Case Title: P. v. Garcia

Citation: 

Docket Number: S097765

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/22/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S097765 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B141994 
ARTURO GARCIA, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. LA032965 
 
 
) 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
In re ARTURO GARCIA on Habeas 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B149050 
Corpus. 
 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted review to decide whether convictions for two defendants must 
support a firearm sentencing enhancement for one of them. 
Under Penal Code1 section 12022.53, subdivision (d), a defendant 
convicted of a qualifying felony who intentionally and personally discharges a 
firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury or death, is subject to an 
additional term of 25 years to life.  In this case, we must decide whether this 
enhancement applies to an aider and abettor if the shooter is not convicted.  
Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we conclude that a shooter’s conviction is not 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
required to impose vicarious liability.  Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In a drive-by shooting, Juan Fernando Galeana, a member of the Burbank 
Trece street gang, was shot and killed.  Salvador Morales, a member of the 
Vineland Boys (related to the Sun Valley Diablos street gang), later bragged to his 
friend and fellow gang member, Sergio Arriola, that he was the shooter and that 
defendant Arturo Garcia, also part of the Vineland Boys, was the driver.  Arriola 
told the police what Morales said, but later changed his story after he was beaten 
up.  Defendant told the same story to another fellow gang member, who informed 
the police.  At the time of his arrest, defendant admitted his involvement in 
Galeana’s murder and later gave the police a full confession. 
 
Both defendant and Morales were charged with Galeana’s murder.  (§ 187, 
subd. (a).)  As relevant here, the information included sentence enhancements 
alleging that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang 
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (4)), and that a principal discharged a firearm in 
committing the murder.  (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)  The information also included a 
firearm discharge allegation against defendant (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), though he 
was not the alleged shooter.  (See § 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)   
 
Following a court trial, defendant was convicted of second degree murder 
(§ 187, subd. (a)), for aiding and abetting in the killing of Galeana.  As to 
defendant, the trial court found true the allegations under sections 186.22 and 
12022.53, subdivision (d).  Defendant’s 15-year-to-life sentence was increased by 
25 years to life pursuant to the section 12022.53 enhancement.  Morales, the 
alleged shooter, was acquitted of all charges.  The evidence against defendant 
showed that he was not the shooter. 
 
3 
 
Defendant appealed.  He argued that the People failed to prove all the 
elements supporting the section 12022.53 enhancement.  Defendant argued that 
although he was an aider and abettor and not the shooter, the firearm enhancement 
could apply to him only if allegations under sections 12022.53, subdivision (d), 
and 186.22 were “pled and proved.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)  However, 
because Morales was acquitted and there was no evidence that defendant was the 
shooter, no person stood “convicted of a felony . . . , and who in the commission of 
that felony intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately 
caused . . . death.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (d), italics added.)  Thus, section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e)(1)’s, requirement, imposing vicarious liability on aiders and 
abettors, was not met.  
 
Agreeing with defendant, the Court of Appeal reversed the finding on the 
section 12022.53 enhancement.  In order to impose vicarious liability for an aider 
and abettor who is not the shooter, section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), requires 
that allegations under both sections 12022.53, subdivision (d), and 186.22 be 
pleaded and proved.  The Court of Appeal found that the section 12022.53, 
subdivision (d), allegation was not proved here.  Although there was evidence that 
defendant was a principal involved in Galeana’s murder, there was no evidence 
that either Morales or defendant was “convicted” of that murder by “intentionally 
and personally discharg[ing] a firearm.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)  The Court of 
Appeal denied defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
We granted the Attorney General’s petition to review whether section 
12022.53 permits imposing this enhancement on an aider and abettor only if the 
perpetrator has been convicted of the same. 
 
4 
DISCUSSION 
A. Applicable statutes 
 
Enacted in 1997 as part of the so-called 10-20-Life bill (Assem. Bill No. 4 
(1997-1998 Reg. Sess.)), section 12022.53 imposes sentence enhancements for 
firearm use applicable to certain enumerated felonies.  (§§ 12022.53, subd. (a)(1)-
(18), 246, 12034, subds. (c), (d); see Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 3.)  These 
enhancements vary in length, corresponding to various uses of a firearm.2  At 
issue here, subdivision (d) of section 12022.53 adds a consecutive 25-year-to-life 
term if a person convicted of a felony enumerated in “subdivision (a), Section 246, 
or subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 12034, . . . in the commission of that felony 
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great 
bodily injury . . . or death . . . .” 
 
Section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), imposes vicarious liability under this 
section on aiders and abettors who commit crimes in participation of a criminal 
street gang.  (People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 11-12.)  “The 
enhancements specified in this section shall apply to any person charged as a 
principal[3] in the commission of an offense that includes an allegation pursuant to 
this section when a violation of both this section and subdivision (b) of Section 
                                             
 
2 
Section 12022.53, subdivision (b), provides that a person convicted of a 
specified felony “in the commission of the felony personally used a firearm,” shall 
be subject to an additional and consecutive 10-year term.  Subdivision (c) of 
section 12022.53 increases the enhancement to an additional and consecutive 20-
year term if the person “in the commission of that felony intentionally and 
personally discharged a firearm.”   
3 
“Principal” includes not only those persons who directly commit the act, 
but also aiders and abettors.  (§ 31.) 
 
5 
186.22 are pled and proved.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)4   In turn, section 186.22, 
part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act), imposes 
a sentence enhancement or increased penalty for any person who is convicted of a 
felony “committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any 
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members . . . .”  (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (4); see 
People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 100-101.) 
 
The legislative intent behind section 12022.53 is clear:  “The Legislature 
finds and declares that substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed on 
felons who use firearms in the commission of their crimes, in order to protect our 
citizens and to deter violent crime.”  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1.)  With respect to 
aiders and abettors, one Court of Appeal has observed that section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e)(1), “is expressly drafted to extend the enhancement for gun use in 
any enumerated serious felony to gang members who aid and abet that offense in 
furtherance of the objectives of a criminal street gang.”  (People v. Gonzales, 
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.)  This subdivision provides a “clear expression of 
legislative intent” (ibid.) to “severely punish aiders and abettors to crimes by a 
principal armed with a gun committed in furtherance of the purposes of a criminal 
                                             
 
4 
On July 9, 2002, the Governor approved and the Secretary of State 
chaptered legislation amending section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), as follows:  
“The enhancements provided in this section shall apply to any person who is a 
principal in the commission of an offense if both of the following are pled and 
proved: [¶] (A) The person violated subdivision (b) of Section 186.22. [¶] (B) Any 
principal in the offense committed any act specified in subdivision (b), (c), or (d).”  
(Stats. 2002, ch. 126, § 4.)  Effective January 1, 2003, the enacted legislation 
“rewrites this provision without changing its substance.  Arguably, as rewritten by 
this bill, the vicarious application of the ‘10-20-life’ enhancement in gang cases is 
significantly easier to read.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 2173 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) June 18, 2002, p. H.)  
 
6 
street gang.  It has done so in recognition of the serious threats posed to the 
citizens of California by gang members using firearms.”  (Id. at p. 19.)  
B. Statutory interpretation 
 
In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and 
purpose for the enactment.  (People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 772.)  We 
look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their 
usual and ordinary meaning.  (Ibid.)  If there is no ambiguity in the statutory 
language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it 
said.  (Ibid.)  “However, if the statutory language permits more than one 
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the 
purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public 
policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.”  (Torres v. Parkhouse 
Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 973, 977.) 
C. Court of Appeal’s interpretation  
 
The Court of Appeal adopted what it considered a plain meaning of section 
12022.53.  Because neither Morales nor defendant was actually convicted of 
intentionally and personally discharging a firearm, the express requirements of 
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), were not met.  Thus, defendant could not be 
vicariously liable as an aider and abettor under the arming enhancement.  (§ 
12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)  The Court of Appeal rejected the People’s argument that 
“ ‘it was extremely clear that someone personally and intentionally discharged the 
firearm which killed Mr. Galeana, and that should be sufficient so long as the 
other requirements of section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), are satisfied.’ ”   
 
As explained below, we disagree with the Court of Appeal’s interpretation. 
 
7 
D. Analysis 
 
Section 12022.53, subdivision (d), provides that a defendant who is 
“convicted of [an enumerated felony], and who in the commission of that felony 
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great 
bodily injury, . . . or death, to any person other than an accomplice, shall be 
punished by a term of imprisonment of 25 years to life in the state prison, which 
shall be imposed in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for that 
felony.”  Applied to a defendant/shooter, this enhancement is arguably 
unambiguous:  a defendant who is convicted of a specified felony and is found to 
have intentionally and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great 
bodily injury or death when committing that felony, is subject to section 12022.53, 
subdivision (d).  (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 493.)  However, 
as applied to an aider and abettor, section 12022.53, subdivision (d), is not as 
clear.  (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)  The ambiguity stems, in part, from the vicarious 
nature of an aider and abettor’s liability.   
 
“The aider and abettor doctrine merely makes aiders and abettors liable for 
their accomplices’ actions as well as their own.  It obviates the necessity to decide 
who was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent 
each played which role.”  (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120.)  In 
certain circumstances, an aider and abettor may be guilty of a more serious offense 
than an actual perpetrator.  (Ibid.) 
 
Because section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), does not set forth the specific 
requirements for an aider and abettor’s liability, but implicitly makes cross-
references to subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), the potential for confusion exists.  By 
strictly construing the term “convicted” (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), however, the 
Court of Appeal failed to consider the distinctive nature of an aider and abettor’s 
liability.  Because an aider and abettor may potentially be guilty of a more serious 
 
8 
offense than the shooter (see People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120), the 
absence of a shooter’s conviction is not dispositive of the aider and abettor’s 
exposure to liability.  We see no basis to depart from this general principle of aider 
and abettor liability with respect to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), 
especially when the Legislature has expressed its clear intent to punish aiders and 
abettors in this context.  (See People v. Gonzales, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) 
 
We agree with the Attorney General that the term “convicted” (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (d)), refers to the procedural prerequisite of a defendant’s conviction, which 
must occur before imposing an enhancement.  “ ‘[A] defendant is not at risk for 
punishment under an enhancement allegation until convicted of a related 
substantive offense.’ [Citation.]”  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 500; 
see also People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 307.)  In fact, supporting this 
statement, we have noted parenthetically, “[s]ee, e.g., section 12022 
[, subdivision] (b), enhancing sentence only ‘upon conviction . . . .’ ”  (Wims, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 307.)  As amicus curiae California District Attorneys 
Association observes, various enhancement provisions include the term 
“conviction” or “convicted.”  (See, e.g., §§ 12021.5, 12022.2, 12022.4, 12022.5, 
12022.55, 12022.7, 12022.75.)  This tends to support the view that the term’s 
inclusion in these provisions, as in section 12022.53, refers to a procedural 
prerequisite, and does not suggest an additional element for pleading and proof.   
 
We conclude that in order to find an aider and abettor—who is not the 
shooter—liable under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), the prosecution must 
plead and prove that (1) a principal committed an offense enumerated in section 
12022.53, subdivision (a), section 246, or section 12034, subdivision (c) or (d); (2) 
a principal intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately 
caused great bodily injury or death to any person other than an accomplice during 
the commission of the offense; (3) the aider and abettor was a principal in the 
 
9 
offense; and (4) the offense was committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members” (§§ 186.22, subd. 
(b)(1) & (4), 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)  Although the aider and abettor must first be 
convicted of the underlying offense before the enhancement may apply (People v. 
Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 500), the prosecution need not plead and prove the 
conviction of the offense by the principal who intentionally and personally 
discharged a firearm. 
 
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s suggestion, the issue here is not whether 
the enhancement elements for vicarious liability are contained in section 12022.53, 
subdivision (b), (c) or (d), but exactly what elements are required.  In that regard, 
section 12022.53, subdivisions (f) through (j), provides very little, if any, 
substantive support for the Court of Appeal’s interpretation.  Unlike section 
12022.53, subdivision (e), subdivisions (f) through (j) do not concern vicarious 
liability, nor do they shed light on the substantive requirements for subdivisions 
(b), (c) or (d).  Rather, these subdivisions simply set forth procedural requirements 
(§ 12022.53, subds. (f), (h)), probation eligibility (§ 12022.53, subd. (g)), and 
limitations on term credits (§ 12022.53, subd. (i)).   
 
Unlike the Court of Appeal, we do not find that section 12022.53, 
subdivision (j), compels a contrary result.  To impose an additional term under 
section 12022.53, subdivision (j), “the existence of any fact required under 
subdivision (b), (c), or (d) shall be alleged in the information or indictment and 
either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of 
fact.”  Based on this subdivision, the Court of Appeal found it “[q]uite plain[]” 
that in order “for a principal to be vicariously liable under subdivision (e), proof of 
the elements of subdivision (b), (c), or (d) is required.”  The Court of Appeal, 
however, misconstrues the word “convicted” as an additional element, or fact, of 
 
10 
subdivision (d).  (See ante, at pp. 7-8.)  We agree with amicus curiae that 
subdivision (j) is simply a restatement of section 1170.1, subdivision (e), which 
provides that “[a]ll enhancements shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and 
either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of 
fact.” 
 
We are not persuaded that the “pled and proved” language of section 
12022.53, subdivision’s (e)(1), supports the Court of Appeal’s strict construction 
of subdivision (d).  Focusing on the term “proved,” defendant asserts that only 
through the shooter’s conviction, may the prosecution prove that the principal 
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or 
death.  (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)  We disagree.  Section 12022.53, subdivision 
(e)(1), merely sets forth the general requirements of pleading and proof for 
sentencing enhancements.  (See People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 197, 
208.)  There is no indication the Legislature intended that only a conviction may 
satisfy the proof requirement for firearm enhancements such as section 12022.53.  
Indeed, the case law is to the contrary.  (See, e.g., People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 
Cal.App.4th 410, 421 [sufficiency of evidence for firearm use under § 12022.5]; 
People v. Camacho (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1747 [sufficiency of evidence for 
firearm use under §§ 12022, 12022.3, 12022.53].)  By requiring the conviction of 
the actual shooter as proof for vicarious liability, defendant’s interpretation would 
impose an additional element for aiders and abettors than for shooters under 
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).  As we shall explain, we discern no clear intent 
justifying this distinction. 
 
In support of his interpretation, defendant relies on press releases and letters 
to and from the authoring legislator, memoranda, legislative digest extracts, 
 
11 
committee reports, and analyses of Assembly Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.).5  
He argues that nothing in these documents identifies particular or special concerns 
regarding gang members.  Describing the vicarious liability provision (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (e)(1)) as an “afterthought,” defendant posits that nothing in section 
12022.53’s legislative history reveals why, when, and by whom subdivision (e)(1) 
was added.  As such, he asserts it is not unreasonable that the Legislature would 
require heightened proof (in the form of a conviction) with respect to gang 
members who are not the shooters.   
 
We disagree.  Section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), expressly extends 
liability to aiders and abettors to crimes by a principal armed with a gun, for 
crimes committed in furtherance of the purposes of a criminal street gang.  Its 
legislative history clearly reveals that this was the Legislature’s intent.  
“[A]ccomplice (‘principal’) liability is excluded, with one exception.  If a 
violation of the [STEP] Act is pled and proved, accomplice liability is permitted.  
For example, if a criminal street gang is involved all principals to the felony may 
have the 10-20-Life penalties imposed upon them, not merely the defendant who 
personally used, discharged, or inflicted great bodily injury.”  (Off. of Crim. 
Justice Planning, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) 
                                             
 
5  
We grant both defendant’s and the Attorney General’s requests to take 
judicial notice of certain legislative history documents of section 12022.53.  
However, we deny defendant’s request to take judicial notice of the authoring 
legislator’s press releases and letters.  “In construing a statute we do not consider 
the objective of an authoring legislator when there is no reliable indication that the 
Legislature as a whole was aware of that objective and believed the language of 
the proposal would accomplish it.  [Citations.]”  (Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 726-727.)  We also deny defendant’s request to take 
judicial notice of a memorandum from a Contra Costa deputy district attorney to 
proponents of Assembly Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.).  (Quintano v. Mercury 
Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062, fn. 5.)  
 
12 
Sept. 18, 1997, p. 2.)  With respect to why section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), 
was added, we agree with the Gonzales Court of Appeal that this provision 
recognizes “the serious threats posed to the citizens of California by gang 
members using firearms.”  (People v. Gonzales, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 19.)  
In this context, we fail to see the importance of the questions when and by whom 
the provision was added. 
 
Defendant argues that “prosecutors are inviting this court to write out of 
section 12022.53 a key element proving an intentional shooting so that the 
prosecutors can avoid their problems of proof.”  Not so.  Our holding today does 
not relieve the prosecution from pleading and proving that a principal intentionally 
and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or 
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), or from other requirements under section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e)(1).  We hold only that a shooter’s conviction is not required as 
proof of the firearm allegation.  In that regard, we reject defendant’s contention 
that our interpretation would permit what he calls “strict accomplice liability.”     
 
Defendant also seeks support in section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), the one-
year firearm enhancement.  This section provides that “[t]his additional term shall 
apply to any person who is a principal in the commission or attempted commission 
of a felony if one or more of the principals is armed with a firearm, whether or not 
the person is personally armed with a firearm.”  (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), italics 
added.)  The italicized portion, defendant contends, indicates that had the 
Legislature intended that no personal use allegation was required under section 
12022.53, it only had to say what it did in section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).  In 
contrast, the Attorney General maintains that the vicarious liability language in 
both section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), and section 12022.53 are not “significantly 
distinct in their language and scope,” and should be interpreted similarly.    
 
13 
 
There is no dispute that an aider and abettor need not personally use or 
discharge a firearm to be liable under section 12022.53.  (§ 12022.53, subd. 
(e)(1).)  The issue here is whether a shooter’s conviction is a prerequisite for 
vicarious liability.  Section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), though it permits vicarious 
liability, does not address what level of proof is sufficient for the firearm 
allegation.  As such, we do not find that section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), sheds 
much light on the present issue.  
 
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation would lead to anomalous results and 
would frustrate the Legislature’s apparent purpose in section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e)(1).  If a shooter’s conviction is required to impose vicarious 
liability on an aider and abettor, this restriction may unduly thwart the prosecution 
of defendants involved in gang-related shootings.  For instance, if the actual 
shooter were also killed during an exchange of gunfire (therefore making a 
conviction impossible), the aider and abettor would escape liability under section 
12022.53, subdivision (d), notwithstanding undisputed evidence that someone 
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death.  
Indeed, under the Court of Appeal’s interpretation, aiders and abettors would have 
an incentive not to identify a shooter in a gang-related shooting because without 
the latter’s conviction, aiders and abettors would not be exposed to longer 
sentences under section 12022.53.   
 
As a procedural matter, the prosecution may also face an undue burden if 
required to prosecute and convict a shooter prior to an aider and abettor.  The 
Attorney General observes that defendants in gang-related shootings may seek to 
manipulate the order of trials through unnecessary motions and discovery requests 
to ensure that an aider and abettor is tried before the shooter.  Under the Court of 
Appeal’s interpretation, this potential procedural maneuver would create a 
windfall for aiders and abettors, allowing them to escape liability under section 
 
14 
12022.53.  Moreover, there is no indication the Legislature did not intend section 
12022.53 to apply because a shooter’s identity is unknown, or the shooter is at 
large.  In short, we agree with the Attorney General that the Legislature did not 
intend to relieve principals from section 12022.53 liability simply because a  
shooter/defendant has been acquitted, has yet to be convicted, or is unavailable for 
prosecution.  
 
Finally, as a general matter, we emphasize that “ ‘[t]he fact that certain 
defendants may escape conviction for their crimes is not any legal or logical 
reason why another defendant, where substantial evidence has been introduced to 
sustain his conviction, should be exonerated and be permitted to escape 
punishment for his crime.’ [Citation.]”  (People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 
861.)  We conclude these considerations weigh against adopting the Court of 
Appeal’s interpretation. 
DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment, and remand the cause for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J.  
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
15 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Garcia (Arturo) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 88 Cal.App.4th 794 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S097765 
Date Filed: August 22, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Michael R. Hoff 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Maxine Weksler, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Marc E. Turchin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Mary E. Sanchez, Darryl C. Hottinger and Jaime L. Fuster, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney, and 
Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorney, for California District Attorneys’ Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Maxine Weksler 
P.O. Box 157 
Agoura Hills, CA  91376 
(818) 865-1965 
 
Jamie L. Fuster 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2354 
 
Phyllis C. Asayama 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angels, CA  90012 
(213) 974-5916