Case Title: State v. Foust

Citation: 2004-Ohio-7006

Docket Number: 20021350

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. FOUST, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 2002-1350 — Submitted October 12, 2004 — Decided December 29, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, No. CR-406021. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, defendant-appellant, Kelly Foust, raises 13 
propositions of law.  Finding none meritorious, we affirm his convictions.  We 
have independently weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
factors and have compared his sentence to those imposed in similar cases, as R.C. 
2929.05(A) requires.  As a result, we affirm Foust’s sentence of death. 
{¶ 2} During the early morning of March 31, 2001, Foust broke into the 
home of 54-year-old Jose Coreano in Cleveland.  Foust entered Jose’s first-floor 
bedroom and killed him with a hammer blow to the head.  Foust then went 
upstairs and repeatedly raped Jose’s 17-year-old daughter, Damaris Coreano.  
After stealing items from the house, Foust tied Damaris to the bathtub and set the 
house on fire; despite her situation, Damaris managed to escape. 
{¶ 3} A three-judge panel convicted Foust of the aggravated murder of 
Jose, the kidnapping, rape, gross sexual imposition, and attempted murder of 
Damaris, and aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated arson.  
Foust was sentenced to death.  To establish Foust’s guilt, the state introduced 
Foust’s pretrial confession, testimony from Damaris identifying Foust as her 
assailant, and the murder weapon containing Foust’s DNA. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
State’s case 
{¶ 4} Foust was distraught after his relationship with his girlfriend, 
Janira Acevedo, came to an end.  Damaris and her sister, Cheyla Coreano, were 
friends with Acevedo.  After Foust and Acevedo broke up, Acevedo began 
staying at the Coreano home. 
{¶ 5} Sometime before March 28, 2001, Foust broke into the Coreano 
home.  On March 28, Jose, Cheyla, and Acevedo went to the police, seeking a 
restraining order against Foust.  They did not receive a restraining order, but the 
police offered to send a patrol car to their residence.  Jose, however, refused this 
offer. 
{¶ 6} During the early morning hours of March 31, Foust had been 
drinking beer and wine and “getting pretty wasted.”  At some point, Foust went 
looking for Acevedo at a home on Sackett Avenue, where he thought she was 
staying.  Foust peeked into a window of that home and realized that Acevedo was 
not there.  Foust later explained, “I got really mad because [Acevedo] told me she 
stays there every night and doesn’t go anywhere.” 
{¶ 7} Foust then went to the Coreano home and gained entry through an 
open basement window.  Foust found Damaris sleeping upstairs but did not locate 
Cheyla or Acevedo.  Foust then went to Jose’s bedroom on the first floor and 
struck Jose on the head with a claw hammer. 
{¶ 8} Foust returned to the second-floor bedroom where Damaris was 
sleeping and got on top of her.  When she awakened, Foust put a knife to her 
neck, shoved her face into the pillow, and ordered her to lie on her stomach.  She 
tried to grab the knife, but Foust told her not to be a hero because “in reality 
heroes die.”  Foust asked Damaris for “the money,” and she said, “[W]hat 
money?”  Foust threatened to kill her if she did not tell him where the money was, 
and as a result, she said that she had a dollar and told him where he could find it. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 9} Foust asked Damaris if she was a virgin.  Damaris told Foust that 
she was not, hoping that he would leave her alone.  Foust removed Damaris’s 
clothing and tied her hands behind her back.  Foust then ordered her to perform 
oral sex.  When she refused, he pointed his knife at her neck and asked her if she 
wanted her father to live.  Damaris then performed oral sex on him.   
 
{¶ 10} After this, Foust untied her hands and ordered her to lie on her 
back.  He vaginally raped her multiple times and also touched her breasts and put 
his fingers on her vagina.  She saw his face during these rapes.  When he finished, 
he ordered her not to move and left the bedroom. 
{¶ 11} Shortly thereafter, Foust returned to the bedroom and vaginally 
raped her again.  Damaris asked why he was “doing this to a Christian,” and he 
replied that if she was a real Christian, she would forgive him.  Foust then ordered 
her to get on her knees and pray out loud for him.  While on her knees, Damaris 
prayed that God would help him realize what he was doing.  Foust told Damaris 
to shut up, put her back on the bed, and raped her again. 
{¶ 12} After that, Foust took Damaris into her sister’s bedroom.  Although 
Foust had placed a shirt over her head, Damaris saw Foust take several things 
from her sister’s room.  Foust then forced Damaris into the bathroom and tied her 
hands and feet together with shoestrings.  He then tied Damaris to the bathtub leg 
with a chain belt, told her not to move, and left the bathroom. 
{¶ 13} Later, Foust returned to the bathroom and accused her of moving 
around.  He said, “[Y]ou think I’m playing with you,” and cut one of her braids 
off.  Foust also touched her vagina with his knife and threatened to slice her open 
if she moved. 
{¶ 14} While Damaris was tied up in the bathroom, Foust started fires in 
Jose’s downstairs bedroom and in the upstairs bedrooms of Cheyla and Damaris.  
Afterwards, he took Jose’s car keys, left the house, and drove Jose’s car about two 
blocks, parked it on the street, and walked to a friend’s house. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 15} While tied up in the bathroom, Damaris smelled smoke, managed 
to move the shirt from her face, and saw that the house was on fire.  She freed 
herself by wiggling the belt loose from the bathtub leg.  She then crawled into her 
bedroom, maneuvered herself onto her bed, and let the fire on her mattress burn 
the shoelaces off her ankles and wrists.  Damaris put the fire out in her room and 
went downstairs to look for her father but could not find him.  She then left the 
smoke-filled house and ran to a neighbor’s home for help. 
{¶ 16} Police and firefighters arriving at the scene found the home 
engulfed in flames.  Jose’s body, burned beyond recognition, was found on his 
bed.  Damaris told Patrolman William Hyland that “Kelly” had attacked her and 
started the fire.  Although she was unsure of his last name, she thought it was 
“Foster or something like that.”  Hyland noticed that Damaris had shoelaces tied 
to her wrists. 
{¶ 17} After the fire was extinguished, police and fire personnel began 
collecting evidence from the house.  Lt. Victor Gill, an arson investigator, 
determined that the fire had originated in the first-floor bedroom and the two 
second-floor bedrooms.  Investigations revealed two spent matches: one next to a 
box of matches on the kitchen floor and another on the carpet next to Damaris’s 
bed.  Lt. Gill concluded that “there were at least three fires and each [had been] 
separately and intentionally set.” 
{¶ 18} In the basement, police found Foust’s left thumbprint on a water 
pipe near the basement window.  During a search of the house on April 6, 2001, 
police found a claw hammer underneath Damaris’s bed. 
{¶ 19} After identifying Foust as the primary suspect, police began 
searching for him.  On April 7, 2001, the police arrested Foust, and around 10:30 
a.m., Detectives Denise Kovach and Michael Cipo interviewed Foust at the police 
station.  After waiving his Miranda rights, Foust confessed to breaking into the 
home, hitting Jose, and raping Damaris.  However, Foust claimed that he “didn’t 
January Term, 2004 
5 
intentionally want to do any harm” and said, “I really don’t know what I was 
doing, just trying to find out where Janita [sic, Janira] was.” 
{¶ 20} At trial, Julie Heinig, a DNA analyst, testified that a preliminary 
examination of the hammer revealed blood on the hammer claw.  According to 
Heinig, “The DNA profile obtained from the blood on the hammer matched the 
DNA profile of Jose Coreano.”  The handle of the hammer was also tested and 
revealed a DNA mixture to which Foust could not be excluded as a contributor. 
{¶ 21} Joseph Serowik, a scientific examiner for the Cleveland Police 
Department, examined a rape kit containing blood, hair, and swab samples 
obtained from Damaris.  Examination of the vaginal swab sample revealed sperm 
cells and seminal fluid.  Testing of rectal swabs showed the presence of seminal 
fluid and blood.  Due to administrative problems at the lab, however, DNA testing 
was not conducted on this evidence. 
{¶ 22} Dr. William Bligh-Glover, a deputy coroner for Cuyahoga County, 
performed an autopsy on Jose Coreano and concluded that Jose had fourth-degree 
burns over 100 percent of his body and had “suffered blunt force trauma to his 
head with soft tissue skull and brain injuries.”  He further testified that the 
hammer found in Damaris’s bedroom could have caused the circular fracture on 
Jose’s skull.  Dr. Bligh-Glover concluded that Jose’s death was caused by the 
blunt impact to the head and that the burns occurred after death.  He reached this 
conclusion because no carbon monoxide had been found in Jose’s blood, and high 
levels of carbon monoxide would normally be found in the blood of a person who 
had died from smoke inhalation.  Also, he found no soot in Jose’s lungs. 
{¶ 23} The defense presented no evidence during the guilt phase of trial. 
Trial result 
{¶ 24} The state charged Foust with one count of aggravated murder, 
alleging he had caused Coreano’s death with prior calculation and design, five 
counts of aggravated murder, alleging he had caused Coreano’s death while 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
committing a felony, and 20 related felony counts.  Foust waived his right to a 
jury trial, and a three-judge panel heard his case.  He pleaded not guilty to all 
charges.  The following chart summarizes the charges and the court’s findings and 
sentence: 
Count 
Specifications  
Verdicts  
(count and 
specifications) 
Sentence 
1. Aggravated 
murder of Coreano 
(murder committed 
with prior 
calculation and 
design) 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
course of conduct, and 
five (A)(7) 
specifications: 
aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated arson 
Not guilty of 
aggravated 
murder; guilty 
of lesser 
included 
offense of 
murder 
15 years to 
life 
2. Aggravated 
murder of Coreano 
(felony murder—
aggravated 
burglary)  
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
course of conduct, and 
five (A)(7) 
specifications: 
aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated arson 
Guilty 
3. Aggravated 
murder of Coreano 
(felony murder—
aggravated robbery)  
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
course of conduct, and 
five (A)(7) 
specifications: 
aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated arson 
Guilty 
4. Aggravated 
murder of Coreano 
(felony murder—
kidnapping) 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
course of conduct, and 
five (A)(7) 
specifications: 
aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated arson 
Guilty 
Death 
January Term, 2004 
7 
5. Aggravated 
murder of Coreano 
(felony murder—
rape) 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
course of conduct, and 
five (A)(7) 
specifications: 
aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated arson 
Guilty 
6. Aggravated 
murder of Coreano 
(felony murder—
aggravated arson) 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
course of conduct, and 
five (A)(7) 
specifications: 
aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated arson 
Guilty 
 
7. Attempted 
murder of Damaris 
Coreano 
 
Guilty 
10 years 
8. Aggravated 
burglary 
 
Guilty 
10 years 
9. Aggravated 
robbery 
 
Not Guilty 
 
10. Aggravated 
robbery 
 
Guilty 
10 years 
11. Kidnapping 
(Damaris Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years * 
12. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years ** 
13. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years ** 
14. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years ** 
15. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years ** 
16. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years ** 
17. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Not Guilty 
 
18. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Not Guilty 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
19. Rape (Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Not Guilty 
 
20. Gross sexual 
imposition 
(Damaris Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
1 year ** 
21. Gross sexual 
imposition 
(Damaris Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
1 year ** 
22. Gross sexual 
imposition 
(Damaris Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
1 year ** 
23. Aggravated 
arson (risk of harm 
to Jose Coreano) 
 
Not Guilty 
 
24. Aggravated 
arson (risk of harm 
to Damaris 
Coreano) 
 
Guilty 
10 years 
25. Aggravated 
arson (risk of harm 
to fireman) 
 
Not Guilty 
 
26. Aggravated 
arson (physical 
harm to occupied 
dwelling) 
 
Guilty 
10 years 
Various sexual-
motivation and 
sexual-predator 
specifications 
 
Not Guilty 
 
* Sentence for kidnapping (Count 11) to be served consecutively with sentences 
for rape (Counts 12-16), gross sexual imposition (Counts 20-22), and attempted 
murder (Count 7). 
** Sentences for rape (Counts 12-16) and gross sexual imposition (Counts 20-
22) to be served concurrently with one another. 
 
{¶ 25} Foust now appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
Pretrial issues 
{¶ 26} Missing elements in the indictment.  In proposition of law II, 
Foust argues that the indictment is defective because the felony-murder counts 
January Term, 2004 
9 
and the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications do not set forth every element of the 
charged offenses.1  Foust also claims that his indictment for aggravated burglary 
in Count 8 is defective because the count fails to specify the offense that Foust 
intended to commit inside the house. 
{¶ 27} Foust never challenged the sufficiency of the indictment before or 
during trial.  Under Crim.R. 12(C), “[d]efenses and objections based on defects in 
the indictment” must be raised before trial.  As stated in Crim.R. 12(H), “[f]ailure 
by the defendant to raise defenses or objections” within the time required “shall 
constitute waiver of the defenses or objections,” although the court may grant 
relief from the waiver.  Accord State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 
5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364; State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 598, 
734 N.E.2d 345. 
{¶ 28} No reason exists to grant Foust relief from his failure to object.  In 
fact, no deficiency in the indictment exists.  Under Crim.R. 7(B), an indictment 
“may be made in ordinary and concise language without technical averments or 
allegations not essential to be proved.  The statement may be in the words of the 
applicable section of the statute, provided the words of that statute charge an 
offense, or in words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all the elements of 
the offense with which the defendant is charged.”  See, also, State v. Childs 
(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 564, 728 N.E.2d 379. 
{¶ 29} Felony-murder counts.  The indictment language for the 
aggravated felony-murder counts follows the wording of R.C. 2903.01(B), the 
felony-murder provisions of the aggravated-murder statute.  Thus, these counts 
were properly worded in the indictment.  See State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio 
St.3d 554, 583, 605 N.E.2d 884; State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 
119, 559 N.E.2d 710.  Moreover, the indictment included separate counts for the 
                                                 
1. Foust concedes that the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct specifications are correctly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
underlying felonies – Counts 8 through 19 and Counts 23 through 26 – and these 
counts set forth the elements for these offenses.  Reading the felony-murder 
counts in pari materia with the related felony counts provided ample notification 
of the elements of the underlying felonies—aggravated burglary, aggravated 
robbery, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated arson—that the state had to prove.  See 
State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 197, 616 N.E.2d 909. 
{¶ 30} R.C. 2929.04 specifications.  R.C. 2941.14(C) governs the form of 
death-penalty specifications in indictments and provides that “[t]he aggravating 
circumstance may be stated in the words of the subdivision in which it appears or 
in words sufficient to give the accused notice of the same.”  Here, the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specifications in the indictment tracked the language of R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7), and each of the specifications named the underlying felonies that 
Foust allegedly committed.  See State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 456, 
653 N.E.2d 285 (R.C. 2941.14[C] “clearly provides that the specification is 
sufficient if the accused knows which subsection, or which aggravating 
circumstance * * * listed in R.C. 2929.04[A] has been alleged”).  Thus, we find 
no defect in the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications. 
{¶ 31} Aggravated-burglary count.  The state also correctly presented 
the aggravated-burglary charge in the indictment—Count 8.  The wording of the 
indictment tracked the language for aggravated burglary in R.C. 2911.11 and did 
not need to allege the particular felony that Foust had intended to commit.  See 
State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 331, 652 N.E.2d 1000; State v. 
Waszily (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 510, 516, 664 N.E.2d 600, abrogated in part on 
other grounds by State v. Fontes (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 527, 721 N.E.2d 1037. 
{¶ 32} We also reject Foust’s constitutional arguments.  An indictment 
meets constitutional requirements if it, “first, contains the elements of the offense 
                                                                                                                                     
charged in the indictment. 
January Term, 2004 
11 
charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must 
defend, and second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of 
future prosecutions for the same offense.  * * * ‘Undoubtedly the language of the 
statute may be used in the general description of an offence, but it must be 
accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform 
the accused of the specific offence, coming under the general description, with 
which he is charged.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Hamling v. United States (1974), 418 
U.S. 87, 117-118, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590, quoting United States v. Hess 
(1888), 124 U.S. 483, 487, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516.  Review of Foust’s 
indictment shows that the aggravated-murder counts, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
specifications, and the aggravated-burglary count met these criteria. 
{¶ 33} Nevertheless, Foust argues that Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 
584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 
U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, require that every element of an 
offense be set forth in the indictment.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be “expose[d] * * * to a 
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435.  In Ring, a capital case, the Supreme Court held that a 
trial judge may not make findings of fact on an aggravating circumstance 
necessary to impose the death penalty, as this determination is within the province 
of the jury.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556.  However, 
neither case stands for the proposition that there is a constitutional requirement 
that every element of a criminal offense must be set forth in an indictment. 
{¶ 34} Foust also argues – citing Esparza v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2002), 310 
F.3d 414 – that an indictment of a capital specification must include all the 
essential elements necessary to establish the specification.  In Esparza, the grand 
jury returned an indictment on an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification that failed to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
allege that he was the principal offender or, if not the principal offender, that he 
had acted with prior calculation and design.  However, in Mitchell v. Esparza 
(2003), 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263, the Supreme Court held that 
the failure to allege that the defendant acted as the principal offender did not 
constitute a fatal error. 
{¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we reject Foust’s argument that there is a 
constitutional requirement that the indictment specify every element of the 
offense in either the felony-murder counts or the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
specifications. 
{¶ 36} Finally, Foust has not shown that he was prejudiced in the defense 
of his case or that he would have proceeded differently if each of the felony-
murder counts, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications, and the aggravated-
burglary count had been worded differently.  See State v. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d at 
457, 653 N.E.2d 285. 
{¶ 37} In summary, we find that the issue was waived and there was no 
plain error because the wording of the felony-murder counts, the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specifications, and the aggravated-burglary count in the indictment 
were not defective.  Thus, we overrule proposition II. 
{¶ 38} Jury waiver.  In proposition of law I, Foust contends that his 
waiver of a jury trial was not voluntary and intelligent, and was hence invalid, 
because the trial court did not inform him that (1) if he was tried by a jury and 
found guilty of a capital crime, the jury would recommend his sentence, (2) a 
jury’s vote for a death sentence must be unanimous, and (3) the waiver would be 
valid for both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of trial. 
{¶ 39} Foust signed a jury waiver, which was filed and journalized and is 
in the record.  The written waiver contains the following acknowledgment:  “I, 
Kelly Foust, the defendant in the above cause, hereby voluntarily and knowingly 
waive and relinquish my right to a trial by jury, and elect to be tried by a panel of 
January Term, 2004 
13 
three judges of the court in which said cause may be pending.  I fully understand 
that under the laws of this state I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.” 
{¶ 40} After Foust signed the jury waiver, the trial court conducted the 
following colloquy with him: 
{¶ 41} “The Court:  Mr. Foust, this is your signature on this jury waiver; 
correct? 
{¶ 42} “The Defendant:  Yes, sir. 
{¶ 43} “The Court:  Okay.  Your attorneys have advised you that you 
have a right to a jury of 12 men and women; correct? 
{¶ 44} “The Defendant:  Yes, sir. 
{¶ 45} “The Court:  And obviously, then, they advised you that you can 
waive that right and have your case tried by three judges instead of a jury.  You 
understand that, sir? 
{¶ 46} “The Defendant:  Yes, sir. 
{¶ 47} “The Court:  Okay.  Did anybody put any pressure on you to give 
up your jury right and have this tried by three judges instead of a jury?  
{¶ 48} “The Defendant:  No. 
{¶ 49} “The Court:  Okay.  Was this your own free-will decision to 
do that? 
{¶ 50} “The Defendant:  Yes.” 
{¶ 51} Following this colloquy, the trial court found that Foust’s waiver 
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 
{¶ 52} A jury waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  State v. 
Ruppert (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 263, 271, 8 O.O.3d 232, 375 N.E.2d 1250.  Waiver 
may not be presumed from a silent record.  However, if the record shows a jury 
waiver, the conviction will not be set aside except on a plain showing that the 
defendant’s waiver was not freely and intelligently made.  State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 
Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 37, citing Adams v. United 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
States ex rel. McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 281, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268.  
Moreover, a written waiver is presumptively voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  
United States v. Sammons (C.A.6, 1990), 918 F.2d 592, 597; State v. Bays (1999), 
87 Ohio St.3d 15, 19, 716 N.E.2d 1126. 
{¶ 53} Although the trial court did not fully advise Foust of all the 
implications of his jury waiver, “[t]here is no requirement for a trial court to 
interrogate a defendant in order to determine whether he or she is fully apprised of 
the right to a jury trial.”  State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  “The Criminal Rules and the Revised Code are 
satisfied by a written waiver, signed by the defendant, filed with the court, and 
made in open court, after arraignment and opportunity to consult with counsel.  
While it may be better practice for the trial judge to enumerate all the possible 
implications of a waiver of a jury, there is no error in failing to do so.”  (Citation 
omitted.)  Id. at 26, 559 N.E.2d 464; see, also, State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 
309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 26; State v. Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d at 20, 
716 N.E.2d 1126 (trial court’s failure to explain that a single juror can block a 
death recommendation did not invalidate a jury waiver). 
{¶ 54} We also reject Foust’s claim that his jury waiver was invalid 
because the trial court failed to advise him that the waiver applied to both the guilt 
and the penalty phases of trial.  The waiver of the right to trial by jury in a capital 
case applies to both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the trial.  Contrary to 
Foust’s contentions, the record demonstrates that he knew that his waiver applied 
to both phases of trial: during a colloquy with counsel after accepting Foust’s 
waiver, the court stated, “[W]e will leave the date for December 12th before a 
panel of three judges.  You should all be aware, in the event any discussions about 
a plea to reduced charges should be done, that we still have to convene the three-
judge court in order to take that plea and impose a sentence.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Thus, the record reflects that all were aware—including Foust—that his waiver of 
January Term, 2004 
15 
a jury trial meant that the three-judge panel would impose sentence during the 
penalty phase. 
{¶ 55} Further, nothing in the record suggests that Foust’s jury waiver was 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.  When the trial court accepted 
Foust’s written waiver, Foust affirmed that his decision was voluntary.  Moreover, 
his trial counsel did not request that the trial court ask any further questions or 
clarify any of the other rights associated with Foust’s waiver. 
{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition I. 
{¶ 57} Admissibility of confession.  In proposition of law IV, Foust 
argues an inadequate Miranda advisement because he asserts police did not 
advise him that he could request counsel at any time during the interrogation and 
that police questioning would stop if he requested counsel.  Because of this 
alleged failure, Foust contends that his Miranda waiver was not knowingly and 
intelligently made and thus his confession should not have been admitted into 
evidence. 
{¶ 58} However, Foust did not raise these specific issues in the trial court.  
Instead, Foust filed a motion to suppress challenging the voluntariness of his 
confession based on his youth and his being intimidated by police.  Because Foust 
did not attack the adequacy of the Miranda warnings before the trial court, he has 
waived that issue absent plain error.  State v. Peagler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 
499-501, 668 N.E.2d 489 (on appeal, a defendant cannot introduce a new basis for 
a challenge made at trial).  Moreover, no plain error exists because the police 
properly apprised Foust of his Miranda rights. 
{¶ 59} The record reveals that on April 7, 2001, the police arrested Foust, 
and, at that time, Detective Frank Costanzo advised Foust of his Miranda rights.  
Foust stated that he understood those rights. 
{¶ 60} Around 10:00 a.m. on April 7, at the police station, Detectives 
Michael Cipo and Denise Kovach interviewed Foust.  Before the interview, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
Detective Cipo again advised Foust of his Miranda rights.  Using an advisement-
of-rights card issued by the police department, Detective Cipo advised Foust:   
{¶ 61} “You have a right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will 
be used against you in Court.  You have a right to consult with a lawyer before 
answering any questions and to have a lawyer with you during any questioning.  
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for you free of cost.” 
{¶ 62} According to Detective Cipo, there was also a large placard with 
these same warnings posted on the wall in the interview room.  After being 
advised of his Miranda rights, Foust said that he understood his rights and did not 
need a lawyer, and then he talked with the police and confessed to the crimes. 
{¶ 63} After his oral confession, Foust agreed to provide a written 
statement.  After the written statement was prepared, but before Foust signed it, 
Detective Kovach again read Foust his Miranda rights, using the preprinted 
advisement of rights on the first page of the statement.  Detective Kovach advised 
Foust:  
{¶ 64} “Before making any written statement that may be used against 
you at the time of your trial, we wish to repeat the instructions issued prior to oral 
interrogation; that you have the right to counsel, appointed or retained, before 
interrogation, that you have the right to remain silent, and that anything you say 
may be used against you.  You have the right to have an attorney present while 
making this statement.” 
{¶ 65} Following this advisement of rights, Foust was asked, “Do you 
understand your rights as stated above?” and “Do you care to make any written 
statement?”  Foust answered yes to both questions, marked his agreement on the 
form, and signed his name underneath the advisement of rights.  Foust then signed 
each page of his written statement.  On the last page of his statement, Foust 
answered no to the question “Did anyone threaten you or promise you anything to 
make this statement?”  He answered yes to the question “Having read your 
January Term, 2004 
17 
statement, do you find it to be true?”  Foust then signed the last page of his 
confession. 
{¶ 66} Adequacy of the Miranda warnings.  Foust claims that the police 
provided him inadequate Miranda warnings because they did not tell him he could 
ask for an attorney at any time, including after the questioning began, and that if 
he asked for an attorney once the questioning had started, all questioning would 
stop. 
{¶ 67} Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694, requires that before questioning a suspect in custody, law-
enforcement officials must inform the suspect (1) that he or she has the right to 
remain silent, (2) that his or her statements may be used against him or her at trial, 
(3) that he or she has the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and 
(4) that if he or she cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed. 
{¶ 68} The Supreme Court has never insisted that Miranda warnings be 
given in the exact form described in that decision.  Instead, the court has stated 
that “ ‘the “rigidity” of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of 
the warnings given a criminal defendant,’ and that ‘no talismanic incantation [is] 
required to satisfy its strictures.’ ”  Duckworth v. Eagan (1989), 492 U.S. 195, 
202-203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, quoting California v. Prysock (1981), 
453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696.  “Reviewing courts therefore 
need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms 
of an easement.  The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] 
to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’ ”  Duckworth at 203, 109 S.Ct. 
2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, quoting Prysock at 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696. 
{¶ 69} Police do not have to provide additional warnings to a suspect 
beyond what Miranda requires.  Indeed, in State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio 
St.2d 31, 39-41, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1051, we found that Miranda warnings 
were adequate even though the defendant was not explicitly asked whether he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
wanted an attorney.  Similarly, in State v. Dailey (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 90-91, 
559 N.E.2d 459, Miranda warnings were deemed adequate even though they did 
not explicitly refer to “appointment of counsel.” 
{¶ 70} Federal courts have also rejected challenges to the adequacy of 
Miranda warnings based on the absence of additional warnings.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Ricks (C.A.6, 1993), 989 F.2d 501, unpublished opinion, 1993 WL 
78781 (suspect need not be informed that he has the right to stop answering 
questions at any time); United States v. Lares-Valdez (C.A.9, 1991), 939 F.2d 688 
(suspect need not be advised of the right to have questioning stopped at any time, 
of the option to answer some questions but not others, or that some questions may 
call for incriminating responses); United States v. Caldwell (C.A.8, 1992), 954 
F.2d 496, 501-504 (suspect need not be explicitly advised of his right to counsel 
before and during questioning); United States v. DiGiacomo (C.A.10, 1978), 579 
F.2d 1211, 1214 (no express requirement under Miranda to advise suspects of the 
right to terminate questioning). 
{¶ 71} In this case, the police fully advised Foust of his rights as required 
by Miranda.  Foust was advised of (1) his right to remain silent (and was warned 
that any statement he made could and would be used against him in court), (2) his 
right to have a lawyer present prior to and during interrogation, and (3) his right to 
have a lawyer appointed at no cost if he could not afford one.  However, police 
were not required to also advise Foust of his right to ask for a lawyer and stop 
questioning at any time after the interrogation was underway.  Indeed, “[t]here are 
numerous circumstances and ways in which the right to silence may be invoked 
and officers could not possibly warn of all of them.  Having advised of the 
essential rights, the officers are not obliged to warn of any or all of the 
circumstances or manners in which the right may be invoked.”  United States v. 
Alba (D.Conn.1990), 732 F.Supp. 306, 310.  Moreover, when he was advised of 
January Term, 2004 
19 
his Miranda rights, Foust never asked for a further explanation of them.  Thus, the 
Miranda warnings Foust received were proper. 
{¶ 72} Voluntariness.  The “totality of the circumstances” surrounding 
Foust’s confession also shows that Foust voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
and that his confession was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.  See 
Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410.  
First, the police never subjected Foust to threats or physical abuse or deprived him 
of food, sleep, or medical treatment.  Nor did the police make any promises to 
Foust in return for his cooperation.  Foust was in police custody for only two and 
one-half hours prior to being interviewed.  Furthermore, the interview lasted only 
two hours. 
{¶ 73} Second, Foust appeared to be mentally alert and not under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the interview.  During the police 
interview, Foust stated that he had completed a GED course and had the highest 
score in his class.  Thus, we find no evidence of police coercion or overreaching 
showing that Foust’s confession was involuntary.  See State v. Eley (1996), 77 
Ohio St.3d 174, 178-179, 672 N.E.2d 640. 
{¶ 74} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition IV. 
Guilt-phase issues 
{¶ 75} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In proposition of law III, Foust 
argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction 
for ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant show, first, that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 76} Failure to challenge Heinig’s expert qualifications.  Foust 
argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Julie 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Heinig’s testifying as a DNA expert.  Heinig, a forensic DNA analyst with the 
Cuyahoga County Coroner’s Office, conducted DNA analysis of blood found on 
the suspected murder weapon, the hammer found underneath Damaris’s bed.  
Heinig testified that DNA from the blood matched the DNA of Jose Coreano.  
She also testified that a DNA analysis of a swab used to collect matter from the 
hammer’s handle showed a “mixture” of DNA from more than one person and 
that Foust’s DNA profile was “visible” within this mixture. 
{¶ 77} Evid.R. 702(B) provides that a witness may qualify as an expert by 
reason of his or her “specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education regarding the subject matter of the testimony.”  Neither special 
education nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness.  
“The individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the 
field in question, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of 
fact in performing its fact-finding function.”  State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 274, 285, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 
709 N.E.2d 128. 
{¶ 78} Contrary to Foust’s assertions, Heinig qualified to testify as an 
expert in DNA analysis.  She holds a bachelor of science degree in biology, a 
master’s degree in zoology, and a Ph.D. degree in anatomy and cell biology.  
Heinig also received six months of training on various testing procedures 
involving DNA analysis and has testified as a DNA expert on other occasions.  
See State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 32 
(Heinig testified that the defendant’s DNA was found in the getaway vehicle); 
State v. Fluellen, Cuyahoga App. No. 78532, 2002-Ohio-3262, 2002 WL 
1397128, ¶ 14 (Heinig found “well-qualified to serve as an expert in the area of 
forensic DNA analysis”).  Thus, Heinig possessed the necessary qualifications to 
provide expert testimony at Foust’s trial. 
January Term, 2004 
21 
{¶ 79} Given the strong presumption that counsel’s performance 
constituted reasonable assistance, we find that his defense counsel were not 
ineffective for failing to challenge Heinig’s qualifications as an expert witness.  
See State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 51; 
State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 297, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 80} Failure to object to Heinig’s testimony.  Foust contends that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Heinig’s testimony 
because she allegedly did not adequately establish the scientific method used to 
conduct DNA testing of the hammer.  Heinig testified that DNA material from the 
hammer was tested using the Short Tandem Repeat (“STR”) method.  Heinig 
explained that the STR method examines “13 different regions of DNA” to obtain 
a person’s DNA profile.  Using the STR method, Heinig found that “each of the 
13 loci” from Foust’s DNA was visible in the mixture on the hammer. 
{¶ 81} Thus, contrary to Foust’s claims, Heinig explained the scientific 
method used in conducting DNA analysis in this case.  Moreover, we recognized 
in State v. Pierce (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 497, 597 N.E.2d 107, that “the 
theory and procedures used in DNA typing are generally accepted within the 
scientific community.”  Accordingly, “the failure to challenge the admissibility of 
such evidence cannot be considered ineffective assistance of counsel.”  State v. 
Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 437, 613 N.E.2d 225. 
{¶ 82} Foust also claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by failing to object to Heinig’s testimony because she did not actually perform the 
DNA testing herself.  During her direct examination, Heinig said, “For the most 
part another analyst did the testing and I did the DNA typing at the end of the 
analysis.” 
{¶ 83} The defense counsel’s failure to object to Heinig’s testimony as 
hearsay was a tactical decision.  By not objecting to Heinig’s testimony, the 
defense counsel avoided forcing the prosecution to call the other DNA analyst as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
a witness.  The other DNA analyst would likely have elaborated upon Heinig’s 
findings and bolstered the prosecution’s case.  Thus, we find that counsel’s failure 
to object to Heinig’s testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance.  See State 
v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d 373; cf. State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, at ¶ 51. 
{¶ 84} Finally, Foust argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to challenge the foundation for Heinig’s testimony on the 
statistical probability that the DNA profile of the blood that matched Jose 
Coreano’s DNA profile would match another person’s DNA profile.  Heinig 
testified that the probability that another person’s DNA profile would match the 
DNA profile obtained from the blood on the hammer was one in 140 trillion for 
southwestern Hispanics, one in 980 trillion for southeastern Hispanics, and one in 
four quadrillion for Caucasians. 
{¶ 85} DNA evidence expressed in terms of population frequency is 
admissible if it is relevant.  Questions regarding the reliability of DNA evidence 
in a given case, including DNA statistics on population frequency, go to the 
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.  See State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d 107, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Moreover, expert 
witnesses are allowed to testify to statistical conclusions about DNA evidence 
without being experts in statistical analysis.  See State v. Rowe (Dec. 26, 2001), 
Hamilton App. No. C-000727, 2001 WL 1887770; State v. Martin (Aug. 14, 
2000), Brown App. No. CA99-09-026, 2000 WL 1145465.  Thus, we find that the 
defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to Heinig’s testimony 
about DNA frequency statistics. 
{¶ 86} Adequacy of cross-examination of Heinig.  Foust asserts 
ineffective assistance of counsel in their cross-examining of Heinig on her DNA 
findings.   
 
January Term, 2004 
23 
{¶ 87} This court has recognized that “ ‘[t]rial counsel need not cross-
examine every witness * * *.  The strategic decision not to cross-examine 
witnesses is firmly committed to trial counsel’s judgment.’ ”  State v. Campbell 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 339, 738 N.E.2d 1178, quoting State v. Otte (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 555, 565, 660 N.E.2d 711. 
{¶ 88} Foust claims that counsel did not properly prepare to cross-
examine Heinig, because they did not understand DNA terminology.  According 
to Foust, counsel’s inadequacy is exemplified by the following cross-examination 
question: “Is it possible that at that first stage of his alleles, whatever you’re 
calling it, someone could have a 17, too?”   
{¶ 89} Foust’s claim that his counsel did not understand DNA 
terminology and rendered ineffective assistance in cross-examining Heinig about 
her findings is purely speculative.  Given the “strong presumption” that counsel’s 
performance constituted reasonable assistance, we reject this allegation.  State v. 
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 90} Foust also fails to explain how further cross-examination of Heinig 
would have made a difference in his case.  If challenged, Heinig would likely 
have elaborated on the reliability of DNA testing procedures and clarified her 
testimony.  However, such clarification may not have worked in Foust’s favor.  
Thus, counsel may have decided to forgo further cross-examination to avoid the 
danger of reiterating the state’s evidence and clarifying expert testimony that 
might not come out in Foust’s favor.  We find that counsel made a legitimate 
“tactical decision” and were not ineffective.  See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 
285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 121-123. 
{¶ 91} Failure to object to fingerprint evidence.  Foust also claims that 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the reliability of 
fingerprint evidence or object to testimony that his fingerprint matched the 
fingerprint found in the basement.  Foust also claims that his counsel should have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
objected to the admissibility of the lab report based on discovery violations and 
the report’s inadmissibility as a public record. 
{¶ 92} At trial, Jill Ryan, a fingerprint examiner with the Cleveland Police 
Department, testified that Foust’s left thumbprint matched a print found on a 
basement water pipe in the Coreano home. 
{¶ 93} Counsel’s failure to object to the fingerprint evidence falls within 
legitimate trial strategy.  Foust confessed to entering the Coreano home on the 
night of the murder through a basement window.  Thus, fingerprint evidence of 
Foust’s thumbprint found in the basement is not critical. Furthermore, the 
reliability of fingerprint evidence is well established.  See State v. Payne, Franklin 
App. Nos. 02AP-723 and 02AP-725, 2003-Ohio-4891, 2003 WL 22128810, ¶ 54-
55; State v. Hamilton (Apr. 12, 2002), Lake App. No. 200-L-003, 2002 WL 
549841; see, also, 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Evidence (2d Ed.2001) Section 702.27.  
Here, then, counsel could have reasonably determined it unwise to challenge 
fingerprint evidence and unnecessary to object to the lab report.  State v. 
Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 300, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (failure to challenge bloodstain 
evidence was a legitimate trial strategy because the defendant admitted that police 
would find the victim’s blood on his boots).  Accordingly, we have concluded that 
Foust has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel in their failure to 
challenge fingerprint evidence in this case. 
{¶ 94} Failure to request defense experts.  In addition, Foust argues that 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request funds for a DNA 
expert, an alcohol- and substance-abuse expert, a fingerprint expert, and an arson 
expert. 
{¶ 95} DNA expert.  Foust claims that he needed a defense DNA expert 
to challenge DNA testing procedures, to demonstrate the unreliability of DNA 
evidence, and to assist counsel in challenging the state’s DNA evidence. 
January Term, 2004 
25 
{¶ 96} Foust claims that a DNA expert was crucial to his defense because 
he never admitted striking Coreano with a hammer.  Nevertheless, in his 
confession, Foust admitted “pick[ing] up something by the door and hit[ting 
Coreano] with it.”  Moreover, the coroner testified that the circular fracture on the 
top of Coreano’s skull was consistent with Coreano’s having been hit by the 
round striking face of a hammer. 
{¶ 97} As an initial matter, “the failure to call an expert and instead rely 
on cross-examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”  State 
v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d at 436, 613 N.E.2d 225, citing State v. Thompson 
(1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407.  Here, the record reveals that 
trial counsel’s decision to rely on cross-examination appears to have been a 
legitimate “tactical decision,” particularly since the results of defense DNA 
testing might not have turned out to be favorable to the defense.  See State v. 
Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 299, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 98} Moreover, Foust’s argument that his counsel needed a DNA expert 
to adequately prepare for trial is purely speculative.  Despite Foust’s assertions, 
the record does not establish a deficiency in his counsel’s knowledge about DNA 
terminology and procedures. 
{¶ 99} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Foust’s claim that his counsel 
were ineffective by failing to utilize a DNA expert. 
{¶ 100} Alcohol- and substance-abuse expert.  Foust asserts that his 
counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 2901.21(C)2 and 
claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to retain an 
alcohol- and substance-abuse expert to challenge the statute.  Foust also claims 
that counsel’s failure to present expert testimony on alcohol and substance abuse 
deprived him of relevant mitigation evidence. 
                                                 
2. R.C. 2901.21(C) states: “Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in 
determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense.”   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 101} In his confession, Foust claimed that he had been drinking beer 
and wine for a couple of hours before breaking into the Coreano home and was 
“getting pretty wasted.”  He claimed, “I didn’t mean to hurt anybody, my mind 
was just messed up.”  Damaris testified that she had smelled alcohol on Foust’s 
breath while he was raping her. 
{¶ 102} Counsel’s decision not to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 
2901.21(C) was a legitimate tactical decision.  Cf. State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 560, 569, 715 N.E.2d 1144 (not ineffective assistance of counsel to 
forgo challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statute).  Thus, 
counsel were not ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 
2901.21(C).  And Foust failed to explain how expert testimony on alcohol and 
substance abuse would have aided such a challenge. 
{¶ 103} Second, we reject Foust’s claim that counsel’s failure to call a 
substance-abuse expert deprived him of mitigating evidence.  Dr. James 
Karpawich, a clinical psychologist, testified as a mitigation witness, and the 
defense introduced his written evaluation into evidence.  Dr. Karpawich testified 
that Foust was diagnosed with “alcohol dependence.”  In his written evaluation, 
Dr. Karpawich’s reviewed Foust’s history of alcohol and marijuana abuse and 
mentioned that Foust reported “abusing alcohol heavily around the time of the 
present offenses.”  Thus, the defense presented “alternative devices that * * * 
fulfill[ed] the same functions as the expert assistance sought.”  State v. Jenkins 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph four of the 
syllabus; State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 12-13, 752 N.E.2d 859. 
{¶ 104} Fingerprint expert.  As discussed, counsel were not ineffective 
for failing to object to the state’s fingerprint evidence, because Foust admitted 
entering the Coreano home through the basement window.  Thus, counsel were 
not ineffective for failing to obtain a defense expert to contest this evidence. 
January Term, 2004 
27 
{¶ 105} Arson expert.  Foust also claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to request a defense arson expert to assist them in 
challenging the state’s arson expert. 
{¶ 106} Lt. Victor Gill, a fire investigator, investigated the cause of the 
fire at the Coreano home.  He concluded that there were “at least three fires and 
each [had been] separately and intentionally set.”  Investigators located a box of 
matches and a spent match on the kitchen floor and another spent match on the 
carpet near the point of origin of the upstairs-bedroom fire.  Moreover, Foust 
confessed that he had been striking matches and “throwing them down” in the 
house.  
{¶ 107} In view of overwhelming evidence that Foust started the fires at 
the Coreano home, counsel could have determined it unnecessary to hire a 
defense arson expert to challenge Lt. Gill’s findings.  Thus, counsel exercised 
professional judgment in refraining from requesting a defense arson expert.  See 
State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 300, 754 N.E.2d 1150.  As we have noted, “ 
‘[a]ttorneys need not pursue every conceivable avenue; they are entitled to be 
selective.’ ”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 542, 747 N.E.2d 765, 
quoting United States v. Davenport (C.A.7, 1993), 986 F.2d 1047, 1049. 
{¶ 108} Finally, resolving this issue in Foust’s favor would be purely 
speculative.  Foust does not indicate how the testimony of a defense arson expert 
would have made any difference in the outcome of the case. 
{¶ 109} Cumulative error.  Foust argues that even if individually his 
counsel’s errors did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
cumulative effect of those errors necessitates reversal.  Foust received a fair trial, 
no error occurred, and the “cumulative error” argument is rejected.  Based on the 
foregoing, we reject proposition III. 
{¶ 110} In proposition of law V, Foust asserts that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to effectively advocate the motion to suppress his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
confession.  He also claims that counsel were ineffective in that they failed to 
object to Judge Robert Glickman’s presence on the three-judge panel because he 
had recently served as a prosecutor. 
{¶ 111} Adequacy of the motion to suppress.  In a pretrial motion, 
defense counsel filed a motion to suppress Foust’s confession “on the grounds 
that Defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived [sic] his 
rights before making such oral statements.”  During the presentation of the state’s 
evidence on the motion, Detective Michael Cipo testified that Foust was advised 
of his Miranda rights prior to making a statement.  Foust then waived his 
Miranda rights and agreed to provide a statement.  According to Detective Cipo, 
Foust did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs and provided 
coherent responses to police questioning.  Moreover, Foust never informed the 
police during the interview that he wanted to talk to a lawyer. 
{¶ 112} Foust argues that his counsel were deficient in failing to 
introduce any evidence to support their assertion that he had asked the police to 
let him speak to an attorney.  However, the record supports the voluntary element 
of Foust’s confession. Thus, it would be highly speculative to conclude that other 
evidence could have been presented to show that Foust’s confession was 
involuntary or that he had asked for a lawyer.  See State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio 
St.3d at 299, 754 N.E.2d 1150.  Moreover, Foust’s contention of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in not calling him as a witness to support the motion is not 
well taken.  Counsel’s decision “fell within the realm of trial strategy.”  State v. 
Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 121. 
{¶ 113} Foust also claims that his counsel were deficient by failing to 
cross-examine Detective Denise Kovach about the voluntariness of Foust’s 
confession.  During the state’s case-in-chief, the prosecution introduced Foust’s 
confession through Detective Kovach’s testimony.  Detective Kovach, who had 
not testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, testified that police had 
January Term, 2004 
29 
advised Foust of his Miranda rights and that he had waived those rights prior to 
making his confession.  At the conclusion of the state’s case, defense counsel 
renewed the motion to suppress the confession, which the court overruled. 
{¶ 114} Foust argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to ask Detective Kovach during cross-examination whether Foust had 
requested a lawyer before making his confession.  However, Foust’s confession 
was determined to be admissible evidence before Detective Kovach testified.  
Both Detective Cipo’s testimony and Foust’s written waiver of his Miranda rights 
had earlier established that Foust had waived his right to a lawyer prior to 
confessing.  Given the strong presumption that counsel’s performance constituted 
reasonable assistance, the decision to forgo further cross-examination on this 
issue represented a valid “tactical decision.”  See State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 
309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 51; State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 
297, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 115} Finally, it is highly speculative whether further cross-
examination of Detective Kovach would have made any difference in the outcome 
of the reasserted motion to suppress.  Indeed, counsel may have decided to forgo 
further cross-examination of Detective Kovach to avoid eliciting testimony that 
might not come out in Foust’s favor.  See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 
2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 123.  Moreover, Foust’s counsel had no duty 
to cross-examine Detective Kovach about the voluntariness of Foust’s confession 
solely because they had reasserted the motion to suppress at the end of the state’s 
case. 
{¶ 116} Failure to object to Judge Glickman.  Foust claims that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Judge Glickman’s 
presence on the three-judge panel.  Foust also claims counsel deficiency in their 
failing to consult with him on the record before informing the court that the 
defense had no objection to Judge Glickman’s presence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶ 117} During pretrial motions, the trial court informed the parties that 
Judge Glickman had recently been appointed to the bench after serving as an 
assistant Cuyahoga County prosecutor.  The trial court stated, “Counsel have 
advised me that the mere association with Judge Glickman and his prior 
experience with the Prosecutor’s Office * * * would not in and of itself be a 
matter of concern provided that Judge Glickman had not had any involvement in 
any prior actions involving Mr. Foust.” 
{¶ 118} After opening statements, Judge Glickman disclosed his former 
position as an assistant county prosecutor “assigned to the major trial unit, but at * 
* * no time * * * ever assigned any case regarding this particular defendant.”  
Further, Judge Glickman stated that he could never recall talking with Mr. Del 
Balso, the prosecutor, about Foust’s case.  In response, Foust’s trial counsel 
stated, “We’re satisfied that the Court has made a complete inquiry into that 
situation and we have no objection.” 
{¶ 119} After the second witness testified, Judge Glickman reiterated that 
he did not know anything about this particular case from his time at the 
prosecutor’s office but felt he should disclose that he had worked with Dr. Bligh-
Glover (the deputy coroner who testified in this case) in previous cases, that he 
had helped train several members of the coroner’s DNA lab – although not Ms. 
Heinig,  and that he had worked with Detectives Cipo and Kovach on a number of 
homicide cases.  Again, Foust’s trial counsel agreed that there was “no problem.” 
{¶ 120} “The prior professional activities of a judge are not grounds for 
disqualification where the record fails to demonstrate the existence of a 
relationship or interest that clearly and adversely impacts on a party’s ability to 
obtain a fair and impartial trial.”  In re Disqualification of Cross (1991), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 1228, 657 N.E.2d 1338.  Because Judge Glickman had no prior involvement 
with Foust’s case as a prosecutor, counsel had no basis for objecting to his 
presence on the three-judge panel.  Thus, counsel cannot be deficient for failing to 
January Term, 2004 
31 
object to Judge Glickman’s presence on the panel or in failing to file an affidavit 
of disqualification against him.  See R.C. 2701.03.  Moreover, counsel did not 
need to consult with Foust on the record about not objecting to Judge Glickman. 
{¶ 121} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition V. 
{¶ 122} In proposition of law VI, Foust argues ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to raise various guilt-phase issues. 
{¶ 123} Failure to cross-examine Serowik.  Foust contends his counsel 
failed to cross-examine Joseph Serowik, a scientific examiner for the Cleveland 
Police Department, as to why no DNA analysis was performed on the rape-kit 
swabs. Serowik testified that he had examined swabbings taken from the victim’s 
oral, rectal, and vaginal cavities.  Microscopic examination of the vaginal swab 
revealed sperm cells and seminal fluid, and testing of the rectal swab showed 
seminal fluid. 
{¶ 124} Serowik testified that “DNA analysis was started,” but “due to 
various issues it was unable to be completed.”  Serowik explained that DNA 
analysis was not completed because the senior DNA analyst went on maternity 
leave on the day the evidence was submitted to the lab.  Additionally, the lab was 
“unable to obtain a reagent necessary for DNA analysis.” 
{¶ 125} Because Serowik demonstrated why DNA analysis had not been 
conducted on the swabs, counsel may have concluded it was futile to question 
further on this issue.  Moreover, whether further questioning would have 
unearthed any useful information is a matter for speculation only.  Indeed, the 
lack of DNA testing on the swabs was more favorable to the defense than the 
reasons why such tests were not completed – particularly when the reasons 
involved administrative miscues.  Thus, counsel’s decision to forgo cross-
examination of Serowik on the reasons why the state did not conduct DNA 
analysis on the swabs constituted a legitimate “tactical decision.” See State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 123; State v. 
Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 339, 738 N.E.2d 1178. 
{¶ 126} Adequacy of cross-examination.  Foust also asserts that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by eliciting testimony concerning other 
acts that Foust had committed. 
{¶ 127} First, Foust complains that counsel elicited information from 
Damaris that Foust had been physically violent and that Damaris had seen Foust 
hit Acevedo.  During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Damaris whether 
she had told Acevedo that she should stop going out with Foust.  Damaris’s 
response, “He was physically violent,” was nonresponsive to counsel’s question.  
Counsel then asked, “Did you see any incidence of that?” and Damaris said, “I 
seen him hit her.”   
 
{¶ 128} This cross-examination of Damaris was intended to demonstrate 
bias on the part of Damaris because she had expressed her dislike of him before 
the night of the murder.  It is not ineffective assistance to fail to anticipate a 
nonresponsive answer to some questions.  Moreover, “this case was tried to a 
three-judge panel, which was capable of drawing the correct conclusion” from the 
evidence.  State v. Frazier (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 254, 574 N.E.2d 483; 
accord State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754 (judges 
presumed to know the law and expected to consider only relevant, material, and 
competent evidence during deliberations). 
{¶ 129} Second, Foust complains that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by eliciting from Damaris that her friendship with Acevedo had ended 
because of Foust’s “actions and the things we knew he did.”  This comment about 
Foust was a nonresponsive answer to the appropriate question “Where did Janira 
live at the time that all this came down?”  Moreover, Foust did not suffer any 
prejudice, particularly because a three-judge panel tried the case.  State v. Frazier, 
61 Ohio St.3d at 254, 574 N.E.2d 483. 
January Term, 2004 
33 
{¶ 130} Third, Foust claims that counsel’s cross-examination of Damaris 
improperly elicited Damaris’s comment that Foust had mocked her about being a 
Christian.  This response followed a line of questioning about previous 
discussions Damaris and Foust had had about religion.  We find that counsel’s 
decision to pursue this line of questioning was a legitimate tactical decision, even 
though some of Damaris’s answers resulted in negative information about Foust.  
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 131} Fourth, Foust argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by eliciting testimony that Foust had made sexual advances toward 
Damaris before the night of the rapes.  Foust asserts that this testimony supplied a 
motive for the state’s case: revenge of a spurned suitor.  However, the record does 
not support Foust’s assertion.  During cross-examination, Damaris testified that 
Foust had expressed some romantic interest toward her but that Foust knew 
Damaris did not like him and that she had a boyfriend. 
{¶ 132} Contrary to Foust’s claims, Damaris’s testimony did not supply a 
motive for the crimes.  By Foust’s own admission, he was looking for Acevedo, 
not Damaris, on the night of the crimes.  Thus, the “spurned suitor” motive 
applied to Foust’s relationship with Acevedo, not Damaris.  Damaris’s testimony 
does not establish that Foust had a romantic interest in Damaris to support a 
motive for committing murder.  Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for 
eliciting such testimony. 
{¶ 133} Fifth, Foust claims that his counsel’s cross-examination of 
Damaris harmed him by eliciting that Foust had “used her to purchase an 
automobile, to enable [Foust] to drive illegally.”  During cross-examination, 
Damaris stated that she had allowed Foust to buy cars and put them in her name 
because he had told her she would be able to drive them.  However, Damaris 
never got to drive these cars. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
{¶ 134} Counsel’s cross-examination showed that Damaris and Foust 
knew each other better than she had indicated under direct examination.  
Moreover, the fact that Damaris was never allowed to drive the cars titled in her 
name helped establish bias of the witness.  Counsel’s decision to ask these 
questions was a reasonable trial strategy and did not constitute ineffective 
assistance.  State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 96, 568 N.E.2d 674; State v. 
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 135} Sixth, Damaris’s comment that she was never told that Foust did 
not have a license or that it might have been suspended was a nonresponsive 
comment to one of counsel’s questions.  Again, this case was presented to a three-
judge panel, capable of disregarding nonresponsive comments from the witness.  
State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d 754. 
{¶ 136} Finally, Foust claims that counsel’s cross-examination of 
Patrolman William Hyland was ineffective in that it elicited that Foust had once 
forced Damaris to drink an alcoholic beverage that he often drank and that she 
had recognized the smell of that beverage on his breath while he raped her.  Such 
testimony was not prejudicial because this case was tried before a three-judge 
panel.  Id.  
{¶ 137} Other acts of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  Foust 
raises other instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but even if we 
assume deficient performance by counsel, Foust cannot show prejudice.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  As 
we discussed in response to proposition I, Foust knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and he suffered no prejudice from his 
counsel’s failure to ensure its validity.  Moreover, Foust was not prejudiced by 
counsel’s failure to object to the indictment (see discussion corresponding to 
proposition II) or by his counsel’s failure to consult with him on the record before 
waiving any objection to Judge Glickman’s presence on the panel (proposition V).  
January Term, 2004 
35 
Foust was also not prejudiced by his counsel’s decision not to challenge the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2901.21(C) (proposition III), or by his counsel’s failure 
to request merger of the offenses of rape, kidnapping, and gross sexual imposition 
(proposition VII). 
{¶ 138} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition VI. 
{¶ 139} Allied offenses.  In proposition of law VII, Foust argues that his 
separate convictions for kidnapping, rape, and gross sexual imposition violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause because the offenses are “allied offenses of similar 
import” under R.C. 2941.25.3  Foust asserts that the state failed to prove separate 
animus for these offenses and that they should have been merged into a single 
offense.  However, the defense failed to raise this issue at trial and thus waived all 
but plain error.  See State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 
N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 
206, 211, 553 N.E.2d 640. 
{¶ 140} Kidnapping and Rape.  The test for determining whether 
kidnapping and rape were committed with a separate animus as to each is 
“whether the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a separate 
underlying crime or, instead, whether it has a significance independent of the 
other offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 
135, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345.  Moreover, “[w]here the asportation or 
restraint of the victim subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm 
separate and apart from that involved in the underlying crime, there exists a 
separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions.”  Id. 
at subparagraph (b) of the syllabus. 
                                                 
3. R.C. 2941.25(A) provides, “Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment * * * may contain counts 
for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶ 141} In Logan and subsequent cases, we held that prolonged 
movement, secretive confinement, or substantial movement of the victim are facts 
that establish a separate animus for kidnapping.  Id. at subparagraph (a) of the 
syllabus; State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 
134. 
{¶ 142} Here, the facts showed substantial movement and restraint as 
Foust forced Damaris into the bathroom after raping her.  Foust then tied her 
hands and feet together and tied her to the leg of the bathtub with a belt.  These 
actions subjected Damaris to a substantial increase in risk of harm because after 
he chained her to the bathtub, he set the house on fire.  Cf. State v. Hartman, 93 
Ohio St.3d at 280-281, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (separate animus for kidnapping when 
victim had been tied to a bed, gagged, stabbed 138 times, and strangled and had 
had her throat slit).  Based on these facts, we find that Foust committed 
kidnapping with an animus separate from the rapes. 
{¶ 143} Gross Sexual Imposition and Rape.  Gross sexual imposition is 
a lesser included offense of rape.  State v. Johnson (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 224, 522 
N.E.2d 1082, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Consequently, a defendant may not 
be convicted of both gross sexual imposition and rape when the counts arise out 
of the same conduct. 
{¶ 144} One of the three counts of gross sexual imposition that Foust was 
found guilty of committing was based upon evidence that Foust touched 
Damaris’s vagina with his knife.  Damaris testified that Foust left the bathroom 
after he tied her to the leg of the bathtub.  However, he returned to the bathroom 
after hearing Damaris move around.  According to Damaris, Foust cut off one of 
her braids, touched her vagina with a knife, and threatened to slice her open if she 
moved.  This constitutes conduct separate and distinct from rape.  Under these 
facts, the crimes of gross sexual imposition differ from rape, and, therefore, Foust 
could be convicted of each. 
January Term, 2004 
37 
{¶ 145} The two other counts of gross sexual imposition are premised on 
Damaris’s testimony that Foust had touched her breasts and put his fingers on her 
vagina.  There is no evidence that Foust committed these acts while he was raping 
Damaris.  We conclude that these acts were distinct and separate from each other 
and from the rapes, and, therefore, Foust could be convicted of each in addition to 
the rapes. 
{¶ 146} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition VII. 
Penalty-phase issues 
{¶ 147} In proposition of law VIII, Foust argues that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. 
{¶ 148} Failure to develop Dr. Karpawich’s testimony.  Foust claims 
that his counsel were deficient in failing to develop Dr. Karpawich’s testimony to 
show that Foust suffered from a mental disease or defect that qualified as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor.  Foust claims that his counsel were obligated to 
present such testimony because counsel had “indicated” in opening statement that 
“mitigation was based in part upon R.C. §2929.04(B)(3).” 
{¶ 149} R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) applies when “at the time of committing the 
offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender’s conduct or to conform the 
offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law.” 
{¶ 150} Dr. Karpawich testified that Foust suffered from a major 
depressive disorder and alcohol dependence.  Additionally, Dr. Karpawich’s 
conclusions were included in his written evaluation that was introduced into 
evidence.  Counsel’s questioning of Dr. Karpawich addressed the mitigating 
features of Foust’s mental illnesses as follows: 
{¶ 151} “Q:  And your interviews with Kelly Foust in the jail since 
you’ve had a chance to meet with him and the information that you obtained by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
way of history * * * leads you to believe that that’s what he was suffering from 
and he does suffer from a major depressive disorder; is that correct? 
{¶ 152} “A:  That is my opinion, yes. 
{¶ 153} “Q:  How would that affect his ability to conduct his everyday 
life with respect to making judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of what 
he’s doing or what he’s not doing? 
{¶ 154} “A:  Again, depends on the severity of the depression at any 
given time, it depends.  Unfortunately in this case when depression is mixed with 
alcohol then someone’s judgment is even more significantly impaired.  It depends 
on what other stability he has in his life to cling on to.” 
{¶ 155} Nevertheless, Foust argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to elicit testimony from Dr. Karpawich that Foust lacked the 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and thus failed to 
trigger the language of R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Because it is highly speculative 
whether Dr. Karpawich could have so testified, Foust’s counsel were not 
ineffective by failing to elicit such testimony.  See State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 
354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 116, 121 (counsel not ineffective for 
failing to show that the defendant’s paranoid schizophrenia qualified as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor). 
{¶ 156} However, counsel’s questioning of Dr. Karpawich established 
that Foust suffered from a mental illness that qualified as a mitigating factor under 
the R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) catchall factor.  Cf. State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 
4, 9, 564 N.E.2d 408 (“psychological and mental problems, though not qualifying 
under R.C. 2929.04[B][3], are directly relevant under R.C. 2929.04[B][7]”).  
Thus, counsel were not ineffective in questioning Dr. Karpawich. 
{¶ 157} Failure to object to the reintroduction of guilt-phase 
evidence.  Foust asserts that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing 
to object to the reintroduction of all guilt-phase exhibits in the penalty phase.  
January Term, 2004 
39 
However, Foust does not specify which exhibits he believed prejudiced him.  
Nevertheless, counsel were not ineffective by failing to object to this evidence.  
The reintroduction of evidence from the guilt-phase in the mitigation phase is 
allowed by R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).  State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 
N.E.2d 542, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
436, 447, 751 N.E.2d 946. 
{¶ 158} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition VIII. 
{¶ 159} Merger.  In proposition of law IX, Foust argues that the three-
judge panel failed to merge the aggravated-murder counts and the duplicative 
aggravating circumstances prior to sentencing him.  He also claims that the trial 
court considered nonstatutory aggravating factors as part of the course-of-conduct 
specification. 
{¶ 160} Aggravated-murder counts involving the same victim are to be 
merged for sentencing.  State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 
N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 132; State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 351, 595 N.E.2d 
902.  Here, review of the sentencing journal entry reveals that the three-judge 
panel imposed a death sentence “as to each of counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6,” pursuant 
to each conviction, but obviously considered these counts as merged. 
{¶ 161} As to the multiple aggravating circumstances, the rule is that 
“where two or more aggravating circumstances arise from the same act or 
indivisible course of conduct and are thus duplicative, the duplicative aggravating 
circumstances will be merged for purposes of sentencing.”  State v. Jenkins, 15 
Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph five of the syllabus.  
However, in the case at bar, the five R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) aggravating 
circumstances (rape, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and 
aggravated arson) are not duplicative because none arose from the same act or 
indivisible course of conduct as another.  Moreover, as discussed in proposition 
VII, the facts established that Foust, after breaking into the Coreano home, raped 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
and kidnapped Damaris with a separate animus for each offense.  The facts also 
showed that Foust’s theft of property from inside the house, his setting the house 
on fire, and his theft of Jose’s car constituted separate and distinct acts, each 
committed with a separate animus.  See State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 
349, 744 N.E.2d 1163. 
{¶ 162} Furthermore, 
the 
course-of-conduct 
specification, 
R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5), and the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification need not be merged.  
The R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications alleged that the aggravated murder of Jose 
occurred during the course of rape, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated 
robbery, and aggravated arson.  In contrast, the course-of-conduct specification 
alleged that Jose’s murder was part of a course of conduct in which Foust also 
attempted to kill Damaris.  Thus, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) and (A)(7) 
specifications did not arise from the same course of conduct and are not 
duplicative.  See State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 
26, ¶ 51-52; State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 85, 723 N.E.2d 1019; State v. 
Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d at 256, 574 N.E.2d 483. 
{¶ 163} Finally, Foust points out that the panel considered nonstatutory 
aggravating factors as part of the course-of-conduct specification.  In its 
sentencing opinion, the panel stated, “[T]he killing of Jose Coreano was part of a 
course of conduct that included all the other crimes committed by the defendant 
that night: the aggravated burglary of the home, rape and gross sexual imposition 
upon Damaris Coreano, aggravated robbery, and aggravated arson.  These are no 
longer separate crimes, but have been tied together in a Gordian knot of perversity 
and brutality.” 
{¶ 164} The R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) specification applies only to “a course 
of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more 
persons by the offender.”  Thus, the panel improperly referred to other felony 
offenses that Foust committed as part of a course of conduct, an error that we will 
January Term, 2004 
41 
correct during our independent review.  See State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
183, 191-192, 631 N.E.2d 124. 
{¶ 165} Based on the foregoing, proposition IX has some merit but does 
not result in error sufficient to warrant a reversal or retrial. 
{¶ 166} Sentencing opinion.  In proposition of law X, Foust contends 
that the sentencing panel failed to adequately address and give weight to 
mitigating factors presented at trial. 
{¶ 167} First, Foust argues that the three-judge panel failed to consider 
evidence that he suffered from depression and alcohol dependence as a mitigating 
factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), the catchall provision. 
{¶ 168} The sentencing panel evaluated Foust’s history of depression and 
alcohol dependence to determine whether it qualified as a mental disease or defect 
under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  The panel stated that “the defendant indeed suffers 
from a mental disease or defect (depression and alcohol dependence).  The report 
and testimony of Dr. Karpawich confirm earlier diagnoses to this effect, and Dr. 
Karpawich’s testimony further suggests that these conditions may have played a 
role in the defendant’s conduct on the night of March 31, 2001.”  Nevertheless, 
the panel concluded that no evidence established that these conditions affected 
Foust’s “ ‘capacity to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to conform 
[that] conduct to the requirements of the law.’ ” Panel opinion, quoting R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3). 
{¶ 169} The panel erroneously failed to discuss whether Foust’s mental 
illness had any weight as a (B)(7) factor.  We consider this factor during our 
independent review. See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 
N.E.2d 1064, ¶100; State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 345, 715 N.E.2d 
136. 
{¶ 170} Second, Foust argues that the panel did not properly weigh as a 
mitigating factor the tragic losses of his older brother and younger sister.  In the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
sentencing opinion, the panel considered evidence that “[t]he defendant’s one 
significant role model, an older brother, was murdered, execution-style” as a 
possible R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) mitigating factor.  However, the panel concluded that 
“sympathy for the tragic manner in which the defendant lost his older brother and 
younger sister may help explain his conduct but does not support mitigation of the 
sentence.” 
{¶ 171} Examination of the sentencing opinion reveals that the panel 
considered the tragic deaths of Foust’s brother and sister as mitigating evidence 
but chose to give it no weight.  “There is ‘no requirement’ that the trial court 
‘explain how it decides how much weight to give any one factor.’ ”  Moreover, 
‘[t]he weight, if any, given to a mitigating factor is a matter for the discretion of 
the individual decisionmaker.’ ”  State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-
6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 
245, 714 N.E.2d 867.  Thus, the panel could reasonably assign whatever weight, 
if any, it deemed appropriate for that mitigating evidence.  Accordingly, we reject 
proposition X. 
Cumulative errors 
{¶ 172} In proposition of law XI, Foust contends that errors, individually 
and collectively, deprived him of a fair trial and necessitate the reversal of his 
death sentence.  However, our review of the evidence shows that Foust received a 
fair trial.  Any error was nonprejudicial.  We reject proposition XI. 
Settled issues 
{¶ 173} Proportionality.  In proposition of law XII, Foust challenges the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s proportionality review.  However, we summarily reject 
these arguments.  See State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 
N.E.2d 166, ¶ 23; State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 118, 684 N.E.2d 668; 
State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2004 
43 
{¶ 174} Constitutionality.  In proposition of law XIII, Foust attacks the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statutes.  We have previously rejected 
similar claims.  See State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 607, 734 N.E.2d 345; State 
v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 175} Foust also argues that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes violate 
international agreements to which the United States is a party.  However, we also 
reject this argument.  State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 502, 709 N.E.2d 
484; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 176} Having considered Foust’s propositions of law, we are required 
by R.C. 2929.05(A) to independently review Foust’s death sentence for 
appropriateness and proportionality.  The evidence at trial established that Foust 
murdered Jose Coreano and attempted to murder Damaris Coreano as part of a 
course of conduct involving the purposeful attempt to kill two people, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5).  The evidence also established that Foust murdered Jose while 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, 
rape, kidnapping, and aggravated arson, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 177} Against these aggravating circumstances, we are called upon to 
weigh the mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B).  Foust presented three 
mitigation witnesses and personally made an unsworn statement. 
{¶ 178} Gary William Foust Sr., the defendant’s father, testified that 
Foust was the sixth oldest of his eight children, that he and his wife, Barbara, 
frequently argued and fought with each other in front of their children, and that he 
was an alcoholic.  Foust was eight years old when his parents were divorced in 
1985.  Foust did not do well in school and never graduated from high school. 
{¶ 179} In 1987 or 1988, Foust’s mother was sent to prison.  Thereafter, 
Foust, who was then 11 years old, and three of his siblings lived with their father.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
Because Gary was working, he hired a woman to look after the children.  In 1990, 
Foust’s mother was released from prison and assumed custody of the children.  
Thereafter, Gary lost contact with Foust, and Gary had not seen him since 1990. 
{¶ 180} Terence, Foust’s brother, was shot and killed when he was 18 or 
19 years old.  Terence lived with two people who were dealing drugs when he 
was shot.  According to Gary, “the people who executed him went there to 
execute them two people, [and Terence] just happened to be there.”  In 1981, 
Foust’s two-year-old sister died from a carbon monoxide leak. 
{¶ 181} Barbara Ann Foust, the defendant’s mother, testified that Gary 
had been “very violent” and “very unstable.”  According to Barbara, Gary treated 
the children very badly.  “[I]f he wasn’t hitting, he was screaming, he was 
threatening, he was ridiculing, berating them.  [E]verything they ever did wasn’t 
good, nothing they ever did was okay.”  Gary often physically abused Barbara, 
and she went to the hospital several times after he had beaten her.  Gary also hit 
Foust and his brothers with “[h]is fist, whatever he could pick up, [and] he’d kick 
them.”   
 
{¶ 182} Barbara stated that “[u]p until seventh grade [Foust] was my very 
best child. * * *  He was always on the merit roll, always on the honor roll, I don’t 
remember every [sic] having to discipline him.”  However, in the seventh grade, 
Foust “just totally changed.”  According to Barbara, “[h]e wouldn’t go to school.  
When he did he was just there roaming the hall.  He’d be out all night.  He’d 
disappear for a day or night on end.” 
{¶ 183} Foust had had a close relationship with Terence, his older 
brother.  However, Terence was involved in car theft.  When Foust was 15 years 
old, he got into trouble and was sent to the Riverview School for Boys.  In 1994, 
while Foust was at Riverview, Terence was shot and killed.  Shortly afterward, 
Foust tried to kill himself.  About a year later, Foust was released from Riverview 
and moved back in with his mother.  However, Foust “very rarely spoke to 
January Term, 2004 
45 
anyone.  You know, he’d go for days coming and going and not speak to anyone 
in the house.”   
{¶ 184} Foust’s relationship with Acevedo was “very bad on both their 
parts.”  According to Barbara, “[w]hen he first started seeing her he was actually 
living with her at her mother’s apartment.  And there was some kind of a problem 
between [Foust] and [Acevedo’s] brother so he moved back home and brought her 
with him.”  However, Foust and Acevedo were constantly fighting.  But Barbara 
did not “know who hit who the most or who argued the most.” 
{¶ 185} Barbara said she has been angry with her son since these offenses 
were committed.  However, she hoped that Foust would not receive a death 
sentence because “we now have the choice of life without parole.” 
{¶ 186} Dr. James Karpawich, a clinical psychologist, described Foust’s 
upbringing as “very traumatic as well as very chaotic.”  Foust’s family members 
told Dr. Karpawich that Foust’s father had been “physically abusive towards all 
members of the family.  On the other hand, Mr. Foust, Kelly’s father, indicated 
that Kelly’s mother was unstable.  He also alleged that [she] would have men 
come into the home when he went to work and that she was committing adultery.” 
{¶ 187} Because of the lack of stability in the home, Foust never 
developed a strong sense of security.  Foust “experienced violence throughout his 
upbringing, which has an impact on the way he would interact with other people, 
especially women.”  Moreover, Foust lacked positive role models during his 
formative years.  Foust had looked up to his older brother Terence as a role model 
before he was shot and killed. 
{¶ 188} Dr. Karpawich reviewed a report prepared by Dr. Feldsher of the 
Court Psychiatric Clinic on Foust’s mental state.  Although the report was not 
introduced at trial, Dr. Feldsher diagnosed Foust as suffering from a depressive 
disorder with a secondary diagnosis of alcohol dependence.  Dr. Karpawich 
concurred with the finding that Foust “has a significant problem that qualifies for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
alcohol dependence.”  Moreover, Dr. Karpawich believes that Foust was 
“suffering from a major depressive disorder at the time since both [Foust] and his 
family had reported that he had been suffering from depression and suicidal 
thoughts for several months prior to the offense.” 
{¶ 189} Intelligence tests indicated that Foust’s IQ is “in the average 
range and he does not have any severe clouded deficits.”  As reported in Dr. 
Karpawich’s written evaluation, other tests showed that Foust’s memory was 
intact, he had mild problems with his complex reasoning ability, and his reading 
skills were at the high school level. 
{¶ 190} Finally, Dr. Karpawich indicated that Foust has “abided by the 
rules and regulations since he’s been in the Cuyahoga County Jail.”  Although 
other inmates have given Foust “a hard time because of the high publicity of the 
trial, * * * he’s been able to maintain his control over his anger.”  Moreover, 
“he’s not gotten into any violence * * * [and] he’s been a very appropriate 
prisoner.” 
{¶ 191} Foust’s unsworn statement.  On the date of the offenses, Foust 
was drinking alcohol with a friend.  Foust said that his purpose in going to the 
Coreano house was to see Acevedo, who “was one of the only individuals that 
[he] had at the time to talk to or to listen to [him].”  According to Foust, “I don’t 
know what exactly triggered everything off, but it was just a lot of unstable 
emotions and mixed feelings that was going through my head at the time.” 
{¶ 192} Foust told the Coreano family, “I’d like to just say I’m sorry.  It 
should have never happened.”  He also said, “I didn’t mean to hurt nobody.  I 
wasn’t intentionally trying to do harm to anybody.  When I went there it had 
nothing to do with the Coreano family at all, but when I arrived there everything 
in my mind just changed that one split second.”  In closing, Foust said, “You 
know, if there’s a way I can change that I would, but I don’t think there’s, you 
know, anything within my power that I can actually do to help any of the pain or 
January Term, 2004 
47 
change anything that happened.  The most I can do is just, you know, tell them 
that I’m sorry for it and hope that one day * * * maybe they can learn to forgive 
me for it.” 
{¶ 193} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offenses 
to be mitigating.  Foust broke into the Coreano home and murdered Jose Coreano 
while he was sleeping.  Foust also repeatedly raped Damaris Coreano, chained her 
to the leg of the bathtub, and then tried to kill her by setting the house on fire.  
Furthermore, Foust stole property from inside the house and stole Jose’s car in 
fleeing from the scene. 
{¶ 194} Although Foust’s character offers nothing in mitigation, we give 
some weight to his history and background.  Foust was raised in a very unstable 
family environment.  His father was an alcoholic, and his mother spent time in 
prison while Foust was growing up. 
{¶ 195} We find that the statutory mitigating factors are generally 
inapplicable here, including R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) 
(duress, coercion, or strong provocation), and (B)(6) (offender was accomplice 
only). 
{¶ 196} Foust’s mental disorders do not qualify as an R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) 
factor because there was no testimony that Foust, by reason of a mental disease or 
defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
{¶ 197} We give little weight to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) mitigating factor 
(youth of the offender) because Foust was 23 years old at the time of the offenses.  
See State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 306, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. Dunlap 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d 244, 257, 667 N.E.2d 369. 
{¶ 198} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of significant 
criminal history) is entitled to only some weight because Foust has a prior felony 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
conviction for receiving stolen property.  Foust was also sent to the Riverview 
School for Boys from September 1992 to February 1995. 
{¶ 199} Under the catchall provision, R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), we also give 
some weight to Foust’s mental problems.  Foust was diagnosed with “Depressive 
Disorder” and “a significant problem with Alcohol Dependence.”  Nevertheless, 
there was no evidence of any significant connection between Foust’s mental 
disorders and Coreano’s murder.  Moreover, we have previously rejected the 
argument that a defendant’s alcoholism ought to receive much weight as a 
mitigating factor.  See State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 614, 605 N.E.2d 
916. 
{¶ 200} We also give some weight as a (B)(7) mitigating factor to 
evidence suggesting that Foust will adapt well to prison life.  State v. Madrigal, 
87 Ohio St.3d at 397, 721 N.E.2d 52.  Additionally, we give weight under (B)(7) 
to Foust’s cooperating with the police after he was arrested.  State v. Mink, 101 
Ohio St. 3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 125. 
{¶ 201} Finally, we give weight to Foust’s apologies to the victims’ 
family and his expressions of remorse.  See State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 
365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, at ¶ 143; but, see, State v. Keene (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 646, 671, 693 N.E.2d 246 (remorse entitled to little weight in 
mitigation).  The evidence does not reveal any other mitigating factors under R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7). 
{¶ 202} Upon weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors, we find that the aggravating circumstances as to Jose 
Coreano’s murder outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Foust murdered Jose Coreano during the course of an aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated arson, which are grave 
aggravating circumstances.  Similarly, his course of conduct in killing Jose and 
attempting to kill Damaris Coreano is also a serious aggravating circumstance.  In 
January Term, 2004 
49 
contrast, Foust offered no significant mitigating evidence.  Thus, we find that the 
death penalty is appropriate. 
{¶ 203} We also find that the penalty imposed in this case is both 
appropriate and proportionate when compared to other course-of-conduct murders 
for which the death penalty was imposed.  See State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 
230, 714 N.E.2d 867 (one murder and one attempted murder); State v. Dennis 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (one murder and one attempted 
murder); State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 526 N.E.2d 274 (one murder 
and two attempted murders). 
{¶ 204} The death penalty is also appropriate and proportionate when 
compared to death sentences approved for other burglary-murder and robbery-
murder cases.  See State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 
N.E.2d 446; State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 
1017; State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 731 N.E.2d 159.  It is also 
appropriate and proportionate when compared with the sentence in other 
kidnapping-murder cases.  See State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-10, 
800 N.E.2d 1133; State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. 
Ballew, 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 667 N.E.2d 369.  Additionally, the death penalty is 
appropriate and proportionate when compared to other rape-murder cases.  See 
State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio 
St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 
932.  Finally, the death penalty is appropriate and proportionate when compared 
to death sentences approved in other arson-murder cases.  See State v. Franklin, 
97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26; State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 381, 659 N.E.2d 292. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 205} We affirm Foust’s convictions and his sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Gail D. 
Baker, Perry M. Kendall Jr., and Carol M. Skutnik, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
David L. Doughten and Alan C. Rossman, for appellant. 
_____________________