Case Title: Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Comp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43912

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: August 12, 1999 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JOEL C. GROSHONG, JOANN HUTH
and GARY HUTH,

Petitioners on Review,

	v.

MUTUAL OF ENUMCLAW INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Washington corporation,

Respondent on Review.

(CC 9407-04901; CA A89325; SC S43912)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted November 3, 1997.

	Michael A. Lehner, of Lehner, Mitchell, Rodrigues & Sears,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on
review.  Edward L. Sears, of Lehner, Mitchell, Rodrigues & Sears,
Portland, filed the petition for review.

	Thomas M. Christ, of Mitchell, Lang & Smith, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	CARSON, C.J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.

	 *Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	  Nely Johnson, Judge.

	  143 Or App 450, 923 P2d 1280 (1996).

	**Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

	CARSON, C.J.

	In this case, we are asked to decide whether an
insurance policy that defendant issued provides coverage for a
claim of housing discrimination made by a prospective tenant
against the insured plaintiffs.  After a trial on stipulated
facts, the trial court entered judgment for defendant, concluding
that the terms of the policy did not cover the prospective
tenant's claim.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment.  Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Or App
450, 923 P2d 1280 (1996).  That court, however, did not base its
decision upon the wording of the policy.  Instead, the court
concluded that, because the prospective tenant's claim alleged
intentional housing discrimination, the public policy
consideration that prohibits insuring against injuries that
intentionally are inflicted precluded defendant from defending or
indemnifying against that claim.  Id. at 456-61.

	We allowed review and now conclude, as did the trial
court, that the terms of the insurance policy did not provide
coverage for the housing discrimination claim.  Accordingly, we
do not address the public policy argument upon which the Court of
Appeals relied.  We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the circuit court.

	We take the following facts from the parties'
stipulation.  Plaintiff Groshong owns a two-story apartment
complex in Portland.  He employed plaintiffs JoAnn and Gary Huth
to manage the apartments.

	Defendant was Groshong's insurer and issued to him a
"special businessowner's" policy of insurance.  That policy
provided, in part:

		"The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of bodily injury, property
damage or personal injury caused by an occurrence to
which this insurance applies."

The policy further provided:

		"[O]ccurrence means an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured and with respect to personal injury, the
commission of an offense, or a series of similar or
related offenses;

		"[P]ersonal injury means injury which arises out
of one or more of the following offenses committed in
the conduct of the named insured's business:

		"* * * * *

		"(c) wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of
the right of private occupancy[.]"

(Boldface type in original.)

	In November 1992, a prospective tenant, the mother of a
small child, responded to a newspaper advertisement for the
rental of an apartment on the second floor of the complex.  While
showing the apartment to the prospective tenant, JoAnn Huth
stated that the complex did not allow small children to live on
the second floor due to safety concerns.  At that time, there
were no ground-floor apartments available.

	Several months later, Groshong received a letter and
draft complaint from a lawyer representing the prospective
tenant.  The draft complaint alleged claims of familial status
discrimination under federal housing laws.  Groshong tendered the
claim to defendant for defense under the policy, and defendant
rejected the tender.

	The prospective tenant's discrimination claim
ultimately proceeded to litigation, naming both Groshong and the
Huths as defendants.  At various stages during the proceedings,
Groshong again tendered the claim to defendant.  Each time
defendant rejected the tender.  Plaintiffs later settled the
prospective tenant's claim.  Defendant stipulated that the
settlement was reasonable and that plaintiffs had performed all
conditions required of them under the policy. 

	Plaintiffs then brought this action against defendant
for breach of contract.(1)  Defendant responded by arguing, among
other things, that the underlying claim -- housing discrimination
under federal law -- did not allege "personal injury" within the
meaning of the insurance policy, because the claim was not one
for an "other invasion of the right of private occupancy." 
Defendant further argued that public policy prohibited insuring
against a claim of intentional housing discrimination.  The trial
court agreed with defendant's first argument and entered judgment
accordingly.  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed, but did so
based upon defendant's public policy argument.  Groshong, 143 Or
App at 456-61.  That court did not address whether the policy
covered the prospective tenant's claim.  Id. at 455.

	On review, the parties have briefed both the public
policy question and the question whether the prospective tenant's
claim constituted a "personal injury" under the terms of the
policy.  We begin our inquiry with the question presented under
the terms of the policy and will address the public policy
argument only if we conclude that the policy covers the claim. 
See A-1 Sandblasting v. Baiden, 293 Or 17, 19-20, 643 P2d 1260
(1982) (examining wording of policy before addressing public
policy considerations).  As noted, we conclude that the policy
does not provide coverage.

	The analytical framework for construing the terms of an
insurance policy is set out in Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred
S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 469-71, 474-75, 836 P2d 703 (1992). 
The question of policy interpretation is one of law, id. at 469,
and our task is to determine the intent of the parties, Totten v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 298 Or 765, 770, 696 P2d 1082 (1985).  We
determine the parties' intent from the terms and conditions of
the policy.  Interstate Fire v. Archdiocese of Portland, 318 Or
110, 117, 864 P2d 346 (1993).

	Plaintiffs argue that the prospective tenant alleged a
claim for personal injury based upon an "other invasion of the
right of private occupancy."  Therefore, we must ascertain the
meaning of that quoted phrase as it is used in the policy.  The
policy, however, offers no definition.  Accordingly, we resort to
various aids of interpretation to discern the parties' intended
meaning.  See Hoffman, 313 at 469 (turning to such aids when
policy did not define term at issue).

	The first aid to interpretation is determining whether
the term at issue has a plain meaning.  See ibid. (so
demonstrating).  The meaning of a term is "plain" -- that is,
unambiguous -- if the term is susceptible to only one plausible
interpretation.  See id. at 469-70 (so demonstrating).  If so,
the parties' intent conclusively is established, and our
interpretive inquiry is at an end.  However, as the court noted
in Hoffman, establishing the plain meaning of a term at this
level of analysis -- that is, showing that the term is not
susceptible to competing plausible interpretations -- may be
difficult:

"[G]iven the breadth and flexibility of the English
language, the task of suggesting plausible alternative
meanings is no challenge to capable counsel."

Id. at 470.  We turn, then, to the question whether the phrase
"other invasion of the right of private occupancy" has a plain
meaning.  

	Plaintiffs argue:

	"[T]he language is not limited to claims arising out of
possessory interest in property.  In the context of
this case, plaintiffs argue that the insurance policy
encompasses claims made by prospective tenants who have
been denied the right to occupy an apartment because of
rental policies that have a discriminatory impact. * *
*"

Plaintiffs continue that:

		"Defendant's interpretation should be rejected
because it renders part of the definition of personal
injury meaningless.  If coverage is limited to rights
of occupancy associated with entry into a tenant's
premises, or eviction of a tenant, the phrase 'other
invasion of the right of private occupancy' would add
nothing to the policy and would be meaningless. * * *"

	Defendant, in turn, argues that the plain meaning of
the phrase does not encompass housing discrimination claims:

	"As a would-be tenant, not an actual tenant, [the
prospective tenant] had no right of occupancy that
could be invaded. * * * [S]he left the [apartment
complex] without even applying for the vacant
apartment, let alone obtaining it, after Ms. Huth
informed her of the no-kids-upstairs policy.  Thus, she
was neither occupying the apartment nor entitled to
occupy it at the time of the alleged discrimination."

Stated differently, defendant argues that "other invasion of the
right of private occupancy" can refer only to claims affecting
either an actual possessory interest in property or an
entitlement to such an interest.  Neither of those circumstances,
defendant asserts, were at issue in the prospective tenant's
action.

	Defendant also argues that construing the phrase "other
invasion of the right of private occupancy" to include only
claims involving a possessory interest in property would not
render that phrase redundant of, or superfluous to, claims for
"wrongful entry or eviction."  Defendant lists several examples
of claims for which the phrase at issue exclusively would apply. 
They include claims for interrupting services to a tenant's
dwelling (water, heat, electricity, etc.) and claims for allowing
disruption of a tenant's right to quiet enjoyment.

	Defendant further argues that plaintiffs' proffered
construction would require the court to give the words "right"
and "occupancy" within the phrase "strained or unlikely
meanings:

	"A person viewing a vacant apartment does not 'occupy'
the apartment, nor does she have a 'right' to occupy
it.  A 'right' is a legally enforceable claim of one
person against another.  A right of occupancy,
therefore, is a legally enforceable claim to possession
of property to the exclusion of all others, including
the owner. * * *"

	Finally, defendant argues that the phrase applies, by
its terms, only to invasions of the right of private occupancy,
not the right to private occupancy.  The latter formulation,
defendant suggests, could imply a right to obtain occupancy,
which arguably underlay the prospective tenant's claim. 
Defendant argues that the former formulation, however, which
expresses the actual wording of the policy, presupposes an
existing right of occupancy and, therefore, cannot support
plaintiffs' suggested interpretation.  That is so, defendant
contends, because housing discrimination laws do not confer upon
a prospective tenant an entitlement to occupy a dwelling but,
rather, only prohibit landlords from denying tenancy based upon
prohibited criteria.  Continuing with that argument, defendant
notes that, even if plaintiffs had not discriminated against the
prospective tenant, she still might have been denied the
apartment.  For example, she might have had a poor credit or
rental history, had insufficient funds for a deposit, or
otherwise might have been unqualified (for non-discriminatory
reasons) to rent the apartment.

	On the question whether defendant's proffered
interpretation would render the phrase meaningless, defendant has
the better argument.  As noted, defendant has identified other
claims for which the phrase -- even if construed as defendant
suggests -- would apply exclusively.  Plaintiffs have not
rebutted that argument.  The question remains, however, whether
the phrase, which we have concluded is meaningful, admits by its
terms of but one plausible interpretation.  As discussed below,
we conclude that it does not.  

	Analyzing the words of the phrase "other invasion of
the right of private occupancy" suggests, but does not
demonstrate conclusively, that the parties intended to limit that
phrase to possessory contexts.  For example, the dictionary first
defines the term "invasion" as "a hostile entrance or armed
attack on the property or territory of another for conquest or
plunder."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1188 (unabridged
ed 1993).  That definition supports defendant's reading of the
phrase, viz., that the phrase pertains only to offenses involving
possessory interests.  The dictionary, however, also defines the
term, in part, as "an encroachment upon a right protected by law
affording grounds for an action for damages or some other
remedy."  Ibid.  That definition lends support to plaintiffs'
proffered interpretation.

	Use of the term "private occupancy" likewise supports
defendant's construction, but not conclusively so.  Read in
isolation, the term strongly connotes possessory-like interests. 
See Webster's at 1560, 1804 (defining "occupancy," in part, as
"the taking and holding possession of real property under a lease
or tenancy at will" (emphasis added) and defining "private," in
part, as "intended for or restricted to the use of a particular
person or group or class of persons").  That analysis, however,
is incomplete, because the term does not exist in isolation. 
Instead, "private occupancy" is the object of the preposition
"of" that precedes it.  Thus, even accepting the dictionary's
definitions, the question remains whether a "possessory" right of
private occupancy is limited to circumstances in which the right
already exists (i.e., the tenant has possession, which was not
presented by the prospective tenant's complaint) or also includes
an entitlement to establish a possessory private occupancy in the
future (which, at least arguably, underlay the prospective
tenant's complaint).

	As noted, defendant has addressed that ultimate
question and focuses upon the fact that the phrase refers to the
"right of private occupancy," rather than the "right to private
occupancy."  We agree that use of the word "to" would have
strengthened plaintiffs' position.  We also note that the policy
could have been made more explicit in other respects as well, if
the parties actually had intended the broader meaning that
plaintiffs advocate.(2)  Those arguments notwithstanding, we do not
agree that the term "private occupancy" and the prepositional
phrase within which it occurs establishes a simple, plain
meaning.  Although demonstrably less plausible than defendant's
interpretation, plaintiffs' reading of "right of private
occupancy" to include future possessory interests is not
implausible.

	In sum, in examining only the wording of the phrase at
issue, we cannot state that plaintiffs' proffered interpretation
is unreasonable.  To the analysis above, we also note, and deem
it significant, that the policy neither defines the phrase "right
of private occupancy" nor expressly states that the phrase is
limited to claims involving a possessory interest.  Absent such
qualification, and in light of the actual wording of the phrase,
we cannot conclude our interpretive inquiry at this level.  The
phrase reasonably could be read to include claims that an insured
landlord unlawfully had denied a prospective tenant an
opportunity to rent a dwelling.

	Because we have determined that the meaning of the
phrase at issue is not, on its face, plain, we proceed to our
second aid to interpretation.  That is, we examine the phrase in
light of "the particular context in which that [phrase] is used
in the policy and the broader context of the policy as a whole." 
Hoffman, 313 Or at 470; see also id. at 474-75 (applying
principle).  Here, examining the phrase in its context resolves,
to our satisfaction, the question whether the parties intended
the phrase to provide coverage for claims of housing
discrimination.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
they did not. 

	The sentence in which the phrase occurs states:

		"[P]ersonal injury [includes] the following
offenses * * *:

		"* * * * *

		"(c) wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion
of the right of private occupancy[.]"

(Boldface type omitted; emphasis added.)  Viewed contextually,
the phrase at issue here does not stand in isolation.  Instead,
the phrase is tied to the wording that precedes it by the word
"other."  The word "other" is one of common usage, and its
meaning generally is understood.  The dictionary defines the word
"other," in part, as

	"being the one (as of two or more) left : not being the
one (as of two or more) first mentioned or of primary
concern : REMAINING * * * being the ones distinct from
the one or those first mentioned or understood * * *
SECOND * * * DIFFERENT, DISTINCT * * * MORE,
ADDITIONAL."

Webster's at 1598.  The question, then, is whether the parties
intended "other invasions of the right of private occupancy"
(emphasis added) to refer to claims distinct from or claims in
addition to claims for "wrongful entry or eviction."  The
dictionary definition alone, which embraces both interpretations,
does not resolve the ambiguity.  

	A legal dictionary, however, expands on the general
definition of "other" quoted above:

	"Following an enumeration of particular classes 'other'
must be read as 'other such like,' and includes only
others of like kind and character."

Black's Law Dictionary, 1101 (6th ed 1990).  That statement is a
derivation of the Latin maxim "ejusdem generis" (of the same
kind), which this court has restated as follows:

	"Basically, the rule provides that when general words
follow an enumeration of specific persons or things,
the general words are not construed in their widest
extent, but are applied only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically
enumerated. * * *"

McGrath v. Electrical Const. Co., 230 Or 295, 307, 364 P2d 604
(1962).

	Although most commonly employed by courts when
interpreting constitutional or statutory enactments, the maxim
has utility in a contractual context as well.  See, e.g., ibid.
(applying principle in interpreting construction contract); U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomlinson Co., 172 Or 307, 318-19, 141 P2d
817 (1943) (stating that principle "has, of course, been applied
with some qualifications to the construction of contracts" and
applying principle in interpreting bond).  Also, and importantly,
this court has stated that "the rule of ejusdem generis in
contracts is peculiarly applicable where specific enumeration
precedes the word 'other' followed by general words."  McGrath,
230 Or at 307.  We deem it appropriate to apply the maxim here.

	Again, standing alone, it is not entirely clear that
the phrase "other invasion of the right of private occupancy"
embraces only claims that involve possessory interests.  It is
clear, however, that claims for "wrongful entry or eviction" are
so limited.  Stated differently, a person cannot suffer a
wrongful entry or eviction until that person actually occupies --
or at least has a legally cognizable possessory interest in -- a
particular premises.  Therefore, use of the term "other" to
connect the phrase "invasion of the right of private occupancy"
to the wording that precedes it satisfies us that the parties
intended that such invasion also be limited to claims that
involve a possessory interest in the premises.

	In light of our examination of both the wording of the
phrase at issue and the context in which that wording occurs,
plaintiffs' proffered interpretation no longer is plausible. 
Further resort to interpretive aids, therefore, is unnecessary. 
As used in defendant's policy, the phrase "other invasion of the
right of private occupancy" applies only to offenses that involve
a possessory interest in the premises at issue.  It follows that
plaintiffs are not entitled to coverage.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.

1. 	The policy identified Joel and Barbara Groshong as the
named insureds under the policy.  The policy, however, also
defined "insured" to include "any employee of the named insured
while acting within the scope of his duties as such."  (Boldface
type omitted.)  The parties stipulated that, at all relevant
times, the Huths were Joel Groshong's employees and were acting
within the course and scope of their employment.

2. 	For example, the phrase could have been written to
provide "other invasion of the right of private occupancy,
whether possessory or non-possessory," or "other invasion of the
right of private occupancy or the right to rent premises."