Case Title: Hibsman v. Mullen

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0036

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN H. HIBSMAN, JR., Deceased: JASON HIBSMAN v. ROBERT "BOB" MULLEN and TRUDY HIBSMAN, REBECCA HIBSMAN and EMILY HIBSMAN2012 WY 139Case Number: S-12-0036Decided: 10/31/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN H. HIBSMAN, JR., Deceased:JASON 
HIBSMAN,Appellant(Former Personal 
Representative),v.ROBERT “BOB”  
MULLEN,Appellee(Personal 
Representative),andTRUDY HIBSMAN, 
REBECCA HIBSMAN and EMILY 
HIBSMAN,Appellees(Heirs).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
M. 
Gregory Weisz and Jodi D. Shea of Pence and MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. Weisz.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Robert Mullen, of 
Casper, WY.
No appearances 
entered for Trudy, Rebecca, and Emily Hibsman.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
HILL, Justice.
 
[¶1]      
Jason Hibsman (Appellant) appeals an order issued by the 
district court finding prima facie evidence for the Personal Representative of 
John H. Hibsman, Jr.’s estate to proceed in recovering “not 
less than $137,566.46” from Appellant.  Finding that this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, it is 
dismissed.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
Appellant states one issue:
 
1.    
Whether there was 
sufficient evidence presented at the September 9, 2011, hearing to find that 
[Appellant] concealed, embezzled, conveyed away and/or disposed of monies and 
other property of the Estate and whether the evidence presented at the September 
9, 2011 hearing supported the judgment entered against [Appellant] in an amount 
not less than $137,566.46.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
John H. Hibsman, Jr. died testate on June 22, 2008.  
His Last Will and Testament named his four adult children as his 
heirs.  The will was admitted to probate by the district court 
on December 23, 2008 and, consistent with his directive, his son Jason was named 
executor and personal representative of the estate, albeit six months after the 
elder Mr. Hibsman had passed.  During those six 
months, a dispute had ensued with another heir, Appellant’s sister Trudy 
Hibsman, who contested Appellant’s appointment as Personal 
Representative.
 
[¶4]      
After his appointment, Appellant hired attorney 
Michael Zwickl (now deceased) to represent him.  
The estate contained two properties which Appellant renovated and then 
petitioned the court for permission to list and sell.  Both 
properties sold, as did two of the decedent’s vehicles. 
 Appellant and his siblings distributed some of the 
estate property among themselves and, after holding a small estate sale, moved 
the balance of the decedent’s belongings to a storage unit in 
Casper.  Eventually, Appellant moved the contents of the 
storage unit to his home in Colorado.
 
[¶5]      
On October 18, 2010 Appellant’s attorney, Mr. Zwickl, filed an 
“Application for Allowance of Ordinary Fees for Personal Representative and 
Ordinary and Extraordinary Fees for Attorney for the Estate,” as well as the 
“Final Report, Accounting, and Petition for Distribution.”  An 
Exhibit “A” was attached to the final report that valued the estate’s “gross 
value” as $478,894.94.  The report showed expenditures of 
$358,466.26, including an advance distribution that Appellant made to himself 
for $16,998.82, and miscellaneous expenses of $195,452.21, $51.670.65 of which 
was paid to himself.  The report also asked the court to 
approve a final payment of $26,525.69 to Appellant and his attorney.  
Trudy Hibsman objected to the final report, and a hearing was 
set for November 17, 2010.
[¶6]      
Up to this point, Appellant had not complied with his statutory duty to 
give the district court an inventory of estate assets within the 120-day window 
provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-403(a) and 2-7-806 (LexisNexis 
2011).  A June 5, 2009 district court filing entitled, 
“Inventory and Appraisement” does not qualify to be an inventory of all assets 
as contemplated by the statute because it is an appraisal of a single residence 
owned by the decedent.  Along with no proper inventory being 
filed, the record lacks a proper application for partial distribution as 
required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-807 (LexisNexis 2011) and an application 
for authority to allow Appellant to pay himself for working on the estate under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-805 (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶7]      
On November 17, 2010 the district court held a hearing and removed 
Appellant as Personal Representative of his father’s estate.  
Appellant was not present at the hearing.  The court 
appointed Michael Zwickl, Appellant’s attorney, as the temporary/interim 
Personal Representative, froze the estate bank account, and prohibited the 
transfer of any estate asset without prior court approval.  In 
addition, the district court ordered Appellant to provide Mr. Zwickl 
with written statements for estate assets and incurred liabilities, verified as 
to truth and accuracy by Appellant, within ten days of the court 
order.
 
[¶8]      
On January 18, 2011, two months after being removed as personal 
representative, identifying himself as “formerly appointed personal 
representative,” Appellant filed an “Inventory of Estate” valuing the inventory 
at $411,111.50.
 
[¶9]      
Subsequently, attorney Robert Mullen was appointed by the district court 
as successor personal representative of the estate.  He filed 
his first interim report on February 10, 2011, to which the district court 
ordered the completion of probate beginning, to the extent possible, with an 
inventory and appraisal of estate assets.  On July 15, 2011 
attorney Mullen filed his second interim report.  In that 
report, Mullen alleged that Appellant had violated Wyoming Probate Statutes 
during his time as Personal Representative.  He alleged that 
Appellant had “failed to render his accounts in the manner prescribed by law and 
as required by the order of this Court, and that he has conveyed away or 
disposed of monies of the Estate.”  Mullen requested that the 
court, in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-3-136 and 2-7-412 and 
2-7-414 (LexisNexis 2011), “examine Jason Hibsman about the 
allegations contained in this Report, including but not limited to his handling 
of Estate monies and the payment of same to himself in order to ascertain the 
facts and the course best calculated to protect the interests of all 
parties[.]”
 
[¶10]   
In response, on August 24, 2011 the district court entered a notice of 
setting for a hearing on the second interim report and citation for Appellant. 
 The citation was issued ordering Appellant to appear before 
the court on September 9, 2011.  Appellant appeared at the 
scheduled hearing and invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify to most 
questions asked of him at the hearing.  He did testify that he 
had reviewed the second interim report and confirmed that he had exclusive 
access to the estate bank account.  Appellant declined to 
answer questions regarding disposition of estate assets, including what happened 
to $137,566.46 that was absent from the estate bank account.  
No other witness was called at the hearing, nor was any other evidence 
presented.  The district court advised Appellant that the 
court could apply appropriate adverse inferences to his silence. 
 Also, Appellant’s attorney explained that “we understand the 
nature of this proceeding is to understand what happened with the accounts 
related to the estate,” but were Appellant to “try to clarify for the court and 
for [Appellee] the accounting matters with the estate, he may run the 
risk of … criminal implications[.]”
 
[¶11]   
On January 5, 2012 the district court entered an order stating that 
Appellant concealed, embezzled, conveyed away and/or disposed of monies and 
other property of the estate and entered an order finding prima facie evidence 
of the right of the estate’s Personal Representative to recover an amount “not 
less than $137,566.46.”  This appeal followed.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]   
Although neither party to this appeal raised the issue of 
jurisdiction, this Court has a duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal.  Mathewson v. Estate of Nielsen 
(In re Estate of Nielsen), 2011 WY 71, ¶ 11, 
252 P.3d 958, 961 (Wyo. 2011) 
(quoting Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 
¶ 4, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 2006)). The existence of 
jurisdiction is a question of law and our review is de novo. 
 Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 8, 
248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011).  This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to 
appeals from final, appealable 
orders.  Plymale, ¶ 4, 
125 P.3d 1023.  See 
also, W.R.A.P. 1.04(a) and 1.05.
 
[¶13]   W.R.A.P. 
1.05 defines an appealable order as: 
 
(a)  An 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or
(b)  An 
order affecting a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding; or
(c)  An 
order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; or
(d)  An 
order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated 
in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is taken from such an 
order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal 
by another party; or
(e)  Interlocutory 
orders and decrees of the district courts which:
(1)  Grant, 
continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve 
or modify injunctions; or
(2)  Appoint 
receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.
 
[¶14]   
With W.R.A.P. 1.05 in mind, we no longer look at just whether 
or not an order was “final.”  Inman v. Williams, 2009 
WY 51, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 185, 189-90 (Wyo. 2009).  
Rather, we consider whether an order is “appealable.”  
As we mentioned in Northwest Bldg. Co., LLC v. Northwest 
Distrib. Co., 2012 WY 113, ¶ 27, 
285 P.3d 239, 246 (Wyo. 2012) (citing Public Serv. 
Comm'n v. Lower Valley Power & Light, 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 
1980), this Court has previously observed that an appealable order is “a judgment or order which 
determines the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future 
consideration.”
 
[¶15]   
In this case, we conclude that the order from which Appellant takes his 
appeal was made in a “special proceeding.” 
 See WJH v. State (In re 
Interest of WJH), 2001 WY 54, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Wyo. 2001), where we held:
 
In general terms, 
special proceedings are those which were not actions in law or suits in equity 
under common law and which may be commenced by motion or petition upon notice 
for the purpose of obtaining relief of a special or distinct type. State in 
Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 168 (Wyo. 1981). 
 They result from a right conferred by law together with 
authorization of a special application to the 
courts to enforce the right.  Id. 
 This court has recognized that, even in cases involving 
delinquency, proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act could be in lieu of 
proceedings under the general criminal procedure. 
 Id.
 
[¶16]   
We further stated in Inman, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 
190:
 
“'Special 
proceedings' is a term used to distinguish litigation that is not governed by 
the general regime of pleadings.’ … They are distinguished from other civil 
actions 
by the manner of pleading, practice and procedure prescribed by law.” 
 Barber v. Barber, 2003 OK 52, ¶ 6, 
77 P.3d 576, 579 (Okla. 2003); also see 39B Words and 
Phrases, “Special Proceeding” 416-447 
(2006); 1A C.J.S. Actions § 115 
(2005).
 
We 
are satisfied that the instant case involves a special proceeding as 
contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.05.  The court held a 
hearing, pursuant to notice and citation, for consideration of the second 
interim report of the Personal Representative.
 
[¶17]   
The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05, however, is 
that the order affects a “substantial right.”  We do not 
discern that a substantial right was affected here.  In our 
jurisprudence, the most prevalent cases affecting “substantial rights” in 
“special proceedings” are those dealing with parental rights and child custody 
or criminal defendants’ rights.  Obviously, that is not the 
case here.  There was no final judgment against Appellant, nor 
any criminal findings against anyone. 
 The proceeding 
appealed here merely determined a prima facie case that the Personal 
Representative could initiate litigation to determine if there was a wrongful 
taking of at least that amount of money.  Accordingly, this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to decide this matter on appeal.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶18]   
Although a special proceeding occurred, no substantial right of 
Appellant’s was affected by the district court’s decision, and thus this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear the instant case on appeal. 
 Accordingly, it is hereby dismissed.