Case Title: Ex parte Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Montrose Ecor Rouge, L.L.C. and montrose Ecor Rouge, L.L.C. v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1091042

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel: 10/22/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1091042
_________________________
Ex parte Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission
v.
Montrose Ecor Rouge, L.L.C.
and
Montrose Ecor Rouge, L.L.C.
v.
Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CV-08-900122;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2080276)
WOODALL, Justice.
1091042
2
The Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Commission ("the
Commission") sought certiorari review of an opinion of the
Court of Civil Appeals, upholding the trial court's issuance
of a writ of mandamus sought by Montrose Ecor Rouge, L.L.C.
("Montrose"), to compel the Commission to grant Montrose's
application for a proposed residential subdivision.  We
reverse and remand.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Montrose owns a 7.98-acre parcel of land fronting on
Mobile Bay.  Montrose proposed to subdivide the parcel into 8
numbered lots, with lots 1 through 4 fronting Mobile Bay ("the
bay lots").  Just behind the bay lots are lots 5 and 6, which
are mainly composed of a cliff ("the cliff lots").  Just
behind and above the cliff lots are lots 7 and 8.  The parcel
is subject to a rating scheme devised "[f]or purposes of flood
insurance" 
by 
the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA"), reflecting the susceptibility of property to damage
from "flooding and exposure to velocity-driven waves in a
storm."  Baldwin County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Montrose
Ecor Rouge, L.L.C., [Ms. 2080276, April 9, 2010] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)(Per Bryan, J., with one judge
1091042
3
concurring and three judges concurring in the result).  More
specifically, 
"FEMA has rated a portion of the ... parcel as VE,
has rated a portion of it as AE, and has rated a
portion of it as X.  The portion of the ... parcel
that is rated VE is coastal land that is subject to
a high risk of flooding and is also subject to
velocity-driven waves in a storm.  [The bay lots]
and the portion of [the cliff lots] closest to the
bay ... [are] rated VE.  The portion of the ...
parcel that is rated AE is subject to a high risk of
flooding but is not subject to velocity-driven waves
in a storm. ... [P]ortions of [the cliff lots] [are]
... rated AE.  The portion of the ... parcel that is
rated X is neither subject to a high risk of
flooding nor subject to velocity-driven waves in a
storm. ... [P]ortions of [the cliff lots] and lots
7 and 8 [are] ... rated X.
"The FEMA ratings for the developer's parcel are
typical of the FEMA ratings for the eastern shore of
Mobile Bay as a whole.  FEMA regulations do not
prohibit residential construction in areas rated VE
or AE; however, they do impose special requirements
on residential construction in such areas."
Baldwin County, ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added).
In addition to these FEMA ratings, the parcel is subject
to the Subdivision Regulations of Baldwin County ("the
regulations"), which were adopted by the Baldwin County
Commission pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §§ 11-19-1 to -24, and
Ala. Code 1975, §§ 11-24-1 to -7.  The regulations "govern
1091042
Reg. § 5.3.18 ("Street Elevations") provides:
1
"The 
Planning 
Commission 
may 
require, 
where
necessary, profiles and elevations of streets for
areas subject to flood.  No street shall be approved
for construction within an area subject to flood
that is proposed to be constructed more than 2 feet
below the elevation of the base flood, as defined in
these regulations.  Fill may be used for streets.
Drainage openings shall be so designed as not to
restrict the flow of flood waters or increase
upstream flood heights."
4
each and every subdivision of land in all unincorporated areas
of Baldwin County."  Reg. § 2.2.  
In November 2007, Montrose sought the Commission's
preliminary-plat approval for the subdivision and development
of the parcel for residential purposes.  The plat contemplated
the construction of a roadway, which would serve as the sole
means of ingress and egress for the bay lots.  Although the
road was to be elevated according to the specifications set
forth Reg. § 5.3.18,  non-native fill material was to be
1
imported to the site to serve as the roadway bed.
On January 17, 2008, at a Commission meeting ("the
meeting"), Montrose presented its plat for approval.  At the
meeting, Baldwin County permit engineer, Gregory Smith,
reported to the commissioners that the plat satisfied the
1091042
5
"black and white technical requirements" for submission.
Nevertheless, there was subsequent discussion at the meeting
regarding the elevations of the roadway and the bay lots, and
the susceptibility of the bay lots to flooding, particularly
during landfalling tropical cyclones.  A number of residents
of the neighborhood in which the parcel was located attended
the meeting. One or two of them presented photographs showing
that the bay lots or adjacent areas had been thoroughly
inundated twice in 2005 by two tropical cyclones of widely
disparate 
intensity. 
