Case Title: Lebron v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-677

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-677 
____________ 
 
JERMAINE LEBRON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[January 30, 2014] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Jermaine Lebron seeks review of an order of the circuit court that denied his 
motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of 
death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A jury convicted Jermaine Lebron of the 1995 first-degree murder and 
robbery with a firearm of Larry Neal Oliver.  See Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997, 
1004 (Fla. 2001) (Lebron I).  In affirming Lebron’s convictions, this Court detailed 
the facts surrounding the murder: 
 
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According to eyewitnesses, [Oliver, who worked with one of 
Lebron’s acquaintances, Danny Summers,] had been lured to a house 
in Osceola County (the “Gardenia house”) where Lebron and several 
others were staying after Lebron offered to sell [Oliver] some 
“spinners” for his truck.  Shortly after [Oliver] arrived at the home, 
Lebron called to him to come toward the back bedrooms.  As [Oliver] 
entered the hallway leading to the bedrooms, he was forced to lie face 
down, and was shot at short range in the back of the head. . . .  Money, 
checks, and a credit card were taken from [Oliver], and stereo 
equipment was stripped from his truck.  Lebron directed others 
present at the time to burn [Oliver’s] identification papers, to dispose 
of [his] body, and to clean up the area where [he] had been shot. 
Over the next several days, Lebron and some of the others used 
[Oliver’s] credit card, pawned his stereo equipment, and cashed his 
checks.  An attempt was also made to burn [Oliver’s] truck. . . .  
Shortly thereafter, Lebron left for New York City, the place where 
“Legz Diamond,” a topless juice bar owned by his mother, was 
located. 
[Oliver’s] body was later discovered in a rural area near the 
Walt Disney World property.  Although the body was covered with a 
blanket and some shrubs, it was still visible from the road. 
The medical examiner, Dr. Julia Martin, performed the autopsy 
on Oliver’s body after it was discovered.  She testified that . . . [t]here 
were no bruises to the hands consistent with defensive wounds.  The 
cause of death, which was instantaneous, was from a shotgun wound 
to the head. 
After Lebron left for New York, the others having knowledge 
of the event reported the murder to law enforcement officers. . . .  All 
of the witnesses other than the Tocci brothers gave statements which 
were consistent throughout, and also consistent with what the police 
were able to verify with evidence and other statements (such as where 
the body was hidden; where the truck was burned; how the checks 
were cashed; and where Oliver’s property was pawned). 
At about the same time, a crime-scene investigation was being 
conducted by the Osceola County Sheriff’s Department.  Investigators 
observed several drops of what appeared to be dried blood in a big 
area at the southeast bedroom door of the home where the event 
allegedly occurred.  They also discovered what appeared to be blood 
that had some foreign substance on it.  The area was at least twelve to 
 
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fourteen inches in diameter.  A very strong stench of dried blood was 
detected immediately upon entering the residence. 
Plastic balls were found inside the southeast bedroom, along 
with sponges and pellets.  A spent Winchester twelve-gauge pheasant 
shotgun shell was found in a drawer in another bedroom.  In a third 
bedroom, the police found four shotgun shells and the decedent’s ring 
in a pair of sneakers. 
Shortly after these eyewitness reports were made to law 
enforcement, Lebron, accompanied at the time by Stacie Kirk and 
Howard Kendall (who was involved in burning Oliver’s truck), was 
apprehended in a car parked on the street outside of Legz Diamond, 
and arrested.  Incident to the arrest, a search of the vehicle was 
conducted, and a day planner was recovered from the center console 
underneath the dashboard between the passenger seat and the driver’s 
seat.  Upon opening the planner, an identifying card with the name 
“Larry N. Oliver” was found.  Detective Rodriguez retrieved the 
planner and secured it for safekeeping.  He also found four shotgun 
shells in the center console. 
 
Id. at 1001-02. 
Lebron’s first trial resulted in a mistrial due to a jury deadlock.  Id. at 1001.  
During the guilt phase of the second trial, the jury found the following on special 
verdict forms: (1) Lebron was guilty of first-degree felony murder; (2) Oliver was 
killed by someone other than Lebron; (3) Lebron did not possess a firearm during 
the commission of the felony murder; (4) Lebron was guilty of robbery with a 
firearm; and (5) Lebron possessed a firearm during the commission of the robbery.  
Id. at 1004.  During the penalty phase for this proceeding, the jury recommended 
the death penalty by a vote of seven to five and the trial court sentenced Lebron to 
death.  Id. at 1006-08.  In 2001, this Court affirmed Lebron’s convictions but 
vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase because the trial 
 
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court erred when it: (1) found the felony probation aggravating factor, in violation 
of the ex post facto doctrine; and (2) rejected the minor participant mitigating 
factor based on an improper finding that Lebron shot Oliver, which was contrary to 
the special finding of the jury that someone other than Lebron shot Oliver.  Id. at 
1020-22.1
After a second penalty phase, a jury again recommended the death penalty 
by a vote of seven to five.  Lebron v. State, 894 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 2005) 
(Lebron II).  The trial court again sentenced Lebron to death.  Id.  In 2005, this 
Court vacated that death sentence and remanded for a third penalty phase because 
we concluded that the probative value of the evidence presented to establish the 
prior violent felony aggravating factor was far outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
 Id. at 853-56. 
 
 
After a third penalty phase ended in a mistrial, a fourth penalty phase was 
held on August 16, 2005.  Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 656 (Fla. 2008) 
(Lebron III).  During that proceeding, the State presented the testimony of 
Detective Andrew Lang, who provided a summary of the facts surrounding 
                                         
 
1.  On direct appeal, Lebron raised the following guilt phase claims: (1) 
double jeopardy barred Lebron’s retrial; (2) the trial court erred when it denied 
Lebron’s motion to continue the retrial due to the absence of trial counsel; and (3) 
the trial court erred when it denied Lebron’s motion to recuse based upon an 
alleged ex parte communication between the judge and the prosecutor regarding a 
scheduling matter.  Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 1008 n.8.   
 
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Oliver’s murder.  Id.  The State also presented victim impact evidence from 
Oliver’s mother and exhibits which included: (1) proof of Lebron’s prior violent 
felony convictions; (2) pictures of the deceased Oliver and the hallway at the crime 
scene; and (3) evaluations of mental health professionals who analyzed Lebron.  
Id. at 656. 
The defense presented only Jocelyn Ortiz, Lebron’s mother, who testified 
with regard to her relationship with Lebron and his troubled childhood.  Id.  The 
defense also introduced exhibits which included: (1) the charges and convictions of 
the other individuals involved in the Oliver murder; (2) reports with regard to 
Lebron’s prior arrest in New York for attempted robbery (which disclosed that he 
was seventeen at the time, and that a codefendant possessed a gun during the 
crime); and (3) reports addressing Lebron’s attendance and performance at various 
schools and group homes during his teenage years.  Id.  
Again, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote of seven to 
five.  Id.  The jury found that three aggravating factors had been established, for 
which the trial court required the jurors to record a numerical vote for each: (1) 
Lebron had been convicted of a prior violent felony (twelve to zero); (2) the 
murder of Oliver was committed while Lebron was engaged in a robbery (twelve 
to zero); and (3) the murder of Oliver was committed for financial gain (nine to 
three).  Id. at 656 n.4.  The jury also found the following with regard to mitigation: 
 
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(1) Lebron was not merely an accomplice whose participation was relatively minor 
(twelve to zero); (2) Lebron’s age was not a mitigating factor (twelve to zero); (3) 
no aspect of Lebron’s character, record, or background was a mitigating factor 
(nine to three); and (4) no other circumstance of the murder was a mitigating factor 
(twelve to zero).  Id. at 656 n.5.  
 
  On October 20, 2005, the trial court conducted a Spencer2 hearing.  Id. at 
657.  During that hearing, the trial court considered the testimony of State witness 
Howard Kendall, who testified regarding Lebron’s involvement in a separate and 
unrelated criminal trial that involved victim Roger Nasser.3
                                         
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
  The defense presented 
various school records and asserted that the aggravating factors should receive 
limited weight because: (1) this Court does not typically give great weight to either 
the during the course of a robbery or the pecuniary gain aggravator, and here, the 
robbery also benefited other individuals involved in its commission; (2) when 
Lebron committed the attempted robbery in New York, he was a juvenile and an 
accessory as evidenced by his probation sentence, and the main culprit used a gun 
that contained blanks; (3) Lebron was provoked by Brandi Gribben’s threats, 
 
3.  Lebron was convicted of robbing and kidnapping Nasser.  The incident in 
question occurred approximately one week after Oliver’s murder.  Lebron III, 982 
So. 2d at 657 n.7. 
 
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which mitigates the aggravated assault that he committed against her;4
On December 27, 2005, the trial court for the third time sentenced Lebron to 
death.  Id.  The court found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that: (1) Lebron was previously convicted of a violent felony; and (2) the capital 
felony was committed while Lebron was engaged in or an accomplice in the 
commission of a robbery (the court merged this aggravating factor with the 
financial gain aggravating factor).  Id.  The trial court did not assign these 
aggravating factors a particular weight, but rather found them to be “present.”  Id. 
at 667.  The trial court did not find any statutory mitigating factors, but did find the 
following nonstatutory mitigation with regard to Lebron: (1) his mother used drugs 
(very little weight); (2) he performed poorly in school (some weight); (3) he was 
good with children (very little weight); (4) the profile of his parents was mitigating 
(very little weight); (5) his mother rejected him and had negative feelings about 
him (some weight); (6) he behaved properly during trial (very little weight); and 
(7) he had emotional and mental health problems, and he lacked the “world’s best 
 and (4) 
Lebron did not possess a firearm when he robbed and kidnapped Nasser.  Id.  
Conversely, the State presented a summary of psychological reports and asserted 
that Lebron unjustifiably murdered Oliver.  Id. 
                                         
 
4.  Lebron was convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm against 
Gribben.  This incident occurred only a few days before Oliver’s murder.  Id. at 
657 n.8. 
 
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mother” (little weight).  Id.  Finally, the trial court found that the death sentence 
was supported by an Enmund5-Tison6
On appeal, Lebron raised six claims alleging: (1) the trial court erred in its 
mitigation findings when it considered and relied on evidence not contained in the 
record; (2) the trial court improperly required the jurors to record a numerical vote 
for findings with regard to each aggravating and mitigating factor presented; (3) 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002); (4) Florida’s standard penalty phase jury instructions are 
unconstitutional;  (5) execution by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment; and (6) the imposition of the death sentence here is disproportionate.  
Id. at 658-70.   
 analysis because Lebron was a major 
participant in the murder of Oliver, and Lebron had demonstrated a reckless 
disregard for human life.  Id. at 657-58.  
With respect to the first claim, we held that the trial court, in the sentencing 
order, relied on information that had not been introduced during the 2005 penalty 
phase in finding the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors.  Id. at 658.  
However, we conducted an independent review of the evidence from the 2005 
                                         
 
5.  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 
6.  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 
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penalty phase proceedings, and denied the claim.  Id. at 659-64.  We then denied 
the remainder of Lebron’s claims and affirmed his sentence of death.  Id. at 670.       
Proceedings Below 
 
On June 18, 2009, Lebron filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment of Convictions 
and Sentences.  In claim one, Lebron alleged that counsel was ineffective during 
his second guilt phase trial for the failure to: (A) file a motion to suppress based 
upon an illegal search of the vehicle Lebron was in when arrested in New York; 
(B) present Robert Spears and Charlotte Spears as witnesses; (C) properly conduct 
jury selection, including counsel’s failure to (1) object to the improper questioning 
and dismissal of an African-American juror, (2) ensure that the law was properly 
explained to the jury, and (3) move to strike a panel of jurors or effectively 
rehabilitate the panel; (D) move for a mistrial based on the State’s improper 
opening statement that referenced witnesses and evidence that were not presented 
during trial, as well as references to collateral crimes; (E) properly impeach State 
witnesses; (F) move for a mistrial based on the improper introduction of other 
crimes evidence; (G) present Roswell Summers to rebut the testimony of Danny 
Summers; and (H) object to the speculative and hearsay testimony of Detective 
Martin Rodriguez.  
 
In claim two, Lebron alleged that counsel was ineffective during his fourth 
penalty phase trial for the failure to: (A) conduct a reasonably competent 
 
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mitigation investigation and to present mitigation concerning Lebron’s background 
and history; (B) present evidence of Lebron’s drug use during the weeks and 
months before the homicide; (C) present evidence of incomplete brain 
development; (D) present positive prisoner evidence; (E) present expert testimony 
with regard to Lebron’s mental illness and cognitive brain dysfunction; (F) present 
expert testimony with regard to Lebron’s adverse development; (G) properly 
appeal the Nasser convictions which led to the imposition of the prior violent 
felony aggravator; and (H) present evidence and expert testimony about Lebron’s 
activities from ages 18 to 21 and establish that his adverse development, mental 
health, and neurological problems were present at the time of the homicide.  In 
addition, Lebron claimed cumulative error during both the guilt and penalty phases 
of his trial.  Lebron also alleged that section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2009), 
infringes on his constitutional rights by preventing him from knowing the identity 
of the members of the execution team.  Finally, Lebron asserted that by executing 
him, the State will violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment because he may be incompetent at the time of execution.   
Following a case management conference/Huff7
                                         
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 hearing, the postconviction 
court ordered an evidentiary hearing on claims 1(B), 1(G), 2(A), 2(B), 2(D), 2(E), 
2(F), 2(G), and 2(H).  The evidentiary hearing was held on November 7-10, 2011.  
 
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In addition to his own testimony, Lebron presented three witnesses.  Dr. Mark 
Cunningham, a clinical forensic psychologist, testified that Lebron exhibited thirty-
two major adverse developmental factors that impacted Lebron’s childhood, his 
teen years, and his moral culpability.  Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist 
and an expert in the fields of clinical psychology, forensic psychology, and 
neuropsychology, diagnosed Lebron with six psychiatric and behavioral disorders 
and determined that Lebron suffers from functional brain impairment, frontal lobe 
impairment, and cognitive brain dysfunction.  Dr. Eisenstein also concluded that 
Lebron suffered from extreme mental disturbance at the time of the murder.  
Robert Norgard, Lebron’s penalty phase counsel, testified about the strategy he and 
co-counsel Harvey Slovis developed during their representation of Lebron.  The 
State presented one witness, Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, a psychiatrist and expert in 
forensic psychiatry and addictionology, who refuted the findings of Dr. 
Cunningham and Dr. Eisenstein and diagnosed Lebron with, among other things, 
antisocial personality disorder.   
On March 13, 2012, the postconviction court issued an order denying all 
claims presented in Lebron’s motion to vacate.  This appeal follows.  
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
Lebron first challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his eight guilt 
phase claims.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated in accordance 
with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  We have previously described what a defendant must 
establish to succeed on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective:   
[T]he test when assessing the actions of trial counsel is not how, in 
hindsight, present counsel would have proceeded.  See Cherry v. 
State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995).  On the contrary, a claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must satisfy two criteria.  First, 
counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  Strickland[, 
466 U.S. at 687].  Deficient performance in this context means that 
counsel’s performance fell below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id.  When examining counsel’s performance, an 
objective standard of reasonableness applies, id. at 688, and great 
deference is given to counsel’s performance.  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant bears the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 
trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 
(1955)).  This Court has made clear that “[s]trategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”  See Occhicone v. State, 
768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) [(Occhicone II)].  There is a strong 
presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
reliable result.  [Id. at] 689.  A defendant must do more than speculate 
that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  Prejudice is met only if 
there is a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
 
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confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Both deficient performance 
and prejudice must be shown.  Id.   
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010) (parallel citations omitted).  
Because Strickland requires that a defendant establish both deficiency and 
prejudice, an appellate court evaluating a claim of ineffectiveness is not required to 
issue a specific ruling on one component of the test when it is evident that the other 
component is not satisfied.  See Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 996 (Fla. 2006).  
Further, we examine ineffective assistance claims under a mixed standard of 
review because the performance and prejudice elements of Strickland present 
mixed questions of law and fact.  Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672.  Postconviction courts 
hold a superior vantage point with respect to questions of fact, evidentiary weight, 
and observations of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.  See Cox v. State, 
966 So. 2d 337, 357-58 (Fla. 2007).  As a result, this Court defers to the 
postconviction court’s factual findings so long as those findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  See Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672.  However, this 
Court reviews the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Id.    
 
 
 
 
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Guilt Phase Claims8
Failure to File a Motion to Suppress  
 
Shortly after eyewitness reports of Oliver’s murder were received by law 
enforcement, Lebron, Stacie Kirk, and Howard Kendall were apprehended in a 
parked stolen Chevy Blazer which was located on the street outside Legz Diamond 
in New York.  Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 1002.  All three individuals were ordered 
out of the vehicle, and Lebron and Kendall were immediately taken into custody.  
Id.  Incident to the arrest, Detective Rodriguez searched the vehicle.  Id.  A day 
planner was recovered from the center console, and inside the planner was an 
identification card with the name “Larry N. Oliver.”  Id.  Detective Rodriguez also 
found four shotgun shells in the center console.  Id.  
 
Lebron alleges that his trial counsel performed deficiently when he failed to 
file a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the stolen 
Chevy Blazer.  He contends that Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), 
permits law enforcement officers to conduct a search of an automobile incident to 
                                         
 
8.  Before addressing Lebron’s guilt phase claims, we note that both Norgard 
and Slovis represented Lebron during his first guilt phase trial, which ended in a 
mistrial.  During retrial, however, Norgard was involved in another capital case, 
and was unable to participate in the pretrial and guilt phase proceedings.  Lebron I, 
799 So. 2d at 1001.  These proceedings were conducted with only Slovis appearing 
on Lebron’s behalf.  Id.  Nevertheless, Norgard did represent Lebron during all 
four of his penalty phase proceedings.  During the evidentiary hearing, Lebron did 
not present Slovis as a witness, but instead relied exclusively upon the testimony of 
Norgard even though Lebron challenges several aspects of Slovis’ performance 
during his 1998 guilt phase trial.   
 
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arrest only to protect an officer’s safety or to prevent the destruction of evidence.  
Thus, Lebron claims that the search of the stolen Blazer was unjustified and illegal 
because the two justifications that support the search incident to arrest warrant 
exception were not present as he and the other individuals were already in police 
custody.   
 
 
Without addressing deficiency, we conclude that this claim fails the 
prejudice prong of Strickland.  To establish prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s 
failure to file a motion to suppress, a defendant must demonstrate that the motion 
would have been successful, and the evidence in question would have been 
excluded.  See Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 694 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]here 
defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the 
principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his 
Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.” (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 375 (1986)).  
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, subject only to a few well-
delineated exceptions, searches conducted without prior judicial approval are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967).  Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search 
incident to a lawful arrest.  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).  
In Chimel, the Supreme Court held that a search incident to an arrest may only 
 
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include the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control,” which 
includes the area within which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence.  395 U.S. at 763.  The search conducted in Chimel occurred 
inside the home of the defendant.  Id. at 753.  Twelve years after Chimel, the 
Supreme Court considered the applicability of the search incident to arrest 
exception in the context of automobile searches.  See New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 460 (1981).  In Belton, the Supreme Court held that when an officer 
lawfully arrests the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the 
automobile and any containers therein.  Id.  This holding was 
widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a 
recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain 
access to the vehicle at the time of the search.  This reading may be 
attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which he 
characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction . . . that the 
interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee 
who has recently been in the car.”  [453 U.S.] at 466.  Under the 
majority’s approach, he argued, “the result would presumably be the 
same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions 
in the patrol car” before conducting the search.  Id. at 468. 
Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given 
different answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an 
arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest, but 
Justice Brennan’s reading of the Court’s opinion has predominated. 
As Justice O’Connor observed, “lower court decisions seem now to 
treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified 
by the twin rationales of Chimel.”  Thornton [v. United States], 541 
U.S. [615, 624 (2004)] (opinion concurring in part).  Justice Scalia has 
similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could 
 
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gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been 
handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing 
a search in “this precise factual scenario . . . are legion.”  Id. at 628 
(opinion concurring in judgment) (collecting cases).  Indeed, some 
courts have upheld searches under Belton” even when . . . the 
handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.”  541 U.S. at 628 
(same). 
 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341-43 (2009) (parallel citations; footnote omitted).  
This interpretation of Belton predominated until 2009—twelve years after 
Lebron’s first guilt phase trial—when the Supreme Court in Gant rejected this 
broad reading of Belton and narrowed the search incident to arrest exception to 
permit police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when 
the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or when it is “reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”  Id. at 343.9
As the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Gant indicates, the law in 
effect at the time of Detective Rodriguez’s search of the stolen Chevy Blazer 
incident to the arrest of Lebron was well settled.  Under Belton, law enforcement 
officers were permitted to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
occupant even if there was no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the 
   
                                         
 
9.  As noted by the Fourth District in Flowers v. State, 54 So. 3d 1049, 1049 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2011), the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gant is “an 
evolutionary refinement in Fourth Amendment law and not a development of 
fundamental significance, a major constitutional change, or jurisprudential 
upheaval that requires retroactive application.” 
 
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vehicle at the time of the search.  See Gant, 556 U.S. at 342.  At the time of the 
search, Detective Rodriguez knew there was an active arrest warrant for Lebron for 
the murder and armed robbery of Oliver.  He also knew that Lebron and his 
accomplices were driving a stolen Chevy Blazer.  It was reasonable for Detective 
Rodriguez to believe the stolen vehicle contained relevant evidence relating to 
those crimes and it was lawful under Belton for him to search the car incident to 
placing Lebron and Kendall into custody.  This Court has “consistently held that 
trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law,” 
Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1053 (Fla. 2000), and Lebron cannot now rely 
upon the later holding in Gant to contend that his counsel performed ineffectively 
by failing to file a meritless motion to suppress.  See Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 
730, 740 (Fla. 2011) (holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing 
to file a meritless motion). 
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that Detective Rodriguez’s search 
of the vehicle was improper under the search incident to arrest warrant exception, 
the evidence discovered in the stolen car would still have been admissible because 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not automatically render any and all 
evidence inadmissible.  See Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754, 759 (Fla. 2003).  A 
court may admit evidence obtained outside the scope of a warrant exception if the 
State can show that: (1) an independent source existed for the discovery of the 
 
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evidence; (2) the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in the course of 
a legitimate investigation; or (3) sufficient attenuation existed between the 
challenged evidence and the illegal conduct.  Here, the second exception applies.  
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984).  Lebron was apprehended in a 
stolen Chevy Blazer.  That vehicle, as direct evidence of a car theft and not 
lawfully in the possession of its owner, would have been held by law enforcement 
and subject to an inventory search.  See Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 294 (Fla. 
1997).  That search would have independently led the police to the challenged 
evidence notwithstanding Lebron’s allegation of police misconduct.  See Moody, 
842 So. 2d at 759.  Accordingly, this evidence was properly admitted under either 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement or the inevitable 
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.  As a result, Lebron has failed to 
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland because he has failed to provide a basis 
upon which the motion would have successfully led to the exclusion of evidence in 
question.  See Zakrzewski, 866 So. 2d at 694.  We deny relief on this claim. 
Failure to Present Robert and Charlotte Spears as Witnesses During Trial 
 
Lebron next alleges that Robert and Charlotte Spears reported that they saw 
two white males drive the victim’s truck eastbound on Interstate 4 toward Daytona 
Beach between the time of the homicide and the discovery of the victim.  Lebron 
claims this testimony was critical because it would have supported his recorded 
 
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statement to police that he never saw the victim’s truck and contradicted testimony 
presented by the State regarding the location of the truck during that time.  This 
claim fails for several reasons.   
First, it is insufficiently pled.  Lebron does not allege specific facts in 
support of his claim that counsel provided deficient performance that prejudiced 
his guilt phase trial.  See Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007) (holding 
that a motion claiming ineffective assistance must include facts in support of both 
deficient performance of counsel and prejudice to the defendant, and instructing 
that the failure to sufficiently allege both prongs will result in summary denial of 
the claim); see also Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 513-14 (Fla. 2008).  Rather, 
Lebron’s strongest allegation of ineffectiveness with regard to this claim is that 
“Norgard’s recollection regarding several important aspects of the trial preparation 
[was] suspect at best.”  Even though Lebron felt this evidence was “critical,” his 
mere feelings about the strength of a claim do not constitute sufficient facts to 
establish both deficient performance and prejudice.  
 
Further, Lebron’s claim is also facially insufficient because he has failed to 
demonstrate that either Robert or Charlotte Spears would have been willing or able 
to testify during Lebron’s 1998 guilt phase trial.  See Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 
994, 1003 (Fla. 2006) (“If a witness would not have been available to testify at 
trial, then the defendant will not be able to establish deficient performance or 
 
- 21 - 
prejudice from counsel’s failure to call, interview, or investigate that witness.”) 
(quoting Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004)).  In Nelson, this Court 
held that to present a facially sufficient claim alleging the ineffectiveness of 
counsel for failing to present certain witnesses, a postconviction motion must 
include an assertion that those witnesses would in fact have been available to 
testify at trial.  875 So. 2d at 584.  Here, not only does Lebron’s postconviction 
motion fail to specifically allege that either Robert or Charlotte Spears would have 
been available to testify, but Lebron’s postconviction counsel stated during the 
evidentiary hearing that he was unsuccessful in his attempts to locate the Spears.  
Thus, Lebron has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that the Spears 
would have been able to testify during Lebron’s 1998 trial.  Further, the alleged 
evidence was never presented.  
Second, Lebron has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently.  During the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he did not 
specifically remember the Spears; however, he did recall that based on testimony 
and evidence presented during trial, the defense made a strategic decision not to 
present a case because it wanted to retain the ability to have the last word with the 
jury before deliberations.10
                                         
 
10.  At the time of Lebron’s 1998 guilt phase trial, Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.250 provided that “a defendant offering no testimony in his or her own 
behalf, except the defendant’s own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument 
  This testimony suggests a carefully considered and 
 
- 22 - 
planned defense and provides a proper evidentiary basis for the trial court’s denial 
of relief on this claim.  See Occhicone II, 768 So. 2d at 1048 (holding that defense 
counsel’s decision not to present evidence or witnesses because counsel believed 
that it was more important to have the first and last closing arguments did not 
constitute deficient performance).  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.  
Failure to Properly Conduct Jury Selection 
 
Lebron next alleges that counsel Slovis was not qualified to conduct jury 
selection in a death penalty case, and contends that Slovis performed deficiently in 
three ways.  First, Lebron alleges that Slovis failed to properly object to the 
striking of Juror Simmons—one of only two African-Americans in the venire—
after the trial court struck the juror for cause due to financial hardship. 
                                                                                                                                   
before the jury.”  In re Amend. to the Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro.-Final Arguments, 
957 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 2007).  In 2006, the Legislature created a new 
statutory provision, section 918.19, Florida Statutes, governing closing statements 
in criminal trials.  The statute provides that the prosecution shall present the first 
closing, the defendant may respond, and the prosecution may then reply in rebuttal.  
Id. at 1166.  In response to the change in the law, this Court amended rule 3.250 to 
eliminate the portion of the rule providing that the defense has the right to 
conclude closing statements if the defendant offered no evidence during trial other 
than his or her own testimony.  Id.  We also adopted Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.381 which states that in all criminal prosecutions, “the prosecuting 
attorney shall be entitled to an initial closing argument and a rebuttal closing 
argument before the jury or the court sitting without a jury.”  See F. R. Crim. P. 
3.381; see also  Id. at 1166-67.  Thus, although it is not currently the law, at the 
time of Lebron’s trial, the rules of criminal procedure provided a strategic 
advantage to defense counsel for not presenting witness testimony.     
 
- 23 - 
 
During jury selection, Juror Simmons testified that his commute to the 
courthouse involved an hour-and-a-half to two-hour bus ride on two different 
buses, and that he could not afford to continue to pay for bus trips to the 
courthouse.  The trial court indicated that it would excuse Juror Simmons for 
financial hardship if there were no objections.  Lebron’s counsel objected and 
offered to have his driver provide the juror with transportation to the courthouse.  
Slovis further requested that the court require the State to provide bus fare for the 
prospective juror.  Without addressing Slovis’ request, the court excused the juror 
for cause due to financial hardship.  Lebron acknowledges that counsel objected to 
Juror Simmons’ dismissal; however, he contends that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to question Juror Simmons regarding the extent of his financial hardship.  
The postconviction court denied this claim noting, 
Lebron cites no authority for his argument that counsel should have 
pursued alternate transportation to enable Mr. Simmons to attend jury 
duty, and this Court finds none.  It is highly unlikely that funds would 
have been available in the trial court’s budget to provide bus fare for 
one particular juror or that the Sheriff would have been willing to 
transport him.  Whether any of the suggested accommodations would 
have been possible or would have alleviated Mr. Simmons’ financial 
hardship, the fact remains that counsel did object when this potential 
juror was stricken from the panel.  Therefore, the issue was properly 
preserved for appeal, and he cannot establish prejudice. 
 
 
Essentially, Lebron alleges that his counsel performed deficiently by failing 
to “ensure” that one of only two prospective African-American jurors was 
provided with a sufficient opportunity to serve on the jury.  This claim fails under 
 
- 24 - 
both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland.  When the court excused 
Juror Simmons for cause, trial counsel Slovis objected in a timely and proper 
manner.  By objecting, Slovis alerted the trial court that it may have erred in 
excusing Juror Simmons, and provided the court with a possible solution as well as 
an opportunity to correct the error immediately.  Strickland does not require 
counsel to ask every question the client thinks is appropriate, and counsel cannot 
be deemed deficient simply because he or she did not preserve the client’s desired 
jury makeup or because he or she failed to object as fervently as the client wishes.  
We conclude that Slovis performed appropriately during jury selection, and that his 
representation of Lebron did not fall below the objective standards of 
reasonableness delineated in Strickland.   
 
Second, Lebron alleges counsel failed to ensure that prospective jurors 
during the 1998 penalty phase were properly informed as to the law governing the 
imposition of the death penalty.  The postconviction court denied this claim, noting 
that Lebron did not challenge the information given to prospective jurors prior to 
the 2005 penalty phase.  As the postconviction court correctly noted, the only 
relevant penalty phase occurred in 2005, and any claim associated with the 1998 
penalty phase—the first of four penalty phases—is irrelevant.  See Lebron I, 799 
So. 2d at 1021.   
 
- 25 - 
 
   Third, Lebron alleges counsel performed ineffectively when he failed to 
move to strike the jury panel or properly rehabilitate the panel after Juror Rombach 
stated that it would be difficult for him to believe that a law enforcement officer 
would testify untruthfully.  Lebron acknowledges that counsel moved to strike this 
prospective juror for cause, but contends that counsel performed ineffectively 
when he did not present the trial court with case law demonstrating that it was 
erroneous not to excuse Juror Rombach for cause.   
When Juror Rombach’s panel entered the courtroom, the parties had already 
selected twelve jurors and one alternate.  Those jurors were dismissed from the 
courtroom and a new panel, which included Juror Rombach, was seated and 
questioned for the purpose of selecting a second alternate juror.  During the course 
of questioning Juror Rombach’s panel, both the State and the defense backstruck 
one previously approved juror from the first panel, leaving three open spots (one 
juror and two alternates) to fill.  While other prospective jurors remained in the 
courtroom, Juror Rombach, a former police officer, strongly indicated during voir 
dire that he would likely find the testimony of a police officer to be more credible 
than a normal witness because of the procedural checks—i.e., police reports, 
supervisor checks, and grand jury proceedings—he believed increased the 
credibility of officer testimony during trial.  Lebron’s counsel objected to Juror 
Rombach’s testimony and moved to strike him for cause. 
 
- 26 - 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It is not proper to let a prospective juror who 
was a police officer to tell this jury panel and pollute it with things 
like, well, generally I know they go through their reports and check 
their reports and supervisors have taken care of it, they’re going to tell 
the truth when they come here; that’s not for a jury to hear, and that is 
improper and prejudicial questioning. 
 
The only question that’s of importance is, is he going to take 
what a police officer says more than he would from a regular citizen, 
is he predisposed to believe a police officer. 
 
THE COURT: The only problem with cause is the case law in the 
State of Florida indicates there is no problem with a juror giv[ing] a 
police officer’s testimony great weight.   
 
The court denied the challenge for cause, and defense counsel struck Juror 
Rombach peremptorily.  We conclude that defense counsel Slovis acted properly 
and not deficiently when he articulated a clear objection to the State’s questioning 
of Juror Rombach, by challenging Juror Rombach for cause and, when that 
challenge was denied, struck him peremptorily.   
 
Moreover, we have previously held that to demonstrate prejudice in the 
denial of challenges for cause in a postconviction proceeding, the defendant must 
show that one of the jurors on the panel was actually biased.  See Carratelli v. 
State, 961 So. 2d 312, 323 (Fla. 2007).  Under the actual bias standard, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial, and the 
evidence of bias must be plain on the face of the record.  Id.  Of the prospective 
jurors present in the courtroom at the time Juror Rombach was questioned and 
struck, only three—Denise Annas (juror), Melba Anderson (alternate), and 
 
- 27 - 
Rebecca Riehm (alternate)—sat on the jury.  Only Juror Annas was a member of 
the panel that reached a verdict.  Therefore, the only juror Lebron could assert was 
prejudicially impacted by Juror Rombach’s comments was Juror Annas.  However, 
Lebron does not allege that Juror Annas, or any other juror who served on the 
panel, was actually biased.  As a result, we conclude that Lebron has not satisfied 
the requisite prejudice standard because he has failed to demonstrate that a member 
of the jury who adjudicated Lebron’s guilt was actually biased.   
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
this claim, as all three subclaims lack merit.  
Failure to Move for a Mistrial—Prosecutor’s Opening Statement 
 
Lebron contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 
mistrial when the State, during its opening statement, referred to physical and 
testimonial evidence that was not ultimately introduced during trial.  He contends 
that the prosecutor’s opening statement, which referenced witnesses Jesenia Ortiz, 
Carmen Berrios, and Martin Bullard, served as an improper conduit for the State to 
present evidence that Lebron attempted to illegally manufacture an alibi by bribing 
and threatening witnesses without affording Lebron with an opportunity to rebut 
those allegations.  Lebron also alleges that the State’s opening statement with 
 
- 28 - 
respect to these witnesses resulted in the erroneous admission of Williams11
In Florida, a prosecutor’s comments will merit a mistrial only when they 
deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the 
conviction, are so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or are 
so inflammatory they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict 
than it would have otherwise rendered.  Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 
1994); see also Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 464-65 (Fla. 2004) (“An order 
granting mistrial is required only when the error upon which it rests is so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, making a mistrial necessary to ensure that 
the defendant receives a fair trial.”).  Here, Ortiz, Berrios, and Bullard—the three 
witnesses mentioned in the 1998 opening statements—testified during the 1997 
trial that resulted in a mistrial.  There is no evidence in the record demonstrating 
that the State referenced these witnesses in bad faith or with the intent to inflame 
the jury.  See Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 363 (Fla. 2005).  Rather, it appears 
that based on the 1997 trial, the State mentioned these witnesses during opening 
statements with the intent to present them during the 1998 retrial.  Thus, the 
prosecutor’s comments were consistent with the purpose of opening statements, 
and were not improper even though the State ultimately did not present these 
 rule 
evidence.   
                                         
 
11.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).   
 
- 29 - 
witnesses during trial.  See Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990) 
(Occhicone I) (noting that “Opening remarks are not evidence, and the purpose of 
opening argument is to outline what an attorney expects to be established by the 
evidence.” (emphasis supplied)).  Further, although the State did not present these 
specific witnesses to establish that Lebron attempted to manufacture an alibi, the 
State presented similar testimony from other witnesses reflecting that Lebron had 
asked them to lie with regard to where he was located on the day of the murder.  
Thus, Lebron had the opportunity to rebut the allegation that he was attempting to 
improperly influence witnesses to provide him with an alibi, although not through 
the specific witnesses mentioned by the State during its opening statement.     
Since it is clear that the prosecutor’s fleeting remarks during opening 
statements did not warrant a mistrial, we conclude that Lebron has failed to 
establish prejudice, as a reasonable probability does not exist sufficient to 
undermine confidence in his guilt that, but for the allegedly improper prosecutorial 
remarks made during opening statements, the result of the trial would have been 
different.  We deny relief on this claim.    
Failure to Properly Impeach State Witnesses 
 
Lebron contends that trial counsel performed ineffectively when he failed to 
adequately attack the credibility of several State witnesses.  He contends that had 
counsel possessed the transcripts, depositions, and records of prior convictions of 
 
- 30 - 
State witnesses during cross-examination, counsel could have attacked the 
credibility of these witnesses or pointed out inconsistencies between the witnesses’ 
trial testimony and their previous statements and testimony.   
 
Lebron’s allegations do not warrant relief under Strickland because Lebron 
does not articulate with specificity the manner in which counsel’s alleged failure to 
properly impeach several State witnesses demonstrates either deficiency or 
prejudice.  See Spera, 971 So. 2d at 758.  Although Lebron alleges that counsel 
“could have impeached the state’s witnesses with transcripts,” he does not 
sufficiently allege what information counsel could have used to impeach these 
witnesses or otherwise refuted their testimony.  He also fails to articulate how 
counsel’s failure to impeach State witnesses prejudicially impacted his trial to such 
an extent that confidence in his guilt has been undermined.  As a result, this claim 
was insufficiently pled and was properly summarily denied by the postconviction 
court.  See Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 483 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the 
lower court did not err in issuing a summary denial of claims for which the 
defendant presented only bare, conclusory allegations).   
Failure to Move for a Mistrial—Williams Rule Evidence 
 
During Lebron’s 1998 guilt phase trial, the prosecutor asked Mark Tocci if 
Lebron had ever bragged to him about crimes Lebron had committed in the past.  
Defense counsel immediately objected to the question as leading.  That objection 
 
- 31 - 
was overruled by the trial court, and Tocci responded that Lebron only bragged to 
him about the theft of a car, for which he went to jail in Orange County.  Defense 
counsel immediately and successfully moved to strike this comment.  The 
prosecutor then asked a related question as to whether Tocci believed Lebron when 
Lebron would tell him about crimes that Lebron had purportedly committed.  Tocci 
responded “no,” and counsel did not object or move for a mistrial at that time.   
Lebron contends that counsel’s failure to object or move for a mistrial in 
response to this second statement constitutes deficient performance.  He supports 
this claim by noting that later in the trial proceedings, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial on this specific portion of Tocci’s testimony, but the trial court denied that 
request because defense counsel did not object to either the prosecutor’s second 
question or Tocci’s answer.  Lebron further contends that the erroneous admission 
of collateral crimes evidence is presumptively prejudicial because the admission of 
that testimony creates a danger that the jury may view the defendant’s bad 
character or propensity to commit crimes as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.   
 
Without addressing deficiency, we conclude that this claim fails the 
prejudice prong of Strickland.  Tocci’s one-word negative response to the 
prosecutor’s second question conveyed that Tocci did not believe Lebron when 
Lebron would talk about criminal misconduct.  This testimony does not constitute 
improper Williams rule evidence, and arguably benefitted Lebron’s defense by 
 
- 32 - 
showing that Lebron was known among his friends to be a man of words, but not 
action.  Further, considering the substantial evidence supporting Lebron’s guilt, see 
Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 1001-03, we conclude that but for counsel’s failure to 
object to the prosecutor’s second question and Tocci’s one-word response, a 
reasonable probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in Lebron’s guilt has 
not been presented nor would the outcome of Lebron’s guilt phase trial have been 
different.  Accordingly, we conclude that Tocci’s one-word response to the 
prosecutor’s second question was not prejudicial and is distinguishable from other 
cases that addressed the prejudicial impact of the erroneous introduction of 
Williams rule evidence.  See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 451 So. 2d 458, 460-61 (Fla. 
1984); Schofield v. State, 67 So. 3d 1066, 1071-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Jackson v. 
State, 627 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).  We affirm the denial of this claim.          
Failure to Present Roswell Summers as a Witness During the 1998 Trial 
 
Lebron contends that Danny Summers’ testimony during the 1998 trial was 
critical to the prosecution’s case, and that trial counsel performed deficiently when 
he failed to: (1) present Roswell Summers, Danny’s father, as a witness to impeach 
the credibility and testimony of Danny; (2) file a motion to establish the 
unavailability of Roswell during the 1998 retrial and introduce his former 
testimony from Lebron’s first guilt phase trial; and (3) understand the procedures 
 
- 33 - 
necessary to properly impeach a State witness through the testimony of other 
witnesses.  This claim fails for two reasons.   
First, Lebron has failed to establish either deficiency or prejudice because he 
has failed to present any evidence that demonstrates Roswell was either willing or 
able to testify during Lebron’s 1998 guilt phase trial.  See Melton, 949 So. 2d at 
1003; Nelson, 875 So. 2d at 583.  Second, the claim fails because counsel’s 
decision not to present Roswell was based on a sound trial strategy.  During the 
original 1997 trial, Danny was presented by the State to describe his relationship 
with Lebron and the events on the day of the murder.  The State next presented 
Roswell, who testified that Danny had initially lied to him about the location where 
he (Danny) had witnessed a murder.  Roswell testified that Danny first told him 
that he had witnessed a murder at Church Street Station.  Roswell then testified 
that Danny changed his story and told Roswell that he had actually witnessed a 
murder at a house.   
 
During the 1998 retrial, Danny testified on direct examination that he did not 
immediately tell his parents about witnessing a murder.  On cross-examination, 
trial counsel Slovis asked Danny whether he had initially told Roswell that 
something happened at Church Street Station.  Danny responded, “I might have, 
but I don’t remember.”  During the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that 
Danny never concealed that he was deceptive and untruthful when he first told his 
 
- 34 - 
parents about the facts of the murder and counsel concluded that it would not have 
been a sound trial strategy to present Roswell as the only defense witness solely to 
rebut Danny’s testimony.  According to counsel, the defense did not want to 
sacrifice the procedural advantage of presenting the last closing statements simply 
to address a point that was essentially admitted to by Danny.  Counsel’s 
evidentiary hearing testimony suggests a carefully considered defense and 
provided a proper evidentiary basis for the postconviction court to deny relief.  
Consequently, we conclude that relief is not warranted on this claim. 
Failure to Object to the Hearsay Testimony of Detective Rodriguez  
 
During the 1998 trial, the State asked Detective Rodriguez whether Stacie 
Kirk had provided him with directions to find a shotgun that was believed to 
belong to Lebron.  Detective Rodriguez answered in the affirmative and defense 
counsel immediately objected to this line of questioning.  The objection was 
overruled by the trial court.  Next, Detective Rodriguez began to describe Kirk’s 
directions but defense counsel again objected to his testimony alleging it was 
hearsay.  Without a ruling on the objection, the prosecutor rephrased his question 
and the detective testified that he followed Kirk’s instructions but did not locate the 
shotgun.  Shortly thereafter, during redirect examination, the State asked the 
detective whether it was possible the shotgun was still in New York, to which he 
responded, “as far as I’m concerned, it probably is.”  Defense counsel did not 
 
- 35 - 
object at that time to the State’s question.  Lebron contends counsel performed 
ineffectively when he failed to object to this question.   
 
We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.  Lebron’s counsel 
did not perform deficiently, as he objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning 
with respect to the location of the gun.  Furthermore, because the trial court 
overruled counsel’s general objection to the entire line of questioning, there is no 
reasonable probability that, had counsel objected to the more specific follow-up 
question asked by the prosecutor, that the trial court would have sustained the 
objection.  Accordingly, this claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland.     
Lebron’s Penalty Phase Claims 
 
Lebron also challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his eight penalty 
phase claims.  Although Strickland serves as a baseline to assess both guilt and 
penalty phase ineffectiveness claims, this Court has developed a more detailed test 
for penalty phase challenges.  One of our principal concerns in deciding whether 
counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment during a penalty phase 
proceeding is whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case.  See 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003).  We also focus on whether the 
investigation supporting counsel’s decision to not introduce certain mitigating 
evidence was itself reasonable.  Id. at 523.  In assessing whether counsel’s 
investigation was reasonable under prevailing professional norms, we conduct an 
 
- 36 - 
objective, context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.  Id.  Furthermore,  
In the context of penalty phase errors of counsel, the prejudice 
prong of Strickland “is shown where, absent the errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances would have been different or the deficiencies 
substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.” 
Hoskins[v. State, 75 So. 3d 250, 254 (Fla. 2011)] (quoting Gaskin v. 
State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 n.14 (Fla. 1999), receded from in part on 
other grounds by Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 582-83 (Fla. 2004)). 
[A defendant] “must show that but for his counsel’s deficiency, 
there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different 
sentence.  To assess that probability, we consider ‘the totality of the 
available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the 
evidence adduced in the [evidentiary hearing]’—and ‘reweig[h] it 
against the evidence in aggravation.’ ”  Porter [v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 
30, 41 (2009)] (quoting Williams [v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 
(2000))].  See also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.  However, the Supreme 
Court reiterated in Porter that “[w]e do not require a defendant to 
show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish ‘a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.’ ”  
Porter, [550 U.S. at 44] (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 
 
Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 503 (Fla. 2012) (parallel citations omitted). 
Failure to Conduct a Reasonable Investigation into  
Lebron’s Background, Adverse Development, and Mental Health 
 
 
Lebron contends that penalty phase counsel failed to adequately investigate 
and present substantial statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence.  According 
to Lebron, had counsel presented evidence with regard to his background, his 
adverse development, and his mental and psychological health, the mitigating 
circumstances would have outweighed the aggravating circumstances, and, given 
 
- 37 - 
the seven-to-five jury recommendation, the jury would have recommended a life 
sentence for the murder.  To support these claims, Lebron presented Dr. 
Cunningham, a clinical forensic psychologist, and Dr. Eisenstein, a 
neuropsychologist and expert in the fields of clinical psychology, forensic 
psychology, and neuropsychology.   
During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Cunningham testified that he reviewed 
Lebron’s background, education, and mental health records and interviewed 
Lebron and several of his friends and family members.  Based on his evaluation, 
Dr. Cunningham identified thirty-two major adverse developmental factors in five 
different categories that he believed impacted Lebron during his childhood and 
teen years and could have been presented during the 2005 penalty phase.  Dr. 
Cunningham also opined that Lebron’s adverse developmental factors created 
substantial risk factors for delinquency and criminal violence.  Dr. Eisenstein 
testified that Lebron suffers from a frontal lobe impairment that diminishes his 
ability to make rational life decisions, think logically, and show flexibility and 
control in decision making.  Dr. Eisenstein also diagnosed Lebron with bipolar 
disorder, attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD), borderline personality 
disorder, reactive attachment disorder, paranoid personality disorder, and 
intermittent explosive disorder (IED).  He further concluded that Lebron suffers 
from functional brain impairment and cognitive brain dysfunction, and believed 
 
- 38 - 
that Lebron was suffering from an extreme mental and emotional disturbance at the 
time of the crimes.   
To rebut the testimony of Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Eisenstein, the State 
presented Dr. Danziger, a psychiatrist and expert in forensic psychiatry, 
addictionology, and psychiatry.  Dr. Danziger testified that Lebron suffers from 
antisocial personality disorder, polysubstance dependence, which was in remission, 
and multiple learning disabilities.  However, Dr. Danziger did not believe that 
Lebron suffers from paranoid personality disorder because Lebron did not exhibit a 
sense of suspiciousness or believe that others were plotting against him.  Dr. 
Danziger also could not identify anything from Lebron’s background and records 
that would support a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.  He testified that Lebron denied 
manic episodes, and that nothing in the sixteen years of prison records indicated 
that Lebron was actively suffering from mania, hypomania, or manic episodes.12
                                         
 
12.  According to Dr. Danziger, a manic episode is characterized by a mood 
that is persistently elated or euphoric and is a necessary component to diagnose 
bipolar disorder.  Hypomania involves at least four days of such symptoms, and 
mania involves seven days of symptoms.   
  
Dr. Danziger also excluded reactive attachment disorder and IED.  He explained 
that the clinical diagnosis of IED requires several discrete episodes that 
demonstrate an inability to resist aggressive impulses which are out of proportion 
to psychosocial stresses.  Here, Dr. Danziger concluded that the facts of the murder 
 
- 39 - 
and robbery demonstrate that Lebron’s conduct during the crimes was calculated, 
planned, and organized rather than sudden and disproportionately aggressive.  He 
also concluded that the evidence in support of the diagnosis of ADHD was 
equivocal, and that available evidence did not indicate Lebron was suffering from 
an extreme emotional or mental disturbance at the time of the murder.  Finally, Dr. 
Danziger testified that he did not believe there was a direct correlation between 
Lebron’s childhood and his ability to understand his actions on the day of the 
murder.  
 
Penalty phase counsel testified with regard to his mitigation strategy for 
Lebron’s fourth penalty phase.  Counsel explained that he began his penalty phase 
investigation in the late 1990s and continued to refine his mitigation strategy with 
each subsequent penalty phase.  During the investigation, he acquired Lebron’s 
school records and personally visited the Pleasantville Cottage School to obtain 
detailed information about Lebron.  Counsel testified that he spoke with nearly 
every person he thought might possess relevant mitigation information and 
followed an extensive mitigation checklist to ensure that his investigation was 
thorough.  He directed his investigator to interview both Lebron and Lebron’s 
mother, using the checklist as a guide to identify possible mitigation.  Lebron did 
not provide counsel with the names of any friends or family members who could 
 
- 40 - 
have helped with the investigation, and, despite his independent investigative 
efforts, counsel was unable to locate Lebron’s former stepfather, Tony Ortiz.  
 
Counsel testified that he had originally retained Dr. Henry Dee to conduct a 
clinical interview as well as psychological and neuropsychological testing of 
Lebron.  Dr. Dee concluded that Lebron exhibited signs of frontal lobe impairment.  
However, Dr. Dee also advised counsel that Lebron was “the coldest antisocial 
personality disorder [he had] ever seen.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Dr. Dee was 
astounded by Lebron’s ability to emotionally react to situations while 
simultaneously maintaining the ability to make rational, calculated choices and 
address each situation in a way he felt appropriate.  Lebron’s counsel testified that 
he retained Dr. Dee in nearly every capital case in which he had participated, and 
that Dr. Dee’s evaluation of Lebron “floored” him because he “never heard [Dr. 
Dee] describe anybody that way.” 
Based on Dr. Dee’s evaluation of Lebron, counsel made a strategic decision 
not to present mental health mitigation because he did not want to expose Lebron 
to a compelled mental health examination.13
                                         
 
13.  In Dillbeck v. State, 643 So. 2d 1027, 1031 (Fla. 1994), we held that 
when a defense expert who has interviewed the defendant will be presented to 
testify during a capital penalty phase proceeding as to the presence of mental 
health mitigation, the State may hire its own mental health expert to examine the 
defendant, and that expert will be allowed to testify at trial to rebut the defense 
expert’s testimony.  Our holding has since been incorporated into Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.202.       
  Instead of presenting Dr. Dee, Dr. 
 
- 41 - 
McClane was hired to only review the discovery and records, which allowed 
counsel to present mental health testimony about Lebron through his medical 
records without having to submit Lebron to a compelled mental health evaluation 
by a State expert.   
Counsel did not present evidence of an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance because Lebron continued to maintain that he was innocent and not 
present at the crime scene when the murder occurred.  As a result, Dr. Dee could 
not develop an opinion of Lebron’s mental state at the time of the crime, or 
whether Lebron’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired.  Even if Lebron had discussed his mental state at the time 
of the crime, Dr. Dee concluded that such evidence would have been outweighed 
by evidence demonstrating Lebron’s unique ability to react to emotionally charged 
situations in a controlled, rational, and calculated manner.  In light of his 
investigation into Lebron’s background and mental health, counsel testified that the 
strategy during the 2005 penalty phase trial was to present only Lebron’s mother to 
provide background information about Lebron’s life, his relationship with her, his 
struggles in school, and his troubled childhood, and then to introduce mental health 
mitigation outside the presence of the jury through psychological records during 
the Spencer hearing.   
 
 
- 42 - 
Analysis  
We have previously affirmed a trial court’s finding that counsel’s 
performance was not deficient where counsel conducted a reasonable investigation 
into mental health mitigation prior to trial and then made a strategic decision not to 
present that information.  See Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 453-54 (Fla. 2009); 
Jones v. State, 732 So. 2d 313, 317 (Fla. 1999); Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 
216, 223 (Fla. 1998).  For example, in Floyd, the mental health expert concluded 
that the supposedly mitigating evidence would cause more harm than good in light 
of Floyd’s antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, the fact that he killed his 
brother at age fourteen, and the inconsistencies between the statements of Floyd’s 
parents.  Id. at 454.  We affirmed the postconviction court’s finding that counsel 
properly relied upon the mental health expert and made a strategic decision not to 
present mental health mitigation during the penalty phase.  Id.   
 
Here, as in Floyd, we conclude that Lebron’s counsel did not perform 
deficiently.  His lawyer testified that he has tried over seventy murder cases and 
conduced approximately twenty-five penalty phase trials.  He began his mitigation 
investigation in this case during the late 1990s, and with each penalty phase he 
continued to reconsider the evidence and refine his strategy.  He reviewed family, 
school, and mental health records.  He personally interviewed Lebron’s mother and 
several individuals from the Pleasantville Cottage School to gain perspective on 
 
- 43 - 
Lebron’s life and childhood.  He retained Dr. Dee, a well-known and well-
respected mental health expert, to evaluate Lebron.  When Dr. Dee did not provide 
favorable mitigation information, counsel retained a second expert, Dr. McClane, 
to offer testimony about Lebron through his medical records so that Lebron would 
not be subjected to a compelled mental health evaluation.   
Further, when Dr. Dee advised counsel that Lebron suffered from the most 
aggravated antisocial personality disorder he (Dr. Dee) had ever seen, counsel 
strategically decided not to present mental health mitigation for fear that the 
introduction of mental health mitigation would subject Lebron to a compulsory 
mental health evaluation by a State expert and would open the door to unfavorable 
testimony regarding the extent of Lebron’s antisocial personality disorder.  
Counsel decided the best strategy was to mitigate the evidence offered, without 
presenting witnesses who he believed to be non-credible.  See Lebron III, 982 So. 
2d at 657.  Counsel presented Lebron’s mother, who testified about Lebron’s 
family history and described his troubled childhood.  These decisions were both 
reasonable and tactical and were reached after counsel evaluated the available 
evidence.  Counsel ultimately decided—after having the unique opportunity to 
reconsider his penalty phase strategy three times—that Lebron’s best chance of 
receiving a life sentence was if mental health mitigation was not presented to the 
jury.  See Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 223 (“Strategic decisions do not constitute 
 
- 44 - 
ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have been considered and 
rejected.” (quoting State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 1987))).  Simply 
because Lebron has now secured favorable mental health testimony does not 
render counsel’s initial decision not to present mental health mitigation 
unreasonable.  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 454 (“Trial counsel’s investigation into mental-
health mitigation ‘is not rendered incompetent merely because the defendant has 
now secured the testimony of a more favorable mental health expert.’ ” (quoting 
Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000))).  Accordingly, we conclude 
counsel conducted a reasonable mitigation investigation into Lebron’s background, 
mental health, and adverse development, and that counsel’s decision not to present 
this mitigation was reasonable, strategic, and did not constitute deficient 
performance. 
Lebron’s claim also fails the prejudice prong of Strickland because he 
cannot establish that had the evidence offered during the evidentiary hearing been 
presented during his 2005 penalty phase trial, there is a reasonable probability he 
would have received a different sentence.  See Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 503.  
Although Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Eisenstein could have presented relevant 
mitigating information about Lebron’s background, mental health, and adverse 
development during the 2005 penalty phase proceeding, by introducing this 
testimony counsel would have opened the door to the introduction of damaging 
 
- 45 - 
testimony concerning the extent of Lebron’s antisocial personality disorder.  For 
example, a State expert could have testified that, as Dr. Dee conveyed to counsel, 
Lebron exhibited a remarkable antisocial ability to respond to emotionally charged 
situations in a calculating and rational way.  A State expert also could have 
testified, as Dr. Danziger did, that Lebron exhibited several antisocial personality 
traits including: (1) a repeated pattern of criminal behavior; (2) deceitfulness, 
lying, and conning behavior; (3) irritability, aggressiveness, and repeated acts of 
violence; and (4) consistent irresponsibility between the ages of 18 and 21.  
Finally, a State expert could have testified, as Dr. Danziger did, that the facts of the 
robbery and murder suggested that Lebron planned and executed this crime 
through the use of organization and forethought.   
Thus, had counsel introduced expert testimony about Lebron’s mental 
health, he would have triggered the admission of highly unfavorable evidence in 
rebuttal that would have undercut the mitigation value of the testimony already 
presented during the penalty phase, particularly that Lebron was a product of a 
dysfunctional home and suffered a troubled childhood.  See Reed v. State, 875 So. 
2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004) (“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the 
failure to present mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged 
sword.”).  Moreover, the evidence presented by Dr. Cunningham about Lebron’s 
family background and his adverse development was largely cumulative to the 
 
- 46 - 
testimony and evidence presented during Lebron’s 2005 penalty proceedings and 
addressed by this Court on appeal.  See Lebron III, 982 So. 2d at 656, 661-64.    
Based on the established aggravation (prior violent felony and the murder 
was committed during the commission of a robbery), the relative lack of mitigation 
(zero statutory mitigating circumstances and seven nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances with none given more than “little weight”), the potential for 
admission of highly unfavorable mental health evidence in rebuttal, and the 
cumulative nature of some adverse development evidence, we conclude that trial 
counsel’s failure to present evidence introduced by Lebron during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing does not undermine our confidence in the 
outcome of Lebron’s 2005 penalty phase proceeding.  Consequently, Lebron has 
failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under either prong of Strickland 
and we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of these claims. 
Alleged Failure to Conduct a Reasonable Investigation into Lebron’s 
Substance Abuse During the Weeks and Months before the Murder 
 
Lebron contends that counsel performed deficiently when he failed to 
conduct a reasonably comprehensive investigation into his substance abuse during 
the weeks and months before the homicide.  Lebron claims that if counsel had 
conducted a reasonably competent investigation, he would have located additional 
witnesses who could have testified about Lebron’s substance abuse.   
 
- 47 - 
During the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he inquired into 
Lebron’s drug use, both around the time of the murder and throughout his life, but 
his investigation revealed that Lebron was not using drugs or alcohol (other than 
casual marijuana use) around the time of the murder.  Lebron told counsel and the 
investigators that he was “an experimenter as opposed to an abuser,” and that he 
would try drugs in social situations but would not continue to use them.  Lebron 
denied heavy drinking, and Lebron’s friends also indicated that Lebron was not a 
heavy drinker or drug user.  Counsel was never informed, by Lebron or anyone 
else, that Lebron was habitually drinking a quart of vodka and using cocaine as 
Lebron claimed during the postconviction proceedings.  Additional evidentiary 
hearing testimony from Dr. Danziger indicated that although Lebron self-reported 
the use of drugs and alcohol near the time of the murder, the facts of the crime did 
not suggest that Lebron was intoxicated or suffering from impaired mental 
faculties due to substance abuse.  Rather, the facts indicated that Lebron possessed 
a relatively stable mental state and was executing a deliberate scheme to rob and 
murder the victim.   
We conclude that counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into 
Lebron’s drug and alcohol use.  Counsel thoroughly investigated Lebron’s use of 
drugs and alcohol and discovered that Lebron’s drug use was casual and primarily 
limited to marijuana.  Neither Lebron nor his friends described him as a drug or 
 
- 48 - 
alcohol abuser.  Thus, despite Lebron’s current position that he was habitually 
abusing drugs and alcohol at the time of the crime, we conclude that counsel’s 
investigation into Lebron’s drug and alcohol use was reasonable and clearly within 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
Lebron also fails the prejudice prong of Strickland because he cannot 
demonstrate that the introduction of evidence concerning Lebron’s alleged drug 
and alcohol abuse would have created a reasonable probability that the jury would 
have recommended life.  The record reflects that even if Lebron was using drugs or 
alcohol or both during the months, weeks, days, or even hours before the crime, the 
drugs or alcohol had no identifiable impact on his ability to plan, organize, and 
execute the robbery and murder of the victim.  This claim does not undermine our 
confidence in Lebron’s sentence of death and we affirm the postconviction court’s 
denial of this claim, as it fails both elements required by Strickland.  
Failure to Present Evidence of Incomplete Brain Development  
 
According to Lebron, on May 25, 2004, the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) published a study proving that the region of the human brain that inhibits 
risky behavior and volitional control is not fully formed and developed until an 
individual is approximately 25 years old.  Lebron contends that counsel, knowing 
that Lebron was 21 years old at the time of the crime, performed deficiently when 
he failed to present this study during the 2005 penalty phase trial.  Lebron alleges 
 
- 49 - 
that counsel’s failure to present the study prejudiced him because the study proved 
that his emotional maturity was less than previously believed.   
When a capital defendant is not a minor, no per se rule exists which 
pinpoints a particular age as an automatic factor in mitigation.  Rather the 
existence and weight to be given to the age mitigating circumstance depends on the 
evidence presented during trial and the sentencing hearing.  See Shellito v. State, 
701 So. 2d 837, 843 (Fla. 1997); see also Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 528-29 
(Fla. 2003).  For example, evidence that demonstrates a defendant’s mental, 
emotional, or intellectual age was lower than his or her chronological age would 
support the finding of age as mitigation.  Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 1112, 1117 
(Fla. 1996).   
Without addressing deficiency, we conclude that Lebron has failed to 
establish prejudice because the introduction of the study would have had little or 
no effect on the jury’s view of Lebron’s age as a mitigating circumstance.  We 
noted the following on appeal from Lebron’s fourth penalty phase:     
During the 2005 penalty-phase proceeding, there was some evidence 
presented that Lebron functioned at a mental, emotional, and 
intellectual level below his chronological age, but conversely, there 
was also contradicting evidence that supported the opposite 
conclusion.  A neuropsychological evaluation described Lebron as (1) 
“an extremely engaging youngster”; (2) highly motivated to perform 
well and attentive; (3) showing no evidence of disordered or 
delusional thought; (4) having an IQ of ninety-seven, which is in the 
“average range of intellective ability”; (5) exhibiting “no evidence of 
a dyslexia or dysgraphia for numbers or spatial disorganization of 
 
- 50 - 
numbers”; and (6) although slightly behind academically, having 
everything (e.g., brain functioning) needed to succeed. . . .  Lebron 
lacks factors to link his chronological age to any immaturity. . . .  
Moreover, the record is virtually devoid of any evidence with regard 
to how Lebron functioned from the age of eighteen until Oliver’s 
murder . . . .  The manner in which Lebron functioned at the time of 
Oliver’s murder would have been the most crucial evidence with 
regard to this age mitigator.  The evidence is consistent with a finding 
that Lebron could function as a typical twenty-one-year-old. 
 
Lebron III, 982 So. 2d at 660 (emphasis supplied).  Thus, even if counsel 
introduced the NIH study during the penalty phase proceedings, the general 
findings in that study would have been significantly outweighed by the specific 
evidence introduced demonstrating that, at the time of the murder, Lebron was 
functioning as a typical 21-year-old adult.  This conclusion is further supported by 
the fact that the 2005 penalty phase jury unanimously found that Lebron’s age was 
not a mitigating factor.  See Lebron III, 982 So. 2d at 657.  We conclude that 
Lebron has failed to establish that a reasonable probability exists sufficient to 
undermine our confidence in his sentence of death that, but for the introduction of 
the NIH study, the outcome of the penalty proceedings would have been different.  
We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 51 - 
Failure to Present Positive Prisoner Evidence 
 
Lebron alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence 
that Lebron would have adjusted positively to a life in prison.14
                                         
 
14.  Lebron lists several factors he believes, if presented, would have 
demonstrated that he could positively adjust to life in prison, including: (1) his age 
(31); (2) a ten-year history of no serious violence; (3) he was often housed in the 
general population with other non-death inmates; and (4) he earned his high school 
equivalency diploma in prison.   
  During the 
evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he was aware of Lebron’s behavior in 
prison, but decided not to present positive prisoner evidence because Lebron had 
been investigated for trying to escape from prison.  He testified that Lebron was 
never disciplined for the attempted escape, but knew that the State was aware of 
the allegation.  Counsel was also aware of another incident during which Lebron 
allegedly attempted to have a female smuggle a cell phone into prison for him; 
however, he could not remember if this incident occurred before or after the 2005 
penalty phase.  Given the likelihood that the introduction of positive prisoner 
evidence would have opened the door to damaging evidence about Lebron’s 
attempts to escape and smuggle contraband into prison, the strategic decision to not 
present this evidence during the penalty phase was reasonable and clearly within 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690; see also Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004).  Accordingly, we 
affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.  
 
- 52 - 
Failure to Properly Contest the Prior Violent Felony Aggravator 
 
 
 
Finally, Lebron contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly appeal Lebron’s convictions for the robbery, assault, and kidnapping of 
Roger Nasser.  In the Nasser case, Lebron initially was convicted of attempted 
first-degree murder, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping, but these convictions 
were reversed on appeal because of juror misconduct.  See Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 
1004 n.3; see also Lebron v. State, 724 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).   Upon 
retrial, the jury returned special verdicts finding that Lebron had committed only 
assault with a firearm, robbery (without a firearm), and kidnapping with intent to 
commit a felony (without a firearm).  Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 1004 n.3.  Lebron 
contends that, despite receiving numerous extensions of time, counsel failed to file 
a timely appellate brief in the Nasser case, and Lebron’s challenges to his 
convictions for the lesser offenses were dismissed.  According to Lebron, if 
counsel had properly appealed the Nasser convictions, there was a reasonable 
probability that the convictions would have been reversed.  Lebron contends that 
counsel’s failure to properly appeal the Nasser case permitted the Nasser 
convictions to improperly serve as a basis for the prior violent felony aggravator, 
and that he suffered prejudice because this aggravating factor was the primary 
aggravator in support of his sentence of death.  The postconviction court denied 
 
- 53 - 
this claim, finding that Lebron failed to establish the prejudice prong of 
Strickland.15
 
This claim has a unique posture because it is premised on the allegation that 
counsel’s ineffectiveness in a non-capital collateral postconviction proceeding 
constitutes ineffective assistance in this capital postconviction proceeding.  During 
the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that after Lebron was convicted of assault 
with a firearm, robbery, and kidnapping, he filed the initial notice of appeal with 
the district court.  However, after fulfilling his obligations as trial counsel, the trial 
lawyer withdrew and the public defender was appointed to represent Lebron on 
appeal.  Months later, Lebron’s mother rehired previous counsel to represent 
    
                                         
 
15.  The State contends that, pursuant to State v. Kilgore, 976 So. 2d 1066, 
1069-70 (Fla. 2007), the postconviction court did not have jurisdiction to rule on 
this claim because registry counsel is expressly prohibited from representing a 
capital defendant in a postconviction proceeding other than the capital proceeding 
for which counsel was appointed.  In Kilgore, this Court held that CCRC, like 
registry counsel, is not authorized to represent a capital defendant in a non-capital 
collateral postconviction proceeding attacking the validity of a felony conviction 
that was used as a prior violent felony aggravator in support of a sentence of death.  
Id. at 1070.  The facts here are distinguishable from Kilgore.  Lebron’s current 
counsel, registry counsel Mills, did not represent Lebron in the Nasser appeal.  
Instead, Mills has presented a claim during Lebron’s capital postconviction appeal 
that alleges Norgard’s ineffectiveness during the Nasser case prejudicially 
impacted Lebron’s fourth penalty phase trial.  Thus, although Lebron’s current 
capital postconviction claim is procedurally unique, registry counsel Mills is not 
representing Lebron in a collateral non-capital postconviction proceeding, and 
therefore is not acting outside of his statutory authority.  As such, Kilgore is 
inapplicable to the facts at hand and the postconviction court had jurisdiction to 
rule on this claim. 
 
- 54 - 
Lebron on the Nasser appeal.  By the time counsel received the record from the 
public defender’s office, he only had approximately two weeks to complete the 
appellate brief.  Counsel filed a motion for extension of time, and then left for a 
pre-planned family vacation.  When he returned, he received a notice that the 
district court had dismissed the case.  Counsel later unsuccessfully filed two 
separate motions, requesting that the district court reconsider its decision to 
dismiss the appeal.  Counsel testified during cross-examination that he believed 
that even if he had timely filed the appeal, it would have been unsuccessful 
because there were no viable issues that would have justified the reversal of 
Lebron’s convictions.   
 
Lebron now alleges in his capital postconviction appeal that counsel’s 
failure to file a timely appellate brief in the Nasser case constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  This claim fails for two reasons.  First, Lebron’s capital 
postconviction appeal is a separate and independent action from the Nasser appeal.  
Simply because Lebron was represented by the same counsel during the Nasser 
appeal and his 2005 penalty phase does not mean that he can circumvent 
procedural rules to raise claims here that should have been raised in a habeas 
petition during the Nasser collateral postconviction proceeding.  As a result, 
Lebron’s claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness during a non-capital collateral 
proceeding is procedurally barred and improperly raised in this capital appeal.  
 
- 55 - 
 
Second, Lebron’s claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland.  Even if (1) 
counsel had timely filed an appeal in the Nasser case; and (2) the appeal was 
somehow successful, Lebron’s current claim would still fail because Lebron was 
adjudicated guilty of two other violent crimes16
Cumulative Error 
 that both independently support the 
imposition of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance.  See Lebron III, 
982 So. 2d at 667 (noting that the trial court relied on three prior violent felonies in 
support of a finding that the aggravating factor was present).  Thus, even if the 
Nasser case never existed, Lebron’s prior criminal conduct would still support the 
finding of the same statutory aggravating circumstance.  Accordingly, because 
Lebron’s claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of this claim.     
Lebron’s individual claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during both 
the guilt and penalty phases of his trial independently lack merit.  Lebron is not 
entitled to relief on a cumulative error claim.  See Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 
1046, 1069 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 85 (2013).  
 
 
                                         
 
16.  Those crimes were: (1) a 1993 attempted robbery in New York; and (2) 
the aggravated assault with a firearm involving victim Gribben that was committed 
a few days before Oliver’s murder.  Lebron III, 982 So. 2d at 667.   
 
- 56 - 
Conclusion 
 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
Lebron’s motion for postconviction relief.  
 
It is so ordered.  
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur.  
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,  
Belvin Perry, Jr., Judge - Case No. 1996 CF 002147 CR 
 
J. Edwin Mills, Orlando, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee