Case Title: Guill v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 971153

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
DWAYNE EDWARD GUILL 
 
v.  Record No. 971153 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                       January 9, 1998 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this criminal appeal, the dispositive issue is whether 
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of another crime 
committed by the defendant for the purpose of proving his intent 
to commit the crime charged. 
 
Dwayne Edward Guill was indicted for unlawfully and 
feloniously breaking and entering a dwelling house in the 
nighttime with the intent to commit murder, rape, or robbery in 
violation of Code § 18.2-90.  He was tried by the Circuit Court 
of Charlotte County, sitting without a jury, and was found guilty 
as charged.  The trial court sentenced Guill to confinement in 
the penitentiary for 20 years, with execution of 5 years 
suspended. 
 
We state the evidence taken at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  Roach 
v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 468 S.E.2d 98, 101, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 365 (1996); Graham v. 
Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 81, 459 S.E.2d 97, 98, cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 997 (1995).  On May 22, 1995, at about 2:00 a.m., Guill 
broke and entered the home of Danny and Donna Crews who were 
asleep in their bedroom.  The Crews' two daughters, ages five and 
seven, were also in the house at the time.  The girls shared a 
bed in a ground floor bedroom, which was illuminated both by an 
outdoor safety light and by a light inside the house. 
 
Mr. Crews testified that he awakened and heard his daughters 
talking.  When he arose and walked into the kitchen, he saw 
Guill, a stranger, backing out of the girls' bedroom.  Crews 
confronted Guill, stating, "[M]an, what in the hell are you doing 
in my house."  In response, Guill reached for his back pocket 
with his right hand and said, "I'll cut your f_ _ _ing head off." 
 After the two men looked at each other "for a second or two," 
Guill ran out the back door. 
 
Mr. Crews stated that although there were open ground floor 
windows in the living room and the master bedroom, Guill entered 
the house by taking a twelve-foot ladder from the basement and 
climbing through a bathroom window.  The open windows were 
located in a portion of the house which was illuminated by 
exterior light, while there were no exterior lights in the area 
near the bathroom window.  In a hallway just outside the 
bathroom, Mrs. Crews had left a purse containing $200 in plain 
view, as well as her keys. 
 
Over Guill's objection, the Commonwealth called a witness 
who stated that, in 1985 when she was 16 years old, Guill broke 
and entered the house in which she was sharing an upstairs room 
with her 15 year-old female cousin.  The witness testified that 
she and her cousin were asleep when Guill, a stranger to the two 
girls, got into the witness' bed with his shirt off, kissed her, 
and attempted to rape her.  According to the witness, Guill "told 
my cousin that if I [did not] be quiet he was going to kill me." 
 
Three weeks after the incident at the Crews' residence, 
Guill was arrested.  He made a statement to the police in which 
he gave the following explanation.  He stated that he stopped at 
the Crews' house because his vehicle "ran out of gas."  He first 
attempted to get some gasoline out of a truck on the Crews' 
property and then broke into their house to find keys to open 
some locked gas tanks. 
 
Guill also told the police that he entered the house by 
using a ladder to go through a bathroom window.  Once in the 
house, he looked around for keys "and heard the kid wake up."  
When he told her to be quiet, she started crying.  Guill stated 
that, at this point, he "got up and went out of the room and as I 
did I met the man."  Guill did not testify at the trial. 
 
The trial court found the defendant guilty after ruling that 
evidence of the 1985 crime was admissible because it was of "such 
. . . a similar nature" to the present offense.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in an unpublished 
opinion, holding that the 1985 crime and the present offense were 
"sufficiently similar to be probative of [the defendant's] 
intent," and that the evidence of his prior conduct was 
admissible for the "narrow purpose of proving, elucidating, or 
explaining [the defendant's] intent." 
 
On appeal to this Court, the defendant argues that evidence 
of the 1985 crime was irrelevant because the facts of the present 
offense contain no evidence of an intent to commit rape.  The 
defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of the 1985 crime because it was dissimilar to the 
present offense. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that evidence of the 
1985 crime was admissible to prove the defendant's intent in the 
crime charged based on his conduct on the prior occasion.  We 
disagree with the Commonwealth and hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the trial court's ruling on this issue. 
 
