Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Charles J. Hausmann

Citation: 2005 WI 131

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 131 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP156-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charles J. Hausmann, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Charles J. Hausmann, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HAUSMANN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2005 WI 131
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP156-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charles J. Hausmann, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles J. Hausmann, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's report and 
recommendation that Attorney Charles J. Hausmann's license to 
practice law in this state be suspended for one year for his 
professional misconduct as alleged in the complaint filed by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) in this court on January 15, 
2004.  That complaint alleged that Hausmann, who was admitted to 
practice law in this state on February 12, 1971, and has had no 
prior disciplinary history, committed two counts of professional 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
2 
 
misconduct by violating SCR 20:1.7(b)1 and SCR 20:8.4(b).2  
Attorney James Winiarski was appointed as referee in this 
matter.  Shortly before the scheduled public hearing, the 
parties filed a joint stipulation whereby Hausmann stipulated 
not only to the facts supporting the violations as alleged by 
the OLR in its complaint, but also that the facts established 
his violations of SCR 20:1.7(b) and SCR 20:8.4(b).  The only 
issue in dispute before the referee concerned the appropriate 
sanction to be recommended for Hausmann's admitted violations of 
the two rules.  The OLR urged the referee to recommend a two-
year suspension of Hausmann's license; Hausmann, on the other 
hand, advocated a five-month suspension as being the appropriate 
sanction for his admitted misconduct.  In his report, the 
referee recommended that this court impose a one-year suspension 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.7(b) provides in pertinent part:  Conflict of 
interest: general rule.  
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation 
of that 
client 
may 
be 
materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(1) 
the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected, and 
 
(2) 
the client consents in writing after 
consultation. . . . 
2 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides: Misconduct.  "It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
3 
 
plus require Hausmann to pay the costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding now totaling $14,431.78. 
¶2 
Neither Hausmann nor the OLR have appealed and neither 
challenge the referee's recommendation regarding the sanction to 
be imposed; accordingly, this court's review proceeds pursuant 
to SCR 22.17(2).3   
¶3 
After our review of the record in this matter, we 
adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
stipulated to by the parties.  We also accept the referee's 
recommendation 
and 
agree 
that 
a 
one-year 
suspension 
of 
Hausmann's license to practice law in this state is an 
appropriate sanction to be imposed for his admitted misconduct.  
We also determine that Hausmann should pay all the costs of 
these 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
in 
the 
amount 
specified, 
$14,431.78. 
¶4 
Charles Hausmann practices law in Milwaukee primarily 
representing personal injury plaintiffs.  His firm, Hausmann-
McNally, S.C., is one of the largest personal injury firms in 
the area with most of its clients coming from Milwaukee.  
Attorney Hausmann is no longer as active in the actual 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.17(2) provides in pertinent part: Review; appeal. 
(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
4 
 
representation of clients as he had been in the past; now as the 
self-described firm's "rainmaker," he spends a substantial 
amount of his time marketing the law firm to prospective 
clients.   
¶5 
The firm's personal injury clients are required to 
sign a retainer agreement which usually provides that the firm 
will be paid one-third of whatever total sum is collected on 
behalf of the client.  In the retainer agreement, the client 
authorizes the firm to pay medical and other bills directly to 
the medical providers and hospitals; the money to pay those 
bills comes directly from the client's portion of any settlement 
payments received.  After a retainer agreement had been signed, 
the firm frequently would refer clients to various medical 
providers in the Milwaukee area.  Between October 1999 and June 
2001, 
the 
firm 
referred 
approximately 
200 
clients 
to 
a 
chiropractor, Scott Rise, and his clinic, Milwaukee Spinal 
Injury Center.  Sometime before these referrals started, 
Hausmann and Rise entered into an oral agreement by which Rise 
agreed to provide chiropractic care and treatment to the law 
firm's clients who did not have insurance; Rise also agreed that 
he would not insist upon immediate payment, would wait for 
payment until conclusion of the personal injury case, and would 
waive payment in the event the case yielded no recovery.  In 
addition, Rise agreed that he would be willing to reduce his 
charges if necessary to 
settle a 
case to 
the client's 
satisfaction.  It was also agreed that Rise would locate a 
chiropractic office in Milwaukee's central city, on a bus line, 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
5 
 
would treat all referrals with "dignity and respect," and would 
render quality care appropriate to the severity of the injury 
sustained. 
¶6 
Furthermore, 
in 
return 
for 
the 
referrals 
from 
Hausmann, Rise agreed to pay 20% of his fees for chiropractic 
services to third-party recipients as directed by Hausmann.  
Between October 1999 and June 2001, Hausmann named several 
recipients 
for 
these 
payments 
from 
Rise 
including 
(1) individuals who had provided miscellaneous personal services 
to Hausmann or his relatives; (2) a marketing firm providing 
services at Hausmann's direction; (3) business entities (or 
their agents) in which Hausmann held some interest; and (4) 
charities that Hausmann supported.4   
¶7 
The financial arrangement between Hausmann and Rise 
was not disclosed by Hausmann to any of the firm's clients who 
were treated at Rise's chiropractic office.  Likewise, Hausmann 
                                                 
4 Pursuant to this arrangement, Rise paid $31,692 to a 
marketing firm with whom Hausmann had contracted to market 
services of lawyers and chiropractors as part of a planned 
"Accident Care Network."  Rise also paid at least $2000 to a 
charity that Hausmann had named which was actually a payment for 
landscaping 
work 
performed 
at 
Hausmann's 
residence. 
 
In 
addition, Rise paid $14,900 to a full-time handyman who had 
provided services at Hausmann's direction to Hausmann's firm, 
Rise's office, Hausmann personally, a business jointly owned by 
Hausmann and his law partner in their individual capacities, and 
Hausmann's sister.  Furthermore, as directed by Hausmann, Rise 
wrote a check for $850 to a company that refinished floors of an 
employee involved in Hausmann's marketing project.  According to 
a subsequent FBI investigation and report, at least $2000 of the 
checks Rise wrote at Hausmann's direction, benefited Hausmann 
directly. 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
6 
 
had not disclosed the arrangement with Rise to his partners or 
firm, nor did he inform his clients who received chiropractic 
treatment from Rise's office, about any potential conflicts that 
could be generated by the financial arrangement Hausmann had 
with Rise.  And, Hausmann did not obtain his clients' written 
consent to his representation despite this potential conflict of 
interest.  See SCR 20:1.8.5 
¶8 
Hausmann 
stipulated——and 
the 
referee 
found——that 
Hausmann handled the payment of his clients' medical bills at 
Rise's chiropractic center differently than the way Hausmann 
handled payments to other medical providers on behalf of 
clients.  With respect to the other medical providers he had 
referred clients to for treatment, after Hausmann received a 
settlement on behalf of a client, Hausmann would usually send 
individual checks to each party listed on the settlement 
statement, including the medical providers who were owed for 
their services.  In contrast, in the settlements involving 
clients who Hausmann had referred to and had been treated by 
Rise, Hausmann held those payments and settlement checks in a 
separate folder.  Once a month, Hausmann would then meet with 
Rise personally and give Rise the checks.  At Hausmann's 
direction, Rise would then draft checks payable to third persons 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.8 provides in pertinent part:  Conflict of 
interest: prohibited transactions.  "(a) A lawyer shall not 
enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: . . . (3) the client 
consents in writing thereto." 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
7 
 
as specified by Hausmann.  These checks that Rise drafted at 
Hausmann's 
direction 
totaled 
approximately 
20% 
of 
Rise's 
billings for Hausmann's clients.  Between October 1999 and June 
2001, Rise received approximately $350,000 in medical billings 
generated from Hausmann's clients.  During that time, Rise, at 
Hausmann's 
direction, wrote 
57 checks 
totaling 
$77,062.87 
payable to third parties Hausmann had identified. 
¶9 
Based on this arrangement, in January 2002, a federal 
grand jury indicted Hausmann and Rise on charges of conspiracy 
to commit mail and wire fraud——depriving clients of the 
"intangible right to honest services"——in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, §§ 371, 1341, 1343 and 1346.6   
¶10 Count 1 of the indictment alleged that Hausmann owed a 
fiduciary duty to the clients of his law firm; that the clients 
were owed the "intangible right to honest services"; and that 
Hausmann had engaged in a "kickback scheme" which was concealed 
from his clients in violation of Hausmann's fiduciary duty. 
¶11 The second count of the indictment charged Hausmann 
with causing securities (i.e. the checks written by Rise at 
Hausmann's direction) to be transferred in interstate commerce 
                                                 
6 Where "two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any 
offense" under Title 18 of the United States Code "one or more 
of such persons [who commit] any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy" may be held criminally liable therefore under 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  It is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1543, and 
1346 to use the United States Postal Service, a private 
interstate courier, or an interstate wire communications service 
in order to implement a "scheme or artifice to defraud [by 
depriving] another of the intangible right of honest services."  
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2002).   
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
8 
 
in connection with fraud, in violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, §§ 2314 and 2. 
¶12 On June 3, 2002, Hausmann entered a conditional plea 
of guilty to Count 1, the conspiracy charge; pursuant to the 
agreement, the second count of the indictment was dismissed.  
Hausmann also, in the plea bargain, preserved his ability to 
appeal the denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss.  At the 
plea hearing in the federal district court, Hausmann admitted 
that he had a financial arrangement with Rise that called for 
Rise to write checks at Hausmann's direction; that the amount of 
the checks equaled approximately 20% of the medical bills 
collected by Rise's chiropractic center; that Hausmann used the 
U.S. mails and interstate wire communications in furtherance of 
his arrangement with Rise; and that the financial arrangement 
was not disclosed to Hausmann's clients. 
¶13 After accepting Hausmann's guilty plea, the federal 
district court sentenced him to two months imprisonment, 16 
months of supervised release and 40 hours of community service.  
Hausmann was also fined $10,000 and he and Rise were ordered to 
pay restitution to the clients in the amount of $77,062.87, 
jointly and severally.  Subsequently, Hausmann personally paid 
the restitution in full.7   
                                                 
7 Rise was convicted in federal court following a jury trial 
on the conspiracy charge.  Both he and Hausmann appealed and 
those appeals were consolidated.  On September 22, 2003, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
both convictions.  United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
9 
 
¶14 On their consolidated appeals, the federal court of 
appeals rejected the argument that the clients Hausmann had 
referred to Rise had not been "harmed" by the arrangement 
between Hausmann and Rise.  The Seventh Circuit wrote:   
 
Appellants 
contend 
that 
Rise's 
third-party 
payments were not kickbacks, but rather constituted 
the legitimate spending of income derived from use of 
fees to which Rise was legally entitled.  They 
maintain that Hausmann's clients had no right to the 
settlement funds paid to Rise nor, consequently, to 
the allocation of twenty percent of those funds to 
expenditures designated by Hausmann.  In this sense, 
reason Appellants, no harm resulted to Hausmann's 
clients, who were deprived of nothing to which they 
were entitled.  This reasoning ignores the reality 
that Hausmann deprived his clients of their right to 
know the truth about his compensation:  In addition to 
one third of any settlement proceeds he negotiated on 
their behalf, every dollar of Rise's effective twenty 
percent fee discount went to Hausmann's benefit.  
Insofar as Hausmann misrepresented this compensation, 
that discount should have inured to the benefit of his 
clients.  It is of no consequence, despite Appellants' 
arguments to the contrary, that Rise's fees (absent 
his 
discount) 
were 
competitive, 
or that 
clients 
received the same net benefit as they would have 
absent the kickback scheme.  The scheme itself 
converted Hausmann's representations to his clients 
into 
misrepresentations, 
and 
Hausmann 
illegally 
profited at the expense of his clients, who were 
entitled to his honest services as well as their 
contractually 
bargained-for 
portion 
of 
Rise's 
discount. 
United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 2003). 
¶15 In his post-hearing brief submitted to the referee in 
this disciplinary proceeding, Hausmann again suggested that none 
of his clients had been harmed in any way by the arrangement 
Hausmann had with the chiropractor, and that any disclosure to 
the clients of a potential conflict of interest would have been 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
10 
 
a "mere formality."  In its post-hearing brief submitted to the 
referee, the OLR disputed Hausmann's altruistic view of the 
arrangement he had with Rise.  According to OLR's argument in 
that post-hearing brief, Hausmann was aware of the potential 
conflict of interest from the beginning of his arrangement with 
Rise; moreover, the OLR pointed out that this agreement was 
oral, that Hausmann did not disclose his 20% arrangement to his 
law partners or associates, and that the monthly exchange of 
checks between Hausmann and Rise occurred in "relative secrecy."   
¶16 As noted, Hausmann stipulated before the referee that 
the facts as outlined in the OLR's complaint were sufficient to 
find violations of both SCR 20:1.7(b) (conflict of interest) and 
SCR 20:8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer).  Not only did Hausmann stipulate to the facts, but he 
also stipulated to the conclusions of law that he violated both 
of those supreme court rules.  Therefore, according to Referee 
Winiarski, his discussion and report would focus on the 
appropriate discipline to be recommended for this admitted 
misconduct by Hausmann.   
¶17 The referee agreed with the OLR's analysis that the 
arrangement between Hausmann and Rise created an obvious 
conflict of interest for Hausmann in relation to the clients 
Hausmann referred to Rise for chiropractic services.  Moreover, 
the referee criticized Hausmann for his "disturbing" positions, 
which failed to recognize the conflict of interest and the harm 
to his clients.  According to the referee, although Hausmann had 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
11 
 
stipulated to the violation of the two supreme court rules, he 
failed to appreciate the substantial conflict of interest that 
arose from his relationship with Rise and did not appreciate the 
effect his actions had on his law firm and on the legal 
profession.  Referee Winiarski wrote: 
Hausmann had much to gain in his arrangement with 
Dr. Rise as it related to the development of a direct 
marketing brochure and program for chiropractors.  
Hausmann had the potential for considerable profits if 
the chiropractic direct marketing program had been 
successful.  He thus benefited by the payments he 
directed Dr. Rise to make to various vendors and 
organizations involved in developing the chiropractic 
direct marketing program.  Hausmann also benefited 
from the exposure he and his firm received when 
donations were made to various inner city charities to 
which he directed Dr. Rise to make payments from the 
chiropractic receipts.  Hausmann did not refer clients 
to Dr. Rise "solely in the client's best interest" as 
he argued, but also because such referrals were 
beneficial to the personal injury practice conducted 
by the Hausmann firm.  
¶18 In its post-hearing brief, the OLR argued that the 
appropriate sanction for Hausmann's misconduct should be a two-
year suspension of his license to practice law in this state.  
The OLR maintained that that sanction would be consistent with 
the discipline imposed in numerous prior cases such as In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stein, 170 Wis. 2d 112, 486 
N.W.2d 526 (1992); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Shlimovitz, 2002 WI 103, 255 Wis. 2d 353, 647 N.W.2d 241; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Webster, 217 Wis. 2d 371, 577 
N.W.2d 21 (1998); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Hunsick, 2001 WI 58, 243 Wis. 2d 631, 628 N.W.2d 341; and In re 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
12 
 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wolf, 2001 WI 4, 241 Wis. 2d 
76, 621 N.W.2d 624.  According to the OLR, Hausmann's misconduct 
in this case was comparable to the misconduct involved in those 
prior attorney disciplinary matters, and in each of those prior 
cases, the attorney involved had received a two-year suspension 
after a felony conviction. 
¶19 The OLR also argued that in those cases where the 
attorney received a suspension of less than two years, see, 
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Frank, 206 Wis. 2d 
233, 556 N.W.2d 717 (1996); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Runyon, 121 Wis. 2d 37, 357 N.W.2d 545 (1984); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Olson, 216 Wis. 2d 483, 574 
N.W.2d 245 (1998); and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Meagher, 2003 WI 132, 266 Wis. 2d 18, 669 N.W.2d 733, the 
misconduct involved was far less serious than Hausmann's 
misconduct in this case.  In addition, according to the OLR, 
none of those prior cases where the attorney received a shorter 
period of suspension involved a federal felony conviction for 
mail and wire fraud for engaging in a kickback scheme affecting 
over 200 clients. 
¶20 Furthermore, the OLR identified several aggravating 
factors 
regarding 
Hausmann's 
misconduct 
which, 
the 
OLR 
maintained, outweighed such mitigating factors as Hausmann's 
lack of a prior disciplinary history and his longstanding 
commendable involvement in community affairs.  According to the 
OLR those aggravating factors included Hausmann's dishonest or 
selfish motive, his pattern of misconduct (depriving over 200 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
13 
 
clients of honest services and over $77,000 in personal injury 
settlement funds), his stipulated two count violation of supreme 
court rules, his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
his misconduct, and his substantial experience in the practice 
of law.  The OLR, therefore, urged the referee to recommend a 
two-year suspension of Hausmann's license to practice law.   
¶21 Hausmann, on the other hand, in his post-hearing brief 
to the referee, urged the referee to recommend only a five-month 
suspension.  Hausmann maintained that his misconduct was far 
less serious and was distinguishable from many of the cases 
cited by the OLR.  He also emphasized that although his failure 
to advise his clients of the relationship he had with Rise 
deprived the clients of the right to question that relationship 
or make other arrangements for either their health care or legal 
representation, the arrangement did not deprive any of his 
clients of money they would have otherwise received.  Hausmann 
also pointed out that he had personally paid the entire $77,000 
in restitution to all the clients affected by what he conceded 
was an "ill-conceived plan."  Again, Hausmann stressed that 
despite appearances, this was not a "kickback scheme"; rather, 
according to Hausmann, it was simply a method for Rise to pay 
for legitimate marketing services in his effort to expand his 
chiropractic clinic.  Hausmann, in the post-hearing brief 
recognized that he should have disclosed his relationship with 
Rise even though that relationship had no tangible adverse 
effect on Hausmann's clients.  He also conceded that that 
constituted a "deprivation of honest services"; according to 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
14 
 
Hausmann, that is why he pled guilty to the federal charge 
brought against him.   
¶22 As noted, Referee Winiarski has recommended that this 
court should suspend Hausmann's license to practice law in this 
state for a period of one year based on Hausmann's admitted 
misconduct.  In his report, the referee reasoned that although 
Hausmann has performed charitable work "far above anything I 
have ever seen before," and that until this case, Hausmann's 
character 
has 
been 
outstanding, 
the 
referee 
nevertheless 
emphasized that Hausmann displayed poor judgment and placed 
himself in the position of a conflict of interest.  The referee 
discussed the various factors to be taken into account when 
considering the appropriate discipline to be imposed for 
professional misconduct as set out in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130 ¶40, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  The referee viewed Hausmann's conduct to be far 
more serious than the conduct involved in those prior cases 
where a shorter suspension was imposed because here, Hausmann's 
misconduct was not a single act, but rather his misconduct 
affected 
200 
clients. 
 
The 
referee 
concluded 
that 
the 
appropriate sanction to be recommended for Hausmann's misconduct 
was a one-year suspension of his license to practice law in this 
state. 
¶23 We 
have 
recognized 
in 
prior 
disciplinary 
cases 
involving an attorney's violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) based on an 
attorney's criminal conviction, that each case must be assessed 
on the basis of its own facts.  There is no "standard" two-year 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
15 
 
suspension of an attorney's license to practice law following 
the attorney's criminal conviction.  Rather, this court imposes 
the sanction it deems appropriate under the circumstances of 
each case regardless of the referee's recommendation.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 
45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
¶24 In 
this 
case, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
recommendation that Hausmann's license to practice law should be 
suspended for one year.  That suspension, we believe, is 
commensurate with the serious nature of Hausmann's misconduct, 
yet at the same time acknowledges mitigating factors present in 
this case including Hausmann's lack of a prior disciplinary 
history 
and 
his 
long 
record 
for 
community 
service 
and 
involvement.  The lawyer regulation system in this state has 
been established to, among other things, "protect the public 
from misconduct by persons practicing law in Wisconsin."  See 
preamble, SCR Chapter 21.  We find Hausmann's professional 
misconduct to constitute serious infractions of the rules 
governing a lawyer's professional behavior and responsibility.  
We also recognize that requiring Hausmann to pay the costs of 
these proceedings totaling $14,431.78 on top of his $10,000 fine 
and the $77,000 restitution he has personally paid, means that 
Hausmann will ultimately have paid more than $100,000 for 
participating in what he aptly describes as an "ill-conceived 
plan." 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
16 
 
¶25 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Charles J. 
Hausmann to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period 
of one year, effective August 30, 2005. 
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Charles J. 
Hausmann shall comply, if he has not already done so, with the 
requirement of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Charles J. Hausmann pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to 
this court of an inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Attorney Charles J. Hausmann to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court. 
 
No. 
2004AP156-D   
 
 
 
1