Case Title: State ex rel. Cleveland Ass'n of Rescue Employees v. City of Cleveland

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3112

Docket Number: 2022-1091

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Cleveland Assn. of Rescue Emps. v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3112.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3112 
THE STATE EX REL. CLEVELAND ASSOCIATION OF RESCUE EMPLOYEES ET AL., 
APPELLEES, v. THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Cleveland Assn. of Rescue Emps. v. Cleveland, 
Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3112.] 
Mandamus—Public-records requests—Public Records Act does not permit denial 
of open-ended requests for all emails sent to and/or from one or more 
specified individuals whenever search terms have not been provided—
Union’s requests for emails “exchanged between” two particular city 
employees over 27-day period and emails “to and from” third city 
employee’s email address over same period identified the records it was 
seeking with reasonable clarity—Court of appeals’ judgment granting writ 
in part and denying it in part, awarding union statutory damages, and 
ordering city to pay court costs affirmed and award of attorney fees 
reversed. 
(No. 2022-1091—Submitted February 28, 2023—Decided September 7, 2023.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 111230, 2022-Ohio-3043. 
_______________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, the city of Cleveland, appeals the judgment of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals granting in part and denying in part a writ of mandamus 
to appellees, Cleveland Association of Rescue Employees and its president, Paul 
Melhuish (collectively, “the union”), awarding the union statutory damages and 
attorney fees and ordering the city to pay court costs.  While this appeal was 
pending, the city filed a motion for oral argument.  We deny the city’s request for 
oral argument and affirm the court of appeals’ judgment granting in part and 
denying in part the writ of mandamus, awarding the union statutory damages, and 
ordering the city to pay court costs.  We reverse the court appeals’ award of attorney 
fees. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} On January 6, 2022, the union submitted two public-records requests 
through the city’s online public-records-request portal.  The requests sought: 
 
[1] [a]ll emails exchanged between the following e-mail 
addresses for the time period between 12/9/2021 and 1/5/2022[:] 
khoward2@clevelandohio.gov 
(Karrie 
Howard) 
and 
ncarlton@clevelandohio.gov (Nicole Carlton) [; and] 
[2] * * * all emails to and from the following email address 
between the dates of 12/9/2021 and 1/5/2022: 
Dtownsend@clevelandohio.gov (Townsend, Dawntaunya 
S). 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
3 
{¶ 3} Five days later, on January 11, the city sent the following email 
denying each request: 
 
The City respectfully to [sic] your request for all 
communication * * * as being overly broad.  It is the responsibility 
of the requester to identify with reasonable clarity the records being 
sought.  State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 119 Ohio St.3d 391 [2008-
Ohio-4788, 894 N.E.2d 606]; State ex rel. Bristow v. Wilson [6th 
Dist. Erie Nos. E-17-060, E-17-067, and E-17-070, 2018-Ohio-
1973]; State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312 [750 
N.E.2d 156] (2001).  If you choose to revise your request, please 
identify names of the messages’ sender and recipient(s), or domain 
email address, and search terms. 
 
{¶ 4} Ten days later, on January 21, the union received the following email 
regarding each request: 
 
In regards to the City – Public Records Request received on 
1/6/2022 requesting records, the records have been in “Requested 
Clarification” status for 10 days.  The City of Cleveland considers 
this request closed.  If you would still like the records, please submit 
another City – Public Records Request.  Thank you for using the 
Cleveland Public Records Center. 
 
(Boldface and underlining sic.)  The union did not send revised requests. 
{¶ 5} On January 31, the union filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in 
the Eighth District to compel production of the requested records.  The complaint 
named as respondents Public Records Administrator Kim Roberson and the city, 
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the latter in care of Director of Law Barbara Langhenry.  The union also sought 
statutory damages and attorney fees for the city’s alleged violation of R.C. 
149.43(B).  The clerk of courts sent the complaint by certified mail to Roberson, 
the city, and Langhenry.  However, certified-mail service failed when service was 
refused on February 3. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals had scheduled mediation automatically under a 
local rule but canceled it upon learning that certified-mail service had failed.  The 
certified-mail return receipts were docketed as “refused” on February 25.  Service 
by regular mail was accepted on February 28. 
{¶ 7} On March 10, the court of appeals issued an alternative writ ordering 
the city to release all requested records or show cause why they should not be 
released and “why certified mail service was not effected.”  On March 16, the city 
simultaneously filed an answer to the complaint and a motion for reconsideration 
of the alternative writ, to cancel the show-cause hearing, and to schedule the case 
for mediation.  The city asserted that it had inadvertently refused service, that 
Roberson was no longer employed as the city’s public-records administrator, and 
that Langhenry was no longer employed as the director of the city’s legal 
department.  The city further indicated that when the union had sent prior public-
records requests to the city, the union had “worked with” the city “to clarify their 
requests for ‘all emails’ for a certain period, to include topics and/or search terms.” 
{¶ 8} The court held a show-cause hearing on March 22.  According to the 
court, at the show-cause hearing, the union “admitted that it wanted records relating 
to payroll and time-keeping problems following a data breach.”  2022-Ohio-3043, 
¶ 8.  Later that day, the court filed a journal entry stating: 
 
The court continues the alternative writ as follows: The city 
of Cleveland shall release the requested records by April 1, 2022, 
and shall certify to the court on that date what records have been 
January Term, 2023 
 
5 
released, including the number of records.  If the city withholds 
records or redacts records, it shall identify those records and explain, 
with supporting legal authority, why the records were withheld or 
redacted.  The relators by April 15, 2022, shall certify whether they 
are satisfied that the released records have fulfilled their request, and 
if not, why they believe the requests have not been fulfilled.  This 
includes opposing redactions.  * * *  The court orders the parties to 
co-operate with each other for the quick release of the requested 
records. 
 
{¶ 9} In a March 28 filing, the city certified that in response to the union’s 
first records request, the city had provided to the union “51 pages of emails, 
including attachments, * * * concerning * * * payroll and timekeeping problems in 
December 2021 and January 2022, following the data breach of UKG Solutions, 
also called Kronos,” that “[n]o redactions were made to the emails produced,” and 
that the city was not withholding any responsive emails “on the basis of any 
privilege or exception to R.C. 149.43.”  The city certified that in response to the 
union’s second records request, the city had produced “262 pages of emails, 
including attachments, * * * concerning * * * payroll and timekeeping problems 
following the Kronos data breach” and that redactions had been made on two pages 
to “an individual employee’s paystub attached to an email, on the basis that the 
paystub was nonresponsive.” 
{¶ 10} On April 15, 2022, the union notified the court of appeals that the 
city had “sufficiently produced the public records sought” in this action, thereby 
mooting the union’s mandamus claim in part.  However, the union simultaneously 
filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to statutory damages and 
attorney fees, arguing that its requests were not overbroad and that the city thus had 
violated R.C. 149.43(B) when it failed to promptly provide the responsive records.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The city filed a combined brief in opposition and cross-motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the requests were overbroad, that it had timely responded to 
the union explaining its decision, and that the union was not entitled to statutory 
damages or attorney fees. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals determined that the union’s requests as initially 
worded “stated with clarity what records were requested,” 2022-Ohio-3043 at ¶ 13, 
determined that the city’s failure to honor them “undermine[d] the purpose of the 
[P]ublic [R]ecords [A]ct,” id., and granted in part and denied in part the requested 
writ of mandamus, id. at ¶ 18-19.  The court found that the “representations made 
at the show cause hearing on March 22, 2022, indicated that [the city] had not 
released any records by that date, more than ten business days after the perfection 
of service.”  Id. at ¶ 16.  Based on that finding, the court awarded the union statutory 
damages in the amount of $1,000 and attorney fees in the amount of $4,672.50 and 
ordered the city to pay court costs.  Id. at ¶ 16-18.  The court also dismissed 
Roberson from the lawsuit because she was no longer the city’s public-records 
administrator.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 12} The city appealed to this court as of right, and we granted the city’s 
unopposed motion to stay the court of appeals’ judgment.  168 Ohio St.3d 1404, 
2022-Ohio-3545, 195 N.E.3d 1042. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  City’s motion for oral argument 
{¶ 13} We have discretion to order oral argument upon the request of a party 
in an appeal under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).  The factors that inform our discretion 
are “whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues 
of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among the courts of 
appeals.”  State ex rel. Scott v. Streetsboro, 150 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-3308, 78 
N.E.3d 809, ¶ 9. 
January Term, 2023 
 
7 
{¶ 14} The city moved for oral argument because, in its view, “whether 
search terms are required when a public records requester requests emails stored 
electronically by a public office” is an important issue.  Yet the city has conceded 
that the material facts are undisputed, and it has not identified any reason why the 
parties’ briefs provide an insufficient basis for evaluating the issues germane to this 
appeal. 
{¶ 15} The city’s reasons in support of its request are unconvincing, and we 
deny the request for oral argument. 
B.  Standard of review 
{¶ 16} Because the city provided the union with the requested records 
during the mandamus proceedings, only the court of appeals’ decision granting 
summary judgment to the union and ordering the city to pay statutory damages, 
court costs, and attorney fees is at issue.  We review de novo a court of appeals’ 
grant of summary judgment in a mandamus action.  State ex rel. Ames v. Portage 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, ¶ 11.  
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, properly submitted, shows 
that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Civ.R. 56(C); Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. 
Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 11. 
C.  Whether a request for “all emails” is overbroad 
{¶ 17} The city first argues that a public-records request seeking “all 
emails” is overbroad when it does not identify applicable “search terms.”  A public 
office may deny a request as overbroad if the office “cannot reasonably identify 
what public records are being requested.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(2).  Moreover, “a request 
that seeks duplication of entire categories of documents is overly broad and may be 
denied on that basis.”  State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 163 Ohio St.3d 217, 2020-
Ohio-5585, 169 N.E.3d 625, ¶ 73; see also State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Hutson, 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 624, 640 N.E.2d 174 (1994) (holding that the Public 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Records Act “does not contemplate that any individual has the right to a complete 
duplication of voluminous files kept by government agencies”). 
{¶ 18} The city claims that it seeks “clarification” from a public-records 
requester “[w]henever an open-ended request is made for voluminous public 
records in the form of * * * ‘all emails’ to/from a certain account.”  Thus, the city 
argues, it acted reasonably when it “request[ed] that” the union “narrow” its request 
for “all emails” by providing “search terms.” 
{¶ 19} The city cites several cases in support of its argument that a public-
records request for “all emails” sent to or from a specified city employee without 
limitation by search terms is “understood” to be an unenforceable, overbroad 
request. 
{¶ 20} In State ex rel. Dissell v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110425, 
2021-Ohio-2937, ¶ 1, the relator had requested “all communications sent to the 
Mayor’s Action Center (‘MAC’) in 2018, 2019, and the first ten months of 2020.”  
The Eighth District determined that the request was overbroad, “constituting a 
complete duplication of voluminous files,” and denied relief.  Id.  In Dissell, after 
reviewing the records produced, the court reasoned that “the diversity of emails 
sent to the MAC show that there is, in fact, no subject-matter limitation.”  Id. at  
¶ 19. 
{¶ 21} In State ex rel. Bristow v. Wilson, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-17-060, E-
17-067, and E-17-070, 2018-Ohio-1973, ¶ 12, a court of appeals determined that a 
request for “every email sent and received” by the six respondents and their 
employees over a one-month period was overbroad because it “essentially [sought] 
a complete duplication of the respondents’ email files, albeit in one-month 
increments.”  The court rejected the relator’s argument that a temporal limitation 
of one month had sufficiently narrowed the requests.  The court also found that the 
respondents complied with R.C. 143.49(B)(2) when they “invited [the relator] to 
revise his requests (which [he] declined to do) * * * to ‘specific topics or subject 
January Term, 2023 
 
9 
matter’—indicating that [the] respondents organize[d] their email files by subject.”  
Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 22} In State ex rel. Harris v. Rose, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2022 CA 0022, 
2022-Ohio-3729, ¶ 19, 21, a court of appeals determined that a prison inmate’s 
request for “[e]-mails” sent from one specified corrections officer to another was 
overbroad and that the records custodian had complied with her duties under R.C. 
143.49(B) by requesting that the inmate “specify a time frame.” 
{¶ 23} And in State ex rel. Adams v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 18AP-1005, 2020-Ohio-2843, ¶ 39, a court of appeals adopted the 
recommendation of a magistrate to grant a limited writ of mandamus ordering a 
university to produce documents “included in the full chronological range of [the] 
relator’s request and covering all of [his] submitted search terms.”  In that case, the 
relator’s initial request was for “all communications to or from” five named 
individuals “and 14 university officers and employees.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  The relator 
revised his initial request twice in response to the university’s assertions that the 
request was overbroad.  Id. at ¶ 15-18. 
{¶ 24} Although these cases indicate that an open-ended request for all 
emails sent to and/or from one or more specified individuals could be overbroad, 
the decisions do not support the proposition that the union’s January 6, 2022 public-
records requests were overbroad as a matter of law because they lacked search 
terms.  We have never held that R.C. 149.43(B) authorizes a public office to 
automatically deny a public-records request when search terms have not been 
provided.  R.C. 143.49(B) requires a public office to meaningfully review each 
public-records request before denying it out-of-hand for lack of search terms.  See 
State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Community College, 133 Ohio St.3d 122, 
2012-Ohio-4228, 976 N.E.2d 861, ¶ 26 (“Manifestly, each request—and each 
retention category when the request is structured after such a category—must be 
analyzed under the totality of facts and circumstances”).  The city’s admitted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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practice contravenes the purpose of the Public Records Act, “which is to expose 
government activity to public scrutiny,” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. 
Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 25} We reject the city’s argument that the Public Records Act permits 
the denial of open-ended public-records requests for all emails sent to and/or from 
one or more specified individuals whenever search terms have not been provided. 
D.  Whether the city’s refusal to search for responsive records until it received 
search terms was reasonable under the circumstances 
{¶ 26} The city also challenges the court of appeals’ conclusion that the 
union had a clear legal right to records based on the initial wording of its public-
records requests.  The city contends that the union’s requests were not “sufficiently 
limited by time frame and accounts at issue” and that the city did not violate the 
Public Records Act by demanding that the union provide search terms. 
{¶ 27} We reject the city’s arguments because the union’s requests as 
initially worded identified the sought-after records with reasonable clarity.  The 
union requested email correspondence, not all communications without limitation, 
and therefore did not require “a complete duplication” of the city’s “voluminous 
files,” Glasgow, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 2008-Ohio-4788, 894 N.E.2d 686, at ¶ 17; id. 
at ¶ 19 (request for “all [of a state representative’s] work-related e-mail messages, 
text messages, and correspondence during her entire tenure” was unenforceable as 
overbroad); State ex rel. Dehler v. Spatny, 127 Ohio St.3d 312, 2010-Ohio-5711, 
939 N.E.2d 831, ¶ 3 (request for “all of the records relating to the quartermaster’s 
orders for and receipt of clothing and shoes for a period of over seven years” was 
unenforceable as overbroad).  Moreover, the union requested emails “exchanged 
between” two particular city employees over a 27-day period and emails “to and 
from” a third city employee’s email address over the same period.  Rather than 
being overbroad, the union’s requests were straightforward and not overly 
burdensome.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ determination that the 
January Term, 2023 
 
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city violated an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B) when it refused to promptly 
produce the records responsive to the January 6, 2022 requests. 
E.  Statutory damages 
{¶ 28} “A person requesting public records ‘shall’ be entitled to recover an 
award of statutory damages ‘if a court determines that the public office or the 
person responsible for the public records failed to comply with an obligation in 
accordance with R.C. 149.43(B).’ ”  State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 164 Ohio St.3d 
557, 2021-Ohio-624, 174 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 16, quoting R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  The court 
may reduce or not award statutory damages if it determines that (1) based on the 
law as it existed at the time of the request, a well-informed person responsible for 
the records reasonably would have believed that R.C. 149.43(B) did not require 
their disclosure and (2) a well-informed person responsible for the records 
reasonably would have believed that withholding the records would serve the public 
policy that underlies the authority asserted for withholding them.  R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b).  A court’s decision not to reduce or eliminate statutory 
damages is subject to review for an abuse of discretion.  State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Enquirer v. Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 44. 
{¶ 29} The city argues that it satisfied R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b) because 
its response asking that the union narrow its request by providing search terms was 
reasonable based on State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 156 Ohio St.3d 22, 
2018-Ohio-5110, 123 N.E.3d 895, and Dissell, 2021-Ohio-2937, and was “in 
furtherance of the public policies underlying those cases, i.e., avoiding a complete 
duplication of voluminous files in response to a records request and unreasonable 
interference with the discharge of the duties of the records custodian.”  But the city 
did not raise this argument in the proceedings below; instead, the city maintained 
in the court of appeals that “[s]tatutory damages would be inappropriate in this case 
under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) because the City did not fail to meet any obligation under 
the Public Records Act.”  Absent an argument by the city below regarding the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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applicability of R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b), the court of appeals’ award of full 
statutory damages was not an abuse of discretion. 
F.  Costs and attorney fees 
{¶ 30} The city challenges the court of appeals’ judgment to the extent that 
it ordered the city to pay the court costs associated with this case.  But because the 
court of appeals concluded that the union was entitled to a writ of mandamus 
ordering the city to provide public records responsive to its requests, an award of 
costs to the union was mandatory under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i).  The court of 
appeals did not err when it so ordered. 
{¶ 31} With regard to attorney fees, an award is discretionary when a court 
orders a public office to comply with R.C. 149.43(B).  State ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, 
169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, ¶ 74.  There are four discrete 
“triggering events that grant a court discretion to order reasonable attorney fees in 
a public-records case.”  State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 155 Ohio 
St.3d 545, 2018-Ohio-5111, 122 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 32, citing R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b).  
Here, the court of appeals determined that the circumstance outlined in R.C. 
149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii) applied to the city’s conduct in this case.  That provision allows 
attorney fees if the court determines that 
 
[t]he public office or the person responsible for the public records 
acted in bad faith when the office or person voluntarily made the 
public records available to the relator for the first time after the 
relator commenced the mandamus action, but before the court issued 
any order concluding whether or not the public office or person was 
required to comply with division (B) of this section. 
 
{¶ 32} A finding of bad faith requires proof that the public office exhibited 
“ ‘a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known 
January Term, 2023 
 
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duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud [or an] 
actual intent to mislead or deceive [the requester].’ ”  State ex rel. McDougald v. 
Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-Ohio-3686, 161 N.E.3d 575, ¶ 25-26, quoting 
Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962), 
paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds by Zoppo v. Homestead 
Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994), paragraph one of the syllabus.  
The Public Records Act “expressly states that there is no presumption of bad faith 
based solely on the fact that the public office makes a record available after the 
mandamus case is filed but before being ordered by the court to do so.”  Summers, 
164 Ohio St.3d 583, 2021-Ohio-2061, 174 N.E.3d 747, at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 33} Here, the court of appeals determined that the city acted in bad faith 
when it refused “to accept certified mail from the court and one of Cleveland’s own 
unions * * * even if the addressees no longer held the relevant positions” because 
“[t]he source of the letter demanded that it be accepted.”  2022-Ohio-3043 at ¶ 14.  
In so determining, the court rejected the city’s argument that its “Copy Center” 
employees were complying with their duties when they rejected the certified-mail 
service from the clerk of courts. 
{¶ 34} R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii) is concerned with a public-records 
custodian’s bad faith in not disclosing the requested records until after the relator 
“commenced the mandamus action” but “before the court issued any order” 
determining that the public office was required to disclose the documents to comply 
with its duties under the act.  Thus, here, the city’s refusal to accept the certified-
mail service of the complaint is not a legitimate basis on which to award attorney 
fees under the Public Records Act, and in this respect, the court of appeals erred. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment 
granting in part and denying in part a writ of mandamus, we affirm the court’s 
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award of statutory damages and court costs, and we reverse the court’s award of 
attorney fees.  We deny the city’s request for oral argument. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, 
JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would affirm the court 
of appeals’ award of attorney fees. 
_______________ 
Mark D. Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and William M. Menzalora 
and Timothy J. Puin, Assistant Directors of Law, for appellant. 
Muskovitz & Lemmerbrock, L.L.C., Ryan J. Lemmerbrock, and Brooks W. 
Boron, for appellees. 
_________________