Case Title: State Ex Rel. Herman v. Schaffer

Citation: 105 Ariz. 478, 467 P.2d 66

Docket Number: 9836-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1970-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
105 Ariz. 478 (1970) 467 P.2d 66 STATE of Arizona ex rel. Justin HERMAN, Director, Arizona Highway Department, Appellant, v. Enos P. SCHAFFER, as his sole and separate property, et al., Appellees. No. 9836-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. March 26, 1970. Rehearing Denied April 28, 1970. *479 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrel F. Smith, former Atty. Gen., William Kimble, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Dunseath, Stubbs & Burch, by Robert C. Stubbs, Hirsch, Van Slyke & Ollason, by Gerald B. Hirsch, Tucson, for appellees. McFARLAND, Justice: The State of Arizona filed this action in eminent domain against seventeen parcels of land located along Interstate Highway 10, formerly known as the Casa Grande Highway, U.S. 80, in the Jane's Station area northwest of Tucson. All of the properties abutted both sides of the highway along a one-and-one-quarter-mile strip between Sunset Road and Ruthrauff Road. Prior to its conversion to a limited-access highway, U.S. 80 was a divided road with certain designated crossovers. Along the one-and-one-quarter-mile strip in question there were seven such crossovers put in by the State in accordance with an agreement with the property owners, made at the time the State acquired the right of way. Thus all of the properties had direct access to both the northbound and southbound lanes of traffic. Interstate 10 was constructed entirely within the existing right of way so that it was not necessary to take any land. However, the crossovers were eliminated, and a fence was constructed along the sides of the highway, thereby eliminating the property owners' direct access to the mainstream of traffic. But the State constructed two-way frontage roads on either side of the highway, on which roads all of the properties abutted. The ramps connecting to the frontage roads were located about a half mile to the north and south of the subject properties. Thus, for example, a motorist proceeding north towards Phoenix would leave the main highway approximately 2,000 feet south of Ruthrauff Road via a ramp, straight ahead to the easterly frontage road. If he sought to visit one of the businesses on the other side, or westerly side, of the highway he would turn left on Ruthrauff Road, pass under the highway and turn right directly onto the frontage road. Because both frontage roads are two way, a traveller need not retrace his steps to return to the main highway, but can continue in the same direction to rejoin the mainstream of traffic. Again, for example, the motorist travelling north towards Phoenix can, after stopping at one of the properties involved, continue in the same direction some 2,000 feet to Sunset Road and rejoin the mainstream of traffic. On March 29, 1965, the trial court ordered that the issues raised by the State's claim for declaratory relief be tried separately with the issue of damages to abide *480 the decision. The State's claim was tried to the court on December 21, 1965, and, on March 8, 1966, the court rendered its decision that the State's action in limiting access to the properties constituted a taking of private property, and was compensable. A jury trial to determine damages was ordered. On March 18, 1966, two defendants, owning four parcels of land, moved to sever their action from the others, and on April 28, 1966, the court granted the motion and fixed October 3, 1966, as the date of trial. On March 22, 1966, the remaining defendants moved for separate trials, which was denied on April 28, 1966, and November 14, 1966, was set as the trial date. On October 17, 1966, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the State and against the first two of the defendants. On February 3, 1967, after 34 days of trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the State and against the defendants, Schaffer, Megna, Lewis, Honnas, Runnels, Davis, Stroh, Eicholtz, and Hague (Tucson Truck Service). It also returned verdicts in favor of Vick in the amount of $8,000; Soloman in the amount of $10,000; Davis in the amount of $8,000, and Hague (Hague Truck Stop) in the amount of $10,000. Subsequently, all the parties involved filed motions directed to the verdict and judgment, including motions for a new trial by the defendants. The State moved for judgment N.O.V., which was denied. The motions by the defendants, Arizona Land Title & Trust Company and Jeter were denied by Judge Garrett. Subsequently, Judge Collins granted the motion for a new trial for the remaining defendants on the following grounds: The motion referred to in number 6 was the motion of March 22, 1966, which Judge Garrett denied on April 28, 1966. The State appeals from this order, and from the order denying its Motion for Judgment N.O.V. We take the latter question first. It is the State's position that controlling direct access to an interstate highway is an exercise of its police power, not eminent domain, and is not a taking of property so as to be compensable. A limited access highway has been defined as follows: There is no argument that the State has the authority to limit access in the construction of such a highway. The problem arises as to whether such action is compensable, and there is a great diversity of opinion among the courts of the several States. There are two areas, however, where there is more agreement between the courts. Where a limited-access highway is constructed on a new location as contrasted with using the existing right of way neither the new abutting owners nor the ones abutting on the former highway, which becomes a service road, are entitled to compensation. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988; Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404. Also, there is generally more agreement that compensation is due where the limitation amounts to a complete destruction of the abutter's practical access. See e.g.: Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259; Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208, 71 N.W.2d 276. It is in the latter area that the basis for a solution to the problem may be found if we add to the requirement of "complete destruction" the added condition that the ingress and egress to the limited-access highway as provided by a frontage road be not so circuitous as to be unreasonable. We hold in agreement with the ever-increasing trend of authority that direct access to a highway is not a private property right within the contemplation of Article 2, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S., which provides, in part: We incline towards the reasoning expressed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Brock v. State Highway Commission, 195 Kan. 361, 404 P.2d 934: See also Ray v. State Highway Commission, 196 Kan. 13, 410 P.2d 278, cert. den. 385 U.S. 820, 87 S. Ct. 43, 17 L. Ed. 2d 57; Carazalla v. State of Wisconsin, supra; State v. Jordan, 247 Ind. 361, 215 N.E.2d 32; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Meier (Mo.) 388 S.W.2d 855, cert. den. Mohr v. State Highway Comm., 382 U.S. 846, 86 S. Ct. 79, 15 L. Ed. 2d 86; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Brockfeld (Mo.) 395 S.W.2d 232; McKenna v. State Highway Commission, 28 Wis.2d 179, 135 N.W.2d 827. It is generally conceded that regulation of traffic on highways and roads falls under the police power of a State. Under this heading comes restricting traffic to one-way travel, regulating parking, limiting size, weight and type of vehicles, proscribing speed limits, building highway dividers and prohibiting left turns. In *483 Rayburn v. State ex rel. Willey, 93 Ariz. 54, 378 P.2d 496, we said: See also, Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165. It is equally well-established that an abutting owner has no vested interest in the unobstructed and unchanging flow of traffic in front of his premises. Rayburn v. State ex rel. Willey, supra. In State v. Meier, supra, the court stated: We fail to perceive any difference in principle between the foregoing situations and one where the State, in the interest of the public, regulates high-speed traffic by limiting access. This was well expressed in a concurring opinion in Ray v. State Highway Commission, supra, 410 P.2d at 287: Justice Fatzer, in this concurring opinion, summarized what we conclude to be the better-reasoned authority, as follows: Ordinarily, whether the ingress and egress provided by the frontage road is reasonable is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact in the first instance, Hendrickson v. State, supra. However, "when it can be said that reasonable minds could not differ * * * the question becomes one of law for the court to decide * * *." Brock v. State Highway Commission, supra, 404 P.2d at 945 (concurring opinion). Hendrickson v. State, supra, 127 N.W.2d at 172. The defendants cite our recent decision in State ex rel. Herman v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760, as controlling authority in favor of their position. We disagree. Wilson did not involve a frontage road as the majority pointed out: In fact, Wilson was decided on the same principle which pervades many of the authorities which we have cited here; that the ingress and egress after conversion of the highway must not be "unreasonably circuitous." The question of fact as to whether the ingress or egress is reasonable is one on which members of the court may differ, as in Wilson, supra. In the event the trier of fact determines that the ingress and egress is unreasonable, the measure of damages "is the difference between the market value of the abutting property immediately before and immediately after the destruction or impairment thereof." State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, supra; Hendrickson v. State, supra. In the Hendrickson case the court set forth the commonly-accepted rule for damages: Read in conjunction with the foregoing, particularly as to the limited use of evidence of lost business, the majority and dissenting opinions in Wilson, supra, can be harmonized. In the majority, it was stated: The minority stated: This statement, with that of the majority, was more in the nature of further explanation. Thus, the court may cautiously permit the introduction of evidence of loss of business in order to show "a diminution in the highest and best use of the property," but the damages should not reflect such "non-compensable factors," as set forth in Hendrickson, supra. We hold that under the principles of law, set forth herein, relating to the standards of reasonable ingress and egress, the frontage road provided by the State for the benefit of these defendants was not unreasonably circuitous. Therefore, the limitation of access is not compensable. However, a contractual element is injected into this case. The defendants claim, and the State concedes, that the consideration for the original taking of land for the Casa Grande Highway in 1950 included agreement by the State that it would install and maintain seven crossovers for the benefit of the abutting properties. They further claim that the elimination of these crossovers constitutes a breach of this agreement, which would be a matter quite distinct from limiting access under the police power. Assuredly, the police power does not give the State authority to make and breach contracts with impunity. If the State considers it advantageous to agree to construct and maintain crossovers at the time of taking land as part of the consideration rather than pay the full and just compensation in money, it should not subsequently complain that it is being held to this agreement or to responding in damages for the breach thereof. In State ex rel. Herman v. Tucson Title Insurance Company, 101 Ariz. 415, 420 P.2d 286, we said: It is no less a breach of agreement to fail to maintain crossovers than to fail to construct an interchange. In apparent anticipation, the State in its brief claims: Such a rule of retroactive damages would allow the State to speculate in land values to the detriment of the property owners. We therefore hold that, as a matter of law, *487 the State breached its agreement and the measure of damages, if any, should be computed, in accordance with the rule we have set forth herein, at the time that the breach occurred. In view of our disposition of this matter, it is unnecessary to consider the appellant's contention that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a new trial. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The order of the Superior Court is set aside. The judgments of the Superior Court are reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and HAYS, JJ., concur.