Case Title: Lovelace v. City of Shelby

Citation: 351 N.C. 458

Docket Number: 312A99

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 312A99
FILED: 7 APRIL 2000
SHARON LYNN LOVELACE, Administratrix of the Estate of SHAYLA
MEAGEN MOORE, and SHARON LYNN LOVELACE, Individually
v.
CITY OF SHELBY and THOMAS LOWELL LEE
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 133 N.C. App. 408, 515
S.E.2d 722 (1999), reversing and remanding an order entered
12 March 1998 by Payne (Ronald K.), J., in Superior Court,
Cleveland County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 15 November 1999.
Deaton & Biggers, P.L.L.C., by W. Robinson Deaton, Jr., and
Lydia A. Hoza; and Hamrick, Mauney, Flowers, Martin & Moore,
by Fred A. Flowers, for plaintiff-appellant.
Scott, Hollowell, Palmer & Windham, LLP, by Martha Raymond
Thompson, for defendant-appellee City of Shelby.
ORR, Justice.
Plaintiff, Sharon Lynn Lovelace, individually and in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of her deceased
daughter, Shayla Meagan Moore (Shayla), initiated this action
against defendants on 5 November 1997.  Plaintiff alleged that
defendant City of Shelby (City) was negligent in the dispatch of
fire-fighting personnel to plaintiff’s home, resulting in
Shayla’s death, and that the City, through its negligent dispatch
of fire-fighting personnel, caused plaintiff severe emotional
distress.  Plaintiff also asserted claims against defendant Lee,
but he is not a party to this appeal.  On 16 January 1998, the
City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the
ground that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
On 11 March 1998, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion
to amend the complaint to allege additionally that the City’s
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of Shayla’s death
and that the City’s actions created a “special duty” between
plaintiff, Shayla, and the City.  On 12 March 1998, the trial
court denied the City’s 12(b)(6) motion.
The City appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as
error the trial court’s denial of the 12(b)(6) motion because
“plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under the Public Duty Doctrine.”  The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s 12 March 1998 order and remanded to
the trial court for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff’s
case.  See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 133 N.C. App. 408, 414,
515 S.E.2d 722, 726 (1999).  The Court of Appeals concluded that
plaintiff had not alleged facts that adequately established the
“special duty” exception to the public duty doctrine.  See id. at
413, 515 S.E.2d at 726.  Judge Wynn dissented on the grounds that
plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish negligence and
alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the case fell within
the “special duty” exception to the public duty doctrine.  Id. at
414, 515 S.E.2d at 726 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  Based on the
dissent, plaintiff appealed to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
7A-30(2).
Because this appeal is based on defendant City’s motion to
dismiss, we must treat plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. 
See Cage v. Colonial Bldg. Co., 337 N.C. 682, 683, 448 S.E.2d
115, 116 (1994).  The facts, as alleged, show that on 29 June
1996, plaintiff and her three minor children, including Shayla,
resided at 706 Calvary Street, Shelby, North Carolina, when a
fire was discovered inside the house.  Their home was located 1.1
miles from the Shelby fire station.  Plaintiff exited the house
with two of her three minor children, but Shayla failed to follow
them.  The fire was reported to the City by calling its 911
emergency number.  According to the pleadings, Helen Earley, the
911 system operator for the City, delayed dispatching the fire
department until six minutes after she received the call
reporting the fire.  The fire department did not arrive at
plaintiff’s home until approximately ten minutes after that
initial 911 call was placed.
While plaintiff and others waited for the fire department to
arrive, Shayla could be heard inside the house talking and
calling for her mother.  Bystanders, including police officers
who arrived on the scene before the fire department, made several
attempts to enter the house, but the intensity of the flames
thwarted their rescue attempts.  Shayla was alive inside the
house for several minutes immediately following the beginning of
the fire and prior to the fire department’s arrival.
The issue in this case is whether the public duty doctrine
insulates the City of Shelby from liability for the alleged
negligence of Helen Earley, a 911 operator for the City, and, if
so, whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to support the
“special duty” exception to the public duty doctrine.
As early as this Court’s decision in Hill v. Alderman of
Charlotte, 72 N.C. 55 (1875), the state and its agencies have
been immune from tort liability under the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  Sovereign immunity continues to be a viable
protection against tort claims for local governments.  It is
subject, however, to certain legislatively created exceptions
allowing local governments to purchase liability insurance to
protect the public, see N.C.G.S. §§ 153A-435 (1999) (applying to
counties), 160A-485 (1999) (applying to cities), and court-made
exceptions for public officials involved in conduct that is
either corrupt, malicious, or outside of and beyond the scope of
their official authority, see Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 112,
489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997).
This Court adopted for the first time the common law public
duty doctrine and explained its application to local governments
in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991).  We
stated in Braswell:
The general common law rule, known as the public
duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents
act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there
is no liability for the failure to furnish police
protection to specific individuals.  This rule
recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and
refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of
liability for failure to prevent every criminal act.
Id. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901 (citation omitted).
The holding in Braswell was specifically limited to the
facts in that case and to the issue of whether the sheriff
negligently failed to protect the decedent.  This limitation is
consistent with the origin of the public duty doctrine in the
United States in South v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle, 59 U.S. 396,
15 L. Ed. 433 (1855).
While this Court has extended the public duty doctrine to
state agencies required by statute to conduct inspections for the
public’s general protection, see Hunt v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 348
N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (1998); Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor,
347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 L.
Ed. 2d 449 (1998), we have never expanded the public duty
doctrine to any local government agencies other than law
enforcement departments when they are exercising their general
duty to protect the public, see Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601,
517 S.E.2d 121 (1999) (refusing to extend the public duty
doctrine to shield a city from liability for the allegedly
negligent acts of a school crossing guard).  We decline to expand
the public duty doctrine in this case.  Thus, the public duty
doctrine, as it applies to local government, is limited to the
facts of Braswell.
Because we decline to expand the public duty doctrine as it
applies to local governments, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and remand to that court for reinstatement of
the trial court’s order denying defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.
REVERSED.