Case Title: State v. Nash

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000731-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP731-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Kevin L. Nash, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 144,930 N.W.2d 282 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 19, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Ralph M. Ramirez   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public defender. There was an 
oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by John 
W. Kellis, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
John W. Kellis. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 85 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP731-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF148) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kevin L. Nash, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 19, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAROFSKY, J., filed 
a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., 
joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Nash, No. 
2018AP731-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 2019), 
affirming the Waukesha County circuit court's1 judgment and order 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Ralph M. Ramirez presided.  
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
2 
 
denying Kevin L. Nash's postconviction motion to withdraw his 
Alford2 plea.  We affirm.  
¶2 
An Alford plea is "a guilty plea in which the defendant 
pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not 
admitting having committed the crime."  State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 856, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  Nash was convicted of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child after entering an Alford 
plea.  After sentencing, Nash sought to withdraw his Alford plea 
and argued that manifest injustice would result if he were not 
allowed to withdraw his plea because the circuit court failed to 
establish strong proof of guilt as to each element of the offense.  
He argues that the factual basis, upon which the circuit court 
relied, is insufficient to overcome his assertion of innocence.  
He requests that this court exercise its superintending authority 
and adopt specific procedures to satisfy the heightened standard 
under Alford.  
¶3 
Nash has not met his burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result if he 
were not permitted to withdraw his plea.  The record was sufficient 
for the circuit court to accept Nash's Alford plea.  Nash, having 
had the benefit of reviewing discovery materials and charging 
documents with counsel, accepted the plea offer of the State.  He 
acknowledged that he understood the elements of the offense and 
agreed that the State's evidence was sufficient to prove him 
guilty.  Based on the facts alleged in the charging documents, the 
                                                 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
3 
 
other acts evidence, the forensic interviews, the inculpatory 
statement and transcript of the inculpatory statement, statements 
by counsel for Nash and the State, and statements from Nash at the 
plea hearing admitting that the State could present evidence 
sufficient to convict him, the record demonstrates that there was 
a sufficient factual basis to support strong proof of Nash's guilt 
for each of the two elements of the offense.  The circuit court 
specifically concluded that the State's offer of proof and the 
amended complaint provided a sufficient factual basis for Nash's 
Alford plea.  The court of appeals concurred and held that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying Nash's plea withdrawal motion.  We agree. 
¶4 
We conclude that Nash has failed to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that manifest injustice merits plea 
withdrawal, and that the factual basis in the record demonstrates 
strong proof of guilt to overcome the innocence maintained in 
Nash's Alford plea.  Further, this court will not exercise its 
superintending authority to require that courts employ a specific 
procedure to establish a sufficient factual basis when accepting 
an Alford plea.  Accordingly, we affirm.  
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
The following facts are in the record we review.  On 
October 
6, 
2015, 
police 
initiated 
an 
investigation 
into 
allegations that Nash sexually assaulted C.L.W. between November 
2011 and November 2012, in Pewaukee, Wisconsin.  The police 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
4 
 
arranged for C.L.W. and her two sisters, A.T.N. and M.K.N., to be 
forensically interviewed.   
¶6 
On October 8, 2015, forensic interviews were conducted 
with the three victims.  At the time of the interviews, C.L.W. was 
eight years old, A.T.N. was 12 years old, and M.K.N. was 15 years 
old.  During the forensic interviews, each victim alleged that 
Nash engaged in forced sexual intercourse with each of them between 
November 2011 and November 2012.  These alleged assaults occurred 
at their homes in Milwaukee and Pewaukee, as well as at a 
relative's house in Georgia.  C.L.W. alleged that Nash exposed his 
penis to her and forced it into her mouth when she was only four 
or five years old.  A.T.N. stated that Nash had forced sexual 
intercourse with her on an almost daily basis between November 
2011 and November 2012, when she was only nine or ten years old.  
M.K.N. similarly alleged that Nash engaged in forced sexual 
intercourse with her.  The forensic interviewer video-recorded 
each of the victims' forensic interviews and provided the 
recordings to the police.  
¶7 
On February 2, 2016, the State filed a criminal complaint 
charging Nash with two counts:  Count 1, first-degree sexual 
assault of a child under age 12, alleged that "[Nash] between 
November 1, 2011 and November 1, 2012, [in Pewaukee], did have 
sexual intercourse with a child under the age of [12], 
[C.L.W.] . . . "; and Count 2, repeated sexual assault of a child, 
alleged that "[Nash], between November 1, 2011 and November 1, 
2012, [in Pewaukee, Wisconsin], did commit repeated sexual 
assaults involving the same child, [A.T.N.], [] where at least 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
5 
 
three 
of 
the 
assaults 
were 
violations 
of 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§] 948.02(1)(am), (b) or (c) . . . ."  The court found probable 
cause for the allegations based upon the narrative in the complaint 
and signed an arrest warrant for Nash.  The complaint also 
specifically alleged that the State would seek to introduce other 
acts evidence and the victims' forensic interviews.  The complaint, 
containing a factual narrative supporting the allegations, was 
attached to the arrest warrant.   
¶8 
On February 9, 2016, Nash was arrested in Georgia and 
subsequently extradited to Wisconsin.  On February 23, 2016, Nash 
made his initial appearance in the Waukesha County circuit court.3   
¶9 
On March 28, 2016, Nash waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing, and the State filed an Information alleging the same two 
criminal counts and penalties stated in the amended complaint.  
Nash then entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in 
the Information. 
¶10 On April 26, 2016, the State filed a notice of expert 
testimony, naming the forensic interviewer, and a notice of intent 
to use the three victims' video-recorded forensic statements.  The 
State also filed a motion to admit other acts evidence and sought 
to introduce the victims' allegations of four prior sexual assaults 
Nash committed in order to show his motive and intent for the 
charged offenses.  Describing what the victims alleged in their 
                                                 
3 At the initial appearance, Nash noted an error in the 
penalty section of the criminal complaint; the State agreed to 
file an amended criminal complaint that corrected the penalty 
section.  The State filed this amended complaint on March 3, 2016.  
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
6 
 
forensic interviews as a basis for admitting the other acts 
evidence, the State asserted the following: 
[C.L.W.] recalled an incident that occurred . . . in 
Milwaukee.  She said that this incident occurred [in] 
the basement of that address.  She remembers that [Nash] 
put his "privates" into her "privates."  She said that 
[Nash] was on top of her while they were on the couch in 
the basement.  
[C.L.W.] remembers that [Nash's] "private" moved in and 
out of her.  When this was over, [Nash] told her not to 
tell anyone about it.  
[A.T.N.] described an incident that occurred in 
Georgia . . . .  She said that during that visit, she 
was in the garage with [Nash].  She said that she didn't 
want to be in the garage with him, as he [was] making 
her do things that she did not want to do.  Specifically, 
[Nash] made her lie down and he "touched her private 
part with his private parts."  He also put his hand over 
her mouth.  While this was happening, [A.T.N.] remembers 
that [someone] walked in on this, and from that point 
on, [they] kept her and [Nash] separated.  
[I]n Milwaukee, [Nash] tried to put his "private parts" 
inside of [A.T.N.].  This happened in the [] basement.  
She remembers the isolation of that basement, and how 
completely that basement stifled all sound.   
Finally, [M.K.N.], during her forensic interview, spoke 
with very obvious trauma about incidents that she 
remembers [that occurred] in Milwaukee County.  She 
remembers a first incident when [Nash] made her and 
[A.T.N.] take their clothes off.  When this happened, 
she said that [Nash] would do "sexual things." 
¶11 On June 29, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on 
the State's motion to admit the prior sexual assaults in Georgia 
and Milwaukee as other acts evidence.  During the hearing, the 
State recounted in detail the assaults that occurred in Georgia 
and in Milwaukee.  Nash argued against the admission of the other 
acts evidence, but the circuit court agreed with the State.  The 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
7 
 
circuit court permitted the State, if a trial occurred, to bring 
in the prior alleged sexual assaults as evidence.  
¶12 By letter dated August 2, 2016, the State notified the 
circuit court and Nash that it obtained a copy of a video-recorded 
statement Nash made on February 9, 2016, while in police custody 
in Georgia, in which he admitted to engaging in sexual contact 
with A.T.N. in Pewaukee.  The State gave notice that it intended 
to call the police officer who took the statement as a witness and 
to introduce Nash's statement if a trial occurred.   
¶13 On August 17, 2016, the State filed its witness list.  
The witness list included all three victims, the forensic 
interviewer, and the police officer from Georgia.  
¶14 On August 25, 2016, the day the parties were scheduled 
to meet for a pre-trial status conference, the parties notified 
the court that they had reached a plea agreement.  The State filed 
an amended information, amending the original charges of first-
degree sexual assault of a child under age 12 and repeated sexual 
assault of a child to a single, lesser charge of second-degree 
sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age.   Specifically, 
the amended information stated that Nash "did have sexual 
intercourse 
with 
a 
child 
under 
the 
age 
of 
[16], 
[C.L.W.], . . . contrary 
to 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§§] 
948.02(2), 
939.50(3)(c), 968.075(1)(a)."  In addition, the State agreed to 
"leave sentencing up to the court" with Nash "free to argue" for 
whatever sentence he thought was appropriate.  This amended charge 
carried with it a maximum penalty of 40 years in prison (25 years 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
8 
 
confinement and 15 years extended supervision) and/or a $100,000 
fine.   
¶15 Nash filed his Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form 
indicating that he would plead no contest to the charge.4  Nash's 
counsel explained that "[m]y client is not saying that he committed 
the offense outright and in a way it could be construed as an 
Alford plea, but that is the basis of the no-contest plea and we 
would like to resolve the case in that matter and that the State 
has no objection."5 
¶16 The circuit court engaged in a plea colloquy with Nash 
to ascertain whether he was knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering his plea.  After the colloquy, the following 
exchange occurred:  
THE COURT:  All right.  Let's take a look at this 
offense.  According to the amended information, it says 
between November 1st, 2011, and November 1st, 2012, [in 
Pewaukee], you did have sexual intercourse with a child 
under the age of sixteen, [C.L.W.], . . . contrary to 
                                                 
4 Attached to the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form is 
a page, which Nash separately initialed, stating the elements of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age, as 
follows:  
1.  The defendant had (sexual contact) or (sexual 
intercourse) with a person.  
2.  The person was under the age of 16 years at the 
time of the (sexual contact) or (sexual intercourse).  
5 When quoting the record, we will refer to Nash's plea as 
the circuit court did——a no contest plea. Despite how the circuit 
court record referred to the plea, Nash entered an Alford plea to 
the amended charge, and this plea is what we review here today.  
Accordingly, we will refer to his plea as an Alford plea unless we 
are quoting from the record. 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
9 
 
section 948.02(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes, a class C 
felony.  Upon conviction, you could be fined up to 
$100,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than forty years 
or both . . . . 
Is that going to remain intact, [State]? 
[THE STATE]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  All right.  What is your plea to that 
charge, sir?  Mr. Nash, what is your plea to that charge? 
[NASH]:  No-contest.  
THE COURT:  All right.  [State], give me a factual 
basis, an offer of proof please . . . ? 
[THE STATE]:  Yes, Judge.  Last fall I believe the 
[victims], who are here in court, made outcries to the 
Village of Pewaukee Police Department, that between the 
dates roughly of November 1st, 2011, and November 1st, 
2012, when the four of them and their mother and 
stepfather lived [in Pewaukee], that the defendant had 
engaged in sexual intercourse with two of the three 
[victims].  
All three [victims] were under the age of sixteen 
at the time.  In fact, even though we have just alleged 
one act of sexual assault, sexual intercourse of a child 
under the age of sixteen, and that is [C.L.W.], there 
were multiple acts of sexual intercourse, penis to 
vagina, at that address all in Waukesha County, State of 
Wisconsin, sir.  
THE COURT:  Do you understand that's what the State 
would intend to prove if this matter went to trial, Mr. 
Nash? 
[NASH]:  Yeah, I do.  
¶17 The court then questioned Nash about his plea, which led 
to some confusion as to the specific type of plea Nash was 
entering:  
THE COURT:  All right.  Understanding that that's 
what the State says that they could prove, is it your 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
10 
 
intent to continue your plea of no-contest to this 
charge? 
[NASH]:  Yep.  But I mean – yeah, I understand.  I 
understand.  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Say yes if you do. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Do you acknowledge that the 
State has enough evidence to prove this charge?  
[NASH]:  No.   
THE COURT:  Do you believe that you are not guilty 
of these charges?  
[NASH]:  Yes, I do.  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That was in essence the no-
contest Alford part.  
To alleviate this confusion, the court asked defense counsel to 
explain how he "talked about the plea [], the factual basis, and 
the State's obligation to meet its burden of proof with [Nash]." 
Defense counsel responded as follows:  
In the last week we have had three meetings at the jail.  
We went over that if the case proceeded to trial, the 
State would produce largely the three [victims] as 
witnesses.  Perhaps the individuals from the care center 
that did the interviews.  Officers.  And that we –- 
I relayed to him that the [victims], if they 
testified as to what was in the discovery materials, 
were going to say that he had sexual contact with them 
and/or sexual intercourse.  And I went over with him 
what a no-contest plea meant as far as the standard no-
contest plea.  Where you say you are not challenging it.  
You are saying that the State could produce this evidence 
and that it is believed a jury would convict him.  
He denied to me that he actually committed the 
offense but he wanted to accept the plea bargain because 
the original charges were carrying 120 years of exposure 
and the State was willing to reduce this to one charge 
and that they also reduced their sentence recommendation 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
11 
 
to basically leaving it up to the Court.  We went over 
this on three separate occasions and he indicated to me 
that he understood what that meant.  And that at the 
time of sentencing, I would make a recommendation and 
see what happened and he understood that.  
Nash confirmed that this is what his counsel relayed to him.  The 
court then engaged in the following exchange with Nash: 
THE COURT:  Okay.  So, to me that means that you 
wish to take advantage of the State's plea offer.  The 
amended charge to reduce the possible time you could be 
incarcerated, 
locked 
up, 
and 
that 
you 
are 
not 
acknowledging that it happened but that there is enough 
evidence that the State could prove that. 
 
Is that true? 
 
[NASH]:  No, sir.  Really not.  Everything in this 
case . . . . It's basically a hearsay case, sir.  And, 
I mean, but at the same time I don't want to keep hearing 
the he said she said stuff . . . . I'm offering to keep 
staying in Waukesha for something I didn't do, that's 
why I plead no-contest because I'm not, you know, I'm 
not saying I did it at all.  I'm not going to say I did 
something that I didn't do, sir, at all. 
 . . . That's why I was going to take it to trial 
and now I'm not, I'm not going to take it to trial 
because I see I will lose . . . . So, that's why I was 
not trying to fight it at all.  That's why I signed the 
plea deal.   
 
