Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brewbaker,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-15

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brewbaker,1999 WY 15972 P.2d 962Case Number: 98-15Decided: 02/18/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
DIVISION, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

Clarence W. BREWBAKER, 
Appellee (Petitioner).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen; Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.

F. Gaston Gosar 
of Nicholas Law Office, LLC, Riverton, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

TAYLOR, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (the Division), claims the district court 
erred in reversing the hearing examiner's denial of benefits to appellee, 
Clarence W. Brewbaker (Brewbaker). The hearing examiner determined that the work 
activities leading to Brewbaker's heart attack were not "unusual * * * or 
abnormal" as required by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603(b) (1997). Finding no evidence 
to support the hearing examiner's conclusion, we affirm the order of the 
district court.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      The Division 
presents the following issue for review:

A. Was the 
Hearing Examiner's denial of benefits supported by substantial evidence and 
within his discretion?

Brewbaker 
phrases the issue as:

Did the district 
court err when it reversed the hearing examiner, concluding that his decision 
was contrary to law, arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial 
evidence? Was the hearing examiner's decision to deny benefits for Mr. 
Brewbaker's work related heart attack contrary to law and, therefore, arbitrary, 
capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence?

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      Brewbaker worked 
for two years as a truck driver for Foster Construction Company, Inc. (Foster). 
Due to his experience as a welder in the oil field and the lack of driving 
opportunities in the winter, Brewbaker agreed to temporarily perform welding 
tasks for Foster. In January 1996, Brewbaker and two other employees began 
repairing a large rock crusher used by Foster in its construction 
business.

[¶4]      On March 12, 
1996, Brewbaker and a co-worker were engaged in the repair of the "grizzly" on 
the rock crusher, the main hopper at the base of the crusher. The grizzly 
consists of steel plates welded together to form a funnel-shaped rectangle, 
measuring approximately ten feet by twelve feet. When Brewbaker arrived at work 
at about 7:00 a.m., the temperature was well below freezing with the wind 
gusting from fifteen to twenty miles per hour. Brewbaker and his co-worker began 
the project by making a "rough cut" on each steel plate, which individually 
weighed approximately 300 pounds. The two men then loaded the plates on a front 
end loader to move them into position for reattachment to the 
grizzly.

[¶5]      The grizzly was 
located in the middle of the Foster yard, unprotected from the weather. Instead 
of scaffolding, a large rock pile had been erected to provide support while the 
plates were fitted to the grizzly at a forty-five degree angle. The men unloaded 
the plates and laid them on the rock pile. Reattachment to the grizzly began 
with the plate being "scribed" to ensure a proper fit. While both men squatted 
against the rocks, they lifted the steel plate to the forty-five degree angle. 
Brewbaker used one arm to mark the excess steel; the plate was then lowered and 
the excess steel removed.

[¶6]      The process 
continued with the two men again lifting the plate. Brewbaker supported his side 
with his body, arm, and head. Using his free arm, Brewbaker then tack welded the 
plate into position. After tack welding all four sides, the co-worker went back 
to another project while Brewbaker completed the welding of the circumference of 
the plate. Once finished, the scribing and welding process began for the next 
plate.

[¶7]      After working for 
approximately three hours, Brewbaker tacked the third plate into place. While 
welding the circumference, he began to feel pains in his chest. He tumbled off 
the rock pile and called for help. Within thirty minutes, Brewbaker was examined 
by Dr. David Steger in the emergency room at Riverton Memorial 
Hospital.

[¶8]      From the 
emergency room, Brewbaker was transferred to the intensive care unit, where he 
was examined by Dr. John Reckling and diagnosed with "[a]typical chest pain." A 
series of tests revealed Brewbaker's condition as a "myocardial infarction" - a 
heart attack. He was referred to a cardiologist, Dr. Robert Novick, who 
performed an angioplasty on March 18, 1996.

[¶9]      Although the 
report of injury was timely filed, the Division denied benefits on April 3, 
1996, citing Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603(b). The evidence at the subsequent hearing 
consisted of Brewbaker's testimony and documentary evidence, including 
Brewbaker's medical records and the deposition testimony of Dr. Reckling. The 
hearing examiner found that Brewbaker proved that his activity at work had 
caused his heart attack, but that he failed to prove the activity was "clearly 
unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment * * *." Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-603(b)(ii).

[¶10]   Brewbaker filed a petition for 
review in the district court. The district court reversed the order denying 
benefits, finding that the hearing examiner's decision was unsupported by any 
record evidence. This timely appeal followed.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1997) 
prescribes the scope of appellate review for agency decisions. The reviewing 
court shall:

 

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

* * 
*

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (E). Our review accords no special deference to the 
decision of the district court; the case is considered as if it came to us 
directly from the agency. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. 
Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶12]   While Brewbaker retains the burden 
of establishing the insufficiency of the evidence, the Division has "the initial 
burden of persuasion to show the district court made an error of law when it 
applied an improper standard or rule or reweighed the evidence and substituted 
its judgment for that of the agency." Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 
882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994). It must also demonstrate that the administrative 
agency's decision was justified by evidence in the record. Id. We examine the 
entire record to determine if the agency's findings are supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. at 877.

[¶13]   " 'Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
an agency.' " Harris, 931 P.2d  at 258 (quoting Stuckey v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 1995)). To establish a 
fact, more than just a mere scintilla of evidence or a suspicion is required. 
Harris, 931 P.2d  at 258. However, the agency's factual findings will be set 
aside only if clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 
Id.

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶14]   The successful applicant for 
worker's compensation benefits for a heart attack must prove every requirement 
enumerated in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603(b):

Benefits for 
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused 
by an injury, are not payable unless the employee establishes by competent 
medical authority that:

(i) There is a 
direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was 
performed and the cardiac condition; and

(ii) The 
causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly 
unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment, irrespective 
of whether the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual 
employee; and

(iii) The acute 
symptoms of the cardiac condition are clearly manifested not later than four (4) 
hours after the alleged causative exertion.

There is no 
question that Brewbaker fulfilled the requirements of subsections (i) and (iii). 
The only issue here is subsection (ii): whether the hearing examiner could 
reasonably conclude that Brewbaker failed to establish that his employment 
activities preceding the injury involved stress which was clearly unusual or 
abnormal for that employment. "This is an objective test and invokes the usual 
employment activities; it does not focus on the activities or characteristics of 
an individual employee." Harris, 931 P.2d  at 259.

[¶15]   Brewbaker's testimony is the only 
record evidence relating to the nature of the employment stress preceding his 
heart attack. Although he admitted his work normally involved tasks requiring 
"heavy labor," Brewbaker consistently maintained that the combination of the 
weather conditions and the difficulty of this specific project created a work 
situation both unusual and abnormal for welding employment. The Division 
submitted no evidence to challenge or contradict this 
testimony.

[¶16]   Instead, the Division now contends 
that Brewbaker's questionable credibility is the key justification for the 
hearing examiner's determination. This argument is singularly unpersuasive. In 
its efforts to create a credibility issue, the Division attempts to show a 
conflict between Brewbaker's statements to his physicians and his testimony at 
the hearing. Suffice it to say that these alleged contradictions are produced 
only through an incomplete and unfair characterization of the evidence. A 
careful review of the entire record negates any material conflict in Brewbaker's 
statements to his treating physicians and/or in his testimony. Indeed, the only 
evidence before the hearing examiner was that the project was over and above the 
range of "heavy labor" normally required for a welding 
project.

[¶17]   Citing to Robles, 882 P.2d  at 876, 
the Division argues that because Brewbaker's testimony went uncorroborated by 
another witness, the hearing examiner reasonably could find his testimony 
incredible without the presentation of contradictory evidence. The Division's 
reliance on Robles is misplaced. There, we clearly stated that the Division must 
"demonstrate the administrative agency decision was justified by evidence in the 
record." Id. at 876. There is simply no evidence to support the Division's 
argument that the hearing examiner found Brewbaker's basic facts incredible, and 
no evidence to support the hearing examiner's determination that lifting 300 
pound steel plates in freezing weather for three hours is usual or normal stress 
in the welding profession. In other words, the hearing examiner's conclusion is 
contrary to all evidence.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶18]   The hearing examiner's denial of 
benefits was clearly contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The district 
court's order reversing and remanding the case to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings is affirmed.