Case Title: State v. Scott R. Jensen

Citation: 2010 WI 38

Docket Number: 2008AP000552-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP552-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Scott R. Jensen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 26 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 377, 762 N.W.2d 833 
(Ct. App. 2009-published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 10, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan, III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert H. Friebert, Matthew W. O’Neill, and Friebert, Finerty & 
St. John, S.C., Milwaukee, and R. Ryan Stoll and Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, Chicago, Ill., and oral argument by 
Robert H. Friebert. 
 
For the plaintiff respondent the cause was argued by Brian 
W. Blanchard, district attorney, with whom on the brief was J.B. 
Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP552-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF2453) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Scott R. Jensen, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's decision2 
denying Scott R. Jensen's (Jensen) motion to change the venue of 
his criminal trial to Waukesha County Circuit Court pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) (2007–08).3  The issue presented is 
                                                 
1 State v. Jensen, 2009 WI App 26, 316 Wis. 2d 377, 762 
N.W.2d 833. 
2 The Honorable David T. Flanagan, III of Dane County 
presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007–08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
2 
 
whether Waukesha County Circuit Court is the proper venue for 
Jensen's trial because it is the "circuit court for the county 
where the defendant resides" pursuant to § 971.19(12), or 
whether Dane County Circuit Court, the circuit court for the 
county "where the crime was committed," is the proper venue for 
his trial pursuant to § 971.19(1). 
¶2 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes 
Waukesha County Circuit Court as the proper venue for Jensen's 
trial because the State's allegations against Jensen come within 
two categories of actions described in § 971.19(12).  First, the 
State alleged that Jensen violated a law arising from or in 
relation "to the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation."  Second, the State alleged that Jensen violated 
a law "arising from or in relation to . . . any matter that 
involves elections . . . under chs. 5 to 12."  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit 
court's denial of Jensen's motion to change the venue of his 
trial to Waukesha County Circuit Court.  Waukesha County Circuit 
Court is the proper venue for the action that the State has 
brought against Jensen. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On October 18, 2002, the State filed a complaint in 
Dane County Circuit Court charging Jensen with three counts of 
felony misconduct in public office as party to the crime, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.12(3)4 and one misdemeanor count of 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.12(3) states: 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
3 
 
intentional misuse of public positions for private benefit as 
party to the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 19.45(2).  The 
complaint alleged that the acts relating to Jensen's alleged 
violations occurred in Dane County. 
¶4 
Jensen moved to dismiss the complaint on various 
grounds.  The circuit court denied his motion to dismiss, and in 
an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.  State 
v. Jensen (Jensen I), 2004 WI App 89, ¶¶1-2, 272 Wis. 2d 707, 
681 N.W.2d 230.  While the decision of the court of appeals was 
ultimately 
affirmed, 
we 
note 
that 
only 
four 
justices 
participated in the decision and there was no majority on all 
issues that the court of appeals decided; therefore, parts of 
the court of appeals decision were affirmed due to the equal 
split among the justices.  See State v. Jensen (Jensen II), 2005 
WI 31, ¶2, 279 Wis. 2d 220, 694 N.W.2d 56 (per curiam). 
¶5 
Following a jury trial, Jensen was found guilty on all 
four counts.  Jensen appealed each of the three felony 
convictions.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court erred in instructing the jury and in excluding portions of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Any public officer or public employee who does any of 
the following is guilty of a Class I felony: 
. . . 
(3) Whether by act of commission or omission, in 
the officer's or employee's capacity as such officer 
or employee exercises a discretionary power in a 
manner inconsistent with the duties of the officer's 
or employee's office or employment or the rights of 
others and with intent to obtain a dishonest advantage 
for the officer or employee or another. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
4 
 
Jensen's own testimony.  State v. Jensen (Jensen III), 2007 WI 
App 256, ¶1, 306 Wis. 2d 572, 743 N.W.2d 468.  Accordingly, it 
remanded for a new trial.  Id. 
¶6 
In February 2007, while Jensen's second appeal was 
pending, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), which 
provides that defendants charged with certain violations of, and 
violations arising from or in relation to, the elections, 
ethics, and lobbying regulation laws are to be tried in the 
county where the defendant resides.  See 2007 Wis. Act 1, § 205.  
On January 10, 2008, 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 went into effect.  On 
that date, pursuant to § 971.19(12), Jensen moved the court to 
transfer his case from Dane County Circuit Court, where the 
misconduct is alleged to have occurred, to Waukesha County 
Circuit Court, where Jensen resides.  The circuit court denied 
Jensen's motion, concluding that § 971.19(12) is clear and 
unambiguous and that it does not apply to the charges pending 
against Jensen.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's decision denying Jensen's motion. 
¶7 
We granted review and now reverse. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶8 
To resolve the question presented, we must interpret 
and apply Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12).  "'The interpretation and 
application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts are 
questions of law that we review independently.'"  Estate of 
Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
5 
 
N.W.2d 481 (quoting McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶7, 300 
Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273). 
B.  Parties' Positions 
¶9 
The parties offer competing interpretations of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.19(12).5  The State contends that § 971.19(12) does 
not apply to the charges pending against Jensen; therefore, he 
must be retried in Dane County Circuit Court.  Jensen contends 
that § 971.19(12) does apply to the charges pending against him, 
and pursuant to his change of venue motion, requires he be 
retried in Waukesha County Circuit Court.  Before examining the 
language of the statute, it is instructive to examine each 
party's argument in detail. 
1.  State's position 
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) applies to "violation[s] 
of any other law arising from or in relation to the official 
functions of the subject of the investigation."  The State 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) states:  
Except as provided in s. 971.223, in an action 
for a violation of chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, 
or subch. III of ch. 19, or for a violation of any 
other law arising from or in relation to the official 
functions of the subject of the investigation or any 
matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying 
regulation under subch. 5 to 12 [chs. 5 to 12], subch. 
III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19 a defendant who 
is a resident of this state shall be tried in circuit 
court for the county where the defendant resides.  For 
purposes of this subsection, a person other than a 
natural person resides within a county if the person's 
principal place of operation is located within that 
county. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
6 
 
argues 
that 
"the 
investigation" 
must 
be 
a 
Government 
Accountability Board investigation.  Because Jensen has never 
been the subject of an investigation conducted by the Government 
Accountability Board, the State contends that this portion of 
the statute does not apply to him. 
¶11 The last portion of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) applies to 
violations of any other law arising from or in relation to "any 
matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation."  
The State contends that "regulation" modifies "elections," 
"ethics," 
and 
"lobbying." 
 
Pointing 
to 
the 
Government 
Accountability Board's ability to promulgate administrative 
regulations interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the 
conduct and administration of elections under Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.05(1)(f), the State argues that this portion of § 971.19(12) 
applies only to violations arising from or in relation to 
administrative 
regulations 
promulgated 
by 
the 
Government 
Accountability Board.  Because Jensen was not charged with a 
violation of any such regulation, the State contends that this 
portion of the statute does not apply to him. 
2.  Jensen's position 
¶12 Jensen contends that the phrase "the subject of the 
investigation" should not be construed to mean "the subject of 
the [Government Accountability Board] investigation."  Instead, 
Jensen contends that this phrase applies to investigations by 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
7 
 
the Government Accountability Board, the former Elections Board,6 
the former Ethics Board or those undertaken independently by 
district attorneys.  Jensen was the subject of an investigation 
by the former Elections Board and by the district attorney.  
Accordingly, because Jensen's pending charges allege a violation 
of a law "arising from or in relation to" his "official 
functions" and he was "the subject of the investigation," Wis. 
Stat. § 971.19(12) requires him to be tried in Waukesha County 
Circuit Court. 
¶13 Jensen further contends that the term "regulation" in 
the phrase "any matter that involves elections, ethics, or 
lobbying regulation" does not refer to administrative rule-
making.  Instead, the term "lobbying regulation" is a term of 
art referring to subch. III of ch. 13, which subchapter is 
entitled the "Regulation of Lobbying."  Jensen argues that the 
allegations against him fall squarely within the statute because 
he was charged with the violation of "any other law arising from 
or in relation to" any matter involving "elections . . . under 
chs. 5 to 12." 
                                                 
6 The Elections Board is the Government Accountability 
Board's predecessor.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 5.02(1s) (2005–06) 
("'Board' means the elections board.") with § 5.02(1s) (2007–08) 
("'Board' means the government accountability board.").  Also 
compare Wis. Stat. § 5.05 (2005-06) (entitled "Elections board; 
powers and duties") with § 5.05 (2007–08) (entitled "Government 
accountability board; powers and duties"). 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
8 
 
C.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
¶14 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If 
the meaning of the words in the statute is plain, the analysis 
goes no further.  Id.  Statutes must be interpreted reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Id., ¶46.  And, where 
possible, an interpretation must give effect to every word in 
the statute to avoid surplusage.  Id. 
¶15 Context and purpose are important in discerning the 
plain meaning of a statute.  Id., ¶48.  As such, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; in 
relation to the surrounding and closely-related statutes.  Id., 
¶46.  "Some statutes contain explicit statements of legislative 
purpose . . . ."  Id., ¶49.  In construing a statute, we favor a 
construction that fulfills the purpose of the statute over one 
that defeats that purpose.  County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, 
¶34, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.  Finally, we do not resort 
to legislative history in interpreting a statute if the 
statute's meaning is plain; however, legislative history may be 
used "to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51. 
D.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) 
¶16 Generally, a "[c]riminal action[] shall be tried in 
the county where the crime was committed, except as otherwise 
provided."  Wis. Stat. § 971.19(1).  In 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, 
the legislature created an exception to the general venue 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
9 
 
provision.  The legislature enacted § 971.19(12), a new rule of 
criminal procedure, to establish venue in criminal actions 
involving violations of, and violations arising from or in 
relation to, the elections, ethics and lobbying regulation laws.  
Section 971.19(12) states: 
Except as provided in s. 971.223,7 in an action 
for a violation of chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, 
or subch. III of ch. 19, or for a violation of any 
other law arising from or in relation to the official 
functions of the subject of the investigation or any 
matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying 
regulation under subch. 5 to 12 [chs. 5 to 12],8 subch. 
III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19 a defendant who 
is a resident of this state shall be tried in circuit 
court for the county where the defendant resides. For 
purposes of this subsection, a person other than a 
natural person resides within a county if the person's 
principal place of operation is located within that 
county. 
¶17 In 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, the legislature also enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 801.64, which establishes the purpose of the new 
venue provision.  Section 801.64 states in relevant part:  
The legislature finds that violations of offenses 
covered by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 are violations of the 
public trust that should be adjudicated in the county 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.223(1) provides that "a defendant 
who is a resident of this state may move to change the place of 
trial to the county where the offense was committed."  Such a 
motion "shall" be granted by the circuit court.  § 971.223(2). 
Therefore, if a defendant's alleged conduct falls within that 
described in Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), it is the defendant who 
chooses where the trial will be held, not the district attorney.  
8 A statutory note indicates that the bracketed language is 
the correct cross-reference and that corrective legislative is 
pending.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.19.  We will refer to the statute 
as if it contains the correct, bracketed cross-reference. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
10 
 
where the offender resides so the individuals who the 
defendant interacts with daily, serves, or represents 
as a public official or candidate and whose trust was 
violated by the offense will judge the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. 
Accordingly, we must interpret Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) to 
promote its "textually . . . manifest statutory purpose" as set 
out in § 801.64.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49. 
¶18 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.19(12) 
describes 
three 
categories of offenses for which venue is the county where the 
defendant resides.  The first category applies to actions "for a 
violation of chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III 
of ch. 19."9  This portion of the statute establishes that 
allegations that a defendant violated any matter relating to 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation are venued "in [the] 
circuit court for the county where the defendant resides."   
¶19 The second portion of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) mandates 
that venue is in the county where the defendant resides "for a 
violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the 
official functions of the subject of the investigation or any 
matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation 
under chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 
19."  The statutory language creates two categories of actions 
to which the venue statute applies:  violations arising from or 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. chs. 5 to 12 govern the elections laws.  
Subchapter III of ch. 13 establishes the lobbying regulation 
laws.  Subchapter III of ch. 19 sets out the "Code of Ethics for 
Public Officials and Employees."  For simplicity and clarity's 
sake, we may refer to these three categories of statutes as the 
elections, ethics and lobbying regulation laws. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
11 
 
in relation to public officers' "official functions" and 
violations arising from or in relation to "any matter that 
involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation." 
¶20 There had been some dispute as to whether the 
introductory phrase, "for a violation of any other law arising 
from or in relation to," modifies only category two, the 
"official functions" category, or whether that phrase also 
modifies category three, which applies to "any matter that 
involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation."  Before the 
court of appeals, it was Jensen's position that the introductory 
phrase modifies both category two and three.  In contrast, the 
State contended that the introductory language modified only 
category two.  However, the State appears to have changed its 
position.  In its brief to this court, the State asserted: 
[T]he State also concurs with the defendant that the 
phrase "for a violation of any other law arising from 
or in relation to" appears to modify not only category 
two ("the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation") but also category three ("any matter 
that 
involves 
elections, 
ethics, 
or 
lobbying 
regulation under" the enumerated statutes). 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes that venue 
shall be in the county where the defendant resides for certain 
criminal violations.  We agree with the parties that the phrase 
"for a violation of any other law arising from or in relation 
to" modifies both category two, violations of the "official 
functions," and category three, "matter[s] that involve[ ] 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation" under the statutes 
enumerated in § 971.19(12).  Without the introductory language, 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
12 
 
category three does not describe a violation of law because 
standing alone, the phrase "any matter that involves elections, 
ethics, or lobbying regulation" is meaningless.  To give meaning 
to every word in the statute, we conclude that the phrase "for a 
violation of any other law arising from or in relation to" 
modifies categories two and three.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46.   
¶22 The punctuation in Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) further 
supports our conclusion that the introductory language modifies 
categories two and three.  A "serial comma" is the comma used 
immediately before a conjunction that precedes the last item in 
a list of three or more items.  See William A. Sabin, The 
Gregg Reference Manual 39 (10th ed. 2005).  While the use of a 
serial comma is optional, we note that the legislature used a 
serial comma in three places in § 971.19(12).  First, the venue 
provision applies to actions for an alleged violation of "chs. 5 
to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19."  Second, 
the legislature lists the same statutes a second time in 
§ 971.19(12) also using a serial comma.  Third, the legislature 
used a serial comma in the phrase "any matter that involves 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation." 
¶23 As we previously noted, Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) 
establishes venue for three categories of alleged violations.  
We note that there is no comma before "or any matter that 
involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation," the third 
category.  To be consistent with its use of the serial comma, 
the legislature should have inserted a comma before "or" in this 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
13 
 
phrase in order to indicate that it is not modified by any 
preceding language.  The absence of a serial comma bolsters the 
conclusion that "for a violation of any other law arising from 
or in relation to" modifies both "the official functions of the 
subject of the investigation" and "any matter that involves 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation."  See Bryan A. 
Garner, The Oxford Dictionary of American Usage and Style 70 
(2000) (quoting David W. Ewing, Writing for Results in Business, 
Government, and the Professions 358 (1974) (advising that the 
omission of a serial comma allows the final entries to be 
"joined" or "read as one category")).  Stated otherwise, the 
lack of a serial comma after "for a violation of any other law" 
and before "or any matter that involves elections, ethics, or 
lobbying regulation" suggests that the former modifies the 
latter.  Accordingly, we interpret the third category described 
in § 971.19(12) as establishing venue in the county where the 
defendant resides for an alleged violation of any other law 
arising from or in relation to any matter that involves 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation.   
E.  Interpretation and Application of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) 
¶24 As we explained, Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes 
that venue shall be in the county where the defendant resides in 
three categories of alleged violations.  Both parties agree that 
category one is not at issue here because Jensen has no pending 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
14 
 
charges that come within the described laws.10  The second 
category applies to "violation[s] of any other law arising from 
or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation."  The third category applies to "violation[s] of 
any other law arising from or in relation to . . . any matter 
that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation under 
chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19."  
We must determine whether the allegations against Jensen fall 
within the ambit of either the second or third categories.  We 
will analyze each category in turn. 
1.  Official functions category 
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes that venue 
shall be in the county in which the defendant resides if it is 
alleged that he violated "any other law arising from or in 
relation to the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation."  The parties do not dispute that Jensen was 
charged with "a violation of any other law" arising from his 
"official functions." 
¶26 At oral argument, the State conceded:  "We're actually 
not disputing that any other law, even in this case, could be 
[Wis. Stat.] § 946.12(3).  We acknowledge that, actually."  The 
State further conceded in its brief that Jensen's charges arise 
                                                 
10 While Jensen was charged with a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.45(2), a violation of subch. III of ch. 19, Jensen did not 
appeal from his conviction under this statute.  State v. Jensen, 
2007 WI App 256, ¶1 n.2, 306 Wis. 2d 572, 743 N.W.2d 468.  
Accordingly, Jensen may not rely on this charge to demonstrate 
that his case falls within Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12). 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
15 
 
from his official functions.  Indeed, this issue was addressed 
by the court of appeals in Jensen I.  The court of appeals 
explained that Jensen "fac[es] prosecution for violating a 
criminal 
statute, 
namely 
[Wis. 
Stat.] 
§ 946.12(3), 
which 
prohibits [an] official[ ], such as [Jensen], from violating 
[his] duty as [a] public official[ ]."  Jensen I, 272 Wis. 2d 
707, ¶31.  As the case is presented to us, the dispute between 
the parties focuses on whether Jensen was "the subject of the 
investigation," 
as 
that 
phrase 
is 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.19(12). 
¶27 The State urges us to interpret "the subject of the 
investigation" as including only investigations conducted by the 
Government Accountability Board.  We disagree.  For the reasons 
explained below, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) 
encompasses investigations by the Government Accountability 
Board, the former Elections Board, the former Ethics Board and 
district attorneys. 
¶28 The legislature created the Government Accountability 
Board in 2007 Wisconsin Act 1.  As part of that Act, the 
legislation abolished both the Elections Board and the Ethics 
Board.  See Drafting File for 2007 Wis. Act 1, Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau of 2007 S.B. 1, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. [hereinafter Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau].  The Government Accountability 
Board has the power to investigate violations of the laws it 
administers, which includes "chs. 5 to 12, other laws relating 
to elections and election campaigns, subch. III of ch. 13, and 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
16 
 
subch. III of ch. 19."  Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1), (2m).  The former 
Elections Board had the power to investigate possible violations 
of the elections laws.  § 5.05(3) (2005-06).  The former Ethics 
Board had the power to investigate possible violations of the 
ethics laws and lobbying regulation laws.  Wis. Stat. § 19.49(3) 
(2005–06); Wis. Stat. § 13.74(2) (2005–06).  District attorneys 
also have the power to investigate possible violations of chs. 5 
to 12, other laws relating to elections and election campaigns, 
subch. III of ch. 13 and subch. III of ch. 19.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 978.05. 
¶29 We begin by recognizing the broad language the 
legislature used in drafting Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12).  The 
statute includes the phrases "for a violation of any other law" 
and "any matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying 
regulation."  § 971.19(12) (emphasis added).  In Marotz v. 
Hallman, 2007 WI 89, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411, we 
explained that a phrase modified by the word "'any' indicates 
broad application."  Id., ¶25.  In State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, 
244 Wis. 2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820, we explained our broad 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b), which contained 
the phrase "involving the use," by noting that "'[i]nvolving' is 
a broad term."  Id., ¶31. 
¶30 To be consistent with the broad language utilized by 
the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), we interpret the 
phrase "subject of the investigation" broadly to encompass more 
than just Government Accountability Board investigations.  The 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
17 
 
State's interpretation is too limited and is contrary to the 
broad language contained in § 971.19(12).   
¶31 Statutory interpretation also requires that we examine 
the statutory language, "subject of the investigation," in the 
context in which it is used, i.e., in relation to the language 
of closely-related statutes.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 978.05 is a closely related-statute as 
subsection (1) was amended in 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 to reflect 
the language the legislature used in creating Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12).  Section 978.05 sets forth duties of district 
attorneys, and subsection (1) states in relevant part: 
The district attorney shall: 
(1) 
Criminal Actions.  Except as otherwise 
provided by law, prosecute all criminal actions before 
any court within his or her prosecutorial unit and 
have 
sole 
responsibility for prosecution of all 
criminal actions arising from violations of chs. 5 to 
12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19 and 
from violations of other laws arising from or in 
relation to the official functions of the subject of 
the 
investigation 
or 
any 
matter 
that 
involves 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation under chs. 5 
to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19. 
§ 978.05(1) (emphasis added). 
¶32 Because Wis. Stat. §§ 978.05(1) and 971.19(12) were 
created to parallel one another, the two statutes should be 
interpreted 
consistently. 
 
Compare 
§ 978.05(1) 
("sole 
responsibility for prosecution of all criminal actions arising 
from . . . violations of other laws arising from or in relation 
to the official functions of the subject of the investigation") 
with § 971.19(12) ("violation of any other law arising from or 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
18 
 
in relation to the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation"). 
 
To 
interpret 
"the 
subject 
of 
the 
investigation" under § 978.05(1) to include only Government 
Accountability Board investigations would produce absurd results 
because it would limit the powers of district attorneys to 
prosecute 
crimes involving elections, ethics and lobbying 
regulation without any indication of such a limitation from the 
legislature.  
¶33 To explain further, district attorneys possess the 
"sole responsibility for prosecution of all criminal actions 
arising from . . . violations of other laws arising from or in 
relation to the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation."11  Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1).  Incorporating the 
State's interpretation of the phrase "the subject of the 
investigation" 
to 
mean 
"the 
subject 
of 
the 
[Government 
Accountability 
Board] 
investigation" 
to 
both 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 971.19(12) and  978.05(1) would inhibit the district attorney 
from prosecuting criminal violations "of any other law arising 
from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of 
                                                 
11 The attorney general has the power to prosecute criminal 
violations of the elections, ethics and lobbying regulation laws 
in certain circumstances.  If the defendant in the action "is a 
district attorney or a circuit judge or a candidate for either 
such office, the action shall be brought by the attorney 
general."  Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(i).  If the district attorney 
declines or fails to prosecute an alleged criminal violation, 
the Government Accountability Board may refer the matter to the 
attorney general.  § 5.05(2m)(c)15.–16.; Wis. Stat. § 5.08.  The 
attorney general may commence actions for equitable, legal or 
peremptory relief to compel compliance with the election laws.  
Wis. Stat. § 5.07. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
19 
 
the investigation" unless the Government Accountability Board 
first 
initiates 
an 
investigation. 
 
See 
§ 971.19(12); 
§ 978.05(1).   
¶34 However, the Government Accountability Board is not 
required to investigate alleged violations; it is merely 
permitted to investigate such violations.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.05(2m)(a);12 Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Todd P. Wolf, Wood 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.05(2m)(a) states in relevant part:  
"The board shall investigate violations of laws administered by 
the board and may prosecute alleged civil violations of those 
laws."  The Wisconsin Attorney General noted:  "Despite the fact 
that 
both 
'shall' 
and 
'may' 
are 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.05(2m)(a), the [Government Accountability] Board clearly is 
not required to investigate all alleged violations of election 
laws, lobby laws, and ethics laws."  Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. 
to Todd P. Wolf, Wood County Dist. Att'y, OAG 10-08 (Oct. 29, 
2008). 
The attorney general justified that conclusion by pointing 
to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)4., which limits when the Government 
Accountability Board is permitted to conduct an investigation.  
The 
Government 
Accountability 
Board 
may 
commence 
an 
investigation only if it "believes that there is reasonable 
suspicion that a violation . . . has occurred or is occurring."  
§ 5.05(2m)(c)4.  If it finds reasonable suspicion then it "may 
by resolution authorize the commencement of an investigation."  
Id. 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Finally, 
its 
resolution 
must 
"specifically set forth any matter that is authorized to be 
investigated."  Id. 
The parties both agree that the Government Accountability 
Board is permitted, not required, to conduct an investigation.  
The State's brief to this court explained that "the G[overnment] 
A[ccountability] B[oard] 'shall' consider investigation of all 
allegations of violations of the enumerated statutes of which it 
becomes 
aware." 
 
(Emphasis 
added) 
(citing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.05(2m)(a)).  Jensen's brief explained that the "G[overnment] 
A[ccountability] B[oard] and the appropriate district attorney's 
office have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate conduct that 
may ultimately give rise to criminal charges."  (Emphasis in 
original.) 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
20 
 
County Dist. Att'y, OAG 10-08 (Oct. 29, 2008) (explaining that 
"the [Government Accountability] Board and district attorneys 
possess joint and co-equal authority to investigate" and that 
the Government Accountability Board "has no statutory obligation 
to commence an investigation").  Accordingly, under the State's 
interpretation, the district attorney's authority to prosecute a 
criminal violation venued according to Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) 
hinges on the Government Accountability Board's initiation of an 
investigation, which the Board is not required to commence.  
Under 
the 
State's 
theory, 
it 
would 
be 
the 
Government 
Accountability 
Board 
that 
would 
decide 
which 
"official 
functions" violations are subject to criminal prosecution.   
¶35 This cannot be an accurate reading of the statute 
because it is at odds with the district attorney's "sole 
responsibility for prosecution" of alleged "official functions" 
violations.  Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1); Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11.  
Stated otherwise, the State's interpretation of "the subject of 
the 
investigation" 
as 
referring 
only 
to 
a 
Government 
Accountability 
Board 
investigation 
inhibits 
the 
district 
attorney's prosecutorial authority, which § 978.05(1) expressly 
confirms, on discretionary investigatory action on the part of 
the board.  The State's argument, in effect, permits the 
Government Accountability Board to control, and therefore limit, 
the 
district 
attorney's 
prosecutorial 
authority.  
Section 978.05(1) gives no indication that a district attorney's 
ability to prosecute criminal violations of any matter involving 
elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation should be conditioned 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
21 
 
on 
the 
Government 
Accountability 
Board's 
decision 
to 
investigate.  The State's reading of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) and 
§ 978.05(1) conflicts with our goal of harmonizing provisions 
relating to the same subject matter.  See State v. Morford, 2004 
WI 5, ¶21, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349. 
¶36 The phrase "the subject of the investigation" appears 
in 
two 
other 
statutory 
provisions, 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.05(5s)(d);13 Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)14.,14 both of which were 
enacted by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1.  The State contends such phrase 
in both of these statutes unambiguously refers only to a 
Government Accountability Board investigation.  Accordingly, the 
State contends that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) must be interpreted 
in the context of § 5.05 as a closely-related statute, and in so 
doing, we must also interpret § 971.19(12) as referring only to 
Government Accountability Board investigations. 
¶37 Both of the provisions referred to by the State are 
part of Wis. Stat. § 5.05, which was enacted to describe the 
composition, powers, and duties of the Government Accountability 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.05(5s)(d) states in relevant part:  
"If the board commences a civil prosecution of a person for an 
alleged violation . . . as the result of an investigation, the 
person who is the subject of the investigation may authorize the 
board to make available for inspection and copying . . . records 
of the investigation." 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)14. states in relevant part:  
"If 
a 
special 
investigator 
. . . 
in 
the 
course 
of 
an 
investigation authorized by the board, discovers evidence of a 
potential violation of a law that is not administered by the 
board arising from or in relation to the official functions of 
the subject of the investigation . . . the special investigator 
. . . may present that evidence to the board." 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
22 
 
Board.  The above-listed provisions are not part of the context 
in light of which we interpret Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) because 
they do not involve the prosecution of a crime, as § 971.19(12) 
and Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1) do.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
While all three statutes were enacted by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, 
the Government Accountability Board is a separate entity, the 
duties and powers of which are specifically tailored to refer to 
that entity.  A statute created to enumerate the powers and 
duties of the Government Accountability Board will likely be 
referring to the Government Accountability Board in the phrase 
"the subject of the investigation" for such entity is the focus 
of the statute.  However, the same cannot be said for the 
interpretation of the phrase "the subject of the investigation" 
in § 971.19(12), a statute that is not limited, on its face or 
in its application, by the powers and duties of the Government 
Accountability Board.  Accordingly, interpreting "the subject of 
the investigation" in § 971.19(12) in light of § 5.05, a statute 
which appears in a limited, narrow context does not assist our 
construction of § 971.19(12). 
¶38 Furthermore, 
were 
we 
to 
follow 
the 
State's 
interpretation, venue for a violation of "any other law arising 
from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of 
the investigation" would be in the county in which the crime was 
committed if the Government Accountability Board does not 
investigate and in the county in which the defendant resides if 
the Government Accountability Board does investigate.  However, 
in either circumstance, when a criminal violation is alleged the 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
23 
 
district attorney of the county of venue would prosecute the 
action.15  Indeed, in its brief the State conceded:  "The 
defendant's charged conduct would fall within the ambit of this 
category if his conduct had been the subject of a GAB 
investigation, but it was not."  The State contends that 
differing results based on which entity investigates are 
justified by convenience considerations.   
¶39 The State explained that referring an alleged criminal 
violation to a district attorney in a county other than where 
the offense occurred after the Government Accountability Board 
has investigated allows the district attorney to resolve the 
case much more quickly because the district attorney benefits 
from the Government Accountability Board investigation.  The 
State explained at oral argument that it is difficult to 
prosecute a case "where the conduct, the evidence, the gravamen 
of the offense is in another county."  Moreover, Brian 
Blanchard, Dane County District Attorney,16 testified before the 
Senate Committee on Campaign Finance Reform and Ethics regarding 
his "strong objections" to the new venue provision created by 
2007 Senate Bill 1.  Testimony of Brian Blanchard, Dane County 
District Attorney, to the Senate Committee on Campaign Finance 
Reform and Ethics Regarding Assembly/Special Session Bill 1, 
                                                 
15 If the district attorney refuses to prosecute the 
referral of an alleged criminal violation, the attorney general 
may do so.  See Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)16.  
16 Brian Blanchard was counsel for the State of Wisconsin in 
this case and argued the case to this court. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
24 
 
Jan. 18, 2007, available at the Wisconsin Legislative Council 
[hereinafter Testimony of Brian Blanchard].17  At the hearing, he 
contended that the proposed venue provision was "unprecedented 
and unworkable" and advocated for the application of the 
traditional venue rule, which requires a defendant to be tried 
where a crime was committed.  Id.  His main concern with the 
proposed venue provision was the inconvenience it would cause 
district attorneys.18  See id. 
¶40 Prosecuting a case may be inconvenient for district 
attorneys in counties distant from where the alleged crime 
occurred; however, the legislative history of 2007 Senate Bill 1 
indicates that the legislature rejected concerns bottomed in 
inconvenience to district attorneys.  After considering Attorney 
Blanchard's testimony regarding his concerns about the venue 
                                                 
17 We are using Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12)'s legislative 
history to confirm our plain-meaning interpretation of it.  See 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[L]egislative history 
is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation."). 
18 Attorney Blanchard testified that:  "The rationale behind 
th[e] [traditional venue] rule is clear.  The county or district 
in which the offense occurred is where witnesses and evidence 
are most likely to be found[] [and] where resources to 
investigate the offense should be located."  Testimony of Brian 
Blanchard, 
Dane 
County 
District 
Attorney, 
to 
the 
Senate 
Committee on Campaign Finance Reform and Ethics Regarding 
Assembly/Special Session Bill 1, Jan. 18, 2007, available at the 
Wisconsin Legislative Council.  Under the proposed venue 
statute, Blanchard contended, the district attorney with venue 
to prosecute the case is located in a county "where there 
appears to be no relevant evidence, witnesses, or local nexus to 
the case."  Id. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
25 
 
provision, the legislature voted to pass the bill without 
amending any portion of it.  Accordingly, the legislature in 
effect rejected Attorney Blanchard's convenience argument. 
¶41 We further note that neither Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) 
nor the statute's stated purpose in Wis. Stat. § 801.64, provide 
a basis for a convenience-based distinction.  At oral argument, 
we directed the State to the legislative findings contained in 
§ 801.64 and asked counsel to explain how the convenience of the 
district attorney promotes the stated purpose of the venue 
provision, which is to give the people who elected the defendant 
and whose trust was violated by the defendant an opportunity to 
judge him at trial.  See § 801.64.  The State conceded that its 
interpretation based on convenience for district attorneys does 
not further the stated purpose, and admitted they are "competing 
interests." 
¶42 We must interpret a statute to promote, not to 
contravene, its statutory purpose.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶49.  First, we note that the legislature set out a broad, 
unambiguous purpose.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.64 explains that the 
venue provision broadly applies to "violations of the public 
trust."  Such violations should be tried in the county where the 
offender resides so the individuals "whose trust was violated by 
the offense will judge the defendant's guilt or innocence."  To 
promote such a broad purpose, we must broadly interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 971.19(12), including the phrase "the subject of the 
investigation."  Accordingly, we conclude that venue is proper 
in the county in which the defendant resides when charged with a 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
26 
 
violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the 
official functions of the subject of the investigation commenced 
by the district attorney, the former Elections Board, the former 
Ethics Board or the Government Accountability Board.  Such an 
interpretation does not base venue on who commenced the 
investigation of the alleged criminal violation; instead, our 
interpretation broadly encompasses violations of the public 
trust. 
¶43 Applying that interpretation of category two of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.19(12) to the case before us, we conclude that venue 
for the crime of which Jensen has been accused is in Waukesha 
County Circuit Court, "the circuit court for the county where 
the defendant resides," because it is an action alleging "a 
violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the 
official functions of the subject of the investigation."  Jensen 
was the subject of an investigation by the former Elections 
Board and the Dane County District Attorney for what were 
alleged to be violations of his official functions.   
 
2.  Any matter that involves elections, ethics, 
or lobbying regulation 
¶44 Although 
we have concluded that Waukesha County 
Circuit Court is the proper venue for the State's case against 
Jensen because the allegations come within category two of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.19(12), we continue our analysis to determine 
whether the allegations against Jensen also fall within the 
third category of the statute because his pending charges are 
alleged "violation[s] of any other law arising from or in 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
27 
 
relation to . . . any matter that involves elections, ethics, or 
lobbying regulation under chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or 
subch. III of ch. 19." 
¶45 The State urges us to interpret category three as 
applying only to matters involving violations of administrative 
regulations promulgated by the Government Accountability Board 
for the administration of the elections, ethics, and lobbying 
regulation laws.  The State submits that the statute demands 
such an interpretation because "regulation" does not modify only 
"lobbying," but instead modifies "elections," "ethics," and 
"lobbying."  We are unpersuaded. 
¶46 We begin by reemphasizing, as we did previously, the 
broad language the legislature used in drafting Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12).  See supra ¶29.  The phrases "for a violation of 
any other law" and "any matter that involves" are broadly stated 
introductory phrases.  See § 971.19(12) (emphasis added).  To be 
consistent with the broad language utilized by the legislature 
in § 971.19(12), we interpret the phrase "any matter that 
involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation" broadly to 
encompass 
more 
than 
just 
violations 
of 
administrative 
regulations promulgated by the Government Accountability Board 
to assist in its administration of the elections, ethics, and 
lobbying regulation.  Again, we conclude that the State's 
interpretation is too limited and is contrary to the broad 
language of the statute. 
¶47 Next, 
we 
reject the State's interpretation that 
"regulation" modifies "elections," "ethics," and "lobbying."  
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
28 
 
Instead, we conclude that "regulation" modifies only the word 
"lobbying." 
 
We 
so 
conclude 
because 
the 
term 
"lobbying 
regulation" is a term of art utilized in subch. III of ch. 13.  
This is evidenced in several places in subch. III of ch. 13.  
First, subch. III of ch. 13 is entitled "Regulation of 
Lobbying."  Second, Wis. Stat. § 13.61 is entitled, "Lobbying 
regulated; legislative purpose."  Third, § 13.61 explains that 
"the legislature determines that it is necessary to regulate" 
lobbying.  (Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, we conclude that 
"regulation" modifies only "lobbying" and this is supported by 
the use of the term "lobbying regulation" elsewhere in the 
Wisconsin statutes.  Because "regulation" modifies only the word 
"lobbying," Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) is not limited to violations 
of administrative regulations; rather, it encompasses violations 
of any matter that involves elections, ethics, and lobbying 
regulation. 
¶48 There 
are 
numerous authorities that confirm our 
interpretation.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 ("[L]egislative 
history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-
meaning interpretation.").  First, the Wisconsin Legislative 
Council's interpretation is consistent with our interpretation 
that category three involves violations of any matter that 
involves elections, ethics, and lobbying regulation, not only 
administrative regulations.  The Legislative Council's memo 
states, Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) "[p]ermits a defendant . . . who 
is prosecuted in connection with a violation of an election law, 
campaign finance law, lobbying law, or ethics law to move to 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
29 
 
change the place of trial to the county where the offense was 
committed."  Wisconsin Legislative Council Amendment Memo for 
Senate Substitute Amendment 2 to 2007 Special Session Senate 
Bill 1 (Jan. 30, 2007) (on file with Wisconsin Legislative 
Council, 
Madison, 
Wis.), 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2007/data/lc_amdt/jr7sb001.pdf 
(emphasis added).19 
¶49 Another Legislative Council memo states, "In general 
under [2007 Wisconsin] Act [1], a Wisconsin resident must be 
criminally or civilly prosecuted in the county of residence for 
violations of laws relating to . . . any matter involving 
elections, campaign financing, lobbying regulation, or ethics."  
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
Act 
Memo 
for 
Government 
Accountability Board to 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 (Feb. 26, 2007) (on 
file 
with 
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council, 
Madison, 
Wis.), 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2007/data/lc_act/act001-jr7sb1.pdf 
(emphasis added).  Inserting a comma before and after "lobbying 
regulation" indicates that "regulation" modifies only the word 
"lobbying."  This is consistent with our interpretation. 
¶50 Second, at least one court has interpreted "lobbying 
regulation" as a term of art referring to subch. III of ch. 13.  
In Katzman v. Wisconsin Ethics Board, 228 Wis. 2d 282, 596 
N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1999), the court noted, "The Ethics Board 
                                                 
19 This comment is in accord with Wis. Stat. § 971.223.  See 
supra note 7. 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
30 
 
is charged with the responsibility of administering state laws 
regulating the conduct of lobbyists."  Id. at 284 n.1 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 13.685) (emphasis added). 
¶51 Finally, the analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau of 2007 Senate Bill 1 confirms this construction.  It 
states, "The bill also provides that violations of any civil or 
criminal laws by a resident of this state arising from or in 
relation to . . . any matter that involves elections, ethics, or 
lobbying regulation laws shall be prosecuted in circuit court 
for the county where the defendant resides."  Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau, supra ¶28 (emphasis added). 
¶52 Applying our interpretation of category three to the 
case before us, we conclude that proper venue is in Waukesha 
County Circuit Court, "the circuit court for the county where 
the defendant resides," because the State's action against 
Jensen alleges a violation arising from or in relation to a 
matter involving elections under chs. 5 to 12.  This is so 
because Jensen was charged with a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.12(3), misconduct in public office.  That charge alleges a 
violation of "any other law" arising from or in relation to 
elections. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes 
Waukesha County Circuit Court as the proper venue for Jensen's 
trial because the State's allegations against Jensen come within 
two categories of actions described in § 971.19(12).  First, the 
State alleged that Jensen violated a law arising from or in 
No. 
2008AP552-CR 
31 
 
relation "to the official functions of the subject of the 
investigation."  Second, the State alleged that Jensen violated 
a law "arising from or in relation to . . . any matter that 
involves elections . . . under chs. 5 to 12."  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit 
court's denial of Jensen's motion to change the venue of his 
trial to Waukesha County Circuit Court.  Waukesha County Circuit 
Court is the proper venue for the action that the State has 
brought against Jensen. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the action is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶54 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
that Scott R. Jensen's motion to change the venue of his 
criminal trial from Dane County, the place where the alleged 
illegal conduct occurred, to Waukesha County, Scott Jensen's 
county of residence, should be granted.  The legislature 
intended this result. 
¶56 I begin by placing in context Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), 
the "home county venue" provision at issue in the instant case.  
This provision was enacted as part of 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, 
which 
created 
the 
Government 
Accountability 
Board 
and 
significantly overhauled how the state's elections, ethics, and 
accountability laws governing public officials are administered, 
investigated, and enforced.  In practical terms, § 971.19(12) 
provides a special venue rule for certain offenses by public 
officials:  trial in the county of the official's residence.  
This venue provision supplants the usual rule of venue, which is 
of long standing and constitutional stature, that prosecution 
and trial generally take place where the offense occurred.   
¶57 In 
short, 
section 
971.19(12) 
arguably 
provides 
preferential procedural treatment for those prosecuted in public 
ethics actions, who are disproportionately public officials.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, this provision was very controversial 
during the passage of the Act and was subject to much scrutiny 
and negotiation, as was the entire Act.  That context provides 
valuable insight in interpreting the statutory provision.  I 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
shall return to the context after first examining the text of 
§ 971.19(12).   
I 
¶58 I turn first to the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12).  
The text is very difficult to read and understand and hard to 
apply to the facts of the present case.  To help analyze 
§ 971.19(12), I format the text as follows: 
§ 971.19(12). Except as provided in s. 971.223,1 in an 
action 
[1] for a violation of chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 
13, or subch. III of ch. 19, or  
[2] for a violation of any other law arising from or 
in relation to the official functions of the subject 
of the investigation or  
[3] any matter that involves elections, ethics, or 
lobbying regulation under subch. 5 to 12 [chs. 5 to 
12], subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19  
a defendant who is a resident of this state shall be 
tried in circuit court for the county where the 
defendant resides. For purposes of this subsection, a 
person other than a natural person resides within a 
county if the person's principal place of operation is 
located within that county. 
¶59 Part 
[1] 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.19(12) 
seems 
straightforward and clear.  A defendant who violates one of the 
specifically enumerated statutes shall be tried in the circuit 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.223 provides an opt-out provision.  
A defendant subject to "home county venue" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12) may choose instead to be tried in the county where 
the alleged offense was committed.  As discussed further below, 
this opt-out provision appears to have been added to save the 
"home county venue" provision from running afoul of the state 
constitutional right to jury trial in "the county or district 
wherein the offense shall have been committed."  Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 7. 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
court in the county where the defendant resides.  The parties, 
the majority opinion, and I all agree that this part of  
§ 971.19(12) does not apply in the present case.  Scott Jensen 
is not charged with violating any of the enumerated statutes.  
Rather, 
he 
is 
charged 
with 
a 
felony 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.12(3), misconduct in public office. 
¶60 Part [2] of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) is not limited to 
a violation of election, ethics, or lobbying laws.  Rather, 
under part [2] of § 971.19(12) a person who violates any law 
arising from or in relation to his or her official function 
shall be tried in the circuit court in the county where the 
defendant resides.  Scott Jensen is charged with violating a law 
relating to his official functions as a legislator.2   
¶61 The difficulty presented in Part [2] of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12), however, is the meaning of the statutory phrase 
"subject of the investigation."  The statute does not say 
"subject of an investigation."  The legislature's use of the 
article "the" rather than "a" appears to refer to a specific 
type of investigation rather than to any type of investigation.   
¶62 As the majority opinion points out, the phrase 
"subject of the investigation" appears in other sections of the 
Act where the phrase clearly refers to investigations by the 
                                                 
2 Scott Jensen's argument with regard to Part [2] is that he 
is the subject of the investigation and is charged with 
committing misconduct in public office, "in relation to" the 
official functions of his office, by his purported failure to 
comply with the duties of state officials, duties established in 
part by the laws regulating elections, ethics, and lobbying 
under chapters 11, 12, and 19 of the statutes. 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
Government Accountability Board.  See majority op., ¶¶36-37.  
The ordinary rule of statutory interpretation is that the 
legislature intends a word or phrase used in a single Act to 
have the same meaning throughout the Act.3  Here, the majority 
opinion at ¶37 abandons this rule of statutory interpretation 
and declares that the same phrase is meant to have different 
meanings in different parts of the same enactment.  This 
reasoning is unconvincing.   
¶63 The 
majority opinion interprets the phrase "the 
subject of the investigation" to include "investigations by the 
Government Accountability Board, the former Elections Board, the 
former Ethics Board and district attorneys."  This delineation 
of a set of investigations has no textual basis.  Why include 
these bodies but not investigations by the Attorney General or 
by other executive or law enforcement entities?  Subject to 
those arbitrary distinctions, the majority effectively equates 
"the subject of the investigation" with "a defendant."  But 
section 971.19(12) uses both "the subject of the investigation" 
and "a defendant."  In interpreting statutes, the court 
ordinarily says that when the legislature uses two different 
words or phrases the legislature intended the two to have 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2005 WI 
85, ¶58, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643; State v. Dismuke, 2001 
WI 75, ¶21, 244 Wis. 2d 457, 628 N.W.2d 791.  
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
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different meanings.4  The majority opinion in effect reads the 
phrase "subject of the investigation" to mean "a defendant." 
¶64 Part [2] of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) is difficult to 
understand and apply, especially to the facts of the present 
case. 
¶65 I now turn to the text of Part [3] of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12). 
 
The 
first quandary is that the text is 
grammatically challenged.  It cannot be understood as written.  
If Part [3] is read literally it does not yield an intelligible 
sentence: 
"Except 
as 
provided 
in 
s. 
971.223, 
in 
an 
action . . . any matter that involves elections . . . ."   
¶66 Part [3] makes sense if, for example, the word "for" 
is inserted in the statute.  With this addition the statute 
would read as follows:  "Except as provided in s. 971.223, in an 
action . . . for any matter that involves elections . . . ."   
¶67 Or, to make sense Part [3] may be read to incorporate 
the 13-word introductory phrase appearing in Part [2] of 
§ 971.19(12).  With the addition of these words, Part [3] would 
read as follows:  "Except as provided in s. 971.223, in an 
action . . . for a violation of any other law arising from or in 
relation to any matter than involves elections . . . ."  The 
majority opinion at ¶¶20-23 adopts this reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12). 
 
If 
there was ever any doubt about this 
                                                 
4 Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22 
n.14, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67 (citing Graziano v. Town of 
Long Lake, 191 Wis. 2d 812, 822, 530 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1995) 
("[W]here the legislature uses similar but different terms in a 
statute, particularly within the same section, we may presume it 
intended the terms to have different meanings.")).  
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
provision's textual opacity, the conclusive evidence is that the 
majority 
requires 
four 
paragraphs 
of 
judicial 
analysis, 
including two dedicated to the absence of a single comma, just 
to decide which words should be cobbled together to form a 
proper sentence.   
¶68 Having thus rehabilitated the statute's syntax, the 
majority opinion at ¶46 also broadly interprets the word 
"involves" used in Part [3] to include the charge in the present 
case for violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.12(3), misconduct in 
office.  With this broad interpretation of Part [3], the 
majority opinion has in effect incorporated all of Part [1] of 
§ 971.19(12) into Part [3], rendering Part [1] wholly surplusage 
and redundant.  Direct violations of the ethics, lobbying, and 
elections laws, covered in Part [1], are plainly swallowed up by 
the majority's interpretation of "any matter that involves 
elections, ethics or lobbying regulation."  This reading of Part 
[3] renders Part [1] irrelevant, violating yet another basic 
rule of statutory interpretation.5  
¶69 It is obvious that the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) 
raises many problems and questions that the majority opinion has 
not satisfactorily resolved.  I return to the context of the 
"home county venue" provision for guidance.  The text is more 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶32, 299 
Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 ("Statutes should be interpreted so 
that every word is given effect."); Donaldson v. State, 93 
Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980) ("A statute should be 
construed so that no word or clause shall be rendered surplusage 
and every word if possible should be given effect.").  
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
easily understood and applied by examining the findings and 
objectives the legislature set forth in adopting the Act. 
II 
¶70 The enactment of a comprehensive ethics, elections, 
and accountability bill was considered by the legislature for 
several years.  In January 2007, Governor James Doyle called the 
legislature into special session on ethics reform, and the 
legislature adopted 2007 Wisconsin Act 1.  Like many laws, the 
Act was a delicate compromise between the governor and the 
legislature, between the Senate and the Assembly, and between 
members of the two political parties.6  With all the compromises, 
the Act was adopted overwhelmingly——97-2 in the Assembly and 33-
0 in the Senate.7  
¶71 Prior to the adoption of the Act, both Democratic and 
Republican members of the legislature had been prosecuted and 
convicted for violating various laws as public officials.  
Section 971.19(12), the "home county venue" provision, was 
                                                 
6 See Judith Davidoff, Ethics Overhaul Headed for Passage:  
Some Provisions Trouble DA, Journalists, Capital Times, Jan. 30, 
2007, at C1; Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Rift over Ethics 
Bill Expands: Parties are at odds over legality of measure that 
would try legislators in their home counties, Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, Jan. 20, 2007, at A1; Stacy Forster, If reforms are 
rejected, 
ethics, 
elections boards would return: Lawmaker 
promises option in case court strikes down changes, Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, Jan. 17 2007, at B1.  
7 The bill passed without debate in the Senate.  In the 
Assembly, supporters defeated attempts to remove the "home 
county venue" provision.  Ryan J. Foley, Ethics Board Gets 
Overwhelming OK: Governor Says He Will Sign Bill, Capital Times 
(AP Wire Story), Jan. 31, 2007, at C1. 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
critical to winning Republican support.8  It was reported that 
Republican legislators considered the "home county" provision 
"critical, because three of their former leaders were convicted 
of crimes in Dane County."9  By many reports, "Republicans were 
concerned that they would not get a fair shake in Madison 
courts."10  Sponsors of the Act reportedly said "they allowed for 
a venue change in order to placate lawmakers who were concerned 
about facing an overzealous Dane County prosecutor and a 
potentially hostile Dane County jury."11  Rep. Fred Kessler (D-
Milwaukee) criticized the "home county venue" provision as 
"giv[ing] 
the 
political 
class 
in 
Wisconsin 
a 
home-court 
advantage" and tried to amend the bill to remove the venue 
provision; this effort was soundly defeated in the Assembly by 
an 80-19 vote.12   
                                                 
8 Significantly, 
at 
the 
time 
this 
legislation 
was 
considered, the two houses of the legislature were controlled by 
two different political parties.  In the previous legislative 
session, a bill to create the Government Accountability Board 
that did not include the "home county venue" provision passed 
the Democratic-controlled Senate but failed to pass in the 
Republican-controlled Assembly.  See 2005 Sen. Bill 1. 
9 Steven Walters, DA: Ethics bill has 'loophole': Reform 
plan would let accused legislators be prosecuted in their home 
county, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Jan. 19, 2007, at A1. 
10 Editorial: Ethics Reform Bill Passage is Good News for 
Wisconsin, La Crosse Tribune, Feb. 3, 2007. 
11 David Callender, Ethics Reform Bill Draws DA's Fire——
Blanchard: It Gives Accused Lawmakers Special Breaks, Capital 
Times, Jan. 19, 2007, at C1. 
12 See, e.g., Ryan J. Foley, Ethics Board Gets Overwhelming 
OK Governor Says He Will Sign Bill, Capital Times (AP Wire 
Story), Jan. 31, 2007, at C1. 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶72 Legislators also expressed concern, however, that the 
"home county venue" provision was unconstitutional.13  Some 
argued that it would violate of Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which guarantees an accused "a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
wherein the offense shall have been committed . . . ."  The 
"home county venue" provision was therefore modified to allow an 
accused to opt out of the "home county venue" provision.14  This 
opt-out 
provision 
was 
included 
to 
protect 
an 
accused's 
constitutional right to trial in the place where the acts were 
committed.   
¶73 Trepidation was expressed that the "home county venue" 
provision might violate the equal protection clause of the 
Wisconsin and United States constitutions by treating certain 
defendants, disproportionately public officials, differently 
from other persons accused of crimes.15   
                                                 
13 Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Rift over ethics bill 
expands: Parties are at odds over legality of measure that would 
try legislators in their home counties, Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, Jan. 20, 2007, at A1. 
14 See Wis. Stat. § 971.223. 
15 Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Rift over ethics bill 
expands: Parties are at odds over legality of measure that would 
try legislators in their home counties, Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, Jan. 20, 2007, at A1. 
The circuit court raised the equal protection issue in the 
present case but did not resolve it, and no equal protection 
argument was made in this court.  The combined effect of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.19(12) and § 971.223 is that certain criminal 
defendants, especially  public officials, charged with certain 
crimes, are able to choose one of two venues, while most 
defendants are tried in the county where the allegedly criminal 
conduct occurred, with no choice about venue.   
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶74 In 
light 
of 
these 
constitutional 
concerns, 
the 
legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 801.64, which made specific 
legislative findings regarding the Act.16  The legislature 
collectively opined that the enactment of the "home county 
venue" and opt-out provisions was consistent with other statutes 
and with the protections under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin constitution.  The legislature further found that the 
"home 
county 
venue" 
provision 
"is 
consistent 
with 
equal 
protection of the laws under article I, section 1 of the 
                                                 
16 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 801.64 reads as follows:  
801.64 Legislative findings; 2007 Wisconsin Act 1. The 
legislature finds that providing under 2007 Wisconsin 
Act 1 for the place of trial in the county where the 
offender resides is consistent with the legislature's 
authority 
under 
article 
I, 
section 
7, 
of 
the 
constitution and with previous acts by the legislature 
providing for the place of trial in counties other 
than where the elements of the offense may have 
occurred. The legislature further finds that allowing 
defendants charged with violating offenses covered by 
2007 Wisconsin Act 1 to request a trial in the county 
where the offense occurred is consistent with the 
protections 
in 
article 
I, 
section 
7, 
of 
the 
constitution.  The legislature finds that violations 
of offenses covered by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 are 
violations 
of 
the 
public 
trust 
that 
should 
be 
adjudicated in the county where the offender resides 
so the individuals who the defendant interacts with 
daily, serves, or represents as a public official or 
candidate and whose trust was violated by the offense 
will judge the defendant's guilt or innocence. The 
legislature further finds that to so provide is 
consistent with equal protection of the laws under 
article I, section 1, of the constitution. The 
legislature 
finds 
the 
venue 
provision 
in 
2007 
Wisconsin Act 1 represents an appropriate balance 
between the rights of the defendant and the need to 
prevent and prosecute civil and criminal offenses 
covered by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1. 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
[Wisconsin] constitution."  Legislative findings pre-emptively 
defending the constitutionality of an enactment are unusual in 
Wisconsin legislative enactments.   
¶75 Moreover, the legislature expressed its intent in Wis. 
Stat. § 801.64 that violations of offenses covered by the Act 
are violations of public trust and should be adjudicated in the 
county where the public official resides so that the individuals 
in the county whom the official serves will judge the official's 
guilt or innocence.  Unfortunately, the legislature left murky 
in § 971.19(12) exactly which offenses are "violations of 
offenses covered by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1."  Indeed the issue 
presented in the instant case is whether the charges against 
Scott Jensen are among those "violations of offenses covered by 
2007 Wisconsin Act 1."  As discussed above, it is not clear from 
the language whether any of the three parts of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(12) covers the charges pending against Scott Jensen.   
¶76 The legislative goal of removing certain (but not all) 
cases involving public officials from prosecution and trial in 
Dane County to the county of the official's residence is, 
however, clear.  The legislative findings and history inform the 
application of § 971.19(12) to the present case.   
¶77 Scott Jensen was charged and convicted in Dane County 
Circuit Court before the Act was adopted.  His appeal from his 
conviction was pending in the court of appeals when the Act was 
adopted.  After the adoption of the Act, the court of appeals 
ordered a new trial for Scott Jensen.  The parties agree that 
the Act applies to Scott Jensen's retrial.  In light of the 
No.  2008AP552-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
legislative history, the legislative findings in Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.64, and the pendency of Scott Jensen's prosecution at the 
time the Act was debated, negotiated, and adopted, I would 
interpret the hard-to-read-and-understand home county venue 
provision, § 971.19(12), as including Scott Jensen. 
¶78 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
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