Case Title: Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Shattuck

Citation: 1999-Ohio-271

Docket Number: 19982221

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Shattuck, 85 Ohio St.3d 334, 1999-Ohio-271.] 
 
 
 
 
 
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. SHATTUCK. 
[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Shattuck (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 334.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Complaint charging common pleas court judge with 
violating Canon 3(A)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct dismissed, when. 
(No. 98-2221 — Submitted December 16, 1998 — Decided April 7, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-81. 
 
On October 13, 1997, relator, Ohio State Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging that sometime between June 29, 1994 and July 7, 1994, respondent, Hon. 
Judson L. Shattuck, Jr., of Xenia, Ohio, Judge of the Greene County Court of 
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Attorney Registration No. 0021063, 
violated several Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Judge Shattuck allegedly 
signed without authority an entry in case No. 94 CR 94, releasing Lloyd Dale Perry 
from the Pickaway Correctional Institution, vacating Perry’s  plea of guilty to a 
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and entering a nolle prosequi with respect to the 
case.  After respondent answered, the matter was submitted to a panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
The panel found that in February 1994, a grand jury indicted Perry for 
violating R.C. 2925.03(A)(6).   Perry originally entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charge because, had he been convicted of the charge, he would have been required 
to serve a sentence of at least three years.  However, in April 1994, Perry filed a 
petition to enter a plea of guilty to violating R.C. 2925.11(A), a fourth-degree drug 
abuse felony, which required no term of actual incarceration.  In February 1994, 
Judge M. David Reid of the Court of Common Pleas, General Division, assigned to 
preside over the case, sentenced Perry to eighteen months’ imprisonment for 
violating R.C. 2925.11(A), suspended his driving privileges for a year, and 
 
 
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imposed a $1,500 fine.  Judge Reid also overruled Perry’s immediate motion to 
reconsider the sentence. 
 
In June 1994, while serving the sentence, Perry filed a motion with Judge 
Reid, asking that Reid suspend further execution of the sentence and place him on 
probation.  Judge Reid did not rule on the motion nor did he rule on Perry’s 
subsequent motion to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea because of failure of 
consideration for the plea bargain he had negotiated. 
 
Sometime in late June or early July 1994, Perry’s counsel and the 
prosecuting attorney presented Judge Reid with an entry which, among other 
things, released Perry from prison.  Judge Reid either personally or through his 
bailiff told Perry’s counsel and the prosecuting attorney that he would not sign an 
entry releasing Perry but that they could get some other judge to handle the case.  
Shortly thereafter, Perry’s counsel and the prosecuting attorney approached 
respondent about taking a “transfer-case” from Judge Reid to permit the defendant 
to withdraw a guilty plea and go to trial by jury on the charges.  The lawyers, 
representing to respondent that Judge Reid did not oppose respondent’s taking over 
the case, then presented respondent with an entry in the transfer-case releasing 
Perry.  Respondent was unable to contact Judge Reid, but learned from Reid’s 
bailiff that Judge Reid did not object to Perry’s counsel and the prosecuting 
attorney’s finding another judge to handle the case.  Respondent then signed the 
entry in the transfer-case, ordering that the guilty plea be vacated, the cause be 
nolled, and Perry be released from incarceration.  The entry was filed on July 7, 
1994. 
 
At the time respondent signed the entry, he knew that Greene County 
common pleas judges had a longstanding informal practice of transferring judges, 
without formal entry memorializing the transfer, from one division of the court to 
another to dispose of a matter properly docketed in the other division.  He also 
 
 
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knew that Judge Reid had not formally requested that he take over the case but did 
not oppose his doing so.  Even though the presiding judge of the Common Pleas 
Court of Greene County had not signed an entry transferring respondent from the 
domestic relations division to the criminal division of the court, respondent 
believed, on the basis of  the longstanding informal practice and what he knew 
about Judge Reid’s position, that he had responsibility, power, and authority to 
dispose of the case. 
 
The panel found that in the absence of an order signed either by the 
presiding judge of the common pleas court or by the Chief Justice of the Ohio 
Supreme Court, respondent lacked legal authority to dispose of the Perry case.  
The panel concluded that by taking over the case and signing the entry, respondent 
inadvertently violated Canon 3(A)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it existed 
on that date (a judge shall give appropriate attention to the guidelines set forth in 
the Rules of Superintendence promulgated by the Supreme Court of Ohio).  The 
panel recommended that respondent receive a public reprimand.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation. 
__________________ 
 
John J. Mueller, Robert K. Leonard and Eugene P. Whetzel, for relator. 
 
William R. McCarty, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We held in Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 36-
37, 22 OBR 27, 30-31, 488 N.E.2d 210, 213-214, that a judge may be transferred 
from one division of the common pleas court to another only by the Chief Justice 
under the authority of R.C. 2503.04 or by the presiding judge of the common pleas 
court under authority of C.P.Sup.R. 2 (now Sup.R. 3).  The findings of the board 
indicate that respondent was not so transferred.  Instead, respondent exercised 
authority over the Perry case on the basis of what he thought was a legitimate 
 
 
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longstanding informal transfer process in effect in Greene County and the asserted 
tacit approval of the judge to whom the case was assigned. 
 
Given the unique facts of this case, we conclude that no disciplinary action 
is warranted.  Accordingly, this matter ought to be and hereby is dismissed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the recommendation of the panel and the 
board that respondent be publicly reprimanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.