Case Title: Hurst v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-1947 
____________ 
 
TIMOTHY LEE HURST,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 1, 2014] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Timothy Lee Hurst appeals his sentence of death that was imposed for the 
1998 first-degree murder of Cynthia Harrison.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm his sentence.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hurst was convicted for the May 2, 1998, first-degree murder of Cynthia 
Harrison in a robbery at the Popeye’s restaurant where Hurst was employed in 
Escambia County, Florida.  The victim, also an employee, had been bound and 
gagged and repeatedly cut and stabbed with a weapon consistent with a box cutter 
found at the scene.  Hurst’s conviction and death sentence were originally affirmed 
 
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in Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2002).  In that decision, we set forth the 
facts surrounding the murder as follows: 
On the morning of May 2, 1998, a murder and robbery occurred at a 
Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in Escambia County, Florida, 
where Hurst was employed.  Hurst and the victim, assistant manager 
Cynthia Lee Harrison, were scheduled to work at 8 a.m. on the day of 
the murder.  A worker at a nearby restaurant, Carl Hess, testified that 
he saw Harrison arriving at work between 7 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. 
Afterwards, Hess said that he saw a man, who was about six feet tall 
and weighed between 280 and 300 pounds, arrive at Popeye’s and 
bang on the glass windows until he was let inside.  The man was 
dressed in a Popeye’s uniform and Hess recognized him as someone 
he had seen working at Popeye’s.  Shortly after the crime, Hess picked 
Hurst from a photographic lineup as the man he had seen banging on 
the windows.  Hess was also able to identify Hurst at trial. 
On the morning of the murder, a Popeye’s delivery truck was 
making the rounds at Popeye’s restaurants in the area.  Janet Pugh, 
who worked at another Popeye’s, testified she telephoned Harrison at 
7:55 a.m. to tell her that the delivery truck had just left and Harrison 
should expect the truck soon.  Pugh spoke to the victim for four to 
five minutes and did not detect that there was anything wrong or hear 
anyone in the background.  Pugh was certain of the time because she 
looked at the clock while on the phone. 
Popeye’s was scheduled to open at 10:30 a.m. but Harrison and 
Hurst were the only employees scheduled to work at 8 a.m.  However, 
at some point before opening, two other Popeye’s employees arrived, 
in addition to the driver of the supply truck.  None of them saw Hurst 
or his car.  At 10:30 a.m., another Popeye’s assistant manager, Tonya 
Crenshaw, arrived and found the two Popeye’s employees and the 
truck driver waiting outside the locked restaurant. 
When Crenshaw unlocked the door, and she and the delivery 
driver entered, they discovered that the safe was unlocked and open, 
and the previous day’s receipts, as well as $375 in small bills and 
change, were missing.  The driver discovered the victim’s dead body 
inside the freezer.  The victim had her hands bound behind her back 
with black electrical tape and she also had tape over her mouth.  
Similar tape was later found in the trunk of Hurst’s car.  The scene 
was covered with a significant amount of the victim’s blood, and it 
 
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was apparent from water on the floor that someone had attempted to 
clean up the area. 
The victim suffered a minimum of sixty incised slash and stab 
wounds, including severe wounds to the face, neck, back, torso, and 
arms.  The victim also had blood stains on the knees of her pants, 
indicating that she had been kneeling in her blood.  A forensic 
pathologist, Dr. Michael Berkland, testified that some of the wounds 
cut through the tissue into the underlying bone, and while several 
wounds had the potential to be fatal, the victim probably would not 
have survived more than fifteen minutes after the wounds were 
inflicted.  Dr. Berkland also testified that the victim’s wounds were 
consistent with the use of a box cutter.  A box cutter was found on a 
baker’s rack close to the victim’s body.  Later testing showed that the 
box cutter had the victim’s blood on it.  It was not the type of box 
cutter that was used at Popeye’s, but was similar to a box cutter that 
Hurst had been seen with several days before the crime. 
Hurst’s friend, Michael Williams, testified that Hurst admitted 
to him that he had killed Harrison.  Hurst told him that he had an 
argument with the victim, she “retaliated,” and that Hurst hit the 
victim and cut her with a box cutter.  Hurst said he had killed the 
victim because, “he didn’t want the woman to see his face.” Williams 
stated that Hurst had talked about robbing Popeye’s on previous 
occasions. 
Another of Hurst’s friends, “Lee-Lee” Smith, testified that the 
night before the murder, Hurst said he was going to rob Popeye’s.  On 
the morning of the murder, Hurst came to Smith’s house with a plastic 
container full of money from the Popeye’s safe.  Hurst instructed 
Smith to keep the money for him.  Hurst said he had killed the victim 
and put her in the freezer.  Smith washed Hurst’s pants, which had 
blood on them, and threw away Hurst’s socks and shoes.  Later that 
morning, Smith and Hurst went to Wal-Mart to purchase a new pair of 
shoes.  They also went to a pawn shop where Hurst saw some rings he 
liked, and after returning to Smith’s house for the stolen money, Hurst 
returned to the shop and purchased the three rings for $300.  An 
employee at the shop, Bob Little, testified that on the day of the 
murder, a man fitting Hurst’s description purchased three rings.  Little 
picked Hurst out of a photographic lineup as the man who had 
purchased the rings.  The police recovered the three rings from Hurst. 
Smith’s parents were out of town the weekend of the murder 
but upon their return, and after discovering the container with the 
 
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money from Popeye’s in Smith’s room, Smith’s mother contacted the 
police and turned the container over to them.  The police interviewed 
Smith and searched a garbage can in Smith’s yard where they found a 
coin purse that contained the victim’s driver’s license and other 
property, a bank bag marked with “Popeye’s” and the victim’s name, 
a bank deposit slip, a sock with blood stains on it, and a sheet of 
notebook paper marked “Lee Smith, language lab.”  On the back of 
the notebook paper someone had added several numbers, and one 
number was the same as the amount on the deposit slip.  Smith’s 
father also gave the police a pair of size fourteen shoes that appeared 
to have blood stains on them and that he had retrieved from the same 
trash can. 
Jack Remus, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE) crime lab analyst, testified that the shoes were tested with 
phenolpthalein to detect blood, and while the test results exhibited 
some of the chemical indications associated with blood, attempts at 
DNA testing were not successful.  Remus also tested the blood-
stained sock and determined that the DNA typing was consistent with 
the victim.  Hurst’s pants were also tested, but no blood evidence was 
detected.  FDLE fingerprint expert Paul Norkus testified that the 
deposit slip in the garbage can had three of Hurst’s fingerprints on it. 
At trial, the State played the tape of an interview the police had 
conducted with Hurst shortly after the murder.  Hurst said that on the 
morning of the murder he was on his way to work and his car broke 
down.  He said that he telephoned Harrison at Popeye’s to say he was 
unable to come to work, and when he talked to her, she sounded 
scared and he heard whispering in the background.  Hurst then went to 
Smith’s house and changed out of his work clothes.  Hurst said he 
went to the pawn shop and bought necklaces for friends, but he did 
not mention purchasing the three rings or buying a new pair of shoes 
at Wal-Mart. 
At the close of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury deliberated 
for approximately six hours before finding Hurst guilty of first-degree 
murder.  
 
Hurst, 819 So. 2d at 692-94 (footnotes omitted). 
 
 
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Hurst filed his initial, amended postconviction proceeding in circuit court.1
                                          
 
 
1.  The claims raised in the initial postconviction motion were: (1) the State 
withheld material and exculpatory evidence and/or presented misleading and false 
testimony, i.e., false testimony of inmate witness Anthony Williams that defendant 
confessed, in exchange for promises of leniency for Williams; suppression of 
testimony of David Kladitis that three or four black males were in the Popeye’s 
parking lot at 7:00 a.m.; false testimony and argument about defendant failing to 
mention his trip to Wal-Mart; withholding the fact that the State planned to indict 
witness Lee (“Lee-Lee”) Smith; and cumulative effect of these errors; (2) newly 
discovered evidence concerning Anthony Williams that his testimony of Hurst’s 
confession was fabricated, newly discovered evidence that jail witness Willie 
Griffin (Anthony’s cousin) testified falsely against defendant, and newly 
discovered evidence from inmate Edison Sartes that Griffin’s testimony was false; 
new information that primary witness Lee-Lee Smith was going to be and was 
charged in the case, when at the time of trial he had not been charged; false 
testimony of witness Carl Hess, who identified defendant based on a false claim of 
a prior job interview of defendant; and inappropriate conversation at trial between 
Hess and Kladitis; (3) defense counsel was ineffective in that he failed to 
adequately investigate and/or present exculpatory and impeachment evidence of 
potential witness Andrew Salter who was at the crime scene and who would have 
said he did not see defendant or his car there; failing to secure the testimony of 
inmate Brett Pleasant regarding his conversations with witness Anthony Williams; 
failing to object to inadmissible testimony and evidence of defendant’s lack of 
remorse; failing to move for mistrial after an emotional display by the victim’s 
family; failing to object or move for mistrial concerning evidence of physical 
abnormality of the victim given to create sympathy; and cumulative effect of these 
errors; (4) counsel failed to adequately investigate and present mitigation in the 
penalty phase about defendant’s childhood, lack of parental support, poverty, 
physical and mental abuse, drug and alcohol abuse; and counsel’s failure to seek a 
psychiatric evaluation and to present mental mitigation including evidence of 
neurological and mental deficits and brain damage; (5) defendant may not be 
executed because he is mentally retarded under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002); (6) Florida’s capital sentencing statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002); (7) cumulative error unconstitutionally deprived defendant of a fair trial, 
  
On appeal from denial of postconviction relief, we affirmed on all but one of his 
 
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postconviction claims.  See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009).  Although we 
concluded that the State should have disclosed certain field notes by investigator 
Donald Nesmith, and that the trial court’s refusal to perpetuate the testimony of 
Willie Griffin was an abuse of discretion, we concluded no prejudice accrued from 
those errors.  Id. at 1015.  However, we reversed the denial of relief on Hurst’s 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in investigation and presentation of 
mitigation in the penalty phase, and remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding.  
Id. at 1008.  In granting a new penalty phase, we explained that there was no sound 
basis for Hurst’s defense counsel to have failed to investigate and present evidence 
of Hurst’s borderline intelligence, possible organic brain damage, the fact that he 
was in special education classes as a child, and other mitigation for which there 
appeared to be no apparent disadvantage in presentation.  See id. at 1013-15. 
 Prior to the new sentencing trial, the trial court denied Hurst’s successive 
motion for an evidentiary hearing on mental retardation.2
                                                                                                                                        
requiring a new trial.  Not all the claims raised in the postconviction motions were 
appealed.  
 
2.  The 2013 Legislature amended all Florida statutes that refer to “mental 
retardation,” “retardation,” and “mentally retarded” to now refer to “intellectual 
disability” or “intellectually disabled.”  See ch. 2013-162, Laws of Fla.; see, e.g., 
section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2013), titled “Imposition of the death sentence 
upon an intellectually disabled defendant prohibited.”  Because the prior statute 
was in effect when Hurst raised the issue in the trial court, we continue to use the 
terms “mental retardation” and “mentally retarded” in this opinion. 
  In addition, the court 
 
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denied Hurst’s request to present mental retardation to the penalty phase jury as an 
absolute bar to recommendation of a death sentence, although the court allowed 
him to present mental retardation and other mental issues as mitigation to the jury.  
After the new penalty phase evidence was presented, in which the State presented 
an abbreviated version of the trial testimony as to the circumstances of the murder, 
and after the defense presented testimony concerning mitigation, the jury returned 
a recommendation of death by a seven-to-five vote.   
 Before sentencing, the trial court held a Spencer3
                                          
 
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 hearing at which defense 
counsel presented further argument that the evidence at the penalty phase 
established that Hurst was mentally retarded.  The trial court subsequently entered 
a sentencing order sentencing Hurst to death.  In doing so, the court found as 
aggravating factors that (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 
see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was assigned great weight; and (2) the 
murder was committed while Hurst was engaged in commission of a robbery, see 
§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was assigned great weight.  In mitigation, 
the trial court found the following two statutory mitigators: (1) no significant 
history of prior criminal activity, see § 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was 
assigned moderate weight; and (2) Hurst’s age of 19 and his young mental age, see 
§ 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was assigned moderate weight.  The trial 
 
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court found as additional mitigation under section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes 
(2012), that Hurst had significant mental issues—limited mental and intellectual 
capacity with widespread abnormalities in his brain affecting impulse control and 
judgment consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome, which was assigned moderate 
weight—although the court expressly found that Hurst is not mentally retarded.  
The trial court rejected as unproven proffered mitigating factors that the defendant 
was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance; the defendant was an 
accomplice with relatively minor participation; the defendant acted under extreme 
duress or substantial domination of another; or the defendant lacked the capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.  See §§ 921.141(6)(b), (d), (e), & (f), Fla. Stat. (2012).  
Hurst took a timely appeal from the sentence of death raising the following 
issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to give him a separate 
evidentiary hearing on his successive mental retardation claim, in refusing to allow 
the jury to determine mental retardation as a bar to execution, and in finding after 
trial that he is not mentally retarded and exempt from execution; (2) whether this 
Court should recede from precedent holding that the jury need not expressly find 
specific aggravators or issue a unanimous advisory verdict on the sentence; and 
(3) whether his death sentence is proportionate.  We turn to Hurst’s first issue on 
appeal. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
A.  Mental Retardation Issues 
 
The United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002), that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids 
execution of mentally retarded defendants.  However, the Supreme Court left it to 
the states to determine the manner in which this constitutional restriction on 
execution of its sentences will be enforced.  Id. at 317.  Florida law sets forth a 
three-pronged test to determine mental retardation as a bar to the death penalty.  In 
order to prove mental retardation as a bar to execution, the defendant must prove 
all three of the following factors: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, which has been interpreted to be a full scale IQ of 70 or below on a 
standardized intelligence test; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) 
manifestation of the condition before age eighteen.  See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 2 So. 
3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2012).  The burden is on the 
defendant raising a claim of mental retardation as a bar to execution to prove 
mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.  See Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 145; 
§ 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2012). 
Hurst contends that the trial court erred in denying a successive mental 
retardation hearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203.  He 
contends that he is mentally retarded and exempt from execution based on a recent 
 
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Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV) test that indicated 
his full scale IQ is 69, and based on expert testimony that he suffered from 
adaptive deficits—all before age eighteen—such that he met the statutory 
requirements for mental retardation.  Hurst was previously provided a full 
evidentiary hearing on the question of mental retardation in his initial 
postconviction proceeding.  At that evidentiary hearing, Hurst presented the expert 
testimony of Dr. Valerie McClain, a licensed clinical psychologist, who 
administered a number of tests to Hurst, including the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI).  That test placed Hurst in the borderline range with a full 
scale IQ score of 70.  As to deficits in adaptive functioning, Dr. McClain testified 
that in her opinion Hurst did not meet the adaptive functioning deficit threshold for 
mental retardation, and she did not determine that Hurst is mentally retarded.  At 
that same evidentiary hearing, the State presented clinical psychologist Dr. James 
D. Larsen.  After testing Hurst with the WAIS-III test, Dr. Larsen concluded that 
Hurst’s full scale IQ was 78.  Dr. Larsen also found no deficits in adaptive 
functioning necessary for a diagnosis of mental retardation.  The circuit court in 
that initial postconviction proceeding denied the mental retardation claim, relying 
primarily on the testimony of Dr. McClain and Dr. Larsen that Hurst’s adaptive 
behavior was not substantially impaired; however, no appeal was taken of that 
ruling when it was denied in 2007.  See Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1008 n.9.   
 
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In this case, Hurst contends that the trial court should have held a second 
Atkins mental retardation hearing prior to the new sentencing trial.  The trial court 
denied the request for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on several grounds, one of 
which was that the motion was untimely under the requirements of rule 3.203.  We 
conclude that denial of the request for a second Atkins hearing was not an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances present in this case.  See, e.g., Arbelaez v. 
State, 898 So. 2d 25, 42-43 (Fla. 2005) (reviewing a trial court’s decision not to 
allow supplemental Ring and Atkins claims on remand under an abuse of 
discretion standard).  Moreover, any error in denying the pretrial evidentiary 
hearing on mental retardation was harmless because Hurst was allowed to present 
all his mental retardation evidence at the penalty phase, after which the trial court 
ruled that he failed to establish that he is mentally retarded.  The background and 
mental mitigation evidence presented by Hurst at the penalty phase is discussed 
next. 
Hurt’s sister, Sequester “Tina” Hurst; brother, Jermaine Bradley; mother, 
Bertha Bradley; father, Timothy Bradley; Bible study teacher, Isaac Sheppard; 
administrator at Hurst’s high school, Calvin Harris; and former United States 
Army Major and principal of East Charter School, Jerome Chism, all testified 
concerning Hurst’s family and background.  Hurst’s mother was age fifteen when 
Hurst was born and, during pregnancy, she drank all day, every day.  As a child, 
 
