Case Title: Commonwealth v. Long

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12694

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12694 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GREGORY W. LONG. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     April 2, 2019. - August 12, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Marijuana.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable 
cause.  Search and Seizure, Affidavit, Probable cause.  
Probable Cause.  Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Eastern Hampshire 
Division of the District Court Department on October 18, 2017. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was considered by 
Michele Ouimet-Rooke, J., and a question of law was reported by 
her to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Luke Ryan for the defendant. 
 
Jeremy C. Bucci, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This matter concerns the search of a 
warehouse, pursuant to a search warrant that was issued, in 
part, based on the odor of unburnt marijuana.  Before the 
2 
 
 
District Court judge had issued a decision on the defendant's 
motion to suppress due to a lack of probable cause to issue the 
warrant, the parties requested that the judge report a question 
to the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as 
amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).  The judge allowed the request 
and reported the question as the parties had phrased it.  We 
transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.  We 
conclude that the warrant affidavit supported a finding of 
probable cause to search the commercial building for evidence of 
illegal marijuana cultivation. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts set forth in the 
warrant affidavit.  On October 17, 2017, Amherst police officers 
Dominic Corsetti and Lindsay Carroll were on patrol in their 
police cruiser at approximately 6:30 P.M.  They noticed two 
automobiles parked at one end of a windowless warehouse 
building, at the far end away from the driveway.  No other 
vehicles were in the parking lot.  The building was in a rural 
area with no nearby neighbors, surrounded by fields to the west 
and trees and brush to the north and east.  Multiple active 
surveillance cameras were mounted on the exterior of the 
building.  Deeming the placement of the vehicles to be 
suspicious, the officers undertook a check of the registrations.  
They learned that the owner of one vehicle, a Toyota Tundra 
pickup truck with a Massachusetts registration, had a number of 
3 
 
 
convictions of possession of marijuana and possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, over a period of almost 
twenty years, beginning in the late 1990s. 
 
The officers got out of their cruiser and walked around the 
building, along a narrow strip of grass that separated the 
building from the woods to the north and east.  The 
approximately 11,000 square foot warehouse was primarily 
constructed of cinder blocks that measured eight inches by 
sixteen inches on their face and eight inches thick.1  The 
warehouse's ordinary ventilation vents appeared to have been 
blocked by plywood from the interior of the building.  At the 
same time, polymer (PVC) exhaust or ventilation pipes, extending 
through the cinder block walls, appeared to have been recently 
mortared into place. 
Detective Gregory Wise of the Amherst police department 
arrived to assist in the investigation.  Wise had received 
specialized training in narcotics investigations, and he was 
familiar with methods utilized to cultivate and harvest 
marijuana.  The officers established a perimeter around the 
warehouse.  Wise observed that "[u]pon walking around the 
                     
1 By comparison, a regulation National Basketball League 
(NBA) court measures ninety-four feet by fifty feet, or 4,700 
square feet, less than one-half the size of the warehouse.  See 
NBA Official Rulebook 2018-2019, Rule 1:  Court Dimensions -- 
Equipment, https://official.nba.com/rule-no-1-court-dimensions-
equipment [https://perma.cc/82DD-64PS]. 
4 
 
 
circumference of the building it should be noted that the 
overwhelming odor of unburnt fresh marijuana was present and 
appeared to be coming from the inside of the building."  The 
officers also observed that a padlock on the door to a smaller, 
attached building had been broken, and there were pry marks on 
the door.  The interior of that building held many empty bottles 
of a cleaning solvent. 
The officers were able to contact the owner of the 
building, who was located in another State.  He told the police 
that he had rented the building to the defendant.  The owner's 
son arrived on scene and said that three or four individuals had 
been leasing the warehouse for the past year.  The tenants paid 
approximately $4,000 per month; the son did not know the nature 
of their business. 
The police checked the records of "the Medical Marijuana 
System" and determined that neither the defendant nor the 
registered owner of the Toyota had a medical marijuana card or 
was authorized to grow marijuana pursuant to a hardship 
marijuana cultivation license.  A check of the defendant's 
criminal record indicated that it contained six entries, 
including possession of marijuana in 2004, 1989, and 1988. 
One of the officers noted a light coming from around the 
door of a garage that was attached to the other side of the 
warehouse and knocked on the door, but received no response.  
5 
 
 
Looking through one of the cracks in the door panels, he saw 
another vehicle and an individual leaving the garage and 
entering the main warehouse. 
Officers secured the area while another officer went to 
obtain a search warrant.  Upon executing the warrant, police 
found, and seized, among other items, United States currency, 
equipment used to cultivate marijuana, and at least fifty pounds 
of marijuana.  The defendant was placed under arrest for 
trafficking in fifty pounds or more of marijuana, in violation 
of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (a). 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized 
pursuant to the search warrant, on the ground of a lack of 
probable cause.  He argued that, using only their sense of 
smell, the police were unable to exclude the possibility that 
the odor emanating from the windowless, 11,000 square foot, 
cinder-block warehouse was the product of legal marijuana use, 
possession, or cultivation. 
After the defendant filed his motion to suppress in the 
District Court, and before a judge of that court had ruled on 
the motion, the defendant and the Commonwealth jointly requested 
that the District Court judge report what both parties labeled a 
determinative question in the defendant's motion to suppress to 
the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, and the 
judge did so.  To facilitate this report, the parties stipulated 
6 
 
 
to the facts set forth in certain paragraphs in the search 
warrant affidavit.  The case was transferred to this court on 
our own motion. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Reported question.  The judge reported 
the following question: 
"Does probable cause exist where an affidavit establishes 
the overwhelming odor of unburnt fresh marijuana emanating 
from an 11,000 square foot windowless commercial building 
with exhaust vents that appears to be covered in plywood 
where the reported leaseholder has a criminal history 
including [four] charges of possession of Class D between 
1988 and 2004 and no active license to cultivate and the 
registered owner of a vehicle on the property has a 
criminal history including charges of possession with 
intent to distribute a Class D substance in 2015 and 
possession of a Class D substance in 1999 and 1998, and 
also had no active license to cultivate pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16 (2014), and its 
progeny." 
 
 
As an initial matter, we observe that "[o]nly in the most 
exceptional circumstances will we review interlocutory rulings 
in criminal cases under our general superintendence powers."  
Gilday v. Commonwealth, 360 Mass. 170, 171 (1971). 
"Interlocutory matters should be reported only where it 
appears that they present serious questions likely to be 
material in the ultimate decision, and that subsequent 
proceedings in the trial court will be substantially 
facilitated by so doing." 
 
Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 362 Mass. 552, 557 (1972), 
quoting John Gilbert Jr. Co. v. C.M. Fauci Co., 309 Mass. 271, 
273 (1941).  Interlocutory reports are not to "be permitted to 
become additional causes of the delays in criminal trials which 
7 
 
 
are already too prevalent."  Commonwealth v. Vaden, 373 Mass. 
397, 399 (1977).  "An interlocutory appeal, like a report, may 
be appropriate when the alternatives are a prolonged, expensive, 
involved or unduly burdensome trial or a dismissal of the 
indictment."  Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 366 Mass. 277, 279 
(1974). 
 
Here, however, what was reported was not a question of law 
that was a material part of the question that the motion judge 
was required to answer.  The question that the parties asked the 
judge to report, and that the judge did report to this court, is 
a hypothetical question; it extracts some of the relevant facts 
set forth in the warrant affidavit.  It is not the question that 
was before the magistrate who reviewed the entirety of the 
search warrant affidavit, nor the question that was before the 
motion judge considering the defendant's motion to suppress on 
the ground that the warrant affidavit did not establish probable 
cause.  See Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 264-
265 (1986) (noting "traditional and salutary practice of this 
court to decline to answer a constitutional question" "in the 
abstract," and declining to answer question reported under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 34 before circumstances had been established by 
trial). 
 
Moreover, the parties each attached to their briefs to this 
court, and ask this court to review, evidence that was not part 
8 
 
 
of the search warrant affidavit that was before the magistrate.  
See Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 608 (2003) ("our 
inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application 
always begins and ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit'" 
[citation omitted]).  As such, the question is not properly 
reported under Mass. R. Crim. P. 34 ("If, prior to trial, or, 
with the consent of the defendant, after conviction of the 
defendant, a question of law arises which the trial judge 
determines is so important or doubtful as to require the 
decision of the Appeals Court, the judge may report the case so 
far as necessary to present the question of law arising 
therein").  See E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§ 46:1 (4th ed. 2014).  It is unclear on this record why the 
parties did not await the judge's decision and then proceed by 
filing applications for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 474 
Mass. 1501 (2016), in the county court. 
Reviewing the warrant affidavit de novo, as we would had 
the matter been before us on the allowance of an appeal pursuant 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2),2 we conclude that the warrant 
affidavit supported a finding of probable cause to search the 
                     
 
2 "A report of a case for determination by an appellate 
court shall for all purposes under these rules be taken as the 
equivalent of a notice of appeal."  Mass. R. A. P. 5, as 
amended, 378 Mass. 930 (1979). 
9 
 
 
commercial building for evidence of illegal marijuana 
cultivation. 
 
b.  Standard of review.  Under both the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, a search warrant may issue only upon a 
showing of probable cause.  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 
97, 102 (2017).  Probable cause means a "substantial basis" to 
conclude that "the items sought are related to the criminal 
activity under investigation, and that they reasonably may be 
expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time 
the search warrant issues."  Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 
91, 102 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 
521 (2017).  See Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983).  "When considering the 
sufficiency of a search warrant application, our review 'begins 
and ends with the four corners of the affidavit.'"  Holley, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 500-501 
(2016).  The warrant affidavit is "considered as a whole and in 
a commonsense and realistic fashion" (citation omitted).  
Dorelas, supra at 501.  In determining whether probable cause 
has been established, "[a]ll reasonable inferences which may be 
drawn from the information in the affidavit may also be 
considered."  Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 
(2000). 
10 
 
 
 
"Probable cause is a 'fact-intensive inquiry, and must be 
resolved based on the particular facts of each case.'"  Holley, 
478 Mass. at 522, quoting Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 
426 (2017).  This makes a probable cause determination a 
particularly inapt issue to treat as a reported question.  See 
Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 753 n.7, cert. denied, 
574 U.S. 891 (2014); Commonwealth v. Yacobian, 393 Mass. 1005, 
1005-1006 (1984). 
 
c.  Odor of marijuana and probable cause.  The parties each 
appear to be arguing that, standing alone, the overwhelming odor 
of unburnt marijuana, coming from a particular type of 
commercial building, is a dispositive factor in a probable cause 
analysis.  The Commonwealth appears to suggest that, coming from 
a warehouse of this size and construction, the odor of unburnt 
marijuana necessarily must be sufficient for a finding of 
probable cause.  The defendant, on the other hand, appears to 
suggest that the overwhelming odor of unburnt marijuana, coming 
from a commercial warehouse of this size and construction, may 
never be considered as a factor in the probable cause analysis.  
Neither analysis is correct. 
 
For more than one hundred years, possession of any amount 
of marijuana was a criminal offense in the Commonwealth.  See 
G. L. c. 94C, § 34; St. 1911, c. 372, § 1 ("An act relative to 
the issuance of search warrants for hypnotic drugs and the 
11 
 
 
arrest of those present").  Accordingly, the "distinctive" odor 
of marijuana provided police with probable cause to believe that 
an illegal controlled substance was "nearby."  Commonwealth v. 
Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 48 (2008).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Lawrence L., 439 Mass. 817, 823-824 (2003) (strong odor of 
marijuana "reeking off" clothing of juvenile); Commonwealth v. 
Cohen, 359 Mass. 140, 145 (1971) (odor of burning marijuana 
coming from apartment); Commonwealth v. Correia, 66 Mass. App. 
Ct. 174, 177 (2006) ("the perception by a police officer with 
training and experience in narcotics detection of a strong, 
fresh odor of burnt marijuana emerging from a motor vehicle 
provide[s] probable cause to search the vehicle" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
In December of 2008, as a result of a ballot initiative, 
"the offense of possessing one ounce or less of marijuana 
changed from being a criminal to a civil offense."  Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 470 (2011).  The initiative, entitled, 
"An Act establishing a sensible State marihuana policy," was 
codified by the Legislature at G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N.  Id. at 
464.  Thereafter, the odor of marijuana is no longer de facto 
evidence of criminal activity under Massachusetts law.  Id. at 
472.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 778 (2015) 
(police not entitled to stop vehicle based on detecting odor of 
burnt marijuana); Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 33-34 
12 
 
 
(2014) (odor of marijuana emanating from vehicle does not 
provide probable cause to search for illegal quantity of 
marijuana); Overmyer, 469 Mass. at 21 (odor of unburnt marijuana 
is not reliable predictor of "the presence of a criminal amount 
of [marijuana], that is, more than one ounce, as would be 
necessary to constitute probable cause"). 
 
The ability of the police to rely upon the odor of 
marijuana, burnt or unburnt, as evidence of criminal conduct was 
further diminished by the adoption of two subsequent initiative 
petitions.  In November of 2012, Massachusetts voters approved 
"An Act for the humanitarian medical use of marijuana." 
St. 2012, c. 369.  See Commonwealth v. Canning, 471 Mass. 341, 
344 (2015).  The medical marijuana law, codified at G. L. 
c. 94I, §§ 1-7, provides that a qualifying patient shall not be 
subject to arrest for the possession of up to a sixty-day supply 
of marijuana necessary for the patient's personal medical use.  
Canning, supra at 346.  "[A] qualifying patient whose access to 
a licensed medical marijuana treatment center is limited by 
finances or an inability to travel to a licensed center may 
obtain a 'hardship cultivation registration' that allows the 
patient . . . to cultivate a sufficient number of marijuana 
plants to produce a sixty-day supply of marijuana."  Id.  See 
935 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 501.015, 501.035 (2018).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 350-351 (2018) 
13 
 
 
(medical marijuana patients entitled to pursue home hardship 
cultivation in limited circumstances). 
 
Most significantly, in November of 2016, Massachusetts 
voters approved a ballot initiative that legalized the 
recreational possession and use of marijuana by persons at least 
twenty-one years of age, and allowed limited, regulated 
commercial sale.  See St. 2016, c. 334.  The act, codified in 
G. L. c. 94G, §§ 1-14, and entitled "Regulation of the Use and 
Distribution of Marijuana not Medically Prescribed," provides, 
in relevant part, 
"a person [twenty-one] years of age or older shall not be 
arrested, prosecuted, [or] penalized . . . under the laws 
of the commonwealth in any manner . . . for:  
(1) possessing, using, purchasing, processing or 
manufacturing [one] ounce or less of marijuana, except that 
not more than [five] grams of marijuana may be in the form 
of marijuana concentrate; [or] (2) within the person's 
primary residence, possessing up to [ten] ounces of 
marijuana and any marijuana produced by marijuana plants 
cultivated on the premises and possessing, cultivating or 
processing not more than [six] marijuana plants for 
personal use so long as not more than [twelve] plants are 
cultivated on the premises at once." 
 
G. L. c. 94G, § 7 (a) (1), (2). 
 
As a result of these changes to the Commonwealth's 
marijuana laws, to obtain a search warrant for an offense 
involving marijuana, the police are required to establish that 
they are investigating illegal marijuana possession or illegal 
marijuana cultivation, not merely the possession, consumption, 
or cultivation of marijuana.  See Richardson, 479 Mass. at 350-
14 
 
 
351.  This necessarily requires proof that the possession or 
cultivation of marijuana at issue is not sanctioned by State 
law.  Id.  Cf. State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94-95, 96 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2004) (warrant "must provide an affirmative reason to 
conclude that the possession is illegal or that the marijuana 
otherwise constitutes evidence of a crime" in light of 
constitutional right to possess small amounts of marijuana in 
home); State v. Castilleja, 345 Or. 255, 270 (2008) (after 
legalization of marijuana in Oregon, issue is whether there was 
probable cause to believe that unlawful amount of marijuana -- 
more than six "usable" ounces -- would be found in residence). 
 
Here, the District Court judge framed the question of 
probable cause in light of our holding in Overmyer, 469 Mass. 
at 17.  In that case, we considered whether the odor of unburnt 
marijuana "standing alone" provided probable cause to search an 
automobile.  Id.  The motion judge had concluded that a "very 
strong odor" of marijuana allowed the police to suspect that 
more than one ounce of marijuana was present inside a vehicle.  
Id. at 18-19.  We reversed the judge's denial of the motion to 
suppress.  We stated that, "[a]lthough the odor of unburnt, 
rather than burnt, marijuana could be more consistent with the 
presence of larger quantities, . . . it does not follow that 
such an odor reliably predicts the presence of a criminal amount 
of the substance, that is, more than one ounce, as would be 
15 
 
 
necessary to constitute probable cause."  Id. at 21.  We noted 
also that the characterization of odors as "strong" or "very 
strong" is inherently subjective, and "depend[s] on a range of 
other factors, such as ambient temperature, the presence of 
other fragrant substances, and the pungency of the specific 
strain of marijuana present," and, thus, is "a dubious means for 
reliably detecting the presence of a criminal amount of 
marijuana."  Id. at 22.  We held that "we are not 
confident . . . that a human nose can discern reliably the 
presence of a criminal amount of marijuana, as distinct from an 
amount subject only to a civil fine.  In the absence of 
reliability, 'a neutral magistrate would not issue a search 
warrant, and therefore a warrantless search is not justified 
based solely on the smell of marijuana,' whether burnt or 
unburnt" (citation omitted).  Id. at 23. 
 
Following that decision, our appellate courts consistently 
have held that the odor of marijuana, burnt or unburnt, without 
more, is insufficient to establish probable cause that a crime 
is being committed.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 
Mass. 625, 633 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Fontaine, 84 
Mass. App. Ct. 699, 706 (2014) ("odor of unburnt 
marijuana . . . , standing alone, does not provide . . . 
probable cause to conduct a search"); Commonwealth v. Locke, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. 497, 498, 500, 503-505 (2016), quoting Rodriguez, 
16 
 
 
472 Mass. at 774 (suppressing 159 pounds of marijuana found in 
back of minivan, where trooper approaching van's window 
"immediately detected the odor of unburned marijuana" that was 
"so strong that three air fresheners and an aerosol spray did 
not cover [it]," because "we no longer consider the 'strong' or 
'very strong' smell of unburnt marijuana to provide probable 
cause to believe that a criminal amount of the drug is 
present"). 
 
The defendant contends that, because we held in Overmyer 
and its progeny that the odor of unburnt marijuana, alone, does 
not establish probable cause, the same result must be reached in 
this case.  The defendant is correct that we concluded in 
Overmyer, 469 Mass. at 22-23, that a police officer's sense of 
smell is an unreliable means to distinguish between a legal and 
an illegal amount of marijuana stashed in an automobile.  Id. 
at 22-23.  In that case, however, we did not articulate a 
bright-line rule excluding the odor of unburnt marijuana as one 
factor in the probable cause calculus in all circumstances.  
Probable cause, after all, is a "fact-intensive inquiry and must 
be resolved based on the particular facts of each case."  Morin, 
478 Mass. at 426.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
696 (1996) (probable cause is "fluid concept[]" dependent upon 
context in which it is being assessed).  Cf. Zullo v. State, 
2019 VT 1, ¶ 81, citing Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16 (odor of 
17 
 
 
marijuana is factor, "but not necessarily a determinative 
factor, as to whether probable cause exists"; agreeing with 
"courts that treat odor of marijuana as factor in totality-of-
circumstances test rather than those courts concluding that odor 
of marijuana alone can provide probable cause to believe that 
marijuana is nearby"; "[t]he weight of that factor in 
determining whether probable cause exists generally depends not 
only upon the nature and strength of the odor and other factors 
accompanying the odor, but also how those factors relate to the 
offense being investigated"). 
 
Here, the circumstances before the magistrate formed a 
complete picture of which the overwhelming smell of unburnt 
marijuana was one factor.  We conclude that the affidavit was 
sufficient to allow a magistrate to find probable cause to 
search the warehouse for evidence of illegal marijuana 
cultivation. 
 
First, the police were searching for evidence of marijuana 
cultivation in a place where it was not allowed under State law.  
The lease holder, and at least one of the other suspected 
occupants, did not have medical marijuana hardship cultivation 
licenses, and cultivation as a registered commercial provider 
had not yet been implemented under the 2016 voter initiative.  
See G. L. c. 94G, §§ 1-14.  General Laws c. 94G, § 7 (a) (2), 
allows a person twenty-one years of age or older to cultivate 
18 
 
 
not more than six marijuana plants for personal use "within the 
person's primary residence," and the commercial warehouse 
clearly was not a residence.  Thus, the search warrant affidavit 
excluded the possibility of legal marijuana cultivation, while 
the collection of empty chemical bottles, the newly mortared PVC 
exhaust pipes, and the plywood-boarded ordinary vents suggested 
a cultivation operation.  Multiple active surveillance cameras 
were mounted on the exterior of the building.  In addition, 
police had evidence of an apparent break-in, with lights 
emanating around the edges of a closed garage door, and two 
isolated vehicles parked in what the officers viewed as a 
suspicious manner, after ordinary business hours, one of which 
was owned by an automobile dealership in a distant State, and 
the other of which was owned by an individual who had prior 
convictions of possession and possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana over the course of several decades. 
 
Of course, a prior conviction of a related offense does not 
establish probable cause that an individual is committing a 
similar offense.  See Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 
246 (2017) ("While Massachusetts courts have commented that 
knowledge of a person's arrest record . . . [may] be considered 
in a reasonable suspicion evaluation . . . , further evidence is 
required to support reasonable suspicion" [quotation and 
citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 709 
19 
 
 
(1998) ("We have often recognized that a police officer's 
knowledge of the reputation for drug use or drug dealing of 
persons interacting with a defendant, even though not sufficient 
alone, is a factor to support probable cause to arrest the 
defendant").  Nonetheless, a prior related conviction may be a 
factor in the over-all analysis.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Carrasco, 
405 Mass. 316, 322 (1989); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. 660, 666 (2016).  In these circumstances, the multiple 
convictions related to marijuana possession and distribution, 
over a lengthy period, combined with the other evidence, added 
an additional measure of support to the officers' probable cause 
calculus. 
 
The situation here is similar to that in Canning, 471 Mass. 
at 343–344.  In that case, we held that the search warrant 
affidavit established probable cause that there was cultivation, 
but not illegal cultivation, because no license or registration 
check was done.  Police observed that "[the] windows of the 
addition to the house on the property were obscured by dark 
material, . . . an aluminum flexible hose [was] protruding out 
of one of the windows, and . . . a pickup truck registered to 
the defendant [was] in front of the house."  Id. at 343.  
Officers continued surveillance and "smelled a strong odor of 
'freshly cultivated' marijuana emanating from the house."  Id.  
In addition to the "aluminum hose coming out of the window of 
20 
 
 
the addition," police "heard the sound of fans, and, using night 
vision goggles, saw light emanating from another window."  Id.3 
 
The overwhelming odor of unburnt marijuana wafting from an 
11,000 square foot, windowless, cinder-block warehouse, with all 
its doors apparently shut, its ventilation system blocked, and 
new exhaust pipes installed, is a different situation from the 
odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from the close confines of 
an automobile, or the front porch of a house.  This is not to 
say, as the Commonwealth appears to suggest, that any odor of 
unburnt marijuana emanating from a building other than a house, 
by itself, provides probable cause.  "[T]he 'strong' or 'very 
strong' smell of unburnt marijuana" is insufficient "to provide 
probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of the drug is 
present."  Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 774, citing Overmyer, 469 
Mass. at 23.  See Commonwealth v. Meneide, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 
448, 451 n.4 (2016) ("The smell of . . . unburnt marijuana, 
standing alone, no longer provides . . . reasonable suspicion," 
                     
 
3 In Commonwealth v. Canning, 471 Mass. 341, 343–344 (2015), 
the officers had conducted a multiday surveillance of the 
property.  During that time, an officer in a neighboring town 
informed these officers that the defendant and another man had 
been observed "purchasing 'a large amount of indoor [marijuana] 
grow materials' from a "hydroponic shop' . . . and then loading 
the materials into an automobile registered to the defendant."  
Id. at 343.  Police also obtained utility bills for electrical 
service at the subject property and neighboring houses, covering 
the previous six months, and learned that the charges at the 
property in question averaged more than one hundred times the 
number of kilowatts used by neighboring houses.  Id. 
21 
 
 
much less "probable cause").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Villagran, 477 Mass. 711, 717 (2017).  As the cases supra make 
clear, the circumstances underlying a determination of probable 
cause are fact- and situation-specific. 
 
Here, in all of the circumstances set forth in the search 
warrant affidavit, there was probable cause that illegal 
cultivation of marijuana was taking place within the warehouse. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The search warrant affidavit established 
probable cause to search the warehouse for evidence of marijuana 
cultivation.  The matter is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.