Case Title: MILLER DOLLARHIDE, P.C. v. MOSHE TAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100179

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MILLER DOLLARHIDE, P.C. v. MOSHE TAL  MILLER DOLLARHIDE, P.C. v. MOSHE TAL 2007 OK 58 163 P.3d 548 Case Number: 100179 Decided: 07/03/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA MILLER DOLLARHIDE, P.C., Plaintiff/Appellee, v. MOSHE TAL, Defendant/Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III THE HONORABLE DAVID HARBOUR, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 The appellant, Moshe Tal (client) filed a malpractice action against the appellee, Miller Dollarhide (law firm) in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. The law firm brought a counterclaim for unpaid legal fees. Tal, who had previously entered a pro se appearance, dismissed the malpractice action against the law firm, but failed to appear for a scheduling conference on the counterclaim. The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the law firm on the counterclaim. Both before and after the default judgment was entered, Tal sought disqualification of the Honorable David Harbour, trial judge. The trial judge refused to disqualify several times, and on two separate occasions the Chief Judge of Oklahoma County refused to grant a motion to re-assign the case. Simultaneously, the client raised the disqualification issue in an original mandamus action in this Court and an appeal which was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals. This Court assumed original jurisdiction in the mandamus action, but denied relief in a single sentence order. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals refused to consider the disqualification issue on the grounds that this Court's order denying relief was the binding law of the case. In Miller Dollarhide I, we determined that assuming jurisdiction and denying relief in the original mandamus action did not bar the Court of Civil Appeals from considering the issue on appeal and we remanded the cause to the Court of Civil Appeals to decide the merits of the bias claim. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. We hold that: 1) a trial court's continued participation while motions to disqualify are pending results in a deprivation of due process; and 2) the refusal to disqualify was an abuse of discretion. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED. Jack S. Dawson, Mark Edmondson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the Appellee. Moshe Tal, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Pro se. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The questions presented are whether: 1) a trial judge's continued participation in a cause while motions for disqualification are pending deprive the movant of a fundamental right to due process; and 2) the trial judge abused his discretion when he declined to disqualify. We hold that: 1) a trial judge's continued participation while motions to disqualify are pending results in a deprivation of due process; and 2) the refusal to disqualify was an abuse of discretion. FACTS ¶2 The facts surrounding the genesis of this action are discussed in Miller Dollarhide, P.C., v. Moshe Tal, ¶3 On October 30, 2003, the trial court entered a default judgment against Tal for failing to appear at a scheduling conference and set a date for a hearing on damages. Tal then sought vacation of the default judgment, and on November 24, 2003, the parties appeared for a hearing before the trial court on the motion to vacate. During the hearing the trial judge denied the motion to vacate and announced that he would set an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the amount of the claim. Tal again sought the trial judge's disqualification, handed the judge a letter requesting an in camera review to recuse and insisted that the trial court stay the matter until the disqualification issue had been resolved. Instead, the trial court denied the request, but did not memorialize the denial. ¶4 On December 8, 2003, the cause was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing and Tal filed a renewed motion to disqualify which the trial court denied on the spot. Tal left the hearing to deliver the motion to the Chief Judge. ¶5 Pursuant to Rule 15(b), Tal brought a mandamus action in this Court to review the denial of his motion. At the same time, Tal also brought a direct appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate the default judgment, in which he argued that the trial judge should have been disqualified because of bias. On February 17, 2004, this Court assumed original jurisdiction in the mandamus action but we declined "to disqualify the trial judge in both cases." On July 25, 2005, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate, and specifically declined to consider the issue of bias. ¶6 The Court of Civil Appeals in Miller Dollarhide I determined that our February 17, 2004, order denying mandamus relief was the law of the case. We granted certiorari and determined that: 1) Tal's claims of bias were preserved for appellate review; 2) assuming jurisdiction and denying relief in the original mandamus action did not bar the Court of Civil Appeals from considering the issue on appeal; and 3) we remanded the cause to the Court of Civil Appeals to decide the merits of the bias claim. On remand, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. We again granted certiorari on May 7, 2007. I. ¶7 A TRIAL COURT'S CONTINUED PARTICIPATION WHILE MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY ARE PENDING RESULTS IN A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS. ¶ ¶9 Clark involved the constitutional implications to a movant when a trial judge neglects to rule on a request for disqualification, yet continues to preside over the cause. The movant in Clark filed two documents requesting that the trial judge be disqualified, but the record contained no memorialized disposition of either request. Recognizing the implications of due process when challenging the impartiality of a trial judge, the Court said: A fundamental requirement of due process is a fair and impartial trial. A neutral and detached judiciary is imperative to ensure procedural fairness to individual litigants and to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. Every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. A challenge to an assigned judge for want of impartiality presents an issue of constitutional dimension which must be resolved and the rule memorialized of record after a meaningful evidentiary hearing. The quest for recusal may not be ignored, nor is a judge free to proceed with the case until the challenge stands overruled of record following a judicial inquiry into the issue. . . . (citations omitted, emphasis added). We explained the three-step process for challenging the assigned judge's neutrality and detachment under District Court Rule 15: ¶ ¶11 Here, the Rule 15 procedure was not followed by either the trial court or the movant. As we explained in Miller Dollarhide I: The first attempt began with Tal's February, 2003 in camera letter requesting recusal. When his request was denied, Tal filed a timely formal motion in the trial court. The record is silent on why that motion was not considered by, or ruled upon by the trial court, but under our decision in Clark v. Board of Education of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89, At this point, Tal was entitled, pursuant to Rule 15(b), to bring a mandamus action in this Court within five days of the Chief Judge's order denying relief. However, Tal chose not to seek mandamus relief from the order as it applied to this case. Rather, Tal stood on the record, and under our holding in Pierce v. Pierce, ¶12 The second attempt at disqualification occurred during a November 24, 2003, hearing concerning vacation of the default judgment. During that hearing, Tal sought the trial judge's disqualification but the trial judge denied his request. Tal renewed the motion at the next hearing which was held on December 8, 2003, by presenting the judge with a filed, written renewed request to disqualify and request to stay the proceedings. The trial court denied the motion from the bench and refused to stay the proceedings, even though Tal informed the court of his intent to present the matter to the chief district judge immediately. Without a memorialized ruling and before the matter was decided by the Chief Judge, the trial court continued to preside over the proceeding and entered a journal entry of judgment. ¶13 Apparently, confusion exists over Clark v. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 89, supra, and its mandate regarding whether a trial court may continue to rule on a matter while a motion to recuse is pending. In November of 2006, this Court issued an order in another cause directing the trial court to vacate all orders entered while a motion to recuse was pending and to refrain from further rulings until completion of Rule 15 proceedings. II. ¶14 THE REFUSAL TO DISQUALIFY WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. ¶15 The appellee argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify because there was no showing of any bias or prejudice. Tal insists that the record supports specific instances of conduct by the trial judge which would support disqualification. ¶16 The due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. ¶17 Where there are circumstances of such a nature as to cause doubts as to a judge's partiality, it is the judge's duty to disqualify notwithstanding the judge's personal belief that the judge is unprejudiced, unbiased, and impartial. ¶18 In Pierce v. Pierce, . . . The common law contains a presumption that a judge is not biased, and a party must point to some fact to overcome the presumption to require disqualification because of bias. . . .Similarly, a party must point to some fact to substantiate a claim that the appearance of a fair trial is not present, or that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . . When an order of a judge in a civil proceeding denies a disqualification application that order will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. . . .Generally, a clear abuse of discretion occurs when the decision challenged is against, or not justified by, reason and evidence. (Citations omitted). ¶19 We have reviewed the entire record. Throughout the proceedings it is evident that there was elevated tension between the trial judge and Tal at nearly every hearing. This began when the trial court ordered that the parties be realigned so that the law firm would appear as a plaintiff and Tal as a defendant over Tal's objection. Tal's objection to the realignment was based on his opinion that the law firm did not want to appear to be sued by a former client. ¶20 Both Tal and the trial judge had frequent colloquies which provoked the trial judge to question Tal's veracity from the bench. CONCLUSION ¶21 When a Rule 15 proceeding to seek disqualification of a trial judge is initiated, the trial court must refrain from presiding over the case until the disqualification ruling is memorialized and the movant has, at the movant's option, exhausted the Rule 15 procedure. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED. EDMONDSON, V.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ., concur. WINCHESTER, C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, dissent. FOOT