Case Title: Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90770, 90841

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 90770, 90841 cons.-Agenda 29-September 2001.
VERNON SCHULTZ, Appellant, v. NORTHEAST ILLINOIS
REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION, d/b/a/
Metra, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 6, 2002.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Vernon Schultz, filed a complaint against defendant,
Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation,
doing business as Metra, pursuant to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. (1994)), for injuries
he allegedly sustained while employed as a switch foreman for
defendant. The purpose of FELA is to provide a remedy to railroad
employees for injuries and death resulting from accidents on
interstate railroads. 45 U.S.C. §51 (1994). Plaintiff alleged that he
was seriously injured while performing his duties when he fell off
a retaining wall at defendant's 47th Street Yard in Chicago. After
trial, the jury returned a verdict of $800,000, which was reduced
to $400,000 upon a finding of 50% contributory negligence. Both
parties appealed. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. Nos. 1-99-3596, 1-99-3647 cons. (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). The parties subsequently filed
petitions for leave to appeal with this court. We granted both
petitions (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and consolidated the cases on
appeal.



BACKGROUND

	Undisputed facts indicate that at its 47th Street Yard,
defendant services commuter trains operating on its Rock Island
line, which runs from the La Salle Street Station in Chicago to
Joliet. Double mainline tracks running north-south are located to
the east of the yard along with two yard lead tracks, the long lead
and short lead. A building known as the "Rocket House," where
employees service and repair locomotives, is situated at the
northwest end of the yard, and a concrete retaining wall, adjacent
to the Rocket House, separates an upper yard from a lower yard.
The retaining wall is approximately 6½ feet high at the southeast
corner of the Rocket House. The building's main entrance is
located in the lower yard, and a second door is located on the east
side of the building in the upper yard. The area between the tracks
and the Rocket House is a flat surface covered by crushed
limestone.
	At trial, plaintiff testified that he began working for railroads
in 1960 and had always performed switch work. On February 15,
1994, while employed by defendant, he was the foreman of a
three-man crew that included Mark Essary and Tom Miller. After
the morning rush hour, the crew disconnected two passenger trains
at the La Salle Street Station, left a few cab cars from each train at
the station, doubled the remaining cars and rode them southbound
to the 47th Street Yard for washing and servicing. Essary and
Miller rode on the locomotive, while plaintiff rode in the last cab
car.
	Plaintiff stated that it was his typical practice to alight from
the train when it passed the east door to the Rocket House, while
the other crew members took the train into the 47th Street Yard.
He would enter the Rocket House from the east door, which was
normally propped open for him, but on February 15, 1994, after
noticing that the door was locked, he remained on the train and
alighted at the south end of the Rocket House. When he exited the
train he was "snowblinded" and reached for his photograde
sunglasses. After putting on his sunglasses, plaintiff walked
another eight or nine feet when he heard a noise he thought was a
train. As he turned to look back, plaintiff walked off the top of the
retaining wall near the southeast corner of the Rocket House,
allegedly injuring his back, toe, and left knee.
	Immediately after his fall, plaintiff reported the incident to the
Rocket House superintendent and filed an incident report. He was
taken by one of defendant's employees to Dr. Barry Fischer's
office at the U.S. Occupational Health Clinic. Plaintiff did not
return to work until July 20, 1994, and was again taken off duty by
Dr. Fischer in May 1995. After a one-month absence, plaintiff
returned to work, and continued to work, with restrictions, until
January 5, 1996. On April 2, 1996, plaintiff failed defendant's
biennial physical examination upon which Dr. Fischer disqualified
him from performing his duties. On July 30, 1996, plaintiff had
total knee replacement surgery. He never returned to work for
defendant.
	Plaintiff also indicated that he injured his left knee in 1990
while climbing on rocks and hills but maintained that his left knee
and leg had not created problems for him prior to the accident. He
denied walking with a limp prior to the accident and noted that he
had passed defendant's biennial physical examination in 1992. On
cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that, in a medical history
report prepared for his 1990 physical exam, he indicated that he
experienced pain and locking in his left knee and pain in the left
side of his lower back.
	Plaintiff called Dennis Mogan, defendant's director of safety
and rules, as an adverse witness. Mogan testified that he is
responsible for the safety of defendant's 2,500 employees and part
of his job is to remedy unsafe conditions. He testified that he has
been to the 47th Street Yard on several occasions to perform safety
audits and crew observation and is familiar with the Rocket House
and the retaining wall. Mogan admitted that an unprotected height
can be hazardous and acknowledged that, prior to February 15,
1994, the retaining wall had no guardrail. Although he admitted
that plaintiff's fall would most likely have been prevented by a
guardrail, he indicated that the "walkway" by the retaining wall is
not a "work area." He stated that the walkway can be used by
trainmen and maintenance employees, but its use is unnecessary,
as employees can walk on the other side of the tracks and, in any
event, do not have to walk near the retaining wall. Mogan,
however, further stated that he would not be surprised to learn that
trainmen walked in the area near the retaining wall in the course
of their everyday duties.
	According to Mogan, no employee had reported safety
concerns to him regarding the retaining wall and no accidents in
the area had been reported. He testified that, in the course of his
safety audits, he noticed and corrected many hazards in and around
the Rocket House. Because of the obvious difference in elevation,
Mogan never considered the need for a guardrail above the
retaining wall.
	Dr. David Smith testified by evidence deposition that he first
met with plaintiff on March 16, 1994. On that date, he reviewed
an MRI that revealed a tear of the medial meniscus, or cartilage,
in plaintiff's left knee, and degenerative arthritis, also known as
osteoarthritis, in all three components of his left knee. Smith noted
that the osteoarthritis preexisted plaintiff's fall but opined that
despite the preexisting condition, plaintiff's fall at least irritated or
inflamed the knee and led to his chronic knee problems. Smith
admitted that his opinion could change if he knew that plaintiff
was symptomatic prior to the accident. He further acknowledged
that a thinning and tearing of the medial meniscus could be caused
by a degenerative process.
	Smith performed an arthroscopy of plaintiff's left knee on
April 5, 1994. At that time, he determined that plaintiff's
osteoarthritis was "grade 5," the most severe form, there was a
softening of the cartilage under the kneecap, and the lining of the
knee joint was inflamed. Smith performed a second arthroscopic
procedure on January 11, 1996, at which time he observed that
plaintiff's degenerative condition had progressed from the time of
the first arthroscopy. This led to a total knee replacement on July
30, 1996. Smith testified that it is not unusual for patients to return
to work after knee replacements and plaintiff is capable of
sedentary or light-duty work.
	Jonathan Crane, an economist, analyzed plaintiff's earning
loss. Under his most conservative estimate, he concluded that
plaintiff lost $341,000 in earnings, and under his least
conservative estimate, plaintiff lost $432,500 in earnings, resulting
in an average of $386,000.
	Prior to trial, plaintiff disclosed his intention to call Eugene
Holland, a structural engineer, as an expert witness to testify, in
part, that defendant violated certain sections of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) (29 U.S.C. §651 et seq. (1994))
and the Chicago Building Code (Code). Defendant filed a motion
in limine to "exclude any reference to OSHA at trial," arguing that
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) preempted OSHA
regulations in the area of walkways and working surfaces beside
tracks in railroad yards. Further, defendant argued that OSHA and
the Code do not, by their own terms, regulate the area of the
retaining wall. The trial court agreed and granted defendant's
motion in limine. Based on this holding, the court also denied
plaintiff's motion in limine to bar defendant from asserting the
defense of contributory negligence. The trial court, however,
reserved ruling on whether Holland could testify that OSHA and
the Code indicated defendant's standard of care.
	At trial, Holland testified that he consults various parties in
the construction industry on the construction process, design, and
construction safety and, for this case, he had reviewed depositions
and legal documents and had conducted a thorough site inspection
of the area of plaintiff's injury. Holland stated that he is a member
of several organizations including the American Society of Civil
Engineers, the American Society of Safety Engineers, the
American Concrete Institute, the American Institute of Steel
Construction, the Structural Engineers' Association of Illinois,
BOCA, and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), all
of which promulgate safety standards. He is also familiar with the
safety standards promulgated in OSHA and the Code.
	Holland concluded that "every safety standard *** recognizes
a change of level as being a fault" and the area above the retaining
wall is a work area and an unprotected fall hazard. Plaintiff's
counsel then asked Holland whether he believed defendant should
have installed a guardrail on the retaining wall. Defense counsel
objected to the question, arguing that Holland had never stated an
opinion on the issue prior to trial. The court sustained defendant's
objection. Plaintiff's counsel rephrased the question to the court's
satisfaction, and the following dialogue ensued:
			"MR. BRUGESS [plaintiff's attorney]: Mr. Holland, do
you have an opinion within a reasonable degree of
engineering and safety certainty whether or not that
retaining wall as it existed on February 15, 1994,
constituted a safety hazard?
			A. Yes.
			MR. SIKES [defendant's attorney]: Objection for the
record.
			THE COURT: So noted for the record.
			MR. BRUGESS: What is that opinion?
			A. Because it was a fall hazard. There was a change of
level.
			Q. And you told us a little bit about some of these
safety standards that are out there, ANSI, BOCA, building
codes, OSHA regulations. If one were to look at those
types of standards and-let me ask it first. Do any or all of
these standards deal with unprotected fall hazards?
			A. Yes, all of them.
			Q. If one were to look at those types of standards, what
would they say about unprotected fall hazards?
			A. You need a guardrail when you have a change in
elevation, and they spell out the guardrail sizing, heights,
and all of the requirements in order to provide it."
Holland further testified that it would take only a visual inspection
of the area to realize that an employee could fall off the retaining
wall.
	Defendant presented the following testimony. First, Michael
K. Bennett, defendant's senior manager of communications,
testified that prior to February 15, 1994, he had daily contact with
plaintiff at the La Salle Street Station and had noticed that plaintiff
always walked with a limp. Thomas Miller, plaintiff's crew
member, also testified that prior to plaintiff's accident, plaintiff
walked with a limp. However, defendant's employee Ken Malloy
testified that, prior to February 1994, he had worked with plaintiff
and had not observed any physical disability, although Malloy did
notice that plaintiff walked bowlegged.
	Beth Birkenfeld, a conductor, testified that prior to February
15, 1994, plaintiff "made it very clear" to her that she had to
perform the physical work while he backed her up.
	Kevin King, also a conductor, testified that he had worked as
plaintiff's helper several times. He stated that plaintiff rarely
missed a day of work prior to his accident and had performed his
job "very, very well"; however, after the fall, plaintiff had a "real
tough time" completing his work. King could not recall making an
alleged statement to defense counsel that, prior to February 15,
1994, plaintiff had a "slow manner" of walking.
	Ingrid Dillon, a physical therapist, testified that on September
4, 1997, she performed a functional-capacity evaluation of
plaintiff, which included a review of plaintiff's medical records,
job description, and physical tests. She concluded that plaintiff
was incapable of performing the job of switch worker due to
lower-back and knee pain, and, due to lower-back pain, plaintiff
was incapable of throwing a switch. Dillon stated that plaintiff
could return to a job with a medium physical demand level.
	Dr. Philip FitzSimons, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
after reviewing plaintiff's medical records and depositions taken
in the case, concluded that plaintiff suffered from osteoarthritis in
his left knee prior to February 15, 1994. FitzSimons testified that
an MRI conducted approximately three weeks after plaintiff's
injury revealed moderately severe to severe arthritis in all three
compartments of the knee. He opined that plaintiff's work injury
did not "make his arthritis accelerate any faster, *** the arthritis
was inevitably going to progress based on findings at the first
arthroscopy, and [the] injury may have made his knee sore but it
certainly did not produce the arthritis nor *** speed up the
arthritis." According to FitzSimons, it was plaintiff's preexisting
arthritic condition that led to his eventual total knee replacement
surgery.
	FitzSimons further testified that an MRI performed in May
1995 revealed degenerative disc disease and a general wearing and
tearing of the lumbar discs, and opined that plaintiff's back
problems were not caused by the accident. He indicated that
plaintiff could return to a job requiring medium functional activity.
	At the close of trial, over defendant's objection, the court
tendered Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 30.21 (Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 30.21 (1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil
1995 No. 30.21)), regarding damages for an injury resulting from
the aggravation of a preexisting condition. The court rejected both
of defendant's suggested alternatives to IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21.
Also over defendant's objection, the court allegedly instructed the
jury that assumption of risk is not a defense.(1) Finally, the court
declined to instruct the jury, pursuant to defendant's request, that
defendant is not an insurer of plaintiff's safety.
	The jury returned a verdict, without considering plaintiff's
contributory negligence, in the amount of $800,000, itemized as
follows: $250,000 for disability; $250,000 for pain and suffering;
$0 for disfigurement resulting from the injury; $300,000 for
present and future earnings lost. The jury further found plaintiff
50% responsible for his injuries and reduced the judgment to
$400,000. Both parties filed timely post-trial motions.
	The appellate court "affirmed in part and reversed in part."
Although the court indicated that it was reversing the trial court's
judgment in part, rather, it simply disagreed with the trial court's
reasoning as to one issue and ultimately affirmed the trial court's
judgment (see People v. Speed, 315 Ill. App. 3d 511, 517 (2000)
(the trial court's judgment may be affirmed on any basis supported
by the record)).



ANALYSIS
I. Jury Instructions
A. Aggravation of Preexisting Condition
	Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury pursuant to IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21:
			"If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of
liability, you may not deny or limit the plaintiff's right to
damages resulting from this occurrence because any
injury resulted from an aggravation of a pre-existing
condition or a pre-existing condition which rendered the
plaintiff more susceptible to injury." IPI Civil 1995 No.
30.21.
According to defendant, the instruction is in direct conflict with
federal substantive law applicable in FELA cases, which mandates
that damages be limited to those resulting from an aggravation of
a preexisting condition. Defendant proposed the following
nonpattern instructions as alternatives to IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21:
			"If you find that the plaintiff's injury was due in part to
a pre-existing condition and in part to defendant's
aggravation of that pre-existing condition, you must
determine how much of the plaintiff's injury was due to
his pre-existing condition and how much of the plaintiff's
present injury is the result of defendant's aggravation of
his pre-existing condition. Defendant can only be held
responsible for that portion of plaintiff's injury that is the
result of defendant's aggravation of his pre-existing
condition." Defendant's Instruction No. 29.
			"As to the aggravation of [a] preexisting condition, if
you find in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability,
Metra is liable for damages, both temporal and
permanent, caused by the aggravation of the condition,
but not for losses which would have resulted from the
preexisting condition even if the accident had not
occurred." Defendant's Instruction No. 34.
	A trial court is required to use an Illinois Pattern Jury
Instruction when it is applicable in a civil case after giving due
consideration to the facts and the prevailing law, unless the court
determines that the instruction does not accurately state the law.
177 Ill. 2d R. 239(a); Hobart v. Shin, 185 Ill. 2d 283, 294 (1998).
If the pattern instruction does not accurately state the law, the
court may instruct the jury pursuant to a nonpattern instruction.
Hobart, 185 Ill. 2d  at 294. The trial court has discretion to
determine which instructions to give the jury and that
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that
discretion. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 412 (2000); In re
Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 173 (2000). The standard for
deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion is whether,
taken as a whole, the instructions fairly, fully, and
comprehensively apprised the jury of the relevant legal principles.
Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, 269
Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1062 (1995). A reviewing court ordinarily will
not reverse a trial court for giving faulty instructions unless they
clearly misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the appellant.
Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill. App. 3d 458, 464 (2001).
	First, we must determine whether IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21
accurately states the law to be applied in the instant case regarding
the aggravation of a preexisting condition. Generally, a FELA
action brought in state court is governed by state procedural law
and federal substantive law. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411, 84 L. Ed. 2d 303, 306, 105 S. Ct. 1347, 1348 (1985); Noakes v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 312
Ill. App. 3d 965, 967 (2000); Gibbs v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.,
298 Ill. App. 3d 743, 748 (1998). In Dickerson, the Supreme Court
noted that "it is settled that the propriety of jury instructions
concerning the measure of damages in an FELA action is an issue
of 'substance' determined by federal law." Dickerson, 470 U.S.  at
411, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 306, 105 S. Ct.  at 1348, citing Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493, 62 L. Ed. 2d 689,
693, 100 S. Ct. 755, 757 (1980). See also Argueta v. Baltimore &
Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co., 224 Ill. App. 3d 11, 18 (1991);
Pryor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 301 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633
(1998) (in an FELA case, the substance contained in jury
instructions is governed by federal law while the instructional
format is procedural and is a matter for the state to regulate). Thus,
the proper content of jury instructions regarding damages for an
injury resulting from the aggravation of a preexisting condition, is
determined by federal law.
	In Sauer v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 106 F.3d 1490
(10th Cir. 1997), the plaintiff filed suit under FELA claiming that
he was injured on two separate occasions while working for the
railroad. The evidence established that the plaintiff had a
preexisting degenerative condition in his back that made him more
susceptible to injury. The district court instructed the jury as
follows on aggravation of a preexisting condition:
			" 'If you find for the Plaintiff, you should compensate
him for any aggravation of an existing disease or physical
defect resulting from such injury. If you find that there
was an aggravation, you should determine, if you can,
what portion of the Plaintiff's condition resulted from the
aggravation and make allowance in your verdict only for
the aggravation. However, if you cannot make that
determination or if it cannot be said that the condition
would have existed apart from the injury, you should
consider and make allowance in your verdict for the entire
condition.' " Sauer, 106 F.3d  at 1494.
	The jury found the railroad not negligent in the plaintiff's first
accident, but determined that both parties were equally at fault in
the subsequent accident. The jury attributed 75% of the plaintiff's
injuries to preexisting conditions and reduced his damages
accordingly. Sauer, 106 F.3d  at 1493. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
quoted the apportionment instruction with approval, noting that
sufficient evidence supported the instruction. Sauer, 106 F.3d  at
1494-95. Further, the court held that the jury was properly
instructed to reduce the plaintiff's damages by the likelihood that
he would have suffered the injury even if the accident had not
occurred. Sauer, 106 F.3d  at 1495. Following the Tenth Circuit
decision, a federal pattern jury instruction substantially similar to
the instruction given in Sauer arose on aggravation of a
preexisting condition. See Federal Jury Practice & Instructions,
Civil, No. 155.65 (5th ed. 2001).
	In Stevens v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 594 (1st
Cir. 1996), also an FELA case, evidence was presented at trial that
the plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease prior to his
employment-related accident. The plaintiff, however, presented
expert testimony that the accident caused an aggravation of his
preexisting condition. The trial court gave the following
instruction:
			"There is evidence in this case that plaintiff had a pre-existing injury or condition which existed prior to
February 19, 1994. The railroad is only liable for damages
you find to be caused by the occurrence of February 19,
1994. If you find that plaintiff's pre-existing condition
made him more susceptible to injury than a person in
good health, the defendant is responsible for all injuries
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
negligence, even if those injuries are greater than would
have been suffered by a person in good health under the
same circumstances.
			If you find that defendant negligently caused further
injury or aggravation to plaintiff's pre-existing condition,
plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all of plaintiff's
damages caused by the incident, including that further
injury or aggravation. If you cannot separate the pain or
disability caused by the pre-existing condition from that
caused by the occurrence of February 19, 1994, then the
defendant is liable for all of plaintiff's injuries." Stevens,
97 F.3d  at 601.
	The court concluded that the instruction correctly stated the
law and, "as a general matter, when a defendant's negligence
aggravates a plaintiff's pre-existing health condition, the defendant
is liable only for the additional increment caused by the negligence
and not for the pain and impairment that the plaintiff would have
suffered even if the accident had never occurred." Stevens, 97 F.3d 
at 601. See also Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1564-65 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding the use of special
interrogatories in conjunction with an apportionment instruction
allowing damages only for the aggravation of a preexisting
condition upon a finding that aggravation exists); Wise v. Union
Pacific R.R. Co., 815 F.2d 55, 58 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting with
approval instruction stating that railroad is liable for pain or
disability jury finds to be caused by the plaintiff's accident and
that if it cannot separate the pain or disability caused by the
preexisting condition from that caused by the accident, the railroad
is liable for all of the pain or disability); Boyt v. Grand Trunk
Western R.R., 233 Mich. App. 179, 186, 592 N.W.2d 426, 431
(1999) (trial court properly instructed jury according to federal law
that if it found the injury to be an aggravation of a preexisting
condition, it must attempt to determine what portion of the
condition resulted from the aggravation, and award damages only
for the aggravation).
	Accordingly, in FELA cases, if sufficient evidence exists to
indicate that an injury may have resulted from the aggravation of
a preexisting condition, the jury should be instructed that if it finds
for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, it should award damages
only for the aggravation of the plaintiff's preexisting condition.
We turn now to whether the jury was so instructed in the case at
bar.
	The appellate court held that IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21 was "in
tune" with federal substantive law because it "only addresses
damages 'which result from' the accident, including those which
aggravate pre-existing injuries, and nothing more." The court
noted that defendant's instructions in the case at bar, similar to
those rejected in Pruett v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 261 Ill.
App. 3d 29 (1994), attempted to stress to the jury that it may not
award damages for an injury or condition that existed or which
would have resulted if the accident had not occurred. The court
determined that defendant's proposed instructions would have
only confused the otherwise clear pattern instruction. We disagree.
Several Illinois cases have discussed the propriety of IPI Civil No.
30.21 in FELA cases. See Pruett, 261 Ill. App. 3d 29; Worthy v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 249 Ill App. 3d 1096 (1993); Ficken
v. Alton & Southern Ry. Co., 255 Ill. App. 3d 1047 (1993);
Grimming v. Alton & Southern Ry. Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 961
(1990). In Worthy, evidence was introduced at trial that the
railway's negligence aggravated the plaintiff's preexisting knee
and back conditions. The trial court gave plaintiff's instruction
number eight, a slightly modified version of IPI Civil No. 30.21,
and plaintiff's instruction number one, which instructed the jury
that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that he was injured and
that the defendant's negligence caused his injuries " 'in whole or
in part.' " Worthy, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1100-01. The court refused
two nonpattern instructions suggested by the railway which were
similar to defendant's numbers 29 and 34 in the present case. The
railway argued that the court's refusal to give its nonpattern
instructions along with the giving of plaintiff's instructions one
and eight allowed the plaintiff's counsel to make improper and
inflammatory argument to the jury regarding what to consider
when awarding damages. Worthy, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. The
appellate court noted that IPI Civil No. 30.21 was promulgated in
response to this court's decision in Balestri v. Terminal Freight
Cooperative Ass'n, 76 Ill. 2d 451 (1979), and was an accurate
statement of the law regarding the aggravation of a preexisting
condition. Worthy, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1101-02. In concluding that
the trial court did not err, the appellate court rejected the notion
that the pattern instructions allowed the plaintiff to argue that he
should be compensated for his preexisting condition or directed
the jury to compensate the plaintiff for that condition. Worthy, 249
Ill. App. 3d at 1102.
	In Pruett, the jury was instructed pursuant to IPI Civil No.
30.21. The trial court rejected the defendant's alternatives, one of
which instructed the jury that it should not consider any pecuniary
loss caused by the plaintiff's preexisting condition which would
have resulted independently of the accident, and if it found all
damages attributable solely to the progression of the plaintiff's
preexisting condition, it should return a verdict in favor of the
defendant. Although structured in a different way, the defendant's
proposed alternate in Pruett essentially said the same thing as
defendant's suggested instructions in this case-a plaintiff cannot
be compensated for the preexisting condition itself, but will be
compensated for the aggravation of the preexisting condition. The
court held that IPI Civil No. 30.21 accurately stated the law on
aggravation of a preexisting condition and the defendant's
proposed instructions, which misstated the law, could be construed
as contrary to IPI Civil No. 30.21. Pruett, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 36.
Also citing Balestri, the court noted that "our supreme court
disapproved as contrary to law, a jury instruction that 'failed to
instruct the jury that the damages assessed should not be reduced
because the disability was due in part to a preexisting condition or
for the reason that plaintiff, because of a preexisting condition,
was more susceptible to injury than an individual would have been
without the preexisting condition.' " Pruett, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 36-37, quoting Balestri, 76 Ill. 2d  at 456. The court found no error by
the trial court in giving IPI Civil No. 30.21 and refusing
defendant's tendered instructions. Pruett, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 37.
	Balestri was not an FELA case. Defendant correctly notes that
in FELA cases, the appellate court has failed to apply federal
substantive law to jury instructions concerning the measure of
damages. Under federal law, the trial court should instruct the jury
that if it finds for the plaintiff and finds that there was a
preexisting condition, it should award damages only for the
aggravation of that condition that was caused by the defendant's
negligence. Although the appellate court here apparently
recognized the application of federal substantive law, the court
erred in concluding that IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21 adequately
instructed the jury.
	IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21 instructs the jury that "[it] may not
deny or limit the plaintiff's right to damages resulting from this
occurrence because any injury resulted from an aggravation of a
pre-existing condition or a pre-existing condition which rendered
the plaintiff more susceptible to injury." Plaintiff argues that the
pattern instruction is proper because it states that he can recover
only for "damages resulting from this occurrence." IPI Civil 1995
No. 30.21 does not so instruct the jury. Instead, it tells the jury that
it "may not deny or limit" damages "resulting from this
occurrence" simply because the plaintiff has a preexisting
condition. Although not directly contrary to federal law, the
pattern instruction does not clearly inform the jury that damages
should be awarded only for the aggravation of a preexisting
condition. Jury instructions should not be misleading or confusing.
See People v. Pinkney, 322 Ill. App. 3d 707, 717 (2000). IPI Civil
1995 No. 30.21 is misleading in that it appears to instruct the jury
that damages should not be denied or limited in any way if the
injury resulted from the aggravation of a preexisting condition. A
jury is unlikely to read the phrase "resulting from this occurrence"
as a limitation. See Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207, 213 (1927) (the test of the correctness of an instruction is not
what meaning the ingenuity of counsel can attribute to it, but how
and in what sense, under the evidence before them and the
circumstances of the trial, ordinary persons acting as jurors will
understand the instruction); see also People v. Lozada, 211 Ill.
App. 3d 817, 822 (1991); Nicholl v. Scaletta, 104 Ill. App. 3d 642,
647 (1982). As such, it is unclear from the instruction whether the
jury should compensate the plaintiff for the preexisting condition
itself.
	Unlike IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21, defendant's proposed
instructions clearly and accurately state the law to be applied in
FELA cases. Further, there was ample evidence to support the
giving of one of defendant's proposed instructions. Dr. FitzSimons
testified that plaintiff's back and knee problems were not caused
by his work-related accident but, rather, they were a result of
plaintiff's degenerative disc disease and osteoarthritis. In addition,
he testified that plaintiff's arthritis would have progressed even if
the accident had not occurred. Plaintiff's own expert, Dr. Smith,
also testified that the osteoarthritis preexisted the accident;
however, he concluded that plaintiff's accident at least irritated or
inflamed his knee. Further, several witnesses observed plaintiff
limping or walking bowlegged before the accident, and plaintiff
admitted that he had injured his back and left knee prior to the
accident.
	We conclude that the trial court erred in giving IPI Civil 1995
No. 30.21. The court should have instructed the jury pursuant to
either defendant's Nos. 29 or 34. Nonetheless, we hold that the
trial court's failure to so instruct the jury is not reversible error.
We note that an appellate court's judgment may be affirmed on
any basis in the record. Speed, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 517; People v.
Collins, 214 Ill. App. 3d 98, 104 (1991). It is not clear from the
record that the jury was misled by the error. In addition to IPI Civil
1995 No. 30.21, the jury was given the following instruction: "If
you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must
then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly
compensate him for any of the following elements of damages
proved by the evidence to have resulted from the negligence of the
defendant, taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration
of the injury ***." Further, if defendant was concerned about jury
confusion, it could have offered a verdict form that required the
jury to specify the amount of damages awarded for aggravation of
a preexisting condition. Cf. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d 288,
294 (1970) (defendants could have submitted a separate verdict
form to determine the count or counts upon which the jury
returned its verdict and could not seek to benefit from their
failure). Here, defendant failed to offer such an itemized form.
Instead, the jury concluded that plaintiff suffered $800,000 in
damages: $250,000 for disability resulting from the injury;
$250,000 for pain and suffering; $0 for disfigurement resulting
from the injury; $300,000 for value of earnings lost and the
present cash value of earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the
future.
	Finally, in refusing defendant's nonpattern alternatives to IPI
Civil 1995 No. 30.21, the trial court allowed defense counsel to
discuss in closing argument the evidence established by the
doctors regarding plaintiff's preexisting condition and that
plaintiff's injury would have resulted even if the accident had not
occurred. In his closing argument, defense counsel, in fact,
emphasized the evidence regarding plaintiff's preexisting
condition in approximately seven pages of argument. Counsel
further emphasized to the jury that "[o]ne of the instructions will
be that you must reasonably and fairly compensate Mr. Schultz for
damages, here are the important words, ['p]roved by the evidence
to have resulted from the conduct of Metra.['] [']Proved by the
evidence to have resulted.['] " Later, defense counsel specifically
told the jury that it could not award damages for losses which
would have resulted from plaintiff's preexisting condition, even if
the accident had not occurred.
	We conclude that the erroneous giving of IPI Civil 1995 No.
30.21 and the failure to give one of defendant's proposed
alternatives does not constitute reversible error here.



B. Assumption of Risk
	Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in instructing the jury on assumption of risk. If submitted, the
alleged instruction, using statutory language, essentially told the
jury that assumption of risk is not a defense in an FELA case. The
court also instructed the jury that if it found plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence, it must reduce plaintiff's damages
accordingly. There is some overlap between the doctrines of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence; however, the
defenses are not interchangeable. Taylor v. Burlington Northern
R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir. 1986). Assumption of risk
is "an employee's voluntary, knowledgeable acceptance of a
dangerous condition that is necessary for him to perform his
duties," while contributory negligence is a "careless act or
omission on the plaintiff's part tending to add new dangers to
conditions that the employer negligently created or permitted to
exist." Taylor, 787 F.2d 1316.
	FELA expressly eradicated the common law defense of
assumption of risk. 45 U.S.C. §53 (1994); see Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58, 87 L. Ed. 610, 613, 63 S. Ct. 444, 446-47 (1943). The giving of an instruction on assumption of
risk in a case where the "defense" has been neither pleaded nor
argued has been condemned by several courts as "a confusing,
negative statement which refers to issues not involved in an FELA
case." Heater v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1243, 1249
(7th Cir. 1974). See also DeChico v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,
758 F.2d 856, 861 (2d Cir. 1985); Casko v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern
Ry. Co., 361 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 1966); Seaboldt v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 290 F.2d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 1961).
	The appellate court concluded that the issue of assumption of
risk was "implicitly or otherwise" before the jury in this case;
therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing
the jury to disregard the assumption of risk defense. Defendant,
however, maintains that the evidence and argument at trial were
directed to the issue of contributory negligence rather than
assumption of risk, and that defendant was prejudiced by the
erroneous instruction because "the jury could have found plaintiff
more or solely at fault for his injuries, had it not been confused
with the concept of assumption of risk."
	Defendant fails to cite a case in which the giving of an
assumption of risk instruction in an FELA case was held to be
reversible error. See Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984); Heater, 497 F.2d  at 1249 (found no case
in which the giving of the instruction in an FELA case was alone
held to be reversible error). It is within the discretion of the trial
court to determine whether, based on the evidence, an instruction
is applicable and should be given. Hobart, 185 Ill. 2d  at 294. Even
if the giving of the instruction was erroneous, the jury still found
plaintiff 50% at fault. This comports with the evidence and
indicates that the jury was not confused by the alleged instruction.
See Clark, 726 F.2d  at 452. Therefore, we conclude that if the
assumption of risk instruction was submitted to the jury, it does
not rise to the level of reversible error.



C. Insurer of Safety
	Last, with respect to jury instructions, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that defendant
is not an insurer of plaintiff's safety. Defendant maintains that the
instruction was necessary due to evidence introduced at trial.
During cross-examination, plaintiff's counsel questioned Dennis
Mogan regarding his identification of an unprotected fall hazard
inside the Rocket House and his order to construct a guardrail
around the area:
			"Q. Was that to insure the employees' safety?
			A. That was to protect what was categorized as a work
area, yes.
			Q. Okay. Was that to insure the employees' safety?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Did you testify earlier that, and I quote, Metra does
everything possible to assure employee safety?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Wouldn't a railing [above the retaining wall] have
assured Mr. Schultz's safety on February 14 of 1995?
			A. It could have."
	Later, plaintiff's counsel posed the following question:
			"Q. If you wanted to insure Metra's employees' safety
at this location, you would put a guardrail up, isn't that
true?
			MR. SIKES [Defense attorney]: Judge, I object.
			THE COURT: Answer the question, sir. I indicated to
you earlier that Mr. Sikes will have an opportunity to
reexamine you.
			A. Yes.
			MR. BRUGESS [Plaintiff's attorney]: Yes, you would
put a guardrail up there?
			A. Yes."
	Based on this testimony, defendant offered the following
nonpattern instruction:
			"The law does not make the defendant-railroad
company an insurer of the safety of its employees, nor of
the safety of the places in which they work. Defendant is
bound only to exercise the care which the particular
circumstances reasonably demand. The basis of
defendant's liability, if any, is negligence, and not the
mere fact that an injury occurs while plaintiff is working.
Moreover, that negligence must, in whole or in part, cause
the injury, or plaintiff may not recover."
	Defendant states that liability under FELA is based on
negligence and not the mere fact that an injury occurs. See 45
U.S.C. §51 (1994). Defendant argues that plaintiff's cross-examination of Mogan interjected an inappropriate standard of
care and its tendered instruction was necessary to inform the jury
of the proper standard of care.
	We agree with the appellate court that Illinois Pattern Jury
Instruction, Civil, No. 10.04 (1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil 1995 No.
10.04) adequately and correctly stated the standard of care to be
applied in FELA cases: "It was the duty of the defendant, before
and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care for the
safety of the plaintiff. That means it was the duty of the defendant
to be free from negligence." IPI Civil 1995 No. 10.04. The trial
court further instructed the jury on the definition of negligence:
"When I use the word 'negligence' in these instructions, I mean
the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful
person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown
by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful
person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to
decide." IPI Civil 1995 No. 10.01. As previously stated, the trial
court must use a pattern instruction when it is applicable and
accurately states the law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 239(a); Hobart, 185 Ill. 2d 
at 294. The trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to
give a nonpattern instruction if an appropriate pattern instruction
exists. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 412. Here, the jury was correctly and
adequately instructed on the appropriate standard of care. The trial
court's refusal to give defendant's nonpattern instruction was not
an abuse of discretion.


II. Reduction for Contributory Negligence
	FELA provides for the reduction of damages when an
employee is contributorily negligent "[p]rovided, [t]hat no such
employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation
by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of
employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
(Emphasis in original.) 45 U.S.C. §53 (1994). On cross-appeal,
plaintiff argues that defendant violated standard 1910.23(c) of
OSHA (29 C.F.R. §1910.23(c) (1993)), a "statute enacted for the
safety of employees," when it failed to install a guardrail above the
retaining wall. Therefore, plaintiff maintains that the trial court
erred by reducing his damages based on contributory negligence.
Defendant, however, responds initially that OSHA standards do
not regulate the area above the retaining wall and, even if they do
apply, the FRA has preempted OSHA regulations in that area.
Further, defendant maintains that even if it committed an OSHA
violation, OSHA is not a safety statute contemplated by section 53
of FELA; therefore, plaintiff's damages were properly reduced by
his contributory negligence.
	The trial court agreed with defendant, determining, as a matter
of law, that OSHA regulations do not apply to the area of the
retaining wall and, even if the regulations are applicable, they are
preempted by the FRA. Based on these conclusions, the trial court
denied plaintiff's motion to bar consideration of contributory
negligence.
	The appellate court disagreed, concluding that the "upper
level area near the retaining wall" is a "platform" under standard
1910.23(c)(1), and implicitly determined that defendant violated
OSHA by failing to install a guardrail on the open side of the
"platform." The appellate court also held that the FRA did not
preempt OSHA in this area because the FRA had not exercised its
authority "over the top of the retaining wall from which plaintiff
fell." However, the court determined that OSHA is not a "statute
enacted for the safety of employees"; therefore, evidence of an
OSHA violation does not constitute negligence per se. As such,
the portion of section 53 which prohibits evidence of employee
contributory negligence had not been triggered.
	Initially, defendant suggests that plaintiff should be barred
from raising the issue of an OSHA violation on appeal because he
failed to allege an OSHA violation in his complaint pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 133(a). Under Rule 133(a), "[i]f a breach of
statutory duty is alleged, the statute shall be cited in connection
with the allegation." 134 Ill. 2d R. 133(a). While it is true that
plaintiff did not cite OSHA in his complaint, plaintiff was not
permitted to argue at trial that defendant violated OSHA. In any
event, the purpose of Rule 133(a) is to provide the opposing party
with notice of the allegation of a breach of statutory duty.
Defendant had ample notice through the report and deposition of
Eugene Holland, and through plaintiff's response to its affirmative
defense of contributory negligence, that plaintiff would attempt to
prove that defendant violated OSHA.
	Defendant also argues that this issue is waived because
plaintiff failed to timely move to strike the affirmative defense of
contributory negligence. We need not determine whether plaintiff
waived this issue by failing to move to strike the contributory
negligence defense. Even assuming, arguendo, that the argument
is not waived, plaintiff's argument fails on the merits, for, as we
shall demonstrate, defendant did not violate the OSHA regulations
on which plaintiff relies in failing to install a guardrail above the
retaining wall.
	The parties first dispute the applicable standard of review.
Defendant maintains that the trial court's judgment should not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion, while plaintiff argues that
we should apply de novo review. We agree with plaintiff. The
determination of whether OSHA regulations apply to the area of
the retaining wall, whether the FRA preempts those regulations,
and whether OSHA is a safety statute under 45 U.S.C. §53 (1994)
are questions of law. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998)
(applying de novo review to questions of law). Further, the
underlying facts necessary to make these legal determinations are
not in dispute.
	We must first determine whether OSHA regulations apply to
the area above the retaining wall. Under OSHA, each employer(2)
"(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
his employees" and "(2) shall comply with occupational safety and
health standards promulgated under this chapter." 29 U.S.C.
§§654(a)(1), (a)(2) (1994). Standard 1910.23(c) of OSHA
provides for the protection of "open-sided floors, platforms, and
runways" on "walking-working surfaces." 29 C.F.R. §1910.23(c)
(1993). Specifically, in relevant part, it provides:
			"(1) Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more
above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by
a standard railing (or the equivalent as specified in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except
where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed
ladder. ***
* * *
			(2) Every runway shall be guarded by a standard railing
(or the equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this
section) on all open sides 4 feet or more above floor or
ground level." 29 C.F.R. §§1910.23(c)(1), (c)(2) (1993).
	"Platform" is defined as "[a] working space for persons,
elevated above the surrounding floor or ground; such as a balcony
or platform for the operation of machinery and equipment." 29
C.F.R. §1910.21(a)(4) (1993). A "[r]unway" is a "passageway for
persons, elevated above the surrounding floor or ground level,
such as a footwalk along shafting or a walkway between
buildings." 29 C.F.R. §1910.21(a)(5) (1993).
	Plaintiff maintains that the area of the retaining wall is a
"runway" or a "platform" in need of protection by a "standard
railing."(3) In General Electric Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 583 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1978), the court addressed
whether the unguarded portion of the top of a "dip and bake" oven
where workers performed occasional maintenance(4) on a circulation
and exhaust motor was a "platform" within the meaning of section
1910.21(a)(4). The court concluded that the definition of a
"platform" does not
		"apply to every flat surface over four feet high upon
which employees may some day stand while performing
some task related to their employment and the operations
of their employer. An elevated flat surface does not
automatically become a 'working space' and a 'platform'
merely because employees occasionally set foot on it
while working. Had the authors of the regulation intended
the term 'platform' to include every elevated flat surface
upon which employees could alight, they no doubt would
have forgone the opportunity to limit the definition by
using the phrase 'such as a balcony or platform for the
operation of machinery and equipment.' "  General
Electric Co., 583 F.2d  at 64-65.
	The court, citing the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis, noted that where specific words follow a general term, the
specific words limit the application of the general term to things
similar to those enumerated. General Electric Co., 583 F.2d  at 65.
The court adopted the definition of "platform" suggested by an
administrative law judge that "applies 'only to elevated working
spaces, 4 feet or [more] above ground level, which are designed
primarily for the operation of machinery and equipment and which
require employee presence on a predictable and regular basis; and
not to spaces where only occasional maintenance or repair work is
performed,' " and held that the unguarded portion of the top of the
oven did not fall within the definition of "platform." General
Electric Co., 583 F.2d  at 65.
	In Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 317 (8th
Cir. 1981), the Secretary of Labor cited the defendant for a
violation of standard 1910.23(c)(1) for failing to provide
guardrails on the top surface of its "can-line" pasteurizers.
Employees climbed fixed ladders to the top of the pasteurizers to
perform such tasks as biweekly inspections of water
"sprayheaders," periodic repair of the "sprayheaders," placement
and removal of aluminum logs between different lots of cans of
beer every shift, and intermittent inspection of the progress of the
aluminum bars two to four times a shift as they pass through the
pasteurizer. Donovan, 666 F.2d  at 318.
	On review, the court rejected General Electric's use of the
maxims of statutory construction to determine that the phrase
"such as a balcony or platform for the operation of machinery and
equipment" was a phrase of strict limitation. Instead, the court
concluded that under a reasonable and commonsense
interpretation of the phrase, it serves as an example or illustration
of structures included in the definition of "platform." Donovan,
666 F.2d  at 326-27. Therefore, noting that this interpretation is
consistent with the purpose of OSHA, the court concluded that
standard 1910.21(a)(4) "defines a 'platform' as a 'working space
for persons, elevated above the surrounding floor or ground' and
then provides an example to this definition." Donovan, 666 F.2d 
at 327, quoting 29 C.F.R. §1910.21(a)(4) (1993). The court further
stated that the facts of the case, although materially different from
those in General Electric, come within the definition of
"platform" set forth in that case in that employee presence on the
top surfaces of the "can-line" pasteurizers occurs on a predictable
and regular basis and is necessary to the operation of the "can-line" pasteurizer machinery and equipment. Donovan, 666 F.2d  at
328.
	In 1984, the Secretary of Labor, recognizing the disagreement
as to when an "elevated surface" constitutes a "platform," issued
an OSHA directive to clarify and define the "conditions and
circumstances under which a 'platform' is deemed to exist, and
where the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.23(c) apply." OSHA
Instruction STD 1-1.13 (April 16, 1984). According to the
Secretary,
			"1. Platforms are interpreted to be any elevated surface
designed or used primarily as a walking or working
surface, and any other elevated surfaces upon which
employees are required or allowed to walk or work while
performing assigned tasks on a predictable and regular
basis (See 29 CFR 1910.21(a)(4) for definition of
'platform'.)
			2. Predictable and regular basis means employee
functions such as, but not limited to, inspections, service,
repair and maintenance which are performed:
				a. At least once every 2 weeks, or
				b. For a total of 4 man-hours or more during any
sequential 4-week period (e.g., 2 employees once every
4 weeks for 2 hours = 4 man-hours per 4-week
period)."
	We conclude that the area above the retaining wall is not a
"platform" within the definition articulated in either General
Electric or Donovan, or by the Secretary. The retaining wall is
approximately 6½ feet above ground level at the southwest corner
of the Rocket House, thus meeting one requirement of standard
1910.23(c). The retaining wall, however, is simply a wall that
separates the upper yard from the lower yard. The evidence at trial
indicates that the top of the retaining wall is not a "working
surface" or, as interpreted by the Secretary of Labor, a "surface
designed or used primarily as a walking or working surface."
Certainly, the wall was not designed primarily for the operation of
machinery or equipment and does not require employee presence
on a predictable and regular basis. The evidence failed to
demonstrate that any employee, including plaintiff, performed
work in the area above the retaining wall. Plaintiff testified that
there was a red switch across from the east door of the Rocket
House that he would occasionally throw to change the path of a
train from the long-lead track to the short-lead track. After
alighting from the train at the east door to the Rocket House,
plaintiff would sometimes throw this switch and then enter the
Rocket House. In addition, the closest switch to the retaining wall
was a yellow switch 15 feet away and on the opposite side of the
short-lead track. The job of throwing these switches does not occur
in or near the area above the retaining wall. Plaintiff did not
maintain that he performed any other type of work near the
retaining wall, other than using the area occasionally as a
walkway. When asked whether other employees worked in the
area of the retaining wall, plaintiff replied, "No. I'm probably the
only one that would ever have to walk along that wall because of
the job I do with the engines." Further, Dennis Mogan testified
that the area above the retaining wall could be used by trainmen
and maintenance workers as a walkway, but its use is unnecessary
to the performance of their duties. The fact that employees
occasionally use the area as a walkway does not transform it into
a "platform" "merely because employees occasionally set foot on
it while working." General Electric Co., 583 F.2d  at 564.
	For similar reasons, the area is not a "runway," i.e., a
"passageway for persons, elevated above the surrounding floor or
ground level, such as a footwalk along shafting or a walkway
between buildings." 29 C.F.R. §1910.21(a)(5) (1993). The
retaining wall was not designed to function as a passageway. It is
not a walkway between buildings or the sole path between the
Rocket House and the south end of the 47th Street Yard. Further,
the evidence demonstrated that employees do not use this area as
a passageway in the routine performance of their duties.
	We hold that the area above the retaining wall is neither a
"platform" nor a "runway." Plaintiff does not suggest the area falls
under any other OSHA regulation; therefore, we find that
defendant did not violate OSHA by failing to install a guardrail
above the retaining wall. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to
determine whether OSHA is a safety statute under 45 U.S.C. §53
(1994) and, if so, whether the FRA has preempted OSHA
regulations in this area. The trial court correctly denied plaintiff's
motion to bar evidence of contributory negligence.


III. Testimony of Eugene Holland
	We return now to defendant's appeal and final contention,
namely, that the trial court erred in allowing Holland to testify that
various governmental regulations, such as OSHA and the Code,
were evidences of the standard of care. At a pretrial conference,
the court, ruling on defendant's motion in limine to "exclude any
reference to OSHA at trial," initially determined that the FRA
preempted OSHA in the area of the retaining wall and neither
OSHA nor the Code, by their own terms, applied to the area. Thus,
plaintiff was not permitted to represent at trial that defendant
violated OSHA or the Code. The trial court, however, reserved
ruling on whether Holland could testify that OSHA and the Code
were evidences of the standard of care. During trial, the court
allowed such evidence, and Holland opined that standards
promulgated by numerous governmental organizations recognize
the necessity of a guardrail when there is a change in elevation.
	Defendant first argues that Holland's opinion was not
properly disclosed pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 213(f) and (g)
(177 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(f), (g)). Admission of evidence pursuant to
Rule 213 is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Becht v. Palac,
317 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1036 (2000); Susnis v. Radfar, 317 Ill. App.
3d 817, 828 (2000); Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill.
App. 3d 7, 22 (1999). Rule 213 provides, in pertinent part:
			"(f) Identity and Testimony of Witnesses. Upon written
interrogatory, a party must furnish the identity and
location of witnesses who will testify at trial, together
with the subject of their testimony.
			(g) Opinion Witness. An opinion witness is a person
who will offer any opinion testimony. Upon written
interrogatory, the party must state:
				(i) the subject matter on which the opinion witness
is expected to testify;
				(ii) the conclusions and opinions of the opinion
witness and the bases therefor; and
				(iii) the qualifications of the opinion witness;
		and provide all reports of the opinion witness.
			***
			(i) Duty to Supplement. A party has a duty to
seasonably supplement or amend any prior answer or
response whenever new or additional information
subsequently becomes known to that party.
			If a deposition of an opinion witness is taken, the
witness' testimony at trial will be limited to the opinion
expressed therein, in addition to those opinions identified
in answers to Rule 213(g) interrogatories." 177 Ill. 2d Rs.
213(f), (g), (i).
	Defendant maintains that, prior to trial, Holland opined that
defendant violated OSHA and the Code by failing to install a
guardrail above the retaining wall. However, Holland failed to
state an opinion as to how a reasonable person would protect the
area of the retaining wall, a reasonable standard of care, or a
standard of care for railroads under FELA. As such, defendant
maintains that Holland's testimony went beyond his disclosed
opinions and "severely prejudiced" and "unfairly surprised"
defendant. We disagree. Although Holland never explicitly stated
in his deposition or report that the safety standards promulgated by
various organizations were evidences of a standard of care, he
opined that the area above the retaining wall was an unsafe
workplace because there was nothing to prevent falling over the
change in elevation. Implicit in that opinion, and in his opinion
that defendant violated OSHA and the Code, is the fact that these
safety standards indicate a standard of care.
	Further, the committee comments to Rule 213(g) explain that,
"in order to avoid surprise, the subject matter of all opinions must
be disclosed pursuant to this rule and Supreme Court Rule 218,
and that no new or additional opinions will be allowed unless the
interests of justice require otherwise." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g),
Committee Comments, at xxx-xxxi; see also Copeland v. Stebco
Products Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 932, 938 (2000); Seef, 311 Ill.
App. 3d at 21. Defendant's pretrial motion was a motion to bar
any evidence of OSHA at trial. In response to that motion, the trial
court granted defendant relief in part by refusing to allow Holland
to testify regarding violations but allowing him to indicate that
various standards recognize the necessity of a guardrail when there
is a change in elevation. In fact, defendant was aware of plaintiff's
"fall-back" position and argued against the position at the pretrial
conference. Thus, we agree with the appellate court that defendant
was not surprised by Holland's testimony. Defendant was aware
of Holland's position prior to trial and had ample time to prepare
an objection or cross-examination.
	Finally, defendant argues that Holland should not have been
allowed to testify that OHSA and other safety standards indicate
a standard of care because they are inapplicable to the area of the
retaining wall. We have already determined that OSHA does not
regulate the area above the retaining wall and need not determine
whether the other standards mentioned by Holland apply because
we find that admission of this evidence was not erroneous.
	The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 223 (2001); In re Estate of
Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 420 (1993). The appellate court, relying
on Miller v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 925 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1996), concluded that Holland's testimony
was not erroneous.
	Miller brought an action pursuant to FELA against the
Chicago & North Western Transportation Company (C&NW),
alleging that C&NW was negligent, in part, in failing to protect its
workers from falling into an 8- to 10-foot deep open maintenance
pit. While employed by C&NW, Miller fell into the pit and
suffered closed head injuries. Miller intended for his expert
witness to testify that a reasonable person would have had
protective guards around the open pit, and C&NW was negligent
in failing to do so. Miller, 925 F. Supp.  at 585. C&NW filed a
motion in limine to prevent Miller's expert from testifying that it
failed to comply with regulations promulgated by OSHA, the
Melrose Park building code, and safety regulations published by
American National Standards, Inc. (ANSI). C&NW argued that
the testimony should be barred because all three standards were
preempted by the actions of the FRA. Miller, 925 F. Supp.  at 584-85.
	With respect to OSHA, the court determined that the FRA,
through a 1978 policy statement, preempted OSHA regulations
with respect to railroad inspection pits; therefore, Miller's expert
could not testify that C&NW was bound by OSHA regulations.
Miller, 925 F. Supp.  at 587. The court, however, concluded that
because "Miller's FELA claim includes the burden of showing that
C & NW did not act as a reasonable person would have under the
circumstances," Miller's expert could "permissibly consider the
OSHA regulations as relevant to what reasonable safety
precautions are called for regarding open pits generally"; thus, the
expert was allowed "to use OSHA's standards as part of the basis
for his opinion as to what a reasonable person would do to protect
an open pit." Miller, 925 F. Supp.  at 588. The court also stated that
jury instructions would supplement its holding.
	In Robertson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 32 F.3d 408
(9th Cir. 1994), Robertson sued Burlington Northern Railroad
Company under FELA after he sustained a hearing loss and
tinnitus (ringing in the ears) while employed by the defendant. The
district court admitted evidence of noise standards established by
OSHA as some evidence of the defendant's duty of care to be
viewed in connection with other evidence in the case, but
instructed the jury that the standards were not binding on the
defendant and could not be used to establish negligence as a matter
of law. Robertson, 32 F.3d  at 409. On appeal, the court held that
admission of OSHA noise regulations was not error, as such
evidence "may be admitted in an FELA case as some evidence of
the applicable standard of care." Robertson, 32 F.3d  at 410. The
court also upheld the giving of a jury instruction which informed
the jury that OSHA and other standards were not binding on the
defendant. Robertson, 32 F.3d  at 411. See also Ries v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1992) (a violation
of OSHA could be considered by a jury as evidence of
negligence).
	Here, Holland testified that various safety standards, including
OSHA, recognize a change in elevation as a safety hazard. He
opined that a change in elevation should be protected by a
guardrail and mentioned the safety standards as evidence of what
a reasonable person would do to protect the area of the retaining
wall. Consistent with the trial court's motion in limine, Holland
did not testify that defendant had violated OSHA regulations or
any other safety standard. Further the jury was instructed that
			"Reference has been made in this case to certain
standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), BOCA National Building Code, American
National Standards, Inc. (ANSI), and the Chicago
Building Code for the limited purpose of suggesting
construction standards in certain industries of the United
States. These standards are not binding on the defendant
Metra in this lawsuit, but may be considered by you,
along with all the other evidence in this case in
determining whether or not Metra provided a reasonably
safe place to work. The issue of negligence in this case
must be determined by you based upon all the evidence
submitted to you, and by applying the law as I have
instructed you."
	As Miller, Robertson, and Ries indicate, these regulations are
admissible as evidence of the standard of care in an FELA case,
even though the regulations are not binding on defendant.
	In addition, an expert must be allowed to testify regarding the
basis for his opinion (cf. People v. Delgado, 282 Ill. App. 3d 851,
860 (1996) (expert may reveal contents of material he reasonably
relied upon to explain the basis of his opinion); Giraldi v.
Community Consolidated School District No. 62, 279 Ill. App. 3d
679, 690 (1996) (expert may testify to facts or data on which his
opinion is based)), because an expert's opinion is only as valid as
the reasons that underlie it (see Aguilera v. Mount Sinai Hospital
Medical Center, 293 Ill. App. 3d 967, 974 (1997)). Holland's
testimony that "every safety standard *** recognizes a change of
level as being a fault" was simply intended to support his expert
opinion that defendant was negligent in failing to install a
guardrail above the retaining wall.

III. CONCLUSION
	We conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
pursuant to IPI Civil 1995 No. 30.21. The court should have
instructed the jury pursuant to one of defendant's proposed
alternative instructions. However, this failure does not constitute
reversible error. Further, even if the trial court instructed the jury
on assumption of risk, it is not reversible error. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that
defendant was not an insurer of plaintiff's safety. Holland's
testimony did not violate Rule 213 and was properly admitted as
evidence of negligence. We hold that OSHA regulations do not
apply to the area above the retaining wall and, therefore, the trial
court correctly denied plaintiff's motion to bar evidence of
plaintiff's contributory negligence. For these reasons, we affirm
the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
 



1.      1It is unclear whether this instruction was submitted to the jury. After
deliberation, the trial court decided to give the instruction but later
failed to read it to the jury. The instruction is, however, contained in the
record although the record does not reflect whether the instruction was
given, given as modified, refused, or withdrawn as other instructions
offered by the parties indicate. Because the parties proceed, without
discussion, on the assumption that the instruction was given, we will
later address defendant's argument that the instruction was improper. 

2.      2An "employer" is "a person engaged in a business affecting
commerce who has employees, but does not include the United States
or any State or political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. §652(6)
(1994).

3.     3A "standard railing" is defined as a "vertical barrier erected along
exposed edges of a floor opening, wall opening, ramp, platform, or
runway to prevent falls of persons." 29 C.F.R. §1910.21(a)(6) (1993).

4.       According to a General Electric Company employee, he had
performed maintenance work on the top of the oven four or five
times during a period of 2½ years. General Electric Co., 583 F.2d 
at 62.