Case Title: Samuel Jason Derrick v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1559 
____________ 
 
SAMUEL JASON DERRICK,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1380 
____________ 
 
SAMUEL JASON DERRICK,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 7, 2008] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Samuel Jason Derrick was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death for the 1987 killing of Rama Sharma.  In this postconviction proceeding, he 
 
appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction 
and sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions 
this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const.  For all the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s 
denial of postconviction relief and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The pertinent facts of this case were set forth in this Court’s opinion on 
direct appeal as follows: 
On June 25, 1987, at 6:30 a.m., Harry Lee found the body of 
Rama Sharma in a path in the woods near Sharma’s Moon Lake 
General Store in Pasco County.  Blood trailed from the body to a 
blood puddle twenty feet away.  The police found a piece of a tee shirt 
near the body as well as two sets of tennis shoe prints, one set 
belonging to Harry Lee.  The medical examiner found that Sharma 
had died from over thirty-one stab wounds and that he had died 
approximately ten to fifteen minutes after the last wound was 
inflicted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Derrick was implicated in the murder by his friend, David 
Lowry.  At trial Lowry testified that he and his wife visited Derrick on 
June 24 at Derrick’s mother’s house and that Derrick had knives out.  
Lowry drove Derrick to another friend’s house, at which time Lowry 
noticed that Derrick had a knife in the back of his pants.  At the time, 
Derrick was wearing a tee shirt, jeans, and tennis shoes. The friend’s 
house was about two blocks from Sharma’s store.  At approximately 
1:30 a.m. on June 25, Derrick showed up at Lowry’s house in a 
sweaty condition and without a shirt.  When Lowry drove Derrick 
home, Derrick told him that he had robbed the Moon Lake General 
Store.  Derrick gave Lowry twenty dollars for gas.  Later that day, 
after Lowry heard that Sharma had been killed, he asked Derrick 
whether he had killed him.  Derrick admitted killing Sharma, stating 
that he had stabbed him thirteen times because Sharma kept 
screaming.  Lowry testified that Derrick “kind of laughed and said it 
2 
was easy.”  Lowry also noted that on June 25 Derrick had a new car 
that was worth approximately $200-$300.  On June 29, Lowry 
notified the sheriff’s department about Derrick’s involvement in the 
murder.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After being arrested and advised of his rights, Derrick denied 
any knowledge of the murder to Detective Vaughn.  Vaughn then 
advised Derrick that they had a witness, David Lowry.  After denying 
that Lowry had told them anything, Derrick demanded, “I’d like to 
have him in front of me.  Let him tell me.”  Vaughn then brought 
Lowry and Derrick into the same room and Derrick confessed to the 
murder.  He stated that he went to Sharma’s store to rob it and jumped 
Sharma as he left the store.  Sharma turned to run back to the store.  
When Derrick grabbed him, Sharma turned around and saw that it was 
Derrick.  Sharma started screaming and Derrick stabbed him “to shut 
him up.”  Derrick then took approximately $360 from Sharma’s 
pocket.  Derrick also admitted that he tore off a piece of his tee shirt at 
the scene because it had blood on it.  After the murder, Derrick threw 
the knife into the woods and ran to Lowry’s house.  Derrick also 
stated that he lost the money and that he threw his shoes and some 
clothing into a pond.  The police took Derrick to the Moon Lake 
General Store, and he showed them where he had attacked and 
murdered Sharma.  The police never located the clothing, shoes, or 
knife.  
Derrick v. State, 581 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 1991).  The jury found Derrick guilty of 
first-degree murder.  During the penalty phase, Derrick presented witnesses who 
testified that he was a good husband, father, and human being and that he had 
suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child.  The jury recommended death by an 
eight-to-four vote.  In following the jury’s recommendation and sentencing Derrick 
to death, the judge found four aggravators1 but only one statutory mitigating 
                                          
 
1.  The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) the murder 
was committed in the course of a robbery; (2) the murder was committed to avoid 
arrest; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) 
3 
circumstance—the defendant was twenty years old at the time of the murder.  The 
judge did not find any nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  See id. at 34. 
  
On direct appeal, Derrick raised nine issues.2  This Court affirmed the 
conviction for first-degree murder.  However, the Court reversed Derrick’s death 
sentence based on its conclusion that the testimony offered by the State during the 
penalty phase from Randall James, a jailhouse informant, was impermissible and 
prejudicial because it suggested Derrick would kill again.  The Court affirmed on all 
other guilt-phase issues and discussed one other penalty-phase issue,3 but declined 
to address any other issues concerning the penalty phase.  See id. at 36-37. 
                                                                                                                                        
the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP).  
Derrick, 581 So. 2d at 34. 
 
2.  Derrick argued that: (1) the trial court did not make an adequate inquiry 
under Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971), into the prosecution’s 
discovery violation; (2) the jury received highly prejudicial, irrelevant testimony 
which tainted the penalty recommendation; (3) he was denied a fair trial by being 
shackled throughout the proceedings; (4) he was denied a fair trial because the 
court did not inquire about jurors’ exposure to prejudicial media coverage; (5) the 
trial court erred in limiting the defense’s cross-examination of several State 
witnesses; (6) the trial court erred in overruling defense objections to the State’s 
improper closing arguments; (7) he was denied the right to a fair penalty 
recommendation when the court rejected his proposed jury instructions; (8) the 
court’s instructions on HAC were unconstitutionally vague; and (9) the imposed 
death sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution because the court applied improper aggravating 
circumstances and excluded existing mitigating circumstances.   
 
3.  The Court concluded that it was inconsistent for the trial court to find 
both CCP and the avoid arrest aggravators.  Derrick, 581 So. 2d at 36-37. 
 