Ultimately, 
the 
Commission 
denied
approval of the plat on the ground that the plat failed to
conform to certain of the regulations, including Reg. §§
1.2.2, 5.1, and 5.2.2, inasmuch as the bay lots lie "in an
area prone to severe flooding."  Those sections provide:
§ 1.2.2: "Land to be subdivided shall be of such
character that it can be used safely for building
purposes without danger to health or peril from
fire, flood, or other menace.  Land shall not be
subdivided until proper provision has been made for
drainage, water, sewerage disposal and streets, and
approval has been granted in accordance with the
procedures prescribed in these regulations."
__________ 
§ 5.1. (Minimum Standards): "The following planning
and standards shall be complied with, and no higher
standard may be required by the County Commission,
except where, because of exceptional and unique
1091042
6
conditions of topography, location, shape, size,
drainage, wetlands or other physical features of the
site, minimum standards specified herein would not
reasonably protect or provide for public health,
safety, or welfare.  Any higher standard required
shall be reasonable and shall be limited to the
minimum additional improvements necessary to protect
the public health, safety, or welfare."
__________
§ 5.2.2 (Character of the Land): "Land which the ...
Commission finds to be unsuitable for subdivision or
development due to flooding, improper drainage,
steep 
slopes, 
rock 
formations, 
adverse 
soil
formations or topography, utility easements, or
other features which will reasonably be harmful to
the safety, health, and general welfare of the
present or future inhabitants of the subdivision
and/or 
its 
surrounding 
areas, 
shall 
not 
be
subdivided or developed unless adequate methods are
formulated by the applicant and approved by the ...
Commission, 
upon recommendation of the County
Engineer, or his/her designee, to solve the problems
created by the unsuitable land conditions; otherwise
such land shall be set aside for uses as shall not
involve such a danger.  It is therefore recommended
that the applicant perform any necessary site
investigations related to items such as soils,
wetlands, flooding, drainage, and natural habitats
prior to submitting a Preliminary Plat for review.
".... 
"Land within any floodway shall not be platted for
residential occupancy or building sites.  Land
outside the floodway but subject to flood may be
platted for residential occupancy provided each lot
contains a building site that may reasonably lend
itself to construction of a minimum floor level of
one (1) foot above base flood elevation, or for such
other uses which will not increase the danger to
health, life, and property.  Fill may not be used to
1091042
7
raise land in the floodway.  In other areas subject
to flood, fill may be used providing the proposed
fill does not restrict the flow of water and unduly
increase flood heights."
(Emphasis added.)  
Montrose subsequently petitioned the Baldwin Circuit
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to
vacate its denial; to declare §§ 1.2.2., 5.1, and 5.2.2
unenforceable because, Montrose argued, the provisions are
unconstitutionally vague; and to approve the preliminary plat.
It also sought compensatory damages for alleged "lost profits,
lost opportunity for the sale of subdivided lots, a decrease
in market value, increased interest charges, [and] additional
engineering costs."  The trial court denied Montrose's request
for damages, but, citing Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d
305 (Ala. 1979), granted the petition in all other respects.
The Commission appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, and
Montrose cross-appealed on the issue of damages.  
In a plurality opinion outlined by Judge Bryan and joined
by Judge Pittman, the Court of Civil Appeals, also citing
Smith v. City of Mobile, affirmed the trial court's issuance
of the writ of mandamus.  Judge Bryan's opinion held: 
1091042
8
"The 
challenged 
portions 
of 
the 
Subdivision
Regulations are not reasonably definite and fixed in
their requirements; to the contrary, they accord the
Commission 
the 
discretion 
to 
treat 
similarly
situated landowners differently.  Accordingly, we
conclude that they are void because they are
impermissibly vague.  See Smith v. City of Mobile[,
374 So. 2d 305 (Ala. 1979)]."
Baldwin County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, ___ So. 3d at ___
(emphasis added).  However, on the cross-appeal, the Court of
Civil Appeals reversed the damages portion of the judgment
and "remand[ed] the action for the circuit court to determine
the amount of damages [Montrose] is entitled to recover."
Baldwin County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, ___ So. 3d at ___.
As its sole authority for Montrose's recovery of damages, the
plurality cited Town of Gulf Shores v. Lamar Advertising of
Mobile, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1987).  The Commission
sought certiorari review of both aspects of the plurality
opinion.  We granted the petition to consider (1) whether the
plurality opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with
our precedent concerning the standard of review in a case such
as this, and (2) whether Lamar Advertising should be
overruled.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
1091042
9
The broad, substantive issue, as acknowledged by a
plurality of the Court of Civil Appeals, is whether § 1.2.2,
§ 5.1, and § 5.2.2 are unconstitutionally vague. 
"'The 
legislature 
has 
given 
the 
[Baldwin 
County
Commission] the authority to regulate the development of
subdivisions through its planning commission. [§§ 11-19-1 to
-24; §§ 11-24-1 to -7].  "Subdivision legislation is part of
planning legislation, as is zoning; they are all predicated on
the police power of the state."'"  Beachcroft Props., LLP v.
