Case Title: Capshaw v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-63

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
CAPSHAW v. STATE2000 WY 17911 P.3d 905Case Number: 98-240Decided: 09/29/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
GARY CAPSHAW, Appellant 
(Defendant),v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, 
Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Vaughn Neubauer, Student Intern. 
Argument presented by Mr. Neubauer.Representing Appellee: Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General. Argument presented by Mr. 
Rehurek.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY*, GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

HILL, J., delivers the 
opinion of the Court; THOMAS, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, 
Gary Capshaw (Capshaw), was convicted by a jury of conspiring to bring large 
quantities of methamphetamine into Casper, Wyoming, for resale. On appeal he 
faults the district court for improperly admitting W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, 
claims a fatal variance between the crime charged and that proven, and charges 
that admission of his conspirators' guilty pleas to the subject conspiracy 
prejudiced his defense. We are unable to conclude that the district court abused 
its discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, nor can we find that testimony 
regarding the conspirators' guilty pleas necessitates reversal under the plain 
error doctrine, in light of the strength of the State's case and the appellant's 
chosen trial strategy. The conspiracy alleged was that for which Capshaw was 
convicted. Therefore, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Capshaw 
identifies three issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court 
err by allowing unfairly prejudicial other crimes evidence to be introduced at 
trial, which could permit a reasonable juror improperly to infer that because of 
an independent incident when methamphetamine was discovered at a motel in 
Evanston, Gary Capshaw must be guilty of conspiracy to 
deliver?

II. Did the variance 
between the single broad-based conspiracy charged in the information, and the 
more limited conspiracies demonstrated at trial affect Mr. Capshaw's substantial 
rights and require reversal of his conviction?

III. Did the State's 
questioning of witnesses about their guilty pleas to offenses which arose out of 
circumstances leading to Gary Capshaw's trial improperly imply that Gary Capshaw 
is also guilty and violated his right to have a trial on its own 
merits?

[¶3] The State 
iterates those issues in somewhat different form:

I. The trial court 
properly admitted evidence of [Capshaw's] possession and transportation of a 
large quantity of methamphetamine during the [same] time period charged in the 
conspiracy.

II. There was no variance 
between the conspiracy charged and the conspiracy proved at trial. In any event, 
this issue was never raised in the trial court and should not be considered on 
appeal.

III. Under the 
circumstances of this case, it was not reversible error for the prosecutor to 
elicit from a witness that he had pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiring with 
[Capshaw] to deliver a controlled substance.

FACTS

[¶4] In the late 
1980's, Capshaw and Steve Tisdale (Tisdale) were fellow inmates at the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary and the Honor Farm, and the two got to know each other well. 
Upon his release from confinement in 1989, Tisdale returned to his home in 
Stockton, California. Early in 1993, Capshaw was looking for a supply of 
methamphetamine and visited Tisdale in California. Capshaw told Tisdale that 
there was money to be made by transporting the drug from California, where it 
was plentiful and relatively cheap, to Casper, where Capshaw "said he could get 
a lot more for it." Tisdale became the source for several pounds of 
methamphetamine, which Capshaw and others imported to Casper for delivery at a 
much higher price.

[¶5] After his 
initial purchases from Tisdale, Capshaw began to solicit his friends to invest 
in his scheme, urging Lynette Draper (Draper) to help him buy methamphetamine in 
California for resale in Casper at great profit. Another willing recruit was 
Steven Horn (Horn), whom Capshaw introduced to Tisdale. Horn accompanied Capshaw 
on several trips to California, participating in his purchases from Tisdale, and 
eventually handling most of the Casper sales. Later, Capshaw's introduction of 
Horn to Tisdale paved the way for Horn to make his own purchases of 
methamphetamine, which he resold in Casper.

[¶6] On March 
22, 1993, Horn and Capshaw picked up a shipment of at least three quarters of a 
pound of methamphetamine from Tisdale. Capshaw told Draper that he had spent 
$6,000.00 for methamphetamine on that particular trip. However, ten miles out on 
the return leg to Casper, the conspirators' vehicle broke down. Tisdale was 
certain of the date because when he went to rescue Horn and Capshaw, he was 
arrested by a California highway patrolman for driving under the influence. In 
addition, the next morning Tisdale's wife rented a car for Horn and Capshaw to 
use on their return trip, and the dated rental car receipt was admitted into 
evidence.

[¶7] The police 
obtained Tisdale's rental car agreement when a search warrant was executed upon 
the home shared by Michelle McIntosh (McIntosh) and Horn on March 24, 1993. When 
Capshaw and Horn returned from that late March trip, Draper observed them 
weighing out sales portions, repackaging those smaller amounts in separately 
sealed containers, and selling their product to an unidentified "dark haired 
girl with a child, a little boy or a little girl." The search warrant, which was 
obtained as a result of Draper's information, yielded two ounces of 
methamphetamine, $650.00 in cash, the scales employed by the two conspirators, 
numerous resale containers, and the rental car agreement, inter alia.1

[¶8] Capshaw 
made one final bulk purchase of methamphetamine from Tisdale in June of that 
year, "around Father's Day, 1993." McIntosh drove Capshaw to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the two of them then proceeded to Stockton, California, by train. 
Tisdale picked them up at the train station and took them to a motel where they 
stayed the night. The next day, Tisdale and Capshaw sought out a source for 
their final transaction. Following the couple's return to Wyoming, Capshaw gave 
an individual dose of methamphetamine to McIntosh as a reward for providing her 
vehicle and company on the trip.

DISCUSSION

[¶9] Admission 
of Rule 404(b) Evidence

[¶10] Prior to 
the commencement of trial, Capshaw filed a demand for notice of prosecutorial 
intent to introduce evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), as well as a motion in 
limine aimed, inter alia, at excluding evidence of bad acts, either prior to or 
after the time frame of the conspiracy alleged. The State then notified Capshaw 
of its intent to introduce evidence concerning a visit Capshaw made to Evanston, 
Wyoming, on April 13 and 14, 1993. The State sought to prove that Capshaw and an 
unidentified third party had shared a motel room on that occasion and, upon 
vacating the motel room, four baggies, each containing approximately 1/4 ounce 
of methamphetamine, were found by the cleaning crew after the two occupants of 
the room had checked out. Eventually, the district court analyzed that evidence 
according to the test articulated in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 381, 357 (Wyo. 
1996) (hereinafter, the Vigil test), finding it admissible. In its case in 
chief, the State called five witnesses and offered four exhibits to prove that 
incident. Capshaw renews his challenge to any evidence concerning the motel 
incident, asserting that such evidence had no demonstrable relevance to the 
charges against him, that the prejudicial impact of the evidence far outweighed 
any probative value that it might have had, and, in any event, that dual 
occupancy of the motel room should have obviated any effort to connect the 
seized methamphetamine with him.

[¶11] Admission 
of evidence at trial lies within the sound discretion of the district court. 
Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo. 1995). Decisions to admit or exclude 
evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. Sturgis v. State, 932 P.2d 199, 201 (Wyo. 1997). The sound exercise 
of discretion is characterized by the reasonableness of the choice made. Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998). Reasonable choices are those based upon 
objective criteria made with due regard for what is right under the 
circumstances and unsullied by arbitrary or capricious conclusions. Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 
704 P.2d 1236 (1985)). By contrast: "Abuse of discretion occurs when a court's 
decision, or decision-making process, exceeds the bounds of measured reason in 
light of those matters properly before that court." Curl, 898 P.2d  at 373 
(citing Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)).

[¶12] When the 
issue is admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, we measure the 
district court's exercise of its discretion according to the specific four-part 
Vigil test, as derived from United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1414-15 
(10th Cir. 1992), aff'd on appeal after remand, 34 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 1994), 
which decision relies, in turn, upon Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 
692-92, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988). Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 
354-57.

[¶13] At the 
threshold, the Vigil test is noteworthy for the increased vigilance it requires 
of defense counsel. Under the so-called Dean test, which Vigil has supplanted, 
the initial burden was upon the prosecution to demonstrate the admissibility of 
any other bad act evidence the State wished to proffer. Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 609 (Wyo. 1993). Now, pursuant to Vigil, a prosecutor need not prove the 
admissibility of other bad acts evidence unless the defense first interposes an 
objection, absent, of course, plain error. Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 355. Cautious 
counsel will generally seek pretrial notice from the prosecution of any bad acts 
evidence the prosecution proposes to proffer. Such a request for notice removes 
the decision to raise a W.R.E. 404(b) objection from the realm of trial tactics 
and allows the defense to challenge admissibility out of earshot of the jury, 
without need for an objection which jurors might interpret as aimed at keeping 
information from them.

[¶14] A timely 
defense objection to the prosecution's proffer triggers a carefully delineated 
test:

[¶15] Such 
evidence is admissible if: 1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; 2) 
the evidence is relevant; 3) the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and 4) upon 
request, the trial court instructs the jury that the [other bad] acts evidence 
is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 
admitted.

[¶16] Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 357.

[¶17] Here, 
although the prosecutor provided the notice of other bad acts evidence requested 
by the defense, and the defense filed a pretrial motion in limine, the district 
court did not consider the admissibility of evidence concerning the motel 
incident until after the jury had been impaneled and the parties had given their 
opening statements. As a consequence, the prosecutor was able to preview that 
evidence for the jury before the court made a detailed determination of 
admissibility. Such premature and untoward disclosure of other bad acts evidence 
to a jury constitutes a kind of prosecutorial brinkmanship which is contrary to 
the ordered process envisioned in Vigil and is inconsistent with the 
prosecutor's ethical obligation to further the ends of justice. Curl, 898 P.2d  
at 376; Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, 3.8, comment 
1.

[¶18] When the 
belated Vigil hearing was finally convened, the prosecutor sought to legitimize 
evidence regarding the motel incident by noting that it fit within the time 
frame of the alleged conspiracy, was described in the affidavit supporting the 
information filed against Capshaw, involved the drug which Capshaw was accused 
of conspiring to deliver, and placed him on "the only route that's going to get 
him [from Casper to Stockton and back]." With respect to the dual occupancy of 
the motel room in which the drugs were found, the prosecutor asserted that he 
need not conclusively link the drugs to Capshaw but could rely upon the jury to 
make that inference.

[¶19] In 
response, the defense noted that the prosecutor had failed the Vigil test at the 
outset by neglecting to explain what part of the alleged conspiracy the motel 
incident would be presented to prove or, put another way, the evidentiary 
purpose of that information. Given the problems engendered by the motel room's 
double occupancy, counsel observed that any connection of the drugs to Capshaw 
was speculative at best. Finally, counsel noted that the dubious probative value 
of the motel incident was overwhelmed by the clear likelihood that it would 
simply inflame the jury by suggesting that Capshaw had a propensity to engage in 
crimes involving drugs, rather than serving to prove any necessary element of 
the charged crime.

[¶20] In ruling 
on Capshaw's motion in limine, the district court observed that the motel 
incident was offered for the purpose, inter alia, of showing the "course of 
conduct of the conspiracy." The court went on to make findings as to the 
remaining three prongs of the Vigil test, finding the evidence to be relevant 
and more probative than prejudicial and offering to give a limiting instruction 
if one was offered by Capshaw.2

[¶21] The 
district court appropriately applied the Vigil test to the motel incident 
evidence, and we are unable to conclude that the determination was an abuse of 
discretion.

[¶22] Variance 
Between Conspiracy Charged and Conspiracy Proven

[¶23] For his 
second assignment of error, Capshaw claims that while the State alleged that 
Tisdale and he, inter alia, conspired to deliver methamphetamine, all that was 
conclusively established were smaller conspiracies to the same end between 
Tisdale and Horn. Capshaw argues that such a variance between the crime with 
which he was charged and the crime upon which he was convicted is fatal to that 
conviction.

[¶24] In making 
his case, Capshaw relies exclusively upon federal case law. This constitutes 
appropriate recognition of our observation that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 
(LEXIS 1999) is derived from 21 U.S.C. § 846, rendering federal case law on the 
latter "convincing authority when construing the former." Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1981). In resolving the variance argument, then, we look 
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for guidance:

[¶25] A variance 
arises when the evidence presented at trial establishes facts that are different 
from those alleged in the indictment. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105, 
99 S. Ct. 2190, 2193-94, 60 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1979); United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1431 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 946, 113 S. Ct. 1356, 122 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1993). However, no variance occurs when the government's theory on 
which the case was tried is the same as that charged in the indictment. Dunn, 
442 U.S.  at 106, 99 S. Ct.  at 2194. Moreover, even if a variance exists, we will 
not reverse unless the variance affects the defendant's substantial rights. 
Powell, 982 F.2d  at 1431; United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 759 (10th 
Cir. 1991) ("variance did not affect defendant's right to a fair 
trial").

[¶26] United 
States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1485 (10th Cir. 1996).

[¶27] As Meyers 
suggests parenthetically, even in cases where an appellate court determines the 
existence of a variance, such a variance:

`is not fatal unless the 
defendant could not have anticipated from the indictment what evidence would be 
presented at trial or unless the conviction based on an indictment would not bar 
a subsequent prosecution.' 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 516 at 27 (2d ed. 1982); see Stoner [United States v.] 98 F.3d [527] at 536 
[(10th Cir. 1996)].

[¶28] United 
States v. Ailsworth, 138 F.3d 843, 849 (10th Cir. 1998).

[¶29] Here, the 
information alleged, in pertinent part:

[¶30] [T]hat 
GARY CAPSHAW, late of the County aforesaid, from between on or about the 1st day 
of March, 1993, to on or about the 1st day of July, 1993, in the County of 
Natrona, in the State of Wyoming, did unlawfully conspire to deliver a 
controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, in violation of W.S. 1977, as 
amended, § 35-7-1031 and § 35-7-1042[.]

[¶31] Appended 
to the information filed against Capshaw was a detailed affidavit describing the 
information supplied to the authorities by Draper, detailing his business 
dealings with Tisdale, his relationship with Horn, and even repeating a 
narrative of the motel incident.

[¶32] Capshaw 
might have sought a bill of particulars. He did not. Nor did he take any other 
sort of action before, during, or after his trial by which the district court 
might have been put on notice of his claim that the State's proof was at 
variance with the crime alleged. In general, matters not presented to the 
district court will not be considered on appeal, absent the implication of 
jurisdiction or the abridgment of fundamental rights. Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 867 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶33] However, 
if it clearly appears from the record that such fundamental and prejudicial 
error has been committed as to amount to a denial of substantial justice, or to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, the court should not hesitate to reverse 
the judgment and grant a new trial, although proper exceptions were not taken at 
the time.

[¶34] Parker v. 
State, 24 Wyo. 491, 500, 161 P. 552, 554 (1916). What Justice Beard described in 
Parker is what we have come to know as plain error. The oft-repeated litany of 
requirements for the showing of plain error will not benefit an appellant 
unless: "(1) the record clearly reflects the incidents urged as error." Seymour 
v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶35] What the 
record reveals in this case, exclusive of the evidence of the motel incident, is 
testimony and exhibits which establish a conspiracy involving Capshaw, Tisdale, 
Horn, Draper, and McIntosh. To be sure, it was Capshaw's theory that he was 
simply an unlucky bystander to a conspiracy between Horn, Tisdale, and the 
others. So stark, however, is the contrast between the State's case and the 
testimony of Horn that the jury was presented with a clear choice: Believe Horn 
and acquit Capshaw, or, believe the balance of the evidence adduced at trial and 
convict. Simply put, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, as we are obliged to do, Horn was not a generally credible witness. 
The assertion that the State only proved a conspiracy between Horn and Tisdale 
is not supported by the record. There was no variance between the crime charged 
and the crime proven, and Capshaw's right to a fair trial was not 
violated.

[¶36] Admission 
of Conspirators' Guilty Pleas

[¶37] For his 
final assignment of error, Capshaw challenges admission of evidence regarding 
guilty pleas entered by two of his alleged conspirators. Indeed, the record 
reveals that McIntosh admitted under prosecution questioning that she had been 
indicted in federal court on conspiracy charges stemming from her Wyoming 
activities with Capshaw, inter alia, and had received favorable treatment by the 
federal system conditioned upon her agreement to testify against him. More 
significantly, perhaps, Tisdale acknowledged, under prosecutorial questioning, 
that he had entered a guilty plea to conspiracy for which he received remarkably 
lenient treatment in return for his testimony against 
Capshaw:

[¶38] 
[Prosecutor] : And when you pled guilty to conspiracy, who did you plead guilty 
to conspiring with? . . . .

[Tisdale] : Gary 
Capshaw.

