Case Title: Blackwell v. Alabama Power Company

Citation: 152 So. 2d 670

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1963-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
152 So. 2d 670 (1963)
Braxton B. BLACKWELL
v.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY.
1 Div. 885.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 4, 1963.
Rehearing Denied May 9, 1963.
*672 Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for appellant.
Inge, Twitty & Duffy, Thos. E. Twitty, Mobile, and Martin, Vogtle, Balch & Bingham, Harold Bowron, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from judgment for defendant in action for wrongful death of plaintiff's twelve-year-old son, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the intestate, who was allegedly killed as the proximate result of the negligence of defendant in maintaining its electric wires through a tree which the boy was climbing when he met his death.
At defendant's request, the court gave the following written charge:
On this appeal, plaintiff insists that the court erred in giving said charge. Plaintiff argues that every essential averment of one or more counts of the complaint was sustained by the evidence.
Defendant contends that the peremptory instruction in its favor was given without error for two reasons: first, because the complaint fails to state a cause of action, and, therefore, is insufficient to support a judgment; second, because even if the complaint be sufficient to support a judgment, the evidence was insufficient to sustain any count of the complaint.
As we understand it, defendant contends that the complaint was defective in failing to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its wires so as to guard against injury to one climbing the tree. Defendant says the allegations are insufficient to show that defendant was under a duty to exercise such care because the allegations failed to show that defendant should reasonably have anticipated that a boy would climb the tree.
If the averments of the complaint fail to show a duty on defendant to anticipate that someone lawfully pursuing business or pleasure might come into contact with defendant's wires which ran through the tree, then, we agree, the complaint would fail to state a cause of action.
The complaint was amended many times. Our understanding is that issue was joined and evidence taken on an amended complaint which contained twelve counts. In some of these counts, plaintiff alleges that his son was killed as the proximate result of defendant's negligence; in others, as a result of the "wantonness of the defendant."
Ten of the amended counts, perhaps all of them, contain the following averments:
*673 The sufficiency of the amended complaint against demurrer is not before us on this appeal, because the counts of the amended complaint charging negligence were upheld and there is no cross-assignment. Sims v. Tigrett, 229 Ala. 486, 158 So. 326.
This court has said:
On demurrer, all intendments are against the sufficiency of the complaint, but when the inquiry arises upon the sufficiency of the complaint to sustain the judgment, all reasonable intendments are indulged to support the judgment. Werten v. K. B. Koosa & Co., 169 Ala. 258, 53 So. 98; Klepac v. Fendley, 222 Ala. 417, 132 So. 619.
This court has said:
We are of opinion that the amended complaint, when measured by the foregoing rules, contains allegations sufficient to show that defendant was bound reasonably to anticipate that boys would climb the tree, and, therefore, under a duty to exercise reasonable care commensurate with the circumstances to guard against injury to persons, pursuing business or pleasure, who were likely to come into contact with defendant's wires.
As a result, we hold that the peremptory instruction to find for defendant was not justified on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
It has been stated that an electric company maintaining a dangerous wire through or near a tree is bound to anticipate that persons may lawfully climb the tree, to exercise due care to prevent injury to such persons from its wire, and to keep such wires insulated in places where children climbing the tree will come into contract with the wire. Curtis on Law of Electricity, § 512. The statement is supported by decisions of this court and other courts.
In affirming judgment for plaintiff, the Mississippi court said:
The Pennsylvania court said:
In an action for wrongful death of a twelve-year-old boy, killed by contact with an electric wire while he was climbing a tree, the North Carolina Court affirmed the judgment for plaintiff and approved the rule stated above. Benton v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448.
The Missouri Court approved the following statement:
See also: Williams v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 274 Mo. 1, 202 S.W. 1; Godfrey v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 299 Mo. 472, 253 S.W. 233.
To like effect, the Maine Court said:
*675 The Wisconsin Court said:
The Texas Court said:
The Michigan Court said:
In every case cited to us by appellant or appellee, in which a boy climbing a tree was injured by contact with a wire carrying electricity, the court held in accord with the above cited cases. In an Alabama case involving injury from contact with electric wire by a person climbing a tree, there an adult, this court said:
In Woodward Iron Co. v. Burges, 219 Ala. 136, 121 So. 399, this court, conditioned on remittitur, affirmed judgment for a boy who was injured by contact with defendant's power line while the boy was climbing a tree.
So it must be regarded as settled that one who maintains a dangerous wire carrying electricity through or near a tree, must anticipate that persons may climb the tree, unless the circumstances are such that the remoteness of the tree, or perhaps some other reason, makes it improbable that a person will climb the tree.
This decision, then, must turn on whether there was, or was not, a scintilla of evidence to support the inference that a boy might reasonably have been expected to climb the tree here involved.
In reviewing the giving of affirmative instructions for defendant, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and we must allow all inferences favorable to plaintiff which the evidence, or a scintilla thereof, supports. Bradford v. Moore Bros. Feed & Grocery, 268 Ala. 217, 105 So. 2d 825; McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 88 So. 135; cases cited in Ala. Digest, Appeal. If, from the evidence, reasonable inference may be drawn substantiating the claimed culpability of defendant, a directed verdict for defendant is improper. Sullivan v. Alabama Power Company, 246 Ala. 262, 267, 20 So. 2d 224.
Intestate was a boy over the age of twelve at the time of his death on a dry Sunday afternoon in July. He had gone with his parents and other relatives to the place of Mr. and Mrs. Griffice in Mobile County. The Griffice place was located in what defendant's District Manager or Superintendent referred to as the "Price Morris Road Community." The Griffices were offering Azaleas for sale to purchasers who would themselves dig up the plants in a sort of field near the Griffice house. The field lay in the northwest corner of the intersection of Moffat Road and Price Morris Road, that is, the field was bounded on the south by Moffat Road and on the east by Price Morris Road. The field was enclosed by a fence on the sides next to these roads.
On the afternoon in question, intestate rode with his parents in a truck to a point in the field about 150 or 200 feet from the tree here in question. The intestate and relatives disembarked from their vehicles and began to dig Azaleas, all with the consent of the Griffices. There were present other vehicles and other people, similarly engaged and children. Intestate dug Azaleas for a while. He was called by other boys to the tree and climbed it to catch a little squirrel. He met his death in the tree.
The tree was located alongside Price Morris Road about 115 feet north of the north boundary of Moffat Road and about 5 feet west of the west boundary of Price Morris Road. The fence on the east side of the field was of net or hog wire, about 5 feet high, and was nailed to the tree. There were barbed wire strands running across the net wire and they were mounted on posts. The tree was used for a post also. The tree was 5 feet and a few inches west of the east property line of the field. *677 There was nothing but empty space between tree and road. Price Morris Road appears to have a gravel or, perhaps, an asphalt surface, and was about 19 feet wide. The field and the road seem to be on the same level. The terrain appears to be flat.
One witness described the tree as follows:
The witness described intestate's dying as follows:
The witness testified that intestate, while in the tree, had one hand around the top wire and his foot on the bottom wire and smoke was boiling up from it. Examination of intestate's body showed that his hand and foot had been burned.
Defendant's two wires, which ran through the tree, carried 7200 volts. The wires were uninsulated, that is, bare.
Jimmy Blackwell, aged 14, cousin of intestate, testified on cross-examination that the tree "was pretty easy to climb up." Two or three boys in addition to intestate climbed the tree that afternoon.
Mrs. Brackett, who lived across Price Morris Road opposite the tree, testified that Price Morris Road was about one-half mile long; that "At least 50" people lived on Price Morris Road on the day in question; that about that number had lived there for one or two years prior to that date; that about 30 children lived there over that period; that Price Morris Road is a "cut-off road" and those people "have to come out to the highway, or come from the highway down to Price Morris Road" and "They definitely have to use Price Morris Road," "It's the only route"; that they catch school buses there; that she had lived there "Around 10 years"; that the children use Price Morris Road to ride their bicycles, to walk to the store and back, and to catch school buses "right close to this very tree"; that there were fruit trees and berry vines along beside the tree; that she had noticed children in that vicinity and has picked berries there herself; that she has seen children in trees in that vicinity on her property just on the opposite side of the *678 road from the tree where intestate met his death, but she never saw a child in that tree.
Defendant's wires were installed in 1939. The last record of trimming or pruning the tree was in the spring of 1953. Intestate's death was in 1957.
There is evidence that the tree was on land owned by Mrs. and Mrs. Griffice. Defendant had a permit, or easement, which authorized defendant to maintain its lines and poles over the land, and also gave defendant the right to "cut and keep clear of all trees, * * * that may injure or endanger said lines."
Whatever status intestate may have occupied as to Mr. and Mrs. Griffice, intestate was not a trespasser as against the defendant, which owned neither the land nor the tree. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Cockrum, 179 Ala. 372, 60 So. 304; Woodward Iron Co. v. Burges, supra. The fact that the injured child was trespassing upon a third party's property at the time of the injury is no defense. Godfrey v. Kansas City, Light & Power Co., supra.
There was evidence tending to show that the tree was easy to climb. It was beside a road along which the community's children constantly passed. It was directly across the road from other trees. The evidence positively shows that children had climbed those other trees on previous occasions. Certainly, under this evidence it would be reasonable to anticipate that children would again climb the other trees across the road. The tree which intestate climbed was easily accessible to boys and "pretty easy to climb up." What reason forbids the inference that a boy could be expected to climb the tree which intestate climbed? We think there is none.
We think the jury could infer that a boy might reasonably have been expected to climb the tree that intestate climbed and, therefore, that defendant was bound to anticipate that a boy would climb it and, consequently, under a duty to maintain its wires in a manner reasonably calculated to guard against injury, from contact with defendant's wires, to a boy climbing the tree which intestate climbed.
As the defendant was not entitled to the general charge as to the negligence counts, it was, of course, not entitled to same as to the whole case. Woodward Iron Co. v. Burges, supra.
For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.