Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Alan S. Glueck

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-1101

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1101 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
ALAN S. GLUECK,  
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
ALAN S. GLUECK,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 26, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee's report recommending that Alan S. Glueck be 
found guilty of professional misconduct and be suspended from the practice of law 
for three years.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  Except as 
expressed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations 
as to guilt, but disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline.  The combination 
of the number of clients affected, the failure to pay attention, the suborning 
unauthorized practice of law, and misrepresentations to the Bar during the 
investigation warrant disbarment. 
FACTS 
The Florida Bar filed complaints against Glueck, which were later 
consolidated into these two cases.  After holding a hearing and considering exhibits 
entered into evidence, the referee submitted an eighty-seven page report making 
the following findings and recommendations. 
These cases concern eight different clients and the business relationship 
Glueck had with a person who held herself out as Glueck’s paralegal.  Glueck also 
made misrepresentations to the Bar in his responses to some of the individual 
grievances filed by various clients and in a sworn statement during the Bar’s 
investigation. 
Glueck, who has been a member of the Bar since 1976, first met Elayne 
Bechtinger in 1998, when he was introduced to her as a conduit into the Brazilian 
community.  When meeting to discuss the establishment of a business relationship, 
Glueck agreed to represent Bechtinger concerning an unlicensed practice of law 
(UPL) investigation of her and her company at the time, B & L Business Legal, 
 
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Inc. (B & L). The UPL investigation was concluded by way of a Stipulation for 
Permanent Injunction, which this Court approved by order on December 24, 1998.  
The injunction specifically prohibited Bechtinger from: 
Advising persons and entities of their rights, duties, and 
responsibilities under Florida Law, or Federal Law, as those laws 
relate to any legal matters and immigration and naturalization matters, 
including advising persons and entities as to various immigration 
benefits or statuses and the INS forms and procedures which are 
required to obtain these benefits and statuses, except to any limited 
degree permitted under the Code of Federal Regulations or other law. 
 
Fla. Bar v. Bechtinger, No. 94,074 (Fla. 1998) (stipulation approved on December 
24, 1998). 
Thereafter, Bechtinger sold B & L to two friends who renamed the business 
Millennia Consulting Services, Inc. (Millennia), and Bechtinger continued to serve 
as an employee/manager for the business.  Although Glueck’s primary office had 
always been in Hollywood, Florida, he established an office inside the Millennia 
suite in Aventura, Florida.  For all labor and immigration work completed at the 
Aventura office, Glueck only used the Aventura office mailing address.  All mail 
concerning these cases was sent to the Aventura office.  Bechtinger reviewed all 
the legal mail and brought it to Glueck’s attention when necessary.  The only 
telephone number or address the Aventura clients had was for the Aventura office. 
Glueck entered into a partnership or business relationship with Bechtinger, 
wherein he provided legal services to the clients of Millennia through his law 
 
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office at the Aventura location.  Glueck benefited financially from this partnership 
by receiving services from Millennia’s secretaries, bookkeepers, and billing 
employees.  Furthermore, Glueck did not pay for rent, utilities, photocopying, or 
secretarial services provided by the employees of Millennia at the Aventura 
location.  Glueck allowed Bechtinger to use his name and title in return for the 
legal business generated by Millennia at the Aventura location.  In practice, 
Millennia and the Law Office of Alan S. Glueck blended together into one 
operation sharing the same office manager, location, employees, and control over 
bank accounts.  Glueck only went to the Aventura location approximately every 
two to three weeks. 
Glueck allowed Bechtinger to be in control of Millennia’s legal services and 
his law office’s day-to-day operations at the Aventura location.  Bechtinger’s 
office prepared the clients’ documents based on their meetings with her and the 
information and documents they provided to her.  Bechtinger also prepared the 
labor and immigration packets for Glueck’s review and signature.  Bechtinger and 
her staff met with the clients, took their inquiries, explained the law, and answered 
all their questions regarding immigration and labor certificate matters.     
As to fees, a client would come to the Aventura office and would either 
execute a retainer agreement with Millennia or Glueck and fees would be paid to 
both without any real pattern.   If money was paid to Glueck directly, these funds 
 
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would be deposited in an account that he managed through the Aventura office and 
to which Millennia or Bechtinger had access.  Glueck testified that if the fee was 
paid to Millennia he was to be paid a small sum (ranging from $150 to $300), with 
Millennia keeping the balance of the funds and paying the appropriate costs of its 
services, including that of Bechtinger.  However, Glueck’s testimony regarding the 
fee arrangement was not credible in light of the fact that clients of the Aventura 
location paid thousands of dollars in what they believed to be “legal fees.”  As the 
volume of work being performed in the Aventura office increased, Glueck lost 
track of how money was being collected.  Glueck admitted that this financial 
arrangement was flawed and inappropriate. 
 
At one point, Glueck discovered that Bechtinger had written a letter on his 
law firm stationery that he had no knowledge of and had not approved.  Based on 
this incident, Glueck terminated his business relationship with Becthinger and 
Millennia.   Accordingly, a new immigration lawyer was found for the Aventura 
clients and all open files were transferred, purportedly with the client’s consent and 
at no additional charge, to the new lawyer.  
 
Eight clients were affected by Glueck’s misconduct in these cases.  As to 
each client, Glueck failed to communicate with the client as to the status of his or 
her case, failed to take necessary corrective actions with regard to petitions filed on 
behalf of the client, took actions adverse to a client’s case without consent, or 
 
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abandoned the client.  Due to the failure of one of the clients to attend a noticed 
hearing, the client was faced with deportation and later incarcerated.  Glueck had 
not even met most of the clients until the commencement of disciplinary 
proceedings against him.  The clients still attempted to contact Glueck after the 
Aventura office was closed because they were not advised that the office had 
closed and that their file had been transferred, or because the other lawyer 
attempted to charge them an additional fee.  The clients were unable to contact 
Glueck because they were never told about his Hollywood office. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the referee recommended that Glueck be found 
guilty of numerous violations of the following provisions of the Rules Regulating 
the Florida Bar:  3-4.2 (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is a cause 
for discipline); 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of an act that is unlawful or 
contrary to honesty and justice may constitute a cause for discipline); 4-1.1 (a 
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client; competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation); 4-1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client); 4-1.4(a) (a lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information); 4-1.4(b) (a lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
 
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regarding the representation); 4-5.4(c) (a lawyer shall not form a partnership with a 
nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law); 
4-8.1(a) (a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact); 4-8.1(b) (a lawyer in connection with a 
disciplinary matter shall not knowingly fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter); 4-8.4(a) (a 
lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another); 
and 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation). 
Further, although the referee did not find specific rule violations with regard 
to the following, she considered the following in determining her disciplinary 
recommendation:  (1) Glueck assisted a nonlawyer in violating her UPL injunction; 
and (2) Glueck failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer.  With regard to 
aggravating factors, the referee specifically found:  (1) a dishonest or selfish 
motive; (2) a pattern of misconduct; (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary 
proceeding; (4) vulnerability of the eight victims and the seriousness of the 
consequences to the victims; (5) Glueck’s substantial experience in the practice of 
law; and (6) Glueck’s indifference to making restitution.  Although the referee did 
not specifically find mitigating factors, she states that she considered the following 
 
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in making her disciplinary recommendation:  absence of prior disciplinary history 
and the testimony of character witnesses.  Based on these factors, the referee 
recommended a three-year suspension. 
 
The Bar petitioned for review of the referee’s recommended discipline, 
arguing that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  Glueck cross-petitioned for 
review of the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt and 
discipline. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Glueck challenges the referee’s conclusion that he formed a partnership with 
a nonlawyer.  First, he argues that he did not have a partnership with Millennia or 
Bechtinger.  Second, Glueck argues that even if there was a partnership, the 
business activities did not constitute the practice of law.   
To succeed in challenging a referee’s findings of fact, the challenging party 
must establish there is a lack of evidence in the record to support such findings or 
that the record clearly contradicts the referee’s conclusions.   See Fla. Bar v. 
Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Karten, 829 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 
2002).  An attorney cannot meet his burden by simply pointing to contradictory 
evidence when there is also competent, substantial evidence in the record to 
support the referee’s findings.  See Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 
2005); Fla. Bar v. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d 828, 832 (Fla. 1997).   
 
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Rule of Professional Conduct 4-5.4(c) provides:  “A lawyer shall not form a 
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of 
the practice of law.”  In the instant case, Millennia would generally bill each client, 
include Glueck’s services as line items in the bill, and pay Glueck for his services.  
Further, Bechtinger acted as both Glueck’s paralegal and as an employee/manager 
for Millennia.  Glueck did not pay Bechtinger directly for her services, or for rent, 
utilities, photocopying, or secretarial services provided by the employees of 
Millennia.  Moreover, Glueck had a law office in the Millennia suite.  Due to the 
sharing of at least one employee, space, and fees, the referee appropriately found, 
based on competent, substantial evidence, that Glueck’s law office and Millennia 
blended together into one operation that was in essence a partnership.  See Fla. Bar 
v. James, 478 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1985) (finding a violation of a predecessor rule on 
facts similar to those of the instant case).   
Glueck’s second argument, that the alleged partnership did not conduct 
activities that constitute the practice of law, is without merit.  The facts of the 
instant case demonstrate that Bechtinger decided which forms would be completed 
for the clients.  Standing alone, the selection of legal forms usually constitutes the 
practice of law.  See State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass’n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433 
(Ind. 2005); Unauthorized Practice Comm., State Bar of Texas v. Cortez, 692 
S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1985) (relying on Fla. Bar v. Retureta-Cabrera, 322 So. 2d 28, 29 
 
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(Fla. 1975)).  Thus, the referee carefully considered the evidence and appropriately 
concluded that Bechtinger engaged in the practice of law in violation of the UPL 
injunction and with Glueck’s assistance.  These findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence in the record and are approved. 
Next, Glueck challenges the referee’s findings of fact to support her 
recommendations as to guilt that he made misrepresentations to the Bar during its 
investigation.  The referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the 
applicable rules to support the recommendations as to a lawyer’s guilt.  See Fla. 
Bar v. Abrams, 919 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2006).  The referee considered various letters 
that Glueck wrote to the Bar, which omitted the facts that he had a law office in the 
Millennia suite in Aventura, that Bechtinger worked for him as a paralegal in that 
office, and that Millennia billed clients for the services that Glueck provided.  The 
letters attempted to veil Glueck’s relationship with Millennia and Bechtinger when, 
in fact, there was a substantial business relationship between them.  The referee’s 
findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and are 
approved.   
Glueck also challenges the referee’s findings of fact to support her 
recommendations as to guilt of misconduct with regard to the individual clients.  
We find that the referee’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence 
in the record and approve all without discussion except for one which we 
 
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disapprove.  We disapprove the referee’s finding that Glueck is responsible for a 
deportation order entered against a former client.  The record reflects that the 
notice of hearing of removal proceedings was not served on Glueck and the record, 
which only contains the client’s testimony and a retainer agreement for the 
completion of a particular labor petition, is insufficient to demonstrate that he 
represented the client at that time.  Therefore, we disapprove this finding.  
Nonetheless, we note that due to the disorganized and flawed manner in which 
Glueck conducted business with his Aventura clients, it was reasonable for the 
client to assume, as she did at the final hearing, that Glueck represented her 
generally on immigration and labor matters. 
Glueck further challenges the referee’s failure to find mitigating factors.  
Specifically, Glueck argues that the referee should have found a lack of prior 
disciplinary history, a good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his 
misconduct, good character and reputation, and remorse.  A referee’s finding as to 
mitigation carries a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless 
clearly erroneous or without support in the record.  See Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 
2d 296 (Fla. 2003).  As stated above, the referee considered Glueck’s lack of a 
prior disciplinary history and character and reputation evidence.  Further, in 
contrast to any good faith rectification or remorse, the referee actually found that 
Glueck was indifferent toward making restitution, which is evidenced by the 
 
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affected clients’ various unfulfilled claims for fee refunds.  These findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and are approved. 
The Bar challenges the referee’s recommendation as to discipline.  In 
reviewing a referee's recommended discipline, this Court's scope of review is 
broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because, ultimately, it is 
our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 
So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also Art. V, ' 15, Fla. Const.  However, generally 
speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee's recommended discipline as 
long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 
1999).  Further, the Court views cumulative misconduct more seriously than an 
isolated instance of misconduct.  See Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 
2002).  In this case, we reject the referee’s recommendation as to discipline and 
instead conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 
In Florida Bar v. Elster, 770 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2000), the Court considered 
four cases involving a lawyer’s representation of five clients in immigration 
matters.  In those cases, Elster failed to provide meaningful assistance to clients, 
collected excessive fees, made misrepresentations to clients, failed to communicate 
with clients, abandoned clients, and used a misleading business card.  Id. at 1185-
86.  Two of the clients that Elster failed to competently represent were deported.  
 
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Id. at 1186.  Noting in particular that the clients were vulnerable because they 
“were unfamiliar with the legal system in this country and many of [them] were in 
very precarious legal situations,” the Court suspended Elster for three years.  Id. at 
1189.  In Florida  Bar v. Abrams, 919 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2006), the Court found a 
lawyer to have had an improper relationship with a corporation formed by a 
paralegal to provide clients with immigration legal services; two clients were 
harmed and the Court suspended the lawyer for one year. 
In addition to committing misconduct similar to that in Elster and Abrams, 
Glueck affected more clients than in either of those cases, attempted to mislead the 
Bar during its investigation, assisted in the unlicensed practice of law, and formed 
an improper partnership with a nonlawyer whom he previously represented.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the referee’s erroneous determination that Glueck was responsible 
for a client’s threatened deportation, the record supports a harsher sanction than in 
Elster and Abrams—disbarment.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 7.1. 
CONCLUSION 
Except as set forth above, we approve the referee's findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt.   We disapprove the recommended discipline and 
instead find that disbarment is a more appropriate sanction.  Accordingly, Glueck 
is hereby disbarred.  The disbarment will be effective thirty days from the filing of 
this opinion so that Glueck can close out his practice and protect the interests of 
 
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existing clients.  If Glueck notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer 
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the disbarment effective immediately.   
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Alan S. Glueck in the 
amount of $4,264.65, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Kenneth l. Marvin, Staff Counsel, 
The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Juan Carlos Arias, Bar Counsel, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, The Florida Bar, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, P.L.C., Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent