Case Title: Kellermann v. McDonough

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL H. KELLERMANN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF JAIMEE ELIZABETH KELLERMANN, DECEASED 
 
 
       
    OPINION BY  
CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 081718 
 November 5, 2009∗ 
PAUL MCDONOUGH, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
Daniel T. Balfour, Judge 
 
I. 
 
The primary question that we consider in this appeal is 
whether adults who agree to supervise and care for a child owe 
a duty to exercise reasonable care in the supervision and care 
of that child. 
II. 
 
Michael H. Kellermann, administrator of the estate of his 
daughter, Jaimee Elizabeth Kellermann, filed a wrongful death 
action against Paul McDonough and Paula McDonough (the 
McDonoughs).  Kellermann alleged in the complaint that Paul 
McDonough and Paula McDonough breached numerous duties owed to 
Jaimee and as a result of such breaches Jaimee died.  The 
McDonoughs filed a demurrer to the complaint asserting, among 
other things, that they owed no duties in tort to Jaimee, a 
14-year-old child under their supervision and care.  Even 
                     
∗ The prior opinion in this appeal issued July 17, 2009, 
was withdrawn and a rehearing was granted by Order of the 
Court dated September 16, 2009. 
 
1
though the circuit court initially overruled the demurrer, the 
court subsequently sustained the demurrer and entered an order 
dismissing the complaint.  Kellermann appeals.  
III. 
A. 
The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether a 
complaint states a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted.  Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 
712-13, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006); Welding, Inc. v. Bland 
County Service Auth., 261 Va. 218, 226, 541 S.E.2d 909, 913 
(2001).  "A demurrer admits the truth of all properly pleaded 
material facts.  'All reasonable factual inferences fairly and 
justly drawn from the facts alleged must be considered in aid 
of the pleading.  However, a demurrer does not admit the 
correctness of the pleader's conclusions of law.' "  Dodge v. 
Randolph-Macon Woman's College, 276 Va. 1, 5, 661 S.E.2d 801, 
803 (2008) (citations omitted); accord Tronfeld, 272 Va. at 
713, 636 S.E.2d at 449; Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass’n, 
265 Va. 127, 131-32, 575 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2003).  With these 
principles in mind, we will consider the litigants' arguments. 
 
2
 
B. 
 
Kellermann pled the following facts in his complaint that 
are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.  Michael 
Kellermann and Elizabeth Kellermann (the Kellermanns) were the 
natural parents of Jaimee Kellermann.  At the time of the 
events described in the complaint, they lived in Wake Forest, 
North Carolina. 
 
In December 2004, the McDonoughs, husband and wife who 
resided in Henrico County, informed the Kellermanns that the 
McDonoughs' daughter, Becka McDonough, was "having a 'tough 
time of it.' "  The McDonoughs told the Kellermanns that 
Becka’s "outlook and mood" might improve if she spent time 
with her former classmate, Jaimee, who had moved from Henrico 
County with her family to North Carolina in 2002.  The 
McDonoughs asked the Kellermanns if "Jaimee Kellermann could 
stay a night or two at the McDonoughs' home." 
 
The Kellermanns agreed that Jaimee could spend one night 
with the McDonoughs and Becka.  On Saturday, December 4, 2004, 
Michael Kellermann left his home with Jaimee and traveled 150 
miles, approximately half the distance between their home in 
North Carolina and Richmond, Virginia, where they met Paula 
McDonough and Becka.  "Michael Kellermann asked . . . Paula 
McDonough what activities were planned during Jaimee 
 
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Kellermann's stay at the McDonoughs' home. . . . Paula 
McDonough said that they planned to go to the new shopping 
mall. . . . Paula McDonough said that she would be taking the 
girls to the mall.  Michael Kellermann then said that Jaimee 
Kellermann was not to be driven by any inexperienced drivers.  
He then emphasized that his daughter was not to be in a car 
with any young, male drivers, stating 'no boys with cars.'  
The rule was intended for Jaimee Kellermann's safety and was a 
rule enforced by the Kellermanns at their home."  Paula 
McDonough agreed and said "'don't worry, I promise we'll take 
good care of her,' or words to that effect."  Paula McDonough 
returned to her home in Henrico County with Jaimee and Becka. 
 
Later that day, Paula McDonough took Jaimee and Becka to 
a shopping mall and movie theater complex in Henrico County.  
Paula McDonough "dropped the girls off, and drove away, 
leaving them unsupervised." 
 
Mary Madelyn Lane (Maddie) joined Becka and Jaimee at the 
shopping mall.  All the girls were 14 years old and were 
former classmates as well as best friends.  The girls planned 
to go to a movie theater. 
Before the girls went to the movie theater, Nathan 
DeFrank (Nate), a 17-year-old boy who was Becka's friend, 
arrived at the shopping center in his car.  Nate had a 
reputation for reckless behavior.  Allegedly, Becka had "gone 
 
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street racing with [Nate]; Becka McDonough may have driven the 
car at times."  Nate had been stopped by police officers 
previously because Nate had driven his car more than 20 miles 
per hour over the speed limit. 
 
After meeting Nate, the girls attended a movie with Nate 
and another young male, Bruce MacConnell, who was 15 years 
old.  After the movie concluded, Becka spoke, by telephone, 
with her mother, Paula McDonough.  Becka either asked Paula 
McDonough if the girls could obtain a ride home with Nate, or 
Becka "informed . . . Paula McDonough that the girls were 
going to be driven [home] by [Nate]."  Even though the 
Kellermanns had instructed Paula McDonough that their 
daughter, Jaimee, "was not to be driven by any non-adult 
drivers," Paula McDonough "purposefully instructed or 
otherwise permitted the girls to go home with [Nate] in his 
car." 
 
Jaimee and Maddie did not want to ride in the car with 
Nate.  After learning that Paula McDonough had directed the 
girls to obtain a ride home with Nate, Jaimee and Maddie 
"separated from Becka McDonough, [Nate], and Bruce."  Jaimee 
and Maddie tried to contact, by telephone, Maddie's father, 
mother and brother.  Jaimee and Maddie were unable to contact 
them.  Jaimee and Maddie also tried to contact one other 
person, by telephone, but they were not successful. 
 
5
 
Jaimee and Maddie reluctantly got into Nate's car about 
10:00 p.m.  Nate began to "drive wildly."  "On a two-lane, 
winding road, [Nate] drove [his car] at speeds that at times 
approached or exceeded 80 miles per hour."  Jaimee and Maddie, 
"clutching each others['] hands in the back seat, begged 
[Nate] to slow down or to let them out.  At one point, while 
driving at or over 25 miles per hour, [Nate] opened his door 
and told Jaimee Kellermann and Maddie Lane they could get out 
of the moving car if they wished." 
 
"Fearing for her life, Jaimee Kellermann sent a 'text 
message' to her father and a friend.  She said to her friend 
in real-time messages that: she wanted to go home, that she 
wanted to get away from the 'guys,' and that she feared she 
would 'die.'  She also said that 'they're planning on street 
racing.' " 
 
As Nate drove his car, he approached oncoming "headlights 
in the distance.  [Nate] slammed on the brakes and pulled the 
hand brake.  [His] car skidded and the front end spun to the 
right side of the road, causing the rear left passenger side 
of the car, where Jaimee Kellermann was seated, [to leave the 
road and] slam into a tree.  The car recoiled off the tree and 
came to rest in the roadway.  The car left a skid mark 173 
feet long, and a 'yaw mark' that measured 92 feet."  When Nate 
 
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lost control of his car, he was traveling at least 77 miles 
per hour. 
 
Jaimee was transported by helicopter to the Virginia 
Commonwealth University Medical Center, where she died the 
next morning.  Paula McDonough was informed of the car 
accident and she went to the hospital.  She repeatedly told 
Maddie's parents "that she feared that she was 'going to be 
sued' for directing the girls to go in [Nate]'s car, which 
violated the Kellermann's clear instructions." 
IV. 
A. 
 
Kellermann argues that he pled a cause of action in tort 
against the McDonoughs and that they owed a duty of care to 
Jaimee.  Kellermann alleged that Jaimee was a 14-year-old 
minor; she was visiting the McDonoughs' home at their 
invitation; she was dependent upon the McDonoughs to make wise 
decisions about her care and safety; and the McDonoughs 
breached this duty of care.  Responding, the McDonoughs argue 
that they owed no duty of care to Jaimee, and hence the 
circuit court properly sustained their demurrer.  We disagree 
with the McDonoughs' argument. 
 
We have stated that a "plaintiff who seeks to establish 
actionable negligence must plead the existence of a legal 
duty, violation of that duty, and proximate causation which 
 
7
results in injury."  Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 
259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000); accord Marshall 
v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1990); Fox 
v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 73-74, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988); 
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365 
S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988); Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 
776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951). 
 
The issue whether a legal duty in tort exists is a pure 
question of law.  Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments, 
261 Va. 97, 106, 540 S.E.2d 134, 139 (2001); Burns v. Johnson, 
250 Va. 41, 45, 458 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1995).  If the 
allegations in a complaint are legally sufficient to establish 
the existence of a duty, then a jury, upon consideration of 
the evidence, must determine whether the duty has been 
performed.  Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 106, 540 S.E.2d at 139; 
Acme Markets, Inc. v. Remschel, 181 Va. 171, 178, 24 S.E.2d 
430, 434 (1943). 
 
The gist of Kellermann's claim against the McDonoughs is 
that they had a common law duty to supervise and care for 
Jaimee, a 14-year-old child who was dependent upon the 
McDonoughs' care and supervision.  We agree with Kellermann 
that he pled a common law cognizable cause of action in 
negligence against the McDonoughs.  We hold that when a parent 
relinquishes the supervision and care of a child to an adult 
 
8
who agrees to supervise and care for that child, the 
supervising adult must discharge that duty with reasonable 
care.  However, such adult who agrees to supervise and care 
for a child upon the relinquishment of that care and 
supervision by the child's parent is not an insurer of the 
child's safety.  Rather, the supervising adult must discharge 
his or her duties as a reasonably prudent person would under 
similar circumstances. 
In this case, Kellermann pled sufficient facts that 
support the existence of this common law duty.  As we have 
already stated, both Paula and Paul McDonough invited Jaimee 
to visit their family, and the McDonoughs knew Jaimee was a 
14-year-old child.  Kellermann alleged that Jaimee was in the 
care of the McDonoughs for approximately two days, that she 
was dependent upon their supervision and care, that they 
breached their duty to supervise and care for her, and that 
she died as a result of the McDonoughs' breaches of duty. 
 
We note that our holding is consistent with the majority 
rule embraced by most states that have considered the issue 
whether an adult who agrees to supervise and care for a minor 
has a duty in tort to exercise reasonable care in the 
supervision of that minor.  See e.g., Laite v. Baxter, 191 
S.E.2d 531, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (" 'measure of precaution 
which must be taken by one having a child in his care, who 
 
9
stands in no relation to the child except that he has 
undertaken to care for it, is that care which a prudent person 
would exercise under like circumstances' ") (citation 
omitted); Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285, 291 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1901) ("that which is ordinary care as respects adults, 
may not be as regards children; nevertheless, as regards 
children as well as adults, the care of persons having no 
special relation to them, required by law, is that which 
prudent people exercise under like circumstances"); Hernandez 
v. Toney, 289 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 1973) ("'[t]he 
general rule, however, is that a person who undertakes the 
control and supervision of a child has the duty to use 
reasonable care commensurate with the reasonably foreseeable 
risks of harm'"); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. 
1965) ("[e]ven without compensation, when defendants undertook 
to control a young child and provide care for her, they became 
responsible for her injury through their negligence" and "were 
required to use reasonable care to protect the infant 
plaintiff from injury"). 
 
If this Court were to agree with the McDonoughs, that 
they do not owe a duty in tort to supervise and care for a 
child whose parents have relinquished such supervision and 
control to them, such holding would yield absurd results.  For 
example, an adult who agreed to supervise and care for a group 
 
10
of four-year-old children could permit the youngsters to play 
in a street at a dangerous and busy intersection, and yet that 
supervising adult would not be subject to tort liability for 
her negligent supervision and care.  Additionally, under the 
McDonoughs' view of this case, an adult who agreed to baby-sit 
and care for a group of four-year-old boys in her home 
overnight could allow the boys to play with loaded pistols 
without being subject to any tort liability in the event one 
of the boys fired a pistol and killed another child. 
B. 
Kellermann argues that he pled sufficient facts in his 
complaint that would support a conclusion that Paul McDonough 
and Paula McDonough assumed a duty to Jaimee and that they 
were required to discharge that duty with reasonable care.  
Continuing, Kellermann asserts that the circuit court erred by 
sustaining the demurrer to his claim of assumption of a duty.  
Responding, the McDonoughs contend that Kellermann failed to 
plead a viable cause of action for assumption of a duty in 
tort by them.  Additionally, Paul McDonough assigns as cross-
error the circuit court's failure to sustain the demurrer 
filed on his behalf because the only allegations of alleged 
liability on his part regarding this claim involved the 
conduct of his wife. 
 
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This Court has recognized on many occasions that "[i]t is 
ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though 
gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting 
carefully, if he acts at all."  Nolde Bros. v. Wray, 221 Va. 
25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1980) (quoting Glanzer v. 
Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922)). We recently restated 
this principle in Fruiterman v. Granata, 276 Va. 629, 645, 668 
S.E.2d 127, 136 (2008) and Didato v. Strehler, 262 Va. 617, 
628, 554 S.E.2d 42, 48 (2001).  Accord Ring v. Poelman, 240 
Va. 323, 326, 397 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1990); Cofield v. Nuckles, 
239 Va. 186, 192, 387 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1990). 
 
In Didato, we observed that the common law principle of 
assumption of a duty is embodied in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 323: 
" 'One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the protection 
of the other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
perform his undertaking, if  
"(a)  his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
"(b)  the harm is suffered because of the 
other's reliance upon the undertaking.' " 
 
Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 48. 
Applying our well established jurisprudence, we hold that 
Kellermann pled a cause of action cognizable in tort against 
Paula McDonough on the theory that she assumed a duty to 
 
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Jaimee.  As we have already stated, Kellermann pled that he 
and his wife allowed their daughter, Jaimee, to spend a night 
at the McDonoughs' home in Henrico County.  Michael Kellermann 
specifically told Paula McDonough that Jaimee was "not to be 
driven by any inexperienced drivers" and he emphasized that 
Jaimee "was not to be in a car with any young, male drivers, 
stating 'no boys with cars.' "  Kellermann alleged that Paula 
McDonough agreed and said " 'don't worry, I promise we'll take 
good care of her,' or words to that effect."  Kellermann also 
alleged that Paula McDonough breached the duty that she 
assumed and, as a proximate cause of that breach, his daughter 
was killed in the car accident.  Hence, Kellermann pled that 
Paula McDonough undertook a duty to render services to Jaimee, 
that Paula McDonough breached this duty, and the breach was a 
proximate cause of Jaimee’s injuries and death. 
 
Kellermann, however, failed to plead a cause of action in  
tort based upon assumption of a duty against Paul McDonough.  
The complaint contains no allegations that would permit the 
finder of fact to find that Paul McDonough assumed any duty of 
care to Jaimee.  Indeed, according to the allegations in the 
complaint, Paul McDonough was not present when Paula McDonough 
assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent Jaimee 
from riding in cars driven by inexperienced drivers or young 
male drivers. 
 
13
Contrary to the assertion in Justice Kinser’s concurrence 
and dissent, Kellermann repeatedly contended in the circuit 
court and in this Court that the McDonoughs owed a common law 
duty of care to his daughter, Jaimee.  For example, Kellermann 
pled in his complaint that the McDonoughs “had a duty . . . to 
provide ordinary and reasonable care to Jaimee Kellermann.  
These duties included, but were not limited to, the obligation 
of the [McDonoughs] to exercise ordinary and reasonable care 
in transporting Jaimee Kellermann while she stayed at the 
McDonoughs’ home.”  Additionally, Kellermann alleged that the 
McDonoughs were negligent in “failing to exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care or otherwise failing to reasonably provide for 
the safety of Jaimee Kellermann.” 
Kellermann also asserted in the circuit court that the 
McDonoughs “owed clear duties to Jaimee Kellermann, including 
the duty to provide her with safe transportation and adequate 
supervision.”  Additionally, during a hearing in the circuit 
court, Kellermann argued that the McDonoughs owed numerous 
duties to Jaimee, including a duty to care for her.  
Kellermann stated that the McDonoughs, “when they took 
[Jaimee] in, had a duty to ensure that if she got ill, she[] 
[would] be taken to a doctor, to feed her, to give her 
shelter, and to provide her safe transportation.” 
 
14
In this Court, Kellermann asserts in an assignment of 
error that the circuit court erred by sustaining the demurrer 
to his negligence claim because he pled sufficient facts that 
constituted a sufficient cause of action against the 
McDonoughs.  Kellermann also argues in his brief, filed in 
this Court, that an adult who accepts responsibility for the 
supervision of a child has a duty to exercise reasonable care. 
Code § 8.01-384(A) states: 
“No party, after having made an objection or motion 
known to the court, shall be required to make such 
objection or motion again in order to preserve his 
right to appeal, challenge, or move for 
reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or action of 
the court. No party shall be deemed to have agreed 
to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial 
court so as to forfeit his right to contest such 
order on appeal except by express written agreement 
in his endorsement of the order. Arguments made at 
trial via written pleading, memorandum, recital of 
objections in a final order, oral argument reduced 
to transcript, or agreed written statements of facts 
shall, unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be 
deemed preserved therein for assertion on appeal.” 
 
We recently discussed this statute this year in Helms v. 
Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 6, 671 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2009).  We stated 
in Helms that “[o]nce a litigant informs the circuit court of 
his or her legal argument, ‘[i]n order for a waiver to occur 
within the meaning of Code § 8.01-384(A), the record must 
affirmatively show that the party who has asserted an 
objection has abandoned the objection or has demonstrated by 
his conduct the intent to abandon that objection.’ ”  Id. 
 
15
(quoting Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 127-28, 645 
S.E.2d 914, 917 (2007)); accord King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 
576, 581, 570 S.E.2d 863, 865-66 (2002); Chawla v. 
BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833 
(1998).  Based on the record, Kellermann raised the issue 
whether the McDonoughs owed a common law duty of care to 
Jaimee and Kellermann never waived this legal argument. 
C. 
 
Kellermann argues that the circuit court erred in 
sustaining the demurrer because the McDonoughs owed Jaimee a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in controlling the conduct of 
third parties to prevent her from harm.  We disagree with 
Kellermann's contention. 
 
We have consistently held that "generally a person does 
not have a duty to protect another from the conduct of third 
persons."  Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 49; accord 
Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 322, 626 S.E.2d 428, 
432 (2006); Delk, 259 Va. at 134-35, 523 S.E.2d at 832; A.H. 
v. Rockingham Publishing Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495 S.E.2d 
482, 485 (1998); Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 311, 421 
S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992).  However, this general rule does not 
apply when a special relationship exists between a defendant 
and a plaintiff that gives rise to a right to protection to 
the plaintiff or between the defendant and third persons that 
 
16
imposes a duty upon the defendant to control the conduct of 
the third person causing reasonably foreseeable danger to the 
plaintiff.  Taboada, 271 Va. at 323-24, 626 S.E.2d at 432-33; 
Didato, 262 Va. at 630, 554 S.E.2d at 49; Delk, 259 Va. at 
134-35, 523 S.E.2d at 832; A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 
485; Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 420. 
 
Examples of special relationships that we have recognized 
between a defendant and a plaintiff include common carrier-
passenger, business proprietor-invitee, innkeeper-guest, and 
employer-employee with regard to the employer's potential duty 
of protecting or warning an employee.  Even though this list 
of relationships that give rise to a special relationship is 
not exhaustive, A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485, we 
perceive of no reason to expand our jurisprudence regarding 
special relationships to include an adult who agrees to 
supervise and provide care to a minor.  Therefore, we hold 
that the circuit court did not err when it sustained the 
demurrer on this basis. 
 
In view of our holding that the Kellermanns have failed 
to establish a special relationship as we have defined this 
particular legal concept in our jurisprudence, proof of 
foreseeability in order to create a duty is not necessary.  
The duties that do exist in this case are a general duty of 
ordinary care and an assumed duty.  And, as discussed in part 
 
17
IV. D, infra, of this opinion, the Kellermanns must establish 
proximate causation in order to impose liability upon the 
McDonoughs. 
D. 
 
The McDonoughs argue that based upon the complaint, as a 
matter of law, Nate's "actions were the sole proximate cause 
of Jaimee Kellermann's death" and therefore, they could not be 
liable in tort to her.  We disagree with the McDonoughs. 
 
Generally, issues of negligence and proximate causation 
are questions of fact for the jury's determination.  Moses v. 
Southwestern Va. Transit Mgmt. Co., 273 Va. 672, 679, 643 
S.E.2d 156, 160 (2007); Jenkins v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128, 
465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996); Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524, 
531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1985); Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 
190, 200, 196 S.E. 613, 616 (1938).  "'The proximate cause of 
an event is that act or omission which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause, produces the event, and without which that event would 
not have occurred.'"  Beverly Enterprises-Virginia v. Nichols, 
247 Va. 264, 269, 441 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994) (quoting Coleman v. 
Blankenship Oil Corp., 221 Va. 124, 131, 267 S.E.2d 143, 147 
(1980)); accord Williams v. Le, 276 Va. 161, 167, 662 S.E.2d 
73, 77 (2008); Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 
851, 853 (1970).  There may be more than one proximate cause 
 
18
of an event.  Williams, 276 Va. at 167, 662 S.E.2d at 77; 
Atkinson v. Scheer, 256 Va. 448, 454, 508 S.E.2d 68, 71 
(1998); Panousos v. Allen, 245 Va. 60, 65, 425 S.E.2d 496, 499 
(1993); Coleman, 221 Va. at 131, 267 S.E.2d at 147.  "A 
subsequent proximate cause may or may not relieve a defendant 
of liability for his negligence."  Williams, 276 Va. at 167, 
662 S.E.2d at 77. 
 
We have stated: 
" 'In order to relieve a defendant of liability for 
his negligent act, the negligence intervening 
between the defendant's negligent act and the injury 
must so entirely supersede the operation of the 
defendant's negligence that it alone, without any 
contributing negligence by the defendant in the 
slightest degree, causes the injury.' " 
 
Atkinson, 256 Va. at 454, 508 S.E.2d at 71-72 (quoting 
Jenkins, 251 Va. at 129, 465 S.E.2d at 799) (emphasis 
omitted); accord Williams v. Joynes, 278 Va. 57, 63, 677 
S.E.2d 261, 264 (2009); Panousos, 245 Va. at 65, 425 S.E.2d at 
499; City of Richmond v. Gay, 103 Va. 320, 324, 49 S.E. 482, 
483 (1905).  We have emphasized that "a superseding cause of 
an injury 'constitutes a new effective cause and operates 
independently of any other act, making it and it only the 
proximate cause of injury.' "  Jenkins, 251 Va. at 129, 465 
S.E.2d at 799 (quoting Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 511, 
151 S.E.2d 339, 345 (1966)); accord Joynes, 278 Va. at 63, 677 
S.E.2d at 264; Atkinson, 256 Va. at 454, 508 S.E.2d at 72; 
 
19
Dickenson v. Tabb, 208 Va. 184, 191, 156 S.E.2d 795, 801 
(1967).  We also note that: 
"[N]ot every intervening cause is a superseding cause.  
In order to relieve a defendant of liability for his 
negligence, negligence intervening between the 
defendant's negligence and the injury 'must so entirely 
supersede the operation of the defendant's negligence 
that it alone, without the defendant's [negligence 
contributing] thereto in the slightest degree, produces 
the injury.'  Richmond v. Gay, 103 Va. 320, 324, 49 S.E. 
482, 483 (1905).  Furthermore, an intervening cause is 
not a superseding cause if it was 'put into operation by 
the defendant's wrongful act or omission.'  Jefferson 
Hospital, Inc. v. Van Lear, 186 Va. 74, 81, 41 S.E.2d 
441, 444 (1947)." 
 
Coleman, 221 Va. at 131, 267 S.E.2d at 147; accord Joynes, 278 
Va. at 63, 677 S.E.2d at 264. 
 
Based upon the above legal principles, if Kellermann 
presents evidence at a trial to prove the factual allegations 
in the complaint, and the jury finds that the McDonoughs 
breached their duty of care and supervision of Jaimee, a jury 
could also find that their breaches of duty constituted a 
proximate cause of Jaimee's death and that Nate's acts were 
not the sole proximate cause of her death.  Additionally, if a 
jury finds that Paula McDonough assumed a duty to Jaimee to 
exercise reasonable care to provide safe transportation for 
Jaimee and to prevent her from riding in cars with young males 
and Paula McDonough breached that duty, the jury could also 
find that Paula McDonough's breach of that duty was a 
proximate cause of Jaimee's death. 
 
20
V. 
 
In conclusion, we hold as follows.  Kellermann pled a 
cause of action for negligence against the McDonoughs because 
he alleged that they breached a common law duty in tort by 
failing to supervise and care for Jaimee when her parents 
relinquished supervision and care to the McDonoughs and the 
McDonoughs agreed to supervise and care for Jaimee.  
Kellermann also pled a viable cause of action against Paula 
McDonough on the basis that she assumed a duty to Jaimee.  
Kellermann failed to plead a cause of action based upon 
assumption of a duty against Paul McDonough and the circuit 
court erred by failing to sustain the demurrer on this basis.  
Paul McDonough and Paula McDonough did not have a special 
relationship with Jaimee and, therefore, they had no duty to 
protect her from the criminal acts of third parties based on 
this theory of negligence. Finally, Nate's acts did not 
constitute, as a matter of law, a superseding act between the 
McDonoughs' alleged negligent acts and Jaimee's death. 
We will remand this proceeding to the circuit court for a 
trial on Kellermann's claims of assumption of a duty against 
Paula McDonough and breach of a common law tort duty of 
supervision and care against both McDonoughs. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 and remanded. 
 
21
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  At its core, this case involves 
the tragic death of a fourteen year old child, Jaimee 
Elizabeth Kellermann, who died as a result of an automobile 
accident caused by the criminal acts of the juvenile operator 
of the vehicle in which she was a passenger during the time in 
which Jaimee was a social guest in the home of Paul and Paula 
McDonough, the parents of her friend Becka McDonough.  Today, 
for the first time in this Commonwealth, a majority of this 
Court under these factual circumstances fashions a generalized 
common law duty upon a host parent to “supervise and care” for 
a child guest “when a parent relinquishes the supervision and 
care of [that] child to an adult who agrees to supervise and 
care for that child.”  In my view, the majority’s 
characterization of this common law duty is too broad, both 
because in this case it is made applicable to the criminal 
acts of a third party not occurring on the premises of the 
host parent and also because it implicitly makes the host 
parent the virtual insurer of the guest child’s safety despite 
the majority’s disclaimer to the contrary. 
Justice Kinser in her dissenting opinion in this case 
takes a persuasive view that the common law duty to supervise 
and care for Jaimee now fashioned by the majority in this case 
 
22
is not a theory of liability before this Court in this appeal.  
Indeed, Justice Kinser correctly observes that the circuit 
court when ruling on the McDonoughs’ demurrer specifically 
identified the issues to be resolved as those involving a 
“special relationship” from which a duty to protect Jaimee 
might arise and proximate cause.  The theory of liability 
premised upon a special relationship upon which a duty to 
protect a person from the criminal acts of a third party can 
arise is distinctly different from a theory of liability 
premised upon the assumption of a specific duty to care and 
protect another.  In this case, there is no dispute that 
Michael H. Kellermann, in his capacity as the administrator of 
Jaimee’s estate, asserted both of these theories of liability 
against the McDonoughs.  However, because the majority also 
addresses the theory of a common law duty and I cannot concur 
with the majority’s analysis of that issue, I write separately 
here on that issue. 
In Virginia, we adhere to the rule that “[g]enerally, a 
person does not have a duty to protect another from the 
conduct of third persons.”  Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000).  While we 
have recognized a narrow exception to this general rule when a 
“special relationship” exists between the defendant and the 
plaintiff, see, e.g., Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va. 
 
23
121, 129, 540 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2001), in the present case 
neither the plaintiff nor the majority is able to cite to any 
prior decision of this Court which, in the absence of a 
finding of a special relationship, creates an exception to 
this general rule in the context of a guest child and host 
adult with regard to the criminal acts of a third person 
causing harm to the child.  Additionally, it is notable that 
the cases relied upon by the majority provide little, if any, 
support for a holding that essentially creates a broad 
exception to this general rule. 
Laite v. Baxter, 191 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972), 
involved a twelve year old boy who died from injuries he 
received when he slipped and fell on wet rocks below a dam 
while he was on an outing as the guest of the parents of his 
friend.  While recognizing a general rule that “a person who 
undertakes the control and supervision of a child, even 
without compensation, has the duty to use reasonable care to 
protect the child from injury,” the court stressed that such a 
person “is required only to use reasonable care commensurate 
with the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm” to the child.  
Id. at 534.  In finding no liability on the part of the 
supervising adult, the court reasoned that the danger of the 
wet rocks was open and obvious, that the child appreciated 
that danger and, thus, that the incident was “nothing more 
 
24
than an accident, for which no one can be held [liable].”  Id. 
at 536.  Laite, unlike the present case, did not involve the 
criminal acts of a third party. 
Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1901), 
involved a two year old child who fell into a tub of hot water 
on the floor of the kitchen and died as a result of her 
injuries while a guest in the home of an adult who used the 
hot water for housecleaning purposes.  In finding no liability 
on the part of the adult, the court reasoned that placing 
“tubs of hot water upon a floor of the kitchen, to which small 
children have access, for the purpose of cleaning the room, is 
an ordinary occurrence, and an act such as prudent people 
perform in the discharge of household duties.”  Id. at 290.  
Again, unlike the present case, Putney did not involve the 
criminal acts of a third party. 
Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1965), involved a 
four year old child who was injured when a faulty swing set on 
the defendants’ premises fell on her during the time the 
defendants had assumed the duty to care for the child while 
her mother was at work.  Id. at 313.  The court held that the 
defendants owed a duty to maintain their premises in a 
reasonably safe condition, and they had breached that duty.  
Id.  Again, Zalak was a premises liability case and did not 
involve the criminal acts of a third party. 
 
25
Finally, the majority cites Hernandez v. Toney, 289 So.2d 
318 (La. Ct. App. 1973), which involved a young child who was 
injured when he left the fenced playground of the apartment 
complex in which he lived with his mother and was accidentally 
struck and injured by a car driven by a third person in a 
nearby parking lot.  One of the defendants was the apartment 
manager who had ordered the child to leave the playground 
after observing the child throwing dirt in the face of the 
manager’s child.  The court reasoned that the manager 
“undertook control and supervision of [the child, and] assumed 
the duty to use reasonable care to protect the child from 
injury,” and he “breached this duty by ordering [the child] 
from the fenced playground without escorting him the short 
distance to his home or notifying his mother that he was no 
longer in the playground.”  Id. at 321.  The court further 
reasoned that the manager “could easily have foreseen the 
result of his action.”  Id.  In Hernandez, the driver of the 
vehicle was not found to be negligent.  Id. at 323.  At best, 
Hernandez supports a finding of a duty of care when the 
supervising adult assumes a specific duty of care. 
In the present case, the majority concludes that “we 
perceive of no reason to expand our jurisprudence regarding 
special relationships to include an adult who agrees to 
supervise and provide care to a minor.”  I agree and need not 
 
26
unnecessarily lengthen this opinion by repeating the 
majority’s citations to our prior cases that support this 
conclusion.  However, it is to be noted that our prior cases 
make clear that it is the finding of a special relationship 
between a defendant and a plaintiff that gives rise to a duty 
upon the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the harmful 
acts of a third person, and that duty is an exception to the 
general rule that no such duty exists at common law.  In this 
regard, we have cautioned that application of exceptions to 
this general rule “is always fact specific and, thus, not 
amenable to a bright-line rule for resolution.”  Yuzefovsky v. 
St. John’s Wood Apartments, 261 Va. 97, 106, 540 S.E.2d 134, 
139 (2001).  We have also cautioned that each particular 
factual circumstance must be carefully analyzed “to avoid 
permitting the narrow exception to swallow the general rule.”  
Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 261 Va. 133, 139, 540 
S.E.2d 129, 132-33 (2001). 
In this case it has been determined that no “special 
relationship” existed between Jaimee and the McDonoughs in her 
capacity as a guest in their home.  Jaimee was fatally injured 
as a result of the criminal acts of a third person.  Those 
acts did not occur on the premises or in the presence of the 
McDonoughs.  Nor were those acts committed by a person under 
the control of the McDonoughs.  Until today, under such 
 
27
factual circumstances, our prior cases have not recognized an 
exception to the general rule that a person does not have a 
duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third 
person.  In my view, to fashion a generalized, common law duty 
to “supervise and care” for a child guest, such as Jaimee, 
upon adult hosts, such as the McDonoughs, so as to impose 
potential liability upon the adult hosts for the criminal acts 
of a third party which harm the child under the circumstances 
of the present case effectively permits an exception to 
swallow the general rule.  Accordingly, I would hold that 
Kellermann did not plead a viable cause of action against the 
McDonoughs on the basis that they breached a duty in tort by 
failing to supervise and care for Jaimee. 
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience that 
parents frequently invite friends of their children to visit 
in their homes as their guests for periods of time.  
Certainly, such visits can be both enjoyable and beneficial to 
the children.  While the parents undoubtedly assume a degree 
of responsibility for the care and safety of the guest 
children during these visits, the parents, as recognized by 
the majority in this case, are not the insurers of these 
childrens’ safety during the visits.  The duty to “supervise 
and care” fashioned by the majority in this case, however, is 
potentially broad enough to bring that proposition into 
 
28
serious question.  I simply take this opportunity to assure 
host parents in this Commonwealth that the host parent in this 
case, Paula McDonough, assumed a specific duty not to permit 
her guest child to be transported by a juvenile driver and her 
potential liability for breaching that duty, if proven at 
trial, does not make her an insurer of the guest child’s 
safety, and I am confident that the majority does not intend 
to suggest otherwise. 
I respectfully concur with that portion of the majority’s 
opinion holding that Kellermann failed to plead a viable cause 
of action against Paul and Paula McDonough on the basis that 
they had a special relationship with Jaimee and, therefore, 
they had a duty to protect her from the criminal acts of a 
third party.  I also concur with those portions of the opinion 
holding that Kellermann pled a viable cause of action against 
Paula, and not Paul, on the basis of assumption of a specific 
duty to Jaimee and that the acts of the third party did not 
constitute, as a matter of law, a superseding act between 
Paula’s alleged negligence and Jaimee’s death. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
The threshold question in any negligence case is whether 
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.  Burns v. 
Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 44, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995).  The 
 
29
majority addresses three sources of duty that it concludes are 
at issue in this appeal: (1) a common law duty to supervise 
and care for a minor child during a social visit; (2) an 
assumption of duty; and (3) a special relationship.  Michael 
H. Kellermann, Administrator of the Estate of Jaimee Elizabeth 
Kellermann, has asserted, however, only two bases for 
liability, assumption of duty and special relationship, before 
both the circuit court and this Court.  Without explanation, 
the majority is departing from the well-established principle 
that "an appellate court may not reverse a judgment of the 
trial court based upon an alleged error in a decision that was 
not made or upon an issue that was not presented."  McDonald 
v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249, 255, 645 S.E.2d 918, 921 (2007).  
Thus, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that Kellermann pled a common law duty on the part of Paul and 
Paula McDonough to supervise and care for Jaimee during her 
visit with the McDonoughs.  I concur in the majority's holding 
with regard to the theories of liability based on assumption 
of duty and special relationship.  I will address each source 
of duty seriatim. 
 
30
I. COMMON LAW DUTY 
To demonstrate why a common law duty to supervise and 
care for Jaimee is not a theory of liability before us in this 
appeal, I will first discuss the proceedings in the circuit 
court and Kellermann's arguments before that court, and then 
turn to his arguments in this Court. 
In his wrongful death action, Kellermann alleged in the 
complaint that, by the McDonoughs' inviting Jaimee to their 
home for an overnight visit, "a special relationship of care 
and trust" existed between the McDonoughs and the Kellermanns.  
Kellermann claimed this special relationship gave rise to a 
"duty to warn the Kellermanns and/or protect Jaimee Kellermann 
from the danger of harm caused by the reasonably foreseeable 
wrongful acts of others." 
Continuing, Kellermann asserted that since Paula 
"agree[d] to comply with the Kellermanns' directive" that 
Jaimee was not to be in a vehicle with a young male driver, 
the McDonoughs "were required to provide or otherwise ensure 
transportation by an experienced, responsible, and safe 
driver."  Kellermann claimed "the McDonoughs failed to provide 
safe transportation" for Jaimee when "the Defendants, through 
Defendant Paula McDonough, knowingly, consciously, and 
purposefully instructed or otherwise permitted [Jaimee] to go 
home with [Nate] DeFrank in his car."  Additionally, 
 
31
Kellermann alleged that the McDonoughs agreed "to take Jaimee 
Kellermann into Defendants' care" and "promis[ed] Kellermann 
to provide Jaimee Kellermann with responsible, adult 
supervision." 
Finally, Kellermann alleged that the McDonoughs were 
"negligent and/or grossly negligent . . . by failing to use 
ordinary and reasonable care in transporting [Jaimee] or 
otherwise providing for her safe transportation."  The 
McDonoughs' breach of these duties, according to Kellermann, 
was a proximate cause of Jaimee's death.1 
In response to the complaint, the McDonoughs filed a 
demurrer, claiming, among other things, that Kellermann failed 
to state a cause of action because no duty extended from the 
McDonoughs to either Jaimee or her parents.  In response, 
Kellermann asserted a special relationship arose between 
Jaimee and the McDonoughs; "[c]onsequently, the McDonoughs 
willingly assumed a myriad of duties to Jaimee and her parents 
– among them to feed her, to take her to a doctor if she 
became ill, to drive her in a safe manner and to look out for 
her welfare like a parent would."  The circuit court denied 
the demurrer despite its "serious reservations as to whether a 
                     
1 Kellermann also alleged breach of an express contract, 
breach of an implied contract, and breach of implied 
warranties. The circuit court sustained the demurrer as to 
these counts, and they are not before us in this appeal. 
 
32
third party, as in this case, can be liable without more in a 
non-paid in loco parentis arrangement."  The court concluded 
that the negligence claim could go forward if Kellermann could 
prove a special relationship existed between the McDonoughs 
and the Kellermanns. 
After filing their answer to the complaint, the 
McDonoughs filed a motion to revive their demurrer and a 
motion for summary judgment.  In support of both motions, the 
McDonoughs asserted that, as a matter of law, they owed no 
duty to protect Jaimee from the criminal acts of third parties 
on the night of the accident because no special relationship 
arose between the McDonoughs and Jaimee.  They also claimed 
that their alleged negligent conduct was not a proximate cause 
of the accident and Jaimee's death.  Finally, the McDonoughs 
asserted the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to 
show that Paul had any involvement in the arrangements for 
Jaimee's visit or participated in the decision to allow the 
girls to ride in the vehicle driven by DeFrank. 
Kellermann opposed the motions.  He claimed that a 
special relationship did exist between the McDonoughs and 
Jaimee.  Kellermann also asserted that the McDonoughs 
voluntarily "assumed a duty to care for and protect Jaimee 
Kellermann, including a duty to provide safe transportation 
for her." 
 
33
In a letter opinion, the circuit court enumerated the 
issues before it: 
1. Whether or not a "special relationship" exists 
between the [Kellermanns] and the Defendants. 
 
2. If a special relationship existed, whether or not 
a duty was placed upon the Defendants while 
acting in loco parentis of the minor during the 
weekend visitation. 
 
3. Generally, whether or not there is any basis for 
proximate cause of the accident by Defendants. 
 
The circuit court concluded that "the law in Virginia does not 
recognize [a special] relationship creating a duty on the 
[McDonoughs] that would lead to [the] proximate cause of this 
accident."  Thus, the court sustained the demurrer without 
addressing the remaining two issues. 
In my view, it is clear from the pleadings, the parties' 
arguments, and the circuit court's findings that Kellermann 
never asserted or relied on a common law duty to supervise and 
care for a minor.  The primary focus in the circuit court was 
on the issue concerning whether a special relationship existed 
between the McDonoughs and Jaimee.  Kellermann also 
specifically argued the McDonoughs assumed a duty to care for 
and protect Jaimee.  The common law duty addressed by the 
majority was not mentioned by anyone. 
On appeal to this Court, Kellermann argues "the 
McDonoughs assumed willingly a myriad of duties to Jaimee – 
 
34
among them, to feed her, to give her shelter in their house, 
to take her to a doctor . . . if she became ill, to drive her 
in a safe manner, to look out for her welfare, and to protect 
her from harm."  Kellermann states the McDonoughs "voluntarily 
took upon themselves" responsibility for Jaimee and "assumed, 
temporarily, at the least the minimum duty to exercise 
ordinary care for [Jaimee's] safety."  Kellermann also asserts 
additional duties on the part of the McDonoughs because a 
special relationship existed between them and Jaimee. 
In support of his argument regarding assumption of duty, 
Kellermann cites this Court's decision in Didato v. Strehler, 
262 Va. 617, 554 S.E.2d 42 (2001) and Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 323.  With regard to the issue of special 
relationship, Kellermann relies on many of this Court's 
decisions discussing special relationships that give rise to 
an affirmative duty to protect an individual from the 
reasonably foreseeable wrongful acts of a third party.  See, 
e.g., Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 626 S.E.2d 428 
(2006); Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 540 
S.E.2d 123 (2001). 
While I believe there can be no confusion about 
Kellermann's theories of liability, if there is any, he 
resolves it in his reply brief.  There, Kellermann expressly 
refers to "the two bases for negligence liability in this 
 
35
case."  Again relying on Didato and Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 323, the first theory of liability, argues Kellermann, 
is based on the McDonoughs' own negligent conduct, which 
Kellermann describes as the McDonoughs' undertaking "to 
supervise and care for Jaimee during her weekend stay at their 
home (an obligation that they assumed voluntarily and had 
acted upon), including agreeing to provide safe transportation 
(free of boys with cars[])."  Continuing, Kellermann argues: 
"[The McDonoughs] failed to exercise reasonable care in that 
undertaking; this failure increased the risk of harm to Jaimee 
. . . and led to her tragic death.  This basis of liability 
comes from [the McDonoughs'] affirmative decision to put 
[Jaimee] into harm's way."  Then, Kellermann states: "The 
second basis for liability is founded on the well-recognized 
'special relationship' exception to the rule that, generally, 
one does not have a duty to protect another from the wrongful 
conduct of a third person." 
Nowhere before this Court has Kellermann relied on a 
theory of liability based on the common law duty used by 
the majority as the basis of its decision.  Even assuming 
Kellermann initially pled such a duty in his complaint, 
he has since waived it by failing to assert that legal 
position in the proceedings in the circuit court and now 
in this Court.  In any event, he affirmatively abandoned 
 
36
any such theory in his reply brief when he specifically 
articulated only two bases for liability.  The Court 
therefore cannot and should not reach the issue.  Rule 
5:17(c)(4); see McDonald, 274 Va. at 255, 645 S.E.2d at 
921 ("the arguments of the parties on appeal . . . must 
be limited to issues preserved in the trial court . . . 
and to issues presented before the appellate courts[;] an 
appellate court may not reverse a judgment of the trial 
court based upon an alleged error in a decision that was 
not made or upon an issue that was not presented"); 
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 127-28, 645 S.E.2d 
914, 917 (2007) (waiver occurs if the record 
affirmatively shows a party has abandoned an objection or 
has demonstrated by conduct an intention to abandon the 
objection); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 436, 304 
S.E.2d 271, 278 (1983) (an issue not raised or ruled on 
by a trial court will not be noticed on appeal); Thrasher 
v. Thrasher, 210 Va. 624, 628-29, 172 S.E.2d 771, 774 
(1970) (a question not raised in the trial court and upon 
which the record contains no evidence will not be 
considered on appeal); Allaun v. First & Merchs. Nat'l 
Bank of Richmond, 190 Va. 104, 113, 56 S.E.2d 83, 88 
(1949) (a claim not decided by the trial court will not 
be addressed on appeal). 
 
37
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
finding that Kellermann pled the existence of a common law 
duty to supervise and care for Jaimee.2  I firmly believe that 
this Court's Rules must be applied consistently.  Otherwise, 
our decisions become arbitrary. 
II. ASSUMPTION OF DUTY 
Relying on this Court's decision in Didato and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, Kellermann argues the 
McDonoughs undertook the responsibility to care for, 
supervise, and provide safe transportation for Jaimee during 
her overnight visit, thereby assuming a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in performing the undertaking.  He further 
claims the McDonoughs failed to exercise reasonable care in 
                     
2 In light of my conclusion on this issue, it is not 
necessary to address the majority's holding that "an adult who 
agrees to supervise and care for a minor has a duty in tort to 
exercise reasonable care in the supervision of that minor."  I 
do, however, wholeheartedly agree with Justice Koontz' 
dissenting opinion regarding this common law duty. As Justice 
Koontz correctly explains, the cases upon which the majority 
relies, Laite v. Baxter, 191 S.E.2d 531, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1972); Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1901); Hernandez v. Toney, 289 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 
1973); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. 1965), did 
not involve a duty to supervise and care for a minor in the 
context of protecting that minor from the wrongful or 
negligent acts of a third party, which is the only duty 
allegedly breached by the McDonoughs in this case.  Given the 
nature of the alleged breach, the majority is giving 
Kellermann the benefit of a common law duty to protect against 
the wrongful acts of a third party without the attendant 
restrictions concerning foreseeability that govern liability 
 
38
carrying out that undertaking when they allowed Jaimee to ride 
in a vehicle driven by DeFrank and that such failure increased 
the risk of harm to Jaimee, leading to her death. 
In Didato, the Court decided, among other things, whether 
the plaintiffs stated cognizable causes of action against the 
defendant healthcare providers on the theory that they had 
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
communication of certain medical information to the plaintiffs 
even if no duty existed prior to the undertaking to render 
services.  262 Va. at 627-28, 554 S.E.2d at 47.  The Court 
concluded "the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts which, if 
proven at trial, would permit the finder of fact to conclude 
that the defendants assumed the duty to convey to the 
plaintiffs the correct results of [a medical test]."  Id. at 
629, 554 S.E.2d at 48.  The Court reiterated the legal 
principle that "'[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes 
to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject 
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.'"3  Id. at 
628, 554 S.E.2d at 48 (quoting Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Wray, 221 
Va. 25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1980) (quoting Glanzer v. 
                                                                
based on a special relationship.  A.H. v. Rockingham Publ'g 
Co., 255 Va. 216, 220-21, 495 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1998). 
3 This principle is often referred to as the "negligent 
undertaking doctrine" or the "Good Samaritan" rule.  See 
Mukthar v. Latin Am. Sec. Serv., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 566 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
39
Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922))); accord Fruiterman v. 
Granata, 276 Va. 629, 645, 668 S.E.2d 127, 136 (2008); Ring v. 
Poelman, 240 Va. 323, 326, 397 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1990); Cofield 
v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 192, 387 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1990). 
Additionally, the Court referenced with approval 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the protection 
of the other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
perform his undertaking, if 
 
(a) his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the 
other's reliance upon the undertaking. 
 
Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 48. 
In Fruiterman, the Court further explained that, for an 
assumption of duty to occur in the physician-patient context, 
"a physician [must] personally engage[] in some affirmative 
act amounting to a render[ing of] services to another."  276 
Va. at 646, 668 S.E.2d at 137 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original).  
Whether in a physician-patient context or some other 
circumstance, the threshold requirement for liability under 
the voluntary undertaking theory is that the defendant must 
specifically undertake to perform the task with which he or 
she is charged as having performed without reasonable care.  
 
40
Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implant Recipients v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 113 F.3d 1484, 1493 (8th Cir. 1997); Patentas v. United 
States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3rd Cir. 1982); Artiglio v. Corning 
Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Cal. 1998); Rogers v. Clark Equip. 
Co., 744 N.E.2d 364, 368-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Lather v. 
Berg, 519 N.E.2d 755, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); South v. 
McCarter, 119 P.3d 1, 16-17 (Kan. 2005).4  Without the 
defendant's actual undertaking to render a service, there is 
no correlative duty to perform the undertaking with reasonable 
care.  See South, 119 P.3d at 17.  The extent of the 
undertaking defines the scope of a defendant's duty.  TMJ 
Implant Recipients, 113 F.3d at 1493; Margaret W. v. Kelley 
R., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); McGee v. 
Chalfant, 806 P.2d 980, 983 (Kan. 1991). 
The Court has not previously defined the phrase 
"voluntary undertaking," nor has the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.  One court, however, concluded "voluntarily undertaking 
a duty requires some sort of affirmative acknowledgment or 
recognition of the duty by the party who undertakes the duty; 
                     
4 Some of these cases discuss Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 324A instead of § 323.  While the sections state 
somewhat different rules, both pertain to a person who 
voluntarily undertakes to render services to another and 
provide that a person may be liable for failing to take 
reasonable care in performing the undertaking.  See Browne v. 
Turner Constr. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 433, 443 & n.4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
 
41
in other words, there must be a showing of the party's intent 
to undertake the duty."  Rogers, 744 N.E.2d at 368-69.  
Another court stated, "the term 'undertaking' is potentially 
somewhat ambiguous, since it may refer either to a promise 
that one will do a thing, or to an actual endeavor or setting-
out to do the thing."  Browne v. Turner Constr. Co., 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 433, 443 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 323, caveat (expressing no 
opinion whether "the making of a contract, or a gratuitous 
promise, without in any way entering upon performance, is a 
sufficient undertaking to result in liability").  I therefore 
conclude, as indicated in Fruiterman, 276 Va. at 646, 668 
S.E.2d at 137, that, in order to have a voluntary undertaking, 
a party must engage in an affirmative act that amounts to a 
rendering of services to another and demonstrates the party's 
intent to undertake a duty. 
Although Kellermann argues that the McDonoughs undertook 
the responsibility to care for, supervise, and provide safe 
transportation for Jaimee during her overnight visit, his 
factual allegations concerning the alleged undertaking are not 
so broad in scope.  Kellermann specifically alleged that, when 
he asked Paula about what activities were planned during 
Jaimee's visit, he told Paula that Jaimee was not "to be 
driven by any inexperienced drivers" and "emphasized that his 
 
42
daughter was not to be in a car with any young, male drivers, 
stating 'no boys with cars.' "  According to Kellermann, Paula 
"agreed," and said, " '[D]on't worry, I promise we'll take 
good care of her.' " 
Accepting these allegations as true, see Taboada, 271 Va. 
at 317, 626 S.E.2d at 429, I conclude that Paula, by agreeing 
to comply with Kellermann's directive that Jaimee not be 
allowed to ride in a vehicle driven by an inexperienced and/or 
young male driver, and then taking Jaimee with her and her 
daughter, Becca McDonough,5 to Henrico County for the overnight 
visit, engaged in an affirmative act that amounted to the 
rendering of a service to Jaimee and demonstrated Paula's 
intent to assume a duty to protect Jaimee from inexperienced 
and/or young male drivers.  See Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 
S.W.2d 298, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding the defendant 
assumed a duty to protect the plaintiff from attacks by third 
persons as the defendant's employee assured the plaintiff 
someone would be present and would help her unload her donated 
merchandise because the plaintiff was reluctant to go to the 
rear of the shop alone due to the character of the 
neighborhood). 
                     
5 Although Kellermann initially spelled her name "Becka" 
in his pleadings below, he has conformed his spelling of Becca 
to the McDonoughs' spelling of their daughter's name in the 
briefs before this Court. 
 
43
By this conclusion, I am not suggesting that any time a 
parent invites his or her child's friend for a social visit 
and assures the friend's parents that the friend will be 
supervised and cared for, that parent has voluntarily 
undertaken to protect the child from the wrongful acts of 
third persons and thereby assumed a duty of care.  My 
conclusion in the case before us is based on the particular 
allegations in the complaint, which if proven at trial, would 
sustain a factfinder's determination that Paula voluntarily 
and affirmatively undertook to protect Jaimee from a very 
specific risk of harm, i.e., the risk of harm associated with 
riding in a vehicle driven by an inexperienced and/or young 
male driver.  The scope of her undertaking was narrow and 
defined the extent of her duty to exercise due care in 
performing the undertaking.  See South, 119 P.3d at 16 ("The 
extent of the undertaking defines the scope of the duty.").  
Thus, I concur with the majority in this regard and conclude 
that Kellermann stated a cause of action against Paula based 
on the theory of assumption of duty.  
I also concur with the majority's decision as to Paul.  
As the McDonoughs assert in their assignment of cross-
error, the complaint contains no factual allegations that 
Paul engaged in any undertaking to protect Jaimee from 
inexperienced and/or young male drivers.  He was not 
present when Paula met Kellermann halfway between their 
respective homes and was not a party to the conversation 
when Paula agreed to Kellermann's directive regarding 
Jaimee.  Paul's knowledge of and assent to Jaimee's 
 
44
overnight visit were not affirmative acts amounting to 
the rendering of a service to Jaimee and did not 
demonstrate any intent by Paul to undertake a duty to 
protect.  Thus, I conclude that Kellermann did not state 
a cause of action with regard to Paul. 
Before addressing the issue of special relationship, I 
find it appropriate at this juncture to turn to the 
McDonoughs' remaining assignment of cross-error.  Relying on 
Robinson v. Matt Mary Moran, Inc., 259 Va. 412, 525 S.E.2d 559 
(2000), and Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 422 S.E.2d 765 
(1992), the McDonoughs contend Paula's decision granting 
permission for Jaimee to ride in the vehicle driven by DeFrank 
was not a proximate cause of Jaimee's death.  In response, 
Kellermann asserts the issue of proximate cause is generally a 
question of fact for the jury to decide.  I agree with 
Kellermann. 
In Robinson, this Court held that the act of selling 
alcoholic beverages, even to an intoxicated person under the 
age of 21, is "too remote to be a proximate cause of an injury 
to a third party resulting from the negligent conduct of the 
purchaser of the beverages."  259 Va. at 417, 525 S.E.2d at 
562; accord Williamson v. The Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 
353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1986).  Thus, the plaintiff's 
pleading in that case was insufficient as a matter of law 
because the defendant's act of serving alcohol to an 
individual who subsequently drove an automobile negligently, 
 
45
resulting in an accident, was not a proximate cause of the 
passenger's death.  Robinson, 259 Va. at 417, 525 S.E.2d at 
562. 
Likewise in Turner, which involved a claim against two 
parents for the alleged negligent entrustment of an automobile 
to their son, the Court stated that "the plaintiff must prove 
that the negligent entrustment of the motor vehicle to the 
tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the accident."  244 Va. at 
557, 422 S.E.2d at 767 (citations omitted).  This Court 
concluded that there was no allegation that the son's "conduct 
in prior accidents was negligent or that his accident with 
[the plaintiff] was a proximate cause of similar negligence."  
Id. at 558, 422 S.E.2d at 768. 
Neither of these cases is analogous to the factual 
scenario presented in the case before us.  According to the 
allegations in Kellermann's complaint, Paula undertook the 
responsibility to protect Jaimee from the specific danger 
associated with riding in a vehicle operated by an 
inexperienced and/or a young male driver.  Paula allegedly 
failed to perform that particular undertaking with due care.  
Thus, I cannot say in this context that Paula's decision 
allowing Jaimee to ride in the vehicle driven by DeFrank is 
too remote, as a matter of law, to constitute a proximate 
cause of Jaimee's death. 
 
46
A proximate cause of an event is that "act or omission 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and without 
which that event would not have occurred."  Beale v. Jones, 
210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970); accord Jenkins 
v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996); Banks 
v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135, 348 S.E.2d 280, 282 
(1986). Generally, the issue of proximate causation is a 
question of fact to be resolved by a jury.  Jenkins, 251 Va. 
at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 
524, 531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1985)).  In this case, it is a 
question for the jury to decide.  Thus, I concur with the 
majority in holding the circuit court did not err by failing 
to sustain the demurrer on this basis. 
III. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
Kellermann argues that, based on the particular facts of 
this case, a special relationship existed between the 
McDonoughs and Jaimee because the McDonoughs invited Jaimee to 
their home for an overnight visit and undertook the 
responsibility of caring for and supervising her.  Thus, 
according to Kellermann, this special relationship gave rise 
to an affirmative duty to protect Jaimee from the reasonably 
foreseeable wrongful acts of third persons.  The McDonoughs 
counter that, while this Court has recognized certain 
 
47
categories of special relationships, such as business 
invitor/invitee, innkeeper/guest, common carrier/passenger, 
and employer/employee, the "social host/sleepover" situation 
alleged here is not a recognized special relationship. 
"Generally, a person does not have a duty to protect 
another from the conduct of third persons."  Delk v. 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 
826, 830 (2000).  There is, however, an exception to this 
general rule "when a special relationship exists (1) between 
the defendant and the plaintiff which gives rise to a right to 
protection to the plaintiff, or (2) between the defendant and 
the third person which imposes a duty upon the defendant to 
control the third person's conduct."  Id. at 132, 523 S.E.2d 
at 830-31; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315.  We 
have recognized that a special relationship may exist between 
a particular plaintiff and defendant "either as a matter of 
law or because of the particular factual circumstances in a 
given case, which may give rise to a duty of care on the part 
of the defendant to warn and/or protect the plaintiff against 
the danger of harm from the reasonably foreseeable criminal 
acts committed by a third person."  Thompson, 261 Va. at 129, 
540 S.E.2d at 127.  In that regard, the "special relationships 
that may create a duty of care include those of common carrier 
and passenger, business proprietor and invitee, innkeeper and 
 
48
guest, and employer and employee."  Yuzefovsky v. St. John's 
Wood Apts., 261 Va. 97, 108, 540 S.E.2d 134, 140 (2001); see 
also A.H. v. Rockingham Publ'g Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495 
S.E.2d 482, 485 (1998).  This list, however, is not exclusive 
and the determination whether a special relationship exists is 
fact-specific.  See Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at 
140. 
Because the imposition of a duty of care to warn and/or 
protect a plaintiff from the reasonably foreseeable danger of 
harm from the criminal acts of a third party is an exception 
to the general tort rule, the Court must carefully analyze 
each particular fact pattern so as "to avoid permitting the 
narrow exception to swallow the general rule."  Dudas v. 
Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 261 Va. 133, 139, 540 S.E.2d 129, 
132-33 (2001).  Additionally, " 'in determining whether a duty 
exists, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden 
of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that 
burden on the defendant must be taken into account.  
Imposition of a duty does not depend upon foreseeability 
alone.' "  Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 
S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974) (quoting Trice v. Chicago Housing 
Auth., 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)); accord 
Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 531, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1987). 
 
49
Aside from the traditional type of special relationships 
that the Court has recognized, see Taboada, 271 Va. at 326, 
626 S.E.2d at 434 (innkeeper/guest); Thompson, 261 Va. at 129, 
540 S.E.2d at 127 (business invitor/invitee); A.H., 255 Va. at 
220, 495 S.E.2d at 485 (employer/employee); Hines v. Garrett, 
131 Va. 125, 137, 108 S.E. 690, 693-94 (1921) (common 
carrier/passenger), the Court has, in only two instances, 
found that a special relationship existed between a defendant 
and a plaintiff that gave rise to a duty to protect based on 
the particular factual scenario presented.6  In the first case, 
Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 311, 421 S.E.2d 419, 420 
(1992), a deputy sheriff failed to render assistance to and/or 
protect a citizen who was being assaulted by a third person 
even when the citizen asked for help.  The deputy sheriff knew 
the assailant and the victim and witnessed part of a first 
attack and all of a second attack.  Id. 
The issue before this Court was twofold: (1) whether a 
special relationship existed between the deputy sheriff and 
the victim that "gave rise to a special duty" on the part of 
the deputy sheriff to protect the victim; and (2) whether the 
                     
6 The Court, however, also held that a special 
relationship may arise between a defendant and a third party 
by the defendant's taking charge of the third party, which 
therefore creates a duty to control the third party's conduct.  
See, e.g., Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond, 
Inc., 241 Va. 270, 279-80, 401 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1991). 
 
50
deputy sheriff "reasonably could have foreseen that he would 
be expected to take affirmative action to protect" the citizen 
from harm.  Id. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421.  Because the deputy 
sheriff was on duty at the time, the Court concluded it could 
be reasonably inferred that he was armed and possessed the 
capabilities to subdue the assailant.  Based on the particular 
facts alleged, the Court held that "a special relation existed 
between [the deputy sheriff and the citizen] which imposed a 
duty upon [the deputy sheriff] to render assistance to [the 
citizen]."  Id.  The Court further held that the case "falls 
within one of the exceptions to the general rule [and] that, 
under the facts alleged, [the deputy sheriff] owed a legal 
duty to protect [the citizen] from [the assailant's] attack."  
Id. at 313, 421 S.E.2d at 421. 
In the second case, the plaintiff, who was a patient at a 
psychiatric facility, alleged that another patient entered her 
room and sexually assaulted her.  Delk, 259 Va. at 130, 523 
S.E.2d at 829-30.  The plaintiff further alleged that the 
defendants knew she was a danger to herself and others, was in 
constant need of 24-hour supervision, had a history of 
psychiatric problems associated with prior sexual assaults, 
and was deemed a high risk to herself and others.  Id. at 130, 
523 S.E.2d at 829.  Based on those allegations, the Court held 
the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to establish a special 
 
51
relationship between herself and the psychiatric facility that 
would give rise to a duty on the part of the defendants to 
protect the plaintiff from third persons.7  See id. at 134, 523 
S.E.2d at 831. 
In contrast, the Court held in Holles v. Sunrise Terrace, 
Inc., 257 Va. 131, 137, 509 S.E.2d 494, 498 (1999), that a 
special relationship did not exist between a resident on an 
"independent living" floor of an adult care residence center 
and the defendant company that provided food and management 
services, including security, for the center.  The plaintiff 
was robbed and raped by an intruder who gained entry into the 
building by waiting until a side door was opened from within 
and then walking through the open doorway past the person who 
had opened the door.  Id. at 134, 509 S.E.2d at 496.  The 
Court concluded the defendant did not have a special 
relationship with the plaintiff "because there was no right of 
protection inherent in their relationship separate and apart 
from any duties imposed" by the defendant's contract with the 
                     
7 The Court also concluded that the plaintiff pled 
sufficient facts to create a jury issue as to whether the 
assault was reasonably foreseeable and to show that the 
defendants had taken charge of the assailant because he was in 
the acute care wing of the psychiatric facility but failed to 
control him.  Delk, 259 Va. at 135, 523 S.E.2d at 832. 
 
52
local county to manage the center.8  Id. at 137, 509 S.E.2d at 
498. 
In Burdette and Delk, as opposed to Holles, a duty of 
protection from the criminal acts of third persons was 
inherent in the particular relationship between the plaintiff 
and the defendant.  In Burdette, an on-duty deputy sheriff 
witnessed an attack upon a citizen by a third person.  244 Va. 
at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421.  Likewise in Delk, the plaintiff 
was a patient at a psychiatric facility, was a danger to 
herself and others, had a history of psychiatric problems 
related to sexual assaults upon her, and needed constant 24-
hour supervision.  See 259 Va. at 130, 523 S.E.2d at 829.  In 
both instances, the defendants were necessarily equipped to 
protect against the criminal acts of third persons.  Thus, the 
magnitude of the burden of providing the protection and the 
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant was not 
                     
8 The Court has also held in several cases that there was 
not a special relationship between a landlord and a tenant as 
to give rise to a duty on the part of the landlord to protect 
a tenant from the criminal acts of third persons.  See 
Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at 140; Klingbeil Mgmt. 
Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 447, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 
(1987); Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d at 844.  In 
denying the existence of a special relationship, we noted that 
a landlord is not an insurer of a tenant's safety, Yuzefovsky, 
261 Va. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at 140; Dudas, 261 Va. at 141, 540 
S.E.2d at 133-34; Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 159-60, 207 S.E.2d 
at 845, and does not have a "duty to act as a policeman," 
Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 447, 357 S.E.2d at 201. 
 
53
unfair or unreasonable given the particular facts presented in 
each case. 
Based on our prior cases and the factual scenario 
presented here, I concur with the majority's holding that a 
special relationship did not exist between the McDonoughs and 
Jaimee.  Jaimee was a social guest in the McDonoughs' home.  A 
duty to protect Jaimee from the wrongful acts of third persons 
is not inherent in that relationship as it was in Burdette and 
Delk.  The magnitude of the burden to provide such protection 
and the consequences of placing that burden on the McDonoughs 
are too great. 
Parents routinely invite their children's friends into 
their homes for social visits.  When doing so, they do not 
become insurers of the friends' safety, especially against the 
wrongful acts of third persons.  To hold otherwise would 
indeed stretch the exception of the special relationship 
beyond the limits of the rule itself.  I therefore conclude 
the circuit court did not err in finding that a special 
relationship did not exist between the McDonoughs and Jaimee.9 
                     
9 Kellermann relies on the decisions in Doe v. Bruton 
Parish Church, Law No. 7977 (City of Williamsburg and James 
City County, July 10, 1997) and Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 
236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002), in support of his 
assertion that a special relationship existed between the 
McDonoughs and Jaimee.  Those cases are not analogous to the 
present case and do not persuade me to a contrary conclusion. 
 
54
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from that 
portion of the majority's opinion holding that Kellermann pled 
a common law duty on the part of the McDonoughs to supervise 
and care for Jaimee during her visit.  I respectfully concur 
with the other portions of the majority's opinion.  Thus, I 
would reverse the circuit court's judgment sustaining the 
demurrer with regard to the cause of action against Paula 
McDonough on the theory of assumption of duty and remand for 
further proceedings.  I would otherwise affirm the circuit 
court's judgment. 
 
55