Case Title: State v. Weitbrecht

Citation: 1999-Ohio-113

Docket Number: 19982144

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 1999-Ohio-113.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WEITBRECHT, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Weitbrecht (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 368.] 
Criminal procedure — Involuntary manslaughter — R.C. 2903.04(B), as applied to 
a minor misdemeanor traffic offense which results in a vehicular homicide, 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United Constitution or Section 
9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
R.C. 2903.04(B), as applied to a minor misdemeanor traffic offense which results 
in a vehicular homicide, does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 98-2144 — Submitted May 26, 1999 — Decided September 8, 1999.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, No. 97CA588. 
 
On July 17, 1997, defendant-appellee, Nancy Weitbrecht, was indicted on 
two counts of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of R.C. 2903.04(B), for the 
deaths of Donald J. Greer and Vera J. Carroll.  The involuntary manslaughter 
charges arose out of an automobile collision in which the appellee’s motor vehicle, 
which was travelling west on State Route 62 in Holmes County, went left of center 
in a no-passing zone and struck a vehicle head-on in the eastbound lane.  As a 
result, two passengers from appellee’s vehicle (Donald Greer and appellee’s 
husband, Merlyn P. Weitbrecht) were killed, as well as one passenger from the 
eastbound vehicle (Vera Carroll).  The bill of particulars alleged that appellee had 
violated any of four underlying minor misdemeanor traffic offenses:  operating a 
motor vehicle without reasonable control (R.C. 4511.202); failing to operate a 
motor vehicle on the right half of the roadway (R.C. 4511.25[A]); operating a 
motor vehicle left of center (R.C. 4511.29); and failing to obey hazardous zone 
markings (R.C. 4511.31). 
 
 
2
 
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Ohio’s 
involuntary manslaughter statute (R.C. 2903.04[B]), when based upon a minor 
misdemeanor, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of both the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions.1  The trial court granted appellee’s motion to 
dismiss the indictment.  The court found a gross disproportionality between the 
underlying minor misdemeanor offense and the potential punishment.  The court 
also found that the offense and the potential penalty were disproportionate when 
compared to other similar crimes in Ohio and to crimes in other states. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed.  Finding its decision in conflict with decisions 
of the Eleventh Appellate District in State v. Stanford (Sept. 23, 1996), Trumbull 
App. No. 95-T-5358, unreported, 1996 WL 537856, and the Twelfth Appellate 
District in State v. Garland (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 688 N.E.2d 557, the 
court of appeals entered an order certifying a conflict. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists. 
__________________ 
 
Stephen D. Knowling, Holmes County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for 
appellant. 
 
Kennedy, Cicconetti & Knowlton and David C. Knowlton, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Kimberly L. Charles, Assistant 
Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, state of Ohio. 
 
Harry R. Reinhart, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  The issue certified for our review is, “Does 
Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute [R.C. 2903.04(B)] as applied to a minor 
misdemeanor traffic offense which results in a vehicular homicide violate the 
 
 
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 9, Article [I] of 
the Ohio Constitution?”  For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified 
question in the negative. 
 
R.C. 2903.04 provides, in relevant part: 
 
“(B) No person shall cause the death of another * * * as a proximate result 
of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of the first, 
second, third, or fourth degree or a minor misdemeanor. 
 
“(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter.  * 
* * Violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree.” 
 
A third degree felony carries the potential penalty of one to five years in 
prison and a fine of up to $10,000.  (R.C. 2929.14[A][4]; 2929.18[A][3][c].) 
 
Appellee successfully argued to the lower courts that the potential penalty 
imposed for a violation of R.C. 2903.04(B) is disproportionate to the crime 
committed (a minor misdemeanor), and is violative of the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.  We are now asked to decide 
whether the lower courts were correct in finding that R.C. 2903.04(B) violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 9, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution.  In resolving this issue, we are mindful that legislative 
enactments are to be afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality.  State v. 
McDonald (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 47, 48, 31 OBR 155, 156, 509 N.E.2d 57, 59. 
Any reasonable doubt regarding the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved 
in favor of the legislature’s power to enact the law.  Id.  Thus, the legislation will 
not be struck down unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 
664 N.E.2d 926, 928; Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38-39, 616 
N.E.2d 163, 166. 
 
 
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The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:  
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”  Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is 
couched in identical language.  Historically, the Eighth Amendment has been 
invoked in extremely rare cases, where it has been necessary to protect individuals 
from inhumane punishment such as torture or other barbarous acts.  Robinson v. 
California (1962), 370 U.S. 660, 676, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1425, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 768.  
Over the years, it has also been used to prohibit punishments that were found to be 
disproportionate to the crimes committed.  In McDougle v. Maxwell (1964), 1 Ohio 
St.2d 68, 30 O.O.2d 38, 203 N.E.2d 334, this court stressed that Eighth 
Amendment violations are rare.  We stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual 
punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under 
the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person.” Id. at 
70, 30 O.O.2d at 39, 203 N.E.2d at 336.  Furthermore, “the penalty must be so 
greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the 
community.”  Id.  See, also, State v. Chaffin (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 59 O.O.2d 
51, 282 N.E.2d 46, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has also discussed the concept of whether 
the Eighth Amendment requires that sentences be proportionate to the offenses 
committed.  An Eighth Amendment challenge on these grounds was initially 
applied only in cases involving the death penalty or unusual forms of 
imprisonment.  Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 
L.Ed.2d 1140; Weems v. United States (1910), 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 
L.Ed. 793.  Then, in Solem v. Helm (1983), 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 
3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649, the court applied the Eighth Amendment to reverse a 
felony sentence on proportionality grounds, finding that “a criminal sentence must 
be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.”  In so 
 
 
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holding, the Solem court set forth the following tripartite test to review sentences 
under the Eighth Amendment: 
 
“First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.  
* * *  Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction.  If more serious crimes are subject to the same 
penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive.  * * *  Third, courts may find it useful to compare the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”  Id. at 
290-291, 103 S.Ct. at 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649-650. 
 
More recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 
2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of 
proportionality as it relates to the Eighth Amendment.  In Harmelin, the court was 
asked to decide whether a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility 
of parole for possession of six hundred seventy-two grams of cocaine violated the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.  In finding no constitutional 
violation, the lead opinion rejected earlier statements made in Solem v. Helm and 
stated that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.  
However, this statement failed to garner a majority.  The three Justices who 
concurred in part would refine the Solem decision to an analysis of “gross 
disproportionality” between sentence and crime.  As stated by Justice Kennedy in 
his opinion concurring in part, “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme 
sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”  Id. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. at 
2705, 115 L.Ed.2d at 869. 
 
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the case at hand. Appellant 
contends that R.C. 2903.04(B), as applied to a minor misdemeanor traffic offense, 
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because its potential penalty for 
 
 
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causing the death of another is not disproportionate to the offense committed and 
does not shock the community’s sense of justice.  Appellant relies on State v. 
Stanford (Sept. 23, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 95-T-5358, unreported, 1996 WL 
537856, and State v. Garland (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 688 N.E.2d 557, to 
support its position.  The Stanford decision is of little value in helping us resolve 
this issue because the court was without a sufficient basis to review the issue.  
However, the Garland court did fully consider the issue.  In Garland, the 
defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter with the underlying minor 
misdemeanor of failure to stop at a stop sign and was sentenced to a term of five to 
ten years.  The court held that “[t]he sentence imposed by the trial court falls 
within the range of punishments contained within the sentencing statute for this 
offense.  There is no evidence to suggest that appellant’s sentence would shock the 
conscience of the community.  * * *  Accordingly, the punishment imposed cannot 
be deemed cruel and unusual.”  Id. at 466, 688 N.E.2d at 561. 
 
In contrast, appellee argues that the court of appeals’ decision was correct 
and urges us to follow the appellate decisions of State v. Campbell (1997), 117 
Ohio App.3d 762, 691 N.E.2d 711, and State v. Shy (June 30, 1997), Pike App. No. 
96 CA 587, unreported, 1997 WL 381782, which used the tripartite test set forth in 
Solem to find that R.C. 2903.04(B) violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  In these decisions, the courts 
found that the potential punishment for committing a minor misdemeanor traffic 
offense is grossly disproportionate to the crime.  Furthermore, the courts found that 
the potential sentence under R.C. 2903.04(B) was excessive when compared to 
similar related Ohio crimes that require a greater degree of culpability (such as 
negligent homicide, vehicular homicide, and aggravated vehicular homicide), and 
when compared with other jurisdictions.  These decisions also relied, in part, on 
dictum from our decision in State v. Collins (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 616 
 
 
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N.E.2d 224, 225, which questioned the policy behind applying the involuntary 
manslaughter statute to include minor misdemeanors as predicate offenses. 
 
At the outset, we reject appellee’s reliance on the Collins decision.  In 
Collins, we interpreted the statutory language of former R.C. 2903.04(B), which 
stated that it applied to “misdemeanors.” Under the principles of statutory 
construction, and in reviewing various sections of R.C. Title 29 that differentiate 
between misdemeanors and minor misdemeanors, we found that the statute as 
written did not include minor misdemeanors. Thus, we held that offenses classified 
as minor misdemeanors could not serve as a predicate offense for a charge of 
involuntary manslaughter.2  Since the General Assembly has amended R.C. 
2903.04 so that Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute now encompasses minor 
misdemeanors as predicate offenses, the current version of R.C. 2903.04 differs 
from that which we interpreted in Collins.  Thus, our decision in Collins has no 
bearing on our decision today. 
 
We also reject the reasoning employed by those courts, which found that 
R.C. 2903.04(B) violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.  
Although the potential maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment may be 
somewhat severe, it is not tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment.  
Unfortunately, lives were lost as a result of the traffic accident.  Where human 
lives are lost, the gravity of the crime is serious and is not lessened by the fact that 
the underlying crime consists of a minor misdemeanor.  Furthermore, we note that 
the trial court has the option of imposing a less stringent punishment than actual 
incarceration.3  For instance, an offender can be sentenced to a term of probation 
(R.C. 2929.15 to R.C. 2929.17) or, if incarcerated, can file an application for 
judicial release after six months (R.C. 2929.20[A]; [B][2]).  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot say that the potential penalty for violating R.C. 
2903.04(B) is “so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of 
 
 
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justice of the community.”  McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d at 70, 30 O.O.2d 
at 39, 203 N.E.2d at 336; cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 995, 111 S.Ct. at 
2701-2702, 115 L.Ed.2d at 865, where the court held that severe, mandatory 
penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, and do 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.4 
 
In reaching this decision, we are cognizant of the fact that reviewing courts 
should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 
290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-999, 111 
S.Ct. at 2703-2704, 115 L.Ed.2d at 867 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  We find that 
the General Assembly acted within its discretion in setting forth the penalties it did 
when the commission of minor misdemeanors results in the deaths of individuals. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 2903.04(B), as applied to a minor 
misdemeanor traffic offense which results in a vehicular homicide, does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 9, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded 
to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Appellee also argued that R.C. 2903.04(B) violates the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and raised two 
 
 
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nonconstitutional issues in her motion to dismiss.  However, none of those issues is 
before this court. 
2. 
Former R.C. 2903.04(B) provided that “[n]o person shall cause the death of 
another as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit 
a misdemeanor.”  134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1901. 
3. 
Although appellee has not been sentenced, or even been found guilty, we 
find that the potential maximum sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the 
underlying crimes. 
4. 
The court of appeals compared the potential sentence in this case with 
similar Ohio crimes and with those of other jurisdictions.  However, we decline to 
make these comparisons.  Instead, we agree with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. at 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d at 871, in 
which he stated that a comparative analysis within the state where the crime was 
committed and between jurisdictions (the second and third prongs in Solem) is 
“appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.” 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  Dispassionate dissection of a legal conundrum is 
often required to achieve the correct result in matters that come before this court.  
In those instances, the facts of the case are secondary to the legal analysis.  Here, 
where we are considering whether the sentence at issue would “shock the sense of 
justice of the community,” the facts must stand at the center of our consideration.  
The facts in this case tell the whole story. 
 
While driving on Highway 62 on April 27, 1997, Nancy Weitbrecht 
apparently suffered a cardiac event, lost consciousness, crossed left of center, and 
collided with the Carroll vehicle.  She lost her husband and a friend in the accident, 
 
 
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and must live with the fact that she also caused the death of Vera Carroll.  The 
state stipulated that there was no evidence of criminal recklessness or criminal 
negligence on her part.  Nancy Weitbrecht now faces a potential five-year prison 
term.  It would be hard to conjure up a situation more shocking to the community’s 
sense of justice, or a more inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  I 
accordingly dissent.