City of Alabaster, 949 So. 2d 899, 904 (Ala. 2006) (quoting
City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., 822 So. 2d 1227,
1236 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)(emphasis omitted)).  "The governing
body of a municipality, in considering a zoning ordinance,
acts in a legislative capacity. ... Because zoning ordinances
are legislative acts, they are presumed valid unless they are
shown to be arbitrary and capricious."  Woodard v. City of
Decatur, 431 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Ala. 1983).
"The standard of review in a zoning case is
highly deferential to the municipal governing body.
See American Petroleum Equip. & Constr., Inc. [v.
Fancher,] 708 So. 2d [129,] 132 [(Ala. 1997)]
('Because the adoption of an ordinance is a
legislative function, the courts must apply a highly
deferential standard in zoning cases.').
1091042
10
"'"[P]assage of a zoning ordinance is a
legislative act, and it is well established
that municipal ordinances are presumed to
be valid and reasonable, to be within the
scope of the powers granted municipalities
to adopt such ordinances, and are not to be
struck 
down 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable."  Cudd v. City
of Homewood, 284 Ala. 268, 270, 224 So.2d
625, 627 (1969).'
"Pollard v. Unus Props., LLC, 902 So. 2d 18, 24
(Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Nathan Rodgers Constr., Inc., 1 So. 3d 46, 49 (Ala.
2008).  In reviewing an ordinance against a challenge of
unconstitutional vagueness, "[w]e must be certain that the
ordinance is so plainly and palpably inadequate and incomplete
as to be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it offends the
constitution or we will not strike it down."  Walls v. City of
Guntersville, 253 Ala. 480, 485, 45 So. 2d 468, 471 (1950).
Courts should declare such an act to be void for vagueness
only if the act is so indefinite that "a person of ordinary
intelligence, exercising common sense [could] derive no rule
or standard at all from the ... language," or if it is so
vague 
as 
to 
"authorize 
or 
encourage 
arbitrary 
and
discriminatory enforcement."  Northington v. Alabama Dep't of
Conservation & Natural Res., 33 So. 3d 560, 567 (Ala. 2009).
1091042
11
"When 
a 
challenged 
ordinance 
involves 
land 
use
regulation, the ordinance is judged as applied, not evaluated
for facial vagueness."  Swoboda v. Town of La Conner, 97 Wash.
App. 613, 618-19, 987 P.2d 103, 106-07 (1999) (emphasis
added).  "Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the
First Amendment, this Court examines '"whether the statute is
vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this
case,"' instead of hypothetical concerns."  Cadle Co. v. City
of Kentwood, 285 Mich. App. 240, 259, 776 N.W.2d 145, 159
(2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich. App. 361, 374 n. 4,
624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228
Mich. App. 649, 652, 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)).
"To make a successful facial challenge in a non-First
Amendment context, a litigant 'must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.'"
Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1253
n.13 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
Montrose's theory of the case is that the three
regulations on which the Commission relied in rejecting the
preliminary plat -- §§ 1.2.2, 5.1, and 5.2.2 -- are
1091042
12
impermissibly "vague as applied to Montrose because they [1]
allow for the exercise of discretion [on the part of the
Commission] and [2] fail to indicate to Montrose or any other
applicant what is required in order to lawfully subdivide real
property." 
Montrose's 
brief, 
at 
43 
(emphasis 
added).
According to Montrose, the regulations are particularly
offensive because they purport to regulate development in
areas subject to "flooding."  Montrose's position is that,
because the Baldwin County Commission has not yet promulgated
a regulation absolutely prohibiting development in areas
subject to flooding, it must absolutely permit Montrose to
develop its property in such an area.
The Commission contends, however, that "Baldwin County
Subdivision Regulations §§ 1.22, 5.1, and 5.2.2 necessarily
allow for discretion by the ... Commission regarding the
extent the regulations apply to exceptional and unique
conditions of ... flooding."  The Commission's brief, at 8
(emphasis added).  We agree. Caselaw from Alabama and
elsewhere compels us to reject the "all or nothing" approach
to subdivision regulation urged by Montrose.
1091042
13
For example, in Ex parte City of Orange Beach Board of
Adjustment, 833 So. 2d 51 (Ala. 2001), this Court reaffirmed
the principle that an ordinance may validly delegate some
discretion in its enforcement where "'"discretion relates to
the administration of a police regulation and is essential to
the protection of the public morals, health, safety, welfare,
etc."'"  833 So. 2d at 54 (quoting Walls v. City of
Guntersville, 253 Ala. at 485, 45 So. 2d at 471).  This
reaffirmation was made in the context of our consideration of
the constitutionality of a nonconforming-use provision of an
ordinance of the City of Orange Beach pertaining to signage.
The ordinance authorized a "code-enforcement officer" for the
City of Orange Beach Board of Adjustment to determine whether
a billboard was  "dilapidated" or "structurally unsound."  833
So. 2d at 52-53.  The owner of two billboards contended that
the 
use 
of 
those 
terms 
rendered 
the 
ordinance
"unconstitutionally 
vague, 
overbroad, 
ambiguous, 
and
arbitrary; and that the arbitrary and capricious enforcement
of 
the 
ordinance 
... 
deprived 
[the 
owner] 
of 
its
constitutionally protected property rights."  833 So. 2d at
53. This Court disagreed, stating:
1091042
14
"In Walls v. City of Guntersville, [253 Ala.
480, 45 So. 2d 468 (1950)], this Court addressed the
constitutionality 
of 
a 
zoning 
ordinance 
that
provided, in pertinent part:
"'"Any use whatsoever, not in conflict
with any other ordinance of the City, is
allowed in an Industrial District, provided
that no use shall be permitted which would
be offensive because of injurious and
obnoxious noise, vibrations, smoke, gas,
fumes, odors, dust or other objectionable
features, or would be hazardous to the
community on account of danger of fire or
explosion."'
"253 Ala. at 484, 45 So. 2d at 471.  The ordinance
further provided that its provisions would 'be
administered and enforced by the Mayor or the
building inspector and or other person delegated by
the Mayor to carry out this function for him.'  253
Ala. at 484, 45 So. 2d at 470-71.  The challenger of
the ordinance asserted that the ordinance was an
unlawful delegation of power that vested in the
delegated agency 'an uncontrolled and arbitrary
discretion ... to say what is or is not "offensive"
within the meaning of the ordinance.'  253 Ala. at
484, 45 So.2d at 471.  This Court accordingly framed
the relevant inquiry as 'whether or not [the terms
"injurious and obnoxious noise, vibrations, smoke,
gas," etc.] are so vague and indefinite as to
furnish no standard of conduct by which the official
in charge under the ordinance may be guided.'  253
Ala. at 485, 45 So.2d at 471.  In upholding the
ordinance against the constitutional challenge and
determining that its language did not contain
'unusual 
or 
ambiguous 
expressions,' 
this 
Court 
reasoned:
"'....
"'"... [O]rdinances need not always
prescribe a specific rule of action ...
1091042
15
some situations require the placing of some
discretion in municipal officials, as in
cases 
where 
it 
is 
difficult 
or
impracticable to lay down a definite or
comprehensive rule for guidance, or where
the 
discretion 
relates 
to 
the
administration of a police regulation and
is essential to the protection of the
public 
morals, 
health, 
safety, 
welfare, 
etc.["]
"'....
"'Provisions of such general nature as
[in this ordinance] are not uncommon, but
are usual in setting out the uses to which
property 
in 
industrial 
zones 
may 
be
restricted. These provisions are uniform in
application, the standards set up are not
so indefinite as to confer unlimited power
and they relate directly to the health and
public welfare.'
"253 Ala. at 485, 45 So.2d at 471 (citations
omitted)."
Ex parte Orange Beach, 833 So. 2d at 54 (emphasis added).  We
concluded that, "in the context of the ordinance, the terms
'structurally 
unsound' 
and 
'dilapidated' 
[were 
not]
impermissibly vague and ambiguous so that the ordinance [was]
'plainly and palpably inadequate and incomplete.'"  833 So. 2d
at 56 (emphasis added).
A number of courts have reviewed ordinances functionally
equivalent to § 5.2.2 and rejected challenges similar to those
made here by Montrose.  See, e.g., Jackson, Inc. v. Planning
1091042
16
& Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Avon, 118 Conn. App. 202, 982
A.2d 1099 (2009); Burrell v. Lake County Plan Comm'n, 624
N.E.2d 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Busse v. City of Madison, 177
Wis. 2d 808, 503 N.W.2d 340 (Wis.Ct. App. 1993).  
Burrell involved "the denial of approval by the Lake
County Plan Commission [('the Plan Commission')] to the
preliminary subdivision plan submitted by Donald and Alice
Burrell." 624 N.E.2d at 528. The area of the proposed
subdivision was said to be subject to "substantial surface
water runoff and flooding during normal rains," and "excessive
water runoff and flooding" during periods of heavy rain, while
the soil was subject to the possibility of leaching and sewage
elimination difficulties.  624 N.E.2d at 533 n.8. 
"The Burrells' application was denied, consistent with
the requirements of ... [Ordinance, § IV(B)], based on the
[Plan] Commission's conclusion that the subdivision would have
an adverse effect on the health, safety, and general welfare
of the community." 624 N.E.2d at 528. More specifically, §
IV(B) of the Ordinance directed the Plan Commission to "deny
preliminary plan approval ... 'where a proposed subdivision
would adversely affect the health, safety, or general welfare
1091042
17
of the County.'" 624 N.E.2d at 528 (emphasis omitted).  The
Burrells challenged § IV(B) on the same grounds asserted by
Montrose here, namely, that the regulation was "so vague and
uncertain as to be unconstitutional and that it represent[ed]
an illegal delegation of legislative authority because it
purport[ed] 
to 
give 
the 
[Plan] 
Commission 
unlimited
discretion."  624 N.E.2d at 528 (emphasis added).  
The Court of Appeals of Indiana rejected both these
contentions. 
 
With 
regard to the unlimited-discretion
argument, the court said:
"[T]he Ordinance specifically requires the [Plan]
Commission to reject the application for preliminary
plan approval when the proposal is not in compliance
with the applicable ordinances or where the proposed
subdivision would have an adverse effect on health,
safety, or general welfare.  Most importantly, this
health, safety, and general welfare language does
not stand alone.  Another section of the Ordinance
instructs the [Plan] Commission and property owners
alike on the sorts of adverse effects that would
properly serve as a basis for denial:
"'1. Suitability of Land. No land shall be
subdivided 
which 
is 
unsuitable 
for
subdivision 
by 
reason 
of 
flooding,
collection of ground water, bad drainage,
adverse 
earth 
or 
rock 
formation 
or
topography, or any feature likely to be
harmful to the health, safety, or welfare
of the future residents of the subdivision
or of the community.  Such lands shall not
be considered for subdivision until such
1091042
18
time 
as 
the 
conditions 
causing 
the
unsuitability are corrected.'  
"Ordinance § V(B)(1) (Record, p. 413). ... 
"....  
"It is well settled that discretion in the
formulation of standards is to be exercised when an
ordinance is created, rather than when an ordinance
is applied. ... Accordingly, we agree with the
Burrells that the [Plan] Commission may not exercise
the sort of discretion reserved to a legislative
body enacting a law or ordinance to protect the
health, 
safety, 
and 
general 
welfare 
of 
the
community, and that any attempt to delegate such
broad authority would be improper.  The question
before us, then, is whether the health, safety, and
general welfare language in [§ IV(B)] improperly
attempts to imbue the [Plan] Commission with
legislative discretion or, instead, directs the
[Plan] Commission to deny preliminary approval based
on adverse effect to health, safety, and general
welfare 
upon 
a 
determination 
that 
specified
conditions 
exist. 
 
We 
believe 
the 
latter
interpretation is the better view.
"Within 
the 
area 
of 
administrative 
law
generally, the courts of this state have held that
although a legislative body may not delegate the
power to make a law, it may delegate to an
administrative body the power to determine facts
upon which the law's action depends.  State ex rel.
Standard Oil Company v. Review Board of Indiana
Employment Security Division (1951), 230 Ind. 1, 101
N.E.2d 60; Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace (1939),
216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E.2d 472.  In other words, 'a
legislative body may enact a law, the operation of
which depends upon the existence of a stipulated
condition, and ... it may delegate to a ministerial
agency power to determine whether the condition
exists.'  Campbell v. Heiss (1944), 222 Ind. 297,
1091042
19
302, 53 N.E.2d 634, 636.  A planning commission's
review of a subdivision plan to determine if the
plan is in compliance with the applicable statutes
and ordinances is a form of exercising delegated
authority to make factual determinations within the
guidelines established by a legislative body.
"We reiterate that the Ordinance involved here
does not give the [Plan] Commission unguided
discretion to determine what conditions are adverse
to the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community. Instead, § V(B)(1) ..., reproduced supra,
provides that property subject to specified adverse
conditions may not be subdivided.  The function of
reviewing evidence in connection with an application
for preliminary plan approval for the purpose of
determining whether those adverse conditions exist
does not constitute an improper delegation of
legislative authority to the [Plan] Commission.  We
view [§ IV(B)] as merely directing the [Plan]
Commission to make a factual determination on
whether 
specific conditions exist that render
property unsuitable for subdivision (e.g., flooding,
bad drainage, adverse topography) and to deny
subdivision plan approval based on health, safety,
and general welfare where those conditions are found
to exist.  Accordingly, we find that the health,
safety, and general welfare standard of which the
Burrells complain does not represent an improper
delegation of legislative authority because the
Ordinance 
provides 
guidelines 
regarding 
those
characteristics 
considered 
adverse 
to 
the
community."
624 N.E.2d at 530-32 (emphasis added).  In short, that court
concluded that any impermissible vagueness or potential for
1091042
Regarding the Burrells' lack-of-notice argument, the
2
Court of Appeals of Indiana concluded that, because of the
guidelines contained in § V(B)(1), namely, "'flooding,
collection of ground water, bad drainage, adverse earth or
rock formation or topography, or any feature likely to be
harmful to the health, safety, or welfare of the future
residents of the subdivision,'" the regulations "provid[ed]
ample notice to landowners of those conditions that [would] be
evaluated by the [Plan] Commission."  624 N.E.2d at 530.
20
arbitrary discretion that might have inhered in § IV(B) was
cured by the guidelines in § V(B)(1).2
Section § 5.2.2 is similar to § V(B)(1) of the Ordinance
at issue in Burrell: it vests in the Commission the authority
to "find" that development on land in certain flood-prone
areas could "reasonably be harmful to the safety, health, and
general welfare of the present or future inhabitants of the
subdivision and/or its surrounding areas."  (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that the bay lots are in a "flood-prone"
area, as that term is defined by Ala. Code 1975, § 11-19-1(3)
("Any area with a frequency of inundation of once in 100 years
as defined by qualified hydrologists or engineers using
methods that are generally accepted by persons engaged in the
field of hydrology and engineering."). The Commission contends
that legislature has granted it "broad authority to regulate
development in unincorporated flood-prone areas of Baldwin
1091042
21
County" and that "[d]iscretion is a necessary component [of
such authority] due to the multitude of factors that affect
whether developing in a [flood-prone area] would create an
unacceptable risk."  The Commission's brief, at 18.
Indeed, the purpose and intent of the Alabama legislature
in enacting Title 11, Chapter 19, of the Code of Alabama 1975,
entitled "Comprehensive Land-use Management in Flood-prone
Areas" (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is clearly set
forth:
§ 11-19-2, Ala. Code 1975: "It is the declared
purpose of this chapter to provide in each county of
this state a comprehensive land-use management plan
by:
"(1) Constricting the development of
land which is exposed to flood damage in
the flood-prone areas;
"(2) 
Guiding 
the 
development 
of
proposed construction away from locations
which are threatened by flood hazards;
"(3) Assisting in reducing damage
caused by floods; and 
"(4) Otherwise improving the long-
range management and use of flood-prone
areas."
_______________ 
§ 
11-19-3, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975: 
"The 
county
commission in each county of this state is hereby
authorized and may adopt zoning ordinances and
1091042
22
building codes for flood-prone areas which lie
outside the corporate limits of any municipality in
the county.
"Each such county commission shall have broad
authority to:
"(1) 
Establish 
or 
cause 
to 
be
established 
comprehensive 
land-use 
and
control measures which shall specifically
include the control and development of
subdivisions in flood-prone areas; 
"....
"(6) Employ such technical and/or
advisory 
personnel, 
including 
the
establishment 
of 
a 
county 
planning
commission, as is deemed necessary or
expedient; and
"(7) 
Adopt 
ordinances 
for 
the
enforcement of all such regulations."
_______________
§ 11-19-4, Ala. Code 1975: "Land-use and control
measures shall provide land-use restrictions based
on probable exposure to flooding. Measures specified
in this section shall:
"(1) 
Prohibit 
inappropriate 
new
construction 
or 
substantial 
improvements 
in
the flood-prone areas;
"... [and] 
"(6) 
Prescribe 
such 
additional
standards as may be necessary to comply
with federal requirements for making flood
insurance coverage under the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968 available in this
state."
1091042
23
_______________
§ 11-19-5, Ala. Code 1975: "In addition to land-
use restrictions commensurate with the degree of the
flood hazards in various parts of the area, there
shall be such subdivision regulations as may be
necessary:
"(1) To prevent the inappropriate
development of flood-prone lands;
"(2) To encourage the appropriate
location and elevation of streets, sewers
and water systems and the reservation of
adequate and convenient open space for
utilities; [and] 
"(3) To provide for adequate drainage
so as to minimize exposure to flood and
hazards and to prevent the aggravation of
flood hazards ...."
(Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the "all or nothing" approach espoused by
Montrose, the legislature specifically authorized planning
commissions to "[p]rohibit inappropriate ... construction ...
in the flood-prone areas" (§ 11-19-4), through implementation
of the "land-use and control measures" established under the
"broad authority" conferred on county commissions (§ 11-19-3).
In other words, although some development in flood-prone areas
may be permitted as appropriate, development in such areas
shall be denied where it is deemed by the relevant planning
1091042
24
authority to be "inappropriate."  That is precisely the
scenario contemplated by §§ 1.2.2, 5.1, and 5.2.2.   
As we explained previously in this opinion, "'"some
situations require the placing of some discretion in
[enforcement] officials, as in cases where it is ...
impracticable to lay down a definite or comprehensive rule for
guidance, 
or 
where 
the 
discretion 
relates 
to 
the
administration of a police regulation and is essential to the
... health, safety, welfare, etc."'"  Ex parte City of Orange
Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 833 So. 2d at 54 (quoting Walls, 253
Ala. at 485, 45 So. 2d at 471).  The Commission contends, and
we agree, that it would be impracticable, if not impossible,
for the Baldwin County Commission to promulgate regulations
that could address "the multitude of variables [involved] in
determining whether development in a flood zone presents an
unreasonable risk to public health and safety."  The
Commission's brief, at 21.  Such an approach was not mandated
by the legislature or attempted by the Baldwin County
Commission.
Instead, §§ 1.2.2, 5.1, and 5.2.2 direct the "Commission
to make a factual determination [as to] whether specific
1091042
25
conditions 
exist 
that 
render 
property 
unsuitable 
for
subdivision."  624 N.E.2d at 532.  This determination is
circumscribed further by the requirement that prohibited
development be such as could "reasonably be harmful to the
safety, health, and general welfare of the present or future
inhabitants of the subdivision."  § 5.2.2 (emphasis added).
In other words, the regulation -- written as it is in the
conjunctive -- inextricably links considerations of "general
welfare" to the more objectively reviewable concepts of safety
and health.  Thus, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that §§ 1.2.2, 5.1, and 5.2.2. vest in the Commission the type
of arbitrary discretion to deny Montrose's preliminary plat
that is prohibited under Alabama law.
Neither do those sections deprive Montrose of notice as
to "what is required in order to lawfully subdivide [its] real
property."  See Montrose's brief, at 43.  The Act authorizes
the Baldwin County Commission to address the "great financial
and economic loss [and] human suffering, caused by floods and
flooding" through regulatory action designed to "guide" and
"constrict" development of land-use and development in the
unincorporated, flood-prone areas of the county. § 11-19-2.
1091042
26
Section 11-19-1(2) of Act defines "flood or flooding" as
"[t]he general and temporary condition of partial or complete
inundation of normally dry land areas[] ... a.[f]rom the
overflow of streams, rivers, and other inland waters, or b.
[f]rom tidal surges, abnormally high tidal waters, tidal
waves, or rising coastal waters resulting from tsunamis,
hurricanes, or other severe storms."  (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, § 3.2 of the regulations defines "flood or
flooding" as "[a] general and temporary condition of partial
or complete inundation of normally dry land areas from[] (a)
the overflow of inland or tidal waters; [or] (b) the unusual
and rapid accumulation of runoff of surface waters from any
source."  (Emphasis added.)  
Both the Act and the regulations thus specifically
address the overflow of "tidal waters," which commonly
accompanies 
the 
landfall 
of 
tropical 
cyclones. 
The
susceptibility of the bay lots to flooding from tidal waters
was well known to residents of the locality and was a matter
of considerable discussion at the Commission's meeting on
Montrose's development plan.  In connection with the overflow
1091042
27
of tidal waters, the bay lots were -- as indicated by FEMA's
VE classification -- subject to wind-driven waves.  
Montrose attempts to make much of Smith's statements that
the 
plat 
satisfied 
the 
"black 
and 
white 
technical
requirements" for submission to the Commission.  However,
Smith also stated at the meeting -- and correctly so -- that
ultimate decisions as to suitability based on § 5.2.2. were
reserved for the Commission, not a county engineer.  See,
e.g., Reg. § 4.1 ("no subdivision plat of land ... shall be
filed or recorded ... until the plat shall have been submitted
to and approved by the County Planning Commission").  
Indeed, Smith stated without contradiction in the trial
court that he had always had misgivings about the structural
integrity of the proposed elevated roadway that was to serve
the subdivision because of the composition of the non-native
fill material Montrose proposed to use to elevate the roadbed.
Specifically, he explained that such material would likely not
withstand the wind-driven waves that the area was known to
experience. With the roadway thus washed out, the residents'
only means of escape from rising tidal surge would be lost. 
1091042
28
This concern was expressed by at least one of the zoning-
board commissioners at the meeting.  Even before the meeting,
the County's concern over the structural integrity of the
roadway as platted had prompted the County to decline to
accept responsibility for its maintenance.  This declination
was known to Montrose before it submitted its preliminary
plat.  In the trial court, Montrose's engineer expressed the
view that tidal surge would not pose a danger to subdivision
residents, because, he "assume[d]," the residents would
evacuate.  This Court, however, takes judicial notice of the
fact that residents in the paths of tropical cyclones often
fail to heed evacuation orders in a timely manner.
Under the circumstances here presented, Montrose could
reasonably have known that "exceptional and unique conditions
of topography," § 5.1, would render the bay lots "unsuitable
for subdivision ... due to flooding," absent the formulation
of "adequate methods ... to solve the problems,"  § 5.2.2,
associated with an uncertain exit route.  It could reasonably
have anticipated that, "because of [the] exceptional and
unique topography" of the bay lots, "minimum standards
specified [in the regulations] would not reasonably," § 5.1,
1091042
Because we review these land-use regulations for
3
vagueness only as applied to Montrose, and because this case
is primarily about the possible flooding from tidal surge,
Montrose 
may 
not 
challenge 
non-flood 
aspects 
of 
the
regulations, definitions of flooding in general, or flooding
from hypothetical potential sources. 
We also note that "[i]f one of the [Commission's] reasons
4
for rejecting the plat is adequate, whether the other reasons
are valid is irrelevant."  Busse v. City of Madison, 177 Wis.
2d 808, 813, 503 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Wis.Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis
added).  See also Wolff v. Mooresville Plan Comm'n, 754 N.E.2d
589, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("The Commission's decision will
be sustained if it was correct on any grounds stated for
disapproval of the [plat]."). 
29
assure that the residents of the proposed subdivision would
not be stranded in the path of a hurricane or other tropical
cyclone.
Indeed, Montrose has always known that one of the
Commission's main concerns about its proposed subdivision
centered on the danger to the bay lots of flooding, in
particular that species of flooding known as tidal surge.
There was no confusion at the meeting that tidal surge was at
issue.  Thus, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
§§ 1.2.2, 5.1, and 5.2.2., construed together, do not apprise
Montrose  of notice as to "what is required in order to
3
lawfully subdivide [its] real property."4
1091042
30
Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 305 (Ala. 1979), on
which the lower courts relied, is clearly distinguishable and
does not counsel a different result.  Indeed, that case did
not directly involve the issue, here presented, regarding the
deference to be exercised in reviewing subdivision regulations
for vagueness.  There, the Mobile City Planning Commission
("the Planning Commission") denied an application for a
proposed subdivision on the ground "that 'the lots would be
out of character with the other lots in the area.'" 374 So. 2d
at 306.  As support for its denial, the Planning Commission
cited "Section V(D)(1) of the Planning Commission Subdivision
Regulations," which stated: "'The size, width, depth, shape
and orientation of lots and the minimum building setback lines
shall be appropriate to the location of the subdivision and
the type of development and use contemplated.  Every lot shall
contain a suitable building site.'"  374 So. 2d at 307.  The
Planning 
Commission, 
however, 
was 
ignoring 
more 
particularized
sections of its subdivision regulations, which set forth
"specific criteria regarding minimum lot size, maximum depth,
position of lots in relation to streets, etc."  374 So. 2d at
309.
1091042
31
After a general discussion of the well recognized need
for specificity in land-use regulations, this Court declined
the Planning Commission's invitation to ignore the more
specific sections of the regulations, stating:
"To construe the provisions of Section V(D)(1),
as appellees urge, as being synonymous with 'out of
character with other lots in the area' would be to
ignore the specific criteria which follow it and
vest a discretion in the Planning Commission which
is unguided by uniform standards, and capable of
arbitrary application. ...
"The Planning Commission's 
denial 
of 
approval 
of
[the subdivision] on the grounds that it was 'out of
character with other lots in the area' was unrelated
to its conformance with the Planning Commission's
own regulations and exceeded its statutory grant of
power."
374 So. 2d at 309.  
This case is actually the converse of Smith.  While the
Planning Commission in Smith sought to ignore specific
regulatory provisions that would circumscribe its discretion,
the Commission in this case embraces such limiting provisions,
namely, the particularized type of flood hazard involved, as
defined in § 11-19-1(2)(b), Ala. Code 1975, and Reg. § 3.2;
with the further limitation that the hazard "reasonably be
harmful to the safety, health, and general welfare of the
present or future inhabitants of the subdivision."  Section
1091042
32
5.2.2.  Although the reason for disapproval involved in Smith
bore no relationship to "safety" or "health," the Commission's
position is that any development of the bay lots must
incorporate a reliable means of ingress and egress from the
property in the event of a tropical cyclone.  For these
reasons, we hold that Montrose was not entitled to a writ of
mandamus compelling the Commission to approve its preliminary
plat.
B. Damages Pursuant to Lamar Advertising
This holding obviates the need to address the issues
whether Montrose is entitled to damages and whether Lamar
Advertising, on which the plurality opinion of the Court of
Civil Appeals based its remand for a determination as to
damages, should be overruled.
III. Conclusion
The manner in which the plurality opinion of the Court of
Civil Appeals reviewed §§ 1.2.2., 5.1, and 5.2.2. conflicts
with the "highly deferential standard" required by Alabama
caselaw. Consequently, the judgment of that court is reversed,
and the cause is remanded to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1091042
33
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Smith, Parker, Murdock, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., concurs in the result.