Case Title: Lauthern v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lauthern v. State1989 WY 37769 P.2d 350Case Number: 87-144Decided: 02/09/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
CLAUDE 
FREDERICK LAUTHERN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 
 
Steven E. 
Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Claude 
Frederick Lauthern appeals from his convictions of aggravated burglary, 
aggravated assault and battery, and attempted second-degree 
murder.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues:

 
 
            
Issue I

 
 
     Whether or not the 
trial court abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Nix to testify, or to provide 
an alternative remedy, after Mr. Nix was in the courtroom in spite of the 
court's order sequestering witnesses.

 
 
Issue 
II

 
 
     Whether or not the 
trial court erred by failing to merge Appellant's charges or convictions of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

 
 
Issue 
III

 
 
    Whether or not the 
introduction of evidence, in violation of Rule 404(b), W.R.E., deprived 
Appellant of a fair trial.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant and Katherine 
Gunderman were married in 1978, and they divorced in August 1985. After the 
divorce, Ms. Gunderman frequently lived with appellant in his house in Casper, Wyoming, even 
though she had her own house in Casper from a previous marriage. Ms. Gunderman 
spent the night of January 25, 1986, with appellant, but, according to her, he 
kicked her out of his house on Sunday, January 26, 1986. Appellant and Ms. 
Gunderman both spent all day January 26 working at a VFW club. Ms. Gunderman 
left that club in the early evening and went to another VFW club in Casper where she met Alvin 
Rone, a man with whom she had been previously involved. Ms. Gunderman and Mr. 
Rone spent that night at Ms. Gunderman's house.

 
 

[¶5.]     The testimony as to 
what occurred the following morning was conflicting, but the State's evidence, 
as accepted by the jury, indicated the following sequence of events. At 
approximately 9:30 a.m., Ms. Gunderman heard pounding on the door and realized 
that someone was trying to break into her house. She called the police. 
Appellant broke a window on the door and was able to reach inside to turn the 
lock, gaining entrance into the house. He shouted at Ms. Gunderman, "`I'm going 
to kill you. I'm going to kill you.'" Ms. Gunderman told appellant to leave, and 
she picked up the telephone to again call the police. Appellant grabbed the 
telephone away from her, and he hit her on the head several times with it. He 
then grabbed a knife and threatened Ms. Gunderman with it, apparently striking 
at her but not connecting. Appellant also threatened to kill Mr. 
Rone.

 
 

[¶6.]     Aroused from sleep by 
the commotion, Mr. Rone proceeded to the kitchen where appellant jumped at him. 
At this point, Ms. Gunderman ran out of the house and went to a friend's house 
to call the police. In describing the ensuing melee, Mr. Rone testified that he 
saw something in appellant's hand but that he remembered very little after that 
because he was knocked unconscious and did not regain consciousness until after 
he had arrived at the hospital.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant fled before 
the police arrived at Ms. Gunderman's house. The police found the door kicked 
in, Mr. Rone lying unconscious in a pool of blood, and a brick and telephone on 
the floor near Mr. Rone's body. Mr. Rone was taken to the hospital. Pieces of 
Mr. Rone's hair were found on the brick and telephone during laboratory tests. 
Medical testimony at trial indicated that Mr. Rone had been seriously injured, 
incurring multiple traumas and fractures, including a skull fracture. The 
medical testimony indicated that many of Mr. Rone's injuries appeared to be the 
result of blows with a blunt object. 

 
 

[¶8.]     On February 3, 1986, a 
criminal complaint was filed in NatronaCounty court charging appellant with 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault and battery, alleging the criminal 
entry and beating of Ms. Gunderman as a basis for the first charge and the 
threats to Ms. Gunderman with a deadly weapon as the basis for the second 
charge. A second complaint was filed on March 3, 1986, charging appellant with 
attempted second-degree murder of Mr. Rone. Appellant was bound over to district 
court, and an information was filed containing all three charges. At the 
conclusion of a five-day trial held October 20 through 24, 1986, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. Judgment and sentence were 
entered on February 9, 1987. Appellant was sentenced to not less than five years 
nor more than seven years, suspended, on the aggravated burglary charge; not 
less than three years nor more than five years on the aggravated assault and 
battery charge, with credit for fourteen days served off the minimum and maximum 
terms; and not less than twenty years nor more than twenty-one years, suspended, 
on the attempted second-degree murder charge.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶9.]     In his first issue, 
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing 
Vernon Nix to testify for the State or by not providing another remedy, because 
Mr. Nix was in the courtroom during voir dire in violation of the court's 
sequestration order. We disagree.

 
 

[¶10.]  Exclusion of witnesses is provided for by 
W.R.E. 615, which provides in relevant part:

 
 
     At the request of a 
party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of 
other witnesses, and it may [issue] the order of its own 
motion.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) From its plain language, it is apparent that the rule contemplates 
sequestration only during the testimony of other witnesses. The rule is designed 
to "prevent the tailoring of evidence to conform to prior testimony and to 
assist the parties in detecting falsehoods and testimony which is less than 
candid." Towner v. State, 685 P.2d 45, 47 (Wyo. 1984). See also Pixley v. State, 406 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 
1965).

 
 

[¶11.]  In this case, Mr. Nix was in the 
courtroom inadvertently and without the knowledge of either party. We agree with 
the trial court's assessment of the situation when, in denying appellant's 
motion to prohibit Mr. Nix's testimony, it stated:

 
 
[I]n any 
event, I listened to the voir dire and I didn't hear anything that would give 
him even a hint of what the trial was going to be about. I thought both counsel 
conducted the voir dire in a very open ma[nn]er without regard to the facts of 
the case. I really don't see how he could have prejudiced himself by being 
present.

 
 
Even if we 
were to consider Mr. Nix's presence during voir dire a violation of the spirit 
of the rule, and it apparently was in violation of the court's order, we have 
previously stated that permitting witnesses to testify who have been in the 
courtroom in violation of a sequestration order is a matter addressed to the 
sound discretion of the court and that we would reverse only for an abuse of 
that discretion. Towner, 685 P.2d  at 48; Whiteley v. State, 418 P.2d 164 
(Wyo. 1966). 
Here, there was no abuse of discretion, and the trial court properly allowed Mr. 
Nix to testify.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant's second issue requires us to 
examine the question of double jeopardy/merger within the context of multiple 
punishments in a single trial. Courts, including this Court, have struggled with 
this often troublesome area of the criminal law.1 Recent decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court, however, and their adoption and application by this Court 
have resolved much of the confusion surrounding this 
issue.

 
 

[¶13.]  The prohibition against double jeopardy 
is found in both the United States2 and Wyoming3 Constitutions. In Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969), the Supreme Court 
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 
(Wyo. 1977), we stated that, although the respective double jeopardy provisions 
of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions are dissimilar in language, "they 
have the same meaning and are coextensive in application." See also Birr v. 
State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987). The double jeopardy prohibition 
affords three distinct protections to the accused. It prohibits a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense in 
a single trial. Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367, 369 (Wyo. 1988); Birr, 744 P.2d 1117; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977). The third, or multiple punishment protection, is our concern in this 
case.

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant's contentions are essentially 
twofold. First, appellant argues that the State, in charging him with burglary, 
used the intent to commit an aggravated assault to elevate a criminal entry 
charge to burglary and, therefore, aggravated assault was an underlying felony 
to the burglary charge and conviction and the district court erred in not 
merging aggravated burglary and aggravated assault and battery. Second, although 
not as clearly presented, appellant seems to contend that the battery of Ms. 
Gunderman, employed by the State to elevate the charge of burglary to aggravated 
burglary, was part of the same transaction or same offense as the threatening of 
Ms. Gunderman with a knife, which formed the basis for the aggravated assault 
and battery charge, and, therefore, again the charges should have merged. We 
disagree as to both contentions.

 
 

[¶15.]  Compounding the difficulty in this case 
is the fact that Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-3-301(c) (aggravated burglary) and 6-2-502(a) 
(aggravated assault and battery) (1977) are each single offenses that can be 
violated in several different ways, with a substantial overlap in the manner in 
which the two statutes can be offended. A concern which we perceive as inherent 
in appellant's argument is that the State simply segmented two methods of 
violating either of the statutes and charged them separately under the two 
overlapping statutes. Thus, we must look at all the aggravating factors provided 
in the two statutes in order to evaluate appellant's double jeopardy 
claim.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant was charged with aggravated 
burglary pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(ii) (1977), which 
encompasses one of the three aggravating factors in subsection (c) of the 
statute. Section 6-3-301(a) and (c) provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
     (a) A person is guilty 
of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(c) [A 
person is guilty of a]ggravated burglary * * * if, in the course of committing 
the crime of burglary, the person:

 
 
            
(i) Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon or a simulated 
deadly weapon;

 
 
            
(ii) Knowingly or recklessly 
inflicts bodily injury on anyone; or

 
 
            
(iii) Attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) Aggravated assault and battery is defined in § 6-2-502(a) as follows 
(with emphasis added to paragraph (iii) under which appellant was 
charged):

 
 
(a) A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

 
 
            
(i) Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
   human 
life;

 
 
            
(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon;

 
 
            
(iii) Threatens to use a drawn 
deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his 
person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another; 
or

 
 
            
(iv) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a 
woman whom he knows is pregnant.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶17.]  As a first step in the multiple 
punishments analysis, we must determine whether there is a clear expression of 
legislative intent that aggravated burglary and aggravated assault and battery 
be punished cumulatively. This is so because, "[w]ith respect to cumulative 
sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no[] more 
than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983). See also Garrett v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 773, 793, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 2418, 
85 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1985). "`[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally 
permissible is not different from the question of what punishment[s] the 
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.'" Birr, 744 P.2d  at 1119 (quoting 
Albernaz v. United States, 
450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1145, 
67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981)). Thus, we defer to clearly expressed legislative intent 
to impose multiple penalties for criminal conduct in a single trial. Schultz, 
751 P.2d  at 369; Hunter, 459 U.S.  at 368-69, 103 S. Ct.  at 
679-80.

 
 

[¶18.]  Therefore, with respect to appellant's 
argument that, in his case, aggravated burglary and aggravated assault and 
battery are of the same character, grow out of the same transaction, and are 
aspects of the same offense, it is clear that, even if appellant is correct in 
this contention, it simply does not matter if indeed the legislature intended 
cumulative punishments under the two statutes. Where a legislature specifically 
authorizes cumulative punishments under two statutes, a court's task of 
statutory construction is at an end, regardless if those two statutes prohibit 
the same conduct, and the trial court may impose cumulative punishments under 
the two statutes at the same trial. Id. In the instant case, however, neither of 
the statutes in question expressly authorizes cumulative punishments where both 
statutes have been violated in a single criminal episode. Appellant thus 
surmounts the first hurdle in his double jeopardy 
challenge.

 
 

[¶19.]  We must next determine if the two 
statutes address the same conduct because, where two statutes proscribe the same 
offense, they are construed to not authorize cumulative punishments - absent 
clear legislative intent to the contrary. Id., 
459 U.S.  at 366, 103 S. Ct.  at 
678; Whalen v. United States, 
445 U.S. 684, 692, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1438, 
63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980). This rule of construction emanates from the assumption 
that the legislature does not ordinarily intend to punish the same offense under 
two different statutes. Hunter, 459 U.S.  at 366, 103 S. Ct.  at 678; Whalen, 445 U.S.  at 691-92, 100 S. Ct.  at 1437-38. 
This is the underlying assumption of the Blockburger4 test, which will be discussed 
momentarily. Conversely, when the legislature creates two distinct offenses, the 
presumption is that it intends to allow cumulative punishments. Birr, 744 P.2d  
at 1122; Garrett, 471 U.S.  at 793, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2418.

 
 

[¶20.]  In determining whether the legislature 
intended the same or separate offenses, we first look to the plain language of 
the statutes, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Schultz, 751 P.2d  at 370. In so doing, we can dispose of appellant's contention that 
aggravated assault and battery was the underlying felony to burglary, requiring 
merger. A simple reading of the statutes demonstrates that burglary requires an 
unlawful entry with the intent to commit any felony. The felony need not be 
committed. Thus, aggravated assault and battery was not an underlying felony to 
the burglary, and appellant could have been convicted of burglary absent the 
assault, as long as the requisite intent was shown.

 
 

[¶21.]  The question of whether the aggravated 
burglary and aggravated assault and battery statutes were intended to proscribe 
the same offense cannot be so easily resolved. Looking at the language of § 
6-2-502(a) and comparing it with that of § 6-3-301(c) does not provide a 
conclusive answer. Each statute can be violated in several ways, some of which 
overlap. For example, a knowing and intentional infliction of bodily injury may 
form the basis for a conviction of aggravated assault and battery and for a 
conviction of aggravated burglary - if the elements of burglary are present. 
Sections 6-2-502(a)(i) and 6-3-301(a) and (c)(ii). Similarly, an attempt to 
cause injury to another with a weapon constitutes an aggravated assault and 
battery pursuant to § 6-2-502(a)(ii), and yet it also would be sufficient to 
elevate a burglary to aggravated burglary under § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(iii). Thus, 
the plain language of the statutes is not decisive in this 
instance.

 
 

[¶22.]  Where, as here, the legislative intent is 
not clear from the face of the statute, that intent is inferred from legislative 
history, the purpose of the statute, and the Blockburger test. Howard v. State, 
762 P.2d 28, 32 (Wyo. 1988). The dearth of legislative history 
in Wyoming 
generally renders inquiry into that domain to be of limited value. We note, 
however, that aggravated assault and battery has, in various forms, been 
statutorily proscribed since statehood. 1890 Wyo.Laws, ch. 73, § 22. Aggravated 
burglary, as a more serious form of burglary and incorporating factors similar 
to the current enactment, was not grafted onto the burglary statute until 1957. 
1957 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 185, § 1; Wyo. Stat. § 6-129 
(1957). Although we assume the legislature, in enacting the aggravated burglary 
statute, was aware of the aggravated assault and battery statute, this does no 
more than bolster the assumption that the legislature does not ordinarily intend 
to punish the same offense under two separate statutes. Hunter, 459 U.S.  at 366, 103 S. Ct.  at 
678.

 
 

[¶23.]  An examination of the purposes of the two 
statutes is also inconclusive as to legislative intent. Where independent but 
overlapping statutes are directed to separate evils, cumulative punishments are 
intended. Birr, 744 P.2d  at 1121; Albernaz, 450 U.S.  at 343, 101 S. Ct.  at 1144. Although the prohibition against burglary is clearly intended to 
protect property and the security of the home, the additional factors which 
encompass aggravated burglary are similar to the aggravated assault and battery 
provisions in that they generally provide punishment for the infliction of, the 
attempt to inflict, or the threat of inflicting bodily injury. It is not clear, 
therefore, whether or not the two statutes are directed to separate 
evils.

 
 

[¶24.]  At this point, consequently, we arrive at 
the Blockburger test as a tool for discerning legislative intent.5 The Blockburger test is a rule of 
statutory construction as opposed to a constitutional requirement. Birr, 744 P.2d  at 1120; Hunter, 459 U.S.  at 367, 103 S. Ct.  at 678. 
Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), held that:

 
 
The 
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does 
not.

 
 

[¶25.]  Application of the above test to the 
overlapping provisions of §§ 6-2-502 and 6-3-301 convinces us that these 
statutes do not proscribe the same offense or conduct. Aggravated burglary 
requires, inter alia, (1) proof of unlawful entry with (2) the intent to commit 
larceny or a felony therein. Neither of these facts needs to be proved in 
connection with aggravated assault and battery. Thus, one can commit aggravated 
assault and battery without committing aggravated burglary. In order to 
determine if the converse is true (i.e., that one can commit aggravated burglary 
without committing aggravated assault and battery), we must look at each 
aggravating circumstance in the aggravated burglary statute and compare it with 
its similar counterpart in the aggravated assault and battery statute. Under § 
6-3-301(c)(i), an aggravated burglary occurs when the burglar is simply armed or 
becomes armed with a deadly weapon. Conviction of an aggravated assault and 
battery pursuant to § 6-2-502(a), however, requires proof of the additional 
facts of either an attempt to cause or actually causing bodily injury with the 
weapon (paragraph (ii)) or a threat to use the weapon (paragraph (iii)). Section 
6-3-301(c)(ii) provides that an aggravated burglary also occurs when the burglar 
knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on anyone. Under § 6-2-502(a), 
however, in addition to a knowing and reckless infliction of injury, an 
aggravated assault and battery requires proof of circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of life (paragraph (i)), use of a weapon 
(paragraph (ii)), or injury to a pregnant woman (paragraph (iv)). Finally, § 
6-3-301(c)(iii) provides that an aggravated burglary occurs when the burglar 
attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone. Section 6-2-502(a)(ii) requires, in 
addition to the attempt to inflict bodily injury, proof that the attempt was 
made with a deadly weapon. Therefore, in each instance, aggravated assault and 
battery requires proof of additional facts not required to be proved under each 
method by which aggravated burglary is established, and each manner of 
committing aggravated burglary under § 6-3-301(c) can be accomplished without 
committing aggravated assault and battery. The two statutes satisfy the 
Blockburger test, and we conclude that separate offenses and punishments were 
intended.

 
 

[¶26.]  Although the preceding is dispositive as 
to appellant's double jeopardy claim, we also note that the same result is 
achieved, albeit much more simply, when we apply the "different evidence" test, 
a derivative of the Blockburger rule.6 In State v. Carter, 714 P.2d 1217, 
1220 (Wyo. 
1986), we stated that, "where there is separate evidence of the two offenses, 
the offenses cannot be said to have merged." In the instant case, the evidence 
supporting the aggravating burglary was the beating of Ms. Gunderman with the 
telephone - the infliction of bodily injury. On the other hand, the evidence 
supporting the aggravated assault consisted of appellant's threat to Ms. 
Gunderman with a knife. Clearly, there was separate evidence of the two offenses 
and, under the "different evidence" test, the offenses did not merge. 
Appellant's double jeopardy claim fails, therefore, under either a statutory or 
an evidence based application of Blockburger.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶27.]  In his final issue, appellant contends 
that the introduction of prior bad acts evidence at trial violated W.R.E. 404(b) 
and deprived appellant of a fair trial. The failure of appellant's trial counsel 
to object to this evidence, however, requires that appellant establish plain 
error to warrant reversal. We conclude that appellant has not demonstrated plain 
error.

 
 

[¶28.]  The evidence received at trial to which 
appellant now objects consisted primarily of testimony regarding previous 
instances of appellant's abusive treatment of Ms. Gunderman. The testimony on 
this point was fairly extensive. Ms. Gunderman's son, Robert Taylor, testified 
that appellant had assaulted Ms. Gunderman and that he, Taylor, had seen bruises 
on his mother. Ms. Gunderman testified to several prior instances of appellant's 
violence toward her, including his striking her, kicking her out of the house, 
administering a beating to her in the front yard of their home, breaking out her 
car window and jerking her out of her car, and threatening to kill her. In 
addition, the prosecutor referred to this testimony in both his opening and 
closing statements. The only objection raised to any of this testimony and 
argument was a relevancy objection to Ms. Gunderman's testimony that she 
constantly carried extra clothing in her car because of the repeated beatings 
and ejections from the house. This objection was overruled, and similar 
testimony was thereafter elicited without objection.

 
 

[¶29.]  W.R.E. 404(b) 
provides:

 
 
     Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 
We adhere 
to the general rule that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is normally 
not admissible in the trial of a criminal case. Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 582 (Wyo. 1986); Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). As indicated by the rule, however, evidence of prior acts may be 
admitted for a variety of purposes, including the establishment of a course of 
conduct. Noetzelmann, 721 P.2d  at 582; Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 
1982).

 
 

[¶30.]  When an issue was not raised at trial, 
the appellant must establish that the alleged error was plain error. Lozano v. 
State, 751 P.2d 1326, 1327 (Wyo. 1988); 
Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1985). Failure to 
object at trial constitutes a waiver of the alleged error unless the error rises 
to the level of plain error. Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1163-64 
(Wyo. 1981); Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379 
(Wyo. 1979). 
Appellant bears the burden of establishing plain error, and the rule is applied 
sparingly and only in special circumstances. Gresham, 708 P.2d  at 55; Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 
(Wyo. 1983). 
This Court applies a three-part test to determine if plain error has occurred. 
First, the record must clearly show the incidents alleged as plain error. 
Second, the appellant must demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law. Finally, it must be shown that the appellant was materially 
prejudiced - that a substantial right of the appellant was adversely affected. 
Lozano, 751 P.2d  at 1327; Gresham, 708 P.2d 49.

 
 

[¶31.]  Here, the record plainly shows the 
incidents alleged as plain error. The record contains considerable testimony 
regarding appellant's prior abusiveness. Appellant's plain error contention, 
however, cannot surmount the requirement of demonstrating the transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law. The decisions of this Court have admittedly 
not established the exact parameters of W.R.E. 404(b). Of necessity, the 
decisions often rest upon the circumstances of each case, and the limits to the 
exceptions under W.R.E. 404(b) remain unsettled.

 
 

[¶32.]  A sampling of recent decisions of this 
Court concerning W.R.E. 404(b) readily confirms the above observations. In 
Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 49 (Wyo. 1986), we applied a "`course of conduct' 
exception" to the rule, limiting the exception in that case to conduct within 
the same general transaction as the crime charged. The course of conduct 
exception was expanded in Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987), to include 
prior acts remote in time from the crime charged. The admission of evidence of 
prior instances of incest remote from the incident charged was upheld by a 
divided Court in Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110(Wyo. 1987), upon the basis that 
the testimony was relevant to motive and common design. See also Makinen v. 
State, 737 P.2d 345 (Wyo. 1987). As is apparent, we have developed 
a rather liberal attitude toward admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts. Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 
1988); Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1988). In Miller, we noted several of the 
above cases and commented that, as far as further extension or expansion of the 
admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, we had gone about as far as we 
want to go, "at least in this case." 755 P.2d  at 862. In Brown, the specially 
concurring opinion observed:

 
 
The 
difficulty I have is in finding a clear 
rule of law that will tell us in the future when bad-act evidence * * * is 
admissible and when it is not admissible.

 
 
736 P.2d  at 
1116 (Cardine, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added). More emphatically, in 
the dissenting opinion in that case, it was stated: "This case has just struck 
the final death blow to Rule 404, W.R.E., and all that remains is the spirit of 
the rule." Id. 
at 1128 (Macy, J., dissenting).

 
 

[¶33.]  The State argues that the evidence in 
this case of appellant's prior abusive treatment of Ms. Gunderman was admissible 
under the course of conduct exception. This assertion is questionable. What is 
not in doubt, however, as illustrated by the above cases, is that admission of 
this evidence did not transgress a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Under the 
circumstances, therefore, it was essential that an objection be made at trial, 
thereby giving the district court an opportunity to rule on admissibility and 
providing an adequate record by which we could review the reasoning of the 
district court. See Bradley, 635 P.2d 1161. Appellant has failed to establish 
plain error, and we need not reach the question of material 
prejudice.

 
 

[¶34.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In Albernaz v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1144, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981), Justice 
Rehnquist (now Chief Justice), writing for the majority, observed that 
decisional law in the area of double jeopardy "is a veritable Sargasso Sea which 
could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial 
navigator."

 
 

2 U.S. Const. amend. V 
provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."

 
 

3 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 
states in part: "[N]or shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense."

 
 

4 Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 
(1932).

 
 

5 We reiterate that the 
Blockburger rule is not controlling where legislative intent is clear from the 
face of the statute or from the legislative history. Howard, 762 P.2d  at 32; 
Schultz, 751 P.2d  at 370; Carrett, 471 U.S.  at 779, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2411.

 
 

6 The "different 
evidence" test, also known as the "same evidence" test, was developed in cases 
concerning successive prosecutions. Whalen, 445 U.S.  at 705, 100 S. Ct.  at 1444 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because the test requires reference 
to the information and the facts of the case, its continued vitality in the 
multiple punishment context has been called into question by recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court and of this Court. See Albernaz, 450 U.S.  at 338, 101 S. Ct.  at 
1142 (the Court's application of Blockburger focuses on the statutory elements 
of the offense - the test is satisfied if each requires proof of a fact the 
other does not, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to 
establish the crimes); Howard, 762 P.2d  at 31 (the test is the statutory 
definition, not the proof offered in a particular case); and Birr, 744 P.2d  at 
1120 n. 7 (it would seem that the Blockburger test should be applied to the 
statutes involved and not to the particular facts).

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶35.]  This triangle involved 
ex-husband/defendant/appellant Lauthern, his ex-wife/sometimes present 
housemate, Katherine Gunderman, and her sometimes boyfriend, Alvin Rone. Rone 
and Lauthern were hostile for more reasons than their separate complicating 
romantic interests in Gunderman. Events came to a climax when Lauthern, fretting 
all night that Gunderman had not come home, located her with Rone the next 
morning at her separate residence. Cultivating emotion into high anger, Lauthern 
broke into the house where Gunderman and the still intoxicated Rone had spent 
the late evening and early morning.

 
 

[¶36.]  It was from the fracas that resulted that 
Lauthern was charged with and sentenced after conviction for attempted second 
degree murder of Rone, aggravated assault on Gunderman and aggravated burglary 
of the residence where the two people were located. I dissent from the 
majority's affirmation of the convictions for both aggravated assault and 
aggravated burglary. In my opinion, the trial court accurately assessed the 
unitary nature of the case in its sentence by entering penitentiary confinement 
of not less than three nor more than five years for the aggravated assault and 
suspended sentences for both the conviction of aggravated burglary and attempted 
second degree murder, with all sentences to run concurrently for this 
sixty-two-year-old man.

 
 

[¶37.]  Initially, I could dispose of this 
appellate issue - questioning the duplicity or double jeopardy in separate 
charges for the assault as well as the burglary - on a concurrent sentence 
doctrine. Driskill v. State, 761 P.2d 980 (Wyo. 1988); Emanuel, The Concurrent Sentence 
Doctrine Dies a Quiet Death - Or Are the Reports Greatly Exaggerated?, 16 
Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 269 (1988). Unfortunately, the majority chose to justify the 
overlapping and duplicitous charges with which result I presently dissent 
because of possible future precedent in a case where the issue really matters to 
the convicted individual. 

 
 

[¶38.]  Applying the evidence with a construction 
most favorable to prosecution, Lauthern broke into the house to inflict his 
anger forcefully and physically upon Rone, and Gunderman got in his way in the 
process. Considering that possibly a brick and a telephone were the instruments 
of infliction of injury on the love-interest competitor, the parameters of 
attempted second decree murder may be stretched to the limits of proof and 
interpretation, but that uncertainty is not an issue contested by 
appeal.

 
 

[¶39.]  Obviously, the entry was a factual 
constituent of the resulting mayhem. The assault on Gunderman was the 
aggravation factor within which aggravated burglary could be extruded. I have no 
great difficulty with the citations of the various cases by the majority or 
disagreement in relevant principles as we journey from the historical Wyoming 
law of the transactional limitation for double jeopardy through Carter v. State, 
714 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1986) to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) and the confused and complicating cases in 
numerous number from the United States Supreme Court, federal courts and state 
tribunals that have since followed in review of the double jeopardy and 
duplicitous charging analyses. Since Carter, 714 P.2d 1217, this court has not 
been spared as the issues have been more recently visited in Schultz v. State, 
751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988) and Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987). See Note, Criminal Procedure - 
Consecutive Sentences for Felony Murder and the Underlying Felony: Double 
Jeopardy or Legislative Intent? Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), XXIIILand & Water L.Rev. 603 
(1988).

 
 

[¶40.]  I find the general rules improperly 
applied here which also occurred in Birr, 744 P.2d 1117, in that we extrapolate 
a lesser included offense to create a separate crime. Clearly, the 
constitutional issue raised by the lesser included offense doctrine involves the 
Fifth Amendment, that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life and limb. This provision protects against both 
multiple prosecution and multiple punishments for the same offense. See 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 
2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664-65 (1969), as recited and substantiated in State v. 
Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Iowa 1988).

 
 

[¶41.]  In this case, in the context of the 
angered ex-husband/boyfriend, the assault was the aggravation for the aggravated 
burglary conviction as the constituent felony to be differentiated from whatever 
property damage offense might be committed by forceful and unacceptable entry. 
My special concurrence in Schultz, 751 P.2d 367 and dissent in Birr, 744 P.2d 1117 define a present concern about a result that essentially extrapolates the 
lesser included to create a separate crime which is contrary to both the general 
law and the interpretative posture of Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180 to 
require a separate element for each charge.

 
 

[¶42.]  In excellent analysis and carefully 
defined text, the Iowa Supreme Court in Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728 defines and 
illuminates the factors and function of the lesser included offense doctrine. 
That case probably provides the most academically considered and comprehensively 
enumerated dissertation on the subject which can be found in any recent case 
review. Without extended reference, it would realistically appear that 
Wyoming has followed the decisional approach of 
Iowa in 
acceptance of the common law or strict statutory elements approach. Wyoming provides by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c):

 
 
The 
defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense 
necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense.

 
 
See 
Goodwine v. State, 764 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1988); 
Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189 (Wyo. 1988); 
Driskill, 761 P.2d 980; and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988). In this 
application, at least generally by definition, a lesser included offense is 
enveloped within the confines of the principal offense so that some contended, 
unproven fact, such as intent, justifies diminution of penalty to the less 
severe charge. 

 
 

[¶43.]  Consequently, by any consistent 
application of adopted legal principles, the lesser included offense within the 
Blockburger thesis cannot be a separate offense since there cannot be separate 
elements for each of the two charges.

 
 

[¶44.]  Further, in Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d  at 
734-35, we perceive:

 
 
The 
lesser-included offense doctrine comes into play in determining what is a "same 
offense" for double-jeopardy purposes. Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188, 9 S. Ct. 672, 676, 33 L. Ed. 118, 122 (1889). According to Nielsen, if an offense is 
a lesser-included one of the offense charged, a conviction or acquittal of the 
charged offense bars a subsequent prosecution of the lesser offense. Id. Further, a conviction 
or acquittal of the lesser-included offense bars a subsequent prosecution of the 
greater offense.

 
 
In 
Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309 (1932), the Supreme Court laid down the following test for 
determining the "same offense" for double-jeopardy purposes: "where the same act 
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the 
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is 
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does 
not." This test parallels the strict statutory-elements approach. Ettinger, 50 
Brooklyn L.Rev. at 218.

 
 

 [¶45.] In factual recitation where I depart from the 
majority, is in their analysis with regard to the differentiated elements of 
aggravated burglary as requiring "inter alia, (1) proof of unlawful entry with 
(2) the intent to commit * * * a felony therein," where the assault was the 
felony since clearly Lauthern was vengeful but not larcenous. Obviously, a 
person can commit burglary without committing assault, but in this case, the 
activity constituent within the burglary and aggravated burglary charge was the 
indispensable lesser included assault and aggravated assault 
conduct.

 
 

[¶46.]  It is in the essential nature of serious 
criminal conduct that the proscribed activity or course of felonious behavior 
can be expected to invade more than one criminal statute or at least to invoke a 
more serious charge for which, with some factor deleted, a lesser included 
offense will be involved. For this reason, the cases on this dual subject of 
double jeopardy and lesser included offense are vastly variant in character and 
numerous in number beyond any reasonable review or citation. However, somewhat 
immediately similar in nature is Ramsey v. State, 183 Ga. App. 344, 358 S.E.2d 902 (1987), invoking inquiry of whether aggravated assault would be the lesser 
offense of armed robbery. In finding that the assaultive activity constituted 
the effort to carry the armed robbery into effect, that court determined that 
the conviction for aggravated assault merged into the armed robbery and 
consequently the aggravated assault conviction had to be set aside. See Hambrick 
v. State, 256 Ga. 148, 344 S.E.2d 639 (1986); 
Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean Task for 
the Michigan 
Courts, 1975-76 Det.C.L.Rev. 41, 68 (1975); and Blair, Constitutional 
Limitations of the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine [Double Jeopardy], 21 
Am.Crim. L.Rev. 445, 455 (1984). "Clearly, then, the impact of the standard 
chosen to identify a lesser included offense is that by implication it serves to 
delineate the scope of the double jeopardy protection afforded to the 
defendant." Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included 
Offense, 50 Brooklyn L.Rev. 191, 219 (1984). 
The transgressions pursued by Lauthern in his unprovoked entry and assault are 
adequately served by one conviction in addition to the separate offense of 
attempted second degree murder of Rone. State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125, 545 A.2d 1026, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 235, 102 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1988); Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977); Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
89 S. Ct. 2072; Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, 49 Ohio St.L.J. 799 (1988).

 
 

[¶47.]  Consequently, I respectfully dissent from 
a decision affirming three felonies which resulted from Lauthern's anger driven 
conduct.