Case Title: State v. O'Brien

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-207


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Thomas J. O'Brien                            February Term, 1992


 Edward J. Cashman, J.

 William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
   Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 Jarvis & Kaplan, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant's motor vehicle operator's license was suspended
 pursuant to the Vermont administrative suspension law, 23 V.S.A. { 1205.
 Although he uses a scattergun approach to this appeal, we can reduce the
 issues he raises to three:  (1) the administrative suspension proceeding is
 essentially criminal and so requires the procedural trappings of a criminal
 trial; (2) this Court's implementation of the administrative suspension
 proceeding through the procedures of D.C.C.R. 80.5 improperly impinges on
 the powers of the Legislature; and (3) the expert testimony in this case was
 admitted without a proper foundation.  We affirm.
      Defendant was stopped for driving under the influence (DUI) on February
 5, 1991.  He was asked to, and did, take a breath test.  When the results
 showed a blood-alcohol content of 0.275%, he was charged with DUI and
 notified, on February 15, 1991, of the State's intention to suspend his
 operator's license.  23 V.S.A. { 1205(c).  He requested a hearing in
 district court.  Id. V.S.A. { 1205(e), (f).  A preliminary hearing was held
 on March 6, 1991, and a final hearing on April 24, 1991.  Based in part on
 affidavits filed by the issuing officer and the state chemist, the trial
 court found in favor of the State and sent notice of suspension to the
 Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.  Id. { 1205(h).
      While defendant argues that the procedures used violate the Vermont and
 federal constitutions and the rules of evidence, he does not directly attack
 the conclusion of the trial court.  Defendant's first argument boils down to
 whether the license suspension proceeding is civil or criminal for purposes
 of the relevant procedural safeguards.  There is no question that, were the
 proceeding criminal, it would be unconstitutional, because it does not
 provide a jury trial, afford confrontation of witnesses or require proof
 beyond a reasonable doubt.
      The claims defendant raises are largely foreclosed by our recent
 decision in State v. Strong, 3 Vt. L.W. 6 (Jan. 10, 1992).  In Strong, we
 held that the imposition of a criminal penalty in a DUI prosecution,
 following a civil license suspension, did not violate the double jeopardy
 proscription of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We
 first held that the license suspension is not a punishment for purposes of
 the Fifth Amendment because the statute serves "the rational remedial
 purpose of protecting public safety by quickly removing potentially
 dangerous drivers from the roads."  Id. at 7.  We then held that defendant
 had not been twice prosecuted for the same offense because the
 administrative suspension proceeding "is a civil proceeding, not a criminal
 prosecution."  Id. at 8.
      Without repeating all of the analysis of Strong, we see no reason to
 distinguish among the various procedural safeguards defendant seeks in
 determining whether the license suspension proceeding is criminal.  We hold
 that it is not criminal and defendant is not entitled to a jury trial,
 appointed counsel, protection against self-incrimination, proof beyond a
 reasonable doubt or confrontation of witnesses as protected by the Sixth
 Amendment, as those protections apply to criminal proceedings. (FN1) Nor, for
 the same reason, is defendant entitled to the protections accorded to
 criminal defendants by the Vermont Constitution.
      In his brief defendant argues generally that the administrative license
 suspension proceeding denies him due process of law even if not of a
 criminal nature, under the United States Supreme Court's holding and
 analysis in Matthews v. Eldridge,