Case Title: State v. Antwan B. Manuel

Citation: 2005 WI 75

Docket Number: 2003AP000113-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 75 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP113-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Antwan B. Manuel,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 111 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 146, 685 N.W.2d 525 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Stuart A. Schwartz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 75 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP113-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00CF1379) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Antwan B. Manuel,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
JUN 10, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Antwan Manuel seeks review 
of a published court of appeals' decision1 that affirmed his 
convictions, which included attempted first-degree homicide and 
five related offenses.  Manuel shot Prentiss Adams in the neck 
while Adams was sitting in his car talking to Derrick Stamps.  
Shortly after the incident, Stamps made several statements to 
his girlfriend that incriminated Manuel.  A couple of days 
later, the girlfriend revealed these statements to a police 
officer when the officer was arresting Stamps.  At Manuel's 
                                                 
1 State v. Manuel, 2004 WI App 111, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 685 
N.W.2d 525. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
2 
 
trial, Stamps invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, 
and the girlfriend claimed she could not remember what Stamps 
told her, but the State introduced Stamps' statements through 
the arresting police officer. 
¶2 
A number of issues revolve around Stamps' hearsay 
statements.  The court of appeals concluded that: (1) the 
statements were admissible under the statement of recent 
perception exception; (2) their admission did not violate 
Manuel's right of confrontation; and (3) Manuel's trial counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to impeach Stamps' credibility 
with the number of Stamps' prior convictions after Stamps' 
statements were admitted into evidence.  State v. Manuel, 2004 
WI App 111, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 685 N.W.2d 525.  Manuel argues that 
this court should reverse on any of these conclusions. 
¶3 
We affirm the court of appeals' decision.  We conclude 
that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
by 
admitting 
Stamps' 
statements 
as 
statements 
of 
recent 
perception.  Further, we conclude that Stamps' statements were 
not "testimonial" under the recently announced decision of 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  We retain the 
analysis 
of 
Ohio 
v. 
Roberts, 
448 
U.S. 
56 
(1980), 
for 
scrutinizing nontestimonial statements under the Confrontation 
Clause and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Applying Roberts, we conclude that the statement of recent 
perception hearsay exception is not "firmly rooted."  However, 
because Stamps' statements contain particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness, we hold that admission of Stamps' statements 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
3 
 
did not violate Manuel's confrontation rights.  Finally, we 
conclude that Manuel's trial counsel was not ineffective.  
Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
I 
¶4 
On June 25, 2000, shortly after midnight, Adams was 
driving his vehicle down Fisher Street in Madison, Wisconsin.  
As he drove by a group of men standing on a sidewalk, one of the 
men, later identified as Stamps, flagged Adams over to the side 
of the street.  The two spoke about an altercation that occurred 
between their groups of friends a few days earlier.  While Adams 
remained in his vehicle to speak with Stamps, Manuel allegedly 
reached around Stamps and shot Adams in the neck.  Adams stated 
that he saw Manuel’s face, head, and arm as Manuel reached 
around the right side of Stamps and fired at Adams.  Adams knew 
Manuel prior to the incident, as he had seen him in the 
neighborhood approximately 20 times. 
¶5 
Adams immediately drove himself to the hospital.  
There, he spoke with Detective Alix Olsen.  Adams told Olsen the 
address of where the incident took place and limited details 
about the shooting.  Olsen proceeded to the crime scene where 
other officers had begun investigatory work.  The police did not 
find much evidence around the scene but they preserved foot 
impressions left in a muddy spot between the sidewalk and the 
street on Fisher Street.  
¶6 
Around 4:00 a.m., Olsen visited Adams again in the 
hospital.  Adams recounted the incident again, but this time 
with more details.  He described the car of the shooter and gave 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
4 
 
the nicknames of both the shooter, "Twin" (Manuel), and the man 
who waived him down, "Tick" (Stamps).   
¶7 
At about 1:30 p.m. the same day, Olsen yet again 
visited Adams at the hospital, this time along with Detective 
Matthew Misener.  During this meeting, the detectives showed 
Adams six photo arrays, with six different pictures in each 
lineup.  Adams identified Manuel as the man who shot him and 
said he was "a hundred percent sure."  Adams also identified a 
photo of Stamps as the man who waved him over to the side of the 
street.     
¶8 
After completing the photo array, Olsen and Misener 
met with members of the Madison Gang Task Force and asked them 
to arrest Stamps and Manuel.  Around 6 p.m. on June 25, 2000, 
police officers and gang task force members followed Manuel in 
his car before performing a felony stop.  Manuel cooperated with 
the officers and was subsequently arrested.  His car was removed 
from the scene and taken to a police station, where police 
recovered numerous pairs of shoes from the vehicle's trunk. 
¶9 Two days later, on June 27, 2000, the police arrested 
Stamps at the apartment of his girlfriend, Anna Rhodes.  When 
the police took Stamps into custody, Rhodes asked the police why 
Stamps was being arrested.  The arresting officer, Misener, 
replied that Stamps may have been involved in a shooting and was 
being arrested on a probation hold.  According to Misener, 
Rhodes responded, "Why, because he was with the guy that shot 
that dude?"  When Misener asked Rhodes for the source of her 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
5 
 
information, Rhodes said that Stamps told her that he "was there 
when Twin [Manuel's knickname] shot the guy."   
¶10 Misener also said that Rhodes told him that Stamps 
said he was talking to Adams after Adams pulled his vehicle over 
to the roadside.  At that point, Misener stated that Rhodes 
indicated that Stamps told her that Manuel "came out of 
nowhere."  Misener then said that Rhodes told him that Stamps 
told her he heard gunshots and all of a sudden saw Manuel.  
Stamps did not tell her, however, whether he actually saw Manuel 
holding a gun.   
¶11 The State charged Stamps with attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide as party to a crime, but later dropped the 
charge.  The State charged Manuel with attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide, aggravated battery, reckless use of 
firearm, possession of firearm by a felon, bail jumping, and 
second-degree reckless injury.   
¶12 The day before Manuel's trial was to commence, Manuel 
filed a motion in limine, seeking to prevent the admission of 
statements Stamps made to Rhodes.  Manuel argued that Rhodes 
lacked personal knowledge of the shooting and that Stamps' 
statements were hearsay.  The State claimed that Stamps' 
statements to Rhodes were admissible under the statement of 
recent perception exception.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2) (2001-
02).2  The State argued that Stamps was simply trying to tell 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
6 
 
Rhodes about the events with which he had just been involved so 
that she would have a reason to go with him to a motel.  The 
Dane County Circuit Court, Honorable P. Charles Jones, agreed 
with the State and denied the motion.  
¶13 At Manuel's trial, the State called Stamps as a 
material witness, but he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Rhodes was also called to testify, 
but she claimed that she could not recall anything that Stamps 
told her about the shooting or what she told the police Stamps 
told her.  She merely testified that she learned about a 
shooting from Stamps the day of the incident and that they then 
went to a motel for a couple of days.  The State then introduced 
the statements Stamps made to Rhodes regarding the crime through 
the arresting officer, Misener.   
¶14 Apparently, as of the time of the trial, Stamps had 
four prior criminal convictions.  This was never raised at trial 
to impeach Stamps' credibility as it related to the statements 
he made to Rhodes.   
¶15 Adams also testified, and again identified Manuel as 
the shooter.  To corroborate Adams' identification, the State 
called Charles Cates, a footwear examiner at the Wisconsin State 
Crime Lab.  He studied the shoes found in Manuel's trunk and the 
impressions made on Fisher Street between the sidewalk and the 
street on the night of the shooting.  Cates testified that the 
impression matched the make, design, and pattern of the K-Swiss 
brand of shoe worn by Manuel.  Thus, he opined that the shoes 
found in Manuel’s trunk probably made the impressions.   
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
7 
 
¶16 The jury convicted Manuel on all charges.   
¶17 Manuel filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that: 
(1) the court erred by denying the motion in limine; (2) the 
defendant's confrontation rights were violated by admitting 
Stamps' statements; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue the confrontation issue; and (4) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to impeach Stamps' credibility with 
his four prior convictions.  The circuit court, the Honorable 
Stuart A. Schwartz,  denied the motion.   
¶18 Manuel appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that Stamps' 
statements were admissible under the statement of recent 
perception exception.  Manuel, 275 Wis. 2d 146, ¶¶12-16.   
¶19 Turning to Manuel's confrontation violation claim, the 
court of appeals noted that Stamps' statements did not fit 
within any of Crawford's3 express categories of testimonial 
statements and were not made to an agent of the government or to 
someone engaged in investigating the shooting.  Further, the 
court of appeals determined that the statements were not the 
type of statement Crawford depicted as the "'primary object' of 
the framer's concerns in enacting the confrontation clause."  
Manuel, 275 Wis. 2d 146, ¶21 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-
53, 68).  Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the 
statements were nontestimonial.  Id.  
                                                 
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
8 
 
¶20 In view of Crawford's repudiation, not overruling, of 
Roberts, 
and 
in 
view 
of 
Crawford's 
equivocation 
on 
how 
nontestimonial evidence is to be gauged, the court of appeals 
proceeded with "an abundance of caution" in analyzing Stamps' 
nontestimonial statements under the Roberts' test.  Id., ¶¶22-
23.  Using Roberts, the court of appeals concluded that the 
recent perception exception is not a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception.  Id., ¶25.  However, the court of appeals concluded 
that 
there 
were 
sufficient 
particularized 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness surrounding Stamps' statements, which were:  (1) 
the statements were made in good faith and without contemplation 
of pending litigation; (2) Stamps did not have a motive to 
fabricate; (3) the statements were spontaneous, motivated by 
Stamps' need to explain why he wanted to take Rhodes and their 
son to a motel.  Id., ¶27.   
¶21 The court of appeals also rejected Manuel’s claim that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Stamps' 
four prior convictions in order to impeach his credibility after 
his statements were introduced through Misener.   The court of 
appeals concluded that there was ample evidence that already 
impeached Stamps' credibility, including his affiliation with a 
gang and that he was arrested and taken to jail on a probation 
hold.  Id., ¶32.  Alternatively, given the strength of the 
evidence 
supporting 
the 
verdict——Adams' 
100 
percent 
sure 
identification of Manuel as the shooter, and the circumstantial 
and physical evidence that tied Manuel to the scene——the court 
of appeals concluded that Stamps' credibility was not crucial to 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
9 
 
the State's case against Manuel.  Id., ¶33.  Therefore, because 
the court of appeals determined that there was not a reasonable 
probability that the result of Manuel's trial would have been 
different if his counsel had established that Stamps had been 
convicted of four crimes, the court of appeals rejected Manuel's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Id., ¶34. 
¶22 Manuel seeks review. 
II 
¶23 Because Manuel raises a confrontation violation, we 
must first determine whether Stamps' statements were admissible 
under the rules of evidence.  State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 
¶41, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367.  Thus, the first issue is 
whether the trial court properly determined that Stamps' 
statements were admissible under the statement of recent 
perception 
exception 
to 
the 
hearsay 
rule. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2).   
¶24 A 
trial 
court's 
decision 
to 
admit 
evidence 
is 
discretionary, and this court will uphold that decision if there 
was a proper exercise of discretion.  State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).  When reviewing an 
evidentiary decision, "the question on appeal is not whether 
this court, ruling initially on the admissibility of the 
evidence, would have permitted it to come in, but whether the 
trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted 
legal standards and in accordance with the facts of record."  
State v. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d 224, 232, 397 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 
1986).  A proper exercise of discretion requires that the trial 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
10 
 
court rely on facts of record, the applicable law, and, using a 
demonstrable rational process, reach a reasonable decision.  
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 
698.  If a trial court fails to adequately set forth its 
reasoning in reaching a discretionary decision, we will search 
the record for reasons to sustain that decision.  McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  
¶25 If Stamps' statements were admissible under the rules 
of evidence, then the second issue is whether the admission of 
that 
statement 
violated 
Manuel's 
right 
to 
confrontation.  
Whether admission of hearsay evidence violates a defendant's 
right to confrontation presents a question of law we review de 
novo.  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶10, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485.4 
¶26 If there was no confrontation violation, then the last 
issue is whether Manuel's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to introduce the number of Stamps' prior criminal 
convictions to impeach Stamps' credibility.  We review a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under a mixed question of 
fact and law standard.  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 
596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  We will not set aside a trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
                                                 
4 As we choose to address the merits of this issue, we need 
not decide whether Manuel's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise a contemporaneous confrontation violation 
objection to Stamps' statement.  See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 
296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (only dispositive issues need be 
addressed). 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
11 
 
However, whether the attorney's performance is constitutionally 
deficient is a question of law this court reviews de novo.  Id. 
III 
 
¶27 Manuel first argues that the trial court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
by 
admitting 
Stamps' 
statements 
regarding the shooting.  He claims that the statements cannot 
fall under the statement of recent perception exception to the 
hearsay 
rule 
because 
there 
is 
no 
evidence 
that 
Stamps' 
statements were "made in good faith" and "not in contemplation 
of pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was 
interested." See Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2).  To the contrary, 
Manuel 
submits 
that 
Stamps 
was 
anything 
other 
than 
a 
disinterested witness to the shooting, as Manuel claims Stamps 
played a major role in the incident even if he was not 
criminally liable.  Further, Manuel asserts that Stamps' 
statements must have been in contemplation of pending litigation 
because 
he must have 
known 
that 
the 
shooting 
would be 
investigated and someone would be prosecuted.  Manuel claims 
that Stamps' fear of this impending litigation undoubtedly 
explains why he persuaded Rhodes to go to the Sun Prairie motel 
with him.  We are not persuaded. 5  
                                                 
5 Because we conclude the evidence was properly admitted as 
an exception under the hearsay rules, we decline to consider 
Manuel's alternative argument that its admission was not 
harmless error.  For this same reason, we do not consider the 
State's 
alternative 
argument 
that 
Stamps' 
statement 
was 
admissible under the residual hearsay exception.  See Gross, 227 
Wis. at 300. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
12 
 
¶28 The statement of reception perception exception "is 
similar to the hearsay exceptions for present sense impression 
and excited utterances, but was intended to allow more time 
between the observation of the event and the statement."  Weed, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶15 (citation and quotations omitted).  The 
purpose of the exception "is to admit probative evidence which 
in most cases could not be admitted under other exceptions due 
to the passage of time."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(2), 
which 
contains 
the 
statement of recent perception exception, states: 
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a 
person 
engaged 
in 
investigating, 
litigating, 
or 
settling 
a claim, 
which 
narrates, 
describes, or 
explains an event or condition recently perceived by 
the 
declarant, 
made 
in 
good 
faith, 
not 
in 
contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in 
which the declarant was interested, and while the 
declarant's recollection was clear. 
As this court summarized in Weed, for a statement to fit recent 
perception exception, it must pass the following three criteria: 
(1) the statement was not made in response to the 
instigation of a person engaged in investigating, 
litigating, or settling a claim and was made in good 
faith with no contemplation of pending or anticipated 
litigation 
in 
which 
the 
declarant 
would 
be 
an 
interested 
party; 
(2) 
the 
statement 
narrated, 
described, or explained an event or condition recently 
perceived by the declarant; and (3) the statement was 
made while the declarant's recollection is clear. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
13 
 
Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶14 (citation and quotations omitted).  
Only the first criterion is at issue here.6   
 
¶30 According to 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Wisconsin Evidence, § 8045.2 at 710 (2d ed. 2001), the statement 
of 
recent 
perception 
exception 
"mainly 
focus[es] 
on 
the 
declarant's mental state at the time the statement was made."  
Because the exception is based on unavailability, however, the 
exception’s criteria "must be inferred from the statement itself 
and the surrounding circumstances."  Id.   
¶31 With regard to the specifics of the first criterion, 
we first note that Stamps’ statements were not made in response 
to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, 
litigating, or settling a claim.  Stamps made his statements to 
his girlfriend two days after the shooting, just before they 
went with their son to a motel in Sun Prairie.  The trial court 
ruled that Rhodes' testimony formed the basis for Stamps' 
comments about what had occurred and for their behavior 
afterwards.  There simply is no evidence that Stamps' comments 
were made in response to the instigation of Rhodes, and it is 
clear that she was in no way investigating, litigating, or 
setting a claim.   
¶32 Regarding good faith, whether a statement is made in 
"good faith" depends on "the declarant's incentive to accurately 
                                                 
6 There is no question that the statements by Stamps 
"narrated, described, or explained" an event recently perceived 
by him, and that the statements were made while his recollection 
was clear. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
14 
 
relate the event or condition."  Id. at 710-11.  Similarly, the 
"not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation" 
requirement 
"may 
be 
inferred 
circumstantially 
from 
a 
consideration of whether a lawsuit has been filed, lawyers have 
been contacted, and the manner in which the subject matter came 
up during the conversation in which the statement was made."  
Id. at 711. 
 
¶33 At the trial court, the State submitted that the 
statements were made in good faith and not in anticipation of 
litigation because Stamps "was simply trying to tell [his 
girlfriend] what happened . . . so that she would have a reason 
also to get out of the house to go with him to this motel to get 
away from the police officers."  The trial court agreed, 
indicating that Stamps' statements "formed the basis . . . for 
[Stamps' and Rhodes'] behavior thereafter."  Viewing the 
surrounding circumstances, the trial court concluded that the 
statement was nothing more than a justification to prompt Rhodes 
to go to a motel.  Thus, the trial court essentially found that 
there was no indication the statement was made in bad faith and 
was not made in anticipation of litigation.  We cannot conclude 
this assessment was unreasonable.  
 
 ¶34 Manuel asserts the statement could not have been made 
in good faith and was made in anticipation of litigation, given 
that 
"Stamps 
was 
hardly 
a 
disinterested 
witness 
to 
the 
shooting;" that Stamps "certainly knew that [the police] would 
investigate 
the 
shooting, 
that 
they 
would 
interview 
eyewitnesses, and that they would arrest and prosecute those who 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
15 
 
were involved;" and that Stamps "likely surmised that Adams 
could identify him as the person who flagged him down."  While 
Manuel advances conceivable alternative accounts for why Stamps 
made the statement, the trial court essentially rejected them by 
acquiescing to the State's arguments.  See Hagenkord v. State, 
100 Wis. 2d 452, 464, 302 N.W.2d 421 (1981) (upholding 
discretionary ruling despite the absence of "an express ruling 
or an articulation of reasons," where record indicates trial 
court "acquiesced in the explanation of the prosecutor").  
Because the trial court arrived at a reasonable result, and 
because we are reviewing that decision for an erroneous exercise 
of discretion, we affirm its decision.  
IV 
 
¶35 Next, Manuel argues that even if the statement was 
admissible, its admission violated his right of confrontation.7  
We do not agree. 
A 
  
¶36 "The Confrontation Clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right 
to confront the witnesses against them."  State v. Hale, 2005 WI 
7, ¶43, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637; U.S. Const. amend. VI; 
                                                 
7 We review only whether Stamps' statement to Rhodes 
violated Manuel's confrontation rights.  Manuel does not claim 
that Rhodes' statement to Misener constitutes a separate 
confrontation violation. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.8  In light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
alteration for the analysis of confrontation violations in 
Crawford, our first task is to determine whether Stamps' 
statements were "testimonial."  "[W]here "testimonial" hearsay 
evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law required: (1) unavailability and (2) a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination."  Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶51 
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).   
 
¶37 In Crawford, the Court concluded that the "principal 
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use 
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused."  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.  Thus, not all hearsay implicates the 
Confrontation Clause's core, only that which is "testimonial."  
Id. at 51.  While the Court established the boundaries of the 
Confrontation's Clause's core, it declined to define them with a 
comprehensive definition of "testimonial."  It did note that 
"testimony" is typically '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.'"  
                                                 
8 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him . . . ."  Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution states that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face 
to face."  Generally, we apply United States Supreme Court 
precedents 
when 
interpreting 
the 
right 
of 
confrontation 
contained in our constitution.  See State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 
¶43, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637; but compare Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-50 (1990), with Wis. Const. art. I, § 
7. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
17 
 
Id.   From this "core class" of testimonial statements, the 
Court 
indicated 
that 
testimonial 
statements 
could 
be 
characterized by three various formulations, all of which "share 
a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at 
various levels of abstraction around it," id. at 52: 
(1) "[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent——that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial 
examinations, 
prior 
testimony 
that 
the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially"  Id. at 51. 
(2) 
"[E]xtrajudicial 
statements . . . contained 
in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."  Id. at 
51-52. 
(3) "[S]tatements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial."  Id. at 52. 
¶38 Under any of these formulations, the Court was able to 
indicate that "[w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it 
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to 
police interrogations."  Id. at 68.  These, the Court wrote, 
represent "the modern practices with closest kinship to the 
abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."9  Id.   
                                                 
9 On the other end of the spectrum are "nontestimonial" 
statements.  The Court portrayed this type of statement as "[a]n 
off-hand, 
overheard 
remark," 
"a 
casual 
remark 
to 
an 
acquaintance," business records, or statements in furtherance of 
a conspiracy.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 56. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
18 
 
 
¶39 Manuel's statements clearly do not fall within these 
specified minimums that the Court highlighted.  Further, we 
agree 
with 
the 
State 
that 
Manuel's 
statements 
are 
not 
testimonial under any of the three formulations set forth in 
Crawford.  Because we conclude that Manuel's statements are not 
testimonial under any of these formulations, and because 
Crawford marks "a new day [that] has dawned for Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence," Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶52, we are 
reluctant to accept Manuel's invitation to choose among the 
three formulations as the proper test for measuring whether a 
statement is testimonial.  The particulars of the various 
formulations 
have 
yet 
to 
be 
developed, 
and 
the 
facial 
desirability of choosing one formulation may come at the hidden 
expense of another.  In short, we save for another day whether 
any of these formulations, or for that matter different 
formulations, surpass all others in defending the right to 
confrontation.  For now, at a minimum, we adopt all three of 
Crawford's formulations. 
1 
 
¶40 For a statement to be testimonial under the first 
formulation, it must be "ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent."  Id. at 51.  Stamps' oral statements to 
his girlfriend at their apartment clearly do not fit this 
depiction. 
2 
 
¶41 For a statement to be testimonial under the second 
formulation, 
it 
must 
be 
an 
"extrajudicial 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
19 
 
statement[] . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as [an] affidavit[], deposition[], prior testimony, or 
confession[]."  Id. at 51-52.  Again, Stamps' oral statements to 
his girlfriend at their apartment do not fit this depiction. 
3 
 
¶42 For a statement to be testimonial under the third 
formulation, it must be a "statement[] that [was] made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial."  Id. at 52.  We conclude that Stamps' statements 
to Rhodes were not testimonial under this formulation. 
 
¶43 Other 
jurisdictions 
have 
begun 
to 
develop 
the 
parameters of Crawford's third formulation.  We turn to those 
jurisdictions for guidance.  
¶44 In People v. Cervantes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 783 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004), the California Court of Appeal concluded 
that 
an 
out-of-court 
statement 
made 
by 
the 
defendants' 
accomplice to the accomplice's neighbor after the defendants and 
the accomplice committed a murder was not testimonial.  The 
neighbor worked as a surgical medical assistant and knew the 
accomplice for 12 years.  After the accomplice sought out the 
neighbor for medical care, the neighbor noticed the accomplice 
had several swollen lacerations on his hand.  When she asked 
what 
happened, 
the 
accomplice 
answered 
that 
he 
and 
the 
defendants shot a man the night before.  The neighbor reported 
this to the police.  She later testified as to the accomplice's 
admissions at the defendants' trial.  As is the case here, the 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
20 
 
defendants argued that the accomplice's statement to the 
neighbor was testimonial because the accomplice knew the 
neighbor would repeat the statement to the police.  The 
California Court of Appeal disagreed. 
¶45 Under 
Crawford's 
third 
formulation 
for 
defining 
testimonial statements, the court of appeal concluded there was 
nothing in the record to suggest that the neighbor would report 
the accomplice's statements to the police.  The court of appeal 
stated it "subscribe[d] to the view that [the accomplice] sought 
medical assistance from a friend of long standing who had come 
to visit his home."  Id. at 783.  Consistent with the 
accomplice's later fear of testifying, the court of appeal 
concluded that the "[accomplice's] statement appears to have 
been made without any reasonable expectation it would be used at 
a later trial.  Rather, it seems far more likely [that the 
accomplice] expected [that the neighbor] would not repeat 
anything he told her to the police."  Id.  
¶46 In Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2004), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a co-
defendant's spontaneous statements to two different third-party 
acquaintances were not testimonial.  There, the defendants 
killed two people.  Prior to killing them, the co-defendant told 
one acquaintance that he "had a job to do" for the defendant but 
felt reluctant to do it.  After killing them, the co-defendant 
told a second acquaintance that he used one of the victim's 
credit 
cards 
and 
purchased 
film 
tickets 
in 
the 
first 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
21 
 
acquaintance's name to make it look like that acquaintance 
killed the victims.   
¶47 At the defendant's 
trial, 
the two 
acquaintances 
testified as to the co-defendant's statements.  Although the co-
defendant's second statement was made after the killing, the 
Texas 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
co-
defendant's statements were not testimonial because they were 
casual, spontaneous "street corner" statements.  Id. 
¶48 In State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191 (Conn. 2004), the 
defendant and a co-actor broke into a house to steal jewelry, 
killed the owner, and then burned the house down.  Five months 
later, the co-actor confided in his nephew that he and the 
defendant committed the burglary.  The co-actor also stated that 
when the victim walked in on them, the defendant strangled her 
to death and then lit the house on fire.  A year and a half 
later, the state charged the defendant with murdering the 
victim.  At the defendant's trial, the co-actor invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the 
State introduced his statement through the nephew.   
¶49 The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded the co-actor's 
statement to his nephew was a statement against penal interests 
and was not testimonial: 
[U]nlike a statement to the police, the circumstances 
under which the statement was made would not lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial. 
Specifically, [the co-actor] made the statement in 
confidence and on his own initiative to a close family 
member, almost eighteen months before the defendant 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
22 
 
was arrested and more than four years before his own 
arrest.  In light of these circumstances, [the co-
actor's] communication to  . . .  his nephew[] clearly 
does not fall within the core category of ex parte 
testimonial statements that the court was concerned 
with in Crawford. 
Id. at 202. 
¶50 Similarly, in People v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004), the defendant was charged with perjury 
after her boyfriend was convicted of fleeing, eluding, and 
assault.  During the boyfriend's trial, the defendant testified 
that the boyfriend could not have been the culprit because he 
was not at the scene that night but rather was with her.  After 
the boyfriend was convicted, the state charged the defendant 
with perjury.  At the defendant's perjury trial, the state 
introduced statements that jail guards overheard the boyfriend 
make to relatives while the boyfriend was in jail awaiting his 
trial.  Those statements implicated the boyfriend as the culprit 
for 
the 
fleeing, 
eluding, 
and 
assault 
crimes 
and 
thus 
contradicted the defendant's testimony at the boyfriend's trial. 
¶51 The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the 
boyfriend's statements that the jail guards overheard were not 
testimonial.  The court stated: 
[The boyfriend] was speaking to relatives, not to the 
guards, and made spontaneous, unprompted comments 
regarding his role in the fleeing and eluding and 
assault.  Even under the broadest definition of 
testimonial, it is unlikely that [the boyfriend] would 
have reasonably believed that the statements would be 
available for use at a later trial. 
Id. at 729. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
23 
 
¶52 In Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004), a 
co-actor told someone named Garcia that he needed money and that 
a drug dealer had refused to furnish him drugs on credit.  Later 
that night, the co-actor and the defendant killed the drug 
dealer and two other people.  At the defendant's trial, Garcia 
testified as to the co-actor's statement, and the First Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
statement 
was 
not 
testimonial under the third formulation because it was made 
during a private conversation.  Id. at 84.  
¶53 We find these cases persuasive.  Applying them, we 
conclude that Stamps' statements to Rhodes were not testimonial.  
Stamps made the statements to Rhodes, his girlfriend, during 
what appears to be a spontaneous, private conversation that 
occurred shortly after the shooting.  See United States v. 
Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (statements "made 
to loved ones or acquaintances . . . are not the kind of 
memorialized, 
judicial-process-created 
evidence 
of 
which 
Crawford speaks."); Horton, 370 F.3d at 84; Rivera, 844 A.2d at 
202; Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d at 729; Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 114.  
There is no dispute that Rhodes is not a government agent, nor 
is there any contention that Stamps somehow expected Rhodes to 
report to the police what he told her.  See Cervantes, 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 774, 783.  By all indications, the conversation was 
confidential and not made with an eye towards litigation.  See 
also 
State v. Vaught, 
682 
N.W.2d 
284, 291 
(Neb. 
2004) 
(concluding 
that 
four-year-old 
victim's 
statement 
to 
an 
emergency room physician that her uncle sexually assaulted her 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
24 
 
was not testimonial as there was no indication of a purpose to 
develop testimony for trial, nor any indication of government 
involvement in the initiation or course of the examination).  
Absent any evidence that Stamps was attempting to use Rhodes to 
mislead the police on his own behalf, we conclude that Stamps' 
statements cannot be considered testimonial under Crawford's 
third formulation.   
B 
 
¶54 Having concluded that Stamps' statements are not 
testimonial under any of Crawford's formulations, we must next 
determine the form and the substance of the constitutional 
analysis to be applied for nontestimonial statements.  Crawford 
left 
this 
question 
debatable, 
writing 
that 
"[w]here 
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with 
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law———as does Roberts, and as would an 
approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny altogether."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.    
 
¶55 Manuel contends that until the Supreme Court offers 
definitive guidance on how to handle nontestimonial statements 
under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment, 
we 
should 
assume 
that 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
still 
regulates 
the 
admission 
of 
nontestimonial statements.  Compare id. at 53 ("[E]ven if the 
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial 
hearsay, that is its primary object."), with id. at 68.  Manuel 
submits that we should continue to rely on the Roberts' test to 
ensure reliability.  Manuel notes that well before Roberts, the 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
25 
 
Court 
displayed 
concern 
for 
ensuring 
reliability 
of 
nontestimonial statements.  See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 
(1970) ("[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance 
a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining 
process in criminal trials by assuring that the trier of fact 
[has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement." (citation and quotation omitted)).  Further, Manuel 
claims, the advantage of maintaining Roberts is that the courts 
of this state are quite familiar with its application.  Finally, 
Manuel notes a number of jurisdictions have embraced Roberts as 
the proper test for nontestimonial statements.10 
¶56 In contrast, the State argues that we should assess 
nontestimonial statements only under the rules of evidence.  The 
State points out that the Crawford Court noted that in White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Court rejected the argument 
that the Confrontation Clause should be applied "only to 
testimonial statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by 
hearsay law."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.  The Crawford Court 
indicated that its analysis "casts doubt on that holding," id., 
but left for another day whether White survived the Crawford 
decision.  Id.  Given Crawford's emphasis that "the principal 
                                                 
10 Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004); 
People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 201-02 (Conn. 2004); Doe 
v. Doe, 103 P.3d 967, 972 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004); State v. 
Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (applying Roberts on both 
state and federal constitutional grounds); State v. Blackstock, 
598 S.E.2d 412, 422 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Miller v. State, 
98 P.3d 738, 743-44 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
26 
 
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use 
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused," id. 
at 50, and because Crawford's historical analysis revealed that 
"not 
all 
hearsay 
implicates 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's 
core 
concerns," id. at 51, the State submits that nontestimonial 
statements need satisfy only the rules of evidence to be 
admissible.   
¶57 We decline to follow the State's position.  Some, but 
not all, of the hearsay exceptions are premised on reliability.  
Many 
of 
the 
exceptions 
listed 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 908.03 
"represent[] a determination of categorical reliability; that 
is, hearsay falling within any one of the rules carries with it 
guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability comparable to in-
court testimony."11  7 Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence, § 801.1 at 
523.  On the other hand, the six "unavailability" exceptions in 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045 "balance considerations of reliability with 
need 
for 
the 
evidence. 
 
Conceptually, 
the 
categorical 
reliability of the six are insufficient to justify the hearsay's 
reliability except when there is a pressing need for the 
evidence because the declarant is unavailable to testify."  Id. 
at 523.  In short, as Professor Blinka notes: 
                                                 
11 We do not decide that any hearsay that falls within any 
one of the exceptions listed in Wis. Stat. § 908.03 carries with 
it guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability comparable to 
in-court testimony.  We merely acknowledge that that is 
Professor Blinka's view.  We leave for future days and under 
different circumstances an analysis of the reliability of each 
of the exceptions listed in § 908.03.  
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
27 
 
Although the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule 
are designed to protect similar values, they are not 
identical.  More to the point, the hearsay rule 
generally permits a wider array of statements than the 
confrontation clause.  
Id. at 575.  
¶58 This 
concern 
was 
recognized 
when 
the 
hearsay 
exceptions were promulgated in this state.  The drafters 
expected that the exceptions would not displace constitutional 
principles.  An accompanying Federal Advisory Committee note 
concluded:12 
[A] hearsay rule can function usefully as an adjunct 
to the confrontation right in constitutional areas and 
independently 
in 
nonconstitutional 
areas. 
 
In 
recognition of the separateness of the confrontation 
clause and the hearsay rule, and to avoid inviting 
collisions between them or between the hearsay rule 
and other exclusionary principles, the exceptions set 
forth in Rules 803 and 804 are stated in terms of 
exemption from the general exclusionary mandate of the 
hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of 
admissibility. 
                                                 
12 The Federal Advisory notes were not adopted but were 
provided for informational purposes.  Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R2 ¶4 (1974). 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
28 
 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R229 (1974).13 
¶59 Thus, we conclude that it is unwise to establish a 
blanket-rule that blindly trusts the hearsay rules to safeguard 
constitutional rights.  Although the rules are to be construed 
in such a manner as "to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of 
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that 
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined," 
Wis. Stat. § 901.02, they are no substitute for constitutional 
examination.14 
¶60 While 
the 
Crawford 
Court 
abrogated 
Roberts 
by 
highlighting its shortcomings and failures, the Court declined 
to overrule Roberts and expressly stated that the states were 
free to continue using Roberts when dealing with nontestimonial 
hearsay.  We accept Manuel's argument that Roberts ought to be 
                                                 
13 A corresponding Judicial Council Committee Note observed 
that after the Federal Advisory Committee Note was drafted, the 
United States Supreme Court decision in California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 155 (1970), substantiated the Federal Advisory 
Committee Note's assertions.  In Green, the Supreme Court 
concluded that "[w]hile it may readily be conceded that hearsay 
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to 
protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest 
that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause 
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of 
hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at 
common law."  Id.; see also Bergeron v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 595, 
616, 271 N.W.2d 386 (1978) (same); State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 
2d 425, 432, 247 N.W.2d 80 (1976). 
14 That is not to say, however, that admission of statements 
under certain hearsay exceptions will not satisfy an alleged 
confrontation violation.   
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
29 
 
retained for nontestimonial statements, as we agree that 
evidence that may be admissible under the hearsay rules may 
nevertheless still be inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause.  Therefore, we join the jurisdictions that have used 
Roberts to assess nontestimonial statements.15 
¶61 Roberts established the following two-part test to 
determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements under the 
Confrontation Clause: 
First, the witness must be "unavailable" at trial.  
Second, the statement of the unavailable witness must 
bear adequate "indicia of reliability."  This second 
prong could be inferred without more in a case where 
the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception 
or 
upon 
a 
showing 
of 
"particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." 
Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶45 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 73).  
We conclude that Stamps' statements are admissible under the 
Roberts test. 
                                                 
15 See 
infra 
n.10. 
 
According 
to 
our 
research, 
no 
jurisdiction has accepted the argument advanced by the State.  
Further, our research indicates that only one reported case, a 
trial court decision, has construed Crawford as exempting 
nontestimonial 
hearsay 
from 
Confrontation 
Clause 
analysis 
altogether.  See People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2004).  However, that conclusion seemed to rest on a 
misquotation of Crawford.  Compare id. ("The [Crawford] Court 
further found that 'where a nontestimonial statement is at 
issue, such statement would be exempted from the Confrontation 
Clause altogether.'" (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68)); with 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at 
issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to 
afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay 
law——as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted 
such 
statements 
from 
Confrontation 
Clause 
scrutiny 
altogether."). 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
30 
 
1 
¶62 There is no issue as to Roberts' first step, as all 
parties agree that Stamps made himself unavailable by invoking 
his privilege against self-incrimination.  See State v. Stuart, 
2005 WI 47, ¶62, __ Wis. 2d __, 695 N.W.2d 259; See also Wis. 
Stat. § 908.04(1)(a). 
2 
 
¶63 Moving on to the second step to determine whether the 
statement 
bears 
adequate 
indicia 
of 
reliability, 
Manuel 
initially contends that the "statement of recent perception" 
exception is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  The State 
recognizes Manuel's contention but does not respond, instead 
choosing to focus its argument on whether there are sufficient 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  Although the State has conceded 
the point, for reasons we explain below, we conclude that Manuel 
is nonetheless correct.   
 
¶64 A hearsay exception is firmly rooted "if, in light of 
longstanding judicial and legislative experience, it rests on 
such a solid foundation that admission of virtually any evidence 
within it comports with the substance of the constitutional 
protection."  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) 
(citations, quotations and alterations omitted).  This test "is 
designed to allow the introduction of statements falling within 
a category of hearsay whose conditions have proved over time to 
remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an 
adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath and 
cross-examination at a trial."  Id. (citations and quotations 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
31 
 
omitted).  In Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶24, this court assumed 
that the statement of recent perception exception was not firmly 
rooted.  We now conclude that it is not. 
 
¶65 As the court of appeals noted below, the statement of 
recent perception exception was not known at common law.  When 
the exception was promulgated in 1973, the accompanying Judicial 
Council Committee Note represented that "[t]his subsection is a 
major change in Wisconsin law which presently would characterize 
the statement as inadmissible hearsay."  Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d at R314.   
¶66 In addition to the exception's relative newness, the 
exception has not gained widespread acceptance.  To the 
contrary, "Wisconsin is one of a small number of jurisdictions 
that have adopted the exception for statements of recent 
perception."  7 Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence, § 8045.2 at 708.  It 
seems that only three states have embraced the statement of 
recent perception exception:  Hawaii, Kansas, and Wyoming.16  See 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Rule 804(b)(5) (2002);17 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
                                                 
16 As of 1995, New Mexico's statement of recent perception 
exception has been removed from its rules of evidence.  State v. 
Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1086 n.3 (N.M. 1996). 
17 Hawaii Rev. Stat. Rule 804(b)(5) (2002) states:  
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:  . . . A 
statement, not in response to the instigation of a 
person 
engaged 
in 
investigating, 
litigating, 
or 
settling 
a claim, which 
narrates, 
describes, or 
explains an event or condition recently perceived by 
the 
declarant, 
made 
in 
good 
faith, 
not 
in 
contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
32 
 
460(d)(3) (2005);18 Wyo. Stat. Rule 804(b)(5)(2003).19  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court included the exception in its draft of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  However, "Congress rejected it as 
'unwarranted' based on concerns about reliability."  7 Blinka, 
Wisconsin Evidence, § 8045.2 at 708.  As Professor Blinka notes, 
"The [exception's] reception has been decidedly mixed."  Id. 
¶67 In view of these considerations, we conclude that the 
statement of recent perception exception is not firmly rooted.  
Therefore, we must determine whether Stamps' statements contain 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 
¶68 To evaluate whether statements contain particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness: 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the declarant was interested, and while the 
declarant's recollection was clear. 
18 Kansas Stat. Ann. § 60-460(d)(3) (2005) states: 
A statement which the judge finds was made . . . if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness, by the 
declarant at a time when the matter had been recently 
perceived by the declarant and while the declarant's 
recollection was clear and was made in good faith 
prior to the commencement of the action and with no 
incentive to falsify or to distort.   
19 Wyoming's 
statement 
of 
recent 
perception 
exception 
applies 
only 
in 
civil 
proceedings. 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. 
Rule 
804(b)(5)(2003) ("The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness . . . In a 
civil action or proceeding, a statement, not in response to the 
instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating, or 
settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an 
event or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in 
good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated 
litigation 
in 
which 
he 
was 
interested, 
and 
while 
his 
recollection was clear."). 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
33 
 
 [W]e consider the "totality of the circumstances, 
but . . . the 
relevant 
circumstances 
include 
only 
those that surround the making of the statement and 
that render the declarant particularly worthy of 
belief."  [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990)].  
Some factors that have been considered in assessing 
the reliability of a statement include spontaneity, 
consistency, mental state, and a lack of motive to 
fabricate.  Id. at 821.  We look to see "if the 
declarant's 
truthfulness 
is 
so 
clear 
from 
the 
surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-
examination would be of marginal utility . . . ."  Id. 
at 820.  In other words, we examine whether the 
statement is "so trustworthy that adversarial testing 
would add little to its reliability."  Id. at 821. 
Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶25.  We conclude that there are adequate 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness surrounding Stamps' 
statements. 
 
¶69 Stamps' statements were spontaneously made shortly 
after the shooting.  There is no indication that Stamps spoke 
with a "studied reflection of the situation" or made the 
statements in bad faith.  Nor is there any indication that 
Stamps made the statements after being provoked by questioning.  
Instead, Stamps' statements were volunteered statements that 
were made to his girlfriend, also the mother of his child, and 
were nothing more than an explanation of where he was and what 
had occurred and an instigation for what they had to do next 
(i.e., get to a motel).  There is no basis on which to conclude 
that Stamps made the statements to his girlfriend in anything 
but in confidence.   
¶70 We agree with the State that it cannot reasonably be 
said that Stamps had an ulterior motive to fabricate, as any 
statement placing Stamps at the scene makes him a potential 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
34 
 
suspect, or in the very least a person of interest.  And as the 
court of appeals observed, Stamps implicated a fellow gang 
member, not a member of a rival gang or some other enemy.  
Manuel, 275 Wis. 2d 146, ¶13.  Therefore, after reviewing the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Stamps' 
statements 
contain 
sufficient 
particularized 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 
V 
 
¶71 Lastly, Manuel argues that once Stamps' statements 
were admitted, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
impeach Stamps' credibility with the number of his prior 
convictions.  We conclude that Manuel was not prejudiced by this 
failure. 
¶72 "To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the defendant must show that counsel's actions or 
inaction 
constituted 
deficient 
performance 
and 
that 
the 
deficiency caused him prejudice."  State v. Brunette, 220 
Wis. 2d 431, 445, 583 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998).  To prove 
deficiency, the defendant must establish that counsel's conduct 
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 
111, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  To prove prejudice, 
the defendant must show that "'there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.'"  Id., ¶20 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  We 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
35 
 
need not discuss both of these prongs if there is an 
insufficient showing on one.20  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶34 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
 
¶73 Manuel correctly notes that when hearsay has been 
admitted, the declarant's credibility may be attacked as if the 
declarant had testified as a witness.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.06.21  
Manuel's trial counsel did not introduce the fact that Stamps 
had four prior criminal convictions.  Although "all prior 
convictions 
are 
relevant 
to 
a 
witness'[s] 
character 
for 
truthfulness," State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33, ¶23, 270 Wis. 2d 
62, 676 N.W.2d 475, we conclude that Stamps' credibility had 
been sufficiently attacked, such that the failure to introduce 
the prior convictions did not prejudice Manuel. 
                                                 
20 Manuel's trial counsel conceded he had no strategy for 
failing to impeach Stamps' credibility with the four prior 
convictions.  We conclude that Manuel's counsel was deficient 
for failing to impeach the credibility of a key witness. 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.06 states: 
When 
a 
hearsay 
statement 
has 
been 
admitted 
in 
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be 
attacked, and if attacked, may be supported by any 
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes 
if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a 
statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, 
inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, 
is not subject to any requirement that the declarant 
may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or 
explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement 
has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, 
the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the 
statement as if under cross-examination. 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
36 
 
 
¶74 The jury heard that Stamps was a member of a gang, and 
Misener, the officer who took Rhodes' statement as to what 
Stamps told her, testified that Stamps was arrested and taken to 
jail on a probation hold.  We agree with the State that it is 
fair to say that most people know that an individual has been 
convicted of a crime if he or she is on probation.  As the court 
of appeals concluded, "that fact is not so obscure as to be 
beyond the knowledge of the average juror."  Manuel, 275 Wis. 2d 
146, ¶32.  With Stamps' status as a criminal made clear, "the 
exact number of convictions might have incrementally weakened 
the credibility of the witnesses, [but] this decrease is not 
enough to establish a reasonable probability that the jury would 
have reached a different verdict."  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 
77, ¶44, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801. 
 
¶75 In addition, more importantly, there is overwhelming 
evidence that supports the verdict.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
696 ("[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the 
record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one 
with overwhelming record support.").  The victim, Adams, 
identified Manuel as the shooter through both a photo array 
conducted shortly after the shooting and at trial.  The 
identification was not premised on a momentary glimpse of the 
shooter.  Adams indicated that he was positive Manuel was the 
shooter, as Adams had seen Manuel around the neighborhood many 
times before.  Moreover, the State presented circumstantial 
physical evidence that linked Manuel to the crime scene.  Cates, 
the State Crime Lab analyst, testified that the shoes taken from 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
37 
 
the trunk of Manuel's car were consistent with the footprints 
that were preserved at the crime scene.  Thus, because Stamps' 
credibility had been sufficiently attacked, and because the 
evidence against Manuel was overwhelming, we conclude that 
Manuel cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's performance. 
VI 
¶76 In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
by 
admitting 
Stamps' 
statements as statements of recent perception.  Further, we 
conclude that Manuel's right to confrontation was not violated.  
Stamps' statements were not testimonial under any of Crawford's 
formulations.  However, we conclude that nontestimonial evidence 
must still be scrutinized under both the federal and state 
constitutions.  Accordingly, we retain Roberts for that purpose.  
We conclude that the statement of recent perception exception is 
not firmly rooted.  However, we hold that Manuel's confrontation 
rights were not violated because Stamps' statements contain 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  Finally, we 
conclude 
that 
Manuel's 
counsel 
was 
not 
constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to introduce the number of Stamps' prior 
convictions after 
Stamps' 
statements 
were 
introduced 
into 
evidence.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
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No. 
2003AP113-CR   
 
 
 
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