Case Title: STEVEN BRADLEY GILES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2009-SC-000137-DG

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY l, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. STEVEN BRADLEY GILES Q ,zmyrrzrtt tourf of RENDERED : OCTOBER 21, 2010 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 2009-SC-000137-DG MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NO. 2007-CA-002608-MR MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CR-00024 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE On December 11, 2004, Appellant, Steven Bradley Giles, and his fiancee, Shirley Maestas, went to a Christmas party at a location on Third Street in Paducah. Appellant drove himself and Maestas to the home of Rhoda Brown. After picking up Rhoda, along with a co-worker and friend, Edward Peppers, they all went to the party . While at the party, both Appellant and Maestas became intoxicated . At approximately 11 :00 p.m. that . night, the four individuals left the party and went back to Brown's residence . Appellant was driving his father's green 1994 Lincoln Continental. Brown asked Appellant and Maestas to stay at her house. Though there is some conflicting testimony, it appears that Brown attempted to retrieve the keys to the vehicle from Appellant, but he refused to give them to her . Shortly thereafter, Appellant - and Maestas left Brown's residence to return home to Ballard County . Peppers testified that there was no doubt in his mind that Appellant was driving the vehicle when he left. While driving on U.S . Highway 60 towards Ballard County, Appellant's vehicle wrecked . According to the testimony of Appellant's accident reconstructionist, Appellant apparently lost control of the vehicle, left the road, then swerved back and left the road on the other side, striking a culvert and an earthen embankment . The vehicle then struck a telephone pole and ran over a stop sign before going into another ditch . The vehicle finally flipped over and began rolling and spinning, coming to a rest upside down on top of two vehicles in a salvage yard. Maestas was thrown from the vehicle and later died from multiple traumatic injuries . A blood sample taken from her body during the autopsy the next day revealed a blood alcohol level of .30% . Appellant was not seriously injured and was found sitting near the vehicle . Appellant's blood alcohol level was tested and found to be .20% . When a deputy asked Appellant during an interview at Western Baptist Hospital in Paducah who was driving at the time of the accident, Appellant stated, "I'm going to say I was," and later added, "I was probably driving." A three-day trial occurred in the McCracken Circuit Court. Ajury convicted Appellant of manslaughter in the second degree, driving under the influence of alcohol, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree . Appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on the manslaughter charge, enhanced to fifteen years due to his PFO status . He was also sentenced to thirty days on the DUI charge . Appellant then sought review in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction on February 6, 2009 . This Court granted discretionary review on January 13, 2010 . Appellant raises two issues on appeal : (1) the trial court erred in allowing expert witnesses to testify to the effects of a blood alcohol level of .30% when the blood was collected the day after Maestas' death; and (2) the court erred in allowing the improper opinion evidence of a police officer. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. Effects ofBlood Alcohol Level Appellant's first allegation of error is premised on the idea that the Commonwealth offered misleading testimony. This evidence pertained to the extrapolation of the victim's blood alcohol which was based on the assumption that its metabolism would have ceased at death. Appellant contends that the human body continues to metabolize alcohol after death, leading to an increase in the amount of alcohol present in the blood long after the final drink was taken . In other words, Appellant claims that the blood taken from Maestas during the autopsy would have actually been higher in alcohol content than at the time of the accident because of the natural process of decomposition . However, no evidence of this theory was either advanced at trial by Appellant or in any post-trial proceedings . Therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court. At trial, defense counsel stipulated to the autopsy report of Maestas. Contained in that report was information which clearly indicated when the blood was actually drawn from Maestas . In addition, defense counsel stipulated to Maestas having a blood alcohol level of .30/0 . This appears to have been an apparent trial strategy on the part of defense counsel. See Wiley v . Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 649 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Counsel may believe it tactically wise to stipulate to a particular element of a charge or to issues of proof.") (citing United States v . Brown, 428 F.2d 1100 (D .C . Cir. 1970) ; Cox v . Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir . 1979) ; Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir . 1941)) . The Commonwealth then sought to use that evidence in an attempt to show that Maestas would have been physically incapacitated and unable to operate a motor vehicle . Appellant now objects to the Commonwealth's use of that testimony at trial . As stated earlier, defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the blood alcohol level of Maestas, as well as the autopsy results which clearly indicated that the blood was withdrawn approximately one day after her death . Apparently, defense counsel did not anticipate this particular use of that evidence by the Commonwealth . This is simply part of the adversarial process and is neither improper nor error. In addition, the testimony concerning the bodily effects of a blood alcohol level of .30% on an average living person was clearly permissible . As the Court of Appeals made clear, both Dr. Fred Mushkat, an emergency room physician at Western Baptist Hospital, and David Barton, a forensic chemist with the Kentucky State Police Crime Lab, testified they had been trained in this regard . Accordingly, such evidence was admissible under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 702 . Improper Opinion Evidence Appellant's second allegation of error is that the trial court erred in allowing the improper opinion evidence of Sgt. David White, the police officer who did the accident reconstruction analysis for the Commonwealth . We agree with the Court of Appeals that any error was harmless . The testimony at issue was the following: Sgt. White : Well, you know, I'm not a lawyer, but we get basic training in court procedures and so forth. And I think there's a reason that the law allows you to accept an excited utterance from somebody . And I think that, you know, in my experience, I've seen several times where-you definitely, the sooner we can interview people, the sooner we can get statements from them, the less time, in most criminal matters, the less time they have to reflect on their responsibility that they faced or the responsibility of their actions. Prosecution witness, Rhoda Brown, gave a statement to an insurance attorney eleven months after the accident which conflicted with her testimony at trial, as well as with a statement she gave to the officer right after the accident . We note at the outset that Sgt. White at no point rendered an opinion that any witnesses were lying. See Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W .2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997) . Nor did he give an opinion as to the veracity of Rhoda Brown's testimony. To the contrary, Sgt. White merely stated that, in his experience and as a matter of police procedure, it is preferable to get a statement from a witness early on . While the wording of the question from the Commonwealth arguably sought "to characterize the testimony of another witness . . . as [being false or unreliable]," the jury was already well aware of the conflicting statements given by Rhoda Brown . Id.. Though we reiterate that "[c]ounsel should be sufficiently articulate to show the jury where the testimony of the witnesses differ without resort to blunt force," we agree with the Court of Appeals that any error was, in this instance, harmless . Id. One reason the testimony is harmless is because it is practically within common knowledge that one's fresh recollection of an event is going to be more accurate than one articulated after a passage of time. Though it may have been improper to assert such reasoning on direct examination, this was an issue that the Commonwealth would have been allowed to pursue during closing arguments . As such, we do not believe that the "judgment was . . . substantially swayed by the error." Winstead v . Commonwealth, 283 S .W .3d 678, 689 (Ky . 2009) . For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is hereby affirmed. All sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: V . Gene Lewter Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Perry Thomas Ryan Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204