Case Title: Upper Harmony Ditch Company v. Stunkard

Citation: 492 P.2d 631

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1972-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
492 P.2d 631 (1972) UPPER HARMONY DITCH COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff in Error, v. Jim A. STUNKARD et al., Defendants in Error. No. 24123. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. January 3, 1972. Rehearing Denied January 24, 1972. *632 Raphael J. Moses, George Vranesh, Boulder, Neil L. Carleton, Sterling, for plaintiff in error. Giacomini & Giacomini, Robert W. Giacomini, Sterling, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Clyde O. Martz, Rothgerber, Appel & Powers, Donald L. Giacomini, Denver, for defendants in error. GROVES, Justice. The plaintiff ditch company sought to enjoin the defendants from diverting water from Ramsey Draw and to obtain damages for such past diversions by the defendants. After certain depositions had been taken, affidavits filed and other documentary evidence was before the court, it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, stating that the plaintiff might file "amended pleadings or Motion For New Trial within twenty days if it so desires." Within 20 days plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The defendants again filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. We affirm. The defendants (defendants in error here) urge that the matter became res judicata with the first order sustaining the motion for summary judgment, of which the plaintiff did not seek review. In view of the result which we reach, we assume that, by permitting the plaintiff to file "amended pleadings," the court intended the summary judgment to be vacated in the event the plaintiff did file an amended complaint. We treat the matter, therefore, as if the only order granting summary judgment was that entered under the second motion. The defendants have an adjudicated priority to water from Ramsey Draw, which is later than that of the original Harmony Ditch No. 2. The plaintiff is the owner of the Harmony Ditch No. 2. Its headgate formerly was on the north bank of the South Platte River from which the ditch proceeded northeasterly a substantial distance before reaching the users of its water. Before reaching the lands of the ditch's users, it crosses several draws. Water in these draws has flowed into and down the ditch. It appears that the headgate on the South Platte River has not been in place and the upper portions of the ditch have not been used for a number of years. It would seem, therefore, that in recent years the entire flow of the ditch has been collected from the draws which it intercepts. The principal thrust of the plaintiff's position is that the decree adjudicating the priority of the ditch (as well as a priority decree for an enlargement thereof) contemplated that one of the sources of water was from Ramsey Draw. This ditch, the Knowles Spring Ditch No. 2 and other ditches were constructed near the close of the last century by C. D. McPhee and J. K. Mullen for irrigation of substantial acreages in northeastern Colorado. Harmony Ditch No. 2 and Knowles Spring Ditch No. 2 were adjudicated in the same 1911 decree, the Harmony Ditch being awarded priority No. 28 and the Knowles Spring Ditch having priority No. 29. The two ditches later came under separate ownership, the plaintiff obtaining the Harmony Ditch. The plaintiff has no rights to the water adjudicated to the Knowles Spring Ditch. The following findings were made in the adjudication: The decretal portion of the adjudicative decree specifies the South Platte River as the sole source of water for the Harmony Ditch No. 2 and adds that there also be allowed to flow in the ditch "for the benefit of the party or parties lawfully entitled thereto" water decreed to Knowles Spring Ditch No. 2. The decretal portion relating to the Knowles Spring Ditch No. 2 specified that the source of its water was as follows: When both of these ditches, as well as other ditches, were in common ownership and part of the agricultural ownership of McPhee and Mullen, there would be no need to question the source of water for any particular ditch. It is true that the findings contain some indication that waters from Ramsey Draw go to the Harmony No. 2 Ditch, and there is no question but what under the McPhee and Mullen operation Knowles Spring No. 2 Ditch water was transported through the Harmony Ditch No. 2. We must look, however, to the adjudicative decree, rather than the findings, to ascertain the source of water for the respective ditches. The decree as to Harmony Ditch No. 2 did not mention Ramsey Draw, and gave as the only source the South Platte River.[1] The decree as to the Knowles Spring Ditch No. 2 specifically mentions that Ramsey Draw is *634 one of the sources of water. Plaintiff cannot predicate a right to Ramsey Draw water upon the decree. The plaintiff alleged that state officials charged with the administration of water recognized and interpreted the decree to require and permit water from Ramsey Draw to be diverted into plaintiff's ditch. The plaintiff contends that, such decree having been entered more than 18 years ago, under C.R.S.1963, 148-19-1 it is entitled to Ramsey Draw water. This statute relates to decrees entered more than 18 years prior to commencement of an action to set the same aside. It provides that such a decree shall not be set aside or declared invalid because of any irregularity, of failure to give proper notice, of other defect in the adjudication proceedings, or of any other jurisdictional ground when, This statute is not applicable here. It relates to an action to set aside a decree or have it declared invalid. Here the plaintiff seeks to justify an interpretation of a decree because water officials have so interpreted it. The statute does not pertain to such a situation. Plaintiff urges that it is entitled to the use of the Ramsey Draw water by reason of estoppel on the part of the defendants. We are accustomed to a view of estoppel as a defense and not as a basis for the establishment of a right. The defendants, however, have not raised this point. Consequently, we will pass by it without further comment. The allegation in the complaint upon which estoppel is asserted reads as follows: The plaintiff has not met the standard set in Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 27 Colo. 267, 60 P. 629 (1900) as follows: This standard was quoted with approval in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, *635 120 P.2d 196 (1941) and Jacobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008 (1957). The plaintiff cited no authority on the estoppel issue in its briefs, but in oral argument mentioned Surface Creek Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 168 P.2d 906 (1946). That case involved estoppel by reason of the provisions of a contract, and is not controlling here. In connection with the matter of estoppel, there is some significance in a portion of the testimony of the president of plaintiff in his deposition. We gather from this testimony that the plaintiff has been confronted with the problem of others using the Ramsey Draw water since 1934. We call attention to the fact that the plaintiff has not asserted title by adverse possession. The complaint contains the following hint in this connection: This is not a sufficient allegation of title acquired by adverse possession; and the plaintiff has not argued that it so obtained title. Judgment affirmed. KELLEY, HODGES and ERICKSON, JJ., concur. [1] The Ramsey Ditch mentioned in the findings has no connection with Ramsey Draw. The Ramsey Ditch takes its water from the South Platte River.