Case Title: Horlock v. OGLESBY

Citation: 231 N.E.2d 810, 249 Ind. 251

Docket Number: 30,841

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1967-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 251 (1967)
231 N.E.2d 810
HORLOCK
v.
OGLESBY ET AL.
No. 30,841.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 20, 1967.
*252 John D. Clouse, of Evansville, for appellant.
Theodore Lockyear, of Evansville, for appellees.
JACKSON, C.J.
This appeal comes to this Court by opinion of the Indiana Appellate Court made pursuant to Acts 1901, ch. 247, § 9, p. 565, as amended by Acts 1963, ch. 279, § 1, p. 424, being § 4-214 Burns, 1963 Replacement. (See Horlock v. Oglesby (1965), 210 N.E.2d 56).
This appeal stems from an action instituted in the court below by a petition filed by appellees, husband and wife, for the adoption of the wife's minor child born as a result of her former marriage. The original action was filed August 7, *253 1963. The court examined the petition, found the same in proper form and directed the clerk of the court to forward one copy of the petition to the State Department of Public Welfare and one copy to the Vanderburgh County Department of Public Welfare.
Thereafter on the 16th day of December, 1963, the petitioners filed their amended petition for the adoption of such child. Such petition, omitting formal parts, signatures and jurat, reads as follows:
On February 6, 1964, appellant filed his answer to the petition herein, which answer in pertinent part reads as follows:
Thereafter, on May 26, 1964, appellant filed to said amended petition, his second paragraph of answer, such answer in pertinent part reads as follows, to-wit:
The record shows that on the 23rd day of December, 1963, the Vanderburgh County Department of Public Welfare filed *256 its written report of its investigation and recommendation in said cause, the same in pertinent part reads as follows:
On the 26th day of May, 1964, on the issues formed by the amended petition and appellant's answers thereto, the cause was tried to the court without the intervention of a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of appellees, which judgment in pertinent part reads as follows:
Thereafter, on the 10th day of June, 1964, appellant filed a motion for a new trial. Such motion was based on each of the following two grounds, viz:
The court overruled the appellant's Motion For New Trial on October 14, 1964.
Appellant's Assignment of Errors is the single ground:
A short resume of the evidence most favorable to the appellees discloses that appellant and appellee Doris Jean Oglesby are the parents of Monte Alan Horlock (Oglesby) who was born during and as the fruit of their marriage. The parties were divorced May 23, 1958. Doris Jean (Horlock) Oglesby was granted the custody of their child, Monte Alan, and appellant was ordered to pay $10.00 per week for the *258 support of said child. Appellant, by the terms of the divorce decree, was permitted to see his son and have the child with him on Sunday of each week from 1:00 to 6:00 p.m. as well as to see and visit him at reasonable times.
During the interval between her divorce and second marriage Doris Jean Oglesby continued to live in Evansville. Appellant knew where she lived, but he came to see his child only four or five times. Doris Jean Oglesby never refused appellant the right to see their child. Appellant has never filed an information for contempt since his divorce, nor has he ever represented to anyone that he was deprived of custody rights. After the appellees were married February 13, 1960, they lived in Evansville continuously for over a year. Since 1958 appellant has never seen his child. Since 1959 he has never paid any support, never sent his child birthday presents, Christmas presents or cards, nor has he done anything to show any affection toward his child. He admitted during the trial that he and his son did not know each other.
Appellant did not pay support regularly prior to his ex-wife's marriage to James Raymond Oglesby and since November 29, 1959, has paid no support at all. In 1959 while appellant was in Florida, Doris Jean Oglesby went to the Vanderburgh County Prosecuting Attorney's office and filed a reciprocal action for support, but no support payments were made. Appellant worked in Florida from October of 1958 to May of 1960 and then quit his job to resume college. After graduation from college in 1961, appellant was unemployed for three months. He then worked at Sears for a year making $70.00 per week. He made no support payments for his child. In the year preceding the date of the trial of this cause, appellant earned $6,000.00, yet paid nothing for the support of his child. At the trial appellant did not ask for the custody of his child.
Appellant first asserts that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law. In support of this argument he points out *259 that he did not consent to the adoption; that the court made no special findings of facts that the child had been abandoned or deserted for six months or more immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or that the appellant as father of the child had failed to pay support money for a period of one year immediately prior to the date of the filing of the petition; that there was no period of supervision by a duly-licensed child-placing agency or a county department of public welfare as required by Acts 1941, ch. 146, § 3, p. 438 as amended by Acts 1943, ch. 40, § 2, p. 89 being § 3-117 Burns', 1946 Replacement; and that the investigation and report of the county department of public welfare did not comply with the statutory requirements enumerated in Acts 1941, ch. 146, § 4, p. 438 as amended by Acts 1943, ch. 40, § 3, p. 89 being § 3-118 Burns', 1946 Replacement. Appellant concludes, "In view of the flagrant disregard for the procedural requirements, we believe that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to make the decree that it did, and its decision is therefore contrary to law."
Although appellant did not consent to the adoption, it was unnecessary for him to do so since he had failed to pay support for the child for a period of one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. Acts 1941, ch. 146, § 6, p. 438 as amended by Acts 1943, ch. 40, § 5, p. 89 being § 3-120 Burns', 1946 Replacement.
The general finding "that the allegations of petitioners' petition are true ..." is sufficient since appellant failed to request the court to make special findings of facts and conclusions of law as he could have done pursuant to Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, § 394, p. 240 as amended by Acts 1923, ch. 83, § 1, p. 254 being § 2-2102 Burns' 1946 Replacement, which reads in part as follows:
The length of the period of supervision provided for in § 3-117 Burns', supra, is "within the sole discretion of the court hearing the adoption petition." The report of the welfare board provided for in § 3-118 Burns' supra, is "not binding on the court, but [is] advisory only." Under the circumstances in the case at bar there was sufficient compliance with the procedural requirements. One of the petitioners was the child's natural mother who obtained custody of the child at the time of her divorce from appellant, the natural father. The child had lived with the appellees since they were married on February 13, 1960.
Appellant next argues that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law because it is not sustained by sufficient evidence. It is not the province of appellate courts to weigh evidence. We will consider only the evidence most favorable to the appellee together with any reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom to determine whether the decision is sustained by sufficient evidence within the standard of proof required by law. A.S.C. Corp. v. First National Bank (1960), 241 Ind. 19, 167 N.E.2d 460; Booth v. Town of Newburgh (1958), 237 Ind. 661, 147 N.E.2d 538; Emmons v. Dinelli (1956), 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56.
The evidence most favorable to appellees is discussed herein above and is sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court.
Finally appellant challenges the constitutionality of § 3-120 Burns' supra, which permits consent of a parent to be dispensed with in an adoption proceeding if that parent has failed to support the child for one year. He argues that the statute does not differentiate between parents who are able to support their children but do not and parents who cannot support their children because of some incapacity. He asserts the statute is unconstitutional upon its face and as applied to him by the trial court.
*261 The evidence clearly indicates the appellant was able to support his child during the year prior to the filing of the adoption petition; therefore, the statute was not unconstitutionally applied to him.
A party who raises the question of constitutionality of a statute assumes the burden of substantiating his claim. He must overcome a strong presumption in favor of the statute's validity. City of Aurora v. Bryant (1960), 240 Ind. 492, 165 N.E.2d 141; Alanel Corp. v. Indianapolis Redevelopment Commission (1958), 239 Ind. 35, 154 N.E.2d 515; Hanley v. State Dept. of Conservation (1954), 234 Ind. 326, 123 N.E.2d 452.
Appellant admits he was unable to find a precedent to support his constitutional argument. Thus it is unnecessary for us to pass on the constitutionality of the statute.
Since there was no error in the proceedings below, the judgment of the Vanderburgh Probate Court is affirmed.
Arterburn, Hunter and Lewis, JJ., concur.
Mote, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 231 N.E.2d 810.