Case Title: Yu v. ID State University

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46364

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2019-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 46364 
 
 
JUN YU, 
 
        Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, MARK 
ROBERTS, individually and his official 
capacity as a faculty member of Idaho State 
University; SHANNON LYNCH, individually 
and in her official capacity as a faculty 
member of Idaho State University; KANDI 
TURLEY-AMES, individually and in her 
official capacity as a faculty member of Idaho 
State University; CORNELIS J. VAN DER 
SCHYF, individually and in his official 
capacity as a faculty member of Idaho State 
University, and JOHN/JANE DOES I 
through X, whose true identities are presently 
unknown, 
 
        Defendants-Respondents. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, June 2019 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: July 10, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bannock County. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s order is affirmed.  
 
Idaho Employment Law Solutions, Eagle, for appellant. Ronaldo A. Coulter 
argued.  
 
Kelly Law, PLLC, Garden City, for respondents. Michael E. Kelly argued.  
_____________________ 
BRODY, Justice. 
Jun Yu appeals the dismissal of his claims for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. section 
1983 and breach of contract. Idaho State University dismissed Yu from its doctoral program in 
 
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clinical psychology in May 2013, with his final administrative appeal denied on October 2, 2013. 
While Yu originally filed his claims against ISU in the federal district court, he brought an 
identical state action nearly five years after his dismissal from the program once the federal court 
dismissed most of his claims. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Yu’s claims because 
they were untimely.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Jun Yu is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who was completing his Ph.D. in 
clinical psychology at Idaho State University. He completed all the requisite coursework, wrote 
and defended his dissertation, but still had to complete a one-year clinical internship. After not 
matching any programs with the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers, 
Yu set up an alternative internship with the Cleveland Clinic Center for Autism in Ohio. 
However, he was dismissed from the Ohio internship early due to performance concerns and 
subsequently dismissed from Idaho State University’s doctoral program on May 3, 2013. After 
exhausting his appeals with the university, Yu received a final letter on October 2, 2013, that 
denied his appeal and immediately made his dismissal effective.  
On March 10, 2014, Yu filed a notice of tort claim against ISU pursuant to the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act (ITCA), alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress and a violation of Title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Right Act. Eighteen months later he filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Idaho alleging violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, deprivation of 
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Yu later amended his complaint to include allegations of denial of procedural and substantive 
due process, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract, totaling 18 claims against ISU. No 
individual defendants were named in the notice of claim or in his federal action.  
Yu later argued before the federal district court that he was prompted to amend his 
complaint because of expert reports issued after the litigation commenced. Three experts in 
psychology reviewed Yu’s case and concluded that ISU violated ethical and accreditation 
standards. Yu received these expert reports between March 13, 2016, and March 23, 2016, 
several months into his litigation at the federal district court. Yu then amended his federal 
complaint against ISU on March 29, 2017.  
 
ISU moved for summary judgment in the federal action and prevailed on 17 of the 18 
claims because the Eleventh Amendment provided ISU with immunity from suit and Yu had not 
 
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named any state officials in his complaint. Only the Title VI claim remains in federal district 
court. The other 17 claims were dismissed on January 26, 2018.  
On February 21, 2018, within a month of the federal district court’s dismissal, and almost 
four years after filing his notice of tort claim against ISU, Yu filed the complaint that is at issue 
in this case, naming six defendants: ISU; Mark W. Roberts, ISU’s Director of Clinical Training 
in the Psychology Department; Shannon Lynch, ISU’s Chair of the Department of Psychology; 
Kandi Turley-Ames, ISU’s Dean of the College of Arts and Letters; Cornelius J. Van der Schyf, 
ISU’s Dean of the Graduate School; and Arthur C. Vailas, President of ISU (collectively, 
Defendants). The individual defendants were sued in their official and individual capacities. Yu’s 
complaint alleged the same 17 claims previously dismissed by the federal district court: a 42 
U.S.C. section 1983 claim for denial of his procedural and substantive due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, promissory estoppel, and 13 
claims asserting breach of contract.  
On April 2, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss this case for Yu’s failure to 
comply with the ITCA and applicable statutes of limitation, and failure to state a claim for relief. 
Yu opposed the motion. The district court held a hearing, and ultimately granted Defendants’ 
motion for dismissal. The district court determined that Yu had failed to comply with the ITCA 
with respect to all individual defendants because the 2014 notice of claim was only filed against 
ISU. In addition, the district court ruled that the applicable statutes of limitations for both 
personal injury and implied contract claims barred Yu’s action since the latest date the claims 
could have accrued was October 2, 2013, when Yu’s administrative appeal challenging his 
dismissal from ISU was final. All of Yu’s claims were dismissed with prejudice.  
Yu timely appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and breach of contract 
claims. While Yu states in a footnote that he also appeals the dismissal of his tort claim against 
ISU, but not the individually named defendants, he presents no arguments in his briefing. 
Because we will not review a trial court’s action where the briefs contain no arguments or 
citations to authority, Hurtado v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 17, 278 P.3d 415, 419 
(2012), we will not review the dismissal of the tort claim.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court properly converted the 
motion to a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Procedure 12(d): “If, on a 
 
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motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” 
Consequently, when reviewing the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss, the 
standard of review we use is the same as that used in summary judgment. In re City of Shelley, 
151 Idaho 289, 291, 255 P.3d 1175, 1177 (2011); Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 
P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006).  
The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is 
the same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Baxter 
v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on 
file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 
228, 232, 61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002). 
 
Gibson, 142 Idaho at 751, 133 P.3d at 1216. This Court maintains free review over a 
statute’s construction. Id. In addition, where there is no dispute over any issue of material 
fact, the time when a cause of action accrues is a question of law that this Court freely 
reviews. Molen v. Christian, 161 Idaho 577, 580, 388 P.3d 591, 594 (2017).  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not dismiss Yu’s federal and contract claims for failure to comply 
with the ITCA. 
The first argument Yu raises on appeal is that the district court improperly dismissed all 
of his claims due to noncompliance with the ITCA when that statute does not apply to his federal 
1983 claims or his breach of contract claims. He does not challenge the dismissal of the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against the five individual defendants or the 
university, so that is not an issue before this Court. We do not reach the merits of Yu’s argument 
because his reading of the district court’s order is too broad. Fairly read, the district court’s 
decision barred “all of the Plaintiff’s claims subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act as against the 
individually named Defendants for failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements of 
that statute.” (Emphasis added). The district court did not dismiss all of Yu’s federal or contract 
claims for failure to comply with the ITCA. As discussed, infra, those claims were properly 
dismissed based on the applicable statutes of limitation.     
B. The district court correctly held that Yu’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and breach of 
contract claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitation.  
 
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1. Yu’s federal 1983 claims.  
Yu asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for alleged violations of 42 
U.S.C. section 1983 as untimely. The district court determined that the last possible date of 
accrual of Yu’s claims was October 2, 2013, when his last administrative appeal with the 
university was denied. Defendants concede this was the date of accrual for purposes of this 
appeal. Yu contends, however, that the date of accrual falls between March 13, 2016, and March 
26, 2016, because that is the time period when he received expert opinions that laid the 
foundation of his due process and breach of contract claims. Thus, Yu argues the receipt of 
expert opinions gave him, for the first time, the requisite knowledge and awareness of his injury. 
We disagree with Yu’s analysis.  
Statutes of limitation play an important role in litigation. As stated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court:  
Statutes of limitation, . . . in their conclusive effects are designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is 
unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation 
and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right 
to prosecute them. 
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944). See also 
Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442, 448–49 (2013).  
In 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions, courts generally apply the corresponding state-law 
statute of limitation for personal injury torts. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 
U.S. 113, 123 n.5 (2005); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 280 n.6 (1994); Wilson v. Garcia, 
471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). This Court applies the two-year statute of limitation set forth in Idaho 
Code section 5-219(4) to section 1983 actions. McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 
896, 899 (2008). Under this statute, an action to recover damages for personal injury must 
commence within two years of “the occurrence, act or omission complained of.” I.C. § 5-219(4). 
Accordingly, Yu’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims all fall under this two-year statute of 
limitation.  
Although the length of the statute of limitation is governed by Idaho law, federal law 
governs the date on which a section 1983 cause of action accrues. McCabe, 145 Idaho at 957, 
188 P.3d at 899. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, “accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a 
 
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complete and present cause of action . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” 
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). “In other 
words, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms 
the basis of his cause of action.” Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 2015).  
Yu seems to be advocating for the discovery rule, an age-old doctrine where “accrual is 
delayed until the plaintiff has ‘discovered’ his cause of action.” Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442, 
449 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). The discovery rule typically applies in cases of fraud, 
such as where deceptive conduct prevents a plaintiff from knowing he was defrauded. See, e.g., 
Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442, 449 (2013). Not only has Yu failed to allege or provide any 
evidence of fraud or concealment concerning his dismissal, Yu’s reliance on the date of 
discovery is misplaced. The knowledge requirement for a section 1983 action falls on the date 
when there is knowledge of an injury by the claimant, not the date when a specific theory of 
relief is identified by counsel. For example, in the Ninth Circuit, a federal claim accrues at the 
time a plaintiff learns of his injury—when plaintiffs recognize harm and know the identity of the 
tortfeasor, even if additional harm arises later on. Doe, 7 v. Josephine Cnty., 697 F. App’x 567, 
568 (9th Cir. 2017); Bradford, 803 F.3d at 387.  
Contrary to well-established case law, Yu’s argument rests on his claim accruing at the 
time he discovered additional legal theories, namely breaches of contract and violations of due 
process. It is clear from the record, however, that Yu was aware of his injury since at least 
October 2, 2013, when the graduate school dismissed him from ISU at the end of his appellate 
process. Because Yu filed his action in state court on February 21, 2018, roughly four years and 
six months after his dismissal from ISU, his federal claims are time-barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations.  
2. Yu’s breach of contract claims.   
Yu next argues that he had a written contract with ISU based on documents like ISU’s 
Governing Policies and Procedures, graduate catalogs, student and faculty handbooks, and the 
American Psychological Association Accreditation standards. He continues to argue that the date 
of accrual of his breach of contract claims falls between March 13, 2016, and March 26, 2016, 
because that is when he received expert opinions that laid the foundation for his breach of 
contract claims. The distinction between implied contracts and written contracts is important to 
Yu’s claims because a five-year statute of limitations for written contracts would make Yu’s 
 
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breach of contract claims timely even under the October 2, 2013 accrual date. However, we 
agree with the district court’s analysis that the cited documents, at best, give rise to a claim for 
breach of an implied contract with a four-year statute of limitations.  
An action based upon an oral or implied contract must be brought within four years of the 
date of accrual, while an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 5 years. 
I.C. §§ 5-216 and 217. “The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a 
claim accrues upon the breach of the contract.” Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P.2d 
714, 721 (1995).  
It is well-settled that the “principal relationship between a college and its students is 
contractual.” Wickstrom v. N. Idaho Coll., 111 Idaho 450, 452, 725 P.2d 155, 157 (1986) (citing 
Peretti v. State of Montana, 464 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Mont.1979), rev’d on other grounds, 661 
F.2d 756 (9th Cir.1981)). Because a formal contract is rarely prepared, “the general nature and 
terms of the agreement are usually implied, with specific terms to be found in the university 
bulletin and other publications; custom and usages can also become specific terms by 
implication.” Id. (quoting Peretti, 464 F.Supp. at 786). Even where the contract’s terms are 
within a university’s published documents, Idaho courts have treated the contractual relationship 
between student and college as implied. See Wickstrom, 111 Idaho at 452, 725 P.2d at 157 (citing 
Peretti, 464 F.Supp. at 786) (“the general nature and terms of the agreement are usually implied, 
with specific terms to be found in the university bulletin and other publications;”) (emphasis 
added); George, 121 Idaho at 38, 822 P.2d at 557 (“based on the excerpts of the University's 
Faculty–Staff Handbook . . . the University had an implied contractual obligation ‘to fulfill its 
responsibilities in pursuit of the academic goals and objectives of all members of the university 
community,’”). 
There is no evidence in the record that Yu had an express or formal written contract with 
ISU. Nor has he shown how the documents he relies upon established contractual intent by the 
parties. His argument for a written contract—and its corresponding five-year statute of 
limitations—is based on ISU’s written and published documents and policies. While the 
documents are in writing, they do not constitute an express contract between the student and 
university. Instead, at best, those writings provide the terms of an implicit agreement. See 
Wickstrom, 111 Idaho at 452, 725 P.2d at 157 (quoting Peretti, 464 F.Supp. at 786); George, 121 
Idaho at 38, 822 P.2d at 557. Accordingly, a four-year statute of limitations for implied contracts 
 
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applies with the latest possible date of accrual on October 2, 2013; the date Yu’s administrative 
appeals were exhausted. Because Yu filed his claims outside the requisite four-year period, the 
district court properly dismissed his breach of contract claims as time-barred.  
C. 
Whether Defendants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
Defendants claim they are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, 
which permits an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party where a case was “brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” In this case, we award 
attorney fees against Yu because he unreasonably pursued his claims. It was clear that Yu’s 
claims were untimely under the applicable statutes of limitation and Yu failed to cite to any law 
to the contrary or make a good faith argument for overturning existing case law.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court in dismissing all of Yu’s claims with 
prejudice. We award attorney fees and costs to Defendants.  
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER and MOELLER CONCUR.