4 
 
At the second sentencing hearing, Derrick presented several witnesses who 
testified as to his positive traits and helpful nature.  Unlike the first penalty phase, 
there was no evidence presented of Derrick’s terrible childhood or the 
circumstances of his sexual abuse.  The jury recommended the death penalty by a 
seven-to-five vote.  The trial judge again found substantial aggravation, 
specifically that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery, 
the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest, and the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Unlike the first sentencing, the trial court 
did not find the CCP aggravator applicable.  As to mitigation, the trial court once 
again found the statutory mitigator of age and, in addition, found the nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstance of potential for rehabilitation as follows: 
[T]he defendant has met the standard of “reasonable certainty” in 
establishing that the defendant has some potential for rehabilitation.  
Although the defendant has only recently been given an opportunity to 
assist other inmates in their efforts to become literate, the defendant’s 
past assistance of his learning handicapped brother combined with the 
testimony of Nanci Denamen from the Scwettman Adult Education 
Center, tends to indicate that the defendant actually is well motivated 
in this regard and is not simply taking advantage of an opportunity to 
make himself look somewhat better to the sentencing jury and the 
Court. 
However, finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, 
the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Derrick to death.
 
On his direct appeal after resentencing, Derrick raised seven claims all 
5 
related to the penalty phase.4  This Court, finding that each issue raised was 
without merit, affirmed the sentence of death.  The postconviction process then 
began with the initial filing of a “shell” rule 3.850 motion in 1997, Derrick’s first 
amended motion for postconviction relief in 1998, and his second amended motion 
in December 2001.  Six claims were raised and the trial court summarily denied all 
of the claims except for counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence at the 
second penalty-phase proceeding, Derrick’s subclaim that counsel failed to present 
evidence of other suspects, and Derrick’s cumulative error claim.5  Following an 
                                          
 
4.  This Court addressed four issues in detail: (1) whether the trial court 
erred in responding to a jury inquiry regarding a tie vote; (2) whether the court 
erred in instructing the jury on the aggravating factors that the killing occurred 
during the course of a robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain; (3) whether 
the court erred in finding that the killing was committed to avoid or prevent a 
lawful arrest; and (4) whether the court erred in finding that the crime was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Derrick v. State, 641 So. 2d 378, 379-81 
(Fla. 1994).  The remaining claims were: (1) the trial court erred in failing to 
consider all nonstatutory mitigating factors; (2) the court erred in finding that the 
killing was committed in perpetration of a felony; and (3) the death penalty was 
disproportionate to the crime.  Id. at 381 n.4.  The Court found these claims 
meritless.  Id. at 381. 
 
5.  Derrick asserted that: (1) he was denied access to files and records 
pertaining to his case in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial and at the guilt phase; (3) the State 
withheld material and exculpatory evidence or presented misleading evidence or 
both; (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase; (5) 
resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a mental health expert; 
and (6) he was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial because of the cumulative 
error present during the proceedings. 
6 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a detailed order denying relief and 
Derrick now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
A.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: 
first, the defendant must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient; 
second, the defendant must establish that counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant.  See Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 320 (Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); Mendoza v. State, 964 So. 2d 121, 127 (Fla. 
2007); Philmore v. State, 937 So. 2d 578, 583 (Fla. 2006). 
 
To establish the deficiency prong under Strickland, the defendant must prove 
that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional 
norms.”  Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688).  To establish the prejudice prong under Strickland, the defendant 
must prove that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).   
7 
 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). 
1.  SUMMARY DENIAL OF GUILT-PHASE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
 
We begin with the issue of whether the trial court erred in summarily 
denying Derrick’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the guilt 
phase.  Generally, a defendant in a rule 3.850 motion filed in a capital case is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless: “(1) the motion, files, and records in the 
case conclusively show that the [defendant] is entitled to no relief, or (2) the 
motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.”  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000); accord Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d).6  In such a case, “[t]he 
defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally 
valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden.”  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1061.  However, when reviewing a court’s summary denial 
                                          
 
6.  Although Derrick’s second amended motion was filed in December 2001, 
his first amended rule 3.850 motion was filed in December 1998, before the rule 
change.  See generally Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(a) (“This rule . . . shall apply to all 
postconviction motions filed on or after October 1, 2001, by prisoners who are 
under sentence of death.  Motions pending on that date are governed by the version 
of this rule in effect immediately prior to that date.”).  Therefore, we analyze 
Derrick’s claims under the summary denial standard set forth in rule 3.850(d). 
8 
of an initial rule 3.850 motion filed in a capital case, the Court will affirm the 
ruling only if the State has shown that the motion is legally flawed or that the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is entitled to no relief.  See 
Patton v. State, 784 So. 2d 380, 386 (Fla. 2000).  This Court must accept Derrick’s 
allegations as true “to the extent they are not refuted by the record.”  Peede v. 
State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).   
 
a.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Derrick’s Confession 
 
In his first claim, Derrick contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the evidence presented at his suppression hearing by: (1) 
failing to call lay and expert witnesses, such as a “confessionologist”; and (2) 
failing to impeach the State’s witness.  In sum, Derrick asserts that his alleged 
confession to Detective Vaughn was given under police coercion and that the 
techniques used during questioning could lead to false confessions.  The trial court 
denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim because Derrick failed to establish a 
basis for suppression of the confession.      
 
As to the failure to call a “confessionologist,” Derrick specifically claims 
that a “confessionologist” would have testified that the techniques used during 
Derrick’s confession could lead to false confessions; thus, the confession should be 
9 
suppressed.7  We rejected a similar claim in Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 
2005).  There, Bryant claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to obtain a false confession expert.  Id. at 821.  Bryant neither provided 
proposed testimony nor claimed to have retained a confession expert.  Id.  Instead, 
Bryant concluded that an expert could testify that “[Bryant’s] confession is typical 
of those which are false.”  Id. at 821-22 (alteration in original).  This Court held 
that such a claim was legally insufficient.  Id. at 822.  Likewise, Derrick’s claims 
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present testimonial 
evidence from the “confessionologist” are legally insufficient.  We reject the claim 
as we did in Bryant because Derrick does not provide specific factual allegations 
regarding the “confessionologist’s” testimony.  In making this determination, we 
also deem it important that Derrick does not allege that his confession to Detective 
Vaughn was actually false.8    
 
Derrick also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective at the suppression 
hearing for failing to impeach the State’s witness by: (1) failing to present evidence 
                                          
 
7.  We question whether the testimony of an expert “confessionologist” 
would even be admissible but do not reach that decision in this postconviction 
proceeding.  See Beltran v. State, 700 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) 
(questioning whether expert testimony regarding the voluntariness of a confession 
is ever admissible). 
 
