Case Title: Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1287

Docket Number: 20001276

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 92 Ohio St.3d 
574, 2001-Ohio-1287] 
 
 
WHALEY, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 574.] 
Political subdivision tort liability — Defense and indemnification of employees — 
R.C. 2744.07(A)(1), construed — R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires that a 
political subdivision provide legal defense for an employee whenever the 
underlying complaint alleges or reasonably implies either that the employee 
was not acting manifestly outside the scope of his or her employment or 
official responsibilities. 
(No. 00-1276 — Submitted February 28, 2001 — Decided August 22, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-570. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  On August 12, 1997, plaintiff-appellant, Pat Whaley, a 
Franklin County Deputy Sheriff, filed criminal charges in the Franklin County 
Municipal Court against Kim Tignor.  Tignor was arrested and jailed.  The charges 
against Tignor were subsequently dismissed at arraignment. 
 
It appears that for a number of years prior to the filing of the criminal 
charges, Tignor and appellant’s family were friends.  It also appears that the 
relationship between Tignor and the Whaleys had become strained due to a financial 
dispute. 
 
On May 14, 1998, Tignor filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Franklin County against the Franklin County Board of Commissioners, “the Franklin 
County Local Government,” and appellant, individually and as a Franklin County 
Deputy Sheriff.  The complaint alleged that appellant had caused an arrest warrant to 
be issued and that Tignor had been improperly arrested and jailed.  The complaint 
also alleged that appellant “acted maliciously, wantonly, intentionally, and with 
reckless disregard to [Tignor’s] rights.”  Based upon these allegations, the complaint 
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also charged that Franklin County government officials, through certain acts and 
omissions, violated Tignor’s constitutional rights by failing to properly train, 
supervise, and discipline its police officers. 
 
On July 29, 1998, appellant instituted this action pursuant to R.C. 
2744.07(C)1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County against the Franklin 
County Board of Commissioners, defendant-appellee.  The county had refused to 
provide appellant with a defense in the lawsuit filed by Tignor.  In filing this action 
for declaratory judgment, appellant sought an order to compel the county to provide 
for his individual defense in the underlying Tignor action as mandated by R.C. 
2744.07(A)(1). 
 
On November 16, 1998, appellant moved for summary judgment.  Appellee 
failed to file a response to the motion.  On March 31, 1999, appellee did, however, 
file a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Appellant submitted a 
timely response. 
 
On May 5, 1999, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  In its entry sustaining appellee’s motion, the trial court, without 
discussion, also overruled appellant’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
Appellant appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County.  In a decision rendered on June 8, 2000, the court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
The primary issue presented for our review is whether Franklin County 
wrongfully refused to provide appellant a defense against the claims brought against 
him in the civil action filed by Tignor.  Specifically, we must decide whether the 
                                                          
 
1. 
R.C. 2744.07(C) provides: 
 
“If a political subdivision refuses to provide an employee with a defense in a civil action or 
proceeding as described in division (A)(1) of this section, the employee may file, in the court of 
common pleas of the county in which the political subdivision is located, an action seeking a 
determination as to the appropriateness of the refusal of the political subdivision to provide him with a 
defense under that division.” 
January Term, 2001 
3 
complaint filed in the underlying Tignor lawsuit alleges sufficient facts to trigger the 
county’s duty to defend appellant pursuant to the dictates of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1). 
 
R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) provides: 
 
“Except as otherwise provided in this division, a political subdivision shall 
provide for the defense of an employee, in any state or federal court, in any civil 
action or proceeding to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or 
property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the employee in connection with a 
governmental or proprietary function if the act or omission occurred or is alleged to 
have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside 
the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.” 
 
R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) imposes a duty on a political subdivision to provide a 
defense for an employee in any civil action or proceeding to recover damages 
allegedly caused by acts or omissions of the employee in connection with a 
governmental or proprietary function.  R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) sets forth a two-prong test 
to determine when the political subdivision’s duty to defend one of its employees is 
triggered.  The first prong of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) provides that the duty to defend 
attaches if the act or omission actually occurred while the employee was acting in 
good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official 
responsibilities.  The second prong of the test provides that the political subdivision’s 
statutory duty to defend is triggered if the act or omission is alleged to have occurred 
while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of 
his employment or official responsibilities. 
 
