Case Title: Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers1985 WY 155707 P.2d 717Case Number: 84-301Decided: 10/08/1985CHEYENNE AIRPORT BOARD AND CITY OF CHEYENNE, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

TERRY ROGERS AND BRENDA ROGERS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHEYENNE AIRPORT BOARD 
AND CITY OF CHEYENNE, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

TERRY ROGERS AND BRENDA 
ROGERS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Rehearing Denied November 
1, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
John C. Patton 
and Royann Fransen of Carmichael, McNiff & Patton, Cheyenne, and R. Walter 
Connell, Asst. City Atty., Cheyenne, for 
appellants, oral argument by Patton.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, 
C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question here 
presented for our determination is whether the City of Cheyenne zoning ordinance providing a height limitation in 
a noninstrument approach zone to the Cheyenne municipal airport is unconstitutional. 
The appellees, Terry and Brenda Rogers, own residential property in the 
noninstrument approach zone. The Rogerses purchased this residential property in 
1976, which was two years after passage of the ordinance. The particular height 
limit on their property, about 26 feet, has not affected the residential usage 
of the property. It does affect, however, a large cottonwood tree which 
apparently exceeded the height limit by a few feet on the date the ordinance was 
passed. By the time of trial the tree had grown to a height of 48 feet and was, 
therefore, 22 feet above the height limitation.

[¶2.]     For reasons that 
follow, we conclude that the ordinance is constitutional and valid as an 
exercise of the police power, both in general and as applicable to this case; 
that no compensable easement was taken; and, hence, that the judgment of the 
district court should be reversed.

[¶3.]     On October 15, 1974, 
the City of Cheyenne adopted Ordinance No. 1969, 
§§ 1-15, Code Appendix B, which is entitled The Cheyenne Municipal Airport Zoning Ordinance. 
The general purpose of the ordinance is to keep the approach zones to the 
Cheyenne airport 
runways free from such obstructions as would interfere with the landing and 
taking off of airplanes.

[¶4.]     Of particular 
importance to this case are the provisions for a noninstrument approach zone in 
§ 3(2) and a height limitation on such zone in § 4(2) of the ordinance. Section 
3(2) states:

"A noninstrument approach 
zone is established at each end of all noninstrument runways on the CheyenneMunicipalAirport for noninstrument landings and 
takeoffs. The noninstrument approach zone shall have a width of five hundred 
(500) feet at a distance of two hundred (200) feet beyond each end of the 
runway, widening thereafter uniformly to a width of two thousand five hundred 
(2,500) feet at a distance of ten thousand two hundred (10,200) feet beyond each 
end of the runway, its center-line being the continuation of the center-line of 
the runway."

[¶5.]     Section 4 
states:

"Except as otherwise 
provided in this ordinance, no structure or tree shall be erected, altered, 
allowed to grow, or maintained in any zone created by this ordinance to a height 
in excess of the height limit herein established for such zone. Such height 
limitations are hereby established for each of the zones in question as 
follows:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) Noninstrument approach zones: One foot 
in height for each forty (40) feet in horizontal distance beginning at a point 
two hundred (200) feet from and at the elevation of the end of the noninstrument 
runway and extending to a point ten thousand two hundred (10,200) feet from the 
end of the runway."

[¶6.]     The Cheyenne airport zoning 
ordinance, in contrast to many exercises of municipal zoning which are concerned 
with purely local matters, was passed under the authority and direction of both 
state and federal legislative bodies and was designed to protect both state and 
federal interests. To appreciate this blending of powers and authority, we must 
briefly examine the legal beginnings of the air age.

[¶7.]     The federal government 
initiated the era of commercial air travel in 1926 with the enactment of the Air 
Commerce Act of 1926, 49 U.S.C. § 171, which in part declared a "public right of 
freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation" in the navigable airspace of 
the United 
States. Subsequent amendments preserved this 
declaration. 49 U.S.C. § 403 (1938); 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958); 49 U.S.C. § 1304 
(Supp. 1984).

[¶8.]     The State of Wyoming made, in 1931, a 
similar declaration of right of public passage through the navigable airspace. 
Section 10-4-302, W.S. 1977, asserts:

"The ownership of the 
space above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the 
several owners of the surface beneath subject to the right of flight described 
in W.S. 10-4-303 * * *."

Section 
10-4-303, W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Flight in aircraft 
over the lands and waters of this state is lawful unless it 
is:

"(i) At such a low 
altitude as to interfere with the existing use to which the land or water, or 
the space over the land or water, is put by the owners;

"(ii) Conducted as to be 
imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water; 
or

"(iii) In violation of 
the air commerce regulations promulgated by the department of transportation of 
the United 
States."

[¶9.]     Wyoming intended that its 
declaration and limitations be compatible with those of the federal government. 
Section 10-4-304, W.S. 1977, states:

"W.S. 10-4-101 through 
10-4-304 shall be construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the law of those states which enact it and to harmonize, as far as possible, 
with federal laws and regulations on the subject of 
aeronautics."

[¶10.]  The air commerce regulations alluded to 
in §§ 10-4-303(a)(iii) and 10-4-304 have, according to John Wood, manager of the 
Cheyenne airport, specified that approach zones to airport runways be free from 
obstacles, but they have not specified the method by which this is to be 
accomplished by state and local governments. Presumably, exercises of eminent 
domain, police power and negotiated purchase would be equally 
satisfactory.

[¶11.]  The State of Wyoming, in response to 
these regulations, has specifically authorized its municipalities to zone the 
approaches to airport runways. Section 10-5-301, W.S. 1977, 
states:

"(a) The governing body 
of each incorporated Wyoming municipality and county may regulate and restrict 
by ordinance the number of stories and size of buildings and the height of other 
structures constructed upon land within one-half (1/2) mile of the boundaries of 
airports owned or controlled by the town, city or county. They may provide 
zoning for airspace beyond one-half (1/2) mile of the boundaries and within the 
county, to assure aircraft reasonable safety for visual and instrument approach 
and departure. The right to zone shall be confined to the geographical limits of 
the current applicable approach zone established by the federal aviation 
administration for the particular airport and in no case shall the right to zone 
extend beyond six (6) nautical miles along the approach path from the end of the 
instrument runway."

This provision, 
permissive and not mandatory in nature, was the basis for the municipal exercise 
of zoning powers by the City of Cheyenne in adopting §§ 3 and 4, supra, of the 
Cheyenne Municipal Zoning Ordinance in 1974.

[¶12.]  The ordinance was initially designed to 
operate prospectively and it, therefore, preserved rights in nonconforming uses 
which had vested on the effective date of the ordinance, § 6 providing 
that

"[t]he regulations 
prescribed by this ordinance shall not be construed to require the removal, 
lowering, or other changes or alteration of any structure or tree not conforming 
to the regulations as of the effective date of this 
ordinance."

[¶13.]  However, such vested rights do not 
include the right of expansion. The ordinance specifically states that new 
growth or new additions on vested nonconforming uses are prohibited. Section 
7(b) of the ordinance provides, in part, that:

"No permit shall be 
granted that would allow the establishment of or creation of an airport hazard 
or permit a nonconforming use, structure, or tree to be made or become higher, 
or become a greater hazard to air navigation, than it was on the effective date 
of this ordinance * * *."

This section 
codifies the general rule that expansion of a legally protected nonconforming 
use is not allowed. See Wasinger v. 
Miller, 154 Colo. 61, 388 P.2d 250 
(1964).

[¶14.]  The impact of these sections is to impose 
an ongoing duty of trimming on the owners of legally protected nonconforming 
trees. In this case, however, appellees did not make periodic trimmings of their 
cottonwood and, as stated, it grew to 48 feet at the time of trial. At that 
point, the pruning necessary to bring the tree into compliance with the 
ordinance would, according to David Powell, an arborist, quite likely have 
killed the tree which in his opinion was worth $2,064.

[¶15.]  Irrespective of the silvicultural 
difficulties of pruning such a mature cottonwood, airport officials notified the 
Rogerses in July of 1982 that the tree was in violation of its protected 
nonconforming use status, and that the Rogerses would either have to trim it or 
the airport board would trim it at the Rogerses' expense.

[¶16.]  The Rogerses would not accede to this 
ultimatum. After an unsuccessful attempt to procure advance damages from the 
City, they posted their property against unauthorized entrance and maintained 
their refusal to cut the tree. During this time, the Rogerses made no attempt to 
use the variance procedure provided for in the ordinance. The City of Cheyenne, therefore, was 
not afforded an opportunity to consider granting a conditional variance or other 
relief if appropriate in accordance with § 7(d) of the zoning ordinance which 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Any person desiring to 
erect or increase the height of any structure, or permit the growth of any tree, 
or use his property, not in accordance with the regulations prescribed in this 
ordinance, may apply to the planning commission for a variance from such 
regulations. Such variances shall be allowed where it is duly found that a 
literal application or enforcement of the regulations would result in practical 
difficulty or unnecessary hardship and the relief granted would not be contrary 
to the public interest but will do substantial justice and be in accordance with 
the spirit of this ordinance."

[¶17.]  On April 12, 1984, the Rogerses commenced 
this litigation seeking a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional, 
both on its face and as applied to their property, and an injunction against 
enforcement of the ordinance. With regard to their contention that the ordinance 
violated both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions, the Rogerses claimed 
that the ordinance represented an uncompensated taking of an easement in the 
airspace above their property and, also, would effect an unconstitutional taking 
if applied to the cottonwood tree in question or future trees that might 
penetrate into the zoned airspace.

[¶18.]  The Rogerses' case was tried to the 
district court on September 20, 1984, and on October 19, 1984, the trial judge 
issued an order declaring:

"Section 4(2) of Appendix 
B of the City Code of the City of Cheyenne * * * to be unconstitutional as 
applied to the plaintiffs herein as being without just compensation or due 
process of law."

Furthermore, the 
trial court permanently enjoined the City of Cheyenne and the Cheyenne Airport Board from 
the enforcement of Section 4(2) against the Rogerses.

[¶19.]  Though somewhat unclear as to scope, the 
trial judge's ruling may not only have found the ordinance to be 
unconstitutional as applied but unconstitutional on its face as well. Though the 
order of October 19 declares the unconstitutionality to be only in the 
application to the Rogerses, it also purports to incorporate by reference the 
court's comments which were made at the conclusion of the parties' evidence. The 
trial judge said at that time, with regard to the ordinance as a 
whole:

"I think there is no 
question here that private property is sought for the public's good and safety 
and that compensation should be paid. I find that this is not strictly an 
exercise of police power. It is similar to the construction of a highway * * * 
the City should condemn and a jury should decide what the damages are to the 
property by the City's taking."

[¶20.]  Thus, it appears that the trial court 
declared the ordinance to be unconstitutional both as applied to the Rogerses' 
tree and future surface uses and to the extent that it created an overflight 
easement without the payment of compensation. As so viewed, the following 
distinct issues are presented for review:

1. Was an actual flight 
easement taken in the appellees' airspace? If so, is compensation necessary to 
the validity of such an interest?

2. Is the municipal 
zoning ordinance, to the extent that it restricts surface uses, a valid exercise 
of the police power, both in general and as applied to the 
appellees?

[¶21.]  In addressing the issue of whether a 
compensable easement has been taken in the appellees' airspace, we first note 
that both the federal government and the State of Wyoming have declared a 
general right of free public passage through the air. The federal provision, 49 
U.S.C. § 1304 (1958) (as amended, Supp. 1984), declares on behalf of all 
citizens, a public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace. 
Section 10-4-303, W.S. 1977, declares that private ownership of the surface is 
vested subject to the lawful right of flight.

[¶22.]  These statutes can be viewed as either 
the uncompensated appropriation of an easement of flight as an aspect of the 
public domain, or as a redefining of the recognized extent of legally 
protectable property. The courts, understanding the need for an accommodation 
between modern air travel and common law property concepts, and recognizing that 
rigid notions of compensation for all intrusions ad coelum would effectively 
preclude commercial air travel, have consistently held, in cases since the 
federal and state declarations, that surface owners have no cause of action in 
trespass nor constitutional claim for uncompensated taking unless the exercise 
of the flight easement by aircraft produces nuisance - such as impacts on the 
surface. Thus, in the pivotal case of United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946), the Supreme Court of the United States held that compensation to 
surface owners would be necessary only when overflights were so low and so 
frequent as to substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the 
property.

[¶23.]  The subsequent case of Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 
Pennsylvania, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S. Ct. 531, 7 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1962), dealt with 
overflights emanating from a county-owned airport and crossing property zoned 
for residential use. The Court held that the overflights would constitute a 
taking with the necessity of just compensation if such operations made 
residential use "unbearable" and thus made the property unuseable for its 
authorized purposes. 369 U.S.  at 87-88, 82 S. Ct.  at 
532-533.

[¶24.]  Though some jurisdictions have not 
insisted on a direct invasion of the airspace for a taking claim (see e.g. Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S. Ct. 806, 42 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1975)), these jurisdictions uniformly require that for a 
cause of action to exist, a property owner must suffer a substantial 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the surface. See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 955, 83 S. Ct. 506, 9 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1963), 
and Annot., 22 A.L.R.4th 863 (1983). See also § 10-4-303(a), W.S. 1977, which 
codifies this requirement providing that overflight is lawful unless it 
is:

"(i) At such a low 
altitude as to interfere with the existing use to which the land or water, or 
the space over the land or water, is put by the owner;

"(ii) Conducted as to be 
imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water; 
or

"(iii) In violation of 
the air commerce regulations promulgated by the department of transportation of 
the United 
States."

[¶25.]  In the present case, the Rogerses have 
not contended, nor was evidence presented showing, that flights from the 
Cheyenne airport 
have caused substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of their 
residential property. All that was shown was that planes were flying in the 
airspace that the state and federal governments have reserved for lawful air 
travel. This court, under precedent and logic, must hold that such a showing 
does not establish a cause of action or constitutional 
claim.

[¶26.]  We note also in passing that even if a 
proper claim based on overflight alone were presented, that such claim would 
arise either when the United States and Wyoming declared a public right of free 
transit through the navigable airspace (see 29 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958) (as amended 
Supp. 1984) and § 10-4-302, W.S. 1977), or no later than the date of the first 
airplane overflight. The Rogerses made no claim for the use of the easement in 
the airspace until April 12, 1984, and then the claim was directed only against 
the City of Cheyenne and the airport board. Section 
1-3-103, W.S. 1977, provides that an action for the recovery of title or 
possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments can only be brought within ten 
years after the cause of action accrues. Cases from other jurisdictions indicate 
that the running of such statutes of limitations bar subsequent claims of 
inverse condemnation. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.4th 68 (1983). Thus, § 1-3-103, 
supra, would seemingly preclude a claim (had such a claim even been made) that 
the federal or state government had taken a general flight easement by either 
their declarations of public right or by their use of the 
airspace.

[¶27.]  The Cheyenne Municipal Airport Zoning 
Ordinance, No. 1969, §§ 1-15, Code Appendix B, was adopted on October 15, 1974. 
Appellees claim that the declaration of a flight easement in the ordinance was 
an unconstitutional taking and within the ten-year limitation provided for by § 
1-3-103, W.S. 1977. This court does not, however, view the ordinance itself as 
the actual creator or appropriator of the flight easement, as this was either 
accomplished by the state and federal statutory declarations or by the repeated 
physical acts of overflight. Instead, we view the Cheyenne ordinance as an exercise of delegated 
police powers which was intended to protect the easement from activities on the 
surface. The impact of the police power zoning regulation on the actual and 
potential surface activities raises certain other legal and constitutional 
issues, which we will discuss infra.

[¶28.]  To conclude this first segment and to 
preface our discussion of the ordinance as an exercise of the police power, we 
reiterate our belief that the mere fact of over-flight without evidence of 
impact on the surface, does not create a constitutional claim against either the 
City of Cheyenne or the airport board for the unconstitutional taking of a 
flight easement. In addition, the flight easement utilized by airplanes was not 
taken by the passage of the city zoning ordinance, but by federal and state 
declarations of public navigability and by repeated overflights which preceded 
this action by considerably more than the ten years allowed by the statute of 
limitations pertaining to real property actions. Finally, we hold that the city 
ordinance is properly viewed as an exercise of police power designed to protect 
this long-existent flight easement. As such it raises discrete issues of 
constitutional and legal validity, and we turn now to a discussion of these 
issues.

[¶29.]  The police power can be generally 
described as a government's ability to regulate private activities and property 
usage without compensation as a means of promoting and protecting the public 
health, safety, morals and general welfare. See Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 202, 97 P.2d 667, 670 (1940). Zoning is a 
particular exercise of the police power. It involves the division of land into 
zones and within these zones the regulation of both the nature of land usage and 
the physical dimensions of these uses including height setbacks and minimum 
area. Airport zoning, as a more refined exercise, deals with the regulation of 
the type of land activities and their physical dimensions in the immediate 
vicinity of airports. The general purpose of such airport zoning is to prevent 
conflicts from emerging between adjacent landowners and their uses and airplane 
overflights.

[¶30.]  There are several potential limitations 
on the local employment of airport zoning, some of which pose no real problems 
in this case. In one basic sense, local zoning must be authorized, as even after 
home rule amendments, municipalities remain largely the creatures of the 
sovereign state and in need of specific delegations of powers. This is 
especially so with regard to subjects like airports and their regulation which 
clearly are matters of statewide significance. The Wyoming legislature, as a 
means of protecting the state-declared public flight easement passed an enabling 
act, § 10-5-301, W.S. 1977, supra.

[¶31.]  Even after enabling legislation is passed 
and local regulation is authorized, the local grants of power with regard to 
matters of statewide concern can be preempted by either subsequent state 
legislation or federal power exercises. With regard to the case at bar, it is 
clear that the state has not amended its specific delegation of power to the 
municipalities, and that the federal regulations continue to insist on 
obstruction-free approach zones.

[¶32.]  Constitutional limits, however, stand 
apart from the authorization of either federal or state bodies and bind not only 
the recipients of delegated powers but also the delegators. The federal 
constitutional limits contained in the Bill of Rights apply directly to federal 
officials and to agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Agency, and indirectly 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which, in part, imposes its own 
direct limits of due process and equal protection on state actions, and also 
imposes other limits from the federal Bill of Rights which are deemed 
incorporated into the concept of due process and thus made applicable to the 
states. State constitutions may add to these limitations and may be more 
protective of individual liberties. They may not, however, under the dictates of 
supremacy, be less protective. Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980); see generally Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 
(1977).

[¶33.]  Both the United States Constitution and 
the Wyoming Constitution impose due process limitations on exercises of the 
police powers. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution all assert that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law. In general, Wyoming has, in zoning cases, interpreted its 
due process provision in a manner parallel to the federal provisions. See e.g. 
Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., Wyo., 652 P.2d 400, 414 
(1982).

[¶34.]  The due process clause has both a 
procedural and a substantive aspect. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 
(1938). In the case at bar the trial court declared that Cheyenne's airport zoning 
ordinance failed to meet constitutional standards of substantive due process. 
For the reasons that follow, we cannot agree with this 
conclusion.

[¶35.]  The constitutional standard of 
substantive due process, under both United 
States and Wyoming interpretations, demands that a police 
power regulation must promote a legitimate public objective with reasonable 
means. The substantive due process standard of reasonableness is applicable 
during the initial legislative process and theoretically confines the 
legislators. The judiciary may, in the context of an actual case, be called on 
to measure the legislative performance against the constitutional standard. When 
the legislative enactment lies in the economic and social welfare area, and when 
there are no suspect criteria or fundamental interests involved, the court will, 
in testing the enactment, inquire only as to whether the regulation is of 
debatable reasonableness. In other words, if the court perceives that the 
legislature had some arguable basis for choosing the end and the means, it will 
sustain the regulation at least as to compliance with substantive due process. 
Only when a regulation amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of regulatees' 
property will it be deemed to violate the dictates of substantive due process. 
As we said in Washakie CountySchool 
District 
No. One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 333 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 
28:

"When an ordinary 
[nonfundamental constitutional] interest is involved, then a court merely 
examines to determine whether there is a rational relationship between a 
classification * * * and a legitimate state objective."

[¶36.]  In the present case the appellees sought, 
and the trial court apparently granted, a declaration of the ordinance's general 
or facial invalidity under substantive due process. We conclude, for reasons 
that follow, that the ordinance does comply with the requirements of substantive 
due process and that the trial court's contrary conclusion is 
erroneous.

[¶37.]  The legitimate objectives of the police 
power are loosely characterized as being public in nature and the potential 
range is very broad. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 
(1954). There is no real dispute in this case that the objectives of the 
Cheyenne airport 
zoning ordinance are both public and legitimate. The trial judge, in fact, 
stated:

"I think there is no 
question here that private property is sought for the public's good and safety * 
* *."

[¶38.]  As to the means chosen by the Cheyenne council to 
achieve these objectives, we reiterate that, in the economic and social welfare 
area and when the ordinance is examined in a general, facial manner, the courts 
will usually go no further than to ascertain the debatable reasonableness of the 
legislative choices. See Snake River 
Venture v. Board of County Commissioners, Teton County, Wyo., 616 P.2d 744, 
753 (1980). The United States Supreme Court, in dealing with general, facial 
challenges to local exercises of police power, has sustained the substantive due 
process reasonableness of a number of facets of local zoning. Thus, in Village of 
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926), the Court determined that in a 
general sense, it is constitutionally reasonable and in accord with substantive 
due process for a local legislature to use comprehensive zoning and its 
uncompensated restrictions on use and bulk in order to promote the health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare. In Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L. Ed. 1228, 53 A.L.R. 1210 (1927), the Court upheld the general 
reasonableness of zoning setbacks and their requirement that portions of plots 
be left unbuilt. In Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, New 
York, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S. Ct. 987, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130 
(1962), the Court upheld the general reasonableness of local zoning restrictions 
on excavations below the depth of the water table. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), the Court sustained the general 
constitutionality of height limitations that New York City had imposed to protect historic 
and aesthetic landmarks. See also Welch 
v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923 
(1909).

[¶39.]  These Supreme Court precedents do not 
address the specific issues of airport zoning and its general validity under the 
standards of substantive due process. We note, however, that they do deal with 
zoning provisions and restraints on the portions of property that can be 
physically used. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has sustained the general 
constitutional reasonableness of restrictions on the depth of activities in the 
subsoil (Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 
New York, supra), the lateral extent of activities on the surface (Gorieb v. Fox, supra, and Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty 
Co., supra), and the height of activities in the airspace (Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, supra). We hold, therefore, that to the extent that the lower 
court in the present case purported to enjoin airport zoning in general as 
contrary to the demands of substantive due process, it was in 
error.

[¶40.]  Substantive due process, with its 
emphasis on legitimate objectives and rational means, can be explored and 
applied in a general sense when the reasonableness of the entire ordinance or 
statute is in question. See e.g. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., supra. It can also 
be examined in a specific sense, when the court evaluates the reasonableness of 
a law as applied to an individual. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447, 72 L. Ed. 842 
(1928). In a case with some similarities to the one at bar, the Supreme Court 
sustained the specific reasonableness of a regulation that resulted in the 
destruction of one party's ornamental cedar trees in order to save local apple 
crops from cedar rust.

"The Supreme Court held 
that the trees could be destroyed by the state without incurring any 
constitutional duty to compensate the injured landowner. The Court observed that 
apple production was an important agricultural activity in Virginia while the 
ornamental cedar trees had only minimal importance. The Supreme Court concluded 
that `[w]hen forced to such a choice, the state does not exceed its 
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property 
in order to save another, which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of 
greater value to the public.' Like the zoning-property use decisions, this case 
comports with modern substantive due process analysis by allowing the government 
to determine how to deal with societal problems without strict judicial review." 
(Footnote omitted.) J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law 490 (2d 
ed. 1983).

[¶41.]  Though there are examples of cases that 
deal with substantive due process as applied in particular cases, see e.g. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), most 
cases that deal with the particular impact of a land use regulation do so under 
the provisions of the taking clause. The appellees in the present case made 
several arguments based upon the taking clause, and the trial court accepted 
them. We next consider the limitations posed by the taking clause 
provisions.

[¶42.]  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states in part: "nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation." The Fourteenth Amendment which directly binds 
the states does not have a taking provision but it was early held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause incorporates the concepts and 
limitations of the taking clause. Chicago Burlington 
and Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 
(1897). The Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 33, states 
that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged * * * without just 
compensation."

[¶43.]  The taking clauses have three possible 
areas of application. They serve to confine formal exercises of the sovereign 
power of eminent domain. They apply to cases where governmental action 
effectively takes or destroys a private interest in property. These situations 
are described as inverse condemnation. Finally, the clause can cover those 
situations where the impact of a regulation is deemed to be too severe to be 
borne without payment of just compensation. We will look with more particularity 
at the latter two situations as they are alleged to exist in this 
case.

[¶44.]  Inverse condemnation which is generally a 
physical taking in fact, as opposed to a taking by formal procedure, can involve 
situations where the government or those acting under government auspicies 
physically occupy all or part of a private estate in land. If such occupation 
exists, then just compensation is owed for the interest in exclusive possession 
that has been appropriated. See Sheridan 
Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. State, Wyo., 384 P.2d 597 (1963). It is significant 
to note that when government actively takes an interest in property through 
physical occupation, it is usually obligated to pay the fair market value of the 
interest acquired - without regard to the value of the property remaining in 
private hands. See Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982), where the Supreme Court found that an ordinance, that authorized 
cable television companies to install receivers on private buildings, amounted 
to the taking of a compensable easement - without regard to the remaining value 
of the building to the private owner.

[¶45.]  Perhaps the clearest example of an 
inverse condemnation occurs when the government floods private property without 
the prior payment of compensation. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi 
Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. Ed. 557 
(1871). Less clear but still covered situations would include intrusions on 
private property by members of the public pursuant to governmental 
authorization. Thus, in Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979), the 
Supreme Court held that the federal government could not require the owners of a 
private marina to allow the public free access without the payment of just 
compensation.

[¶46.]  Airplane overflights can constitute 
inverse condemnation but as noted earlier, the courts have generally not found a 
taking from mere passage through the airspace. Rather, as held in United States v. Causby, supra, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, flights over private land are not deemed a taking unless so 
low and so frequent as to be a direct and substantial interference with the use 
and enjoyment of land. See Annot., 57 L. Ed. 2d 1254, 1260-1261 (1978). As noted, 
the appellees in this case have not demonstrated any evidence of substantial 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the surface. There is, therefore, no 
basis for an allegation of inverse condemnation due to 
overflight.

[¶47.]  We turn now to a discussion of the zoning 
ordinance and whether its regulatory impact on appellees' land amounts to a 
taking. We have previously discussed our conclusion that the municipal ordinance 
does not itself amount to the compensable taking of an affirmative easement in 
the airspace. Rather, the flight easement was initially taken by federal and 
state declaration and by actual uses, and the ordinance serves merely to protect 
this affirmative easement. The appellees, however, have also argued that the 
protective effect of the zoning ordinance is to create a negative easement 
without compensation. A negative easement theoretically involves only a servient 
tenement and not a dominant one. The owners of such servient tenements would, by 
virtue of the negative easement, be precluded from the full spatial usage of 
their property. The holder of a negative easement has, by virtue of such an 
interest, no right to active use; rather the holder can merely insist that the 
burdened party refrain from certain uses or uses in certain 
areas.

[¶48.]  In the present case, the appellees insist 
that their property is burdened by a negative easement because they are 
precluded from building or allowing their trees to extend above the ordinance's 
height limit. The appellees assert that such negative easements represent 
property interests taken by the government even though the government is not an 
active user and that such takings require compensation without regard to the 
remaining value of the regulated plot.

[¶49.]  The Supreme Court of the 
United 
States chooses not to view zoning setbacks and 
height limits as the creation of compensable negative easements. This argument 
was raised in Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. City of New York, supra, and the majority replied that extensive 
precedent precluded this argument.

"These cases [Welch v. Swasey, Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 
Gorieb v. Fox, supra] dispose of any contention that might be based on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), that full use of air rights is so bound 
up with the investment-backed expectations of appellants that governmental 
deprivation of these rights invariably - i.e., irrespective of the impact of the 
restriction on the value of the parcel as a whole - constitutes a `taking.' 
Similarly, Welch, Goldblatt, and Gorieb illustrate the fallacy of 
appellants' related contention that a `taking' must be found to have occurred 
whenever the land-use restriction may be characterized as imposing a `servitude' 
on the claimant's parcel." 438 U.S.  at 131 n. 27, 98 S. Ct.  at 2662 
n. 27.

Rather, the 
Supreme Court views the situation where a landowner is restrained in his use of 
one spatial area of his property - his airspace, side yards or subsoil - as 
merely one species of use regulation. The Court thus presumes that no actual 
property in these cases had been appropriated by the government and an 
unconstitutional taking will be found only if the regulation fails the balancing 
test first articulated in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322, 28 A.L.R. 1321 
(1922).

[¶50.]  Under Justice Holmes' reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the 
taking clause application was expanded beyond the formal eminent domain and 
inverse condemnation of physical interests in property. Under Pennsylvania Coal 
Company's balancing test, a regulation can also be deemed invalid as an 
uncompensated taking if it goes too far in its restrictions on the use of property. This situation can be 
clearly differentiated from cases where the government appropriates actual 
easements as there are no necessary physical or spatial aspects. Instead, the 
regulation's impact on usage is the key.

[¶51.]  The taking through excessive use 
regulation is also differentiated from cases of formal or inverse condemnation 
of actual property interests in that, when the government takes an actual 
easement, it must pay the fair market value of the interest taken, regardless of 
the value of the remaining plot. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp., supra, 455 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164. In the excessive regulation cases, the remedy, where the regulatory 
impact has gone too far, has generally been limited to a declaration of 
unconstitutionality and an injunction. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, supra, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d 1271.

[¶52.]  The application of the balancing test 
involves a comparison of the substantiality of the public interest with the 
impact upon the individual. Though such a comparison can conceivably be made 
when the general constitutionality of a regulation is questioned, see 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, the vast bulk of regulatory taking cases 
have involved instances of specific application. To the extent that the 
appellees in the present case have alleged an unconstitutional regulatory 
taking, it is clear that their focus is on the specific application of the 
regulation to their plot and not on all the impacts that might stem from the 
entire ordinance.

[¶53.]  The balancing test and the components of 
comparison are not rigidly fixed. However, certain relevant factors can be 
identified and certain principles as to how these factors should be treated have 
been established in the Supreme Court opinions.

[¶54.]  In assessing the substantiality of the 
government interest, the courts may be concerned with whether the regulation can 
be characterized as designed to prevent a harm (the theoretical province of the 
police power) or intended to secure a benefit (the theoretical province of 
eminent domain). If the regulation is deemed to be directed at a potential harm, 
the courts are then concerned with the harm's imminence, its severity, and how 
likely the law is to be successful in preventing the harm. See J. Nowak, R. 
Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law 492; see also United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 
73 S. Ct. 200, 97 L. Ed. 157 (1952); and United States v. Central Eureka Mining 
Company, 357 U.S. 155, 78 S. Ct. 1097, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1228 (1958), where the regulations were reasonably designed to prevent imminent, 
severe wartime harms. The substantial governmental interest in the regulations 
thus permitted a high degree of impact on private property without exceeding the 
taking clause limits.

[¶55.]  The Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
the impact to be considered and balanced is the impact of the regulation on the 
plot as a whole. The impact of the regulation on discrete segments is not 
relevant. In Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. City of New York, supra, the Court said:

"`Taking' jurisprudence 
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine 
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent 
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole - here, the city tax 
block designated as the `landmark site.'" 438 U.S.  at 130-131, 
98 S. Ct.  at 2662-63.

[¶56.]  In assessing the impact of the regulation 
on the plot as whole, the more relevant of the elements a restrained landowner 
can show are: the near-complete frustration of investment-backed expectations; 
the diminution of the property's market value as a result of regulation; and, 
perhaps most significantly, the absence of a reasonable remaining economic use. 
See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York, supra, 438 U.S.  at 127-137, 98 S. Ct.  at 
2660-2666. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing these claims. If he 
fails to do it, the court will not presume the impact. In describing the result 
in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, the 
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York, supra, said:

"Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, is a 
recent example. There, a 1958 city safety ordinance banned any excavations below 
the water table and effectively prohibited the claimant from continuing a sand 
and gravel mining business that had been operated on the particular parcel since 
1927. The Court upheld the ordinance against a `taking' challenge, although the 
ordinance prohibited the present and presumably most beneficial use of the 
property and had, like the regulations in Miller and Hadacheck, severely 
affected a particular owner. The Court assumed that the ordinance did not 
prevent the owner's reasonable use of the property since the owner made no 
showing of an adverse effect on the value of the land. Because the restriction 
served a substantial public purpose, the Court thus held no taking had 
occurred." 438 U.S.  at 126-127, 98 S. Ct.  at 
2660-61.

[¶57.]  In addition, if the plaintiff fails to 
utilize available administrative procedures such as those allowing variances, 
the courts may also find that impact has not been clearly shown. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, supra, 438 U.S.  at 137, 98 S. Ct.  at 
2665-66.

[¶58.]  In the case at bar, the appellees have 
alleged a taking pursuant to the airport zoning ordinance's height limit as to 
both the cottonwood tree presently exceeding the height limit, and the future 
trees or possible residential additions which may be affected. As previously 
noted, the uniform treatment of this claim precludes the characterization of 
such restricted plot usage as the compensable appropriation of a property 
interest in the airspace. Therefore, this facet of appellees' claim depends on 
application of the balancing test and a comparison of the substantiality of the 
government interest and the impact on the plot as a whole.

[¶59.]  In assessing the impact on the plot as a 
whole, it is noteworthy that the Rogerses made no attempt to use the variance 
procedure contained in § 7(d) of the zoning ordinance. The municipality might, 
if appellees had made the necessary showings, have granted a variance for the 
tree and for possible future uses. In such an event, the regulatory impact of 
the ordinance would have been alleviated. Appellees' failure to use the variance 
provision denies the municipality an administrative means of protecting its 
ordinance from constitutional challenges and of fashioning individual relief in 
accord with both justice and the spirit of the ordinance. See Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276 Ala. 166, 160 So. 2d 6 
(1964).

[¶60.]  It is also noteworthy that appellees 
purchased the zoned property after the ordinance had been in effect for almost 
two years, a fact that indicates it unlikely that appellees have suffered loss 
of "distinct, investment-backed expectations." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, supra, 438 U.S.  at 127, 98 S. Ct.  at 2660-2661. 
Finally, the required existence of impact does not appear, for appellees' 
residential usage of the plot was not noticeably affected until 1982 when the 
height of a single tree became legally problematic.

[¶61.]  With regard to this particular 
cottonwood, appellees claim that the ordinance as applied will result in a loss 
of $2,064. It seems likely that the loss would have been substantially less if 
appellees had complied with the ordinance in 1976 and periodically trimmed the 
tree and not allowed it to substantially exceed the allowed height. It also is 
apparent that this figure is far less than the value of the plot for residential 
purposes.

[¶62.]  In summation, the cases involving taking, 
including those cited by the appellees for the proposition that the particular 
application of airport zoning effects a taking, have almost always involved 
situations of substantial or nearly total restriction of plot usage or value. 
The appellees have failed to demonstrate such a significant impact as to 
counterbalance the significant public interest in protecting the airport flight 
path.

[¶63.]  For the reasons enunciated, the judgment 
of the trial court is reversed.