Case Title: State v. Pace

Citation: 447 S.E.2d 186

Docket Number: 

State: south-carolina

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1994-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
447 S.E.2d 186 (1994) The STATE, Respondent, v. Beondi Clifford PACE, Petitioner. No. 24108. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard February 1, 1994. Decided July 5, 1994. Chief Atty. Daniel T. Stacey, of SC Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for petitioner. Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Rakale B. Smith, Columbia; Solicitor Charles Molony Condon, North Charleston, for respondent. Sue C. Erwin, of South Carolina Women Lawyers Ass'n, for amicus curiae. PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review Petitioner's (Pace) conviction for grand larceny as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[1] We reverse. At trial, defense counsel asked Mr. Brown, a witness for the prosecution, "Do you have a criminal record?" The judge sustained the prosecution's objection, stating the question was "highly improper", then sent the jury to its room. In camera, the judge chastised defense counsel that such a broad question amounted to a "fishing expedition," since counsel had no knowledge of any prior record against Mr. Brown.[2] During his admonishment of counsel, the judge continuously referred to her as a "nice girl" and a "pretty girl." Thereafter, evidence was introduced establishing Mr. Brown's prior conviction for petty larceny, a crime of moral turpitude for which he could be impeached. Upon the jury's return to the courtroom, the judge made the following statement: The Court of Appeals, although holding that these comments were inappropriate, concluded no prejudicial error resulted. Moreover, as a procedural ground, the Court noted counsel's failure to object at trial to the judge's comments. We granted certiorari. Pace contends that the remarks in question deprived him of a fair trial. We agree. The trial judge must act with absolute impartiality in the performance of judicial duties. Canon 3 of Rule 501, SCACR. Reference by a trial judge to an attorney's age, gender, or competence are improper and constitute reversible error upon a showing of prejudice to the defendant. State v. Mitchell, 261 S.C. 452, 200 S.E.2d 448 (1973) (Justices Brailsford and Bussey, dissenting); State v. Simmons, 267 S.C. 479, 229 S.E.2d 597 (1976). Here, the judge commented to the jury upon the attorney's age and gender. As the dissent stated in State v. Mitchell, supra, "[t]he remarks of the court tended to impugn the credibility of counsel and to diminish him and his defense of appellant in the eyes of the jury." 261 S.C. at 461, 200 S.E.2d at 453. Prejudice to Pace is evident on this record since his attorney's credibility was crucial to his defense of alibi. We hold that these remarks undermined counsel's ability to effectively represent her client and constituted reversible error. As to counsel's failure to raise an objection, the tone and tenor of the trial judge's remarks concerning her gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile. Accordingly, we find no waiver of this issue. Cf. Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling, ___ S.C. ___, 426 S.E.2d 756 (1993). We reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. [1] State v. Pace, ___ S.C. ___, 425 S.E.2d 73 (Ct.App.1992). [2] See State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979).