Case Title: Ex Parte Blake

Citation: 469 So. 2d 1301

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
469 So. 2d 1301 (1985)
Ex parte Arthur James BLAKE.
(Re Abe LEWIS, Junior and Arthur James Blake a/k/a "Arthur James Jackson" v. STATE of Alabama).
83-933.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 8, 1985.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1985.
John E. Pilcher of Pilcher & Pilcher, Selma, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Martha Gail Ingram, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
We granted certiorari in this case to review the issue of whether petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
Petitioner was indicted on January 28, 1982. His trial was not until August 11, 1983. The various reasons and dates of petitioner's 19½ months' trial delay, as set forth by the Court of Criminal Appeals, 469 So. 2d 1291, are as follows:
In reaching its determination, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), four-part balancing test, which requires an inquiry into the following: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason *1303 for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that a significant portion of the trial delay occurred as a direct result of the state's attempt to implement its trial strategy. Four of the state's motions for continuance were grounded on its desire to take advantage of the newly promulgated Rule 15.4(b) of the Alabama Temporary Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing that separately indicted defendants may, under some circumstances, be joined for trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the following:
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that "because the total delay attributable to the state was only 9½ months and because Blake had shown no substantial prejudice, his sixth amendment rights were not violated." The court indicated that it was a "close case" and that if the delay had been significantly longer, that court would have had no hesitation in finding a constitutional violation.
Petitioner has established, and it is reflected in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, that the state delayed the trial in order to perfect its trial strategy. No Alabama case squarely addresses the proper weight that should be accorded deliberate prosecutorial requests for trial delays which substantially contribute to the delay of a defendant's trial. Petitioner asks us to assume prejudice under the circumstances of this case. This we cannot do.
The fourth factor of the balancing test, prejudice, was discussed at length in Barker. The Supreme Court opined as follows:
Thus, the factors which must be examined to determine prejudice, as contemplated by the Supreme Court, include, among other things, death or unavailability of a witness or lapse of memory. Even if the prejudice element did not weigh in Blake's favor, however, the Barker Court held that it is not mandatory that all four factors be satisfied in order to determine that a defendant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. These factors are related and "must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Barker, supra, at 533, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances of this case, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied the applicable principles of law in finding that Blake was not denied his right to a speedy trial. Although the State's behavior, as the Court of Criminal Appeals found, makes this a "close case," we cannot justify a conclusion that Blake was seriously prejudiced by the delay, and thus denied his right to a speedy trial as contemplated by our state or federal Constitutions. The trial delay directly attributable to the State was only 9½ months. We are of the opinion that the balancing process required by Barker must be carefully applied, because a finding that one has been denied a speedy trial results in the serious consequence of allowing a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime to go free. We would make such a determination in this case if we were not of the opinion that the factors weighing in favor of Blake were outweighed by the lack of prejudice and the relatively short length of the trial delay attributed to the state.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
JONES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.
JONES, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Blake was incarcerated from February 2, 1982, till August 11, 1983, awaiting trial (18 months, 10 days). None of the delays (justified or unjustified) except for two months, was occasioned by the Defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals reduces the period of delay "attributable to the State [to] only 9½ months" by counting from the time of Defendant's "speedy trial" objection to the continuance granted November 1, 1982. What the Court of Criminal Appeals is saying is that, while only a two-month delay is attributable to the Defendant, only the last half of the total period between indictment and trial is reviewable when testing Defendant's "speedy trial" challenge. This includes the last five of a total of six delays granted at the request of the State.
I have no quarrel with the Court of Criminal Appeals' analysis as summarized above. Indeed, I further agree that the trial court's order of November 29, 1982, denying Defendant's objection and "speedy trial" demand was without error. From that point forward, however, it is my opinion that this Court's affirmance of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment overlooks one essential element in the requisite test of Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial: the reason for each delay requested by the State and the State's conduct with respect to its stated grounds for each such delay.
1) The first continuance was granted November 1, 1981, on the express condition that the "State would be prepared to try Blake as soon as it completed the trial of the co-defendant."
2) Implicit in the State's motion on January 10, 1983, requesting a continuance to April 1983, is its noncompliance with the explicit terms of the earlier order of continuance. This second of the last five requests for delay was grounded on the State's desire to consolidate Blake's case with those of the co-defendants pursuant to Rule 15.4(b), A.R.Crim.P.
*1305 3) At the call of the April docket, with more than sufficient time to comply with the consolidation rule's seven-day requirement, the State requested an additional seven days in order to effect the appropriate consolidation order.
4) At the end of that seven-day period, the State requested another continuance in order to comply with the rule's requirement regarding the number of veniremen.
5) Again, on the setting of the case for trial, the State requested and was granted a nine-day delay pursuant to Rule 15.4.
So struck with the severity of the cumulative adverse effect of these circumstances, the Court of Criminal Appeals was moved to observe: "In short, we believe that the nine and one-half month delay after November 1982 must be attributed solely to the prosecution and must be weighed heavily against the State."
Furthermore, as to the "Defendant's Assertion of [his] Rights," the Court of Criminal Appeals commented: "In accordance with Barker's admonition that we should weigh `the frequency and force of the objections (to delay) as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection,' 407 U.S.  at 529, we find that Blake strenuously asserted his rights and we conclude that this factor should weigh in his favor."
In spite of the obvious accuracy of these findings (indeed, both of these observations are understatements), coupled with Defendant's 18-month incarceration, the Court of Criminal Appeals nonetheless concluded that Defendant had not been prejudiced. If the totality of these circumstances falls short of the denial of a speedy trial, then I confess my gross misunderstanding of this constitutional guarantee.