Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF BD, JW and CW: BW V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0216

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF BD, JW and CW: BW V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 18226 P.3d 272Case Number: S-08-0216Decided: 02/23/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF BD, JW and CW: 
BW,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk 
A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This appeal 
arises from an indirect criminal contempt action against Appellant, BW 
(hereinafter Father).  The juvenile 
court found Father in criminal contempt for violating its order entered in a 
neglect proceeding and sentenced him to a term of incarceration in the county 
jail.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we vacate Father's criminal contempt conviction.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Father challenges 
his conviction for indirect criminal contempt on several grounds.  We find, however, that the dispositive 
issue in this appeal is whether the juvenile court followed proper procedural 
requirements in finding Father in indirect criminal contempt.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The basic 
pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute.  On November 1, 2006, an adjudication of 
neglect under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402, et seq. (LexisNexis 2005), the Child 
Protection Act, was entered against Father for not providing adequate care 
necessary for the well-being of his minor children.  During a subsequent review hearing held 
on October 1, 2007, the juvenile court ordered Father to satisfy certain 
requirements within a specified period of time.  On January 28, 2008, the State filed an 
Information in the underlying juvenile neglect case charging Father with 
indirect criminal contempt pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-438 (LexisNexis 
2009), alleging Father had failed to comply with the juvenile court's 
order.  The Information bore the 
same docket number and caption as the juvenile case, with Father added as a 
named defendant.  After a bench 
trial on June 26, 2008, the juvenile court found Father in indirect criminal 
contempt and sentenced him to ninety days incarceration, with all but five days 
suspended in favor of probation.  In 
accord with the juvenile court's rulings, a Judgment and Sentence was entered in 
the underlying juvenile case.  It is 
this Judgment and Sentence that is the focus of this 
appeal.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      Criminal contempt 
is "a crime in every fundamental respect," and a conviction for criminal 
contempt is indistinguishable from an ordinary criminal conviction.  Swain v. State, 2009 WY 142, ¶ 13, 220 P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Bloom 
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 1481-82, 20 L. Ed. 522 (1968); 
Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715, 722 
n.5 (Wyo. 1992)).  Because of its 
punitive character, a court imposing criminal contempt sanctions must comply 
with due process.  The due process 
protections of one charged with criminal contempt have been addressed in Rule 42 
of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.1  Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138, ¶ 18, 54 P.3d 754, 760 (Wyo. 2002); United Mine 
Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Wyo. 
1989) (decided under the old rule, W.R.Cr.P. 41).  Subparagraph (c) delineates the due 
process safeguards attendant to indirect criminal contempt actions which must be 
satisfied in all such proceedings, and states: 

 
 

(c) Indirect (constructive) contempt 
proceedings. -- 
A criminal contempt, except as provided in subdivision (b) concerning direct 
contempt, shall be prosecuted in the following manner:

 

 

(1) 
Order to Show Cause. -- 
On the court's motion or upon affidavit of any person having knowledge of the 
facts, a judge may issue and sign an order directed to the accused, stating the 
essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and requiring the 
accused to appear before the court and show cause why the accused ought not be 
held in contempt of court. The order shall specify the time and place of the 
hearing, with a reasonable time allowed for preparation of a 
defense.

 

 

(2) 
Motions; Answer. -- The 
accused, personally or by counsel, may move to dismiss the order to show cause, 
move for a statement of particulars or answer such order by way of explanation 
or defense. All motions and the answer shall be in writing unless specified 
otherwise by the judge. An accused's omission to file motions or answer shall 
not be deemed as an admission of guilt of the contempt 
charged.

 

 

(3) 
Order of Arrest; Bail. 
-- If there is good reason to believe the accused will not appear in response to 
the order to show cause the judge may issue an order of arrest of the accused. 
The accused shall be admitted to bail in the manner provided by these 
rules.

 

 

(4) 
Arraignment; Hearing. -- 
The accused shall be arraigned at the time of the hearing, or prior 
thereto upon the request of the accused. A hearing to determine the guilt or 
innocence of the accused may follow a plea of not guilty or may be set for trial 
at a later date or time. The judge may conduct a hearing without assistance of 
counsel or may be assisted by the attorney for the state or by an attorney 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The accused is entitled to be 
represented by counsel, have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, 
and may testify in his own defense. Unless the charged contempt is tried to a 
jury as provided in subdivision (e), all issues of law and fact shall be heard 
and determined by the judge.

 

 

(5) 
Disqualification of Judge. 
-- If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a 
judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing and shall assign 
the matter to another judge.

 

 

(6) 
Verdict; Judgment. -- At 
the conclusion of the hearing the judge shall sign and enter of record a 
judgment of guilty or not guilty. In addition to the requirements of Rule 32, a 
judgment of guilt for contempt of court shall include a recital of the facts 
constituting the contempt.

 

 

(7) 
Sentence. -- Unless an 
accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary, a presentence investigation is not 
required but may be ordered. In other respects, Rule 32 shall apply to 
sentencing for contempt.

 
 
[¶5]      In addition to 
strict compliance with the due process mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 42(c), a proceeding 
in indirect criminal contempt must be instituted and conducted as a separate and 
independent criminal action apart from the original cause in which the contempt 
arose.  Swain, ¶¶ 15-17, 220 P.3d at 508-09; UMWA, Local 1972, 774 P.2d  at 1284; Garber v. United Mine Workers of 
America, 524 P.2d 578, 579-80 (Wyo. 1974).  That is, an indirect criminal contempt 
action may not be pursued and treated simply as a component of the case giving 
rise to the contemptuous conduct.  
We have held that the failure to adhere to the separate and independent 
action rule constitutes a fatal jurisdictional defect which renders any judgment 
of contempt null and void.  Swain, ¶ 17, 220 P.3d  at 509; UMWA, Local 1972, 774 P.2d  at 
1284.

 
 
[¶6]      With these 
principles in mind, we now turn to the case at hand.  Father was charged and convicted of 
indirect criminal contempt.  The 
Information against Father was filed in the underlying juvenile case, as was his 
Judgment and Sentence.  This 
procedure clearly violates the precedent of this Court mandating indirect 
criminal contempt actions be separate and independent from the underlying 
action.  The only question is 
whether due process protections attendant to indirect criminal contempt 
proceedings apply to contempt actions in juvenile court under the Child 
Protection Act.

 
 
[¶7]      There is no 
question that a juvenile court has the power to punish a party for contempt when 
the party fails to comply with an order of the court.  Pertinent to this appeal is Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-438 (LexisNexis 2009), which states:

 
 
Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the court upon its own motion or upon the motion of 
the district or county attorney, or guardian ad litem, may find that the child's 
parent, parents, or guardian or any other person who willfully violates, or 
neglects or refuses to obey or perform any order or provision of this act is 
liable for contempt of court and may be fined not more than five hundred dollars 
($500.00) or incarcerated not more than ninety (90) days, or both.[2]

 
 
[¶8]      The juvenile 
court statutes and rules, however, are silent as to the process to be followed 
in pursuing an indirect criminal contempt action.  Given this silence, and also given an 
alleged contemnor's constitutionally protected due process rights, we find the 
general criminal contempt law regarding the procedures to be followed applies, 
in equal force, to contempt proceedings arising under the Child Protection 
Act.

 
 
[¶9]      We do not 
overlook the fact that a juvenile court acting under the Child Protection Act 
operates as a court of equity, but these equitable powers exist to protect 
children from harmful conduct.  The 
purpose of an indirect criminal contempt action is to punish.  As previously noted, a conviction for 
criminal contempt is tantamount to an ordinary criminal conviction.  Indeed, it is, for all intents and 
purposes, a criminal action.  As 
such, it is very much an action at law rather than equity.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶10]   Within the context of the Child 
Protection Act, an alleged contemnor must be granted all due process rights 
mandated by law.  Because the 
contempt proceeding against Father was not conducted as an independent criminal 
action apart from the underlying juvenile case, with its own caption and docket 
number, the juvenile court never acquired jurisdiction to proceed.  Having no jurisdiction, its Judgment and 
Sentence of contempt is null and void and is hereby vacated.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Rule 42 distinguishes between contempt committed in the presence of the 
court (direct contempt), which may be summarily punished, and contempt occurring 
outside the court's presence and of which the court has no personal knowledge 
(indirect contempt), which may be punished only upon notice and 
hearing.

 
 

2As can be 
seen, a juvenile court's contempt authority is broad; it is limited only by the 
sanctions that may be imposed.