8.  We also reject Derrick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
call lay witnesses at the suppression hearing because Derrick has failed to allege 
how such testimony would have led to the suppression of his confession. 
10 
that Derrick did not waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966); (2) failing to challenge the inconsistencies in Detective Vaughn’s 
testimony; and (3) failing to cross-examine Vaughn about his interrogation 
techniques.  As to this ineffective assistance claim, Derrick first asserts that he 
never waived his Miranda rights; therefore, any statements made to Detective 
Vaughn should have been suppressed.  Derrick emphasizes that he never signed the 
Statement of and Waiver of Miranda Rights.  However, an unsigned waiver form 
does not necessarily equate to a failure to waive Miranda rights.  See Sliney v. 
State, 699 So. 2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the failure to sign a Miranda 
form in full does not necessarily invalidate the waiver).  Here, Detective Vaughn 
testified that Derrick was read his Miranda rights, a fact Derrick does not dispute.  
Further, in response to the question of whether he understood his rights, Derrick 
replied in the affirmative and stated that he would talk to the officers.   
Second, Derrick asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the inconsistencies in Detective Vaughn’s testimony.  In summarily 
denying this aspect of Derrick’s claim, the trial court found that the inconsistencies 
between witness statements would not have led to suppression of Derrick’s 
confession.  Derrick has not identified any significant disparities between 
statements and we conclude independently that none of the identified 
inconsistencies would have led to the suppression of the confession as either 
11 
coerced or involuntary.  Third, as to the adequacy of the cross-examination of 
Detective Vaughn, we agree with the trial court that any cross-examination of 
Detective Vaughn would go to credibility and not admissibility.9   
We agree with the summary denial because, even assuming counsel had 
taken the steps proposed by Derrick, there was no legally cognizable basis to 
suppress Derrick’s confession and hence no prejudice.  Without an allegation of 
falsity in this case, any proposed testimony offered by the “confessionologist” 
would not have affected the trial court’s ultimate decision as to the admissibility of 
the confession.  There is nothing about the circumstances of Derrick’s confession 
that suggest it was coerced, involuntary or otherwise inadmissible, especially in 
light of the testimony of David Lowry, to whom Derrick initially confessed.10  In 
short, we conclude that no prejudice has been established as a matter of law, based 
on the record in this case, and nothing that Derrick has alleged would alter the 
                                          
 
9.  Additionally, Derrick asserts that counsel was rendered ineffective 
regarding the confession due to the State’s misconduct in failing to provide 
complete police reports.  With regard to Derrick’s allegation of incomplete police 
reports, trial counsel was made aware of Detective Vaughn’s partial report at the 
time of the initial trial and the report was then filed in the trial court.  Any claim of 
error regarding misconduct in providing an incomplete report should have been 
raised on direct appeal.  Further, as for any claim of ineffectiveness, Derrick has 
not identified any information in any other police report that would have led to 
suppression of his confession. 
 
10.  Moreover, the record contains the psychological evaluation conducted 
by Dr. Nancy Simons who noted that it is “highly unlikely that [he] would be 
easily manipulated by the police or confused in being questioned by the police.” 
12 
conclusion that the confession was voluntary and admissible.  Accordingly, this 
claim is conclusively refuted by the record. 
b.  Ineffective Assistance Regarding Jailhouse Informant Randall James 
 
The next guilt-phase issue of ineffective assistance of counsel concerns trial 
counsel’s handling of the proposed testimony of jailhouse informant Randall 
James.  The background facts pertinent to this issue are set forth in our opinion on 
Derrick’s first direct appeal:  
After the defense had presented two witnesses, they announced 
that they were calling Derrick to testify.  At this point, the prosecutor 
announced that if Derrick testified that he had not committed the 
murder, he planned to call in rebuttal an inmate named Randall James.  
The prosecutor said that, after the first defense witness began to 
testify, he had received a note informing him that Detective Vaughn 
had just been told by James that Derrick told James that he had killed 
Sharma and that he would kill again.  The prosecutor offered to make 
James available for a deposition. 
 
 
 
 
Derrick’s attorneys, who were public defenders, requested a 
recess to determine what to do because their office also represented 
James and they were therefore concerned about the implications of 
cross-examining James.  The prosecutor indicated that it was his 
understanding that James was willing to waive the attorney-client 
privilege.  After the recess, the judge removed the public defender’s 
office from representing James in an effort to alleviate the conflict.  
Continuing to express concern over the dual representation, Derrick’s 
attorneys made a motion for mistrial which was denied.  They then 
decided to rest without calling Derrick as a witness.  The jury found 
Derrick guilty.  Derrick’s attorneys took James’s deposition while the 
jury was deliberating. 
Derrick, 581 So. 2d at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).   
13 
As to the specifics of James’s testimony, the State alleged that James would 
testify to the following conversation, in which James asked the defendant, “What 
are you in here for?”  Derrick said, “Murder” to which James allegedly asked him, 
“Did you do it?”  The State further alleged that Derrick responded, “Yeah, I killed 
the motherfucker and I may kill again.”  Based on that representation by the State, 
trial counsel made a decision not to call Derrick, thereby avoiding this potentially 
devastating testimony in the guilt phase.  Trial counsel ultimately deposed James 
before the penalty phase and discovered that James had a history of mental illness 
and was moved to the psychiatric ward after the alleged conversation with Derrick.  
Derrick cites a number of reasons for counsel’s ineffectiveness as to this issue, 
including: the failure of trial counsel to depose James until after the conclusion of 
the guilt phase; an allegation that the jury overheard the substance of James’s 
proposed testimony; and an alleged conflict of interest because Derrick’s attorney 
from the Public Defender’s Office was also representing James in a separate 
matter. 
 
