Case Title: State v. Lotches

Citation: 

Docket Number: S40460

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
ERNEST NOLAND LOTCHES,
Appellant.

(CC 92-08-34431; SC S40460)
On automatic and direct review of the judgments of
conviction and the sentence of death imposed by the Multnomah
County Circuit Court.
William Snouffer, Judge.
Argued and submitted March 6, 2000.
Jeff Price, Los Angeles, argued the cause and filed the
brief for appellant.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With him on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General, Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney
General, and Lainie Block, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*
GILLETTE, J.
The judgments of conviction for aggravated murder on counts
1 and 2 are reversed.  The judgment of conviction for aggravated
murder on count 3 and the sentence of death are affirmed.  The
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
with respect to counts 1 and 2.
*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This criminal case is before us on automatic and direct
review from convictions for aggravated murder and a sentence of
death.  Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1997), repealed by Or Laws
1999, ch 1055, § 1.(1).  Following a jury trial, the trial court
entered a judgment finding defendant guilty of three counts of
aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one
count of attempted murder, one count of assault in the first
degree with a firearm, one count of robbery in the first degree,
and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, and imposed a
sentence of death.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse two
of the three convictions for aggravated murder and remand those
charges to the trial court for further proceedings.  We affirm
the other convictions and the sentence of death.

I.  SUMMARY OF FACTS
Because the jury found defendant guilty of all the
crimes charged, we view the evidence presented at trial in the
light most favorable to the state. See   State v. Thompson , 328 Or
248, 250, 971 P2d 879, cert den 527 US 1042 (1999) (stating
principle).
At about 2:30 in the afternoon on August 22, 1992,
defendant approached Hedges in O'Bryant Square near downtown
Portland.  While bantering back and forth with Hedges, defendant
pretended to be a police officer and frisked Hedges.  While
Hedges was bending over, defendant slapped Hedges on the back of
the motorcycle helmet that Hedges was wearing.  The slap was
unprovoked.  Hedges stood up and asked defendant what he was
doing.  Defendant then began shouting obscenities at Hedges. 
Hedges made an effort to calm defendant; defendant joined a
friend sitting on a nearby retaining wall.  Hedges kept an eye on
defendant and, when defendant and his friend walked away, Hedges
followed him.  After a few blocks, Hedges saw a Portland Guide,(2)Cramer, and told Cramer that he wanted to file a complaint
against defendant.
Cramer radioed to the Portland Guides headquarters and
to other nearby guides that a man had been assaulted by an
individual who was then near Pioneer Square.  Cramer described
defendant and asked for an officer to respond.  Two other unarmed
Portland Guides, Edwards and Calderon, spotted defendant walking
down the street and began to follow him at a distance of about
half a block.  They signaled to Riley, another unarmed Portland
Guide who happened to be nearby, and Riley, too, began to follow
defendant.  Defendant appeared to notice that he was being
followed and increased his pace.
William Hall, an armed EID officer, approached
defendant from the direction in which defendant was walking.  
Riley also converged on defendant.  Hall called out to defendant,
stating that he would like to have a word with him.  Defendant
then threw his hand up toward Riley in an apparent effort to
strike him.  Riley blocked defendant's swing.  Defendant ran
north toward Alder Street.  Hall, Riley, Edwards, and Calderon
began running in pursuit.
There is some dispute about precisely what happened
next but, by all accounts, defendant slowed down and Hall began
yelling, "He's got a gun.  Get down."  Shots were fired.  Most of
the witnesses to the episode could not say who shot first or even
where Hall was when the first shot was fired.  Riley testified
that he saw defendant pull a gun out of a paper bag and that no
shots had been fired before that moment.  A bystander, Gates,
testified that she heard a shot and then saw defendant pull a gun
out of the back of his pants.
In any event, during that incident, defendant raised
his gun, aimed it directly at Edwards, and shot at her.  Bullets
hit her in the left breast and in the right arm, fracturing a
bone and requiring surgery and the insertion of a metal plate. 
Riley dragged the wounded Edwards into a nearby shop and ran for
cover in the back of the store.  Hall engaged defendant in an
exchange of gunfire; two bullets fired from Hall's gun later were
recovered from inside the shop.
Defendant fled down Fourth Avenue with Hall in pursuit. 
Defendant ran up to a car stopped at a traffic light in which
Keaton and her 9-year-old grandson were riding.  Defendant came
up from behind Keaton, pointed a gun at her head through the
half-open window, and said something to the effect that "You are
going to take me somewhere."  Keaton responded, "No way," and
stepped on the accelerator.  The car stalled and Keaton
immediately began trying to unfasten her grandson's seatbelt and
shove him out the car door.  While Keaton was fumbling with the
seatbelts, she looked up and saw Hall standing in front of a
pillar along the street on the opposite side of her car, yelling
at defendant, directing him to get away from the car and "leave
the innocent alone."  According to Keaton, defendant then ceased
his efforts to get into her car and directed his attention to
Hall.  Meanwhile, the grandson unlocked the car door, got out,
and ran toward where Hall had been standing.  Keaton took the
keys out of the ignition and threw them down a sewer grate, and
then closed her eyes and waited.
Defendant began shooting in Hall's direction.  Hall
left the relative cover provided by the pillar and pulled
Keaton's grandson to safety.  He also shot out two of the tires
on Keaton's car and pushed two transients out of the line of
fire.  In the skirmish, defendant shot Hall twice.  One shot
entered and exited Hall's wrist.  The other, fatal, shot entered
Hall's arm, traversed his lungs, and penetrated his heart.
Defendant, himself uninjured, then fled down Stark
Street, hiding his gun behind his back.  He approached a pickup
truck stopped at a traffic light on Washington Street.  Reaching
through the window of the truck, he pointed his gun at the
driver's head and ordered the occupants out of the vehicle.  They
immediately complied.  Defendant then drove off, heading the
wrong direction down Third Avenue, a one-way street.  He sped
down that street, swerving to avoid oncoming cars.  He then drove
over the Burnside Bridge and turned onto Martin Luther King
Boulevard.  Defendant next attempted to turn onto Southeast
Ankeny, but he was driving too fast and was unable to negotiate
the turn.  The truck jumped the curb, hit a parked car and,
ultimately, came to a stop after crashing into some other parked
cars in an adjacent used-car lot.
A customer at the car lot who saw the crash went to aid
defendant.  He forced open the driver's-side door of the truck
and asked defendant if he was hurt.  Defendant answered no and
made an effort to get out of the truck from the passenger side. 
The customer asked defendant if he was going to run, and
defendant replied, "Hell, yes, I got to get out of here."  The
customer stepped aside, and defendant slid back to the driver's
side to get out.  By that time, several marked police cars had
arrived at the scene.  One of them, driven by Officer Elliot,
pulled up in the vicinity of the truck after having been flagged
down by an individual in front of the car lot.  After Elliot had
stopped his car, defendant reached back into the truck and pulled
out his gun.  Defendant turned and aimed the gun in Elliot's
direction and began walking toward him.  Defendant then stopped,
assumed a combat stance in which he squared off and held the gun
in front of him with two hands.  When Elliot realized what was
happening, he leaned away from defendant and put his car in
reverse.  Defendant fired at Elliot as he was backing up. 
Defendant then aimed and fired a second shot at Elliott that
narrowly missed him and struck the driver's seat of the police
car.
After shooting at Elliot, defendant began running
toward the corner of Ankeny and Grand Avenue.  He attempted
unsuccessfully to commandeer one vehicle, and then succeeded in
getting into a second one, which someone apparently had abandoned
in the middle of the street.  While defendant tried to start that
car, Elliot, now armed with a shotgun, approached defendant and
ordered him to drop his gun.  Defendant again briefly appeared to
consider fleeing.  However, by this time, he was surrounded by
other officers.  He threw down his gun and surrendered.
After he was taken into custody, defendant agreed to
give blood and urine samples.  Experts later extrapolated from
those samples that defendant probably had a blood-alcohol content
of approximately .17 percent at the time of the crimes.

II.  THE TRIAL
Defendant was charged in a ten-count indictment for his
conduct in connection with the foregoing events.  The first three
counts, discussed below, charged defendant with aggravated
murder, for intentionally killing Hall:  (1) during the course of
and in the furtherance of and in immediate flight from an
attempted robbery; (2) in the course of and in the furtherance of
and in immediate flight from an attempted second-degree
kidnaping; and (3) in an effort to conceal his identity as the
perpetrator of an attempted murder.  The other seven charges
concerned defendant's conduct with respect to Elliot, Edwards,
Riley, and the driver of the truck.(3) 
Defendant pled not guilty
to all charges.(4)After a jury trial, he was acquitted of one
count of attempted murder and convicted on all the other counts. 
After a penalty-phase proceeding, defendant was sentenced to
death.(5)

Defendant requests that this court grant him a new
trial and assigns 20 claims of error, all relating to the guilt
phase of his trial.  We have considered each of defendant's
assignments of error.  Several of those assignments were not
preserved for review or otherwise are not well taken.  Other
assignments of error present questions that do not warrant
discussion in this opinion because they have been resolved in
other decisions by this court.  We address the remaining issues
in the order in which the events giving rise to the assignments
occurred during the proceedings below.  As we shall explain, we
also address a matter that was not raised by defendant, but that
arguably constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record.


III.  SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT

Defendant argues that the first three counts of the
indictment, for aggravated murder, are impermissibly vague.  
Defendant did not demur to those charges, but argues nonetheless
that the trial court should have stricken them on its own motion. 
Those counts state:


" Count 1 "AGGRAVATED MURDER

"The said defendant, on or about August 22, 1992, in the
County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and
intentionally attempt to commit the crime of Robbery in the
First Degree and in the course of and in the furtherance of
and in the immediate flight from said crime which the said
defendant was attempting to commit, the said defendant
personally and intentionally did cause the death of another
human being, to-wit: William Hall, a person who was not a
participant in the crime, contrary to the Statutes in such
cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of
the State of Oregon,


" Count 2 "AGGRAVATED MURDER

"The said defendant, on or about August 22, 1992, in the
County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and
intentionally attempt to commit the crime of Kidnaping in
the Second Degree and in the course of and in the
furtherance of and in the immediate flight from said crime
which the said defendant was attempting to commit, the said
defendant personally and intentionally did cause the death
of another human being, to-wit: William Hall, a person who
was not a participant in the crime, contrary to the Statutes
in such cases made and provided and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Oregon,


 "Count 3 "AGGRAVATED MURDER

"The said defendant, on or about August 22, 1992, in the
County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and
intentionally, in an effort to conceal the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime of Attempted Murder, cause the
death of another human being, to-wit: William Hall, contrary
to the Statutes in such cases made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon[.]"

The state and federal constitutions give defendant the
right to be informed of the particular charges against him. 
Specifically, Article I, Section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to * * * demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof."  The Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
* * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation 
* * *."  In addition, ORS 132.550 requires indictments to contain
"[a] statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary
and concise language, without repetition, and in such manner as
to enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended."

Defendant argues that the aggravated murder charges in
the indictment in the first three counts fail to meet the
foregoing statutory and constitutional standards, because they
fail to state the particular elements and circumstances that make
up the offenses charged.  That is so, according to defendant,
because, in each case, the aggravated murder count fails to name
the victim or circumstances of the underlying felony.

Although defendant concedes that an indictment usually
is sufficient if it tracks the wording of the statute on which it
is based(6) (as the indictment in the present case does), he argues
that, in this case, more is required because the three aggravated
murder counts do not inform him of how or against whom the
attempted robbery, attempted second-degree kidnaping, and
attempted murder were alleged to have been perpetrated.  In
support of that proposition, defendant cites  State v. Sanders,
280 Or 685, 688-90, 572 P2d 1307 (1977), in which this court
observed that there are occasions when an indictment must state,
directly and with certainty, the particular circumstances of a
crime in order to bring a defendant within the condemnation of a
statute.(7)

Additionally, defendant argues that the vagueness of
the indictment impermissibly would permit the state to shift
theories of the case after indictment.  Defendant derives that
argument from the general rule that variance between the
indictment and the proof presented at trial is fatal if it
misleads a defendant in making a defense or exposes a defendant
to the risk of being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.(8) See   State v. Anderson, 241 Or 18, 21, 403 P2d 778 (1965) (stating
rule).  Defendant also asserts that the principle is analogous to
the requirement, which this court announced in  State v. Boots,
308 Or 371, 780 P2d 725 (1989), that jurors unanimously must
agree on a specific theory of the factual circumstances that
elevate a murder to aggravated murder.

As one illustration of the problem, defendant points to
Count 3 of the indictment, which alleges aggravated murder
committed to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of attempted
murder.  Defendant argues:

"On the basis of the evidence presented by the state at
trial, the attempted murder victim could have been
Anissa Calderon, Valencia Edwards, William Hall, James
Riley or Kim Keaton's young grandson as he ran to the
car toward where Mr. Hall was shot.  Because the
indictment is vague as to this material fact, the trial
court was unconstitutionally forced to guess on the
factual and legal theory found by the grand jury."

The state responds that an indictment is not required
to be as specific as defendant contends, and cites various cases
in which this court has held that persons' names, although
relevant, need not be pleaded specifically in an indictment. See, e.g.,  State v. Rood, 234 Or 196, 380 P2d 806 (1963)
(charging instrument need not specify names of purchasers of
lottery tickets in prosecution for sale of lottery tickets);  State v. Nussbaum, 261 Or 87, 94, 491 P2d 1013 (1971) (indictment
for crime of rioting need not include names of co-rioters).  In
addition, the state notes that defendant did not attempt to
clarify the matter for the jury by requesting special
instructions regarding the aggravated murder counts, nor did he
except to the instructions given.

The indictment itself indicates that defendant was
alleged to have committed more than one attempted robbery and
more than one attempted murder.  Moreover, the facts as proved at
trial would support more than one charge of kidnaping.  Under
those circumstances, we agree that defendant would have been 
entitled to require the state to specify which particular facts
and circumstances made up the underlying crimes on which the
charges of aggravated murder were based.  But that fact alone
does not justify overturning the indictment at this stage of the
proceeding.

Defendant did not demur or otherwise object to the
indictment.  This court often has held that objections to the
sufficiency of an indictment not timely raised are waived. See, e.g,  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 597, 789 P2d 1352 (1990)
(objection to indictment at end of trial was untimely);  State v.
Holland, 202 Or 656, 667, 277 P2d 386 (1954) (defendant who fails
to demur at time of arraignment waives objection to indictment). 
Defendant argues that this court should exercise its discretion
to consider his arguments as to the indictment's alleged
deficiencies, despite the failure to demur, either on the ground
that those deficiencies constitute error apparent on the face of
the record, ORAP 5.45(2), or on the ground that the indictment's
alleged deficiencies constitute a jurisdictional problem and,
therefore, may be raised at any time.

Error is apparent on the face of the record only when
"the legal point is obvious, not reasonably in dispute." State
v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355, 800 P2d 259 (1990).  Given that this
court repeatedly has held that an indictment that tracks the
wording of the statute is sufficient, we do not think that
defendant's legal point is so obvious that it can be said to
merit reversal, notwithstanding defendant's failure to object. 
Defendant's jurisdictional argument also is not well taken.

Our disposition of defendant's arguments concerning the
indictment does not end the matter, however.  In the course of
examining the record in this case concerning defendant's
challenge to the indictment, we have reviewed the jury
instructions that the trial court gave.  Those instructions do
not appear to clarify any of the matters that we have discussed.

That is, although the three aggravated murder counts were based
on three underlying felonies, the instructions did not identify
for the jury the victim or attendant circumstances applicable to
each of those underlying felonies or in any other way ensure jury
unanimity concerning those issues.

The foregoing discovery concerning the jury
instructions led this court to pose supplemental questions to,
and ask for additional briefing from, the parties.  The questions
were:

"1.  Did the jury instructions given in the
present case meet the specificity requirements for such
instructions established in  State v. Boots, 308 Or 371,
780 P2d 725 (1989)?  More specifically, was it
necessary for the instructions concerning each of the
counts of aggravated murder to require the jury to
agree as to the identity of the victim of the alleged
underlying felony and, if so, did the instructions meet
that requirement?

"2.  Assuming that the instructions in question
were not sufficiently specific, did defendant object to
the error?  If not, was the error apparent on the face
of the record under the rationale of  State v. Brown,
310 Or 347, 800 P2d 259 (1990)?"

Although the parties' briefs in answer to our questions vary
widely with respect to what consequences, if any, should flow
from the procedural facts, both sides appear to agree that:  (1)
the instructions in question did not identify the victim of the
alleged underlying felony with respect to any of the three counts
of aggravated murder; and (2) defendant did not make any
contemporaneous objection concerning those omissions.  We turn to
the parties' arguments concerning the legal effect of those
procedural facts.

The state argues that this court should not address the
matter for three reasons.  First, the state argues that the
failure of the instructions to specify the victim of the
underlying felony is not plain error, because this court never
has held that that sort of specificity is required and,
therefore, there was no violation of a firmly established legal
principle.  Second, the state argues that any error was harmless,
because there was no actual dispute or confusion at trial as to
the identity of the victims of the underlying felonies.  Third,
the state asserts that the trial court's instructions were
adequate in any event.

We address the last point first because, if the
instructions given were adequate, the other arguments are
irrelevant.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the
instructions were not adequate.

The starting point for our inquiry in this respect
begins (and ends) with Boots .  In that case, the defendant was
charged with aggravated murder based on two separate aggravating
factors, viz., the murder was committed in the course of a
robbery, and the murder was committed to conceal the identity of
the robbers.  308 Or at 374.  The trial court specifically
instructed the jurors that they were not required to agree
unanimously on any particular theory, so long as some combination
of the 12 jurors agreed that one or the other (or both) of the
alleged aggravating factors had been proven.  This court held
that that instruction was erroneous because, in order to convict
a defendant of aggravated murder, the jury must agree unanimously
on all the facts required by a particular subsection of the
aggravated murder statute, ORS 163.095. Id. at 377.  In reaching
that conclusion, the court stated:

"Of course[,] jurors cannot convict a defendant if they
unanimously agree that he intended to kill a person but
only half believe that he did so.  No more can they
convict if they unanimously agree that a defendant's
act caused a person's death but only half believed that
he acted intentionally.  The same is true if jurors
agree that a defendant's act caused a person's death
but do not agree that the defendant committed a felony,
or vice versa."

 Id. In addition, the court quoted with approval from United
States v. Gipson, 553 F2d 453 (5th Cir 1977), a case in which a
defendant was charged with being a person who "receives,
conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of" a stolen
vehicle in interstate commerce.  In that case, the trial court
had instructed the jury that they need not agree on which of
those acts the defendant had done.  The federal court ruled that
that instruction was erroneous, stating:

"Like the 'reasonable doubt' standard, which was found
to be an indispensable element in all criminal trials * * *, the unanimous jury requirement 'impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective
state of certitude on the facts at issue. * * *  The
unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in
substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did
as a step preliminary to determining whether the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Requiring
the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does
little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict
is protected unless this prerequisite of jury consensus
as to the defendant's course of action is also
required."

 Gipson, 553 F2d at 455-56 (citations and footnote omitted;
emphasis added), quoted in Boots, 308 Or at 380.

It is plain from the foregoing that the jury in the
present case properly could not have convicted defendant of
aggravated murder, for example, based on murder committed to
conceal one's identity as the perpetrator of attempted murder, if
half the jurors thought that defendant had attempted to murder
Riley and half thought that he had attempted to murder Edwards. 
As in the passage from Gipson that this court quoted with
approval in Boots, the unanimity rule requires that the jury
agree as to "just what defendant did" to bring himself within the
purview of the particular subsection of the aggravated murder
statute under which he was charged.

It is true that  Boots  is distinguishable factually,
because the trial court in the present case did not instruct the
jurors expressly that they could convict defendant in the absence
of unanimity respecting which underlying felonies defendant had
committed.  However, because the aggravated murder instructions
that were given did not either limit the jury's consideration to
a specified underlying felony or require jury unanimity
concerning a choice among alternative felonies, each instruction
carried the same danger that this court had condemned in Boots. 
We can perceive of no reasonable basis for refusing to apply the
rule of Boots to the present case.  As a legal matter, the jury
instructions were erroneous.

We turn next to the state's argument that any errors
that may have been committed in the jury instructions were
harmless.

At the outset, we note that that argument is based, at
least in part, on the fact that, in the state's view, the
prosecutor ensured jury unanimity by clarifying the matter for
the jury, in that he made clear in his closing argument that
counts 1 and 2 were based on defendant's robbery and attempted
kidnaping of Keaton and that count 3 was based on defendant's
attempted murder of Edwards.  This court previously has rejected
the notion that counsel may fill in the blanks to redeem an
erroneous jury instruction.  In Brown, 310 Or at 356, this court
stated that 

"neither the sufficiency of the evidence nor the
completeness of counsel's arguments concerning that
evidence is a substitute for the sufficiency of the
instructions.  As is usually the case, the trial court
cautioned the jury that what the lawyers argue is not
evidence and that it is the court's function to
instruct the jury as to the law."

In the present case as well, the prosecutor's arguments were not
a legally sufficient substitute for necessary jury instructions. The state's principal argument is that the present case
is distinguishable from Boots.  The state acknowledges that Boots requires jury unanimity on all material facts.  It argues,
however, that the names of the victims or the other details of
the underlying felonies in the aggravated murder charges in the
present case are not material facts and, therefore, need not be
identified to the jury.  The state contends that

"this is not a situation where there was any
possibility that any of the jurors could have found
that defendant by different acts in a different
location at a different time committed an attempted
robbery and kidnapping and then murdered Hall in
relation to those crimes.  The facts establish only a single attempted robbery and attempted kidnapping that
occurred at a discrete time and place by a single
series of acts.  The same is true for the attempted
murder, particularly given the jury's acquittal of
defendant on the second charge [that defendant
attempted to murder Riley]."

Implicit in the state's argument is the notion that, if
there is a possibility of jury confusion, the identity of the
victim or the circumstances of the underlying felony is information that is material and for which jury unanimity is
required.  The state merely assumes that it proved adequately the
underlying felonies and that there was no way that the jury could
have been confused as to what was being referred to as the
underlying felony in each count.  As our discussion of Boots indicates, we agree with the state's premise.  As the discussion
that follows will explain, however, we disagree with the state's
assertion that no juror confusion was likely.

We turn to an examination of each of the three
aggravated murder counts, to determine whether there was a
substantial likelihood of jury confusion as to the underlying
felony that was applicable to each count.  The first aggravated
murder count was based on defendant's intentional murder of Hall
in connection with his attempt to commit the crime of first-
degree robbery.  The state argues that the underlying felony
charged in this count refers to the robbery that occurred when
defendant tried to force Keaton to drive him away from the scene,
immediately before killing Hall.  That robbery was not charged
separately.  However, as noted, defendant was charged with (and
convicted of) robbery based on his hijacking of the pickup truck
immediately after he killed Hall.  In the absence of instructions
clarifying the circumstances of the particular robbery referred
to, it is impossible to determine whether, in convicting
defendant on the first count, the individual jurors believed that
defendant committed robbery with respect to Keaton or with
respect to the pickup truck.

The second aggravated murder count was based on the
intentional murder of Hall in connection with the crime of
attempted kidnaping.  As to that felony charge, both Keaton and
her grandson were possible victims.  The kidnaping also was not
charged separately.  Again, in the absence of explicit jury
instructions, jury unanimity on a particular attempted kidnaping
victim was not ensured.

Finally, the third aggravated murder count was based on
the intentional killing of Hall to conceal defendant's identity
as the perpetrator of attempted murder.  As noted, defendant was
charged separately with two counts of attempted murder -- one
involving Edwards and the other involving Riley.  The state
asserts that the attempted murder referred to in the third
aggravated murder count was the Edwards crime.  The only way in
which that notion was conveyed to the jury, however, was in the
prosecutor's statement to the jury.  As the court concluded in Brown, that statement was not a substitute for the sufficiency of
the instructions. Brown, 310 Or at 356.  Because nothing in the
instructions respecting the third count required the jury
unanimously to decide whether defendant was attempting to conceal
his identity as the perpetrator of the attempted murder of
Edwards or of Riley, the instructions also were erroneous
respecting that count.

Unlike the errors respecting the instructions on the
first two counts, however, we agree with the state that the error
in the instructions respecting the third count was harmless.  The
jury acquitted defendant of the attempted murder of Riley (10-2),
but it unanimously convicted him of the attempted murder of
Edwards.  Because that conviction proves that all 12 jurors
agreed that defendant attempted to murder Edwards, that
conviction provides the predicate for defendant's conviction on
the third count of aggravated murder.

Having concluded that there was error in the
instructions concerning all three counts of aggravated murder and
that the errors respecting the first two of those counts were not
harmless, we turn to whether the errors respecting the first two
counts of aggravated murder were "apparent on the face of the
record."

We hold that they were.  The elements of "error
apparent on the face of the record" are that:  (1) the error is
one of law; (2) the point of law is obvious, i.e., is not
reasonably in dispute; and (3) the error is not one respecting
which the court must go outside the record or select among
competing inferences. Brown, 310 Or at 355.  The first and third
elements are not really at issue; the question of what must be
included in a jury instruction is a question of law, and what was
or was not included is determined readily by examining the
instructions that were given.  Therefore, the only issue is
whether the errors were "obvious."

We conclude that they were.  It has been clear in
Oregon, at least since Boots, that a jury must be instructed
concerning the necessity of agreement on all material elements of
a charge in order to convict.  The factual distinctions between
the present case and Boots are not such that a court reasonably
could doubt what its duties respecting jury instructions would
be.

In summary, we hold that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury fully respecting the three counts of
aggravated murder.  We further hold that, with respect to the
first two of those counts, the error was not harmless.  We hold
that the error was harmless with respect to the third count. 
Finally, we hold that, although defendant did not object at the
time, the errors respecting the first and second counts were
apparent on the face of the record.  Defendant's convictions for
aggravated murder respecting the first two counts must be
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.  However, because we do not reverse defendant's
conviction for aggravated murder on the third count, we proceed
to examine defendant's other assignments of error.


IV.  JURY SELECTION

Defendant raises three assignments of error arising out
of the jury selection process.  First, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in rejecting his for-cause challenge to one
juror, Nunez, who had expressed his personal views in favor of
the death penalty.  Second, defendant contends that the trial
court erred in excusing for cause two other prospective jurors,
Warren and Robotham, who expressed their personal opposition to
the death penalty.  Third, defendant claims that the prosecutor
improperly vouched for his case during the voir dire process by
stating that he "anticipated" that defendant would be found
guilty of aggravated murder and that there would be a penalty
phase to the trial.  We do not consider that third assignment of
error, because it was not preserved in the trial court and, in
any event, this court rejected that precise claim in  State v.
Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 526-27, 789 P2d 1326 (1990) (prosecutor's
statement to effect that "I anticipate" there will be a penalty
phase to the trial held not to constitute improper expression of
belief in the defendant's guilt).  For the reasons that follow,
we also conclude that neither of defendant's other jury selection
arguments is well taken.

Jurors may be challenged for cause on the basis of,
among other things, actual bias.(9) ORCP 57 D(1)(g) (incorporated
by reference and made applicable to criminal trials in ORS
136.210(1)).  The determination whether a prospective juror
actually is biased is a factual question "to be determined by the
trial court in the exercise of its discretion." Montez, 309 Or
at 574-75; ORCP 57 D(1)(g).  Because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the challenged prospective juror's
demeanor, apparent intelligence, and candor, that court's
judgment as to a prospective juror's ultimate qualifications is
entitled to great weight. Montez, 309 Or at 575; Lambert v. Srs.
of St. Joseph, 277 Or 223, 228-29, 560 P2d 262 (1977). 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed
absent a finding of "a manifest abuse of * * * discretion." Nefstad, 309 Or at 528.

As this court stated in Montez, "[a] prospective
juror's approval of or opposition to the death penalty alone is
not determinative of whether the juror may serve as a juror or
must be excused.  The question is whether the prospective juror's
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his or her duties if selected as a juror."  309 Or at 575.  The
trial court makes that determination by looking at the totality
of the potential juror's voir dire testimony to discern whether
it suggests the "'probability of bias.'" Nefstad, 309 Or at 537
(quoting Lambert, 277 Or at 230).

Defendant argues that Nunez should have been excluded
for cause, because he had expressed a general view in favor of
the death penalty for individuals convicted of aggravated murder. 
However, as explained above, the fact that a juror favored the
death penalty would not necessarily disqualify the juror from
serving as a juror.  The question, then, is whether there is
evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion
that Nunez could serve as a fair and impartial juror.  There is
such evidence.

Both in his questionnaire and in his response to
defense counsel questioning, Nunez responded that he did not
believe that the death penalty was appropriate in all cases of
aggravated murder.  He also expressed his belief that he could
put aside his feelings regarding the death penalty and make a
decision in the case on the basis of the evidence and the court's
instructions.  His voir dire examination does not establish that
he was biased against defendant personally or that he was unable
to follow the law.  The trial court was entitled to believe that
Nunez would be a fair and impartial juror.  We find no error.

Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion (and therefore erred) in excluding Warren and Robotham
on the state's for-cause challenge.  Defendant argues that the
record with respect to each juror demonstrates that they could
have put aside their personal opposition to the death penalty,
fairly heard the evidence, and followed the court's instructions. 
Defendant argues that, under Gray v. Mississippi, 481 US 648, 107
S Ct 2045, 95 L Ed 2d 622 (1987), the improper exclusion of a
juror never is harmless error and that, therefore, he is entitled
to a new trial.

The issue, again, is whether there is evidence in the
record to support the trial court's determination that Warren and
Robotham would not be fair and impartial.  Our review of the
record satisfies us that there was ample evidence to support the
trial court's conclusion as to each of those jurors.

Warren expressed significant hesitancy in her ability
to impose the death penalty.  In her jury questionnaire, she
indicated that she was "not sure" of her feelings about the death
penalty.  During the voir dire examination, she stated that she
was neither for nor against the death penalty but, upon
questioning by defense counsel, she explained,

"I wouldn't think I could make a decision if someone
should die or not.  I feel that's God's decision.  If
it should be, it should be.  But I don't think I could
ever condemn somebody to death.  I don't think I
could."

On further inquiry from defense counsel, Warren stated that she
would follow the court's instructions with respect to the four
death-penalty questions.  However, when the prosecutor and the
trial court probed her views, Warren repeatedly stated that she
did not think that she could make the decision to sentence
someone to death, regardless of the evidence.  In response to
defense counsel's efforts to rehabilitate her, Warren ultimately
stated, when asked if she could vote "yes" to the penalty-phase
questions, "I could do it, yes.  Yes, I could do it."

At the conclusion of the voir dire examination, the
trial court excused Warren for cause.  The court ruled:

"I am going to grant the state's motion despite
the answer to the last question.  It is pretty apparent
to me that Ms. Warren's beliefs have changed since she
did fill out the questionnaire.  Her beliefs are such
that they would substantially interfere with her
ability to decide the questions that will be put to her
in the penalty phase of the case."

In response to defendant's continued objection to excusing
Warren, the trial court explained its ruling in further detail:

"I realized her response to the last question.  I
did note that.  My problem is, I guess among other
things, it is pretty clear to me she pretty much would
agree with any proposition put to her on the issue. 
Just judging her responses to the questions from both
sides, the problem that she has with conscientious
beliefs are such that she did pretty clearly, and to me
more forthrightly, indicate that she would not consider
properly the possibility of deciding to impose a death
sentence based on her beliefs.

"I think that her responses, what she said
earlier, she would try to follow the court's
instructions and the law that applies to the case are
the more honest answers to the questions put to her. 
In essence, in the final analysis, even saying she
could try to put aside her beliefs, she indicated that
she really could not vote for the question in the
affirmative.  It is clear to me that her views would be
such that she would be pretty substantially impaired in
terms of following the legal requirements."

The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court gave
due consideration to all of Warren's statements and, based on
those statements and on the court's observation of her demeanor
and candor, determined that she would be unable to be fair and
impartial.  Because of the contradictory nature of Warren's
various responses, we think it particularly important to defer to
the trial court's determination. See  Nefstad, 309 Or at 538
(according trial court's conclusions great weight under similar
circumstances).  The record supports the trial court's factual
findings respecting Warren's ability to perform her role as a
juror.  We find no error.

Robotham also expressed contradictory views concerning
the death penalty.  In his jury questionnaire, he indicated
strong disagreement that most murderers should receive the death
penalty, expressed no opinion whether he could vote to impose the
death penalty, and indicated that he had such strong feelings
against the death penalty that he would be unable to be fair and
impartial.  During voir dire, Robotham stated that,
philosophically, he opposed the death penalty, explaining,
"[a]side from the fact that an innocent person could be
convicted, I am basically opposed to the State taking a life."

During questioning by defense counsel, Robotham
moderated the foregoing statements by repeatedly answering that
he thought that he would be able to answer the four death-penalty
questions fairly and impartially, and that he thought that he
would be able to follow the court's instructions.  On further
questioning by defense counsel, Robotham indicated that he had
changed his mind since completing the voir dire questionnaire and
had changed his "no opinion" response to the question whether he
could vote for the death penalty to "Yes, I think I could" vote
to impose the death penalty.

In answer to the prosecutor's questions whether
Robotham thought that his strongly-held views against the death
penalty substantially would impair his ability to have a role in
executing defendant, Robotham answered:

"Well, I guess all I could say is I make an effort
to follow the law.  I think a completely open mind is a
myth.

"* * * * *

"But that's all -- I would make an effort to give
an impartial judgment."

On further questioning by the prosecutor, Robotham
emphasized repeatedly that, although he would make every effort
to be fair, he could not say for sure whether his opposition to
the death penalty or even the presence of defendant in the
courtroom for a few weeks might impair his ability to follow the
law.  Moreover, when asked to consider the matter in terms of
percentages, he estimated that there was a 60 percent chance that
he could put his feelings regarding the death penalty aside. 
Finally, during further questioning by defense counsel, the
following interchange took place:

"Q. [I]f you felt the State had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt on all four questions yes, could you
vote yes on all four questions based upon evidence and
the instructions?

"A.  Well, again, I think I could.

"Q.  You would try your hardest?

"A.  Again, I don't feel comfortable to say yes or no. 
I think I could.

"Q.  So basically you are saying, given everything we
discussed, all the questions [the prosecutor] asked you
and I asked you and the judge told you, do you think
you can be fair to both sides in this case given the
issues of the death penalty?

"A.   Yes."

The trial court granted the state's motion to excuse
Robotham for cause.  In so doing, the court stated:

"I find that even though he has indicated that he would
try to set aside his personal beliefs against the death
penalty, he did indicate that he would have a 60\40
percent difficulty in setting aside his opinions and
that is certainly a substantial infringement upon his
capacity to follow the court's instructions and follow
the law that applies."

Again, the trial court, having had the opportunity to
observe Robotham's demeanor and to listen to the tone of his
answers, was in the best position to determine whether Robotham
would be able to be a fair and impartial juror.  The trial court
concluded that Robotham's strong opposition to the death penalty
would prevent him from following the court's instructions,
notwithstanding his firm and sincere commitment to try to do so. 
As our recitation of the record shows, there was evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion.  We find no error.


V.  DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY

Defendant contends that the trial court denied him his
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf and,
accordingly, that he is entitled to a reversal of his
convictions.  A brief recitation of the facts pertinent to the
resolution of this issue is helpful.

During the trial, defendant advised the court several
times that he wished to testify.  Nonetheless, the question as to
the circumstances under which and the effect to which defendant
would testify was a frequent subject of discussion among the
lawyers, defendant, and the court.  On one such occasion toward
the end of the defense case (May 27, 1993), one of defendant's
lawyers informed the court that defendant wished to testify
before one of the psychiatric witnesses was called to the stand. 
Defendant's other lawyer also advised the court that defendant
wished to testify that day, and defendant himself so advised the
court.  The trial court replied that, because of their travel
schedules, two psychiatric witnesses would testify that day
instead and that defendant could testify "tomorrow or next week
or whenever."  Later that day, defendant reiterated, "I do state
here that I do want to take the witness stand though."  At the
conclusion of the psychiatric testimony, court adjourned until
June 7, 1993.

On June 7, 1993, the court heard testimony from three
witnesses for the defense and one witness for the prosecution. 
Defendant did not state that day his intention to testify.  The
next day, June 8, 1993, after testimony from one defense witness,
the court called a recess.  Then, in open court, outside the
presence of the jury but in front of defendant, the prosecutor,
the court, and defense counsel engaged in an extended discussion
concerning the defense's intention to rest its case.  Defense
counsel informed the court that it intended to rest its case with
the proviso that it might still call a certain witness for
surrebuttal.  Neither defendant nor his counsel stated on the
record or otherwise suggested in any manner that defendant still
wished to testify.  When the jury was called back into the
courtroom, the trial judge informed the jury, in front of
defendant, that the defense had rested its case.  Again,
defendant remained silent.

The prosecution proceeded with rebuttal witnesses.  At
the conclusion of that testimony, the state advised the court
that it had two remaining witnesses for the next morning.  Still,
defendant said nothing about testifying, and the court adjourned.

The next morning, June 9, 1993, the court and the
parties addressed some procedural matters, the state called its
last two witnesses, and the state rested.  At no time during the
foregoing did defendant mention wanting to testify.  After the
state rested its case, defense counsel advised the court about a
possible surrebuttal witness.  Neither defense counsel nor
defendant said anything about testifying.  After a brief recess,
the defense recalled one of its psychiatric witnesses for a brief
surrebuttal.  After that witness was finished, defense counsel
advised the court that defendant "may want to testify."

At that point, the trial court and defendant engaged in
a lengthy colloquy, during which defendant asserted that it was
his recollection that the trial judge had told him earlier that,
if he wanted to testify, he would have to "wait until the last
person to testify."  The court responded, correctly, that he had
told defendant no such thing.  Nonetheless, defendant insisted
that that was what he had understood from the statements made to
him by the court and that was the reason that he had been sitting
silently waiting for the conclusion of the trial.  Additionally,
he stated:

"[N]ow I would like to testify here.  But I would want
to sit down and confer with my attorneys tonight before
I do that, because I want to go over the questions and
what have you with them, because they haven't done that
with me yet.

"And I think that again, for the record, I would like
to say that both my attorneys have been somewhat
reluctant to have me get up and testify on my own
behalf, while I've wanted to get up and testify on my
own behalf.  What their reasons are for not wanting me
to testify, I don't know, but I think that I have the
constitutional right to testify in my behalf, in my own
defense."

The court responded that, earlier, there had been a
discussion about the ground rules for any testimony by defendant
and that the lawyers were supposed to have researched the extent
to which defendant would be allowed to make a speech as opposed
to answering questions, and the extent to which the prosecutor
would be allowed to cross-examine defendant.  The court pointed
out that defendant had said nothing further concerning the matter
and that his side had rested.  When defendant protested further,
the court replied, "Well, I'm also hearing you say that you
haven't made a final decision as to whether you're going to
testify, and if so, what you're going to say, because you said
something a moment ago about conferring with your attorneys this
evening."

The court advised defendant and his counsel that it was
calling a recess for the day and suggested that "you all go on
upstairs and talk about it."  The court expressly left the matter
open until the next day, but reminded defendant that, if he chose
to testify, his testimony would be subject to the rules of
evidence that apply to any witness.

When the court reconvened the next morning, defense
counsel advised the court that they "spoke to [defendant] last
night, and he expressed to us he would like to address the
court."  With that brief introduction, defendant personally
addressed the court and expressed his concern that, if he
testified, his testimony would be limited within a certain
"scope."  He told the court that, given the other evidence that
had been admitted in the case, "it would seem to me I would be
able to go over all the issues of my entire life, because my
entire life has been brought out before this court, before this
jury, and I don't see where the restrictions come in at."  In
response, the court summarized the status of the case and once
again advised defendant:

"[I]f you were to testify, you'd have to comply
with the rules of evidence that apply to every other
witness who testifies in court.  And you presented your
defense earlier in the week and rested, and then the
state put on its rebuttal testimony, and then [the
surrebuttal witness] testified yesterday, and
essentially the case is closed.

"And only after the case was fully closed did you
present the issue last night about wanting to testify,
and as I understood it, you still had not discussed
with your attorneys what it was you intended to say,
which was what the situation was on May 27th as well."

Defendant then repeated his view that he had "the right
to be able to testify to anything that pertained to my life, you
know, especially before this jury, because right now my life is
at stake, and I think if my life is at stake here, then I should
be able to convey to the jury everything that has taken place
within my life, everything that has happened to me."

The court, defendant, and his lawyers again engaged in
a lengthy exchange in which defendant continued to assert, and
the court to deny, that defendant had been misled into waiting to
testify on his own behalf.  During that discussion, the state
asserted that defendant should have to make an "offer of proof"
as to the content of his testimony.  In response, defendant
simply reasserted his constitutional right to "tell their side of
the story."  At no time during that discussion did defendant
indicate a willingness to testify subject to the rules of
evidence.

At the conclusion of that exchange, defense counsel
conferred off the record with defendant.  Then defense counsel
advised the court, in defendant's presence, that, under the
circumstances, i.e, considering the topics that defendant wanted
to address, the fact that his testimony would be limited by the
rules of evidence and subject to the prosecution's cross-examination, and his lawyers' advice not to testify, defendant
had elected not to testify and not to make an offer of proof. 
Defendant's lead lawyer stated:

"Your Honor, I've just spoken with [defendant].  I
did advise him that if he wished to take the witness
stand, make an offer of proof on what it is that he
would like to say, and in spending some time with him
last night, I think we spent about an hour, hour and a
half, you know, talking with him, essentially what he
would intend to say would be to basically give a
rendition of his entire life through and up to the 22nd
of August.  And as I indicated to [defendant] last
night, and I indicated to him just now this morning,
that would certainly open up all of these areas for
[the prosecutors] to cross-examine on.

"I also explained to [defendant] that he would be
under the rules, particularly whenever we talk about
the Evidence Code, Rule 403, relevancy, he'd also be
under some restrictions.  He couldn't talk about what
other people said, because those would be hearsay
statements, so he would be under the same rules as any
other witness.

"I believe he does understand that, and I also
pointed out to [defendant] that if he did choose to
take the witness stand, while I would have to, as his
lawyer and advocate, attempt to ask him questions to
lead him through the testimony, he would certainly be
doing so against my advice, and against the advice of
my co-counsel * * *.

"That all being said, [defendant] does inform me
that he has said to the court what he's wished to say
to the court, and that he has nothing further to say to
the court.

"And so with that, I would at this time formally
close the defense case, except for our motions."

Defendant added nothing further on the subject and the court
submitted the case to the jury without any further evidence.

Defendant contends that the foregoing colloquies
between himself, his lawyers, and the court establish that he
repeatedly and unequivocally informed the court that it was his
wish to testify in his own defense, that he never waived the
right to testify, that defense counsel unilaterally rested the
defense case before defendant had the opportunity to testify, and
that he "protested his attorney's actions on the record." 
Defendant argues that the state and federal constitutions
guarantee him the right to testify in his own defense(10) and that
the law is clear that that right is personal to the defendant and
cannot be waived by counsel.(11) See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463
US 745, 751, 103 S Ct 3308, 77 L Ed 2d 987 (1983) (defendant has
the "ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case, as to whether to * * * testify in his or her
own behalf").  Because of the apparent conflict between defendant
and his lawyers concerning the matter, defendant argues, the
trial court had a duty to conduct a hearing to determine whether
defendant in fact wished to exercise his right to testify or
whether defendant instead acceded to his counsel's advice not to
testify.  According to defendant, the trial court's failure to
conduct such a hearing constitutes reversible error.  Defendant
also contends that, even if he were found to have waived his
right to testify at the time when his lawyer rested the defense
case, the trial court abused its discretion and denied defendant
due process of law when it failed to allow him to reopen his case
so that his testimony could be received.

The state, in response, agrees with defendant that a
defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf in a
criminal prosecution and that the right is personal to the
defendant, but it argues that the colloquies summarized above
establish that, as a factual matter, defendant, with the
assistance and knowledge of counsel, knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to testify.
 
After reviewing the record, we agree with the state
that the trial court was entitled to conclude that defendant had
waived his right to testify in his own behalf at the close of the
defense case.  Although it is true that, at various times,
defendant had expressed a desire to testify, he remained silent
at all critical moments when his lawyers and the court discussed
resting the defense case.  Given defendant's loquacious
participation in earlier discussions on the topic, his silence at
that moment spoke volumes.  Defendant does not argue that trial
courts have an affirmative duty to determine whether a silent
defendant has knowingly and intentionally waived his
constitutional right to testify.  Indeed, defendant concedes that
the courts do not have such a duty.(12) Accordingly, when
defendant's counsel rested the case in open court, without
calling defendant to testify or notifying the court of his desire
in that regard, the trial court was permitted to assume that
defendant and his lawyers mutually had decided that defendant
would not testify.

That defendant now insists that he had not meant to
waive his right to testify does not alter that conclusion.  This
is not a proper forum for an inquiry into the content of
defendant's private conversations with his lawyers or whether the
lawyers actually were acting in accordance with defendant's
wishes.  Such questions are more appropriately addressed, if at
all, in a future post-conviction proceeding.  We consider the
facts as they appeared to the court at the time when the defense
rested.  Because defendant remained mute while his lawyers rested
the defense case, the court was entitled to assume and, as is
apparent from the court's remarks, did in fact assume that
defendant acquiesced in his lawyers' actions.

Additionally, the record does not support defendant's
assertion that the trial court separately denied defendant the
right to reopen the case so that his testimony could be received. 
It is apparent from the trial court's remarks to defendant on the
second-to-last day of the trial that defendant would have been
permitted to testify the next day if he had been willing to
follow the rules of evidence.  Defendant conferred with his
lawyers on the matter and defendant's lead counsel informed the
court that defendant "does inform me that he has said to the
court what he's wished to say to the court, and that he has
nothing further to say to the court."  Defendant does not contend
that the trial court should have allowed him to testify without
restrictions.  Under the circumstances, then, defendant waived
his right to testify a second time at the conclusion of the
trial.  The trial court did not deny defendant his right to
testify; there was no error.


VI.  EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

Defendant makes seven different arguments concerning
the trial court's assertedly erroneous admission or exclusion of
evidence.  For the reasons that follow, none of those arguments
is well taken.

A.  Exclusion of Audiotape 

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
excluding an audiotape of an interview, which was offered to
rehabilitate the credibility of a defense witness regarding the
exchange of gunfire between defendant and Hall near Fourth and
Alder.  On the day after the shooting, the witness, Gates, told
both a police investigator and a defense investigator, in
separate interviews, that she was standing on the corner of
Fourth and Alder Streets when she heard someone shout, "Oh, he's
got a gun," that she then looked around, heard a gunshot, and, after hearing the gunshot, saw a man who later was identified as
defendant pull a gun out of the back of his pants.  During her
examination at trial, however, Gates retreated from her prior
statements.  She testified that, on reflection, she was not
absolutely sure whether she had heard the gunshot before or after
she saw defendant pull out the gun.  The trial court allowed
defendant to introduce the notes of the police investigator who
had interviewed Gates on the day after the shooting, which
confirmed what Gates had told the investigator concerning the
order of events.  However, the trial court excluded an audiotape
of Gates's interview with the defense investigator, in which
Gates had conveyed the same information.

In a later discussion outside the presence of the jury,
defense counsel argued that Gates's tape-recorded statement was
admissible to rehabilitate her credibility and to substantiate
her prior consistent statement.(13) In response, the prosecution
argued that Gates's tape-recorded statement was cumulative and
irrelevant.  The trial court ruled that, because Gates had
testified at trial to the fact that she had told the police
investigator and the defense investigator immediately after the
event that she had heard the gunshot before seeing defendant pull
out his gun, there was nothing to rehabilitate.  The trial court
did not permit the jury to hear the audiotape.

Defendant repeats in this court his argument that the
trial court erred in excluding the tape, because the tape was
admissible under OEC 801(4)(a)(B) as a prior consistent statement
"offered to rebut an inconsistent statement or an express or
implied charge against the witness of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive."  At trial, Gates testified that
she did not become unsure of her recollection until after she had
been interviewed by the Deputy District Attorney in the case. 
Defense counsel argued that Gates's memory problem was a result
of an improper motive stemming from pressure put on her by the
prosecutor's office.  Further, defendant now argues that, while
the police report that was admitted gave a written version of her
earlier statements, that report could not capture the demeanor
evidence that defendant was attempting to elicit with the
audiotape and, therefore, the audiotape was not merely cumulative
of either Gates's prior trial testimony or of the report. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's alleged error
was not harmless, because it showed that decedent Hall fired at
defendant first, before defendant pulled his gun from his pants,
and such evidence bolstered defendant's trial theory that
defendant was not the initial aggressor and was justified in
acting in self defense.(14)

Under the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC), evidentiary error
is not presumed to be prejudicial.  OEC 103(1).  A defendant in a
criminal case assigning error to the exclusion or admission of
evidence must establish that the error was not harmless.  Article
VII (Amended), of the Oregon Constitution, requires appellate
courts to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary
error, if there is substantial and convincing evidence of guilt
and little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. State
v. Van Hooser, 266 Or 19, 23-26, 511 P2d 359 (1973) (affirming
convictions despite statutory error, holding that constitutional
provision does not permit reversal if "there was substantial and
convincing evidence of guilt [and] the error committed was very
unlikely to have changed the result at trial").  Under the United
States Constitution, the court must determine whether the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California,
386 US 18, 24, 87 S Ct 824, 17 L Ed 2d 705, 710-11 (1967).

In this case, we need not consider the merits of
defendant's argument concerning the admissibility of the
audiotape under OEC 801(4) because, after carefully reviewing the
record, we conclude that defendant has failed to show that any
error in excluding the tape was likely to have affected the
verdict.  As noted, at the trial, Riley testified that defendant
had pulled out his gun before the first shot was fired and Gates
testified that she had told the investigators after the incident
that defendant had pulled his gun out after the first shot was
fired.  However, all of the witnesses to the exchange of gunfire
at Fourth and Alder (including Gates) testified that the words,
"He's got a gun," preceded the first shot.  Moreover, all of
those witnesses who knew decedent Hall testified that it was Hall
who uttered those words.

The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the fact
that, before any shot was fired, Hall exclaimed that defendant
had a gun, was that Hall felt that either he or others nearby
were in danger from defendant and his gun.  Under those
circumstances, it would not matter whether Hall or defendant
fired the first shot.  If Hall perceived that defendant was about
to use his gun, Hall would have been justified in firing the
first shot, which undercuts defendant's self-defense theory. 
Thus, even if the trial court erred in excluding the audiotape
from evidence, there is little likelihood that the error affected
the verdict.  We conclude that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

B.  Exclusion of Testimony as to Victim's Character 

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the admission of
testimony of Hancock, who had been Hall's supervisor when Hall
worked as a police officer for the City of Boardman.  Defendant
wished to elicit testimony about specific instances of Hall's
past conduct which, he claimed, tended to show that Hall was
reckless and dangerous, and acted outside of established rules
and procedures for police work.  Defendant claimed that evidence
of that conduct was relevant to his self-defense theory, because
it supported his contention that Hall had initiated the gunfight
that resulted in his death.  The prosecution objected that
Hancock's testimony was not relevant.  The trial court sustained
the objection on the grounds that Hancock's testimony would be
both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, inasmuch as it tended to
blacken Hall's character.

Defense counsel then called Hancock to the stand in an
offer of proof.  Hancock testified that he had trained Hall in
1987 (approximately five years before the shooting), when Hall
was a probationary police officer for the Boardman Police
Department.  Hancock testified that he felt that Hall was
performing inadequately as a police officer and recounted two
instances in which Hall had been called to a situation that had
called for an arrest, but either had failed to request backup or
to make an arrest.  He also testified that he had had no reason
to believe that Hall was a violent or aggressive person.

At the conclusion of the offer of proof, the trial
court adhered to its previous ruling.  Among the reasons for its
ruling, the court stated:

"You haven't got the evidence * * * to rise to the
level of habitual conduct that this was his habitual
response to overreact, which is kind of what you are
arguing here.

"You have got two instances in Boardman some time
between January of '87 and later in the fall of '87 and
that doesn't rise to the level of habitual behavior on
the part of Mr. Hall."

Under OEC 404(2)(b), evidence of a pertinent character
trait of the victim of a crime, offered by an accused, is
admissible for the purpose of proving that the victim acted in
conformity therewith.(15) The trial court concluded that Hancock's
testimony about two instances, five years earlier, in which Hall
had failed to follow police procedure, did not establish a
character trait for acting in a reckless, erratic, or dangerous
manner and, therefore, was not relevant.  We agree with that
assessment.(16) The trial court correctly excluded Hancock's
testimony.

C.  Exclusion of Evidence Pertaining to Insanity Defense 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
limiting the testimony of defense witness Jurdem, a public
defender who had represented defendant in various proceedings in
Colorado, and in excluding two letters from Colorado physicians
to Jurdem.  In the guilt phase of the trial, defendant asserted
an insanity defense, "based in part on prior Colorado court
adjudications that he was legally insane."  The state had
introduced evidence from several Colorado State Hospital
physicians that defendant had faked mental illness during his
examinations in Colorado and that he was, in fact, sane.  In
response, defendant wished to call Jurdem, who would have
testified to an alleged bias on the part of two of the doctors,
Doyle and Hufaker, who had diagnosed defendant as a malingerer. 
Through Jurdem, defendant also wished to introduce letters to
Jurdem from two other Colorado physicians in which those
physicians alleged the existence of a pattern of institutional
bias in the Colorado State Hospital that predisposed its doctors
to misdiagnose its mentally ill patients as malingerers.  Those
letters did not address defendant's particular case.

The state objected on relevance grounds, arguing that
it did not intend to call either Doyle or Hufaker and that none
of the witnesses whom it did intend to call would rely on any of
Doyle's or Hufaker's statements or reports.  The trial court
agreed with the prosecution that the evidence was not relevant;
the court ruled that Jurdem could testify only about his opinion
of the doctors who were called to testify.  However, the court
stated that it would reconsider the matter if the evidence became
relevant at some future point in the trial.

Analyzing the matter on a statutory level, we agree
with the state that defendant's proffered evidence of bias of a
non witness was not relevant.  Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to prove a fact at issue in the dispute.  OEC 401. 
Defendant has not shown how Jurdem's opinion concerning the
credibility of the two Colorado doctors who had diagnosed
defendant as malingering would have had any tendency to affect
the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses who
testified for the state in its case-in-chief.  Moreover, the
trial court gave defendant an opportunity to establish relevance
by showing that the state's mental health experts had relied on
those doctors' conclusions in forming their own opinions, but
defendant never established that necessary link.  The trial court
did not err in limiting Jurdem's testimony.

In this court, defendant makes a supplementary,
constitutional argument, asserting that evidence of bias always
is relevant and that the trial court's exclusion of the evidence
violated his rights under the compulsory process and the
confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  Defendant did not raise those constitutional
arguments before or during trial, nor is any error of law of that
kind apparent on the face of the record.  We decline to consider
the constitutional objections for the first time on review.  ORAP
5.45(2);  see also State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 253, 839 P2d 692
(1992) (declining to consider constitutional arguments not raised
in trial court).

We further hold that the trial court did not err in
excluding the letters to Jurdem regarding an alleged pattern of
institutional bias in the Colorado State Hospital.  Those letters
were offered to prove the truth of their contents.  The authors
were not called to testify and the state had no ability to cross-examine them.  Accordingly, the letters properly were excluded as
hearsay under OEC 801(3).(17) Moreover, the letters did not address
defendant's particular circumstances and, therefore, were not
sufficiently connected to the circumstances of the defendant to
be relevant.

D.  Admission of Decedent Hall's Last Words 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting statements made by the murder victim, Hall, after he
had been shot.  Calderon, who had witnessed the gunfight,
testified that she ran to Hall after he had been shot and that,
before dying, Hall had said, "I don't want to die. * * * I love
my kids.  I love my family, and I really love my wife.  I don't
want to die."  Defense counsel objected to that testimony on
hearsay grounds, to which the prosecution responded that the
statement was a dying declaration admissible under OEC
804(3)(b).(18) The trial court overruled the objection.

Later, defense counsel clarified his objection,
claiming that the statement did not meet the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule, because Hall's statements did not
concern the causes or circumstances of his impending death.  Both
the trial court and the prosecutor then asserted that the
statement met the hearsay exception for an "excited utterance"
under OEC 803(2).(19) The prosecutor also contended that the
statement was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.  OEC 801(3).  Rather, the
prosecutor argued, the statement tended to establish Hall's state
of mind and thereby rebut defendant's assertion that Hall was the
aggressor in the gunfight.  The trial court overruled defendant's
objection a second time, without specifically stating the basis
for its ruling.

In this court, defendant repeats his contention that
the trial court erred in admitting Hall's dying statement because
it was not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. 
The statement, however, was not hearsay as defined in OEC 801(3). 
The statement was made outside of court, but the "matter
asserted" in the statement, Hall's feelings about not wanting to
die, and his love for his family, was not at issue in the case. 
As the prosecutor contended before the trial court, the statement
was offered for a purpose other than establishing the truth of
its contents, such as establishing Hall's character as a
peaceable family man.

Defendant argues, alternatively, that the statement was
inadmissible because it was not relevant, OEC 402, its probative
value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, OEC 403, and its
admission violated various of defendant's constitutional rights. 
Defendant, however, did not make any of those arguments to the
trial court and may not do so for the first time here.  ORAP
5.45(2).  An objection to the admission of evidence on one ground
does not preserve an objection on other grounds.  State v. Isom,
313 Or 391, 406, 837 P2d 491 (1992).

Defendant concedes that he did not preserve his claims
under OEC 402 or OEC 403, but asserts that this court should
review the claims nonetheless as plain error.  As we already have
had occasion to observe, error is 
"plain" only when "the legal
point is obvious, not reasonably in dispute." Brown, 310 Or at
355.  In this case, 
the error, if any, does not rise to that
level.


Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."  OEC 401.  This court has
stated that OEC 401 is a minimal requirement for the admission of
evidence; evidence is relevant even if it only slightly increases
or decreases the probability that a material fact exists.
 State
v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 86, 969 P2d 1013 (1998) cert den ___ US
___, 120 S Ct 977, 145 L Ed 2d 928 (2000).  Under that low
standard, we cannot say that Hall's dying statement was
irrelevant to his character for peaceableness, which defendant's
self-defense theory placed at issue.  It may be that the
statement's minimal probative value was outweighed substantially
by its unfair prejudicial effect.  As this court stated in  Barone, "generally, evidence is unfairly prejudicial under OEC
403 if it appeals to the preferences of the trier of fact for
reasons that are unrelated to the power of the evidence to
establish a material fact."  328 Or at 87.  Certainly, Hall's
dying statement was inflammatory, inasmuch as at least one of its
effects likely would have been to appeal to the jury's sympathies
for Hall, the victim.  Nonetheless, we do not view the matter as
so obvious that it is not reasonably open to dispute. 
Accordingly, we hold that the error, if any, was not one that is
apparent on the face of the record.

E.  Admission of Documents 

Defendant assigns error to the trial court's decision
to admit various documents offered by the prosecution:  a list of
books and pamphlets on weapons, combat tactics, terrorist
activities, and false identification that defendant wanted to
purchase; an order of post-prison supervision, which defendant
was carrying when he was arrested, forbidding defendant from
carrying weapons; and a letter that defendant had written to
prison officials in early 1992, explaining why he should be
eligible for good-time and work release, together with the letter
defendant had received from prison staff in response, stating
that the reason for his ineligibility was his failure to complete
a drug and alcohol treatment program.  At trial, defendant
objected to the admission of those documents on the grounds that
they were irrelevant, cumulative, and unfairly prejudicial.  The
trial court overruled those objections on all three grounds.

Before this court, defendant repeats those arguments
and asserts other, unpreserved, reasons why the exhibits should
have been excluded.(20) It is not necessary to discuss at length
whether any of those arguments is meritorious because, in each
instance, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish that
the error, if any, was prejudicial.  As noted above, evidential
error is not presumed to be prejudicial; in order to prevail, a
defendant must establish that the error was not harmless.  OEC
103(1).  Error is harmless if there is little likelihood that it
affected the verdict.  In the present case, the jury had heard
evidence of defendant's extensive criminal background, including
his 17 convictions for violent felonies, such as armed robbery
and escape.  Because the jury already had heard that evidence, it
was highly unlikely to have convicted defendant of aggravated
murder on the basis of his possession of a list of books on
weapons or a post-prison supervision order stating that he was
not to carry weapons.  Moreover, the jury was made aware of
defendant's chemical dependency during the course of the trial. 
Indeed, defendant claimed in his defense that his .17 percent
blood-alcohol level at the time of the crimes mitigated his
culpability, and his medical experts testified that his drug and
alcohol abuse was a mechanism to self-medicate his paranoid-schizophrenia.  Under those circumstances, we cannot say that the
jury was likely to have convicted defendant on the basis of a
letter disclosing that defendant failed to complete a substance
abuse program.  Consequently, we reject defendant's arguments.


VII.  IMPROPER PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing
to declare a mistrial after one of his expert witnesses, Dr.
Plazak, informed the court that the prosecutor was communicating
with a juror about Plazak's testimony.  Plazak, a psychiatrist,
testified in support of defendant's insanity defense.  In an in
camera session after he had concluded his testimony, Plazak
testified that, during his testimony, one of the prosecutors had
been making gestures indicating disbelief, such as head-shaking,
scoffing, and laughing, toward one of the jurors in the first
row.  Plazak complained that, toward the end, the prosecutor's
actions became so intense as to be seriously distracting. 
Defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that Plazak's testimony
was critical to his insanity defense and the prosecutor's actions
improperly could have tainted Plazak's credibility.  
Alternatively, defendant asked the court to direct the prosecutor
to stop his actions and to give a curative instruction to the
jury to disregard his actions any of the prosecutor's facial
expressions and gestures.

The trial court denied the motion.  The court had not
seen the prosecutor gesticulating.  Moreover, the court stated
that, in its experience, lawyers who behave disrespectfully or in
an inappropriate or obnoxious manner in the courtroom do more
harm to their own cases than to those of their opponents.  In
response, defendant asked to be allowed to question the juror to
whom the prosecutor's gestures appeared to have been directed. 
The trial court declined to interrupt the proceedings for that
purpose, reasoning that it would tend to overemphasize the
matter, particularly if the juror had not seen the prosecutor's
gestures or if the juror had not been influenced by them.

In this court, defendant argues that, in gesturing to a
juror, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the state's case by
commenting on and impugning Plazak's credibility.  Further, he
contends that the prosecutor, by his conduct, violated
defendant's due process rights under the United States
Constitution and his right to a fair trial under Article I,
sections 11 and 20, of the Oregon Constitution.  For those
reasons, according to defendant, the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to declare a mistrial.

At the outset, we note that defendant did not raise
either of the constitutional objections at trial.  We will not
consider them for the first time on appeal.  We review the trial
court's decision not to declare a mistrial for abuse of
discretion.  State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24, 791 P2d 836 (1990). 
We use that standard because the trial judge is "in the best
position to assess and to rectify the potential prejudice to the
defendant."  State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 164, 786 P2d 161
(1990).  As this court stated in Smith :

"The question thus is not whether this court would have
granted a new trial to defendant, but whether the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to do so.  Even
if we find the prosecutor's remarks to be improper,
tasteless, or inappropriate, we will not find an abuse
of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion
for a mistrial unless the effect of the prosecutor's
remarks is to deny a defendant a fair trial."

310 Or at 24;  see also   State v. Simonsen, 329 Or 288, 300, 986
P2d 566 (1999)  cert den ___ US ___, 120 S Ct 822, 145 L Ed 2d 692
(2000) (approving principle).  We hold that the same standard
applies to the prosecutor's alleged nonverbal conduct.

In this case, we note that the trial judge did not
observe the prosecutor's alleged inappropriate gesturing
personally.  The trial judge determined, however, that, in the
overall context of the trial, it would be more prejudicial to
defendant to call any additional attention to the conduct than
simply to let it pass.

Because the trial court clearly was in the best
position to consider the effect of the prosecutor's alleged
gesticulations on all of the participants, that court's
perception of the comparative effects of that conduct and any
remedy that the court might have fashioned is entitled to
deference, even though that court did not observe that conduct. 
The trial court's comments on the matter satisfy us that that
court adequately considered the potential for prejudice to the
defendant and took steps to minimize the prejudice.  Assuming the
prosecutor's conduct to have been as improper as Plazak asserted,
that conduct was not so prejudicial that the trial court's
decision not to grant a mistrial or to question the allegedly
affected juror can be said to have denied defendant a fair trial. 
We find no abuse of discretion and, therefore, no error.


VIII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNINGTHE DURESS DEFENSE

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury on the applicability of the defense of duress
to the first two counts of aggravated murder based on the
underlying felonies of robbery and attempted kidnaping.  As
noted, we have reversed the convictions on those two counts
because the jury instructions failed to ensure jury unanimity as
to the circumstances of the underlying felonies.  Accordingly, we
do not consider the assignments of error pertaining to the trial
court's jury instructions on the defense of duress.


IX. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCETO SUPPORT CONVICTIONS

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support his convictions on counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8, and,
therefore, that the trial court erred in denying his motions for
judgment of acquittal on those counts.  In his brief to this
court, defendant specifically addressed the sufficiency of the
evidence with respect to count 1.  With respect to counts 2, 3,
and 5, defendant incorporates by reference the arguments he made
to the trial court.  Defendant does not mention or incorporate by
reference any argument with respect to counts 6 and 8.

As discussed, we have reversed defendant's convictions
on counts 1 and 2; there is no need to consider defendant's
sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments with regard to those
counts.  We have reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence on
counts 5, 6, and 8.  We conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to support the convictions on those counts and that
further discussion is not warranted.  We turn to defendant's
arguments with respect to count 3.

This court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence solely to determine whether a rational factfinder,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,
and accepting all reasonable inferences and credibility choices,
could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994).  The
issue is not whether this court would have found defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the evidence is sufficient
for the jury to so find. Id. 

Count 3 alleged that defendant killed Hall in an effort
to conceal his identity as the perpetrator of the crime of
attempted murder.  With respect to that count, defendant argued
to the trial court that, because he committed the attempted
murder in broad daylight in front of numerous witnesses, the jury
reasonably could not have inferred that he had murdered Hall in
an effort to conceal his identity as the perpetrator of that
crime.

The state responded that there was no evidence that any
of the witnesses knew defendant's identity, and there was
evidence that defendant was attempting to flee the scene of the
attempted murder when he shot and killed Hall.  From that, the
state argued, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant was
attempting to avoid capture and thereby attempting to conceal his
identity when he killed Hall.  We agree that the jury was
entitled to draw the inference that the state described. 
Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support the
conviction on count 3.


X.  REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

As noted, defendant makes several additional
assignments of error.  We have considered all of them and every
argument made in support thereof.  Any assignment of error or
argument not discussed in this opinion either has been discussed
by this court in previous cases and resolved against defendant,
was not preserved on appeal, or is not well taken.  Further
discussion of the issues would not benefit the bench or bar. 
Accordingly, we hold that no error occurred as claimed in any of
the remaining assignments of error.

The judgments of conviction for aggravated murder on
counts 1 and 2 are reversed.  The judgment of conviction for
aggravated murder on count 3 and the sentence of death are
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings with respect to counts 1 and 2.



1. Judgments of conviction and sentences of death now are
subject to automatic review in this court under ORS 138.012(1). 
In enacting ORS 138.012(1), the legislature renumbered the
statute that described the court's reviewing authority in death
penalty cases, but made no substantive change to that authority. 
That statutory change does not affect the analysis or disposition
of this case.

2. The Portland Guides is an unarmed unit of the Economic
Improvement District (EID), a program funded by a confederation
of Portland merchants to provide security and information to
visitors to the city.  Portland Guides carry radios and wear
distinctive green caps, blue slacks, and white shirts.  EID has
its own officers, who wear blue caps, blue slacks, and blue
shirts.  EID officers carry weapons.

3. 
A fourth count charged defendant with attempted
aggravated murder for his actions with respect to Elliot, a
police officer.  A fifth count charged defendant with the
attempted murder of Edwards.  A sixth count charged first-degree
assault with a firearm based on defendant's shooting of Edwards. 
A seventh count charged defendant with the attempted murder of
Riley.  An eighth count charged defendant with first-degree
robbery for taking the pickup truck at gunpoint.  A ninth count,
also for first-degree robbery of a vehicle, was dismissed before
trial.  Finally, a tenth count charged defendant with being a
felon in possession of a firearm.

4. In his opening statement, defense counsel acknowledged
to the jury that the evidence would show that defendant had
killed Hall and shot Edwards, but asserted that the evidence also
would show that, during the entire episode, defendant was
attempting to get away from Hall who, in a panic, initiated the
gunplay and began to chase defendant, shooting wildly.  Defense
counsel also suggested that the evidence would show that
defendant was intoxicated and suffered from a mental disease or
defect at the time of the crimes.

5. Defendant was sentenced to death on the three counts of
aggravated murder.  He was sentenced to consecutive prison
sentences totaling 198 months for the convictions on the other
counts.

6. See, e.g.,  State v. Fair, 326 Or 485, 490, 953 P2d 383
(1998) (racketeering indictment sufficient although it did not
set out with particularity the nexus among the predicate
offenses);  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 597, 789 P2d 1352 (1990)
(aggravated murder indictment alleging aggravating factor of
concealment of other crimes sufficient, although it did not set
out the elements of those other crimes).

7. In Sanders, this court held that an indictment charging
burglary was insufficient, despite the fact that it tracked the
wording of the statute, because it did not specify what crime the
defendant had intended to commit when he entered the dwelling in
which the burglary was committed.

8. In that connection, defendant also contends that the
indictment, as worded, was not sufficiently specific to permit
him to assert double jeopardy as a defense to any subsequent
prosecution for attempted robbery, attempted kidnaping, or
attempted murder, involving victims other than those involved in
the felony charges underlying the aggravated murder charges.  In
response, the state correctly points out that ORS 131.515 bars
the state from charging defendant for offenses arising out of the
"same criminal episode."  "Criminal episode" is defined in ORS
131.505(4) as "continuous and uninterrupted conduct that
establishes at least one offense and is so joined in time, place
and circumstance that such conduct is directed to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective."  It is not
subject to dispute that all of the crimes with which defendant
potentially could have been charged in this case arose out of the
same criminal episode.

9. "Actual bias" is defined in ORCP 57 D(1)(g) as "the
existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror that
satisfies the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that
the juror cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice
to the substantial rights of the party challenging the juror."

10. In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44, 107 S Ct 2704, 97 L Ed
2d 37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that the right
to testify on one's own behalf in a criminal trial is "one of the
rights that 'are essential to due process of law in a fair
adversary process.'" 483 US at 51, 97 L Ed 2d at 46 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 US 806, 819 n 15, 95 S Ct 2525, 45 L
Ed 2d 562 (1975).  The Court in Rock explained that the right to
testify has "sources in several provisions of the Constitution,"
including the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no one shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law, the Sixth
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause guarantee of the right of a
criminal defendant to call witnesses, and the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against compelled testimony. Id. at 51-53, 97 L Ed 2d
at 46.  In addition, the right to testify on one's own behalf is
guaranteed under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, which provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel * * *."

11. We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the right
to testify under the Oregon Constitution also is personal to the
defendant and may not be waived by counsel, although, to date,
this court has not had occasion to consider that precise
question.

12. In light of defendant's concession, which we accept, we
do not address the issue separately.

13. Defendant asserted that, during the trial, Gates
sounded muddled and confused, whereas, in the interview tape,
Gates sounded sure and confident.  Defendant argued that the jury
should have been able to hear Gates's voice when she clearly and
consistently gave the investigator information about the
shooting.  We decline to characterize how Gates sounds on the
interview tape, because the correctness of the trial court's
ruling does not depend on it.

14. Defendant also argues that the audiotape was admissible
under OEC 803(5) as a recorded recollection and that exclusion of
the audiotape violated certain of his state and federal
constitutional rights.  Those arguments were not preserved and we
do not consider them.

15. OEC 404(2)(b) provides:

"Evidence of a person's character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving that the person
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except:

"* * * * *

"(b) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same * * *."

16. Moreover, the proffered testimony also was
inadmissible, because defendant failed to offer it in a
permissible form.  Proof of a character trait of a victim must be
given in the form of an opinion; only on cross-examination is it
permissible to inquire into specific instances of conduct.  OEC
405(1).  That section provides:

"In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may
be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony
in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances
of conduct."

Here, Hancock did not testify as to his opinion of Hall's general
reputation for dangerousness or recklessness and, in fact,
specifically denied that Hall was a violent or aggressive person. 
Instead, Hancock's testimony described two specific instances of
conduct.  Under OEC 405(1), that type of evidence could have been
elicited only on cross-examination.

17. OEC 801(3) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."

18. OEC 804(3)(b) provides that the following is admissible
when the declarant is unavailable:

"A statement made by a declarant while believing
that death was imminent, concerning the cause or
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be
impending death."

19. OEC 803(2) provides that the following hearsay
statement is admissible, even if the declarant is available as a
witness:  "A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition."

20. In the context of his discussion of the admissibility
of the list of books and pamphlets, defendant argues at length
that the recently added subsection (4) of section 404 of the
Oregon Evidence Code does not apply either to review in this case
as a whole or to that issue in particular.  OEC 404(4) expands
the admissibility of certain other-crimes evidence in criminal
cases.  However, because we hold that the admission of the
challenged documentary evidence, even if found to be erroneous,
would constitute harmless error, we need not address the
potential applicability of OEC 404(4).