Case Title: Belanger v. Yorke

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 24

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 24 
Docket: 
BCD-19-115 
Argued: 
September 26, 2019 
Decided: 
February 25, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.** 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Concurrence/ 
Dissent: 
JABAR, J. 
 
 
REBECCA W. BELANGER 
 
v. 
 
LISA M. YORKE 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Rebecca W. Belanger (Belanger) and Lisa M. Yorke (Yorke) each 
claim to have taken title to a piece of property by way of a deed delivered to her 
by Brad Belanger (Brad).  Brad deeded the property to his daughter, Yorke, 
before he deeded it to his wife, Belanger, but Belanger recorded her deed before 
Yorke recorded hers.  As the trial court (Business and Consumer Docket, 
Mulhern, J.) explained, “[t]his is a case about a piece of real property that a man 
                                         
*  Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of this 
opinion.  See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified Justice may participate in a decision even though not 
present at oral argument.”). 
 
**  Although Justices Alexander and Hjelm participated in the appeal, they retired before this 
opinion was certified. 
 
 
2 
inherited from his parents and seems to have conveyed to both his wife and his 
daughter (his wife’s stepdaughter) at different times during his life. . . . Both 
women now claim exclusive title to the property, and have sued each other for, 
inter alia, a declaratory judgment to that effect.”   
[¶2]  The complex procedural history of this case includes cross-motions 
for partial summary judgment and, later, a request for judgment based on a 
stipulated record; both of these decisions are currently before us.  In ruling on 
the summary judgment motions, the court concluded “as a matter of law” that 
33 M.R.S. § 480, which requires the signature of a nonowner spouse on a 
transfer of real property in certain circumstances, was not an affirmative 
defense to Yorke’s ownership claim.  Later in the proceedings, based on a 
stipulated record, the court (Duddy, J.) found that Brad’s deed to Belanger was 
not supported by consideration and that, therefore, she was not a bona fide 
purchaser of the property for purposes of Maine’s recording statute, 33 M.R.S. 
§ 201 (2018).  Concluding that resolution of the consideration issue rendered 
all other contested issues moot, the court entered an order of final judgment, 
holding that Yorke owned the property.  Belanger challenges both of these 
rulings on appeal.  After reviewing the stipulated facts and the applicable law, 
we affirm the ruling regarding section 480, vacate the final judgment entered 
 
 
3 
on behalf of Yorke on the issue of consideration, and remand to the trial court 
to address unresolved issues.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts.1  In 1976, Brad 
acquired property located in West Bath (the Camp) through a deed from his 
parents.  Belanger and Brad were married on October 1, 1977.  This was Brad’s 
second marriage. 
[¶4]  In 1977, shortly after their marriage, Brad and Belanger entered 
into an oral agreement (the 1977 Agreement) by which each would deed his or 
her separately-owned real estate to the other as his or her joint tenant.  In 1978, 
Belanger conveyed property on Prospect Street in Bath (the Prospect Street 
Property) to herself and Brad as joint tenants.  Brad did not reciprocate by 
deeding the Camp to himself and Belanger in 1977 or 1978.  Instead, in 1978, 
Brad and Belanger agreed to postpone the transfer until after his parents died.  
Although Brad’s parents died in 1984 and 1989, Brad did not deed the property 
to himself and Belanger after either death.   
                                         
1  Although there are slight differences between the factual record created through the summary 
judgment filings and the stipulated record, those differences do not affect this opinion.  We use the 
stipulated record to provide background for the opinion.  
 
 
4 
[¶5]  In 2005, Brad deeded the Camp to Yorke, his daughter from his first 
marriage.  Yorke did not record the deed until many years later, because she 
wanted to give Brad time to tell Belanger about it.  Neither Yorke nor Brad ever 
did tell Belanger of the deed’s existence.   
[¶6]  In 2016, during Brad and Belanger’s mutual estate planning process, 
Brad executed a deed transferring the Camp to himself and Belanger as joint 
tenants, consistent with the 1977 Agreement.  Belanger recorded her deed on 
June 29, 2016.  Yorke recorded her deed on July 15, 2016.  Brad died on 
August 21, 2016.  He was survived by Belanger and by three adult children, 
including Yorke.  Yorke learned of the 1977 Agreement between Brad and 
Belanger after Brad’s death.  
 
[¶7]  Belanger filed her initial complaint in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc 
County)2 on April 14, 2017, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment 
establishing her as the sole legal owner of the Camp and damages for slander of 
title.  Yorke filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment establishing 
her, not Belanger, as the sole legal owner of the property and asserting a claim 
of undue influence.  Both parties purported to have taken title by way of the 
deeds delivered to them by Brad.   
                                         
2  On Belanger’s application, the case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket on 
November 28, 2017.   
 
 
5 
 
[¶8]  On April 24, 2018, Belanger filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment with regard to her declaratory judgment and slander of title claims 
and seeking judgment in her favor on Yorke’s counterclaims.  In that motion, 
she argued that as Brad’s widow she had a superior claim to the property 
because Brad’s transfer to Yorke was invalid in view of the fact that Belanger 
did not sign the deed as required by 33 M.R.S.A. § 480 (1999);3 that she held 
superior title by operation of the Maine Recording Act, 33 M.R.S. § 201; that 
Yorke’s deed was invalid because it failed to adequately describe the property; 
that Yorke was estopped from claiming a right to the property by the 
affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and laches; and that Yorke’s claim of 
undue influence against Belanger must fail as a matter of law.  Yorke countered 
                                         
3  The transfer to which the section 480 argument applies occurred in June of 2005.  Thus, all 
relevant citations are to the statute in effect at that time, which provided, in relevant part: 
 
An owner of real estate may convey that real estate, or any interest in it free from 
any claim to the real estate by his nonowner spouse, by deed, mortgage or any other 
instrument, without signature of his nonowner spouse, unless: 
 
1. Nonbona fide purchaser.  The transfer requires signature pursuant to the 
Title 18-A, section 2-202, subsections (1) and (3) . . . ; 
 
. . . . 
 
After that conveyance, any claim of the nonowner spouse under probate, divorce 
or any other laws, shall be against the proceeds of that conveyance and not against 
the real estate. 
 
33 M.R.S.A. § 480 (1999).  Section 480 has since been amended, though not in any way relevant to 
this appeal.  See P.L. 2017, ch. 402, §§ A-1 to -2 (effective Sept. 1, 2019); P.L. 2019, ch. 417, § B-14. 
 
 
6 
with her own motion for partial summary judgment on the section 480 issue 
and the affirmative defenses Belanger had raised.   
[¶9]  On November 2, 2018, after oral argument, the court (Mulhern, J.) 
issued an order (the Combined Order) granting Yorke a partial summary 
judgment as to the section 480 issue, concluding “as a matter of law that 
33 M.R.S. § 480 is not an affirmative defense to Ms. Yorke’s ownership.”  The 
court determined that genuine disputes of fact remained as to Belanger’s claims 
of slander of title, estoppel, and laches, and denied her motion for summary 
judgment as to those issues.  It also found that genuine disputes of material fact 
remained regarding Yorke’s claim of undue influence and denied summary 
judgment on that count.   
[¶10]  As the matter proceeded toward trial, Yorke sought leave to file a 
second motion for summary judgment, having identified a discrete legal issue 
that she believed could resolve the case: whether Brad’s deed to Belanger was 
supported by consideration.  The court (Duddy, J.) denied this request as 
untimely but agreed to consider motions for judgment on the issue if the parties 
could agree on a stipulated record and abbreviated briefing schedule.  The 
parties so agreed, submitted a stipulated record, and briefed the issue.   
 
