Case Title: Wolfe v. Board of Zoning Appeals

Citation: 

Docket Number: 991705

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices  
 
JAMES B. WOLFE, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 991705 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 
FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
                                 OPINION BY 
            
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 
FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
v.  Record No. 991706 
 
JANE W. GWINN, ZONING  
ADMINSTRATOR OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY  
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
Background 
 
On April 1, 1997, the Zoning Administrator for Fairfax 
County issued a notice of violation to James B. Wolfe and 
Raymond L. Wolfe stating that a recent inspection had 
revealed the operation of a business called Wolfe Brothers, 
Inc. on property identified on the Fairfax County Tax Map 
as No. “41-1((1))15” (hereinafter, Lot 15), with the 
parking of commercial vehicles1 and the storing of building 
materials.  These activities, the notice stated, were 
                     
1 The commercial vehicles listed in the notice of violation 
included a Chevrolet dump truck and a Sierra GMC dump 
truck, both with “Wolfe Bros., Inc.” lettered thereon, as 
well as a Chevrolet flat bed roll-off vehicle, a Chevrolet 
“deemed to be a contractor’s office and shop and a storage 
yard,” uses not permitted under the Fairfax County Zoning 
Ordinance in an R-2 District, the residential zoning 
classification applicable to Lot 15.  The notice stated 
further that the parking of the vehicles also violated a 
provision of the zoning ordinance permitting the parking of 
only “one (1) commercial vehicle per dwelling unit in an R 
district.” 
 
On April 28, 1997, Wolfe Brothers, Inc., Raymond L. 
Wolfe, and James B. Wolfe (collectively, the Wolfes)2 gave 
notice of their intention to appeal the notice of violation 
to the Fairfax County Board of Zoning Appeals (the BZA).  
At a hearing before the BZA on September 9, 1997, the 
issues included whether the vehicles the Wolfes parked on 
their property were commercial vehicles within the meaning 
of the zoning ordinance, whether such parking implicated a 
“lawful nonconforming” or “grandfathered” use or a “vested 
right,” and whether the Zoning Administrator was estopped 
from enforcing the prohibition against more than one 
commercial vehicle per dwelling because of the actions of a 
former senior zoning inspector.  On a tie vote of three to 
                                                             
stake body truck, and a flat bed trailer with a front-end 
loader/back hoe. 
 
2
three, the BZA upheld the determination of the Zoning 
Administrator concerning Lot 15.3   
 
On October 16, 1997, pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314, the 
Wolfes filed in the trial court a petition for a writ of 
certiorari challenging the decision of the BZA.4  A writ of 
certiorari was issued to the BZA, and the record of the 
proceeding before the BZA was forwarded to the trial court.5
 
During the hearing before the BZA on Lot 15, the 
Deputy Zoning Administrator noted that the Wolfes also 
owned Lot 15A, located to the rear of Lot 15, and he told 
the BZA “it was hard to tell . . ., out in the field, which 
                                                             
2 The record indicates that Raymond Wolfe and James Wolfe 
are the owners of the property and Wolfe Brothers, Inc. is 
the tenant. 
3 Under § 18-306(2) of the Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance, 
the concurring vote of four of the seven members of the BZA 
is required to overturn a determination of the Zoning 
Administrator. 
4 The Wolfes say on brief that this petition for certiorari 
raised “commercial parking and storage-yard issues.”  
However, the petition itself states clearly that “[u]pon 
[the Wolfes’] appeal of the Notice [of Violation] to the 
BZA, the only issue pertained to the [Wolfes’] continued 
parking of various vehicles, utilized by [the Wolfes] in 
their contracting enterprises, upon the subject premises.  
All other issues had been, and have remained, resolved by  
agreement of the parties.”  In addition, the trial court 
ruled that the Zoning Administrator’s finding concerning 
illegal parking was the only issue before the court with 
respect to Lot 15, the other issues having “been resolved 
among the parties.”  Consequently, we will disregard any 
further reference by the Wolfes to the storage-yard issue 
so far as Lot 15 is concerned. 
 
