Case Title: Gottfried v. People

Citation: 408 P.2d 431

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1965-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
408 P.2d 431 (1965) William D. GOTTFRIED, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 21330. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. December 6, 1965. Downing & Knowlton, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Aurel M. Kelly, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. An information in two counts was filed in the district court of the City and County of Denver in which plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, and one Henry B. Williams, were accused of the crimes of burglary and conspiracy to commit that offense. The defendant Gottfried entered a plea of not guilty to each count. The issues as to him were tried to a jury which returned a *432 verdict of not guilty on the charge of burglary, and "Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Burglary as charged in the Second Count of the Information herein." The information was filed on January 2, 1963, and the date of the alleged offense was December 23, 1962. On January 22, 1963, counsel who had been appointed to represent the defendant filed a "Motion to Dismiss" and as grounds therefor alleged: This motion was denied on February 18, 1963. The trial began on August 20, 1963, and was concluded the following day with the result hereinabove indicated. In due course judgment entered on the verdict of the jury and the defendant was sentenced to a term in the state penitentiary of not less than seven nor more than ten years. Counsel presents his argument for reversal of the judgment under three captions as follows: *433 Defendant's principal grievances are that he was not taken before the justice of the peace within a reasonable time and that a complaint against him was not filed forthwith. These contentions were answered by this court in People v. Griffith, 130 Colo. 475, 276 P.2d 559, where it was said: This rule was again approved in Lowe v. People, 139 Colo. 578, 342 P.2d 631. The defendant concedes that the prejudice resulting from this alleged noncompliance with Rule 5(a) (2) is at best conjectural. It hardly seems necessary to point out that every presumption is indulged in favor of the regularity of the proceedings in the trial court and the burden of showing error is on the party asserting it. Kallnbach v. People, 125 Colo. 144, 242 P.2d 222; St. Louis v. People, 120 Colo. 345, 209 P.2d 538; Jones v. People, 93 Colo. 282, 26 P.2d 103. And since the objection does not go to the merits of the controversy, the duty is upon the defendant to show prejudice, if any, People v. Brown, 87 Colo. 261, 286 P. 859. But the defendant asserts that the necessity of showing prejudice is suspended where a constitutional principle has been violated. It is not necessary to consider the validity of this broad generalization, since the defendant has wholly failed to specify just what constitutional principle, privilege or right has been violated or denied to him. Great reliance is placed on Mallory v. United States 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479, to support the contention that noncompliance with Rule 5(a) (2) resulted in a violation of some nebulous constitutional right. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819, and Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100, are also cited as demonstrative of the argument. They are clearly distinguishable upon the facts. In those cases confessions were obtained during the period of prolonged detention and they were admitted upon the trial. The Supreme Court of the United States held such confessions to be inadmissible and ordered a new trial. These cases are certainly not authority for the proposition being asserted here that the charges must be dismissed and the defendant discharged. It is our considered judgment that the defendant in the instant case was not denied any constitutional right and no prejudice was shown by a delay in the presentation of the defendant before a magistrate or in the filing of the information following his arrest. With reference to the assignment hereinabove quoted under "B" it is sufficient to say that there was ample competent evidence to support the verdict. The judgment entered thereon is therefore proper. *434 The defendant objected to the giving of Instruction No. 10 which informed the jury that, "* * * possession of stolen property recently after the commission of theft or burglary may be a criminating circumstance tending to show that the person or persons in whose possession it was found was guilty of the offense of burglary * * *." The objection was that the instruction was not adequate to protect the defendant on his theory of the case that he had no knowledge of the stolen character of the property. Assuming arguendo that the instruction could have been improved upon, it could not have prejudiced the defendant for the simple reason that he was acquitted on the charge of burglary, and the instruction given was in nowise applicable to the count upon which he was convicted. The judgment is affirmed. SUTTON and FRANTZ, JJ., concur.