Case Title: Willie H. Nowell v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-276

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-276 
____________ 
 
WILLIE H. NOWELL,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[December 30, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand for a 
new trial. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Kelvis Smith and Michelle Gill were a couple for almost eight years.  Gill 
was pregnant with Smith‘s child.  On June 14, 2002, Smith picked Gill up from 
work and they went straight home.  After arriving home, Gill went into the house 
first.  When Smith entered the house he saw two men, and he saw that the 
 
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bedrooms had been ransacked.  Gill was sitting on the floor crying while one of the 
men had a gun pointed at her.  Nowell pulled a gun on Smith.  The two intruders 
were not wearing masks and Smith recognized them as Willie Nowell and 
Jermaine Bellamy.  Smith asked Nowell what was going on, and Nowell said he 
believed that Smith had previously shot him.  Smith denied having shot Nowell.1   
Nowell and Bellamy discussed what they should do.  Nowell stated, ―If we 
let them go, they going to try to kill us.‖  Bellamy then made a slicing motion 
across his throat.  While acting hysterical, Gill begged Nowell not to do anything 
to Smith.  She stated if they did not, she would not call the police after they left.  
Nowell and Bellamy forced Smith and Gill to sit in the closet in the back room.  
Smith testified that he thought that the two men were getting ready to leave but 
then he saw both the guns come across from the side of the closet and bullets 
coming down the wall.   
After the ―flurry of bullets,‖ Smith looked at Gill.  She was shaking but did 
not say anything.  Soon thereafter Smith lost consciousness.  When Smith regained 
consciousness, he was tied up and sitting in the darkness of the closet.  Gill was 
beside him, not moving.  She was fatally injured with multiple gunshot wounds.  
                                          
 
1.  Smith said he heard that Nowell and Bellamy had been shot earlier in the 
year on April 19, 2002.  Smith testified that he did not know who had shot Nowell 
and Bellamy.  During that shooting, Nowell was shot in the leg.  Smith was one of 
the suspects in the shootings, but no arrests were ever made because the shooter 
was never identified.   
 
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Smith was shot near his right eye and in his jaw.  The paramedics transported 
Smith to a medical center.   
On June 17, 2002, two officers and a detective from the Palm Bay Police 
Department interviewed Smith at the medical center.  Smith used sign language to 
tell them Nowell and Bellamy were the shooters.2  Smith identified Nowell and 
Bellamy through two photo lineups.  Smith knew Nowell because Nowell was a 
friend of Smith‘s older brother, and Smith and Nowell had worked at the same 
steakhouse.   
On July 16, 2002, Willie H. Nowell and Jermaine Bellamy were charged by 
indictment with the following crimes: (1) first-degree premeditated murder; (2) 
attempted first-degree premeditated murder; (3) killing of an unborn child by 
injury to the mother; (4) armed burglary of a structure while inflicting great bodily 
harm or death; (5) robbery with a firearm while inflicting great bodily harm or 
death; (6) kidnapping while inflicting great bodily harm or death; (7) another count 
of kidnapping while inflicting great bodily harm or death; (8) grand theft of a 
motor vehicle; (9) possession of firearm by convicted felon (Bellamy); and (10) 
possession of firearm by convicted felon (Nowell).  Bellamy‘s trial was severed 
from Nowell‘s trial.  Count ten was dismissed when Nowell later pled to other 
pending charges and to violations of probation.  The jury trial commenced on 
                                          
 
 
2.  Because Smith had a tracheotomy, he used sign language to 
communicate. 
 
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September 29, 2005, in the circuit court in Brevard County.  The jury returned 
guilty verdicts on all of the charges, and trial court adjudicated Nowell guilty of 
each count.   
During the State‘s penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor made 
comments that Nowell argues were improper.  Nowell objected to the comments 
and moved for a penalty phase mistrial after each objection.  The trial court 
overruled the objections and denied the motions for mistrial.  The jury issued an 
advisory sentence that recommended the death penalty for Nowell by a vote of 
seven to five.  A Spencer3 hearing was held on December 12, 2005.   
On January 31, 2006, the trial court issued its judgment and sentence.  The 
trial court found four aggravating circumstances applicable to Gill‘s murder:  (1) 
Nowell had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
the person; (2) the crime for which Nowell was to be sentenced was committed 
while he was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit the crimes of 
attempted first-degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping; (3) the crime for which 
Nowell was to be sentenced was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest; and (4) the crime for which Nowell was to be sentenced 
was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) 
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.   
                                          
 
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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The trial court found four statutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) the crime 
for which Nowell was to be sentenced was committed while he was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the capacity of Nowell 
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired; (3) the age of Nowell at the time 
of the crime; and (4) the existence of any other factors in Nowell‘s background that 
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.  The trial court also found 
the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) Nowell voluntarily 
surrendered to authorities; (2) Nowell was a good son and friend; (3) Nowell was 
removed at an early age from his mother and raised in a foster home, grew up 
without his father, was raised by his mother and stepfather, and was the victim of 
neglect as a child; (4) Nowell suffered a traumatic incident as a victim of an assault 
and had been sexually abused; (5) Nowell was a good employee; (6) Nowell 
received no psychological or psychiatric treatment; (7) Nowell handled himself 
acceptably and appropriately at trial; (8) Nowell will adjust well to prison life; (9) 
Nowell exhibited good behavior in jail prior to and after the verdict; (10) Nowell 
was involved in religious activities at a young age; (11) Nowell has family and 
friends who care for and love him; (12) Nowell may have been exposed to negative 
influences in his life; and (13) society can be protected by a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
 
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In evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court 
found that the aggravating circumstances clearly outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances.  The court sentenced Nowell to death for the murder of Michelle 
Gill; life imprisonment for attempted first-degree premeditated murder; fifteen 
years for the killing of an unborn child by injury to the mother; life imprisonment 
for the armed burglary of a structure while inflicting great bodily harm or death; 
life imprisonment for robbery with a firearm while inflicting great bodily harm or 
death; life imprisonment for each count of kidnapping while inflicting great bodily 
harm or death; and five years for grand theft of a motor vehicle.  All sentences are 
to be consecutive. 
In his appeal to this Court, Nowell raises five claims of error.4  We only 
address two of the claims:  that the trial court erred in allowing the State‘s 
peremptory strike of Nelson Ortega, a member of a minority group, and that the 
trial court erred in denying appellant‘s objections and motions for mistrial made 
during the State‘s penalty phase closing argument.  We will not address the other 
                                          
 
 
4.  The five claims raised are:  (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State‘s 
peremptory strike of Nelson Ortega, a member of a minority group; (2) the trial 
court erred in denying Nowell‘s objections and motions for mistrial during the 
State‘s guilt phase closing argument; (3) the trial court erred in overruling 
Nowell‘s objections and motions for mistrial when the prosecutor made improper 
comments during his closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial; (4) the trial 
court erred in failing to find the death penalty unconstitutional under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (5) the trial court erred in finding as a statutory 
aggravator that Nowell committed the crime to avoid arrest. 
 
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claims because they are rendered moot as a result of our decision.  Because we find 
that the trial court erred in its rulings on these claims, we vacate the judgments and 
sentences imposed and remand for a new trial.   
Peremptory Strike of Prospective Juror 
Nowell contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State‘s use of a 
peremptory challenge against Mr. Ortega, a potential juror who was described as 
being of Hispanic descent, because the State‘s race-neutral reason for the strike 
was not genuine.  The State argues that the trial court properly allowed it to use a 
peremptory challenge against Mr. Ortega because the prosecutor offered facially 
race-neutral reasons, namely, that the potential juror was of a similar age to the 
defendant and that his philosophies on the death penalty might prevent him from 
following the law, and that the trial court‘s decision should be affirmed because it 
was not clearly erroneous. 
It is well settled in Florida that peremptory challenges may not be used to 
exclude prospective jurors solely because of their race or ethnicity.  See State v. 
Alen, 616 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1993); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984), 
receded from on other grounds by State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1993).  
An individual venireperson has the constitutional right not to be excluded from 
jury service on the basis of race.  See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).  
Potential jurors also have an equal protection right under both the state and federal 
 
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constitutions ―to jury selection procedures free from stereotypical presumptions 
that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination.‖  Rivera v. State, 
670 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994)), receded from on other grounds by Foster v. State, 767 
So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).5   
In Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996), we clarified the 
guidelines that are to be used whenever a race-based objection to a peremptory 
challenge is made.  We stated: 
A party objecting to the other side‘s use of a peremptory 
challenge on racial grounds must:  a) make a timely objection on that 
basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial 
group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for 
the strike.  If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must 
ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.  
At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent 
of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2).  
If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, 
given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is 
not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3).  The court‘s focus in 
step 3 is not on the reasonableness of the explanation but rather its 
genuineness. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  In determining whether a reason is genuine, the relevant 
circumstances to be considered may include, but are not limited to, the following:  
                                          
 
 
5.  Although the State never asserted that Mr. Ortega was not of a protected 
class of jurors, we note that Florida courts have recognized Hispanic Americans as 
a cognizable ethnic group entitled to protection against discrimination in jury 
selection.  See State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1993); Bernard v. State, 
659 So. 2d 1346, 1347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). 
 
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―the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial 
group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or 
singling the juror out for special treatment.‖  Id. n.8. 
We acknowledge that peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised 
in a nondiscriminatory manner and that the appropriate standard of appellate 
review for determining the threshold question of whether there is a likelihood of 
racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is abuse of discretion.  
Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Jones v. State, 923 So. 2d 
486, 490 (Fla. 2006)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1112 (2008); accord Files v. State, 
613 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Fla. 1992).  Generally, the trial court is in the best position 
to assess the genuineness of the reason advanced, and the decision will be affirmed 
unless clearly erroneous.  See Jones, 923 So. 2d at 490.  However, this Court has 
also confirmed that ―deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of 
judicial review,‖ Dorsey v. State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 1200 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)), because ―[d]eference does not by 
definition preclude relief.‖  Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.  As we will now explain, 
we conclude that the State‘s race-neutral reasons were clearly pretextual and not 
genuine and that the trial court therefore committed reversible error in allowing the 
State to exercise a peremptory challenge against Mr. Ortega. 
 
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Following voir dire of the prospective jurors, the State sought to exercise a 
peremptory challenge for Mr. Ortega.  Mr. Ortega was described as a person of 
Hispanic background.  The defense objected to the peremptory challenge and 
asked for a Neil inquiry.  The court asked the prosecutor, John Parker, his reasons 
for the challenge.  The prosecutor said:  
My reasons are two-fold.  Number one, as I look at it, he 
appears young and of a similar age to the defendant.  I would think 
that Mr. Ortega would relate to the defendant based on age.   
Second of all, I noted that his wife works for Devereux, which 
is a childcare nurturing facility.   
I am concerned, based on philosophies within the family, that 
he may not be able to follow the law when it comes to the actual, in 
any phase of this particular proceeding. 
 
The judge did not recall any specific answers that would raise that concern about 
following the law and asked the prosecutor what specific answers by Mr. Ortega 
would justify such a concern.  The prosecutor responded: 
There [are] no specific answers.  But following the law, I would 
argue, is what we use to determine whether or not a cause challenge is 
granted, whether or not that person can follow the law.   
           
 
My race-neutral reason is, in spite of the fact that he said he 
could follow the law, I don‘t particularly like him, I don‘t think he is 
going to be the kind of juror that I would like.  And for those reasons 
which were race-neutral, I‘m asking the Court to proceed with 
allowing me my peremptory challenge.   
 
 (Emphases added.)   
Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor‘s reasons were not race-neutral: 
Mr. Ortega has a sister who is in law enforcement.  That would 
normally be something that the State of Florida--or involved in law 
 
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enforcement, that would normally be a characteristic that would be 
somewhat more state-oriented.   
He‘s a hard-working individual, he works in retail at a 7-
Eleven, he said he would follow the law, even if he didn‘t like it.  
There is nothing that I heard that would indicate he wouldn‘t support 
the State‘s position.   
Our only suggestion is that he happens to be a person of color, 
so we object to the State‘s grounds. 
 
In response, the prosecutor made the following remark: 
 
And this is why, because we have peremptoral challenges, the 
problem I have with it is, in the past it‘s not like somebody‘s face.  
The problem is, well, listen, you can‘t strike anybody from now on 
because of race.  All minorities have a right to sit, they have a right to 
sit, can‘t strike them because of race.   
My reason for striking him is that he‘s young and appears to be 
the same or similar age as the defendant, that‘s my first reason.  I 
think that‘s sufficient for a peremptory challenge, whether or not it 
goes for cause for his inability to actually follow the law.   
I think he would associate himself with the defendant because 
of his age.  I think he looks at the defendant and says, you know, that 
could be me.  As a result, it‘s going to be more difficult for him, if not 
impossible, to actually do what‘s asked of him in terms of following 
the law.   
For that primary reason that I‘m asking that he be stricken, that 
peremptory challenge, I don‘t want to confuse it with a cause 
challenge unless the Court finds that my race-neutral reason is not 
reasonable.  Certainly, that‘s within the discretion of the Court. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
After a discussion about Florida caselaw, the trial court asked whether there 
were other white males of similar age to Mr. Ortega that were not stricken and the 
parties agreed that David Collins, an individual who actually sat on the jury in this 
case, was one such juror.  The court then, without explaining its reasoning, found 
 
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that the State‘s race-neutral reasons were reasonable and allowed the strike to 
remain.  The following day, the trial court allowed additional argument from each 
side on this issue and again, without expressing its reasoning, found the reasons to 
be genuine and sustained the peremptory challenge. 
In order to determine whether the trial court‘s decision to allow this 
peremptory strike was clearly erroneous, we must review the alleged race-neutral 
reasons given by the State and the circumstances in which they were made.  See, 
e.g., Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764.  A review of the record indicates that the State 
offered three separate reasons for striking Mr. Ortega:  (1) that the prosecutor did 
not ―particularly like‖ Mr. Ortega; (2) that Mr. Ortega was of a similar age to the 
defendant and would therefore relate to him; and (3) that because of Mr. Ortega‘s 
wife‘s job at a child daycare center, he would not be able to put aside his personal 
philosophies and follow the law.  We address each reason in turn. 
First, the prosecutor justified his use of a peremptory challenge because he 
did not ―particularly like‖ Mr. Ortega and did not ―think he [was] going to be the 
kind of juror that [he] would like.‖  However, Florida courts have consistently 
rejected a general feeling or ―dislike‖ of a juror as a genuine race-neutral reason for 
exercising a peremptory challenge.  See State v. Holiday, 682 So. 2d 1092, 1094 & 
n.1 (Fla. 1996) (affirming the trial court‘s refusal to allow a peremptory strike 
based on the defense counsel‘s ―gut feeling‖ that the potential juror would favor 
 
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the State); Foster v. State, 557 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (―[A] ‗feeling‘ 
about a juror does not satisfy the Neil test.‖).  This is especially so when the 
proponent of the strike points to nothing in the record, such as worrisome behavior 
or questionable answers given by the potential juror during voir dire, which 
supports a general distaste for a particular juror.  Id.; see also Dorsey, 868 So. 2d at 
1201-02 (emphasizing the need for record support for the race-neutral reason 
proffered for a peremptory challenge); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 24 (Fla. 
1988), receded from in part on other grounds by Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 
759 (Fla. 1996) (noting that deference to the trial court‘s findings is diminished 
where the State fails to demonstrate that the alleged reason for the peremptory 
challenge actually existed). 
Secondly, the prosecutor wanted to challenge Mr. Ortega because of his age, 
stating that ―he appears young and of a similar age to the defendant.  I would think 
that Mr. Ortega would relate to the defendant based on age.‖  Although this Court 
has never held that age is a legitimate race-neutral reason for a peremptory 
challenge, district courts have concluded that it is.  See Saffold v. State, 911 So. 2d 
255, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that peremptory challenge based on age of 
juror is permissible); Daniels v. State, 837 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) 
(same); Cobb v. State, 825 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (concluding that it 
was not unreasonable to strike a prospective juror in a drug case when the State 
 
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genuinely believed that the juror‘s youth and status as a student would cause her to 
be more lenient).  However, the court‘s inquiry does not end when the proponent 
of the strike points to the potential juror‘s age; rather, the judge must consider all 
the relevant circumstances to determine whether the justification is genuine, 
including the reasonableness of the explanation and whether other jurors of a 
similar age were challenged for these reasons.  See Hoskins, 965 So. 2d at 9; 
Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1089-90 (Fla. 2000) (acknowledging that a race-
neutral reason that applied to another juror who was not challenged could indicate 
pretext); Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 & nn.8-9.  In this case, Mr. Ortega was 
struck from the jury panel based on his young age, which was a reason equally 
applicable to a white juror who was not challenged by the State.   
During the trial, the defense and the State agreed that Mr. Collins was both 
white and the only remaining member of the jury who was young.  According to 
defense counsel, Mr. Collins appeared to be younger than Mr. Ortega, and during 
voir dire, Mr. Collins confirmed that he worked as a web designer for a corporation 
and had one son who lived separately with the mother.  Similarly, Mr. Ortega was 
identified as being in his mid- to late twenties, worked in retail at a 7-Eleven, was 
married and had three children.  The record confirms that both of these potential 
jurors were around the same age, were fathers, and were neither asked questions 
nor gave any responses during voir dire indicating they would identify with the 
 
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defendant.  Therefore, the State‘s age-based justification for striking Mr. Ortega, a 
Hispanic male, was clearly applicable to Mr. Collins, a similarly aged white male 
whom the State failed to challenge.  See Booker, 773 So. 2d at 1089-90; Davis v. 
State, 691 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that pretext may exist when a 
juror is struck from the jury panel based on a reason equally applicable to an 
unchallenged juror); cf. Dorsey, 868 So. 2d at 1201-02 (holding that a juror‘s 
nonverbal behavior, which is both disputed by the parties and not evident in the 
record because counsel failed to ask any questions concerning the behavior, cannot 
be a genuine race-neutral reason to sustain a peremptory challenge).  In addition, 
the victim in this case was also in her mid-twenties, which further undermines the 
genuineness of the State‘s asserted justification—if Mr. Ortega was going to 
identify with someone in this case based solely on his age, he was just as likely to 
identify with the victim, which would clearly favor the State‘s position. 
Thirdly, the prosecutor stated that he was worried about Mr. Ortega‘s ability 
to follow the law based on his wife‘s job at a daycare center and his philosophy on 
the death penalty.  Certainly, a juror‘s inability to follow the law could be a viable 
concern for either a cause challenge or a peremptory strike.  See Morrison v. State, 
818 So. 2d 432, 443-44 (Fla. 2002) (stating that ―unequivocal discomfort‖ with the 
death penalty is a valid race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike); Hartley v. 
State, 686 So. 2d 1316, 1322 (Fla. 1996) (same).  However, when the prosecutor 
 
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initially stated that he believed Mr. Ortega‘s philosophy on the death penalty 
would prevent him from following the law, the trial court immediately asked what 
answers given by Mr. Ortega would raise such a concern, and the prosecutor 
confirmed that ―[t]here [were] no specific answers.‖  In fact, the prosecutor first 
admitted that Mr. Ortega confirmed he would follow the law and then contended 
that a juror‘s inability to follow the law was really only relevant for a cause 
challenge.  Thus, the prosecutor seemed to abandon Mr. Ortega‘s alleged inability 
to follow the law and ultimately rested his race-neutral reason on the fact that he 
just did not ―particularly like‖ Mr. Ortega.  Moreover, the record confirms that Mr. 
Ortega would fairly consider the imposition of the death penalty depending on the 
evidence he heard in the courtroom, could impose a death sentence in a murder 
case depending on the circumstances presented, only had ―mixed feelings‖ about 
capital punishment, and never expressed uncertainty about his ability to vote for it 
in a proper case according to the appropriate legal standards.  In fact, he stated he 
would follow the law.6   
                                          
 
 
6.  Although the State relied upon his wife‘s job at a daycare center to 
support his inability to follow the law, we note that Mr. Ortega also had a sister-in-
law who worked in law enforcement.  In addition, Mr. Ortega worked in retail at a 
7-Eleven and admitted that he had incidents of theft at his job.  Importantly, as 
noted by defense counsel, these are two characteristics that the State would 
typically prefer in a juror, which further supports the pretextual nature of this 
challenge. 
 
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Although the trial court revisited this issue the next morning and the 
prosecutor espoused yet another reason for the strike, namely, that Mr. Ortega felt 
he was judging the person, the defense attorney pointed out that these reasons were 
equally applicable to other jurors that were not challenged.7  Further, the 
prosecutor only offered this ―afterthought‖ justification after an entire day of 
reflection, which we have previously viewed with some skepticism.  See Franqui v. 
State, 699 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1997) (affirming the trial court‘s decision to 
deny a peremptory challenge where the defense first stated that it did not ―like‖ the 
juror and later attempted to justify the strike, after several pages of questioning, 
with additional reasons as an ―afterthought‖).  Not only does the record contradict 
the State‘s belief that Mr. Ortega would not have an ability to follow the law, we 
simply cannot ignore that the prosecutor‘s initial response when asked for a race-
neutral reason was essentially that he did not particularly like the juror.   
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court‘s decision to allow the 
peremptory challenge of Mr. Ortega was clearly erroneous because the State‘s 
explanations, which may have appeared to be race-neutral, were pretextual.  The 
State‘s asserted reasons for the peremptory challenge were insufficient to satisfy 
                                          
 
 
7.  In fact, in comparing Mr. Ortega‘s responses to questions about his 
feelings on the death penalty with those of Mr. Collins, the similarity is quite 
striking.  Both potential jurors stated that they believed the death penalty should be 
reserved for the most serious crimes.  However, as previously noted, the prosecutor 
in this case challenged Mr. Ortega but had no issue with Mr. Collins. 
 
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equal protection because the challenge was unsupported by the record, directly 
contradicted by defense counsel, and based upon reasons that were not genuine.  
See Dorsey, 868 So. 2d at 1202.  We therefore find merit in Nowell‘s claim that 
the trial court erred in allowing the State‘s peremptory strike of Mr. Ortega 
because the State failed to provide a sufficient race-neutral reason for the strike.   
State’s Penalty Phase Closing Argument 
Nowell also contends the trial court erred in denying his objections and 
motions for mistrial made during the State‘s penalty phase closing argument. 
The control of prosecutorial comments is within the trial court‘s discretion, and 
this Court will not reverse the trial court‘s decision unless there has been an abuse 
of that discretion.  Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 872 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 1035 (2006); Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 950 (Fla. 2003).   
Nowell contends that the trial court erred in overruling the objections and 
motions for mistrial he made when the prosecutor made improper comments 
during the State‘s closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial.8  At one point 
during the State‘s argument, the prosecutor said, ―Mercy.  State asks that you 
recommend mercy if mercy is warranted.  And mercy wasn‘t given in this case, not 
by Mr. Nowell, not by Mr. Bellamy.  There was no mercy there, none whatsoever.‖  
                                          
 
 
8.  Although the defendant argues that four comments were improper, we 
address only one of these comments in this opinion. 
 
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Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial.  The trial judge overruled the 
objection and denied the motion for mistrial.  This comment is strikingly similar to 
a comment made by the prosecutor in Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998), a 
comment we found to be improper.  In Urbin, the prosecutor argued: 
If you are tempted to show this defendant mercy, if you are tempted to 
show him pity, I‘m going to ask you to do this, to show him the same 
amount of mercy, the same amount of pity that he showed Jason 
Hicks on September 1, 1995, and that was none.   
 
714 So. 2d at 421.  We held that this line of argument is blatantly impermissible 
under Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989), and Richardson v. State, 
604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992), which condemned these type of arguments 
because they are an unnecessary appeal to the sympathies of the jurors.  The 
prosecutor‘s statement is equally improper in this instance.  Thus, the trial court 
erred in overruling defense counsel‘s objection to this line of argument.   
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse Nowell‘s conviction for first-degree 
murder and vacate his sentence of death.  This case is remanded to the trial court 
with directions that a new trial be conducted. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur 
WELLS, J., dissents. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
 
 
- 20 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Tonya B. Rainwater, Judge – Case No. 05-2002-CFF-61466-B 
 
Robert R. Berry and Gregory W. Eisenmenger of Eisenmenger, Berry and Peters, 
P.A., Viera, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Charmaine M. 
Millsaps and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee