Case Title: State v. Evans

Citation: 241 Or. 567, 407 P.2d 621

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1965-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed November 10, 1965.
Gary D. Babcock, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief *568 was Lawrence A. Aschenbrenner, Public Defender, Salem.
R. Thomas Gooding, La Grande, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Grace K. Williams, District Attorney for Grant County, Canyon City, and Burleigh, Carey & Gooding, Deputy District Attorneys, La Grande.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE, LUSK and SCHWAB, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
SCHWAB, J. (Pro Tempore)
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of the crime of rape entered on October 23, 1964. He assigns as error the admission into evidence of two exhibits, a shotgun with which he threatened the victim and a blanket on which the act was performed. We set forth only so much of the facts as are necessary to a consideration of the assignment of error.
On August 9, 1964, the complaining witness was driving from John Day to Bend when she was forced off the road by the defendant, who was driving a green sedan. Defendant forced the complaining witness into his car by shotgun point, then took her several miles down an old logging road where he stopped, spread the blanket upon the ground and had intercourse with her. Sometime after she was released by the defendant she reported the happenings to the state police. In the course of the investigation the state police obtained a description of the defendant and his car. It developed that a man who met this description was living at the hotel in Long Creek, Oregon. One state policeman, James E. Whalen, went to the Long Creek *569 hotel where he found the defendant. The pertinent portions of his testimony are as follows:
The shotgun and the blanket had previously been received into evidence without objection by the defendant *571 after they had been identified by the complaining witness. Nothing further transpired with regard to counsel's motion to suppress until after the state had rested, when the following proceedings were had outside the presence of the jury:
The defendant's position throughout the trial was that he did in fact have sexual relations with the complaining witness at the time and place described by her, but that they were voluntary. In his opening statement, defendant's counsel discussed the shotgun at some length, admitting that the defendant had possession of it on the night in question but denying that it was used to threaten the complaining witness. He stated:
The defendant did not take the stand and offered no testimony. In the course of closing argument defendant's counsel stated:
Defendant, in his brief, sets forth the following as the basis of his assignment of error:
In essence, his argument is that if after arrest a suspect consents to a search of his automobile without being first advised of his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination, the articles seized may not be used against him because to permit such would be in violation of the rule laid down in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US 478, 84 S Ct 1758, 12 L Ed2d 977.
1. We do not reach this question for the defendant was not under arrest or any other form of custody at the time officer Whalen took possession of the blanket and the gun. Escobedo was not intended to prevent legitimate police investigation. State v. Shannon, 241 Or 450, 405 P2d 837. In State v. Neely, 239 Or 487, 491, 395 P2d 557, 398 P2d 482, we noted that the essence of the majority's decision was:
2. An analysis of the language above quoted shows that police may interrogate a criminal suspect without first warning him of his constitutional right except under certain conditions which are stated in the conjunctive. One of these conditions is "the suspect has been taken into police custody." People v. Stewart, 43 Cal Rptr 201, 400 P2d 97. In applying the rule in Escobedo in State v. Neely, supra, we said at 503-04:
We were there applying the rule set forth in Escobedo and in the context used "focal suspect" is to be interpreted to mean a person upon whom the inquiry into an unsolved crime has focused to the point where he has been taken into police custody. In the usual situation police interrogation of the nature proscribed in the absence of constitutional warnings takes place after arrest, and "arrest" includes "custody." People *574 v. Stewart, supra. However, "custody" as the word is used in Escobedo may under certain circumstances mean something less than legal arrest. See State v. Ervin, 241 Or 475, 406 P2d 901.
3. What we stated in State v. Shannon, supra, relative to "interrogation" is equally true with regard to "custody." It is probably not possible in a single case to lay down an absolute test as to what is and what is not custody, for it may well be a functional test. In any event, we need not attempt to lay down a precise definition here since, giving the word an interpretation most favorable to criminal defendants, there was no semblance of police custody in this case. Even the broadest definition of "custody" requires that there be some element of police control and consequent inhibition on freedom of movement, some circumstance, or some word or action on the part of the police that can be reasonably construed as physical or psychological restraint. Here, one policeman talked to the defendant at defendant's hotel. He explained what he was investigating; he asked the defendant as he was leaving the hotel whether or not he could look in his vehicle, and after looking in the vehicle and taking the articles in question, he left without him.
Affirmed.
McALLISTER, C.J., specially concurring.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion on the sole ground that defendant consented to a search of his automobile and at the trial did not object to the introduction of the evidence obtained therefrom. I do not agree with the dictum in the majority opinion that the police may interrogate a focal suspect without warning him of his constitutional rights so long *575 as the suspect has not been taken into police custody. Police interrogation to elicit incriminating statements is not involved in this case.
SLOAN, J. joins in this opinion.