Case Title: RONALD L. SIMEK V. STACY TATE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CAROL B. BREHM, DECEASED

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0177

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
RONALD L. SIMEK V. STACY TATE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CAROL B. BREHM, DECEASED2010 WY 65231 P.3d 891Case Number: S-09-0177Decided: 05/24/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RONALD 
L. SIMEK,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.STACY TATE, 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CAROL B. BREHM, 
DECEASED,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Andrea 
L. Richard of The Richard Law Firm, P.C., Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Larry 
B. Jones, William L. Simpson, and Chris D. Edwards of Simpson, Kepler & 
Edwards, LLC the Cody, Wyoming Division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & 
Jardine, P.C.  Argument by Mr. 
Jones.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ., and CAMPBELL, 
D.J.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a district court order enforcing an oral settlement agreement requiring the 
appellant (Simek) to purchase certain real property from the appellee (the 
Estate).1  We conclude that the district court did 
not err in determining that partial performance by the Estate made the 
settlement agreement enforceable despite the statute of frauds, and we therefore 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Did the district court err in 
denying Simek's motion for an additional "live" evidentiary hearing, and holding 
a telephonic hearing instead?

 
 
            
2.    Did the 
district court err in denying Simek's motion to enforce an earlier settlement 
agreement?

 
 
            
3.    Did the 
district court err in granting the Estate's motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement despite the statute of frauds?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 1993, Simek 
purchased from Carol Brehm (Brehm) certain ranch property located in Park 
County, Wyoming.  Brehm reserved 
from that sale her residence and the acreage surrounding her residence, but gave 
Simek the "first right to purchase" the property if she decided to sell it. 
 Brehm died in Illinois in 1994, 
without having indicated any desire to sell her residence, and, therefore, 
without Simek's option to purchase having been exercised.

 
 
[¶4]      On October 19, 
1998, Simek filed in Park County a civil action against Michael A. Alexander 
(Alexander), as executor of Brehm's estate in Illinois.  Simek alleged that Brehm had breached the 
ranch sale contract in certain particulars, and he sought specific performance 
of the purchase option.  Count II of 
the Complaint was later amended so as also to seek declaratory judgment in 
regard to the purchase option.  On 
April 20, 2001, the district court dismissed Count II on the ground that the 
purchase option was specifically conditioned upon Brehm exhibiting her desire to 
sell the property, and that she had not done so.

 
 
[¶5]      Litigation 
between Simek and the Estate continued until, after participating in mediation, 
they reached a settlement agreement in August of 2003 (the 2003 Agreement), 
which agreement was reduced to writing and executed by the parties.  In addition to settling the contract 
breach issues, the 2003 Agreement provided for Simek's purchase of Brehm's 
residential property.  The 2003 
Agreement was, however, conditioned as follows:

 
 

            
3.  Approval 
of Illinois Probate Court.  The parties understand that approval by 
the Illinois Court conducting the probate of Carol Brehm's Estate is required 
for approval of this Settlement Agreement.  
Mr. Alexander, on behalf of the estate and the Brehm Parties, has agreed 
that he will advise the Illinois Probate Court of the settlement of these claims 
and will seek the approval of the Illinois Probate Court of these terms and file 
all necessary documents and pleadings with the Illinois Probate Court reflecting 
said approval.

 
 
[¶6]      On January 28, 
2005, Simek filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, in which he alleged 
that he, but not the Estate, had taken all necessary steps to implement the 
settlement.  The Estate responded on 
February 17, 2005, attaching to its response a copy of an order from the 
Illinois Probate Court denying the petition for approval of the settlement. 
 The motion not having been heard, 
Simek refiled it on April 28, 2005, and again on May 2, 2005.  On May 26, 2005, the district court set 
the motion for hearing.  In the 
meantime, Brehm's daughter, Stacy Tate (Tate) obtained appointment as 
administrator of her mother's estate in Wyoming, and on June 27, 2005, the 
parties stipulated that she be substituted for Alexander as the defendant in 
this lawsuit.

 
 
[¶7]      On July 25 and 
26, 2005, Simek and Tate and their Wyoming attorneys met in Cody, Wyoming, for 
settlement negotiations.  Believing 
settlement had been achieved, Tate's attorney drafted a Settlement Agreement and 
Release of All Claims (the 2005 Agreement).  The scope of the 2005 Agreement was 
relatively similar to that of the 2003 Agreement, although the purchase price 
for the Brehm residential property was different.  The 2005 Agreement contained a provision 
requiring its approval by the probate courts in both Wyoming and Illinois, and 
it also contained the following relevant provisions:

 
 
5.   REAL PROPERTY IS BEING CONVEYED "AS 
IS".  SIMEK acknowledges that the 
real property described in Paragraph Two herein is being conveyed "AS IS".  SIMEK acknowledges that he is informed 
that there are multiple problems with said real estate (including, but not 
limited to the house on the real property), and that he accepts the PROPERTY "AS 
IS".

 
 
6.   KEY TO PROPERTY.  SIMEK acknowledges that he has received 
the key to the PROPERTY in order to make plans for renovation of the 
PROPERTY.  SIMEK agrees, however, 
that he will return the key if the probate courts in Illinois and Wyoming do not 
approve of the settlement.  SIMEK 
further agrees that he will make absolutely no changes to the PROPERTY until he 
makes payment for the PROPERTY as outlined in Paragraph Three herein.  SIMEK also agrees to keep the PROPERTY 
locked at all times.  SIMEK also 
acknowledges that the alarm, for which he has received information, is not the 
property of the ESTATE OF BREHM, and it must be returned to the alarm company at 
closing.

 
 
[¶8]      Simek received 
the key to the Brehm residence, and kept it for several months.  During that period of time, he accessed 
the premises and had it appraised, but he neither signed the 2005 Agreement nor 
indicated that he rejected it.  
Eventually, his attorney sent the Estate's attorney an offer to purchase 
the property for a lower price than that stated in the 2005 Agreement.  What ensued was a motions duel, with 
Simek repeatedly asking the district court to enforce the 2003 Agreement and the 
Estate repeatedly asking the district court to enforce the 2005 Agreement.2  Finally, the case was assigned to a 
different district judge, who held an additional evidentiary hearing on 
September 30, 2008.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Enforcing Terms of 
Settlement Agreement on December 19, 2008.  In summary form, relevant findings 
included the following:  (1) the 
2003 Agreement required approval of the Illinois Probate Court to be effective, 
and such approval was denied; (2) Simek's testimony that he obtained the key to 
the residence under the 2005 Agreement for the purpose of a two-week period in 
which to inspect the premises was not credible; (3) Simek obtained the key to 
the residence under the 2005 Agreement for the purpose of planning its 
remodeling; (4) Simek obtained and kept the key until January 2006, during which 
period he had complete access to the premises and invited many contractors and 
an appraiser into the residence; (5) under the 2005 Agreement, Simek offered to 
purchase the property "as is"; and (6) neither Simek nor his attorney notified 
Tate that the settlement had been rejected.

 
 
[¶10]   Based upon these and other 
findings, the district court reached the following relevant conclusions of 
law:  (1) the 2003 Agreement was 
rendered void when the Illinois Probate Court disapproved it; (2) the parties 
agreed to settle in 2005, with the terms of the settlement being those set forth 
in the 2005 Agreement; (3) delivery of the key to the premises to Simek, and his 
use thereof, constituted such partial performance of the oral 2005 Agreement so 
as to render it enforceable despite the statute of frauds; and (4) Simek's 
silence, failure to object to the agreement, and failure to notify the court 
that settlement had not been reached justified precluding Simek from raising the 
statute of frauds as a defense and justified affirming the oral 2005 
Agreement.

 
 
STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS

 
 
[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
            
(a)    In the 
following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

 
 
                     
. . . .

 
 
(v)     Every agreement or 
contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one 
(1) year;

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court err in denying Simek's motion for an additional "live" 
evidentiary hearing, and holding a telephonic hearing 
instead?

 
 
[¶12]   A district court enjoys 
considerable latitude in determining the procedural scheme it will follow in 
reaching its determinations, and we will not reverse such procedural decisions 
absent an abuse of discretion.  Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 11, 198 P.3d 552, 555 (Wyo. 2008).  We have 
said that "[a] court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. . . . and the ultimate 
issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did."  Three Way, Inc. v. Burton Enters., Inc., 
2008 WY 18, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 219, 225 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Doenz v. Sheridan County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 949 P.2d 464, 465 (Wyo. 1997)) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶13]   In the instant case, the trial 
judge held an evidentiary hearing on January 6, 2006, on the Estate's motion to 
enforce the 2005 Agreement.  The 
122-page transcript of that hearing, containing the testimony of two witnesses 
and arguments of counsel, is in the record.  Because counsel needed time to present 
additional testimony, the matter was continued for further hearing on January 
27, 2006.  The 263-page transcript 
of that day's hearing, containing the testimony of five witnesses and arguments 
of counsel, is also in the record.  The matter was again continued, and a 
third hearing occurred on February 21, 2006.  The 218-page transcript of that hearing, 
containing the testimony of three witnesses and arguments of counsel is, 
likewise, in the record.  The "final 
installment" of the trial, as characterized by the trial judge, was scheduled 
for July 21, 2006, but was continued at the request of Simek's counsel.  During that aborted hearing, the assigned 
judge advised counsel that he had just announced his 
retirement.

 
 
[¶14]   The case was assigned to a 
different district judge on October 18, 2006.  Court-ordered status reports were filed 
in December 2006, but no further activity is revealed in the court file until 
the Estate filed a setting request on April 25, 2008.  Simek soon filed his own request for an 
evidentiary hearing.  Simek 
requested a day and a half for the hearing, in order to "complete the evidence 
and present updated evidence," and to allow the district court "to assess the 
credibility of the evidence rather than attempting to do the same from previous 
stale and incomplete transcripts."

 
 
[¶15]   On September 5, 2008, the district 
court issued a scheduling order setting a "supplemental evidentiary hearing" for 
September 30, 2008.  The hearing was 
held as scheduled, with Tate and the Estate's counsel and a witness appearing in 
person in the courtroom in Torrington, Wyoming, and with Simek and his counsel 
and a witness appearing telephonically from Jackson, Wyoming.  At the outset of the hearing, the 
following colloquy occurred between the district court and Simek's 
counsel:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  And, [Simek's 
counsel], are you ready to go?

 
 
            
[SIMEK'S COUNSEL]:  Yes, we 
are, your Honor.

 
 
            
And for the record, we have in Jackson in the conference room in our law 
firm, Mr. Ron Simek and his wife, Mrs. Simek, Ms. Ky Simek, and myself; and we 
will be joined later by another witness by telephone; and we are ready to 
proceed.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Very 
well.

 
 
            
Well, first of all, let me say, counsel, thank you for your cooperation 
with me on a schedule here; and for both of the clients, you know, you have a 
right to have your case in Cody, in Park County.  That's the way the system works in 
Wyoming.  And by consent your 
attorneys have agreed to get this case expedited and going and finished, they 
have agreed to do it in this matter with [the Estate's counsel] here, and by 
telephone for Mr. Simek.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Very good.  If there is a problem, we might have a 
plan B that we can come up with also.

 
 
            
All right.  So folks, I have 
reviewed several times the four transcripts in this case from the four 
hearings.  The first three of those 
had evidentiary presentation, and the fourth, really, was just a discussion 
between counsel and the judge.  And 
where we left things kind of seems to be in flux.  There at least was a point in time when 
I think some of the parties were willing to be satisfied with what evidence they 
had if they could complete the case then; and then perhaps if there is more that 
needs to be presented, maybe one or both sides want to present some 
more.

 
 
            
So, [Simek's counsel], I will ask you to call any additional witnesses 
you have.

 
 
Simek 
then called two witnesses, and the Estate called one witness.  The record contains the 102-page 
transcript of the hearing.

 
 
[¶16]   We will summarily affirm the 
district court on this issue for the following reasons:  (1) the numerous hearings provided the 
parties with ample opportunity to present evidence; (2) the record reveals no 
reason Simek and his attorney and his witness could not have appeared in person 
at the hearing; (3) the parties consented to the procedure; (4) Simek has shown 
no prejudice from the procedure; (5) the newly assigned district judge reviewed 
all of the evidence that had been presented at all the hearings; and (6) the 
single case cited by Simek on this issue in his appellate brief, Yaekle v. Andrews, 169 P.3d 196, 200 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2007), stands for the proposition that a hearing is required if 
the terms or existence of a settlement agreement are in dispute, not for the 
proposition that a telephonic hearing is insufficient under such 
circumstances.

 
 
Did 
the district court err in denying Simek's motion to enforce an earlier 
settlement agreement?

 
 
[¶17]   As noted earlier herein, the 
district court concluded that the 2003 Agreement was rendered void when approval 
of the Illinois Probate Court, a condition precedent, was not obtained.  See supra ¶ 10.  In his appellate brief, Simek finds 
fault with the district court in this regard as follows:

 
 
            
The District Court's failure to consider the 2003 Agreement undermines 
its reliance on the 2005 Agreement.  
In other words, the terms of the 2003 Agreement are inconsistent with the 
terms of the 2005 Agreement.  The 
District Court did not reconcile these differences and under this Court's juris 
prudence [sic] these inconsistencies would limit the ability to create an oral 
contract as the District Court did in its decision.  For example, in Fowler v. Folwer, 
[sic] 933 P.2d 502, 505 (Wyo. 1997), the District Court had concluded that there 
was an oral contract and the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the findings that 
the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of an oral contract 
between a father and son.  What 
troubled the Court and caused it impart [sic] to conclude that there was not an 
oral contract was the fact that there were different versions of the essential 
terms of the contract and that the essential terms were inconsistent and 
contradicted one another.  
Folwer, [sic] 933 P.2d  at 505.  The same situation exists here, the 
parties in 2003 agreed to essential terms including price for the real estate 
transaction.  The Court in this case 
created a contract and supplied terms that are inconsistent. . . 
.

 
 
[¶18]   As with the first issue, we will 
again summarily affirm the district court.  
The present scenario in no way resembles that in Fowler, where this Court concluded that 
"[t]he lack of certainty in essential contractual terms forces us to determine 
that an oral contract did not exist."  
Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 506 (Wyo. 1997).  In the case 
now before the Court, two separate settlement agreements were reacheda written 
settlement agreement in 2003 and an oral settlement agreement in 2005.  The fact that some terms of the two 
agreements are inconsistent with one another is legally meaningless.  The 2003 Agreement became void because 
it was not approved by the Illinois Probate Court.  The prior existence of the 2003 
Agreement, as well as its terms, has nothing to do with the question of whether 
the parties reached an oral settlement in 2005, or with the question of whether 
that 2005 Agreement should be enforced.

 
 
Did 
the district court err in granting the Estate'smotion to enforce the 
settlement agreement despite the statute of 
frauds?

 
 
[¶19]   In its simplest relevant terms, the 
statute of frauds requires contracts for the sale of land to be in writing.  See supra ¶ 11.  The question of whether a contract has 
been formed is a question of fact, and the district court's determination on 
that question will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.  In re Estate of Maycock, 2001 WY 103, ¶¶ 
10-11, 33 P.3d 1114, 1117 (Wyo. 2001).  
"A settlement agreement is a contract and, therefore, subject to the same 
legal principles that apply to any contract."  Id. at ¶ 10; see also In re Estate of McCormick, 926 P.2d 360, 361 (Wyo. 1996).  We apply 
the following standard in reviewing whether the district court's determination 
as to the existence of a settlement agreement was supported by sufficient 
evidence:

 
 
[O]n 
appeal, the Supreme Court assumes that evidence in favor of the successful party 
is true, leaves out of consideration entirely the conflicting evidence presented 
by the unsuccessful party, and gives the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference that may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it.  Furthermore, a reviewing court cannot 
substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the trial court unless the 
trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of 
the evidence.

 
 

McCormick, 
926 P.2d  at 362 (quoting Wyoming 
Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 (Wyo. 
1988)).

 
 
[¶20]   The intention of the parties is of 
particular significance when a court is faced with determining whether a 
contract existed after the oral communications between the parties, or only 
after the terms were reduced to writing.  
Recently, we stated the law in that regard as 
follows:

 
 
            
One specific question in determining the parties' intent is whether their 
contract was meant to be formed only upon the signing of written documents or 
was meant to be formed upon an oral understanding.

 
 
"An 
agreement to make a written contract where the terms are mutually understood and 
agreed on in all respects is as binding as the written contract would be if 
it had been executed.'  Robert W. Anderson House[w]recking and 
Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 25, Fremont County, 
Wyoming, 681 P.2d 1326, 1331 (1984).

 
 
"In 
general, the principle is well settled that where the parties to a contract 
intend that it shall be closed and consummated prior to the formal signing of a 
written draft, the terms having been mutually understood and agreed upon, the 
parties will be bound by the contract actually made, although it be not reduced 
to writing; but, on the other hand, if the parties do not intend to close the 
contract until it shall be fully expressed in a written instrument properly 
attested, then there will be no complete contract until the agreement shall be 
put into writing and signed.'  Summers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 
Wyo. 369, 75 P. 937, 943 (1904)."

 
 

Frost 
Const. Co. v. Lobo, Inc., 
951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting 
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 776 (Wyo. 
1988)).

 
 

Birt 
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶ 11, 75 P.3d 640, 648 (Wyo. 2003).  In an earlier case, we set forth the 
applicable law in even more detail:

 
 
            
The law is well stated in Hageman 
& Pond, Inc. v. Clark, [69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919], 923-924 
[(1951)]:

 
 
"* 
* *  The courts generally hold that 
whether or not a contract is to be effective only when reduced to writing and 
signed by all the parties is mainly a question of intention.  In 122 A.L.R. 1248-1250, it is 
said:  The fact that parties to 
negotiations contemplated the drawing and execution of a formal written contract 
is regarded in numerous cases as evidence that they intended the prior oral or 
informal agreement, * * * to be merely tentative and not final.  Indeed, this circumstance has been 
considered as "strong evidence" that the parties did not intend that the 
negotiations should amount to an agreement prior to the execution of the formal 
writing.  * * *  It has been said that if the parties 
stipulate for a formal written agreement expressive of their intention, there is 
a strong presumption that no contract is made until the formal instrument is 
prepared and executed, also that where there is a statute requiring that a 
contract be reduced to writing there can be no presumption of an intention to 
consummate the contract in any other form.'  [. . .] "Counsel for defendant contends 
that the circumstances in this case clearly show that it was the intention of 
the parties that a written contract was to be drawn and signed by all the 
parties, and that the case of Summers v. 
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 12 Wyo. 369, 75 P. 937, 943, 66 L.R.A. 812 
[(1904)] is decisive on the point here discussed.  The decision was by the late Justice 
Potter.  He cites with approval the 
case of Mississippi & Dominion 
Steamship Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248, 29 A. 1063 [(1894)], enumerating some of 
the circumstances in determining as to whether or not an oral contract should be 
considered as the final contract of the parties, namely, such as whether the 
contract is one usually put in writing, whether there are few or many details, 
whether the amount involved is large or small, whether it requires a formal 
writing for a full expression of the covenants and promises, and whether the 
negotiations themselves indicate that a written draft is contemplated as the 
final conclusion of the negotiations.'  
Other circumstances may be added in the case at bar, namely that it 
involves a transfer of an interest in real property which ordinarily under the 
Statute of Frauds must be in writing and signed by the party sought to be 
charged; that the contract was in fact reduced to writing and submitted to the 
other party; the fact that the written instrument contains a blank space where 
the defendant was expected to sign his name, [. . .], and perhaps the fact that 
he actually refused or neglected to sign it.  * * *"

 
 

Turner 
v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 
696 P.2d 76, 78 (Wyo. 1985) (some internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶21]   In the instant case, the district 
court concluded that the 2005 Agreement existed and that it was saved from the 
statute of frauds as a result of the doctrine of partial performance.  Under that doctrine, an oral agreement 
for the sale of land that has been partially or wholly performed by one party, 
to its detriment, may be enforced by that party.  Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, ¶ 16, 
94 P.3d 450, 458 (Wyo. 2004); McClellan 
v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 249 (Wyo. 1992); Gaido v. Tysdal, 68 Wyo. 490, 508, 235 P.2d 741, 747 (1951).  Before the 
doctrine of partial performance may be applied, however, the terms of the oral 
agreement sought to be enforced must be "a definite and complete agreement 
between the parties," and "the contract terms must be so certain that the court 
can require the specific thing agreed upon to be done."  Fowler, 933 P.2d  at 504; see also  Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1124 
(Wyo. 2000).  Where the partial 
performance is alleged to consist of transfer of  possession of the premises to the 
putative purchaser, such possession must be "proved beyond the possibility of 
findings to the contrary."  Hovendick, 10 P.3d  at 1124.  It also must be "referable solely to the 
contract sought to be enforced, and not such as might have been referable to 
some other or different contract."   
Butler v. McGee, 373 P.2d 595, 
597-98 (Wyo. 1962).3

 
 
[¶22]   The doctrine of partial performance 
is a common law equitable doctrine that actually predates the original English 
statute of frauds.  73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statute of Frauds § 312 
(2001).

 
 
This 
common law exception to the statute of frauds is a version of equitable 
estoppel.  It prevents a party to a 
contract from perpetrating a fraud or injustice on the other party when the 
latter has fully performed under the terms of the oral 
contract.

 
 

Wyoming 
Realty Co. v. Cook, 
872 P.2d 551, 554 (Wyo. 1994).  
Given the legislative policy evidenced by the statute of frauds, partial 
performance should take an oral contract out from its reach only when necessary 
to avoid a fraud, and to accomplish justice.  Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 465 
(Wyo. 1978); see also Crosby v. Strahan's 
Estate, 78 Wyo. 302, 320, 324 P.2d 492, 499 (1958).  
The statute of frauds must be applied within the context of competing 
policies:

 
 
            
Application of the statute of frauds to the facts of this case 
having been called into question, we look to the underlying purposes of 
that legislation.  Furthermore, 
however jealous we may be of inroads upon application of the statute of frauds, 
we remain mindful that its rote application is not automatic.  Enforcement of the statute of frauds 
subserves significant policy concerns, not unlike enforcement of the policy 
favoring settlements:

 
 
            
The statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud, not to aid it, and 
should receive a reasonable interpretation with that end in view.  The great majority of courts have always 
endeavored to keep that principle uppermost in rendering their 
decisions.

 
 

Mead 
v. Leo Sheep Co., 
32 Wyo. 313, 327, 232 P. 511, 515 (1925).

 
 

Maycock, 
2001 WY 103, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d  at 1119.  
It is helpful to remember that the doctrine of partial performance is not 
an evidentiary proposition; rather, it is an equitable theory based upon 
estoppel:

 
 
The 
doctrine of part performance operates not upon the theory that the part 
performance is a substitute for the written evidence required by the statute of 
frauds, but rather on the theory that the defendant may be estopped in view of 
the part performance to assert the statute as a defense.  Thus, part performance takes the case 
out of the statute not because it furnishes proof of the contract or because it 
makes the contract any stronger but because it would be intolerable in equity 
for the defendant knowingly to allow the plaintiff to invest time, labor, and 
money upon the faith of a contract that did not exist.

 
 
The 
doctrine of part performance accomplishes its purpose of preventing fraud on the 
theory of estoppel by conduct to assert the statute.

 
 
73 
Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 314 
(2001).

 
 
[¶23]   
The injury or loss that supports application of the equitable 
doctrine of partial performance is not the injury or loss caused simply by the 
failure of one party to perform the contract.  Crosby, 78 Wyo. at 320, 324 P.2d  at 
499.  "If the mere failure to 
perform an oral contract were sufficient to remove it from the reach of the 
statute of frauds, the statute would be rendered vain and nugatory."  Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 346 (Wyo. 
1993).  Rather, the injury or 
loss

 
 
must 
arise from the acts done in performance or in pursuance of the oral agreement, 
and such acts must so far alter the situation of the parties seeking to avoid 
the statute that it would be unjust and against conscience to allow the other 
party, who has permitted such change to take place in pursuance of his oral 
agreement, to thereafter refuse to perform on his part.

 
 

Crosby, 
78 Wyo. at 320, 324 P.2d  at 499; see also 
Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1143 (Wyo. 1976).   The court looks to several factors 
in determining whether equity should defeat the statute of frauds, including the 
following:  (1) the relations of the 
parties; (2) the nature of the parol agreement; and (3) the relative benefit and 
detriment derived by the parties.  
Empfield v. Kimbrough, 900 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Wyo. 1995); Davis, 
855 P.2d  at 346-47.  Part 
performance must be substantial.  Id. at 346.  On the other hand, the party relying 
upon partial performance must show only a material detriment, as opposed to 
irreparable injury.  73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statute of Frauds § 314 (2001).  "The sufficiency of particular acts as a 
part performance is for the court to decide as a matter of law."  73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 319 (2001); see also Maycock, 2001 WY 103, ¶ 12, 33 P.3d  at 1117, and In re Estate of 
Jackson, 892 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶24]   In the instant case, the district 
court concluded first that, as a matter of fact, a contract was 
formedsettlement was reachedduring the negotiations on July 25-26, 2005.  Second, the court concluded that the 
parties intended for their agreement to be effective upon its oral 
consummation.  Several facts 
informed these conclusions:  (1) the 
Estate offered possession of the premises before the agreement was reduced to 
writing and allowed Simek to disarm the house's security system; (2) Simek 
accepted and took possession of the premises before the agreement was reduced to 
writing; (3) Simek retained possession of the premises for several months 
despite not having executed the written agreement; (4) Simek utilized his 
possession of the premises to bring in contractors for remodeling assessments, 
which was in furtherance of the oral agreement; (5) neither Simek nor his 
attorney notified the Estate or its attorney that settlement had not been 
reached; and (6) after the 2005 Agreement was reached, Simek's attorney informed 
the Estate's attorney that Simek had filed another motion to enforce the 2003 
Agreement, not because the 2005 Agreement did not exist, but to protect Simek's 
rights in case the 2005 Agreement did not receive court 
approval.

 
 
[¶25]   As mentioned above, the two 
attorneys engaged in repeated e-mail and telephone contacts as the Estate's 
attorney attempted to determine why Simek was not signing and returning the 
agreement that had been reduced to writing.  The district court set out these 
contacts at length in its findings of fact, and then relied upon them in 
concluding that Simek's failure to deny existence of the 2005 Agreement was a 
factor in estopping him from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense.  The Estate's attorney testified that, in 
one particular telephone call, Simek's attorney told her the following in regard 
to Simek's renewal of his motion to enforce the 2003 
Agreement:

 
 
Well, 
we've been through this rodeo before.  
We had tried towe have settled before, and the 2003 agreement was not 
approved.  And so in 
case the 2005 agreement also was not approved, she wanted to make sure 
she preserved her rights under the 2003 agreement.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The emphasized language 
reveals that Simek's position was not that the 2005 Agreement had not been 
reached; rather, his position was that he wanted to try to fall back upon the 
2003 Agreement if the courts did not approve the 2005 
Agreement.

 
 
[¶26]   This case boils down to a question 
of lawwhether the Estate's acts in partial performance of the 2005 Agreement 
were sufficient to estop Simek from asserting the statute of frauds as a 
defense, especially when coupled with Simek's failure to disclaim the agreement 
in the face of that conduct.  We 
conclude that the district court did not err in answering that question in the 
affirmative.  The Estate acted to 
its detriment in reliance upon the agreement by relinquishing possession of the 
Brehm residential property to Simek for several months, by allowing him repeated 
access to the residence for remodeling assessments, by allowing him to disarm 
the security system to obtain entry, and by informing the district court that 
the civil action had been settled.  
As noted above in the citations to Empfield, 900 P.2d  at 1155, and Davis, 855 P.2d  at 346-47, see supra ¶ 23, the court looks to 
the specific factors of a particular case in determining whether equity should 
defeat the statute of frauds.  In 
that regard, this dispute had been going on since Simek filed the civil action 
in 1998for seven years.  Brehm died 
in 1994, yet probates remained open eleven years later in two states because of 
the delay in resolving this controversy.  
The 2005 Agreement settled not just the Brehm residence purchase, but 
also Simek's separate claims against the Brehm estate based on the ranch 
purchase.

 
 
[¶27]   The Estate seeks an equitable 
escape from the effects of the statute of frauds.  We have said in many contexts that the 
function of equity is to provide fairness and justice to the parties under the 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Bentley v. Dir. of Office of 
State Lands & Invs., 2007 WY 94, ¶ 32, 160 P.3d 1109, 1118 (Wyo. 2007) 
(equitable conversion); Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Steamboat Springs, N.A., 2006 WY 132, ¶ 
23, 144 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Wyo. 2006) (equitable subrogation); Garlach v. Tuttle, 705 P.2d 828, 829 
(Wyo. 1985) (equitable estoppel); United 
States Through Farmers Home Admin. v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1040 (Wyo. 
1985) (equitable lien); Fuller v. 
Fuller, 606 P.2d 306, 309 (Wyo. 1980) (constructive trust); Cady v. Slingerland, 514 P.2d 1147, 1149 
(Wyo. 1973) (contract rescission); and Wantulok v. Wantulok, 67 Wyo. 22, 41, 
214 P.2d 477, 484 (1950) (clean hands doctrine).  We cannot say in the present case that 
the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that the acts of 
partial performance by the Estate, under the circumstances presented, were 
sufficient to invoke equity to enforce the oral agreement.  If we consider the factors mentioned in 
Empfield and Davis, to do other than what the 
district court did in this case would be to return these parties to a seemingly 
never-ending dispute, to neither's benefit and to both's detriment, despite a 
clear parol agreement that resolved all of their 
differences.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶28]   The 
district court did not err in holding the final evidentiary hearing in this 
matter, at which hearing one party and its witnesses appeared in person and the 
other party and its witnesses appeared by telephone.  The district court also did not err in 
denying Simek's motion to enforce the 2003 Agreement, which agreement was void 
due to its rejection by the Illinois Probate Court.  Finally, the district court did not err 
in enforcing the parties' oral 2005 Agreement, inasmuch as the equitable 
doctrine of partial performance took the agreement out from the statute of 
frauds.

 
 
[¶29]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1On 
January 13, 2009, Simek appealed from the district court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Enforcing Terms of Settlement Agreement, which was filed on 
December 22, 2008.  The Final Order 
and Judgment Enforcing Settlement Agreement Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Enforcing Terms of Settlement Agreement was not filed until 
July 8, 2009, after the probate courts of Wyoming and Illinois had approved the 
settlement agreement.

 
 

2There 
was also an extensive e-mail duel between counsel, about which more will be said 
in our discussion of the third issue.

 
 

3Butler 
v. McGee, 
as well as two earlier cases, Johnson v. 
Maki, 45 Wyo. 113, 16 P.2d 46 (1932), and Mecum v. Metz, 30 Wyo. 495, 222 P. 574 
(1924), although dealing with possession of land as partial performance, are of 
limited utility in the present case because they concern the factors in regard 
to possession that a putative buyer must prove to take his or her 
land purchase contract out of the statute of frauds.  For instance, Mecum holds that, in addition to proving 
possession, the buyer must also prove that he or she made improvements upon the 
land.  Mecum, 222 P.  at 577.  That analysis is not appropriate when 
the transfer of possession is alleged by the putative seller of the land.  See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 339 
(2001).