Case Title: Lightsey v. BESSEMER CLINIC, PA

Citation: 495 So. 2d 35

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
495 So. 2d 35 (1986)
Kenneth W. LIGHTSEY
v.
BESSEMER CLINIC, P.A.
85-111.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 1, 1986.
Rehearing Denied September 19, 1986.
Ralph E. Coleman, Birmingham, for appellant.
W. Stancil Starnes and W. Hill Sewell of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellee.
*36 BEATTY, Justice.
Appeal by plaintiff from summary judgment for defendant in plaintiff's action based upon allegedly negligent medical treatment. We affirm.
Plaintiff, Kenneth W. Lightsey, was admitted to Bessemer Carraway Hospital on March 28, 1980, with a history of acute viral hepatitis. His physician, Dr. Hugh Hood, determined that a liver biopsy was necessary to determine the type of hepatitis present. He initiated a closed liver biopsy, i.e., a needle biopsy, and, in the process, Lightsey's gallbladder was inadvertently penetrated with the needle. Two attempts failed to produce any liver tissue. Dr. Hood contacted Dr. William Edge, a general surgeon, who decided to perform an open biopsy in order to obtain the liver tissue. While performing this procedure on April 3, 1980, Dr. Edge found that the puncture site had healed itself. He also found that the gallbladder was abnormally positioned slightly outside of and over a portion of the liver. Dr. Edge stated in his affidavit that a "gallbladder will only be found in this position in two percent (2%) of patients examined, which makes it a very rare condition."
Later tests performed on the liver tissue revealed that Lightsey was suffering from chronic persistent hepatitis.
Plaintiff filed this action on April 3, 1981. Bessemer Clinic's motion to dismiss was denied, and it propounded interrogatories. Bessemer Clinic filed its motion for summary judgment on July 14, 1982, based upon the pleadings and the affidavit of Dr. Hood. In his affidavit, Dr. Hood established the need for the biopsy, and added:
Plaintiff responded to defendant's summary judgment motion with an affidavit of his lawyer and with an unauthenticated document entitled "Operative Record," which appeared to be a portion of a medical record. The affidavit of plaintiff's lawyer, in pertinent part, stated:
The "Operative Record" itself contained an account of the operation performed by Dr. Edge and a description of the medical findings. The record does not reveal a "progress report of the doctor" unless this phrase is meant to describe some portion of the "Operative Record."
In further support of its summary judgment motion, defendant then filed another affidavit, this one from Dr. Edge. His affidavit established this:
Following a hearing, the motion was denied. Shortly thereafter, on December 6, 1982, defendant moved to have plaintiff identify his expert witnesses, and this motion was granted on December 20, 1982, with plaintiff being ordered to respond within 28 days. The plaintiff did not comply with this request until August 1984, when by letter his lawyer notified defendant's *38 lawyer that Dr. James E. Lee and Dr. Don Brascho would be his expert witnesses. But, after receiving notices that defendant would take the depositions of these physicians, plaintiff's counsel, on September 18, 1984, notified defendant's counsel that Dr. Lee would not be called. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Brascho informed defendant's counsel that he had no indication that he would testify as an expert in the case. Defendant then, on January 14, 1985, renewed its motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had failed to submit any expert testimony contradicting the affidavits of Dr. Hood and Dr. Edge. This motion was granted on February 20, 1985. On March 14, 1985, plaintiff moved to set aside the summary judgment. After an extension of time for a ruling on the motion (see Rule 59.1, A.R.Civ.P.), the court held a hearing on this motion on September 13, 1985, and the court denied the motion on September 16, 1985.
Plaintiff presents two issues for review. It is urged that summary judgment was not proper, and, alternatively, that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment without proper notice.
From an examination of the materials before the trial judge, it appears that his ruling granting summary judgment was eminently correct. Indeed, this case is controlled by our decision in Holt v. Godsil, 447 So. 2d 191 (Ala.1984). There, this Court recited the principle that "To establish a physician's negligence, the plaintiff must ordinarily proffer expert medical testimony as to what is or is not the proper practice, treatment, or procedure." Cf. Code of 1975, § 6-5-484(a), and see Parrish v. Spink, 284 Ala. 263, 224 So. 2d 621 (1969).
In this case, by affidavits from physicians Hood and Edge, defendant established that plaintiff's care and treatment were performed with due skill and under standard procedures. Plaintiff, from 1982 until 1985, did not establish anything with any affidavit from any medical expert countering the statements of defendant's medical experts. To the contrary, the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel contained nothing to negate the positive statements of defendant's expert witnesses dealing with the applicable standard of treatment. Indeed, there was no showing that plaintiff's counsel was competent as a witness to the matters referred to in his affidavit. See Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P. Accordingly, the allegations in the affidavit proffered by plaintiff were insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.
Plaintiff also argues that he was not given proper notice of the renewed motion for summary judgment before entry of that judgment. That motion was filed on January 14, 1985. The accompanying certificate of service discloses that copies of the motion were mailed to counsel for all parties on January 9, 1985. Plaintiff does not contend that his lawyer did not receive a copy of the motion. Thereafter, on February 20, 1985, the trial court granted summary judgment. For 37 days after the renewed motion was filed, plaintiff had filed no expert medical affidavits in opposition. Perhaps under those circumstances, the trial court believed that plaintiff had intended to have the motion ruled upon based upon material already filed. Nevertheless, Rule 56(c) does by its language contemplate a hearing upon a motion for summary judgment.
The record discloses, however, that no hearing was held on the renewed motion for summary judgment. The case action summary shows only that a pretrial hearing was set for February 21, 1985. It follows, therefore, that the court erred in granting the summary judgment motion on the day before without a hearing thereon.
But, that error was rendered harmless by later events. On March 14, 1985, plaintiff filed his motion to set aside the summary judgment. This motion was continued by "express agreement of all parties," and was ultimately considered at a hearing on September 13, 1985, attended by the parties' counsel of record. During this interim period, plaintiff did not proffer any expert medical evidence by affidavit countering *39 that of the defendant. The trial court heard and considered argument of counsel, and then denied the motion. The effect of this hearing and the ensuing denial was compliance with the provisions for notice and hearing under Rule 56, A.R. Civ.P.
Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.