Case Title: State ex rel. Bell v. Madison County Bd. of Comm’rs

Citation: 2014-Ohio-1564

Docket Number: 2013-0633

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Bell v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1564.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-1564 
THE STATE EX REL. BELL ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Bell v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1564.] 
R.C. 2323.51—Judgment awarding sanctions for frivolous conduct affirmed. 
(No. 2013-0633—Submitted February 4, 2014—Decided April 16, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA2010-04-010. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the Madison County Court of Appeals 
sanctioning appellants, Greg Bell and his attorney, Philip Wayne Cramer, for 
frivolous conduct.  The sanctions are in relation to an action for a writ of 
mandamus that Bell, through Cramer, filed in the court of appeals, requesting that 
the court order appellee, the Madison County Board of Commissioners, to comply 
with R.C. 163.01 and 163.02, to provide him with due process in the taking of his 
real-property rights, and to comply with a consent agreement.  The court of 
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appeals dismissed that petition, and we affirmed.  State ex rel. Bell v. Madison 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 357, 2011-Ohio-527, 944 N.E.2d 659. 
{¶ 2} Thereafter, the court of appeals ruled on a motion for sanctions 
filed by the board.  The court granted the motion for sanctions in the amount of 
$21,137.19 against Bell and his attorney, Cramer. 
{¶ 3} Bell and Cramer timely appealed the sanctions judgment to this 
court.  The only issue before us is whether the court of appeals abused its 
discretion in granting the motion for sanctions.  Because the underlying case was 
the last in a series of legal actions covering the same ground, and because the 
board provided sufficient evidence to support the fees that were awarded, the 
court of appeals did not abuse its discretion, and so we affirm. 
Facts 
{¶ 4} Appellants, Cramer and Bell, have been counsel and party in 
numerous court proceedings originating from a 2003 appropriation action filed by 
the board against Bell and his wife to acquire a sewer easement on Bell’s 
property.  In that case, Bell and his wife challenged the appropriation pro se, and 
the Madison County Court of Common Pleas held that the board was entitled to 
an easement.  Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Bell, Madison C.P. No. 2003CV-
02-71 (Aug. 29, 2005).  That judgment was affirmed on appeal.  12th Dist. 
Madison No. CA2005-09-036, 2007-Ohio-1373.  We declined to accept a 
discretionary appeal from that judgment.  114 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2007-Ohio-4285, 
872 N.E.2d 953. 
{¶ 5} In April 2008, Bell, through Cramer, filed a complaint in the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas naming numerous defendants and 
asserting various causes of action related to the Madison County appropriation 
case.  As later observed by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in the decision 
now on appeal, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the case 
based on res judicata, finding that the claims were “ ‘a repackaging of the issues 
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[that were] addressed or that could have been addressed in the Madison County 
Court of Common Pleas and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ ” and noting 
that “ ‘the Bells admit that they are collaterally attacking the judgment rendered 
against them.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  12th Dist. Madison No. CA2010-04-010 (Sept. 
10, 2012) at 4, quoting Bell v. Nichols, Franklin C.P. No. 2008 CVA 6427 (Apr. 
3, 2009) at 15. 
{¶ 6} The Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed.  10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 9AP-438, 2009-Ohio-4851.  Some of the defendants in the Franklin 
County case filed a joint motion for sanctions against the Bells and Cramer, 
arguing that the case was frivolous under R.C. 2323.51.  Sanctions were assessed 
against the Bells and Cramer, jointly and severally.  Franklin C.P. No. 2008 CVA 
6427 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
{¶ 7} On April 13, 2010, Bell, again represented by Cramer, filed the 
underlying mandamus case in the Madison County Court of Appeals.  The court 
of appeals dismissed the complaint, finding that Bell had “extensively litigated, or 
at least had the opportunity to litigate, all of the claims and issues for which he is 
seeking mandamus.”  12th Dist. Madison No. CA2010-04-010 (July 14, 2010).  
We affirmed.  128 Ohio St.3d 357, 2011-Ohio-527, 944 N.E.2d 659. 
{¶ 8} The board filed a motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 against 
Bell and Cramer in the mandamus case.  A magistrate was assigned, conducted a 
hearing, and eventually filed a decision granting the board attorney fees of 
$21,137.19.  The magistrate decided that the mandamus action was frivolous 
because the issues raised had been litigated in other cases and mandamus was not 
available under existing law and no good-faith argument could be made for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.  The magistrate determined that 
the board had been adversely affected by the frivolous conduct in that it had had 
to expend resources in hiring outside counsel to litigate the mandamus case.  The 
magistrate also rejected Bell and Cramer’s argument that because the magistrate 
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had denied their request for discovery prior to the sanctions hearing, they had 
been denied due process.  The magistrate reiterated his earlier determination that 
the discovery sought by Bell and Cramer would not have aided in the 
determinations necessary for him to rule on the motion for sanctions.  Finally, the 
magistrate determined that the hourly rate of $150 for the board’s attorney was 
reasonable, and he awarded attorney fees in the amount of $21,137.19.  The court 
of appeals denied Bell and Cramer’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and 
adopted the decision. 
{¶ 9} Bell and Cramer appealed to this court.  After mediation was 
unsuccessful, the case was returned to the regular docket, and the board filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal.  We denied the motion on September 25, 2013.  A 
motion to supplement the record with the exhibits that were presented at the 
hearing on sanctions was granted shortly thereafter. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 10} On appeal, we will not reverse a lower court’s decision on whether 
to award sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 absent a showing of an abuse of 
discretion.  State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 130 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-5350, 
957 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 11.  To prove such an abuse, Bell and Cramer must establish 
that the court of appeals’ award of attorney fees was “unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable.”  Id. 
{¶ 11} Bell and Cramer have engaged in repetitive litigation about a sewer 
easement on Bell’s property in Madison County.  The underlying mandamus case 
is the latest attempt to argue issues that were long ago litigated to finality.  On the 
merits, the underlying case was properly dismissed on the basis of res judicata, a 
decision affirmed by this court.  The only question at this point is whether the 
court of appeals abused its discretion in awarding the board sanctions against Bell 
and Cramer. 
 
 
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Sanctions were warranted 
{¶ 12} Sanctions for frivolous conduct are authorized by R.C. 2323.51.  
The first determination to be made in deciding whether sanctions are warranted 
here is whether Bell and Cramer engaged in frivolous conduct.  The definition of 
“frivolous conduct” includes conduct by a party to a civil action that is “not 
warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for 
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by 
a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.”  R.C. 
2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii).  The court of appeals correctly held that given the history of 
the litigation, “[m]andamus was simply not available under existing law, and the 
petition cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.”  12th Dist. Madison No. CA2010-04-
010 (Sept. 10, 2012) at 10.  Bell and Cramer’s arguments that the previous 
litigation was somehow improper or incomplete is without merit, as Bell had had 
his day in court and the opportunity to litigate all issues related to the easement.  
Filing a petition for a writ of mandamus was clearly improper here.  Given Bell 
and Cramer’s history of repetitive litigation relating to this matter, the court of 
appeals did not abuse its discretion in finding that the filing of the petition was 
frivolous conduct. 
{¶ 13} Under R.C. 2323.51(B)(1), a court may award costs, reasonable 
attorney fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred by a party adversely 
affected by the frivolous conduct.  The award may be against a party, the party’s 
counsel, or both.  R.C. 2323.51(B)(4).  So the next determination to be made here 
is whether the board was adversely affected by Bell and Cramer’s frivolous 
conduct. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals found that the filing of the mandamus case 
itself had caused adverse effects to the board, as the board was required to defend 
against it.  The board had hired Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin & Boggs Co., L.P.A. 
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(“OLRB”) to represent it, and at the hearing on sanctions, the board introduced 
itemized invoices from the firm.  Bell and Cramer questioned whether the board 
had needed to hire the law firm.  The court of appeals found that because Bell and 
his wife had filed a third-party complaint against the prosecuting attorney in the 
related appropriation case, it was reasonable for the board to hire outside counsel 
rather than rely on representation from the prosecuting attorney. 
{¶ 15} Bell and Cramer also assert that OLRB generated excessive fees by 
litigating the mandamus case instead of trying to settle it.  However, as the court 
below held, the board was under no obligation to settle a frivolous lawsuit. 
{¶ 16} Thus, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that the board was entitled to sanctions against Bell and Cramer for engaging in 
frivolous conduct that had caused the board to incur attorney fees. 
Discovery was not necessary 
{¶ 17} After the motion for sanctions was filed, Cramer orally requested 
discovery to prepare in defending against the motion for sanctions.  That request 
was denied.  At the hearing, Cramer made another motion for discovery.  The 
motion was denied because the discovery Bell and Cramer sought would not have 
answered any of the pertinent questions: Was the mandamus action frivolous?  
Was the board adversely affected?  What fees were incurred? 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals did not deny Bell and Cramer their due-
process rights in denying the motion for discovery.  OLRB engaged in and 
completed legal work in connection with the mandamus case on behalf of the 
board. 
Amount of fees was reasonable 
{¶ 19} Finally, the fees awarded by the court of appeals were reasonable.  
Attorney Derek Graham of OLRB testified at the hearing that his firm charged 
fees and expenses for defending the board against the mandamus action. 
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{¶ 20} The court reasonably concluded that Bell and Cramer were equally 
responsible for bringing the frivolous mandamus action, because their testimony 
at the hearing indicated that they both knew the prior history of the case and yet 
decided to pursue a mandamus action in an attempt to relitigate the same issues.  
The court found that they had “maintained a united front” and therefore were 
jointly and severally liable.  12th Dist. Madison No. CA2010-04-010 (Sept. 10, 
2012) at 14.  The history of the litigation supports this conclusion.  
{¶ 21} The court also determined, based on Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, 
Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 145-146, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991), that the starting point 
for calculating fees is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a 
reasonable hourly rate, taking into account the factors in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) 
(setting forth the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a 
fee).  The court pointed out that Bell and Cramer did not object to the hourly rate 
charged by OLRB or argue that particular items billed by OLRB were 
unreasonable or unnecessary.  The court found the hourly rate of $150 to be 
reasonable.  After reviewing the invoices, the court reduced the fees requested to 
account for some services that appeared to be connected with other litigation and 
arrived at a total of $21,137.19.  The court of appeals thus applied the correct law 
in determining whether the fees were reasonable.  This decision was not arbitrary 
or an abuse of discretion, and therefore we affirm the judgment. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in levying 
sanctions in the form of attorney fees against Bell and Cramer because they had 
engaged in frivolous conduct by attempting to relitigate matters that had already 
been determined.  Indeed, they had been sanctioned once before, by the Franklin 
County Common Pleas Court, for litigating a case on the same matter.  The 
mandamus action was clearly frivolous and adversely affected the board by 
causing it to incur attorney fees.  The fees awarded are reasonable. 
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{¶ 23} In short, the court below did not abuse its discretion, and we 
affirm. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., not participating. 
____________________ 
 
Philip Wayne Cramer, pro se, and for appellant Greg Bell. 
Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin & Boggs Co., L.P.A., and Timothy S. Rankin, for 
appellee. 
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