Evidence that shows or tends to show a defendant has 
committed a prior crime generally is inadmissible to prove the 
crime charged.  Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 95, 372 
S.E.2d 377, 380 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009 (1989); 
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 
805 (1970).  Such evidence implicating an accused in other crimes 
unrelated to the charged offense is inadmissible because it may 
confuse the issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the 
defendant.  See Boggs v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 478, 486, 100 
S.E.2d 766, 772 (1957).  There are several exceptions to the 
general rule excluding this type of evidence. 
 
Evidence of "other crimes" is relevant and admissible if it 
tends to prove any element of the offense charged.  Kirkpatrick, 
211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805.  Thus, evidence of other 
crimes is allowed when it tends to prove motive, intent, or 
knowledge of the defendant.  Id.  Among other exceptions, 
evidence of other crimes also is allowed if relevant to show the 
perpetrator's identity when some aspects of the prior crime are 
so distinctive or idiosyncratic that the fact finder reasonably 
could infer that the same person committed both crimes.  Spencer 
v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616, cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990). 
 
Admission of evidence under these exceptions, however, is 
subject to the further requirement that the legitimate probative 
value of the evidence must exceed the incidental prejudice caused 
the defendant.  Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 502, 303 
S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983).  Further, the admission of such "other 
crimes" evidence is prohibited when its only purpose is to show 
that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes or a 
particular type of crime and, therefore, probably committed the 
offense for which he is being tried.  Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 
272, 176 S.E.2d at 805. 
 
The element of the crime in dispute in the present case is 
that of the defendant's intent.  Intent is the purpose formed in 
a person's mind that may, and often must, be inferred from the 
particular facts and circumstances of a case.  Ridley v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979).  Like 
any other element of a crime, intent must be proved as a matter 
of fact and may not be the subject of surmise and speculation.  
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 380, 382, 89 S.E.2d 344, 345 
(1955). 
 
As we stated in Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 273, 176 S.E.2d at 
805, the leading case on the principles involved here is Walker 
v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574 (1829).  There, a defendant 
was indicted for larceny of a watch and, at trial, evidence was 
admitted that at one time he had stolen a coat.  In setting aside 
his conviction, we held that this evidence was irrelevant and 
inadmissible to prove the defendant's intent in the crime 
charged, because the evidence did not have "such necessary 
conne[ct]ion with the transaction then before the court as to be 
inseparable from it."  Id. at 580.  We explained that 
 
 
if the circumstances [of the other event] have no 
intimate conne[ct]ion with the main fact; if they 
constitute no link in the chain of evidence . . . they 
ought to be excluded, because they are irrelevant; 
[and] if they denote other guilt, they are not only 
irrelevant, but they do injury, because they have a 
tendency to [cause] prejudice. 
 
Id. at 577. 
 
 
In Barber v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 858, 30 S.E.2d 565 
(1944), an appeal of an attempted rape conviction, we again 
applied these principles.  The trial court had allowed evidence 
that the defendant committed an attempted rape on a different 
victim for the purpose of showing the defendant's intent in the 
crime charged. 
 
We reversed the defendant's conviction, stating that it is 
improper to use evidence that a defendant has committed another 
crime when it has "no connection with the one under 
investigation.  Such other acts of criminality . . . are not 
legally relevant and should not be [used] to prejudice the 
defendant or to create a probability of guilt."  Id. at 866, 30 
S.E.2d at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We explained 
that the test for admission of evidence of other crimes is met 
when there is "a causal relation or logical and natural 
connection between the two acts, or they . . . form parts of one 
transaction."  Id. at 868, 30 S.E.2d at 569 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 912-
13, 86 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1955). 
 
We again applied these principles in Donahue v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 300 S.E.2d 768 (1983).  There, the 
trial court had allowed evidence of the defendant's prior sale of 
phencyclidine (PCP) for the purpose of proving her intent to 
distribute PCP and marijuana in the crimes charged.  The prior 
sale had occurred over one month before her arrest on the crimes 
charged.  Id. at 149, 300 S.E.2d at 770. 
 
We held that evidence of the prior sale of PCP was 
inadmissible to prove the defendant's intent because that 
evidence was unrelated to the crime charged and none of the other 
exceptions to the general rule barring admission of "other 
crimes" evidence was applicable.  We also stated that the 
prejudicial effect of that evidence required its exclusion.  Id. 
at 156, 300 S.E.2d at 774; see also Boyd v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 
52, 53, 189 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1972). 
 
Applying these principles to the present case, we hold that 
evidence of the 1985 crime was unrelated to the crime charged.  
Like the "other crimes" evidence in the above cases, there was no 
causal relation or logical connection between the 1985 offense 
and the crime charged, nor did the two crimes form parts of one 
transaction.  See Barber, 182 Va. at 868, 30 S.E.2d at 569; see 
also Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 273, 176 S.E.2d at 806; Day, 196 Va. 
at 912-13, 86 S.E.2d at 26; Walker, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) at 577.  
Therefore, evidence of the 1985 crime was not probative evidence 
of the defendant's intent in the crime charged and was irrelevant 
and inadmissible for purposes of proving that intent.  See 
Donahue, 225 Va. at 155-56, 300 S.E.2d at 773-74; Kirkpatrick, 
211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805; Day, 196 Va. at 912-13, 86 
S.E.2d at 26; Barber, 182 Va. at 866-68, 30 S.E.2d at 568-69; 
Walker, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) at 577. 
 
We also hold that evidence of the 1985 crime is not 
admissible under any other exception to the general rule barring 
admission of "other crimes" evidence.  Specifically, we hold that 
the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was admissible 
because it was of "such a similar nature" to the offense charged. 
 In Spencer, we held that when the identity of a perpetrator is 
at issue, evidence of another crime may be admitted to prove the 
actor's identity if the prior crime bears "a singular strong 
resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged" and is 
sufficiently idiosyncratic in relation to that offense to permit 
an inference of a pattern for proof purposes.  240 Va. at 90, 393 
S.E.2d at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that this test is applicable 
here when the identity of the perpetrator is known, we hold that 
the test is not met.  Although a few of the facts in the two 
burglaries are similar, the crimes do not have any idiosyncratic 
characteristics. 
 
As stated above, in the 1985 crime, the defendant entered a 
house through a rear door and proceeded to an upstairs bedroom 
occupied by two girls, ages 15 and 16.  Here, the defendant used 
a ladder to crawl through a ground floor bathroom window after 
punching holes in the window screen.  He then walked into the 
ground floor bedroom of two girls who were five and seven years 
of age. 
 
In the 1985 crime, the defendant got into the girls' bed and 
kissed and attempted to rape one of them.  Here, there is no 
evidence that the defendant got into the girls' bed or touched 
either girl in any manner.  Instead, the evidence shows only that 
the defendant "got up" before he left the girls' room. 
 
Although the defendant threatened the girls' father in this 
case, he threatened the witness in the 1985 crime.  Moreover, we 
note that conduct of this nature unfortunately is common, rather 
than idiosyncratic, in this type of crime. 
 
Based on the above factual differences, evidence of the 1985 
crime was inadmissible under a Spencer analysis because that 
offense was not idiosyncratic in relation to the facts of the 
present offense.  As such, the evidence lacked a logical 
relationship to the offense charged and, thus, was irrelevant and 
showed only the defendant's propensity to commit the crime 
charged.  See Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805.  
Since this evidence was inadmissible and had no probative value, 
we hold that its admission caused undue prejudice to the 
defendant.  See Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. at 156, 300 
S.E.2d at 774.
*
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals' 
judgment and remand the case to the Court with direction that the 
matter be remanded to the trial court for a new trial, if the 
Commonwealth be so advised, consistent with the principles set 
forth in this opinion. 
                     
     
* Since our holding requires reversal of this case, we do 
not 
reach 
the 
defendant's 
remaining 
assignment 
of 
error 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 
 
Reversed and remanded.
 
JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
The main issue in this criminal appeal is whether the trial 
court erroneously admitted so-called "other crimes" evidence on 
the question of the accused's specific intent to commit the 
offense charged. 
 
Dwayne Edward Guill was tried by the Circuit Court of 
Charlotte County, sitting without a jury, upon an indictment for 
unlawfully and feloniously breaking and entering a dwelling house 
in the nighttime with the intent to commit murder, rape, or 
robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-90.  Defendant was found 
guilty as charged and was sentenced to confinement in the 
penitentiary for 20 years, with execution of 5 years suspended. 
 
Upon review, a panel of the Court of Appeals unanimously 
affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion.  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly admitted 
evidence regarding defendant's 1985 conviction for breaking and 
entering a dwelling house in the nighttime with the intent to 
commit rape, and correctly found the evidence sufficient to 
sustain the instant conviction. 
 
The Court awarded defendant this appeal.  According to 
settled principles of appellate review, I shall summarize the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 
 
On May 22, 1995, Danny Crews, his wife, and their two 
daughters, five and seven years of age, resided in the Drakes 
Branch area of Charlotte County.  On that date, near 2:00 a.m., 
the parents awoke in their ground level bedroom to the sound of 
the daughters talking in a separate bedroom, also at ground 
level.  As the father approached the children's room, the 
defendant "was backing out of that bedroom," which was 
illuminated by a security light mounted on a pole outside the 
home. 
 
The father said to defendant, a stranger, "[M]an, what in 
the hell are you doing in my house."  According to the father, 
defendant "reached for his back pocket with his right hand" and 
threatened to cut off the father's head.  The two men stood 
facing each other "for a second or two."  Then defendant "fled 
out of the back door," breaking two door locks as he ran.  
Defendant left the scene on a motorcycle parked nearby. 
 
Defendant, age 34, was arrested three weeks later.  "At 
first he denied any involvement in the burglary or break-in and 
later on he did admit that he went in the house," according to 
the investigating officer. 
 
In a statement to the police, defendant, who did not testify 
at trial, claimed that while riding the motorcycle, he "ran out 
of gas and that he was in the house looking for keys to the gas 
tanks" of trucks parked in the yard of the Crews' home.  
Defendant stated he had found "a little" gas but was searching 
for more in a locked tank "on the back of a pickup truck." 
 
Defendant further stated he gained access to the home by 
using a ladder and crawling through a bathroom window after 
cutting the screen.  Once inside, he said, "I was looking around 
for the keys and heard the kid wake up."  Defendant stated that 
while he was in the children's room, "I told her to be quiet . . 
. And then she started crying."  Asked what happened next, 
defendant stated:  "I got up and went out of the room and as I 
did I met the man."  
 
The investigation revealed that, at the time of the 
incident, ground floor windows were open that would have allowed 
defendant to enter the home without use of a ladder.  These 
windows, however, were in a portion of the home that was 
illuminated by the exterior light, while the area near the 
bathroom window was dark. 
 
In addition, a desk and chair in an illuminated hall area 
were in the path of one proceeding from the bathroom to the 
girls' room.  Mrs. Crews' purse containing keys was in the chair, 
and $200 in cash "was sticking up out of [the] pocketbook"; it 
was not disturbed during the incident.  Also, prior to the 
incident, the door to the girls' room "was halfway open" and a 
light burning in the kitchen shone into their room. 
 
At trial, the prosecution presented, over defendant's 
objection, the testimony of a woman who was the victim of a 
breaking and entering with intent to commit rape perpetrated by 
defendant in June of 1985.  That crime occurred during the 
nighttime in a Chase City residence when the witness, age 16 at 
the time, occupied an upstairs bedroom with her 15-year-old 
female cousin. 
 
The defendant, a stranger to the girls, unlawfully entered 
the dwelling through a rear door, proceeded past a downstairs 
bedroom occupied by an adult, entered the girls' bedroom wearing 
only "shorts," got into their bed, kissed one of the girls, 
attempted to rape the witness, and left the home when the girls 
fought him and screamed for help.  According to the witness, 
defendant "told my cousin that if I don't be quiet he was going 
to kill me."  Subsequently, defendant was convicted in 
Mecklenburg County of that offense. 
 
In this appeal, defendant contends the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the action of the trial court in admitting the 
evidence of the 1985 crime.  I disagree. 
 
Generally, proof showing an accused committed other crimes 
at other times is incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of 
establishing commission of the particular crime charged.  Woodfin 
v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 95, 372 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1988), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009 (1989); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 
211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970).  Such evidence is 
admissible, however, when "it tends to prove any relevant element 
of the offense charged," such as when the accused's intent is at 
issue.  Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805.  Accord 
Jennings v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 9, 15, 454 S.E.2d 752, 755 
(1995).  Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible 
only when "the legitimate probative value outweighs the 
incidental prejudice to the accused."  Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 
Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983). 
 
In the present case, under the indictment, the Commonwealth 
had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
broke and entered the Crews' residence in the nighttime with the 
specific intent to commit rape.  See Code § 18.2-90; Snyder v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 792, 798, 263 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1980).  
"Intent is the purpose formed in a person's mind which may, and 
often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in a 
particular case."  Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 
S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979).  This state of mind may be shown by the 
offender's acts and conduct.  Id.
 
Here, there is no dispute defendant broke and entered the 
Crews' dwelling in the nighttime.  The only contested element of 
the offense charged is whether defendant's intent, in entering 
the home, was to rape either or both of the girls, as opposed to 
an intent to procure fuel for his motorcycle, as he claimed.  The 
question then becomes whether evidence of the 1985 crime was 
relevant and tended to prove defendant's specific intent to 
commit the crime. 
 
Admissibility of "other crimes" evidence does not 
necessarily turn on the proximity of the prior acts to the crime 
charged.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals has approved the use of 
such evidence when the prior conduct was ten and twenty years in 
the past.  Jennings, 20 Va. App. at 14, 454 S.E.2d at 754. 
 
Also, this Court has rejected the notion that when evidence 
of other crimes is offered to prove modus operandi, an exact 
resemblance to the crime on trial as to constitute a "signature" 
is necessary to qualify such evidence for admission.  Rather, the 
Court has said it is sufficient if the evidence of other crimes 
bears "a singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the 
offense charged."  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 
S.E.2d 609, 616, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court has explained that the test 
for admissibility is met when the prior crime is sufficiently 
idiosyncratic to permit an inference of a pattern for proof 
purposes.  Id.  The present case is not a modus operandi case in 
which an effort is made to establish the identity of the accused 
by showing the probability of a common perpetrator.  However, I 
perceive no reason why the same test should not apply when, as 
here, the perpetrator's identity is known and his intent is in 
question. 
 
Here, the evidence of the 1985 crime bears a singular strong 
resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged and is 
sufficiently distinctive to permit an inference of a pattern of 
behavior.  For example, in 1985, as here, defendant broke and 
entered a residence.  In 1985, as here, the crime was committed 
in the nighttime.  In 1985, as here, the defendant proceeded past 
an adult's bedroom en route to a bedroom occupied by young 
girls.In 1985, the girls were young, 15 and 16 years of age.  
Here, the girls also were young, five and seven years of age. 
 
In 1985, defendant tried to rape one of the girls.  Here, 
the defendant did something in the bedroom, while he was there an 
undetermined period, that required him to "get up" before he left 
the room.  A reasonable inference from that proven fact is that 
defendant sat on the girls' bed in order to molest either or both 
of them.  Although that proven fact may give rise to other 
inferences, such as, that defendant intended to commit an assault 
and battery, the Court must accept on appeal the inference that 
is most favorable to the Commonwealth. 
 
In 1985, the girls screamed and defendant threatened to kill 
one of them.  Here, the girls cried and defendant threatened to 
kill the father. 
 
Therefore, I would hold that proof of the 1985 crime was 
relevant because it tended to establish the defendant's specific 
intent.  Further, the legitimate probative value of the evidence 
outweighs the incidental prejudice to the defendant.  "The 
responsibility for balancing these competing considerations is 
largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge. . . . And 
a trial court's discretionary ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion."  Coe v. Commonwealth, 
231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).  Hence, the evidence 
was admissible, and the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming 
the trial court's ruling on that issue. 
 
My analysis of the first issue effectively disposes of the 
second.  Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of the crime charged.  I disagree. 
 
The trial court was entitled to infer that defendant, given 
his propensity to commit sexual crimes involving young girls, 
entered the home and remained in the girls' bedroom intending, 
not to look for keys, but to rape either or both of them.  
Defendant's activity was wholly inconsistent with a quest for 
fuel. 
 
Defendant observed the girls sleeping as he was standing in 
the yard near their illuminated room.  At that point in time, he 
already had obtained "a little" gasoline, sufficient to enable 
him to drive a distance from the scene after he fled the home, 
according to the evidence.  Nevertheless, according to his story, 
he risked entering the home to search for still more fuel.  One 
wonders why he did not just drive away using the gas he had 
found. 
 
After breaking and entering the home through a dark area to 
avoid detection, he moved through a lighted hall toward the 
girls' room.  He passed an open purse containing both keys and 
money, with which he readily could have obtained the gas he 
allegedly sought.  He remained in the girls' room for an 
indeterminate period of time and "got up" in order to leave.  As 
I have said, reasonably to be inferred from all the circumstances 
is the conclusion that defendant entered the home with the 
specific intent to commit rape. 
 
Consequently, I would hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
err, and I would affirm the judgment appealed from.