Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC SHERROD DENNIS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 116852

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 3, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116852  
ERIC SHERROD DENNIS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
Defendant was convicted by a jury of (1) possession with  
intent to deliver more than 50, but less than 225, grams of  
cocaine, 
MCL 
333.7401(2)(a)(iii); 
(2) 
possession 
of 
marijuana,  
MCL 333.7403(2)(d); (3) carrying a concealed weapon in a  
vehicle, MCL 750.227; (4) malicious destruction of police  
property, MCL 750.377b; (5) possession of a firearm during the  
 
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; and (6) felon in  
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. The Court of Appeals  
reversed defendant’s convictions because of testimony from a  
police 
detective 
that 
referenced 
defendant’s 
refusal 
to 
submit  
to 
police 
questioning.  While the testimony was inappropriate,  
we conclude that it did not amount to a violation of  
defendant’s constitutional right to due process and that the  
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying  
defendant’s motion for a mistrial.  Accordingly, we reverse  
the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate  
defendant’s convictions.  
I  
On the afternoon of August 23, 1997, defendant was a  
passenger in a van that was stopped by the police. A police  
officer observed that defendant was sitting with an object  
that turned out to be a safe between his legs.  Eventually,  
the police called for a drug sniffing dog to be brought to the  
scene.  At that point, defendant became “extremely enraged”  
and was placed in the back of a police car.  After being  
placed in the police car, defendant kicked out its rear  
window, 
completely 
shattering the window.  Eventually, the dog  
was brought inside the van, and it alerted to the safe.  
Later, the police opened the safe and found several packets of  
2  
 
 
  
cocaine, a small amount of marijuana, a loaded “Tech Nine”  
handgun, and over $2,000 in cash.1  This led to the present  
charges and convictions against defendant.  
At issue now is the following testimony from defendant’s  
trial that transpired during the direct examination of police  
detective Kent Cooper by the prosecutor after eliciting  
testimony that defendant had been arrested:  
Q. What type of investigation follow-up did 
you do with regard to this?  
A. I went out and attempted to interview 
[defendant], and at that time it was refused.  He  
wished to speak to an attorney prior to me asking 
him any questions.  
We note that the trial record does not include any express  
mention that defendant had been advised of his Miranda2 rights  
to remain silent and to have an attorney present during  
custodial interrogation. 
However, the prosecution has  
effectively stipulated that defendant was in police custody  
following his arrest at the time of the attempted questioning  
1 Notably, defendant had also been a passenger in another 
vehicle that was stopped earlier that day.  Defendant  
consented to a search of his person during that earlier stop. 
The police found over $1,000 in cash in one of his pockets, 
mostly in $20 bills, and several “corner baggies,” which are 
plastic baggies with the bottoms torn off and that are tied 
off with a knot.  A police officer indicated that “corner 
baggies” are frequently used by drug dealers.  However, no 
drugs were found on defendant’s person at that time and he was 
released.  
2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d  
694 (1966).  
3  
 
 
 
and had been advised of his Miranda rights before rejecting  
Detective Cooper’s attempt to interview him.3  Accordingly,  
our decision presumes that defendant’s refusal to submit to  
police questioning constituted “post-Miranda” silence.  
Defense counsel requested a mistrial on the basis of  
Detective Cooper’s testimony about defendant refusing to be  
questioned before speaking with an attorney.  The trial court  
denied this request, stating that it was convinced the  
prosecutor did not intend to elicit testimony on this point  
and that it did not think “the jury picked it up or caught it  
in any way.”  
In its final instructions to the jury, the trial court  
provided the following curative instruction with regard to  
Detective Cooper’s testimony referencing defendant’s refusal  
to submit to a police interview:  
Also, at one time Detective Cooper made  
mention of the fact that when we [sic] went out to 
the jail to talk to [defendant], [defendant] did 
not want to talk to him and [defendant] said that 
he wanted a lawyer.  
This is an absolute right that every citizen 
of this country has.  In fact, if Officer Cooper 
had talked to [defendant], he would have had to 
tell [defendant] before he even started talking 
that [defendant] had a right to refuse to talk, and 
[defendant] had a right to have a lawyer present  
3 In its brief to this Court, the prosecution states that 
it is not “arguing that the defendant’s comment was pre- 
Miranda or that the defendant’s invocation of his right to 
counsel should have been admissible.”  
4  
when he was talking to the officer.  
So the fact that [defendant] said he wanted a 
lawyer and didn’t want to talk to the officer 
cannot be used by you in any way and is not any 
indication of anything.  It’s a constitutional  
right that every citizen of this country has.  
II  
Defendant argued before the Court of Appeals that the  
trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial.  The  
Court of Appeals agreed with that conclusion.  It treated the  
improper testimony from Detective Cooper as constituting a  
preserved 
claim 
of 
constitutional 
error 
that 
requires 
reversal  
unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court  
stated that it could not conclude the error was harmless  
beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, held that the  
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s  
motion for a mistrial.  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued  
April 14, 2000 (Docket No. 215244).  
In its appeal to this Court, the prosecution argues that  
there was no constitutional violation because the prosecution  
did not attempt to use defendant’s post-Miranda silence  
against him and that the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial. As  
we will explain below, we agree.  
5  
 
III  
We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for  
a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., People v  
Grove, 455 Mich 439, 475-476; 566 NW2d 547 (1997).  
In Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 865 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed  
2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court articulated the  
rule that the police must advise a suspect before custodial  
interrogation that the suspect has the right to remain silent,  
that anything the suspect says may be used against him, and  
that the suspect has a right to the presence of retained or,  
if indigent, appointed counsel during questioning.4  To be  
clear, the present case does not involve any allegation of a  
violation of Miranda itself because there is no claim that  
defendant was interrogated by the police without being  
afforded the warnings required by Miranda. Neither does this  
case involve any other type of claim under the Self- 
Incrimination 
Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, inasmuch as there  
is no claim that any involuntary statement by defendant was  
used against him.  
Rather, properly understood, the present case involves a  
question regarding whether the testimony at issue from  
4 In Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428; 120 S Ct 
2326, 2336; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000), the Court quite recently 
held that Miranda announced a binding “constitutional rule” 
under the Fifth Amendment in requiring these warnings.  
6  
 
Detective Cooper violates defendant’s constitutional right to  
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Doyle v Ohio,  
426 US 610, 619; 96 S Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976), the  
United States Supreme Court held that the use of a criminal  
defendant’s silence “at the time of arrest and after receiving  
Miranda warnings” for impeachment purposes violates the Due  
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United  
States Constitution.  
The Doyle Court explained that silence in the face of  
Miranda warnings cannot be used as evidence5 to cast doubt on  
the defendant’s credibility for two basic reasons.  First,  
silence in the face of Miranda warnings may reflect nothing  
more than an exercise of Miranda rights (as opposed to being  
any implicit acknowledgment of guilt):  
Silence in the wake of these warnings may be 
nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these 
Miranda rights.  Thus, every post-arrest silence is 
insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is 
required to advise the person arrested.  [Doyle,  
supra at 617.]  
Second, the Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that  
silence in reliance on those warnings will not be penalized:  
5 The only exception is a situation in which a defendant 
testifies 
to 
having 
earlier provided an exculpatory version of 
events to the police and the prosecution offers evidence of 
defendant’s silence to rebut such a claim.  Doyle, supra at  
619, n 11.  The Court, however, declined to allow the fact of 
silence to be raised by the officers in testimony even when 
the defendant offers an exculpatory version of events at 
trial.  
7  
 
Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda  
warnings contain no express assurance that silence 
will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit 
to any person who receives the warnings.  In such  
circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and 
a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested 
person’s silence to be used to impeach an  
explanation subsequently offered at trial. [Doyle,  
supra at 618.]  
Accordingly, the Doyle Court quoted with approval the  
statement in Justice White’s concurrence in United States v  
Hale, 422 US 171, 183-184; 95 S Ct 2133; 45 L Ed 2d 99 (1975),  
that “it seems to me that it does not comport with due process  
to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention  
to [the defendant’s] silence at the time of arrest . . .”  
after the defendant has received Miranda warnings. 
Doyle,  
supra at 620. The Doyle Court reversed the convictions of the  
defendants on the basis of the prosecution’s conduct in using  
their post-Miranda silence against them.  
The 
circumstances of the present case differ greatly from  
those of Doyle.  In Doyle, the prosecution unabashedly used  
the silence of each of the two defendants in the face of  
Miranda warnings against them at their respective trials.  The  
prosecution repeatedly asked each defendant questions to  
emphasize that he did not provide an exculpatory version of  
events to the police after being arrested. In contrast, the  
present case involves a single question and answer in which  
Detective Cooper revealed in response to an open-ended  
8  
question that defendant had refused to be interviewed by the  
detective before speaking with an attorney.  
We recognize that Detective Cooper’s answer may not  
reasonably be viewed as nonresponsive to the prosecutor’s  
open-ended question asking about the “type of investigation  
follow-up” 
pursued 
by the detective.  Detective Cooper’s reply  
about his attempt to interview defendant described something  
that he did in attempting to investigate the case after  
defendant was arrested. On the other hand, there is nothing  
to reasonably support a conclusion that the prosecutor  
intended for this question to elicit a reference to the  
attempted 
interview. 
 
Immediately 
after 
the 
detective’s 
answer  
referencing defendant’s refusal of the police interview, the  
detective began testifying about his other investigative  
efforts.  In our view, it is evident that the prosecutor’s  
question, while it may have been inartfully phrased, was aimed  
at eliciting testimony about these investigative efforts, not  
about the defendant’s refusal of a police interview.6  
6 
Nevertheless, 
this 
case 
provides 
an 
excellent  
opportunity to underscore the prosecutor’s continuing duty to 
carefully question witnesses so as to avoid improper, 
unforeseen 
testimony 
that 
may 
result 
from 
open-ended 
questions.  
We 
respectfully 
disagree 
with 
the 
dissent’s  
characterization of this case as involving “a series” of 
questions and answers focused on defendant’s silence.  Slip  
op, pp 1, 10.  As may be seen from the quotation of the 
(continued...)  
9  
 
 
  
In considering the implication of the substantial  
difference between this case and Doyle, we are guided by the  
intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court in  
Greer v Miller, 483 US 756; 107 S Ct 3102; 97 L Ed 2d 618  
(1987).
 In Greer, the defendant7 testified at his trial,  
claiming that he was innocent of the murder and related crimes  
charged and providing an exculpatory version of events that  
implicated two others as the perpetrators.  Id. at 758.  
During 
the 
prosecutor’s 
cross-examination 
of 
the 
defendant, 
he  
asked, “why didn’t you tell this story to anybody when you got  
arrested?” Id. at 759.  Defense counsel immediately objected,  
and the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the  
jury to ignore the question.  Importantly, the prosecution did  
not pursue the inquiry further or mention it during closing  
argument.  In its jury instructions, the trial court told the  
6(...continued) 
testimony set forth in the dissent, slip op, pp 6-7, the 
prosecutor only asked Detective Cooper one question that  
specifically regarded whether other people spoke with him. 
The prosecutor never commented on or stated that any inference 
should be drawn from the apparent willingness of certain 
witnesses to speak with Detective Cooper as opposed to 
defendant’s refusal to be interviewed prior to speaking to an 
attorney.  
7  Greer was actually a federal habeas corpus action. 
However, the important points of Greer involve the trial in  
which the petitioner was a criminal defendant.  To avoid  
confusion, we will refer to the petitioner in Greer as the  
“defendant” in that case.  
10  
 
 
jury to disregard questions about which objections were  
sustained. Id.  
The United States Supreme Court in Greer held that,  
despite the prosecutor asking an improper question, no actual  
violation of Doyle occurred. Greer, supra at 764-765. The  
Court explained:  
[T]he trial court in this case did not permit 
the inquiry that Doyle forbids. Instead, the court 
explicitly sustained an objection to the only 
question that touched upon Miller’s postarrest 
silence.  No further questioning or argument with 
respect to Miller’s silence occurred, and the court 
specifically advised the jury that it should  
disregard any questions to which an objection was 
sustained.
 Unlike the prosecutor in Doyle, the  
prosecutor in this case was not “allowed to  
undertake impeachment on,” or “permit[ted] . . . to 
call attention to,” Miller’s silence. The fact of  
Miller’s postarrest silence was not submitted to 
the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to 
draw any permissible inference, and thus no Doyle 
violation occurred in this case.  [Id., citation  
omitted.]  
Thus, the Court held that the prosecutor’s improper question  
did not require reversal of the defendant’s convictions.  Id.  
at 761.  Notably, the Greer Court emphasized that “[i]t is  
significant that in each of the cases in which this Court has  
applied Doyle, the trial court has permitted specific inquiry  
or argument respecting the defendant’s post-Miranda silence.”  
Id. at 764.  
We conclude that the circumstances of this case are  
analogous to Greer and that no Doyle violation actually  
11  
 
occurred.  Indeed, the conduct of the prosecutor in Greer was  
far worse in that he attempted to directly inject the  
defendant’s silence into the defendant’s trial while the  
prosecutor in the present case inadvertently elicited  
testimony about the present defendant’s refusal to submit to  
a police interview.  As in Greer, apart from the single  
impropriety, the prosecution did not call attention to  
defendant’s 
silence. 
While 
the 
dissent 
essentially  
hypothesizes that the jury may have drawn some type of  
negative inference from the willingness of other witnesses to  
speak to Detective Cooper, the prosecution never made such an  
argument to the jury.  In our view, it would be strained to  
believe that the prosecution intended to draw—or that the jury  
actually drew—such an implicit “comparison” from Detective  
Cooper’s testimony which was overwhelmingly focused on  
presenting expert testimony about the drug trade. There was  
no further questioning or argument regarding defendant’s  
silence.
 Thus, the trial court did not allow (or have  
occasion to allow) any specific inquiry or argument about  
defendant’s post-Miranda silence. Further, because defendant  
in the present case did not testify, there was obviously no  
attempt to use his prior silence for impeachment purposes.8  
8 Of course, we recognize that a defendant’s post-Miranda  
silence could be improperly used against him in violation of 
(continued...)  
12  
 
Moreover, 
the 
trial 
court gave a forceful curative instruction  
to the jury that defendant saying he wanted a lawyer and did  
not wish to talk with the officer “cannot be used by you in  
any way and is not an indication of anything.”  Thus, as in  
Greer, 
“[t]he 
fact 
of [the defendant’s] postarrest silence was  
not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was  
allowed to draw any permissible inference . . . .”  Id. At  
764.  
Critical to our conclusion is that Doyle prohibits “the  
use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at  
the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings  
. . . .” 
Doyle, supra at 619. 
Because defendant did not  
testify, the testimony at issue by Detective Cooper could not  
possibly have been used against defendant for impeachment  
purposes.  Thus, this is not a case like Doyle in which the  
prosecution essentially attempted to use a defendant’s post- 
Miranda silence to further an argument that the defendant  
presented a fabricated version of events on the basis of  
hearing the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial.  
8(...continued) 
Doyle even in cases where the defendant did not testify. We  
merely note that the fact that the testimony at issue was 
obviously not used for impeachment purposes is one factor 
suggesting 
that 
there was no “use” of defendant’s post-Miranda  
silence against him in the present case.  
13  
 
This reinforces that the prosecution did not use defendant’s  
post-Miranda silence against him in this case.  
We note that our conclusion that no Doyle violation  
occurred in this case is supported by the decision of the  
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in  
United States v Stubbs, 944 F2d 828 (CA 11, 1991). That case  
similarly 
involved 
improper testimony by a witness in response  
to an open-ended question.  The prosecutor asked a prosecution  
witness what happened after she talked to a federal agent.  In  
her answer, the witness said that the agent told her that the  
defendant would not “say anything.”  Id. at 834. As in the  
present case, the prosecution in Stubbs did not attempt to  
draw 
out 
further 
information 
about 
the 
defendant’s 
cooperation  
with the police and never mentioned the issue during closing  
argument.  However, the defendant argued on appeal that the  
testimony improperly commented on her postarrest refusal to  
talk with the police in violation of Doyle.  The Eleventh  
Circuit concluded that no Doyle violation occurred:  
While a single comment alone may sometimes 
constitute a Doyle violation,[9] the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Greer makes clear that a single mention 
does 
not 
automatically 
suffice 
to 
violate  
defendant’s rights when the government does not  
9 Accordingly, contrary to the dissent’s indication, we 
do not suggest that a single comment may never constitute a 
Doyle violation. Slip op, p 7, n 6.  We merely conclude that 
the single isolated incident at issue in the present case did 
not constitute a Doyle violation.  
14  
 
 
 
 
 
  
specifically and expressly attempt to use–as was  
attempted in Doyle and in Greer–the improper 
comment to impeach the defendant.  See Lindgren v  
Lane, 925 F2d 198, 201 (CA 7, 1991) (“As explained 
in Greer v Miller, . . . it is the use of an  
accused’s silence against him at trial by way of 
specific inquiry or impeachment that forms the  
basis 
for 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
Fourteenth  
Amendment.”) (emphasis added). As was the case in  
Greer, the prosecutor here “was not allowed to  
undertake impeachment on, or permitted to call 
attention to [defendant’s] silence.” Greer, 483 US  
at 764 (citation omitted). The prosecution made no 
“specific inquiry or argument” about defendant’s 
postarrest silence. Id.  Accordingly, we conclude 
there was no Doyle violation in this case.  
[Stubbs, supra at 835 (emphasis in original).]  
As in Stubbs, the present case involved no specific inquiry by  
the prosecution regarding defendant’s silence or any attempt  
to use that silence for impeachment purposes.  Accordingly,  
Stubbs reinforces our conclusion that there was no violation  
of 
defendant’s 
constitutional right to due process under Doyle  
in the present case.10  
10 Our decision is also consistent with the holding of the 
Indiana Supreme Court in Cook v State, 544 NE2d 1359, 1363 
(Ind, 1989), that testimony by a federal agent that there was 
no further contact with the defendant at a certain point 
because he “had made a request to speak to an attorney” did 
not constitute a Doyle violation. 
Similar to the present 
case, the remark was an “isolated statement,” and there was no 
specific inquiry or argument from the prosecution regarding 
the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. Cook, supra.  See also  
Pulley v Commonwealth, 31 Va App 600, 605; 525 SE2d 51 (2000) 
(holding that there was no Doyle violation from a police 
officer’s 
nonresponsive 
comment 
that 
the 
defendant 
invoked 
his 
right to counsel where the prosecution did not exploit the 
issue); State v Baccam, 476 NW2d 884, 886-887 (Iowa App, 1991) 
(finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of 
a mistrial on the basis of a single comment related to the 
(continued...)  
15  
 
 
 
 
We acknowledge that, as argued by defendant, this case  
differs from Greer in that a witness actually testified in the  
presence of the jury that defendant refused to submit to  
police 
questioning. 
 
Essentially, 
defendant 
contends 
that 
this  
circumstance makes this case worse than Greer and involves an  
actual Doyle violation because evidence of the defendant’s  
silence was actually placed before the jury as opposed to a  
question that merely insinuated such silence. However, we do  
not accept this argument.  The prosecutor in the present case  
made no effort to use the testimony about defendant’s silence  
against him.  In contrast, the prosecutor in Greer insinuated  
that the defendant’s testimony in that case was questionable  
because he did not provide his story to the police at an  
earlier point. If the prosecutor’s conduct in Greer did not  
constitute “use” of the defendant’s silence against him, then  
neither did the inadvertently elicited testimony in this  
case.11  
10(...continued) 
defendant’s post-Miranda silence where trial court gave 
curative instruction and the silence was not used against the 
defendant).  
11 We note that, in light of our conclusion that no 
constitutional error occurred, the “harmless beyond a  
reasonable doubt” test used by the Court of Appeals is 
inapposite.  Like the Eleventh Circuit in Stubbs, “[w]e do not 
reach the issue of harmless error because we conclude that, 
absent use by the prosecution of the comment on defendant’s 
postarrest silence, there was no Doyle violation.” Stubbs, 
(continued...)  
16  
 
 
In light of our conclusion that there was no violation of  
defendant’s due process rights under Doyle, we hold that the  
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying  
defendant’s motion for a mistrial.  As the Greer Court stated,  
“we normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to  
disregard 
inadmissible 
evidence 
inadvertently 
presented 
to 
it,  
unless there is an ‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury  
will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a  
strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be  
‘devastating’ to the defendant.” Id. at 767, n 8 (citations  
omitted).  The trial court in the present case emphatically  
instructed the jury to place no weight on defendant’s  
invocation of his Miranda rights. Thus, it was reasonable for  
the trial court to conclude that any possible prejudice from  
the improper testimony from Detective Cooper could be cured  
with a cautionary instruction and that a mistrial was not  
required.12  
11(...continued) 
supra at 835, n 10 (emphasis in original).  
12 Indeed, this analysis is consistent with Greer.  The  
Greer Court stated that it had no reason to believe that the  
jury was incapable of obeying curative instructions and that, 
far from being “devastating,” evidence of the defendant’s 
postarrest silence was at most “insolubly ambiguous.” Id. at  
767, n 8.  As a further consideration, Detective Cooper’s 
testimony did not state that defendant absolutely refused to 
be interviewed by the police, but rather only that he wanted 
to speak to an attorney before being questioned.  A desire to  
(continued...)  
17  
  
For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with the Court of  
Appeals decision to reverse defendant’s convictions.13  
Our judgment that the circumstances of the present case  
do not warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions should in  
no way be taken as condoning the inappropriate injection of a  
defendant’s exercise of the Miranda rights into a trial by  
either prosecutors or the police.  In the present case,  
considering (1) the limited nature of the improper testimony,  
(2) the lack of any effort by the prosecution to improperly  
use defendant’s invocation of the Miranda rights against him,  
(3) the strong curative instruction used by the trial court,  
12(...continued) 
involve an attorney in a police interview or interrogation 
could well be understood by a juror as reflecting a concern 
for being treated fairly and wishing the assistance of a 
sophisticated advocate to respond to any unfair questioning 
that might seek to turn the suspect’s words against himself. 
A typical citizen should understand such concerns and not 
regard the request for an attorney before questioning as being 
“suspicious” in the same way that an absolute refusal to speak 
with the police might be taken.  Accordingly, the present 
opinion does not address a situation in which police testimony 
makes clear that a defendant has absolutely refused to be 
interviewed by the police.  
13 We also note that we are puzzled at that Court’s 
decision to reverse defendant’s conviction of malicious  
destruction of police property.  From the record, and even 
from the recitation of facts in the Court of Appeals opinion, 
there 
was 
undisputed 
evidence that defendant openly kicked out 
the window of a police car in the presence of police officers. 
Accordingly, it is evident that any possible error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to the  
malicious destruction charge in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of guilt regarding that charge.  
18  
 
 
 
 
and (4) that defendant did not testify so there is no concern  
of his post-Miranda silence having been used for impeachment  
purposes, we conclude that there was no constitutional  
violation and that the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion by declining to order a mistrial.  
IV  
In sum, we conclude that the inadvertent elicitation of  
testimony that defendant exercised his Miranda right to  
decline 
police 
questioning without the presence of counsel did  
not 
constitute 
a 
violation 
of 
defendant’s 
constitutional 
right  
to due process under Doyle.  The circumstances of this case  
did not involve use by the prosecution of defendant’s post- 
Miranda silence against him within the meaning of Doyle and  
Greer.  Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
and reinstate defendant’s convictions.  
CORRIGAN, 
C.J., 
and WEAVER, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred  
with TAYLOR, J.  
19  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 116852  
ERIC SHERROD DENNIS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I find that the prosecutor in this case used defendant's  
post-Miranda1 silence against him. He asked a series of  
questions that compared and contrasted defendant's refusal to  
submit to a police interview with the acquiescent responses of  
other witnesses in similar circumstances. By doing so, the  
prosecutor submitted defendant's post-Miranda silence to the  
jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw an  
inference of guilt, thereby violating due process. Thus, I  
would affirm the Court of Appeals decision to reverse  
1Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d  
694 (1966).  
 
 
 
defendant's convictions and hold that the trial court's  
refusal to grant a mistrial was an abuse of discretion.  
I. Doyle and its Progeny  
In finding no due process violation below, the majority  
takes solace in the fact that the prosecutor did not "use"  
defendant's invocation of Miranda rights to impeach him. I  
think that this is an overly narrow view of due process  
protections.  
A defendant's due process right not to have his post- 
Miranda silence used against him exists in more situations  
than where a prosecutor uses the silence to impeach. To be  
sure, Doyle v Ohio2 held that due process is violated where a  
prosecutor impeaches a defendant with evidence of his post- 
Miranda silence. But, the point of Doyle is "that it is  
fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his  
silence will not be used against him and thereafter . . .  
us[e] the silence to impeach [him]" or otherwise "make use of  
the . . . exercise of those rights in obtaining his  
conviction." Wainright v Greenfield, 474 US 284, 292; 106 S Ct  
634; 88 L Ed 2d 623 (1986). "What is impermissible is the  
evidentiary use of . . . his constitutional rights after the  
. . . assurance" of Miranda. Id. at 295.  
I believe that it is also fundamentally unfair, and  
2426 US 610, 618; 96 S Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).  
2  
 
 
 
therefore, a deprivation of due process, for the prosecution  
to 
use 
a 
defendant's 
post-Miranda silence as affirmative proof  
at trial. This conclusion is consistent with that in several  
decisions that applied Doyle to references made to a  
defendant's 
post-Miranda 
silence 
during 
the 
prosecution's 
case  
in chief. See, e.g., United States v Moreno, 185 F3d 465, 473  
(CA 5, 1999); People of Territory of Guam v Veloria, 136 F3d  
648, 651-653 (CA 9, 1998); United States v Massuet, 851 F2d  
111, 114 (CA 4, 1988); United States v Elkins, 774 F2d 530,  
537 (CA 1, 1985); State v Treesh, 90 Ohio St 3d 460, 479; 739  
NE2d 749 (2001).  
The issue in this case is whether defendant's trial was  
fundamentally unfair.  It is whether the prosecutor used  
defendant's post-Miranda silence against him so that it was  
submitted to the jury as evidence from which the jury could  
infer guilt.  
II. The Prosecution's "Use" of  
Defendant's Post-Miranda Silence  
Although the majority acknowledges that Detective  
Cooper's testimony was "inappropriate," it nevertheless finds  
that there was no improper "use" of defendant's post-Miranda  
silence against him in this case. It cites the "limited  
nature" of the improper testimony and asserts that the  
prosecutor neither pursued the matter further nor raised the  
issue during oral argument. I disagree and maintain that the  
3  
prosecutor did impermissibly use defendant's post-Miranda  
silence against him.  
In my view, the majority arrives at an erroneous  
conclusion in part because it fails to consider Detective  
Cooper's testimony in context. With this in mind, I will  
provide a brief review of the facts surrounding this case.  
On 
the 
afternoon of August 23, 1997, defendant telephoned  
his  grandmother and asked that she send someone to get him in  
an automobile. She sent her daughter, Nancy Kennebrew, and  
defendant's half-sister, Evonne Ezell, in the grandmother's  
van.3 After defendant got into the van, Grand Rapids Police  
Officers Beckett and Anderson saw it fail to stop at a stop  
sign. They stopped the van and found that Ezell was driving,  
Nancy Kennebrew was in the passenger seat, and defendant was  
in the back seat apparently straddling a safe.  
The officers asked permission to search the occupants.  
Defendant and Nancy Kennebrew refused, while Ezell agreed.  
Although no contraband was found on Ezell's person, the  
officers detained her, directed Nancy Kennebrew and defendant  
to wait inside the officers' cruiser, then searched the van.  
Inside, they discovered a locked safe, prompting them to call  
3Defendant's grandmother and her daughter are both named 
"Nancy Kennebrew." To help avoid confusion, I will refer to 
the elder Kennebrew as "the grandmother," and the junior 
Kennebrew as "Nancy Kennebrew."  
4  
 
for assistance from a police dog to determine whether there  
were prohibited substances inside the safe. Meanwhile, while  
in the police cruiser, defendant kicked out its rear window.  
A subsequent search of the safe revealed a handgun, cocaine,  
marijuana, and a large amount of cash.  
At trial, the prosecutor called Grand Rapids Detective  
Kent Cooper as an expert witness on the subject of controlled  
substances. After several preliminary questions, the trial  
court qualified him as an expert. Although one would expect  
the prosecutor then to query him regarding his expert opinion  
on certain matters of evidence, the prosecutor opted not to do  
so immediately. Instead, he questioned Cooper regarding his  
investigation of the case and engaged in the following  
colloquy:  
Q. [The prosecutor]: Detective, you in fact 
were the assigned detective for the investigation 
after the arrest of [defendant], is that correct?  
A. [Cooper]: Correct.  
Q. Can you tell the jury how you initially 
came into contact with this case?  
A. I was assigned to the Vice Unit day team, 
and on the day team we are assigned the cases from 
the previous night of arrest or from the weekend 
prior to the day that we work.  
Q. And this arrest occurred on Saturday 
afternoon, actually, of the 23rd of August?  
A. Right, and on Monday I received the case.  
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q. What type of investigation follow-up did  
you do with regard to this?  
A. I went out and attempted to interview  
[defendant], and at that time it was refused. He  
wished to speak to an attorney prior to me asking  
him any questions.  
Q. Did you speak with the other persons in  
this particular case?  
A. I believe it was the next day that I went  
to the Kennebrew residence and spoke with Nancy  
Kennebrew, the younger one. I spoke with the  
grandmother, and I spoke with Evonne Ezell.  
Q. And did they give you statements as to  
their knowledge or lack of knowledge of this  
incident?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And then you obtained warrants in this  
particular manner?  
A. Yes.[Emphasis added.]  
Cooper's testimony unequivocally communicated to the  
jurors that defendant "refused" to submit to police  
questioning after his arrest and "wished to speak to an  
attorney" before answering any questions.  Whereas the  
majority labels this as testimony of a "limited nature," it  
is, in fact, an explicit statement that defendant invoked his  
Miranda rights. It enabled the jury to infer guilt from  
defendant's silence, thereby violating his due process  
rights.4  
4Contrary to the majority's inherent suggestion, a single 
(continued...)  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even if Cooper's reference to defendant's post-Miranda  
silence did not constitute a "use" of post-Miranda silence by  
itself, in subsequent questions the prosecutor did use  
defendant's post-Miranda silence against him. 
Immediately  
after Cooper told the jury of the "refusal" to speak, the  
prosecutor asked Cooper if he spoke with "the other persons in  
this particular case." Cooper related that he spoke with  
defendant's 
grandmother, as well as Nancy Kennebrew and Evonne  
Ezell. The prosecutor then asked Cooper whether those  
witnesses gave statements to him.  Cooper replied that they  
did, and then explained that those witnesses' statements led  
to the issuance of arrest warrants.5  
4(...continued) 
improper comment about a defendant's post-Miranda silence may 
rise to the level of a due process violation. 
See Moreno,  
supra at 473; Veloria, supra at 651-653; Lindgren v Lane, 925 
F2d 198, 203 (CA 7, 1991); United States v Stubbs, 944 F2d 
828, 835 (CA 11, 1991); Booton v Hanauer, 541 F2d 296, 298-299  
(CA 1, 1976). Greer v Miler, 483 US 756; 107 S Ct 3102; 97 L 
Ed 2d 618 (1987), does not hold otherwise. See id. at 764, n 
5, rebutting the dissent's contention that the Court held that 
"a single comment cannot be sufficient to constitute a Doyle 
violation;" id. at 770 (Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting). Indeed, the Court in Greer explained that the 
lack of a violation there stemmed from the "sequence of  
events," not the fact that there was but one comment. See id.  
at 764-765.  
5The majority interprets the prosecutor's follow-up 
questions regarding Cooper's interview with the other  
witnesses as constituting the real aim of the prosecutor's 
question to Cooper regarding his "investigation follow-up." I 
find this interpretation unpersuasive. See United States v  
Baker, 999 F2d 412, 416 (CA 9, 1993), stating that counsel's 
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
 
Viewed in context, the prosecutor's questions and  
Detective Cooper's answers demonstrate how the prosecutor  
compared defendant's willingness to be interviewed by police  
with 
the 
willingness 
of the other witnesses directly involved.  
The prosecutor conveyed that defendant refused to speak, but  
that others who were in the van when it was stopped, and the  
van's owner, agreed to speak to police. Given that the others  
were initially implicated with the safe, questions regarding  
the degree of cooperation by defendant and the others in  
Cooper's investigation implied that defendant's silence  
evidenced guilt.6  
Everything considered, I believe it reasonable to  
conclude that the prosecutor's line of questioning was  
intended 
to 
call 
attention 
to 
defendant's 
post-Miranda 
silence  
and use it against him. The tactics rendered the trial  
"fundamentally unfair."7  
5(...continued) 
"subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." 
The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of 
questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other 
witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury.  
6Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point 
with possession of the safe's contents.  
7See Moreno, supra at 473-474, finding error where the 
prosecutor's 
question's 
"natural 
consequence, 
if 
not 
purpose," 
was 
to 
draw 
meaning 
from the defendant's post-Miranda silence; 
Veloria, supra at 652, finding Doyle error after reviewing 
entire context of improper testimony; Elkins, supra at 537, a 
(continued...)  
8  
 
 
My conclusion is not altered by the cautionary  
instruction given in the instant case. A curative instruction  
does not always eradicate a due process violation brought  
about by the use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence.8 The  
instruction 
here 
did 
not 
address 
the 
prosecutor's  
juxtaposition of defendant's response to Cooper's request for  
an interview and the other witnesses' responses. Thus,  
notwithstanding the instruction, the effect of the comparison  
remained unassailed in the jury's perception. Therefore, the  
curative instruction does not preclude a finding that the  
prosecutor 
used 
defendant's 
post-Miranda 
silence 
against 
him.9  
7(...continued) 
"Doyle violation occurs not only when the objectionable 
comments explicitly refer to a defendant's failure to answer 
questions . . . but when the reference to defendant's silence 
is more oblique . . . ;" United States v Newman, 943 F2d 1155, 
1158 (CA 9, 1991), finding error requiring reversal where the 
effect of a police officer's statements, "intended or  
otherwise, was to suggest to the jury that [the defendant] 
must have been guilty because an innocent person would not 
have remained silent"; State v DiGuilio, 491 So2d 1129, 1131 
(Fla, 1986), it was constitutional error for a police officer 
to give testimony that was "fairly susceptible of being 
interpreted by the jury as a comment on silence."  
8See Newman, supra at 1156-1157, finding a Doyle 
violation despite two cautionary instructions.  
9In effect, the majority's reliance on the trial court's 
curative instruction merely ensures that improper testimony 
like that submitted here will be admitted in other criminal  
trials in Michigan. When it occurs, the trial court may give 
the 
same 
curative 
instruction 
that 
was 
given 
here,  
anticipating no error requiring reversal.  
9  
 
 
 
 
The 
impermissible 
use 
of 
defendant's 
post-Miranda 
silence  
in this case makes the majority's reliance on Greer, supra,  
inapposite. Here, unlike in Greer, there was a series of  
questions 
and 
answers 
that 
focused 
on 
defendant's 
post-Miranda  
silence.10  Thus, there was actual testimony presented here  
that conveyed to the jury that defendant "refused" to speak to  
an investigating officer and wanted to speak to an attorney.  
Additionally, the trial court in Greer gave two  
cautionary instructions; the trial court in the present case  
gave merely one. See Greer, supra at 759. The trial court's  
instructions 
in 
Greer did not specifically mention the earlier  
impropriety.11 By contrast, here the trial court's instruction  
expressly cited Cooper's improper testimony, highlighting the  
earlier testimonial error and reminding the jury of  
defendant's refusal to submit to a police interview.  
10The majority explains its conclusion that there was no 
"use" 
against 
defendant of his post-Miranda silence by stating 
that Cooper's testimony "did not state that defendant  
absolutely refused to be interviewed by the police, but rather 
only that he wanted to speak to an attorney before  
questioning." Slip op at 18, n 12. I find it a distinction 
without a difference.  Also, the majority ignores the 
preceding sentence where Cooper stated that his request to 
interview defendant was "refused."  
11 In Greer, the trial court's first instruction directed 
the jury to "ignore [the] question, for the time being." Id.  
at 759. The second instruction informed the jury to "disregard 
questions . . . to which objections were sustained." Id.  
10  
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, unlike in Greer, the record here supports the  
conclusion that there was an improper use of defendant's  
post-Miranda silence against him.  Here, the prosecutor  
highlighted for the jury the fact that defendant chose not to  
speak to an investigating officer, whereas other persons,  
possibly associated with the safe, did speak. Because there  
was a far greater burdening of defendant's rights in the  
instant case than in Greer, I believe that the majority errs  
in finding Greer analogous. See Moreno, supra at 474, limiting  
Greer to cases where no answer is given to an improper  
question; Newman, supra at 1157-1158.  
I would find the prosecutor's use of defendant's post- 
Miranda silence violative of due process and the trial court's  
refusal to grant a mistrial an abuse of its discretion.12  
III. Conclusion  
The prosecutor used defendant's post-Miranda silence  
against him by calling the jury's attention to it and by  
inferring 
defendant's 
guilt 
from 
it. 
This 
rendered 
defendant's  
12The 
majority's 
reliance 
on 
Stubbs, 
supra, 
is 
unavailing. 
Stubbs did not involve, as here, a prosecutor engaging in a 
specific comparison of defendant's and other witnesses' 
willingness to speak to police, or a cautionary instruction 
that expressly reminded the jurors of the improper reference 
to defendant's post-Miranda silence. Id. at 835. Also, the 
improper testimony in Stubbs came from a civilian witness; 
here, the improper testimony came from a police officer and, 
thus, is subject to greater scrutiny. See People v Holly, 129 
Mich App 405, 415-416; 341 NW2d 823 (1983).  
11  
 
trial "fundamentally unfair" and violated defendant's due  
process rights. Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals  
decision to reverse defendant's convictions.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
12