Case Title: People v. Jung

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86634

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 86634-Agenda 30-May 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								EDWARD M. JUNG, Appellee.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is the constitutionality of section
11-501.4-1 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, which allows the
results of physician-ordered blood or urine tests conducted in the
course of emergency treatment for injuries resulting from a motor
vehicle accident to be reported directly to state or local law
enforcement officials. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996). The
circuit court of La Salle County ruled that the statute violates a
patient's right to privacy in his medical records under article I,
section 12, of the Illinois Constitution, which states that, "[e]very
person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or
reputation." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12. The State appealed the
circuit court's ruling directly to this court pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 302(a). 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). For the following
reasons, we reverse and remand.
	On March 22, 1997, at approximately 3:30 a.m., the
defendant, Edward Jung, and a passenger riding in his car were
involved in a one-vehicle accident. Master Sergeant T.W. Dalton
of the Illinois State Police arrived to investigate the accident scene.
While Sergeant Dalton was administering first aid to defendant he
noticed that defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath
and was slurring his speech. Defendant told Sergeant Dalton that
he was driving at the time of the accident, and that he had been
drinking since approximately 6 p.m. that evening, consuming a
total of four or five beers.
	An ambulance arrived and took defendant to the hospital for
emergency treatment. Sergeant Dalton arrived at the hospital
shortly afterward. Approximately 45 minutes after Sergeant
Dalton's arrival, a lab technician offered him a copy of defendant's
blood test results in accordance with section 11-501.4-1 of the
Motor Vehicle Code, which provides in pertinent part:
			"(a) *** [t]he results of blood or urine tests performed
for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol,
other drugs, or both, in an individual's blood or urine
conducted upon persons receiving medical treatment in a
hospital emergency room for injuries resulting from a
motor vehicle accident may be reported to the Department
of State Police or local law enforcement agencies. Such
blood or urine tests are admissible in evidence as a
business record exception to the hearsay rule only in
prosecutions for any violation of Section 11-501 of this
Code [625 ILCS 5/11-501] or a similar provision of a
local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless homicide
brought under the Criminal Code of 1961 [720 ILCS
5/1-1 et seq.].
			(b) The confidentiality provisions of law pertaining to
medical records and medical treatment shall not be
applicable with regard to tests performed upon an
individual's blood or urine under the provisions of
subsection (a) of this Section." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1
(West 1996).
	Defendant's blood test revealed a blood-alcohol concentration
of 0.19, in excess of the legal limit of 0.08. Sergeant Dalton placed
defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
	Prior to defendant's first scheduled court date, the State filed
a motion to turn over medical records, which was granted over
defendant's objection. The State also filed a subpoena duces tecum,
requesting that defendant's medical records be released to the trial
court. Defendant subsequently filed a motion in limine, seeking to
bar the State from using the blood test results on the grounds that
section 11-501.4-1 is unconstitutional.
	Statutes are presumed constitutional. The party challenging a
statute's constitutional validity bears the burden of clearly
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional. Since our decision
is one of law, we review de novo the circuit court's decision with
respect to a statute's constitutionality.
	In conducting our review, we initially note that the State
mistakenly refers to "section 5/11-501.4" several times in its
opening brief, rather than to section 5/11-501.4-1, which the
circuit court held unconstitutional. Nevertheless, reading the entire
brief as a whole, the issues are sufficiently defined and presented so
as to make dismissal inappropriate. See People ex rel. Carter v.
Touchette, 5 Ill. 2d 303, 305 (1955). Our decision to address the
State's claims on their merits is supported by the fact that the
appellee neither sought to have the State's brief stricken or sought
sanctions against the State, but rather filed a coherent response to
the State's arguments.
	Nationwide, over 16,000 lives were lost and over 1 million
people were injured in alcohol-related crashes in 1997 alone. In
Illinois, over 42% of the total motor vehicle crash fatalities
involved drunken drivers. Because the public has a compelling
interest in safe roads, a driver's expectations of privacy are
significantly diminished. Highway driving is a privilege and not a
right. Drivers must demonstrate knowledge of driving rules and
their own capacities. When a person obtains a driver's license, he
consents to the conditions imposed by the legislature in exchange
for that privilege, one such condition being that found in section
11-501.4-1.
	Under the instant statute, the medical information which may
be disclosed to police is strictly confined to the results of physician-ordered blood or urine tests. Given that life, limb and property are
seriously threatened by drunken driving and given the all too
common reality that a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident
may be intoxicated, waiver of a driver's privacy interest in his
blood or urine test results in this situation is reasonable and does
not violate his constitutional right to privacy.
	Defendant additionally argues that section 11-501.4-1 is
unconstitutional on its face because it also applies to passengers
and pedestrians, who, as nondrivers, are not subject to the same
reduced expectation of privacy. Defendant, however, was driving
at the time of the accident and, thus, lacks standing to make this
challenge.
	In the alternative, defendant claims that section 11-401.4-1 is
unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers
provisions found in the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art.
II, §1; art. VI, §§1, 16. Specifically, defendant contends that the
statute conflicts with the uniquely judicial function of managing the
discovery process. Defendant is incorrect. The statute states only
that the blood or urine test results "may be reported" to law
enforcement officials. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996). This
has nothing to do with separation of powers.
	Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I concur in the judgment reached by the court today.
Nevertheless, I, like Justice McMorrow, believe that the court's
opinion "fails to adequately explain the basis for its judgment." See
slip op. at 13 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring). I base my
decision in this case on the reasons set forth in Justice
McMorrow's special concurrence, in which I fully join.
	I write separately, however, to provide a more complete
picture of the State's briefing deficiencies as identified in the
court's opinion and in the dissents. I agree with the court that the
brief adequately allows this court to decide the substantive merits
of this appeal. See slip op. at 2-3. In contrast, both Chief Justice
Harrison and Justice Rathje believe that the State has violated
Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)). Indeed,
both take the court to task for, among other things, "advocating"
for the State (see slip op. at 21-22 (Rathje, J., dissenting)) and
being "an apologist for the State" (see slip op. at 18 (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting). In light of these criticisms, I offer the following
observations.
	Both Chief Justice Harrison and Justice Rathje refer to
Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7). That provision of the rule provides
that an appellant's brief must contain an
			"[a]rgument , which shall contain the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the
authorities and the pages of the record relied on. Evidence
shall not be copied at length, but reference shall be made
to the pages of the record on appeal or abstract, if any,
where evidence may be found. Citation of numerous
authorities in support of the same point is not favored.
Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the
reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing."
177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
According to Justice Rathje, the State's opening brief speaks only
to section 11-501.4 and, as a result, the State has waived its
challenge to section 11-501.4-1 because points not argued are
waived. Chief Justice Harrison believes that because the wrong
statute was argued, the State's brief is in violation of Rule
341(e)(7). Both justices appear to take the view that arguments
that do not satisfy Rule 341(e)(7) do not merit consideration on
appeal.
	Rule 341 was promulgated to require parties to an appeal to
present the court of review with clear and orderly arguments. See
47th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp., 56 Ill.
App. 3d 229, 232 (1977), citing Biggs v. Spader, 411 Ill. 42
(1951). Our appellate rules of procedure have the force of law, and
this court has observed that "some logical order for the
presentment of the issues to be reviewed must be observed, and the
bar, or others appearing before us, are presumed to be aware of the
rules prescribed." Biggs, 411 Ill.  at 44. A party's failure to state
properly or informatively the errors relied upon for reversal renders
it impossible for a court of review to determine the issues sought
to be raised and, as such, justifies dismissal of the appeal. Biggs,
411 Ill.  at 44-45. Moreover, it is not the duty of this court or any
other court of review "to search the record to determine what the
real issues in a contest are, nor to seek for material for the
disposition of such issues." Biggs, 411 Ill.  at 44.
	I believe that this court's decision in Biggs is especially helpful
to today's discussion because it provides insight into the type of
brief that fails to meet the standard envisioned by our rules.(1) The
court in Biggs began by noting that the appeal came to the court
from several orders entered by the trial court in the course of
preliminary hearings,
			"yet none of such orders are complained of in the errors
relied upon for reversal. The errors assigned, rather, range
from argumentative statements charging judges of the trial
court and of the Appellate Court with prejudice and libel,
to extremely vague allegations that certain court rules and
provisions of the Civil Practice Act have been violated. A
reading of the brief fails to bring enlightenment as to
whether there was a final and appealable order in this
cause, whether there are any grounds which give this court
jurisdiction on direct appeal, or whether appellant is
seeking a review of the issues in [a previous case], in
which this court previously denied his petition for leave to
appeal. The entire brief is presented in a manner that is
ambiguous and arduous and does not present the issues
sought to be determined in the orderly manner required to
expedite and facilitate the administration of justice."
Biggs, 411 Ill.  at 43-44.
The court struck the brief and dismissed the appeal,
notwithstanding the fact that it had "serious doubts" as to the
propriety of the judgment order in the case.
	 Biggs was decided in 1951. Since that time, courts of review
have been less detailed in describing the manner in which a brief
violates the appellate rules. To an extent, the question is a
subjective one. Obviously, whether a brief is of poor quality
depends largely upon the perceptions of the reader. Nevertheless,
some deficiencies are uniformly recognized. Few judges would
dispute, for example, that a court may decline to address an
argument that speaks in conclusory fashion without citation to
legal authority because, without legal support, it is nothing more
than an opinion. See Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical
Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 389, 401 (1987) (noting that failure
to support conclusory statement with legal authority results in
waiver of the issue). The question is more difficult, however, when
an argument is supported by legal authority, but the argument itself
is obtuse, poorly written, or badly structured. This sometimes
occurs when a court is faced with a pro se litigant who is without
legal training, but it can also occur when a party is represented by
licensed counsel. Our case law provides objective guidance in such
situations. We have held that the rules of appellate procedure are
not jurisdictional and the appeal will not be "arbitrarily dismissed
for noncompliance if a reading of the entire brief makes it possible
for the court to determine the questions or issues sought to be
raised." People ex rel. Carter v. Touchette, 5 Ill. 2d 303, 305
(1955). Courts have also used other sanctions, short of dismissal,
when confronted with Rule 341(e)(7) violations, including striking
the brief or declining consideration of the argument. See e.g.,
Cottrill v. Russell, 253 Ill. App. 3d 934, 939 (1993); People v.
