Case Title: Rolf Jensen & Associates v. Dist. Ct.

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 42

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev., Advance Opinion 4Z

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROLF JENSEN & ASSOCIATES, INC., No. 57461
Petitioner,

vs,
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF | FILED
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE |

ELISSA F. CADISH, nus 99 2012
Respondents,

and

MANDALAY CORPORATION,
Real Party in Interest.

|

Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment in a tort
action,

Petition granted.

Weil & Drage, APC, and Jean A. Weil, John 'T. Wendland, and ‘Thomas A.
Larmore, Henderson,
for Petitioner.

Cotton, Driggs, Walch, Holley, Woloson & Thompson and Dennis R.
Haney, Las Vegas; Jones Day and Clark T. Thiel, San Francisco,
California,

for Real Party in Interest.

Backus, Carranza & Burden and Leland Eugene Backus and Shea A.
Backus, Las Vegas; Lloyd, Gray, Whitehead & Monroe, PC, and E. Britton
Monroe and R. Burns Logan, Birmingham, Alabama,

for Amicus Curiae Halcrow, Inc.

1A A567

 
on

Watt, ‘Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP, and David R. Johnson and Jared
M, Sechrist, Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae Tishman Construction Corporation of Nevada.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, and Michael M.
Edwards, J. Scott Burris, and Chad C. Butterfield, Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae Converse Professional Group.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.!

OPINION

By the Court, SAITTA, J.:

In this original petition for a writ of mandamus, we are asked
to consider whether the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
preempts state law claims for indemnification brought by an admitted
violator of the ADA. After examining the purpose and intended effects of
the ADA, we conclude that such claims pose an obstacle to the objectives of
the ADA and therefore are preempted. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

FACTS

In 2002, real party in interest Mandalay Corporation entered
into a contract with petitioner Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc., whereby
Rolf Jensen would provide consulting services regarding construction of an
expansion to the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino (the Resort) in Las
Vegas in compliance with the ADA. The parties’ contract contained a
provision providing that Rolf Jensen would indemnify Mandalay for any

"The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

 

 
 

damages arising from any act, omission, or willful misconduct by Rolf
Jensen in its performance of its obligations. After the Resort expansion
was constructed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an investigation
of numerous violations of the ADA arising from a lack of handicap
accessibility at the Resort. Thereafter, Mandalay entered into a
comprehensive settlement agreement with the DOJ that required
Mandalay to bring the Resort into compliance with the ADA. Mandalay
estimates that these retrofits will cost it more than $20 million,

Mandalay subsequently sued Rolf Jensen in district court,
seeking to recover the costs it will incur to retrofit the Resort. After
preliminary motion practice, the following claims remained pending
against Rolf Jensen: (1) express indemnification, (2) breach of contract, (3)
breach of express warranty, and (4) negligent misrepresentation. Rolf
Jensen filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that these claims
are each preempted by the ADA and that, alternatively, Mandalay’s claim
for negligent misrepresentation is barred by the economic loss doctrine,
‘The district court denied Rolf Jensen's motion for summary judgment.
Rolf Jensen now petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to grant its motion,

DISCUSSION

Rolf Jensen maintains that the district court was required to
grant its motion for summary judgment because Mandalay’s claims are
each preempted by the ADA and, in addition, Mandalay’s negligent
misrepresentation claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine, Rolf
Jensen contends that consideration of its petition is appropriate given the
important questions of law involved and notions of judicial economy.

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of

an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or

 

 
 

station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.”
international Game Tech. v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.8d 556,
558 (2008) (citations omitted); NRS 34.160. “Writ relief is not available,
however, when an adequate and speedy legal remedy exists” and, as we
have explained, an appeal generally constitutes a sufficient remedy. Id;
NRS 34.170. The issue of whether an appeal is an adequate and speedy
remedy “necessarily turns on the underlying proceedings’ status, the types
of issues raised in the writ petition, and whether a future appeal will
permit this court to meaningfully review the issues presented.” D.R.
Horton v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736 (2007). Even
when an appeal is not an adequate and speedy remedy, we typically will
not entertain writ petitions challenging the denial of a motion for
summary judgment unless “no factual dispute exists and summary
judgment is clearly required by a statute or rule, or an important issue of
law requires clarification.” Walters v. Dist. Ct, 127 Nev. _, _, 263
P.3d 231, 234 (2011),
Here, an appeal is not a speedy or adequate remedy in light of,
the relatively early stages of litigation and considerations of sound judicial

administration. Next, the issue of preemption under the ADA is an issue

 

of nationwide magnitude in need of clarification in the courts of this state.
Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to entertain this writ petition.
Preemption

Whether state law claims are preempted by federal law is a
question of law that we review de novo, without deference to the findings
of the district court. Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust, 123 Nev. 362,
370, 168 P.3d 73, 79 (2007). The preemption doctrine emanates from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, pursuant to which
state law must yield when it frustrates or conflicts with federal law. Id,

 

 
mn a

‘The doctrine is comprised of two broad branches: express and implied
preemption. Id, Express preemption occurs, as its name suggests, when
Congress “explicitly states that intent in a statute's language.” Id. at 371,
168 P.3d at 79. Implied preemption arises, in contra:

 

does not include statutory language expressly preempting state law.” Id,

Implied preemption contains two sub-branches: field and
conflict preemption. Id. Field preemption applies “when congressional
enactments s0 thoroughly occupy a legislative field, or touch a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant, that Congress effectively leaves
no room for states to regulate conduct in that field.” Id. Conflict
preemption, or obstacle preemption, as it is oftentimes called, occurs when
“federal law actually conflicts with any state law.” Id. at 371, 168 P.3d at
80. As we have explained:

Conflict preemption analysis examines the federal
statute as a whole to determine whether a party's
compliance with both federal and state
requirements is impossible or whether, in light of
the federal statute’s purpose and intended effects,
state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment
of Congress's objectives.

Id, at 371-72, 168 P.3d at 80.
This petition involves conflict preemption. More precisely,

 

this petition concerns whether, in view of the ADA’s purpose and intended
effects, Mandalay’s state law claims pose an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress's objectives in enacting the ADA.

As a threshold matter, we note that the United States
Supreme Court has set forth “two cornerstones” of preemption that we
must factor into our analysis of this issue. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
565 (2009). First, the Court has explained that “the purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Id. (quoting

 

 
1 009 <>

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Second, the Court has
instructed that “liJn all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in
which Congress has legislated...in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied, ... we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act

 

 

unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). ‘The second
principle, known as the presumption against preemption, arises out of
“respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system.”
Id. at 565 n.3 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485).

‘This writ petition involves Congress's legislation in the area of
disability discrimination, Although states have the “police powers to
prohibit discrimination on specified grounds,” Kroske v, U.S. Bank Corp.
482 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2005), historically states have, at best, played
a junior role in this area, See Alexander v, Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96
(1985) (explaining that Congress enacted provisions prohibiting
discrimination against disabled persons precisely because such persons
had otherwise been neglected), ‘Thus, because this petition does not
involve a legislative landscape traditionally occupied by the states, the
presumption against preemption does not apply with particular force here.
See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 (noting that the force given to the
presumption against preemption is guided by “the historic presence of
state law”), With these overarching principles in mind, we consider the
purpose and intended effects of the ADA.

 

 
‘The ADA
In enacting the ADA, Congress declared:
It is the purpose of this chapter—

(to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the climination of
discrimination against individuals with
disabilities

 

(2)to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;

(8) to ensure that the Federal Government
plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established in this chapter on behalf of individuals,
with disabilities; and

(A) to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,
in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.

42 US.C. § 121010) (2006).

‘Thus, the goal of the ADA is twofold. It is intended not only to

 

  

remedy discrimination against disabled individuals but to prevent it. “To
effectuate its sweeping purpose,” the ADA has a comprehensive scope
covering discriminatory practices that disabled persons face ‘in major
areas of public life,” including access to public accommodations. PGA

‘Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). But Congress was not

 

 

simply concerned with intentional discrimination when it enacted the
ADA. It also specifically designed the provisions of the ADA to prevent
discrimination stemming from neglect and indifference. See id, As such,

regardless of the intent of an owner of a place of public accommodation,

when, as here, a facility is not constructed to be readily accessible to

 

 
con

 

individuals with disabilities, the owner is liable for unlawful
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C § 12182%a) (2006) (prohibiting the
discrimination against disabled individuals “in the full and equal
enjoyment of... facilities ...or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns .... or operates a place of public
accommodation”); 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2006) (explaining that
“discrimination” for purposes of the ADA includes “a failure to design and
construct facilities for first occupancy ... that are readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities”), Notably, however, with the
exception of landlord-tenant relationships, 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (2010),
there are no provisions within the ADA, or its accompanying regulations,
that permit indemnification or the allocation of liability between the
various entities subject to the ADA.

Mandalay’s indemnification claim
Having examined the germane aspects of the ADA, we now

 

turn to the parties’ specific arguments with respect to whether Mandalay’s
state law claims are preempted by the ADA, Regarding Mandalay’s
indemnification claim, Rolf Jensen argues that such claims are preempted

\centive to comply with the ADA, thereby

 

because they diminish owners’
frustrating Congress's goal of preventing disability discrimination.
Mandalay responds that its indemnification claim, in fact,
advances the purpose of the ADA. Specifically, it argues that if owners of
places of public accommodation are able to seek indemnification from ADA
consultants, such as Rolf Jensen, then they will be more inclined to hire
these consultants, which have the overall effect of promoting ADA
compliance. Mandalay also asserts that it would simply be unfair to
preempt its indemnification claim and force it to bear the cost of
retrofitting the Resort, while Rolf Jensen, who was a direct factor in

8

 
causing these expenses, escapes responsibility. Finally, Mandalay
contends that enforcing the parties’ indemnification provision does not
interfere with the purpose of the ADA because it does not deprive disabled
persons the right to seek relief for violations of the ADA.

Courts in other jurisdictions have “flatly rejected” the type of
indemnification claim brought by Mandalay. See 1 John P. Relman,
Housing Discrimination Practice Manual § 2:9 (2011). The leading case in
this regard is Equal Rights Center v. Niles Bolton Associates, 602 F.3d
597 (Ath Cir, 2010). In Niles Bolton, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reasoned that permitting an owner to, in essence,
circumvent responsibility for its violations of the ADA and the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) through an indemnification claim would lessen the
owner's incentive to ensure compliance with the ADA and FHA? Id, at

 

602. The court therefore concluded that such claims are preempted:

Allowing an owner to completely insulate itself
from liability for an ADA or FHA violation
through contract diminishes its incentive to

"Notwithstanding Mandalay’s criticisms, this view of
indemnification claims has long been embraced by courts, in various
statutory contexts. See, e.g., LeCompte v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 780 F.2d
1260, 1264 (th Cir. 1986) (state indemnification actions against
supervisory personnel by employers who have been sued for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are preempted because “an employer
who believed that any violation of the [FLSA] could be recovered from its
employees would have a diminished incentive to comply with the statute
and might be inclined to close its eyes [to violations of the FLSAJ");
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v, Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 676
(9th Cir. 1980) (permitting indemnification for violations of the Securities
Act of 1933 “would undermine the statutory purpose of assuring diligent
performance of duty and deterring negligence’).

 

 

 
 

ensure compliance with discrimination laws. If a
developer . . ., who concededly has a non-delegable
duty to comply with the ADA and FHA, can be
indemnified under state law for its ADA and FHA
violations, then the developer will not be

accountable for discriminatory practices... . Such
a result is antithetical to the purposes of the FHA.
and ADA.

Id.

Likewise, the federal district courts that have considered this
issue have each uniformly concluded that owners’ indemnification claims
for their own ADA violations undermine the goals of the ADA. See United
States v, The Bryan Co,, No. 3:11-CV-302-CWR-LRA, 2012 WL 2051861,
at *5 (S.D. Miss. Jun. 6, 2012) (permitting indemnification claims for
violations of the ADA or FHA “would frustrate, ‘disturb, interfere with, or
seriously compromise the purposes of the’ FHA and ADA” (quoting

lorgan City v. siana Elec. , 81 F.3d 319, 322 (6th Cir,
1994); Equal Rights Center v, Archstone Smith Trust, 603 F, Supp. 2d
814, 824 (D. Md, 2009) (“{{ndemnification is antithetical to Congress’
purpose in enacting the FHA and the ADA.”); United States v. Murphy
Development, LLC, No. 3:08-0960, 2009 WL 3614829, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
Oct. 27, 2009) (“LAlllowing recovery under state law for indemnity and/or
contribution would frustrate the achievement of Congress’ purposes in
adopting the FHA and the ADA.”),

We agree with these courts that permitting indemnification
claims would weaken owners’ incentive to prevent violations of the ADA
and therefore would conflict with the ADA’s purpose and intended effects.
Simply put, such claims would allow owners to contractually maneuver
themselves into a position where, in essence, they can ignore their
nondelegable responsibilities under the ADA. As previously noted,

10

 
   

eliminating this type of neglectful environment was one of the specific
aims of Congress in enacting the ADA. It follows that if owners were
permitted to pursue indemnification for their own ADA violations,
Congress's goal of preventing discrimination would be frustrated. In
addition, such claims would intrude upon the remedial scheme set forth in
the ADA, which, we reiterate, does not provide for a right to
indemnification, despite having a sweeping and comprehensive scope. See
Access 4 All, Inc. v. Trump International Hotel and Tower Condominium,
No. 04-CV-7497KMK, 2007 WL 633951, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007)
(examining New York state law and explaining that even if it provided for
a right to indemnity for a party's own ADA violations, “it would raise the
specter that any state-law right to indemnity would be pre-empted by the
extensive remedial scheme of the ADA”). Thus,
and as every court to squarely consider this

Rolf Jensen argues,
1e has held,? the ADA

 

  

preempts indemnification claims brought by owners for their violations

thereof becaus

 

such claims would pose an obstacle to the ADA.

With respect to Mandalay’s assertion that permitting
indemnification claims would have the overall effect of promoting ADA
compliance by encouraging owners to seek advice from ADA consultants,
we disagree. Owners are motivated to seck this advice to aid in their duty

to construct facilities in compliance with the ADA; indeed, that is the very

The only authority critical of this view is a law review note. See

Charles Daugherty, Note, Who Needs Contract Law?—A Critical Look at

Contractual Indemnification (or Lack Thereof) in FHAA and ADA “Design
and Construct” Cases, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 545, 547 (2011). As with the
arguments advanced by Mandalay, we find the analysis contained in this
authority unpersuasive.

 

 
point of seeking such assistance. Mandalay’s suggestion that owners only
contract with these consultants in order to obtain indemnification
understates the role qualified consultants play in owners’ efforts to meet
ADA requirements. Moreover, the debilitating effect that such @ mindset
has on ADA compliance, as dramatically illustrated by the numerous
violations of the ADA in this case, is palpable, As previously explained,
the surest way to maximize compliance with the ADA is to hold owners’
risks of noncompliance firmly in place.

We also disagree with Mandalay’s contention that it is simply
unfair to preempt its indemnification claim. In today's commercial
construction industry, it is surely an owner such as Mandalay—a highly
sophisticated entity with ultimate authority over all construction

decisions—who is in the best position to prevent violations of the ADA.

 

Furthermore, contrary to Mandalay’s contention, Rolf Jensen is not
immunized from liability for the role that it allegedly played in
Mandalay’s violations of the ADA. Rolf Jensen's liability, however, simply
runs to disabled individuals rather than to Mandalay. Soe Archstone
Smith, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (any entity who contributes to a violation of
the ADA may be directly liable); U.S, v. Days Inns of America, Inc,, 997 F.
Supp. 1080, 1083 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (‘[Alrchitects, builders, [and] planners,
among others, are within the ADA’s “broad sweep of liability.”).

Mandalay is correct that its indemnification claim does not
directly interfere with the rights of disabled individuals to obtain relief
under the ADA. Mandalay overlooks, however, that the goal of the ADA is

not simply to remedy discrimination against individuals with disabilities
but to prevent it in the first place. See 42 U.S.C. § 121010) (2006). Thus,
although Mandalay’s indemnification claim may not interfere with the

 

 
remedial components of the ADA, as detailed above, it thwarts the
prophylactic aspects of the ADA.

‘Mandalay has not cited any case that has directly addressed
this issue and concluded that claims for indemnification are not
preempted by the ADA. The only decision cited by Mandalay to arguably
indicate that such claims might be viable is Independent Living Resources
v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 755 (D. Or. 1997), wherein the
court stated that an owner and architect responsible for violations of the
ADA “can decide later, as between themselves, who will be responsible for
any costs that [the owner] may incur as a result ....” Mandalay seizes on
this statement, arguing that the remark shows that indemnification
¢ permitted. But Oregon Arena is not so broad. ‘The court wai
mply commenting on a possible dispute between the owner and the

claims

 

architect. In fact, the architect w:
court was considering. Id, And, to the extent it can be said that Oregon

 

not a party to the dispute that the

Arena speaks to the question at issue here, the court cited no authority
and provided no analysis of preemption; thus, Mandalay’s reliance on
Oregon Arena is misplaced.

Mandalay also cites to 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (2010), which
provides, in pertinent part, that “allocation of responsibility for complying

with the obligations of [the ADAJ" is permitted between landlords and

 

tenants. Despite the selective quotations of this regulation in Mandalay’s
briefs, by its plain language, this provision only applies in the landlord-
tenant context. The inclusion of a right to indemnification for landlords

and tenants undermines Mandalay's argument because the regulation’s
omission of other entities appears intentional. See Matter of Estate of
Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) (recognizing the

 

 
om

 

general rule of construction that when one thing is mentioned the
exclusion of another is implied). Equally misguided is Mandalay’s reliance
on decisions that have cited this regulation in concluding that
indemnification is permitted between landlords and tenants. See, e.g.
Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.8d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2000). As the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he history of [28 C.F.R.
§ 36.201(b)] demonstrates that this allocation provision is unique to the
landlord-tenant relationship and does not impact the relationships
builders, and other parties.” Equal Rights Center v.
‘Niles Bolton Associates, 602 F.3d 597, 602 n.1 (Ath Cir. 2010).

‘The remaining authorities cited by Mandalay are
distinguishable. Mandalay relies upon Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285
(2003), where the Supreme Court stated that an action brought under the

betwoen architect

   

FHA “is, in effect, a tort action,” and that “when Congress creates a tort

action, it legislates

 

gainst a logal background of ordinary tort-related
vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to
incorporate those rules.” Mandalay also cites Norfolk & Western R, Co. v,
Avers, 538 U.S. 136, 162 (2003), where the Court indicated that an
‘employer liable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act may seck

 

contribution or indemnification from concurrently liable third parties in

 

accordance with the traditional principles of tort law. Mandalay argues
that the ADA essentially creates tort liability and, because
indemnification is a traditional principle of tort law, Congress intended for
the ADA to incorporate the right to such relief. But neither Meyer nor
Norfolk involved preemption, much less the specific issue of preemption by
the ADA, and we are aware of no case that has cited these decisions for
the proposition advanced by Mandalay. Also unpersuasive is Mandalay’s

“4

 
reliance on American Federal Savings v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 869,
875-76, 802 P.2d 1270, 1275 (1990), where this court concluded that a
third-party tortfeasor’s contractual right to express indemnification from
an employer based upon an employee's injury was not voided by Nevada's
workers’ compensation scheme. As with Mever and Norfolk, American
Federal is distinguishable because it did not concern preemption by the
ADA. In sum, the few authorities that Mandalay has patched together in
support of its position are unavailing. ‘Therefore, we conclude that
Mandalay’s indemnification claim is prompted by the ADA.

 

Rolf Jensen also argues that Mandalay’s claims for breach of
contract, breach of express warranty, and negligent misrepresentation are
preempted by the ADA because, in substance, these claims are merely
reiteration of Mandalay’s claim for indemnification,

Mandalay responds that it does not simply seck
indemnification through these claims. Rather, it contends that it seeks
separate and distinct relief for Rolf Jensen's breach of its contractual and
professional obligations to provide advice that would prevent violations of
the ADA.

Niles Bolton is instructive on this issue. There, the Fourth
Cireuit held that although an owner may attempt to plead an
indemnification claim in the garb of breach of contract and negligence

theories, when the relief the owner seeks is recovery of all the losses
arising from its violations of the ADA and FHA, such claims are “de facto
indemnification claims and, thus, preempted.” 602 F.3d at 602; see also
Equal Rights Center v. Archstone Smith Trust, 603 F. Supp. 24 814, 824
(D. Md. 2009) (concluding that claims for breach of contract and

 

 
professional negligence were preempted where they were “wholly
derivative of [the owner's] primary liability” under the ADA and FHA).
Like these courts, in resolving the issue of whether state law

claims are preempted by federal law, we analyze their substance, not

simply their labels. See, e.¢., Cervantes v. Health Plan of Nevada, 127
Nev. _, __ nd, 263 P.Sd 261, 264 n.4 (2011) (although a party may

plead different theories, claims based upon the same substantive

allegations “necessarily stand or fall together” when considering whether

 

they are preempted), Consequently, if, as Rolf Jensen asserts, Mandalay's

claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligent

 

misrepresentation are simply a subterfuge for Mandalay’s indemnification

 

claim, then those claims are preempted by the ADA.

A close reading of Mandalay'’s third amended complaint
reveals that each of its claims and requested damages derive solely from
its first-party liability for its admitted violations of the ADA. While
Mandalay argues that its claims have an independent basis, what
Mandalay seeks to recover, and what each of its claims are predicated
upon, is the cost of retrofitting the Resort as required by its settlement
with the DOJ. Indeed, were it not for this settlement, Mandalay would
not have brought these claims against Rolf Jensen in the first place.
Accordingly, we conclude that Mandalay’s claims for breach of contract,
breach of express warranty, and negligent misrepresentation are de facto
claims for indemnification and thus are preempted by the ADA.

‘We have considered Mandalay’s remaining contentions and
conclude that they are without merit.

 

 
anes ab

CONCLUSION
We conclude that Mandalay's state law claims for
indemnification pose an obstacle to the objectives of the ADA and

 

therefore are preempted,® Accordingly, we grant Rolf Jensen's petition for
extraordinary relief and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
mandamus instructing the district court to grant Rolf Jensen's motion for

summary judgment.¢

 

De
J

Gibbons:

1d

lesty
4

sd

Parraguirre

5In view of our disposition, we need not address whether Mandalay's
negligent misrepresentation claim is also barred by the economic loss
doctrine,

In light of this opinion, we vacate the stay ordered by this court on
July 20, 2011,

17