Case Title: Commonwealth v. Plasse

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12486

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12486 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CAYLA S. PLASSE. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     September 6, 2018. - January 10, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation, Revocation of 
probation, Judicial discretion. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Orange Division of 
the District Court Department on September 26, 2013. 
 
 
A motion for release from unlawful restraint and for a new 
sentencing hearing, filed on March 31, 2017, was heard by David 
S. Ross, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Edward Gauthier for the defendant. 
 
Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Lisa Newman-Polk, for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  "Few, perhaps no, judicial responsibilities are 
more difficult than sentencing.  The task is usually undertaken 
2 
 
by trial judges who seek with diligence and professionalism to 
take account of the human existence of the offender and the just 
demands of a wronged society."  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 
Mass. 256, 259 (2012), quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
77 (2010).  While the exercise of this "quintessential judicial 
power" is never an easy task, Rodriguez, supra at 266, it is 
made all the more difficult when the crime and subsequent 
noncompliance with probation are related to the effects of drug 
addiction. 
 
The issue here arises from the judge's imposition of a 
sentence of incarceration following the defendant's repeated 
addiction-related violations of probation over a period of 
several years.  The defendant requested the sentence in order to 
participate in a secure residential drug treatment program, but, 
after several months of serving her sentence, sought release 
from the alleged unlawful restraint, as well as a new sentencing 
hearing.  She now appeals from the denial of the motion she 
filed pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001); the defendant contends that the judge erred 
in considering the rehabilitation program when setting the 
length of her sentence of incarceration.  We conclude that in 
3 
 
the circumstances presented, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Initial disposition.  In August 2013, 
the defendant stole items valued at more than $250 from a chain 
department store.  A complaint issued approximately one month 
later charging her with larceny, in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 30 (1), and with using disguises to obstruct execution of the 
law, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 34.  At a plea colloquy, 
the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding 
of guilt with respect to the larceny charge.2  The judge then 
continued the matter without a finding for one year, from 
December 2013 through December 2014.  Upon the successful 
completion of the one-year period of probation, the charge was 
to be dismissed.3 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services; the American Academy of Addiction 
Psychiatry; the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, 
Inc.; the Association for Behavioral Healthcare; the Center for 
Prisoner Health and Human Rights; the Center for Public 
Representation; the Grayken Center for Addiction Medicine at 
Boston Medical Center; the Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers; the Massachusetts Society of Addiction 
Medicine; and Prisoners' Legal Services. 
 
 
2 The prosecutor dismissed the charge of obstruction. 
 
 
3 In a disposition of a continuance without a finding, a 
defendant admits to sufficient facts that the offense occurred 
as charged, but the judge does not enter a finding of guilt.  
Instead, the matter is continued to a specific date, whereupon 
it is dismissed if the imposed conditions have been met.  See 
4 
 
 
At that time, the defendant was twenty-one years old.  The 
continuance was conditioned on the successful completion of two 
programs:  "Stoplift," an Internet-based program designed to 
prevent shoplifting recidivism, and a program involving 
intensive supervision by the probation service known as level 
three "community corrections."  The latter includes office 
visits, group meetings, and drug and alcohol screenings. 
 
b.  Probationary violations.  We summarize the course of 
the probationary violations over the next three years as 
follows. 
 
In January 2014, one month after the initial continuance 
was imposed, the probation service filed its first notice of 
violation.4  The notice related to the defendant's noncompliance 
                     
G. L. c. 278, § 18.  If the defendant is found to have violated 
the conditions imposed in an order of probation, the judge may 
convert the continuance to a guilty plea and sentence the 
defendant accordingly.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Sebastian S., 
444 Mass. 306, 315 (2005). 
 
 
4 Where there is reason to believe that a defendant has 
violated a condition of probation, a probation officer may 
initiate probation violation proceedings by filing a "Notice of 
Probation Violation and Hearing."  See Rule 4(b) of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings, Massachusetts Rules of Court, at 644 (Thomson 
Reuters 2018).  At a preliminary detention hearing, a judge 
determines whether probable cause exists to believe that the 
probationer has violated a condition of the probation order, 
and, if so, whether the probationer should be held in custody 
pending a final violation hearing.  See Rule 5 of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings, supra at 645-646.  At a final violation hearing, 
5 
 
with the requirements of the community corrections program and 
her failure to pay court-ordered fees.  A second notice of 
violation was filed in March 2014, following a drug screening in 
which the defendant tested positive for the presence of 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).  At a hearing concerning both of 
these violations, the defendant, represented by counsel, 
stipulated to the underlying facts.  The defendant was found in 
violation of the terms of probation and reprobated, and the 
continuance -- as it was initially imposed -- remained in 
effect. 
 
In April 2014, the defendant reported to the probation 
service and her drug screen returned a positive result for the 
presence of THC and cocaine.  Approximately one week later, the 
defendant again tested positive for the presence of THC and 
cocaine, as well as for amphetamine and morphine.  The probation 
service filed its third and fourth notices of violation.  
Counsel was appointed, and the defendant was held pending a 
final violation hearing.  At the final violation hearing in May 
2014, the judge again found the defendant in violation of the 
terms of probation.  This time, he modified the terms of 
                     
the judge determines whether, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the defendant violated the terms of probation and, if 
so, what the appropriate disposition should be.  See Rule 8 of 
the District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings, supra at 653. 
6 
 
probation, requiring a substance abuse evaluation, a mental 
health evaluation, that the defendant remain drug and alcohol 
free,5 and that she participate in a residential treatment 
program.  The judge also extended the probationary period until 
May 2015.  The defendant subsequently entered into the specified 
drug treatment program. 
 
In October 2014, a warrant issued for the defendant's 
arrest when the probation officer became aware that she had left 
the court-ordered residential treatment program without 
authorization.  The defendant was brought into court, at which 
time her drug screening results again were positive.  She was 
found in violation, and was reprobated, without any further 
modification of the length or terms of probation. 
 
In November 2014, another warrant was issued for the 
defendant's arrest, due to her failure to report to her 
probation officer on two occasions.  The warrant remained 
outstanding until she came to court one month later, when she 
tested positive for the presence of cocaine and THC.  Following 
a hearing in December 2014, the judge found the defendant in 
violation, reprobated her, and amended the conditions of 
probation for a second time, to require that the defendant 
                     
 
5 The requirement that the defendant remain drug and alcohol 
free was implicit in the Community Corrections level three 
program, which includes mandatory drug and alcohol screenings. 
7 
 
complete a different residential drug treatment program.  He 
also extended the defendant's term of probation until December 
2015.  The defendant was held in custody for several weeks until 
a bed became available in that program. 
 
In January 2015, the defendant entered the second 
residential treatment program and remained there for 
approximately three months before transitioning to a sober 
living program.  She was expelled from the sober living house 
shortly thereafter, as a result of using drugs.  The defendant 
failed to report to the probation service as required, and 
another warrant was issued for her arrest. 
 
At a July 2015 hearing, the judge found the defendant in 
violation of the terms of her probation.  He again modified the 
terms of probation to require the defendant to reside at a third 
residential drug treatment program.  The defendant entered that 
program, but later was asked to leave because of drug use.  A 
warrant again issued for the defendant's arrest.  She ceased 
contact with her probation officer, and with the court, for the 
next thirteen months. 
 
The defendant eventually telephoned her mother, who had 
been actively coordinating with her probation officer in an 
attempt to locate the defendant throughout the prior year.  The 
defendant reported to her mother that her drug use had spiraled 
8 
 
out of control and that she had "hit rock bottom."  In October 
2016, police officers located and arrested the defendant. 
 
As of the time of the October 2016 hearing, the defendant 
had been in violation of the terms of her probation during most 
of the three years of the repeatedly extended continuance.  The 
probation service requested that the judge vacate the 
continuance and enter a finding of guilt, revoke the defendant's 
probation, and sentence her to a term of incarceration of 
eighteen months.  Her probation officer reported that the 
defendant's family agreed that she was in "great need for 
treatment," in addition to needing to be held accountable for 
her crime. 
 
Defense counsel represented that the defendant agreed she 
was "not a good candidate for probation," and that she needed a 
more structured environment in which to obtain treatment.  
Counsel therefore requested that the defendant be sentenced to a 
term of incarceration of "at least nine months," a period of 
time that he stated was sufficient for her to be assigned to, 
and then complete, the structured and intensive treatment 
program known as "Howard Street."6 
                     
 
6 "Howard Street" refers to a secure residential treatment 
program at a facility in Hampden County run by the sheriff's 
department.  The facility has since moved locations and is now 
known as the Western Massachusetts Recovery and Wellness Center.  
It is designed to provide for the custody, care, and treatment 
of substance abusers. 
9 
 
 
Noting the defendant's failure to complete several 
residential treatment programs and his concern that many in her 
position "don't make it," the judge concluded that the defendant 
presented one of the rare cases in which all efforts at 
rehabilitation, other than incarceration, had been unsuccessful.  
He stated that a sentence of incarceration would be imposed "not 
to punish [the defendant] but to make sure that she gets through 
a program and is back out on the street safe and alive."  
Consequently, the judge revoked the defendant's probation and 
sentenced her to two years' incarceration in a house of 
correction for the underlying offense, pursuant to G. L. c. 266, 
§ 30 (1).  In calculating the length of the sentence, the judge 
noted that the defendant would be credited with two months of 
"time served," took into account the potential "good time" 
credits that she could earn toward early release, and considered 
her eligibility for parole after serving one-half of the 
sentence.  In doing so, he appeared to have reasoned that the 
defendant would serve approximately nine to ten months of the 
two-year sentence, a period of time adequate to complete the 
program that the defendant had requested. 
 
Months later, represented by new counsel, the defendant 
sought release from the alleged unlawful restraint, as well as a 
new sentencing hearing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30.  She 
argued that the judge had erred in considering rehabilitative 
10 
 
programming in determining the appropriate length of 
incarceration.  The motion was denied.  The defendant appealed, 
and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court 
on our own motion.7 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review the 
denial of a motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 for abuse of 
discretion or error of law.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 
Mass. 677, 681-682 (2017).  See also Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 
Mass. 562, 567 (2018).  "Under that standard, the issue is 
whether the judge's decision resulted from '"a clear error of 
judgment in weighing" the factors relevant to the decision . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives.'"  Perez, supra at 682, quoting L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).8 
 
b.  Probation revocation.  When a sentencing judge, after 
sufficient facts have been admitted, terminates a continuance, 
                     
 
7 The defendant is no longer incarcerated, rendering moot 
her challenge to the order denying the motion for a new sentence 
and release from unlawful confinement.  See Acting Supt. of 
Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000).  
Nonetheless, we decide the case because it raises important 
issues concerning proper sentencing considerations that are 
likely to recur in similar circumstances, but to evade review.  
See id. 
 
 
8 To the extent that the defendant also moved for a new 
sentencing hearing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), the 
decision to allow such a motion is similarly left "to the sound 
discretion of the judge."  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 
336, 344 (2014). 
11 
 
revokes probation, and enters a guilty finding, the judge is 
permitted to impose "a sentence or other disposition as provided 
by law."  See Rule 9(b) of the District/Municipal Court Rules 
for Probation Violation Proceedings, Massachusetts Rules of 
Court, at 655 (Thomson Reuters 2018) (noting dispositional 
options available to judge following violation of conditions 
associated with continuance).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 801 (2002) (when defendant admits to 
sufficient facts for purposes of continuance, violation "may 
lead to . . . an immediate conviction and sentence . . . during 
the continuance period").  When a violation occurs and a 
defendant's probation is revoked because the defendant has 
"abused the opportunity" offered to avoid incarceration in the 
first instance, the defendant is imprisoned not for the 
violations that prompted revocation of probation, but, rather, 
"the defendant is essentially being sentenced anew on his [or 
her] underlying conviction" (citations omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 97, 102 (2018). 
 
Here, the defendant does not challenge that a term of 
incarceration appropriately was imposed, or that the sentence 
fell within the legal limits prescribed by the statute pursuant 
to which she had been convicted.  Rather, her challenge is to 
the factors considered by the judge in fashioning that sentence.  
She contends that, in setting the length of her sentence, the 
12 
 
judge abused his discretion when he took into account the time 
requirements of a rehabilitative program she wished to enter and 
had urged upon him.  We discern no abuse of discretion in these 
limited circumstances. 
 
c.  Sentencing considerations.  We have long held that "[a] 
judge has considerable latitude within the framework of the 
applicable statute to determine the appropriate individualized 
sentence."  Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 Mass. 88, 92 (1993), 
citing Commonwealth v. Celeste, 358 Mass. 307, 309-310 (1970).  
"That sentence should reflect the judge's careful assessment of 
several goals:  punishment, deterrence, protection of the 
public, and rehabilitation."  Goodwin, supra.  In determining 
the extent to which a particular sentence will facilitate these 
goals, a sentencing judge is tasked with weighing "various, 
often competing, considerations."  Rodriguez, 461 Mass. at 259.  
Those considerations include, among others, the circumstances of 
the crime, the role of the defendant in the crime, the need for 
deterrence, the defendant's risk of recidivism, and the extent 
to which a particular sentence will increase or diminish the 
risk of recidivism.  See id., and cases cited.  Thus, in order 
"to impose a just sentence, a judge requires not only sound 
judgment" but also information concerning, among other factors, 
the defendant's "criminal and personal history."  See id. 
13 
 
 
In fashioning an appropriate and individualized sentence 
that takes account of a defendant's personal history, a judge 
has discretion to weigh "many factors which would not be 
relevant at trial," including the defendant's behavior, 
background, family life, character, history, and employment.  
See Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 399-400 (2002); 
Goodwin, 414 Mass. at 92, citing Celeste, 358 Mass. at 310.  See 
also Commonwealth v. White, 436 Mass. 340, 343 (2002) (judge may 
consider such factors in assessing defendant's "propensity for 
rehabilitation").  Taking into account a defendant's substance 
abuse issues may be part of this calculus.  See Commonwealth v. 
Healy, 452 Mass. 510, 515 (2008) (judge had discretion to 
consider defendant's alcohol use problem during sentencing).  
See also Sentencing Commission, Advisory Sentencing Guidelines, 
at 27 (Nov. 2017) ("[a] just system of punishment" is one that 
"provides the defendant with treatment for mental, emotional, 
psychological, or physical conditions, including substance 
abuse, as needed").  In circumstances in which a defendant 
specifically requests a judge's consideration of his or her 
substance abuse issues and related need to complete a 
rehabilitative program while incarcerated, the judge may take 
these factors into account.  See Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 
Mass. 786, 792-793 (1980) (defendant cannot challenge on appeal 
proposal that own counsel offered). 
14 
 
 
A judge's discretion to consider external factors, however, 
is not unlimited.  Indeed, "[i]t is of paramount importance that 
justice be administered impartially, based solely on relevant 
criteria for sentencing."  See Mills, 436 Mass. at 401.  For 
example, a sentencing judge may not punish a defendant for an 
untried criminal offense, Commonwealth v. Souza, 390 Mass. 813, 
817 (1984); rely on inaccurate or misleading information in 
sentencing, Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 221 (1976); 
or punish a defendant to direct a personal message of deterrence 
to a particular community, Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. 
Ct. 322, 327-328 (1997). 
 
The judge here expressed no personal or private beliefs 
regarding the defendant's history that appeared to "interfere 
with his judicial role and transform it from that of impartial 
arbiter."  Cf. Mills, 436 Mass. at 401.  Nor did he make remarks 
indicating that he was punishing the defendant for conduct 
"other than that for which the defendant [stood] convicted" 
(citation omitted).  Cf. White, 436 Mass. at 341-342.  As part 
of his sentencing considerations, the judge took into account 
the defendant's request to participate in a particular 
rehabilitation program while incarcerated, as well as the actual 
amount of time that she would be required to serve in order to 
15 
 
complete that program.9  We discern no abuse of discretion in 
considering those programmatic time constraints, among various 
other factors, when fashioning her sentence in the circumstances 
here.10 
 
Indeed, after the defendant's failure to make use of the 
opportunity to avoid incarceration while on probation, the judge 
sought to maintain an appropriate balance between the 
defendant's individualized needs and those of the community in 
which she resides.  See Eldred, 480 Mass. at 103.  In so doing, 
he considered permissible factors, such as the defendant's 
history, behavior, and propensity for rehabilitation while on 
probation.  See, e.g., White, 436 Mass. at 343; Commonwealth v. 
Doucette, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).11  Because nothing 
                     
 
9 The judge gave no indication that he otherwise would have 
imposed a shorter sentence if it were not for the programmatic 
time constraints. 
 
 
10 The judge, of course, could only recommend that the 
defendant be allowed to participate in the Howard Street 
program; the power and responsibility of implementing a sentence 
reside with the sheriff's department.  See Commonwealth v. Cole, 
468 Mass. 294, 302 (2014).  Similarly, parole eligibility and 
good time credits are not within a judge's purview.  It appears 
that, given the judge's apparent familiarity with the area, the 
available programs, and the sheriff's practices, there was 
likely reason for those involved to think his recommendation as 
to the Howard Street program would carry significant weight. 
 
 
11 As our cases have long made clear, rehabilitation remains 
an important interest served by sentencing.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. White, 436 Mass. 340, 343 (2002); Commonwealth 
v. Coleman, 390 Mass. 797, 805 (1984). 
16 
 
in our common law precludes a sentencing judge from considering 
a defendant's amenability to rehabilitative programming in 
imposing a sentence of incarceration expressly permitted by 
statute, we cannot conclude that the judge exhibited a "clear 
error of judgment" such that his decision fell "outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" here (citation omitted).  See 
Perez, 477 Mass. at 681-682. 
 
That being said, we emphasize that, while we discern no 
abuse of discretion in this case, it is because of the unusual 
context in which the challenged sentencing decision was made.  
The approach taken here, over a three-year period, consistently 
embodied the recognition that incarceration is not the preferred 
means of achieving rehabilitation, at least for those whose 
minor, nonviolent crimes are related to the effects of substance 
abuse.  See, e.g., Deputy Chief Counsel for the Pub. Defender 
Div. of the Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Acting First 
Justice of the Lowell Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 477 Mass. 
178, 179 (2017) (in drug courts, judge "impose[s] probation to 
accommodate a need for treatment rather than a sentence of 
incarceration"); Department of Correction, FY16 Gap Analysis 
Report, at 3 (Oct. 2017) (noting that forty-one per cent of 
eligible individuals did not complete or participate in drug and 
alcohol programming in jails and prisons, and thirty-two per 
cent had no access to such programming).  At the same time, all 
17 
 
else had failed; both the defendant's family and the defendant 
herself acknowledged the need for incarceration; the defendant 
requested to participate, while incarcerated, in a particular 
program; and the judge considered that request, along with other 
factors, when determining the length of her committed sentence.  
Had the constellation of circumstances been otherwise, so might 
the result.12 
 
d.  Federal approach.  Acknowledging that there is no 
existing jurisprudence in the Commonwealth that precludes a 
sentencing judge from considering a defendant's need for 
rehabilitation in imposing a sentence of incarceration, the 
defendant urges us to adopt the Federal approach.  See Tapia v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).  In Tapia, the United States 
Supreme Court relied upon express language in the Federal 
Sentencing Reform Act that directs a Federal judge, when 
sentencing, to recognize that "imprisonment is not an 
appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."  
                     
 
12 By way of example, even if an imposed sentence is within 
the statutory limits and thus legal, we would not be sanguine 
about sentencing practices for the same underlying crime if, 
following the substance-abuse-related revocation of probation, 
the imposed sentence were harsher than it would have been 
following the revocation of probation due to other causes.  
Moreover, when determining the length of a committed sentence, a 
judge's consideration of the time requirements of a 
rehabilitation program that the defendant has not voluntarily 
requested, but that the judge mandates, is a practice fraught 
with peril and generally best avoided.  
18 
 
Id. at 326, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).  In interpreting this 
provision, the Court held that, although a Federal judge at 
sentencing may discuss the opportunities for rehabilitation 
within prison, the judge may not impose or lengthen a term of 
incarceration solely to ensure that a defendant completes 
rehabilitative programming.  See id. at 332. 
 
The defendant does not point to, and we are unaware of, any 
controlling Massachusetts authority that would prohibit a State 
trial court judge from considering rehabilitation in imposing a 
term of incarceration explicitly permitted by the language of 
the criminal statute pursuant to which she was convicted.  As 
discussed, in Massachusetts, "it is a rare sentence, whether or 
not jail is a part of it, that does not in fact involve . . . 
rehabilitation."  Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 415 
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996), quoting United 
States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1986).  Thus, as Tapia 
concerned the interpretation of a Federal statute for which 
Massachusetts has no analog, we decline to adopt its approach 
today.13 
                     
 
13 Other State courts similarly have rejected arguments that 
they adopt the reasoning in Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 
(2011), also on the ground that Tapia relies exclusively on the 
interpretation of Federal law.  See, e.g., Knox v. State, 122 
A.3d 1289 (Del. 2015) (unpublished); State v. Baker, 153 Idaho 
692, 699 n.2 (Ct. App. 2012).  But see State v. Jepsen, 907 
N.W.2d 495, 510 (Iowa 2018) (Zager, J., dissenting) (citing 
19 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  "Trial court judges, particularly judges 
in the drug courts, stand on the front lines of the opioid 
epidemic."  See Eldred, 480 Mass. at 99.  Here, as in Eldred, 
the defendant's underlying crime is substance abuse related, the 
probation violations are substance abuse related, and the 
relapses associated with those violations may themselves be part 
of the recovery process.  See id.  Mindful that judges are to 
steer carefully between Scylla and Charybdis when sentencing 
such individuals, and that sentencing decisions are bounded by 
limits, we are of the view that, given all of the circumstances 
present here, the judge did not exceed those limits. 
 
The order denying the motion for release from unlawful 
confinement and for a new sentencing hearing is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
Tapia, in context of double jeopardy challenge, for proposition 
that imprisonment is inappropriate for rehabilitation as 
compared to probation).