Case Title: Commonwealth v. Moreau

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13168

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13168 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC J. MOREAU. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     January 5, 2022.  -  July 29, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Evidence, Blood 
alcohol test.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.  
Consent.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Gardner Division of 
the District Court Department on October 15, 2020. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mark A. 
Goldstein, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Wendlandt, J., in the Supreme Judicial 
Court for the county of Suffolk, and the matter was reported by 
her. 
 
 
 
Ann Grant, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the 
defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, & David L. Sheppard-
Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for 
the Hampden district & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Eric J. Moreau, has been charged 
with operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol (OUI) or with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 
percent or greater, in violation of G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1) (§ 24 [1] [a] [1]), and negligent operation of 
a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a) 
(§ 24 [2] [a]).  The defendant filed this interlocutory appeal 
to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress the results of 
the test of the defendant's blood for BAC conducted by the State 
police crime laboratory (crime lab) without the defendant's 
consent.  For the reasons discussed infra, we reverse the denial 
of the motion to suppress.1 
Background.  We summarize the relevant facts found by the 
judge, supplemented where appropriate with uncontroverted 
testimony from the suppression hearing.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).  The relevant facts 
are undisputed for the purposes of the present appeal.  On 
September 29, 2020, a police officer responded to a report of a 
motor vehicle accident.  On arrival at the scene, the officer 
observed a pickup truck that had collided with a tree off the 
side of the road, suffering extensive front-end damage.  No 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the district 
attorneys for the Hampden, Bristol, eastern, Norfolk, northern, 
northwestern, and Plymouth districts. 
3 
 
other vehicle was involved in the collision.  The officer spoke 
with the defendant, who was seated in the driver's seat and 
admitted that he was the operator of the vehicle.  The officer 
observed the defendant to be unsteady on his feet, slurring his 
speech, and glassy-eyed; a strong odor of alcohol emanated from 
the defendant's person.  The defendant was transported to a 
nearby hospital.  Police gave to hospital personnel a 
"preservation of evidence letter," seeking the preservation of 
any blood that might be drawn during medical treatment. 
Police then obtained and executed a search warrant for the 
defendant's blood.  The blood was transported to and analyzed by 
the crime lab for BAC.  Police never requested or obtained the 
defendant's consent to test his blood for BAC. 
The defendant was charged with OUI in violation of 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1) and negligent operation of a motor vehicle in 
violation of § 24 (2) (a).  The defendant moved to suppress the 
results of the BAC analysis conducted by the crime lab, arguing 
that he did not consent to having his blood tested.  The judge 
denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing.  The defendant 
filed an application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 
1501 (2017), to which the Commonwealth assented.  A single 
justice of this court allowed the application and ordered that 
the appeal proceed in the Supreme Judicial Court. 
4 
 
Discussion.  The sole issue on appeal is whether, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) (§ 24 [1] [e]), a BAC test done by 
or at the direction of the police without the defendant's 
consent is inadmissible in a prosecution for OUI pursuant to 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (§ 24 [1] [a]), where the blood was 
first drawn independently by a third party.  As a matter of 
statutory interpretation, we review the issue de novo.  
Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 4 (2018).  "The meaning of a 
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in [the] language 
in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."  
Commonwealth v. Bohigian, 486 Mass. 209, 213 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557 (2014).  
Additionally, "[a] basic tenet of statutory construction 
requires that a statute be construed so that effect is given to 
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous" (quotations omitted).  Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 
699, 704 (2004), quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Commissioner 
of Ins., 427 Mass. 136, 140 (1998). 
Section 24 (1) (e) provides the conditions under which 
"evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the 
defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, as shown 
by chemical test or analysis of his blood . . . shall be 
admissible" in prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while 
5 
 
under the influence of alcohol pursuant § 24 (1) (a).2,3  The 
statute sets forth three distinct prerequisites to the 
 
2 Section 24 (1) (e) provides, in relevant part: 
 
"In any prosecution for a violation of [§ 24 (1) (a),] 
evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the 
defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, as 
shown by chemical test or analysis of his blood or as 
indicated by a chemical test or analysis of his breath, 
shall be admissible and deemed relevant to the 
determination of the question of whether such defendant was 
at such time under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
provided, however, that if such test or analysis was made 
by or at the direction of a police officer, it was made 
with the consent of the defendant, the results thereof were 
made available to him upon his request and the defendant 
was afforded a reasonable opportunity, at his request and 
at his expense, to have another such test or analysis made 
by a person or physician selected by him; and provided, 
further, that blood shall not be withdrawn from any party 
for the purpose of such test or analysis except by a 
physician, registered nurse or certified medical 
technician.  Evidence that the defendant failed or refused 
to consent to such test or analysis shall not be admissible 
against him in a civil or criminal proceeding."  (Emphases 
added.) 
 
3 Although not implicated in a case such as this where the 
statutory requirements are unmet, we note that where the 
conditions of § 24 (1) (e) are met, BAC evidence is only 
presumptively admissible in a prosecution under § 24 (1) (a).  
Although there is nothing presumptive in the language "shall be 
admissible," of course BAC evidence must meet general 
requirements for admissibility that exist separate and apart 
from § 24 (1) (e), such as laying a proper foundation and 
complying with constitutional requirements.  See Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (evidence meeting 
statutory requirements for admissibility may not be admitted in 
violation of Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution); 
Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 818 (2007) (where 
Commonwealth proceeds only on theory of impaired operation, it 
must present expert testimony establishing relationship between 
test results and intoxication as foundational requirement of 
 
6 
 
admissibility of BAC evidence in a prosecution for OUI under 
§ 24 (1) (a), the first of which is that a defendant must 
consent to a "chemical test or analysis" of his blood when "such 
test or analysis [is] made by or at the direction of a police 
officer."4  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  Our interpretation of 
this provision is controlled by our decision in Bohigian. 
In Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 211, the court stated that 
"[§] 24 (1) (e) requires that where a test of a defendant's 
breath or blood to determine alcohol content is made by or at 
the direction of a police officer, it must be done with the 
defendant's consent in order for the results to be admissible in 
a prosecution for OUI under . . . § 24 (1) (a)" (emphases 
added).  The court also concluded that "the testing of [BAC] 
 
admissibility of such results); Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 
Mass. 700, 704 (1977) (to be admissible, evidence must be shown 
to be what its proponent represents it to be).  This is because 
constitutional limitations trump any contrary statutory 
prescription, see, e.g., Callan v. Winters, 404 Mass. 198, 202 
(1989), and because background evidentiary rules continue to 
govern absent a clear indication of the Legislature's intent to 
override them, see Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. McLaughlin, 482 Mass. 
579, 590 (2019); Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 
(2005), which § 24 (1) (e) lacks. 
 
4 Second, the statute requires, on the defendant's request, 
that the results of a chemical test or analysis of the 
defendant's blood be made available to the defendant and that 
the defendant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to have his 
own test or analysis conducted "by a person or physician 
selected by him."  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  Third, the 
statute requires that the defendant's blood only be withdrawn 
for chemical test or analysis "by a physician, registered nurse, 
or certified medical technician."  Id. 
7 
 
. . . includ[es] the drawing of blood."  Id.  Of course, a blood 
draw is a prerequisite to a chemical test or analysis of blood 
where such test or analysis requires a blood sample to be tested 
or analyzed.  Therefore, separate from the discussion of safety 
concerns surrounding blood draws in Bohigian, the Bohigian 
court's conclusion that a test or analysis of blood includes the 
preceding blood draw such that police must obtain a defendant's 
consent to such draw is correct for this reason.  See id. at 
211, 216-217. 
Relying on Bohigian, the defendant argues that § 24 (1) (e) 
provides that a BAC "test or analysis" done "by or at the 
direction of" the police is inadmissible in an OUI prosecution 
under § 24 (1) (a), unless the defendant has consented to such 
test or analysis.  The Commonwealth contends that Bohigian 
stands for the proposition that, under § 24 (1) (e), a 
defendant's consent is required only when his blood is drawn "by 
or at the direction of" the police, and that a defendant's 
consent is not required when a defendant's blood is tested or 
analyzed "by or at the direction of" police, so long as the 
blood first was drawn independently by a third party.  For the 
following reasons we agree with the defendant and do not read 
the statute to apply only where both a blood draw and subsequent 
chemical test or analysis is done by or at the direction of 
police. 
8 
 
First, such an interpretation would contradict the plain 
language of the statute, rendering the consent provision of 
§ 24 (1) (e) inoperative in certain situations where, according 
to the plain language of the statute, the consent provision 
applies.  We will not read an exception to the consent provision 
into the statute that the Legislature "did not see fit to put 
there."  Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015), quoting 
Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial 
Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006).  
Second, such a reading of the statute makes sense only if the 
Legislature's sole intent in drafting § 24 (1) (e) was to 
mitigate safety concerns related to nonconsensual blood draws.  
Although such concerns likely were part of the Legislature's 
motivation in drafting § 24 (1) (e), we have no direct evidence 
of such intent, and the plain language of the statute indicates 
that the Legislature was motivated by other concerns as well. 
Regarding a plain language interpretation of § 24 (1) (e), 
the statute provides in part that BAC evidence, "as shown by 
chemical test or analysis of [the defendant's] blood . . . shall 
be admissible . . . provided, however, that if such test or 
analysis was made by or at the direction of a police officer, it 
9 
 
was made with the consent of the defendant" (emphases added).5  
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  Thus, by its plain language, where a 
"chemical test or analysis . . . was made by or at the direction 
of a police officer," the defendant's consent is required for 
the resulting BAC evidence to be admissible, regardless of 
whether the preceding blood draw was done by or at the direction 
of a police officer.  To hold that the consent provision is only 
triggered where the defendant's blood is first drawn by or at 
the direction of police would contradict the plain language of 
the statute. 
Notably, both § 24 (1) (e) and G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1) (§ 24 [1] [f] [1]), which were intended to work 
in tandem, Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 211, discuss a defendant's 
consent "to a chemical test or analysis of his . . . blood," 
rather than consent to a blood draw.  Section 24 (1) (e) 
"further" requires that "blood shall not be withdrawn . . . for 
the purpose of such test or analysis except by a physician, 
registered nurse or certified medical technician" (emphasis 
added).  Section 24 (1) (f) (1) "further" provides that "no 
person who is afflicted with hemophilia, diabetes or any other 
condition requiring the use of anticoagulants shall be deemed to 
 
5 We understand the phrase "such test or analysis" to refer 
to the preceding phrase, "chemical test or analysis of [the 
defendant's] blood."  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e). 
10 
 
have consented to a withdrawal of blood" (emphasis added).  
Thus, in separately discussing "a chemical test or analysis of 
. . . blood" and "withdrawal of blood" or "blood . . . be[ing] 
withdrawn," the Legislature appears to have conceived of "a 
chemical test or analysis" of a defendant's blood as distinct 
from a blood draw. 
This interpretation is supported by the second statutory 
prerequisite to the admissibility of BAC evidence -- that the 
results of any chemical test or analysis of the defendant's 
blood be "made available to him upon his request and [that] the 
defendant [be] afforded a reasonable opportunity, at his request 
and at his expense, to have another such test or analysis made 
by a person or physician selected by him."  G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (e).  This requirement appears to be solely related to 
concerns about the result of chemical testing or analysis of 
blood and entirely unrelated to concerns about a preceding blood 
draw, and such concerns reasonably cannot be said to arise only 
where both a blood draw and subsequent test or analysis is done 
by or at the direction of police. 
 
Thus, by its plain language, the statute requires that in a 
prosecution under § 24 (1) (a), where the Commonwealth wishes to 
have admitted BAC evidence arising from testing or analysis of a 
defendant's blood done "by or at the direction of" police, 
police must first obtain the defendant's consent to the 
11 
 
"chemical test or analysis" of his blood which may result in 
such evidence, regardless of whether the blood was first drawn 
by or at the direction of police or independently by a third 
party.  The statute contains no exception to the consent 
requirement where the blood was first drawn without police 
involvement.  We may not rewrite the statute to create 
judicially an exception to the consent provision not presented 
by the statute's plain language.  Chin, 470 Mass. at 537, 
quoting Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. at 126. 
 
As to the Legislature's intent in enacting § 24 (1) (e), 
the Bohigian court noted that "[t]here are valid reasons for 
[providing additional privacy protections in this context, above 
those granted by the Federal Constitution and the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights], including avoiding the confrontation 
that occurred during the blood draw conducted in this case."  
Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 216.  The court went on to discuss those 
"valid reasons," citing to United States Supreme Court cases and 
a book chapter on phlebotomy published by the World Health 
Organization.6  Id. at 216-217.  Thus, the Bohigian court 
discussed the objective reasonability of the consent provision, 
but did not purport to conclude that it was the Legislature's 
 
6 The court's discussion of other States that have enacted 
statutory schemes similar to § 24 (1) (e) did not include a 
discussion of the intent of any other State Legislatures in 
enacting such statutes.  See Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 217-218. 
12 
 
intent in enacting the statute to avoid confrontations during 
nonconsensual blood draws. 
Further, § 24 (1) (e) also predicates the admissibility of 
BAC evidence in prosecutions under § 24 (1) (a) on the results 
having been made available to the defendant on request and the 
defendant having been afforded a reasonable opportunity to have 
his own chemical test or analysis completed.  G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (e).  This requirement, which, as noted supra, facially 
is concerned solely with the results of the chemical test or 
analysis of blood and not with the prior blood draw, reasonably 
cannot be construed to have been drafted out of safety concerns 
related to the nonconsensual drawing of blood. 
 
If the Legislature's sole concern had been ensuring the 
safety of those involved in blood draws, it could have 
conditioned the admissibility of BAC evidence solely on the 
defendant's consent to having his blood drawn by or at the 
direction of the police.  As such language sufficiently would 
address that concern, the Legislature would have no discernible 
reason also to require (1) the defendant's consent to testing or 
analysis done by or at the direction of police or (2) that the 
results be made available to the defendant on request and that 
the defendant be allowed independently to have another test or 
analysis done. 
13 
 
 
The plain language of the statute, the absence of any 
record of legislative intent to contradict that plain language, 
and our decision in Bohigian control here.  Where a "chemical 
test or analysis" of the defendant's blood is "made by or at the 
direction of a police officer," including where the blood is 
first withdrawn independently by a third party, the defendant's 
consent is required for the resulting BAC evidence to be 
admissible in a prosecution under § 24 (1) (a).7 
 
However, while § 24 (1) (e) discusses conditions for 
admissibility of BAC evidence, we observe that it does not 
expressly state what happens when these conditions are not met.  
The Commonwealth argues that even if a defendant's consent were 
required for a chemical test or analysis of a defendant's blood 
made by or at the direction of police after being withdrawn by a 
third party, suppression nevertheless is not required where the 
exclusionary rule is not triggered.  We agree only to the extent 
that the constitutional exclusionary rule is inapplicable.  
Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 211, citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
141, 148 (2013), and Commonwealth v. Angivoni, 383 Mass. 30, 32 
 
7 We previously have stated that there is no warrant 
exception to the consent provision in § 24 (1) (e).  Bohigian, 
486 Mass. at 213.  Thus, where, as here, the police do not 
obtain the defendant's consent to conduct a chemical test or 
analysis of his blood but do obtain a warrant for the 
defendant's blood sample, the resulting blood alcohol content 
(BAC) evidence remains inadmissible in a prosecution for OUI 
pursuant to § 24 (1) (a). 
14 
 
(1981).  However, here we have a statutory exclusionary rule 
that applies. 
As noted supra, the statute provides that BAC evidence 
resulting from a chemical test or analysis of a defendant's 
blood done by or at the direction of the police is admissible in 
a prosecution for OUI under § 24 (1) (a) "provided that" such 
test or analysis complied with, among other things, the consent 
provision of § 24 (1) (e).  We previously have concluded that 
the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e) "places several conditions 
on the admissibility of" BAC evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 778, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 
(2011).  We also specifically have concluded that "nonconsensual 
testing done at the direction of the police is inadmissible."  
Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 218. 
It may be true that providing for the admissibility of 
evidence if certain conditions are met is not linguistically 
equivalent to providing for the inadmissibility of evidence if 
those conditions are not met.  However, conditions on the 
admissibility of certain evidence would be rendered inoperative 
if noncompliance with those conditions did not result in the 
inadmissibility -- or required suppression -- of the evidence.8  
 
8 Because it would be "inconsistent with the manifest 
intent" of the Legislature to read § 24 (1) (e) in a way that 
leaves its admissibility conditions illusory, we interpret the 
 
15 
 
Thus, suppression is the appropriate remedy where, as here, the 
Commonwealth cannot prove compliance with the consent provision 
of § 24 (1) (e).  See Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 218-220 (concluding 
BAC test results improperly were admitted where defendant did 
not consent to blood draw and remanding for new trial); 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. at 778 ("prosecution must prove compliance 
with [consent provision and other] conditions as a foundational 
matter before the judge may admit the results in evidence"); 
Commonwealth v. Lopes, 459 Mass. 165, 173 (2011), quoting 
§ 24 (1) (e) (BAC evidence "'shall be admissible and deemed 
relevant' only if the defendant actually consented to the 
test"); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 538-539 
(2019) (denial of motion to suppress BAC evidence reversed where 
Commonwealth failed to prove defendant consented to blood test).  
Compare Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 612 n.20, cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012) (G. L. c. 233, § 79G, which provides 
that hospital medical records "shall be admissible . . . 
provided . . . that" certain conditions are met, sets forth 
"requirements for admissibility" of such evidence). 
 
provision to provide for the exclusion of BAC evidence that does 
not comply with those conditions.  See Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 
489 Mass. 589, 605 n.27 (2022); Tallage Lincoln, LLC v. 
Williams, 485 Mass. 449, 456 (2020); Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 
Mass. 355, 358 (2013), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 313 
Mass. 779, 781-782 (1943).  This is not to suggest that every 
statutory violation results in exclusion of otherwise 
admissible, relevant evidence. 
16 
 
In criminalizing OUI, § 24 (1) (a), the Legislature's 
apparent aim was to protect the residents of the Commonwealth 
from motorists impaired by alcohol or other substance 
consumption.  In so doing, "the Legislature has created a 
statutory scheme specifically to address the testing of [BAC] in 
connection with prosecutions for OUI."  Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 
211.  Under § 24 (1) (f) (1), "[i]f the arrestee does not 
consent, . . . the arrestee's license is suspended for at least 
six months."  Id. at 212.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  
While it is true that certain provisions of § 24 may make it 
more challenging for the Commonwealth to present BAC evidence in 
OUI prosecutions pursuant to § 24 (1) (a), it is for the 
Legislature to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of the statutory 
scheme, as it appears to have done by providing that a refusal 
to consent results in an automatic license suspension.  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1208 n.6 (1992) ("The 
statutory provision requiring actual consent reflects a 
legislative intent to avoid forced testing").  It is beyond the 
power of this court to undermine that balancing by rewriting the 
statute as the Commonwealth proposes.  See art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; Commonwealth v. Biagiotti, 
451 Mass. 599, 602-603 (2008). 
We take this opportunity to point out that by enacting 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1), in addition to § 24 (1) (e), the Legislature 
17 
 
has provided law enforcement with a mechanism to ensure that 
residents of the Commonwealth are protected from motorists 
impaired by alcohol or other substance consumption, including in 
situations where a driver suspected of OUI refuses to permit BAC 
testing.  Where a police officer arrests a driver suspected of 
OUI, and that driver then refuses to consent to a breathalyzer 
or blood test for BAC, the driver's license is automatically 
suspended for at least six months and, in certain circumstances, 
permanently.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  That mechanism 
presumably could have been used in this case regardless of our 
decision today. 
The police officer who responded to the accident scene 
observed that the defendant, who conceded he was the operator of 
a pickup truck that had collided with a tree, was unsteady on 
his feet, slurring his speech, and glassy-eyed, and that a 
strong odor of alcohol emanated from the defendant's person.  
Where these observations coupled with the defendant's concession 
presumably provided probable cause that the defendant had 
violated § 24 (1) (a), the police officer likely could have 
placed the defendant under arrest.  That the officer chose to 
have the defendant transported to a hospital did not preclude 
such action.  See Dennis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 529 (officer had 
defendant suspected of OUI sent to hospital and placed defendant 
under arrest in ambulance).  Had the officer placed the 
18 
 
defendant under arrest, § 24 (1) (f) (1) would have been 
triggered such that, if the defendant refused to consent to a 
BAC test or analysis, his license would have been automatically 
"suspended for a period of at least 180 days and up to a 
lifetime loss" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  
Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 212.  While it is not our role to pass 
judgment on the Legislature's policy decisions, it appears that 
the statutory scheme provides for the protection of the public 
from dangerous offenders.  All that is required is that the 
police follow the procedures set forth by the Legislature. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.