Case Title: SANDRA OLSON v. A.H. ROBINS COMPANY, INC., A Virginia Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SANDRA OLSON v. A.H. ROBINS COMPANY, INC., A Virginia Corporation1985 WY 43696 P.2d 1294Case Number: 84-76Decided: 03/19/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
SANDRA OLSON, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

A.H. ROBINS COMPANY, 
INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Rex O. Arney of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

Michael J. 
Sullivan and J. Kenneth Barbe of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, 
Casper, for appellee; oral argument by J. 
Kenneth Barbe.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is a product 
liability case seeking recovery for injuries suffered because of breach of 
implied and express warranties, strict liability, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and negligence in the manufacture, sale and distribution of the Dalkon Shield by 
appellee A.H. Robins Company, Inc. The district court granted summary judgment 
relying on the applicable statute of limitations. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises two 
issues:

"Does the discovery rule 
or doctrine of equitable estoppel apply in this case to toll the running of the 
statute of limitations?"

"Are there issues of 
material fact relating to the exceptions which tolled the statute of limitations 
in this case so as to render the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendant improper?"

[¶3.]     On June 20, 1973, a 
Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive device (I.U.D.), was inserted into 
appellant by her physician. In the summer of 1973, appellant became pregnant. 
She was advised that removal might cause a miscarriage. The Dalkon Shield was, 
therefore, left in place. During a Christmas trip to Arizona in 1973, 
appellant started bleeding and having other pregnancy complications. At the 
emergency room of the University of Arizona Medical Center she was informed of 
the chance of infection which might prevent further pregnancies. She was told 
that she would have a better chance of later pregnancies if the present 
pregnancy were terminated. Appellant acquiesced in that decision, and the 
pregnancy was terminated during December 1973.

[¶4.]     In the summer of 1982, 
appellant's mother relayed information to her concerning lawsuits being brought 
against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield. During September 1982, she 
underwent a complete hysterectomy because of ovarian cysts and acute 
inflammation throughout the uterus. It is not claimed that the medical problems 
necessitating the hysterectomy were caused by the Dalkon Shield that had been 
removed nine years earlier. In October 1982, appellant received a newspaper 
article from her mother concerning litigation against the Dalkon Shield 
manufacturer. She contacted her attorney and commenced this lawsuit on March 31, 
1983.

THE DISCOVERY 
RULE

[¶5.]     Appellant admits that a 
four-year statute of limitations applies to this case; however, she contends 
that there are two exceptions applicable which toll the running of the statute 
of limitations, i.e., the discovery rule and equitable estoppel. 

"Statutes of limitation 
have long been a part of the jurisprudence of the United 
States, all its states and the State of 
Wyoming. They 
are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation and spare 
citizens from having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are 
unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost. Statutes of 
limitation are arbitrary by their very nature and do not discriminate between 
the just and unjust claim. They are not judicially made but represent 
legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate. The statutes 
operate against even the most meritorious of claims and courts have no right to 
deny their application. When considering the statute of limitations, the nature 
of injury, its extent, the amount of money damages involved, and social 
considerations, the emotional appeal the facts may have must pass to the 
background. The circumstances are only 
significant in the bearing they may have on where the cause of action arose, 
when it arose and when the time expired for pursuing the applicable judicial 
remedy." (Emphasis added and citations omitted.) Duke v. Housen, Wyo., 589 P.2d 334, 340 
(1979).

[¶6.]     Wyoming is a "discovery" 
state; therefore, the statute of limitations is triggered when the plaintiff 
knows or has reason to know the existence of the cause of action. Duke v. Housen, supra; Banner v. Town of Dayton, Wyo., 
474 P.2d 300 (1970). The party asserting a right to an exception to the 
limitations has the burden of proof. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. 
Apodaca, Wyo., 
524 P.2d 874 (1974). Ordinarily a negligent act and the resulting injury occur 
simultaneously. Occasionally the injury will not be sustained or is not known 
until a later date. The discovery rule provides 
that:

"A claim does not accrue 
until the injury is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
be discovered." Hansen v. A.H. Robins, 
Inc., 113 Wisc.2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578, 581 (1983).

When a 
limitation period starts to run depends upon a balancing of policy 
considerations

"* * * reflecting the 
manufacturer's interest in defending a claim before his ability to do so has 
deteriorated through passage of time, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
injured person's interest in not being deprived of his claim before he has had a 
reasonable chance to assert it * * *." Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, Division of 
American Hospital Supply Corp., 60 N.Y.2d 417, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923, 457 N.E.2d 1150 (1983). (New 
York is a date-of-injury jurisdiction rather than 
discovery.)

There have been 
several cases addressing the problem of the statute of limitations in Dalkon 
Shield injury cases. Ballew v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1982), applied Georgia law in 
determining whether plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the causal connection between the injury and the alleged 
negligence of the company. The court, reversing a summary judgment, held that 
although the evidence might support a finding that appellant should have 
discovered the relationship between the I.U.D. and her injury, the evidence was 
also susceptible of showing that appellant did not know that the shield was 
connected to her injuries. Appellant had specifically asked her physicians if 
the shield had caused her pelvic infection. Her physician could not say whether 
or not the infection was causally related to the I.U.D. Three other doctors 
responded in a similar manner. Therefore, the court held that there was a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether appellant knew or should have discovered the 
relationship at the time of her first infection or at a later date when she read 
a newspaper article about injuries caused by the Dalkon 
Shield.

[¶7.]     Other courts have 
reversed summary judgments where the evidence did not conclusively show that the 
plaintiff had the necessary knowledge. MacMillen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 217 
Neb. 338, 348 N.W.2d 869 (1984); Newberry v. Tarvin, 
Tex.Civ. App., 594 S.W.2d 204 (1980). In Nelson v. A.H. Robins Co., 515 F. Supp. 623 (N.D.Cal. 1981), summary judgment was held improper because it was unclear 
whether the plaintiff possessed enough facts for her to draw a conclusive 
relationship between her infection and the I.U.D. In that case the only evidence 
by which she should have known of an injury was a doctor's statement telling her 
that the I.U.D. was removed because it was infected and causing her problems. 
The court held that this statement, by itself, was ambiguous and not sufficient 
to show that she had the necessary knowledge as a matter of law. However, in Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1983) the court affirmed a summary judgment where the doctor 
informed the plaintiff that the I.U.D. had perforated her uterus and that 
plaintiff testified that she knew the perforation was an abnormal event in the 
course of using an intrauterine device.

[¶8.]     The primary question in 
the present case is whether appellant knew or should have known the cause of her 
injury in 1973 after becoming pregnant, having complications and a therapeutic 
abortion, or whether she did not discover her cause of action until 1982 from 
information contained in a newspaper. Appellant testified by 
deposition:

"Q. When did you first 
learn or receive information which led you to believe that the Dalkon Shield was 
responsible for the termination of your first pregnancy?

"A. I believed it to be responsible at the 
time I was in the hospital in Tucson.

"Q. And you attributed 
the problems you were having at that time to the Dalkon 
Shield?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. And was that because 
of what you thought yourself or because of what Dr. Mays had told you before or 
something else that you heard?

"A. I believe it was a 
combination of everything.

"Q. Of those 
factors?

"A. Yes, and also the 
idea that one of the doctors, when I was in the examining room, asked me what 
kind it was and I said it was a Dalkon Shield, and he said, `the bug, we had a lot of problems 
with that.'

"Q. So, you knew from 
that time on that the Dalkon Shield was probably responsible for the termination 
or what caused you to go into the hospital and ultimately the termination of the 
pregnancy?

"A. I would say I believed it to 
be.

"Q. And you had reason to 
believe it to be because of what the doctor had told you, because the doctor in 
Arizona and 
because of what Dr. Mays had told you before and because of your own personal 
thoughts about it, the entire circumstances of that 
pregnancy?

"A. 
Yes.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Do you recall saying, 
`I had a pregnancy terminated,' or something like that, `I had my first 
pregnancy and it was terminated because I had a Dalkon 
Shield'?

"A. Yes, I believe I 
probably said something like that." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant 
contends that the doctor's statement, "the bug, we had a lot of problems with 
that" was directed to a group of interns and was, therefore, not adequate to 
establish that she was aware of a clear-cut diagnostic statement regarding the 
causal relationship necessary to start the running of the limitations period. It 
makes no difference to whom the statement was directed. It is of no import how 
appellant came to know significant facts. It matters only that she was aware of 
information that would indicate to a reasonable person the causal relationship 
between her injury and the I.U.D. A physician's diagnosis or other facts and 
circumstances must be such that a person would understand the information to 
such a degree that it could be asserted that the plaintiff knew or should have 
known the causal relationship between the allegedly defective product and her 
injuries. That standard was met in this case when appellant, based upon all of 
the facts, the circumstances then existing, and the physician's remark about the 
Dalkon Shield, testified that she knew or believed that the Dalkon Shield was 
responsible for the termination of her first pregnancy.

[¶9.]     It is possible that she 
was not aware of her legal rights until she read the newspaper ad in 
1982.

"We are unconvinced that 
for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights 
and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause should receive 
identical treatment. That he has been injured in fact may be unknown or 
unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about causation may 
be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at 
least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in 
possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the 
injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can 
tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask. If he does ask and if the 
defendant has failed to live up to minimum standards of medical proficiency, the 
odds are that a competent doctor will so inform the plaintiff." 
United 
States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 359, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979).

Had appellant's 
injury been caused by the act of another in treating or failing to treat or in 
diagnosis, the statute might begin to run from that date. But here, appellant's 
injury was caused by appellee's product, the Dalkon 
Shield.

[¶10.]  The statute of limitations began to run 
when she knew or reasonably should have known that she had suffered an injury 
and knew or reasonably should have known the cause of that injury. Appellant's 
own uncontroverted testimony shows that in December 1973 she knew of the injury 
and that the Dalkon Shield, a "bug, [that caused] problems" was the cause of the 
injury. The statute, therefore, began running in December 1973; the claim 
expired four years later and was, therefore, barred.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL - 
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

[¶11.]  Appellant contends that A.H. Robins 
Company discovered that the Dalkon Shield was defective and had dangerous side 
effects and willfully concealed this and other information in order to deceive 
the purchasers and users of the Dalkon Shield, and that, therefore, A.H. Robins 
Company should be estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations. 
Equitable estoppel can result from either conduct of a party which induces the 
postponement of a suit or a fraudulent concealment of the facts necessary to a 
cause of action. Knaysi v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 679 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); Turner v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d 600, 602 
(1978). Summary judgment is improper where a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether equitable estoppel is applicable. Where the defendant has superior 
knowledge of the facts necessary to make out a cause of action and fraudulently 
conceals those facts or misrepresents them to the detriment of the plaintiff, 
equitable estoppel applies to prevent the statute of limitations from being a 
defense. Perry v. A.H. Robins Co., 
Inc., 560 F. Supp. 834 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).

[¶12.]  In this case the I.U.D. was inserted June 
20, 1973 and the incident which gave rise to this claim occurred during December 
1973. During the ensuing approximate ten-year period there was no contact 
between appellant and appellee A.H. Robins Company. Therefore, there were no 
negotiations, no offers to settle, no statements of fact or opinion, no 
representations upon which appellant relied, and no course of dealings between 
the parties that could give rise to an estoppel. There is no showing that 
appellant inquired of appellee concerning the Dalkon Shield, or attempted to 
develop factual information, or that information was concealed from appellant. 
It is not enough that others may have undertaken this course of action. That 
does not help appellant; for, had she inquired of either the doctors or 
appellee, additional information might have resulted. There being no showing 
that information was concealed from appellant or that facts were misrepresented 
to her and relied upon to her detriment, she cannot prevail upon equitable 
estoppel.

ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT

[¶13.]  Appellant next contends the granting of 
summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material 
fact. Material facts are those having legal significance. These material facts 
must be viewed by the trial court and by us in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment and giving that party all favorable inferences 
that may be drawn from those facts. Roth 
v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 
684 P.2d 93 (1984). The material facts stated in appellant's deposition are 
uncontroverted. They require a holding that, as a matter of law, the statute of 
limitations began running and expired before this action was filed. Although the 
existence of equitable estoppel preventing a statute of limitations defense will 
generally involve questions of fact, such facts are not present in this case; 
and this determination, therefore, becomes a matter of law for the court. 
Turner v. Turner, supra.

[¶14.]  In the present case summary judgment was 
proper because looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant 
and relying on her testimony, it is apparent that she knew of her injury and the 
cause thereof in 1973. The complaint in 1983 was, therefore, as a matter of law, 
filed after the applicable statute of limitations had expired and was properly 
held barred.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.