Case Title: State v. Leak

Citation: 

Docket Number: 206A15

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. 
Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
 
NO. COA14-1005 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 17 March 2015 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Halifax County 
Nos. 13CRS051640, 
     13CRS051694-95 
MICHAEL SCOTT HAMILTON 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 27 March 2014 by 
Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. in Halifax County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 8 January 2015. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant-appellant. 
 
 
DILLON, Judge. 
 
 
Michael Scott Hamilton (“Defendant”) appeals from convictions 
for two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count 
of first-degree burglary.  For the following reasons, we find no 
error in part; vacate Defendant’s conviction for first-degree 
burglary and remand to the trial court for entry of a new judgment 
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and sentencing Defendant for felonious breaking and entering; and 
award Defendant a new trial for the two attempted voluntary 
manslaughter convictions. 
I. Background 
Defendant was indicted for two counts of attempted first-
degree murder and one count of first-degree burglary, stemming 
from events which occurred on the evening of 4 May 2013.  Defendant 
was tried by a jury on these charges. 
The State’s evidence tended to show that on the evening in 
question, Defendant went to the mobile home residence of his 
cousin, Walter Thompson,1 who was dating Sarah Smith2.  Ms. Smith 
had formerly dated Defendant, and they had a child together.  
Defendant entered the residence uninvited holding a baseball bat 
and began arguing with Mr. Thompson.  Ms. Smith went outside with 
Defendant to try to calm him down; however, Defendant hit Ms. Smith 
with the bat several times.  Mr. Thompson then exited the residence 
to assist Ms. Smith, and Defendant hit him in the wrist with the 
bat.  After a brief struggle, Defendant fled the scene. 
As a result of the attack, Ms. Smith suffered a number of 
injuries to her face, jaw, and finger requiring her to undergo a 
                     
1  
Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion to protect the 
identity of the victims. 
2  
A pseudonym. 
-3- 
 
 
number of surgeries to repair these injuries.  Mr. Thompson was 
treated for a broken wrist and injury to his forehead. 
Defendant did not present evidence at trial, but raised 
motions to dismiss, which were denied by the trial court. 
The jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of attempted 
voluntary manslaughter and one count of first-degree burglary.  
The trial court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive terms of 33 
to 52 months imprisonment for the attempted voluntary manslaughter 
convictions and a concurrent term of 84 to 113 months of 
imprisonment for the first-degree burglary conviction.  Defendant 
gave oral notice of appeal at trial. 
II. Analysis 
 
On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the first-degree 
burglary indictment is facially defective; (2) the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the first-degree burglary 
charge; and (3) the trial court erred in its instruction on 
attempted voluntary manslaughter.  We address each argument in 
turn. 
A. Indictment--Burglary 
 
Defendant contends that we should reverse his conviction for 
first-degree burglary because the indictment is facially defective 
where it alleges that he broke and entered the trailer “with the 
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intent to commit a felony therein, to wit: attempted murder.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Specifically, Defendant argues that it is 
logically impossible to intend to commit the crime of “attempted 
murder.” 
“On appeal, we review the sufficiency of an indictment de 
novo.”  State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 652, 675 S.E.2d 406, 
409 (2009). 
Applying our reasoning in State v. Speight, we hold that the 
indictment was sufficient.  213 N.C. App. 38, 711 S.E.2d 808 
(2013).  In Speight, the indictment for burglary stated that the 
underlying felony that the defendant intended to commit when he 
broke and entered into a residence at nighttime was “unlawful 
sexual acts.”  Id. at 44, 711 S.E.2d at 813.  The defendant argued 
that the indictment was fatal because it failed to allege the 
specific underlying felony, contending that “unlawful sexual acts” 
was not specific enough.  Id. at 45, 711 S.E.2d at 813.  We held 
that the indictment was sufficient because by alleging that the 
defendant intended to commit “unlawful sexual acts,” the 
indictment informed the “defendant of the charge against him with 
sufficient clarity to withstand dismissal.”  Id.  In reaching our 
holding, we stated that the General Statutes only require that the 
indictment allege the facts supporting the elements of the crime 
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“with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant . . . 
of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.”  Id. at 
44, 711 S.E.2d at 813 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5) 
(2009)). 
In Speight, we recognized that older cases decided prior to 
the passage of G.S. 15A-924 may have required that the underlying 
felony be described with greater specificity, citing State v. 
Cooper, 288 N.C. 496, 219 S.E.2d 45 (1975), but that the pleading 
requirements were no longer as rigid.  Speight, 213 N.C. App. at 
45, 711 S.E.2d at 813. 
In the present case, assuming that the indictment should have 
stated “murder” or “manslaughter” as the underlying felony rather 
than attempted murder, applying the reasoning in Speight, we hold 
that the indictment sufficiently informed Defendant “of the charge 
against him with sufficient clarity to withstand dismissal.”  Id.  
Accordingly, Defendant’s argument is overruled. 
B. Motion to Dismiss--Burglary 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss the first-degree burglary charge –- which 
requires that the offense occur at nighttime -- because there was 
definitive evidence that the offense occurred before nighttime and 
because there was no substantial evidence that the attack occurred 
-6- 
 
 
during the nighttime.  However, the State argues that testimony 
from witness Jeffrey Black3 -- that when Defendant entered his home 
uninvited “it was dark” and “[i]t was probably 8 or 9 o’clock” -- 
was sufficient evidence for the charge to go to the jury. 
 
The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is 
well established: 
A defendant’s motion to dismiss should be 
denied if there is substantial evidence of: 
(1) each essential element of the offense 
charged, and (2) of defendant’s being the 
perpetrator 
of 
the 
charged 
offense. 
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion. 
 
State v. Johnson, 203 N.C. App. 718, 724, 693 S.E.2d 145, 148 
(2010) (marks omitted).  Additionally, “[t]he Court must consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the State 
is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that 
evidence.  Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant 
dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve.”  State v. 
Phillpott, 213 N.C. App. 468, 478, 713 S.E.2d 202, 209 (2011). 
“The elements of first-degree burglary are: (i) the breaking 
(ii) and entering (iii) in the nighttime (iv) into the dwelling 
                     
3  
A pseudonym. 
-7- 
 
 
house or sleeping apartment (v) of another (vi) which is actually 
occupied at the time of the offense (vii) with the intent to commit 
a felony therein.”  State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 101, 472 
S.E.2d 895, 899 (1996) (emphasis added); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
51 (2013).  Though our burglary statute does not define the term 
nighttime, “our courts adhere to the common law definition of 
nighttime as that time after sunset and before sunrise when it is 
so dark that a man’s face cannot be identified except by artificial 
light or moonlight.”  State v. McKeithan, 140 N.C. App. 422, 432, 
537 S.E.2d 526, 533 (2000) (marks omitted). 
 
As Defendant requests, we take judicial notice that in Roanoke 
Rapids, on 4 May 2013, sunset occurred at 8:01 p.m., and civil 
twilight began at 8:29 p.m., as computed by the Astronomical 
Applications Department of the United States Naval Observatory.  
See State v. Brown, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 732 S.E.2d 584, 587 
(2012) (taking judicial notice of when civil twilight began); State 
v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 280, 240 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1978) (taking 
judicial notice of when sunset occurred). 
 
In State v. Barnett, the defendant was convicted of breaking 
into a residence and stealing a purse sometime between 10:00 p.m. 
on 3 April 1992 and 6:30 a.m. on 4 April 1992, when the victim 
woke up.  113 N.C. App. 69, 75, 437 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1993).  This 
-8- 
 
 
Court noted that on 4 April 1992 civil twilight began at 5:41 a.m. 
and the sun rose at 6:07 a.m.  Id.  In reversing the trial court’s 
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, this Court held that 
[b]ecause the [offense] . . . could have 
occurred at any time up until . . . [shortly 
after 
sunrise], 
the 
evidence 
is 
only 
sufficient 
to 
raise 
a 
“suspicion 
or 
conjecture” that the breaking and entering of 
the [victim’s] home occurred at nighttime. . 
. .  Thus, the State failed to produce such 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support the conclusion 
that when the breaking and entering occurred, 
it was [nighttime] . . . . 
 
Id. 
 
In the present case, the most definitive testimony was from 
the investigating officer who testified that he arrived on the 
scene after the attack at 7:56 p.m., five minutes before sunset.  
Further, other witnesses testified that the attack occurred 
sometime before 8:00 p.m. while it was “dusky dark[.]”  The only 
evidence cited by the State to support a finding that the offense 
occurred in the nighttime was the testimony of Mr. Black, who 
stated that “it was dark” and “[i]t was probably 8 or 9 o’clock[.]”  
However, we believe Mr. Black’s testimony only provides a 
“suspicion or conjecture” that Defendant entered the residence at 
nighttime.  Specifically, his testimony that it was “probably 8 or 
9” leaves at least one minute before sunset and twenty-nine minutes 
-9- 
 
 
before civil twilight for Defendant to have entered the residence.  
In sum, we hold that there was not substantial evidence before the 
jury that the offense occurred in the nighttime; and, therefore, 
the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
 
Notwithstanding, we hold that there was substantial evidence 
to support a conviction for felony breaking and entering with the 
intent to commit a felony pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a).  
The essential elements of felonious breaking or entering are (1) 
the breaking or entering (2) of any building (3) with the intent 
to commit any felony or larceny therein.  State v. Litchford, 78 
N.C. App. 722, 725, 338 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1986).  That is, by 
convicting Defendant of burglary, the jury necessarily found facts 
that would support a verdict convicting Defendant of felonious 
breaking and entering.  See Barnett, 113 N.C. App. 75-76, 437 
S.E.2d at 715; State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 131, 135-36, 187 S.E.2d 785, 
788 (1972).  Accordingly, we vacate Defendant’s conviction for 
first-degree burglary and remand to the trial court for entry of 
a new judgment and sentencing Defendant for felonious breaking and 
entering. 
C. Jury Instructions—Involuntary Manslaughter 
 
Lastly, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
giving its jury instruction regarding the charges of attempted 
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voluntary manslaughter by telling the jury on a number occasions 
that the crime did not include the element of specific intent.  
Defendant admits that he did not object to the trial court’s jury 
instructions but argues that because he requested three times the 
inclusion of the element of specific intent in the trial court’s 
instruction as to attempted voluntary manslaughter during the 
charge conference, this request properly preserved this issue for 
appeal. 
The State counters with a number of arguments and contends 
that we should apply a plain error standard.  “In order to prevail 
under a plain error analysis, defendant must establish not only 
that the trial court committed error, but that absent the error, 
the jury probably would have reached a different result.”  State 
v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 269, 536 S.E.2d 1, 25-26 (2000) (marks 
omitted).  We hold that even applying a plain error standard, the 
trial court committed reversible error in its instructions on the 
attempted voluntary manslaughter charges. 
 
We have held that “specific intent” is an element for the 
crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  State v. Rainey, 154 
N.C. App. 282, 289, 574 S.E.2d 25, 29 (2002).  In reaching this 
conclusion, our Court in Rainey recognized that “in North Carolina, 
heat of passion voluntary manslaughter is essentially a first-
-11- 
 
 
degree murder, where the defendant’s reason is temporarily 
suspended by legally adequate provocation.”  Id. at 289, 574 S.E.2d 
at 29.  Therefore, the Court concluded that 
[t]he specific intent to kill does exist in 
the mind of [a defendant charged with 
attempted voluntary manslaughter]; however, 
the defendant is only legally culpable for the 
general intent because the “specific intent" 
is not based on “cool reflection.” The 
specific intent is based on an “adequate 
provocation” that would cause an individual 
with an ordinary firmness of mind . . . to 
commit an act spawned by provocation rather 
than malice. 
 
Id. 
In the present case, Defendant was convicted of attempted 
voluntary manslaughter based on acts against both Ms. Smith and 
Mr. Thompson.  Following the trial court’s instruction on the 
charge of attempted first-degree murder the trial court gave the 
following instructions: 
Attempted voluntary manslaughter differs 
from attempted first degree murder in that the 
State need not prove that the defendant did 
the attempted killing with premeditation and 
deliberation or malice or that the defendant 
intended by his action to result –that his 
action would result in the victim’s death, but 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did an intentional and 
unlawful act in an attempt to kill the victim 
in the heat of passion suddenly aroused by 
adequate provocation. 
 
So ladies and gentlemen, if you find from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on 
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or about the alleged date the defendant 
attempted to cause the victim’s death by his 
intentional and unlawful act, it would be your 
duty to find the defendant guilty of attempted 
voluntary manslaughter. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court then instructed the jury 
specifically regarding the acts committed against each victim.  As 
Defendant concedes, the instruction with respect to the crime 
against Mr. Thompson correctly stated that the jury had to find 
that Defendant acted with the specific intent to kill in order to 
convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  However, with 
respect to the attack on Ms. Smith, the trial court instructed the 
jury as follows: 
 
Attempted voluntary manslaughter differs 
from attempted first degree murder in that the 
State need not prove that the defendant did 
the attempted killing with premeditation and 
deliberation or malice or that the defendant 
intended for his action to result in the 
victim’s death.  But the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did an intentional and unlawful act in an 
attempt to kill the victim in the heat of 
passion 
suddenly 
aroused 
by 
adequate 
provocation. 
 
So ladies and gentlemen, if you find from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on 
or about the alleged date the defendant 
attempted to cause the victim’s death by his 
intentional and unlawful act, it would be your 
duty to find the defendant guilty of attempted 
voluntary manslaughter. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
-13- 
 
 
Contrary to one of the State’s arguments, we believe that the 
trial court’s instruction decreased, not increased, the State’s 
burden of proof by informing the jury that the State did not have 
to prove specific intent.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury.  We must determine next whether this error 
amounted to plain error. 
There was conflicting evidence presented as to Defendant’s 
intent when he entered Mr. Thompson’s residence on the evening in 
question.  On the one hand, testimony was presented that Defendant 
stated he was “going to get” Ms. Smith, that he was going to “get 
that bitch,” and that he hoped “they all die[,]” and, additionally, 
he entered the residence holding a baseball bat.  However, 
testimony was also presented that Defendant told a witness that he 
just wanted to talk with Ms. Smith; his concern was that his 
daughter was in the residence where people were drinking alcoholic 
drinks; and when he entered the kitchen he told Ms. Smith, “Let’s 
walk outside and talk about it a minute and then I’ll leave.” 
Our Supreme Court in State v. Harris concluded that the trial 
court erred in giving conflicting jury instructions regarding the 
burden of proof and awarded the defendant a new trial.  289 N.C. 
275, 280, 221 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1976)4.  The Court reasoned that 
                     
4  
We note that even though this case was decided before plain 
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[i]t has been uniformly held that where the 
court charges correctly at one point and 
incorrectly at another, a new trial is 
necessary because the jury may have acted upon 
the incorrect part. This is particularly true 
when the incorrect portion of the charge is 
the application of the law to the facts. 
[Citations omitted.] A new trial must also 
result when ambiguity in the charge affords an 
opportunity for the jury to act upon a 
permissible but incorrect interpretation. 
 
Id. (marks omitted).  “The jury cannot be expected to know which 
of two conflicting instructions is correct.”  Id.  “It must be 
assumed on appeal that the jury was influenced by that portion of 
the charge which is incorrect.”  Id. 
 
Likewise, here, the trial court gave a contradictory 
instruction regarding the inclusion of specific intent for the 
crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter, stating that it was not 
required then stating that it was an element of the crime.  
Compounding this error, the trial court later repeated its 
contradictory instruction to the jury.  Additionally, there was 
conflicting evidence regarding Defendant’s intent on the day in 
question.  From the record, we cannot tell whether the jury 
convicted Defendant for attempted voluntary manslaughter based on 
                     
error review was available, its ruling and analysis have been 
applied under plain error review.  See State v. Hunt, 192 N.C. 
App. 268, 271-72, 664 S.E.2d 662, 664 (2008) (in a plain error 
analysis applying the holding in Harris and awarding a new trial 
for an instructional error). 
-15- 
 
 
the incorrect portion of the instruction or not.  Therefore, given 
the specific nature of these errors, we must assume that the jury 
was influenced by the incorrect portion, see Harris, supra, and 
award Defendant a new trial for the charges of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter. 
 
NO ERROR IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART; AND NEW TRIAL 
IN PART. 
Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur. 
Report Per Rule 30(e).