Case Title: LOOMER v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
LOOMER v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2004 WY 4788 P.3d 1036Case Number: 03-26Decided: 04/30/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

RONALD 
EUGENE LOOMER, deceased,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
R. Michael Shickich, Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steve Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. 
Delicath, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Ronald Eugene 
Loomer drove a truck to Colorado to make a delivery for his employer, TRC Rod 
Services of the Rockies, Inc. (TRC).  
While there, he had a heart attack and died.  His widow, Sandra Loomer, filed a 
request for benefits with the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division 
(the Division).  After the Division 
denied benefits, Mrs. Loomer requested a hearing before the Medical Commission 
(the Commission).  The Commission 
found that although Loomer was initially employed as a pipe inspector, on the 
day he died he was working as a truck driver.  The Commission concluded that Mrs. 
Loomer had not satisfied the burden of proof set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-603(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003), requiring that she establish, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that on the day her husband died he was subject to 
employment stress "clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in that 
particular employment . . .."  Mrs. 
Loomer appealed the Commission's decision to the district court.  The district court affirmed.  We will also 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Three issues are 
raised in this appeal:

 

1.         
What is the "particular employment," for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-603(b)(ii), of an employee who is hired as a pipe inspector, but who dies 
of a heart attack while working as a truck driver?

 

2.         
Was the Commission's determination that Mr. Loomer's employment stress on 
the day he died was not clearly abnormal to or unusual for employees in that 
particular employment supported by substantial evidence?

 

3.         
Did the burden of proof shift to the Division after Mrs. Loomer presented 
her evidence to the Commission?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In late 
January or early February of 2001, Mr. Loomer began working for TRC.  TRC inspects and delivers pipes and 
"sucker rods" to oil wells.  Mrs. 
Loomer testified that her husband was hired by TRC as a rod inspector, and 
indicated that he had been in the "pipe business" for at least twenty-five 
years.

 

[¶4]      TRC's usual truck 
driver, Jim Dudley, lost his commercial driver's license and could no longer 
drive the truck used to deliver the rods.  
Aware that Mr. Loomer had recently obtained a commercial driver's 
license, TRC asked him to drive the truck and deliver rods to a client in 
Colorado.  Mr. Loomer agreed to make 
the delivery.  Mrs. Loomer testified 
that before her husband left, he told her that Dudley would accompany him to 
help unload the rods.  For some 
reason, Dudley did not accompany him, and Mr. Loomer made the trip to Colorado 
alone.

 

[¶5]      Upon arriving in 
Colorado, Mr. Loomer met Chad Baldwin, an employee of the company that was to 
receive the rods.  Baldwin led Mr. 
Loomer to the delivery site.  
Although Baldwin was the only person with firsthand knowledge of what 
happened at the site that day, he was never deposed or called as a witness to 
testify.  Karen Stricklett, a 
vocational assessment expert hired by Mrs. Loomer, spoke with Baldwin about the 
events of that day.  Stricklett's 
report provides an account of her conversation with 
Baldwin:

 

When 
they arrived at the site, Mr. Loomer expressed concern about the fact that there 
was no one available to assist him with unloading the rods.  Mr. Baldwin stated that he offered to 
help Mr. Loomer, although he had never been involved in this type of activity 
before.  Mr. Baldwin stated that 
there was no equipment available at the site to assist with unloading.  Mr. Loomer proceeded to reconfigure the 
truck in order to prepare the winch to be used to hoist the bundles of rod onto 
the ground.  According to Mr. 
Baldwin, the process of disassembling and reconfiguring the truck appeared to 
involve a significant amount of physical exertion, such as lifting large pieces 
of pipe from the trailer bed.  
Shortly after this activity, Mr. Loomer collapsed.

 

Baldwin 
gave a similar account to Pam Whitlock, Mrs. Loomer's daughter, when Whitlock 
called him shortly after Mr. Loomer's death.  Whitlock wrote a letter that was 
submitted to the Commission, in which she described her conversation with 
Baldwin:

 

[H]e 
explained he was under the impression he was only sent to show [Loomer] where 
the well was, that he was only a pumper . . ..  When they got to the well there wasn't 
anyone to help unload.  [Loomer] 
knew he needed a[n] empty truck to load for his next trip which he was leaving 
for the next day to Montana  [Loomer] said I guess we'll have to unload them or 
let's get started  [Baldwin] explained how [Loomer] said they should wench 
[sic] the truck up so it might be easier.  
He told me [Loomer] started complaining he wasn't feeling well and was 
going to go back to the truck to take some gas pills  [Baldwin] said he offered 
to take [Loomer] into town  but [Loomer] said no  [Baldwin] knew he just 
wanted to finish the job so he could get home  he said that was how he would of 
[sic] felt.  They continued to work, 
I believe it was over an hour and he said on the last load [Loomer] didn't lower 
the rods he looked up and he was slunched [sic] over.

