Case Title: State v. John J. Watson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION  
DATED AND FILED 
 
 
NOTICE 
 
December 11, 1997 
    This opinion is subject to further editing. If 
published, the official version will appear in the 
bound volume of the Official Reports. 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk, Court of Appeals 
of Wisconsin 
    A party may file with the Supreme Court a 
petition to review an adverse decision by the 
Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62, 
STATS. 
 
 
 
No. 95-1067  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN 
 
IN COURT OF APPEALS 
DISTRICT IV 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
JOHN J. WATSON,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County:  
ANGELA B. BARTELL, Judge.  Affirmed in part; reversed in part.   
 
Before Eich, C.J., Dykman, P.J., and Vergeront, J. 
 
EICH, C.J.   The supreme court, after accepting our certification of 
this case on August 15, 1996, deadlocked on a decision and returned it to us for 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
2
determination.1  The State appeals the circuit court’s determination that it failed to 
establish probable cause to believe that John Watson was subject to commitment 
under the “sexual predator law,” chapter 980, STATS. 
 
In 1980, Watson pled guilty to a charge of false imprisonment and 
was sentenced to 30 years in prison.2  In 1994, as he was about to complete 
serving that sentence, the State filed a petition under chapter 980, STATS., seeking 
to have him committed to the Department of Health and Family Services as a 
“sexual predator.”  The law authorizes such a commitment upon a determination 
that the individual is a “sexually violent person,” as that term is defined in the law.  
It is a two-step process, involving a preliminary “probable-cause” hearing on the 
issue and, if probable cause is found, a trial. 
 
The sexual predator law authorizes commitment of a “sexually 
violent person” and defines the term—insofar as is relevant to this appeal—as one 
who: (1) “has been convicted of a sexually violent offense”; and (2) is “dangerous 
because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially 
probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence” in the future.  
Section 980.01(7), STATS.  A “sexually violent offense” is either a stated sexual 
crime or, as in this case, a crime that has no sexual component but, in its 
commission, “is determined … to have been sexually motivated.”  Section 
980.01(6)(b).  Thus, the State was required to establish probable cause that 
                                                          
 
1 We have been furnished with the parties’ briefs to the supreme court on the certification 
and, because these briefs amplify the arguments made in their initial briefs to this court, we have 
considered them in deciding this appeal.     
2 Watson was also convicted of endangering safety for brutally beating the victim.  That 
offense is not before us because the State relies only upon the false imprisonment charge as a 
basis for seeking Watson’s commitment. 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
3
Watson’s false imprisonment of the victim was sexually motivated within the 
meaning of the law.  
 
The circuit court dismissed the State’s petition, concluding that the 
sexual predator law is unconstitutional and that the State failed to establish 
probable cause to believe that Watson was a sexually violent person because the 
only evidence on that point—a psychologist’s opinion—was based entirely upon 
inadmissible hearsay.   
 
Since the circuit court’s decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
upheld the sexual predator law against several constitutional challenges, including 
those Watson makes in this case, in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995), and State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  
The only remaining issue is whether the court erred in dismissing the petition for 
lack of probable cause on the sexual-motivation issue.  We conclude that it did 
not.  We therefore reverse the court’s ruling on the constitutional issue but affirm 
its dismissal of the State’s petition for lack of probable cause.  
 
At the probable-cause hearing, the State called only one witness, Dr. 
Richard Althouse, a psychologist, and he offered testimony on both elements of 
the statute.  He stated that, in his opinion, Watson suffers from the mental disorder 
of paraphilia, a condition involving uncontrollable urges for sexual contact with 
nonconsenting partners.  He based that conclusion on two interviews with Watson 
and on his review of various files relating to Watson’s conviction.  
 
With respect to the issue at the heart of this appeal, Dr. Althouse 
testified that, in his opinion, Watson’s false imprisonment of the victim was 
sexually motivated.  The opinion came in response to a question on direct 
examination of whether, based on his training, education and experience, he had 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
4
formed “an opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty as to whether 
[the false-imprisonment] count … was a sexually violent offense or sexually 
motivated offense?”  Dr. Althouse responded: “It is my professional opinion based 
on my experience that the offense was sexually motivated.”   
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Althouse acknowledged that his opinion 
“rest[ed] entirely” on a statement the victim made to a probation agent in the 
presentence investigation in 1980.  According to the agent’s report, while she was 
in Watson’s car he had said: “Now you are going to suck me off, bitch.”  Dr. 
Althouse was then asked: “[A]ssuming that statement wasn’t made, would that 
change your opinion that the false imprisonment charge was sexually motivated 
…?”  He responded: “If I didn’t have that statement, it would be virtually 
impossible to draw that conclusion.”  Watson denied ever making this statement. 
 
As indicated, the circuit court found Dr. Althouse’s testimony 
insufficient to establish probable cause on the issue, reasoning that: (1) the 
statement in the presentence report was hearsay contained within a hearsay 
document and thus provided no “independent foundation” to trigger an exception 
to the hearsay ban; and (2) Dr. Althouse conceded that without this statement it 
would be “virtually impossible” to conclude that Watson’s offense had been 
sexually motivated.3 
                                                          
 
3 The court amplified its reasoning at a later hearing, stating: 
 
The record is poignantly clear in this case that the 
statement attributed to Mr. Watson by [the victim] is the 
controlling and driving factor in Dr. Althouse’s opinion.  He had 
no opinion as to whether or not the crime was sexually motivated 
without that statement ….  
 
 
As I stated before … the facts supporting sexual 
motivation are an essential element that must be shown at the 
(continued) 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
5
 
The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred because, under 
§ 907.03, STATS., an expert opinion based in part on hearsay is admissible.  The 
statute provides:  
907.03 Bases of opinion testimony by experts. The facts 
or data … upon which an expert bases an opinion … may 
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or 
before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence. 
According to the State, no cases have held that “an expert opinion which is based 
in part on inadmissible evidence cannot be given any weight,” and that to so hold 
would be absurd because most expert opinions are based, in part at least, on 
hearsay.   
 
We agree with the State that, because experts are “fully capable of 
judging for [themselves] what is, or is not, a reliable basis for [their] opinion,” 
such a rule “respects the functions and abilities of both the expert witness and the 
trier of fact, while assuring that the requirement of witness confrontation is 
fulfilled.”  United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975).  We disagree, 
however, with the State’s conclusion that our inquiry ends once we recognize this 
rule. 
 
We question whether Dr. Althouse’s opinion was an “expert” 
opinion within the meaning of § 907.03, STATS.  While the prosecutor’s initial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
probable cause hearing in order to bring Mr. Watson under 
Chapter 980 and to give this Court jurisdiction.  Since there is no 
admissible evidence of the statement, the opinion itself does not 
prove the statement, and the State has failed to carry its burden 
of proof with regard to probable cause on the issue of sexual 
motivation ….    
 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
6
question sought his opinion as an expert, Dr. Althouse’s subsequent testimony 
suggests that it was not.  
 
Because expert testimony is testimony on a subject which is 
“‘distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation,’” it is 
“‘beyond the realm of the average lay[person].’”  State ex rel. Kalt v. Milwaukee 
Bd. of Fire and Police Comm’rs, 145 Wis.2d 504, 517, 427 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (quoted source omitted).  A court will receive expert testimony in 
evidence only “when the issue under consideration involves ‘special knowledge or 
skill or experience on subjects which are not within the realm of the ordinary 
experience of [hu]mankind,’” Grace v. Grace, 195 Wis.2d 153, 159, 536 N.W.2d 
109, 111 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoted source omitted), and it is helpful to the court 
“only to the extent the expert draws on some special skill, knowledge, or 
experience to formulate [his or her] opinion.”  United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 
598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991).  The testimony must reflect an expert opinion—one 
“informed by the witness’ expertise[] rather than simply an opinion broached by a 
purported expert.”  Id.  These concepts are embodied in Wisconsin’s expert-
testimony statute, § 907.02, STATS., which provides: 
907.02 Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
 
We do not question Dr. Althouse’s expert qualifications as a 
psychologist, but not all of his testimony was expert testimony.  And on the crucial 
issue of sexual motivation, he based his opinion solely on a probation agent’s 
hearsay statement recounting the victim’s hearsay statement as to what Watson is 
alleged to have said to her.  The statement was not only double—if not triple—
No. 95-1067   
 
 
7
hearsay, it was no more than a layperson’s representation of what another person 
said to her.  It was not, in our opinion, the type of data or information reasonably 
relied upon in the formation of an expert opinion.4  Indeed, when Watson’s 
counsel objected to the question eliciting Dr. Althouse’s opinion, the prosecutor, 
even though having just phrased the question in terms of “expert opinion,” argued 
to the court that it was not: “It is not an opinion that an expert need make.  An 
ordinary citizen can draw such a conclusion as I am asking [Dr. Althouse] to draw 
.…”   
 
According to the Judicial Council Committee’s note to § 907.03, 
STATS., the second sentence of the rule—stating that an expert’s opinion is not 
rendered inadmissible because it is based in part on evidence that is itself 
inadmissible—has its genesis, and finds support, in Professor McCormick’s view 
that such a provision is appropriate because “an expert in a science is presumably 
competent to judge … the reliability of statements made to him by other 
investigators or technicians.  He seems just as competent indeed to do this as a 
judge and jury are to pass upon the credibility of an ordinary witness on the 
stand.”  CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 15, at 33 (1954) (quoted 
in Vinicky v. Midland Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 35 Wis.2d 246, 254-55, 151 N.W.2d 
77, 82 (1967)).    
 
This is not a situation like that envisioned by Professor McCormick, 
where the witness, in arriving at an expert opinion, relies on texts, articles, reports, 
                                                          
 
4 We note in this regard that at least some courts have recognized that an expert who 
merely summarizes the content of a hearsay source without applying his or her own expertise is 
merely a “hearsay witness.”  State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Modern 
Tractor & Supply Co., 839 S.W.2d 642, 655 (Mo. App. 1992).  See also Stang-Starr v. 
Byington, 532 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Neb. 1995); Arizona v. Lundstrom, 776 P.2d 1067, 1074 
(Ariz. 1989). 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
8
or statements of other experts, investigators, or technicians—materials that an 
expert not only commonly relies on in forming opinions but is in a position to 
evaluate for worth or trustworthiness as a result of his or her training, experience 
and expertise.  To the extent the State suggests that presentence investigation 
reports are materials typically and reasonably relied on by people like Dr. 
Althouse, the record is, at best, equivocal.  At a December 29, 1994, hearing 
captioned “Preliminary Hearing - Sexual Predator Law,” Dr. Althouse was asked 
whether he had in the past found files kept by the Department of Corrections to be 
“reliable.”5  He responded that, while he had no reason at the moment to consider 
them unreliable, he was not sure that he had “any way of knowing” their 
reliability.6  In such circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the hearsay 
statement in one of those files was something he could reasonably rely on to 
justify an expert opinion.  
 
The other problem with Dr. Althouse’s reliance on the hearsay 
statement in this case is that it formed the only basis for his opinion, and that—in 
his own words—without that statement, “it would be virtually impossible to draw 
                                                          
 
5 Apparently, this hearing was the initial probable-cause hearing on the petition to have 
Watson declared a sexual predator.  According to the State’s brief, Watson filed several motions 
to dismiss the petition, some of which the court, Judge Jack Aulik presiding, denied.  According 
to the State, Judge Aulik denied some of the motions and deferred decision on several others.  
The State says that another judge, Judge Angela B. Bartell, “subsequently entered an order 
finding the petition and evidence presented at the probable cause hearing inadequate to confer 
jurisdiction,” and dismissed the petition.  An appeal was taken and, after “[v]arious proceedings 
… in the trial court, [the court of appeals] and the Wisconsin Supreme Court,” the State was 
“authorized … to file a redrafted petition.”  Judge Bartell eventually held a probable-cause 
hearing on the redrafted petition, which resulted in the order dismissing the petition that is the 
subject of this appeal.  
6 After acknowledging that he had “used” such files in the past, he was asked: “And have 
you found them to be reliable?”  His response was: “I’m not sure I have any way of knowing that.  
Yes, I would say so in that I’ve had no reason at this point to find them unreliable.”   
No. 95-1067   
 
 
9
that conclusion.”  Thus, Dr. Althouse’s opinion rests both on the existence of the 
statement in the presentence report and on his assumption that it was true—that 
Watson actually made the statement.  Just as Dr. Althouse would have no opinion 
if the statement did not exist, he would have no opinion if the statement were 
untrue, for implicit in his opinion that those words indicated a sexual motivation 
for Watson’s actions is his assumption that Watson had, in fact, said them. 
 
It is black-letter law that a witness, lay or expert, may not testify that 
the statement of another witness is truthful.  State v. Jensen, 147 Wis.2d 240, 249, 
432 N.W.2d 913, 917 (1988); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis.2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 
673, 676 (Ct. App. 1984).  And while the State is correct in noting that, at a 
probable-cause hearing, neither the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of 
the witnesses is at issue, State v. Dunn, 121 Wis.2d 389, 397-98, 359 N.W.2d 151, 
154-55 (1984), in this case Dr. Althouse, not the court, made the “credibility” 
assessment; his opinion necessarily assumed the truthfulness of the victim’s 
hearsay statement—a statement which, as Dr. Althouse himself acknowledged at 
the first probable-cause hearing on December 29, 1994, Watson denied making.   
 
As the State points out, a probable-cause hearing is not a trial.  But 
the rules of evidence do apply at such hearings, so that where the sole evidence 
presented on the determinative issue is inadmissible, the trial court’s determination 
of probable cause must fail.  See State v. Gerald L.C., 194 Wis.2d 548, 564-65, 
535 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Ct. App. 1995) (where the only evidence supporting 
bindover on charge of sexually assaulting a child was child’s hearsay statement, 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
10
“the record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that a felony was committed” and 
the trial court’s probable-cause finding must be reversed).7  
 
We conclude, therefore, that Dr. Althouse was not testifying as an 
expert when he stated that, in his opinion, Watson’s false imprisonment of the 
victim was sexually motivated.  We thus reject the State’s argument that his 
opinion, though based on inadmissible evidence, was nonetheless admissible 
under the expert-witness statute, § 907.03, STATS.  Additionally, even if he could 
be considered to be testifying as an expert, Dr. Althouse necessarily assumed the 
truth of a lay witness’s hearsay statement of observed fact; and that is simply not 
the type of data or information the statute presumes to be within the special 
competence of an expert witness to verify and reasonably rely on.  
 
Alternatively, the State argues that even if § 907.03, STATS., does 
not justify admission of Dr. Althouse’s sexual-motivation testimony, the statement 
in the presentence report is independently admissible under various exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.  However, the State did not advance any such argument in the 
trial court—either at the probable-cause hearing or at a hearing two weeks later, 
when the State was invited to address the probability of success on appeal8—and 
we have consistently held that we will not consider an argument raised for the first 
time on appeal.  In re C.A.K., 154 Wis.2d 612, 624, 453 N.W.2d 897, 902 (1990).   
                                                          
 
7 The parties concede in this case, and the trial court agreed, that a probable-cause 
hearing under chapter 980, STATS., is analogous to the preliminary hearing in felony prosecutions 
in terms of procedure and proof.   
8 The State listed several hearsay exceptions in its statement to the court at this second 
hearing but never argued any of them, saying only: “We do not believe the Court considered the 
provisions of Section[s] 908.01(4)(b)1, [and] 908.03(1), (8), and (24) in deciding whether to 
allow the hearsay statement .…”  
No. 95-1067   
 
 
11
 
We acknowledge that this “waiver” rule is one of judicial 
administration which does not absolutely prohibit us from reviewing an issue; but  
when the alleged error was never brought to the trial court’s attention, thus denying 
the court the opportunity to address it, such a result “frustrates one of the 
fundamental principles underlying the ... rule.”  Town of Menasha v. City of 
Menasha, 170 Wis.2d 181, 196, 488 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation 
omitted).  We have also held that, in cases such as this, where the State is not in its 
usual role as a respondent but is the appellant seeking to reverse a trial court ruling, 
“[w]e will without hesitation apply the waiver rule against the state where the issue 
was not first raised by it at the trial court.”  State v. Holt, 128 Wis.2d 110, 125, 382 
N.W.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1985).  In so holding, we emphasized the policy 
underlying the rule:  
Contemporaneous objection gives the trial court an 
opportunity to correct its own errors, and thereby works to 
avoid the delay and expense incident to appeals, reversals 
and new trials which might have been unnecessary had the 
objections been properly raised in the lower court.  
Moreover, the waiver rule prevents a party from 
deliberately setting up the record for appeal by sitting 
silently by while error occurs and then seeking reversal if 
the result is unfavorable. 
Id. at 124, 382 N.W.2d at 686 (citations omitted).9 
                                                          
 
9 In a later case, State v. Rogers, 196 Wis.2d 817, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995), we 
applied the Holt rule, declining to entertain on appeal the State’s “new” theory supporting 
admission of hearsay evidence rejected by the trial court.  We again emphasized the underlying 
philosophy of the rule:  
 
The Holt rule is based on a policy of judicial efficiency.  
By forcing parties to make all of their arguments to the trial 
court, it prevents the extra trials and hearings which would result 
if parties were only required to raise a general issue at the trial 
level with the knowledge that the details could always be 
relitigated on appeal (or on remand) should their original idea 
not win favor.  We will not, however, blindside trial courts with 
(continued) 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
12
 
Even giving the State the benefit of the doubt, the arguments it offers 
in favor of admissibility are unpersuasive.   
 
The State first suggests that the statement is an “admission by a party 
opponent,” citing § 908.01(4)(b)1, STATS.  Section 908.01(4)(b)1 provides that any 
prior out-of-court statements made by a party opponent are not hearsay.  Watson’s 
alleged statement would fall under this rule.  The State, however, must elicit 
testimony from someone who actually heard the statement or find another hearsay 
exception for the report and Dr. Althouse to avoid the problem of hearsay within 
hearsay.  Cf. State v. Whiting, 136 Wis.2d 400, 419-20, 402 N.W.2d 723, 731-32 
(Ct. App. 1987).  The presentence report merely recorded the statement as recounted 
by the victim, and Dr. Althouse relied upon the report, never having actually heard 
the statement from either the declarant or the victim.   
 
The State next argues that the statement is admissible as a “present 
sense impression” under § 908.03(1), STATS., because it was “[a] statement 
describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.”  As Watson points 
out, however, the cases applying the rule involved situations in which the present-
sense impression was communicated to the witness testifying at trial,10 not to a 
nontestifying intermediary—or, as in this case through two nontestifying 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reversals based on theories which did not originate in their 
forum. 
 
Id. at 827, 539 N.W.2d at 901 (citations omitted). 
10  See, e.g., Hamed v. Milwaukee County, 108 Wis.2d 257, 273 n.3, 321 N.W.2d 199, 
207 (1982); Shoemaker v. Marc's Big Boy, 51 Wis.2d 611, 616-17, 187 N.W.2d 815, 818-19 
(1971); Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres, Inc., 16 Wis.2d 241, 248-49, 114 N.W.2d 466, 470 
(1962). 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
13
intermediaries.  The State has not referred us to any cases applying § 908.03(1) to 
facts even remotely resembling those before us here.  Nothing in the presentence 
report, or elsewhere in the record, suggests compliance with the requirement of 
§ 908.03(1) that the statement be made while, or immediately after, perceiving the 
event. 
 
The State also argues that the presentence report qualifies as an 
“official government document” within the meaning of § 908.03(8)(c), STATS., 
which authorizes the admission of “factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.”  The State likens the 
presentence report to “case records” maintained by the Department of Health and 
Social Services, which it says were held admissible in State ex rel. Prellwitz v. 
Schmidt, 73 Wis.2d 35, 242 N.W.2d 227 (1976), and police reports, which it says 
were allowed in Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis.2d 325, 267 N.W.2d 349 (1978).   
 
In Prellwitz, the issue was whether the department’s records 
established that a probationer had not regularly reported his whereabouts to his 
agent and had not paid restitution, as required under the conditions of his 
probation—facts which are readily established by data recorded in the course of 
the department’s daily operations.  Prellwitz, 73 Wis.2d at 40, 242 N.W.2d at 229.  
In this case, on the other hand, the portion of the presentence report at issue is not 
such a record: it is no more than a representation to a department employee of 
what one person said another person said.  We do not see Prellwitz as lending 
significant support to the State’s argument. 
 
We think the same may be said—perhaps even more so—for 
Mitchell.  In that case, the question was whether the rules of evidence permitted 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
14
the State to introduce a police report into evidence at a preliminary hearing.  The 
charged offense was auto theft, and the trial court admitted two police reports 
prepared by the arresting officer.  One was an “offense report” of the theft of the 
car, and the other was the officer’s description of his telephone conversation with 
the owner of the car.  Mitchell, 84 Wis.2d at 330, 267 N.W.2d at 352.  The 
supreme court distinguished between “the details of which the officer had personal 
knowledge,” and the “repetition of declarations made by [the victim] to the officer 
over the phone,” and concluded that the public-records exception “does not allow 
admission of this second level of hearsay.”  Id.  “The admission of the police 
reports containing the declarations of [the victim] was … a violation of the 
hearsay rules.”  Id. at 334, 267 N.W.2d at 354.  The State has not persuaded us 
that the public-records exception to the hearsay rule applies to the victim’s 
statement in this case.  
 
Finally, the State argues that the victim’s statement is admissible 
under the “residual” provisions of § 908.03(24), STATS., authorizing admission of 
“[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”  According to 
the State, the victim’s statement has such guarantees of trustworthiness because: 
(1) the statement was recorded in the presentence report, a document that “was 
carefully investigated and drafted”; (2) the statement is “consistent with the 
account of [the victim’s] false imprisonment” as set forth in the criminal 
complaint; (3) the presentence report “is highly detailed and does not shy from 
rather sensitive topics,” including information of a “sensitive, personal nature” 
which indicates that “accurate reporting constituted [the victim]’s only objective”; 
and (4) admission of the statement “conforms with the spirit of admitting the 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
15
[presentence report] itself under the sec. 908.03(8) official records hearsay 
exception.”   
 
Again, we are not persuaded.  First, we find nothing in the record to 
indicate the extent of the probation agent’s investigation, or the degree of care 
used in preparing the report.  Second, Watson’s purported statement is never 
mentioned in the criminal complaint.  Nor do we see how the subject matter of the 
statement imbues it with a guarantee of trustworthiness.  As to § 908.03(8), 
STATS., we have already concluded that it does not warrant admission of the 
statement.  
 
The Mitchell court also considered § 908.03(24), STATS., and 
declined to apply the residual exception to the portion of the police report 
recounting the officer’s telephone conversation with the victim.  Mitchell, 84 
Wis.2d at 332-33, 267 N.W.2d at 353.  The State argued that the conversation was 
admissible because it was used in a preliminary hearing—a probable-cause 
hearing governed by the same rules applicable to the hearing from which this 
appeal derives.  The court rejected the argument, saying: 
The State suggests that [the victim]’s declarations to the 
police should be considered a residual hearsay exception 
under sec. 908.03(24), Stats., only for the purpose of a 
preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause.  
However, this residual exception, by its form, applies to 
statements 
determined 
to 
have 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness comparable to the enumerated hearsay 
exceptions.  The residual exception thus focuses, as do all 
of the enumerated hearsay exceptions, on the character of 
the statements and the circumstances under which they are 
made, not upon the type of judicial forum at which the 
statement is offered.  We do not believe that restricting the 
forum at which such statements can be used provides the 
guarantees of trustworthiness contemplated by this rule.  
Statements made to the police over the telephone by the 
victim concerning the theft of an automobile have some 
guarantees of trustworthiness, but they do not have 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
16
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible 
under the residual hearsay exception .… 
Id. at 333, 267 N.W.2d at 333.  We believe the same rationale applies here, and we 
conclude that the statement in the presentence report is not independently 
admissible under § 908.03, STATS. 
 
While we may differ with the trial court as to the precise reasoning 
underlying its holding that the State had failed to establish probable cause that the 
predicate false imprisonment offense was sexually motivated, we are satisfied the 
court reached the proper result under applicable law.  
 
Finally, because of the possibility that the dissenting opinion, by 
dwelling on Watson’s past crimes over the past forty-five years, will lead to 
misperceptions of what this case is about, we feel constrained to discuss it briefly.  
As we have said, as part of the process of committing Watson as a sexual predator, 
the State had to show probable cause that a non-sex-related offense—a 1980 false 
imprisonment charge—was sexually motivated.  It elected to do so through the 
testimony of Dr. Althouse, whose opinion was solely based on the statement 
Watson is alleged to have made to the victim.  
 
This case has nothing to do with Watson’s lengthy prior record.  He 
has, obviously, done bad things in his life.  But what he may have done in 1953 or 
1971 did not contribute in any way to the formation of Dr. Althouse’s opinion that 
the 1980 false imprisonment was sexually motivated.  Nor was it based on the fact 
that, in addition to falsely imprisoning the victim in this case, Watson savagely 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
17
beat her.  He was charged and convicted of that offense, and it has nothing to do 
with the issues before us on this appeal.11 
 
Nor was Dr. Althouse’s opinion based on any of the other “facts” the 
dissent says must form the basis for determining the existence of probable cause.12  
His opinion on the sexual motivation of the offense had nothing to do with his two 
interviews with Watson, or with the “Hare psychopathy checklist,” or with 
Watson’s paraphilia.  Those matters may have contributed to other opinions of Dr. 
Althouse’s which are not relevant to this appeal, but not to his opinion that the 
false imprisonment was sexually motivated.13  In Dr. Althouse’s own words, 
                                                          
 
11 It should be noted that the State never alleged that Watson sexually assaulted or had 
sexual contact with the victim in this case. 
12 The State lodges an argument similar to the dissent’s, asking us to consider the 
“totality of the evidence.”  Our analysis rejecting the dissent’s position applies equally to the 
State’s argument.   
13 Despite Dr. Althouse’s unequivocal acknowledgment that his opinion that the false 
imprisonment offense was sexually motivated was “based solely” on Watson’s statement, the 
dissent is grounded on a contrary premise—that Dr. Althouse considered “other information” in 
forming his opinion.  The assertion is based on Dr. Althouse’s response to a generally phrased 
prefatory question the prosecutor posed shortly after he had taken the stand: What, if anything, 
had he learned from the presentence report “of a sexual nature” concerning the false 
imprisonment charge?  After a flurry of objections, Dr. Althouse responded, as the dissent 
indicates: “The statement that I relied upon which I believe you are asking about to form in part 
the basis of my opinion” was Watson’s statement.  He was then asked whether, based on the 
materials he had reviewed and his interview with Watson, he had an opinion “as to whether Mr. 
Watson suffered from a mental disorder.”  Dr. Althouse responded that, in his opinion, Watson 
suffered from paraphilia.    
(continued) 
No. 95-1067   
 
 
18
Watson’s alleged statement was the only basis for his opinion in that regard and he 
acknowledged that, indeed, it would be “impossible” for him to so conclude 
without that statement. 
 
By the Court.—Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
As we stress throughout this opinion, two elements must be established in order to obtain 
a commitment under the sexual predator law: (1) the person has been convicted of either an 
offense that is a designated sex crime or another offense that was “sexually motivated”; and (2) 
the person “suffers from a mental disorder.”  Section 980.01(7), STATS.   The dissent thus 
attempts to compare apples to oranges by attaching Dr. Althouse’s testimony on the second 
element to his testimony on the first element—which, as we also stress, is the sole issue the State 
has brought before us on this appeal.   Indeed, that issue was not broached in Dr. Althouse’s 
testimony until a dozen pages later in the transcript when the prosecutor, having completed his 
questioning on the mental-disorder element, moved on to the issue of sexual motivation and 
asked Dr. Althouse whether he had an opinion on whether the offense was “sexually motivated.”  
And, as Dr. Althouse candidly acknowledged, his opinion in that regard was based not on any 
interview or any tests—or even consideration of Watson’s criminal history—but, again in his 
words, “solely” on the statement in the presentence report.  
 
No. 95-1067(D) 
 
 
 
 
 
DYKMAN, P.J. (dissenting).   This case is about the phrase 
“probable cause.”  The majority concludes that the State failed to show probable 
cause that one of Watson’s past crimes was sexually motivated.  I believe that it 
did.  I do so in part because the Wisconsin Supreme Court has described probable 
cause as a minimal showing of the truth of an assertion.  Not much is required for 
a conclusion that probable cause exists. 
 
In State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis.2d 672, 681-82, 482 N.W.2d 364, 367-
68 (1992), the supreme court explained the phrase “probable cause.”  The court 
noted that a “possibility or suspicion” does not meet this test, but that the evidence 
need not show that “guilt is more likely than not” to meet the test.  This “not more 
likely than not” test shows the low threshold that evidence must pass.  In the usual 
situation, it can be “more likely than not” that a defendant is not guilty of the 
crime charged, and yet “probable cause” exists.  Here, it can be “more likely than 
not” that Watson’s act which led to his conviction for false imprisonment was not 
sexually motivated, and probable cause can still be found.   
 
The dispositive issue is whether Watson’s 1980 conviction for false 
imprisonment was sexually motivated.  All agree that the only evidence of sexual 
motivation was a statement allegedly made by the victim of the crime that Watson 
told her:  “Now you are going to suck me off, bitch.”  A psychologist, Dr. Richard 
Althouse, testified that without that statement, it would be virtually impossible to 
conclude that the false imprisonment was sexually motivated.   
No. 95-1067(D) 
 
 
2
 
The majority concludes that the victim’s statement, admittedly 
hearsay, cannot be the basis for Dr. Althouse’s opinion because he was not 
testifying as an expert when he said that he believed Watson had made the 
statement.  I view the matter differently. 
 
Ordinarily, I would agree that no one can testify that another person 
is telling the truth.  State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis.2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 
(Ct. App. 1984).  But the hearing at which Dr. Althouse testified was not a trial; it 
was a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to proceed to trial.  
The question was not whether Watson’s underlying crime was sexually motivated, 
but whether it was probably sexually motivated.  Probable cause requires much 
less certainty than the proof required at trial.  Where the majority and I differ is in 
the reliance that we, the trial court and Dr. Althouse may place on a hearsay 
statement allegedly made by the victim of Watson’s crime.   
 
First, I do not agree that Dr. Althouse’s opinion was based only upon 
Watson’s statement, considered in isolation.  The question asked was:  “What, if 
anything, did you learn from that presentence connected with Count 3 that appears 
in Exhibit 1 of a sexual nature?”  After Watson’s objection was overruled, Dr. 
Althouse answered:  “The statement that I relied upon which I believe you are 
asking about to form in part the basis of my opinion, is this:  ‘Now you are going 
to suck me off, bitch.’”  (Emphasis added.)  Later, Dr. Althouse testified:  “It is 
my professional opinion based upon my experience that the offense was sexually 
motivated.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Dr. Althouse’s answers pertain to whether Watson’s crime was 
sexually motivated, not to whether he suffered from a mental disorder.  I cannot 
transform what Dr. Althouse actually said:  “It is my professional opinion … that 
No. 95-1067(D) 
 
 
3
the offense was sexually motivated” into something else having to do with 
Watson’s mental disorder.  I am aware that a question asking whether a crime is of 
a “sexual nature” is not the best way to ask whether a crime is sexually motivated.  
But it is by no means a question that inquires into whether Watson suffered from a 
mental disorder.  The transcript of the probable cause hearing speaks for itself.  
These are direct quotes from Dr. Althouse, not digests or interpretations of what 
he said.   
 
Once one considers Dr. Althouse’s answers, and in particular the 
italicized portions, I do not think that it is correct to assert, as the majority does, 
that “[Dr. Althouse’s] opinion on the sexual motivation of the offense had nothing 
to do with his two interviews with Watson, or with the ‘Hare psychopathy 
checklist,’ or with Watson’s paraphilia.”  At best, Dr. Althouse’s answers would 
lead to an inquiry into all of the factors that led to his opinion, and what in Dr. 
Althouse’s experience helped him to conclude that Watson’s crime was sexually 
motivated. 
 
Once one accepts, as I do, that there were other factors that Dr. 
Althouse considered before coming to his conclusion, the question becomes 
whether the information that Dr. Althouse knew would support his conclusion that 
Watson’s crime was sexually motivated.  The majority considers this other 
information irrelevant and usable only to show that Watson is a bad man.  That is 
not my purpose.  I agree with the majority that Watson has done bad things in his 
life.  But the question is whether the information that Dr. Althouse knew about 
Watson could form the basis for his decision to believe that Watson made the 
statement to his victim.  I believe that the following information could form a 
basis for Dr. Althouse’s decision to believe the victim and not Watson.   
No. 95-1067(D) 
 
 
4
 
In 1953, Watson was convicted of carnal knowledge and abuse.  In 
1971, he was convicted of two counts of endangering safety by conduct regardless 
of life and one count of attempted rape.  In 1980, he was convicted of battery, two 
counts of false imprisonment and one count of endangering safety by conduct 
regardless of life. 
 
The facts giving rise to Watson’s latest convictions were that in 
1971, Watson picked up three women in Milwaukee and was driving them to 
Algoma.  He forced the women to disrobe by threatening them with a knife and 
attempted to tape together the hands of one of them.  He disrobed and crawled into 
the back seat of his car, where he attempted to have sexual intercourse with one of 
the women.  The women successfully fled the vehicle.  In 1980, Watson picked up 
a female hitchhiker, drove to and parked in the University of Wisconsin 
Arboretum, and threatened the woman with a knife.  During a struggle, Watson hit 
the woman about the head with a hammer wrapped in a cloth.  He tied the woman 
up, forced her into the back seat and wrapped tape around her head.  The woman 
freed herself and, after a struggle, escaped from the car.  Later that morning, 
Watson picked up another female hitchhiker and began striking her about the head 
with a hammer.  She managed to break away and exit the car.  Watson followed 
her and began hitting her with the hammer again before fleeing.   
 
Dr. Althouse interviewed Watson twice for a total of about two and 
one-half hours.  He reviewed the Department of Corrections social services file, 
the Bureau of Clinical Services confidential file, including Watson’s presentence 
report, and reviewed Watson’s legal file.  He used a “Hare psychopathy checklist,” 
which assesses twenty variables in order to measure anti-social personality 
disorders.  The test revealed that Watson was in an area reserved for people who 
are commonly thought of as having serious anti-social personality disorders.  Dr. 
No. 95-1067(D) 
 
 
5
Althouse discussed Watson’s prior record with him.  Watson admitted being 
convicted of carnal knowledge and abuse of a minor, although he denied actually 
raping or attempting to rape the victim.  Watson described his previous conviction 
for attempted rape and two counts of endangering safety by conduct regardless of 
life as a joke that apparently went too far.  Watson denied that his prior offenses 
were sexually motivated with the exception of the one in 1953, and he admitted 
that he asked the victim in one of his convictions to disrobe.  Dr. Althouse 
diagnosed Watson as suffering from paraphilia, a condition that results in 
uncontrollable urges that involve sexual contact with non-consenting partners.    
 
I do not think it is necessary to conclude that Dr. Althouse was 
guessing or speculating when he decided to believe Watson’s victim’s view of 
what happened over Watson’s explanation.  Althouse knew of the two different 
stories.  He used his experience and expertise in psychology, his knowledge of 
Watson’s past criminal record, and what Watson revealed in interviews to 
determine that Watson probably made the statement.   
 
This is the information from which we must determine whether there 
is probable cause to believe that Watson’s crime was sexually motivated.  We 
need not conclude that it is more likely than not that Watson fits this definition.  
We need only conclude that it is more than a possibility or a suspicion that Watson 
is sexually violent.  Mitchell, 167 Wis.2d at 681-82, 482 N.W.2d at 367.  Indeed, 
we can conclude that it is more likely than not that Watson’s crime was not 
sexually motivated and still find probable cause that it is.  Id. at 682, 482 N.W.2d 
at 367-68.  I conclude that it is more than a possibility or speculation that Dr. 
Althouse was probably correct in determining that Watson made the statement and 
therefore, in his opinion, Watson’s crime was sexually motivated.  It is not 
necessary that it is “more likely than not” that Dr. Althouse correctly made his 
No. 95-1067(D) 
 
 
6
assessment.  A court’s duty at a preliminary or probable cause hearing is to 
determine whether there exists a believable or plausible account of the defendant’s 
guilt.  See State v. Dunn, 121 Wis.2d 389, 398, 359 N.W.2d 151, 155 (1984).  
Here, the question is whether there is a believable or plausible account from which 
Dr. Althouse, the trial court and this court can say that Watson’s previous crime 
was probably sexually motivated.   
 
Using the standard we are to use at the probable cause stage of a 
Chapter 980, STATS., proceeding, I conclude that there is probable cause to believe 
that Watson’s crime was sexually motivated.  I would therefore remand to the trial 
court for a trial at which a jury could decide whether the State could prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that it was.