Case Title: ERICKSON v PERRETT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-01-21T00:00:00Z

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No. 13014 IN T H E S U P R L T V I E C O U R T OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 19 75 TYYRA J. ERICKSON and NILS G. ERICKSON, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellant, LUELL J. PERRETT, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Montana Sam E. Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula, Montana Shelton C. Williams argued, Missoula, Montana i Filed: - I Submitted: November 5, 1975 Decided: ; ) h ~ ~ 3 i b l 1 7 . k . .Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment f o r defendant entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Missoula County. P l a i n t i f f s seek review of a jury verdict f o r defendant i n a personal injury and property damage action. T.lotions by p l a i n t i f f s pursuant t o Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), f o r a new t r i a l o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied. The i n s t a n t case grew out of an automobile accident which occurred on December 4, 1972, near the intersection of Brooks Street and South Avenue i n Missoula under extremely i c y conditions. A n automobile driven by defendant Luell J. P e r r e t t collided with the r e a r of a c a r driven by p l a i n t i f f Nils G. Erickson i n which h i s wife p l a i n t i f f Tyyra J. Erickson was riding. A t the time of the c o l l i s i o n p l a i n t i f f rick sons' vehicle was headed south on Brooks and was stopped i n the right-hand t r a f f i c lane behind other stopped vehicles waiting f o r the t r a f f i c signal a t the intersection of Brooks and South to turn from red t o green. Defendant P e r r e t t ' s car was a l s o proceeding south on Brooks i n the right-hand lane, attempting t o turn l e f t i n t o the middle lane. After moving two-thirds of the way i n t o t h e middle lane, defendant's vehicle turned back i n t o the r i g h t lane because a panel truck had entered the middle lane i n front of him. Even though defendant was traveling slowly, about ten miles per hour, the i c y s t r e e t conditions prevented him from stopping before he h i t p l a i n t i f f s 1 vehicle. Property damage t o defendant's and p l a i n t i f f s ' vehicles a s a r e s u l t of the accident was $78 and $94.84, respec- tively. Action was brought f o r property damage t o p l a i n t i f f s 1 automobile; for medical and hospital expenses, l o s t wages, pain and suffering and general damages from i n j u r i e s t o p l a i n t i f f Mrs. Erickson; and f o r damages f o r l o s t employment t o M r . Erickson while he was caring f o r h i s wife. The matter came on f o r t r i a l on November 25, 1974. p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t a t t h e c l o s e of t h e evidence was denied and t h e jury found f o r defendant on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y . Subsequently p l a i n t i f f s moved, pursuant t o Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., f o r a new t r i a l o r judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t . The d i s t r i c t court denied p l a i n t i f f s ' motions and they appeal. Presented f o r review i s t h e correctness of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s on p l a i n t i f f s ' motions, a s w e l l a s whether t h e evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o uphold t h e v e r d i c t . While t h e t e s t s f o r d i r e c t i n g judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t o r a new t r i a l a r e d i s s i m i l a r , w e consider t h e d e n i a l of both Rule 50(b) motions together, i n view of t h e d i s c r e t i o n granted t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and t h i s Court by Rule 50(b). This discussion i n 5 A ~ o o r e ' s Federal P r a c t i c e Para. 50.11, p.2363, supports t h a t d i s c r e t i o n : "Rule 50 (b) provides f o r t h r e e possible d i s p o s i t i o n s of a motion made thereunder. I f t h e r e i s evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t , t h e t r i a l court must e n t e r judg- ment i n accordance with t h e v e r d i c t ; it cannot order a new t r i a l . I f t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o permit a v e r d i c t t o stand under t h e r i g i d t e s t s heretofore described, t h e t r i a l court i s given a d i s c r e t i o n a r y power e i t h e r t o order judgment f o r t h e moving p a r t y , t o grant a new t r i a l , o r t o order dismissal without pre- judice under Rule 41. y : y : ik" Cases from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court have held t h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n Federal Rule 50 (b) , which ~ o n t a n a ' s r u l e i s patterned a f t e r , a l s o a p p l i e s t o review by a p p e l l a t e courts. Bryan v. U n i t e d ' S t a t e s , 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L ed 335, c i t e d with approval i n Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322, 87 S.Ct. 1072, 18 L ed 2d 75. Appellants argue t h a t t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t i n view of the respondent's breach of duty established by these Montana s t a t u t e s : Section 32-2144, R.C.M. 1947: "(a) A person operating or driving a vehicle of any character on a public highway of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l drive it i n a careful and prudent manner, and a t a r a t e of speed no greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing a t t h e point of operation, taking i n t o account the amount and character of t r a f f i c , condition of brakes, weight of vehicle, grade and width of highway, condition of surface, and freedom of obstruc- t i o n t o view ahead, and he s h a l l drive it so a s not t o unduly o r unreasonably endanger the l i f e , limb, property, m o t h e r r i g h t s of a person e n t i t l e d t o the use of t h e s t r e e t o r highway. "(c) The driver of a vehicle s h a l l , consistent with paragraph (a), drive a t an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection o r railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a h i l l c r e s t , when traveling upon a narrow or winding roadway, and when a special hazard e x i s t s with respect t o pedestrians o r other ' t r a f f i c o r by reason of weather or highway condition. I I Section 32-2153, R.C.M. 1947: "The following r u l e s s h a l l govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding i n the same direction, subject t o those limitations, exceptions, and special r u l e s hereinafter stated: "(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding i n the same direction s h a l l pass t o t h e l e f t thereof a t a safe distance and s h a l l not again drive t o the r i g h t s i d e of the roadway u n t i l safely c l e a r of the overtaken veh3.c l e . "(b) Except when overtaking and passing on t h e r i g h t i s permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle s h a l l give way t o the r i g h t i n favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and s h a l l not increase the speed of h i s vehicle &ti1 completely passed by the ove;taking vehicle. I I Section 32-2159(a), R.C.M. 1947: "Whenever any roadway has been divided i n t o two (2) o r more c l e a r l y marked lanes f o r t r a f f i c the following r u l e s i n addition t o a l l others consistent herewith s h a l l apply "(a) A vehicle s h a l l be driven a s nearly a s practicable e n t i r e l y within a single lane and s h a l l not be moved from such lane u n t i l the driver has f i r s t ascertained t h a t such movement can be made with safety. I I Section 32-2160 ( a ) , R. C.M. 1947: "(a) The driver of a motor vehicle s h a l l not follow another vehicle more closely than i s reasonable and prudent, having due regard f o r the speed of such vehicles and the t r a f f i c upon and the condition of the highway. I I Appellants argue breach of duty established by t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s conclusive a s t o t h e i s s u e of negligence and could not be overlooked by a jury. Respondent submits t h a t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e jury verdict. However, w e reverse t h e d i s t r i c t court. W e note t h a t t h e mere happening of an accident i s in- s u f f i c i e n t evidence of negligence. Flansberg v. Montana Power Co., 154 Iqont. 53, 58, 460 P.2d 263; F r i e s v. Shaughnessy, 159 Mont. 307, 310, 496 P.2d 1159. Further when t h e breach of a s t a t u t o r y duty i s a l l e g e d , t h a t duty required by s t a t u t e must be t h e e f f i c i e n t o r proximate cause of t h e damages f o r negligence t o be predicated on t h e v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e . J o k i v. IJlcBri.de, 150 Mont. 378, 436 P.2d 78; Rauh v. J e n s a , 161 Mont. 443, 445, 507 P.2d 520. I n t h e i n s t a n t case the above s t a t u t e s do contemplate protection of d r i v e r s who a r e stopped waiting f o r t r a f f i c s i g n a l s t o change. ~ e s p o n d e n t ' s unsuccessful attempt t o change lanes and h i s f a i l u r e t o stop because of t h e i c y road conditions involved breaches of t h e d u t i e s imposed by t h e s t a t u t e s which l e d proximately t o t h e accident. These Montana cases where t h e defendant claimed t h a t a f a c t o r over which he lacked c o n t r o l excused h i s conduct--Custer Broadcasting Corp. v. Brewer, 163 Mont. 519, 518 P.2d 257 (swirling snow), F a r r i s v. Clarlc, 158 Mont. 33, 487 P.2d 1307 ( f a i l u r e of power s t e e r i n g ) , and 14cDonough v. Smith, 86 Mont. 545, 284 P. 542 (oncoming vehicle)---are applicable t o t h e i n s t a n t case. Thus through f a i l u r e t o c o n t r o l h i s vehicle negligence per s e w a s established on t h e p a r t of respondent which t h e jury could not overloolc, McNair v. Eerger, 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.2d 834; Burns v. Fisher, 132 Fiont. 26, 313 P.2d 1044; Williams v. E'laley, 150 Idont. 261, 434 P.2d 398. S t i l l respondent argues t h a t t h e r e was a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r t h e jury t o f i n d no negligence on h i s p a r t because of t h e intervening negligence of a panel truclc which allegedly suddenly entered t h e middle lane i n f r o n t of him. This mysterious panel truck, which could not be located nor i t s d r i v e r produced a t t r i a l , i s a l s o t h e b a s i s f o r t h e i n j e c t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of sudden emergency a s support f o r t h e jury v e r d i c t . N o sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n was given t h e jury i n t h i s case. Thus it was not t h e law of t h e case and r e l i a n c e on it a s support f o r t h e v e r d i c t i s ill-founded. With regard t o respondent's a s s e r t i o n of intervening negligence, we must f i n d t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t a new, independent, and unforeseeable cause produced t h e accident i n order t o a f f i r m t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . Plize v. Roclcy Itfountain B e l l Telephone Co., 35 Mont. 521, 532, 100 P. 971; Cowden et a1.v. Crippen, 101 Mont. 187, 206, 53 P.2d 98; 2 Restate- ment of Torts 2d, 5 5 440,442. I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e evidence was not s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h such a superceding cause. Respondent w a s t r a v e l i n g on a busy, i c y s t r e e t , approaching a t r a f f i c s i g n a l where c a r s continually change lanes t o g e t i n t o t h e proper position f o r t h e i r intended d i r e c t i o n of t r a v e l a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . It was n o t shown t o be unforeseeable t h a t a c a r o r t r u c k would swerve i n f r o n t of respondent a s he was attempting t o change lanes. Nor was t h i s mysterious panel truck shown t o be an independent cause of t h e accident given t h e . i n a b i l i t y of respondent t o stop h i s own vehicle on t h e i c y s t r e e t . Because t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t proof of an intervening cause of t h e accident respondent must be held l e g a l l y responsible f o r t h e established negligence. Only through application of t h e doctrine of sudden emergency could a jury i n t h i s case determine t h a t t h e respondent was not l i a b l e f o r h i s conduct which proximately caused property damage. Since the jury was not instructed on sudden emergency, there was an i n s u f f i c i e n t l e g a l basis f o r the verdict. Accordingly, it was e r r o r for the d i s t r i c t court not t o s e t aside the verdict and deny the Rule 50 (b) motions. Since we have s e t aside the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment because of the negligence established a t t r i a l , t h i s Court, i n the exercise of sound discretion provided f o r i n Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., must determine whether t o d i r e c t judgment f o r appel- l a n t s or t o order a new t r i a l . United States v. Weiler, 385 F.2d 63, 66; Bryan v. United States, supra; Neely v. Martin I<. Eby Construction Co,, supra. This Court i s of the opinion t h a t a new t r i a l i n t h e i n s t a n t case would b e t t e r serve the ends of justice. Here, there i s one appellant with a complex medical h i s t o r y dating from a time prior t o the accident and existing a t the time of t h e acci- dent. For the jury t o c l e a r l y comprehend the extent of the i n j u r i e s and other damages resulting proximately from t h i s acci- dent, the complete case should be before it. Even though property damages were small, the proof of them was c l e a r and not disputed. The substantial damages, i f any, were r e l a t e d t o the alleged i n j u r i e s and the alleged consequential damages a r i s i n g therefrom. Thus, f o r a jury t o ignore both proof of negligence and proof of property damages a r i s i n g therefrom necessitates a new t r i a l . By the same token, f o r the jury t o f u l l y appreciate the e n t i r e alleged damage s i t u a t i o n , a new t r i a l r a t h e r than a directed verdict on t h e issue of l i a b i l i t y only i s required. Finally, i n view of our decision t o grant a new t r i a l and respondent's assertion of the doctrine of sudden emergency, we f e e l further discussion of propriety of such an instruction i n the i n s t a n t case necessary. O n review of the record we emphasize chat the d i s t r i c t court properly refused the sudden emergency in- struction. Such an instruction i s not available t o those whose negligence has produced the emergency. Peabody v. Northern Pacific itai.lway Co., 80 Mont. 492, 497,498, 261 P. 261; 2 Restatement of Torts 2d $296. It i s a l s o improper where the emergency is a n t i c i - pated o r foreseeable. Peabody v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. , supra. Foreseeability of emergencies on highways i s discussed i n Prosser on Torts, 4th ed. p. 170: "A further qualification which must be made i s t h a t some 'emergencies' must be anticipated, and the actor must be prepared t o meet them when he engages i n an a c t i v i t y i n which they a r e l i k e l y t o a r i s e . Thus under present day t r a f f i c conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared f o r the sudden appearance of obstacles i n the highway o r of other vehicles a t intersections, j u s t a s one who sees a child on the curb may be required t o a n t i c i p a t e i t s sudden dash i n t o the s t r e e t , and h i s f a i l u r e t o a c t properly when they appear may be found t o amount t o negligence." If the d i s t r i c t court is presented a similar record on r e t r i a l , sudden emergency instructions should be refused. Judgment i s reversed and the cause i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court with orders t o grant a new t r i a l . J u s t i c e /y 2 1 : . Justice ' ' r a ~ i l c I-. i a ~ ~ e L i , J ~ s ~ e ~ ~ c i r ~ g . I would a f f i r m t h e judglilent based on ~11r jury v e i d l ~ i . Chis case involves an appeal from (1) an order denying ~ J - d z l c ~ i r s a new t r i a l , (2) an order denying e n t r y of judgment ~~irtwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t , and (3) t h e judgment. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order denying p l a i n t i f f s ' motion izoi -i r i e w t r i a l i s c l e a r l y c o r r e c t . The motion was d e f e c t i v e i n r a i l i n g 110 s t a t e the grounds with p a r t i c u l a r i t y . Halsey v. Uithof, Nor a r e p l a i n t i f f s e n t i t l e d t o e n t r y of judgment not- w ~ ~ h s r d n d i n g the v e r d i c t f o r the reasons s t a t e d i n t h e majority pinion. The majority concludes t h a t t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u p p u r t the jury v e r d i c t because defendant's negligence i s estab- I-ished a s a matter of law and f a i l u r e of proof of intervening neg- ligence on t h e p a r t of t h e d r i v e r of t h e panel truck. I n m y v i e w these a r e both jury questions decided adversely t o p l a i n t i f f s . A jury could w e l l conclude t h a t t h e accident here was nirc caused by negligent driving. The evidence viewed i n t h e l i g h t r u o s t favorable t o t h e prevailing p a r t y shows t h a t defendant was driving a t a speed of ten miles an hour on an i c y s t r e e t and was a b l e t o s t o p the forward motion of h i s c a r without impact, but chat it s l i d o r skidded sideways when t h e forward momentum ceased ; i r i k i n g t h e r e a r of p l a i n t i f f s ' c a r . Nor do I believe t h a t proximate cause i s established a s i ndcier of law. This i s p a t e n t l y a jury question resolved against p l a i n t i f f s . For the foregoing reasons, I d i s s e n t . J u s t i c e .