Case Title: Swindall v. Speigner

Citation: 214 So. 2d 436

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1968-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
214 So. 2d 436 (1968)
Oliver Roscoe SWINDALL et al.
v.
Vinnie Jerkins SPEIGNER, Adm'x.
4 Div. 209.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 5, 1968.
Rehearing Denied October 10, 1968.
*437 Oliver Brantley, Troy, and Wm. B. Matthews, Ozark, for appellants.
Wm. R. Martin and Chas. Woods, Ozark, Godbold, Hobbs & Copeland and Euel A. Screws, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
The application for rehearing is granted with respect to Assignment of Error No. 2. The opinion is modified in that the part which related to Assignment 2 is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. The opinion is extended to consider additional assignments of error which were not considered on original deliverance.
Defendants appeal from judgment for plaintiff in action for wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate in a motor vehicle collision on a highway.
*438 About 7 a. m., during daylight on a clear, dry day, plaintiff's intestate was driving his pickup truck, traveling north, on U. S. 231 at a point near Chism's Truck Stop, which was on the west side of the highway. Defendant Swindall was riding in his automobile traveling south on the same highway meeting intestate's truck. Jimmy Rushing was driving Swindall's automobile. Rushing's administrator is the other defendant.
Plaintiff's intestate made a left turn to drive his truck into the truck stop and the vehicles collided. The investigating State Trooper testified that the width of the highway, where the accident occurred, was twenty-four feet, and that the point of impact was approximately at the center of the west, or southbound, lane about six feet from the extreme west edge of the highway. Both drivers were killed almost instantly.
Plaintiff states in brief that his theory is that wanton driving of Swindall's automobile was established by the circumstances of excessive speed of the automobile in an area congested by a busy business and intersection and dangerous topography such as a "blind hill from the north.
Defendant's theory seems to be that the driver of Swindall's automobile was not guilty of either negligent or wanton conduct; that plaintiff's intestate, Jerkins, was guilty of negligence in the operation of his truck; and that Jerkins' own negligence was the proximate cause of his death.
Defendants say the court erred in giving plaintiff's requested charge 9 which recites:
By charge 9, plaintiff sought the benefit of the sudden emergency doctrine. In substance, that doctrine is that one who, without fault on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly placed in a perilous situation, so as to be compelled to act instantly and without an opportunity for the exercise of deliberate judgment, is not chargeable with negligence if, in attempting to escape from the peril or to minimize the threatened injury, he acts as a person of reasonable prudence would or might have acted in the same or a similar situation. 80 A.L.R.2d 12.
The above stated rule has no application to, and cannot be invoked by, one who wrongfully and voluntarily puts himself in such a position of danger. Pittman v. Calhoun, 231 Ala. 460, 464, 165 So. 391. To like effect are McCauley v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 93 Ala. 356, 360, 9 So. 611; Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Fox, 174 Ala. 657, 675, 56 So. 1013; Alabama Co. v. Sanders, 202 Ala. 295, 297, 80 So. 360; Birmingham Stove & Range Co. v. Vanderford, 217 Ala. 342, 345, 116 So. 334; Hill v. Almon, 224 Ala. 658, 660, 141 So. 625; Alaga Coach Line v. Foy, 227 Ala. 506, 510, 150 So. 493; Clark v. Farmer, 229 Ala. 596, 599, 159 So. 47; Pittman v. Calhoun, 233 Ala. 450, 452, 172 So. 263.
Defendants say charge 9 is bad because it assumes that the party killed was placed in peril "by the wrong of the defendant," and thus assumes the existence of a material fact as to which the evidence is in conflict. We do not agree. Charge 9, we think, is the statement of an abstract proposition of law and limits the application of the emergency doctrine to a situation "Where" the party was placed in peril "by the wrong of the defendant." In this respect, we understand the word "where" to have the same meaning as "if" or "when."
In Pittman v. Calhoun, 231 Ala. 460, 461, 165 So. 391, 392, this court held that charge 6 asserted a sound proposition of law. Charge 6 recited:
In charge 6, it was assumed that the traveler was placed in peril "without any fault on his part." In Pittman, however, the evidence was in conflict as to whether the plaintiff was placed in a position of peril by his own actions or by the fault of defendant.
We are of opinion that the instant charge 9 is not bad for assuming as true a disputed fact.
Defendants say charge 9 is bad, for a second reason, to wit, because the charge omits to state that plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the sudden emergency doctrine if plaintiff, by his own acts, produced the sudden peril.
Charge 9 could have been refused without error for the reason that the charge pretermits freedom from fault in bringing about the sudden peril. See holding as to charge 11 in Alaga Coach Line v. Foy, supra.
This omission, however, did not make giving charge 9 reversible error under the holding in Hill v. Almon, supra. There this court considered an oral charge, on the emergency doctrine, which omitted reference to whether plaintiff, by his acts, produced the sudden peril. This court said that, if the charge were defective for this omission, the defendant should have asked for charges instructing the jury that the plaintiff could not claim the benefit of the emergency doctrine if he, or his agent, brought about the emergency.
Assignment 10 does not show reversible error.
On application for rehearing, plaintiff says we erred in holding that giving plaintiff's requested charge 1 was reversible error. Charge 1 recites:
Defendants say charge 1 is bad for two reasons: (1) because the charge fails to limit Swindall's liability for the driver's negligence to his negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury complained of, and (2) the charge ignores the defense of contributory negligence.
Plaintiff says that giving plaintiff's charge 1 was not reversible error because charge 1 is not an incorrect statement of the law, but, at its worst, is merely incomplete and misleading and could have been cured by an explanatory charge. Plaintiff says further that the court did give other charges which cured the omissions in charge 1 with respect to proximate cause and contributory negligence.
If plaintiff's charge 1 was illegal, not simply misleading, it should have been refused because no explanation or qualification of it could make it good. Mobile City Lines v. Holman, 273 Ala. 371, 373, 141 So. 2d 180.
If, however, plaintiff's charge 1 was merely incomplete and, therefore, misleading, giving it was not reversible error. It is not necessarily reversible error to give ambiguous or misleading charges; proper explanatory instructions should be given at the request of the party supposing himself prejudiced thereby. Birmingham So. R. Co. v. Harrison, 203 Ala. 284, 291, 82 So. 534, *440 541; First National Bank of Mobile v. Ambrose, 270 Ala. 371, 374, 119 So. 2d 18, 21.
On original deliverance, we held plaintiff's charge 1 to be an incorrect statement of the law and not merely incomplete and misleading. On further consideration, we think that our holding on original deliverance is in conflict with Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, 221 Ala. 273, 128 So. 228; McGough Bakeries Corp. v. Reynolds, 250 Ala. 592, 35 So. 2d 332; and Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 273 Ala. 509, 142 So. 2d 228. The three cases last cited were not called to our attention on original consideration of this appeal.
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, supra, defendant excepted to certain portions of the court's oral charge. On the appeal, appellant assembled three exceptions as one paragraph and gave that paragraph the number 16. The third exception in number 16 recites:
Another exception to the oral charge was numbered 19. It recites:
Neither number 16 nor number 19 contains any reference to proximate cause. With respect to these exceptions, this court said:
In McGough Bakeries, supra, the plaintiff sued for the death of his minor son, allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant, James Hamilton, while driving a truck owned by the other defendant, McGough Bakeries. The trial court, at request of plaintiff, gave the following written charges, to-wit:
This court considered the omission from Charges B and C of any reference to proximate cause and said:
In Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, supra, defendant argued, as here, that plaintiff's requested charges 12 and 13 were bad because they omit any mention of proximate causation and instruct that the master is answerable for all negligent acts of the servant, whether such acts be the proximate cause of injury or not. Charges 12 and 13 recite:
"`No. 12.
"`No. 13.
We held that the charges were ambiguous or misleading and that the omission of mention of proximate cause did not make the charges illegal or incorrect statements of the law; and, further, that the omission was cured by additional charges which the court gave at request of the defendants.
On the authority of the three cases last cited, we hold that plaintiff's charge, in the instant case, is not an incorrect statement of the law but is incomplete and misleading for omission of proper mention of proximate cause. It follows that giving charge 1 was not reversible error on the ground that proper mention of proximate cause is omitted.
We come to defendants' argument that charge 1 is bad for the reason that the charge ignores the defense of contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate.
In Moore v. Cruit, 238 Ala. 414, 191 So. 252, the court gave plaintiff's requested charge 10 which recites:
In the summary of appellant's argument in 238 Ala., at page 418, 191 So. 252, the following appears:
In rejecting this argument, the court said:
In First National Bank of Mobile v. Ambrose, 270 Ala. 371, 119 So. 2d 18, the trial court gave plaintiff's requested charge 4 which recites:
This court held that giving charge 4 was not reversible error for failure to instruct on contributory negligence, saying:
On authority of the two cases last cited, we hold that plaintiff's given charge 1 in the instant case was not an incorrect statement of the law for failure to instruct on contributory negligence.
In answer to plaintiff's argument on rehearing, defendants argue that charge 13 in Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, supra, is abstract, and, therefore, the omission of mention of proximate causation did not make the charge an incorrect statement of law, but merely made the charge incomplete and curable by an explanatory charge; whereas plaintiff's charge 1 in the case at bar is not abstract and instructs the jury that defendant Swindall is "liable" for negligence of the driver. Defendants point out that charge 12 in Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, supra, is not abstract but, defendants say, charge 12 in Smith uses the word "responsible" instead of "liable". Therefore, defendants argue, charge 12 is not infected with the vice which comes from the word "liable" used in plaintiff's charge 1 in the case at bar. We do not think the difference which defendants point out between abstract charges and charges not abstract is a real, substantial distinction which makes the omission of proximate cause in an absract charge curable by explanatory charge, but not curable in a charge which is not abstract. Neither do we think that the difference between the word "liable" and the word "responsible" is such as to make one charge an incorrect statement of law and the other merely incomplete. Charge B in McGough, supra, uses the word "liable" and is not abstract.
Defendants cite four cases to support their contention that giving plaintiff's charge 1 in the instant case is reversible error.
Defendants cite Wilkey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269 Ala. 308, 112 So. 2d 458, *443 which was an action to recover disability payments under an insurance policy. This court reversed for error in giving defendant's requested charges which were incorrect statements of applicable law. The charges had no relation to the liability of a master for the negligence of his agent or servant, and the case is of no help in deciding whether plaintiff's instant charge 1 is incorrect or merely incomplete. Wilkey does hold that giving correct oral charges did not cure the error of giving incorrect written charges, the reason being that there is no way of knowing which of the contradictory charges the jury followed. Defendants cite Wilkey in support of this last proposition. Russell v. Thomas, 278 Ala. 400, 178 So. 2d 556, is also cited by defendants for the same reason.
Defendants cite Mobile City Lines v. Proctor, 272 Ala. 217, 130 So. 2d 388, where in considering Assignment 4 we held it reversible error to give plaintiff's requested Charge 6 which recites:
We held Charge 6 bad for failure to limit actionable negligence to that neglect which proximately causes injury to plaintiff. It is well understood that negligence is not actionable unless it proximately causes injury. In giving Charge 6, the court was instructing the jury as to what constituted actionable negligence. Such a definition is not correct where an essential element, proximate cause, is omitted. Plaintiff's instant charge 1 does not undertake to define actionable negligence but is a statement of circumstances in which the owner of an automobile, riding in it, is liable for the negligence of his agent who is the driver. Proctor holds that omission of proximate cause makes a charge stating the definition of actionable negligence an incorrect statement of the law. Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, supra; McGough Bakeries Corp. v. Reynolds, supra; and Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, supra, hold that omission of proximate cause makes a charge stating that, under certain circumstances, the master is liable for the negligence of his agent, merely incomplete and misleading. We are of opinion that the distinction we have undertaken to point out is a valid one, and we are not persuaded that we should depart from these decisions.
In Mobile City Lines, Inc. v. Holman, 273 Ala. 371, 141 So. 2d 180, this court reversed for giving plaintiff's requested charge which recites:
This court held the charge prejudicially erroneous in omitting that the alleged negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. Here again, the charge does not state the circumstances in which the master is liable for the negligence of his servant, but merely declares that, if defendant was guilty of negligence in operating the vehicle, the passenger is entitled to recover. We think the charge distinguishable from plaintiffs charge 1 in the instant case.
After considering the additional cases cited by the parties in briefs on rehearing, we have concluded that giving plaintiff's charge 1 was not reversible error.
Defendants say the court erred in overruling their objection to a question propounded by plaintiff to his witness Coppage.
On direct examination, defendants' witness, Blackmon, had testified that he had been riding to work in a car pool with *444 defendants and one other; that on the day of the collision, Blackmon drove his own car because he was going to get off from work early; that he saw Swindall and Rushing at Mitchell's grocery on that morning; that they were getting gas; that they left Mitchell's first and Blackmon left right behind them as soon as he paid for cigarettes and finished a coca cola; that he did not see the accident but arrived there about a quarter or ten minutes to 7:00; that he drives between fifty and sixty and tries to average sixty; and that he was the first car to get to the wreck.
On direct examination, defendant Swindall testified that he and Rushing left Swindall's home, in his automobile "around 6:00 o'clock" in the morning; that they made one stop at Mitchell's to get gas; that, on reaching Chism's, they were traveling around fifty-five and sixty miles an hour; that he was due at work at 7:30; and that the accident happened at about a quarter or ten to 7:00.
On cross-examination of defendant Swindall, plaintiff asked Swindall how fast he was going at a place on the highway about a mile or mile and a half before he got to Chism's truck stop, at a little dip in the road with a creek and bridge across there. Swindall replied that he was going slower at the time of the accident than at the little dip in the road; that at the little dip he was going fifty-five, fifty-seven, fifty-eight miles an hour, give or take a mile or two or three miles either way; and that he was going about fifty-five miles an hour at the time of the accident. Swindall testified further that his speed remained continuously about the same, give or take a few miles.
On rebuttal, plaintiff placed his witness, Coppage, on the stand. On direct examination, Coppage testified that, on the morning of the accident, he was on the highway north of Chism's; that he was driving an egg truck going south; that he saw Rushing who was traveling south; that Rushing passed the witness about a mile, or maybe less, from the accident; that Rushing was driving an automobile; and that Coppage was traveling about fifty-five or sixty when he was passed.
Plaintiff then asked Coppage the following question:
"And what is your estimate of the of Mr. Rushing's speed?"
Defendants objected. As we understand the record, defendants stated the ground of objection to be that the evidence called for by the question is not admissible because it is too remote. The court overruled and Coppage answered:
"I estimate between seventy and eighty."
Defendants now urge that their objection should have been sustained because the question called for evidence to impeach the witness Swindall on an immaterial matter, but, this latter ground is not available to defendants on appeal because they stated one ground on the trial and did not then state the ground that the evidence called for would impeach on an immaterial matter. T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Ralls, 280 Ala. 253, 192 So. 2d 706, Error 4.
As to the ground stated in the trial court; that is, that the evidence of speed at a prior place was too remote; in view of all the circumstances of this case, we are of opinion that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's speed at the place a mile or mile and a half before the accident.
The admissibility of evidence regarding the speed of a motor vehicle on a highway before reaching the scene of the accident depends upon the facts of each case and must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Utility Trailer Works v. Phillips, 249 Ala. 61, 66, 29 So. 2d 289. See annotation, 46 A.L.R.2d 9.
Assignment 23 does not show error.
Defendant Swindall separately assigns as error the overruling of his demurrer to Count I-A which recites:
In brief, counsel for Swindall say it is not sufficient against Swindall to allege that Rushing negligently operated an automobile belonging to Swindall and as aproximate result of Rushing's negligence plaintiff was injured.
Counsel's statement is probably correct. There is in Count I-A, however, more than the bare allegation that Rushing was operating Swindall's automobile. Plaintiff alleges also that Swindall was a passenger in the automobile and had the right to control its operation, and that the automobile was then being operated for the benefit of Swindall or for the mutual benefit of Swindall and Rushing.
This court has said where a permissive user (owner also) occupies a car at time of collision, she (he) is liable for negligence of the driver if (1) she has not abandoned her right to control the car, or (2) if she exercises or has a right to exercise any control over the driver or the operation of the car, or (3) if the ride is for her benefit or for the mutual benefit of herself and the driver. Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 304, 13 So. 2d 172. See also: Downes v. Norrell, 261 Ala. 430, 74 So. 2d 593; Glass v. Davison, 276 Ala. 328, 161 So. 2d 811; Towry v. Moore, 281 Ala. 644, 206 So. 2d 889.
In Count I-A, plaintiff alleges that Swindall occupied the car, and had the right to control the operation by the driver, Rushing, and the car was being operated for Swindall's benefit or the mutual benefit of Swindall and Rushing. These, we think, are not allegations of facts which merely prima facie or presumptively establish the ultimate facts. These are allegations of the ultimate facts themselves and satisfy the rule stated in Sims v. Tigrett, 229 Ala. 486, 489, 158 So. 326. The allegations are that two of the factual situations, which make the owner liable as stated in Woodson v. Hare, supra, existed. If both conditions existed, then Swindall was liable for Rushing's actionable negligence and facts showing Swindall's liability were sufficiently alleged.
Count I-A is not subject to the objection here urged against it.
The court's refusal to give defendants' requested affirmative charge to the wanton count is assigned as error.
Defendants say that the evidence shows that defendants were traveling at a speed between fifty-five and sixty miles an hour in a sixty mile an hour zone when plaintiff's intestate made a left turn into the side of defendants' car; that defendants' car skidded ninety-eight feet prior to impact; that no tire or brake marks were left by the truck; and that the evidence is undisputed that plaintiff's intestate simply continued his left turn until the impact.
Defendants say the evidence that they were driving between fifty-five and sixty miles an hour is uncontradicted because Coppage's testimony as to defendants' speed at a point a mile and a half from the point of impact is not evidence that they were traveling at the same speed at the point of impact. Defendants say further that speed alone does not import wantonness, citing Mink v. Brown, 276 Ala. 3, 158 So. 2d 647, and other cases.
It appears that Chism's Truck Stop is on a sort of plateau, that the highway proceeds up to this plateau from both north and south; that north of the scene of the accident, the crest of the hill is approximately 500 feet; that in coming from the north, as defendants' car did, the driver of a car could see between 400 and 600 feet from the crest of the hill to the point of impact. A dirt road intersects the highway in the area of Chism's. In the judgment of State Trooper Snellgrove, there were "Cross Road" or "Slow" signs on the highway "prior to this intersection." There was no curbing on the west side of the road in the area of the truck stop. There were 98 feet of brake marks made by defendants' car leading to the point of impact. "They were complete brake marks beginning dimly and continuing on in a darker color." Part of the time you could see four, part of the time three, "he was skidding sideways part of the time."
Officer Snellgrove testified:
The Reverend A. C. Phillips testified that he was traveling north behind plaintiff's intestate's truck; that intestate slowed down and gave a turn signal by extending his left arm. This witness testified:
The point of impact was on the west side of the highway, approximately the center of the west lane, about six feet from the extreme west edge of the highway. Defendants' car came to rest 66 feet from the point of impact in the same general direction in which it was traveling. The truck came to rest at a point 41 feet in the same direction.
Considering the 98 feet of skid marks and the testimony that both vehicles were lifted three feet off the ground by the impact, and that they moved the distances shown in direction of defendants' travel before coming to rest, we do not think the jury was limited to a finding that defendants' speed was not faster than between fifty-five and sixty miles per hour. Considering the testimony as to traffic and the "Slow" sign, we think that the jury could find for plaintiff on the wanton count.
Defendants assign as error refusal of their requested affirmative charge as to the negligence count. Defendants say that they were entitled to this charge because the uncontradicted evidence shows that plaintiff's intestate was guilty of contributory negligence. We are of opinion that a jury question was presented on this issue.
Defendants say they were entitled to a favorable ruling on motion for new trial because the verdict is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence. Without further discussion of the evidence, we are of opinion that the stated ground of the motion was overruled without error.
Rehearing granted.
Opinion modified and extended.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur except SIMPSON, J., not sitting.