Case Title: Estate of Girard v. Laird

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers 
 are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
 corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                    No. 92-133


 Estate of Sydney Girard                      Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Justina Laird, et al.                        October Term, 1992


 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Donna Russo-Savage and Ralph W. Howe III of Paterson & Walke, P.C.,
   Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

 David A. Otterman of Otterman and Allen, P.C., Barre, for defendants-
   appellees



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.    This is a dispute over the ownership of a house and
 surrounding land located at 3-5 Hillside Avenue in the City of Barre.  The
 contending parties are plaintiff, estate of Sydney Girard, and certain
 relatives of Sydney Girard (defendants) who claim title under a deed from
 Sydney Girard to his parents, Francis and Patricia Shepard.  The Washington
 Superior Court awarded title to defendants.  We affirm.
      The parties stipulated to the facts in this one-issue case.  Girard
 purchased the property from his grandparents in 1975.  Shortly thereafter,
 he married Sharon Houle, and they took up residence on the property.  A son,
 Jonathan, was born in 1979.  The couple separated in 1979, however, and
 neither Sharon nor Jonathan ever again lived in the Barre premises.  A year
 later, Girard conveyed the property to his parents by his sole deed, but he
 continued to live on the property until May of 1986.  Through later
 transfers, record title to the property ended up in Girard's aunt, Justina
 Laird.
      In 1982, Girard and Sharon Houle divorced.  The final order, which was
 based on a stipulation between the parties, provided that "[t]he real pro-
 perty at 5 Hillside Avenue, Barre, Vermont, belonging to [Girard] is awarded
 to [Girard], subject to debts presently on this property."
      Girard died in 1990, and his former wife and son opened an estate.
 They made a formal demand that Justina Laird convey the Barre property to
 Jonathan.  When Justina Laird refused, this suit ensued. (FN1) 
 Plaintiff's claim is that the Girard deed to his parents was void because 
 Sharon Houle did not join in it to convey her homestead interest.  Because it 
 was void, they argue that the property remains in Girard's estate and passes 
 to his heirs. (FN2)
      The trial court found that conveyance from Girard to his parents was
 made without the required participation of his wife Sharon but that the
 defect made the conveyance only voidable by Sharon.  Because Sharon failed
 to void the conveyance before the divorce, and she lost all interest in the
 property in the divorce, the court held that the conveyance was no longer
 voidable.  Accordingly, it awarded summary judgment to defendants.
      The parties agree that there are no disputed issues of fact, and the
 case was properly decided by summary judgment.  Plaintiff renews here its
 argument that Girard's deed was void, and the property remains in the
 estate.  Defendants rely on the trial court analysis, adding that Girard was
 estopped to contest the validity of his deed.  Both agree that the
 controlling statute is 27 V.S.A. { 141(a), which provides:
         { 141. Execution and acknowledgement of conveyance
           (a) A homestead or an interest therein shall not be
         conveyed by the owner thereof, if married, except by way
         of mortgage for the purchase money thereof given at the
         time of such purchase, unless the wife or husband joins
         in the execution and acknowledgment of such conveyance.
         A conveyance thereof, or of an interest therein, not so
         made and acknowledged, shall be inoperative so far only
         as relates to the homestead provided for in this
         chapter.

 The statute is part of the remedial scheme to protect home ownership from
 loss to creditors, to conserve family homes and to "save [families] from
 disintegration and secure their permanency."  Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt.
 523, 524,