Case Title: Doktor v. Doktor

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11727

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-30T00:00:00Z

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SJC-11727 
 
JOSEPH W. DOKTOR  vs.  DOROTHY A. DOKTOR. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     October 6, 2014. - January 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment, 
Separation agreement.  Statute, Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Berkshire Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on March 15, 1991. 
 
 
A 
complaint 
for 
modification, 
filed 
on 
June 
21, 
2013, 
was 
heard 
by Beth A. Crawford, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
Peter C. Alessio for the husband. 
 
Janet H. Pumphrey for the wife. 
 
 
DUFFLY, 
J.  Joseph 
W. 
Doktor 
and 
Dorothy 
A. 
Doktor 
were 
divorced 
by a judgment nisi that entered in January, 1992, after a marriage 
of over twenty years.1  The judgment incorporated a separation 
                                                 
1 Because they share a last name, we refer to Joseph W. Doktor 
and Dorothy A. Doktor by their first names. 
 
 
2 
agreement that, among other things, obligated Joseph to pay alimony 
to 
Dorothy 
in 
the 
weekly 
amount 
of 
$200 
until 
"the 
death 
or 
remarriage 
of the Wife."  That provision merged with the judgment.  In June, 
2013, Joseph filed a complaint for modification in the Probate and 
Family Court, seeking termination of the alimony obligation under 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 49 (f), 
inserted 
by 
St. 
2011, 
c. 
124 
(alimony 
reform 
act), which provides that "general term alimony orders shall 
terminate upon the payor attaining the full retirement age."  He 
asserted that he had retired, and was past the normal age of full 
retirement as defined by the alimony reform act.  See G. L. c. 208, 
§ 48.  Thereafter, he filed an amended complaint for modification, 
asserting as a further change in circumstances that his former wife 
was no longer in need of alimony.  Following a trial, a Probate and 
Family Court judge dismissed the complaint for modification, 
concluding that G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f) (retirement provision), 
applies prospectively, and therefore that Joseph was required to, 
but had not, established that there had been a material change in 
circumstances warranting modification.  Joseph appealed, and we 
granted his petition for direct appellate review. 
This case again raises a question relative to retroactive 
application of the retirement provision of the alimony reform act 
to alimony agreements that merged with judgments of divorce entered 
prior to March 1, 2012, the effective date of the act.  See Chin v. 
 
 
3 
Merriot, 
ante 
at    ; 
Rodman 
v. 
Rodman, 
ante 
at    .  Joseph 
argues 
that the judge erred in concluding that only those general term 
alimony orders that exceed the durational limits set forth in G. L. 
c. 208, § 49 (b),2 can be terminated pursuant to provisions of the 
alimony 
reform 
act.  We 
have 
concluded 
that 
the 
Legislature 
intended 
the retirement provision to have prospective application; 
consequently, it is not applicable to modification of the alimony 
judgment 
in 
this 
case.  Chin 
v. 
Merriot, 
supra.  As 
to 
Joseph's 
claim 
that the evidence he presented supports modification of his 
obligation to pay alimony based on a material change in 
circumstances, we conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion 
in 
finding 
that 
the 
evidence 
failed 
to 
establish 
a 
change 
in 
the 
parties' 
circumstances 
warranting 
termination 
of 
the 
alimony 
obligation. 
Background.  We draw our summary of the facts from the judge's 
findings and the stipulations of the parties.  The parties were 
married on September 20, 1968.  Joseph was trained as an electrical 
                                                 
2 The alimony reform act, St. 2011, c. 124, sets limits on the 
period 
of 
time 
that 
alimony 
awards 
may 
continue, 
based 
on 
the 
length 
of the parties' marriage as defined by the act.  See G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b) (1)-(4).  Following a marriage of more than ten but less 
than 
fifteen 
years, 
for 
example, 
"general 
term 
alimony 
shall 
continue 
for not longer than [seventy] per cent of the number of months of 
the marriage."  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (3).  Uncodified § 4 (b) of 
the alimony reform act states in part:  "Existing alimony awards 
which exceed the durational limits established in [G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49,] shall be modified upon a complaint for modification."  St. 
2011, c. 124, § 4 (b) (uncodified section). 
 