 
7 
[¶11]  On March 7, 2019, the court entered a judgment on the stipulated 
record in favor of Yorke.  The court found that Belanger provided no “new 
consideration” to Brad in 2016 and noted that Brad’s verbal 1978 promise to 
transfer the property to Belanger “was unenforceable due to the statute of 
frauds.”  Based largely on those findings, the court determined that Brad’s deed 
to Belanger “was not supported by consideration, and thus [Belanger] was not 
a bona fide purchaser for the purposes of Maine’s Recording Act.”  Shortly 
thereafter, the court issued a final judgment, concluding that Yorke owned the 
real estate at issue and that, “[a]s a result of the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law contained in the Combined Order and Stipulated Record Order, all other 
claims raised by the parties are moot.”   
[¶12]  Belanger appeals, asserting that the court erred in holding that 
Yorke’s ownership of the property is not barred by section 480 and that there 
had been no consideration for the 2016 deed to her.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Title 33 M.R.S.A. § 480 
[¶13]  As discussed above, the court ruled on the section 480 issue in the 
context of Yorke’s motion for summary judgment.  “We review the grant of a 
motion for summary judgment de novo, and consider both the evidence and 
 
 
8 
any reasonable inferences that the evidence produces in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment has been granted 
in order to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact.”  Grant v. Foster 
Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242 (quotation marks omitted).  A 
genuine issue of material fact exists “when a fact-finder must choose between 
competing versions of the truth, even if one party’s version appears more 
credible or persuasive.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  When there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, “we review de novo the trial court’s 
interpretation and application of the relevant statutes and legal concepts.”  Id. 
¶ 13 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶14]  At the time of Brad’s transfer to Yorke, there were two sets of 
circumstances under which a transfer of real estate to someone other than a 
bona fide purchaser required the signature of the transferor’s nonowner 
spouse.  33 M.R.S.A. § 480.  Relevant to this case is the provision in subsection 
480(1) requiring the signature of a nonowner spouse when “[t]he transfer 
requires signature pursuant to [18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-202(1)].” 
 
 
9 
[¶15]  Title 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-202(1) (1998),4 in turn, required signatures 
of nonowner spouses for “[a]ny transfer under which the decedent retained at 
the time of his death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, 
the property.”  If an owner of real estate transferred the property without the 
signature of a nonowner spouse, any subsequent “claim of the nonowner 
spouse under probate, divorce or any other laws, shall be against the proceeds 
of that conveyance and not against the real estate.”  33 M.R.S.A. § 480. 
[¶16]  Belanger argues that Brad “retained the possession [or] enjoyment 
of” the Camp property at the time of his death, and thus her signature was 
required on the Yorke Deed.  Even viewed in the light most favorable to 
Belanger, however, the parties’ statements of material fact do not create a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Brad maintained possession or 
enjoyment of the Camp at the time of his death.  The record shows that Brad 
and Belanger last spent a night at the Camp in the 1980s, and although they 
kept a boat there, the last time the couple used the boat was “six or seven years 
ago”—that is, no later than 2012.  In contrast, the Yorke family used the Camp 
several weekends per month, and Yorke’s husband lived at the Camp full time 
                                         
4  In 2017, 18-A M.R.S. § 2-202 was recodified at 18-C M.R.S. § 2-208(1).  See P.L. 2017, ch. 402, 
§§ A-1 to -2 (effective Sept. 1, 2019); see also P.L. 2019, ch. 417, § B-14.  Again, all references are to 
the statute in effect in 2005, the time of the relevant transfer.  See supra ¶ 8 & n.3. 
 
 
10 
for a period beginning in 2015.  The Yorkes had spent tens of thousands of 
dollars in repair and maintenance costs since 2005.  Because the record does 
not support the conclusion that there is any genuine dispute as to whether Brad 
maintained the “possession or enjoyment” of the Camp property at the time of 
his death in 2016, Brad’s 2005 gift transfer to Yorke is not the type of transfer 
that required the signature of a nonowner spouse pursuant to section 480.  The 
court did not err in granting summary judgment on that issue. 
[¶17]  Belanger’s argument also fails for a second reason, grounded in the 
statutory language of section 480.  Even assuming for the sake of argument that 
the statute required Belanger’s signature on the Yorke Deed, the language of 
the statute does not provide her with a claim against the real estate as a remedy.  
As noted above, section 480 provides an explicit remedy for nonowner spouses: 
“After [a conveyance by the owner spouse], any claim of the nonowner spouse 
under probate, divorce or any other laws, shall be against the proceeds of that 
conveyance and not against the real estate.”  Belanger argues that section 480 
must provide an implied remedy for nonowner spouses that includes a claim to 
the real estate where the improper transfer is gratuitous, because the proceeds 
are necessarily zero in such a situation, leaving the nonowner spouse with no 
remedy at all.  In order to avoid an illogical result, argues Belanger, section 480 
 
 
11 
must be interpreted to provide her with an affirmative defense against Yorke’s 
ownership claim.  Belanger’s argument ignores the fact that the Maine Probate 
Code provides spouses in such a position a clear remedy by including the actual 
value of such gratuitous transfers in the augmented estate from which a 
surviving spouse may take his or her elective share.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. 
§ 2-202(1).  
[¶18]  Belanger posits an implausible reading of the plain language of 
section 480, grounded in an argument that, absent such a reading, spouses in 
her position will be left without a remedy to a legal wrong.  The plain language 
of the statute, however, does not support Belanger’s position, and a remedy 
does exist elsewhere in Maine law.  Furthermore, even if Belanger’s 
interpretation prevailed, the record cannot support a finding in her favor.  We 
affirm the trial court’s grant of Yorke’s motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of Belanger’s section 480 affirmative defense. 
B. 
Consideration 
[¶19]  The court resolved the consideration issue on a stipulated record, 
which consisted of the stipulated statement of facts plus certain exhibits.  “[A] 
record of stipulated facts does not, by itself, mean that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact,” Blue Sky West, LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 ME 137, 
 
 
12 
¶ 16 n.10, 215 A.3d 812, and unlike in the summary judgment context, a trial 
court undertaking a merits analysis on a stipulated record may “draw factual 
inferences from that evidence and decide disputed inferences of material fact 
to reach a final result,” Rose v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, ¶ 8, 118 A.3d 220.  Although 
we normally review with deference a trial court’s factual findings, such as 
whether consideration existed, we review “de novo for errors of law when the 
parties stipulate” to a set of facts.  Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr. v. Town 
of Limington, 2006 ME 44, ¶ 9, 896 A.2d 287. 
[¶20]  The trial court determined that Brad’s 2016 deed to Belanger was 
not supported by consideration largely because Belanger advanced no “new 
consideration” to Brad in 2016.  To support this determination, the trial court 
cited language from our cases explaining the familiar rule that “past 
consideration” is not consideration.  Cadwallader v. Clifton R. Shaw, Inc., 127 
Me. 172, 179, 142 A. 580 (1928); Hayden v. Russell, 119 Me. 38, 39-40, 109 
A. 485 (1920).   The past consideration rule, however, is not a rule about 
temporal proximity, but rather a necessary connotation of the rule that the 
benefits and detriments on both sides of a contract must be bargained for.  See 
infra ¶¶ 25-27; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 71, 86 & cmt. a (Am. Law 
Inst. 1981).  When one party has already provided a gratuitous (i.e., 
 
