Case Title: County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Limited Partnership. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Moon, in which J. Levinson joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Transfer, filed 07/08/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Opinion, filed 04/21/2009. S.Ct. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant-Appellants Motion for Reconsideration and Order of Amendment, filed 05/22/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 399. S.Ct. Amended Opinion, filed 05/22/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 400. S.Ct. Opinion, filed 11/10/2010 [ada].

Citation: 119 Haw. 352

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAL' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

=--000:

 

 

COUNTY OF HAWAI'I, a municipal corporation,

 

 

Plaintif£/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee 4 ri
vs. 23 5 »
Zs 2
cey coupe emuniy uimareo rartwersure, 22h EE
Defendant /Counterclainant-Appellant’ Zag BOO
and g 6S

ROBERT NIGEL RICHARDS, TRUSTEE UNDER THE MARILYN
SUE WILSON TRUST; MILES ‘HUGH WILSON; JOHN DOES 1-100;
JANE DOES 1-100; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100; DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-100; DOE ENTITIES 1-100; and DOE
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-100, Defendants

 

C&I COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
‘Third-Party Plaintiff-Aappellant

1250 OCEANSIDE PARTNERS aka HOKULI‘A,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee
(CIV. NO, 00-1-0161K)

 

COUNTY OF HAWAT'T, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee

C&J COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant /Counterclaimant /Cross Claimant-Appellant

and

1250 OCEANSIDE PARTNERS aka HOKULI‘A,
Defendant /Cross Claim Defendant-Appellee

and
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER:

ROBERT NIGEL RICHARDS, TRUSTEE UNDER THE MARILYN
SUE WILSON TRUST; MILES HUGH WILSON; JOHN DOES 1-100;
JANE DOES 1-100; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100? DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-100; DOE ENTITIES 1-100; and
DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-100, Defendants
(CIV. NO, 05-1-015K)

 

 

 

No. 28622
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NOS. 00-1-0181K; 05-1-015)
December 24, 2008
NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
WITH MOON, C.J. CONCURRING SEPARATELY
AND DISSENTING, WITH WHOM LEVINSON, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBAL J,

‘This case arises from two condemnation actions brought
by Plaintiff-Appellee County of Hawai'i (Appellee or the County).
In both actions Appellee sought to condenn property belonging to
Defendant-Appellant CéJ Coupe Family Limited Partnership

(Appellant)' for use as a public highway (Bypass) .? 1250

 

2 the complaints were initially filed against fobert Nigel Richards,

Trustee under the Marilyn Sue Hilson Trust) Robert Nigel Richards, Trust
Under the Joan Elizabeth Coupe Trust; Charles Willian Coupe; Joan Elizabeth
Coupe; Miles Hugh Wilsons Joan Coupe, Trustee under Revocable Trust of Joan
Coupe Dated March 30, 1988, and unidentified defendants. All named defendants
except fobert Nigel Aicharde, Trustes Under the Marilyn Sue Wilson Trust, and
Miles Hugh Wilson anavered the complaints. On May 23, 2007, the parti
Stipelated to sunsticute Ce Coupe Fansly Limited Partnership fer the
Foragoing named defendants who appeared in the two cases. ‘Therefore, th
said naned defendants are hereafter referred to as “Appellant.”

 

 

   

This case is before us by virtue of our acceptance of a request
‘rom the Intermediate Court of Appeals [the
jant to Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAB) Rule 40,2" (2008)
SU Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-38 (Supp. 2007). HRS 5 602-38
‘entitled “Application for transfer to the suprene court,” states in part as

 

 

 

 

2
 

‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

Oceanside Partners (Oceanside), a development company that vas to
build the Bypass through an agreement with Appellee, was added in
Civ. No, 00-1-0181K (Condennation 1) as a Third-Party Defendant
and, therefore, is the Third-Party Defendant-Appellee in the
appeal in that case. Oceanside was ordered joined as a defendant
on indispensable party grounds in Civ, No. 05-1-015K
(Condemnation 2) and, therefore, is the Defendant-Appellee in the

‘The court consolidated the cases and

 

appeal from that c:

 

dismissed Condernation 1 in favor of Appellant but granted
condemnation in Condemnation 2, entering judgment in favor of
Appellee and Oceanside on September 27, 2007. Oceanside joined
Appellee in its answering brief on appeal and, therefore, is
bound by the resolution herein of the issues raised.

Appellant appeals from (1) the automatic denial by

operation of law of Appellant's post-judgment motion for

follows:

(a) The suprene court, in the manner and within the
time provided by the rules of court, shall grant an
applitation to transfer any case within the jurisdiction of
the intermediate appellate court to the supreme court upon
the grounds that the case involves:
(2) A'question of inperative or fundamental public
inportancer

 

ib} The supreme court, in the manner and within the
time provided by the rules of court, may grant sa
application ro transfer any cose within the jurisdiction of
the intermediate appellate court to the supreme court upon
the grounds thet the case involves!
(2) A question of first impression or a novel Legal
question; oF
(2) Tasuea spon which there ss an inconsistency in
the decisions of the intermediate appellate
court or of the supreme court.

 

  

 

3
/-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

statutory damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 (1993)? in
Condemnation 1 and (2) the September 27, 2007 First Amended Final
Judgment of the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (the court)*
in favor of Appellee in Condemnation 2. Related to the court's
judgment dismissing Condemnation 1, Appellant argues that it was
entitled to statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 because
“(Appellee] did not succeed in taking the property in that case.”
Related to Condemnation 2, Appellant argues that (1) the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of
abatement, and (2) ££ the court had subject matter jurisdiction,
it erred in failing to consider whether the asserted public
purpose was a pretext for private benefit. On appeal, Appellant
asks this court to (1) remand Condemnation 1 for an award of
damages,’ and (2) (a) reverse the court’s Judgment in Condemnation
2 for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, (b) vacate
the Judgment in Condemnation 2 and remand for determination of

whether the asserted public purpose vas pretextual.

+ HRS § 101-27 19 quoted in its entirety infra at pages 16.

‘the Honorable Ronald Ibarra presided.

+ Because, ae explained belok, the requested damages were decned
denied by operation of Lau when the court failed to rule on the request within
the prescribed time period, there is no order or judgment to dispose of
Felated to the appeal in Condemnation 1. The Judgment dismissing Condemnation
1°\s"hor challenged by Appellant’ first iseve on appeal. In that connection,
Appedlant notes that Appellee has not appealed from the dismissal of
Condeanation 1, the peried to appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a) (1) (2008) has
expired, and, therefore, the Juageent in Condemnation 1 is final and cannot
how be sppesied. Ses Bacon v. Karlin, 68 Haw. €48, 651, 127 P.24 1127, 1130
(isse) tholding that the failure to file a notice Of appeal within tha time
provided in MRAP Role 4a) (1) deprived this court of appellate jurisdiction.)

 

 
“***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

We hold that (1) a landowner in a condemnation action
is entitled to damages under HRS § 101-27 where the property at
issue is not finally taken in the context of a particular

condemnation proceeding, irrespective of whether the government

attempts to take the land through subsequent condemnation

 

proceedings; (2) abatement does not apply where the relief sought
in two concurrent actions is not the same; and (3) although our
courts afford substantial deference to the government's asserted
public purpose for a taking in condemnation proceeding, where
there is evidence that the asserted purpose is pretextual, courts
should consider a landowner’s defense of pretext. Therefore,
(2) automatic denial of statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 in
Condemnation 1 is vacated and the case remanded for a
determination of damages, (2) the court's conclusion that
Condemnation 2 was not abated by Condemnation 1 is affirmed, and
(3) the court’s Judgment in Condemnation 2 is vacated and the
case remanded for a determination of whether the public purpose
asserted in Condemnation 2 was pretextual.

I.

‘This case arises from the development of the Hokuli'a
subdivision (Hokuli‘a) by Oceanside. The project is located on a
1550-acre parcel, which extends from the ocean almost to the
Manalahoa Highway, and crosses the border between North and South
Kona on the Island of Hawaii. Appellant’s property is

contiguous to the southern border of Hokuli‘a, Tt appears that
   

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

the zoning of the 1550-acre parcel did not allow for the planned
Hokuli'a development.‘ Thus, the Hawai'i County Council (HCC)
passed Ordinances 96-7 and 96-8, which, in pertinent part,
rezoned the Hokuli'a land, As a condition of rezoning, Oceanside
agreed to construct a Bypass in the vicinity of Keauhou and
Captain Cook. According to Appellee, the Bypass is necessary to
“alleviat(e] unacceptable and unsafe traffic conditions.”
Appellant characterizes the Bypass as a means of
accessing the Hokuli‘a development from the existing
infrastructure, ise., Mimalahoa Highway. It maintains that

Oceanside agr

 

d, a a condition of rezoning, to “construct a
road to connect its property to Mamalahoa Highway.” Further,

Appellant represents that, under this condition, Oceanside was
responsible for acquiring the property necessary for the Bypass

and for the cost of constructing the Bypass. Contrastingly,

 

Appellee states that, because the Bypass would cross many parcels
of privately-owned land, “the [rezoning] ordinances anticipated
that [Appellee] might need to use its eminent domain power in

connection with the construction of the Bypass.” Paragraph 14 of

 

© the parties do not state how the land was originally zoned, and

what category was needed to allow for Hokuli'a to be developed. This court
Sheed not search through @ voluminous record, which in this case includes
thousands of pages in each condemnation action, for detaile not provided. Cf.
janai Cou. Ines Zs Land Use Comm'n, 105 Hawai'i 296, 309 n.31, 97 P.3d 372,
585 nest {aout Texpiaining that this court “ie not obligated to sift ehrough
the-voluminous record to verify an appellant's inadequately documented
contentions” (citations omitted) )

 

 

 

> te seems that the Bypass referred to by Appellee and the access
road referred to by Appellant is, in fact, the same road. Therefore, for the
Sake of consistency, “Bypass” is used throughout.

6
‘+1 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

the Development Agreement requires Oceanside to dedicate the
Bypass to Appellee upon its completion. Thereafter, Appellee
Will “assume all responsibility and costs for operation,
maintenance, repair, or reconstruction of the (Bypass).”

In April of 1998, the HCC passed Resolution 244-98
adopting the Development Agreement between Appellee and
Oceanside. Appellant presents the portions of the Development
Agreement following as salient. First, Oceanside was authorized
to determine the route of the Bypass and, thus, which property
needed to be acquired.

oceanside shall:

[2] ‘Determine the final . . , alignment of the entire
[Bypass], including intersection areas

(Capitalization omitted.) Relatedly, Paragraph 10 provided for
the exercise of Appellee’s eminent domain power if Oceanside
could not obtain the land necessary for the Bypass through
private sale.

 

Should Oceanside and any parson
be unable to negotiate a mutually agreeable purchase price,
then Oceanside shall provide [a list of appraisers, from
hich the landowner must cheose one appraiser and accept the
price established by the appraiser]. should Oceanside and
decide ofa Brice vecommended by (s)
mutoally selected appraiser, then upon written request to

ioe, (Appelee| shall’
‘Sondemnation powers to acauize the seanentis) from the
person pursuant to Paragraph (i)

(Bnphases added.) (Capitalization omitted.) The Development
Agreement also allowed for the institution of condemnation

proceedings in the absence of
‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
negotiations, where the landowner refused to consider selling his

or her land to Oceanside.

Notwithetanding Paragraph (10.b), if the parson fails

eo negot iat
Sirshase of seamentis] of the [Bypass] from tho person
Respite Oceanside’ s good faith attempts to negotiate, thet
ae nav, in ite 2
e >

Dpon Fecaipt of the written reque

 

(Enghases added.) (Capitalization omitted.) Second, Paragraph
11 of the Development Agreement established that (1) condennation
actions would be initiated upon Appellee’s receipt of a notice of
requirement from Oceanside, (2) Oceanside had sole discretion to
determine what property to condemn, and (3) Oceanside would
einburse Appellee for eny costs incurred as a result of the

condennation proceedings.

Should the person fail to participate in negotiations
with Oceanside . «. , the condennation powers of (Appellee)
ABALL be roguired' for’ the acquisition of the segeent(s) «

 

 

8. Upon Oceanside’ s tender of a requirenent of
condemnation by letter to [Appellee], [Appellee] shall
Sithin thirty (30) says begin to immediately and
expeditiously exercise the sane pursuant to MKS chapter 101.

 

‘Sohgemnation action” as that ters is Used in Condition L(2)
Sf Ordinance 96-8 and Condition M(2) of Ordinance 96-7 and
Shell relieve Oceanside of all further liability or

Sbligation to purchase segments) of the (Bypase] from such

perssn.
b. [Appellee] shall subeit to Oceanside a
a Zor paysent of any and ali reasonable “costs

‘Aidexpenses incurred by [Ampelleel for the acquisition of
the condesned land in conjunction with [Appel lee’ a] exercise
of its condennation powers shen Oceanside has determined in

Within forty-five (45) gays of written

‘Hieasmuiced Tang.
notice from [Appellee], Gceanside shall reimburse (Aopellee!
for apy and a1 ceasonable coats and expenses incuzced by

‘{igpellgel for the acquisition of the condened land in
conjunction with (Appelles’s] exercise of its condemnation
powers.

 
“SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

(Emphases added.) (Capitalization omitted.) Third, once ail the
required land was acquired, Oceanside would be responsible for
constructing the Bypass. “Oceanside shall construct the [Bypass]
to the standards set forth in Exhibit ‘M’ by the Department of
Public Works for Ali Highway with such modifications as may be
deemed necessary by the County Department of Public Works and by
Oceanside.” (Capitalization omitted.)

Oceanside initially attempted to obtain Appellant's
property through a private sale. Appellee relates that
“[s]tarting in 1997, Oceanside and [Appellee] engaged in
negotiations with [Appellant] to obtain the right-of-way needed
to construct the Bypass through [its] property. However, despite
lengthy negotiations, Oceanside and [Appellee] were unable to
reach an agreement with (Appellant) and they eventually reached
an impasse in 2000.” Being unable to negotiate a sale, on
May 23, 2000, Oceanside sent a letter to Appellee requesting that
it exercise ite power of eminent domain with respect to

Appellant’s land. After receiving the request, Appellee started

 

the necessary procedures, and on July 26, 2000, the HCC adopted
Resolution No. 266-00, finding it necessary for Appellee to
initiate eminent domain proceedings against Appellant’s land
pursuant to the Development Agreement, Oceanside having been
unable to acquire the right-of-way for the Bypass. That

resolution read:
‘++°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Whereas, the [D)evelopment (A)grecment provide

lof the owners acroaa whose property the [8Ypa

to traverse fails to mutually agree with Oceanside
Price of “the terme of the

n powers of [Appellee] shall be

      
  
 
   
 

  

Pursuant to that Resolution, on October 9, 2000, Appellee filed a
condemnation complaint, thereby initiating Condemnation 1. Both
Resolution No. 266-00 and the October 2000 Complaint attached a
survey identifying the parcel to be condemned, which comprised an
area of 2.9 acres. On October 9, 2000, Appellee also filed an
“Ex Parte Motion for Order Putting [Appellee] in Possession”
pursuant to HRS § 101-29 (1993), which was granted on October 10,
2000.

on January 24, 2001, Appellant filed its Answer to
Appellee’s October 9, 2000 Complaint and a Counterclaim against
Appellee. Appellant’s Ansver asserted eleven defenses and the
counterclaim raised four claims for relief.

on September 4, 2001, in Condemnation 1, Appellee filed
a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to [Appellant’s] Sixth
and Seventh Affirmative Defenses and First Claim for Relief
Asserted in the Answer and Counterclaim Filed January 24, 2001”
(Notion for Partial Summary Judgment). Appellant’s sixth
affirmative defense was that there “is no public necessity for
the taking.” In that connection, the seventh affirmative defense
was that Condemnation 1 did not have a valid public purpose, but
was being effected “for private benefit.” Similarly, the first

claim for relief in the counterclaim alleged that the taking was

10
‘**°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAY'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

instituted “for the private benefit of Oceanside,” in violation
of the public purpose clauses of the federal and state
constitutions. On November 27, 2001, the court granted
Appellee’s Notion for Partial Summary Judgment.

According to Appellee, relevant to the subsequent
Condemnation 2 action, on February 21, 2002, Appellee issued a
“final subdivision approval for the Bypass."" Although
Condemnation 1 had sought only 2.9 acres of Appellant's property,
the final subdivision approval indicated that 3.349 acres of
Appellant's property would be needed for the Bypass.

In July of 2002, the court held a hearing on the issue
of public purpose and, after considering the evidence, on
Septenber 5, 2002, reversed its Novenber 27, 2001 Order granting
partial summary judgnent to Appellee, finding that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to public purpose. Upon motion
by Appellant, on December 11, 2002, the court thereby stayed the
order putting Appellee in possession of Appellant's property
until final judgment.

According to Appellant, possession was subsequently
returned to Appellant and the construction of the Bypass
“halted.” Thereafter, Oceanside sought a writ of mandamus
directing Judge Ibarra to rescind his sua sponte order

transferring Oceanside’s motion for disqualification or recusal

+ re should be noted that, at that tine, Appelles had not yet
ingtiated Condesnation 2.

cy
“*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

of Judge Ibarra, and its motion for stay of proceedings, to Judge
Amano, which this court denied on April 10, 2003. See County of
Hawai'i v. Richards, No. 25746, 2003 WL 1961471 (Apr. 10, 2003)
(unpublished order).

According to Appellant, at trial, in Civil No. 00-1-
181K,? it opposed Condemnation 1, arguing, inter alia, that
(1) Appellee “illegally delegated its power of eminent domain to
Oceanside,” (2) “the claimed public use was a pretext,” and

(3) “the taking was not for a public use or purpose[, nJor was it

 

 

cise of [Appellee’s) independent discretion.” It also

objected to the reimbursement provisions of the Development

 

Agreement, “maintain[ing] that the Development Agreement

attempted to shift Oceanside’s obligation to pay for its road to
third parties, whether or not their land was being taken.”
Pursuant to the Development Agreement, these third parties may
include “developers or land owners” who Appellee determined as
benefitting from construction of the Bypass.

For unstated reasons, during the pendency of

Condemnation 1, Appellee for a second time initiated procedur:

 

to condemn Appeliant’s property. On January 23, 2003, the HCC
adopted Resolution No. 31-03. That resolution

authoriz{ed Appellee) to initiate a second eminent domain
Proceeding for condeanation of [Appellant's] property for

the Bypass. Unlike Resolution [No-} 266-00 this resolution
Sid not reference the Develosment Agreement and instead the

+ Ag noted Antza at page 23, on March 31, 2005, the court ode:
Condannation 1 and Condesnation 2 to be sonsciidated.

 

12
 

“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

[nice] determined that the Bypass (would) provide “a regional
Benefit for the public purpose and use which will benefit

the County [of Hawai'i}.”

 

on January 28, 2005, Appellee filed a second condemnation action
against Appellant pursuant to the Resolution. tn accord with the
final subdivision approval, both Resolution No. 31-03 and
Appellee’s Complaint in Condemnation 2 sought to condemn
approximately 3.348 acres of Appellant's land.

on February 7, 2005, Appellant filed a Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative to Consolidate with Condemnation 1.
Based on that motion, on March 31, 2005, the court consolidated
Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2.

A bench trial took place over the course of sixteen
days in July and August, 2007. Appellant asserts that throughout
the proceedings related to Condemnation 2, it repeatedly argued
that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
matter because Condemnation 2 was abated by the pendency of
Condemnation 1.

As to Condemnation 1, on September 27, 2007, the court
determined that it was invalid because Appellee had “illegally
delegated its power of condemnation, through the Development

Agreement, to a private party, [Oceanside], and therefore did not

 

have @ proper public purpose.” In that connection, the court
ordered that judgment be entered against Appellee and in favor of
Appellant as follows:

‘The Condemnation is invalid.

 

3
 

and therefore
ia not have a proper public purpose.

(Bmphasis added.) As to Condemnation 2, the court ruled (1) that
it was not abated and (2) that it was for a public purpose.
Relatedly, the Judgment declares that

[t]here is no abatement. Judgment is hereby entered in
Favor of (Appeliee) and [Oceanside], and against {Appel ant)

because the clains are substantially ditierent, based on

   

 

 

(Emphasis added.)

© for

 

on October 11, 2007, Appellant filed a requ
statutory damages consisting of attorneys’ fees and costs (fees
motion) pursuant to HRS § 101-27 “because [its] property was not
taken for public use” in Condemnation 1. On October 26, 2007,
Appellant appealed from the Judgment in Condemnation 2. The
court did not rule on the fees motion by January 9, 2008, and,
therefore, as related by Appellant, it ‘was deemed denied by
operation of (HRAP Rule) 4(a) (3) [(2008)], which requires that
(the court] . . . dispose(] of the motion within [ninety] days.
on February 8, 2008, Appellant appealed from this denial of the
fees motion.

on June 16, 2008, Appellee filed a motion for transfer
to this court pursuant to MRAP Rule 40.2 and HRS § 602-58 (a) (1).
On June 23, 2008, Appellant filed its opposition to transfer. on
July 9, 2008, this court accepted transfer. On October 16, 2008,

this court heard oral argument on the merits.

1s
“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

n.
Appellant presents three questions on appeal. The
first pertains to Condemnation 1 and the others to Condemnation
2. First, related to its fees motion, Appellant asks, “May
[Appellee] forever avoid its obligation under [HRS] § 101-27 to
Pay damages for discontinued or failed takings by instituting
serial condemnation actions?” In connection with this question,
Appellant asserts that because its property was not taken in
Condemnation 1, the court was required to award “all such damages
fas may have been sustained . . . by reason of the bringing of the
[condemnation] proceeding . . . including [its] costs of court, a

reasonable amount to cover attorney's fees paid by [it) in

 

connection therewith, and other reasonable expenses.” (Quoting

RS § 101-27.) (Emphases omitted.) Second, related to the issue
of abatement, Appellant asks:
Ie an eminent domain action abated -- and the circuit court
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction ~~ when the court is
Already considering another, earlier-filed eminent domain
action, instituted by the same plaintiff, in the same court,
againot the sane detendants, for the sano Feller?
As to this question, Appellant further maintains that, in
Condemnation 2, the court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
and [it] erred when it denied multiple motions to dismiss.”
‘Third, in connection with the Judgment in Condemnation 2,
Appellant asks:
Does a circuit court have any duty under the (United States]
and Hawai'i Constitutions to examine the record to determine
Whether the government's proffered public purpose supporting

3 taking is 3 pretext niding » predominantly private
benefit, or may it simply take the government’ s word?

 

  

4s
 

“HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

Related to this question, Appellant further posits that “(the

court] should not have rejected allegations of a pretextual

taking or

predominantly private purpose by looking only to the

government’s claims of public use.”

statutory

qr.
As discussed infra, Appellant is entitled to seek

damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 because it prevailed

in Condemnation 1, HRS § 101-27 provides:

(Emphases

any proceedings instituted under this part
are abandoned or discantinued before reaching a final
for any cause, the nioperty concerned is

 

fo recover rz

ihe of te
Dioperty concerned if the possession has been awarded

‘nciugina thedefencant"s costa of court, a ransonable
‘ghoul to-eorar attomey's fees paid by the defendant in
and the

Possession of the property concerned shell be restored to
The defendant entitied thereto, Issues of fact arising in
Connection with any claim fer guch danage shall be tried by
the court without a jury uniess a trial by jury is denanded
by either party, pursuant to the rules of court, within ten
Gays from the date of the entry of an order or judgment
allowing the discontinuance of the proceedings, of
Gismissing the proceedings or denying the right of the
plaintiff to take the property concerned for public use
Ehe event judgment is entered in favor of the defendant
against. the plaintiff, any moneys which have been paid,
any additional security whieh has been furnished, by th
Plaintiff to the clerk of the court under sections 101-28
Snd 101-23, shail be applied or enforced toward the
Satisfaction of the judgnent.. In the case of the state or a
Gounty, if the moneys so paid to the clerk of the court are
insufficient, then the balance of such Judgeent shall be
paid from any moneys available or appropriated for the
Sequiaieion of the property concerned, or if that 48
insufficient then the sane shall be paid from the general
fund of the state or county, as the case may be.

 

 

 

 

      

added.)

Whether Appellant was entitled to damages presents an

issue of statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de

16
“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

novo. State v. Bayly, 118 Hawai't 1, 6, 185 P.3d 186, 191 (2008)
(stating that “[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)}. Under the canons of statutory construction, “where
the language of the law in question is plain and unanbiguous
courts must give effect to the law according to its plain and
cbvious meaning.” Mikeleon v. United Serve. Auto, Ass'n, 108
Hawal's 388, 360, 120 P.3d 257, 259 (2005) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The canons of statutory
construction also require this court “to construe statutes so as
to avoid absurd results.” Tauese v, State, Dep't of Labor é
Indus. Relations, 113 Hawai'i 1, 31, 147 P.34 785, 815 (2006)
(quoting Franks v. Hawaii Planing Mill Found., 88 Hawai'i 140,
144, 963 P.2d 343, 353 (1998)). Furthermore, an interpretation
of a statute must be “reject [ed]” if it “renders any part of the
statutory language a nullity.” City & County of Honol
Hsiung, 109 Hawai'i 159, 173, 124 P.3d 434, 448 (2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

Appellant seeks “statutory danages pursuant to [HRS]
§ 101-27 because although [Appellee] improperly forced
(Appellant] to litigate [Condemnation 1], [Appellee] did not
succeed in taking the property in that case.” Tt contends that
“the [court] invalidated [Condemnation 1], holding it was void
and the taking was not for public use, but for Oceanside’s

private benefit{,]” and therefore, Appellee failed to “tak[e] the

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property in that case” notwithstanding the fact that Condemnation
2 was upheld.

In support of its position, Appellant makes four sub-

 

arguments: (1) the consolidation of the two condemnation actions
pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 42
(2008) “did not relieve [Appellee] of its (HRS) § 101-27
obligation”? (2) the legislature did not intend to allow “serial
eminent domain abuse” as a means of allowing the government to

escape payment of statutory damages; (3) the term “proceedings”

for purpo!

 

of HRS § 101-27 “means a single eminent domain
action, not many”; and (4) “(HRS §) 101-27 is unambiguous,”

quiring that the “[glovernment bear{] the risk of eminent

 

domain failures{.]"

Appellee argues that Appellant’s fees motion “was
properly denied{.]" In support of its position, Appellee makes
three subarguments:

(2) HRS § 101-27 does not
finally taken for

where (xppeliant was) awarded Just compensation for the
property: (2) the Kotion for Sumaary Oameges was filed
Sutside of the 10-day period permitted under HRS § 101-27
and (3) (Appellant) aid not present 2 sufficient record to
Getermine reasonable attorneys’ fees.

  
 

 

 

With respect to Appellant’s first subargument,
Appellant urges that the court’s “consolidation of the two
condemnation actions did not relieve [Appellee] of its [HRS]

§ 101-27 obligation to make [Appellant] whole after the court
denied [Appellee] relief in (Condemnation 1}.” In sum, Appellant

argues that “even though [the court} held that [Appellee] could

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take [Appellant's] property in [Condemnation 2, it] does not mean
that it was ‘finally taken for public use’ for purposes of [HRS]
§ 101-27." (Quoting HRS § 101-27.) In response, Appellee
maintains in its first subargument that Appellant “ha(s] not
carried (its) burden of proving that HRS § 101-27 applies to an
eminent domain defendant who ultimately lost in a consolidated
condemnation trial{.J”

Appellant and Appellee are correct that the issue of
whether Appellant is entitled to statutory damages under HRS
§ 101-27 turns upon whether the property in question “was finally
taken” under that statute. HRS § 101-27 identifies three
circumstances under which a defendant in an eminent domain action
is entitled to statutory damages: (1) where the eminent domain
proceedings are “abandoned . . . before reaching a final
judgment"; (2) where the eminent domain proceedings are
“discontinued . . . before reaching 2 final judgment"; or (3) if
“for any cause, the property concerned is not finally taken for
public use[.]” Because neither party has alleged that
Condemnation 1 was “abandoned” or “discontinued,” Appellant can
only recover statutory damages under the third circumstance, if
“the property concerned [was] not finally taken for public
use[.]”

It is evident that Appellant is correct that “the
property concerned [was] not finally taken for public use” in

Condemnation 1, As noted previously, in that action, the court

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stated in its order that “{tlhe Condemnation is invalid.
Judgment is hereby ordered to be entered in favor of [Appellant]
and against [Appellee] . . . .” (Emphasis added.) That the

property was eventually condemned after Appelle

 

prevailed in the

second condemnation action it filed is of no import. To hold, as

 

Appellee argues, that statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 are
unrecoverable by the prevailing defendant in a condemnation
action if the property in question is later condemned in another,
subsequently filed condennation action, would render a portion of
the statute a nullity. Under this interpretation, statutory
damages could never be recovered under HRS § 101-27 by a
prevailing defendant because there is always a risk that the
property might be “finally taken for public use” in a future
condemnation action. Thus, under this interpretation, a
defendant could only recover statutory damages under HRS § 101-27
where the condemnation proceedings are abandoned or discontinued,
and not where defendant prevailed in an action, contrary to the

plain meaning of the statute.'*

 

w appellee cites State v. Davis, 53 Haw. S82, 585-86, 499 F.24 663,
666-67 (1972), for the proposition that HRS § 101-27 manifests a legislative
intent to preclude recovery if the property is finally taken, and that "ai
sninent domain proceeding 1s not to be deemed ‘in favor of the defendant and
Sgainst the plaintiff’ unless the property sought to be condenned is not
Hinally taken for public use.” However, Dauig is inapposite, as it did not
Address application of the statute under circumstances where the Landowner was
‘Setually successful with respect to one of the condeanation actions at issue.
Tn Davis, the government was successful on b11 counts, but the defendants
Atgued that attorneys’ fees and costs should be included as part of the “Just
Compensation” awarded. Id at 583-86, 499 P.2d at 665-67. The court referred
EoumRS § 101-27 as indicating that the legisiature only intended for
defendants to receive attorneys’ fees and costs where the landowner is
Successful on the merits, and not as a part of Just compensation where the
lang is taken. dd, at 585, 499 7.24 at 665

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Insofar as a statute must be interpreted to avoid
rendering any part of it a nullity, see Haiung, 109 Hawas‘i at
173, 124 P.3d at 448, HRS § 101-27 cannot be interpreted as
precluding the recovery of statutory damages if the defendant
prevails in a condemnation action but fails in a subsequent
condemnation action on the sane property. See also EéJ Lounge

eratin. Yn of City & Cou ert)
Hawai'i 320, 349, 169 P.3d 432, 461 (2008) (stating “the well-
established tenet of statutory construction [1s] that an
Anterpreting court should not fashion a construction of statutory
text that effectively renders the statute a nullity or creates an
absurd or unjust result” (internal quotation marks, citation, and
emphasis onitted)). Accordingly, Appellant is correct that, for
purposes of HAS § 101-27, the property in question was not
finally taken in Condernation 1, irrespective of the fact that
the property in question was taken in a subsequent condemnation
action.

As to its second subargument, Appellant argues that,
with respect to HRS § 101-27, “the [legislature did not intend
to be an enabler of dysfunctional and abusive government conduct”
and therefore “[it] surely could not have intended . . . to
encourage local governments to become serial takers and keep
pressing forvard in repeated condemnation lawsuits without

consequence, until they finally win one, or the property owner is

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bankrupted.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellee does not respond
to Appellant's second subargunent.

Appellant is correct that Appellee’s interpretation of
HRS § 101-27 as precluding the recovery of damages by a defendant
who prevails in one condemnation action but fails in a later

rial eminent domain abuse”

 

condemnation action, would “enable
by the government. Under Appellee’s interpretation, HRS § 101-27
would allow recovery of statutory damages by a defendant in an
eminent domain action where the action was “abandoned or
discontinued,” but the defendant could not recover danages if the
defendant prevailed at trial because it would be possible that
the government could bring one or more eminent domain actions in
the future under which the property might be “finally taken for

public use[.]" HRS § 101-27.

 

This interpretation does not comport with common sense
and fairness, as it would be patently unjust under the statute to
award damages to a defendant where the eminent domain action was
discontinued or abandoned, but deny them where the defendant
prevailed and received a final judgment in his or her favor.

Such an interpretation is legally absurd in that the statute
would penalize the government for abandoning or discontinuing
eminent domain actions but would not sanction it for bringing
actions lacking merit that result in judgments in favor of the
defendant. Thus, as Appellant notes, “(iJnterpreting the term

‘finally taken’ to mean anything beyond a single, discrete

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eminent domain lawsuit vould transform that statute from one
designed to remedy eminent domain abuse into one that encourages
it, @ plainly unintended and absurd result.” (Emphases in
original.)

‘This court is “bound to construe statutes so as to
avoid absurd results." Tauese, 113 Hawai'i at 31, 147 P.3d at
815 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Beneficial Hawai'i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai'i 289, 308, 30 P.3d
895, 914 (2001) (stating that “the legislature is presumed not to
intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to
avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and
Allogicality” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
‘Thus, Appellee’s interpretation of HRS § 101-27 must be rejected
to the extent that it not only renders a portion of the statute a
nullity as described supra, but also produces a legally absurd
outcone.

With respect to Appellant's third subargument,
Appellant contends that the term “proceedings” as used in HRS
§ 101-27 refers to “a single eminent domain lawsuit, not
several.” In support of this subargument, Appellant states that
other statutes in HRS chapter 101 governing the state’s eminent
domain powers “use the term ‘proceedings(]’ . . . [to] mean a

single condemnation action.” Appellant cites HRS § 101-13

 

Appellant algo cites to language from Davia that seems to indicate
that HRS $ 101-27 refers to a final juggnent ina single eminent donain
proceeding, not several. fea $3 law, at S66, 499 P.2d st 667 ("Tt ie clear
from HBS '§ 101-27, however, that judgment in’ an emi ie

 

 

 

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(1993), the statute pertaining to the exercise of eminent donain
powers by a county, which provides, in pertinent part as follows:

Exercise of power by county. Whenever any county
dooms it advisable of necessary to exercise the right of
‘eminent domain in the fortherance of any governmental power,
the procandings nay be instituted as provides in section
TOTS tter the governing authority (esunty couneli, oF
other governing board in the case of an independent board
having control of its oun funds) of the county

Suthorized guch auit by resolution duly passed, oF adopted
Gna approved, az the case may be.

 

 

(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.)

Appellant argues that HRS § 101-13 “treats ‘the
proceedings’ as a single suit by later use of the term ‘such
suit,’ meaning ‘one.'” Thus, Appellant asserts that because
under HRS § 1-16 (1993), “*(1]aws in pari materia, or upon the
same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each
other[,]'" HRS § 101-27 “must be read” as referring to a single
suit. Appellee answers that Appellant “ha(s) not carried [its)
burden of proving that HRS $ 101-27 applies to an eminent domain
defendant who ultimately lest in a consolidated condemnation
triall.1”

Neither the term “proceedings” as used in HRS § 101-27,
nor the singular form “proceeding,” is defined in that statutory
section or in HRS chapter 101 governing eminent domain. the term
“proceeding” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as

2. The regular and orderly progression of a Lawsuit
including _all_acts and events betmeen the tine of

‘Soumencenant and the entry of Sadameat. 2, Any procedural
eens for seoking redress from a tripunal or agency. 3. Ap

8. continue
not to be deamea "in favor of the desendant and against the plaintift” unless
the property sought to be condemned is not finally taken for’ public vse.”
(Emphasis addes.))

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1 sic. 4. the
Business conducted by a court or other official body: a
hearing.

Black's Law Dictionary 1241 (8th ed. 2004) (emphases added).

This definition is not helpful in resolving the issue of
whether the term “proceedings,” as used in HRS § 101-27, refers
toa single suit or multiple suits. On the one hand, the third
definition supports Appellant's argument that the term
“proceedings” refers to a single suit. If the term “proceeding”
is equivalent to “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger
action{,]” then a single suit could contain many proceedings. on
the other hand, the first definition supports Appellee’s argument
that the term “proceedings” could refer to multiple suits. tf
the term “proceeding” means “a lawsuit, including all acts and
events between the time of commencement and the entry of
judgment {,]” then in the plural, “proceedings” would connote
multiple lawsuits.

Turning to case law, the term “proceeding” has been
used to refer to a single lawsuit in accordance with the first
definition in Black's Law Dictionary which implies that the
plural term, “proceedings,” refers to multiple lawsuits. See,
S:a., Hawaii Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 116 Hawai'i 465, 470,
173 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2007) (using the term “proceedings”
interchangably with the term “acticns”). However, the term
“proceedings” has also been used to refer to steps that are part
of a larger action in accordance with the third definition. See

Yn, County of Hawai'i, 111 Hawai'i 234,

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250 n.44, 140 P.3d 1014, 1030 n.44 (2006) (using the term
“proceedings” to refer to hearings held by @ county liquor
commission in the plaintiff's action to obtain a permit for the
sale of Liquor).

Although the ordinary meanings of “proceedings” in
Black"s Law Dictionary and in case law provide support for both
parties, the term “proceedings” for purposes of interpreting HRS
§ 101-27 can only be reasonably read as referring to a single
action. If the term “proceedings,” as used in HRS § 101-27,

referred to multiple suits as argued by Appellee, then it could

 

wer be determined at the conclusion of a particular
condemnation action whether the defendant’s property would be

“finally taken for public use” because, again, subsequent

 

condemnation actions could always be filed against the property
owner in which the property might eventually be taken. As
discussed supra, this interpretation of HRS § 101-27 is
impermissible because it renders a portion of the statute a
nullity and would create an absurd result not attributable to the
legislature. Thus, the term “proceedings” as used in HRS
§ 101-27 must be construed as referring to a single condemnation
action.

With respect to Appellant's fourth subargument,
Appellant declares that HRS § 101-27 “unambiguous{ly]” requires
that the “government bear[] the risk of eminent domain failures.”

Appellant contends that “{t]he conclusion that [it is] entitled

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to damages {2 simple enough if one adheres to the plain text of
[HRS] § 101-271." Appellee does not respond to this
subargument.

To reiterate, HRS § 101-27 must be read as allowing @
defendant who prevails in a condemnation action to recover
damages sustained in that action regardless of whether the
defendant's property 4s later taken for public use in a
subsequent condennation action. As discussed supra, HRS § 101-27
must be interpreted in this manner in order to prevent part of
the statute from being rendered a nullity and to avoid an absurd
outcome. Furthermore, as argued by Appellant, eminent domain
statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the landowner.
Seo Marks vs Ackerman, 39 Haw. 53, 58-58 (Terr. 1951) (stating
that eminent domain “provisions should be construed liberally in
favor of the landowner as to remedy in{Jsol)far as they are in
harmony with the common-law principles and constitutional
guarantees protecting private property(]" and that “they should
be construed strictly against the condennor as to right to enter
the land of the landowner without his consent in so far as they
are in derogation of such principles and guarantees”). Thus,
Appellant is correct that the statute allows it to seek damages
insofar as the property in question was not taken in Condemnation
1.

Appellee's first subargunent, that HRS § 101-27 does

not apply because Appellant's property was “finally taken” in

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Condemnation 2, has been answered. With respect to Appellee’s
second subargument, Appellee urges that Appellant is not entitled
to statutory damages pursuant to HRS § 101-27 because under that
section it was required to “take steps to have [its claim for

damages} tried ‘within ten days from the date of the entry of an
order of judgment’ and Appellant failed to do so. (Quoting HRS
§ 101-27.) Appellee cites the following portion of HRS § 101-27

to support its argument:

Taaues of fact arising in connection with any claim for such
Samege sh uiehout =
ules thet

Sf sander ar Sudarent slloving the discontinuance of the
Brocesdings, OF dismissing the proceedings or denying the
Eight of the plaintice to take the property concernes for
public use.

(Emphasis added.) Appellant responds that the ten-day limitation
in HRS § 101-27 pertains to the request for a jury trial but is
not “applicable to the motion for damages itself.”

on Septenber 27, 2007, the court entered judgment in
favor of Appellant, ordering the condemnation invalid. Fourteen
days later, on October 11, 2007, Appellant filed its fees motion.
If Appellee is correct that Appellant was required “to take steps
to have [its statutory damages) claim tried” within ten days of
the entry of Judgment “denying the right of [Appellee] to take
the property concerned for public use,” see HRS § 101-27, then
Appellant's motion for damages was untimely.

But, contrary to Appellee’s contention, under a plain
reading of ARS § 101-27, the ten-day Limitation is applicable

only to the demand for a jury trial on factual issues relating to

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the condemnation claim. Granmatically, the phrase “pursuant to
the rules of court, within ten days” in that section is preceded
by the words “unless trial by jury ie demanded.” Thus, the
ten-day phrase would modify the jury demand option.

Moreover, it would be illogical to conclude that the
phrase “pursuant to the rules of court, within ten days” applied
to the damages trial itself, tt would be reasonable and
necessary to expressly state that the jury demand must be made in
accordance with the HRCP because that section contains a specific

and detailed procedure for demanding a jury trial." Without

 

express reference to “the rules of court,” a party could

conceivably be uncertain as to whether the demand for 2 jury
authorized by HRS § 101-27 must be made in accordance with the
rule governing such demand established in HRCP Rule 38 or not.
Therefore, the phrase “pursuant to the rules of court” and the

phrase “within ten days” inmediately following it, appropriately

nutes of court specifically governing the demand for a jury trial

fare set forth in HRCP Rule 36(b) (2008). That rale provides:
() Demand, wav denand a trial by jury of

any issue triable of right bya tury by (0) serving unon the
Sther- parties s demand therefor in writing or any tine after

aiter the service of the last pleading airected to such
Such demand aay be indorsed upon a pleading of the party.
Where by statute a jury trial is allowed on sppesl to the
circuit court from the prior determination of any court or
adninistrative body, a trial by jury may be had if demanded
in the notice of appeal, and if aot demanded in the notice,
the appellee may have atrial by Jury by filing a denang
within 10 days after the case is docketed in the circust

 

 

(Emphases added.)

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apply to the demand for a jury trial on the damages issues, not
to the trial on damages itself. Appellant's fees and costs
motion, then, is not precluded by the fact that it was filed more
than ten days after the entry of judgment in Condemnation 1.

With respect to its third subargunent, Appellee
maintains that Appellant “failed to submit a sufficient record
for [the court} to award reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Appellee
argues that if Appellant is deemed to have “prevailed on (its)
Amproper delegation of condemnation power defense in
(Condemnation 1,]” then “any award under HRS § 101-27 should be
Limited to amounts paid for the improper delegation of
condemnation power defense in [that] case.” However, Appellee
argues that because Appellant's “motion and supporting documents
did not provide @ means to determine whether the requested
amounts were expended . . . on issues other [than] the improper
delegation claim{,]” Appellant's motion for statutory damages
should be denied due to insufficiency of the record. Appellant
did not respond to this subargument.

The court did not rule on Appellant’s fees motion. The
court is required to dispose of such motions within ninety days.
HRAP Rule 4(a) (3) mandates that “failure to dispose of any motion
by order entered upon the record within [ninety] days after the

date the motion was filed shall constitute a denial of the

 

motion.” As noted before, because the court failed to issue an

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order on Appellant’s motion by January 9, 2008, ninety days after

deemed denied.

 

Appellant filed the motion, the motion wa

Inasmuch as the court did not enter an order with
respect to Appellant's motion for atatutory damages, it is
Indeterminable whether a denial would be based on an erroneous
conclusion of law (conclusion) that HRS § 101-27 was inapplicable
because the property in question was taken in Condemnation 2, or
based on a finding of fact (finding) that Appellant's requested
damages were not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the
record on appeal is insufficient to determine on what basis
denial would have been based. Moreover, because no determination
was made on whether damages were awardable, no record exists as
to the court's assessment of Appellant's motion for statutory
damages. In contrast with Appellee’s contention, Appellant's
motion appears to be limited to attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred in defending Condemnation 1.

Based on the discussion supra, Appellant is entitled to
seek statutory damages under HRS § 101-27. As for the scope of
damages, HRS § 101-27 provides in pertinent part as follows:

[Al defendant who would have been entitled to
compensation or dimages had the property been finally taken,
Snail se entitled, in such proceedings, to zecover from she
plaintiff all such damage as may have been sustained by the
Sefendant by reason of the bringing of the proceedings and
sion by the plaintiff of the property concerned if
been i

 

      

% According to Appellee, Appellant's motion for fees and supporting
documents “did not provide 4 meang to determine whether the requested. ancunt=
Were expended in Civil Wo, OS-1-15K or were expended in Civil No; OO-1-181K.=
However, Appellant seated in ite motion thst it was only requesting attorneys’
fees and costa associated with Condemnation b

 

 

a
‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTEI

 

 

aid. by the defendant in connection therewith, and other

aneeneset T
(Emphasis added.) According to the statute, Appellant is
entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees, as well as any expenses
that may have been incurred by reason of Appellee taking
possession of the property." It is manifest from the language
of HRS § 101-27, as well as this court’s interpretation of the
statute in Davis, as discussed supra, that any damages avarded
must be strictly related to Appellant's expenses in defending
Condemnation 1. See Davis, 53 Haw. at 586, 499 P.2d at 667.

The court did not enter any order with respect to
Appellant's motion for statutory damages. Appellant's motion
Andicated that the bulk of the amount requested was for
attorneys’ fees incurred in defending Condemnation 1. It is for
the court to determine whether the fees claimed by Appellant are
related to Condemnation 1 and are reasonable under relevant
standards. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the court for
a calculation of the damages to which Appellant is entitled in
defending against Condemnation 1.

Ww.

Appellant maintains that under the doctrine of

abatement, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

Condemnation 2 because Condemnation 1 had not been resolved at

 

 

“gt appears from the record that Appellee vas put in possession

pursuant to Condemnation l'on Octeber 10, 2000; and that posseselon was then

Feturned to Appellant on December 11, 2002, algo pursuant to Condemnation 1.

However, it does not appear from Appéllant’s motion for damages that it 1s
ing any expenses related to dispossession.

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the time Condemnation 2 wi

 

adjudicated by the court. As a

threshold matter, it, must be determined whether the court had

 

subject matter jurisdiction over the condemnation proceedings.
“subject matter jurisdiction” is defined as “[3Jurisdiction over
the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent
to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the state
of things.” Black's Law Dictionary at 870.

In Hawai'i, pursuant to statute,

(a) The several circute courts shall ha
jurisdiction, except as otherwise expressly provided by

 

ia)" Givin actions and proceedings, in addition, to
those listed in sections 60S-21.6, 603-21.7, and
503-218.)

HRS § 603-21.5 (Supp. 2007). Relying on HRS § 603-21.5, this
court has declared that “the circuit court has jurisdiction over
all civil causes of action unless precluded by the [s]tate

 

% the analyais on this point resolves Appellant's Tasve 2 generally,
land more specifically, its argunents that (1) "two eminent domain actions
Seeking the sane relief cannot be pending in the sane court at the sane tine,”
(2) “abatenent trunpa 2 second condemnation to counter deficiencies raised by
{the} Landowner in the first condemnation,” (3) “consolidation cannot create
subject matter jurisdiction,” and (4) Appellee’ s argunent that the issue of
Abatement does Aot necessarily implicate subject matter jurisdiction is
Contrary to this court's holding in heltan engineering Contractors, Ltd. v.
Hawaiian Pacific Industries, inc, $1 Waw, 202, 456 P.28 222 (1968), and the
Teva decision in Eatausnite v_ Container wens’ supsly, 6 Haw. App. 133, 726
P.24'273 (1986), and Appelles’s arguments that (1) the court correctly’
Concluded that abatement did not deprive it of jurisdiction over Condemnation
2 because “the two lanssite had different causes ané prayed for different
Telief{,]” and (2) abstenent does not, as 8 matter of law, Amplicate subject
matter jurisdiction.

 

 

  

MRS $ 603-21-6 (Supp. 2007) pertains to probate cases. HRS
§ 603-21.7 (1983) Lists actions {1} to declare heirs of » decedent; (2) to
Adninister dower or curtesy rights and partitioning real property:

(3) relating to trusts, mortgages, contracts, and suits in equity: and (4) for
Weite or orders “to coures of inferior jurisdiction, corporations and
Unsividuels(-)" HRS § £03-21.8 (1953) pertains co appeals Drought fron the
Geciaion of another court oF an agency

33

 

 
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[clonstitution or by statute.” Sherman v. Sawyer, 63 Haw. 55,
58, 621 P.2d 346, 349 (1980) (emphasis added). HRS chapter 101,
entitled “Eminent Domain,” explicitly vests jurisdiction over
condemnation proceedings in the circuit courts. specifically,
HRS § 101-10 (Supp. 2007) mandates that “(t)he circuit courts
shall try and determine all actions arising under this part,
subject only to an appeal in accordance with law.” Thus, it is
evident that the court “can rule on the conduct of persons or the
state of things” in proceedings in the nature of condemnation and
can award the relief sought in that action. See Black's Law
Dictionary at 870.

It is concluded that, as a general rule, the court has
subject matter jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings. The
question then is whether the pendency of Condemnation 1 deprived
the court of its jurisdiction in relation to Condemnation 2.
Neither Shelton Engineering nor Matsushita, the cases relied upon
by Appellant, explicitly holds that abatement raises issues of
subject matter jurisdiction. Similarly, Appellee does not cite
to any case law from this jurisdiction holding the converse,
Ase., expressly stating that abatement is not @ question of
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, a survey of opinions from
other jurisdictions is useful at this juncture.

a,
Upon review, it appears that Appellant’s contention

that abatement necessarily implicates a court's subject matter

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jurisdiction over a case is not correct. Rather, it appears that
abatement is a remedy for a variety of defects, including lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Bd. of Regents v, Oglesby, 591
8.8.24 417, 421 (Ga. App. 2003) (explaining that “a defendant can
raise a plea in abatement . . . that raises the issue of the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court” (citing
Ga. Code Ann. § $-11-12(b) (1) (1993)) (emphasis added)); Cummins
Momt., L.P. vs Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d $38, S44 (Neb. 2003) (holding
that, when “the basis for the plea in abatement is the court's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is obligated to
dismiss without prejudice, rather than to suspend the action”
(emphasis added)). “Abatement” is defined, pertinently, as

“ [t]he suspension or defeat of a pending action for a reason
unrelated to the merits of the claim,” Black’s Law Dictionary at
3, lending further support to this construction.

Contrary to Appellant’s position, some jurisdictions
have rejected the contention that abatement necessarily
implicates subject matter jurisdiction, mainly on the ground that
abatement, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, can be waived. In
Kelly v, Kelly, 245 $.W.3d 308, 314 (Mo. App. 2008), the Missouri
Court of Appeals held that abatement and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction are not synonymous. That court reiterated the
Missouri Supreme Court’s criticism “that the term jurisdiction
has been overused and misused to describe situations where it was

simply legally erroneous to enter a conflicting iudament while

35
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another action was pending!.]” Id, at 315 (emphasis added). In
that connection, the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that abatement implicated subject matter jurisdiction,
because, under Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55, the
abatement defense could be waived, whereas, contrastingly, “folne
would never view subject matter jurisdiction as being waivable.”
Id, at 314; see also Bourque v, Comm’r of Welfare, 308 A.2d 543,
548-49 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1972) (holding that where a defendant
failed to raise the pendency of prior proceedings as a defense to
subsequent proceedings, either in its answer or in a motion for
abatement, “the issue was waived” (citation omitted) (emphasis
added)); Cent, Trust Co, of 111, v, Owsley, No. 19527, 1914 WL
2783 at *8 (111, App. Oct. 6, 1914) (explaining that “the
objection of a prior proceeding pending could only have been made
by a plea in abatement in the Circuit Court(]” and that “{nlot
only was this plea not made, but the point was waived” (emphasis
added)); Nicholson v. State, 106 P. 929, 930 (Wyo. 1910) (holding
that the defense of abatement grounded on prior proceedings “is
waived unless interposed by motion to quash or plea in abatement”
(emphasis added) )

Based on the foregoing, the pendency of Condemnation 1
did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over
condemnation 2.

B.

Appellee claims that it is a “fundamental principle

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that [it] cannot be denied rights to acquire property, that is,
the power of eminent domain, it determines to be necessary to
[its] function by reason of contract, res judicata, estopple
[sic] or claim of abatement in prior legal actions." According
to Appellee, “the power of eminent domain is essential for the
proper performance of governmental functions such that it cannot
be surrendered, and, if attempted to be transferred avay, or

otherwise impeded, such as by a plea in abatement, it may be

resumed at will.” (Citing Georgia v. city of Chattanooga, 264
u.s. 472, 480 (1924); ransmiss: violet
Trapping Co., 200 So. 24 428 (La. App. 1967); Burke v. Oklahoma

City, 360 P.2d 264, 268 (Okla. 1960)

 

State v. Charlton, 430 P.24
977, 978-79 (Wash. 1967).)

on the contrary, the cases cited by Appellee do not
support the contention that a plea in abatement cannot
successfully “impede” a particular attempt by a governmental
entity to exercise its power of eminent donain. The cases cited
uniformly support the proposition that the power of eminent
donain may not be inhibited by contract, but none of the cases
hold that abatement is not a viable defense in 2 condemnation
action. To illustrate, in Georgia v. City of Chattanooga,
Tennessee had previously entered into a contract with Georgia
allowing Georgia to use the land at issue for railway purposes.
264 U.S. at 478. Chattanooga attempted to condemn the Land

governed by the contract and Georgia objected. Id. Georgia

2
 

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argued that its agreement with Tennessee rendered it immune from
Tennessee's, and therefore, Chattanooga’s, power of eminent
domain. Id, at 479. The United States Supreme Court held that
Tennessee could not surrender its power of eminent domain through
contract. Ids at 480. Thus, Chattanooga could pursue the
condemnation. Id, at 481. Appellee’s contention, then, that the
defense of abatement may not be invoked in an eminent domain
Proceeding, is not supported by the cases cited.”

c.

Appellant asserts that consolidation of Condemnation 1
and 2 under HRCP Rule 42 is not the equivalent of merger, thus
Appellee was required “to establish subject matter jurisdiction
in both lawsuits.” It further maintains that this court's

decision in Shelton Engineering and the ICA's decision in

 

© tn Tennessee Gag, a prior condemnation suit had been settled and
tthe sottlonent nenorsalized in a contract. 200 So. 2d at 432. In the
Subsequent suit, the defendants raised the contract ss a defense, arguing that
the setelenent contract indicated that the plaintiff would not take any sore
of defendant's land. dd, at 433. The Louisiana Coure of Appeals held chat
the plaintiff could not contract away its power to take private property for 9
public purpose. Id,” Similarly, in Burke, the defendant® pled defenses of
Contract, waiver, and estoppel, based on the settlement reached between the
parties in'an eafiier suit seeking condeanation of the same property involved
in the later suit. 350 P.2a at 266. The Supreme Court of Orlanona held that

Of ran judicata and estoppel were not available againat the

‘condemnation proceedings. id. st 267 (explaining that holding
were available "would be holding that a minicspaliey can
Surrender, alienate and contract away or waive the right of eminent comain
sich it Cannot do").

Finally, in Charlton, the parties had also negotiated a settlement
in prior condemnation proceedings. 430 7.24 at 978. In che subsequent
proteeding, the defendants raised the defense of estoppel. Ld, the supreme
Court of Washington did not decide Whether estoppel was always unavailable to
Gefendants in eminent domain proceadings, avoiding the qoortion by holding
that there was not evidence in that cage to support the defense. Id. at 380.
Further, that court noted that the doctrine of estoppel “is not Fed one
When applied to sunicipal corporations or the state when acting
Governmental capacity.” Id, at 979)

 

   

 

   

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Mataushita establish that abatement implicates subject matter
jurisdiction.

Appellee responds that abatement does not, as a matter
of ax, implicate subject matter jurisdiction, noting that other
courts have “held that abatement does not implicate the subject
matter juriediction of the court and the trial court has broad
discretion in applying abatement.” (Citing Halpern v. Bd. of
Educ, 495 A.2d 264, 266 n.4 (Conn, 1985); Kelly, 245 S.W.3d at
314.) Appellee urges that, if this court follows that holding,
“(the court] clearly did not abuse its discretion because the
causes and relief are sufficiently different and consolidation
achieved the goals of abatement.” Alternatively, Appellee argues
that, even if abatement would generally destroy subject matter
jurisdiction, in this case “abatement would not apply because the
cases were consolidated.” (Citing Kehr vs Kehr, 114 N.W.2d 26,
28 (Neb. 1962) (for the proposition that “the purpose of
abatenent[,] ‘to avoid multiplicity of suits,’ does not apply
where the matters are consolidated”).

RCP Rule 42 is identical to its counterpart in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). In construing FRCP Rule
42, Professors Wright and Miller explain that

[11m the context of Legal procedure, “consolidation” is used
in thres different senses:

2)" then 11 except one of several actions are stayed
lunes one se tried) in which case the Judgment in the one
trial is conclusive ag to the others. This is not actually
a consolidation but sonetines is referred to as such.

2) wera acti ined inte one, os

 

 

 

4 fan Tivustration of
Enis ie the sitestion sn which several actions are pending

39.
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between the same parties stating clains that might have been

SeU'GUE criginaiay as separate” sounts in one Complaint

ceauires the entry of a separate iudanent. this type of

Seicause the pareice to one action to be parties to another,
9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2382, at 8-9 (3d ed. 2008) (footnotes omitted)
(emphases added). Appellee espouses the second view, maintaining
that the consolidation of Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2 made
the two suits one. On the other hand, Appellant advocates the
third interpretation, that consolidation did not, on its own,
merge the suits.

As to this issue, it appears that Appellant is correct.
In choosing among the three options described above, Professors
Wright and Miller conclude that

the ols both the second and third of the
procedures =. Ae quite clearly
fo the contrary. “the federal courts have read the rule as
They
Fegard as still authoritative whet the Supreme Court said
About consolidation a few years before (FRCP) Rule é2(a) was
Sdopted:
Consolidation is permitted as 2 matter of
Gonvenience and econony in administration, but
not ‘che suits into a single cause, or
Change the rights of the parties, or make those
who are parties in suit parties to another

      

Id. at 10 (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479,
496-97 (1933)) (emphases added) (footnote omitted). Relying on
the foregoing language, our courts have apparently followed the
interpretation adopted by the federal courts. See First Hawaiian
Bank v. Timothy, 96 Hawai'l 348, 352 n.2, 31 P.3d 205, 209 n.2
(App. 2001) (concluding that the trial court, in consolidating
the subject cases, “intended that the actions be tried jointly

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but retain their separate character”). Moreover, given that

 

Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2 retained their separate
identities and the court entered separate judgments in each
action, it 4s evident that the third procedure described above is
moze apt to the circumstances of this case. Thus, the
consolidation did not merge Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2,
and we must address the question of whether Condemnation 2 was
abated by Condennation 1.

D.

This court has held that “where the party is the same
in a pending suit, and the cause is the sane and the relief is
the same, a good plea in abatement lies.” Shelton Ena’a, 51 Haw.
at 249, 456 P.2d at 226 (citations omitted).

Appellant contends that

Uwlnere a claim involves the sane subject matter and parties

filed action, so that the sane facts and
ited, resolution should scour through the
prior acticn, and a second suit should be dismissed. It is
Fundamental that a plaintiff 1s not authorized simply to
ignore a prior action and Bring a second, independent action
on the same state of facts while the original action 4s
Pending.

     

 

 

 

(Quoting 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement $ 6, at 89 (2005).)
Accordingly, it argues that “two eminent domain actions seeking
the same relief cannot be pending in the same court at the same

time[.]""" Appellant argues that Condemnation 2 was abated by

\ in support of this position, Appellant cites to Bed Oak farm. tne.
Clty of ocala, 636 So. 24 97, 98 (Fla. App. 1994), in which the Florigs
Sourt of Appeals heid that a second suit to condemn the sane property, filed
while the first suit was pending on appeal, should have been dismissed. They
Bso rely on Maxey v. Redeviopsent authority of Racine, 286 N.W.2d 794, 103,
kis, 1980), in which it was held That # condemnation sit could not proceed
Cont ine.

a
 

‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**

 

the pendency of Condemnation 1 because “the court was the sane,
the parties were the sane, and the relief was the sane (property
for the sane [Bypass]; the only differences in the legal
description of (Appellant’s] property in Condemnation (1) and
Condemnation {2} were minor, at best).” Tt contends that the
court erred in concluding that the “attenuation” between the two
causes of action was sufficient to create different causes.”

In response, Appellee argues that [the court]
correctly decided that [Appellant] failed to prove the claim for
abatement because the two lawsuits had different causes and

prayed for different relief.” In this connection, the court

 

found that “[Condennation 1] wae an eminent domain action ba
on County Resolution (No.} 266-00." In contrast, the court found
that “(Condemnation 2 was) an eminent domain action based on

Resolution [No.] 31-03.” ‘The court further found that Resolution

No. 31-03 authorized Appellee “to condemn a larger parcel of

2, continue
lihere the landowner had earlier f1ed an inverse condemnation action relating
fo the sane property.

% Appellant argues that Appellee could have effectively changed the
at issue by amending Condemnation 1 under HRS § 101-19 (1993). That
weovides 22 follows

   

In all procesdings under this part the court shall
have power at any stage of the proceeding to allow anendnent
in form or substance in any complaint, citation, sunsons,
process, answer, motion, order, verdict, judgment or other
Proceeding, including anendnent in the description of the
Tanas sought to be candeaned, whenever the anendnent will
ot impair the substantial rights of any party.

 

 

However, the fact that Appellee could have anended its complaint does not
Alter our analysis, The atate of the record ia that Appelice did not amend
Condemnation 1+

 

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[Appellant's property] for the Bypass.” Based on these findings,

 

the court conclude

10... Ag the basis [sic] for these two County
Resolutions are substantially different from each
other, and have been vated on by emo aifferent County
Counci1s over four years apart, ‘the (clourt concludes
that. (Condemnation 1) and (Condemnation 2} are
Separate claims for the purposes of abatement.

11. [Condemnation 1) prays for the condemnation of 2.90
acres of (Appellant’s) land. (Condemnation 2) prays
for the condesnation of 3,348 acres of [Appellant's]
land. As there is nearly a half scre difference
(Q.4i8 acces) in the prayer for relief in the two
eminent domain cases, the [cJourt concludes that
{Condemnation 1) and (Condemnation 2] request
Gifferent relief for the purposes of abstenent.

 

 

  

 

 

(Quotation marks and footnote omitted.)
It suffices here to note that the area of the land that
Appellee sought to condemn was different by nearly a half acre in
Condennation 1 and Condemnation 2, a difference of approximately
20%. Arguably, then, the relief sought in the two actions
encompassed two different prayers for relief. In that light it
cannot be said that the court wrongly concluded that Condemnation

2 was not abated by Condemnation 1."

% ‘this conclusion addresses Appellant’ s argumente from Les opening
Brief that “to eminent donain actions sesking the sane relief cannot be
Pending in the sane court at the ane tine(,]" and when two Laweusts

Sone relief, the ‘cause’ ig the sane.” rt Slso addressee the related
argunente raised in Appellant's Reply Brief that (1) the difference in the two
parcels sought “did not make the relief (Appellee) sought in the two cases
Ekeforent since in both cases it sought consennation of property for a road
from Hokuli to Mamelahoa Highway[,1* (2) “for the second action to be
considered different fron the first, the relief sought must actually be
Yegaliy and materially distinct(,]" (citing ghelean Ena'g, $1 Haw, at 267-88,
G5 P.2a ae 225-56; Qabs Lumber j sidg, cov ran You, It’ Haw. 426, 410 (Haw
Rep. i698)), and. (3) the omission of references £0 the development’ Agreenent
in Condemnation 2 "aid not make the relief sought by [Appellee]...
materially different” because its "goal in both cases remained the
(Appellant's) property for [the Bypass)”

In that connection, this conclusion addresses Appellee’ =
counterargunents in ite Answering Brief that (1) the court correctly concluded
that abatenent did not deprive it of Jurisdiction over Condeanation 2 because
Sthe tho lewoules had different causes and prayed for different ralief(,]*
(citing shelton Ena'g, 51 Haw, at 243, 656 P.2d st 226-27), because (a) the

continue

 

 

  

 

 

   

 

king of

 

 

 

 

43
 

B.

As to Appellant’s argument that “subjecting property
owners to concurrent condemnations violates due process,”
Appellee argues that the contention should be deemed waived
because Appellant did not raise it to the court.” Appellant
does not dispute the alleged failure to raise this argument. “As

a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial,

 

that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal; this
rule applies in both criminal and civil cases.” State v, Moses,
102 Hawai's 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003); gee, aia, State
YsHoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990)
("Generally, the failure to raise an issue at the trial level
precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.”)

Additionally, Appellant fails to provide this court
with arguments upon which a decision can be rendered. cf.
‘Kaho'chanohano v. Dep't of tiuman Servs., 117 Hawai'i 262, 298
1.37, 178 P.3d $38, $78 n.37 (2008) (determining that the

appellant had failed to raise a discernible argument with regard

 

continue
condemnation actions were instituted pursuant to different resolutions of the
fice, tb) Condemnation 1 referred to the Development Agreenent, but
Condemnation 2 did net, and (c) the parcel sought in Condemnation 2 was
“nearly half an acre” larger than the parcel sought in Condemnation 1, and
(2) courts insist upon ‘strict compliance” with che came cause/sane relief
requirenent only where abatement if deened related to the doctrine of

   

Juudicata, (citing Horter v, Commercial bank ¢ Trust Co., 12680. 309, 312
(eis. 1530))
tn its September 27, 2007 Judgment, the court concluded that

“(appeliant's d]ue [p]rocess claim hala) been’ addressed in (its) ruling on
the Failure to Caject within Ten (10) Days.” It is not clear where in the
Fecord this ruling is located. It has aleady been notes that this court will
ot taift through the voluminous record to verify an appellant's
Contentions.” Lanai cou, 105 Hawai'i at 309 m.31, 97 Pa3d at 385 n-31.

 

 

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to any factual errors contained in the trial court’s findings
because it did not point to any specific finding as being
incorrect, but rather raised a general objection to them, thereby
“ehift{ing] the burden upon this court to comb through the 249
[€indings) and determine which of the [findings] are erroneous”);
=! ne. v , 116
HawaS's 277, 288, 172 P.3d 1021, 1032 (2007) (noting that this
court could disregard one of the appellants’ contentions because
they failed to make any “discernible argument or cite to any
authority with respect to their position”); Laeroc Waikik
Parkside, LLC vs K.S.K. (Oahu) Ltd, Pfship, 115 Hawai'i 201, 212,
166 P.3d 961, 972 (2007) (concluding that the appellant made no
discernible argument because it “cite[d) no authority,
present [ed) no analysis as to this argument, and d[id] not
explain the relevance of” the omission complained of).

In this case, Appellant makes general assertions that
defendants are entitled to due process protections in eminent
domain proceedings. However, Appellant fails to explain
specifically which due process rights were infringed by this
process and how." The mere assertion that “{dJue process is
violated when a property owner is forced to endure concurrent
attempts to condemn the same land,” without elaboration or

citation to authority, does not enable this court to reach a

 

= appellee provides Little counterargunent, merely stating that
“tdppeltant’s] due process rights were not tiolated by concurrent attenpea to
conden the sane land because the cases involved different causes and
Felief, and the cases wore consolidated.”

   

    

 

45,
‘s/HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!**

reasoned conclusion. Based on the foregoing, Appellant's general
due process argument is deemed waived.”
v.

Appellant's Issue 3 concerns whether courts are
obligated to accept the governnent’s asserted public purpose for
a taking when faced with the assertion that the public purpose
may be a pretext for a primarily private benefit. Appellant's
argument challenging the validity of the asserted public purpose
underlying the condemnation presents a question of constitutional
law, which this court reviews de novo under the right /wrong
standard. See State v, Cuntapay, 104 Hawai'i 109, 113, 85 P.3d
634, 638 (2004) ("We answer questions of constitutional law by
exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the

 

Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the
right/wrong standard.” (Internal quotation marks, citations, and
ellipsis points omitted.)).
A

Appellant maintains the court erred in not “Look{ing]
beyond Resolution [No.] 31-03" to adjudicate Appellant's claim
“that the asserted public use was a pretext . . . to hide the
predominantly private benefit of the [Bypass] to Oceansidel,)”
and therefore requests that the court’s Judgment in Condennation

2 “be reversed, and the case remanded to consider whether

Insofar ag this argunent invokes a constitutional argument
concerning due process under the Fifth Asencnent, it is addressed antra.

 

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“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
[Appellee’s) claim that the taking was for public use is valid,

or was a pretext to hide the predominant private benefit to
Oceanside.” According to Appellant, “[the court] cannot merely
accept the government’s word that a taking is for public use.”
(Formatting altered.) It contends that “the public use question
is judicial in nature and is decided on the facts and
circumstances of each case.” (Citing Haw, Hous, Auth, va
Adimine, 39 Haw. 543 (Terr. 1952)

Contrastingly, Appellee asserts that the “applicable
public purpose test” states that “where the exercise of the
eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the (United States Supreme] Court has never held

a compensated taking to be proscribed by the (public [ulse

 

{cllause.” (Quoting Haw. Hous, Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
241 (1984).) (Other citations omitted.)
B.

Article I, section 20 of the Hawai'i Constitution
states that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.” This court has

interpreted the “public use” clause to authorize takings for

% ___appeliant’s prayer for relief concerning the dispositions on
appeal available to this court should be clarified. Pursuant. to HRAP Rule
38(e) (2008), “the word ‘reverse’ ends iitigation on the merits, and the
phrase ‘vacate and Tenand’ indicates the litigation continues in the court

.n accordance with the appellate court’ instruction.” Recorsingly, st
vaned that, in connection with issue (3}, Appellant seeks to have the

in condemnation 2 vacsted and’ remanded fora determination of
sorted public purpose was pretextual.
In response to Appellant's requested relief, Appellee does nat ask
for anything except affirmance of the Usdgment in Condemnation 2

a

 

 

 

is'pr
couse’ = Jaane
whether the

 

 

 
‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

“public purposes.” Hav. Housing Auth, v. Luman, 68 Haw. $5, 68,
704 P.2d 688, 896 (1985) (holding that “[w)here the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, 2 compensated taking is act proscribed by the
public use clause” (citation omitted)). It is well-settled that
legislative bodies vested with the power of eminent domain have
broad discretion in determining what uses will benefit the public
and what land is necessary to facilitate those uses. AS a

general rule,

   

ely, when the public
nature of 2 use for vnich @ taking nae been authorized by
Taw is disputed,

ices {es unethee th a 7

 

5 on the presusction thats use Ts public 1?

She Tecislatire bas declared it tobe auch.
Aiming, 39 Haw. at 549 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, “great weight” is
accorded to “legislative findings and declarations of public
use.” Id. In fact, the legislative determination “is entitled
not only to respect but to a prima facie acceptance of its
correctness." id, at 550 (internal quotation marks and

% the court in Alinine was concerned with the application of Revised
awe of Hawail § 3501 (19451, which declared thet “the clearance, replanning,
nd reconstruction of areas in which unsanitary or unsafe housing conditions
suist® to provide “safe snd sanitary dnelling acsonmodations for persons of

ow income” were “public uses and purposes for which public money may be spent
and private property acgired[.J”

 

% pursuant to HRS § 101-2 (1993), the governmental body seeking to
condemn private property is the plaintiff in the condemnetion action. HRS
S'Toieit" (1995) instructs that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in
this part, the procedure shall be the sane asin other civil actions.” In
that Connection, a governmental entity, as the plaineiff, has the initial
Durden of proving that the taking 1s fora public yee of purpose, in
accordance with article 1, section 20 of the Hawaid Constitution and HRS

 

48
 

‘++ HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER™

 

citation omitted). In order to overcome the prima facie evidence
of public use, a defendant must show that “such use is clearly
and palpably of a private character.” Id, (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

However, the legislature’ s discretion in this area is
not unfettered. As Appellant notes, neither “the decision of the
legislature [nJor the presumption is conclusive, for the issue of
public use is a judicial question and one of law to be decided on

the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”” Id.

 

Hence, “the great weight accorded to the legislative finding and

the prima facie acceptance of its correctness, as well as the

 

binding effect of the presumption, demonstrate[] that the courts
will not Lightly disturb such a finding and will not overrule it
unless it is manifestly wrong.” Id, Contrary to Appellee’s

position, then, under the Hawai'i constitution, courts may

 

continue
§ 101-2° (i993), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[plrivate property
ay be taken for’ public use.” Gee In te Lotenso's Batata, 61 Haw. 236, 246
120, 602 P-24 521, 529 9.20 (1973) (explaining that “{e]he burden of
Prodiicing evidence 4s uavally cast firet upon the party who has pleaded the
Guistence of the fact”). Once the government has Met that burden, the
property ower nay defend against the condemation action. See 1d. (noting
Chat the burden of proof “aay shife to the adversary when the pleader has
discharged ais initial burden").

 

 

 

 

© the decisions of other jurisdictions are in accord with this rule.
fee, ooo QoUE Ne Lilac, vs Minneapolis Catv. Dev. Agency, 599 N.W.2d 582,
56a" tian. Ce. Rpp--1989) explaining tnat “(glenerally, chailenges to
‘condemnation procesding involve a challenge to the public purpose supporting
tthe tating or 2 challenge to the ancunt of compensation for the taking"! as
76 B.36.1, 14 (Nev. 2003) (holding

that "al property omer may False, aa an affiraative defense to the eaking

[iithat) the avowed public purpose ie merely 2 pretext or used in bed
Eaithe’(gootnoves omitted) } S04 8.8.20 235, 237
[Va. 2003) (concluding that “the fact that the Clty filed with its petition
for condemnation a resolution that stated that the landowners’ property would
be taken for a public use does not bar judicial review of the issue of public
use")

 

4
 

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consider the validity of the public purpose asserted in a
condemnation action. Consequently, under appropriate
circumstances, courts may consider whether a purported public
purpose is pretextual.
c

As concluded above, our case law supports the
proposition that a court can look behind the government's stated
Public purpose. However, Appellant relies heavily on federal
law, primarily the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v, City of
New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005), to support the contention
that the condemning authority’s motives should be scrutinized.
As discussed infra, the Kale majority opinion, consistent with
our prior decisions, allows courts to look behind an eminent
domain plaintiff’s asserted public purpose under certain

circumstance

 

1
In Kalo, Connecticut's Office of Planning and
Management reviewed a revitalization proposal for New London, an
economically depressed area, and determined that “the project was

consistent with relevant state and municipal development
policies.” 545 U.S. at 474 n.2. The New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a non-profit, quasi-governmental entity
charged with revitalizing New London, “announced that it would
lease some of the parcels to private developers in exchange for

their agreement to develop the land according to the terms of the

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development plan. Specifically, [{t] was negotiating a 99-year
ground lease with Corcoran Jennison, a developer selected from
group of applicants.” Id. at 476 n.4.

Although NLDC was able to negotiate private transfers
with most of the private property owners whose lands were needed
for the revitalization development, it vas unable to reach
agreenents related to fifteen parcels. Id, at 475. Accordingly,
NLDC invoked the City’s condesnation power, which had been
granted to it for purposes of acquiring the land needed for the
revitalization project, and instituted proceedings to obtain
those parcels. Id, The owners (petitioners in Kelo) objected to
the takings, claiming that they violated “the ‘public use’
restriction in the [£]ifth [almendment.” 1d.

2.

The majority in Kele held that New London’ s
redevelopment “plan unquestionably serve(d) a public purpose”
such that the condemnation of the petitioners’ properties was
permissible under the fifth anendment’s takings clause. Id. at
484. The facts of Kele are distinguishable from the instant case
insofar as the Court was considering the constitutionality of
using eminent domain to condenn unblighted property as part of an
economic rejuvenation plan. See id. at 472-73, 483.
Nevertheless, like Kelo, this case contains a salient feature,

wizs, the fact that the condemned property would be transferred

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from one private party to another, at least initially.” See id.
at 476 n.4, In that light, the reasoning of Justice Stevens’
majority opinion is informative.

Justice Stevens commenced his analysis with the
juxtaposition of two “perfectly clear” “polar propositions.” Id.
at 477. First, that the government “may not take the property of
A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private
party B{.]" Id, Second, that the government “may transfer
property from one private party to another if ‘use by the public’
is the purpose of the taking(.]” Id. The majority then noted
that the “use by the public” standard had evolved from a “Literal

requirement” in the nineteenth century to a “public purpose” test

 

at the turn of the twentieth century. Id. at 479:

 

Accordingly, the question presented in Kelo was “whether the

City’s development plan serve(d] a ‘public purpo

 

ota at
480.

In that connection, the majority surveyed prior
redevelopment cases wherein the Court had determined that a valid
public purpose supported the condemnation, despite at least
initial transfer to a private party. For example, in Seman vs

Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Court had upheld a plan to

As noted, in the instant case, property condanned pursuant to the

Developnent Agreement is to be transferred initially to Oceanside, e private
corporation. Nowever, Paragraph 14 of the Development Agreenant. requires
Oceanside to dedicate the Bypass to Appellee upon its completion. Thereafter,
Appellee will “assure all responsibility and costs for operation, maintenance,
Fepair, or reconstruction Of the (Bypses).”

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redevelop “a blighted area of Washington, D.C.,” despite the fact
that a portion of the property “would be leased or sold to
private parties for the purpose of redevelopment [.]” Kele, 545
U.S, at 480. Similarly, in Midkiff, the Court reviewed “a Hawaii
statute whereby fee title was taken from lessors and transferred
to lessees (for just compensation) in order to reduce the
concentration of land ownership.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481 (citing
Midkitt, 467 U.S. 229). Deferring to the legisiature’s judgnent,
the Court concluded that eliminating the “*land oligopoly’

Iwas) a valid public use . . . [and] rejected the contention that
the mere fact that the State immediately transferred the
properties to private individuals upon condemnation somehow
diminished the public character of the taking.” Id, at 482
(quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42).

Finally, the Kelo majority reviewed Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). In that case, the Court
upheld “the provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act under which the Environmental Protection Agency
could consider data (including trade secrets) submitted by a
prior pesticide applicant in evaluating a subsequent application,
so long as the second applicant paid just compensation for the
data.” Kelo, 545 U.S, at 482 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at
1014). The Court concluded that the law passed constitutional
muster under Berman and Midkiff because Congress’ intent of

increasing competition by eliminating the expense of research

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satisfied the “public purpose” test. See id. (citing
Buckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015). The Kelo majority summarized the
Court's public purpose jurisprudence as “wisely eschew[ing] rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs
justify the use of the takings power.” Id, at 483.

Applying its precedent to the facts presented in Kelo,
the Court first noted that the City’s “determination that the
area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic

rejuvenation” was entitled to judicial deferenc

 

Id. The
majority then determined that it was necessary to consider the

public purpo:

 

of the entire redevelopment project, not just the
condemnation of the petitioners’ specific properties. Id. at
484. The majority rejected the petitioners’ proposed “bright-
Line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public
use.” Id, In that connection, the majority noted that
“{p)romoting economic development is a traditional and long-
accepted function of government” such that there was “no
principled way of distinguishing economic development from the
other public purposes that (the Court] has recognized.” Id.
Accordingly, the majority concluded that “[{]t would be
incongruous to hold that the City’s interest in the economic
benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull
area has less of a public character than any of those other

interests.” Id. at 485.

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With regard to the petitioners’ argument that the
taking was improper because private parties might benefit from
the redevelopment of New London, the majority opined that “the
government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit
individual private parties." Id, The majority cited (1) the
transfer of rail track from one private party to another to
“facilitat[e) Amtrak's rail service” in National Railroad
Passenger Corp, v, Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422
(1992), and (2) “the provision of legal services to the poor” in

Brown v, Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003), as

instances in which “the achievement of a public good .

 

coincide[d] with the immediate benefitting of private parties.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 n.14. The majority concluded that the
legislative body was authorized to determine that the public
purpose would be best effectuated by a private entity. see id.
at 486, Accordingly, it reasoned that it “[could not) say that
public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public
purposes of community redevelopment projects.” Id. (internal

quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted) .*

% — gustice Thosas, in his separate dissent, primarily took issue with
the majority's ‘exten{sion of] the concept of public purpose to encompass any
‘economically beneficial goal,” Kolo, 545 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J.» dissenting)»
Because, inter alia, it “elininste[d) liberties expressly enumerated in the
Constitution,” Ady at 506, and the resultant “losses will fail
disproportionately on poot communities |, ]" id at 521- Justice Thomas
therefore advanced 2 strict interpretation of the fifth amendment, stating
that "(t]he most natural reading of the (Public Use) Clause 1a that it allows
‘the government to take property only if the government ova, of the public has:
# legal richt to use the property, as opposed to taking it for any public
purpose or necessity whatscever.” Jd, at 502 (emphasis added). Inesmuch as
There is no dispute in the instant case that the public has a iegal right eo
tse the property in question because it will become a county road the Thoms
cont inse

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

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The Kelo majority explicitly stated what that case did
not hold. First, it noted that Kelo did not present a case in
which property was transferred from private owner A to private
owner B “for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property
to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes.” Id, at 486-
87. Second, the majority rejected the petitioners’ argument
that, in redevelopment cases, the Court “should require a
‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits will
actually accrue.” Id. at 487. Third, the Court declared that it
would not “second-guess the (government's) determinations as to
what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the
project.” Id, at 488-89, Finally, the Court “emphasize{d) that
nothing in [its] opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power[,]” noting that
“many States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are
stricter than the federal baseline.” Id, at 489. In that

connection, the Court held that New London’s condemnation of the

 

continue
Gissent is not particularly germane.
‘ionetheless, the Thomas i

 
      

 

notes that "[e]here ig no justification... for affording
Gnasemountable deference £2 legislative conclusions that
Spublic use./" Id, st 517. That dissent explained that “[olnce one accepts,
fs the Court at Teast nominally does, that the (plublic (ulse [e)lause is a
ifmit'on the aninent domain pover of the Federal Government and the States,
there is no Justification for the almost complete deference it grants to
legisiatures aa to wnat satisfies it-”" Jd. at S18 {citation omitted). ‘Thus,
Under the vicw of the Thonas dissent, it would be error for the court to
decline to lock beyond the legislative findings in ruling on ehe tasue of
hether the public use requirement was satisfied.

 

 

 

 

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petitioners’ property satisfied the baseline of the fifth

amendment’s “public use” requirement. ida at 490."

Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion and also

 

concurred separately to elaborate on pretextual public purpos
See id, at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He declared that
the traditional fifth amendment test requiring that the asserted

public use be “rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose” does not authorize takings for the benefit of private
parties with public benefits that are merely “incidental or

pretextual(.)” Id. at 490 (internal quotation marks and citation

 

% justice o'connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, criticized the majority opinion
Because “(ulnder the banner of econcnic development, all private property 1
now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to ancther private ower” shere
the property will be "given to an owner who will ee st in a way that the
Legislature deens more beneficial to the public(.J"" Ja at 454 (O'Connor, J,
dissenting). The O"Connor dissent recognizes “two distinct conditions”
Pursuant to the fifth amendene for the exercize of eminent domain power:
(1) “the taking must be for a public ase” and (2) "Just compensation mast be
paid to the owner,” 1d. at 496 (internal quotation marks, citation, and
Brackets omitted). The dissent noted that “(olur cases nave generally
identified three categories of takings that conply with the public use
Fequirenent” which include (1) “public ownership” cases where “the soversign
may transfer private property to public ownership = such as for a road, 3
hospital, of a military base(,]” (2) "use-by-therpublic™ cases where "the
sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often com
Carriers, who make the property available for the public's use = auch
Surailroad, a public utility, ora stadium[,]” and (3) where the takings
“serve a public purpose . |. even if the property is destined for subsequent
private use.” Ig. at 497-98,

While Justice O'Connor's dissent enuersted instances of property
takings that satisfied the “public use” requirenent, it does not appesr that
She intended this list to constitute » bright line test under which takings
akin to the identified inatances ahould automatically be deemed to fulfill the
“public use condition. See ia. at 497, 500. Thus, thet the propersy in the
Shstant case is being taken for the construction of a road and thereby falls
into the “public ownership" category of cases historically deemed to meet the
Spublic ure" requirement, is noe dssposies * issue.

Furehernore, ‘the O'Connor disse vile give
considerable deference to legislatures’ determinations about what governmental
Activities will advantage the public[,]* nonetheless, "[aln external Judie.al

in how the public use requirenent is snterpreted, however limited, 2
"igh at 497, That dissent cautioned that “nearly any lawful use
fate property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to
Tai at 501.

 

 

 

    

 

   

 

 

wien

 

 

 

   

 
    

 

  
  

 

 

the public.

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omitted), Justice Kennedy opined that “[a] court applying
rational-basis review under the [pJublic [u]se [c]lause should
strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to
favor_a particular private party, with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits(.1” Id, at 491 (emphasis added) .
Therefore, Justice Kennedy would require courts presented with “3
plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private
parties” to “treat the objection as a serious one and review the
record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that
the government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve a
public purpose.” Id.

Appellant urges this court to adopt this position,
arguing that “[the court] should not have stopped at Resolution
[Mo.} 31-03, but should have followed the roadmap to analyzing
claims of pretext laid out by Justice Kennedy in his concurring
opinion in Kelo[.]” However, as discussed infra, the majority
opinion in Kele, as well as our own cases, provide ample
authority to require the court to reach the issue of pretext.

‘Therefore, we decline to adopt Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion.

vr.

Despite finding that a public purpose existed on the
facts presented in Kelo, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
government could not condemn private property for the sole

purpose of transferring title to @ different private owner. Id.

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at 477, Justice Stevens explained with respect to the pretext
defense that

tthe City would no doubt be forbidden from taking
petitioners’ lend for the purpose of conferring a private
Benefit on a particular private party. Sse Migkite, #67
Ores (] at 2651], (°A purely private taking courd not

withstand the scrutiny of the public Use requirement; it
Mould serve fo legitimate purpose of government and would

 

 

thus be void"). Nor would the City be allowed co take

‘The trial judge and all the menpers of the Supreme Court of

illcaitinate purpose in this case.
Id. at 477-78 (emphases added) (citation and footnote omitted)

  

Courts have interpreted this statement to mean that,
under the appropriate circumstances, the Kelo majority would
review the asserted public purpose of a taking to evaluate its
veracity in the face of a pretext challenge. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia opined that the
majority

recognized that there may be situations where a court should

Rot take at face value what the Legislature has said. The

Jovernnant will rarely scknowledye that it 42 acting for 2

forbidden reason, so a poverty aunex must in sone

sixcumstances be allowed to-allege and-to demonstrate thet

she stated oublic ourmose tor the condemnation 18
Bustextual It say be difficult to make this showing, and
fhe Supreme Court’ decision may raise rany nore questions

than it answers, but q-pestest defense (a aot necessarily
foreclosed by ele.

Exanco v. Nat’) Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169

(D.C. 2007) (emphases added) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In reaching the conclusion that pretext was a valid
Related to the belief that Kele did not “foreclose” the

possibility of succesefel pretext defenses, it is notewrihy thar some state
Courts expressly allowed the defense even before the Supreme Court announced

   

 

its decision in Kole. gee, 2a, ‘of AL county, "62 5.6.26
350, e52 (Ga. 1954) (reiterating the holding that
eh muerl. a8 shen, reef public the

cones.

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defense to condemnation, that court explicitly clarified that it
was “applyling) the decision of the Kele majority, written by
Justice Stevens{,]" and not adopting Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. Id, at 169 n.8.

Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, also
interpreting the majority opinion in Kela, rejected a pretext
claim “founded only on mere suspicion,” Goldstein v, Pataki, 516
F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008), cert, denied, No. 07-1247, __ U.S.
_-+ 128 8.Ct. 2964 (Jun. 23, 2008), but left open “the
possibility that a fact pattern may one day arise in which the
circumstances of the approval process so greatly undermine the
basic legitimacy of the outcone reached that a closer objective
sctutiny of the iustitication being offered is required,” id at
63

 

mphases added).
In several cases decided shortly before Kelo, federal
district courts did, in fact, scrutinize asserted public

purposes. See Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1177

%., continue
property of A is taken and given to B, the Courts will interfere and set aside
fhe law” enphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) );
Eapgag, 76 F.3d at 14 (explaining that “{a] property owner may raise, as an
Sifirmacive defense co the taking, that. =

Rarely a cretaxt or vsed in bad faith" (Footnotes omitted) (emphasis sdded)) «
Bdaitionally, Georgia provided statutory relief from pretextual takings. Sea

338 5.6.24 240, 245 (Ge, 1985)

(helaing that, genersily, the legislature has the authority "eo determine when
‘the right of eminent domain nay be exercisea()” Sut “iif. under pretext

 

 

(quoting Official Code of Georgie
Rnnctated § 22-1-3) (emphasis added) internal quotation marks omitted)))

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(E.0. Mo. 2003) (stating that property owners had “shown at least
fa serious question on the merits of their takings claim on public
use grounds” where their property was to be condemned and
transferred to another private party for use as a retail store),
xev'd on other grounds by 357 F.3d 768, 777 (8th Cir. 2004);
Cottonwood Christian Ctr, v, Cypress Redev, Agency, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that the property
owner had demonstrated “at least a fair question” that the
challenged condemnation lacked a valid public purpose where the
property was to be turned over to “Costco”); 29 Cents Only Stores
ancaster Redev, Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (rejecting the condennor’s argument that condemnation was
supported by the public purpose of preventing blight because,
inter alia, there was “no evidence in the record to suggest that
so-called ‘future blight’ was the actual reason underlying” the

condemnation action).

 

Under our precedents and Kelo, it appears that the
stated public purpose in this case on its face comports with the
public use requirements of both the Hawai'i and United states
constitutions. The Kelo decision confirms that the fact that the
condemied property is transferred from one private owner to
another does not, a fortiori, invalidate the taking. Moreover,

the public purpose of the Bypass is evident from its nature as a

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public road,%* consistent with the land use plans.
In that connection, the “prima facie evidence” of the

Bypass’s public purpose, as delineated in Resolution No. 31-03,

 

% tm this connection, the character of the proposed public use,
a public road, io ttgelf’ strong evidence mitigating in faver of the
Diesinpeion of validity. Indisputably, pubis roads have long been recognized
Ss°s"public purpose for which private property may be condemned, G68" gudur
uNEY, 262 U.S. 700, 706 (1923) (wThat 2 taking of
Property fora highway ian taking for public Ose has been universally
Focognived, from time imeenorial."); Bailey vr. Myers, 76.94 898, 902 (Ariz.
Ge. App. 2003) (explaining that “[w]hien the governnect proposes to take
person's property to build streets, jails, government buildings, libraries or
Public parks that the governsent will own of operate, the anticipated use is,
Unquestionably public”); Cochran vw State, 699°N.6.2¢ 727, 731 (ind. Ct. APP.
2507) {holding that the “State had the power co exercise eminent domain over
[the appellant's] property for the purposes of constructing drainage
Hieiuities cuteide of the street limits 22 2 pare of its (highway)
reconstruction project”); City of Novi v. Robert Adel] Children’s Punded
Teast, 701 WN.2a 164, 150=81 (atch. 2008) (holding that a road “Is 2 public
Righway” for which “the legislature may constitutionally authorize the
Condennation of land” if it *has been established by public authority, and the
Samages for the condemnation of the land has been paid by the general public,
and the road is under the control and managenent of public officers, whose
Suey Ve i2"to keep st in repair” (citation omitted) )? Towehip of WL Oranse v
800 Aved 86, 91 (N.J. 2002) (reiterating thet “[c]ourts
have Long held that the condemnation of private property for use aa a public
foad fulfills the public use requirenent™ (citation omitted) ); gteatare, 574
ScE.2d at 238 (holding that where "the City own(ed) the road, and... the
oad [wes] open for use to the public,” the sppellant’s land nag been
Condenned for a public purpose); Ford v Dickerson, 662 S.E.24 503, 506 im.
Va. 2008) (Listing condemnation as one OF three seans by unicn “ene public may
acquire a valid right to use lend owned by another as and for a public rosd oF
Righway" (Internal quotation marks and citation cnitted))
But “the single fact chat a project is a road does not per se make
At a public road.” cltvef Novi, 701 N.w.2a at 150. (emphasis in original).
In that connection, the Michigan Suprenc Court has explained that

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the difference between public and private use in the context
of roads depends largely upon whether the property condemned
$5 Gander the direct control and use of the government or
public officers of the government, or, what is almost the

ihe thing, in the direct use and occupation of the public
at" large, though under the control of private persons oF of
2 corporation!]

 

 

Ide (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipses points omitted)
Rppiying the aforementioned factors, it ia noted that (1) under the
Developrent Agreement, the Bypass 12 to be dedicated to Appellee, which will
june control and responsibility for ite maintenance, and (2) the Bypass will
be available for “direct use and cccupation of the public at large(.J” see

id

However, even when considering @ condemnation action for the
purpose of constructing a public road, *(e)here ie no mechanical formals
Ustermining ‘public use.’ “This issue must be decided on a case-by-case
basis.” Bailey, 76 7.34 at 902 (citation omitted)

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includes: (1) the determination in the Kona Regional Plan that

 

“the current Mamalahoa Highway [is] inadequate to handle the
volume of traffic currently traversing on the roadway"; (2) the
declaration that “the proposed Mimalahoa Bypass had been
determined by [Appellee], through its County Council, as
providing a regional benefit for a public purpose and use which
will benefit” the community; and (3) the resolution “that it is
necessary for the public use and purpose, to wit: the
construction and development of a road intended to bypass the
Mamalahoa Highway in the approximate vicinity between Keauhou and
Captain Cook, Kona, to acquire and condemn” Appellant's property.
‘Thus, it appears that Appellee presented sufficient prima facie
evidence of public purpose under a rational relationship test.

See Lyman, 68 Haw. at 68, 704 P.2d at 896.

 

However, both Aiimine and Kelo make it apparent that,
although the governnent’s stated public purpose is subject to
prima facie acceptance, it need not be taken at face value where

there is evidence that the stated purpose might be pretextual.

See Aiimine, 39 Haw. at 550 (holding that “where . . . the
[1Jegislature declares a particular use to be a public use[,] the
presumption is in favor of this declaration . . . unless such use

is clearly and palpably of a private characterl,]” however, “that

does not mean that either the decision of the legislature or the

Presumption is conclusive, for the issue of public use is a

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dudicial question and one of law to be decided on the facts and
cixcumstances of each particular case” (internal quotation marks
* gee also Kelo, 545

U.S. at 478 (stating that a taking is not valid if the asserted

and citation omitted) (emphases added)

 

purpose is a “mere pretext of @ public purpose, when its actual
purpose [{s] to bestow a private benefit”).

Appellant’s objection to Condennation 2 is not that the
asserted public purpose is invalid on its face, but that the

public purpose was pretextual. Tt argues that Condemnation 2

 

provided a “predominately private benefit . . . to Oceanside.

In that vein, Appellant contends on appeal that

[11m Condemnation (2), the (court) did not look beyond
County's Resolution 31-03 to conclude that it satisfied both
the federal and Hawaii public ues requirenents, Tt sae
Fequires to do nore and address (Appellant's) claim that the
asserted public purpose was 2 prstext -- as in Condennation
:

 

ist, elapectaliy since st
Strack own the attospted taking in Condesnation (1) for
Tack of public uses ["]

sg

 

er

 

nt cites to Kennedy's concurring opinion for the
proposition that the burden for rebutting prima facie evidence of public
Purpose iss “clear showing.” aq diseenting opinion at 5, 9 (citing Kala,
5as'U.s. at 491) (Kennedy, J., Concurring). Sowever, liming also indicates
that 4 burden-shifting regine’ is appropriate by referring eo a “presumption”
In'favor of the legislature, whose determination is subject to “prima facie
Acceptance," unich is “binding” unless that presumption ss rebutted by
@vicence thac "such use ia clearly end palpably of @ private character.” See
Riisine, 59 daw. at 549-50

     

 

 

% rp appears that the court’s basis for invalidating Condemnation 1

as lacking a valid public purpose rested predominantly, if not exclusively, on
the court's conclusion that the taking represented an illegal delegation of
Appelles’s eminent domain power to Oceanside. The court's order stated, in
pereinent part, that "[Condennation 1] 1a invalid, . , because County
Resolution 265-00 illegally deleastes its power of condemnation, through the
Development Agreement, ‘to [Oceanside], and

public purpess.” (Eaphases added.) However, courts generally speak of
Miegal delegation and public purpose as two distinct considerations. Esther
{legal delegation, ar lack ot" valid public purpose, will invalidate a
taking. Tt 13 unclear from the court's findings snd conclusions whether there
were additional considerations that led the court to conclude that

 

 

 

 

 

 

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(Emphases added.) Accordingly, Appellants argue that “the

[court] should not have stopped at Resolution 31-03, but should

 

have followed the roadmap to analyzing claims of pretext(.]

Appellee argues alternatively that the “court properly
found public purpose.” It asserts that “(a]t trial,
[Appellant's] private benefit arguments were: (1) (Appellee)
changed the Bypass’s northern terminus from mauka at Kuakini
Highway to maka at Als" Highway to benefit Oceanside to the
detriment of [Appellee]; and (2) Oceanside (and not [Appellee]
determined the alignment of the Bypass.” According to Appellee,
“the [court] did not fail to analyze these private benefit
allegations[,]”" as the court

specifically found that the “alignaent of the (Bypass), with
arporthern terminus at Alii Highway was. preferred and
Selected by {Appeliea’s) Departnent of Public Works, and La
Consistent with the General Plans that have been adopted by
[Appeliee]” and in "County Resolution No. 31-03, the final
determination of the [bypass] remained with [appellee's]
Department of Public Works.

  

 

Despite Appellee’s argument, it is unclear from the
entirety of the court’s findings and conclusions regarding
Condemnation 2 whether the court did in fact consider and reject
Appellant’s pretext argument. The findings relating to “public
purpose” in Condemnation 2 are as follows:

36. The eminent domain action in {Condemnation 2) has

County Resolution No, 31-0) as ite Basis for public purpose

continue
Condemnation 1 lacked a valid public purpose,
However, Condemnation 1 was Rot. app%

» private benefit to
fed’ and therefore 1s final

 

        

S22 oops Civil Service Con'n, 106 Hawai'i 205, 224, 103
Pisd 365, 364 (2004) (TA Judgment is final and binding unless an appeal is

 

taken.")" Therefore, we only consider whether Appellant's pretext ergunent was
fully considered as’ to Condemnation 2.

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‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

97. County Resolution No, 31-03 atates that the proposed
construction and use of the (Bypass) would provide a public
benefit to tne County of Hawaits

88, The (HCC) approved of the (Bypass) to be a public
purpose and passed County Resolution ilo. 31-03 on

February 5, 2003.

59. The 2003 County Council ws
nine menbers|

100 “The (Bypass) as to be built to State Highway Design
Standaras,

101. The alignment of the (Bypass), with a northern
terminus at Alli Highway was preferred and selected by
(Appellec’ s} Department of Public Works, and is consistent
with the General Plana that have been adopted by [Appellee] «
02. “In County Resolution No. 31-05, the final.
dotermination S€ the (Bypasa] remained with (appellee's)
Department of Public Works.

 

composed of the following

 

 

 

(citations omitted.) The conclusions of the court regarding
Condemnation 2 relating to “public purpose” are the following:

94. the Figth Amendment to the (U.S.) constitution
provides, in part, "(Nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.” U8. Const.
amend.

3s, The Hawais Constitution atates, “Private property
‘shill not be taken or damaged for public use without Just
Compensation.” Naw. Const, art. Ty § 20.

Se. When applying the Haual! Congtitution, Haweii courte
nay interpret it to afford greater protection than provided
by the U.8. Constitution. See [Lyman], 62 Haw. S5{, 104
P26 888}

37.) The inquiry under the public use clause of (a}rticle
3, Is]ection 20 is whether a taking is designed to further a
Shegitinate government purpes

Gore ee Castle, 19 [Hauaili) 64{, 808 F.2d S76] CSBa)
56. Generally, courts are bound by the legislature's
public ue determination unless the use 4a clearly and
Balpably of 2 private character.” State. Anderson, 56
Haw, S66(, 545:P.24 1175) (2976). However, the public us
question ie still one that renaine jodscial in nature
‘Biiininel, 39 aw. 5030)

35. The’ [HCC] “determined that there wae a public purpose
in county Resclution 31-03. county Resolution 31-03 did not
Eofer to the Developaent Agreement, and was passed by a new
County Council with a different council make-up.

200." (Appeilant] timely raised [its) objection to public
purpose within the ten-day limit in (Condemnation 217
Appellee) did not raise this issue.

101" County Resolution 1-03 is vaita.

202. The [court concludes that the eminent domain action
in’ {condemnation 2) ia valldly supported by public purpose,
and properly passed by the (HCC)

 

 

 

  

(Internal reference omitted.)

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With all due respect, the court’s conclusion that
Condemnation 2/s public purpose was valid, because the resolution
upon which it was based omitted reference to the Development
Agreement and was passed by a slightly altered HCC, may have
elevated form over substance. See Coon v, City & County of
Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 254, 47 P.3d 348, 369 (2002)
(reaffirming this court’s policy of “eschew[ing]” constructions
that “elevate form over substance”). In this connection,

jerts that the court's findings and conclusions “are

Appellant

 

devoid of any reference to evidence regarding public use beyond
the fact [that] the second resolution does not use the words
‘evelopment Agreement,’ and the resolution was approved by
county council comprised of different menbers.” Despite the lack
of reference to the Development Agreement in Resolution No.
31-03, it is not apparent from the record whether any or all of
the same provisions in the Agreenent that led the court to
invalidate Condemnation 1 were still in effect and underlay

Condemnation 2,** or whether other conditions existed such that

% The court invalidated the Impact fee and condennation provisions
of the Development Agrecnent. Pertinent to reibursement te Oceanside for
Geveloping the Bypass, Paragraph 15.2. of the Development Agreement provided
that “nothing herein shall be construed as preventing Oceanside. from seeking
reinbursenent” fron Appellee for "the difference between the [total [elost of
the (Bypass) and the "Project Ispact Cost{.]’”  Faragraph 15.0 of the
Developaent Agreenent declared that Oceanside would be reimbursed with funds
from (1) “fair share” assessments levied against future developeants a2
conditions of development, (2) an impact fee that could be levied against
Hawai'i County “or the region extending from Keauhou to Miiolii,” or (3), "any
other monetary contribution paid to (Appellee) from developers ‘or land omers”
who benefit ron the construction of the Bypass. With regard to those
Brovisions of the Developnent Agreement that provided for the collection of
fees by the County, the court concladed:

 

  

81. The Development Agraenent also purports to amend,
continue,

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the private character predominated. Those issues may be factors
relevant to the pretext issue.

In its conclusion 71 related to Condennation 1, the
court stated that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under

the [p]ublic [uJse [c]lause should strike down a taking that, by

 

>. seontinue

Supersede or substitute for ordinances and the impact fee
Statute. The Development Agreonent imposes an impact fee,
and (Appellee) has not enacted an impact fee ordinance
Pursuant to section 46-141 of the [BRS], as amended. [HRS]
Peete.

84; ” [appetige! does not have statutory authority to impo
2 “fair share” assessment, but hag statutory authority Co)
‘enact inpact fee ordinances pursuant to section 46-141 of
the [HRS], as amended.

65. Tho “fair share” assessment under the Development
Agreement, in substance, 9 tantamount to an ampact fee that
does not conform to Section 46-141 of the [HRS], a5 amended
86. "The portion of the Developaent Agreement that imposes
the “fair Share” assessment against (Appellant) is vous for
pot being in compliance with Section 46-14] of the [HRS], ae

       

 

 

Therefore, the “fair share” and inpact fee provisions of the Development
Agresnent, a2 applied to Appellant, were declared void. The future vitality
Of such provisions, assuming compliance with ARS § 46-61 (Supp. 2007), 1 not
Shear

 

Additionally, the court concluded that all of the condemnation
provisions were illegal.” The relevant conclusions are as follows:

 

78. (Appellee) and Oceanside's actions prior to, and
performance aftery the adoption of the Development
Agreement,

Advecnent maka it-uneTatatanly oleae that theoet teat

73, The condennation provisions of the Developssnt
Agreament are invalis

Sondamnation authority te a orivate party.

(Emphases added.) It is not evident from the record whether the invalidated
Gondeanation and impact fee provisions were still in effect at the tine
Condemnation 2 was instituted,

‘other ‘than the condesnation and “fair share” provisions, st
appears the remainder of the Agreement was left in place. As for the
Fenaining provisions, including whether Oceanside was required to designate
the area for the Bypses, negotiate wieh landowners, complete and cover ail
costs of construction of the Bypass, dedicate the Sypass to Appellee, and
Fecelve sone reinbursement from Appellee for costs associated with the Bypass
[sia sone monetary contribution other than the invalidated impact fee
provisions), it is also unclear as to whether these are still in effect
Between Appellee and Oceansice with respect £0 Condemnation 2.

 

 

 

 

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‘1 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"

 

ack

with only incidental or pretextual public benefits{.]” (Quoting
(Emphasis

showing, is tended to favor a particular private party,

 

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

 

added.) Despite the court's ref.

 

nce to pretext in Condemnation
1, it is not evident whether the court engaged in a “pretext”
analysis as to whether Condemnation 1 provided a predominantly
private benefit to Oceanside, or merely concluded that the
condennation was void because it was an illegal delegation.
Moreover, it is not apparent why the court
referred to pretext in its conclusions with respect to
Condemnation 1 but not with respect to Condemnation 2. As to
Condemnation 2, although the court referenced the relevant
standards from Anderson and Aiimine, it is not discernible that
the court based its determination of public purpose on anything
more than the fact that “County Resolution No. 31-03 states that
the proposed construction and use of the [Bypass] would provide 2
public benefit to the County of Hawaii” and that “[tlhe [wc
determined that there was 2 public purpose in County Resolution
31-03.” (Bmphases added.) The court did not state that
Appellant failed to make a clear showing that the use was of a
predominantly private character, or indicate any recognition that
despite any ostensible private benefit to Oceanside, the actual
purpose was a valid public use. Contrary to Appellee’s
assertions and the dissent, in Condemnation 2 the court did not

expressly consider the question of whether the taking was

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“clearly and palpably of a private character,” liming, 39 Haw.
at 550 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and
determine that it was not.
c
The dissent states that “our on case law denonstrates
that the rational-basis test -- identical to that laid out in the

federal precedent

 

is the appropriate standard to be applied in
determining whether a governmental taking has @ public purpose
under the public use clause of the Hawai'i Constitution, as well
as the federal constitution.” Dissenting opinion at 13.
However, where the actual purpose of a condemnation action is to
bestow a benefit on a private party, there can be no rational
basis for the taking. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-78) Alimine, 39
Haw. at 550.

According to the dissent, “(iJt is well-settled that,
“whenever property is taken for a highway, it is for the public
use, huay may reat
private party(,]/" dissenting opinion at 15 (quoting Rodgers dev
Co. v. Town of Tilton, 781 A.24 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2001)) (emphasis
in original), and also, the project is not “an economic
development condemnation” as in Kelo, id. at 19. It appears,
therefore, that the dissent would foreclose all pretext argunents
Where the government's stated public purpose is a “classic”
public use, such as a road, and that the dissent believes that

pretext arguments should be confined to cases where the

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condennation is for the purpose of economic development. See ids
at 19-20.

Plainly it was not the intention of this court in
Adimine or of the Supreme Court in Kelo to foreclose the
possibility of pretext arguments merely because the stated
purpose is a “classic” one. According to Aiming, although the
Legislative determination is subject to prima facie acceptance,
“that does not mean that either the decision of the legislature
or the presumption is conclusive, for the issue of public use is
a tion and one of Law
circumstances of each particular case.” 39 Haw. at 550 (emphasis
added). Under the dissent’s formulation, it is difficult to
imagine what question would be left for the court to decide when

the stated purpose of the taking is a public road. Similarly,

 

Kelo the majority stated that “the City would no doubt be
forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of
conferring a private benefit on a particular private party

+ + + ly nlor would the City be allowed to take property under
the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was
to bestow a private benefit.” 545 U.S. at 477-18. There is no
indication that this proposition was limited to economic
development cases such as in Kelo. Indeed, the dissent's attempt
to distinguish between “classic” public uses and “economic
development” condemnations conflicts with the majority opinion.

In Kelo, Justice Stevens determined that “[p]romoting economic

n
 

government. There is, moreover, no principled way of

distinguishing economic development from the other public
purposes that we have recognized.” Id, at 484 (emphases added).

‘Therefore, the dissent has no basis for distinguishing “economic

development” cases.%*
Aside from the foregoing it is not established that
“ whenever property is taken for a highway, it is for the public
use(.]/” Dissenting opinion at 15 (quoting Rodgers Dev, Co., 781
A.2d at 1034). The dissent takes that proposition from a New
Hampshire case wherein the New Hampshire Supreme Court
interpreted the New Hampshire atate constitution. See Rodaera
Dev, Co., 781 A.2d at 1034. More consistent with Alimine and
Kelo are state cases that have determined that simply because the
government's stated public purpose is to build a public highway,
does not a fortiori mean that the taking is for a public use.
See Novi, 701 N.W.2d at 150. In Movi, the Michigan Supreme Court

“agree(d] with defendants that the single fact that a project is

% Therefore, the dissent’s attack on our “reliance on a string of
federal cases =~ ail relating to econamic development condemnations)"
Giessenting opinion at 19 (fostncte onitted), ie misplaced, None of thot
cases indicate that pretext arguments should be confined to seononic
development cases, As discussed herein, both Adimine and Kelg indicate that
here the private character of 2 taking predominates, it 1 invalid,
Fegerdless of whether it is 3 “classic” public use. furthermore, courts have
indicated that merely because a taking is a road does not mean that it is par,
2 valid. See Boel, 701 M.w.24 at 150 (stating that “the single fact that's
Project is a road does not per ce make it » public road”); ges alsa gthafare,
Sre’sie.2d at 237 (despite holding thst road was valid public purpose tn thet
case, recognizing that “whether 2 taking is for a public purpose ts a judicial
uestion, reviewable by the courts” and “the fact that the City filed with ies
Petition for condennation a resolution that stated that the laidowners"
Property would be taken for a public use does not bar judicial review of the
issue of public use”)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

a road does not per se make it a public road.” Id, (emphasis in
original). The court determined that the road at issue in that
case was a public use under the Michigan constitution because
“the public body establishe(d the] road, pafid) for it out of
public funds, and retain{ed) control, management, and
esponsibility for its repair.” Id, at 151. To adopt a per se
rule for roads under the public use clause would deprive the
court of ite judicial function and therefore clash with Aiimine.
‘Thus, even where the government’s stated purpose is a
“classic” one, where the actual purpose is to “confer[] a private
benefit on a particular private party(,)" the condemnation is
forbidden. See Kelo, $45 U.S. at 477. In Kelo, the majority was
not concerned because “{t}he trial judge and all the menbers of
the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that there vas no
evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case.” Id, at 478.
‘hus, it was not the case that the Supreme Court was “unwilling
to examine the appellants’ pretext defense in the face of a
taking premised on an economic development plan,“ dissenting
opinion at 20, but that such an examination was unnecessary
because both the trial court and the state supreme court had
already done so. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. On the other hand,
in this case, there is no finding or conclusion of the court that
“there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose[,]” ide, and

therefore, remand is appropriate.

3
 

The dissent relies on Goldstein to argue that “inasmuch

as the [Bypass] in this case is a classic public use... ,
there was no need for 2 ‘full judicial inquiry into the
subjective motivation of every official who supported the
taking(.]'" Dissenting opinion at 31-32 (brackets omitted)
(quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64). We doubt that such an
inquiry would be workable or permissible and obviously do not
mandate one.” In Goldstein, the Second Circuit took issue with
the fact that the appellants sought “to gain discovery into the
Process by which the [government] approved this [p]roject . . .
[including] depositions of pertinent government officials, along
with their emails, confidential communications, and other
pre-decisional documents[.]” 516 F.3d at 62.

Indeed, in Goldstein, despite that court’s concerns
that the appellants were seeking “an unprecedented level of

intrusion into the proc

 

8," as the dissent acknowledges,
dissenting opinion at 31 (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63), the
Goldstein court explicitly “preservied) the possibility that a

fact pattern may one day arise in which the circumstances of the

 

yin the sane vein the dissent argues “that it waz not necessary for
the trial court to look beyond ‘the face of Resolution 31-03 because th
onstruction of » bypass road that would, unquestionably, benefit the public
is'a valid public purpose to which Condennation 2 15 ravionaily related{ei=
Gissenting opinion at 17, and that {t doles) not believe that this ca
presents a situation where it is necessary to closely scrutinize the novives
Sf the City Council” because the taking in this case is a "classic public
*‘Ld.'at 20, and not “an economic development condemnation,” ada at
is opinion nowhere calls for a "cloge() scrutiny [of] the motives of
the city Council” or the “subjective motivation of every official,” as porites
by the dissent.

 

   

m
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approval process so greatly undermine the basic legitimacy of the
outcone reached that a closer gbiective scrutiny of the
Justification being offered is required{,]” 516 F.3d at 62-63
(emphasis in original). Unlike the appellants in Goldstein,
Appellant in this case has not sought to probe in such an
intrusive manner, but, as contemplated by Goldstein, questions

“the basic legitimacy of the outcome” and seeks a “closer

 

objective scrutiny of the justification being offered{
ide
5,
We agree with the dissent that “the ultimate question
is whether (Appellee’s] decision to condemn the subject
property for the construction of a public bypass road was a mere
pretext for its actual purpose to bestow a private benefit on
Qceanside.” Dissenting opinion at 23-24 (emphases added) .*
However, we respectfully part ways with the dissent in its
assessment of whether the court actually considered Appellant’ s
pretext argument. The dissent argues that “the record indicates
+. that the trial court did, in fact, seriously consider
whether [Appellee’s] stated public purpose to build a bypass road

to alleviate traffic concerns was a mere pretext for the actual

% the dissent also argues that “[Appeliee's) determination (in
Resolution No. 31-03] that the condeanation is necessary for a public purport
does not, on its face, involve an impossibility and is not palpably without
reasonable foundation.” Dissenting opinion at 16 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, it appears that the
Glssent agrecs with this opinion on that point,

   

 

 

18
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’
purpose to bestow a private benefit.” Id, at 21 (emphases in

 

original).
we

In support of its argument, the dissent points to the
courts findings with respect to Appellee’s need for the road,
and the finding regarding Oceanside’s proposal that,
“{rlecognizing [Appellee’s] need for new roads, Oceanside
Proposed to build the [Bypass] in exchange for a change of zoning
for the Hokulia development project.” Id, at 25-26 (emphasis
omitted). The dissent concludes that based on those findings,
“[iln essence, the trial court found that [Appellee] had -- since
1929 -- ‘recognized a need for a road to bypass Mamalahoa
Highway.’ Additionally, the trial court found that, based upon
Qceanside’s avareness of the public need for a bypass road, it
Proposed to build the road in exchange for a change in zoning.”
Id. at 26 (emphases in original).

However, the above-stated findings do not address
Appellant’s argunent that, despite the stated public purpose,
there was a predominantly private benefit to Oceanside, nor do
such facts indicate that the court thoroughly considered the
pretext argument as to Condemnation 2. Merely because Appellee
had recognized the need for a bypass prior to entering into
negotiations with Oceanside and Oceanside had in turn capitalized
upon that need, does not preclude Appellant's argument that

Appellee’'s subsequent negotiations with Oceanside resulted in an

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agreement that provided a “predominantly private benefit to

oceanside.”

‘The dissent also accepts ae sufficient indication that
the court considered and rejected Appellant's pretext argument,
the court's conclusions (1) “that Condemnation 2, which did not
refer to the [Djevelopment [Algreement, ‘stood independently from
the Development Agreement, and {(2)] that there was sufficient
attenuation between the Development Agreement previously
mentioned and Resolution No. 31-03{,]'" and, (3) therefore, “*the
County Council determined that there was a public purpose in
County Resolution 31-03,'" making Condemnation 2 “*valid./”*

Id. at 26 (brackets omitted) (quoting Conclusions 93, 99, and
aon).

As discussed supra, those conclusions appear to take
Resolution 31-03 at face value, whereas Appellant's argument
raised circumstances beyond the mere face of the Resolution.
Furthermore, the Development Agreement may not be the sole source
of evidence as to whether the asserted public purpose in
Condemnation 2 was pretextual. Rather, the court was obligated
to consider any and all evidence that Appellant argued indicating
that the private benefit to Oceanside predominated. The court
based its conclusion that there was an illegal delegation in

Condemnation 1 on the condemnation provisions in the Development

 

% the dissent expresses confusion in its footnote 6 as to “how the
issue of Silegal delegation relates to whether the asserted purpose of the
taking 4e a mere pretext for an actual purpose to bestow a private benefit.”
Ad. at 30 f.6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

 

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Agreement, and therefore, the court's conclusions regarding the
“attenuation” between Resolution 31-03 and the Development
Agreement seemingly represent only the court's belief that there
was no illegal delegation in Condemnation 2. It cannot be
discerned from the court's findings and conclusions whether the
conclusions pointed to by the dissent actually address the
pretext issue.
2

‘The dissent asserts that “with regard to Condemnation
2, the trial court determined that the public purpose was ‘that.
the proposed construction of the bypass road would provide public
benefit to the County of Hawaii.’” Id, at 28 (emphasis added)
(quoting Finding No. 97) (brackets omitted). However, contrary
to the dissent’s characterization of the court’s finding 97, that
finding, as related supra, actually declares that “County
Resolution No, 31-02 states that the proposed construction and
use of the [Bypass] would provide a public benefit to the County
of Hawaii.” (Emphasis added.) ‘Therefore, finding 97 does not
represent the court’s independent determination that, based on
the record, the Bypass was the public purpose underlying the
condemnation, but merely relates the CC's assertion in
Resolution 31-03 that the Bypass would provide a public benefit.

3.
‘The dissent similarly recasts the court’s conclusions

99 and 101, asserting that the court “concluded” that “(iJnasmuch

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as Condennation 2 stood independently from the (DJevelopnent
(Algreement, . . . ‘the [HCC] determined that there was a public
purpose... ,! and, thus, Condemnation 2 was ‘valid.
Dissenting opinion at 28 (brackets omitted). However, there is
no indication that Conclusions 99 and 101 were in any way based
on or related to Conclusion 93, in which the court determined
that County Resolution 31-03 stood independently from the
Development Agreement. In fact, the court placed Conclusion 93

under the subject heading “Development Agreement,” where

 

Conclusions 99 and 101 both fall under the separate subject
heading “Public Purpose.” Thus, it does not “{Ilogically . .
follow{],” as the dissent argues, that “inasmuch as [the court]
concluded that Condemnation 2 was ‘sufficiently attenuated’ from
the (Dlevelopment (Agreement, . . . [the court] also believed
that the [DJevelopment [A]greement was not the ‘actual purpose’
of Condemnation 2.” Id. at 29-30 (brackets omitted).
a

Moreover, the conclusions the dissent points to as
evidence that the court fully considered pretext have no factual
basis in the court’s findings. The only facts that could support
the conclusion that there was “attenuation” between the
Development Agreenent and Resolution 31-03 are Findings 82 and
99, which indicate that the menbership of the HCC had changed
between 2000 and 2003, such that four of the nine menbers were

different, and Finding 92, which states that “[n]o reference is

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made to the Development Agreement in County Resolution [No.] 31-

 

03.” The court's conclusions do not indicate that the court

actually looked further than the passage of Resolution 31-03, or
considered factors other than the language of that Resolution in
order to determine that the stated public purpose was valid.
Thus, we must disagree with the dissent’s belief that

the [findings] and [conclusions] demonstrate . . . that the
Erial court did, in fact, examine whether Condemnation 2 wae
“clearly and palpably'of a private character,” Auimine, 20
Haw. at 350, ana determined that the stated public purpose
in'Rosolucign [31-03], dea, to build a bypass road, was aot
“only incidental or 4 mere “pretextual public benefit” to
bide the predominantly private benefit of the bypass road co
Sceansice

 

 

Dissenting opinion at 29 (emphasis in original) (brackets
omitted). That interpretation stretches the court’s conclusions
beyond their Language.
5.
Finally, the dissent posits that in considering whether
the court decided the pretext issue “this court should not linit

and

 

itself to the four corners of the trial court’s [finding
[conclusions], but also look to the record.” Id, at 22. In this
regard, the dissent adopts Appellee’s argument on appeal,
discussed in more detail supra, that the court's findings that
“the alignment of the [Bypass] . . . was preferred and selected
by (Appellee, ]/" id at 29, and that “‘the final determination of
the [Bypass] remained with {Appellee,]'” id, demonstrate that
“the trial court rejected {Appellant's} actual purpose
contention,” id. at 28, However, we cannot agree that it is
apparent from the record, see dissenting opinion at 24-25, that

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the court actually decided the pretext issue when determining
that Resolution 31-03 had a valid public purpose, or rather that
its determination of a public purpose was simply based on the
language of Resolution 31-03 itself, which authorized
Condemnation No. 2. As noted supra, in Condemnation 1, the court
held that the condemnation was an illegal delegation of
Appellee’s eminent domain power to Oceanside, based upon certain
provisions of the Development Agreement. Relevant to illegal
delegation, the court found that “[t]he Development Agreement []
gives Oceanside the ability to designate the private property to
be condenned by allowing Oceanside to ‘idletermine the fina!
Right-of-Way for the alignment of the entire [Bvpasel, including
intersection areas[,]'" “the Development Agreement indicates
that, at the time the parties entered into the agreement,
[Appellee] intended to condemn any private property that
Oceanside has determined, in ite sole and absolute discretion, as.
necessary for the construction of the (Bypass) {,]” and “Qceanside
identified the property to be condemed and directed the County
to condemn.” (Emphases added.)

‘Thus, any findings the court made in Condemnation 2
with regard to who had the power to determine the alignment of
‘the highway, and therefore, which property to condemn, appear
intended to clarify that in Condemnation 2, Appellee did not
“attempt (] to delegate its power of eminent domain to a private

party in an agreement whereby the developer controls what

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property is taken... .” (Emphases added.) Therefore, those

findings are linked to illegal delegation and not to pretext.
Although it may turn out to be true that “[Appellants) have
Likewise failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the
legislature(,]” dissenting opinion at 18, we believe that was a
question for the court to determine, and we cannot conclude that
the record confirms that it did so.
FB

Further, the dissent claine that “the majority's
conclusion . . . appears to rest on the fact that the trial court
aid not . . . use the specific word ‘pretext’ or ‘pretextual’ in
its written decision.” Dissenting opinion at 29. It is true
that the court rendered conclusions mentioning pretext with
respect to Condemnation 1, but made no reference to Kelo or any
consideration of pretext with respect to Condemnation 2. But
that is not the primary concern here. Rather, the focus of the
foregoing discussion is that the court’s findings and conclusions
with respect to Condemnation 2 do not plainly indicate that the
court actually decided the pretext issue and looked beyond the
face of Resolution 31-03.

6.

Also, the dissent asserts that “(t]he majority seens
troubled by the fact that Oceanside received a benefit from
Condemnation 2{.]" Id. at 30. The receipt of a private benefit

may be a relevant factor in consideration of the pretext defense.

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However, the ultimate question for the court is whether the
“actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit{,]” Kelo, 545
U.S. at 478, or the taking was “clearly and palpably of a private
character,” Aliming, 39 Haw, at 550. The concern is not with
incidental private benefits. What is fundanental to judicial
review is full consideration of the arguents and evidence
presented by the defending landowner in its attempt to make the

requisite clear and palpable showing of pretext.

Finally, the dissent posits that “(t]he majority's
remand of this case to the trial court improperly provides the
[Appellant] with a second bite at the apple to make a ‘clear
showing that the taking was intended to favor [Oceanside).‘”
Dissenting opinion at 33 (brackets and citation omitted). To the
contrary, in the absence of findings and conclusions
demonstrating that the court actually considered and rejected
Appellant's pretext argument, remand will not provide a “second
bite at the apple,” but will ensure compliance with the precepts
of Alimine and Kelo as laid out in this opinion.

vir.

Accordingly, we cannot concur with the dissent that, in
the context of this case, “‘the power of eminent domain is merely
a means to an end [and that o]nce the object, i.e., the public
purpose, is within the authority of the government, the means by

which it will be attained is also for the government to

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determine."" Dissenting opinion at 32 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S.
at 240) (ellipses points and brackets omitted). Taken to its
Logical conclusion, that statement would mean that the government
could delegate its eminent domain power to a private party if it
so chose, so long as the end that was finally achieved was a
“classic public use.” Under that formulation, the court's
determination in Condemnation 1 would be wrong, because so long
as the stated public purpose was a public road, it would be
irrelevant that Appellee illegally delegated its eminent domain
power to Oceanside. That cannot be what the Supreme Court in
Migkift intended, inasmuch as the majority in Kelo indicated that
there are limits on the eminent domain power. See 545 U.S. at
478.

In sum, existing state and federal case law provide
ample authority for our courts to examine allegations that a

taking is pretextual. Under the circumstances of this case, it

 

appears that the court erred in declining to expressly examine
the pretext issue in Condemnation 2. Therefore, the court's
Septenber 27, 2007 Judgment in Condemnation 2 must be vacated and
this case remanded.
vinta.

Based on the foregoing, (1) the court must enter a
decision and order on Appellant’s motion for statutory damages
pursuant to HRS § 101-27 as to Condemnation 1 (2) Condemnation 2

was not abated by Condemnation 1, therefore, the court did not

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err in proceeding with Condemnation 2; and (3) the court must
expressly consider the question of whether Appellee’s asserted
public purpose underlying Condemnation 2 was pretextual.
Consequently, Condemnation 1 is remanded for a decision on
Appellant’s motion for statutory damages, and the court’s
Septenber 27, 2007 Judgment in Condemnation 2 is vacated and the
case remanded for an express determination by the court of

whether the asserted public purpose was pretextual.

Robert H. Thomas tenet Oak ag a -

(kenneth Re Kupchak,
fark my Murakami, and

Cheisei-anne te Kudo Chock TT
With him on the Briefs)

{Damon Key Leong Kupchak

faste:t) for appellant Bor 6, Badly

Geo Coupe Fanily Linited

Partneronip.

Joseph K. Kamelanela,
(Michael J. Udovic,

Ivan M. Torigoe, and
Katherine A, Garson with
him on the briefs)
Deputies Corporation
Counsel, County of
Hawai'i, for appelles
County of Hawai'i.

William Meheula (Winer,
Meheula & Devens) for
appellee 1250 Oceanside
Partners aka Hokuli'a.

85