Case Title: Ballard v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-2041

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2041 
____________ 
 
ROY PHILLIP BALLARD,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 30, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the judgment and sentence of the trial court adjudicating 
Roy Phillip Ballard guilty of first-degree murder and imposing a sentence of death.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated 
herein, we affirm the conviction, but vacate the sentence of death and reduce 
Ballard’s sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that Autumn Traub (Autumn) 
disappeared on September 13, 2006, after being in the company of Roy Phillip 
Ballard (Ballard), her stepfather.   Ballard and his wife, Kathy Ballard, had 
 
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temporary custody of Autumn’s minor daughter, Suny Houghtaling (Suny).  
However, shortly before Autumn’s disappearance, Suny moved back in with 
Autumn and her husband, John Traub.  On August 10, 2006, upset about Suny’s 
decision, Ballard confronted Autumn in an attempt to have Suny return to his home 
in Zephyrhills.  The police were called and intervened, advising Ballard that the 
―custody paperwork‖ he had was insufficient to cause police to transfer custody of 
Suny back to the Ballards.  Ballard stated to the officer he would do anything he 
needed to get his granddaughter back.  After the investigation of the disappearance 
of Autumn, authorities became convinced that Ballard had killed Autumn in order 
to gain custody of Suny and continue his sexual relationship with her.  Autumn’s 
body has never been found. 
 
The evidence presented at trial showed that on September 2, 2006, Ballard 
was depicted in a Lowe’s hardware store surveillance video buying an eighteen-
inch metal pipe and duct tape.  The receipt for the items was found in his car trunk.  
On September 4, 2006, Ballard was rushed to the hospital after experiencing a 
series of seizures.  During the course of the hospitalization, it was determined that 
he had suffered a number of small strokes.  By September 6, 2006, Dr. Vyas (his 
treating physician) found that Ballard was cognizant and he was discharged on 
September 8, 2006.  On September 11, 2006, Ballard returned to his job as 
maintenance supervisor at Atlantic Metals in Tampa, Florida.  According to his 
 
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supervisor, Tom Witzigman, there were no observable changes in Ballard other 
than that he appeared somewhat tired.  
 
On September 12, 2006, Ballard reported to work at approximately 5:40 a.m. 
but, later, was sent home by Witzigman after he reported not feeling well.  Ballard 
did not show up for work on September 13, 2006, but returned September 14, 
2006, and continued to work regularly thereafter.  
 
On September 12, 2006, Ballard left work and traveled past his home in 
Zephyrhills to a remote area in North Lakeland as evidenced by his cell phone 
utilizing a cellular tower in that area.  The morning Autumn disappeared, 
September 13, 2006,  his cell phone was ―captured‖ by the same cellular tower.   
 
During the course of the continued investigation, Ballard’s car trunk was 
searched.  The search resulted in two Wal-Mart bags with small spots of blood on 
them.  The results of the DNA tests performed on the blood found on the Wal-Mart 
bags showed a statistically certain match to Autumn’s DNA.  There was some 
blood found on the duct tape, from which experts were able to obtain a partial 
DNA profile consistent with Autumn’s.  The trunk also contained numerous 
shopping bags, one with a spot of Autumn’s blood on it; a shovel; concrete blocks; 
a cooler; the Lowe’s receipt for the metal pipe and duct tape; and a sex toy with 
Suny’s DNA on it.  On September 21, 2006, Ballard made a taped statement to 
police in which he acknowledged buying some duct tape but said he could not 
 
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remember why he bought the metal pipe or what he did with it.  The trial court 
found this troubling because an eighteen-inch metal pipe is an unusual piece of 
hardware that would have a specific purpose.  Ballard also told police that on 
September 13, 2006, he drove to Autumn’s residence.  He situated himself so as 
not to be observable from Autumn’s home and waited for John to leave for work.  
He then approached Autumn to discuss Suny’s future, and convinced her to 
accompany him to get a drink and dropped her off at a Walgreens.  However, the 
police found no evidence to corroborate Ballard’s statements other than that 
Autumn left her residence in his company.  To the contrary, the evidence collected 
by investigators disproves Ballard’s description of what he and Autumn did that 
morning. 
 
Further, Michael Needham (Ballard’s former cellmate) testified that Ballard 
told him he hit Autumn in the back of her head with the pipe.  Then, after killing 
her, he knocked out her teeth to eliminate any comparison to dental records, placed 
her body in some type of acidic water, and held her down with concrete blocks.  
He then disposed of the murder weapon by grinding it down at his place of 
employment, a metal fabrication shop.  Needham also testified Ballard confessed 
to having had a sexual relationship with Suny.  
 
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The jury convicted Ballard and recommended the death sentence on a vote 
of nine to three.  The trial court sentenced Ballard to death.1  
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Ballard raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in 
admitting collateral crime evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding the 
CCP aggravator; and (3) whether the death sentence is proportionate.  We affirm 
on issues 1 and 2.  Additionally, we find competent, substantial evidence to 
support the conviction.  However, upon our proportionality review, we conclude 
                                         
 
1.  The trial court found the existence of one aggravating circumstance:  that 
the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner 
without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). 
 
The trial court found the following statutory mitigating factors:  (1) the 
capital felony was committed while the Defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance—slight weight; (2) the capacity of the 
Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law was substantially impaired—slight weight; (3) The age of 
the Defendant at the time of the crime—little to slight weight.  Additionally, the 
trial court considered the following nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1) Ballard has 
a close relationship with his wife—little to no weight; (2) Ballard can continue the 
relationship with his wife in prison—little to no weight; (3) Ballard has a strong 
work ethic—slight weight; (4) Ballard was charitable to his stepfamily—no 
weight; (5)-(15) medical and mental problems—very slight weight when 
combined; (16) lack of impulse control—very little weight; (17) lack of societal 
inhibition—little weight; (18) Ballard suffered from an obsession to regain custody 
of Suny Houghtling—no weight; (19) Ballard had in the past a domestic 
relationship with Autumn Traub and Suny Houghtling—no weight; (20) Ballard 
was involved in an ongoing quarrel with the Traubs over Suny’s custody—no 
weight. 
 
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that the sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.   
GUILT PHASE 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
While this issue is not contested by Ballard, we have a mandatory obligation 
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the homicide conviction.  
We have outlined the evidence presented at trial and, upon review, find that 
evidence sufficient to sustain Ballard’s conviction of first-degree murder. 
Admission of Collateral Crime Evidence 
 
Ballard claims that the evidence relating to his sexual relationship with Suny 
was overly prejudicial and requires a new trial.  We disagree. 
 
―The admissibility of collateral crime evidence is within the discretion of the 
trial court, and the trial court’s ruling shall not be disturbed upon review absent an 
abuse of that discretion.‖  Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 357 (Fla. 2004); see 
Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1997).  However, a trial court’s 
discretion is limited by the rules of evidence.  Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 
278 (Fla. 2003).  ―Discretion . . . is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused 
only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.‖  
 
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Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 
382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)).   
 
In State v. Williams, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), we articulated the 
following standard for the admission of such evidence: 
Our view of the proper rule simply is that relevant evidence will not 
be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to 
the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is 
relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy. 
Id. at 659-60.  As codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2006), ―[s]imilar 
fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove 
a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.‖   
Thus, relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if the 
probative value to show motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident outweighs any unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, misleading of the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  
See LaMarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 2001).   Finally, collateral crimes 
evidence is ―inextricably intertwined‖ if the evidence is necessary to (1) adequately 
describe the deed; (2) provide an intelligent account of the crime(s) charged; (3) 
establish the entire context out of which the charged crime(s) arose; or (4) 
adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crime(s).  Dorsett v. State, 
944 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).   
 
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Here, the State presented testimony from multiple witnesses that Ballard 
engaged in inappropriate conduct with Suny.  Neighbors testified that they 
witnessed the pair kissing and fondling each other.  Suny herself testified that they 
engaged in intercourse ―every other weekend‖ her entire eighth grade year.  She 
further testified that while Ballard was in the hospital, immediately prior to 
Autumn’s disappearance, he told Suny that he loved her and wanted to marry her. 
The State also presented evidence in the form of the sex toy found in the trunk of 
Ballard’s car that had traces of Suny’s DNA on it.  The State alleges that this 
evidence is relevant to show motive and inextricably intertwined with the 
testimony needed to establish the crime.  We agree. 
 
The evidence presented that Ballard had a sexual relationship with Suny was 
not wholly inflammatory without any relevance to the case.  The only testimony 
presented was relevant to establish why Ballard would want to murder Autumn to 
regain custody of Suny.  As argued by the State, there was no reasonable way for 
the State to have excluded the testimony while accurately describing the chain of 
events that led to Autumn’s disappearance.  See, e.g., LaMarca, 785 So. 2d at 
1212-13 (upholding the admission of evidence that the defendant raped his 
daughter because it was relevant to show the defendant’s motive to murder his 
daughter’s husband so that he could have his daughter to himself).  Suny testified 
that she hid from Ballard when he first attempted to retrieve her from her mother’s 
 
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home.  John Traub testified that Suny had requested he get a restraining order 
against Ballard.  Neither of these statements would make sense to the jury without 
the context of Ballard’s relationship with Suny.  See id. at 1213 (noting that the 
testimony was relevant because it put into context the victim’s admonition to 
LaMarca to stay away from his wife). 
 
Because the collateral crime evidence that Ballard was engaged in an illegal 
sexual relationship with Suny was relevant to establish motive and inextricably 
intertwined with the testimony of the chain of events, we deny relief on this claim.   
SENTENCING PHASE 
Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravator 
 
 Ballard next alleges that the trial court improperly found that the murder 
was cold, calculated, and premeditated.  We disagree. 
 
In reviewing the trial court’s finding of an aggravating circumstance, this 
Court’s ―task on appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial court 
applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether 
competent substantial evidence supports its finding.‖  McWatters v. State, 36 So. 
3d 613, 641 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 368 (Fla. 2003)), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 510 (2010).   
 
We have stated: 
To establish the CCP aggravator, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) the killing was the product of cool and calm 
 
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reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit 
of rage (cold); (2) the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged 
design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); (3) the 
defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and (4) 
the murder was committed with no pretext of legal or moral 
justification.   
McWatters, 36 So. 3d at 640-41 (citing § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2009); Pearce v. 
State, 880 So. 2d 561, 575-76 (Fla. 2004)).  ―The CCP aggravator pertains 
specifically to the state of mind, intent, and motivation of the defendant.‖  Wright 
v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 298 (Fla. 2009) (citing Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 
(Fla. 1998)).  The trial court’s determination of whether CCP is present in a case is 
based upon the totality of the circumstances.  Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1360 (2009). 
 
Ballard argues that CCP was not proven because the facts used to establish 
the aggravator are based in speculation.  This argument is without merit.  CCP can 
be proven by circumstantial evidence.  Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2004).  
CCP can be indicated by the circumstances showing such facts as advance 
procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of 
a killing carried out as a matter of course.  Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 
1988). 
 
The first element, ―cold‖ means ―cool and calm reflection, and not an act 
prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage.‖  Jackson v. State, 648 So. 
2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994).   This element was established by competent, substantial 
 
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evidence. The evidence presented at trial showed that Ballard purchased the 
murder weapon weeks before the actual murder occurred.  Ballard’s hospitalization 
only provided additional time for him to reflect on his actions and plan his attack. 
 
The second element, ―calculated‖ means the defendant had a ―careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder.‖  Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 89.  This requires a 
careful plan or design to kill, not to commit another crime to which the murder was 
incidental.  Id.  There is competent, substantial evidence to support this element.  
Ballard told Needham that he took the murder weapon, an eighteen-inch pipe, to 
work and ground it down.  Ballard further told Needham that he had hit Autumn in 
the back of the head to kill her, and struck her again to knock out her teeth to 
prevent her identification through dental records.  The evidence showed that 
Ballard waited outside of Autumn’s home and did not approach the door until after 
her husband left for work.  This evidence supports that Ballard had a careful plan 
or design to kill Autumn. 
 
The third element, ―premeditated‖ requires more than that required to prove 
first-degree murder.  It is heightened premeditation, defined as ―deliberate 
ruthlessness.‖  See Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1008 (Fla. 1994) (citing 
Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 388 (Fla. 1994)).  There is competent, substantial 
evidence to support the finding of this element.  Ballard purchased the materials 
used to murder Autumn weeks before the crime.  He lay in wait while her husband 
 
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prepared to leave for work.  He escorted her from her home under false pretenses.  
Then, presumably, he took her to a remote location before striking her with the 
pipe he purchased for this specific purpose.  This Court has previously upheld a 
finding of CCP where a defendant laid in wait for the victim’s arrival.  See Dennis 
v. State, 817 So. 2d 741, 765 (Fla. 2002) (upholding CCP where facts showed 
defendant arrived at the apartment before the victim and waited for her arrival).   
 
Accordingly, we find this aggravator was supported by competent, 
substantial evidence. 
Proportionality 
 
We find the imposition of the death penalty in this case to be 
disproportionate.  This Court has previously stated that CCP is one of the 
weightiest aggravating circumstances.  See Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 243 
(Fla. 2008).  However, this Court has also held that the death penalty is reserved 
only for those circumstances where the most aggravating and the least mitigating 
circumstances exist.  See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).  This is not 
such a case.  In this case, the trial court found CCP to be the only aggravating 
circumstance.  The trial court also found three statutory mitigating factors— (1) the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at 
the time the capital felony was committed, (2) the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
 
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requirements of law was substantially impaired, and (3) the age of the defendant.  
Additionally, the trial court considered numerous nonstatutory mitigating factors.  
Accordingly, we find the death sentence to be disproportionate when comparing 
this case to other death penalty decisions.  See, e.g., DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 
440 (Fla. 1993) (concluding the defendant’s death sentence was disproportionate 
where the only aggravating circumstance found was CCP); Klokoc v. State, 589 
So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991) (finding the one aggravating circumstance, CCP, did not 
outweigh the mitigating factors when compared to other death penalty cases).   
Ring2 
 
Ballard argues that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional.  
Because we are remanding this case for an entry of a sentence of life 
imprisonment, Ballard’s argument is now moot.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Because we find that there is sufficient evidence to uphold Ballard’s 
conviction for first-degree murder, we affirm the conviction.  However, because 
we find the sentence to be disproportionate, we reverse the sentence of death and 
remand to the trial court for entry of an order sentencing Ballard to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
 
It is so ordered. 
                                         
 
2.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
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PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm Ballard’s conviction for first-
degree murder.  I also agree that there is competent substantial evidence to support 
the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravator.  Unlike the majority, 
however, I would affirm Ballard’s death sentence because it is proportionate when 
compared to other death penalty cases.  See, e.g., Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817 
(Fla. 2003) (upholding death sentence where trial court found one aggravator and 
several mitigators); Lamarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 2001) (upholding 
death sentence where trial court found one aggravator and less than substantial 
mitigation in case where father murdered son-in-law in order to have his daughter, 
who he had raped, for himself).  Planning in advance and executing a brutal 
murder for the purpose of continuing an inappropriate and incestuous relationship 
with the victim’s minor daughter, with only mitigation of little and slight weight, 
certainly qualifies as one of the most aggravated and least mitigated of murders.  
See Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 440 (Fla. 1995) (―It is well settled that it is 
 
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not the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances that is critical but the 
weight to be given each of them.‖).  
The trial court here found the CCP aggravator based upon Ballard’s 
deliberate actions after he realized that his stepdaughter was not going to return 
custody of her minor daughter to Ballard, custody Ballard desired in order to 
continue his sexual relationship with the minor.  Ballard began planning the 
murder of Autumn Traub in early September when he purchased an eighteen-inch 
metal pipe and duct tape from a hardware store.  And the day before he killed her, 
Ballard scouted a remote area where he could commit the murder and dispose of 
the body.  Then, Ballard coldly carried out his plan on the morning of September 
13, 2006, when he lured his stepdaughter from her home and to her death after 
stealthily waiting for her husband to leave the house. 
 
This Court has repeatedly stated that CCP is one of the most serious and 
weightiest aggravating circumstances.  See Diaz v. State, 860 So. 2d 960, 971 (Fla. 
2003); Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324, 331 (Fla. 2001); Larkins v. State, 739 So. 
2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).  This Court also has explained that ―[w]hen one or more of 
the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper 
sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating 
circumstances.‖  Diaz v. State, 860 So. 2d at 971 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 
2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)).  However, in this case, the majority summarily vacates 
 
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Ballard’s death sentence and reduces it to life by simply identifying CCP as the 
only aggravator.  See majority op. at 12.    
This Court has upheld death sentences based upon a single aggravating 
circumstance.  See Butler, 842 So. 2d 817; Lamarca, 785 So. 2d 1209; Burns v. 
State, 699 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1997); Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1996); 
Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994), postconviction relief granted on 
other grounds, 826 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 2002).   While it is true that ―[t]his Court has 
vacated numerous death sentences where there was only one aggravating factor[,] 
those cases generally involved substantial mitigating circumstances.‖  Lamarca, 
785 So. 2d at 1216.  Unlike those cases, the trial court here found the mitigation to 
be less than substantial.  And it is not this Court’s function to reweigh the 
mitigating circumstances.  See Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1065 (Fla. 2007) 
(―This Court reviews a trial court’s assignment of weight to proven mitigating 
factors under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Again, we do not reweigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  We defer to the trial court’s determination . . . 
.‖). 
In this case, the trial court indicated that it was aware of this Court’s single 
aggravator decisions, but after weighing the single strong aggravator of CCP 
against the ―very little‖ mitigation, the trial court found that the aggravating 
 
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circumstance ―far outweighs‖ the mitigating circumstances.3  More specifically, 
while the trial court found three statutory mitigators and various nonstatutory 
mitigators, it assigned this mitigation less than substantial weight.  In regard to the 
statutory mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance due to alleged 
stroke-induced brain damage, the trial court explained that it was only given ―slight 
weight‖ because of testimony explaining that the MRI findings were not significant 
and testimony that there were ―no outward signs of brain damage‖ and no changes 
in Ballard’s behavior or demeanor.  And the trial court only gave the aggravator of 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct ―slight weight‖ because the 
alleged drug toxicity exacerbating his medical problems would cause dizziness and 
slurred speech, not confusion or anything else that would lead to Ballard not being 
able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.  Additionally, the trial court assigned the statutory age 
aggravator ―little to slight weight,‖ because, although Ballard was 65 at the time of 
the murder, his aging ―did not appear to slow him down‖ as he worked at a full-
time job that started before 7:00 a.m. and ―required both physical stamina and 
mental acuity.‖  Furthermore, much of the proposed nonstatutory mitigation 
                                         
 
3.  The majority’s ruling takes us further away from Florida’s death penalty 
statute, which provides that the trial court must weigh mitigators against 
aggravators.  See § 921.141(3) (instructing the trial court to set forth written 
finding that the mitigators do not outweigh the sufficient aggravators).  Nothing in 
the statute or constitution limits the weight or effect of a single aggravator. 
 
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involved Ballard’s actual motive for killing his stepdaughter, namely his 
incestuous relationship with her minor daughter.  See majority op. at 5 n.1 (noting 
that the trial court considered that Ballard was charitable to his stepfamily (no 
weight), that Ballard had a lack of societal inhibition (little weight), that Ballard 
suffered from an obsession to regain custody of the minor girl (no weight), that 
Ballard had a past domestic relationship with his victim and her minor daughter 
(no weight), and that Ballard was involved in a quarrel with the victim over her 
daughter’s custody (no weight)).  Therefore, because this case involved less than 
substantial mitigation, it is not similar to the single aggravator cases in which this 
Court has found the death sentence disproportionate.  Cf. Besaraba v. State, 656 
So. 2d 441, 446-47 (Fla. 1995) (finding death sentence disproportionate with single 
aggravator and ―vast‖ mitigation); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fla. 
1990) (finding death sentence disproportionate with single aggravator and 
―substantial mitigation‖).   
This case is also not similar to the cases that the majority cites when 
concluding that Ballard’s death sentence was disproportionate.  See majority op. at 
13.  In contrast to this case, the cases cited by the majority involved substantial 
mitigation, including evidence of severe and debilitating mental disorders.  
Specifically, the defendant in DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1993), 
had bipolar disorder, psychotic disorders, hallucinations, delusions, and paranoid 
 
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thinking.  And there was evidence that the defendant in Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 
219, 221 (Fla. 1991), suffered from bipolar affective disorder, manic type with 
paranoid features, among other mental problems.         
To summarize, as found by the trial court, this case involves one of the most 
serious aggravators and less than substantial mitigation.  It is not this Court’s 
function to reweigh these aggravating and mitigation circumstances.  See Merck, 
975 So. 2d at 1065.  The death sentence here is proportionate when compared to 
other death penalty cases.  See, e.g., Butler, 842 So. 2d 817; Lamarca, 785 So. 2d 
1209.  Additionally, although the majority did not address it, Ballard’s claim that 
his death sentence is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
is without merit.  See Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003) (holding in 
as-applied challenge that death is the statutory maximum sentence for first-degree 
murder); Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d at 834 (upholding death sentence with HAC 
aggravator found by the trial court); see also Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 
(Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002).   
Accordingly, I would affirm both Ballard’s conviction and death sentence.  I 
respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.   
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
Donald G. Jacobsen, Judge – Case No. CF06-007863-XX 
 
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James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee