Case Title: Com. v. Cortino

Citation: 387 Pa. Super. 210, 563 A.2d 1259

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1989-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
387 Pa. Superior Ct. 210 (1989) 563 A.2d 1259 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Aram CORTINO, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted July 17, 1989. Filed September 12, 1989. *212 Richard H. Pratt, Doylestown, for appellant. Alan M. Rubenstein, Dist. Atty., Doylestown, for Com., appellee. Before TAMILIA, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ. HOFFMAN, Judge: This is an appeal from the order below denying appellant's petition to withdraw his pleas of guilt on separate sets of charges for possession of a controlled substance, 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, id. Appellant contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas because (1) they were unlawfully induced by ineffective acts of his trial counsel, and (2) his second plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently. For the reasons that follow, we disagree, and accordingly, affirm the order below. On February 20, 1985, appellant entered a guilty plea before the Honorable William Hart Rufe, III, to charges of possession and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Sentence was deferred pending a pre-sentence investigation. Pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement, on March 26, 1985, appellant entered a guilty plea before the Honorable Kenneth G. Biehn on charges of possession and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Those charges were unrelated to those heard by Judge Rufe. On this date, after a colloquy, Judge Biehn imposed sentence on both sets of charges. The aggregate sentence was five-to-ten years imprisonment. On April 8, 1985, appellant filed a motion to challenge his guilty pleas.[1] Judge Biehn having recused himself, the Honorable Isaac S. Garb presided over the hearing on *213 appellant's motion, which he then denied on May 31, 1985. Subsequently, appellant filed his pro se petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA").[2] 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9551 (repealed). A hearing on the petition was held on January 5, 1989, before Judge Biehn. Trial counsel testified at the hearing, and relief was denied by Order dated January 27, 1989. This appeal followed. Appellant first contends that his counsel was ineffective because he induced appellant to plead guilty. Specifically, appellant alleges that counsel was ineffective in "condoning or acquiescing in an agreement for [appellant] to accept culpability that did nothing to advance his client's interests but only served to advance a co-defendant's interest, to [appellant's] detriment." Appellant's Brief at 8. When confronted with a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a reviewing court must consider three factors: Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 83, 541 A.2d 315, 318 (1988). *214 Appellant in this case claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he recommended that appellant enter into a plea bargain arrangement by which appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five to ten years. For purposes of this appeal we will assume, without deciding, that appellant's claim possesses arguable merit. A review of the PCHA hearing reveals, however, that counsel had a reasonable basis for recommending that appellant enter the plea. Appellant had an extensive prior criminal record. Not only was he caught in the act of attempting to sell narcotics to an undercover officer in this case, but in a separate case he confessed to having committed similar crimes scarcely a month before. Standard sentencing guidelines would have placed him in the aggravated range and he could well have received consecutive sentences. Moreover, trial counsel testified that appellant gave him inconsistent accounts of the facts of the case, thereby making it difficult to prepare a coherent defense. Counsel also testified that, in light of the fact that the appellant was in possession of a key that opened a strongbox that contained drugs, it would be difficult to defend against the charge of constructive possession. In addition, counsel testified that he believed that appellant did not make a good impression on Judge Rufe. Finally, we note that the PCHA court specifically found counsel's testimony to be credible. Based upon these facts, we agree with the PCHA court that counsel had a reasonable basis for recommending that appellant accept the plea bargain. Appellant also contends that "his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently entered, and induced only by fear and confusion." Appellant's Brief at 8. Specifically, he claims that (a) trial counsel's belief that appellant would receive a harsh sentence in the case before Judge Rufe was a matter of pure conjecture, (b) the plea bargain entered into was nothing but an attempt to benefit a co-defendant at appellant's expense, (c) trial counsel's involvement in an agreement to help exonerate the co-defendant did nothing *215 but prejudice appellant and (d) appellant's answers during the colloquy were not knowing and voluntary answers, but simply those he believed were expected from him as a matter of form. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends that trial counsel acted reasonably in handling appellant's case and that the record indicates that appellant was in complete control of his faculties and understood the significance of the colloquy in which he entered the guilty plea. Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 ("the Rule") states that: The Comment to the Rule states that, at a minimum, inquiry should be made into the following six areas: Thus, the Rule requires that the trial court be satisfied that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the effect of the plea, and is willing to act on his understanding. This Court has heard claims similar to the one at issue in this case, and based on the appellant's conduct during the colloquy, affirmed the denial of a petition to withdraw a guilty plea. In Commonwealth v. Long, 310 Pa.Super. 339, 456 A.2d 641 (1983), a full and complete colloquy had taken place. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, reasoning that the court could assess for itself the appellant's mental state at the time of the colloquy, and at that time there was no indication that the plea was not freely and knowingly entered. Id., 310 Pa.Superior Ct. at 346, 456 A.2d at 645. The court noted that "the record did not support his [the appellant's] position." Id. Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Edrington, 317 Pa.Super. 545, 464 A.2d 456 (1983), we specifically held that "a criminal defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer questions truthfully. We can not permit a defendant to postpone the final disposition of his case by lying to the court." Id., 317 Pa. at 552, 464 A.2d at 460 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 242 Pa.Super. 240, 247, 363 A.2d 1249, 1253 (1976)). Applying those standards to the case at bar, we are satisfied that appellant entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Appellant alleges no deficiency in the form and content of the colloquy, and we find none. His responses during the colloquy show that the appellant *217 was attentive, coherent and responsive during the entire procedure. He was asked on two separate occasions whether or not he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and he stated that he was not. His responses to the other questions during the procedure were all appropriate. In short, the record indicates that appellant was well aware of the significance of the proceedings, and understood them fully. As we held in Edrington and Brown, appellant's assertion that he lied during the colloquy, merely giving those responses which he considered to be appropriate as a matter of form, cannot, by itself, act to postpone the final disposition of this case. We find appellant's claim to be meritless because, like the claim in Edrington, it is completely unsupported by the record. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the appellant's claims that his guilty pleas were unlawfully induced by ineffective acts of his trial counsel and were not entered into voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying appellant's petition. Order affirmed. [1] On April 8, 1985, an Order was entered denying appellant's motion for reconsideration of sentence on the first charges. [2] The PCHA has been modified in part, repealed in part, and remained the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) by the Act of April 13, 1988, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The new provision applies to all actions for collateral relief filed on or after the effective date. Because the instant petition was filed before the effective date of the PCRA, it must be evaluated under the former act.