Case Title: Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Donlin

Citation: 1996-Ohio-422

Docket Number: 19960442

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
TRUMBULL COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION V. DONLIN. 
[Cite as Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Donlin (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Attorney at law -- Misconduct -- Failure to properly withdraw from 
employment -- Complaint dismissed, when. 
 
(No. 96-442 -- Submitted May 22, 1996 -- Decided July 24, 1996.) 
 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-37. 
 
In a complaint filed April 27, 1995, relator, Trumbull County Bar 
Association, charged respondent, Patrick J. Donlin of Warren, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0030848, with one count of misconduct, involving alleged 
violations of DR  2-110 (withdrawal from employment), 6-101 (failing to act 
competently), and 7-101 (representing a client zealously).  The complaint 
alleged that respondent was retained by Frances T. Kolasky to represent her in 
connection with personal injury and property damage claims arising out of an 
automobile accident occurring on May 19, 1992.  The count further alleged that 
respondent represented to his client that a complaint had been filed on her 
behalf, but that respondent never filed a complaint.  The count alleges that 
Kolasky is now barred by the statute of limitations from prosecuting any of her 
 
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claims arising from the accident.  Finally, the count alleges that respondent 
failed to properly withdraw from employment with his client in regard to the 
accident.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) heard the matter on November 17, 
1995.   
 
Respondent and relator stipulated that, in his representation of Kolasky, 
respondent took photographs of her vehicle, obtained a police report from 
Ravenna, and communicated with Nationwide Insurance Company, the 
insurance carrier of the other driver involved in the accident.  Nationwide 
denied the claim on or about August 30, 1993.  At the hearing before the board,  
respondent testified that he explained to Kolasky that the physical evidence and 
the other driver’s version of the facts in the police report were diametrically 
opposed to Kolasky’s version.  Furthermore, he explained to her that while the 
only injury she sustained was a leg hurt from pushing on the brake pedal, she 
was presenting respondent with medical bills from unrelated prior injuries.  
Respondent testified that he told Kolasky that he did not see the case as having 
any merit.  Respondent testified that he told her he would not pursue the claim 
 
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any further in any court of law, and she agreed.  Since he was still representing 
her on another matter, respondent overlooked presenting this notification of 
withdrawal from employment in writing.  Kolasky filed a grievance against him 
on this other matter, after it had been settled.  This grievance was eventually 
dismissed at the state level.  Respondent testified that after this other grievance 
was dismissed she contacted another attorney, Raymond Tisone, regarding the 
1992 accident claim.  However, by the time she contacted this attorney the 
statute of limitations had expired.  Respondent testified that Kolasky may have 
changed her mind and decided again to pursue this claim because she was upset 
that the other grievance against him had been dismissed.  She then filed the 
instant grievance against respondent. 
 
Respondent and relator stipulated that the actions of respondent violated 
DR 2-110(A)(2), specifically agreeing that “[r]espondent never effectively 
notified his client, Frances Kolasky[,] that he was withdrawing from 
employment in connection with this accident.”  At the hearing, respondent 
testified that he entered into this stipulation because, while DR 2-110(A)(2) 
does not state that withdrawal from a case has to be in writing, maybe a writing 
 
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was actually required.  Relator withdrew the other charges filed against 
respondent.  The relator and respondent agreed that an appropriate sanction for 
the violation of DR 2-110(A)(2) would be a public reprimand. 
 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the panel found that 
respondent violated DR 2-110(A)(2).  In mitigation, the panel conceded that 
Kolasky was a “troublesome” client, and that the accident claim was of 
doubtful value.  The panel recommended a public reprimand for this violation. 
 
The board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
panel and recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded and, further, 
that the costs of the proceedings be taxed to respondent. 
__________ 
 
Hoppe, Frey, Hewitt & Milligan and William L. Hawley, for relator. 
 
Patrick J. Donlin, pro se. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.   Because the evidence is insufficient to 
support a violation of DR 2-110(A)(2), this court finds that the complaint 
against respondent, Patrick J. Donlin, should be dismissed. 
 
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DR 2-110(A)(2) states, in pertinent part, that “*** a lawyer shall not 
withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid 
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to 
his client ***.”  The panel concluded that respondent violated DR 2-110(A)(2) 
because he “did not effectively deal with a difficult situation” regarding the 
withdrawal from his employment with his client.  The panel is apparently 
referring to the fact that respondent did not notify his client in writing that he 
was not going to pursue the May 19, 1992 accident claim.  Based on the 
circumstances of this case, we cannot find that this rises to the level of a 
violation of DR 2-110(A)(2). 
 
The stipulations and evidence at the hearing demonstrate that respondent 
took photographs, obtained a police report, and communicated with the 
insurance carrier of the other driver involved in the accident.  The evidence 
further demonstrates that the carrier denied the claim of Kolasky.  Respondent 
testified that he explained to Kolasky that he believed the case had no merit.  
Respondent testified that he told Kolasky that he would not pursue her May 19, 
1992 accident claim in any court of law and she agreed.  However, after the 
 
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statute of limitations had expired on this accident claim, Kolasky apparently 
changed her mind and took the case to another attorney.  Her decision again to 
pursue the 1992 accident claim came only after another grievance that she filed 
against respondent had been dismissed.  Kolasky then filed the instant 
grievance against respondent. 
 
Based on the above, we find that the evidence demonstrates that 
respondent adequately protected Kolasky’s rights with regard to her accident 
claim.  Furthermore, it is clear from respondent’s testimony that he gave 
Kolasky due notice that he was withdrawing from employment in connection 
with the accident.  While it probably would have been more prudent of 
respondent to have notified his client in writing that he would not handle the 
case further, the fact that it was not reduced to writing does not rise to the level 
of a violation under DR 2-110(A)(2).  Thus, we find that respondent should not 
be bound by his stipulation that he violated DR 2-110(A)(2), as it was entered 
into under the mistaken belief that he was required to withdraw from his 
employment in writing.   
 
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed. 
 
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                                                                                              Complaint dismissed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  In accordance with the respondent’s stipulation 
that his conduct violated DR 2-110(A)(2) and that a public reprimand is the 
appropriate sanction, I would impose the public reprimand. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.