Case Title: State v. Monroe

Citation: 2005-Ohio-2282

Docket Number: 20022241

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384  , 2005-Ohio-2282.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MONROE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 2002-2241 — Submitted February 1, 2005 — Decided May 25, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, No. 01CR04-2118. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} In the early morning of April 17, 1996, Travinna Simmons and 
Deccarla Quincy were murdered in Quincy’s apartment on Columbus’s east side.  
Four years later, the Cold Case Unit of the Columbus Police Homicide 
Department obtained evidence implicating Shannon Boyd and defendant-
appellant, Jonathon Monroe, in the double homicide.  Monroe was found guilty of 
murdering Simmons and Quincy and was sentenced to death.  This is Monroe’s 
appeal. 
{¶ 2} In 1996, Shannon Boyd had known Monroe for a few years and 
had sold drugs with him.  According to Boyd, on April 16, 1996, Monroe phoned 
Boyd and asked him if he wanted “to take a ride.”  Monroe picked Boyd up and 
told him he had to meet someone on the east side of Columbus.  They then drove 
to the Classic Lounge. 
{¶ 3} Boyd later testified that inside the lounge, Monroe began talking to 
Deccarla Quincy and Travinna Simmons, whom Boyd described as flirtatious.  
The women invited Boyd and Monroe to smoke marijuana with them, and they all 
agreed to meet at Quincy’s apartment nearby.  Federal authorities were watching 
Quincy’s apartment because the women were reputed to be dealers in large 
quantities of drugs. 
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{¶ 4} According to Boyd, he and Monroe got into Monroe’s car, and 
Monroe told Boyd that he planned to smoke marijuana with the women and have 
them call their friends.  He told Boyd that while Boyd stayed with the women, he 
would ride around with the women’s friends, rob them, and then come back to get 
Boyd and act as if nothing had happened.  But Boyd refused to go along with the 
plan, and when Monroe tried to give him a gun, Boyd refused that, too.  Monroe 
shoved the gun under his driver’s seat and told Boyd: “Quit being a pussy.” 
{¶ 5} Monroe and Boyd exited the car and followed the women into 
Quincy’s third-floor apartment.  Boyd noticed that the cigars in Quincy’s 
apartment were not the type he preferred for making marijuana cigars, so he went 
back to Monroe’s car to retrieve his own cigars.  When Boyd reentered Quincy’s 
apartment, Simmons and Quincy were sitting on a couch, and Monroe was 
standing in front of them holding a gun.  The gun was different from the one 
Monroe had showed Boyd earlier.  Boyd told Monroe that he did not want to go 
along with what Monroe was doing.  Monroe pointed the gun at Boyd and asked 
him, “Do you want to die?”  When Boyd replied no, Monroe told him to shut the 
door and do what he said. 
{¶ 6} Boyd stated that Monroe gave him a pair of yellow latex 
dishwashing gloves to put on.  Monroe then told Boyd to tape the women’s hands 
and ankles with clear packing tape that was on a table in the apartment.  While 
Boyd taped the ankles and wrists of the woman he referred to as the “big girl” 
(Simmons), one of the glove’s fingertips came off after getting stuck on the tape.  
When Boyd began taping the ankles of the “smaller girl” (Quincy), Monroe told 
Boyd he was doing it wrong and told him to get a knife from the kitchen.  Monroe 
taped Quincy’s ankles and then began asking the women where the drugs and 
money were.  The women repeatedly denied having any.  Monroe took the knife 
Boyd had brought from the kitchen and began poking the women with it, asking 
them where the drugs were.  When the women denied having any drugs, Monroe 
January Term, 2005 
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stabbed them.  Monroe then told Boyd to separate the women.  Boyd grabbed 
Simmons and dragged her into a bedroom. 
{¶ 7} According to Boyd, Monroe put Simmons in a headlock while 
demanding drugs and money and stabbed her in the chest when she said that she 
and Quincy did not have any.  Monroe put Simmons on a bed, then picked up 
Quincy from the couch and carried her into another bedroom.  Boyd then 
panicked and ran out of the apartment and down the outside stairwell. 
{¶ 8} Monroe later told a cellmate that after Boyd ran away, Monroe 
“went ahead and dumped them in the head,” meaning he shot both women in the 
head.  Boyd heard gunshots when he was at the bottom of the stairwell.  He then 
ran to a nearby gas station, where he called a cab. 
{¶ 9} Bennett and Patricia Wise lived in the apartment below Quincy’s.  
Bennett was awakened by the scuffling and screaming coming from Quincy’s 
apartment.  Patricia, who was in the living room talking on the phone, also heard 
screaming and scuffling.  She called 911.  Patricia and Bennett heard someone 
running down the apartment-complex stairwell, and Bennett looked out from a 
window and saw a thin man wearing a greenish-yellow jacket running “real fast” 
from the apartment stairwell.  Bennett recalled hearing “maybe four” gunshots.  
After the shots were fired, he saw a shorter, stocky, heavy man with a “mini-afro” 
run from the apartment stairwell with a gun in his hand.  Other witnesses 
described Monroe as having been heavyset at the time of the murders. 
{¶ 10} Patricia also looked out the apartment window during the 
commotion.  She first saw a young, tall, thin man run out wearing what she 
described as a “bright lined yellow jacket.”  Shots were still being fired in the 
apartment above when she saw the first man.  After the first man fled the scene, 
Patricia saw a stocky black man come out of the stairwell.  Patricia recalled that 
all the shots were fired from the apartment above.  She estimated that seven or 
eight shots were fired. 
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{¶ 11} Columbus Police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and found 
the bodies of Simmons and Quincy.  The apartment appeared to have been 
ransacked.  Shell casings found in Quincy’s apartment indicated that the women 
had been shot with a nine-millimeter firearm.  Also found at the crime scene were 
pieces from a yellow rubber glove.  Police collected blood from the front door of 
Quincy’s apartment. 
{¶ 12} Although both women had suffered several sharp-instrument 
wounds, the coroner attributed Quincy’s death to a gunshot wound to the head and 
Simmons’s death to multiple gunshot wounds, including a fatal gunshot wound to 
her head. 
{¶ 13} The murders remained unsolved for several years.  In January 
2000, Detective Richard Bisutti of the Columbus Police Cold Case Unit was 
assigned the case.  He had information that Monroe had been scheduled to make a 
drug transaction with one of the victims on the day of the homicides.  The 
detectives began viewing Monroe as a suspect in the slayings after blood samples 
they obtained from him matched blood recovered from the crime scene. 
{¶ 14} During the fall of 2000, Boyd implicated Monroe in the murders 
and made a plea bargain with the prosecutor to plead guilty to two counts of 
involuntary manslaughter in exchange for his testimony against Monroe.  Charles 
White, who shared a cell with Monroe in the county jail in November 2001, also 
implicated Monroe based on conversations he had with Monroe while they were 
incarcerated together. 
{¶ 15} Mark Hardy, a firearms examiner, concluded that the casings 
recovered at the scene, as well as bullets recovered from the two murder victims, 
were fired from a nine-millimeter firearm, likely a semiautomatic pistol.  Hardy 
found that three different brands of ammunition were used in the slayings; 
however, no evidence suggested that more than one weapon was involved. 
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{¶ 16} Lynn Bolin, a forensic scientist with the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation (“BCI”) specializing in DNA analysis, testified 
that blood found on the front door of Quincy’s apartment was a mixture from 
various sources.  The major DNA profile found in the mixture was consistent with 
Monroe’s.  Although the two victims could not be excluded as minor contributors 
to the mixture found on the apartment door, Boyd was excluded as a contributor.  
Bolin opined that Monroe could not be excluded as the source of the major DNA 
profile of the blood.  The profile found occurs in one in every 29.140 quadrillion 
in the Caucasian population, one in every 2.336 quadrillion in the African-
American population, and one in every 1.538 quadrillion in the Hispanic 
population. 
{¶ 17} In April 2001, a grand jury indicted Monroe on eight counts of 
aggravated murder for the killings of Quincy and Simmons.  Each count included 
a firearms specification and four death-penalty specifications: murder in 
connection with (1) an aggravated burglary, (2) an aggravated robbery, and (3) 
kidnapping (R.C. 2929.04[A][7]), and (4) murder as part of a course of conduct 
involving the killing of two persons (R.C. 2929.04 [A][5]).  Monroe was also 
indicted on one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, 
and two counts of kidnapping. 
{¶ 18} During a jury trial, the state presented a number of witnesses, 
including Boyd.  Monroe presented three defense witnesses, including Boyd and 
White.  Defense witness Nathaniel Gilmore, who had lived with Boyd after the 
murders, testified that Boyd had told him that he murdered the two women and 
had never mentioned that anyone was with him.  White testified that when he and 
Boyd were in jail, Boyd told him that he and Monroe had stabbed and shot the 
two victims.  When another inmate expressed disbelief that Boyd could ever stab 
or shoot anyone, Boyd revised his story and said that Monroe was the one who 
had stabbed and shot the two women.  When called by the defense, Boyd denied 
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ever having talked to Gilmore about the murders and denied telling White that he 
had stabbed the victims.  The trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury that 
the testimony by Gilmore and White regarding what Boyd had told them was 
admitted solely to test the credibility of Boyd and was not to be considered for 
any other purpose. 
{¶ 19} After deliberation, the jury found Monroe guilty as charged.  At 
the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended death, and the trial 
court imposed the death sentence. 
I 
TRIAL ISSUES 
Gruesome Photographs 
{¶ 20} In propositions of law II, V, and VIII, Monroe claims that the trial 
court erred in admitting gruesome photographs during both phases of trial. 
{¶ 21} Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is 
left to a trial court’s sound discretion.  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 
601, 605 N.E.2d 916; State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 121, 559 
N.E.2d 710; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264, 15 OBR 379, 473 
N.E.2d 768.  Nonrepetitive photographs in a capital case, even if gruesome, are 
admissible if the probative value of each photograph outweighs the danger of 
material prejudice to the accused.  Maurer, paragraph seven of the syllabus; State 
v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267. 
{¶ 22} In proposition of law II, Monroe contends that many of the photos 
admitted in both phases of trial depicting the crime scene and the two victims at 
the morgue were gruesome and repetitive and deprived him of a fair trial and fair 
sentencing determination.  Monroe asserts that the sheer number of photographs 
admitted, over 200, rendered them repetitive and cumulative. 
{¶ 23} The defense filed a motion in limine to exclude all photos of the 
victims.  Prior to voir dire, the parties discussed the motion with the trial court, 
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and the defense then specifically objected to State’s Exhibit M-20, a morgue 
photo depicting a gaping cut on Quincy’s neck.  The trial court overruled the 
objection and stated that although the photo was gruesome, it was the only photo 
showing that particular wound. 
{¶ 24} At the close of the state’s case, the prosecutor moved to admit 
State’s Exhibits M (morgue photos of Quincy), N (morgue photos of Simmons), 
and P (crime-scene photos).  The prosecutor noted that out of the 24 photos 
constituting State’s Exhibit M, the court had excluded nine as too gruesome.  Of 
the 18 morgue photos of Simmons included in State’s Exhibit N, the court 
excluded six. 
{¶ 25} Monroe failed to object to the admission of any of the remaining 
photos, except for State’s Exhibit M-20, and has therefore waived all but plain 
error.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 
1364, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Yet Monroe fails to demonstrate plain error 
in the admission of any of the photos in issue.  We have reviewed all of these 
photos and hold that there was no plain error in admitting them. 
{¶ 26} We hold that all of these photos were relevant and helped to prove 
the killer’s intent and the lack of accident or mistake and illustrated the testimony 
of the detectives who described the crime scene and the coroner who described 
the wounds and injuries sustained by the two murder victims.  These photos gave 
the jury an “appreciation of the nature and circumstances of the crimes.”  State v. 
Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 251, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  Moreover, reversal is 
not required merely because a large number of photos were admitted.  State v. 
Smith, 97 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-6659, 780 N.E.2d 221, ¶ 35. 
{¶ 27} Here, the trial court reviewed all the photographs submitted by the 
state and removed those photos that it considered overly gruesome or repetitive or 
cumulative.  In so doing, the trial court exercised its discretion in admitting the 
photos.  See, e.g., State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 318, 686 N.E.2d 245; 
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State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 23.  We 
find no outcome-determinative plain error from the admission of these photos.  
Moreover, with respect to the one photograph Monroe did object to (the morgue 
photo showing the cut on Quincy’s neck), we find that its probative value 
outweighed any prejudice to Monroe. 
{¶ 28} In proposition of law V, Monroe argues that his counsel were 
ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the photographs during the 
guilt phase.  Monroe objects to the same photos (State’s Exhibits M, N, and P) as 
repetitive that he objected to in proposition of law II. 
{¶ 29} Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the 
defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.  
However, in no instance does Monroe demonstrate prejudice, i.e., “a reasonable 
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different.”  Bradley at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Given that the trial 
court reviewed the photographs — removing those it believed to be overly 
gruesome or repetitive — counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the 
photos admitted. 
{¶ 30} In proposition of law VIII, Monroe contends that the trial court 
erred in admitting gruesome photographs in the penalty phase over defense 
counsel’s objection. 
{¶ 31} Yet we have uniformly held that a trial court may properly allow 
repetition of much or all that occurred in the guilt phase, pursuant to R.C. 
2929.03(D)(1).  See, e.g., State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 282-283, 
528 N.E.2d 542; State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 
303, ¶ 73.  Exhibits from the guilt phase are relevant to the death-penalty 
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specifications and to the nature and circumstances of the offense.  State v. Mason 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 165, 694 N.E.2d 932; State v. Woodard (1993), 68 
Ohio St.3d 70, 78, 623 N.E.2d 75. 
{¶ 32} Here, the trial court noted the defense’s objection to the admission 
of the photographs that had been admitted in the guilt phase and reviewed the 
photos again.  As a result, the trial court excluded three gruesome photos from the 
penalty phase: State’s Exhibits N-2, N-3, and M-20.  Given the trial court’s 
renewed scrutiny of the photos at the close of the penalty phase, Monroe’s claim 
of error is not persuasive. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, propositions II, V, and VIII are not well taken. 
Guilt-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 34} In proposition of law III, Monroe asserts that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of 
murder and involuntary manslaughter, as requested by defense counsel.  Monroe 
contends that the jury could have believed that Boyd exaggerated his story or 
could have chosen not to believe the parts of Boyd’s testimony bearing upon prior 
calculation and design.  According to Monroe, the jury had good reason to 
disbelieve Boyd’s testimony, because the defense called two acquaintances of 
Boyd’s, Nathaniel Gilmore and Charles White, who testified that Boyd had told 
them that he was the killer. 
{¶ 35} We note that only two of the eight aggravated-murder counts 
(Counts 1 and 2) against Monroe alleged prior calculation and design.  The 
remaining six aggravated-murder counts were felony-murder counts.  Thus, even 
if we were to accept Monroe’s argument, only those two aggravated-murder 
counts would be affected.  See State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 338, 
738 N.E.2d 1178. 
{¶ 36} Murder (R.C. 2903.02) is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder (R.C. 2903.01[A]).  State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 161, 694 N.E.2d 
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932.  The sole difference is that prior calculation and design is absent from 
murder.  State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 345, 703 N.E.2d 1251.  
Involuntary manslaughter (R.C. 2903.04) is also a lesser included offense of 
aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01[A]).  State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The primary difference is 
that aggravated murder requires a purpose to kill, while involuntary manslaughter 
requires only that a killing occur as a proximate result of committing or 
attempting to commit a felony.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 218, 
15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶ 37} However, “[e]ven though an offense may be statutorily defined as 
a lesser included offense of another, a charge on such lesser included offense is 
required only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both 
an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included 
offense.”  State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  In making this determination, the trial court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the defendant.  State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 47-48, 630 N.E.2d 339.  When the evidence presented at trial does not 
meet this test, a charge on the lesser included offense is not required.  State v. 
Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 282-283, 513 N.E.2d 311. 
{¶ 38} Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Monroe, 
there was no reasonable basis for the jury to find that the element of prior 
calculation and design was absent.  Monroe brought a gun and yellow latex gloves 
to Quincy’s apartment.  He tortured the two victims with a knife, inflicting stab 
wounds to their chests that would have been fatal if not treated.  He moved the 
women to different rooms.  He inflicted a fatal gunshot wound to Quincy’s head 
and several fatal gunshot wounds to Simmons’s head and body.  His actions 
occurred over a period of time and were not the result of a sudden decision.  
Therefore, we hold that an instruction on murder was not warranted. 
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{¶ 39} The evidence of prior calculation and design presented in this case 
was, in our view, stronger than the evidence in State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 
331, 703 N.E.2d 1251.  In Goodwin, we held that the trial court correctly refused 
to give a requested instruction on murder in a case involving one victim killed 
during the robbery of a store.  In that case, we held that putting the murder 
weapon to the forehead of the cooperative, unresisting victim and firing the 
weapon was sufficient evidence to support the element of prior calculation and 
design.  Id. at 344-345, 703 N.E.2d 1251. 
{¶ 40} Monroe argues, however, that the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that Boyd had lied and that Boyd was the actual killer.  Monroe points 
to testimony from Nathaniel Gilmore and Charles White, who both testified that 
Boyd had admitted killing the two women.  However, the trial court gave a 
limiting instruction to the jury that that testimony was admitted solely to impeach 
the credibility of Boyd and was not to be considered for any other purpose. 
{¶ 41} Even if the testimony of Gilmore and White had been admitted as 
evidence that Boyd was the killer, it would not have supported a lesser-included-
offense instruction for murder.  According to Gilmore, Boyd said that he was the 
sole killer of the two women and did not say that Monroe or anyone else was with 
him at the time.  Thus, under the version that Boyd allegedly told Gilmore, 
Monroe would have to be acquitted, since he was not involved in the murders at 
all.  Cf. State v. Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 388-389, 18 O.O.3d 528, 415 
N.E.2d 303. 
{¶ 42} According to White, Boyd told him two different versions of what 
had happened.  Under one version, both Boyd and Monroe stabbed and shot the 
two women.  Under the other version, Boyd fled the scene before the shootings 
took place.  Thus, there was nothing in White’s testimony whereby the jury could 
reasonably conclude that Monroe had acted without prior calculation and design 
and was guilty only of murder. 
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{¶ 43} Likewise, there was no evidence whereby the jury could 
reasonably conclude that Monroe had acted without purpose to kill, which would 
make him guilty only of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.  
The manner in which the victims were killed clearly points to purposeful killings.  
Both victims were stabbed repeatedly and shot in the head. 
{¶ 44} Both Boyd and White testified for the state.  Boyd essentially 
testified that Monroe had wanted to rob the women of drugs and was prepared to 
kill them, as evidenced by his bringing gloves and a gun to the apartment.  
According to White’s testimony as a prosecution witness, Monroe admitted 
stabbing the two women and then shooting them in the head so that he would not 
leave any witnesses. 
{¶ 45} Moreover, even if the testimony from Gilmore and White 
regarding Boyd’s alleged confession had been admitted to prove that Boyd was 
the killer, it did not portray Monroe as a mere accomplice, lacking a purpose to 
kill.  Under Gilmore’s testimony, Monroe was not involved in the killings.  Under 
White’s testimony, Monroe was directly involved in both the stabbings and the 
shootings.  Under the evidence admitted at trial, no jury could have reasonably 
found the absence of a purpose to kill on the part of Monroe.  Hence, the trial 
court properly refused to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.  See State 
v. Smith (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 323, 330-331, 731 N.E.2d 645; State v. Raglin 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 257-258, 699 N.E.2d 482.  Accordingly, we reject 
proposition III. 
Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence 
{¶ 46} In proposition of law IV, Monroe argues that the verdicts in his 
case were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest 
weight of the evidence.  Specifically, Monroe asserts that the state failed to prove 
the element of prior calculation and design. 
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{¶ 47} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  “[T]he weight to be given 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the 
facts.”  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 
212, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 48} We hold that the evidence in this case was sufficient to establish 
Monroe’s guilt of the crimes and to prove prior calculation and design.  The 
state’s evidence showed that Monroe cajoled Boyd to take a ride with him.  They 
drove to a bar on the east side of Columbus where they met up with Quincy and 
Simmons.  The women invited Monroe and Boyd to Quincy’s apartment to smoke 
marijuana.  Shortly thereafter, Monroe confided to Boyd that he planned to rob 
the women’s friends. 
{¶ 49} At the apartment, Monroe brandished a gun, produced yellow latex 
gloves, and told Boyd to wear the gloves and bind the women’s hands and ankles 
with packing tape.  Monroe rummaged through the apartment looking for drugs.  
Monroe then ordered Boyd to retrieve a knife from the kitchen.  Monroe then 
stabbed the women with a knife, demanding that they give him drugs.  He and 
Boyd moved the women to different bedrooms.  Boyd panicked and fled the 
apartment.  Monroe then shot both women in the head and fled the scene. 
{¶ 50} While in jail with Charles White, Monroe admitted stabbing and 
shooting both women after they denied having drugs, which Monroe believed 
were in Quincy’s apartment.  The DNA profile of blood recovered from the front 
door of Quincy’s apartment was consistent with Monroe’s DNA profile.  This 
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DNA profile would be found in only one of every 2.336 quadrillion African-
Americans. 
{¶ 51} Viewing the foregoing evidence in favor of the state, we hold that 
there was sufficient evidence to support Monroe’s convictions for the aggravated 
burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and murder with prior calculation and 
design of both Quincy and Simmons. 
{¶ 52} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether “there is 
substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the 
elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis sic.)  State v. 
Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193, 702 N.E.2d 866, citing State v. Eley 
(1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 10 O.O.3d 340, 383 N.E.2d 132, syllabus.  The 
evidence we set forth above collectively represents “substantial evidence” and 
supports the convictions.  In our view, the jury did not lose its way, and this is not 
“ ‘the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 
conviction.’ ”  State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d. 
541, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 
N.E.2d 717; State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 25, 752 N.E.2d 859. 
{¶ 53} Accordingly, we overrule proposition IV. 
II 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 54} In propositions of law IX and X, Monroe argues that the penalty-
phase jury instructions denied him a fair trial. 
{¶ 55} In proposition IX, Monroe contends that he was prejudiced 
because the second of three verdict forms submitted to the jury for each of the 
eight aggravated murder counts stated that a life-imprisonment verdict must be 
unanimous.  Monroe asserts that recommendation of a life sentence need not be 
unanimous and that the jurors should recommend a life sentence if they are 
January Term, 2005 
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anything other than unanimously in favor of a death verdict.  Yet Monroe’s failure 
to object at trial waived all but plain error.  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  No plain error occurred. 
{¶ 56} The second verdict form given to the jury for each of the eight 
aggravated murder counts provided: 
{¶ 57} “We, the Jury, having reached a deadlock on whether the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt, hereby unanimously recommend the following life sentences on Count * * 
* (check one): 
{¶ 58} “___ Life Imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 full years. 
{¶ 59} “___ Life Imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 full years.” 
{¶ 60} In State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 
264, paragraph ten of the syllabus, we held: “In returning a sentence of life 
imprisonment under R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), the jury’s verdict must be unanimous.”  
Thus, contrary to Monroe’s assertion, unanimity is indeed required in order for 
the jury to return a life sentence. 
{¶ 61} Monroe cites State v. Springer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 
N.E.2d 96, and State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 1030, but 
neither case supports his argument.  In Springer, we held that if the jury becomes 
irreconcilably deadlocked in the penalty phase of a capital trial and is unable to 
reach a unanimous verdict to recommend any sentence authorized by R.C. 
2929.03(C)(2), then the trial court is required to impose a life sentence.  Springer 
at syllabus.  In Brooks, we recognized that in Ohio, a solitary juror may prevent a 
death-penalty recommendation and held that juries from the date of that decision 
forward should be so instructed.  Brooks at 162, 661 N.E.2d 1030.  Yet Brooks 
also reaffirmed the Jenkins standard that the jury must be unanimous in returning 
a life verdict.  Id.  “In Ohio, it is required that a verdict of life imprisonment be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
unanimous, and that requirement has been upheld as constitutional.”  State v. 
Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 30, 752 N.E.2d 859. 
{¶ 62} Thus, the second verdict form for each of the aggravated-murder 
counts accurately reflected Ohio law, and we reject Monroe’s argument that a 
recommendation of a life sentence need not be unanimous. 
{¶ 63} In proposition of law X, Monroe claims that the trial court 
deprived him of a fair trial by using the term “recommendation” throughout voir 
dire and in its penalty-phase jury instructions when referring to the jury’s penalty 
verdict.  Yet, as Monroe concedes, use of the term “recommendation” in a jury 
instruction accurately reflects Ohio law.  State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
438, 444, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 559, 651 
N.E.2d 965.  Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the term 
“recommend” was not intended to “diminish [the jurors’] sense of responsibility 
in this matter.”  This instruction was nearly identical to the cautionary instruction 
we approved in State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 84, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  
Therefore, we overrule proposition X. 
Merger of Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶ 64} In proposition of law XII, Monroe argues that the trial court erred 
in failing to merge duplicative aggravating circumstances in the penalty phase. 
{¶ 65} Because Monroe failed to request a merger of the aggravated 
circumstances at trial, he waived all but plain error.  State v. Cook (1992), 65 
Ohio St.3d 516, 528, 605 N.E.2d 70; State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 39, 
544 N.E.2d 895.  Moreover, Monroe fails to specify which aggravating 
circumstances he believes should have been merged. 
{¶ 66} There 
were 
four 
aggravating 
circumstances/death-penalty 
specifications under each aggravated-murder count: (1) murder in connection with 
an aggravated burglary, (2) murder in connection with an aggravated robbery, (3) 
murder in connection with a kidnapping, and (4) murder as a course of conduct 
January Term, 2005 
17 
involving the purposeful killing of two or more persons.  However, as explained 
below, merger was not required for any of these aggravating circumstances. 
{¶ 67} Aggravated robbery and kidnapping.  Both victims in this case 
were bound at the hands and ankles with packing tape and were tortured with a 
knife.  According to Boyd, the victims were stabbed because they denied having 
drugs, which Monroe wanted to steal from them.  Given the prolonged torture, 
along with the fact that the bound victims were dragged into separate bedrooms, it 
is clear that the kidnappings had significance independent of the aggravated 
robbery.  See State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 280-281, 754 N.E.2d 1150.  Cf. 
State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 89-95, 
and State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 344, 715 N.E.2d 136 (two cases in 
which we held that the aggravating circumstances of aggravated robbery and 
kidnapping should have been merged). 
{¶ 68} Aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.  The aggravated-
burglary and aggravated-robbery specifications were also not subject to merger, 
since they were committed with separate animus.  The burglary was complete as 
soon as Monroe entered the apartment by deception with the intent to commit a 
theft offense.  Monroe then attempted to rob Quincy and Simmons of drugs that 
Monroe thought were in Quincy’s apartment.  Thus, the aggravated burglary and 
aggravated robbery were separate offenses and constituted separate aggravating 
circumstances because they did not arise from the same act.  See State v. Williams 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 580, 660 N.E.2d 724; State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 
344, 715 N.E.2d 136.  See, also, State v. Frazier (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 253, 256, 
12 O.O.3d 263, 389 N.E.2d 1118. 
{¶ 69} Aggravated burglary and kidnapping.  Merger was not required 
for the aggravated burglary and kidnapping specifications.  Aggravated burglary 
and kidnapping are not allied offenses of similar import.  State v. Waddy (1992), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
63 Ohio St.3d 424, 448, 588 N.E.2d 819; State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 344, 
715 N.E.2d 136. 
{¶ 70} Course of conduct and aggravated burglary, aggravated 
robbery, and kidnapping.  The course-of-conduct specification involved 
Monroe’s purposeful murder of two persons and is distinctly different from 
committing murder during an aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, or 
kidnapping.  No merger of specifications was required.  See State v. Smith (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 116, 684 N.E.2d 668 (specifications for multiple murder and for 
felony murder represent distinct and separate aggravating circumstances). 
{¶ 71} The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to merge any of 
the death-penalty specifications.  Therefore, we overrule proposition XII. 
Waiver of Mitigation 
{¶ 72} In propositions of law VII and XIII, Monroe argues that the trial 
court erred in how it conducted the penalty phase of Monroe’s trial. 
{¶ 73} In proposition VII, Monroe asserts that the trial court failed to 
determine whether he was competent to waive presentation of mitigating 
evidence.  Monroe contends that although he gave an unsworn statement, he 
addressed the statement to his family in the courtroom and offered nothing to the 
jury in mitigation.  Monroe further contends that the lone witness called to testify 
on his behalf, Eliza Dillard, had not seen him in over 20 years and could testify 
only as to his poor upbringing. 
{¶ 74} Monroe contends that the trial court failed to adhere to our holding 
in State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231.  In Ashworth, we 
held, in paragraph one of the syllabus: “In a capital case, when a defendant wishes 
to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence, a trial court must conduct an 
inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether the waiver is 
knowing and voluntary.”  (Emphasis sic.)  However, Ashworth has no 
applicability here because Monroe did not waive presentation of all mitigating 
January Term, 2005 
19 
evidence.  Given our emphasis in Ashworth on the word “all,” it is clear that we 
intended to require an inquiry of a defendant only in those situations where the 
defendant chooses to present no mitigating evidence whatsoever. 
{¶ 75} Moreover, Monroe’s claim that he essentially presented no 
mitigating evidence is not borne out by the record.  Regardless of how Monroe 
characterizes it, he did in fact present mitigating evidence.  Eliza Dillard testified 
about Monroe’s upbringing in West Virginia.  Dillard stated that Monroe’s family 
suffered a hard life in the early 1980s, and she told of infidelity and other 
problems in his parents’ marriage.  She told the jury that Monroe’s father 
eventually left the family. 
{¶ 76} Monroe gave an unsworn statement to the jury, and he described 
the hard life he had had as a child, including the absence of his father, and said 
that both of his parents had endured abuse during their upbringing.  Monroe’s 
unsworn statement was directed at the jury, not his family, as he now claims.  For 
example, Monroe noted near the end of his statement:  “Like I said before, I 
respect all of your decisions and I think that if the evidence is presented to you the 
way I think it should have been, I don’t think I would be sitting here begging for 
my life now.  Well, I’m not begging for my life * * *.”  Even assuming that 
Monroe directed his statement at his family, it is clear that his statement was also 
directed at the jury. 
{¶ 77} Monroe also suggests that his family members could have given 
additional mitigation testimony but cites nothing in the record to support this 
assertion.  In fact, defense counsel informed the trial court that they complied 
with Monroe’s request not to have any of his family testify in his behalf. 
{¶ 78} And even if family members had testified in Monroe’s behalf, it is 
not clear that their testimony would have helped Monroe avoid a death sentence.  
Given that Monroe was already serving a prison term for murder in an unrelated 
case, a thorough mitigation presentation could have opened the door for the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
prosecution to introduce evidence of that murder conviction, a fact the defense 
naturally wanted to keep from the jury. 
{¶ 79} As we noted in State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 63, 706 N.E.2d 
1231, even if a trial court were to require defense counsel to present mitigating 
evidence, it could not force an unwilling defendant to provide that evidence to his 
attorney.  Moreover, if a defendant does not want to present mitigating evidence, 
“no societal interest counterbalances his right to control his own defense.”  State 
v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 553 N.E.2d 576. 
{¶ 80} Moreover, a capital defendant’s decision to forgo mitigation “does 
not by itself call his competence into question.”  Id. at 29, 553 N.E.2d 576.  
“[A]bsent a request by counsel, or any indicia of incompetence, a competency 
evaluation is not required.”  Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 62, 706 N.E.2d 1231.  A 
court is required to inquire into a capital defendant’s competence only if some 
reason other than the decision to forgo presentation of mitigation evidence exists 
that calls into question the defendant’s competence.  See State v. Cowans (1999), 
87 Ohio St.3d 68, 82, 717 N.E.2d 298.  Neither Monroe’s behavior at trial nor his 
decision to limit the amount of mitigating evidence presented in his behalf 
provided cause to call his competence into question.  Nor did his counsel, who 
worked with him closely, raise any questions about Monroe’s competence.  
Deference on such issues should be granted to those “who see and hear what goes 
on in the courtroom.”  Id. at 84, 717 N.E.2d 298. 
{¶ 81} In summary, we hold that Monroe did present mitigating evidence.  
Therefore, State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231, syllabus, does 
not apply in this case.  Monroe’s behavior did not raise questions concerning his 
competence at any time during trial.  Therefore, the trial court was not obligated 
to order a competency evaluation sua sponte. 
{¶ 82} Thus, proposition VII is not well taken. 
January Term, 2005 
21 
{¶ 83} In proposition of law XIII, Monroe asserts that the trial court did 
not permit the jury to hear all relevant mitigating evidence, because it permitted 
defendant to waive presentation of potentially relevant testimony from numerous 
witnesses. 
{¶ 84} However, as we discussed in response to proposition VII, a capital 
defendant cannot be compelled to present mitigating evidence.  As we observed in 
State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 63, 706 N.E.2d 1231, “a rule requiring the 
presentation of mitigating evidence would be impossible to enforce.  Even if the 
court attempted to require an attorney to present mitigating evidence, it cannot 
force an unwilling defendant to provide that evidence to his attorney.”  Nor does 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution compel a capital 
defendant to present mitigation evidence against his will.  See id. at 64, 706 
N.E.2d 1231. 
{¶ 85} We do not find error in the trial court’s respecting Monroe’s 
decision to limit the amount of mitigating evidence presented to the jury.  As we 
stated in State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 28, 553 N.E.2d 576, no societal interest 
counterbalances the defendant’s right to control his own defense. 
{¶ 86} Accordingly, proposition XIII is overruled. 
III 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶ 87} In propositions of law I and XI, Monroe argues that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance 
requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient 
and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.E.2d 674, State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  However, in no instance does Monroe demonstrate 
deficient performance or “a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”  Bradley at paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 88} In proposition I, Monroe contends that counsel were deficient in 
failing to object to the form and substance of the testimony of David Devillers, 
the former prosecutor who negotiated the plea agreement with state’s witness 
Shannon Boyd. 
{¶ 89} Monroe concedes that defense counsel objected to Devillers’s 
testimony on two grounds before Devillers took the stand: first, that the state had 
not listed him as a potential witness, and second, that his testimony would be in 
the nature of rebuttal and therefore procedurally improper unless Devillers were 
called after the defense’s case. 
{¶ 90} The trial court overruled the defense’s objections and permitted 
Devillers to testify as a “fact witness.”  The state had proposed Devillers as a late 
prosecution witness to refute the defense’s assertion during opening statement that 
the police and prosecutor had “manufactured” evidence.  Moreover, the state 
wanted to refute defense counsel’s suggestion (during cross-examination of Boyd) 
that a secret deal had been made between the state and Boyd concerning the 
length of his sentence.  Defense counsel specifically raised Devillers’s name as 
the person who had worked out the plea bargain. 
{¶ 91} Monroe claims that Devillers testified that he believed Boyd had 
given truthful information in exchange for a plea deal.  Monroe asserts that his 
counsel should have objected to this testimony, which he claims vouched for 
Boyd’s testimony. Monroe contends that allowing Devillers’s testimony was 
contrary to our holding in State v. Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 128-129, 
545 N.E.2d 1220 (a child-molestation case in which we reversed the conviction 
because an expert witness had given her opinion as to the veracity of the child 
declarant). 
January Term, 2005 
23 
{¶ 92} In this case, however, Devillers did not testify that he believed that 
Boyd had testified truthfully.  Rather, he explained what had happened during the 
plea-bargaining process with Boyd.  Devillers explained that prosecutors will not 
make a deal with a witness unless they conclude that the witness is telling the 
truth.  While Devillers testified that he had agreed to the plea bargain with Boyd 
because he believed that Boyd was being truthful, he did not vouch for the 
truthfulness of Boyd’s testimony.  Rather, Devillers noted that the determination 
whether Boyd was giving truthful testimony was “completely up to the jury.” 
{¶ 93} Through Devillers’s testimony, the prosecution sought to establish 
that the state and police had not manufactured evidence and that there was no 
“secret deal” made with Boyd.  Similar to the situation we faced in State v. 
Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 449, 751 N.E.2d 946, the prosecutor here 
established that there was a plea agreement with the witness, and as part of that 
agreement, the witness had agreed to tell the truth.  See, also, State v. Williams 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d, 1, 12-13, 679 N.E.2d 646.  Even if part of Devillers’s 
testimony was improper, any error did not affect the outcome of Monroe’s trial, 
especially in view of the abundant evidence of Monroe’s guilt.  Therefore, 
counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to certain aspects of Devillers’s 
testimony. 
{¶ 94} Monroe asserts that although the state never offered Devillers as an 
expert witness, his testimony bore all the indicia of expert testimony, since it 
explained the new criminal-sentencing law, the parole laws, the difference 
between murder and manslaughter, and how prosecutors make plea bargains.  
Monroe contends that it was improper to allow Devillers to testify, in effect, as an 
expert witness, since the trial court did not formally qualify him as such. 
{¶ 95} Monroe concedes that the state did not offer Devillers as an expert 
witness and that the trial court allowed his testimony as a “fact witness.”  Even if 
we were to view Devillers as an expert witness not formally qualified by the trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
court, it is clear that Devillers’s knowledge of criminal law and of the facts and 
circumstances of Boyd’s plea bargain is not knowledge possessed by the average 
lay person.  Thus, Devillers was qualified to testify as an expert on such matters 
under Evid.R. 702, even though the court did not formally qualify him as one.  
See State v. Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 709 N.E.2d 128. 
{¶ 96} Therefore, we overrule proposition I. 
{¶ 97} In proposition XI, Monroe argues that there were four instances of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. 
{¶ 98} First, Monroe contends that counsel were deficient in allowing him 
to waive mitigation without determining whether he was competent to do so.  
However, as we noted in our discussion in response to proposition VII, Monroe 
did not waive presentation of mitigating evidence.  Monroe called a former 
neighbor to testify in his behalf and gave an unsworn statement to the jury.  
Moreover, he instructed defense counsel not to call members of his family to 
testify in his behalf.  Although Monroe now contends that he “essentially” waived 
presentation of mitigating evidence, State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 
N.E.2d 1231, paragraph one of the syllabus, does not apply to Monroe’s case, 
since mitigating evidence was in fact presented to the jury. 
{¶ 99} Nor does the record reveal sufficient indicia of incompetence to 
have required the trial court or defense counsel to request a competency 
evaluation of Monroe.  Counsel became familiar with Monroe in representing 
him, and if they had any reason to question Monroe’s competency in any respect, 
they surely would have done so.  See State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 
411, 692 N.E.2d 151.  Neither Monroe’s behavior at trial nor any testimony 
presented in his behalf provided “sufficient indicia of incompetence” to warrant a 
competency hearing.  See State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 
N.E.2d 433.  Therefore, counsel were not deficient in failing to request a 
competency evaluation of Monroe. 
January Term, 2005 
25 
{¶ 100} Second, Monroe asserts that counsel were ineffective for not 
presenting relevant mitigating testimony by Monroe’s family members.  Yet as 
we noted above, counsel presented the mitigating evidence that Monroe allowed 
them to present.  Monroe specifically instructed counsel not to call any of his 
family to testify in mitigation.  An attorney does not render ineffective assistance 
by declining, in deference to a client’s desires, to present mitigating evidence.  
See, e.g., State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d at 81, 717 N.E.2d 298; State v. Keith 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536-537, 684 N.E.2d 47. 
{¶ 101} Third, Monroe contends that counsel were ineffective by not 
requesting the court to merge the aggravating circumstances.  However, as we 
discussed in response to proposition XII, none of the aggravating 
circumstances/death-penalty specifications required merger.  Therefore, counsel 
were not deficient in failing to request it. 
{¶ 102} Moreover, counsel were not deficient in not objecting to the 
instruction that the jury was to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors.  In State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 126, 734 N.E.2d 
1237, we stated that “[a]ggravating circumstances in a single count are considered 
collectively in assessing the penalty for that count * * *.”  Accord State v. Cooey 
(1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 103} Last, Monroe claims that counsel were ineffective for not 
objecting to the trial court’s repeated use of the term “recommendation” and to 
the second verdict form used for each murder count, which stated that a decision 
to impose a life sentence had to be unanimous.  However, as we discussed in 
response to proposition X, use of the term “recommendation” correctly reflects 
Ohio law, and counsel were not deficient in failing to object. 
{¶ 104} Similarly, counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the 
verdict forms requiring a unanimous verdict for a life sentence.  As we discussed 
in response to proposition IX, Ohio law requires a unanimous verdict for life 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
sentences.  State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, 
paragraph ten of the syllabus. 
{¶ 105} Based on the foregoing, Monroe’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are not well taken. 
IV 
Constitutionality of Death Penalty 
{¶ 106} In proposition of law VI, Monroe challenges Ohio’s death-
penalty statutes on numerous constitutional grounds, but these claims can be 
summarily rejected.  See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 
473 N.E.2d 264;  State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 
N.E.2d 795; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, 
syllabus. 
V 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE REVIEW 
Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶ 107} Upon independent assessment, we find that the evidence proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances in this case: Monroe 
murdered Deccarla Quincy and Travinna Simmons in connection with committing 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping, and as a course of 
conduct involving the murder of two persons. 
Mitigating Evidence 
{¶ 108} During the penalty phase, Monroe instructed defense counsel not 
to call any family members as mitigation witnesses.  Thus, Monroe presented one 
witness, Eliza Dillard, who had known Monroe when he was a child.  Dillard, a 
retired teacher, knew Monroe and his family in the early 1980s and knew 
Monroe’s grandfather from high school.  She stated that Monroe’s family had a 
hard life and that Monroe’s parents had a marriage fraught with infidelity, 
drinking, and fighting. 
January Term, 2005 
27 
{¶ 109} According to Dillard, Monroe’s mother was a very angry person.  
She frequented a nearby house where “a very permissive environment” of alcohol, 
sex, and possibly drugs was maintained.  Monroe’s father was a skilled carpenter 
but could not read or write.  Eventually, Monroe’s father left the family.  
Although Dillard had not seen Monroe for approximately 20 years, she said she 
was testifying in his behalf because of her love for him and God. 
{¶ 110} Dillard described Monroe as a unique child, in that he was 
somewhat of a leader among his four siblings.  For example, she had noticed that 
he usually tried to get them to obey their curfew. 
{¶ 111} Monroe gave an unsworn statement noting that he did not want 
his family to testify in his behalf.  He said, “I don’t want any of them getting on 
the stand today and begging or pleading for my life; I won’t do it either.”  Monroe 
asserted that he had not been given a fair trial but offered his condolences to the 
families of the two victims.  He said several times that he was not begging for his 
life. 
{¶ 112} Monroe claimed that his lawyers had decided not to offer into 
evidence letters Boyd had written to him, offering him money to take 
responsibility for committing the murders. 
{¶ 113} Monroe also talked about his family life while growing up: “We 
had no water, electric, or food in the house, and no father provider, and often I 
went door to door asking for work.”  Monroe stated that he thought at times about 
blaming his parents — his mother for being depressed and his father for not being 
there for him.  However, he said that his mother had been abused and molested as 
a child by her father.  He also said that his father had blamed his own father 
(Monroe’s grandfather) for his bad actions.  Monroe asked, “How could anyone 
be a good mother and a good father if not raised by good parents?”  Yet Monroe 
said he ultimately placed no blame on anyone else for how his life had turned out. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶ 114} Monroe said that he is not proud that he had sold drugs.  He told 
the jurors that he respected their decision but thought the evidence was not 
presented to them the way he thought it should have been. 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 115} The nature and circumstances of the offenses offer nothing in 
mitigation.  Monroe deceived Quincy and Simmons by accepting their invitation 
to go to Quincy’s apartment to smoke marijuana, while Monroe was planning all 
along to rob the women’s friends.  Once Monroe got into the apartment, he held 
the two women at gunpoint, ordered Boyd to tie them up, and then tortured them 
with a knife before shooting both women in the head. 
{¶ 116} Monroe’s history, character, and background offer little in 
mitigation.  Monroe had a difficult childhood, and his father abandoned the 
family.  This history provides some mitigation. 
{¶ 117} With respect to the statutory mitigating factors of R.C. 
2929.04(B), we note that the trial court instructed the jury on mitigating factor 
(B)(4), the youth of the offender, and (B)(7), any other factor mitigating against a 
death sentence.  Monroe was 22 years old when he committed the two murders.  
As in previous capital cases, we accord some mitigating weight to the fact that 
Monroe committed his crime at that age.  See, e.g., State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 
31, 2004-Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 105. 
{¶ 118} None of the other statutory mitigating factors of R.C. 2929.04(B) 
appear applicable.  Neither Quincy nor Simmons induced or facilitated the 
murders.  Nor was there evidence that Monroe was under duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation at the time of the murders.  There is no evidence that Monroe 
suffers from a mental disease or defect.  And although Boyd assisted Monroe by 
tying up a victim and retrieving a knife from the kitchen, no credible evidence 
suggests that Monroe was not the principal offender.  Nor did Monroe lack a 
January Term, 2005 
29 
criminal record.  He was incarcerated in Chillicothe for murder at the time he was 
charged with these crimes. 
{¶ 119} Upon independent weighing, we find that the aggravating 
circumstances in each murder count outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  For purposes of reviewing the sentence, we now merge counts 
1, 3, 5, and 7 into one count for the murder of Quincy, and merge counts 2, 4, 6, 
and 8 into one count for the murder of Simmons.  See State v. Jones (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 403, 419, 739 N.E.2d 300.  The four aggravating circumstances in 
each count are particularly grave.  The two victims were held at gunpoint, bound, 
and tortured prior to being shot in the head. 
{¶ 120} As to the murder of each victim, the death penalty is both 
appropriate and proportionate when compared with capital cases involving 
aggravated murders during aggravated burglary, see, e.g., State v. Davie, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245, and for aggravated murders during aggravated 
robbery, see, e.g., State v. Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 653 N.E.2d 242, and 
State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482.  The death penalty is 
also appropriate and proportionate to death sentences approved for aggravated 
murders during kidnapping, see, e.g., State v. Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 
763 N.E.2d 122, and for aggravated murders as a course of conduct involving the 
purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons, see, e.g., State v. Keith, 
79 Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47; State v. Jordan, 101 Ohio St.3d 216, 2004-
Ohio-783, 804 N.E.2d 1; and State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-
4190, 813 N.E.2d 637. 
{¶ 121} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of common 
pleas, including the penalty of death, is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Steven L. Taylor, 
and Laura M. Rayce, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
W. Joseph Edwards and Todd W. Barstow, for appellant. 
______________________