 
4 
engineer and worked for the majority of his career at a major 
electronics firm, until his retirement in 2001 at the age of 
fifty-seven.  Dorothy 
earned 
a 
degree 
in 
medical 
technology 
and 
last 
worked in that field in 1973.  During the marriage, Dorothy focused 
on 
raising 
the 
parties' 
two 
children, 
who 
are 
now 
adults, 
and 
managing 
the 
household.  Joseph 
was 
the 
primary 
wage 
earner.  The 
parties 
had 
been married for more than twenty years when they were divorced by 
a judgment of divorce nisi entered on January 10, 1992, which 
incorporated 
the 
parties' 
separation 
agreement.  A 
merged 
provision 
of that agreement provides that "the Husband shall . . . pay to the 
Wife 
the 
sum 
of 
$200 
per 
week 
as 
alimony . 
. 
. 
. 
Payments . . . 
shall 
cease upon the death or remarriage of the Wife." 
Following a trial on Joseph's complaint for modification, the 
judge concluded that the retirement provision does not operate 
retroactively, 
and 
thus 
that 
it 
does 
not 
apply 
in 
circumstances 
such 
as these, where the parties' divorce judgment predates the alimony 
reform act.  The judge also determined that Dorothy could not meet 
her expenses without alimony payments, and that Joseph had the 
ability to meet his alimony obligation. 
Discussion.  1.  Prospective application of the retirement 
provision.  Joseph 
challenges 
the 
judge's 
conclusion 
that 
§ 4 
of 
the 
uncodified provisions of the alimony reform act, St. 2011, c. 124, 
§ 4 (uncodified section), sets forth the standard of review for 
 
 
5 
modification 
for 
alimony 
awards 
in 
judgments 
existing 
prior 
to 
March 
1, 2012.3  As we explained in Chin v. Merriot, ante at     , citing 
Murphy v. Department of Correction, 429 Mass. 736, 737-738 (1999), 
we "construe the language of the uncodified sections of the alimony 
reform act together with the codified sections, according to their 
plain 
meaning, 
unless 
the 
reliance 
on 
the 
literal 
words 
would 
produce 
an 
absurd 
result, 
or 
a 
result 
contrary 
to 
the 
Legislature's 
manifest 
intent." 
The judge was correct in concluding that the Legislature 
distinguished between modifications of newly-enacted durational 
limits on alimony, defined in G. L. c. 208, § 49, and other 
modifications 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
alimony 
awarded.  The 
alimony reform 
act provides that "existing alimony judgments that exceed the 
durational 
limits 
under 
[G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 49,] 
shall 
be 
modified 
upon 
                                                 
3  Uncodified § 4 (b) of the alimony reform act provides: 
 
"[General 
Laws 
c. 
208, 
§§ 48-55,] 
shall 
not 
be 
deemed 
a 
material 
change of circumstance that warrants modification of the amount of 
existing 
alimony 
judgments; 
provided, 
however, 
that 
existing 
alimony 
judgments that exceed the durational limits under [G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49,] 
shall 
be 
deemed 
a 
material 
change 
of 
circumstance 
that 
warrant 
modification. 
 
"Existing 
alimony 
awards 
shall 
be 
deemed 
general 
term 
alimony.  
Existing alimony awards which exceed the durational limits 
established in [G. L. c. 208, § 49,] shall be modified upon a 
complaint for modification without additional material change of 
circumstance, unless the court finds that deviation from the 
durational limits is warranted." 
 
 
6 
a complaint for modification without additional material change of 
circumstance, unless the court finds that deviation from the 
durational 
limits 
is 
warranted."  Uncodified 
§ 4 (b).  In 
all 
other 
respects, however, G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-55, "shall not be deemed a 
material change of circumstance that warrants modification of the 
amount of existing alimony judgments."  Uncodified § 4 (b). 
Under 
common 
understanding 
of 
the 
phrase, 
the 
term 
"durational 
limits" 
refers 
to 
"the 
length 
of 
time 
something 
lasts."  Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
613 
(10th 
ed. 
2014).  The 
codified 
sections 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act, 
discussing 
durational 
limits, 
clearly 
refer 
to 
the 
length 
of 
time 
that 
alimony 
is 
to 
be 
paid, 
and 
distinguish 
this 
period 
from 
the 
amount 
of 
alimony 
to 
be 
paid.4  Under 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act, 
the 
term "durational limits" does not include an event, such as death, 
remarriage, cohabitation, or reaching the age of retirement, that 
might 
trigger 
termination 
or 
reduction 
of 
alimony.  The 
language 
of 
uncodified § 4 (b) is consistent with the language of uncodified 
§ 4 (a), which provides that G. L. c. 208, § 49, 
"shall apply prospectively, such that alimony judgments 
entered before March 1, 2012 shall terminate only under such 
judgments, under a subsequent modification or as otherwise 
                                                 
4 Thus, G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b), sets forth limitations on the 
duration of alimony obligations based on the length of the parties' 
marriage.  General 
Laws 
c. 
208, 
§ 49 
(b), 
by 
its 
terms, 
does 
not 
apply 
to a marriage of more than twenty years.  See id. ("if the length 
of 
the 
marriage 
is 
[twenty] 
years 
or 
less, 
general 
term 
alimony 
shall 
terminate 
no 
later 
than 
a 
date 
certain 
under 
the 
following 
durational 
limits"). 
 
 
7 
provided for in this act." 
 
As we explained in Rodman v. Rodman, ante at    , modification 
based on the newly-enacted durational limits in G. L. c. 208, § 49, 
affords the sole exception to prospective application, and it is 
apparent that this is what the Legislature was referencing in 
uncodified § 4 (a) when it allowed prospective application "as 
otherwise provided for in this act." Uncodified § 5 staggers the 
filing dates for complaints for modification asserting that an 
existing alimony judgment exceeds the durational limits of G. L. 
c. 208, § 49.5  There is a three and one-half year phase-in period 
                                                 
5 Uncodified §§ 5 and 6 of the alimony reform act provide: 
 
"SECTION 5.  Any complaint for modification filed by a payor 
under 
[§] 4 
of 
this 
act 
solely 
because 
the 
existing 
alimony 
judgment 
exceeds the durational limits of [G. L. c. 208, ' 49,] may only be 
filed under the following time limits: 
 
"(1) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [five] 
years or less, may file a modification action on or after March 1, 
2013. 
 
"(2) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [ten] 
years or less, but more than [five] years, may file a modification 
action on or after March 1, 2014. 
 
"(3) 
Payors 
who 
were 
married 
to 
the 
alimony 
recipient 
[fifteen] 
years or less, but more than [ten] years, may file a modification 
action on or after March 1, 2015. 
 
"(4) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [twenty] 
years 
or 
less, 
but 
more 
than 
[fifteen] 
years, 
may 
file 
a 
modification 
action on or after September 1, 2015. 
 
"SECTION 
6.  Notwithstanding 
clauses 
(1) 
to 
(4) 
of 
[§] 5 
of 
this 
 
 
8 
for filing of such requests.6  However, uncodified § 6 provides an 
exception to that phase-in period.  Read together, uncodified §§ 5 
and 
6 
establish 
that, 
where 
a 
payor 
who 
had 
been 
married 
to 
a 
recipient 
for fewer than twenty years seeks to modify an alimony obligation 
based on the durational limits of G. L. c. 208, § 49, and the payor 
also will "reach full retirement age on or before March 1, 2015," 
the payor may file a complaint for modification on or after March 
1, 2013, "[n]otwithstanding clauses (1) to (4) of [§] 5"; 
accordingly, 
such 
a 
payor 
is 
not 
restricted 
to 
the 
phased 
filing 
dates 
provided in uncodified § 5. 
Based 
on 
the 
foregoing, 
the 
judge 
did 
not 
err 
in 
dismissing 
the 
complaint 
for 
modification 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
G. 
L. 
c. 208, 
§ 49 (f), 
is prospective, and therefore provides no basis for modifying the 
alimony judgment that entered more than twenty years prior to March 
1, 2012. 
2.  Material change in circumstances.  Joseph also challenges 
the 
judge's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
parties' 
circumstances 
do 
not 
warrant 
                                                                                                                                                             
act, any payor who has reached full retirement age, as defined in 
section [G. L. c. 208, ' 48,] or who will reach full retirement age 
on or before March 1, 2015 may file a complaint for modification on 
or after March 1, 2013." 
 
6 According 
to 
the 
chairs 
of 
the 
alimony 
task 
force 
that 
drafted 
the proposed legislation act that eventually was adopted as the 
alimony reform act, this "phase in period" was intended to ease the 
additional burden on courts resulting from the sudden influx of 
cases.  See letter of December 28, 2010, from Chairs of the Alimony 
Task Force to Chairs of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary. 
 
 
9 
modification of the alimony judgment.  The judge properly "looked 
to the statute governing modification of divorce judgments that was 
in 
effect 
prior 
to 
the 
enactment 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act, 
to 
inform 
her determination whether there had been a material change in the 
parties' circumstances."  Chin v. Merriot, ante at    , citing 
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 293 (2009). 
Because 
the 
parties 
stipulated 
"that 
the 
Husband 
has 
the 
ability 
to pay the current alimony award," the judge made no findings 
concerning Joseph's income, expenses, or assets.  Indeed, nothing 
in 
the 
record 
reflects 
the 
amount 
of 
his 
income 
and 
expenses, 
or 
the 
net value of his assets.  Instead, in light of the stipulation, the 
judge's 
findings 
focus 
on 
whether 
Dorothy's 
circumstances 
since 
the 
divorce have changed so materially that she is no longer in need of 
alimony.  In determining whether Dorothy is no longer in need of 
alimony, the judge considered the parties' marital standard of 
living, as she was required to do.  "If a supporting spouse has the 
ability 
to 
pay, 
the 
recipient 
spouse's 
need 
for 
support 
is 
generally 
the amount needed to allow that spouse to maintain the lifestyle he 
or she enjoyed prior to termination of the marriage.  'The standard 
of need is measured by the "station" of the parties -- by what is 
required to maintain a standard of living comparable to the one 
enjoyed during the marriage.'"  Pierce v. Pierce, supra at 296, 
quoting Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 819 (1985). 
 
 
10 
Joseph does not challenge the following findings of fact.  
During the marriage, Joseph was the primary wage earner; his gross 
weekly income was $1,428,66.  Dorothy earned no significant income 
after the children were born.  At the time of the divorce, her only 
income, other than child support, was one hundred dollars per week 
from dividends and interest.  The marital home, which the parties 
built together using their own labor, was sold at the time of the 
divorce.  The house, a four-bedroom, two and one-half bathroom 
colonial, 
is 
located 
on 
four 
and 
one-half 
acres 
of 
land.  Joseph 
used 
the proceeds to pay off the mortgage on the house, in which he 
continues to live with his current wife; title to the house is now 
in 
her 
name.7  Dorothy 
purchased 
"a 
modest 
house," 
which 
at 
the 
time 
of trial had equity in the amount of $109,000.  During their 
marriage, Joseph and Dorothy traveled regularly; every year, they 
took an extensive vacation with their children, and Dorothy often 
accompanied Joseph on business trips.  They drove expensive 
automobiles, went to concerts and dined out frequently, and Joseph 
often purchased jewelry for Dorothy. 
Following the divorce, Dorothy worked as a limousine driver 
earning seventy-nine dollars per week.  By the time of trial on the 
complaint for modification, she no longer drove for a company, but 
                                                 
7 The record does not reflect the value of the house, its sale 
price, or the amount of equity each party received. 
 
 
11 
continued to drive for friends, earning between forty dollars and 
$46.15 per week.  As additional sources of weekly income, she 
received 
$197 
in 
Social 
Security 
benefits, 
$232.42 
in 
dividends, 
and 
$144.26 from her share of Joseph's pension.  The judge found 
Dorothy's adjusted weekly expenses of $634.49 to be "reasonable."  
The judge found also that Dorothy traveled occasionally, but that 
her travel was not as "lavish" as it had been during the marriage, 
and that she used discounts and coupons to meet her other expenses.  
Dorothy had received two assets as part of an equal division of 
marital 
assets 
when 
the 
parties 
divorced.  They 
had 
a 
combined 
value 
of 
$690,231 
at 
the 
time 
of 
trial 
on 
the 
complaint 
for 
modification.8  
The judge found that Dorothy "is not able to meet her current 
reasonable 
expenses 
from 
income 
without 
alimony, 
unless 
she 
invades 
her assets." 
Joseph 
argues 
that 
the 
judge 
erred 
in 
not 
considering 
Dorothy's 
ability to use the principal of her assets to meet her reasonable 
expenses.  "In determining whether to modify a support or alimony 
order, a . . . judge must weigh all relevant circumstances"; 
"[r]esolution of the issue rests in the judge's sound discretion."  
                                                 
8 One of these assets was an investment account valued at 
$375,839 
that 
generated 
dividend 
income 
in 
the 
amount 
of 
$232.42 
per 
week, and the other was an individual retirement account valued at 
$314,392.  The judge found that Dorothy also had, at some point, 
acquired an additional individual retirement account valued at 
$30,361; the evidence does not reflect the date on which this asset 
was acquired. 
 
 
12 
Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 370 (1981).  On this record, the 
judge appears to have "weigh[ed] all relevant circumstances," id., 
and to have reached her determination based on the evidence 
presented.  She properly considered the parties' station in life 
during the marriage; the nature, source, and value of Dorothy's 
assets; her current income and reasonable expenses; and Joseph's 
stipulated ability to continue to pay alimony in the amount of $200 
per week.  On these facts, the "judge properly could conclude that 
the wife should not be required to deplete her assets in order to 
maintain herself."  Downey v. Downey, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 818 
(2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.