Case Title: John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-335

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis1998 WY 24954 P.2d 1353Case Number: 96-335Decided: 02/27/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

JOHN Q. 
HAMMONS INC., d/b/a Sheridan Holiday Inn, a Missouri corporation, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Andrew POLETIS, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from The District Court, 
Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, J.

 

Rebecca A. Lewis (argued) 
and Scott W. Meier, Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellant 
(Defendant).

Donald J. Sullivan (argued), 
Sullivan Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, for Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Andrew Poletis sued the owner of the Sheridan 
Holiday Inn, John Q. Hammons Inc., for injuries he sustained while a guest at 
the hotel. Following a jury verdict in favor of Poletis, John Q. Hammons Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as Holiday Inn) moved for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial or reduction of the verdict. 
Holiday Inn now appeals the district court's denial of its motion. We 
affirm.

 

[¶2] Appellant Holiday Inn 
presents the following issue for our review:

 

1. Did the district court err in allowing the jury 
verdict to stand and not award [sic] a verdict notwithstanding the judgment, a 
new trial, or a reduction in the verdict amount?

 

[¶3] Appellee Poletis states 
the issues in this way:

 

1. Whether a party which presents no evidence at 
trial, and which argues the facts unsuccessfully to the jury and to the trial 
judge, may thereafter argue to this Court that the evidence should be 
reappraised here to support the party's view of the facts rather than the 
factual findings of the jury.

 

2. Whether this Court should create a rule of law 
requiring that the amount of actual damages must be limited to a specific 
multiple of the medical expenses, and should further apply such a rule 
retroactively.

 

                                  
            FACTS

 

[¶4] Poletis and his family, 
on vacation from their home in Michigan, checked into the Sheridan Holiday Inn 
on the night of July 25, 1993. The next morning when Poletis was showering, he 
grasped the hand bar to lower himself down into the bathtub. As he lowered 
himself, the bar came out of the wall and Poletis fell, hitting his lower back 
on the tub. Poletis declined medical care at that time, but upon returning home 
from vacation he visited Dr. Loren Meengs, an orthopedic surgeon, because he 
continued to experience pain in his low back.

 

[¶5] Dr. Meengs examined 
Poletis and reviewed his spine x-ray. He discovered that Poletis suffered from a 
congenital or long-standing problem of spondylolisthesis which, in his opinion, 
was not caused by the incident at the Holiday Inn. Dr. Meengs concluded, 
however, that Poletis suffered from a low back strain or contusion as a result 
of the fall, and he instructed Poletis to work on a gentle exercise program to 
stretch and strengthen the area. Poletis visited Dr. Meengs two other times, in 
June 1994 and again in August 1996, due to continuing back pain and discomfort. 
Both times, Dr. Meengs advised Poletis to continue his stretching and 
strengthening program as long as the pain and discomfort continued, and to use 
antiinflammatories to keep any pain under control.

 

[¶6] Poletis brought suit 
against Holiday Inn on April 12, 1995, alleging Holiday Inn's negligence 
resulted in injuries to his back. On October 9, 1996, the case was tried to a 
six-person jury. At trial, Poletis presented three witnesses: he and his wife 
testified in person, and the deposition testimony of Dr. Meengs was read to the 
jury. At the close of Poletis' case in chief, Holiday Inn moved for a judgment 
as a matter of law, arguing that Poletis had failed to introduce any evidence of 
Holiday Inn's negligence. After hearing argument from both parties, the court 
denied the motion. At that time the defense rested, choosing not to put on any 
witnesses. The jury found in favor of Poletis and awarded him $75,000. Holiday 
Inn filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial or reduction of the verdict. The court denied 
Holiday Inn's motion and entered a judgment on the jury verdict on October 25, 
1996. Holiday Inn timely appeals. 

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

 Motion 
for Judgment as a Matter of Law

 

[¶7] Holiday Inn moved for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, contending that the evidence presented at 
trial did not support a finding of negligence against Holiday Inn by the jury. 
Our standard of review is the same whether it arises in the procedural context 
of a motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to the submission of the case 
to the jury (formerly, a motion for a directed verdict) or in the context of a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury has returned a 
verdict (formerly, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).1 Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 62 
(Wyo. 1983). We undertake a full review of the record without deference to the 
views of the trial court. Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 609 (Wyo. 
1993). The test to be applied is whether the evidence is such that, without 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of 
the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable 
persons could have reached. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id. When the facts permit the 
drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose which will be 
utilized.  Big-O Tires, Inc. v. 
Santini, 838 P.2d 1169, 1176-77 (Wyo. 1992). Since a judgment as a matter of law 
deprives the party opposing the motion of a determination of the facts by a 
jury, it should be cautiously and sparingly granted. Cody, 658 P.2d  at 
61.

 

[¶8] In a negligence case, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving four elements: 1) a duty, 2) a violation 
thereof, 3) which violation is the proximate cause of, 4) injury to the 
plaintiff. Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 1995). The existence of a 
duty is a matter of law to be determined by the court. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER 
AND KEETON). The court determined the existence of a duty, and instructed the 
jury on the general standard of care Holiday Inn owed to Poletis: "An innkeeper 
must use ordinary care to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition for 
the purpose for which the property was reasonably intended." Since it is 
impossible to prescribe definite rules in advance for every combination of 
circumstances which may arise, the details of the standard are dependent on the 
facts in each particular case. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, § 37. Under our system 
of procedure, this question is to be determined in all doubtful cases by the 
jury. Id; RESTATEMENT, SECOND, TORTS § 328C cmt. b (1965) (jury is expected to 
determine what the general standard of conduct requires in the particular case 
and, therefore, to set a particular standard of its own within the general one). 
In this case, then, it was for the jury to determine, based on the evidence 
presented and with the background of ordinary human experience, whether Holiday 
Inn exercised ordinary care to keep the property in a reasonably safe 
condition.

 

[¶9] Negligence and 
proximate cause are never presumed from the happening of an accident, and mere 
conjecture cannot form the basis of liability. Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo. 1994). However, negligence, like other facts, can be proved 
by circumstantial evidence. THOMAS A. MOORE, EVIDENCE IN NEGLIGENCE CASES § 
5.2.4.1 (9th ed. 1991); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, § 39; RESTATEMENT, SECOND, 
TORTS, supra, § 328D cmt. b. Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts or 
circumstances from which the existence or non-existence of other facts may 
reasonably be inferred. Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 863 (Wyo. 1975) 
(suggesting jury instruction on circumstantial evidence). A reasonable 
inference, like the facts or circumstances on which the inference is based, is 
competent evidence and is not a mere presumption or guess. Kobielusz v. Wilson, 
701 P.2d 559, 562 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting 32A C.J.S. Evidence [§ 1341 (1996)]). 

 

[¶10] Poletis testified at 
trial that the bar came out of the wall when he put his weight on it. He stated 
that the wall where the bar came out was "punky soft" and that there was mold. 
Mrs. Poletis testified that when she came into the bathroom, she saw Poletis 
lying in the tub, with the bar in his hand, with the screw still in it. She 
stated that the "crumbled wall was all over the place" and tiles were missing. 
She described the wall where the bar detached as being "crumbly and rotted" and 
"mushy." Holiday Inn maintains that because there was no evidence of Holiday 
Inn's failure to maintain or inspect the bar, or that the bar was improperly 
installed or the wall improperly constructed, Poletis did not show that Holiday 
Inn violated its duty.

 

[¶11] The mere fact that the 
bar came out of the wall, causing Poletis to fall, is not sufficient to show 
that Holiday Inn breached its duty to keep the hotel room in reasonably safe 
condition. However, Poletis and his wife both testified that the wall was mushy, 
crumbly and rotted where the bar came out. From this testimony, a jury could 
reasonably infer that the condition of the wall had occurred over a sufficiently 
long period of time that Holiday Inn, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered and fixed the problem. "There are many known and obvious 
facts in the realm of common knowledge which speak for themselves, sometimes 
even louder than witnesses, expert or otherwise." Chapman v. Pollock, 69 N.C. 
App. 588, 317 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1984).  
Here, there was no expert testimony indicating the type of material 
behind the tiles or how long it would take to become crumbly and rotted. Even 
so, the jury could reasonably infer, based on common knowledge and ordinary 
human experience, that moisture had to have been accumulating behind the tiles 
for more than a short time for the wall to assume that appearance. Audas v. 
Montgomery Ward, Inc., 79 Or. App. 718, 719 P.2d 1334, 1335 
(1986).

 

[¶12] Viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Poletis, and giving him the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, we 
cannot say that reasonable persons could have reached but one conclusion, that 
Holiday Inn was not negligent. Therefore, the court did not err when it denied 
Holiday Inn's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

 

Motion for New Trial

 

[¶13] In the alternative to 
its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Holiday Inn moved for a new trial or 
a reduction of the verdict pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59(a). As grounds for obtaining 
a new trial, Holiday Inn argued that the verdict is not sustainable by 
sufficient evidence, W.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), and that the damages are excessive and 
not sustained by the evidence, W.R.C.P. 59(a)(4), (5). We address those 
arguments in turn.

 

 1. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶14] Different standards 
apply to a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law and a motion asking for a 
new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; 
a new trial motion is viewed more leniently. Cody, 658 P.2d  at 63-64. On a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court has no discretion whatsoever 
and considers only the question of law - whether there is sufficient evidence to 
raise a jury issue. Id. at 64. In contrast, a trial court is vested with broad 
discretion when ruling on a motion for new trial, and we will not overturn the 
court's decision except for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court 
should grant a new trial when the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict, or whenever in the exercise of sound discretion the judge thinks a new 
trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 
63.

 

[¶15] The trial court, like 
the jury, heard the evidence and observed the witnesses. The court, by denying 
Holiday Inn's motion for a new trial, indicated its belief that under the 
circumstances of this case the verdict was supported by the weight of the 
evidence and no substantial injustice would occur by upholding the jury's 
verdict.

 

[¶16] As we pointed out in 
our discussion of the motion for judgment as a matter of law, Poletis presented 
sufficient evidence to permit the jury to reach the issue of negligence. Poletis 
relied predominantly on circumstantial evidence to prove his case. However, 
circumstantial evidence is not evidence of a lower order; the law makes no 
distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Kobielusz, 701 P.2d  at 563; Blakely, 542 P.2d  at 862-63. The jury must 
find the facts according to a preponderance of the evidence. PROSSER AND KEETON, 
supra, § 39; Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 180 (Wyo. 1981). A preponderance of 
the evidence is that evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude that it 
is more likely than not that the event was caused by negligence. PROSSER AND 
KEETON, supra, § 39. We find no indication that the evidence presented was not 
credible. Holiday Inn made no attempt to impeach the witnesses or, for that 
matter, to put on any evidence at all.

 

[¶17] Viewing the record as 
described above, we cannot say that the verdict was unsupported by the weight of 
the evidence. Holiday Inn points out nothing beyond its claim of insufficient 
evidence to show that the court abused its discretion. We, therefore, uphold the 
trial court's ruling as a proper exercise of its 
discretion.

 

2. Damages

 

[¶18] The jury awarded 
Poletis $75,000 in compensatory damages. Holiday Inn contends that the verdict 
is outrageous and grossly excessive considering that Poletis only showed $400 in 
medical expenses actually incurred, no past or future wage loss, no future 
medical expenses, and very little evidence of pain and suffering or loss of 
enjoyment of life.

 

[¶19] As discussed in the 
previous section, the power to order a new trial is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1064 (Wyo. 1986). Where the law provides no specific measure for 
quantifying damages, the amount to be awarded rests almost totally within the 
discretion of the jury. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Richards, 702 P.2d 1272, 1278 
(Wyo. 1985). Both trial and appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with the 
jury's decision unless the award, by its excessiveness or inadequacy, denotes 
passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous basis. Id.

 

[¶20] At trial, the jury 
heard testimony from Poletis and his wife of the ongoing effects of the injury. 
Poletis testified that he experiences a great deal of pain in his back and legs 
when he sits for long periods in the car or stands for several hours, both of 
which are requirements for his job as a salesman. He testified that he can no 
longer run without aggravating his back. Mrs. Poletis testified that her husband 
is not able to walk with the family anymore because he gets sore. She stated 
that when he rides his bike it alleviates the pain, but that activity takes time 
away from the family. She also testified that he must sometimes rearrange his 
work schedule to avoid long-distance driving if his back is too achy or 
sore.

 

[¶21] The jury also heard 
Dr. Meengs' deposition testimony that Poletis could perform normal functions of 
daily living, but had to curtail more strenuous physical and recreational 
activities which he enjoyed. Dr. Meengs testified that, in his opinion, Poletis' 
pain was real, not feigned. Dr. Meengs noted that Poletis had had minimal back 
pain before the fall, and he expressed his belief that Poletis' current 
symptoms, persistent back pain of a greater degree of severity than he had 
previously experienced, were related to the fall. Dr. Meengs also stated that, 
although exercise alleviated the symptoms, Poletis was likely to continue to 
experience some pain and discomfort.

 

[¶22] Taken together, the 
evidence amply supports the $75,000 awarded by the jury, and we find no evidence 
that passion or prejudice influenced the award. The court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Holiday Inn's motion seeking a reduction of the 
verdict or a new trial because of excessive damages.

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶23] The evidence was 
sufficient to raise a jury issue as to whether Holiday Inn was negligent, and 
the court therefore properly denied Holiday Inn's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. The weight of the evidence supported both the verdict and the 
damages award, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Holiday Inn's motion for a new trial or reduction of the judgment. The 
judgment is affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

           
1The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
no longer use the terms "directed verdict" and "judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict." See W.R.C.P. 50. Both are now termed "judgments as a matter of law." 
See W.R.C.P. 50; WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 
2521 (1995). More precisely, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
is denominated a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 
50(b).