Case Title: Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1998 WY 1952 P.2d 209Case Number: 96-197Decided: 01/02/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

George 
A. WRIGHT, Appellant (Petitioner/Employee-Claimant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee

(Respondent/Objector-Defendant).

George Santini of Santini 
Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General 
(argued), for Appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, 
MACY and LEHMAN, JJ., and CARDINE, Retired Justice.*

 * CARDINE, Ret.J., deceased July 22, 
1997.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 [¶1] The key issue in this case, in which review is 
sought of the denial of extended benefits for an injured workman, is whether the 
award of retrospective benefits is foreclosed because WYO. STAT. § 27-14-403(g) 
(1991) does not specifically provide authority for such an award. After 
achieving a remarkable recovery from a serious and disabling injury, George A. 
Wright (Wright) returned to the work force and enjoyed a successful career for 
several years. Ultimately, however, his injuries forced him to discontinue his 
employment, and a claim was filed for extended benefits pursuant to the statute. 
Those benefits were awarded, and Wright then filed claims for extended benefits 
for the two one year periods that preceded the period for which the benefits 
were awarded. The office of hearing examiners upheld the denial of these claims 
for benefits, ruling that the statute did not authorize retrospective award of 
extended benefits. A collateral debate occurs between the parties with respect 
to the application of limitations periods found in the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act. We hold that the rule of liberal construction must be applied 
in favor of the injured workman when the statute is silent, and the hearing 
examiner erred in ruling that the claims must be denied because awards for 
retrospective benefits were not authorized under the statute. We also hold that 
no applicable statute of limitations forecloses the award of the extended 
benefits sought by Wright. The proceeding is reversed and remanded for the entry 
of an appropriate order in accordance with this decision.

[¶2] In his Appellant's 
Brief, Wright states the issue in this manner:

Did the hearing office err as a matter of law in 
denying Appellant's claims for permanent partial disability extended benefits on 
the grounds that the statute providing for such benefits does not provide for 
retroactive application?

In the Brief of the 
Appellee, the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) 
states the issue in a way that suggests the issue of a limitation on filing as 
well as retrospective application:

Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings erred 
in denying Claimant's application for extended permanent disability benefits 
submitted over one year after Claimant's disability became 
apparent.

[¶3] Wright was injured in a 
work related accident while employed by Sweetwater Television Company in 
November of 1973. Wright's injuries were so serious and extensive that his 
physician informed him he never would be able to walk again. He received medical 
and disability benefits from the Workers' Compensation Fund until April of 1977 
when he was awarded permanent total disability benefits.  Over the years, Wright participated in 
extensive physical therapy programs and pursued rehabilitation programs, 
including education in cable television technology. He succeeded in regaining 
the use of his lower extremities, and he re-entered the work force in the cable 
television industry in 1985. He continued to receive periodic payments of his 
award of permanent total disability benefits, with the last installment being 
paid on February 26, 1986.

[¶4] In September of 1991, 
Wright again was required to leave the work force because of increased pain and 
discomfort in his right hip, lower back, and lower extremities. The pain and 
discomfort prevented him from performing his regular work activities. Two years 
later, in September of 1993, he filed a claim for permanent total disability 
extended benefits pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-403(g) (1991). On September 13, 
1994, the Office of Administrative Hearings entered Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order pursuant to which Wright was awarded extended 
permanent disability benefits for the period beginning September 1, 1993 until 
the date of the order. In that order the Office of Administrative Hearings found 
that Wright had suffered a second compensable injury arising out of the initial 
job related injury of 1973. The date of the second compensable injury was 
determined to be September of 1991 when Wright was unable to continue in the 
work force because of the disabling pain that gradually had grown 
worse.

[¶5] After the entry of the 
order awarding the extended permanent disability benefits, Wright submitted two 
claims for permanent total disability extended benefits; one for the period of 
September 1, 1991 through August 31, 1992, and another for September 1, 1992 
through August 31, 1993. These claims were disallowed, and, following a 
contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings entered an Order 
Denying Benefits. The rationale for that decision was that the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act does not authorize the payment of extended benefits 
retroactively.

[¶6] The interpretation and 
correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act 
is a question of law over which our review authority is plenary. Tenorio v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 1997); 
Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299 (Wyo. 1991). Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law. 
Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996); Aanenson v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992). We do not 
afford any deference to the agency's determination, and we will correct any 
error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying the law. Matter of 
Gneiting, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 1995); City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 587 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶7] Wright was awarded 
extended permanent disability benefits for the period of September 1, 1993 
through the date of the first order pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-403(g) (1991) 
which provides:

(g) Following payment in full of any award, or if a 
lump sum settlement was made under subsection (f) of this section when the award 
would have been fully paid but for the lump sum settlement, to an employee for 
permanent total disability or to a surviving spouse for death of an employee, an 
additional award may be granted:

(i) 
In the case of an employee subject to the following requirements and limitations 
which shall be met:

(A) A claim for compensation is filed by the employee 
or someone on his behalf and a hearing is held following notice to the employer 
and division;

(B) The employee establishes a reasonable effort on 
his behalf has been made to return to part time or full time employment 
including retraining and educational programs;

(C) The hearing examiner in determining entitlement 
under this paragraph shall consider income of the employee from all sources 
including active or passive income, household income and any monthly amount from 
any other governmental agency;

(D) The maximum monthly amount of additional 
compensation shall not exceed the amount provided in subsection (c) of this 
section;

(E) The hearing examiner may attach reasonable 
conditions to application for or receipt of awards under this subsection 
including retraining or educational programs and the award may be adjusted in 
accordance with fulfillment of the conditions;

(F) The hearing examiner may decrease an award to 
qualify an employee eligible for maximum benefits under any other state or 
federal pension plan;

(G) Any award granted under this subsection shall not 
exceed twelve (12) months but may be renewed following additional hearings 
unless the hearing examiner, the director and the employer mutually determine a 
hearing is not necessary.

This statutory provision is 
silent with respect to the question of retrospective award of extended benefits 
for permanent total disability.

[¶8] Our historic rule is 
that the construction of an ambiguous statute which is part of the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act should be accomplished to afford coverage wherever 
that end may be achieved without unreasonably extending the clear language of 
the statute. Archuleta v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 
(Wyo. 1990); Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988); Parnell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div., 735 P.2d 1367, 1368 (Wyo. 1987); Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 
293, 131 P.2d 333, 338 (Wyo. 1942). The act should be applied in favor of the 
workman to the end that industry, not an individual, bears the burden of an 
accident and injury that has occurred within the industrial setting. Seckman v. 
Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 1989); Lehman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 752 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1988); Conn v. Ed Wederski Const. 
Co., 668 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1983). The justification for this rule of construction 
is that the statute provides an industrial insurance act for the benefit of 
employees pursuant to which industrial accidents become a cost of production and 
are to be borne by the industry. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 888 (Wyo. 1984); Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 
173 P. 981, 989 (Wyo. 1918). This rule has been described as a rule of liberal 
construction.1

[¶9] We have recognized that 
the award of disability benefits under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act may 
be retrospective.  Higgins v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 739 P.2d 129, 133 (Wyo. 1987). We 
acknowledged in Higgins that when a hearing is held after the termination of his 
benefits, full retroactive relief should be available in order to satisfy 
procedural due process. We so ruled even though the statute at issue in Higgins 
was silent as to whether the award of benefits could have a retroactive 
application. Applying Higgins by analogy to this case, we hold that the rule of 
liberal construction of the statute in favor of the claimant results in the 
availability of a retrospective award of extended benefits for permanent total 
disability in the face of silence in the statute. We recently applied Higgins in 
the context of temporary total disability benefits, assuming that they could be 
awardedretroactively. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. 
Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶10] The Division contends 
that regardless of how we rule with respect to the retrospective application of 
extended benefits for permanent total disability, the claims for the two years 
at issue are barred pursuant to the first sentence of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-503(a) 
(1991), which provides:

(a) A payment for benefits involving an injury which 
is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a 
substantial period of time shall not be made unless in addition to the proper 
and timely filing of the reports of the accident, an application or claim for 
benefits is filed within one (1) year after the date the accident occurred or 
for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the 
injury by the employee. * * *

[¶11] In response to the 
Division's contention, Wright relies upon the four year statute of limitations 
found in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) (1991) (emphasis added), which 
provides:

(a) If a determination is made in favor of or on 
behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act, an application may be 
made to the division by any party within four (4) years from the date of the 
last payment for additional medical and disability benefits or for a 
modification of the amount of benefits on the ground of increase or 
decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud.

[¶12] The applicability of a 
statute of limitations is a question of law that must be decided by the court. 
Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104 (Wyo. 1997); Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d  at 299. No deference is to be accorded to the agency decision with respect 
to a statute of limitations. Pete Lien & Sons, Inc. v. Ellsworth Peck Const. 
Co., 896 P.2d 761, 762 (Wyo. 1995); Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 362 
(Wyo. 1994). We invoke our traditional rules of statutory interpretation. The 
legislative intent, manifested in the plain language of the statutes, is the 
controlling consideration. Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 
1995); Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 
1042 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶13] We have had occasion 
to parse the language of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a), and we have 
said:

The plain language of § 27-14-605(a) grants any party 
- employee, employer, or the Workers' Compensation Division  a four year window 
in which to petition to reopen a case for: (1) additional medical and disability 
benefits; or (2) modification of the amount of benefits because (a) of an 
increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or (b) a mistake or 
fraud has occurred.

State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 249 (Wyo. 1994). It is 
clear that the award of extended benefits for permanent total disability to 
Wright for his 1973 injury must fall within the first classification found in 
Jerding.  The Office of 
Administrative Hearings had authority to award benefits to Wright in the form of 
extended benefits for permanent partial disability pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-403(g).

[¶14] The Division relies in 
part upon the finding of fact entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings 
in the September 13, 1994 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order in 
which a finding was made that Wright had suffered a second compensable injury in 
September of 1991. The 1994 order is not attacked in this appeal. In the absence 
of a petition for review, the validity of that order, however erroneous it might 
be, has been conceded by the parties, and the ruling on that aspect must stand. 
Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1997); Epple v. 
Clark, 804 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1991). The Division contends that because of that 
decision, the one year statute of limitations found in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-503(a) 
would control over the four year statute of limitations found in WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-605(a), and that the record is clear that Wright filed no claim within one 
year of discovery of the "second compensable injury."

[¶15] The Division's 
position is refuted in more than one way. It must be recognized that if this 
position is sound then there should have been no award for the period from 
September 1, 1993 to the date of the first order because, of course, Wright did 
not file a claim within one year of September 1, 1991. The Division apparently 
did not perceive the one year statute of limitations as a barrier to that award 
and may have waived this defense. Secondly, a review of the provisions relating 
to extended benefits for permanent partial disability demonstrates that the 
statute does not require a second injury as a condition for awarding extended 
benefits.  Consequently, the finding 
in the first order is superfluous with respect to the award of extended benefits 
for permanent partial disability. 
Finally, it is apparent, from the plain language of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a), 
that Wright is granted four years to petition to reopen a case for additional 
disability benefits. That period must be the four year period beginning with the 
September 1994 order, and Wright's claims for the retrospective awards of 
benefits were timely.

[¶15] We hold that applying 
the provision of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-403(g) (1991) in the light of WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-605(a) (1991), as interpreted in Jerding, Wright filed a valid claim for 
additional disability benefits within the applicable four year period. The 
statute of limitations rule asserted by the Division is of no avail to it in 
defending the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Office of 
Administrative Hearings erred as a matter of law in ruling that extended 
benefits for permanent total disability could not be awarded retrospectively. 
Wright's claims for the benefits for the periods beginning September 1, 1991 
through August 31, 1992 and September 1, 1992 through August 31, 1993 should be 
granted pursuant to the statute.

[¶17] The Order Denying 
Benefits is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings for any further proceedings deemed necessary prior to the entry of an 
order conforming to this opinion.

  

FOOTNOTES

11 In 
1994, an amendment to the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act was adopted by the 
legislature with the apparent purpose of rejecting the rule of liberal 
construction. The statute now provides in pertinent part:

(b) * * 
* It is the specific intent of the legislature that benefit claims cases be 
decided on their merits and that the common law rule of "liberal construction" 
based on the supposed "remedial" basis of workers' benefits legislation shall 
not apply in these cases. * * *

WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-101(b) (1997). That statutory provision is not applicable in this 
instance because a claim for benefits pursuant to the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act is controlled by the laws in effect at the time of the injury. 
Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 
1997); Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 1997); 
Matter of Shapiro, 703 P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Wyo. 1985). Whether the injury for 
which Wright has sought extended benefits is perceived to have occurred in 1973 
or 1991, the earlier rule of construction must be 
applied.