Case Title: Barcon, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Barcon, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization1992 WY 192845 P.2d 373Case Number: 92-133Decided: 12/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
BARCON, 
INC. a Wyoming 
Corporation, Appellant (Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
The 
WYOMING STATE 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J

 
 
Tracy J. 
Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, Powell, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard and Clinton D. Beaver, Sr. Asst. Attys. 
Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this appeal, we are 
asked to determine whether Wyoming's use tax imposes an excise tax on 
persons purchasing used property out-of-state from a non-vendor. We affirm the 
decision of the district court which affirmed the Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization decision that the deficiency assessment issued by the Wyoming 
Department of Revenue and Taxation was in accord with specifically amended 
provisions of Wyoming law. However, because of ambiguity in 
the statutory language, we must construe the language of the provisions of 
Wyoming's Use 
Tax Act of 1937, Wyo. Stat. §§ 39-6-501 through 39-6-518 (1990 & Supp. 1992) 
(hereinafter Use Tax Act or use tax) to effectuate the legislative 
intent.

 
 
I.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant states a 
single issue for our consideration:

 
 
I. Was it 
error for the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District to determine that 
W.S. § 39-6-504(b) (1977) which in relevant part provides, "Persons storing, 
using or consuming tangible personal property are liable for the tax imposed by 
this article[]" actually imposes a tax rather than indicates who is liable for 
the tax imposed by the Use Tax law and did the District Court therefore err in 
concluding that the Use Tax Act of 1937 imposes a Use Tax on persons acquiring 
used property out of state from persons other than 
vendors?

 
 

[¶3.]     On behalf of appellee, 
the Attorney General's office rephrases:

 
 
            
Does W.S. 39-6-504 impose[] Use Tax on the sale of tangible personal 
property for first use in Wyoming from an out-of-state seller, regardless of 
whether the seller was a vendor as defined at W.S. 
39-6-502(a)(viii)?

 

II.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant, Barcon, Inc. 
(Barcon), is a Wyoming corporation engaged in 
the heavy construction industry with its principal place of business in 
Sheridan, Wyoming. During December of 1988, Barcon 
purchased some earth-moving and trenching equipment from Barnard Construction 
Co., Inc. (Barnard), a Montana construction 
company with offices in Bozeman, Montana.1 It is undisputed that Barnard is 
not in the business of selling construction equipment. The equipment Barnard 
sold was used when resold as surplus in company 
operations.

 
 

[¶5.]     Wyoming's Department of 
Audit, Excise Tax Division, discovered that Barcon had not paid a use tax on the 
equipment purchase. The Department of Revenue and Taxation issued a Deficiency 
Assessment, Notice and Demand, requesting payment of a sales and use tax 
deficiency of $66,411.97 for the equipment and various other items not at 
issue.2 Barcon was also assessed a ten 
percent penalty of $6,641.20 along with interest at one percent per month 
aggregating to $21,213.73, making the total tax assessment 
$94,266.90.

 
 

[¶6.]     Barcon paid the tax 
under protest and appealed the deficiency assessment to the Wyoming State Board 
of Equalization (Board of Equalization or Board). Barcon argued that the use tax 
was not intended to apply to "isolated, out-of-state purchases by Wyoming residents of used 
equipment or property from a person not in the business of selling that 
property."3 The Board concluded, as a matter of 
law, that the term "vendor" was used in the Use Tax Act to describe a 
legislative intent to limit the administrative burdens of licensing, collecting, 
reporting and paying the use tax to enterprises with a nexus or clear connection 
to Wyoming which were actually engaged in the business of selling products or 
services. The Board determined, however, that the legislative omission of the 
term "vendor" from some provisions of the Use Tax Act demonstrated an intent to 
tax transactions, such as Barcon's, by making the purchaser individually 
liable.

 
 

[¶7.]     The Board acknowledged 
that Barcon had relied on a "reasonable interpretation of poorly worded use tax 
statutes" in making its decisions. As a result, the Board determined the penalty 
should not be imposed. The interest assessment was retained. 

 
 

[¶8.]     Barcon sought judicial 
review of the Board of Equalization's decision in the District Court for the 
Fourth Judicial District, Sheridan 
County, Wyoming. The 
district court found a provision of the Use Tax Act, Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-504(b), 
imposed, in clear and unambiguous terms, tax liability on Barcon without regard 
to the seller's status. The district court affirmed the Board of Equalization's 
decision. A timely application for review in this court 
followed.

 
 
III.

 
 
STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9.]     The right to judicial 
review of administrative decisions of the Board of Equalization is granted by 
Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-306 (1990).4 The Wyoming Administrative 
Procedures Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 (1990 & Supp. 1992), 
controls the scope of review.

 
 
            
     (c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
                        
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

                        
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

 
 
                        
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

                        
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

                        
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

                        
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

                        
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (1990). See Exxon Corp. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 783 P.2d 685, 687 (Wyo. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910, 110 S. Ct. 1937, 109 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1990) (collecting cases). No special deference is 
accorded to the district court's decision. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 820 P.2d 993, 995 (Wyo. 1991); Union Pacific R. Co. 
v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 859 (Wyo. 
1990).

 
 

[¶10.]  This court has identified three possible 
outcomes in reviewing an agency conclusion of law:

            
The agency may correctly apply their findings of fact to the correct rule 
of law. * * * In such case, the agency's conclusions are affirmed. But the 
agency could apply their findings of fact to the wrong rule of law or they could 
incorrectly apply their findings of fact to a correct rule of law. * * * In 
either case, we correct an agency conclusion to ensure accordance with law. * * 
* Our standard of review for any conclusion of law is straightforward. If the 
conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is affirmed * * *; if it is not, 
it is to be corrected * * *.

 
 
Employment 
Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Western Gas 
Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990).

 
 

[¶11.]  The question of law presented by this 
appeal requires this court to enforce the statutory language as understood by 
the Board of Equalization or construe its meaning to determine if Barcon's 
argument is determinative. If the language of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, conveying a clear and definite meaning, this court does not resort 
to rules of statutory construction. Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991). When the wording is ambiguous or 
unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with respect to legislative 
purpose or mandate, this court must resort to additional construction. 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. WyomingState Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 
1991). A statute must be considered ambiguous if a word or phrase is susceptible 
to more than one meaning. State Bd. of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d 97, 99 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶12.]  Legislative intent is ascertained from 
the language of the statute viewed in light of its object and purpose. Belle 
Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo. 1988). The power to 
tax is a legislative power which includes the power to say what shall be taxed, 
who pays it and what the tax shall be. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221, 240 (Wyo. 1987). "In construing a taxing or revenue 
statute, courts should attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intention of 
the legislature, and that intention is to be gathered from a consideration of 
every word in the statute so as to make it harmonious and reasonable in its 
operation." State v. Union Pacific R. Co., 823 P.2d 539, 541 (Wyo. 1992). Every 
subsection of the statute must be considered in the context of all others to 
ascertain the meaning of the whole. B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield 
Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 816 (Wyo. 1992). We assume that the legislature's 
amendment of a statute indicated some change in existing law was intended. 
Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 
IV.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶13.]  A review of the arguments presented by 
the Board of Equalization and Barcon provides a useful measure of the 
susceptibility of the Use Tax Act to multiple, viable interpretations. Both 
sides agree that the use tax is imposed by Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-504 (hereinafter § 
504) which provides, in relevant part:

 
 
                        
(a) Except as otherwise provided, there is levied and shall be paid by 
purchaser an excise tax of three percent (3%) upon sales in Wyoming. The vendor shall 
collect the tax and give the purchaser a receipt therefor displaying the tax 
paid separately.

 
 
                        
(b) Persons storing, using or consuming tangible personal property are 
liable for the tax imposed by this article. The liability is not extinguished 
until the tax has been paid to the state but a receipt given to the person by a 
registered vendor in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is 
sufficient to relieve the purchaser from further 
liability.

 
 
                        
(c) Tangible personal property sold by any person for delivery in this 
state is deemed sold for storage, use or consumption herein and is subject to 
the tax imposed by this article unless the person selling the property has 
received from the purchaser a signed certificate stating the property was 
purchased for resale and showing his name and address.

 
 

[¶14.]  The Board of Equalization, initially, 
argues that the Use Tax Act is unambiguous because § 504(b) imposes a tax 
liability on the purchaser of the property while § 504(c) independently imposes 
tax liability on the property purchased. In the alternative, the Board of 
Equalization asserts if the statute is ambiguous, the legislative intent is 
revealed by reading § 504(a) and (c) together to disclose an intent to impose 
use tax on goods "sold by any person." The "vendor" language in § 504(a), 
according to the Board, is merely stating a collection mechanism. The Board 
contends that to maintain the complementary nature of the Use Tax Act and the 
Selective Sales Tax Act of 1937, Wyo. Stat. §§ 39-6-401 through 39-6-417 (1990 
& Supp. 1992) (hereinafter Sales Tax Act or sales tax), the use tax must 
reach all sales of tangible personal property purchased out-of-state and brought 
into this state for consumption.

 
 

[¶15.]  Barcon partially agrees with the Board of 
Equalization. Barcon admits that § 504(a) imposes a use tax, but Barcon reads 
that subsection as limiting the imposition of the tax to those sales occurring 
in Wyoming. Barcon contends the only provision of the Use Tax Act which imposes 
a tax on tangible personal property sold outside the state of Wyoming is § 
504(c). However, Barcon says the equipment purchase it made in Montana does not qualify 
as a "sale" under the terms of § 504(c) because the sale was not made by a 
"vendor." Barcon defends its evaluation by reference to the definitions provided 
in the Use Tax Act:

 
 
            
(a) As used in this article:

 
 
                        
     (i) 
"Retail sale" means the sale of tangible personal property to a person for 
storage, use or consumption and not for subsequent resale;

                        
     (ii) 
"Sale" means the transfer of title or possession 
of tangible personal property from a vendor for a consideration for storage, use 
or other consumption in Wyoming * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
                        
     (viii) 
"Vendor" means any person engaged in the business of selling at retail or 
wholesale tangible personal property, having or maintaining within this state 
directly or by any subsidiary, an office, distribution house, sales house, 
warehouse or other place of business or any agents operating or soliciting sales 
or advertising within this state under the authority of the vendor or its 
subsidiary, regardless of whether the place of business or agent is located in 
the state permanently or temporarily or whether the vendor or subsidiary is 
qualified to do business within this state. Agents acting under the authority of 
the vendor include but are not limited to truckers, peddlers, canvassers, 
salespersons, representatives, employees, supervisors, distributors, delivery 
persons or any other persons performing services in this 
state[.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-502. Barcon further supports its limited reading of the Use Tax Act by 
relying on an earlier version of the Act which applied the tax to property 
purchased from retailers. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 39-309 through 39-335 (1957 & 
Supp. 1975) (amended 1977). Barcon does not respond to the Board of 
Equalization's argument that the sales tax and the use tax must be 
complementary.

 
 

[¶16.]  After this review, we have no difficulty 
in agreeing with the Board of Equalization that the Use Tax Act is "poorly 
worded." The fact that both interpretations of the language are potentially 
viable directs our conclusion. The language of the Use Tax Act is ambiguous in 
proclaiming its intention to tax transactions originating out-of-state involving 
used property from entities that are not in the business of selling such items. 
Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d  at 100. The ambiguous nature of the Use Tax Act 
requires a determination of legislative intent as a matter of law. See 
Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d  at 219 and Exxon Corp., 783 P.2d  at 
689.

 
 

[¶17.]  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized a normally applied justification for use tax legislation. A use tax 
is generally regarded as a "necessary complement" to the sales tax which is 
designed to protect state revenues by diminishing the perceived advantage to 
residents from traveling out-of-state to make untaxed purchases while also 
protecting local businesses from out-of-state competition able to offer lower 
prices because of a reduced tax burden. D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 32, 108 S. Ct. 1619, 1624, 100 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1988); Williams v. Vermont, 
472 U.S. 14, 24, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 2472, 86 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1985) (quoting Leverson v. 
Conway, 144 Vt. 523, 481 A.2d 1029, 1032, appeal dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question, 469 U.S. 926, 105 S. Ct. 316, 83 L. Ed. 2d 255 
(1984)).

 
 

[¶18.]  Previous decisions of this court have 
stated the legislative intent of the Use Tax Act, in 
general.

 
 
            
"The Wyoming use tax statutes, W.S. 
39-6-501 through -518, impose an excise tax upon "persons storing, using or 
consuming tangible personal property" in Wyoming. W.S. 39-6-504(b). The legislature 
intended that the use tax be complementary to the Wyoming sales tax. 
Morrison-Knudson Co., Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 58 Wyo. 500, 135 P.2d 927, 
932 (1943). See also Chap. IV, § 3, Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State 
Tax Commission - Department of Revenue & Taxation. The use tax is applied to 
property purchased outside the state and brought into the state for storage, use 
or consumption, so as to put that property on an equal footing with property 
purchased within the state that is subject to the Wyoming sales 
tax."

 
 
Burlington 
Northern R. Co., 820 P.2d  at 995 (quoting Exxon Corp., 783 P.2d at 688). See 
also State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 809 
n. 2 (Wyo. 
1980). The intent of this state's use tax parallels the usual rationale for 
similar statutes across the country.5 Without further inquiry, we have 
not answered the question, however, of whether the legislature intended to make 
the use tax applicable to transactions involving used property purchased 
out-of-state from entities not in the business of selling such 
items.

 
 

[¶19.]  Wyoming initially adopted a sales tax with the 
passage of the Emergency Sales Tax Act of 1935, 1935 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 74. The 
emergency act was in effect for only two years until a comprehensive sales tax 
and use tax were imposed. The Selective Sales Tax Act of 1937, 1937 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 102, and the Use Tax Act of 1937, 1937 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 118, were 
passed during the same legislative session as obvious complements to each other. 
In Morrison-Knudson Co., this court stated a rule which should guide our efforts 
to determine legislative intent. "In the absence, then, of a contrary indication 
in the Use Tax Act, the intention evidently was to apply the same rules and 
principles, as nearly as possible, to both taxes." Morrison-Knudson Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 58 Wyo. 500, 135 P.2d 927, 932 
(1943).

 
 

[¶20.]  As they existed from 1937 to 1977, the 
sales tax and use tax continued their complementary nature. Wyo. Stat. §§ 39-286 
through 39-308 (1957 & Supp. 1975) (amended 1977) (Sales Tax Act); Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 39-309 through 39-335 (Use Tax Act). The Sales Tax Act imposed: "An 
excise tax upon every retail sale of tangible personal property made within the 
State of Wyoming equivalent to three percent (3%) * * 
*." Wyo. Stat. 
§ 39-291(a). The Use Tax Act directed: "An excise tax is hereby imposed on the 
storage, use or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property 
purchased from a retailer on or after June 1, 1937, for storage, use or other 
consumption in this state at the rate of three percent (3%) of the sales price 
of such property." Wyo. Stat. § 39-311(a). A "retailer" was 
specifically defined by the Use Tax Act:

 
 
            
"Retailer" means and includes every person engaged in the business of 
making sales for storage, use or other consumption or in the business of making 
sales at auction of tangible personal property owned by such person or others 
for storage, use or other consumption; provided, however, that when in the 
opinion of the board it is necessary for the efficient administration of this 
act * * * to regard any salesmen, representatives, servicemen, repairmen, 
maintenance men, delivery men, appraisers, peddlers or canvassers as the agents 
of the dealers, distributors, supervisors or employers under whom they operate 
or from whom they obtain the tangible personal property sold, handled or 
attended to by them, irrespective of whether they are making sales, service 
repairs, maintenance, deliveries or appraisals on their own behalf or on behalf 
of such dealers distributors, supervisors or employers, the board may so regard 
them and may regard the dealers, distributors, supervisors or employers as 
retailers for purposes of this act.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
39-310(f).

 
 

[¶21.]  Under the Use Tax Act that existed prior 
to 1977, we agree with Barcon that the purchase of used equipment out-of-state 
from a non-retailer for use in Wyoming would not have been taxable. It is 
undisputed that Barnard was not in the business of selling tangible personal 
property for use, consumption or sale. However, the question is whether the 1977 
legislative amendments to the Use Tax Act, specifically, and the Sales Tax Act, 
generally, reflect an intent to tax transactions such as the one at 
issue.

 
 

[¶22.]  In 1977, the Wyoming legislature 
considered a major revision of excise tax authorizations for this state. House 
Bill No. 207, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 51. The proposed bill 
included revisions of the cigarette tax, gasoline tax, mine products taxes, 
sales taxes, use tax and inheritance tax. Id. The bill contained a stated purpose to 
eliminate obsolete or fully executed statutes, conform conflicting or 
duplicitous sections and eliminate "archaic language, sentence structure and 
form of existing statutes * * *." Id.

 
 

[¶23.]  As proposed, House Bill No. 207 amended 
the Use Tax Act to adopt most of the language used today. Compare, House Bill 
No. 207, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 51, with 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 
39-6-501 through 39-6-518. The adopted form of the Use Tax Act, however, 
contains an important difference from the proposed language. In proposed House 
Bill No. 207, the provision that would have become the first sentence of § 
504(b) read: "Persons storing, using or consuming tangible personal property purchased from a vendor are liable for 
the tax imposed by this article." 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 51 (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶24.]  House Bill No. 464 specifically amended 
the language of proposed § 504(b) in House Bill No. 207. House Bill No. 464, 
1977 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 46. As structured by House Bill No. 464, the first sentence of § 
504(b) was amended to read: "Persons storing, using or consuming tangible 
personal property are liable for the tax imposed by this article." The language 
"purchased from a vendor" contained in House Bill 207 was eliminated by House 
Bill 464. The record shows that both House Bill No. 207 and House Bill No. 464 
were passed by the legislature. House Bill 207, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 51; House Bill 464, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
46.

 
 

[¶25.]  The intent of House Bill No. 464 is 
revealed by its preamble, which states:

 
 
            
AN ACT to amend W.S. 39-311(b) and 39-6-504(b); and to repeal W.S. 
39-312(i) and 39-6-505(a)(x) relating to use tax; deleting the provision that the use tax only 
applies to tangible personal property purchased from retailers; repealing 
the use tax exemption of tangible personal property used by nonresidents; and 
providing for an effective date.

 
 
1977 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 46 (emphasis added). This language discloses a clearly stated 
legislative intent to eliminate the provisions of the former Use Tax Act and 
amend the proposed language of House Bill 207, which limited the taxing 
authority to purchases from "vendors."6

 
 

[¶26.]  We conclude that the legislature 
established its intention to permit the imposition of an excise tax on 
transactions involving the sale of tangible personal property purchased 
out-of-state from non-vendors and stored, used or consumed in Wyoming from the 
fact that the amended language of § 504(b) was passed. However, we must review 
the Use Tax Act's provisions to determine if the language used throughout the 
act conforms with this established intent to change previous law. We are guided 
by a presumption that the legislature did not intend futile acts. Wetering, 682 P.2d  at 1061.

 
 

[¶27.]  We believe the proper reading of § 504 
recognizes that subsection (a) imposes a three percent excise tax on sales in 
Wyoming. 
Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-504(a). The excise tax imposed by the use tax does not apply to purchases 
which are taxed under provisions of the Sales Tax Act or other stated 
exceptions. Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-505(a)(i). So, the use tax 
is not duplicating the sales tax - it remains 
complementary.

 
 

[¶28.]  We agree with the substance of the Board 
of Equalization's interpretation of § 504(a). Under the language of Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-504(a) and the definition of "vendor" in Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(viii), a 
taxing scheme is created which requires any person to collect the use tax 
imposed if they are engaged in the business of selling at retail and making the 
applicable transactions while, to some degree, physically present in Wyoming. 
The "vendor" definition is self-limiting and highly qualified. Among its stated 
limitations are:

 
 
            
1) any person7

            
2) engaged in the business of selling

            
3) at retail or wholesale

            
4) tangible personal property

            
5) having or maintaining within this state

            
6) an office, distribution house, sales house, etc.

 
 
The 
"vendor" contemplated by § 504 is not the traditional merchant who is a retail 
dealer buying products to sell; or, even more generally, the person who 
transfers property by sale. Black's Law Dictionary 1555 (6th ed. 1990). We agree 
with the Board of Equalization that the "vendor" meeting the requirements of 
Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(viii) is a more restricted subspecies and that, as 
detailed in § 504(a), the term "vendor" means a responsible party for collection 
of the applicable use tax. The "vendor" defined by Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-502(a)(viii) is one whose involvement with Wyoming is probably sufficient 
to meet the "substantial nexus" commerce clause and "minimum contacts" due 
process requirements of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota By and Through Heitkamp, ___ 
U.S. ___, ___-___, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1913-14, 119 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1992).8

 
 

[¶29.]  In their readings of § 504, both Barcon 
and the Board of Equalization ignore the introductory language of § 504(a): 
"Except as otherwise provided * * *." The effect of the initial limiting 
language in subsection (a) is to alert the reader that subsection (a) is 
disjunctive from the remaining subsections. B & W Glass, Inc., 829 P.2d  at 
817. The language of § 504(b) and § 504(c), together, provide the tax scheme for 
tangible personal property purchased out-of-state for storage, use or 
consumption in Wyoming. In § 504(b), the liability for the 
three percent excise tax imposed by Article 5, the Use Tax Act, is placed on 
"[p]ersons storing, using or consuming tangible personal property" without 
regard to whether the property was purchased from a "vendor." Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-504(b). 
In § 504(c), a presumption is created that the tangible personal property sold 
by any person for delivery in Wyoming "is deemed sold for storage, use or 
consumption herein and is subject to the tax imposed by this article * * *." 
Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-504(c). Both sections include provisions under which no tax liability will 
be found, such as by proof of a receipt from a registered vendor or evidence of 
intent to purchase for resale. Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-504(b) and 
(c).

