Case Title: State v. Gowdy

Citation: 2000-Ohio-355

Docket Number: 19982301

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Gowdy, 88 Ohio St.3d 387, 2000-Ohio-355.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GOWDY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Gowdy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 387.] 
Criminal procedure — Notice requirement for sexual offender classification 
hearings under R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) is mandatory. 
The notice requirement for sexual offender classification hearings under R.C. 
2950.09(B)(1) is mandatory. 
(No. 98-2301 — Submitted November 30, 1999 — Decided April 28, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-970359. 
 
Huey L. Gowdy, defendant-appellant, and Valerie Parks lived together in 
Parks’s apartment from July 1996 to December 1996.  After defendant developed a 
relationship with another woman, he moved out.  On January 21, 1997, at around 
11:15 p.m., Parks and her date, Montez Rhodes, were at Parks’s apartment 
watching TV when Parks received a telephone call from defendant.  Defendant told 
Parks that he wanted to come over to talk,  but Parks told him she had company.  
Defendant told her he was coming over anyway. 
 
About ten to fifteen minutes later, there was a knock at the door.  Parks 
opened the door a crack to step outside to talk to defendant because she did not 
want to wake her three children who were asleep in the apartment.  Defendant 
 
 
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pushed the door open, came in, and began yelling and cussing at Parks.  At 
defendant’s urging, Rhodes left. 
 
As Rhodes was walking out, Parks tried to walk out with him to apologize, 
but defendant jumped in front of her so she could not follow him.  Defendant 
pushed Parks down on the couch and locked the door.  Defendant questioned Parks 
about what she had been doing with Rhodes before he arrived and accused her of 
having sex with Rhodes, which Parks denied. 
 
According to Parks’s testimony, defendant grabbed her and forced his 
fingers into her vagina.  Parks testified that she struggled to resist defendant, but he 
overpowered her and raped her.  Parks further testified that defendant warned her 
not to tell anyone because he would be watching and would come back and hurt 
her. 
 
After defendant left, Parks called her eldest child’s father, Kevin Taylor, and 
told him what had happened.  Shortly thereafter, Rhodes came back to the 
apartment.  He testified that after he got home, he decided he should go back to 
check on Parks, so he called his cousin, LaDon Woods, to go with him.  When he 
and Woods arrived at Parks’s apartment about forty-five minutes after Rhodes had 
left, Parks came to the door crying.  Rhodes asked her what was wrong, and she 
told them that defendant had raped her. 
 
 
3
 
Both Rhodes and Taylor urged Parks to call the police and go to the hospital, 
but Parks testified that she did not because she feared retribution from defendant.  
The next morning after she got her children to school, Parks went to the Justice 
Center, seeking a restraining order, but was told she had to go to Hamilton 
County’s Private Complaint Program (“Private Complaint”).  Parks testified that 
Private Complaint informed her that in order to get a restraining order, defendant 
would have to participate in the program.  After Parks told the worker at Private 
Complaint that defendant would not attend because he had outstanding warrants 
against him, the worker suggested that Parks file domestic violence charges against 
defendant. 
 
Later in the evening of January 22, 1997, Parks went to Bethesda Hospital, 
where she told staff that she had been raped.  The hospital notified the police, and 
after Parks was examined, she related her story to Officer Shawn George.  After 
Officer George took her information, he collected, as evidence, the clothing Parks 
had been wearing the previous night. 
 
At trial, defendant testified that the incident was consensual.  Defendant 
testified that Parks was jealous about his relationship with his new girlfriend, so 
Parks filed charges against him in retribution.  On April 28, 1997, a jury found 
defendant guilty of two counts of rape.  The court set the sentencing hearing for 
 
 
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May 9, 1997.  The court did not discuss the sexual offender classification hearing 
at that time. 
 
At sentencing, the trial judge indicated that defendant had filed a pro se 
motion that the court considered to be a motion for new trial.  Defense counsel 
noted that in that motion, defendant had made comments indicating that he was 
unhappy with her representation.  On that basis, defense counsel requested 
permission to withdraw from the case.  The trial judge denied her request and 
proceeded immediately with the sexual offender classification hearing.1  Defense 
counsel did not formally object to going forward with the sexual offender 
classification hearing.  Following a brief hearing, the trial judge adjudicated 
defendant a sexual predator.  After overruling a defense motion for an acquittal, the 
judge sentenced defendant.  The Hamilton County Court of Appeals affirmed 
defendant’s convictions, sentence, and sexual predator classification. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Phillip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney 
General, and David M. Gormley, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
 
5
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Jane P. Perry, Assistant State 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and David M. Gormley, Associate 
Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General. 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso and Raymond Vasvari, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  As a threshold matter, the issues of facial due 
process and all issues regarding the registration and notification provisions of R.C. 
Chapter 2950 are resolved by State v. Williams, No. 99-286, State v. Worthy, No. 
99-764, and State v. Suffecool, No. 99-765, decided today. Today we address due 
process as it relates to notice of the sexual offender classification hearing under 
R.C. 2950.09(B), as well as the other non - R.C. Chapter 2950 issues raised in this 
appeal. 
Batson-Related Peremptory Challenge 
 
In his first proposition of law, defendant claims that the state used a 
pretextual reason for a peremptory challenge of an African-American prospective 
juror in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised a 
peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror Albert Smith (“Smith”).  
 
 
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Because of the fact-specific nature of this claim, the full transcript merits 
repeating: 
 
“Mr. Tieger [prosecutor]: Good afternoon, Mr. Smith. 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Good afternoon. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Anything about the questions that anybody has asked that 
you’d like to talk to us about? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: No. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: As far as the religious beliefs, I notice that you’re wearing a 
cross that’s hanging outside of your clothes.  Do you have some strongly held 
religious beliefs? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: I’m a christian. My belief doesn’t cause me 
not to be able to tell right from wrong. 
 
“The Court: Would you keep your voice up a little bit, sir?  I’m having a 
hard time hearing.  You said you were a christian? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Yes, I’m a christian.  I know right from 
wrong, so I would be able to judge, you know. 
 
“The Court: Thank you.  Next question. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: As far as your religion, you know, is that something you take 
very, very seriously in terms of attending service and going to church, and all of 
that, on a very regular basis? 
 
 
7
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Yes. 
 
“Mr. Tieger:  How often would you go? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Every Sunday. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Okay.  Not during the week at all? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: No.  My job doesn’t allow me to go 
through the week. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: And if you don’t mind me asking, what religion is that? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Just a christian. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Okay. 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Non-denominational. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Is there a particular church you belong to? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Yes, Faith Christian Center. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Where is that located? 
 
“Prospective Juror Albert Smith: Waycross and Kenn Road in Forest Park. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“[At this point Smith was asked a few questions about his family.] 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Pass for cause. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The Court:  Peremptory challenges, ma’m, are with you—thank you, with 
the State. 
 
 
8
 
“Mr. Tieger: Judge, I will thank and excuse Mr. Smith. 
 
“The Court: You two approach, please? 
 
“(The following discussion took place at sidebar.) 
 
“The Court: Batson—did you want to say any reason? 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Judge, I don’t think that threshold has been made in any way, 
shape or form.  I don’t think the defense has raised it. 
 
“Ms. Adams [defense counsel]: I would be happy to raise it at this time. 
 
“The Court: Pardon? 
 
“Ms. Adams: I would raise the Batson challenge at this point, Judge.  I think 
this is the only black male on this jury. 
 
“The Court: Wait a minute. You’re right, male. 
 
“Ms. Adams: Right. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: Well, Judge.  If the record can reflect, if the Court wants me to 
respond, there is a black female on the jury, which I did not exercise any type of 
challenge on, and I’m not going to exercise a challenge on.  There is another black 
male that was excused for cause because he said that he felt he wouldn’t be fair in 
this case because his son was the victim of a crime. 
 
“And I certainly think I have very valid reasons.  He comes in wearing a 
very large cross around his neck that’s very visible. 
 
 
9
 
“He stated his religious beliefs are very strongly held.  He attends church.  
That, I thought he was evasive in answering which one.  He said he was simply a 
christian.  I mean, there is a lot. 
 
“The Court: I was just inquiring as to your reasoning. 
 
“Mr. Tieger: I asked where his church was.  There was a lot of reasons. 
 
“The Court: Thank you.  So noted. 
 
“Ms. Adams: Judge, our objection still stands.” 
 
Smith was excused and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court on this 
issue.  Defendant contends that Smith’s peremptory removal was discriminatory.  
Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Smith to 
be excused, we affirm the court of appeals on this issue. 
 
In 1875, the United States Congress prohibited the race-based exclusion of 
any qualified citizen from jury service.  See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, Section 
4, 18 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at Section 243, Title 18, U.S.Code [1948]).  
Later in 1879, the United States Supreme Court followed suit, holding that a state 
statute excluding African-Americans from jury service violated a defendant’s right 
to equal protection.  Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 25 
L.Ed. 664.  Despite these noble principles, prospective African-American jurors 
continued to be excluded from jury panels through the use of peremptory 
 
 
10
challenges.  See Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 
759. 
 
In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 
the court overruled its opinion in Swain and held that a prosecutor’s racially 
motivated exercise of peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The court established a three-step, burden-shifting 
procedure to determine whether a peremptory challenge is race-based.  First, the 
opponent of the strike must establish a prima facie showing that the attorney 
purposefully discriminated in exercising a peremptory challenge to dismiss a 
potential juror.  The challenging party “initially must show that he is a member of 
a racial group capable of being singled out for differential treatment.”  Id., 476 
U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d at 86.  In determining whether defendant 
established a prima facie case of discrimination, we observe that the trial court 
raised the Batson issue, sua sponte.  The court of appeals noted that both defendant 
and Smith are African-Americans and Smith was not challenged for cause but was 
excused pursuant to a peremptory challenge.  We agree with the court of appeals 
that we must presume that the trial court believed that a prima facie case under 
Batson was established. 
 
Once the opponent of the strike makes a prima facie showing of purposeful 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to “come forward 
 
 
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with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.”  Id., 476 U.S. at 97, 106 
S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.  Since the trial court found that a prima facie case 
of discrimination had been established, the burden shifted to the state to rebut the 
claim. 
 
In the second step of the Batson inquiry, the neutral explanation “need not 
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”  Id.  In fact, the 
United States Supreme Court has subsequently held that the “second step of this 
process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.  ‘At 
this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s 
explanation.  Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ”  Purkett v. Elem 
(1995), 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839, quoting 
Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 
L.Ed.2d 395, 406. 
 
In determining whether the state advanced a race-neutral explanation for the 
peremptory challenge, we examine the four reasons proferred by the state.  First, 
the prosecutor pointed out that he had not challenged an African-American female 
who was ultimately seated on the jury.  Second, the prosecutor noted that Smith 
was wearing a large cross around his neck that was very visible.  Third, the 
prosecutor claimed that in his opinion, Smith’s religious beliefs were very strongly 
 
 
12
held.  Fourth, the prosecutor stated that he thought that Smith was evasive in 
answering which church he attended. 
 
We first observe, as the court of appeals pointed out, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the rights of a prospective juror from the use of 
discriminatory challenges, and the fact that another juror of the same race remained 
on the jury does not preclude a holding that the state unlawfully removed Smith 
from the jury.  The exercise of even one peremptory challenge in a purposefully 
discriminatory manner would violate equal protection.  See State v. White (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 433, 436, 709 N.E.2d 140, 147.  Therefore, the prosecutor’s first 
statement was in error. 
 
Turning to the other reasons advanced by the prosecutor, the trial court and 
the court of appeals both acknowledged that Smith’s wearing of a religious 
symbol, his strongly held religious beliefs, and his alleged vagueness in answering 
the prosecutor’s questions were reasons based on something other than race.  We 
agree that these were all reasons that did not, on their face, deny defendant equal 
protection.  Thus, we  proceed to step three of the Batson inquiry. 
 
In step three, the trial judge must determine if the defendant has established 
purposeful discrimination.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 
at 88-89.  The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, 
 
 
13
and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.  Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 
S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839. 
 
Defendant claims that although the reasons advanced by the prosecutor to 
support his peremptory strike may have been race-neutral on their face, they were 
merely a pretext to mask the prosecutor’s intent to remove Smith on the basis of 
race in violation of equal protection.  Moreover, defendant claims that the trial 
court did not proceed to step three of the inquiry and instead stopped after 
determining that the reasons advanced by the prosecutor were race-neutral.  We 
disagree with both assertions. 
 
In the third part of the Batson analysis, the court must decide whether the 
neutral explanation offered by the proponent of the strike is credible or instead is a 
“pretext” for unconstitutional discrimination.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 
S.Ct. at 1868, 114 L.Ed.2d at 408.  This part of the analysis essentially boils down 
to the credibility of the proponent of the peremptory challenge’s race-neutral 
explanation.  Id. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409.  In this case, the 
trial court chose to believe the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for striking 
prospective juror Smith. 
 
“In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be 
whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be 
believed.  There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best 
 
 
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evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”  
Id.  Because the trial judge’s findings in this step “ ‘largely turn on evaluation of 
credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great 
deference.’ ”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409, 
quoting Batson at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 89, fn. 21.  Thus, we cannot 
overturn the trial court’s finding on the issue of discriminatory intent “unless 
convinced that its determination was clearly erroneous.”  Id. at 369, 111 S.Ct. at 
1871, 114 L.Ed.2d at 412. 
 
With regard to the cross worn by Smith, personal appearance is frequently 
upheld as a race-neutral and non-pretextual basis for peremptory strikes.  In fact, 
one court has upheld striking a prospective juror who was wearing a crucifix.  See 
James v. Commonwealth (1994), 247 Va. 459, 460-463, 442 S.E.2d 396, 397-398.  
Other personal-appearance characteristics that have been upheld as race-neutral 
and non-pretextual have included facial hair (Purkett v. Elem, supra), having a 
muscular build (Maxey v. State, [Mar. 19, 1992], Tex. App. No. A14-90-00793-
CR, unreported, 1992 WL 49905), wearing flashy clothes (Stanford v. 
Commonwealth [Ky.1990], 793 S.W.2d 112, 114), and chewing gum (Webb v. 
State [Tex.App.1992], 840 S.W.2d 543).  In deference to the trial court, who was 
able to view the cross in question and observe Smith’s demeanor, we find no abuse 
of discretion. 
 
 
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The second reason advanced by the prosecutor was that Smith had strongly 
held religious beliefs.  Again, we find no abuse of discretion in finding this to be a 
race-neutral and non-pretextual basis for the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge.  
Religion is often the foundation for an individual’s moral values, so religious 
beliefs can be an important consideration for both sides in seating an impartial 
jury.  Defendant points out that Smith indicated that he would be able to sit in 
judgment of others and that he knew right from wrong.  But only the trial court was 
able to determine the sincerity of the effect of these words and whether it was 
reasonable for the prosecutor to believe otherwise.  Even Smith’s quickness in 
pointing out his ability to judge others may have played into the prosecutor’s 
decision to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike him.  Again, in deference to 
the trial court who was able to determine the credibility of the words that we can 
only see on paper, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that 
this reason was both race-neutral and non-pretextual. 
 
The third and final reason advanced by the prosecutor as a basis for 
challenging Smith was his alleged vagueness in answering questions about his 
religion.  Again, the defendant points to Smith’s final answer where he identified 
his church and even pinpointed an address.  However, the record shows that before 
he ultimately volunteered the information, he generically identified himself as “just 
a christian,” and “nondenominational.” 
 
 
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Again, only the trial court was able to listen to Smith’s tone of voice, and his 
inflection, and to observe his mannerisms and overall demeanor and that of the 
prosecutor.  From our vantage point, far removed from the trial and with only a 
transcript to review, we give great deference to the trial court who was in the best 
position to make the determination of whether the defendant met his burden of 
proving purposeful discrimination.  While the trial judge could have made more 
explicit findings on the record regarding the challenges, we find no abuse of 
discretion in allowing the state to exercise a peremptory challenge against Smith.  
Accordingly, we find that defendant’s first proposition of law is without merit. 
Other Acts Evidence 
 
In his fifth proposition of law, defendant alleges that the repeated 
introduction of bad character evidence to show his propensity to commit the crime 
charged was so prejudicial as to deny the presumption of innocence and the 
fundamental fairness of his trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing the 
state to introduce evidence from a prior criminal trial, which resulted in acquittal, 
as well as evidence of other acts that he allegedly committed.  In particular, 
defendant objects to admission of details about his prior rape charge and other 
offenses. 
 
 
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The premise of the defense was that Valerie Parks had a motive to bring 
false rape charges against defendant.  Therefore, at trial, defense counsel brought 
out details about Parks’s knowledge of the prior rape charge brought by his ex-
wife.  In addition, defense counsel elicited details about defendant’s prior 
conviction for domestic violence. 
 
Because defense counsel did not object to any of these alleged errors, they 
are waived absent plain error.  Crim.R. 52(B).  Defendant acknowledges that 
defense counsel was the proponent of much of this alleged other acts evidence, but 
claims that the state went too far in eliciting the details and misused the prior rape 
charge to show defendant’s propensity to commit rape.  However, once defendant 
brought this evidence in and attempted to use it to undermine Parks’s credibility, 
defendant opened the door for the state to refer to it as well.  Crim.R. 52(B).  The 
court of appeals described the above evidence as the “crux of Gowdy’s defense and 
had to be offered to support his claim.”  We agree.  Accordingly, defendant’s fifth 
proposition of law is without merit. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, defendant claims that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial.  “Counsel’s performance will not be deemed 
ineffective unless and until counsel’s performance is proved to have fallen below 
an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises 
 
 
18
from counsel’s performance.”  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 
N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus.  In addition, to show defendant has 
been prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, “the defendant must prove 
that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the 
result of the trial would have been different.”  Id., paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
First, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
when trial counsel allowed a juror who had been the victim of an attempted date 
rape to remain on the panel.  However, as the court of appeals noted, the record 
reflects that counsel successfully removed from the jury panel a prospective juror 
who had been the victim of an attempted date rape and who informed counsel that 
she would not be able to be objective.  In addition, counsel exercised a peremptory 
to excuse another juror whose aunt had been the victim of an attempted rape and 
who was closely related to a police officer.  Trial counsel used her remaining 
peremptory challenges to excuse a prospective juror who was caring for an elderly 
relative, and a prospective juror who needed to care for his son. 
 
As for the prospective juror in question, juror Pearson, when she indicated 
that she had been the victim of an attempted date rape in 1985, counsel followed 
up with questions.  Juror Pearson acknowledged that no physical contact was made 
and she informed counsel that she could set aside her personal feelings and could 
judge the facts in this case fairly.  Moreover, the other jurors who remained on the 
 
 
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panel all stated that they would be able to set aside their personal feelings and be 
objective.  Based on all of the above, we find that defendant failed to show that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different had prospective juror Pearson been 
excused. 
 
Second, defendant alleges that defense counsel’s strategy of introducing 
evidence of defendant’s prior rape charge at trial amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  As noted previously, the crux of defendant’s defense was 
that the sexual intercourse was consensual and that Parks, motivated by jealously, 
was lying.  Thus, the evidence that Parks had knowledge of the prior rape charge 
and used it as retaliation for defendant’s breakup was central to defendant’s attack 
on her credibility.  We further note that defense counsel’s failure to object when 
the state elicited testimony about the details of the prior charge did not prejudice 
the defendant.  Taken in context with all of the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that this did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Third, defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object when the state cross-examined defendant about prior charges for domestic 
violence, no driver’s license, and failure to pay child support. 
 
Defendant, himself, on direct examination, brought up the fact that he had 
warrants against him.  He mentioned both failure to pay child support and domestic 
violence.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor simply asked defendant the basis 
 
 
20
of the warrants to which he had earlier referred on direct exam.  Defendant then 
explained that one was for failure to pay child support and one was for a probation 
violation related to his prior domestic violence conviction against his ex-wife.  
Therefore, the defense had already opened the door to cross-examination on these 
subjects by bringing them up on direct examination as part of the theory of their 
defense—that Parks knew about the prior conviction for domestic violence and the 
prior rape charge, and knew that she could intimidate the defendant into staying 
with her by threatening to call police regarding the warrants or fabricate her own 
rape charges against defendant.  Therefore, this information was related to the crux 
of the defense’s case.  We find that it was a reasonable tactical decision for defense 
counsel not to object to cross-examination on these issues. 
 
As for the driver’s license, while counsel should have objected to the 
admission of this evidence, defendant has not demonstrated “a reasonable 
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different.”  Bradley, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Thus, we 
conclude that the failure to object to the issues above did not rise to the level of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Finally, defendant alleges that trial counsel was unprepared to go forward 
with the sexual offender classification hearing.  Indeed, counsel was unprepared to 
conduct the sexual offender classification hearing.  But that was through no fault of 
 
 
21
her own.  Neither counsel nor defendant received notice of the hearing.  Our 
resolution of the notice issue follows and makes this particular claim moot. 
  
Based on our prior review of the other three claims, we find that defendant’s 
claims did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, 
we find that defendant’s sixth proposition of law is without merit. 
Sexual Offender Classification Hearing 
 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) provides that “the judge who is to impose sentence upon 
the offender shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is a sexual 
predator.  The judge shall conduct the hearing prior to sentencing and, if the 
sexually oriented offense is a felony, may conduct it as part of the sentencing 
hearing required by section 2929.19 of the Revised Code.  The court shall give the 
offender and the prosecutor who prosecuted the offender for the sexually oriented 
offense notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing.”  R.C. 2950.09(B)(1). 
 
When defendant was convicted on April 28, 1997, the trial judge set the 
sentencing hearing for May 9, 1997, without any mention of a sexual offender 
classification hearing.  On May 9, 1997, defendant and his counsel and the 
prosecutor were present for sentencing when trial counsel made a motion to 
withdraw from further representation because defendant had written a letter to the 
trial judge after his conviction, accusing trial counsel of ineffectiveness.  The trial 
 
 
22
court denied her motion, and she was forced to proceed with both sentencing and 
then the sexual offender classification hearing. 
 
The court of appeals determined that the trial court erred in failing to give 
the notice required by R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), but concluded that there was no 
prejudice to defendant from the lack of notice.  We strongly disagree and reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue. 
 
Defendant received no notice of the hearing, either orally or in writing.  
Clearly, defendant did not receive that which was due to him under the statute. 
Trial counsel did her best to represent defendant at the sexual offender 
classification hearing within the constraints upon her; however, we find that it is 
imperative that counsel have time to adequately prepare for the hearing.  At the 
hearing, the defendant is entitled to “testify, present evidence, call and examine 
witnesses and expert witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses and expert witnesses 
regarding the determination as to whether the offender is a sexual predator.”  R.C. 
2950.09(B)(1). 
 
At a sexual offender classification hearing, decisions are made regarding 
classification, registration, and notification that will have a profound impact on a 
defendant’s life.  Defendants must have notice of the hearing in order to “have an 
opportunity to testify, present evidence, call and examine witnesses and expert 
witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses and expert witnesses regarding the 
 
 
23
determination as to whether the offender is a sexual predator.”  R.C. 
2950.09(B)(1). 
 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) further provides that “[t]he court shall give the offender 
and the prosecutor who prosecuted the offender for the sexually oriented offense 
notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing.”  Giving effect to the plain 
language of the statute, we conclude that the notice provision of R.C. 
2950.09(B)(1) demands strict compliance.  To hold otherwise would make the 
hearing perfunctory in nature and would deny defendant the rights guaranteed him 
under the statute. 
 
Defense counsel did not formally object to the judge’s proceeding with the 
hearing without notice to the defendant.  We are mindful that we have held that 
sexual offender classification hearings under R.C. 2950.09(B) are civil in nature, 
State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 423, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585.  “In appeals of 
civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the 
extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no 
objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of 
the underlying judicial process itself.”  Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 
116, 679 N.E.2d 1099, syllabus.  We find that this case involves such exceptional 
 
 
24
circumstances and therefore hold that this lack of notice to the defendant 
constituted plain error. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the notice requirement for sexual offender 
classification hearings under R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) is mandatory.  Notice of the 
sentencing hearing is not sufficient notice of the sexual offender classification 
hearing.  Absent compliance with the mandatory notice provision, defendant’s 
classification as a sexual predator must be vacated and the matter remanded to the 
trial court for a sexual offender classification hearing with proper advance notice 
of the hearing issued to the parties.  The remainder of the judgment of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY AND PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 425, 700 N.E.2d 570, 587, 
this court referred to the hearing described in R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) as a “sexual 
predator determination hearing.”  However, “sexual offender classification 
 
 
25
hearing” better describes what takes place at the hearing.  As such, that is the 
preferred term. 
 
2. 
Batson has since been extended to prohibit peremptory strikes based 
on gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994), 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 
128 L.Ed.2d 89. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the majority that the trial court’s failure 
to satisfy the notice requirement for the sexual offender classification hearing was 
error.  Gowdy, however, did not object to this error.  The majority decides, without 
elaboration, that this case involves “exceptional circumstances” and reverses on the 
basis of plain error.  I respectfully dissent, because I would find no plain error here. 
 
At least two appellate districts in this state have determined that plain error 
does not necessarily occur whenever a trial court fails to provide proper notice of 
the classification hearing under R.C. 2950.09.  See, e.g., State v. Meade (Apr. 30, 
1999), Scioto App. No. 98CA2566, unreported, 1999 WL 299890;  State v. Martell 
(Nov. 29, 1999), Clermont App. Nos. CA99-01-009 and CA99-05-054, unreported, 
1999 WL 1087025.  Both courts adhered to the well-established prudential rule 
that “[n]otice of plain error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution, under 
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  
 
 
26
State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
 
In Meade, the offender pleaded guilty to rape, and the trial court held the 
sexual predator classification hearing just before the sentencing hearing without 
objection from either party.  On appeal, Meade argued that the trial court deprived 
him of due process by failing to notify him that the classification hearing would 
occur at sentencing.  The court of appeals found no plain error, noting that Meade 
expressed no surprise or confusion when the court began the classification hearing, 
and that Meade’s counsel presented evidence on Meade’s behalf that dovetailed the 
factors enumerated in R.C. 2950.09(B)(2).  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
concluded that the failure to provide specific notice of the classification hearing 
did not prejudice Meade. 
 
In Martell, the offender pleaded guilty to rape and gross sexual imposition.  
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor said to the judge, 
“Wait, Your Honor, there is the issue of classification, I guess, before—if we can 
do that at this time. * * * My understanding from [defense counsel] is that there is 
not going to be an argument on that.”  Defense counsel then said to the judge, “We 
are not going to stipulate to it.  We think all the information necessary * * * is 
before the Court.  We concede ‘sexually oriented offender’ would not be 
appropriate.  We think the middle classification would be appropriate.”  The state 
 
 
27
urged the court to classify Martell as a sexual predator, and defense counsel 
discussed Martell’s remorse.  The court classified Martell as a sexual predator. 
 
On appeal, Martell argued that the trial court’s failure to notify him that the 
sexual predator classification would occur at sentencing denied him due process.  
Like the Meade court, the Twelfth Appellate District determined that the notice 
error did not prejudice Martell.  The court reasoned that Martell’s counsel knew 
the classification hearing would occur at sentencing, since he had previously 
discussed the classification issue with the prosecutor.  And Martell’s counsel 
advocated the interests of his client by noting Martell’s remorse and suggesting the 
appropriateness of the “middle” classification.  For these reasons, the court of 
appeals concluded that the notice failure did not amount to plain error. 
 
Both the Meade and Martell courts applied the definition of “plain error” 
from Crim.R. 52(B).  Today, the majority applies the civil definition of “plain 
error” from Goldfuss v. Davidson, noting that our decision in State v. Cook held 
that sexual predator classification hearings are “civil in nature.”  Regardless, 
Goldfuss expressly found that the plain error doctrine “originated as a criminal law 
concept,” Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099, 
1103.  And Goldfuss’s definition of the plain error standard to be applied in civil 
contexts tracks the standard in our criminal cases interpreting Crim.R. 52(B).  
Compare State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, 
 
 
28
paragraph three of the syllabus (“Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52[B] is to be 
taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent 
a manifest miscarriage of justice.”), and Goldfuss, supra, 79 Ohio St.3d at 121, 679 
N.E.2d at 1103 (“In applying the doctrine of plain error in a civil case, reviewing 
courts must proceed with the utmost caution, limiting the doctrine strictly to those 
extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its application to 
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error complained of, if left 
uncorrected, would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public 
confidence in, judicial proceedings.”).  Finally, even in Cook, we cited criminal 
cases to support our conclusion that the trial judge’s reliance on a presentence 
report during the classification hearing did not amount to plain error.  State v. Cook 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 426, 700 N.E.2d 570, 587, citing State v. Nicholas 
(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 435-436, 613 N.E.2d 225, 229, and State v. Martin 
(1955), 164 Ohio St. 54, 59, 57 O.O. 84, 87, 128 N.E.2d 7, 12.  All of this 
persuades me that the Meade and Martell courts properly employed the Rule 52(B) 
standard for plain error. 
 
The record of the sentencing proceeding in this case reveals that Gowdy did 
not suffer prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure to comply with the notice 
requirement of R.C. 2950.09.  Gowdy’s trial counsel appeared with Gowdy at his 
sentencing hearing, and they expressed no surprise that the classification hearing 
 
 
29
would occur before sentencing.  When Gowdy’s attorney requested to withdraw as 
Gowdy’s counsel, she did so on the basis of her client’s pro se motion alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel—not because she felt unprepared to represent 
Gowdy during the classification hearing.  When the trial court denied defense 
counsel’s request to withdraw, based on her demonstrated history of effective 
representation, the parties—like the parties in Meade and Martell—presented 
arguments that dovetailed appropriate factors for consideration under R.C. 
2950.09(B)(2).  Defense counsel urged the court to consider Gowdy’s lack of prior 
felony convictions.  See R.C. 2950.09(B)(2)(b) and (f).  And the state noted 
Gowdy’s prior criminal record, the nature of the offense, Gowdy’s demonstrated 
pattern of abuse, and evidence of cruelty.  See R.C. 2950.09(B)(2)(b), (f), (h), and 
(i).  Only after considering these statutorily permissible factors did the trial court 
classify Gowdy as a sexual predator. 
 
Because I do not believe that the trial court’s improper notice prejudiced 
Gowdy, I would not vacate his classification as a sexual predator on the basis of 
plain error.  This is not “the extremely rare case involving exceptional 
circumstances” where the trial court’s error challenges the legitimacy of the 
judicial process.  Goldfuss, supra, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099, syllabus.  
And because I concur with the majority’s disposition of Gowdy’s other claims, I 
would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.