Case Title: Capanna v. Travelers Ins. Co.

Citation: 355 Pa. Super. 219, 513 A.2d 397

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
355 Pa. Superior Ct. 219 (1986) 513 A.2d 397 Janet CAPANNA, Administratrix of the Estate of John Capanna, Deceased; and Janet Capanna, Individually, Appellant, v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 7, 1986. Filed July 24, 1986. *221 Richard A. Lefchak, Philadelphia, for appellant. David M. McCormick, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and BROSKY, ROWLEY, WIEAND, MONTEMURO, BECK, TAMILIA, POPOVICH and JOHNSON, JJ. MONTEMURO, Judge: On October 22, 1980, appellant's husband/decedent, John Capanna, died as a result of injuries suffered when the uninsured automobile which he owned and was operating on that day collided with another vehicle parked along the side of Interstate 95. On May 25, 1983, appellant submitted an application for basic loss benefits to the assigned claims bureau pursuant to the Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan (PACP).[1] Appellee, although assigned to process appellant's claims, has nevertheless refused to pay the claimed benefits. On April 9, 1984, appellant filed a complaint in assumpsit setting forth three counts. The first count sought basic loss benefits in the nature of work loss benefits, medical expenses, and funeral expenses on behalf of the estate of appellant's decedent. The second count similarly sought work loss benefits, medical expenses, and funeral expenses *222 yet alternatively on behalf of appellant as a "survivor". 40 P.S. § 1009.103. The third count sought "survivor's loss" benefits, id., on appellant's own behalf. On April 24, 1984, appellee filed preliminary objections to appellant's Counts I and II in the nature of a demurrer. By an order and opinion dated June 13, 1984, the Honorable Alfred J. DiBona, Jr., dismissed the first count in so far as it sought work loss benefits and dismissed the second count in toto. No appeal was taken. Thereafter, in response to appellee's June 25, 1984 motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to appellant's third count, Judge DiBona dismissed that count by an order dated August 9, 1984. On September 7, 1984, appellant filed the following notice of appeal: Initially, we note that it is incumbent upon this court to consider the propriety of each appeal. See Indiana County Hospital Authority v. McCarl's Plumbing & Heating Company, 344 Pa.Super. 226, 496 A.2d 767 (1985). The appealability of an order may be raised sua sponte. Id. In Cloverleaf Development Inc. v. Horizon Financial F.A., 347 Pa.Super. 75, 500 A.2d 163 (1985), Judge Wieand cogently instructed as follows: Id., 347 Pa.Superior Ct. at 80-81, 500 A.2d at 166-67. The question instantly before us is whether Judge DiBona's June 13, 1984 order was "interlocutory", as described in appellant's notice of appeal, or whether in fact that order was final and appealable. If the June 13, 1984 order was final, then appellant's delay of nearly three months renders the appeal ultimately taken untimely as to that order. See Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa.Super. 332, 341 n. 3, 459 A.2d 1255, 1260 n. 3 (1983). More specifically, the issue to be resolved is whether the June 13, 1984 order precluded appellant from pursuing *224 "separate and distinct causes of action". See Cloverleaf Development, Inc. v. Horizon Financial F.A., supra, 347 Pa.Super. at 81, 500 A.2d at 166. We find that it did. The June 13, 1984 order effectively foreclosed both of appellant's claims to work loss benefits; namely on behalf of her decedent's estate and on her own behalf. The August 9, 1984 order foreclosed appellant's discrete claim to survivor's loss benefits. In his opinion announcing the judgment of the court in Smiley v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 309 Pa.Super. 247, 455 A.2d 142 (1983), our former colleague Judge Robert Van der Voort (since retired) observed: Id., 309 Pa.Superior Ct. at 252, 455 A.2d at 145 (emphasis supplied). In so far as work loss benefits and survivor's loss benefits are clearly separate and distinct in nature, we are of the opinion that claims to these respective benefits must also be viewed as separate and distinct. We are bolstered in this resolve by the ready comparisons, employed by Judge Van der Voort above, between work loss claims and survival actions and between survivor's loss claims and wrongful death actions. See also Sachritz v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, 500 Pa. 167, 455 A.2d 101 (1982); Midboe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 495 Pa. 348, 433 A.2d 1342 (1981); Krock v. Chroust, 330 Pa.Super. 108, 478 A.2d 1376 (1984); Daniels v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 283 Pa. Super. 336, 423 A.2d 1284 (1980); 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8301, 8302. In Gallick v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 188 (M.D.Pa. 1982), the district court, interpreting Pennsylvania law, observed "Although the survival and wrongful death statutes confer a right to recover damages growing out of a single incident. . . nevertheless, the rights of action are separate and distinct, and cumulative not alternate." Id. at 190 (emphasis supplied). See also Martin v. Swift, 258 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1958); Schwab v. P.J. Oesterling & Son, Inc., 386 Pa. 388, 126 A.2d 418 (1956). Accordingly, on their faces and by analogy, the work loss claims presented by appellant's first and second counts were separate and distinct from the survivor's loss claim presented by the third count. The June 13, 1984 order in effect put appellant "out of court" with respect to the pertinent claims dismissed thereby and, therefore, that order was in fact final and appealable. To the extent that the instant appeal addresses the June 13, 1984 dismissals, we find that appellant has failed to perfect her appellate rights. *226 Appellant's appeal from the August 9, 1984 dismissal of her third count, claiming survivor's loss benefits, is properly before us. As recently reiterated, we note the following standard of review: Spack v. Apostolidis, 353 Pa.Super. 362, 363-364, 510 A.2d 352, 352 (1986). Appellant contends that the court below erred in dismissing the third count of her complaint on the grounds that her claim for survivor's loss benefits was not presented to the assigned claims bureau within one year of her decedent/husband's death. "Survivor's loss" is defined in the No-Fault Act as: 40 P.S. § 1009.103. We are of the opinion that the court below correctly construed the applicable sections of the No-Fault Act in finding this claim to have been time barred. In Sachritz v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, supra, our supreme court held: "Initial claims for survivor's benefits under the No-fault Insurance Act are subject to a one year limitation under Section 106(c)(2) as were wrongful death damages when the legislature, analogizing to them, passed the No-fault Insurance Act." 500 Pa. at 177, 455 A.2d at 107. Section 106(c)(2) provides: Section 108(c)(1) sets forth the time limitations for presenting claims under the PACP and incorporates the time limitations of 106(c) as follows: Appellant's claim for basic loss benefits was submitted to the assigned claims bureau on May 25, 1983, more than two years after her husband's death. It is therefore clear that, under sections 108(c)(1) and 106(c)(2), her claim was time barred. See Zubris v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, 321 Pa.Super. 83, 467 A.2d 1139 (1983) (upholding the *228 dismissal of an action for No-fault benefits where the assigned claims bureau had not been presented with timely notice of the claim under sections 108(c)(1) and 106(c)(1)). Appellant seeks to avoid application of the above provisions by arguing that section 106(c)(2) should be construed as encompassing a rule of discovery. Appellant cites Bond v. Gallen, 503 Pa. 286, 469 A.2d 556 (1983), for the proposition that limitation periods under the No-Fault Act do not begin to run until the claimant knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that a cause of action exists. Appellant specifically argues that, despite her exercise of reasonable diligence, her husband's uninsured status was not ascertainable until 1983. We find that appellant has read Bond v. Gallen, supra, too broadly. That case involved only the narrow question of whether the two year statute of limitations on tort actions begins to run prior to the claimant's becoming aware, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, that one of the monetary thresholds of section 301(a) (setting forth the exceptions to the No-Fault Act's abolition of tort liability) has been reached. Bond v. Gallen, supra, does not construe either section 106 or 108 of the Act and is therefore inapposite to the instant case.[2] We decline to accept appellant's invitation to read a qualifying element into the clear time limitation of sections 106(c)(2) and 108(c)(1). We find the following statement from Smiley v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, supra, to be instructive: 309 Pa.Super. at 257, 455 A.2d at 148. Appellant next argues that, pursuant to section 106(c)(4), she was entitled to notice from appellee of its rejection of her claims to benefits and to an additional sixty days after receipt of that notice to bring an action against appellee. Section 106(c)(4) provides a special time limitation for assigned claims cases: Appellant contends that since she has never received written notice of appellee's rejection of her claims for basic loss benefits, the sixty day grace period renders the third count of her complaint timely initiated. We disagree. It is plain that section 106(c)(4) comes into play only if the original claim has been timely presented to the assigned claims bureau in accordance with section 108(c). The case upon which appellant relies, Warren v. Reliance Insurance Co., 318 Pa.Super. 1, 464 A.2d 487 (1983), clearly holds that a claimant is entitled to written notification of rejection by the assigned claims obligor, and then to a sixty day period from that notice within which to bring an action, only if the claimant has filed a timely claim with the assigned claims bureau pursuant to section 108(c). Since appellant's claim *230 was not timely presented to the assigned claims bureau, we find her argument to be without merit. Appellant's final contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her leave to amend her complaint. The right to amend should generally be allowed where a defect in pleadings can be cured. See Puleo v. Broad Street Hospital, 267 Pa.Super. 581, 407 A.2d 394 (1979). However, we have been unable to discover, and appellant has failed to offer, any possible amendment to the complaint with which appellant could have cured her third count's defect. We accordingly find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court below. See Klein v. Raysinger, 302 Pa. Super. 248, 448 A.2d 620 (1982), aff'd and remanded, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983). In light of the foregoing discussion, we dismiss appellant's appeal from the June 13, 1984 order of the court below. We affirm the order dated August 9, 1984. Appeal from the June 13, 1984 order is dismissed. August 9, 1984 order is affirmed. [1] Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, art. I, § 108, 40 P.S. § 1009.108 (repealed). [2] Appellant also relies on Rigotti v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Pa.D. & C.3d 472 (1985). Apart from the fact that Rigotti is not compelling authority, that case involved section 106(c)(1) (applicable to losses arising other than from death) rather than section 106(c)(2)(applicable to actions for survivor's benefits). Unlike section 106(c)(2), section 106(c)(1) does contain language encompassing a period of reasonable diligence in ascertaining "that the loss was caused by the accident."