 
 

[¶30.]  Our view that both § 504(b) and (c), 
together, impose a use tax is supported by the legislature's language in the one 
remaining provision of the statute. In § 504(d), the legislature stated the use 
tax should be applied to certain computer products. The specific language of the 
subsection makes computer products "subject to the provisions of subsections (b) 
and (c) of this section." Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-504(d).

 
 

[¶31.]  The Use Tax Act, as construed, is 
complementary to the Sales Tax Act. If a Wyoming resident purchases an item of 
tangible personal property in Wyoming, the purchase is subject to the sales tax 
of Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-404(a)(i) which imposes a three percent excise tax on 
"every retail sale of tangible personal property within the state[.]"9 If the transaction occurs in 
Wyoming, but involves a registered10 "vendor" as defined in the Use Tax 
Act, Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(viii), doing business in Wyoming even temporarily, 
the use tax is imposed by Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-504(a). If the transaction occurs 
outside Wyoming, the use tax is imposed under 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-504(b) and (c) when the goods are stored, 
used or consumed in Wyoming. The "person storing, using or 
consuming" the tangible personal property in Wyoming is responsible for the payment of the 
use tax. Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-6-507(b).

 
 

[¶32.]  The most obvious example of the 
complementary operation of these provisions is in motor vehicle purchases. See 
Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Sales or Use Tax on Motor Vehicle Purchased Out of 
State, 45 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1972 & Supp. 1992) (collecting cases). If the 
vehicle is purchased from XYZ Dealership located in Wyoming, the sales tax is applicable and paid by the 
purchaser upon registration in Wyoming. Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-404(a)(xi); Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-6-406. A used vehicle purchased from a neighbor in Wyoming is still subject 
to the sales tax which is collected on first registration by the new owner. 
Id. If the 
purchaser goes to another state to buy the vehicle from a dealership, upon 
return to Wyoming and first use registration by the new 
owner, the use tax is imposed. Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-504(b) and (c); Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-506. The used vehicle 
purchased from an out-of-state private owner is subject to the same use tax 
imposition, at first registration, when the vehicle is returned to Wyoming for storage or 
use. Id.

 
 

[¶33.]  The fact that the property is used by 
another before its subsequent purchase by a new owner is immaterial. For 
purposes of the use tax, a first use by the new purchaser occurring in 
Wyoming 
creates the taxable event.11 Burlington Northern R. Co., 820 P.2d  at 995; 
Exxon Corp., 783 P.2d  at 688. The fact that the seller is not a "vendor" as 
defined by the Use Tax Act or even a person who regularly conducts such sales is 
similarly immaterial except for the means of tax collection. See Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507. It 
is settled law that sales and use tax statutes apply to casual or incidental 
sales or even sales which were not necessarily for a profit. People v. 
ImperialCounty, 76 Cal. App. 2d 572, 
173 P.2d 352, 354 (1946) (holding County's sale of used surplus equipment to 
buyers was subject to sales tax).

 
 

[¶34.]  Barcon attempts to find a contrary 
indication to the foregoing construction in two specific provisions of the Use 
Tax Act. First, Barcon argues a "sale," as defined in Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-502(a)(ii), must be made by a "vendor" as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-502(a)(viii). Second, Barcon contends the interpretation is contrary to the 
clear language of another provision of the Use Tax Act, Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507 
(hereinafter § 507 or collection provision) which, in relevant part, 
requires:

 
 
            
     (b) Every 
person storing, using or consuming tangible personal property purchased from a 
vendor who does not maintain a place of business in this state is liable for the 
tax imposed by this article and shall on or before the last day of each month 
file a return showing the total sales price of tangible personal property 
purchased subject to the tax imposed by this article during the preceding month 
and remit all taxes due to the department. The return shall contain such 
information as requested by the department. Returns shall be signed by the 
person liable for the tax or his agent.

 
 
Barcon 
challenges that the "purchased from a vendor" language of the collection 
provision must relate back to § 504(b) to indicate that it is only when persons 
store, use or consume tangible personal property acquired from a vendor that the 
use tax is imposed. The provision, according to Barcon, means no use tax may be 
imposed on the sale of used property by a non-vendor.

 
 

[¶35.]  The limited construction favored by 
Barcon is unsatisfactory in application. The term "vendor" as used in the 
definition of "sale" in Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(ii) and in the collection 
provision of Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507(b) is ambiguous. If we apply the construction 
urged by Barcon, to the "sale" definition, it would limit the use tax to a 
transfer of title or possession of personal property from a "person engaged in 
the business of selling at retail * * * tangible personal property, having or 
maintaining within this state, directly or by any subsidiary, an office, 
distribution house, sales house, warehouse or other place of business, or any 
agents * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(ii) and (viii). This construction 
confuses the administrative and collection function implicit in the definition 
of the term "vendor," Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(viii), with the broader purpose 
of the act. The reference to a vendor in the definition of "sale," Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-502(a)(ii), must be construed as a reference to the broad, common use of 
the term as a person who transfers property by sale. Black's Law Dictionary 1555 
(6th ed. 1990). Any other construction would be contrary to reason and destroy 
the operation of the Use Tax Act. Deherrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482 
(Wyo. 
1977).

 
 

[¶36.]  Similarly, the language of the collection 
provision, Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507(b), must be construed in light of the statute's 
object and purpose. Like its counterpart in the Sales Tax Act, Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-407, the collection provision defines the responsibility of parties 
collecting the use tax to file returns and make payments. If the party is a 
"vendor" as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(viii), a specific responsibility 
is created to collect the use tax imposed. Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507(a).12 The "vendor" is required to file a 
monthly tax return showing the total sales of tangible personal property subject 
to the tax and remit the taxes due to the Department of Revenue and Taxation. 
Id.

 
 

[¶37.]  Subsection (b) of the collection 
provision details a complementary system requiring the purchaser of tangible 
personal property subject to use tax to file the appropriate tax return and make 
the necessary payment. Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507(b). The intent of the 
language of subsection (b), "purchased from a vendor who does not maintain a 
place of business in this state," is to differentiate the purchaser's 
obligation. If the purchase was made from a registered vendor responsible for 
collecting the use tax, the type defined by Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(viii), the 
purchaser is freed from the obligation to file a return and remit the tax due. 
However, if the purchase is made from a person not registered, Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-503, and not required to collect use tax under Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507(a), 
the language of subsection (b) is intended to make the purchaser liable for the 
use tax imposed and require the filing of a return and the payment of tax due.13 Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-507(b). As used in § 507(b), 
the term "vendor" refers again to a person who transfers property by sale.14 Black's Law Dictionary 1555 (6th 
ed. 1990). It would be inconsistent with the statute's object and purpose and 
destroy the operation of other provisions to construe this provision otherwise. 
Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 
651 P.2d 778, 787 (Wyo. 1982); Deherrera, 565 P.2d  at 
482.

 
 
V.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶38.]  The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The 
specific items purchased included the following:

 
 
Item                             
            
Purchase Price                     
Use Tax Assessed

Henry's 
Pipelayer                  
$ 286,798.00                         
$ 8,603.94 

Capital 
Trencher       
            
$ 420,200.00                         
$12,606.00 

Cleveland Trencher 
              
$ 44,917.00                           
$ 1,347.51 

D-6 Dozer 
                 
            
$ 60,959.00                           
$ 1,828.77 

14 G Cat 
Grader       
            
$ 61,000.00                           
$ 1,830.00 

225 Cat 
Excavator                
$ 133,250.00                         
$ 3,997.50 

235 Cat 
Excavator                
$ 151,011.00                         
$ 4,530.33 

235 Cat 
Excavator                
$ 142,050.00                         
$ 4,261.50 

235M ME Cat 
Excavator      $ 
265,000.00                         
$ 7,950.00 

950 B Cat 
Loader                 
$ 72,500.00                           
$ 2,175.00 

950 B Cat 
Loader                 
$ 72,500.00                           
$ 2,175.00 

950 B Cat 
Loader                 
$ 64,000.00                           
$ 1,920.00 

966 C Cat 
Loader                 
$ 36,200.00                           
$ 1,086.00 

966 D Cat 
Loader                 
$ 85,000.00                           
$ 2,550.00 

966 D Cat 
Loader                 
$ 90,000.00                           
$ 2,700.00

Total                            
            
$1,985,385.00                       
$59,561.55

 
 
     The Wyoming State 
Board of Equalization, in its "Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law Order," 
states Barcon owed a deficiency assessment for the equipment in the amount of 
$59,561.55.

 
 

2 Barcon 
contested only the portion of the deficiency, penalty and interest assessed to 
the equipment purchase.

 
 

3 At 
Barcon's request, this matter was submitted to the Board of Equalization by 
briefing and affidavit. No hearing was held. Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-107 
(1990).

 
 

4 Wyo. Stat. 
§ 39-1-306 provides:

 
 
          Any person including the state of 
Wyoming aggrieved by any order issued by the board, or any county board of 
equalization whose decision has been reversed or modified by the state board of 
equalization, may appeal the decision of the board to the district court of the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is 
situated.

 
 
Supreme 
Court review of district court appeals is granted by Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-115 
(1990), which states:

 
 
            
     An 
aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court 
under this act by appeal to the supreme court. The appeal shall be taken as in 
other civil cases.

 
 

5 An 
additional rationale exists in Wyoming for a sales tax and a use tax. As a 
state which does not impose an income tax, the revenue from the sales tax and 
the use tax provides indispensable operating revenue for essential state and 
local governmental services. Sales lost to out-of-state purchases directly 
affect this revenue stream.

 
 

6 House Bill 
No. 207 substituted "vendor" for the former Use Tax Act's "retailer" term. 
St.Tax Rep. [Wyo] (CCH) ¶ 60-092. As we shall see, the 
inconsistent use of the term "vendor" created much of the confusion in the 
present Act's meaning.

 
 

7 The term 
"person" is defined in the general provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-101(a)(xiii) 
(Supp. 1992) to mean "an individual, partnership, corporation, company or any 
other type of association and any agent or officer of any partnership, 
corporation, company or other type of association[.]"

 
 

8 In Quill 
Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1904, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
mail order business did not have to have a physical presence in the state to 
permit the state to require the business to collect a use tax from in-state 
customers, but a physical presence in the state was required for the business to 
have the "substantial nexus" required of the taxing state by the commerce 
clause. See National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 97 S. Ct. 1386, 51 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1977).

 
 

9 Under the 
Sales Tax Act, a "retail sale" is a "sale of tangible personal property to a 
person for use and not for subsequent resale." Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-402(a)(ii). The 
sale does not have to be conducted by a "vendor." Unless the sales tax has been 
paid to a vendor for collection purposes, the purchaser is responsible to pay 
the tax directly. Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-407(d).

 
 

10 A "vendor" 
registers under the Use Tax Act by compliance with the provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
§ 39-6-503.

 
 

11 The 
eligibility for imposition of the use tax requires a "retail sale" which is 
defined as, "the sale of tangible personal property to a person for storage, use 
or consumption and not for subsequent resale[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 
39-6-502(a)(i).

 
 

12 The 
limitation on the authority of the state to mandate the collection of the use 
tax dates back to the decision of this court in Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. 
State Board of Equalization, 62 Wyo. 265, 166 P.2d 952 (1946). The court held 
that "some one must have a place of business within the State, in order that a 
compulsory collector of the use tax can come into existence." Id., 166 P.2d  at 959. The 
court ruled the creamery company did not maintain a place of business in this 
state because the salesman involved only solicited orders while traveling 
through Wyoming from Colorado. The salesman 
had no authority to accept orders, make collections or compromise disputes or 
bind the company in any way.

 
 

13 We 
recognize the inherent difficulties of enforcement embodied in this provision. 
However, the tax at issue in this case was assessed following a routine review 
by the Department of Audit which was designed, apparently, to detect unpaid use 
taxes by corporate and business entities. Other collection means, such as the 
vehicle registration provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-506, help insure average 
citizens pay the use tax on major purchases taking place 
out-of-state.

 
 

14 It is 
worth noting that in the previous version of the Use Tax Act, the section which 
stated applicable definitions for relevant terms directed: "The following words, 
terms and phrases when used in this act * * * have the meanings ascribed to them 
in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different 
meaning." Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-310.