Case Title: People v. Schultz

Citation: 

Docket Number: S114671

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL JOSEPH SCHULTZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S114671 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
CR49517 
 
 
November 23, 2020 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban and Goethals* concurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
S114671 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Michael Joseph Schultz of the 
first degree murder of Cynthia Burger (Pen. Code, § 187, 
subd. (a)),1 and found true the special circumstance allegations 
that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged 
in 
the 
commission 
of 
rape 
and 
burglary 
(§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(C), (G)).  After a penalty phase trial, the jury 
returned a verdict of death.  Defendant moved to modify his 
sentence to life without the possibility of parole.  (§ 190.4, 
subd. (e).)  The trial court denied the motion and sentenced him 
to death.  Defendant’s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
Cynthia Burger lived in a condominium complex in Port 
Hueneme, a city located in Ventura County.  Around 3:30 a.m. 
on August 5, 1993, her neighbor was preparing to leave for work 
and was surprised to see that Burger’s garage door was open.  
Finding that sight unsettling, the neighbor sat in his car in front 
of Burger’s garage.  After hearing and seeing nothing for several 
minutes, he left for work. 
 
1   
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated.   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
About two hours later, another neighbor awoke to the 
smell of smoke and saw that Burger’s condominium was on fire.  
Police officers were first on the scene, but they were unable to 
get far into the home because of the thick smoke.  Firefighters 
soon arrived and quickly extinguished the fire, which was 
confined to an upstairs bedroom.  When firefighters searched 
the rest of the residence, they found Burger’s lifeless body 
facedown in a half-filled bathtub located on the first floor.  Her 
matted hair was an unnatural yellow-orange color that was 
coated with a foamy soap-like substance.  Fire personnel pulled 
her from the water and attempted to revive her, but they 
abandoned their efforts when it was apparent she was dead. 
Police officers collecting evidence from the scene found no 
signs of forced entry.  They discovered, however, that the 
condominium’s smoke detectors had been removed or disabled.  
Burger’s sister was called to the scene and informed officers that 
Burger’s purse containing her wallet and credit cards was 
missing. 
Later that day, Ventura County’s Chief Medical 
Examiner, Dr. Ronald O’Halloran, performed on autopsy on 
Burger’s body.  Dr. O’Halloran noted that Burger had petechial 
hemorrhages on the skin of her face, her eyelids, and the whites 
of her eyes.  She also had abrasions under her chin, bruising on 
her neck, and a fractured hyoid bone.  He concluded based on 
these observations that the cause of death was manual 
strangulation.  Dr. O’Halloran also concluded that Burger was 
already dead when the fire started because there was no 
evidence she had inhaled smoke and no evidence of carbon 
monoxide in her bloodstream. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
Dr. O’Halloran examined Burger’s genital area and 
discovered three lacerations in the pubic area and bruising in 
the lower portion of the vagina.  He concluded that Burger had 
been forcibly penetrated.  Dr. O’Halloran swabbed and 
aspirated Burger’s vaginal canal to recover possible seminal 
fluid.  He then conducted a microscopic examination from one of 
the swabs and observed sperm.  He released the swabs and 
vaginal aspirant to the Port Hueneme Police Department.  The 
material was preserved for future testing. 
Two weeks after the fire, an expert in fire reconstruction 
visited the condominium to determine the fire’s point of origin, 
characteristics, and duration.  According to the expert, the fire 
started when an open flame was applied to synthetic bedclothes 
at the foot of the bed, erupted quickly, and was rapidly 
extinguished.  The expert concluded the fire was set 
intentionally. 
The investigation into Burger’s death went unsolved for 
several years.  In March 1996, three years after the killing, the 
assistant laboratory manager at the Ventura County Sheriff’s 
Department crime lab contracted with Orchid Cellmark 
Laboratories (Cellmark) to extract DNA from the vaginal 
aspirant (also referred to as a vaginal wash) produced by 
Dr. O’Halloran during the autopsy.  Cellmark successfully 
extracted DNA from the sperm cells present in the vaginal wash 
and the evidence was returned to the crime lab.   
Meanwhile, around the time of the killing, defendant 
became romantically involved with Therresa Mooney.  The two 
broke up at one point but had resumed dating when defendant 
was sentenced to prison in 1996 for other crimes.  Mooney 
visited defendant in prison regularly.  Defendant’s mother, 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
Bruni Loprieato, had previously been estranged from defendant 
but often joined Mooney to visit defendant. 
In 1999, three years into his prison sentence and six years 
after Burger’s death, defendant was transferred to a low 
security fire camp.  By August of that year, defendant and 
Mooney were engaged to be married and they expected, 
incorrectly, that he would be released within six months.  
Mooney was therefore incredulous when defendant asked her to 
help him escape. 
Mooney testified at trial about her conversations with 
defendant.  She stated that defendant explained to her that 
prison authorities soon would be taking a DNA sample from 
him, which might implicate him in a prior crime.  Defendant told 
Mooney that he and a companion were burglarizing a home 
when the homeowner awoke and confronted them.  Defendant 
claimed the homeowner cut him on the forearm with a butcher 
knife as defendant attempted to flee, and that his companion 
then killed the homeowner. 
Defendant feared he would be held responsible for the 
homeowner’s death, and asked Mooney to bring a car and to 
meet him outside the fire camp between bed counts.  He 
explained that he wanted Mooney to give him a ride to a bus 
station or airport, and that he might flee to live with a relative 
in Germany.  Mooney refused defendant’s request to help him 
escape, saying that he should not run from the situation because 
“if that’s really the way it happened,” defendant would not be 
charged. 
Mooney testified that she visited defendant about one 
week later, this time accompanied by Loprieato.  On the drive to 
the fire camp, Mooney told Loprieato about defendant’s request 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
for help to escape.  Both women were angry and hurt, and they 
made clear to defendant they would not assist him in escaping.  
At one point during the visit, Loprieato went to the bathroom 
and Mooney told defendant that she loved him and was “there 
for [him],” but that she was skeptical of his story.  Mooney asked 
defendant whether he had killed someone.  Defendant said that 
he had.  Prompted by a “weird feeling,” Mooney asked whether 
the victim was a woman and whether he had raped her.  
Defendant again said yes.  He then told Mooney that the victim’s 
name was “Cindy Burger” and that the killing happened on 
August 4 or 5, 1993.  He suggested that Mooney search the local 
newspapers for coverage of Burger’s death, saying that he had 
set a fire during the incident and that it was covered in the news.  
Loprieato then returned, and the group resumed talking about 
defendant’s plan to escape.  Neither Mooney nor defendant 
mentioned Burger to Loprieato at that time. 
Mooney stated that when she left the fire camp, she and 
Loprieato agreed not to tell anyone about defendant’s plan to 
escape.  Mooney did not tell law enforcement about the plan or 
defendant’s admission regarding Burger’s death because she 
was afraid and “wanted it to all be not true.”  She eventually 
went to a library and located a newspaper article about the 
killing.  She brought the article with her when she visited 
defendant the following weekend.  Mooney gave defendant the 
article to read.  At one point, he stopped reading and said the 
article was wrong in stating that Burger had been wearing a 
nightshirt.  Mooney read the rest of the article to defendant and 
demanded that he tell her what happened.  Defendant agreed 
and answered Mooney’s questions regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the rape and killing. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
Mooney also testified that defendant told her that he had 
used a lot of methamphetamine earlier in the day and stumbled 
upon Burger’s open garage between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m.  He said 
he entered the garage intending to steal something, but then 
found a key that unlocked the door separating the garage from 
the residence.2  He went inside, looked around the first floor, 
went upstairs, found Burger nude on her bed, and raped her.  
When Mooney asked defendant if Burger fought back, he said, 
“No, actually she seemed to like it.”  Defendant told Mooney that 
at one point Burger scratched either his face or his chest.  
Mooney recalled that sometime around August 1993 she had 
seen marks on defendant’s face. 
Defendant answered more of Mooney’s questions about 
the killing.  Defendant explained that he had smothered Burger 
with a pillow and that he killed her because he was “too 
identifiable.”  He said that he placed Burger’s body in the 
downstairs bathtub and filled it with water, bleach, and other 
household chemicals to “kill any DNA.”  Defendant told Mooney 
that, fearing he could be identified by DNA from hair or sperm 
on Burger’s bed, he went back upstairs and used a candle to light 
the bed on fire.  He also explained that before leaving the scene, 
he took some items to make it appear that Burger’s residence 
had been burglarized. 
After defendant had answered Mooney’s questions, she 
mentioned that her friend knew a City of Ventura Police 
Department employee who, for a fee, could check to determine 
 
2  
Mooney admitted at trial she had testified during the 
preliminary hearing that defendant told her he did not have a 
plan concerning what he was going to do when he entered 
Burger’s home. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
whether any DNA evidence had been recovered from the crime 
scene.  She asked defendant not to attempt an escape until she 
could obtain that information.  Defendant agreed, telling 
Mooney to ask Loprieato for the money.  Mooney later gave her 
friend $100 for the information; the friend reported that the 
DNA from the case “wasn’t legible,” and Mooney communicated 
the “good news” to defendant by telephone.  Defendant then 
asked Mooney to tell Loprieato about the crime. 
Mooney further testified that during a subsequent drive to 
visit defendant she disclosed to Loprieato what defendant had 
told her about killing Burger.  When Loprieato arrived at the 
fire camp, she tearfully asked defendant whether what Mooney 
told her was true.  Defendant said, “Yes, mama, it is.”  Mooney 
and Loprieato decided they would not tell anyone about the 
crimes. 
Loprieato also testified at trial.  She admitted that 
defendant had asked for her help escaping from the fire camp 
but asserted that she repeatedly refused to help him.  She 
denied that defendant told her he wanted to escape because of 
any concern regarding DNA, but she admitted he said that 
something he had done in the past was going to “backfire” on 
him.  Loprieato also denied that defendant ever confessed to her 
that he had raped and killed Burger.  She did, however, admit 
that Mooney had told her about defendant’s confession and the 
possible DNA evidence during one trip to visit defendant, that 
she believed Mooney, and that she had no reason to think 
Mooney would lie about the confession.  When Loprieato 
approached defendant at the fire camp that day, she said to 
defendant, “[W]hat have you done?”  He proceeded to cry, put 
his head down, and walk away. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
Loprieato agreed that she and Mooney made a pact not to 
tell anyone about defendant’s confession.  Loprieato testified 
that although defendant never personally told her he had 
committed the crime, he also never told her he had not killed 
Burger.  Similarly, Mooney testified that defendant continued 
to write to her after he was implicated in Burger’s death and 
leading up to his capital trial, but that he never denied killing 
Burger. 
In August 2000, one year after defendant had disclosed to 
Mooney the details of Burger’s rape and killing and several 
months before defendant’s expected release from the fire camp, 
Mooney told her daughter about defendant’s confession.  
Mooney’s daughter told Mooney to call the police, or she 
(Mooney’s daughter) would.  That day, Mooney placed an 
anonymous call to the City of Ventura Police Department to 
report that she had information regarding Burger’s death. 
In October 2000, investigators contacted Loprieato and 
asked her about Burger’s death.  Loprieato denied knowing 
anything about the incident.  After she spoke with investigators, 
Loprieato met with Mooney at a restaurant.  Unbeknownst to 
Loprieato, Mooney was wearing a recording device.  Loprieato 
told Mooney that she was “playing dumb” when she spoke with 
investigators, and that she would deny knowing anything about 
Burger’s death.  She reported that she had talked to defendant 
about Burger’s death, saying, “I said to [defendant] what in the 
world possibly could have happened to him to murder 
somebody?”  And she told Mooney that telling the police 
anything “is not helping you and it’s not helping him.  And you 
know something, I think to myself fuck the system.  Do you 
know how many people who have money would have gotten 
away with it?”  At trial, Loprieato admitted to making those 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
statements, although she denied talking with defendant directly 
about the killing, saying her statement was taken out of context.  
She explained, too, that she was upset, trying to comfort a 
“hysterical” Mooney, and attempting to protect her son. 
Later in October 2000, Loprieato became extremely 
distraught about Burger’s death.  She talked with a family 
friend, Alan Bice, about whether to be truthful with law 
enforcement about what she knew.  Bice told Loprieato she 
should be honest with investigators.  Bice also testified that 
Loprieato told him that defendant had admitted to her that he 
had killed a woman.3  Six days later, Bice spoke with 
investigators regarding his conversation with Loprieato.  Later 
that day, Bice accompanied Loprieato to the prosecutor’s office 
where she talked with investigators and related what she knew. 
About one month later, investigators obtained blood 
samples from defendant.  The blood samples were sent to 
Cellmark, where they were compared with the DNA collected 
from sperm found during Burger’s autopsy.  DNA testing 
showed the likelihood that the sperm collected during Burger’s 
autopsy came from a Caucasian other than defendant was one 
in 24 times 10 to the 18th power.  In other words, the DNA 
evidence showed a match. 
 
3  
On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed to 
statements Bice made to law enforcement in an attempt to cast 
doubt on Bice’s testimony.  Bice acknowledged that some of his 
prior statements were ambiguous but maintained at trial that 
Loprieato had told him that defendant personally confessed to 
her. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
2.  Defense evidence 
The defense presented no affirmative evidence at the guilt 
phase of trial. 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution’s case in aggravation 
The prosecution’s case in aggravation included testimony 
and 
documentary 
evidence 
regarding 
defendant’s 
prior 
convictions and various uncharged acts of violence or threats of 
violence.  In addition, three of Burger’s family members 
described how Burger’s death had affected them.   
a.  Prior convictions  
The jury learned that defendant had been convicted of 
residential burglary in September 1992, that he was initially 
sentenced to probation but eventually sent to prison in 
December 1992, and that he was released on parole in June 
1993. 
The jury also learned that in 1996, three years after the 
killing, defendant pleaded guilty to six charges, including 
second degree burglary, felony battery resulting in serious 
bodily injury to a police officer, being under the influence of a 
controlled substance, and other misdemeanor offenses.  These 
convictions stemmed from an incident that occurred on the 
Ventura campus of California State University, Northridge.  
Two officers, Thomas Avery and Alex Marquez, discovered 
defendant using tools to break into a vending machine coin box 
in the student lounge.  According to the officers, they drew their 
guns and ordered defendant to put down his tools and lie on the 
floor.  Defendant dropped the tools, but then ran at full speed 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
toward the officers and was able to slip between them.4  The 
officers chased defendant down several hallways and a flight of 
stairs, cornering him inside an underground parking garage.  
During the pursuit, the officers unsuccessfully used pepper 
spray and baton strikes to attempt to stop defendant.  At one 
point they held defendant down on the ground of the garage with 
both officers on top of him.  Defendant managed to hoist himself 
up into a squatting position and move toward a door leading 
outside the garage.  Defendant opened the door, and he and the 
officers tumbled onto the ground outside.  Defendant continued 
to struggle to get away while Avery and Marquez held him 
down, striking him each time he attempted to get up.  Defendant 
was subdued and handcuffed only after five additional officers 
arrived and assisted in the arrest.  The parties stipulated at trial 
that a sample of defendant’s blood that was taken on the day of 
the incident tested positive for methamphetamine. 
Officer Marquez testified that several times during the 
incident defendant reached for or grabbed Marquez’s holstered 
sidearm, leading Marquez to fear for his life.  Officer Avery 
testified that he never saw defendant reach for Marquez’s 
firearm; he acknowledged that there were times when Officer 
Marquez and defendant were out of his sight, and that he would 
have been watching for defendant to reach for the firearm.  
Officer Marquez, for his part, stated there was “no doubt in [his] 
mind” that defendant was reaching for his firearm.  He 
described the incident as “the most violent confrontation I had 
in my entire life.”  As a result of the injuries he suffered during 
 
4  
Officer Marquez testified that defendant did not drop the 
tools until he (Officer Marquez) struck him in the chest with a 
police baton. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
the arrest, Officer Marquez had to undergo eight surgeries on 
his knees and one on his back.  Officer Avery said he had never 
been involved in a struggle that was so violent; he dislocated a 
finger while punching defendant to keep him subdued. 
b.  Uncharged crimes of violence 
The prosecutor called several witnesses to testify about 
prior uncharged incidents involving violence by defendant.   
Michael Hecht testified that he met defendant in April or 
May of 1989 when Hecht moved from Las Vegas to Redlands, 
California.  Hecht’s mother was dating defendant’s father at the 
time, and Hecht and defendant worked at defendant’s father’s 
refrigeration repair business; Hecht slept on a couch at the 
business.  That June, defendant’s father abruptly demanded 
Hecht leave.  As Hecht was gathering his possessions, he asked 
his mother to leave with him  because she and defendant’s father 
had been fighting.  Defendant and his father later attacked 
Hecht and beat him, saying, “you’re dead.”  Defendant grabbed 
Hecht around the neck with one arm and punched him 
repeatedly in the face with the other arm.  At one point, after 
Hecht had been wrestled to the ground, defendant banged 
Hecht’s head against the pavement.  Defendant’s father told 
defendant that he was going to retrieve a firearm.  Hecht 
responded by slashing at his attackers with a pocketknife and 
eventually was able to get away.  He suffered a dislocated jaw, 
a bloody nose, a concussion, and rib injuries. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
Defendant’s stepfather, Nick Loprieato,5 testified about 
another incident that occurred in early 1991.  He stated that he 
was upstairs in the family home when he overheard defendant 
and defendant’s mother arguing over defendant’s use of the 
family’s washing machine.  When Mr. Loprieato told defendant 
that he “ought to respect [his] mother,” defendant grabbed him, 
placed him in a chokehold, and said, “I could hurt you if I want 
to.”  Defendant’s mother called the police.  A police officer 
testified that Mr. Loprieato reported that defendant had 
threatened to kill him, although at trial Mr. Loprieato said he 
did not remember such a threat. 
Therresa Mooney also testified about several incidents 
involving defendant’s acts of violence.  One incident occurred 
around September 1993 at the beginning of their relationship 
when defendant became angry with Mooney for socializing with 
a male friend at a beach party.  According to Mooney, she and 
defendant argued, and defendant and the man got into a scuffle.  
When defendant went to his car, Mooney’s friend picked up a 
metal pipe that was part of a trampoline to defend himself.  
Defendant then drove at Mooney’s friend, who “kind of hit the 
front of the car . . . [and] jumped and rolled over the side of the 
car . . . .”  Mooney’s daughter gave a similar account of the 
incident. 
Mooney also described defendant’s assaults on her.  On 
one occasion in late 1994, defendant and Mooney were in a car 
accident together and Mooney was in intensive care for two 
weeks.  After she was released from the hospital, she and 
 
5  
To avoid confusion, this opinion refers to Nick Loprieato 
as “Mr. Loprieato” and refers to defendant’s mother, Bruni 
Loprieato, as “Loprieato.”  
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
defendant argued over his drug use and he kicked or kneed her 
in the buttocks.  During a later argument over defendant’s drug 
use, he kneed Mooney in the buttocks, hitting her tailbone.  In 
an incident that occurred after Mooney had broken off the 
relationship due to defendant’s continued drug use, defendant 
ingested methamphetamine, took Mooney’s house and car keys, 
refused to return them to her, and twisted her hand backward 
when she confronted him.  Mooney’s daughter called the police.  
Mooney also testified that on one occasion when defendant was 
trying to convince Mooney not to end the relationship, he 
threatened to smash her television.  She was able to convince 
him to leave her house, and she closed and locked the door.  
Defendant then broke through the door, knocking her down in 
the process. 
Mooney also testified that in early 1995, after she and 
defendant separated, she went on a date with a man named 
Darryl Allen.  When she returned home with Allen after the 
date, defendant rushed at the car yelling at Allen and pulled 
Allen from the vehicle.  Allen retrieved a sledgehammer handle 
from the back of his car, and he and defendant struggled.  
Defendant put Allen in a chokehold and was able to take control 
of the sledgehammer handle.  Allen got back into his car to leave, 
and defendant broke the car windshield with the handle.  
Mooney’s daughter corroborated this account, including that 
defendant broke Allen’s windshield.  Allen testified and 
provided a slightly different account of the events.  Allen stated 
that he drove to Mooney’s house alone and saw defendant and 
Mooney arguing in the street.  Allen exited his car, and 
defendant started yelling at him, ripped Allen’s shirt from his 
body, and punched Allen in the head.  Allen then retrieved the 
sledgehammer handle from his car, and defendant put him in a 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
chokehold.  Allen could not say how his car windshield had been 
damaged; he believed it may have occurred when he was 
retrieving the sledgehammer handle and defendant grabbed 
him. 
Richard Bowens described an incident from April 1995 in 
which defendant became angry with Bowens’ girlfriend 
concerning her failure to repay a $5 debt.  Defendant grabbed 
her shirt collar and shook her, prompting the woman to call out 
for help.  Bowens came between defendant and the woman and 
told defendant that she would repay the debt when she could.  
As defendant walked away, however, he turned and threw a 
punch at Bowens that “grazed” his cheek.  Police responded but 
no charges were filed; Bowens said that he did not pursue the 
matter after defendant begged him not to. 
c.  Victim impact evidence  
The prosecution called Burger’s father, mother, and older 
sister to testify regarding the effect Burger’s death had on them 
individually and as a family.  Burger’s father, Had, testified that 
his daughter’s death left him with a feeling of emptiness.  
Burger’s mother, Virgie, described the pain she felt after 
learning of the killing.  And Burger’s sister, Sandra, described 
the bond she had with her sister and her reaction upon hearing 
of her sister’s death. 
2.  Defense case in mitigation 
The defense case in mitigation included testimony from 
defendant’s family members, expert witnesses, and lay 
witnesses.  Defendant’s family members described defendant’s 
upbringing in an environment of drug abuse and domestic 
violence, the mental abuse inflicted on him and his siblings by 
his father, and defendant’s use of drugs beginning at an early 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
age.  Other witnesses testified regarding defendant’s heavy drug 
use and addiction to methamphetamine during his adult years 
and the behaviors he exhibited in connection with that 
addiction.  The defense also presented testimony from an expert 
in addictive medicine and expert testimony from a psychologist 
regarding how an individual can be affected by witnessing and 
experiencing domestic violence as a child.  Finally, the defense 
called several lay witnesses and a penology expert to testify 
regarding defendant’s prospects for a successful adjustment to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.   
a.  Defendant’s upbringing and family background  
Defendant’s half sister and brother described growing up 
in a household beset by parental neglect, drug abuse, and 
frightening domestic violence perpetrated by defendant’s father.   
Defendant’s mother was the family’s primary income 
earner and she spent long hours working as a hairdresser.  From 
a young age, defendant and his brother were generally left in 
the care of their sister, who was five years older than defendant.  
The children were often left alone at night. 
Defendant’s father punished the children frequently, and 
all three children were punished for the digressions of one.  His 
methods included beating them with a belt and forcing them to 
kneel on the kitchen floor for lengthy periods of time.  
Defendant’s father would belittle the children, often in an 
interrogation-like setting that lasted for hours.  According to 
defendant’s sister, it was common practice for her and her 
brothers to be awakened in the middle of the night for 
punishment and then to be forced to stay awake.  She described 
their existence as akin to living in “a hostage situation” with a 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
“sort of terrorist” because they had no idea what was going to 
anger their father. 
Defendant’s siblings testified that defendant’s father also 
forced the three children to witness the physical abuse he 
inflicted on their mother.  For example, in the children’s 
presence and while in a drunken rage, defendant’s father 
pummeled their mother with his fists after she had mentioned 
the possibility of a separation.  Defendant’s sister remembered 
another incident that occurred after their mother had fled the 
home.  After their mother had driven off, their father placed the 
three children in his car to hunt her down, telling the terrified 
children he would kill their mother when he found her.  
Defendant’s brother described another occasion after their 
mother had fled the house with their sister.  Their father 
grabbed his shotgun and put defendant’s brother and defendant 
in the car, telling them that something bad would happen to the 
boys if he could not find their mother. 
Defendant’s siblings further testified that their father 
used illegal drugs in the home, and would ingest “speed” and 
cocaine in front of them.  With his ever-increasing drug use, 
their father became more paranoid and began threatening the 
children with the firearms he kept at home. 
According to defendant’s brother, beginning when 
defendant was nine or 10 years old, he and defendant would 
experiment with their father’s drugs, including “speed” and 
marijuana.  Around that time, they also started drinking hard 
alcohol and beer.  Defendant’s sister recalled that the drugs 
made defendant agitated, and that he and his brother would hit 
and burn each other with cigarettes when they were under the 
influence. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
Defendant’s sister also testified that her father had 
sexually molested her beginning when she was eight or nine 
years old.  To avoid him, she would often sleep in her brothers’ 
bedroom, sometimes under the bottom bunk bed.  She kept the 
molestations a secret.  Defendant’s brother recalled that his 
sister would occasionally sleep in the room he shared with 
defendant.  He remembered that on one of these nights their 
father came into the room, drunk, around 2:00 or 3:00 in the 
morning and lay down next to their sister.  When their father 
put his arm around her and said he loved her, defendant’s 
brother stirred loudly, as if he had just woken up, and then got 
out of bed to walk to the bathroom.  As he walked out, he 
overheard his sister say to their father something like, “It’s not 
right.” 
When defendant’s sister was about 17 years old, she heard 
defendant’s father trying to enter the locked door to her 
bedroom.  When she saw that he had then gone outside the 
house to try to break into her room through the window, she fled 
to a bathroom and locked the door.  Her father, who was clad 
only in his underwear, began banging on the bathroom door 
yelling for her to come out.  The commotion brought defendant 
and his mother and brother to the scene, and they observed 
defendant’s father punch a hole through the bathroom door to 
get inside.  Defendant’s sister cowered in the corner, crying and 
shaking.  Defendant’s mother testified that when she angrily 
asked her husband what was going on, he threatened her. 
A short time after that incident, defendant’s sister 
permanently left the home.  Two or three weeks later, after 
defendant’s father threatened to kill defendant’s mother if she 
did not bring defendant’s sister back, defendant’s mother moved 
out of the house and filed for divorce. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
Defendant and his brother were 12 and 14 years old, 
respectively, when their mother and sister departed.  The boys 
were left mostly in the care of their father, who provided them 
with no structure, control, or stability.  Defendant and his 
brother moved from place to place with their father.  During this 
time, defendant used cocaine, methamphetamine, and other 
drugs, sometimes with his father.  By then, defendant had 
stopped going to school and would often hang around at an 
arcade. 
After defendant’s parents divorced, defendant’s father 
became 
romantically 
involved 
with 
Jacqueline 
White.  
Defendant and his father lived with White when defendant was 
about 15 years old.  She testified that during the time defendant 
and his brother resided in her home, defendant was quiet and 
considerate, and very nurturing to her young son.  White was 
distressed by the abuse and punishment that defendant’s father 
imposed on his sons, and she eventually became the target of his 
wrath as well.  On one occasion after defendant’s father and his 
sons had moved to a different residence, they came to stay with 
White for the weekend.  During the evening, defendant’s father 
became enraged and pushed White up against a wall.  
Defendant stepped in, pulled his father off of White, and 
managed to get him to stop the attack.  White described another 
similar incident when defendant stepped in to protect his 
brother from their father’s abuse. 
Defendant’s paternal aunt testified that her father 
(defendant’s paternal grandfather) was abusive, controlling, 
and unpredictable, and that she, defendant’s father, and their 
mother had been subjected to the same type of abuse that 
defendant’s father later meted out to his own wife and children. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
b.  Defendant’s drug use as an adult 
Defendant’s mother testified that when defendant was 
about 18 years old he came to live with her and her new 
husband.  She asked defendant to leave, however, after his drug 
use became more frequent and he had refused to attend the 
airline mechanics school in which they had enrolled him. 
Kenneth Ross testified that he first met defendant when 
defendant was in his early twenties.  At that time, Ross found 
defendant to be a helpful and humble person who enjoyed down-
to-earth pleasures like walking on the beach and taking their 
dogs out to play together.  Several years later, Ross started 
supplying defendant with methamphetamine.  For the next 
three or four years, they regularly used the drug together. 
Ross explained that when he (Ross) was under the 
influence he became a “totally different” person, doing things he 
would never think of doing while sober.  Ross also described the 
changes he noticed in defendant’s personality after regular use 
of methamphetamine.  Specifically, Ross found defendant was 
less likely to be helpful or generous.  Instead, defendant grew 
cold and self-absorbed.  And when the effects of the drug were 
wearing off, defendant could be intimidating and even 
aggressive.  Ross related that on one occasion, defendant 
knocked him to the ground. 
Defendant’s friend, Chad Hoffman, described similar 
observations. 
 
Hoffman 
testified 
that 
he 
used 
methamphetamine 
regularly 
with 
defendant, 
and 
that 
defendant would often become quiet, grumpy, and even 
aggressive when the effects of the drug were wearing off. 
Other evidence regarding defendant’s drug use was 
provided through the testimony of the probation officer who 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
prepared a presentencing report in connection with defendant’s 
1996 guilty plea.  During the interview with the officer, 
defendant blamed the incident on his use of methamphetamine.  
In summarizing his lengthy history of drug addiction and abuse 
for the officer, defendant indicated that beginning at 15 years 
old he snorted cocaine on a monthly basis, and that between the 
ages of 22 and 24 his use of this drug increased significantly 
until he was incarcerated.  Defendant also reported that 
between the ages of 15 and 20 he smoked marijuana daily.  And, 
with regard to his use of methamphetamine, he told the officer 
that in his early twenties he snorted or smoked one-quarter 
gram of methamphetamine every day. 
c.  Defense expert testimony 
i.  Drug addiction  
The defense called as a mitigation witness an addiction 
medicine expert, Alex Stalcup, M.D., who provided the jury with 
detailed information about drug addiction and its effects.  He 
explained that a “drug of abuse” is a chemical that 
overstimulates the neurotransmitters of the brain’s pleasure 
centers.  Such overstimulation changes the brain’s physiology 
by damaging the pleasure systems, which in turn interferes with 
the drug addict’s ability to experience pleasure without the use 
of drugs.  For a drug addict, the overstimulation of the pleasure 
center’s neurotransmitters leads to the need for a higher dose of 
the drug to achieve the same high, and with that need comes the 
inability to control or stop their drug use.  And because drug 
addiction renders an individual incapable of experiencing 
pleasure without drugs, he or she avoids sobriety, which 
becomes a state of emptiness and boredom that can become 
intolerable. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
Dr. Stalcup further explained that factors such as genetic 
makeup and life experiences can predispose an individual to 
drug addiction.  For example, when children use drugs during a 
tumultuous time the drugs not only make them feel good but 
also allow them to escape the turmoil.  The social context of a 
child’s first use of drugs is also significant to predisposition 
because a home or peer group environment that supports drug 
use enables the child to obtain enough drugs to damage his or 
her brain’s ability to experience pleasure. 
Dr. Stalcup also discussed the factors that can lead a 
susceptible person to become an addict.  According to 
Dr. Stalcup, “early onset use” of a high potency drug before 15 
years old, when the brain’s pleasure centers are still developing, 
presents a dangerous factor for progression toward addiction.  
Another significant factor, he explained, is childhood trauma, be 
it physiological, physical, or sexual. 
With regard to the use of methamphetamine specifically, 
Dr. Stalcup characterized it as a “much too powerful” drug that 
if used over any extended period of time, particularly if smoked 
or injected, will demonstrably injure the user’s pleasure centers.  
According to Dr. Stalcup, studies have shown that some 
methamphetamine users exhibit aggressive behavior because 
the drug simulates the fight-or-flight response caused by 
adrenaline. 
 
A 
methamphetamine 
user 
may 
become 
apprehensive and hypervigilant, seeing a threat that does not 
exist.  Dr. Stalcup also opined that methamphetamine users do 
not exercise free will but that, when intoxicated, they do what 
the drug tells them to do.  He further asserted that, in the case 
of someone who committed a rape-murder, the drug “created 
conditions that [a rape-murder] would happen.” 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
Based on his review of the transcripts of the guilt phase 
and interviews with defendant’s family members, Dr. Stalcup 
believed that defendant was addicted to methamphetamine and 
probably addicted to marijuana at the time of his 1996 arrest.  
In explaining that opinion, Dr. Stalcup reviewed the various risk 
factors shown by this evidence.  For example, he found that 
defendant’s family history of drug use showed he had a “high 
genetic load” for addiction.  He also observed that defendant was 
raised in a household where he, his siblings, and his mother 
suffered psychological abuse and brutal physical assaults.  In 
Dr. Stalcup’s view, incidents such as those described by 
defendant’s family members are associated with feelings of 
hopelessness, which further served to predispose defendant to 
addiction.  Dr. Stalcup also supported his opinion with evidence 
that defendant snorted speed when he was 10 or 11 years old, at 
a time when his brain function was not fully matured.  This 
suggested to Dr. Stalcup that the effect of that drug would be 
much more potent than had it been ingested when defendant 
was older.   
Dr. Stalcup also found significance in the prevalence and 
casualness of drug use in the household, which further enabled 
defendant’s ingestion of drugs.  Dr. Stalcup believed that the 
description of the events that unfolded in 1996, when he fought 
back violently against the officers who were attempting to 
apprehend him, was a classic example of the methamphetamine 
fight-or-flight phenomenon.  Finally, in Dr. Stalcup’s view, the 
testimony by defendant’s friends regarding defendant’s dark 
mood when coming off the effects of methamphetamine was like 
that of the addict who believes the way he or she feels without 
the drug to be intolerable. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
ii.  Impact of child abuse 
The defense also called Bruce Gladstone, Ph.D., to testify 
regarding the destructive behaviors that can be set in motion as 
a result of growing up in an abusive environment.  According to 
Dr. Gladstone, the formative years of childhood are important 
to the development of an individual’s brain and adult 
personality.  Child abuse can result in dysfunction later in life, 
including cognitive and psychiatric problems.  
Dr. Gladstone characterized as child abuse many of the 
incidents that occurred during defendant’s upbringing, such as 
witnessing the repeated beating of a parent, being left alone and 
unsupervised, being beaten with a belt for a minor infraction, 
and being exposed to drugs left around the house in accessible 
places.  As Dr. Gladstone explained, without a mentor or 
positive role model outside the household, many children 
growing up in an abusive environment tend to model the 
behaviors that they see in their adult caretakers.  They can 
develop low self-esteem, poor impulse control, and an increased 
likelihood for drug addiction as a result of the abuse.  The more 
severe the abuse, the more severe the damage to the child’s 
development. 
iii.  Prospects for a positive adjustment to life 
in prison 
The defense called Anthony Casas, a former associate 
warden for the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, as a penology expert to offer his opinion 
regarding whether defendant would make a positive adjustment 
if sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  According 
to Casas, the record of an individual’s behavior in prison prior 
to a capital offense is the best indicator of that person’s future 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
behavior in prison.  Casas opined that neither defendant’s 
conviction for Burger’s rape and murder nor his asking for help 
to escape from fire camp would factor into the determination 
concerning whether defendant would adjust well in prison. 
After reviewing defendant’s prison and jail records, 
including his work and disciplinary history, Casas expressed the 
view that defendant would serve out a life sentence as an 
obedient and peaceful inmate.  He found it significant that 
defendant worked and completed a vocational training program 
while housed in a high security prison after his 1996 convictions.  
Only one year later, defendant’s behavior allowed him to be 
transferred to the Sierra Conservation Center to train as an 
inmate firefighter.  On his successful completion of that 
program, Casas explained, defendant was assigned to the Mount 
Gleason Fire Camp, which meant he was being housed in a 
facility with the least secure level of custody.  As Casas 
described it, individuals selected for the fire camps “are 
considered the A students of the prison population.”  As for 
defendant’s rules violations at the fire camp and while in 
custody in county jail awaiting trial in this case, Casas noted 
that the records showed only minor infractions (including 
smoking cigarettes and being out of bounds), and that none 
involved violence against staff or other inmates.  Casas did note 
one incident in 1998 when defendant caused a large boulder to 
fall down a hill, leading the rest of the crew to take cover to avoid 
being hit.  Casas acknowledged that defendant was belligerent 
and disrespectful when counseled about the incident. 
Finally, the defense presented four witnesses who 
supervised defendant when he worked at the fire camp.  
Corrections Lieutenant Gregory Sims described defendant as an 
“average” inmate, noting that defendant had earned prestigious 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
positions on the fire crew but was also counseled several times 
for incidents including smoking and failing to show up for count.  
Charles Lovers, the firefighter foreperson at the fire camp, 
testified that defendant earned the position of first sawyer on 
the fire crew.  Although defendant was once relieved of his 
duties for not following Lovers’ directions and creating an 
unsafe environment during a fire, Lovers believed defendant 
worked well and had a good attitude.  Fire Captain John Bailey 
supervised defendant during 24-hour shifts fighting a fire on 
Catalina Island.  Bailey remembered defendant as having done 
an outstanding job and found that he demonstrated leadership 
abilities.  Firefighter Michael Bernal also supervised inmates at 
the fire camp.  He testified that defendant served as a tool man 
responsible for sharpening the firefighting tools.  Bernal 
explained that the position was a coveted one at the fire camp 
that required the approval of all eight of the camp’s supervisors. 
3.  Prosecution rebuttal evidence  
The prosecution called several rebuttal witnesses to 
challenge the defense case in mitigation.  Former police officer 
Donald 
MacNeil, 
a 
narcotics 
expert, 
disagreed 
with 
Dr. Stalcup’s assertion that methamphetamine use renders a 
person unable to exercise free will.  In MacNeil’s opinion, 
defendant’s ability to think through and execute actions to cover 
up the rape and murder, such as dismantling the smoke 
detectors, filling the bathtub with chemicals, and setting the bed 
on fire to destroy possible genetic material showed a 
“remarkable” presence of mind. 
The prosecution also presented evidence to rebut 
testimony regarding defendant’s prospects for a positive 
adjustment to prison life.  Dennis Fitzgerald, an investigator 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
with the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office, testified 
that defendant got a “white pride” tattoo while in custody 
sometime after his 1996 arrest.  Fitzgerald also told the jury 
that while awaiting trial in the present case defendant 
corresponded with Justin Merriman, once a leader of the 
Ventura-based Skinhead Dogs white supremacist gang.  One 
letter showed that defendant referred to Merriman as “homey,” 
ended his correspondence with the phrase “Long respects,” and 
asked Merriman to keep in touch.  Letters from Merriman to 
defendant showed that Merriman referred to defendant as 
“homey,” “Big Mike,” and “brother.”  Merriman ended his letters 
with the phrase, “With respect.” 
C.  The Parties’ Theories of the Case 
The prosecution argued during both the guilt and penalty 
phases that defendant had intentionally targeted Burger’s 
home, knowing that she was “an attractive woman who lived 
alone.” 
Defense counsel conceded during the guilt and penalty 
phase that defendant had raped and killed Burger.  Counsel 
argued, however, that defendant did not target Burger 
specifically, but entered her home looking for items to steal 
when he saw her garage door open.  Defense counsel asserted 
that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine at 
the time of the crime and characterized the crime as “a random 
act committed by a man high on methamphetamine.”  The 
prosecution contested that defendant was under the influence 
when the crime occurred, calling the killing “well planned, 
deliberate, [and] organized.” 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
II.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
Excusal of Two Prospective Jurors for Cause 
Defendant asserts that the trial court excused two 
prospective jurors for cause in violation of the constitutional 
standards set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 
(Witherspoon) and Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 
(Witt).  We find substantial evidence supporting the excusals 
and uphold the trial court’s rulings.   
1.  Governing principles  
Under state and federal constitutional principles, a 
criminal defendant has the right to be tried by an impartial jury.  
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.)  With 
regard to jury selection in a capital case, decisions by this court 
and the United States Supreme Court have made clear that 
prospective jurors’ personal opposition to the death penalty is 
not a sufficient basis on which to remove them from jury service 
in a capital case, “ ‘so long as they clearly state that they are 
willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to 
the rule of law.’ ”  (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446, 
quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176; accord, 
People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 863.)  Excusal for 
cause is permissible, however, when the prospective juror’s 
beliefs regarding the death penalty “would ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a 
juror in accordance with [the court’s] instructions and [the 
juror’s] oath.’ ”  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, quoting Adams 
v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 (Adams); see also People v. Ghent 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [adopting the Witt standard].) 
We review a trial court’s excusal of a prospective juror for 
cause to determine “ ‘if it is fairly supported by the record.’ ”  
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
(People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 462, quoting People v. 
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 727.)  “ ‘In many cases, a 
prospective juror’s responses to questions on voir dire will be 
halting, equivocal, or even conflicting.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting People 
v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1094.)  In such cases, “the trial 
court’s findings as to the prospective juror’s state of mind are 
binding on appellate courts if supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 10, citing 
People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779; see also Utrecht v. 
Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [deference to the trial court’s ruling 
on a challenge for cause is appropriate because that ruling is 
based in part on the court’s ability to assess the prospective 
juror’s demeanor].)   
2.  Jury selection process  
The trial court began the jury selection process by 
providing several groups of prospective jurors a brief 
introduction to the case, including the nature of the charges, the 
structure of a capital trial, and general principles of law.  After 
the court excused some of the prospective jurors for hardship, it 
directed 
those 
who 
remained 
to 
complete 
a 
93-item 
questionnaire.  About one week later, after the court and the 
parties had reviewed the questionnaires, approximately 
70 prospective jurors assembled in the courtroom.  After the 
first 12 prospective jurors were seated in the jury box, the court 
described for the entire courtroom a juror’s duty in a capital 
case.  For example, the court explained that a juror “must accept 
and follow the law as I state it to you regardless of whether you 
agree with the law.” 
The court began voir dire questioning by asking each of 
the 12 individuals seated in the jury box whether he or she had 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
any reason to believe he or she could not be fair and impartial 
to both sides in the case.  After excusing some of the 12 
prospective jurors for cause on its own motion and replacing 
them, the court permitted counsel for both sides to question the 
prospective jurors about their questionnaire responses.  Neither 
party challenged any of the first group of prospective jurors for 
cause.  The parties were then given the opportunity to exercise 
peremptory challenges.  The prosecutor exercised one 
peremptory challenge, and another prospective juror was called 
to the jury box.  The court asked the newly seated prospective 
juror the same question it had asked the first group — whether 
she could think of any reason why she could not be a fair and 
impartial juror — and then permitted the parties to question the 
prospective juror, to challenge for cause, and to exercise 
peremptory challenges. 
Jury selection proceeded in this manner for three days 
until 12 jurors and two alternates were accepted by the parties 
and empaneled.  During this process, Prospective Juror A.A. 
was excused for cause at the prosecutor’s request, and 
Prospective Juror M.M. was excused for cause on the court’s own 
motion. 
3.  Discussion  
a.  Prospective Juror A.A.  
Prospective Juror A.A.’s questionnaire answers indicated 
that his opinion regarding the death penalty vacillated between 
strong and mild opposition.  For example, A.A. stated that his 
views on the death penalty were influenced by his Catholicism, 
and he characterized the death penalty as “unbiblical.”  When 
asked to choose where he stood on a numerical scale of one to 
10, with 10 being strongly in favor of having a death penalty and 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
one being strongly opposed, A.A. circled the number three and 
commented that he was “kind of against but [not] sure what 
[I’m] gonna do.”  But he also answered “Yes” to the question 
whether he had strong feelings on the use of capital punishment, 
and included a comment that he was “against [the] death 
penalty.”  When asked what purpose, if any, he believed was 
served by the death penalty, he answered, “None.” 
A.A.’s questionnaire answers also provided conflicting 
responses to questions regarding his ability to serve as a juror.  
When asked whether his religious or moral views would make it 
difficult for him to be a fair juror in a death penalty case, he 
checked “Yes.”  He also checked “Yes” when asked whether his 
feelings against the death penalty were so strong that he would 
always vote against it.  At the same time, however, A.A. marked 
“Yes” when asked whether he believed he could be open minded 
about the penalty and whether he was willing to weigh and 
consider all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence before 
deciding the appropriate punishment. 
When A.A. was called to sit in the jury box, the court asked 
him, “Do you believe you can be a fair and impartial juror to both 
sides in the case?”  A.A. responded that he was “pretty sure” he 
“could be fair in the first phase.  But the second phase — you 
know, I kind of don’t believe in the death penalty.”  During 
questioning by the prosecutor, A.A. elaborated on some of his 
questionnaire answers.  He explained, for example, that he was 
against the death penalty but that “inside this court, you know, 
I will follow the instruction, you know,” and, “I think I can follow 
it, yeah.”  When asked about his comment that he would always 
vote against the death penalty, he stated, “I think I could — you 
know, I could — as I said, I could follow the instruction, you 
know.  I would — I will try, you know, to be fair, you know, and 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
follow the judge[’s] instructions.  That’s all I can do, you know.”  
And when asked if he could actually sign a verdict form stating 
defendant should be put to death, A.A. responded that after 
considering other jurors’ views, “probably I could — I could do 
that, yes” and, “Yes, I could sign.”  The prosecutor ended his 
questioning by asking A.A., “If you have a choice between life in 
prison and the death penalty as the two punishments, would you 
always pick life in prison?”  A.A. replied, “Well, if I have a choice, 
you know, I would always pick life in prison.” 
The prosecutor challenged A.A. for cause, and the trial 
court granted the challenge.  Defense counsel objected, arguing 
that A.A. stated repeatedly that he could consider death as well 
as life without the possibility of parole.  The court explained that 
A.A. indicated on his questionnaire and during questioning that, 
if given the choice, he would always choose life without the 
possibility of parole over the death penalty.  In the court’s view, 
that answer, in combination with A.A.’s equivocal responses to 
the prosecutor’s questions and his deeply held religious 
convictions, rendered A.A. unable to consider imposition of the 
death penalty “as any possibility.”  Defense counsel offered a 
different interpretation of A.A.’s statement, understanding A.A. 
to have meant that he would choose life without the possibility 
of parole if he had a choice, but that A.A. recognized that “he 
didn’t have a choice.  He had to follow [the court’s] instructions.”  
The court rejected that interpretation of A.A.’s response, 
observing that the jurors would, in fact, have a choice:  “The 
Court is not going to instruct the [jurors] they must vote for 
death or must vote for life without the possibility of parole.” 
While a prospective juror may not be excused for cause 
based on “general objections” or “conscientious or religious 
scruples” against the death penalty (Witherspoon, supra, 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
391 U.S. at p. 522), excusal is proper when a prospective juror 
cannot “consider and decide the facts impartially and 
conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court” (Adams, 
supra, 448 U.S. at p. 45).  When a prospective juror’s views 
“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath” the 
juror may be excused for cause.  (Ibid.) 
The record supports the trial court’s determination that 
A.A.’s responses reflected a substantial impairment in his 
ability to perform his duties as a juror.  His juror questionnaire 
responses revealed conflicting views on his ability to impose the 
death penalty.  Although he stated that he was willing to 
consider all aggravating and mitigating evidence before 
deciding the appropriate punishment, he also stated that his 
feelings against the death penalty were so strong that he would 
always vote against it.  During questioning by the court, A.A. 
stated he was “pretty sure” he could be “fair” during the guilt 
phase, “[b]ut the second phase — you know, I kind of don’t 
believe in the death penalty.”  This response suggests that A.A. 
doubted his ability to be fair during the penalty phase; he felt he 
could be fair during the guilt phase but during the penalty phase 
his opposition to the death penalty could prevent him from being 
fair.  An inability to be “fair” during the penalty phase would 
substantially impair the performance of A.A.’s duties as a juror.  
(See Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 45.)  This conclusion is further 
supported by A.A.’s cautious responses during additional 
questioning:  “I think I can follow [instructions],” “I think I could 
[vote for the death penalty],” “I will try, you know, to be fair,” 
“probably I could [sign a death penalty verdict form].” 
Defendant acknowledges that deference to a trial court’s 
determinations is owed when a prospective juror’s responses are 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
conflicting or equivocal.  He asserts, however, that deference is 
not appropriate here because A.A. did not exhibit ambivalence 
or confusion, but instead explicitly stated he would set aside his 
personal beliefs and follow the court’s instructions.  Defendant 
further asserts that A.A.’s responses indicated he distinguished 
between his personal views against the death penalty and his 
willingness to follow the court’s instructions.   
The record shows, however, that A.A.’s responses were 
conflicting and equivocal.  On the one hand, he stated that he 
believed he could be open minded about the appropriate penalty, 
that he would try to be fair and follow the judge’s instructions, 
and that he was willing to consider all of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence.  On the other hand, he stated that he 
believed the death penalty was “unbiblical,” that it served no 
purpose, and that his moral feelings against the death penalty 
were so strong that he would always vote against it.  Any 
responses suggesting A.A. would follow the court’s instructions 
notwithstanding his opposition to the death penalty were 
contradicted when he indicated, several times, that he would 
always choose life without parole over the death penalty when 
given a choice between the two. 
Given these conflicting statements, we defer to the trial 
court’s determination regarding A.A.’s state of mind (see People 
v. Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10), and conclude the record 
supports the trial court’s ruling.  The trial court was able to hear 
A.A.’s responses to the prosecutor’s questions and observe 
firsthand his demeanor and tone.  The trial court did not err in 
concluding that A.A.’s assurances that he could follow the 
court’s instructions notwithstanding his personal beliefs were 
undermined by his conflicting responses, particularly his 
statement that, if given a choice, he would always vote for life 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
without the possibility of parole.  Although defense counsel 
understood A.A. to have been speaking abstractly, the court was 
entitled to accept A.A.’s comment at face value particularly 
given, as the trial court noted, that A.A. would have a choice 
about whether to impose the death penalty or life without the 
possibility of parole.  The court’s assessment of A.A.’s conflicting 
responses and its observation of A.A.’s demeanor and tone “could 
give rise to a definite impression that [A.A.’s] views on the death 
penalty would substantially impair the performance of his 
duties.”  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 
1007.)  We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in 
excusing A.A. for cause.   
b.  Prospective Juror M.M.  
Prospective Juror M.M. indicated in her questionnaire 
that she previously was opposed to capital punishment but that 
when she completed her questionnaire she believed that life in 
prison might be worse than death.  When asked to pick a 
number from one to 10, with the number 10 being strongly in 
favor of having a death penalty and the number one being 
strongly opposed, M.M. circled the number five, commenting 
that the punishment “doesn’t really matter because, if convicted, 
the defendant’s life is over anyway.”  She checked “No” when 
asked whether she had strong feelings on the subject of the use 
of capital punishment.  She checked “Yes” when asked whether 
she believed she could be open minded about the penalty 
decision and would consider all of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence before making that decision. 
M.M.’s questionnaire responses suggested some confusion 
regarding the meaning of special circumstance murder.  
Specifically, when asked how she felt regarding the death 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
penalty as punishment for a murder with a special 
circumstance, M.M. wrote that it “depend[ed] on the special 
circumstance, if someone can be treated or helped with their 
‘special circumstance’ then I would not vote for the death 
penalty.” 
During voir dire, the court asked M.M. whether she could 
think of any reason why she could not be a fair and impartial 
juror in the case.  M.M. responded that she believed she could 
be fair during the guilt phase, “but when it came to penalty, I’ve 
been thinking about it for the last week and I know that I can’t 
put someone to death.”  The court probed further, asking, “So 
you’re saying that regardless of the evidence and regardless of 
the weighing in aggravation and mitigation in the penalty 
phase, because of certain principles you hold, you could never 
impose the death penalty.  Is that what you’re saying?”  M.M. 
replied, “That’s what I’m saying, yes.”  The court then excused 
M.M. for cause on its own motion, finding that she could not be 
a fair and impartial juror to both sides in the penalty phase of 
trial.6 
The record fairly supports the court’s finding that M.M.’s 
views on the death penalty would impair the performance of her 
duties as a juror.  M.M. indicated in her questionnaire that she 
was neutral on the subject of capital punishment.  During voir 
dire questioning, however, she stated that her views had 
 
6  
Defense counsel did not object to M.M.’s excusal.  
Defendant’s claim is not forfeited, however, because the trial 
occurred before our decision in People v. McKinnon (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 610 at page 636, holding that counsel would 
prospectively be required to make a timely objection to preserve 
a Witt issue for appeal.  (See also People v. Buenrostro (2018) 
6 Cal.5th 367, 413.)   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
changed and that she knew she could not vote for death.  In 
response to the court’s subsequent question, she confirmed that 
she could never vote for death, regardless of the evidence and 
the aggravating and mitigating factors.  M.M.’s responses 
indicating she would be unable to impose death even in an 
appropriate case, when coupled with the court’s firsthand 
observations of M.M.’s demeanor and tone, “could give rise to a 
definite impression that [M.M.’s] views on the death penalty 
would substantially impair the performance of [her] duties.”  
(People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1007.)   
Defendant asserts the court’s questions to M.M. did not 
amount to an adequate and effective inquiry.  He emphasizes 
that the court never asked M.M. directly whether her opposition 
to the death penalty meant she was not willing or able to set 
aside her views and to follow the court’s instructions to 
determine the appropriate punishment.  And he asserts that 
additional questioning was especially important because it was 
apparent from M.M.’s responses to the juror questionnaire that 
she did not understand the meaning of aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 
Before excusing a juror for cause, “ ‘the court must have 
sufficient information regarding the prospective juror’s state of 
mind to permit a reliable determination’ ” concerning whether 
the juror’s views on capital punishment would impair his or her 
performance as a juror in a capital case.  (People v. Leon (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 569, 592, italics omitted (Leon), quoting People v. 
Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445.)  To ensure that its ruling 
excusing a prospective juror for cause is consistent with the 
constitutional standard, the court must make “ ‘a conscientious 
attempt to determine a prospective juror’s views . . . .’ ”  (Leon, 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 592, quoting People v. Wilson, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 779.)   
In Leon, three prospective jurors stated in their juror 
questionnaires that they were opposed to the death penalty but 
could nonetheless set aside their personal feelings and follow the 
law.  (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 590–591.)  During voir dire, 
the trial court asked those jurors questions related only to 
whether they were so opposed to the death penalty that they 
would automatically vote for life without the possibility of 
parole, but not whether they could set aside their personal 
feelings.  (Id. at p. 591.)  The court then excused those jurors for 
cause.  (Ibid.)  We held the court’s approach was problematic 
because when confronted with the jurors’ conflicting statements, 
“the court did not inquire about the jurors’ willingness to set 
aside their views and follow the law . . . .”  (Id. at p. 593.) 
The present case is distinguishable from Leon given 
M.M.’s clear and unambiguous statements during voir dire 
regarding her inability to impose the death penalty.  Unlike the 
prospective jurors in Leon, who stated affirmatively that they 
could set aside their personal views, M.M. firmly and directly 
stated that her views on the death penalty had changed between 
when she completed the juror questionnaire (when she stated 
she was neutral on the subject of capital punishment) and when 
she was questioned on voir dire (when she stated that she could 
never put someone to death).  The court presumably assessed 
those answers in light of M.M.’s tone and demeanor.  Although 
M.M. indicated on her questionnaire that she did not have 
strong views regarding the death penalty and that she could 
follow the court’s instructions, her statements during voir dire 
effectively repudiated her questionnaire responses.  And her 
statements 
during 
voir 
dire 
were 
unequivocal 
and 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
unambiguous.  She stated, “I know that I can’t put someone to 
death.”  The court immediately summarized and clarified her 
beliefs:  “So you’re saying that regardless of the evidence and 
regardless of the weighing in aggravation and mitigation in the 
penalty phase, because of certain principles you hold, you could 
never impose the death penalty.  Is that what you’re saying?”  
And M.M. replied, “That’s what I’m saying, yes.” 
These responses were clear and unambiguous statements 
from which the trial court could properly conclude that M.M. 
would not be able to set aside her beliefs and follow the court’s 
instructions.  (See People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 446 
[upholding removal of juror during trial, finding juror’s 
statement that, upon reflection, he “ ‘could not ever’ ” impose 
death penalty “ ‘no matter what the aggravating circumstance 
is and no matter what the mitigating circumstance evidence 
is,’ ” was a “clear indication that he would not be able to perform 
his duty of choosing whether a death sentence was 
appropriate”]; People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 429–430 
[upholding removal of prospective juror when oral questioning 
revealed the prospective juror’s views would substantially 
impair her ability to return a death sentence, despite juror’s 
questionnaire responses expressing a willingness to consider the 
death penalty].)  Defense counsel’s failure to object to M.M.’s 
removal did not forfeit the claim on appeal, as we have noted, 
but it does suggest that counsel “ ‘concurred in the assessment 
that the juror was excusable.’ ”  (People v. Souza (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 90, 127, quoting People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
704, 735.)  
Defendant further asserts that additional inquiry was 
required by the trial court because it was apparent from M.M.’s 
responses to the juror questionnaire that she did not understand 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
the meaning of aggravating and mitigating factors.  We 
disagree.  Although M.M.’s questionnaire response suggested 
she did not understand what was meant by a murder “with a 
special circumstance” when she completed the questionnaire, it 
does not shed light on her understanding of aggravating and 
mitigating factors at the time she told the court that regardless 
of such factors she could never impose the death penalty.  As 
this court has observed, “When first called to the capital venire, 
prospective jurors frequently know little about death penalty 
law and procedure and have reflected little on their own 
attitudes.”  (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1053.)  We 
have also recognized, however, that the voir dire process, when 
conducted in the presence of the entire venire, can serve to 
educate 
a 
prospective 
juror 
and 
help 
clear 
up 
misunderstandings regarding his or her duty as a juror in a 
death penalty case.  (Ibid.)   
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, nothing in the record 
suggests that M.M., after having listened to the voir dire 
questioning of the other prospective jurors, would have 
misunderstood the meaning of aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  When examining prospective jurors before M.M. was 
called into the jury box on the second full day of jury selection, 
the prosecutor and defense counsel repeatedly explained what 
was meant by aggravating and mitigating factors and the 
process by which those factors were weighed during the penalty 
determination.  There is no indication, then, that M.M.’s clear 
statement that she could not impose the death penalty was the 
result of confusion or misunderstanding.  To the contrary, the 
record supports the trial court’s determination that M.M.’s 
views regarding the death penalty would impair her ability to 
perform her duty as a juror in the case. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Admission of Recording of Answering Machine 
Message from Burger 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred prejudicially 
when it admitted the recording of a message that Burger left on 
the telephone answering machine of her dance class partner on 
the evening before Burger’s death.  Although the relevance of 
the message was not particularly strong and the evidence 
arguably posed some risk of undue prejudice, any error in its 
admission is harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of 
defendant’s guilt.  
1.  Background 
In a trial brief submitted prior to jury selection, the 
prosecution asked the court to permit admission of a recording 
of a message that Burger had left for her dance class partner, 
Larry Rodriguez.  In the message, left the evening before her 
death, Burger discussed plans for attending dance class the next 
day.  The message, which is less than 30 seconds long, was as 
follows:  “Hi Larry.  This is Cindy.  And it’s about 9:15 on 
Wednesday night.  Give me a call back if you can, uh, or at work 
tomorrow.  I’d like to meet a little early before class and go over 
the step from last week.  Um, I just hope I don’t get too lost 
tomorrow.  But anyway, I had a real good, uh, trip.  Look forward 
to seein’ ya, and give me a call when you get a chance.  Bye-bye.” 
The prosecutor argued that Burger’s message was 
admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that she 
planned to stay at home that night rather than to go out.  Such 
evidence, he argued, precluded any inference that Burger met 
defendant while she was out and invited him back to her home.  
The prosecutor also argued that the message would corroborate 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
Mooney’s anticipated testimony that defendant told her he 
entered Burger’s open garage intending to steal something. 
In a written response to the prosecutor’s trial brief, the 
defense opposed admission of the recording on the grounds that 
it was not relevant to any disputed issue, that the evidence did 
not satisfy the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule and 
was therefore inadmissible hearsay, and that the “voice from the 
grave” evidence was more prejudicial than probative.  Counsel 
also argued that the recording amounted to improper victim 
impact evidence because there was little doubt that Rodriguez 
would become emotional while testifying regarding the tape’s 
authenticity. 
At a hearing on the in limine motion, defense counsel 
again asserted the message was not relevant because whether 
Burger had stayed home was not an issue in dispute.  The 
prosecutor asserted that the prosecution had the burden of 
proving defendant’s intent on entering the house, no matter 
what the defense intended to dispute.  According to the 
prosecutor, the prosecution had “to show that this isn’t some 
pickup or date that went awry” and was therefore entitled to 
show Burger was planning to be home the evening she was 
killed.  The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that the 
message was admissible for both a hearsay and a nonhearsay 
purpose, and found that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed its prejudicial impact. 
The message was played for the jury three times.  First, 
during the prosecution’s opening statement at the guilt phase. 
Second, during the testimony of Rodriguez (the prosecution’s 
first witness in the guilt phase).  And, finally, during the 
prosecution’s closing at the penalty phase.  Defendant now 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
asserts the admission of the message during the guilt phase (but 
not during the penalty phase) was prejudicial error. 
2.  Discussion  
Defendant argues that the answering machine message 
was not relevant, constituted inadmissible hearsay, created an 
“aura of sympathy and pathos” that harmed defendant’s case, 
and should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial.  We 
conclude that, even assuming the trial court erred by refusing 
to exclude or limit the recording, any error was undoubtedly 
harmless under the standard articulated in either Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 36 (Chapman) (error is prejudicial 
unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not contribute to the verdict) or People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) (error is prejudicial if it is reasonably 
probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable 
result absent the error).   
There was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.  
Defendant admitted to Mooney that he raped and killed Burger, 
and he asked for Mooney’s help escaping from custody to avoid 
detection.  Mooney provided compelling testimony describing 
defendant’s detailed account of the crime.  She described 
defendant’s statements about gaining entry into Burger’s home 
through an open garage, raping Burger in her bed, strangling 
her to death, placing her body in a bathtub, pouring bleach into 
the bathtub, and starting a fire in her bedroom.  These are 
details Mooney could not have known about the crime absent 
defendant’s statements to her.  He gave Mooney Burger’s name 
and directed her to a newspaper article by providing the date of 
the incident.  This testimony was consistent with the crime 
scene and the assault on Burger.   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
Loprieato, defendant’s mother, confirmed that Mooney 
had told her about the confession and said she had no reason to 
doubt what Mooney had related to her.  Although Loprieato 
maintained that defendant never confessed to her personally, 
her surreptitiously recorded statements to Mooney stating she 
would lie to law enforcement about her knowledge would have 
drawn her credibility on that point into doubt.  And Loprieato’s 
testimony on that point was further undermined by Bice, who 
told the jury that Loprieato spoke with him about whether to be 
candid with law enforcement.  According to Bice, Loprieato 
admitted that defendant told Loprieato directly that he had 
killed a woman.   
Finally, DNA from sperm collected during Burger’s 
autopsy matched a DNA profile developed from defendant’s 
blood.7  The DNA evidence directly linked defendant to Burger’s 
death.  All of this evidence taken together establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same 
verdict absent any error regarding Burger’s message to 
Rodriguez. 
Defendant’s main assertion regarding prejudice is that the 
message 
tainted 
the 
jury’s 
determination 
regarding 
premeditation.  He contends the message “led the [jurors] to feel 
that they knew Burger” and “made it difficult for them to focus 
dispassionately on the elements of murder and accept the 
defense that Schultz’s perceptions were so altered by 
 
7  
As discussed below, although certain testimony regarding 
the DNA evidence may have been improperly admitted, the 
ultimate determination that the DNA profile developed from 
defendant’s blood matched the DNA from sperm found during 
Burger’s autopsy was properly admitted. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
methamphetamine that it was impossible for him to 
premeditate this crime or that the crime was not premeditated 
but simply a random, albeit terrible, act.”  There is no support 
for defendant’s position.  Defendant’s statements to Mooney — 
that he killed Burger because he was afraid she would be able 
to identify him and that he attempted to destroy any DNA 
evidence by lighting a fire on her bed and placing Burger’s body 
in a bathtub with bleach — amply support a finding of 
premeditation.  Further, the jury found true the felony-murder 
special-circumstance allegations that defendant murdered 
Burger during the commission of a rape and burglary.  
Defendant could be convicted of first degree murder regardless 
of the jury’s determination regarding premeditation.  (See 
People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 848.)  As 
defense counsel put it during closing argument, “in a lot of ways 
[premeditation] doesn’t really matter because what happened is 
a felony murder any way you slice it.”  Although the jury was 
exposed to a “voice from the grave,” any error in the court’s 
admission of the message did not prejudice defendant. 
B.  Admission of the Results of DNA Testing 
Defendant challenges the admission of expert testimony 
establishing that defendant’s DNA profile matched the DNA 
profile obtained from sperm recovered during Burger’s autopsy.  
He puts forward three reasons the testimony should have been 
excluded:  first, that Magee related testimonial hearsay in 
violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because Yates 
did not testify; second, that it was not admissible as a business 
record under Evidence Code section 1271; and third, that the 
trial court erred by failing to adequately evaluate the proposed 
testimony under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly).  We 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
conclude that any error in admitting this testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
1.  Background 
Prior to trial, the prosecution sought a ruling allowing a 
supervisor at Cellmark to testify regarding the procedures, 
results, and maintenance of the DNA testing records relevant to 
the case.  At a hearing, the court initially denied the motion, 
agreeing with defense counsel that to properly present the DNA 
evidence the prosecution was required to call the technicians 
who performed the DNA testing to testify regarding the actual 
procedures they employed.  On the prosecution’s motion for 
reconsideration, however, the court reversed its previous ruling 
and, over defense counsel’s objection, permitted the prosecution 
to call Wendy Magee, the Cellmark analyst who performed a 
DNA comparison in 2000 (comparing DNA profiles she created 
based on samples from defendant’s blood and from sperm found 
in Burger’s vagina) but who did not perform the DNA extraction 
in 1996 (extracting DNA from sperm found in Burger’s vagina). 
At trial, the jury heard the following testimony.  Dr. 
O’Halloran conducted Burger’s autopsy, discovered trauma to 
her genital area, swabbed and aspirated her vaginal canal, and 
observed sperm cells during a microscopic examination from one 
of the swabs.  Ventura County Sheriff’s Department crime lab 
assistant laboratory manager Michael Parigian testified that 
the lab received the vaginal swabs and vaginal aspirant (which 
he referred to as a “vaginal wash”).  Several years later, in 
March 1996, Parigian placed some of the vaginal wash into a 
microcentrifugued tube and sent it to Cellmark for the purpose 
of extracting DNA.  Parigian also testified that Cellmark 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
returned the vaginal wash to the crime lab with a report 
indicating that DNA had been extracted. 
Over a continuing defense objection, the prosecution called 
Magee to testify.  Magee testified that in 1996 Cellmark 
employee Paula Yates performed a differential extraction to 
isolate DNA from the sperm and nonsperm portions of the 
vaginal wash.  That procedure involved separating the 
nonsperm cells from the sperm cells and extracting DNA from 
both to be used for future testing.  According to Magee, Yates 
was trained and qualified to carry out a DNA extraction and the 
methods she used were accepted within the scientific 
community at the time of testing and at the time of trial. 
Magee further explained that Yates recorded her lab notes 
regarding the extraction procedure, and that any later evidence 
could be compared with the DNA obtained during the extraction 
that Yates had performed.  Magee confirmed that at the time of 
the DNA extraction in 1996 Cellmark had no blood or tissue 
sample from defendant with which to conduct a DNA 
comparison. 
In November 2000, a blood sample was obtained from 
defendant and sent to Cellmark.  Magee explained to the jury 
that she performed a DNA analysis of the blood sample.  She 
compared that analysis to the DNA profiles she obtained from 
testing the sperm and nonsperm portions of the vaginal wash.  
Her testing, using short tandem repeat (STR) amplification kits, 
showed that the DNA profile she obtained from the nonsperm 
cells did not match the DNA profile obtained from defendant’s 
blood sample.  The DNA profile she obtained from the sperm 
cells, however, did match the DNA profile obtained from 
defendant’s blood sample.   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
2.  Discussion 
Defendant asserts multiple errors occurred based on 
Magee’s purported testimony that she compared the DNA 
profile she created from defendant’s blood sample with a DNA 
profile Yates created from sperm cells recovered during Burger’s 
autopsy in 1996.  The factual premise of these claims is that 
Magee’s conclusions relied on a DNA profile that Yates had 
created, and thus necessarily communicated Yates’s findings to 
the jury.  Specifically, defendant asserts that Magee’s testimony 
regarding the DNA profile Yates created and the “process 
involved to secure” that DNA profile constituted testimonial 
hearsay admitted in violation of defendant’s confrontation 
clause rights under Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50.  
Defendant further asserts the trial court abused its discretion 
in allowing Magee’s testimony under the business records 
exception to the Evidence Code because Yates used her personal 
conclusions to develop the DNA profile and because Yates’s 
records were created for use as evidence in a criminal trial.  
Finally, defendant asserts the trial court was required to 
conduct a Kelly hearing to test the reliability of the DNA profile 
Yates created and the methods Yates used to develop that 
profile. 
The record belies the factual basis for defendant’s claims.  
It is apparent from the record that Magee did not rely on any 
DNA profile created by Yates.  Rather, Magee’s testimony 
indicates that Magee herself created a DNA profile using DNA 
extracted from sperm cells, that Magee herself created a DNA 
profile based on defendant’s blood sample, and that Magee 
herself compared the two DNA profiles.  Thus, to the extent 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
defendant’s claims hinge on the premise that Magee relied on a 
DNA profile that Yates created, they necessarily fail.8   
To be sure, some portions of the record suggest that Yates 
may have created a DNA profile in 1996.  At one point during 
her 
testimony, 
Magee 
agreed 
with 
the 
prosecution’s 
characterization that Yates both performed a DNA extraction 
and created a DNA profile from the extracted DNA.9  And in 
describing the proffered testimony before trial, the prosecution 
stated that Cellmark had produced a DNA profile in 1996 based 
on the vaginal wash.  But other portions of the record make clear 
that, even assuming Yates created a DNA profile, Magee relied 
on — and confined her testimony to — DNA profiles that she 
created herself.  Magee’s testimony describing Yates’s actions 
 
8  
For this reason, the facts here are readily distinguishable 
from Williams.  There, a nontestifying expert created a DNA 
profile based on semen found on vaginal swabs, and a testifying 
expert relied on this DNA profile to conclude that it matched the 
defendant’s DNA profile.  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 60 
(plur. opn.).)  In this case, as we have observed, Magee created 
both the DNA profile from the sperm and the DNA profile from 
defendant’s blood, she compared the two profiles herself, and 
she testified at trial regarding her actions and her conclusion 
that the DNA profiles matched.  Magee did not rely on any DNA 
profile created by a nontestifying expert.  We therefore need not 
delve further into the fractured opinion in Williams or the 
“considerable flux” surrounding the high court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence in this area.  (People v. Bryant, 
Smith, and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 (Bryant); see also 
People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 628 (conc. opn. of Chin, 
J.).)    
9  
That testimony was as follows:  “[The People]:  And do your 
records show that the vaginal wash pellet was separated into a 
sperm and nonsperm fraction or portion and DNA was extracted 
from each and a DNA profile was obtained for each?  [¶]  
[Magee]:  Yes.”   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
related only to DNA extraction, not to profile creation.  And 
Magee testified that she “tested the extracts from 1996” to 
compare with the DNA profile from defendant’s blood sample.  
There is no indication, then, that Magee compared a DNA profile 
she created with a DNA profile Yates created.   
Defendant also broadly asserts that evidence of the DNA 
extraction Yates conducted could be admitted only through 
testimony from Yates herself, rather than through testimony 
from Magee.  At oral argument before this court, counsel further 
asserted that Magee was not qualified to testify regarding the 
DNA extraction carried out by Yates because there was no 
ability for defendant to cross-examine Magee regarding the 
DNA extraction in any meaningful way.  And without Yates’s 
DNA 
extraction, 
defendant 
asserts, 
Magee’s 
testimony 
regarding her creation and comparison of the DNA profiles could 
not be admitted. 
Even assuming the trial court erred under the Sixth 
Amendment, Evidence Code section 1271, or Kelly by admitting 
Magee’s testimony describing the DNA extraction performed by 
Yates any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See 
Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 395 [confrontation clause 
violations are subject to federal harmless error analysis under 
Chapman]; People v. Ayers (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 988, 996 
[applying Watson standard to evaluate prejudice when evidence 
is improperly admitted as a business record under Evid. Code, 
§ 1271]; People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 93 [applying the 
Watson standard for evaluating prejudice when evidence is 
improperly admitted under Kelly].) 
To determine prejudice, we examine the record as though 
Magee’s testimony regarding the actions carried out by Yates 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
had not been admitted.  But this analysis does not require us to 
set aside Magee’s testimony in its entirety.  As counsel 
acknowledged at oral argument, Magee was qualified to testify 
about the procedures she conducted herself, including the 
creation of the DNA profiles.  (See People v. Capistrano (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 830, 872 [holding any error in allowing a testifying 
analyst to describe results obtained by a nontestifying analyst 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because the 
testifying analyst “personally” performed the STR test 
implicating the defendant].)   
Nor does setting aside the portion of Magee’s testimony 
related to the DNA extraction fatally undermine the chain of 
custody or foundation supporting Magee’s testimony regarding 
the DNA 
profiles. 
 
The 
jury heard 
testimony 
from 
Dr. O’Halloran that he recovered sperm cells after swabbing and 
aspirating Burger’s vaginal canal.  The swabs and aspirant were 
sent to the county crime lab, and Parigian then sent the vaginal 
wash sample to Cellmark.  Parigian also testified that he 
received the evidence back from Cellmark with a report 
indicating that DNA had been extracted from the sample.10  
Parigian further testified that in 2000 he again sent Cellmark 
the vaginal wash sample along with a blood sample collected 
from defendant.  Magee related to the jury that she created a 
DNA profile from defendant’s blood sample, that she “tested the 
extracts from 1996,” and compared the resulting profiles herself.  
This narrative sufficiently established that Magee created a 
DNA profile based on sperm recovered from Burger’s autopsy, 
and supported Magee’s ultimate conclusion that the DNA profile 
 
10  
Defendant does not challenge the admission of Parigian’s 
testimony describing the Cellmark report. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
from defendant’s blood sample matched the DNA profile from 
that sperm. 
There is no indication that the chain of custody here was 
compromised.  The trial court stated it was “not particularly 
worried about” any chain of custody related to the DNA 
evidence, and defendant does not raise any claim of a chain of 
custody error.  The evidence connecting the DNA evidence 
recovered from Burger’s autopsy to the DNA profile Magee 
created “raise[s] no serious questions of tampering.”  (See People 
v. Caitlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 134.)  In any event, any 
presumed defect in the chain of custody would not have rendered 
Magee’s testimony entirely inadmissible but would have gone to 
the weight of her testimony.  (See People v. Lucas (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 153, 285 [“the trial court decides the admissibility of 
physical evidence based on challenges to the chain of custody, 
and, once admitted, any minor defects in the chain of custody go 
to its weight”].)   
We find that any error in admitting Magee’s testimony 
regarding the actions Yates took is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  As we discussed above, there was 
overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt presented during 
trial.  Magee’s conclusion that defendant’s DNA matched the 
DNA from sperm found during Burger’s autopsy provided strong 
support for the prosecution’s case.  The presence of defendant’s 
sperm also corroborated defendant’s asserted motive for killing 
Burger (to prevent her from identifying him as her rapist).  Even 
without being able to point to the DNA extraction process, 
Magee’s testimony established for the jury that DNA recovered 
from sperm found in Burger’s body matched defendant’s DNA 
profile.   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
53 
The DNA evidence was buttressed, too, by testimony from 
Mooney, Loprieato, and Bice.  Mooney provided compelling 
testimony describing defendant’s detailed confession, and her 
testimony was consistent with the crime scene and the assault 
on Burger.  Mooney’s testimony was corroborated by Loprieato, 
and further supported by testimony from Bice.  All of this 
evidence taken together establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury would have reached the same verdict absent 
Magee’s testimony describing the DNA extraction process 
conducted by Yates. 
Defendant maintains that the trial court’s decision to 
allow Magee to testify as she did “forced defense counsel to 
abandon an entire line of defense and to make concessions 
during the guilt phase that would not have been made had he 
had the opportunity to attack Yates’s DNA profile.”  He asserts 
that counsel would not have conceded defendant’s guilt and 
would have attacked Mooney’s credibility regarding defendant’s 
alleged confession because it was “easily impeached.”  He alleges 
that Mooney had previously and unsuccessfully tried to 
implicate defendant in the death of a different woman, Jennifer 
Vernals, and that Mooney’s credibility would have been 
seriously undermined had the jury known she made more than 
one accusation that defendant had killed a woman.  He also 
attacks Mooney’s account of defendant’s confession as being 
based on her “weird feelings,” and he asserts that the details of 
the crime came from the newspaper article Mooney read and not 
from any confession from defendant. 
We are not persuaded.  To the extent that defendant’s 
prejudice arguments are premised on the notion that Magee 
relied on a DNA profile Yates created, we have already rejected 
them.  To the extent defendant’s assertions are based on 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
prejudice stemming from the introduction of Yates’s actions by 
way of Magee’s testimony, they likewise fail.   
Defendant focuses in part on how counsel allegedly would 
have revealed serious flaws in Yates’s report if she had testified.  
But he provides no support for this assertion and we have found 
none in the record.  Defendant’s attacks on Mooney’s credibility 
are also unpersuasive.  Mooney’s suspicion that defendant was 
involved in Vernals’s death was raised during the preliminary 
hearing.  Mooney testified at the preliminary hearing that when 
she first told Loprieato about defendant’s plan to escape from 
the fire camp because of his concerns about a DNA test, 
Loprieato produced a clipping of a newspaper article discussing 
Vernals’s death and said, “This is what I think he did.”  
Although it’s not clear from the record what was in the 
newspaper article, Mooney testified that she (Mooney) was 
named in the article (although defendant was not) and that the 
article, “kind of said that I might have [implicated defendant] 
on that Jennifer Vernals case.  And I think [Loprieato] was going 
to confront me with him about that.” 
Mooney also testified at the preliminary hearing that 
during the visit when defendant asked her and Loprieato for 
help escaping, she and Loprieato confronted defendant about his 
story that he had participated in a burglary and was cut with a 
knife.  Neither believed the story because “we both thought that 
he had committed the Jennifer Vernals murder.”  Mooney stated 
that during the same visit when Loprieato went to the bathroom 
and left Mooney alone with defendant, Mooney asked defendant 
whether he killed Vernals.  He said he did not.  Mooney then 
asked defendant if he had killed someone, and he said yes and 
went on to tell Mooney about assaulting and killing Burger. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
Bringing this issue to the attention of the jury would not 
have undermined Mooney’s credibility, as defendant suggests.  
On the contrary, it would likely have been highly prejudicial to 
defendant for defense counsel to alert the jury that defendant’s 
girlfriend (and perhaps also his mother) believed he had killed 
another woman besides Burger.  Indeed, defense counsel filed a 
motion in limine to exclude any references to Vernals’s death at 
trial.  The prosecution did not object, and the court granted the 
motion and directed the prosecution to instruct the witnesses 
not to mention Vernals during trial. 
Nor is there any indication in the record that the details 
of the crime that Mooney claimed defendant had described came 
from Mooney herself or the newspaper article describing 
Burger’s death.11  Further, the testimony from Loprieato and 
Bice supported Mooney’s credibility, and the jury was able to 
make its own determination as to each witness’s credibility 
based on his or her testimony and demeanor.  In short, we 
conclude that any error in the portion of Magee’s testimony 
relating the DNA extraction process conducted by Yates was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Defendant’s Correspondence with a White 
Supremacist Gang Leader 
Defendant raises two related claims concerning penalty 
phase rebuttal evidence informing the jury that while awaiting 
trial in the present matter defendant exchanged letters with 
Justin Merriman, a prison inmate who had once been the leader 
 
11  
The newspaper article is not in the record before us. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
of a white supremacist gang.12  First, he asserts that the 
rebuttal evidence violated due process as evidence of “guilt by 
association,” infringed his constitutional right to freedom of 
association, was improper hearsay, and was irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial.  Second, defendant argues that the trial 
court erred by not granting a mistrial after, contrary to the 
court’s earlier ruling limiting the scope of the testimony 
regarding the letters, the prosecutor inquired into the contents 
of one of the letters.  As we explain below, neither claim requires 
reversal of the death judgment. 
1.  Admission of evidence regarding the 
correspondence  
a.  Background 
i.  Prosecution’s cross-examination of Casas 
As part of its penalty phase case in mitigation, the defense 
called penology expert Anthony Casas, who expressed the view 
that defendant would conduct himself in an obedient and 
cooperative manner if sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  (See ante, pt. I.B.2.iii.)  On cross-
examination, the prosecutor elicited from Casas that Casas 
would predict a negative adjustment to prison for someone who 
had joined a prison gang such as a white supremacist gang.  
Casas explained that such gangs are dangerous “because when 
you have a situation like that, if the individual is a validated 
member of one of those gangs and gets an order to do something, 
like kill an officer or kill an inmate, and he doesn’t do it, then 
he’s signed his own death warrant because the punishment for 
 
12  
We upheld Merriman’s first degree murder conviction on 
direct appeal in 2014.  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1.)   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
failing to carry out a contract with these organizations, the 
organized prison gangs, is death usually.” 
The prosecutor then showed Casas photographs of 
defendant’s tattoos that said “white” and “pride,” and asked 
whether this indicated that defendant might join a white 
supremacist gang.  Casas replied, “Not at all.”  The prosecutor 
asked whether Casas’s answer would change if he knew 
defendant had been corresponding with a former leader of a 
Ventura County-based white supremacist gang called the 
Skinhead Dogs.  Defense counsel promptly objected on the 
ground of undue prejudice and lack of foundation, pointing out 
at a sidebar conference that there was no evidence defendant 
was in a gang.  The court sustained the objection for lack of 
foundation.  But the court allowed the prosecutor to attempt to 
lay a foundation by probing Casas’s experience regarding the 
topic of prison gang membership. 
When questioning resumed, the prosecutor elicited from 
Casas that a person who holds white supremacist beliefs might 
be likely to join a white supremacist gang.  But Casas strongly 
disagreed with the prosecutor’s suggestion that a person with 
“white pride” tattoos would be more likely to join a white 
supremacist gang than a person without such tattoos.  Nor did 
Casas believe that any correspondence between defendant and 
a one-time gang leader in which defendant referred to the gang 
leader as “homey” and signed his letter “with respect” meant 
that defendant was more likely to join a gang than someone not 
engaged in such correspondence.  Casas reiterated that an 
exchange of letters in which an individual referred to the 
recipient white supremacist gang member as “homey” or 
“brother” would not be enough to conclude that the letter writer 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
was more likely to join a gang.  As Casas phrased it, “it could or 
it couldn’t.” 
ii.  Prosecution’s rebuttal  
One of the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses was District 
Attorney Investigator Dennis Fitzgerald.  Anticipating that the 
prosecution would seek to introduce the correspondence 
between defendant and Merriman through Fitzgerald’s 
testimony, the defense sought an offer of proof outside the jury’s 
presence.  In relevant part, the prosecutor indicated that 
Fitzgerald would testify based on defendant’s booking record 
that defendant likely obtained his “white pride” tattoos in 
prison.  Fitzgerald, who was the investigator in Merriman’s 
capital case, would also testify that he had reviewed the two 
letters Merriman wrote to defendant and the one letter 
defendant wrote back to Merriman.  Fitzgerald would testify 
that defendant and Merriman addressed each other as “homey” 
and “brother” and that defendant asked Merriman to “stay in 
touch.”  Fitzgerald would also inform the jury that Merriman 
was a member of a skinhead gang that advances the doctrine of 
white supremacy.  After having laid that foundation, the 
prosecutor explained, he intended to introduce the letters. 
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the three 
letters on the grounds that they constituted inadmissible 
hearsay, were irrelevant to the argument that defendant was 
likely to join a prison gang, were highly prejudicial, and would 
violate defendant’s right to a fair trial if introduced.  As counsel 
pointed out, the letters disparaged counsel and the court system 
by, for example, referring to “kangaroo courts” and unfair juries.  
Notably, counsel observed, nothing in the letters referred to 
gangs. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
The court ruled that the contents of the letters were not 
admissible but that the fact of the correspondence was proper 
rebuttal to the defense expert’s opinion that defendant would 
adapt well to life in prison.  The court also indicated it would 
allow the prosecutor to elicit from Fitzgerald how defendant and 
Merriman addressed each other, how they signed their letters, 
and whether Merriman was a gang member.  Defense counsel 
renewed his objection to this limited line of questioning, but 
indicated he understood the court’s ruling. 
Fitzgerald then testified in front of the jury that he had 
reviewed defendant’s booking records and concluded that he had 
received his “white pride” tattoo sometime while in custody after 
1996.  Fitzgerald also testified that he was the lead investigator 
in a criminal case involving Merriman, who was then a leader of 
a white supremacist gang in Ventura County called the 
Skinhead Dogs.  Fitzgerald indicated that he was familiar with 
Merriman’s writings and that he had reviewed an exchange of 
letters between defendant and Merriman.  He testified that in 
the letter from defendant to Merriman, defendant twice referred 
to Merriman as “homey” and signed off with the phrase “Long 
respects, Michael J. Schultz.”  In one of the two letters 
Merriman wrote to defendant, Merriman referred to defendant 
as “brother” and signed it “with respect, Justin James 
Merriman.”  The salutation in a second letter from Merriman to 
defendant referred to defendant as “Big Mike” and later as 
“brother” and “homey,” and again ended with the phrase “With 
respect.” 
Fitzgerald did not state any opinion regarding defendant’s 
ability to adjust to life in prison.  On cross-examination, defense 
counsel elicited from Fitzgerald that he was aware of no 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
60 
evidence showing that defendant was ever a member of the 
Skinhead Dogs. 
iii.  Jury instructions and closing argument 
The jury was instructed by the trial court that it could not 
consider the letters and salutations as factors in aggravation:  
“Evidence received in the penalty phase of this trial regarding 
Mr. Schultz’s correspondence with another inmate and his 
tattoos may not be considered as a factor or factors in 
aggravation.” 
Toward the end of the prosecution’s closing argument at 
the penalty phase, the prosecutor discussed the defense 
evidence regarding defendant’s prospects for a positive 
adjustment to life in prison.  In the prosecutor’s view, evidence 
of defendant’s positive behavior while previously in custody was 
not a significant mitigating factor even if true.  He nonetheless 
argued to the jury that Casas’s testimony should not be credited.  
In the course of that brief argument, the prosecutor pointed out 
that Casas’s opinion was based in part on his belief that 
defendant would not join a prison gang.  Casas’s opinion was 
refuted, the prosecutor argued, by evidence that defendant 
received a “white pride” tattoo in prison and that he was in 
contact with a member of a white supremacist gang.  The 
prosecutor clarified that he was not suggesting the evidence of 
defendant’s correspondence with Merriman was a factor in 
aggravation, or that Merriman endorsed Burger’s rape and 
murder.  Rather, he asserted, the use of the terms “homey” and 
“brother” indicated a possibility that defendant would be 
interested in joining the gang, thereby undermining the defense 
argument that defendant would adapt well to life in prison. 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
b.  Discussion 
i.  Asserted First Amendment violation  
Defendant argues that, assuming the rebuttal evidence 
established that he shared Merriman’s white supremacist views 
and wanted to associate with Merriman and his gang, the 
admission of such evidence infringed his First Amendment 
rights to freedom of association and belief. 
As defendant acknowledges, he did not raise this First 
Amendment claim in the trial court, but objected only on 
relevance and prejudice grounds.  Citing People v. Partida 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th, 433–439 and People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
412, 441, defendant asserts that he has not forfeited the claim 
notwithstanding the lack of a specific objection because the 
arguments he now presents do not invoke facts or legal 
standards different from those the trial court was asked to 
apply.  Neither case is availing because the legal standards 
applicable to a claim under Evidence Code section 352 and a 
First Amendment claim are different.  Under Evidence Code 
section 352, a court determines whether evidence (including 
evidence of a defendant’s racist beliefs) is relevant and its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the 
probability of prejudice, undue consumption of time, confusing 
the issues, or misleading the jury.  (See People v. Young (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 905, 930–931 (Young).)  A First Amendment claim, on 
the other hand, asks a court to exclude evidence not only because 
it is irrelevant, but because it is irrelevant and therefore its only 
possible purpose is to invite the jury to convict the defendant 
based on protected speech or associational activity.  (See id. at 
p. 946.)   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
62 
In Young, this court held that a First Amendment claim 
nearly identical to the one raised here was forfeited when that 
defendant objected during the guilt phase of a capital trial to the 
admission of his racist tattoos and beliefs only on relevance and 
prejudice grounds.  (Young, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 931–932.)  
Here, too, the claim is forfeited.  Defendant’s general objections 
on relevance and prejudice grounds did not preserve the more 
specific First Amendment claim he now attempts to raise. 
ii.  Asserted due process claim 
Defendant asserts that the testimony regarding the fact of 
the correspondence between himself and Merriman and the 
salutations in their letters was improper rebuttal evidence 
because it was based on a “guilt by association” theory and thus 
violated due process.  To the extent this claim amounts to an 
assertion that the evidence was irrelevant or unduly prejudicial, 
we reject it below.  To the extent the claim is related to 
defendant’s First Amendment claim or raises a separate “guilt 
by association” due process claim, it was not raised in the trial 
court and is therefore forfeited.  (See Young, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
pp. 931–932; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 689.)  
iii.  Evidence Code section 352 
Defendant argues that the evidence regarding his 
correspondence with Merriman was more prejudicial than 
probative and should have been excluded under Evidence Code 
section 352.  We examine the trial court’s decision to determine 
whether the court “ ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.’ ”  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 
1060, 1124, quoting People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.)  
We are not persuaded the trial court erred. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
63 
The probative value of the evidence here related to the 
defense expert’s opinion that defendant would adjust well to life 
in prison.  In light of this testimony, the prosecution was entitled 
to explore the issue on cross-examination and rebuttal.  (See 
People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211, disapproved on 
another ground in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 
458–459; see also People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 878 
[“Evidence of future dangerousness may be introduced in 
rebuttal when the defendant himself has raised the issue of 
performance in prison and offered evidence that in a prison 
environment he would be law-abiding”]; People v. Coleman 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 150 [same].)  In exploring the issue during 
cross-examination, the prosecutor could properly ask the 
witness whether his opinion would change if he was aware that 
defendant was likely to join a white supremacist gang, and to 
suggest several grounds from which such a possibility could be 
inferred.  (See People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 479 
[“Having chosen to raise this subject, the defense could not 
reasonably insulate it from cross-examination”].)  During 
rebuttal, the prosecutor was likewise permitted to undermine 
the defense expert’s opinion by presenting evidence suggesting 
a likelihood of future gang membership.  This evidence was 
presented through the prosecution investigator’s testimony 
regarding defendant’s “white pride” tattoos, the fact of 
defendant’s correspondence with an incarcerated white 
supremacist gang leader, and the friendly salutations in 
defendant’s letter to Merriman. 
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the probative value of 
this evidence was not based on an inference of “guilt by 
association” or on defendant’s alleged racist views.  Rather, the 
evidence provided a foundation for questioning the defense 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
64 
expert’s opinion that defendant was likely to live out his days as 
a peaceful and cooperative prison inmate.  For the same reason, 
there is no merit to defendant’s assertion that the trial court 
should have excluded all evidence regarding the correspondence 
because the court knew the letters did not mention gangs or 
racist ideology.  The trial court concluded the contents of the 
letters were not admissible, but the fact of the correspondence 
itself and some of the familiar salutations arguably indicated 
defendant might join a white supremacist gang.  The trial court 
provided a limiting instruction to the jury on this point, stating 
that evidence “regarding Mr. Schultz’s correspondence with 
another inmate and his tattoos may not be considered as a factor 
or factors in aggravation.”  The prosecution, in closing 
argument, similarly pointed out that the letters were not to be 
considered as factors in aggravation, but to “refute the 
contention that [defendant is] not so bad when he’s in 
prison . . . .” 
The defense expert disagreed with many of the 
prosecutor’s assertions regarding the evidence during cross-
examination.  But the fact defendant and a former leader of a 
white supremacist gang had exchanged letters in which 
defendant referred to the former gang leader as “homey” created 
an inference that undermined the expert testimony that 
defendant would make a positive adjustment to life in prison. 
The trial court did not err in concluding that the probative 
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its 
potential for prejudice.  As defendant acknowledges, the 
“prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 means 
“ ‘evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias 
against the defendant as an individual and which has very little 
effect on the issues.  In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
65 
synonymous with “damaging” ’ ”  (People v. Karis (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 612, 638, quoting People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 358, 
377; accord, Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 408.)  This court has 
observed that gang evidence “may have a highly inflammatory 
impact on the jury,” and that trial courts should “carefully 
scrutinize such evidence before admitting it.”  (People v. 
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193, citing People v. Champion 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922–923.)  The trial court here did 
scrutinize the evidence, limiting its admission to the fact of the 
correspondence and some of the words used by defendant and 
Merriman, excluding a second witness the prosecutor sought to 
call, and providing a limiting instruction to the jury that 
prohibited the use of the evidence as an aggravating factor.  And 
the limited evidence offered was not likely to evoke an 
inflammatory emotional bias from the jurors.  The testimony 
was brief and limited in scope.  The prosecutor’s argument, 
likewise, did not inflame the juror’s emotions; it was limited to 
a brief argument that defendant received a “white power” tattoo 
while in prison and corresponded with Merriman, which 
“refutes the contention that he’s not so bad when he’s in 
prison . . . .”  We find no error. 
iv.  Assertedly inadmissible hearsay 
The trial court ruled that the contents of the 
correspondence between defendant and Merriman were 
inadmissible.  However, the court did allow the prosecutor to 
present evidence regarding the fact of the correspondence and 
that defendant and Merriman referred to each other as “homey” 
and “brother” and signed their letters using phrases such as 
“with respect.”  Defendant argues that the court erred in 
admitting the salutations in the letters to him from Merriman 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
66 
because they constituted inadmissible hearsay that did not fall 
within any exception to the hearsay rule. 
As an initial matter, we disagree with the Attorney 
General that defendant has forfeited his hearsay challenge to 
this evidence by not raising it below.  Defense counsel objected 
to the admission of the letters on various grounds, including that 
the letters were inadmissible hearsay.  As mentioned above, the 
court ruled the contents of the letters were generally 
inadmissible with the exception of the salutations used by 
defendant and Merriman.  Defense counsel indicated to the 
court that the defense still objected to the evidence but 
understood the court’s ruling.  Although the court did not 
articulate the basis of its ruling excluding the letters but 
permitting evidence of the salutations, we conclude on this 
record that the court was aware that counsel’s hearsay objection 
extended to the admission of the salutations.  Defendant’s claim 
is preserved for appeal. 
The Attorney General further argues that the salutations 
did not constitute inadmissible hearsay because they were not 
admitted for their truth and because they fell within the scope 
of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.  (See Evid. 
Code, § 1250.) 
As noted, the trial court did not articulate the basis of its 
ruling excluding the contents of the letters but allowing the 
salutations.  Even if we assume the salutations in Merriman’s 
letters should have been excluded, any such error would not 
entitle defendant to a new penalty trial because there is no 
reasonable possibility that the admission of the challenged 
evidence affected the penalty verdict.  (See People v. Wilson 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28.) 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
67 
The purpose of introducing defendant’s correspondence 
with Merriman was to rebut the defense expert’s opinion that 
defendant would serve out his life in prison as a peaceful and 
cooperative inmate.  As noted above, the jury was instructed 
that this was not to be considered as an aggravating factor.  And 
this was a minor component of the defense case in mitigation 
and played an even smaller role in the prosecutor’s closing 
argument.  The focus of the prosecution’s argument was instead 
on the callous and brutal nature of the capital crime, the 
strength of the evidence of guilt, and defendant’s pattern of 
violence both before and after the murder.  By contrast, the 
prosecutor’s references to evidence of defendant’s exchange of 
correspondence 
with 
Merriman 
comprised 
only 
three 
paragraphs in a closing argument transcript spanning 48 pages.  
Any assumed hearsay violation at issue amounted to a further 
subset of that minor component, and the salutations added 
relatively little to the properly admitted fact of the 
correspondence generally.  Further, defendant does not 
challenge the admission of the salutations in his letters to 
Merriman, which were nearly identical to the salutations in 
Merriman’s letters.  On this record, there is no reasonable 
possibility the admission of the salutations in the letters from 
Merriman to defendant affected the jury’s penalty verdict. 
2.  Denial of motion for mistrial 
In a related claim, defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred in denying defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial during 
the penalty phase.  The prosecutor posed a leading question to, 
and elicited an answer from, rebuttal witness Fitzgerald that 
revealed the contents of Merriman’s letter to defendant, in 
direct violation of the court’s recent ruling.  The prosecutor’s 
question constituted misconduct.  Nonetheless, we conclude that 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
68 
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial 
motion.  
a.  Background 
As observed above, immediately prior to the testimony of 
prosecution rebuttal witness Fitzgerald the trial court ruled 
inadmissible the contents of the exchange of letters between 
defendant and Merriman except for their salutations.  Despite 
that ruling, which the prosecutor acknowledged he understood, 
the prosecutor asked Fitzgerald whether Merriman “offer[ed] to 
send [defendant] a manual from San Quentin?”  Fitzgerald 
responded, “Yes, he [did].”  The court promptly sustained 
defense counsel’s objection, ordered the answer stricken, and 
admonished the jury to disregard it, telling the prosecutor, 
“I ruled from the bench on that issue . . . .” 
At a bench conference immediately after the conclusion of 
Fitzgerald’s testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial 
based on the prosecutor’s question regarding the San Quentin 
manual, arguing that the inquiry was a violation of the court’s 
order and highly prejudicial to defendant.  Before ruling on the 
motion, the court excused the jury for the day.  In giving its 
usual admonishments, the court added, “I want to admonish you 
again the objection made to a question asked by the district 
attorney in reference to an item allegedly contained in a letter 
from a Mr. Merriman to defendant — objection made to it.  
I sustained the objection.  The answer was stricken.  [¶]  I want 
to admonish you again you’re not to consider anything that you 
heard in that answer for any purpose whatsoever in this case.” 
The court heard from the parties on the motion.  The 
prosecutor apologized for eliciting testimony in violation of the 
court’s earlier ruling but asserted that no prejudice resulted.  
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69 
The court responded, “I sure don’t like it, and I can understand 
[defense counsel’s] concern completely.”  The court nonetheless 
denied defendant’s motion for mistrial, concluding that the 
misconduct would not have inflamed the jurors against 
defendant.  The court explained, “it does seem to the Court the 
jury’s already aware that at a minimum the defendant’s going 
to spend the rest of his life in prison . . . .  [¶]  I think the reality 
[is] that the jurors are not foolish, stupid idiots but do indeed 
follow the law as the Court instructs and will do so in this 
case.”13   
Later, when instructing the jurors before their penalty 
phase deliberations, the court read CALJIC No. 1.02, which, as 
given, reminded the jurors not to consider “for any purpose . . . 
any evidence that was stricken by the court” but to “treat it as 
though you had never heard it.” 
b.  Discussion 
We agree with defendant that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting testimony regarding the contents of one 
of the letters Merriman wrote to defendant.  (See People v. Tully 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1035.)  The trial court had ruled clearly 
that the contents of the letters were inadmissible.  The 
prosecutor nonetheless directly asked Fitzgerald a question 
regarding the contents of one letter.  Although the prosecutor 
apologized for asking the question, he offered no excuse or 
explanation for his conduct.  This was clear misconduct, not a 
situation in which a question led to “a witness’s nonresponsive 
 
13  
The prosecutor stated during this colloquy that he 
believed the manual referred to in the letter was a document 
published by prison officials “about what it’s like [in San 
Quentin State Prison].” 
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70 
answer that the prosecutor neither solicited nor could have 
anticipated.”  (Ibid.)  We take this opportunity to admonish 
counsel regarding the importance of strictly adhering to a 
court’s rulings concerning the scope of proper examination.  
Such adherence is important in every case.  It certainly is no less 
vital in the context of a capital case. 
Still, the prosecutor’s error did not require the court to 
declare a mistrial.  “ ‘Whether a particular incident is incurably 
prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial 
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial 
motions.’ ”  (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 323, 
quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854.)  As we have 
explained, “[a] trial court should grant a mistrial only when a 
party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably 
damaged . . . .”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 555, 
citing People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282; see People v. 
Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 986 [court should grant a mistrial 
if it determines the prejudice “incurable by admonition or 
instruction”].)   
Reviewing the court’s denial of the mistrial motion for an 
abuse of discretion (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 128, 
citing People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 283), we conclude 
the court did not err.  We presume that a jury follows the court’s 
admonishments.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574, 
citing People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436.)  Here, after 
scolding the prosecutor in open court for violating its earlier 
ruling, the court promptly and forcefully directed the jury to 
disregard the improper question and response.  The court did so 
repeatedly, both at the time the court sustained the defense 
objection and again, a short time later, when the court excused 
the jury for the day.  The jury was also instructed in more 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
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71 
general terms prior to penalty phase deliberations that it was 
not to consider for any purpose evidence stricken by the court.   
The court acknowledged defense counsel’s concerns that 
the improper question and response could lead the jury to 
speculate regarding the contents of the San Quentin “manual” 
in ways that could prejudice defendant.  But the court also 
reasonably concluded its admonishments would ensure that the 
brief reference to an undescribed “manual” did not irreparably 
damage defendant’s chance of receiving a fair penalty trial.   
Citing empirical research suggesting generic instructions 
are of limited value in curing prejudice, defendant asserts that 
the three “anemic” admonitions did not effectively dispel the 
prejudice.  But nothing in the record provides any reason to 
question the court’s belief that the prejudice resulting from the 
improper evidence was cured by the court’s prompt and explicit 
directives that the jury disregard it.  Nor does the record disclose 
any reason for this court to cast aside the presumption that the 
jurors followed the court’s repeated admonishments.  We 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion for a mistrial.  
B.  Victim Impact Testimony 
The prosecution called to the witness stand three 
members of Cynthia Burger’s immediate family to testify 
regarding how they were impacted by her death.  Defendant 
contends the testimony by two of the witnesses fell outside the 
scope of constitutionally permissible victim impact evidence.  He 
further complains that the testimony was emotionally 
overwrought and thereby diverted the jury from its proper role 
at the penalty phase.  As we explain, the admission of the 
challenged testimony was proper. 
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72 
1.  Background 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to limit any 
victim impact testimony proffered by the prosecution.  After a 
brief hearing on the motion, the court rejected the defense 
argument that such evidence should be limited to testimony by 
only those family members who were actually present at the 
crime scene.  But the court agreed to limit the evidence to 
testimony from three immediate family members — Burger’s 
father (Had Burger), mother (Virgie Burger), and sister (Sandra 
Woodward). 
Mr. Burger testified briefly regarding how much his 
daughter had meant to him, his deep sense of shock and grief 
upon learning she had died, and the enduring feeling of 
emptiness that could not be filled after her death. 
Mrs. Burger testified next.  In explaining what her 
daughter 
meant 
to 
her, 
Mrs. 
Burger 
described 
the 
circumstances surrounding Burger’s birth, including that Mr. 
Burger drove 500 miles to the hospital and was there to hold 
their newborn child.  Mrs. Burger explained how that event 
created a special bond between Burger and Mr. Burger because 
he could not attend the birth of their first child, which occurred 
during World War II when he was stationed at Guadalcanal.  
She also mentioned that she was very ill following the birth and 
that family members supported her. 
Mrs. Burger mentioned her daughter’s dedication to 
Jesus, saying, “Jesus Christ was her hero.”  She talked about 
Burger’s desire to be the best person she could be, and about her 
graduation from Calvary Bible College.  When asked to recount 
how she learned her daughter had died, Mrs. Burger described 
the news as “a horrendous story by a monster” and called the 
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73 
killing a “weird, horrible story.”  According to Mrs. Burger, her 
heart broke that day and has never healed.  She also expressed 
how much she missed Burger, who she described as a “wonderful 
daughter, beautiful daughter, kind, considerate.”  When 
relating some of the hardest things for her after Burger’s death, 
Mrs. Burger discussed having to walk through her daughter’s 
home, including the bedroom where she had been strangled.  
She also mentioned the loss of the family Bible in the fire.  Mrs. 
Burger found some solace in having a close and loving family.  
After bringing Burger’s cats to live with her and her husband, 
Mrs. Burger would “feel the [cats’] fur and I knew that I was 
feeling Cindy’s hands stroking that little kitty.”  After Burger’s 
death, Mrs. Burger explained that she suffered poor health and 
depression, and that she lived in fear at night when her husband 
was not home. 
Burger’s older sister, Sandra Woodward, explained that 
she and Burger had “something magic” between them, even 
when Burger was an infant.  When she learned Burger was 
dead, she was shocked and suffered intense, unrelenting pain.  
Woodward said she knew everything about Burger and had 
taken for granted that she and her sister would grow old 
together.  She recounted how difficult it was to answer police 
investigators’ 
questions 
about 
Burger’s 
friends 
and 
acquaintances, and to inventory Burger’s house to identify what 
was missing.  According to Woodward, it was hard to control her 
suspicions about Burger’s friends during the long investigation. 
In describing her experience at the mortuary, Woodward 
recalled that her sister’s hair and features were unrecognizable 
and that she struggled with how to tell her parents.  She related 
that her father did not want to see Burger’s body because he 
“wanted to remember how Cindy was last week.”  When 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
74 
Woodward returned to the mortuary with Mrs. Burger, 
Woodward could see the grief washing over Mrs. Burger as she 
(Mrs. Burger) rocked Burger in her arms. 
Woodward testified that she had trouble sleeping after 
Burger’s death, and that she would often wake around 3:00 a.m.  
She said that when she later was told that defendant entered 
Burger’s home “between 2:30 or 3:00, I just had a stab to my 
heart.  It all made sense to me.  I knew why I was waking up at 
3 o’clock.  There was no doubt in my mind.” 
Woodward also told the jury that although she finds joy in 
her memories of her sister, she is saddened knowing they will 
no longer have special times together.  Woodward explained that 
her sister’s death traumatized the family, each of whom dealt 
with his or her grief differently.  Specifically, her father became 
angry and hard, while her mother cried all the time because she 
“worried about the pain and the torture that Cindy went 
through and she kept reliving it.”  Woodward also described her 
own physical pain, including difficulty breathing.  She stated 
that when another individual told her she was experiencing 
heartache, she said, “I didn’t realize there was such physical 
pain with death.” 
2.  Discussion 
Defendant raises three challenges to the victim impact 
testimony.  First, he argues that the testimony by Mrs. Burger 
and Ms. Woodward exceeded the limitations the high court 
placed on victim impact evidence in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 
501 U.S. 808 (Payne).  Payne departed from earlier precedent to 
hold that the Eighth Amendment does not bar states from 
allowing at a capital sentencing proceeding evidence regarding 
the loss to the victim’s family that resulted from the murder, so 
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75 
long as the evidence is not “so unduly prejudicial” that it leads 
to a “fundamentally unfair” trial.  (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at 
p. 825; see also People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835 
[holding that § 190.3, factor (a) authorized “evidence and 
argument on the specific harm caused by the defendant, 
including the impact on the family of the victim”].)  Payne did 
not disturb the high court’s earlier holding in Booth v. Maryland 
(1987) 482 U.S. 496, however, that “admission of a victim’s 
family members’ characterizations and opinions about the 
crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the 
Eighth Amendment.”  (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2; 
see also People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 647–648.)  
Defendant argues that the testimony by Burger’s mother 
and sister exceeded the permissible scope of victim impact 
evidence under Payne.  He asserts that Burger’s mother and 
sister offered improper opinions regarding the crime and 
defendant.  Specifically, defendant points to Mrs. Burger’s 
characterization of the facts of Burger’s death as “a horrendous 
story by a monster” and a “weird, horrible story.”  He 
emphasizes Mrs. Burger’s testimony that “[t]his girl was so 
beautiful both inside and out and was murdered with great pain, 
fear, and then set [on] fire, and then put in a tub of acid.”  
Defendant also complains that Woodward’s testimony regarding 
the police investigation invited the jury to speculate that 
numerous individuals beyond the immediate family had been 
adversely impacted by Burger’s death.  Defendant further 
asserts that the testimony from Burger’s mother and sister ran 
afoul of Payne because it was distracting, emotional, and 
irrelevant.  He points to testimony from both women regarding 
the circumstances of Burger’s birth, Burger’s religious 
convictions, and the “psychic connections” described by the 
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76 
witnesses (Mrs. Burger’s testimony that she would pet Burger’s 
cats and know “that I was feeling Cindy’s hands stroking that 
little kitty,” and Woodward’s testimony that she would often 
wake up at 3:00 a.m., around the time Burger was killed). 
As an initial matter, defendant failed to object to these 
statements during trial.  Defendant moved before trial to limit 
any victim impact testimony to those family members present 
during or immediately after the crime, and to exclude any 
prejudicially emotional victim impact testimony.  The trial court 
granted the motion to the extent that defendant sought to limit 
testimony to impacted family members but stated those 
witnesses need not have been present during the crime.  Rather, 
the court ruled that testimony from Burger’s mother, father, and 
sister would be admissible to describe the impact of Burger’s 
death on them.  Defendant did not subsequently object that the 
witnesses’ testimony exceeded the scope of the trial court’s order 
or was otherwise improper.   As the Attorney General asserts,  
and defendant does not contest, defendant’s claims are therefore 
forfeited.  (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 46 
[“denial of the motion in limine [to exclude all victim impact 
testimony] did not make objection during testimony redundant, 
but rather it was incumbent on defendants to object if they 
believed the testimony actually presented was ‘excessive, 
improper, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial’ ”].)   
Even considering defendant’s claims on the merits, 
however, the challenged statements did not run afoul of the 
Eighth Amendment.  Neither Mrs. Burger nor Ms. Woodward 
improperly commented on the crime or defendant.  When placed 
in context, Mrs. Burger’s references to the horrendous nature of 
the crimes against her daughter, and the suffering that she 
imagined her daughter must have endured, reflected how those 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
77 
crimes had directly affected her (Mrs. Burger).  (See People v. 
Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 713 [permitting testimony of 
family members describing how they imagined their loved ones’ 
final moments, and describing as “obvious” that a parent would 
describe a child’s murder as a “ ‘tragic, sickening, evil, 
disgusting death’ ”]; People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 
1182 [rejecting the defendant’s challenge to testimony by the 
victims’ son describing his parents’ murders as brutal and “ ‘a 
savage act’ ”].)  Likewise, Mrs. Burger’s characterization of her 
daughter’s killer as a “monster” was a permissible expression of 
the harm caused by the crimes.  (See People v. Taylor, supra,  
48 Cal.4th at p. 647 [one family member’s fleeting reference to 
the defendant as “ ‘that idiot’ ” reflected how the murder had 
devastated her and the victim’s large family and close friends].)  
Mrs. Burger’s testimony was properly admitted to remind the 
jury that Burger was “ ‘an individual whose death represents a 
unique loss to society and in particular to [her] family.’ ”  (Payne, 
supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825, quoting Booth v. Maryland, supra, 
482 U.S. at p. 517 (dis. opn. of White, J.).)   
Further, defendant does not explain how Woodward’s 
testimony regarding the investigation improperly broadened the 
scope of testimony regarding those impacted by Burger’s death.  
At most, her testimony stated what was obvious;  Burger’s death 
generally impacted those who knew her.  Woodward’s general 
testimony that officers investigating the crime questioned those 
close to Burger was not so emotional as to invite an irrational 
response from the jury.  (See People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 465 [rejecting similar claim when victim’s sister and 
mother described impact of murder on victim’s father, who was 
“ ‘totally devastated’ ” and died six months after the murder].)   
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
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78 
Nor can the testimony here be characterized as irrelevant, 
distracting, or unduly emotional.  Contrary to defendant’s 
assertion, Mrs. Burger could properly describe some of the 
circumstances surrounding Burger’s birth because, by showing 
the supportive and loving family environment in which Burger 
was raised, the testimony provided the jury a glimpse of who 
Burger was.  (See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 786 
[victim impact evidence offers the jury “an idea of who the victim 
was”].)  As we have repeated, “ ‘[t]he People are entitled to 
present a “ ‘complete life histor[y] [of the murder victim] from 
early childhood to death.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Williams (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 1244, 1286, quoting People v. Garcia (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 706, 751; accord, People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
327, 365.)  
For a similar reason, Mrs. Burger’s references to her 
daughter’s trust in Jesus and graduation from a Christian 
college were not improper.  We denied a similar challenge to 
testimony regarding a murder victim’s participation in Bible 
study classes in People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at page 
1181.  Although we noted that the testimony there did not 
include mention of the victim’s “specific religious beliefs” (ibid.), 
the testimony here was brief and limited to a general description 
of Burger as a devout Christian.   And, like in Pollock, nothing 
in the record supports defendant’s assertion that this testimony 
would have suggested to the jury that its penalty decision should 
be guided by religious doctrine, let alone his claim that these 
references “cast a mantle of saintliness about [Burger] and 
invited the jury to recall the Old Testament call to take 
vengeance for the righteous.”   
Further, we find untenable defendant’s contention that 
the testimony by Mrs. Burger and Woodward relating their 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
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79 
thoughts about Burger subsequent to her death (which 
defendant characterizes as “psychic connections”) would have 
invited jurors to believe Burger’s spirit would be watching over 
their deliberations.  We have previously rejected similar 
challenges to “ ‘supernaturally tinged’ ” evidence such as a 
murder victim’s mother describing a nightmare about being shot 
just before learning her son had been shot (People v. Mendez, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 713) and a witness describing that the 
victim’s goddaughter reported seeing the victim’s ghost after the 
victim was killed (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 297–
299).   
Defendant also urges us to revisit our holding in People v. 
Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, that section 190.3, factor (a) 
allows victim impact evidence, and those decisions declining to 
limit such evidence to the facts and circumstances that the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known at the time of 
the crime.  He cites to language in Justice Kennard’s concurring 
and dissenting opinion in People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 
264.  We have declined to adopt that language, and defendant 
provides no persuasive reason to reopen our consideration of 
these issues.  (See, e.g., People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 
140–141; People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 70; People v. Myles 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1219; People v. McKinnon, supra, 
52 Cal.4th at p. 690.)   
Finally, defendant asserts that the victim impact 
testimony was far more prejudicial than probative and that the 
court should not have allowed the jury to consider it when 
deciding the appropriate punishment.  Again, the claim is 
forfeited because defendant failed to object.  And, again, 
defendant’s claim fails on its merits.  Testimony regarding grief 
and loss is necessarily emotional, but that does not necessarily 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
80 
render it inadmissible.  Here, the testimony of Burger’s father, 
mother, and sister, which included their descriptions of the 
shock and grief they experienced on learning of Burger’s death, 
was the type of evidence typically permitted at the penalty 
phase and “concerned the kinds of loss that loved ones commonly 
express in capital cases.”  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at p. 1057; see also People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th 
at p. 1197 [victim’s father related to the jury that when he was 
informed of his son’s death, he fell to his knees and dropped the 
telephone in disbelief].)  Nor was it error to allow Mrs. Burger’s 
testimony describing the emotion she felt listening to trial 
testimony or testifying herself.  Testimony describing the 
“ ‘residual and lasting impact’ ” of a murder on the victim’s 
family is permissible.  (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 691, quoting People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 398.) 
Characterizing 
the 
victim 
impact 
testimony 
as 
“duplicative and excessive,” defendant faults the court for not 
attempting to lessen the prejudicial effect by, for example, 
allowing only one of the three members of Burger’s immediate 
family to testify.  The record shows that the victim impact 
testimony in this case was neither duplicative nor excessive.  
Indeed, the testimony represented only 20 pages in a reporter’s 
transcript of the prosecution’s case in aggravation that spanned 
several hundred pages.  (See, e.g., People v. Mendez, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 712 [stating that allowing three victim impact 
witnesses per murder victim is comparable to what this court 
has previously condoned]; People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th 
at p. 1285 [rejecting challenge to amount of victim impact 
testimony involving ten witnesses].)  We discern no error in the 
trial court’s decision to allow the testimony here.   
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81 
Nor did the testimony unduly prejudice defendant by 
painting a contrasting picture for the jury, effectively asking the 
jury to compare Burger’s life with defendant’s and to “base its 
punishment decision on which life was more valuable to society.”  
Nothing in the record supports this assertion, and we have 
previously rejected similar unsupported claims.  (See People v. 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 465; People v. Kelly (2007) 
42 Cal.4th 763, 799.) 
C.  Unadjudicated Criminal Activity 
Defendant contends that section 190.3, factor (b), which 
permits evidence of “criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force of violence,” violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. 
The purpose of section 190.3, factor (b) is to “enable the jury 
to make an individualized assessment of the character and 
history of a defendant to determine the nature of the 
punishment to be imposed.”  (People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
829, 851.)  This court has long held that the admission of 
evidence of unadjudicated crimes at the penalty phase is not a 
violation of state or federal constitutional principles.  (See, e.g., 
People v Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1054; People v. 
Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204–205.)   
Defendant mischaracterizes section 190.3, factor (b) as 
allowing evidence of irrelevant everyday “spats and quarrels.”  
In fact, the statute allows the use of criminal activity related to 
force or violence, or what we have described as “prior violent 
conduct.”  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 544.)  The jury 
is instructed that it may consider evidence of such prior conduct 
only when the conduct has been proved beyond a reasonable 
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82 
doubt.  (People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53.)  As we have 
explained, “[t]he penalty phase is unique, intended to place 
before the sentencer all evidence properly bearing on its decision 
under the Constitution and statutes.  Prior violent criminality 
is obviously relevant in this regard; the reasonable doubt 
standard ensures reliability; and the evidence is thus not 
improperly prejudicial or unfair.”  (People v. Balderas, supra, 
41 Cal.3d at p. 205, fn. 32.)  Defendant was entitled to argue to 
the jury that the incidents were mere minor spats and should be 
given little weight.  (See People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p.  1030 [“Whether defendant’s use of force was legally justified 
and the weight, if any, to be given to these incidents for purposes 
of the individualized assessment of his character and history 
were matters for the jury to decide in light of the instructions 
given to it”].) 
Defendant 
further 
asserts 
that 
the 
admission 
of 
unadjudicated acts through anecdotal evidence violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s requirement of heightened reliability in 
capital cases because, as a general matter, only the victim’s 
recollection is presented to the jury.  We have repeatedly 
rejected claims that the admission of section 190.3, factor (b) 
evidence violates a defendant’s right to a reliable penalty 
determination.  (See, e.g., People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
543, 584–585.)  Defendant’s complaint that only the victim’s 
version of events is the one heard by the jury is remedied by his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses who testify 
against him at the penalty phase.  (See People v. Rogers (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 826, 894.)   
Defendant also asserts that the admission of evidence 
under section 190.3, factor (b) violates the Eighth Amendment 
because it is out of step with evolving standards of decency.  We 
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83 
have not previously considered this particular challenge to 
section 190.3, factor (b).  We reject it now.   
Defendant asserts that section 190.3, factor (b) is “the only 
statute in the country to include a statutory aggravator that 
allows a jury to impose the death penalty based upon 
unadjudicated everyday spats and quarrels.”  He acknowledges, 
however, that other states allow consideration of unadjudicated 
acts as a nonstatutory aggravating factor.   
Indeed, at least seven other states allow the admission of 
unadjudicated acts in a similar fashion as California.  (See, e.g., 
Devier v. State (Ga. 1984) 323 S.E.2d 150, 163 [allowing as an 
aggravating factor “[a]ny lawful evidence,” including prior 
unadjudicated acts, that tend to show a defendant’s “general 
moral character” or “predisposition to commit other crimes”];  
State v. Johns (Mo. 2000) 34 S.W.3d 93, 113 [allowing 
consideration of evidence of defendant’s “character and 
conduct,” including unadjudicated criminal conduct that 
occurred before or after the capital offense]; Paxton v. State 
(Okla. 1993) 867 P.2d 1309, 1321–1323 [allowing unadjudicated 
offenses to support aggravating circumstance of continuing 
threat to society]; State v. Tucker (Or. 1993) 845 P.2d 904, 913 
[allowing evidence of unadjudicated “bad acts” as an 
aggravating factor related to defendant’s future dangerousness]; 
Powell v. State (Tex. 1994) 898 S.W.2d 821, 830 [allowing 
unadjudicated “extraneous offenses” to show defendant poses a 
future danger to society]; State v. Taylor (Utah 1991) 818 P.2d 
1030, 1035 [allowing violent and nonviolent unadjudicated 
crimes as an aggravating factor relevant to defendant’s 
character]; Stockton v. Commonwealth (Va. 1991) 402 S.E.2d 
196, 209–210 [construing applicable statute as allowing 
evidence of unadjudicated misconduct, rejecting due process 
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84 
challenge to that practice, and noting split between states 
allowing or prohibiting admission of such evidence].)   
That 
California 
is 
among 
eight 
states 
allowing 
consideration at the penalty phase of prior unadjudicated 
criminal activity involving force or violence is not sufficient to 
establish that California’s statutory scheme is out of step with 
evolving standards of decency or otherwise violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 634; 
cf. Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469–470, 479 [holding 
that mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences for 
juvenile offenders violated 8th Amend. evolving standards of 
decency].) 
D.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Law 
Defendant 
presents 
several 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty law that, he 
acknowledges, this court has previously considered and rejected.  
We decline his request to reconsider our prior conclusions.  
(People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303.)   
Section 190.2 provides a list of the special circumstances, 
including felony murder, which render a defendant eligible for 
the death penalty.  These factors are not so numerous and 
broadly interpreted that they fail to narrow the class of death-
eligible first degree murders as required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 
114–115 (Brooks); People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 654–
655 (Johnson).) 
 Section 190.3, factor (a), directs the jury to consider as 
evidence in aggravation the circumstances of the capital crime.  
This has not resulted in the wanton imposition of the death 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
85 
penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments by permitting prosecutors to argue that the 
various features of the murder, even features that are the 
converse of those in other cases, are aggravating factors.  
(Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 655; People v. Brown, supra, 
33 Cal.4th at p. 401.) 
Defendant raises various challenges to the procedural 
aspects of a penalty phase trial.  This court has repeatedly 
rejected those challenges.  The federal Constitution does not 
require “either unanimity as to the truth of aggravating 
circumstances or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Penal Code section 190.3, 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 
1235, citing People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 90, People v. 
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 814, People v. Avila, supra, 
38 Cal.4th  at p. 724; see also Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
pp. 655–656; People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1215–
1216.)  Neither the federal Constitution nor state law requires 
the jury be instructed that the prosecution bears some burden 
of proof as to the truth of the aggravating factors (other than 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) or the appropriateness of a death 
verdict.  Nor is the court required to explicitly tell the jury that 
neither party bears the burden of proof.  (Linton, supra, 
56 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)  The high court’s decisions interpreting 
the Sixth Amendment in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 
466 and its progeny do not compel a different conclusion.  (People 
v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 106.) 
There is no federal constitutional requirement, either under 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments, that the 
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86 
jury make unanimous findings regarding the aggravating 
factors or the truth of the unadjudicated criminal activity 
admitted under section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. Clark (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 856, 1007; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at 
pp. 204–205.) 
The standard instructions governing the jury’s deliberative 
process at the penalty phase are not constitutionally infirm.  
Informing the jury that a death verdict is “ ‘warranted’ ” if the 
aggravating factors are “ ‘so substantial’ ” in comparison with 
the mitigating factors is not impermissibly broad or vague.  
(People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171; People v. Breaux 
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315–316.)  The jury need not be instructed 
that it must return a verdict of life without the possibility of 
parole if it finds the mitigating circumstances outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances.  (People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
955, 978.)  There is no requirement that the jurors be instructed 
that a defendant bears no burden of proving the facts in 
mitigation, or that mitigating circumstances did not have to be 
found unanimously.  (People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1068–1069.)  And the death penalty law does not require the 
jury be instructed that there is a presumption that life without 
possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence.  (Arias, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 190.) 
 The penalty phase jury is not required to make written 
findings regarding its penalty choice, and the absence of such 
written findings does not preclude meaningful appellate review.  
(People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1364, abrogated on 
other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3; 
People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 859.) 
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87 
The court’s instructions regarding the various aggravating 
and mitigating factors did not act as a barrier to the jury’s 
consideration of defendant’s mitigating evidence or infringe 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  An instruction reflecting 
section 190.3’s use of adjectives such as “extreme” and 
“substantial” in factors (d) and (g) does not interfere with a 
defendant’s right to present mitigating evidence.  (Brooks, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 115; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 
270.)  Nor must a court delete from the instructions any 
inapplicable mitigating factors, or identify which factors are 
aggravating and which are mitigating.  (People v. Cook (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 566, 618.)  Directing the jury to consider “ ‘whether 
or not’ ” certain mitigating factors were present does not invite 
the jury to use the absence of such factors as a factor in 
aggravation.  (Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 656.) 
 The failure of California’s death penalty procedures to 
provide for intercase proportionality review does not violate the 
federal Constitution or principles of equal protection or due 
process.  (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 115; People v. Verdugo, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 305.) 
 The failure to afford capital defendants at the penalty 
phase the same procedural safeguards provided to noncapital 
defendants does not violate the equal protection clause pf the 
federal Constitution.  (People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 91, 
disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 44, fn. 17.) 
California does not regularly use the death penalty as a 
form of punishment, and “its imposition does not violate 
international norms of decency or the Eighth Amendment’s 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
88 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”  (People v. 
Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) 
Defendant acknowledges that this court has previously 
rejected each of the challenges to California’s death penalty 
scheme that he presents here.  He asserts, however, that our 
analysis of these issues is constitutionally defective because we 
have failed to consider their cumulative impact or to address the 
capital sentencing scheme as a whole.  This court has considered 
and rejected identical arguments before, and we do so again 
here.  (See, e.g., People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal. 5th 
886, 928; Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 657–658.)   
V.  CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ASSERTED ERRORS  
Defendant argues that the asserted errors that occurred 
during the guilt and penalty phases, when considered 
cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial.  We have assumed for 
purposes of argument that the recording of Burger’s last 
telephone call and Magee’s testimony regarding the DNA 
extraction conducted by Yates should not have been admitted, 
but concluded that any error was harmless.  (See ante, pts. III.A, 
& III.B.)  We have also assumed that the salutations in 
correspondence from Merriman to defendant were inadmissible 
hearsay, but likewise concluded that defendant was not 
prejudiced by any error in the admission.  (See ante, 
pt. IV.A.1.b.iii.)  And we have concluded that the prosecution 
committed misconduct by eliciting statements from a rebuttal 
witness during the penalty phase regarding the contents of one 
of those letters, but that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the defendant’s related motion for a 
mistrial.  (See ante, pt. IV.A.2.)  Considering these together, we 
PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
89 
likewise conclude the cumulative effect of the asserted errors 
was harmless.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 We affirm the judgment in its entirety.  
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GOETHALS, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Schultz 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal  XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted    
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114671  
Date Filed:  November 23, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Ventura 
Judge:  Donald D. Coleman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General,  Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, Joseph P. Lee and Ryan M. 
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jeralyn Keller 
790 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 900 
Pasadena, CA 91101-2113 
(626) 683-1233 
 
Ryan M. Smith 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6108