Case Title: State Ex Rel. Cox v. SUP. CT. OF MARION CO.

Citation: 121 N.E.2d 881, 233 Ind. 531

Docket Number: 29,204

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1954-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
233 Ind. 531 (1954)
121 N.E.2d 881
STATE ON RELATION OF COX
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF MARION COUNTY, ROOM 3, DAVIS, SPECIAL JUDGE, ETC.
No. 29,204.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 4, 1954.
Townsend & Townsend, of Indianapolis, for relatrix.
Robert D. Symmes, of Indianapolis, for respondent.
GILKISON, J.
On July 14, 1954, relatrix filed her original action in this court asking that a temporary writ of prohibition issue commanding respondents to refrain from making further orders in cause No. B-41751, entitled Karen O. Cox v. J. Vernon Cox, in respondent *532 court, and that respondents show cause why the temporary writ should not be made permanent.
We issued the temporary writ.
Respondents filed their response herein on July 26, 1954.
The petition shows that relatrix obtained a decree of divorce and was awarded the custody of her child, in a divorce action against her husband on December 18, 1945. That her divorced husband filed a petition for modification of the custody order, on July 2, 1954. On July 13, 1954, relatrix filed her affidavit for change of judge in the proceedings which was sustained by the court and the court then peremptorily named Lewis Davis as special judge in the cause. That the court refused to name a panel of three judges as required by Rule 1-12 of the Indiana Supreme Court. That the special judge so selected has set the matter for hearing and that he will make determinations adverse to relatrix unless prohibited.
The response admits that respondent court refused to name a committee of three qualified judges or lawyers from which the parties might each strike one and that the judge named respondent, Lewis Davis, a practicing attorney, as special judge.
The response further contends that the method of the appointment of a special judge, at most is only an error  and therefore could be corrected only on appeal.
Other contentions are made relative to the several statutes concerning change of venue and change of judge. Except for the causes for change these have become extinct by reason of the adoption of Rule 1-12 of the Supreme Court. Acts 1937, Ch. 91, § 1, p. 459, Sec. 2-4718, Burns' 1946 Repl. provides as follows:
By this act the legislature abandoned such rights as it might have under Art. 7, Sec. 4 of the State Constitution to place "regulations and restrictions" upon the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, particularly with respect to "rules of court which shall govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of this State." By that Act the Supreme Court was given the power to adopt, amend and rescind rules of court governing and controlling practice and procedure in all the courts of the state. It is provided therein that such rules are to be "promulgated and to take effect under such rules as the Supreme Court shall adopt, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect."
This statute has been in force and effect for some seventeen years. Clause 3 of Rule 1-12 of the Supreme Court was adopted and made effective September 1, 1948. The rule provides by its first sentence:
Then follows Sections 1, 2 and 3. The first paragraph of Section 3 is as follows:
There can be no doubt that this Section of Rule 1-12 applies to the situation confronting the court when it (properly, we think) sustained the motion for change of judge. Rule 1-12 by paragraph 9 of Section 3 thereof expressly provides that:
The affidavit for change of judge contains an averment as follows:
We think this shows proper diligence in filing the affidavit.
Our State Constitution provides that justice shall be administered freely, completely and speedily. Art. 1, Sec. 12. It has been wisely said that justice shall be administered without denial, delay or prejudice. 56 Am. Jur.  Venue  § 57, pp. 59, 60. Assisting in the implementation of these rights we have our own change of venue and change of judge rules and laws. Their proper administration is essential to the American idea of justice.
Having granted the motion for change of judge the trial court must have the special judge selected agreeable with our Rule 1-12. He has not completed the change of judge operation until he makes the selection agreeable with that rule. In that matter he has no discretion to exercise. His duties are mandatory and imperative. The respondent, Lewis Davis, is without authority to serve as special judge in the case for the reason that he was not selected in the manner required by law.
The temporary writ of prohibition heretofore issued herein is hereby made permanent.
NOTE.  Reported in 121 N.E.2d 881.