To put this issue in proper context, it is important to stress that James never 
testified at the guilt phase because trial counsel decided not to call his client to 
testify when faced with his damaging testimony.  Further, Derrick never alleges 
what he would have testified to if called to the stand and, given his confession, it is 
difficult to understand how his testimony would have been helpful to his defense.  
14 
Moreover, this Court previously reviewed trial counsel’s conduct in dealing 
with James’s rebuttal testimony on direct appeal.  In fact, we rejected the claim 
that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Richardson inquiry after the State 
revealed James as a potential witness.  Derrick, 581 So. 2d at 34.  In rejecting the 
claim, this Court stated that trial counsel “made a tactical decision to rely upon the 
prosecutor’s representations of what James’s testimony would be and advised 
Derrick not to testify.”  Id. at 35.  By finding that this issue had previously been 
considered on direct appeal, the lower court correctly held that Derrick’s claim 
should be denied.  In essence, Derrick’s claim is procedurally barred because it “is 
merely a variant of the issues raised on direct appeal.”  Jones v. State, 949 So. 2d 
1021, 1033 (Fla. 2006).   
 
Even assuming that trial counsel’s failure to depose James rather than rely 
on the prosecutor’s representations could be considered unreasonable, there is no 
basis to conclude that the failure to call Derrick in light of James’s extremely 
damaging testimony was an unreasonable strategy.  Although it is true that counsel 
could have deposed James and obtained potentially valuable impeachment 
evidence regarding his mental illness, impeachment alone would not have 
eliminated the damage that could have resulted from James’s proposed testimony 
that Derrick admitted: “Yeah, I killed the motherfucker and I may kill again.”  To 
the contrary, if trial counsel had called Derrick to testify and thus opened the door 
15 
for James’s damaging testimony, Derrick might well have had a valid claim that it 
was unreasonable strategy to allow him to testify.   
Further, we conclude as a matter of law that prejudice has not been 
established, i.e., our confidence in the outcome of the guilt phase has not been 
undermined.  Had James testified in the guilt phase, such statements would only 
have added to the existing incriminating evidence against Derrick, including 
Lowry’s testimony that Derrick admitted to the murder and Derrick’s own 
confession.  Importantly, none of the alleged claims of ineffectiveness would affect 
the admissibility of James’s testimony, only the ability to impeach James if he had 
testified.  Further, as stated previously, Derrick fails to allege in his postconviction 
motion what he would have testified to had he taken the stand in his own defense.  
In short, Derrick has failed to establish a basis for either deficiency or prejudice.  
Therefore, summary denial was proper because the record conclusively shows that 
Derrick is entitled to no relief.    
 
As to Derrick’s assertion that the substance of James’s testimony was  
announced in open court, the record affirmatively indicates that the jury was 
removed from the courtroom before any discussion of James’s testimony took 
place.  Derrick has not alleged any facts that would refute the record, showing that 
the jury was in the courtroom when James’s testimony was discussed or that the 
jury overheard that testimony.  Further, considering the overwhelming evidence of 
16 
guilt, including Derrick’s own confession, prejudice has not been established as a 
result of these alleged deficiencies in not deposing James in the guilt phase. 
 
Lastly, as to Derrick’s claim that James’s proposed testimony should have 
been excluded from the guilt phase because he and Derrick were represented by the 
same counsel, this claim should have been raised on direct appeal and is therefore 
procedurally barred.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 661 (Fla. 2000) 
(supporting trial court’s finding that conflict of interest claim should have been 
raised on direct appeal and was procedurally barred because the facts that formed 
the basis of the claim were known to the defendant at the time of the direct appeal).  
However, because the right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the 
right to conflict-free counsel, Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 786, 791 (Fla. 2002), we 
also examine this claim on the merits.  
 
In a motion for postconviction relief, a defendant must establish both that 
there was an actual conflict of interest and that the conflict adversely affected 
counsel’s performance.  See id.; Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059, 1065 (Fla. 
1999).  However, in this case, once the trial court removed counsel from 
representing James, any actual conflict of interest was eliminated.  Further, even 
assuming an actual conflict existed, the defendant must also allege how the conflict 
adversely affected counsel’s performance.  See Hunter, 817 So. 2d at 791.  As to 
this prong, Derrick alleges that counsel’s faulty advice not to testify arose from a 
17 
conflict of interest.  However, we reject as a matter of law the claim that a conflict 
of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance for the same reasons we 
previously discussed in concluding that no prejudice could have resulted from the 
failure to depose James earlier.  In short, even if counsel had advised Derrick to 
testify, James’s rebuttal testimony would have been extremely damaging to 
Derrick’s defense and there has been no allegation of how Derrick’s proposed 
testimony would have in fact assisted his defense. 
We likewise reject Derrick’s claim that the State’s notice regarding the 
proposed guilt-phase testimony of Randall James amounted to prosecutorial 
misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  First, on direct appeal, we rejected that there 
was a Richardson violation in the trial court’s treatment of Randall James’s 
proposed testimony.  See Derrick, 581 So. 2d at 35 (“We have never before held 
that a defendant was prejudiced by the late listing of a witness who never testifies 
at trial, and we decline to do so now.”).  Second, there cannot be a Giglio violation, 
which involves the knowing presentation of false testimony, because James never 
testified.  Third, for the same reasons that we concluded that Derrick has not 
suffered prejudice from the proposed testimony of Randall James, Derrick has not 
established materiality under Brady.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
682 (1985) (expressly applying the Strickland standard of “reasonable probability” 
18 
to Brady cases); Cardona v. State, 826 So. 2d 968, 973 (Fla. 2002).  Because of the 
foregoing, the trial court was correct in finding that this claim did not warrant an 
evidentiary hearing and we affirm the denial. 
 
c.  Ineffective Assistance Regarding Knife and Blood Evidence 
 
Derrick’s final allegations of error regarding the guilt-phase ineffective 
assistance claims that were summarily denied involve the following: trial counsel’s 
failure to object to the State’s closing argument about the type of knife that was 
used on the victim; the failure of trial counsel to object to the testimony of State 
witnesses Calhoun and Page; and trial counsel’s failure to attack blood evidence 
found at the crime scene.  
 
As to the first aspect of this claim, the State argued in its closing argument 
that the medical examiner, whom the State called as a witness, “made a mistake” in 
determining that the murder weapon was a single-edged blade because the photos 
of the victim’s wounds plainly showed that the blade used was double-edged.  In 
summarily denying this claim, the trial court found the closing arguments proper, 
stating that Derrick was seen with both single and double-edged knives and 
admitted to using a double-edged knife during the murder.  We agree that there 
was nothing improper about this closing argument for the same reasons; 
accordingly, the trial court did not err in summarily denying the claim that trial 
counsel was deficient in failing to object.  See Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 
19 
997 (Fla. 2006) (finding that the prosecutor’s statements were proper and therefore 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object could not be established). 
 
As to the claim of failure to object to the admissibility of the testimony of 
State witnesses Calhoun and Page regarding blood splatter evidence, neither 
witness’s testimony amounted to expert opinion.  Both witnesses were crime scene 
technicians and testified as to their observations, such as the location and position 
of the body and its distance from a trail of blood found on a pathway.  Because 
trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to object to properly admissible 
testimony, see id., summary denial of this claim was also proper.  
 
Finally, Derrick alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an 
expert to examine a bloody T-shirt found at the crime scene and analyze actual 
blood evidence and the videotape of the crime scene.  The trial court found that it 
was unnecessary for counsel to obtain an independent analysis of the blood 
evidence because there was no suggestion that the blood did not belong to the 
victim or that anyone else bled in the vicinity of the crime scene.  Further, Derrick 
did not allege how an independent analysis of the videotape or bloody T-shirt 
would demonstrate prejudice.  We agree with the trial court that the allegations do 
not provide a basis for a finding of deficiency or prejudice.  However, we note that 
subsequent to his rule 3.850 motion, Derrick filed in the trial court a motion for 
postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 
20 
3.853.  The State did not oppose the motion and the trial court granted the testing.  
The items to be tested include the bloody shirt, but also include a partially eaten 
hot dog, a sample from a blood drop found under a nearby picnic table, and 
fingernail scrapings from the victim.  Accordingly, although we affirm the 
summary denial of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the 
blood evidence and videotape, we do so without prejudice to consideration of the 
separate DNA proceedings in the trial court. 
2.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF PENALTY-PHASE COUNSEL 
 
We now turn to the claims of ineffective assistance of penalty-phase 
counsel, which were denied by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing.   
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s 
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 
771-72; see also Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]his Court’s 
standard of review is two-pronged: (1) this Court must defer to the circuit court’s 
findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial evidence supports 
them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the deficiency and 
prejudice prongs.”) (citing Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999)).  
Derrick alleges that resentencing counsel failed to investigate and present a 
21 
significant amount of mitigating evidence to the jury, including the failure to 
present lay witnesses to testify concerning the deprivations in Derrick’s early life 
and the sexual abuse he endured as a child.  Derrick also asserts that counsel was 
ineffective by failing to present a mental health expert to testify to statutory and 
nonstatutory mitigation.  To put this claim into its proper context, we will review 
the testimony presented at the initial penalty phase, at the resentencing, and at the 
evidentiary hearing on Derrick’s motion for postconviction relief.   
 
During the initial penalty phase of Derrick’s trial, defense counsel presented 
the testimony of a total of five witnesses, including three family members, who 
testified that Derrick was a good husband, father, and person and that he had 
suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child.  Derrick, 581 So. 2d at 34.  Although 
Derrick received a psychological evaluation, counsel did not present any mental 
health testimony.  As to the childhood sexual abuse, defense counsel only 
presented the testimony of one witness, Harry Martin, the foster parent who had 
committed the abuse.  Notwithstanding all of this testimony, the trial court found 
only Derrick’s age as a statutory mitigator and found no other nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances applicable, including Derrick’s abusive childhood.  The 
jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four and the trial court followed the 
recommendation.    
22 
 
At resentencing, newly appointed defense counsel presented the testimony 
of eight witnesses, including two family members, who each testified as to 
Derrick’s positive traits.11  Similar to the initial penalty phase, counsel did not 
present any mental health mitigation.  Cherie, Derrick’s wife at the time of the 
crime who also was a witness at the initial penalty phase, testified that Derrick was 
a good husband.  Travis Derrick, Derrick’s older brother, testified about growing 
up with Derrick and about his positive qualities.  Defense counsel focused on 
Derrick’s positive attributes and good nature but did not, however, present any 
testimony regarding the childhood conditions or abuse suffered by Derrick.  
Although counsel presented the testimony of family members who could have 
testified regarding the physical and sexual abuse, specifically his brother Travis, 
defense counsel did not ask questions of any of these witnesses regarding the 
abuse.  Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found 
that Derrick was “quite young” at the time of the killing and that 
Derrick has some potential for rehabilitation. The court also found 
that Derrick had helped illiterate inmates in prison and had helped his 
handicapped brother. 
Derrick, 641 So. 2d at 379 (footnote omitted).  The jury recommended death by a 
vote of seven to five and the trial court followed that recommendation. 
                                          
 
11.  For instance, Robert D’Antonio, a deputy sheriff, testified that Derrick 
became a tutor at the jail to teach other inmates to read, and Charlotte Wise, a 
neighbor, testified that Derrick would do anything asked of him for her family.  
23 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Derrick presented the testimony of several 
witnesses, including family members and a mental health expert, to support his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from resentencing; specifically, 
defense counsel’s failure to present evidence of Derrick’s impoverished childhood 
and sexual abuse and failure to present a mental health expert.  Carolyn Haney, 
Derrick’s sister, testified about their poor upbringing, their mother’s drug use and 
Derrick’s role as her protector.  Travis Derrick testified regarding the sexual abuse 
he and his brother suffered at the hands of their foster parent and about Derrick’s 
willingness to help Travis with his schoolwork.  Cherie Derrick also testified 
regarding Derrick’s loving and kind nature.  Additionally, other family members 
testified at the evidentiary hearing, including: Samuel Derrick, Derrick’s younger 
brother, who testified that Derrick once saved him from drowning; and Victoria 
Marion, Derrick’s mother, who found out from another adult that her sons were 
being sexually molested by Martin.   
 
Dr. Henry Dee, who completed neuropsychological testing and an evaluation 
of Derrick in 2001, testified that Derrick had impaired memory functioning and 
impaired frontal lobe functioning, which is associated with difficulty in inhibiting 
one’s responses.  He testified that these impairments indicated that Derrick was 
“suffering a major mental disturbance that is brain damage with mixed features.”  
However, Dr. Dee could not establish what caused the impairments or when the 
24 
impairments began.  Although he learned from family members of an abusive 
childhood, he testified that the sexual abuse would have had no effect on Derrick’s 
mental impairment.  His school records did not reveal any significant educational 
problems and there was no history of mental health treatment.  As for the statutory 
mental health mitigators, Dr. Dee testified that Derrick “would have difficulty in 
conforming his conduct to the dictates of the law because of the extreme 
impulsivity that [he sees] in patients with this type of brain damage,” but did not 
explain how the brain damage he diagnosed specifically affected the crime in 
question.   
 
Robin Kester, one of the two defense attorneys at resentencing, testified as 
to her review of the record in the case, including the initial penalty phase and the 
testimony presented therein, and her reasons for not presenting evidence of 
Derrick’s abuse and mental health mitigation to the jury.  In rebuttal, the State 
presented the testimony of Robert McClure, counsel from Derrick’s initial trial.  
McClure testified as to his preparation for the initial penalty phase, including the 
fact that he interviewed Derrick’s mother and that his notes indicated he spoke 
with Derrick’s sister, but decided to use only Derrick’s father at the first penalty 
phase.   
 
Regarding the failure to put on mitigation about his childhood, the trial court 
acknowledged the deplorable circumstances of Derrick’s childhood in its detailed 
25 
order denying this claim, as portrayed through the testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing.  This included the uncontradicted testimony of sexual abuse.  However, 
the trial court ultimately rejected this claim.  The trial court essentially determined 
that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision, with input from Derrick, to 
forego any focus on his neglected childhood and childhood sexual abuse, and 
pursue a strategy to “go positive.”  The trial court concluded that counsel’s strategy 
was reasonable, stating in pertinent part: 
The result of the first penalty phase was a jury recommendation for 
death, by a vote of 8 to 4.   
Apparently as a result of the perceived failure of the tactics 
utilized in the first penalty phase in this case, the defendant decided 
that those tactics should be abandoned in the second penalty phase 
and instructed counsel in the second penalty phase to “go positive” 
during the second penalty phase.  In short, the defendant wished to 
abandon the tactic of attempting to demonstrate that he should be 
spared a death recommendation due to the deplorable circumstances 
of his upbringing, including his victimization by a pedophile.  This 
would appear to be a reasonable course of conduct based upon the 
disappointing results achieved in the first penalty phase. . . .  
Although the second penalty phase jury ultimately recommended 
death, the final vote improved to 7 to 5 and the jury nearly 
recommended life by a vote of 6 to 6.   
. . . .  
The defendant’s attorneys in the second penalty phase 
proceeding were well aware of the attempts made by the defendant’s 
attorneys in the first penalty proceeding to develop mental health 
evidence to assist the defendant.  The evidence presented to the court 
demonstrates that these efforts failed and, although they were not 
repeated by the attorneys in the second penalty phase proceeding, 
there appears to have been no reason to expect that further efforts 
along the lines would have any better chance of succeeding. 
 
(Citation omitted.)   
26 
Derrick’s claim must be analyzed in light of the fact that this was a 
resentencing and that his counsel, in preparing for the second penalty phase, had 
the advantage of analyzing the first penalty phase, which resulted in a sentence of 
death.  See Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 685 (Fla. 2003) (“Retrial counsel . . . 
testified that when he undertook Henry’s representation, he obtained and 
familiarized himself with all the files from the previous trial, including the mental 
health examinations, reports, depositions, and trial transcripts.”).  In other words, 
this is not a case involving the failure of counsel to discover mitigation but rather a 
case involving trial counsel’s strategic decision not to present certain mitigation 
after having had the opportunity to review the initial penalty phase and the first 
jury’s death recommendation.  Thus, we distinguish this case from our other 
decisions where we held counsel to be ineffective for failing to investigate and 
discover mitigating evidence.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1996) 
(noting that counsel did not obtain records which contained information about 
defendant’s mental problems); Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 1995) 
(stating that counsel was unaware of defendant’s psychiatric hospitalizations and 
suicide attempts).   
 
Attorney Kester testified that she had the advantage of watching the guilt 
phase and reviewing the case files from the Public Defender’s office.  She was 
aware that the first jury heard information about the details of Derrick’s childhood 
27 
and had recommended the death penalty; therefore, she considered other options.  
In this regard, we again note that at the initial trial, counsel presented evidence of 
Derrick’s childhood sexual abuse through the testimony of the abuser, Harry 
Martin.  The State recognized the molestation but argued that it was not traumatic 
for Derrick because he continued to be associated with Martin after Martin was 
released from prison.  The trial court did not find this abuse to be a mitigating 
factor.12  Although the childhood sexual abuse was undoubtedly traumatic, there 
was no evidence established at the initial trial or the evidentiary hearing as to how 
it affected Derrick as he became a young adult.  Therefore, Kester’s decision not to 
pursue this line of mitigation and to adopt a different strategy could be considered 
reasonable.  Arguably, it might have been deemed unreasonable to pursue the same 
strategy with the awareness that such tactics were unsuccessful the first time they 
were used.  Cf. Henry, 862 So. 2d at 686 (“[R]etrial counsel had the advantage of 
knowing that the strategy Henry proposes failed at the first trial, where despite the 
mental health mitigation testimony of the two defense experts, the trial court found 
no mitigation, and the jury . . . recommended death.”).   
Nevertheless, we emphasize that the failure to obtain a life recommendation 
in an initial penalty-phase proceeding should not be the sole factor in counsel’s 
decision not to present the same mitigating evidence at a resentencing.  Our focus 
                                          
 
12.  We did not address Derrick’s claim on his first direct appeal that the 
trial court erred in failing to find the sexual abuse as a mitigating circumstance. 
28 
is on “whether counsel’s decision not to present such evidence was a reasonably 
informed, professional judgment.”  Id. at 685 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 522-23 (2003)).  Here, Kester’s decision was not made out of ignorance.  
While Derrick asserts that Kester’s “deficiency is also rooted in her failure to 
investigate,” counsel was indeed aware of the abuse Derrick suffered and his poor 
living conditions, but selected another approach she considered viable.   
First, although Kester did not reinterview witnesses from the first penalty 
phase, she performed additional investigation.  She then used two original penalty-
phase witnesses and several new witnesses to support her “go positive” strategy, 
speaking to each one before they testified at the resentencing.  In fact, as 
previously mentioned, Kester presented the testimony of eight witnesses, including 
two family members, who testified as to Derrick’s helpful nature; in effect, each 
portrayed Derrick in a positive light.  Moreover, not only did Kester review the 
case files from the initial trial, she also testified that she conferred with co-counsel 
about the presentation of the sexual abuse.   
Second, the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing supports the 
conclusion that Kester conducted a reasonable investigation, decided to adopt a 
strategy that focused on Derrick’s positive traits as opposed to the abuse he 
suffered, and introduced testimony at resentencing in accordance with that 
strategy.  Out of the eight witnesses presented by the defense at the evidentiary 
29 
hearing, only three could have specifically testified regarding Derrick’s abusive 
childhood—Carolyn, Victoria and Travis.   
As to Carolyn, Kester testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not 
know if she would have wanted Carolyn as a witness because there had been a 
juvenile criminal case alleging that Derrick committed a lewd and lascivious act 
upon her.  Presenting Carolyn’s testimony would have risked exposing the jury to 
this damaging testimony. 
As to Travis, Kester presented Travis as a witness at resentencing to testify  
about Derrick’s positive traits and specifically chose not to question Travis about 
the childhood abuse in accordance with her strategy.  Notably, Travis testified at 
the evidentiary hearing and recalled his conversation with the Public Defender’s 
office about the focus of his proposed testimony.  The following exchange took 
place:  
 
Mr. Rosario [assistant state attorney]:  Do you recall speaking 
with the Public Defender’s office and that he got a new sentencing 
phase and that he wanted to go positive at that second sentencing 
phase? 
 
Travis Derrick:  Yes. 
 
Mr. Rosario:  And they spoke to you about because he wanted 
to go positive, it was his decision to go positive, that they wanted you 
to bring out the good things that he had done in his life. 
 
Travis Derrick:  Yes. 
 
This colloquy further indicates that Kester was consciously following the 
strategy to “go positive.” 
30 
In addition to her own investigation and preparation, Kester also took into 
consideration Derrick’s request that counsel not present any evidence of his bad 
home life.  Although we reiterate that counsel is obligated to conduct a reasonable 
investigation even where a defendant requests that mitigation be waived, see State 
v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002), a defendant’s wishes can be a valid 
consideration in deciding on an appropriate trial strategy.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691 (“Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic 
choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.”).  
Here, Kester testified: “I didn’t let Jason [Derrick] run the show . . . .  I’m the 
attorney, and clients don’t run the show.  But . . . I didn’t think it was necessarily at 
the time a bad strategy.”  For all these reasons, we agree with the trial court that 
counsel’s decision not to present evidence of Derrick’s childhood abuse and to 
adopt a different strategy at resentencing was reasonable.  
 
After conducting a reasonable investigation into Derrick’s early life and the 
original trial, and considering the prior death recommendation, counsel followed 
Derrick’s proposed approach and made a strategic decision to focus on the positive 
attributes of Derrick’s life.  See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 
1998) (trial court’s finding that counsel made a strategic decision to “humanize” 
the defendant and present mental mitigation to the judge but not the jury was not 
erroneous); see also Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1250 (Fla. 2006) (finding 
31 
counsel conducted a reasonable investigation as evidenced by counsel’s awareness 
of the defendant’s childhood, substance abuse and mental health issues and 
counsel’s research into the work and research of former defense counsel).  
“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if 
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 
2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  
 
In conjunction with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
penalty phase, Derrick also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for not 
presenting mental health testimony.  Although a psychological evaluation was 
initially obtained before the first penalty phase, mental health evidence was not 
presented at the first penalty phase.  Resentencing counsel reviewed Dr. Nancy 
Simons’ report of Derrick’s psychological evaluation, in which he was diagnosed 
with antisocial personality disorder, and felt it was more harmful than helpful 
because it conflicted with testimony of Derrick’s kind nature.  See Burns v. State, 
944 So. 2d 234, 243-44 (Fla. 2006) (no error in trial court’s finding that mental 
mitigation would have contradicted lay witness testimony of defendant’s “role 
model” traits).  Furthermore, “this Court has acknowledged in the past that 
antisocial personality disorder is ‘a trait most jurors tend to look disfavorably 
32 
upon.’”  Reed, 875 So. 2d at 437 (quoting Freeman v. State, 852 So. 2d 216, 224 
(Fla. 2003)).   
 