[¶39] Capshaw 
acknowledges that it is clear from the record that no objection was interposed 
to the conspirators' testimony about their convictions. This absence of a 
contemporaneous objection obliges us to apply the plain error standard of 
review. Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969 (Wyo. 1996). Though we have 
previously mentioned the threshold requirement for a finding of plain error, it 
remains useful to articulate the plain error test in full:

[¶40] Plain 
error will not be assigned unless: (1) the record clearly reflects the incidents 
urged as error; (2) appellant is able to demonstrate violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is shown that a substantial right of the 
appellant was materially abridged. Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 459 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 721 (Wyo. 
1994)).

[¶41] Seymour, 
949 P.2d  at 883.

[¶42] There is 
no need to dwell upon the threshold requirement of record clarity. Beyond 
question, two of Capshaw's conspirators were allowed to reveal their guilty 
pleas stemming from their involvement in the charged 
conspiracy.

[¶43] We have 
long held that "when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out 
of the same circumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible 
against the other." Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo. 1979). The 
vitality of this rule is amply demonstrated by Kwallek. There, when a 
contemporaneous objection was lodged with respect to a conspirator's testimony, 
this Court had no difficulty holding that admission of that guilty plea evidence 
constituted prejudicial error presaging reversal of Mr. Kwallek's conviction and 
remand for a new trial. Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1376. As Capshaw points out, Mr. 
Justice Jackson clearly explained the basis for this unequivocal 
rule:

[¶44] It is 
difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the 
minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked 
together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, 
co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they 
convict each other.

[¶45] Krulewitch 
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S. Ct. 716, 723, 93 L. Ed. 790, 800 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion).

[¶46] In short, 
there can be no doubt that the appellant's right to a fair trial embraces his 
right not to be convicted, in whole or in part, upon the guilty pleas of his 
conspirators. Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶47] Thus, 
under the plain error standard, we are left to ponder only the third prong of 
that test: Whether Capshaw has shown that a substantial right of his was 
materially abridged. The State urges us to draw a parallel between this case and 
the one against Chad Urrutia, alleging that the evidence which convicted Capshaw 
was more than sufficient, exclusive of the offensive guilty plea testimony. 
Urrutia, 924 P.2d  at 970.

[¶48] Although 
many of the witnesses against Capshaw were drug users and inadvertently 
manifested the deleterious effects of drug use through their inability to recall 
specific dates, there was abundant testimony implicating him in a conspiracy to 
purchase methamphetamine at low California prices for profitable resale in the 
Casper market. Tisdale was clear, temporally and otherwise, as to the March 22, 
1993, incident in which he was arrested for DUI when he went to assist Capshaw 
and Horn. Shortly thereafter, Draper observed Capshaw's presence during the 
weighing and repackaging of the product obtained on the March 22, 1993, trip. 
Such presence is corroborative of the underlying conspiracy. Urrutia, 924 P.2d  
at 969.

[¶49] Moreover, 
the veracity of Draper's observations was confirmed when the search warrant, 
based upon her information, yielded quantities of methamphetamine and cash, 
along with the scales and repackaging materials she had described. Both Draper 
and McIntosh specifically described deliveries of methamphetamine made to them 
by Capshaw. For McIntosh, one delivery to her was a gesture of gratitude for her 
company on Capshaw's last buying trip to California. Draper, whose information 
to the police was the basis for the search warrant, found out soon after that 
warrant was issued that Capshaw's motives for delivery could be more 
sinister:

[¶50] [Draper] : 
. . . And Gary came out of the back room. And he informed me he'd made up a 
syringe for me to use.

[¶51] 
[Prosecutor] : Did you use the syringe Mr. Capshaw provided to 
you?

[¶52] [Draper] : 
Yes.

[¶53] 
[Prosecutor] : Why did you use it on that occasion?

[¶54] [Draper] : 
The topic of conversation, before he came out, when he was fixing this up, was - 
there was a friend of theirs, a user of theirs, that was very paranoid. And the 
topic was how to tell if people are going against you. And one of the ways is if 
they did no longer use drugs around you, or you never seen them anymore. So I 
felt the pressure of - I couldn't let them know.

[¶55] Even Horn, 
whom Capshaw scapegoated as the "real conspirator," implicated the appellant 
when cross-examined by the prosecutor:

[¶56] [Horn] : 
My general purpose for going to California was to get drugs. Nobody else 
-

[¶57] 
[Prosecutor]: But did Mr. Capshaw know that?

[¶58] [Horn] : I 
imagine he did. He was pretty gung ho about it.

[¶59] 
[Prosecutor] : You weren't secretive about it, you let him know what your 
intentions were?

[¶60] [Horn] : I 
believe I did, yes sir,

[¶61] 
[Prosecutor] : And after you made those intentions clear, he introduced you to 
Mr. Tisdale, is that correct?

[¶62] [Horn] : 
Yes sir.

[¶63] 
[Prosecutor] : So this first time, how much methamphetamine did you 
get?

[¶64] [Horn] : 
Quarter pound.

[¶65] 
[Prosecutor] : How much did it cost?

[¶66] [Horn] : 
$2,500.

[¶67] 
[Prosecutor] : Who was present when you obtained it?

[¶68] [Horn] : 
Myself and [Capshaw] and [Tisdale].

[¶69] Indeed, 
Capshaw's strategy of maintaining that, while he was present, he was not a 
conspirator engendered difficulties beyond Horn's testimony. The strategy for 
discrediting the parade of witnesses adverse to Capshaw was to show that they 
had each accepted very favorable plea bargains as a quid pro quo for their 
testimony against him. This was made clear by defense counsel's opening 
statement:

[¶70] And Mr. 
Tisdale, for coming here this week and speaking to you, ladies and gentlemen, is 
going to be free. By coming in here and pointing the finger at the person the 
state asks him to point his finger at, doesn't go to 
prison.

[¶71] While the 
prosecutor makes no mention of the guilty pleas in closing argument, defense 
counsel again reminds the jury of Tisdale's plea in an effort to vitiate 
Tisdale's testimony:

[¶72] [Tisdale] 
is charged as a conspirator. He could go back to prison, but by coming here and 
saying those two things [that he gave drugs to Mr. Capshaw and Mr. Capshaw gave 
him money], he doesn't go for [sic] prison, he goes back to 
California.

[¶73] We agree 
with the State that there is sufficient evidence, in addition to the 
impermissible guilty plea evidence, to render the error harmless according to 
the rule of Urrutia. Furthermore, because Capshaw incorporated those guilty 
pleas into his trial strategy and invited the guilty plea testimony by his own 
opening statement, we cannot say that a substantial right was abridged in such a 
fashion as to require reversal under the plain error standard. Ross, 930 P.2d  at 
969; see also United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1988); 
also see V. Woerner, Annotation, Prejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney's 
argument or disclosure during trial t hat another defendant has been convicted 
or has pleaded guilty. 48 A.L.R.2d 1016, esp. § 4 (1956 and Later Case 
Service).

[¶74] Finally, 
we offer this additional suggestion for the trial courts so as to deter similar 
potentially fatal errors from occurring in future cases. As noted above, as a 
general rule, admission of evidence that a codefendant or conspirator has 
pleaded guilty or been found guilty is not admissible in the trial of another 
codefendant or conspirator. If such evidence is introduced by the prosecution, 
it is error. Recently, we were compelled to reverse a conviction on these very 
grounds because the prosecution improperly used evidence of guilty pleas by 
co-defendants. Mazurek v. State, 2000 WL 1156425, *3-*10 (Wyo.), ___ P.3d ___, 
___ (Wyo. 2000). If no objection is interposed by the defense, we will review 
such an error under the plain error standard. Likewise, if an objection is made, 
the error is subject to review for harmless error. In either event, a clear and 
comprehensive instruction to the jury (whether requested by the defense or given 
by the trial court sua sponte) may have a salutary effect in either a plain 
error analysis or a harmless error analysis. Trial courts should be alert to 
this potential pitfall when a codefendant or conspirator is called as a witness 
for the prosecution under circumstances similar to the instant case. The 
prosecution should be cautioned about introducing the subject of a guilty plea 
or conviction into another defendant's trial, and the trial court should be 
alert to properly instruct the jury to disregard any such testimony should it be 
called to the jury's attention. As can be gleaned from a review of the American 
Law Reports annotation cited above, there are many circumstances where prejudice 
is not found. One significant factor in such a finding may be the guidance 
provided by the trial court in such an instance.

CONCLUSION

[¶75] Finding no 
error requiring reversal of Capshaw's conviction, we affirm the Judgment and 
Sentence of the district court in all respects.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶76] I am in 
accord with affirming Capshaw's conviction. I agree that there was no error 
committed in the admission of uncharged criminal conduct. I am also satisfied 
that there was no variance between the conspiracy that was charged and the 
conspiracy established by the evidence at trial.

[¶77] I cannot, 
however, join in that aspect of the opinion that treats the claim of error under 
Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979). In Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 
972-73 (Wyo. 1996), I reiterated the analysis of Kwallek that I advanced in 
Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 971-72 (Wyo. 1996). I still am satisfied that I 
articulated in those concurring opinions the correct way in which Kwallek should 
be applied. The net effect is that, in the absence of an objection by the 
defendant, which was not made in this case, there is no cognizable claim of 
error in an appeal from a conviction even under the plain error standard. I 
would hold on that issue that there is no error in this case in the absence of 
the requisite objection.

[¶78] In 
decisions subsequent to Kwallek, this Court has disregarded the requirement for 
a timely objection at trial, and applied plain error analysis when evidence of a 
witness' factually related plea agreement was admitted. The dynamics at the 
trial that result in such testimony being offered are intriguing. The 
prosecution seeks to introduce the conviction or plea in order to manifest a 
posture of openness and candor, and blunt the effect of its introduction on 
cross-examination. As we said in Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 739 (Wyo. 
1986):

[¶79] [O]pposing 
counsel may choose not to object to receipt of the offered evidence for many 
reasons. Trial strategy may dictate no objection; the opposing party may believe 
the offered evidence will be favorable; the opposing party may believe that 
impeachment may be more damaging and choose not to exclude the 
evidence.

[¶80] For 
tactical reasons, the defendant may well prefer that the conviction come in 
during the prosecution's case-in-chief. The defense may prefer to focus 
cross-examination upon the details of the conviction and the deal the witness 
was able to make with the prosecution. On the other hand, the defense may 
perceive an advantage in first introducing the conviction on cross-examination. 
There may be instances in which the defense may prefer that the matter not be 
presented at all. In either of the latter instances, the defendant will object 
to the introduction of the information by the prosecution, and, as Kwallek 
holds, it will be prejudicial error to permit the presentation to 
proceed.

[¶81] If no 
objection is posed by the defendant, the trial court or this Court cannot know 
whether the failure to object was inadvertent or tactical. If, in that equivocal 
atmosphere, we permit the invocation of the plain error rule in an appeal, the 
defendant enjoys the opportunity to fail to object to information he wants the 
prosecution to develop, but he still has tucked away in his briefcase a claim of 
error on appeal if the jury finds him guilty. That result is inherently unfair 
to the prosecution, and indeed justifies the correct rule articulated in 
Kwallek. In State v. Marshall and Brown-Sidorowicz, P.A., 2 Kan. App. 2d 182, 
577 P.2d 803, 817 (1978), the Court of Appeals of Kansas ruled that failure to 
offer a timely objection to testimony about a witness' plea of nolo contendere 
bars a challenge on appeal. That rule was adopted in Kwallek, and we should now 
reaffirm that holding. I still am satisfied that, in the absence of a timely 
objection by the defendant to testimony about a witness' plea agreement or 
conviction, there is no cognizable claim of error on appeal even under the plain 
error standard. Urrutia and Ross should be overruled in this 
regard.

[¶82] The 
approach suggested by the majority opinion may be palliative, but we will be 
left with an obligation to review the issue in every similar case. For me, a 
better approach would be to require that the matter be settled prior to trial. 
The prosecution could be required to disclose an intention to offer such 
evidence, and if so, the defendant would be required to state whether an 
objection would be made. If the defendant manifests an intention to object, then 
the prosecution would not be permitted to offer the evidence. On the other hand, 
if the defendant did not announce the intention to object prior to trial, there 
would be no error arising out of its introduction by the prosecution. Invoking 
such a procedure, similar to that adopted in connection with W.R.E. 404(b), 
would definitively resolve the issue, and we would not find it included in the 
claims of error on appeal.

[¶83] I agree to 
affirm Capshaw's conviction, but I would address the issue of the prior 
convictions differently.

FOOTNOTES

1 The search 
warrant was invalidated because of a mistaken street address. While that error 
inured to the temporary benefit of Horn and McIntosh by virtue of their 
residence in the house, which was searched, Capshaw's challenge to admission of 
the evidence seized as a result of the warrant failed because he lacked standing 
to challenge the inaccurate warrant.

2 If the 
defense offered such a limiting instruction, the record does not reflect 
it.