Trimble, 181 Ill. App. 3d 355, 357 (1989). Other courts have
admonished the responsible party, but nevertheless reviewed the
merits in the interests of justice, Taake v. WHGK, Inc., 228 Ill.
App. 3d 692, 714 (1992).Therefore, the court of review must
determine whether its rules have been substantially complied with
(see Biggs, 411 Ill. at 45), which means that the question ultimately
becomes one of discretion for the reviewing court once jurisdiction
is found to exist. See Luttrell v. Panozzo, 252 Ill. App. 3d 597
(1993) (and cases cited therein.) See also Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A,
par. 341, Historical & Practice Notes, at 478 (Smith-Hurd 1985)
(noting that what action a court of review will take when a party
is in noncompliance with the appellate rules "is a matter entirely in
its discretion, a discretion usually exercised by reference to the
effect of the case on the public and on the parties").
	In light of the foregoing principles, I cannot agree with those
in dissent who believe that the State's brief contains so
inadequately presented an argument vis   vis section 11-501.4-1
that consideration of the merits by this court is precluded. Justice
Rathje grossly misrepresents the State's brief in asserting that the
State only referred to the incorrect statute. A careful reading of the
State's brief reveals that, contrary to the views expressed in the
dissents, the State did speak in terms of section 11-501.4-1. For
example, the argument section of the State's brief begins with a
heading that reads, "The trial court erred when it declared 625
ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 unconstitutional." This heading corresponds
with the first heading of the State's "Points and Authorities"
section. The first sentence of the State's argument reads, "On
October 29, 1998, the Circuit Court of La Salle County entered a
written order declaring 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 unconstitutional
and granting Defendant's motion in limine." The problem with the
State's brief is that it also speaks to section 11-501.4 (625 ILCS
5/11-501.4 (West 1996)).(2) At certain points in the State's
argument, the State speaks of section 11-501.4 when it should be
speaking of section 11-501.4-1. The erroneous reference to
section 11-501.4 occurs on page 9 of the State's brief. It also
occurs elsewhere in the argument. I acknowledge that the
references to both provisions are confusing. However, any
confusion about which particular statute is at issue in this appeal
can easily be resolved by referring to the circuit court's written
order, which can be found in the record and which is contained in
the appendix to the State's brief. In that order, the circuit court
expressly ruled that
		 "Section 11-501.4-1 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code
is unconstitutional, based on the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Best v. Taylor (1997). The privacy
interest of a patient as to medical information and records
is a right under the Illinois Constitution and can be
overcome only by waiver or after a due process hearing as
already in place in the Motor Vehicle Code."
That the State's brief could have been better structured (or
proofread) is without question,(3) but I disagree that this court must
now consider the issue waived as a result of the violation of Rule
341(e)(7). A waiver occurs when the argument consists of
conclusory sentences which are not supported by any legal
authority. See Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d  at 401 (stating that failure to
support conclusory statement with legal authority results in waiver
of the issue). In such instances, the "waiver" results not from the
party's failure to raise the issue (to which the doctrine of "waiver,"
or more properly procedural default, normally applies), but from
the party's violation of the appellate rules. In its opening brief, the
State contends that, contrary to the circuit court's conclusion,
defendant does not have a protected privacy right to medical
information and records under the Illinois Constitution. This
contention is supported with citations to both Illinois and United
States Supreme Court decisions. The State's argument also
contains a discussion concerning the inapplicability of our decision
in Best to the facts of this case. The State further cites decisions
from other jurisdictions as persuasive authority. There is no reason
why this court cannot respond definitively to these assertions.
Clearly, the State has supplied this court with an argument
supported by authority such that Rule 341(e)(7) has been
substantially complied with. To hold otherwise would be to elevate
form over substance.
	Apart from the confusing reference to section 11-501.4,
neither Chief Justice Harrison nor Justice Rathje identify what it is
about this brief that causes them to react to it so harshly when
briefs that are just as bad, if not worse, have been accepted and the
merits of the appeal have been reached. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Carter v. Touchette, 5 Ill. 2d 303 (1955); People v. Stork, 305 Ill.
App. 3d 714 (1999); Eickmeyer v. Blietz Organization, Inc., 284
Ill. App. 3d 134 (1996); Luttrell v. Panozzo, 252 Ill. App. 3d 597
(1993); In re Marriage of Forbes, 251 Ill. App. 3d 133 (1993);
Geers v. Brichta, 248 Ill. App. 3d 398 (1993); Roberts v. Dow
Chemical Co., 244 Ill. App. 3d 253 (1993); First National Bank
v. Loffelmacher, 236 Ill. App. 3d 690 (1992); Zadrozny v. City
Colleges, 220 Ill. App. 3d 290 (1991); Gallo v. Henke, 107 Ill.
App. 3d 21 (1982); People v. Willett, 44 Ill. App. 2d 545 (1976).
After reviewing the State's brief and the relevant case law in this
area, I believe that it is "possible for the court to determine the
questions or issues sought to be raised." Touchette, 5 Ill. 2d  at 305.
	I must also stress that the four members of this court who
reach the merits of this appeal today are not the only ones who
could discern the State's argument. As the court's opinion
correctly notes, the appellee in this case has never asked this court
to take any punitive action with regard to the State's opening brief.
The appellee has not sought to have the State's brief stricken nor
has he sought sanctions for noncompliance with our rules. Instead,
the appellee has filed a brief that contains a reasoned and lucid
response to the State's opening brief. This, in my view, further
strengthens the notion that this is not a case in which the
appellant's argument is unintelligible. See People v. Willett, 44 Ill.
App. 3d 545, 547 (1976) (noting that appellate court would be
perfectly justified in striking appellant's brief that contained many
unintelligible arguments, but choosing instead to address the merits
of the appeal).
	In view of the foregoing, I cannot agree with my dissenting
colleagues that the court today is advocating, as well as
adjudicating, the points the State seeks to raise. As noted, the
State's position can be easily deduced by reading its brief. To
address the argument does not require this court to "advocate" in
any way. Rather, the court is responding to an inartfully presented
argument, something, I might add, this court unfortunately has to
do in many cases. As Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has pointed out, "if failure to make one's
grounds of appeal perspicuous were a ground for waiver, we
would have very few issues to decide." Kopec v. City of Elmhurst,
193 F.3d 894, 905 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Given
the fact that the constitutionality of a statute is at issue here, the
court is perfectly justified in exercising the discretion that we have
in this matter so as not to punish the party for "the sins of [its]
attorney." Roberts v. Dow Chemical Co., 244 Ill. App. 3d 253, 256
(1993). See also Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 341, Historical &
Practice Notes, at 478 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (stating that when there
is noncompliance with the appellate rules, the court of review
"does not necessarily have to visit the consequences *** on the
litigant but may vindicate the rule by enforcement proceedings
against the attorney responsible [citation] or by referring the matter
to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission).
	As the foregoing authority demonstrates, a court of review has
the discretion to enforce the rules of appellate procedure in the
manner it sees fit with an eye toward the interests of justice and
concern for the parties. The cases make clear that not every
infraction of Rule 341(e)(7) can or should be handled in the same
way. A majority of this court has seen fit to merely admonish the
attorney responsible for the violation and not visit the
consequences on the litigant-in this case the People of the State of
Illinois. This is an appropriate exercise of our discretion and is one
that is more than amply supported by Illinois decisional law. 
	Had the Chief Justice and Justice Rathje been content to
reproach only the four members of today's majority, I would end
this special concurrence here because we in the majority have the
opportunity to respond to their charges. Unfortunately, however,
both justices have chosen to lace their dissents with unnecessary
aspersions directed at the State, which, at this stage in the appeal,
has no real opportunity to defend or explain its actions. It is for this
reason that I strongly take issue with the tone and tenor in which
my colleagues have voiced their displeasure with the office of the
Attorney General. For example, Chief Justice Harrison chastises
the office for the "inadequacy" of its staffing and questions the
competency of the attorneys employed there (see slip op. at 18
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting)). The Chief Justice levels these charges
based upon "requests for time extensions in other cases pending
before our court" and by citing to another case in which a brief was
not filed. See slip op. at 18 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). I fail to see
the relevance of citations to other cases in this situation. Nor do I
find this type of one-way dialogue between members of this court
and the office of the Attorney General very constructive as the
Attorney General is no longer in any position to respond at this
time. In my opinion, the time for such discussion between the
office of the Attorney General and members of this court has long
passed. I must point out that the very first mention-indeed the only
mention before today-of the State's briefing problems came in the
waning moments of the assistant Attorney General's opening oral
argument, which was held in Springfield nearly one year ago, on
June 22, 1999. Counsel had concluded her prayer for relief and
invited the court to ask any questions it might have. Justice Rathje
then asked her which statute was at issue, stating that he had
trouble understanding her brief. Counsel admitted that her brief
contained the error and responded that section 11-501.4-1 was the
provision at issue. Justice Rathje's reply was simply "good
enough." This was the extent of the discussion between this court
and the Attorney General's office regarding the propriety of the
State's brief. I believe that everyone would have been better served
had these justices seen fit to voice their disapproval then rather
than to harangue now. In light of the exchange at oral argument,
one can hardly fault the State for failing to seek leave to file a
corrected brief (see slip op. at 21 (Rathje, J., dissenting)). Such a
response from the bench certainly does not foreshadow the
accusatory and hostile tone taken against the State in these
dissenting opinions.
	It is my hope that this type of rancor and incivility can be
avoided in future cases by the use of a show cause order, which
can be issued by the court sua sponte. I note that this is the
procedure utilized by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Sosa, 55 F.3d 278 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Ford, 806 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 1986). This
court would be well served by following the Seventh Circuit's
example. The use of a show cause order in these situations would
eliminate any appearance of arbitrariness on the part of the court
of review because it gives the party in question the opportunity to
be heard on the matter before punitive action is taken against it,
particularly in cases where the opposing party has not made an
issue of the alleged infractions. 
	JUSTICES MILLER and McMORROW join in this special
concurrence.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, also specially concurring:
	This is a direct appeal from an order entered by the circuit
court of La Salle County holding section 11-501.4-1 of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996))
unconstitutional. Section 11-501.4-1 states that results of blood
or urine tests performed for the purpose of determining the level of
alcohol or drugs in a person's bloodstream while the person is in
a hospital emergency room receiving treatment for injuries
resulting from a car accident may be reported to law enforcement
agencies. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996). Section
11-501.4-1 also states that "confidentiality provisions of law
pertaining to medical records and medical treatment" will not apply
to the results of tests performed in these circumstances. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996). The circuit court ruled that section
11-501.4-1 violates the privacy right in medical records
guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, citing Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997).
	The majority reverses the circuit court and finds section
11-501.4-1 constitutional. While I concur in the result, I believe
that the majority opinion fails to adequately explain the basis for its
judgment. The legal community and the legislature rely on our
opinions to map the evolving course of the law. I write separately,
therefore, to provide the analysis which forms the basis for my
decision in this case.
	As an initial matter, the majority concludes that section
11-501.4-1 does not constitute an impermissible infringement on
a driver's privacy interests. The majority seems to ground its ruling
on the reduced privacy expectation that drivers are deemed to have
by virtue of their operation of an automobile, as well as the State's
compelling interest in discouraging driving while intoxicated. I
agree. 
	Although this court has recognized a constitutionally based
privacy interest in "confidential medical information" (Best v.
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 459 (1997)), the court has
also noted that an individual's expectations of privacy are reduced
when operating an automobile (Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 310
(1996)). This is because the state subjects automobile driving to
intensive regulation. Fink, 174 Ill. 2d  at 310. Other factors may
reduce an individual's expectation of privacy even further. In Fink,
for example, this court found mandatory analysis of an automobile
driver's blood-alcohol content constitutional because, among other
factors, the conditions under which the blood could be drawn
reduced a driver's expectation of privacy. More specifically, under
the statute, blood could be drawn only if the driver suffered
specified, severe injuries in an automobile accident and an officer
had already issued the driver a ticket for drunk driving. Also, the
law required anyone involved in an auto accident to stay at the
scene, exchange driver information and render aid to the injured.
These are conditions which necessarily involve extended presence
at the scene and the involvement of law enforcement officers. In
sum, the court found that these facts increased the likelihood of a
decreased expectation of privacy, so that a blood test performed
under these circumstances could be deemed only minimally
intrusive. Fink, 174 Ill. 2d  at 311.
	Additionally, the Fink court held that the mandatory blood
testing served a "special need" of the State, beyond mere law
enforcement, to keep chemically impaired drivers off of Illinois
roads. Fink, 174 Ill. 2d  at 302, 308-09. Thus, Fink appears to hold
that the presence of a specialized need permits the state to intrude
upon a privacy interest such as compelling a citizen to submit to a
blood test, as long as the state can concurrently show the existence
of a reduced expectation of privacy. Fink, 174 Ill. 2d  at 309, 312.
	The "special need" described in Fink to keep Illinois roads free
of intoxicated drivers is present in the case at bar. Additionally, the
driver whose blood or urine is collected under circumstances
described in section 11-501.4-1 has a reduced expectation of
privacy concerning his person while operating an automobile. The
mere operation of an automobile is a heavily regulated activity.
Fink, 174 Ill. 2d  at 310. The statute permits the blood or urine to
be drawn under only very narrow circumstances: (1) in a hospital
emergency room, (2) where the driver is brought for treatment of
injuries sustained in an auto accident, and (3) solely for purposes
of determining the presence of intoxicants in the driver's system.
625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996). In circumstances such as
these, drivers would not only have a reduced expectation of
privacy in information concerning their physical condition, but they
might even expect that such information would necessarily be
obtained in order to render medical treatment to them. Thus, the
conclusion reached by the majority that section 11-501.4-1 is
constitutional is consistent with Illinois legal authorities.
	Defendant also argues that section 11-501.4-1 violates the
separation of powers doctrine (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1; art. VI,
§§1, 16) because it infringes upon this court's authority to regulate
the court system, and because it conflicts with supreme court rules
concerning discovery. Defendant relies principally on Best and
Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519 (1997), to urge this court to
invalidate section 11-501.4-1. However, Best and Kunkel are
distinguishable from the case at bar. In Best, the court construed an
amendment to section 2-1003(a) of the civil procedure code that
mandated a waiver of the physician-patient privilege for all
plaintiffs filing personal injury claims. 735 ILCS 5/2-1003(a) (West
1996). The amendment prescribed a wholesale disclosure of all
medical records, irrespective of their relevance to the plaintiff's
lawsuit. The amendment also prescribed mandatory dismissal of the
lawsuit if the plaintiff failed to comply with the medical record
disclosure requirements.
	 The Best court held section 2-1003(a) unconstitutional
because the statute conflicted with supreme court rules concerning
discovery. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 449. In particular, section 2-1003(a)
undercut those rules that allow a court to tailor discovery sanctions
to the severity of the recalcitrance exhibited by a litigant. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 449. Section 2-1003(a) also conflicted with rules that
permit a court to limit discovery to materials that are relevant to
the claims or defenses raised by the parties, and to enter orders of
protection to shield particularly sensitive materials from
unnecessary disclosure. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 445. In addition, this
court found that section 2-1003(a) unduly infringed upon the
court's authority by requiring the court to dismiss a plaintiff's
lawsuit, with prejudice, if the plaintiff failed to follow the statutory
disclosure requirements. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 441-42; see also
Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d  at 528-37.
	 I agree with the majority that section 11-501.4-1 does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. The pertinent provision
of section 11-501.4-1 at issue in this case permits a hospital
worker to show the results of a blood test, conducted under limited
circumstances, to law enforcement personnel. The subject
provision is unrelated to discovery rules that control the course of
any subsequent prosecution against the patient. Therefore, nothing
in this provision is adverse to rules of discovery promulgated by
this court. Nor are the terms of section 11-501.4-1 at odds with
a court's authority to control the course of litigation.
	Finally, I share the concerns voiced by Justice Freeman in his
specially concurring opinion, and join in his specially concurring
opinion. I believe that Justice Freeman is correct in his observation
that the remarks of Chief Justice Harrison and Justice Rathje which
are critical of the State and the Attorney General's office are
untimely and unfair, because the State and the Attorney General's
office have been denied an opportunity to respond to those
criticisms. As Justice Freeman states, had a majority of the court
found the State's brief incomprehensible, the court should have
issued a show cause order (155 Ill. 2d R. 375), or, as advocated by
Justice Bilandic, directed the parties to further brief the issue.
	JUSTICES MILLER and FREEMAN join in this special
concurrence.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	My colleagues have misrepresented the circumstances of this
case. The statute invalidated by the trial court is section
11-501.4-1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1
(West 1996)). In its appeal, however, the State directs its
arguments to the validity of section 11-501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4 (West 1996)). Section 11-501.4-1 is
not a subsection of section 11-501.4. They are separate provisions.
	The argument portion of the State's brief contains no
"contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation
of the authorities," as they pertain to section 11-501.4-1. The
State's analysis does not mention 11-501.4-1 at all. All arguments
and citations to authority are directed instead to section 11-501.4,
which has nothing to do with this case. With respect to section
11-501.4-1, the statute at issue here, the State's brief is therefore
in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341
(e)(7)), which is applicable to criminal appeals pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 612(i). 177 Ill. 2d R. 612(i); People v.
Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 303-04 (1987).
	The State's failure to comply with Rule 341(e)(7) should be
fatal to its appeal. A reviewing court is entitled to have issues
clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and coherent
arguments presented. Arguments inadequately presented are
waived. See People v. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 261-62 (1999);
Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, Inc.,
118 Ill. 2d 389, 401 (1987); Vernon Hills III Ltd. Partnership v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 303, 311
(1997); see also Maun v. Department of Professional Regulation,
299 Ill. App. 3d 388, 399 (1998) (arguments that do not satisfy
Rule 341(e)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may be
rejected for that reason alone).
	Although the State did eventually address arguments to the
correct statutory section in its reply brief, those arguments came
too late. Under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), points not argued
in the appellant's brief are waived and cannot be raised for the first
time in appellant's reply brief. 177 Ill. 2d R. 341 (e)(7); Sylvester
v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 507 (1997); Illinois
Farmers Insurance Co. v. Cisco, 178 Ill. 2d 386, 395 (1997);
People v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d  at 304.
	Because the State's contentions as to section 11-501.4-1 are
not properly before us, analysis of the State's position would
require this court to speculate as to the nature of the arguments
that could have been made, but were not. See In re Parentage of
Janssen, 292 Ill. App. 3d 219, 228 (1997). A reviewing court will
not become an advocate for, as well as the judge of, points the
appellant seeks to raise. See Vernon Hills, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 311.
The State should therefore be deemed to have forfeited its right to
challenge the propriety of the circuit court's judgment. See Cisco,
178 Ill. 2d  at 395; Greer v. Illinois Housing Development
Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 516 (1988); Maun, 299 Ill. App. 3d at
399.
	The State's error was evident to this court when we heard oral
argument. Why my colleagues have chosen to ignore it today is
something only they can account for. Perhaps they believe some
higher purpose will be served. Perhaps they want to spare the
Attorney General's office embarrassment. In either case, I cannot
condone their actions.
	The power to promulgate rules conferred on this court by the
Illinois Constitution does not carry with it any concomitant right to
disregard the rules whenever we are unhappy with the effect they
will have in a particular case. To the contrary, as author of the
rules, our court has a special duty to see that they are honored and
obeyed in every case, regardless of the circumstances. We sit above
all tribunals, save the United States Supreme Court. If this is to be
a government of laws, not men, we, above all others, must set the
example.
	Our court should not be an adjunct to the prosecution or an
apologist for the State. When the Attorney General's office makes
an error as fundamental as the one committed in this case, we do
a disservice when we look the other way. Lawyers entrusted with
responsibility for defending the laws of Illinois should at least be
able to correctly identify what laws they are supposed to be
defending. If something so basic is beyond their competence, what
will happen when they are called upon to protect the interests of
the people in cases where human life or public safety are at stake?
The consequences could be disastrous.
	The Attorney General's office has suffered chronic personnel
problems. Based upon requests for time extensions in other cases
pending before our court, it appears that turnover is high and
staffing inadequate. Work is not being completed as it should. In
one instance, People v. Barrow, No. 80332, delays were so
extreme that this court was forced to hold that the State had
forfeited its right to file a brief.
	The problem in this case may be symptomatic of these
difficulties. When too few people are forced to do too much work,
mistakes are inevitable. What can be done about this I do not
know. That is a matter for the Attorney General alone. All I know
is that if we say nothing and do nothing, the Attorney General will
have no incentive to put things in proper order. The problems will
continue unchecked. They will come back to confront us again, and
the people of Illinois will be the worse for it.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
La Salle County should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, also dissenting:
	I cannot join the majority opinion. This court should order the
appellant to brief the issue of whether section 11-501.4-1 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4-1 (West 1996)) is
unconstitutional. The appellant here addressed its opening brief to
the constitutionality of a different statutory section; namely, section
11-501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4
(West 1996)). The appellant's brief block-quotes section 11-501.4
and argues that this court should hold that statute constitutional.
	The appellee's brief makes no mention of the error. The
appellee's brief simply argues that section 11-501.4-1 is
unconstitutional. The appellee may not have noticed the appellant's
error because of the similarity in the numbering of the two separate
statutory provisions; however, it is possible that the appellee saw
the mistake and chose not to argue waiver.
	The failure of both parties to call the appellant's error to the
court's attention in a timely manner indicates that there may have
been a mutual mistake. Instead of issuing an opinion without
proper briefing, this court should issue an order directing the
parties to rebrief this cause. 
	JUSTICE RATHJE, also dissenting:
	The majority concludes its discussion of the separation of
powers issue by stating that this case "has nothing to do with
separation of powers." Slip op. at 3. Stated more accurately, this
case, as defined and argued by the State, has nothing to do with
section 11-501.4-1.
	According to the majority, the "issue in this case is the
constitutionality of section 11-501.4-1 of the Illinois Motor
Vehicle Code." Slip op. at 1. Curious. Apparently, I have received
a different set of briefs than my colleagues. In my copy of the
State's brief, the "Issue Presented for Review" is, "Whether the
trial court erred in declaring 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4 unconstitutional
and in granting Defendant's motion in limine to exclude
Defendant's blood test results." (Emphasis added.) The majority is
obviously deciding an appeal other than the one that the State has
presented to us.
	To be sure, the statute that the majority cites is the one that
the trial court held unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the State on
appeal decided to defend the constitutionality of a different statute.
Any notion that the "Issue Presented for Review" section merely
contains a typographical error is immediately dispelled when the
State quotes section 11-501.4 in its entirety and refers to that
statute no less than 15 times. The State consistently argues that
section 11-501.4 is constitutional. The argument that the State
should have made is that section 11-501.4-1 is constitutional. The
State did not make that argument and thus has forfeited its
challenge to the trial court's ruling. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)
("points not argued are waived"). Accordingly, the trial court's
judgment should be affirmed.
	Admittedly, in its reply brief, the State finally block quotes
section 11-501.4-1 and argues that this section is constitutional.
The State does so, however, without acknowledging its previous
mistake. Indeed, the State acts as if it has been arguing about this
statute all along. At this point, the State could no longer preserve
its argument. According to Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), "Points
not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in
oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." (Emphasis added.) At
oral argument, the State admitted that it was aware that it had
argued the wrong statute in its opening brief. In other words, the
State knew that it had argued the wrong statute, but took no
corrective action, such as seeking leave to file a corrected brief.
Instead, the State left this court with an opening brief that made no
sense and then slipped the correct statute into its reply brief
without acknowledging the problem.
	Apparently, Chief Justice Harrison and I are the only members
of this court bothered by the State's conduct in this case.(4) The
majority ignores the State's clear waiver and addresses the
constitutionality of Section 11-501.4-1. Not only does the
majority fail to criticize the State's conduct, the majority rewards
the State by making the State's argument for it and then deciding
the case in the State's favor. Justice Freeman asserts in his special
concurrence that "[a] majority of this court has seen fit to merely
admonish the attorney responsible for the violation." Slip op. at 10
(Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Miller and
McMorrow, JJ.). Where? I can find no instance in either the
majority opinion or in Justice Freeman's concurrence in which the
State is admonished. "Admonish" means "[t]o caution or advise.
To counsel against wrong practices, or to warn against danger of
an offense." Black's Law Dictionary 48 (6th ed. 1990). The
majority has nowhere cautioned the State against arguing the
wrong statute on appeal. Quite the contrary. The majority instead
assures the State that there are no consequences to its actions.
According to the majority, when the trial court holds a statute
unconstitutional, the State can defend the constitutionality of an
entirely different statute on appeal, and this court will simply
address the arguments the State should have made instead of the
ones the State actually made.
	Justice Freeman provides several defenses for the majority's
decision to ignore the fact that the State argued the wrong statute
on appeal. First, Justice Freeman scolds the dissenting justices for
criticizing the State and argues that this court should have given
the State notice of the problems in the brief and allowed it to
respond. Justice Freeman cites no  authority for the proposition
that this court must give the parties notice and an opportunity to
respond before finding an issue waived. Indeed, what would be the
purpose of the waiver rule if such a requirement existed?
	Next, Justice Freeman argues that the State should not have
sought leave to file a corrected brief because it acknowledged the
briefing problem at oral argument. The State, however,
acknowledged the problem only in response to a question from the
bench. The time for filing a corrected brief was when the State
realized that there was a significant deficiency in the brief. Instead
of doing so, the State argued the correct statute in its reply brief
without acknowledging the previous mistake. The State apparently
hoped that the court would not notice the mistake. I disagree with
Justice Freeman's conviction that this conduct is somehow beyond
reproach from this court.
	 Justice Freeman's final defense is that the State's brief
contains the proper argument but improper citations. According to
Justice Freeman, "clearly the State has supplied this court with an
argument such that Rule 341(e)(7) has been substantially complied
with." I must respectfully disagree with Justice Freeman's assertion
that a party substantially complies with Rule 341(e)(7) by devoting
its entire brief to arguing about a statute other than the one at issue
in the case.
	Section 11-501.4 addresses the admissibility in evidence of
blood tests conducted in the course of providing emergency
medical treatment. Section 11-501.4-1 addresses when the results
of blood tests taken during emergency treatment can be reported
to law enforcement officials. The entirety of the State's brief is
addressed to the admissibility of blood test results, not whether
those results can be reported to law enforcement officials. For
instance, Justice Freeman notes that the State's brief discusses out-of-state authority. True. The brief discusses out-of-state authority
that holds that similar blood test results are admissible. Justice
Freeman further assures the reader that the State's brief addresses
a patient's right to privacy in his or her medical records. Again,
Justice Freeman is correct. The State's argument on this issue is
captioned: "Admission of Defendant's blood test results does not
violate Defendant's fundamental right to privacy as guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Emphasis
added.)
	The clearest example of the State's confusion in this case
appears in section C of its brief,(5) where the State specifically
applies its arguments to the terms of the statute. In this section, the
State discusses the legislature's intent in passing section 11-501.4,
block quotes that statute, notes that it sets forth specific
requirements for the admission into evidence of blood test results,
explains why that statute is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and
argues that the statute meets the rational basis test. Thus, this is
not, as Justice Freeman claims, an example of an argument failing
to be "perspicuous." Slip op. at 10 (Freeman, J., specially
concurring, joined by Miller and McMorrow, JJ.). The State's
argument is entirely clear; it is just the wrong argument. My
colleagues in the majority claim that they can discern that an
argument about the evidentiary admissibility of blood test results
pursuant to section 11-501.4 is really an argument about turning
over blood test results to law enforcement officials pursuant to
section 11-501.4-1. I must take them at their word, but when I
read the State's argument about the admissibility of blood tests
pursuant to section 11-501.4, I discerned that it was precisely that.
	In sum, reviewing courts in this state should not become
advocates for, as well as judges of, points that an appellant seeks
to raise. Vernon Hills III Ltd. Partnership v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 303, 311 (1997). Here, my
colleagues in the majority are apparently content to play the dual
roles of both appellate advocates for the State and judges of the
appeal. I would prefer that they confine their duties to those of
justices of the Illinois Supreme Court.
1.      1In Biggs, the court addressed compliance with former Rule 39 of this
court. Rule 39 was the predecessor of our current Rule 341.

2.      2Section 11-501.4 deals with the admissibility at trial of chemical
blood and urine tests conducted in the course of providing emergency
treatment; section 11-501.4-1 permits disclosure of blood or urine tests,
used to detect the presence of alcohol or drugs, to law enforcement
officers.

3.      3The State is certainly guilty of several shortcomings in its brief. Rule
341(e) requires that every appellant's brief filed in an Illinois court of
review must contain certain delineated sections. The State's brief fails to
include an accurate "statement of the issue" presented for review. See
177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(3). In cases which involve the validity of a statute,
such as here, subsection (e)(5) requires that the statute be quoted
verbatim in a section that is to precede the statement of facts. The State's
brief fails to include such a section. As noted above, the argument section
of the brief cites to both sections 11-501.4 and 11-501.4-1 and, as such,
is confusing.

4.      4Justice Bilandic argues in a separate dissent that this court should
order the appellant to brief the issue of whether section 11-501.4-1 is
unconstitutional. This court has already done so. The State was ordered
to file its brief in this case on April 27, 1999.

5.     5There are two section Cs in the State's brief. I am referring to the one
that appears on pages 15 through 18.