Case Title: In re Chapman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-013


In re Jerry Chapman                          Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
                                             Washington Superior Court

                                             June Term, 1989


David A. Jenkins, J.

Robert Andres, Burlington, for petitioner-appellant

Terry Trono, Washington County State's Attorney, Barre, and Jo-Ann Gross,
  Law Clerk, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier, for respondent-
  appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Petitioner appeals from the superior court's denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief.  We affirm.
     Petitioner was charged with aggravated assault stemming from a severe
beating of a woman in her apartment.  One defense asserted at trial was that
petitioner suffers from a medical condition (a brain tumor) which produces
unprovoked fits of violence, and that he was consequently insane at the time
of the offense.
     During pretrial proceedings, petitioner was represented by attorney
David Kidney, and was medically evaluated and found competent to stand
trial.  At trial, petitioner was represented by attorney Charles Gibson, who
put forth the defense of insanity, put on testimony regarding the brain
tumor, and presented another expert psychiatric witness to counter the
competency evaluation.  Petitioner was evaluated daily at trial and again
before sentencing and found competent.  The jury convicted petitioner of
aggravated assault on March 9, 1987, and the court requested a psychia-
trist's report for use in sentencing.
     Between conviction and sentencing, petitioner wrote to the trial court
twice.  In his first letter he stated that he wanted "immediately to get a
different attorney," declaring that his appeal would be partially based on
his trial counsel's ineffectiveness and incompetence.  A second letter
accompanied a lengthy motion to strike the pretrial report of the state's
psychiatrist, who stated the opinion that petitioner was competent to stand
trial and was not insane at the time of the offense.  Petitioner asked to
challenge the psychiatrist's report and stated that he would "do it pro se."
Thereafter, on May 22, 1987, attorney Gibson was allowed to withdraw as
counsel for petitioner.
     On May 24, 1987, attorney Robert Paolini was appointed to represent
petitioner at sentencing only.  Defendant requested that he be allowed to
represent himself, with attorney Paolini present to assist him.  Apparently,
this request was granted, and the sentencing hearing went forward with
petitioner appearing pro se, assisted by counsel.  The sentencing transcript
is not before us so we cannot determine to what extent counsel assisted at
the sentencing hearing.  Petitioner was sentenced on July 10, 1987 to serve
a term of 13 1/2 years to 15 years.
     After sentencing, petitioner did not file an appeal of the conviction
or a motion for reconsideration of the sentence in district court.  Instead,
six months later, in January, 1988, he filed a pro se petition for post-
conviction relief in superior court in which he claimed defects in his
trial, including inadequate representation by counsel at trial and at
sentencing.  He also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, and on February 2,
1988 he requested appointment of another attorney, citing a conflict with
the public defender.  On March 7, 1988, he moved for the production of
documents and witnesses in his post-conviction relief proceeding and in that
motion stated "I wish to proceed Pro Se with no representation."   On March
15, 1988, he wrote to the district court clerk asking the clerk to send the
psychiatrist's report to the superior court, and stating "Please ignore the
fact that I'm not an attorney but know I am making pro se pleadings and oral
arguments in the PCR case."  On March 17, 1988 petitioner informed the
superior court that attorney Paul Clemente "has consented to assist me in
preparing for a hearing on the merits," and requested the court's assistance
in transferring certain medical files from attorney Gibson to attorney
Clemente.
     At the post-conviction relief hearing on April 4, 1988, the clerk
announced, "I believe that the Plaintiff is going to be representing himself
pro se, with the aid of Attorney Paul Clemente."  The State requested
clarification of "whether Mr. Chapman is proceeding pro se or if he's being
represented by counsel."  Petitioner asked, "Well, would it be all right if
you entered it as like co-counsel assistant if I need it?  Pro Se."  The
court informed him, "He would be the attorney of record, but you could
conduct the examination.  Only one party can do it, not both.  You're
entitled to if you want to do it and you can confer with your attorney."
Petitioner answered, "That's how I'd like it to be, your Honor."  Throughout
the hearing, petitioner conducted the examination of witnesses.
     On April 21 petitioner moved pro se for an expedited transcript.  This
motion was granted, and on April 25 he filed a lengthy pro se memorandum
entitled "Closing Argument, Conclusions, Memorandum of Law."  On June 23,
1988, petitioner requested substitute counsel and, on July 7, 1988 the court
appointed attorney Alan Rome whose only participation in the matter prior to
the decision was to forward petitioner's pro se "Amended Final Argument" on
October 12, 1988.  Petitioner also sent directly to the court this pro se
"Amended Final Argument," with a cover letter in which he advised the
superior court clerk that "attorney of record has some type of
communications problem and as such is no longer assisting me as far as I am
concerned."  Attorney Rome filed the notice of appeal after the superior
court denied the petition for post-conviction relief.  Attorney Robert
Andres was assigned to represent petitioner on appeal and has filed the
brief.
     In denying the motion for post-conviction relief, the superior court
found that petitioner had not carried his burden of persuading the court, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the conviction was invalid or
defective, and found petitioner's pretrial and trial representation to have
been adequate.  Petitioner does not claim on appeal that the superior court
erred in its post-conviction relief decision regarding the fairness of the
criminal trial or the effectiveness of counsel at his trial or sentencing.
Rather, on appeal, petitioner claims only that at the post-conviction relief
proceeding he was denied both his right to counsel and his right to appear
pro se, and was incompetent to make the decision concerning self-
representation.
     Petitioner appears to complain both that he was denied, without a
proper waiver, his right to appointed counsel and that he was denied his
right to represent himself.  He complains that the "co-counsel" arrangement
permitted by the trial court protected neither right.  In arguing their
position, both parties have relied on cases which address the state of
tension between two constitutional rights of defendants in criminal trials
and appeals of right:  the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright,