Case Title: Valonis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 52/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jeffrey Robert Valonis v. State of Maryland, No. 46, and Anthony Tyler v. State of Maryland,
No. 52, Opinion by Greene, J.
CRIMINAL LAW – WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL – MARYLAND RULE
4-246
Maryland Rule 4-246 sets forth the standard for waiver of the fundamental constitutional
right to a jury trial.  Subsection (b) requires an “examination of the defendant on the record
in open court,” and then a “determin[ation] and announce[ment] on the record [by the trial
judge] that the [defendant’s] waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.”  Under the totality
of the circumstances, a trial court’s failure to follow the dictates of the Rule should not be
treated as no more than a technicality.  Rather, the Rule requires strict compliance by the trial
judge to make an explicit determination and announcement that the defendant has elected a
court or jury trial, and if the former, whether he or she has done so voluntarily and
knowingly. 
CRIMINAL LAW – WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL – REVERSIBLE
ERROR
A trial judge’s failure to comply with the dictates of Maryland Rule 4-246(b) constitutes
reversible error because the waiver provisions in place in Rule 4-246(b) are intended to
ensure that there has been an examination of the defendant such that the judge may make an
explicit determination and announcement that defendant’s waiver of an important
constitutional right, namely, to trial by jury, is actually made knowingly and voluntarily. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Nos. 46 and 52
September Term, 2012
JEFFREY ROBERT VALONIS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
ANTHONY TYLER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald, 
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Adkins and McDonald, JJ., dissent.
Filed:   May 20, 2013
1 We granted separately petitions for certiorari in Valonis v. State, 427 Md. 606, 50
A.3d 606 (2012) and Tyler v. State, 427 Md. 606, 50 A.3d 606 (2012).  Each case was argued
separately before this Court.  Because of the common issue of law in each case, we have
consolidated our decisions in a single opinion. 
In this opinion we must address whether the amendment to Rule 4-246(b) which
added the language “the court determines and announces on the record” and requires a trial
judge to make an explicit finding of jury trial waiver on the record is subject to strict
compliance; and whether failure to make such a factual determination is reversible error.
Also we must determine whether the defendant’s failure to object during the proceedings to
the trial judge’s failure to comply strictly with Rule 4-246(b) constitutes a waiver or, whether
a trial judge’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 4-246(b) is harmless error.  The two
criminal cases before us involve Jeffrey Robert Valonis, convicted of robbery and related
criminal charges in a bench trial in Carroll County and Anthony Tyler, convicted of burglary
and malicious destruction of property in a bench trial in Baltimore County.  We have
consolidated the two criminal cases for purposes of this opinion.1    
I.
A.
Jeffrey Robert Valonis
Valonis was represented by counsel at his trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County.
At the conclusion of a bench trial he was convicted of robbery, second-degree assault, and
theft of property worth less than $1,000.00 and sentenced to a term of incarceration of ten
years, with all but six years suspended, and subject to a five-year term of supervised
probation.  Prior to commencement of trial the following exchange occurred:
2
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Good afternoon, Your Honor . . . .
This is a plea of not guilty.  Shall I advise?
THE COURT:  Please do.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Valonis, you are electing to have
a trial in front of [His] Honor instead of a jury trial.  Okay, a
jury consists of 12 citizens selected at random from the voter
and motor vehicle polls of Carroll County.  In a jury trial, all 12
jurors would have to agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty.
The standard used by the jury is the same standard [His]
Honor would use, which is beyond a reasonable doubt, okay? 
It is my understanding you are waiving your right to a
jury trial and have [His] Honor hear the case today?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.  We will note the waiver of the right to
trial by jury.  He pleads not guilty.  Anything preliminarily?
The trial judge accepted defense counsel’s comments and Valonis’s response, “Yes” as a
valid waiver of Valonis’s right to a trial by jury.  At the conclusion of the bench trial, the
court found Valonis guilty of all charges and imposed a sentence.  Valonis noted a timely
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, held that “the record supports
a finding that [Valonis’s] waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary.”  In
addition, the intermediate appellate court held that the issue was preserved even though
Valonis did not object in a timely manner to the sufficiency of the trial judge’s acceptance
of the jury trial waiver.  The court reasoned that “there is no indication on the record in this
case that [Valonis] recognized error and failed to lodge a timely objection for strategic
3
purposes.”  Moreover, our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals concluded that “it
would be somewhat perverse to penalize [Valonis] for failing to alert the court to error in a
procedure whose whole purpose was for the court to ensure that [Valonis] understood what
was going on.”  As to the merits of Valonis’s claim that the trial judge did not strictly comply
with Rule 4-246(b) in failing to announce on the record that Valonis’s waiver was knowing
and voluntary, the court held that the trial judge’s statement — “We will note the waiver of
the right to trial by jury[]” — satisfies the requirement of Rule 4-246(b) that a “court
determine[] and announce[] on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and
voluntarily.” According to the intermediate appellate court, the trial judge “did take
cognizance of [Valonis’s] waiver[,]” and because the judge stated, “We will note the waiver
of the right to trial by jury,” the court concluded that the trial judge found that Valonis
knowingly waived his right to a jury trial.  As to the voluntariness prong, the court held that
Valonis did not allege “a triggering fact or information which suggests [he] was coerced or
induced to waive his rights[,]” or “that the absence of a voluntariness inquiry at his trial was
error.”  Thus, the intermediate appellate court held, in consideration of our holding in
Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 320-21, 893 A.2d 1018, 1036 (2006), Valonis’s waiver was
knowing and voluntary.  In addition the court pointed out that Valonis’s constitutional rights
were not impaired, the trial judge is not “obliged to spell out in words every thought and step
of logic[,]” and the trial judge, in the present case, knew and is presumed to know “that
waivers of a jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily, and there is an affirmative
indication on the record that the court recognized and accepted the waiver here.”  
4
B.
Anthony Tyler
Anthony Tyler was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with burglary,
in varying degrees, attempted theft and malicious destruction of property.  He was convicted
after a bench trial of burglary and malicious destruction of property.  Tyler was sentenced
to a term of incarceration for ten years for the crime of burglary in the first-degree.  The
remaining convictions were merged.  
Initially, Tyler and his attorney appeared in court to proceed with a trial by jury.  Prior
to trial, however, apparently, Tyler expressed an interest in foregoing the jury trial and
proceeding with a bench trial.  Before the Circuit Court, the following exchange occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Initially, Mr. Tyler in Judge Finifter’s
courtroom made election for Jury trial.  At this point Mr. Tyler
wishes to waive Jury trial and proceed with this matter before
Your Honor with a Court trial.
THE COURT: Would you talk to Mr. Tyler about that on the
record?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Mr. Tyler, I have indicated just now
to Judge Cahill that you are wishing to waive the right to a Jury
trial.  I explained to you previously a Jury is 12 people picked
from a larger pool of candidates from the motor/voter
registration rolls of Baltimore County.  By proceeding in this
manner, you give up the right to have jurors decide this case
unanimously, meaning all 12 would have to agree on a verdict,
and give up the right to have those jurors hear the case.  The
State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty
of any crime. 
You asked a couple [of] times this morning what my
thoughts were of a Court and Jury trial.  I gave you my counsel
5
. . . on how I thought you should proceed.  By no means does
that mean that I’m telling you what to do.  This is your choice.
No one can decide this for you.  This is a decision you have to
make on your own; you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s my understanding after talking
with me, consulting with me, asking me pertinent questions, it’s
your desire to have Judge Cahill be the sole trier of facts and law
in this case, is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Couple additional things about a Jury trial.  If
you were to ask for a Jury trial, we would get jurors up here and
start picking forthwith.  The critical part about a Jury trial is that
the State has to prove its case to the unanimous satisfaction of
all 12 jurors.  If even one person doesn’t agree the State has
made their case, that Jury can’t find you guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Ultimately, if there is not unanimous
concurrence amongst the jurors, a mistrial is declared and the
State has a right to come back and retry you another time.  You
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Moreover, if you were to elect a Jury trial, that
wouldn’t change the fact that you have a right not to testify and
to remain silent during the course of the trial.  If we had a Jury
trial and you decided you wanted to maintain your silence, then
I would instruct that jury upon request of Mr. Parvizian [defense
counsel] that they were not allowed to consider your invoking
your Fifth Amendment right as any evidence or indication of
guilt.  Do you understand all that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you wish to have, to elect a bench trial? Yes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
2 We restated and re-ordered Petitioners’ questions for the sake of brevity and clarity.
Tyler’s petition asks:
(continued...)
6
THE COURT: Okay.  All right.  You may have a seat.  Ready
to start?
Following this exchange, the case proceeded as a bench trial.  At the conclusion of the trial,
the court found Tyler guilty and imposed a sentence.  He noted a timely appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals.  
The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, held that Tyler waived his
claim that Rule 4-246(b) was violated because he “never complained about the court’s failure
to find on the record that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.”  In addition, the court held
alternatively, assuming the trial judge erred by failing to place on the record an explicit
determination that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, under the circumstances, the error
was harmless “because the record evidences that [Tyler’s] jury waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made.”
We granted both Tyler and Valonis’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to determine: (1)
whether the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that Tyler and Valonis validly
waived their right to a jury trial where the trial judge did not make an explicit determination
on the record that the waiver was knowing and voluntary; (2) whether their failure to timely
raise an objection to a violation of Rule 4-246(b) is sufficient to waive the affirmative
obligation contained in Rule 4-246(b); and (3) whether a technical violation of Rule 4-246(b)
amounts to harmless error.2 
2(...continued)
Must Tyler’s jury trial waiver and subsequent conviction in a bench trial
be set aside because the trial judge failed to determine and announce on
the record that Tyler was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to
a jury trial, as expressly required by Md. Rule 4-246?
Valonis’s petition poses:
Did the trial court err in proceeding with a bench trial where there was
no compliance with the express requirement of Rule 4-246(b) that before
accepting a waiver of jury trial the trial court determine and announce on
the record that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and where all the
trial court said was “We will note the waiver of the right to trial by
jury”?
The State’s conditional cross-petition in the Valonis case asks:
If the trial court’s statement did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-
246(b), did Valonis waive his claim about the trial court’s announcement
by failing to object and, if not waived, was the error harmless?
7
II.
Petitioners argue in both cases that the trial judges failed to comply with the express
requirements of Rule 4-246(b), which, in a jury waiver proceeding, requires a trial judge to
determine and announce on the record that a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was knowing
and voluntary.  Petitioners argue that in amending Rule 4-246(b), the Court of Appeals
decided that it was no longer enough to rely on a presumption,  rather, the record would have
to affirmatively show that the trial judge thought about, determined, and announced openly
on the record whether the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary to establish that
the waiver was in fact knowing and voluntary, and therefore valid.  Petitioners stress that the
issue in this case is of substantial importance because it involves protection of a key
constitutional right and that because the Rule was intended to protect defendants by imposing
an affirmative requirement on trial judges, waiver through a failure to object should not be
8
the default rule.  Finally, Tyler argues that if the errors by the trial judge in failing to follow
the provisions of 4-246(b) are deemed harmless, then the change to the Rule would have
been rendered “completely toothless,” likely because trial judges would never need to make
the express determination prescribed by the Rule. 
The State, in response, argues that this Court should examine the totality of the
circumstances of the trial record to determine whether there was a valid knowing and
voluntary jury trial waiver, rather than looking to see if the trial judge announced on the
record that the waiver was proper.  The State, additionally, asserts that any error was
procedural or technical and by failing to object at trial, Petitioners did not preserve the issues
for appeal.  The State contends that to conclude otherwise would allow criminal defendants
to fail to object, denying the trial judge an opportunity to correct the error, in order to obtain
the unfair tactical advantage of trying the case and knowing that if it ends in conviction, there
remains a viable challenge on appeal to the court’s lack of a determination and
announcement.  Finally, the State argues that even if the trial judge committed error, the error
should be subject to harmless error analysis and, in these cases, we should conclude the error
was harmless.  The State maintains that this is so because the Rule is intended to facilitate
appellate courts in determining whether the trial judge made a determination that a jury trial
waiver was knowing and voluntary and, in these cases, the records indicate such
determinations by the trial judges.  
A criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial is a fundamental right under both the
United States and Maryland Constitutions.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV § 1; Md. Decl.
3 Rule 4-246 currently provides: Waiver of jury trial — Circuit court. 
  
(a) Generally.  In the circuit court, a defendant having a right to trial by jury shall be
tried by a jury unless the right is waived pursuant to section (b) of this Rule.  The State does
not have the right to elect a trial by jury. 
(b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver.  A defendant may waive the right to a trial
by jury at any time before the commencement of trial.  The court may not accept the waiver
until, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the
court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, the
court determines and announces on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and
voluntarily.  
(c) Withdrawal of a waiver.  After accepting a waiver of jury trial, the court may 
(continued...)
9
of Rts. Art. 5, 21, 24; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1450,
20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 498-99 (1968).  In Maryland, a defendant’s right to waive a trial by jury
may be exercised only by the defendant.  Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379, 825 A.2d 1055,
1063 (2003).  Such a waiver is valid and effective only if made on the record in open court
and if the trial judge determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record and in
open court, that it was made “knowingly and voluntarily.”  Maryland Rule 4-246(b); Smith,
375 Md. at 378-81, 825 A.2d at 1063-64; State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 716-17, 720 A.2d 311,
314-15 (1998); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 29-32, 590 A.2d 550, 550-52 (1991); Martinez
v. State, 309 Md. 124, 131-34, 522 A.2d 950, 953-55 (1987).  This factual determination is
circumstance-specific and has two equally important components: the waiver must be both
“knowing” and “voluntary.”  Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551; State v. Hall, 321 Md.
178, 182-83, 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 90, 570 A.2d 1229,
1233-34 (1990); Martinez, 309 Md. at 133-34, 522 A.2d at 955.  
Md. Rule 4-2463 was adopted by the Court of Appeals in 1984 (patterned after revised
3(...continued)
permit the defendant to withdraw the waiver only on motion made before trial and for good
cause shown.  In determining whether to allow a withdrawal of the waiver, the court may
consider the extent, if any, to which trial would be delayed by the withdrawal.
10
Rule 735).  Hall, 321 Md. at 182, 582 A.2d at 509.  Rule 4-246 sets the procedural standard
for the waiver of a jury trial in a criminal case.  Boulden v. State, 414 Md. 284, 294, 995 A.2d
268, 274 (2010).  The Rule is designed to ensure that a criminal defendant who “expresses
a desire to be tried by the court be afforded an opportunity to waive his right to a jury trial.
That opportunity is afforded when the nature of a jury trial is explained to him [or her] along
with some explanation of the nature of a court trial and/or the distinction between the two
modes of trial.”  Thomas v. State, 89 Md. App. 439, 446, 598 A.2d 789, 792 (1991).  This
Court and the Court of Special Appeals have said that compliance with the Rule is
determined based on the “facts and circumstances of each case.”  Hall, 321 Md. at 182, 582
A.2d at 509 (citations omitted), and the “totality of the circumstances as reflected by the
entire record.”  Robinson v. State, 67 Md. App. 445, 455, 508 A.2d 159, 164 (1986) (citations
and quotations omitted).  The intermediate appellate court has also noted that Rule 4-246
“was intended to incorporate the constitutional due process standard for waiver of a
fundamental right but no more.”  See Robinson, 67 Md. App. at 454, 508 A.2d at 163
(citations omitted).  We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133, 522 A.2d at 955, that “[f]or
a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made
knowledgeably and voluntarily.”  In other words, the waiver must have been “an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”  See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
11
U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938).  In addition, the trial court,
under Rule 4-246, must “satisfy itself that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion
and further that the defendant has some knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed
to waive it.”  Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83, 582 A.2d at 509 (citations omitted); see also Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756 (1970).   
  
By adopting the recommendation of the Rules Committee to amend Rule 4-246(b),
by Order of this Court dated December 4, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, we deleted the
words “it determines” and added to the Rule the phrase “the court determines and announces
on the record” and further added Committee and Cross reference notes.  By adding the
phrase, “the court determines and announces on the record,” the Court clearly directed circuit
court judges to make an explicit determination of a defendant’s knowing and voluntary
waiver, or lack thereof, on the record. 
We noted in Walker v. State, 406 Md. 369, 377 n.1, 958 A.2d 915, 919 n.1 (2008) that
“[t]he Rule change was in response to Powell v. State, 394 Md. 632, 907 A.2d 242 (2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1222, 127 S. Ct. 1283, 167 L. Ed. 2d 103 (2007)[.]”  In Powell, the
Court held that the version of Rule 4-246(b), in existence at the time of the trials of the
defendants, Powell and Zylanz, did not compel that the trial judge state explicitly on the
record that he or she found the jury trial waiver to be knowing and voluntary.  Powell, 394
Md. at 641, 907 A.2d at 247.  In Powell, the Court reasoned that although the plain language
of the Rule mandates that the examination of the defendant be conducted on the record, its
12
language does not compel that the trial judge state explicitly his or her determination that the
waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.  Powell, 394 Md. at 641, 907 A.2d at 247.  Two
years later, in Walker, however, we acknowledged that the changes we made to Rule 4-
246(b) were substantive and confirmed that “[t]rial judges are now required to determine[]
and announce[] on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.”  Walker,
406 Md. at 377 n.1, 958 A.2d at 919 n.1 (quotations omitted).  We acknowledged that
appellate courts should look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
waiver was valid.  See Walker, 406 Md. at 378-80, 958 A.2d at 920-21; see also Boulden,
414 Md. at 296, 995 A.2d at 275.
Rule 4-246(b), which sets forth the standard for waiver of a jury trial, could not be
clearer.  The Rule “means what it says.”  Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 463, 408 A.2d
1302, 1311 (1979) (analyzing Rule 735, the pre-cursor to Rule 4-246); Boulden, 414 Md. at
315, 995 A.2d at 286 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).  Subsection (b) requires the circuit court judge
to make an express determination on the record that the defendant acted knowingly and
voluntarily.  In other words, the judge is required to announce his or her finding as to the
knowing and voluntary waiver on the record.  Because the waiver of a jury trial is personal,
the requirement of an on-the-record determination by the trial judge provides further
safeguards to ensure that the decision is in actuality the defendant’s own knowing, voluntary,
and personal choice.  Furthermore, because the decision to waive the jury trial is personal,
the trial judge, who is able to observe the defendant’s demeanor, is in the best position to
assess that the defendant knew what he or she was doing and was doing it voluntarily.
13
In Walker, analyzed under the former version of Rule 4-246(b), we relied strictly on
the totality of the circumstances test to conclude that the Circuit Court had an adequate basis
to determine that Walker knowingly waived his right to a jury trial.  Walker, 406 Md. at 382-
83, 958 A.2d at 922-23.  To reach this conclusion we distinguished the case of Tibbs v. State,
323 Md. 28, 31-32, 590 A.2d 550, 551-52 (1991) from Walker.  In the Tibbs case we held
that Tibbs did not receive any information concerning the nature of a jury trial, and simply
because Tibbs had certain “unspecified” experiences with the criminal justice system that
fact was not adequate to support the determination that he made a knowing waiver of his
right to a trial by jury.  We said that by contrast, Walker requested a jury trial in the District
Court, elected to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed on a not guilty statement of facts, and
stated in open court that he understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial.  Walker,
406 Md. at 382-83, 958 A.2d at 922-23.  In relying on these circumstances, among others,
this Court determined that the defendant’s knowledge of the right to a jury trial did not need
to be “complete” or “entire.”  Walker, 406 Md. at 379, 382-83, 958 A.2d at 921, 922-23.  The
Court pointed out that Walker’s experiences with the criminal justice system were not
“unspecified” because he had a prior jury trial which was held before the same presiding
judge and Walker, therefore, had some knowledge of his right to a jury trial.  Walker, 406
Md. at 382-83, 385, 958 A.2d at 922-23, 924.  
Our concern here is that by merely continuing to apply the totality of the
circumstances test, we fail to enforce the specific requirements of the amended Rule 4-
246(b), which explicitly requires the court to “determine[] and announce[] on the record that
14
the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.”  Md. Rule 4-246(b).  Our Rules are precise
rubrics.  State v. Camper, 415 Md. 44, 55, 998 A.2d 352, 358 (2010); Johnson v. State, 355
Md. 420, 447, 735 A.2d 1003, 1018 (1999); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d
597, 606 (1987).  To continue to adhere to the totality of the circumstances test, to the
exclusion of the dictates of Rule 4-246(b), in a situation where there is a clear violation of
the Rule, does not strengthen the Rule, instead it would further weaken it.  Under the totality
of the circumstances test, a trial court’s failure to follow the dictates of the Rule should not
be treated as no more than a technicality.  Rather, the Rule must be complied with to validly
waive the right to trial by jury.  The court in U.S. v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419, 1420-21 (9th
Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) noted:
While a constitutional guarantee may ordinarily be waived, to argue as
the government does here that a failure to waive constitutes a technicality
is to denigrate the very existence of the constitutional right at issue.  If
the failure to waive is only a technicality, the constitutional right can be
denied without the defendant’s consent.  In such a case, the right no
longer has any meaning.
The issue of whether the trial court followed procedure is not secondary, it is our
primary focus on appellate review.  We amended Rule 4-246(b) to require the circuit court
to announce its factual determination on the record.  Compliance with Rule 4-246(b) ensures
that an explicit determination is made and enhances our review of what actually transpired
in the trial court.  In turn, the reviewing process will become more streamlined and efficient.
To be certain, on appellate review, an appellate court may search the record for the trial
judge’s determination as to defendant’s waiver and then analyze the evidence on the record
to ensure that the determination of waiver was not clearly erroneous.  Moreover, we note that
15
enforcing compliance with the Rule as it is written will likely curtail the growing number of
appeals in this area given the clarity or lack thereof with regard to the trial judge’s
determination and announcement on the record.  The failure of the trial judge to comply with
the Rule and to make such a determination during a jury trial waiver proceeding, therefore,
not only violates the Rule, but it also, ultimately, undermines the appellate process. 
In the case of a jury trial waiver, Rule 4-246 places the onus on the trial court to
ensure that the defendant has elected a court or jury trial, and if the former, whether he or she
has done so voluntarily and knowingly.  See Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 317, 893 A.2d at 1034
(citing Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 n.9, 522 A.2d at 954 n.9) (acknowledging that it is the trial
court that “bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the accused has tendered a valid
waiver”).  Chief Judge Bell explained further in Boulden, 414 Md. at 328, 995 A.2d at 294
(Bell, C.J., dissenting), that “[t]he major actor . . . is the trial judge and not the criminal
defendant.  The defendant is the recipient of the benefit that the Rule is intended to confer.
There is no burden on the defendant in that regard.”
In this opinion we seek not to undermine the requirements of Rule 4-246.  Rule 4-246,
not unlike Rule 4-215, is a precise rubric.  See Camper, 415 Md. at 55, 998 A.2d at 358
(citing Parren, 309 Md. at 280, 523 A.2d at 606).  Rule 4-246(a) provides that “ . . . a
defendant having a right to trial by jury shall be tried by a jury unless the right is waived
pursuant to section [4-246(b) – “Procedure for acceptance of waiver”] . . . .” (emphasis
added).  Rule 4-246(b) sets forth the procedure for the valid acceptance of a defendant’s
waiver of a jury trial.  Considering the Rule as a whole, not unlike Rule 4-215, compliance
16
with the requirements of Rule 4-246 is mandatory.  See, e.g., Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 637,
980 A.2d 435, 443 (2009); Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 87, 945 A.2d 638, 645 (2008);
Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 182, 931 A.2d 1098, 1102 (2007); Richardson v. State,
381 Md. 348, 369, 849 A.2d 487, 499 (2004); Johnson, 355 Md. at 452, 735 A.2d at 1020;
Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 411-12, 663 A.2d 593, 595-96 (1995); Parren, 309 Md. at 280-
82, 523 A.2d at 606-08.   
Furthermore, Rule 4-246(b) provides specifically that 1) a defendant may waive the
right to trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial; 2) the court may not
accept the waiver until after the examination of the defendant on the record in open court;
3) either the court, State’s Attorney, or the attorney for the defendant or combination thereof
may conduct the examination on the record; and 4) the court determines and announces on
the record that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.
The Rule dictates that there must be an examination of the defendant on the record in
open court.  The Committee note following Rule 4-246 advises that the record must
demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of a known right.  And, the note advises that the
questions to be asked will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The Committee note also suggests very specific provisions or questions that should be
discussed in order for the court to ensure that the defendant’s waiver is knowing.  Further,
the Committee note suggests that the court consider the defendant’s responses to specific
questions in determining whether the defendant’s waiver is voluntary.  While courts need not
engage in a “fixed litany,” Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 320, 893 A.2d at 1036, the record must
17
show that the defendant has some information regarding the nature of a jury trial.  By
discussing the applicable provisions, and recording the defendant’s responses to those
statements, that is one practical way for the court to reasonably ensure that the defendant’s
waiver is knowing.  Likewise, by considering the defendant’s answers to the suggested
questions pertaining to the voluntariness of the waiver, that too is one practical way for the
court to be reasonably certain that the waiver was voluntary.   
 We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more
than merely “go through the motions.”  See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32, 590 A.2d at 551 (noting
that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry .
. . ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13, 50 S. Ct. 253, 263, 74 L. Ed. 854, 870
(1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 339 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26
L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court . . . is not to be discharged as a
mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable
or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof .
. . ”).  He or she is not permitted to presume as a matter of fact a knowing and voluntary
waiver.  For certain, the first level fact-finding, subject to the clearly erroneous standard, is
the duty of the trial judge to make a determination after an examination of the defendant,
taking into consideration the judge’s personal observations of the defendant and the
defendant’s responses to questions posed.  Under our case law, the findings of our trial
judges are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  
After the court determines that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, the court is
18
required to announce that determination on the record.  It is the responsibility of the trial
judge to make a determination and to announce it on the record.  In our view, when a circuit
court judge adheres to the requirements of Rule 4-246(b), such compliance will aid our
appellate review and should thereby reduce the number of appeals with regard to the issue
of waiver of the right to trial by jury.  Other jurisdictions have gone even further in
affirmatively requiring that a trial judge “state his or her reasons for granting or denying the
[waiver] request on the record.”  See State v. Blann, 57 A.3d 1102, 1109 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2013) (citations omitted).  Cf. Allison v. State, 654 S.E.2d 628, 634 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007) (noting that a judge cannot establish a valid waiver of a constitutional right to a trial
by jury through mere conclusory statements).  Such requirements are in place to ensure that
the waiver procedure is not “discharged as a mere matter of rote,” but, instead, is undertaken
“with sound and advised discretion,” to conclude that the defendant’s waiver is or is not
knowing and voluntary.  See Blann, 57 A.3d at 1109 (citing Patton, 281 U.S. at 312, 50 S.
Ct. at 263, 74 L. Ed. at 870).  
Rule 4-246(b) is a rule of procedure governing the waiver of a fundamental
constitutional right.  Its provisions specifying that the defendant be examined on the record
regarding his or her waiver of the right to a jury trial, and that the trial court make a
determination and announcement with regard to whether the waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made are subject to strict compliance.  Because the onus is on the trial court to
announce its determination, it would be, as indicated by the Court of Special Appeals in the
Valonis case, “perverse to penalize [the defendant] for failing to alert the court to [an] error
19
in a procedure whose whole purpose was [and is] for the court to ensure that [the defendant]
understood what was going on.”  As Judge Bell, now Chief Judge of this Court, writing for
the Court of Special Appeals noted in Bell v. State, 66 Md. App. 294, 298, 503 A.2d 1351,
1353-54 (1986) (citations omitted) in his review of Maryland case law, the record should
affirmatively show compliance with the Rule’s tenets, and “failure to object does not
preclude appellate review.”  The waiver of the constitutional right to a trial by jury must
“appear affirmatively in the record, and a failure of it to so appear is not grounds for
dismissal of the appeal . . . [i]ndeed, it is the very basis of the appeal.”  Id. (citations and
quotations omitted).  Moreover, because of the importance of this Rule in this case it is
desirable that we opine on the matter “to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and
delay of another appeal.”  Md. Rule 8-131(a). 
Accordingly, we conclude in the two cases before the court that the issue of waiver
is preserved for appellate review notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to object.
Moreover,  the trial judge’s failure to announce its determination on the record is not a mere
technicality and is not subject to harmless error analysis.  In Camper, we explained that the
court’s “failure to comply strictly with [Rule 4-215 – “Waiver of counsel”] constitutes
reversible error” because “strict compliance with the requirements of the Rule protects the
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel and best serves the administration of justice.”  415
Md. at 55, 58, 998 A.2d at 358, 360.  We cited to Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d
597 (1987), which explained that the purpose of Rule 4-215 “is to protect that most important
fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel,” and explained that the waiver
20
provisions and mandatory language included in 4-215(a)(3) are in place to preserve that right.
Parren, 309 Md. at 281-82, 523 A.2d at 607-08.  We stated in Parren, 309 Md. at 282, 523
A.2d at 608:
In the light of all of this we would be reluctant indeed to conclude that
noncompliance with such an essential part of our Waiver Rule be
determined on an ad hoc basis.  We think that to do so would erode Rule
4-215 and seriously encroach upon its purpose to protect the
constitutional right to counsel.  We believe that such a holding would
enhance complexity rather than secure simplicity in procedure, tend to
unfairness rather than fairness in administration, and, in the long run,
promote rather than eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.
We relied on this reasoning in Moten, 339 Md. at 412-13, 663 A.2d at 596, and again in
Camper, 415 Md. at 58-59, 998 A.2d at 360, to hold that the trial court committed reversible
error in failing to follow the express provisions of Rule 4-215.  Likewise, we note the
important constitutional protection of a defendant’s right to a jury trial.  See U.S. Const.
amend. VI, XIV § 1; Md. Decl. of Rts. Art. 5, 21, 24; see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154, 88
S. Ct. at 1450, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 498-99.  Furthermore, the waiver provisions in place in Rule
4-246(b) are intended to ensure that the defendant’s waiver to a jury trial is made knowingly
and voluntarily.  Strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 4-246(b) will ensure that
there is an adequate examination of the defendant, such that the judge may determine and
announce on the record that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.  We
conclude, therefore, that in the two criminal cases before this Court the trial judges
committed reversible error in failing to comply with the determine and announce requirement
of Rule 4-246(b) and thereby failed to demonstrate a valid waiver of Valonis’s and Tyler’s
21
right to a trial by jury. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS
R E V E R S E D .  
 
C A S E S
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS
TO 
REMAND 
TO 
THE
RESPECTIVE TRIAL COURTS
FOR A NEW TRIAL WITH
COSTS.        
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Nos. 46 and 52
September Term, 2012
JEFFREY ROBERT VALONIS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
ANTHONY TYLER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald, 
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J.
which Adkins, J., joins.
Filed:   May 20, 2013
Trial by jury is an important right of defendants charged with serious crimes – a right
that must be safeguarded by the courts.  But there are often sound reasons that a defendant
might prefer that his or her culpability be assessed by a judge rather than a lay jury.  The
rules of criminal procedure appropriately require a thorough inquiry by the trial court to
ensure that a defendant who makes that choice waives the right to a jury trial knowingly and
voluntarily.  It is, of course, helpful that a trial judge verbally document his or her finding,
as Rule 4-246(b) requires.  But it is the inquiry and the trial court’s determination, not its
documentation, that is key.  
The Pre-Trial Inquiries
In each of the cases before us, the defendant stated on the record that he wanted a
bench trial instead of a jury trial and, prior to trial, responded to a series of questions from
his counsel, indicating on the record that he was aware of the difference between a jury trial
and a bench trial.   
In Mr. Tyler’s case, defense counsel not only reviewed with him the nature of a jury
and the requirement that the jurors all agree that the State had proven its case beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict, but also emphasized that Mr. Tyler himself had to make
the decision whether to proceed with a jury or bench trial.  At one point, the trial judge
intervened in the colloquy between Mr. Tyler and his counsel to make sure that Mr. Tyler
was in fact fully aware of the choice he was making and had an understanding of his rights
in a criminal trial.  It is true that, at the conclusion of the relatively lengthy colloquy, the
judge responded to Mr. Tyler’s expressed desire to proceed with a bench trial with an
“Okay,” rather than a more explicit statement that the judge found the waiver to be knowing
2
and voluntary.  But no one reading the transcript could have any doubt that the trial judge
was fully engaged in ensuring that Mr. Tyler was acting with full knowledge of what he was
waiving and that the decision was Mr. Tyler’s own. 
In Mr. Valonis’ case, the trial judge left the inquiry entirely to defense counsel, as
Rule 4-246 permits.  Mr. Valonis’ counsel reviewed with him on the record the difference
between a jury trial and bench trial and asked whether he wished to waive his right to a jury
trial.  After Mr. Valonis answered in the affirmative, the trial judge “note[d] the waiver” and
the not guilty plea previously stated by Mr. Valonis’ counsel and asked whether either side
had any preliminary matters.  Neither Mr. Valonis nor his counsel suggested any addition to
the jury waiver inquiry.
In each case, defense counsel did not suggest that his client lacked the requisite
knowledge and intent to elect a bench trial.  In each case, neither the defendant nor his
counsel raised any objection as to the adequacy of the inquiry into the jury waiver.  Nor did
either defendant or his counsel object when the trial judge proceeded with the bench trial that
each had requested.  
We cannot know, of course, whether either defendant’s demeanor contradicted his
statements that he understood the nature of a jury trial and wanted instead to be tried by a
judge.  But, as the majority opinion notes, the respective trial judges were in the “best
position” to assess demeanor and decline to accept a waiver for that reason.  Majority Slip
Op. at 13.
The Trials and Appeals
1In the Court of Special Appeals, Mr. Valonis argued that the pre-trial inquiry in his
case should have included additional advisements, including the fact that he would be tried
before a jury if he did not waive a jury trial.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected his
argument concerning the adequacy of the inquiry and he has not reiterated it in this Court.
3
Following Mr. Tyler’s bench trial, he was convicted of burglary and malicious
destruction of property.  Following Mr. Valonis’ bench trial, he was convicted of robbery,
second degree assault, and theft.  
Both of these defendants appealed their respective convictions on a single ground.
To place the basis of their appeals in perspective, it is also worth noting what they do not
argue.
Neither defendant contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily ask for a bench
trial in lieu of a jury trial.  Neither defendant now contends that the substance of the inquiry
as to his intention to waive a jury trial was inadequate.1  Neither contends that the trial judge
did not, in fact, find his waiver to be knowing and voluntary.  Neither defendant argues that
the ensuing trial was unfair.  Neither defendant complains that his counsel was ineffective.
Neither defendant complains of over-reaching by the police or prosecution.  
Each defendant asks for his conviction to be overturned only because the trial judge
failed to document explicitly the judge’s conclusion that the defendant had waived a jury
knowingly and voluntarily.
The Decision in this Court
2Cf. Maryland Code, Article 1, §26 (meaning of “may not”).
4
The Court’s decision today reverses the results of two bench trials for faulty
documentation despite the absence of any objection by defense counsel that the trial court
had inadequately documented its determination that the defendant acted knowingly and
voluntarily.  
Even if one believes that the judges in these two cases failed to comply strictly with
the direction in Rule 4-246(b) to state a finding as to the defendant’s state of mind on the
record, that does not necessarily mean that the convictions should be reversed.  It may be,
as the Court states, that the Maryland Rules are a “precise rubric.”  Majority Slip Op. at
pp.14, 16.  But, as with many precision instruments, multiple parts work together to make
a finely crafted whole.  Another part of the “precise rubric” states:
....  When a rule, by the word “shall” or otherwise, mandates or
prohibits conduct, the consequences of noncompliance are those
prescribed by these rules or statute.  If no consequences are
prescribed, the court may compel compliance with the rule or
may determine the consequences of the noncompliance in light
of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the rule.
Maryland Rule 1-201(a).  The verb phrase “may not” in Rule 4-246(b) is the negative
equivalent of “shall.”2  Accordingly, the consequences of a failure to comply with the rule
– if such occurred – are to be determined by the principle stated in Rule 1-201(a) – with
3The same principle applies with respect to guilty pleas in federal courts, where the
court is required to inquire in somewhat greater detail to determine whether the defendant
is waiving the right to a jury trial, as well as other constitutional rights, knowingly and
voluntarily.  See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h) (“A variance from the
requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights”).
5
consideration of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the rule.3  See also
Boulden v. State, 414 Md. 284, 305, 995 A.2d 268 (2010).
There can be little question here that the purpose of the rule – to ensure that each
defendant’s decision to elect a bench trial was made knowingly and purposefully – was fully
served.  The defendants do not appear to argue otherwise in this Court.
The majority opinion holds that we must overlook the failure of the defense counsel
to raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial court’s documentation of its finding as to
the defendant’s intent with respect to the waiver.  The majority draws an analogy to our cases
interpreting Rule 4-215, which concerns the inquiry that a trial court must undertake when
a defendant seeks to discharge his attorney or to waive counsel altogether.  Majority Slip Op.
at p. 16.  However, the situation in a Rule 4-215 inquiry is quite different.  For example, in
the context of a request to discharge counsel under Rule 4-215(e), the inquiry concerns the
defendant’s displeasure with his counsel’s services – the very situation in which a defendant
is least bound to representations made by counsel on his behalf.  By contrast, there is no
inherent reason to discount defense counsel’s objections – or decisions not to object – when
the issue concerns a defendant’s decision to have a bench trial.  In the cases before us, no
question as to the competence and effectiveness of defense counsel has been raised.  No
4Majority Slip Op. at 15, 18.
5A common temptation of lawyers may be to focus on documentation at the expense
of comprehension, which may serve lawyers well, but not the people they serve.  In other
contexts, excessive attention to documentation at the expense of understanding can lead to
a person affixing his or her signature to attest, acknowledge, or agree without any
comprehension as to what he or she is attesting, acknowledging or agreeing to.
6
claim has been made that either defense counsel forced his client to waive a jury for some
reason. 
The requirement of Rule 4-246(b) that the trial judge state a finding on the record as
to the defendant’s state of mind as to the jury waiver provides useful documentation.  It is
always good to document compliance with a rule.  It makes things much easier, as the
majority opinion notes,4 for those who, like us, must later assess compliance with the rule.
But excessive emphasis on documentation at the expense of attention to the underlying
purpose can lead to perverse results.5  In this case, there are two concerns.
What the Court’s opinion tells trial judges
It is true that neither judge stated precisely “I find that the defendant is waiving a jury
trial knowingly and voluntarily” or whatever particular formulation we ultimately will hold
suffices.  But, in one case, the trial judge not only undertook the inquiry required by Rule 4-
246, but personally intervened to ensure that the defendant understood the right that he was
giving up.  Nevertheless, our opinion faults that judge for not reciting more explicitly what
the judge obviously found.
7
Perhaps this decision will make an appellate court’s job simpler.  We will just look
for the magic words – whatever ultimately gains acceptance as the formulation that satisfies
the last sentence of Rule 4-246(b) – but our real focus should be on the adequacy of the
colloquy required by the rule.
My concern is that our decision in these cases will inevitably encourage trial judges
to focus on reciting a rote formulation more than it will enhance the inquiry made by the trial
judge into the defendant’s knowledge and intention.
What the Court’s opinion tells defense counsel
The Court holds that these defendants are each entitled to a new trial as a result of the
trial court’s failure to document its finding during the pre-trial inquiry.  As noted above,
neither of these defendants nor their respective counsel raised any objection at or before trial
as to the adequacy of the waiver inquiry when the trial judge could have remedied the
situation.  As a result of the Court’s decision, it seems unlikely that any competent defense
counsel ever will and give up the option of an assured “do-over” – if the outcome of the
bench trial is not to the defendant’s satisfaction, the trial court’s failure to document allows
the defendant to obtain a do-over, even for an error-free trial. 
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we should affirm the decisions of the Court of
Special Appeals in these cases.  If the Court has any doubt as to whether either of these
judges actually found that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary, the case
8
should be remanded for the judge to supplement the record.  On remand, the trial court could
either (1) confirm that it had found the defendant’s waiver to be knowing and voluntary at
the time of the inquiry or (2) state that it is unable to provide such confirmation.  Only in the
latter case would the defendant be entitled to a new trial.
Judge Adkins joins this opinion.