Case Title: Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School Dist

Citation: 1991 WY 107

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cite as: 1991 WY 107,  Wyo., 816 P.2d __

CENTURY 
READY-MIX COMPANY; CHARLES NESS AND GLORIA NESS, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 

CAMPBELL 
COUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT; 
LOWER & COMPANY; TOM BARKER, D/B/A COOPER ENGINEERING & MATERIAL 
TESTING; RUNDQUIST & HARD; AND CHRIS HARD, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy, J. Judson, 
J.

 
 
H.W. 
Rasmussen, Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellants.

 
 
John 
A. Coppede, Redle, Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellee Campbell County School 
Dist.

 
 
Robert 
Brown, Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appellee Tom Barker d/b/a Cooper 
Engineering and Material Testing.

 
 
J. 
Stan Wolfe and S. Gregory Thomas, Banks, Johnson & Wolfe, Gillette, for appellee Chris Hard and Rundquist & 
Hard.

 
 
Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Century 
Ready-Mix Company (Century) appeals the trial court's orders granting summary 
judgment to appellees in this suit arising out of an agreement to provide 
concrete for an addition to CampbellCountyHigh 
School in Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issue:

 
 
[Whether] 
[t]he District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to Appellees, Campbell 
School District, Rundquist & Hard, P.C., and Chris Hard, and Tom Barker dba 
Cooper Engineering & Material Testing.

 
 

[¶3.]     We affirm the orders 
granting summary judgment.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     This case is before us 
a second time. In Century Ready-Mix 
Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692 (Wyo. 1989) (Century I), we reversed summary judgment 
entered against Century and in favor of Lower & Company, the general 
contractor. We are now faced with an appeal from orders granting summary 
judgment to the other defendants.

 
 

[¶5.]     Some of the facts 
presented here overlap those of our earlier opinion. In 1986, Campbell County 
School District (CCSD) decided to expand the CampbellCountyHigh 
School building in Gillette. CCSD let bids, and 
Lower & Company (Lower) was chosen as the general contractor for the 
project. Lower entered into a detailed, standard form agreement with 
CCSD.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellee Rundquist 
& Hard contracted with CCSD to provide architectural services. Rundquist 
& Hard signed a written standard-form contract with CCSD. Appellee Tom 
Barker, doing business as Cooper Engineering and Materials Testing (C.E. & 
M.T.), was hired by CCSD to do initial geotechnical investigation and to provide 
materials testing after construction began, apparently without a formal, written 
contract.1

 
 

[¶7.]     Century received a 
purchase order from Lower to supply concrete for the project. C.E. & M.T. 
tested samples of Century's concrete as it was poured. The results of some of 
the 28-day tests2 showed that the concrete samples 
failed to meet the design specifications required by the district. Specifically, 
the concrete broke at lower pressures than those required.

 
 

[¶8.]     Century then called in 
an independent expert to evaluate C.E. & M.T.'s testing procedures. The 
expert, William Rossi, found that C.E. & M.T.'s testing procedures did not 
meet American Concrete Institute (ACI) and American Society for Testing in 
Materials (ASTM) standards. He characterized the procedures used by C.E. & 
M.T. for testing Century's concrete as "the most careless and negligent 
procedures I had observed in 27 years of concrete 
testing."

Chris 
Hard, the architect, recommended to the school board that core samples of the 
concrete already in place be removed and tested. Testing showed that the 
concrete in place met the design requirements and 
specifications.

 
 

[¶9.]     The school board met on 
February 10, 1987. At this meeting, Chris Hard gave a progress report on 
construction of the high school addition. Larry Hite, one of the school board 
members, questioned Hard about the quantity of concrete already poured and then 
made a motion to stop the pouring of concrete until the testing problems could 
be worked out. During the discussion which ensued on this motion, Tom Barker of 
C.E. & M.T. stated that the unusual variations noticed in the stress the 
samples could handle was "probably a mistake in the ingredients." Barker 
suggested that the job ought to continue under "more intense investigative 
activities to lay the basis for design mix revision."

 
 

[¶10.]  Hite asked Chris Hard for his opinion 
whether there was a problem with continuing to pour. Hard responded that in his 
opinion there was no major problem. He indicated that the already-poured 
concrete met the specifications of the bid. Nevertheless, the board voted to 
suspend pouring.

 
 

[¶11.]  Barker then informed the board that an 
expert from the School of Mines in Rapid City had reviewed the procedures used 
on the projects and had indicated that the testing procedures were not the cause 
of the inconsistent test results. He stated that he "hoped" that the error was a 
product error, rather than a testing error.

 
 

[¶12.]  After the meeting, Hard telephoned Jack 
Ylitalo, Lower's project coordinator, and advised him of the board's ruling. 
Hard received a return call from Dennis Lower, Jr., who asked him whether 
pouring could continue if the concrete supplier were changed. Hard stated he 
would pass this request on to the board.

