Case Title: Oregon v. Algeo

Citation: 

Docket Number: S060830

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  October 3, 2013 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL ALGEO, 
Defendant. 
 
J. W. P., 
Petitioner on Review, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF OREGON  
and DANIEL ALGEO, 
Respondents on Review. 
 
(CC CR100607; SC S060830) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
 
On petition for review pursuant to ORS 147.539. 
 
 
Argued and submitted April 29, 2013. 
 
 
Erick J. Haynie, Perkins Coie, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for 
petitioner on review.  With him on the brief were Nathan R. Christensen and Bryan D. 
Beel. 
 
 
Paul L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for respondent on review State of Oregon.  With him on the brief were Ellen F. 
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General. 
 
 
Paula J. Lawrence, The Lawrence Law Firm, McMinnville, argued the cause and 
filed the brief for respondent on review Daniel Algeo. 
 
 
Margaret Garven, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae The National Crime 
Victim Law Institute.  With her on the brief was Amy C. Liu. 
 
 
WALTERS, J. 
 
 
 
The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
*Review of an order of the Yamhill County Circuit Court, Ronald W. Stone, 
Judge. 
 
 
 
WALTERS, J. 
1 
 
 
Petitioner is a crime victim who filed a claim pursuant to ORS 147.515, 
2 
alleging that the trial court had violated her right to "receive prompt restitution" under 
3 
Article I, section 42(1)(d),1 of the Oregon Constitution.  The trial court entered an order 
4 
denying petitioner's claim, and, pursuant to ORS 147.539, petitioner sought direct review 
5 
of that order in this court.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order. 
6 
 
 
The material facts are procedural and undisputed.  Petitioner and her friend 
7 
were crossing a street late at night when defendant, who had been drinking, hit them with 
8 
his car and seriously injured them.2  Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of driving 
9 
                                              
 
1 
Article I, section 42(1) (d) provides: 
 
"To preserve and protect the right of crime victims to justice, to 
ensure crime victims a meaningful role in the criminal and juvenile justice 
systems, to accord crime victims due dignity and respect and to ensure that 
criminal and juvenile court delinquency proceedings are conducted to seek 
the truth as to the defendant's innocence or guilt, and also to ensure that a 
fair balance is struck between the rights of crime victims and the rights of 
criminal defendants in the course and conduct of criminal and juvenile 
court delinquency proceedings, the following rights are hereby granted to 
victims in all prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency 
proceedings: 
 
"* * * * * 
 
"The right to receive prompt restitution from the convicted criminal 
who caused the victim's loss or injury[.]" 
 
2 
Both women were given emergency medical treatment at the scene.  
Petitioner was identified as having serious physical injuries, including a fractured skull.  
She was transported by Life Flight helicopter to a Portland hospital for emergency 
treatment.  The other victim was taken by ambulance to the Willamette Valley Medical 
Center for non-life-threatening injuries. 
 
under the influence of intoxicants and two counts of assault in the fourth degree for 
1 
"intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury."  ORS 163.160.  The 
2 
trial court sentenced defendant to a combination of supervised probation, jail time, fines, 
3 
and suspension of his driver's license.  Pursuant to ORS 137.106, the trial court judgment 
4 
also granted the state 90 days to submit a "reasonable final restitution amount."3 
5 
 
 
ORS 137.106(1) provides that, when a trial court determines that a person 
6 
has been convicted of a crime that has resulted in economic damages, the court must 
7 
include in its judgment a requirement that the defendant pay restitution to the victim in 
8 
the "full amount" of those damages.  In this case, the state timely submitted a proposed 
9 
supplemental judgment requesting that defendant be ordered to pay restitution in an 
10 
amount that defendant stipulated represented the full amount of petitioner's economic 
11 
                                              
 
3 
ORS 137.106 provides, in part: 
 
 
"(1) When a person is convicted of a crime * * * that has resulted in 
economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and present to the 
court, prior to the time of sentencing, evidence of the nature and amount of 
the damages.  If the court finds from the evidence presented that a victim 
suffered economic damages, in addition to any other sanction it may 
impose, the court shall include one of the following in the judgment: 
 
"(a) A requirement that the defendant pay the victim restitution in a 
specific amount that equals the full amount of the victim's economic 
damages as determined by the court. 
 
"(b) A requirement that the defendant pay the victim restitution, and 
that the specific amount of restitution will be established by a supplemental 
judgment based upon a determination made by the court within 90 days of 
entry of the judgment.  In the supplemental judgment, the court shall 
establish a specific amount of restitution that equals the full amount of the 
victim's economic damages as determined by the court." 
 
damages.  The trial court found that criminal conduct had occurred; that petitioner had 
1 
suffered economic damages; and that, but for defendant's criminal conduct, petitioner 
2 
would not have incurred those damages.  However, the court asked the parties to brief 
3 
two questions:  (1) whether the court may grant an award of restitution that exceeds the 
4 
amount that petitioner could have recovered in a civil action; and (2) whether a 
5 
contributory negligence analysis is appropriate in the context of a restitution 
6 
determination. 
7 
 
 
After considering the parties' arguments, the court issued a letter opinion 
8 
dated July 17, 2012, awarding restitution in an amount equal to 10 percent of petitioner's 
9 
economic damages.  The court reasoned that the economic damages recoverable through 
10 
criminal restitution are those that are recoverable in a civil action and that, in a civil 
11 
action, petitioner could not have obtained judgment for damages resulting from her own 
12 
negligence.  The court found that petitioner had been "jaywalking" when defendant struck 
13 
and injured her and concluded that that unlawful activity, rather than defendant's criminal 
14 
conduct, was the "cause" of petitioner's injuries.  However, because defendant had 
15 
admitted at sentencing that he recklessly had caused physical injury to petitioner, the 
16 
court determined that the state had proved that defendant had caused "some," although 
17 
not more than a "nominal percentage," or 10 percent, of petitioner's economic damages.  
18 
"It is clear from the evidence that almost all of the economic damages suffered by the 
19 
victim[] were caused by [her] violation of the law," the court wrote.  "I don't believe I 
20 
have any authority to award more."  The court then entered a supplemental judgment in 
21 
an amount that reflected its reasoning.  Neither party appealed from that judgment, which 
22 
 
was entered on August 3, 2012. 
1 
 
 
On August 13, 2012, represented by private counsel, petitioner filed a claim 
2 
in the underlying criminal proceeding alleging that the court had entered the 
3 
supplemental judgment in error and in violation of Article I, section 42, of the Oregon 
4 
Constitution.  Petitioner set out her claim on Form 4.100.2a of the UTCR Appendix of 
5 
Forms, "Claim of Violation of Crime Victims' Right(s)."  On September 13, 2012, 
6 
petitioner filed an amended claim using the same form.  In her amended claim, petitioner 
7 
alleged that the court's supplemental judgment had violated her right "[t]o receive prompt 
8 
restitution from the convicted criminal who caused [her] loss or injury."  As a remedy, 
9 
petitioner sought restitution in the full amount of her economic damages. 
10 
 
 
After considering additional briefing and conducting another hearing, the 
11 
trial court entered an order denying petitioner's claim "for the reasons on the record 
12 
includ[ing the court's] letter opinion of July 17, 2012."4  Petitioner sought review of the 
13 
trial court's order pursuant to ORS 147.539.5  This court exercised its discretion to grant 
14 
                                              
 
4 
ORS 147.517 requires that, upon receipt of a facially valid claim under 
ORS 147.515, the court "shall issue an order to show cause why the victim should not be 
granted relief."  If the court determines that the victim has not alleged a facially valid 
claim, the court shall enter an order dismissing the claim, in conformance with certain 
statutory requirements.  ORS 147.515(5).  It appears that the trial court issued its October 
29, 2012, order denying petitioner's motion in lieu of either a "show cause" order or an 
order dismissing petitioner's claim as facially invalid.  In their arguments to this court, the 
parties do not raise the question whether the trial court followed the procedures mandated 
by ORS 147.515. 
 
5 
ORS 147.535(4) provides, in part, that "[a]ppellate review of an order 
issued under ORS 147.515 * * * shall be as provided in * * * ORS 147.539 in all appeals 
 
 
review and extended the time to issue its final decision pursuant to ORS 147.539(4)(b).6 
1 
 
 
Before considering petitioner's arguments, we think it helpful to lay out the 
2 
pertinent constitutional and statutory framework that governs petitioner's claim.  Article I, 
3 
sections 42 and 43, of the Oregon Constitution provide crime victims with specifically 
4 
enumerated rights, including "[t]he right to receive prompt restitution from the convicted 
5 
criminal who caused the victim's loss or injury."  Or Const, Art I, § 42(1)(d).  Article I, 
6 
section 42(3)(a), provides that every victim shall have a "remedy by due course of law for 
7 
violation of a right established in [section 42]."  Article I, section 42(3)(b), provides that 
8 
a "victim may assert a claim for a right established in [section 42] in a pending case, by a 
9 
mandamus proceeding if no case is pending or as otherwise provided by law." 
10 
 
 
The legislature enacted ORS 147.500 to 147.550 to effectuate those 
11 
constitutional rights.  See ORS 147.504(1) (so stating).  Under those statutes, a victim 
12 
who wishes to allege a violation of a right granted by Article I, section 42, must inform 
13 
the court within 30 days of the date the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, 
14 
of the facts supporting the allegation.  ORS 147.515(1).  The victim then must describe 
15 
                                              
arising under ORS 147.500 to 147.550 except those described in paragraph (a) of this 
subsection."  ORS 147.539(1) provides that the Supreme Court has discretionary 
jurisdiction to review orders described in ORS 147.535(4)(b). 
 
6 
ORS 147.539(4)(a) generally requires this court to issue its decision on 
appeal within 21 days after the date that the court issued the order granting review.  We 
determined that the ends of justice that would be served by permitting the parties to file 
briefs and participate in oral argument outweighed the best interests of the victim, the 
prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the public in this case.  We thus extended the 
applicable time requirement for issuing our final decision, pursuant to 147.539(4)(b). 
 
those facts and propose a remedy.  Id.  If the trial court deems the victim's claim to be 
1 
facially valid, it must issue an order to "show cause why the victim should not be granted 
2 
relief," ORS 147.517(2), and may hold a hearing on the victim's claim, ORS 147.530(1).  
3 
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court must issue an order granting or denying 
4 
the relief requested.  ORS 147.530(4).  A party not satisfied with the court's order may 
5 
seek review in this court pursuant to ORS 147.535, 147.537, and 147.539. 
6 
 
 
In this case, petitioner and the trial court followed the statutory procedures 
7 
that we have outlined.  Petitioner filed a claim alleging a violation of her right to "receive 
8 
prompt restitution" under Article I, section 42, and the trial court entered an order 
9 
denying that claim.  On review, petitioner does not contest the trial court's determination 
10 
that she was 90 percent responsible for the injuries that she suffered; rather, she argues 
11 
that ORS 137.106(1)(a) requires that a person who commits a crime that results in 
12 
economic damages pay the "full amount" of those damages, irrespective of the fault of 
13 
the victim or any third party.  Petitioner interprets Article I, section 42(1)(d), as 
14 
incorporating that statutory requirement.  Alternatively, petitioner argues that this court 
15 
has authority to determine whether the trial court committed statutory error by failing to 
16 
impose restitution in the full amount of her economic damages. 
17 
 
 
In accordance with our usual approach, we take up petitioner's statutory 
18 
argument before we consider her constitutional argument.  Burt v. Blumenauer, 299 Or 
19 
55, 70, 699 P2d 168 (1985).  In doing so, we proceed differently than this court did in 
20 
State v. Barrett, 350 Or 390, 255 P3d 472 (2011).  In Barrett, the victim claimed a 
21 
violation of her constitutional right to advance notice of, and the right to be present at, the 
22 
 
critical stages of a criminal prosecution.7  Or Const, Art I, § 42(1)(a).  Although the 
1 
victim in Barrett alleged that her statutory rights had been violated, the statutes that she 
2 
cited provided rights duplicating those set out in the constitution; those statutes were not 
3 
necessary to the victim's constitutional argument.  The trial court held that the state had 
4 
violated the victim's constitutional and statutory rights, but did not provide a remedy for 
5 
those violations.  Id. at 396-97.  Therefore, the trial court denied the victim's claim. 
6 
 
 
On review, this court began its analysis with the victim's claim that her 
7 
constitutional rights had been violated.  The court explained that, in enacting ORS 
8 
147.500 to 147.550, the legislature had "created a clear and expedited procedural path for 
9 
a victim to assert claims for the violation of her constitutional rights, both at trial and on 
10 
appeal," but that the procedural path to a statutory remedy was "less clear."  Id. at 398-99.  
11 
Therefore, the court departed from its usual approach and, on the merits, concluded that 
12 
the victim had proved a violation of Article I, section 42(1)(a), and was entitled to the 
13 
remedy that she sought -- a resentencing hearing at which she could appear.  Id. at 407.  
14 
Given those conclusions, there was no need for the court to consider, in addition, whether 
15 
                                              
 
7 
Article I, section 42(1), provides, in part, that 
 
"the following rights are hereby granted to victims in all 
prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency proceedings: 
 
"(a)  The right to be present at and, upon specific request, to be 
informed in advance of any critical stage of the proceedings held in open 
court when the defendant will be present, and to be heard at the pretrial 
release hearing and the sentencing or juvenile court delinquency 
disposition[.]"   
 
a statutory violation had occurred. 
1 
 
 
This case is different.  Here, Article I, section 42, does not explicitly 
2 
require, as ORS 137.106(1)(a) does, that a trial court award restitution in "the full amount 
3 
of the victim's economic damages."  Rather, Article I, section 42, provides that a crime 
4 
victim is entitled to "receive prompt restitution from the convicted criminal who caused 
5 
the victim's loss or injury."  Petitioner's argument is that we should interpret that 
6 
constitutional right to incorporate the statutory requirement or, alternatively, that we 
7 
should review the trial court's decision to determine whether the trial court committed 
8 
statutory error in ordering restitution that constitutes only 10 percent of petitioner's 
9 
economic damages.  If ORS 147.500 to 147.550 permits the latter review, we need not 
10 
take up an issue of constitutional interpretation that our "salutary sense of judicial 
11 
restraint" counsels us to avoid.  See Barrett, 350 Or at 397.  Thus, we adhere to our "first 
12 
things first" approach in this proceeding and analyze our authority to consider, in this 
13 
proceeding, whether the trial court committed statutory error. 
14 
 
 
In that regard, it is important to remember that the question of the trial 
15 
court's obligation to enter restitution in the "full amount" of petitioner's economic 
16 
damages first arose when the state proposed a supplemental judgment seeking restitution 
17 
in that amount.  The parties -- at that time, the state and defendant -- fully briefed the 
18 
issue, and the state took the position that petitioner takes in this appeal -- that ORS 
19 
137.106(1) requires restitution in full, that the amount recoverable in a civil action is 
20 
irrelevant to a restitution award, and that the trial court was precluded from reducing the 
21 
restitution award to reflect the extent of a victim's "fault."  The trial court disagreed with 
22 
 
the state's argument and entered judgment in an amount equal to 10 percent of petitioner's 
1 
economic loss.  The state did not appeal to the Court of Appeals from that supplemental 
2 
judgment, although it was permitted to do so.  See ORS 138.060(1)(e) (providing for 
3 
appeal to the Court of Appeals); State v. Ceballos, 235 Or App 208, 210, 230 P3d 954 
4 
(2010) (state's appeal from supplemental judgment of restitution).  Instead, petitioner 
5 
filed a claim in the trial court alleging a violation of her constitutional right, and the trial 
6 
court entered an order denying that constitutional claim.  It is that order that is before us 
7 
on review. 
8 
 
 
Petitioner nevertheless contends that this court is authorized to consider 
9 
whether the trial court committed statutory, as opposed to constitutional, error in entering 
10 
that judgment.  Petitioner argues that no statute expressly prohibits this court from that 
11 
exercise of jurisdiction.  In fact, petitioner notes, ORS 147.535(3) does not limit this 
12 
court's jurisdiction to constitutional issues.  Rather, it provides that "the jurisdiction of the 
13 
Supreme Court is limited to the order for which appellate review is sought."  Thus, 
14 
petitioner suggests, when a victim seeks review of such an order on statutory as well as 
15 
constitutional grounds, this court may address both issues. 
16 
 
 
In our view, the statute to which petitioner refers -- ORS 147.535 -- 
17 
resolves the issue that petitioner raises, but resolves it against her.8  The only jurisdiction 
18 
                                              
 
8 
ORS 147.535 provides, in part, that, 
 
"(1)(a)  Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as 
provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, appellate review of an order 
 
 
that that statute grants is jurisdiction to review the order of a trial court denying a 
1 
petitioner's constitutional claim.  In granting crime victims an opportunity for direct 
2 
review of such orders in this court, the legislature has permitted crime victims a unique 
3 
procedural path.  See Barrett, 350 Or at 398 (expedited procedural path provided by ORS 
4 
147.517, 147.530(5), and 147.535(2) designed to allow victims to assert claims for 
5 
violation of constitutional rights).  Other judgments or post-judgment orders in criminal 
6 
cases generally are appealable only to the Court of Appeals.  See ORS 138.040, 138.050, 
7 
                                              
issued under ORS 147.515, 147.520, or 147.530 shall be solely as provided 
in this section and ORS 147.537, 147.539, and 147.542. 
 
"(b)  A defendant who seeks to appeal an order issued under ORS 
147.515, 147.520 or 147.530 must do so in the manner provided for appeals 
in ORS chapter 138.  The provisions of this section and ORS 147.537, 
147.539 and 147.542 do not apply to an appeal under ORS chapter 138. 
 
"* * * * *  
 
"(2)  Jurisdiction for appellate review of an order issued under ORS 
147.515, 147.520 or 147.530 is vested originally and exclusively in the 
Supreme Court. 
 
"(3)  Subject to ORS 147.542, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
is limited to the order for which appellate review is sought and the trial 
court retains jurisdiction over all other matters in the criminal proceeding. 
 
"(4)  Appellate review of an order issued under ORS 147.515, 
147.520 or 147.530 shall be as provided in: 
 
"(a) ORS 147.537 if the order was issued under ORS 147.520 or 
147.530 in a criminal proceeding in which a defendant is charged with a 
felony or a person Class A misdemeanor * * *. 
 
"(b) ORS 147.539 in all appeals arising under ORS 147.500 to 
147.550 except those described in paragraph (a) of this subsection." 
 
138.053, 138.057, 138.060, and 147.535(1)(b) (governing appeals to the Court of 
1 
Appeals in criminal cases and stating persons who may appeal and under what 
2 
circumstances).  Thus, in this case, the state was permitted to appeal the supplemental 
3 
judgment that the trial court entered to the Court of Appeals.  Had the state taken such an 
4 
appeal, it could have argued that the trial court had committed statutory error in entering 
5 
the supplemental judgment in an amount less than petitioner's full economic damages.  
6 
However, the legislature has limited direct review in this court under ORS 147.535(3) to 
7 
considering whether the trial court committed constitutional error when it denied 
8 
petitioner's claim that her constitutional rights were violated.9 
9 
 
 
That does not mean, however, that ORS 137.106 is completely immaterial 
10 
to our task.  Petitioner contends that Article I, section 42(1)(d), incorporates the 
11 
requirements of ORS 137.106, and we therefore are required to analyze that statute in the 
12 
course of analyzing petitioner's constitutional claim.  We turn now to that task and 
13 
consider whether Article I, section 42(1)(d), guarantees a victim the right to receive the 
14 
"full amount of [her] economic damages" required by ORS 137.106(1)(a). 
15 
 
 
Because Article I, section 42, was enacted by the voters through ballot 
16 
                                              
 
9 
We emphasize that the legislature is not foreclosed from making a different 
choice.  The legislature has the authority, if it wishes to exercise it, to permit victims to 
file claims in the trial court alleging violation of their statutory rights, to permit trial 
courts to decide those claims, and to permit the Court of Appeals or this court to consider 
appeals of such decisions.  Such a path to appellate review is not constitutionally 
prohibited; it simply is not provided by ORS 147.535, the statute on which petitioner 
relies in this case. 
 
measure, we must consider the voters' intent.  Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State 
1 
Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994).  We focus first on the text and 
2 
context of Article I, section 42(1)(d), but also may consider the measure's history, should 
3 
it appear useful to our analysis.  Cf. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 
4 
(2009). 
5 
 
 
The text of Article I, section 42(1)(d), grants a victim the right to receive 
6 
prompt restitution.  Section 42 does not define the term "restitution," and, although it 
7 
provides that a victim "shall have remedy by due course of law for violation of a right 
8 
established in [that] section," it does not further describe that remedy.  Or Const, Art I, § 
9 
42(3)(a).  Nevertheless, both petitioner and the state argue, for different reasons, that 
10 
Article I, section 42(1)(d), confers a right to receive the "full amount" of a victim's 
11 
economic damages.  Petitioner suggests that that meaning is captured by the term 
12 
"restitution" itself, because the "ordinary meaning" of "restitution" is to "restor[e] 
13 
someone to a position he occupied before a particular event."  Alternatively, petitioner 
14 
argues that, because Article I, section 42, permits the legislature to "effectuat[e]" victims' 
15 
constitutional rights, it confers the right to receive "restitution" as that term is statutorily 
16 
defined. 
17 
 
 
The state makes a somewhat different argument.  It contends that Article I, 
18 
section 42(1)(d), grants a crime victim a "procedural" right to receive promptly the 
19 
restitution that a criminal defendant statutorily is required to pay.  Alternatively, the state 
20 
argues that, when the voters amended Article I, section 42, in 2008, they intended the 
21 
term "restitution" to have its contemporaneous statutory meaning; that is, a right to 
22 
 
receive restitution as that term was defined by ORS 137.106 in 2008.10 
1 
 
 
We begin with petitioner's suggestion that, in using the term "restitution," 
2 
the voters intended to give that term its ordinary meaning and to require that a victim be 
3 
fully restored or returned to the condition that he or she had enjoyed prior to the crime.  
4 
Although petitioner certainly is correct that the ordinary meaning of the term "restitution" 
5 
includes the idea of repayment,11 we are not persuaded that the voters intended that term 
6 
to require repayment "in full."  
7 
 
 
In 1976, before Article I, section 42, was adopted, this court had interpreted 
8 
the original version of the criminal restitution statute, former ORS 137.540(10) (1975), to 
9 
permit a trial court to award a victim an amount of restitution that was less than the 
10 
amount of the victim's loss.  State v. Stalheim, 275 Or 683, 552 P2d 829 (1976).  Former 
11 
ORS 137.540(10) authorized a sentencing court to require, as a condition of probation, 
12 
that the defendant "[m]ake reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage 
13 
or loss caused by [the] offense, in an amount to be determined by the court."  (Emphases 
14 
added.)  The court interpreted the term "restitution" to mean "the return of a sum of 
15 
money, an object, or the value of an object which a defendant wrongfully obtained in the 
16 
course of committing the crime."  Id. at 687-88.  The court interpreted the term 
17 
                                              
 
10 
In 2008, as today, ORS 137.106 required that a trial court judge impose 
restitution in the "full amount" of a victim's economic damages.  
 
11  
Petitioner cites Hughey v. United States, 495 US 411, 416, 110 S Ct 1979, 
109 L Ed 408 (1990), for the proposition that "the ordinary meaning of 'restitution' is 
restoring someone to the position he occupied before the particular event." 
 
"reparation" to have a broader meaning -- "repairing" or "restor[ing]."  However, the 
1 
court held that both terms encompassed only "reimbursement for the victim's liquidated 
2 
or easily measurable damages resulting from the charged offense," id. at 688, and noted 
3 
that it "[did] not mean to imply that a judge could not impose restitution or reparation in 
4 
an amount less than the victim's loss."  Id. at 688 n 8. 
5 
 
 
In 1999, when the voters enacted Article I, section 42, the criminal 
6 
restitution statute -- ORS 137.106 (1999), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 670 § 1 -- 
7 
continued to permit trial courts to impose restitution in amounts that were less than a 
8 
victim's full economic damages.12  At that time, the term "restitution" was statutorily 
9 
defined as the "full, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to a victim."  ORS 
10 
137.103(3) (1999).  "Pecuniary damages," in turn, were limited to "special damages * * * 
11 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action" arising out of the 
12 
defendant's criminal activities.  ORS 137.103(2) (1999).  Whether restitution was 
13 
imposed, and in what amount, was entirely within the sentencing court's discretion.  ORS 
14 
137.106(1) (1999) (making restitution a discretionary part of a defendant's sentence).  
15 
Thus, before the adoption of Article I, section 42, the legislature had used the term 
16 
"restitution" to mean repayment, but not to mean, necessarily, repayment of economic 
17 
damages "in full."  We are not persuaded that the ordinary meaning of the term 
18 
                                              
 
12 
Although the Oregon Legislature made various amendments to the criminal 
restitution statute following Stalheim, see State v. Hval, 174 Or App 164, 174-76, 25 P3d 
958 (2001) (providing overview of amendments), those amendments did not require the 
court to impose restitution in the amount of a victim's full economic damages.   
 
"restitution" incorporates the concept of repayment of economic damages "in full" or that 
1 
the voters intended the term "restitution" to carry that meaning when they enacted Article 
2 
I, section 42. 
3 
 
 
We turn now to the argument, advanced by both petitioner and the state, 
4 
that Article I, section 42, grants crime victims a right to receive the restitution required by 
5 
statute.  Petitioner bases her argument on the text of Article I, section 42(3)(c), which 
6 
states that the legislature may "provide by law for further effectuation" of the rights and 
7 
remedies set forth in that subsection.  (Emphasis added.)  The legislature "effectuated" 
8 
Article I, section 42, petitioner argues, by amending ORS 137.106 to require that trial 
9 
courts impose restitution in the "full amount" of a victim's economic damages.  
10 
Therefore, petitioner asserts, that statutory requirement has become an element of a 
11 
victim's constitutional right to "receive prompt restitution."  In a related vein, the state 
12 
contends that the voters who adopted Article I, section 42, would have understood that 
13 
the statutory meaning of the term "restitution" had changed over time and would continue 
14 
to do so.  In the state's view, the fact that Article I, section 42, did not define the term 
15 
"restitution" suggests that the voters intended to create a procedural right that would 
16 
ensure that victims receive promptly the amount of restitution to which they were 
17 
statutorily entitled at the time that restitution was imposed. 
18 
 
 
Before we consider those arguments, it is important to clarify the difference 
19 
between a procedural and a substantive right to receive restitution.  A right to receive, 
20 
promptly, whatever restitution a trial court orders is procedural in nature.  A right to 
21 
receive, promptly, payment of a specific amount, or payment measured by a specific 
22 
 
standard, is both a substantive and a procedural right.  Petitioner argues for what she 
1 
recognizes is a substantive right.  She contends that the constitution requires the prompt 
2 
payment of restitution in a specific amount -- that is, the amount required by statute at the 
3 
time that restitution is ordered.  The state also contends that a victim has a constitutional 
4 
right "to promptly receive the restitution that a convicted defendant is required to pay 
5 
under current restitution statutes" (emphasis added), but it describes its interpretation as 
6 
purely procedural.13   
7 
 
 
We disagree with the state's characterization of its argument.  The state's 
8 
interpretation of Article I, section 42, would permit a victim to claim not only a 
9 
procedural error should a trial court fail to award restitution "promptly," but also 
10 
substantive error should a trial court fail to award restitution in a particular sum -- the 
11 
sum mandated by statute.  Because the state, like petitioner, argues that the trial court 
12 
committed error by awarding petitioner less than the "full amount" of her economic 
13 
damages, we conclude that the state advances the same argument as does petitioner, 
14 
albeit on different grounds.  For the following reasons, we reject both parties' 
15 
contentions. 
16 
  
 
The logical result of the parties' arguments is that, as used in Article I, 
17 
                                              
 
13 
At another point in its brief, the state argues that the voters intended to 
enshrine a victim's right "to quickly receive whatever restitution was imposed."  
(Emphases added.)  However, because the state also argues for the interpretation we 
discuss above, and because the state does not claim that petitioner did not receive 
"promptly" the restitution that the trial court imposed, we limit our analysis to that 
addressed above. 
 
section 42, the term "restitution" may have a different substantive meaning depending on 
1 
how that term is defined by statute over time.  Thus, in 1999, when the trial court had 
2 
statutory discretion to award restitution that was full, partial, or nominal, a crime victim's 
3 
constitutional right also would have been limited accordingly.  But, in 2012, the 
4 
constitution would have granted victims the right to receive restitution in the "full 
5 
amount" of the victims' economic damages -- the amount required by ORS 137.106 at 
6 
that time.  Following the parties' arguments, the meaning of Article I, section 42, would 
7 
change, not as a result of the people's amendment of the constitution, but by legislative 
8 
action.  Such an interpretation arguably could raise a question of constitutional 
9 
magnitude, because Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, requires 
10 
proposed amendments to the Oregon Constitution to be referred "to the people for their 
11 
approval or rejection." 
12 
 
 
We need not address that potential issue in this case, however, as we do not 
13 
glean from either the text or context of Article I, section 42, an intent to make the 
14 
meaning of the term "restitution" dependent on future statutory changes.  First, we reject 
15 
petitioner's argument that that intent is evidenced by the grant of legislative authority to 
16 
"effectuate" provisions of Article I, section 42.  Subsection (3) of section 42 provides that 
17 
"[e]very victim * * * shall have remedy by due course of law for violation of a right 
18 
established in this section," and subsection 42(3)(b) provides that "[a] victim may assert a 
19 
claim for a right established in this section in a pending case, by a mandamus proceeding 
20 
if no case is pending or as otherwise provided by law."  Subsection (3)(c) states that the 
21 
legislature may "provide by law for further effectuation of the provisions of this 
22 
 
subsection."  (Emphasis added.)  The subsection referenced is subsection (3) -- the 
1 
subsection that pertains to remedies for violating the rights set forth in subsection (1).  
2 
Thus, the authority that Article I, section 42(3)(c), grants is authority to further spell out 
3 
or enable the remedies that the constitution provides and to specify procedural means of 
4 
obtaining them.  The voters made that meaning clear by providing in subsection 42(3)(c) 
5 
two examples of actions that the legislature may take pursuant to its authority to 
6 
"effectuate" under Article I, section 42(3)(c), both of which are procedural in nature:  the 
7 
authority to provide "expedited and interlocutory consideration of claims for relief," and 
8 
the authority to establish "reasonable [time] limitations."  By its terms, Article I, section 
9 
42, does not grant the legislature authority to define or determine the substantive rights 
10 
set forth in subsection (1) of section 42. 
11 
 
 
Nor does the fact that the voters who adopted Article I, section 42, may 
12 
have been aware that the legislature had changed the nature of a trial court's authority to 
13 
grant restitution over time convince us that the voters intended to grant constitutional 
14 
stature to variable statutory rights.  We agree with the state that the voters may not have 
15 
intended to fix a victim's right to restitution to the 1999 statutes, but that does not mean 
16 
that the voters intended to give the word "restitution" a later-enacted statutory meaning. 
17 
 
 
For the reasons stated, we reject the parties' arguments that the term 
18 
"restitution" as used in Article I, section 42(1)(d), confers a substantive right to receive 
19 
the "full amount" of a victim's economic damages, either because the term "restitution" 
20 
carries that meaning or because the voters intended that term to incorporate its statutory 
21 
meaning at the time that restitution is imposed.  We now consider the state's alternative 
22 
 
argument that, when the voters amended Article I, section 42, in 2008, they intended that 
1 
"restitution" be defined according to the statutory definition of that term at that time.  The 
2 
state suggests that, if Article I, section 42(1)(d), previously had created a right to 
3 
restitution that was "illusory" because it was tied to the entirely discretionary statutory 
4 
scheme in place in 1999, then the purpose of the 2008 amendments to Article I, sections 
5 
42 and 43, was to "rectif[y] that situation." 
6 
 
 
We can dispense with that argument summarily.  In 2008, the voters 
7 
amended Article I, section 42, to provide victims with a "remedy by due course of law" 
8 
for violation of their existing constitutional rights.  Or Const, Art I, § 42(3)(a).  The fact 
9 
that the voters intended to guarantee a remedy for the violation of existing constitutional 
10 
rights does not indicate an intent to change the substance of those rights themselves.  We 
11 
conclude that the 2008 amendments to Article I, section 42, do not evince voter intent to 
12 
provide a constitutional right to the "full amount" of a victim's economic damages, as 
13 
provided by Oregon statute. 
14 
 
 
In reaching that conclusion, we do not decide whether the constitutional 
15 
right to "receive prompt restitution" is purely procedural or instead carries a substantive 
16 
element and requires restitution in some amount or as measured by some standard.  That 
17 
is a question for another day, because, in this case, petitioner does not contend that 
18 
Article I, section 42(1)(d), entitles her to receive a sum other than the "full amount" of 
19 
her economic damages as required by ORS 137.106.  Petitioner does not contend, for 
20 
example, that the constitution entitles her to a "substantial" sum in restitution to 
21 
compensate her for her loss.  See Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or 359, 362, 298 P3d 1 (2013) 
22 
 
(discussing constitutional "right to remedy" in terms of whether remedy is "substantial").  
1 
We therefore limit our holding to that necessary to decide this case:  Article I, section 
2 
42(1)(d), does not grant petitioner a right to "restitution" in the "full amount" of her 
3 
economic damages as that term is defined in ORS 137.106.  This court does not have 
4 
jurisdiction to determine the additional question whether the trial court violated 
5 
petitioner's statutory rights when it awarded restitution in an amount limited to 10 percent 
6 
of petitioner's economic damages.   
7 
 
 
The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
8