Case Title: In re C.C.

Citation: 2011 IL 111795

Docket Number: 111795

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 IL 111795
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111795)
In re C.C. and SO. C. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v. Marlene Long, Appellee).
Opinion filed December 1, 2011.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Garman, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
Respondent, Marlene Long, was the legal guardian of her
grandchildren, C.C. and So. C. The State filed a neglect petition as to
C.C. and So. C. in the circuit court of Champaign County. The
petition named Long, along with the children’s biological mother and
father, as respondents. The biological father waived adjudication.
Long and the children’s biological mother stipulated that the children
were neglected. Thereafter, the trial court entered a dispositional
order terminating Long’s guardianship and dismissing her from the
case.
¶ 2
Long appealed her dismissal from the case. The appellate court
reversed. 406 Ill. App. 3d 360. The appellate court held that the
legislature could not have intended that a guardian could be dismissed
from the case based simply upon her dismissal as guardian. The
appellate court also held it was in the children’s best interests that
Long be allowed to remain a party in the case. 
¶ 3
This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.
Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
BACKGROUND
¶ 4
C.C. was born on May 22, 2002, and So. C. was born on February
22, 2006. Jacqueline C. is the mother of C.C. and So. C., and Cyrus
Wildman is the putative father. A third child, Sa. C. was born to
Jacqueline on April 4, 2009. Sa. C.’s biological father is deceased.
Only C.C. and So. C. are at issue in this appeal.
¶ 5
Long was appointed guardian of C.C. on October 20, 2005, and
was appointed guardian of So. C. on May 23, 2007. On May 5, 2010,
the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect and shelter care
on behalf of C.C., So. C., and Sa. C. The petition named Jacqueline,
Wildman, and Long, as well as Sa. C.’s putative father. The petition
alleged that it was in the best interests of the minors to be made wards
of the court. The petition contained three counts. 
¶ 6
Count I alleged that the children were neglected pursuant to
section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705
ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2010)). Count I stated that the children’s
environment was injurious to their welfare when they resided with
Jacqueline because that environment exposed them to domestic
violence. Count II alleged that the children were neglected pursuant
to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act. That count stated that the children’s
environment was injurious to their welfare when they resided with
Jacqueline because that environment exposed the children to
substance abuse. Count III alleged that C.C. and So. C. were
neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) because their environment
was injurious to their welfare when they resided with Long, in that
Long left the minors in the care of an inappropriate caregiver.
¶ 7
Also on May 5, 2010, the trial court appointed the Champaign
County Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) as the guardian
ad litem for the minors. A child protective investigator for CASA
prepared a shelter care report on May 5, 2010. The report stated that
on May 2, 2010, a caller to the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) hotline alleged there was a risk of harm to Sa. C.
The reporter claimed that there had been a domestic dispute between
Jacqueline and her boyfriend, and that both parties were very
intoxicated. A fight between the two began when Jacqueline’s
boyfriend tried to stop her from leaving to buy cocaine. Jacqueline
was arrested and charged with domestic battery.
¶ 8
A child protective investigator spoke with Jacqueline following
the domestic battery incident. Jacqueline told the investigator that
Long was the legal guardian of C.C. and So. C., but that Jacqueline
-2-
had the children after school, until her mother got off work, and on
weekends. 
¶ 9
The investigator reviewed prior reports of DCFS involvement
with Jacqueline. Among the incidents was one on January 4, 2007,
where Jacqueline was indicated for risk of harm to C.C. and So. C.
During that incident, So. C. was at Jacqueline’s residence during a
party where cocaine was used. In addition, earlier on the day of
report, C.C. was at Jacqueline’s residence “and the adults were
smoking marijuana and [C.C.] was locked in the house.” This
incident took place after Long was given guardianship of C.C.
¶ 10
In another incident, on July 21, 2007, after Long had been given
custody of both children, Jacqueline was indicated for inadequate
supervision of C.C. and So. C. On that date:
“5 year old [C.C.] and 1 year old [So. C.] walked over to the
neighbors’ trailer without supervision. Reporter took the
children home but there was no answer when he knocked on
the door and yelled out for someone. Reporter took the
children back to his residence and his wife took the children,
[then he] went into the trailer next door and called out for the
mother [Jacqueline]. The mother was asleep, was woke [sic]
up and told her children had left the house without any
knowledge. [Jacqueline] got up and allowed the children to
stay with the neighbors. Reporter said he would take the
children back to their mother. Reporter said he believes there
is an open case on the mother and that the grandmother
[Long], who lives in the trailer has custody of the children.
Reporter said he thinks the children may not be left alone with
the mother. Reporter thinks the grandmother is working today
because she was not at home.”
¶ 11
The investigator’s report noted that protective custody was taken
from Long “due to the fact that over the past several years,
[Jacqueline] has resided with Ms. Long for extended periods of time.
During these periods she has used alcohol and engaged in behaviors
that have put her children at risk. *** Ms. Long has allowed
[Jacqueline] to be in a caretaker role of the minor children despite her
confirmation that she is aware of her daughter’s substance abuse
issues.”
¶ 12
Long told the investigator that she had been a stable caregiver for
C.C. and So. C., and that she never allowed drugs or alcohol in the
house, though she was aware of her daughter’s issues. Long also said
-3-
that Jacqueline helped with picking up the children after school, and
watched them until Long got home from work, but Jacqueline did not
keep the children overnight. 
¶ 13
The report noted that protective custody was taken of the children,
and they were placed with their maternal grandfather and his wife.
The report stated that even after Long was given guardianship of the
children, there were subsequent indicated reports relating to
Jacqueline being allowed to be the caretaker of the children. As set
forth in the report, “Ms. Long has raised both children, although it
does appear that Jacqueline has resided with her mother during most
of those years. It is of concern that following this most recent arrest,
due to intoxication and domestic violence, Ms. Long still was
allowing her daughter to have unsupervised contact with the children.
Ms. Long admitted she was aware of her daughter’s substance abuse
issues and entrusted the children in her care despite this knowledge.”
¶ 14
On May 6, 2010, a temporary custody and admonition order was
entered placing temporary custody of the minors with the
Guardianship Administrator of DCFS.
¶ 15
At a July 7, 2010, adjudicatory hearing, Jacqueline stipulated to
count II of the petition for adjudication of neglect. Wildman waived
his right to an adjudicatory hearing. Long stipulated to count III of the
petition and waived adjudication.
¶ 16
On August 4, 2010, CASA filed a dispositional hearing report.
The report noted that C.C. and So. C. were in relative foster
placement with their maternal grandfather and his wife. Jacqueline
had entered a 30-day treatment program. Jacqueline stated that she
wanted to parent her children and was willing to make all changes
necessary to accomplish that goal. Jacqueline said that the main
reason she had not parented her children was that Long made it too
easy for her not to parent. Wildman also indicated that he would like
to have custody of his biological children. 
¶ 17
The CASA report stated:
“Jackie has lived on and off with her mother, Marlene[,] and
admits she has, for the most part, resided with her mother,
Marlene Long[,] and her children. In spite of Marlene’s legal
guardianship and therefore, legal responsibility to supervise
[C.C. and So. C.], there have continued to be events in which
the children were placed in unsafe situations, were
unsupervised or placed under the direct supervision of their
-4-
mother when she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol
and witnessed their mother in domestic violence.
* * *
While Marlene [Long’s] original intention was clearly to
protect her grandson, [C.C.], and provide stability not
provided by her daughter, after five years of such
guardianship, this relationship seems to only have enabled
Jackie into a dependence on her mother and allowed her to
parent without parenting, to parent when it was convenient for
her mother, to parent without the legal responsibility.
Subsequently, none of the children were adequately parented
or supervised.”
¶ 18
The CASA report reflected the concern that “[t]he co-dependent
relationship of Marlene Long and Jackie has promoted, condoned and
enabled Jackie’s continued substance abuse.” The CASA report stated
that the future permanency goal for C.C. and So. C. should be “a
‘return home to a biological parent’ as a first choice placement.”
¶ 19
Catholic Charities also prepared a report for the August 4, 2010,
dispositional hearing. The Catholic Charities report noted that
Jacqueline had attended all visitation that had been offered and was
very appropriate during visitation. Jacqueline indicated her desire to
parent her children again.
¶ 20
With regard to Wildman, the Catholic Charities report noted that
Wildman had missed only one scheduled visitation due to a
miscommunication concerning the time of the visitation. Wildman’s
visits with his children went well. The report indicated that
Wildman’s history of legal problems and substance abuse, and his
lack of involvement in his children’s lives, might impact his ability
to adequately parent his children. However, given Wildman’s strong
motivation to parent, as well as his reported lack of legal problems
and substance abuse for several years, Wildman could play an
important role in his children’s lives. Moreover, Wildman’s wife
participated in the weekly visitation and the children appeared to
enjoy the visits.
¶ 21
The Catholic Charities report concerning Long noted that she had
weekly visitation with the children and had attended all her visits. The
visits went well. With regard to the current situation, “Long discussed
the recent arrest of [Jacqueline] and expressed her surprise over the
discovery of [Jacqueline’s] ongoing drug use.” Long discussed
allowing Jacqueline to watch C.C. and So. C. intermittently while
-5-
Long was working. Long stated that being the primary caregiver of
the children was difficult, and she had considered shifting
guardianship to her ex-husband in the past, although she also stated
her wish to provide the caregiver role for the children again. 
¶ 22
Catholic Charities recommended that DCFS be granted custody
and guardianship of the minors. 
¶ 23
On August 5, 2010, the trial court entered a dispositional order
finding it in the children’s best interests that they be made wards of
the court and adjudged neglected. The trial court found Jacqueline
and Wildman unfit and unable to care for, protect, train, or discipline
the minors. The trial court also found Long unable to care for, protect,
train, or discipline the minors. The trial court ruled that it was in
C.C.’s and So. C.’s best interests that custody and guardianship be
removed from the respondent parents and Long and placed with
DCFS. The trial court then dismissed Long from the case and
discharged her counsel. Jacqueline and Wildman were ordered to
cooperate with DCFS and CASA and to comply with the terms of
their service plans.
¶ 24
On appeal, Long argued that the trial court erred in holding that
removal of Long as guardian of C.C. and So. C. automatically
terminated her party status and terminated Long’s ability to partake
of services. Long did not appeal the trial court’s finding that it was in
the children’s best interests to be made wards of the court or that
Long was unable to care for the children. Long also did not appeal the
trial court’s decision to name the Guardianship Administrator for
DCFS as the children’s guardian. 
¶ 25
The appellate court noted that the Act does not specifically
address the status of a guardian who is a necessary party to the
proceeding when the trial court removes that guardian and appoints
DCFS as guardian. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 371-72. The appellate court
concluded that the legislature intended for a minor’s legal guardian
to remain a party throughout the proceedings, regardless of whether
the trial court removes the guardian from that position and names
DCFS as guardian. Id. at 372. The appellate court also concluded that
it was in the children’s best interests that Long be allowed to remain
a party. Id. at 373. The appellate court held that Long was entitled to
notice of hearings and to present evidence, to cross-examine
witnesses, and to present arguments. Id. The appellate court also held
that Long was entitled to keep her court-appointed counsel if she
-6-
could not afford to hire her own, and could continue to receive any
other services to which she was entitled under the Act. Id.
¶ 26
ANALYSIS
¶ 27
The statute at issue in this case is section 1-5(1) of the Act. That
section provides, in pertinent part:
“Except as provided in this Section ***, the minor who is the
subject of the proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal
custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent
have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence
material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to
examine pertinent court files and records and also, although
proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in
character, the right to be represented by counsel. At the
request of any party financially unable to employ counsel,
with the exception of a foster parent permitted to intervene
under this Section, the court shall appoint the Public Defender
or such other counsel as the case may require. Counsel
appointed for the minor and any indigent party shall appear at
all stages of the trial court proceeding, and such appointment
shall continue through the permanency hearings and
termination of parental rights proceedings subject to
withdrawal or substitution pursuant to Supreme Court Rules
or the Code of Civil Procedure.” 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West
2010).
¶ 28
In addition, section 1-5(2)(a) provides that:
“Though not appointed guardian or legal custodian or
otherwise made a party to the proceeding, any current or
previously appointed foster parent or relative caregiver, or
representative of an agency or association interested in the
minor has the right to be heard by the court, but does not
thereby become a party to the proceeding.” 705 ILCS 405/1-
5(2)(a) (West 2010).
¶ 29
On appeal, the State argues that the appellate court erred in
finding that section 1-5(1) requires a guardian to remain a party to
proceedings even after the guardian has been removed from that
position. Our review of the construction of a statute is a question of
law that this court reviews de novo. State Building Venture v.
O’Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151, 160 (2010).
-7-
¶ 30
The primary objective of this court in construing a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Id. at 160. The surest
and most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the
statute itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, it will be applied as written,
without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Id. This
court will not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading
into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the
expressed intent. Id. In determining the plain meaning of statutory
terms, this court will consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it
addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the
statute. Id.
¶ 31
The appellate court in this case found that section 1-5(1) of the
Act was silent concerning the status of a guardian once the
guardianship is removed. The appellate court therefore concluded that
“the legislature intended for a minor’s legal guardian to remain a
party throughout the proceedings, regardless of whether the trial court
names DCFS as guardian.” 406 Ill. App. 3d at 372. The appellate
court noted that section 1-5(1) gives a guardian not only party status,
but also legal representation throughout the proceedings. The
appellate court therefore held that “[t]he General Assembly could not
have intended a guardian, legal custodian, or responsible relative,
who the Juvenile Court Act requires the State to name as a
respondent, could simply be dismissed as a party if guardianship of
the child was awarded to DCFS at a dispositional hearing.” Id. The
appellate court, however, did not explain why the General Assembly
could not have intended a guardian to be dismissed as a party if his or
her guardianship was removed. The appellate court further held that
it was in the children’s best interests that Long be allowed to remain
a party in the case. Id. 
¶ 32
Upon review, we find that the appellate court erred in construing
section 1-5(1) of the Act. We disagree with the appellate court that
the absence of language in section 1-5(1) of the Act affirmatively
addressing the party status of a former guardian mandates the
conclusion that a guardian who has been removed from that position
nonetheless remains a party to the proceedings. The appellate court
erred in relying upon the purported silence in section 1-5(1) in
concluding that Long remained a party to the proceedings even after
she was dismissed as the children’s guardian. 
-8-
¶ 33
In fact, section 1-5(1) is not silent concerning the party status of
dismissed guardians. As noted, section 1-5(1) affirmatively states that
the parties to the proceedings are “the minor who is the subject of the
proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible
relative.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2010). The
Act is clear in including a guardian in the enumerated list of who is
a party respondent. The Act also provides that custody or
guardianship granted thereunder continues until the court otherwise
directs. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(5) (West 2010). Consequently, once the
court directs the removal or dismissal of a guardian, that individual
no longer is a guardian. Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous
language in section 1-5(1), a former guardian is not a guardian and,
thus, no longer is a party respondent to the proceedings following her
dismissal from that position and is no longer entitled to legal
representation as provided for in the statute.
¶ 34
When a statute lists the things to which it refers, there is an
inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions,
despite the lack of any negative words of limitation. People v.
O’Connell, 227 Ill. 2d 31, 37 (2007). Section 1-5(1) lists those that
are necessary parties to the proceedings, and section 1-5(2)(a) lists
those who, while not parties, may participate in the proceedings.
Given that the statute specifically sets forth both the necessary parties
and those permitted to participate as nonparties, the omission of
former guardians or others from that list should be understood as an
exclusion.
¶ 35
That section 1-5(1) is limited to guardians and not former
guardians is further evident in examining the Act as a whole. It is well
settled that where the legislature includes particular language in one
section of a statute, but omits it in another section of the same act,
courts presume that the legislature acted intentionally in the exclusion
or inclusion. In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 341 (2010). Section 2-28 of
the Act provides that the “court may remove the custodian or
guardian and appoint another in his stead or restore the minor to the
custody of his parents or former guardian or custodian,” assuming
the court finds that the former guardian is now fit to care for the
minor. (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-28(1) (West 2010). The
legislature thus recognized that a former guardian could be restored
to guardian status. However, despite providing that former guardians
could be returned to guardian status, the legislature did not provide
party status to former guardians in section 1-5(1) of the Act.
-9-
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for this court to nonetheless infer
that the legislature intended to include former guardians in the list of
enumerated parties in section 1-5(1).
¶ 36
Long also argues that she should be allowed to retain her party
status because she was a responsible relative as set forth in section 1-
5(1). We disagree. Long’s legal status regarding the children was as
their court-appointed guardian, not as a responsible relative. In any
event, once Long was removed as the guardian of the children, she no
longer had custody of the children and no longer could have been
considered a responsible relative.
¶ 37
The appellate court also found that Long should be permitted to
remain a party to the case because it was in the children’s best
interests that she remain a party and be permitted to keep her court-
appointed counsel. The appellate court noted that: Long had been the
children’s primary caregiver for most of their lives; the children had
strong bonds with Long; Long attended all visits with the children
that she had been offered; and, in a report prepared by Catholic
Charities, Long had expressed surprise over the discovery of
Jacqueline’s ongoing drug use. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 372-73. The
appellate court also stated that, in the event the trial court decided to
terminate the parental rights of the children’s parents, Long likely
would be able to provide the court with important information
regarding the children’s best interests, and might decide to seek
restoration of her guardianship. Id. at 372.
¶ 38
We find that the appellate court erred in looking to the children’s
best interests in deciding that Long would remain a party to the case
even after she was dismissed as the children’s guardian. Section 1-
5(1) does not contain a best interests requirement in setting forth the
necessary parties to the proceedings. As noted, section 1-5(1) clearly
and unambiguously states that the necessary parties to proceedings
are the minor and “his parents, guardian, legal custodian or
responsible relative who are parties respondent.” The named parties
are listed as necessary parties without regard to whether it is in the
minor’s best interests to have those individuals participate in the
proceedings.
¶ 39
Moreover, in removing Long as guardian for the children, the trial
court found that it was not in the children’s best interests for Long to
continue as the children’s guardian. Accordingly, it is antithetical to
then hold that it nonetheless is in the children’s best interest for Long
to remain a party to the proceedings.
-10-
¶ 40
The best interests of a minor are relevant in determining legal
custody or guardianship of the minor (see 705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West
2010)) and in reviewing the appointed legal custodian or guardian of
the minor, including determining whether to restore the minor to the
custody of his former guardian or custodian (see 705 ILCS 405/2-
28(1) (West 2010). Consequently, the children’s best interests with
regard to Long were relevant in determining whether to remove Long
as guardian and would be relevant in determining whether to restore
Long’s guardianship. In this case, however, Long did not challenge
the appellate court’s finding that it was in the children’s best interests
to be made wards of the court, that Long was unable to care for the
children, or that Long should be removed as guardian and the
Guardianship Administrator for DCFS should be named as the
children’s guardian. Because Long did not raise these issues on
appeal, the appellate court erred in considering the children’s best
interests in its decision.
¶ 41
With respect to best interests, we further note that the appellate
court erred in considering the facts of this particular case in finding
that a former guardian is entitled to remain a party to the proceedings.
The appellate court was greatly influenced by the fact that Long was
the grandmother of the children, had a strong bond with the children,
and had been the primary caregiver of the children. However, section
1-5 of the Act necessarily applies without regard to the specific facts
of each individual case. We apply the statutes of this state as written,
and do not carve out exceptions that do not appear in the statute
simply because we do not like how the statute applies in a given case.
Consequently, it was inappropriate for the appellate court to consider
the specific facts of this case in determining that Long should be
allowed to remain a party to the proceedings and should retain her
court-appointed counsel.
¶ 42
Finally, we note that the cases relied upon by the appellate court
and by Long in support of a finding that Long should be allowed to
remain a party even after she is removed as guardian are not on point.
In this court and in the appellate court, Long cited In re Anast, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 750 (1974). In that case, the court held that the stepfather of
two girls, who had been awarded custody of the girls when he and the
girls’ biological mother divorced, was entitled to an adjudicatory
hearing to determine his fitness before depriving him of custody.
Anast, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 756. The court held that the statute at issue
“obviously contemplates that if a minor is under legal guardianship
-11-
at the time a petition is filed under the Act, the guardian should be
named.” Id. at 754. 
¶ 43
Anast is inapposite. Here, as the appellate court noted, Long was
named a respondent in the petition and did receive an adjudicatory
hearing. 
¶ 44
The appellate court found the decision in In re A.K., 250 Ill. App.
3d 981 (1993), to be persuasive. There, while a dissolution of
marriage was pending between Brenda and Randy Kirchner, a petition
was filed alleging that A.K. was an abused child. A.K. was born to
Brenda during her marriage to Randy. Brenda and Randy were joined
as respondent parents. During the proceedings, the trial court entered
an order that Randy was not the biological father of A.K., and an
order was later entered dismissing Randy from the case.
¶ 45
On appeal, the court noted that at the initiation of the juvenile
proceedings, Randy was a “parent” of A.K. within the meaning of the
Act because his parentage was presumed, so that he was properly
made a party respondent to the proceedings pursuant to section 1-5(1)
of the Act. A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d at 987. The court noted, however,
that the legislative scheme was silent concerning the position of a
presumed father once the presumption was rebutted. Id. The court
held that one in Randy’s position should not be dismissed from the
case until the case is concluded. Id. at 988.
¶ 46
In so holding, the court noted that in a section 2-29 proceeding,
any formerly presumed father who might qualify in other states as an
“equitable parent” would benefit by remaining in the proceeding
“until all issues are resolved because he would have an opportunity
to persuade the court to frame its dispositional order in such a way as
to be consistent with any ability he might have to adopt the child,”
and therefore the father might obtain some of the protection which the
“equitable parent” rule might give him. Id. at 989. Nonetheless, the
appellate court affirmed Randy’s dismissal from the case, finding that
he suffered no prejudice as a result of his dismissal. Id.
¶ 47
The appellate court in the instant case analogized Long’s position
to that of the presumed father in A.K. The appellate court further held
that, in contrast to A.K., the children in this case would be prejudiced
by Long’s dismissal from the case. 
¶ 48
We find A.K. to be distinguishable from the instant case. In
contrast to the potentially shifting legal status of a presumed father,
the legal status of a guardian is clearly set forth. Under the Act,
guardianship of a minor includes “the duty and authority to act in the
-12-
best interests of the minor.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3 (West 2010).
Guardianship includes the rights and responsibilities of legal custody.
705 ILCS 405/1-3(8)(c) (West 2010). Legal custody is the
relationship created by an order of court which imposes on the
custodian certain responsibilities toward the minor. 705 ILCS 405/1-
3(9) (West 2010). Custody or guardianship granted under the Act
continues until the court otherwise directs. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(5)
(West 2010). Once the court directs otherwise, guardianship ceases.
¶ 49
In contrast, the legal status of a father is not necessarily as clearly
defined as that of a guardian. The status of a presumed father involves
unique issues. For example, in A.K., the two-year limitation period of
section 8(a)(2) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987, ch. 40, ¶ 2508(a)(2) (now 750 ILCS 45/8)) barred Brenda from
making a claim in the dissolution proceedings that Randy was not the
father of A.K. A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d at 983. Consequently, for
purposes of the dissolution, Randy remained the presumed father of
A.K. However, for purposes of the section 2-29 proceeding, an order
was entered determining that Randy was not the father of A.K. In
other cases, a presumed father may have acted as such for many years
before it is determined that he is not the biological father. 
¶ 50
Given the complexities inherent in the case of a presumed father
who is later found not to be the biological father, we find the decision
in A.K. to be sui generis and, therefore, inapplicable in the instant
case. In so holding, we decline to pass on the correctness of the
decision in that case, as that issue is not now before us. We simply
find that the appellate court in this case erred in analogizing the
position of a guardian to that of a presumed father in holding that a
guardian retains her party status even after her dismissal as guardian.
¶ 51
We also find that the appellate court erred in declining to follow
the analysis of the appellate court in In re S.B., 373 Ill. App. 3d 224
(2007). In that case, C.L. was S.B.’s guardian at the time the State
filed its original juvenile petition alleging that S.B. was neglected.
Accordingly, C.L. was named a respondent in the petition. Later, a
dispositional order was entered appointing DCFS as S.B.’s guardian
and ending C.L.’s guardianship of S.B. Accordingly, C.L. was
dismissed from the case.
¶ 52
The appellate court held that at the time of the dismissal, C.L. was
no longer S.B.’s guardian, so she no longer had the right to be a party
to the proceedings, although she had the right to be heard pursuant to
section 1-5(2)(a) of the Act as a previously appointed relative
-13-
caregiver. In re S.B., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The appellate court held
that the trial court did not err by dismissing C.L. from the case after
the dispositional order was entered. Id.
¶ 53
The appellate court in the instant case disagreed with S.B. that the
trial court properly dismissed C.L. from the case once she was
dismissed as C.L.’s guardian. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 369. The appellate
court in this case held that the proper procedure would have been to
allow C.L. to remain a party in the case. Id. As discussed, however,
the S.B. court was entirely correct in holding that C.L. was no longer
a party to the case once she was removed as S.B.’s guardian. The
appellate court, therefore, erred in rejecting the court’s analysis in
S.B.
¶ 54
Finally, we note that Long is not left without recourse. Pursuant
to section 1-5(2)(a), Long may have the right to be heard by the court
as a previously appointed relative caregiver interested in the minors.
See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(2)(a) (West 2010). Long also may seek
restoration of her guardianship status pursuant to section 2-28 of the
Act. See 705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 2010). However, having been
dismissed as guardian of the minors, Long no longer was a party
respondent to the proceedings, and was properly dismissed as a party
by the trial court. The appellate court erred in reversing Long’s
dismissal from the case and in holding that Long was entitled to keep
her court-appointed counsel and to receive any other services to
which she was entitled under the Act.
¶ 55
CONCLUSION
¶ 56
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the
appellate court, and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 57
Appellate court judgment reversed;
¶ 58
circuit court judgment affirmed.
-14-