Case Title: Curtis v. State

Citation: 480 So. 2d 1277

Docket Number: 65891

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1985-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
480 So. 2d 1277 (1985)
Hugh Miller CURTIS, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 65891.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 26, 1985.
Rehearing Denied January 30, 1986.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Mark C. Menser and Ellen D. Phillips, Asst. Attys. Gen., Daytona Beach, for respondent.
EHRLICH, Justice.
This case is before us because it is in direct conflict with Ivory v. State, 351 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1977).[1]
Curtis was charged and convicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was accused of threatening the manager of a motel with a knife. The sole issue before us is based on the following facts stated by the district court:
Curtis v. State, 455 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.410 requires:
The record in this case fails to show compliance with the procedure of rule 3.410.[2] The district court resolved this silence by assuming no such procedure was followed. Based on this assumption, the district court concluded that, while the safer course of action would have been to follow the procedure of rule 3.410, the nature of the trial court's response to the questions, characterized as a refusal to answer, did not violate the rule. In other words, according to the district court, a refusal to answer is not within the scope of the rule.
This is an incorrect conclusion. We explained the operation of rule 3.410 in Ivory:
351 So. 2d  at 28 (emphasis added).
The "response" contemplated by Ivory, vis-a-vis "instructions," encompasses more than merely rereading some or all of the original instructions, or the giving of additional instructions from the Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal). The procedural mandates of rule 3.410 apply when any additional instructions are requested.
"Additional instructions" are defined thusly: "If during the course of deliberations the jury is unclear about a particular point of law or aspect of the evidence it may request the court for additional or supplementary instructions." Black's Law Dictionary 769 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). A "jury instruction" is a "direction given by the judge to the jury concerning the law of the case." Id. Obviously, the trial judge's response in this case was an "instruction," a "direction ... concerning the law of the case" in response to a question about an "aspect of the evidence"  in short, the trial judge gave additional instructions to the jury without complying with rule 3.410.
Ivory dictates reversal. The state urges us to recede from Ivory's per se rule and adopt a harmless error standard. However, the considerations which led us to conclude that per se reversal was appropriate in 1977, when we decided Ivory, remain just as vital today.
We explained the reason for strict compliance with rule 3.410 in Ivory, 351 So. 2d  at 28 (quoting from Slinsky v. State, 232 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)):
The state urges that when the record is adequate to show lack of prejudice, reversal should not be required. However, regardless of whether the record is preserved, either by a court reporter or, as in this case, by virtue of the fact that the court's response was preserved in the record in a writing, the state and defendant *1279 have been deprived of the right to discuss the action to be taken, including the right to object and the right to make full argument. As the written response in this case demonstrates, even a refusal to answer questions frequently will require something more than a simple "no," and both the state and the defendant must have the opportunity to participate, regardless of the subject matter of the jury's inquiry. Without this process, preserved in the record, it is impossible to determine whether prejudice has occurred during one of the most sensitive stages of the trial.
We reaffirm the viability of Ivory and conclude with the words of Justice England:
Ivory, 351 So. 2d  at 28 (England, J., concurring).
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., dissents.
[1]  The conflict arises because the district court attempted to avoid the per se rule of Ivory by distinguishing the facts. The facts are indistinguishable, therefore failure to apply the per se rule conflicts with Ivory. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
[2]  At oral argument before this Court, petitioner's counsel stated that there was some indication that trial counsel had actual notice of the questions from the jury, but that this did not come to light until after the decision of the district court. Petitioner's counsel asked this court to remand for a supplemental hearing should we determine that actual notice was dispositive. Notice is not dispositive. The failure to respond in open court is alone sufficient to find error.