 
 

[¶13.]  Hard returned, at about 5:00 p.m., to the 
area where the board met. Most of the board members were still present. After 
explaining to board member Larry Hite that there may not have been a problem 
with the concrete, Hard presented Lower's proposal to change concrete suppliers 
to various board members, and got their assent. (Apparently, no formal motion 
was made, nor is there any indication of official action taken in the board 
minutes on this point). Hard then called Lower back and they agreed to proceed 
quickly with the new supplier. The new supplier began pouring the next 
day.

 
 

[¶14.]  Century sued Lower, the general 
contractor, for breach of contract. It sued CCSD for intentional interference 
with contract, negligent hiring, defamation, and breach of contract. It sued Tom 
Barker d/b/a C.E. & M.T. for negligence, intentional interference with 
contract, and defamation. It sued Chris Hard, individually, and Hard & 
Rundquist, P.C., for negligence and malpractice in breach of their contractual 
duties to the other defendants. The surviving claims involved in this appeal are 
against CCSD, Tom Barker d/b/a C.E. & M.T., and Chris Hard and Rundquist 
& Hard, P.C.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶15.]  Summary judgment is properly granted only 
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State of Wyoming v. Homar, 798 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 1990); Teton 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, LaramieCountySchool 
District No. One, 763 P.2d 843, 847 (Wyo. 1988). When 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment,

 
 
we 
review the judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same 
information. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the 
nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Material fact has been defined 
as one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an 
essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. 
Upon examination of a summary judgment, we view the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving him all favorable 
inferences which may be drawn from the facts.

 
 

Doud 
v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 
769 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 
(Wyo. 
1985)).

 
 

[¶16.]  If we can uphold summary judgment under 
the record presented under any proper legal theory, we will do so. Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, 918 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
Summary 
Judgment for CampbellCountySchool 
District

 
 
Defamation

 
 

[¶17.]  Century argues that issues of material 
fact remain concerning its defamation claim against the school district. The 
alleged defamatory statements were made during the school board meeting on 
February 10, 1987, and are contained in the minutes of that 
meeting:

 
 
A 
discussion ensued during which Mr. Barker explained that the concrete cores 
which are poured, cured and then broken vary unusually widely in the amount of 
stress they can handle. This is probably a mistake in the ingredients. The 
testing guidelines are set by the American Concrete Institute. Mr. Barker said 
his firm, C.E. & M.T., has been authorized to investigate everything that is 
going on at the site. The firm conducted an investigation as to procedure and is 
satisfied.

 
 
Later 
in the meeting, school board member Dr. Antrim asked, "If it is not a testing 
error, then is it a product error?" To which Mr. Barker responded, "That is what 
we hope, too."

 
 

[¶18.]  Century claims Barker, the owner of C.E. 
& M.T., was acting as an "agent" of the school board when he made these 
statements, and others, at the meeting. Further, Century argues that the school 
district is vicariously liable for the statements. Century concedes that C.E. 
& M.T. "qualified as an independent contractor" on the project, but attempts 
to argue that C.E. & M.T. was nevertheless an agent of the school board for 
purposes of Barker's statements.

 [¶19.]  Establishing the existence of an agency 
relationship is the burden of the asserting party. Czapla v. Grieves, 549 P.2d 650, 653 
(Wyo. 1976). 
Here, Century provides no cogent argument as to why independent contractor C.E. 
& M.T. or its owner, Tom Barker, should be considered an agent of the school 
board. Century's claim that the school board is vicariously liable for 
statements made by Tom Barker is unsupported. We hold that no agency 
relationship has been demonstrated between either Barker or C.E. & M.T. and 
the school board or school district sufficient to make the latter liable for 
Barker's statements.

 
 

[¶20.]  Nor, in our opinion, were the challenged 
statements defamatory. A defamatory statement is one which "tends to hold the 
plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, ridicule or scorn or which causes him to be 
shunned or avoided; one that tends to injure his reputation as to diminish the 
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which he is held." Tschirgi v. LanderWyomingState 
Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wyo. 1985). See also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton 
& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts § 111 at 773 (5th ed. 1984).

 
 

[¶21.]  Here, the statements made by Barker 
merely suggested that the mix was probably, or might have been, the problem with 
the test results. Barker's statements did not directly impute any misfeasance to 
Century. Nor did Barker recommend that any action be taken against Century, 
other than to continue to investigate what he saw as a problem with the mix. 
Under the circumstances, these statements were simply not defamatory. See Grande & Son, Inc. v. Chace, 333 
Mass. 166, 129 N.E.2d 898 (1955).

 
 

[¶22.]  For the reasons stated above, we affirm 
the order of summary judgment on Century's claim for defamation against 
CampbellCountySchool 
District.

 
 
Interference 
with Contract

 
 

[¶23.]  Century next asserts that summary 
judgment was inappropriate on its claim of interference with contractual 
relations. The trial court found that this claim was barred because it was not 
included within the waiver of immunity provided by the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act, W.S. 1-39-101 et seq. (June 1988 Repl.). We need not reach the issue 
of immunity because we hold that the school district's actions under the 
circumstances did not constitute interference with contract and were justified 
to protect its own interests.

 
 
A 
claim of intentional interference with contractual relations requires that the 
plaintiff show

 
 
(1) 
the existence of a valid contractual relationship;

(2) 
knowledge of the relationship on the part of the 
interferor;

(3) 
intentional and improper interference including or otherwise causing a breach or 
termination of the relationship; and

(4) 
resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been 
disrupted.

 
 

Dynan 
v. Rocky Mountain Federal Savings and Loan, 
792 P.2d 631, 641 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Dehnert v. Arrow Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846, 850 (Wyo. 1985)).

 
 

[¶24.]  We have recognized a privilege to 
interfere with contractual relations where the defendant, in good faith, asserts 
his own legally-protected interest which he believes may be impaired or 
destroyed by the performance of the contract. Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. 
Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 814 (Wyo. 1986). Here, the 
school district first acted to protect its own interests in not having 
questionable concrete poured. After it voted to stop pouring concrete, the board 
did not recommend that Century be fired. Board members merely assented to 
Lower's own decision to dismiss its subcontractor, again acting in the 
district's own interests in having the project move 
forward.

 
 

[¶25.]  The deposition testimony of the board 
members shows that the board did not take an active role in Lower's dismissal of 
Century. Larry Tanner stated that he was asked if he would have a problem if 
another supplier was on the job pouring concrete. He answered no, not as long as 
the project specifications were met. Daniel Siebersma remembered Hard asking 
board members whether Lower could start pouring again if it had another 
supplier. The response, as he remembered it, was that the board had instructed 
its architect and engineer that they could proceed with pouring when they were 
satisfied that the specifications could be met. James Galt stated that he told 
Chris Hard "[t]hat's not my problem. I don't have anything to do with the 
supplier. That's Lower's problem. If he's not satisfied, let him take care of 
it." Larry Hite stated that Chris Hard came to him after the board meeting and 
asked if they could continue pouring concrete if Lower used another concrete 
company until they found out what the problem was with the existing concrete 
company. Mr. Hite agreed to the request.

 
 

[¶26.]  In short, the school district did not 
"induce" or "otherwise cause" the breach of the relationship between Lower and 
Century. It merely acted to protect its own interests. There has been no showing 
that the district acted in bad faith. Its actions are privileged under our 
previous cases. Summary judgment was properly granted for CCSD and against 
Century on Century's claim of interference with contract.

 
 
Punitive 
Damages

 
 

[¶27.]  Since we affirm summary judgment for CCSD 
on Century's other claims, its claim for punitive damages must also fail, 
because there is no underlying claim to support it. Condict v. Condict, 664 P.2d 131, 136 n. 
3 (Wyo. 1983). 

 
 
Summary 
Judgment for Rundquist & Hard, P.C., and Chris 
Hard

 
 

[¶28.]  Century's claim against Rundquist & 
Hard and Chris Hard is based on negligence and malpractice. Century argues that 
Hard was responsible for overseeing the work and supervising construction and 
was responsible for providing arbitration concerning the quality of the concrete 
and that Hard breached these duties to Century.

 
 

[¶29.]  The trial court granted summary judgment 
to Rundquist & Hard and Chris Hard on the basis that they owed no 
contractual duty to Century on which to base Century's claim. The duty of care 
architects owe to contractors in the absence of contract is discussed in 
Annotation, Tort Liability of Project 
Architect for Economic Damages Suffered by Contractor, 65 A.L.R. 3rd 249, § 
2(a) (1975). The annotation notes that a majority of jurisdictions now recognize 
a tort duty of care in the absence of contractual privity. However, we do not 
need to reach this issue, because we hold that the architects in this case did 
not fail to use reasonable care in obtaining or relaying information for the 
school district.

 
 

[¶30.]  Century fails to show that Chris Hard and 
Rundquist & Hard, P.C., acted negligently by virtue of Hard's statements to 
the board. Although he informed the board of the "erratic breaks", Hard also 
told the board that in his opinion there was no "major problem" with Century's 
continuing to pour concrete. Once the board voted to suspend pouring by Century, 
Chris Hard acted only as a messenger for Lower's proposals to the board but 
there is no evidence that he himself recommended that the board change 
subcontractors. No evidence exists that Hard failed to use reasonable care in 
obtaining or relaying the information to the school 
district.

 
 

[¶31.]  Century further argues that Hard and his 
firm breached a duty to arbitrate the dispute over the quality of the concrete. 
The trial court found that there was no arbitration clause of record except for 
the one contained in Rundquist & Hard's contract with CCSD. That clause 
contains the following provision: "No arbitration, arising out of or relating to 
this Agreement, shall include, by consolidation, joinder or in any other manner, 
any additional person not a party to this agreement except by written consent 
9*9 9*9 9*9."

 
 

[¶32.]  Century was not a party to the agreement 
and did not obtain the parties' consent. Thus, the arbitration clause did not 
impose a duty upon Hard and his firm to arbitrate Century's concern over 
concrete testing.

 
 

[¶33.]  Century argues that the "ACI Manual of 
Concrete Practice 1983" and the "ASTM Standards C94" were made part of the 
project specifications. Century claims that the ACI Manual provision requires 
the architect to ensure that qualified and conscientious inspectors are on the 
job. The ASTM standard, it says, requires the architect to arbitrate disputes in 
case there is a dispute concerning the quality of ready-mix delivered to the job 
site. However, neither the Manual section nor the applicable standard is 
included in the record on appeal before this court. This means we have nothing 
before us to consider regarding these claims. This court will not consider 
factual recitations in briefs unless supported in the record. Hayes v. American 
National Bank of Powell, 784 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶34.]  We hold that the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment on Century's claims against Rundquist & Hard, P.C. 
and Chris Hard.

 
 
Summary 
Judgment for Tom Barker d/b/a C.E. & M.T.

 
 
Negligence

 
 

[¶35.]  The trial court granted summary judgment 
against Century on its negligence claim against Barker on the ground that 
"[t]here can be no liability for pecuniary harm, which does not involve physical 
harm, because of the negligent acts of another." The court cited Champion Well Services v. NL Industries, 
769 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1989) for this 
proposition.

 
 

[¶36.]  We cannot agree with the trial court that 
Champion precludes all economic 
damages for pecuniary harm in the absence of physical harm. Champion merely holds that such damages 
may not be recovered by an employer for the loss of his employee's services. 
However, we affirm summary judgment on another ground cited by the trial court: 
that C.E. & M.T.'s communication of test results to the school board was not 
the proximate cause of Century's injuries.

 
 

[¶37.]  The elements of a cause of action for 
negligence include: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff; (2) a breach, or violation 
of that duty; (3) which is the proximate cause of (4) plaintiff's injuries. MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990). We discussed 
the concept of proximate cause in Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989) (citation omitted): "Proximate 
cause is the concept `that the accident or injury must be the natural and 
probable consequence of the act of negligence.' Proximate cause is normally a 
question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree."

 
 

[¶38.]  In this case the evidence presented is 
such that reasonable minds could not disagree. We hold as a matter of law that 
C.E. & M.T.'s actions were not the proximate cause of Century's injuries. 
After he discussed the initial test results with the board, Tom Barker did not 
recommend that Lower terminate its relationship with Century. Instead, he 
recommended that concrete pouring continue under careful scrutiny. The board 
voted, in spite of his recommendation, to stop pouring. Subsequently, Lower 
fired Century, without affirmative action on Barker's 
part.

 
 

[¶39.]  The ultimate harm, which forms the injury 
component of Century's cause of action, was in Lower's termination of Century 
from the project. Lower's actions were not the natural and forseeable 
consequences of Tom Barker's reports to the board or of any faulty concrete 
tests. Lower acted independently and its actions were an independent, 
intervening cause of Century's harm.

 
 
An 
intervening cause is one that comes into being after a defendant's negligent act 
has occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable event it will insulate the 
defendant from liability. It is reasonably foreseeable if it is a probable 
consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to the 
stimulus of the situation created thereby.

 
 

Buckley 
v. Bell, 
703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

[¶40.]  The causation element of negligence was 
not established here. Summary judgment was therefore properly granted on 
Century's negligence claim against Tom Barker d/b/a C.E. & 
M.T.

 
 
Interference 
with Contract

 
 

[¶41.]  As stated by the trial court, Barker did 
not advise Lower to terminate its contract with Century. Barker did nothing to 
"induce" or "cause" Lower to terminate its contract. Therefore, by definition, 
there can be no liability for interference with contractual relations. Dynan, 792 P.2d  at 
641.

 
 
Defamation

 
 

[¶42.]  As stated elsewhere in this opinion, 
Barker's statements to the board were not defamatory. Therefore, the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment on Century's defamation claim against Barker 
and C.E. & M.T.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶43.]  The trial court's orders granting summary 
judgment in favor of CCSD, Tom Barker d/b/a C.E. & M.T. and Chris Hard and 
Rundquist & Hard, P.C., are affirmed, as there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
In its brief C.E. & M.T. makes reference to the "terms of a contract" with 
the school district, but provides no citation for any written contract entered 
into the record embodying these "terms". In his deposition, Tom Barker stated 
that he had no written contract with the school board but that C.E. & M.T. 
served "at the pleasure of the school district."

 
 

2 
The affidavit of Century's expert contained in the record describes the testing 
process as follows:

 
 
(1) 
Samples of concrete are placed into molds to form 
cylinders.

(2) 
The cylinders are cured under strict temperature and humidity controls, and 
tested at regular intervals, e.g. 7, 
14 and 28 days, with a minimum of two cylinders being tested after 28 
days.

(3) 
The cylinders are "capped" to insure a dead level load-bearing surface for step 
4; and

(4) 
Finally, the cylinders are compressed along the longitudinal axis by a 
calibrated hydraulic ram until they fail.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring and dissenting.

 
 

[¶44.]  I concur with the reasoning and 
disposition of the majority in affirming summary judgment in the claims 
presented against the CampbellCountySchool 
District and against the architects, Rundquist & 
Hard, P.C., and Chris Hard, individually. However, I conclude that summary 
judgment was inappropriately granted to Tom Barker, d/b/a Cooper Engineering 
& Material Testing, a soils and material testing lab service, which on this 
record negligently started the entire process causing appellant to lose its 
contract and consequently sustain significant damages.

 
 

[¶45.]  To that extent, with application of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977), which does provide a proper basis 
for liability, I respectfully dissent. Furthermore, this is another case of the 
court functioning as a fact finder in order to justify summary judgment, which 
is inappropriate because it contravenes established and broadly applied legal 
principles.

 
 
I.

 
 
INTRODUCTION

 
 

[¶46.]  My dissent is confined to the portion of 
the majority opinion that determines the testing lab cannot be held liable to 
Century Ready-Mix, a concrete supplier, on a theory of negligence. The majority 
concludes that Cooper Engineering & Material Testing's communication of test 
results to the School Board was not the proximate cause of Century Ready-Mix's 
injuries. The majority correctly states that "`[p]roximate cause is normally a 
question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree.'" Stephenson v. Pacific Power 
& Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶47.]  However, I disagree with the majority's 
proposition that "[i]n this case the evidence 9*9 9*9 9*9 is such that 
reasonable minds could not disagree." Unless this court would be willing to 
reverse a jury's finding of negligence on the basis of insufficiency of 
evidence1 had this case gone to trial, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. Therefore, I conclude that summary judgment 
was improper on the issue of Cooper Engineering & Material Testing's 
negligence.

 
 
II.

 
 
ISSUE 
PRESENTED

 
 

[¶48.]  Century Ready-Mix seeks to impose 
liability upon Cooper Engineering & Material Testing for negligently 
performing and reporting the testing of concrete poured by Century Ready-Mix. It 
claims that negligence caused Lower & Company, the general contractor, to 
breach its contract with Century Ready-Mix, resulting in damages to Century 
Ready-Mix. Cooper Engineering & Material Testing maintains that even 
assuming that they were negligent, Century Ready-Mix cannot recover for 
pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm if that harm results from 
negligently causing a third person (Lower & Company) to breach its contract 
with Century Ready-Mix. See Champion Well 
Service, Inc. v. NL Industries, 769 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

[¶49.]  The majority distinguishes Champion and 
disagrees with the proposition that Champion precludes all economic damages for 
pecuniary harm in the absence of physical harm. It then affirms summary judgment 
on proximate cause grounds. I agree that a proper basis for liability was 
pleaded and shown in summary judgment evidence. Unfortunately, the majority 
assumes a fact finding responsibility and misapplies summary judgment precepts 
in determining proximate cause did not exist as a matter of law. See England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 
1150 (Wyo. 
1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. 

 
 
III.

 
 
ANALYSIS

 
 

[¶50.]  Traditionally, attempts by injured third 
parties to recover for damages arising out of the negligent performance of a 
contractual duty fail because of lack of privity. See Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) and see 
generally 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence, § 123 (1989). Courts first 
discarded the requirement of privity in product liability cases based on 
negligence. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The basis of liability may be 
negligent misrepresentation. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 
(1957). Damages in product liability suits have not been limited to physical 
injury; recovery has also been permitted for economic loss. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). An exhaustive review of economic loss 
damages is provided in Continental Ins. 
v. Page Engineering Co., 783 P.2d 641, 666-82 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶51.]  Courts, upon abandonment of the privity 
requirement, expanded tort liability by holding that a third party, not in 
privity of contract with a professional person or entity, may recover for 
negligence which proximately causes a foreseeable economic injury to him.2 The general principle is delineated 
in Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, 
§ 552 (Topic 3. Negligent Misrepresentation).3

 
 

[¶52.]  The case of Howell v. Fisher, 49 N.C. App. 488, 272 S.E.2d 19 (1980) is illustrative of this line of cases. A corporation engaged in 
mineral exploration entered into a contract with a geological engineering firm 
to perform a geological feasibility study on tracts of land the corporation had 
leased. The engineering firm's favorable report was given to potential investors 
who invested in the corporation and became shareholders. Shortly after the 
corporation started mining the tract, it was discovered that the quality, 
quantity and value of the minerals in the tract did not conform to the 
engineering firm's representations in its report. The corporation subsequently 
became insolvent.

 
 

[¶53.]  The shareholders sued the geological 
engineering firm for negligent preparation of the soil testing report. The 
North Carolina 
court held that the shareholders' claim was a proper action for negligent 
misrepresentation which could be brought absent privity of contract to recover 
pecuniary loss where damages to identified third parties were reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant.

 
 

[¶54.]  In determining that negligence liability 
should be imposed to protect the foreseeable interests of third parties not in 
privity of contract, the Howell court 
relied on Prosser:

 
 
"[B]y 
entering into a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a 
relation toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in 
tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured. The 
incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does not negative the 
responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a course of affirmative conduct 
which may be expected to affect the interests of another 
person."

 
 

Howell, 
272 S.E.2d  at 23 (quoting Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 93 at 622 (4th 
ed. 1971)).

 
 

[¶55.]  In the instant case, Century Ready-Mix is 
seeking to recover pecuniary loss it suffered as a result of Cooper Engineering 
& Material Testing's negligence in the absence of privity of contract. If 
Century Ready-Mix's damages were reasonably foreseeable by Cooper Engineering 
& Material Testing, Century Ready-Mix's cause of action is proper under this 
line of cases.

 
 

[¶56.]  By affirming summary judgment on 
proximate cause grounds, the majority has gone half way by abandoning the 
privity requirement to now recognize that a third party, not in privity of 
contract with a professional person or entity, may recover for negligence which 
proximately causes a foreseeable economic injury to him. I believe this 
expansion of tort liability is the correct approach as the duty is defined by 
reasonably foreseeable consequences and parties.

 
 

[¶57.]  To reach the issue of proximate cause, 
the majority has recognized that Cooper Engineering & Material Testing owed 
a duty of care in performing and reporting the compression strength test not 
only to the School Board that had hired it, but also to Century Ready-Mix. The 
majority also necessarily assumed that Cooper Engineering & Material Testing 
breached its duty to Century Ready-Mix, a conclusion that is adequately 
supported by the record. The remaining elements of a cause of action for 
negligence are proximate cause and injury. MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990). 

 
 
IV.

 
 
PROXIMATE 
CAUSE

 
 

[¶58.]  Proximate cause means the accident or 
injury must be the natural and probable cause of the act of negligence. Fiedler v. Steger, 713 P.2d 773 
(Wyo. 1986); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 
(Wyo. 1983). 
As cited earlier, "`[p]roximate cause is normally a question of fact unless the 
evidence is such that reasonable minds could not disagree.'" Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 1178. Support 
for this position can be found in Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 45 at 
321 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting Healy v. 
Hoy, 115 Minn. 321, 132 N.W. 208 
(1911)):

 
 
[I]n 
any case where there might be reasonable difference of opinion as to the 
foreseeability of a particular risk, the reasonableness of the defendant's 
conduct with respect to it, or the normal character of an intervening cause, the 
question is for the jury, subject of course to suitable instructions from the 
court as to the legal conclusion to be drawn as the issue is determined either 
way. By far the greater number of the cases which have arisen have been of this 
description; and to this extent it may properly be said that "proximate cause is 
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good 
common sense in the consideration of the evidence of each particular 
case."

 
 

[¶59.]  The majority concludes that Lower & 
Company's actions (termination of Century Ready-Mix from the project) were not 
the "natural and foreseeable consequences of Tom Barker's reports to the board 
or of any faulty concrete tests" and that such actions were an "independent, 
intervening cause of Century's harm."

 
 

[¶60.]  The majority then quotes Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 
(Wyo. 1985) 
(emphasis added) to support its conclusion:

 
 
"An 
intervening cause is one that comes into being after defendant's negligent act 
has occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable event it will insulate the 
defendant from liability. It is reasonably foreseeable if it is a probable 
consequence of defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to the stimulus of the 
situation created thereby."

 
 

[¶61.]  It is reasonable to conclude that the 
normal, usual and expected response to the communication of the unfavorable test 
results would be that the concrete supplier would be terminated and another 
obtained. It was a probable consequence that the School Board, upon receiving 
the report, would request that the contractor cease pouring more concrete and 
just as probable for the contractor, in response, to immediately hire a new 
concrete subcontractor. Therefore, I conclude that Lower Company's intervening 
actions were reasonably foreseeable as a normal response to the stimulus Cooper 
Engineering & Material Testing created by negligently testing the concrete 
and reporting erroneous test results to the School Board.

 
 

[¶62.]  In a Wyoming case addressing the issue of proximate 
cause, Justice Blume quoted Prosser on Torts at 324 on the subject of 
intervening cause:

 
 
"If 
the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's 
loss, it follows that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because 
other causes, such as the negligence of other persons, have contributed to the 
result."

 
 
He 
continued:

 
 
If 
the original wrongdoer "could have anticipated that the intervening act of 
negligence might, in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act of 
negligence, the person first in fault is not released from liability by reason 
of intervening negligence of another." Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 
Rev.Ed., Section 38.

 
 

Phelps 
v. Woodward Const. Co., 
66 Wyo. 33, 
204 P.2d 179, 187 (1949). See also 
Chandler v. Dugan, 70 Wyo. 439, 251 P.2d 580 
(1952).

 
 

[¶63.]  I dissent from the majority's absolution 
of liability in favor of the negligent concrete tester in its performance of 
contractual responsibilities for three reasons. First, the School Board, for its 
benefit and use by other participants, employed Cooper Engineering & 
Material Testing to be accurate, not erroneous. Services required of a testing 
lab are physically capable of accuracy and, thus, it is appropriate to expect 
accuracy.

 
 

[¶64.]  Starting first with the notion that an 
accurate test was anticipated, I would question the conclusion that termination 
of the concrete supplier following test result failure was unusual, unexpected 
or inflicted by intervening cause. No one in the construction business can 
afford to gamble on bad concrete in building construction. If the concrete 
supplier fails to meet test requirements, termination of the concrete supplier 
from the job site is clearly inevitable. Quality is of the essence of the 
product and service to be provided by the concrete 
supplier.

 
 

[¶65.]  Second, the majority unduly interjects 
intervening cause into its analysis where composite factors create the result. 
The decision almost reaches back to the now forsaken days when any contributory 
negligence foreclosed total recovery. Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796 (1952); Johnston v. Vukelic, 67 Wyo. 1, 213 P.2d 925 
(1950). See Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28 (1973) and in present form W.S. 1-1-109, 
comparative negligence. The "any degree of fault and you get nothing" concept 
was abolished by legislative adoption of the comparative negligence statute, but 
that thesis now seems to achieve a rebirth by a similar application of 
intervening cause. Obviously the bad test results, negligently provided, caused 
the termination of Century Ready-Mix as the supplier. Any other analysis only 
achieves a play on words. Whether we pursue proximate cause and intervening 
cause in terms of "legal cause" or "foreseeability", England, 
728 P.2d  at 1150, the conduct of the testing lab fails a liability standard 
under any one. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, § 430 
(Necessity of Adequate Casual Relation); § 431 (What Constitutes Legal Cause); 
and § 435 (Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its 
Occurrence).

 
 

[¶66.]  The third problem presented by the 
majority is the generic effect of using proximate cause to not so discreetly 
destroy the entire principle of recovery provided by Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra, § 552. In this context, 
the majority disregards a singular volume of cases, only a few of which I have 
provided in footnote two of this dissent. Countervailing authority, which 
clarifies that action of the contracting principal does not manufacture an 
intervening cause, is obvious within the volume of cases cited under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, § 552 and, additionally, those addressing the general 
subject of third party reliance on negligently furnished information. See Allen, Liabilities of Architects and Engineers to 
Third Parties, 22 Ark.L.Rev. 454 (1968); Boston, Liability of Attorneys to Nonclients in Michigan: A 
Re-examination of Friedman v. Dozorc and a Rule of Limited Liability, 68 
U.Det.L.Rev. 307 (1991); Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 
Vand.L.Rev. 231 (1966); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 93 at 622 (4th 
ed. 1971); Annotation, What Constitutes 
Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other Than Immediate 
Client, 61 A.L.R.4th 464 (1988); Annotation, Negligence in Preparing Abstract of Title as 
Ground of Liability to One Other Than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 A.L.R.4th 
314 (1986); and Annotation, Tort 
Liability of Project Architect for Economic Damages Suffered by Contractor, 
65 A.L.R.3d 249 (1975). See also Survey, 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 Nova 
L.Rev. 1285 (1991).

 
 
V.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶67.]  Cooper Engineering & Material 
Testing's testing of the concrete and reporting the results created the 
situation that served as the stimulus for the actions of the School Board and 
Lower & Company. Thus, Cooper Engineering & Material Testing's conduct 
was the motivating factor, if not the predominate cause, in contract termination 
and consequent loss sustained by Century Ready-Mix. I conclude that a reasonable 
difference of opinion exists as to the foreseeability of harm to Century 
Ready-Mix and the effect of the intervening actions of the contractor who was 
faced with a job shutdown when the concrete tested bad. 

 
 
Both 
issues of actual negligence and proximate cause should have been jury questions. 
Consequently, I respectfully dissent from this summary judgment of liability 
when negligent performance clearly caused the damages 
sustained.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1

The 
standard of review applied by this Court when [following trial] the sufficiency 
of the evidence is at issue is well settled. [At that juncture], [w]e assume 
that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, leaving out of consideration 
the evidence presented by the other party in conflict therewith, and giving 
every favorable inference to the evidence of the successful party that may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1987); M & 
M Welding, Inc. v. Pavlicek, 713 P.2d 236 (Wyo. 1986). The findings of the trial court 
are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed by this Court unless they 
are clearly erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. Eddy v. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. - Lander, 750 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 1988); Pancratz Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

O's 
Gold Seed Co. v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 
761 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 
The 
test for entry of summary judgment when factual issues are presented is 
singularly different. Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987); Cordova 
v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

2 
See Donnelly Const. Co. v. 
Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292 (1984) (architect liable 
on negligence theory to contractor for increased cost of construction due to 
error in plans and specifications); Guardian Const. Co. v. Tetra Tech 
Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del.Super. 1990) (lack of contractual 
privity between design engineer and general contractor and subcontractor was not 
fatal to negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims against design 
engineer, notwithstanding fact that contractor and subcontractor were seeking 
purely economic damages); Hodges v. 
Smith, 517 A.2d 299 (Del.Super. 1986) (surveyor had duty to anyone who might 
foreseeably rely on survey to conduct survey with reasonable care); Calandro Development, Inc. v. R.M. Butler 
Contr., Inc., 249 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1971) (engineer or architect must be 
deemed to know that his services are for protection not only of owner's interest 
but also surety on contractor's performance bond); Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (abstractor of title liable to foreseeable third parties not 
in privity of contract who relied on the abstract); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & 
Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973) (third party, not in privity of contract 
with a public accountant, has a claim against the accountant for alleged 
negligent audit opinion relied upon by the third party to its damage); Davidson and Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover 
County, 41 N.C. App. 661, 255 S.E.2d 580 (1979) (lack of privity of contract 
does not render engineering firm immune from liability to general contractor or 
subcontractor for damages proximately resulting from submitting bid or 
conducting work in reliance on negligently prepared soil test reports. 
Architect, in absence of privity of contract, may be sued by general contractor 
or subcontractor for economic loss foreseeably resulting from architect's breach 
of duty of due care in performance of contract with owner); Tartera v. Palumbo, 224 Tenn. 262, 453 S.W.2d 780 (1970) (surveyor hired by purchaser of property may be liable to 
third person for economic losses arising out of negligent survey); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) (lack of privity between an accountant and a relying third 
party is not a defense to the accountant's negligence where the accountant is 
aware of the fact that his work will be relied on by parties who may extend 
credit to his client or assume his client's obligations); Costa v. Neimon, 123 Wis.2d 410, 366 N.W.2d 896, 899 (1985) (real estate appraiser hired by lender should have 
foreseen that prospective buyer was "`within the ambit'" of harm which could 
result from carelessly done appraisal and thus purchasers could recover from 
appraiser for negligent appraisal); and A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 
62 Wis.2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974) (architect's failure to properly consider 
subsoil condition is negligence rendering architect liable to tenants 
notwithstanding lack of privity).

 
 
Additionally, 
there has been a significant increase in the number and types of cases where 
attorneys have been found liable to third parties for malpractice. See Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to 
Render Attorney Liable to Person Other Than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R.4th 
464 (1988). See also Licata v. 
Spector, 26 Conn. Sup. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966) and Security Nat. Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833 
(D.C.App. 1973).

Two 
very well reasoned cases are found from Florida 
law: First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Maximum 
Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990) 
(involving an accountant) and A.R. Moyer, 
Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) (involving an architect or 
engineer).

 
 

3 
This case fits closely within Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 552, illustration 
9:

 
 
The 
City of A is 
about to ask for bids for work on a sewer tunnel. It hires B Company, a firm of 
engineers, to make boring tests and provide a report showing the rock and soil 
conditions to be encountered. It notifies B Company that the report will be made 
available to bidders as a basis for their bids and that it is expected to be 
used by the successful bidder in doing the work. Without knowing the identity of 
any of the contractors bidding on the work, B Company negligently prepares and 
delivers to the City an inaccurate report, containing false and misleading 
information. On the basis of the report C makes a successful bid, and also on 
the basis of the report D, a subcontractor, contracts with C to do a part of the 
work. By reason of the inaccuracy of the report, C and D suffer pecuniary loss 
in performing their contracts. B Company is subject to liability to B and to 
D.

 
 

See M. 
Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).