Case Title: DENISE SEHERR-THOSS V. ROGER SEHERR-THOSS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
DENISE SEHERR-THOSS V. ROGER SEHERR-THOSS2006 WY 111141 P.3d 705Case Number: 05-237, 06-10Decided: 08/31/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DENISE 
SEHERR-THOSS,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROGER 
SEHERR-THOSS,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
S. Cohen of Cohen Law Office, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bret F. 
King of King and King, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Denise 
Seherr-Thoss (Wife) appeals an order of the district court enforcing a 
prenuptial agreement (the Agreement) and dividing the marital estate.  On appeal, Wife challenges the validity 
of the Agreement and the propriety of the district court's division of certain 
marital property pursuant to specific provisions of the Agreement.  In a separate appeal, Wife challenges the 
sufficiency of an award of attorneys' fees.  We will affirm the district court's 
property distribution in part and reverse in part and affirm the district 
court's award of attorneys' fees.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
05-237, Wife sets forth the following statements of the 
issues:

 
 
ISSUE 
NO. 1

 
 
The 
district court erroneously held that the Premarital Agreement is enforceable, in 
spite of its finding that Appellee breached the Agreement by failing to make any 
of the annual $10,000 payments to Appellant required under the 
Agreement.

 
 
ISSUE 
NO. 2

 
 
The 
district court erred when it ruled that Article III, Paragraph 3 of the 
Premarital Agreement controlled the distribution of the sale proceeds from the 
Arizona house (rather than Article I, Paragraph 4), and that Appellant was not 
entitled to any portion of the sale proceeds. 

 
 
ISSUE 
NO. 3

 
 
The 
district court erred when it ruled that, pursuant to Article I, Paragraph 3 of 
the [Premarital] Agreement, Appellant was entitled to four annual payments of 
$10,000 rather than five annual payments, and Appellant is therefore owed an 
additional $10,000 [for 2004, and a pro rata sum for 
2005].

 
 
ISSUE 
NO. 4

 
 
The 
district court erred when it held that the parties were married at least three 
years but less than four years, and that pursuant to Article III, Paragraph 4 of 
the [Premarital] Agreement, Appellant was entitled to a lump sum payment of 
$40,000.  The district court should 
have held that the parties were married at least four years but less than five 
years and that Appellant [is] owed a lump sum payment of 
$50,000.

 
 
ISSUE 
NO. 5

 
 
The 
district court erred when it held that [Wife] was required to repay [Husband] 
the sum of $20,000 based on her withdrawal of funds from joint accounts 
immediately prior to filing for divorce.

 
 
Appellee 
Roger Seherr-Thoss (Husband) responds with statements of the issues that 
parallel those set out above though framed in support of the district court's 
ruling. 

 
 
[¶3]      In Case No. 
06-10, Wife sets out the following:

 
 
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in awarding to [Wife] less than half of the 
attorneys['] fees incurred by her in the divorce proceeding under W.S. § 
20-2-111, in view of the fact that [Wife] did not have the resources to pay an 
attorney to litigate the proceeding; and that [Husband] was a wealthy man who 
throughout this litigation took the position  ultimately rejected by the 
district court  that [Wife] was not entitled to any further settlement 
distribution; and that [Husband] had significantly breached the Premarital 
Agreement he was seeking to hide behind?

 
 
Husband 
responds:

 
 
Did the 
District Court act arbitrarily and capriciously when it awarded [Wife] $15,000 
in attorney's fees pursuant to W.S. § 20-2-111[?]

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The parties were 
married on October 1, 2000.  Prior 
to the marriage, they entered into a prenuptial agreement.  The Agreement set forth the parties' 
basic intentions:

 
 
The 
parties desire to define their respective property and rights in the event of a 
dissolution of their marriage, and to limit or release their prospective rights 
of inheritance from each other.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
The 
parties desire by this Agreement to provide that all real and personal property 
owned by either of them at the time of the marriage and all real and personal 
property coming to them from any source during the marriage, including 
inheritance, shall be their respective sole and separate 
property.

 
 
The 
parties further desire by this Agreement to waive and relinquish any rights 
heretofore or hereafter accruing to either of them for spousal support from the 
other in the event of dissolution of their forthcoming 
marriage.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
This 
Agreement is being made, in part, with the express intention of keeping such 
property, income and earnings or increase from each party's business, 
investments or occupations the sole and separate property of the party earning 
or acquiring came to use and dispose of as he or she see fit as if no marriage 
had been entered into.

 
 
The 
substantive provisions of the Agreement that are relevant to the dispute before 
us are these:

 
 
[Article 
I, Paragraph 3] Gifts to Denise During Marriage. Roger agrees to pay to 
Denise the sum of $10,000 per year for so long as the parties are married to 
each other.  The parties agree that 
the first of such payments shall be made no later than December 30, 2000. . . 
.

 
 
[Article 
I, Paragraph 4] Transfers Between the Parties. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of this Agreement, either party shall have the right to transfer or 
convey to the other any property or interest therein which may be lawfully 
conveyed or transferred during his or her lifetime or by will or otherwise upon 
death, and neither party intends by this Agreement to limit or restrict in any 
way the right and power to receive any such transfer or conveyance from the 
other.  No such transfer or 
conveyance shall be deemed an amendment, in whole or in part, or a termination 
of this Agreement or any portion thereof, nor shall such be construed to limit 
or adversely affect the purpose and intent of this Agreement establishing the 
separate property of the parties.

 
 
[Article 
III, Paragraph 3] Property Acquired by Joint Contributions. Except as 
specifically provided in Article II paragraph 4 hereof, each of the parties 
shall own, as their separate property, an interest in any property acquired by 
them during the marriage by joint contributions of separate property, 
notwithstanding the manner in which such property is titled.  The interest of each party shall be equal 
to that percentage which he or she contributed to the acquisition of such 
property.  The provisions of this 
Article III paragraph 3 may be altered with respect to specific property, but 
only by a separate written agreement, signed by both parties, and referring to 
the specific item of property to which such agreement 
pertains.

 
 
[Article 
III, Paragraph 4] Lump Sum Settlement.  The parties agree that Roger will pay to 
Denise the following lump sum amounts in the event of divorce within the first 
five years of marriage, as a full and final settlement for all property and 
alimony issues: a) if the parties were married less than 1 year, Roger will pay 
Denise $10,000; b) if the parties were married at least one year, but less than 
2 years, Roger will pay Denise $20,000; c) if the parties were married at least 
2 years but less than 3 years, Roger will pay Denise $30,000; d) if the parties 
were married at least 3 years but less than 4 years, Roger will pay Denise 
$40,000; and e) if the parties were married at least 4 years but less than 5 
years, Roger will pay Denise $50,000. Such payment shall be made in full within 
30 days following the court order finalizing the divorce, except that if the 
payment owing to Denise is $50,000, Denise agrees Roger may make two equal 
installments over a period of two years.

 
 
[¶5]      Wife filed for 
divorce on January 7, 2004.  On 
September 10, 2004, she filed a motion for partial summary judgment contesting 
the enforceability of the Agreement.  
Wife argued that Husband had breached the Agreement by failing to make 
the annual $10,000 payments required under Article I, Paragraph 3.  Husband filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment arguing the continued validity of the Agreement.  After an unreported hearing on the 
competing motions was held on October 19, 2004, the district court issued an 
order concluding that the Agreement was valid and enforceable and granting 
Husband's motion.

 
 
[¶6]      On April 18, 
2005, a hearing was held on the division of the marital estate under the 
provisions of the Agreement.  The 
hearing was not recorded and Wife did not obtain a statement of the evidence 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.031 (LexisNexis 2005). 

 
 
When 
this Court does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, it must 
accept the trial court's findings of fact upon which it bases any decisions 
regarding evidentiary issues.  Capshaw v. Schieck, 2002 WY 54, 
¶ 21, 44 P.3d 47, ¶ 21 (Wyo. 2002).  The failure to provide a transcript does 
not necessarily require dismissal of an appeal, but our review is restricted to 
those allegations of error not requiring inspection of the transcript.  Lacking a transcript, or a substitute for 
the transcript, the regularity of the trial court's judgment and the competency 
of the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be presumed. Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 
(Wyo. 1993); and see Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616 (Wyo. 1993) (dismissing 
appeal for lack of record, rather than affirming).

 
 

Harshberger 
v. Harshberger, 2005 
WY 99, ¶ 3, 117 P.3d 1244, 1246-47 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 2002 WY 127, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 101, 103 (Wyo. 2002)).  Since 
we must accept the district court's findings of fact, we set forth the following 
findings and conclusions from the Decree of Divorce that are pertinent to the 
issues on appeal:

 
 
6.  A 
Premarital Agreement ("the Agreement") was executed on September 28, 2000.  The Court finds the Agreement is fair and 
equitable, the parties entered into the agreement knowingly and willingly, and 
neither party was acting under fraud or duress at the time of execution and 
performance.  The agreement is valid 
and binding between the parties and should be fully incorporated in the Decree 
of Divorce.  The Agreement provides 
in part:

 
 
a.  Article 
I, Paragraph 3:  Defendant 
agrees to Pay [sic] Plaintiff $10,000 per year for so long as the parties are 
married to each other.  The first of 
such payment shall be made no later than December 30, 2000.  Defendant did not make any of the 
payments to Plaintiff and breached the Agreement.  Defendant gave Plaintiff $10,000 in 2001 
to be used as a loan to her daughter.  In return, Plaintiff's daughter delivered 
four cement mixers to the Defendant to be used as collateral until the loan 
could be repaid.  Defendant either 
has the cement mixers in his custody or has disposed of them.  The Court considers the cement mixers as 
collateral for the loan and will treat the $10,000 payment to Plaintiff as being 
repaid.  Pursuant to the Agreement, 
Defendant owes Plaintiff $10,000 per year for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
totaling $40,000.

 
 
b.  Article 
III, Paragraph 3:  The interest 
of each party in property is equal to that percentage which he or she 
contributed to the acquisition of such property.  Plaintiff did not contribute to the 
acquisition of the Arizona house and is not entitled to any of 
the proceeds from the sale of the home.

 
 
c.  Article 
III, Paragraph 4:  In the event 
of divorce Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $10,000 per year for each 
year they were married as a full and final settlement for all property and 
alimony issues.  The parties were 
married three years but less than four years and Defendant will pay Plaintiff 
$40,000.00.  Therefore, Defendant 
owes Plaintiff $40,000.00.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
9.  On 
October 31, 2002, Plaintiff withdrew $5,000.00 from Jackson State Bank and 
placed the money in her personal account.  On November 1, 2002, Plaintiff withdrew 
an additional $10,000.00 and placed it in her personal account.  She used the money to rent an apartment 
in Driggs and to support herself and her son.  The Court finds these funds necessary for 
the temporary support of Plaintiff and her son.  Prior to filing for divorce, Plaintiff 
withdrew additional funds:  $25,000 
from Jackson State Bank, $5,000.00 from Wells Fargo and $10,000.00 from a credit 
card, totaling $40,000.  This amount 
should be repaid to the Defendant, giving credit to Plaintiff for the $20,000 
she contributed to the purchase of the parties' motor home.  Subtracting the amount contributed to the 
motor home, $20,000.00, from the amount withdrawn, $40,000.00, equals 
$20,000.00.

 
 
In 
appeal No. 05-237, Wife assigns error to these rulings by the district 
court.

 
 
[¶7]      Subsequent to the 
issuance of the Decree of Divorce, Wife filed a motion to recover her attorneys' 
fees pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-1112 (LexisNexis 2005).  Wife sought an award of $33,836.08.  After a hearing that was not recorded 
and without making any specific findings, the district court awarded attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $15,000.00.  
Wife challenges the sufficiency of that award in appeal No. 
06-10.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      It should be kept 
in mind as we review each of the issues raised by Wife under the particular 
standard of review applicable thereto that, as noted above, the absence of a 
hearing transcript means that we will presume the regularity of the trial 
court's decision and the competency of the evidence upon which that judgment is 
based.  Harshbarger, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d  at 
1252.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court determined the validity of the Agreement on motions for summary 
judgment.

 
 
Summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element 
of a cause of action or a defense that a party has asserted. Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, [1055] (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and 
by examining the same material as the district court.  Id. We examine de novo the record, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record.  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 (Wyo. 2000).  If upon review of the record, doubt 
exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that doubt must be 
resolved against the party seeking summary judgment.  Id. We accord no deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law. Metz, 
¶ 9.

 
 

Knapp v. 
Landex Corp., 2006 
WY 36, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005)).

 
 
[¶10]   A district court's disposition of 
marital property is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  In making that determination, we ask 
whether or not the district court reasonably could have concluded as it did. 
 Ordinarily, we consider only the 
evidence of the successful party and grant to that party every favorable 
inference that can be drawn from the record.  Montoya v. Navarette-Montoya, 2005 WY 
161, ¶ 3, 125 P.3d 267, 267-68 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Welch v. Welch, 2003 WY 168, ¶ 4, 
81 P.3d 937, 938 (Wyo. 2003)). 

 
 
[¶11]   Prenuptial or antenuptial 
agreements are valid and enforceable in Wyoming and are governed by the same rules of 
construction that are applicable to other contracts.  Lund v. Lund, 
849 P.2d 731, 739 (Wyo. 1993). 

 
 
In 
contract litigation, when the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, the 
interpretation is a question of law.  Examination Management Services, Inc. v. 
Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996); 
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 218-19 (Wyo. 1994).  Whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law for the reviewing court.  Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J 
Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993).  We review questions of law de novo 
without affording deference to the decision of the district court.  Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1997); Griess v. Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of 
Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
According 
to our established standards for interpretation of contracts, the words used in 
the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable person would give 
them.  Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018, 
1023 (Wyo. 
1993).  When the provisions in the 
contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four corners" 
of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties.  Union Pacific Resources Co., 882 P.2d  at 
220; Prudential Preferred Properties, 
859 P.2d  at 1271.  In the absence of 
any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its terms because no 
construction is appropriate. Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996); Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.

 
 

Mueller 
v. Zimmer, 2005 
WY 156, ¶ 35, 124 P.3d 340, 359 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Roney v. B.B.C. Corporation, 2004 WY 
113, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 196, 200 (Wyo. 2004); Amoco Prod. Co. v.  EM 
Nominee Partnership Co., 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000); and Double Eagle Petroleum & Min. Corp. v. 
Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 2003 
WY 139, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
[¶12]   Finally, the decision to award 
attorneys' fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-211 rests within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 
1355-56 (Wyo. 1997); Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 234 
(Wyo. 1996). 
 The party seeking to recover 
attorneys' fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees 
requested.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]   In her first assignment of error, 
Wife contends that the district court erred in finding the Agreement valid and 
enforceable.  Wife notes that 
Husband failed to make any of the $10,000 annual payments during the course of 
the marriage as required under Article I, Paragraph 3, of the Agreement.  Wife characterizes that failure as a 
substantial and material breach of the parties' contract and, citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 237 (1981),3 argues that as a consequence she is 
no longer bound by the Agreement. 

 
 
[¶14]   In order to warrant termination or 
repudiation of a contract, a breach must be substantial and material.  Stillwell Welding Co. v. Colt Trucking, 
741 P.2d 598, 600 (Wyo. 1987).  To determine whether a breach was 
substantial and material, we have cited with approval Restatement (Second) 
Contracts § 241 (1981):

 
 
In 
determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material, the 
following circumstances are significant:

 
 

(a)   the 
extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected;

 
 

(b)   the 
extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of 
that benefit of which he will be deprived;

 
 

(c)    
the 
extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer 
forfeiture;

 
 

(d)   the 
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure 
his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances;

 
 

(e)   the 
extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair 
dealing.

 
 

Stillwell 
Welding Co., 741 
P.2d at 600-01; see also Browning v. 
State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061, 1071 (Wyo. 2001). 

 
 
[¶15]   Wife's argument presumes, without 
discussion or analysis, that Husband's breach of the Agreement is substantial 
and material.  As the commentary to 
§ 237 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which was relied upon by Wife, 
makes clear:

 
 
In 
determining whether a failure of performance is material, the circumstances 
listed in § 241 should be considered. 

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 237, comment b.  Failure to cite pertinent authority has 
long been a basis for summary affirmance of cases or issues by this Court.  Kelley v. Watson, 2003 WY 127, ¶ 4, 
77 P.3d 691, 692 (Wyo. 2003); Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 891 P.2d 85, 87 
(Wyo. 1995). 
 We decline to consider Wife's 
arguments given her failure to fully evaluate the issue within the context of 
the applicable law.4

 
 
[¶16]   Wife contends that the district 
court made four errors in applying the terms of the Agreement.  Initially, she contends the court erred 
when it awarded Husband the entirety of the proceeds from the sale of a house in 
Arizona.  The parties agree that the house was 
acquired during the course of the marriage and that it was purchased entirely 
with Husband's funds with title resting in a trust of Husband's.  Later, however, Husband signed a warranty 
deed conveying title from the trust to "ROGER W. SEHERR-THOSS and JOY DENISE 
SEHERR-THOSS, husband and wife, as their community property with the rights of 
survivorship[.]" Citing Article III, Paragraph 3, of the Agreement, the district 
court concluded that since Wife did not contribute to the acquisition of the 
house, she was not entitled to any of the proceeds from the sale.  Wife challenges that ruling arguing that 
Husband deeded her half of the property as a gift and that distribution of the 
proceeds from its sale should have been pursuant to Article I, Paragraph 4, of 
the Agreement.

 
 
[¶17]   We have said that when title to 
real estate is taken in the names of both spouses but only one spouse paid for 
it, a rebuttable presumption that a fifty percent interest intended as a gift to 
the non-paying spouse arises.  DeJohn v. DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, 
¶ 18, 121 P.3d 802, 809 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 
2000)); see also Tyler v. Tyler, 624 P.2d 784, 785-86 (Wyo. 1981).  The inquiry into whether or not the 
presumption of a gift has been rebutted is, by necessity, a factual one 
dependent upon the particular circumstances surrounding the conveyance.  DeJohn, ¶ 18, 121 P.3d  at 809 
(concluding that district court's determination that husband's testimony had 
provided sufficient evidence to rebut presumption not an abuse of discretion); 
see also Ewing v. Hladky Construction, 
Inc., 2002 WY 95, ¶¶ 11-13, 48 P.3d 1086, 1088-89 (Wyo. 2002) (whether a 
conveyance was a gift was a factual determination by the trial court).  Wife's contention that Article I, 
Paragraph 4, governed disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the 
Arizona house 
is predicated on her presumption that she was gifted a half-interest in it. 
 The implication of the district 
court's ruling, however, is that it did not believe that Husband intended the 
warranty deed to convey a gift and that the presumption had been overcome.  The lack of specific findings by the 
court on the issue is regrettable but there is no indication in the record that 
any request pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a) (LexisNexis 2006) was made.  See In re MS, 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo. 2000) 
("A trial court relying on discretionary power is not required to place on 
record the circumstances and factors that were crucial to its determination 
unless one of the parties requests it under W.R.C.P. 52(a).").  Our review is also constrained by the 
deficient record in this case.  We 
must presume that the court's decision is supported by competent evidence.  In the absence of any basis upon which to 
review the factual determination that the presumption of a gift was rebutted, we 
cannot conclude that there was an abuse of discretion by the district court in 
its disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the Arizona 
residence.

 
 
[¶18]   Pursuant to Article I, Paragraph 3, 
of the Agreement, Husband was required to pay Wife "$10,000 per year for so long 
as the parties" were married to each other with the first payment being "made no 
later than December 30, 2000."  The 
district court found that Husband had failed to make any of the payments and 
ordered him to pay Wife $10,000 each for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, 
for a total of $40,000.  Wife 
contends that the district court misapplied the Agreement.  She notes that the Agreement provides 
that the payment obligation continued "for so long as the parties are married." 
 Since the divorce did not become 
effective until August 12, 2005, Wife contends that she was entitled to payments 
for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, along with a pro rata share for 
the partial year of 2005.  She 
argues that Husband admitted in his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law submitted to the district court that she was entitled to payments for the 
years 2000 through 2004.  Including 
the pro rata amount for 2005, she concludes that the district court should have 
ordered Husband to pay her $55,833.

 
 
[¶19]   We agree with Wife to the extent 
that pursuant to the plain and unambiguous terms of Article I, Paragraph 3, of 
the Agreement, Husband was obligated to pay $10,000 each year the parties were 
married.  Although the divorce 
proceedings had commenced during 2004, the parties remained legally married 
during that time.5  Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 54 
(Wyo. 1993) 
(dissolution of marriage requires a decree of divorce by a district court with 
appropriate jurisdiction).  Accordingly, Wife is correct when she 
asserts that Husband owed her $50,000 ($10,000 per year for the years 2000 
through 2004) under the Agreement.  Wife also correctly notes that Husband 
admitted in his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that he owed 
payments for that period:

 
 
Pursuant 
to Article I, Paragraph 3 of the Premarital Agreement, [Wife] was to receive 
annual payments of $10,000 per year starting in 2000. Thus, [Wife] was entitled 
to a $10,000 payment in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. The 
parties agree that the payment was made in 2001.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Wife 
neglects to mention the highlighted sentence in her main or reply briefs.  At this point, our ability to review this 
issue is effectively curtailed by the state of the record.  Without a transcript of the evidentiary 
hearing, it is impossible for us to determine the actual facts.  We must presume that the facts support 
the district court's ultimate ruling.

 
 
[¶20]   Finally, we do not agree with Wife 
that she is entitled to a pro rata share for the year 2005.  The Agreement obligates Husband to make 
payments "per year" so long as the parties are married.  The ordinary meaning to the term "year" 
is a twelve-month calendar period.  See Webster's II New College Dictionary 
1309 (3rd ed. 2005).  If the parties had intended for pro rata 
payments, they could have so specified in the Agreement.  They did not.  Accordingly, Husband's obligation does 
not encompass the partial year of marriage.  Therefore, the district court's order 
that Husband's obligation to Wife under this provision of the Agreement is 
$40,000 is affirmed.

 
 
[¶21]   Wife contends that the district 
court erred when it awarded her $40,000 pursuant to Article III, Paragraph 4, of 
the Agreement.  That provision 
obligates Husband to make a lump sum payment of varying amounts to Wife 
depending on the length of the marriage "in the event of divorce within the 
first five years of marriage."  The 
district court found that "the parties were married three years but less than 
four years" obligating Husband to pay $40,000 under the terms of the provision. 
 Wife insists that the parties were 
married for four years but less than five, entitling her to $50,000 payable in 
"two equal installments over a period of two years." 

 
 
[¶22]   The language of Article III, 
Paragraph 4, is unambiguous.  It 
provides that if the parties were to divorce within the first five years of 
marriage Wife was entitled to a lump sum payment from Husband.  The amount of Husband's obligation 
increases in increments of $10,000 for each year of marriage up to a maximum of 
$50,000 if the parties have been married at least four but less than five years. 
 As previously noted, the parties 
were married on October 1, 2000, and divorced on August 12, 2005.  By the plain terms of the Agreement, 
Husband owes Wife $50,000.  In his 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Husband agreed with this 
conclusion:

 
 
In 
addition, pursuant to Article III, Paragraph 4 of the Premarital Agreement, 
[Wife] is entitled to a lump sum payment from [Husband] upon divorce, that sum 
to be dependent on the length of the marriage with a maximum payment of $50,000. 
[Wife] is entitled to a lump sum payment of $50,000, payable in $25,000 
increments over a two year period.

 
 
On 
appeal, Husband contends that the district court's conclusion that the parties 
"were married three years but less than four years" and that Husband was 
obligated to pay $40,000 should be affirmed because "hypothetically" there might 
have been evidence regarding the parties' intent on how to determine the length 
of marriage under the Agreement during the unrecorded evidentiary hearing.  Husband's argument is not persuasive. 
 The determination of whether or not 
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that we have already answered. 
 When a contract is unambiguous, it 
will be enforced according to its terms.  In this case, the facts determinative in 
application of the Agreement provision  the dates of marriage and divorce  are 
part of the record before us.  Applying the unambiguous terms of the 
provision then, we must conclude that the district court erred when it awarded 
Wife $40,000; the parties were married for at least four and less than five 
years and, accordingly, Wife should have been awarded 
$50,000.

 
 
[¶23]   In her final allegation of error in 
Case No. 05-237, Wife contends that the district court erred in concluding that 
she had improperly removed $40,0006 from joint bank accounts after the 
divorce action had been filed.  Wife 
insists that since these were joint accounts, she had the right to withdraw the 
money.  She also argues that by 
adding her name to the accounts, Husband intended a gift.

 
 
[¶24]   The disposition of marital 
property, including funds in joint accounts, is within the district court's 
discretion and a just and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be 
unequal.  Dunham v. Dunham, 2006 WY 1, 
¶¶ 6-9, 125 P.3d 1015, 1016-18 (Wyo. 2006); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, 
¶ 12, 91 P.3d 922, 925-26 (Wyo. 2004).  In this case, the Agreement provided that 
each party was entitled to their separate property.  It is obviously a fact-intensive inquiry 
to determine the extent to which the funds in the parties' joint accounts were 
joint property or the personal property of Husband or Wife. Merely because the 
funds were in a joint account is not determinative of that inquiry.  To the extent that Wife's argument is 
predicated on a claim of a gift, that too is a factual inquiry as we have 
already discussed.  We cannot review 
this claim because the lack of a transcript of the evidentiary hearing means 
that we must presume that the evidence supports the district court's decision. 
 For that reason, we cannot find an 
abuse of discretion by the district court in its disposition of the funds in the 
parties' joint accounts.

 
 
[¶25]   In Case No. 06-10, Wife challenges 
the district court's ruling on her motion for attorneys' fees.  After the entry of the divorce decree, 
Wife filed a motion in the district court seeking attorneys' fees pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111.  Wife 
sought an award of $33,836.08.  A 
hearing was held on the motion and on October 14, 2005, the district court 
issued an order awarding Wife attorneys' fees of $15,000.00 as reasonable and 
necessary.  Wife appeals that order 
arguing that she provided factual documentation in support of her full claim. 
Husband responds by arguing that we cannot effectively review the district 
court's decision given the lack of a transcript of the hearing.  Wife counters in her reply brief that the 
hearing has been transcribed and is part of the record in this appeal. 

 
 
[¶26]   Wife's representation regarding the 
state of the record before this Court is not accurate:  There is no transcript of the hearing on 
her motion for attorneys' fees in the record.  Wife supported her representation by 
citing to the district court's Docket Index.  There is a difference, however, between 
the Docket Index, which identifies all documents made part of the record during 
the lower court proceedings and the record transmitted to this Court in an 
appeal.  Compare W.R.A.P. 3.01(a) 
and (b).7  The latter consists only of those parts 
of the district court record designated by the parties.  See W.R.A.P. 3.05(b)-(d).8  Wife's Designation of Record does not 
include the hearing transcript.  Wife, as the appealing party, bore the 
burden of providing this Court with a complete record on which it could base a 
decision.  Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 721 
(Wyo. 1999). 
 That duty encompasses designation 
for transmission to this Court of all parts of the district court record 
pertinent to the issues raised.  Orcutt v. Shober Investments, Inc., 2003 
WY 60, ¶¶ 9-11, 69 P.3d 386, 389-90 (Wyo. 2003); W.R.A.P. 3.05(b).  Without a transcript, we cannot review 
the factual basis for the district court's discretionary ruling.  We summarily affirm the district court's 
order in Case No. 06-10.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   In Case No. 05-237, the district 
court's order that Husband was to pay Wife $40,000 pursuant to Article III, 
Paragraph 4, of the Agreement is reversed and remanded for the amount owed to be 
increased $10,000 for a total amount of $50,000.  The district court's order in that case 
is affirmed in all other respects.  Case No. 06-10 is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.A.P. 
3.03 provides:

 
 
3.03  Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was 
made or when the transcript is unavailable.

If no report 
of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means including appellant's recollection. 
 The statement shall be served on 
appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 15 days after 
service.  The statement and any 
objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for 
settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.

 
 

2                       
§ 20-2-111. Alimony during 
pendency of action; allowances for

prosecution or defense of 
action; costs.

In every 
action brought for divorce, the court may require either party to pay any sum 
necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the action and for support 
and the support of the children of the parties during its pendency.  The court may decree costs against either 
party and award execution for the costs, or it may direct costs to be paid out 
of any property sequestered, in the power of the court, or in the hands of a 
receiver.  The court may also direct 
payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due and owing from any 
person.

 
 
We have held 
that the trial court has broad discretion whether to award attorneys' fees 
pursuant to this statute.  See Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293 
(Wyo. 1991); and Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883 
(Wyo. 
1977).

 
 

3Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 237 provides:

 
 
Except as 
stated in § 240, it is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render 
performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no 
uncured material failure by the other party to render any such performance due 
at an earlier time.

 
 
We have not 
yet had occasion to consider the applicability of Section 237 in Wyoming and for our 
resolution of this case, it is not necessary to do so 
today.

 

4We note that 
enforcement of the Agreement results in Wife fully receiving the benefit for 
which she bargained and expected to receive under the contract while the intent 
of the parties in executing the Agreement  defining and protecting each party's 
respective rights and property in the event of dissolution of the marriage  is 
given effect.

 
 

5While the 
parties could not have provided for termination of their marriage in their 
prenuptial agreement they could have, of course, counted only the time of 
marriage prior to the filing of divorce for purposes of establishing Husband's 
financial obligations.  They did not 
do that, however, and instead simply used the generic term of marriage.  Accordingly, we apply the ordinary 
meaning of that term, which is legally defined as the period from date of 
marriage to divorce.  Combs, 865 P.2d  at 
54.

 
 

6The court 
offset this amount by crediting Wife with $20,000 she had contributed towards a 
motor home and reducing the amount Husband owed under Article I, Paragraph 3, of 
the Agreement by the remainder.

 
 

7           
3.01.  Composition of 
record.

                        
(a) The record shall consist of:

                                    
(1) The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial 
court.

(2) The 
transcript of proceedings or any designated portion (if the proceedings were not 
stenographically recorded or transcribed in accordance with these rules, the 
electronic audio recording of the proceedings, or any designated portion); 
and

(3) A 
certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the trial 
court.

(b) The 
transmitted record shall consist of all portions of the record designated by the 
parties to the appeal for transmission to the appellate court, as described in 
Rule 3.05(b), (c) and (d).

 
 

8           
3.05.  Designation, transmission and retention 
of record.

            
. . . .

(b)  Appellant shall, contemporaneously with the filing of its 
brief in the appellate court and service of that brief upon appellee, serve on 
appellee, file with the clerk of the trial court a designation for transmission 
to the appellate court of all parts of the record, without unnecessary 
duplication, to which appellant intends to direct the particular attention of 
the appellate court in its brief.

            
(c)  If appellee desires to designate parts of the record for 
transmission not designated by appellant, appellee shall, contemporaneously with 
the filing of appellee's brief in the appellate court and service of that brief 
upon appellant, file with the clerk of the trial court and serve upon appellant 
a designation of those parts of the record desired by appellee.  If appellee does not wish to designate 
additional portions of the trial court record, then such a certification shall 
be made to the clerk of the trial court.

            
(d)  Appellant may make an additional designation of record 
within the time any reply brief is to be filed and 
served.