Case Title: State ex rel. McVay v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-181

Docket Number: 19980547

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. McVay v. Indus. Comm., 86 Ohio St.3d 587, 1999-Ohio-181.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MCVAY v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. McVay v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 587.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s denial of application for an 
additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement vacated and 
cause returned to commission for further consideration and amended order, 
when. 
(No. 98-547 — Submitted August 25, 1999 — Decided September 22, 1999.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
Relator-claimant, Michelle M. McVay, was employed by Johnson 
Manufacturing Company (“Johnson”).  On August 19, 1992, while returning to her 
work station, she was struck by a towmotor.  The towmotor, placed into service in 
April 1977, did not have a visual warning system or continuously operating audible 
device.  It did, however, have a warning horn. 
 
After her workers’ compensation claim was allowed, claimant filed an 
application with respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio, alleging that Johnson 
had committed a violation of a specific safety requirement (“VSSR”), Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(C)(7).  That provision, effective January 1, 1986, provides 
that “[a]ll motor vehicles operating within the confines of the owner’s property 
shall be equipped with an audible or visual warning device, in an operable 
condition, activated at the operator’s station.” 
 
A staff hearing officer denied claimant’s application: 
 
“[F]or the reason that claimant has cited no specific safety requirement 
which was violated when the claimant sustained the injury of record. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“Specifically, it is found that the injury herein occurred when claimant 
walked into the path of the towmotor being operated on the employer’s premises, 
 
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and was struck.  This towmotor, purchased and placed in service by the employer 
in April of 1977, was not equipped with a continuously operating audible or visual 
device.  There is evidence that the regular horn on the towmotor worked. 
 
“Claimant has alleged a violation of [Ohio Adm.Code] 4121:1-5-13(C)(7), 
effective 1/1/86, and the corresponding section in the code effective 8/1/77 is 
41[2]1:1-5-13(C)(6).  With reference to 41[2]1:1-5-01(A), ‘Scope,’ and as this 
towmotor was placed in service in April of 1977, it is found that claimant has not 
cited a code section which applies, and the V.S.S.R. application must be denied.  
The IC-5 code in effect in April of 1977 contains no sections which apply to 
towmotors.” 
 
This cause is now before this court as an original action in mandamus to 
compel the commission to grant claimant’s VSSR application. 
__________________ 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
for relator. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, 
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Industrial Commission. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A), under which the disputed 
specific safety requirement falls, states in its “scope” provision: 
 
“Installations or constructions built or contracted for prior to the effective 
date (shown at the end of each rule) of any requirement shall be deemed to comply 
with the provisions of these requirements if such installations or constructions 
comply either with the provisions of these requirements or with the provisions of 
any applicable specific requirement which was in effect at the time contracted for 
or built.” 
 
The commission ruled that this grandfather clause rendered controlling those 
 
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specific safety requirements in effect when the towmotor was placed into service 
— April 1977.  Because there were at that time no provisions requiring a visual or 
audible warning device, the application was denied. 
 
Recently, in State ex rel. Colliver v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 
476, 705 N.E.2d 349, we held that a motorized mobile object is not “an installation 
or construction” for purposes of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A) and is not 
subject to the provision’s grandfather clause.  Accordingly, the present claimant’s 
VSSR application is governed by the specific safety requirements in effect on the 
date of injury. 
 
Here applicable, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(C)(7) required “[a]ll motor 
vehicles operating within the confines of the owner’s property” to have “an audible 
or visual warning device.”  The commission found that the towmotor had no 
“continuously operating audible or visual device,” but did have a working horn.  
The question thus remains for the commission to determine whether this horn 
satisfied the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(C)(7). 
 
Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus vacating the commission’s order 
and returning the cause to the commission for further consideration and amended 
order. 
Writ granted 
and cause returned. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.