THE COURT:  All right.  So, just so we are clear on 
everything here, if you say to me, Judge, I'm not saying 
I did this but I want to enter this plea of no-contest 
acknowledging that the jury could convict me, you want 
to take advantage of the State's offer, I can accept 
this plea.  But if you say, you know what, Judge, I 
didn't do this.  Somebody is forcing me to do this.  I 
don't want to do this, then I have concerns.   
 
What do you want me to do, sir? 
 
[NASH]:  . . . I got several concerns, sir, about 
this case . . . . I mean, some of that, this is really 
messed up and I want to take it to trial but I really 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
12 
 
don't because . . . [i]t's all this hearsay.  I feel 
like everybody is looking at me the wrong way.  Oh, he 
did it.  I believe he did it.  Yeah, he did this.  He 
did that.  Sir, I'm telling you right now I never did 
none of this and I don't want to keep going through it.   
 
THE COURT:  All right.  Okay.  The case is set for 
trial next week.  And I feel like I'm pulling teeth here 
and it's not my intent to do that.  If Mr. Nash wishes 
to enter a plea of no-contest of an Alford type taking 
advantage of the State's offer but indicating that he is 
not guilty of the offense, I don't have a clear 
indication from Mr. Nash that that's exactly what he 
wants to do and there is a great deal of difficulty here.  
 
So, I guess what I'm going to do at this point is, 
I will leave the matter on the trial calendar and I will 
return the documents to the parties.  The plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form and the amended 
information.  And if there is a change or problem or 
concern, you gentlemen know where to find me and if I 
need to recall the case, I will.  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not accept nor enter Nash's 
Alford plea at this hearing.   
¶18 The next day, on August 26, after Nash's counsel met 
with him to discuss entering into a plea agreement with the State, 
the court held another plea hearing.  At this second plea hearing, 
Nash filed the same Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form he 
filed the day before, in which he indicated that he was pleading 
no contest, waived his constitutional rights, and acknowledged 
that the court could impose a maximum penalty of 40 years in prison 
(25 years confinement and 15 years extended supervision) and/or a 
$100,000 fine.  The State refiled the Amended Information, amending 
the original charges of first-degree sexual assault of a child 
under age 12 and repeated sexual assault of a child to a single, 
lesser charge of second-degree sexual assault of a child under 16 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
13 
 
years of age, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(2), 939.50(3)(c), 
and 968.075(1)(a).  The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form 
contained the same no contest plea to the single charge in the 
Amended Information, second-degree sexual assault of a child under 
16 years of age.  After a discussion about the timing of 
sentencing, the court began a colloquy with Nash as to the amended 
charge: 
THE COURT:  . . . My understanding from [defense 
counsel] is that your position is you are not admitting 
that you did these things.  That you believe you wish to 
take 
advantage 
of 
the 
State's 
plea 
offer 
and 
recommendation and the amended charge.  That you 
believe, based on your review of the evidence, that the 
State has evidence that could result in your conviction.  
 
Is that correct, sir? 
[NASH]:  Yes, sir.  
. . .  
THE COURT:  All right.  Now, do you understand the 
charge to which you are pleading?  In other words, did 
[defense counsel] review with you the elements of the 
offense that the State would have to prove before you 
could be found guilty?  
[NASH]:  Yes, sir.  
After the court reviewed with Nash the specific constitutional 
rights he was waiving, the following exchange occurred:  
THE COURT:  The charge against you in the amended 
information indicates as follows: Between November 1st, 
2011, and November [1st], 2012, [in Pewaukee], you did 
have sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 
sixteen, [C.L.W.], . . . and this was contrary to section 
948.02(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes . . . . This is a 
class C felony punishable by up to $100,000.00 fine or 
up to forty years of imprisonment or both.   
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
14 
 
What is your plea to this charge? 
[NASH]:  Um, no-contest. 
. . .  
THE COURT:  Okay. Now, yesterday [the State] made 
an offer of proof; correct []?  
[STATE]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  And you heard what [the State] said 
yesterday.  Do you remember that?  
[NASH]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  Have you reviewed the complaint 
with your attorney and all the police reports?  
[NASH]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  And [the State] stand[s] by that offer 
of proof, []?  
[STATE]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  And you offer the complaint and the 
amended complaint originally filed in this action as a 
factual basis? 
[STATE]:  I do.  
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that, 
[defense counsel]? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No, Judge, not at all.  I have 
reviewed that with my client fully.   
THE COURT:  All right.  So you've entered a plea of 
no-contest which means you are not challenging the 
charge against you in the amended information and you 
understand that I will find you guilty if I accept your 
plea?  
[NASH]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  All right.  What I have been told and 
I want to reiterate this, it is your position you didn't 
do these things, however, you believe that the State has 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
15 
 
a sufficient amount of proof or information such that we 
could have a jury trial and they could meet their burden 
of proof.  You could be found guilty at a jury trial of 
the 
two 
charges 
on 
the 
original 
document, 
the 
information, but you wish to take advantage of this 
amended information and enter your no-contest.  Is that 
true? 
[NASH]:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  [Defense counsel], again please tell 
me, did you review the issues related to a so-called 
Alford plea with your client? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  In depth.  
THE COURT:  All right.  Is that true, Mr. Nash? 
[NASH]:  Yes, sir.  
THE COURT:  Do you understand what it is when we 
say an Alford plea?  It's a person's name but it's a 
plea that means I'm going to plead guilty or no-contest, 
I'm going to accept responsibility for the charge, I'm 
not necessarily admitting that those facts occurred but 
I understand that the State has got enough evidence where 
I could be found guilty at trial?  Is that what is going 
on here? 
[NASH]:  Yes, sir. 
¶19 After a colloquy with Nash about the implications of 
entering a plea to a serious sexual offense,6 the court made the 
following findings:   
I will find, taking into consideration the proceedings 
yesterday and the proceedings and the information that 
has been set out on the record, the statements made by 
counsel, the documents I have received, the plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, the factual 
                                                 
6 These consequences include the inability to vote in any 
election until his civil rights are restored, the inability to own 
or possess a firearm, the inability to engage or participate in a 
position that requires interacting primarily and directly with 
children under the age of 16, and registering as a sex offender.  
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
16 
 
basis of the offer of proof that was set out on the 
record yesterday as well, that I'm convinced at this 
time, given Mr. Nash's responses to the questions that 
I have posed, that he has freely, voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights and 
entered his plea.   
I will find a sufficient factual basis based on the 
contents of the complaint and the offer of proof.  I 
will find Mr. Nash, based on his no-contest, guilty of 
the charge set out in the amended information filed as 
of today's date.   
After finding Nash guilty, the court ordered a presentence 
investigation.   
¶20 On October 24, 2016, the court sentenced Nash to eight 
years of imprisonment, consisting of three years of initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision.  The court 
then stayed that sentence and placed Nash on probation for a period 
of five years.  As a condition of probation, the court ordered 
Nash to spend one year in jail, with 258 days of credit for time 
served.   
¶21 On January 26, 2018, 15 months after being sentenced, 
Nash filed a postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his Alford 
plea.7  Nash argued that the circuit court neglected to find that 
the record contained "strong evidence of actual guilt."   
                                                 
7 Nash also moved to remove a domestic abuse modifier that 
was erroneously included in the judgment of conviction.  Agreeing 
it was erroneously included, the circuit court removed the 
modifier.  Although Nash argued that including this domestic abuse 
modifier constituted a manifest injustice, the circuit court 
disagreed.  Nash did not appeal the circuit court's determination 
that including the domestic abuse modifier did not constitute a 
manifest injustice. 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
17 
 
¶22 On April 6, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on 
Nash's postconviction motion.8  The parties agreed that it was 
Nash's burden to present a prima facie case that there was manifest 
injustice.  Nash asserted that the circuit court failed to 
establish a sufficient factual basis to support his Alford plea, 
constituting a manifest injustice.  He contended that a mere 
summarization of the facts in the complaint is insufficient to 
support an Alford plea.  Moreover, he asserted, this is a case in 
which strong proof of guilt will be difficult to show because it 
rests solely on testimonial evidence from three children.   
¶23 In response to Nash's allegations, the State argued that 
the circuit court was "extremely careful" when it accepted Nash's 
plea.  The State recounted the August 25 and 26 plea hearings.  It 
restated the offer of proof: 
Last fall I believe the [victims], who are here in court, 
made outcries to the Village of Pewaukee Police 
Department between the dates . . . roughly of November 
1st, 2011, and November 1st, 2012, [in Pewaukee], that 
the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with two 
of the three [victims]. All three [victims] were under 
the age of sixteen at the time.   
In fact, . . . even though we have just alleged one 
act of sexual assault, sexual intercourse of a child 
under the age of sixteen, and that is [C.L.W.], there 
were multiple acts of sexual intercourse, penis to 
vagina, at that address all in Waukesha County, State of 
Wisconsin, sir.  
The State also reiterated the specific wording the court used when 
finding a factual basis:  
                                                 
8 The State did not file a written response to Nash's 
postconviction motion. 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
18 
 
I will find, taking into consideration the proceedings 
yesterday and proceedings [and] the information that has 
been set out on the record, the statements made by 
counsel, the documents I have received, the plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, the factual 
basis of the offer of proof that was set out on the 
record yesterday as well, that I'm convinced at this 
time, given Mr. Nash's responses to the questions that 
I have posed, that he has freely, voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights and 
entered his plea.  I will find a sufficient factual basis 
based on the contents of the complaint and the offer of 
proof. 
The State argued that the criminal complaint was sufficient to 
show strong proof of Nash's guilt.  The State contended that the 
criminal complaint "talks about sexual intercourse with [C.L.W.].  
Describes that.  Describes where it occurred in the basement.  
Describes about how it occurred.  It describes the address.  It 
describes multiple victims."  The State asserted that it had 
"absolutely and positively satisfied this Alford requirement of 
strong [proof] of guilt . . . ."  Accordingly, the State asked the 
court to deny Nash's claim of manifest injustice.  
¶24 The court asked defense counsel about what it must say 
when accepting an Alford plea: "[D]o I have to say the magic words? 
Do I have to say those words, strong proof?" Defense counsel agreed 
that the court need not use any magic words when accepting an 
Alford plea, but, instead, asserted that it must be clear on the 
record that the parties were all operating on the heightened 
standard.  Nash argued that without physical evidence or witnesses 
other than the victims, the record will likely not reflect a strong 
proof of guilt.   
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
19 
 
¶25 At the conclusion of the postconviction hearing, the 
circuit court concluded that Nash had not demonstrated manifest 
injustice meriting withdrawal of his plea.  Concluding that there 
was a strong proof of guilt on the record, the court stated: 
Again, we are looking at the nature of this offense 
and it was made clear on the record before I accepted 
the plea of what the allegations were, who was involved, 
and what was done.  
We didn't just say, there was some sort of facts.  
There was something sexual going on or some sort of 
touching.  We are not able to be definite about it.  It 
was stated on the record that there was sexual 
intercourse and the nature, the specific nature of the 
sexual intercourse.  The people involved.  The ages.  
The location.  Using as well the information set out in 
the complaint.  
In addition to that, I think that this record 
demonstrates that there was strong proof of actual 
guilt.  That this Court did consider all the things that 
were brought to its attention at the time of the plea 
colloquy.  . . . 
So, I'm going to find that the defense has not met 
that prima facie showing.  For the reasons set out on 
the record, I will deny the motion . . . .  
On April 16, 2018, Nash filed a Notice of Appeal. On May 2, 2019, 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  Nash, No. 
2018AP731-CR, ¶28. 
¶26 On December 10, 2019, Nash petitioned this court for 
review.  We granted the petition.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 Nash asks this court to review the circuit court's denial 
of his postconviction motion to withdraw his Alford plea.  The 
decision to permit a plea withdrawal is a matter of the circuit 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
20 
 
court's discretion, which we review under an erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard.  State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶20, 342 
Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (citing State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, 
¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836).  "We do not disturb a 
circuit court's findings of fact, except in situations where those 
findings are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance 
of the evidence."  Id.  Moreover, "we must ensure that the circuit 
court's determination was made upon the facts of record and in 
reliance on the appropriate and applicable law."  State ex rel. 
Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 635, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).   
¶28 In reviewing the circuit court's decision to accept a 
plea in a post-sentencing withdrawal appeal, we are not limited to 
what the circuit court stated it relied upon in determining its 
factual basis——we may rely upon the entire record in our review.  
Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29.  A defendant can withdraw a plea after 
sentencing only if "the withdrawal is necessary to correct a 
manifest injustice." Id., ¶24.  "[W]hen applying the manifest 
injustice test, it is our role not to determine whether the circuit 
court should have accepted the plea in the first instance, but 
rather to determine whether the defendant should be permitted to 
withdraw the plea."  Id., ¶30 (footnote omitted).  Therefore, when 
reviewing a circuit court's denial of a post-sentencing plea 
withdrawal, we will not overturn the circuit court's determination 
of a sufficient factual basis unless it is clearly erroneous.  
Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645. 
¶29 As 
for 
Nash's 
proposal 
that 
we 
exercise 
our 
superintending 
authority, 
we 
alone 
are 
tasked 
with 
that 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
21 
 
responsibility.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3; see, e.g., Koschkee v. 
Evers, 2018 WI 82, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶30 Because Nash seeks to withdraw his plea, we begin with 
a general discussion of plea withdrawal. More specifically, 
because Nash seeks to withdraw an Alford plea, we next provide 
background information on Alford pleas.  Subsequently, we 
determine whether the record supports the circuit court's finding 
of Nash's strong proof of guilt.  Finally, we address Nash's 
request that we exercise our superintending authority to create 
certain evidentiary requirements for a court to accept an Alford 
plea.  
 
A.  Plea Withdrawal Generally 
¶31 Depending on when a defendant seeks to withdraw his plea, 
two different standards apply.  If a defendant seeks to withdraw 
his plea prior to sentencing, "a circuit court should 'freely allow 
a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any fair 
and just reason, unless the prosecution [would] be substantially 
prejudiced.'" Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 (quoting State v. Jenkins, 
2007 WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24) (alteration in 
original).  "The defendant must prove that a fair and just reason 
exists by a preponderance of the evidence."  Thomas, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, ¶15.   
¶32 On the other hand, as is the case here, when a defendant 
seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing, the defendant must show 
that allowing the withdrawal of the plea "is necessary to correct 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
22 
 
a manifest injustice."  State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 549 
N.W.2d 232 (1996).  The defendant "carries the heavy burden of 
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence" that refusing to 
allow plea withdrawal would result in manifest justice.  Thomas, 
232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶16.  "The higher standard of proof is used after 
sentencing, because once the guilty plea is finalized, the 
presumption of innocence no longer exists."  Id.  "Historically, 
one type of manifest injustice is the failure of the trial court 
to establish a sufficient factual basis that the defendant 
committed the offense to which he or she pleads."  Smith, 202 
Wis. 2d at 25.  Therefore, a circuit court must determine that a 
sufficient factual basis exists for each element of the crime based 
on the entire record.  If it does not, a manifest justice occurs.   
B.  Alford Pleas Generally 
 
1.  Alford pleas 
¶33 An Alford plea is a conditional guilty plea, which allows 
the defendant to maintain his or her innocence outright, but 
nonetheless accept a conviction and sentence for the crime.  The 
United States Supreme Court found this type of plea to be 
constitutionally acceptable.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25, 37 (1970).  In 1995, this court recognized for the first time 
"that the circuit courts of Wisconsin may, in their discretion, 
accept Alford pleas."  Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 856.9  In that case, 
we described an Alford plea as "a guilty plea in which the 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals had previously recognized Alford pleas 
over a decade before this court. See State v. Johnson, 105 
Wis. 2d 657, 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981). 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
23 
 
defendant pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or 
not admitting having committed the crime."  Id.  
¶34 An Alford plea shares characteristics of both a guilty 
plea and a no contest plea, but it is nonetheless different.  
Unlike a no contest plea or a guilty plea, a defendant who enters 
an Alford plea maintains his or her innocence but nonetheless 
chooses to enter an Alford plea knowing the court will enter a 
judgment of conviction.  Like a guilty plea, an Alford plea "places 
the defendant in the same position as though he had been found 
guilty by a verdict of a jury."  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 631.  
Unlike a guilty plea, an Alford plea does not constitute an express 
admission that the defendant committed the act charged.  Wis. JI—
Criminal SM-32A at 2 (2019).  An Alford plea is similar to a no 
contest plea in that "both lack an express admission of guilt" and 
neither constitutes an admission for collateral purposes in civil 
cases.  Id. at 2, 7-8.  Despite this commonality, "[t]he key 
distinction between [Alford and no contest pleas] is that '[a]n 
Alford plea goes beyond a no contest plea in the sense that the 
former involves an outright claim of innocence while the latter 
involves something less than an express admission of guilt.'"  
Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 631 n.9 (quoting Wis. JI—Criminal SM-32A at 
1 (1995)).  
2.  Accepting an Alford plea. 
¶35 Before accepting a guilty, no contest, or Alford plea, 
a circuit court must be satisfied that certain requirements are 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
24 
 
met.  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) (2017-18).10  To accept an Alford 
plea, "the circuit court must determine that the summary of the 
evidence the [S]tate would offer at trial constitutes 'strong proof 
of guilt.'"  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645 (citing Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 859-60).  "'Strong proof of guilt' is not the equivalent of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is 'clearly greater than 
what is needed to meet the factual basis requirement under a guilty 
plea.'"  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645 (quoting Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 
27).  For a traditional guilty plea, the record must reflect "that 
the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense 
charged in the indictment or information or an offense included 
therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty."  Ernst v. 
State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 673, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), overruled in 
part on other grounds, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  However, because a defendant who wishes to enter 
an Alford plea outright claims innocence, the record must reflect 
a "strong proof of guilt" to overcome the defendant's protestations 
of innocence.  See Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 859-60 (citing State v. 
Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657, 663, 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981)).  
We require that the record reflect a strong proof of guilt not to 
convince the defendant of his or her guilt; rather, it is 
constitutionally required to ensure that the defendant is 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a plea that 
                                                 
10 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
25 
 
will result in a judgment of conviction, despite the defendant's 
claims of innocence.  See id. at 857. 
¶36  In determining whether it can accept an Alford plea, 
the circuit court must examine the record to determine whether a 
"sufficient factual basis was established at the plea proceeding 
to substantially negate [the] defendant's claim of innocence."  
Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645 (quoting Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 664) 
(alteration in original).  Because an Alford plea often results 
from agreed-upon plea negotiations between a defendant and the 
State, a court "need not go to the same length to determine whether 
the facts would sustain the charge as it would [where] there is no 
negotiated plea."  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645-46 (quoting Smith, 
202 Wis. 2d at 25).  Because of this, the circuit court does not 
need to use any "magic words" when it accepts an Alford plea.  
Instead, the court must be satisfied that the facts in the record, 
as a whole, are sufficient to provide strong proof of guilt and 
overcome a defendant's protestations of innocence.  See Thomas, 
232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶20 ("All that is required is for the factual 
basis to be developed on the record——several sources can supply 
the facts."); Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 859-60 (concluding "an 
adequate record of the 'strong proof of guilt'" is sufficient); 
Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 664 (stating "[t]he record in this case" 
was sufficient); Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 ("[T]he record before the 
judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.").   
¶37 When determining whether the record contains facts 
sufficient to accept a defendant's Alford plea, the circuit court 
must find strong proof of guilt for each element of the alleged 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
26 
 
crime.  See Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 26 ("If there is no evidence as 
to one of the elements of the crime, the defendant's Alford plea 
cannot be accepted and the factual basis requirement cannot be 
met.").  Accordingly, to accept an Alford plea, the circuit court 
looks at the record as a whole and determines whether the facts in 
the record show a strong proof of guilt as to each element of the 
alleged crime.   
¶38 However, what constitutes an adequate record in a 
particular case is specific to the facts and circumstances of that 
case, and such determinations are left to the discretion of the 
circuit court.  For example, in Warren, this court held that the 
victim's testimony and a police officer's testimony from a 
preliminary hearing constituted strong proof of guilt.  219 Wis. 2d 
at 646-47 (specifically, the victim testified in detail to the 
events of a particular sexual assault and the interviewing officer 
testified that the victim told her in detail about the sexual 
assault).  In Johnson, the State's recital of evidence was deemed 
a sufficient factual basis for the circuit court to conclude the 
record contained strong proof of guilt.  105 Wis. 2d at 665 ("The 
prosecutor's recital of the evidence in this case indicates that 
the [S]tate could prove all of the elements of the crimes 
charged . . . .").  In State v. Annina, the court of appeals held 
that a criminal complaint combined with a prosecutor reading a 
portion of the police report was a sufficient factual basis.  2006 
WI App 202, ¶¶16-17, 296 Wis. 2d 599, 723 N.W.2d 708.  "A factual 
basis may also be established through witnesses' testimony, or a 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
27 
 
prosecutor reading police reports or statements of evidence."  
Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶21.11  
¶39 As we stated previously, "a judge must establish the 
factual basis on the record, but [we do] not dictate how a judge 
must do this."  Id.  We reaffirm that principle.12  
 
C.  The Factual Basis Supports a Showing  
of Strong Proof of Guilt. 
¶40  Nash has not established manifest injustice because his 
Alford plea was supported by a strong factual basis. In reviewing 
the entire record, it is clear that the circuit court properly 
determined that a sufficient factual basis existed for both 
elements of Nash's crime, second-degree sexual assault of a child 
under 16 years of age.   
¶41 Nash is specifically charged with sexually assaulting 
C.L.W., and the record clearly establishes a sufficient factual 
basis to overcome his protestations of innocence.  This offense 
has two elements: (1) that Nash had sexual intercourse or contact 
with a person, and (2) that person was under the age of 16 years 
at the time of that intercourse or contact.  See Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
11 We recognize the importance of Wis. JI—Criminal SM-32A and 
recommend that circuit courts review it when determining whether 
to accept a defendant's Alford plea.   
12 Other jurisdictions follow this rule.  See, e.g., State v. 
Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); 
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. 
State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 
301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 
1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2012).  
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
28 
 
§ 948.02(2).  The record demonstrates strong evidence to support 
each element of the crime. 
¶42 During the plea hearings, Nash admitted verbally and in 
writing that he understood the nature and elements of the offense.  
The criminal complaint and amended criminal complaint outlined the 
detailed victim accounts of the forced sexual intercourse and 
contact.  The record also contains significant other acts evidence 
that the court deemed admissible at a prior hearing.  The court 
heard the prosecutor describe the victim's forensic interviews, 
the facts of the charges at issue, and the details regarding other 
uncharged sexual assaults in other jurisdictions.  The court heard 
of the witnesses who would testify about the assaults, and the 
court also had, as other acts evidence, a statement Nash made to 
law enforcement admitting to sexually assaulting A.T.N.  In 
addition, the prosecutor provided a summary explaining how Nash 
engaged in multiple acts of sexual intercourse with the victims, 
all of whom were under age 16.  The record reflects that the State 
would call the three victims and also the forensic examiner to 
testify against Nash.  Nash's counsel acknowledged the State's 
witnesses.  In sum, the record contains ample evidence to support 
"strong proof of guilt," and Nash has failed to meet his burden to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that his plea resulted in 
manifest injustice. 
¶43 More specifically, the record supports the circuit 
court's finding that Nash committed both elements of the offense: 
(1) sexual contact or intercourse (2) with a person under 16 years 
of age.  As to the first element, the record reflects that Nash 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
29 
 
engaged in sexual contact or intercourse with C.L.W.  The police 
began an investigation into Nash because C.L.W. told a school 
counselor that Nash "touched [her] in a way [she] did not want.  
He touched [her] private parts and put his private part in [hers]."  
During her forensic interview, C.L.W. stated that Nash exposed his 
penis to her and forced it into her mouth.  The amended complaint 
reiterated what C.L.W. disclosed during her forensic interview.  
The State, as an offer of proof, stated that Nash engaged in 
"multiple acts of sexual intercourse, penis to vagina" with C.L.W.  
Such statements in the record establish that the circuit court did 
not err when it determined that Nash engaged in sexual contact or 
intercourse with C.L.W.    
¶44 As to the second element of Nash's crime——the age of the 
victim——it is clear that C.L.W. was under the age of 16 at the 
time of the sexual assaults.  In fact, C.L.W. was only four or 
five years old at the time of the assaults.  This fact is clearly 
established in the amended complaint which provides C.L.W.'s date 
of birth.  Accordingly, the record clearly supports the element 
that C.L.W. be under the age of 16.   
¶45 Therefore, our review of the record demonstrates that it 
contains strong proof of guilt as to each element of the crime to 
support Nash's Alford plea.  Accordingly, we conclude that Nash 
failed to demonstrate manifest injustice, and the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied Nash's 
motion to withdraw his Alford plea. 
D.  Superintending Authority 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
30 
 
¶46 Article VII, Section 3(1), of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, "[t]he supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts."  That section "endows 
this court with a power that is indefinite in character, unsupplied 
with means and instrumentalities, and limited only by the 
necessities of justice."  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 
225, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  "'The superintending authority is as 
broad and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration 
of justice in the courts of this state.'"  Id. at 226 (quoting In 
re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975)).  Although 
this court has the power to act, it must be mindful when it 
exercises that power.  See id. ("[W]e do not use [our 
superintending authority] lightly.").  
¶47 Nash 
proposes 
that 
this 
court 
exercise 
its 
superintending authority, under Article VII, Section 3(1) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, to impose certain evidentiary standards 
for establishing a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.  
He argues that we should require live testimony, oral statements 
of relevant witnesses, or other documentary evidence.  We decline 
to exercise our superintending authority to adopt such a 
requirement.  
¶48 The procedural safeguards and "strong proof of guilt" 
requirement in Alford pleas adequately address the need for a 
sufficient factual basis.  Circuit courts are required to establish 
a sufficient factual basis to support a plea whether the plea is 
guilty, no contest, or Alford.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1).  
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
31 
 
Requiring a specific evidentiary presentation is unnecessary to 
afford the protection due. 
¶49 "'This court will not exercise its superintending power 
where there is another adequate remedy, by appeal or otherwise, 
for the conduct of the trial court . . . .'"  Arneson, 206 
Wis. 2d at 226 (quoting McEwen v. Pierce Cnty., 90 Wis. 2d 256, 
269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979)).  Nash had several other "adequate 
remedies."  He could have raised his specific concerns with the 
factual basis before or at sentencing.  See State v. Spears, 147 
Wis. 2d 429, 436, 433 N.W.2d 595 (raising concerns to one specific 
element of the crime to which defendant pled).  He could have 
tested the State's proof and proceeded to trial.  Cf. U.S. Const. 
amend VI (right to a jury trial); Wis. Const. art. 1, § 5 (same).  
If Nash believed that the circuit court should have heard more 
evidence to establish a strong proof of guilt, he had several 
options to remedy his concerns.  Instead, from the record, not 
only is strong evidence demonstrated but Nash himself acknowledged 
as much at the plea hearings. Therefore, we will not exercise our 
superintending authority to create a specific evidentiary 
requirement as Nash requests.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 We conclude that Nash has failed to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that manifest injustice merits plea 
withdrawal, and that the factual basis in the record demonstrates 
strong proof of guilt to overcome the innocence maintained in 
Nash's Alford plea.  Further, this court will not exercise its 
No. 
2018AP731-CR   
 
32 
 
superintending authority to require that courts employ a specific 
procedure to establish a sufficient factual basis when accepting 
an Alford plea.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶51 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in full.  I write separately to point out the 
pitfalls of plea bargaining——particularly when Alford pleas are 
part of the deal.  The justice system tolerates such pleas only in 
tension 
with 
constitutional 
commands 
governing 
criminal 
prosecutions.  Given the incongruity of accepting a guilty plea 
from a defendant who maintains his innocence, judges must approach 
Alford pleas with caution and deliberation. 
¶52 The right to a trial by jury in criminal cases is a 
fundamental bedrock of the Constitution.  As Thomas Jefferson 
explained, a trial by jury is the "only anchor, ever yet imagined 
by man, by which government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution."  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 
11, 1789), in 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 269 (Julian P. 
Boyd ed., 1958).  Indeed, this precept is integral to preventing 
prosecutorial overreach and protecting the liberty of innocent 
defendants.  "A criminal trial is in part a search for truth.  But 
it is also a system designed to protect 'freedom' by insuring that 
no one is criminally punished unless the State has first succeeded 
in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that the 
defendant is guilty."  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113-14 
(1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Mindful of this purpose, our founders understood the right to a 
jury trial as the "heart and lungs" of liberty.  See Letter from 
John Adams to William Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John 
Adams 169 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977). 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶53 In a dangerous departure from an original understanding 
of the constitutional design for criminal prosecutions, trial by 
jury has become the exception rather than the rule.  Without a 
doubt, "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials."  Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 
170 (2012).  In recent years, approximately 97 percent of federal 
convictions and 94 percent of state convictions have been resolved 
through a guilty plea.   Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) 
(citing statistics from the United States Department of Justice).  
Many courts are often eager to accept them.  Indeed, plea 
agreements serve a practical role in the judicial system.  For 
both attorneys and judges alike, plea agreements facilitate the 
prompt resolution of cases and prevent the criminal justice system 
from becoming overwhelmed.  See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained 
Justice: Plea-Bargaining's Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-
Valve, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 51, 59-60 (2012). 
¶54 As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, plea 
agreements also allow criminal defendants who know they are guilty 
to admit to their crimes in exchange for more favorable terms at 
sentencing.  See Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.  In this sense, plea 
agreements can benefit "both parties."  Id.  With respect to a 
defendant who actually committed the crime for which he was 
charged, pleading guilty serves the State's interest in expediency 
and the people's interest in swift justice, in addition to 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
sometimes sparing victims from the trauma of reliving the crimes 
against them during trials.1 
¶55 Recognizing 
the 
benefits 
of 
plea 
bargaining 
in 
appropriate cases, however, does not negate the harm caused by its 
exploitative use, when the "bargain" coerces a defendant into 
admitting guilt in response to a prosecutor's threat to add charges 
carrying lengthy sentences.2  The Constitution does not countenance 
this coercive type of plea bargaining, which not only allows the 
guilty to escape justice but also permits the extortion of the 
innocent.  See Ralph Adam Fine, Escape of the Guilty & Extortion 
of the Innocent (2d ed. 2013).  "Plea bargaining rests on the 
constitutional fiction that our government does not retaliate 
against individuals who wish to exercise their right to trial by 
jury."  Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 
Regulation, Fall 2003, at 24, 26.  Extortive plea bargaining 
encourages the guilty to hold out for reduced charges and a lighter 
sentence while coercing the innocent to plead guilty in fear of 
                                                 
1 When the defendant's guilt is certain, plea bargaining may 
be favored in "situations where the facts of a particular case may 
justify a lenient sentence, a dismissal, or reduction," and 
"consideration to a defendant may be warranted, in appropriate 
cases, to get his or her help in catching or convicting a 'bigger 
fish' or to avoid the trauma of a trial for a . . . victim."  Ralph 
Adam Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unnecessary Evil, 70 Marq. Law Rev. 
615, 616 (1987).  These scenarios promote "justice for society and 
for the victim."  Id. 
2 Nothing in the record in this case suggests any coercion on 
the part of the prosecutor.  Indeed, this case was particularly 
appropriate for a plea agreement, in light of the strong proof of 
Nash's guilt, and for purposes of sparing three young children the 
trauma of a trial during which they would have had to testify 
regarding the sexual assaults they suffered. 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
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increased charges and a harsher sentence.  For the sake of 
expediency, this tool of the justice system appallingly results in 
the incarceration of the innocent.  For the sake of conserving the 
limited resources of the justice system, plea bargaining allows 
the guilty to be released earlier than the law contemplates, at 
society's expense should the guilty re-offend.  See, e.g., Lafler, 
566 U.S. at 186-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Albert W. 
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
38 (1979)) (Without plea bargaining, "our system of criminal 
justice would grind to a halt."). 
¶56 The United States Supreme Court, as well as this court,3 
have concluded that plea bargaining is permitted as a "necessary 
evil."  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 187 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
"[W]hatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is 
that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are 
important 
components 
of 
this 
country's 
criminal 
justice 
system.  Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned."  
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361–62 (1978) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)). 
¶57 In 
the 
decades 
following 
Bordenkircher, 
proper 
administration of plea bargains has faded as judges sometimes 
reflexively accept pleas without ferreting out the extortion by 
which the State sometimes elicits them.  "A finely tuned criminal 
justice system will punish the guilty and leave the innocent 
unmolested."  Ralph Adam Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unnecessary 
                                                 
3 State ex rel. White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 21-22, 203 
N.W.2d 638 (1973); Armstrong v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 282, 286-88, 198 
N.W.2d 357 (1972). 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
Evil, 70 Marq. Law Rev. 615, 626 (1987).  Every decision by an 
innocent defendant to forego his constitutional right to a jury 
trial in response to the State's coercive tactics imperils liberty.  
Every plea bargain enabling the guilty to evade legally prescribed 
punishment erodes the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
¶58 Perhaps most fundamentally, "plea bargaining is . . . at 
war with our most precious tradition:  the presumption of 
innocence."  Ralph Adam Fine, Echoes of a Muted Trumpet, 4 Engage 
39, 40 (2003).4  Although in this case the circuit court conducted 
an exhaustive colloquy with the defendant and initially declined 
to accept Nash's Alford plea based upon Nash's protestations of 
innocence, sometimes absent from the process is any real inquiry 
into whether or not the defendant actually committed the crime.  
In this case, the record belies Nash's declarations of innocence.  
As the majority opinion details, "the factual basis in the record 
demonstrates strong proof of guilt to overcome the innocence 
maintained in Nash's Alford plea."  Majority op., ¶¶4, 50.  
Troublingly, in other cases "innocent defendants do plead guilty 
more often than most people think and certainly more often than 
anyone cares to admit."  John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The 
Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 
                                                 
4 Echoes of a Muted Trumpet can be accessed at https://fedsoc-
cms-public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/PcJMmPtH2g 
0Seh2zqsDpiSa8zy5D3CIBLiPB1f2Q.pdf.  
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
Cornell L. Rev. 157, 158 (2014).5  Plea bargaining "presents grave 
risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an 
innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a 
lesser offense; and for guilty defendants it often——perhaps 
usually——results in a sentence well below what the law prescribes 
for the actual crime."  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 185 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
¶59 While defendants ostensibly retain the ultimate "choice" 
of proceeding to trial, that option becomes illusory when 
individual liberties are held hostage by expediency.  Plea 
bargaining 
empowers 
prosecutors 
to 
effectively 
penalize 
defendants, via heightening charges or recommending enhanced 
sentencing, for not accepting plea bargains.  See Bordenkircher, 
434 U.S. at 372.  If the right to a jury trial is the "anchor" and 
"heart and lungs" of American liberty, a justice system that 
incentivizes defendants to waive this fundamental right cannot be 
reconciled with the Constitution's conception for the adjudication 
of guilt or innocence.  "[F]or what greater security can any 
person have in his life, liberty or estate, than to be sure of 
not being divested of, or injured in any of these, without the 
                                                 
5 See also Ralph Adam Fine, Echoes of a Muted Trumpet, 4 
Engage 39, 41 (2003) ("During my nine years as a trial judge, I 
had several defendants who wanted to plead guilty even though when 
I then asked them to tell me what they did, responded with stories 
of innocence.  When I asked them why they were trying to plead 
guilty, they all told me that they had been threatened with harsher 
penalties if they insisted on going to trial.  In rejecting their 
pleas, I told them that we had enough guilty persons to convict, 
and that we did not need to dip into the pool of the innocent.  In 
each of the instances, we went to trial and the defendants were 
acquitted."). 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
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sense and verdict of twelve honest and impartial men of his 
neighborhood?"  Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 22, 27 (1853). 
¶60 Alford pleas exemplify the gravest dangers of plea 
bargaining.  An Alford plea allows a defendant to both plead guilty 
and profess innocence.  See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970).  This impossibility is as perplexing as the paradox of 
Schrödinger's cat.6  "One would think that if a defendant says he 
did not commit the crime, the criminal justice system would insist 
on a trial to resolve the question."  Blume & Helm, supra, at 172.  
Instead, our criminal justice system uses Alford pleas to "grease 
the system's wheels with the oil of expediency."  Ralph Adam Fine, 
Echoes of a Muted Trumpet, 4 Engage 39, 40 (2003).  Accepting them 
"exacerbate[s] the risk of truly innocent defendants pleading 
guilty."  Blume & Helm, supra, at 172.  Consequently, "the trial 
courts in this state" should "act with great reticence when 
confronted with an Alford plea."  See State ex rel. Warren v. 
Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 15, ¶21 n.8, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998) (quoted 
source omitted).  Not surprisingly, some jurists have been quite 
"troubled that a defendant may plead guilty to a charge while 
continuing to protest his innocence thereto."  State v. Garcia, 
192 Wis. 2d 845, 868, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995) (Wilcox, J., 
concurring).  If "[t]he dual aim of our criminal justice system is 
'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer[,]'" id. (quoting 
                                                 
6 https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Schrodingers-cat  
(explaining 
Nobel 
Prize-winning 
Austrian 
physicist 
Erwin 
Schrödinger's thought experiment presenting the paradox of a cat 
being both dead and alive at the same time, as a critique of a 
particular interpretation of quantum mechanics). 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)), "[a]n Alford 
plea, in my mind, contradicts this very simple proposition[.]"  
Id. 
¶61 Because the right to a jury trial ensures that the 
government is "held to the principles of its constitution," courts 
must proceed with caution when allowing defendants to waive this 
right entirely.  "The Framers of the Constitution were aware of 
less time-consuming trial procedures when they wrote the Bill of 
Rights, but chose not to adopt them.  The Framers believed the 
Bill of Rights, and the freedom it secured, was well worth any 
costs that resulted.  If that vision is to endure, the Supreme 
Court must come to its defense."  Lynch, supra, at 27 (advocating 
for the abolition of plea bargaining).  Judicial acceptance of 
plea bargaining distorts the constitutional design for criminal 
prosecutions.  "The Framers decided that the benefits to be derived 
from the kind of trial required by the Bill of Rights were well 
worth any loss in 'efficiency' that resulted.  Their decision 
constitutes 
the 
final 
word 
on 
the 
subject, 
absent 
some 
constitutional amendment."  Williams, 399 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, 
J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). 
¶62 So long as plea bargains remain an entrenched and 
accepted mechanism for resolving criminal cases, judges should be 
wary of accepting them.  A plea entered solely in response to 
threats of added charges or harsher sentences should be rejected.  
Prosecutors should not be allowed to "up the ante" in order to 
discourage a defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to 
a jury trial.  Nor should guilty defendants be permitted to benefit 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
from a "bargain" that allows them to escape responsibility and 
punishment for crimes actually committed——unless the benefits to 
society outweigh the costs.7  "If we want defendants to respect 
the law, we must enforce it with justice and honesty."  Ralph Adam 
Fine, Plea Bargaining:  An Unnecessary Evil, 70 Marq. Law Rev. 
615, 621 (1987).  Plea bargaining for the sake of expediency 
"vitiates public confidence in the criminal justice system."  Id.  
It also disregards victims' rights, "sending the message to them 
and to society that some crimes simply do not count."  See id. at 
616-18 n.7.8 
¶63 Nearly 150 years ago, this court condemned some plea 
bargaining as a "direct sale of justice."  Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 
Wis. 344, 354 (1877).  Our predecessors recognized that the 
prosecutor's job is to "distinguish between the guilty and the 
innocent, between the certainly and the doubtfully guilty" and to 
"never voluntarily [] acquiesce in an acquittal upon certain 
presumption of guilt, or in conviction upon doubtful presumption 
of guilt."  Id. (emphasis added).  Prevailing plea bargaining 
practices, including the Alford plea, extend legally incognizable 
leniency to the guilty while criminalizing the innocent.  "The 
bottom line is that any system of justice must ensure fairness.  
Sadly, for too many people, our criminal-justice system is not 
                                                 
7 See Ralph Adam Fine, Plea Bargaining:  An Unnecessary Evil, 
70 Marq. Law Rev. 615, 616 (1987). 
8 Quoting Ralph Adam Fine in State v. Smith, No. 94-2894-CR, 
unpublished slip op., *2 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other 
grounds, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996). 
No.  2018AP731-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
fair."  See Ralph Adam Fine, Escape of the Guilty & Extortion of 
the Innocent (2d ed. 2013). 
¶64 In many cases, plea bargaining effectively replaces the 
constitutional construct for adjudicating criminal guilt or 
innocence and supplants legislatively-prescribed punishment, all 
without the people's consent.  Alford pleas present the greatest 
risk of convicting innocent defendants while allowing guilty 
defendants to repudiate responsibility for their crimes.  This 
constitutionally-suspect contrivance puts justice "on sale" while 
unacceptably depriving the innocent of any justice whatsoever. 
¶65 In this case, I endorse the court's conclusion that "the 
record demonstrates strong proof of guilt to overcome the innocence 
maintained in Nash's Alford plea."  Majority op., ¶¶4, 50.  I 
therefore join the majority opinion, which reflects the current 
state of the law.  I write separately to reiterate the fundamental 
flaws of plea bargaining in general, which is inherently inimical 
to the search for truth that should be paramount in any system of 
justice.  I respectfully concur. 
No. 2018AP731-CR.jjk 
1 
 
¶66 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in full.  I write separately to discourage the 
acceptance of Alford pleas in Wisconsin circuit courts.  I fully 
recognize that in certain cases, especially those involving child 
sexual assault victims, an Alford plea may be the only avenue by 
which victims are spared from testifying and offenders are still 
held accountable.  This is why I do not believe an absolute ban to 
the Alford plea practice is warranted.  However, the acceptance of 
Alford pleas is troubling because a system allowing defendants to 
accept punishment without admitting guilt may rob victims of needed 
closure and may prevent defendants from being rehabilitated.   
¶67 When the courts permit a defendant who is actually guilty 
to avoid taking responsibility, a victim may not fully obtain 
closure.  See, e.g., Claire L. Molesworth, Knowledge Versus 
Acknowledgement: Rethinking the Alford Plea in Sexual Assault 
Cases, 6 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 907, 908 (2008).  Our criminal 
justice system demands that "the victim of a crime places his or 
her trust in the criminal justice system.  How then does a victim 
react when he or she hears the defendant plead guilty while all 
the while maintaining his innocence to the crime?  The sense of 
finality is clearly missing."  State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 
868-69, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995) (Wilcox, J., concurring).  Victims 
in cases resolved by Alford pleas may suffer from a lack of 
finality, and as this court has stressed, "justice requires that 
all who are engaged in the prosecution of crimes make every effort 
to minimize further suffering by crime victims."  Schilling v. 
Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶26, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 
N.W.2d 623.   
No. 2018AP731-CR.jjk 
2 
 
¶68 Alford pleas likewise can have a negative impact on 
defendants, particularly defendants convicted of sexual offenses.  
Failing to take responsibility can severely hamper a defendant's 
rehabilitation and render him ineligible for otherwise-available 
treatment options.  As this court has previously reasoned, "[a]n 
inherent conflict arises when a charged sex offender enters an 
Alford plea:  the offender cannot maintain innocence under the 
Alford plea and successfully complete the sex offender treatment 
program, which requires the offender to admit guilt."1  State ex 
rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 652, 579 N.W.2d 698 
(1998).  For these reasons, I encourage circuit court judges to 
proceed with caution when asked to accept an Alford plea and to 
accept such pleas sparingly.   
¶69 Lastly, it is important to state unequivocally that 
crime victims who come forward and report their victimization are 
brave.  We rely on "the civic and moral duty of victims and 
witnesses of crime to fully and voluntarily cooperate with law 
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies."  Wis. Stat. § 950.01 
(2017-18).  Such citizen cooperation is important to "state and 
local law enforcement efforts and the general effectiveness and 
well-being of the criminal justice system of this state."  Id.  In 
this case, the young victims fulfilled their duty, holding their 
abuser accountable and in doing so demonstrated more strength, 
resiliency, and courage than most of us could ever imagine. 
¶70 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
1 See Wis JI—Criminal SM-32A for more information about the 
detrimental effect of Alford pleas, including their impact on 
defendants. 
No. 2018AP731-CR.jjk 
2 
 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this concurrence. 
 
No. 2018AP731-CR.jjk 
1