 

[¶6]      An ambulance was 
called and paramedics unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate Mr. Loomer.  The day after Mr. Loomer's death, Dr. 
Michael J. Dobersen, M.D., Ph.D., a forensic pathologist with the Arapahoe 
County Coroner's Office, performed an autopsy and provided the following opinion 
regarding the cause of death:

 

This 
53-year-old man was witnessed to collapse after complaints of not feeling 
well.  He was pronounced dead a 
short time later at the scene despite resuscitative measures.  His death is attributed to severe 
two-vessel coronary artery atherosclerosis due to arteriosclerotic 
cardiovascular disease.  Toxicologic 
analyses of body fluids obtained at the time of autopsy were negative.  In view of the scene and circumstances 
surrounding the death and autopsy findings, the manner of death is classified as 
natural.

 

[¶7]      Shortly after her 
husband's death, Mrs. Loomer filed a request for death benefits with the 
Division.  TRC submitted a letter 
acknowledging that Mr. Loomer died while performing his job, but maintaining 
that his heart attack was not the result of any unusual stress or activity.  The letter stated that driving the truck 
and unloading rods was "a normal task that he had done many times in the 
past."  The Division, citing Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b), concluded "[n]o [c]ausative exertion clearly unusual 
or abnormal for employees in this particular employment has been documented," 
and denied benefits.

 

[¶8]      Mrs. Loomer 
objected to the Division's determination and requested a hearing before the 
Commission.  Mrs. Loomer and the 
Division each submitted disclosure statements,1 and a hearing was held.  After opening statements by both 
attorneys, Mrs. Loomer testified first.  
She explained that her husband was hired by TRC as a pipe inspector, but 
that on the day he died he was working as a truck driver.  She testified that prior to this 
instance, her husband had never driven the delivery truck for TRC.  She also stated that Dudley was supposed 
to accompany Mr. Loomer to Colorado and help him unload the rods, but did not 
go.

 

[¶9]      After Mrs. Loomer 
testified, Dr. Dobersen was called.  
Dr. Dobersen explained his autopsy revealed that severe coronary artery 
disease caused Mr. Loomer to have an acute heart attack.  He then testified that the heart attack 
was "brought upon by the exertion of his carrying out the job that he was 
involved in."

 

[¶10]   The final witness was Karen 
Stricklett, a vocational rehabilitation specialist hired by Mrs. Loomer to 
"assess Mr. Loomer's job and determine whether what he was doing on the day that 
he died was usual and customary for that particular position."  Stricklett had researched the Internet 
and conducted a labor market survey to find job descriptions for a pipe 
inspector and truck driver, and to determine the normal and usual level of 
exertion for both occupations.  
Stricklett explained that, as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles, Fourth Edition, pipe inspector is classified as "light work," and truck 
driver is classified as "medium work . . .."  She then testified that, in her opinion, 
Mr. Loomer's exertion on the day he died was abnormal and unusual because he was 
hired as a pipe inspectora light work occupation, but was working as a truck 
drivera medium work occupation.

 

[¶11]   Stricklett also testified that her 
research revealed the industry standard for unloading rods from trucks is to use 
"equipment and normally a forklift."  
She then opined that Mr. Loomer's employment stress was abnormal and 
unusual even for a truck driver because he did not use a forklift to unload the 
rods.  However, upon further 
questioning, she acknowledged that a winch truck, like the one Mr. Loomer was 
using, could be used rather than a forklift:

 

Q         
Okay, I guess I am still confused.  
You're saying that even if they have a winch truck, they take a second 
truck and they drive a forklift out to that site?

 

A         
Oh, I understand your question.  
I'm sorry, I misunderstood.  
When I talked with the employers, none of them used a winch truck.  They all used a forklift.  And the first that I heard of a winch 
truck was with this particular employer.  
So the employers that I spoke with did not use winch trucks, they used 
forklifts.  So I can't really say 
whether both pieces of equipment would commonly be used.  My understanding is probably not, based 
upon the people that I did talk with.  
So apparently it's one or the other, I suppose.

 

Q         
And I guess  so you're not intimately familiar with the piece of 
equipment they were using that day on the site; is that 
correct?

 

A         
That's correct.

 

She 
concluded, "the physical activities that Mr. Loomer was performing on that day 
were inconsistent with [her] understanding of the typical physical demands of 
that particular position."

 

[¶12]   After Stricklett's testimony, Mrs. 
Loomer closed and the Division rested without presenting further evidence or 
calling any witnesses.2  Both attorneys offered closing 
statements and the Commission took the matter under 
advisement.

 

[¶13]   On April 12, 2002, the Commission 
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Medical Commission 
Hearing Panel.  The Commission 
denied benefits.  Citing Pederson 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 
1997), 
the Commission noted that a claimant requesting benefits has the burden of 
proving all essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  The Commission 
specifically found that "Stricklett's testimony was not credible regarding the 
exertional work stresses that were utilized by Mr. Loomer on the date of his 
death.  Too many questions remain 
unanswered about the level of work and the anticipated exertional stress that 
would have been engaged in by Mr. Loomer."  
It then concluded, the claimant "has not met her burden of proof in 
establishing that Mr. Loomer was engaging in tasks at a level that is clearly 
unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular 
employment.'"

 

[¶14]   On June 7, 2002, Mrs. Loomer filed 
a petition for review in the district court.  The district court affirmed the 
Commission's decision.  This appeal 
followed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶15]   W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) limits 
our review of administrative decisions to a determination of those matters 
specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003).3  State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Brewbaker, 972 P.2d 962, 963-64 (Wyo. 1999).  In Hoff v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 129, ¶¶ 5-8, 53 P.3d 107, 
109-10 (Wyo. 2002), 
we reiterated the proper application of the substantial evidence and arbitrary 
and capricious standards of review:

 

Our 
standard of review when reviewing administrative agency action was recently 
clarified in the case of Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo.2002).  . . .

 

In 
appeals where both parties submit evidence at the administrative hearing, 
Newman mandates that appellate review be limited to application of the 
substantial evidence test. Newman, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 22, 49 P.3d 163.  This is true regardless of which party 
appeals from the agency decision. In addition, this court is required to review 
the entire record in making its ultimate determination on appeal. Newman, 
at ¶ 19 and ¶¶ 24-26.

 

The 
substantial evidence test to be applied is as follows:

 

"In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If the agency's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our 
judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal. 
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of the agency's conclusions. It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence."

 

Newman, 
at ¶ 12 (quoting State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. 
v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶ 10 
(Wyo.2001)).

 

Even 
when the factual findings are found to be sufficient under the substantial 
evidence test, Newman further concludes this court may be required to 
apply the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a "safety net" to catch other 
agency action which prejudiced a party's substantial right to the administrative 
proceeding or which might be contrary to the other WAPA review standards. 

 

Because 
Mrs. Loomer and the Division both presented evidence, in the form of 
witnesses or exhibits, we will review the Commission's decision under the 
substantial evidence standard.  
Although the district court upheld the Commission's determination, we 
afford no deference to conclusions reached by the district court, but review the 
case as if it had come directly from the agency.  Brewbaker, 972 P.2d  at 
964.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) 
provides that worker's compensation benefits for employment-related coronary 
conditions are only available where the claimant establishes by competent 
medical authority that:

 

(i)         
There is a 
direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was 
performed and the cardiac condition; and

 

(ii)        
The causative 
exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to 
or abnormal for employees in that particular employment, irrespective of whether 
the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual employee; 
and

 

(iii)       
The acute 
symptoms of the cardiac condition are clearly manifested not later than four (4) 
hours after the alleged causative exertion.

 

[¶17]   Originally enacted in 1969, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) adopted the "unusual-exertion" rule.  Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 221-22 (Wyo. 1977); 
see also, Patrick J. Crank and Kenneth R. Buck, Comment, The 
Compensability of Cardiac Conditions Under Wyoming Worker's Compensation: Health 
Insurance or Worker's Compensation?, XX Land & Water L. Rev. 607, 614 
(1985).  For a claimant to qualify for worker's 
compensation benefits under this rule, he or she must demonstrate that the 
work-related coronary condition resulted from an unusual exertion.  Id. at 613.  Two methods have been used to ascertain 
when an employee's specific exertion is unusual: a subjective and an objective 
test.  Id. at 614.  The subjective test determines whether a 
specific exertion is unusual by comparing the employee's exertion at the time of 
the heart attack to the level of exertion to which that particular 
employee is accustomed.  
Mor, Inc., 566 P.2d  at 222.  The objective test, on the other hand, 
compares the employee's specific exertion to the usual exertion of other 
employees engaged in the same or similar activity.  Matter of Desotell, 767 P.2d 998, 
1001 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶18]   In the original version of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b), the legislature used language consistent with the 
subjective test:

 

No 
benefits for cardiac conditions, except those directly and solely caused by a 
traumatic accident, shall be compensable unless the employee establishes by 
competent medical authority that there is a direct causal connection between the 
condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition, and then 
only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment 
stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, the individual employee 
in that particular employment . . ..

 

Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 200, § 15 (1969) (emphasis added).  In Mor, Inc., the first case to 
interpret the 1969 statute, we adopted the subjective test, holding that the 
exertion "must only be unusual to the employee  it need 
not necessarily be unusual to others engaged in the same employment."  Mor, Inc., 566 P.2d at 
222 (emphasis in original).  Then, in 1977, the legislature amended 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) to read, in pertinent part: "the causative 
exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual 
to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment . . 
.."  Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 1 at 
467 (1977) (emphasis added).  In 
Claim of McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Wyo. 1979), 
we recognized that the amended statute set forth an objective test.  Nonetheless, a number of 
post-McCarley decisions continued to use the subjective test from the 
previous version of the statute.  
See Creek v. Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 
1983); 
Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 
654 P.2d 137, 140 (Wyo. 1982); 
Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Schwilke 
on Behalf of Schwilke, 649 P.2d 218, 221-22 (Wyo. 1982); 
and Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Wyo. 
1979).  In 1989, we expressly adopted the 
objective test and noted the prior misapplication of the subjective test 
stating, "[t]his court erred in Schwilke and Yost by misreading 
the clear 1977 legislative mandate requiring claimants to prove an actual 
period of employment stress' based on an objective standard and by applying the 
superseded subjective test . . .."  
Matter of Desotell, 767 P.2d  at 1002.

 

[¶19]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b)(ii) 
again was amended in 1986 to read: 
"The causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress 
clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment, 
irrespective of whether the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal 
for the individual employee[.]"  
Wyo. Sess. Laws, sp. sess. ch. 3, § 
3 at 37 (1986) (emphasis added).  
The new language emphasized above clearly indicates the legislature's 
intent to adopt the objective test, and since the 1986 amendment, we have 
consistently used the objective test when applying Wyo. Stat. Ann 
§ 
27-14-603(b).  See Bruns v. TW 
Services, Inc., 2001 WY 127, ¶ 
25, 
36 P.3d 608, 616 (Wyo. 2001); 
Sheth v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 11 P.3d 375, 
379-80 (Wyo. 2000); 
Brewbaker, 972 P.2d  at 964; 
and State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 258-59 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶20]   The Commission determined that Mrs. 
Loomer had not met her burden of proving the elements of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-14-603(b).  She now argues that 
this decision should be reversed based on three theories.  First, she asserts that the Commission 
improperly interpreted the meaning of "particular employment" as used in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 27-14-603(b)(ii), claiming that, although her husband was working as 
a truck driver when he died, his "particular employment" was that of a pipe 
inspector, and the employment stress causing his heart attack was clearly 
unusual to and abnormal for a pipe inspector.  Second, she maintains that even if her 
husband's "particular employment" on the day he died was that of a truck driver, 
the employment stress was clearly unusual to or abnormal even for a truck driver 
because he did not have the aid of an assistant or a forklift when he unloaded 
the rods.  Finally, Mrs. Loomer 
contends that after she presented her case to the Commission, the burden of 
proof shifted to the Division and the Division failed adequately to rebut her 
evidence.

 

What 
was Loomer's "particular employment" when he suffered a heart 
attack?

 

[¶21]   It is undisputed that Mr. Loomer 
was hired by TRC as a pipe inspector.  
While there is some disagreement about the number of times Mr. Loomer had 
driven the delivery truck for TRC before he died, both parties acknowledge that 
on the day of his heart attack, Mr. Loomer was working as a truck driver.   Mrs. Loomer contends that, for 
purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-603(b)(ii), "particular employment" should be 
read to mean the job for which the employee was originally hired, rather than 
the particular task he was performing at the time of the heart attack.  She notes that her husband was hired as 
a pipe inspector, a "light" level physical exertion job, and that truck driving 
is classified as a "medium" level job in the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles.  Mrs. Loomer argues that the 
Commission should have determined that her husband's "particular employment" was 
a pipe inspector, and she claims that "[t]he stress, toil and exertion involved 
with unloading pipes from a truck was well beyond what was usual or normal for 
pipe inspecting."

 

[¶22]   While this argument may have merit 
under a subjective standard, it is misplaced in an objective analysis.  Under the prior subjective test, a 
claimant could argue that he was not hired to do this particular type of work, 
and therefore, the employment stress was unusual and abnormal to him because 
he was not accustomed to the level of exertion required.  However, the objective test asks only 
whether the exertion is "clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in 
that particular employment, irrespective of whether the employment stress 
is unusual to or abnormal for the individual employee[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b)(ii) 
(emphasis added).  Asking what job 
Mr. Loomer was originally hired to do, the type of work to which he was 
accustomed, and whether truck driving is a more physically demanding job than 
pipe inspecting, all relate to whether the employment stress was clearly unusual 
to or abnormal for Mr. Loomer.  Yet, the objective test examines only 
whether the employment stress causing the heart attack was abnormal or unusual 
for that particular employment"it does not focus on the 
activities or characteristics of an individual employee."  Harris, 931 P.2d  at 
259.

 

[¶23]   We hold that under the objective 
test set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-603(b)(ii), a claimant's "particular 
employment" is the job he is performing at the time of the causative 
exertion.  Any other interpretation 
of the statute would negate clear legislative intent.  See Yost, 654 P.2d at 
143 (Rooney, J., dissenting).  Mr. Loomer's "particular employment" at 
the time of the causative exertion was that of a truck driver.  In Brewbaker, a case factually 
similar to the present case, the claimant was a truck driver who agreed 
temporarily to perform welding tasks for his employer.  Brewbaker, 972 P.2d  at 
963.  While performing a particularly 
strenuous welding job in inclement weather conditions, the claimant suffered a 
heart attack.  Id.  We reversed a denial of benefits and 
stated, "[i]ndeed, the only evidence before the hearing examiner was that the 
project was over and above the range of heavy labor' normally required 
for a welding project." Id. at 965 (emphasis added).  We also found "no evidence to support 
the hearing examiner's determination that lifting 300 pound steel plates in 
freezing weather for three hours is usual or normal stress in the welding 
profession." Id. (emphasis added).  While we acknowledge that 
Brewbaker is not directly on point, as we were not expressly addressing 
the meaning of "particular employment" as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-14-603(b)(ii), we note that in that case we considered "particular 
employment" to be the job in which the claimant was engaged at the time of the 
heart attack, not the job for which he was originally 
hired.

 

Was 
the Commission's decision supported by substantial evidence?

 

[¶24]   When Mr. Loomer suffered his heart 
attack, his particular employment was that of a TRC truck driver.  Therefore, we must now determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination that the 
employment stress Mr. Loomer experienced was neither abnormal to nor unusual for 
a TRC truck driver.  In Matter of 
Desotell, 767 P.2d  at 1002, 
we described what a claimant must prove to satisfy the requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 27-14-603(b):

 

Given 
the way the statute is phrased, the claimant must first prove that the injured 
employee experienced an "actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or 
abnormal for, employees in that particular employment * * *." Next, and only 
after proof of the first requirement, the claimant must establish legal 
causation, by proving a "causative exertion" during the proven period of actual 
unusual or abnormal stress. Then, the claimant must establish medical causation, 
by introducing competent medical testimony evidencing a direct causal connection 
between the causative exertion and the coronary condition.  Last, the claimant must introduce 
evidence showing that the acute symptoms of that coronary condition were 
manifested within four hours of the causative exertion. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division v. Van Buskirk, 
721 P.2d 570, 572 (Wyo.1986) first analyzed as a four-part test in Claim of McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1335-336 
(Wyo.1979).

 

(Emphasis 
in original.)  See also Sheth, 
11 P.3d at 379 and Harris, 931 P.2d  at 
258-59.  As the claimant, Mrs. Loomer had the 
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the above 
elements.  Bruns, 2001 WY 
127, ¶ 12, 36 P.3d  at 613.  This standard requires that she present 
evidence that would lead the trier of fact to conclude that the existence of the 
contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.  Id., 2001 WY 127, ¶ 13, 36 P.3d  
at 613.

 

[¶25]   As indicated above, Mrs. Loomer's 
first task was to prove that her husband experienced an actual period of 
employment stress clearly unusual to or abnormal for a TRC truck driver.  Matter of Desotell, 767 P.2d  at 
1002.  Mrs. Loomer contends that her husband's 
employment stress was abnormal and unusual for two reasons: he did not have the 
assistance of another employee when he unloaded the truck and no forklift was 
available to unload the truck.  One 
of the exhibits presented to the Commission was a TRC job description for "Truck 
Driver."  Two of the tasks listed in 
that exhibit are "set up gin poles and unload rods where customer designates" 
and "[c]ontrol and be responsible for swamper (if provided)."  Gin poles are part of the winch system 
on a winch truck and swampers are assistants.  This job description clearly indicates 
that reconfiguring and unloading the truck is a normal and usual task for a TRC 
truck driver.  Additionally, the 
parenthetical language "if provided" indicates that a swamper is not always 
provided.  While it may be true that 
Dudley was supposed to go with Mr. Loomer to help unload, nothing in the record 
demonstrates that a TRC truck driver's employment stress becomes unusual or 
abnormal if he does not have the assistance of a swamper.

 

[¶26]   In her next argument, Mrs. Loomer 
relied on the report and testimony of Stricklett to claim that a truck driver's 
employment stress is abnormal and unusual if he does not use a forklift to 
unload oil-well rods.  Stricklett 
testified that the industry standard for unloading rods from trucks is to use 
"equipment and normally a forklift."  
However, of the thirty-four employers she contacted, only four said they 
used a forklift to unload trucks.  
When asked whether a company that uses a winch truck rather than a 
forklift would be required to have both available, Stricklett responded that it 
would have to have "one or the other . . .."  Finally, she conceded that if TRC truck 
drivers normally unloaded their trucks the way Mr. Loomer had, using a winch 
truck, there would be no unusual employment stress.

 

[¶27]   The Commission found Stricklett's 
knowledge with respect to the equipment Mr. Loomer was using inadequate and 
noted that "[n]owhere in her report is it indicated that forklifts are used to 
unload pipe at an oil field location."  
Also, the Commission specifically found aspects of Stricklett's testimony 
"not credible" and concluded that Mrs. Loomer had not met her burden of 
establishing that the absence of a forklift made her husband's work "clearly 
unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment."  The Commission, "as the trier of fact, 
had the authority to weigh [an expert's] opinion against the remaining evidence 
and to conclude it was not adequately supported by facts."  Bruns, 2001 WY 127, ¶ 26, 36 P.3d  
at 617.

 

[¶28]   The Commission determined that Mrs. 
Loomer had not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the absence of an 
assistant or a forklift made a TRC truck driver's employment stress abnormal and 
unusual. Affording appropriate deference, we find neither determination 
arbitrary and capricious and hold that both were supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

Did 
the burden of proof shift to the Division?

 

[¶29]   Finally, Mrs. Loomer contends that 
the Commission's decision should be reversed because after she presented her 
case, the burden of proof shifted to the Division and it failed to rebut the 
evidence presented.  She quotes 
Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
979 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1999), 
"[o]nce the claimant has satisfied this burden, the burden shifts, requiring the 
Division to produce evidence that the injury is excluded from the Act's coverage 
. . .."  However, the burden does 
not shift upon presentation of any evidence; it shifts only if the 
claimant has proven all the essential elements of her claim.  Id.; In re Helm, 982 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Wyo. 1999).  Mrs. Loomer failed to prove all the 
elements of her claim, and therefore, the burden never shifted to the 
Division.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶30]   The phrase "particular employment" 
as found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b)(ii) means the task being performed at 
the time of the causative exertion.  
Consequently, a claimant must prove exertion that is clearly unusual to 
or abnormal for employees performing that task as opposed to employees 
performing the job for which that claimant may originally have been hired.  In the instant case, Mrs. Loomer did not 
prove all the elements of her claim and the burden of proof did not shift to the 
Division.  The order of the district 
court affirming the Commission is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Both disclosure statements provided 
a list of anticipated witnesses and exhibits.  Mrs. Loomer's statement listed eight 
exhibits and named Mrs. Loomer, Pam Whitlock, Dr. Dobersen, and Karen Stricklett 
as potential witnesses.  The 
Division listed six exhibits and named Mrs. Loomer as a potential witness and 
"[s]uch rebuttal witnesses as appropriate to rebut evidence . . .."  The Commission received the disclosure 
statements and admitted all exhibits into evidence.

 

  2The six exhibits listed in the 
Division's disclosure statement had already been admitted into 
evidence.

 

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
provides as follows:

 

To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 

(ii)         
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found 
to be:

 

(A)        
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

(B)        
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 

(C)        In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 

(D)        
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E)        
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute.