Case Title: McCLEAN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-8

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCLEAN v. STATE2003 WY 1762 P.3d 595Case Number: 02-8Decided: 01/30/2003
October Term, A.D. 2002

 
 

 

MICHAEL 
LYNN McCLEAN,

 

Petitioner,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Respondent.

 

 

Petition 
for Writ of Review

from 
the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
T. Moxley of Gage & Moxley, LLC, Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Moxley.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; Lynne Callaghan, Student Intern; and Jonathan Davis, Student 
Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Davis.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This 
case involves a petition surrounding the conviction of Michael Lynn McClean 
(Petitioner) of driving with a suspended license and driving without proper 
regis­tration.  Specifically, 
this matter is before this court pursuant to a Petition for Writ of Review and 
involves solely an issue of statutory construction.  We affirm. 

 

 

 ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Petitioner sets 
forth the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  For 
the purposes of a criminal prosecution, must the statutory term of art, 
"dedicated to public use"found in W.S. § 31-1-101(a)(viii)be strictly 
construed to require that a "public highway" be formally or prescriptively 
created, according to the law of real property?

 

II.  Where 
the common area and driveways of a private mobile home park are neither publicly 
maintained nor formally dedi­cated to the public, did the circuit court and 
district court commit error of law when they found that traffic offenses 
occurred, respectively, on a "public highway of this state" and on "any 
highway?"

 

III.  Does 
permissive use by some members of the public, and by law enforcement, convert a 
privately owned, privately main­tained drivewayin a mobile home parkinto a 
"public high­way?"

 

Respondent 
State of Wyoming phrases the issue on appeal as:

 

Did the 
district court properly conclude that the definition of "highway" provided in 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-1-101(a)(viii), is unam­biguous and is clearly intended to 
include the road inside Ponderosa Village Mobile Home Park for the purpose of 
apply­ing Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-4-101 and 31-7-134?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On August 27, 
2000, Laramie County Sheriff Deputy Dave Skipper was at Ponderosa Village Mobile 
Home Park (Ponderosa Village) speaking with several children and handing out 
baseball cards.  While he was there, 
Skipper observed Petitioner driving a black motor­cycle from the south end 
of Ponderosa Village without the headlight illuminated.  Knowing that Petitioner's driving 
privileges had been suspended, Deputy Skipper stopped Petitioner.  Petitioner was unable to produce his 
driver's license, valid registration, or proof of insurance as requested.  Petitioner, therefore, was taken into 
custody for driving under suspension, operating a vehicle without proper 
registration, and failure to maintain liability insurance.1  In addition, Petitioner was cited for 
breach of the peace stemming from his behavior during the stop. 

 

[¶4]      Petitioner filed 
motions to dismiss the charges, arguing that the roads within Ponderosa Village 
are not "highways."  The parties 
stipulated that the roads are not publicly maintained; have never been formally 
dedicated to public use; are used by the public; and mail delivery and other 
services, including patrol by law enforcement, are provided to the tenants of 
Ponderosa Village via use of the roads.  
After the circuit court denied the motions to dismiss, the parties 
entered a conditional plea agreement.  
Pursuant to the agreement, Peti­tioner entered pleas of guilty to the 
driving under suspension charge and the registration charge, reserving the right 
to appeal.  The remaining two 
charges were deferred.  

 

[¶5]      On appeal, the 
district court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court, stating, 
in part:  

 

It 
is not contested that the road in question is not publicly maintained, but it is 
also not contested that the road is open for public use.  The road is an access route to the 
mobile homes in the area and is used by the postal service, law enforcement and 
the general public on a regular basis.

 

The 
statute [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-101(a)(viii)] is unambiguous.  The legislature clearly intended to 
include in the definition of highway roads like the one in question with the 
language "if not publicly maintained then dedicated to public use when any part 
is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel."  Defendant stretches the word "dedicated" 
to mean a formal dedication, but nothing in the statute supports that broad 
interpretation. 

 

This 
court then granted Petitioner's petition for writ of review on January 29, 2002. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      We have long 
recognized that conclusions of law, such as questions regarding statu­tory 
interpretation, are to be reviewed by this court de novo.  Hutchings v. Krachun, 2002 WY 98, 
 ¶10, 49 P.3d 176, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2002).  In Pagel v. 
Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶9, 57 P.3d. 1226, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Wyoming 
Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶¶16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, ¶¶16-18 (Wyo. 2001)), we stated:

 

In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to deter­mine the 
legislature's intent.  Fontaine 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  Legisla­tive intent must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last 
Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991).  When the words are clear and 
unambiguous, a court risks an impermissi­ble substitution of its own views, 
or those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to 
interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by 
the legislature. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.  Moreover, "[a]ll statutes must be 
construed in pari materia; and in ascer­taining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same 
general purpose must be con­sidered and construed in harmony."  Fontaine, 4 P.3d  at 894 
(citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d at 
735).

 

Therefore, 
in performing our review, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Parker Land 
& Cattle Company v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 
1993)).  A statute is clear and 
unam­biguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to 
agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Parker Land & Cattle, at 
1043. Conversely, a statute is ambigu­ous if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Id.  We have said that divergent opinions 
among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity.  Basin Electric Power Co-op. v. State 
Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1978).  However, the fact that opin­ions may 
differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court. 
Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Petitioner 
asserts that the district court erred by interpreting the term "highway" as 
embracing the common area of a mobile home park and that the district court's 
decision was without support in logic or precedent.  Petitioner cites Amrein v. State, 
836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo. 1992); Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 
1988); Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 224 (Wyo. 1997); and Haines 
v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 167, 13 P. 8 (1877), for the proposi­tion that if 
it is possible to reasonably construe the statutory definition of "highway" to 
exclude a privately-owned mobile home park, this court is bound to do so as a 
matter of law.  Further, Petitioner 
posits that the terms "dedicated" and "highway" are legal terms of art taken 
from property law and must be interpreted giving them their ordinary and 
accepted legal meaning.  

 

[¶8]      Petitioner argues 
that a "dedicated" public highway can be created only by formal action, which is 
absent in this case.  In particular, 
Petitioner protests that under the plain and ordinary meaning of the language 
used, a "public highway" can only be established if it is 1) a publicly 
maintained roadway, or 2) the roadway is formally dedicated by being 
officially platted and recorded and open for use by the public for 
purposes of vehicular travel.2   Peti­tioner emphasizes his 
view that a roadway must be both formally dedicated and open to 
public use before it can be deemed a "public highway."

 

[¶9]      Conversely, the 
State emphasizes that the words "dedicated to the public use" must be given 
their ordinary, obvious, and common meaning within the public's ken and general 
expectations regarding the obligations attending the operation of motor 
vehicles.  Thus, cit­ing 
Merriam Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1979), the State asserts 
that the word "dedicate" as used with the applicable Wyoming statutes should be 
construed to mean "set apart to a definite use."  Moreover, the State claims that the 
legislature, in adopting the appli­cable statutes, would not have required 
the public to resort to a legal definition of the term "dedicate" when 
assess­ing the obligations associated with the operation of motor 
vehicles.  

 

[¶10]   The ultimate determination of 
this case, therefore, turns on the definition of the word "highway" and, most 
particularly, whether the subject roadway within Ponderosa Village was a highway 
"dedicated to public use."  The term 
"highway" is defined in two separate statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-1-101(a)(viii) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-102(a)(xlix), respectively, as 
follows:

 

"Highway" 
means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly 
maintained or if not publicly maintained, dedicated to public use when any 
part is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular 
travel.

 

"Street 
or highway" means the entire width between the bound­ary lines of every way 
publicly maintained or if not publicly maintained, dedicated to public 
use when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for 
purposes of vehicular travel[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  

 

[¶11]   Considering the statutory 
definitions of "highway" set forth above, we find no ambigu­ity.  Upon simple reading of these definitions 
and application of the plain and ordi­nary meaning of those words, we 
clearly discern the legislature's intent that the term "highway" include a road 
that is either 1) publicly maintained, or 2) dedicated for public use 
in such a manner that any part is open for use by the public for purposes of 
vehicular travel.  We further 
determine that in a situation where a road is not publicly maintained, it is 
not required that the road be either formally statutorily 
dedicated, as asserted by Petitioner, or dedicated in common law as allowed 
under established Wyoming case law for the road to be deemed a "highway."3  Rather, in such an instance, the proper 
interpretation of the legisla­ture's intent is that the road merely be 
dedicated for public use through the opening of any part of it for use by the 
public for purposes of vehicular travel. 

 

[¶12]   Here, the facts as stipulated by 
the parties, establish 1) the roadways within Ponderosa Village are not 
closed to the public, 2) members of the public can drive into and around 
Ponderosa Village, and 3) mail delivery and other services, including 
patrol by law enforce­ment, are provided to the tenants of Ponderosa Village 
via these roadways.   Further, 
there are no signs or other indications that the roads in Ponderosa Village are 
private.  Hence, the intention to 
allow the public to use those roads for vehicular travel within Ponderosa 
Village has been clearly established.  
In addition, the public has exercised its ability to use these roads by 
traveling on them in their vehicles.

 

[¶13]   We recognize that the owner of 
Ponderosa Village, Mr. Lemmons, maintains in his 
affidavit:

 

1.  The 
driveway within Ponderosa Village, connected to a roadway within Ponderosa 
Village ("Gordon Road"), wherein Petitioner was stopped is not a public 
thoroughfare;

 

2.  This 
drive is solely for the use of tenants which he could close at any 
time;

 

3.  The 
roadways within Ponderosa Park are not open to the public for pur­poses of 
vehicular travel and are for the purposes of moving mobile homes, tenant access, 
and for the use of legitimate invited guests, and persons who have business 
within Ponderosa Village;  

 

4.  He 
has contemplated putting up signs which give notice of the private nature of the 
roads within Ponderosa Park;

 

5.  He 
regards anyone who is not a tenant and who drives on these roads with­out an 
invitation from a tenant as a trespasser; and 

 

6.  He 
has enlisted the assistance of law enforcement to remove 
trespassers.

 

These 
assertions, however, do not abrogate the fact that the roads within Ponderosa 
Village have been opened to the public for vehicular travel as contemplated by 
the statutory defini­tion of "highway."

 

[¶14]   Simply put, although Mr. Lemmons' 
statements are expressed in an apparent attempt to vitiate the established fact 
that the roads within Ponderosa Village have been used by the public for 
vehicular travel, these statements are ineffective.  Mr. Lemmons' statements that the 
driveway in question is not a public thoroughfare is countered by his own 
admission that this driveway is connected to Gordon Road, which has been 
formally statutorily dedicated for public use since 1923.  While Mr. Lemmons asserts his belief 
that he could close the driveway at any time, he has contemplated putting up 
signs giving notice of the private nature of the roads within Ponderosa Village, 
and he regards anyone who is not a tenant and who drives on these roads without 
an invitation from a tenant as a trespasser, this does not erase the well 
established fact that these roadways are open to the public for vehicular use.4

 

[¶15]   Petitioner also argues that Wyoming 
case law demands that this court provide Peti­tioner lenity as a criminal 
defendant in rendering its interpretation of the statutes at issue. However, it 
is clear that this case law precedent is only applied if the subject statute is 
deemed to be ambiguous.  As we find 
no ambiguity in the statutes at bar, the case law authority cited by Petitioner 
is inapplicable.  

 

 

 

[¶16]   Given those reasons set forth 
above, we affirm the order entered by the district court affirming the judgment 
and sentence of the circuit court finding Petitioner guilty of driving with a 
suspended license and driving without proper registration.  

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-4-101 provides:

 

(a)  No 
person shall knowingly operate, nor shall an owner knowingly permit to be 
operated, upon any highway any vehicle:

 

(i)  Unless 
a valid certificate of title or nontransferable certificate under W.S. 
31-2-102(a)(iii), certificate of registration and license plates or temporary 
permits have been issued for the vehicle except as otherwise provided by this 
act[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-134 
states:

 

(a)  No 
person shall drive a motor vehicle on any public highway in this 
state at a time when his driver's license, from this or any other jurisdiction, 
or nonresident operating privileges are cancelled, suspended or revoked under 
this act or any other law. 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

2As 
noted above, it is established in this case via stipulation of the parties that 
the roads within Ponderosa Village have never been publicly maintained. 

3We 
note that contrary to the position argued by Petitioner that dedication of a 
roadway mandates solely the statutorily defined formal action of officially 
platting and recording such roadway, this court has previously stated: 

 

[A] 
dedication is generally defined as the devotion of property to a public use by 
an unequivocal act of the owner, manifesting an intention that it shall be 
accepted and used presently or in the future.  When lots are being subdivided or 
streets are being defined, land may be dedicated for public use either through 
the statutory procedures for dedication or under common law. 

 

River 
Properties Partnership v. Willoughby, 
944 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Wyo. 1997) (citations omitted and emphasis added).  In addition, this court has recognized 
that:

 

 A common-law dedication requires an 
intention to dedicate expressed in some form, and an acceptance of the 
dedication by the proper public authorities, or by general public 
user.  It is distinguishable 
from a statutory dedication, which is in the nature of a grant, and from 
prescription which is based on a long period of use.  Generally a common-law dedication 
rests upon the doctrine of estoppel.  Statutory dedication generally vests the 
legal title to the grounds set apart for public purposes in the municipal 
corporation, while the common-law method leaves the legal title in the 
original owner.  

 

Town 
of Moorcroft v. Lang, 
779 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted and emphasis 
added).

 

4Arguably, 
Mr. Lemmons or any previous owner of Ponderosa Village may have been able to 
take advantage of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-306 (a)(vii), dealing with submission 
of subdivision permits at the county level, in attempting to insure the private 
nature of the roadways contained within Ponderosa Village not already 
statutorily dedicated for public use.  
This statute provides, in applicable part: 

 

If, 
however, the subdivider proposes to make any streets, alleys or roadways 
private, then the subdivider shall submit to the board properly acknowledged 
written certification that certain streets, alleys or roadways within the 
subdivision shall remain private and the board shall be under no obligation to 
repair, maintain or accept any dedication of such roads to the public use. 

 

However, 
the record on appeal is devoid of any information as to whether Mr. Lemmons or 
any other owner would have had such an opportunity under the 
circumstances.