Case Title: Kingbrook Inc. v. Pupurs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92162

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92162-Agenda 11-May 2002.
KINGBROOK, INC., Appellant, v. JOHN A. PUPURS et al., 								Appellees.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The subject of this appeal is appellate jurisdiction. The circuit
court of Boone County entered summary judgment against
plaintiff Kingbrook, Inc. (Kingbrook), and denied Kingbrook's
motion to reconsider. Kingbrook appealed, but the appellate court
found that Kingbrook's motion to reconsider was ineffective to
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the
appellate court found the notice of appeal to be untimely and
dismissed Kingbrook's appeal. The question before us is: In a
nonjury case, what degree of detail must be included in a motion
to reconsider for such a motion to qualify as a "post-judgment
motion" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure (see
735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 1998)) and the rules of this court (see
155 Ill. 2d R. 301(a)), such that the motion will toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal until its disposition?
BACKGROUND
	Kingbrook sued John A. Pupurs and Rockford Manufacturing,
Inc. (Rockford), based on a theory of unjust enrichment, and sued
R&D Thiel, Inc. (Thiel), for unjust enrichment and breach of
contract. Although the issues before this court are solely
procedural, we briefly note that according to the allegations of the
complaint, Kingbrook is a commercial real estate agent which
showed a specific property to Thiel. Thiel placed multiple offers on
the property, but never completed a purchase from the original
seller. Instead, the property was sold to Rockford, a corporation of
which Pupurs is the sole shareholder. Rockford then sold the
property to Thiel for $500,000 more than Rockford had paid the
original seller. Kingbrook, characterizing Rockford's profit as a
commission, sued Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel on the above-noted
theories.
	Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel (collectively, defendants) moved
to dismiss Kingbrook's complaint for failure to state a claim, and
the circuit court granted that motion. However, this judgment was
reversed on appeal and the cause was remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings. Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, Nos.
2-98-1120, 2-98-0550 cons. (2001) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
	It is at this time that the proceedings pertinent to this appeal
began. On remand, defendants moved for summary judgment. The
circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on
January 21, 2000. On February 17, 2000, Kingbrook filed a
document titled "Motion For Reconsideration." The body of that
document read, in its entirety, as follows:
		"N[ow comes] the plaintiff, K[ingbrook, Inc.], an Illinois
corporation, by and through its attorneys, B[arrick],
S[witzer], L[ong], B[alsey] & V[anavera], and hereby
moves the Court to reconsider its decision granting
severing [sic] judgment in favor of the Defendants."
No additional materials in support of or opposition to the motion
were filed by any party or requested by the circuit court. Kingbrook
noticed up the motion within the time allowed by the circuit court
rules, and the circuit court denied the motion on April 28, 2000.
	On May 30, 2000, Kingbrook filed a notice of appeal. In the
appellate court, defendants moved to dismiss the appeal for want
of jurisdiction, arguing that Kingbrook's notice of appeal was late
because the motion to reconsider was not a proper post-judgment
motion. The appellate court agreed with defendants and dismissed
the appeal. No. 2-00-0611 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We granted Kingbrook leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	Before this court there is but one central issue. The parties
agree that the filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998). The parties also agree that the notice of appeal
was timely if and only if Kingbrook's motion to reconsider tolled
the 30-day filing period.(1) The sole question is whether Kingbrook's
motion did toll the filing period. The parties' arguments may be
briefly summarized as follows. Kingbrook contends that neither the
Code of Civil Procedure nor the rules of this court demand any
specificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided without a
jury, whereas the Code does explicitly require specificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided by a jury. Thus, Kingbrook
argues, the motion filed in this case was sufficient because it was
timely filed, was in proper form, and requested the appropriate type
of relief. Defendants respond that a bare motion with no specifics,
such as the motion in this case, cannot serve the purpose of a
proper post-judgment motion and is nothing more than a subterfuge
to delay the time for filing the notice of appeal. Such chicanery,
defendants argue, should not be countenanced. Some detail, some
argument, they contend, must be presented for a post-judgment
motion to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal.
	The pertinent portions of the Code and our rules read as
follows. Our Rule 303(a)(1) governs when a notice of appeal must
be filed in civil cases. It states that
			"Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the notice
of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court
within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment
appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed
against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a
nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order
disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion." 155
Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).
	Section 2-1203(a) of the Code, which governs post-judgment
motions in cases decided without a jury, provides that
			"In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within
30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any
further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any
extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a
retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the
judgment or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West
1998).
	Kingbrook also calls our attention to section 2-1202 of the
Code, which governs post-trial motions in cases decided by a jury.
Section 2-1202(b) provides in part that
			"Relief desired after trial in jury cases, heretofore sought
by reserved motions for directed verdict or motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in arrest of
judgment or for new trial, must be sought in a single post-trial motion. *** The post-trial motion must contain the
points relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds in
support thereof, and must state the relief desired, as for
example, the entry of a judgment, the granting of a new
trial or other appropriate relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(b)
(West 1998).
	Our primary job in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The plain
language of a statute provides the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent, and " '[w]e must not depart from the plain
language of [a statute] by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent.' "
Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 56 (1998), quoting
Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996).
Moreover, if the meaning is not unmistakable from the face of the
statute, our civil appeals rules are to be interpreted liberally, in
order that lawsuits may be decided on the merits. Parks v.
McWhorter, 106 Ill. 2d 181, 185 (1985); 735 ILCS 5/1-106 (West
1998).
	Each side claims support for its position in previous decisions
of this court. Defendants rely on Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232
(1991), and Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342 (1990), both of which involved the same basic question as the
case at bar: whether a particular document constituted a post-judgment motion within the meaning of section 2-1203(a) of the
Code. Defendants note that in those cases, this court explicitly
stated that specificity is required in post-judgment motions. See
Beck, 144 Ill. 2d  at 241; Andersen, 133 Ill. 2d  at 347. They suggest
that this precedent is conclusive.(2)
	Kingbrook contends that Beck and Andersen are not
controlling. Kingbrook argues that in both cases the court had
already concluded that the documents in question were not post-judgment motions for other reasons than the lack of specificity and
thus that the mention of specificity was dictum. Moreover,
Kingbrook notes that when mentioning the specificity requirement,
Beck merely cited Andersen, and the only authority cited in
Andersen was Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 83 Ill. 2d 344
(1980). Kingbrook contends that this chain of precedent casts
doubt on the validity of the statements in Beck and Andersen,
because Brown involved a post-judgment motion after a jury
verdict. As Kingbrook points out, sections 2-1202 and 2-1203 of
the Code differ, in that the former-which governs post-judgment
motions after a jury verdict-explicitly requires specificity and the
latter does not. See Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., Chicago, 297 Ill.
App. 3d 891, 894-97 (1998), vacated & dismissed on other
grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). Moreover, even in Brown this
court did not hold that the nonspecific post-judgment motion did
not qualify as a post-judgment motion at all. Rather, we stated that
the motion was insufficient to preserve specific issues for appeal,
and affirmed the appellate court's judgment affirming the judgment
entered on the jury verdict. We did not find a lack of appellate
jurisdiction in Brown.
	For Kingbrook's part, it relies on Berg v. Allied Security, Inc.,
193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). Kingbrook notes that after considering
various contentions as to why specificity should be required of
post-judgment motions under section 2-1203, the statement was
made that such arguments were only
		" 'reason[s] for denying the motion or granting counsel an
additional opportunity to respond after the initial hearing
is concluded. It is not a reason for holding that the motion
does not even qualify as a motion. A lame horse, after all,
is still a horse.' " Berg, 193 Ill. 2d  at 200 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting).
However, as Kingbrook admits, the language on which it relies is
contained in a dissent; it does not represent a holding of this court.
The majority did not address whether the motion sufficed to toll the
time for filing the notice of appeal. Berg, 193 Ill. 2d  at 188.
	Nevertheless, we find that the plain language of the Code and
rules supports Kingbrook's position. Rule 303(a) makes no
mention of the contents of any post-judgment motion. It merely
states that if a motion is filed, a notice of appeal must be filed
within 30 days after the order disposing thereof. Nor does section
2-1203(a) of the Code speak to the contents of any such motion-in
direct contradistinction to section 2-1202(b) of the Code,
governing post-judgment motions in cases decided by a jury.
Compare 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 1998) with 735 ILCS
5/2-1202(b) (West 1998) (post-trial motions after a jury verdict
"must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying the
grounds in support thereof"). There simply is no basis in the plain
language of the Code or our rules for a specificity requirement.
	There are practical difficulties as well with the notion of
holding that a timely, properly filed post-judgment motion which
requests appropriate relief might not qualify as a motion because
of a lack of specificity. For instance, although it may seem
unlikely, it is not difficult to imagine a circumstance in which a
circuit court might wish to grant such a motion. A judge could take
cross-motions for summary judgment under advisement, then sign
the wrong order. Upon presentation of even a cursory motion for
reconsideration, the court could realize its error and enter the
judgment it had intended to enter. But if the cursory motion was
not even a motion, as defendants argue, the court would be without
jurisdiction to enter such an order if 30 days had elapsed from the
entry of the mistaken judgment.(3) Indeed, the court would lose
jurisdiction to enter any order, even an order denying or striking
the purported post-judgment motion.
	On the other hand, the burdens on a victorious litigant by
tolling the time for filing a notice of appeal until disposition of all
properly formed and filed motions are relatively slight. Such
motions must be brought within 30 days of judgment or such
extension of time as the trial court might grant within 30 days after
the entry of judgment. Local rules of court generally will require
motions to be noticed up for hearing within a fairly short time after
their filing-in this case, two months. This delay is an
inconvenience, to be sure, but we cannot help but note that motions
for extensions of time are fairly routinely granted in the appellate
court and this court; a three-month delay is hardly without
precedent. It does not, at any rate, persuade us to ignore the plain
language of the Code and rules and to muddy the waters of
jurisdiction.
	Defendants protest that a nonspecific post-judgment motion
cannot serve the purpose of a post-judgment motion-giving the
circuit court the opportunity to correct its errors before a case is
brought up on appeal. Kingbrook rejoins that especially in a case
such as the instant one, which was decided on a motion for
summary judgment, the arguments of the losing party would have
been presented to the court quite recently, in the briefing in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Kingbrook argues
that there would be no point in requiring a party to reiterate the
same arguments to avoid risking its right to an appeal.
	We decline to hold that post-judgment motions in nonjury
cases must contain some undefined degree of detail, lest the filer
risk that the reviewing court hold that the motion is not a motion
at all. It is not clear that a nonspecific motion could not fulfill its
role, and there is no reason to require the filer to guess how much
detail is enough.
	Defendants also argue that we should uphold the dismissal of
the appeal because of certain conduct by Kingbrook in the circuit
court. Defendants contend that counsel for Kingbrook did not even
prepare a draft order by the entry of which the circuit court could
have granted the motion, but prepared only the order entered in this
case, which denied its motion. Further, they refer to a letter from
counsel for Kingbrook to counsel for defendants in which the
author stated that he "intend[ed] to present [the draft order denying
the motion] to the Judge on the scheduled date so that the matter
could be concluded." Defendants contend that these facts evince
that the motion was not made in good faith. Kingbrook objects that
there is no evidence of record that Kingbrook prepared only the
draft order denying its motion, and also argues that the letter to
which defendants refer is not properly of record and should not be
considered.
	These contentions are irrelevant to our analysis. The issue
before us is the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Defendants'
argument is, at its heart, that the appeal was properly dismissed
because the motion to reconsider was brought solely as a delaying
tactic-in other words, that dismissal was proper because of
Kingbrook's motives for bringing the motion. But defendants cite
no authority, nor are we aware of any, that suggests that
jurisdiction should depend on the perceived intent or mind-set of
the litigants. Reviewing courts are generally unsuited to fact-finding; appellate jurisdiction is not and should not be based on
inferences the reviewing court draws from a cold record regarding
the motives of the parties in making filings before the circuit court.
If the litigant satisfies the requirements of the Code and rules,
jurisdiction vests in the appellate court; otherwise, not. The good
or bad faith of the parties does not enter into the equation.
	There are procedures in place to resolve contentions of bad-faith litigation. Our Rule 137 specifically allows a party to request
sanctions against a party and its counsel for filings "interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." (Emphasis
added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. We believe that accusations and
imputations of bad-faith litigation must be dealt with as such,
within the channels established for resolution of such issues, rather
than requiring reviewing courts to make factual determinations in
the first instance, in the context of deciding their jurisdiction to
review the merits of the case. We of course intimate no opinion as
to whether any conduct in the instant case might be sanctionable.
In this case, as in general, that fact-based determination should be
made initially by the circuit court.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated above, the order of the appellate court
dismissing the appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the
appellate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.
	Reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.



	JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority's conclusion that the motion in
question was permissible under the current language of section
2-1203(a). I write separately to express serious concerns regarding
the practical effects of the statute in its current form.
	As the majority states, section 2-1203(a) of the Code makes
mention of the contents of any post-judgment motion. As such, the
majority correctly concludes that the plain language of the Code
provides no basis for a specificity requirement. However, the
current requirements raise the specter that a motion need be
nothing more than an empty shell in order to be effective.
Permitting skeletal motions invites sloppiness and will only create
more confusion for reviewing courts. A motion that is devoid of
detail does not meaningfully inform the trial court, or reviewing
courts, of what objections or points have been raised. A party
could, theoretically, file a motion that says nothing more than, "We
request a do over."
	Furthermore, it is not difficult to envision abuse of the
requirements as currently written. The lack of a specificity
requirement encourages spurious pleadings or blatant attempts to
extend the time for leave to appeal through the filing of an empty,
meaningless motion to reconsider.
	While I agree with the majority that the filer of a motion
should not have to guess how much detail is enough (slip op. at 8),
there is a difference between insufficient detail and no detail at all.
I believe that a motion containing absolutely no identification and
articulation of objections or points does not contribute to fair and
informed decisionmaking. The law demands some specificity to be
administered effectively and consistently. To that end, I sincerely
hope that the legislature addresses the lack of any content
requirements for motions to reconsider in nonjury cases.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this special concurrence.
1.      1The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 28. The
thirtieth day after April 28 was a Sunday, and the next day was
Memorial Day, a court holiday. The notice of appeal was filed the next
day, and thus was timely if the petition was effective to toll the 30-day
period for filing the notice.

2.      2Defendants also cite several appellate court cases for the proposition
that some degree of specificity is required for a post-judgment motion
to qualify as such. See Town of Sugar Loaf v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 305 Ill. App. 3d 483 (1999); Robertson v. Winnebago County
Forest Preserve District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 520, 522-23 (1998); Sho-Deen, Inc. v. Michel, 263 Ill. App. 3d 288 (1994). Contra Berg v. Allied
Security, Inc., Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1998), vacated &
dismissed on other grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). As Kingbrook
notes, however, all of the appellate authority on which defendants rely
stems from Beck and Andersen.

3.      3It is possible, of course, that the court might be able to enter an
order nunc pro tunc to correct such an error even after losing
jurisdiction. Beck, 144 Ill. 2d  at 238. However, nunc pro tunc orders
cannot be entered unless they are "based upon definite and precise
evidence in the record," and their accuracy cannot rest "upon the
memory of the judge or any other person." (Emphasis added.) Beck, 144 Ill. 2d  at 239. So, while in some cases the court could properly correct
an error nunc pro tunc after having lost jurisdiction, certainly in other
cases it could not do so. Indeed, we found the circuit court's nunc pro
tunc modification of its earlier order to be improper in Beck because of
a lack of record evidence showing that the initial order was a mistake.
Beck, 144 Ill. 2d  at 239.