Case Title: GLEN TOLKSDORF V JOHN T GRIFFITH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115032

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 15, 2001  
GLEN TOLKSDORF and MARINDA TOLKSDORF, 
DAVID PENDELL, RICHARD PENDELL and 
KAREN PENDELL, JOHN LUCZAK and 
MARCY LUCZAK, RICHARD DEISLER and 
PATRICIA DEISLER, DENNIS HILL and 
NANCY HILL, TERRENCE TORMOEN and 
LYNNE TORMOEN,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v  
No. 115032  
JOHN T. GRIFFITH, JANE GRIFFITH, 
NORTH WOODS CONSERVANCY, 
JOHN T. FOLEY, PAUL MICHAEL FOLEY, II, 
and MICHELLE FOLEY SHEPPARD,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
GERALD DAHLGREN,  
Defendant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except MARKMAN, J.).  
KELLY, J.  
This case involves the constitutionality of the Opening  
of Private Roads and Temporary Highways Act (the private roads  
act), MCL 229.1 et seq.; MSA 9.281 et seq.  The key issue is  
whether the act provides for an unconstitutional taking under  
art 10, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. We hold that  
it does because the act authorizes a taking and the taking  
primarily benefits a private rather than a public purpose.  
For that reason, we strike down the act as unconstitutional.  
I. The History of the Private Roads Act  
Both the Michigan and federal constitutions prohibit the  
taking of private property for public use without just  
compensation.1 US Constitution, Am V; Const 1963, art 10, § 2.  
The Taking Clause of the state constitution is substantially  
similar to that of the federal constitution.  City of Kentwood  
v Sommerdyke Estate, 458 Mich 642, 656; 581 NW2d 670 (1998).  
Const 1963, art 10, § 2 provides:  
[P]rivate property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor being 
first made or secured in a manner prescribed by 
law. 
Compensation 
shall 
be 
determined 
in  
proceedings in a court of record.  
The private roads act arose from language at art 18, § 14  
of the Michigan Constitution of 1850. This predecessor of art  
10, § 2 of the 1963 Constitution provided:  
1The Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause is applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Central  
Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 122; 98 S Ct 
2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978).  
2  
 
 
The property of no person shall be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor. 
Private roads may be opened in the manner to be 
prescribed by law; but in every case the necessity 
of the road and the amount of all damages to be 
sustained by the opening thereof, shall be first 
determined by a jury of freeholders; and such 
amount, 
together 
with 
the 
expenses 
of 
the  
proceedings, shall be paid by the person or persons 
to be benefitted.  
A 
similar 
provision is found in the Michigan Constitution  
of 1908, art 13, §§ 1 and 3. However, the current Michigan  
constitution eliminated the express reference to private  
roads.  
More than eighty years before that change, the Michigan  
Legislature enacted the private roads act.  It allows a  
private landowner to petition the township supervisor to open  
a 
private 
road 
across another landowner's property. MCL 229.1;  
MSA 9.281. A jury consisting of property owners determines  
whether the road is necessary. MCL 229.2; MSA 9.282. If a  
private road is authorized, the jury then sets a dollar amount  
that the petitioner must pay to compensate the owner of the  
land where the road is built. MCL 229.3; MSA 9.283, MCL 229.5;  
MSA 9.285.  
II. The Facts and Procedural History of the Present Case  
Plaintiffs own section 12, township 57 north, range 33  
west, in Allouez Township, Keweenaw County, Michigan.  
Defendants own a neighboring parcel, section 13.  
3  
 
Section 12 is landlocked, although it can be accessed by  
foot trails.  Plaintiff Glen Tolksdorf acquired section 12 in  
March of 1992, intending to develop the property and sell it  
as lots.  He attempted without success to acquire an easement  
from surrounding property owners in order to achieve a paved  
vehicular connection from his property to a roadway. Those who  
purchased lots from Tolksdorf are also plaintiffs in this  
case. In addition to seeking a road across section 13, they  
seek an easement for utility lines.  
In the past, defendants have allowed members of the  
general public to use the trails on section 13 to access  
section 
12 
for 
recreational purposes. They have also permitted  
loggers to cross their property. However, they object to the  
installation of a paved road and utility lines.  
Plaintiffs sued, naming as defendants the section 13  
property owners as well as Gerald Dahlgren, Allouez Township  
supervisor, who had refused to commence proceedings to open a  
private road. In their complaint, plaintiffs sought a  
determination that they had acquired an easement by  
prescription.2 The trial court ruled against them. It also  
2"Prescriptive easements arise where a person uses, but 
does not possess, the land of another for a particular purpose 
without permission for 15 years." 1 Cameron, Michigan Real 
Property Law, § 6.11, p 204 (2d ed). They are "based upon the 
legal fiction of a lost grant." Id., citing Dyer v Thurston, 
(continued...)  
4  
denied their request for a writ of mandamus that would compel  
Dahlgren to proceed under the private roads act.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision  
concerning the easement issue.  However, it found error in the  
refusal to issue a writ. It remanded the case, with  
instructions to direct Dahlgren to commence proceedings to  
open a private road pursuant to the act.  
We granted leave limited to the question whether the  
private roads act is constitutional.  461 Mich 1014 (2000).  
The issue whether plaintiffs acquired an easement in section  
13 is not before us.  
III. The Constitutionality of the Private Roads Act  
Review of the constitutionality of a statute presents a  
question of law that is reviewed de novo. Blank v Dep't of  
Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 112; 611 NW2d 530 (2000). A statute  
is presumed constitutional, unless its unconstitutionality is  
readily apparent. Id.  
Over the years, the Court of Appeals has struggled with  
whether the private roads act is constitutional. In 1975, the  
first panel to consider the question found the act "repugnant  
to Const 1963, art 10, § 2." White Pine Hunting Club v  
Schalfoski, 65 Mich App 147, 149; 237 NW2d 223 (1975).  
2(...continued) 
32 Mich App 341, 343; 188 NW2d 633 (1971).  
5  
 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, White Pine Hunting Club found no public purpose  
justifying the taking authorized by the act.  
Seventeen years later, another panel declined to follow  
White Pine Hunting Club, and found the act constitutional.  
Bieker v Suttons Bay Twp Supervisor, 197 Mich App 628, 630;  
496 NW2d 398 (1992). Bieker said that a public use was  
embodied in the statute. Id. at 632. Specifically, the Court  
expressed concern about the depressed value of landlocked  
property and concluded that "providing access to land is  
beneficial to the community as a whole." Id.  
Judge 
Shepherd 
concurred, 
but 
wrote 
separately 
to 
express  
his view that the private roads act had "nothing to do with  
the taking by a public authority of property for a public  
purpose." Id. at 633. Instead, he opined that the act  
authorized a permissible limitation on the private use of  
land.  
The next panel to consider the act's constitutionality  
disagreed with Bieker, but found itself constrained to follow  
it. McKeighan v Grass Lake Twp Supervisor (McKeighan I),  
Docket No 195437, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May  
8, 1998, vacated May 20, 1998, printed at 229 Mich App 801;  
587 NW2d 505 (1998). A special panel was convened to resolve  
the conflict between McKeighan I and Bieker. McKeighan v Grass  
Lake Twp Supervisor, 234 Mich App 194, 196; 593 NW2d 605  
6  
 
 
 
 
(1999)(McKeighan II).3  
McKeighan 
II 
upheld the constitutionality of the act. Id.  
at 209. It determined that the act had its origins in the  
state's power to reasonably regulate property usage, rather  
than its power of eminent domain. Id. The Court also compared  
the limitation it imposed on property to a common-law easement  
by necessity. Id. at 201-202. McKeighan II concluded that "the  
Taking Clause of Const 1963, art 10, § 2 is neither implicated  
nor offended by the act." Id. at 210.  
One member of the panel dissented. He felt that the  
analogy 
to 
a 
common-law 
easement 
by 
necessity 
was  
inappropriate. Id. at 215. He agreed that the private roads  
act did not emanate from the state's power of eminent domain.  
The land was not taken for public use, but for private use.  
Id., citing 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed), § 1.11, p 1-7.  
However, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the  
act did not implicate the Taking Clause. Id. at 215-216. He  
would have found the private roads act repugnant to Const  
1963, art 10, § 2. Id. at 217.4  
3An appeal to this Court was filed in McKeighan II, but  
was dismissed when the plaintiffs sold the property in 
question. McKeighan v Grass Lake Twp Supervisor, 605 NW2d 319 
(1999). The order dismissing the case noted that this Court 
would have granted the application for leave to appeal. Id.  
4Although the Court of Appeals followed McKeighan II as  
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
A state may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or  
property without due process. US Const, Am XIV. The state's  
power to take private property is called its power of eminent  
domain 
or 
condemnation. 2 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law,  
§ 24.1, p 1102 (2d ed).  
It is without question that the private roads act  
authorizes a taking. See Nollan v California Coastal Comm, 483  
US 825; 107 S Ct 3141; 97 L Ed 2d 677 (1987). In Nollan, the  
plaintiffs owned beachfront property in California. They  
wished to tear down an existing home and replace it with a  
larger one. Id. at 828. Because the property was on the  
seacoast, a California statute required the Nollans first to  
obtain a permit from the Coastal Commission. Id.  
The commission agreed to grant the permit only if the  
Nollans allowed the public an easement over their property,  
thereby facilitating public access to a nearby public beach.  
Id. In analyzing whether the terms of the permit constituted  
a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the  
federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court held:  
In Loretto [v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV  
Corp, 458 US 419; 102 S Ct 3164; 73 L Ed 2d 868 
(1982)] we observed that where governmental action  
4(...continued) 
required by MCR 7.215(I), Judge Markman and Judge O'Connell 
both indicated that they agreed with the vacated McKeighan 
decision and the dissent in McKeighan II.  
8  
 
 
 
 
results in "a permanent physical occupation" of the 
property, by the government itself or others, see 
458 US, at 432-433, n 9, "our cases uniformly have 
found a taking to the extent of the occupation, 
without regard to whether the action achieves an 
important public benefit or has only minimal  
economic impact on the owner," id. at 434-435. We  
think 
a 
"permanent 
physical 
occupation" 
has  
occurred, 
for 
purposes 
of 
that 
rule, 
where  
individuals are given a permanent and continuous 
right to pass to and fro, so that the real property 
may be continuously traversed, even though no 
particular individual is permitted to station  
himself permanently upon the premises. [Id. at 831­
832.]  
Similarly, the private roads act gives individuals "a  
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro" over  
another's property. It thus allows a "permanent physical  
occupation" 
of 
private property by means of government action.  
This is a taking. Nollan, supra at 832. 
5  
The next question is whether the taking authorized by the  
private roads act is constitutionally permissible. Private  
property may not be taken for a private purpose. Shizas v  
Detroit, 333 Mich 44, 50; 52 NW2d 589 (1952). Plaintiffs argue  
that the takings that the  private roads act enables are those  
for a public not a private purpose. They point to the Court  
of Appeals decision in McKeighan II, supra, for support of  
their position.  
5A taking occurs even if there is a benefit to the 
public. Nollan, supra at 831. Whether the government may take 
the property will then depend on the interest served.  
9  
 
Whatever public interest the act serves, plaintiffs are 
 
primarily 
benefitted by it. In Poletown Neighborhood Council,  
Inc v Detroit,6 this Court set forth the analysis used when a  
taking benefits both private entities and the public:  
The power of eminent domain is restricted to 
furthering public uses and purposes and is not to 
be exercised without substantial proof that the 
public is primarily to be benefitted. Where, as 
here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way 
that benefits specific and identifiable private 
interests, 
a 
court 
inspects 
with 
heightened 
scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the 
predominant interest being advanced. Such public 
benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must 
be clear and significant if it is to be within the 
legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature. 
[Id. at 634-635.]  
Hence, the question becomes whether the public interest  
advanced here, access to landlocked property, is the  
predominant interest advanced. We find that it is not.  
We are unconvinced that the public is the predominant  
interest served by the private roads act. The very language  
of the act reveals that it is concerned with private roads  
having, presumably, a private not a public benefit. Also, the  
act does not require the state to compensate the landowner,  
but, rather, the private person petitioning for the private  
road. MCL 229.3; MSA 9.283 and MCL 229.5; MSA 9.285. The  
private roads act uses the state's power of eminent domain to  
6410 Mich 616; 304 NW2d 455 (1981).  
10  
 
 
convey an interest in land from one private person to another.  
The Court of Appeals has opined that the private roads  
act merely supplements the already existing law of private  
easements. McKeighan II, supra at 208-209. However, the  
McKeighan II dissent accurately remarked that there is a  
difference between easements by necessity and the interest  
created by operation of the private roads act:  
As noted in Judge Holbrook, Sr.'s dissent in 
White Pine Hunting Club[supra at 151-152], the 
analytical 
basis 
for 
enforcing 
a 
common-law  
easement by necessity is the assumption that the 
parties who have originally created the landlocked 
parcel intended that the owner of the landlocked 
parcel have access to the land over the other's 
parcel. Accordingly, with a common-law easement by 
necessity, "all the court is really doing is  
enforcing the original intent of the parties." Id.  
at 152. [McKeighan II, supra at 214-215 (Talbot, 
P.J., dissenting).]  
An implied easement also arises only when the land on  
which the easement is sought was once part of the same parcel  
that is now landlocked. 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law,  
§ 6.9, p 199 (2d ed). Missing from the private roads act is  
some conduct by the party whose land is burdened or his  
predecessor, indicating assent to the burden imposed.  
The McKeighan II dissent took the position that the  
private roads act does not involve the state's power of  
eminent domain. We note that the act does not impose a  
limitation on land use that benefits the community as a whole.  
11  
 
Instead, it gives one party an interest in land the party  
could not otherwise obtain. By eliminating the landowner's  
right to exclude others from his property, the act conveys an  
interest in private property from one private owner to  
another. The taking authorized by the act appears merely to  
be an attempt by a private entity to use the state's powers  
"to acquire what it could not get through arm's length  
negotiations with defendants." Lansing v Edward Rose Realty,  
192 Mich App 551, 558; 481 NW2d 795 (1992), aff'd 442 Mich  
626; 502 NW2d 638 (1993) (analyzing a proposed taking under a  
city ordinance governing cable television service).  The  
result more closely resembles a taking of private property  
than a limitation on it.7  
Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals panel in  
McKeighan I, supra at 808. "[T]he primary benefit under the  
private roads act inures to the landlocked private landowner  
seeking to open a private road on the property of  
another . . . . [A]ny benefit to the public at large is purely  
incidental and far too attenuated to support a constitutional  
7Even if we agreed with plaintiffs that the private roads 
act merely authorizes a land use restriction, not a taking, 
the act would have to withstand constitutional scrutiny. "[A] 
land use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not 
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial 
government purpose . . . ." Penn Central Transportation Co, n  
1 supra at 122.  
12  
 
 
 
taking of private property." We find that the private roads  
act is unconstitutional, because it authorizes a taking  of  
private property for a predominantly private purpose.  
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision in this case and  
reinstate the ruling of the trial court for defendants. Bieker  
and McKeighan II are overruled.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ.,  
concurred with KELLY, J.  
MARKMAN, J., took no part in the decision of this case.  
13