Case Title: State v. Shaw

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51416

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  June 16, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
v.
SEBASTIAN ALEXANDER SHAW,
Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
(CC 010331742; SC S51416)
En Banc
On appeal from the Multnomah County Circuit Court.
David Gernant, Judge.
Argued and submitted October 27, 2004.
Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent.  With him on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Richard L. Wolf, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent/cross-appellant.  
CARSON, C. J.
On appeal, the order of the circuit court dismissing the
indictment and the judgment of acquittal are reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings.  Cross-appeal
dismissed.
CARSON, C. J.
The first issue in this criminal case is whether the
trial court erred by dismissing with prejudice an indictment
charging defendant with aggravated murder after the state refused
to proceed with the prosecution because it intended to appeal a
pretrial exclusionary ruling that the trial court had made.  If
the trial court did err by dismissing the indictment with
prejudice, then the second issue is whether the trial court erred
by excluding the testimony of a certain state witness pursuant to
OEC 403. (1) 
Shortly before defendant's aggravated murder trial was
scheduled to begin, the state sought a pretrial ruling concerning
the admissibility of evidence of other crimes by defendant that
the state planned to offer during the guilt phase of defendant's
trial to prove defendant's motive and intent.  The trial court
ruled that, under OEC 404(3), (2) the state was entitled to
introduce evidence of defendant's other crimes for those
noncharacter purposes.  The trial court further ruled, however,
that the state could not prove one of defendant's other crimes
through the testimony of the surviving victim because that
victim's personal testimony would be unfairly prejudicial under
OEC 403.  
The state moved for a continuance to appeal the trial
court's OEC 403 ruling to this court.  After concluding that its
OEC 403 ruling was not appealable, the trial court denied the
state's motion.  The state then informed the trial court that,
without the testimony of that other crime victim, it would not
proceed with the prosecution of the case.  Defendant moved to
dismiss the indictment, and the trial court dismissed the
indictment without prejudice.  Subsequently, citing the state's
"inexcusable neglect in its handling of this prosecution" and the
prejudice to defendant that further delay of his trial would
cause, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a dismissal
with prejudice and entered a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
ORS 136.130, set out post.    
The state now appeals to this court the trial court's
dismissal order and judgment of acquittal, as well as the trial
court's underlying OEC 403 ruling.  See ORS 138.060(2)
(authorizing state appeals to this court from certain pretrial
rulings in murder and aggravated murder prosecutions).  Defendant
challenges this court's jurisdiction to hear the state's appeal
and, on cross-appeal, raises 15 assignments of error relating to
other pretrial rulings that the trial court made.  See ORS
138.040 (providing that defendant may cross-appeal when state
appeals pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a)).
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that ORS
138.060(2) authorizes the state's appeal to this court.  On the
merits, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing the
indictment and entering a judgment of acquittal, and also reverse
the trial court's OEC 403 ruling.  With the exception of his
challenge to the relevance of the state's other crimes evidence,
we decline to address the merits of the assignments of error that
defendant raises on cross-appeal.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2001, the state charged defendant with one
count of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095(2)(d), (3) for the
death of Rickbeil, on the theory that defendant intentionally and
personally had killed Rickbeil in July 1991 during the course of
a first-degree burglary.  Rickbeil, a paraplegic suffering from
cerebral palsy, had been stabbed to death in his apartment. 
During their investigation of Rickbeil's murder, the police
discovered blood on a hallway wall and in the bathroom of
Rickbeil's apartment, which they submitted to the Oregon State
Police Forensic Laboratory (OSP laboratory) for analysis.  The
OSP laboratory determined that the blood had not come from
Rickbeil and that it did not match any DNA profiles in the Oregon
Convicted Offender Database.  The police entered the DNA profile
developed from that blood into the Oregon State Police database
of DNA profiles for unsolved crimes.  The police had no suspects
for Rickbeil's murder, and the investigation stagnated.
On July 20, 1992, Ferguson and Rudiger were discovered
stabbed to death in their home.  Both Ferguson and Rudiger had
their hands and feet bound together with electrical and telephone
cords.  Forensic tests conducted on the body of Ferguson
suggested that she had been sexually assaulted, and the police
took swabs from her body that tested positively for the presence
of seminal fluid that did not belong to Rudiger.  The police
created a DNA profile from that seminal fluid and then entered
that profile into the OSP unsolved crimes database.
On June 1, 1995, a man with a handgun forced his way
into the apartment of Pliska.  After sexually assaulting her, the
intruder bound Pliska's hands and feet together with electrical
and telephone cords, and attempted to smother her with a pillow. 
Pliska resisted and was able to make enough noise to cause her
assailant to flee from her apartment.  During their subsequent
investigation of the attack on Pliska, the police took oral swabs
from Pliska that tested positively for the presence of seminal
fluid.  The police created a DNA profile from that seminal fluid
and then entered that profile into the OSP unsolved crimes
database.  
In February 1998, the police arrested defendant for the
rape and attempted murder of Pliska.  Pursuant to a search
warrant, the police seized samples of defendant's blood, which
they submitted to the OSP laboratory for analysis.  The DNA
analysis of defendant's blood matched the DNA profiles of the
semen samples that the police had recovered from both Pliska and
Ferguson. 
In February 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to two
counts of aggravated murder for the deaths of Ferguson and
Rudiger, and to one count of attempted aggravated murder for the
attack on Pliska.  The court sentenced defendant to two
concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole for
the aggravated murder counts and to a 240-month consecutive
sentence for the attempted aggravated murder count. (4)  After
his convictions, pursuant to ORS 137.076, (5) the state took a
buccal sample from defendant, which it used to create a DNA
profile for defendant that it entered into the Oregon Convicted
Offender Database. 
In March 2001, defendant was indicted for one count of
aggravated murder for the death of Rickbeil after a database
search reportedly matched the DNA profile of defendant to the DNA
profile of the blood taken from the scene of the Rickbeil murder. 
The state informed the trial court that it planned to seek a
death sentence if defendant was convicted of that aggravated
murder charge.
Defendant's trial date first was set for May 28, 2002,
and then reset to September 5, 2002.  On July 3, 2002, defendant
moved for a continuance, because the parties had not completed
discovery and because defense counsel had needed to hire a new
investigator.  After defendant waived applicable speedy trial
requirements, (6) the trial court granted defendant's motion
and reset the trial date to August 18, 2003.
On March 19, 2003, defendant moved for another
continuance after one of his lawyers learned that the lawyer's
teenage son had been diagnosed with cancer.  After defendant
requested that the lawyer continue his representation and again
waived speedy trial requirements, the trial court granted
defendant's motion, setting the first omnibus hearing date to
December 4, 2003, and resetting the trial date to April 5, 2004. 
The trial court subsequently reset defendant's trial date to
April 23, 2004.  
In December 2003 and February 2004, the trial court
conducted several omnibus hearings to consider various pretrial
motions that the parties had filed in the case.  Although the
state reported that it planned to introduce evidence of
defendant's crimes against Ferguson, Rudiger, and Pliska if
defendant's trial proceeded to a penalty phase, the state did not
seek any pretrial ruling at those omnibus hearings as to whether
evidence of defendant's other crimes also would be admissible
during the guilt phase of defendant's aggravated murder trial.    
On April 1, 2004, approximately three weeks before his
trial was scheduled to begin, defendant filed another motion for
a continuance.  Also on April 1, 2004, the state filed a motion
asking the trial court to conduct another omnibus hearing to
determine the admissibility of certain photographs and writings
by defendant.  In addition to that motion, the state filed a
notice of intent to offer evidence relating to defendant's crimes
against Ferguson, Rudiger, and Pliska during the guilt phase,
rather than just the penalty phase, of defendant's trial.
The trial court held a hearing on the parties' motions
the next day.  At that hearing, defendant argued for a
continuance upon the ground that one of his lawyers was unable to
assist with his defense because that lawyer was occupied with
another aggravated murder penalty trial and was not certain that
he would be finished by the start of defendant's trial. 
