Case Title: Bartholomew v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 573, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
WESLEY BARTHOLOMEW,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 573, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0509027632 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  May 2, 2007 
Decided:  May 22, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of May 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Defendant-appellant, Wesley Bartholomew, appeals from Superior 
Court convictions of twenty-five counts of Rape First Degree, one count of 
Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child, eight counts of Sexual Solicitation of a Child, 
and one count of Indecent Exposure First Degree.  Bartholomew makes two 
arguments on appeal.  First, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support twenty-eight of his convictions.  He contends that the complainant’s 
testimony was too “generic” because the complainant could not specify the exact 
number of times the alleged offenses took place or the general time frame in which 
the crimes allegedly occurred.  Therefore, Bartholomew argues, the evidence failed 
 2
to establish each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, 
Bartholomew contends that the trial judge prejudicially deprived him of a fair trial 
when he refused to sever two of the counts involving a single complainant from 
thirty-three counts involving another complainant.  After consideration of the 
record, we hold that the evidence sufficiently supported Bartholomew’s 
convictions.  The complainants testified in sufficient detail about Bartholomew’s 
acts and the general time frame in which they occurred.  Furthermore, the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Bartholomew’s motion to sever.  
Bartholomew committed similar offenses against members of the same family 
during the same time period.  Bartholomew failed to establish actual prejudice 
resulting from joinder of the charges under those factual circumstances.  
Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
(2) 
From 2001 to 2004,1 Sheila, her five children, and her boyfriend, 
Bartholomew, lived in Harrington, Delaware.  Sheila and her daughter worked at 
night.  Bartholomew, who did not work, watched Sheila’s sons while she and her 
daughter worked. 
                                          
 
1  
Sheila testified that she, her children, and Bartholomew moved to a home in Harrington 
on September 15, 2001.  Bartholomew moved out of the home on February 14, 2004.   She 
moved out on May 27, 2004.   
 3
(3) 
Kevin and David2 told their father, Richard, that Bartholomew had 
sexually abused them while they lived with Bartholomew in Harrington.  Richard 
took the boys to the Harrington Police Department and filed an official complaint 
against Bartholomew. 
(4) 
On December 5, 2005, a Kent County grand jury indicted 
Bartholomew on twenty-five counts of Rape First Degree, one count of Continuous 
Sexual Abuse of a Child, eight counts of Sexual Solicitation of a Child, and one 
count of Indecent Exposure First Degree.  On the first day of trial, the State 
amended count 34 to change the name of the alleged victim from David to Kevin.  
At the conclusion of the State’s case, Bartholomew moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on all counts.  The trial judge denied the motion.  On September 25, 2006, 
a jury convicted Bartholomew on all counts.  The trial judge sentenced him to 396 
years at Level V followed by decreasing levels of probation.  Bartholomew 
appealed. 
(5) 
At trial, David and Kevin testified that Bartholomew sexually abused 
them during the period they lived together in Harrington, Delaware.  They testified 
that Bartholomew asked them (and one of their brothers, Brian) on three occasions 
                                          
 
2  
Under Supreme Court Rule 7(d), the names of the parties are pseudonyms selected sua 
sponte by the Court. 
 4
in 2001 to watch pornographic movies with him and masturbate.  David complied 
the third time, but Brian and Kevin did not.    
(6) 
Kevin testified that a few weeks after these incidents, Bartholomew 
called him into the laundry room to clean a floor vent.  When Kevin looked up, 
Bartholomew had his pants down and an erect penis.  When Bartholomew asked 
him to engage in fellatio, Kevin left the room.   
(7) 
David testified that Bartholomew once awakened him in the middle of 
the night and sodomized him.  David also recounted a time when Bartholomew 
offered him $200 to “suck his penis.”  David complied.  Bartholomew did not pay 
him.   
(8) 
In addition to these specific incidents, David testified that 
Bartholomew sodomized him on other occasions.  He testified that Bartholomew 
performed anal sex on him “more than eight” times, and that he performed anal sex 
on Bartholomew “more than five times.”  David testified that he performed oral 
sex on Bartholomew “more than five” times.  He testified that Bartholomew asked 
him to watch pornography “more than five times,” and that he masturbated in front 
of Bartholomew “more than five times.”   
(9) 
Both David and Kevin testified that they did not tell their mother 
because Bartholomew told them he would hurt them if they did and that he would 
prevent them from visiting their father on the weekends.  Sheila stated at trial that 
 5
there had been charges for pornographic movies on her television bill, and that 
when Bartholomew moved out of her home, he possessed pornographic material.  
The Delaware Child Advocacy Center interviewed David, Brian and Kevin about 
Bartholomew’s alleged conduct on September 26, 2005.  The State played a 
videotape of the interviews at the trial. 
(10) After the State presented its evidence, Bartholomew moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on all of the thirty-five charges.  The trial judge denied his 
motion.3   
(11) Bartholomew first argues that because David’s testimony about some 
of the alleged acts was “generic,” 4 it insufficiently supported twenty-eight of the 
convictions involving David.  By “generic,” Bartholomew apparently means that 
                                          
 
3  
The trial judge stated: 
 
I think there is evidence in the record that the defendant intentionally 
engaged in one or more of the acts defined as sexual intercourse with [David] in 
the time frame indicated in the indictments.  [David] being under the age of 18 
years while the defendant was in a position of authority relative to him, and that 
such act occurred 25 times to satisfy the 25 counts, according to the evidence 
provided by [David] through one form or another. 
 
There is evidence that there were three or more such acts intentionally 
occurring over a period which exceeded three months.  There is evidence that the 
Defendant requested of [David] acts defined as prohibited eight different times, 
and there is evidence that the defendant exposed his genitals to [Kevin], who was 
under the age of 16, in a manner likely to cause affront or alarm, all of these, 
again occurring in the time frame indicated in the indictments, and all occurred in 
Kent County, Delaware.  So those motions are denied.   
 
4   
Bartholomew does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the counts involving 
Kevin. 
 
 6
“[David] merely saying it happened multiple times, five times or eight times, is not 
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude the rapes occurred on more than the 
two occasions that were described by David.”  We review insufficiency of the 
evidence claims to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”5 
(12) Bartholomew urges this Court to adopt a three prong test which has 
been used in other jurisdictions to determine whether “generic testimony” 
sufficiently supports these similar allegations.  Under the proposed three-prong 
test, a complainant must:  (a) describe the kinds of acts that occurred with 
sufficient specificity; (b) testify about the number of acts with sufficient certainty; 
and, (c) provide a general time period in which the acts occurred.6  Generic 
                                          
 
5  
Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 168 (1988) (citation omitted). 
 
6  
California v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643, 655 (Cal. 1990); The Court stated: 
It must be remembered that even generic testimony (e.g., an act of intercourse 
“once a month for three years”) outlines a series of specific, albeit 
undifferentiated, incidents each of which amounts to a separate offense, and each 
of which could support a separate criminal sanction. . . Does the victim's failure to 
specify precise date, time, place or circumstance render generic testimony 
insufficient? Clearly not. As many of the cases make clear, the particular details 
surrounding a child molestation charge are not elements of the offense and are 
unnecessary to sustain a conviction. . . The victim, of course, must describe the 
kind of act or acts committed with sufficient specificity, both to assure that 
unlawful conduct indeed has occurred and to differentiate between the various 
types of proscribed conduct (e.g. lewd conduct, intercourse, oral copulation or 
sodomy). Moreover, the victim must describe the number of acts committed with 
sufficient certainty to support each of the counts alleged in the information or 
 7
testimony will support multiple convictions “so long as a victim is able to describe 
the kind of act committed, the number of acts committed and the general time 
period in which they were committed.”7   The State contends that the evidence 
presented at trial satisfies this test.  We agree. 
(13) David testified in explicit detail about various sexual acts with 
Bartholomew.  He testified about the number of times that the incidents occurred.  
He testified that the incidents occurred while he was living with Bartholomew in 
Harrington between 2001 and 2003, a definable, non-illusory, timeframe.8  
                                                                                                                                        
indictment (e.g., “twice a month” or “every time we went camping”). Finally, the 
victim must be able to describe the general time period in which these acts 
occurred (e.g., “the summer before my fourth grade,” or “during each Sunday 
morning after he came to live with us”) to assure the acts were committed within 
the applicable limitation period.  Additional details regarding the time, place or 
circumstance of the various assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or 
substantiality of the victim's testimony, but are not essential to sustain a 
conviction. 
 
See also Washington v. Jensen, 104 P.3d 717, 721 (Wash. App. Div. 2005). 
 
7  
Gaxiola v. State, 119 P.3d 1225, 1235 (Nev. 2005) (explaining the California v. Jones 
test). 
 
8  
David’s direct examination (in pertinent part): 
Prosecutor: Now, I’m going to ask you to recollect to the best of your ability back 
to 2001, early in the year, when you were all living at 49 Nevada Avenue in 
Harrington.  Did there ever come a time where your mother had gone to work 
where you ever saw the defendant watching a porno movie? 
David: Yes. 
* * *  
Prosecutor: How long – over what period of time do you think, if you can recall, 
over what period of time did the defendant engage in these sexual activities with 
you or have you do these sexual things with him? 
David: You mean time, like ten minutes, five? 
 8
                                                                                                                                        
Prosecutor: Weeks, months, years? 
David: About three years. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, may we approach? 
(The following held at sidebar) 
Defense counsel: I know in cases like this, the Court allows juvenile witnesses to 
have some latitude. 
Trial judge: Excuse me? 
Defense counsel: I know the Court in cases like this allows juvenile witnesses to 
have some latitude, but this young man just testified that the duration was about 
three years.  The indictment only alleges events from  -- 
Prosecutor: February ’01 to April of ’03.   
Defense counsel: Right, which is a substantially shorter period.  I don’t know if 
he’s going to intend to offer alleged bad acts or not.  We’re already beyond the 
dates stated in the indictment.   
Trial judge: The references were about the same starting point extending further 
than the State is going to attempt to prove.  Is that correct? 
Prosecutor: Yes 
Trial judge: I believe the testimony was early in the year 2001, and I think that’s 
the same starting period, as I recall.   
Prosecutor: Right. 
Defense counsel: I don’t know what else  
Prosecutor: I won’t. 
Defense counsel: At this point, we can technically ask for an instruction on a 
motion to strike, but I don’t want to emphasize anything. 
Trial judge: I think it’s a mistake of his 
Defense counsel: That’s my point, so I’m not going to ask for a limiting 
instruction. 
Trial judge: Exactly. 
Prosecutor: His time is probably off. 
(Sidebar concluded) 
Prosecutor: I am going to ask you to really tax your brain because I want you to 
concentrate on during the period you lived at 49 Nevada Avenue in Harrington 
between 2001 and 2003.  
David: Mm-hmm. 
Prosecutor: During that period when the defendant was living with you all, how 
many times do you think that he engaged in anal intercourse with you; that is, that 
as you put it, he stuck his penis in your butt? 
David: Multiple times. 
 
 
* * *   
Prosecutor: If you had to out a number on multiple times, how many do you think 
it would be? 
 
David: More than eight. 
 
 9
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier 
of fact could easily find that the evidence supported the essential elements of each 
offense charged.    
(14) Second, Bartholomew argues that the trial judge substantially 
prejudiced him when he denied his request to sever two charges arising from acts 
involving another complainant (Kevin) from the indictment.  We review a trial 
judge’s denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of discretion.9  
(15) Joinder of parties and claims “promote[s] judicial economy and 
efficiency, provided that the realization of those objectives is consistent with the 
rights of the accused.”10  It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to grant 
or deny a motion to sever.11  In the context of a motion to sever, the defendant 
                                          
 
9  
Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Del. 1990). 
 
10  
Wiest 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988) (quoting Mayer v. State, 320 A.2d 713, 717 (Del. 
1974)); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8(a) provides: 
 
Joinder of Offenses.  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses 
charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
 
11  
Wiest v. State, 542 A.2d at 1195. 
 
 10
bears the burden of showing that substantial injustice resulted from a joint trial.12  
A claim of “mere hypothetical prejudice is not sufficient.”13 
(16) Bartholomew argues that Counts 34 and 35 of the indictment, those 
involving alleged acts with Kevin, were unrelated to the rest of the counts in the 
indictment because they involved a different complainant (David), a different time, 
a different location, and different conduct than the other thirty-three counts.  
Furthermore, 
Bartholomew 
argues 
that 
the 
evidence 
presented 
about 
Bartholomew’s alleged conduct with David could have led to an inference of a 
“general criminal disposition” resulting in convictions for conduct allegedly 
involving Kevin by implication alone. 
 
(17) The actual trial testimony persuades us that the offenses are 
sufficiently related so that the jury could not have been misfocused away from 
their duty to examine the elements of the offenses allegedly perpetrated on Kevin.  
As the trial judge correctly explained, “the State can group counts involving 
multiple victims so long as the victims and the acts of the Defendant are part of a 
conscious scheme or plan that happened at the same time or in close proximity to 
                                          
 
12  
Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Del. 1989); Wiest, 542 A.2d at 1195; see Super. 
Ct. Crim. R. 14 (“[i]f it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
. . . the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or 
provide whatever other relief justice requires.”)  
 
13  
Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1118 (citing Bates, 386 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Del. 1978)). 
 11
each other.”  Here, Bartholomew committed similar offenses against members of 
the same family during the same time period and at the same location.  Each of the 
complainants testified separately about “their” incidents and presented sufficient 
evidence supporting the elements of the offenses arising from those incidents.  
Simply because some of the alleged acts did not occur contemporaneously does not 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that the counts are so wholly unrelated that a 
failure to sever them would substantially prejudice Bartholomew by confusing the 
jury about its role and therefore deny him a fair trial.  Bartholomew has not met his 
burden of establishing actual prejudice resulting from joinder of the charges.  
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied the motion to 
sever. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice