Case Title: Kent Jermaine Jackson v. Warden (Unpublished Order)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042706

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Thursday      16th          June, 2005. 
 
Kent Jermaine Jackson, No. 318275,  
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 against  
Record No. 042706 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed December 2, 2004, and the respondent's motion to dismiss, the 
Court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted and the 
writ should not issue. 
 
Kent Jermaine Jackson was convicted in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Newport News of capital murder in the commission of a 
robbery or attempted robbery, robbery, felony stabbing, and 
statutory burglary.  The jury found the aggravating factor of 
vileness and fixed a sentence of death for the capital murder 
conviction and fixed sentences totaling life imprisonment plus 25 
years and a $100,000 fine for the non-capital offenses.  The trial 
court imposed the sentences fixed by the jury.  This Court 
unanimously affirmed Jackson’s convictions and upheld the sentence 
of death in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 587 S.E.2d 532 
(2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 281 (2004).  
In claim (I)(A), petitioner alleges that Alfred Masters, one of 
his two appointed counsel, “deserted” him prior to trial.  
Petitioner alleges that he was left with only one counsel to perform 
all the work of his defense and that he was deprived of a second 
counsel’s intellect and trial talents in prejudice to his right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.   
The Court holds that claim (I)(A) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
 
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enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
The record, including the withdrawal hearing transcript, 
demonstrates that Masters filed a motion to withdraw on the basis 
of irreconcilable differences with petitioner and the trial court 
granted the unopposed motion.  James Ellenson, petitioner’s 
remaining counsel, represented to the court that Masters had done 
an extensive amount of preparation on the technical aspects of the 
case and was providing all of that information to Ellenson.  
Petitioner was present at the hearing and agreed with Ellenson’s 
assessment that a second trial counsel was not required.  
Petitioner has alleged no specific error caused by Master’s 
withdrawal and has not articulated how Master’s presence would have 
affected the proceedings against him.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.   
In claim (I)(B), petitioner alleges that trial counsel’s 
failure to object to the trial court’s approval of Master’s motion 
to withdraw and to move for the appointment of a second counsel 
constituted a failure of representation.  The Court holds that claim 
(I)(B) satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong 
of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  At the time of 
petitioner’s trial, Va. Code § 19.2-163.7 provided, in pertinent 
part, that a trial court appoint “one or more” attorneys.  As stated 
above, counsel had received ample assistance from Masters who shared 
his work-product with trial counsel when he withdrew.  Petitioner 
agreed that it was not necessary to appoint a second counsel.  
Further, the record demonstrates that the trial court was prepared 
to appoint co-counsel if trial counsel felt that to be necessary.  
 
3
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  Further, petitioner has failed to 
articulate how any alleged error of counsel was caused by the lack 
of co-counsel at trial or how the presence of co-counsel would have 
affected the proceedings.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (I)(C), petitioner alleges that the trial court’s 
granting of co-counsel’s motion to withdraw was a denial of the 
right to adequate counsel.  The Court holds that claim (I)(C) is 
procedurally defaulted because this non-jurisdictional issue could 
have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton v. 
Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
In a portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges that the 
indictment failed to state a death-eligible capital offense by not 
including the specific aggravating factors listed in Code § 19.2-
264.2.  Petitioner argues that there are two separate capital 
offenses in Virginia: death-eligible capital murder under Code § 
18.2-31 and a finding of future dangerousness or vileness, or both; 
and the lesser-included offense of capital murder under § 18.2-31 
with no finding of either aggravating factor.  Petitioner argues 
that death is only an option in the former case, and because proof 
of the aggravating factors increases the applicable punishment, it 
is an element of the offense and must be set forth in the 
indictment.   
The failure to include aggravating factors in an indictment is 
not a jurisdictional defect and is waived by the failure to object 
to the indictment before trial.  Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 
223-24, 576 S.E.2d 471, 488-89 (2003); Rule 3A:9(b),(c).  The Court 
 
4
holds that this portion of claim (II) is procedurally defaulted 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Parrigan, 215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
In another portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not challenging the capital murder 
indictment on the grounds that it failed to identify the aggravating 
factors.  The Court holds that this portion of claim (II) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  There is no constitutional 
requirement that a capital murder indictment include allegations 
concerning aggravating factors.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 
n. 4 (2002) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment has not been 
construed to include the Fifth Amendment right to "presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury"); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
477 n. 3 (2000).  Furthermore, this Court has held that a defendant 
charged with capital murder is not entitled to a bill of particulars 
delineating the Commonwealth’s intended aggravating factors when the 
indictment specifying the crime gives the defendant notice of the 
nature and character of the offense charged.  Roach v. Commonwealth, 
251 Va. 324, 340, 468 S.E.2d 98, 107 (1996).  The indictment in this 
case gave petitioner notice of the nature and character of the 
offense.  Thus, counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to 
make a frivolous argument.  Furthermore, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  
In claim (III)(A), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to interview or call Jacqueline Cruz as an 
alibi witness.  Petitioner alleges that Cruz, petitioner’s 
girlfriend, would have testified that petitioner was with her in 
 
