Case Title: State v. Michael L. Popke

Citation: 2009 WI 37

Docket Number: 2008AP000446-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP446-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael L. Popke, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 757 N.W.2d 851 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 27, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca   
 
JUDGE: 
Raymond S. Huber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Mark A. Neuser, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by John M. 
Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk, and the John Miller Carroll Law 
Office, Appleton, and oral argument by John M. Carroll. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 37
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2008AP446-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2007CT230) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael L. Popke, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.  This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals' decision1 that reversed the Waupaca 
County Circuit Court, Raymond S. Huber, Judge.  The circuit 
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration.  The defendant asserted that 
any evidence should be suppressed because the police officer had 
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to conduct the 
traffic stop.  The defendant appealed the circuit court's 
                                                 
1 State v. Popke, No. 2008AP446-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2008). 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
2 
 
decision, and the court of appeals reversed.  The State 
petitioned for review.  We accepted review and now reverse the 
court of appeals' decision.   
¶2 
The single issue for review is whether this traffic 
stop violated the constitutional protections of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We conclude that the 
police officer had probable cause to believe a traffic code 
violation had occurred, namely operating left of center, and 
also that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the 
defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  
Therefore, the traffic stop was constitutional, and thus, the 
circuit court correctly denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence.   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The following facts are taken from the motion to 
suppress hearing.  On July 8, 2007, at approximately 1:30 a.m., 
Sergeant Jeff Schlueter of the New London Police Department was 
sitting at the intersection of Beckert Road and Pershing Road in 
the City of New London.2  The officer observed the defendant 
approaching from the west on Pershing Road.  Once the defendant 
reached the intersection where the officer was sitting, the 
defendant turned left to go northbound on Cedarhurst Drive.   
                                                 
2 When traveling northbound on Beckert Road, Beckert Road 
becomes Cedarhurst Drive after crossing Pershing Road.   
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
After the defendant turned onto Cedarhurst Drive, the 
officer began following the defendant, and the officer made the 
following observations: The defendant initially turned onto 
Cedarhurst Drive within the correct lane of traffic, but he then 
"swerved" into the left lane.  Three-quarters of the defendant's 
vehicle was left of the center of the road.  The center of the 
road was identified by a black strip of tar.  The defendant then 
moved back into the proper northbound lane but "overcompensated" 
and as a result "almost hit the curb" on the right-hand side of 
the road.  The defendant's vehicle then began to "fade back" 
towards the middle of the road and "nearly struck th[e] median."   
¶5 
The officer made these observations as the vehicle 
traveled approximately one block.  These observations led the 
officer to activate his emergency lights and initiate a stop of 
the defendant's vehicle one block later.  As a result of the 
traffic stop, the defendant was arrested and charged with third-
offense 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
and 
operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration with a .255 
blood alcohol concentration.  
¶6 
The defendant moved the circuit court to suppress any 
evidence that arose from the traffic stop because, he argued, 
the officer had neither probable cause that a traffic violation 
had occurred nor reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot.  The State, however, argued that the traffic stop was 
reasonable because the officer had probable cause that a traffic 
violation——driving left of center——had been committed. 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress finding that the officer had probable cause that a 
traffic code violation occurred when the defendant crossed the 
center of the road.  The circuit court also commented that the 
officer could have had reasonable suspicion that the defendant 
was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, but the circuit court concluded that it did not need to 
decide that issue because it was "satisfied that the officer 
observed the violation of the Traffic Code and he was perfectly 
valid, appropriate in stopping the vehicle based on the 
observation of operating left of center."  The defendant 
subsequently pled no contest to operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated, and the circuit court sentenced him to 75 days in 
jail, fined him $3,491, and revoked his license for 36 months. 
¶8 
The defendant appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's decision.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the officer did not have probable cause to 
believe a traffic violation had occurred.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that the defendant's "conduct did not constitute 
driving down the wrong side of the road within the meaning of 
[Wis. Stat.] § 346.05" because the defendant crossed the center 
of the road only "momentarily."  In addition, the court of 
appeals concluded that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion that a traffic or criminal code violation had 
occurred.  The court of appeals reasoned that, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the State did not show "specific 
and articulable facts" that warranted this intrusion.  The 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
5 
 
appellate court determined that it was not uncommon for vehicles 
to momentarily cross the center of the road, there was no 
testimony to establish how close the defendant came to striking 
the curb, and that no erratic driving was recounted by the 
officer.  Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the 
traffic stop did not comport with constitutional protections, 
and as a result, the motion to deny suppression was reversed and 
the judgment of conviction vacated.  The State petitioned this 
court for review, which we accepted.  
¶9 
We reverse the court of appeals' decision because the 
police officer had probable cause to believe a traffic code 
violation had occurred, namely operating left of center, and the 
officer also had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant 
was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  Therefore, the 
traffic stop was constitutional, and thus, the defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence should be denied.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 Whether 
there 
is 
probable 
cause 
or 
reasonable 
suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of constitutional 
fact.  State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 684, 482 N.W.2d 364 
(1992); State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶18, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 
N.W.2d 106.  A finding of constitutional fact consists of the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact, which we review 
under the "clearly erroneous standard," and the application of 
these historical facts to constitutional principles, which we 
review de novo.  Id., ¶¶18-19. 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
6 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶11 "The temporary detention of individuals during the 
stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief 
period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 
'persons' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."  State v. 
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)).  
An 
automobile 
stop 
must 
not 
be 
unreasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances.  Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605 (citing Whren, 517 
U.S. at 810).  "'A traffic stop is generally reasonable if the 
officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 
has occurred,' id., or have grounds to reasonably suspect a 
violation has been or will be committed."  Gaulrapp, 207 
Wis. 2d at 605 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 
(1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968)).  
A. Probable cause 
¶12 The defendant argues that the officer did not have 
probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred 
because the defendant's vehicle crossed the center of the road 
only momentarily.  The State, on the other hand, argues that 
crossing over the center of the road is a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.05(1) (2005-06),3 and as a result, the officer had 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated.  The text of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.05 can be found in ¶15. 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
7 
 
probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred.  We 
agree with the State. 
¶13 An officer may conduct a traffic stop when he or she 
has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.  
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 
(stating that a traffic stop is "reasonable where the police 
have probable cause to believe" there was a traffic violation, 
such as "No person shall turn any vehicle . . . without giving 
an 
appropriate 
signal" 
and 
"No 
person 
shall 
drive 
a 
vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions"); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 9.3(a) (4th ed. 2004) (concluding that probable cause for even 
the slightest traffic violation is legally sufficient to justify 
a traffic stop). 
¶14 Probable cause refers to the "'quantum of evidence 
which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe'" that a 
traffic 
violation 
has 
occurred. 
 
Johnson 
v. 
State, 
75 
Wis. 2d 344, 348, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1977) (citation omitted).  The 
evidence need not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt or 
even that guilt is more probable than not, but rather, probable 
cause requires that "'the information lead a reasonable officer 
to believe that guilt is more than a possibility.'"  Id. at 348-
49 (citation omitted).  In other words, probable cause exists 
when the officer has "reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person is committing or has committed a crime."  Id. at 348 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 968.07(1)(d)). 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
8 
 
¶15 The alleged traffic violation at issue here is Wis. 
Stat. § 346.05, "Vehicles to be driven on right side of roadway; 
exceptions," which prohibits a person from operating left of 
center.  It provides as follows: 
(1) Upon all roadways of sufficient width the 
operator of a vehicle shall drive on the right half of 
the roadway and in the right-hand lane of a 3-lane 
highway, except: 
(a) When making an approach for a left turn under 
circumstances in which the rules relating to left 
turns require driving on the left half of the roadway; 
or 
(b) When 
overtaking 
and 
passing 
under 
circumstances 
in 
which 
the 
rules 
relating 
to 
overtaking and passing permit or require driving on 
the left half of the roadway; or 
(c) When the right half of the roadway is closed 
to traffic while under construction or repair; or 
(d) When 
overtaking 
and 
passing 
pedestrians, 
animals or obstructions on the right half of the 
roadway; or 
(e) When 
driving 
in 
a 
particular 
lane 
in 
accordance with signs or markers designating such lane 
for traffic moving in a particular direction or at 
designated speeds; or 
(f) When the roadway has been designated and 
posted for one-way traffic, subject, however, to the 
rule stated in sub. (3) relative to slow moving 
vehicles. 
¶16 In this case, the officer testified that he was 
sitting at a stop sign when the defendant turned left onto the 
road directly ahead of where the officer was sitting.  The 
officer immediately began following the car and his view was not 
obstructed at any time.  The defendant initially turned into the 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
9 
 
correct lane of traffic.  However, the defendant subsequently 
"swerved" into the left lane of traffic and that resulted in the 
defendant's vehicle being three-quarters left of the center of 
the road, which was identified by a black strip of tar.   
¶17 Based on this testimony, we conclude that the police 
officer had probable cause to believe a traffic code violation 
had occurred, namely operating left of center pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.05, and therefore, the traffic stop was reasonable.  
The officer watched as the defendant drove left of center, and 
as a result, the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic 
violation was being committed.  Moreover, the circuit court 
concluded, and we agree, that none of the exceptions to this 
statute apply.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.05(a)—(f).  That is, there 
was nothing that required the defendant to drive left of center. 
¶18 The defendant argues that he was not "driving" on the 
wrong side of the road given that he only "momentarily" crossed 
the center of the road.  While "drive" is not defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 346.05, that word is defined elsewhere in chapter 346.  
See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 46:6 (7th ed. 2007) (asserting that 
identical terms generally have the same meaning whereas unlike 
terms generally have different meanings).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 346.63(3)(a) provides: "'Drive' means the exercise of physical 
control over the speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it 
is in motion."  The defendant's actions are consistent with this 
definition, and thus, he was driving left of the center of the 
road in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.05(1).  The State posits 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
10 
 
an interesting question with regard to the defendant's claim 
that he was not driving; if the defendant was not driving in the 
left lane, what was he doing?  This question itself reflects the 
inherent flaw with the defendant's argument.   
¶19 The defendant argues that this interpretation will 
lead to a situation whereby "thousands of drivers" could be 
pulled over every day "if one tread of tire moves over the 
centerline for even one millisecond."  The United States Supreme 
Court responded to a similar argument in Whren.  In that case, 
the defendants similarly asserted "that the 'multitude of 
applicable traffic and equipment regulations' is so large and so 
difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of 
violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever 
they wish for a stop."  The Court appropriately responded: 
But we are aware of no principle that would allow us 
to decide at what point a code of law becomes so 
expansive and so commonly violated that infraction 
itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the 
lawfulness of enforcement.  And even if we could 
identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what 
standard 
(or 
what 
right) 
we 
would 
decide, 
as 
petitioners 
would 
have 
us 
do, 
which 
particular 
provisions 
are 
sufficiently 
important 
to 
merit 
enforcement. 
For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely 
is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the 
traditional 
common-law 
rule 
that 
probable 
cause 
justifies a search and seizure. 
Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19. 
¶20 The defendant also argues, as he did at the circuit 
court, that the officer in this case was not in position to 
observe the defendant's "brief swerve" into the wrong lane of 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
11 
 
traffic.  The circuit court, however, concluded that the officer 
would have been in position to make the requisite observations 
because the officer was directly across the street and nothing 
blocked his view.  We review the circuit court's findings of 
fact under the "clearly erroneous standard."  Therefore, "we are 
bound not to upset the trial court's findings of historical or 
evidentiary fact unless they are contrary to the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Turner, 136 
Wis. 2d 333, 343, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  We find no reason to 
conclude that the facts as found by the circuit court are 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
considered 
the 
defendant's 
photographs and heard testimony from the officer and the 
defendant who each described the area in question.  Despite the 
defendant's challenges, the circuit court concluded that the 
officer could make the observations in question, and we conclude 
that its findings are on firm footing.   
¶21 Accordingly, the traffic stop was reasonable because 
the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation 
had occurred, namely operating left of center. 
B. Reasonable suspicion 
¶22 In addition to the officer having probable cause that 
a 
traffic 
violation 
had 
occurred, 
the 
officer 
also 
had 
reasonable suspicion the defendant was operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated.  The defendant, however, asserts there is too 
little evidence to establish such reasonable suspicion, but we 
agree 
with 
the 
State 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
12 
 
circumstances, the officer did have reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle.   
¶23 Even if no probable cause existed, a police officer 
may still conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that 
a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed.  
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605.  The officer "'must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' 
the intrusion of the stop."  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10, 301 
Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634 (citation omitted).  "'The crucial 
question is whether the facts of the case would warrant a 
reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and 
experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was 
committing, or is about to commit a crime.'"  Id., ¶13 (citation 
omitted).  An "officer's inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 
or hunch," however, will not give rise to reasonable suspicion.  
Id., ¶10 (citations and quotations omitted). 
¶24 In Post, we concluded that the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to believe the defendant was operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated, but we concluded that weaving within a single 
lane of traffic, by itself, does not establish reasonable 
suspicion.  Id., ¶¶26-27.  The officer, in Post, observed the 
defendant driving partially in an unmarked parking lane at 
9:30 p.m.  Id., ¶4.  The officer began following the defendant 
and observed the defendant's car traveling in a smooth "S-type" 
pattern with the vehicle coming within six to eight feet of the 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
13 
 
curb when it moved towards the right part of the parking lane 
and then coming within 12 inches of the center line when it 
moved back to the left.  Id., ¶5.  This deviation resulted in 
the defendant's car moving approximately ten feet from right to 
left within the lane of traffic.  Id.  The officer testified 
that the pattern was repeated several times over the course of 
two blocks, but the "movement was neither erratic nor jerky, and 
the car did not come close to hitting any other vehicles or to 
hitting the curb at the edge of the parking lane."  Id. 
¶25 We concluded that while "'any one of these facts, 
standing alone, might well be insufficient'" for reasonable 
suspicion, when "such facts accumulate, and 'as they accumulate, 
reasonable inferences about the cumulative effect can be 
drawn.'"  Id., ¶37 (citation omitted).  We determined that under 
the totality of the circumstances, there were "specific and 
articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, g[a]ve rise to the reasonable suspicion 
necessary for an investigative stop."  Id.  The defendant "was 
weaving across the travel and parking lanes, that the weaving 
created a discernible S-type pattern, that Post's vehicle was 
[driving] in[] the parking lane, and that the incident took 
place at night."  Id. 
¶26 In the case at hand, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated.  Similar to the specific and articulable facts 
observed by the officer in Post, the officer in this case made 
the following observations over the course of approximately one 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
14 
 
block at 1:30 a.m.: The defendant was driving with three-
quarters of the vehicle left of the center of the road; the 
vehicle then moved back into the proper lane but almost hit the 
curb; the defendant's vehicle then faded back towards the middle 
of the road and nearly struck the median.  Under the totality of 
the circumstances, we conclude that the accumulation of these 
facts gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant 
was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.   
¶27 The defendant, relying on Post, argues that the 
officer's observations did not support reasonable suspicion 
because the observations were too few and not detailed enough.  
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive because under our 
totality of the circumstances approach, there was ample proof 
adduced to justify reasonable suspicion.  Therefore, the 
potential inadequacies set forth by the defendant do not 
undermine 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
other 
facts 
that 
support 
reasonable suspicion.  Moreover, the facts of this case support 
a reasonable suspicion determination even more than those facts 
from Post, given that in this case the officer observed a 
traffic code violation, the events took place at 1:30 a.m., the 
events occurred within one block, and there was erratic driving.  
As a result, the defendant's assertions and his reliance on Post 
do not support his argument. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶28 We conclude that the police officer had probable cause 
to believe a traffic code violation had occurred, namely 
operating left of center, and also that the officer had 
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
15 
 
reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was operating a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated.  Therefore, the traffic stop 
was constitutional, and thus, the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence should be denied. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No. 
2008AP446-CR   
 
 
 
1