Case Title: State v. Halton Flowers - Rape

Citation: 

Docket Number: 36036-2009

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2011-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36036-2009 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
HALTON FLOWERS, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
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Boise, February 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No. 30  
 
Filed: March 17, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Bannock County.  The Hon. Peter C. McDermott and the Hon. Robert 
C. Naftz, District Judges. 
 
The judgment and order of the district court are affirmed. 
 
Silvey Law Office, Ltd., Kuna, for appellant.  Greg S. Silvey argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Lori A. Fleming 
argued. 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant challenges his sentence for statutory rape and the denial of 
his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he had not been 
advised of the requirement that he register as a sexual offender.  We affirm the judgment and the 
order of the district court. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Twenty-four-year-old Halton Flowers (Defendant) was charged with three felonies:  
raping a sixteen-year-old girl in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6101(1); committing lewd conduct 
upon a fourteen-year-old girl in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508; and attempting to commit 
lewd conduct upon a fifteen-year-old girl in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-306 and 18-1508.  All 
three crimes were alleged to have been committed in August 2007. 
 
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The State and Defendant agreed to a plea agreement under which Defendant would plead 
guilty to the rape charge, the State would dismiss the other two charges, and the State would 
recommend a sentence of ten years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with three 
years fixed and seven years indeterminate.1  Pursuant to that plea agreement, Defendant pled 
guilty to the rape charge on October 27, 2008, and the other two charges were dismissed. 
On December 15, 2008, the district court sentenced Defendant on the rape charge to 
fifteen years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with five years fixed and ten years 
indeterminate.  The following day Defendant filed a motion to reduce the sentence pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules.  The court heard that motion on January 26, 2009, and 
denied it.  Defendant filed a notice of appeal on December 31, 2008. 
On September 25, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c).  He alleged that he should be permitted to withdraw the plea because 
the district court had not complied with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) by informing him of the 
requirements to register as a sexual offender.  The court denied the motion by order issued on 
November 10, 2009.2  That order was included in the appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
11(c)(9) as an “order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or the 
state.” 
 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A.  Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea? 
B.  Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing sentence? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Defendant’s Motion to 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea? 
                                                 
1 A defendant is required to serve the fixed portion of the sentence and is then eligible for parole during the 
indeterminate portion. 
2 Judge Naftz heard and decided Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and Judge McDermott was the 
presiding judge in the prior proceedings. 
 
 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) states:  “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made 
only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest 
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw defendant’s plea.”  “The rule distinguishes between pleas made prior to 
and after sentencing, exacting a less rigorous measure of proof for presentence motions.”  State 
v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55 (1993).  To withdraw a guilty plea prior to 
sentencing, the defendant must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea.  Id.  If he does so, 
then the State may avoid the granting of the motion by showing that prejudice would result if the 
plea were withdrawn.  Id.  A showing of manifest injustice is necessary in order to withdraw a 
guilty plea after sentencing.  “A motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after sentencing will 
only be granted to correct manifest injustice.”  State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 
1193, 1195 (2007). 
 
1.  Defendant must show manifest injustice.  Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea nine months after the district court sentenced him.  Defendant contends that the motion 
should be considered as having been made before sentencing because the sentencing was void.  
According to Defendant, “the court never actually accepted the plea of guilty after it had made 
the determinations required by I.C.R. 11(c) or adjudged him guilty of the crime.”  If it did not 
accept the guilty plea, then Defendant “was never formally adjudged guilty under I.C. § 19-101”; 
“[s]ince he had never been adjudged guilty, he could not be sentenced”; and “thus his sentence 
was illegal, and he was being unlawfully held in prison.” 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c) states: 
Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, 
including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show:  
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.  
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including 
minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may 
apply.  
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would 
waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, 
and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant.      
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against the 
defendant.      
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether 
the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the 
agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any 
promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment.      
 
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In this case, Defendant’s attorney recited the plea agreement to the district court, and then 
the prosecutor agreed with the recitation and moved to dismiss two of the charges.  The court 
granted the motion and asked Defendant if he would like to enter a new plea to the rape charge.  
Defendant answered that he would, the court asked what the plea was, and Defendant responded, 
“Guilty.”  The court then asked some questions about Defendant’s knowledge or belief about the 
victim’s age, his understanding that a mistaken belief she was over eighteen years of age was not 
a defense to the rape charge, and whether the act of sexual intercourse was consensual.  The 
court then said, “I accept the plea of guilty to count one [the rape charge],” and the court then 
proceeded to question Defendant to make a record of the matters set forth in subsections (1) 
through (5) of Rule 11(c).  Defendant contends that because the court’s verbal acceptance of the 
guilty plea preceded rather than followed the questioning, the court never properly accepted the 
guilty plea. 
 
Defendant has not pointed to any authority requiring that the court verbally announce that 
it has accepted a defendant’s plea of guilty.  Idaho Code § 19-101 states, “No person can be 
punished for a public offense except upon a legal conviction in a court having jurisdiction 
thereof.”  Idaho Code § 19-109 states, “No person can be convicted of a public offense unless by 
the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, or upon a plea of guilty . . . .”  “Thus, a 
conviction occurs ‘by the verdict of a jury . . . or upon a plea of guilty’ and it must precede 
punishment.”  United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 404, 179 P.3d 1059, 1060 (2008).  There is 
no requirement that a court orally announce that it has accepted a guilty plea in order for there to 
be a conviction.  The court questioned Defendant at length to ensure that he had pled guilty 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and it then announced a date for imposing sentence.  
The court obviously had accepted Defendant’s guilty plea because it could not proceed to 
sentencing if it had not done so.  Therefore, Defendant was required to show manifest injustice in 
order to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
  
2.  District court’s failure to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) did not 
constitute manifest injustice.  Defendant contends that his plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the district court failed to comply with Idaho 
Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) by advising him that he would be required to register as a sex offender.  
“Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver 
 
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is not met.”  State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007).  To determine 
whether a plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, we examine the record to 
determine: 
(1) whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to 
refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the 
consequences of pleading guilty. 
 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484, 861 P.2d 51, 54 (1993). 
 
Defendant does not contend that he did not understand the nature of the charges, and the 
record shows that he did.  Count 1 of the information alleged, “That the said HALTON LEE 
FLOWERS, in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on or about the 1st day of August, 2007, 
did accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with a person, under the age of eighteen, A. C. of the 
present age of sixteen (16) years.”  The district court stated that before accepting the plea he was 
going to ask some questions, and the first question was, “In Bannock County, Idaho, on or about 
August 1, 2007, did you accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 
eighteen, being then the age of sixteen?”  Defendant answered, “Yes, sir.”  The court then 
inquired about Defendant’s belief as to the victim’s age, his knowledge that a mistake as to her 
age was not a defense, and his understanding that she could not legally consent to sexual 
intercourse.  
 
Defendant does not contend that he was coerced into pleading guilty, and during his 
colloquy with the court, Defendant stated that nobody had threatened him or promised him 
anything to plead guilty and that his guilty plea was entirely voluntary and of his own free will.  
Near the end of the colloquy, the court again asked Defendant if the plea was entirely voluntary 
and of his own free will, and Defendant answered that it was. 
Defendant does not contend that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights 
to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself.  Prior to 
pleading guilty, Defendant filled out a “Guilty Questionnaire.”  One of the questions was as 
follows: 
14. Do you understand that you have a Constitutional right to: 
A.  Jury trial where the State must convince all jurors of your guilt? 
 
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B.  Remain silent and not make any statement to the Court or any person 
that will incriminate you, or any way help to prove the charges against 
you? 
C.  Require that all persons who have accused you of the crime appear in 
Court and be questioned under oath? 
 
To the right of each question was a line in which Defendant wrote, “Yes.”  During the colloquy, 
the court explained these rights to Defendant in greater detail, and Defendant stated that he 
understood he was waiving them by pleading guilty.   
 
Defendant contends that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty 
because, “At no time before this [sentencing] hearing or prior to entering my plea was I advised 
by my counsel or the court of the punishment and requirement to register that I’d be subject to . . 
. .”3  Defendant knew the maximum sentence for the crime of rape.  In the Guilty Questionnaire, 
Defendant was asked, “What is the maximum prison sentence that you may receive for each 
crime?”  In the line below the question, he wrote, “Life Count 1.”  In its colloquy with 
Defendant, the court stated:  “And, sir, this is a felony, and the legislature has set the maximum 
sentence you could receive.  It could be up to life in a state correctional facility without parole or 
good time.”  The court did not inform Defendant that he would be required to register as a sexual 
offender. 
 
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court is only required to inform the defendant of the 
direct consequences of the plea.  Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999).  
“[S]ex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.  Therefore, the district 
judge’s failure to inform [Defendant] prior to entry of his plea that he would be required to 
register as a sex offender does not invalidate his plea.”  Id. 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) provides: 
(d)  Other advisories upon acceptance of plea.  The district judge shall, 
prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual admissions during a plea 
colloquy, instruct on the following: 
. . . . 
(2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense requiring registration 
on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the defendant of such 
registration requirements. 
 
                                                 
3 Prior to sentencing, Defendant knew of the requirement to register as a sexual offender.  During his statement to 
the district court, Defendant brought up the fact that he would be required to register as a “sexual offender.” 
 
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The failure to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 does not, by itself, constitute manifest 
injustice.  That rule “has not been held to be constitutionally mandated in order to fulfill the 
requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea.”  State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 98, 
156 P.3d 1193, 1196 (2007).  Likewise, amending the rule in 2007 to add subsection (d)(2) did 
not transform the registration requirement into a direct consequence of the plea. 
 
3.  Alleged violations of the plea agreement.  Defendant contends that there is manifest 
injustice because the State violated the plea agreement.  He asserts that the first two violations 
occurred during the sentencing hearing because the presentence report and the prosecutor’s 
comments both referred to facts relating to the dismissed charges.  There was no violation of the 
plea agreement. 
 
The plea agreement, as stated by Defendant’s counsel, was:  “He is going to plead guilty 
to statutory rape.  The State’s going to recommend three fixed, seven indeterminate and they’re 
going to dismiss all other charges in all other cases.  We’re free to make our own 
recommendations at sentencing.”  The plea agreement did not in any way restrict the information 
that the State could provide to the district court at sentencing. 
 
Under the plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years in 
the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with three years fixed and seven years 
indeterminate.  The district court was not bound by that recommendation.  It could impose that 
sentence, a lesser sentence, or a greater sentence.  There is no requirement that the State limit the 
information provided to the sentencing court to the amount estimated as necessary to convince 
the court to impose the recommended sentence.  There should be no limitation placed on the 
information presented to the court regarding the background, character, and conduct of the 
defendant being sentenced.  In State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583, 618 P.2d 759, 761 (1980), 
we quoted with approval from Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), as follows:  
“[M]odern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a 
sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement 
of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.”  Information 
that a sentencing court can rely upon includes a defendant’s past criminal behavior that resulted 
in a conviction, Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397 (1995); the defendant’s prior 
uncharged criminal conduct, id.; and the defendant’s prior conduct for which he was tried and 
acquitted, United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997).  When imposing a sentence, the 
 
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court is to consider “the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and 
condition of the defendant,” Idaho Code § 19-2521(1), and it is to consider whether 
imprisonment is warranted for protection of the public.  Absent a provision in the plea agreement 
expressly limiting the information that the State can present, it can present any relevant 
information that could assist the court.  Defendant’s conduct relating to the dismissed charges 
could properly be considered by the district court, and there was nothing in the plea agreement 
purporting to prevent the State from submitting that information or referring to it. 
 
Defendant also contends that the State breached the plea agreement during the hearing on 
Defendant’s motion for reduction of sentence made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The 
district court imposed a sentence that was greater than the prosecutor’s recommendation pursuant 
to the plea agreement.  At the hearing on Defendant’s motion for reduction of the sentence, the 
prosecutor argued against the reduction, stating, “I don’t think granting the Rule 35 is 
appropriate and we would ask you to keep his sentence the same.” 
 
Relying upon State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009), Defendant argues 
that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted a breach of the plea agreement.  In Lampien, the 
prosecutor agreed to be bound by a plea agreement under which the defendant would receive a 
withheld judgment, no jail time, and probation.  The trial court instead sentenced the defendant 
to five years in prison with a minimum period of confinement of three years.  She filed a motion 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for reduction of her sentence, and the prosecutor opposed the 
motion.  We held that under the “somewhat unusual language of the plea agreement,” the 
prosecutor breached the agreement by doing so.  Id. at 378, 223 P.3d at 761.  The agreement 
recited that “[t]he State and Defendant agree to be bound to following [sic] sentence agreement.”  
Id. at 377, 223 P.3d at 760.  We stated, “The significance of this language is that the State was 
not simply bound to the agreed-upon recommendation at Lampien’s sentencing, but the broad 
language represents an unqualified commitment by the State to adhere to the sentencing 
recommendation at every stage of the proceedings.”  Id. at 378, 223 P.3d at 761. 
 
The circumstances in this case differ from Lampien.  The prosecutor did not agree to be 
bound by a particular agreed-upon recommendation.  Rather, he simply agreed to make a 
particular sentencing recommendation.  There was nothing in the language of the plea agreement 
indicating that the parties intended the agreement to remain in effect after the initial sentencing.  
Therefore, the prosecutor did not breach the agreement by his comments at the post-sentencing 
 
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hearing on Defendant’s motion for reduction of sentence.  State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 241 
P.3d 955 (2010). 
 
Defendant has failed to show manifest injustice.  Therefore, the district court did not err 
in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
B.  Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Sentence? 
 
Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence.  
“We review the length of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.”  State v. Al-Kotrani, 
141 Idaho 66, 70, 106 P.3d 392, 396 (2005).  “When a sentence is challenged as being 
excessively harsh, we independently review the record on appeal, having due regard for the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.”  
State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002).  “[W]hen doing so we consider the 
defendant’s entire sentence.”  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).  
However, “[w]e presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable 
term of confinement.  That is because whether or not a defendant serves longer than the fixed 
portion of the sentence is a matter left to the sole discretion of the parole board . . . .”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “When determining whether the sentence is excessive, we must consider: (1) 
the protection of society; (2) deterrence of the defendant and others; (3) the possibility of the 
defendant’s rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for the defendant.”  State v. Strand, 
137 Idaho 457, 460-61, 50 P.3d 472, 475-76 (2002).  “In order to show that the sentence imposed 
was unreasonable, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.”  State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 73, 44 P.3d 
1122, 1128 (2002). 
 
Defendant contends that the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion because he would 
have started college in the spring of 2008 had he not been incarcerated in Indiana for violating 
his probation on a felony battery charge; in 1996 while in Indiana he had been diagnosed as 
bipolar and had received medication and treatment, both inpatient and outpatient; he was taking 
lithium at the time of sentencing in this case; he did not commit any new crimes during the three 
months he was out on bail in this case; and he apologized during the sentencing hearing and 
stated he had learned his lesson.  Defendant argues that a lesser sentence would have 
 
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accomplished the goals of sentencing and that the district court did not explain the need for the 
particular length of sentence imposed. 
 
“‘Idaho’s sentencing scheme requires no [judicial] findings of fact under I.C. § 19-
2521.’”  State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 149, 191 P.3d 217, 227 (2008) (quoting State v. Stover, 
140 Idaho 927, 931, 104 P.3d 969, 973 (2005)).  A court is not required to recite the factors set 
forth in Idaho Code § 19-2521, nor is it required to give reasons for imposing the sentence.  
Stevens at 149, 191 P.3d at 227.  
 
During a seven-day period, Defendant aggressively sexually molested two under-age 
girls and aggressively attempted to sexually molest a third.  He had a mental-health evaluation in 
preparation for sentencing, and the evaluator stated that “it is unlikely that [Defendant] is 
suffering from a severe and reliably diagnosable mental illness.”  The evaluator concluded:  
“[Defendant’s] unresolved issues primarily appear to be his resentment towards authority and 
poor boundary issues with females.  He reports prior behavioral patterns of destroying females’ 
property after challenging issues emerged during the relationship.”  His criminal record included 
convictions for criminal mischief and residential entry in 2001 in Indiana; criminal mischief, 
resisting law enforcement, and two batteries, one of a law enforcement officer, in 2003 in 
Indiana; battery in 2007 in Bannock County, Idaho, with an unlawful entry charge dismissed; 
using the telephone to harass in Bannock County in 2007; malicious injury to property in 
Bannock County in 2007; stalking in Bannock County in 2007; and violation of a no-contact 
order in Bannock County in 2008, with a battery charge dismissed.  The probation violation in 
Indiana was absconding from supervision by leaving the state.  Prior to imposing sentence, the 
district court stated that it was considering the deterrence of Defendant and others, the need to 
protect society, rehabilitation, and the effect of Defendant’s conduct on the victim.  Defendant 
has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment and order of the district court are affirmed. 
 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.