5
King George, Virginia from April 14, 2000 until 5:00 p.m. on April 
16, 2000.  The Court holds that claim (III)(A) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including petitioner’s 
statements to the police and the affidavit of trial counsel, 
demonstrates that the indictment charged the murder occurred between 
April 16 and 18, 2000; that petitioner admitted to the police and to 
his counsel that he was present when the murder took place; and that 
petitioner never provided any alibi information to counsel.   
Counsel’s representation does not fall “below an objective standard 
of reasonableness” when counsel relies upon information supplied by 
his client and “[does] not also investigate alternative defenses.”  
Curo v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 493, 493 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1997)(citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 691).  Furthermore, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. 
In claim (III)(B), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to interview Jacqueline Cruz and to have 
her testify as to petitioner’s character and demeanor “in the weeks 
and months after the murder.”  Cruz allegedly would have testified 
that petitioner “did not appear worried or haunted by anything” 
while he lived with her after April 2000.  The Court holds that 
claim (III)(B) satisfies neither the "performance" nor the 
"prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Self-serving evidence of petitioner’s character and demeanor after 
April 2000 is irrelevant because he admitted to the police and to 
his counsel that he was present at the murder.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
 
6
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  
In claim (III)(C), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to have Jacqueline Cruz sequestered at 
trial, thus forfeiting the opportunity to use her as a witness.  
The Court holds that claim (III)(C) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit of 
trial counsel, demonstrates that petitioner’s investigator 
interviewed Cruz, that she never suggested that petitioner had been 
with her at the time of the murder, and that counsel thus never 
contemplated calling her as a witness.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to establish, through the medical examiner, 
the date and time of the victim’s death, which was “crucial 
information” given Jacqueline Cruz’s ability to provide an alibi 
for Sunday.  The Court holds that claim (IV) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  As discussed above, the record 
demonstrates that petitioner admitted that he was present at the 
murder and never provided alibi information.  The indictment 
specified that the crime occurred between April 16 and 18, 2000.  
Counsel had no independent reason for establishing April 16 as the 
time of death.  Furthermore, petitioner does not allege that the 
medical examiner would have been able to more precisely narrow the 
 
7
time of death from the period specified in the indictment.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.   
In a portion of claim (V)(A), petitioner alleges that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel during jury selection 
because counsel failed to make proper challenges to juror Brooke 
Wright who allegedly favored the Commonwealth.  Petitioner argues 
that Wright should have been challenged for cause because she 
indicated during voir dire that she felt petitioner should testify, 
stated she would believe a law-enforcement officer over other 
witnesses, and said she believed “essentially” in “an eye for an 
eye.”  While Wright was later rehabilitated by the Commonwealth, 
petitioner contends “she was never asked to back down from her 
prejudicial statement that she would give preference to” an 
officer’s testimony.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (V)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the transcript 
of voir dire, demonstrates that Wright, upon further questioning, 
would be fair and impartial, and would follow the trial court’s 
instructions.  Wright stated that she understood a defendant had a 
right not to testify and she would follow the court’s instructions 
not to draw unfavorable inferences if that right were exercised.  
Wright also confirmed that if she was instructed that the testimony 
of all witnesses, whether or not law-enforcement, had to be taken 
equally she could set aside her individual belief as to law-
enforcement officers and would follow the instruction.  Finally, 
Wright indicated that she would follow the law and could sentence 
petitioner to life.  The voir dire, taken as a whole, demonstrates 
 
8
that there was no valid basis for moving to strike Wright.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In another portion of claim (V)(A), petitioner alleges that he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel during jury selection 
because counsel failed to make proper challenges to juror Shera 
Price, who allegedly favored the Commonwealth.  Petitioner argues 
Price should have been challenged for cause because she indicated 
during voir dire that she believed a defendant should prove that he 
did not deserve the death penalty.   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (V)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
transcript of voir dire, demonstrates that Price, upon further 
questioning, would be fair and impartial, and would follow the 
trial court’s instructions.  Price stated that she could follow the 
trial court’s instructions that the Commonwealth must prove certain 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can give the 
death penalty and that she would be able to follow the law.  The 
voir dire, taken as a whole, demonstrates that there was no valid 
basis for moving to strike Price.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
In claim (V)(B), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to rehabilitate prospective juror Danis 
Lensch who the court sua sponte struck for cause.  Lensch stated she 
would hold the court and the prosecution to a higher standard and 
 
9
would expect proof higher than “beyond a reasonable doubt” before 
agreeing to sentence someone to death.  Petitioner concedes that 
Lensch’s views were troublesome, but argues that counsel could have 
rehabilitated Lensch by making it clear that “reasonable doubt” was 
in fact a high standard of proof.   
The Court holds that claim (V)(B) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the transcript of 
voir dire, demonstrates that Lensch indicated several times that she 
would hold the Commonwealth and the trial judge to a higher standard 
than “beyond a reasonable doubt” and that she did not know whether 
she could follow the court’s instructions on the “reasonable doubt” 
standard.  Counsel’s representation does not fall “below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” for declining to attempt to 
rehabilitate a witness who has unequivocally expressed doubts as to 
her ability to follow the trial court’s instructions.  Further, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
In claim (V)(C), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during jury selection because 
counsel failed to rehabilitate five prospective jurors who stated 
their opposition to the death penalty and counsel failed to object 
to their dismissal on the grounds that petitioner was entitled to a 
jury of his peers and that dismissing persons who disagree with the 
death penalty would deprive petitioner of that right.  Petitioner 
concedes that it is proper to dismiss for cause prospective jurors 
who oppose the death penalty.  Petitioner, however, argues that this 
is an issue that should be “asserted again and again” and, thus, 
claims counsel should have objected to the dismissal of the five 
jurors in order to preserve the issue for appeal.  
 
10
The Court holds that claim (V)(C) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the transcript of 
voir dire, demonstrates that the five prospective jurors were 
unequivocally opposed to the death penalty.  Therefore, there was 
no valid basis for counsel to object when the trial court struck 
the five prospective jurors.  Further, petitioner cites no 
authority which supports his position that striking jurors who 
oppose the death penalty deprives a defendant of a jury of his 
peers and, thus, cannot demonstrate any likelihood that an appeal 
as to this issue would have been successful.  Petitioner has not 
articulated any basis for his speculation that any of the jurors 
could have been rehabilitated.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.     
In claim (VI), petitioner alleges that trial counsel, 
“apparently intimidated by the Trial Court,” was ineffective for 
deciding not to call Dr. Steven Ganderson as a trial witness.  The 
trial court held that Dr. Ganderson would not be allowed to testify 
as to petitioner’s veracity or the reliability of his confession.  
Petitioner asserts that Dr. Ganderson, however, would have been 
allowed to testify about antecedents concerning isolation, police 
pressure, distress, and cognitive and situational factors that 
could affect the reliability of a defendant’s statements.   
The Court holds that claim (VI) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
 
11
transcript and the affidavit of trial counsel, demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth was prepared to rebut Dr. Ganderson’s testimony by 
presenting the testimony of Dr. Don Killian who had examined the 
petitioner.  Trial counsel’s decision was not based on intimidation 
by the trial court, but on a tactical decision that not calling Dr. 
Ganderson would bar Dr. Killian’s “contrary testimony.”   A tactical 
decision on the use of a witness is an area of trial strategy left 
to the discretion of counsel.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.  
Further, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.     
In claim (VII), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object when the trial court further 
defined for the jury the definition of “willful and deliberate.”  
The record demonstrates that the jury had received an instruction 
defining “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”  During 
deliberations, the jury asked for a dictionary in order to obtain 
the definition for “willful and deliberate.”  The trial court 
prepared an additional instruction amplifying the terms and trial 
counsel requested the court to give the new instruction.  Petitioner 
now argues that the jury “almost certainly” had resolved the issue 
of premeditation in favor of the Commonwealth.  The petitioner 
claims that the jury’s question with “‘willful and deliberate’ was 
almost certainly a question in favor of the defense” and that the 
additional instruction encouraged the jury to consider “willful and 
deliberate” as being the same as “premeditated.”    
The Court holds that claim (VII) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner proffers no basis for his 
speculation that prior to being given the new instruction the jury 
was predisposed to find in favor of the petitioner concerning the 
terms “willful and deliberate.”  Petitioner does not challenge the 
 
12
additional instruction as being an inaccurate statement of the law.  
Counsel’s representation does not fall “below an objective standard 
of reasonableness” when he requests an instruction that properly 
states the law.  Further, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.    
In claim (VIII), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s issuance of 
a revised finding instruction on “stabbing in the commission of a 
felony.”  Petitioner asserts counsel improperly agreed to a change 
that made it easier for the jury to resolve its questions and 
expanded the range of behavior that justified a finding.  The 
record reflects that petitioner was indicted on a charge of 
unlawfully stabbing, cutting or wounding the victim in the 
commission of a felony.  The initial finding instruction referenced 
“using a knife in the commission of a felony.”  During 
deliberations, the jury asked the court whether the offense 
required a knife only.  Trial counsel then agreed with a substitute 
finding instruction that described the offense as “guilty of 
stabbing, cutting or wounding in the commission of a felony, as 
charged in the indictment.”   
The Court holds that claim (VIII) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The Court finds that the substitute 
finding instruction accurately described the offense charged in the 
indictment, and counsel’s representation did not fall “below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” for agreeing to a proper 
instruction.  Further, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that  
 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
 
13
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.    
In claim (IX), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to preserve for direct appeal the pre-trial 
motion for a change of venue based on extensive publicity about the 
murder.  On direct appeal, the Court held that counsel’s failure to 
preserve the continuing motion before the jury was impaneled 
constituted a waiver pursuant to Rule 5:25.  Jackson, 266 Va. at 
430-31, 587 S.E.2d at 539.   
The Court holds that claim (IX) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of Strickland.  The trial court struck all the 
members of the venire who were aware of the murder based on media 
accounts or personal knowledge, except for Sandra Peiffer whose 
participation as a juror was upheld on direct appeal.  Jackson, 266 
Va. at 435, 587 S.E.2d at 541-42.  Furthermore, a panel of 24 jurors 
was selected after voir dire of only 42 prospective jurors.  Thus, 
jury selection in this case was accomplished with relative ease.  
See Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 420, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 
(1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999) (holding that jury 
selection was accomplished with relative ease when a panel of 24 
jurors was selected after voir dire of only 58 prospective jurors).  
The ease of seating a jury is a relevant factor in determining 
whether a motion for a change of venue should be granted.  Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 232, 559 S.E.2d 652, 661 (2002).  On this 
record, the attorney’s performance was not deficient because the 
motion, even if made, would not have been successful.  Furthermore, 
petitioner has failed to prove that, but for counsel’s alleged 
error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687.  
In claim (X), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to preserve for direct appeal the pre-trial 
motion to limit the Commonwealth’s presentation of crime scene and 
 
14
autopsy photographs of the victim.  The trial court held that the 
motion was premature because the Commonwealth had not identified 
which of the photographs it intended to use.  On direct appeal, the 
Court held that counsel’s failure to object at trial to the 
admission of the fourteen photographs constituted a waiver pursuant 
to Rule 5:25.  Jackson, 266 Va. at 431, 587 S.E.2d at 539.   
The Court holds that claim (X) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the pre-trial 
motion to limit the photographs and the transcripts, demonstrates 
that counsel moved to exclude photographs which were either 
cumulative or of the autopsy.  The motion was dismissed as 
premature.  At the time of trial, however, the Commonwealth had 
selected fourteen photographs and trial counsel had no objections.  
Counsel then used several of the photographs during jury selection 
as a tactical decision to identify jurors who could be adversely 
affected by the photographs and other evidence.  Such tactical 
decisions are an area of trial strategy left to the discretion of 
counsel.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.  Petitioner has not 
identified any photographs that were cumulative or unduly 
prejudicial.  On direct appeal, the Court held in its 
proportionality review that the pictures “accurately depicted the 
condition of the victim....” and noted “the jury was entitled to use 
the photographs to make an informed decision on the [petitioner’s] 
guilt.”  Jackson, 266 Va. at 441, 587 S.E.2d at 545.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate how counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  
In claim (XI), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request the trial court to conduct a 
proportionality review of the jury’s imposition of the death penalty 
 
15
to determine whether it was based upon passion and prejudice.  The 
Court holds that claim (XI) satisfies neither the "performance" nor 
the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Proportionality review is entirely a creature of statute and is not 
required by either the federal or Virginia constitutions.  Winston 
v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 620, 604 S.E.2d 21, 53 (2004).  Code § 
17.1-313 imposes the requirement to conduct such a review upon this 
Court, not upon the trial court.  Id.; Jackson, 266 Va. at 431-32, 
587 S.E.2d at 540.  Counsel is not deficient for failing to assert a 
claim that has no merit.  See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 
375 (1986).  Further, having conducted the statutorily required 
proportionality review, this Court concluded that the sentence was 
not the result of passion or prejudice and was not disproportionate.  
Jackson, 266 Va. at 441-42, 587 S.E.2d at 545-46.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.   
 
In claim (XII), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth Attorney’s 
penalty phase argument to the jury comparing the worth of the 
petitioner and the victim.  The record reflects that the 
Commonwealth referred to the victim as “a gift to the community” and 
to petitioner as someone “who was given everything and only sought 
to take more.”  The Commonwealth then argued that the jury should, 
“[w]eigh the life he had against what he has taken, and when you do 
you will know that the appropriate punishment for capital murder is 
death.”  Petitioner alleges counsel “should have protected 
[p]etitioner from these comparisons” by objecting to this argument. 
The Court holds that claim (XII) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  This Court has previously held that 
 
16
“victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital 
murder prosecution in Virginia."  Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (1994).  The record, including the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that the Commonwealth’s comments 
about the victim and petitioner were based on evidence already in 
the record.  Petitioner does not argue that the comments, standing 
alone, were factually inaccurate or unsupported by the record.  
Petitioner concedes that the United States Supreme Court approved 
the use of victim impact evidence in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991), but argues there is a judicial movement towards 
recognizing that victim impact statements and argument could be “so 
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.”  
Id. at 825.  In support of this argument, petitioner asks this Court 
to consider Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004).  The 
United States Court of Appeals, however, has since vacated that 
panel opinion and affirmed the judgment of the district court, 
holding that the South Carolina Supreme Court did not err when it 
held that the solicitor’s comparison of the defendant’s life to that 
of the victim in closing argument during the sentencing phase did 
not render the trial fundamentally unfair.  Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 
F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.   
In claim (XIII), petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to adequately challenge the unconstitutional 
character of the death penalty in Virginia.  Petitioner presents an 
argument relying upon various reports including a 2000 report of the 
American Civil Liberties Union on the death penalty in Virginia and 
a 2001 study of Virginia’s system of capital punishment by the 
Commonwealth’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, which 
 
17
he contends counsel should have raised “to the extent that the 
factual basis...existed at the time of petitioner’s trial and direct 
appeal proceedings.”  This new argument cites four factors that have 
purportedly rendered the imposition of the death penalty in Virginia 
“unconstitutionally random and arbitrary:” the locus of the crime; 
the disproportionate application for female victims and where the 
races of the victim and defendant differ; the disproportionate 
impact on indigent defendants represented by appointed counsel; and 
the ineffectiveness of Virginia’s direct and collateral review 
processes in detecting trial errors.   
The Court holds that claim (XIII) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that counsel 
filed a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of the 
death penalty on various grounds including due process, equal 
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment.  Counsel’s supporting 
memorandum contained arguments that the death penalty is 
discriminatorily imposed; that the statutes deny defendants 
meaningful review on direct appeal; and that the statutes deny the 
effective assistance of counsel because of the manner in which 
Virginia appoints counsel for the indigent and because the 
collateral review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is not 
meaningful.  This Court rejected petitioner’s constitutional 
challenges on direct appeal.  Jackson, 266 Va. at 429-30, 587 S.E. 
2d at 538-39.  Counsel is not ineffective for making strategic 
decisions on the selection of arguments that advance a meaningful 
constitutional attack on a statute.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689-90.  Further, the constitutionality of the death penalty has 
been upheld repeatedly by this Court.  Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 497, 508, 537 S.E.2d 866, 873-74 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
815 (2001).  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient, or that there is a reasonable 
 
18
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In an unenumerated claim, petitioner alleges that all of the 
“foregoing claims” of ineffective assistance of counsel constitute 
separate claims for relief “based on the direct violations of his 
said constitutionally protected rights.”  The Court holds that this 
claim is procedurally defaulted because these non-jurisdictional 
issues could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, 
thus, are not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Parrigan, 215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682.   
Finally, petitioner recites, “The Newport News Circuit Court 
interfered with petitioner’s investigation of possible juror 
improprieties.”  Petitioner further states that he filed with this 
Court an appeal of the circuit court’s order denying him a copy of 
the “jury list” containing the addresses and telephone numbers of 
the jury panel and “for the purposes of this petition, Petitioner 
prays this Court to preserve the issue of juror misconduct until 
Petitioner’s counsel may have access to the information allowing 
them to locate and question the jurors.”  The Court declines “to 
preserve the issue of juror misconduct.”  Despite habeas counsel’s 
representation of having spoken with three jurors (one of whom 
refused to speak) and one alternate juror, the petition contains no 
factual allegations regarding, or even indicating, any type of juror 
misconduct. 
Petitioner’s requests for a plenary hearing, for leave to 
conduct discovery, for reasonable litigation expenses, and for leave 
to amend the petition are denied.  
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 
 
 
 
             A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
                Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clerk