Case Title: Resurrection of Life, Inc. v. Dailey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180154

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: June 5, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180154
____________________
Resurrection of Life, Inc., d/b/a Perfect Place Christian
Academy, and Latoya Mitchell Dawkins
v.
Mark Dailey and Valerie Dailey, as parents and next friends
of Christian Dailey, a minor 
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-15-904652)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Christian Dailey, a minor, suffered a catastrophic
personal injury at a day-care facility run by Resurrection of
Life, 
Inc., 
d/b/a 
Perfect 
Place 
Christian 
Academy
("Resurrection of Life").  Christian's parents, Mark and
1180154
Valerie Dailey, sued Resurrection of Life and its employee
Latoya 
Mitchell 
Dawkins 
(hereinafter 
"the 
day-care
defendants") on his behalf and, following a jury trial,
obtained a sizable compensatory-damages award.  The day-care
defendants do not challenge the size of that award, likely
because their lack of insurance and the discharge of the award
through bankruptcy make it uncollectible.  But they do
challenge the trial court’s refusal to grant them a new trial
on the ground of juror misconduct.  Because the day-care
defendants are not entitled to a new trial, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 25, 2015, an unsecured television fell onto
Christian while he was sleeping at Perfect Place Christian
Academy, a church-based day-care facility operated by
Resurrection of Life.  Christian was not yet two years old at
the time of the incident.  Parts of his skull were crushed
from the impact, and he was put on a ventilator for nine days. 
He suffered developmental issues as a result of the incident.
On December 3, 2015, Mark and Valerie Dailey, as parents
and next friends of Christian, sued Resurrection of Life, its
owner Sharon Jones, and Dawkins, the employee directly
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responsible for Christian's care, asserting claims of
negligence, wantonness, and premises liability.1  The Daileys
demanded a trial by jury. 
As the operator of an unlicensed church-exempt facility,
Resurrection of Life was not required to have -- and did not
have -- general liability insurance, nor was it subject to
inspection or oversight by the Jefferson County Department of
Human Resources ("Jefferson County DHR").  After Christian was
injured, Jefferson County DHR conducted an investigation of
the day-care defendants and, on November 29, 2016, filed a
confidential report under seal with the trial court.  Based
primarily on Jefferson County DHR's confidential report, the
Daileys moved for a summary judgment.  On December 11, 2017,
the trial court entered a partial summary judgment in the
Daileys' favor on their negligence claim, leaving only the
question of damages for the jury to decide.2
1Jones was dismissed as a defendant by the trial court on
May 14, 2018.  Mark Dailey and Valerie Dailey also asserted,
in their individual capacities, claims against the day-care
defendants for 
loss 
of 
Christian's 
services 
and 
companionship.
2It appears that, before trial, the Daileys abandoned all
other claims they asserted against the day-care defendants.
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The trial began on May 14, 2018, with Judge Jim Hughey
III presiding.  On the second day of trial, the day-care
defendants filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama
("the Bankruptcy Court"), which automatically stayed the
proceedings in the trial court.  The Daileys immediately
sought and obtained approval from the Bankruptcy Court to
continue the trial on the condition that any judgment obtained
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. 
The jury was then called back and the trial continued.  The
jury was not told about the day-care defendants' bankruptcies
or that any damages awarded would likely be discharged.
The Daileys presented expert testimony regarding the
extent of Christian's injuries, his continuing developmental
problems, and the potential future costs of his care as a
result of the injuries.  At the time of trial, Christian was
five years old.  He could not talk or control his bowel
movements and was subject to daily mood swings, fits, and
outbursts.  The Daileys' expert testified that Christian had
a normal life expectancy but that the injuries resulting from
the incident had caused developmental issues that would
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necessitate 24-hour care for the rest of his life.  The
Daileys' expert estimated that the inflation-adjusted total
cost of Christian's care after the age of 25 and continuing
for the remainder of his life was between $18-20 million.  The
Daileys also asked the jury to consider in its verdict costs
of medical care, the loss of earning potential for Christian,
and compensation for Christian's pain and suffering.  In their
closing argument, the Daileys asked the jury to award them at
least $50 million in compensatory damages.  
After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the
jury.  In doing so, the trial court instructed the jury that
no outside research, including Internet searches, should take
place or be used by the jury in reaching a verdict.  The jury
began deliberations at 2:50 p.m. on May 17, 2018, and sent two
notes to the trial court by the end of that afternoon.  The
first note stated: "We are unable to come to an agreement. 
Can we reconvene tomorrow morning or at your earliest
convenience?"  The second note stated: "What if we cannot come
to an agreement on the amount ever?"  The trial court shared
both notes with the parties and their counsel.  Believing that
the jurors were merely tired, the trial court responded by
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giving them the choice either to continue deliberating into
the evening or to go home and continue deliberations the next
day.  The jury chose to go home and return the next day. 
Because Judge Hughey was unavailable to preside over jury
deliberations the next day, he arranged instead for Presiding
Judge 
Joseph 
Boohaker 
to 
preside 
over 
the 
jury's
deliberations. 
After deliberations restarted the next morning, the jury
foreman conducted an Internet search for the definition of a
word.  The specific word is not disclosed in the record. 
Shortly after the Internet search, another juror sent a note
to the trial court stating that "[i]n jury deliberations [the]
internet was used to 'Google' terms and ways to calculate
compensation."  The trial court promptly discussed the note
with the parties' counsel and offered both sides the
opportunity to question the juror responsible for the alleged
misconduct.  Neither side agreed with that approach.  Instead,
the day-care defendants' attorney moved for a mistrial.  The
trial court thereafter immediately halted deliberations and
brought the jury into the courtroom to investigate the alleged
misconduct before ruling on the day-care defendants' motion.
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The trial court first asked the jury whether "access
[was] made to the internet for some information about how to
calculate compensation."  Juror R.L. volunteered that "there
was a word that came up and they Googled the meaning of the
word, what that word means, I remember that happening.  It was
a word.  That's the only thing I know.  That was it."  No
juror disputed Juror R.L.'s statement.  The trial court then
admonished the jury that its verdict must be based strictly on
the law and the evidence presented, not on any outside
information.  At that point, the Daileys' counsel asked the
trial court to ask the jurors if they were able to "decide
this case without being influenced by one definition."  With
no objection by the day-care defendants' counsel, the trial
court agreed and asked each individual juror two questions:
(1) if he or she remembered the word or definition searched
and (2) if the juror remembered, whether he or she would be
able 
to 
disregard 
that 
extraneous information when 
determining
the verdict.  In response, 5 of the 12 jurors remembered the
searched word, 2 remembered only that the searched word was a
medical term, and the remaining 5 were unaware of an Internet
search at all.  Each juror, regardless of whether he or she
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heard the definition, affirmed that he or she could and would
disregard the definition in determining the verdict.  The day-
care defendants made no requests to the trial court to ask the
jurors additional questions based upon the jurors' responses
at that time.  Following its questioning of the jurors, the
trial court sent the jury back to the jury room to await
further instructions.
The trial court and the parties' counsel then discussed
the results of the investigation outside the presence of the
jury.  Judge Boohaker first noted that compensation
calculations were not specifically mentioned by the jurors
even though that issue was referenced in the note.  Judge
Boohaker indicated that he believed this was because the
writer of the note was not privy to the Internet search.  In
response, counsel for the day-care defendants asserted his
belief that the jurors were not being forthcoming about the
extent of the Internet search and renewed the day-care
defendants' motion for a mistrial or, in the alternative,
asked if he could question the jurors directly about the
contents of the note.  Judge Boohaker disagreed with the day-
care defendants and stated that he believed, based on his
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evaluation of the jurors' demeanor and statements, that the
jurors were able to reach a verdict based strictly on the law
and evidence.  Judge Boohaker then commented on the jury's
ability to disregard the extraneous information, stating:
"I've got to look at demeanor, body language, and what they
say and how they say it. Yes, they can.  Maybe that's a
difficult thing to do, but they said they can.  So I'm going
to take them at their word that they can do that and let them
continue on deliberating."  At that point, the trial court
denied the day-care defendants' motion for a 
mistrial, stating
that it believed that its actions had cured any prejudice
generated by the extraneous information and that it did not
want to create further prejudice by highlighting the Internet
search.  The jury resumed deliberating and returned a verdict
later that morning, awarding the Daileys $30.3 million in
compensatory damages.
The next day, Juror P.W. telephoned the day-care
defendants' counsel and discussed the case, including the
Internet search.  Following that phone call, the day-care
defendants filed a motion for a new trial.  The day-care
defendants attached an affidavit from Juror R.L. to their
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motion, which included a single paragraph about the Internet
search:
"On Friday morning, May 18, 2018, one of the jurors,
the only male in the room who was also the
foreperson of the jury, stated that 'based on my
research, after looking further into this case our
numbers are way off.'  Prior to making this
statement, this same guy had been on his laptop
computer looking up a medical term.  Additionally,
he was on the computer for an extended amount of
time while we were discussing damages and the cost
of college tuition."
Juror R.L. did not assert in her affidavit that the verdict
was influenced by the definition of the medical term or by any
other extraneous information that was introduced into the jury
room.  The day-care defendants' counsel also submitted his own
affidavit with the 
day-care defendants' motion.  His affidavit
stated that he had spoken to five jurors about the note
discussing juror misconduct.
The Daileys opposed the day-care defendants' motion for
a new trial and attached affidavits from Jury Foreman D.E.,
Juror P.W., and Juror S.T.  Jury Foreman D.E.'s affidavit
stated: "During our deliberations I used my computer to look
up one medical term.  While I don't remember the term it was
just another word for head injury."  Jury Foreman D.E.'s
affidavit further stated that the jury verdict was "based only
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1180154
on the evidence presented at trial and no internet search
influenced or factored into our decision in any manner." 
Juror P.W., the juror who contacted the day-care defendants'
counsel after the trial, also provided an 
affidavit suggesting
that the Internet search was not a factor in the jury's
deliberations.  Juror P.W. stated: 
"Shortly after the trial I was able to speak with
all of the attorneys in the courtroom except for
[the day-care defendants' attorney] because he was
already gone. I then contacted him by telephone
since I was unable to speak with him at the
courthouse.
"My intention with the telephone call to [the day-
care defendants' attorney] was not to indicate any
misconduct 
regarding 
our 
deliberations 
or 
to
indicate 
that 
internet 
searches 
in 
any 
way
influence[d] our decision because those searches
[were] never considered in assessing this case."
(Paragraph numbering deleted.)  The relevant portions of 
Juror
S.T.'s affidavit, also submitted by the Daileys, stated:
"During deliberations we came across an unfamiliar
term in the medical records.  The foreman googled
this term. Soon after he googled the term I told him
we were not supposed to be doing any searches and he
stopped.
"I do not remember the term searched and we never
discussed or used the searched information in our
deliberations.  This information did not factor into
our decision making or verdict. 
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"All our discussions and our verdict were based upon
the evidence presented during the trial and not on
any internet search or outside source.
"There were no internet searche[s] performed after
Judge Boohaker questioned us individually and as a
group."
(Paragraph numbering deleted.)
After considering the materials filed by the parties,
Judge Hughey, who was again presiding over the case, conducted
a hearing on the day-care defendants' motion for a new trial. 
That motion was subsequently denied by operation of law under
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., after the passage of 90 days, and
the day-care defendants appealed.  The Daileys state that the
compensatory damages awarded have been discharged by the
Bankruptcy Court.3
3No judicial record of the Bankruptcy Court's discharge
has been provided, but both sides acknowledge that any damages
are subject to discharge by the Bankruptcy Court.  Although
the Daileys are unable to recover the damages because of the
Bankruptcy 
Court's 
discharge, 
the 
discharge 
does 
not
extinguish the underlying debt.  Easterling v. Progressive
Specialty Ins. Co., 251 So. 3d 767 (Ala. 2017) ("'Although
entry of a Chapter 7 debtor's discharge does not extinguish
the debts, once the discharge is entered, the debtor is no
longer personally liable for any of the discharged debts.'"
(quoting In re Patterson, 297 B.R. 110, 112-13 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2003))). 
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Standard of Review
The day-care defendants ask us to reverse the trial
court's order denying their motion for a new trial.  A ruling
on such a motion rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed by this Court unless the
trial court exceeded its discretion and the record shows plain
and palpable error.  Coots v. Isbell, 552 So. 2d 139, 142
(Ala. 1989).  The sole ground on which the day-care defendants
seek a new trial is juror misconduct.  We will reverse a trial
court's ruling on a motion for a new trial on the basis of
juror misconduct only "when [the misconduct] indicates bias or
corruption, or when the misconduct affected the verdict, or
when from the extraneous facts prejudice may be presumed as a
matter of law."  Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 655,
658 (Ala. 1984).
Analysis
Although the Bankruptcy Court has apparently discharged
the $30.3 million damages award, the day-care defendants
continue to challenge the judgment entered against them.  The
day-care defendants argue that the extraneous information to
which certain jurors were exposed tainted the jury's verdict,
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despite the trial court's curative actions before the jury
delivered its verdict and despite the lack of evidence
indicating that the extraneous information influenced that
verdict.
Not every instance of juror misconduct requires a new
trial.  Dawson v. State, 710 So. 2d 472, 474 (Ala. 1997); Reed
v. State., 547 So. 2d 596, 597 (Ala. 1989).  Juror misconduct
involving 
the 
introduction 
of 
extraneous 
information
necessitates a new trial only when: "1) the jury verdict is
shown to have been actually prejudiced by the extraneous
material; or 2) the extraneous material is of such a nature as
to constitute prejudice as a matter of law."  Ex parte
Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865, 870 (Ala. 2001) (abrogated on other
grounds, Betterman v. Montana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1609
(2016)).  But no single fact or circumstance determines
whether a verdict is unlawfully influenced by a juror's
misconduct.  809 So. 2d  at 871.  Instead, the unique facts
and circumstances of each case determine whether juror
misconduct resulted in prejudice requiring a new trial.  See
Reed, 547 So. 2d at 598.
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A. Actual Prejudice
We begin by examining whether the introduction of the
extraneous information "actually motivated the jury or any
individual juror to decide in any particular way."  Pearson v.
Fomby, 688 So. 2d 239, 242 (Ala. 1997).  Mere exposure to
extraneous information does not, by itself, create actual
prejudice.  Id.  When faced with an allegation of juror
misconduct involving extraneous information, if the "trial
court investigate[s] the misconduct and finds, based on
competent evidence, the alleged prejudice to be lacking, this
Court will not reverse."  Reed, 547 So. 2d at 597.  We 
therefore first determine whether the trial court adequately
investigated the alleged juror misconduct before considering
the evidence discovered in that investigation.
1. Adequacy of Investigation
Once a trial court is alerted to the possibility that
jurors have been exposed to extraneous information, the court
must 
reasonably 
investigate 
the 
circumstances and 
substance 
of
the alleged exposure to determine whether the rights of a
party have been prejudiced by the misconduct and whether the
misconduct may be cured.  Holland v. State, 588 So. 2d 543,
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546 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).  What constitutes a reasonable
investigation differs with each case -- the scope of
investigation is dictated by the circumstances and is within
the discretion of the trial court.   Sistrunk v. State, 596
So. 2d. 644, 648-9 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).  If the
investigation undertaken by the trial court is reasonable
under the circumstances, this Court will not reverse its
judgment simply because this Court might have conducted a
different or more extensive inquiry.  Id.
It is clear that the trial court in this case conducted
a timely and reasonable investigation of the alleged
misconduct and took appropriate steps to cure it.  As soon as
it received the note alleging juror misconduct, the court
immediately contacted the parties and their counsel.  Then,
the court promptly stopped juror deliberations and 
brought the
jury before it to investigate the content of the note.  Once
before the court, the entire jury panel was asked if the
Internet had been used "for some information about how to
calculate compensation."  After Juror R.L. responded that the
definition of one word was searched, the court then determined
whether other jury members had been exposed to that
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definition.  The court did so by asking each individual juror
whether he or she was aware of the Internet search and its
substance.  The court's investigation revealed that five
jurors knew both the word searched and its definition found on
the Internet, two jurors knew only that the searched word was
a medical term, and five jurors were unaware that any Internet
search had taken place.  No juror stated that Internet
research was used for compensation calculations or gave
statements that conflicted with Juror R.L.'s statements.  
Once
the scope of the misconduct was clear, the trial court
assessed the demeanor and statements of each juror to
determine if the jury was able to disregard the extraneous
information to come to a verdict, and it admonished the entire
jury panel that the jury's verdict should be based solely on
the law and the evidence presented at trial. 
Our conclusion that the trial court's investigation and
curative 
instructions 
were 
adequate 
is 
bolstered by 
persuasive
authority from a federal appellate court.  The parties have
not cited, and we have not found, another Alabama case
involving 
extraneous 
information 
accessed 
during 
jury
deliberations and discovered by the trial court before a
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verdict was rendered.  But similar circumstances arose in
United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2008), and we
find the analysis in that case persuasive.  In Wheaton, the
defendant moved for a new trial after it was discovered in the
middle of jury deliberations that jurors had been exposed to
extraneous information through a juror's personal laptop
computer.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the district
court failed to thoroughly investigate the misconduct and 
that
the extraneous information had influenced the jury's verdict. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the district court acted appropriately when it promptly
investigated the alleged misconduct by addressing the entire
jury in open court and asking the jurors if the extraneous
information accessed on the laptop computer would influence
their decision and by "admonishing the jury for its outside
investigation ... and giving a curative instruction to remind
them that the verdict must be based solely on the evidence
p+resented at trial."  Id. at 361.  Because the district court
made 
an 
appropriate 
investigation 
and 
took 
appropriate actions
to cure any defect resulting from the juror's misconduct, and
because the defendant could not show any connection between
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the extraneous information and the ultimate verdict, the 
Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant had not
carried his burden of proving actual prejudice, and it
affirmed the judgment.  Here, the trial court's investigation
and curative action was at least as thorough as that in
Wheaton.  We therefore hold that the trial court took proper
steps to investigate the juror misconduct and to cure any
prejudice that may have resulted from that misconduct.
The day-care defendants argue that the trial court should
have investigated further to determine the identity of the
writer of the note informing the trial court of the misconduct
and the exact medical term searched.  But a trial court
investigating juror 
misconduct 
must 
"balance 
the 
probable 
harm
resulting from the emphasis such action would place upon the
misconduct" with the "likely extent and gravity of the
prejudice generated by that misconduct."  United States v.
Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1978).  The trial court
in this case weighed those opposing interests and concluded
that additional questioning would "highlight the matter
further," exacerbating the problem of the juror misconduct. 
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Under these circumstances, the trial court was justified in
stopping its investigation when it did.
2. Evidence of Actual Prejudice
Next, we examine whether the introduction of the
extraneous 
information 
created 
actual 
prejudice 
by 
influencing
the jury's verdict. "[A]ctual prejudice may not be inferred
from the exposure [to extraneous information] itself." 
Pearson, 688 So. 2d at 243.  The day-care defendants were
required to show that at least one juror had been motivated by
the extraneous information to decide the case in a particular
manner or that there was evidence proving that juror
misconduct continued to occur and that the new misconduct
affected the verdict.  Ankor Energy, LLC v. Kelly, 271 So. 3d
798, 809 (Ala. 2018); Dawson, 710 So. 2d at 475;  Bascom v.
State, 344 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977).  The day-
care defendants failed to make this showing.
Not a single juror affidavit submitted in connection with
the day-care defendants' motion for a new trial stated that
any juror's verdict was influenced by the extraneous
information or that the improper jury conduct continued after
the trial court's curative instruction.  Although a juror is
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generally prohibited from impeaching his or her own verdict,
an exception is made where an affidavit presents evidence
indicating that a juror was exposed to extraneous information
and that such information influenced the juror's verdict. 
Ankor Energy, 271 So. 3d at 806.  The juror affidavits
submitted by both sides in this case confirm that juror
misconduct occurred, but none indicates that the extraneous
information affected the jury's verdict or attempt to impeach
the validity of the verdict.  Juror R.L.'s affidavit,
submitted by the day-care defendants, stated that she saw the
jury foreman using his laptop computer during deliberations
and that he looked up the definition of a medical term.  But
her affidavit did not state that the verdict was affected by
his misconduct.  The foreman admitted in his affidavit that he
conducted the Internet search during jury deliberations, but
he stated that he could no longer remember the term that he
searched, only that the term meant "head injury."  His
affidavit supports the trial court's denial of the day-care
defendants' motion for a mistrial, because, as the foreman and
as the person who conducted the improper Internet search, the
fact that he could not remember the searched term indicates
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that the term did not factor into the jury's determination of
compensatory damages.  The other two juror affidavits
similarly stated that the verdict was rendered solely on the
basis of the evidence presented at trial.
The trial court took adequate steps to investigate and
cure the jury's initial misconduct, and there is no evidence
indicating that the misconduct influenced the verdict or that
any further misconduct took place after the trial court's
admonishment of the jurors.  The day-care defendants are thus
not entitled to a new trial on the basis of actual prejudice.
B. Prejudice as a Matter of Law
A new trial may also be warranted on the basis of juror
exposure to extraneous material when "the extraneous material
is of such a nature as to constitute prejudice as a matter of
law."  Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d at 870.  This Court has
presumed prejudice in some cases involving extraneous
definitions.  See, e.g., Ex parte Arthur, 835 So. 2d 981, 985
(Ala. 2002).  But presumed prejudice is restricted to cases
where the extraneous information considered by the jury was
"'crucial in resolving a key material issue in the case.'" 
Dawson, 710 So. 2d at 475 (quoting Hallmark v. Allison, 451
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So. 2d 270, 271 (Ala. 1984)).  See also Ex parte Arthur, 835
So. 2d at 985; Ex parte Thomas, 666 So. 2d 855, 858 (Ala.
1995); Hallmark v. Allison, 451 So. 2d at 271.  The day-care
defendants do not explain how the definition of an unknown
word for "head injury" could have had any impact on the
compensatory damages awarded when the existence of a head
injury was undisputed and was not even at issue in the case. 
Thus, because there is no evidence indicating that the
extraneous information was crucial in resolving a material
issue, there can be no presumed prejudice here.4
Conclusion
The extraneous information improperly accessed by a juror
during deliberations did not taint the jury's verdict because
the trial court made an adequate investigation following the
discovery of the misconduct and took appropriate curative
measures, and there is no evidence indicating that the
extraneous information actually prejudiced the verdict. 
4This Court expresses no opinion regarding the amount of
damages awarded or whether such damages were supported by the
evidence admitted at trial.  The day-care defendants did not
raise those issues with the trial court after the jury's
verdict was announced or after the judgment was entered, nor
have the day-care defendants raised those issues on appeal.
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Further, the day-care defendants are not entitled to a new
trial based on presumed prejudice because there is no evidence
indicating that the extraneous information was crucial in
resolving a key material issue in the case.  We therefore
affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, and Sellers, JJ., concur in the
result. 
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