Case Title: Mike and Verla Bird v. Gary and Linda Bidwell Seeks determination of an implied easement by prior use

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35314-2008

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35314-2008 
 
MIKE and VERLA BIRD, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
GARY and LINDA BIDWELL, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
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Boise, May 2009 Term 
 
 2009 Opinion No. 73  
 
Filed: May 29, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Fremont County.  The Hon. Brent J. Moss, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Nalder Law Office, P.C., Idaho Falls, for appellants.   Benjamin K. Mason 
argued. 
 
Lynn Hossner, St. Anthony, for respondents.    
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action seeking a determination that the 
plaintiffs had an implied easement by prior use.  We affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen were the owners of an 80-acre parcel of property located in 
Fremont County.  The property was rectangular in shape, with the long boundaries running north 
and south and the southern boundary bounded by a county road.  The Mickelsens’ house was 
located in the southwest corner of the property near the county highway. 
 
In December 1995, the Mickelsens deeded three parcels of their property to their 
daughters and their respective husbands.  For convenience, those three parcels will be called the 
northern parcel, the middle parcel, and the southern parcel. 
 
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The Mickelsens conveyed the northern parcel to Linda and Gary Bidwell (Defendants).  
This parcel contains about 23.561 acres located at the northern end of the 80-acre property.  It is 
trapezoidal in shape because its southern boundary is a canal that runs diagonally across the 80-
acre property in a southwest-northeast line.  Because this parcel does not border on the county 
highway, the deed stated that the property conveyed included a “30 Ft. right of way into the 
property along the west side of property and through and around the existing buildings.”1  That 
right of way corresponded to a road that had been used for decades to access the northern end of 
the Mickelsens’ property. 
 
The Mickelsens conveyed the middle parcel to Verla and James Bird (Plaintiffs).  It is 
located just south of the northern parcel and contains about 20.340 acres.  It is generally 
trapezoidal in shape because its northern boundary is the canal, but it also includes a 66-foot 
wide, 1254-foot long, strip of land along the eastern boundary of the 80-acre property to provide 
access to the county highway.  The deed to this parcel excepted “that part used for the 30 ft. right 
of way on west side of property.” 
 
The Mickelsens conveyed the southern parcel to Carol and Roger Murri.  It contains 
about 16.894 acres and is located in the southwest corner of the 80-acre property, but excludes 
the Mickelsens’ homestead.  The deed also excepted “that part used for 30 ft. right of way on 
west side of property.”  The southern boundary of this parcel abuts the county highway.  On 
October 6, 2000, the Murris deeded their parcel to the Defendants, and in June 2007 the 
Defendants received the homestead pursuant to Virgil Mickelsen’s will. 
 
On August 9, 2007, the Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a declaration that they have 
an implied easement by prior use in the road located along the western boundary and seeking an 
injunction preventing the Defendants from interfering with their use of that road.  The matter was 
tried to the district court.  It found that the Mickelsens did not intend to grant an easement by 
prior use to the Plaintiffs and entered judgment in favor of the Defendants.  The Plaintiffs then 
appealed. 
 
                                                 
1 Neither party asked the trial court to determine whether the phrase “30 Ft. right of way into the property along the 
west side of property and through and around the existing buildings” granted an easement or fee simple title, and we 
express no opinion on that issue. 
 
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II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in considering whether the Mickelsens intended to grant an 
easement by prior use? 
2. Is the district court’s finding that the Mickelsens did not intend to grant an easement by 
prior use supported by substantial and competent evidence? 
3. Is either party entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the District Court Err in Considering whether the Mickelsens Intended to Grant an 
Easement by Prior Use? 
 
For decades prior to 1995, there was a road on the Mickelsens’ property going from the 
county highway, through the homestead, and then north along the western boundary of the 80-
acre parcel.  The road would provide access to the Plaintiff’s parcel.  They filed this action 
seeking to establish an implied easement by prior use in that road.  To do so, they were required 
to prove three elements: 
(1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the 
dominant estate;  (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of 
the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent;  and (3) 
the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the 
dominant estate. 
 
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006). 
 
The district court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the second element.  After 
considering the terms of the three deeds, the district court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that the Mickelsens intended to grant an easement to the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs contend 
that the district court erred in seeking to ascertain the Mickelsens’ subjective intent.  They argue 
that the only inquiry relevant to this element is whether the use of the road was apparent and 
continuous for a long period of time prior to the separation of the dominant estate. 
 
The second element includes as a necessary consideration the intent of the grantor at the 
time the dominant estate was separated.  The intent to grant or reserve the easement is presumed 
from apparent continuous use for a long period of time prior to that separation.  Schultz v. Atkins, 
97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976).  The easement is “based on the theory that when 
someone conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is required for the beneficial use 
 
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and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that is required for the use and 
enjoyment of the land retained.”  Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362, 368 
(1999).  Because the intent to grant or reserve the easement is a necessary element, there is no 
logical reason to base the decision solely upon the grantor’s presumed intent from prior use and 
to exclude other relevant evidence of that intent.  Therefore, the district court did not err in 
considering that other evidence. 
 
B.  Is the District Court’s Finding that the Mickelsens Did Not Intend to Grant an 
Easement by Prior Use Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence? 
 
In reaching its decision that the Mickelsens did not intend to grant the Plaintiffs an 
implied easement by prior use, the district court relied primarily upon the provisions of the three 
deeds executed by the Mickelsens when they divided their property.  The court noted that the 
deed conveying the northern parcel to the Defendants expressly granted them a 30-foot-wide 
right of way in the location of the existing road to access their parcel and that the other two deeds 
expressly excepted that right of way.  The court inferred that by doing so the Mickelsens 
intended that the 30-foot right of way was only for access to the Defendants’ northern parcel.  In 
addition, the Plaintiffs expressly asked the Mickelsens to deed them the 66-foot-wide strip along 
the eastern boundary in order to provide access to the middle parcel from the county highway, 
and the Mickelsens did so.  The court viewed that as further evidence that the Mickelsens did not 
intend to grant the Plaintiffs an easement in the existing road along the western boundary. 
 
The Plaintiffs quibble with the court’s reasoning and offer what they believe are other 
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence.  “A trial court’s findings of fact will not be set 
aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  When deciding whether findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous, this Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court.”  
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 637, 132 P.3d 392, 394 (2006) (citation omitted).  “It is the 
province of the trial court to determine . . . the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  
KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003).  The district court’s 
inferences are reasonable, and its determination that the Mickelsens did not intend to grant the 
Plaintiffs an easement in the road along the western boundary of the 80 acres is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
 
 
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C.  Is Either Party Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
 
The Plaintiffs request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-
121 and 12-123, as do the Defendants.  Attorney fees can be awarded to the prevailing party on 
appeal under Section 12-121 only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation.  Fenwick v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 144 Idaho 318, 324, 160 
P.3d 757, 763 (2007).  Because this appeal involved an issue not previously decided by this 
Court, it was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.  Section 12-123 does 
not apply on appeal to this Court.  By its terms, an award of attorney fees as a sanction for 
frivolous conduct must be made “at any time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil 
action or within twenty-one (21) days after the entry of judgment in a civil action.”  I.C. § 12-
123(2)(a).  The judgment in this case was entered on April 4, 2008. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court.  We award the respondents costs, but not 
attorney fees, on appeal. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.