Case Title: DONALD ALICK CROSS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0066

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONALD ALICK CROSS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 154221 P.3d 972Case Number: S-09-0066Decided: 12/17/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DONALD 
ALICK CROSS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
D. Domonkos of Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh & Jardine, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin Daraie, 
Prosecution Assistance Clinic Student Director and Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Daraie.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      
This 
is an appeal from several related convictions for forgery and uttering a 
forgery.  The appellant contends 
that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, and that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview a potential 
witness.  Finding no error below, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion by denying the appellant's motion for a new 
trial?

 
 
            
2.   Was the appellant's 
trial counsel ineffective for failing to interview a potential 
witness?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2003, the 
appellant recorded in the records of the county clerk four 
instruments assigning certain overriding royalty interests to his 
daughter's corporation.  The 
instruments purported to have been signed and notarized in 2000.  Shortly after recording the instruments, 
the appellant "took bankruptcy," and he did not list the overriding royalty 
interests as assets of the bankruptcy estate.  Trial testimony revealed that, at the 
appellant's direction, the instruments actually were signed and notarized in 
2003, but backdated to 2000. Trial testimony also revealed that, had the 
instruments shown the correct transfer date in 2003, they would have been 
considered by the bankruptcy court to be prohibited inter-family transfers, and 
would have been "reversed," with the property rights brought into the bankruptcy 
estate.

 
 
[¶4]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-602(a) (LexisNexis 2009), under which the appellant was criminally charged, 
reads in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(a)   A person is guilty of forgery if, 
with intent to defraud, he:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(ii)      Makes, completes, 
executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to 
be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or 
to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; 
or

 
 
(iii)     Utters any writing 
which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in paragraphs (i) or (ii) of 
this subsection.

 
 
[¶5]      After judgment 
was entered, but before sentencing, the appellant filed in the district court a 
Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence.  In that regard, W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) provides 
in pertinent part that "[t]he court on motion of a defendant may grant a new 
trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice."  The appellant's alleged newly discovered 
evidence was the testimony of Wayne Agner, a former employee of the appellant, 
who would testify that in 2000 he drafted and the appellant signed the 
overriding royalty interest assignments, and that he recreated them for the 
appellant's signature in 2003 when he could not locate the originals.  It is the appellant's theory that this 
testimony "exonerates" him because the jury would not have found that he had an 
intent to defraud in 2003 if it had known that he originally signed the 
assignments in 2000.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion for a 
new trial?

 
 
[¶6]      Our standard for 
the review of the denial of a motion for a new trial is as 
follows:

 
 
            
The question of whether to grant or deny a new trial motion is a matter 
for the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not 
be reversed without a showing of abuse of that discretion.  Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 
(Wyo. 2000).  A trial court abuses 
its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did.  Id.  In this context, "reasonably" means 
"sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'"  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

 
 

Robinson 
v. State, 
2003 WY 32, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 743, 748 (Wyo. 2003); see also Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, ¶ 
30, 187 P.3d 877, 883 (Wyo. 2008).  
Where the motion is based upon alleged newly discovered evidence, the 
"interest of justice" requires that the appellant prove the 
following:

 
 
1.   He did not become aware of the new 
evidence until after the trial.

 
 
2.   It was not because of lack of due 
diligence that the new evidence did not come to light 
sooner.

 
 
3.   The evidence is so material that it 
would probably produce a different result.

 
 
4.   The evidence is not 
cumulative.

 
 

Robinson, 
2003 WY 32, ¶ 20, 64 P.3d  at 748-49.

 
 
[¶7]      In denying the 
motion, the district court concluded both that the appellant had not proven the 
exercise of due diligence, and that the evidence was not so material that it 
would have had any effect on the trial.  We agree as to both conclusions.  The record is clear that both the 
appellant and his attorney were aware of Mr. Agner before trial, and that the 
appellant specifically knew of Agner's creation of the instruments, both in 2003 
and, allegedly, in 2000.  The 
appellant testified at the motion hearing that his attorney did not subpoena 
Agner to testify at trial, either because the State had already done so, or 
because Agner was out-of-state and could not be subpoenaed.  He did not testify that they did not 
subpoena Agner because they did not know that he could or should be a witness. 
They failed to exercise due diligence.

 
 
[¶8]      Perhaps more 
importantly, we also agree with the district court on the more substantive issue 
of whether the evidence was so material that it likely would have changed the 
result of the trial.  The district 
court thought not.  The gist of 
Agner's testimony was that, sometime in 2003 when the appellant's bankruptcy had 
not yet been filed but was being considered, the appellant contacted Agner and 
asked him for the assignments.  
Agner testified that, when he could not find the assignments, he simply 
created new ones and gave them to the appellant for signature.  Agner claimed to know nothing about the 
signature, notarization, or backdating of the assignments, other than that they 
were blank when he gave them to the appellant, and that the appellant returned 
them to him to give to a secretary for notarization.

 
 
[¶9]      There are several 
reasons that Agner's testimony is not likely to have affected the outcome of the 
trial.  First, Agner's memory was 
sketchy, at best, and selective, at worst.  
Second, his testimony certainly did not "exonerate" the appellant; 
instead, it corroborated the State's theory that, just prior to declaring 
bankruptcy, the appellant went to extraordinary lengths to get the overriding 
royalty interests out of his name and into his daughter's.  Third, Agner's shaky and self-serving 
testimony directly contradicted the precise testimony of the notary public, 
given initially against her penal interest, that the appellant brought the 
assignments to her and asked her to backdate them.1  And finally, the State produced 
considerable evidence to corroborate the notary public's version of what had 
happened, while Agner's testimony was riddled with "I don't know" and "I don't 
remember" answers.  It was not an 
abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the new trial 
motion.

 
 
Was 
the appellant's trial counsel ineffective for failing to interview a potential 
witness?

 
 
[¶10]   When reviewing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, we invoke a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered effective assistance, and we do not reverse unless counsel's 
performance so undermined the adversarial process that the results of the trial 
cannot be trusted.  Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 25, 184 P.3d 687, 695 (Wyo. 2008).  The appellant 
must prove both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that prejudice 
resulted.  Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 3, 201 P.3d 434, 436 (Wyo. 2009).  In the 
instant case, the appellant's argument in this regard must fail because it is 
premised upon his first argument.  
He alleges that his trial attorney was ineffective because he did not 
adequately investigate the case and did not call Mr. Agner as a witness.  Inasmuch as we have already concluded 
that, at best, Agner would have been a neutral witness, we cannot conclude that 
defense counsel's failure or decision not to call him as a witness exhibited 
deficient performance, or that the appellant was prejudiced thereby.  Not only was Agner's testimony evasive 
and not particularly helpful to the appellant, Agner also admitted on the stand 
that he had for some time gone by a different name because  he "was on the run from the law."  The record reflects a witness who 
patently was not credible, and whose version of events was not particularly 
helpful to the appellant.  Counsel 
did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to call him as a witness.2

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial.  The identity of Mr. Agner and his 
potential as a witness was not newly discovered, but was known to the appellant 
and his attorney before trial.  
Beyond that, the appellant was not prejudiced by Agner's absence from the 
trial, given the highly questionable value of his testimony in the formation or 
corroboration of a defense.  For the 
same reasons, counsel was not ineffective in failing to call Agner as a 
witness.  If anything, Agner would 
have corroborated the State's theory that the appellant produced the backdated 
documents to get the assigned interests out of his bankruptcy 
estate.

 
 
[¶12]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
notary public was charged with four misdemeanors for her part in the 
notarization of the assignments, which misdemeanor charges were dismissed in 
exchange for her agreement to testify truthfully at the appellant's trial.  It is significant that she admitted her 
role quite some time before entering into the agreement with the 
State.

 
 

2The 
appellant makes unfounded accusations that defense counsel was ineffective 
largely because he was suffering from a conflict of interest caused by the fact 
that he was running for public office during the time that he represented the 
appellant.  This allegation is 
unsubstantiated by the presentation of any facts, so we will disregard 
it.