Case Title: Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter

Citation: 

Docket Number: S251392

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BRUCE L. SCHECHTER et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S251392 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E066267 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIC1511553 
 
 
July 11, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
S251392 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Here the parties to a tort action agreed to settle their 
lawsuit.  Their agreement was reduced to writing and included 
several 
provisions 
purporting 
to 
impose 
confidentiality 
obligations on the parties and their counsel.  All parties signed 
the agreement and their lawyers signed under a notation that 
they approved the written agreement as to form and content.   
Counsel allegedly violated the agreement by making 
public statements about the settlement and were sued, inter 
alia, for breach of contract.  Counsel urged they were not 
personally bound by the confidentiality provisions and moved 
to dismiss the suit under the anti-SLAPP1 statutes.  As to the 
cause of action at issue here, the trial court denied counsels’ 
motion.  The Court of Appeal reversed that ruling, concluding 
the notation meant only that counsel recommended their 
clients sign the document.  We conclude the notation does not 
preclude a factual finding that counsel both recommended their 
clients sign the document and intended to be bound by its 
provisions.   
                                        
1  
“ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against 
public participation.’ ”  (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 
381, fn. 1 (Baral), citing Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer 
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.)   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2012, Wendy Crossland and Richard Fournier sued 
Monster Energy Company (“Monster Energy”) for products 
liability and wrongful death following the death of their 
daughter.  (Hereafter “the Crossland suit.”)  Bruce L. 
Schechter and his firm R. Rex Parris Law Firm represented 
Crossland and Fournier.2  In 2015, the parties entered into a 
confidential settlement agreement.  The agreement stated that 
it was made “on the behalf of the settling Parties, individually, 
as well as on the behalf of their, without limitation, respective 
beneficiaries, trustees, principals, attorneys, officers, directors, 
shareholders, employers, employees, parent company(ies), 
affiliated company(ies), subcontractors, members, partners, 
subsidiaries, insurers, predecessors, successors-in-interest, and 
assigns.”3  (Emphasis added.)  The agreement included a 
confidentiality 
clause: 
 
“The 
Parties 
understand 
and 
acknowledge that all of the terms, conditions and details of this 
Settlement Agreement including its existence are to remain 
confidential.  Plaintiffs and their counsel agree that they will 
keep completely confidential all of the terms and contents of 
                                        
2  
Crossland and Fournier were also represented by 
attorney Michael E. Blumenfield of Miles & Stockbridge P.C.   
3  
A section entitled “Binding Agreement” stated:  “The 
Parties acknowledge that this Settlement Agreement, inclusive 
of the releases contained herein, was the product of good faith 
negotiations, is final, and wholly binding upon them, as well as 
inure to the benefit of the Released Parties, inclusive of, but 
not limited to, their respective successors, devisees, executors, 
administrators, affiliates, representatives, insurers, spouse, 
dependents, successors, heirs, issue, assigns, officers, directors, 
partners, agents, subcontractors, attorneys, employers, and 
employees.”   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
this Settlement Agreement, and the negotiations leading 
thereto, and will not publicize or disclose the amounts, 
conditions, terms, or contents of this Settlement Agreement in 
any manner . . . .  [¶] Specifically, and without limitation, 
Plaintiffs and their counsel of record, individually and on 
behalf of themselves and their principals, partners, agents, 
attorneys, 
servants, 
representatives, 
parents, 
spouse, 
dependents, issue, heirs, insurers, predecessors, successors-in-
interest and assigns agree and covenant, absolutely and 
without limitation, to not publicly disclose to any person or 
entity, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, 
television, fliers, documentaries, brochures, Lawyers & 
Settlements, VerdictSearch (or the like), billboards, radio, 
newsletters, and/or the Internet” certain facts related to the 
settlement.  (Emphasis added.)  The agreement continued that 
“[i]n regard to any communication concerning the settlement of 
this Action, the Parties and their attorneys and each of them 
hereby agree that neither shall make any statement about the 
Action, each other party or Defendants’ products in relation to 
this Action, in the media, including but not limited to print, 
television, radio or Internet,” and any comment “shall be 
limited to the following, or words to their effect:  ‘This matter 
has been resolved.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  The agreement also 
contained other provisions referring to attorneys for the parties 
in the Crossland suit.4  The agreement was signed by the 
                                        
4  
The provisions included:  (1) a release and discharge of 
the parties and their attorneys from claims arising from the 
suit, except that “[n]othing herein, however, shall be deemed a 
limitation of any kind, release, and or discharge on, or 
prohibition of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ prosecution of any current 
or future claims against the Released Parties not arising out of 
 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
parties.  The parties’ attorneys, including Schechter, signed 
under the preprinted notation “APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT.”   
Shortly after the settlement, an article appeared on the 
website “LawyersandSettlements.com” entitled “ ‘Substantial 
Dollars’ for Family in Monster Energy Drink Wrongful Death 
Suit.”  The article, written by Brenda Craig, attributed several 
quotes to Schechter.  According to the article, “Schechter’s 
most recent case resulted in ‘substantial dollars’ for the family 
of a 14-year-old that went to the mall with girlfriends in the 
summer of 2011, drank two Monster Energy drinks and died of 
cardiac arrest.  [¶]  Schechter can’t reveal the exact amount 
because he says, ‘Monster wants the amount to be sealed.’ ”  
The article describes how Schechter has filed three additional 
suits against Monster Energy and quotes his statements that 
he believes its products are unsafe.  The article concluded with 
a link and a phone number for “Monster Energy Drink Injury 
Legal Help.”  Craig attested to the accuracy of Schechter’s 
statements quoted in the article.   
Monster Energy sued defendants Schechter and R. Rex 
Parris Law Firm, alleging four causes of action:  breach of 
contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith; unjust 
                                                                                                           
 
the Incident in any jurisdiction and venue”; and (2) a non-
disparagement clause applicable to the parties but which did 
not limit “Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ ability to disparage (within the 
confines of the law) Defendants or Defendants’ products in 
connection with other current or future litigation against the 
Released Parties in any jurisdiction and venue” or “Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ prosecution of other current or future litigation 
against the Released Parties in any jurisdiction and venue.”   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
enrichment; and promissory estoppel.  Defendants filed a 
special motion to strike the complaint (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 425.16), 
arguing 
the 
suit 
implicated 
Schechter’s 
constitutional free speech rights.  The court denied the motion 
as to the breach of contract claim but granted it as to the other 
causes of action.  The court found “the settlement clearly 
contemplates counsel as being subject to the agreement” and 
noted that “Schechter signed the agreement.”  The court 
concluded that the “suggestion that [Schechter] is not a party 
to the contract merely because he approved it as to form and 
content only is beyond reason.”  The Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion as to the 
breach of contract claim.  (See Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter 
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 54.)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Legal Background 
“Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets out a 
procedure for striking complaints in harassing lawsuits that 
are commonly known as SLAPP suits . . . which are brought to 
challenge the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech 
rights.”  (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 196.)  A cause of action arising from a 
person’s act in furtherance of the “right of petition or free 
speech under the United States Constitution or the California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject 
to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that 
the plaintiff has established that there is a probability” that 
the claim will prevail.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  
“The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants 
from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
petition or speech.  It only provides a procedure for weeding 
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected 
activity.  Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two 
steps.  First, the defendant must establish that the challenged 
claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.  
[Citation.]  If the defendant makes the required showing, the 
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the 
claim by establishing a probability of success.  We have 
described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like 
procedure.’  [Citation.]  The court does not weigh evidence or 
resolve conflicting factual claims.  Its inquiry is limited to 
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and 
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a 
favorable judgment.  It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, 
and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it 
defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.  [Citation.]  
‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ ”  
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385, fn. omitted.)  The grant 
or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo.  (Park 
v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)  As to the second step, a plaintiff seeking 
to demonstrate the merit of the claim “may not rely solely on 
its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made 
upon competent admissible evidence.”  (San Diegans for Open 
Government 
v. 
San 
Diego 
State 
University 
Research 
Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 95; see Grenier v. 
Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 480; City of Costa Mesa v. 
D’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 376; 
Paiva v. Nichols (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1017.)   
It is undisputed that defendants met their first-step 
showing.  The issue here is whether Monster Energy 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
sufficiently established a probability of prevailing on its breach 
of contract claim.  That claim, in turn, hinges on whether 
defendants were bound by the confidentiality provisions of the 
Crossland settlement.  “A settlement agreement is a contract, 
and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally 
apply to settlement contracts.  [Citation.]  An essential element 
of any contract is ‘consent.’  [Citations.]  The ‘consent’ must be 
‘mutual.’  [Citations.]  ‘Consent is not mutual, unless the 
parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.’  (Civ. 
Code, § 1580; see also Civ. Code, § 1636 . . . .)”  (Weddington 
Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810-811; 
see Civ. Code, § 1550 [essential elements of a contract].)  “ ‘The 
existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather 
than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward 
manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to 
believe.  [Citation.]  Accordingly, the primary focus in 
determining the existence of mutual consent is upon the acts of 
the parties involved.’ ”  (T.M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 
36 Cal.3d 273, 282; see Civ. Code, § 1565 [essentials of 
consent].)   
There is no question that the language of the settlement 
agreement generally, and the confidentiality provisions in 
particular, purported to encompass not only the Crossland 
parties but also their respective counsel.  Further, counsel 
could consent to be bound by the agreement’s provisions, and, 
ordinarily, “[i]n the absence of fraud, mistake, or another 
vitiating factor, a signature on a written contract is an 
objective manifestation of assent to the terms set forth there.”  
(Rodriguez v. Oto (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1027.)  
Defendants argue that Schechter’s signature on the settlement 
agreement did not manifest his consent to be bound by its 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
provisions because he signed under the notation “APPROVED 
AS TO FORM AND CONTENT.”  They urge his signature 
conveyed only that defendants were approving the agreement 
for their clients’ signatures.  The Court of Appeal agreed, 
relying on two cases construing similar notations:  Freedman v. 
Brutzkus (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1065 (Freedman) and RSUI 
Indem. Co. v. Bacon (Neb. 2011) 810 N.W.2d 666 (RSUI).   
In Freedman, two companies, Teddi and CAI, entered 
into a licensing agreement.  During negotiations, attorney 
Freedman 
represented 
Teddi 
while 
attorney 
Brutzkus 
represented CAI.  Because Freedman had performed legal 
services for CAI in the past, CAI agreed to waive any conflict of 
interest.  The licensing agreement explicitly stated that 
Freedman represented only Teddi’s interests.  In addition to 
the parties, the attorneys signed the licensing agreement with 
the notation, “ ‘Approved as to Form and Content.’ ”  
(Freedman, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068.)  A dispute 
arose and CAI sued Teddi, leading to the latter’s bankruptcy.  
CAI also sued Freedman, alleging Freedman had represented 
CAI during negotiations and that he made statements assuring 
CAI that Teddi would fulfill its obligations.  In the course of 
this suit, Brutzkus testified at a deposition that CAI and its 
owner “were relying on Freedman in connection with the 
transaction on the basis of their ‘ “long standing professional 
relationship,” ’ ” and Brutzkus “did not tell Freedman or 
anyone else representing Teddi about that reliance on 
Freedman, or that the conflict waiver provisions in the 
agreement were inaccurate.”  (Ibid.)   
Freedman then sued Brutzkus, alleging tort claims.  
Freedman asserted that “in approving the agreement, ‘as to 
form and content,’ Brutzkus made an actionable representation 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
. . . as to the accuracy of the agreement” that he knew was 
false because the agreement included an inaccurate conflict of 
interest waiver.  (Freedman, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1068.)  The trial court granted Brutzkus’s demurrer and the 
Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that “the only reasonable 
meaning to be given to a recital that counsel approves the 
agreement as to form and content, is that the attorney, in so 
stating, asserts that he or she is the attorney for his or her 
particular party, and that the document is in the proper form 
and embodies the deal that was made between the parties.”  
(Id. at p. 1070.)  Freedman approved the trial court’s 
characterization of the phrase as showing “that counsel has 
read the agreement, that the recital formalizes counsel’s 
involvement as attorney to one of the parties, . . . the recital 
adds solemnity to the contract’s formation,” and “Brutzkus 
gave this approval to his client.”  (Ibid.)  Freedman concluded 
“that Brutzkus’s signature approving the document as to form 
and content was not an actionable representation” to opposing 
counsel.  (Ibid.)   
The Nebraska Supreme Court in RSUI applied similar 
reasoning with respect to a breach of contract claim.  Ronald 
Bacon was injured while working on a construction site.  He 
sued Kiewit Construction, the general contractor, and Ridgetop 
Holdings, the parent company of the subcontractor that 
employed him.  Kiewit and Bacon settled.  The settlement 
agreement included a provision that, in the event Bacon settles 
with Ridgetop, “BACON and his attorneys” agree to pay Kiewit 
a specified percentage of the settlement.  (RSUI, supra, 810 
N.W.2d at p. 670.)  The attorneys for both parties signed the 
agreement under the notation, “ ‘Agreed to in Form & 
Substance.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Bacon subsequently settled with Ridgetop 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
but refused to pay anything to Kiewit.  Kiewit’s insurers sued 
Bacon and his attorneys for breach of contract and obtained a 
judgment.  (Id. at p. 671.)   
RSUI reversed the judgment as to Bacon’s attorneys, 
concluding they had no personal liability.  Although 
acknowledging “the general rule that an agent, acting for a 
disclosed principal, is not liable for the principal’s contract,” 
the court observed that “an agent can become personally liable 
if ‘the agent purports to bind himself or herself, or has 
otherwise bound himself or herself, to performance of the 
contract.’ ”  (RSUI, supra, 810 N.W.2d at p. 671.)  The court 
held the attorneys did not so bind themselves.  The signature 
“under the legend ‘Agreed to in Form & Substance’ 
demonstrates only that he was Bacon’s attorney[5] and that ‘the 
document [was] in the proper form and embodie[d] the deal 
that was made between the parties.’  Nothing about the 
signature indicates or implies an intent to incur personal 
liability on the contract.  Indeed, Kiewit’s attorney signed an 
identical signature block even though no contractual language 
could be construed to impose a personal obligation on Kiewit’s 
attorney.  In addition, the contractual language relied upon by 
[the insurers] is ambiguous, but at most governs the manner 
by which payment under the contract was to be made, not the 
parties which were to be liable for such payment.”  (Id. at p. 
672, fn. omitted.)   
The Court of Appeal here initially noted “that the 
confidentiality provisions of the settlement agreement did at 
least purport to bind the Attorneys.”  (Monster Energy Co. v. 
                                        
5  
Only one of Bacon’s attorneys signed the agreement.   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
Schechter, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 65.)  However, the court 
concluded defendant counsel were not bound by the agreement.  
It first reasoned that counsel were not identified as parties to 
the agreement and the parties could not bind them without 
their consent.  (Id. at pp. 66-67.)  Second, relying on Freedman 
and RSUI, the court reasoned that Schechter’s signature on 
the agreement did not express an intent to be bound:  “[T]he 
language in the settlement agreement purporting to impose 
obligations on the Attorneys was a nullity, unless and until the 
Attorneys consented to it.  And while Freedman is not precisely 
on point, it does stand for the proposition that an attorney’s 
signature under words such as ‘approved as to form and 
content’ means only that the document has the attorney’s 
professional thumbs-up.  It follows that it does not objectively 
manifest the attorney’s intent to be bound.”  (Id. at p. 69.)  
While acknowledging that “confidentiality is often a material 
term of a settlement agreement” and a party may not be 
inclined to settle if opposing counsel “is free to blab about it,” 
the court suggested “[i]t seems easy enough, however, to draft 
a settlement agreement that explicitly makes the attorneys 
parties (even if only to the confidentiality provision) and 
explicitly requires them to sign as such.”  (Ibid.)   
B.  The Significance Of “Approved As To Form And 
Content” 
In light of the procedural posture here, the issue we 
address is a narrow one.  As noted, at the second anti-SLAPP 
step, “ ‘a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must 
“ ‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.’ ”  
[Citation.]  Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate 
that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a 
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is 
credited.” ’  [Citation.] ‘. . . However, we neither “weigh 
credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence.  Rather, 
[we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff 
[citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to 
determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a 
matter of law.” ’ ”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis West).)   
We agree with Freedman’s characterization of what the 
notation “approved as to form and content” means.  The 
notation affirms that counsel has read the document, it 
embodies the parties’ agreement, and counsel perceives no 
impediment to his client signing it.  (Freedman, supra, 182 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1070; cf. In re Marriage of Hasso (1991) 229 
Cal.App.3d 1174, 1181.)  A similar understanding of this 
phrase is reflected in case law regarding orders signed by the 
court and approved as to form and content by the parties’ 
attorneys.  (See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 
249, 254; In re Marriage of Walters (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 
1062, 1069; In re Blaze (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 210, 213-217.)  
Thus, there appears a general consensus that “approved as to 
form and content” has a fixed meaning understood by the legal 
community, and we do not suggest otherwise.   
This does not end our inquiry, however.  The legal 
question is whether counsel’s signature approving an 
agreement as to form and content for his clients’ signature 
precludes, as a matter of law, a finding that he also intended to 
be bound by the agreement.  If, as in Freedman, the agreement 
contains no provision purporting to bind counsel or otherwise 
impose any obligation on him, the question is easily answered.  
(See Freedman, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1068-1069.)  In 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
that circumstance, counsel’s signature that he approved the 
agreement as to form and content could only mean he is 
approving it for his client’s signature.   
But that will not always be the case.  An attorney’s 
signature on an agreement containing substantive provisions 
imposing duties on counsel may reflect an intent to be bound 
even though counsel also approves the document for his client’s 
signature.  RSUI is, of course, not binding on this court, but its 
reasoning is instructive in this regard.  (See Episcopal Church 
Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 490.)  Concluding that counsel 
there did not assume personal liability, the RSUI court did not 
rely solely on the signature notation.  Instead, it examined the 
substance of the provisions at issue and reasoned that, at most, 
the agreement “governs the manner by which payment under 
the contract was to be made, not the parties which were to be 
liable for such payment.”  (RSUI, supra, 810 N.W.2d at p. 672.)  
Thus, counsel’s signature that he approved the agreement as to 
form and content did not reflect his intent to be personally 
obligated to indemnify an opposing party if his client refused to 
perform as the agreement required.   
Here, a factfinder considering all the circumstances could 
reasonably conclude Schechter agreed to be bound.  (See 
discussion post.)  The confidentiality provisions are not only 
extensive but repeatedly refer both to the parties and their 
counsel.  The agreement stated “Plaintiffs and their counsel 
agree that they will keep completely confidential all of the 
terms and contents of this Settlement Agreement, and the 
negotiations leading thereto, and will not publicize or disclose 
the amounts, conditions, terms, or contents of this Settlement 
Agreement in any manner,” and “without limitation, Plaintiffs 
and their counsel of record . . . agree and covenant, absolutely 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
and without limitation, to not publicly disclose to any person or 
entity” facts related to the settlement, specifically identifying 
“Lawyers & Settlements” as an entity to whom counsel should 
not disclose such facts.  (Emphasis added.)  The agreement also 
required “the Parties and their attorneys” not to “make any 
statement about the Action, each other party or Defendants’ 
products in relation to this Action, in the media,” and any 
comment “shall be limited to the following, or words to their 
effect:  ‘This matter has been resolved.’ ”  (Emphasis added.) 
These extensive provisions regarding the specific conduct 
of counsel stand in stark contrast to RSUI, where the 
agreement only referenced counsel with respect to the 
mechanics of payment under the parties’ agreement.  Further, 
RSUI involved a different procedural posture.  The RSUI court 
reversed the grant of summary judgment against the attorneys 
after the trial court concluded the attorneys were liable under 
the contract as a matter of law.  By contrast, the trial court 
here denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, rejecting their 
claim that they were not liable as a matter of law.  It bears 
emphasis that a plaintiff’s burden at the second anti-SLAPP 
step is a low one, requiring only a showing that a cause of 
action has at least “minimal merit within the meaning of the 
anti-SLAPP statute.”  (Oasis West, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 825.)   
Our 
conclusion 
also 
recognizes 
the 
role 
that 
confidentiality plays in facilitating settlement agreements.  
“The privacy of a settlement is generally understood and 
accepted in our legal system, which favors settlement and 
therefore supports attendant needs for confidentiality.”  
(Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court 
(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.)  Routine public disclosure of 
private settlement terms would “chill the parties’ ability in 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
many cases to settle the action before trial.  Such a result runs 
contrary to the strong public policy of this state favoring 
settlement of actions.”  (Board of Trustees of California State 
University v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 889, 899.)  
There is little doubt here that “[c]onfidentiality was an 
important term of that settlement” (Jalali v. Root (2003) 109 
Cal.App.4th 1768, 1784), and the agreement goes to great 
lengths to ensure that virtually nothing would be publicly said 
about the case other than that it had been resolved.  Indeed, 
Schechter acknowledged in a deposition that “Monster would 
not settle the case if the party did not agree to keeping it 
confidential.”  As noted, the agreement stated it was “the 
product of good faith negotiations.”  (Ante, at p. 2, fn. 3.)  
Excluding counsel from the scope of the confidentiality clause 
would risk undermining an important term of the agreement.6   
Defendants argue they could not be found to be bound by 
the settlement because they were not identified as parties to 
the agreement.  It is true the agreement does not include 
counsel in its definition of “Party.”  However, that label does 
not answer the question of whether Schechter, by signing an 
agreement that included provisions purporting to bind him 
individually, manifested his intent to be so bound.  It is the 
substance of the agreement that determines his status as a 
party to the contract, as opposed to a party to the lawsuit.  The 
agreement clearly refers to others beside the Crossland parties.  
                                        
6  
During the pendency of the anti-SLAPP proceedings, 
none of the parties have argued that enforcement of the 
confidentiality provisions here is contrary to public policy (see, 
e.g., Cariveau v. Halferty (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 126, 130-137), 
and we do not address the question.   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
(Cf. Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of 
Miwok Indians (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 391, 439 [contractual 
labels not controlling]; Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States 
Fire Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 52, 62 [same].)7   
                                        
7  
Defendants assert, without citation to the record, “[t]here 
is no evidence that Attorney Schechter even negotiated the 
Settlement Agreement,” suggesting that the agreement was 
negotiated by a different firm.  Even if we were to accept that 
assertion, it does not assist Schechter.  Regardless of whether 
he 
personally 
negotiated 
the 
settlement, 
an 
attorney 
representing the Crossland plaintiffs negotiated the settlement 
on their behalf.  Schechter thereafter read and signed the 
document.  Our reasoning regarding the significance of his 
signature, pertaining to the language of the agreement itself, 
remains unchanged.   
 
Defendants also argue that plaintiff “presented no 
evidence of any objective outward manifestation of the 
Attorneys’ consent to be bound by the confidentiality provisions 
of the Settlement Agreement communicated to Monster 
Energy.”  This argument is premised on defendants’ position 
that Schechter’s signature could not convey an intent to be 
bound by the document he signed, which included provisions 
specifically applicable to counsel.  As the premise does not 
hold, the argument necessarily fails.  Similarly lacking merit is 
defendants’ contention that the agreement violates the statute 
of frauds because it was not “subscribed by” Schechter as a 
party.  (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a).)  As discussed, one may 
reasonably conclude that Schechter’s signature evinced his 
intent to be bound, thus rendering the agreement “subscribed 
by” him.  (Cf. In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 
1108.)   
 
The observations we make here relate only to an analysis 
of the SLAPP question and a plaintiff’s low burden at the 
second step.  We do not express any opinion as to the facts that 
may ultimately be adduced at trial.  Nor by our rejection of 
defendant’s legal argument in this regard do we intend to 
 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
We conclude that an attorney’s signature on a document 
with a notation that it is approved as to form and content does 
not, as a matter of law, preclude a factual finding that the 
attorney intended to be bound by the document’s terms.  The 
intent question requires an examination of the agreement as a 
whole, including substantive provisions referring to counsel.  
Ultimately, that question would be resolved by the trier of 
fact.8   
C.  Consideration Of Evidence At The Second Anti-
SLAPP Step 
Monster Energy argues the Court of Appeal “ignored” 
evidence supportive of its position, including Schechter’s 
statement to reporter Craig that he could not reveal the 
amount of the settlement because “Monster wants the amount 
to be sealed,” and his deposition testimony explaining his 
signature.  Monster contends this evidence showed Schechter 
was aware that he was bound by the confidentiality provisions.  
Defendants counter that the evidence was irrelevant to 
establish an intent to be bound, arguing Schechter was merely 
manifesting 
his 
ethical 
obligation 
to 
maintain 
client 
confidences.   
                                                                                                           
 
foreclose any defenses or inferences defendant may argue at 
trial. 
8  
We do not suggest that counsel’s signature on a 
settlement agreement approving it as to form and content will 
always create a triable issue of fact with respect to counsel’s 
intent to be bound by that agreement.  A court may find as a 
matter of law that counsel could not have so intended under 
the circumstances where, for example, no substantive 
provisions imposed obligations on counsel, as was the case in 
Freedman.   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
As discussed, at the second anti-SLAPP step, a court 
“does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative 
strength of competing evidence.”  (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 683, 714.)  It “accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, 
and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it 
defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.”  (Baral, supra, 
1 Cal.5th at p. 385.)  “[W]e resolve conflicts and inferences in 
the record in favor of plaintiff.”  (Armin v. Riverside 
Community Hospital (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 810, 815.)  However, 
speculative inferences not supported by the evidence proffered 
need not be considered.  (See Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 
Cal.App.4th 892, 931.)   
Monster Energy is correct that properly submitted 
admissible evidence should be considered, and a court 
evaluating a probability of success should draw any non-
speculative inferences favorable to the plaintiff.  (Sweetwater 
Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 931, 949; see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)  
Here, the Court of Appeal had no occasion to consider the cited 
evidence in light of its erroneous legal conclusion that a 
signature with a notation that counsel approved the agreement 
as to form and content precluded an inference that counsel also 
intended to be bound by its terms.  We review de novo the 
probability of success and consider the evidence below.  
(Sweetwater, at p. 940.)   
D.  Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Shown A Probability Of 
Prevailing 
On this record, plaintiff has shown a probability of 
success sufficient to defeat defendant’s claim the suit lacks 
even minimal merit.  “The Legislature’s inclusion of a merits 
prong to the statutory SLAPP definition . . . preserves 
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
appropriate remedies for breaches of contracts involving 
speech by ensuring that claims with the requisite minimal 
merit may proceed.  [Citations.]  Indeed, as the statute is 
designed and as we have construed it, a defendant who in fact 
has validly contracted not to speak or petition has in effect 
‘waived’ the right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection in the 
event he or she later breaches that contract.”  (Navellier v. 
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94.)   
Here, the settlement agreement makes numerous 
references to counsel as one whose keeping of confidentiality is 
assured.  The wording can be understood to reflect an 
expectation that the confidentiality provisions would apply to 
counsel as well.9  Given this backdrop, it is reasonable to argue 
that counsel’s signature on the document evinced an 
understanding of the agreement’s terms and a willingness to 
be bound by the terms that explicitly referred to him, which, in 
turn, would appear consistent with the expectations of the 
parties and their counsel.  This understanding is also 
supported by Schechter’s statement to reporter Craig that he 
could not divulge the settlement amount because “ ‘Monster 
wants the amount to be sealed,’ ” which, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, could be interpreted as a tacit 
acknowledgement that he was bound by the confidentiality 
provisions.  Further, assuming the confidentiality provisions 
applied to him, sufficient evidence was presented that 
Schechter violated them by making public comments about the 
                                        
9  
We have no occasion to decide if any terms of the 
settlement agreement apply to entities other than the parties 
and their respective counsel.   
MONSTER ENERGY CO. v. SCHECHTER 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
settlement to a reporter from LawyersandSettlements.com.  In 
light of the nature and extent of provisions in the agreement 
here purporting to bind counsel, and the other properly 
submitted evidence, Monster Energy has met its burden of 
showing its breach of contract claim has “minimal merit” 
sufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion.   (Oasis West, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 825.)   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Monster Energy Company v. Schechter 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 26 Cal.App.5th 54 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S251392 
Date Filed: July 11, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Daniel A. Ottolia 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, Keith G. Bremer, Jeremy S. Johnson, Benjamin L. Price; Grignon Law 
Firm, Margaret M. Grignon and Anne M. Grignon for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Frank C. Rothrock, Gabriel S. Spooner and Victoria P. McLaughlin for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Murchison & Cumming, Edmund G. Farrell, III; Walsh Pizzi O’Reilly Falanga, Peter J. Pizzi and 
Katherine M. Romano for International Association of Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Margaret M. Grignon 
Grignon Law Firm 
6621 East Pacific Coast Highway, Suite 200 
Long Beach, CA  90803 
(562) 285-3171 
 
Frank C. Rothrock 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon 
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1600 
Irvine, CA  92614-2546 
(949) 475-1500