Case Title: Roch v. Mollica

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12517

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12517 
 
CAROLINE ROCH  vs.  DAVID J. MOLLICA & another.1 
 
 
 
Worcester.     October 2, 2018. - January 4, 2019. 
 
Present (Sitting at Worcester):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Jurisdiction, Personal, Nonresident.  Due Process of Law, 
Jurisdiction over nonresident.  Practice, Civil, Motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 11, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by James G. Reardon, Jr., J., 
and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Traver Clinton Smith, Jr., for the plaintiff. 
 
Paul E. Mitchell for the defendants. 
 
Jennifer A. Creedon & Meghan L. Morgan, for Massachusetts 
Defense Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Donna Z. Mollica. 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. The plaintiff, Caroline Roch, a New Jersey 
resident, sued defendants David and Donna Mollica, New Hampshire 
residents, in Superior Court for negligence.  The claim arose 
out of an incident in Florida.  A deputy sheriff served both 
defendants with in-hand process in Worcester.  The defendants 
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (2), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  A Superior 
Court judge allowed the motion to dismiss; the plaintiff 
appealed.  The judge also denied the plaintiff's motion for 
reconsideration.  We transferred the appeal from the Appeals 
Court on our own motion.2 
 
We conclude that, as a matter of both State common law and 
due process, Massachusetts courts have personal jurisdiction 
                                                          
 
 
2 Judgment on the defendants' motion to dismiss was entered 
on August 8, 2017.  On August 15, 2017, the plaintiff served on 
the defendants a motion for reconsideration of defendants' 
motion to dismiss. On August 28, 2017, the plaintiff filed the 
motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss and a notice 
of appeal.  The motion for reconsideration was decided in 
September 2017.  Because the plaintiff did not file a new notice 
of appeal after the motion for reconsideration had been decided, 
she failed to comply with Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a), as amended, 464 
Mass. 1601 (2013).  We nevertheless decide the appeal.  On the 
compressed time frame here, the concerns underlying rule 4 (a) 
are not implicated:  no action on the appeal had yet been taken 
before the motion for reconsideration was decided. See Anthony 
v. Anthony, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 299, 301 (1985) ("There [is] 
little point in having an appeal work its way up the ladder from 
a judgment which might be altered").  The appeal has been 
briefed and argued, and we transferred it here to address the 
important issue that it presents. 
3 
 
 
over nonresident individuals who are served with process while 
intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in Massachusetts.3  
Because the defendants here were served under these 
circumstances, we reverse the judge's order allowing the 
defendants' motion to dismiss and remand to the Superior Court 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.4 
 
Background.  "When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
adducing facts on which jurisdiction may be found. . . . In 
considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, we accept as true the essential uncontroverted 
facts that were before the judge" (citation, alteration, and 
quotations omitted).  SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
3 Our holding applies only to individuals.  We do not 
address whether presence in the forum State when served with 
process confers personal jurisdiction over corporations.  Cf. 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (finding that 
foreign corporation was not "subject to suit [in forum State] on 
claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything 
that occurred or had its principal impact in [forum State]"); 
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 637 (2d Cir. 2016) 
("federal due process rights likely constrain an interpretation 
that transforms a run-of-the-mill registration and appointment 
statute into a corporate 'consent' . . . to the exercise of 
general jurisdiction by [S]tate courts"); Martinez v. Aero 
Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) ("Burnham [v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 
U.S. 604 (1990),] does not authorize tag jurisdiction over 
corporations"). 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. 
4 
 
 
324, 325 n.3 (2017), quoting Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 
321 (2007). 
 
The uncontested facts are as follows.5  The plaintiff was a 
freshman member of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute softball 
team.  The defendants are the parents of the team's head coach.  
During a spring training trip to Florida, the team and coaches 
visited with the defendants at a house the defendants had 
rented.  The house had a swimming pool.  As part of an 
initiation ritual, without warning, upperclassmen members of the 
team pushed the freshman members into the pool.  The plaintiff 
hit and injured her shoulder on the edge of the pool.  According 
to the complaint, the defendants "negligently allowed a 
dangerous act of initiation or hazing to be imposed upon" the 
plaintiff and "negligently failed to obtain or seek immediate 
medical attention and/or medical advice for" her.  The 
defendants were served with process while attending a softball 
game at Worcester State College in Worcester. 
 
The judge held a nonevidentiary hearing on the defendants' 
motion to dismiss.  At the hearing, plaintiff's counsel 
contended that the Superior Court had personal jurisdiction over 
the defendants because the defendants were served in 
                                                          
 
 
5 We take these facts from the complaint and, to the extent 
they are favorable to the plaintiff, from the defendants' 
memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. 
5 
 
 
Massachusetts.  The judge responded that service of process is 
conceptually distinct from personal jurisdiction, and suggested 
that personal jurisdiction was improper here because the 
plaintiff's case had no connection to Massachusetts.  The judge 
allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss in a summary order, 
reasoning, "Personal service on the Defendants does not confer 
jurisdiction on the court." 
 
Discussion.  Massachusetts courts have personal 
jurisdiction over any person "domiciled in" the Commonwealth,  
G. L. c. 223A, § 2, and, in certain circumstances, over 
nonresidents.  The plaintiff argues that under the common-law 
rule of transient jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant's mere 
presence in the forum State when served with process confers 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.6  See Burnham v. 
                                                          
 
 
6 The plaintiff also contends that there is a statutory 
basis for transient jurisdiction here.  We disagree.  The 
Legislature has codified transient jurisdiction in the context 
of support orders and parentage disputes.  See G. L. c. 209D, 
§ 2-201 (a) (1).  But other statutes that seem to confer 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants present in 
Massachusetts are inapposite, as they pertain to venue or 
service of process.  See G. L. c. 223, § 1 ("If neither party 
lives in the commonwealth, the action may be brought in any 
county"); G. L. c. 223, § 2 (district courts "shall have 
jurisdiction of a transitory action against a defendant who is 
not an inhabitant of the commonwealth, if personal service or an 
effectual attachment of property is made within the 
commonwealth; and such action may be brought in any of said 
courts in the county where the service or attachment was made"); 
G. L. c. 227, § 1 ("A personal action shall not be maintained 
against a person not an inhabitant of the commonwealth unless he 
6 
 
 
Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 629 n.1 (1990) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (defining "transient jurisdiction" as 
"jurisdiction premised solely on the fact that a person is 
served with process while physically present in the forum 
State").  We recognized common-law transient jurisdiction as 
early as the Nineteenth Century.  In Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 
Mass. 217, 220 (1870), we observed, "When the party is in the 
state, however transiently, and the summons is actually served 
upon him there, the jurisdiction of the court is complete, as to 
the person of the defendant."  This was identified as "the 
general rule of the common law."  Id.  See Ehrenzweig, The 
Transient Power of Personal Jurisdiction:  The "Power" Myth and 
Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289, 293-294 (1956) (contesting 
transient jurisdiction's historical origins but conceding that 
"there was true transient jurisdiction" in Peabody v. Hamilton).  
See also Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400, 402 (1843) (defendant 
"personally within [the State's] jurisdiction" is "liable to the 
jurisdiction of a court of the State"). 
 
However, we also have stated that, "[f]or a nonresident to 
be subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts, there must 
be a statute authorizing jurisdiction and the exercise of 
jurisdiction must be 'consistent with basic due process 
                                                          
 
or his agent . . . has been served with process in the 
commonwealth . . ."). 
7 
 
 
requirements mandated by the United States Constitution.'"  
Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 210, 215 (2010), quoting Intech, Inc. v. 
Triple "C" Marine Salvage, Inc., 444 Mass. 122, 125 (2005).  
Caplan v. Donovan, 450 Mass. 463, 465, cert. denied, 553 U.S. 
1018 (2008), quoting Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 
378 Mass. 1, 5-6 (1979) ("[j]urisdiction is permissible only" if 
both "authorized by statute" and "consistent with basic due 
process requirements").  The only personal jurisdiction statute 
that could possibly apply here is the long-arm statute, G. L. 
c. 223A, § 3, which requires that the "cause of action . . . 
aris[e] from" at least one of a list of acts or omissions 
related to Massachusetts.7  But, as the plaintiff in essence 
conceded in oral argument, the long-arm statute does not confer 
personal jurisdiction here.  Instead, the plaintiff contends 
that the long-arm statute need not be satisfied because the 
defendants were served with process in Massachusetts. 
                                                          
 
 
7 Other statutes conferring personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants are scattered throughout the General 
Laws.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 104, § 9 (personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident wholesalers); G. L. c. 110A, § 414 (h) (personal 
jurisdiction over those who violate Uniform Securities Act); 
G. L. c. 159C, § 12 (personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who 
violate telemarketing solicitation laws); G. L. c. 201A, § 2 (b) 
(personal jurisdiction over custodians under Uniform Transfers 
to Minors Act); G. L. c. 203B, § 4 (c) (personal jurisdiction 
over custodial trustees under Uniform Custodial Trust Act); 
G. L. c. 209D, § 2-201 (a) (personal jurisdiction over 
nonresidents in support order and parentage proceedings). 
8 
 
 
 
The Appeals Court has implicitly addressed the tension 
between common-law transient jurisdiction, on the one hand, and 
the requirement that personal jurisdiction be conferred by 
statute, on the other, by stating that the long-arm statute does 
not apply when there is in-State service of process.  See 
Schinkel v. Maxi-Holding, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45 (1991) 
("There is no need to predicate jurisdiction over [defendant] on 
the long-arm statute.  Jurisdiction over his person was 
conferred by service of process in Boston").  Because we have 
not yet addressed this tension ourselves, we take the 
opportunity to clarify that, as a matter of both State common 
law and due process, Massachusetts courts have personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals who are served with 
process while intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in 
Massachusetts.8 
 
1.  Legislative intent.  We first consider whether the 
numerous statutes that address personal jurisdiction have 
supplanted the common-law rule of transient jurisdiction and 
                                                          
 
 
8 Our personal jurisdiction cases, which address the due 
process clause but not the Massachusetts Constitution, indicate 
that the Massachusetts Constitution provides the same level of 
protection as the due process clause with regard to personal 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 
479 Mass. 312, 314 (2018) (not mentioning Massachusetts 
Constitution and stating that personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendant "must satisfy . . . the requirements of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution"). 
9 
 
 
conclude that they have not.  "[W]e should not interpret a 
statute 'as effecting a material change in or a repeal of the 
common law unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed.'"  
Brear v. Fagan, 447 Mass. 68, 72 (2006), quoting Pineo v. White, 
320 Mass. 487, 491 (1946), superseded on other grounds by G. L. 
c. 209, § 1.  We are not aware of a statute that expressly 
repeals common-law transient jurisdiction, and "[w]e decline to 
interject such an intent into the plain language of" the 
jurisdictional statutes.  Page v. Commissioner of Revenue, 389 
Mass. 388, 392 (1983) (discussing Uniform Commercial Code).9  We 
acknowledge that an intent to repeal the common law "need not be 
explicitly stated in the statute."  Reading Co-Op. Bank v. 
Suffolk Constr. Co., 464 Mass. 543, 549 (2013).  However, we 
                                                          
 
 
9 The Legislature has eliminated expressly transient 
jurisdiction in the context of modifying support orders.  
General Laws c. 209D, § 2-201 (a) (1), codifies transient 
jurisdiction with regard to support orders and parentage 
disputes.  However, G. L. c. 209D, § 2-201 (b), states that 
"[t]he bases of personal jurisdiction set forth in subsection 
(a) or in any other law of the commonwealth may not be used to 
acquire personal jurisdiction . . . to modify a child support 
order of another state unless" other statutory requirements are 
met.  That the Legislature has limited the use of transient 
jurisdiction with regard to modifying support orders is evidence 
that it has not eliminated transient jurisdiction as a general 
matter. 
 
10 
 
 
have not found any authority implicitly repealing transient 
jurisdiction.10 
 
2.  The common-law rule.  We also decline to repeal our 
common-law rule as it applies to defendants who are 
intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in the Commonwealth.  
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 627-628 (opinion of Scalia, J.) 
(affirming lower court's exercise of transient jurisdiction as 
matter of due process but observing that "[n]othing we say today 
prevents individual States from limiting or entirely abandoning 
the in-state-service basis of jurisdiction"). 
                                                          
 
 
10 The Legislature did not implicitly repeal common-law 
transient jurisdiction when it enacted the long-arm statute in 
1968.  See St. 1968, c. 760.  The long-arm statute established a 
list of ways to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants, and presence in Massachusetts was not included on 
that list.   However, statutes conferring personal jurisdiction 
through implied consent and presence already existed when the 
Legislature enacted the long-arm statute.  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 90, § 3B, inserted by St. 1923, c. 431, § 2 (implicitly 
appointing in-State agent for service of process for any driver 
involved in an "accident or collision" in Massachusetts); G. L. 
c. 223, § 38, inserted by St. 1906, c. 269 (discussing service 
of process on foreign corporations).  If the Legislature 
intended the long-arm statute to be comprehensive, it would have 
been effectively abolishing these other statutes.  But the 
Appeals Court has held, and we agree, that at least one of these 
laws continues to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.  
See Campbell v. Frontier Fishing & Hunting, Ltd., 10 Mass. App. 
Ct. 53, 55 (1980) ("[G. L. c. 223, § 38,] is independently 
viable and has not been supplanted by G. L. c. 223A").  See also 
In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 
280, 300 n.43 (D. Mass. 2003) ("Massachusetts provides an 
alternative statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation through its 'soliciting business' statute, 
[G. L.] c. 223, § 38").  Therefore, we do not read the long-arm 
statute to be an exclusive list. 
11 
 
 
 
"[T]he mere longevity of the rule does not by itself 
provide cause for us to stay our hand if to perpetuate the rule 
would be to perpetuate inequity.  When the rationales which gave 
meaning and coherence to a judicially created rule are no longer 
vital, and the rule itself is not consonant with the needs of 
contemporary society, a court not only has the authority but 
also the duty to reexamine its precedents rather than to apply 
by rote an antiquated formula."  Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 
628 (1976).  Nevertheless, "adhering to precedent is our 
preferred course" (quotation omitted).  Shiel v. Rowell, 480 
Mass. 106, 108 (2018), quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991).  A consistent common law creates predictability, 
Shiel, supra, and predictability is especially important in 
areas, such as personal jurisdiction, "in which reliance upon 
existing judicial precedent often influences individual action" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 109. 
 
According to the United States Supreme Court, the rule of 
transient jurisdiction is well established across the country.  
In Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628, the Supreme Court upheld as 
constitutional the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant who was served with process while visiting 
the forum State.  Although the Supreme Court issued multiple 
opinions in the Burnham case, none of which garnered a majority 
or a plurality of votes, all nine Justices agreed that transient 
12 
 
 
jurisdiction is widely accepted among the States.11  See id. at 
610 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("Among the most firmly established 
principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is 
that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents 
who are physically present in the State"); id. at 635-636 
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("however murky the jurisprudential 
origins of transient jurisdiction, . . . American courts have 
announced the rule for perhaps a century"); id. at 640 (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (basing opinion in part on "the historical 
evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia"). 
 
In addition, we are unwilling to repeal the common-law rule 
because, where personal jurisdiction is based solely on a 
defendant having been served with process while intentionally, 
knowingly, and voluntarily in the Commonwealth, a judge still 
has discretion to protect a defendant by dismissing the case 
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, thereby allowing a 
case to be tried elsewhere.  See Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. 
Hernandez, 480 Mass. 462, 472-473 (2018) (describing forum non 
conveniens); Pulte Computer Corp. vs. Debus, Boston Mun. Ct., 
App. Div. No. 132666 (Dec. 14, 1990) (considering forum non 
                                                          
 
 
11 Justice Scalia's opinion of the Court was joined by two 
Justices in whole and by Justice White in part.  Justice White 
wrote his own concurring opinion, as did Justice Stevens.  
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion joined by three other 
Justices. 
13 
 
 
conveniens after finding personal jurisdiction based on 
defendant's presence in Massachusetts when served with process).  
See also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
("any burdens that do arise [from transient jurisdiction] can be 
ameliorated by a variety of procedural devices").12 
 
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the argument that 
transient jurisdiction is an outdated vestige of the era in 
which personal jurisdiction was based solely on State control 
over people and property within its territory.  Under this view, 
personal jurisdiction is now based on fairness, and transient 
jurisdiction is not "fair."  Here, the defendants argue that 
"the plaintiff urges the Court to turn back the clock . . . and 
bow to tradition, disregarding contemporary notions of due 
process requiring that litigation in the forum be foreseeable by 
                                                          
 
 
12 The defendants here argue for dismissal on grounds of 
forum non conveniens.  But they did not raise this issue below, 
and the forum non conveniens inquiry is fact-intensive.  See 
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 407 Mass. 572, 
577 (1990) ("A decision whether to dismiss an action under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens . . . depends greatly on the 
specific facts of the proceeding before the court").  Therefore, 
we do not address this argument on the limited record before us.  
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 413 Mass. 
730, 734-735 (1992) ("A prevailing party is . . . entitled to 
argue on appeal that the judge was right for the wrong reason, 
even relying on a principle of law not argued below.  If, 
however, the new argument depends on facts not established in 
the record, we cannot accept the new argument on appeal").  Cf. 
Gianocostas v. Interface Group-Mass., Inc., 450 Mass. 715, 716, 
723-727 (2008) (conducting forum non conveniens analysis when 
issue was raised below and relevant affidavits were in record). 
14 
 
 
the defendant."  However, transient jurisdiction is no more 
onerous than the Massachusetts long-arm statute, the validity of 
which the defendants here do not question.  A nonresident 
defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts 
courts under the long-arm statute will suffer the same hardship 
as a nonresident defendant who must litigate in Massachusetts 
after being served with process in the Commonwealth. 
 
Additionally, we adopt Justice Brennan's approach to "the 
fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule" in the Burnham 
case.  Burnham, 495 Mass. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
Although Brennan's analysis occurred in the due process context, 
it explains why transient jurisdiction is fair to defendants.  
"The transient rule is consistent with reasonable 
expectations . . . ."  Id. at 637.  "By visiting the forum 
State, a transient defendant actually avails himself . . . of 
significant benefits provided by the State.  His health and 
safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emergency 
medical services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and 
waterways; he likely enjoys the fruits of the State's 
economy . . ."; and he may sue in the State's courts (quotation 
omitted).  Burnham, supra at 637-638, quoting Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).  There is nothing unfair 
about subjecting to the State's judicial processes someone who 
benefits from these services.  Id. at 638 ("Without transient 
15 
 
 
jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise:  A transient would have 
the full benefit of the power of the forum State's courts as a 
plaintiff while retaining immunity from their authority as a 
defendant").  Finally, "modern transportation" and "procedural 
devices" such as forum non conveniens, discussed supra, mean 
that "[t]he potential burdens on a transient defendant are 
slight" (alteration and quotation omitted).  Id. at 638-639, 
quoting Burger King Corp., supra at 474. 
 
On balance, the weakness of the arguments in favor of 
abolishing transient jurisdiction, our general reluctance to 
modify the common law, the United States Supreme Court's 
analyses of transient jurisdiction among the States, and the 
availability of forum non conveniens result in our decision to 
reaffirm the common-law rule of transient jurisdiction for 
defendants who are intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in 
the Commonwealth.  See Shiel, 480 Mass. at 112 (declining "to 
fell judicial precedent").  Here, the defendants were served 
with process while attending a softball game in Massachusetts.  
Therefore, they were served while knowingly and voluntarily 
visiting the Commonwealth for a particular purpose, namely, to 
attend a sporting event.  Personal jurisdiction over them was 
proper as a matter of State law. 
 
3.  Due process.  Finally, we address whether exercising 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies due process.  
16 
 
 
See SCVNGR, Inc., 478 Mass. at 330 (clarifying that 
constitutional inquiry should follow, rather than precede, 
State-law analysis).  Guided by the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in the Burnham case, we conclude that it does.  
In the Burnham case, 495 U.S. at 628, the Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed the lower court's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction "based on the fact of in-state service of process."  
The reasoning of the various opinions makes clear that at least 
eight of the Justices on the Burnham court would uphold the 
constitutionality of transient jurisdiction over defendants who 
are intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in the forum State 
when served with process.  See id. at 619 (opinion of Scalia, 
J.) ("jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes 
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of 
our legal system");  id. at 628 (White, J., concurring) ("claims 
in individual cases that the [transient jurisdiction] rule would 
operate unfairly as applied to the particular nonresident 
involved need not be entertained.  At least this would be the 
case where presence in the forum State is intentional, which 
would almost always be the fact"); id. at 640 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) ("In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was 
served with process while voluntarily and knowingly in the State 
17 
 
 
of California.  I therefore concur in the judgment").13  As 
already discussed, the defendants here were served while 
intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in Massachusetts to 
watch a softball game.  Therefore, personal jurisdiction over 
them also satisfies due process.14 
 
Conclusion.  Because personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants comports with both State law and due process, the 
order of the Superior Court allowing the defendants' motion to 
dismiss is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
13 Because Justice Stevens did not base his conclusion on 
any particular doctrinal framework, we do not address his 
analysis.  See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 
 
14 Although not necessary to our decision, other undisputed 
connections between the defendants and Massachusetts are 
apparent from the record.  The defendants hosted the softball 
team of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), which is 
located in Massachusetts, at the defendants' property in 
Florida, and the alleged tort occurred during the team's visit. 
The WPI team had traveled to Florida during a "similar" trip in 
the past, although it is unclear whether they visited the 
defendants on that earlier trip.  The defendants' daughter 
coached the WPI team at the time of the alleged tort.  And the 
defendants were served with process while attending a softball 
game at Worcester State College.