Case Title: Lewis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 44/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rasherd Lewis v. State of Maryland, No. 44, September Term, 2019 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — ODOR OF MARIJUANA — PROBABLE CAUSE — 
SEARCH 
INCIDENT 
TO 
LAWFUL 
ARREST 
EXCEPTION 
— 
DECRIMINALIZATION OF LESS THAN TEN GRAMS OF MARIJUANA —  The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  For a warrantless arrest to be reasonable, there must be probable cause to believe 
that the arrestee committed a felony or was committing a felony or misdemeanor in the 
presence of a law enforcement officer.  Possession of less than ten grams of marijuana is 
neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but rather a civil offense.  In order to lawfully arrest 
someone for possession of marijuana, the law enforcement officer must have probable 
cause to believe the arrestee possesses a criminal amount of marijuana, i.e., ten grams or 
more.  A law enforcement officer cannot determine by the odor of marijuana alone the 
quantity of marijuana, if any, someone possesses.  Therefore, the mere odor of marijuana 
does not create probable cause to believe an arrestee possesses a criminal amount of that 
substance. 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City  
Case No. 417048006 
Argued:  January 9, 2020 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 44 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
RASHERD LEWIS 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
 
               JJ. 
 
 
 
                 Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Filed: July 27, 2020 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-07-27 14:09-04:00
 
In 2014, the General Assembly decriminalized the possession of less than ten grams 
of marijuana, making such possession a civil offense.  Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 
2012 Repl. Vol., 2014 Supp.), § 5-601(c)(2).  Since then, this Court has issued three 
opinions in three cases addressing the Fourth Amendment implications of such 
decriminalization: Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94 (2017), Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 174 (2017), and Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 (2019).  All three 
cases involved police officers’ actions in response to their knowledge or suspicion of either 
the presence or odor of marijuana.  The outcome of each, however, was dictated by the 
underlying facts and consideration of the pertinent exception(s) to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement.  See Robinson, 451 Md. at 125–35 (automobile exception); Norman, 
452 Md. at 411–13 (stop and frisk exception); Pacheco, 465 Md. at 321–23 (search incident 
to arrest and automobile exceptions). 
We here consider, and for the reasons that follow hold, that the odor of marijuana, 
without more, does not provide law enforcement officers with the requisite probable cause 
to arrest and perform a warrantless search of that person incident to the arrest. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
Rasherd Lewis, Petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of 
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun upon the court’s finding him guilty of that 
charge based on an agreed statement of facts.  That proceeding followed a hearing on 
Petitioner’s motion to suppress a handgun, marijuana, cash, and plastic baggies that the 
2 
 
police seized during a search of him at a convenience store in downtown Baltimore City 
on February 1, 2017. 
The Suppression Hearing 
Baltimore City Police Officer David Burch, Jr., was the sole witness to testify at the 
suppression hearing, after being accepted as an expert in the identification and packaging 
of marijuana.  The court, having credited the testimony of Officer Burch, denied 
Petitioner’s motion to suppress the items seized during the search.  We summarize Officer 
Burch’s testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, here, the 
State. 
On February 1, 2017, Officer Burch received a tip about a potentially armed 
individual in the 400 block of West Saratoga Street in Baltimore City.  The tipster was not 
a confidential informant but someone whom Officer Burch described as having provided 
reliable information to him for “a little less than a month” before the incident at issue in 
the present case.  Officer Burch conveyed the tip and a description of the individual to 
CitiWatch, which monitors Baltimore City’s surveillance cameras.  The CitiWatch 
Operator reported back that an individual matching the description given by Officer 
Burch—later identified as Petitioner—was observed on a surveillance camera entering the 
Bag Mart, a convenience store located at 401 West Saratoga Street.  Officer Burch was 
familiar with that store, as it was in a “high crime area” and known to him as an “open air 
drug market” where marijuana was often distributed both inside and in front of the store.  
He previously made controlled dangerous substance and handgun arrests at the location.  
3 
 
Officer Burch and five other officers responded to the Bag Mart.  The store is small.  
As he and the other officers were entering, Officer Burch saw that the store was “fairly 
crowded” and smelled of the odor of marijuana.  Officer Burch spotted Petitioner move 
from a position near the cash register and follow others who were heading toward the exit.  
Petitioner had a red bag strapped across his chest, was walking normally, and appeared to 
be calm. 
As Petitioner passed “literally right in front of” Officer Burch, the officer smelled 
“the odor of marijuana emitting from [Petitioner’s] person.”  By that time, the officers had 
asked the other patrons to exit the store, leaving only the store’s owner, Petitioner, and the 
six police officers. 
Officer Burch testified that he reached out and “stopped” Petitioner based on “the 
odor of marijuana and the information [he] received to further investigate.”1  Officer Burch 
described the stop.  While standing “face to face” with Petitioner, he used his right hand to 
grab Petitioner’s right hand and his left hand to grab Petitioner’s left shoulder.  The other 
five officers surrounded Petitioner, with Officer Curtis situated directly behind Petitioner. 
Officers Burch and Curtis were wearing department-issued body worn cameras.  
Footage from each of the cameras was entered into evidence at the suppression hearing.  
Officer Burch testified that he turned on his camera when he came into direct contact with 
Petitioner.  Officer Burch acknowledged, however, that for about thirty seconds the camera 
                                              
1 As we shall see, the suppression court found that the tip did not supply sufficient 
reliability to support a lawful Terry stop of Petitioner. 
4 
 
was “buffering.”  As best we can discern from the record, during that time, Officer Burch 
directed Petitioner to raise his hands and Petitioner complied.  When Petitioner began to 
lower his hands, Officer Curtis, at Officer Burch’s direction, grabbed one then presumably 
the other of Petitioner’s arms and handcuffed Petitioner.  Officer Curtis’s camera recorded 
Officer Burch advising Petitioner to calm down as Officer Curtis handcuffed him.   
  Once Petitioner was handcuffed, Officer Burch undertook a full search of 
Petitioner.  He first searched the red bag and found a handgun inside.  Then, as he searched 
Petitioner’s pockets and waistband, Petitioner advised that he was carrying a small amount 
of marijuana.  Officer Burch found that quantity of marijuana in a sealed, one-inch plastic 
baggie in one of Petitioner’s pockets.2   
Petitioner, through counsel, advanced two theories to support his motion to suppress 
the fruits of the search.  He argued first that, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
the police did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion to “stop” Petitioner at the 
outset of the encounter.3  Independent of that argument, Petitioner contended that the full 
search of Petitioner and the bag he carried was unlawful because at the time the search was 
undertaken, the police lacked probable cause to believe he had committed a felony or was 
committing a felony or misdemeanor in their presence. 
                                              
2  The search also disclosed a number of empty plastic baggies and $367. 
 
3 Law enforcement officers may conduct “an investigatory stop or detention” when 
the officers have “reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit 
a crime[,]” commonly known as a “Terry stop.”  Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 363 (2010) 
(quoting Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 149–51 (2006)). 
5 
 
Specific to the probable cause argument, Petitioner argued that the search incident 
to arrest exception—the justification propounded by the State—did not justify a full-scale 
search because no probable cause existed to arrest him.  Petitioner noted that someone in 
possession of less than ten grams of marijuana may be issued a civil citation but cannot be 
arrested, therefore no lawful arrest occurred.  The State responded that the odor of 
marijuana provided Officer Burch with probable cause to arrest and search Petitioner 
because marijuana in any amount is contraband, and although possession of less than ten 
grams of marijuana was decriminalized, “it was never the legislature’s intention to 
reclassify marijuana as not being contraband.”   
The suppression court determined that the tip that caused Officer Burch and his five 
fellow officers to respond to the Bag Mart lacked sufficient reliability to justify the initial 
stop of Petitioner.  In making that determination, the court quoted Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 
266, 272 (2000), which states that reasonable suspicion “requires that a tip be reliable in 
its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.”  Given 
the lack of sufficient indicia of reliability, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to suppress 
evidence of the tip. 
The suppression court credited Officer Burch’s testimony that he smelled the odor 
of marijuana on Petitioner’s breath and body as soon as he and Petitioner were “face to 
face.”  Based on that finding, the court ruled that the odor of marijuana gave police probable 
cause to arrest Petitioner and, incident to such arrest, conduct a full search of his person.  
In making that ruling, the court relied on Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94 (2017), which we 
6 
 
noted at the outset of this opinion involved the automobile exception, not the search 
incident to arrest exception, to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 
Extrapolating upon the reasoning of Robinson, the suppression court concluded: 
“[I]t would appear that the odor of marijuana emanating from a person provides probable 
cause to believe that that person contains evidence of a crime[; consequently,] a police 
officer may search that person under such circumstances.”  Based on that ruling, the court 
denied the defense’s motion to suppress the handgun found during the search of Petitioner.4 
Subsequent Procedural History 
Petitioner pleaded not guilty on an agreed statement of facts to the charge of 
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun.  After the State’s presentation of the agreed-
upon facts, the circuit court found Petitioner guilty of the handgun charge and sentenced 
him to three years’ incarceration with all but ninety days suspended and three years’ 
supervised probation. 
The Appeal 
 
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the three-judge panel, in a fractured 
opinion, affirmed the decision of the circuit court.  Lewis v. State, 237 Md. App. 661 
(2018).  Petitioner advanced two theories supporting the claim that he was unlawfully 
seized and subjected to a search incident to arrest.  Only one of those contentions was raised 
and argued at the suppression hearing and therefore was properly before the Court of 
                                              
4 The court did not suppress the non-criminal amount of marijuana found during the 
search of Petitioner.  
7 
 
Special Appeals and is properly before us now.  The other argument, raised for the first 
time on appeal, was waived by omission at the suppression hearing. 
A Contention Unpreserved for Appellate Review 
Petitioner’s first of two contentions on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was 
that the police officers had no lawful basis to seize him at the outset of the encounter in the 
Bag Mart; consequently, the handgun found during the search following that unlawful 
seizure should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  See Cox v. State, 421 
Md. 630, 651 (2011) (“[T]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes direct and 
indirect evidence that is a product of police conduct in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”) (quoting Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 291 (2006)).  Petitioner advances the 
same contention in the second question he presents to us. 
The Court of Special Appeals explained why this contention was not preserved for 
appellate review: 
A review of the body-camera footage does not reflect where Officer 
Burch was when Officer Curtis initially touched appellant’s arm.  It does 
reflect, however, that within one second or less, Officer Burch was in front 
of appellant telling him to put his hands up.  Although appellant hinges his 
argument on appeal on this sequence of events during a fast moving situation, 
he never raised this argument below or suggested that the timing of Officer 
Curtis’ actions had any bearing at all on the suppression issue.  And the 
circuit court did not address the significance or timing of Officer Curtis’ 
action in grabbing appellant because the issue was not raised at the 
suppression hearing.  Under these circumstances, the issue is not preserved 
for this Court’s review.  See Maryland Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, the 
appellate court will not decide any other issues unless it plainly appears by 
the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.”); Ray v. State, 
435 Md. 1, 19, 76 A.3d 1143 (2013) (where a defendant advances one theory 
of suppression pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252, but fails to argue an 
additional theory that it later asserts on appeal, the defendant has “waived the 
8 
 
right to have that claim litigated on direct appeal.”).  Accordingly, we will 
not address this contention. 
 
Lewis, 237 Md. App. at 675 (footnotes omitted).   
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Petitioner failed to preserve his 
contention that Officer Curtis had no lawful basis to seize Petitioner before Officer Burch 
smelled marijuana on his person, rendering the handgun found during the subsequent 
search inadmissible as the poisonous fruit of the unlawful seizure.  There is, moreover, no 
need to exercise our discretion to consider that unpreserved contention, as Petitioner asks 
us to do,5 because Petitioner ultimately prevails on the first question he presents.  We 
address that argument below. 
Probable Cause to Conduct a Full-Scale Search of Petitioner? 
Petitioner argues that the police officers lacked probable cause to conduct a 
warrantless search of him based solely on Officer Burch’s having smelled the odor of 
marijuana emanating from either or both Petitioner’s breath or body.  A majority of the 
Court of Special Appeals’ three-judge panel agreed with the circuit court’s ruling at the 
                                              
5 The questions as presented by Petitioner are: 
 
1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that the odor of 
marijuana on a person, without more, constitutes probable cause to arrest?  
 
2) When a majority of a Court of Special Appeals panel concludes that its 
decision “will result in injustice,” should the court exercise its discretion 
under Maryland Rule 8-131 and address a constitutional question, which the 
parties fully briefed in the absence of a preservation challenge, about whether 
incontrovertible body-camera evidence demonstrates the “seizure” of a 
person without probable cause?  
9 
 
suppression hearing that Robinson stands for the proposition that, because marijuana 
remains contraband, the odor of marijuana provides law enforcement officers with 
probable cause to arrest a person, and therefore a search incident thereto is reasonable.  
Lewis, 237 Md. App. at 683 (holding “that the odor of marijuana, if localized to a particular 
person, provides probable cause to arrest that person for the crime of possession of 
marijuana.”); id. at 690 (Arthur, J., concurring) (“Therefore, if ‘the odor of marijuana 
remains evidence of a crime’ in the context of a vehicle search, as Robinson said . . . , it 
presumably ‘remains evidence of a crime’ in the context of a warrantless arrest.”). 
Conversely, the dissenting opinion explained that “Robinson fairly applies the 
general principle that probable cause can arise from indicia of a crime or contraband, and 
holds that the odor of marijuana coming out of a car indicates that contraband or criminal 
activity are present in the car.”  Id. at 697 (Nazarian, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
Because, however, there are plausible innocuous explanations for why someone may smell 
of marijuana that do not involve a vehicle, the dissent asserted that Robinson cannot be 
read as “stand[ing] for the proposition that an odor of marijuana emanating from a person 
indicates that contraband is present or that a crime has been committed.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
For the reasons that follow, we agree with Petitioner that Robinson does not control 
the outcome of this case.  Instead, it is Pacheco, decided after the Court of Special Appeals 
issued its opinion in the case at bar, that dictates the outcome here.  We hold that more than 
the odor of marijuana is required for probable cause to arrest a person and conduct a search 
10 
 
incident thereto.  We therefore further hold that Petitioner was entitled to suppression of 
the handgun and other items seized during the search because Officer Burch, at the time he 
undertook the search of Petitioner that produced the seized items, did not have probable 
cause to believe that Petitioner had committed a felony or was committing a felony or 
misdemeanor. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we 
interpret the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and accept the factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Norman, 452 Md. at 386.  We review de novo 
the “court’s application of the law to its findings of fact.”  Id.  “When a party raises a 
constitutional challenge to a search or seizure, this Court renders an ‘independent 
constitutional evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts 
and circumstances of the case.’”  Pacheco, 465 Md. at 319 (quoting Grant v. State, 449 
Md. 1, 15 (2016)). 
III. 
Discussion 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
11 
 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also MD. 
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 26 (“That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search 
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive”).  The 
touchstone of whether a warrantless search or seizure withstands Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny is reasonableness.  See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013) (“[T]he 
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’”) 
(citation omitted); Pacheco, 465 Md. at 320 (“It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment 
. . . prohibits ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures.”).   
“What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search 
or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.”  United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citation omitted).  “[S]ubject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, a warrantless search or seizure that 
infringes upon the protected interests of an individual is presumptively unreasonable.”  
Grant, 449 Md. at 16–17 (footnote omitted); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967).  “Whether a particular warrantless action on the part of the police is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment depends on a balance between the public interest and the 
individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.”  
Pacheco, 465 Md. at 321 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
12 
 
Pacheco and the Odor of Marijuana 
The relevant exception to the warrant requirement in the present case is the search 
incident to arrest exception set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).  This 
Court recently discussed that exception as well as the automobile exception announced in 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in Pacheco. 
In Pacheco, two police officers noticed a “suspicious vehicle” occupied by Michael 
Pacheco parked behind a laundromat.  465 Md. at 317.  The officers approached the vehicle 
and, as they drew near, they smelled the odor of marijuana and observed a marijuana 
cigarette in the center console.  Id. at 318.  One of the officers requested that Mr. Pacheco 
give him the “joint,” which the officer later testified he immediately knew weighed less 
than ten grams.  Mr. Pacheco was ordered out of the vehicle.  The officers searched him 
and recovered cocaine from Mr. Pacheco’s pocket.  They then searched the vehicle and 
found marijuana stems and rolling papers.  Mr. Pacheco was given a civil citation for 
possession of less than ten grams of marijuana and charged with possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute.  Id.   
Mr. Pacheco filed a motion to suppress the cocaine.  Id.  He argued that the police 
officers lacked probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of both his person and his 
vehicle because there was no reason to suspect he possessed ten grams or more of 
marijuana. The State responded that the odor of marijuana provided the officers with 
probable cause to search both Mr. Pacheco and the vehicle.  Id.  The circuit court agreed 
with the State despite Mr. Pacheco’s not having possessed a criminal amount of marijuana; 
13 
 
the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 319.  On further appeal, this Court reversed 
and held that the search of Mr. Pacheco’s person was unreasonable.  Id. at 333. 
The circumstances in Pacheco gave rise to two exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception.  Under 
the automobile exception, “Carroll [v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),] and its progeny 
authorize the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have 
developed ‘probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a 
crime.’”  Id. at 321 (quoting State v. Johnson, 458 Md. 519, 533 (2018)).  The justifications 
for the automobile exception are grounded in the mobility of automobiles as well as the 
reduced expectations of privacy harbored therein.6  Id. at 321–22 (citing California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985)).  Given those justifications, the scope of an automobile 
search cannot extend beyond the automobile itself or else “the core Fourth Amendment 
protection afforded to” places where privacy expectations are heightened would be 
undervalued and the exception would be “untether[ed] . . . from the justifications 
underlying it.”  Id. at 322 (quoting Collins v. Virginia, — U.S. — , 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 
(2018) (internal quotations omitted)).   
 
The prerequisite to a lawful search of a person incident to arrest is that the police 
have probable cause to believe the person subject to arrest has committed a felony or is 
                                              
6 Although typically described as the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement, the Carroll exception also applies to searches of other 
vehicles.  California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 n.2 (1985) (“With few exceptions, the 
courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle exception to vehicles other than 
automobiles.”). 
14 
 
committing a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the police.  Pacheco, 465 Md. at 
323 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369–70 (2003)).  “Because the search is 
premised on probable cause to make the arrest, the first question to be considered whenever 
such a search has been conducted is whether the police had the requisite probable cause 
before conducting the search.”  Id. (citing Donaldson v. State, 416 Md. 467, 481 (2010)).  
The justifications underpinning the search incident to arrest exception include the 
confiscation of weapons potentially used to resist arrest, escape custody, or endanger police 
officers’ safety, and the seizure of evidence “to prevent its concealment or destruction.”  
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 383, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014) (internal quotation 
omitted); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons . . . [and] 
any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”).  
Probable Cause Requirements for the Automobile Exception and the Search Incident to 
Arrest Exception 
 
 
Probable cause is the prerequisite to both a search under the automobile exception 
and the search incident to arrest exception.   
[T]he probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that 
deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. . . . [P]robable cause 
is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal 
rules.   
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or 
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and 
depends on the totality of the circumstances. 
 
Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370–71 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
15 
 
When analyzing whether probable cause for a warrantless search or seizure existed 
in a given scenario, we must look to “[t]he authorization for and permitted scope of the 
search at issue” in relation “to the justification(s) for it.”  Pacheco, 465 Md. at 324.  In 
Pacheco, it was at the “justification(s)” stage of the analysis that we noted that probable 
cause for the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception diverge.  
“Although the probable cause determination for each of these exceptions requires the same 
‘quantum of evidence,’ ‘[e]ach requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different 
facts and circumstances.’”  Id. at 324–25 (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: 
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(b), at 7 (5th ed. 2012)); see also State v. 
Funkhouser, 140 Md. App. 696, 721 (2001) (explaining that there is “no distinction made 
between the predicate for an automobile search and the predicate for a lawful arrest.  
Although the closely related predicates may sometimes differ slightly in terms of 
qualitative content or substance, they do not differ quantitatively in terms of degree of their 
probability.”).  As such, probable cause may exist to search a vehicle under the automobile 
exception but not to arrest a person—and therefore trigger the search incident to arrest 
exception—and vice versa.   
“When determining whether probable cause exists for purposes of the automobile 
exception, courts ask whether ‘there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime.’”  Pacheco, 465 Md. at 325 (quoting Johnson, 458 Md. 
at 533).  When determining whether the police had probable cause to arrest and conduct a 
search incident to the arrest, courts look to the likelihood of the guilt of the arrestee and 
16 
 
whether probable cause existed to believe that a felony was committed or a felony or 
misdemeanor was being committed in the presence of law enforcement.  Id.  “The 
distinction between the two exceptions is at least in part due to the diminished expectation 
of privacy that justifies the automobile exception . . .  as compared to the unique, 
significantly heightened constitutional protections afforded a person to be secure in his or 
her body.”  Id. at 325–26 (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
 
In Pacheco, we upheld the search of the vehicle under the automobile exception.  
This Court previously held in Robinson that the odor of marijuana provides police officers 
with probable cause to search a vehicle because marijuana in any quantity remains 
contraband.  Given that jurisprudence, Mr. Pacheco did not contest the vehicle search based 
on the odor of marijuana and presence of a marijuana cigarette in the vehicle.  Id. at 330.   
Relevant to the case at bar, we further held in Pacheco that the police did not have 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Pacheco and search his person.  Id.  “For such a search to have 
been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officers must have possessed, before 
the search, probable cause to believe that Mr. Pacheco was committing a felony or a 
misdemeanor in their presence.”  Id.  We determined that neither the odor of marijuana nor 
the presence of a marijuana cigarette in the vehicle indicated to the police officers that Mr. 
Pacheco possessed a criminal amount of marijuana.  Id. at 332–33.  The totality of the 
circumstances leading up to Mr. Pacheco’s arrest did not create probable cause to believe 
“he was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime.”  Id. at 333.  It 
followed that the State did not meet its burden of showing “why this minimal amount of 
17 
 
marijuana [in the marijuana cigarette], which is not a misdemeanor, but rather a civil 
offense, gave rise to a fair probability that Mr. Pacheco possessed a criminal amount of 
marijuana on his person.”  Id. 
Pacheco guides us in deciding that police officers must have probable cause to 
believe a person possesses a criminal amount of marijuana in order to arrest that person 
and conduct a search incident thereto.  Although marijuana in any quantity is considered 
contraband, Robinson, 451 Md. at 99, the search incident to arrest exception can be invoked 
only upon the occurrence of a felony or attempt of a felony or misdemeanor; a civil 
infraction is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor.  The odor of marijuana alone is not 
indicative of the quantity (if any) of marijuana in someone’s possession, a fact to which 
Officer Burch testified. 
It is certainly understandable that the Court of Special Appeals considered and 
followed, in the present case, the reasoning and holding of this Court in Robinson, as 
Pacheco had not yet been decided.  Equally understandable is Judge Arthur’s concern 
about the risks that attend the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in the present case.  Judge 
Arthur addressed those risks in his concurring opinion:  
[I]f the mere odor of burnt marijuana on a citizen’s breath gives the police 
probable cause to make an arrest, it would seem to follow that the odor of 
marijuana smoke on a person’s clothes or hair would give probable cause as 
well.  If so, it is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which police officers 
would have probable cause to arrest and search someone whose only 
exposure to marijuana is from second-hand smoke—e.g., someone who was 
standing inside a bus enclosure in the rain while others smoked marijuana; 
someone whose family members or housemates smoke marijuana; someone 
who borrowed a piece of clothing or outerwear from an acquaintance who 
smokes marijuana; someone who just came from a concert at which members 
18 
 
of the audience were smoking marijuana; etc.  In fact, the officers would have 
probable cause to arrest and search someone who got off a bus or subway 
train in Maryland after smoking marijuana in the District of Columbia, where 
the private use and possession of up to two ounces has been legalized (and 
not merely decriminalized).  D.C. Stat. Ann. § 48–904.01(a)(1) (West 2018).  
I would have thought that the reform of Maryland’s marijuana laws was 
intended to reduce rather than facilitate intrusive searches in circumstances 
such as these. 
 
Lewis, 237 Md. App. at 691 (Arthur, J., concurring).  Judge Nazarian expressed similar 
concerns in his dissenting opinion.  Id. at 703 (Nazarian, J., dissenting) (cautioning that 
“[t]here is no way to challenge or verify what the officer smelled, no way to test whether a 
person actually smelled of marijuana, . . . and no way to control for the fully legal and 
otherwise non-criminal or second-hand ways someone could come to smell like 
marijuana.”).7 
Robinson and Possession of Contraband 
The State seizes on Robinson to argue that, because marijuana remains contraband 
and police officers cannot estimate whether a person possesses a criminal quantity of 
marijuana based on odor, the odor of marijuana creates probable cause to arrest someone 
in public without a warrant.  In Robinson, we held that the odor of marijuana emanating 
                                              
7 In our sister state of New York, trial judges have been similarly critical about 
whether the mere odor of marijuana may provide probable cause for law enforcement 
officers to seize an individual.  See e.g., People v. Suncar, 116 N.Y.S.3d 872, 882 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2019) (“If possession of marijuana in small quantities is no longer a crime then 
the mere odor of unburnt marihuana could not provide probable cause for the arrest of the 
occupants of a vehicle that has not committed a moving violation.”); People v. Brukner, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 559, 571 (N.Y. City Ct. 2015), aff’d, appeal dismissed, 43 N.Y.S.3d 851 (N.Y. 
Co. Ct. 2016) (“An odor of stale or burnt marihuana on clothing, without more, is equally 
susceptible to the innocent non-criminal explanation that the Defendant smoked marihuana 
previously in private, and not in public.”). 
19 
 
from an automobile gives rise to probable cause to search that automobile.  451 Md. at 99.  
We explained that: 
[P]ossession of ten grams or more of marijuana, crimes involving the 
distribution of marijuana, and driving under the influence of a controlled 
dangerous substance have not been decriminalized in Maryland, and, thus, 
the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, and a law enforcement 
officer may search the vehicle under such circumstances. 
   
Id. at 134. 
 
Robinson—indeed, the Carroll doctrine altogether—is inapplicable outside of the 
vehicle search context.  See Lewis, 237 Md. App. at 695  (Nazarian, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that “the broad probable cause language in Robinson arose in the context of 
vehicle searches, and flows from the vehicle search doctrine that doesn’t apply identically 
to individuals.”); see also Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 411 (noting “the only issue in 
Robinson was whether an odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides probable 
cause to search the vehicle.  No frisks or searches of persons were at issue in Robinson”).8  
As explained above, one of the justifications for the automobile exception is the diminished 
expectation of privacy one enjoys in his or her vehicle.  In juxtaposition, there is a 
                                              
8 In Norman, we analyzed the impact of decriminalization on a law enforcement 
officer’s authority to frisk vehicle occupants upon detecting the odor of marijuana 
emanating from the vehicle.  452 Md. at 378.  We held that a law enforcement officer has 
reasonable suspicion to frisk one of multiple occupants of a vehicle when that vehicle is 
emanating an odor of marijuana and the totality of the circumstances indicates that the 
occupant in question is armed and dangerous.  Id. at 379.  We cautioned, though, that the 
“odor of marijuana alone emanating from a vehicle with multiple occupants does not give 
rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are armed and 
dangerous and subject to frisk.”  Id. at 412. 
20 
 
heightened expectation of privacy enjoyed in one’s person.  Arresting and searching a 
person, without a warrant and based exclusively on the odor of marijuana on that person’s 
body or breath, is unreasonable and does violence to the fundamental privacy expectation 
in one’s body; the same concerns do not attend the search of a vehicle.  See Pacheco, 465 
Md. at 326 (remarking that probable cause “to believe that a person is carrying evidence 
does not justify a warrantless search of a person . . . . Only places or things enjoying a 
lesser expectation of privacy . . . are vulnerable to probable-cause-based warrantless 
searches for the purpose of discovering and seizing evidence of a crime.”) (quoting 
Funkhouser, 140 Md. App. at 724). 
The State asserts that by requiring more than the odor of marijuana for probable 
cause to arrest, but not for probable cause to search a vehicle, we would be creating a 
“probable cause plus” rule for the search incident to arrest exception.  Not so.   
There is no denying that both the automobile exception and the search incident to 
arrest exception must satisfy the probable cause standard.  The Court has made clear, 
though, that 
[t]he same facts and circumstances that justify a search of an automobile do 
not necessarily justify an arrest and search incident thereto.  This is based on 
the heightened expectation of privacy one enjoys in his or her person as 
compared to the diminished expectation of privacy one has in an automobile.  
The arrest and search of Mr. Pacheco was unreasonable because nothing in 
the record suggests that possession of a joint and the odor of burnt marijuana 
gave the police probable cause to believe he was in possession of a criminal 
amount of that substance. 
 
Pacheco, 465 Md. at 333–34. 
21 
 
 
The same holds true in the present case.  The search of Petitioner and the red bag 
strapped across his chest was based solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from his 
person.  Under Pacheco, that information fell short of supplying the requisite probable 
cause to conduct that search.  Id.   
 
For such a search to be supported by probable cause, the police must possess 
information indicating possession of a criminal amount of marijuana.  There is no 
indication in the record suggesting that Petitioner was in possession of that amount of 
marijuana; all the record does reflect is that Petitioner smelled of marijuana.  Consistent 
with our decision in Pacheco, we hold here that the mere odor of marijuana emanating 
from a person, without more, does not provide the police with probable cause to support 
an arrest and a full-scale search of the arrestee incident thereto. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
prohibits law enforcement officers from arresting and searching a person without a warrant 
based solely upon the odor of marijuana on or about that person.  Probable cause to conduct 
a lawful arrest requires that the arrestee committed a felony or was committing a felony or 
misdemeanor in a law enforcement officer’s presence.  Possession of less than ten grams 
of marijuana is a civil offense, not a felony or a misdemeanor, therefore law enforcement 
officers need probable cause to believe the arrestee is in possession of a criminal amount 
22 
 
of marijuana to conduct a lawful arrest.  The odor of marijuana alone does not indicate the 
quantity, if any, of marijuana in someone’s possession.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED 
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS 
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY 
AND REMAND TO THAT COURT WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
GRANT 
THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.  COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY THE STATE.