3
lot the equipment was parked on so only 15 was cited.”  The 
Deputy also said “it appears that at least some of the 
equipment is parked on 15A,” and he thought the situation 
“will require [the Zoning Administrator] to . . . turn 
around and issue a notice to include 15A.”6
 
Accordingly, on June 29, 1998, the Zoning 
Administrator issued a notice of violation to Raymond L. 
Wolfe and James B. Wolfe stating that recent inspections 
had revealed that trucks and construction equipment were 
being stored on Lot 15A.  The notice also stated that 
“[t]he storage of these vehicles and construction equipment 
is deemed to be a storage yard,” a use not permitted in an 
R-2 District, the residential zoning classification 
applicable to Lot 15A. 
 
On July 21, 1998, the Wolfes gave notice of their 
intention to appeal the notice of violation on Lot 15A to 
the BZA.  At a hearing before the BZA on October 27, 1998, 
the issues included whether the vehicles parked on Lot 15A 
were commercial vehicles within the meaning of the zoning 
ordinance, whether such parking was a “grandfathered” or a 
                                                             
5 This certiorari proceeding was designated in the trial 
court as At Law No. 165844, and it is incorporated in our 
Record No. 991705. 
6 The record shows that Lot 15 contains one-half acre and is 
improved by a dwelling.  Lot 15A contains .3640 acre and is 
 
4
“permitted . . . nonconforming” use, and whether the Zoning 
Administrator was estopped from enforcing the prohibition 
against more than one commercial vehicle per dwelling  
because of the actions of the former senior zoning 
inspector. 
 
On a vote of four to three, the BZA reversed the 
determination of the Zoning Administrator.  On November 25, 
1998, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County (the Board 
of Supervisors) and Jane W. Gwinn, the Zoning 
Administrator, filed in the trial court a petition for a 
writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the BZA with 
respect to Lot 15A.  A writ of certiorari was issued to the 
BZA, and the record of the proceedings before the BZA was 
forwarded to the circuit court. 7
Trial Court Proceedings 
  
On February 23, 1999, the Zoning Administrator moved 
for the entry of “an order of nonsuit as to the claim by 
the Board of Supervisors,” asserted in the certiorari 
petition relating to Lot 15A.  The motion stated that the 
Board of Supervisors “did not authorize the filing of the 
Petition [for Certiorari] on its behalf.”  An order was 
                                                             
unimproved, except that a garage is located partly on Lot 
15 and partly on Lot 15A. 
 
5
entered on March 5, 1999, providing that “this matter is 
nonsuited insofar as it purports to state any claim on 
behalf of the Board of Supervisors." 
 
The Wolfes filed a motion to consolidate for hearing 
the two petitions for certiorari.  The trial court granted 
the motion. 
 
The BZA then filed a motion to dismiss the petition 
for certiorari relating to Lot 15A.  The motion alleged 
that the Zoning Administrator lacked standing “to prosecute 
an appeal of the decision of the BZA” in light of the 
admission, made in the Zoning Administrator’s motion for 
nonsuit and incorporated in the nonsuit order, that the 
Board of Supervisors did not authorize the certiorari 
petition “to be filed on its behalf.” 
 
The trial court denied the BZA’s motion to dismiss.  
The court held that Gwinn, as the Zoning Administrator, 
“has standing to bring this case whether the Board of 
Supervisors joins in, authorize[s] it, or takes some 
contrary position.” 
 
Proceeding to the merits of the two petitions for 
certiorari, the trial court rejected the Wolfes’ request 
that the “second appeal,” i.e., the certiorari petition 
                                                             
7 This certiorari proceeding was designated in the trial 
court as At Law No. 176552, and it is incorporated in our 
 
6
relating to Lot 15A, be heard first because, the Wolfes 
claimed, “[t]he administrative record [in the second 
appeal] is much more complete.”  The trial court stated 
that it would consider the cases “in the order in which 
they were filed,” meaning that the appeal concerning Lot 15 
would be considered first. 
 
The court then held that “the vehicles [in question] 
are clearly commercial vehicles” and that “the Zoning 
Administrator was correct in . . . finding that the Wolfes 
had illegally parked commercial vehicles . . . on Lot 15.”  
The court recognized that, because “the [Wolfes] had a 
commercial vehicle in 1969 parked on the property . . ., 
they may continue to park that vehicle there as long as 
it’s not a tractor-trailer.”  The court held further that 
“estoppel is not an argument that may be made against the 
government in the performance of its legitimate functions.”  
In a final order entered April 20, 1999, and a corrected 
order entered April 28, 1999, the court affirmed the 
decision of the BZA with respect to Lot 15. 
 
Concerning the petition for certiorari relating to Lot 
15A, the trial court held that the BZA had “relied on 
erroneous principles of law” in overturning the 
determination of the Zoning Administrator.  The court 
                                                             
Record No. 991706. 
 
7
stated that there was “no grandfather issue” with respect 
to Lot 15A, that estoppel was not available to the Wolfes 
concerning statements made to them by zoning officials, and 
that the storage of vehicles on Lot 15A was not “some kind 
of a lawful nonconforming use.”  Accordingly, in a final 
order entered April 20, 1999, the court reversed the 
decision of the BZA and reinstated the determination of the 
Zoning Administrator that the Wolfes’ use of Lot 15A 
constituted a storage yard in violation of the zoning 
ordinance. 
 
The Wolfes appeal from the final judgments in both 
certiorari proceedings, and the BZA appeals from the final 
judgment in the proceeding involving Lot 15A.  We will 
consider the cases in the same order as the trial court, 
meaning that we will consider Lot 15 first and on its own 
separate record. 
Lot 15 — Record No. 991705 
Procedural Defaults 
 
The Wolfes have defaulted several of the arguments 
they make on appeal with respect to Lot 15.  First, the 
Wolfes argue that, “because the BZA’s 1997 decision 
[involving Lot 15] was effectively subsumed within and 
superseded by the 1998 BZA decision [involving Lot 15A], 
the initial BZA decision and the Circuit Court’s affirmance 
 
8
thereof are essentially void and should be reversed.”  This 
argument was not made in the trial court, Rule 5:25, and 
the point is not the subject of an assignment of error, 
Rule 5:17(c).  Accordingly, we will not notice the point.  
Buck v. Jordan, 256 Va. 535, 545-46, 508 S.E.2d 880, 885-86 
(1998) (this Court will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal); City of Winchester v. American 
Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 460, 464 S.E.2d 148, 153-54 
(1995) (this Court does not consider arguments that are not 
the subjects of assignments of error). 
 
Second, in urging reversal of the trial court’s 
judgment upholding the 1997 BZA decision concerning Lot 15, 
the Wolfes argue at great length on the point that they 
have been pursued for “violations regarding Lot 15 for 
activities which were, in fact, occurring on Lot 15A.”  The 
Wolfes made no argument in the trial court questioning 
whether Lot 15 served as the location of vehicles allegedly 
parked in violation of the zoning ordinance.  Indeed, the 
Wolfes conceded the point below.  In their petition for a 
writ of certiorari regarding Lot 15, the Wolfes stated 
that, “[b]ased upon uncontroverted evidence before the BZA, 
there is no question the parking of vehicles designated in 
 
9
the Notice [of Violation] has occurred, and yet is 
occurring, upon both Lot 15 and Lot 15(A).”8
 
Moreover, the Wolfes have not assigned error to the 
trial court’s finding that Lot 15 served as the location of 
illegally parked vehicles.  In their petition for appeal, 
the Wolfes assigned only two errors that are presently 
pertinent to Lot 15.9  They read as follows: 
 
3.  The Circuit Court erred in concluding that 
the Wolfes’ construction vehicles were “commercial 
vehicles” under the 1959 and 1978 Fairfax County 
Zoning Ordinances. 
 
 
4.  The Circuit Court erred in determining that 
estoppel, in the narrow sense the term was used by the 
Wolfes, was inapplicable. 
 
 
Assignment of Error No. 3 involves only the question 
whether the Wolfes’ vehicles were commercial vehicles 
within the meaning of the zoning ordinances and not whether 
the vehicles were parked on Lot 15.  Similarly, Assignment 
of Error No. 4 involves only the question whether estoppel 
is applicable in this case, which turns solely on the 
                     
8 This statement was made in an obvious attempt by the 
Wolfes to support the allegations in their petition for a 
writ of certiorari that the parking of vehicles on their 
property was a grandfathered or lawful nonconforming use.  
9 A third assignment of error, No. 2, alleged that “[t]he 
Circuit Court erred in determining that the Wolfes were 
operating a storage yard on their property.”  This language 
is broad enough to encompass Lot 15, but, as demonstrated 
in n.4, supra, no viable issue remains in the case 
concerning the existence of a storage yard on Lot 15, so 
 
10
actions of a former senior zoning inspector and not on 
where the vehicles were located on the Wolfes’ property.  
Hence, the location argument is made for the first time on 
appeal and is not the subject of an assignment of error.  
Accordingly, we will not notice the argument.  Buck, 256 
Va. at 545-46, 508 S.E.2d at 885-86; American Woodmark, 250 
Va. at 460, 464 S.E.2d at 153-54. 
 
Third, the Wolfes argue that “[t]here can be no 
question that the provisions of both the 1959 and 1978 
Ordinances, which allowed the parking of ‘commercial 
vehicles’ in residential districts, were ambiguous.”  While 
it is doubtful the Wolfes properly raised any objection 
below to the alleged ambiguity of the term “commercial 
vehicle,” it is clear beyond doubt that no assignment of 
error addresses the trial court’s putative failure to find 
the term ambiguous.  Accordingly, we will not notice the 
Wolfes’ argument on the point.  Id. 
 
Fourth, without always designating which lot they are 
talking about, the Wolfes continue to assert on appeal 
issues concerning the concepts of “grandfathered” and 
“lawful nonconforming” uses they raised unsuccessfully 
below.  Yet, while the Wolfes’ Assignment of Error No. 5 
                                                             
Assignment of Error No. 2 can only be considered in 
relation to Lot 15A.  
 
11
alleges that the trial court erred in concluding that Lot 
15A was not “grandfathered,” no assignment of error 
addresses the issues of “grandfathered” and “lawful 
nonconforming” uses with respect to Lot 15.  Consequently, 
we will not notice those issues.  Id.
Commercial Vehicles 
 
This brings us to the merits of the Wolfes’ Assignment 
of Error No. 3 and the question whether their vehicles were 
“commercial vehicles” within the meaning of Fairfax 
County’s zoning ordinances.  The Wolfes began parking 
vehicles on their property in mid-1969 in connection with 
their business of installing underground storage tanks, 
lifts, lubrication equipment, air compressors, and other 
types of equipment for gasoline service stations.  At that 
time, a zoning ordinance adopted in 1959 provided that 
“[t]here may be kept as an accessory use on any lot in [a 
residential] district not to exceed one commercial vehicle 
(other than a tractor trailer) operated by the occupant of 
the lot.” 
 
A new zoning ordinance adopted in August 1978 allowed 
the parking of one commercial vehicle on a residential lot 
but barred “any tractor trailer or vehicle exceeding one 
and one-half (1½) ton capacity.”  A further change in 
October 1978 added garbage trucks, dump trucks, 
 
12
construction equipment, and cement-mixer trucks to the list 
of commercial vehicles prohibited from parking in 
residential districts.  The amendment also defined a  
“commercial vehicle” as “[a]ny vehicle with a rated 
carrying capacity of 1,500 pounds (3/4 ton) or more, and 
any vehicle, regardless of capacity, which displays 
advertising lettered thereon or which is licensed as a ‘for 
hire’ vehicle.” 
 
The trial court held that, because the Wolfes’ 
vehicles “were used for commercial purposes,” they “then 
and now are commercial vehicles,” meaning they were 
commercial vehicles under both the 1959 and the 1978 
versions of the zoning ordinance.  The Wolfes say this 
holding was “incorrect.” 
 
Citing Sellers v. Bles, 198 Va. 49, 53, 92 S.E.2d 486, 
489 (1956), the Wolfes submit that, since the provisions of 
the zoning ordinances restrict the common law right of an 
owner “to use his property in his own way,” the provisions 
must be strictly construed in favor of the individual 
claiming the right.  Continuing, and stressing a lack of 
definition of the term “commercial vehicle” in the 1959 
zoning ordinance, the Wolfes say that while, “in its 
broadest sense, ‘commercial’ simply indicates a 
relationship to business or commerce, . . . in its more 
 
13
narrow and restricted sense the term is limited to the 
purchase, sale, or trade of goods, commodities, and 
services.”  (Citing Hendricks v. American Employers Ins. 
Co., 176 So.2d 827, 832 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (emphasis 
added)).  The Wolfes also say that, “construing the term 
most favorably to the landowner, [the] term ‘commercial 
purpose’ in [a] zoning ordinance [is] limited to businesses 
for the purchase, sale, exchange of goods and commodities, 
or the rendering of services.”  (Citing Reiser v. Meyer, 
323 S.W.2d 514, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (emphasis added)). 
 
We fail to perceive how these definitions benefit the 
Wolfes.  In their contracting business, they are obviously 
involved in “the rendering of services,” and their vehicles 
are used directly in the performance of those services.  
Nor can we perceive any difference between a meaning of the 
term “commercial” based upon the element of rendering 
services, on the one hand, and the meaning assigned by the 
trial court based upon the element of use, on the other 
hand.  To hold there is a difference would be to say that 
rendering services with a vehicle is not a use of the 
vehicle, and that would involve an unacceptable exercise in 
hair-splitting. 
 
The meaning adopted by the trial court, viz., a 
commercial vehicle is one used for commercial purposes, 
 
14
provides a simple, straightforward, and common sense test, 
fair to both sides of a zoning contest.  Accordingly, we 
will apply the test here. 
 
There can be no question that the Wolfes used their 
vehicles for commercial purposes.  Indeed, they have 
admitted as much.10  They also admitted before the BZA that 
the vehicles were commercial vehicles under the 1978 
version of the zoning ordinance.11  We think the vehicles 
were just as clearly commercial vehicles under the 1959 
ordinance.  Accordingly, we find no error in the trial 
court’s ruling that the vehicles were commercial vehicles 
“then and now.” 
Estoppel 
 
The Wolfes’ Assignment of Error No. 4 presents the 
question whether the trial court erred in determining that 
estoppel was inapplicable in this case.  As noted 
previously, the Wolfes’ estoppel argument is based upon the 
actions of a former senior zoning inspector of Fairfax 
County. 
                     
10 In the hearing before the BZA on Lot 15, the Wolfes’ 
counsel stated that the vehicles “are used for commercial 
purposes.”  The trial judge found that “[i]t’s admitted 
[the vehicles] were used for commercial purposes.”  
11 In the BZA hearing on Lot 15, the Wolfes’ counsel was 
asked whether, under “the current definition,” the vehicles 
in question were “commercial vehicles,” and counsel 
replied, “yes.” 
 
15
 
The record shows that, on February 6, 1979, the 
inspector, Douglas S. Leigh, issued a notice of violation 
to the Wolfes for “[s]torage [on Lot 15] of construction 
equipment in a residential zone.”  Leigh later marked the 
notice “[c]leared 3-7-79.”  The Wolfes note on brief that 
Leigh “did not even mention any vehicle, although the same, 
or substantially the same, vehicles as those at issue were 
right there in front of him.” 
 
Leigh issued a second notice of violation on November 
16, 1979, for the “parking [on Lot 15] of a dump truck and 
construction equipment in a residential zone.”  Leigh 
marked this notice “[c]leared 12-31-1979.” 
 
Leigh issued a third notice of violation on March 27, 
1984, for “the storage [on Lot 15] of construction 
equipment, mortar pans, cinder blocks and plastic and metal 
pipe.”  There is no indication of record that this notice 
was “cleared,” but the Wolfes state on brief that the 
violation was not prosecuted, and they again note that 
there was no mention in the 1984 notice “of any vehicle, 
although the vehicles at issue were right there.” 
 
The gist of the Wolfes’ argument is that Leigh’s 
failure to issue citations for the parked vehicles prior to 
the 1978 zoning amendments and his marking as “cleared” or 
failing to prosecute citations issued after the amendments 
 
16
indicate his consistent interpretation of “the applicable 
Ordinances to permit the parking of the subject vehicles on 
the Wolfes’ property.”  And this, the Wolfes say, works an 
estoppel against the Zoning Administrator. 
 
The Wolfes do not question the rule that estoppel does 
not apply to a local government when it acts in a 
governmental capacity, the capacity involved here.  
Westminster-Canterbury of Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of 
Virginia Beach, 238 Va. 493, 503, 385 S.E.2d 561, 566 
(1989); Gwinn v. Alward, 235 Va. 616, 621, 369 S.E.2d 410, 
413 (1988).  The Wolfes say, however, that they are “not 
attempting to use estoppel in that sense — that is, to 
argue that the current Zoning Administrator is estopped 
from finding a violation based on a prior Administrator’s 
failure to find one, if there were, in fact, an unlawful 
use from the start.”  “Rather,” the Wolfes say they “argue 
that the current Zoning Administrator is estopped from 
finding that the use had been unlawful throughout.” 
 
If one could detect a distinction between the senses 
in which the Wolfes are attempting to use estoppel in this 
case, it would be a distinction without a difference, and  
the result would be the same either way.  The Wolfes’ 
thesis assumes that the use of their property was lawful at 
some point before the current Zoning Administrator found 
 
17
that the use had been unlawful throughout.  The thesis also 
assumes that the use was previously lawful because the 
purported “interpretation” of Inspector Leigh, right or 
wrong, made it lawful. 
 
The true situation, however, is that the use was 
unlawful throughout; ever since adoption of the 1959 
ordinance, it has been unlawful to park more than one 
commercial vehicle on a residential lot in Fairfax County, 
and the Wolfes admittedly have consistently parked more 
than one.  And, concerning Leigh’s purported 
interpretation, the rule is that “[n]o subordinate 
municipal official can bind the municipality to an 
incorrect . . . interpretation of the [municipality’s] 
ordinances.”  Dick Kelly Enters. v. City of Norfolk, 243 
Va. 373, 382, 416 S.E.2d 680, 685 (1992). 
Conclusion
 
The determination of the Zoning Administrator 
concerning Lot 15 is presumed to be correct.  See Crestar 
Bank v. Martin, 238 Va. 232, 236, 383 S.E.2d 714, 716 
(1989).  The decision of the BZA upholding the Zoning 
Administrator’s determination and the trial court’s 
judgment affirming the BZA’s decision are also 
presumptively correct.  See Masterson v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 732-33 (1987).  
 
18
The Wolfes have failed to overcome any of these 
presumptions.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court with respect to Lot 15, including the trial 
court’s reservation of the Wolfes’ right to park on Lot 15 
one commercial vehicle other than a tractor trailer. 
Lot 15A — Record No. 991706 
 
The Wolfes’ Assignment of Error No. 1 and the BZA’s 
sole assignment of error present the same question, viz., 
whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Zoning 
Administrator had standing to appeal the BZA decision in 
the certiorari proceeding involving Lot 15A.  The Wolfes’ 
Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 5 present the additional 
questions, respectively, whether the trial court erred in 
determining that the Wolfes were operating a storage yard 
on their property and that Lot 15A had never been a lawful 
use and was not grandfathered.  We find the standing issue  
dispositive.  Accordingly, we do not reach the Wolfes’ 
additional questions. 
 
With respect to the standing issue, Code § 15.2-2280 
authorizes localities to adopt zoning ordinances and Code 
§ 15.2-2286(A)(4) authorizes localities to include in the 
ordinances provisions for the appointment of a zoning 
administrator who “shall have all necessary authority on 
behalf of the governing body to administer and enforce the 
 
19
zoning ordinance.  [This] authority shall include . . . 
insuring compliance with the ordinance, bringing legal 
action, including injunction, abatement, or other 
appropriate action or proceeding.”  Code § 15.2-2314 
provides that “any officer, department, board or bureau of 
the locality, may present to the circuit court for the 
county or city a petition [for a writ of certiorari] 
specifying the grounds on which aggrieved.” 
 
Section 18-101(1) of the Fairfax County Zoning 
Ordinance provides that “[u]nless otherwise specifically 
qualified, the provisions of this Ordinance shall be 
enforced by the Zoning Administrator, who shall serve at 
the pleasure of the Board of Supervisors.”  Section 18-
101(3) of the ordinance provides that “[t]he Zoning 
Administrator shall have all necessary authority on behalf 
of the Board [of Supervisors] to administer and enforce the 
provisions of this Ordinance.  Such authority shall include 
. . . the ability to bring legal action to insure 
compliance with the provisions [of the ordinance], 
including injunction, abatement, or other appropriate 
action or proceeding.” 
 
Gwinn, as we will refer to the Zoning Administrator 
hereinafter, emphasizes the “all necessary authority” 
language contained in Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4) and in § 18-
 
20
101(3) of the Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance relating to 
the administration and enforcement of the ordinance.  Gwinn 
also puts great emphasis upon the language of Code § 15.2-
2314, which authorizes “any officer” of a locality to 
present a certiorari petition to a circuit court. 
 
Gwinn argues that nothing in the zoning ordinance 
requires that the Board of Supervisors authorize her to 
present a petition for a writ of certiorari or that the 
board must be a co-litigant in any action she brings. 
Rather, she says, the zoning ordinance unambiguously grants 
and delegates to her “all necessary authority” to bring 
appropriate legal actions to ensure compliance with the 
zoning ordinance, including the presentation of a petition 
for certiorari to the circuit court pursuant to Code 
§ 15.2-2314. 
 
We do not agree that Gwinn possessed such authority in 
the present case.  While she emphasizes the “all necessary 
authority” language of Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4) and § 18-
101(3) of the zoning ordinance, we place the emphasis where 
it properly belongs, and that is upon the language “on 
behalf of the local governing body” or “on behalf of the 
Board [of Supervisors],” which appears immediately after 
the “all necessary authority” language in the statute and 
the ordinance, respectively.  With the emphasis so placed, 
 
21
the necessary conclusion is that Gwinn is authorized to 
present a petition for certiorari only when such action is 
taken on behalf of the Board of Supervisors. 
 
Nor is the conclusion altered by the language of Code 
§ 15.2-2314 which permits “any officer” of a locality to 
present a petition for certiorari to the circuit court from 
a decision of a board of zoning appeals.  Code § 15.2-2314 
must be read in pari materia with Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4) 
and § 18-101(1) of the zoning ordinance, “since they relate 
to the same subject.”  Taylor v. Shaw & Cannon Co., 236 Va. 
15, 19, 372 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988).  When so read, there is 
imposed upon “any officer” taking action under Code § 15.2-
2314 the requirement that the action be on behalf of the 
local governing body. 
 
Here, there is a clear admission in Gwinn’s motion for 
nonsuit and a clear judicial finding in the nonsuit order 
that Gwinn’s filing of the petition for certiorari relating 
to Lot 15A was not on behalf of the Board of Supervisors, 
and that is conclusive of the issue.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court erred in finding that Gwinn had 
standing to file the certiorari petition in question. 
 
Gwinn’s counsel expressed the concern in the trial 
court that if Gwinn was held to lack standing in this case 
then it would be necessary to have “a specific 
 
22
authorization or resolution entered each time by the Board 
of Supervisors for any case to be appealed by the Zoning 
Administrator.”  We do not hold in this case, however, that 
Gwinn must secure authorization from the Board of 
Supervisors each time she decides it is necessary or 
appropriate to present a petition for certiorari.  We hold 
only that, under the particular circumstances of this case, 
she did not possess the authority to file the petition for 
certiorari relating to Lot 15A. 
 
Gwinn cites several of our prior decisions in each of 
which, she says, “a zoning administrator was a participant 
in proceedings before the circuit court and a party to the 
subsequent appeal,” namely, McNair v. Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 
532, 186 S.E.2d 45 (1972), WANV, Inc. v. Houff, 219 Va. 57, 
244 S.E.2d 760 (1978), Gwinn v. Alward, supra, and Gwinn v. 
Collier, 247 Va. 479, 443 S.E.2d 161 (1994).  None of these 
decisions, however, involved the question that is presented 
here, viz., whether a zoning administrator has standing to 
file a petition for certiorari from a decision of a board 
of zoning appeals when such filing is not on behalf of the 
local governing body. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court with respect to Lot 15A, dismiss Gwinn’s petition for 
 
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certiorari, and reinstate the decision of the BZA 
concerning Lot 15A. 
 
 
       Record No. 991705 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 991706 — Reversed and dismissed. 
 
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