Defendant also argued that a continuance would permit plea
negotiations to continue.  The trial court denied defendant's
motion, explaining that the court already had summoned thousands
of jurors for defendant's scheduled trial and that "the train has
left the station."  The trial court postponed argument on the
state's motion after asking the state to prepare a more specific
list of the evidence that it sought to introduce.     
On April 15, 2004, approximately one week before
defendant's trial was scheduled to begin, the trial court
conducted another omnibus hearing to determine the admissibility
of certain evidence that the state sought to introduce.  At that
hearing, among other things, the state sought a pretrial
determination of the admissibility of evidence of the Rudiger and
Ferguson murders and of the Pliska attempted murder during the
guilt phase, in addition to the penalty phase, of defendant's
trial.  The state argued that it sought to present evidence of
those other crimes to support its theory that defendant had
responded to setbacks in his personal life by murdering people
whom he did not know.  Specifically, the state asserted that it
sought to offer evidence that defendant had murdered Rudiger and
Ferguson on the same day that he had been fired from a job and
that defendant had attempted to murder Pliska shortly after he
had confided to a coworker that a woman had "jilted" him.  The
state asserted that that evidence was relevant to show
defendant's motive and intent in this case because the state also
planned to introduce evidence that Rickbeil had been murdered on
the same day that defendant had been fired from another job.  In
addition, the state contended that evidence of those other crimes
was necessary for the state to establish that defendant had
entered Rickbeil's apartment unlawfully because all witnesses who
had seen Rickbeil on the day of his murder now were deceased.  
For his part, among other things, defendant objected to
the tardiness of the state's motion to introduce other crimes
evidence during the guilt phase of his trial.  Specifically,
defendant contended that the timing of the state's motion
undermined his preparedness for trial, pointing out that, because
the state previously had taken the position that it would
introduce other crimes evidence only during a penalty phase,
defense counsel had investigated defendant's other crimes only to
the extent that they would be relevant to penalty-phase issues.
After hearing both parties' arguments, the trial court
ruled that it would allow the state to introduce evidence of the
Rudiger and Ferguson murders during the guilt phase of
defendant's trial for the noncharacter purposes of proving
defendant's motive and intent and proving the unlawfulness of
defendant's entry into Rickbeil's apartment.  The trial court
limited that ruling, however, by providing that the state could
not prove those murders through the testimony of the fathers of
Rudiger and Ferguson, who had discovered their children's bodies
after the murders.  In addition, the trial court ruled that it
would not permit the state to introduce evidence of the Pliska
attempted murder upon relevance grounds (7) and because "the
fact that Ms. Pliska herself would be here to testify to this
makes it more inflammatory and distracting."
The state did not object to the trial court's
limitation on the manner that it could prove the Rudiger and
Ferguson murders.  The state, however, filed a written motion
asking the trial court to reconsider its evidentiary ruling
respecting the Pliska attempted murder.  
The trial court held a hearing on the state's
reconsideration motion on April 21, 2004, two days before
defendant's scheduled trial.  At that hearing, the state argued
that evidence of the Pliska attempted murder was crucial for the
state to prove that defendant had entered Rickbeil's apartment
unlawfully and with the intent to kill.  Specifically, the state
urged that evidence of defendant's attempted murder of Pliska was
the most probative evidence of defendant's intent in this case
because Pliska was the "only living witness who can testify that
the defendant unlawfully entered her residence, a residence with
the intent to commit murder."  To reduce the risk of prejudice
from Pliska's testimony, the state offered to limit Pliska's
testimony by excluding any mention of defendant's sexual crimes
against her.  
After hearing arguments on the state's motion, the
trial court ruled that, in addition to evidence relating to the
Ferguson and Rudiger murders, the state also could introduce
evidence relating to defendant's attempted murder of Pliska
during the guilt phase of defendant's trial.  The trial court
further ruled, however, that the state could not prove that crime
by introducing testimony from Pliska herself because Pliska's
personal testimony would be unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. 
In making that second ruling, the court explained:
"* * * I think [that the evidence of defendant's attempted murder of Pliska] is in the same category as
the Rudiger and Ferguson evidence with the exception
that you want to put the victim on live.  And that, I
think, has the high potential of being an incendiary
moment in the trial, and it's just going to be totally
distracting.  So, if you can do this without bringing
her, and put on the same kind of evidence as to the
crime in her house that you're putting on with Rudiger
and Ferguson, I think my ruling would be the same. * * * I'm really concerned about that personal
appearance in front of a jury.  That's my only
concern."
After a recess, the state informed the trial court that
it had contemplated alternative means to prove defendant's
attempted murder of Pliska, but that it had concluded that
Pliska's personal testimony was "essential" to its case.  The
state then moved for a continuance to appeal the trial court's
OEC 403 ruling to this court.  The trial court denied that
motion, stating:
"Well, in my view, this is not a pretrial ruling
suppressing evidence.  This is a motion in limine on
the admissibility of evidence.  It is not appealable. 
You may try to mandamus it, I suppose. * * * I've made it very clear that I'm not suppressing evidence.  I
have simply made an evidentiary decision as to the
manner in which you may prove what you want to prove. 
I had agreed with you that you're entitled under 404 to
prove what you want to prove.  I have simply restricted
the manner in which you want to do that because of the
danger of unfair prejudice and inflaming the jury."
The state responded to the trial court's denial of its
motion for a continuance by stating that, unless it was able to
introduce Pliska's testimony during the guilt phase of
defendant's trial, then it was "unable to proceed" with the
prosecution.  Defendant responded by moving to dismiss the
indictment, and the trial court ruled that it would dismiss the
indictment without prejudice.  In doing so, the trial court
explained:
"[The court:] I'm not dismissing with prejudice. 
I'm saying if I dismiss without prejudice[,] you are
still free to re-file as a matter of procedure, are you
not?
"[The state:] We -- the State feels that it is,
but we also feel that we are entitled to appeal the
Court's order dismissing it.
"[The court:] And you well may be.  Well, I'm 
going to dismiss the indictment for the reason the
State is not ready after however many years this has
been since the indictment.  You've raised these 404
issues very late in the game, long after the jury was
summoned even.  I believe.  Is that right?
"[The state:] I'm not sure when the jury was
summoned, Your Honor.
"[The court:] Well, approximately five weeks ago. 
These things have been raised since that time.  They
are in the nature of motions in limine as to the
admissibility of evidence.  And as such, they are
within the discretion of the Court to rule on without
interference of appellate courts.
"Since [defendant] is in custody forever and ever,
you don't risk a [speedy trial] problem, if you take a
frivolous appeal, as I think it is, but it seems very
ill advised from the standpoint of orderly procedure of
both your office and the process of the Court.  And
obviously I cannot force you to trial, as far as I
know.  So I will take the other alternative and grant
the defense motion to dismiss the indictment.  And we
are done."
A week later, on April 28, 2004, defendant filed a
motion for a dismissal with prejudice and a judgment of acquittal
under ORS 136.130.  In that motion, defendant argued that
dismissal with prejudice was proper because the prosecutor's
refusal to proceed constituted "inexcusable neglect" of the
prosecution, noting specifically that the state had known of
defendant's other crimes long before the indictment in this case
even had been filed.  Defendant also contended that the state's
delay of his trial would prejudice his defense because three of
his penalty-phase witnesses -- namely, his aunt and stepmother,
who both had raised him, and his sixth-grade teacher, who still
communicated with him -- were either elderly or very ill. 
Finally, because he already was serving two "true-life" sentences
for his other crimes, defendant asserted that granting him a
judgment of acquittal would not frustrate the protection of the
public.
The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion
for a dismissal with prejudice and judgment of acquittal the next
day.  At the outset of that hearing, the trial court offered to
postpone arguments to allow the state the opportunity to file a
written response to defendant's motion for a dismissal with
prejudice.  The state declined the trial court's offer to delay
the hearing and also declined to file any written response to
defendant's motion.
At the hearing on defendant's motion, the state argued
that the trial court lacked discretion to dismiss the indictment
with prejudice because defendant had failed to show that the
state had neglected the prosecution or that delaying trial would
prejudice his defense.  The state pointed out that it had no duty
to provide pretrial notice of its intent to offer other crimes
evidence and that it previously had provided defendant with
discovery of all evidence relating to the Rudiger and Ferguson
murders and the Pliska attempted murder.  In response to the
trial court's questions about why the state had not filed a
notice of intent to introduce other crimes evidence during the
guilt phase "a year ago or six months ago," the prosecutor
explained that, although the witnesses had died some time ago,
the prosecutor had learned only four months earlier, in December
2003, that the witnesses who had seen Rickbeil on the day of his
murder now were deceased.  The prosecutor also noted that,
although the indictment against defendant had been filed three
years earlier, he had been assigned to the case only "about a
year, year and a half."
The trial court subsequently dismissed the indictment under ORS 136.120 (8) and entered an order of dismissal with
prejudice and a judgment of acquittal pursuant to ORS
136.130. (9)  In its written "Opinion and Order Dismissing
Indictment," the trial court explained its decision by stating:
"Because of the state's inexcusable neglect in its handling of this prosecution * * * culminating in its
claim of 'unable to proceed' less than 48 hours prior
to the time of trial that had been scheduled for more
than a year; because of the prejudice to this defendant
of the difficulty of calling at some indefinite time in
the future elderly or seriously ill witnesses who may
not be alive at the time of a trial at some future
indefinite date; because of the prejudice to the
defendant, and thus to the people of the State of
Oregon, who are paying for his defense, in re-scheduling defendant's expert witnesses, at more time
and expense; because of the unnecessary expense borne
by the people of the State of Oregon in calling 2500 of
what turned out to be unnecessary jurors; because even
a defendant already incarcerated on two true-life
sentences is prejudiced by the stress of being charged
in a death-penalty case that the state has declined to
negotiate, and thus his right to a speedy trial is
impinged by the state's neglect and the lengthy delay
that the state invites by its April 21 claim of 'unable
to proceed'; because in this case the public interest
is adequately protected because defendant is already
incarcerated on two true-life sentences, plus a
consecutive 240-month sentence; and because
'rehabilitation' of this offender is not an issue -- IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to ORS 136.120 and State v.
Cheshier, 41 Or App 141, 597 P2d 839 (1979), that
because 'the defendant appear[ed] for trial and the
district attorney [was] not ready and [did] not show
any sufficient cause for postponing the trial,' the
accusatory instrument is hereby dismissed."
(Emphasis in original.)
As noted above, the state filed this direct appeal to this court under ORS 138.060(2)(a) and (b), challenging both the
trial court's dismissal of the indictment with prejudice and the
trial court's OEC 403 ruling excluding the testimony of Pliska. 
Defendant argues that neither of those trial court orders are
appealable and, on cross-appeal, raises 15 assignments of error
relating to other pretrial rulings that the trial court made.  We
address both the parties' arguments below.
II.  STATE'S APPEAL
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
A threshold question in this case is whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide the state's
appeal. (10)  With the exception of certain instances of
original jurisdiction provided in Article VII (Amended), section
2, of the Oregon Constitution, (11) this court's jurisdiction
to hear and decide an appeal derives from statute.  McCarger v.
Moore, 89 Or 597, 599, 175 P 77 (1918).  Because this court lacks
judicial power to resolve any substantive issues in the absence
of appellate jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to
determine whether an appeal is statutorily authorized, and
parties to an appeal may not confer jurisdiction by either waiver
or agreement.  McEwen et ux v. McEwen et al, 203 Or 460, 470, 280
P2d 402 (1955).
ORS 138.060 governs the state's right to appeal in
criminal actions.  See State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607,
612, 956 P2d 202 (1998) ("ORS 138.020 limits appeals by the state
in criminal cases to those allowed by ORS 138.060.").  The
question whether ORS 138.060 authorizes the present appeal is one
of statutory interpretation, requiring us to discern the intent
of the legislature.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (court's task in
interpreting statutes is to discern legislature's intent).  To do
so, we first examine the text and context of the statute,
including this court's prior interpretations of the same statute
or earlier versions of that statute.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525,
532, 964 P2d 1007 (1998).
ORS 138.060 provides, in part:
"(1) The state may take an appeal from the circuit court to the Court of Appeals from:
"(a) An order made prior to trial dismissing or setting aside the accusatory instrument;
"* * * * *
"(c) An order made prior to trial suppressing
evidence;
"* * * * *
 "(i) An order dismissing an accusatory instrument under ORS 136.130.
"(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, when the state chooses to appeal from an order
listed in paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection, the
state shall take the appeal from the circuit court to
the Supreme Court if the defendant is charged with
murder or aggravated murder.  The orders to which this
subsection applies are:
"(a) An order made prior to trial suppressing evidence; and
"(b) An order made prior to trial dismissing or setting aside the accusatory instrument."
As noted previously, the state filed this direct appeal
to this court pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a) and (b), challenging
both the trial court's dismissal order and its OEC 403 ruling
concerning the testimony of Pliska.  In deciding whether we have
jurisdiction over this appeal, however, our initial inquiry
focuses upon only the state's right to appeal from the trial
court's dismissal order -- that is, whether the state's right to
appeal from "[a]n order made prior to trial dismissing or setting
aside the accusatory instrument" under ORS 138.060(2)(b)
encompasses the right to appeal from a pretrial order dismissing
the indictment with prejudice and entering a judgment of
acquittal under ORS 136.130.  Our jurisdiction to proceed depends
upon the answer to that question because, unless we have power to
reverse the trial court's dismissal of the indictment and
determine that we in fact should do so, then any decision that we
would make concerning the correctness of the trial court's OEC
403 ruling would have no practical effect upon the rights of the
parties and would constitute an advisory opinion.  See Yancy v.
Shatzer, 337 Or 345, 362-63, 97 P3d 1161 (2004) (Oregon state
courts lack authority to render advisory opinions).  We turn,
then, to our consideration of the scope of the state's right to
appeal under ORS 138.060(2)(b). (12)
Although a version of ORS 138.060 has been in effect
since the Deady Code of 1864, see General Laws of Oregon,
Criminal Code, chapter XXIII, section 227, page 480 (Deady 1845-1864), the legislature has made a number of significant
amendments to that statute since that time.  First, as discussed
in more detail below, the legislature gradually has broadened the
state's right to appeal in criminal actions by expanding the
types of trial court orders that are appealable under ORS
138.060.  After creating the Court of Appeals in 1969, the
legislature also initially transferred exclusive statutory
jurisdiction over all state appeals under ORS 138.060 from this
court to the Court of Appeals.  Or Laws 1969, ch 198, § 64.  In
2001, however, the legislature again amended ORS 138.060 to
return exclusive statutory jurisdiction to this court in state
appeals from certain pretrial orders in murder or aggravated
murder prosecutions.  Or Laws 2001, ch 870, § 4.  One of the
state appeals over which this court has exclusive statutory
jurisdiction in murder and aggravated murder prosecutions is an
appeal from "[a]n order made prior to trial dismissing or setting
aside the accusatory instrument" under ORS 138.060(2)(b).
Looking only at the text of ORS 138.060(2)(b), a
pretrial order dismissing an indictment with prejudice under ORS
136.130 appears to be a type of pretrial order "dismissing * * *
the accusatory instrument" within the meaning of ORS
138.060(2)(b).  As described more fully in our discussion on the
merits, ORS 136.120 authorizes a trial court to dismiss an
indictment when "the defendant appears for trial and the district
attorney is not ready and does not show any sufficient cause for
postponing the trial[.]"  ORS 136.130, in turn, prescribes the
effect of a pretrial dismissal under ORS 136.120 depending upon
the type of offense at issue.  In cases where the charged offense
is a felony or Class A misdemeanor, ORS 136.130 provides that
such a dismissal does not bar another prosecution for the same
offense unless the trial court "so directs."  If the trial court
orders the dismissal with prejudice, however, then ORS 136.130
requires the trial court to effectuate that order by entering a
judgment of acquittal.
Although a pretrial order dismissing the indictment
with prejudice under ORS 136.130 appears to fall within the
textual scope of ORS 138.060(2)(b), our examination of the
context of that provision initially points us to a contrary
reading.  That is so because, in contrast to subsection (2) of
ORS 138.060, which governs this court's exclusive statutory
jurisdiction over state appeals in criminal actions, subsection
(1) of ORS 138.060, which governs the Court of Appeals'
jurisdiction, lists two types of pretrial orders dismissing the
indictment that the state may appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (context includes other provisions of same
statute).  The first of those provisions -- now codified at ORS
138.060(1)(a) -- contains statutory wording identical to ORS
138.060(2)(b) and authorizes a state appeal to the Court of
Appeals from "[a]n order made prior to trial dismissing or
setting aside the accusatory instrument."
 In State v. Carrillo, 311 Or 61, 804 P2d 1161 (1991), this court construed the statutory provision now codified at ORS
138.060(1)(a).  In that case, focusing upon the absence of any
reference to a "judgment of acquittal," this court determined
that ORS 138.060 (1991) did not authorize a state appeal from a
dismissal with prejudice resulting in judgment of acquittal under
ORS 136.130.  In reaching that conclusion, this court opined that
"the legislature made a conscious policy decision not to allow
the state an appeal when a trial court orders the accusatory
instrument to be dismissed for the reasons stated in ORS 136.120,
directs that the order is a bar to another action for the same
crime, and signs a 'judgment of acquittal' pursuant to ORS
136.130."  Id. at 67.
Subsequently to this court's decision in Carrillo, the
legislature amended ORS 138.060 to add a provision -- now
codified at ORS 138.060(1)(i) -- that authorizes a state appeal
to the Court of Appeals from "[a]n order dismissing an accusatory
instrument under ORS 136.130."  Or Laws 1999, ch 946, § 2. 
Defendant correctly points out that, similarly to ORS
138.060(1)(a), ORS 138.060(1)(i) contains no explicit reference
to a "judgment of acquittal" under ORS 136.130.  Nevertheless, in
view of its unqualified reference to orders of dismissal under
ORS 136.130, the text of ORS 138.060(1)(i) makes clear that the
state may appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of
dismissal with prejudice under ORS 136.130.  Because ORS 136.130
directs that a judgment of acquittal must accompany any such
order, we conclude that the state's right to appeal from an order
of dismissal with prejudice under ORS 136.130 necessarily
encompasses the right to appeal from a judgment of acquittal
entered pursuant to that order.  The question remains, however,
whether ORS 138.060(2)(b) authorizes such appeals to this court
in murder and aggravated murder prosecutions.  
In construing statutes, we generally presume that the
legislature intended the same term in the same statute to have
the same meaning throughout that statute.  Penland v. Redwood
Sanitary Sewer Service Dist., 327 Or 1, 7, 956 P2d 964 (1998). 
We also generally presume that "use of a term in one section and
not in another section of the same statute indicates a purposeful
omission[.]"  PGE, 317 Or at 611.  If we were to apply only those
rules of textual construction to ORS 138.060(2)(b), then it would
appear to follow that, by using the same statutory wording in
subsection (2) of ORS 138.060 that this court had construed in
Carrillo, the legislature directed this court to have exclusive
statutory jurisdiction over state appeals from all pretrial
orders dismissing the indictment in murder and aggravated murder
prosecutions except those orders where the trial court had
dismissed the indictment with prejudice and entered a judgment of
acquittal pursuant to ORS 136.130.  As explained below, however,
other aspects of the context of ORS 138.060(2)(b) cause us to
question whether those rules of textual construction should
control our interpretation here.
In examining ORS 138.060 as a whole, we view as significant the types of state appeals that the legislature
selected for this court's exclusive statutory jurisdiction in
murder and aggravated murder prosecutions.  By contrast to other
types of orders that the state may appeal to the Court of Appeals
under ORS 138.060(1), (13) the state appeals over which this
court has exclusive statutory jurisdiction in murder and
aggravated murder prosecutions -- that is, state appeals from
pretrial orders suppressing evidence and state appeals from
pretrial orders dismissing the indictment -- are both types of
state appeals that uniquely may implicate speedy trial
requirements.  That is so because, if the state prevails in an
appeal from a pretrial order in a criminal prosecution, then the
state must reinitiate the prosecution, and the pretrial delay
stemming from the state's appeal may give rise to a speedy trial
violation.  See State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 90, 11 P3d 641
(2000) (observing that "[t]he state always must exercise its
statutory right to appeal in a manner that is consistent with its
constitutional obligation" under Article I, section 10, of Oregon
Constitution to bring accused to trial "without delay").  By
contrast, state appeals from post-verdict orders or judgments do
not implicate speedy trial requirements, because those appeals
proceed after the state has obtained a conviction and, if the
state prevails in those appeals, then the state is entitled to
reinstatement of the verdict.  See State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554,
558, 771 P2d 264 (1989) (noting that successful state appeal from
motion for new trial or motion for arrest of judgment restores
earlier conviction).  Thus, by selecting only pretrial state
appeals for this court's exclusive statutory jurisdiction in
murder and aggravated murder prosecutions, the legislature
appears to have intended to minimize the risk of speedy trial
violations in cases involving those serious criminal charges. 
Because the risk of speedy trial violations is equally great in
state appeals from orders dismissing the indictment without
prejudice and orders dismissing the indictment with prejudice,
that context strongly suggests to us that the legislature
intended this court to have exclusive statutory jurisdiction over
both types of dismissals in those prosecutions. 
Because the legislature's intent is unclear when the
text of ORS 138.060(2)(b) is viewed in the above-described
context, we turn to the legislative history of ORS 138.060(2)(b)
for further guidance.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611-12 (court considers
legislative history of statute if legislature's intent is not
clear from text and context).  That history reveals that the 2001
Legislative Assembly enacted subsection (2) to ORS 138.060,
giving this court exclusive statutory jurisdiction over state
appeals from pretrial orders suppressing evidence or dismissing
the indictment in murder and aggravated murder prosecutions, in
response to this court's decision in Harberts, 331 Or at 72. 
Tape Recording, House Floor Proceeding, HB 2918, July 5, 2001,
Tape 240, Side A (statement of Rep Max Williams).  In Harberts,
this court vacated a criminal defendant's conviction and sentence
of death for aggravated murder after concluding that the state
had violated the state constitutional speedy trial requirements
as the result of delay from state appeals of pretrial suppression
orders.  In explaining the purpose of the bill that became ORS
138.060(2), Senator Kate Brown stated during Senate floor
proceedings that the bill served to prevent speedy trial
violations.  Tape Recording, Senate Floor Proceeding, HB 2918,
July 5, 2001, Tape 278, Side A (statement of Senator Kate Brown). 
Because, as noted above, state appeals from all forms of pretrial
dismissals carry the same risk of speedy trial violations, that
history convinces us that the legislature intended this court to
have exclusive statutory jurisdiction over state appeals from all
pretrial orders dismissing an indictment in murder and aggravated
murder prosecutions, including pretrial orders dismissing an
indictment with prejudice and entering a judgment of acquittal
pursuant to ORS 136.130.
In sum, after examining the text, context, and
legislative history of ORS 138.060(2)(b), we conclude that the
state's right to appeal from "[a]n order made prior to trial
dismissing or setting aside the accusatory instrument" under ORS
138.060(2)(b) encompasses the right to appeal from a pretrial
order dismissing the indictment with prejudice and entering a
judgment of acquittal under ORS 136.130.  Having so concluded, we
now turn to the merits of the state's appeal. (14)
B. Trial Court's Dismissal of the Indictment under ORS 136.120
and Dismissal with Prejudice and Entry of Judgment of
Acquittal under ORS 136.130
As noted previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at 20), any
ultimate ruling on our part respecting the correctness of the
trial court's OEC 403 ruling would have no practical effect upon
the parties if the trial court's dismissal of the indictment was
proper.  Thus, in addressing the merits of the state's appeal, we
begin our analysis by considering whether the trial court erred
by dismissing the indictment against defendant with prejudice in
response to the state's refusal to proceed with the prosecution. 
Before turning to the parties' arguments concerning that
question, we first describe the relevant statutory framework.  
ORS 136.120 governs the propriety of the trial court's
dismissal of the indictment in this case.  That statute provides:
"If, when the case is called for trial, the
defendant appears for trial and the district attorney
is not ready and does not show any sufficient cause for
postponing the trial, the court shall order the
accusatory instrument to be dismissed, unless, being of
the opinion that the public interests require the
accusatory instrument to be retained for trial, the
court directs it to be retained."
(Emphasis added.)  When a trial court dismisses an accusatory
instrument pursuant to ORS 136.120, ORS 136.130 prescribes the
effect of that dismissal.  That statute provides:
"If the court orders the accusatory instrument to
be dismissed and the instrument charges a felony or
Class A misdemeanor, the order is not a bar to another
action for the same crime unless the court so directs. 
If the court does so direct, judgment of acquittal
shall be entered.  If the accusatory instrument charges
an offense other than a felony or Class A misdemeanor,
the order of dismissal shall be a bar to another action
for the same offense." 
(Emphasis added.)
ORS 136.120 is one of the statutory mechanisms that the
legislature has adopted to effectuate the speedy trial
requirement under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution.  See State v. Clark, 86 Or 464, 468, 168 P 944
(1917) (so stating); see also ORS 135.745 (authorizing trial
court to dismiss prosecution if accusatory instrument not filed
within 30 days unless good cause shown); ORS 135.747 (authorizing
trial court to dismiss accusatory instrument if defendant not
brought to trial within reasonable period of time).  That statute
authorizes a trial court to dismiss an accusatory instrument in a
criminal prosecution only if the prosecutor is not ready for
trial and is unable to show "any sufficient cause" for postponing
the defendant's trial.  Thus, when a prosecutor is not ready for
trial, and the defendant moves for dismissal, then ORS 136.120
first requires the trial court to determine whether the
prosecutor has shown "any sufficient cause" for postponing the
defendant's trial. 
By its terms, the initial inquiry under ORS 136.120 --
whether the prosecutor has shown "any sufficient cause" for
postponing a defendant's trial -- examines whether the prosecutor
has shown reasons that objectively justify the postponement of
the trial.  As a result of that focus, whether or not delaying
trial will prejudice the defendant is not part of the trial
court's initial determination as to whether it has authority
under ORS 136.120 to dismiss the indictment.  Cf. State v. Emery,
318 Or 460, 465-66, 869 P2d 859 (1994) (rejecting notion that ORS
135.747 requires showing of prejudice to defendant for trial
court to dismiss accusatory instrument when defendant is not
brought to trial "within a reasonable period of time").  Because
the determination whether the prosecutor has shown "any
sufficient cause" for postponement involves a determination that
is capable of only one legally correct outcome, we review that
determination for errors of law.
If the trial court determines that the prosecutor has
failed to show "any sufficient cause" for postponing trial, then
the next step under ORS 136.120 is to determine whether dismissal
is proper.  Although ORS 136.120 provides that the trial court
"shall" dismiss the indictment in such circumstances, that
statute does not require the trial court to do so if the trial
court is "of the opinion that the public interests require the
accusatory instrument to be retained for trial[.]"  Because ORS
136.120 delegates to the trial court's "opinion" the
determination whether "the public interests require the
accusatory instrument to be retained," we review a trial court's
ultimate decision whether to dismiss an indictment under ORS
136.120 for abuse of discretion.  See State v. Rogers, 330 Or
282, 310-12, 4 P3d 1261 (2000) (appellate court reviews for abuse
of discretion when application of legal rule capable of more than
one legally correct outcome).  
 As noted above, if the trial court has authority to dismiss the accusatory instrument under ORS 136.120, and the
trial court elects to do so, then ORS 136.130 prescribes the
effect of that dismissal.  In cases where the accusatory
instrument charges an offense other than a felony or Class A
misdemeanor, ORS 136.130 provides that a dismissal under ORS
136.120 operates to bar another prosecution for the same offense. 
By contrast, in cases where the charged offense is a felony or
Class A misdemeanor, ORS 136.130 provides that a dismissal under
ORS 136.120 does not operate to bar another prosecution unless
the trial court "so directs."  Because ORS 136.130 confers the
trial court with authority to direct a dismissal with prejudice,
but provides no criteria for its exercise, it follows that the
trial court's decision to dismiss with prejudice under ORS
136.130 is a discretionary one.  Consequently, we also review
that decision for abuse of discretion.
With that background in mind, we now return to the
trial court's dismissal of the indictment in this case.  The
state contends that the trial court exceeded its authority under
ORS 136.120 in dismissing the indictment against defendant
because the state's intent to appeal from the trial court's OEC
403 ruling concerning Pliska's testimony constituted "any
sufficient cause" for postponing defendant's trial.  If that
contention is wrong -- that is, if the trial court possessed
authority to dismiss the indictment under ORS 136.120 and did not
abuse its discretion in doing so -- then the state next argues
that the trial court abused its discretion under ORS 136.130 by
dismissing the indictment with prejudice and entering a judgment
of acquittal.  For the reasons explained below, we agree with the
state's first argument and, consequently, do not reach its second
one.   
In State v. Caruso, 289 Or 315, 613 P2d 752 (1980),
this court considered the propriety of a trial court's dismissal
of an accusatory instrument after the state refused to proceed
with the prosecution because it wished to appeal a trial court's
denial of its request for a pretrial omnibus hearing under ORS
135.037. (15)  In considering that question, this court first
determined that ORS 138.060 did not authorize the state to appeal
from a trial court order denying a pretrial omnibus hearing.  Id.
at 321.  After making that determination, this court went on to
conclude that the trial court's dismissal of the accusatory
instrument was proper there because, in light of the state's
refusal to proceed, the trial court had "scant alternative to
dismissal."  Id. at 322.  In reaching that conclusion, however,
this court took care to stress that the state's refusal to
proceed in the face of a nonappealable ruling "is to be
distinguished from cases where appealable orders are followed by
dismissal."  Id. at 322 n 6 (citing State v. Hoare, 20 Or App
439, 532 P2d 240 (1975), and State v. Knudsen, 41 Or App 123, 597
P2d 834 (1979)).
In the present case, the trial court was of the view that, as was true in Caruso, the state did not have the right to
obtain appellate review of the trial court's OEC 403 ruling
excluding Pliska's testimony.  On the basis of that conclusion,
the trial court determined that it had authority to dismiss the
indictment against defendant because the state had failed to show
"any sufficient cause" for postponing defendant's trial under ORS
136.120.  As explained below, however, that predicate
determination concerning the appealability of the trial court's
OEC 403 ruling was erroneous.  Because the state had the right to
appeal that ruling, the trial court did not have authority under
ORS 136.120 to dismiss the indictment against defendant.
As set out previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at 19), ORS
138.060(2)(a) authorizes a state appeal from "[a]n order made
prior to trial suppressing evidence."  In State v. Koennecke, 274
Or 169, 545 P2d 127 (1976), this court considered the scope of
the state's right to appeal under that statutory wording.  In
that case, the state had sought to appeal from a pretrial order
excluding the testimony of two police officers based upon those
officers' refusal to comply with a trial court order to produce
certain evidence to the defense.  In deciding that the state had
statutory authority to appeal that ruling, this court concluded
that the state's right to appeal from a pretrial order
"suppressing evidence" under ORS 138.060 extended to any pretrial
order excluding evidence.  Id. at 172-73.  Applying that holding
in Koennecke to the circumstances at issue here, it is clear that
the trial court's OEC 403 order excluding Pliska's testimony was
a pretrial order "suppressing evidence" within the meaning of ORS
138.060(2)(a).  Under ORS 138.020, the state may appeal from such
an order as "a matter of right[.]"  The trial court erred in
concluding otherwise.  
We recognize, as the trial court did, that the state's
decision to appeal from a pretrial ruling is one that may add
significant delay to the time before which a defendant is brought
to trial.  We also recognize, as the trial court did, that the
state's delay of defendant's criminal trial in this case may
carry the risk of prejudice to the defense.  Nevertheless, the
state apparently determined, even if it did so belatedly, that
Pliska's testimony was sufficiently important to its case to
warrant the delay and interruption that attends a pretrial appeal
from an exclusionary ruling.  Because the state alone must make
that prosecutorial judgment, we conclude that, notwithstanding
the state's tardiness in seeking the trial court's ruling, the
state's intent to appeal from the trial court's OEC 403 order
excluding Pliska's testimony necessarily constituted "any
sufficient cause" under ORS 136.120 for postponing defendant's
trial.  Consequently, we conclude that the trial court exceeded
its authority under ORS 136.120 in dismissing the indictment
against defendant.
C. Trial Court's Exclusion of Pliska's Testimony under OEC 403
Having concluded that the trial court exceeded its
authority under ORS 136.120 in dismissing the indictment against
defendant, we next consider whether the trial court erred by
excluding the testimony of Pliska during the guilt phase of
defendant's trial pursuant to OEC 403.  As noted previously, the
trial court determined that, with the exception of her personal
testimony, evidence of defendant's attempted murder of Pliska was
admissible under OEC 404(3), set out at __ Or at __ n 2 (slip op
at 1 n 2).  This court previously has explained the test for
determining the admissibility of other crimes evidence under OEC
404(3):
"A three-part test governs the admissibility of 'other crimes' evidence under OEC 404(3):  (1) The
evidence must be independently relevant for a
noncharacter purpose [such as intent or motive]; (2)
the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient
proof that the uncharged misconduct was committed and
that defendant committed it; and (3) the probative
value of the uncharged misconduct evidence must not be
substantially outweighed by the dangers or
considerations set forth in OEC 403.  Each of these
requirements must be satisfied before uncharged
misconduct evidence is admissible under OEC 404(3)." 
State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195, 832 P2d 443 (1992) (footnotes
omitted); see also State v. Cox, 337 Or 477, 483-84, 98 P3d 1103
(2004) (applying same test). 
In this case, the trial court determined that the state
had satisfied the first two parts of the above-described test
under OEC 404(3), that is, the state had shown that evidence of
defendant's attempted murder of Pliska was relevant for a
noncharacter purpose (16) and had offered sufficient proof that
defendant had committed that crime.  In considering the third
part of the test, however, the trial court held that, although
the state could prove defendant's attempted murder of Pliska in a
different way, Pliska's personal testimony was inadmissible
during the guilt phase of defendant's trial under OEC 403.
In challenging the trial court's ruling, the state
first appears to contend that the trial court erred by applying
OEC 403 at all in deciding the admissibility of Pliska's
testimony during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. 
Specifically, the state points out that, in criminal cases, OEC
404(4) (17) now authorizes a trial court to exclude relevant
evidence of a defendant's other crimes under OEC 403 only "to the
extent required by the United States Constitution or the Oregon
Constitution[.]"  According to the state, no state or federal
constitutional provision "required the trial court to conduct
[OEC 403] balancing[,] * * * let alone conclude that such
balancing should result in excluding [Pliska's] testimony[.]"  
Defendant responds that, regardless of the merits of
the state's argument in that regard, OEC 404(4) may not be
applied to his criminal trial because such an application would
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. (18)  We
agree with defendant and, consequently, conclude that the trial
court did not err by applying OEC 403 to decide the admissibility
of Pliska's testimony in the guilt phase of defendant's trial.
In State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 213, 26 P3d 802 (2001),
this court explained that the ex post facto clause in Article I,
section 21, prohibits the application of "laws that alter the
rules of evidence in a one-sided way that makes conviction of the
defendant more likely" than the conviction would have been at the
time when the defendant allegedly committed the charged offense. 
To the extent that it purports to limit the trial court's
authority under OEC 403 to exclude relevant, but prejudicial,
evidence of a defendant's other crimes to only those
circumstances when exclusion is constitutionally required, OEC
404(4) clearly qualifies as an evidentiary change in the law that
favors only the prosecution by making the conviction of a
defendant more likely.  See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence
(4th ed 2002) at IV-95 (opining that "courts wishing to avoid
potentially unconstitutional application of OEC 404(4) should
apply full OEC 403 balancing to [prior bad acts] evidence."). 
Thus, although OEC 404(4) ostensibly applies to defendant's
criminal trial, see Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 313, section 38
(providing that OEC 404(4) "appl[ies] to all criminal actions
pending or commenced on or after December 5, 1996"), we conclude
that Article I, section 21, prohibits its application here
because the 1991 murder that defendant allegedly committed
occurred before the enactment of OEC 404(4) in 1997.  See Or Laws
1997, ch 313, § 29 (enacting OEC 404(4)); Fugate, 332 Or at 214-15 (concluding that retroactive application of different
evidentiary provision set out in Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 313,
would violate state ex post facto protection).
Having concluded that OEC 404(4) did not limit the
trial court's authority to exclude Pliska's testimony under OEC
403, we now turn to the merits of the trial court's OEC 403
ruling.  As set out previously, OEC 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Under OEC 403, evidence introduced over a defendant's
objection is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is
harmful to the defense.  State v. Lyons, 324 Or 256, 280, 924 P2d
802 (1996).  Instead, in deciding whether evidence is unfairly
prejudicial under OEC 403, the critical inquiry is whether the
evidence improperly "appeals to the preferences of the trier of
fact for reasons that are unrelated to the power of the evidence
to establish a material fact."  State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 87,
969 P2d 1013 (1998), cert den, 528 US 1135 (2000).
In State v. Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 645, 733 P2d 438
(1987), this court explained that deciding whether relevant other
crimes evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial under
OEC 403 requires the trial court to apply a four-step analysis. 
First, the trial court must assess the state's need for the
evidence.  Id.  Secondly, the trial court must determine how
prejudicial the evidence is, that is, to what extent the evidence
may distract the jury from the issues of the defendant's trial. 
Id.  Thirdly, the court must weigh the state's need for the
evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice against the
defendant.  Id.  Finally, as its fourth step, the trial court
must make a "ruling to admit all the [state's] evidence, to
exclude all the [state's] evidence[,] or to admit only part of
the evidence."  Id.  Although we examine whether the trial court
properly applied the balancing test that OEC 403 prescribes for
errors of law, we review the trial court's ultimate determination
as to whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403 for
abuse of discretion.  See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 332 Or
59, 71-72, 23 P3d 320 (2001) (applying that analysis).  This
court grants a trial court "broad discretion" under OEC 403 when
the trial court makes findings on the record that support its
discretionary ruling.  See Cox, 337 Or at 487 (so stating).
With those considerations in mind, we examine the trial
court's determination in this case that the risk of unfair
prejudice and confusion of the issues "substantially outweighed"
the probative value of Pliska's testimony during the guilt phase
of defendant's criminal trial.  In reaching that determination,
the trial court appears to have accepted the state's assertion
that it had a strong need for evidence of defendant's attempted
murder of Pliska to prove defendant's intent and motive in
Rickbeil's murder.  Indeed, as a general matter, the trial court
concluded that the risk of unfair prejudice resulting from
evidence of defendant's attempted murder of Pliska did not
outweigh its probative value.  Despite that ruling, however, the
trial court determined that Pliska's personal testimony was
inadmissible under OEC 403 because it was concerned that Pliska's
testimony would create an "incendiary moment in the trial" and
that her testimony would be "totally distracting."  As we
understand the trial court, it was concerned both that Pliska's
testimony would be emotional in light of defendant's violent
crimes against her and that her personal testimony would have the
effect of distracting the jury from the issues that the state
needed to prove in this case. 
The state does not dispute, and we conclude, that the
trial court applied the balancing test under OEC 403 properly. 
Instead, the state contends that the trial court abused its
discretion under OEC 403 in excluding the testimony of Pliska
because, according to the state, the trial court's ruling was
premised upon the "unwarranted assumption" that Pliska would
become "emotionally overwrought or hysterical on the witness
stand."  In oral argument before this court, the state more
specifically argued that the trial court's exclusion of Pliska's
testimony during the guilt phase of defendant's trial was based,
at least in part, upon gender stereotypes that the trial court
held about the capacity of female witnesses to control their
emotions.  We first reject that refinement of the state's
argument.   
In explaining its concerns about Pliska's testimony
during the guilt phase of defendant's trial, the trial court
stated, among other things:
"[W]e're all lawyers, and we're involved, and we
can -- we can talk about [defendant's prior crimes] in
a cut-and-dry way, but [Pliska is] going to be here [if
she testifies].  She's going to see [defendant].  I
mean, how is she not going to react to just -- I mean,
as the psychiatrists say, and react all over again?"
Even if we were to agree that the foregoing comment could be read
as a form of impermissible gender stereotyping -- and we do not
agree as to that reading -- other parts of the record demonstrate
that the judge's intentions were otherwise.  Most notably, in
ruling that the state could not prove the Rudiger and Ferguson
murders through the testimony of their fathers, the trial court
expressed a similar concern about those male witnesses. 
Specifically, the trial court explained its exclusionary ruling
as to the fathers' testimony by stating:
"Well, I think for the same reason that I don't
want to hear from Ms. Pliska during the guilt phase, I
wouldn't want to hear from witnesses describing
Rudiger's and Ferguson's crime scene who are going to
be testifying with emotional baggage, when we can hear
from detectives or someone else to establish the
facts." 
As we understand the trial court's statements, the
trial court was concerned about admitting testimony from both
Pliska and the fathers of Rudiger and Ferguson during the guilt
phase of defendant's trial, because, as the victims of
defendant's crimes, it would be normal for all those witnesses to
have strong emotions about the crimes and to express those
emotions in their testimony.  We do not view that concern as
relating to the witnesses' gender in any way.
We, however, disagree with the trial court that it had
authority to exclude Pliska's testimony on that basis.  Unlike
the fathers of Rudiger and Ferguson, Pliska could testify as to
her personal knowledge of defendant's entry into her apartment
and his attempt to murder her.  In addition, from our examination
of the record, the trial court's concern that Pliska would not be
a controlled, objective witness appears to have been only
speculation.  If the trial court had a concern that Pliska's
testimony might be overly emotional, then the trial court's
proper course would be to instruct Pliska and the state to avoid
any emotionalism that might distract the jury.  We conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion under OEC 403 in choosing
instead to exclude Pliska's testimony altogether as unfairly
prejudicial.
III.  DEFENDANT'S CROSS-APPEAL
Having disposed of the state's assignments of error on
appeal, we turn to the assignments of error that defendant raises
on cross-appeal.  ORS 138.040 governs a defendant's right to
cross-appeal when, as in this case, the state files a pretrial
appeal pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a).  ORS 138.040 provides, in
part:
"Except as provided under ORS 138.050, the
defendant may appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
judgment or order described under ORS 138.053 in a
circuit court, and may cross-appeal when the state
appeals pursuant to ORS 138.060 (1)(c) or (2)(a).  The
following apply upon such appeal or cross-appeal:
"(1) The appellate court may review:
"(a) Any decision of the court in an intermediate
order or proceeding."
(Emphasis added.)  By providing that this court "may" review any
intermediate decision of the trial court on a defendant's cross-appeal from a state appeal under ORS 138.060(2)(a), ORS 138.040
reserves to this court's sound discretion the decision whether to
undertake such a review.  Cf. Western Helicopter Services v.
Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 364, 811 P2d 627 (1991) (reaching
same conclusion under ORS 28.200 in light of legislature's use of
word "may" in that statute).  Because this court previously has
not identified the circumstances under which we will elect to
exercise our statutory discretion to review a defendant's cross-appeal under ORS 138.040, we take the opportunity to do so here.  
As an initial matter, we recognize that the state's
right to a pretrial appeal under ORS 138.060(2)(a) is an
exceptional procedure that the legislature devised in light of
the state's inability to appeal from an evidentiary ruling of the
trial court after the attachment of jeopardy.  See Caruso, 289 Or
at 320 (noting same).  Unlike the state, however, a defendant has
the full opportunity to appeal any intermediate adverse trial
court ruling if that defendant is convicted of a criminal
offense.  Id. at 319.  Further, if a defendant ultimately is
acquitted, then any challenges that defendant raises to a trial
court's intermediate rulings become moot.  Thus, judicial economy
supports ordinarily limiting appellate review of a defendant's
challenges to a trial court's intermediate rulings until, and
only if, the defendant is convicted of a criminal offense.  Cf.
State v. George, 337 Or 329, 340-41, 97 P3d 656 (2004)
(concluding that it would be inappropriate to address certain of
defendant's assignments of error when defendant's convictions
reversed and remanded for new trial on other grounds).   
Secondly, and more importantly, because a state
pretrial appeal under ORS 138.060(2)(a) necessarily prolongs the
restraint of a criminal defendant before any trial can be had, we
view as paramount the need to resolve such appeals quickly and
efficiently.  See Harberts, 331 Or at 83 ("[p]retrial
imprisonment in connection with pending charges 'shortens the
constitutionally permissible measure of delay'" (quoting Haynes
v. Burks, 290 Or 75, 83, 619 P2d 632 (1980))).  In view of the
considerable delay that entertaining a cross-appeal might add to
that resolution, that consideration also strongly supports the
view that this court should limit the exercise of its discretion
under ORS 138.040 to review a defendant's challenges to a trial
court's intermediate rulings raised by cross-appeal.
Having identified why we conclude that we should
exercise our discretion to consider a defendant's cross-appeal
under ORS 138.040 only sparingly, the question that remains is
under which circumstances this court will do that.  In light of
the considerations articulated above, we conclude that, in
respect of a defendant's cross-appeal, this court's ordinary
practice will be to limit its consideration only to those
assignments of error that are inextricably linked, either
factually or legally, to the state's assignments of error on
appeal.  Only under those circumstances can we reasonably be
assured that our review of a defendant's assignments of error on
cross-appeal will not contribute unnecessarily to the delay from
a state pretrial appeal under ORS 136.060(2)(a).  In this case,
with the exception of his challenge to the relevance of the other
crimes evidence that we discussed previously, __ Or at __ n 16
(slip op at 38 n 16), all the assignments of error that defendant
raises on cross-appeal go beyond the scope of the state's appeal. 
We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to address any of
defendant's other assignments of error on cross-appeal at this
time. (19)
IV.  CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that ORS 138.060(2) authorizes the
state's appeal to this court.  Because we conclude that ORS
136.120 did not authorize it to do so, we reverse the trial
court's order dismissing the indictment and entering a judgment
of acquittal.  In addition, we reverse the trial court's OEC 403
ruling excluding Pliska's testimony.  Finally, we reject
defendant's challenge to the relevance of the other crimes
evidence and decline to address the merits of the other
assignments of error that defendant raises on cross-appeal. 
On appeal, the order of the circuit court dismissing
the indictment and the judgment of acquittal are reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings.  Cross-appeal
dismissed.
1. OEC 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
2. OEC 404(3) provides:
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident."
3. ORS 163.095 provides, in part:
"As used in ORS 163.105 and this section,
'aggravated murder' means murder as defined in ORS
163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied by,
any of the following circumstances:
"(2)* * *
"(d) Notwithstanding ORS 163.115 (1)(b), the
defendant personally and intentionally committed the
homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS
163.115 (1)(b)."
See also ORS 163.115(1)(b) (defining crime of felony murder).
4. Defendant did not appeal those convictions or seek
post-conviction relief. 
5. As relevant here, ORS 137.076 requires a felon in the
custody of the Department of Corrections to provide a blood or
buccal sample to the Department of Corrections for transmission
to the Oregon State Police.  See ORS 137.076 (so providing).
6. Both statutory and constitutional law mandate that the
state provide a speedy trial to a defendant charged with a
criminal offense.  ORS 135.747 provides that the state must bring
a criminal defendant to trial "within a reasonable period of
time[.]"  Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part, that "justice shall be administered * * *
without delay[.]"  The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution similarly provides, in part, that, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial[.]"  The Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 US 213, 87 S Ct
988, 18 L Ed 2d 1 (1967).
7. The trial court appeared to question the relevance of
evidence of the Pliska attempted murder to the murder at issue in
this case because of dissimilarities between those crimes,
including: (1) defendant had not been fired from a job on the day
of the attack on Pliska; (2) the attack on Pliska had involved
"solely a female victim" and had been "a sexual crime"; and (3)
the weapon used in the Pliska attack had been a gun, rather than
a knife. 
8. ORS 136.120 provides:
"If, when the case is called for trial, the
defendant appears for trial and the district attorney
is not ready and does not show any sufficient cause for
postponing the trial, the court shall order the
accusatory instrument to be dismissed, unless, being of
the opinion that the public interests require the
accusatory instrument to be retained for trial, the
court directs it to be retained."
We note that, although a trial court's authority to dismiss an
accusatory instrument under ORS 136.120 arises only "when the
case is called for trial," the dismissal in this case was not
premature, because the state had informed the trial court that it
would not proceed with the prosecution.  See Daugharty v.
Gladden, 217 Or 567, 578, 341 P2d 1069 (1959) ("[T]he law will
not require the doing of a useless act."). 
9. ORS 136.130 provides:
"If the court orders the accusatory instrument to
be dismissed and the instrument charges a felony or
Class A misdemeanor, the order is not a bar to another
action for the same crime unless the court so directs. 
If the court does so direct, judgment of acquittal
shall be entered.  If the accusatory instrument charges
an offense other than a felony or Class A misdemeanor,
the order of dismissal shall be a bar to another action
for the same offense."  
10. On May 27, 2004, defendant filed a "Motion for
Summary Determination of Appellate Jurisdiction" with this
court pursuant to ORS 19.235 and ORAP 2.35.  This court
denied that motion on July 27, 2004, with leave for
defendant to renew that motion in his brief on the merits.
11. Article VII (Amended), section 2, provides, in
part, that "the supreme court may, in its own discretion,
take original jurisdiction in mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus proceedings." 
12. We note that both defendant and the state appear
to presume that, if ORS 138.060(1) authorizes a state appeal
to the Court of Appeals from a dismissal with prejudice
resulting in a judgment of acquittal under ORS 136.130, then
the present appeal properly is before this court by
operation of ORS 138.060(2)(b).  The parties' failure to
address ORS 138.060(2)(b) does not prevent this court from
doing so, however, because we have an independent duty to
confirm the existence of our jurisdiction, as well as a duty
to discern the legislature's intent when interpreting a
statute.  See Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722
(1997) ("In construing a statute, this court is responsible
for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not
asserted by the parties.").    
13. Along with the pretrial orders set out previously,
__ Or at __ (slip op at 18-19), ORS 138.060(1) authorizes
state appeals to the Court of Appeals from certain post-verdict orders or judgments, including: (1) an order
arresting the judgment, ORS 138.060(1)(b); (2) a judgment of
conviction based on the sentence as provided in ORS 138.222,
ORS 138.060(1)(e); (3) an order made after a guilty finding
dismissing or setting aside the accusatory instrument, ORS
138.060(1)(g); and (4) an order granting a new trial, ORS
138.060(1)(h).  In addition, ORS 138.060 authorizes state
appeals from "[a]n order made prior to trial for the return
or restoration of things seized[,]" ORS 138.060(1)(d); and
"[a]n order in a probation revocation hearing finding that a
defendant who was sentenced to probation under ORS 137.712
has not violated a condition of probation by committing a
new crime[,]" ORS 138.060(1)(f).  
14. Defendant also argues that this court should not
reach the merits of the state's appeal because, according to
defendant, the state "invited" the trial court's dismissal
of the indictment.  To the extent that defendant is invoking
the principle that invited error cannot serve as the basis
for reversal, see, e.g., Clay/Luttrell v. Pay Less Drug
Stores, 276 Or 673, 677, 556 P2d 125 (1976) (so stating), we
reject defendant's argument.  The state did not advise the
trial court to dismiss the indictment and, indeed,
specifically stressed to the trial court that the state was
not moving to dismiss the indictment by refusing to proceed
with the prosecution.  Cf. State v. Koennecke, 274 Or 169,
173-74, 545 P2d 127 (1976) (although order excluding
testimony of two state witnesses was appealable order under
ORS 138.060, state had invited challenged error by advising
trial court to enter order). 
15. ORS 135.037 provides, in part:
"(1) At any time after the filing of the
accusatory instrument in circuit court and before the
commencement of trial thereon, the court upon motion of
any party shall, and upon its own motion may, order an
omnibus hearing."
(Emphasis added.)
16. In one of his assignments of error on cross-appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that evidence of defendant's crimes against
Pliska, Ferguson, and Rudiger was relevant to any issue in
the guilt phase of defendant's trial.  OEC 401 provides that
evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."  We reject
defendant's argument that the trial court erred in
concluding that evidence of defendant's other crimes was
relevant, because we agree with the trial court that that
evidence had a tendency to prove defendant's motive and
intent.
17. OEC 404(4) provides, in part:
"In criminal actions, evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts by the defendant is admissible if
relevant except as otherwise provided by:
"(a) ORS 40.180, 40.185, 40.190, 40.195, 40.200, 40.205, 40.210 and, to the extent required by the
United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution,
ORS 40.160[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 40.160 adopts OEC 403.
18. Article I, section 21, provides, in part, that
"[n]o ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed * * *."
19. In addition to his challenge to the relevance of
the other crimes evidence, defendant's assignments of error
on cross-appeal include: (1) whether the trial court erred
in admitting certain of defendant's statements to the
police; (2) whether the trial court erred in overruling
defendant's demurrer to the indictment and in failing to
dismiss the indictment because it was "tainted" by illegally
obtained evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by
failing to suppress the results of the DNA comparison using
defendant's buccal sample, taken pursuant to ORS 137.076,
because the police lacked probable cause to believe that he
had committed a crime; (4) whether the trial court had erred
by denying defendant's request for "certain DNA materials,
including access to information in the CODIS database"; (5)
whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to declare ORS 163.150 unconstitutional; (6) whether the
trial court erred by overruling defendant's motion to
preclude a conviction for "capital aggravated murder"
because the indictment did not allege "deliberateness"; (7)
whether the trial court erred by overruling defendant's
"Request for Proportionality Review"; (8) whether the trial
court erred by denying defendant's motion to require the
prosecution "to declare and elect aggravating evidence"; (9)
whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion
for separate jury panels for the guilt phase and the penalty
phase of defendant's trial; (10) whether the trial court
erred by denying defendant's motion to declare "Measure 6"
as null and void; (11) whether the trial court erred by
overruling defendant's demurrer because the "four questions
[under ORS 163.150] include vague terms"; (12) whether the
trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to "forbid
the death qualification of jurors"; (13) whether the trial
court erred by denying defendant's motion to compel jury
records; and (14) whether the trial court erred by denying
defendant's "Motion to Argue Proportionality."  As noted
above, with the exception of his challenge to the relevance
of the other crimes evidence, none of those assignments of
error is linked legally or factually to the state's appeal.