Case Title: RONALD D. KELLY v. DUSTIN KILTS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Roxie Carol Kelly, Deceased

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0090

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
RONALD D. KELLY v. DUSTIN KILTS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Roxie Carol Kelly, Deceased2010 WY 151Case Number: No. S-10-0090Decided: 11/23/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

RONALD 
D. KELLY,Appellant (Defendant),v.DUSTIN KILTS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Roxie Carol Kelly, Deceased,Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal from the 
District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable 
Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
H. Peek, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Rex 
O. Arney and Carrie L. Shaw of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.            

 
 
[¶1]  Roxie Carol Kelly filed a complaint for 
divorce from her husband, Ronald D. Kelly.  
Mr. Kelly filed an answer in which he stated that he did not object to 
the divorce being awarded to Mrs. Kelly.  
Six days later, Mrs. Kelly filed a motion requesting an emergency 
hearing, alleging she was in the hospital in critical condition and wanted the 
divorce finalized before she died.  
After efforts to schedule a hearing with Mr. Kelly's attorney were 
unsuccessful, the district court entered a divorce decree awarding Mrs. Kelly a 
divorce and retaining jurisdiction to equitably divide the marital estate at a 
later date.  Mr. Kelly filed a 
motion to set aside the decree, which the district court denied, and Mr. Kelly 
appealed the decree to this Court.  
We affirm.     

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]     Mr. Kelly presents the 
following issue on appeal:

 
 
            
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it prepared and entered 
the Decree of Divorce on September 15, 2006, without a hearing and notice to the 
parties in violation of Rules 12(c), 56(c), and 6(c), W.R.C.P., and in violation 
of [Mr. Kelly's] right to due process?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  The parties were married in 1977.  They had no children together.  Mrs. Kelly filed her complaint for 
divorce on August 9, 2006.  Mr. 
Kelly filed an answer to the complaint on September 8, 2006, in which he 
affirmatively stated "that either party could be awarded a divorce under the 
circumstances, but [he did] not object to [Mrs. Kelly] being awarded the divorce 
as the filing party."  In his prayer 
for relief, he asked the court to enter an order "[a]warding [Mrs. Kelly], as 
the filing party, a divorce."  

 
 
[¶4]  Six days later, on September 14, 2006, 
Mrs. Kelly filed a motion for emergency hearing.  The motion alleged that Mrs. Kelly was 
hospitalized in intensive care and had spoken with friends and relatives about 
wanting to obtain her divorce "now" because she did not want Mr. Kelly making 
health care decisions for her or, in the event of her death, inheriting her 
share of the marital property.  The 
motion further alleged that in the event of her death Mrs. Kelly wanted any 
property she owned to go to her family.

 
 
[¶5]  By decree entered September 15, 2006, 
the district court awarded Mrs. Kelly a divorce.  The decree stated that the court 
attempted to schedule an emergency hearing with Mr. Kelly's attorney before 
entering the decree but he was unable to appear in court at any of the times 
discussed.  The decree further 
stated that both parties acknowledged irreconcilable differences had arisen 
between them and "due to the immediacy of the issue and the fact that [Mr. 
Kelly] agreed that a divorce should be granted, it is in the best interest of 
the parties that a decree of divorce be granted and [Mrs. Kelly], as the filing 
party, should be awarded a divorce."  
The Court retained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter 
to address all other issues, including the division of the marital estate.    

 
 
[¶6]  On September 19, 2006, Mr. Kelly filed a 
motion to set aside the decree.  He 
asserted the district court entered the decree without proper notice or hearing 
in violation of W.R.C.P. 6(c) based upon an unverified motion containing 
inadmissible hearsay without giving him time to respond or file a motion to 
amend his answer.  He further 
asserted the entry of the decree violated his right to due process.  Along with the motion, Mr. Kelly filed 
motions to amend his answer to request that he be awarded a divorce and for 
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent Mrs. Kelly's interests in the 
proceedings.   

 
 
[¶7]  Mrs. Kelly died on September 19, 
2006.  After her death, Mr. Kelly 
supplemented his motion to set aside the decree, asserting that its entry 
deprived him of significant property he and Mrs. Kelly held as tenants by the 
entireties which, but for the divorce, would have passed to him as surviving 
spouse.[1]  Dustin Kilts, as personal representative 
of Mrs. Kelly's estate, filed a motion to be substituted for Mrs. Kelly in the 
district court proceedings, which motion the district court granted.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied Mr. Kelly's motions to set aside the decree, amend his answer and appoint 
a guardian ad litem. 

 
 
[¶8]  The district court subsequently convened 
a hearing for purposes of taking evidence on the issue of dividing the marital 
property.  Following the hearing, 
the court entered an order dividing the marital property.  Mr. Kelly timely appealed to this 
Court.  The notice of appeal states 
that the appeal is from the decree of divorce and not from the order dividing 
the marital property.    

 
 
             

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]  Mr. Kelly asserts that the district 
court violated W.R.C.P. 6, 12 and 56.  
The interpretation of rules, like the interpretation of statutes, 
involves a question of law which we review de novo.  Busch v. Horton Automatics, Inc., 2008 
WY 140, ¶ 13, 
196 P.3d 787, 790 (Wyo. 2008).  Mr. 
Kelly also asserts the district court violated his right to due process, which 
is also a question of law reviewed de 
novo.  Welch v. Welch, 2003 WY 168, ¶ 5, 81 P.3d 937, 938 (Wyo. 2003).   

            

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Kelly contends the district court 
did not comply with the following provision:

 
 
[W.R.C.P.] 
6.  Time.

. . . 
.

 
 
(c)  
Motions and motion practice. 

      (1) Unless these 
rules or an order of the court establish time limitations other than those 
contained herein, all motions . . . together with supporting affidavits, if any, 
shall be served at least 10 days before the hearing on the motion.  Except as otherwise provided in Rule 
59(c), or unless the court by order permits service at some other time, a party 
affected by the motion may serve a response, together with affidavits, if any, 
at least three days prior to the hearing on the motion or within 20 days after 
service of the motion, whichever is earlier. 

 
 
Mr. Kelly 
asserts the district court violated this rule when, after Mrs. Kelly filed her 
motion for an emergency hearing, it entered the decree granting the divorce 
without a hearing or allowing him to respond to the motion.  He contends Rule 6(c)(1) required the 
district court to convene a hearing at least ten days after Mrs. Kelly filed her 
motion.  He further contends the 
rule required the district court to allow him to serve a response three days 
before the hearing or twenty days after service of Mrs. Kelly's motion, 
whichever was earlier.

 
 
[¶11]  Mr. Kilts maintains a hearing was not 
required on Mrs. Kelly's motion for an emergency hearing.  He relies in part on the following 
language in Rule 6(c)(2):

 
 
(c)  Motions and motion practice. 

            
. . . .

            
(2)  A request for hearing 
may be served by the moving party or any party affected by the motion within 20 
days after service of the motion.  
The court may, in its discretion, 
determine such motions without a hearing, except for those motions which will 
determine the final rights of a party in an action.  (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶12]  We conclude the language in Rule 6(c)(2) 
is determinative.  The motion for 
emergency hearing to award Mrs. Kelly a divorce in proceedings in which both 
parties had agreed that a divorce was appropriate and should be awarded to Mrs. 
Kelly as the filing party was not a motion that would determine the final rights 
of either party.  The final rights 
of the parties were left to be determined at a later date.  Under these circumstances, the district 
court properly exercised its discretion to grant the divorce without a hearing 
pursuant to Rule 6(c)(2).  

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Kelly also asserts the district 
court failed to comply with Rule 12(c), which states in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
            
(c)  Motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, 
any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.  If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 

 
 
By considering 
Mrs. Kelly's statements concerning her hospitalization and health status, Mr. 
Kelly contends the motion for judgment on the pleadings was converted to a 
motion for summary judgment governed by Rule 56, which provides in 
part:

 
 

(a)              
 For claimant.  A party seeking to 
recover upon a claim . . . may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action . . . move with or without supporting affidavits 
for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part 
thereof.

  . . . .

            
(c)    Motion and proceedings thereon.  Unless 
the court otherwise orders, the motion and any response and other papers 
relating thereto shall be served pursuant to Rule 6(c).  The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages.

            . . . 
.

             
(e)  Form of affidavits; . . .  Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  

 
 
Mr. Kelly also 
asserts error in the district court's consideration of the statements because 
they were not presented in a form admissible at trial.

 
 
[¶14]  Our resolution of Mr. Kelly's Rule 6 
argument applies with equal force to this argument.  Rule 6(c)(2) gives district courts the 
discretion to determine motions without a hearing unless the motion will 
determine the final rights of the parties.  
No one disputed in this case that the district court should enter a 
decree dissolving the marriage.  The 
only matter for the district court to decide was how the marital property should 
be divided, which was left for a later hearing.  Once Mrs. Kelly filed her complaint for 
divorce, nothing Mr. Kelly submitted would have changed the outcome with respect 
to dissolution of the marriage.  Had 
there been a hearing, he could not have appeared and prevented the court from 
awarding a divorce.  At most, he 
could have withdrawn his consent to awarding her the divorce and presented 
reasons why the divorce should have been awarded to him, which would have led to 
the same resultdissolution of the marriage.  The district court did not err in 
granting the divorce without a hearing.

 
 
[¶15]  Turning to Rule 56 specifically, Mrs. 
Kelly was entitled after the expiration of twenty days to move for summary 
judgment on her complaint for divorce with or without supporting 
affidavits.  The decree accurately 
states that she filed her motion for emergency hearing after expiration of 
twenty days from commencement of the action.  There is no contention that she did not 
properly serve Mr. Kelly with the motion.  
Given that the parties agreed a divorce should be granted and that no 
genuine issue as to any material fact existed on that matter, the district court 
properly "rendered [judgment] forthwith" by entering the decree, "interlocutory 
in character," dissolving the marriage.  
The district court properly directed in the decree that it would retain 
jurisdiction to divide the marital estate at a later date.  As for Mr. Kelly's contention that the 
district court should not have considered the statements in Mrs. Kelly's motion 
that she was hospitalized and wanted the divorce finalized, we find no error 
under the circumstances of this case.  
The matter for the district court's determination upon Mrs. Kelly's 
motion was whether a divorce should be granted.  The pleadings showed that no genuine 
issue as to any material fact existed and a divorce should be granted as a 
matter of law.    

 
 
[¶16]  Mr. Kelly argues that entry of the 
decree deprived him of the opportunity to move to amend his answer to request 
that he, rather than Mrs. Kelly, be awarded the divorce.  Citing W.R.C.P. 15(a), he asserts that 
he was entitled to amend his answer with leave of court, which "shall be freely 
given."  In entering the decree 
without a hearing, he contends, the district court deprived him of the right to 
amend.  In presenting this argument, 
Mr. Kelly makes no claim that allowing the amendment and granting him the 
divorce would have led to a different result in the property division.  In fact, as noted early in this 
decision, Mr. Kelly did not appeal the district court's order dividing the 
property.  Absent an assertion that 
the failure to allow the amendment and award him the divorce somehow prejudiced 
him in the property division, any Rule 15 error was harmless.      

         

[¶17]  Mr. Kelly also asserts the district 
court denied him his right to due process when it entered the decree without 
affording him the opportunity to be heard.  
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, binding upon 
the states, provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law."   Article 1, § 6 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, similarly provides, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law."  Notice and the opportunity to be heard 
are touch stones of this due process of law.  DH v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2003 WY 
155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003).  
Before a property interest can be terminated, except in emergency 
situations, due process must be afforded to litigants in the form of notice and 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  
Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1996).  This is true 
in divorce actions just as it is in other types of cases.  Id.

  

[¶18]  The notice and opportunity for hearing 
must be appropriate to the particular type of case, and the opportunity to be 
heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  Id.  The party claiming an infringement of 
his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both that he had a 
protected interest and that such interest was affected in an impermissible 
way.  Id.  The question is whether there has been a 
denial of fundamental fairness.  Id.  

 
 
[¶19]  Mr. Kelly maintains he had a protected 
property interest in his rights of inheritance as Mrs. Kelly's surviving spouse 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009) and to a property 
allowance under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-501 (LexisNexis 2009).  By entering a divorce decree without 
affording him sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard, Mr. Kelly 
contends the district court interfered with his protected property interest in 
an impermissible way.  But for the 
entry of the decree, he asserts, the divorce action would have terminated upon 
Mrs. Kelly's death and he, as the surviving spouse, would have inherited the 
property.  

 
 
[¶20]  The fallacy in Mr. Kelly's argument is 
that, once the complaint for divorce was filed alleging irreconcilable 
differences in the marital relationship, he had no right, constitutional or 
otherwise, to remain married to Mrs. Kelly.  There was no question that the parties 
wanted the marriage dissolved.  To 
reiterate, at the time the district court entered the decree, Mr. Kelly had 
answered the divorce complaint by admitting a divorce was in order and asking 
the court to enter an order granting it to Mrs. Kelly.  It was not until after the district 
court entered the decree in accordance with the parties' requests that Mr. Kelly 
objected to its entry.  Had the 
district court not entered the decree as requested, and had Mrs. Kelly not 
become fatally ill, the matter would have proceeded to hearing and the district 
court would have granted the divorce and divided the property equitably between 
the parties.  The only difference 
would have been that Mrs. Kelly, rather than her personal representative, would 
have presented her case as to how the property should be divided.  Absent an allegation that awarding Mrs. 
Kelly the divorce somehow prejudiced Mr. Kelly in the property division, we 
conclude his property interest was not affected in an impermissible way when the 
district court entered the divorce decree dissolving the marriage and set the 
property division hearing for a later date.

 
 
[¶21]  Citing cases from other jurisdictions, 
Mr. Kelly contends the district court acted improperly when, without a hearing, 
it bifurcated the proceedings by granting the divorce and retaining jurisdiction 
to later divide the property.  
Wyoming does not have a statutory provision expressly authorizing courts 
to grant a divorce in one proceeding and determine an equitable division of the 
marital property in a subsequent proceeding.  However, the trial of issues separately 
is well accepted, such as in criminal cases where guilt and punishment are 
determined separately or personal injury cases where liability and damages may 
be separately tried.  Additionally, 
W.R.C.P. 56(c) and (d) expressly contemplate the rendering of judgment as a 
matter of law on some issues and a later trial on any remaining factual 
issues.  

 
 
[¶22]  Consistent with this practice, in Saunders v. Saunders, 464 P.2d 1020 
(Wyo. 1970), the district court heard evidence concerning the cause of the 
divorce first and evidence concerning the parties' finances and property some 
months later.  Similarly, in Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, ¶ 7, 74 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Wyo. 2003), the district court held a trial and issued a 
decision letter addressing child custody, visitation and child support.  When the parties were not able to agree 
on a final order, the district court bifurcated the proceedings by entering a 
decree of divorce dissolving the marriage and leaving all remaining matters for 
a future order.  Id.  Some months later, the court issued an 
order addressing custody, visitation, child support and the property 
division.  Most recently, in Eickbush v. Eickbush, 2007 WY 179, ¶ 3, 
171 P.3d 509, 510 (Wyo. 2007), the parties filed a stipulated motion to 
bifurcate the proceedings.  The 
district court granted the motion and entered a divorce decree without 
addressing the related issues of custody, visitation or property.  Subsequently, the court entered an order 
on those issues.  

 
 
[¶23]  In light of this precedent, we find no 
error in the district court's entry of the divorce decree and later 
determination dividing the property.  
The parties agreed the marriage should be dissolved, Mrs. Kelly requested 
an emergency hearing to grant the divorce because she was in poor health, the 
district court entered the decree when opposing counsel was not available for a 
hearing, and Mr. Kelly has not appealed the property division order.  Under these circumstances, we uphold the 
divorce decree.   

            

 [¶24]  Affirmed.  

[1] Mr. Kelly also 
filed a notice of appeal to this Court.  
We dismissed the appeal finding that the decree was not an appealable 
order because the district court had retained jurisdiction to divide the marital 
property; therefore, the order appealed did not resolve all outstanding 
issues.