Case Title: JEFFERY LEE CARTER V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 2010 WY 136, 241 P.3d 476

Docket Number: 461290

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cite as: 2010 WY 136, 241 P.3d 476

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
JEFFERY 
LEE CARTER,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff)

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
H. Reese, Contract Appellate Counsel, of Michael Henry Reese, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
 VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jeffery Lee 
Carter (Carter) was tried by a jury and convicted of the second-degree murder of 
Johnny Shane Moody (Moody).  Carter 
appeals from the Judgment and Sentence, arguing prosecutorial misconduct and 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Did the prosecutor commit 
misconduct by referring to Carter as the "black guy" and Moody as the "white 
guy"?

 
 
2.   Was trial counsel 
ineffective?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During an 
argument that turned into a physical altercation, Carter stabbed Moody, killing 
him.  Carter was arrested for, 
charged with, and eventually convicted of second-degree murder.  He was subsequently sentenced to 
incarceration for not less than thirty-five years, nor more than forty-five 
years, with credit for time served.  
Carter appeals from the Judgment and Sentence arguing prosecutorial 
misconduct and several instances of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Finding no prosecutorial 
misconduct or ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we 
affirm.

 
 

DISCUSSION 

 
 
Did 
the prosecutor commit misconduct by referring to Carter as the "black guy" and 
Moody as the "white guy"?

 
 
[¶4]      Carter claims 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly referring during the 
trial to him as the "black guy" and to Moody as the "white guy."  Carter further claims that these 
comments deprived him of a fair trial and an impartial jury guaranteed to him by 
principles of due process and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as applied to the states through application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Regarding claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct, we have said the following:

 
 
Claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct are settled in reference to the entire record and 
hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced that the defendant 
did not have a fair trial.  Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997).  The propriety of a closing argument is 
considered in the context of the entire argument.  Id.  Reversal is warranted when a reasonable 
possibility exists that, absent the error, the appellant may have enjoyed a more 
favorable verdict.  Id.

 
 

Campbell 
v. State, 
999 P.2d 649, 663 (Wyo. 
2000).  No objection was made at 
trial to the alleged improper comments by the prosecutor, so we apply a plain 
error analysis.  Id.  Accordingly, in order for Carter to 
prevail on appeal, he must demonstrate 

 
 
that 
the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law which adversely affected a substantial right.  Reversal of a conviction on the basis of 
prosecutorial misconduct, which was not challenged in the trial court, is 
appropriate only when there is a substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice.  

 
 

Burton 
v. State, 
2002 WY 71, ¶ 13, 46 P.3d 309, 314 (Wyo. 2002) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).

 
 
[¶5]      As support for 
his contention that the prosecutor committed misconduct, Carter points to 
numerous times throughout the trial in which the prosecutor and witnesses made 
reference to him as the "black guy" and Moody as the "white guy."  On appeal, the State does not contest 
the fact that the record clearly reflects the prosecutor's repeated use of the 
phrases "black guy" and "white guy" throughout the trial.

 
 
[¶6]      Having satisfied 
the first prong of the plain error test  that the record clearly reflects the 
alleged error  we turn to the second prong to determine whether the alleged 
error violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  Carter points to numerous cases to 
support his contention that the prosecutor, by referring to him as the "black 
guy" and Moody as the "white guy," violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
prohibiting such comments.  The 
consistent theme throughout the cases cited by Carter, and others dealing with 
this particular issue, is the desire to remove illegitimate references to race 
from judicial proceedings to the fullest extent possible.  See State v. Garrett, 681 A.2d 362, 
367-68 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (prosecutor's comment in closing argument telling 
the jury not to let the defendant hide behind his "blackness," which was in 
response to defendant claiming he was being prosecuted for being black, was 
error, but not prejudicial); Reynolds v. 
State, 580 So. 2d 254, 255-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991) (In a 
sexual battery case involving black defendant and white victim, prosecutor's 
comments, such as asking jury to think about "how embarrassing it is for an 
18-year old white girl from Crestview to admit she was raped by a black man," 
were held to have improperly injected race into the trial and violated 
defendant's right to fair trial.); State 
v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 302-05 (Minn. 2002) (statement made by white 
juror to another juror regarding the area where crime was committed as being the 
"miracle mile" because it was a miracle if a white person could walk through 
that area without being beaten or robbed held improper and prejudicial); and Clark v. State, 59 So. 887, 888 (Miss. 
1912) (denial of black defendant's request for instruction stating that "he is 
entitled to be tried by the same rules of evidence and law as if he were a white 
man" upheld).  We continue to 
recognize that core principle as a prerequisite to a fair trial, but we also 
follow the reasoning found in this Court's jurisprudence, and others, which 
recognize legitimate exceptions to the general principle that race should be 
excluded to the fullest extent possible.  
See Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 663 
(prosecutor's references to victim being mixed race and defendant's boyfriend 
being white were legitimate grounds for the use of race as it established motive 
for abuse of the child); State v. 
Hill, 414 S.E.2d 73, 76-77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (Use of defendant's and 
victim's skin color as a means of identification was not error and "did not 
cause the issue of race to improperly dominate the defendant's trial.'"); Lee v. State, 560 P.2d 226, 233 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1977) (prosecutor's request for witness to provide description of robbers and 
witness's response using their race as descriptions was "legitimate and 
proper").

 
 
[¶7]      Turning to the 
present case, we find that the best way to demonstrate how the phrases "white 
guy" and "black guy" were used throughout the trial is to provide samples of 
testimony.  For brevity's sake, we 
are not quoting every portion of the record that contains those phrases, but we 
have reviewed the entire record and determined that the following samples are 
representative of the context and purpose for which the phrases were used 
throughout the remainder of the unquoted portions of the record.  For instance, the following colloquy 
between the prosecutor and one of the witnesses, who did not know the names of 
Carter or Moody, shows that the witness described them based, in part, on race 
when asked to identify the parties involved in the fight.  This colloquy demonstrates the 
prosecutor's attempts to use descriptive features that other witnesses relied on 
to identify Carter and Moody, such as the color of Carter's shirt and the fact 
that Moody was not wearing a shirt, in order to make all of the witnesses' 
testimony consistent and clear to the jury. 

 
 
Q.    Okay.  How many people were down by the trash 
cans?

 
 
A.    There was [sic] two, maybe 
three people.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  What were they 
doing?

 
 
A.    
Arguing.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Describe the people that are arguing for 
me.  What do they look 
like?

 
 
A.    One person was black; the 
other person was a heavy-set white person.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  The  the white guy, does he have a 
shirt on?

A.    No.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  The black guy, does he have a shirt 
on?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
Q.    How would you describe that 
shirt?

 
 
A.    I am sorry.  I don't remember 

 
 
Q.    Okay.

 
 
A.     what 
color.

 
 
Q.    Do you remember describing it 
to the police as a tan shirt with a big stripe on it?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
[¶8]      While some 
witnesses used race to identify Moody and Carter, several witnesses who 
testified, including people who witnessed the murder and police officers who 
were first on the scene, knew the names of Moody and Carter and could identify 
them without the need to mention their respective race.  For example, when the State questioned a 
witness who knew both Carter and Moody, the prosecutor attempted to tie that 
witness's testimony to what previous witnesses had 
testified:

 
 
Q.    Who were the  who were the 
individuals that were arguing as you witnessed that standing at the end of the 
balcony?

 
 
A.    Jeff and 
John.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Jeff meaning Mr. 
Carter?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
Q.    And John meaning Mr. 
Moody?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And then Renee comes into the picture; 
what does she do?

 
 
A. 
   She starts hitting 
Moody.

 
 
Q.    She starts hitting Mr. 
Moody?

 
 
A.    Yeah.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Now, did you notice . . . what kind of 
clothing that Mr. Moody was wearing at that time?

 
 
A.    He didn't have no shirt 
on.

 
 
During 
yet another witness's testimony  a witness who knew Carter, but did not know 
Moody  the following exchange occurred between her and the 
prosecutor:

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And do you know  in the time that you 
lived here, did you ever become acquainted with the defendant, Jeff 
Carter?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Can you just tell us how it was that you 
met Mr. Carter?

 
 
A.    (No 
response.)

 
 
Q.    Maybe I'll ask you this, it 
might help to clarify:  How long 
have you known Mr. Carter?

 
 
A.    Since 
May.

 
 
Q.    May of this 
year?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
Sir.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Now . . . did you have occasion, also, 
to ever meet a man by the name of John Shane Moody?

 
 
A.    No, 
sir.

Q.    Did you ever have occasion to 
meet a man by the name of Shane?

 
 
A.    No, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Do you recall an incident at all in a 
laundromat involving the defendant Jeff Carter and another 
man?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And you were there visiting another 
friend?

 
 
A.    Yeah, I was just sitting 
there.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And at some point, Mr. Carter showed 
up?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Now, at some point did another gentleman 
show up?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  What happened when this other  how 
would you describe this other gentleman?

 
 
A.    He was a white man to me at 
that time.

 
 
Q.    Okay.

 
 
A.    And he told 

 
 
Q.    Did you know his 
name?

 
 
A.    No, sir, at the time I 
didn't.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  He's a white man.  Can you describe him for us, 
please?

 
 
A.    He's about my height and had 
brown hair, and he didn't have a shirt on.  
He had some shorts, and he camed [sic] up and he approached Jeff. . . 
.

 
 
[¶9]      We also find 
relevant the fact that Carter's trial counsel also used race as a means of 
description when questioning witnesses unfamiliar with Carter or Moody's 
names.  One such instance is as 
follows:

 
 
Q.    Where was Mr. Carter when you 
saw  when you came out and looked down in the middle of the 
street?

 
 
A.    He was standing on the left 
side of the gentleman in front of him.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  This left side of 

 
 
A.    This 
side.

 
 
Q.    Would be of the white guy 
with no shirt?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    Okay.  And so there were  was it three 
individuals facing towards him?

 
 
A.    Well, the gentleman that  or 
gentleman or female  I couldn't tell you if it was male or female standing 
behind the tree.  I don't know where 
they were facing.  But the two that 
I could clearly see was facing the white man. 

 
 
[¶10]   Although Carter is correct that 
there is an abundant use of the phrases "white guy" and "black guy" throughout 
the record, we cannot say that the use of those phrases was for anything other 
than the legitimate purpose of describing the actors involved, and such use was 
not intended to inflame the jury or prejudice Carter.  Rather, the phrases were used as a means 
to describe the actors involved, including the defendant and victim.  The race of the defendant and victim was 
obvious to the jury and the use of those phrases told them nothing they did not 
already know from their own courtroom observations.  See State v. Kirk, 472 P.2d 237, 239, 
240 (Kan. 1970) (The prosecutor's question to witness as to whether witness knew 
"the young colored gentleman sitting at the table" was not a violation of 
defendant's substantive right to a fair trial as "[t]he jury was told nothing it 
did not already know from courtroom observation, and from evidence properly 
admitted.").  Because we cannot say 
that the prosecutor's use of the phrases "black guy" and "white guy" as a means 
of describing the defendant and the victim violated any clear and unequivocal 
rule of law, Carter has failed to prove plain error.  

 
 
[¶11]   Carter also claims that it was 
error to admit into evidence and that he was prejudiced by the admission into 
evidence of his videotaped interrogation where the detectives make several 
references to the victim as the "white guy."  Specifically, Carter takes exception to 
a portion of the video where one of the detectives, in the course of trying to 
get Carter to tell them what happened, offers the following possible 
explanation:  "Some white guy that 
thought he was gonna get the better of you.  Why don't you sit up here and talk to 
us."  Carter did not object to this 
at trial and therefore we review this claim of error under plain error.  Because the video clearly depicts the 
scene about which Carter complains, the first prong of plain error is 
satisfied.  Regarding the second and 
third prongs of the plain error analysis  that the prosecutor violated a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law and that it adversely affected a substantial right  
we note that this is not a situation where the prosecutor was interjecting race 
into the trial in an attempt to prejudice or disparage Carter, but rather these 
were comments made in the course of the detectives' investigation.  One of the witnesses testified that he 
heard the defendant say, "You don't mess with a black man, he'll stick you or 
shoot you."  Apparently, the 
detectives were following up on the possibility of race as a possible motive for 
the crime.  Furthermore, this 
particular comment made up a small portion of the interrogation video and 
overall trial.  See Garrett, 681 A.2d  at 368 (Improper 
racial comments made by prosecutor did not warrant reversal because they "were 
restricted to a very brief segment of the state's entire closing argument. . . . 
and did not pervade the entire trial.").  Additionally, the evidence of Carter's 
guilt was quite strong, especially considering the number of witnesses who 
testified to seeing Carter be the aggressor in the fight and then observing 
Carter stab Moody.  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot say that playing that portion of the video was error, 
or that it violated Carter's substantial rights.  Accordingly, Carter has failed to prove 
plain error. 

 
 
Was 
trial counsel ineffective?

 
 
[¶12]   Carter alleges that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for three reasons:  (1) failing to object to the "white guy" 
and "black guy" comments discussed above; (2) failing to file a motion to 
suppress Carter's statements made to the police and replayed to the jury; and 
(3) calling a defense witness who was impeached by the State.  Regarding claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, we have said the following:

 
 
An 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that:  1) counsel's 
performance was deficient and 2) prejudice resulted.  Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 594 (Wyo. 2006), 
citing Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
[2059], 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Both 
components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and 
fact.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 698, 104 S.Ct. [at 
2070].  Our review, therefore, is 
de novo.  United States v. 
Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, fn. 
16 (10th Cir. 1989).

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Hirsch, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d  at 593.  We indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Id.  Under the two-prong standard articulated 
in Strickland, to 
warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant 
must demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency 
prejudiced the defense of the case.  
Id. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must 
be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result."  Id., quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S.Ct. [at 
2064].

 
 

The 
burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on the 
appellant.  Martinez v. 
State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo. 2006).  The appellant must also demonstrate the 
existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel's 
performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different.  Id.  A failure to make the required showing of 
either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness 
claim.  Id.  An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed 
of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.  Id.  When ineffective assistance of counsel 
is alleged due to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, prejudice to a 
defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been 
granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, only a limited amount of evidence 
remained to support a conviction.  Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 12, 121 P.3d 127, 132-33 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

Dettloff 
v. State, 
2007 WY 29, ¶¶ 17-19, 152 P.3d 376, 382-83 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
1.    Failing to object to the 
"white guy" and "black guy" comments

 
 
[¶13]   As noted above, we find no error in 
the use of the phrases "white guy" and "black guy" in the context in which they 
were used to describe the actors involved in this case.  Additionally, with regard to the 
comments made by the detectives on the interrogation video, even if that portion 
of the video was played in error, which we have not concluded, Carter has not 
proven that it prejudiced him to the extent that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different, given the remaining amount of evidence against him.  Accordingly, Carter has failed to prove 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

 
 
2.    Failing to file a motion to 
suppress

 
 
[¶14]   
Carter claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file a motion to suppress the interrogation video, which was played for the 
jury.  Specifically, Carter argues 
that his statements were involuntary because the detectives who were 
interviewing him would not allow him to sleep, and Carter's trial counsel's 
failure to file a suppression motion, on that ground, constitutes 
ineffectiveness. 

 
 
[¶15]   The first step in determining 
whether Carter's trial counsel was ineffective is to determine whether Carter's 
statements to detectives were involuntary.  
If they were voluntary, the motion would have been unsuccessful, and no 
prejudice resulted from the failure to bring the motion.  Dettloff, 2007 WY 29, ¶¶ 17-19, 152 P.3d  at 
382-83 (If a suppression motion would have been brought, but denied, the 
defendant suffers no prejudice from the failure to bring such a motion.).  The law relating to voluntariness of 
statements in Wyoming was stated in State 
v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120 
(Wyo. 1997):

 
 
Confessions, 
admissions, and statements are constitutionally required to be voluntary by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Art. 1, 
§ 6 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478, 92 S. Ct. 619, 
621, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972); Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 1991). 
 The voluntariness requirement has 
been a part of the United States Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence since its decision in Bram v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S. Ct. 183, 187, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897).  Additional constitutional requirements 
concerning voluntariness were imposed by theCourt's decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), for custodial 
interrogations.

 
 

It 
is well established, however, that satisfying Miranda does not resolve 
the question of voluntariness.  A 
confession may be found involuntary because of the means used to obtain it. 
 Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992, 88 S. Ct. 489, 19 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1967); People v. Scott, 198 Colo. 371, 600 P.2d 68, 69 (1979).  A confession which is the product of 
either mental or physical coercion by the government is untrustworthy and cannot 
be used for any purpose in the trial of the case.  In Wyoming, the State has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that a confession, admission, or statement was given voluntarily. 
 Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 1989); 
Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 308-09 (Wyo. 1977). 
 Admission of an involuntary 
confession offends due process, whether or not the defendant was in custody when 
the confession was given.  Black, 820 P.2d  at 971. . . 
.

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
Statements 
are made voluntarily if they are the product of a citizen's free and deliberate 
choice rather than of governmental intimidation, coercion, or deception. 
 Bravo [v. State], 897 
P.2d [1303,] 1305 [(Wyo. 1995)]. "Involuntariness requires coercive state 
action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or mistreatment."  Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 
1762, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986)).  We have held that voluntariness must 
proceed from the spontaneous suggestion of the citizen's own mind, free from the 
influence of any extraneous disturbing cause.  Maki v. State, 18 Wyo. 481, 487, 112 P. 334, 335 (1911).  In State v. Jones, 73 Wyo. 122, 276 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 
1954), we quoted from Wharton on Criminal Evidence that "even a slight 
inducement held out by such a person [in a position of authority] renders the 
confession involuntary."  Jones, 73 Wyo. at 144, 276 P.2d  at 455; 
see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 
1471, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (similarly holding that even a slight inducement 
will render a statement involuntary).  Jones quoted approvingly of a New 
Mexico decision:

 
 

When 
direct or implied promises made by the person in authority are shown "the law 
cannot measure the force of the influence thereby produced; neither can the 
courts determine in what degree they affected the mind of the accused and to 
what extent they entered into his decision to confess. Hence, the rule is 
established that, . . . confessions which are made [under such conditions] must 
be excluded."

 
 

Jones, 
73 Wyo. at 141, 276 P.2d  at 453 (quoting State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 214 P. 583, 584 (1923)). Our later 
decisions summarize that a confession offends due process if the suspect's will 
was overborne by the police and the suspect's capacity for self-determination 
was seriously impaired.  Yung v. 
State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 1995). 
 In Wyoming, coercive police tactics 
violate the due process clause of Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 6 and statements elicited 
pursuant to these tactics may be suppressed. Yung, 906 P.2d  at 1035.  This Court has not yet decided whether 
coercion is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is involuntary 
under our state constitution; however, coercive government activity is a 
necessary predicate to finding involuntariness within the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 606.  Once the evidence establishes state actor coercion, a court 
must consider the effect of that coercion on the defendant's choice to confess 
or make an admission or statement.  Id.  Unless the court finds that coercive 
conduct caused the defendant to speak, the court must find the statement to be 
voluntary and the statement is admissible.  Id.  We recognize that coercion can be mental 
as well as physical.  Id. 
 The use of tricks or factual 
misstatements in and of themselves does not render a confession involuntary. 
 Id.

 

 
. 
. . .

 
 
Relevant 
factors concerning the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation include:

 
 
whether 
the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the 
situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation 
and whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; whether 
the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to 
the interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course 
of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied 
threat or promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed 
by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.

 

 

People 
v. Gennings, 
808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991); 
see also Yung, 906 P.2d  at 1034; Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 139-40 (Wyo. 1995); 
Vigil v. State, 
859 P.2d 659, 665 
(Wyo. 1993); Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 386 (Wyo. 1992); 
Black, 820 P.2d 
at 971-72; Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 607; Stone [v. 
State], 745 P.2d [1344,] 1348 [(Wyo. 1987)]; Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

Evans, 
944 P.2d  at 1124-26.

 
 
[¶16]   Carter claims that his statements 
were involuntary because he was sleep deprived and intoxicated at the time of 
the interrogation.1  Specifically, Carter points to numerous 
portions of the interrogation video in which he complains to the detectives that 
he is "tired" or that he just "wants to sleep" and another portion of the 
interrogation video in which Carter told the detectives that he had 
approximately a six pack of beer and a "pint" to drink that night.  We have recognized that sleep 
deprivation and intoxication are factors which can make a statement 
involuntary.  See Burnett v. State, 997 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wyo. 2000) 
(discussing the requirement that sleep deprivation must be used as a means of 
coercive state action in order for it to make a statement involuntary (citing People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 213 (Colo. 1998)); Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, ¶ 25, 115 P.3d 14, 26 (Wyo. 2005) 
(Evidence of intoxication by itself does not render a statement per se 
involuntary, but will do so if "the impairment [is] so great as to deprive an 
individual of a capacity to understand the meaning of his statements."); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo. 1972) 
(same).

 
 
[¶17]   In the above-cited Burnett case, the appellant raised a 
similar sleep-deprivation argument to that raised here.  In Burnett, the appellant claimed that her 
trial counsel was ineffective because her counsel should have pursued a motion 
to suppress her statement, given to police, arguing that it was involuntary due 
to getting "very little sleep the night before she gave the statement, she had 
difficulty standing up to men, and she was wearing her nightgown when she was 
taken to the police station and interviewed."  Burnett, 997 P.2d  at 1026.  In upholding Burnett's statements as 
voluntarily given, we stated, 

 
 
Even 
if we were to assume, arguendo, that 
Burnett's claims regarding the circumstances of her statement were entirely 
true, there still was no basis for the suppression of her statement.  "Involuntariness requires coercive 
state action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or mistreatment.'"  State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Wyo. 1997) 
(quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708, 113 S. Ct. 1745, [1762,] 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)).  Absent such coercive 
state action, we will not determine that a statement is involuntary.  See People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 213 (Colo. 1998) 
("Absent evidence that the officers deprived Valdez of food and rest as a means 
of physical punishment, the fact that Valdez happened to be hungry and tired 
does not support a conclusion that his statements were 
involuntary[.]").

 
 

Id. 
at 1026.  Carter attempts to 
distinguish Burnett from this case by 
stating that the Court in Burnett did 
not find any coercive state action, but in the current case 

 
 
the 
coercive state action is evident on the face of the exhibit, where Mr. Carter is 
repeatedly refused sleep and told that he will not be allowed to sleep until he 
answers the questions of the detectives.  
This echoes the language of Valdez, quoted by this Court in Burnett, above, only here, there is 
evidence that Mr. Carter was "deprived . . . of . . . 
rest."

 
 
[¶18]   While it is true that Carter 
requested to be left alone so that he could sleep, the mere fact that the 
detectives continued to ask Carter for information is not dispositive of whether 
Carter's statements were voluntary.  
As noted above, numerous factors are considered under a totality of the 
circumstances test to make a voluntariness determination.  Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1126; see supra ¶ 15.  Application of those factors to this 
particular situation supports the thesis that Carter's statements were 
voluntary.  Carter was provided Miranda warnings prior to the 
interrogation; Carter acknowledged to detectives that he understood his rights; 
Carter is capable of reading and writing; Carter has a GED; Carter was 45 years 
old at the time of the interrogation; Carter is experienced in dealing with 
police having been arrested dozens of times in the past; no threats or promises 
were made by detectives; the interrogation was only just over an hour in length; 
Carter did not complain about sleep throughout the entire interrogation; sleep 
deprivation was not being used as a form of physical punishment; Carter was 
permitted to sleep for several hours from the time he was arrested, at 10:00 
p.m., until the time the interrogation began, at approximately 4:30 a.m.; and 
Carter was not denied food or water  in fact, Carter was provided water at 
least twice upon request.  
Furthermore, a review of the interrogation video reveals that Carter was 
lucid and coherent throughout most of the interrogation.  He seemed fully to understand what was 
going on and maintained his denial of involvement in the murder throughout the 
interrogation.  Moreover, when we 
compare this case with other cases finding statements to be involuntary due to 
the totality of the circumstances, including sleep deprivation, it is evident 
that this case is factually much different than those cases, which compels our 
decision to uphold Carter's statements as voluntary.  See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 
520-21, 88 S. Ct. 1152, 1153-54 (1968) (statement held involuntary where 
defendant requested counsel and was denied access, was not advised of his 
rights, was not provided food or necessary medication for high blood pressure 
for over thirteen hours, and defendant claimed he did not sleep from time he was 
arrested at 10:45 p.m. until he provided a confession at 11:30 a.m. the next 
day); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 707-711, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 1339-41 (1967) (third confession by defendant 
involuntary because, although not denied food or sleep prior to confession, it 
could not be separated from facts of first two confessions where defendant was 
held in custody for 36 hours prior to being taken before a magistrate, had no 
contact with a lawyer, had little sleep or food, was administered several 
polygraphs, was driven on a 600 mile road trip, detained at least three 
different police stations, and appeared to be sick); and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 
153-55, 64 S. Ct. 921, 926 (1944) (statements involuntary where, for 36 hours, 
defendant was held incommunicado, without sleep, and was questioned by numerous 
officers).  Given the totality of 
the circumstances, and the cases cited herein, we cannot say that Carter's will 
was overborne due to lack of sleep, which would render his statements 
involuntary.

 
 
[¶19]   Turning now to Carter's argument 
relating to intoxication, we have said

 
 
Intoxication 
from alcohol does not per se establish involuntariness.  State v. Baker, 4 Kan. App. 2d 340, 606 P.2d 120, 123 (1980); and State v. 
Tucker, 32 Wash. App. 83, 645 P.2d 711, 713 (1982).  Instead, 
for intoxication to render a confession involuntary, the impairment must be so 
great as to deprive an individual of a capacity to understand the meaning of his 
statements.  See Lee v. State, Okla. Crim., 700 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1985).  Even though a defendant appears 
intoxicated, the fact that he understood what he was doing, carried on a 
conversation and responded to questions will render the statements 
admissible.  State v. Curry, 127 Ariz. 1, 617 P.2d 785, 787 (App. 1980).  The proper 
inquiry regarding intoxication is whether a confession cannot be said to be the 
product of rational intellect and free will because of extreme 
intoxication.  State v. Corona, 60 Or. App. 500, 655 P.2d 216, 219-220 (1982).

 
 

Stone 
v. State, 
745 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Wyo. 
1987).  We have also 
stated:

 
 
"The 
general rule applicable to confessions obtained from persons under intoxication 
has been well stated to the effect that proof that the accused was intoxicated 
at the time he confessed his guilt of crime will not, without more, bar the 
reception of the confession in evidence.  
But if it is shown that the accused was intoxicated to the degree of 
mania, or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statements, then the 
confession is inadmissible.'  . . 
."

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

Lonquest 
v. State, 
495 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo. [1972]), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S. Ct. 432, 34 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1972) (quoting People v. 
Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300, 
279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 226 N.E.2d 305, 308, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874, 88 S. Ct. 164, 19 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1967)).

 
 

Siler 
v. State, 
2005 WY 73, ¶ 25, 115 P.3d 14, 26 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶20]   As noted above, Carter was coherent 
during the interrogation.  Although 
he denied any knowledge of the events about which the detectives were 
questioning him, he seemed to understand his situation and what the detectives 
were asking.  He was able to answer 
questions relating to his name, date of birth, people he knew from the Casper 
area, details about the general location where the murder occurred, and to 
provide specific details about his whereabouts the night in question.  There is no evidence of such a level of 
intoxication that would cause us to doubt the video, where he appeared to be 
coherent and able to understand the meaning of his statements.  The fact that Carter claimed to have had 
approximately a six pack of beer and a "pint" to drink that night does not by 
itself show that his statements were involuntary.  Id. at ¶ 25, at 26 (evidence that 
defendant was intoxicated at time of confession will not, by itself, bar 
admission).  Furthermore, although 
determination of intoxication as it relates to voluntariness of statements is 
done on a case-by-case basis, it is worth noting that we have upheld statements 
in situations where the evidence of intoxication of the defendant was much more 
certain and extreme than in this case.  
See Id. at ¶¶ 23-28, at 25-28 
(statements held voluntary although witnesses corroborated defendant's claims of 
excessive drinking the night prior to his early morning confession and officer's 
statements of strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath); Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Wyo. 1987) 
(statements upheld where defendant's blood alcohol content was between 0.15 and 
0.20 around time of statements and officer noted an of odor of alcohol coming 
from defendant); Lonquest, 495 P.2d  
at 579-82 (statements upheld where defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.374, 
one-and-one-half hours prior to statements).  Accordingly, we cannot say that Carter's 
statements were involuntary.  

 
 
[¶21]   Therefore, because it has not been 
shown that Carter's will was overborne due to sleep deprivation or intoxication, 
it also has not been shown that Carter's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to suppress his statements based on those 
grounds.

 
 
3.    Calling a defense witness who 
was impeached by the State

 
 
[¶22]   Carter's final claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel is based on the fact that his trial counsel called a 
witness, E.W., in his defense who was subsequently impeached by the State.  Specifically, Carter claims that because 
E.W. testified inconsistently with what he told police the night of the murder 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for calling E.W. as a witness because 
E.W. was so easily impeached and therefore was not credible to the jury.  At trial, E.W. testified on direct 
examination that he had not been drinking the night of the murder because he was 
on probation.  He further testified 
that he witnessed Moody get up from a chair and push Carter to the ground and 
then follow Carter as he tried to walk away.  At that point, E.W.'s testimony appeared 
to favor Carter in that it helped prove that Moody was the aggressor.  However, on cross-examination, when 
asked about being questioned by the police regarding his whereabouts and whether 
he told the police that he was at a bar earlier in the evening, E.W. denied 
having spoken with the police at all that night.  The State then called, as a rebuttal 
witness, the police officer who spoke with E.W. the night of the murder.  The officer testified that E.W. told him 
that night that he and a couple of friends had just returned from the bar and 
did not see anything that occurred.

 
 
[¶23]   It is clear from the record that 
the State was able effectively to question the reliability of E.W.'s testimony 
through cross-examination and use of a rebuttal witness.  Carter does not point to any case, and 
we are aware of none, that stands for the proposition that the mere fact of 
impeachment of a defense witness equates to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Moreover, given the number 
of witnesses who testified that Carter was the aggressor, it is conceivable that 
this was defense counsel's only chance to bolster Carter's self-defense argument 
by offering a witness to provide an alternative view of the events.  In that light, calling E.W. as a witness 
could be reasonable trial strategy, and the fact that the State impeached E.W. 
does not overcome the presumption that counsel was effective.  See Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Wyo. 1987) 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) ("Judicial 
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.  It is all too tempting for a defendant to 
second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it 
is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved 
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable.").  In any event, to 
find Carter's trial counsel ineffective for calling E.W. as a witness would 
require us to speculate as to the reasoning for calling E.W. as a defense 
witness and attempt to eliminate any possible reasonable trial strategy for 
doing so, which we will not do.2  Accordingly, we cannot say that Carter's 
trial counsel was ineffective for calling E.W. as a witness.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   Carter's claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct regarding the use of the phrases "white guy" and "black guy" fails 
because the phrases were a legitimate means to describe the parties involved in 
this case.  Furthermore, the phrases 
were not used in a way that was intended to prejudice Carter, nor could Carter 
demonstrate any prejudice.  Carter's 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on counsel's failure to 
object to those comments fails for the same reasons.  Likewise, Carter's ineffective 
assistance claim based on his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to 
suppress his statements fails because Carter's will was not overborne due to 
sleep deprivation or intoxication, and no showing was made of police misconduct 
during the interview, meaning his statements were voluntarily given to 
detectives.  Finally, Carter's claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon the calling of E.W. as a 
witness fails because it cannot be shown that such was not part of counsel's 
limited trial strategy options.

 
 
[¶25]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Carter also makes a brief general argument that his statements were 
involuntary because of "deception by the officers during their interview" of 
him.  However, he does not elaborate 
on this argument and after reviewing the interrogation video we cannot find a 
logical basis for this argument.  
Accordingly, we will not further discuss it.  See Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 12, 125 P.3d 269, 274 (Wyo. 2005) ("We 
have consistently stated that we will not consider claims devoid of cogent 
argument and citation to legal authority."). 

 
 

2We note that Carter also briefly claims that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction to instruct the jury 
that it could only consider E.W.'s prior inconsistent statements for purposes of 
impeachment and not for substantive evidence of a crime.  However, 
"[c]ounsel may, as a matter of trial strategy, choose not to request a limiting 
instruction in order to avoid emphasizing the unfavorable evidence."  Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Wyo. 
1997).