of the parties to the conversations.  In late March 1994, Nix obtained four 
cassette tapes containing recordings of these conversations.  The interceptions 
resulted in a series of lawsuits. 
{¶10} In April 1994, respondent filed a lawsuit in federal district court on 
behalf of  Master, Nix, and others whose communications were intercepted (“the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
first wiretapping case”).  The complaint alleged that the Swords, O’Malley, and 
Sazima, among others, engaged in illegal wiretapping, conspiracy to invade 
privacy, conspiracy to conceal wiretapping, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress in an effort to block the partnership’s development plan. 
{¶11} In June 1994, respondent filed a lawsuit for Master and Nix against 
Chalko, claiming that he had committed malpractice by negligently failing to 
pursue the recovery of the bearer bonds (“the first malpractice suit”).  Respondent 
later amended the complaint to also name Sazima, alleging that she (1) had 
conspired with Chalko to have herself appointed Master’s guardian in an effort to 
gain control over his assets and (2) had tortiously interfered with the attorney-
client relationship between Master and his former attorney.  The court denied 
Sazima’s motion to dismiss but also dismissed the claim concerning recovery of 
the bearer bonds, finding the claim improper in a malpractice action.  At trial,2 
Sazima invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during 
cross-examination, and the court directed the jury’s verdict in her favor.  The jury 
returned a verdict against Chalko for $300 in compensatory and $30,000 in 
punitive damages. 
{¶12} Respondent did not appeal the directed verdict against Sazima, and 
years later, the verdict against Chalko was reversed.  See Master v. Chalko (June 
5, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70527, 1997 WL 298260.  Sazima, however, filed a 
motion under R.C. 2323.51 for attorney fees as sanctions for frivolous conduct.  
Respondent opposed the motion, but further proceedings were apparently stayed 
pending Chalko’s appeal. 
{¶13} In November 1994, after filing lawsuits in state and federal courts 
against the Swords, O’Malley, and Sazima, respondent filed on behalf of Nix and 
                                                 
2. 
Master died on or about October 29, 1995, before trial in the first malpractice suit.  Nix 
was appointed executor of Master’s estate and successor administrator of the estate of Dr. Anne 
Masters.  At various times during this case and subsequent proceedings, respondent also 
represented Nix in his representative capacities.   
January Term, 2003 
5 
Master a complaint for declaratory judgment against these individuals and their 
insurance carriers: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance 
Company, and State Farm Insurance Company.  Respondent asked the trial court 
to declare that the defendants’ insurance companies had no duty to defend these 
insureds under their homeowner’s policies and cited precedent from which he 
argued that his clients had standing, even as third parties, to pursue the 
declaratory judgment.  The trial court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that 
respondent’s clients lacked such standing, that there could be no discovery of the 
insurance companies’ files prior to a ruling on a motion to dismiss, and that an 
insurance company must provide a defense if the claims are potentially or 
arguably within the policy coverage.  See Master v. O’Malley (Apr. 4, 1996), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 68895, 1996 WL 157340. 
{¶14} In April 1995, respondent filed a lawsuit in federal court on behalf 
of Master’s accountant, alleging that the Swords, O’Malley, and Sazima, among 
others, conspired to wiretap Nix’s telephone and to use the information gained 
from the interception to block the partnership’s proposed housing development 
(“the second wiretapping case”).  This suit alleged not only that the defendants 
had intercepted the telephone communications, but also that they had illegally 
used and disclosed the contents of the communications. 
{¶15} Thereafter, O’Malley retained the law firm of Weston Hurd, 
Fallon, Paisley & Howley, L.L.P. (“Weston Hurd”), to defend him against the 
allegations in the two wiretapping cases.  O’Malley denied involvement in any 
conspiracy or wiretapping but admitted that he had heard portions of a recording 
that probably contained the intercepted communications.  In November 1995, 
Weston Hurd filed in the wiretapping cases affidavits to support motions for 
summary judgment.  O’Malley purportedly disclosed in these affidavits certain 
contents of the intercepted communications.  For the purpose of the disciplinary 
proceedings, relator and respondent stipulated that these disclosures, if made with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
knowledge or reason to believe that said tapes had been illegally made, violated 
Ohio and federal law. 
{¶16} In December 1995, respondent initiated another lawsuit against 
Chalko on behalf of Master and Nix.  This action (“the second malpractice suit”) 
claimed that Chalko should have attempted to recover the missing bearer bonds.  
