Case Title: Rowe v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 89-500

                              JUNE TERM, 1991


Michael Rowe, Individually         }         APPEALED FROM:
and as a Selectman and Citizen of  }
Ludlow, Windsor County, Vermont    }
                                   }
     v.                            }         Windsor Superior Court
                                   }
                                   }
Dean R. Brown, Jr., Ludlow Town    }
Manager, and Planning Board and/or }         DOCKET NO. S12-85-WrC
Board of Adjustment of Ludlow, Vt; }
Herbert VanGuilder & Town of Ludlow}


             In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

     Pursuant to V.R.A.P. 40, plaintiff has moved to reargue our conclusion
that the trial court appropriately dismissed his 42 U.S.C. { 1983 claim.
Upon reexamining the second amended complaint, we agree with plaintiff with
respect to the alleged July 1985 meeting and accordingly, reverse and remand
with respect to that meeting.  The trial court's opinion is affirmed in all
other respects.  Our opinion issued on January 11, 1991 is withdrawn and
amended.







                                   BY THE COURT:



                                   Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice


                                   Louis P. Peck, Associate Justice


[ ]  Publish                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

[ ]  Do Not Publish
                                   James L. Morse, Associate Justice


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NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-500


Michael G. Rowe, Individually           Supreme Court
and as a Selectman and Citizen of
Ludlow, Windsor County, Vermont         On Appeal from
                                        Windsor Superior Court
     v.

Dean R. Brown, Jr., Ludlow Town         January Term, 1990
Manager, and Planning Board and/or
Board of Adjustment of Ludlow, Vt.;
Herbert VanGuilder & Town of Ludlow


Ellen H. Maloney, J.

Thomas J. McGovern, Ludlow, for plaintiff-appellant

Sheilla C. Files of Douglas Richards, P.C., Springfield, for defendants-
appellees


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



     PECK, J.   Plaintiff appeals from a superior court dismissal of his
action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. { 1983, the Vermont Constitution
and the Vermont Open Meetings statute, 1 V.S.A. {{ 311-314.  Plaintiff
alleged that he was injured when defendants improperly excluded him from
various municipal meetings in Ludlow.  We reverse with respect to
defendant's 1983 claim and affirm with respect to all other claims.
     The complaint alleged that defendant was excluded from meetings of the
Ludlow Board of Selectmen, the Planning Board, and the Board of Adjustment
in 1984 and 1985.  Plaintiff named town manager and zoning administrator
Brown and selectman VanGuilder as defendants, alleging that they "willfully
or maliciously and under color of state law" requested the Planning Board
and Board of Adjustment to exclude plaintiff from their meetings.  In
addition, the complaint alleged that the actions of the defendants violated
plaintiff's free speech rights and caused him to suffer fear of bodily harm,
personal humiliation and mental anguish.  The complaint rested on the
Vermont Open Meetings Law, and the free speech and due process clauses of
the Vermont and the federal constitutions. (FN1) Plaintiff sought declaratory
relief and damages for violation of state statutory and constitutional law
and under 42 U.S.C. { 1983 and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. { 1988.
     In September, 1988, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's federal law
claims, holding that plaintiff had no federal first amendment right to
attend the meeting in question, nor any due process right to a hearing on
his exclusion.  Because the court concluded that 42 U.S.C { 1983 could not
be employed to vindicate rights having their source in state law, and
because his claim was not supported by federal law, his { 1983 claims were
dismissed.
     In September, 1989, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's state law
claims.  The court held that the Open meeting Law created no private right
of action for its enforcement, and that plaintiff had no standing to assert
a cause of action under the state constitution. The present appeal
followed.
     The Open Meeting Law on its face creates rights in favor of all members
         of the public:
          All meetings of a public body are declared to be open to
          the public at all times, except as provided in section
          313 of this title [relating to executive sessions].  No
          resolution, rule, regulation, appointment, or formal
          action shall be considered binding except as taken or
          made at such open meeting, except as provided under
          section 313(a)(2) of this title.  A meeting may be
          conducted by audio conference or other electronic means,
          as long as the provisions of this subchapter are met.

1 V.S.A. { 312(a).  The statute protects the public interest, and its viola-
tion offends the public weal. (FN2) The enforcement provisions of 1 V.S.A. {
314(b) allow the attorney general "or any person aggrieved by a violation of
the provisions" of the law to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.  Thus,
if a Ludlow citizen sought an adjudication that the municipality
misconstrued the statutory provision under which it conducted executive
sessions (or otherwise violated the Open Meeting Law), the citizen could
seek a declaration that the town was in violation of the statute and could
enjoin that violation or seek an additional declaration under { 312(a) with
respect to action purportedly taken in an unlawfully conducted meeting.
     Plaintiff's { 1983 claim rests in part on the first amendment to the
United States constitution.  Plaintiff argues that because, under the Open
Meetings Law, the 1984 and 1985 meetings should have been open, under the
first amendment, he could not be arbitrarily excluded.  The trial court
correctly concluded that { 1983 does not create a remedy for the violation
of purely state-created rights, as its manifest purpose is to "create[] a
species of liability in favor of persons deprived of their federal civil
rights by those wielding state authority."  Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2307 (1988); Williams v. Conway, Nos. 88-309 and 89-042, slip op. at
17-18 (Vt. Nov. 9, 1990). (FN3) However, plaintiff had a federal first amendment
right not to be excluded from a forum generally held open to the public.
See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,