Dr. Simons also stated in her report that if Derrick had committed the 
murder of Rama Sharma, “he would not have been suffering from a mental disease 
or defect and did have the cognitive ability to socially and morally understand the 
concept of right and wrong.”  At the evidentiary hearing, another mental health 
expert, Dr. Dee, stated that Derrick’s performance on the frontal lobe functioning 
test indicated that he has difficulty inhibiting responses and acts without sufficient 
thought or deliberation.  Although the purpose of Dr. Dee’s testimony was to 
establish mental health mitigation, counsel’s reasonable mental health mitigation 
investigation “is not rendered incompetent merely because the defendant has now 
secured the testimony of a more favorable mental health expert.”  Asay v. State, 
769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000).  Accordingly, Derrick has not established that 
counsel’s decision not to further pursue mental health mitigation was unreasonable 
under the circumstances of this case.   
  We also conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances of this case, 
that counsel’s performance at the resentencing was not deficient under Strickland.  
Because Derrick has failed to establish counsel’s deficient performance, it is not 
necessary for this Court to examine Derrick’s claim of prejudice.  Nevertheless, we 
consider whether prejudice has been established by any alleged deficiencies.  
33 
In this case, there were strong aggravating factors.  Specifically, the 
resentencing trial court found that: (1) the murder was committed during the 
commission of a robbery; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; and (3) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel.  This was a murder of a defenseless man who was killed after 
being robbed.  The killing was brutal and Derrick bragged about it to his friend 
after the robbery.  Even if counsel had offered evidence of Derrick’s childhood 
conditions, sexual abuse, and mental health testimony, it would have been quite 
difficult to overcome the strong aggravation.  Further, even though Dr. Dee’s 
testimony could have established some mental mitigation, it was not particularly 
compelling.  As previously mentioned, he testified only that the brain damage, 
diagnosed by him through neuropsychological testing, would have caused 
impulsivity because of damage to the frontal lobe and therefore Derrick would 
have difficulty conforming his conduct to the dictates of law.  However, he never 
specifically discussed how Derrick’s mental impairment would have affected this 
particular crime and never linked up any of the conditions of Derrick’s childhood 
or sexual abuse to the facts of this crime.  
We note that the vote of the jury during resentencing was seven to five—
close to the vote needed for a life recommendation. The jury’s vote in the first 
penalty phase, in which evidence of the deprived childhood and sexual abuse was 
34 
presented, was eight to four.  In this case, it is difficult to speculate whether the 
result of the resentencing would have differed if counsel had presented evidence of 
Derrick’s upbringing or mental health mitigation.  However, in order to sufficiently 
undermine this Court’s confidence in the outcome of the resentencing, Derrick 
must rely on more than mere speculation.  Accordingly, we conclude that Derrick 
has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  Because Derrick has failed to meet both 
prongs under Strickland, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Derrick’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
3.  CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Derrick contends that trial counsel’s numerous errors during the guilt and 
penalty phases deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial and that the lower court 
erred in finding that counsel’s actions were not improper.  Because this Court does 
not find individual error in any of Derrick’s claims, Derrick’s claim of cumulative 
error is also denied.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) (“Because 
the alleged individual errors are without merit, the contention of cumulative error 
is similarly without merit, and [the defendant] is not entitled to relief on this 
claim.”).   
B.  PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
In his habeas petition, Derrick raises two claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 
35 
appropriately presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. 
State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the Strickland standard, 
to grant habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must 
determine 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); accord Freeman, 761 So. 2d 
at 1069.  In raising such a claim, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a 
specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069.  “[C]laims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues 
that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.”  
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  “If a legal issue ‘would in 
all probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Id. (quoting Williamson v. 
Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).   
 
In his first habeas claim, Derrick contends that appellate counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the inaccuracies in the record, namely, 
36 
that the record mistakenly indicates that the jury was not present in the courtroom 
when the prosecutor made his remarks concerning the proposed rebuttal testimony 
of Randall James.  As in our discussion of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness on 
this issue, there is absolutely no indication that the record is incorrect.  Certainly, 
appellate counsel cannot raise an issue if the record is devoid of information 
indicating that the error occurred.  Further, Derrick does not allege that appellate 
counsel was even aware that the record might be incorrect or that he notified 
counsel of the inaccurate transcript.  Because Derrick has failed to demonstrate that 
appellate counsel’s conduct constituted deficient performance, we deny this claim. 
In his second habeas claim, Derrick asserts that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to appeal the State’s improper closing argument.  
Specifically, Derrick alleges that the State: (1) made an improper closing argument 
regarding expert testimony; and (2) erroneously argued that defense counsel had 
conceded Derrick was guilty of a lesser crime.  We deny this habeas claim because 
it is procedurally barred. 
First, Derrick alleges that during closing arguments, the prosecutor 
inappropriately provided testimony by disputing the medical examiner’s testimony 
regarding the murder weapon and victim’s time of death.  However, the record 
indicates that trial counsel did not object to the closing comments, thereby failing 
to preserve the issue for appellate review.  Thus, appellate counsel could not be 
37 
successful on appeal unless the argument was improper and constituted 
fundamental error.  See Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1205 (Fla. 2006).   
We have already rejected a similar claim regarding comments about the 
murder weapon in upholding the summary denial of Derrick’s challenge to trial 
counsel’s failure to object by determining these same closing arguments were not 
improper.  Additionally, as to the prosecutor’s disagreement with the medical 
examiner’s estimation of time of death, such an argument does not constitute 
fundamental error; that is, error that “reach[es] down into the validity of the trial 
itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.”  State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991) 
(quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  Accordingly, we reject 
any claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel regarding the State’s 
reference to the murder weapon and the victim’s time of death during closing 
argument.    
Second, Derrick asserts that the State erroneously argued that defense 
counsel conceded that Derrick was guilty of second-degree murder.  However, 
Derrick’s citation to the record incorrectly references the court’s discussion of 
Randall James as a rebuttal witness, instead of referencing the allegedly improper 
closing statement.  Therefore, this habeas claim is insufficiently pled.   
38 
Notwithstanding the insufficient pleading, Derrick’s allegation of improper 
argument is also procedurally barred.  In its response to Derrick’s petition, the 
State quotes the prosecutor’s closing argument, which stated: “So if you find that 
the defendant wasn’t going to commit a robbery here, and/or he didn’t intend 
consciously to kill Mr. Sharma, then you can look to Murder Two.”  During 
defense closing, trial counsel countered: “See if it’s [first degree murder] been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Some things have.  He [the prosecutor] proved 
that Rama was killed.  And that’s basically all he proved.  He hasn’t proved a 
robbery, and he sure as heck hasn’t proved Jason is involved.  That’s what he’s got 
to do.”  On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded: “Your job here today is to decide if 
this defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree.  And Defense Counsel 
conceded, you have to look for murder in the second degree or manslaughter.  
Your job is to determine if this defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree or 
not guilty.”  Trial counsel failed to object to either of the State’s comments 
regarding second-degree murder.  Again, we have consistently held that appellate 
counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to appeal unpreserved errors that do not 
rise to the level of fundamental error.  Here, the prosecutorial statements fail to 
constitute fundamental error.  As Derrick’s claim of error was not preserved and 
does not rise to the level of fundamental error, counsel had no obligation to raise it 
on appeal.  We thus deny this habeas claim.   
39 
40 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief and deny Derrick’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
To Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County,  
Stanley Richard Mills, Judge - Case No. 87-1775-CFAWS 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Harry P. Brody and Jeffrey M. Hazen of Brody and Hazen, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine V. Blanco, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent