Case Title: P. v. Thomas

Citation: 

Docket Number: S118052

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 4/18/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S118052 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F037501 
ALONZA RYDELL THOMAS, JR., 
) 
 
 
) 
Kern County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC081072A 
___________________________________ ) 
 
When a minor is charged with certain serious criminal offenses, the 
prosecutor can file the charges against the minor directly in the criminal division 
of the superior court (criminal court).  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, subd. (b), 
707, subd. (d).)  If the minor is convicted, the criminal court has discretion under 
Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(4), to “order a juvenile disposition 
under the juvenile court law, in lieu of a sentence under [the Penal] code” – but 
only if the prosecutor consents to that disposition.   
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the prosecutorial consent provision 
is invalid because it violates California’s separation of powers doctrine (Cal. 
Const., art. III, § 3).  But we further conclude that contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s view, the trial court’s discretionary authority under Penal Code section 
1170.19, subdivision (a), to commit a minor to the Youth Authority applies only 
when the minor meets the eligibility requirements of Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 1732.6.  Because defendant here admitted committing robbery and 
 
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personally using a firearm in the commission of that felony, his sentence, when 
added to his age, exceeds 25 years – which makes him ineligible for Youth 
Authority commitment under subdivision (a) of section 1732.6.  We therefore 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and direct that court to affirm the 
judgment and sentence of the trial court. 
I.   
 On March 21, 2000, defendant, then 15 years old, entered a market wearing 
a black bandana over his face and holding a handgun.  He pointed the gun at the 
store clerk and demanded money.  Another clerk grabbed defendant’s hand and a 
struggle ensued during which the gun discharged.  A third clerk subdued 
defendant by hitting him over the head with a bottle.  The clerks held defendant at 
gunpoint until the police arrived. 
The district attorney brought charges in criminal court, as authorized by 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(2) (personal use of a 
firearm).  He charged defendant with three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. 
Code, §§ 211, 212.5), one count of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. 
(a)), and enhancements for personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.53, 
subds. (b) and (c), 12022.5, subd. (a)). 
On December 21, 2000, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one 
count of robbery and admitted use of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 
12022.53.  Under the plea agreement, defendant would not be sentenced to more 
than 13 years in prison.   
Defendant asserted that under Penal Code section 1170.19 the criminal court 
had discretion to order him committed to the Youth Authority, a less restrictive 
confinement than state prison.  Section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(4), states in 
relevant part:  “Subject to the knowing and intelligent consent of both the 
prosecution and the person being sentenced pursuant to this section, the court may 
 
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order a juvenile disposition under the juvenile court law, in lieu of a sentence 
under this code, upon a finding that such an order would serve the best interests of 
justice, protection of the community, and the person being sentenced.”  (Italics 
added.) 
 
 When defendant here asked the criminal court for a disposition under the 
juvenile court law, the prosecution objected.  Under the italicized language in 
Penal Code section 1170.19 just quoted, that objection barred the trial court from 
considering a juvenile disposition.  Defendant argued to the trial court that the 
requirement for prosecutorial consent violated the separation of powers provision 
of the California Constitution.  (See Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)1  The trial court, 
however, ruled that under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6 it had no 
authority to impose a juvenile disposition in defendant’s case.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, but it struck the prison sentence 
and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to order 
a juvenile disposition.  We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review and 
returned the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and 
to reconsider it in light of Penal Code section 1732.6, which limits the criminal 
court’s discretion to order a Youth Authority commitment when a minor is found to 
have personally used a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12022.53.  
Thereafter, the Court of Appeal held:  (1) The provision in Penal Code section 
1170.19, subdivision (a), requiring the prosecutor’s consent to a juvenile court 
disposition in a case filed directly in criminal court violates the separation of  
                                             
 
1 
California Constitution, article III, section 3 provides:  “The powers of state 
government are legislative, executive, and judicial.  Persons charged with the 
exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by 
this Constitution.” 
 
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powers provision (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3); and (2) Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 1732.6 has been impliedly repealed by the enactment of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 602.3, and hence does not limit a trial court’s discretion to 
transfer a case to juvenile court under Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a).   
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review of the latter issue.  We 
later asked the parties to brief also the issue of the constitutionality of the 
prosecutorial consent provision in Penal Code section 1170.19.   
 
II. 
 
In a supplemental brief filed with this court, the Attorney General concedes 
that the prosecutorial consent provision of Penal Code section 1170.19, 
subdivision (a) is unconstitutional.  We accept the Attorney General’s concession, 
which, as discussed below, finds support in the decisions of this court.2  
 
In People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 91-95 (Tenorio), we held that a 
statute requiring a trial court to secure a prosecutor’s consent to dismiss an 
allegation of a prior conviction violates the state Constitution’s separation of 
powers clause by improperly invading the constitutional province of the judiciary.  
We said:  “When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads 
to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.  Just as the fact of 
prosecutorial discretion prior to charging a criminal offense does not imply 
prosecutorial discretion to convict without a judicial determination of guilt, 
discretion to forego prosecution does not imply discretion to sentence without a 
judicial determination of those factors which the Legislature has never denied are 
within the judicial power to determine and which relate to punishment.  The  
                                             
 
2 
Our analysis and much of the language in this section follows the opinion 
of the Court of Appeal. 
 
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judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be 
dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but 
finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor.  The judicial 
power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its 
exercise.”  (Id. at p. 94.) 
 
In the years after Tenorio, we have applied its rationale to several 
analogous situations.  In Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 122, 
this court held that a statute requiring a magistrate to secure a prosecutor’s consent 
to determine that an offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony violates the 
separation of powers doctrine (see Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)).  We said:  “Since 
the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the approval of 
either the executive or legislative branches of government, requiring the district 
attorney’s consent in determining the charge on which a defendant shall be held to 
answer violates the doctrine of separation of powers.”  (Esteybar v. Municipal 
Court, supra, at p. 127.) 
 
The next year, in People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, we held that 
requiring a trial court to obtain a prosecutor’s consent to order a posttrial 
commitment to a narcotic detention, treatment, and rehabilitation facility violates 
the separation of powers doctrine:  “The imposition of sentence and the exercise of 
sentencing discretion are fundamentally and inherently judicial functions.  
[Citation.]  . . .  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . ‘It bears reiteration that the Legislature, of course, 
by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of 
imprisonment, but it cannot abort the judicial process by subjecting a judge to the 
control of the district attorney.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 258-259, fns. omitted, quoting People 
v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 654 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.).) 
 
Then, in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 61, we 
held that a statute requiring a court to get a prosecutor’s consent to order pretrial 
 
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diversion to a narcotic treatment and rehabilitation program violates the separation 
of powers doctrine:  “[W]hen the jurisdiction of a court has been properly invoked 
by the filing of a criminal charge, the disposition of that charge becomes a judicial 
responsibility. . . .  With the development of more sophisticated responses to the 
wide range of antisocial behavior traditionally subsumed under the heading of 
‘crime,’ alternative means of disposition have been confided to the judiciary.”  (Id. 
at p. 66.) 
 
Thereafter, in Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, this court 
held that a local rule precluding the trial court from diverting persons charged with 
felonies to a drug treatment program while permitting diversion for those charged 
with misdemeanors did not violate the separation of powers doctrine (Id. at pp. 69-
74 (plur. opn. of Arguelles, J.)).  The local rule granted the prosecutor discretion to 
be exercised before the filing of a criminal charge, in contrast to the statutes 
invalidated in Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, and its progeny, which purported to 
give a prosecutor the right to veto a trial court’s decision made after criminal 
charges had already been filed.  Davis concluded that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion before the filing of charges does not improperly subordinate the judicial 
branch to the executive branch in violation of the state Constitution.  (Davis v. 
Municipal Court, supra, at p. 82.) 
 
Recently, in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, which 
upheld the constitutionality of an initiative measure that gave the prosecutor 
discretion to file charges against some juveniles directly in criminal court, this 
court again stressed the critical distinction between prosecutorial discretion before 
and discretion after the filing of a criminal charge:  “[This court’s decisions] 
establish that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislative branch 
from granting prosecutors the authority, after charges have been filed, to control 
the legislatively specified sentencing choices available to a court.  A statute 
 
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conferring upon prosecutors the discretion to make certain decisions before the 
filing of charges, on the other hand, is not invalid simply because the prosecutor’s 
exercise of such charging discretion necessarily affects the dispositional options 
available to the court.”  (Id. at p. 553.)  
 
The discretion that Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(4), grants 
to a criminal court to order a juvenile disposition in some cases where the 
prosecutor has filed charges directly in criminal court indisputably constitutes a 
judicial responsibility.  (See Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 83.)  
Like the statutes in Tenorio and its progeny, section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(4), 
authorizes “the exercise of a prosecutorial veto after the filing of criminal charges, 
when the criminal proceeding has already come within the aegis of the judicial 
branch.”  (Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 83.)  Thus, the requirement of 
section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(4), that the criminal court must secure the 
prosecutor’s consent before it can order a Youth Authority commitment violates 
the state Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.  (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)   
III. 
 
We now consider the issue of the criminal court’s discretionary authority 
under Penal Code section 1170.19 to order a disposition under the juvenile court 
laws in a case that the prosecution filed directly in criminal court.  Resolving this 
issue requires the interpretation and cross-referencing of five statutes from two 
different codes.  
 
 
We start our analysis with Penal Code section 1170.17, subdivision (a), 
which states:  “When a person is prosecuted for a criminal offense committed 
while he or she was under the age of 18 years and the prosecution is lawfully 
initiated in a court of criminal jurisdiction without a prior finding that the person is 
not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, upon 
subsequent conviction for any criminal offense, the person shall be subject to the 
 
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same sentence as an adult convicted of the identical offense, in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 1170.19, except under the 
circumstances described in subdivision (b) or (c).”  (The circumstances described 
in subdivisions (b) and (c) are inapplicable here.)  
Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(1), to which Penal Code section 
1170.17 refers, states that a person sentenced pursuant to section 1170.17 “may be 
committed to the Youth Authority only to the extent the person meets the eligibility 
criteria set forth in Section 1732.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”   
Subdivision (a) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6 provides:  
“(a)  No minor shall be committed to the Youth Authority when he or she is 
convicted in a criminal action for an offense described in subdivision (c) of 
Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 of the Penal Code and is 
sentenced to incarceration for life, an indeterminate period to life, or a determinate 
period of years such that the maximum number of years of potential confinement 
when added to the minor’s age would exceed 25 years.  Except as specified in 
subdivision (b), in all other cases in which the minor has been convicted in a 
criminal action, the court shall retain discretion to sentence the minor to the 
Department of Corrections or to commit the minor to the Youth Authority.” 
 
Defendant was convicted in criminal court of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 
212.5), with a sentence enhancement for personal use of a firearm during the 
commission of the robbery (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)).  Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 1732.6, subdivision (a), restricts the criminal court’s 
discretion to order a Youth Authority commitment for minors convicted of any 
offense described in subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 667.5.  Among the 
offenses so described are “[a]ny robbery,” and “[a]ny violation of [Penal Code] 
Section 12022.53.”  (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(9) and (22).)  Minors convicted 
of such offenses cannot be committed to the Youth Authority if they have been 
 
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“sentenced to incarceration for life, an indeterminate period to life, or a 
determinate period of years such that the maximum number of years of potential 
confinement when added to the minor’s age would exceed 25 years.”  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 1732.6, subd. (a).) 
 
Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment for robbery plus 10 
years for the personal use of a firearm, minus 97 days’ credit for time served.  His 
sentence, when added to his age, exceeds 25 years.  Defendant is therefore 
ineligible for a Youth Authority commitment. 
 
Defendant, however, argues that Welfare and Institutions Code section 
1732.6’s restrictions on Youth Authority commitment were removed by the 
Legislature’s enactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.3, 
subdivision (a).  That provision reads:  “Notwithstanding any other law and 
pursuant to the provisions of this section, the juvenile court shall commit any 
minor adjudicated to be a ward of the court for the personal use of a firearm in the 
commission of a violent felony . . . to placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, or 
with the Department of the Youth Authority.”  The apparent purpose of this 
provision was to limit judicial discretion in firearm use cases prosecuted in 
juvenile court. 
 
The amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6, which 
restricted the criminal court’s discretion to place minors with the Youth Authority 
was enacted by the voters as part of Proposition 21’s revision of juvenile court 
law.  Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.3 was enacted by the Legislature 
before the voters approved Proposition 21, but took effect after Proposition 21.  
The parties therefore dispute whether section 602.3 is a later enactment that 
supersedes amended section 1732.6, or whether it is an earlier enactment that 
cannot supersede amended section 1732.6.  We need not resolve this controversy, 
however, because section 602.3 does not apply to defendant.  It concerns only a  
 
10 
minor “adjudicated to be a ward of the court for the personal use of a firearm in the 
commission of a violent felony.”  Defendant has not been adjudicated to be a ward 
of the juvenile court; instead, he was charged and pled guilty in criminal court.   
 
Defendant insists that notwithstanding Penal Code section 1170.19 and 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6, the trial court had discretion under 
Penal Code section 1385 to commit him to the Youth Authority after his guilty 
plea.  We disagree.  Penal Code section 1385 allows a trial court, in the interests of 
justice, to strike individual charges and allegations in a criminal action.  (In re 
Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1137; People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
512, 524.)  It does not permit the court to disregard statutory limits on sentencing 
for charges and allegations that have not been stricken.  (See In re Varnell, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at pp. 1137-1139.)  Moreover, Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision 
(c), expressly forbids the trial court from striking an allegation of personal firearm 
use.  
 
Finally, defendant notes that under the express language of Penal Code 
section 1170.19 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6, it is only his 
commitment to the Youth Authority that would be barred.  He contends, therefore, 
that his case should be remanded to the trial court so it can exercise its discretion 
whether to order a juvenile disposition other than a Youth Authority commitment, 
such as placement at a county youth ranch. 
 
The offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6 are very 
serious crimes.  When a minor is convicted of such an offense, usually the only 
suitable sentencing options would be Youth Authority commitment or sentencing 
as an adult; a disposition less restrictive than Youth Authority commitment, such as 
a county ranch facility, would not be appropriate to the severity of the offense.  
Through Proposition 21 the voters of this state took that sentencing choice from the 
criminal court by barring a Youth Authority commitment when the sentence, as  
 
11 
in this case, would require the defendant to be confined beyond his 25th birthday.  
(See Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 555.)  That enactment 
demonstrates that, in the voters’ view, such minors need more restrictive 
confinement.  For us to conclude that the criminal court lacks discretion to order a 
Youth Authority commitment but retains discretion to order an even less restrictive 
disposition would conflict with the intent of the voters.   
 
For the reasons given above, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled 
that under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6 it had no authority to 
commit defendant to the Youth Authority or to a less restrictive juvenile 
disposition. 
DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to 
that court with directions to affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Thomas 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 109 Cal.App.4th 1520 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S118052 
Date Filed: April 18, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: Arthur E. Wallace 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Lloyd G. Carter, Jeffrey D. 
Firestone, Louis M. Vasquez, Michelle L. West-Scott, Janet E. Neeley and Kathleen A. McKenna, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Athena Shudde 
1762 Columbia Street 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 234-2266 
 
Kathleen A. McKenna 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA 93721 
(559) 445-6599