Case Title: State v. Keffer

Citation: 281 S.E.2d 495

Docket Number: 

State: west-virginia

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1981-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
281 S.E.2d 495 (1981) STATE of West Virginia v. Agnes KEFFER. No. 14285. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. September 8, 1981. *496 Ernest V. Morton, Jr., Webster Springs, for plaintiff. Chauncey H. Browning, Atty. Gen., Paul D. Dean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for defendant. MILLER, Justice: Agnes Keffer appeals from a final order of the Circuit Court of Webster County which sentenced her to one to five years in the state penitentiary for voluntary manslaughter. Her principal assignments of error relate to the giving of instructions on the presumption of intent, premeditation from the use of a deadly weapon and reasonable doubt. We find that the instructions were improper and reverse the case. The appellant complains that State's Instruction No. 5 presumes intent and premeditation: The State argues that we approved a similar instruction in State v. Mason, W.Va., 249 S.E.2d 793 (1978). The instruction in Mason involved a charge on second degree murder. We confined our discussion to that portion of the instruction which dealt with the infliction of a "mortal wound" and which stated upon a showing of such fact that the defendant was "prima facie guilty of an unlawful and malicious killing." 249 S.E.2d at 798-99. We have recognized that this type of instruction impermissibly shifts the burden of proof of an essential element of the State's casemalice to the defendant. State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976).[1] This result *497 was dictated by Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 508 (1975), where the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an instruction which required the defendant to prove provocation in order to reduce the homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter. In Mason, however, we also concluded that under certain circumstances this type of Mullaney-Pendry error could be deemed harmless if, for instance, the jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter on a murder charge. Since this verdict did not involve a finding of malice or premeditation, it could be concluded that the verdict was not affected by the erroneous portions of the typical Pendry instruction. See also State v. Kirtley, W.Va., 252 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1978). In Mason, however, we did not consider the language of the first portion of the "mortal wound" instruction which read: "The court instructs the jury that a person is presumed to intend that which is the immediate or necessary consequence of his act." 249 S.E.2d at 798. This language is contained in State's Instruction No. 5 and is directed to the issue of criminal intent. Such language has been held to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement that the State prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979). We adhered to the ruling of Sandstrom in State v. O'Connell, W.Va., 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), by holding that this instructional language was constitutionally erroneous because it impermissibly "supplie[d] by presumption [a] material element [criminal intent] of the crime charged." Syllabus, in part, State v. O'Connell, supra. For this reason, the initial language, quoted above, of State's Instruction No. 5 is constitutionally deficient under the holdings of Sandstrom and O'Connell. The latter portion of the instruction would not be erroneous under Mason because the conviction in this case was for voluntary manslaughter. The appellant also complains of several State instructions given on reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions attempting to define or explain the reasonable doubt standard outside its customary formulation. State v. Goff, W.Va., 272 S.E.2d 457, 462-63 (1980); State v. Starr, W.Va., 216 S.E.2d 242, 247 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737, 752-53, 113 S.E. 912, 918 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, W.Va., 273 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1980). We believe that such instructions "certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof." State v. Starr, 216 S.E.2d at 247. The State's reasonable doubt instructions alleged to be erroneous are Instruction Nos. 10, 12 and 13. Instruction No. 10 stated: The vice in this instruction is that it states that unless a juror can "give a good and substantial reason arising from the evidence or a lack of evidence in the case" for their opinion, the defendant should be found guilty. In order to entertain a reasonable doubt, it is not necessary for a juror to be able to articulate a good and substantial reason for his or her doubt. Because the State's burden is "beyond a reasonable doubt," the existence of any reasonable doubt is sufficient to bar a conviction. State v. Goff, supra. State's Instruction No. 12 was: In State v. Byers, W.Va., 224 S.E.2d 726, 734 (1976), we declined to hold as reversible error language in a reasonable doubt instruction stating that "[t]he law does not require proof amounting to absolute certainty, nor proof beyond all possibility of mistake." We did however find other portions of the instruction to be erroneous.[2] We believe there is a considerable difference between telling jurors that proof beyond all possibility of mistake is not required to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard and telling them they can convict even if they believe it possible that the defendant is not guilty. State's Instruction No. 13 stated: The citation at the bottom of this instruction indicates that it was taken from a Virginia case. However, the instruction analyzed in the Virginia case contained additional language in the italicized portion of the charge which served to set the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Nelson v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 909, 922, 150 S.E. 407, 411 (1929). Here, in the finding portion of the charge, the jury is merely instructed that if they find the defendant guilty it is their duty to so find. There is no reference in the finding portion of the charge to the reasonable doubt standard. We conclude that where the State's instructions attempt to define reasonable doubt and such definitions are in substantial variance from customary reasonable doubt language so that the jury may well have convicted on a lesser standard of proof, such instructions will constitute reversible error.[3]State v. Byers, supra. We further find that the State's instructions in this case substantially vary from customary reasonable doubt language and invite the jury to convict on a lesser standard of proof than the customary beyond a reasonable doubt theory and therefore constitute reversible error. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Webster County is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Reversed and Remanded. [1] Syllabus Point 4 of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), is: "In a criminal prosecution, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime with which the defendant is charged, and it is error for the court to instruct the jury in such a manner as to require it to accept a presumption as proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any material element of the crime with which the defendant is charged or as requiring the defendant either to introduce evidence to rebut the presumption or to carry the burden of proving the contrary." [2] The erroneous portion of the Byers instruction was: "`If, after having carefully and impartially heard and weighed all the evidence, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty with such degree of certainty that you would act upon the faith of it in your own most important and critical affairs, then the evidence is sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty.' (emphasis added)" State v. Byers, W.Va., 224 S.E.2d 726, 734 (1976). [3] In Note 9 of State v. Goff, W.Va., 272 S.E.2d 457, 463 (1980), we offered a standard instruction on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof.