Case Title: Louisiana v. Martin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2011-K-0082

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA,
No. 2011-K-0082
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS.
OCT 25 zon
TERRANCE A. MARTIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
‘THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU

CLARK, Justice.
fn fe ‘We granted a writ to consider whether the defendant was seized when a police
LW / officer asked for his identification in order to check for outstanding warrants, and
then asked the defendant if he had anything illegal on his person while retaining the
defendant's identification. Under the scant facts presented here, we find there was
4 of nothing in the conduct of the officer which decisively changed the consensual nature
Ca, of the officer’s brief encounter with the defendant such that Fourth Amendment
CDK protections were implicated. Thus, we find the district court did not abuse its
By at siscretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the drugs which the
defendant voluntarily admitted having on his person.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
‘The facts of this encounter were adduced at a suppression hearing held in this
‘matter, during which Cpl. Matthew Gibbs of the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office
described his encounter with the defendant, Terrance A. Martin, on August 16,2009.
On that date, the officer saw the defendant in the parking lot of the Five Star
convenience store in Moss Bluff, Louisiana, as the officer was walking in, and the
defendant was walking out. The officer was in uniform. The two men knew each
other and Cpl. Gibbs asked the defendant how he was doing. Because he knew that

the defendant “had been in some trouble in Lake Charles,” the officer asked the

Gahan g. daeien B tnd erties Maron’
’
defendant for his identification to check for outstanding warrants. The two men
talked fora little while. Cpl. Gibbs noticed the defendant was nervous and sweating
profusely, unusual behavior not characteristic of their previous encounters at football
‘games and other civic functions when their paths would cross and they would “laugh,
joke, cutup.” Presumably while retaining the defendant's identification, and based

on his observations of Martin's uncharacteristic behavior, Cpl. Gibbs inquired

 

whether the defendant had anything illegal on him, The defendant replied he had four
Soma pills in his pocket. The officer retrieved the pills from the defendant's pocket
and placed him under arrest for possession of Carisoprodol, a Schedule IV controlled
dangerous substance. At some point in the encounter, which is not further described,
the officer ran a warrant check on the defendant which proved negative.

‘On October 21, 2009, the defendant was charged by bill of information with
possession of Carisoprodol (Soma), a violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). The defense
filed a motion to suppress, combined with a request for a preliminary examination,
as to this charge and other charges pending against the defendant. The motions in
these cases, as well as a probation revocation, were combined for hearing. After a
hearing held on February 10, 2010, the district court found probable cause for the
instant charge and denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The district court also
revoked the defendant's probation for prior convictions and imposed the previously
suspended sentence.

Immediately following this ruling, the defendant pleaded guilty to the instant
charge, reserving his right to contest the district court’s ruling on the suppression

motion pursuant to State v, Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). As part of the plea

 

agreement, the state dismissed the charges pending in the unrelated docket number

and agreed not to file a habitual offender bill against the defendant. The district court
then sentenced Martin to five year

  

iprisonment at hard labor, to run concurrently.
with the sentences imposed after the probation revocation.

On appeal, Martin argued the district court erred in denying his motion to

 

suppress and in imposing an excessive sentence, As to the suppression motion, the
defendant contended Cpl. Gibbs did not have reasonable suspicion a crime had been,
was being, or was about to be committed at the time the officer asked for his
identification, ran the warrant check or continued to ask him questions. Because the
officer had no reason to detain Martin or to question him, the defendant argued on
appeal that any evidence seized as a result of the illegal detention should have been
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371
US. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

A majority of the court of appeal panel agreed with Martin. See State v.
Martin, 2010-0588 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/8/10); $4 So.3d 111. The appellate pane!
majority and the dissent had no disagreement that Cpl. Gibbs did not initially “seize”
Martin by stopping at the threshold of the Five Star to engage him in conversation.
However, for the majority of the panel, the crux ofthe case was the officer’s decision
toretain Martin's identification for purposes of running a warrant check. Because the
officerhad gone “astep further and detained defendant to check for outstanding arrest
warrants,” the majority concluded the casual conversation ended “because the
Defendant was no longer free to disregard Corporal Gibbs’ questions and walk
away.” Id., 2010-0588, p. 5; 54 So.3d at 115. The appellate majority thus held, at

that point, “[tJhe stop became forcible, an intrusion upon the Defendant's liberty

 

and/or privacy, when Corporal Gibbs asked the Defendant for his identification to
check for outstanding warrants.” Jd. Finding the officer's testimony “did not include

any articulable facts or particularized suspicions about the Defendant’s involvement
incriminal conduct prior to detaining him,” the appellate majority held the officer had
an insufficient basis under La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A) for detaining Martin." [d.,2010-

0588, p. 7; 54 So.3dat 116. “{V]

 

ng the picture as a whole,” the court of appeal
majority found the district court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress,
and reversed and set aside the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id?

‘The dissenting appellate judge found nothing in the encounter between the
officer and the defendant which implicated Fourth Amendment concerns. The dissent
emphasized both men knew each other “from previous encounters around town such
as football games and other civic functions.” Jd., 2010-0588, p. 2; 54 So.2d at 118
(Amy, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the acquaintanceship underscored
that defendant “voluntarily complied with the officer’s request for identification,” and
voluntarily “offered a response to the officer’s potentially incriminating question.”
Id., 2010-0588, p. 2; 54 So.3d at 117 (Amy, J., dissenting). The dissent thus
concluded that there was “no evidence that the defendant's response to the officer
was coerced.” Id.

This court granted the state’s writ application to consider the correctness of the
ruling of the court of appeal majority. State v. Martin, 2011-0082 (La. 6/17/11); 63
So.3d 1042.

LAW AND DISCUSSION
This matter is before us for a determination of whether the court of appeal erred

in reversing a trial court ruling which denied defendant's motion to suppress physical

* La. C.CeP. art 215.1(A) states: “A. A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a
public place witom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to com
offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.” The right of
law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate persons reasonably suspected of criminal conduct
is recognized, as well, by both state and federal jurisprudence. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 88
‘S.Ct, 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Stare . Morgan, 2009-2352, p. 6 (La. 3/18/11); 59 So.3d 403,
407-408.

 

> The court of appeal did not reach the defendant's assignment of error regarding
‘excessiveness of sentence, finding its ruling on the suppression issue made ths alleged error moot.

4

 
evidence, The State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of the evidence
seized without a warrant when the legality of a search or seizure is placed at issue by
motion to suppress evidence. La. C.Cr-P. art. 703(D). A trial court's decision
relative to the suppression of evidence is afforded great weight and will not be set
aside unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. Wells, 2008-2262, p.
5 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So.3d 577, 581.

‘The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La, Const, at
1,§ 5 guarantee citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
‘The Fourth Amendment provides that the people shall “be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ....” La
Const. art. 1, § 5 provides in pertinent part: “Every person shall be secure in his
person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable,
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”

Clearly, not all encounters between law enforcement and individual citizens

constitute “seizures.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879

 

1, 16., 20 L.Bd.2d 889 (1968), Federal jurisprudence has concluded that a “seizure
occurs “[oJaly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Id. This court has held, “[u)nder
Louisiana's slightly broader definition of the term, a seizure may also occur ‘when
the police come upon an individual with such force that, regardless of the individual's
attempt to flee or elude the encounter, an actual stop of the individual is virtually

certain [to occur]. State v. Sylvester, 2001-0607, p. 3 (La. 9/20/02); 826 So.24 1106,

1108, quoting State v. Tucker, 626 So.2d 707, 712 (La. 1993).

> La.C.CrP. art 703(D) provides in pertinent part: “On the tal fa motion to suppress filed
under the provisions ofthis Article, ... the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility
‘of a purported confession or statement by the defendant or of any evidence seized without a
warrant."
‘The Supreme Court has recognized three distinct types of police-citizen
interactions with accompanying levels of justification to establish that the
government action was reasonable or necessary: (1) arrest, which must be supported
by probable cause, see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 799,

157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003); (2) brief investigatory stops, which must be supported by

reasonable articulable suspicion, see Terry, 392 US. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 188(

 

nd (3)
brief encounters between police and citizens, which requireno objective justification,
see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2383, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389
(1991). Under Louisiana law, the same levels of justification are needed to find
reasonable each of these three types of police/citizen interactions. See State v.
Anthony, 1998-0406, p. 19 (La. 4/11/00); 776 So.2d 376, 389 (probable cause needed
for arrest); La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A) (reasonable suspicion needed for temporary
investigatory stop); and State v. Sherman, 2005-0779, p. 7 (La. 4/4/06); 931 So.2d
286, 291 (mere communication implicates no Fourth Amendment concerns).

In this case, the state contends the facts show a consensual encounter between
a law enforcement officer and a pedestrian, According to the state, no Fourth
Amendment protections, or protections under the state constitution, were implicated
or violated by any of Cpl. Gibbs’ actions. ‘The defense disagrees, arguing the
officer's retention of his identification in order to check for outstanding warrants, as
well as the retention of his identification while asking potentially incriminating
questions, changed the nature of the police/citizen contact from initially consensual

toa deter

 

requiring reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

We have held that a law enforcement officer may approach any person and ask

 

simple questions without a requirement of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

‘See State v. Herrera, 2009-1783, p. 1-2 (La. 12/18/09); 23 So.3d 896, 897; Sherman,
2005-0779, p. 7; 931 So.2d at 291 (“The officers did not need either reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop or probable cause for an arrest to approach the
defendant, inquire why he was parked at the side of the road, and ask for some
identification . . . [mJere communications between officers and citizens implicate no
Fourth Amendment concerns where there is no coercion or detention.”). This third
level of police/citizen encounter is less formal than that of an “investigatory stop,”
and is, essentially, a “consensual encounter” involving minimal police contact which
does not invoke constitutional safeguards. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439, 111 S.Ct. at
2388 (“[T]he proposition that police officers can approach individuals as to whom
they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating questions

- is by no means novel; it has been endorsed by the Court any number of times.”)
(citations omitted); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75
L-Ed.2d 229 (1983) (“[Llaw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public

place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions

 

to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.”); Syivester, 2001-0607, p. 4;
826 So.2d at 1108 (quoting Bostick); State v. Lewis, 2000-3136, p. 3 (La. 4/26/02);
815 So.2d 818, 820, cert. denied, 537 US, 922, 123 S.Ct. 312, 154 L.Ed.2d 211
(2002) (quoting Royer),

In addition, “an officer's request for identification does not tum the encounter
into a forcible detention unless the request is accompanied by an unmistakable show
of official authority indicating to the person that he or she is not free to leave.”

‘Sherman, 2005-0779, p. 7; 931 So.2d at 291; Lewis, 2000-3136, p. 3; 815 So.2d at

820 (same); State v. McDaniels, 2001-0305, p. | (La. 12/7/01); 803 So.2d 966, 967
(same); see LN.S. v. Delgado, 466 US. 210, 216, 104 $.Ct 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d
247 (1984).

‘The legal question presented in this matter is whether Martin was seized at any
Point for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or state constitutional protections
considering the totality of circumstances of the encounter. Applying the law to the
present case, Cpl. Gibb's request to see the defendant's identification (presumably his
driver's license but not clearly indicated in the record) did not by itself tum the
otherwise consensual encounter into a forcible detention. Police remain free to
approach an individual on the street to engage him in conversation, which may

include questions which invite an incrimii

 

ting response, and may also ask for some
identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. See Lewis, 2000-3136, p.
3; 815 So.2d at 820.

What we must next determine is whether the officer’s decision to retain the
defendant's identification, after inspecting it briefly, for however long it takes to
conduct a warrant check, transformed his consensual encounter with a pedestrian into
a Fourth Amendment event requiring at least reasonable suspicion for a forcible
detention,

We are aware that some jurisdictions subscribe to a per se rule in the context,
of pedestrian stops. In other words, those courts have held that an officer's retention

of an individual's identific

 

n in the course of continued questi

 

ig, or to check
for outstanding warrants, creates an atmosphere in which an individual, as a general
tule, will not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter. Thus, these courts have
held that a detention or seizure has occurred, necessitating at least reasonable
suspicion in order to justify a restraint on the individual's liberty. See United States

v, Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10 Cir. 1995) (“{wJhen law enforcement officials
retain an individual's driver's license in the course of questioning

 

im, that

individual, as a general rule, will not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter,”
and a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes thus occurs); United States v. Jordan,

958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“{O]nce the identification is handed over to

 

police and they have had a reasonable opportunity to review it, if the identification
is not returned to the detainee [itis] difficult to imagine that any reasonable person
would feel free to leave without it.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 845, 103 P.3d 454, 458 (2004) (“This Court is

concemed about the implications of a rule allowing law enforcement officers the

 

 

to initiate consensual encounters with pedestrians in order to seize

identification and run a warrants check.

 

‘The per se rule draws heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Royer, which
in the context of the detention of an airline passenger in an airport concourse, stated:

‘Asking for and examining Royer’s ticket and his driver’s license were
no doubt permissible in themselves, but when the officers identified
themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected of
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police
room, while retaining his ticket and driver’s license and without
indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively
seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. These circumstances
surely amount to a show of official authority such that a reasonable
person would have believed he was not free to leave.

 

Id., 460 U.S. at 501-502, 103 S.Ct. at 1326 (citation omitted). Courts relying on
Royer for the per se rule have noted the impractical and unrealistic option of a

reasonable person in modem society to abandon one’s identification, as an individual

 

is practically immobilized without adequate identification. See State v. Daniel, 12
S.W.3d 420, 427 (Tenn. 2000); Lambert, 46 F.3d at 1068; Jordan, 958 F.2d at 1087.
After due consideration, we reject a per se rule under these facts. Instead, we

believe the determination of whether a seizure has occurred is a fact-intensive
analysis in which a reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Bostick
We adhere to the rule that, in order to determine whether a
particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that
the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter.
Id, 501 US. at 439, 111 S.Ct, at 2389. We note “police-citizen encounters do not

become ‘seizures’ simply because citizens may feel an inherent social pressure to

cooperate with police.” Danis

 

, 12 8. W.3d at 425, citing People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d
68, 72 (Colo, 1998). Yet, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the
fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond,

hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216,
104 S.Ct. at 1762, Courts must pay attention to the facts of each encounter, while
keeping in mind the realities of every day life and the importance of an individual's
identification. As noted by the Florida Supreme Court,

[clertainly, the dangers posed by crimes such as identity theft and the

ever-present threats to our national security makes the act of identifying

oneself through presentation of valid, government-issued identification

a necessary part of a panoply of human endeavors, from cashing a check

to boarding an airplane.
Golphin v. State, 945 So.2d 1174, 1189-1190 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 552U.S.810,
128 S.Ct. 40, 169 L.Ed.2d 11 (2007). In examining the totality of the circumstances,
acourt must look to “numerous factors, including the time, place and purpose of the
encounter, the words used by the officer, the officer’s tone of voice and general
demeanor, the officer's statements to others present during the encounter, the
threatening presence of several officers, the potential display of a weapon by an
officer, and the physical touching by the police of the citizen.” United States v.

Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4" Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 847, 123 S.Ct. 186,

10
154 L.Ed.2d 75 (2002).

In addition, we generally reject the premise that among the totality of the
circumstances some facts have more weight and relevance than others. Certainly, the
retention of identification during the course of further interrogation or search factors
into whether a seizure has occurred." See Weaver, 282 F.3d at 310, 312 (“We
expressly refuse to adopt a brightline rule that when an officer retains an individual's

identification beyond it

 

intended purpose, in this case checking for outstanding

warrants, the individual whose identification is retained is effectively seized for

 

purpose of the Fourth Amendment. . .. Whil

 

is without question that a driver's
license is one of the most valuable pieces of personal identification possessed by any

citizen, it does not logi

 

lly follow that any time an officer retains someone’s driver's,
license that such retention blossoms into an unconstitutional seizure... .. something
more is required.” (footnote omitted); United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.24 1423,
1425-1426 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he retention of papers under some circumstances
‘may transform an interview into a seizure, where it is prolonged or is accompanied
by some other act compounding an impression of restraint.”) (citations omitted);
Golphin, 945 So.2d at 1188 (“[T]heoretically, retention of Golphin’s identification
‘would not have constrained his ability to either request the return of the identification

or:

 

mply end the encounter by walking into the apartment in which he was staying.”).

Reviewing the totality of the circumstances here, we are confronted with the
reality that the scant record leaves many questions unanswered. Other than some few
details elicited on cross-examination and re-direct examination, Cpl. Gibbs?

testimony about the entire encounter was spare, He testified:

* We can, of course, conceive of some instances in which a single fact would have
conclusive relevance, such as when an officer demanded to see an individual's identification or
‘asked an individual questions at gunpoint.

 

u
I was walking into the Five Star in Moss Bluff. I saw Terrence.{sic’}
‘He was walking out. I knew Terrence from when he lived in Westlake.
I lived in Westlake. 1 used to see him at football games, out and about
town. I asked him how he was doing. I knew he had been in some
trouble in Lake Charles, so I asked him for his ID, to check him for
warrants. He said - - he gave me his ID. We talked a little bit. He was
nervous, sweating profusely. So I asked him, I said, you know,
“Terrence [sic], you got anything illegal on you?” He said, “Yes, sir,
got four Somas in my pocket.” And from there, I had to pat him down,
recover the Somas, arrested him and booked him in for possession. See
R. Vol. 1, p. 77-78

 

Itis not clear exactly when Cpl. Gibbs ran the warrants check. Presumably, he
did so before placing the defendant under arrest, as the officer would have had little
need to check for outstanding warrants on the scene after taking the defendant into
‘custody and transporting him to the station house for booking on the drug charge, at

which time a warrant check would have been conducted as a routine matter. Nor is,

 

clear how the officer ran the warrants check, ie. whether he stood next to the
defendant while he communicated with the Sheriff's Office with a hand-held radio,
‘or retreated to a patrol car.’ Nor is it clear exactly what identification Cpl. Gibbs

obtained from the defendant. Presumably, the identification obtained was the

 

defendant's driver's license reflecting his address and birth date, but the record is,
uncertain about this point.

‘Thus, the appellate pane! majority had an uncertain basis for subscribing to a
brightline per se rule in the present case. At the least, it seems clear that the

encounter between Cpl. Gibbs and the defendant was rel

  

ely brief, even assuming

 

the officer actually conducted the warrant check as he and defendant engaged in “a

* The ill of information shows the defendant’ frst name is spelled “Terrance.” R. Vol. 1,
ps.

* Compare with Golphin, 945 So.2d at 1177 (*.. we determine that the totality of the
circumstances of Golphin's encounter with law enforcement indicates that he was not seized for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment when the police officer held in her hand at that specific site the
identification he had consensually and voluntarily provided and viewed it as she conducted a
‘computerized check for warrants in his presence and without moving away from that location where
the identification had been consensually and voluntarily produced.”).

 

 

12
litle bit” of small talk outside the Five Star.” Under the totality of the circumstances
provided here, the dissenting judge appears correct that nothing in the conduct of the
officer decisively changed the consensual nature of the officer’s brief encounter with
the defendant.

We note the warrant check did not take so long that a reasonable person,
having surrendered his identification in the first place to the police for inspection,
‘would understand that he was no longer free to end the small talk and go about his,
business. By contrast, in Lambert, supra, the officers held the defendant's
identification for 20 to 25 minutes after approaching him in the airport parking lot
before conducting the warrant check, which came back negative. Under those
circumstances, the federal appellate court had no difficulty in concluding “the thirty
‘minute retention of the license exceeded the permissible length of time to determine
if Mr. Lambert was wanted for any crimes.” I, 46 F.3d at 1068 3.

Here, there was no abuse of the district court's discretion in its denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress. The record fails to support a finding that there was
an unmistakable show of official authority in the police/citizen encounter at issue
which would have indicated to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave. We
find, as did the dissenting appellate judge, that Martin voluntarily complied with the
officer's request for identification and voluntarily offered a response to the officer’s

potentially incriminating question, Under the totality of the circumstances, we find

  

the officer's brief retention of Martin's identification under these facts did not change

the nature of this essentially consensual encounter and the officer lawfully retrieved

the Soma pills from the defendant's pocket.

Even one ofthe courts which has ascribed tothe per se rule conceded “the temporary
‘deprivation of [the defendants] identification or travel documents might not significantly interfere
with his intended movements, atleast if that deprivation lasted only a few moments.” Jordan, 958
F.2dat 1088.

   

B
Our ruling today underscores our commitment to the totality of the
circumstances test in determining whether ornot an unreasonable seizure or detention
has occurred and our rejection of a brightline orperse rule. Consequently, our ruling
in this particular matter is limited to the facts adduced in the record. We note
approvingly the caution of the Florida Supreme Court and the possibility that
different facts might produce a different outcome:

While we approve the decision of the district court below, our decision

today does not stand for an absolute, expansive proposition that

retaining identification for the purpose of conducting a warrants check

could never implicate constitutional safeguards. Certainly, we can

conceive of circumstances where the retention of identification for the

purpose of running a warrants check or other purposes, when viewed in

the totality of the circumstances, might implicate the Fourth

Amendment.
Golphin, 945 So,2d at 1189.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the
district court’ s denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse the ruling
of the appellate court and remand the matter to the court of appeal for consideration

of the defendant's remaining assignment of error.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

4