Case Title: Taha v. Southern

Citation: 367 Md. 564

Docket Number: 53/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mukhtar Taha v. Southern Management Corporation, No. 53, September Term 2001.
[Non-Appealable Judgments For Failure to Comply With Maryland Rule 2-601; Held: the
Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear Southern Management Corporation’s
appeal concerning an inconsistent jury verdict because by failing to set forth the judgments in
favor of the individual employees in a separate document and by not entering the judgment on
the docket, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County did not satisfy the requirements of Rule
2-601.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 53
September Term, 2001
MUKHTAR TAHA
v.
SOUTHERN MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   February 4, 2002
On May 15, 1994, Southern Management Corporation (hereinafter “SMC”) hired
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Mukhtar Taha (hereinafter “Taha”) to work as a Maintenance Technician at the Silver Spring
Towers apartment complex, one of the apartment facilities managed by SMC. On October 18,
1994, Taha’s employment with SMC was terminated by property manager, Deborah Wylie-
Forth (hereinafter “Wylie-Forth”), and assistant property manager, Barbara Belton, on the basis
of Taha’s poor work performance, insubordination, and abusive behavior.
Shortly after Taha was terminated, the maintenance supervisor at the apartment
complex, Michael McGovern (hereinafter “McGovern”), notified Wylie-Forth that several
items were missing from a locked maintenance tool and supply area.  In response, Wylie-Forth
contacted the Montgomery County Police Department to report the missing items.  As a result
of police investigation, Taha was arrested and charged with attempted burglary in the second
degree, and burglary in the fourth degree for breaking and entering a dwelling or storehouse
in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27, Section 32 (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1994 Supp.).
Ultimately, the State entered a nolle prosequi to the charges.
On March 3, 1999, Taha filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a civil
complaint against SMC, and two of its employees, McGovern and Wylie-Forth, asserting, inter
alia, a claim of malicious prosecution. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants
Wylie-Forth and McGovern, finding that Taha had not been the victim of malicious prosecution
by either employee, but found against SMC.  The jury awarded Taha $25,000 in economic
damages, $75,000 in non-economic damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages.  The
Judgment Order of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered following
the jury trial failed to include the special verdicts in favor of the individual employees; instead,
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it simply referenced the verdict against the corporation for economic, non-economic, and
punitive damages.  Similarly, the docket contains no entries for verdicts or judgment orders
in favor of the employees.  
SMC appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict to the Court of Special Appeals, Southern Management Corp. v. Taha, 137 Md. App.
697, 769 A.2d 962 (2001).  The Court of Special Appeals held that the verdict against SMC
could not stand based on the jury’s exoneration of the two named defendant employees whose
conduct served as the factual basis for Taha’s respondeat superior claim as to SMC’s liability.
 Id. at 724, 769 A.2d at 978. 
We granted Taha’s petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether the trial court
properly denied SMC’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in light of the jury’s
irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts in favor of the individual employees, Wylie-Forth and
McGovern, but against the employer, SMC, for the tort of malicious prosecution under a
theory of respondeat superior liability.  We shall not reach, however, the underlying issue
raised in Taha’s petition for certiorari.  Because final appealable judgments against the
individual employees were not entered by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, we are
required to order the dismissal of the appeal.
In order for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over an appeal, there ordinarily must
be a final judgment in the trial court.  See Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277,
282, 577 A.2d 78, 80 (1990); Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-301
(1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.).  We have explained that “an order or other form of decision which
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adjudicates fewer than all claims in an action is not a final judgment, is not appealable, does
not terminate the action as to any claims, and is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of a judgment which does adjudicate all claims.”  Shenasky v. Gunter, 339 Md. 636, 638, 664
A.2d 882, 883 (1995); Maryland Rule 2-602(a).  Rather, a final appealable judgment is one
which terminates the case in the trial court, and for which the court has entered a judgment on
the docket.  See Clairbourne v. Willis, 347 Md. 684, 691, 702 A.2d 293, 296 (1997); Board
of Liquor License Comm’rs for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Café, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 127-
28, 685 A.2d 772, 775 (1996)(quoting Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710, 646 A.2d 365, 370
(1994)); Estep, 320 Md. at 282, 577 A.2d at 80; Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566
A.2d 767, 773 (1989); Houghton v. County Comm’rs of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 221, 513
A.2d 291, 293 (1986); McCormick v. St. Francis De Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 426-27,
149 A.2d 768, 771 (1959). 
Maryland Rule 2-601, governing the entry of judgments, provides in relevant part:
(a) Prompt entry – Separate document.  Each judgment shall be
set forth on a separate document.  Upon a verdict of a jury or a
decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a
specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall
forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment, unless the court
orders otherwise.  Upon a verdict of a jury or a decision by the
court granting other relief, the court shall promptly review the
form of the judgment presented and, if approved, sign it, and the
clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment as approved and signed.
A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered
as provided in section (b) of this Rule.  Unless the court orders
otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending
determination of the amount of costs.
(b) Method of entry – Date of judgment.  The clerk shall
1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general
verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a party shall
recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be
denied, the clerk, unless the court otherwise orders, shall
forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting
any direction by the court; (2) upon a decision by the court
granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict
accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall
promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall
thereupon enter it.  Every judgment shall be set forth on a
separate document.  A judgment is effective only when so set
forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a).  Entry of the
judgment shall not be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended,
in order to tax costs or award fees, except that, when a timely
motion for attorneys’ fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the
court, before a notice of appeal has been filed and has become
effective, may order that the motion have the same effect under
Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as a
timely motion under Rule 59.  Attorneys shall not submit forms
of judgment except upon direction of the court, and these
directions shall not be given as a matter of course.
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enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file
jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book,
according to the practice of each court, and shall record the
actual date of the entry.  That date shall be the date of the
judgment.
The purpose of Maryland Rule 2-601 was to address “the need for clear, complete, and
precise judgments” by creating a rule which would be more in keeping with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 58.1  See Reporter’s Note to Proposed Rule 2-601, 23 Md. Reg., Issue 24,
Friday, Nov. 22, 1996, at 1667.  The separate document rule under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was designed to establish clearly when filing periods begin for post-trial motions
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and appeals.  See Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1274 (4th Cir. 1994).
Although we have previously held that parties may waive the separate document
requirement under Maryland Rule 2-601 for preservation purposes, see Suburban Hosp. Inc.
v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 156, 763 A.2d 185, 193 (2000), we did so only where application of
the waiver doctrine preserved the right to appeal, where none of the parties raised any
objection, and where final judgment was entered on the docket.  Id. at 157, 763 A.2d at 193-94.
Our decision in Kirson was based, in part, on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S. Ct. 1117, 55 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1978), which
interpreted the separate document requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.  In Bankers Trust, the
Court stated, “[t]he sole purpose of the separate-document requirement . . . was to clarify when
the time for appeal . . . begins to run.”  435 U.S. at 384, 98 S. Ct. at 1120, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 361.
The Court held that the separate document requirement could be waived by the parties where
the trial court clearly expressed its intent that the action from which the appeal is taken
represents the final decision of the case, and the respondent raises no objections to the appeal.
Id. at 387-88, 98 S. Ct. at 1121, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 363.  The Court stated:
If, by error, a separate judgment is not filed before a party
appeals, nothing but delay would flow from requiring the court of
appeals to dismiss the appeal.  Upon dismissal, the district court
would simply file and enter the separate judgment, from which a
timely appeal would then be taken.  Wheels would spin for no
practical purpose.
Id.  at 385, 98 S. Ct. 1120, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 362.  Nevertheless, in finding that the trial court
clearly had evidenced its intent that the opinion and order from which the appeal was taken
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represented the final decision of the case, the Court noted that a judgment of dismissal had
been recorded in the clerk’s docket.  Id. at 387, 98 S. Ct. at 1121, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 363.
SMC argues that the trial court’s statement at the hearing on its post-trial motions
denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict indicates the trial court’s
intention that a final judgment had been entered against Taha in favor of Wylie-Forth and
McGovern.  In rendering its ruling, the trial court made the following statement:
Even though not finding the individual employees responsible,
which clearly they did by their verdict, that does not mean that the
verdict was legally defective, although it may appear on the
surface to be factually inconsistent.
So for that reason I am not going to disturb the verdict.  I
do believe the J.N.O.V. should be denied.
We have concluded, however, that an oral comment by the trial judge contained in the record
is insufficient to create a final judgment.  See Estep, 320 Md. at 284, 577 A.2d at 81.
In the present matter, we have no docket entries and no separate documents for the
employee verdicts indicating a final judgment, and upon which the issue of irreconcilability
rests.  In the opinion below, the Court of Special Appeals assumed jurisdiction and apparently
overlooked this issue.  
Nevertheless, the entire issue of the irreconcilability of the verdicts at issue in this
appeal is dependent upon the existence of a final judgment with respect to all three defendants.
The verdicts covering two of the defendants are not covered by docket entries and separate
documents as required by Rule 2-601.  Because final and appealable judgments have not been
entered in this matter, the Court of Special Appeals was without authority to entertain this
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appeal.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
WITH
DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS THE
APPEAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
RESPONDENT.