The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs in the second 
malpractice case for the reason, among others, that Chalko had not been asked to 
recover the bonds and, therefore, owed no such duty to Master.  The trial court’s 
judgment was affirmed on appeal.  See Nix v. Chalko (Feb. 19, 1998), Cuyahoga 
App. No. 72023, 1998 WL 72495. 
{¶17} On December 27, 1995, soon after he filed the second malpractice 
case, respondent filed yet another suit on Nix’s behalf, this one against O’Malley 
and Weston Hurd.  The suit, which was later removed to federal district court on 
the basis of a RICO claim, contained three counts: (1) the defendants had violated 
Ohio and federal wiretap statutes by using and disclosing the contents of the 
intercepted conversations; (2) the defendants had conspired to aid and abet others 
in the concealment of the wiretapping and had withheld unprivileged statements 
about the wiretapping to avoid civil and criminal liability; and (3) the law firm 
had committed “legal malpractice,” notwithstanding that the law firm had never 
represented the plaintiff. 3 
{¶18} The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment on all counts.  On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  In reversing, the court of 
appeals found that the first count presented a genuine issue of material fact.  See 
Nix v. O’Malley (C.A.6, 1998), 160 F.3d 343. 
                                                 
3. 
The stipulations indicate that respondent filed a similar complaint against the attorneys 
who had represented the Swords and that that case was also removed to federal court on the basis 
of a RICO claim.   
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶19} Respondent also attempted to instigate various criminal or 
disciplinary proceedings.  In May 1994, he sent a letter asking the Cleveland 
Police Department to internally investigate allegations that Sazima had illegally 
accessed a police computer.  The police department conducted an investigation 
and presented the results to the Cleveland City Prosecutor.  In January 1995, the 
city prosecutor concluded that there was not probable cause to believe that Sazima 
had committed a crime. 
{¶20} In March 1995, also at respondent’s urging, Cleveland police 
investigated allegations that Sazima had participated in illegal wiretapping of 
respondent’s clients.  And in June 1995, respondent wrote a letter to the 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor asking for felony indictments against various 
individuals whom he alleged to be responsible for the wiretapping of his clients’ 
telephone conversations, the illegal use and/or disclosure of the tapes, and/or a 
cover-up of these crimes.  Respondent accused Sazima, other members of the 
police force, Chalko, O’Malley, and neighborhood residents, including the 
Swords, among others.  No indictments resulted from the allegations in 
respondent’s letter. 
{¶21} Moreover, in May 1995, respondent, acting on behalf of Master, 
Nix, and Master’s probate attorney, accountant, and former housekeeper, 
submitted a public records request for documents compiled during the police 
department’s investigation of Sazima.  And in June 1995, acting on behalf of the 
same clients, respondent filed an action in this court seeking a writ of mandamus 
to compel the city prosecutor to investigate the alleged misconduct of Sazima and 
other city employees and to compel the police department and the city of 
Cleveland to allow the inspection and copying of the records requested in the May 
1995 public records request.  The complaint further requested a writ ordering 
appointment of a special prosecutor to “investigate and prosecute the wiretappers, 
and those who have concealed the wiretapping.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶22} In State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 661 
N.E.2d 180, we held that Master and Nix were not entitled to the requested writ.  
However, we ordered the city to submit the subject records for review under seal 
to permit us to determine the applicability of the uncharged-suspects exception of 
Ohio’s Public Records Act.  Id. 
{¶23} Thereafter, in State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d 340, 342, 667 N.E.2d 974, we examined the records submitted by the city 
and, for the limited purpose of that case, observed that “some person or persons 
purposely intercepted and recorded * * * Nix and Master’s cordless telephone 
conversations through the use of some interception device.  The foregoing 
constitutes a violation of R.C. 2933.52(A).”  We concluded, however, that the 
records were exempt from disclosure under the work-product, uncharged-suspect, 
and other-law provisions of Ohio’s public records laws.  We also concluded that 
“[t]he records do not indicate any policy cover-up or fictitious investigation, as 
relators have alleged.  Instead, the sealed investigatory file indicates a thorough 
investigation by law enforcement officials.”  Id. at 343-344, 667 N.E.2d 974. 
{¶24} On December 19, 1995, respondent filed still another suit for Nix, 
this time against Nancy Schuster and Schuster & Simmons Co., L.P.A., Sazima’s 
attorneys in the first malpractice case.  This complaint alleged, among other 
claims, that Schuster had violated state and federal wiretapping laws during that 
proceeding.  As to the disposition of this case, the stipulations before the panel 
indicate only that “[t]he case was removed to federal court, remanded to the state 
court, and refiled on June 24, 1996 [with a different case number].  The trial court 
denied two dispositive motions as to one cause of action filed by Schuster and 
then, on the morning of trial, granted a defense motion in limine which resulted in 
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice by respondent.” 
{¶25} In August 1997, again for Nix, respondent filed a second public 
records request asking for voluminous materials pertaining to the wiretapping and 
January Term, 2003 
9 
to O’Malley that were alleged to be in the city of Cleveland’s possession.  After 
the city responded to the request, respondent filed another writ of mandamus in 
this court.  Concluding that the requests for records were largely meritless, we 
noted that the requests were moot insofar as they requested access to records 
already provided, that some of the requested records were subject to the attorney-
client privilege, and that the other records were exempt from disclosure as trial-
preparation records.  State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 
N.E.2d 12. 
{¶26} In December 1998, respondent filed a lawsuit on Nix’s behalf 
against O’Malley, Weston Hurd, and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and 
its counsel.  This complaint asserted claims of civil conspiracy to conceal criminal 
conduct, conspiracy to defraud Nix, a state RICO claim, and legal malpractice as 
to one of the insurance company’s attorneys.  In particular, the lawsuit alleged 
that newly discovered evidence revealed that O’Malley had made false statements 
in his affidavits and prior statements; that O’Malley was involved in the 
wiretapping; and that Nationwide and its counsel had assisted O’Malley and 
Weston Hurd in concealing evidence of O’Malley’s involvement in the 
wiretapping.  The trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants in this case was also affirmed on appeal.  Nix v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co.  (Mar. 27, 2000), Stark App. No. 1999CA00176. 
{¶27} Then, on February 3, 1999, after a long delay and a series of 
hearings commencing on July 6, 1998, the trial court granted Sazima’s motion for 
sanctions in the amount of $78,504.71.  According to the trial court’s decision, the 
amount represented Sazima’s legal fees incurred in the first malpractice case and 
in prosecuting her frivolous-conduct action.  The trial court held that respondent, 
respondent’s law practice, Nix in his individual capacity, Master’s estate, and Nix 
as executor were jointly and severally responsible for paying Sazima’s award. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶28} Before Sazima was granted attorney fees, respondent sued the trial 
court itself.  In the Eighth District Court of Appeals, respondent requested a writ 
of mandamus and/or prohibition to prevent the judge from hearing the motion for 
sanctions.  Rejecting respondent’s request, the court of appeals held that 
respondent and Nix had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
See State ex rel. Nix v. Curran (Sept. 23, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 75261, 1998 
WL 685384. 
{¶29} While the trial court was considering Sazima’s motion for 
sanctions, respondent filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice against the trial 
judge.  This court rejected respondent’s allegations of bias and declined any 
disqualification.  Master v. Chalko (Oct. 31, 1998), Supreme Court of Ohio No. 
98-AP-125. 
{¶30} Undeterred, respondent and Nix appealed from the ordered 
sanctions and determination that they had violated R.C. 2323.51.  The court of 
appeals affirmed, concluding that respondent, in particular, had exhibited 
“extreme bad faith,” had “improperly directly contacted [Sazima’s] insurers in an 
attempt to deprive her of coverage” to try to intimidate and harass her, had 
“pursued litigation against [Sazima] in an abusive and vexatious manner,” and 
had gone “far beyond” zealous advocacy.  Master v. Chalko (May 11, 2000), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 75973, 2000 WL 573200.  We dismissed sua sponte 
respondent’s request for discretionary review.  Master v. Chalko (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 1428, 736 N.E.2d 25. 
{¶31} The panel incorporated information from the following stipulations 
as part of its findings: 
{¶32} “52.  During the course of litigation that respondent filed on behalf 
of [Master and Nix], respondent telephoned and/or wrote to insurance companies 
in order to persuade potential insurers against affording Sazima, O’Malley, and 
January Term, 2003 
11 
others a defense and/or indemnity protection.  Respondent also asked that Sazima 
be forced to repay her insurers for any legal sums expended in her defense. 
{¶33} “53.  During the course of the litigation that respondent filed on 
behalf of [Master and Nix], respondent took numerous depositions of parties and 
witnesses.  At the depositions, respondent asked questions designed to elicit 
answers constituting inadmissible evidence.  As the lawsuits progressed, 
respondent’s conduct made it necessary for the parties to conduct depositions in 
the presence of a magistrate or judge. 
{¶34} “54.  On more than one occasion, respondent asked Cuyahoga 
County and city of Cleveland prosecutors to file criminal charges against 
opposing counsel. * * * 
{¶35} “55.  Respondent accused Sazima of being a corrupt police officer 
in a written communication to the Civil Service Commission. 
{¶36} “56.  After he sued Attorney Nancy Schuster, respondent made 
several attempts to deny her malpractice coverage. 
{¶37} “57.  [Respondent filed] approximately 20 state and federal 
lawsuits instituted * * * against various parties, including Sazima and arising out 
of Nix’s relationship with [Master]. 
{¶38} “58.  Sazima, O’Malley, Sword and others were forced to expend 
inordinate time, money, and effort to defend against the allegations. 
{¶39} “59.  No one has been charged with a crime in connection with the 
wiretapping allegations set forth by respondent on behalf of Nix, [Master], and 
others. 
{¶40} “60.  The FBI completed its investigation * * * in connection with 
the bearer bonds that originally belonged to [Master’s wife].  Evidence compiled 
by the FBI was presented to an Assistant United States Attorney.  [No one was] 
charged with a crime in connection with the bearer bonds.  [The FBI was able to 
recover approximately half of the bearer bonds at issue.] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
{¶41} “61.  In or about July 2000, all of the then-pending lawsuits filed 
by respondent on behalf of Nix and others as well as those filed by Nix, pro se, 
were dismissed under the terms of a global settlement agreement.  Under the 
terms of the global settlement agreement, approximately 12 defendants including 
but not limited to Weston, Hurd; O’Malley; * * * and Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co., agreed to pay $61,000 to Sazima to satisfy respondent’s and, Nix’s 
sanction award and to relinquish all claims they may have against inter alia 
respondent and Nix arising out of the wiretap litigation.  In exchange, respondent 
agreed to dismiss with prejudice all pending claims against the defendants.” 
{¶42} The panel found that respondent’s conduct at issue in these 
proceedings violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely 
reflects on an attorney’s fitness to practice law), 7-102(A)(1) (taking legal action 
during representation that obviously serves to harass or maliciously injure 
another), 7-102(A)(2) (advancing a claim or defense that the attorney cannot in 
good faith assert is warranted under existing law, or the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law), 7-106(C)(1) (while before a tribunal, stating or 
alluding to a matter that is not reasonably considered relevant or supportable by 
admissible evidence), and 7-106(C)(2) (while before a tribunal, asking a question 
that is not reasonably considered relevant and is designed to degrade another). 
{¶43} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel 
observed that respondent has been practicing law for 27 years without a previous 
disciplinary infraction.  The panel also considered testimony that respondent has 
an established reputation for dedication and competence, particularly in real estate 
law.  According to witnesses, respondent is considered by many in the legal 
community to be an extremely zealous and passionate advocate, having a history 
of representing clients in seemingly unpopular causes or where the clients’ 
success appeared unlikely.  This dedication was graphically manifested by 
January Term, 2003 
13 
respondent’s having personally expended at least $225,000 of the $350,000 
needed to fund the litigation underlying the charged misconduct.  However, 
because respondent had “crossed the line” between zealous, but principled, 
advocacy and the zealousness that “comes from personalizing the litigation,” the 
panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 
one-year, with six months of this period stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶44} In objecting to the board’s report, respondent concedes that he 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 7-102(A)(1), and 7-106(C)(2), but insists that he did not 
violate DR 1-102(A)(6), 7-102(A)(2), and 7-106(C)(1). 
{¶45} As to the violation of DR 7-102(A)(2), we decline to find 
specifically unethical what respondent insists is creative precedent and argument 
to advance his clients’ causes.  It is true that various courts, including this one, 
have found his claims meritless and, at times, frustratingly repetitious.  However, 
those findings do not necessarily mean that the arguments are so far-fetched that 
professional discipline is in order.  Attorneys must be given rein to experiment in 
groundbreaking legal pursuits, and here, respondent researched and supplied 
precedent (however tenuous) for his controversial claims.  We will not foreclose 
the assertion of novel legal theories through the disciplinary process unless they 
are absolutely specious.  The alleged violation of DR 7-102(A)(2), therefore, is 
dismissed. 
{¶46} However, we agree that respondent “crossed the line” and thereby 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), and 7-102(A)(1).  Respondent’s 
representation in the underlying cases became a personal crusade no longer driven 
by his clients’ interests.  Even respondent realizes now that he lost his objectivity.  
Thus, despite respondent’s explanations for the claims and arguments he 
advanced throughout this ordeal and his assurance that he only sought justice for 
his clients, we view respondent’s “zeal” as blind determination to ruin those he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
seemed to consider his clients’ oppressors.  Drawing the same conclusion, the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals declared respondent “an obnoxious litigator bent 
on abusing the courts to further an illegitimate agenda.”  Master v. Chalko (May 
11, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75973, 2000 WL 573200.  That court provided 
these samples of his work when discussing his treatment of Sazima: 
{¶47} “Despite the fact that Mr. Nix and his attorneys have filed in 
excess of 20 lawsuits against an array of defendants arising out of the same series 
of transactions, and have accused literally dozens of people, including prominent 
public officials, of being involved in intricate and high-level conspiracies to loot 
the modest assets of the respective Masters’ estates, they have repeatedly been 
stymied in their efforts to obtain judgments on these claims as they inevitably 
prove to be meritless after the courts are able to sift through the sensational 
allegations and examine the evidence.  See Master v. Sword (Nov. 9, 1995), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 68297; Master v. O’Malley (Apr. 4, 1996), Cuyahoga App. 
No. 68895; Master v. Chalko (June 5, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70527; Nix v. 
Chalko (Feb. 19, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72023; State v. Curran (Sept. 23, 
1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 75261. 
{¶48} “The record is replete with evidence of malicious intent on the part 
of the appellants [respondent and Nix] during their pursuit of the instant litigation 
against the appellee [Sazima] so as to justify the imposition of sanctions under 
R.C. 2323.51.  In a transparent effort to professionally embarrass the appellee, a 
Cleveland police officer, the appellants attempted to depose representatives of the 
Cleveland Police Department, the Civil Service Commission, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.  Additionally, the appellants sought to depose [several 
high-ranking Cleveland officials, including the mayor].  There was not a shred of 
evidence presented at the sanctions hearing by the appellants which tended to 
indicate that any of these officials possessed any information that was in any 
manner relevant to the claims brought against the appellee.  The appellants, in 
January Term, 2003 
15 
furtherance of their character assassination objectives, chose to write a letter to 
the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor stating that the appellee was a ‘dirty cop’ and 
asking that she be criminally investigated.  The appellants even filed a motion 
with the trial court asking that there be a ‘referral’ to the county prosecutor for the 
purposes of a criminal investigation.  Once again, the appellants failed, 
throughout the entire course of this litigation, to either substantiate these charges 
or to demonstrate their relevance to the proceedings.”  Master v. Chalko (May 
11,2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75973, 2000 WL 573200. 
{¶49} We also agree that respondent violated the two remaining 
Disciplinary Rules addressed by the panel, DR 7-106(C)(1) and (2).  Respondent 
does not contest that he at times posed irrelevant and disparaging questions, 
contrary to DR 7-106(C)(2).  Moreover, the parties stipulated, in effect, that at 
some point while representing Master and Nix, respondent so persistently asked 
for inadmissible information that further depositions required court supervision.  
Furthermore, we have before for us the transcripts from the hearing on Sazima’s 
motion for sanctions, and they contain numerous examples of respondent’s 
inappropriate inquiries. 
{¶50} Respondent also argues that an actual suspension of any period is 
too severe in light of the mitigating factors and absence of many aggravating 
concerns.  See Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline.  He also urges us to temper our disposition for the reason that his over-
the-top zeal in the underlying proceedings was provoked by unique circumstances 
unlikely to recur.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 97 Ohio St.3d 500, 2002-
Ohio-6729, 780 N.E.2d 586, ¶ 14.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 501, 684 N.E.2d 36, however, we suspended an attorney’s license for 
six months because he exceeded the bounds of zealous advocacy while 
representing himself in a custody dispute.  Legal wrangling of the proportion in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
which respondent engaged requires a similar disciplinary sanction for the public’s 
protection. 
{¶51} Accordingly, a suspension of one year, with six months stayed, is 
appropriate.  Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in Ohio 
for one year, but six months of this sanction are stayed on the condition that he 
commit no further misconduct during that period.  If respondent violates the 
condition of this stay, the stay will be lifted and respondent will serve the entire 
one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., L.P.A., Larry W. Zukerman and S. 
Michael Lear, for respondent. 
__________________