Case Title: Sartin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 128, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LARRY J. SARTIN, III 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 128, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. Nos. 1103008787,  
§  1103008790 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 26, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 21, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 21st day of October 2014, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
In 2011, the appellant, Larry J. Sartin, III, was indicted by Kent 
County and New Castle County grand juries for multiple felonies arising from 
burglaries and robberies in Kent County and New Castle County.  On August 18, 
2011, Sartin pled guilty in the Kent County Superior Court to one count of 
Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of Robbery in the Second Degree, and one 
count of Burglary in the Second Degree.  The plea agreement resolved cases in 
Kent County and New Castle County.   
2 
 
2. 
In the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and during the plea 
colloquy with the Superior Court, Sartin agreed that he was a habitual offender 
under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  The State and Sartin agreed to recommend that Sartin 
serve a total of twenty-one years of Level V incarceration.  The State also agreed 
to dismiss the remaining charges in Kent County and New Castle County.  On 
August 18, 2011, Sartin was declared a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 
4214(a) and sentenced as follows: (i) for Robbery in the First Degree, twenty-five 
years of Level V incarceration, suspended after three years for decreasing levels of 
supervision; (ii) for Burglary in the Second Degree, eight years of Level V 
incarceration; and (iii) for each of the counts of Robbery in the Second Degree, 
five years of Level V incarceration.  Sartin did not appeal his convictions or 
sentence. 
3. 
On August 10, 2012, Sartin filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief.  The grounds for this motion were: (i) ineffective assistance of counsel 
based upon counsel’s failure to investigate Sartin’s mental health issues; (ii) 
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to communicate; (iii) 
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to recognize Sartin’s 
use of prescribed mental health psycho-tropic medications before the plea colloquy 
and acceptance of the guilty plea; and (iv) diminished capacity.  The 
postconviction motion was referred to a Superior Court Commissioner, who gave 
3 
 
Sartin the opportunity (and an extension) to submit a memorandum of law in 
support of his motion, requested an affidavit from Sartin’s former counsel, asked 
the State to submit a response to the motion, and set a deadline for Sartin to submit 
a reply to his former counsel’s affidavit and the State’s response.  Sartin did not 
submit an opening memorandum of law, but did file a reply to his former counsel’s 
affidavit. 
4. 
After receiving the submissions of the parties, the Commissioner 
issued a Report and Recommendation.  The Commission considered the merits of 
Sartin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and concluded that they lacked 
merit and were barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3).  The Superior 
Court conducted a de novo review of the proceedings, adopted the Commissioner’s 
Report and Recommendation, and denied Sartin’s motion for postconviction relief.  
This appeal followed.   
5. 
Sartin filed a motion for a transcript of the plea and sentencing 
hearing at State expense, which the Superior Court denied.  The State included a 
copy of the transcript in the appendix with its answering brief on appeal.  Sartin 
also claims to have filed a motion for appointment of counsel in the Superior 
Court, but the docket does not reflect such a motion.  Sartin’s request for 
appointment of counsel in this Court and a remand to the Superior Court was 
denied. 
4 
 
6. 
On appeal, Sartin first argues that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion and violated his constitutional rights when it denied his motion for 
postconviction relief as procedurally barred.  This Court reviews the Superior 
Court's denial of a Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) motion for 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.1  Questions of law or claims of a 
constitutional violation are reviewed de novo.2   
7. 
Sartin’s postconviction claims are based primarily on his assertion 
that his counsel was ineffective.  Sartin claims his counsel was ineffective because: 
(i) he failed to investigate Sartin’s mental health issues; (ii) he failed to 
communicate with Sartin; and (iii) he failed to recognize that Sartin was under the 
influence of prescribed medications at the time of his guilty plea.  Sartin claims 
that but for his counsel’s ineffective assistance, he would have rejected the plea 
offer and insisted on proceeding to trial with a mental illness defense.  Sartin also 
appears to contend that he suffered from diminished capacity at the time of his 
guilty plea and could not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily accept a guilty 
plea.       
8. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after entry of 
a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that his defense counsel’s 
                                                 
1 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
2 Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 2010). 
5 
 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty 
and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.3   There is a strong presumption 
that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.4  Conclusory and 
unsupported claims of prejudice are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; 
a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice.5 
9. 
Sartin’s conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do 
not establish that his counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable or 
prejudicial.  Contrary to Sartin’s contentions, the record reflects that Sartin’s 
counsel investigated Sartin’s mental health issues.  Sartin’s counsel referred Sartin 
for a psycho-forensic evaluation, which included an examination of Sartin’s history 
of substance abuse and mental health problems.  Although the box next to the 
question asking whether Sartin had even been a patient in a mental hospital was 
checked “no” in the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, there was also a 
handwritten notation of “98’” next to that question.6  Sartin’s counsel informed the 
                                                 
3 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985); Allbury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (1988). 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984). 
5 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1986). 
6 Appendix to State’s Answering Brief at B-22. 
6 
 
Superior Court at the plea colloquy that Sartin had been treated at a mental hospital 
in 1998.   
10. 
To the extent Sartin claims his counsel’s lack of investigation 
deprived him of a mental illness defense, Sartin’s counsel stated in his affidavit 
that there was no indication Sartin’s mental health issues rose to the level of a 
viable defense.  Instead, Sartin’s counsel tried to use the issues to lessen the 
severity of Sartin’s sentence and to ensure that treatment began while Sartin was 
incarcerated.  Sartin does not identify any authority suggesting a mental illness 
defense would likely have succeeded at trial.     
11. 
There is also no merit to Sartin’s contention that his counsel failed to 
communicate with him.  According to the affidavit of Sartin’s counsel, he met with 
Sartin five times in addition to case reviews.  Sartin indicated in the Truth-In-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form that he was his satisfied with his counsel’s 
representation.  During the plea colloquy, Sartin told the Superior Court that he had 
discussed the matter fully with his counsel and was satisfied that his counsel had 
done all that he could reasonably do for him.  Absent clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, Sartin is bound by these representations.7       
12. 
Sartin’s contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
recognize that he was under the influence of psychotropic medications at the time 
                                                 
7 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
7 
 
of his guilty plea is also contradicted by the record.  Sartin’s prescription for 
lithium was noted in the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.  At the plea 
hearing, Sartin’s counsel informed the Superior Court that Sartin was on lithium 
while in custody and that Sartin was focused and able to discuss the matter 
cogently in all of their discussions.  By pleading guilty, Sartin was able to avoid a 
sentence of life imprisonment.  We conclude that Sartin’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are without merit and that the Superior Court did not err in rejecting 
those claims.   
13. 
Sartin’s conclusory assertion of diminished capacity resulting in an 
involuntary guilty plea is not supported by the record.  As discussed above, the 
parties and Superior Court were informed of Sartin’s history of mental health and 
substance abuse issues, Sartin’s treatment at a mental hospital in 1998, and his 
lithium prescription.  Sartin’s counsel told the Superior Court that Sartin was 
focused and cogent in their discussions and that he believed Sartin was entering 
into the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.   
14. 
The transcript of the plea hearing and sentencing does not suggest 
otherwise.  During the plea colloquy, Sartin told the Superior Court that he 
understood the charges he was pleading guilty to, he understood that he faced a 
maximum penalty of life in imprisonment because he was a habitual offender and 
that there was a minimum mandatory penalty of twenty-one years, he freely and 
8 
 
voluntarily pled guilty because he was guilty of the offenses, he understood that he 
was waiving the constitutional rights listed in the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea 
Form, which included the right to present evidence in his defense, and he had 
discussed the matter fully with his counsel.  Sartin also expressed remorse to the 
victims of his crimes.  The transcript does not reflect that Sartin was unable to 
answer or had any difficulty answering the Superior Court’s questions.  Absent 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Sartin is bound by his 
representations in the Truth-In-Sentencing guilty plea form and his sworn 
statements to the judge during the guilty plea colloquy.8  There is no clear and 
convincing evidence that Sartin’s mental health or lithium prescription rendered 
his guilty plea involuntary.   We therefore conclude that the Superior Court did not 
err in denying Sartin’s motion for postconviction relief. 
15. 
Sartin next argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his request 
for a transcript of his plea and sentencing hearing.  A copy of the transcript was 
included in the appendix accompanying the State’s answering brief, making 
Sartin’s transcript claim moot.9               
16. 
Finally, Sartin argues that the Superior Court erred by not appointing 
counsel to represent him in connection with his first motion for postconviction 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Despite the inclusion of the transcript, Sartin chose not to file a reply brief.   
9 
 
relief.  Although Sartin claims he filed a motion for appointment for counsel in the 
Superior Court after his motion for postconviction relief was denied, there is no 
sign in the record of such a motion.  Sartin does not cite any authority in support of 
the proposition that the Superior Court was required to appoint counsel for him sua 
sponte.  At the time Sartin filed his postconviction motion in August 2012, Rule 
61(e)(1) provided that the Superior Court would appoint counsel only in the 
exercise of discretion and for good cause shown.10  Rule 61(e)(1) was amended in 
May 2013 to provide that the Superior Court would appoint counsel for an indigent 
defendant’s first postconviction proceeding, but that amendment applied to 
postconviction motions filed on or after May 6, 2013 and was not made 
retroactive.11  Under the circumstances of this case, Sartin has not shown that he 
was entitled to the sua sponte appointment of counsel.      
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1) (2012). 
11 Cook v. State, 2014 WL 2949413 (Del. June 26, 2014); Roten v. State, 2013 WL 5808236 
(Del. Oct. 28, 2013).