Case Title: Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce

Citation: 2002-Ohio-4210

Docket Number: 20002178

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266, 2002-Ohio-4210.] 
WALLACE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF STATE FIRE MARSHAL, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 96 
Ohio St.3d 266, 2002-Ohio-4210.] 
Torts — Negligence — State may not raise the “public-duty rule” in an action in 
the Court of Claims alleging negligent inspection by the Ohio 
Department of Commerce, Division of the Fire Marshal, because public-
duty rule is inconsistent with the express language of the Court of Claims 
Act. 
(No. 2000-2178 — Submitted December 11, 2001 — Decided September 4, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-1303. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  The public-duty rule is incompatible with R.C. 2743.02(A)(1)’s express 
language requiring that the state’s liability in the Court of Claims be 
determined “in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits 
between private parties.”  In negligence suits against the state, the Court of 
Claims must determine the existence of a legal duty using conventional 
tort principles that would be applicable if the defendant were a private 
individual or entity.  (Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. [1995], 72 
Ohio St.3d 325, 650 N.E.2d 104, and Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. 
[1991], 58 Ohio St.3d 215, 569 N.E.2d 1042, overruled to the extent 
inconsistent herewith; Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills [1988], 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 
525 N.E.2d 468, distinguished.) 
2.  The language in R.C. 2743.02 that the state shall “have its liability determined 
* * * in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
private parties” means that the state cannot be sued for its legislative or 
judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function 
involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by 
the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.  However, 
once the decision has been made to engage in a certain activity or function, 
the state may be held liable, in the same manner as private parties, for the 
negligence of the actions of its employees and agents in the performance 
of that activity or function.  (Reynolds v. State [1984], 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 
14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776, paragraph one of the syllabus, approved.) 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
This case asks us to decide whether the state may raise the public-
duty rule as a bar to liability in an action in the Court of Claims alleging negligent 
inspection by the Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of the Fire Marshal 
(“fire marshal”).  Because the public-duty rule is inconsistent with the express 
language of the Court of Claims Act, we hold that the state may not. 
I 
{¶2} 
On July 3, 1996, Todd Hall carried a lit cigarette into the Ohio 
River Fireworks store in Scottown, Lawrence County, Ohio.  Before store 
employees could intervene, Hall used the cigarette to ignite a stack of “crackling 
wheel” fireworks.  Those fireworks ignited other fireworks in the store and caused 
a devastating fire, which killed nine people and injured several others.1 Although 
                                          
 
1. 
A Lawrence County grand jury later indicted Hall on multiple counts of involuntary 
manslaughter and aggravated arson.  See State v. Hall (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 561, 564, 752 
N.E.2d 318.  Hall, who suffers from a severe mental disorder, has been declared incompetent to 
stand trial several times.  Id. at 565-566, 752 N.E.2d 318 
January Term, 2002 
3 
the store was equipped with a sprinkler system, the system was disabled at the 
time of the blaze.   
{¶3} 
On the day of the fire, Flying Dragon, Inc., held a valid fireworks 
wholesaler license, issued by the fire marshal, to operate the Ohio River 
Fireworks store.  As a condition of licensure, James Saddler, a certified safety 
inspector employed by the fire marshal, had inspected the Ohio River Fireworks 
store in October 1995 as required by statute.  See R.C. 3743.16.  During the 
mandatory licensing inspection, Saddler had tested the store’s sprinkler system 
and found it to be operational.  Saddler noted no safety violations and 
recommended approving the store’s license renewal application. 
{¶4} 
In addition to the mandatory annual licensing inspection, Ohio 
River Fireworks was also subject to R.C. 3743.21(A), which authorizes the fire 
marshal to inspect a licensed wholesaler’s premises at any time during the license 
period.2  Prior to 1996, as a matter of internal policy, the chief of the fire 
marshal’s code enforcement bureau encouraged inspectors to make seasonal 
inspections of fireworks establishments during the July 4th fireworks season to 
ensure compliance with applicable statutes and safety regulations.  Under this 
policy, Saddler performed two such seasonal inspections of the Ohio River 
Fireworks facility during the spring of 1995 and found the store’s sprinkler system 
to be functional.  In May 1996, Daniel L. Lehman, then acting as chief of the fire 
marshal’s code enforcement bureau, reiterated the policy in an interoffice 
memorandum: 
                                          
 
2. 
R.C. 3743.21(A) provides: “The fire marshal may inspect the premises, and the inventory, 
wholesale sale, and retail sale records, of a licensed wholesaler of fireworks during the 
wholesaler’s period of licensure to determine whether the wholesaler is in compliance with 
Chapter 3743. of the Revised Code and the rules adopted by the fire marshal pursuant to section 
3743.18 of the Revised Code.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶5} 
“Although the annual licensing inspection is conducted during the 
renewal period in the fourth quarter of each calendar year, it is important to have 
every licensed fireworks facility visited by an inspector between now and July 4, 
1996.  The minimum acceptable level of activity is one visit to each facility, and 
return visits should be as needed and in consultation with the respective 
supervisor.  The licensed facilities should be appropriately monitored by these 
cursory inspections to check for overall compliance during this peak period.” 
{¶6} 
In June 1996, a commercial competitor of the Ohio River 
Fireworks store informed the fire marshal that Ohio River Fireworks was 
advertising and selling Class B fireworks to individuals who were not authorized 
to purchase them.  See former R.C. 3743.45(B), 1995 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7647 (forbidding licensed wholesalers to sell Class B 
fireworks to an Ohio resident who is not a licensed wholesaler, manufacturer, or 
exhibitor); see, also, R.C. 3743.44(A) (setting forth similar restriction on sales to 
nonresident purchasers).3  After learning of this possible violation, Michael 
Kraft—then acting as the assistant chief of the fire marshal’s code enforcement 
bureau—organized a “buy bust” operation during which fire marshal agents would 
attempt to purchase Class B fireworks without a proper license.  To prevent the 
planned operation from being compromised, Kraft and Lehman postponed any 
seasonal inspection of the Ohio River Fireworks store until after they had 
completed the buy bust.  As a result of this directive, Saddler did not perform a 
seasonal inspection of the Ohio River Fireworks facility prior to the fire. 
                                          
 
3. 
The statutory and regulatory nomenclature for fireworks has since changed.  The statutes 
now refer to Class B fireworks as “1.4G fireworks.”  In addition, fireworks that were formerly 
referred to as “Class C fireworks” are now known as “1.3G fireworks.”  See Section 215, 1997 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1353. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
{¶7} 
Five days before the fatal fire, arson investigator Donald Eifler 
posed as a customer at Ohio River Fireworks and successfully purchased Class B 
fireworks without being required to show authorization to do so.  When the buy 
bust was complete, Kraft retrieved the money used in the operation for evidentiary 
purposes and ordered the store’s proprietor to stop selling Class B fireworks to 
unauthorized purchasers.  None of the three fire marshal agents who were present 
at the buy bust conducted a fire safety inspection at any time that day. 
{¶8} 
The appellants, persons injured in the fire and administrators of the 
decedents’ estates, filed this lawsuit in the Court of Claims, alleging negligence 
claims against the fire marshal.  The amended complaint alleged, among other 
things, that the fire marshal was negligent in failing to perform an adequate fire 
safety inspection on the date of the buy bust and otherwise failing to comply with 
the internal policy of conducting seasonal inspections during the peak fireworks 
season.  The appellants further alleged that a reasonable inspection by the fire 
marshal would have revealed the store’s inoperable sprinkler system and a host of 
other fire hazards. 
{¶9} 
At trial, the appellants presented testimony indicating that the 
store’s sprinkler system was turned off at the time of the fire.  The appellants also 
presented testimony suggesting that the shutdown of the sprinkler system was not 
an isolated occurrence: inspector Thomas Baker testified that he had found the 
sprinkler system shut down during a “walk through” he performed at the Ohio 
River Fireworks store in July 1994.  In addition, the appellants offered testimony 
from two experts, who opined that the decedents would have had a good chance 
of surviving the fire if the sprinkler system had functioned properly.  Another 
expert testified that any one of the fire marshal agents who were present for the 
buy bust could have easily determined whether the sprinkler system was 
operational.  This expert also added that a safety inspection on the day of the buy 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
bust would have revealed several other fire hazards throughout the store that 
should have been remedied. 
{¶10} Following a four-day trial limited to the issue of liability, the Court 
of Claims ruled in favor of the fire marshal.  In its written opinion, the court gave 
three distinct reasons for its decision.  First, the court found that the fire marshal’s 
failure to conduct an additional seasonal inspection at the Ohio River Fireworks 
facility resulted from a “high degree of discretion” exercised by Chief Lehman.  
The court therefore concluded that liability was precluded by the discretionary-
function immunity recognized by this court in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio 
St.3d 68, 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Second, 
the court found that the public-duty rule precluded liability against the fire 
marshal.  Invoking this court’s decision in Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 
Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468, the Court of Claims ruled that the fire marshal’s 
inspection duties were “owed to the general public” and that the appellants had 
failed to establish a “special relationship” between them and the fire marshal that 
would preclude application of the public-duty rule.  Finally, the Court of Claims 
decided that the proximate cause of the appellants’ harm was Hall’s criminal act 
of arson.  The court concluded that this criminal act “could not have been foreseen 
by a reasonably prudent person” and thus broke any chain of causation that existed 
between any negligence by the fire marshal and the harm suffered by the 
appellants. 
{¶11} The appellants appealed to the court of appeals, which found the 
public-duty rule to be dispositive of the action.  The court of appeals held that 
statutes authorizing inspections by the fire marshal were designed to protect the 
public generally and not any particular individual.  The court further agreed with 
the Court of Claims that there existed no special relationship between the fire 
marshal and the injured parties that would preclude application of the public-duty 
January Term, 2002 
7 
rule.  The court of appeals therefore affirmed the Court of Claims’ judgment 
based on the public-duty rule and declared the appellants’ remaining assignments 
of error moot.  The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
II 
{¶12} The principal focus of this appeal is the applicability of the public-
duty rule to actions against the state and its agencies in the Court of Claims.  The 
appellants argue that the public-duty rule is inconsistent with R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1)’s express authorization of suits against the state in the Court of 
Claims.  Alternatively, the appellants argue that the public-duty rule, if available 
as a defense to negligence actions against the state, functions as a vestige of state 
sovereign immunity and therefore violates Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Finally, the appellants argue that even if the public-duty rule were 
statutorily and constitutionally valid, the rule is inapplicable to the circumstances 
in this case. 
{¶13} In Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468, 
this court addressed whether a municipality could be held liable for negligently 
failing to provide adequate police protection in response to a call for help from the 
victim of an attempted rape and robbery.  This court held that the village of 
Ottawa Hills could not be held liable for the negligence alleged because of the 
public-duty rule.  This common-law doctrine, which “originated at English 
common law and was particularly applied to the office of [the] sheriff,” precludes 
a private party from sustaining a cause of action against a public officer for breach 
of a public duty.  Id. at 229-230, 525 N.E.2d 468; see, also, South v. Maryland 
(1855), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 403, 15 L.Ed. 433.  In other words, a public entity 
owes a duty only to the general public when performing its functions and is 
therefore not liable for torts committed against an individual absent a special duty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
owed to the injured person.  See Stone v. North Carolina Dept. of Labor (1998), 
347 N.C. 473, 477-478, 495 S.E.2d 711; Fudge v. Kansas City (1986), 239 Kan. 
369, 372, 720 P.2d 1093. 
{¶14} Various public-policy considerations are the principal justification 
for the doctrine.  Primary among these is the protection of the public fisc from 
lawsuits tending to second-guess the allocation of scarce resources.  Sawicki, 37 
Ohio St.3d at 231, 525 N.E.2d 468.  Because individuals, juries, and courts are 
“ill-equipped to judge governmental decisions as to how particular community 
resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual members 
of the public,” courts have used the public-duty rule to shield public entities from 
the “severe depletion of those resources” that could result from imposing liability 
for “every oversight or omission” by a public official.  Ezell v. Cockrell 
(Tenn.1995), 902 S.W.2d 394, 398; see, also, Tipton v. Tabor (S.D.1997), 567 
N.W.2d 351, 356.  In Sawicki, for example, this court observed that there were 
“insufficient police resources to meet every need” and that “[p]olice departments 
must be able to prioritize and create responses without the benefit of hindsight.”  
Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 231, 525 N.E.2d 468. 
{¶15} In adopting the public-duty rule, this court was also careful to 
distinguish it from the defense of sovereign immunity, which this court had 
abolished as a common-law defense for municipalities and counties in a series of 
decisions in the 1980s.  See, e.g., Zents v. Summit Cty.  Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 9 
Ohio St.3d 204, 9 OBR 516, 459 N.E.2d 881; Strohofer v. Cincinnati (1983), 6 
Ohio St.3d 118, 6 OBR 178, 451 N.E.2d 787; Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson 
Eng. Ltd. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 31, 6 OBR 53, 451 N.E.2d 228.  Whereas 
immunity was an absolute defense to liability when applicable, the public-duty 
rule “comported with the principles of negligence, and was applicable to the 
determination of the extent to which a statute may encompass the duty upon 
January Term, 2002 
9 
which negligence is premised.”  Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 230, 525 N.E.2d 468; 
see, also, Williams v. State (1983), 34 Cal.3d 18, 22-23, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 
P.2d 137.  Accordingly, the abrogation of common-law immunity for 
municipalities did not eliminate the public-duty rule, which “was coexistent at 
common law with the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”  Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 
230, 525 N.E.2d 468. 
{¶16} The Sawicki court also recognized an important common-law 
exception to the public-duty rule.  If a “special relationship” existed between the 
injured party and the public official—such that the latter assumed an affirmative 
duty to act on behalf of the former—then the public-duty rule would not bar 
government liability.  Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus; see, also, Cuffy v. New 
York City (1987), 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937.  “If a 
special relationship is demonstrated, then a duty is established, and inquiry will 
continue into the remaining negligence elements.”  Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 230, 
525 N.E.2d 468. 
{¶17} Following Sawicki, this court extended the public-duty rule beyond 
the area of local law enforcement to bar governmental liability for alleged 
negligence in connection with various duties imposed by statute or municipal 
ordinance.  See, e.g., Delman v. Cleveland Hts. (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 1, 534 
N.E.2d 835 (point-of-sale housing inspection); Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. v. 
Toledo (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 96, 543 N.E.2d 1188 (firefighting by municipal fire 
department); Williamson v. Pavlovich (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 179, 543 N.E.2d 
1242 (enforcement of municipal parking ordinance); but, cf., Brodie v. Summit 
Cty. Children Serv. Bd. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 112, 118-119, 554 N.E.2d 1301 
(finding public-duty rule inapplicable when statute imposed affirmative duty for 
the specific benefit of children).  And in later decisions, this court extended 
Sawicki beyond actions involving local government.  In at least two cases decided 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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in the decade following Sawicki, this court applied the public-duty rule to 
foreclose liability in actions against the state in the Court of Claims.  See Hurst v. 
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 650 N.E.2d 104 
(applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligently failing to detain parole 
violator); Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 215, 569 N.E.2d 
1042 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligent liquidation of 
assets).4  And even though a handful of states have rejected the public-duty rule as 
a bar to government liability,5 a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the 
question apply the doctrine in some form.6 
                                          
 
4. 
This court also analyzed application of the public-duty rule in Ashland Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 648, 590 N.E.2d 730, a case in which 
numerous county boards of commissioners, boards of education, and auditors sought to hold the 
Tax Commissioner responsible for alleged misfeasance in assessing and apportioning the values of 
certain property.  A close reading of Ashland, however, reveals that this court held that the Court 
of Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 651-653, 690 N.E.2d 730.  Thus, the case’s 
subsequent discussion of the public-duty rule was dicta. 
5. 
See, e.g., Adams v. State (Alaska 1976), 555 P.2d 235; Ryan v. State (1982), 134 Ariz. 
308, 656 P.2d 597; Leake v. Cain (Colo.1986), 720 P.2d 152; Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian 
River Cty. (Fla.1979), 371 So.2d 1010; Fowler v. Roberts (La.1990), 556 So.2d 1; Jean W. v. 
Commonwealth (1993), 414 Mass. 496, 610 N.E.2d 305; Maple v. Omaha (1986), 222 Neb. 293, 
384 N.W.2d 254; Doucette v. Bristol (1993), 138 N.H. 205, 635 A.2d 1387; Schear v. Bernalillo 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728; Brennen v. Eugene (1979), 285 Ore. 
401, 591 P.2d 719; Coffey v. Milwaukee (1976), 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132; DeWald v. 
State (Wyo.1986), 719 P.2d 643. 
6. 
{¶a} 
See, e.g., Williams v. State (1983), 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 
137; Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379; Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia 
(D.C.App.1983), 468 A.2d 1306; Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dept. (1999), 89 Haw. 315, 972 P.2d 
1081; Kolbe v. State (Iowa 2001), 625 N.W.2d 721; Fudge v. Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 
P.2d 1093; Cracraft v. St. Louis Park (Minn.1979), 279 N.W.2d 801; State ex rel. Barthelette v. 
Sanders (Mo.1988), 756 S.W.2d 536; Coty v. Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757, 839 P.2d 97; 
Cuffy v. New York City, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.Supp.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937; Catone v. 
Medberry (R.I.1989), 555 A.2d 328; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor (1999), 336 S.C. 
373, 520 S.E.2d 142; Tipton v. Tabor (S.D.1997), 567 N.W.2d 351; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 
1991), 813 P.2d 1156; Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451; 
Benson v. Kutsch (1989), 181 W.Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36. 
 
{¶b} 
Five other states—Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina, and Vermont—
have applied the public-duty rule in a more limited fashion.  The supreme courts in Georgia and 
January Term, 2002 
11 
{¶18} Consistent with this line of cases, the state urges us to affirm the 
lower courts’ application of the public-duty rule in this case.  Because the fire 
marshal’s inspection duties are owed to the public at large and because the 
appellants have failed to establish a special relationship as defined in Sawicki, the 
state argues that the public-duty rule is as applicable in this context as it was in the 
cases in which we have previously applied it.  In addition to the state’s arguments 
for affirmance, we are also cognizant of cases from other jurisdictions that have 
applied the public-duty rule to bar government liability for an allegedly negligent 
fire inspection—the gravamen of the appellants’ claim in this case.  See, e.g., 
Stone, 347 N.C. at 480-482, 495 S.E.2d 711; Cracraft v. St. Louis Park 
(Minn.1979), 279 N.W.2d 801, 805-807.  Despite all of these factors militating in 
favor of continued application of the public-duty rule to suits against the state, we 
cannot adhere to the doctrine without first determining whether it has a place 
within the statutory scheme created by the legislature in R.C. Chapter 2743.   
                                                                                                                   
Indiana have expressly declined to apply the public-duty rule beyond the context of police and 
emergency services.  See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown (1996), 267 Ga. 6, 8-9, 471 S.E.2d 849 
(limiting Rome v. Jordan [1993], 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861); Benton v. Oakland City 
(Ind.1999), 721 N.E.2d 224, 232-234 (limiting Mullin v. S. Bend [Ind.1994], 639 N.E.2d 278).  
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court recently refused to extend the public-duty rule beyond 
cases involving the alleged failure of a police officer to protect a plaintiff from a third person’s 
criminal acts.  Beaudrie v. Henderson (2001), 465 Mich. 124, 134-142, 631 N.W.2d 308 (limiting 
White v. Beasley [1996], 453 Mich. 308, 552 N.W.2d 1).  The North Carolina Supreme Court has 
embraced the public-duty rule in suits against the state but has declined to extend it to suits against 
municipalities.  Compare Stone v. North Carolina Dept. of Labor, 347 N.C. at 477-479, 495 
S.E.2d 711 (applying public-duty rule to bar claim against the state arising out of negligent failure 
to conduct fire safety inspection), with Thompson v. Waters (2000), 351 N.C. 462, 464-465, 526 
S.E.2d 650 (declining to extend public-duty rule to insulate county from liability for negligent 
building inspection).  The Vermont Supreme Court has apparently drawn the same distinction as 
North Carolina.  Compare Sorge v. State (2000), 171 Vt. 171, 762 A.2d 816, 819-820 (applying 
public-duty rule and special-relationship exception to an action against the state alleging negligent 
supervision of juvenile in custody), with Hudson v. E. Montpelier (1993), 161 Vt. 168, 179, 638 
A.2d 561 (expressly declining to adopt the public-duty rule in an action alleging negligence by 
municipal employees). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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III 
{¶19} Although this court has applied the public-duty rule to suits against 
the state in the Court of Claims, this court has not specifically analyzed whether 
application of the doctrine is compatible with the express language contained in 
R.C. Chapter 2743.  Of specific importance is R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), which states: 
{¶20} “The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents 
to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this 
chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between 
private parties, except that the determination of liability is subject to the 
limitations set forth in this chapter * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶21} The parties do not dispute that R.C. Chapter 2743 does not “set 
forth” the public-duty rule as a limitation to the state’s liability for tortious 
conduct.  The viability of the doctrine in suits against the state therefore depends 
on whether we can fairly characterize the public-duty rule as a rule of law 
“applicable to suits between private parties.”  More specifically, we must decide 
whether the public-duty rule is compatible with the legal rules governing ordinary 
negligence suits involving private parties in the common pleas courts.  We agree 
with the appellants that it is not. 
{¶22} The appellants in this case seek to hold the fire marshal responsible 
for damages on a negligent-inspection theory of liability.  It is well settled that the 
elements of an ordinary negligence suit between private parties are (1) the 
existence of a legal duty, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, and (3) injury 
“resulting proximately therefrom.” Mussivand v. David (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 
314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265.  The duty element of negligence, with which courts 
have linked the public-duty rule, is a question of law for the court to determine.  
Id. 
January Term, 2002 
13 
{¶23} “Duty, as used in Ohio tort law, refers to the relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant from which arises an obligation on the part of the 
defendant to exercise due care toward the plaintiff.”  Commerce & Industry Ins. 
Co., 45 Ohio St.3d at 98, 543 N.E.2d 1188; see, also, Huston v. Konieczny (1990), 
52 Ohio St.3d 214, 217, 556 N.E.2d 505.  This court has often stated that the 
existence of a duty depends upon the foreseeability of harm: if a reasonably 
prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from a 
particular act, the court could find that the duty element of negligence is satisfied.  
Texler v. D.O. Summers Cleaners & Shirt Laundry Co. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 
680, 693 N.E.2d 271; Commerce & Industry, 45 Ohio St.3d at 98, 543 N.E.2d 
1188; Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 15 
OBR 179, 472 N.E.2d 707.  In addition, we have also stated that the duty element 
of negligence may be established by common law, by legislative enactment, or by 
the particular circumstances of a given case.  Chambers v. St. Mary’s School 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565, 697 N.E.2d 198; Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon (1954), 
161 Ohio St. 367, 53 O.O. 274, 119 N.E.2d 440, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Admittedly, however, the concept of duty in negligence law is at times an elusive 
one.  As this court explained in Mussivand: 
{¶24} “There is no formula for ascertaining whether a duty exists.  Duty 
‘* * * is the court’s “expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” 
(Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.1971) pp. 325-326.)  Any number of considerations 
may justify the imposition of duty in particular circumstances, including the 
guidance of history, our continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the 
convenience of the rule, and social judgment as to where the loss should fall.  
(Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited (1953), 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 15).’ “  Id., 45 Ohio St.3d 
at 318, 544 N.E.2d 265, quoting Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc. (1975), 15 Cal.3d 40, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36.  See, generally, Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. 
Co. (1928), 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99. 
{¶25} In light of Mussivand’s explanation of the duty element, there is a 
substantial argument that the public-duty rule is merely an expression of policy 
that leads us to conclude that private interests are not generally entitled to 
protection against conduct by public officials performing public duties.  See Shore 
v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 152, 444 A.2d 1379.  And were we deciding 
this case in the same context in which we decided Sawicki—in an immunity 
vacuum and applying purely common-law principles—we might be more willing 
to decide that the public-duty rule “comport[s] with the principles of negligence” 
by aiding the court in a determination of whether a duty imposed upon a public 
employee “may encompass the duty upon which negligence is premised.”  
Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 230, 525 N.E.2d 468.  But unlike in Sawicki, our 
analysis of common-law negligence principles here is tempered by statutory 
dictates. 
{¶26} To accept the state’s contention that the public-duty rule is 
applicable here because it “determines whether a defendant has any duty to begin 
with” ignores a vital feature of the doctrine that is incompatible with R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1).  The applicability of the public-duty rule depends upon the public 
status of the particular defendant raising it as a bar to liability.  In other words, 
only governmental entities and their employees may rely on the rule.  It is 
spurious logic to conclude that a doctrine that is, by definition, available only to 
public defendants can be consistent with a statute mandating that suits be 
determined in accordance with rules of law applicable to private parties.  See 
Leake v. Cain (Colo.1986), 720 P.2d 152, 159-160 (holding that the public-duty 
rule contravened Colorado statute providing that “liability of the public entity 
shall be determined in the same manner as if the public entity were a private 
January Term, 2002 
15 
person,” Colo.Rev.Stat. 24-10-107); Brennen v. Eugene (1979), 285 Ore. 401, 
411, 591 P.2d 719 (“any distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ duty is 
precluded by statute in this state”).  The limitation on liability occasioned by the 
public-duty rule subjects a plaintiff suing in the Court of Claims to a heightened 
burden of establishing the duty element of negligence that would not exist if that 
same plaintiff were suing a private defendant in common pleas court.  See Adams 
v. State (Alaska 1976), 555 P.2d 235, 242.  Given the unambiguous directive of 
R.C. 2743.02(A), there is no legal or logical basis to conclude that the public-duty 
rule, which is by definition unavailable to private litigants, can apply to suits 
against the state in the Court of Claims.7 
{¶27} In coming to this conclusion, we acknowledge the contrary 
interpretation of R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) expressed over twenty-five years ago in 
Shelton v. Indus. Comm. (1976), 51 Ohio App.2d 125, 5 O.O.3d 286, 367 N.E.2d 
51.  In Shelton, also a case alleging an injury resulting from a negligent safety 
inspection, the court of appeals opted for a narrower interpretation of the language 
providing for state liability in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to 
suits between private parties: 
                                          
 
7. 
Justice Lundberg Stratton’s dissenting opinion surmises that our holding, which depends 
upon the statutory language of R.C. 2743.02(A), could lead to the “unintended consequenc[e]” of 
invalidating Civ.R. 62(C), which permits the state to obtain a stay of a judgment without the 
necessity of providing a bond.  This contention is remarkable, for our holding cannot lead to any 
such result.  It is one thing to say, as we do today, that a common-law rule is incompatible with 
statutory language setting forth the general public policy of Ohio in the area of suits in the Court of 
Claims.  It is quite another thing to contend that duly enacted rules or statutes would be equally 
invalidated.  See, e.g., Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 221, 611 N.E.2d 789, 
paragraph two of the syllabus (“The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5[B], Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, must control over 
subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural matters”); R.C. 1.51 
(announcing general rule of construction that specific provision controls over a general one when 
provisions are in irreconcilable conflict). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶28} “Construing that provision more narrowly, one could say that a 
private party’s duty to inspect and to enforce safety standards is not created by 
statute, but only by virtue of some other legal relationship and, hence, there is no 
rule of law making a private party liable for a failure to perform statutory duties of 
inspection and enforcement of safety standards which were enacted to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of all of the citizens of Ohio.”  Id. at 130, 5 O.O.3d 
286, 367 N.E.2d 51. 
{¶29} Using this reasoning, the court of appeals held that an action could 
not lie against the Industrial Commission when the breach of duty giving rise to 
governmental liability arose only by statute.  Other courts have used a similar 
mode of analysis to reconcile the public-duty rule with statutory waivers of 
sovereign immunity worded similarly to R.C. 2743.02(A)(1).  See, e.g., Stone, 
347 N.C. at 478-479, 495 S.E.2d 711.  At first glance, the Shelton line of 
reasoning may carry with it some superficial appeal as a way to reconcile R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1) with the public-duty rule.  We reject this attempted reconciliation, 
however, because accepting it would run contrary to other areas of Ohio tort law.8 
{¶30} Shelton’s reasoning operates on the unstated premise that statutes 
creating duties for governmental actors cannot satisfy the duty element for 
purposes of the state’s liability for negligence because there are no statutory duties 
that may similarly bind private parties.  Cases from this court, however, suggest 
otherwise.  We have expressly stated that a duty, for purposes of a negligence 
                                          
 
8. 
Justice Lundberg Stratton’s dissent points to legislative silence following Shelton as 
purported evidence of the General Assembly’s endorsement of the court of appeals’ interpretation 
of R.C. 2743.02(A).  A legislature does not, however, express its will by failing to legislate.  “ 
‘The act of refusing to enact a law *** has utterly no legal effect, and thus has utterly no place in a 
serious discussion of the law.’ “  Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 421, 704 
January Term, 2002 
17 
claim, may arise out of a legislative enactment.  Chambers, 82 Ohio St.3d at 565, 
697 N.E.2d 198; see, also, Gelbman v. Second Natl. Bank of Warren (1984), 9 
Ohio St.3d 77, 79, 9 OBR 280, 458 N.E.2d 1262.  And this court has cited 
statutory law as a means of addressing whether the duty element was satisfied in 
negligence suits against private parties.  See, e.g., Mussivand, 45 Ohio St.3d at 
320, 544 N.E.2d 265; Shroades v. Rental Homes (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 20, 22 
O.O.3d 152, 427 N.E.2d 774.  Thus, as a general matter, government actors are 
not alone in having duties imposed upon them by statute.  The fact that a statute 
may impose a duty to act, even if a private person would not have such a duty, 
“does no more than identify the source of the duty.”  Jean W. v. Commonwealth 
(1993), 414 Mass. 496, 508, 610 N.E.2d 305 (Liacos, C.J., concurring); see, also, 
Beaudrie v. Henderson (2001), 465 Mich. 124, 140, 631 N.W.2d 308. 
{¶31} Accordingly, we hold that the public-duty rule is incompatible with 
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1)’s express language requiring that the state’s liability in the 
Court of Claims be determined “in accordance with the same rules of law 
applicable to suits between private parties.”  In negligence suits against the state, 
the Court of Claims must determine the existence of a legal duty using 
conventional tort principles that would be applicable if the defendant were a 
private individual or entity.  This court’s decisions applying the public-duty rule 
in actions brought in the Court of Claims are necessarily overruled to the extent 
inconsistent with our decision today.9 
                                                                                                                   
N.E.2d 1217, quoting United States v. Estate of Romani (1998), 523 U.S. 517, 535, 118 S.Ct. 
1478, 140 L.Ed.2d 710 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
9. 
Baum v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 469, 650 N.E.2d 1347, is not one 
of the cases that we overrule today.  It is true that Baum, which precluded liability for negligence 
arising out of a state trooper’s operation of his vehicle while responding to an emergency call, 
cited Sawicki for the proposition that “liability under R.C. Chapter 2743 cannot be imposed since 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
IV 
{¶32} In declaring the public-duty rule inapplicable to suits against the 
state in the Court of Claims, we are mindful of the various public policies that 
courts have used to justify application of the rule.  Indeed, the public policies that 
this court cited in Sawicki—the integrity of the public fisc and the need to avoid 
judicial intervention into policy decisions—are as significant now as they were 
when Sawicki was decided.  For several reasons, however, the policy rationales 
that have supported application of the public-duty rule are not as compelling when 
applied to suits against the state in the Court of Claims. 
{¶33} First, no matter what considerations of policy support the judicial 
application of the public-duty rule, we must remember that R.C. Chapter 2743 has 
legislatively set forth the public policy of this state.  That policy, expressed in 
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), is to allow suits against the state according to the same rules 
as between private parties, “except that the determination of liability is subject to 
the limitations set forth in this chapter.”  (Emphasis added.)  As we have stated 
previously, the public-duty rule is neither “set forth” in R.C. Chapter 2743 nor a 
rule of law applicable to suits between private parties.  It is inappropriate for the 
court to engraft the public-duty rule as an additional limitation on liability that the 
General Assembly has not provided.  If the public-duty rule is to become a rule of 
substantive law applicable to suits in the Court of Claims, it is the General 
Assembly—the ultimate arbiter of public policy—that should make it so by way 
                                                                                                                   
the action did not result from the breach owed to the particular plaintiff.”  Id. at 471-472, 650 
N.E.2d 1347.  Baum did not, however, involve the public-duty rule.  Baum held that the state was 
immune from liability unless a state trooper committed willful or wanton misconduct while 
operating his or her vehicle in response to an emergency call.  Id. at syllabus.  If Baum had truly 
hinged on the public-duty rule, there would have been no need for us to address whether the state 
was entitled to an immunity defense.  See Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 230, 525 N.E.2d 468. 
January Term, 2002 
19 
of legislation.10  It is not this court’s role to apply a judicially created doctrine 
when faced with statutory language that cuts against its applicability. 
{¶34} Second, 
there 
are 
already 
important 
safeguards 
in 
our 
jurisprudence that satisfy the public-policy concerns addressed by the public-duty 
rule.  In Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 
776, a case in which this court squarely addressed the meaning of R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1), this court acknowledged that the state’s potential liability under 
R.C. Chapter 2743 is not unbounded.  Analogizing to its earlier holdings 
concerning the limitations on the abrogation of municipal immunity, this court 
rejected the notion that the General Assembly’s abrogation of sovereign immunity 
in R.C. 2743.02 extended to essential acts of governmental decisionmaking.  Id. at 
70, 471 N.E.2d 776; see, also, Enghauser Mfg. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d at 35, 6 OBR 53, 
451 N.E.2d 228.  Accordingly, this court held:   
{¶35} “The language in R.C. 2743.02 that ‘the state’ shall ‘have its 
liability determined * * * in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to 
suits between private parties * * *’ means that the state cannot be sued for its 
legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning 
function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by 
                                          
 
10. 
See, e.g., Wilson v. Anchorage (Alaska 1983), 669 P.2d 569, 571 (noting that the Alaska 
legislature immunized public entities from liability based on negligent safety inspections of private 
property following Adams, 555 P.2d 235, in which the Alaska Supreme Court refused to recognize 
the public-duty rule); Clouse v. State (2001), 199 Ariz. 196, 199, 16 P.3d 757 (noting that Arizona 
legislature reinstated immunity for variety of public functions following abrogation of the public-
duty rule in Ryan v. State [1982], 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597); Persilver v. Louisiana Dept. of 
Transp. (La.App.1991), 592 So.2d 1344, 1347, fn. 2 (noting that Louisiana statute providing 
immunity for discretionary acts supersedes Louisiana Supreme Court’s rejection of public-duty 
rule in Fowler, 556 So.2d 1); Barry, Brum v. Town of Dartmouth and the Public Duty Rule: 
Navigating an Interpretive Quagmire (2000), 41 B.C. L. Rev. 383, 410-413 (chronicling the 
Massachusetts legislature’s reinstatement of some aspects of the public-duty rule following judicial 
abrogation of the doctrine in Jean W., 414 Mass. 496, 610 N.E.2d 305). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.  However, once 
the decision has been made to engage in a certain activity or function, the state 
may be held liable, in the same manner as private parties, for the negligence of the 
actions of its employees and agents in the performance of [that activity or 
function].”  Reynolds  at paragraph one of the syllabus; accord Garland v. Ohio 
Dept. of Transp. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 10, 11, 548 N.E.2d 233. 
{¶36} The law as set forth in Reynolds, which we today reaffirm, 
addresses public-policy concerns identical to those that courts have used to justify 
the public-duty rule.  That the state already enjoys some measure of qualified 
immunity for discretionary functions cuts against recognition of an additional rule 
insulating public entities from liability merely because of their public status.  See 
Ryan v. State (1982), 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597 (holding that Arizona’s 
statutory immunity for discretionary acts “should allay these fears” that “people 
will be afraid to act in official capacities” after abrogation of public-duty rule); 
Hudson v. E. Montpelier (1993), 161 Vt. 168, 178-179, 638 A.2d 561 (declining 
to adopt the public-duty rule as a means of limiting municipal liability when 
qualified official immunity for discretionary functions already existed).  Even 
without the public-duty rule, the state already enjoys a fair degree of protection 
from litigious second-guessing of discretionary governmental decisions that 
necessarily involve difficult choices about how to allocate the state’s resources.  
In this case, for example, Reynolds arguably bars liability for the fire marshal’s 
actions if the appellants’ harm resulted from a discretionary executive decision to 
forgo a seasonal inspection; if, on the other hand, the fire marshal’s negligent 
January Term, 2002 
21 
performance of an inspection was the proximate cause of the appellants’ harm, 
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) allows for liability against the state.11 
{¶37} Third, and perhaps most significant, our rejection of the public-
duty rule’s application to suits in the Court of Claims does not automatically open 
the floodgates to excessive governmental liability.  For one thing, the absence of 
the public-duty rule will not automatically result in new duties—and thereby new 
causes of action—that could impose tort liability on the state.  This court has 
previously stated that “R.C. 2743.02(A) does not create a new right of action 
against the state, but places the state upon the same level as any private party.”  
McCord v. Ohio Div. of Parks & Recreation (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 72, 74, 8 
O.O.3d 77, 375 N.E.2d 50.  Thus, suits against the state are inherently limited by 
the type of action asserted against it; if the cause of action is not cognizable as 
between private parties, then there can likewise be no state liability.  For instance, 
actions (unlike this case) that do not sound in tort but seek recovery purely for a 
statutory violation will not necessarily lie against the state—particularly if the 
statute in question provides no private right of action.  Cf. Smith v. Wait (1975), 
46 Ohio App.2d 281, 283-286, 75 O.O.2d 560, 350 N.E.2d 431 (finding no state 
liability in an action alleging violations of statutory provisions concerning 
registration of securities). 
{¶38} For another thing, conventional negligence principles already 
provide some measure of protection against the possibility of the state’s becoming 
                                          
 
11. 
Thus, Justice Resnick’s dissent grossly mischaracterizes (or misunderstands) our holding 
by insisting that our decision subjects the fire marshal to liability for “deciding to postpone a 
cursory, discretionary, and seasonal inspection.”  Infra at ¶52 (Resnick, J., dissenting).  If the 
dissent’s contention were true, it would amount to an implicit overruling of Reynolds.  Our 
reaffirmation today of the Reynolds syllabus—namely, the recognition that the state cannot be held 
liable for highly discretionary decisions—refutes any such claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
the de facto guarantor of every injury somehow attributable to the actions of a 
state tortfeasor.  A state defendant, just like any private defendant, remains 
protected by traditional tort concepts of duty, including foreseeability and 
pertinent public-policy considerations.  Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d at 160; 
Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275, 292, 669 P.2d 451 
(Utter, J., concurring in the result).  Moreover, our tort law already requires a 
special relationship in order to satisfy the duty element in certain types of 
negligence actions, such as actions based on failure to act or failure to control the 
conduct of a third person.  See Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr. 
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449; Hill v. Sonitrol of Southwestern 
Ohio, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 36, 39, 521 N.E.2d 780; see, also, 2 Restatement 
of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 116-122, Sections 314-315.12  Thus, when a duty is 
neither imposed by statute nor undertaken by an instrumentality of the state, the 
state defendant is already insulated from liability based on a failure to act.  See, 
e.g., Juliano v.Ohio Dept. of Health (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 303, 304, 18 OBR 350, 
480 N.E.2d 817 (finding no liability for failure to inspect diving board when 
statute imposed no such duty); cf. Lopatkovich v. Tiffin (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 
204, 207, 28 OBR 290, 503 N.E.2d 154 (snow removal ordinance was at most a 
“duty to assist the city,” did not “raise a duty on owners and occupiers to the 
public at large,” and therefore could not form basis for negligence liability).  A 
plaintiff must also shoulder the burden of establishing proximate cause, which 
could be exceedingly difficult in cases where the governmental conduct alleged to 
                                          
 
12. 
Our recognition that this principle applies to both state and private defendants renders 
puzzling the dissent’s claim that today’s decision somehow imposes an affirmative duty to act upon 
state defendants that would not exist for private defendants.  See infra at ¶90-93, 95-98, 104-106 
(Resnick, J., dissenting).  We have said quite the opposite. 
January Term, 2002 
23 
have caused injury is particularly attenuated or exacerbated by intervening 
circumstances.  “Especially in instances where the public employee’s purported 
negligence stems from a failure to prevent or to mitigate a harmful situation that 
he did not cause, a plaintiff’s burden of establishing proximate cause will be 
significant.”  Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. at 511-512, 610 N.E.2d 305 
(Liacos, C.J., concurring); see, also, Brennen, 285 Ore. at 408, 591 P.2d 719 (“the 
requirement that the risk created by the activity of the municipal agent fall with 
the ‘zone of foreseeability’ imposes an additional limitation on the scope of 
governmental liability”). 
{¶39} For all of these reasons, the public-policy rationales that supported 
our adoption of the public-duty rule in Sawicki do not carry the same force when 
analyzing whether the doctrine should apply to suits against the state in the Court 
of Claims.  Given the legislature’s expression of public policy in the text of R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1) and the built-in safeguards against excessive governmental liability 
already in place, we find no reason to continue Sawicki’s extension to suits 
brought under R.C. Chapter 2743.13 
V 
{¶40} For the foregoing reasons, we reject the public-duty rule as a bar to 
the state’s liability for negligence in actions brought in the Court of Claims.  
Because we hold that the public-duty rule is inconsistent with the statutory 
language of R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), we need not reach the appellants’ arguments 
                                          
 
13. 
Insofar as Sawicki dealt only with municipal liability, we have no occasion to overrule it 
or any of our decisions applying the public-duty rule to actions not brought under R.C. Chapter 
2743.  Various courts of appeals, however, have considered Sawicki (among other cases) to have 
been legislatively superseded by the General Assembly’s enactment of R.C. Chapter 2744.  See, 
e.g., Sudnik v. Crimi (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 394, 397, 690 N.E.2d 925; Franklin v. Columbus 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
challenging the constitutionality of the doctrine.  See State ex rel. DeBrosse v. 
Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114 (“Courts decide constitutional 
issues only when absolutely necessary”).  We also decline to address two other 
issues raised by the parties on this appeal: (1) the appellants’ proposition 
concerning the proper foreseeability standard in assessing issues regarding 
proximate causation and (2) the state’s alternate argument for affirmance based on 
the fire marshal’s discretionary-function immunity.  Because the court of appeals 
held that the public-duty rule barred the appellants’ claims, it had no occasion to 
reach these issues; accordingly, we will leave those issues for the court of appeals 
to resolve, if necessary, on remand. 
{¶41} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.   
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring. 
{¶42} Justice Cook has, with surgical skill, dissected the so-called public-
duty rule and, in the process, has shown why the rule has no efficacy or relevance 
in Ohio.  The intellectual honesty of the opinion, drawing its conclusions from the 
facts as opposed to trying to make the law and facts fit preconceived notions, 
                                                                                                                   
(1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 53, 59-60, 719 N.E.2d 592; Amborski v. Toledo (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 
January Term, 2002 
25 
makes it difficult for the dissenters to mount a credible argument in opposition to 
the majority opinion.  Perhaps that is why both dissents carry on, page after page, 
citing fact patterns and cases that have no relevance to the case at bar. 
{¶43} Justice Cook has, for all to see and understand, explained the clear 
differences between the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applies to the state 
on the one hand, and to municipalities on the other.  Yet even though the case now 
before us involves the state, both dissents continue to confuse the concepts by 
citing and relying on the inapplicable Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio 
St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468—a case arising out of municipal tort liability.  The 
failure to grasp this basic distinction is why we now find the law of Ohio to be 
confused in its application in these types of cases. 
{¶44} It would be an easy task to respond to the dissents point by point, 
but since they both start with a faulty premise and go downhill from there, not 
much would be gained by doing so.  Just one statement from each should suffice. 
{¶45} Justice Resnick, in discussing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
states that “it functions to exempt government from the usual liability that flows 
from the breach of an established duty of care.”  Well, yes, that is exactly what it 
does.  Justice Resnick says that that is OK.  Many of us now say that it is not OK.  
How one justifies that a governmental entity can injure one of its citizens without 
liability but if the same injury is caused by a fellow citizen liability attaches 
escapes many of us and lies at the heart of our disagreement. 
{¶46} Justice Stratton says about the majority opinion that “[t]he 
reasoning is so internally inconsistent that I find it difficult to even argue against.”  
Now that is strange.  A proposition that is so internally inconsistent should be an 
                                                                                                                   
47, 51, 585 N.E.2d 974. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
easy mark.  It could be, of course, that the lack of any real law contrary to the 
majority opinion is the reason it is difficult to argue against. 
{¶47} But it is not the issue of whether they are wrong and we are right or 
vice versa that determines the outcome.  The outcome is determined by the law of 
this state and the framers of our Constitution and makers of our statutes.  It should 
not escape interested readers that both dissents, by necessity and convenience, 
ignore the real law in the case—Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  In 
a separate sentence, which seems to have no particular relevance to the other 
sentence of the section, the framers provided that “[s]uits may be brought against 
the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.”  No 
limitations, other than place and manner, are set forth.  No sovereign immunity 
exception.  No public-duty exception.  Nothing but simple language—the state 
may be sued. 
{¶48} Given the constitutional language, nothing more was needed.  But 
maybe just to be sure, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), which 
provides that “[t]he state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents 
to be sued, and have its liability determined * * * in accordance with the same 
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *.”  Justice Cook has 
now explained what all of that means.  The dissenters have ignored the 
constitutional language. 
{¶49} Notwithstanding the constitutional language, the dissenters say that 
there are limitations on the state’s liability and that those limitations come dressed 
up as the “public-duty rule.”  If this premise is accepted, then it must logically 
follow that without a corresponding amendment to the Constitution, the General 
Assembly could provide that no suit could be brought against the state.  This 
obviously is not and could not be the law. 
January Term, 2002 
27 
{¶50} Justice Cook has done the law a great service.  The opinion 
deserves to be supported, not denigrated.  I respectfully concur. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶51} I am hardly one who concedes infallibility to legal precedent, 
however long or recently established.  See, e.g., Wright v. Bloom (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 596, 635 N.E.2d 31 (overruling paragraph two of the syllabus of In re Estate 
of Thompson [1981], 66 Ohio St.2d 433, 20 O.O.3d 371, 423 N.E.2d 90); Clark v. 
Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438, 628 
N.E.2d 46 (overruling paragraph four of the syllabus of Albain v. Flower Hosp. 
[1990], 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038).  Nor am I inclined to view 
preexisting conceptions of duty as immutable or sacrosanct.  See Estates of 
Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 297-298, 
673 N.E.2d 1311.  But if our decisions are to afford any stability or certainty to the 
law, then the principles they embrace—those founded on sound reason and well 
suited to the interest of justice—should not be discarded at will. 
{¶52} Today’s majority, relying primarily on a statute that is irrelevant to 
the matter at hand, suddenly abolishes a long-established, well-respected, and 
prevalent legal doctrine in a case that demonstrates, better than most others, the 
necessity of its retention.  By abandoning the so-called public-duty rule in claims 
against the state, the majority subjects the fire marshal to liability for deciding to 
postpone a cursory, discretionary, and seasonal inspection at the Ohio River 
Fireworks store in order to conduct a “buy bust” to expose that facility’s illegal 
sale of more dangerous Class B fireworks to unauthorized purchasers.  By the 
same token, the majority’s decision would apply to subject the fire marshal to 
liability had he decided to conduct the inspection rather than the buy bust and 
members of the public were subsequently harmed or killed by Class B fireworks 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
in the hands of an unauthorized purchaser.  It is exactly this kind of judicial 
interference with governmental decision-making and deployment of community 
resources that marks the public-duty doctrine as a cogent, viable, and compelling 
feature of the common law.  For these and the following reasons, I must 
respectfully, but strenuously, dissent. 
{¶53} The ascendancy of the public-duty doctrine in this country, and its 
concomitant “special-relationship exception,” is often attributed to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in South v. Maryland (1855), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
396, 15 L.Ed. 433.  In that case, the plaintiff was abducted, held for several days, 
and released only when he obtained the ransom demanded by his kidnappers.  
According to the plaintiff, the local sheriff knew he had been kidnapped and 
where he was detained, yet did nothing to secure his release or arrest the 
kidnappers.  The plaintiff sued the sheriff on his official bond, claiming that “the 
sheriff did not well and truly execute and perform the duties required of him by 
the laws” of the state of Maryland.  Id. at 401, 18 How. 396, 15 L.Ed. 433. 
{¶54} The plaintiff received a judgment against the sheriff in the circuit 
court, but the Supreme Court reversed the award.  In so doing, the high court held, 
“It is an undisputed principle of the common law, that for a breach of a public 
duty, an officer * * * is amenable to the public, and punishable by indictment 
only.”  Id. at 402-403, 18 How. 396, 15 L.Ed. 433.  The court noted, however, that 
an exception may lie where there exists a “special individual right, privilege, or 
franchise in the plaintiff, from the enjoyment of which he has been restrained or 
hindered by the malicious act of the sheriff.”  Id. at 403, 18 How. 396, 15 L.Ed. 
433. 
{¶55} A substantial majority of jurisdictions now adhere to the principle 
that the duties of public officers and employees ordinarily are owed exclusively to 
the body politic with whom they contracted, and are enforceable only 
January Term, 2002 
29 
administratively or by criminal proceedings.  Those duties are not owed to 
individuals who may be affected by their breach but on whose behalf the 
employees have not assumed to act.  Accordingly, state or local governmental 
bodies cannot be held liable at common law for the breach of a duty owed 
generally to the public as such, but can be held liable for the breach of a duty 
owed specially to individual members of the public.  Correlatively, a 
governmental entity cannot be held liable for negligence in failing to enforce or 
carry out its public duties under a regulatory or penal statute absent a special 
relationship between the government and the injured plaintiff or a statutory 
provision to the contrary. 
{¶56} At the heart of the public-duty doctrine lies an assemblage of 
cogent policy considerations that operate to define the extent to which it is 
economically and socially feasible to subject governmental units to the loss-
distributing function of tort law.  These considerations include most prominently 
the need to preserve the already limited governmental resources that are available 
to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, the principle that courts should 
not interfere with or second-guess the policy decisions made by the other branches 
of government, particularly with regard to the proper allocation of community 
resources and services, and the likelihood that unlimited exposure to liability 
would threaten effective governmental functioning for socially desirable ends.  
Without the doctrine’s protection, the government would be confronted with 
limitless, unpredictable, and, in extreme circumstances, catastrophic liability, 
which could drain the very resources that are needed in the first instance to 
promote the public safety and welfare.  Aside from damages, governmental 
entities would incur considerable expenses in defending the lawsuits.  Most suits 
will survive pretrial dismissal or summary judgment motions, since the element of 
causation, which is almost always a question of fact, will come to replace duty as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
the determinative issue.  In addition, a contrary rule, one whose duty element is 
satisfied by foreseeability alone, would invite judicial scrutiny of every action 
taken, as well as every action that could have been but was not taken, by the other 
branches of government that has some effect in the public domain.  Such a rule 
would subject the entire panoply of policy and enforcement decisions routinely 
made by the political branches to judicial oversight every time a particular injured 
plaintiff finds that its employees failed to properly execute their public duties or 
ward against harm caused by a third party.  Moreover, in the absence of a special 
duty or relationship, it has always been considered unjust and beyond the function 
of tort law to impose a duty on any party to act affirmatively to protect another 
from being harmed by a condition or situation that the party neither created nor 
exacerbated.  There is no legitimate reason for dispensing with this principle 
merely because the defendant is a governmental body.  It is the sum total of these 
and other considerations of policy that has led the majority of courts to adopt the 
doctrine’s essential general-duty/special-duty dichotomy.  See Shearer v. Gulf 
Shores (Ala.1984), 454 So.2d 978; Williams v. State (1983), 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 
Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137; Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 444 
A.2d 1379; Namauu v. Honolulu (1980), 62 Hawaii 358, 614 P.2d 943; Ruf v. 
Honolulu Police Dept. (1999), 89 Haw. 315, 972 P.2d 1081; Ransom v. Garden 
City (1987), 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70; Kolbe v. State (Iowa 2001), 625 N.W.2d 
721; Robertson v. Topeka (1982), 231 Kan. 358, 644 P.2d 458; Ashburn v. Anne 
Arundel Cty. (Md.1986), 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078; Williams v. Mayor of 
Baltimore (2000), 359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41; Cracraft v. St. Louis Park 
(Minn.1979), 279 N.W.2d 801; Hage v. Stade (Minn.1981), 304 N.W.2d 283; 
State ex rel. Barthelette v. Sanders (Mo.1988), 756 S.W.2d 536; Jungerman v. 
Raytown (Mo.1996), 925 S.W.2d 202; Phillips v. Billings (1988), 233 Mont. 249, 
758 P.2d 772; Frye v. Clark Cty. (1981), 97 Nev. 632, 637 P.2d 1215; Coty v. 
January Term, 2002 
31 
Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757, 839 P.2d 97; Motyka v. Amsterdam (1965), 15 
N.Y.2d 134, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 204 N.E.2d 635; O’Connor v. New York City 
(1983), 58 N.Y.2d 184, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485, 447 N.E.2d 33; Cuffy v. New York City 
(1987), 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937; Stone v. North 
Carolina Dept. of Labor (1998), 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711; Melendez v. 
Philadelphia (1983), 320 Pa.Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060; Catone v. Medberry 
(R.I.1989), 555 A.2d 328; Barratt v. Burlingham (R.I.1985), 492 A.2d 1219; 
Orzechowski v. Rhode Island (R.I.1984), 485 A.2d 545; Bellamy v. Brown (1991), 
305 S.C. 291, 408 S.E.2d 219; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor, 
Licensing & Regulation (1999), 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142; Washington v. 
Lexington Cty. Jail (App.1999), 337 S.C. 400, 523 S.E.2d 204; Tipton v. Tabor 
(S.D.1997), 567 N.W.2d 351; Ezell v. Cockrell (Tenn.1995), 902 S.W.2d 394; 
Vaquera v. Salas (Tex.App.1991), 810 S.W.2d 456; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 
1991), 813 P.2d 1156; Sorge v. State (2000), 171 Vt. 171, 762 A.2d 816; 
Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451; Oberg 
v. Dept. of Natural Resources (1990), 114 Wash.2d 278, 787 P.2d 918; Benson v. 
Kutsch (1989), 181 W.Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36; Holsten v. Massey (1997), 200 
W.Va. 775, 490 S.E.2d 864; Walker v. Meadows (1999), 206 W.Va. 78, 521 
S.E.2d 801; Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental Unit 
from Tort Liability on Theory That Only General, Not Particular, Duty Was Owed 
under Circumstances (1985), 38 A.L.R.4th 1194; 57 American Jurisprudence 2d 
(2001) 137-145, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability, Sections 
102-105. 
{¶57} According to appellants, however, there is a growing perception 
that the doctrine “unjustifiably creates inequitable and harsh results for plaintiffs,” 
which has “led an increasing number of states to abandon the public duty doctrine 
altogether.”  In support, appellants cite decisions of the high courts of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
following ten states:  Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  The majority also 
discerns that “a handful of states have rejected the public-duty rule as a bar to 
government liability,” listing decisions from the same states with the exception of 
Iowa and the addition of Florida, Massachusetts, and Louisiana. 
{¶58} Yet a closer analysis reveals that the public-duty doctrine has not 
been entirely discarded in all thirteen of these states.  Just last year, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa clarified that it had never discarded the public-duty rule, while 
confirming its continued adherence to the rule on public-policy grounds.  Kolbe, 
supra, 625 N.W.2d at 729-730.  Thus, despite appellants’ mistaken belief to the 
contrary, the majority correctly lists Iowa as a jurisdiction that continues to adhere 
to the public-duty doctrine. 
{¶59} In Brennen v. Eugene (1979), 285 Ore. 401, 591 P.2d 719, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon did indeed reject the public-duty doctrine, but limited 
its decision to cases of active governmental misfeasance.  Thus, in distinguishing 
a number of cases in which the public-duty doctrine was applied to governmental 
inaction, such as a city’s failure to enforce its housing code, the court stated: 
{¶60} “These cases, which deal with a failure on the part of public 
officials to act at all, involve considerations quite different from those in a case 
such as this, where an act is alleged to have been performed and performed 
negligently.  As a general rule, one is held to a higher standard of care when he 
affirmatively acts than when he fails to act at all. 
{¶61} “Because this case is not one of failure to act at all, we express no 
opinion on the scope of governmental duty in such a case.”  (Citation omitted.)  
Id. at 409, 591 P.2d 719.  See, also, Dist. of Columbia v. Forsman 
(D.C.App.1990), 580 A.2d 1314, 1317, fn. 5 (noting distinction and rejecting 
Brennen “as authority for appellees’ position here,” where the district allegedly 
January Term, 2002 
33 
failed to require an adjacent property owner to obtain a demolition permit prior to 
commencing work that led to the collapse of plaintiffs’ residence). 
{¶62} In Jean W. v. Commonwealth (1993), 414 Mass. 496, 610 N.E.2d 
305, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the public-duty rule on 
a four-to-three vote, largely because of the confusing way in which the doctrine 
had developed and been applied in Massachusetts.  Nevertheless, the court 
decided not to abolish the doctrine at that time.  Instead, the chief justice’s opinion 
announced the court’s intention to abolish the doctrine at the end of the 1993 
legislative session so as to give the Massachusetts legislature an opportunity to 
preempt its decision by passing additional limitations on governmental liability.  
If not for this maneuver, the case may have been decided differently.  Thus, a 
swing vote in that case commented as follows: 
{¶63} “I join in the Chief Justice’s opinion principally because the 
abandonment of the public duty rule is made prospective. * * * 
{¶64} “From my point of view, the prospective nature of the opinion 
recognizes that abandonment of the public duty rule could lead to a deluge of 
lawsuits against governmental entities, particularly municipalities, which will 
drain their already limited resources.  As I said in Cyran v. Ware, 413 Mass. 452, 
455 [597 N.E.2d 1352] (1992), for example, ‘[s]ociety would not favor, and 
public policy does not support, a rule which would expose a municipality to 
liability for damages every time its fire department does not, in plaintiff’s view, 
fight a fire satisfactorily.  In busy urban areas such exposure could be limitless, 
and in extreme circumstances (as recent events in Los Angeles illustrate), the 
potential cost of such governmental liability could be catastrophic.’  In addition to 
damages, governmental entities will incur considerable costs to defend the 
lawsuits.  Most of the suits will probably survive summary judgment (since 
causation, the issue which will be at the heart of most * * * actions under the new 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
rule, is almost always a question of fact).  The costs of defense thus will 
encompass fees and expenses for discovery, which in present lawsuits is often 
lengthy and costly, and fees for trial and appeals.  The costs could have severe 
impact on public treasuries.  I am not persuaded that the Legislature either 
intended or anticipated this result when G.L. c. 258 [the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act] was enacted.”  Id., 414 Mass. at 523-524, 610 N.E.2d 305 (Greaney, 
J., concurring.) 
{¶65} In any event, the Massachusetts legislature responded to the 
decision in Jean W. by codifying many aspects of the public-duty rule, including a 
provision barring liability for negligent inspections by public employees.  See 
Gallego v. Wilson (D.Mass.1995), 882 F.Supp. 1169, 1172; Barry, Brum v. Town 
of Dartmouth and the Public Duty Rule:  Navigating an Interpretive Quagmire 
(2000), 41 B.C.L.Rev. 383, 410-413; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, Section 10(f). 
{¶66} The decisions cited by appellants and the majority in support of the 
rejection of the doctrine in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Louisiana have all 
been superseded or abrogated by subsequent legislative action in those 
jurisdictions as well.  See Wilson v. Anchorage (Alaska 1983), 669 P.2d 569, 571; 
Clouse v. State (2001), 199 Ariz. 196, 199, 16 P.3d 757; Aztec Minerals Corp. v. 
Romer (Colo.App.1996), 940 P.2d 1025, 1031; Persilver v. Louisiana Dept. of 
Transp. (La.App.1991), 592 So.2d 1344, 1347, fn. 2. 
{¶67} Finally, even the most ardent and ingenious proponent of the rule’s 
abolition would be hard-pressed to argue that it no longer exists in Florida.  As 
noted by the majority, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the public-duty rule 
in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty. (Fla.1979), 371 So.2d 1010, 
1015-1016.  Nevertheless, the court was impressed by the notion that “ ‘in any 
organized society there must be room for basic governmental policy decision and 
the implementation thereof, unhampered by the threat or fear of sovereign tort 
January Term, 2002 
35 
liability.’ “  Id., 371 So.2d at 1019, quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church 
v. State (1965), 67 Wash.2d 246, 254, 407 P.2d 440.  Accordingly, the court 
replaced the public-duty rule with a “discretionary-function exception” to 
Florida’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.  Rather than utilizing the 
public-duty/special-duty dichotomy to determine governmental tort liability, the 
discretionary-function exception “distinguishes between the ‘planning’ and 
‘operational’ levels of decision-making by governmental agencies.”  Id., 371 
So.2d at 1022. 
{¶68} In a series of cases decided on April 4, 1985, the Florida Supreme 
Court endeavored to clarify the law of governmental tort liability, particularly 
with regard to the planning/operational dichotomy it created in Commercial 
Carrier Corp.  See Trianon Park Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Hialeah (Fla.1985), 
468 So.2d 912; Reddish v. Smith (Fla.1985), 468 So.2d 929; Everton v. Willard 
(Fla.1985), 468 So.2d 936; Carter v. Stuart (Fla.1985), 468 So.2d 955; Duvall v. 
Cape Coral (Fla.1985), 468 So.2d 961; Daytona Beach v. Huhn (Fla.1985), 468 
So.2d 963; Rodriguez v. Cape Coral (Fla.1985), 468 So.2d 963. 
{¶69} As relevant here, Florida’s high court clarified that although 
governmental entities are not immune from liability for their operational 
activities, neither are they automatically subject to liability for acts or omissions 
that occur at the operational level of government.  “In order to subject the 
government to tort liability for operational phase activities, there must first be 
either an underlying common law or statutory duty of care in the absence of 
sovereign immunity.”  Trianon Park Condominium Assn., 468 So.2d at 919. 
{¶70} In determining that the city had no underlying duty of care to 
inspect for building code violations in Trianon Park, the court stated:  “[T]he 
enforcement of building codes and ordinances is for the purpose of protecting the 
health and safety of the public, not the personal or property interests of individual 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
citizens. * * * Statutes and regulations enacted under the police power to protect 
the public and enhance the public safety do not create duties owed by the 
government to citizens as individuals without the specific legislative intent to do 
so.”  Id., 468 So.2d at 922. 
{¶71} In determining that a deputy sheriff had no underlying duty of care 
to arrest a drunk driver in Everton, the court explained: 
{¶72} “We recognize that, if a special relationship exists between an 
individual and a governmental entity, there could be a duty of care owed to the 
individual. * * * In such a case, a special duty to use reasonable care in the 
protection of the individual may arise.  See, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). 
{¶73} “A law enforcement officer’s duty to protect the citizens is a 
general duty owed to the public as a whole.  The victim of a criminal offense, 
which might have been prevented through reasonable law enforcement action, 
does not establish a common law duty of care to the individual citizen and 
resulting tort liability, absent a special duty to the victim.  This majority view was 
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in its early decision in South v. 
Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1855).”  Id., 468 So.2d at 938. 
{¶74} Thus, as one Florida Supreme Court justice stated, “Today the 
majority embraces the very analysis explicitly quashed in Commercial Carrier.”  
Trianon Park Condominium Assn., 468 So.2d at 924 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).  
And as observed by another, “Careful readers will recognize, absent the labeling, 
the substance of the [public duty] doctrine.”  Id., 468 So.2d at 926 (Shaw, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶75} It would therefore appear that the number of states willing to 
discard all vestiges of the public-duty rule has not increased to 12 or 13, but has 
actually dwindled to about 4 or 5 at the most. 
January Term, 2002 
37 
{¶76} Moreover, the argument that the public-duty rule should be 
abandoned because of the hardship it causes to plaintiffs has “been raised before 
and rejected.  It is true that some individuals will suffer substantial hardship as a 
result of their inability to recover for their injuries from a municipality that 
negligently fails to enforce its own regulations.  The deleterious impact that such a 
judicial extension of liability would have on local governments, the vital functions 
that they serve, and ultimately on taxpayers, however, demands continued 
adherence to the existing rule.  All the more is this so when there has been 
reliance for decades on this doctrine for purposes of municipal fiscal planning.  If 
liability to individuals is to be imposed on municipalities for failure to enforce 
statutes or regulations intended for the general welfare, that imposition should 
come from the Legislature.”  O’Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d at 192, 
460 N.Y.S.2d 485, 447 N.E.2d 33. 
{¶77} When we first adopted the public-duty rule to determine a 
municipality’s tort liability in Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 
525 N.E.2d 468, we had already abolished the judicially created doctrine of 
municipal immunity in Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng. Ltd. (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 31, 6 OBR 53, 451 N.E.2d 228.  We explained:  “Rather than being an 
absolute defense, as was sovereign immunity, the public duty rule comported with 
the principles of negligence, and was applicable to the determination of the extent 
to which a statute may encompass the duty upon which negligence is premised. * 
* * It can therefore be concluded that the public duty rule is an independent 
doctrine and, consequently, survives the abrogation of sovereign immunity.”  
Sawicki, 37 Ohio St.3d at 230, 525 N.E.2d 468. 
{¶78} When the court applied the public-duty rule to claims against the 
state in Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 215, 569 N.E.2d 
1042, and Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 650 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
N.E.2d 104, the state had already waived its immunity from liability under R.C. 
2743.02.  Consistent with Sawicki, we naturally determined that the public-duty 
rule is a defense independent of sovereign immunity and, therefore, is unaffected 
by the waiver of state immunity.  Anderson, 58 Ohio St.3d at 218, 569 N.E.2d 
1042; Hurst, 72 Ohio St.3d at 329, 650 N.E.2d 104. 
{¶79} According to the majority, however, Anderson and Hurst should 
have been decided differently from Sawicki because the state, in waiving its 
immunity under R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), consented to be sued, and have its liability 
determined, “in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between 
private parties.”  Thus, while the public-duty rule may have survived the 
abrogation of municipal immunity, as held in Sawicki, a different inquiry is 
required to determine whether the rule survives the waiver of state immunity 
under R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). 
{¶80} This analysis must fail, however, because it proceeds from a false 
premise.  In order to distinguish Anderson and Hurst from Sawicki, it must 
necessarily be shown that R.C. 2743.02(A)(1)’s waiver of state immunity is 
distinguishable from Enghauser’s abrogation of municipal immunity.  In other 
words, R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) must be interpreted to impose a broader or different 
liability on the state than Enghauser imposes on municipalities.  This is the 
majority’s unstated yet essential premise, for without it there is no basis on which 
to avoid Sawicki’s holding that the public-duty rule survives the abrogation of 
sovereign immunity. 
{¶81} Yet in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70, 14 OBR 
506, 471 N.E.2d 776, the very case upon which the majority relies to support the 
second paragraph of its syllabus, we specifically rejected this interpretation of 
R.C. 2743.02, stating that “[t]he abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the 
state, which was accomplished by the passage of R.C. 2743.02, is not significantly 
January Term, 2002 
39 
different from the common-law abrogation of municipal sovereign immunity 
accomplished by this court [in Enghauser].”  We then held that the language in 
R.C. 2743.02 that the state shall “have its liability determined * * * in accordance 
with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties” means 
essentially the same thing as Enghauser held with regard to the abrogation of 
municipal immunity.  Compare Reynolds, at paragraph one of the syllabus, with 
Enghauser, 6 Ohio St.3d 31, 6 OBR 53, 451 N.E.2d 228, at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶82} There is, therefore, no substantial difference between R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1)’s waiver of state immunity and Enghauser’s abrogation of 
municipal immunity.  To the contrary, R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) imposes the same 
liability on the state that Enghauser imposes on municipalities.  Thus, in 
determining the viability of the public-duty rule, there is no valid basis on which 
to distinguish suits against the state from suits against municipalities. 
{¶83} On a more basic level, there is no reciprocal relationship between 
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) and the public-duty rule.  Sovereign immunity is a defense 
that bars only the enforcement of civil liability.  Conceptually, it does not deny the 
existence of a duty or the wrongfulness of government conduct.  Instead, it 
functions to exempt government from the usual liability that flows from the 
breach of an established duty of care.  The sovereign-immunity doctrine may 
readily admit of the existence of a tort because it applies nonetheless to disallow 
all liability within the limits of the immunity. 
{¶84} In waiving the state’s immunity from liability, R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) 
does nothing more than remove this exemption, thereby exposing the state to 
liability for those acts or omissions that would have been actionable at common 
law but for its immunity.  The statute does not expressly abolish the public-duty 
rule, nor does it purport to define negligence, establish duties, or create new 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
causes of action.  It leaves these matters for judicial determination in accordance 
with the same common-law principles that govern the liability of private parties.  
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) does not, therefore, obviate the plaintiff’s burden of 
establishing the elements of actionable negligence. 
{¶85} The liability of any defendant charged with negligence is premised 
on the existence and breach of a duty owed to the person claiming injury.  In 
determining the existence of any duty, courts must inevitably consider the status 
of the parties involved, including their relationships to one another and society at 
large, and then make a social judgment as to whether and to what extent the 
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.  
The considerations of policy that inhere in this determination will necessarily vary 
and shift depending on the nature of the duty for which legal recognition is 
sought. 
{¶86} In ascertaining the existence of a public duty, courts must therefore 
consider the relationship between government and its citizens and decide whether 
public policy supports a rule that would subject the government to liability every 
time one of its employees fails to enforce a statute or regulation intended for the 
general welfare.  Viewed in this light, the public-duty rule is but a conclusory 
expression of those considerations that lead us to answer this inquiry in the 
negative.  It is basically a function of those common-law principles that inhere in 
the determination of duty and, as such, lies beyond the reach of either the 
application or the abrogation of sovereign immunity. 
{¶87} This is why the two doctrines—sovereign immunity and public 
duty—are considered to be independent of each other, so that the abrogation of 
one does not affect the viability of the other.  This is also why most courts have 
adopted or retained the public-duty rule, as we did in Anderson and Hurst, despite 
the passage of statutes similar to R.C. 2743.02 in their respective jurisdictions.  
January Term, 2002 
41 
See, e.g., Washington v. Lexington Cty. Jail, 337 S.C. at 404-405, 523 S.E.2d 204; 
Walker v. Meadows, 206 W.Va. at 83, 521 S.E.2d 801; Stone v. North Carolina 
Dept. of Labor, 347 N.C. at 478, 495 S.E.2d 711; Tipton v. Tabor, 567 N.W.2d at 
356-357; Holsten v. Massey, 200 W.Va. at 780-784, 490 S.E.2d 864; Ezell v. 
Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d at 399; Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State (1993), 159 Vt. 481, 
622 A.2d 495; J & B Dev. Co., Inc. v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 299, 304, 
669 P.2d 468; Cracraft v. St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d at 803-806; Motyka v. 
Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d at 138, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 204 N.E.2d 635; 57 American 
Jurisprudence 2d, supra, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability, 
Sections 92 and 93. 
{¶88} The majority argues, however, that this view of the public-duty 
rule as a function of duty “ignores a vital feature of the doctrine that is 
incompatible with R.C. 2743.02(A)(1).  The applicability of the public-duty rule 
depends upon the public status of the particular defendant raising it as a bar to 
liability.  In other words, only governmental entities and their employees may rely 
on the rule.  It is spurious logic to conclude that a doctrine that is, by definition, 
available only to public defendants can be consistent with a statute mandating that 
suits be determined in accordance with rules of law applicable to private parties.”  
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶89} This analysis is conceptually upside down.  In passing R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1), the General Assembly incorporated the common-law rules of 
negligence.  The applicable common-law rule that is relevant here provides that 
actionable negligence depends upon the breach of a duty owed by the defendant to 
the injured plaintiff.  The application of the public-duty rule is dependent upon the 
public status of the particular defendant who invokes it because the duty that is 
sought to be imposed on that defendant depends solely on the defendant’s public 
status.  It is the alleged duty, not the rule, that in the first instance brings the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
defendant’s public status into play.  The rule simply responds to the public nature 
of the duty for which legal recognition is sought. 
{¶90} Moreover, the rejection of the public-duty rule will actually result 
in the state having its liability determined in accordance with rules of law that are 
not applicable in suits brought against private tortfeasors.  Private parties do not 
owe a duty of protection to those with whom they have no special relationship and 
for whose benefit they have not assumed to act.  See, generally, 2 Restatement of 
the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Sections 314 et seq.  Nor are private parties liable for 
the breach of public duties.  Instead, they are benefited by the same public-
duty/special-duty dichotomy that inheres in the public-duty rule.  Thus, duties 
created by legislative enactments or administrative regulations that are intended 
for the protection or benefit of the public at large cannot form the basis of a 
negligence action even against private parties.  See, e.g., Wagner v. Anzon, Inc. 
(1996), 453 Pa.Super. 619, 627, 684 A.2d 570; Tri-State Mint, Inc. v. Riedel Env. 
Serv., Inc. (C.A.8, 1994), 29 F.3d 424, 426; Hagen v. Sioux Falls (1990), 464 
N.W.2d 396, 399; Taylor v. Stevens Cty. (1988), 111 Wash.2d 159, 163, 759 P.2d 
447; Bittle v. Brunetti (Colo.1988), 750 P.2d 49; Nichols v. Sitko (1987), 157 
Ill.App.3d 950, 109 Ill.Dec. 903, 510 N.E.2d 971; Gardner v. Wood (1987), 429 
Mich. 290, 311-312, 414 N.W.2d 706; J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cty., 100 Wash.2d 
at 304, 669 P.2d 468; Cracraft v. St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d at 805-806; 2 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, supra, Section 288; 57A American 
Jurisprudence 2d (1989) 683-684, Damages, Section 767. 
{¶91} As explained by the Supreme Court of North Carolina: 
{¶92} “Private persons do not possess public duties.  Only governmental 
entities possess authority to enact and enforce laws for the protection of the 
public.  See Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky.) (recognizing that if 
the State were held liable for a failure to enforce laws and regulations establishing 
January Term, 2002 
43 
safety standards for construction and use of buildings, the State’s status as a 
governmental entity ‘would be the only basis for holding a city or state liable, 
because only a governmental entity possesses the authority to enact and enforce 
laws for the protection of the public’), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 [100 S.Ct. 69], 
62 L.Ed.2d 46 (1979).  If the State were held liable for performing or failing to 
perform an obligation to the public at large, the State would have liability when a 
private person could not.  The public duty doctrine, by barring negligence actions 
against a governmental entity absent a ‘special relationship’ or a ‘special duty’ to 
a particular individual, serves the legislature’s express intention to permit liability 
against the State only when a private person could be liable.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Stone v. North Carolina Dept. of Labor, 347 N.C. at 478-479, 495 S.E.2d 711. 
{¶93} Thus, as succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the 
public-duty rule is “ ‘consistent with the principle that public employees share the 
same—but not greater—liability to injured parties as other defendants under like 
circumstances.’ “  Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d at 729, quoting Sankey v. 
Richenberger (Iowa 1990), 456 N.W.2d 206, 209. 
{¶94} The majority insists that “[c]ases from this court, however, suggest 
otherwise.  We have expressly stated that a duty, for purposes of a negligence 
claim, may arise out of a legislative enactment.  Chambers [v. St. Mary’s School 
(1998)], 82 Ohio St.3d [563] at 565, 697 N.E.2d 198; see, also, Gelbman v. 
Second Natl. Bank of Warren (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 77, 79, 9 OBR 280, 458 
N.E.2d 1262.  And this court has cited statutory law as a means of addressing 
whether the duty element was satisfied in negligence suits against private parties.  
See, e.g., Mussivand [v. David (1989)], 45 Ohio St.3d [314] at 320, 544 N.E.2d 
265; Shroades v. Rental Homes (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 20, 22 O.O.3d 152, 427 
N.E.2d 774.  Thus, as a general matter, government actors are not alone in having 
duties imposed upon them by statute.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
{¶95} But in the absence of the public-duty rule, government actors 
would be alone in having public or general protective duties imposed upon them 
by statute, and the cases on which the majority relies do not suggest otherwise.  In 
none of these cases has this court indicated that public duties created by statute 
can form the basis of a negligence action against private parties.  Nor do any of 
these cases cite statutory law as a means of imposing a general duty on private 
parties to act affirmatively for another’s protection. 
{¶96} In Mussivand, we held that “[a] person who knows, or should 
know, that he or she is infected with a venereal disease has the duty to abstain 
from sexual conduct or, at a minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or 
she expects to have sexual relations of his or her condition.”  Id., 45 Ohio St.3d 
314, 544 N.E.2d 265, at paragraph one of the syllabus.  In so holding, we cited 
R.C. 3701.81(A) as statutory support for this duty.  Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 319, 544 
N.E.2d 265.  R.C. 3701.81(A) provides, “No person, knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that he is suffering from a dangerous, contagious 
disease, shall knowingly fail to take reasonable measures to prevent exposing 
himself to other persons, except when seeking medical aid.” 
{¶97} It is immediately apparent that both R.C. 3701.81(A) and the 
holding in Mussivand require an individual to control only his or her own conduct 
so as not to harm another.  They do not, however, establish any sort of general 
duty under which a private party is obligated to control or protect against the 
conduct or condition of a third person.  This kind of duty could not be imposed on 
a private actor in the absence of a special relationship as provided in Restatement 
of Torts Sections 314 and 315. 
{¶98} In Gelbman, the court declined to impose an affirmative duty on a 
private property owner to protect third parties from the negligent acts of business 
invitees that occur outside the owner’s property and are beyond the owner’s 
January Term, 2002 
45 
control.  In so doing, we explained that “liability in negligence will not lie in the 
absence of a special duty owed by the defendant” and that “unless a special 
relationship between defendant-owner and plaintiff-third party is extant by statute 
or judicial determination, no duty may be imposed.”  Id., 9 Ohio St.3d at 78, 79, 9 
OBR 280, 458 N.E.2d 1262.  See, also, Eichorn v. Lustig’s, Inc. (1954), 161 Ohio 
St. 11, 52 O.O. 467, 117 N.E.2d 436, syllabus (private property owner has no 
common-law duty to protect others from defective conditions that exist outside 
the owner’s property “unless such defects are created or negligently maintained or 
permitted to exist by such owner for his own private use or benefit”). 
{¶99} In Chambers, the court held that the violation of an administrative 
rule, such as the Ohio Basic Building Code, does not constitute negligence per se.  
In so holding, the court distinguished administrative rules from legislative 
enactments, the violation of which was held to constitute negligence per se in 
Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon (1954), 161 Ohio St. 367, 53 O.O. 274, 119 N.E.2d 440.  
82 Ohio St.3d at 566-567, 697 N.E.2d 198.  In Eisenhuth, the court explained:  
“The violation of any specific legislative enactment enacted for the protection of 
private persons is of itself such a breach of duty as to constitute negligence. * * * 
However, a legislative enactment which does not purport to define a civil liability 
but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public is not to 
be construed as establishing such a liability.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 161 Ohio 
St. at 372-373, 53 O.O. 274, 119 N.E.2d 440. 
{¶100} In Chambers, the court stated, “Typically, a duty may be 
established by common law, legislative enactment, or by the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case.”  82 Ohio St.3d at 565, 697 N.E.2d 198.  Given that 
Chambers did not even deal with a statute, it can hardly be asserted that this rather 
innocuous observation suggests that statutory duties imposed for the protection of 
the general public can form the basis of a negligence claim against a private party. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
{¶101} In Shroades, we held that “[a] landlord is liable for injuries, 
sustained on the demised residential premises, which are proximately caused by 
the landlord’s failure to fulfill the duties imposed by R.C. 5321.04.”  Id., 68 Ohio 
St.2d 20, 22 O.O.3d 152, 427 N.E.2d 774, at the syllabus.  However, the duties 
imposed by R.C. 5321.04 are not intended for the protection and benefit of the 
general public but are intended “to protect persons using rented residential 
premises from injuries.”  Id., 68 Ohio St.2d at 25, 22 O.O.3d 152, 427 N.E.2d 
774. 
{¶102} In fact, when this court modified Shroades in Sikora v. Wenzel 
(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 493, 497, 727 N.E.2d 1277, we relied on Sections 288A 
and 288B of the Restatement of Torts in determining when a landlord will be 
excused from liability for violating the duties imposed by R.C. 5321.04.  Sections 
288A and 288B come into play, however, only after a determination is made 
whether the standard of conduct defined by a particular statute should be adopted 
under Section 286 as the standard of conduct for tort liability or rejected under 
Section 288.  Pursuant to Section 288, courts will not adopt the requirements of 
legislative enactments that are “intended only for the protection of the interests of 
the community as such, or of the public at large, rather than for the protection of 
any individual or class of persons.”  2 Restatement of Torts at 30, Comment b.  
Nor will they rely on statutes that are enacted “only for the purpose of securing to 
individuals the enjoyment of rights and privileges to which they are entitled as 
members of the public, rather than for the purpose of protecting any individual 
from harm.”  Id. at 31, Comment c. 
{¶103} Moreover, since we are now comparing duties imposed on public 
and private parties, it is worthwhile to point out that the public-duty rule does not 
apply to prevent the imposition of similar statutory duties on the state in its 
January Term, 2002 
47 
capacity as landowner.  See, e.g., Oberg v. Dept. of Natural Resources (1990), 
114 Wash.2d 278, 787 P.2d 918. 
{¶104} In finding the public-duty rule to be inconsistent with R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1) merely because private parties have duties imposed upon them by 
statute, the majority has therefore engaged an apples-oranges comparison.  The 
nature of the duties that can be legitimately imposed upon private parties by 
statute for purposes of negligence under the foregoing decisions are inherently 
different from those statutorily created duties that the majority’s decision now 
imposes upon public parties.  There is a qualitative difference between imposing 
statutory duties on private parties to control their own activities and imposing 
statutory duties on public employees to control the activities of others.  It must not 
be forgotten that today’s decision imposes potential liability on the fire marshal 
for failure to act affirmatively so as to ascertain and correct a defect on private 
land that he did not create, for the aid and protection of third parties with whom 
he had no special relationship, and purportedly derives from an internal rule 
adopted pursuant to the discretionary portion of a statute that was enacted for the 
safety and welfare of the general public.  This is a far cry from imposing statutory 
duties on a landlord to remedy known defects on his own premises for the safety 
of those who are invited to use his property. 
{¶105} In the second part of its opinion, the majority attempts to assuage 
any fear on the part of government that the abolition of the public-duty rule will 
engender excessive state liability.  According to the majority, “there are already 
important safeguards in Court of Claims jurisprudence that satisfy the public-
policy concerns addressed by the public-duty rule.”  The majority also advises that 
“conventional negligence principles already provide some measure of protection * 
* * to the actions of a state tortfeasor,” while pointing to some of the same 
principles that justify the public-duty rule in the first instance.  Based on these 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
safeguards and principles, the majority concludes that “the public-policy 
rationales that supported our adoption of the public-duty rule in Sawicki do not 
carry the same force when analyzing whether the doctrine should apply to suits 
against the state in the Court of Claims.” 
{¶106} However, the majority never concludes that the public-duty rule is 
unjust, or finds that its underlying policy considerations are invalid, or otherwise 
explains why it is preferable to rely on other safeguards and protections against 
excessive government liability that go only part way in addressing the legitimate 
concerns of the public-duty rule.  Moreover, every safeguard and common-law 
rule cited by the majority, including that provided by Reynolds, is equally 
applicable in claims against municipalities.  Thus, the policy considerations that 
supported our adoption of the public-duty rule in Sawicki carry precisely the same 
force in determining whether the doctrine should apply to suits against the state. 
{¶107} For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals, which denied liability in this case upon the application of the 
public-duty rule. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶108} I do not believe that the language in R.C. 2743.02 that requires that 
the state shall “have its liability determined * * * in accordance with the same 
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties” conflicts with the public-
duty rule.  I would continue to adhere to the public-duty rule pursuant to Sawicki 
v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468, and its progeny.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
January Term, 2002 
49 
{¶109} The majority reasons that the language in R.C. 2743.02 that states 
that a lawsuit against the state must be determined in accordance with the “same 
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties” conflicts with the public-
duty rule because the public-duty rule is a defense that applies only to the 
government.  Thus, the majority interprets the phrase “same rules of law” to mean 
that a statute cannot affect the state differently than it would affect private parties.  
I believe that the majority misconstrues the language of R.C. 2743.02. 
{¶110} The majority in the second paragraph of its syllabus excludes 
judicial and legislative functions from the waiver of immunity, but I simply 
cannot follow its logic as to why these areas fall outside the language of “suits 
between private parties,” while a public duty is somehow included.  The reasoning 
is so internally inconsistent that I find it difficult to even argue against. 
{¶111} The General Assembly waived the state’s immunity from liability 
when it enacted R.C. 2743.02.  However, R.C. 2743.02 does not create “new 
rights or causes of action.”  Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 
162, 163, 6 OBR 221, 451 N.E.2d 1196.  “[I]t only provides a remedy for existing 
duties where the state was previously immune from suit and a private party under 
similar circumstances would have been liable.”  (Emphasis added.)  Shelton v. 
Indus. Comm. (1976), 51 Ohio App.2d 125, 130, 5 O.O.3d 286, 367 N.E.2d 51.    
{¶112} In Shelton, the court addressed whether the language in R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1), that made the state liable in accordance with the same rules of law 
applicable between private parties, permitted an injured worker to sue the 
Industrial Commission for failure to enforce safety standards.  51 Ohio App.2d 
125, 5 O.O.3d 286, 367 N.E.2d 51.  The court held that because there was no 
statutory duty among private parties to inspect and enforce safety standards, the 
injured worker could not sue the Industrial Commission because such an action 
did not exist between private parties before the waiver of immunity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
{¶113} The majority states that the Shelton “reasoning operates on the 
unstated premise that statutes creating duties for governmental actors cannot 
satisfy the duty element for purposes of the state’s liability for negligence because 
there are no statutory duties that may similarly bind private parties.”  The majority 
then dismisses the Shelton reasoning, recognizing that “government actors are not 
alone in having duties imposed on them by statute.” 
{¶114} The language waiving sovereign immunity “should be construed 
reasonably to at least make sure that before the public treasury is emptied the 
result was intended by the legislature.”  Oregon v. Ferguson (1978), 57 Ohio 
App.2d 95, 102, 11 O.O.3d 94, 385 N.E.2d 1084.  The majority’s analysis fails to 
recognize that some statutes that are enacted for the welfare of the public generally 
can be imposed only on the state.  Shelton, 51 Ohio App.2d at 131, 5 O.O.3d 286, 
367 N.E.2d 51, see, also, Stone v. North Carolina Dept. of Labor (1998), 347 
N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711.  Therefore, statutes that impose these public duties are 
not applicable in suits between private parties.  Oregon, 57 Ohio App.2d at 101-
102, 11 O.O.3d 94, 385 N.E.2d 1084; Stone, 347 N.C. at 478, 495 S.E.2d 711.  
Because these public-duty statutes impose duties only upon the government and 
not on private parties, they may not be the basis for an action against the state 
because they are not “in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits 
between private parties.” 
{¶115} The public-duty rule is a defense that applies only where a lawsuit 
against the state is based upon a law that imposes a public duty on the state.  See 
Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 650 N.E.2d 
104; cf. Brodie v. Summit Cty. Children Serv. Bd. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 112, 119, 
554 N.E.2d 1301 (child-abuse statute imposes specific duty on state to each 
allegedly abused child; thus, the public-duty rule is not applicable).  Therefore, the 
requirement in R.C. 2743.02 that the state’s liability be determined according to 
January Term, 2002 
51 
the same rules of law that apply to suits between private parties does not conflict 
with the public-duty rule. 
{¶116} Further, I believe that the majority’s holding could have 
unintended consequences.  R.C. 2743.02 also requires courts to apply the same 
rules of procedure that apply between private parties.  Reese, 6 Ohio St.3d at 164, 
6 OBR 221, 451 N.E.2d 1196.  Civ.R. 62, which applies to lawsuits between 
private parties, treats the state differently from private persons when seeking a 
stay upon an appeal.  Under Civ.R. 62, the state is provided an automatic stay 
without the requirement of bond, while a private person must post bond.  State ex 
rel. State Fire Marshal v. Curl (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 568, 722 N.E.2d 73.  
According to the majority’s reasoning, Civ.R. 62(C), which permits a stay in favor 
of the state without bond, would no longer be applicable because it treats the state 
differently from other private parties.  I do not believe that the General Assembly 
intended the nullification of rules or statutes solely because they treat the state 
differently. 
{¶117} Finally, the Tenth District Court of Appeals, first in Shelton and 
later in Ferguson, invited the General Assembly to correct the court’s 
interpretation that the state could not be sued pursuant to statutes where the duty 
was owed only to the public generally if it disagreed with these judgments.  
Shelton, 51 Ohio App.2d at 131, 5 O.O.3d 286, 367 N.E.2d 51; Ferguson, 57 
Ohio App.2d at 102, 11 O.O.3d 94, 385 N.E.2d 1084, 1088.  Despite this 
invitation, the General Assembly has taken no such action. 
{¶118} Because I strongly believe that the majority’s interpretation is 
clearly not what the General Assembly intended, I invite the General Assembly to 
clarify whether they intended the phrase, “suits between private parties,” to 
abrogate the public-duty rule. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
{¶119} Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., Stanley M. Chesley, 
Paul M. De Marco, Robert A. Steinberg, D. Arthur Rabourn and Jane H. Walker, 
for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Stephen P. Carney, Associate 
Solicitor, William C. Becker, Randall W. Knutti and Rebecca L. Thomas, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Duke W. Thomas, Anthony J. 
O’Malley and Marcel C. Duhamel, urging reversal for amicus curiae OHA: The 
Association of Hospitals and Health Systems. 
 
Jenks, Surdyk, Oxley, Turner & Dowd Co., L.P.A., Robert J. Surdyk and 
James Ickes, urging affirmance for amici curiae Public Entities Pool of Ohio and 
Ohio Township Association Risk Management Authority. 
__________________