Case Title: State v. Dunn

Citation: 2012-Ohio-1008

Docket Number: 2011-0213

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Dunn, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1008.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1008 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DUNN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Dunn, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1008.] 
The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a person to render aid 
if they reasonably believe that there is an immediate need for their 
assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury. 
(No. 2011-0213—Submitted October 19, 2011—Decided March 15, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 23884,  
2010-Ohio-6340. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a person to render aid if 
they reasonably believe that there is an immediate need for their assistance 
to protect life or prevent serious injury. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether the community-
caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement allows the police to stop a driver based on a dispatch that the driver is 
armed and plans to kill himself.  Because we answer in the affirmative, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On March 27, 2008, Vandalia Police Officer Robert Brazel 
received a dispatch that there was a suicidal male driving a tow truck and that he 
was planning to kill himself when he arrived at 114 Helke Road in Vandalia.  The 
dispatcher gave the name of the driver, Richard Dunn, defendant-appellee, and 
indicated that he had a weapon.  The dispatcher also noted that the vehicle was a 
“big rig” tow truck displaying the name Sandy’s towing company. 
{¶ 3} Officer Brazel was familiar with the Helke Road address because 
he had seen a tow truck parked in front of the residence several times during his 
patrol route.  Less than two minutes after he heard the dispatch, Brazel saw the 
tow truck, and it was approximately two miles from the Helke address.  Brazel 
followed it until another officer arrived to assist him, and then the two officers 
signaled for Dunn to pull over. 
{¶ 4} After stopping the truck, Dunn, who was crying, got out of the 
vehicle and put his hands up.  The officers saw that Dunn was holding a cell 
phone, but they did not see any weapon.  Because they were dealing with an 
allegedly suicidal person, they handcuffed Dunn for their safety and his.  The 
officers did not find any weapons on Dunn other than a small pocketknife.  Dunn 
was placed in Brazel’s cruiser. 
{¶ 5} Brazel testified that as he was walking Dunn to his police cruiser, 
Dunn stated: “[I]t’s in the glove box.”  Brazel asked him if he was referring to a 
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gun, and Dunn said yes.  The other officer checked the glove compartment and 
found a loaded gun. 
{¶ 6} After the weapon was secured, Brazel spoke with Dunn about the 
events leading up to the stop.  Dunn told the officer that the week before, he had 
had problems with his soon-to-be ex-wife and had been taken to a hospital for a 
mental-health evaluation.  Dunn informed the officer that he had intended to shoot 
himself when he got to the place where he was to drop off the semi that he was 
towing.  Brazel explained to Dunn that he could be involuntary committed or he 
could go to the hospital voluntarily.  Ultimately, Brazel drove Dunn to the 
hospital in his patrol car. 
{¶ 7} On August 10, 2009, Dunn was indicted on one count of improper 
handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, R.C. 2923.16(B).  On October 2, 2009, 
Dunn filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop violated the 
Fourth Amendment and that the officers had improperly interrogated him without 
informing him of his Miranda rights.  Therefore, Dunn asked that all evidence 
resulting from the stop and his statements be suppressed, including the gun found 
in the glove compartment.  Brazel was the only witness called at the suppression 
hearing, and the testimony focused on the facts surrounding the stop.  Brazel 
testified that he had not observed Dunn commit any traffic violations or violations 
of any other laws while he followed him, and he admitted that the officers had not 
provided Dunn with Miranda warnings. 
{¶ 8} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress, holding that the 
stop was a “ ‘legitimate response to an emergency situation,’ ” quoting State v. 
Stubbs, 2d Dist. No. CA 16907, 1998 WL 677510, *3 (Oct. 2, 1998), and was 
therefore not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The court 
also held that Dunn’s statements and the evidence obtained from them should not 
be suppressed, because the police officers had not engaged in custodial 
interrogation but rather, Dunn’s statements were spontaneous and unsolicited. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} On December 30, 2009, the court held a change-of-plea hearing at 
which Dunn pleaded no contest to the single count in the indictment.  Dunn was 
sentenced to five years of supervised probation and was ordered to attend 
counseling and pay court costs.  The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County 
reversed the judgment of the trial court, vacated the conviction, deemed Dunn’s 
plea of no contest withdrawn, and granted the motion to suppress. 
{¶ 10} The case is now before this court upon our acceptance of the 
state’s discretionary appeal.  State v. Dunn, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2011-Ohio-
1829, 945 N.E.2d 522. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 11} We begin by noting the irony that Dunn, who was suicidal when he 
was stopped by the police, now contends that the police should not have stopped 
his vehicle to render aid.  If the police had not stopped Dunn, he may have 
harmed himself.  And if the police had not acted, and Dunn had harmed or killed 
himself, Dunn or his estate could have filed a civil lawsuit against the police for 
failure to respond to an emergency.  Such is the balancing act of Fourth 
Amendment law. 
{¶ 12} In analyzing the validity of the stop, the court of appeals relied on 
Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), and held that the 
state had not demonstrated that the dispatcher had a reasonable basis for issuing 
the dispatch that caused the officers to stop Dunn’s truck.  The court of appeals 
appears to have determined that the officers were not authorized to stop Dunn 
unless there was evidence from which the dispatcher could have concluded that 
the information supplied to him or her had sufficient indicia of reliability.  This 
was not the proper analysis to employ.  As noted by the dissenting judge below, 
the evidentiary requirement that Weisner imposes on the state in a suppression 
hearing applies only to an “investigative stop” authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which entails seizure of a person to 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
investigate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Since this was not a Terry 
stop, the court of appeals erred in using this analysis. 
A.  Fourth Amendment 
{¶ 13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
{¶ 14} “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.” 
{¶ 15} There are a number of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement, including the one applicable to this case, the community-
caretaking exception, which courts sometimes refer to as the “emergency-aid 
exception” or “exigent-circumstance exception.” 
{¶ 16} The community-caretaking exception was first addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 
2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).  Dombrowski, an off-duty Chicago police officer, 
was arrested by police in Wisconsin on a charge of drunk driving following a one-
car accident in which Dombrowski’s rental car was heavily damaged.  Id. at 435-
436.  The car was towed from the scene to a privately owned garage, and a few 
hours later, one of the arresting officers searched Dombrowski’s vehicle without a 
warrant, looking for his service revolver, which the officer believed to be in his 
vehicle.  Id. at 436-437.  In the trunk of Dombrowski’s vehicle, the officer found 
evidence linking him to a murder, a crime for which he was eventually convicted.  
Id. at 437, 439.  Ultimately, the court concluded that because the trunk of the 
vehicle was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals and the officer reasonably believed 
that the trunk contained a gun, the search was not unreasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 448. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 17} The court explained that local law-enforcement officers 
“frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal 
liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as 
community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute.”  Id. at 441.  As the court noted in Dombrowski, “[t]he ultimate standard 
set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”  Id. at 439.  Thus, the 
Fourth Amendment protects citizens from only unreasonable government 
searches and seizures.  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 
1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). 
{¶ 18} The United States Supreme Court further elaborated on the 
community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).  “We 
do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations.  
Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when 
they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”  Id. at 
392.  “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification 
for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”  Wayne v. 
United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Circ.1963). 
{¶ 19} The Supreme Court has also referred to this exception as the 
“emergency-aid exception.”  For example, in Michigan v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 
130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009), the court upheld an officer’s warrantless 
entry into the defendant’s residence as reasonable when the police officers who 
were responding to a call regarding a disturbance observed a tumultuous situation 
when they arrived at the home, including blood on a damaged vehicle parked in 
the driveway and witnesses reporting that the defendant was “going crazy” inside.  
Id. at 547.  The Fisher court noted that “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
likely serious, life threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”  Id. 
at 549.  Rather, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth amendment, 
regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances 
viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ ” (Emphasis added in Stuart.)  Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), citing 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). 
{¶ 20} Because police officers are duty-bound to provide emergency 
services to those who are in danger of physical harm, I American Bar Assn. 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Section 1-2.2 at 1-31 (2d Ed.1980), courts must 
frequently consider the reasonableness of an officer’s actions in situations, such as 
the one at bar, where a person’s life is in jeopardy.  In State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio 
St.3d 348, 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), this court upheld a warrantless entry into a 
residence by police officers who, while responding to a report of domestic 
violence, heard sounds coming from inside the residence indicative of violence.  
Although we did not use the term “community caretaking,” but rather “exigent 
circumstances,” we held that the warrantless entry was certainly justified by the 
officers’ reasonable belief that entering the residence was necessary to investigate 
an emergency threatening life and limb.  Id. at 349-350.  In so holding, the court 
noted: “ ‘[T]he business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or 
meditate on whether the report is correct.  People could well die in emergencies if 
police tried to act with the calm deliberation of the judicial process.’ ”  (Emphasis 
added in Applegate.)  Applegate at 350, quoting Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212. 
{¶ 21} Thus, courts recognize that a community-caretaking/emergency-
aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is necessary to allow 
police to respond to emergency situations where life or limb is in jeopardy.  For 
example, in Turner v. State, 645 So.2d 444 (Fla.1994), the Florida Supreme Court 
upheld officers’ warrantless entry into a motel room when the defendant had 
opened the door when the officers knocked, walked from the door to a bed, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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leaving the door ajar, and pulled out a gun and pointed it at his head.  Id., 447.  
Further, in Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 470-471 (Fl.2006), the Florida 
Supreme Court held that the warrantless entry and search of an apartment in 
response to a call indicating that a person in the apartment had threatened to kill 
himself was lawful because of exigent circumstances indicating the need for help.  
And the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a warrantless entry into a man’s 
bedroom when his wife reported to the police that he was suicidal and had locked 
himself in the bedroom with a gun.  United States. v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 
1024 (8th Cir.2007).  Finally, in Goldsmith v. Snohomish Cty., 558 F.Supp.2d 
1140, 1152 (W.D.Wash. 2008), the court held that the community-caretaking 
exception to the warrant requirement applied to officers’ temporary arrest of a 
violent injured man for the sole purpose of enabling paramedics to render 
necessary medical aid.  See also Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777, 785-786 (6th 
Cir.2008); State v. Oliver, 91 Ohio App.3d 607, 610, 632 N.E.2d 1382 (9th 
Dist.1993). 
{¶ 22} Thus, we hold that the community-caretaking/emergency-aid 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to 
stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an immediate 
need for their assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury. 
{¶ 23} In this case, officers received a dispatch regarding an allegedly 
armed and suicidal person with an imminent plan to kill himself upon reaching a 
certain destination.  Given that stopping a person on the street is “considerably 
less intrusive than police entry into the home itself, Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 
326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001), the officers’ effecting a traffic 
stop to prevent Dunn from harming himself was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Thus, the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a driver 
based on a dispatch that the driver is armed and plans to kill himself. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
B. Voluntary Statement 
{¶ 24} As the trial court below held, the requirement that police officers 
administer Miranda warnings applies only when a suspect is subjected to both 
custody and interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).  Here, Dunn emerged from the vehicle on his own accord 
and almost immediately stated that a gun was in the glove compartment.  An 
unsolicited and spontaneous statement such as the one made by Dunn in this case 
is not the product of an interrogation, so Miranda does not apply.  See Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 25} As Chief Justice Warren Burger once said, “ ‘ “[t]he policeman on 
the beat, or in the patrol car, makes more decisions and exercises broader 
discretion affecting the daily lives of people, every day and to a greater extent, in 
many respects, than a judge will ordinarily exercise in a week * * *.” ’ "  
Excerpted from an FBI Academy graduation address by then Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court Warren E. Burger.  Dimino, Police Paternalism: 
Community 
Caretaking, 
Assistance 
Searches, 
and 
Fourth 
Amendment 
Reasonableness, 66 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 1485, 1527 (2009), quoting Abadinsky, 
Discretionary Justice 15 (1984), quoting Carlton, A Crime Agenda for North 
Carolina 26-27 (1978). 
{¶ 26} The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement allows a law-enforcement officer with 
objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for his 
or her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury to effect a community-
caretaking/emergency-aid stop.  Thus, the officers in this case were authorized to 
stop Dunn based on the dispatch that Dunn was armed and planned to kill himself.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 27} I concur.  As the majority opinion makes clear, the rule requiring 
evidence of a telephone tip’s reliability is confined to investigatory stops.  
Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999).  And in 
specifically holding that the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception 
exists, we clarify that police may approach citizens without a warrant in 
circumstances such as Dunn’s. 
{¶ 28} What is troublesome here is that the state indicted Dunn for the 
crime of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle 16 months after the 
police prevented his suicide.  One wonders if it was reasonable for the state to 
prosecute Dunn under these circumstances after more than a year had passed.  
Nevertheless, a motion to suppress puts at issue the actions of police rather than 
prosecutors.  Because the officers in this case acted reasonably and responsibly, I 
agree that there was no Fourth Amendment violation and that the court of 
appeals’ judgment should be reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and MCGEE BROWN, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} Whether this case should have been prosecuted at all is 
questionable.  But it was.  It could have been properly prosecuted.  But it wasn’t.  
This case is before us because of the prosecution’s simple failure to meet its 
burden in the suppression hearing of proving that the traffic stop leading to the 
charge against Dunn was reasonable.  The prosecution’s failure to meet its burden 
January Term, 2012 
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comes from its lack of any attempt to show that the telephone tip that led to the 
dispatch had sufficient indicia of reliability.  This case should stand for the simple 
proposition that when criminal charges evolve from a traffic stop that is based 
entirely upon a citizen’s call to a dispatcher, the state must prove that the citizen’s 
call presented sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the stop. 
I 
{¶ 30} This is a case about a telephone tip.  Officer Brazel stopped Dunn 
based solely on a telephone tip that Dunn was suicidal and in imminent danger.  
In Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), this court 
addressed whether a telephone tip can, by itself, create reasonable suspicion 
justifying an investigative stop.  This court held that a telephone tip can, standing 
alone, create reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop where the tip 
has sufficient indicia of reliability: “Where an officer making an investigative 
stop relies solely upon a dispatch, the state must demonstrate at a suppression 
hearing that the facts precipitating the dispatch justified a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Weisner, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 31} But the majority writes that “the evidentiary requirement that 
Weisner imposes on the state in a suppression hearing applies only to an 
‘investigative stop’ authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which entails seizure of a person to investigate a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 12.  First, although it did 
involve an arrest for driving while intoxicated, Weisner does not limit its holding 
to traffic stops involving suspicion of criminal behavior.  Second, although the 
court stated in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 
290 (1978), that “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from 
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a 
person within is in need of immediate aid,” courts cannot take on faith that an 
emergency existed.  “[A] warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the exigencies which justify its initiation,’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 25-26, 88 
S.Ct., at 1882, and it simply cannot be contended that [the] search was justified by 
any emergency threatening life or limb.”  Mincey at 393.  That is, as with any 
search or seizure, a stop based upon a suspected emergency situation must be 
objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.  At heart, 
Weisner is about whether a stop based solely upon a telephone tip can be 
objectively reasonable, and there is no reason that Weisner’s holding should not 
include traffic stops made for the purpose of investigating an emergency situation. 
{¶ 32} The stop of Dunn had all the earmarks of an investigative stop.  In 
the context of an investigatory stop of an automobile, stopping a car and detaining 
its occupants constitutes a seizure.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 
1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).  Officer Brazel testified that he had turned on his 
overhead lights and siren to alert Dunn to pull to the side of the road.  He and the 
township officer also responding “blocked the roadway and lit the area.”  When 
Dunn emerged from his vehicle, Brazel told him to put his hands in the air, and he 
eventually handcuffed him.  The video recording of the stop was labeled by the 
police as a traffic stop. 
{¶ 33} Even if there were a requirement that a suspicion of criminal 
activity is necessary to gain the protection of Weisner, the evidence demonstrates 
that Brazel did suspect criminal activity by Dunn, i.e., the possession of a gun in 
his vehicle.  Dunn was eventually charged with a violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), 
which states, “No person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a 
motor vehicle in such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or 
any passenger without leaving the vehicle.”  Brazel heard a dispatch that a male 
driving a tow truck was planning to kill himself when he arrived at a specific 
residence.  At the suppression hearing, he was asked whether there was any 
information dispatched regarding a weapon.  He responded affirmatively: “Yes, 
advised that he was going to kill himself.  But, I don’t remember if they said there 
January Term, 2012 
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was a—a firearm in the vehicle or anything like that.  But, there was some 
indication of a weapon with the dispatch.” 
{¶ 34} Brazel’s behavior at the stop indicated that he feared Dunn had a 
weapon.  He called for backup.  He approached Dunn’s vehicle with his own 
weapon drawn, ordering Dunn to put his hands up.  He testified that he had seen a 
cell phone in Dunn’s hand but “couldn’t see the obvious other weapons on him at 
that time.”  He then handcuffed Dunn for the officers’ safety because he “wanted 
to check him for weapons.”  As Brazel led him to his cruiser (“for his safety and 
our safety,” according to Brazel), Dunn told him, “[I]t’s in the glovebox.”  Brazel 
had no doubt as to what Dunn was referring: “I said are you referring to the gun.”  
Not a gun, the gun.  Brazel knew a gun was involved. 
{¶ 35} Brazel stopped Dunn because the dispatch indicated that Dunn had 
a weapon in his vehicle that could cause his imminent death.  Dunn ended up 
being charged with “hav[ing] a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a 
manner that the firearm [was] accessible to the operator or any passenger without 
leaving the vehicle.”  The allegation in the call justifying the stop—that he 
possessed a weapon in his vehicle—became the very basis of the charge.  Thus, 
even assuming arguendo that Weisner applies only to situations entailing “seizure 
of a person to investigate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,” as the 
majority holds at ¶ 12, the facts of this case demonstrate that there was sufficient 
suspicion of criminal activity in this case to trigger the protections of Weisner. 
II 
{¶ 36} The majority wants to make this a case only about exigent 
circumstances.  Certainly, whether it is called the community-caretaking 
exception or the emergency-aid exception, there is an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement in cases where police are responding to 
emergency situations.  Regarding its line of cases addressing that issue, the United 
States Supreme Court recently wrote, “A reasonable police officer could read 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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these decisions to mean that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a 
residence if the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an 
imminent threat of violence.”  Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. ___ , ___, 132 S.Ct. 987, 
990, ___ L.Ed.2d ___. 2012 WL 171121, *3 (2012). 
{¶ 37} Of course it is reasonable to make a traffic stop in order to prevent 
a suicide; but if the state brings criminal charges based upon that stop, it still must 
prove that the officer making the stop had a reasonable basis to believe that the 
driver was suicidal.  Where the stop is based entirely on an informant’s call to a 
police dispatcher, the reasonableness of the stop must be based upon the 
reliability of the tip that generated the police dispatch. 
{¶ 38} The majority cites many cases in which courts found that officers 
had a reasonable basis to conduct a warrantless entry, but none of those cases 
involve a telephone tip as the sole reason supporting the entry.  In every case cited 
by the majority, the police officers in question also relied on their own 
observations. 
{¶ 39} In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 
706 (1973), police opened and searched the trunk of the defendant’s heavily 
damaged vehicle after they had had it towed to a privately owned garage.  
Because the searching officer knew the defendant to be an off-duty Chicago 
police officer and believed that Chicago police officers were required to keep 
their service revolver nearby at all times, he searched the trunk to retrieve the 
service revolver.  The incriminating evidence he found—bloody clothing and 
other items—was not what he was originally looking for.  The search of the trunk 
was not based upon an anonymous telephone report—it was based upon normal 
operating procedure and upon the officer’s belief that he was retrieving a revolver 
from an unguarded location. 
{¶ 40} In Michigan v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 
410 (2009), police responded to a disturbance call.  Upon arriving at the residence 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
in question, they saw blood on a damaged vehicle parked outside, as well as on a 
door of the house.  They spoke to witnesses who told them the defendant was 
“going crazy” inside the house.  Id. at 547.  Through a window, the officers could 
see the defendant, Jeremy Fisher, inside the house, screaming and throwing 
things. The back door was locked, and a couch had been placed to block the front 
door.  The police entered the home, and the defendant pointed a rifle at one of the 
officers.  Fisher was later charged with crimes related to the firearm.  Again, 
police had entered the home based in part upon the officers’ own observations. 
{¶ 41} Likewise, in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 
1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), police entered a home only after they had seen—
through a window—a fight break out inside.  After entering the house, they made 
arrests for intoxication and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 
{¶ 42} In State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), 
police entered a residence after they had personally heard sounds coming from 
inside the house indicative of violence.  When the defendant refused to put down 
a whiskey bottle, a scuffle ensued.  The defendant was arrested for disorderly 
conduct, and while he was being searched, a baggie of cocaine was found in his 
pocket. 
{¶ 43} In cases cited by the majority involving threatened suicide, the 
warrantless entrances also came as the result of personal observations by the 
officers involved.  In Turner v. State, 645 So.2d 444 (Fla.1994), officers made 
warrantless entry into a hotel room when they saw the defendant holding a gun to 
his head.  They then encountered evidence of murders that the defendant had 
committed. 
{¶ 44} In Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 470-471 (Fla.2006), police 
responded to a 9-1-1 call regarding a suicidal person.  The call had come from the 
person’s roommate.  When they arrived at the residence, police spoke to the 
roommate who had placed the 9-1-1 call and were told that the defendant was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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inside the residence and was suicidal.  They entered the defendant’s residence 
after he cracked open the door, and while inside, they spotted a severed foot. 
{¶ 45} In United States v. Uscanda-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024 (8th 
Cir.2007), the defendant’s wife consented to the police officers’ entry into the 
residence, and she told them that her husband was armed and despondent. 
{¶ 46} In all of the above cases relied upon by the majority, at least some 
of the facts justifying the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s property 
were gleaned from the officers’ own investigation.  Thus, the present case differs 
from all the cased cited by the majority.  Officer Brazel’s stop was not based on 
any personal observation.  It was based only upon a police dispatch.  And a 
dispatch alone can form a reasonable basis for a valid stop only when there is 
some evidence of the reliability of the information given to the dispatcher. 
III 
{¶ 47} A determination of the reasonableness of a stop under Weisner 
“involves a consideration of ‘the totality of the circumstances.’ United States v. 
Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-629.  
Under this analysis, ‘both the content of information possessed by police and its 
degree of reliability’ are relevant to the court’s determination.  Alabama v. White 
(1990), 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309.” 
Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d at 299, 720 N.E.2d 507. 
{¶ 48} Where the only information possessed by police prior to the stop is 
from an informant’s tip, “the determination of reasonable suspicion will be 
limited to an examination of the weight and reliability due that tip,” specifically, 
“whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the 
investigative stop.” Id.  The most important factors in determining the reliability 
of an informant’s report are “the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge.”  Id., citing White at 328. 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
{¶ 49} In Weisner, this court did not set a high bar on the type of evidence 
needed to prove that a call to a dispatcher presents sufficient indicia of reliability 
to justify a traffic stop.  The state “must present evidence of the facts known to 
the dispatcher in these situations.”  Weisner at 298.  The testimony of the 
informant who made the call is not required.  The testimony of the dispatcher is 
not required.  In Weisner, this court found that testimony from the arresting 
officer about the facts that precipitated the dispatch as relayed to him by the 
dispatcher was sufficient.  This court was even willing to allow that testimony as 
support even though the dispatcher might not have told the officer all the facts 
that precipitated the dispatch until after the stop was completed.  Id. at fn. 1. 
{¶ 50} Here, the state introduced no evidence regarding the facts known 
to the dispatcher regarding the caller.  There was no way, then, for the trial court 
to judge the reliability of the information the caller gave to the dispatcher.  Thus, 
the state failed to prove that the stop leading to Dunn’s indictment was 
reasonable. 
IV 
{¶ 51} Great police work does not have to result in a conviction.  Whether 
they are assisting stranded motorists, helping lost children find their parents, or 
calming potentially dangerous situations, police officers serve their communities 
daily performing good deeds that do not show up on police blotters.  In this case, 
Officer Brazel did exemplary work.  He interrupted Dunn’s potential suicide.  He 
defused the situation with no injury to himself or Dunn.  He did not arrest Dunn; 
instead, he took him to a local hospital to get him the mental-health help he 
needed.  Why did Brazel drive Dunn himself?  Because Dunn was upset over 
having been billed for an earlier trip to the hospital by ambulance.  This was a 
mission of mercy performed with impeccable professionalism by a well-trained 
police officer. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
{¶ 52} But the prosecutor decided to charge Dunn with a crime, and we 
therefore must consider whether the state properly proved the case against him.  
At the suppression hearing, the state failed to prove the reliability of its 
informant’s tip in a situation where the informant’s tip served as the entire basis 
for the stop leading to Dunn’s indictment.  The court of appeals was therefore 
correct in reversing the conviction.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
__________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram and Timothy J. Cole, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
Gary C. Schaengold, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Thaddeus H. Driscoll, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal 
on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
Timothy Young, Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant Public 
Defender, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________