Case Title: Eidson v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.

Citation: 453 P.2d 204, 80 N.M. 183

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1969-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
453 P.2d 204 (1969) 80 N.M. 183 W.G. EIDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 8685. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 14, 1969. Monte Lee Sherrod, Albuquerque, for appellant. R.G. Cooper, B.G. Johnson, J.J. Monroe, Albuquerque, for appellee. TACKETT, Justice. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant as a result of injuries received during the course of his employment with defendant and while engaged as a switchman in Belen, New Mexico. The jury returned a verdict adverse to plaintiff and he appeals. *205 Plaintiff contends under point I that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested instructions Nos. 18 and 19 in lieu of the court's instruction No. 10 (U.J.I. 12.10), alleging it incorrectly states causation as applied to cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.). Plaintiff's tendered instructions Nos. 18 and 19, which were refused, are as follows: The two above instructions were taken from Mathes and Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, at 517 (1965). Instruction No. 10 given by the court, reads as follows: The instructions must be viewed as a whole and each should be considered in the light of all the others and, if they fairly present the law, that is all that is required. Sturgeon v. Clark, 69 N.M. 132, 364 P.2d 757 (1961), and cases cited therein. The court properly instructed the jury in this regard, as instruction No. 4 reads: The court's instruction No. 10 does not stand alone as it is not the only instruction pertinent to causation. The court gave further instructions on causation, Nos. 11 and 15, as follows: In Iannacito v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 380 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir.1967), the trial court gave the "proximate cause" instruction which was standard in its district for ordinary negligence cases and, in addition, instructed under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In affirming the lower court, it was stated: In Tyree v. New York Central Railroad Company, 382 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1967), a judgment was entered on a verdict for the railroad company which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014, 88 S. Ct. 589, 19 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1967). The trial court gave the standard proximate cause negligence case instruction, as well as an instruction under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. There the court, with particularly clear insight into the problem, stated 382 F.2d at 529: We are in accord with the language quoted, but just as in that case where it was held that the Mathes and Devitt instructions requested would have been better, nevertheless, the use of the usual definition of "proximate cause" was not reversible error where the instructions as a whole made the applicable rule of law clear. We conclude here that the instructions as a whole were sufficient to overcome any questions that may have been caused by the use of U.J.I. 12.10 (trial court's instruction No. 10) and that no reversible error resulted. The judgment in favor of appellee is affirmed. It is so ordered. NOBLE, C.J., and MOISE, J., concur.