Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO: KMJ and JDAJ, Minor Children, AJJ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0038

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO: KMJ and JDAJ, Minor Children, AJJ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2010 WY 142Case Number: No. S-10-0038Decided: 11/04/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  
KMJ and JDAJ, Minor Children,

 
 
AJJ,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

John M. Burman, 
Director, Legal Services, UW College of Law; Benjamin Hewett, Student 
Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Hewett.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. 
Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Kucera.

 
 
Guardian Ad 
Litem:

            
Jan K. Flaharty, 
Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, AJJ, 
challenges the district 
court's order terminating his parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2007).  
He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the district 
court's finding that he was unfit to have custody and control of the 
children.  He also claims that the 
Department of Family Services (DFS) failed to prove that less intrusive 
alternatives to termination of his parental rights were impractical.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
The issues on appeal 
are:

 
 

1.    
Whether the district 
court's determination that Appellant's parental rights should be terminated was 
established by clear and convincing evidence.

 
 

2.    
Whether DFS was 
required, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), to prove that less intrusive 
alternatives to termination of Appellant's parental rights were 
impractical.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Appellant is the 
father of KMJ and JDAJ.  KMJ was 
born in 2003.  JDAJ was born in 
2004.  Their mother died in a car 
accident in April 2007.  Appellant 
was in prison at the time.  The 
children were taken into protective custody and have been in the custody of DFS 
since that time.  JDAJ has never 
lived with Appellant, and KMJ only lived with Appellant for the first year of 
her life.  

 
 

[¶4]        
The first involvement 
of DFS with the family occurred in 2003, shortly after KMJ was born.  At that time, DFS received a report 
indicating that the home was unsafe and unsanitary.  A few months later, KMJ was taken into 
protective custody for a short period of time, amid reports that she was not 
being fed properly and had been left with many different caretakers without 
contact information for the parents. 

 
 

[¶5]        
In June 2004, 
Appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and 
ammunition, and was sentenced to serve 51 months in a federal prison.  This was his third felony 
conviction.  Appellant was 
previously convicted of grand larceny in 1994 and of felony child abuse in 1996. 
 The felony child abuse conviction 
resulted from Appellant's physical abuse of a fifteen-month-old child.  The abuse included force feeding the 
child cigarettes and tobacco, burning the child on the hands and feet, and 
causing bruising to the child's buttocks, thigh, and forehead.  Appellant was not the child's 
father.

 
 

[¶6]        
In October 2005, DFS 
again received information concerning the condition of the home and the 
children.  At the time, the children 
lived only with Mother because Appellant was in prison.  DFS worked with Mother and provided 
services to preserve the family unit in the home, but eventually requested that 
the county attorney file a neglect petition.  

 

[¶7]        
A Juvenile Neglect 
Petition was filed in March 2006.  
Mother admitted the allegations.  
Despite the admission, the children were permitted to remain in Mother's 
custody while she worked with DFS to achieve the goals established in a case 
plan.  During this period, Mother 
and Appellant expressed their intention to divorce.  The divorce was not finalized prior to 
Mother's death.

 
 

[¶8]        
After Mother's death, 
the children were taken into protective custody and placed in a foster 
home.  The Multi-Disciplinary Team 
(MDT) and DFS recommended a permanency plan of adoption due to Appellant's 
incarceration, his inability to care for the children for an extended period of 
time, and his history of child abuse.  
The district court initially accepted the recommendation but also 
provided Appellant the opportunity to participate in future MDT meetings and to 
respond to the permanency recommendation. 

 
 

[¶9]        
Appellant was 
released from federal prison in November 2007, and entered a halfway house in 
Casper.  He remained there until 
March 2008.  At that time, Appellant 
returned to Sheridan and moved in with his parents.  In May 2008, the district court 
reconsidered the permanency plan and issued an order finding that the most 
appropriate permanency plan was reunification with Appellant, with a concurrent 
plan of adoption. 

 
 

[¶10]     
Subsequently, DFS and 
Appellant entered into a case plan.  
The plan identified the needs of the children and set goals for Appellant 
relating to obtaining housing and employment, attending counseling, and 
participating in regular visitation.  
In June 2008, Appellant and the DFS caseworker prepared an update to the 
case plan which identified more specific goals for Appellant.  Appellant was advised that termination of 
his parental rights remained a possibility if he failed to meet the goals 
identified in the plan.  

 
 

[¶11]     
Appellant did not 
satisfy his obligations under the plan.  
He failed to regularly attend counseling sessions.  As a result, Appellant's first therapist 
"closed his file."  He did not 
maintain consistent contact with the children's school and service 
providers.  He failed to avail 
himself of the parenting education opportunities offered by DFS.  Perhaps most significantly, Appellant 
failed to take advantage of the increased visitation with his children allowed 
by the plan and seldom telephoned the children, although the foster parents 
permitted frequent phone contact.

 
 

[¶12]     
In March 2009, DFS 
petitioned to terminate Appellant's parental rights.  A guardian ad litem was appointed for 
the children.  Appellant answered 
the petition in May 2009 and requested court-appointed counsel.  The district court appointed counsel to 
represent Appellant.  A bench trial 
was held in August 2009.  
Representatives of DFS and several other witnesses testified.  Appellant also testified.  The district court took the matter under 
advisement and issued its Order Terminating Parental Rights in September 
2009.  Appellant timely 
appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶13]     
The district court 
terminated Appellant's parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v) which provides:

 
 

(a)          
The parent-child 
legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following 
facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:

 
 


 
 
(v) The child has 
been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen 
(15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is 
unfit to have custody and control of the child.

 
 

[¶14]     
Appellant does not 
dispute that the children have been in foster care for the requisite number of 
months.  He asserts, however, that 
DFS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was "unfit to have 
custody and control" of the children.  
This 
Court strictly scrutinizes any proceeding terminating parental rights.  We 
apply 
our traditional principles of evidentiary review when a party challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  BA v. Laramie County Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2007 WY 128, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d 844, 847 (Wyo. 2007).  We examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable evidence to 
be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party.  MN v. State of Wyoming, Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2003 WY 135, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 232, 234 (Wyo. 2003).  We then review the evidence to determine 
if it clearly and convincingly establishes the statutory elements required to 
support termination.  EBH v. Hot Springs Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2001 WY 100, ¶ 14, 
33 P.3d 172, 178 (Wyo. 
2001).  Evidence is clear and 
convincing if it would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention 
is highly probable.  JLW v. CAB, 2010 WY 9, ¶ 17, 224 P.3d 14, 19 (Wyo. 2010).  

 
 

[¶15]     
The term "unfit" is 
not defined in the statute, but we have previously recognized: 

 
 

[F]itness includes 
the ability to meet the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of the 
child.  
Whether a parent is 
fit to have custody and control of a child is a decision that must be made 
within the context of a particular case and depends upon the situation and 
attributes of the specific parent and child.  

 
 

Id., ¶ 19, 224 P.3d  at 
19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The district court found Appellant unfit 
to have custody and control of the children based on several factors, including 
his criminal history, inability to care for the special needs of his children, 
and failure to participate in counseling or parenting education.  

 
 

[¶16]     
At trial, the 
district court observed that the child abuse conviction was "one of the most 
damning pieces of evidence" and was "pretty tough evidence for [Appellant] to 
overcome."  In its decision letter, 
the district court stated: 

 
 
[Appellant] committed 
child abuse of a 15 month old child in December 1995.  The abused child was a household member 
at the time but not the child of [Appellant].  The abuse included cigarette burns on 
the hands and feet, force feeding cigarettes and chewing tobacco, and bruising 
of the right thigh and buttocks of the child.  The child's injuries were severe.  [Appellant] was convicted of felony 
child abuse and sentenced to a period of not less than two nor more than four 
years in prison.  [Appellant] also 
has prior convictions for battery in 1990 and felony larceny in 1994.  [Appellant] was involved in other 
incidents of domestic disputes, battery and weapons violations which did not 
result in arrests or convictions.  
[Appellant] was convicted of federal charges of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm and felon in possession of ammunition on June 9, 
2004.  [Appellant] was sentenced to 
a term of fifty-one (51) months in federal prison.  [Appellant] was also placed on the 
central registry maintained by DFS pursuant to W.S. § 
14-3-213.

 
 
Appellant asserts the 
district court erred by focusing on the previous child abuse conviction rather 
than his current fitness as a parent.  

 
 

[¶17]     
Appellant correctly 
states that the statute requires a finding of unfitness at the time of the 
termination proceedings.  See In re AE, 2009 WY 78, ¶ 17, 208 P.3d 1323, 1328 (Wyo. 
2009).  That does not mean, however, 
that the district court must ignore evidence of a parent's previous 
unfitness.  Id., ¶ 18, 208 P.3d  at 1328.  Appellant has three felony convictions. 
He also has a battery conviction and documented involvement in two domestic 
disputes.  Appellant argues he has 
been rehabilitated following the child abuse conviction, but evidence 
demonstrates he refuses to take responsibility for the incident.  He described the event as "I apparently 
burned the kid's hand and bruised her side or something."  During his therapy sessions, Appellant 
initially could not articulate any memory of the child abuse.  He then stated that he was not present 
when it occurred.  Later, he blamed 
the incident on false accusations, other people's negligence, and bad luck. 
 One of Appellant's therapists 
stated that Appellant "essentially told him that the child abuse did not 
happen."  Appellant's attempt to 
minimize the event and his failure to take responsibility for his past abusive 
conduct was important and relevant evidence that the district court could 
properly take into account in determining Appellant's current parental 
fitness.  "It is appropriate for a 
district court to consider a parent's history and pattern of behavior over time 
in determining whether rights should be terminated."  JLW, ¶ 24, 224 P.3d  at 20.  We find no error in the district court's 
consideration of this evidence.

 
 

[¶18]     
Additionally, the 
district court did not rely solely on Appellant's criminal history in 
determining unfitness.  It also 
found that Appellant "is not fit to meet the specific physical, mental and 
emotional needs of [the children]."  Both children have special needs.  KMJ has a history of being 
developmentally behind in several areas, suffers from tremors, and has an 
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) at school.  KMJ's foster mother, and other care 
providers, testified that the child gets extremely nervous, cries, and is upset 
by any unexpected interruption to her daily routine.  JDAJ's social skills and cognitive 
abilities are delayed and he also suffers from tremors.  Appellant was offered counseling and 
training to help him understand and meet the special needs of his children, but 
he did not accept this help.  At 
trial, he testified that the childcare providers and doctors did not understand 
the needs of his children.  When 
asked about the condition of his children he testified that "they ain't that 
fragile" and "nobody knows" their needs. 

 
 

[¶19]     
The district court 
also determined that Appellant did not meet other requirements of the DFS case 
plan.  He did not maintain steady 
employment or establish a suitable home for the children.  When given the opportunity to visit the 
children more than once a week, Appellant declined, even though he was 
unemployed for the six months prior to the termination of his parental rights, 
and DFS offered vouchers to help him with travel expenses.  Appellant rarely called the children at 
their foster home, though he was encouraged to call every night.  He contacted the children's teachers 
only twice during the period of time between his release from incarceration and 
the termination of his parental rights.  
He seldom met with his counselors.

   

[¶20]     
In a sufficiency of 
the evidence review, we give considerable deference to the district court's 
determination because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the 
witnesses.  DH v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2003 WY 155, ¶ 54, 79 P.3d 997, 1012 (Wyo. 2003).  In that regard, the district court 
noted:

 
 
[Appellant's] 
demeanor and credibility was a factor for the Court even when affording 
considerations for nervousness and [Appellant's] intellectual limitations.  Simply put, [Appellant] did not do well 
while testifying.  He had difficulty 
answering straightforward questions, lacked cogency, and appeared to completely 
be unable to comprehend the gravity of the proceeding or the responsibility of 
having care and custody of two young children both of which have special 
needs.

 
 
The district court's 
decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

 
 

[¶21]     
In 
his second issue, Appellant asserts that "DFS and the state had a duty to 
examine less intrusive means [and] it was their burden to prove their 
impracticability."  He contends that 
DFS was required to prove that it had considered, for example, appointing a 
guardian for the children while allowing Appellant to retain some residual 
parental rights.  Appellant 
supports his assertion that DFS was required to pursue "less intrusive" 
alternatives to termination by citing our decisions in TR v. Washakie 
County Dep't of Public Assistance, 736 P.2d 712, 718 (Wyo. 1987) and 
In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 514 (Wyo. 
1982).  In these cases, however, the district court terminated parental 
rights pursuant to a different statutory subsection, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii).  That subsection provides for termination of parental 
rights if: 

 
 
The 
child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent.

 
 

In 
evaluating whether parental rights were properly terminated under subsection 
(a)(iii), we have recognized that DFS must prove it has attempted "less 
intrusive" alternatives as part of its "reasonable efforts" to rehabilitate the 
family.1  TR, 736 P.2d  at 
718.  However, 
when termination is sought pursuant to other subsections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309, we have held that "reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family" are 
not required:  

 
 

The 
remaining six subsections of § 
14-2-309(a) do not require DFS to make rehabilitation efforts.  Giving the 
plain language of the provision its ordinary meaning, only subsection (a)(iii) 
addressing abuse and neglect by a parent requires reasonable efforts to 
rehabilitate the family.  

 
 

In 
re SJJ, 
2005 WY 3, ¶ 32, 104 P.3d 74, 83 (Wyo. 2005); 
see also In 
re AE, 
¶ 15, 208 P.3d  at 1327.  

 
 

[¶22]     
Appellant's 
parental rights were terminated pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v).  Under 
this statutory subsection, DFS 
must prove that the children have been in foster care for fifteen of the most 
recent twenty-two months and that the parent is unfit to have custody and 
control of the children.  DFS satisfied that burden by clear and convincing 
evidence.  

 
 

[¶23]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellant contends 
that "guardianship with residual parental rights" is a "less intrusive" 
alternative to termination similar to those discussed in TR and PP where termination was sought pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii).  
DFS disagrees, contending that guardianship is not considered a "less 
intrusive" alternative under Wyoming law.  
In light of our decision, we need not resolve that 
issue.