Case Title: State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool

Citation: 1999-Ohio-239

Docket Number: 19991430

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool, 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 1999-Ohio-239.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DEBROSSE ET AL. v. COOL, PIQUA CITY CLERK, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1.] 
Elections — Initiative petitions — “Appropriation,” defined — Proposed 
ordinance to be certified for submission to the electors — Attorney fees to 
abide submission of evidence and briefs. 
(No. 99-1430 — Submitted and decided September 16, 1999.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
Relators, Robert L. DeBrosse, Joseph C. Goetz, Maxine Orr, Cletus Peltier, 
and C. Richard Sword, are residents and qualified electors of the city of Piqua, 
Ohio.  On July 9, 1999, relators, acting as the committee for the petitioners, filed 
an initiative petition with respondent, Piqua City Clerk Rebecca J. Cool, requesting 
that the following proposed ordinance be placed on the November 2, 1999 general 
election ballot: 
 
“An Ordinance to retain legal counsel for the purpose of determining 
ownership of the assets of the Piqua Memorial Medical Center and any legal or 
beneficial interests of the City of Piqua in such assets. 
 
“WHEREAS, The electors of the City of Piqua, Ohio, desire to determine 
the legal ownership of Piqua Memorial Medical Center and the related assets and 
any legal or equitable interests of the City of Piqua in such assets: 
 
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the Electors of the City of 
Piqua, Ohio, that: 
 
“Section 1:  The City Commission of the City of Piqua, Ohio, shall employ 
independent legal counsel recognized as competent in matters of charitable trust 
law to render a legal opinion as to the legal ownership of the lands, buildings, and 
other assets of the Piqua Memorial Medical Center and as to any legal or equitable 
claim by the City of Piqua or residents of the City of Piqua, as a class, as to any 
 
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legal or beneficial interest in such assets and as to whether any terms or provisions 
of the Thayer Trust or of Ohio Revised Code Sections 109.34 or 109.35 have been 
violated or not complied with in connection with the transfer of ownership of the 
Piqua Memorial Medical Center.  Such legal counsel shall further take necessary 
legal action to preserve any legal or beneficial interests of the City of Piqua or its 
residents with respect to such assets and/or to recover any such assets and restore 
any such rights that have been taken contrary to law.  Any settlement negotiated by 
said legal counsel must first be approved by the City Commission after a public 
hearing providing opportunity for comment by residents of the City of Piqua. 
 
“Section 2.  The City Commission shall take all actions required by law, 
including advertising for bids, to retain such legal counsel and shall retain such 
legal counsel within sixty (60) days of the passage of this ordinance.” 
 
On July 14, in accordance with Section 28 of the Piqua Charter, Cool 
certified that relators’ initiative petition was properly attested and that it contained 
three hundred one valid signatures of electors, which was more than the minimum 
number of signatures required by charter.  On the same date that Cool issued her 
certification, Piqua Director of Law Stephen E. Klein advised the city manager in a 
memorandum that consistent with Klein’s prior June 15 written opinion, the 
initiative petition had no legal effect and no further action was needed because 
“Charter Section 14 prohibits initiated appropriation ordinances and  * * * Charter 
Section 53 prohibits an expenditure without an appropriation.” 
 
At the next regular meeting of respondent Piqua Commission on July 19, 
relator DeBrosse, a commission member, moved that the ordinance proposed by 
the initiative petition be referred to a committee of the whole and that a public 
hearing be held on the proposed ordinance within seven days, but the motion failed 
for lack of a second.  Although Section 15 of the Piqua Charter required Cool to 
submit the proposed ordinance to the commission, she did not do so. The 
 
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commission did not read the proposed ordinance or refer it to an appropriate 
committee for public hearings and a report pursuant to Section 15 of the Piqua 
Charter. 
 
On July 22, relators requested pursuant to R.C. 733.58 that Klein institute a 
mandamus action to compel Cool and the commission to proceed on the proposed 
ordinance.  On July 27, in accordance with Section 16 of the Piqua Charter, 
relators filed a certification with Cool demanding that the proposed ordinance be 
submitted to the electors.  The commission responded that on July 19, it had 
reviewed Klein’s June 15 opinion and that the motion of relator DeBrosse had 
failed for the lack of a second.  Klein rejected relators’ request to file a mandamus 
action and informed relators that he had not changed his June 15 opinion on the 
matter.  Klein further noted that if relators’ interpretation of the ordinance were 
correct, the ordinance would not affect an issue that Piqua could control by 
“legislative action.” 
 
Relators then filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel Cool to 
certify to the commission that relators filed a certified copy of the proposed 
ordinance for submission to the electors under Section 16 of the Piqua Charter and 
to compel the commission to submit the proposed ordinance to the electors in 
accordance with Section 17 of the Piqua Charter.  Relators alternatively request, 
pursuant to Section 15 of the Piqua Charter, a writ of mandamus  (1) ordering Cool 
to submit the ordinance proposed by the initiative petition to the commission, (2) 
ordering the commission to immediately read the proposed ordinance and submit it 
to an appropriate committee, (3) ordering the committee to conduct a public 
hearing on the proposed ordinance and report its recommendations to the 
commission, and (4) ordering the commission to take final action on the proposed 
ordinance.  Relators further request that if the court does not issue a peremptory 
writ, it should issue an alternative writ “expediting the presentation of evidence 
 
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and briefing in this case.”  On August 17, respondents filed an answer admitting 
the pertinent factual allegations of relators’ complaint.  Respondents subsequently 
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
This cause is now before the court for our determination pursuant to 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5). 
__________________ 
 
Donald J. McTigue, for relators. 
 
Stephen E. Klein, Piqua Director of Law, for respondents. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) Standards; Expedited Consideration 
 
Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), we must now determine whether dismissal, an 
alternative writ, or a peremptory writ is appropriate.  We apply the following 
standards to render this determination: 
 
“ ‘Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), dismissal is appropriate if it appears beyond 
doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations and making all 
reasonable inferences in favor of relator, that relator is not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief.  If, on the other hand, the complaint may have merit, an 
alternative writ should issue.  Finally, if it appears beyond doubt that relator is 
entitled to the requested extraordinary relief, a peremptory writ should issue.’ ”  
(Citations omitted.)  State ex rel. Dist. 1199, Health Care & Social Serv. Union, 
AFL-CIO v. Lawrence Cty. Gen. Hosp. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 351, 352-353, 699 
N.E.2d 1281, 1282, quoting State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
297, 298, 691 N.E.2d 253, 254. 
 
With the foregoing guidelines in mind, we now proceed with our 
determination under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5). 
Mandamus; Peremptory Writ 
 
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Relators assert that they are entitled to the requested writ based on the 
pertinent initiative provisions of the charter: 
 
“Section 15  Consideration of Initiated Ordinance by Commission. 
 
“If an initiative petition or amended petition be found sufficient by the city 
clerk he shall immediately so certify and promptly submit the proposed ordinance 
therein set forth to the commission which shall at once read it and refer it to an 
appropriate committee, which may be a committee of the whole.  Provision shall 
be made for public hearings upon the proposed ordinance before the committee to 
which it is referred.  Thereafter the committee shall report the proposed ordinance 
to the commission, with its recommendations thereon, not later than sixty days 
after the date on which it was submitted to the commission by the city clerk.  Upon 
receiving the proposed ordinance from the committee the commission shall 
proceed at once to consider it and to take final action thereon within thirty days 
from the date of such committee report. 
 
“Section 16  Submission of Initiated Ordinance to Electors. 
 
“If the commission fails to pass an ordinance proposed by initiative petition 
or passes it in a form different from that set forth in the petition therefor, the 
committee of the petitioners hereinafter provided for may require that it be 
submitted to a vote of the electors either in its original form or with any change or 
amendment presented in writing either at a public hearing before the committee to 
which the proposed ordinance was referred or during the consideration thereof by 
the commission.  If the committee of petitioners require the submission of a 
proposed ordinance to a vote of the electors they shall certify that fact to the city 
clerk, and file in his office a certified copy of the proposed ordinance in the form in 
which it is to be submitted, within ten days after final action on such proposed 
ordinance by the commission. 
 
“Section 17  Election on Initiated Ordinance. 
 
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“Upon receipt of the certified copy of a proposed ordinance from the 
committee of the petitioners, the city clerk shall certify that fact to the commission 
at the next regular meeting.  If any election is to be held not more than one year nor 
less than thirty days after the receipt of the clerk’s certificate by the commission, 
the proposed ordinance shall be submitted to a vote of the electors at the first such 
election unless the commission provides for submitting it to the electors at a 
special election to be held within the time aforesaid.  If no other election is to be 
held within one year and not less than thirty days after the receipt of the clerk’s 
certificate as aforesaid, the commission shall provide for submitting the proposed 
ordinance to the electors at a special election to be held within that time.  If, when 
submitted to the electors, a majority of those voting on a proposed ordinance vote 
in favor thereof, it shall be an ordinance of the city.  Initiated ordinances adopted 
by the electors shall be published, and may be amended or repealed by the 
commission, as in the case of other ordinances.” 
 
After Piqua Clerk Cool certified the sufficiency of the petition, she failed to 
submit it to the commission, and the commission refused to follow the procedures 
specified in Section 15 of the Piqua Charter.  Thereafter, by certification pursuant 
to Section 16, relators required the submission to a vote of electors of the proposed 
ordinance.  Respondents Cool and the commission failed to act on relators’ 
certification as required by Section 17 of the charter. 
 
Respondents refused to proceed in accordance with Sections 15, 16, and 17 
of the charter based on their claims that the initiative petition was excepted from 
the charter initiative provisions as an appropriation ordinance, or that the proposed 
ordinance would require an illegal expenditure without an appropriation, and that 
the proposed ordinance addressed a nonlegislative matter.  Respondents’ claims 
lack merit. 
 
Respondents first contend that the proposed ordinance is excepted from the 
 
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charter initiative provisions because it is an appropriation ordinance.  Section 14 of 
the Piqua Charter specifies that “[t]he electors shall have power to propose any 
ordinance except an appropriation ordinance, and to adopt or reject the same at the 
polls, such power being known as the initiative.”  (Emphasis added.)  The charter, 
however, does not define “appropriation ordinance.”  Undefined language used in a 
municipal charter should be construed according to its ordinary and common 
usage.  State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 127, 698 N.E.2d 
987, 990; State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138, 656 
N.E.2d 940, 944. 
 
We have held that the ordinary and common meaning of the comparable 
phrase “appropriation bill” is a “measure before a legislative body which 
authorizes ‘the expenditure of public moneys and stipulat[es] the amount, manner, 
and purpose of the various items of expenditure.’ ”  State ex rel. Akron Edn. Assn. 
v. Essex (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 47, 49, 1 O.O.3d 28, 30, 351 N.E.2d 118, 119-120, 
quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary (2 Ed.); see, also, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 102; Risser v. Klauser (1997), 207 Wis.2d 176, 192, 558 
N.W.2d 108, 115.  An appropriation bill must “contain, somewhere within its four 
corners, a specific appropriation in money.”  State ex rel. Akron Edn. Assn., 47 
Ohio St.2d at 50, 1 O.O.3d at 30, 351 N.E.2d at 120. 
 
The ordinance proposed by relators in their initiative petition is not an 
appropriation ordinance because it contains no specific appropriation of money and 
fails to stipulate any amount associated with the employment of independent legal 
counsel authorized therein.  There is consequently nothing to support respondents’ 
claims that the proposed ordinance is an appropriation ordinance excepted from the 
charter initiative provisions under Section 14 of the charter.  See State ex rel. King 
v. Portsmouth (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 27 OBR 73, 75, 497 N.E.2d 1126, 1128.  
Respondents’ reliance on the R.C. 131.01(F) definition of “appropriation” is 
 
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misplaced because that definition does not apply to municipal ordinances.  R.C. 
131.01(F) limits the applicability of the definition to statutes enacted by the 
General Assembly. 
 
Respondents next contend that the proposed ordinance is not subject to 
initiative because it is substantively illegal under Section 53 of the Piqua Charter, 
which provides that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury of the city, nor 
shall any obligation for the expenditure of money be incurred excepting pursuance 
of the annual appropriation ordinance, any preliminary appropriation ordinance 
passed in accordance with Section 50 of this Charter, or of the annual 
appropriation ordinance when changed as authorized by Section 51 hereof.” 
 
We need not address this contention because it does not bar an election on 
the proposed initiative ordinance.  Any claims alleging the unconstitutionality or 
illegality of the substance of the proposed ordinance, or actions to be taken 
pursuant to the ordinance when enacted, are premature before its approval by the 
electorate.  In other words, “ ‘where the mandatory provisions of the Constitution 
or statute prescribing the necessary preliminary steps to authorize the submission 
to the electors of an initiative statute or ordinance have been complied with, the 
submission will not be enjoined.’ ”  State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 293, 649 N.E.2d 1205, 1208, quoting 
Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand (1921), 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N.E. 556, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  In this regard, respondents’ citation of State ex rel. McGraw v. 
Smith (1935), 129 Ohio St. 246, 2 O.O. 116, 194 N.E. 872, to attack the validity of 
any contract entered into pursuant to the initiated ordinance, is also premature. 
 
Respondents finally contend that the proposed ordinance is not subject to 
initiative because it does not involve matters that Piqua “may now or hereafter be 
authorized by law to control by legislative action.”   Section 1f, Article II, Ohio 
Constitution.  Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution limits initiative and 
 
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referendum powers to questions that are legislative in nature.  Buckeye Community 
Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 543, 697 N.E.2d 181, 
184.  The matters addressed in the initiative petition are legislative in nature, and 
are therefore properly subject to initiative, because the proposed ordinance 
involves the creation of a new law rather than the execution or administration of 
laws that are already in existence.  Id. at 543-544, 697 N.E.2d at 185; Donnelly v. 
Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  Contrary to respondents’ contentions, the initiative petition 
involved here is not comparable to the initiative petition in State ex rel. Beckstedt 
v. Eyrich (1963), 120 Ohio App. 338, 345, 29 O.O.2d 170, 174, 195 N.E.2d 371, 
376, in which the petition “propose[d] no enactment, provide[d] no detail or 
direction as to how the program should be undertaken, and provide[d] no form 
which could be construed as legislation whether effected by the people themselves 
or by the council.” 
 
Therefore, respondents erroneously failed to act pursuant to the applicable 
charter provisions either to enact the proposed ordinance or submit it to the electors 
at the November 2 general election.  Relators have a clear legal right to compel 
Cool to certify to the commission that relators filed a certified copy of the 
proposed ordinance and to compel the commission to submit the proposed 
ordinance to the electors at the November 2 general election, respondents have 
corresponding legal duties, and given the proximity of the general election, relators 
lack an adequate alternative legal remedy.  Sections 16 and 17, Piqua Charter; see, 
also, Thurn, 72 Ohio St.3d at 291-292, 649 N.E.2d at 1207-1208, citing State ex 
rel. Smart v. McKinley (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 5, 6, 18 O.O.3d 128, 129, 412 N.E.2d 
393, 394.  Because relators’ entitlement to the requested relief is evident and the 
pertinent facts are uncontroverted, no further evidence or argument is necessary to 
resolve this case, and we grant a peremptory writ.  Dist. 1199, 83 Ohio St.3d at 
 
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353, 699 N.E.2d at 1282.  This conclusion is consistent with our duty to liberally 
construe municipal initiative provisions to permit the exercise of the power of 
initiative.  Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 40, 
671 N.E.2d 1, 5; State ex rel. King, 27 Ohio St.3d at 4, 27 OBR at 75, 497 N.E.2d 
at 1128. 
 
By so holding, we need not decide relators’ remaining contention that 
Section 14 of the Piqua Charter, which excepts appropriation ordinances from its 
initiative provisions, is unconstitutional.  Courts decide constitutional issues only 
when absolutely necessary.  State ex rel. BSW Development Group v. Dayton 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 345, 699 N.E.2d 1271, 1277. 
Attorney Fees 
 
Relators also request attorney fees.  Despite respondents’ claims that such 
fees are not authorized by statute, these fees might be recoverable under R.C. 
733.61.  The decision to award attorney fees to successful relators in an R.C. 
Chapter 733 taxpayer suit is within the court’s discretion.  R.C. 733.61; Hubbard 
ex rel. Creed v. Sauline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 407-408, 659 N.E.2d 781, 786.  
An award requires a public benefit resulting from the litigation.  State ex rel. 
Commt. for Charter Amendment Petition v. Avon (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 590, 595, 
693 N.E.2d 205, 209.  It is unclear from the pleadings submitted whether relators 
should be awarded attorney fees.  Therefore, we will withhold a decision on this 
issue until the receipt of briefs and evidence concerning entitlement to the award 
and the reasonableness of the requested amount.  Morris v. Macedonia City 
Council (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 58, 641 N.E.2d 1075, 1080. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we deny respondents’ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and grant a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the 
Piqua Clerk to certify to the Piqua Commission that relators filed a certified copy 
of the proposed ordinance for submission to the electors and to compel the Piqua 
 
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Commission to submit the proposed ordinance to the electors at the November 2 
general election.  In addition, we order the parties to submit evidence and briefs 
regarding relators’ entitlement to and reasonable amount of an award of attorney 
fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.