Case Title: Nolan v. Brawley

Citation: 244 N.E.2d 918, 251 Ind. 697

Docket Number: 30,835

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1969-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
251 Ind. 697 (1969)
244 N.E.2d 918
NOLAN
v.
BRAWLEY.
No. 30,835.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 6, 1969.
Rehearing denied April 16, 1969.
*698 John J. Dillon, Attorney General, for petitioners.
Abe Latker, of Fort Wayne, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This is an original disciplinary action instituted by the filing of an information for the revocation or suspension of admission to practice law by members of the Disciplinary Commission, appointed by the Supreme Court of Indiana, pursuant to Rule 3-21 of said court.
On September 8, 1965, the Attorney General of Indiana, pursuant to the written request of the Disciplinary Commission filed Information in six rhetorical paragraphs for the Revocation or Suspension of Admission to Practice Law against George R. Brawley.
The respondent, on September 20, 1965, submitted his Answer to Information for the Revocation or Suspension of Admission to Practice Law, denying the allegations contained in Rhetorical Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Information, and for an affirmative answer in four paragraphs stated facts in mitigation of the allegations of the Information, and in the fifth paragraph denied that he had resigned, that his resignation was for due cause and not in violation of the law as follows:
After having moved to dismiss rhetorical paragraphs 1 through 4, which motion was granted by the commissioner, *699 the Attorney General proceeded against the respondent solely on the basis of his being removed from the roll of attorneys in Wisconsin for due cause. By reason of such removal, the respondent is not a fit and proper person to practice law in Indiana, and his misconduct in Wisconsin is not to be condoned in Indiana and would form the basis for disciplinary action in Indiana.
The respondent in his exceptions to the Findings of Fact alleges the findings were contrary to the evidence and the findings did not contain all the facts in evidence in this matter.
A commissioner was appointed to hear and report the evidence and make findings of fact. Said hearing was held before the commissioner. The respondent and his attorney, pursuant to the direction of this court, were given fifteen (15) days from the date of the filing of the Findings of Fact to file with this court exceptions. Exceptions were duly filed by respondent and the petitioners.
It was found that respondent George R. Brawley was duly admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana in the year 1935; the said respondent was duly admitted to practice law in the State of Wisconsin on July 10, 1939. In the year 1957 complaints were filed under the procedures and rules of the State of Wisconsin which alleged professional misconduct by George R. Brawley in the State of Wisconsin.
Said Findings of Fact were made as follows:
Said George R. Brawley submitted a check dated June 29, 1957, and drawn on his account at the Teutonia Bank of Milwaukee, Wisconsin to Sanford Carter, broker and William Clanton, principal in repayment of said $1,500. Said check was not honored by the bank because there were insufficient funds in the account. Said $1,500 has been used by George R. Brawley for personal purposes.
By the rendering of the Findings to the State Bar in Wisconsin, the conclusions were as follows:
Thereafter the following order was made:
*701 The commissioner found that while said disbarment proceedings were pending George R. Brawley filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which reads as follows:
Pursuant to said petition the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin did enter the following order:
There are proceedings available to George R. Brawley to petition and be reinstated in the State of Wisconsin if it is found that he should be reinstated.
That the Petition and Order of September 25, 1958, removing the name of George R. Brawley from the rolls of practicing attorneys in the State of Wisconsin, was a compromise by said George R. Brawley whereby said George R. Brawley would be removed from the rolls of lawyers admitted to the practice of law in the State of Wisconsin in return that other proceedings against him would be discontinued.
Said compromise was made and entered into in good faith by the State Bar Association of the State of Wisconsin with George R. Brawley and approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin on September 25, 1958.
The license of said George R. Brawley to practice law in the State of Wisconsin was revoked for due cause on September 25, 1958.
Said license has never been reinstated in the State of Wisconsin.
*703 Proceedings had against George R. Brawley in the State of Wisconsin are tantamount to disbarment proceedings; and George R. Brawley was, by said proceedings, in effect disbarred in the State of Wisconsin for due cause.
Said due cause in the State of Wisconsin was for misconduct in the practice of law.
The record indicates that the staff counsel of the Wisconsin Bar who testified before the commissioner in this proceeding stated under oath that the State of Wisconsin would defer taking any action on reinstatement in Wisconsin until the disciplinary action in the State of Indiana was fully disposed of.
Moral turpitude is a controlling factor in any disciplinary action to be taken by the Supreme Court; Supreme Court Rules, rules 3-21, 3-22; Baker v. Miller (1956), 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145, 59 ALR 2d 1393. Being of good moral character necessarily implies that the attorney will conform to the moral standards of his profession as provided by law, by oath of office and the code of ethics of the legal profession. Baker v. Keisker (1957), 236 Ind. 617, 142 N.E.2d 432. Under the moral standards requirement, a resignation for cause would be an admission on the part of the subject as to his lack of moral standards in the profession, lack of conformity with his oath of admission, and/or lack of conformity with the code of ethics of the legal profession, which acts took place in Wisconsin. Disbarment in another state is the basis for disbarment proceedings in Indiana. Resignation "for cause" during the course of disbarment proceedings must also be a basis for disbarment.
The following cases whether based on comity or under the theory of according full faith and credit to judicial determinations of other courts support the foregoing propositions: In re Leverson (1935), 195 Minn. 42, 261 N.W. 480; In re Clay (1953 Ky.), 261 S.W.2d 301; Fletcher v. U.S. (1949), 174 F.2d 373, cert. den. 338 U.S. 851; In re Veach (1956), *704 365 Mo. 776, 287 S.W.2d 753; State Board of Law Examiners v. Brown (1938), 53 Wyo. 42, 77 P.2d 626; In re Van Bever (1940), 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P.2d 790; In re Brown (1932), 60 S.D. 628, 245 N.W. 824; Copren v. State Bar (1947), 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833.
The commissioner found a preponderance of evidence sustained the charge that the license of the said George R. Brawley to practice law in the State of Wisconsin was revoked for due cause on September 25, 1958, and found that said license had never been reinstated in the State of Wisconsin. To uphold the integrity of the Indiana State Bar as well as protect the citizens of Indiana from persons such as the respondent herein he should not be allowed to honorably occupy a position of trust and confidence in Indiana when he was unable to do so within the State of Wisconsin.
It is directed, therefore, that the respondent be disbarred and that the name of George R. Brawley, the respondent, be stricken from the role of attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Indiana.
Come now the parties by counsel, and the court being duly advised in the premises, now files its Per Curiam opinion, being in words and figures as follows, to-wit:
And now on said opinion, the court renders the following judgment to-wit:
IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that George R. Brawley, a member of the Bar of this Court be, and he is, hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Indiana.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the name of George R. Brawley be stricken from the role of attorneys licensed *705 to practice law in the State of Indiana. The clerk of this Court is directed to note this suspension on the roll of attorneys of this Court.
Dated at Indianapolis, Indiana, this 5th day of March, 1969.
NOTE.  Reported in 244 N.E.2d 918.