Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Norton

Citation: 2007-Ohio-6038

Docket Number: 20071120

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Norton, 116 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007-Ohio-6038.] 
 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. NORTON. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Norton, 116 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007-Ohio-6038.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Intentionally failing to seek client’s lawful objective 
—  Neglecting entrusted legal matter — Failure to disclose to client 
attorney’s failure to carry professional-liability insurance — Failure to 
cooperate in a disciplinary investigation — Six-month suspension stayed 
on conditions. 
(No. 2007-1120 — Submitted August 14, 2007 — Decided November 15, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-065. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Eric E. Norton of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0071563, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has 
recommended that we suspend respondent’s license to practice for six months, all 
stayed on conditions, based on findings that he neglected two clients’ cases, failed 
to advise the clients that he lacked malpractice insurance, and failed to cooperate 
in efforts to investigate alleged misconduct.  On review, we agree that respondent 
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and that a six-month stayed 
suspension is appropriate. 
{¶ 3} Relator, Cleveland Bar Association, charged respondent with four 
counts of professional misconduct, later dismissing Count III of the complaint 
along with several allegations of impropriety contained within Counts I, II, and 
IV.  A panel of the board heard the cause and, based on the parties’ extensive 
stipulations and other evidence, made findings of misconduct and recommended a 
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one-year license suspension, all stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of 
misconduct but modified the recommendation to the stayed six-month suspension. 
{¶ 4} Neither party has objected to the board’s recommendation. 
Misconduct 
Count I - The Todd Case 
{¶ 5} In early February 2005, Linda Todd, a nurse at a healthcare 
facility, slipped and fell in the facility’s parking lot.  While Todd was receiving 
workers’ compensation, her employer discharged her for missing work.  Todd 
agreed to have respondent file a retaliation claim on her behalf, and respondent 
advised Todd’s former employer that she anticipated filing a claim for unlawful 
retaliation under R.C. 4123.90. 
{¶ 6} Todd signed a retainer agreement in which respondent promised to 
investigate and file her claim on a contingent-fee basis.  The agreement also 
provided for respondent’s withdrawal if he determined “at any time that 
prosecution is not feasible.”  Respondent had no professional-liability insurance 
while representing Todd but failed to so advise his client. 
{¶ 7} Over the next few months, Todd sent respondent copies of her 
medical records and a written account detailing her accident.  She also repeatedly 
called respondent to ask questions about her case.  Respondent did not return a 
number of those calls, but in early May 2005, he emailed Todd and asked about 
the possibility of settling her case.  Todd sent respondent information about her 
economic losses, and respondent promised to relay a settlement offer to her 
former employer.  He never did. 
{¶ 8} Over the next several weeks, Todd again had difficulty getting 
respondent to return her calls.  In June 2005, Todd expressed in an email to 
respondent her dissatisfaction with his progress and her concern over an 
impending 180-day statute of limitations deadline.  Respondent did not reply to 
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3 
the email, or file suit on Todd’s behalf, or do any other work in the case for the 
rest of 2005. 
{¶ 9} In February 2006, respondent called Todd’s home, apparently 
because he heard that she had inquired about him from his former law firm, and 
told her husband that he was withdrawing from her case.  On February 23, 2006, 
respondent sent Todd’s case file to her with a letter advising that he could not 
continue representing her.  He explained:  “I am not withdrawing from your case 
because it lacks merit, but because the dollar losses are too low to justify litigating 
this case on a contingent fee basis.” 
{¶ 10} Respondent suggested in his letter that Todd hire another attorney.  
He did not, however, describe her claim as one for retaliation under R.C. 4123.90.  
He instead referred to Todd’s case as a wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy, citing cases including Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio 
St.3d 141, 2003-Ohio-5357, 797 N.E.2d 61, syllabus (“An employee who is 
receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 may 
not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work, when 
the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition”) and 
advising that a four-year statute of limitations applied.  Respondent then wished 
Todd “good luck,” saying nothing about the statute of limitations in R.C. 4123.90, 
which had by that time elapsed. 
{¶ 11} Respondent did not disclose his lack of malpractice insurance, 
failed to complete promised work, and then dropped Todd’s case.  Respondent 
has admitted, and we agree, that he thereby violated DR 1-104(A) (requiring a 
lawyer to advise clients if the lawyer does not carry sufficient malpractice 
insurance), 2-110(A)(2) (requiring a lawyer to take reasonable steps to avoid 
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client before withdrawing from 
representation), 2-110(C)(5) (requiring a lawyer to obtain a client’s free and 
knowing assent before withdrawing from representation when the lawyer is not 
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otherwise justified in withdrawing under the rule), 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of a client), and 7-
101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a contract 
for professional employment). 
Count II – The Torres Case 
{¶ 12} In August 2004, Frances Torres retained respondent to represent 
her in a personal injury claim against an ice cream manufacturer after she choked 
on a foreign object while eating one of the manufacturer’s products.  Torres 
signed a retainer agreement in which respondent promised to investigate and file 
her claim on a contingent-fee basis.  Torres also gave respondent the foreign 
object and the product packaging to help him prepare the case.  Respondent had 
no professional-liability insurance while representing Torres and did not so advise 
his client. 
{¶ 13} Respondent contacted the ice cream manufacturer in early 
September 2004 to advise of the Torres claim, and a claims representative asked 
for evidence of the incident and injury.  Respondent provided this evidence but 
then took no action in the case until November 2005, when Torres threatened to 
file a grievance against him.  Before then, Torres had tried repeatedly to contact 
respondent, but he had not returned many of her calls. 
{¶ 14} Within a week after Torres’s warning, respondent sent a settlement 
demand to the claims representative and, for approximately six months, tried to 
negotiate a settlement.  Torres submitted her grievance to relator in December 
2005 but, by March 2006, she had reconsidered and decided to keep respondent as 
her lawyer.  Respondent ultimately obtained a settlement offer that Torres 
accepted. 
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{¶ 15} Respondent did not disclose to Torres his lack of malpractice 
insurance or properly communicate with her about her case.  He stipulated, and 
we agree, that he thereby violated DR 1-104(A) and 6-101(A)(3). 
Count IV – Failure to Cooperate 
{¶ 16} In December 2005, relator sent two certified letters to respondent, 
requesting a written response to the Torres grievance and another grievance.  
Respondent received the letters but did not reply as requested.  Relator sent 
respondent two more letters in January 2006, this time requesting his responses by 
February 3, 2006.  Respondent did not reply as requested. 
{¶ 17} Respondent did, however, appear in March 2006 in response to a 
subpoena for his deposition and answered questions about the two grievances.  
Since that time, respondent has cooperated appropriately with efforts to 
investigate allegations of his misconduct.  Respondent admitted and we agree that 
his initial unresponsiveness violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to 
cooperate in a disciplinary investigation). 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider the 
duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney's mental state, 
and sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown (1999), 
87 Ohio St.3d 316, 320, 720 N.E.2d 525.  Before making a final determination, 
we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 
10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  See id.  See, also, Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 
Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, and Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Glatki  (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 993. 
{¶ 19} Respondent may not have caused his clients financial loss — 
Todd’s claim arguably remained actionable under Coolidge, she found another 
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job at the same salary to mitigate her damages, and respondent successfully 
settled Torres’s claim.  He nevertheless injured his clients by shrugging off their 
legitimate expectations that he would diligently pursue their interests.  He also 
failed the legal profession and the public by ignoring the inquiries of disciplinary 
authorities charged with monitoring the profession. 
{¶ 20} In his defense, respondent insisted that he did not deliberately 
ignore his clients.  He explained that he had simply “bitten off more than he could 
chew” while trying to practice on his own for the first time.  Respondent 
described his misconduct as careless mistakes and assured that he has since taken 
steps to improve the way he does business. 
{¶ 21} In recommending a one-year stayed suspension, the panel cited 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Micciulla, 106 Ohio St.3d 19, 2005-Ohio-3470, 830 
N.E.2d 332, in which we imposed this sanction and probation on a lawyer who 
had committed six counts of misconduct.  That lawyer neglected four clients’ 
cases, failed to seek the clients’ objectives, failed to carry out his professional 
employment contracts, and failed to disclose his lack of malpractice insurance.  
That lawyer also commingled and did not properly account for clients’ funds in 
violation of DR 9-102(A)(2) and (B)(3), and he intentionally injured two clients’ 
interests in violation of DR 7-101(A)(3).  The incidents of misconduct in 
Micciulla more than marginally surpass respondent’s improprieties. 
{¶ 22} Respondent has expressed remorse and faced up to his 
wrongdoing, a mitigating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d).  He has no 
prior disciplinary record, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), and has obtained 
malpractice insurance.  Through the testimony of colleagues and clients, 
respondent has also established his good character and reputation apart from the 
underlying misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  Finally, the 
aggravation evidence is fairly minimal – respondent acted in his own financial 
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interest in dropping the Todd case, but he did not do anything dishonest.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b). 
{¶ 23} In support of its recommendation, the board also cited Columbus 
Bar Assn. v. Watson, 106 Ohio St.3d 298, 2005-Ohio-4983, 834 N.E.2d 809.  In 
Watson, we suspended a lawyer’s license for six months, but stayed the 
suspension, because he neglected a client’s divorce case by failing to properly 
supervise a paralegal and then failing to disclose that he lacked malpractice 
insurance.  Respondent’s neglect and failure to disclose are comparable to the 
improprieties committed in Watson. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, the board recommended as a condition of the six-month 
stay that respondent be required to pursue continuing legal education (“CLE”) in 
law-office and case-file management, apparently attributing most of respondent’s 
problems to poor organizational skills in his practice.  We agree with this 
assessment.  In cases of lawyers with similar problems, we have stayed six-month 
suspensions on the same condition.  See Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 2002-Ohio-2987, 770 N.E.2d 1009; Disciplinary Counsel v. Harp 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 385, 745 N.E.2d 1032; Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Wilson 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 243, 730 N.E.2d 957. 
{¶ 25} Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for six months; however, the suspension is stayed on the conditions that 
respondent complete six hours of CLE in law-office and case-file management 
and commit no further misconduct during the suspension period.  If respondent 
fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay shall be lifted, and 
respondent shall serve the entire six-month suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
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LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Harold Reader and Gregory J. Phillips, for relator. 
Eric E. Norton, pro se. 
______________________