The governing case law interpreting R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) is set forth in Rogers 
v. Youngstown (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 205, 574 N.E.2d 451.  In Rogers, we held that 
“[w]here a political subdivision wrongfully refuses to defend a suit commenced 
against a police officer employed by the subdivision, and the officer subsequently 
brings a declaratory judgment action against the subdivision to determine the 
subdivision’s obligation to defend, the political subdivision must pay the attorney 
fees, expenses and costs incurred by the police officer, both in the action which the 
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subdivision failed to defend and in the declaratory judgment action.  (R.C. 
2744.07[A][1], construed and applied.)”  Id. at syllabus. 
 
The parties do not dispute that Rogers is the seminal case for construing R.C. 
2744.07(A)(1).  Both parties also agree that our focus in this matter should be on the 
second, or more specifically, the “allegation” prong of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).  Where 
the dispute lies herein is in the application of Rogers to the facts of this matter and 
whether the allegations giving rise to this action activate the duty on the part of the 
county to provide a legal defense for appellant. 
 
Appellant argues that the county was required to provide for his individual 
defense because the acts or omissions attributed to appellant in the complaint filed in 
the underlying Tignor lawsuit indicate that appellant was acting “not manifestly 
outside the scope of his employment.”  Appellant contends that there are no 
reasonable grounds to distinguish this matter from Rogers and that the trial court and 
the court of appeals, in attempting to do so, misconstrued both R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) 
and our decision in Rogers.  We agree. 
 
Rogers arose out of a physical altercation between Philip B. Rogers, a 
Youngstown City Police Officer, and his sister.  After the altercation, Rogers’s sister 
brought a federal lawsuit against Rogers, the city of Youngstown, and certain 
Youngstown city officials, alleging violations of her civil rights.  The city refused to 
provide Rogers with legal counsel in the federal suit, concluding that Rogers’s 
actions surrounding the altercation with his sister were outside the scope of his 
employment.  Rogers subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action, pursuant to 
R.C. 2744.07(C), seeking a determination as to the appropriateness of the city’s 
refusal to provide him with a defense as prescribed in R.C. 2744.07(A)(1). 
 
In Rogers, we stated that “R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) is clear and unequivocally sets 
forth that ‘a political subdivision shall provide for the defense of an employee, in any 
state or federal court * * * if the act or omission occurred or is alleged to have 
occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside the 
scope of his [or her] employment.’  (Emphasis added.)  As can be gleaned, the duty 
January Term, 2001 
5 
of a political subdivision to defend one of its employees may arise from a reading of 
allegations contained in a complaint filed by a plaintiff who seeks redress from the 
subdivision’s employee.”  Id., 61 Ohio St.3d at 208, 574 N.E.2d at 453-454. 
 
Relying on evidence obtained from an internal affairs investigation of Rogers 
and on evidence secured during discovery in the federal civil rights lawsuit, the city 
of Youngstown contended that R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) did not require the city to provide 
Rogers with a legal defense.  We did not agree with the city’s contentions.  In 
reaching our determination we specifically noted that “[f]or the most part, the city 
chooses not to focus on the allegations contained in the complaint itself, but, rather, 
finds support for its position by dwelling upon matters that transpired prior to and 
after the federal complaint was filed.  In so doing, the city ignores the mandatory and 
disjunctive language contained in R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).”  Id. at 208, 574 N.E.2d at 
453. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we construe R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) as requiring that, in 
evaluating the “allegation” prong of the statute, the test to be employed is a pleadings 
test.  In construing the same language of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) in Rogers, we indicated 
that whether a political subdivision’s duty to defend arises may be determined “from 
a reading of allegations contained in a complaint filed by a plaintiff who seeks redress 
from the subdivision’s employee.”  Id. at 208, 574 N.E.2d at 453-454.  However, 
neither R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) nor Rogers mandates that such a determination be made 
solely upon consideration of the underlying complaint.  Thus, a court making such a 
determination may consider all pleadings2 filed in the underlying action. 
 
The standard for evaluating the allegations in the underlying complaint is set 
forth in R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).  The plain language of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires a 
political subdivision to provide a defense for an employee “if the act or omission * * 
                                                          
 
2. 
Civ.R. 7(A), “Pleadings,” provides: 
 
“There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such; an 
answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who 
was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a 
third-party complaint is served.  No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a 
reply to an answer or a third-party answer.” 
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* is alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not 
manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.”3  The 
standard against which the allegations contained in the complaint are to be measured 
is quite broad.  In addition, that standard is clear and unambiguous.  “Words and 
phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and 
common usage.  Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular 
meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed 
accordingly.”  R.C. 1.42.  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 
1375, defines the word “manifestly” as “plainly, obviously.” 
 
Moreover, there is a clear distinction drawn in R.C. 2744.07 between the 
standards “not manifestly outside the scope” of employment in R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) 
and “within the scope” of employment in R.C. 2744.07(A)(2).  R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) 
imposes a duty on a political subdivision in certain circumstances to indemnify an 
employee for any judgment, other than punitive damages, obtained against the 
employee for acts or omissions in connection with a governmental or proprietary 
function.  The standard for indemnification in R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) is whether the 
employee acted in good faith and within the scope of his employment or official 
responsibilities.  By adopting two such varying standards, the General Assembly 
clearly intended that the standard applicable to the duty to defend in R.C. 
2744.07(A)(1) be much broader in scope than the standard applied to the duty to 
indemnify in R.C. 2744.07(A)(2). 
 
Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires a political subdivision 
to provide a legal defense for an employee whenever the underlying complaint (or 
subsequent pleadings) either alleges or reasonably implies that the employee was 
acting not manifestly (i.e., plainly and obviously) outside the scope of his or her 
employment or official responsibilities. 
                                                          
 
3. 
Interpreting R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) in Rogers we determined that an allegation that an employee 
of a political subdivision was acting in good faith “would be incongruous with suing the employee in 
his or her individual capacity.”  Rogers, 61 Ohio St.3d at 209, 574 N.E.2d at 454.  Thus, our focus is 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
We now turn our attention to the allegations raised in the underlying 
complaint.  The plaintiff in the underlying action, Kim Tignor, asserts in the 
introductory section of her complaint that “[t]his is an action for a declaratory 
judgment and money damages for a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the 
defendants [Franklin County Board Commissioners, Franklin County Local 
Government, and Deputy Pat Whaley] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also for malicious 
prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment.”  In paragraph three of the 
complaint, Tignor averred that “[d]efendant Whaley is and was, at all times relevant 
hereto, employed as a deputy of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department and acted 
under color of state law.  He is being sued in [his] individual and official capacities.”  
Tignor further alleged that “Whaley filed criminal charges against plaintiff in the 
Franklin County Municipal Court” and that “Whaley knew that there was no 
justification for the charges.”  In paragraph six Tignor claims that “Whaley caused an 
arrest warrant to be issued and had the plaintiff arrested and [plaintiff] spent time in 
custody and also in jail.”  Tignor also alleged, in paragraphs fifteen and sixteen, that 
“Whaley maliciously prosecuted the plaintiff” and “violated the plaintiff’s clearly 
established federal constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.”  Moreover, Tignor alleged in paragraphs eighteen through 
twenty that “the policy making officials of defendant Franklin County Local 
Government knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that its 
officers, officials, and employees, such as defendant [Whaley] herein, had engaged in 
a pattern and practice of misconduct including, but not limited to, illegal arrests and 
filing bogus charges, all in violation of constitutional rights of persons in the [sic] 
Franklin County, Ohio,” and that “[d]espite knowledge of such a pattern and practice 
of illegality, defendant Franklin County Local Government has failed to properly 
investigate those instances of illegality and to supervise, train, and discipline its 
officers, officials, and employees. * * * Such a failure by defendant Franklin County 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
solely on whether the acts or omissions are alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting not 
manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities. 
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Local Government to break the pattern and practice of illegality encouraged the 
individual defendant herein to believe that he could violate plaintiff’s constitutional 
right with impunity and with the explicit and tacit approval of defendant Franklin 
County Local Government.” 
 
After weighing the allegations contained in the underlying complaint against 
the appropriate standard, we conclude that the complaint filed by Kim Tignor 
contains sufficient allegations that appellant committed the relevant acts and/or 
omissions while he was acting not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or 
official responsibilities.  The complaint, judged in its entirety, avers that appellant 
was acting at all relevant times in his official capacity as a Franklin County Deputy.  
Furthermore, the essence of Tignor’s complaint alleges violations of her 
constitutional rights premised upon claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution.  The allegations raised in the complaint clearly attempt to 
impute the acts of appellant to the county, implying, of course, that appellant was 
acting within the scope of his employment or, at a minimum, not manifestly outside 
the scope.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court and the court of appeals erred 
in determining that the county was not obligated as a matter of law to provide for 
appellant’s defense in the underlying Tignor lawsuit. 
 
Appellee has gone to great lengths to distinguish the instant matter from our 
decision in Rogers.  We recognize that a determination whether a political 
subdivision owes a duty to defend an employee is a fact-sensitive issue.  Thus, 
whether the duty to defend is triggered should not turn solely on a comparison in this 
and other cases with the allegations made in Rogers.  Instead, the primary focus 
should be on whether the allegations raised in the pleadings of the underlying action 
meet the standard set forth in R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).  In any event, appellee’s argument 
that Rogers is distinguishable from the case at bar is not well taken. 
 
Contrary to appellee’s assertion, neither the personal nature of the underlying 
dispute between Tignor and appellant nor the perceived malicious and intentional 
tone of the acts alleged in the underlying complaint is enough to remove this matter 
January Term, 2001 
9 
from the ambit of Rogers and R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).  The facts of this matter are 
essentially indistinguishable from the facts of Rogers.  In Rogers, as here, there were 
allegations of a personal dispute.  The plaintiff in the underlying action of Rogers 
was, in fact, the sister of Officer Rogers.  She alleged that Officer Rogers arrived at 
her home, “began verbally abusing and threatening [her] and accused [her] of 
spreading rumors about him.”  Officer Rogers then allegedly dragged his sister into 
her house, and, in front of their mother and another family member, physically 
battered her.  Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, “the purely personal 
nature of the employee’s conduct” was in fact apparent from a review of the 
underlying pleadings in Rogers. 
 
We also reject appellee’s contention that the use of force by Officer Rogers 
removes this matter from the purview of Rogers and R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).  It is 
appellee’s assertion that law enforcement officers must routinely use force to carry 
out their sworn duties, thus bringing such acts of the officer, in some instances, 
within the scope of employment.  In Rogers, however, there were no allegations 
raised in the underlying complaint or in the answers to the underlying complaint that 
Officer Rogers was attempting to effectuate a lawful arrest during the physical 
altercation with his sister.4  Therefore, it is quite apparent that the use of force by the 
police officer in Rogers had no effect on our decision therein. 
 
Finally, we find it necessary to discuss the trial court’s decision to grant a 
Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings in this action.  Civ.R. 12(C) 
provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the 
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 
 
A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings has been characterized 
as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.  See Nelson v. Pleasant (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 479, 482, 597 N.E.2d 
1137, 1139, and Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 160, 163, 
                                                          
 
4. 
The city of Youngstown denied that Officer Rogers was acting within the scope of his 
employment but did allege, as an alternate defense, that Rogers acted in self-defense. 
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644 N.E.2d 731, 733.  In fact, in State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569-570, 664 N.E.2d 931, 936, this court noted the 
similarities between the two motions.  However, we also recognized that “Civ.R. 
12(C) motions are specifically for resolving questions of law.”  Id. at 570, 664 N.E.2d 
at 936. 
 
When considering a defendant’s Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, the trial court is required to construe as true all the material allegations in 
the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165-166, 63 
O.O.2d 262, 264, 297 N.E.2d 113, 117.  An action brought pursuant to R.C. 
2744.07(C) seeks a determination as to the appropriateness of the political 
subdivision’s refusal to provide a defense, and consideration of the allegation prong 
of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires an evaluation of the allegations raised in the 
underlying pleadings.  Rogers, 61 Ohio St.3d at 208, 574 N.E.2d at 453-454.  
Because appellee is the party that submitted the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, under the appropriate standard for entering judgment on a Civ.R. 12(C) 
motion, appellant was entitled to have all the material allegations of the complaint, 
together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, construed in his favor.  
Peterson, supra. 
 
In reaching its decision, we find that the trial court clearly disregarded the 
appropriate standard required pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) and Peterson.  For instance, 
the trial court stated that “while [the underlying Tignor complaint] alleges that 
Whaley was ‘employed as a deputy’ and [that] he acted ‘under color of state [law],’ 
this does not translate into ‘acting within the scope of employment.’ ”  As can be 
gleaned from the foregoing, in addition to applying the wrong standard pursuant to 
R.C. 2744.07(A)(1), the trial court failed to properly weigh the allegations set forth 
above in the light most favorable to appellant.  Furthermore, contrary to the opinion 
of the court of appeals, we find that the trial court committed procedural error by 
considering matters that were not raised in any pleading filed in this action and that, 
January Term, 2001 
11 
in fact, were not contained anywhere in the record.  Specifically, the trial court based 
its decision in part on the unalleged facts that, unlike the officer in Rogers, appellant 
was not in uniform, not on duty, and did not arrive in a squad car. 
 
Moreover, and in any event, this court stated in Peterson that “Civ.R. 12(C) is 
a continuation of the former statutory practice and presents only questions of law, and 
determination of the motion for judgment on the pleadings is restricted solely to the 
allegations in the pleadings.”  Id., 34 Ohio St.2d at 166, 63 O.O.2d at 264, 297 
N.E.2d at 117, citing with approval Conant v. Johnson (1964), 1 Ohio App.2d 133, 
30 O.O.2d 157, 204 N.E.2d 100.  Thus, despite recognizing the proper scope required 
for deciding a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court 
apparently gave no consideration at all to the allegations raised by appellant in his 
complaint for declaratory judgment.5  In fact, far from construing the allegations 
contained in appellant’s complaint in his favor, the trial court merely compared the 
allegations contained in Tignor’s complaint with the allegations raised in the 
underlying complaint in Rogers. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to consider appellant’s 
motion for summary judgment consistent with Rogers v. Youngstown.  Further, in the 
event that appellant’s motion is granted, we instruct the trial court to conduct a 
hearing, pursuant to Rogers, in order to determine the amount of reasonable attorney 
fees, expenses, and costs incurred by appellant. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
                                                          
 
5. 
We raise the issue without deciding whether it was appropriate for the trial court, in 
adjudicating a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, to take into consideration the 
underlying Tignor complaint.  See Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 166, 63 O.O.2d 
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12 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  The majority today holds that “R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) 
requires a political subdivision to provide a legal defense for an employee whenever 
the underlying complaint (or subsequent pleadings) either alleges or reasonably 
implies that the employee was acting not manifestly (i.e., plainly and obviously) 
outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.”  As does the 
majority today, the majority in Rogers held that the determinative test is not whether 
the act was “alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith 
and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities,” 
but only whether the act was alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting 
“not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Rogers v. Youngstown (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 205, 208-209, 574 
N.E.2d 451, 453, quoting R.C. 2744.07(A)(1).  In Rogers, I joined Justice Wright’s 
dissent, which argued that this reading of R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires political 
subdivisions to defend an employee when that employee acts in bad faith, and that 
this is poor public policy and not intended by the General Assembly.  Id. at 212, 574 
N.E.2d at 456. 
 
While I continue in my belief that the good faith requirement in R.C. 
2744.07(A)(1) must not be ignored, I believe that the case at bar can be disposed of 
under the “not manifestly outside the scope of employment” prong of the test.  The 
underlying complaint in this case does not allege or even reasonably imply that 
Whaley was acting not manifestly outside the scope of his employment. 
 
The complaint clearly demonstrates the personal and nonemployment-related 
nature of Whaley’s conduct.  In essence, the complaint alleges that Whaley filed 
criminal charges against Tignor without justification and acted maliciously, 
wantonly, and intentionally and with reckless disregard of her rights, that he caused 
her to be arrested, and that he maliciously prosecuted her.  The filing of criminal 
charges, causing an arrest warrant to be issued, and maliciously prosecuting another 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
262, 264, 297 N.E.2d 113, 117.  See, also, 4 Harper & Solimine, Anderson’s Ohio Civil Practice (1996) 
373, Section 152.15. 
January Term, 2001 
13 
were all actions of a private citizen.  See R.C. 2935.09.  Nowhere in the pleadings 
does Tignor allege that Whaley used his position as deputy of the Franklin County 
Sheriff’s Department to carry out these acts;  indeed, the only allegation that Whaley 
acted in his official capacity is alleged in paragraph three of the complaint, which 
alleges that “[d]efendant Whaley is and was, at all times relevant hereto, employed as 
a deputy of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department and acted under color of state 
law.  He is being sued in [his] individual and official capacities.” 
 
However, R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) focuses quite appropriately on whether “the act 
or omission occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting 
in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Thus, the statute requires us to focus on the acts that are alleged to have 
occurred, not on the characterization of the defendant as alleged by the plaintiff.  In 
this case, the acts that were alleged to have occurred are all acts of a private citizen, 
and are not dependent upon, nor are they alleged to have been dependent upon, 
Whaley’s status as a deputy sheriff.  It is an inappropriate use of public funds to 
provide legal counsel to a public employee where the conduct for which he is sued is 
in no way related to his public employment.  The precedent established by the 
majority does not bode well for the responsible allocation of tax revenues. 
 
I urge the General Assembly to amend R.C. 2744.07 to prevent the depletion 
of public funds of political subdivisions for such nonpublic purposes as sanctioned in 
this case.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Hunter, Carnahan & Shoub, Robert R. Byard and Russell E. Carnahan, for 
appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, George Speaks and 
Harland H. Hale, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
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Paul Cox, urging reversal for amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police Ohio 
Labor Council, Inc. 
 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging affirmance 
for amici curiae Ohio Municipal League and County Commissioners’ Association of 
Ohio. 
__________________