Case Title: W.R. Meriwether, Factors and Drayage, LLC v. Pike Road Volunteer Fire Protection Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180330

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: June 14, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
_________________________
1180330
_________________________
W.R. Meriwether, Factors and Drayage, LLC, and Gregory P.
Thompson
v.
Pike Road Volunteer Fire Protection Authority, a
corporation, et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-18-901961)
SELLERS, Justice.
A limited liability company, W.R. Meriwether, Factors and
Drayage, LLC ("Meriwether"), and Gregory P. Thompson appeal
from adverse judgments entered by 
the 
Montgomery Circuit Court
1180330
in Meriwether and Thompson's action against the Pike Road
Volunteer Fire Protection Authority, a corporation ("the Fire
Authority"), and other defendants.  We reverse the trial
court's 
judgments 
and 
remand 
the 
cause 
for 
further
proceedings.
Meriwether and Thompson each own parcels of real property
that adjoin a 10-acre piece of property owned by the Fire
Authority.  All three parcels are located in the Town of Pike
Road ("Pike Road").  Pursuant to a Pike Road zoning ordinance,
the parcels are located in an area zoned for "low density,
single-family residential development."  Materials submitted
to the trial court indicate that the Fire Authority plans to
build a fire station on its 10-acre parcel.1
Meriwether and Thompson sued the Fire Authority and Pike
Road, along with the members of the Fire Authority's board of
directors, the Pike Road Planning Commission, the chairman of
the Planning Commission, and the Pike Road planning director. 
In their complaint, Meriwether and Thompson sought a judgment
declaring that the Fire Authority is subject to the referenced
1There is some suggestion in the record that the Fire
Authority plans also to construct a firefighter-training
facility on the parcel.
2
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zoning ordinance and that constructing a fire station on its
property would be a violation of that ordinance.
Pike Road, the Pike Road planning director, the Pike Road
Planning Commission, and the chairman of the planning
commission answered Meriwether and Thompson's complaint and,
thereafter, filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. 
The other defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action. 
Each of the defendants argued, among other things, that the
Fire Authority is exempt from the Pike Road zoning ordinance. 
The trial court agreed and granted both motions, entering
separate judgments dismissing the action.  This appeal
followed.
In 2007, this Court stated:
"It was once 'well settled that city zoning
ordinances [did] not apply to the operation of a
governmental function by a governing body, as
opposed to a proprietary function.' Lane v. Zoning
Bd. of Talladega, 669 So. 2d 958, 959 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995) .... See City of Birmingham v. Scogin,
269 Ala. 679, 690, 115 So. 2d 505, 514 (1959) ('The
Alabama cases have long held that zoning does not
apply to the operation of a governmental function by
a municipality.'); Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ. v.
Alexander, 269 Ala. 79, 86, 110 So. 2d 911, 918
(1959) ('If a city engaged in a governmental
function 
is 
not 
subject 
to 
its 
own 
zoning
regulations, certainly a county engaged in a
governmental function is not subject to a city's
zoning regulations.'); Water Works Bd. of Birmingham
3
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v. Stephens, 262 Ala. 203, 78 So. 2d 267 (1955);
Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. City of
Birmingham, 253 Ala. 402, 44 So. 2d 593 (1950)."
City of Selma v. Dallas Cty., 964 So. 2d 12, 16 (Ala. 2007)
(emphasis omitted).  According to the Court in City of Selma,
the exemption from zoning regulation for the operation of a
governmental function by a governing body remains intact:
"[N]either the judiciary nor the legislature has heretofore
manifested an intent to abrogate the immunity from zoning
ordinances that has long been afforded to political
subdivisions 
in 
the 
operation 
of 
their 
governmental
functions."  964 So. 2d at 19 (emphasis omitted).  The
question in the present case is whether the Fire Authority
qualifies as a "governing body" or a "political subdivision"
that, if engaged in governmental functions, is exempt from
zoning ordinances.  City of Selma, 964 So. 2d at 16, 19.  We
apply a de novo standard of review to that question of law. 
See Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342
(Ala. 2004) (de novo standard applies where there are no
factual disputes and the issue to be resolved is one of law).2
2Several exhibits were submitted in support of, and in
opposition to, the motion to dismiss and the motion for a
judgment on the pleadings.  Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
provides that, if matters outside the pleadings are presented
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According to the parties, the Fire Authority was duly
created pursuant to § 11-88-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which
allows for the creation of public corporations, known as
"authorities," to provide water, sewer, or fire-protection
services.3  The materials submitted to the trial court indicate
that, with the approval of the Montgomery County Commission,
the Fire Authority was formed in 1992 by three resident owners
of property located in a then unincorporated area in
Montgomery County.  See § 11-88-3, Ala. Code 1975 (allowing
resident property owners desiring to create an 
authority under
with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and are
not excluded by the trial court, the motion is to be treated
as one for a summary judgment.  Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
provides a similar requirement with respect to a motion for a
judgment on the pleadings.  See also Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co.
of Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 350 (Ala. 2008) (noting
that, on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction that includes a challenge to the accuracy of the
facts set out in a complaint, a trial court can consider
"evidence beyond the face of the complaint").  The parties do
not provide significant discussion of these concepts.  It
appears that the facts necessary for resolution of this appeal
are undisputed and that the issue for this Court to consider
is one of law.
3Although § 11-88-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, does not
expressly refer to the creation of "volunteer" fire
authorities, the parties agree for purposes of this appeal
that volunteer fire authorities are included in the type of
public corporations that may be created pursuant to the
statutory scheme set out in § 11-88-1 et seq.
5
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Title 4, Chapter 88, to apply to "the governing body of that
county in which the area or areas to be served by the proposed
authority is located").4
The exemption from zoning regulation has been applied in
Alabama to the governmental functions of counties and
municipalities.  See City of Selma, 964 So. 2d at 19; Lane v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Talladega, 669 So. 2d 958, 959
(Ala. Civ. App. 1995); City of Birmingham v. Scogin, 269 Ala.
679, 690, 115 So. 2d 505, 514 (1959).  It also has been
applied to the governmental functions of county and city
boards of education.  Lauderdale Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.
Alexander, 269 Ala. 79, 86, 110 So. 2d 911, 917 (1959); Alves
v. Board of Educ. for Guntersville, 922 So. 2d 129, 133 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005).  Notably, county and city boards of education
have been described as "agencies of the state."  Enterprise
City Bd. of Educ. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 782, 783 (Ala. 1977).
4Neither Pike Road nor any Pike Road officials were
involved in the creation of the Fire Authority, and there is
no indication that they are currently involved in its
management or operations.  Rather, the record suggests that
Pike Road may have a contract with the Fire Authority,
pursuant to which the Fire Authority has agreed to provide
fire-protection services within Pike Road.
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We acknowledge that some of the reasoning set out in
Water Works Board of Birmingham v. Stephens, 262 Ala. 203,
208, 78 So. 2d 267, 272 (1955), might possibly be read to
suggest that a municipal waterworks board created pursuant to
§ 11-50-230 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, can be considered a
governing body or political subdivision for purposes of an
exemption from zoning regulation.  The Court in Stephens, in
discussing 
that 
exemption, described a 
waterworks 
board 
formed
under the predecessor to § 11-50-230 et seq. as "an agency of
the city" and stated that the board was "to be treated in the
same light as the city itself."  262 Ala. at 209, 78 So. 2d at
272.  Ultimately, however, the Court determined that the
waterworks board, in selling water services, was exercising a
proprietary function and therefore could not be exempt from
zoning laws.  It appears, however, that the Court's discussion
of the zoning exemption in Stephens was dicta.  We also note
that more recent precedent states that a waterworks board
formed under § 11-50-230 et seq. is "not a mere agency of the
[municipality it serves] but a public corporation entirely
separate and independent from [that municipality]."  Water
7
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Works Bd. of Arab v. City of Arab, 231 So. 3d 265, 272 (Ala.
2016).5
There is support for the appellees' assertion that the
Fire 
Authority's 
functions 
could 
be 
described 
as
"governmental" in nature.  For example, § 11-88-2, Ala. Code
1975, provides that § 11-88-1 et seq. "is intended to aid the
state in the execution of its duties."  Section 11-88-7(15),
Ala. Code 1975, gives authorities created therein the power of
eminent domain.  Section 11-88-15, Ala. Code 1975, expressly
declares the furnishing of fire-protection services by an
authority a governmental function for purposes of immunity
from tort liability.  See also State ex rel. Hyland v.
Baumhauer, 244 Ala. 1, 8, 12 So. 2d 326, 330 (1942) (not
involving 
the 
exemption 
from 
zoning 
regulation 
but
5We also acknowledge that this Court in City of Huntsville
v. Morring, 284 Ala. 678, 227 So. 2d 578 (1969), intimated
that a municipal medical-clinic board, formed under the
statutory scheme that is now codified at § 11-58-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975, might be exempt from zoning laws if it is
engaged in a governmental function.  That suggestion, however,
was included in dicta.  Finally, we acknowledge that the
Alabama Attorney General's Office has issued opinions stating
that certain entities are exempt from zoning regulation.  See,
e.g., Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-00446 (Sept. 27, 1989)
(involving a State university).  Those Attorney General
opinions, however, do not involve authorities created under §
11-88-1 et seq.
8
1180330
nevertheless 
stating 
that 
"[a] 
fire 
department, 
when 
organized
and functioning, is performing a governmental rather than a
proprietary function"); § 9-3-18, Ala. Code 1975 (stating that
volunteer fire departments are "public in nature, as they
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public"); Ala.
Const. 1901, Local Laws, Montgomery County § 5 ("[A]ll
volunteer fire departments ... are organizations that are
public in nature and serve to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of Montgomery County."); City of
Selma, 964 So. 2d at 19 (stating that governmental functions
include the promotion of public health and safety).  We are
not convinced, however, that, because the Fire Authority
engages in functions that can be described as traditionally
"governmental" in nature, the Fire Authority necessarily is a
governing body or political subdivision for purposes of the
exemption from the zoning ordinance.  Cf. Limestone Cty. Water
& Sewer Auth. v. City of Athens, 896 So. 2d 531, 537 (Ala.
Civ. 
App. 
2004) 
("Possessing 
certain 
powers 
normally
associated with the State does not necessarily make an entity
part of the State.").6
6The Court does not suggest or imply that fire-protection
authorities organized under § 11-88-1 et seq. can never be
9
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Authorities created pursuant to § 11-88-1 et seq. are
incorporated by natural persons.  See § 11-8-4, Ala. Code 1975
(providing 
that, 
after 
the 
appropriate county's 
governing 
body
approves an application by three or more residents who own
property in the area to be served, the applicants "shall
proceed to incorporate an authority by filing for record in
the office of the judge of probate of the determining county
a certificate of incorporation").  Although the members of the
Fire Authority's board of directors are chosen by the
Montgomery County Commission, they cannot be officers of the
state or of any county or municipality. § 11-88-6(c), Ala.
Code 1975.   Rather, they must be "duly qualified elector[s]
of [the] county [in which the Fire Authority's service area is
located] and shall be [residents] of and the owner[s] of real
engaged in "proprietary," as opposed to governmental,
functions for purposes of the exemption from zoning
regulation.  Meriwether and Thompson, however, do not point to
evidence indicating that the Fire Authority engages in
proprietary functions, nor do they develop a persuasive
argument on that issue.  As noted, it appears that the Fire
Authority, which was not created by Pike Road and is not a
department of Pike Road, has contracted with Pike Road to
provide fire-protection services within its municipal limits. 
Meriwether and Thompson have not persuasively argued that the
existence of that contract demonstrates that the Fire
Authority engages in a proprietary function with respect to
Pike Road, and the Court expresses no opinion on that issue.
10
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property in that part of the service area of the [Fire
Authority] which lies within that county."  § 11-88-6(d), Ala.
Code 1975.  Section 11-88-8, Ala. Code 1975, which recognizes
that authorities may issue bonds, provides that all such bonds
are solely the obligation of the authority "and shall not
create an obligation or debt of any county or municipality."
To be sure, § 11-88-2, Ala. Code 1975, describes
authorities as "instrumentalities of the state."  But in doing
so, it specifically provides that such authorities are
"independent" and have "full and adequate powers to fulfill
their functions."  In Limestone County Water & Sewer
Authority, 896 So. 2d at 535, the Court of Civil Appeals
considered § 11-88-2 and held that a water authority formed
under § 11-88-1 et seq. is an entity "independent" of the
State and should not be considered the equivalent of the
State.  As the Court of Civil Appeals acknowledged in
Limestone 
County, 
the 
term 
"independent instrumentality of 
the
state" is used several times throughout the Alabama Code in
describing certain entities.  896 So. 2d at 536.  The Court of
Civil Appeals concluded:
"Despite 
the 
prevalent 
use 
of 
the 
phrase
['independent instrumentality of the state'] with
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respect to public corporations, we have not been
referred to any case in which any of these public
corporations have been adjudicated to be the
equivalent of the State. In fact, as is apparent
from the cases cited [earlier in the opinion], the
courts have determined numerous times that public
corporations are not entities of the State."
896 So. 2d at 536.  Likewise, it does not appear that any of
the 
entities 
described 
in 
the 
Code 
as 
"independent
instrumentalities of the state" have been recognized by
Alabama appellate courts as the equivalent of the State or its
political subdivisions for purposes of exemption from zoning
regulation.7
It is noteworthy that statutory provisions expressly
exempt authorities created under Title 11, Chapter 88, from
laws other than zoning regulations.  Section 11-88-15, Ala.
Code 1975, exempts such authorities from tort liability for
acts committed by "any director, agent, servant, or employee
of the authority in the furnishing of fire protection service
7Pike Road points to Alves v. Board of Education for
Guntersville, 922 So. 2d 129, 133 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), in
which the Court of Civil Appeals used the term "public body"
in referring to entities that are exempt from zoning
regulation.  Alves, however, involved a city board of
education, not an "independent" authority formed under § 11-
88-1 et seq.  The court in Alves made a point to note that
city boards of education are "agencies of the state."  922 So.
2d at 133 n.3.
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or in the construction, maintenance, or operation of any fire
protection facility."  Sections 11-88-7.1(d) and (e) and 11-
88-16, Ala. Code 1975, exempt them from the payment of state
taxes and probate fees.  Section 11-88-17, Ala. Code 1975,
exempts them from restrictions imposed by usury laws. 
Although these provisions could lend support to the
proposition that authorities are engaged in activities that
might be described as governmental in nature, that does not,
as noted, necessarily make them bodies that are exempt from
zoning regulation.  Moreover, the existence of these express
statutory exemptions serves to highlight the fact that the
legislature, which knows how to exempt entities like the Fire
Authority from other areas of law, chose not to exempt them
from zoning regulation.  Given the significance of a blanket
exemption from zoning regulation, which results in the
unfettered use and development of property without regard to
a comprehensive land-use plan, the legislature would have, if
it intended to do so, specifically granted the exemption from
zoning regulation.  Absent a specific exemption from zoning
regulation, the Fire Authority must comply with the zoning
ordinance affecting the property it possesses. 
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 Zoning and other land-use regulations act to limit and
restrict the development of private property.  Because of the
importance of protecting property rights, restricting the use
of property or exempting property from existing zoning
restrictions requires a process that will preserve a property
owner's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his or her property
and simultaneously allow property owners the confidence and
assurance that neighbors will not develop their property for
an inconsistent or nonconforming use that could diminish the
value or use of other property.  Thus, zoning ordinances serve
the important purpose of facilitating the development of
property in a consistent, stable manner based on land-use
plans adopted by property owners for their mutual protection
and benefit.  The exemption from zoning regulation afforded
governing bodies should not be readily awarded.8
8The appellees cite several opinions holding that certain
public corporations are "governmental entities."  Some of
those opinions involved a statute that, for purposes of a
damages cap enjoyed by "governmental entities," expressly
defined that term to include "municipal or county public
corporations."  See § 11-93-1, Ala. Code 1975.  There is no
statute that specifically defines the Fire Authority as a body
that is exempt from zoning laws.  Likewise, citation to § 13A-
10-8, Ala. Code 1975, which criminalizes the making of a
knowingly false alarm to "an official or volunteer fire
department or any other governmental agency," does not
convince the Court that the legislature intended to make
14
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We conclude that the Fire Authority does not qualify as
a body entitled to an exemption from zoning regulation. 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgments and remand
the cause for further proceedings.  Because of our holding, we
pretermit consideration of Meriwether and Thompson's other
arguments in support of reversal.9
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
entities like the Fire Authority exempt from zoning
regulation.  Finally, we are not persuaded by citations to
judicial precedent and Alabama Attorney General opinions
involving the question whether certain public corporations,
including 
volunteer 
fire 
departments, 
are 
subject 
to
competitive-bidding laws, open-records laws, or open-meetings
laws.  Those rulings did not involve the exemption from zoning
regulation.
9The record indicates that the Fire Authority's existing
fire station may be located in the area that is zoned
residential.  That fire station, however, is not at issue in
this appeal.  The Fire Authority was created before Pike Road
was incorporated.  It is not entirely clear, but it appears
likely that the existing fire station also was constructed
before the incorporation of Pike Road and the adoption of the
relevant zoning ordinance.
15