Case Title: Rucker v. Everen Securities, Inc.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-3719

Docket Number: 20030814

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Rucker v. Everen Securities, Inc., 102 Ohio St.3d 1247 , 2004-Ohio-3719.] 
 
 
RUCKER, APPELLANT, v. EVEREN SECURITIES, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Rucker v. Everen Securities, Inc., 102 Ohio St.3d 1247, 2004-Ohio-
3719.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2003-0814 — Submitted April 13, 2004 — Decided July 28, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 81540, 2003-Ohio-
1166. 
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{¶1} 
The discretionary appeal is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been 
improvidently accepted.  The court orders that the court of appeals’ opinion may 
not be cited as authority except by the parties inter se. 
 
RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting. 
{¶2} 
I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to dismiss this case 
as having been improvidently accepted.  The court of appeals committed two 
errors worthy of review and reversal. 
{¶3} 
First, the court of appeals improperly substituted its judgment for 
that of the fact-finder when it determined that plaintiff-appellant, Reginald 
Rucker, failed to establish the essential elements of promissory estoppel.  In order 
to prevail on this cause of action, a plaintiff must show the existence of a promise 
that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the 
promisee and that does induce such action or forbearance.  Mers v. Dispatch 
Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150, paragraph 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
three of the syllabus.  The promise will be binding if injury can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise.  Id. at 105, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150. 
{¶4} 
Whether Everen Securities made certain promises regarding the 
establishment of a minority investment firm upon which Rucker detrimentally 
relied, and whether the promises were fulfilled are factual issues.  The jury 
considered the evidence and concluded that Rucker proved this claim.  The court 
of appeals erroneously overturned the jury’s verdict. 
{¶5} 
More troubling, however, is that the appellate court did not stop at 
merely reversing a factual jury determination.  Instead, without solicitation, it 
invoked the parol evidence rule and held that a future written contract with an 
integration clause “precludes any claim by Rucker of promissory estoppel because 
any oral promises made to Rucker prior to entering into a written agreement 
cannot be considered.”  This incorrect statement of law reveals the appellate 
court’s misunderstanding of the promissory estoppel doctrine. 
{¶6} 
An integration clause is nothing more than the contract’s 
embodiment of the parol evidence rule, i.e., that matters occurring prior to or 
contemporaneous with the signing of a contract are merged into and superseded 
by the contract.  Galmish v. Cicchini (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 22, 27-28, 734 N.E.2d 
782.  “ ‘The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law which, when 
applicable, defines the limits of a contract.’ ”  Id. at 27, 734 N.E.2d 782, quoting 
Charles A. Burton, Inc. v. Durkee (1952), 158 Ohio St. 313, 324, 49 O.O. 174, 
109 N.E.2d 265, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Yet a claim based on promissory 
estoppel does not contravene the parol evidence rule.  Promissory estoppel is an 
equitable doctrine for enforcing the right to rely on promises.  Karnes v. Doctors 
Hosp. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 139, 142, 555 N.E.2d 280.  It is based on the 
principles of good faith, equity, and conscience.  Eric Mills Holmes, The Four 
Phases of Promissory Estoppel (1996), 20 Seattle U.L.Rev. 45, 64.  The doctrine 
may be invoked in various ways. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶2} 
One use is as an affirmative theory of recovery.  Id. at 63.  Under 
such a theory, the plaintiff asserts an independent claim for damages based on 
detrimental reliance.  Id. at 67-68.  Courts confronting such a claim focus on “a 
promissory commitment centering on the promisee’s right to rely, and the 
promisor’s duty to prevent (or not cause) harmful reliance which was reasonably 
foreseeable by the promisor.”  Id. at 68.  “The right to rely arises from promissory 
statements, assurances, and representations that show sufficient commitment to 
induce reasonable reliance in another.”  Id.  Whether the reliance is objectively 
reasonable and foreseeable is a jury question.  Id.  Thus, the integration clause in 
the agreement holds no significance for the promissory estoppel claim.  Instead, 
what is involved is a separate enforceable promise and not a variation or 
modification of the agreement.  Id.  Therefore, the subsequent execution of an 
integration clause does not preclude a claim based on detrimental reliance that 
occurred before the execution of that clause. 
{¶3} 
As we have not had the opportunity to specifically address this 
issue, I believe that we should decide the case on the merits and reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
The Simon Law Firm and Ellen S. Simon, for appellant. 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Marvin L. Karp, Jeffrey S. Dunlap and Britt J. 
Rossiter, for appellees. 
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