Case Title: Coyne v. Walker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013AP000416

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP416 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Peggy Z. Coyne, Mary Bell, Mark W. Taylor, Corey 
Otis,  
Marie K. Stangel, Jane Weidner and Kristin A. 
Voss, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Scott Walker and Scott Neitzel, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Anthony Evers, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 361 Wis. 2d 225, 862 N.W.2d 606) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No. 2015 WI App 21 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 17, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Amy R. Smith 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs, joined by BRADLEY, 
A.W., J. 
PROSSER, J. concurs 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
and BRADLEY, R.G., J. 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents, joined by BRADLEY, R.G., 
J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners, the cause was 
argued by David V. Meany, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Daniel P. Lennington, assistant attorney 
general, Andrew C. Cook, deputy attorney general and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there were briefs by Susan 
M. Crawford, Lester A. Pines, Aaron G. Dumas, and Cullen Weston 
Pines & Bach LLP, Madison, and Randall Garczynski, Wisconsin 
Education Association, Madison and oral argument by Susan M. 
Crawford. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent, 
there 
briefs 
by 
Ryan 
Nilsestuen, Janet A. Jenkins, and Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction, Madison, and oral argument by Ryan Nilsestuen. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Richard M. Esenberg, 
Charles J. Szafir, Brian W. McGrath, and Wisconsin Institute for 
Law & Liberty, Milwaukee on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce, Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce, School 
Choice of Wisconsin, the Honorable Jason Fields, and the 
Honorable Scott Jensen.  Oral argument by Richard M. Esenberg. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Richard F. Verstegen, 
Michael J. Julka, M. Tess O’Brien-Heinzen, and Boardman & Clark 
LLP, Madison on behalf of The Wisconsin Association of School 
Boards and School Administrators Alliance.  Oral argument by 
Michael J. Julka. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP416 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV4573) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Peggy Z. Coyne, Mary Bell, Mark W. Taylor, 
Corey Otis, Marie K. Stangel, Jane Weidner and 
Kristin A. Voss, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott Walker and Scott Neitzel, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Anthony Evers, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
MAY 18, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the Dane 
County circuit court's2 grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Peggy Z. Coyne, Mary Bell, Mark W. Taylor, Corey Otis, Marie K. 
                                                 
1 Coyne v. Walker, 2015 WI App 21, 361 Wis. 2d 225, 862 
N.W.2d 606. 
2 The Honorable Amy Smith, presiding. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
2 
 
Stangel, Jane Weidner and Kristin A. Voss ("Coyne"). Coyne 
sought a declaratory judgment that 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 ("Act 
21") is unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent of 
Public 
Instruction 
("SPI") 
and 
the 
Department 
of 
Public 
Instruction ("DPI"). Among other things, Act 21 amended portions 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 227, which governs the procedures for 
administrative rulemaking and now allows the Governor (and in 
some instances the Secretary of Administration) to permanently 
halt the rulemaking process. The circuit court concluded that 
Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the SPI because it 
gives superior authority over public instruction to officers who 
are not subordinate to the SPI. As a result, it permanently 
enjoined Governor Scott Walker and Secretary of Administration 
Michael Huebsch3 from proceeding thereunder with respect to the 
SPI.   
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed, largely adopting the 
reasoning of the circuit court. Coyne v. Walker, 2015 WI App 21, 
¶36, 361 Wis. 2d 225, 862 N.W.2d 606. The court of appeals 
relied on our decision in Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 
546 N.W.2d 123 (1996), specifically noting that in Thompson we 
determined that rulemaking is a supervisory power of the SPI. 
Coyne, 361 Wis. 2d 225, ¶¶23-24. Applying Thompson's reasoning, 
                                                 
3 After we accepted the petition for review in this case 
Scott 
Neitzel 
replaced 
Huebsch 
as 
the 
Secretary 
of 
Administration. Consequently, on June 18, 2015, Huebsch was 
removed from the caption and Neitzel was added as a defendant-
appellant-petitioner. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
3 
 
the court of appeals concluded that although the Legislature has 
the authority to give, not give, or take away the SPI's 
supervisory powers, "[w]hat the legislature may not do is give 
the SPI a supervisory power relating to education and then fail 
to maintain the SPI's supremacy with respect to that power." 
Id., ¶25.  
¶3 
The 
issues 
presented 
for 
our 
consideration 
are 
threefold. The first is whether administrative rulemaking is a 
supervisory power of the SPI and DPI. The second is whether 
Article X, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution allows the 
Legislature to vest the supervision of public instruction in any 
"other officers" it chooses. The third is whether Act 21 vests 
the supervision of public instruction in the Governor and the 
Secretary of Administration by giving them the authority to 
prevent the SPI and DPI's promulgation of rules.  
¶4 
We hold that Act 21 is unconstitutional and therefore 
void as applied to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
his subordinates. Article X, § 1 requires the Legislature to 
vest the supervision of public instruction in officers of 
supervision of public instruction. The current statutory scheme 
requires the SPI to promulgate rules in order to supervise 
public instruction. Because Act 21 does not provide a way for 
the SPI and DPI to proceed with rulemaking if the Governor or 
Secretary of Administration withholds approval, Act 21 gives the 
Governor and the Secretary of Administration the power to 
"manage, direct, or oversee" the primary means by which the SPI 
and DPI are required to carry out their supervisory duties. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
4 
 
Thus, Act 21 unconstitutionally vests the supervision of public 
instruction in officers who are not officers of supervision of 
public instruction in violation of Article X, § 1. Consequently, 
Act 21 is void as applied to the SPI and his subordinates. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 
¶5 
On May 23, 2011, Governor Walker signed into law 2011 
Wisconsin Act 21. At the heart of this controversy are the 
provisions of Act 21 that changed portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 227 
sub. II (2009-10), the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act. 
This Act prescribes the procedures state agencies must follow in 
order to promulgate administrative rules. Three sections of Act 
21 are especially relevant to the present case:  Section 4, 
Section 21, and Section 32. 
¶6 
First, Section 4 of Act 21 amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.135(2) (2009-10). Wisconsin Stat. § 227.135(2) previously 
required agencies that had prepared a "scope statement"4 to 
submit that scope statement to the Legislative Reference Bureau 
for publication in the administrative register and to "the 
individual or body with policy-making powers over the subject 
matter of a proposed rule" for approval. Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 227.135(2) now additionally requires an agency that has 
                                                 
4 To begin the rule-drafting process, agencies must prepare 
a scope statement that, among other things, describes the 
objectives, policies, authority, and use of government resources 
that the rule may affect. See Wis. Stat. § 227.135(1).  
No. 
2013AP416   
 
5 
 
prepared a scope statement to submit the scope statement to the 
Governor for approval. The agency may not submit the scope 
statement to the Legislative Reference Bureau for publication in 
the Administrative Register nor "perform any activity in 
connection with the drafting of a proposed rule" unless and 
until the Governor approves the scope statement in writing. Wis. 
Stat. § 227.135(2). 
¶7 
Second, Section 21 of Act 21 amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.138(2) (2009-10) and renumbered the subsection to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.137(6). Wisconsin Stat. § 227.138(2) previously 
required only those agencies listed in Wis. Stat. § 227.137(1) 
to receive the Secretary of Administration's approval to submit 
proposed rules that could result in costs of $20,000,000 or more 
to the Legislature. Wisconsin Stat. § 227.137(6) now requires 
all agencies to receive the Secretary of Administration's 
approval to submit such proposed rules to the Legislature.5 
¶8 
Third, Section 32 of Act 21 created Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.185. Prior to Act 21, agencies would submit final drafts 
of proposed rules directly to the Legislature for review. See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.135-.19 (2009-10). Wisconsin Stat. § 227.185 
now requires agencies to submit any final draft of a proposed 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.137(7) requires the Secretary of 
Administration to approve the rule if the "agency has adequately 
addressed 
the 
issues 
raised 
during 
the 
department 
[of 
administration]'s review of the rule," but the determination of 
whether the agency has "adequately addressed the issues" is left 
to the discretion of the Secretary of Administration. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
6 
 
rule to the Governor for approval before submitting the draft 
rule to the Legislature.6 The Governor then has sole discretion 
to approve or reject the rule. Wis. Stat. § 227.185. An agency 
may not submit the proposed rule to the Legislature for review 
unless the Governor "has approved the proposed rule in writing." 
Id. 
B. The Proceedings Below 
¶9 
The Coyne parties7 filed an action pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 806.04 seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief in the Dane County Circuit Court on October 11, 2011. The 
complaint named as defendants Governor Walker, Secretary of 
Administration Huebsch, and Superintendent Anthony Evers, all in 
their 
official 
capacities, 
and 
it 
sought 
to 
enjoin 
the 
                                                 
6 Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 227.185 states, 
After a proposed rule is in final draft form, the 
agency shall submit the proposed rule to the governor 
for approval.  The governor, in his or her discretion, 
may approve or reject the proposed rule. If the 
governor approves a proposed rule, the governor shall 
provide the agency with a written notice of that 
approval.  No proposed rule may be submitted to the 
legislature for review under s.227.19(2) unless the 
governor has approved the proposed rule in writing. 
7 Peggy Z. Coyne and Mary Bell are taxpayers and school 
teachers who are the current presidents of Madison Teacher Inc., 
the labor organization that represents most employees of the 
Madison 
Metropolitan 
School 
District, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Education Association Counsel, a labor organization representing 
thousands of teachers throughout Wisconsin, respectively. Corey 
Otis and Jane Weidner are taxpayers and teachers in Wisconsin 
public schools. Kristin A. Voss, Marie K. Stangel, and Mark W. 
Taylor are taxpayers and parents whose children attend and 
receive services from Wisconsin public schools. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
7 
 
defendants from proceeding with rulemaking under Act 21. The 
complaint alleged that by requiring the SPI and DPI to obtain 
the Governor's and the Secretary of Administration's approval to 
proceed with rulemaking, Act 21 gives the Governor and the 
Secretary of Administration equal or superior authority to that 
of 
the 
SPI 
over 
the 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction. 
Consequently, the complaint alleged that Act 21 violates Article 
X, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and is inconsistent 
with our holding in Thompson. 
¶10 Superintendent Evers filed an answer agreeing with 
Coyne; he has taken the same position as Coyne throughout this 
litigation. Governor Walker and Secretary Heubsch8 filed a motion 
to dismiss the case for lack of standing. Prior to disposition 
of that motion, Coyne filed a motion for summary judgment. On 
April 6, 2012, the circuit court denied the Governor's motion to 
dismiss, and thereafter the Governor answered the complaint. On 
May 25, 2012, the Governor filed a motion for summary judgment 
and opposed Coyne's previously filed motion. 
¶11 The circuit court denied the Governor's motion for 
summary judgment and granted Coyne's motion, concluding that 
"under the analysis set forth in Thompson, Act 21 as applied to 
this case violates the Wisconsin Constitution." Accordingly, the 
circuit court declared void the provisions of Act 21 that 
                                                 
8 For ease of reading, we will refer mainly to the Governor, 
though our analysis and conclusion apply with equal force to the 
Secretary of Administration. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
8 
 
"require approval of the Governor or the Secretary of the 
Department of Administration over the administrative rule-making 
activities 
in 
which 
the 
State 
Superintendent 
of 
Public 
Instruction 
engages 
or 
supervises, 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
supervision of public instruction." 
¶12 The Governor appealed, arguing that administrative 
rulemaking is not a supervisory power of the SPI and that even 
if it were a supervisory power, the Legislature is free to 
"divvy up" the supervisory powers of the SPI among any "other 
officers" as it sees fit. Coyne, 361 Wis. 2d 225, ¶¶21, 25. 
Finally, the Governor argued that Act 21 does not impede the 
SPI's ability to make or authorize rules; thus, Act 21 does not 
place the Governor in a superior role to the SPI relative to 
rulemaking or public instruction. Id., ¶¶27, 29. 
¶13 The court of appeals rejected each of these arguments 
and affirmed the circuit court. Id., ¶36. The court of appeals 
noted that we previously held that rulemaking is a supervisory 
power 
of 
the 
SPI. 
Id., 
¶¶21-24 
(citing 
Thompson, 
199 
Wis. 2d 674). It reasoned, "the practical effect of Act 21" is 
to give the Governor "the power to decide that there will be no 
rule or rule change on a particular subject, irrespective of the 
judgment of the SPI." Id., ¶28. The court went on to highlight 
the tension Act 21 created between the Governor and the SPI: 
"[i]t seems beyond reasonable dispute that a Governor at 
loggerheads with an SPI over the content of a proposed 
rule . . . could use the threat to withhold approval as a means 
of affecting the rule content." Id., ¶35. As a result, the court 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
9 
 
of appeals concluded that Act 21 places the Governor in a 
superior position to the SPI as to the supervision of public 
instruction; consequently, the court found the challenged 
provisions of Act 21 unconstitutional as applied to the SPI. 
Id., ¶36. The Governor appealed, and we granted review on June 
12, 2015. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, 
independently applying the same methodology as the circuit court 
and the court of appeals while benefitting from their analyses. 
Preisler v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶16, 360 
Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136. Summary judgment "shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶15 This case requires us to interpret Article X, § 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution. "We interpret provisions of the 
Wisconsin Constitution de novo." Polk Cty. v. State Pub. Def., 
188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994). This court turns to 
three 
sources 
to 
interpret 
provisions 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution: "(1) the plain meaning of the words in the context 
used, (2) the historical analysis of the constitutional debates 
and of what practices were in existence [at the time the 
provision was drafted or amended]; and (3) the earliest 
interpretation of the provision by the Legislature as manifested 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
10 
 
in the earliest law passed following the adoption of the 
constitution." Id. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Administrative Rulemaking 
¶16 Prior to undertaking our constitutional analysis, it 
is important to explain what rulemaking is, the role that it 
plays in our system of government, and how Act 21 modified the 
rulemaking process.9  
¶17 Agencies are governmental bodies created by the 
Legislature in order to facilitate the efficient functioning of 
government 
by 
implementing 
the 
policy 
decisions 
of 
the 
Legislature.10 "Agency" is defined very broadly in Wisconsin:  
"'Agency' means a board, commission, committee, department or 
officer in the state government, except the governor, a district 
attorney or a military or judicial officer." Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(1). The DPI is a "department in the state government" 
                                                 
9 Administrative rulemaking is a complicated process, and we 
do not endeavor to explicate the required steps for each agency 
nor the requirements of each subdivision of Wis. Stat. ch. 227. 
We merely provide a general summary of the process. 
10 See generally Wis. Stat. § 227.19(1)(b) ("The legislature 
recognizes the need for efficient administration of public 
policy. 
. . . The 
delegation 
of 
rule-making 
authority 
is 
intended to eliminate the necessity of establishing every 
administrative 
aspect 
of 
general 
public 
policy 
by 
legislation."); Wis. Stat. ch. 15, Structure of the Executive 
Branch; Wis. Stat. § 15.001(2)(a) ("As the chief administrative 
officer of the state, the governor should be provided with the 
administrative facilities and the authority to carry out the 
functions of the governor's office efficiently and effectively 
within the policy limits established by the legislature.").  
No. 
2013AP416   
 
11 
 
created by the Legislature that is "under the direction and 
supervision of the state superintendent of public instruction."11 
Wis. Stat. § 15.37. The SPI is an "officer in the state 
government" who is not the governor, a district attorney, or a 
military and judicial officer; thus, the SPI is also considered 
an "agency" to which Wis. Stat. ch. 227 applies. 
¶18 In order to implement the policy decisions of the 
Legislature, the Legislature delegates to agencies, by statute, 
the power to promulgate administrative rules.12 In 1943, the 
                                                 
11 The DPI is the administrative agency that interprets, 
implements, administers, and enforces the statutes in Wis. Stat. 
chs. 115-121 governing the supervision of public instruction at 
the state level. See Wis. Stat. § 115.001(2); see also Wis. 
Admin. Code PI (2013-14).  The DPI is created by the Legislature 
and is "under the direction and supervision of the state 
superintendent of public instruction" Wis. Stat. § 15.37, and it 
is the agency that promulgates rules when it or the SPI are 
required to do so. For example, Wis. Stat. § 115.28(5) requires 
the SPI to promulgate rules establishing procedures for bringing 
appeals before the SPI, but the rule itself is drafted and 
promulgated by the DPI. See Wis. Admin. Code PI 1; CR 87-84, 
384B Wis. Admin. Reg. (Dec. 31, 1987). The SPI is the 
"individual or body with policy making powers" who must approve 
rules proposed by the DPI. 
12 Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) (an agency may promulgate rules 
to effectuate the purpose of any statute administered by it); 
see also, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 85.16 (giving the Secretary of 
Transportation the authority to make rules "deemed necessary to 
the discharge of the powers, duties and functions vested in the 
department [of transportation]"). 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
12 
 
Legislature created Wis. Stat. ch. 227, entitled "Administrative 
Procedure and Review."13 The Legislature sought to promote 
efficiency and create a uniform set of procedures administrative 
agencies were to follow when promulgating rules. Chapter 227 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes has henceforth prescribed the procedure 
agencies must follow to promulgate valid rules and regulations. 
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 227.01(1)-.08 (1943-44); Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.01(1)-.30 (2013-14). 
¶19 A "rule" is defined by Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13) as "a 
regulation, standard, statement of policy or general order of 
general application which has the effect of law and which is 
issued by an agency to implement, interpret, or make specific 
legislation enforced or administered by the agency or to govern 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Legislature also frequently requires an agency to 
promulgate a rule on a certain subject. See generally Wis. Stat. 
§ 41.11(1g)(b)(5) (requiring the Department of Tourism to 
"establish by rule" a reporting and verification requirement for 
recipients of grants or loans under state economic development 
programs); Wis. Stat. § 118.045 (requiring the Department of 
Public 
Instruction 
to 
promulgate 
rules 
to 
implement 
and 
administer the statute section regarding commencement of the 
school term); Wis. Stat. § 150.03 (requiring the Department of 
Health Services to adopt rules and set standards to administer 
subchapters I and II of Wis. Stat. ch. 150). 
13 See Ralph M. Hoyt, The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure 
Act, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 214 (1944). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
13 
 
the 
organization 
or 
procedure 
of 
the 
agency."14 
Agencies 
generally must promulgate rules to take any action pursuant to 
the statutes they are tasked with administering unless the 
statute 
explicitly 
contains 
the 
threshold, 
standard, 
or 
requirement to be enforced.15 All agencies are required to 
                                                 
14 The statute gives a long list of agency actions or 
inactions that are not considered rules even though they would 
otherwise fit the definition given, such as actions concerning 
the internal management of an agency that do not affect private 
rights or interests, decisions or orders in contested cases, 
actions which relate to military or naval affairs, etc. See Wis. 
Stat. § 227.01(13)(a)-(zz). 
15 Agencies generally cannot take any legally binding action 
pursuant to a statute without promulgating a rule. For example, 
the COP-W/CIP-II program allows individuals who would qualify 
for Medicaid institutional care to instead receive services at 
home. The Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) (now 
Department of Health Services) is tasked with administering this 
statute. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 49.43(3e), 
.45(1). 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 49.45(6m)(i) states that this benefit is only available for 
persons receiving skilled, intermediate, or limited levels of 
nursing care as defined by the DHFS. In 2005, DHFS gave a 
written instruction to county "screeners" that changed how the 
screeners assessed whether someone qualified for "limited" care, 
but did not promulgate a rule to implement the new definition of 
needing limited care. Cholvin v. DHFS, 2008 WI App 127, ¶13, 313 
Wis. 2d 749, 758 N.W.2d 118. Previously, screeners were to 
assess people based upon their needs on a "bad day." Id., ¶19. 
The new instruction required screeners to assess a person as 
fully functional unless they needed assistance one-third of the 
time or more. Id. The court of appeals determined that the 
instruction was invalid and had to be promulgated as a rule. The 
court found that the instruction "interprets law because it 
removes from consideration a number of possible functional 
limitations" and that it created a new standard because it 
imposed "an entirely new eligibility condition established by 
DHFS." Id., ¶¶32-33. Thus, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) 
and .10(2m), DHFS screeners could not use the instruction to 
determine whether someone qualified for limited care until it 
validly promulgated the instruction as a rule. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
14 
 
promulgate rules to adopt general policies and interpretations 
of statutes that will govern the agency's enforcement or 
administration 
of 
that 
statute. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(1).16 
Additionally, an agency may not "implement or enforce any 
standard, requirement, or threshold, including as a term or 
condition of any license issued by the agency, unless that 
standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly required or 
explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has been 
promulgated in accordance with [Wis. Stat. ch. 227, subchapter 
II] . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m). 
1. Agency Rulemaking Prior to Act 2117 
¶20 Prior to Act 21, the procedures that agencies were 
required to follow to promulgate a rule were as follows. Once an 
agency resolved to make a rule, the agency began the rulemaking 
process by preparing "a statement of the scope" of the rule. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.135(1). Among other things, the scope statement 
gives an overview of the proposed rule and the effect it is 
likely to have on entities and government resources. Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.135(1)(a)-(f). 
                                                 
16 "Each agency shall promulgate as a rule each statement of 
general policy and each interpretation of a statute which it 
specifically adopts to govern its enforcement or administration 
of that statute." Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1). 
17 Again, we do not endeavor to recite every step of the 
process in detail, and there are many more requirements that 
must be met for a rule to be properly promulgated. See Wis. 
Stat. ch. 227 sub. II. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
15 
 
¶21 Once prepared, the agency sent a copy of the scope 
statement to the Legislative Reference Bureau for publication in 
the Administrative Register, and it sent another copy to the 
Secretary of Administration. Wis. Stat. § 227.135(3) (2009-10). 
The "individual or body with policy-making powers over the 
subject matter of a proposed rule" then had to approve the scope 
statement. Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2)(2009-10). 
¶22 After approval by the individual or body with policy-
making powers, the agency could begin drafting the proposed 
rule. See Wis. Stat. §§ 227.135(2)-.18 (2009-10). Once the 
drafting process was complete, the agency submitted the draft 
rule in its final form along with a detailed report about the 
proposed rule to the Legislature for review.18 Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.19(2)-(7)(2009-10). 
2. Rulemaking After Act 21 
¶23 As relevant here, Act 21 significantly altered the 
rulemaking process by allowing the Governor, at his discretion, 
to halt the process at two key points:  (1) after the agency has 
prepared a scope statement and (2) before the agency submits a 
draft rule to the Legislature for review.19 See Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
18 The 
legislative 
review 
process 
is 
elaborate 
and 
complicated, and again we are merely giving a summary and not a 
comprehensive analysis of the process. The full legislative 
review process can be found in Wis. Stat. §§ 227.19-.265. 
19 As noted previously, in some circumstances Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.137(6) as amended by Act 21 also allows the Secretary of 
Administration to keep a draft rule from being reviewed by the 
Legislature. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
16 
 
§ 227.135(2); Wis. Stat. § 227.185. At either juncture——and 
regardless of the approval of the "individual or body with 
policy-making powers over the subject matter of a proposed 
rule"——the agency may not proceed with the rulemaking process 
unless the agency receives the Governor's written approval, 
which can be withheld for any reason or for no reason. Id. 
B. Constitutional Challenges to Statutes 
¶24 Coyne 
challenges 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
aforementioned changes to Wis. Stat. ch. 227. Generally, there 
are two types of constitutional challenges to statutes: facial 
and as applied. Tammy W-G v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 
Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854. In either case, the statute is 
presumed constitutional. See id., ¶¶46-48. A facial challenge 
"attacks the law itself as drafted by the legislature, claiming 
the law is void from its beginning to the end and that it cannot 
be constitutionally enforced under any circumstances." Soc'y 
Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385. 
¶25 In an as applied challenge, the party does not attack 
the statute itself as unconstitutional; rather, the party claims 
that the statute has been applied to him or her in an 
unconstitutional manner. Id., ¶48. "The analysis of an as-
applied challenge is determined by the constitutional right that 
is alleged to have been affected by the application of the 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
17 
 
statute."20 Tammy W-G, 333 Wis. 2d 273, ¶49. Accordingly, in an 
as applied challenge, the court "assess[es] the merits of the 
particular case in front of us, 'not hypothetical facts in other 
situations.'" State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 
780 N.W.2d 63 (quoting State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 
Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785). 
¶26 The line between facial and as applied challenges is 
not always clear. Here, for example, Coyne's argument contains 
elements of both a facial and an as applied challenge. See 
League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 
2014 
WI 
97, 
¶134 
n.40, 
357 
Wis. 2d 360, 
851 
N.W.2d 302 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). Coyne is attacking the law as it 
was drafted by the Legislature, claiming that the portion of Act 
21 
involving 
the 
process 
of 
drafting 
and 
promulgating 
administrative rules could never be constitutionally applied. 
But Coyne limits this claim as applying only to the SPI. We 
conclude that this is an as applied challenge to Act 21 because 
Coyne is not claiming that the entirety of Act 21 can never be 
applied in any circumstance to any agency, but rather that Act 
21 cannot be constitutionally applied to the SPI. See Soc'y 
Ins., 326 Wis. 2d 444, ¶26. 
                                                 
20 Stated otherwise, the analysis changes depending on the 
right at issue. For example, when the challenge to the 
application of the statute involves an issue of freedom of 
conscience based on religious beliefs, we apply the "compelling 
state interest/least restrictive alternative test." See Tammy W-
G v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶50, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
18 
 
¶27 The dissents take issue with the procedural posture of 
this case, specifically commenting that "no proof has been 
submitted that either Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2) or Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.185 has been unconstitutionally enforced against the 
Superintendent." Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶231; see 
also Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶¶250-52. Contrary to the 
dissents' positions otherwise, Act 21 does not have to have been 
enforced for Coyne to properly bring a claim via a declaratory 
judgment action. Coyne properly seeks——through a declaratory 
judgment——that the court determine her "rights, status, and 
other legal relations" in a justiciable controversy. Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(1). 
¶28 The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04, allows "controversies of a justiciable nature to be 
brought before the courts for settlement and determination prior 
to the time that a wrong has been threatened or committed." 
Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶28, 309 
Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211. We have explained, 
A controversy is justiciable when the following four 
factors are present:  (1) A controversy in which a 
claim of right is asserted against one who has an 
interest in contesting it. (2) The controversy must be 
between persons whose interests are adverse.  (3) The 
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal 
interest in the controversy——that is to say, a legally 
protectable interest. (4) The issue involved in the 
controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. 
Id., ¶29. Governor Walker and Secretary Huebsch contested only 
the third factor in the courts below. They claimed that Coyne 
lacked a legally protectable interest in this controversy and 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
19 
 
thus had no standing to bring this action. See Coyne, 361 
Wis. 2d 225, ¶4. The court of appeals found that the Coyne 
parties had standing as taxpayers, id., ¶13, and Walker did not 
appeal that finding to this court.21 
¶29 Justice Ziegler's assertion that this case is unripe 
for adjudication is also without merit due to the nature of a 
declaratory judgment action. See Justice Ziegler's dissent, 
¶¶250-52. We examined the issue of ripeness in the context of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act in Olson, where we stated, 
By definition, the ripeness required in declaratory 
judgment actions is different from the ripeness 
required in other actions. . . . potential defendants 
'may seek a construction of a statute or a test of its 
constitutional validity without subjecting themselves 
to forfeitures or prosecution.' Thus, a plaintiff 
seeking a declaratory judgment need not actually 
suffer an injury before availing himself of the Act.  
What is required is that the facts be sufficiently 
developed to allow a conclusive adjudication. 
309 Wis. 2d 365, ¶43 (internal citations omitted). The facts 
before this court are sufficiently developed to determine 
whether Act 21 violates the constitution with respect the SPI.  
There are no details of any proposed rule or other facts that 
could come to light in the drafting process that would have any 
bearing on whether the contested portions of Act 21 violate 
                                                 
21 "Unlike the federal courts, which can only hear 'cases' 
or 'controversies,' standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of 
jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy." McConkey v. Van 
Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855. 
Accordingly, we are not required to reexamine this issue before 
proceeding. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
20 
 
Article X, § 1. The germane facts, namely, the constitutional 
provision and the text of the statutes, are already before us. 
¶30 Consequently, this case is properly before us as an as 
applied challenge to the constitutionality of Act 21. See 
Waushara Cty. v. Graff, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16 
(1992) ("Appellate courts need not and ordinarily will not 
consider or decide issues which are not specifically raised on 
appeal."). Coyne is, however, claiming that the statute as 
written can never be constitutionally applied to the SPI. Thus, 
the burden of proof Coyne must meet is that the application of 
Act 21 to the SPI is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Soc'y Ins., 326 Wis. 2d 444, ¶27. 
C. Rulemaking, Supervision, and the Language of Article X 
1. Rulemaking Is A Supervisory Power. 
¶31 We first address whether rulemaking is a supervisory 
power of the SPI and DPI. Article X, § 1 states, "[t]he 
supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state 
superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall 
direct; 
and 
their 
qualifications, 
powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation shall be prescribed by law." The SPI's and DPI's 
powers and duties are "prescribed by" the Legislature and found 
throughout Wis. Stat. chs. 115–121. If rulemaking is not a 
supervisory power, then there is no constitutional impediment to 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
21 
 
Act 21 because it would not affect the supervision of public 
instruction.22 
¶32 Coyne argues that because rulemaking has been part of 
the SPI's supervisory power since statehood, it is an "essential 
aspect" of the SPI's constitutional duty to supervise public 
instruction. In contrast, the Governor claims that rulemaking 
cannot be a supervisory power because of its "legislative 
nature." We find neither argument persuasive. Because the SPI is 
vested 
with 
the 
"supervision 
of 
public 
instruction," 
a 
"supervisory power" is one without which the SPI could not carry 
out his legislatively-mandated duties of supervision of public 
instruction. Put simply, the real question is whether the 
Legislature requires the SPI and DPI to supervise public 
instruction through rulemaking. 
¶33 As agencies, the SPI and DPI are both bound by Wis. 
Stat. ch. 227. This means they are statutorily required by the 
Legislature to engage in rulemaking in order to "implement or 
enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, including as a 
term or condition of any license issued by the agency." Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m). The SPI and DPI cannot take any legally 
binding action pursuant to any of the statutes they are tasked 
                                                 
22 "Public 
instruction" 
has 
been 
interpreted 
as 
"the 
elementary and high schools supported by pubic taxation." Wis. 
Stat. § 115.01(1). The SPI is tasked with the supervision of the 
public schools grades K-12, and the supervision of programs for 
the public schools that are supported by public taxation. See, 
e.g., Wis. 115.28 (1), (3), (20)-(23). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
22 
 
with administering without making rules unless the statute 
specifically provides for another course of action. Id. Because 
rulemaking is the only means by which the SPI and the DPI can 
currently perform most of their legislatively-mandated duties of 
supervision of public instruction,23 rulemaking is a supervisory 
power that the DPI and SPI must use to supervise public 
instruction. 
¶34 Article X, § 1 states, "[t]he supervision of public 
instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such 
other officers as the legislature shall direct; and their 
qualifications, 
powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation 
shall 
be 
prescribed by law." Though we have never interpreted the phrase 
"shall be prescribed by law" in specific reference to Article X, 
"[t]his 
court 
has 
consistently 
stated 
that 
the 
phrase 
'prescribed by law' in art. VI, § 3 plainly means prescribed by 
statutory law." State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶19, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526. Neither reason nor precedent leads 
us to interpret this same phrase differently in this provision. 
¶35 The Legislature has "prescribed by law" the SPI's and 
DPI's duties and powers of supervision of public instruction in 
Wis. Stat. chs. 115-121. By enacting Wis. Stat. § 15.37, the 
Legislature has "prescribed by law" that the SPI oversee the 
DPI. It has also "prescribed by law" that the SPI and DPI are 
agencies 
bound 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
227. 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
23 See Wis. Stat. chs. 115-121; see also Part D., infra; 
n.35, infra. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
23 
 
§ 227.01(1). Further, the Legislature has "prescribed by law" 
that the SPI and DPI must engage in rulemaking. See, e.g., infra 
n.39; Wis. Stat. §§ 227.10. Thus, rulemaking is a supervisory 
power because it is the means by which the Legislature has 
prescribed the SPI and DPI to carry out the majority of their 
statutorily-mandated 
duties 
and 
powers. 
Stated 
otherwise, 
rulemaking is the means by which the Legislature has "prescribed 
by law" that the SPI must carry out his Legislatively-defined 
duties of supervision. 
¶36 To be clear, rulemaking is not a constitutional power 
of the SPI. Article X, § 1 "is not [a provision] which 
incorporates an ancient common law office [such as the sheriff], 
possessing defined powers and duties, into the constitution." 
Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of W. Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 182, 321 
N.W.2d 225 (1982). There were no common law duties and powers 
that the SPI or any other officers of supervision of public 
instruction had traditionally possessed prior to the adoption of 
the Wisconsin Constitution because neither the office of the SPI 
nor a uniform system of public instruction existed prior the 
adoption of our constitution in 1848. See id. 
¶37 Consequently, any rulemaking power the SPI and DPI has 
is clearly a delegation of power from the Legislature, not from 
the 
constitution. 
However, 
under 
the 
current 
statutory 
prescription, the SPI and DPI cannot carry out their duties and 
powers of supervision without rulemaking. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10; see also infra n.39. Accordingly, under the current 
Legislative prescription of the SPI's powers and duties of 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
24 
 
supervision of public instruction, rulemaking is a supervisory 
power. 
 
2. The Legislature May Delegate Supervision of Public 
Instruction Only to Officers of Supervision of Public 
Instruction. 
¶38 We next address the argument that even if rulemaking 
is a supervisory power, the Legislature is free to divide that 
power among any "other officers" it chooses pursuant to Article 
X, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Both parties spent a 
substantial amount of effort arguing about the applicability and 
validity of our decision in Thompson, in which we held that the 
Legislature must maintain the superiority of the SPI over the 
"other officers" in whom supervision of public instruction is 
vested. 199 Wis. 2d 674. Thus, we begin with a discussion of 
Thompson. 
a. Thompson v. Craney 
¶39 Thompson's 
examination 
of 
Article 
X, 
§ 1 
is 
instructive to our analysis here, and much of what was said 
there applies to this case because we are interpreting the same 
constitutional provision under similar circumstances. However, 
this case poses a different constitutional question than the 
question posed in Thompson. In Thompson, the Legislature had 
redistributed nearly all of the SPI's powers of supervision of 
public instruction among other officers whose roles all related 
to the supervision of public instruction: a new Department of 
Education, a new Education Commission, and a new Secretary of 
Education. Id. at 678-79 (emphasis added). There, the question 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
25 
 
was not whether those officers could constitutionally be vested 
with the supervision of public instruction at all, but rather, 
whether the constitution allowed such "other officers" of 
supervision of public instruction to be given equal or greater 
authority over the supervision of public instruction than the 
SPI. Id. 
¶40 In contrast, here, the Legislature is attempting to 
give officers who are not officers of supervision of public 
instruction the ability to prevent the SPI from promulgating 
rules. Thus, the question in this case is whether the term 
"other officers" in Article X, § 1 allows some supervision of 
public instruction to be vested in any other officers the 
Legislature chooses, including other constitutional officers 
whose offices were not created to supervise public instruction. 
¶41 In short, there are two questions a court must 
consider. The first is whether the Legislature vested the 
supervision of public instruction in a proper "other officer." 
If the Legislature did not, then the analysis ends. If the 
Legislature did, then, under Thompson, we proceed to consider 
whether that "other officer" has been given equal or greater 
authority over the supervision of public instruction than the 
SPI. The Thompson court only addressed the second question, but 
we must address the first. Thus, although much of Thompson's 
general discussion of Article X, § 1 applies to this case, 
Thompson does not answer the precise constitutional question 
before us. Accordingly, we proceed to consider the first 
question left unanswered by Thompson: whether the Legislature 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
26 
 
vested the supervision of public instruction in a proper "other 
officer." 
 
b. General Principles Governing the Interpretation of a 
Constitutional Provision 
¶42 "The surest guides to a proper interpretation of 
[Article X, § 1] are the constitutions of 1846 and 1848, the 
1902 amendment, the accompanying debates, our legislature's 
first 
laws 
following 
adoption, 
and 
this 
court's 
prior 
interpretation of Article X, § 1." Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 698. 
Applying this approach, we begin by looking at the language of 
Article X, § 1 when it was adopted in 1848 and when it was 
amended in 1902. See Polk Cty., 188 Wis. 2d at 674. First 
adopted in 1848, Article X, § 1 stated, 
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent, and such other officers as 
the legislature shall direct. The state superintendent 
shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the 
state, in such manner as the legislature shall 
provide; his powers, duties, and compensation shall be 
prescribed by law. Provided, that his compensation 
shall not exceed the sum of twelve hundred dollars 
annually. 
In 1902, Article X, § 1 was amended to read, 
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent and such other officers as 
the 
legislature 
shall 
direct; 
and 
their 
qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law. The state superintendent shall 
be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at 
the same time and in the same manner as members of the 
supreme court, and shall hold office for four years 
from the succeeding first Monday in July. The state 
superintendent chosen at the general election in 
November, 1902, shall hold and continue in his office 
until the first Monday in July, 1905, and his 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
27 
 
successor shall be chosen at the time of the judicial 
election in April, 1905. The term of office, time and 
manner of electing or appointing all other officers of 
supervision of public instruction shall be fixed by 
law. 
Small, non-substantive changes were made by amendment in 1982; 
these changes included removing the word "his" from before the 
word "office," changing the word "four" to "4," and removing the 
sentence about the 1902 and 1905 elections. 
¶43 "The purpose of construing a constitutional amendment 
'is to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the 
voters who adopted it.'" Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶19, 358 
Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888 (citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 
¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328). "To determine what the 
framers and the voters wanted the constitutional provision to 
accomplish we first look at the plain language and meaning of 
the amendment they ratified." Appling, 358 Wis. 2d 132, ¶22. It 
is a paramount rule of constitutional construction that the 
intent of a provision "is to be ascertain[ed], not alone by 
considering the words of any part of the instrument, but by 
ascertaining the general purpose of the whole[.]" Kayden Indus., 
Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis.2d 718, 730, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967) 
(quoting State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 184, 
204 N.W. 803, 805 (1925)). 
¶44 When we examine the constitution as a whole, we 
conclude that Article X, § 1's reference to "other officers" 
means officers of supervision of public instruction other than 
the SPI. Article X is titled "Education," and the eight sections 
that lay within Article X form the foundation of Wisconsin's 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
28 
 
public education system. It follows then that the most logical 
interpretation of Article X, § 1 is that "other officers" means 
"other officers" whose offices relate to supervising education, 
i.e., other officers of supervision of public instruction. 
c. The Plain Language Of Article X, Section 1. 
¶45 The 
structure 
and 
language 
of 
Section 1 
itself 
supports our interpretation as well.  When the plain language of 
Article X, § 1 is read within the context of the entire section, 
it becomes clear that the "other officers" in whom the 
Legislature may vest the supervision of public instruction are 
other officers of supervision of public instruction.  
¶46 When the same word or phrase appears twice in the same 
statute or provision, we attribute the same definition to that 
word or phrase. See DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶29, 
299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 ("It is a basic rule of 
construction that we attribute the same definition to a word 
both times it is used in the same statute or administrative 
rule."). The only officers mentioned in Section 1 are the 
superintendent and the "other officers." The second sentence of 
Section 1 refers only to the superintendent.24 The final sentence 
of Article X, § 1 refers to "all other officers of supervision 
of public instruction." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the most 
                                                 
24 "The 
state 
superintendent 
shall 
be 
chosen 
by 
the 
qualified electors of the state at the same time and in the same 
manner as members of the supreme court, and shall hold office 
for 4 years from the succeeding first Monday in July." Wis. 
Const. Art. X, sec. 1. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
29 
 
reasonable construction of Section 1——as a whole——is that the 
term "all other officers" in the last sentence of Section 1 is 
referring to "all officers authorized by Article X, § 1 other 
than the superintendent." The final sentence specifically states 
that these "other officers" are "other officers of supervision 
of public instruction." It would defy our basic principles of 
construction to conclude that the drafters of Article X, § 1 
were referring to different "other officers" in the first 
sentence than in the last, particularly when read in context 
with the rest of Section 1. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 2003 WI 
112, ¶13, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 ("In interpreting a 
constitutional provision, we first turn to the plain meaning of 
the amendment in context"). 
¶47 Further evidence that the "other officers" referred to 
in Article X, § 1 were intended exclusively to be other officers 
of supervision of public instruction is found throughout 
Section 1. 
The 
Legislature 
is 
empowered 
to 
define 
the 
qualifications, powers, duties, compensation, term of office, 
and time and manner of selection of all "other officers" 
authorized by Article X. The very existence of their offices is 
dependent upon the Legislature. With this in mind, the most 
straightforward interpretation of "such other officers as the 
Legislature may direct" is that the "other officers" are meant 
to be "creatures of the Legislature" whose offices were created 
to supervise public instruction. See, e.g., City of Sun Prairie 
v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, ¶¶29-31, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) 
(nothing that although municipal courts are authorized by the 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
30 
 
constitution, they exist only if the Legislature creates them; 
thus, they are "creatures of the legislature" with no inherent 
powers). 
¶48 Another indication that the "other officers" in 
Article X, § 1 must be other officers of supervision of public 
instruction 
is 
found 
in 
the 
provision 
for 
a 
state 
superintendent. See Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 698-99. The first 
portion 
of 
Article 
X, 
§ 1 
vests 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction in "a state superintendent and such other officers 
as the legislature may direct." The constitution does not define 
"superintendent," so we look to a dictionary from around the 
time of the provision's adoption to determine the common, 
ordinary meaning of the word at the time of the adoption of the 
constitution. See Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2003 WI 64, 
¶32, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665. A superintendent is "[o]ne 
who has the oversight and charge of something, with the power of 
direction."25  
¶49 The Legislature must vest the supervision of public 
instruction in officers over whom the SPI has "oversight and 
charge with the power of direction," or by definition he is no 
                                                 
25 Superintendent, Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of 
the English Language, 810 (J.E. Worcester ed., New York, N. & J. 
White, 15th abr. ed. 1838). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
31 
 
longer the superintendent of public instruction.26 See Thompson, 
199 Wis.2d at 698-99. Article X, § 1 gives the Legislature the 
freedom to shape and reshape a system of public education that 
fits the needs of the people of our State at any given time. See 
id., see also Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 701-02 (Wilcox, J., 
concurring). To that end, the Legislature is free to create or 
eliminate 
the 
positions 
of 
whatever 
"other 
officers" 
of 
supervision of public instruction it wants. The Legislature may 
also grant, withhold, or take away those officers' powers and 
duties 
as 
it 
sees 
fit. 
However, 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction 
must 
remain 
in 
the 
hands 
of 
officers 
whose 
activities the SPI oversees and directs; otherwise, the SPI is 
no longer supervising public instruction, which would constitute 
a violation of Article X, § 1. See Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 698-
99. 
¶50 The argument remains, however, that "other officers" 
and "other officers of supervision of public instruction" are 
different terms, and thus "other officers" in the first sentence 
must have a different meaning than "other officers" in the last 
                                                 
26 This does not mean that the SPI must have direct control 
over every decision made by the other officers of supervision of 
public 
instruction. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 118.01(1) 
(outlining the responsibilities of the superintendent, the 
school boards, the parents and guardians of pupils, and the 
state in public education). Rather, the SPI has the "power of 
direction" of the other officers of supervision of public 
instruction if those officers are not free to ignore the 
directives of the SPI made pursuant to the statutes he is tasked 
with administering by the Legislature. Compare Wis. Stat. 
ch. 115 with Wis. Stat. ch. 118. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
32 
 
sentence. We cannot conclude that the plain language of Article 
X, § 1 unambiguously precludes this interpretation, so we move 
on to our second source of constitutional interpretation:  the 
constitutional debates and practices in existence at the time of 
the writing of the constitutional provision.  Polk Cty., 188 
Wis. 2d at 674. 
d. The Constitutional Debates Regarding Article X. 
¶51 When interpreting a constitutional provision we do not 
rest our analysis on the language of the provision alone. 
Rather, we also consult the constitutional debates and the 
practices in existence at the time of the writing of the 
constitutional provision and the interpretation of the provision 
by the Legislature as manifested in the laws passed following 
its adoption. Id. Both the constitutional debates and the laws 
passed following the adoption of Article X, § 1 and the 1902 
amendment show that the "other officers" authorized by the 
provision were meant to be officers of supervision of public 
instruction whose positions were created by the Legislature 
exclusively for that purpose. 
¶52 As originally proposed in 1846, Article X, § 1 read: 
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent and such other officers as 
the legislature may direct. The state superintendent 
shall be chosen by the electors of the state once in 
every two years. The legislature shall provide for 
filling 
vacancies 
in 
the 
office 
of 
state 
superintendent and prescribe his powers and duties. 
The Convention of 1846, 538 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1919) 
available 
at 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
33 
 
https://books.google.com/books?id=EY0UAAAAYAAJ&printsec=titlepag
e&source=gbs_summary_r&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false 
(hereinafter 
The Convention of 1846). The proposed constitution of 1846 was 
not adopted, and another convention was called in 1847. The 
Attainment of Statehood, VI-VIII, (Milo M. Quaife, ed. 1928). 
The wording of the 1846 provision was largely retained; the only 
changes made were regarding the method of selection of the 
superintendent. See Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 686. 
¶53 As this court recognized in Thompson, discussion of 
the role or powers of the "other officers" mentioned in Article 
X is completely absent from the constitutional debates of 1846 
and 1848. 199 Wis. 2d at 687; see also Conrad Patzer, Public 
Education in Wisconsin 17-27 (1925); Journal and Debates, 
reprinted in The Attainment of Statehood, (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 
1928). The debates focused mainly on the other sections of the 
Article and the importance of the superintendent. The phrase 
"such other officers as the legislature shall direct" went 
virtually unchallenged. Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 687. 
¶54 However, 
two 
defeated 
proposals 
regarding 
the 
superintendent from the 1846 debates indicate that the framers 
envisioned the "other officers" in Article X, § 1 to be officers 
of public instruction whose offices were created by the 
Legislature. One delegate to the 1846 convention sought to amend 
Section 1 by eliminating the superintendent altogether. His 
proposed amendment read "[t]he supervision of public instruction 
shall be vested in such officers as shall hereafter be created 
by law." The Convention of 1846, 568. Another delegate thought 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
34 
 
that the superintendent was unnecessary and that "the duties [of 
supervision of public instruction] for a time might be done by 
the secretary of state or some other officer already provided 
for, leaving to the legislature to provide for this office when 
the time came." Id. 
¶55 The framers of the 1846 constitution rejected a model 
where the supervision of public instruction was vested in "other 
officer[s] already provided for," and all other proposed 
amendments to the section always left it to the Legislature to 
provide for new officers to supervise public instruction. The 
framers decided that a superintendent was crucial and rejected 
both proposals, but clearly they were considering a system where 
the 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction 
was 
vested 
in 
a 
superintendent and officers whose offices were created for that 
purpose. That the "other officers" were intended to be officers 
of supervision of public instruction was never in contention. 
¶56 Moreover, the history of the 1902 amendment to Article 
X, § 1 indicates that the drafter of the amendment and those who 
ratified it also understood the "other officers" to be other 
officers 
of 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction. 
The 
1902 
amendment, which substantially provided Article X, § 1 as we 
know it today, was drafted and supported by then-Superintendent 
of Public Instruction Lorenzo Dow Harvey. See Conrad Patzer, 
Lorenzo Dow Harvey, 93 (1936). Harvey was concerned that local, 
elected county superintendents had been using the office for 
political 
gain 
rather 
than 
for 
furthering 
the 
cause 
of 
education, so he introduced the amendment in order to allow the 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
35 
 
Legislature to provide for the appointment of local public 
instruction officials. See id. at 93; see also Thompson, 199 
Wis. 2d at 691-92. Additionally, Harvey was concerned with 
ensuring that there was enough flexibility to overhaul the 
public school system, as Justice Wilcox pointed out in his 
concurrence in Thompson. 199 Wis. 2d at 702-03 (Wilcox, J., 
concurring). 
¶57 Our review of the history of the drafting of the 1902 
amendment reveals that like the drafters of the original 
provision, Harvey only ever contemplated the Legislature vesting 
the supervision of public instruction in officers whose offices 
were created by the Legislature for that purpose. See Thompson, 
199 Wis. 2d at 690-693; see also Thompson, 199 Wis. Stat. §  at 
701-05 (Wilcox, J., concurring); Conrad Patzer, Lorenzo Dow 
Harvey, 93-95. Harvey's stated purpose of amendment was to allow 
the Legislature to appoint public instruction officers, if 
necessary, in order to ensure that the officers supervising 
public instruction were dedicated solely to the task of 
education rather than using the office as a political stepping 
stone. In fact, it was Harvey who added the "other officers of 
supervision of public instruction" language to the section. It 
strains credulity to accept that Harvey intended Article X, § 1 
to allow the Legislature to vest the supervision of public 
instruction in officials who are not officers of supervision of 
public instruction when he is the person who added that language 
to Section 1. 
e. The First Laws Interpreting Article X, Section 1. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
36 
 
¶58 We next turn to our third source of interpreting a 
constitutional 
provision. 
We 
examine 
the 
"earliest 
interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested 
in the earliest law passed following the adoption of the 
constitution." Polk Cty., 188 Wis. 2d at 674. Thus, we look to 
the first laws passed vesting the supervision of public 
instruction in "other officers." The constitution does not 
define "supervision," so we again look to a dictionary from 
around the time of the provision's adoption to determine the 
common, ordinary meaning of the word "supervision" at the time 
of the adoption of the constitution.27 See Xcel Energy Servs., 
Inc., 349 Wis. 2d 234, ¶32. "Supervision" is defined as "[t]he 
act of overseeing; inspection; superintendence."28  
¶59 The first laws regarding "overseeing, inspection, or 
superintendence" of public instruction passed by the Legislature 
of 1848 defined the powers and duties of the SPI and created the 
office of "town superintendent of common schools." See Laws of 
                                                 
27 The term "supervision" was not changed by the 1902 
amendment, so we use a dictionary from around the time Article 
X, § 1 was initially adopted. Additionally, the definition has 
not changed substantially since 1848. "Supervision" is defined 
as "[t]he series of acts involved in managing, directing, or 
overseeing persons or projects"; 
Supervision, Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
28 Supervision, Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language, 811 (J.E. Worcester ed., New York, N. & J. 
White, 15th abr. ed. 1838). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
37 
 
1848, 127-29;29 Laws of 1848, 209. The duties of the town 
superintendent of common schools included qualifying teachers, 
examining the condition of schools, and advising on the course 
of studies to be pursued. See Laws of 1848, 219, Sec.1-2. The 
town superintendent of common schools was "in all cases under 
the control and direction of the state superintendent of public 
instruction." Laws of 1848, 219, Sec.3. 
¶60 The Legislature also enacted an "Act in relation to 
Public Schools," which created the school district system, 
school district officers, district boards, and town boards of 
school inspectors. Laws of 1848, 226-47. The SPI, the town 
superintendent, and the district officers and boards were 
entrusted with all functions of the public schools. Id. All of 
these officers whom the Act vested with the supervision of 
public instruction are, aside from the SPI, officers whose 
positions the Legislature created for the purpose of supervising 
public instruction.30 See Laws of 1848, 127-29, 226-47. The 
Legislature created county superintendents of schools in 1866. 
See, e.g., Laws of 1866, Chapter 111. Some Legislatures created 
city boards of education and city superintendents to supervise 
public instruction in the cities; these officers wielded the 
                                                 
29 The laws of 1848 did not provide separate numbers for 
each act. Thus, we will cite to these laws by the page on which 
it appears in the bound volume of the Laws and the section 
number where appropriate. 
30 Some record-keeping responsibilities were given to the 
town clerk. See Laws of 1848, 226-47, Sec.80-88. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
38 
 
powers of supervision that would have otherwise been vested in 
the county superintendent. See, e.g., Laws of 1865, Chapter 268, 
361-363 (creating a board of education to supervise public 
instruction in the city of Appleton). The common thread between 
these "other officers" is that they all are officers of public 
instruction whose offices the Legislature created for the 
purpose of supervising public education. 
¶61 Similar to the Legislature's actions following the 
adoption of the 1848 constitution, the Legislature first 
interpreting the 1902 amendment to Article X, § 1 routinely and 
exclusively vested the supervision of public instruction in 
officers of supervision of public instruction. The Legislature 
provided the qualifications, powers, duties, and compensation of 
the SPI in the Laws of 1903, Chapter 37, 54. The Legislature 
reintroduced the office of the County Superintendent of Common 
Schools and the city superintendents were retained. Laws of 
1903, Chapter 307, 480; see also Wis. Stat. ch. 27 sec. 461 
(1911) (assigning duties of county superintendents that included 
licensing teachers, examining schools in his district, and 
advising on methods and courses of instruction). The Legislature 
established the township system of school government in the 
towns of Hiles and Laona. Laws of 1903, Chapter 36, 50. School 
boards in large cities were given the power to establish schools 
and hire support staff. Laws of 1903, Chapter 101, 150. In sum, 
the first laws passed after the 1902 amendment to Article X, § 1 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
39 
 
reflect that Legislature's understanding that "other officers" 
meant other officers of supervision of public instruction.31 
¶62 In fact, the Legislature's vesting of supervision of 
public instruction solely in officers of supervision of public 
instruction has continued in an unbroken line from the founding 
of our State in 1848 to the present. We were unable to find a 
single instance in which the Legislature of this State gave 
supervision of public instruction to officers whose office was 
not dedicated to supervising public education.32 Even when the 
Legislature attempted to restructure the entire system of public 
instruction with the law at issue in Thompson, it created new 
offices 
of 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction 
such 
as 
a 
Department of Education. See Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 678-79. To 
be clear, the Legislature has never attempted to vest the 
supervision of public instruction in "other officers" whose 
offices——like the Governor's——were not devoted to that task, and 
                                                 
31 For a summary of the various ways the Legislature 
organized the school system between 1848 and 1924, see Patzer, 
Public Education in Wisconsin (1924). 
32 There were some instances where the Mayor of a city was 
designated as one of the members of the city board of education; 
however, the vesting of supervision was in the board, not in the 
mayor. See, e.g., Laws of 1865, Chapter 268, 361-362 (Appleton 
city board of education to consist of the mayor, the director, 
and 
the 
clerk 
of 
each 
school 
district, 
with 
the 
city 
superintendent as an ex officio member). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
40 
 
that is how we have uniformly interpreted "such other officers 
as the legislature shall direct" as well.33 
¶63 In 
sum, 
"[t]he 
surest 
guides 
to 
a 
proper 
interpretation of [Article X, § 1] are the constitutions of 1846 
and 1848, the 1902 amendment, the accompanying debates, our 
legislature's first laws following adoption, and this court's 
prior 
interpretation 
of 
Article 
X, 
§ 1." 
Thompson, 
199 
Wis. 2d at 698. Our review of these sources leads us to a single 
conclusion:  that the "other officers" in whom the Legislature 
may vest the supervision of public instruction must be other 
officers of supervision of public instruction. It is self-
evident that neither the office of the Governor nor that of the 
Secretary of Administration were created by the Legislature as 
officers of supervision of public instruction. Accordingly, the 
Legislature may not delegate to the Governor or the Secretary of 
                                                 
33 See Raymer v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 48, 51 N.W. 1133 
(1892) 
("[Article 
X, 
§ 1] 
expressly 
declares 
that 
'the 
supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state 
superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall 
direct.' This left the legislature free to prescribe such 
assistants and clerks as may be deemed essential." (emphasis 
added)); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 707, 546 N.W.2d 
123 (1996) (Wilcox, J., concurring) ("The ability of the 
legislature 
to 
create 
other 
state 
officers 
who 
exercise 
supervisory authority over public instruction was addressed by 
this court in Burton v. State Appeal Bd. . . . [and the court 
held the board members were Article X officers rather than mere 
"employees"]." (emphasis added)); Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of W. 
Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 182, 321 N.W.2d 225 (1982) ("Because the 
constitution explicitly authorized the legislature to set the 
powers and duties of the public instruction officers, Article X, 
§ 1 confers no more authority upon those officers than that 
delineated by statute." (emphasis added)). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
41 
 
Administration the power to "oversee, inspect, or superintend" 
public 
instruction. 
To 
do 
so 
would 
result 
in 
the 
unconstitutional 
vesting 
of 
the 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction in an officer who is not an officer of supervision 
public instruction. 
D. Act 21 And Supervision of Public Instruction. 
¶64 Having determined that rulemaking is a supervisory 
power granted to the SPI and DPI by the Legislature and that the 
supervision of public instruction may not be vested in the 
Governor or the Secretary of Administration, the remaining 
question is whether Act 21 vests the Governor and the Secretary 
of Administration with the supervision of public instruction. 
Act 21 did not remove or reduce the rulemaking powers of the SPI 
or DPI. Accordingly, the issue here is whether the power to halt 
the rulemaking of the SPI and DPI vests the Governor and 
Secretary of Administration with the supervision of public 
instruction. 
¶65 We hold that it does. By giving the Governor the power 
to prevent the SPI's and DPI's proposed rules from being sent to 
the Legislature, Act 21 gives the Governor the authority to 
"oversee, inspect, or superintend" public instruction. Indeed, 
Act 21 gives the Governor the power to decide upon the very 
existence of any rules on all topics regarding the supervision 
of public instruction. The Secretary of Administration holds 
this same power if the rule at issue meets the conditions set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 227.137(6). Accordingly, Act 21 vests the 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
42 
 
Governor 
and 
the 
Secretary 
of 
Administration 
with 
the 
supervision of public instruction. 
¶66 As discussed previously, rulemaking is the primary 
means 
by 
which 
the 
SPI 
and 
DPI 
must 
carry 
out 
their 
legislatively-mandated duties. The SPI and DPI are statutorily 
required to promulgate rules in order to adopt any statement of 
general policy and any interpretation of a statute "to govern 
[their] enforcement or administration of that statute," as well 
as to "implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or 
threshold" unless the same is explicitly required or permitted 
by statute. Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1), (2m). Additionally, the 
"Education" chapters of the statutes, Wis. Stat. chs. 115-121, 
mandate no less than 71 times34 that the SPI or DPI make rules on 
various subjects ranging from the licensing of teachers to the 
                                                 
34 Within Wis. Stat. chs. 115-121, there are 53 instances 
where the statutes state that the SPI or the DPI "shall" 
promulgate rules, and 18 instances where the statutes state that 
a particular item will be administered "as defined [by the SPI 
or DPI] by rule." This does not include statutes that the SPI or 
DPI would have to promulgate a rule to administer or enforce due 
to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 227.10. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
43 
 
commencement of the school term.35 This number does not even 
include 
the 
statutes 
the 
SPI 
and 
DPI 
are 
tasked 
with 
administering that do not include a command to promulgate a 
rule. Under the current legislative prescription, the SPI and 
DPI cannot supervise public instruction without rulemaking. 
Pursuant to Act 21, they cannot promulgate rules without the 
approval of the Governor. Consequently, Act 21 beyond a 
reasonable doubt unconstitutionally vests the supervision of 
public instruction in the Governor. 
¶67 The Governor contends that Act 21 does not vest the 
Governor with the supervision of public instruction because it 
does not transfer the power to make rules regarding public 
instruction to the Governor and Secretary of Administration, nor 
does it infringe upon the SPI's ability to approve or deny the 
DPI's scope statements. We disagree. The essence of supervision 
includes the power to prevent an action at one's discretion. 
While Act 21 does not give the Governor the power to promulgate 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 115.28(7) (SPI must make rules 
establishing standards and procedures for licensing teachers); 
Wis. Stat. § 115.28(59)(d) (SPI must promulgate rules to provide 
academic 
and 
career 
planning 
to 
students); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 115.36(3)(a) (Department of Public Instruction must promulgate 
rules to fund school district projects assisting minors with 
drug or alcohol problems); Wis. Stat. § 115.415 (Department of 
Public Instruction must promulgate rules on evaluating teacher 
effectiveness); Wis. Stat. § 118.045(3) (Department of Public 
Instruction shall promulgate rules to determine whether a school 
board may commence the term before September 1); Wis. Stat. 
§ 120.14 (Department of Public Instruction must establish by 
rule a standard contract and minimum standards for school board 
audits). 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
44 
 
rules regarding public instruction, it does give the Governor 
the power "in his or her discretion"36 to decide that "there will 
be no rule on a given subject irrespective of the judgment of 
the SPI." Coyne, 361 Wis. 2d 225, ¶29. 
¶68 It 
is 
granting 
the 
Governor 
and 
Secretary 
of 
Administration the power to make the decision on whether the 
rulemaking process can proceed that causes the constitutional 
infirmity. This unchecked power to stop a rule also gives the 
Governor the ability to supplant the policy choices of the SPI. 
Like the court of appeals, we believe that "a Governor at 
loggerheads with an SPI over the content of a proposed rule, or 
a proposed rule change, could use the threat to withhold 
approval as a means of affecting the rule content." Id., ¶35. 
For example, the Governor could refuse to approve a scope 
statement or a rule until it met the Governor's specifications. 
¶69 This does not mean the Governor and the Secretary of 
Administration cannot be involved in the rule-drafting process 
at all; it simply means that they cannot be given the authority 
to halt the process. The Legislature can require whatever 
rulemaking steps it wants as long as the SPI and DPI are able to 
make the final decision on the contents of a proposed rule and 
submit that proposed rule to the Legislature at the end of the 
process. For example, there is no constitutional infirmity in 
requiring the SPI and DPI to prepare the economic impact 
                                                 
36 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.185. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
45 
 
analysis and submit it to the Secretary of Administration and 
the Governor as long as those officers are not permitted to 
block the rule from being submitted to the Legislature.  
Additionally, the Legislature could require the SPI to submit 
the draft rule to the Governor and allow the Governor to send 
the rule back to the SPI with requested changes (provided the 
SPI is not required to incorporate them). The Legislature could 
further require the SPI to hold additional hearings on the 
Governor's proposed changes, to prepare a detailed report on the 
Governor's proposed changes and a report on why the SPI does not 
agree with them, to have a personal consultation with the 
Governor, or to resubmit the rule to the Governor to get his 
written opinion on it and submit that opinion to the Legislature 
along with the draft rule. The Legislature can create whatever 
rulemaking process it sees fit, as long as at the end of the 
process the SPI and DPI are able to decide on the final content 
of a proposed rule and submit that proposed rule to the 
Legislature.37 
¶70 Additionally, the constitution gives the Legislature 
control over what powers the SPI and the other officers of 
supervision of public instruction possess in order to supervise 
public instruction. As a result, the Legislature may give, may 
not give, and may take away the powers and duties of the SPI and 
the other officers of supervision of public instruction. If the 
                                                 
37 This statement assumes that the Legislature continues to 
require the SPI and DPI to promulgate rules. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
46 
 
Legislature 
does 
not 
believe 
the 
SPI 
should 
engage 
in 
rulemaking, it is free to change the statutory scheme so that 
the SPI and DPI can carry out the duties with which they are 
tasked through other means and are not required to promulgate 
rules. Moreover, it could change the duties with which they are 
tasked, or it could provide all of the definitions, standards, 
requirements, thresholds, and terms or conditions of any 
licenses issued by the SPI and DPI by statute. What it cannot do 
is require the SPI and DPI to supervise public instruction 
through rulemaking and then condition rulemaking on the approval 
of an officer who is not an officer of supervision of public 
instruction. 
¶71 Accordingly, the constitutional problem with Act 21 is 
that it contains no mechanism for the SPI and DPI to proceed 
with rulemaking in the face of withheld approval by the Governor 
or Secretary of Administration. Had the Legislature provided 
some means for the SPI and DPI to continue the rulemaking 
process if the Governor or the Secretary of Administration did 
not approve the rule, the supervision of public instruction 
would remain with the SPI and DPI. However, as currently 
written, 
Act 
21 
gives 
the 
Governor 
and 
Secretary 
of 
Administration the unchecked power to halt the SPI's and DPI's 
promulgation of rules on any aspect of public instruction, 
ranging from teachers' qualifications to the implementation of 
the school milk program to nonresident waiting list requirements 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
47 
 
for pupils.38 In other words, Act 21 improperly vests the 
Governor and Secretary of Administration with the supervision of 
public instruction in violation of Article X, § 1. Consequently, 
the portions of Act 21 allowing the Governor and Secretary of 
Administration to halt the rulemaking process are void as 
applied to the SPI and his subordinates. 
 
E. The Reasons the Dissents and the Lead Reach a Different 
Conclusion. 
¶72 Now that we have fully presented our interpretation of 
Article X, § 1, we turn to discuss a few of the points made in 
Chief Justice Roggensack's and Justice Ziegler's dissents. We 
begin with a brief summary of our analysis. First, Article X, 
§ 1 states that "the supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested in a state superintendent" and in "other officers of 
supervision of public instruction." Thus, the constitution 
grants the SPI the power to supervise public instruction. 
Second, Article X, § 1 states that the SPI's "qualifications, 
powers, duties, and compensation shall be prescribed by law." 
This means the Legislature has the power to fill in the details 
as to what supervision entails. The Legislature has required the 
SPI 
to 
supervise 
public 
instruction 
through 
rulemaking. Consequently, rulemaking is how the SPI exercises 
his power to supervise public instruction. Under Act 21, the 
Legislature 
has 
taken 
the 
SPI's 
power 
to 
supervise 
via 
                                                 
38 See Wis. Stat. § 115.28(7); Wis. Stat. § 115.343(1); Wis. 
Stat. § 118.51(5)(d)3. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
48 
 
rulemaking 
and 
conditioned 
it 
on 
the 
approval 
of 
the 
Governor. The Governor is not an "officer of supervision or 
public instruction;" therefore, the Legislature cannot vest him 
with the supervision of public instruction. 
¶73 The main problem with the dissents' analyses are their 
singular focus on only half of Article X, § 1. Both dissents 
emphasize the phrase "and their qualifications, powers, duties, 
and compensation shall be prescribed by law." However, a 
meaningful interpretation of Article X, § 1 should focus on two 
equally important phrases: (1) "The supervision of public 
instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such 
other officers as the legislature shall direct," and (2) "and 
their qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall be 
prescribed by law." 
¶74 While Article X, § 1 gives the Legislature the broad 
authority to both create "other officers of supervision of 
public 
instruction" 
and 
to 
outline 
those 
officer's 
"qualifications, powers, duties and compensation," Article X, 
§ 1 also places some limits on the Legislature's power. Per the 
words of Article X, § 1, the "other officers" the Legislature 
creates must be "other officers of supervision of public 
instruction." Additionally, the plain language of Article X, § 1 
demands that "[t]he supervision of public instruction [] be 
vested in a state superintendent and such other officers." Chief 
Justice Roggensack's and Justice Ziegler's dissents refuse to 
recognize these limitations. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
49 
 
¶75 First, neither Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent nor 
Justice Ziegler's dissent attempt to address the question at the 
heart of the controversy in this case: in whom may the 
Legislature vest the supervision of public instruction? Indeed, 
Chief Justice Roggensack remarks, "[t]he matter before us does 
not concern the 'other officers' mentioned in Article X, § 1."  
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶227. And Justice Ziegler 
comments, "[I]t is not really the Governor who is supervising 
(or even obstructing, if one prefers) the actions of the SPI; it 
is the Legislature." Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶247. Our 
response to both is simply this: how is it not? How does the 
matter before us not concern the "other officers" mentioned in 
Article X, § 1? And how is the Governor not supervising public 
instruction and the SPI when he is the one who halts the 
rulemaking process? If neither Chief Justice Roggensack nor 
Justice Ziegler will recognize that the constitution places a 
limit on who the Legislature may vest the supervision of public 
instruction in, then we can never reach the same conclusion 
despite agreeing on many legal principles.39 
                                                 
39 The closest Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent comes to 
answering this question is its statement that "[t]he legislature 
has broad constitutional power over the Superintendent, so long 
as the tasks assigned do not fall outside public instruction, as 
it was alleged the statute did in School Dist. No. 3, supra." 
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶225 (emphasis added). Thus, 
the dissent comments that the tasks assigned to the SPI must 
relate to public instruction. But it fails to consider whether 
the people to whom the tasks are assigned——the officers——must 
relate to public instruction. We are confident that had Chief 
Justice Roggensack undertaken her constitutional analysis with 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
50 
 
¶76 Second, neither dissent is willing to acknowledge the 
constitution's instruction that "[t]he supervision of public 
instruction [] be vested in a state superintendent and such 
other officers as the legislature shall direct." Both Chief 
Justice Roggensack's dissent and Justice Ziegler's dissent 
instead 
immediately 
proceed 
to 
focus 
exclusively 
on 
the 
Legislature and its ability to outline the SPI and the "other 
officers" "qualifications, powers, duties and compensation." 
Because 
both 
dissents 
skip 
over 
the 
clause 
that 
vests 
supervision of public instruction in the SPI and "other 
officers," and instead only look at the "prescribed by law" 
clause, both dissents read our opinion as stripping the 
Legislature of its power under Article X, § 1. For example, 
Chief Justice Roggensack remarks that our opinion "reduces the 
constitutional 
power 
of 
the 
legislature 
to 
control 
its 
delegations of legislative power in rulemaking." Chief Justice 
Roggensack's dissent, ¶229. And according to Justice Ziegler, 
our conclusion in this case gives "unfettered" authority to the 
SPI and the "other officers." See Justice Ziegler's dissent, 
¶248. 
¶77 These allegations are simply not true. As we explained 
earlier in this opinion, our determination in this case "does 
not mean the Governor and the Secretary of Administration cannot 
be involved in the rule-drafting process at all . . . . the 
                                                                                                                                                             
regard to the issue presented, she would have reached the same 
conclusion we reach. 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
51 
 
Legislature can require whatever rulemaking steps it wants as 
long as the SPI and DPI are able to make the final decision on 
the contents of a proposed rule and submit that proposed rule to 
the Legislature at the end of the process." See infra ¶69. 
Moreover, we noted "[T]he Legislature may give, may not give, 
and may take away the powers and duties of the SPI and the other 
officers 
of 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction. 
If 
the 
Legislature 
does 
not 
believe 
the 
SPI 
should 
engage 
in 
rulemaking, it is free to change the statutory scheme . . . ." 
See infra ¶70. 
¶78 To 
summarize, 
unlike 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
Justice Ziegler's dissents, we have attempted to meaningfully 
interpret two equally important phrases: (1) "The supervision of 
public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and 
such other officers as the legislature shall direct," and (2) 
"and their qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law." If one chooses to address only half of 
the question presented, as both dissents have done, or chooses 
to emphasize only one of these two phrases, as both dissents 
have done, then we can never reach the same conclusion 
regardless of our agreement on many legal principles. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶79 Our constitution is the true expression of the will of 
the people: it must be adopted by the people of this State, and 
if it is to be changed, it must be ratified by the people of 
this State. By adopting our constitution, the people of 
No. 
2013AP416   
 
52 
 
Wisconsin gave the Legislature broad discretion to define the 
powers and duties of the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and the other officers of public instruction. However, the will 
of the people as expressed by Article X, § 1 also requires the 
Legislature to keep the supervision of public instruction in the 
hands of the officers of supervision of public instruction. To 
do otherwise would require a constitutional amendment. Because 
Act 21 does not allow the SPI and DPI to proceed with their 
duties of supervision without the Governor's, and in some 
circumstances the Secretary of Administration's approval, Act 21 
unconstitutionally 
vests 
the 
Governor 
and 
Secretary 
of 
Administration with the supervision of public instruction in 
violation of Article X, § 1. Accordingly, the court of appeals 
is affirmed.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶80 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I conclude, 
as do the lead opinion (which represents the views of only 
Justice Gableman) and Justice Prosser's concurrence, that 2011 
Wis. Act 21, which altered the process of administrative 
rulemaking,1 is unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction and the Department of Public Instruction.  
As a result, I concur in the mandate affirming the court of 
appeals.   
¶81 Two reasons prevent me from joining both the lead 
opinion and Justice Prosser's concurrence.   
¶82 First, both Justice Gableman's lead opinion and 
Justice Prosser's concurrence give short shrift to Thompson v. 
Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 678, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  Thompson 
has stood for 20 years as the seminal case interpreting Article 
X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which vests "the 
supervision of public instruction" in the superintendent.  "This 
court follows the doctrine of stare decisis scrupulously because 
of our abiding respect for the rule of law."2  
¶83 In Thompson, this court unanimously held that 1995 
Wis. Act 27 was unconstitutional.  Act 27 substantially 
reorganized the roles of the superintendent and Department of 
                                                 
1 See Ronald Sklansky, Changing the Rules on Rulemaking, 
Wis. 
Lawyer 
(Aug. 
2011), 
available 
at 
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/art
icle.aspx?Volume=84&Issue=8&ArticleID=2092 (explaining 2011 Wis. 
Act 21's salient modifications to the process of administrative 
rulemaking).   
2 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
2 
 
Public Instruction and entrusted many of the powers of the 
superintendent to appointed "other officers" who were not 
subordinate to the superintendent.  Thompson held that "the 
legislature may not give equal or superior authority to any 
'other officer.'"3    
¶84 Although 2011 Wis. Act 21 does change the role of the 
superintendent somewhat differently than did 1995 Wis. Act 27, 
the effect of both laws is the same——both laws give "equal or 
superior authority" over the supervision of public instruction 
to officers other than those inferior to the superintendent.4   
¶85 I agree with the court of appeals that, under 
Thompson, rulemaking is part of the "supervision of public 
instruction," 
which 
Article 
X, 
Section 
1 
vests 
in 
the 
superintendent.5  Likewise, I agree with the court of appeals 
that, under Thompson, 2011 Wis. Act 21 is unconstitutional 
because it grants the governor (and the Secretary of the 
Department of Administration) an unchecked veto power over the 
superintendent's 
rulemaking 
powers, 
thereby 
making 
the 
superintendent subordinate to the governor (and the Secretary) 
in the supervision of public instruction.6   
                                                 
3 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 699. 
4 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 699-700.   
5 Coyne v. Walker, 2015 WI App 21, ¶21, 361 Wis. 2d 225, 862 
N.W.2d 606.   
6 Coyne, 361 Wis. 2d 225, ¶31.     
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶86 I write to reaffirm Thompson and, applying its 
rationale, conclude that 2011 Wis. Act 21 is unconstitutional as 
applied to the superintendent and the Department of Public 
Instruction.    
¶87 Second, I disagree with the lead opinion's unnecessary 
and overly broad assertion that "the Legislature may give, may 
not give, and may take away the powers and duties of the 
[superintendent] and the other officers of supervision of public 
instruction. 
 
If 
the 
Legislature 
does 
not 
believe 
the 
[superintendent] should engage in rulemaking, it is free to 
change the statutory scheme . . . ."7  
¶88 If the legislature may, as the lead opinion suggests, 
"take away the powers and duties" of the superintendent, then 
the superintendent could be reduced to a role the framers of our 
constitution expressly rejected——that of a mere advocate for 
public education, unable to set standards or bring uniformity to 
Wisconsin's public education system. 
¶89 The instant case, like Thompson, "does not require us 
to decide the extent to which the [superintendent's] powers may 
be reduced by the legislature . . . ."8  As a result, we, like 
the Thompson court, should reserve judgment on that issue.   
                                                 
7 Lead op., ¶70.  A third reason I disagree with the lead 
opinion is its failure to be guided by judicial restraint.  It 
goes far afield in discussing numerous matters not necessary to 
decide the instant case.   
8 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 699-700.   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶90 Justice Prosser's concurrence explains that "the very 
nature of the office of superintendent required the ability to 
make rules, irrespective of a specific grant of authority from 
the legislature,"9 and that the superintendent "must possess some 
inherent authority to proceed to fulfill its responsibilities."10    
¶91 This explanation is based on our interpretive tools: 
the plain meaning of the words in the constitution in the 
context used (considering "not alone . . . the words of any part 
of the instrument, but by ascertaining the general purpose of 
the 
whole"11); 
the 
constitutional 
debates; 
the 
earliest 
legislative 
enactment 
interpreting 
the 
constitutional 
provision;12 and judicial interpretation of the constitutional 
provision.13  These tools of constitutional interpretation 
confirm that the superintendent "was intended as a crucial 
position, distinct from the 'other officers,' and possessing the 
ability to do more than merely act as an advocate for 
education."14         
                                                 
9 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶150.   
10 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶152.   
11 Lead op., ¶43 (quotation omitted); see also lead op., 
¶64. 
12 Lead op. ¶15.  The importance of non-partisan, non-
sectarian education was recognized in the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787.    
13 Lead op. ¶42. 
14 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 690. 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶92 For the reasons set forth, I concur and write 
separately.   
I 
 
¶93 First, I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion 
that, adhering to Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996), 2011 Wis. Act 21 unconstitutionally infringes 
on the "supervision of public instruction" vested in the 
superintendent by Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.     
 
¶94 Article X, Section 1 currently reads as follows:  
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent and such other officers as 
the 
legislature 
shall 
direct; 
and 
their 
qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law.  The state superintendent shall 
be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at 
the same time and in the same manner as members of the 
supreme court, and shall hold office for 4 years from 
the succeeding first Monday in July.  The term of 
office, time and manner of electing or appointing all 
other officers of supervision of public instruction 
shall be fixed by law.   
¶95 In Thompson, the court addressed the constitutionality 
of 1995 Wis. Act 27.15  Among other things, 1995 Wis. Act 27 
                                                                                                                                                             
For 
differences 
in 
methodology 
of 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin constitution, compare, for example, Chief Justice 
Roggensack's dissent, ¶¶180-206; Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶249 
n.2; State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 184, 204 
N.W. 803 (1925); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 
N.W.2d 141 (1976); State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 
N.W.2d 668 (1984); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 
690, 693, 54 N.W.2d 123 (1996); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. 
v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶114-118, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 
(Prosser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
15 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 678. 
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
6 
 
created 
a 
new 
state 
Department 
of 
Education, 
Education 
Commission, 
and 
Secretary 
of 
Education 
appointed 
by 
the 
governor.  Under 1995 Wis. Act 27, the Secretary of Education 
and the Education Commission (chaired by the superintendent of 
public instruction but made up of members appointed by the 
governor and legislative leaders) were to be responsible for 
"many functions related to education in Wisconsin, including 
some of the former duties of the [superintendent] . . . ."16   
 
¶96 Craney, the respondent in Thompson, argued that 1995 
Wis. Act 27 violated Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution by stripping the superintendent of powers of 
supervision of public instruction and vesting those powers in 
"other officers" not subordinate to the superintendent.  The 
court unanimously agreed.17   
 
¶97 In analyzing the constitutionality of 1995 Wis. Act 
27, the Thompson court reviewed the text, history, judicial 
interpretations, and purpose of Article X, Section 1, and held 
that 1995 Wis. Act 27 was unconstitutional because it gave "the 
former powers of the elected state Superintendent of Public 
Instruction to appointed 'other officers' at the state level who 
are not subordinate to the superintendent."18   
                                                 
16 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 679.  
17 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 698-99; see also Thompson, 199 
Wis. 2d at 700 (Wilcox, J., concurring).   
18 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 678-80 (citing Polk Cnty. v. 
State Pub. Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 
(1994)).   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
7 
 
 
¶98 The Thompson court's holding that "the legislature may 
not give equal or superior authority to any "other officer" was 
based on grounds that are relevant to the instant case.  In 
particular: 
(1) "The debates at the 1846 and 1847-48 Wisconsin 
constitutional conventions show that the drafters of 
the Wisconsin Constitution intended the public schools 
to be under the supervision of the [superintendent], 
and that the [superintendent] was to be an elected, 
not appointed, public official."  
Thompson, 199 
Wis. 2d at 685. 
(2) The Thompson court noted "two consistent themes from 
these statements of the delegates: first, that the 
system of education required uniformity; second, that 
the SPI [superintendent of public instruction] was to 
provide this uniformity in an active manner by 
implementing the system of education."  Thompson, 199 
Wis. 2d at 688-89.     
(3) The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution considered 
and explicitly rejected a proposal to select a 
superintendent by gubernatorial appointment and a 
proposal that would have allowed the legislature to 
vest "the supervision of public instruction . . . in 
such officers as shall hereafter be created by law."  
Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 685-86.  Simply put, the 
framers viewed the superintendent as "indispensible," 
"the foundation, the life of progressive education" 
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
8 
 
who "alone c[ould] give uniformity, energy, and 
efficiency to the system."  Journal of the Convention, 
reprinted in The Convention of 1846, at 568, 570-71 
(Milo M. Quaife ed. 1919).   
 
¶99 In the instant case, the court of appeals relied on 
Thompson in concluding that rulemaking is a supervisory power of 
the superintendent and that 2011 Wis. Act 21 unconstitutionally 
gives the governor and the secretary of the Department of 
Administration the unchecked authority to block rulemaking by 
the superintendent.19    
 
¶100 I agree with the court of appeals' reliance on 
Thompson 
in 
concluding 
that 
2011 
Wis. 
Act 
21 
is 
unconstitutional.  Although 2011 Wis. Act 21 does change the 
role of the superintendent somewhat differently than did 1995 
Wis. Act 27, the effect of both laws is the same——both laws give 
"equal or superior authority" over the supervision of public 
instruction to officers other than those inferior to the 
superintendent.20  Thus, 2011 Wis. Act 21 is unconstitutional; it 
gives "equal or superior authority [over the supervision of 
public instruction] to . . . '[an]other officer.'"21 
 
¶101 The lead opinion declares that Thompson's examination 
of Article X, Section 1 is instructive but not dispositive 
                                                 
19 Coyne, 316 Wis. 2d 225, ¶¶35-36. 
20 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 699-700.   
21 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 699.   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
9 
 
because 
Thompson 
and 
the 
instant 
case 
pose 
different 
constitutional questions.22   
¶102 In Thompson, according to the lead opinion, the 
question 
presented 
was 
whether 
other 
officers 
of 
public 
instruction could constitutionally be given equal or greater 
authority than the superintendent over the supervision of public 
instruction.23  The lead opinion describes the question presented 
in the instant case as whether the supervision of public 
instruction may be vested in any officers the legislature 
chooses, including constitutional officers like the governor, 
whose offices were not created to supervise public instruction.24   
 
¶103 The lead opinion's distinction of Thompson is without 
a difference.  It is not persuasive.  Like the court of appeals, 
I conclude that Thompson is on point and controls the instant 
case:  Thompson determines the superiority of the constitutional 
office of superintendent over all officers in the supervision of 
public instruction.    
 
¶104 Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence 
(¶159) 
essentially 
argues that Thompson was wrongly decided because it disregarded 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
constitution, 
the 
discussion 
surrounding the adoption of the 1902 amendment to Article X, 
Section 1, and subsequent legislation.   
                                                 
22 Lead op., ¶39.   
23 Lead op., ¶39.   
24 Lead op., ¶40.   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶105 Justice Prosser's concurrence (¶168) disagrees with 
the Thompson court because it "in effect . . . preclude[s] 
serious changes in the present system without a constitutional 
amendment."  Justice Prosser's concurrence (¶169) would allow 
constructive legislative changes regarding the superintendent of 
public instruction but would preclude the changes in Act 21 
because 
they 
"are 
not 
constructive 
changes 
because 
they 
reallocate power without requiring accountability.  Governing 
entails more than saying 'no.'" 
 
¶106 I agree with Justice Prosser's ultimate conclusion 
that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the superintendent 
of public instruction.  I disagree, however, with Justice 
Prosser's treatment of Thompson.               
II 
¶107 Second, I caution the reader that, like Thompson, the 
instant case "does not require us to decide the extent to which 
[the superintendent of public instruction's] powers may be 
reduced by the legislature . . . ."25  Thus our opinions should 
be read as "reserv[ing] judgment on that issue."26   
¶108 Nevertheless, the lead opinion and the dissents 
unnecessarily suggest that "the Legislature may give, may not 
give, and may take away the powers and duties of the 
                                                 
25 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 699-700.   
26 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 700; see also State v. Castillo, 
213 Wis. 2d 488, ¶12, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) ("An appellate court 
should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.") (citing 
State v. Bialock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 
1989)).   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
11 
 
[superintendent] and the other officers of supervision of public 
instruction. 
 
If 
the 
Legislature 
does 
not 
believe 
the 
[superintendent] should engage in rulemaking, it is free to 
change the statutory scheme . . . ."27   
¶109 I do not believe it is necessary in the instant case 
to address or resolve the extent of the legislature's control 
over the superintendent's powers.  The instant case concerns the 
constitutional relationship between the superintendent and the 
governor and executive branch officials.  If legislative control 
were an issue in the instant case, however, I would agree with 
Justice Prosser's concurrence that the superintendent, as a 
constitutional officer, "must possess some inherent authority to 
proceed to fulfill its responsibilities."28  "The very nature of 
the office of superintendent required the ability to make rules, 
irrespective 
of 
a 
specific 
grant 
of 
authority 
from 
the 
legislature."29   
                                                 
27 Lead op., ¶70; see also Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶237; 
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶¶184-185.   
28 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶152.  We have recognized 
a similar point in other contexts.  For example, in discussing 
the powers of sheriffs, who are constitutional officers, in 
Kocken v. Wis. Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 2007 WI 72, 301 
Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828, the court defined the sheriffs' 
constitutional powers in reference to the nature of the office 
of sheriff as it existed when the constitution was adopted, 
namely the "immemorial principal and important duties that 
characterized and distinguished the office."  Kocken, 301 
Wis. 2d 266, ¶¶31-43 (citation omitted). 
29 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶150.   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶110 The superintendent is a constitutional officer.  The 
office was created by Article X of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Article X is entitled "Education."  By addressing education and 
vesting the supervision of public instruction in an independent 
constitutional 
officer, 
the 
framers 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution set education and the superintendent apart from 
other constitutional officers, such as, for example, the 
governor and lieutenant governor (Article V); the secretary of 
state, 
treasurer, 
attorney 
general, 
sheriffs, 
coroners, 
registers of deeds, and district attorneys (Article VI); the 
legislature (Article IV); and the judiciary (Article VII).   
¶111 Article X, Section 1 vests the supervision of public 
instruction in a state superintendent as follows:  
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent and such other officers as 
the 
legislature 
shall 
direct; 
and 
their 
qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law.  The state superintendent shall 
be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at 
the same time and in the same manner as members of the 
supreme court, and shall hold office for 4 years from 
the succeeding first Monday in July.  The term of 
office, time and manner of electing or appointing all 
other officers of supervision of public instruction 
shall be fixed by law.   
¶112 The original version of Article X, Section 1 included 
in the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution provided as follows:  
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent, and such other officers as 
the 
legislature 
shall 
direct. 
 
The 
state 
superintendent shall be 
chosen by the qualified 
electors 
of 
the 
state, 
in 
such 
manner 
as 
the 
legislature shall provide; his powers, duties, and 
compensation shall be prescribed by law. . . .   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶113 In adopting Article X, Section 1, the framers of the 
1848 
constitution 
repeatedly 
expressed 
the 
fundamental 
importance of a robust system of public education and the 
"indispensable" role of the superintendent in maintaining, 
organizing, and advocating for public education.   
¶114 Justice Prosser's concurrence (as well as Thompson, 
199 
Wis. 2d 
at 
687-90) 
recounts 
much 
of 
the 
relevant 
constitutional history.30  I restate and supplement these 
discussions of the relevant constitutional debates as follows.   
¶115 First, as I stated before, the delegates to the 
constitutional conventions considered and explicitly rejected a 
proposal that a superintendent be selected by gubernatorial 
appointment and a proposal that the legislature vest "the 
supervision of public instruction . . . in such officers as 
shall hereafter be created by law."31   
¶116 Second, the delegates to the Wisconsin constitutional 
convention 
repeatedly 
referred 
to 
the 
superintendent 
as 
"indispensable" or "necessary" to "give uniformity, energy, and 
efficiency to the [public education] system."32   
¶117 The delegates suggested the superintendent would have 
a variety of responsibilities, including, among other things: 
(1) "instituting normal schools for the education of teachers, 
                                                 
30 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶149.   
31 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 685-86.   
32 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 687-89 (quoting Journal of the 
Convention, reprinted in The Convention of 1846, at 568, 570-71, 
573-74 (Milo M. Quaife ed. 1919)) (emphasis added).   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
14 
 
appointing 
local 
superintendents, 
and 
visiting 
every 
county . . . ,"33 
(2) 
providing 
an 
annual 
report 
to 
the 
legislature regarding the state of schools throughout the state 
and keeping "a constant and vigilant watch . . . over our 
schools,"34 and (3) "know[ing] what has been done in other states 
and countries——what has worked well and what ill——and who has 
practical good sense enough to select and put in operation what 
has been found by experience to be the best . . . ."35   
¶118 In short, "[t]he 1846 and 1847-48 debates [at the 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
conventions] 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
position of [superintendent] was intended as a crucial position, 
distinct from the 'other officers,' and possessing the ability 
to do more than merely act as an advocate for education."36   
¶119 In light of this history and the text of the Wisconsin 
constitution, I agree with Justice Prosser's concurrence (¶150) 
                                                 
33 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 688 (quoting The Convention of 
1846, at 570-71) (emphasis added) 
34 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 688 (quoting The Convention of 
1846, at 570-71).   
35 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 689 (quoting Journal of the 
Convention, reprinted in The Attainment of Statehood, 560-61 
(Milo M. Quaife ed. 1928)). 
The 1846 constitutional convention emphasized uniformity 
and central control.  The convention created a superintendent of 
public instruction whose exclusive job would be to establish a 
statewide system.  See Joseph A. Ranney, "Absolute Common 
Ground":  The Four Eras of Assimilation in Wisconsin Education 
Law, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 791, 794.    
36 Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 690 (emphasis added).   
No.  2013AP416.ssa 
 
15 
 
that the role of the superintendent, as envisioned by the 
framers, requires the authority to set standards: 
[T]he framers of the constitution contemplated a 
superintendent of public instruction who would set 
standards for public schools and seek a certain 
uniformity among public schools throughout Wisconsin.  
It 
is 
self-evident 
that 
standards 
for 
schools 
throughout Wisconsin could not be set without the 
power to make rules.  "Uniformity" could not be sought 
or enforced without rules.  "Putting a system in 
operation" could not be achieved without rules.  
Consequently, the very nature of the office of 
superintendent required the ability to make rules, 
irrespective of a specific grant of authority from the 
legislature. 
 
It 
is 
hard 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
superintendent would have been powerless to begin to 
develop standards without prior legislative sanction.   
¶120 For the reasons set forth, I concur and write 
separately. 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶122 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  In the spring of 
2011, the legislature enacted 2011 Wisconsin Act 21, which made 
numerous changes in the statutes pertaining to administrative 
rules.  Three of these changes are at issue in this case.  Peggy 
Coyne challenged the constitutionality of the changes embodied 
in sections 4, 21, and 32 of Act 21 as applied to the 
superintendent of public instruction, and the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's voiding of these sections as 
applied to the superintendent. 
¶123 Like any justice, the author of this concurrence seeks 
to promote readability in judicial opinions, but in attempting 
to interpret the constitution and the statutes correctly, this 
concurring opinion will follow closely the words of the 
constitutional provisions and the statutes to be interpreted. 
I.  ACT 21 
A.  Section 4 
¶124 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.135 addresses "Statements of 
scope of proposed rules."  Subsection (1) provides that "[a]n 
agency shall prepare a statement of the scope of any rule that 
it plans to promulgate."  It then lists six pieces of 
information required in the statement of scope, including a 
description of the objective of the proposed rule and the 
statutory authority for the rule. 
¶125 Prior to Act 21, Wis. Stat. § 227.135 (2009-10) 
provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) that no state employee 
or official could perform any activity in connection with 
drafting a proposed rule until "the individual or body with 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
policy-making power over the subject matter approved the 
statement of scope."  The individual or body could not approve 
the statement of scope until the 11th day after its publication 
by the legislative reference bureau, which was notified of the 
statement immediately by the agency.  Notice of the statement of 
scope also was sent to the secretary of administration. 
¶126 Section 4 of Act 21 changed subsection (2) of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.135, in part, as follows: 
 
An agency that has prepared a statement of the 
scope of the proposed rule shall present the statement 
to the governor and to the individual or body with 
policy-making powers over the subject matter of the 
proposed rule for approval.  The agency may not send 
the statement to the legislative reference bureau for 
publication . . . until the governor issues a written 
notice of approval of the statement.  The individual 
or body with policy-making powers may not approve the 
statement until at least 10 days after publication of 
the statement under sub. (3).  No state employee or 
official may perform any activity in connection with 
the drafting of a proposed rule except for an activity 
necessary to prepare the statement of the scope of the 
proposed rule until the governor and the individual or 
body with policy-making powers over the subject matter 
of the proposed rule approve the statement. 
2011 Wis. Act 21, Section 4 (emphasis added). 
 
¶127 These changes in the law vest the governor with the 
power to suppress publication of the scope of a proposed rule 
and thus prevent the individual or body with policy-making power 
over the subject matter of the rule from approving any statement 
of scope.  The governor is not required to approve the proposed 
rule or even to act on the rule, but no state employee in the 
"agency" (or elsewhere in state government) may take any action 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
to draft the proposed rule until the governor approves the 
statement of scope in writing. 
B.  Section 21 
¶128 Under prior law, several entities outside state 
government could petition the department of administration to 
direct any of five enumerated departments to prepare an economic 
impact report for any of the department's proposed rules.  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.137(1)-(2) 
(2009-10). 
 
The 
secretary 
of 
administration could act on his own to order an economic impact 
report from any of these five departments if he determined that 
there would be certain economic impacts from a proposed rule. 
¶129 Section 9 of Act 21 now requires every "agency" to 
prepare an economic impact analysis for a proposed rule before 
submitting it to the legislative council staff under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.15, 227.137(3). 
¶130 Section 21 of the Act then reads: 
 
If an economic impact analysis regarding a 
proposed rule indicates that a total of $20,000,000 or 
more in implementation and compliance costs are 
reasonably expected to be incurred by or passed along 
to 
businesses, 
local 
governmental 
units, 
and 
individuals as a result of the proposed rule, the 
department of administration shall review the proposed 
rule and issue a report.  The agency may not submit a 
proposed rule to the legislature for review under s. 
227.19(2) until the agency receives a copy of the 
department's report and the approval of the secretary 
of administration. 
(Emphasis added.)  See Wis. Stat. § 227.137(6). 
¶131 Act 21 dramatically expands the number of economic 
impact analyses or reports, but section 21 of the Act also 
permits the secretary of administration, in select cases, to 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
block a proposed rule from being submitted to the legislature 
for review. 
C.  Section 32 
¶132 Section 32 is entirely new and reads as follows: 
 
Approval by governor.  After a proposed rule is 
in final draft form, the agency shall submit the 
proposed rule to the governor for approval.  The 
governor, in his or her discretion, may approve or 
reject the proposed rule.  If the governor approves a 
proposed rule, the governor shall provide the agency 
with a written notice of that approval.  No proposed 
rule may be submitted to the legislature for review 
under s. 227.19(2) unless the governor has approved 
the proposed rule in writing. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.185 (emphasis added). 
¶133 The effect of sections 4, 21, and 32 and related 
sections of Act 21 is to give the governor legal authority to 
block potential administrative rules before a statement of their 
scope has been published and to block draft rules before they 
can be submitted to the legislature for review and possible 
approval.  These changes go beyond providing the governor with 
additional notice and additional information about a proposed 
rule.  In essence, they vest the governor with a veto power over 
proposed rules——without imposing any standards on how that power 
is exercised and without indicating how the exercise of that 
power may be overridden by anyone. 
¶134 This expansive power, partly shared by the secretary 
of administration, applies to rules promulgated by an "agency."  
"Agency" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 227.01(1): "'Agency' means a 
board, commission, committee, department or officer in state 
government, except the governor, a district attorney or a 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
military or judicial officer."  The breadth of this definition 
means that Act 21's changes apply not only to all cabinet 
departments but also to the department of employee trust funds 
and to independent boards and commissions such as the investment 
board, the public service commission, and the tax appeals 
commission. 
¶135 "Rule" also is broadly defined: 
"Rule" means a regulation, standard, statement of 
policy, or general order of general application which 
has the effect of law and which is issued by an agency 
to implement, interpret, or make specific legislation 
enforced or administered by the agency or to govern 
the organization or procedure of the agency.  "Rule" 
includes a modification of a rule under s. 227.265. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  The statute then lists multiple 
exceptions, including a rule which "[c]oncerns the internal 
management of an agency and does not affect private rights or 
interests."  § 227.01(13)(a). 
¶136 Act 21 did not alter the legislature's established 
powers to review proposed rules, seek the modification of 
proposed rules, and, if deemed necessary, suspend proposed 
rules.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.19; see also Wis. Stat. § 227.26.  
However, sections 4 and 32 of Act 21 are different from Wis. 
Stat. § 227.19 because they do not provide specific grounds upon 
which the governor may choose not to approve a proposed rule.  
The governor is given unlimited "discretion" not to approve a 
proposed rule——"discretion" to do nothing about a proposed rule.  
By contrast, the legislature must take action if it suspends a 
rule. 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
¶137 This concentration of power in the governor may not 
raise serious legal questions when it is applied to a cabinet 
department already under the governor's control.  However, the 
application of this new gubernatorial power to an independently 
elected constitutional officer who is not otherwise under the 
governor's direction is a different matter. 
¶138 In evaluating the constitutionality of sections 4, 21, 
and 32 of Act 21 as applied to the superintendent of public 
instruction, we must remember that constitutionality should not 
be evaluated solely in terms of the present governor but also in 
terms of any future governor.  It should not be evaluated solely 
in situations when a governor is supported by a friendly 
legislature but also in situations when a governor is opposed by 
the legislature.  In other words, the legislation must be judged 
in light of different possible fact situations by neutral 
principles of law. 
II.  APPLICATION OF ACT 21 TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION 
¶139 The office of superintendent of public instruction was 
created by the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  Article X, 
Section 1 provided: 
 
The supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested 
in 
a 
state 
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction, 
and 
such 
other 
officers 
as 
the 
legislature shall direct.  The state superintendent 
shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the 
state, in such manner as the legislature shall 
provide; his powers, duties, and compensation shall be 
prescribed by law.  Provided, that his compensation 
shall not exceed the sum of twelve hundred dollars 
annually. 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
Wis. Const. art. X, § 1 (1848) (emphasis added). 
¶140 It is notable that the 1848 constitution established 
the office of superintendent in the same manner as it 
established the senate and assembly, the governor, and the 
judiciary: 
● 
Article IV, Section 1: "The legislative 
power shall be vested in a senate and assembly."  
(Emphasis added.) 
● 
Article V, Section 1: "The executive power 
shall be vested in a governor, who shall hold his 
office for two years; a lieutenant governor shall be 
elected at the same time, and for the same term."  
(Emphasis added.) 
● 
Article VII, Section 2: "The judicial power 
of this state, both as to matters of law and equity, 
shall be vested in a supreme court, circuit courts, 
courts of probate, and in justices of the peace.  The 
legislature may also vest such jurisdiction as shall 
be deemed necessary in municipal courts, and shall 
have power to establish inferior courts in the several 
counties, 
with 
limited 
civil 
and 
criminal 
jurisdiction.  Provided, that the jurisdiction which 
may be vested in municipal courts shall not exceed, in 
their 
respective 
municipalities, 
that 
of 
circuit 
courts, as prescribed in this constitution; and that 
the legislature shall provide as well for the election 
of judges of the municipal courts as of the judges of 
inferior courts, by the qualified electors of the 
respective jurisdictions.  The term of office of the 
judges of said municipal and inferior courts shall not 
be longer than that of the judges of the circuit 
courts.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶141 The 1848 constitution also located the office of 
superintendent of public instruction in Article X, entitled 
"Education."  There was no mention of the superintendent in 
Article V entitled "Executive," which discussed the governor and 
lieutenant governor and their respective powers.  Nor was there 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
any mention of the superintendent in Article VI entitled 
"Administrative," which discussed the secretary of state, 
treasurer, and attorney general, as well as sheriffs, coroners, 
registers of deeds, and district attorneys. 
¶142 Because the "supervision of public instruction" is 
vested in the superintendent and because his position is set out 
in a separate article of the constitution, the superintendent 
appears to have a more significant status than the lieutenant 
governor and the officials named in Article VI. 
¶143 At the same time, while the supervision of public 
instruction was vested in the state superintendent of public 
instruction, the constitution did not say, "The power to 
supervise 
public 
instruction 
is 
vested 
in 
the 
state 
superintendent of public instruction."  On the contrary, the 
constitution specifically assigned to the legislature the 
authority to determine the superintendent's "powers, duties, and 
compensation"——as well as the "manner" of his election.  The 
1848 constitution also "vests" the supervision of public 
instruction in "such other officers as the legislature shall 
direct." 
¶144 The 1848 constitution thus sent mixed signals about 
the status of the superintendent of public instruction. 
¶145 Article X, Section 1 was amended in 1902 to read: 
 
The supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested in a state superintendent and such other 
officers as the legislature shall direct; and their 
qualifications, powers, duties, and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law.  The state superintendent shall 
be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
the same time and in the same manner as members of the 
supreme court, and shall hold his office for four 
years from the succeeding first Monday in July.  The 
state superintendent chosen at the general election in 
November, 1902, shall hold and continue in his office 
until the first Monday in July, 1905, and his 
successor shall be chosen at the time of the judicial 
election in April, 1905. The term of office, time and 
manner of electing or appointing all other officers of 
supervision of public instruction shall be fixed by 
law. 
Wis. Const. art. X, § 1 (1902). 
¶146 In one way, the 1902 amendment heightened the unique 
position of the superintendent by moving his election from the 
partisan elections in November of the even-numbered years to the 
nonpartisan elections in the spring when supreme court justices 
are elected.  Many of the early superintendents had been elected 
with a party affiliation at the same time as Wisconsin 
governors.  The amendment removed them from a partisan ticket.  
In addition, the amendment gave the superintendent a four-year 
term many decades before the governor and other state officials 
in the executive branch received four-year terms. 
¶147 On the other hand, the 1902 amendment reemphasized the 
role of the legislature in directing what "other officers" are 
vested 
with 
the 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction 
and 
prescribing 
the 
"qualifications, 
powers, 
duties, 
and 
compensation" 
of 
both 
the 
superintendent 
and 
the 
"other 
officers."  The amendment added, "The term of office, time and 
manner 
of 
electing 
or 
appointing 
all 
other 
officers 
of 
supervision of public instruction [besides the superintendent] 
shall be fixed by law."  This sentence dispensed with any notion 
that "other officers" were mere "assistants and clerks" to the 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
superintendent, as was mistakenly suggested in State ex rel. 
Raymer v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 48, 51 N.W. 1133 (1892), ten 
years earlier. 
¶148 This court interprets provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution de novo.  Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 
546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  In Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, 
2006 WI 107, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408, I restated the 
familiar methodology we use in constitutional interpretation: 
 
1. 
Courts should give priority to the plain 
meaning of the words of a constitutional provision in 
the context used.  Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 
247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).  The plain meaning of the words 
is best discerned by understanding their obvious and 
ordinary meaning at the time the provision was 
adopted, 
taking 
into 
account 
other 
(especially 
contemporary) provisions of the constitution.  See 
State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 403-04, 
216 N.W. 509 (1927). 
 
2. 
Courts may view the "historical analysis of 
the constitutional debates and of what practices were 
in existence in 1848 which the court may reasonably 
presume were also known to the framers of the 1848 
constitution."  Id.  This principle permits courts to 
consider the debates surrounding amendments to the 
constitution and the circumstances at the time these 
amendments were adopted.  We have said that courts may 
examine "the history of the times," meaning not only 
the legislative history of a provision (including word 
changes in the drafts of amendments) but also "the 
state of society at the time," with special emphasis 
on the "practices and usages" then in existence, so as 
to identify the concerns the provision sought to 
address. . . .  
 
3. 
Courts 
may 
scrutinize 
the 
earliest 
interpretations of the provision by the legislature as 
manifested in the first laws passed following adoption 
of the provision.  Legislation that implements a 
constitutional provision is thought to be a fair gauge 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
of contemporary interpretation and is entitled to 
great deference. 
Id., ¶117 (Prosser, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part) 
(citation omitted). 
¶149 In its decision in Thompson, the court focused on the 
second point in our methodology by emphasizing the proceedings 
in the 1846 and 1848 constitutional conventions, including 
comments by delegates about the role of the superintendent of 
public instruction.  See Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 685-90.  Three 
quotes from the 1846 and 1848 debates are especially pertinent: 
● 
Delegate Wallace Wilson Graham (1846) said 
that he "considered that officer [the superintendent] 
indispensable.  There could be no uniform system 
without him.  There must be an annual report of the 
state of schools throughout the state.  There could be 
none, said he, so satisfactory as from a man whose 
entire business it is to visit and know of all the 
schools.  He considered it a matter of the greatest 
importance 
that 
the 
legislature 
have 
all 
this 
information."  Id. at 687-88 (emphasis added). 
● 
Delegate Lorenzo Bevans (1846) said: "All 
admit that the children of the state are to be 
instructed in political economy and in the various 
branches of science.  How is it to be accomplished?  
Is it by striking the word 'superintendent' from the 
first section of the article, by dispensing with this 
state officer, who alone can give uniformity, energy, 
and efficiency to the system."  Id. at 688 (emphasis 
added). 
● 
Delegate Louis P. Harvey (1848) said he 
wanted a superintendent who "knows what has been done 
in other states and countries——what has worked well 
and what ill and who has practical good sense enough 
to select and put in operation what has been found by 
experience to be the best. . . .  An acquaintance with 
the particular subject of public instruction, with the 
peculiar qualities requisite for putting a system in 
operation with life and energy, was what was wanted."  
Id. at 689 (ellipsis in original). 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
¶150 These quotations clearly suggest that the framers of 
the 
constitution 
contemplated 
a 
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction who would set standards for public schools and seek 
a certain uniformity among public schools throughout Wisconsin.1  
It is self-evident that standards for schools throughout 
Wisconsin could not be set without the power to make rules.  
"Uniformity" could not be sought or enforced without rules.  
"Putting a system in operation" could not be achieved without 
rules.  Consequently, the very nature of the office of 
superintendent required the ability to make rules, irrespective 
of a specific grant of authority from the legislature.  It is 
hard to believe that the superintendent would have been 
powerless 
to 
begin 
to 
develop 
standards 
without 
prior 
legislative sanction. 
¶151 The legislature understood this, and so it referenced 
"forms and regulations for making all reports and conducting all 
necessary proceedings under this act" in the first legislation 
setting forth the duties of the superintendent: 
 
The 
superintendent 
shall 
have 
a 
general 
supervision over public instruction in this state, and 
it shall be his duty to devote his whole time to the 
advancement of the cause of education, and for that 
purpose to visit as far and as often as practicable, 
                                                 
1 Article X, Section 3 of the 1848 constitution mirrored the 
uniformity theme: "The legislature shall provide by law for the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly 
uniform as practicable, and such schools shall be free and 
without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 
four and twenty years, and no sectarian instruction shall be 
allowed therein."  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
every town and school in the state for the purpose of 
inspecting the schools and diffusing as widely as 
possible 
by 
public 
addresses . . . and 
personal 
communication 
with 
school 
officers 
teachers 
and 
parents, a knowledge of existing defects and desirable 
improvements in the administration of the system, and 
the government and instruction of the schools: To 
recommend the introduction and use of the most 
approved 
text 
books, 
and 
to 
secure 
as 
far 
as 
practicable uniformity in education throughout the 
state: . . .  To recommend the establishment of school 
libraries and to advise in the selection of books for 
the same: To collect such information as may be deemed 
important in reference to common schools in each 
county, town precinct and school district: . . . to 
ascertain the condition of all the school funds in 
this state with the amount of the school funds due to 
each township from lands or other sources: to propose 
suitable forms and regulations for making all reports 
and conducting all necessary proceedings under this 
act: to adjust and decide all controversies and 
disputes arising under the school lands without costs 
to the parties: . . . to perform such other duties as 
the 
legislature 
or 
governor 
of 
this 
state 
may 
direct . . . . 
Laws of 1848 at 128-29, quoted in Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 694 
(emphasis added; ellipsis in original).2 
                                                 
2 The reference to "school funds" in the statute is grounded 
in three specific provisions in Article X of the 1848 
constitution, namely, Sections 2, 4, and 5.  Section 2 describes 
the sources of revenue for a "school fund."  Sections 4 and 5 
read as follows: 
 
4. 
Each town and city shall be required to 
raise, by tax, annually for the support of common 
schools therein a sum not less than one-half the 
amount received by such town or city respectively for 
school purposes, from the income of the school fund. 
 
5. 
Provision shall be made by law for the 
distribution of the income of the school fund among 
the several towns and cities of the state, for the 
support of common schools therein in some just 
proportion to the number of children and youth 
resident therein, between the ages of four and twenty 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
¶152 The legislature has very broad power to make law.  It 
can certainly authorize an "agency" to promulgate rules and it 
can establish procedures for doing so.  It can change law so 
that the rules implementing former law must be changed.  But a 
constitutional office must possess some inherent authority to 
proceed to fulfill its responsibilities.  For example, it must 
have 
some 
authority 
to 
develop 
rules 
for 
its 
"internal 
management." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.01(13)(a). 
 
For 
the 
superintendent of public instruction, the constitution provides 
the initial authority to develop rules because the constitution 
states the superintendent's mission.  The constitution, of 
course, also gives the legislature the ultimate authority to 
determine what the superintendent may or may not do by 
prescribing the superintendent's powers and duties. 
¶153 Over the years, the legislature has granted general 
authority to the superintendent to make rules.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.10, 227.11(2)(a).  The legislature has sometimes required 
the superintendent to make rules.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 118.045.  This has resulted in administrative rules on at 
least 40 different subjects, from "School district boundary 
                                                                                                                                                             
years and no appropriation shall be made from the 
school fund to any city or town for the year in which 
said city or town shall fail to raise such tax, nor to 
any school district for the year in which a school 
shall not be maintained at least three months. 
Wis. Const. art. X, §§ 4-5 (1848). 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
appeals" and "School district standards" to "Commencement of 
school term" and "Grants for tribal language revitalization." 
¶154 The issue in this case is whether legislation giving 
the governor complete authority to block a proposed rule by the 
superintendent of public instruction is constitutional, even 
when the proposed rule is authorized——perhaps required——by 
statute and is submitted in complete conformity with statute. 
¶155 The answer cannot be yes, because it would give a 
governor authority to obstruct the work of an independent 
constitutional officer to such an extent that the officer would 
be unable to discharge the responsibilities that the legislature 
has given him.  An absolute veto power over a proposed rule is a 
check without a balance.  It is a power greater than the 
gubernatorial veto power in the constitution.  Wis. Const. art 
V, § 10(2). 
¶156 The power given to the governor in Act 21 provides the 
governor with the means not to enforce a law, even if the 
legislature wants it enforced, and is arguably inconsistent with 
the governor's obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.  Wis. Const. art. V, § 4. 
III.  THOMPSON V. CRANEY 
¶157 The reason I have written separately and have not 
joined Justice Gableman's opinion is that my position does not 
depend on the superintendent of public instruction having 
superiority over all other officers who are or may be vested 
with supervision of public instruction. 
¶158 In Thompson, the court stated: 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
Our review of these sources demonstrates beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
office 
of 
state 
Superintendent of Public Instruction was intended by 
the framers of the constitution to be a supervisory 
position, and that the "other officers" mentioned in 
the provision were intended to be subordinate to the 
state Superintendent of Public Instruction. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
. . . Under our holding in the present case, the 
legislature may not give equal or superior authority 
to any "other officer." 
Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 698-99. 
 
¶159 This holding in Thompson is unwarranted for multiple 
reasons.  It disregards the plain language of the constitution; 
it disregards the discussion surrounding the constitution's 
formation 
and 
amendment; 
and 
it 
disregards 
subsequent 
legislation. 
 
¶160 The text of Article X, Section 1 of the 1848 
constitution provided: 
 
The supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested 
in 
a 
state 
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction, 
and 
such 
other 
officers 
as 
the 
legislature shall direct.  The state superintendent 
shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the 
state, in such manner as the legislature shall 
provide; his powers, duties, and compensation shall be 
prescribed by law.  Provided, that his compensation 
shall not exceed the sum of twelve hundred dollars 
annually. 
Wis. Const. art. X, § 1 (1848). 
¶161 Section 1 twice mentioned "the legislature" and gave 
the legislature the power to prescribe the "powers" and "duties" 
of the superintendent and to "vest" "other officers" with 
"supervision of public institutions." 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
17 
 
¶162 The 
framers 
understood 
the 
realities 
of 
local 
education in 1848.  They did not expect the superintendent to 
operate local schools.  "Other officers" would run the public 
schools in Green Bay, in Milwaukee, in Prairie du Chien, in 
Madison.  The superintendent would not run them.  The 
superintendent would not hire teachers in Baraboo or fire school 
superintendents in Beloit.  In the governance and operation of 
local schools, the superintendent was not "superior."  The 
superintendent would be accomplishing a lot if he were able to 
visit local schools, as the first statute on the superintendent 
charged him to do. 
¶163 He also did not control the University of Wisconsin.  
The "state university, at or near the seat of government" was 
never under the supervision of the superintendent of public 
instruction.  Yet it is referenced in Article X, Section 6, 
directly below the section mentioning the superintendent of 
public instruction.  The creation of a public university was 
part of the same "Yankee Assimilation" reform movement that 
inspired creation of a superintendent of public instruction.  
Joseph A. Ranney, "Absolute Common Ground": The Four Eras of 
Assimilation in Wisconsin Education Law,  1998 Wis. L. Rev. 791, 
792-796. 
¶164 The superintendent played no role in the sale of 
"school and university lands," which is mentioned in Article X, 
Section 7, of the 1848 Constitution.  The constitution gave the 
secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general that 
authority. 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
18 
 
¶165 "Vested" is a potent word, but the constitution 
permits "other officers" to be vested with "supervision of 
public instruction."  It should be noted that the 1848 
Constitution, in Article VII, Section 2, provided that "the 
legislature may also vest such jurisdiction as shall be deemed 
necessary 
in 
municipal 
courts . . . .  Provided, 
that 
the 
jurisdiction which may be vested in municipal courts shall not 
exceed . . . that of circuit courts."  (Emphasis added.)  There 
is no limitation on the powers of the "other officers" in 
Article X, Section 1, like the limitation on the jurisdiction of 
municipal courts. 
¶166 The 1902 amendment benefitted the Superintendent in 
two respects, but it also firmed up the power of the legislature 
to prescribe the qualifications, powers, and duties of "other 
officers," thereby rebutting any notion that the elected or 
appointed "officers" described were mere "assistants and clerks" 
of the superintendent.  The Thompson court conceded that Article 
X, Section 1 used the term "other officers," not the term 
"inferior officers," which appears in Article IV, Section 28 of 
the 1848 constitution.  Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 683.3  It was 
                                                 
3 Article IV, Section 28 of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution 
provided: 
Members 
of 
the 
legislature, 
and 
all 
officers, 
executive and judicial, except such inferior officers 
as may be by law exempted, shall before they enter 
upon the duties of their respective offices, take and 
subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the 
constitution of the United States and the constitution 
of the state of Wisconsin, and faithfully to discharge 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
19 
 
not too many years after the 1902 amendment was approved that 
the legislature created a State Board of Education consisting of 
the superintendent, the governor, and the secretary of state, as 
well as one person approved by the board of regents of the 
University of Wisconsin and one person approved by the board of 
regents of the normal schools.  Laws of 1915, ch. 497, § 1. 
¶167 The Thompson decision acknowledged that the language 
of Article X, Section 1 permits a reading that the "power of 
supervision may be allocated by the legislature between" the 
superintendent and the "'other officers' because Article X, § 1 
vests supervision in the SPI and the 'other officers.'"  
Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 684.  The opinion continues: 
We cannot conclude that the plain meaning of Article 
X, § 1 requires the SPI, and the SPI alone, to be the 
ultimate supervisor of public education in Wisconsin.  
The section is ambiguous, in that it can be read 
either as granting the power of supervision solely to 
the SPI, or as granting power to both the SPI and the 
"other officers" referred to in the section. 
Id. 
¶168 The court then adopted the narrow reading by relying 
on excerpts from the early constitutional debates.  In so doing, 
it elevated individual statements (as interpreted by the court) 
over explicit constitutional text.  The result, in effect, was 
to preclude serious changes in the present system without a 
constitutional amendment.  Id. at 698.  But this rigidity is 
contrary not only to the text but also to the statements 
                                                                                                                                                             
the duties of their respective offices to the best of 
their ability. 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
20 
 
authored by the drafter of the 1902 amendment, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction Lorenzo Dow Harvey, who wrote: 
The 
last 
sentence 
[of 
the 
amendment], 
the 
one 
complained of, gives the legislature power at any time 
in the future, to entirely remodel the superintendency 
system if it sees fit to do so. . . .  [T]his sentence 
of the amendment would give the legislature full power 
to make whatever provision might at the time be 
necessary. 
Id. at 692 (quoting Letter from Lorenzo Dow Harvey to Karl 
Mathie (Oct. 15, 1902)). 
¶169 State supervision of public instruction may be working 
beautifully as is, or it may need adjustment.  But it can never 
be viewed as off limits to constructive change by the 
legislature.  Unfortunately, the changes in Act 21 affecting the 
superintendent of public instruction are not constructive 
changes 
because 
they 
reallocate 
power 
without 
requiring 
accountability.  Governing entails more than saying "no." 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶170 In my view, the challenged sections of Act 21 are as 
unnecessary as they are unconstitutional.  There are established 
methods for the governor to address undesirable or controversial 
administrative rules——by negotiation or, if necessary, by 
legislative suspension.  In addition, the governor has the power 
to affect the superintendent's budget and to propose eliminating 
or 
transferring 
part 
of 
the 
superintendent's 
statutory 
authority. 
No.  2013AP416.dtp 
 
 
21 
 
¶171 All these options require the cooperation of the 
legislature.  If the governor is unable to obtain that 
cooperation, he arguably should not succeed. 
¶172 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶173 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (dissenting).   The 
lead opinion errs for at least three reasons:  First, the lead 
opinion fails to recognize that when the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction engages in rulemaking with the Department of 
Public Instruction (DPI), the Superintendent is exercising 
legislative authority delegated to him by the legislature under 
Wis. Stat. § 15.37 (2013-14),1 not constitutional authority 
delegated by Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Second, the lead opinion fails to recognize the legislature's 
constitutional authority to control its legislative delegation 
exercised as rulemaking by state administrative departments such 
as DPI.2  Third, Act 21 has not been applied to the 
Superintendent in an unconstitutional manner.   
¶174 I conclude that the legislature acted pursuant to its 
constitutional authority under Article IV, Section 1 and Article 
X, Section 1 when it enacted Act 21, which creates procedural 
safeguards to be employed in rulemaking by DPI and many other 
administrative agencies.  I also conclude that Act 21 does not 
conflict with Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 546 N.W.2d 
123 (1996).  And finally, I conclude that the plaintiffs have 
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Act 21 has been 
applied unconstitutionally to the Superintendent.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Lead op., ¶¶4, 57, 63. 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
2 
 
I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals, and I 
respectfully dissent from the lead opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶175 Before us, two sections of Act 21 are challenged:  
Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2) and Wis. Stat. § 227.185.3  The 
plaintiffs and the Superintendent4 herein claim these provisions 
are unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent because 
they permit the Governor to reject a proposed rule or scope 
statement created by DPI.   
¶176 The Superintendent also contends that Act 21 is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor 
because it contains neither legislative nor procedural standards 
for exercising that power.  The Superintendent contends that Act 
21 
places 
the 
Governor 
in 
a 
superior 
position 
to 
the 
Superintendent 
through 
regulation 
of 
DPI's 
rulemaking 
in 
violation of Thompson.   
¶177 The State contends that rulemaking is a legislative 
delegation to administrative agencies, and that as part of that 
legislative delegation, the legislature has the authority to 
enact procedural safeguards that apply to rulemaking.  The State 
                                                 
3 The complaint also objected to the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.137(6), which together with § 227.137(2) and the repeal of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.137(1), imposes an obligation on DPI to provide 
an economic impact statement for programs that are expected to 
exceed $20,000,000.  Before us, it has not been argued that this 
requirement 
is 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
Superintendent. 
4 For convenience, hereinafter, I refer to plaintiffs and 
the 
Superintendent 
of 
Public 
Instruction 
as 
"the 
Superintendent." 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
3 
 
asserts that Act 21 is such a procedural safeguard for 
legislative rulemaking delegations.  The State acknowledges that 
Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution vests 
supervision of public instruction in the Superintendent, as an 
executive function.  The State also contends that Article X, 
Section 
1 
requires 
that 
the 
power 
and 
duties 
of 
the 
Superintendent are to be established by the legislature. 
¶178 Upon the Superintendent's motion for summary judgment, 
the circuit court struck down Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2) and Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.185 
as 
unconstitutional 
infringements 
of 
the 
Superintendent's constitutional powers.  The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court and affirmed.  As I explain below, 
the lead opinion errs because it fails to analyze, and instead 
glosses over, foundational legal principles that underlie this 
case.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶179 In order to decide the claims presented, we interpret 
provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution, which we undertake 
independently of the interpretations of the court of appeals and 
circuit 
court, 
while 
benefitting 
from 
their 
discussions.  
Custodian of Records for the Legislative Tech. Servs. Bureau, 
2004 WI 65, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792.  We also 
interpret the challenged statutes, as their meanings are 
important to our decision.  Statutory interpretation and 
application 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
decide 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
4 
 
independently.  State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 
243, 808 N.W.2d 390.   
B.  Constitutional Delegations 
¶180 The Superintendent's assertions require us to begin by 
ascertaining 
the 
nature 
and 
scope 
of 
two 
constitutional 
delegations under Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution:  (1) the delegation to the Superintendent for the 
"supervision" of public instruction and (2) the delegation to 
the legislature to decide the extent of the Superintendent's 
"qualifications, powers, duties and compensation."  We must 
understand both constitutional delegations to determine whether 
Act 21 violates the Superintendent's constitutional authority.  
This is so because the Superintendent obtains authority to 
supervise public instruction from the Constitution and from the 
legislature.  Therefore, we must decide whether the statutes at 
issue in this review affect supervision that is constitutionally 
vested 
in 
the 
Superintendent 
or 
supervision 
that 
is 
legislatively created for the Superintendent. 
¶181 When we interpret a constitutional provision, we 
examine 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
words 
employed, 
the 
constitutional debates at the time of the enactment of the 
provision and the earliest interpretation after enactment as 
manifested in legislation.  Schilling v. Crime Victims Rights 
Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623 (citing 
Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, 
¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612).   
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶182 The constitutional delegations of authority to the 
Superintendent and the legislature, as first enacted, provided 
in relevant part:   
 
The supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested in a state superintendent, and such other 
officers as the legislature shall direct.  The state 
superintendent shall be chosen by the qualified 
electors 
of 
the 
state, 
in 
such 
manner 
as 
the 
legislature shall provide; his powers, duties and 
compensation shall be prescribed by law:  Provided, 
That his compensation shall not exceed the sum of 
twelve hundred dollars annually.   
Wis. Const. art. X, § 1 (1848) (emphases added).  
¶183 In 1902, Article X, Section 1 was amended to provide 
in relevant part: 
The supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested in a state superintendent and such other 
officers as the legislature shall direct; and their 
qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law.   
Wis. Const. art. X, § 1 (1902) (emphasis added). 
¶184 Article X, Section 1 vests "[t]he supervision of 
public instruction" in the Superintendent.  This constitutional 
delegation has not changed materially since 1848 when Article X, 
Section 1 was first enacted, nor has the constitutional 
delegation to the legislature been changed, which delegation 
requires the legislature to establish the powers and duties of 
the Superintendent through legislation.   
¶185 "Supervision" is a key term, but it is not defined in 
Article X, Section 1.  However, as I set forth below, 
examination of the meaning of "supervision" at the time of the 
Constitutional 
Conventions 
of 
1846 
and 
1848 
shows 
that 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
6 
 
"supervision," as used in Article X, Section 1, was understood 
as an executive function.  It was to the legislature that the 
Constitution accorded the authority to determine what actions 
the Superintendent would be permitted to take ("powers"), and 
what obligations ("duties") the Superintendent must shoulder in 
regard to public education.  Wis. Const. art. X, § 1.  Stated 
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution chose no specific 
duties for the Superintendent in regard to "supervision of 
public 
instruction;" 
instead, 
the 
legislature 
was 
given 
authority to control the powers and duties of the Superintendent 
through legislation.   
¶186 During 
the 
constitutional 
debates, 
the 
executive 
nature of the Superintendent was discussed.  For example, during 
the Convention of 1846, Marshall M. Strong was reported to have 
"thought we needed [the superintendent] to travel over the 
state, organize the system, and awaken the people to the 
importance 
of 
this 
subject." 
Journal 
of 
the 
Convention, 
reprinted in The Convention of 1846, 569 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 
1919).   
¶187 During the Convention of 1848, all writers were 
reported to have agreed that the "office should have nothing to 
do with the machinery of the school system or the management of 
the funds. . . .  His province was to put the system in 
operation."  Journal of the Convention, reprinted in The 
Attainment of Statehood, 556-57 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1928).  
Mr. Jackson is reported to have explained, "The duties of a 
superintendent were not of a fixed and well-known kind, like 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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those of political officers.  Public instruction was yet in its 
infancy, though there had been experimenting upon it for the 
last fifty years."  Id. at 561.  
¶188 The 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
"superintend" 
from 
Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (new 
rev. ed. 1847-50) provided:   
To have or exercise the charge or oversight of; to 
oversee with the power of direction; to take care of 
with 
authority; 
as 
an 
officer 
superintends 
the 
building of a ship or construction of a fort.   
Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 683.  Accordingly, vesting supervision 
of public instruction in the Superintendent granted non-
specific, executive authority to the Superintendent.  
¶189 However, even though in neither 1848 nor 1902 was the 
Superintendent's constitutional authority defined, the plain 
meaning of Article X, Section 1's delegation to the legislature 
to 
establish 
the 
Superintendent's 
"qualifications, 
powers, 
duties and compensation" was clearly expressed.  Article X, 
Section 1 plainly granted the legislature control over both the 
power that the Superintendent could exercise and the duties that 
the Superintendent must undertake.  Early cases support this 
plain meaning interpretation of the legislature's control over 
the Superintendent. 
¶190 In Raymer v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133 
(1892), we reviewed a challenge to Superintendent Wells' 
directive to Thomas J. Cunningham, the Secretary of State, for 
payments of his salary, a clerk's salary and claimed travel 
expenses.  Id. at 39-41.  In 1891, the Constitution provided 
that the Superintendent be paid an annual salary of not more 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
8 
 
than $1,200 per year.  Raymer, a citizen and taxpayer, 
complained that Wells had directed Cunningham to make payments 
in excess of $1,200, with which direction Cunningham complied. 
Id. at 39, 42.  It was alleged that although Wells charged the 
state $1,000 for "clerk hire," he incurred no such expense and 
that Wells was paid $1,500 for traveling expenses, when he did 
not incur more than $800.  Id. at 41-42.   
¶191 During our discussion of the question presented, we 
construed the relationship of the Superintendent and the 
legislature.  We said: 
While the section of the constitution cited 
prohibited 
the 
legislature 
from 
increasing 
the 
compensation of that officer beyond the amount named, 
yet it expressly authorized them to increase his 
duties and enlarge his powers and responsibilities ad 
libitum.  This authority of the legislature has been 
from time to time freely exercised by especially 
enjoining new duties and imposing new and more onerous 
responsibilities. 
Id. at 47.  We concluded that although the legislature had 
increased the duties of the Superintendent since 1848 when the 
Constitution was ratified, nevertheless, the Superintendent had 
no legislative delegation to audit his own expenses and he could 
not receive payment above the constitutional limit even when the 
legislature increased his duties.  Id. at 52.   
¶192 The 
first 
legislation 
passed 
after 
Wisconsin's 
Constitution was ratified that bore on Article X, Section 1 was 
Section 3 of the Laws of 1848.  Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d 693-94.  
The law assigned the Superintendent:  
[G]eneral supervision over public instruction in this 
state, and it shall be his duty to devote his whole 
time to the advancement of the cause of education 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
9 
 
. . . .  To recommend the introduction and use of the 
most approved text books, and to secure as far as 
practicable uniformity in education throughout the 
state . . . .  To collect such information as may be 
deemed important in reference to common schools in 
each county, town precinct and school district . . . 
to perform such other duties as the legislature or 
governor of this state may direct . . . . 
Id. at 694 (quoting Laws of 1848, at 128-29) (emphasis added).  
Therefore, since 1848, the legislature has "by law" set the 
Superintendent's powers and duties, as Article X, Section 1 
clearly requires.  Furthermore, in 1848, the legislature 
permitted the governor to direct duties that the Superintendent 
was obligated to undertake. 
¶193 The 1902 amendment to Article X, Section 1 did not 
impart a more definite meaning to "supervision of public 
instruction," nor did the amendment diminish the legislature's 
constitutional power over the Superintendent.  The scope of the 
Superintendent's constitutional authority remained non-specific, 
executive authority as it had been in 1848.   
¶194 The first law passed after the 1902 amendment was ch. 
37 of the Laws of 1903.  Id. at 696-97.  Section 1 of ch. 37 
Laws of 1903 established qualifications for the office of the 
Superintendent 
and 
Section 
2 
imposed 
14 
duties 
on 
the 
Superintendent.  Briefly stated, the legislature directed the 
Superintendent to:  ascertain conditions of Wisconsin's public 
schools; advise in selection of books; investigate different 
systems of common schools; move public sentiment to favor 
industrial and commercial education; formulate study for listed 
schools; prescribe rules for management of school libraries; 
examine and determine appeals referred to the Superintendent; 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
10 
 
collect and purchase maps, charts, books, etc. for use in common 
schools; apportion and distribute the school fund; make copies 
of papers deposited in his office; prepare in even numbered 
years reports on all common schools; supervise teachers' 
institutes; hold one convention annually to confer with county 
superintendents; and "perform all other duties imposed upon him 
by law."  §§ 1 & 2, ch. 37, Laws of 1903.   
¶195 The above referenced ch. 37 of the Laws of 1903 
exemplifies the breadth of the legislature's constitutional 
control over the powers that the Superintendent could exercise 
and the duties the Superintendent was, by law, obligated to 
fulfill. 
 
It 
also 
shows 
the 
executive 
nature 
of 
the 
constitutional grant to the Superintendent to supervise public 
instruction 
because 
all 
legislative 
requirements 
of 
the 
Superintendent relate to public instruction, and it was the 
legislature, not the Superintendent, that was making the choices 
about what tasks would be undertaken. 
¶196 We previously have reviewed the legislature's power in 
regard to a claimed conflict between a statute and Article X.  
In City of Manitowoc v. Town of Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 
285 N.W. 403 (1939), we expressed approval of the reasoning of 
In re Kindergarten Schools, 32 P. 422, 422 (Colo. 1893), which 
provided that unless "the constitution, in express terms or by 
necessary implication, limits it, the legislature may exercise 
its sovereign power in any way that, in its judgment, will best 
subserve the general welfare."  City of Manitowoc, 231 Wis. at 
98.  In so stating, we rejected a challenge based on Article X, 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
11 
 
Section 3 to various statutes that provided for a statewide 
system of vocational schools in Wisconsin municipalities of over 
5,000 inhabitants and the opportunity for free education beyond 
20 years of age.  Id. at 98-99.   
¶197 In School District No. 3 of the Town of Adams v. 
Callahan, 237 Wis. 560, 297 N.W. 407 (1941), we reviewed a claim 
that the Superintendent's legislatively assigned task exceeded 
the legislature's power.  There, we considered Wis. Stat. 
§ 40.30(1) (1939), which provided:  "The state superintendent is 
authorized, on his own motion, by order to attach districts with 
valuations of less than one hundred thousand dollars to 
contiguous districts."  Id. at 566.   
¶198 School District No. 3 contended that the legislature's 
grant of authority to the Superintendent to combine contiguous 
districts 
with 
valuations 
of 
less 
than 
$100,000 
was 
unconstitutional because monetary valuation was not "germane to 
the purpose of the act," and the legislative delegation was 
outside of "matters pertaining to public instruction," which 
limited what power and duties the legislature could confer on 
the Superintendent.  Id. at 566-67.  We reasoned that the 
Superintendent acted in strict compliance with the law, Wis. 
Stat. § 40.30(1) (1939), and that the legislative delegation to 
the 
Superintendent 
was 
in 
accord 
with 
the 
legislature's 
constitutional power under Article X, Section 1.  Id. at 571. 
¶199 It also is significant that DPI was not in existence 
in 1848 when the Superintendent's authority to supervise public 
instruction was created.  When the Constitution was enacted, the 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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Superintendent acted by issuing executive orders, some of which 
were held unlawful because they exceeded both the legislature's 
grant 
of 
authority 
to 
the 
Superintendent 
and 
the 
Superintendent's constitutional authority, as we held in Raymer, 
supra.  
¶200 DPI was created by the legislature in 1967.5  In 1967, 
the legislature also created the "educational approval board" 
that was "attached to the department of public instruction under 
s. 15.03."  Wis. Stat. § 15.375 (1967).  The educational 
approval board consisted of "representatives of state agencies 
and other persons with a demonstrated interest in educational 
programs appointed to serve at the pleasure of the governor."  
Id.   
¶201 The educational approval board was to "exercise its 
powers, duties and functions prescribed by law, including rule-
making . . . independently of the head of the department . . . 
but budgeting, program co-ordination and related management 
functions shall be performed under the direction and supervision 
of the head of the department."  Wis. Stat. § 15.03 (1967).  
Therefore, from DPI's inception, the Superintendent was granted 
executive management duties; however, others (members of the 
educational approval board) participated with DPI, independent 
                                                 
5 "There is created a department of public instruction under 
the direction and supervision of the state superintendent."  
Wis. Stat. § 15.37 (1967).   
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
13 
 
from the Superintendent, on issues involving public instruction, 
including rule-making.6   
¶202 It 
is 
important 
to 
recognize 
that 
DPI 
has 
no 
constitutional authority.  See Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 
687, 698, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992).  It is simply one of many 
administrative departments and agencies that the legislature has 
created.  Id. at 697. 
¶203 By Wis. Stat. § 15.37, as enacted and then as 
companion statutes were amended, the legislature granted the 
Superintendent authority to oversee DPI and later to engage in 
rulemaking with DPI.  However, the Superintendent did not get 
his powers to supervise DPI and to engage in rulemaking from the 
Constitution.  The Superintendent obtained these powers from the 
legislature through statutory enactment.   
¶204 Stated otherwise, the Superintendent's rulemaking with 
DPI 
is 
legislatively 
granted 
supervision 
of 
DPI, 
not 
constitutionally granted supervision of DPI.  This distinction 
about the source of the Superintendent's powers relative to DPI 
is 
important 
because 
in 
order 
for 
a 
statute 
to 
be 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied, 
it 
must 
adversely 
affect 
a 
constitutional power of the Superintendent.  Statutes that 
affect statutory powers of the Superintendent are simply 
statutory amendments, which the legislature is always free to 
enact.  City of Manitowoc, 231 Wis. at 98. 
                                                 
6 The educational approval board is no longer involved with 
DPI, as it was in 1967.  
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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¶205 The 
Attorney 
General 
also 
has 
examined 
the 
constitutional 
delegation 
to 
the 
Superintendent 
and 
has 
concluded that the scope of the Superintendent's authority "is 
placed within the discretion of the legislature by the use of 
the phrase in art. X, sec. 1, 'powers, duties and compensation 
shall be prescribed by law.'"  37 Op. Att'y. Gen. 347, 353 
(1948).   
¶206 Accordingly, I conclude that Article X, Section 1 
granted the Superintendent only non-specific executive authority 
with regard to free public schools on a statewide basis.  The 
Attainment of Statehood, 556-57.  That is the extent of the 
Superintendent's constitutional powers.  I also conclude that 
Article X, Section 1 granted the legislature authority to 
legislate which activities (powers) the Superintendent could 
pursue and which obligations (duties) he was required to meet.  
C.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶207 Now 
that 
I 
have 
determined 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
constitutional delegations to the Superintendent and to the 
legislature under Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, the next step is to decide whether Act 21 collides 
in an unconstitutional way with the executive authority of the 
Superintendent.  This requires interpretation and application of 
those provisions of Act 21 about which complaint has been lodged 
before us:  Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2) and Wis. Stat. § 227.185. 
1. General principles 
¶208 DPI has no power to create a law, nor has the 
Superintendent.  Article IV, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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Constitution clearly provides:  "The legislative power shall be 
vested in a senate and assembly."  Any rulemaking authority DPI 
has is a delegation of power from the legislature.  Martinez, 
165 Wis. 2d at 698-99. 
¶209 In Martinez, we addressed whether the legislature's 
delegation to the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative 
Rules (JCRAR) to "temporarily suspend administrative rules 
pending bicameral review by the legislature and presentment to 
the governor for veto or other action" was lawful.  Id. at 691.  
When JCRAR notified DILHR that it was suspending part of Wis. 
Admin. Code § IND. 72.01(16), DILHR told Wisconsin employers to 
ignore JCRAR's action suspending its rule.  Id. at 692-93.  The 
Martinez litigation followed.   
¶210 In 
upholding 
JCRAR's 
action, 
we 
explained 
that 
"administrative agencies are creations of the legislature and [] 
they can exercise only those powers granted by the legislature."  
Id. at 697.  We also explained that "rule-making powers can be 
repealed by the legislature."  Id. at 698.  Thereafter, we 
concluded that DILHR's arguments lacked merit in part because 
"it 
is 
incumbent 
on 
the 
legislature, 
pursuant 
to 
its 
constitutional grant of legislative power, to maintain some 
legislative accountability over rule-making."  Id. at 701.   
¶211 Here, DPI engages in rulemaking to administer statutes 
that 
involve 
education, 
which 
have 
been 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature and signed into law by the Governor.  DPI cannot 
make rules on any subject matter it chooses.  Rather, all of its 
rules must relate to education.  For example, Wis. Admin. Code 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
16 
 
§ PI 2 establishes procedures for school district boundary 
appeals under Wis. Stat. ch. 117.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § PI 5 
establishes procedures for granting high school equivalency 
diplomas and certificates pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 115.29(4)(a).  
Wisconsin Admin. Code § PI 18 establishes course requirements to 
meet the graduation standards outlined by the legislature in 
Wis. Stat. § 118.33.  
¶212 Furthermore, "[n]o agency may promulgate a rule which 
conflicts with state law."  Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2).  It is well 
established precedent that "[a]n administrative rule that 
conflicts with an unambiguous statute exceeds the authority of 
the agency that promulgated it."  Thomas More High Sch. v. 
Burmaster, 2005 WI App 204, ¶15, 287 Wis. 2d 220, 704 N.W.2d 349 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 
2000 WI 76, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).   
2.  Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2) and Wis. Stat. § 227.185 
¶213 As usual when statutory interpretation is at issue, we 
begin with the words chosen by the legislature.  Wis. Indus. 
Energy Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342 
Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.  If their meaning is plain, we 
apply that meaning and go no further.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.   
¶214 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.135(2) is at the forefront of 
plaintiffs' challenge.  It provides: 
An agency that has prepared a statement of the 
scope of the proposed rule shall present the statement 
to the governor and to the individual or body with 
policy-making powers over the subject matter of the 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
17 
 
proposed rule for approval.  The agency may not send 
the statement to the legislative reference bureau for 
publication under sub. (3) until the governor issues a 
written notice of approval of the statement.  The 
individual or body with policy-making powers may not 
approve the statement until at least 10 days after 
publication of the statement under sub. (3).  No state 
employee or official may perform any activity in 
connection with the drafting of a proposed rule except 
for an activity necessary to prepare the statement of 
the scope of the proposed rule until the governor and 
the individual or body with policy-making powers over 
the subject matter of the proposed rule approve the 
statement.   
Section 227.135(2) unambiguously requires approval of proposed 
scope statements by both the Governor and the Superintendent, 
"the individual . . . with policy-making powers," when DPI is 
rulemaking.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.185 unambiguously requires 
that proposed rules be approved by the Governor before they can 
proceed further.7  Therefore, unless they have been proved 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, they must be 
enforced according to the plain meaning of their terms. 
¶215 As I explained above, administrative rulemaking is 
undertaken to facilitate application of statutes that the 
legislature creates.  It is the legislature that sets, by 
statute, the policy to be furthered in rulemaking.  In addition, 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.185 provides: 
After a proposed rule is in final draft form, the 
agency shall submit the proposed rule to the governor 
for approval.  The governor, in his or her discretion, 
may approve or reject the proposed rule.  If the 
governor approves a proposed rule, the governor shall 
provide the agency with a written notice of that 
approval.  No proposed rule may be submitted to the 
legislature for review under s. 227.19(2) unless the 
governor has approved the proposed rule in writing.   
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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rulemaking is accomplished only through legislative delegation 
to an administrative agency or department.  Martinez, 165 
Wis. 2d at 698-99.  The legislature controls the delegation of 
legislative authority that it accords to administrative agencies 
and departments to employ in rulemaking.  Id. at 701.   
¶216 Requiring the Superintendent to approve the scope 
statement of a new rule that facilitates application of statutes 
relating to education, clearly is within the legislature's 
constitutional power under Article IV, Section 1 and its 
authority in regard to the Superintendent under Article X, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The lead opinion seems 
to agree that the legislature can require the Superintendent to 
approve the scope statement of proposed DPI rules.  
¶217 However, the lead opinion concludes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.135(2) and Wis. Stat. § 227.185 are unconstitutional as 
applied 
to 
the 
Superintendent 
because 
rulemaking 
is 
a 
supervisory power of the Superintendent, and by granting the 
Governor the power to approve the scope of a rule under 
§ 227.135(2) and proposed rules under § 227.185, the legislature 
has 
given 
the 
Governor 
the 
power 
to 
supervise 
public 
instruction.8   
¶218 The lead opinion errs because it misperceives two 
foundational legal principles that underlie this case:  (1) it 
fails 
to 
recognize 
that 
the 
legislature 
accorded 
the 
Superintendent the power to participate with DPI in rulemaking 
                                                 
8 Lead op., ¶¶59-62.   
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
19 
 
and (2) it fails to recognize the legislature's constitutional 
authority 
under 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution to control delegations of legislative power such as 
occurred with DPI's rulemaking.   
¶219 To explain further, first, it was the legislature that 
granted the Superintendent the authority to direct and supervise 
DPI, as Wis. Stat. § 15.37 very clearly provides:  "There is 
created a department of public instruction under the direction 
and 
supervision 
of 
the 
state 
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction."   
¶220 This is a statutory grant of authority from the 
legislature to the Superintendent.  The Superintendent did not 
obtain the power to direct and supervise DPI from Article X, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  He got those powers 
from Wis. Stat. § 15.37.  Therefore, in regard to rulemaking 
with DPI, the Superintendent has only legislative power.   
¶221 There was no DPI when the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction was created by Article X, Section 1, nor was there 
rulemaking.  Rather, it was the legislature that set obligations 
for the Superintendent with regard to DPI.  Stated otherwise, it 
was the legislature that gave the Superintendent the power to 
direct and supervise DPI; not the Constitution.  Compare Wis. 
Stat. § 15.37 with Wis. Const. art. X, Section 1.  Therefore, 
supervision of DPI rulemaking is a statutory power of the 
Superintendent, not a constitutional power.   
¶222 Second, the legislature has the constitutional power 
to control the mechanism by which rulemaking is undertaken 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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because 
rulemaking 
is 
a 
delegation 
of 
the 
legislature's 
legislative power granted in Article IV, Section 1.  Without 
legislation, DPI would not exist and could not engage in 
rulemaking.  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 698 (explaining that an 
agency "has no inherent constitutional authority to make rules, 
and, furthermore, its rule-making powers can be repealed by the 
legislature").   
¶223 A review of the evolution of DPI rulemaking is 
helpful.  Initially, DPI rulemaking was directed by the 
educational approval board, not by the Superintendent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 15.03 (1967).  The legislature subsequently modified DPI 
rulemaking, 
granting 
more 
power 
over 
rulemaking 
to 
the 
Superintendent.  In the statutes now under examination, the 
legislature again has modified DPI rulemaking by inserting 
procedural safeguards for the Superintendent and the Governor to 
oversee.  This is similar to what the legislature did in 
Martinez when it inserted safeguards for JCRAR to oversee with 
regard to DILHR's rulemaking.  Simply because Act 21 affects 
rulemaking of DPI (and many, many other agencies), it does not 
follow that the legislature's constitutional powers to control 
its own rulemaking delegations have been diminished.  Id. at 
701.  
¶224 Furthermore, while statutes may create opportunities 
and obligations for the Superintendent, those opportunities and 
obligations come from the legislature not from the Constitution.  
Therefore, legislative modification of the powers and duties of 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
21 
 
the 
Superintendent 
in 
DPI 
rulemaking 
are 
within 
the 
legislature's constitutional authority.  
¶225 In regard to the interaction of the Superintendent and 
the legislature, Article X, Section 1 grants the legislature the 
right to exercise control over duties that relate to education 
that the Superintendent must undertake.  The legislature has 
broad constitutional power over the Superintendent, so long as 
the duties assigned do not fall outside of public instruction, 
as it was alleged to have occurred in School District No. 3, 
supra.  No challenge in this regard has been raised with regard 
to Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2) and Wis. Stat. § 227.185.   
¶226 Furthermore, simply because the legislature creates an 
opportunity or an obligation for the Superintendent, it does not 
follow 
that 
those 
opportunities 
and 
obligations 
are 
of 
constitutional magnitude.  However, the lead opinion has 
conflated 
the 
Superintendent's 
constitutional 
executive 
authority to supervise public instruction with his statutory 
authority to supervise DPI, which later type of supervision is 
not of constitutional dimension.  
¶227 In addition, my decision is consistent with Thompson.  
Thompson was concerned with "other officers" mentioned in 
Article X, Section 1, one of which was to be Secretary of 
Education, and whether their authority was inferior to that of 
the Superintendent.  Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 683-84.  The 
matter before us does not concern the "other officers" mentioned 
in Article X, Section 1. 
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
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¶228 In Thompson, we did not examine whether duties of the 
Superintendent that had been required by legislation could 
subsequently be modified by the legislature.9  Thompson was not 
concerned with rulemaking; therefore, we did not consider the 
constitutional power of the legislature when it delegates 
rulemaking authority, as I have done here.   
¶229 However, 
without 
recognizing 
the 
effect 
of 
its 
decision, the lead opinion increases the executive power granted 
to the Superintendent in Article X, Section 1 to include the 
power to legislate, which the Constitution clearly reserves to 
the legislature; treats the DPI as though it has constitutional 
power; and reduces the constitutional power of the legislature 
to control its delegations of legislative power in rulemaking, 
all in contravention of Article IV, Section 1 and Article X, 
Section 
1. 
 
However, 
courts 
are 
not 
free 
to 
change 
constitutional delegations, and Article X, Section 1 explicitly 
states how the constitutional delegations to the legislature and 
to the Superintendent are to coexist. 
D.  Constitutional Violation 
¶230 Finally, 
in 
order 
to 
succeed 
before 
us, 
the 
Superintendent must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.135(2) 
or 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.185 
was 
unconstitutionally enforced against him.  Society Ins. v. LIRC, 
                                                 
9 In Thompson, we left open "the extent to which the 
[Superintendent's] powers may be reduced by the legislature, and 
we reserve[ed] judgment on that issue."  Thompson v. Craney, 199 
Wis. 2d 674, 700, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
23 
 
2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385.  In examining 
the constitutionality of the challenged statutes, the phrase 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" expresses the "force or conviction" 
with which we must conclude, as a matter of law, that a statute 
has been enforced unconstitutionally against the Superintendent.  
See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. 
Walker, 2014 WI 97, ¶17, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302.  
¶231 No proof has been submitted that either Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.235(2) or Wis. Stat. § 227.185 has been unconstitutionally 
enforced against the Superintendent.  First, in order for either 
statute to be unconstitutional as applied, enforcement of 
§ 227.235(2) or § 227.185 must adversely affect a constitutional 
power of the Superintendent.  However, Act 21's administrative 
rulemaking 
safeguards 
impose 
conditions 
on 
only 
the 
Superintendent's statutory powers, not on his constitutional 
authority.  There has been no proof that either § 227.235(2) or 
§ 227.185 
interferes 
with 
the 
Superintendent's 
executive 
authority to supervise existing rules and laws affecting public 
instruction.   
¶232 Second, 
the 
Superintendent 
concedes 
that 
the 
legislature could take away all rulemaking power from the 
Superintendent because rulemaking is a legislative delegation of 
authority.10 
 
This 
concession 
belies 
the 
Superintendent's 
assertion 
that 
rulemaking 
is 
constitutionally 
granted 
supervision of public instruction.  Furthermore, when rulemaking 
                                                 
10 Coyne Brief at 15, 23.   
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
24 
 
was introduced to DPI in 1967, the "educational approval board" 
exercised "powers, duties and functions prescribed by law, 
including rule-making," which actions were set out independently 
from the executive functions reserved to the Superintendent.  
Wis. Stat. § 15.03 (1967) (emphasis added).  In addition, 
members of the "educational approval board" were appointed by 
the Governor.11  Accordingly, I conclude that the Superintendent 
has failed to meet his burden of proof; and therefore, his 
constitutional challenge before us fails. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶233 I conclude that the legislature acted pursuant to its 
constitutional authority under Article IV, Section 1 and Article 
X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution when it enacted Act 
21, which creates procedural safeguards to be employed in 
rulemaking by DPI and many other administrative agencies.  I 
also conclude that Act 21 does not conflict with Thompson.  And 
finally, I conclude that the plaintiffs have not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Act 21 has been applied unconstitutionally 
to the Superintendent.  Accordingly, I would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent from 
the lead opinion.   
                                                 
11 The involvement of the Governor in education in the 1967 
statute is consistent with the first legislation passed after 
Wisconsin's Constitution was ratified in 1848, where some of the 
duties of the Superintendent were described specifically and 
some generally as, "such other duties as the legislature or 
governor of this state may direct."  § 3, Laws of 1848, at 129 
(emphasis added).  
No.  2013AP416.pdr 
 
25 
 
¶234 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and REBECCA G. BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
1 
 
¶235 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I join 
the dissent authored by Chief Justice Roggensack because I agree 
that, based on the arguments raised in this case, the 
respondents have failed to establish that the provisions of 2011 
Wisconsin Act 21 ("Act 21") at issue are unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt as applied to the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction ("SPI").  I write to emphasize a few points. 
¶236 First, 
there 
are 
numerous 
significant 
areas 
of 
agreement 
between 
the 
lead 
opinion 
and 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's dissent.  Most importantly, the lead opinion and 
the dissent agree that the Wisconsin Constitution "gives the 
Legislature control over what powers the SPI and the other 
officers of supervision of public instruction possess in order 
to supervise public instruction" such that "the Legislature may 
give, may not give, and may take away the powers and duties of 
the SPI and the other officers of supervision of public 
instruction."  Lead op., ¶70; see dissent, ¶189.  The lead 
opinion and the dissent also agree that the SPI's ability to 
participate in the rulemaking process derives from statute, not 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Lead op., ¶¶35-37; dissent, ¶¶203-
04.  
¶237 One need look no further than Article X, Section 1 
itself for these propositions: "The supervision of public 
instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such 
other officers as the legislature shall direct; and their 
qualifications, powers, duties, and compensation 
shall be 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
2 
 
prescribed by law."  Wis. Const. Art. X, § 1 (emphases added).  
Our case law confirms this notion:  
Article X, sec. 1, explicitly provides that the powers 
and duties of the school superintendent and other 
officers charged by the legislature with governing 
school systems "shall be prescribed by law." Because 
the constitution explicitly authorized the legislature 
to set the powers and duties of public instruction 
officers, Article X, sec. 1 confers no more authority 
upon those officers than that delineated by statute. 
Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of West Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 182, 321 
N.W.2d 225 (1982) (emphasis added).  Article X, Section 1 
therefore 
does 
little 
more 
than 
create 
a 
constitutional 
position: the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution wanted to 
ensure that some officer was in place to oversee Wisconsin's 
system of public instruction.  What supervision means in the 
context 
of 
public 
instruction, 
the 
framers 
left 
to 
the 
legislature to decide.  The framers provided the clay; the 
legislature shapes it. 
¶238 So much for the areas of agreement.  Broadly speaking, 
the lead opinion and the dissent part ways on the question of 
whether the legislature can tie its own hands depending on the 
powers it grants the SPI and the duties it requires of the SPI.  
The court of appeals below clearly thought the answer to this 
question is yes.  It stated, "[T]he legislature has the 
authority to give, to not give, or to take away SPI supervisory 
powers, including rulemaking power.  What the legislature may 
not do is give the SPI a supervisory power relating to education 
and then fail to maintain the SPI's supremacy with respect to 
that power."  Coyne v. Walker, 2015 WI App 21, ¶25, 361 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 225, 862 N.W.2d 606.  Importantly, the court of appeals 
premised this principle on Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 
546 N.W.2d 123 (1996), in which we held that "the 'other 
officers' mentioned in [Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution] were intended to be subordinate to the state 
[SPI]" and that therefore "the legislature may not give equal or 
superior authority to any 'other officer.'"  Thompson, 199 
Wis. 2d at 698-99.  
¶239 The lead opinion and the dissent agree that Thompson 
is not really at issue in this case, however, because the 
Governor and the Secretary of Administration are not Article X 
officers of public instruction.  See lead op., ¶¶39-40 ("[T]his 
case poses a different constitutional question than the question 
posed in Thompson. . . . [H]ere, the Legislature is attempting 
to give officers who are not officers of supervision of public 
instruction the ability to prevent the SPI from promulgating 
rules."); dissent, ¶227 ("Thompson was concerned with 'other 
officers' mentioned in Article X, § 1 . . . . The matter before 
us does not concern the 'other officers' mentioned in Article X, 
§ 1.").  
¶240 Thus, the lead opinion does something new: it takes 
the Thompson idea that, with regard to Article X officers, "the 
legislature may not . . . give the SPI a supervisory power 
relating to education and then fail to maintain the SPI's 
supremacy with respect to that power," and applies it to 
individuals——the Governor and the Secretary of Administration——
who are not Article X officers.  Put differently, the lead 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
4 
 
opinion decides today that if the legislature grants the SPI a 
power, the SPI must have "supremacy with respect to that power" 
both with regard to Article X officers and with regard to non-
Article X officers.  
¶241 In so doing, the lead opinion seriously errs.  To see 
why, let us follow the lead opinion's chain of reasoning.  We 
begin with the lead opinion's premises: (1) the legislature may 
"give, may not give, and may take away the powers and duties of 
the SPI and the other officers of supervision of public 
instruction," that is, the manner in which the SPI and other 
officers supervise public instruction,  lead op., ¶¶70, 72; (2) 
the 
legislature 
has 
defined 
the 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction to include rulemaking, lead op., ¶35; (3) the 
supervision of public instruction, however defined by the 
legislature, must be vested in the SPI and the other officers of 
supervision of public instruction, lead op., ¶63; (4) the 
Governor and the Secretary of Administration are not Article X 
officers, id.; and (5) the legislature has given the Governor 
and the Secretary of Administration "the power to make the 
decision on whether the rulemaking process can proceed," lead 
op., ¶68.  Now, the denouement: "By giving the Governor the 
power to prevent the SPI's and DPI's proposed rules from being 
sent to the Legislature, Act 21 [unconstitutionally] gives the 
Governor the authority to [supervise] public instruction."  Lead 
op., ¶65. 
¶242 I cannot subscribe to this reasoning because it fails 
to account for the unconquerable nature of the first of the 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
5 
 
premises listed above: the legislature may give, may not give, 
and may take away the powers and duties of the SPI and the other 
officers of supervision of public instruction, that is, the 
manner in which the SPI and other officers supervise public 
instruction.  We have stated this idea before: "Article X, sec. 
1 confers no more authority upon . . . officers [of supervision 
of public instruction] than that delineated by statute."  
Fortney, 108 Wis. 2d at 182.  Thus, the supposed limit on the 
legislature's authority envisioned by the lead opinion is not 
really a limit at all; the legislature can simply redefine the 
"supervision of public instruction" in a way that accommodates 
that which the legislature wishes to achieve. 
¶243 More specifically, in the lead opinion's view, the 
legislature defined "supervision of public instruction" to mean 
(in part) "rulemaking," and "rulemaking" to mean "the ability to 
promulgate public instruction-related rules."  But rulemaking is 
not some unchangeable Platonic Form.  I see nothing in Article, 
X, § 1 that prevents the legislature from defining "supervision 
of public instruction" to mean (in part) "rulemaking," and 
"rulemaking" 
to 
mean 
"the 
ability 
to 
promulgate 
public 
instruction-related rules subject to gubernatorial approval." 
¶244 Imagine that, prior to 2011, the legislature had never 
given the SPI any authority to participate in the rulemaking 
process, and that Act 21 represented the legislature's first 
grant of rulemaking authority to the SPI——rulemaking subject to 
gubernatorial approval.  Act 21 would thus represent an 
expansion, not a contraction, of the SPI's powers.  Why would 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
6 
 
this 
be 
unconstitutional? 
 
The 
legislature 
is 
simply 
"prescrib[ing]" the "powers" of the SPI under Article X, Section 
1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  It cannot be that the 
legislature can only expand, and never contract, powers.  Under 
the lead opinion's reasoning, the legislature's ability to 
"prescribe[]" the SPI's "powers" is so limited.  The lead 
opinion's logic suggests that if any power is to be prescribed 
to the SPI, it must be prescribed without any limitation.  This 
logic is fundamentally flawed because this requirement is not 
found in the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶245 Article 
X, 
Section 
1 
vests 
the 
SPI 
with 
the 
supervision of public instruction and states that the SPI's 
"powers . . . shall be prescribed by law," not that its "other 
powers" shall be prescribed by law.  Wis. Const. Art. X, § 1; 
see Fortney, 108 Wis. 2d at 182.  Thus while it is true that 
Article X vests the SPI with "[t]he supervision of public 
instruction," Act 21 cannot be unconstitutional because the 
"supervision of public instruction" is some independent power of 
the SPI.  Further, this court has already determined that 
"[p]ublic instruction and its governance had no long-standing 
common law history at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
7 
 
enacted."  Fortney, 108 Wis. 2d at 182.  "Supervision of public 
instruction" connotes no special grant of common law powers.1 
¶246 So this case is not, ultimately, about the powers of 
the SPI.  It is instead about whether the legislature can create 
a chain of command.  The lead opinion concludes that it is not 
within the province of the legislature to create such a chain of 
command.  The words of the constitution do not so limit the 
legislature. 
¶247 Is the lead opinion correct to conclude that if the 
SPI supervises public instruction, and the Governor supervises 
the SPI, then the Governor is (unconstitutionally) supervising 
public instruction?  The answer is no, because it is not really 
the Governor who is supervising (or even obstructing, if one 
prefers) the actions of the SPI; it is the legislature.  That 
is, built into the very idea of the SPI's supervision of public 
instruction is the idea that this supervision will forever be 
qualified and controlled by the legislature.  It is the 
legislature 
that 
defines 
what 
"supervision 
of 
public 
instruction" is; "[p]ublic instruction and its governance had no 
                                                 
1 This case, which involves the SPI's authority under 
Article X, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, should 
therefore be distinguished from cases involving a provision 
"which incorporates an ancient common law office, possessing 
defined powers and duties, into the constitution."  Fortney v. 
School Dist. of West Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 182, 321 N.W.2d 225 
(1982).  For instance, "[p]rior decisions of this court held 
that the sheriff, under common law, had certain powers and 
duties in his relationship to the courts which were incorporated 
into the constitution.  The sheriff cannot be divested of those 
powers and duties by statute."  Id.  The lead opinion today 
would not affect existing law on these types of offices.  
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
8 
 
long-standing common law history at the time the Wisconsin 
Constitution was enacted."  Fortney, 108 Wis. 2d at 182.  It is 
the legislature which determines the powers the SPI may wield, 
and the way in which the SPI may wield those powers.  See Wis. 
Const. Art. X, § 1.  In short, it is the legislature which 
decides what it means to supervise public instruction in 
Wisconsin.  The legislature has determined through Act 21 that 
the supervision of public instruction in Wisconsin means, in 
part, participation in the rulemaking process with respect to 
specific matters and subject to gubernatorial approval.  Alas, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
determines 
that 
our 
state 
constitution 
prohibits the legislature's actions. 
¶248 The lead opinion's conclusions today could yield 
undesirable 
and 
unintended 
consequences. 
 
Suppose 
the 
legislature, in light of school shootings in recent years, 
decides to increase security at Wisconsin's public schools.  The 
legislature might wish to provide the SPI with rulemaking 
authority over the implementation of this plan.  But, given the 
nature of the issue, the legislature might also conclude that 
the 
Governor's 
input 
on 
any 
proposed 
rules 
should 
be 
dispositive.  Under the lead opinion today, it seems that the 
legislature could: (1) give the SPI the authority to pass rules 
on school security without conditioning the submission of these 
rules to the legislature on the Governor's approval; or (2) give 
the 
Governor's 
office 
a 
measure 
of 
authority 
over 
the 
implementation of the plan, without involving the SPI at all.  
What it could not do, at least apparently, is give the SPI the 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
9 
 
authority to pass rules on school security, subject to the 
approval of the Governor; the lead opinion's reasoning suggests 
that while the legislature need not give any authority at all to 
the SPI on a matter such as public school security, if it in 
fact chooses to give any such authority, that authority must be 
unfettered.  I fail to see why Article X, Section 1 would 
require such an outcome, given that that provision provides that 
the powers of the SPI are prescribed by the legislature.  Wis. 
Const. Art. X, § 1.  The legislature may reasonably wish to give 
the SPI qualified authority over the implementation of the law 
at issue, yet the lead opinion forces the legislature to choose 
between two imperfect solutions.  
¶249 I suspect that the reason the dissent's view leaves a 
sour taste in the lead opinion's mouth is because the SPI, under 
the dissent's interpretation, is a rather weak entity, at least 
insofar as it is subject to the changing whims of the 
legislature.  But this consequence is dictated by the broad 
language of Article X, Section 1, which gives virtually complete 
authority over the SPI to the legislature.  The framers did not 
provide that the SPI constitutes the fourth branch of our state 
government.  That the plain language2 of Article X does not leave 
                                                 
2 The lead opinion states:  
When interpreting a constitutional provision we 
do not rest our analysis on the language of the 
provision 
alone. 
Rather, 
we 
also 
consult 
the 
constitutional debates and the practices in existence 
at the time of the writing of the constitutional 
provision and the interpretation of the provision by 
the Legislature as manifested in the laws passed 
following its adoption. 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
10 
 
the SPI with some set of "core" powers is not a problem for this 
court to resolve.  See Lead op., ¶79.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Lead op., ¶52 (citation omitted).  
"Our methodology in interpreting a constitutional provision 
is not identical to our methodology in interpreting a statute."  
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶114, 295 
Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting 
in 
part). 
 
Although 
justifications 
for 
this 
divergence have, in the past, been provided, see, e.g., id., 
¶116, I am not convinced that the current methodology this court 
uses to interpret constitutional language is sound.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Ours is 'a government of 
laws not men,' and 'it is simply incompatible with democratic 
government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the 
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather 
than by what the lawgiver promulgated.' . . . 'It is the law 
that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.  . . . Men may 
intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact 
which bind us" (citations omitted).); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 375 
(2012) ("The English judges have frequently observed, in answer 
to the remark that the legislature meant so and so, that they in 
that case have not so expressed themselves, and therefore the 
maxim applied, quod voluit non dixit [What it wanted it did not 
say]." (quoting 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 467 
(1826)); 
Daniel 
R. 
Suhr, 
Interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
97 
Marq. 
L. 
Rev. 
93, 
120 
(2012) 
 
("The 
considerations that drove the [Wisconsin Supreme Court's] 
majority in Kalal should lead it to reject the current method it 
uses to interpret the state constitution.  The [current] 
methodology relies on flawed sources in a futile attempt to 
discover a mythical common intent.").  
Additionally, this methodology was not previously applied 
in Coulee.  See Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, ¶57, 768 N.W.2d 868 (interpreting the Wisconsin 
Constitution and stating, "The authoritative, and usually final, 
indicator of the meaning of a provision is the text——the actual 
words used"); id., n.25 ("In this case, we see little reason to 
extend our interpretation beyond the text."). Consequently, I 
would be willing to reexamine the methodology this court 
currently employs when interpreting constitutional text. 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
11 
 
¶250 The last point I wish to discuss is the lead opinion's 
conclusion that Act 21 is unconstitutional "as applied."  Unlike 
the lead opinion, I conclude that the respondents fail to 
establish that Act 21 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt as applied to the SPI because they have not shown that Act 
21 has actually been applied to the SPI.  The respondents do not 
assert that the Governor or the Secretary of Administration have 
rejected a rule proposed by the SPI or the DPI, or have, for 
instance, rendered the SPI powerless by rejecting every rule it 
and the DPI have promulgated since Act 21's passage.  See 
dissent, ¶231 ("No proof has been submitted that either Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.235(2) 
or 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.185 
has 
been 
unconstitutionally 
enforced 
against 
the 
Superintendent.").  
Despite the lead opinion's conclusions, I am not convinced that 
this case is in fact an as-applied challenge.  The SPI is really 
arguing that Act 21 is always unconstitutional when the entity 
concerned is the SPI.  And although this is a declaratory 
judgment action, this matter is not ripe.  
¶251 The lead opinion responds that "Act 21 does not have 
to have been enforced for Coyne to properly bring a claim via a 
declaratory judgment action," because the "Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04, allows 'controversies of a 
justiciable 
nature 
to 
be 
brought 
before 
the 
courts 
for 
settlement and determination prior to the time that a wrong has 
been threatened or committed.'"  Lead op., ¶¶27-28 (citing Olson 
v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶28, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 
N.W.2d 211).  This argument is fine so far as it goes, but the 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
12 
 
problem is that it is not clear how far it goes: "Though the 
authority to declare rights under the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act is broad, it is not unlimited in scope."  Putnam v. 
Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 2002 WI 108, ¶72, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (Sykes, J., dissenting in part) 
(citation omitted).  As the lead opinion points out, a 
controversy is not justiciable for purposes of a declaratory 
judgment action unless it is "ripe for judicial determination."  
Lead op., ¶28 (citation omitted).  "The basic rationale of the 
'ripeness' doctrine is to prevent courts, through avoidance of 
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements 
over 
administrative 
or . . . legislative 
policies."  Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 308, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976).  Ripeness requires that "the facts be 
sufficiently developed to allow a conclusive adjudication."  
Olson, 309 Wis. 2d 365, ¶43 (citations omitted).  I have 
significant doubts that this court possesses the information it 
needs to pronounce a wholesale invalidation of the challenged 
provisions of Act 21 as they apply to the SPI. 
¶252 The lead opinion argues that Walker and Huebsch did 
not contest ripeness (among other things) below, lead op., ¶28, 
but that is not dispositive.  "[T]he question of ripeness may be 
considered on a court's own motion."  Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (citation 
omitted); see also Blanchette v. Conn. General Ins. Corps., 419 
U.S. 102, 138 (1974) ("[T]o the extent that questions of 
ripeness involve the exercise of judicial restraint from 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
13 
 
unnecessary decision of constitutional issues, the [c]ourt must 
determine whether to exercise that restraint and cannot be bound 
by the wishes of the parties.").  
¶253 Though styling the case as an as-applied challenge, 
the lead opinion concludes that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
challenged 
provisions 
of 
Act 
21 
can 
never 
be 
applied 
constitutionally to the SPI.  See lead op., ¶¶4, 24-30.  In my 
view, the facts have not sufficiently developed to permit such a 
sweeping conclusion.  Assuming the Governor will eventually 
reject a proposed rule, we do not know what the substance of 
that 
rule 
will 
be, 
whether 
the 
rule 
impinges 
on 
any 
constitutional powers of the Governor, what reasons, if any, the 
Governor might have for rejecting a proposed rule, what changes, 
if any, the Governor might request, and so on.  "[I]n an as-
applied challenge, we assess the merits of the challenge by 
considering the facts of the particular case in front of us, 
'not hypothetical facts in other situations.'"  State v. Wood, 
2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 (citation 
omitted).  Yet the focus of the lead opinion is precisely that——
hypothetical facts in other situations.  See, e.g., lead op., 
¶68 ("[A] Governor at loggerheads with an SPI over the content 
of a proposed rule, or a proposed rule change, could use the 
threat to withhold approval as a means of affecting the rule 
content" (citation omitted).). 
¶254 Although it would not formally invalidate Act 21 as 
under a facial challenge——Act 21 remains in effect with respect 
to entities other than the SPI——the lead opinion acknowledges 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
14 
 
that the respondents' action "contains elements of . . . a 
facial . . . challenge."  Lead op., ¶26.  The respondents claim 
that, where the SPI is involved, Act 21 "cannot be enforced 
'under any circumstances.'"  Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶13.  It 
seems, then, that as to the SPI, the lead opinion concludes that 
Act 21 is always invalid, not just under "the facts of the 
particular case in front of us."  Id.  I would conclude that 
this facial challenge does not survive scrutiny. 
¶255 The Supreme Court of the United States has stated: 
 
Facial challenges are disfavored for several 
reasons. Claims of facial invalidity often rest on 
speculation.  As a consequence, they raise the risk of 
"premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of 
factually barebones records."  Facial challenges also 
run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial 
restraint that courts should neither "anticipate a 
question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it" nor "formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied."  Finally, 
facial challenges threaten to short circuit the 
democratic process by preventing laws embodying the 
will of the people from being implemented in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution.  We must keep in 
mind 
that 
"[a] 
ruling 
of 
unconstitutionality 
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives 
of the people."  
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 
442, 450-51 (2008).  These considerations apply to the present 
case, and bolster my conclusion that this case is not in the 
proper posture for the determination the lead opinion makes 
today. 
¶256 Today's decision is not really a victory for the SPI——
or Wisconsin, for that matter.  It is easy to see where Coyne v. 
Walker could take us.  If the legislature cannot maintain what 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
15 
 
it views as sufficient control over the SPI's exercise of its 
powers, it could simply exercise its own authority to remove 
those powers, even though a grant of qualified authority to the 
SPI might well have benefitted public instruction in Wisconsin 
more than a complete absence of any such authority.  Rulemaking 
stems in part from the fact that "[t]he legislature recognizes 
the need for efficient administration of public policy.  . . . 
The delegation of rule-making authority is intended to eliminate 
the necessity of establishing every administrative aspect of 
general 
public 
policy 
by 
legislation." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.19(1)(b) (2013-14) (emphasis added). 
 Given 
today's 
decision, the legislature may feel compelled to pass legislation 
regarding these administrative aspects of public instruction, 
even though it might otherwise have delegated this authority to 
the SPI, subject to gubernatorial review.  In my view, Article 
X, Section 1 does not require such an inefficient result. 
¶257 In sum, I join the dissent authored by Chief Justice 
Roggensack because I agree that, based on the arguments raised 
in this case,3 the respondents have failed to establish that the 
                                                 
3 The 
legislation 
in 
this 
case 
raises 
a 
host 
of 
constitutional questions that, appropriately, are not answered 
by the lead opinion.  For instance, the lead opinion does not 
examine whether Act 21's grant of authority to the Governor and 
Secretary of Administration to reject proposed rules contains or 
need contain an ascertainable legislative purpose and procedural 
safeguards to ensure that the Governor and Secretary of 
Administration act within that purpose in exercising their 
authority.  Cf. J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Com'n, 
114 Wis. 2d 69, 90, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing 
Watchmaking Examining Bd. v. Husar, 49 Wis. 2d 526, 536, 182 
N.W.2d 257 (1971)).  
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
16 
 
provisions of Act 21 at issue are unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt as applied to the SPI. 
¶258 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶259 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA G. 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2013AP416.akz 
 
1