Case Title: Brooks & Company v. Randy Robinson Contracting

Citation: 

Docket Number: 980953

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
BROOKS & COMPANY 
GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 980953 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
 
 
 
February 26, 1999 
 
RANDY ROBINSON  
CONTRACTING, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This building construction case involves a controversy 
between Brooks & Company General Contractors, Inc. (Brooks) 
and Randy Robinson Contracting, Inc. (Robinson) over 
whether the agreement between them included a requirement 
that disputes should be submitted to arbitration.  When a 
dispute arose and Brooks demanded arbitration, Robinson 
moved the trial court for a stay pursuant to Code § 8.01-
581.02(B).1  From an order staying arbitration permanently, 
we awarded Brooks this appeal. 
 
The controversy relates to the construction of the 
Swift Creek Presbyterian Church in Chesterfield County.  In 
October 1995, Brooks was in the process of submitting a bid 
to become the general contractor on the project and Randy 
                     
1 Code § 8.01-581.02(B) provides, in pertinent part, that 
“[o]n application, the court may stay an arbitration 
proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there 
is no agreement to arbitrate.” 
Robinson Contracting submitted a written bid to Brooks in 
hopes of becoming the sitework subcontractor.2
 
Because the owner was not prepared to begin 
construction immediately, commencement of the project was 
delayed until the spring of 1996.  In May of that year, 
after Brooks was selected as the general contractor, it 
contacted Robinson to ascertain whether Robinson’s October 
1995 bid was still good.  When Robinson indicated that the 
bid was still good, Brooks’ representative, Rick Griffith, 
advised Robinson that it would be given the work.  Griffith 
marked on his copy of Robinson’s bid document: “$ confirmed 
by Randy Robinson 5/17/96.”  Griffith testified below that 
he told Randy Robinson a written contract would be sent to 
Robinson.  However, Randy Robinson testified that he did 
not recall such a statement. 
 
Two weeks later, Brooks sent Robinson an American 
Institute of Architects (AIA) “Standard Form of Agreement 
Between Contractor and Subcontractor.”  The form contained 
numerous terms not found in Robinson’s bid documents and 
not previously discussed by the parties, including a clause 
requiring arbitration of disputes. 
                     
2At the time this bid was submitted in October 1995, Randy 
Robinson apparently operated as a sole proprietorship under 
the name of Randy Robinson Contracting but incorporated as 
Randy Robinson Contracting, Inc. in March 1996. 
 
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Brooks had not executed the AIA form contract.  
Griffith testified that Brooks did not execute contract 
documents before mailing them to subcontractors because of 
the possibility that subcontractors might mark changes on 
the documents. 
 
Robinson received the AIA form contract but did not 
sign it or return it to Brooks.  Randy Robinson testified 
that he did not agree with the AIA form contract and that 
his refusal to sign was purposeful, although he did not 
communicate his disagreement to Brooks.  Griffith testified 
that Randy Robinson promised several times to sign the AIA 
form contract and that once, at the beginning of Robinson’s 
work, he, Griffith, went to the job site to get a signed 
copy of the AIA form contract and Randy Robinson stated he 
had left his copy at home.  In his testimony, Randy 
Robinson denied making these statements. 
 
Robinson began work on the project on June 26, 1996, 
and continued working until July 15, 1996.  On the latter 
date, Randy Robinson used a front-end loader to demolish 
Brooks’ job-site trailer and then left the site.  Robinson 
performed no further work on the project. 
 
Brooks completed the work Robinson left unfinished 
and, citing the arbitration clause in the AIA form 
contract, filed a demand with the American Arbitration 
 
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Association for arbitration and for an award of damages for 
Robinson’s failure to complete the work.  Robinson then 
filed its motion to stay arbitration, denying that the AIA 
form contract represented any portion of the agreement 
between the parties.  Brooks argued in response that the 
AIA form contract set forth the terms of the agreement 
between the parties and that Robinson had accepted those 
terms by performance.  After hearing the testimony of Rick 
Griffith and Randy Robinson, the trial court found that 
“there was never a meeting of the minds as contained in the 
AIA form contract and the parties are not bound by it.”  
The court then ordered a permanent stay of arbitration. 
 
On appeal, Brooks stakes its case on the proposition 
that Robinson accepted the terms of the AIA form contract 
by performance.  Brooks acknowledges that the “question in 
any case in which a contract is asserted by one party and 
denied by the other is whether there has been a meeting of 
the minds.”  However, Brooks asserts that the determination  
whether there has been a meeting of the minds always 
depends upon the intention of the parties “as objectively 
manifested.”  See Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 
376, 381, 457 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1995); Montagna v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 221 Va. 336, 346, 269 S.E.2d 838, 844 (1980).  
Here, Brooks says, “not only was there no objective 
 
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manifestation of disagreement, but to the contrary, [Randy] 
Robinson actually began the work after having received the 
contract without indicating in any way that he disagreed 
with the written contract documents.” 
 
Nor does it make any difference, Brooks maintains, 
that Robinson “did not sign the contract documents.”  
Brooks states that “[w]hen a party undertakes the 
performance of a contract according to its terms, 
acceptance by performance results, even if the party failed 
to sign the final contract.” 
 
Robinson argues, on the other hand, that the doctrine 
of acceptance by performance is inapplicable here because 
the sole agreement between the parties consisted of an oral 
contract entered into prior to the delivery of the AIA form 
contract by Brooks to Robinson.  The oral contract arose, 
Robinson maintains, when Brooks contacted Robinson in May 
of 1996 to inquire if the October 1995 bid was still good, 
Robinson answered in the affirmative, and Brooks advised 
that Robinson would be given the work.  And its 
“performance on the project,” Robinson insists, “was 
completely in accordance with the terms of that parol 
contract.” 
 
In support of its argument that Robinson accepted the 
terms of the AIA form contract by performance, Brooks cites 
 
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Galloway Corp. v. S.B. Ballard Construction Co., 250 Va. 
493, 464 S.E.2d 349 (1995).  Galloway involved a dispute 
between a general contractor and several of its 
subcontractors, including Empire Granite Corporation 
(Empire).  The president of Empire, through apparent 
oversight, had failed to sign the final contract documents 
as proposed by the general contractor.  We held that, “[a]s 
Empire undertook to perform the contract according to its 
terms, an acceptance by performance resulted.  The absence 
of an authorized signature does not defeat the existence of 
the contract . . . .”  250 Va. at 505, 464 S.E.2d at 356. 
 
In Galloway, however, the final contract documents, 
although not signed by Empire, had been signed by the 
general contractor, objectively manifesting its intention 
to be bound by the documents, and this was the contract we 
said Empire had accepted by performance.  Here, no 
objective manifestation of Brooks’ intention appears.  
Brooks did not sign the AIA form contract it sent to 
Robinson, and Griffith, Brooks’ representative, testified 
this was the firm’s practice because it expected 
subcontractors to make changes in the documents. 
 
Furthermore, there was no issue in Galloway concerning 
whether Empire had performed pursuant to a preexisting 
parol contract rather than the written document it had 
 
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failed to sign.  Here, Robinson makes the preexisting parol 
contract the pivotal element in the case, saying it was the 
sole agreement between the parties and the one under which 
it performed. 
 
During oral argument, Brooks conceded there was “an 
oral contract” between the parties but stated Brooks 
“indicated by sending this written document that the 
intention was to replace the oral contract with a written 
contract.”  Brooks also conceded that Robinson was under no 
duty to reject the modifications contained in the AIA form 
contract, but maintained that because Robinson started work 
“without objection, . . . that’s acceptance by 
performance.” 
 
We disagree with Brooks.  While Brooks may have 
intended that the AIA form contract would replace the oral 
contract, there is nothing in the record indicating that 
Brooks ever conveyed that intention to Robinson or that 
Robinson shared the intention.  A form letter of 
transmittal accompanying the AIA form contract was checked 
only in a box labeled “[f]or approval.”  And although Rick 
Griffith testified that Randy Robinson promised to sign the 
AIA form contract, Randy Robinson contradicted Griffith’s 
testimony, and the trial court resolved the conflict in 
 
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Robinson’s favor when it awarded Robinson a stay of 
arbitration. 
 
This case reduces itself, therefore, to the 
proposition that a valid and binding oral contract existed 
between the parties after Robinson said it stood by its 
October 1995 bid and Brooks said Robinson would be given 
the work, that Brooks simply failed to show there was a 
meeting of the minds on the modifications that later 
appeared in the AIA form contract, and that, without such a 
showing, it cannot be said that Robinson accepted the terms 
of the modified contract by performance.  Hence, as 
Robinson maintains, the oral contract was the sole 
subsisting agreement between the parties, and it did not 
require arbitration in the event of a dispute. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
permanent stay of arbitration. 
Affirmed. 
 
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