Case Title: Holland v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 510, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNETH L. HOLLAND, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
          Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 510, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0605016750A 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 2, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November  7, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 7th day of November 2011, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs, the Superior Court’s decision following remand, and the parties’ 
supplemental memoranda, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The appellant, Kenneth Holland, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  After 
considering the parties’ briefs on appeal, we remanded the matter to the 
Superior Court to consider the merits of Holland’s claims in light of recent 
case law.  Holland’s claims challenge the admission of his codefendant’s 
prior out-of-court statement at trial.  On remand, the Superior Court ordered 
supplemental memoranda from the parties, as well as a supplemental 
 
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response from Holland’s trial counsel.  On June 30, 2011, the Superior Court 
issued its decision denying Holland’s motion on its merits.  The parties have 
filed supplemental memoranda in response to the Superior Court’s decision 
on remand, and the matter is again before the Court for review. 
(2) The relevant facts of this case reflect that Holland was arrested in 
2006 following an administrative search of his property by probation 
officers.  Officers searched a trailer titled in Holland’s name, as well as the 
home of Holland’s mother, which Holland had listed as his home address 
with his probation officer.  The search of the properties uncovered drugs, 
weapons, paraphernalia, and ammunition.  Prior to trial, defense counsel 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the administrative 
searches were invalid.  The Superior Court denied that motion.1  
(3) Also prior to trial, Holland’s former girlfriend and codefendant, 
Yvonne Bradshaw, gave a recorded statement to police, in the presence of 
her attorney, detailing her and Holland’s involvement in the case.  
Thereafter, Bradshaw pled guilty to maintaining a dwelling and second 
degree conspiracy.  As a condition of her sentence, Bradshaw agreed to 
testify truthfully against Holland at his trial.   When she took the stand at 
trial, the prosecutor confirmed with Bradshaw that her August 2006 
                                                 
1 Holland v. State, 2007 WL 3112481 (Del. Super. Sept. 14, 2007). 
 
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statement to the police had been given voluntarily.  The prosecutor, 
however, did not ask Bradshaw about the content of her statement or 
whether the statement she gave was true.  When Bradshaw’s trial testimony 
began to deviate from her prior recorded statement, the prosecutor sought 
admission of the statement under 11 Del. C. § 3507(a)2 without objection 
from defense counsel.  After the jury convicted him, Holland, acting pro se, 
moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the Superior Court denied.  In 
March 2008, the Superior Court sentenced Holland as an habitual offender 
to a total period of thirteen years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
after serving ten and a half years for probation.  On direct appeal, Holland 
challenged the Superior Court’s denial of his suppression motion.  This 
Court affirmed Holland’s convictions and sentence.3  Thereafter, Holland 
sought postconviction relief challenging the admission of Bradshaw’s 
statement.  The Superior Court denied relief.  This appeal ensued. 
(4) In reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief, 
this Court first must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before 
it may consider the merits of any postconviction claims.  Superior Court 
Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the 
                                                 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3507(a) (2007) (provides that, “In a criminal prosecution, the 
voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent 
testimonial value.”) 
3 Holland v. State, 2008 WL 4918213 (Del. Nov. 18, 2008). 
 
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proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is thereafter barred unless 
the defendant can establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice 
from a violation of his rights.  The bar of Rule 61(i)(3) does not apply, 
however, to a colorable claim asserting a miscarriage of justice due to a 
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental fairness of the 
proceedings.4  In this case, Holland argues that the Superior Court’s 
erroneous admission of Bradshaw’s statement without a proper foundation 
violated his constitutional rights and undermined the fundamental fairness of 
his trial.  He further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the admission of Bradshaw’s statement and that counsel’s error 
affected the outcome of his trial. 
(5) On remand, the Superior Court found, and the State concedes, 
that a proper foundation was not laid for the admission of Bradshaw’s prior 
statement because the prosecutor failed to ask Bradshaw whether or not her 
prior statement was true.5  The State argues, however, that Holland cannot 
establish any prejudice from this error because, even if Bradshaw’s 
statement had not been admitted, the other evidence against Holland was 
more than sufficient to sustain his convictions. 
                                                 
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (2011). 
5 See Blake v. State, 3 A.3d 1077, 1081 (Del. 2011) (reiterating the two-part foundation 
that must be established by the State during its direct examination before a witness’ prior 
statement may be admitted under Section 3507—the witness must testify about both the 
events and whether or not they are true). 
 
5
(6) We agree.  The record reflects that, during the search of the 
trailer that Holland owned and was renovating, officers found cocaine, a 
digital scale, 44 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, Holland’s social security 
card, and personal letters with Holland’s name.  The search of the residence 
where Holland lived with his mother uncovered cocaine residue in the 
dresser of Holland’s bedroom as well as a large safe containing two guns, 
ammunition, two digital scales, and a receipt with Holland’s name.  Even 
without Bradshaw’s prior statement, the evidence against Holland was more 
than sufficient to sustain his convictions.  We find that the Superior Court’s 
error in admitting Bradshaw’s prior statement without a proper foundation 
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”6 
(7) The erroneous admission of the statement did not undermine the 
integrity of the proceeding.  Holland cannot establish a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if 
Bradshaw’s prior statement had not been admitted under Section 3507.  We, 
therefore, find no miscarriage of justice sufficient to overcome the 
procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3).7   
                                                 
6 See Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385, 398 (Del. 2006) (quoting Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (2011).  
 
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(8) Moreover, we reject Holland’s second claim, asserting ineffective 
assistance of counsel, on similar grounds.  In order to establish a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (a) counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.8  Even if we 
assume that Holland’s trial counsel erred in failing to object to the admission 
of Bradshaw’s prior statement because of an improper foundation, Holland 
can establish no prejudice from that error because the admission of 
Bradshaw’s prior statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
  
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
  
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).