Case Title: State v. Dale L. Smith

Citation: 2006 WI 74

Docket Number: 2004AP002035-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2035-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Dale L. Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 279 Wis. 2d 519, 693 N.W.2d 148 
(Ct. App. 2005–Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Russell W. Stamper 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and BUTLER, JR., J.J., join the dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Allison M. Ritter and Hartley Law Office, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Allison M. Ritter. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Juan 
B. Colas, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2035-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2001CT8142) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dale L. Smith, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The defendant, Dale L. Smith 
(Smith), seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals,1 which affirmed Smith's judgment of conviction for 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, and 
an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Russell W. 
Stamper, 
Sr., 
Reserve 
Judge, 
denying 
his 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.     
                                                 
1 See State v. Smith,  No. 2004AP2035-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005). 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Smith contends that at trial, he was denied his 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury when the 
circuit court, during voir dire, denied his motion to strike a 
juror for cause.  Smith argues that an administrative assistant 
employed by the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office was 
objectively biased because she worked for the same entity as the 
prosecuting attorney. 
¶3 
We hold that the circuit court reasonably concluded 
that Charlotte T. (Charlotte) was not objectively biased under 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances, 
as 
a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
Charlotte's position could be impartial.  Therefore, we conclude 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying 
Smith's 
motion 
to 
strike 
Charlotte 
for 
cause.  
Essentially, we decline to create a per se rule that excludes 
potential jurors for the sole reason that they are employed by 
the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office.  As such, the 
decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
I 
¶4 
In the early morning hours of October 3, 2001, Smith 
was pulled over by City of Franklin Police Officer Rebecca 
Fletcher (Fletcher).  Based on her observations at the scene, 
Fletcher requested that Smith take a Breathalyzer test in order 
to determine whether he had a prohibited alcohol concentration.  
According to the criminal complaint, Smith refused to submit to 
the test, and Fletcher arrested him.  On October 16, 2001, a 
criminal complaint was filed against Smith for unlawfully 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
3 
 
intoxicant, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2) 
(1999-2000).  This was Smith's second such offense.    
¶5 
A jury trial began on September 30, 2003.  During voir 
dire, 
prospective 
juror 
Charlotte 
called 
to 
the 
court's 
attention that she worked for the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's Office.  Specifically, Charlotte worked as an 
administrative assistant at the Children's Court Center in 
Wauwatosa.  She also stated that she did not work on 
investigations.  When asked whether she would have a problem 
being an impartial juror, Charlotte said, "No."   
¶6 
Later in chambers, Smith's counsel, Patrick D. Wait 
(Wait), moved to strike Charlotte for cause.  The discussion 
between the court, Wait, and Assistant District Attorney Tiffany 
Harris (Harris) proceeded as follows:   
MR. WAIT:  All right. I'd ask Number 9. be stuck [sic] 
for cause, she works for the D.A.'s office. 
THE COURT:  What's the cause? 
MR. WAIT:  She works for the law firm prosecuting this 
case.  Her employer is Michael McCann. 
THE COURT:  Is there authority for that? 
MR. WAIT:  I think that is for cause. 
THE COURT:  Is it occupational exclusion?  By virtue 
of [the] fact she works for the D.A.'s office is it 
impossible for her to be impartial? 
MR. WAIT:  I don't think I have to prove impartiality; 
I think there can be a finding her employer is 
prosecuting the case. 
THE COURT:  I understand your opinion, do you have 
authority for that belief? 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
4 
 
MR. WAIT:  No, I don't have any cases I can cite. 
THE COURT:  State. 
MS. HARRIS:  Judge, I really don't think——I don't know 
her.  She doesn't work in this particular building; 
she's out at Children's Court.  I don't think there is 
any authority for that. 
THE COURT:  Request denied.  That was Number 9. 
¶7 
Besides Charlotte, Smith raised challenges to two 
other potential jurors in voir dire.  These challenges were 
denied by the circuit court.  In his brief to this court, Smith 
further argues that two additional jurors were "very problematic 
from a defense perspective."   
¶8 
First, Juror No. 2 stated that she had a friend who 
almost killed somebody while driving under the influence, and 
she had several friends arrested for driving under the influence 
with whom she did not associate anymore.  Attorney Wait then 
asked her the following: 
MR. WAIT:  Does that make it more difficult for you to 
judge a case fairly? 
JUROR NO. 2:  No, I don't think so. 
MR. WAIT:  Do you think it's going to be difficult for 
you to be impartial here? 
JUROR NO. 2:  Yes. 
Later in chambers, the court posed the following questions to 
Juror No. 2: 
THE COURT:  Can you be impartial with respect to this 
case? 
JUROR NO. 2:  I think so. 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
5 
 
THE COURT:  At this point, are you inclined to believe 
one side as opposed to the other side? 
JUROR NO. 2:  Not necessarily, no.   
THE COURT:  You are at point zero? 
JUROR NO. 2:  Yes.   
THE COURT:  You are fair and neutral as to each side? 
JUROR NO. 2:  Yes. 
After this questioning, Wait did not continue with his argument 
that Juror No. 2 should be struck for cause.  The court had 
previously noted that difficulty in remaining impartial is not 
sufficient to excuse a juror.   
¶9 
Next, Wait challenged Juror No. 6, who informed the 
court that he encountered a drunk driver while driving with his 
wife and children.  When asked whether that experience would 
make it problematic for him to sit on a case where the defendant 
is charged with drunk driving, Juror No. 6 stated, "I guess I'd 
have to hear more information.  At the time, if I had had a gun, 
I'd have shot him."  During later questioning, Juror No. 6 
revealed that his brother was put into a two-week coma because 
of a drunk driver.  Wait then asked him the following: 
MR. WAIT:  Is that going to affect your ability to be 
impartial here? 
JUROR NO. 6:  I hope not, but I'm not sure. 
MR. WAIT:  You also said that when you saw someone 
suspected of drunk driving, if you had a gun you would 
have shot him. 
JUROR NO. 6:  I got that angry with him because I was 
with my wife and kids. . . .  
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
6 
 
MR. WAIT:  Do you feel you can be fair here today? 
JUROR NO. 6:  I can try.   
Later in chambers, the following discussion occurred: 
THE COURT:  The real question is, can you be 
impartial, fair, and neutral in this case? 
JUROR NO. 6:  I understand.  I don't know, I haven't 
heard the evidence yet.  I would say absolutely not if 
I found out the person had denied the police the right 
to check his blood or check that if he was.  To me 
that tells me he was drunk.  I don't care, he should 
go to jail.   
THE COURT:  You don't know the answer to that 
question, right? 
JUROR NO. 6:  No. 
THE COURT:  Given that you don't know the answer as to 
what the evidence is going to say, I need you to tell 
us at this time, right now, are you at zero neutral, 
or are you leaning one way or the other? 
JUROR NO. 6:  I'm trying to stay at neutral. 
THE COURT:  Where are you? 
JUROR NO. 6:  I believe I am neutral. 
THE COURT:  You have the best opinion of where you 
are, and you believe you are neutral.  That's your 
belief, right? 
JUROR NO. 6:  Yes.   
Ultimately, the court concluded that Juror No. 6 said he could 
be impartial, and it refused to strike him for cause.   
¶10 In addition to these two jurors, Smith contends that 
Jurors Nos. 3 and 11 were problematic.  Juror No. 3 was a police 
officer who had arrested people for operating while intoxicated.  
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
7 
 
She said that she thought she could be impartial.  Wait did not 
challenge Juror No. 3 for cause during voir dire. 
¶11 Finally, in response to Wait's question of whether 
anyone on the jury had any feelings already developed about the 
defendant, Juror No. 11 stated, "I kind of feel you would not be 
here unless you were doing something wrong."  Wait then asked, 
"[s]o in that regard, you've already formed an opinion?"  Juror 
No. 11 responded with "[p]erhaps" followed by "Yes. I do feel I 
can be impartial."  In chambers, Wait informed the court that 
"[r]egarding Number 11, I wrote 'he has formed an opinion as to 
this defendant that he's guilty.'"  The court noted, however, 
that Juror No. 11 said he could be impartial.  There was no 
further discussion about Juror No. 11.   
¶12 Smith ultimately used his four peremptory challenges 
to strike Jurors Nos. 2, 3, 6, and 11.  Charlotte was seated on 
the jury, and on October 1, 2003, Smith was unanimously 
convicted and sentenced to 90 days of jail.  
¶13 After his conviction, Smith filed a postconviction 
motion for an order vacating the judgment and for a new trial 
based upon his being denied the right to an impartial jury as 
guaranteed 
by 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The circuit court denied his motion, concluding 
that "the mere fact that a juror works for the prosecuting 
office, without more, does not in and of itself disqualify the 
juror 
from 
service. . . . Taking 
all 
[the] 
factors 
into 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
8 
 
consideration, the court cannot infer that a reasonable person 
in Juror T.'s position would be biased."   
¶14 On appeal, the court of appeals primarily relied on 
two of 
our previous decisions:  
State v. 
Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999), and State v. Louis, 156 
Wis. 2d 470, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990), in reaching its decision.  
Based on Faucher, the court noted that only objective bias, not 
statutory or subjective bias, was at issue.  The court also 
analogized the facts in this case to Louis in that the 
prospective juror and the prosecutor did not know each other.  
See Smith, No. 2004AP2035-CR, ¶6 ("The facts of record here 
suggest that this case is akin to Louis.  Charlotte, although 
employed by the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, did 
not know the prosecutor in this case and the prosecutor did not 
know Charlotte.").  The court of appeals agreed with the circuit 
court that "'the mere fact that a juror works for the 
prosecuting office, without more, does not in and of itself 
disqualify the juror from service.'"  Id.  The judgment and 
order of the circuit court were therefore affirmed.   
¶15 Smith then filed a petition for review in this court, 
and we granted review. 
II 
¶16 The sole question we must address on appeal is whether 
Smith was denied the right to an impartial jury by the circuit 
court's refusal to strike Charlotte for cause.  Smith argues 
that Charlotte should have been disqualified as objectively 
biased because she was employed by the prosecuting attorney.  
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
9 
 
Essentially, Smith seeks a per se rule in Wisconsin that 
employees of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office 
cannot serve on juries in criminal cases prosecuted by their 
employer.  Alternatively, the State argues that Charlotte did 
not demonstrate objective bias, and this court should not create 
a per se disqualification for such employees. 
¶17 We believe in this case, the circuit court reasonably 
concluded that Charlotte was not objectively biased under the 
totality of the circumstances.  We further refuse to create a 
per se exclusion of potential jurors that are employed by the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney.  In our view, the exclusion 
of jurors on the basis of objective bias is best left to the 
case-by-case discretion of the circuit court. 
¶18 "[A] criminal defendant's right to receive a fair 
trial by a panel of impartial jurors is guaranteed by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as principles 
of due process."2  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 715 (citing Louis, 156 
Wis. 2d at 478; State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 666, 482 
N.W.2d 99 
(1992)). 
 
"To 
ensure 
an 
impartial 
jury, 
                                                 
2 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed[.]"  Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense 
shall have been committed[.]" 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
10 
 
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) provides for juror disqualification if a 
prospective juror 'is not indifferent in the case.'"  State v. 
Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 847, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999).3 
¶19 "Prospective jurors are presumed impartial, and the 
challenger to that presumption bears the burden of proving 
bias."  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 478.  We have recognized three 
types of bias: (1) statutory bias; (2) subjective bias; and (3) 
objective bias.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 716.4  Statutory bias is 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.08(1) (2003-04) reads in full:   
The court shall examine on oath each person who is 
called as a juror to discover whether the juror is 
related by blood, marriage or adoption to any party or 
to any attorney appearing in the case, or has any 
financial interest in the case, or has expressed or 
formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or 
prejudice in the case. If a juror is not indifferent 
in the case, the juror shall be excused. Any party 
objecting for cause to a juror may introduce evidence 
in support of the objection. This section shall not be 
construed as abridging in any manner the right of 
either party to supplement the court's examination of 
any person as to qualifications, but such examination 
shall not be repetitious or based upon hypothetical 
questions. 
4 In State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 716, 596 N.W.2d 770 
(1999), we first adopted these three terms to describe juror 
bias.  Previously, courts of this state used the terms implied 
bias, actual bias, and inferred bias.  Id. at 716.  Generally, 
the terms statutory bias and subjective bias closely correspond, 
respectively, to the terms implied bias and actual bias.  Id. at 
716 n.5.  Furthermore, the term objective bias "in some ways 
contemplates both our use of the terms implied and inferred 
bias."  Id. at 716.  However, as we emphasized in Faucher, "the 
case law does not always use the former terms in a consistent 
manner, [and] there is not an absolute, direct correlation 
between the former terms and the terms we adopt today."  Id. at 
716-17.     
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
11 
 
described 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) 
(2003-04) 
and 
concerns 
jurors who are "related by blood, marriage or adoption to any 
party or to any attorney appearing in the case, or has any 
financial interest in the case[.]"  Charlotte does not fit 
within any of the categories constituting statutory bias.     
¶20 Subjective bias "describe[s] bias that is revealed 
through the words and the demeanor of the prospective juror."  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717.  Stated another way, subjective 
bias "refers to the bias that is revealed by the prospective 
juror on voir dire:  it refers to the prospective juror's state 
of mind."  Id.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.01(1) (2003-04) also 
speaks to subjective bias, in that a juror who has "expressed or 
formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the 
case[,]" shall be excused.  Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1); accord 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717.  Smith does not maintain that 
Charlotte 
was 
subjectively 
biased, 
nor 
does 
the 
record 
demonstrate that Charlotte 
presented 
any subjective 
bias.  
During voir dire, Wait asked Charlotte the following question:  
"Even though you work in the district attorney's office and the 
district attorney's office is prosecuting this action, do you 
feel you can be totally impartial and fair about this case?"  To 
this, Charlotte answered simply, "Yes."   
¶21 In this case, we are concerned with objective bias. 
[T]he focus of the inquiry into "objective bias" is 
not upon the individual prospective juror's mind, but 
rather upon whether the reasonable person in the 
individual 
prospective 
juror's 
position 
could 
be 
impartial. 
 
When 
assessing 
whether 
a 
juror 
is 
objectively biased, a circuit court must consider the 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
12 
 
facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire and 
the facts involved in the case.  However, the emphasis 
of this assessment remains on the reasonable person in 
light of those facts and circumstances. . . . [W]hen a 
prospective juror is challenged on voir dire because 
there 
was 
some 
evidence 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
prospective juror had formed an opinion or prior 
knowledge, [] whether the juror should be removed for 
cause turns on whether a reasonable person in the 
prospective juror's position could set aside the 
opinion or prior knowledge.  [State v.] Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d [481], 498, 579 N.W.2d 654 [(1998)]. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718-19. 
¶22 The standard of review for whether a juror is 
objectively biased is a mixed question of fact and law.  Id. at 
720.  "[A] circuit court's findings regarding the facts and 
circumstances surrounding voir dire and the case will be upheld 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Whether those facts fulfill 
the legal standard of objective bias is a question of law."  Id.   
This court does not ordinarily defer to the circuit 
court's determination of a question of law.  However, 
a circuit court's conclusion on objective bias is 
intertwined with factual findings supporting that 
conclusion.  Therefore, it is appropriate that this 
court give weight to the circuit court's conclusion on 
that question.   
The circuit court is particularly well-positioned to 
make a determination of objective bias, and it has 
special competence in this area.  It is intimately 
familiar with the voir dire proceeding, and is best 
situated to reflect upon the prospective juror's 
subjective state of mind which is relevant as well to 
the determination of objective bias.  We therefore 
give 
weight 
to 
the 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
a 
prospective juror is or is not objectively biased.  We 
will reverse its conclusion only if as a matter of law 
a reasonable judge could not have reached such a 
conclusion. 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
13 
 
State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶39, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 
N.W.2d 223 (quoting Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 720-21).   
¶23 Applying these standards, we hold that a reasonable 
circuit court judge could conclude that Charlotte was not 
objectively 
biased 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances.  Therefore, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in failing to strike Charlotte for 
cause.     
¶24 In this case, the State of Wisconsin was represented 
by the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, located in 
the Courthouse Complex in downtown Milwaukee.  Charlotte serves 
as an administrative assistant for the District Attorney's 
Office located in the Children's Court Center in Wauwatosa.  She 
does not work on investigations.  Furthermore, the record does 
not show any indication that Charlotte recognized Harris or vice 
versa.  There is also no evidence that Charlotte had any contact 
with Harris, any prior familiarity with the case, or any work 
connected to the office in Milwaukee.   
¶25 Additionally, both attorneys pressed Charlotte to 
consider whether her position as an administrative assistant for 
the District Attorney would influence her decision, and each 
time she responded unequivocally that she could be fair and 
impartial.  Although we recognize that "[i]t is not always 
enough that a prospective juror assures counsel or the court 
that he or she will be impartial[,]" Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 
¶48, the subjective state of mind of the juror is an important 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
14 
 
consideration in the overall determination of objective bias.  
Id., ¶39. 
¶26 Smith relies on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982), for his position 
that Charlotte should have been dismissed as objectively biased 
because she was employed by the District Attorney's Office. 
While each case must turn on its own facts, there are 
some extreme situations that would justify a finding 
of implied bias.  Some examples might include a 
revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the 
prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative 
of one of the participants in the trial or the 
criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness 
or somehow involved in the criminal transaction. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. at 222 (O'Connor, J., concurring).   What 
Smith fails to discuss, however, is the controlling majority 
opinion of Phillips, and the United States Supreme Court's 
consistent position that government employees are not per se 
disqualified from serving as jurors in criminal cases.  See, 
e.g., Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 513 (1948) 
(concluding that a government employee, merely by virtue of his 
government employment, was neither more nor less biased than a 
nongovernment employee); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 
149 (1936) ("We think that the imputation of bias simply by 
virtue of governmental employment, without regard to any actual 
partiality growing out of the nature and circumstances of 
particular cases, rests on an assumption without any rational 
foundation.").   
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
15 
 
¶27 In Phillips, the Court refused to make a per se 
exclusion on the ground of implied bias of a juror who had 
pursued employment with the district attorney prosecuting the 
case.  Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221.  After the defendant was 
convicted in state court, he sought federal habeas relief, and 
the district court imputed bias, arguing the average man in the 
juror's position would believe his decision as a jury member 
would affect his job application.  Id. at 214.  The Court 
reversed and held that there was no basis for this finding when 
the defendant failed to show the juror was actually biased.  Id. 
at 215-18.  In the words of the Court, "due process does not 
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a 
potentially compromising situation.  Were that the rule, few 
trials would be constitutionally acceptable."  Id. at 217.   
¶28 We fully recognize there may be situations where an 
employee of the Milwaukee County District Attorney will be 
objectively biased.  Indeed, "'we caution and encourage the 
circuit courts to strike prospective jurors for cause when the 
circuit courts "reasonably suspect" that juror bias exists.'"  
Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶49 (quoting Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 
495-96).  However, permitting an administrative assistant to 
serve on a jury who works at a different office in a different 
city than the prosecuting office and who otherwise knows nothing 
about the case, the defendant, and does not even recognize the 
prosecutor is not such an "extreme situation" that we must 
conclude the circuit court erred in refusing to strike Charlotte 
for cause. 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
16 
 
¶29 Smith also contends that there is no meaningful 
distinction between this case and the Seventh Circuit decision 
of United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2000).  In 
Polichemi, one of the jurors, Lorena Nape, was a 15-year 
employee of the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern 
District of Illinois, the prosecuting attorney in the case.  Id. 
at 703.  Nape worked as a secretary in the Civil Division, and 
there was evidence in the record that she sometimes worked on 
matters from the Criminal Division.  United States v. Polichemi, 
201 F.3d 858, 861-62 (7th Cir. 2000).5  Furthermore, Nape 
admitted to recognizing the names of the prosecuting attorneys 
in the case, and being aware that they worked in her office.  
Id. at 862.  She also stated that she could be fair and 
impartial.  Polichemi, 219 F.3d at 703.  The defendants moved to 
strike Nape for cause on the ground of implied bias, but the 
district court denied the motion.  Id. 
¶30 The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
reversed 
the 
defendants' 
convictions and held that although Nape may have been quite 
capable 
of 
maintaining 
her 
objectivity 
and 
"government 
employment alone is not, and should not be, enough to trigger 
the rule under which an employee is disqualified from serving as 
a juror in a case involving her employer," id. at 704, there are 
relationships that are "so close that the law errs on the side 
                                                 