 
13 
unbargained-for) benefit, that benefit cannot be consideration for the 
recipient’s subsequent promise to pay for it, whether five minutes or five years 
after receiving the unanticipated benefit.  When there is a bargain, however, the 
fact that the parties’ performances are separated by some time does not 
retroactively negate the initial bargain. 
[¶21]  As we set forth in greater detail below, the relevant time period for 
determining whether Belanger’s transfer to Brad was consideration for Brad’s 
2016 transfer to Belanger is 1977.  See infra ¶ 27 & n.6.  In other words, if in 
1977 both Belanger and Brad considered that Belanger’s transfer of the 
Prospect Street Property was “in exchange for” Brad’s transfer of the Camp—
whenever those transfers might take place—then Brad’s 2016 deed to Belanger 
was supported by consideration for purposes of the bona fide purchaser 
protections; Belanger was not required to provide any additional consideration 
in 2016.  Brad’s intention in 2016 is therefore irrelevant except to the extent 
that it sheds any light on what his understanding was in 1977, and the trial 
court erred in basing its consideration determination solely on its analysis of 
Brad’s and Belanger’s actions and intentions in 2016.   
[¶22]  Furthermore, to the extent that the court also based its 
determination of the consideration issue on its understanding that the 1977 
 
 
14 
Agreement was unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, see 33 M.R.S. 
§ 51(4)-(5) (2018), the court erred.  There is no need to address the Statute of 
Frauds or any potential exceptions to it, because Belanger is not trying to 
enforce a contract.  Section 78 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
provides that unenforceable promises may constitute consideration, e.g., for 
purposes of rendering a party a bona fide purchaser for value.  See also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 75 cmt. d & illus. 4-6.  The enforceability 
of any contract between Belanger and Brad has no bearing on whether 
Belanger’s transfer of her own property—a transfer she indisputably made—
qualifies as consideration for Brad’s 2016 conveyance. 
[¶23]  If Brad had not deeded the Camp to Belanger, and unless some 
exception applied, such as the part performance exception, the Statute of 
Frauds might have barred her from enforcing a claim that she and Brad had a 
contract that required him to transfer the property.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Porter, 
2004 ME 134, ¶ 11, 861 A.2d 625.  But Belanger is not trying to enforce a 
contract; she is simply arguing, in effect, that when Brad deeded the Camp to 
her he was doing so pursuant to a contract, and that therefore she is a bona fide 
purchaser for purposes of Maine’s recording statute. 
 
 
15 
[¶24]  Because neither Brad’s 2016 intention nor the Statute of Frauds 
has any bearing on the issue of consideration, the trial court did not apply the 
correct legal standard to resolve this issue, and we have no choice but to vacate 
the judgment.  See Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr., 2006 ME 44, ¶ 9, 896 
A.2d 287.  Furthermore, as we explain below, the stipulated record is 
insufficient to allow us to determine—as a matter of law—whether Belanger’s 
1978 transfer was consideration for Brad’s 2016 transfer.  Because we must 
remand this issue to the trial court, we take this opportunity to provide 
guidance to the parties and the court. 
[¶25]  The parties’ stipulated statement of facts establishes that, in 1977, 
Belanger and Brad “made an agreement to put each other’s names on their 
separately owned properties, as joint tenants (the ‘1977 Agreement’).”  Mutual 
promises to convey property interests to one another may constitute sufficient 
consideration for purposes of a contract or for the purpose of determining 
whether someone is a bona fide purchaser.5  See Restatement (Second) of 
                                         
5  There is essentially no case law—in Maine or any other jurisdiction—addressing any differences 
between the meaning of “consideration” for purposes of contract enforceability and “consideration” 
for purposes of a recording statute’s bona fide purchaser protections.  Courts have, however, held 
that the contract-law meaning of consideration does not map precisely onto the term’s meaning in 
other contexts, such as the Internal Revenue Code.  See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. United States, 526 F.2d 
1012, 1015-18 (3d Cir. 1975) (“That [a decedent] may have been obliged under New Jersey [contract] 
law to carry out her original intention . . . does not alter the nature of her original intention [for 
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code].”).  For purposes of this opinion, we assume that the 
definitions are coextensive. 
 
 
16 
Contracts, § 75, cmt a. (“In modern times the enforcement of bargains is not 
limited to those partly completed, but is extended to the wholly executory 
exchange in which promise is exchanged for promise.”); see also Zamore v. 
Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 443 n.3 (Me. 1978) (“In a bilateral contract, one promise 
is good consideration for another.”), overruled on other grounds by Bahre v. 
Pearl, 595 A.2d 1027, 1035 (Me. 1991).  In order “[t]o constitute consideration,” 
however, “a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.”  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(1).  A “return promise is bargained for 
if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the 
promisee in exchange for that promise.”  Id. § 71(2).  The objectively manifested 
intentions of both parties are relevant because it takes two to bargain.  See id. 
§ 71 cmt. b (“[I]t is not enough that the promise induces the conduct of the 
promisee or that the conduct of the promisee induces the making of the 
promise; both elements must be present, or there is no bargain.”); accord 
Laflamme v. Hoffman, 148 Me. 444, 450-51, 95 A.2d 802 (1953). 
[¶26]  Inducing the other person’s promise need not be the primary or 
substantial motive for the action constituting consideration (whether promise 
or performance), see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81(1); likewise, a 
promise induced by the promise constituting consideration need not be 
 
 
17 
primarily motivated by it, see id. § 81(2).  Here, for instance, Belanger’s promise 
to convey her property to Brad may constitute consideration for Brad’s 2016 
deed even if the 1977 agreement was primarily motivated by Brad’s and 
Belanger’s love and affection for each other. 
[¶27]  Thus, two facts must be found to be true in order for Brad’s 2016 
deed to Belanger to have been supported by consideration: (1) Belanger must 
have made her 1977 promise or her 1978 conveyance in exchange for Brad’s 
promise to convey his property, and (2) Brad must have intended for his 
reciprocal 1977 promise to convey his property to induce Belanger’s promise 
to convey hers.6  Brad’s intent at that time may be discerned by evidence of his 
statements and actions in 1977 as well as his actions related to that alleged 
promise thereafter.  If either Brad or Belanger viewed the 1977 agreement 
exclusively as a mutual exchange of gifts, rather than as “bargained-for” 
exchange (at least in part), then neither Belanger’s promise to convey her 
property nor her performance of that promise in 1978 can constitute 
                                         
6  Brad’s intention only in 1977 is relevant, because by the time of his 1978 promise, Belanger’s 
performance was complete, and Brad could not have intended any promise he made after Belanger 
conveyed her property to have induced her to convey the property.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 86 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).   
 
    Belanger’s intention to induce Brad’s promise, by contrast, might be established either in 1977 
or in 1978, because Brad made his two promises—his original 1977 promise and his revised 1978 
promise—either contemporaneously with or after Belanger made her promise, so the “past 
consideration” rule does not apply.  Id.; see supra ¶¶ 20-21.  
 
 
18 
consideration for purposes of rendering her a bona fide purchaser of Brad’s 
property. 
[¶28]  We recognize that whether the fact that mutual promises have 
been made establishes, even presumptively, that each promise constitutes 
consideration for the other is an unsettled question in Maine.  Context matters: 
the evidentiary weight of the simple fact that both parties have made promises 
will vary depending on the parties’ relationship.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 71 cmt. c.  For instance, in a business setting, the fact that one party 
promises to pay money and the other party promises to render a service is very 
strong evidence of a “bargain.”  In the context of marriage, family relationships, 
and even friendship, however, the motives behind a mutual exchange are more 
complex and more difficult to determine.  The “gift or bargain” question that 
bedevils courts interpreting a property transfer between family members does 
not lend itself to a per se rule that reciprocity indicates a bargain. 
[¶29]  Accordingly, in several jurisdictions, the fact that spouses have 
made mutual wills does not establish, per se, that each will was made in 
consideration of the other.  See, e.g., Reznik v. McKee, 534 P.2d 243, 254-55 (Kan. 
1975); Curry v. Cotton, 191 N.E. 307, 310 (Ill. 1934) (noting, however, that 
“where [a joint will] is one jointly executed by the husband and wife, while in 
 
 
19 
itself not conclusive evidence of a contract, it is a very material circumstance” 
to the question of whether a contract exists).   
[¶30]  Here, the stipulated record does not establish as a matter of law 
that Brad’s and Belanger’s mutual promises were either a quid pro quo (and 
thus consideration for each other) or a matter of marital obligation or perceived 
social propriety (and thus not consideration).  For instance, the stipulated 
record contains Belanger’s deposition testimony that Brad’s 2016 transfer was 
“similar to when I put his name on my house [in 1978].  It made a couple.  I 
didn’t gain anything . . . when I put his name on my house, and he didn’t gain 
anything when he put my name on his cottage.”  (Emphasis added.)  On the 
other hand, the stipulated record states that “Belanger considered that her 
1978 transfer of the Prospect Street property was in exchange for the transfer 
of the 2016 Deed from Brad.”   
[¶31]  Furthermore, the parties’ use of the term “agreement” does not 
resolve the question.  Paragraph 22 of the Stipulated Statement of Facts states, 
inter alia, that Brad “delivered a deed of the Camp to [Belanger] and himself as 
joint tenants . . . consistent with the 1977 Agreement.”  In this context, however, 
the word “agreement” does not imply, by itself, that both promises are 
supported by consideration.  The Restatement defines “agreement” simply as 
 
 
20 
“a manifestation of mutual assent.”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3.  The 
comments to section 3 clarify that “[a]greement has in some respects a wider 
meaning than contract, bargain or promise,” and that there exist some 
“agreements which are not contracts, such as transactions where one party 
makes a promise and the other gives something in exchange which is not 
consideration.”  Id. § 3 cmts. a, c.  Spouses or friends may “agree” in a colloquial 
sense to exchange gifts, but in many such exchanges there is no element, even 
minor, of quid pro quo or bargain. 
[¶32]  As discussed above, the stipulated record simply does not permit 
us to determine, as a matter of law, whether Brad and Belanger would have 
made their mutual property transfers even if the other one did not—because 
that was their understanding of their domestic partnership—or, instead, 
whether each spouse did so because the other spouse did as well. 
[¶33]  On remand, the trial court must determine whether Brad’s promise 
was made “in exchange for” Belanger’s promise.  Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 71(2).  The court’s resolution of that issue—including its possible 
conclusion that the stipulated record is insufficient to allow it to make such a 
determination in the first instance, see Rose, 2015 ME 73, ¶¶ 7-8, 118 A.3d 220, 
 
 
21 
a possibility about which we do not currently opine—will determine how it 
should proceed.7 
The entry is: 
 
The judgment on the 33 M.R.S.A. § 480 issue is 
affirmed.  The final judgment on the issue of 
consideration is vacated and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JABAR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
 
[¶34]  I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.  I agree with the 
Court’s decision to vacate the judgment holding that Belanger failed to prove 
that there was any consideration for the 1977 Agreement to convey each 
other’s separately owned property into joint tenancy.  See Court’s Opinion 
¶¶ 24, 33.  I also agree with the Court’s remand to address other unresolved 
issues.  However, I do not believe that we should remand to the trial court to 
resolve the issue of consideration because I believe that the stipulated facts 
establish as a matter of law that there was consideration for the 1977 
Agreement wherein Brad and Belanger both agreed to convey all of their 
individual properties into jointly owned properties.   
                                         
7  Because Belanger’s appeal is not frivolous, we deny Yorke’s motion for sanctions.  See M.R. 
App. P. 13(f); Lincoln v. Burbank, 2016 ME 138, ¶ 46, 147 A.3d 1165.   
 
 
22 
[¶35]  We review the court’s decision on a stipulated record de novo.  
Mason v. City of Augusta, 2007 ME 101, ¶ 18, 927 A.2d 1146 (“Because the facts 
are stipulated, we review de novo the legal issues presented to the [trial 
court].”).  
[¶36]  The stipulated facts establish that Belanger and Brad entered into 
an agreement wherein they agreed “to put each other’s names on their 
separately owned properties as joint tenants (the ‘1977 Agreement’).”  Mutual 
promises to convey property interests to one another constitute consideration 
for purposes of a contract or for the purpose of determining whether someone 
is a bona fide purchaser.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 71(1), (2) 
(Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“To constitute consideration, a performance or a return 
promise must be bargained for. . . . A performance or return promise is 
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is 
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”).   
[¶37]  This bedrock principle of contract law is a common thread seen 
throughout our jurisprudence for more than a century.  See First Nat’l Bank v. 
Ware, 95 Me. 388, 398, 50 A. 24 (1901) (“mutual promises of . . . creditors to 
one another [to partially forgive debt] constitute a sufficient consideration for 
the promise of each.”); see also A.L. Brown Constr. Co. v. McGuire, 495 A.2d 794, 
 
 
23 
797 (Me. 1985) (“Mutual promises to exchange releases and settle claims are, 
themselves, adequate consideration for a contract.”).  
 
[¶38]  The parties’ stipulated statement of facts states, “Soon after their 
marriage, [Belanger] and Brad made an agreement to put each other’s names 
on their separately owned properties, as joint tenants (the ‘1977 Agreement’).”  
In addition, stipulated facts 5, 6, and 7 indicate that Belanger and Brad agreed 
to create a mutual estate plan under which Belanger would receive everything 
Brad owned if he predeceased her, and vice versa.  The parties also stipulated 
that, “During their 39 year marriage, Brad and [Belanger] named each other as 
beneficiaries in their insurance, individual investments, and wills pursuant to 
the estate plan.”  Belanger also established Brad as joint owner of a vehicle and 
her retirement account.   
[¶39]  In addition, Belanger and Brad made several conveyances of real 
estate pursuant to the 1977 Agreement during their lifetimes.  “In 1978, 
[Belanger] conveyed her Prospect Street property in Bath to herself and Brad 
as joint tenants . . . as part of the 1977 Agreement.”  In 1982, Belanger and Brad 
had property on Front Street in Bath conveyed to themselves in joint tenancy, 
in “conformity with the 1977 Agreement.”  Finally, in 2016, when Brad 
conveyed the Camp to Belanger and himself as joint tenants, it was conveyed 
 
 
24 
“consistent with the 1977 Agreement.”  These stipulated facts establish as a 
matter of law that there was a mutual estate plan, a quid pro quo—not an 
agreement to exchange gifts without any understanding of required reciprocity.  
[¶40]  Belanger and Brad’s agreement was much broader than Belanger’s 
conveyance of her separately-owned Prospect Street property into joint 
tenancy in exchange for Brad’s conveyance of his separately-owned camp into 
joint tenancy.  The 2016 deed of the Camp by Brad to himself and Belanger as 
joint tenants was only one part of the “mutual estate plan.”  The stipulated facts 
indicate that Brad and Belanger characterized the transfer of the Camp as being 
made pursuant to the 1977 Agreement.  They both executed other documents 
and conveyances consistent with this estate plan.  They both had named each 
other as beneficiaries on their insurance, investments, savings, wills and 
personal property.  These transactions were not merely an agreement “in a 
colloquial sense to exchange gifts.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 31.  These facts establish 
as a matter of law that the 1977 Agreement was a bargained-for exchange.  
[¶41]  We should remand the matter to the trial court with the direction 
that judgment be entered for Belanger on the issue of consideration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
Christopher E. Pazar, Esq., and William J. Kennedy, Esq. (orally), Drummond & 
Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellant Rebecca W. Belanger 
 
Chris Neagle, Esq. (orally), Troubh Heisler, LLC, Portland, for appellee Lisa M. 
Yorke 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2017-56 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY