Case Title: Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys. of Cent. Ohio, Inc.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-402

Docket Number: 19960269

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
DALOIA, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT, v. FRANCISCAN HEALTH SYSTEM OF CENTRAL OHIO, 
INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys. of Cent. Ohio, Inc. (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 98.] 
Trusts — Doctrine of cy pres construed — Doctrine of deviation distinguished 
from doctrine of cy pres — In applying doctrine of deviation, court cannot 
change original charitable objective of settlor or divert the bequest to an 
entity with a charitable purpose different from the purpose set forth in the 
trust instrument. 
1. 
The doctrine of cy pres is a saving device applicable to charitable trusts and 
it permits a court to direct the application of the trust property to a 
charitable purpose different from that designated in the trust instrument. 
2. 
The doctrine of deviation is distinguishable from the doctrine of cy pres in 
that the doctrine of deviation is applicable to both private and charitable 
trusts and it is concerned solely with the administration of the trust. 
3. 
In applying the doctrine of deviation, a court cannot change the original 
charitable objective of the settlor or divert the bequest to an entity with a 
charitable purpose different from the purpose set forth in the trust 
instrument. 
(No. 96-269 — Submitted April 1, 1997 — Decided June 25, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APE06-808. 
 
On April 20, 1985, Bertha Crisafi and Clara Monte, sisters, executed 
separate trusts to provide for, among other things, the distribution of their estates 
at the time of their deaths.  In their trusts, Bertha and Clara instructed that 
specified percentages of the balances of their estates were to be distributed to, 
among others,1 “ST. ANTHONY MEDICAL CENTER, Columbus, Ohio for use 
 
2
among the sick-poor in accordance with the hospital’s mission.”2  Bertha died in 
1987 and Clara died in 1989.  Bertha and Clara’s nephew, appellant Leonard R. 
Daloia, was a named co-trustee in both trusts. 
 
On September 12, 1990, appellant distributed $259,190.66 to appellee 
Franciscan Sisters of the Poor Foundation at Central Ohio (“FSOP”).  The money 
represented thirty-three and one-third percent of the balance of Bertha’s estate and 
twenty-five percent of the balance of Clara’s estate.  FSOP was established to 
accept charitable gifts and it was directly affiliated with appellee Saint Anthony 
Medical Center, Inc. (“Saint Anthony”).  Saint Anthony was a nonprofit hospital. 
 
On the same date that appellant presented the funds to FSOP, a “distribution 
document” was executed with respect to the gifts.  The document noted that Saint 
Anthony was the designated recipient of the funds.  The document also established 
guidelines for the use and handling of the money.3  Appellant was involved in the 
preparation of the document and he signed it in his capacity as trustee of the trusts 
and as the chairman of FSOP.  The document was also signed by David Valinsky, 
who was the executive director of FSOP, and by Matthias Maguire, who was the 
president of appellee Franciscan Health System of Central Ohio, Inc. 
 
In January 1992, Saint Anthony was sold to an unrelated health care 
institution.  Appellant had met with Valinsky, Maguire, and others to determine 
the proper disposition of the funds bequeathed to Saint Anthony, but they were 
unable to agree upon a plan of distribution.  The funds are currently being held by 
appellee Franciscan Sisters of the Poor Foundation, Inc. 
 
On November 6, 1992, appellant filed a complaint against appellees in the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  In the complaint, appellant requested 
that he receive an accounting of the funds, that the funds be returned to him, and 
that a receiver be appointed “to collect said funds from Defendants and turn said 
 
3
funds over to Plaintiff and The Columbus Foundation, and/or The Ohio State 
University Hospital.” 
 
Appellees answered the complaint.  In their answer, appellees asserted that 
the funds in question should be distributed “to St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. 
in Dayton, Ohio, which is a Franciscan medical facility providing care to the sick-
poor located very near St. Anthony Medical Center.”  Thereafter, appellant was 
granted leave by the trial court to name the Ohio Attorney General as a party 
defendant.4 
 
The matter was referred to a referee (magistrate) in accordance with Civ.R. 
53.  On April 4 and 5, 1994, the case was tried to the referee.  At the hearing, 
Valinsky testified that the hospital nearest to Saint Anthony that provided care for 
the “sick-poor” in accordance with the “Franciscan mission” was Saint Elizabeth 
Medical Center (“Saint Elizabeth”) in Dayton, Ohio.  Appellant did not refute this 
testimony.  In addition, appellant did not present any evidence that there were 
hospitals within the Columbus, Ohio area that were capable of providing medical 
care in accordance with the missions of Saint Anthony and Saint Elizabeth. 
 
Subsequently, the parties submitted briefs in support of their positions.  
Appellant sought to introduce additional evidence that there were certain entities 
within the Columbus, Ohio area with missions similar to Saint Anthony’s.  
Appellant also filed a motion with the trial court, requesting that the court allow 
him to “reopen” the matter and present this additional evidence. 
 
On July 8, 1994, the trial court denied appellant’s request to reopen the 
matter.  The trial court concluded essentially that appellant could not use his brief 
as a vehicle to submit additional evidence that could have been presented during 
the hearing before the referee.  Thus, the trial court instructed the referee not to 
consider such additional evidence when rendering her report and recommendation. 
 
4
 
On July 12, 1994, the referee issued her report.  In her report, the referee 
recommended that the trial court apply the doctrine of deviation and order that the 
bequests designated to Saint Anthony be distributed to Saint Elizabeth.  The 
referee concluded that the sale of Saint Anthony made it impossible to comply 
with the express terms of the trust instruments and that the hospital nearest to 
Saint Anthony, with the same mission of caring for the poor, was St. Elizabeth. 
 
Appellant filed objections to the referee’s report.  On April 11, 1995, the 
trial court overruled appellant’s objections, adopted the referee’s recommendation, 
and requested that appellees submit a final judgment entry for the court’s 
approval.  On April 24, 1995, appellant filed a motion for a new trial. 
 
On June 5, 1995, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of appellees 
with respect to the April 11, 1995 decision, and ordered: 
 
“This matter having been tried before a referee of this Court and this Court 
having adopted and approved the report and recommendation of its referee dated 
July 12, 1994 over the objection of plaintiff, hereby enters judgment in favor of 
defendants and against plaintiff. 
 
“The Court orders that the defendant, Franciscan Sisters of the Poor 
Foundation, Inc., cause the funds received from the Bertha Crisafi Trust and the 
Clara Monte Trust to be distributed to St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. to be 
used among the sick poor in accordance with the mission of St. Elizabeth Medical 
Center, Inc.” 
 
On June 13, 1995, appellant again filed a motion for a new trial.  On June 
26, 1995, appellant appealed the trial court’s June 5, 1995 judgment entry to the 
Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court of appeals held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the bequests to Saint Elizabeth.5 
 
5
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Lane, Alton & Horst and Jack R. Alton; Chester, Willcox & Saxbe and Craig 
Wright, for appellant. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl and Timothy A. Tepe, for appellees Franciscan Health 
System of Central Ohio, Inc., Saint Anthony Medical Center, Inc., Franciscan 
Sisters of the Poor Foundation at Central Ohio, and Franciscan Sisters of the Poor 
Foundation, Inc. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Sherry M. Phillips, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Attorney General. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The primary question presented for our consideration is 
whether the funds bequeathed to Saint Anthony in the trust instruments should, 
given the change in circumstances, be distributed to Saint Elizabeth in Dayton, 
Ohio.  The trial court and court of appeals concluded that the sale of Saint 
Anthony made it impossible to comply with the express terms of the trusts and, as 
a result, the gifts should be awarded to Saint Elizabeth under the doctrine of 
deviation.  The trial court and court of appeals also determined that when 
appellant had distributed the gifts on September 12, 1990, appellant had fulfilled 
his duties as a trustee under the terms of the trusts.  Therefore, the trial court and 
court of appeals concluded that appellant did not retain any further discretion to 
control the final disposition of the gifts after that date.  We agree with the 
conclusions reached by the trial court and court of appeals.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I 
 
6
 
To begin, we note that the powers and duties of a trustee are controlled by 
the terms of the trust instrument.  See IV(A) Scott, Law of Trusts (4 Ed. Fratcher 
Ed.1989) 320, Section 380 (“The trustees of a charitable trust, like the trustees of a 
private trust, have such powers as are conferred on them in specific words by the 
terms of the trust or are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the 
trust and are not forbidden by the terms of the trust.”).  Thus, a “fundamental 
[tenet] for the construction of a * * * trust is to ascertain, within the bounds of the 
law, the intent of the * * * settlor.”  Domo v. McCarthy (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 312, 
314, 612 N.E.2d 706, 708.  “Generally, when the language of the instrument is not 
ambiguous, intent can be ascertained from the express terms of the trust itself.”  Id. 
 
The trust instruments are virtually identical in both form and content.  In 
particular, Article IV of Bertha’s trust and Article IV of Clara’s trust both provide 
in part that “[t]he co-trustees and any successors of the trust established by this 
instrument shall serve without bond and, in addition to those powers granted by 
law, and until actual distribution of the trust property, shall have the following 
rights, powers, duties, and immunities to be exercised without court order or other 
authority upon such terms and conditions and at such times as the trustees 
determine in their absolute discretion[.]”  (Emphasis added.)  Interpreting this 
italicized language, the trial court held, and the court of appeals agreed, that 
appellant did not retain any further authority to control the disposition of the funds 
after he had distributed the gifts on September 12, 1990.  Specifically, the court of 
appeals held that “the trust agreements clearly provided that appellant’s trustee 
powers ended upon distribution of the gifts to St. Anthony.  The trust agreements 
did not give appellant the power to change beneficiaries.  Nor did the trust 
agreements grant a power to direct and guide the actual use of the monies after 
distribution.” 
 
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Notwithstanding, appellant asserts that Saint Anthony never actually 
received the gifts from the trusts because the funds have been “impounded in the 
investment accounts of Defendants in Brooklyn, New York.”  Therefore, 
according to appellant, he still has the authority to control the ultimate disposition 
of the funds because an “actual distribution of the trust property” has never 
occurred.  We disagree. 
 
Appellant’s interpretation of the trust instruments is inconsistent with the 
distribution document executed by appellant on September 12, 1990.  The 
document specifically noted, and appellant alleged in his complaint,6 that the gifts 
had been distributed by him to Saint Anthony on September 12, 1990.  The 
document also provided that the funds could be transferred to the national 
organization (appellee Franciscan Sisters of the Poor Foundation, Inc.) if the 
money would earn a higher return than if invested locally.  Appellant played an 
instrumental role in the preparation of the distribution document and he signed it 
in his capacity as a trustee of the trusts and as the chairman of FSOP.  It is 
apparent that the money has remained with the national organization because of 
the sale of Saint Anthony and because of this ongoing lawsuit. 
 
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court and court of appeals that 
appellant’s discretionary powers under the terms of the trust instruments ended 
when appellant distributed the gifts on September 12, 1990.  We believe that this 
conclusion is consistent with the intent of the settlors as expressed in their trusts.  
At the time appellant distributed the gifts on September 12, 1990, Saint Anthony 
was operating in accordance with its mission of caring for the poor.  Thus, because 
appellant’s discretionary powers under the terms of the trusts ceased upon the 
actual distribution of the funds on September 12, 1990, appellant’s contention that 
 
8
he still has the authority to control the ultimate disposition of the funds clearly 
lacks merit. 
 
Appellant also contends that the trial court and court of appeals erred in 
awarding the gifts to Saint Elizabeth.  Appellant concedes that the sale of Saint 
Anthony has made it impossible to comply with the express terms of the trusts.  In 
this regard, appellant does not challenge whether the bequests may be distributed 
to another institution.  Rather, appellant asserts that it was his aunts’ wishes to 
benefit only those “sick/poor in the inner city of Columbus.”  Therefore, appellant 
suggests that the funds should be distributed to a hospital located in the vicinity of 
Columbus, not Dayton, Ohio.  Again, we disagree. 
 
Upon a reading of the entire trust instruments, and paying particular 
attention to the language granting the specific bequests to Saint Anthony, we are 
not convinced that Bertha and Clara intended that their gifts were to remain solely 
within the Columbus, Ohio area.  We agree with the court of appeals that “[w]hile 
both trusts bequeathed money ‘to ST. ANTHONY MEDICAL CENTER, 
Columbus, Ohio for use among the sick-poor in accordance with the hospital’s 
mission,’ there is no evidence that appellant’s aunts intended the gifts to remain in 
Columbus.”  Appellant’s position that his aunts intended that their gifts were to 
benefit only those individuals in the Columbus, Ohio area would perhaps be more 
persuasive if the language in the trusts ended after the language “to ST. 
ANTHONY MEDICAL CENTER, Columbus, Ohio.”  However, appellant’s 
contention is weakened by the inclusion of the language in the trusts “for use 
among the sick-poor in accordance with the hospital’s mission.”  Given this 
language, it appears that Bertha and Clara did not intend to attach geographical 
barriers to their gifts.  Rather, this plain and unambiguous language indicates that 
 
9
the settlors’ underlying charitable objective was to help the poor who could not 
afford needed health care. 
 
In McIntire’s Admrs. v. Zanesville (1867), 17 Ohio St. 352, a testator had 
executed a will placing a majority of his estate into a trust “ ‘for the use and 
support of a poor-school, which they [the trustees] are to establish in the town of 
Zanesville, for the use of the poor children in said town * * *.’ ”  Id. at 353.  
Following the testator’s death, the trustees erected a school for children who were 
poor.  The school was then placed under the control of the city board of education 
and the school was discontinued as a school used exclusively for the poor.  This 
court held, inter alia, that the trust property could not be used for the benefit of 
public schools because “it would be a perversion of the gift from the purpose of 
the donor, which was that it should be wholly expended for the benefit of the ‘poor 
children’ in the town or city.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 17 Ohio St. at 363.  This court 
also concluded that the trust should not be terminated: 
 
“But the purpose of the donor being to establish a ‘school’ or ‘institution’ 
for the use of poor children, and the state having supplied free schools for all 
children, what shall be done with the fund?  Is the object of the charity exhausted, 
and must the fund be paid over to the heirs of the donor?  We think not.  We must 
look deeper than the mere words of this donation, and, through them, see its spirit.  
We must inquire what the donor himself would now direct, had he lived to witness 
the present altered circumstances of the case.  His object was to educate poor 
children to the extent of the fund bequeathed, and the ‘school’ or ‘institution’ 
provided for in the will, were mere means to that end.  Had circumstances 
remained unchanged, perhaps a free ‘school’ for poor children would have been 
the only necessary and appropriate instrumentality for that purpose, and the whole 
fund might have been exhausted, by thus merely remitting tuition fees to the 
 
10
scholars who should attend.  But this means having become impracticable, can no 
other be adopted to the same end?  The law having anticipated and supplied the 
charity, so far as free schools are required, should not the trustees reach their 
hands further, and do more, and for that purpose resort to other means to effect, as 
far as the fund will go, the ultimate object of the donor?  That object was, to 
instruct poor children in spite of their poverty. * * * This can be done by other 
methods than by merely remitting their tuition fees, which form but an 
inconsiderable part of the expenses of an education. * * *”  (Emphasis omitted in 
part and added in part.)  Id., 17 Ohio St. at 363-364. 
 
Similarly, the specific bequests at issue here are to provide for the poor.  
More importantly, like the school in McIntire, Saint Anthony was simply a method 
or means to accomplish this charitable objective.  In this regard, the trial court and 
court of appeals concluded that the funds from the trusts should be awarded to 
Saint Elizabeth under the doctrine of deviation.  Appellee Attorney General urges 
the application of both the doctrines of cy pres and deviation. 
II 
 
The doctrine of cy pres and the doctrine of deviation both permit a court to 
deviate from the express terms of a trust instrument.  However, both doctrines 
have distinct characteristics and their applications depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.  See Findley v. Conneaut (1945), 145 Ohio 
St. 480, 486-487, 31 O.O. 161, 164, 62 N.E.2d 318, 322. 
 
The cy pres doctrine is a saving device applied to charitable trusts. Scott, 
Law of Trusts, at 476-477, Section 399.  “Roughly speaking, it is the doctrine that 
equity will, when the charity is originally or later becomes impossible, 
inexpedient, or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another charitable object 
which is believed to approach the original purpose as closely as possible.  It is the 
 
11
theory that equity has the power to revise a charitable trust where the settlor had a 
general charitable intent in order to meet unexpected emergencies or changes in 
conditions which threaten its existence.”  (Emphasis added.)  Bogert, Trusts & 
Trustees (2 Ed.Rev.1991) 95-96, Section 431.  See, also, 2 Restatement of the Law 
2d, Trusts (1959) 297, Section 3997; and Scott, Law of Trusts, at 476-477, Section 
399 (“The principle under which the courts thus attempt to save a charitable trust 
from failure by carrying out the more general purpose of the testator and carrying 
out approximately though not exactly his more specific intent is called the doctrine 
of cy pres.”).  Thus, the doctrine of cy pres is a saving device applicable to 
charitable trusts and it permits a court to direct the application of the trust property 
to a charitable purpose different from that designated in the trust instrument. 
 
Under the doctrine of deviation, a court can “direct or permit a deviation 
from the terms of the trust where compliance is impossible or illegal, or where 
owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him 
compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the 
purposes of the trust.”  Scott, Law of Trusts, at 323, Section 381.  See, also, 
Papiernik v. Papiernik (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 337, 345, 544 N.E.2d 664, 672; and 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, at 273, Section 381.8  The doctrine of deviation is 
distinguishable from the doctrine of cy pres in that the doctrine of deviation is 
applicable to both private and charitable trusts and it is concerned solely with the 
administration of the trust.  The administration of a trust involves the methods of 
accomplishing the purposes of the trust.  Id., Comment a.  Therefore, in applying 
the doctrine of deviation, a court cannot change the original charitable objective of 
the settlor or divert the bequest to an entity with a charitable purpose different 
from the purpose set forth in the trust instrument.  Id.  (“The question of the extent 
to which the court will permit or direct the trustee to apply the trust property to 
 
12
charitable purposes other than the particular charitable purpose designated by the 
settlor where it is or becomes impossible or illegal or impracticable to carry out 
the particular purpose involves the doctrine of cy pres * * *.”).  See, also, Scott, 
Law of Trusts, at 479-480, Section 399. 
 
In Craft v. Shroyer (1947), 81 Ohio App. 253, 272-273, 37 O.O. 77, 85, 74 
N.E.2d 589, 598, the Second District Court of Appeals aptly set forth the general 
differences between the two doctrines: 
 
“The cy pres doctrine is a rule of judicial construction under which the court 
is required to first find a general charitable intent in the instrument creating the 
trust; the general charitable purpose of the settlor moves the court to substitute a 
different charitable purpose for the one which has failed.  Cy pres is applied only 
in the field of charitable trusts, whereas, a court of equity may order a deviation 
in private as well as charitable trusts. * * *  In ordering a deviation a court of 
equity is merely exercising its general power over the administration of trusts; it is 
an essential element of equity jurisdiction.  In ordering a deviation the court does 
not touch the question of the purpose or object of the trust, nor vary the class of 
beneficiaries, nor divert the fund from the charitable purpose designated. * * *  
The cy pres doctrine requires the exercise of a more extensive power than the 
ordinary power of a court of equity in ordering deviation. * * *  The jurisdiction 
merely to vary the details of the administration of a trust is more liberally 
exercised, more firmly established and more widely recognized than the cy pres 
power of the court.”  (Emphasis added and citations omitted.) 
 
In the case at bar, the sale of Saint Anthony has made it impossible to 
comply with the express terms of the trust instruments.  Nevertheless, the settlors’ 
intentions are clear.  Notably, the trusts did not limit the bequests to the Columbus, 
Ohio area.  To that end, the award of the funds to Saint Elizabeth will not change 
 
13
the settlors’ underlying charitable objectives.  Moreover, in awarding the funds to 
Saint Elizabeth, the funds will not be diverted to an entity with a charitable 
purpose different from that provided for in the trusts, nor will it vary the class of 
beneficiaries.  Saint Elizabeth’s mission statement is identical to Saint Anthony’s.  
In this regard, we agree with the court of appeals that “[t]he trial court’s order 
merely varied the means and methods of accomplishing the trusts’ charitable 
objectives.” 
 
Given the change in circumstances, we believe that a deviation from the 
express terms of the trust instruments is appropriate to carry out the settlors’ 
charitable wishes.  Saint Elizabeth should be allowed to use the funds for the 
“sick-poor.”  Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find 
that the trial court and court of appeals did not err in applying the doctrine of 
deviation and in awarding the funds to Saint Elizabeth in Dayton, Ohio. 
III 
 
As a final matter, appellant contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to take judicial notice of the ability of “local hospitals” 
to carry out the wishes of his aunts.  Specifically, appellant asserts that “[t]he Trial 
Judge had a wide variety of hospitals within the inner city or even the city of 
Columbus that would have served as an appropriate vehicle for effectuating [the 
Settlors’] gift.”  Appellant also points out that he submitted affidavits from various 
hospital officials, which demonstrated “their willingness to take over the missions 
of the sick/poor in the vicinity of St. Anthony Medical Center.”  These affidavits 
were attached to appellant’s April 24, 1995 motion for a new trial. 
 
The requirements pertaining to judicial notice are contained in Evid.R. 201 
and Civ.R. 44.1.  Evid.R. 201 concerns judicial notice of adjudicative facts.  
Civ.R. 44.1 pertains to judicial notice of domestic and foreign laws.  Appellant 
 
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does not allege the applicability of Civ.R. 44.1.  Rather, appellant’s claims focus 
on various provisions of Evid.R. 201.9 
 
However, appellant did not raise this matter before either the trial court or 
the court of appeals.  In any event, the “facts” alleged by appellant simply do not 
fit within the scope of Evid.R. 201.  Evid.R. 201 is not applicable in this case, and 
any reliance by appellant on the rule is incorrect. 
IV 
 
In conclusion, we find that the trial court and court of appeals properly 
awarded the bequests to Saint Elizabeth.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court 
of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Bertha and Clara also instructed that specified percentages of the balances 
of their estates were to be distributed to “OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Columbus, Ohio to be used [for] (1) research and education of human heart 
problems and (2) for research and education of pulmonary disorders.” 
2. 
The “mission statement” of Saint Anthony provided that: 
 
“We are a community of women and men dedicated to continuing the 
healing ministry of Jesus. 
 
“We strive for excellence in providing service to all who need us. 
 
“We are energized by an atmosphere of joy, mutual respect and compassion 
to find better ways of serving.” 
3. 
The distribution document set forth that the gifts from the trusts “will create 
a new fund titled the ‘Crisafi/Monte Endowment Fund,’ ” and that the money was 
 
15
“to provide for the sick, poor in accordance with the hospital Mission of Saint 
Anthony Medical Center.”  The document also set forth that “[t]he principal will 
be invested in the Foundation Endowment Fund under the rules and regulations 
adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Franciscan Health System of Central Ohio 
and the Franciscan Sisters of the Poor Foundation with the right to invest and to 
reinvest as occasion dictates,” that the income derived from the money would be 
used in a manner determined annually by the “Franciscan Sisters of the Poor 
Foundation at Central Ohio Executive Committee,” that ten percent of the gross 
annual income would be added to the principal, and that the 1990 income from the 
money would be used to support a new patient assistance program to assist 
patients who are unable to pay their medical expenses.  In addition, the document 
provided that the funds could be commingled “with the National Franciscan 
Foundation investments if the return is higher than local investment strategies,” 
and that an annual report detailing the use and the growth of the money should be 
presented to the trustee. 
4. 
The trial court also granted a motion by the Attorney General to intervene in 
the case.  The trial court determined that the Attorney General was a necessary 
party pursuant to R.C. 109.25. 
 
R.C. 109.25 provides: 
 
“The attorney general is a necessary party to and shall be served with 
process or with summons by registered mail in all judicial proceedings, the object 
of which is to: 
 
“(A)  Terminate a charitable trust or distribute assets; 
 
“(B)  Depart from the objects or purposes of a charitable trust as the same 
are set forth in the instrument creating the trust, including any proceeding for the 
application of the doctrine of cy pres or deviation; 
 
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“(C)  Construe the provisions of an instrument with respect to a charitable 
trust; 
 
“(D)  Determine the validity of a will having provisions for a charitable 
trust. 
 
“A judgment rendered in such proceedings without service of process or 
summons upon the attorney general is void, unenforceable, and shall be set aside 
upon the attorney general’s motion seeking such relief.  The attorney general shall 
intervene in any judicial proceeding affecting a charitable trust when requested to 
do so by the court having jurisdiction of the proceeding, and may intervene in any 
judicial proceeding affecting a charitable trust when he determines that the public 
interest should be protected in such proceeding.” 
5. 
While appellant’s appeal regarding the trial court’s June 5, 1995 judgment 
was pending before the court of appeals, the trial court, on August 15, 1995, ruled 
on appellant’s motions for a new trial.  On August 15, 1995, the trial court denied 
appellant’s April 24, 1995 motion for a new trial and concluded that appellant’s 
June 13, 1995 motion was moot.  The issue of whether the trial court had 
jurisdiction to rule on appellant’s motions for a new trial is not a relevant factor in 
our decision today.  However, we point out that when an appeal is pending before 
a court of appeals, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction except to take action in 
aid of the appeal.  In other words, “the trial court retains all jurisdiction not 
inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm 
the judgment.”  Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 141, 146, 637 N.E.2d 890, 895, citing Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. 
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 43, 44, 553 N.E.2d 1354, 1355, and In re Kurtzhalz (1943), 
141 Ohio St. 432, 25 O.O. 574, 48 N.E.2d 657, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Moreover, we have specifically held that, with respect to a Civ.R. 60(B) motion 
 
17
for relief from judgment, an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to 
consider the motion, and that “[j]urisdiction may be conferred on the trial court 
only through an order by the reviewing court remanding the matter for 
consideration of the Civ.R. 60(B) motion.”  Howard, 70 Ohio St.3d at 147, 637 
N.E.2d at 895. 
6. 
In paragraph eight of the complaint, appellant alleged that “[s]aid gift of 
$259,190.66 from the Trust assets of Clara Monte and Bertha Crisafi was 
presented to Saint Anthony Hospital by Plaintiff, as Trustee, on September 12, 
1990.” 
7. 
Restatement of Trusts 2d at 297, Section 399, provides: 
 
“If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, 
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the 
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote 
the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct 
the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the 
general charitable intention of the settlor.” 
8. 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, at 273, Section 381, states: 
 
“The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate 
from a term of the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or 
illegal, or that owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated 
by him compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the 
purposes of the trust.” 
9. 
Evid.R. 201 provides: 
 
“(A)  Scope of Rule.  This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts; i.e., the facts of the case. 
 
18
 
“(B)  Kinds of Facts.  A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
 
“(C)  When Discretionary.  A court may take judicial notice, whether 
requested or not. 
 
“(D)  When Mandatory.  A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
 
“(E)  Opportunity to Be Heard.  A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of 
the matter noticed.  In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made 
after judicial notice has been taken. 
 
“(F)  Time of Taking Notice.  Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of 
the proceeding. 
 
“(G)  Instructing Jury.  In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall 
instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.  In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as 
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.”