Case Title: State of Florida v. Ransom Louis Collins

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-108

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-108 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
RANSOM LOUIS COLLINS, 
Respondent. 
 
[June 5, 2008] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
 
We must decide whether, when a criminal sentence is reversed on appeal 
because of insufficient evidence of the defendant’s habitual offender status, upon 
remand for resentencing the State may present new evidence on that issue.  We 
review Collins v. State, 893 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), in which the Second 
District Court of Appeal held that the State could not present new evidence on 
remand.  It certified conflict with several decisions from other districts: Wilson v. 
State, 830 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Cameron v. State, 807 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2002); Morss v. State, 795 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Roberts v. 
State, 776 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Rhodes v. State, 704 So. 2d 1080 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1997); and Brown v. State, 701 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).  
We have jurisdiction to resolve the certified conflict.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const.  We hold that the State may indeed present additional evidence on remand.  
Below we discuss the conflict in the district courts and then explain our holding. 
I. THE DECISIONS IN CONFLICT 
The respondent, Ransom Louis Collins, pled no contest to robbery.  The 
State sought to sentence him as a habitual felony offender.  To that end, at 
sentencing it presented evidence of several previous felony convictions.  Defense 
counsel argued, however, that the evidence failed to demonstrate that his prior 
convictions were “separately sentenced,” as the habitual offender statute, section 
775.084(5), Florida Statutes (2001), requires.1  The trial court overruled the 
objection and sentenced Collins as a habitual felony offender to twenty years in 
prison. 
On appeal, the Second District reversed the sentence because the State 
presented insufficient evidence establishing the predicate convictions.  As the court 
noted: 
                                          
 
 
1.  That section provides: “In order to be counted as a prior felony for 
purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a 
conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced 
separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
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[T]he State concedes that the documents presented to the trial court 
failed to preclude the possibility that all of Collins’s prior felony 
offenses were originally sentenced on the same date.  Although the 
record contains evidence that Collins has been convicted of a number 
of felonies, many of the documents used as evidence of convictions 
were in fact orders that revoked probation.  The orders revoking 
probation do not disclose when Collins was originally sentenced to 
probation, only the date of revocation. . . . The State concedes that 
where probation was imposed and subsequently revoked with the 
imposition of a prison sentence, the date of the original imposition of 
probation is the date that must be used in determining whether the 
offense was separately sentenced under section 775.084(5). 
 
Collins, 893 So. 2d at 593-94.2  The Second District prohibited the State from 
correcting the error on remand by producing additional evidence.  Id.  The district 
court held that, where the defendant objects to a habitual felony offender sentence 
because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the predicate convictions, 
and the appellate court reverses the sentence on that basis, the State cannot present 
additional evidence on remand.  893 So. 2d at 594.  The court noted “that a 
different rule applies where the defendant has failed to make a proper objection 
during the sentencing proceeding to the basis for the habitual offender sentence.”  
Id. at 594 n.2 (citing Bover, 797 So. 2d at 1251).  Thus, in the Second District, 
                                          
 
2.  Although the Second District stated the issue as whether the sentences 
were imposed “on the same date,” see Collins, 893 So. 2d at 593, for purposes of 
section 775.084(5), the relevant inquiry is whether the sentencing for the prior 
felonies occurred in the same proceeding.  See State v. Richardson, 915 So. 2d 86, 
89 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Fla. 2001)).  
Because the State has not raised this issue and it conceded at oral argument that the 
evidence below was insufficient, we do not address this issue.  
  
 
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where the State fails to present sufficient evidence that the defendant was a 
habitual felony offender and the defendant objects, the State cannot present 
additional evidence on remand. 
The Second District’s holding conflicts with the law in the majority of 
districts.  The court certified conflict with decisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
District Courts of Appeal, which allowed the State to prove the predicate 
convictions on remand even though the defense had objected at sentencing.  Id. at 
594; see Wilson, 830 So. 2d at 245 (permitting resentencing as a habitual felony 
offender on remand if the State can establish the required predicate convictions and 
the identity of the defendant as the person named in the judgments of conviction); 
Cameron, 807 So. 2d at 747-48 (permitting resentencing as a habitual felony 
offender if the State introduces sufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s 
release date within the five-year window); Morss, 795 So. 2d at 263 (permitting 
resentencing as a habitual felony offender on remand following a reversal for 
failure to present copies of the prior felony judgments and sentences); Roberts, 776 
So. 2d at 1034 (permitting resentencing as a habitual felony offender on remand 
upon proper proof); Brown, 701 So. 2d at 410 (permitting resentencing as a 
habitual felony offender on remand upon presentation of proper proof that the 
defendant was the person named in the certified copies of judgments and 
 
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convictions);3 see also Walker v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D44, D44 (Fla. 2d DCA 
Dec. 21, 2007) (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“Were we writing on a clean 
slate, I would follow the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts in concluding that this 
evidentiary error does not preclude the State from seeking a habitual felony 
offender sentence on remand.”).4  We now resolve the conflict. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Before addressing the conflict issue, we must note the issues we do not 
resolve.  The State has conceded that the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to 
sentence Collins as a habitual felony offender.  Thus, the sufficiency of the 
evidence is not before us.  Likewise, in Bover, we held that when the defense fails 
to object to the sufficiency of the evidence, the State may present additional 
                                          
 
3.  Collins also certified conflict with Rhodes, 704 So. 2d at 1083.  The 
opinion in Rhodes, however, does not discuss whether the defendant objected to 
the sufficiency of the evidence.  If the defendant failed to object, the conflict could 
be resolved based on the same distinction the Second District drew in Collins.  All 
the cases cited in the text involved defendants who objected at sentencing. 
 
4.  In Walker, all three members of the panel concurred in Judge 
Altenbernd’s specially concurring opinion that, absent precedent in the Second 
District, he would follow the law from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts that this 
evidentiary error does not preclude the State from presenting new evidence on 
remand.  Judge Altenbernd authored a similar opinion, joined by Judge Kelly, in 
Lloyd v. State, 844 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (Altenbernd, C.J., 
concurring specially) (acknowledging the Second District precedent but arguing 
that “both sides to the controversy are simply entitled to a new sentencing hearing 
where the necessary evidence is presented and the correct law is applied”).  Thus, 
it appears at least four judges in the Second District would agree with the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Districts if not for Second District precedent. 
 
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evidence of habitual felony offender status.  See Bover, 797 So. 2d at 1251.  
Therefore, we do not decide that issue, either.  Finally, we do not here consider the 
effect on resentencing proceedings of two recent United States Supreme Court 
cases: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491 (2000) (holding that all facts 
that would enhance the defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum must be 
found by a jury), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (holding 
that, for purposes of Apprendi, the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence 
that may be imposed based solely on the jury’s findings). 
 
What we do address is the narrow question left open in Bover: when the 
defendant does object at sentencing to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence 
supporting the habitual felony offender sentence, and on appeal the district court 
reverses on that basis, on remand for resentencing may the State present new 
evidence that the defendant is a habitual felony offender?  Our answer is yes.  We 
hold that because resentencing is a de novo proceeding, on remand the State may 
present additional evidence to prove that the defendant qualifies for habitual felony 
offender sentencing. 
 
In the following discussion, we: (A) explain that a resentencing is a de novo 
proceeding; (B) discuss the inapplicability of our decision in Shull v. Dugger, 515 
So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1987), to habitual felony offender sentencing; (C) explain that our 
 
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decision does not implicate double jeopardy concerns; and (D) explain that 
resentencing as a habitual felony offender does not violate due process. 
A. Resentencing as a New Proceeding 
 
In both capital and noncapital cases, we have held that resentencing is a new 
proceeding.  In death penalty cases, we have stated that “[t]he basic premise of 
sentencing procedure is that the sentencer is to consider all relevant evidence 
regarding the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant to determine 
appropriate punishment.”  Wike v. State, 698 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1997).   Thus, 
we have recognized that a resentencing must proceed “as an entirely new 
proceeding,” id., and that a “resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues 
bearing on the proper sentence.”  Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 
1986).  In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the 
defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process 
rights.”  Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002); see also Galindez v. 
State, 955 So. 2d 517, 525 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We 
have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ 
meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his 
‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper 
sentence.’” (citation omitted)); Walker, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D44 (Altenbernd, J., 
concurring specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a defendant 
 
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successfully challenges his sentence on appeal and the cause is remanded for 
resentencing, the resentencing is a ‘de novo’ proceeding, at which either side may 
present evidence anew regarding the appropriate sentence.”). 
 
The principle of de novo sentencing often benefits the defendant.  See, e.g., 
Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 525 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“In fact, because 
resentencing is de novo, the State was required to produce evidence on sentencing 
issues even if the State established the fact at the original sentencing.”); Tubwell v. 
State, 922 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“As this resentencing proceeding 
was de novo, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses.” 
(citations omitted)); Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) 
(holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding, the 
State must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing, 
even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing); 
Mills v. State, 724 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that even though 
the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing, 
law-of-the-case principles do not insulate the State from proving them at 
resentencing); Baldwin v. State, 700 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (agreeing 
that because resentencing is a new proceeding, the defendant may challenge the 
accuracy of prior convictions included on his scoresheet, even though he did not 
challenge them at the original sentencing).  
 
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We have also recognized that because a resentencing is a new proceeding, 
the court is not limited by the evidence originally presented.  See Lucas v. State, 
841 So. 2d 380, 387 (Fla. 2003) (“[A] resentencing court is not limited by evidence 
presented (or not presented) in . . . the original . . . sentencing phase.”); Mann v. 
State, 453 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 1984) (recognizing that where a remand directs a 
new sentencing proceeding, both sides may present additional evidence). 
Our decision in Mann illustrates this principle.  At Mann’s original capital 
sentencing proceeding, the State introduced a Mississippi burglary conviction and 
presented testimony from the victim that Mann committed sexual battery.  453 So. 
2d at 785.  Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the aggravating 
circumstance of previous conviction of a violent felony had been established.  Id.  
On appeal, we held that the trial court erroneously found this aggravating 
circumstance because the judgment of conviction did not disclose that it involved 
violence.  Mann v. State, 420 So. 2d 578, 581 (Fla. 1982).  We also held that the 
trial court erroneously found another aggravating circumstance and that we could 
not determine what the trial court found regarding mitigation.  Id.  We therefore 
vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing without a jury.  Id.  On 
resentencing, in addition to the evidence presented at the first sentencing, the State 
introduced a copy of a Mississippi indictment charging Mann with “burglary both 
with the intent to commit unnatural carnal intercourse and that he did commit that 
 
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crime.”  453 So. 2d at 786.  The trial court again found that the Mississippi 
conviction established the prior violent felony aggravator.  Id. at 785-86.  On 
appeal from the resentencing, we rejected Mann’s argument that our previous 
opinion precluded the State from presenting additional evidence to establish the 
previous conviction: 
Our remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a 
reweighing.  In such a proceeding both sides may, if they choose, 
present additional evidence.  Moreover, as we stated previously: “We 
are not presented with a copy of the Mississippi charge document and, 
thus, cannot determine whether it alleged, and the jury convicted him 
of, a breaking with intent to commit a crime of violence.”  The state 
remedied this omission on resentencing, and the proof—the 
indictment, the conviction, and the victim’s testimony—establishes a 
prior conviction of a violent felony. 
 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mann, 420 So. 2d at 581).  We affirmed the death 
sentence.  Id.5 
As we did in Mann regarding evidence establishing an aggravating factor (a 
case with the ultimate stakes for the defendant), we conclude that because a 
                                          
 
5.  Although not relevant to the precedential value of our decision in Mann, 
we note that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated Mann’s sentence 
on other grounds.  See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (finding the jurors were misinformed as to the importance of their 
recommendation, contrary to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)).  The 
resentencing resulted in another death sentence, which we affirmed.  See Mann v. 
State, 603 So. 2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 1992).  Mann v. Dugger was subsequently 
overruled.  See Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jury’s verdict as “advisory,” 
as a “recommendation,” and of the judge as the “final sentencing authority” are 
permissible under Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994)). 
 
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resentencing is a new proceeding, the State may present additional evidence on 
remand to prove the defendant qualifies for habitual felony offender sentencing.  
Our decision furthers the purpose of the habitual felony offender statute.  See 
Richardson, 915 So. 2d at 88 (recognizing that the purpose of section 775.084 “is 
to protect society from habitual criminals who persist in the commission of crime 
after having been theretofore convicted and punished for crimes previously 
committed”) (quoting Joyner v. State, 30 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1947)). 
B. Shull Does Not Apply 
 
Collins argues that our decision in Shull, 515 So. 2d 748, applies.  Shull held 
that when the reasons for imposing a sentence departing from the sentencing 
guidelines are reversed on appeal, trial judges cannot impose departure sentences 
on remand.  As we have since noted, however, implicit in our ruling in Shull “was 
our desire to preclude the possibility of a judge providing an after-the-fact 
justification for a previously imposed departure sentence.”  Jones v. State, 559 So. 
2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1990); see also Murray v. State, 616 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1993) 
(Barkett, C.J., specially concurring) (“The issue addressed in Shull was the danger 
of developing after-the-fact reasons for departure sentences.”).  Such a danger does 
not exist here.  A judge imposing a habitual offender sentence need not justify the 
sentence with written reasons, except to find the predicate convictions for such a 
sentence.  Therefore, as we now explain, Shull does not apply. 
 
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Before Shull, we had decided Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 
1986).  In that case, we considered the continued viability of the habitual felony 
offender statute in light of the subsequently enacted sentencing guidelines.  We 
held that: (1) the guidelines applied to all felonies (except capital felonies and 
felonies committed before October 1983), and therefore section 775.084 (the 
habitual offender statute) could not operate as an alternative to guidelines 
sentencing; and (2) the habitual offender statute could not be used as a reason for 
departing from the guidelines.  See Whitehead, 498 So. 2d at 865, 867. 
Subsequently, in Shull, the defendant was sentenced to a ten-year departure 
sentence based solely on the habitual offender statute.  515 So. 2d at 749.  The 
defendant, citing Whitehead, filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging error 
in the use of his habitual offender status as a reason to depart.  Shull v. State, 512 
So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).  The trial court denied his motion.  The 
district court reversed.  On review of the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus, we 
held that the “trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence 
after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed by 
the appellate court.”  Shull, 515 So. 2d at 750; see also Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 
554, 556 (Fla. 1990) (“[W]hen an appellate court reverses a departure sentence 
because there were no written reasons, the court must remand for resentencing with 
no possibility of departure from the guidelines.”); Patten v. State, 531 So. 2d 203, 
 
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205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (interpreting Shull to prohibit enunciation of new reasons 
for a departure sentence after the original reasons given have been reversed on 
appeal).    
 
Collins argues that the situation here is similar to departure sentencing.  As 
noted above, in those situations, when the reasons supporting a departure sentence 
are found invalid on appeal, the trial court may not impose a departure sentence on 
remand.  This line of cases is distinguishable, however.  To begin with, Shull no 
longer applies to habitual felony offender sentencing.  The legislature has amended 
section 775.084 to specify that a habitual felony offender sentence is not subject to 
the sentencing guidelines.  It also amended section 775.084 to delete the 
requirement that the trial court determine “if it is necessary for the protection of the 
public to sentence the defendant to an extended term.”  See Ch. 88-131, § 6, at 
708-09, Laws of Fla.; § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“A sentence imposed 
under this section is not subject to s. 921.002.”).  Habitual offender sentencing is 
now separate from both the sentencing guidelines and sentencing under the 
Criminal Punishment Code.  See Bateman v. State, 566 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1990) (recognizing that the amendment to section 775.084 superseded 
Whitehead and “a habitual offender sentence in excess of the guidelines, even in 
the absence of stated reasons for departure, is now valid”); Owens v. State, 560 So. 
2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (recognizing that Whitehead was decided 
 
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before section 775.084 was amended so that once the defendant meets the 
definition of a habitual felony offender, the trial court is no longer required to 
provide written reasons for imposing a sentence in excess of the guidelines).  In 
addition, unlike departure sentencing, which requires written reasons for departing 
from the guidelines, section 775.084 now requires written reasons only when the 
court finds that a habitual felony offender sentence is “not necessary for the 
protection of the public.”  § 775.084(3)(a)6., Fla. Stat. (2001); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.701(d)(11). 
 
Even if the statutes had not been amended, the underlying reason for our 
decision in Shull—preventing after-the-fact justifications for a previously imposed 
departure sentence—is not implicated here.  See Jones, 559 So. 2d at 206 
(recognizing that Shull does not apply to habitual offender sentencing and stating 
that “[t]his was not a case where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that 
was later declared invalid, but, rather, one in which the judge considered his 
sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply”).  On remand for 
resentencing as a habitual felony offender, no danger exists that the judge will 
create after-the-fact justifications.  In contrast to the subjective (and therefore 
manipulable) permissible reasons for departing from the guidelines when we 
decided Whitehead and Shull, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) (1985) (allowing 
departures where there are “clear and convincing reasons” to do so), the decision to 
 
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sentence as a habitual felony offender must be based solely on objective, mostly 
documentary, evidence of the defendant’s prior felony convictions.  See § 
775.084(1)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining a habitual felony offender, habitual 
violent felony offender, three-time violent felony offender, and violent career 
criminal).  Therefore, the concerns Shull addressed do not apply in this context. 
C. Double Jeopardy  
Our decision does not implicate double jeopardy concerns either.  We have 
noted that “[t]he guarantee against double jeopardy consists of three separate 
constitutional protections: ‘It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments for the same 
offense.’”  Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1994) (quoting North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)).  None of these protections is involved in 
a resentencing. 
In almost identical circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that allowing the introduction of additional evidence at resentencing does not 
implicate double jeopardy concerns.  See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 
(1998).  In Monge, the State sought to sentence the defendant under California’s 
“three-strikes” law, another sentence enhancement statute based on prior 
 
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convictions.  As in this case, the State conceded that the evidence of the prior 
convictions was insufficient, but sought to prove the allegations on remand.  Id.  
The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a 
second opportunity to prove that the defendant had a prior conviction that would 
trigger a sentence enhancement.  Id. at 734.  The Court distinguished between an 
acquittal and a sentence:   
We have held that where an appeals court overturns a conviction on 
the ground that the prosecution proffered insufficient evidence of 
guilt, that finding is comparable to an acquittal, and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial.  Where a similar failure of 
proof occurs in a sentencing proceeding, however, the analogy is 
inapt.  The pronouncement of sentence simply does not “have the 
qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.”  
 
Id. at 729 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 
134 (1980)).   
Like the United States Supreme Court, we find that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not preclude granting the State a second opportunity to demonstrate 
that Collins meets the criteria for habitualization.  A second attempt to prove the 
criteria for an enhanced sentence does not equate to “a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal.”  Lippman, 633 So. 2d at 1064 (quoting Pearce, 395 
U.S. at 717).  We have held in other contexts that a resentencing following a 
reversal on a sentencing issue does not implicate double jeopardy concerns.  See 
Trotter, 825 So. 2d at 368 (holding that double jeopardy principles are not violated 
 
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where the trial court did not impose a multiplier at the original sentencing but 
imposed a multiplier on remand); Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1994) 
(holding that imposition of a habitual offender sentence on remand after the trial 
court’s pronouncement of a non-habitual sentence in the original proceeding does 
not violate double jeopardy); see also Walker, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D44 
(Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“There is no doubt that double jeopardy is 
not implicated in this case because Mr. Walker has successfully sought reversal of 
the sentence in this appeal.”).  The same is true here.  
D. Due Process 
 
The final issue is whether granting the State a second opportunity to 
demonstrate that Collins meets the criteria for habitualization violates due process.  
We hold that it does not.  Certainly, due process principles apply to a resentencing.  
See Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1987) (“The pronouncement of 
sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical stage of the proceedings to which 
all due process guarantees attach whether the sentence is the immediate result of 
adjudication of guilt or, as here, the sentence is the result of an order directing the 
trial court to resentence the defendant.”); State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 
1983) (“[O]nce the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and 
the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition 
of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach.”).  In 
 
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Trotter, however, we explained that in resentencing proceedings, “[t]he due 
process inquiry . . . is whether the new sentence . . . constitutes a vindictive 
sentence.”  825 So. 2d at 368 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725-26).  We further 
explained that “the presumption of vindictiveness arises only when a judge 
imposes a more severe sentence upon resentencing.”  Id. at 369.   
 
Here, Collins was originally sentenced as a habitual felony offender and has 
yet to be resentenced (we stayed the district court’s mandate).  As long as the 
sentence imposed following resentencing is not more severe, the presumption of 
vindictiveness does not arise.  Trotter, 825 So. 2d at 369; see also People v. 
Barragan, 83 P.3d 480, 486 (Cal. 2004) (refusing to “use the Due Process Clause 
as a device for extending the double jeopardy protection to cases where it 
otherwise would not extend” and concluding that a retrial of a prior adjudication 
does not violate due process) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 354 
(1990)). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we hold that when a habitual offender sentence is 
reversed because of insufficient evidence, on remand for resentencing the State 
may again attempt to prove that the defendant meets the criteria for such 
sentencing.  We therefore approve the decision of the Second District reversing 
Collins’s sentence, but quash the decision to the extent it precludes the State from 
 
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introducing additional evidence on remand.  On that issue, we approve the 
conflicting decisions in Wilson, Cameron, Morss, Roberts, and Brown.  
 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, PARIENTE, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS, C.J., and QUINCE, J., 
concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
While I have considered the dissenting positions of both Justice Anstead and 
Justice Quince, I conclude that the bases of their dissents are not jurisprudentially 
sound in this case.  Contrary to Justice Anstead’s broad assertions analogizing 
what has occurred here to the State’s failing to prove an essential element in the 
guilt phase, there are important distinctions between the guilt and sentencing 
phases of a criminal proceeding.  As Justice Cantero has articulated in the majority 
opinion, although double jeopardy concerns prohibit the State from getting a 
second bite at the apple after it has failed to prove an essential element of a crime 
during the guilt phase, these same concerns do not bar the State from attempting to 
prove a prior conviction at a resentencing proceeding.  Majority op. at 16-17.   
 
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In fact, in Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2002), in which this Court 
addressed the impact of its decision in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000),6 
we specifically rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the State seeking and the 
trial court imposing a drug trafficking multiplier upon resentencing.  In Trotter, the 
defendant was originally sentenced under the 1995 guidelines to 83.2 months’ 
incarceration on a trafficking charge.  825 So. 2d at 364.  After a reversal because 
the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines was unconstitutional, the trial 
court applied a drug trafficking multiplier and sentenced Trotter to 72 months’ 
incarceration.  Id.  After the Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s application of 
the multiplier, Trotter appealed to this Court arguing that his double jeopardy and 
due process rights were violated by the trial court imposing the multiplier when it 
had not done so at the original sentencing proceeding.  Id. at 365.  Importantly, this 
Court acknowledged that “a resentencing pursuant to Heggs is a de novo 
sentencing proceeding that must comport with constitutional requirements,” but 
held that no double jeopardy violation occurred “even though the trial court 
declined to impose the multiplier at the original sentencing.”  Id. at 368.  We 
                                          
 
 
6.  In Heggs, a majority of the Court struck down a law that amended several 
statutory provisions concerning sentencing guidelines, departure sentences, and 
penalty classifications for certain criminal offenses.  Id. at 625-26.  Because 
portions of the 1995 sentencing guidelines were rendered unconstitutional, the 
Court recognized its decision would require the resentencing of those defendants 
whose sentences were adversely affected by the law.  Id. at 627.  Trotter was one 
such defendant. 
 
- 20 -
concluded that Trotter was “not deprived of any reasonable expectation of finality 
in his original sentence because he challenged his sentence on appeal on a legal 
basis.”  Id. 
Even more persuasive is the majority’s reliance on Monge v. California, 524 
U.S. 721 (1998), where the United States Supreme Court held that the State could 
be given a second opportunity to prove that a defendant had a prior conviction that 
would trigger a sentence enhancement without violating double jeopardy 
principles.  Id. at 734.  Similar to Monge, the issue in this case is whether giving 
the State another opportunity to establish the sequential conviction requirement for 
a habitual offender sentence at a resentencing violates any constitutional principles 
or any of our precedent.  In line with the majority’s decision in this case, I 
conclude that the State’s failure to satisfy the sequential conviction requirement at 
the original sentencing proceeding does not constitute an acquittal of the habitual 
offender sentence and accordingly a defendant’s right against double jeopardy is 
not violated.  
Although we did not discuss the concepts of double jeopardy or due process 
in our decision in Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2001), that opinion is the 
natural precursor to the issue presented in this case.  As in Collins, the State in 
Bover attempted to establish the necessary predicate offenses for imposition of a 
habitual offender sentence.  Id. at 1250.  We held that Bover’s habitual offender 
 
- 21 -
sentence constituted an illegal sentence because it did not appear on the face of the 
record to satisfy the sequential conviction requirement.  Id. at 1250-51 (noting that 
the multiple convictions occurred on the same day and there was no evidence that 
the convictions occurred at separate sentencing proceedings).  A unanimous court 
recognized that when there was no objection by the defendant to the predicate 
offenses, upon remand the State should have the opportunity to present record 
evidence that other prior convictions existed that would satisfy the sequential 
conviction requirement.  Id. at 1251.  
I agree with the majority’s reasoning in extending Bover to circumstances 
where there is an objection, which will give the State the opportunity on remand to 
establish that the sequential conviction requirement has been met.  In sentencing, 
we must balance the interests of the defendant against the interests of society. 
Because one of the interests is fairness to the defendant, our rules of procedure 
have allowed an illegal sentence to be corrected at any time, trumping our usual 
concerns about finality.  Undoubtedly, we have attempted over the years to 
encourage that all sentencing errors be brought to the trial court’s attention at the 
earliest opportunity in order to benefit the defendant.  See Maddox v. State, 760 
So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000), and its progeny.    
I also acknowledge the issue raised in Justice Quince’s dissent about the 
waste of judicial resources in cases where the State has failed to get it right the first 
 
- 22 -
time.  Indeed, Justice Quince cites an impressive number of cases in which the 
sentence was reversed because prosecutors arrived at sentencing without the proof 
required by statute.  Dissenting op. at 29-33 (Quince, J.).   However, although we 
would hope that the State would take all steps to prevent the need for resentencing, 
I also believe that society’s interest in having a habitual offender sentence imposed 
where the defendant meets the criteria of the predicate offenses outweighs the 
defendant’s interest in finality in these circumstances.  
Furthermore, because I believe the Court’s holding is narrow, namely, that 
the State is permitted on remand “to present additional evidence to prove that the 
defendant qualifies for habitual felony offender sentencing” even though Collins 
objected, concerns over vindictive sentencing, another constitutional consideration, 
are not present.  However, as noted by the majority and discussed in more detail in 
Trotter, it is still possible for the presumption of vindictiveness to arise if the trial 
court imposes a greater sentence on remand than Collins originally received.  
Majority op. at 18.  Thus, I recognize the concerns raised by Justice Anstead in his 
dissent, and therefore would not foreclose the possibility of a constitutional 
challenge in other circumstances where the State’s conduct on resentencing has not 
comported with fundamental notions of fairness.7  In my view, however, allowing 
                                          
 
 
7.  Justice Anstead’s dissent also includes a reference to Apprendi to support 
his position.  As the majority notes, the relevance of Apprendi has not been raised 
by the parties as an issue here.  Even if the issue had been raised, it would not in 
 
- 23 -
the State another opportunity to establish the defendant’s predicate convictions at 
resentencing does not violate such principles.   
In sum, although I am hesitant to state that fundamental fairness 
considerations might never dictate a different result, I discern no constitutional bar 
or other public policy reason for arriving at a contrary result in these 
circumstances.  Therefore, I concur in the Court’s decision today but strongly urge 
the State to do its homework and always come to court adequately prepared to lay 
the necessary foundation for habitual offender sentencing and other related 
sentencing issues. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting. 
 
I concur in Justice Quince’s dissent and would affirm the Second District’s 
decision not to grant the State a second opportunity to prove its case by producing 
new evidence. 
 
Some cases cry out for resolution by application of the most basic and 
fundamental rules of criminal trial procedure.  There can hardly be a more 
fundamental principle of law than the rule that the party making an affirmative 
                                                                                                                                        
my view change the result.  See Dinkens v. State, 976 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2008) (finding that the argument that the HFO statute violates Apprendi “has 
been repeatedly rejected by Florida courts” and that the statute “is based solely on 
prior convictions and therefore does not require a jury determination pursuant to 
Apprendi”). 
 
- 24 -
assertion assumes the burden of proving that assertion.  The corollary to this rule, 
of course, is that when that party fails to carry that burden the affirmative assertion 
fails.  We need not, and should not, look beyond this fundamental principle in 
resolving this case.8   
 
Here, there is no dispute that the State had the burden of proof to 
demonstrate, by evidence properly admissible under the rules of evidence, that the 
defendant met the legal requirements for a more severe sentence than would 
normally be allowed, in this case by imposition of the habitual felony sentencing 
scheme.  And there is no dispute that the State failed to carry that burden.  That 
should be the end of the matter, and would, if this Court properly applied the 
fundamental rule of burden of proof.  As Judge Canady explained in his opinion 
for the Second District: 
The State requests that we remand this case to permit it an 
opportunity to produce new evidence that Collins qualifies for a 
habitual felony offender sentence.  In the sentencing proceeding, 
Collins’s counsel specifically objected that the documents offered by 
the State failed to demonstrate a sufficient number of separately 
                                          
 
8.  The majority mistakenly places great reliance on the fact that the 
defendant will have to be resentenced because the Second District has stricken the 
habitual sentence erroneously imposed.  The majority seems to treat the need for 
resentencing as some talisman for starting all over when in fact the resentencing 
has only been ordered for the narrow purpose to correct the error of the improper 
imposition of a habitual offender sentence and to achieve a legal sentence.  This 
situation is distinguishable from one where a new trial is ordered and a de novo 
sentencing, if there is a conviction, is part of the risk assumed with an appeal.  
Here, the defendant asserting the State’s flawed proof has been told by the majority 
“heads you lose and tails the State wins.”  Why appeal? 
 
- 25 -
sentenced prior felony convictions.  In previous cases, when an 
appropriate objection to a habitual felony offender sentence was 
presented in the trial court at sentencing, this court has not afforded 
the State a second opportunity on remand to demonstrate that the 
defendant meets the habitual felony offender criteria.  See Wallace v. 
State, 835 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Rivera v. State, 825 So. 
2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Reynolds v. State, 674 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1996).  Accordingly, we remand for resentencing under the 
Criminal Punishment Code. 
Collins v. State, 893 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (footnotes omitted).  
Instead of applying the simple burden of proof rule, however, the majority rejects 
Judge Canady’s simple logic and now determines that the State is entitled to a 
second chance to correct its mistaken understanding of the Florida rules of 
evidence and is further entitled to produce new evidence to meet its burden of 
proof.  The majority’s conclusion ignores the fact that the State was specifically 
put on notice of its mistake by the defense objection. 
 
After all, the majority seems to imply, the records offered by the State 
indicate the defendant may appear to be eligible for habitual offender sentencing, 
so why should we let the State’s mistaken understanding of our evidence law stand 
in the way?  This time, the State and its advocates assert, we will get it right.  Well, 
the reason we should not afford the State a second chance to prove its case is that 
we are obligated to apply the rule of law consistently and uniformly to all parties.  
And the rule of law that we should be applying today is the rule that the State had 
the burden at the sentencing hearing to establish, by properly admissible evidence, 
 
- 26 -
that the defendant qualified for and should receive a more severe sentence under 
the habitual offender scheme.  The State, of course, like the defendant and all other 
parties to litigation, is charged with knowing that it had the burden of proof and 
knowing the rules of evidence.9   
 
Imagine a case where the State puts on a single witness to prove a crime but 
the evidence of the witness is all improper hearsay gathered by the witness in a 
conversation with an eyewitness.  In reversing a conviction based upon such 
evidence, surely no appellate court would permit the State a second chance to 
prove its case, this time to call the eyewitness.  It is pure sophistry to suggest that 
the State’s burden of proof at the sentencing hearing to invoke the habitual 
sentencing scheme by the use of proper and sufficient evidence should be treated 
any differently than its burden to prove the commission of an offense by properly 
admissible evidence.  Since when do we treat errors in complying with the 
evidence code and the admission of evidence as somehow entitling the party 
bearing the burden of proof to a second chance if the evidence presented is found 
deficient or insufficient?   
                                          
 
9.  Enforcing this fundamental principle is especially important in light of 
the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and its progeny that any factor alleged by the government to allow for an 
enhanced sentence must be treated and proven as an element of the crime.  Imagine 
this Court in a death penalty case finding the State’s proof of a statutory 
aggravating factor defective, but giving the State a second opportunity to prove the 
aggravator. 
 
- 27 -
Oh, there could be a difference if we take a seductive and tempting glance at 
the defendant’s record and the possibility of the State offering new evidence and 
correcting its mistakes at a second hearing.  But we cannot properly look beyond 
the record in this case to speculate that the State will be able to prove its case the 
second time around.  It is no more permissible for this Court to look at what might 
have been in this case than it would for a court to look at what an eyewitness’s 
testimony might have been in the example set out above.  Either the State carried 
its burden of proof by sufficient admissible evidence or it did not.  That is the rule 
of law, and that is why I would approve the Second District’s opinion. 
LEWIS, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. 
 
 
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent because I do not believe that in circumstances where the State knew 
or should have known what was required to be shown in order to get the 
defendant’s sentence enhanced but failed to present evidence to the trial court, the 
State should have another opportunity to attempt to enhance the sentence.  
 
Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, sets out the requirements the State must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that a defendant is a 
habitual felony offender (HFO) or a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and 
have the court impose an extended term of imprisonment on the defendant.  When 
a state prosecutor chooses to seek HFO or HVFO sentencing, proof that every 
 
- 28 -
statutory requirement is met should be confirmed and sufficiently documented 
before the sentencing hearing is held.  Of course there will be cases of first 
impression and cases which fine-tune or clarify various aspects of the statute.  
What I have discovered with regard to application of this statute by state 
prosecutors and trial judges, however, is well beyond any normal learning curve of 
statutory interpretation.   
 
Even a small amount of research into case history involving sentencing 
under this statute reveals that for years and years, all over this state, prosecutors 
have arrived at sentencing procedures without the proof required by statute and set 
out in our case law.  And so the cycle begins:  The State presents slightly deficient 
proof of HFO or HVFO; the defense objects that the proof is not sufficient 
evidence; the trial judge imposes HFO sentencing despite the deficiency and the 
objection; the prisoner, public defender, or a private attorney files an appeal or a 
motion for postconviction relief; briefs are written and filed by the defendant and 
the State, the motion is summarily denied and an appeal is filed, or hearings are 
held, appearances are made, orders or opinions are written and issued; frequently 
the sentence is affirmed and review is then sought by a higher court of appeal; 
again, briefs are written and filed, arguments may be scheduled, court conferences 
are held, orders or opinions are written and issued; a resentencing is scheduled; and 
resentencing takes place at a de novo court proceeding at which both the State and 
 
- 29 -
the defendant present evidence and call witnesses.  By the time a new sentence is 
finally handed down, often years after the initial sentencing, an enormous amount 
of judicial time has been spent in terms of judges, lawyers, clerks and court 
personnel, all at enormous expense to the system and this state.   
 
The fact is, all of this time and expense could be avoided if prosecutors were 
prepared with proper and sufficient evidence of HFO status, and if they are not, the 
trial judges would refuse to impose HFO sentencing.  It seems so obvious, so 
fundamental, yet apparently this has not been the order of things.  The following is 
but a small sampling of appellate cases from each of the district courts of appeal 
involving the prosecutors’ failure to present the information needed to correct 
enhanced sentencing that had been imposed.  See McNair v. State, 920 So. 2d 111 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (resentencing ordered where State did not properly prove two 
or more predicate felonies as required to habitualize); Rogers v. State, 944 So. 2d 
513 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (resentencing ordered where State failed to provide 
competent evidence of date of defendant’s release from prison); Riser v. State, 898 
So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (resentencing ordered where State failed to show 
predicate offenses as enumerated in section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Cook v. 
State, 893 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (resentencing ordered where State 
failed to show that defendant’s prior convictions involved at least three different 
offenses); Klauer v. State, 873 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (resentencing 
 
- 30 -
ordered where State failed to prove defendant’s prior offenses qualified as section 
775.084 enumerated offenses); Prudent v. State, 867 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2004) (resentencing ordered where State failed to establish that defendant was the 
same person who was convicted of the predicate felonies used to support the 
sentence); Hughes v. State, 850 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (resentencing 
ordered where State failed to prove proper predicate felonies as enumerated in 
section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Walker v. State, 842 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2003) (resentencing ordered where State failed to prove satisfactory evidence of 
predicate convictions); Robinson v. State, 830 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) 
(resentencing ordered where record evidence did not support a finding that the 
defendant had requisite sequential convictions to qualify as HFO); Suarez v. State, 
808 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (resentencing ordered where prior case relied 
on by State did not qualify as prior conviction under section 775.084, Florida 
Statutes); Benjamin v. State, 814 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (resentencing 
ordered because HVFO sentencing should not have been imposed where none of 
defendant’s current crimes were enumerated as qualifying offenses in section 
775.084, Florida Statutes); Gordon v. Moore, 832 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) 
(resentencing ordered where predicate convictions relied on by trial court did not 
meet sequential convictions requirement); Wilson v. State, 830 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2002) (resentencing ordered where State failed to provide sufficient evidence 
 
- 31 -
of defendant’s prior convictions to support its claim that he qualified for habitual 
felony offender status); Cameron v. State, 807 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) 
(resentencing ordered where State failed to provide record evidence of the date of 
the current felony offense); Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) 
(resentencing ordered where State failed to introduce evidence that proved 
defendant qualified for enhanced sentencing under section 775.084, Florida 
Statutes); Boyd v. State, 776 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (resentencing 
ordered where State’s evidence was insufficient to establish release date); Hemmy 
v. State, 835 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (resentencing ordered where State 
failed to establish by affirmative evidence the identity of the accused as the person 
previously convicted of the predicate crimes); Alix v. State, 799 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 
3d DCA 2001) (resentencing ordered where State did not prove that prior foreign 
offense was substantially similar to a section 775.084 qualifying offense); Wainer 
v. State, 798 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (resentencing ordered where State 
did not provide satisfactory evidence of predicate convictions); Morss v. State, 795 
So. 2d 262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (resentencing ordered after State failed to present 
copies of defendant’s judgments and sentences); Sanders v. State, 765 So. 2d 161 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (resentencing ordered where State presented no evidence as to 
date defendant was released from prison for prior offenses); Freeman v. State, 773 
So. 2d 110 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (noting that resentencing had been ordered after 
 
- 32 -
State improperly habitualized defendant for two offenses arising out of the same 
criminal episode); Smith v. State, 766 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) 
(resentencing ordered where trial court erred in relying on two convictions that had 
been entered at the same time; an HFO sentence cannot be predicated upon an 
offense or conviction occurring after current offense); Bellamy v. State, 712 So. 2d 
409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (resentencing ordered where State did not prove the dates 
on which the defendant was convicted or released from prison); Hampton v. State, 
711 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (resentencing ordered where defendant was 
incorrectly adjudicated HFO for misdemeanor conviction); Brown v. State, 701 So. 
2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (ordering resentencing after State did not provide 
proper fingerprint authentication); Williams v. State, 692 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1997) (resentencing ordered where State failed to submit sufficient proof that 
defendant was the person who committed prior offense); Olsen v. State, 691 So. 2d 
17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (resentencing ordered where State failed to establish that 
defendant was person convicted of predicate felonies used to support HFO 
sentencing); Reynolds v. State, 674 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (resentencing 
ordered where State did not provide affirmative proof of critical dates); Stephenson 
v. State, 666 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (resentencing ordered where State 
failed to provide sufficient evidence that defendant committed present offenses 
within five years of release from prison); Ford v. State, 652 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st 
 
- 33 -
DCA 1995) (resentencing ordered where State improperly introduced prior 
convictions that had not been sentenced separately); Louis v. State, 647 So. 2d 324 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (resentencing ordered where State failed to prove proper 
fingerprint authentication of predicate crimes); Huggins v. State, 616 So. 2d 188 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (ordering resentencing where defendant did not qualify for 
HFO because present offense did not occur within five years of his release on 
parole from a prison sentencing as required by section 775.084, Florida Statutes); 
Kerney v. State, 605 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (resentencing ordered where 
there was insufficient proof that defendant was released from custody within five 
years of commission of instant crime); Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1991) (resentencing required where State did not provide proper 
fingerprint authentication); Wagner v. State, 578 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) 
(ordering resentencing after trial court erred in sentencing defendant as HFO based 
on previous convictions all entered on the same day); Flewelling v. State, 576 So. 
2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (resentencing ordered where trial court erred in 
sentencing defendant as an HFO without explicit proof of two or more felonies in 
this state); Rowland v. State, 583 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (resentencing 
ordered where trial court failed to make specific findings of prior convictions on 
the record pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Cuthbert v. State, 459 So. 
 
- 34 -
 
- 35 -
2d 1098 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (resentencing ordered where court failed to make 
requisite findings necessary for habitual offender sentence). 
 
Thus, I believe that the Second District’s approach, remanding for 
resentencing under the criminal punishment code and not allowing a second bite at 
demonstrating habitual offender treatment, saves resources and gives the State an 
incentive to be prepared for the sentencing process just as it is prepared for the 
guilt/innocence phase of the proceedings.  Therefore, I would approve the decision 
of the Second District in this case. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. 
 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D02-3655 
 
 
(Lee County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert J. Krauss, 
Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public 
Defender, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent