Case Title: DALLAS D. LAKE V. D & L LANGLEY TRUCKING, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, and ORVAL WHITED, an Individual

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0094

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
DALLAS D. LAKE V. D & L LANGLEY TRUCKING, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, and ORVAL WHITED, an Individual2010 WY 75Case Number: S-09-0094Decided: 06/09/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
DALLAS 
D. LAKE,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.D & L LANGLEY 
TRUCKING, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, and ORVAL WHITED, an 
Individual,Appellees(Defendants)

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Scott 
E. Ortiz of Williams, Porter, Day, & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a personal injury negligence case.  
Dallas Lake was involved in an automobile accident with Orval 
Whited.  Lake alleges Whited, while 
in the course and scope of employment for D & L Trucking, negligently 
attempted to pass him as he was making a left hand turn, thereby causing the 
inevitable collision.   The 
case was tried to a jury.  The jury 
returned a verdict finding Lake eighty-six percent at fault for the 
accident.  Under Wyoming's 
comparative negligence law, Lake was entitled to no damages.1  Lake filed a motion for a new trial, 
which the trial judge denied.  Lake 
appeals, alleging a new trial should be granted because the verdict is 
unsupported by the evidence.  Lake 
also argues a new trial should be granted because of error in the closing 
argument of the defense and also because the jury verdict was an impermissible 
quotient verdict.  We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Lake presents two 
issues for our review:

1.            
 Should a new trial be ordered where there 
is insufficient evidence that the defendant was only 14% at fault where the 
defendant['s] semi illegally passed the plaintiff's pickup in the intersection, 
and the defendant made a surprise argument to the jury which mislead them 
concerning the law of "no-passing" zones?   

 
 

2.            
Should 
a new trial be ordered when there is convincing evidence that the verdict was a 
"quotient verdict?" 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the day of the 
accident, Lake was driving north on Wyoming Highway 214 in a pickup.  Whited, who was driving a 
tractor-trailer combination truck, was also driving north on Highway 214, some 
distance behind Lake.  Highway 214 
is a two-lane highway.  Lake 
intended to turn left off Highway 214 at County Road 207.  

 
 
[¶4]      Whited was 
driving a relatively new Peterbuilt tractor, towing a fifty-foot trailer.  Whited had an exemplary driving record 
and was in the process of returning home from a simple day trip.  As he was driving, Whited saw Lake's 
pickup when he was about three or four miles behind Lake.  Whited noticed that, although he was 
driving sixty-five miles per hour, the speed limit, he was gaining on the 
pickup.  As he approached the 
pickup, he slowed his speed to about fifty-five miles per hour.  There was no solid yellow line on the 
highway indicating a no-passing zone.  
There were no signs on the highway indicating an upcoming 
intersection.  He saw no brake 
lights or turn signal coming from the pickup.  Whited determined to pass the 
pickup.  Whited did not notice the 
intersection with the county road.  
He turned on his left turn signal and when he was about three car-lengths 
behind the pickup he pulled over into the left lane and began his pass.  

 
 
[¶5]      Lake had seen the 
tractor-trailer truck when it was about a half mile behind him, but he had 
driven the road so many times he wasn't paying much attention to the road or the 
tractor-trailer truck.  Lake, 
without checking his rearview mirror or side-view mirror, began his left hand 
turn.  He had no idea the 
tractor-trailer truck was in the process of passing him.  Lake impacted the tractor-trailer truck 
approximately fifteen feet behind the tractor's front wheel.  

 
 
[¶6]      Lake sued Whited 
and Whited's employer, D & L Trucking, alleging Whited negligently passed 
him, causing the accident and resulting personal injuries.2   During closing arguments, both 
sides argued the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-205(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2009), which states in essence no passing is allowed

 
 
[w]hen 
approaching within one hundred (100) feet of or traversing any intersection or 
railroad grade crossing unless otherwise indicated by official traffic-control 
devices[.]  

 
 
Lake's 
counsel argued the statute provided for "no exceptions."  His counsel stated the law is "do not 
pass in an intersection under any circumstances." Defense counsel responded in 
his closing argument by emphasizing the statute actually does provide for an 
exception depending on the presence of a traffic-control device.  Defense counsel went on to argue the law 
was that "unless it is otherwise indicated you can pass."  Defense counsel concluded that, since 
there was no solid yellow line leading up to the intersection, in attempting to 
pass Lake, Whited "was not violating any statute."  Lake's counsel did not object to this 
argument, but rather took the issue up in his rebuttal closing, arguing the 
yellow lines on highways are not "official traffic-control devices" as 
contemplated by the statute and therefore the absence of a solid yellow line at 
the intersection did not make Whited's pass legal.

 
 
[¶7]      The case was 
handed to the jury.  One of the jury 
instructions set forth the exact language of § 31-5-205(a)(ii).  The same instruction also contained the 
following language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-217 (LexisNexis 
2009):

 
 
No 
person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and 
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 
appropriate signal in the manner provided by this section.

 
 
A 
signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given 
continuously during not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by 
the vehicle before turning.

 
 
No 
person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first 
giving an appropriate signal required by this act to the driver of any vehicle 
immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give the signal.    

 
 
The 
jury was also instructed that "if there appears any difference between the law 
as stated or implied by an attorney and these instructions, you are to be 
governed by the instructions."  The 
jury deliberated for three hours.  
During its deliberations, the jury requested a calculator.  The jury returned a verdict that Lake 
was eighty-six percent at fault and Whited was fourteen percent at fault for the 
accident.  Under Wyoming's 
comparative fault statute, since Lake was more than fifty percent at fault, he 
took nothing from the action.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶8]      Lake filed a 
motion for a new trial.  Lake 
contended the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.  Lake also contended the defense counsel, 
in closing, ambushed him with the argument that Whited did not violate the law 
in passing at an intersection because no traffic control device directed 
otherwise.  Finally, Lake contended 
that the jury verdict, attributing eighty-six percent of fault for the accident 
to Lake and fourteen percent to Whited, was obviously an impermissible quotient 
verdict.3  Lake attached an affidavit of one of the 
jurors to his motion supporting his allegation concerning the possibility of a 
quotient verdict.  After a hearing, 
the trial court denied Lake's motion for a new trial.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      A lower court's 
decision on whether to grant a new trial is discretionary.  Hannifan v. American Nat'l Bank of 
Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, ¶ 36, 
185 P.3d 679, 693 (Wyo. 2008); 
Pauley v. Newman, 2004 WY 76, ¶ 17, 92 P.3d 819, 825 
(Wyo. 2004).  "Trial courts have 
broad discretion when ruling on a motion for new trial, and they will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.  A party seeking reversal has a heavy 
burden; indeed, the party must show that a different result would have been 
obtained absent the abuse."  Garnick v. Teton Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
2002 WY 18, ¶ 6, 39 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Wyo. 
2002).   See also John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Wyo. 1998).  The 
ultimate question in determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is 
whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.  Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138, ¶ 8, 54 P.3d 754, 758 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶10]   The availability of the grant of a 
new trial is governed by W.R.C.P. 59:

 
 
Rule 
59. New Trials; Amendment of Judgments.

 
 
(a) 
Grounds. -- A new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues.  On a motion for a new trial in an action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment, if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.  Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted for any of the following causes:

 
 
(1) 
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee, master or 
prevailing party, or any order of the court or referee, or abuse of discretion, 
by which the party was prevented from having a fair trial;

 
 
(2) 
Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;

 
 
(3) 
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against;

 
 
(4) 
Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice;

 
 
(5) 
Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large or too 
small;

 
 
(6) 
That the verdict, report or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence or 
is contrary to law;

 
 
(7) 
Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which the party 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial;

 
 
            
(8) Error of law occurring at the trial.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶11]   Lake's first issue as presented is 
actually a compound issue.  
Initially, Lake suggests a new trial is warranted because the verdict is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence.  
W.R.C.P. 59(a)(6).  The 
district court held the evidence sufficient to support the verdict.  Specifically, the district court held 
the evidence supported a finding that Lake did not use his turn signal and did 
not maintain a proper lookout prior to the collision.  This is a reasonable conclusion by the 
district court.  As did the district 
court, we find substantial and competent evidence supporting the jury's 
findings, including:  Whited's 
testimony that he never saw a turn signal from Lake's pickup; Lake's testimony 
that he was not paying attention and began his left hand turn without checking 
his mirrors; and the physical evidence that reveals that Lake turned into the 
tractor-trailer truck when the front of that tractor was already more than 
fifteen feet past the front of Lake's pickup.  

 
 
[¶12]   Lake's argument on appeal in 
support of his contention that the evidence does not support the verdict is 
quite rudimentary.  Lake argues the 
accident never would have happened had Whited not passed in an intersection; he 
claims that because passing in an intersection violates state statute, the 
majority, if not all, the fault must be Whited's.  Lake's argument concludes that, given 
the jury did not see it this way, the verdict is unsupported by the 
evidence.  Certainly Whited passed 
at an intersection, but this does not make him strictly liable for the 
accident.  Lake's culpability for 
the accident must also be taken into account.  The jury calculated both party's 
culpability for the accident exactly as instructed.  It determined, based on all the evidence 
presented, how it believed the accident occurred.  It then determined the fault of both 
parties in regard to the causation of the accident.  The jury, taking into account all the 
facts and circumstances of the case as they determined them to be, attributed 
fourteen percent of the fault for the accident to Whited.  The jury simply concluded Lake bore far 
more responsibility for the accident.  
Sufficient evidence supports the jury's allocation of negligence.  

 
 
Alleged 
Surprise in Closing Argument

 
 
[¶13]   Lake also suggests a new trial is 
warranted because the comments in the closing argument of defense counsel 
regarding the application of  § 
31-5-205(a)(ii) constituted "a surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against."  W.R.C.P. 
59(a)(3).  The district court 
determined the alleged error (if indeed there was an error) in defense counsel's 
closing was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.  Again, this is a reasonable decision by 
the district court.  Without 
addressing whether the argument was in error, we can find little, if any, room 
for prejudice.  The jury 
instructions included the actual language of § 31-5-205(a)(ii).  Although both counsel argued their 
respective positions on the application of  § 31-5-205(a)(ii) to the facts of the 
case during closing, the jury was instructed that the written instructions would 
govern over any argument regarding the law by either counsel.  This Court assumes juries follow their 
instructions.  Amerigas Propane, Inc. v. Bing, 875 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Wyo. 1994); City of Cheyenne v. Simpson, 787 P.2d 580, 581 (Wyo. 1990).  

 
 
[¶14]   In any event, given the strength of 
the evidence, it is doubtful any different result would be obtained from a new 
trial conducted in the absence of this argument.  Consequently, we find the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in not granting a new trial on the grounds the 
comments by defense counsel in closing allegedly came as a prejudicial 
surprise.

 
 
Jury 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶15]   Lake argues a new trial should be 
afforded because of jury misconduct.  
W.R.C.P. 59(a)(2).  Lake 
argues the misconduct was the rendering of an impermissible quotient 
verdict.  He suggests two distinct 
bodies of evidence support his allegation of an impermissible quotient 
verdict.  First, he points to the 
affidavit from a juror attached to his motion for a new trial.  The affidavit suggests the jury agreed 
to average individual estimates of fault.  
The district court determined that it could not consider the affidavit 
because it violated W.R.E. 606(b).  
We agree.

 
 
[¶16]   Wyoming Rule of Evidence 606(b) 
provides:

 
 
(b) 
Inquiry into validity of verdict or 
indictment. --  Upon an inquiry 
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any 
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or 
to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit 
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be 
precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror.  

 
 
This 
Rule is a codification of a time honored common law rule that the testimony of a 
juror cannot be received to impeach the verdict in which he has concurred: 

 
 
The 
rule against impeachment of a jury verdict by juror testimony as to internal 
deliberations may be traced back to "Mansfield's Rule," originating in the 1785 
case of Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. 
Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). Faced with juror testimony that the jury had reached its 
verdict by drawing lots, Lord Mansfield established a blanket ban on jurors 
testifying against their own verdict. The rule was adopted by most American 
jurisdictions and "[b]y the beginning of [the twentieth] century, if not 
earlier, the near-universal and firmly established common-law rule in the United 
States flatly prohibited the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury 
verdict." Tanner v. United States, 
483 U.S. 107, 117, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1987).   

 
 

United 
States v. Benally, 
546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008).  
In Wyoming, the rule dates back at least to 1895.  The Court in Bunce v. McMahon, 6 Wyo. 24, 41, 42 P. 23, 27 (1895), declared: 
"[T]he affidavits of the jurors cannot be received to impeach their verdict . . 
. .  The general doctrine is one 
which is too well established to require any elucidation or citation of 
authorities."  See also Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, 
320-21, 68 P. 1006, 1009 
(1902).  

 
 
[¶17]   In 1912, this Court applied the 
rule to a case in which an allegation was made of a quotient verdict.  In the case of The Pullman Co. v. Finley, 20 Wyo. 456, 
125 P. 380 (1912), the Court 
dealt specifically with the proffer of the affidavits of two jurors, presented 
to establish a quotient verdict had been rendered.  The Finley Court refused to accept such 
affidavits.  It reaffirmed the rule 
that "the affidavit of jurors cannot be received to impeach their verdict."  Id. at 480, 125 P.  at 386.  The Court decreed:

 
 
That 
being the settled rule in this state, the affidavit of the jurors relied upon by 
the defendant could not be received and considered by the trial court to impeach 
their verdict on the ground of their misconduct.  They were not competent proof of the 
facts therein deposed to, and the court properly refused to grant a new trial 
upon this ground.

 
 

Id. 
at 480, 125 P.  at 386-87. 

 
 
[¶18]   Lake argues W.R.E. 606(b) alters 
the common law rule against jurors impeaching their own verdict, at least in 
regard to its application to proving quotient verdicts.  Lake invokes federal authority to 
support his argument.  Since the 
language of W.R.E 606 mirrors that of its federal counterpart, federal authority 
is highly persuasive.  Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 1273, 
1277 (Wyo. 2008) ("[w]hen this Court construes court rules that are virtually 
identical to their federal counterparts, relevant federal authority is 
persuasive").  See also Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Farmers Co-Op 
Oil Co. of Sheridan, 2009 WY 
112, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d 296, 301 (Wyo. 2009); Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 2006 WY 52, ¶ 12, 132 P.3d 204, 208 (Wyo. 2006).  Oddly, however, Lake cites to debate on 
the floor of the United States House of Representatives during the discussion on 
the bill that eventually resulted in F.R.E. 606.  We say "oddly" because the House bill 
failed.  As explained in Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & 
Co., 709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983):

 
 
The 
draft of Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) as passed by the House of Representatives would have 
permitted juror testimony about objective matters occurring during the jury's 
deliberation, such as the reaching of a quotient verdict, see H.Rep. 93-650, U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News 1974, p. 7051, but the version passed by the Senate, see S.Rep. No. 93-1277, and approved by 
the Joint Conference Committee expressly denounces such a practice, H.Rep. 
93-1597.  This makes clear the 
drafters' intent that a jury's verdict should not be open to searching the minds 
and motives of the jurors.

 
 

Id. 
at 998 n.16.  Legislative history, 
then, explicitly contradicts Lake's argument that the juror affidavit in this 
case is admissible.  Longstanding 
federal precedent also contradicts Lake's argument.  In McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S. Ct. 783, 59 L. Ed. 1300 (1915), the United States Supreme Court accepted the 
general rule that "the losing party cannot, in order to secure a new trial, use 
the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict."  Id. at 269, 35 S. Ct.  at 785.  Applying this rule, the Supreme Court 
held juror testimony regarding the possibility of the entry of a quotient 
verdict was inadmissible.   
Given this federal authority, we find no reason to overrule Finley.  The district court was correct in its 
ruling that it could not consider the affidavit.

 
 
[¶19]   Second, Lake argues that, even 
without the affidavit, the circumstances alone support a finding that the 
verdict was a quotient verdict.  He 
directs our attention to the fact the jury requested a calculator.  Lake contends the only legitimate use 
for the calculator would have been the calculation of damages.  Since the jury did not award any 
damages, Lake concludes the jury could only have been using the calculator to 
compute an averaged percentage of fault for the respective parties.   

 
 
[¶20]   Even if we were to move beyond this 
purely speculative conclusion, the fact the jury may have used a quotient 
process for determining fault does not warrant the presumption the jury 
ultimately rendered an impermissible quotient verdict.  A verdict that is based upon the average 
judgment of all the jurors is not impermissible where it does not appear that 
there was an agreement beforehand to abide by the resulting number.  As this Court has explained: 

 
 
[T]he 
test to be applied in determining the validity of a quotient verdict is whether 
the jury agreed "beforehand" to be bound by the result reached, since it is not 
the mere arriving at the average of the jurors' opinions as to the amount of 
damage which makes the quotient verdict bad, but the vice consists in an 
agreement by the jurors to be bound by the result of the addition and division, 
thus allowing the quotient whatever it may be to stand without subsequent 
reconsideration.  If, however, there 
is no agreement that the average estimate shall be binding, and the averaging is 
done merely for the purpose of arriving at a working basis which the jurors are 
to be free to accept or reject as they see fit, a verdict subsequently agreed to 
is binding, whether it be for the average or for some other amount.  

 
 

Sun 
Land & Cattle Co. v. Brown, 
394 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 
1964).  In this case, there are no 
circumstances justifying a presumption any member of the jury entered into an 
antecedent agreement to be bound by any particular fault estimate.  Indeed, the opposite is true.  The jury was polled, and each juror 
confirmed the verdict reflected her/his individual 
judgment.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Lake's motion for a new trial.  The evidence was sufficient to support 
the verdict.  If there was any error 
on the part of defense counsel in closing argument as alleged by Lake, such 
error was not prejudicial under the facts and circumstances of this case.  Finally, there is no evidence supporting 
Lake's presumption that the jury rendered an impermissible quotient 
verdict.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The comparative negligence statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 
2009), states, in pertinent part:

 
 
(b) Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any 
claimant or the claimant's legal representative to recover damages for wrongful 
death or injury to person or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant 
is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors.  

 
 

2It is undisputed that Whited was working within the course and scope of 
his employment with D & L Trucking at the time.

 
 

3A quotient verdict is a verdict rendered in pursuance of an antecedent 
agreement by the jury to determine damages by adding the estimate of each juror 
and dividing the total by the number of jurors.  It may also apply to estimates of 
fault.