5 This earlier version of United States v. Polichemi, 201 
F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000), was later partially vacated by the 
Seventh Circuit.  See United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 
702 (7th Cir. 2000).  We cite to the earlier version solely for 
factual detail. 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
17 
 
of caution."  Id.  The Polichemi court concluded that the 
relationship between Nape and the prosecuting attorney was just 
such a relationship.   
¶31 Although 
there 
are 
factual 
similarities 
between 
Polichemi and this case, unlike Nape, Charlotte did not work on 
any matters for the Milwaukee office, nor did she recognize the 
prosecutor.  In other words, the relationship was even more 
remote in this case than in Polichemi.  Furthermore, Polichemi 
is, of course, not binding on this court.  In Wisconsin, the 
court has generally been disinclined to create bright-line rules 
regarding juror exclusions.  See Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 479 
(citations omitted) ("Both the United States Supreme Court and 
this court have been reluctant to exclude groups of persons from 
serving as petit jurors as a matter of law.").  Instead, this 
court has preferred to leave the determination of bias in the 
able discretion of the circuit court.  See id. (citing Hammill 
v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 404, 415, 278 N.W.2d 821 (1979)) ("[T]he 
circuit court has been given broad discretion to ensure that the 
jury as finally selected is impartial."). 
¶32 Like the court of appeals, we believe Louis is 
particularly persuasive.  In Louis, the circuit court refused to 
strike for cause two police officers despite the fact that the 
State's chief witness worked in the same police department and 
the officers recognized the witness.  Id. at 474.  We held that 
the officers were not per se ineligible to serve on a jury and 
concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised 
its 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
18 
 
discretion in determining that the two officers were not 
actually biased.  Id. 
¶33 We first noted that police officers were not among 
those groups the legislature had expressly excluded from 
service.  Id. at 479-80.  That is, law enforcement officers are 
not statutorily biased.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 722.  We also 
analyzed whether the officers demonstrated actual bias, or in 
today's terms, subjective bias.  Id. at 723.  Based on the 
questions posed to the officers at voir dire, the circuit court 
concluded that the officers could remain impartial and decide 
the case solely on the evidence presented.  Louis, 156 
Wis. 2d at 484.  The record did not demonstrate otherwise; thus, 
the circuit court did not err in determining that the officers 
did not have actual bias.  Id. 
¶34 Finally, we observed that "[a] prospective juror's 
knowledge of or acquaintance with a participant in the trial, 
without more, is insufficient grounds for disqualification."  
Id. at 484 (citing State v. Zurfluh, 134 Wis. 2d 436, 438, 397 
N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986)).  In Faucher, we equated this 
language with our formulation of the objective bias standard and 
noted that the police officers were not objectively biased as "a 
reasonable person in the position of a law enforcement officer 
could remain impartial despite working in the same department as 
a state witness."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 722.   
¶35 Ultimately, we concluded in Louis that a per se 
exclusion of police officers was not in accord with the great 
weight of state and federal authority.  See Louis, 156 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d at 480-83.  Furthermore, we agreed with the following 
declaration of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:   
"This court does not choose to create a set of 
unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be 
excused for cause due to certain occupational or other 
special relationships which might bear directly or 
indirectly on the circumstances of a given case, 
where, as here, there is no showing of actual bias or 
prejudice." 
Id. at 483 (quoting Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 
(2d Cir. 1970)).  Thus, as we refused to exclude police officers 
from juries on a per se basis, so too do we refuse to exclude 
employees of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office on 
a per se basis.  Without some other evidence that a prospective 
juror such as Charlotte cannot possibly be impartial, he or she 
should not be excluded solely on the basis of their employment.6   
¶36 One of the few cases in which this court has made a 
per se exclusion of potential jurors is Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660.  
As noted, in most cases we have refused to make a per se 
disqualification.  See, e.g., State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 
33, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979): 
                                                 
6 We further believe that State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 
457 N.W.2d 484 (1990), presents a stronger case of objective 
bias than this case does.  Again, in Louis we allowed two police 
officers to sit on a jury even though the officers had to 
evaluate 
the 
credibility 
of 
another 
coemployee 
who 
was 
testifying as a witness.  Here, Charlotte did not have to 
evaluate the credibility of Harris.  Thus, in our view a work-
related relationship between a juror and a witness is more 
indicative of objective bias than a work-related relationship 
between a juror and an attorney.  If the connection in Louis was 
not enough for objective bias, we do not see how the connection 
in this case is enough for us to conclude Charlotte was 
objectively biased. 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
20 
 
(The mere expression of a predetermined opinion as to 
guilt during the voir dire does not disqualify a juror 
per se.  If the person can lay aside his or her 
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence 
presented in court, then he or she can qualify as an 
impartial trier of fact.); 
McGeever v. State, 239 Wis. 87, 96, 300 N.W. 485 (1941) (a 
prospective juror's past employment as a dance hall inspector, 
under the supervision of the local district attorney and 
sheriff, did not per se disqualify him from jury service). 
¶37 In Gesch, we held that a prospective juror who is 
related to a state witness by blood or marriage to the third 
degree must be struck from the jury due to an implied bias.  
Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 662.  We first noted that generally the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
determination 
of 
a 
juror's 
subjective bias will suffice to protect the defendant's right to 
an impartial jury.  Id. at 666.  "However, there are situations 
in which the relationship between a prospective juror and a 
participant in the trial is so close that a finding of implied 
bias is mandated."  Id. at 666-67.   
¶38 We concluded that the circuit court conducted a 
thorough search for subjective bias and found no such bias.  Id. 
at 667.  Despite the lack of subjective bias, we held that the 
juror should still have been removed for cause: 
[W]here a prospective juror is related to a state 
witness by blood or marriage to the third degree, 
special problems exist that render a circuit court's 
search for actual bias an inadequate protection of a 
defendant's right to an impartial jury.  One such 
problem is the potential for unconscious bias.  It is 
virtually 
impossible 
for 
a prospective 
juror to 
consciously estimate how the family relationship with 
a witness will affect his or her judgment.  Although 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
21 
 
no intentional actual bias may exist, the risk of 
unconscious bias in these situations is manifest. 
Id.  As such, we held that "[i]n circumstances, such as here, 
the mere probability of bias is so high that in order to assure 
a defendant the fundamental fairness to which the defendant is 
entitled, we must imply bias and exclude the juror as a matter 
of law."  Id. at 668. 
¶39 Later, in Faucher, we described Gesch as follows: 
Our 
holding 
in 
Gesch 
is 
unique. 
 
In 
most 
circumstances . . . the conclusion that an individual 
is objectively biased requires some view of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the voir dire and the 
case, as well as the prospective juror's answers.  We 
therefore urge a circuit court to engage in a thorough 
voir dire when a party challenges a prospective juror 
through the class to which the prospective juror 
belongs. However, Gesch remains an example that some 
relationships are so fraught with the possibility of 
bias that we must find objective bias regardless of 
the 
surrounding facts 
and circumstances 
and the 
particular juror's assurances of impartiality. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 724. 
¶40 Without more, we do not believe an employee of the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office is an example of a 
relationship "so fraught with the possibility of bias" that we 
must per se exclude Charlotte.  That Charlotte works as an 
administrative assistant in the Children's Court establishes 
little more than a distant acquaintance with the prosecutor.  
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that 
the circuit court reasonably concluded Charlotte was not 
objectively biased.  As noted, Gesch is a unique holding, and we 
do 
not 
think 
that 
standing 
alone, 
an 
employee/employer 
relationship between a juror and the Milwaukee County District 
No. 
2004AP2035-CR   
 
22 
 
Attorney, like a close familial relationship, renders it utterly 
impossible for a potential juror to be impartial. 
III 
¶41 In sum, we hold that the circuit court reasonably 
concluded that Charlotte was not objectively biased under the 
facts and circumstances as a reasonable person in Charlotte's 
position could be impartial.  Therefore, we conclude the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
Smith's motion to strike Charlotte for cause.  Essentially, we 
decline to create a per se rule that excludes potential jurors 
for the sole reason that they are employed by the Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's Office.  As such, the decision of the 
circuit court is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This case 
raises the question whether a challenged prospective juror is 
objectively biased on the basis of her employment in the 
district attorney's office that is prosecuting the case.   
¶43 The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the 
very heart of due process.1  When a prospective juror is employed 
by an attorney in the case to be tried, the situation is "so 
fraught with the possibility of bias that we must find objective 
bias regardless of the surrounding facts and circumstances and 
the particular juror's assurances of impartiality."2  The 
employee is, I conclude, objectively biased under the law and 
should, on objection, be struck for cause from the jury.  
¶44 Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously refused to strike for cause the challenged juror, an 
employee of the Milwaukee County District Attorney, in this 
criminal case prosecuted by the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's office.  
¶45 I agree with the defendant that the circuit court's 
failure to disqualify the challenged prospective juror for cause 
is prejudicial error.  The State agrees that if the circuit 
court erred, the error was prejudicial.  I therefore dissent. 
                                                 
1 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961).  A criminal 
defendant is guaranteed the right to a trial by an impartial 
jury by Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
2 State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 724, 596 N.W.2d 770 
(1999) 
(discussing 
State 
v. 
Gesch, 
167 
Wis. 2d 660, 
482 
N.W.2d 99 (1992)). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶46 In determining whether a prospective juror manifests 
objective bias, the circuit court must determine "whether the 
reasonable person in the individual prospective juror's position 
could be impartial."3  The primary concern in the objective bias 
analysis is whether the parties are provided with a fair trial.4 
¶47 The majority opinion declines to find objective bias 
in the current case, reasoning that the relationship between the 
assistant district attorney prosecuting the case and the 
challenged prospective juror was "little more than a distant 
acquaintance."5   
¶48 I agree that the challenged prospective juror is, in 
the instant case, not closely related to the assistant district 
attorney prosecuting the case.  The challenged prospective juror 
worked in a different office, in a different community, and on 
different types of cases than the assistant district attorney 
prosecuting the case.  Moreover, the assistant district attorney 
had no direct supervisory authority over the challenged juror. 
¶49 Nevertheless, the assistant district attorney and the 
challenged 
prospective 
juror 
do 
share 
the 
same 
ultimate 
superior, the Milwaukee County District Attorney.  The Milwaukee 
County District Attorney is named as counsel along with the 
assistant district attorney on the court documents.   
¶50 The distant degree of acquaintanceship relied upon by 
the majority opinion neither addresses nor diminishes the 
                                                 
3 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718. 
4 Id. at 715. 
5 See majority op., ¶40. 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
challenged prospective juror's perception of the risk of an 
adverse employment action.  Certainly, a reasonable person under 
the circumstances might perceive the possibility of the employer 
being unhappy with his or her vote as a juror.6   An objectively 
reasonable 
person 
might 
(intentionally 
or 
unintentionally, 
consciously or subconsciously) give the edge to the employer in 
light of ties of economic interests and loyalty.7   
¶51 The risk of an employee sensing economic pressure to 
side with his or her employer is too great to rely on the 
prospective juror's representations of his or her ability to be 
unbiased.  In addition, an employee may feel loyalty toward his 
or her employer and the positions the employer takes.  An 
employee may reasonably wish to be a "team player" or may 
perceive peer pressure from coworkers to side with their 
employer.  In contrast, an employee might be biased against an 
employer.  
                                                 
6 I recognize that the juror is likely protected from 
official adverse employment action by civil service rules and is 
protected from retaliatory action by statute.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 103.87 (2003-04) (prohibiting disciplinary action 
when an employee testifies in a trial); Wis. Stat. § 230.90 
(2003-04) (formerly § 895.65) (prohibiting retaliation by a 
government employer).  An employee may nevertheless harbor a 
fear of adverse employment consequences if he or she decides a 
case against the employer's position.   
7 This 
court 
reached 
a 
similar 
conclusion 
regarding 
independent arbitrators in Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 
70, ¶4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, in which we concluded 
that an arbitrator who has an ongoing employment relationship 
(as counsel) with one of the parties to an arbitration was 
"evidently partial" under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶52 While a prospective juror may be able to disclaim 
bias, it will too often be impossible for employees to 
completely eliminate the influence of an employer who, in 
essence, keeps a roof over their head and food on their table.  
These concerns are precisely why a case-by-case analysis of 
subjective and objective bias in this type of case is not 
satisfactory, and a bright-line rule is required.8  
¶53 I conclude that an objectively reasonable person in 
the place of the challenged prospective juror would not 
ordinarily be able to separate his or her economic and loyalty 
interests from the determinations he or she would be required to 
make as juror.  An employee of a district attorney's office 
should therefore be struck as a juror for cause when that office 
is prosecuting a case.  
¶54 As Justice O'Connor recognized in her concurring 
opinion in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1982), some 
situations 
(which 
she 
labeled 
as 
"extreme"), 
including 
employment with the prosecuting agency, would justify a bright-
line rule excluding the prospective juror: 
While each case must turn on its own facts, there are 
some extreme situations that would justify a finding 
of implied bias . . . [including] a revelation that 
the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting 
                                                 
8 "It need not be assumed that any cessation of that 
employment 
would 
actually 
follow 
a 
verdict 
against 
the 
government.  It is enough that it might possibly be the case; 
and the juror ought not to be permitted to occupy a position of 
that nature to the possible injury of a defendant on trial, even 
though he should swear he would not be influenced by his 
relations to one of the parties to the suit in giving a 
verdict."  Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 197 (1909). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
agency . . . .  None of our previous cases preclude 
the use of the conclusive presumption of implied bias 
in appropriate circumstances. 
¶55 My conclusion is consistent with the statutes and case 
law of other jurisdictions.   
¶56 Many states have statutes requiring employees of 
counsel to be struck for cause when they are prospective jurors 
in a case in which their employer is involved.9   
¶57 Similarly, in many jurisdictions, case law establishes 
a strong policy against allowing employees of law firms or 
prosecuting agencies to serve on a jury in which their employer 
is involved.  
¶58 In United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 
2000), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that a 15-year employee of the United 
States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, 
which was conducting the prosecution, was impliedly biased and 
should have been excluded for cause.10  The Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. Proc. 24(c)(10) (2006) (a juror 
is subject to challenge for cause if he or she is the 
"employee . . . of one of the attorneys"); MCR 2.511(D)(9) 
(2006) (Michigan, same); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-20-13.1(4) 
(2006) (South Dakota, same). 
Other 
state 
statutes 
create 
grounds 
for 
striking 
a 
potential juror for cause when the juror is an employee of a 
party.  See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-33-304(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) 
(providing grounds to strike for cause if the juror is employed 
by defendant or complainant); Idaho Code § 19-2020(2) (2006) 
(same); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)e. (2005) (same); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. 
§ 22-3410(2)(b) 
(2005) 
(same); 
Minn. 
R. 
Crim. 
P. 
26.02(5)(1)6. (2006) (same); Ohio Crim. R. 24(C)(12) (2006) 
(same); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.220(3) (2006) (same). 
10 United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
distinguished United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936), and 
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).  In both Wood and 
Dennis, the jurors were not employees of the office prosecuting 
the case, but rather employees of other offices of the United 
States government.11   
¶59 It is useful to compare Polichemi to the instant case.  
The U.S. Attorney's office for the Northern District of Illinois 
currently has over 300 employees, including 161 Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys, in two offices serving 18 counties.12  It is unclear 
how many staff are employed by the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney, the prosecuting agency and employer of the challenged 
                                                 
11 Id. 
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209 (1982), because the challenged juror in that case 
was an applicant for a job with the office of the prosecuting 
attorney, not an employee.  Polichemi, 219 F.3d at 704-05. 
This court has rejected a bright-line rule of exclusion 
based 
on 
government 
employment. 
 
State 
v. 
Louis, 
156 
Wis. 2d 470, 482, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990) (quoting United States 
v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 149 (1936)) ("'We think that the 
imputation of bias simply by virtue of governmental employment, 
without regard to any actual partiality growing out of the 
nature and circumstances of particular cases, rests on an 
assumption without any rational foundation.'"). 
In McGeever v. State, 239 Wis. 87, 96-97, 300 N.W. 485 
(1941), the court held that there is no bright-line rule 
excluding former part-time employees of a district attorney's 
office from serving on a jury in a case prosecuted by the same 
district attorney's office.  Because McGeever addressed past 
employment, it is inapplicable to the instant case.  
12 Website of the United States Attorney for the Northern 
District 
of 
Illinois, 
"About 
Us" 
page, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/aboutus/index.html 
(last 
visited 
June 21, 2006). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
juror in the instant case, but there are approximately 125 
assistant district attorneys.13  There is nothing in the 
Polichemi opinion indicating that the juror in that case was any 
closer to the prosecuting Assistant U.S. Attorney than the 
challenged juror in the instant case was to the prosecuting 
assistant district attorney. 
¶60 Polichemi reflects and is consistent with the policies 
of 
over 
one 
hundred 
years 
of 
case 
law 
from 
various 
jurisdictions.14 
¶61 Some state courts, like the majority opinion, have 
rejected a rule excluding prospective jurors based only on their 
                                                 
13 Website of the Milwaukee County District Attorney, 
http://www.county.milwaukee.gov/display/router.asp?DocID=7715 
(last visited June 21, 2006). 
14 See, e.g., People v. Terry, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729, 731 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (deputy district attorney should have been 
struck for cause "because this very case is being prosecuted by 
his boss"); Beam v. State, 400 S.E.2d 327, 328 (Ga. 1991) 
(secretary in appellate section of district attorney's office 
prosecuting trial should have been struck for cause based on 
perception of bias); State v. Kauhi, 948 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Haw. 
1997) (court shall imply bias when prospective juror is deputy 
prosecuting attorney employed in same office as the prosecutor 
trying the case); Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357, 363 (Ind. 1885) 
(deputy prosecuting attorney impliedly biased because he was 
employee and subordinate of prosecuting attorney); Randolph v. 
Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Ky. 1986) (secretary for 
prosecuting attorney impliedly biased as a matter of law and 
therefore must be struck for cause), overruled on other grounds 
by Shannon v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1988). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
employment relationship with counsel.15  I disagree with the 
reasoning in these cases.   
¶62 Because the challenged prospective juror has financial 
and loyalty ties to his or her employer, the juror cannot be 
expected to make an unbiased decision.  A bright-line rule 
excluding an employee of a district attorney's office as a juror 
guarantees the criminal defendant his or her constitutional 
right to a fair and impartial jury and also protects prospective 
jurors from the unenviable position of deciding cases prosecuted 
by their employers. 
¶63 The bright-line rule I propose is narrow.  I do not 
propose a rule excluding all government employees from serving 
on a jury in every case involving the government.   
¶64 Further, the rule I propose is not a categorical 
exclusion of all employees of a district attorney's office from 
serving on a jury.  Employees of a district attorney's office 
may serve on civil juries if the district attorney's office is 
not involved as counsel in the case.  Moreover, nothing in the 
rule I propose would prohibit an employee of a district 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Lowe v. State, 384 So. 2d 1164, 1171 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1980) (employment by the district attorney did not 
impute bias as a matter of law); State v. Cox, 837 S.W.2d 532, 
535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (child support enforcement investigator 
not automatically excluded as juror even though prosecutor was 
her superior); Roubideaux v. State, 707 P.2d 35, 36 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1985) (administrative assistant in district attorney's 
office not automatically excluded as juror). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
attorney's office from serving on a jury in a criminal case 
prosecuted by a district attorney for another county.16 
¶65 Although this court has been reluctant to do so, we 
have created bright-line rules to exclude prospective jurors 
when such rules were necessary.  In State v. Gesch, 167 
Wis. 2d 660, 
482 
N.W.2d 99 
(1992), 
the 
court 
held 
that 
prospective jurors related to a state witness by blood or 
marriage up to the third degree of consanguinity are "impliedly" 
biased and must be struck for cause.17  Discussing Gesch in a 
later case, the court observed that "Gesch is unique.  In most 
circumstances . . . the 
conclusion 
that 
an 
individual 
is 
objectively 
biased 
requires 
some 
view 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances surrounding the voir dire and the case, as well as 
the prospective juror's answers . . . .  However, Gesch remains 
an example that some relationships are so fraught with the 
possibility of bias that we must find objective bias regardless 
of the surrounding facts and circumstances and the particular 
juror's assurances of impartiality."18  
                                                 
16 For example, had the challenged juror in the instant case 
lived in Waukesha, my proposed rule would not have prohibited 
her from serving on a criminal jury in a case prosecuted by the 
Waukesha County District Attorney. 
17 State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 662, 482 N.W.2d 99 
(1992).  The court now says that such prospective jurors are 
"objectively biased." 
18 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 724 (discussing State v. Gesch, 
167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992)). 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶66 This rationale applies just as forcefully, if not more 
so, to employees of the prosecutor's office as it does to family 
members.     
¶67 For the reasons stated, I conclude that, because the 
challenged prospective juror was an employee of the Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's office that was prosecuting the case, 
she was objectively biased and should have been struck for 
cause.   
¶68 The error was prejudicial.  I would reverse the 
defendant's conviction and remand the matter to the circuit 
court for a new trial.  
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.  
 
 
No.  2004AP2035-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1