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Hurst stuttered and developed very slowly.  As a toddler, he was slow to learn to 
walk.  He was disciplined harshly when he was growing up and was punished more 
than the other children because he could not do things correctly.   
Hurst was a fun-loving child and teenager with a good personality.  He liked 
to play jokes and was mild tempered, but was slow mentally and did very poorly in 
school.  In Bible study classes as a child, Hurst was unable to progress out of the 
most basic children’s Bible study book and could not look up the Bible verses that 
went with the stories.  He was embarrassed because he had difficulty reading.  
Hurst should have been in special education classes because he was low 
functioning and could not understand what was going on in class; and for that 
reason, he would skip class and play basketball in the gym.  Even though his 
school wanted to place Hurst in a special education program, his mother objected 
because she was afraid he would be picked on.  He did go to East Charter School, 
which taught low achievers and children with behavioral problems, and while 
there, was teased about his large size and his slowness.  His maturity level 
remained very low and even at age eighteen, he exhibited the maturity of a middle-
school student.  Hurst could not obtain a GED, but did have a driver’s license and 
obtained a car with his father’s help, although he was a poor driver. 
Family members testified that Hurst had to be reminded to take care of 
himself; and he allowed his mother and sister to wash his clothes, and allowed his 
 
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mother to cook for him.  He had poor hygiene and had to be reminded to bathe and 
dress appropriately.  He had to be reminded to keep appointments and be 
awakened for work.  Hurst did not have a checking account and would likely have 
had difficulty making change if he was working a cash register.  However, Hurst 
was employed at Popeye’s and did food “prep work.”   
 
Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist, professor of psychiatry, and clinical director 
of the University of California at Irvine College of Medicine Brain Imaging 
Center, testified as an expert on the use of positron emission tomography (PET) in 
regard to neurological and psychiatric disorders.  He was present when a PET scan 
was performed on Hurst and later interpreted the results of that PET scan.  Dr. Wu 
testified that the scan showed a decreased cortical cerebellum metabolic rate, 
which indicated widespread damage to the cortical region of Hurst’s brain.  He 
opined that Hurst has widespread abnormalities in multiple areas of his brain, 
which abnormalities are associated with lack of judgment, risk taking, impulsivity, 
and immaturity.  Dr. Wu was aware that it was reported Hurst suffered from fetal 
alcohol syndrome, which, along with other trauma, can cause the types of problems 
seen in Hurst’s PET scan, although he could not say from the PET scan what 
caused the abnormalities in Hurst’s brain.    
 
Dr. Harry Krop, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified that he 
administered the WAIS-IV test, as well as a test of memory malingering (TOMM), 
 
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to Hurst in January and February 2012.  The testing resulted in a full scale IQ of 
69, which is in the range of mental retardation.  Dr. Krop reviewed details of the 
murder, Hurst’s regular school records, the charter school records, Florida 
Department of Corrections records, tests and reports of other testing performed on 
Hurst, and Dr. Wu’s PET scan report.  He also spoke to various family members 
for the purpose of evaluating Hurst’s adaptive functioning as measured by 
completion of the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (ABAS).  He did not 
listen to the recorded statement Hurst gave to police.  After reviewing the 
questionnaire for the ABAS, which was completed by Hurst and three family 
members, Dr. Krop concluded that Hurst is significantly deficient in all areas of 
adaptive functioning.  Dr. Krop was aware of earlier testing in which Hurst scored 
in the 78 IQ range on a different WAIS test, which Dr. Krop opined was not as 
accurate as the newer WAIS-IV, and his final opinion was that Hurst is mentally 
retarded.   
Dr. Gordon Taub, psychologist and associate professor at the University of 
Central Florida specializing in measurement of intelligence, structure of 
intelligence, intelligence theory, and evaluation of intelligence tests, testified that 
he has written articles about the Wechsler Scale of Intelligence tests.  He testified 
that the WAIS-IV, which was revised in 2008, now measures four areas of 
intelligence, made changes in the subtests, and added some completely new tests.  
 
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Dr. Taub was aware that Hurst received a full scale IQ score of 78 on the earlier 
WAIS-III test in 2004, which he said tested for only two main factors.  He agreed 
that on the WAIS-IV test, which was given by Dr. Krop and which tests for four 
main factors, Hurst received a full scale score of 69.  Dr. Taub opined that scores 
on the current WAIS-IV and earlier Wechsler tests cannot properly be compared 
because of the changes to the newer test and because the WAIS-IV is a much better 
test.  However, Dr. Taub agreed that the WAIS-III is a “valid score of intelligence 
and there’s no reason not to use that score if you attained it at the time that it was 
the test to use to measure intelligence.”     
Dr. Taub testified that other testing done on Hurst when he was under the 
age of eighteen and still in school showed depressed scores.  As to Hurst’s adaptive 
functioning, Dr. Taub testified that the information gathered by Dr. Krop showed 
Hurst was impaired in functioning in the real world in areas of self-care and in 
communication.  Dr. Taub administered the Woodcock Johnson Test of 
Achievement, Third Edition, to Hurst, which tests areas in reading, writing, math, 
and spelling.  He opined that Hurst’s limited proficiency shown on the 
achievement test is consistent with his school records showing low performance.  
He concluded based on the WAIS-IV test and on information concerning Hurst’s 
adaptive functioning, school records, and achievement testing, that Hurst meets the 
legal criteria for mental retardation in Florida.    
 
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The State presented the testimony of Dr. Harry McClaren, forensic 
psychologist, who testified that he reviewed court documents, the testimony of 
Hurst’s family members, the testimony of Drs. McClain and Larson at the prior 
evidentiary hearing, mental health records from the Department of Corrections, 
educational records and school test results, information about the crime, Hurst’s 
statement to police, and the testimony of Drs. Taub and Krop.  Dr. McClaren also 
reviewed a WAIS-III test given to Hurst by a Dr. Riebsame in 2003 and the WASI 
(Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence) given by Dr. McClain in 2004.  He 
testified that it would be a mistake to ignore Hurst’s past testing with the WAIS-III 
resulting in full scale IQ scores of 76 and 78 because that test was the state of the 
art instrument at the time.  Dr. McClaren also testified that there was no adaptive 
behavior testing done when Hurst was young, and now the reports of his deficits 
are anecdotal.  He opined that Hurst does not meet the criteria for mental 
retardation.   
The trial court relied primarily on the testimony of Dr. McClaren and on 
evidence of Hurst’s actions in and around the time of the crime in determining that 
Hurst did not meet the test for mental retardation as a bar to the death penalty.  In 
addition to testimony of members of law enforcement who investigated the crime 
and recovered evidence from Lee-Lee Smith’s house, the State presented Hurst’s 
statement given to detectives at the time.  After Hurst signed a waiver of his rights 
 
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and agreed he was speaking voluntarily with the detectives, he gave a narrative of 
what he said he did that morning in which he described going to a friend’s house to 
unsuccessfully try to use the telephone because, he said, his car broke down.  He 
gave street directions to that friend’s house.  Hurst said he then went to the E-Z 
Serve to use the pay telephone to call Popeye’s and tell Cynthia Harrison he would 
not be able to come into work.  He said that she spoke “in a scary voice” with a 
“scary tone,” and he could hear some whispering in the background.  He recited 
the telephone number that he called to talk with her.  Hurst also related to 
detectives that he went to Lee-Lee Smith’s house that morning, and then to his own 
house where his brother Jermaine asked Hurst to take him to a pawn shop.  Hurst 
described putting something in his car to clean out the gas tank and then driving to 
the pawn shop with Jermaine, Lee-Lee, and another young man.  Hurst said in his 
statement that he bought his brother two necklaces at the pawn shop with his 
brother’s money.  Hurst told detectives that after leaving Lee-Lee Smith’s house 
and before going to the pawn shop, he changed his shirt and shoes but not his work 
pants.  Timothy Bradley, Hurst’s biological father, testified that on the morning of 
May 2, 1998, at around 7:45 a.m., he saw Hurst putting the battery back into his 
car after the battery had been on the charger all night.  At that time, Hurst was 
wearing his Popeye’s uniform.   
 
 
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The trial court concluded in the sentencing order that Hurst was able to 
maintain a job and had acquired a driver’s license.  The court noted that Hurst’s 
statement to police and his efforts to conceal his involvement in the crime were 
particularly persuasive in determining that Hurst did not suffer significant deficits 
in adaptive functioning.  The court stated, “The statement, given shortly after the 
crime, reveals an individual clearly recounting a morning’s events, giving 
directions, recalling telephone numbers, and deliberately omitting certain 
information tending to incriminate him.  Similarly, the evidence offered at trial 
suggests that Defendant took numerous steps to conceal his involvement in the 
crime by attempting to clean the murder scene, having his clothes washed, hiding 
the money in another location, discarding Ms. Harrison’s belongings and his shoes, 
and buying new shoes.”  We also note that evidence that Hurst was a nineteen-
year-old who still lived at home and allowed his mother and sister to cook for him 
and do his laundry does not establish that he is unable to care for himself.  Because 
the trial court had before it competent, substantial evidence to support its 
conclusion that Hurst is not mentally retarded under the three-prong test set forth in 
Florida law, we find no error in this ruling.    
Although Hurst was allowed to present all his mental retardation and other 
mental mitigation to the jury, he also contends that the trial court erred in refusing 
to submit the question of mental retardation as a bar to the death penalty to the jury 
 
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for its determination.  This claim lacks merit.  We have repeatedly held that a 
defendant has no right under Atkins to a jury determination of whether he is 
mentally retarded.  See Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 526 (Fla. 2010) (holding 
that defendant is not entitled to a jury determination of his mental retardation 
status), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 164 (2011)); Kilgore v. State, 55 So. 3d 487, 510-
11 (Fla. 2010) (reiterating that the capital defendant has no right under Atkins to a 
jury determination whether he is mentally retarded); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 
1252, 1267 (Fla. 2005) (same).  Some states have established procedures under 
which a jury does determine if a capital defendant is mentally retarded.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 60-61 (Pa. 2011) (discussing survey of 
state law on procedures for determining mental retardation in capital cases).  
Florida is not one of those states, and the United States Supreme Court has not 
mandated any specific procedure for making the determination of mental 
retardation in the capital sentencing context.  Thus, the trial court did not err in 
refusing to submit to the jury the question of Hurst’s mental retardation as a bar to 
the death penalty in this case.  
B.  Lack of Jury Findings as to Specific Aggravators 
and Lack of a Unanimous Advisory Verdict on the Sentence 
 
 
Hurst next contends that constitutional error occurred in his case because the 
advisory jury in the penalty phase was not required to find specific facts as to the 
 
- 20 - 
aggravating factors,4
Hurst contends that the facts of this case support a conclusion that Ring 
applies to require the jury to expressly find one or more aggravators and to issue its 
recommendation based on a unanimous advisory verdict.  He contends that this 
case is distinguishable from cases where a jury has unanimously found an 
aggravating factor such as conviction of a prior violent felony or that the murder 
 and that the jury was not required to make a unanimous 
recommendation as to the sentence.  In this case, the jury voted seven to five to 
recommend a death sentence be imposed.  Hurst bases his claims on the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring, which held that capital defendants are 
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an 
increase in the maximum punishment.  536 U.S. at 589.  Hurst recognizes that our 
precedent has repeatedly held that Ring does not require the jury to make specific 
findings of the aggravators or to make a unanimous jury recommendation as to 
sentence, and he asks us to revisit our precedent on the issue in the decisions in 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 
143 (Fla. 2002).  In the plurality decisions in both cases, we rejected claims that 
Ring applied to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.  We decline to revisit those 
decisions in this case.   
                                          
 
 
4.  Hurst’s counsel asked for an interrogatory verdict to specify the 
aggravators found and the votes on each.  The motion was denied.  
 
- 21 - 
was committed in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or flight after 
commission of a separate enumerated felony.  See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), Fla. Stat. 
(2012).  There is no prior violent felony aggravator in this case, nor did this jury 
convict Hurst of a contemporaneous felony such as robbery.  However, we have 
rejected the Ring claim in similarly situated cases.   
 
We previously rejected the invitation to revisit our decisions in Bottoson and 
King in Peterson v. State, 94 So. 3d 514 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 793 (2012), 
a case which also did not involve conviction for a prior violent felony or a 
contemporaneous enumerated felony, and did not involve a unanimous jury 
advisory verdict.  There, the majority stated, “We have consistently rejected claims 
that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional.”  Id. at 538 (citing Baker v. 
State, 71 So. 3d 802, 823-24 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1639 (2012); 
Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 387 (Fla. 2007); Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 
822 (Fla. 2007)).  Similarly, in Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 834 (Fla. 2003), 
this Court rejected the Ring claim where there was no aggravating factor based on 
a prior violent felony conviction and there was no unanimous jury advisory 
sentence.  See also Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 206 (Fla. 2010) (“[T]his Court has 
repeatedly and continually rejected such claims” that the advisory verdict must be 
unanimous); Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1006 (Fla. 2006) (reiterating that it is 
 
- 22 - 
not unconstitutional for a jury to be allowed to recommend death by a simple 
majority vote).  We continue to adhere to this same body of precedent.   
We also note that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Evans v. 
Secretary, Fla. Dep’t. of Corrections, 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013), reversed a federal district court’s ruling 
that Florida’s sentencing scheme violates Ring.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that 
the United States Supreme Court’s “last word in a Florida capital case on the 
constitutionality of that state’s death sentencing procedures” came in Hildwin v. 
Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), which predated Ring.  Evans, 699 F.3d at 1258.  This 
Court, in Hildwin v. State, rejected the claim that the sentencing scheme was 
unconstitutional because the jury is not required to make specific findings 
authorizing the imposition of the death penalty.  531 So. 2d 124, 129 (Fla. 1988).  
On review, the United States Supreme Court affirmed our decision in Hildwin and 
stated, “[T]he Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings 
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.”  Hildwin, 
490 U.S. at 640-41.  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Evans, the United States 
Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Hildwin, and did not do so in Ring.  
The Evans court also agreed with the State that Florida’s sentencing procedures do 
provide for jury input about the existence of aggravating factors prior to 
sentencing—a process that was completely lacking in the Arizona statute struck 
 
- 23 - 
down in Ring.  Evans, 699 F.3d at 1261.  For all these reasons, we reject Hurst’s 
claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring. 
C.  Proportionality 
Hurst next contends that the death sentence in this case is not proportional 
because it is not one of the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree 
murders, thus requiring that his death sentence be reduced to life in prison.  He 
contends that a life sentence should be imposed based on evidence of abnormalities 
in his brain due to fetal alcohol syndrome, his low mental functioning, and other 
mental and background mitigation.  In performing the proportionality review, this 
Court has explained: 
“[W]e make a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether 
the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the 
least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the 
application of the sentence.”  We consider the totality of the 
circumstances of the case and compare the case to other capital cases.  
This entails “a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis 
for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.”  
In other words, proportionality review “is not a comparison between 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 
 
Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 205 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Offord v. State, 959 So. 
2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007) (citations omitted)).  This Court has long recognized an 
 
- 24 - 
obligation to perform a proportionality review.5
Hurst contends, inter alia, that his case is similar to Cooper v. State, 739 So. 
2d 82, 86 (Fla. 1999), in which the Court vacated the death sentence and imposed a 
  See, e.g., Lamadline v. State, 303 
So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974).  
In reviewing proportionality, this Court follows precedent that requires that 
the death penalty be “reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating and 
least mitigating circumstances exist.”  Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 
1996).  In doing so, we “will not disturb the sentencing judge’s determination as to 
‘the relative weight to give to each established mitigator’ where that ruling is 
‘supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.’ ”  Blackwood v. 
State, 777 So. 2d 399, 412-13 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 
1062, 1064 (Fla. 1996)).  We “review the weight the trial court ascribes to 
mitigating factors under the abuse of discretion standard.”  Smith v. State, 998 So. 
2d 516, 527 (Fla. 2008).  The Court will also “affirm the weight given an 
aggravator if based on competent substantial evidence.”  Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 
839, 846 (Fla. 2007).  “The weight to be given aggravating factors is within the 
discretion of the trial court, and it is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.”  
Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1216 (Fla. 2006).   
                                          
 
 
5.  Rule 9.142 (a)(5), Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure, provides that 
“[i]n death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or 
proportionality is an issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues 
and, if necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.” 
 
- 25 - 
life sentence on the basis of lack of proportionality when compared to other capital 
cases.  In Cooper, the evidence showed the defendant was eighteen years old at the 
time of the crime.  Cooper also suffered from borderline mental retardation, brain 
damage likely caused by beatings and head trauma as a child, a history of seizures, 
schizophrenia, cognitive brain impairment, and an abusive childhood including 
being repeatedly threatened with a gun by his father.  The trial court in Cooper 
found three aggravators and two statutory mitigators, as well as other nonstatutory 
mitigation.  We conclude that although there was more aggravation in Cooper, 
there was also more mitigation than is present in this case.  Cooper does not 
require us to find Hurst’s sentence disproportionate. 
The State relies on Jeffries v. State, 797 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2001), as a basis on 
which to find the sentence in this case proportional.  In Jeffries, the murder 
occurred in a somewhat similar manner to the instant case—the victim was 
stabbed, suffering multiple sharp force injuries, and was beaten.  Id. at 575.  The 
trial court found two aggravators, murder in course of commission of a robbery 
and HAC.  Id. at 576.  The mitigation included findings that the defendant’s 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired, that the 
codefendant was equally culpable and received a plea deal for a twenty-year 
sentence, and that Jeffries had a long history of emotional and mental problems, as 
 
- 26 - 
well as drug and alcohol abuse.  We held that the death sentence in Jeffries was 
proportional when compared to other capital cases.  Id. at 583. 
More recently, in Allen v. State, 38 Fla. L. Weekly S592 (Fla. Jul. 11, 2013), 
we found the death sentence proportionate.  The victim was bound and had 
chemicals poured on her face.  Allen beat the victim with belts, put a belt around 
her neck and, in spite of her pleas to stop, strangled her.  The autopsy also revealed 
facial bruising, bruising on the torso, hand, thigh, knee, and shoulder; and the 
victim had contusions on her hands, face, and torso.  Her hands showed ligature 
marks from having been tied, and her neck showed signs of ligature.  Id. at S593.   
The trial court in Allen found two aggravators—commission of the murder 
in the course of committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, and that the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Id. at S594.  The nonstatutory 
mitigation found by the court included that Allen had been the victim of physical 
and possibly sexual abuse, had brain damage due to numerous prior head injuries 
resulting in lack of impulse control, suffered a poor childhood environment, and 
exhibited helpfulness.  The evidence also showed that Allen had significant 
organic brain damage and intracranial injuries, and was at the lower end of 
intellectual capacity.  Testimony was received that a PET scan revealed at least ten 
brain injuries, mostly to the right side of Allen’s brain which would affect impulse 
control, judgment, and mood, and would make it hard for her to conform her 
 
- 27 - 
conduct to the requirements of society.  We found the death sentence in Allen 
proportionate when compared to sentences in other capital cases.  Id. at S600.   
Similarly, in Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2001), the victim was 
murdered by being brutally stabbed, and had bruises, abrasions, and a shallow 
defensive wound to her arm.  Id. at 986.  The trial court found two aggravators—
that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and that it was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Id. at 987.  The court found one statutory mitigator—
that the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  Id.  
This last mitigating factor was based on the trial court’s finding that Rogers suffers 
from psychosis and brain damage that may have been exacerbated by long-term 
alcohol abuse.  Id. at 996.  The trial court found other mitigation in Rogers’ 
difficult family background, abusive childhood, and his exhibition of good 
qualities as a father and employee.  Id.  We upheld the death sentence in Rogers as 
proportionate.   
Based on the forgoing, we find that Hurst’s death sentence, when compared 
to the death sentences in other comparable capital cases, is proportionate. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Hurst’s sentence of death for the 
first-degree murder of Cynthia Harrison.   
 
- 28 - 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANADY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Hurst a successive mental retardation hearing pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 prior to the new sentencing proceeding.  
I dissent, however, from the majority’s affirmance of Hurst’s sentence of death 
because there was no unanimous jury finding of either of the two aggravating 
circumstances found by the trial judge—that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel; and that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery.   
No jury ever convicted Hurst of the contemporaneous robbery, so this case 
does not fall within the exception to the constitutional requirement of juror 
unanimity for a contemporaneous felony conviction or a prior violent felony 
conviction as an aggravating circumstance, which automatically demonstrate that 
the jury has made the necessary findings to warrant the possibility of a death 
sentence.  See Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 961 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the defendant’s death sentence because the 
 
- 29 - 
“murder in the course of a felony aggravator” was premised on separate 
convictions, “which satisfies Sixth Amendment requirements”). 
In Hurst’s case, the jury recommended death by the slimmest margin 
permitted under Florida law—a bare majority seven-to-five vote.  Because a 
penalty-phase jury in Florida is not required to make specific factual findings as to 
the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death penalty pursuant to 
Florida’s capital sentencing statute, it is actually possible that there was not even a 
majority of jurors who agreed that the same aggravator applied.  See Peterson v. 
State, 94 So. 3d 514, 540 (Fla. 2012) (Pariente, J., concurring as to conviction and 
dissenting as to sentence).  In my view, Hurst’s death sentence cannot be 
constitutionally imposed, consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Florida’s right to trial by 
jury, in the absence of a unanimous finding by the jury that any of the applicable 
aggravators apply, which is not present here. 
 
I have previously expressed my view that “[t]he absence of a requirement of 
a unanimous jury finding as a precondition to a sentence of death is . . . a matter of 
constitutional significance.”  Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 838 (Fla. 2003) 
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Indeed, I continue to 
believe that, in light of Ring, Florida’s death penalty statute, as applied in 
circumstances like those presented in this case where there is no unanimous jury 
 
- 30 - 
finding as to any of the aggravating circumstances, is unconstitutional.  See 
Peterson, 94 So. 3d at 538 (Pariente, J., concurring as to conviction and dissenting 
as to sentence).   
As I stated in my opinion dissenting as to the affirmance of the death 
sentence in Peterson: 
Under our current sentencing scheme, not all defendants who 
are convicted of first-degree murder are eligible for a sentence of 
death.  The trial judge must make additional findings before the death 
penalty can be imposed.  See generally § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2011).  
Without these findings, a trial court cannot impose a higher sentence 
than life imprisonment on the basis of the verdict alone.  See 
§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that without findings by the court that 
a defendant “shall be punished by death, . . . such person shall be 
punished by life imprisonment”).  It is only after a sentencing hearing 
and additional findings of fact regarding aggravators and mitigators 
that the sentence of death may be imposed.  Not only is this 
requirement imposed by Florida law, but it is constitutionally 
mandated by the Eighth Amendment to prevent death sentences from 
being arbitrarily imposed. 
In addition, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court 
in Ring, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find those 
aggravating factors.  As Justice Scalia explained in his concurring 
opinion in Ring, the bottom line is that “the fundamental meaning of 
the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts 
essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant 
receives—whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, 
sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by a jury.”  Ring, 
536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
Id. at 538-39.   
 
“Apart from capital sentencing, the requirement of unanimity has been 
scrupulously honored in the criminal law of this state for any finding of guilt and 
 
- 31 - 
for any fact that increases the maximum punishment.”  Butler, 842 So. 2d at 837 
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “Florida’s exclusion of the 
death penalty from the requirement of jury unanimity cannot be reconciled” with 
the Supreme Court’s holdings in Ring that “[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the 
factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the 
factfinding necessary to put him to death,” and that “the Sixth Amendment applies 
to both.”  Peterson, 94 So. 3d at 539 (Pariente, J., concurring as to conviction and 
dissenting as to sentence) (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609) (emphasis omitted).     
It remains my view that Ring requires any fact that qualifies a capital 
defendant for a sentence of death to be found by a jury, and that Florida’s state 
constitutional right to trial by jury, which is embodied in article I, section 22, of the 
Florida Constitution, “requires a unanimous jury finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt on the existence of any element necessary to increase an authorized 
punishment, most especially the ultimate punishment of the death penalty.”  Butler, 
842 So. 2d at 838 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1022 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  In other words, article I, section 22, is violated in the rare 
case where the death penalty is imposed without any of the aggravators that 
automatically demonstrate that a jury has made the necessary findings to warrant 
 
- 32 - 
the possibility of a death sentence, such as a prior violent felony conviction or that 
the murder occurred while in the course of an enumerated felony that was also 
found by a jury.  This is one of those rare cases. 
This case also illustrates how the use of a special verdict form would help 
solve the problem, as Hurst’s counsel requested an interrogatory verdict to specify 
the aggravators found by the jury and the votes on each, but the motion was denied 
in accordance with this Court’s case law preventing the use of penalty-phase 
special verdict forms detailing the jurors’ determination concerning aggravating 
factors.  See State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 545 (Fla. 2005).  Had the jury been 
permitted to specify its findings, it is possible that this Court would have evidence 
in the record that Hurst’s jury unanimously found the existence of one of the 
aggravators found by the trial judge in imposing the death sentence, thereby curing 
the constitutional infirmity in this case.  Because the jury was not permitted to 
indicate its findings, however, this evidence does not appear in our record. 
I have previously expressed my view as to the “difficulties created” by this 
Court’s decisions that fail to allow or mandate the use of special interrogatories in 
death penalty cases to permit the jury to make special findings as to the 
aggravators.  Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 610 (Fla. 2009) (Pariente, J., 
specially concurring).  I once again renew this position here, as the use of a special 
verdict form during the penalty phase would enable this Court “to tell when a jury 
 
- 33 - 
has unanimously found a death-qualifying aggravating circumstance, which would 
both facilitate our proportionality review and satisfy the constitutional guarantee of 
trial by jury even when the recommendation of death is less than unanimous.”  
Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1024 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
Finally, I also take this opportunity to note an evolving concern as to the 
possible Eighth Amendment implications of Florida’s outlier status, among those 
decreasing number of states that still retain the death penalty, on the issue of jury 
unanimity in death penalty cases.6  Except for Florida, every state that imposes the 
death penalty, as well as the federal system, requires a unanimous jury verdict as to 
the finding of an aggravating circumstance.7
                                          
 
 
6.  Since Ring was decided in 2002, six states— Connecticut, Illinois, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York—have abolished the death 
penalty.  
 
7.  In Steele, 921 So. 2d at 548-49, this Court explained that, aside from 
Florida, only Utah and Virginia did not at that time require a unanimous jury 
finding of aggravators.  Subsequent state supreme court decisions in those two 
states have concluded that a unanimous jury finding of an aggravating 
circumstance is required.  See Prieto v. Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 910, 935 (Va. 
2009) (“[W]e hold that in the penalty phase of capital murder trials the death 
penalty may not be imposed unless the jury unanimously finds either one or both 
of the aggravating factors of ‘vileness’ or ‘future dangerousness’ beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”); Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232, 259 (Utah 2011) (“In 
Utah, the fact finder in the guilt phase must find—unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt—the statutory aggravator that makes death a possible 
sentence.”).            
  This means that in no other state or 
federal court in the country would Hurst have been sentenced to death in this case 
 
- 34 - 
in the absence of a unanimous jury finding of an aggravating circumstance.  
Florida is a clear outlier.8
                                          
 
 
8.  In addition to Florida’s outlier status as the only state in the country that 
allows the death penalty to be imposed without a unanimous jury finding of an 
aggravating circumstance, Florida is also one of the only states to permit the jury to 
recommend death by a less than unanimous vote.   
 
In Steele, 921 So. 2d at 548-49, this Court urged the Legislature to 
reexamine Florida’s capital sentencing statute in light of Ring and Florida’s outlier 
status.  I have also previously echoed this suggestion, encouraging the Legislature 
to bring Florida “closer to the mainstream of capital sentencing states in regard to 
jury findings.”  Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1025 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   
Although those calls for legislative action have arisen primarily due to Ring 
and Sixth Amendment concerns, the Eighth Amendment ramifications of Florida’s 
outlier status are also clear.  For example, two Justices on the United States 
Supreme Court have recently expressed “deep concerns” about the federal 
constitutionality of Alabama’s death penalty statute in light of its outlier status on 
the issue of jury overrides.  See Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 405 (2013) 
(Sotomayor, J., with whom Justice Breyer joins as to Parts I and II, dissenting from 
denial of certiorari).   
 
- 35 - 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that “death is 
different” from every other form of punishment.  See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-
06; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 
349, 357 (1977).  The Supreme Court has also emphasized the “heightened 
reliability demanded by the Eighth Amendment in the determination whether the 
death penalty is appropriate in a particular case.”  Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 
72 (1987).  As this Court has pointed out, “[m]any courts and scholars have 
recognized the value of unanimous verdicts,” particularly given that the 
“reliability” of death sentences “depends on adhering to guided procedures that 
promote a reasoned judgment by the trier of fact.”  Steele, 921 So. 2d at 549 
(quoting State v. Daniels, 542 A.2d 306, 315 (Conn. 1988)).   
While questions of public policy regarding Florida’s capital sentencing 
statute are left to the Legislature, the Sixth and Eighth Amendment implications of 
Florida’s outlier status on the lack of jury unanimity, which threaten to unravel our 
entire death penalty scheme, should be of serious concern.  I once again urge the 
Legislature, as has former Justice Cantero, to revisit this issue in Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme. 
For all these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of Hurst’s 
death sentence because there is no unanimous finding by the jury that any of the 
applicable aggravators apply.  The absence of juror unanimity in the fact-finding 
 
- 36 - 
necessary to impose the death penalty remains, in my view, an independent 
violation of Florida’s constitutional right to trial by jury.           
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,  
Linda Lee Nobles, Judge - Case No. 1998-CF-001795-A 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Davis and William Carl 
McLain, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen Richard White, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee