Case Title: Maddox v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031064

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, 
JJ. 
 
JOSHUA MADDOX, AN INFANT WHO 
SUES BY HIS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, 
TOM AND AMY MADDOX 
 
v.  Record No. 031064  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
April 23, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMELIA COUNTY 
Thomas V. Warren, Judge 
 
 
Joshua Maddox (“Maddox”), an infant suing by his 
parents and next friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, brought an 
action against the Commonwealth of Virginia 
(“Commonwealth”) for personal injuries Maddox suffered in a 
bicycle accident.  In his motion for judgment, Maddox 
asserted separate claims for negligent construction and 
negligent maintenance of a sidewalk, and separate claims 
for creating a nuisance and maintaining a nuisance due to 
the alleged dangerous condition posed by the design of the 
sidewalk.  The circuit court granted the Commonwealth’s 
plea of sovereign immunity and dismissed the motion for 
judgment.  Maddox appealed to this Court on the sole issue 
of whether a claim against the Commonwealth sounding in 
nuisance is barred under the doctrine of sovereign 
 
 
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immunity.1  Because we conclude that Maddox’s nuisance 
claims are precluded by the legislative function exception 
to the Commonwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the 
Virginia Tort Claims Act (“the Act”), specifically Code 
§ 8.01-195.3(2), we will affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
RELEVANT FACTS2
Maddox was injured while riding his bicycle on a 
public sidewalk along Washington Street in an area known as 
“Amelia Village” located in Amelia County.  The front tire 
of his bicycle caught on the inside edge of the sidewalk, 
propelling Maddox and his bicycle into the air.  There was 
a “sharp and sudden drop off from the sidewalk into the 
adjoining yard.”  Maddox was thrown into the yard where he 
landed on his left elbow, injuring it. 
 
The sidewalk was part of a project constructed by the 
Commonwealth and known as “the Route 1003 State Highway 
Project, No. 1003-004-172-501” (“the Project”).  Maddox 
                     
1 Maddox has not raised on appeal any issue concerning 
the circuit court’s dismissal of the counts alleging 
negligent construction and maintenance. 
 
2  Because the circuit court decided this case upon a 
plea of sovereign immunity without an evidentiary hearing, 
we will state the facts as alleged in the pleadings and 
take those facts as true for the purpose of resolving the 
issue presented.  Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 
233, 564 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2002). 
 
 
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alleged that the Commonwealth “was negligent in creating 
the sharp and sudden drop off from the sidewalk into the 
adjoining yard where the accident occurred” and in 
maintaining that drop off.  Continuing, he asserted that 
the Commonwealth could have prevented the resulting 
dangerous condition “by constructing a retaining wall 
and/or adequately backfilling the adjoining area.”  In the 
negligence counts, Maddox alleged that the Commonwealth 
“failed to use ordinary care in both planning and 
constructing the changes and alterations to the area at 
issue” and “in the maintenance of the area.” 
Incorporating by reference his allegations set forth 
in the negligent construction and maintenance counts, 
Maddox further alleged that the Commonwealth created a 
nuisance by failing “to take measures to guard against the 
sharp and dangerous sidewalk ledge” and the “sharp drop 
off,” thereby imperiling the safety of the public sidewalk.  
Finally, he asserted that, by allowing himself and “other 
members of the community to be continuously exposed to the 
dangerous sidewalk ledge,” the Commonwealth maintained a 
nuisance that imperiled “the safety of the public sidewalk 
area at issue” and that was “dangerous and hazardous in and 
of itself.” 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
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This Court has previously recognized that the 
Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from liability for 
the tortious acts of their agents, employees, and servants 
absent express statutory or constitutional provisions 
waiving immunity.  University of Virginia v. Carter, 267 
Va. 242, 244, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004); Baumgardner v. 
Southwestern Virginia Mental Health Inst., 247 Va. 486, 
489, 442 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1994); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. 
v. Hampton Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 217 Va. 30, 32, 225 
S.E.2d 364, 367 (1976); Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. 
Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 456-57, 117 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1961); 
Kellam v. School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 252, 
254, 117 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1960); Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 
655, 657, 79 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1954).  The General Assembly 
provided an express, limited waiver of the Commonwealth’s 
immunity in 1981 by enacting the Virginia Tort Claims Act, 
Code §§ 8.01-195.1 through –195.9.  Because the Act is a 
statute in derogation of the common law, its waiver of 
immunity must be strictly construed.  Carter, 267 Va. at 
245, 591 S.E.2d at 78; Melanson v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 
178, 181, 539 S.E.2d 433, 434 (2001); Baumgardner, 247 Va. 
at 489, 442 S.E.2d 402. 
In pertinent part, the Act imposes liability on the 
Commonwealth for 
 
 
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damage to or loss of property or personal injury 
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act 
or omission of any employee while acting within 
the scope of his employment under circumstances 
where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private 
person, would be liable to the claimant for such 
damage, loss, injury or death. 
 
Code § 8.01-195.3.  There are, however, exceptions to the 
Commonwealth’s waiver of immunity.  At issue here is the 
exception for “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of 
the General Assembly or district commission of any 
transportation district, or any member or staff thereof 
acting in his official capacity, or to the legislative 
function of any agency subject to the provisions of this 
article.”  Code § 8.01-195.3(2).  In other words, the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-195.3(2) preserve the 
Commonwealth’s immunity from liability in tort for any act 
or omission in the exercise of the legislative function of 
an agency of the Commonwealth. 
Maddox argues that the term “legislative function” 
includes such activities as setting rates for public 
utilities, classifying criminal offenses, levying taxes, 
drafting statutes, and promulgating rules for governing 
prisons but does not encompass creating and maintaining a 
nuisance.  In his view, the latter does not involve the 
determination of legislative policy.  Relying on the 
statement that “[a] function is considered governmental if 
 
 
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it is the exercise of an entity’s political, discretionary, 
or legislative authority,” Carter v. Chesterfield County 
Health Comm’n, 259 Va. 588, 591, 527 S.E.2d 783, 785 
(2000), Maddox posits that “an agency’s ‘legislative 
function’ is a subset of its broader governmental function” 
and that the two terms, therefore, cannot be used 
interchangeably.  Finally, he asserts that the rationale 
used in Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 397 
S.E.2d 832 (1990), to hold that sovereign immunity did not 
bar a nuisance claim against a municipality is applicable 
to the facts of the present case and defeats the 
Commonwealth’s claim of sovereign immunity.  We do not 
agree with Maddox’s arguments. 
A sidewalk such as the one at issue is, by definition, 
part of a street.  See Messick v. Barham, 194 Va. 382, 387, 
73 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1952) (“It is generally accepted that 
the word ‘street’ is all inclusive and means all that 
portion of a highway set apart and designated for such use, 
that is, embraces both that portion of the highway set 
apart for vehicular traffic and that part set aside for 
pedestrians”); McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 
662, 16 S.E. 867, 870 (1893) (“It is true that a sidewalk 
along a public street is part of the street”).  In 
Virginia, the General Assembly “has supreme powers to open, 
 
 
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improve, repair, discontinue, or abandon public highways.”  
Ord v. Fugate, 207 Va. 752, 759, 152 S.E.2d 54, 59 (1967) 
(citing former Constitution of Virginia, § 63; City of 
Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 9, 133 S.E. 674, 677 
(1926)).  But, of course, “[p]ractical necessity requires 
that the administration of those powers be delegated to 
appropriate subordinate officials, and this the legislature 
has done.”  Ord, 207 Va. at 759, 152 S.E.2d at 59.  The 
General Assembly has delegated to the Commonwealth 
Transportation Board and the Department of Transportation 
authority over the supervision, management, construction, 
improvement, and maintenance of public highways and roads.  
See e.g. Code §§ 33.1-12, -25, -49, and –69. 
The issue here is whether the alleged acts or 
omissions by an agency of the Commonwealth in regard to the 
sidewalk fall within the “legislative function” exception 
to the Commonwealth’s waiver of immunity.  Resolution of 
that issue does not turn on the theory of tort liability 
asserted by Maddox.  In both nuisance claims, the only acts 
or omissions on the part of the Commonwealth alleged by 
Maddox were the failure to construct a retaining wall along 
the edge of the sidewalk and/or to backfill the adjoining 
yard.  Thus, Maddox must rely on those allegations to 
support his claims for creating and maintaining a nuisance.  
 
 
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See Hawthorn v. City of Richmond, 253 Va. 283, 289, 484 
S.E.2d 603, 606 (1997).  Maddox did not allege that the 
sidewalk’s construction had deviated from the Project’s 
plans or that the sidewalk had fallen into a state of 
disrepair. 
In the context of streets controlled by a 
municipality, we have held that, when a municipality 
selects and adopts a plan for the construction of its 
public streets, it “acts in a governmental capacity.”  City 
of Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 551-52, 9 S.E.2d 356, 359 
(1940).  Further, determining the need for such devices as 
“[t]raffic lights, blinking lights, warning signals, 
roadway markings, railings, barriers, guardrails, [and] 
curbings” and “the decision to install or not to install 
them calls for the exercise of discretion.”  Freeman v. 
City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 60, 266 S.E.2d 885, 886 
(1980); see also Taylor, 240 Va. at 370, 397 S.E.2d at 835 
(a city’s failure “to use reasonable care to install 
lights, a barricade, and other safety devices, and in 
designing and constructing” a particular street involved 
discretionary governmental functions).  In exercising that 
discretion, a municipality “is performing a governmental 
function and is not liable for its negligent performance of 
the function.”  Freeman, 221 Va. at 60, 266 S.E.2d at 886. 
 
 
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For purposes of today’s decision, we do not equate a 
municipality’s exercise of a governmental function with the 
exercise of a legislative function by an agency of the 
Commonwealth.  However, the rationale underlying our 
decisions holding that a municipality’s planning and 
designing its streets is a governmental function also 
supports the conclusion that the design of a sidewalk by an 
agency of the Commonwealth is a legislative function.  In 
either instance, the decision-making process by the 
municipality or the state agency entails the exercise of 
discretion.  Deciding whether the plan and design of the 
sidewalk at issue would include installing a guardrail 
along the edge of the sidewalk and/or backfilling the area 
adjacent to the sidewalk necessarily called for the 
exercise of discretion by an agency of the Commonwealth.  
It required the agency to determine whether public funds 
should be expended to install those particular safety 
features.  Thus, the alleged acts or omissions in this case 
were a legislative function. 
[T]he right to regulate the use of the highways 
of the State or of the streets of a city is 
clearly a governmental power, and its exercise, 
whether by the State or by a municipal 
corporation as an agency of the State, is 
legislative and discretionary; and being 
legislative and discretionary, a municipal 
corporation, as an arm of the State, is no more 
liable for the failure to exercise the power or 
 
 
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for its improper exercise than the State itself 
would be. 
 
Jones v. City of Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722, 725, 34 S.E. 
883, 883 (1900). 
Our decision in Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 
does not, as asserted by Maddox, support a contrary 
conclusion.  There, the city had “placed no signs, 
guardrails, lights, reflectors, painted lines, sidewalks, 
or curbs to mark the end of [a] road” beyond which lay the 
edge of a steep precipice.  240 Va. at 369, 397 S.E.2d at 
834.  The city’s site plan for the street reflected the 
defective and dangerous condition.  Id.  Among other 
things, the plaintiffs sought recovery for wrongful death 
on the basis that the city had created and maintained a 
public nuisance.  Id. at 372, 397 S.E.2d at 835.  We 
reversed the trial court’s judgment sustaining the city’s 
demurrer to the nuisance count.  Id. at 374, 397 S.E.2d at 
837.  In reaching that conclusion, we restated the rule 
“that if a municipal corporation creates or maintains a 
nuisance, it is not protected by the immunity doctrine 
unless (1) the condition claimed to be a nuisance is 
authorized by law, and (2) the act creating or maintaining 
the nuisance is performed without negligence.”  Id. at 373, 
 
 
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397 S.E.2d at 836 (citing Virginia Beach v. Steel Fishing 
Pier, 212 Va. 425, 427, 184 S.E.2d 749, 750-51 (1971)). 
We also concluded in Taylor that the city’s reliance 
upon our decision in Kellam v. School Board, 202 Va. 252, 
117 S.E.2d 96 (1960), was misplaced because Kellam involved 
a school board, which was a state agency and not a true 
municipal corporation as was the City of Charlottesville.  
Id. at 374, 397 S.E.2d at 836.  In Kellam, the plaintiff 
slipped and fell as she walked down the aisle of a school 
auditorium.  202 Va. at 253, 117 S.E.2d at 97.  She sued 
the school board alleging that the board had failed to 
maintain the aisle in a reasonably safe condition and that 
the aisle was dangerous and constituted a nuisance.  Id.  
The Court held that the school board had acted in a 
governmental capacity and was therefore immune from 
liability for both the negligence and nuisance claims.  Id. 
at 257-58, 117 S.E. at 99-100. 
Specifically with regard to the latter claim, we 
emphasized that a school board is an agent or 
instrumentality of the state, not a true municipality, and 
therefore “ ‘partake[s] of the state’s sovereignty with 
respect to tort liability.’ ”  Id. at 259, 117 S.E.2d at 
100 (quoting Bingham v. Board of Education of Ogden City, 
223 P.2d 432, 436 (Utah 1950)).  In other words, we did not 
 
 
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strip away the school board’s immunity derived from its 
status as an arm of the state merely because the plaintiff 
there sought recovery for injuries sustained as a result of 
an alleged nuisance.3  Nor do we strip away the 
Commonwealth’s immunity in this case merely because Maddox 
sought recovery for injuries resulting from an alleged 
nuisance.  As already stated, the pertinent inquiry is 
whether the alleged acts or omissions arose out of the 
exercise of a legislative function by an agency of the 
Commonwealth. 
CONCLUSION 
In preserving the Commonwealth’s absolute immunity for 
claims arising out of its agencies’ exercise of legislative 
functions, the Act does not distinguish among theories of 
tort liability or “ ‘the adjectives used in the 
complaint.’ ” Kellam, 202 Va. at 259, 117 S.E.2d at 100 
(quoting Bingham, 223 P.2d at 436).  Because the nuisance 
claims in this case are predicated on the acts or omissions 
of an agency of the Commonwealth in the design of the 
sidewalk, those claims are barred by the “legislative 
function” exception to the Commonwealth’s waiver of 
                     
3  We recognize that Kellam was decided before the 
passage of the Act. 
 
 
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sovereign immunity.  See Code § 8.01-195.3(2).  Therefore, 
we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
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