Case Title: Anthony John Ponticelli v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-17

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-17 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY JOHN PONTICELLI,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1858 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY JOHN PONTICELLI,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[August 31, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Anthony Ponticelli appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial 
court’s denial of Ponticelli’s motion for postconviction relief and deny Ponticelli’s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.     
FACTS  
On August 12, 1988, Anthony Ponticelli was found guilty of two counts of 
first-degree murder for the deaths of Nicholas and Ralph Grandinetti.  He was 
subsequently sentenced to death.  This Court affirmed Ponticelli’s convictions and 
sentences on direct appeal.  Ponticelli v. State, 593 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1991).  
The following relevant facts were provided in this Court’s prior opinion:    
According to testimony at trial, on November 27, 1987, 
Ponticelli was invited to watch video movies at the home of Keith 
Dotson, whom Ponticelli met while at a convenience store that 
afternoon.  Ponticelli arrived at Dotson’s house between 6:30 and 7:00 
p.m. and stayed thirty to forty-five minutes.  Later that evening he 
returned to Dotson’s house in an automobile.  Upon his return, 
Ponticelli told Dotson’s cousin, Ed Brown, that there were two people 
in the car whom he intended to kill for money and cocaine.  Ponticelli 
showed Brown a gun and told him he would need a ride back to his 
house. Brown agreed to give him a ride and gave Ponticelli Dotson’s 
telephone number.  When the phone later rang several times, Dotson 
and his friends intentionally did not answer it.  Around 11:30 p.m., 
Ponticelli returned to Dotson’s house in a taxi cab.  He told those 
present that he had killed the two people in the car for cocaine and 
$2,000.  Ponticelli asked Brown if he thought that a person would live 
after being shot in the head.  Although Brown told him he did not 
think he had to worry about it, Ponticelli expressed concern, telling 
Brown that he had heard one of his victims moaning.  After Ponticelli 
washed his clothes to remove blood stains, Brown drove him home. 
 
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According to testimony of Timothy Keese,1 who lived with 
Ralph and Nick Grandinetti, on the evening of November 27, Keese 
saw Ponticelli at the Grandinetti brothers’ home around 7:30 p.m.  
The three were discussing money Ponticelli owed the brothers for 
cocaine he had purchased from Ralph.  Ponticelli told the brothers that 
he would sell whatever cocaine they had and then settle up with them. 
The brothers agreed to take Ponticelli to sell the cocaine.  Keese left 
the house; and when he returned around 10:00 p.m. the Grandinettis 
were not at home.  The brothers did not return that night. 
The Grandinettis were found in their car the following day.   
Nick was found badly injured with his head on the floorboard of the 
car.  He was gasping for air and kicking his foot when found.  Nick’s 
head was covered with blood and there was blood spattered all over 
the car. Ralph was found dead in the back seat.  According to the 
medical examiner, Ralph died within one to two minutes of being shot 
once in the back of the head at close range. 
Nick Grandinetti survived until December 12, 1987.  An 
autopsy revealed that he had suffered two gunshot wounds to the back 
of the head.  There were a number of bruises on the back and side of 
his head that were consistent with blunt trauma to the head.  The skin 
on the right ear was peeling and red which was consistent with hot 
pressure being placed on the ear for an extended period of time.  Nick 
died of cardiac arrest which was secondary to the gunshot wounds. 
Ponticelli’s best friend, Joseph Leonard, testified that around 
9:30 p.m. on November 27, Ponticelli came to Leonard’s house and 
returned a gun Leonard had given him.  Ponticelli told Leonard that he 
“did Nick” which Leonard understood to mean that Ponticelli had shot 
and killed Nick Grandinetti.  Ponticelli asked Leonard and his 
roommate what he should do with the bodies. 
Leonard further testified that the next day Ponticelli told him  
that the Grandinettis had been harassing him about money that he 
owed them and were not going to let him leave their house until they 
got their money.  The three left in a car.  Ponticelli directed the 
brothers around the back roads trying to sell their cocaine.  He then 
shot them both in the head.  After dropping the gun off at Leonard’s 
house, he had a flat tire so he left the bodies and took a cab home.  
Leonard eventually gave the police the murder weapon and a 
statement.  After the murder weapon was given to police and 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial transcript spells “Keese” as “Keesee.”   
 
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statements from Leonard and his roommate were taken, Ponticelli was 
arrested. 
 
There was also testimony that on the Sunday after the 
shootings, Ponticelli burned some clothes in Ronald Halsey’s back 
yard.  When asked why he was burning the clothes, Ponticelli told 
Halsey that he had shot two men whom he owed money for cocaine.  
He told Halsey that he shot both of the men in the back of the head 
and threw one of them in the back seat.  The other man was still 
moving so he hit him a couple of times in the head with the butt of the 
gun.  He parked the car when he had a flat tire and took several grams 
of cocaine and $900 in cash. 
After his arrest for the murders, Ponticelli discussed the 
murders with a cellmate, Dennis Freeman, who testified at trial.  
According to Freeman, Ponticelli asked him if he would help him 
dispose of some evidence and drew Freeman a map showing the 
location of the evidence.  The map had Keith Dotson’s name and 
telephone number on it.  Ponticelli told Freeman that he made several 
phone calls from the victims’ house to get them to believe that he was 
trying to sell cocaine for them.  He thought about killing the brothers 
at their home but there were other people there, so he asked the 
brothers to take him to Keith Dotson’s house to sell the cocaine.  After 
leaving Dotson’s house, they drove to a place where he killed them.  
Ponticelli told Freeman that he shot the driver first with two shots to 
the head and then shot the passenger once in the head.  One of the 
men was still alive.  Ponticelli then drove to Joey Leonard’s house, 
where he told Leonard and his roommate what he had done.  He gave 
Leonard the gun and discussed disposing of the bodies.  After he left 
Leonard’s house, he had a flat tire, so he abandoned the car.  He took 
a cab to Dotson’s house where he washed his clothes which he later 
burned.  Ponticelli told Freeman that he shot the brothers because he 
wanted to rob them of cocaine and money. 
Ponticelli was charged with two counts of first-degree murder 
and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon.  At the close of the 
state’s case-in-chief, a judgment of acquittal was entered as to the 
robbery charge.  The jury found Ponticelli guilty of both counts of 
first-degree murder and recommended that he be sentenced to death 
for each murder.2  The trial court sentenced Ponticelli to death in 
                                          
 
 
2.  The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three.  
 
 
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connection with both convictions.  The court found two aggravating 
factors applicable to both murders and a third factor applicable to the 
murder of Nick Grandinetti3 and two mitigating factors in connection 
with both murders.4  
 
Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 485-86 (original footnotes omitted).   
                                          
 
 
3.  The “committed for pecuniary gain” aggravator and the “cold, calculated, 
and premeditated” (CCP) aggravator were established for both murders.  The 
“heinous, atrocious and cruel” (HAC) aggravator was established for Nick 
Grandinetti’s murder only.  Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 486, nn. 1-2.   
 
 
4.  “In mitigation the court found that Ponticelli had no significant history of 
prior criminal activity, and that he was twenty years old at the time of the offense.”  
Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 486 n.3.  
 
 
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This Court denied Ponticelli’s claims on direct appeal.5  The United States 
Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992).  Ponticelli v. 
Florida, 506 U.S. 802 (1992).  Upon remand, this Court considered Ponticelli’s 
challenge to the constitutionality of the jury instructions on the heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel (HAC) and cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravators.  Though 
it was determined that the jury instruction regarding the HAC aggravator was 
“even less detailed than that found insufficient in Espinosa . . . [and] [t]he same 
                                          
 
5.  Ponticelli raised twelve claims on direct appeal.  Ten of the claims 
alleged the trial court erred in  (1) finding Ponticelli competent to stand trial; (2) 
denying Ponticelli’s motion to suppress statements made to investigators; (3) 
preventing Ponticelli from presenting the testimony of an expert in the field of 
behavioral psychology; (4) limiting the defense’s voir dire examination; (5) 
refusing to grant a mistrial after a state witness was allowed to testify regarding the 
potential danger he faced as a result of his testimony when the danger was never 
connected to Ponticelli; (6) admitting a photograph of the victim that was 
cumulative to other photographs and allowing extended publication of photographs 
to the jury; (7) permitting the State to elicit irrelevant and prejudicial testimony 
during the penalty phase; (8) finding the murder of Nick Grandinetti heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (9) finding the murders were committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP); and (11) improperly considering 
valid, unrebutted mitigating factors.  In addition, Ponticelli claimed that (10) the 
statutes authorizing the CCP and HAC aggravators are unconstitutionally vague 
and were applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner; and (12) Florida’s capital 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.  Ponticelli, 593 So 
2d at 487.  This Court found that claims (3), (4), and (6) merited no discussion.  It 
also determined that Ponticelli’s claims “regarding the constitutionality of the 
aggravating factors of [HAC] and [CCP]” and regarding the constitutionality of 
Florida’s death penalty statute had been previously rejected.  Id. at 487 n.4 
(citations omitted).    
  
 
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applies to the instruction on [CCP],” the claim was denied because Ponticelli’s 
defense counsel had not objected to these instructions at the time of trial, thereby 
waiving Ponticelli’s right to contest them.  Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154, 154-
55 (Fla. 1993).  The United States Supreme Court denied Ponticelli’s second 
petition for writ of certiorari.  Ponticelli v. Florida, 510 U.S. 935 (1993).     
  
The current appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Ponticelli’s fifth 
amended motion for postconviction relief.6  On September 23, 1998, the trial court 
held a Huff7 hearing and subsequently issued an order on November 3, 1998, 
denying thirty-two of the claims raised in Ponticelli’s motion for postconviction 
relief.  The November 3, 1998, order also granted an evidentiary hearing on the 
ineffective assistance and Brady8/ Giglio9 issues in the remaining nine claims.  
Beginning July 10, 2000, the trial court held a series of evidentiary hearings,10 and 
on November 1, 2001, the trial court issued an order denying most of Ponticelli’s 
claims.  On September 9, 2004, in response to an order from this Court granting 
the State’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction, the trial court issued a supplemental 
                                          
 
6.  Ponticelli’s initial motion for postconviction relief was filed on April 10, 
1995, and his fifth amended motion was filed on July 31, 1998.   
 
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
    
 
8.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
 
9.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
 
10.  The evidentiary hearings took place on the following dates:  July 10-14, 
2000; October 16-17, 2000; January 29-30, 2001; and May 24, 2001.   
 
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order denying Ponticelli’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the 
penalty phase.  Ponticelli now appeals both orders and petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
Ponticelli’s motion for postconviction relief and deny Ponticelli’s habeas petition.  
ANALYSIS  
I.   Appeal from Denial of 3.850 Motion for Postconviction Relief  
      A.  Brady and Giglio Claims  
 
 
 Ponticelli claims the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), in a number of ways throughout 
trial.  In particular, Ponticelli asserts that the State violated Brady by not disclosing  
(1) the prosecutor’s note following a telephone conversation with Dennis 
Freeman’s defense counsel that indicated the State would not make a deal with 
Freeman but would remember his cooperation with favor in future proceedings; (2) 
the prosecutor’s note following an interview with Timothy Keesee that allegedly 
indicated Keesee saw Ponticelli use cocaine at the Grandinettis’ trailer on the night 
of the homicides; and (3) evidence that a number of witnesses told the state 
investigator that Ponticelli attended a party the night before the homicides.11  
                                          
 
 
11.  Ponticelli’s brief on appeal approaches this issue broadly, arguing that 
the State withheld all the information it had regarding Ponticelli’s cocaine use on 
the night of the crimes.  The record conclusively refutes this broad allegation; 
therefore, we address only those specific allegations that are not conclusively 
refuted by the record.    
 
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Ponticelli also asserts that the State violated Giglio by presenting or failing to 
correct false or misleading testimony regarding (1) whether Freeman was promised 
a benefit in exchange for testifying in Ponticelli’s case; (2) whether Keesee saw 
Ponticelli use cocaine in the twenty-four hours prior to the murders; and (3) the 
date Ed Brown, Warren Brown, and Brian Burgess (i.e., the “West Virginia boys”) 
12 first met Ponticelli.  For the reasons explained below, we deny these claims.  
 
1.  Brady Claims  
In Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
prosecutor’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused “violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  A true Brady violation requires 
that the defendant establish the following three elements:  “(1) that the evidence at 
issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is 
impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.”  Johnson v. State, 
921 So. 2d 490, 507 (Fla. 2005).   To establish prejudice or materiality under 
Brady, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the jury verdict 
would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial.” 
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
12.  Ed Brown, Warren Brown, and Brian Burgess were referred to as the 
“West Virginia boys” because they resided in West Virginia.  On the weekend the 
homicides took place, they were visiting Keith Dotson in Florida.     
 
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Smith v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S159, S159 (Fla. Mar. 9, 2006) (citing Strickler 
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999)).  “In other words, the question is whether 
‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ”  Id. (quoting Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 290).  When reviewing these claims on appeal, we defer to the trial 
court’s findings of fact but determine de novo whether the facts are sufficient to 
establish each element.  Johnson, 921 So. 2d at 507.  In addition, we consider the 
evidence supporting these claims in light of the entire record.  Marshall v. State, 
854 So. 2d 1235, 1251 (Fla. 2003).  As explained below, Ponticelli has failed to 
establish a Brady violation in respect to any of these claims.    
a.  Alleged Deal with Dennis Freeman  
 
 
Ponticelli first claims that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose 
evidence of an alleged deal with Dennis Freeman.  This claim revolves around the 
State’s failure to disclose the prosecutor’s note following a telephone conversation 
with Freeman’s defense counsel.  The note states:   
Spoke with Fred Landt [Freeman’s defense counsel] regarding Dennis 
Freeman.  Told him I would make no firm offer prior to [Ponticelli’s] 
trial but assured him his cooperation would be remembered with favor 
before mitigating judge/Sturgis.  Will make no formal deal on the 
record prior to trial.   
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that she did not believe this note 
indicated that she had promised to reward Freeman for his cooperation in 
 
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Ponticelli’s case, nor did she know whether Freeman had received any favorable 
treatment.  Ponticelli’s defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he 
believed this note indicated the State had made an unspecified deal with Freeman.  
Even if one accepts defense counsel’s testimony as sufficient to establish the first 
two elements of Brady, Ponticelli’s claim still fails because Ponticelli has not 
established that the State’s failure to disclose this evidence resulted in prejudice.  
The evidence had only limited impeachment value and certainly does not rise to 
the level necessary to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
our confidence in the verdict.  See State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1116 (Fla. 
2002) (finding no showing of prejudice where impeachment value of undisclosed 
evidence would have been limited), cited in Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 170 
(Fla. 2004).  
Ponticelli alleges the suppressed evidence was prejudicial because it 
provided a basis for impeaching Freeman and would have led the jury to question 
both the truth of Freeman’s testimony and the State’s credibility.  We disagree.  
First, this evidence was merely cumulative to that presented at trial.  Cf. Guzman 
v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 508 (Fla. 2003) (finding no prejudice under Brady 
because “[i]n light of the significant impeachment evidence presented at trial, 
evidence of the State’s reward to [the witness] would have been merely 
cumulative”).  Freeman was significantly impeached on his motive for testifying 
 
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and his capacity for truthfulness––the very factors that, according to Ponticelli, 
make this evidence prejudicial.  During cross-examination, Freeman testified that 
he had previously worked undercover for the State, had frequently contacted the 
local sheriff’s department with incriminating information on his fellow prisoners, 
and had testified as a jailhouse informant on at least one occasion.  Freeman also 
testified that he had been less than honest about his history of cooperation with the 
State when he testified under oath at the pretrial deposition, that all of his twenty-
six prior felony convictions involved crimes of dishonesty, and that he had been 
continuously incarcerated since December 9, 1985.   
Given the significant amount of evidence impeaching Freeman’s credibility 
as well as the State’s credibility in calling him to testify, Ponticelli has not 
established that the State’s failure to disclose the prosecutor’s note before trial 
constitutes prejudice under Brady.  See Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1251 
(Fla. 2003) (finding no prejudice under Brady when “defense counsel thoroughly 
cross-examined [the witness] and, in doing so, elicited testimony concerning” the 
subject of the State’s alleged promise to the witness); but cf. Mordenti, 894 So. 2d 
at 171 (finding prejudice when the undisclosed evidence refuted a critical issue at 
trial and the witness impeached by the evidence was the only one who was able to 
testify to this issue).      
 
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Furthermore, even assuming this evidence had some additional impeachment 
value, we find no reasonable probability that it would have led the jury to doubt the 
incriminating portions of Freeman’s testimony.  Freeman’s testimony was 
incriminating to the extent the jury believed that Ponticelli had, in fact, confessed 
to the crimes.  This testimony was corroborated by a map Freeman provided to the 
State on which Dotson’s phone number was written in Ponticelli’s handwriting and 
by a number of other witnesses who testified at trial that Ponticelli announced his 
intent to murder the Grandinettis and later admitted that he had done so.  We find 
no reasonable probability that this evidence would have caused the jury to doubt 
Freeman’s testimony.  Therefore, we deny this claim.    
 
b.  Timothy Keesee’s Statements   
Ponticelli also alleges that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose 
evidence that Timothy Keesee had reported to the prosecutor and to the state 
investigator that he saw Ponticelli use cocaine at the Grandinettis’ trailer on the 
night of the homicides.  This claim is based upon the prosecutor’s note following 
an interview with Keesee in which Keesee described the events taking place when 
he arrived at the Grandinettis’ trailer on the night of the homicides.  The note 
stated:  
Owed them $300.  R and N wanted it.  Not physical.  No threats.  He 
was making calls to sell coke, collect money, doing cocaine.   
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that “ ‘R and N’ was Ralph and 
Nick [Grandinetti],” but she was not sure which of the five persons Keesee claimed 
were present at the Grandinettis’ trailer on the night of the homicides (i.e., Ralph 
Grandinetti, Nick Grandinetti, Keesee, Ponticelli, or Keesee’s brother) was “doing 
cocaine.”  Keesee also reported the same information to the state investigator, who 
included it in a December 1987 supplemental report.  This report was provided to 
the defense before trial.  It stated that Keesee left the Grandinettis’ trailer on the 
night of the homicides because of cocaine “usage” taking place there and because 
of a cocaine deal that was in process between Nick, Ralph, and a white male 
identified as Tony.   
In its November 1, 2002, order, the trial court determined that while the 
prosecutor’s note may have provided additional information of Keesee’s 
knowledge of Ponticelli’s drug use prior to the murders, it was neither exculpatory 
nor material.  The trial court held that “[t]here is no way of knowing whether Trial 
Counsel would have gathered from [the note] that Defendant was using cocaine at 
the trailer on the night of the murders,” and given the “overwhelming” evidence of 
Ponticelli’s guilt, “no reasonable probability exists that the evidence regarding 
drug usage found in . . . [the] Prosecutor[’s] interview notes would have changed 
the outcome of the guilt or penalty phase of [Ponticelli’s] trial.”   
 
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We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.  The note does not clearly 
indicate that Ponticelli was the person Keesee witnessed using cocaine on the night 
of the murders.  Furthermore, even if defense counsel could have surmised from 
this note that Keesee told the prosecutor he saw Ponticelli using cocaine, we find 
no “reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have produced a 
different verdict.”  Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 
n.20).  Defense counsel knew Keesee was an important witness in regard to this 
claim; counsel extensively questioned Keesee on this issue at trial; and counsel had 
the opportunity to confront Keesee with at least one document from the State that 
contained substantially the same information as the prosecutor’s note.  We find no 
reasonable probability that confronting Keesee with this note would have led 
Keesee to change his trial testimony; therefore, our confidence in the outcome is 
not undermined and we deny this claim.     
c.  Statements Regarding the Cocaine Party   
Third, Ponticelli alleges that the State suppressed a number of pieces of 
evidence regarding the cocaine party that began the night before the homicides.13  
This allegation involves: (1) the state investigator’s field notes following an 
                                          
 
 
13. Ponticelli approaches this issue as if the State suppressed all evidence 
regarding the cocaine party.  This is not the case.  The most convincing evidence 
regarding the cocaine party came from Ed Brown’s and Burgess’s testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing, and both men testified that they had not told the State about 
the cocaine party.     
 
 
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interview with Timothy Letson in which Letson indicated that he had seen 
Ponticelli smoke cocaine in a manner consistent with that testified to by Burgess 
and Ed Brown at the evidentiary hearing;14 (2) statements John Turner allegedly 
made to the state investigator indicating that he and Ponticelli used cocaine with 
the West Virginia boys the night before the homicides; and (3) Freeman’s 
statements to the state investigator that Ponticelli had told Freeman he used 
cocaine with the West Virginia boys the night before the homicides.  We agree 
with the trial court that Ponticelli has failed to establish a Brady violation in regard 
to any of these allegations.   
The trial court addressed the investigator’s field notes following his 
interview with Letson in the same way it addressed the prosecutor’s interview 
notes following her interview with Keesee.  The trial court found that these notes 
did not clearly indicate the information Ponticelli now alleges and that, even if they 
did, Ponticelli has not established that the suppression resulted in prejudice.  We 
agree.  The state investigator’s field notes indicate that Letson saw Ponticelli use 
                                          
 
 
14.  The investigator’s field notes following Letson’s interview read: “Went 
to someone’s house to drop off girl.  Both Tony and John are there.  They are 
smoking coke out of an orange juice container.”  The testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing did not reveal the date on which Letson witnessed this.  Letson did not 
testify at the evidentiary hearing.   
 
 
 
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cocaine but do not indicate the date on which Letson witnessed the cocaine use.  
The fact that Ponticelli used cocaine was well accepted at trial.  In fact, Turner 
testified at trial that he was with Ponticelli all day, every day for three or four 
weeks immediately preceding the homicides and that Ponticelli smoked “a bunch” 
of cocaine “all day long.”  There is no indication that the field notes would have 
indicated to defense counsel, much less that the State knew they would have 
indicated to defense counsel, that Letson saw Ponticelli use cocaine within the 
twenty-four hours preceding the homicides.  Indeed, the evidence tying these notes 
to Ponticelli’s cocaine use at the time of the crimes was Ed Brown’s testimony, and 
at the evidentiary hearing, Brown denied telling the State about the cocaine party.  
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.   
In regard to Turner’s alleged statement to the state investigator, the 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicated that Turner testified about the 
cocaine party in his deposition taken by defense counsel.  “A defendant cannot 
show a Brady violation has occurred if the defendant knew of the existence of the 
evidence or in fact had the evidence.”  Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 406 (Fla. 
2005) (quoting trial court’s order).   
Finally, Ponticelli claims the State violated Brady by not disclosing a 
statement Freeman allegedly made to the state investigator indicating that 
Ponticelli told Freeman he was with the West Virginia boys on the night before the 
 
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homicides.  Even if this allegation is true, we find no reasonable probability that 
this statement was material.  Ponticelli refused to answer defense counsel’s 
inquiries regarding Ponticelli’s cocaine use at the time of the crimes.  Moreover, at 
trial, all three of the West Virginia boys contradicted this statement in their sworn 
testimony.   
We find no reasonable probability that cross-examining Freeman about an 
incident which he did not witness, but which was allegedly told to him by a 
defendant who refused to speak about this with his counsel, would have caused the 
jury to doubt the sworn testimony of three impartial witnesses at trial.  Our 
confidence in the outcome is not undermined.  Therefore, we deny Ponticelli’s 
Brady claims.   
2.  Giglio Claims 
In Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54, the United States Supreme Court extended 
Brady to claims where a key state witness gives false testimony that was material 
to the trial.  To establish a Giglio claim, it must be shown that (1) the testimony 
given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the 
statement was material.  Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 426 (Fla. 2005).  The third 
element of Giglio differs from the prejudice or materiality prong of Brady in that 
“once a defendant has established that the prosecutor knowingly presented false 
testimony at trial, the State bears the burden to show that the false evidence was 
 
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not material.”  Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 507.  This requires the State to prove that the 
presentation of false testimony was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 
506, or in other words, that “there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the conviction.”  State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 
1986), cited in Guzman v. State, No. SC04-2016 slip op. at 8 (Fla. Jun. 29, 2006).  
When reviewing these claims on appeal, we apply a mixed standard of review, 
deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact but determining de novo whether the 
facts are sufficient to establish the elements required in each claim.  Suggs, 923 So. 
2d at 426.   
Ponticelli asserts that the State violated Giglio by presenting or failing to 
correct false or misleading testimony regarding (1) whether Freeman received any 
benefit from testifying in Ponticelli’s case; (2) whether Keesee saw Ponticelli use 
cocaine in the twenty-four hours prior to the murders; and (3) the date the West 
Virginia boys first met Ponticelli.  As explained below, we deny each of these 
claims. 
a.  Benefit to Freeman     
Ponticelli first alleges that the State violated Giglio by allowing Freeman to 
testify that he did not expect to receive any benefit or special treatment in regard to 
his testimony, despite the fact that the prosecutor’s note from her telephone 
conversation with Freeman’s defense counsel stated otherwise.  This claim is 
 
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without merit.  As we discussed earlier in regard to Ponticelli’s Brady claim, even 
if we accept Ponticelli’s allegation that the prosecutor’s note indicates that 
Freeman was not honest when he testified that he did not expect to receive a 
benefit from cooperating in Ponticelli’s case, we find no prejudice.  While we 
recognize that the materiality prong in Giglio is more “defense friendly” than that 
of Brady, we find the State has met its burden of showing that this portion of 
Freeman’s testimony, even if not entirely true, was “harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506.  As explained above, Freeman was 
significantly impeached on his capacity for truthfulness and his incentive for 
testifying against Ponticelli.  Therefore, informing the jury that Freeman might be 
testifying falsely because of his hope for an unguaranteed, unspecified award 
would not have rendered him “sufficiently less credible in the jury’s eyes” to 
establish a reasonable possibility that this contributed to the verdict.  Therefore, we 
deny this claim.  Cf. Marshall, 854 So. 2d at 1252 (denying Giglio claim based on 
the State’s alleged promise to a witness because “even assuming that the alleged 
promise was made,” defense counsel impeached the witness regarding the subject 
of the promise, and the witness was not “the sole witness to testify in regard to the 
events surrounding the murder”).       
b.  Keesee’s Testimony Regarding Ponticelli’s Cocaine Use   
 
- 20 -
Ponticelli’s second Giglio claim alleges that the State knowingly permitted 
Timothy Keesee to testify at trial that he did not see Ponticelli use drugs on the 
night of the homicides.   This claim is also without merit.  At trial, Keesee testified 
that when he and his brother arrived at the Grandinettis’ trailer on the night of the 
homicides, he saw Ponticelli there discussing money Ponticelli owed the 
Grandinettis for prior cocaine purchases.  Keesee testified that he saw cocaine 
sitting on the table in the trailer, but he did not see anyone using it.15  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Keesee testified that this testimony was false, that he had seen 
Ponticelli use cocaine at the Grandinettis’ trailer, and he certainly told the state 
investigator this, if not the prosecutor as well.16  Keesee attributed his false 
testimony to the facts that (1) he was under the influence of cocaine at the time of 
his deposition and trial,17 and (2) he wanted to “get out of the spotlight” in regard 
                                          
 
 
15.  On cross-examination, Keesee testified that he had seen Ponticelli use 
cocaine at the Grandinettis’ trailer on a number of prior occasions.  
 
 
16.  At the evidentiary hearing, Keesee testified that when the state 
investigator questioned him the day after the murders, he told the investigator that 
he left the Grandinettis’ trailer on November 27, 1987, because the cocaine usage 
there made him uncomfortable since he was with his brother who was in the Navy.  
In regard to Keesee’s statements to the prosecutor, Keesee testified that he believed 
the prosecutor asked him, “Did you all do some cocaine [on the night of the 
crimes]?,” and he responded, “Yes.  We did; one line.”   
 
 
17.  At the evidentiary hearing, Keesee testified that he used a couple of 
lines of cocaine before coming to the courthouse and used another line or two at 
the courthouse an hour before he testified.      
 
 
- 21 -
to his own drug use and criminal charges.18  In addition to the prosecutor’s 
interview notes and state investigator’s report, which are described earlier in regard 
to Ponticelli’s Brady claim, Ponticelli also alleges that a note the prosecutor jotted 
on Keesee’s deposition testimony supports his Giglio claim.  Next to Keesee’s 
statement that he “[d]idn’t see them do cocaine.  Didn’t tell anyone they did 
cocaine,” the prosecutor had underlined “didn’t tell anyone” and wrote in the 
margin “Told BM.19  Taped.”  
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that she could not 
determine what the note in the margin meant.  She testified:   
I don’t know if [the note] meant that I thought it was 
inconsistent with something [the state investigator] had, a tape [the 
state investigator] had made, or that if it was something inconsistent 
with something [the state investigator] had taped. 
 
 
. . . .   
I’m not sure if it was something that was a big dispute between 
[defense counsel] and I wanted to make a note that I thought that 
[Keesee] had said the same things somewhere else, he told [the state 
                                          
 
 
18.  At the evidentiary hearing, Keesee testified that when the state 
investigator interviewed Keesee the day after the homicides, the investigator 
searched Keesee’s car and found drug paraphernalia.  Keesee testified that he 
interpreted the investigator’s failure to seize this paraphernalia as evidence the 
State would reward him for cooperating in Ponticelli’s case.  Keesee was also 
facing charges at the time Ponticelli’s case was investigated.  One month before his 
deposition, he was charged with possession of drugs, and he was in custody for this 
when he testified before the grand jury in Ponticelli’s case.   At the evidentiary 
hearing, the trial judge asked Keesee what sentence he had actually received and 
whether he had any prior convictions.  After Keesee answered these questions, the 
judge stated that he thought Keesee’s sentence was harsher than most. 
 
 
19.  “BM” is the state investigator’s initials.   
 
- 22 -
investigator] the same thing and it was a tape, or, like you’re saying, 
that it’s inconsistent with something that he had told [the state 
investigator] that was taped.  So, I don’t know.  
. . . .  
Oftentimes I’ll put a question mark next to it too [to indicate 
that a witness may have made an inconsistent statement] and there’s 
not a question mark.  
Ponticelli’s defense counsel disagreed with the prosecutor’s interpretation of this 
note.  He testified that he believed this note indicated that the prosecutor 
acknowledged that Keesee told the state investigator that Keesee saw Ponticelli use  
cocaine and that the prosecutor wanted to know if Keesee’s statement was in a 
form that was available to the defense. 
The trial court denied this claim because it found no evidence that the State 
“either knowingly presented, or allowed to be presented, perjured testimony at 
trial.”  It recognized that Keesee testified adamantly at deposition and at trial that 
he did not see Ponticelli use cocaine on the day of the crimes, and that 
“[r]eferences to drug use found in [the state investigator’s] and [the] Prosecutor[’s] 
notes are vague . . . It is understandable that [the prosecutor] and [the state 
investigator] could have overlooked vague statements in their notes when faced 
with this testimony.”  These findings are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  The prosecutor’s notation on Keesee’s deposition testimony does not 
clearly indicate that the prosecutor knew Keesee was testifying falsely.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, defense counsel and the prosecutor gave conflicting 
 
- 23 -
interpretations of this evidence.  We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact in 
regard to the resolution of conflicting testimony presented at the evidentiary 
hearing.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d  766, 785 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing that 
the trial court must resolve conflicting testimony presented at the evidentiary 
hearing by assigning weight to each witness’s testimony).  Therefore, we affirm 
the trial court’s denial of this claim.  
c.  Burgess’s and Brown’s False Testimony        
Ponticelli’s third and final Giglio claim alleges that the State violated Giglio 
by allowing Brian Burgess and Edward Brown to testify falsely at trial about the 
date they first met Ponticelli and whether they had ever seen Ponticelli use 
cocaine.20  Burgess testified that his trial testimony was not completely accurate 
regarding the date he first met Ponticelli.  At trial, Burgess testified that he first 
met Ponticelli around six or seven o’clock on the night the homicides occurred 
when Ponticelli appeared at Dotson’s home and announced his intent to kill the 
Grandinettis.21  At the evidentiary hearing, Burgess testified that he actually met 
                                          
 
 
20.  Ponticelli also claims Warren Brown and Keith Dotson testified falsely 
as well.  Neither man testified at the evidentiary hearing, and Ponticelli has 
provided no evidence to support these allegations.  Therefore, we deny this claim 
without further discussion.   
 
 
21.  There was a question whether Burgess’s testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing was actually inconsistent with his testimony at trial.  Burgess testified at 
trial that he met Ponticelli on Friday at six or seven, and testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing revealed that the Thursday night cocaine party extended into 
 
- 24 -
Ponticelli at a cocaine party at Dotson’s house that began Thursday night and 
continued into the early morning hours on Friday, the day the homicides occurred.  
Burgess testified that he, Brown, Ponticelli, and Turner left the party to purchase 
an “eight-ball” of cocaine from the Grandinettis’ trailer, and when they returned, 
they all smoked some of it.  Brown testified to very similar facts.   He also 
acknowledged that, contrary to his trial testimony, the first time Ponticelli appeared 
at Dotson’s was not after six or seven on Friday evening, but sometime Thursday 
night or early Friday morning at a party at Dotson’s house.  During this time, 
Brown, Burgess, Turner, and Ponticelli drove to the Grandinettis’ trailer to 
purchase cocaine.   
Brown testified at the evidentiary hearing that on the way back from the 
trailer, they stopped to purchase an orange juice container, which either Turner or 
Ponticelli fashioned into a pipe to cook the cocaine in the car.  This contradicted 
Brown’s trial testimony in which he stated that he had never used cocaine with 
Ponticelli.   
Neither Brown nor Burgess testified that the State told him not to testify 
regarding Ponticelli’s cocaine use, and Burgess testified that the rest of his trial 
testimony was truthful.   
                                                                                                                                        
the early morning hours on Friday.  At the evidentiary hearing, Burgess testified 
that he could not remember if, in his trial testimony, he was referring to “a.m.” or 
“p.m.”   
 
- 25 -
The trial court denied this claim because it found no evidence that the State 
knew these witnesses testified falsely.  In its November 1, 2002, order, the trial 
court stated:  
This Court does not find that the Prosecution either knowingly 
presented, or allowed to be presented, perjured testimony at trial. . . . 
Keesee, Brown and Burgess were adamant at deposition and at trial 
that they did not use drugs with the Defendant.  Brown and Burgess 
were adamant at deposition and at trial that they did not meet 
Defendant until the evening of November 27, 1987, and that they did 
not use drugs with Defendant.    
This finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  As explained above, 
there was no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing that the State knew that 
Burgess or Brown testified falsely; in fact, Burgess and Brown testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that they never told the State they saw Ponticelli use cocaine 
the night before the crimes because they did not know this was an issue in 
Ponticelli’s case.  Furthermore, each of the West Virginia boys presented 
consistent testimony at trial.  Ponticelli has not established the second prong of 
Giglio in respect to this claim.  See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1269-70 
(Fla. 2005) (finding summary denial of Giglio claim appropriate, in part, because 
the witness’s testimony was consistent with other witnesses who testified at trial).  
For the reasons explained above, we deny each of Ponticelli’s Brady and Giglio 
claims.   
 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
 
- 26 -
Ponticelli claims that defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty 
phase because he failed to conduct an adequate investigation, failed to provide the 
mental health expert with crucial information regarding Ponticelli’s background, 
and inadequately presented the mitigating evidence available during the penalty 
phase.  Our analysis begins with the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing 
to support this claim.  Next, we provide the standard of review and applicable law 
that is applied to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase.  Finally, we apply this law to Ponticelli’s allegations.  For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.   
1.  Relevant Testimony Presented at the Evidentiary Hearing  
At the evidentiary hearing, Ponticelli’s defense counsel, as well as numerous 
lay witnesses and four mental health experts, testified regarding defense counsel’s 
penalty phase preparation and the potential mitigation evidence available.  
Defense counsel testified that Ponticelli’s trial was his first capital trial, that 
he did not know how to conduct a penalty phase, that his only assistance came 
from a former deputy who was familiar with Freeman, and that the majority (80-
85%) of his preparation was devoted to the guilt phase.  His penalty phase 
investigation consisted largely of talking with Ponticelli’s parents and asking them 
for names of persons who knew Ponticelli as a child in New York.  Ponticelli’s 
parents provided him with the names of some of Ponticelli’s teachers, prior 
 
- 27 -
employers, and family members, but it does not appear that counsel contacted any 
of them.  Counsel did not attempt to gather Ponticelli’s school or medical records, 
and he testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had only a partial view of 
Ponticelli’s drug use and background at the time of trial.   
During the penalty phase, defense counsel called one witness, Dr. Robin 
Mills.  Dr. Mills was one of the three court-appointed mental health experts who 
evaluated Ponticelli before trial and testified at the August 2, 1988, competency 
hearing.   Mills was the only mental health expert who testified that Ponticelli was 
not competent to stand trial.  At the penalty phase, Dr. Mills testified that he had 
twenty-five years’ experience as a psychiatrist, much of which involved studying 
and treating patients addicted to cocaine and other mind-altering substances, and 
that he had presented expert testimony on this subject many times.  Based on a 
hypothetical that defense counsel produced from the trial and deposition 
transcripts, Dr. Mills testified that both statutory mental health mitigators were 
present.  He also testified that the personality change Ponticelli reportedly 
underwent when he was using cocaine was consistent with extreme cocaine 
addiction and warranted both statutory mental health mitigators.  During defense 
counsel’s penalty phase closing arguments, counsel connected Dr. Mills’ testimony 
to the testimony the jury had heard less than two weeks earlier at the guilt phase.  
Ultimately, when imposing its sentence, the trial court did not find either statutory 
 
- 28 -
mental health mitigator because it found that, given the lack of evidence supporting 
Ponticelli’s cocaine use within twenty-four hours of the crime, Mills’ testimony 
was speculative.      
In addition, a number of lay witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing to 
Ponticelli’s positive characteristics and the severe, adverse effect cocaine had on 
him.  Family and friends described Ponticelli as a loving, docile child who had a 
difficult time fitting in during adolescence and whose personality changed during 
high school when he became involved in significant cocaine use.  Approximately 
three years before the homicides, Ponticelli moved to Florida with his parents, and 
friends testified that he did not abuse cocaine at this time.  Three or four weeks 
before the homicides, Ponticelli’s cocaine use began again after he attended a 
cousin’s wedding in New York.  A cousin who attended this wedding described the 
cocaine use there as a binge, and friends who knew Ponticelli both before and after 
this visit testified that he changed from a calm, easy-going person with productive 
hobbies and steady employment to a paranoid person who did little else but use 
cocaine.   
A number of witnesses testified that when on cocaine, Ponticelli frequently 
displayed episodes of extreme, irrational paranoia.  A number of witnesses also 
testified that they saw Ponticelli acting paranoid around the time of the homicides.    
 
- 29 -
In addition to these lay witnesses, four clinical mental health experts 
testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Three of them testified on Ponticelli’s behalf.  
One of these, Dr. Harry Krop, was also one of the court-appointed mental health 
experts who evaluated Ponticelli in preparation for the August 2, 1988, 
competency hearing.  At the competency hearing, Krop testified that he believed 
Ponticelli was competent.  More than twelve years later, at the evidentiary hearing, 
Krop testified that this evaluation enabled him to testify that both statutory mental 
health mitigators applied in Ponticelli’s case.  Krop testified that the report he 
issued following this first evaluation indicated that Ponticelli was voluntarily 
intoxicated at the time of the homicides, but Krop never spoke with defense 
counsel about this.   
In preparation for the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Krop evaluated Ponticelli a 
second time.  He then testified at the evidentiary hearing that both statutory mental 
health mitigators applied in Ponticelli’s case.  Ponticelli’s two other mental health 
experts agreed.  Dr. Barry Crown testified that neurological tests he conducted on 
Ponticelli in 1995 (seven years after trial) showed evidence of brain damage, 
primarily in the parts of the brain that control executive functions.22  Crown neither 
interviewed witnesses nor considered Ponticelli’s behavior at trial or around the 
                                          
 
22.  
Crown described “executive functions” as the ability to problem-
solve, concentrate, and comprehend the long-term consequences of one’s behavior.   
 
 
- 30 -
time of the homicides, and he also acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that 
this behavior exhibited significant mental functioning.  Dr. Michael Herkov also 
testified at the evidentiary hearing on Ponticelli’s behalf.  Based on a September 
1999 evaluation, Herkov testified that it was likely Ponticelli suffered brain 
damage at birth and that his significant cocaine use qualified him for both statutory 
mental health mitigators.  Herkov also testified to the effects of cocaine, the fact 
that cocaine dissipates quickly, and that Ponticelli exhibited signs of severe 
cocaine addiction at the time of the crimes.   
In rebuttal, the State presented a mental health expert, Dr. Wayne Conger, at 
the evidentiary hearing.  Conger evaluated Ponticelli in July 2000 and testified that 
while he could not deny the fact that Ponticelli’s brain may have been damaged by 
his cocaine use, he did not believe the damage was extensive enough to find 
incompetence or insanity.  Conger also testified that Ponticelli was a normal 
functioning individual, both intellectually and cognitively.  The facts surrounding 
the crimes demonstrated significant, goal-oriented behavior that was inconsistent 
with significant cognitive dysfunction and with the allegation that Ponticelli’s 
cocaine use prevented him from reasoning effectively.  Conger conducted many of 
the same tests as Crown and testified that the differences between his results and 
Crown’s indicated that Ponticelli malingered when taking the tests.  Even if he 
were to assume that Crown’s tests were accurate, Conger testified that he did not 
 
- 31 -
believe the results supported Crown’s hypothesis because the results revealed that 
Ponticelli had an antisocial personality disorder and a pattern of not complying 
with the law—not a significant cognitive dysfunction.  He did not believe either 
statutory mental health mitigator was present.       
In addition to the clinical mental health experts, Ponticelli presented Dr. 
Marc Branch, a professor at the University of Florida who studies the effects of 
cocaine through animal research.   Defense counsel had contacted Branch in 1988. 
In fact, counsel proffered Branch’s testimony at trial, but the trial court ultimately 
excluded Branch’s testimony because of the lack of evidence supporting 
Ponticelli’s cocaine use at the time of the homicides.  At the evidentiary hearing, 
Branch testified that even though he was not qualified to diagnose Ponticelli as 
having a cocaine psychosis, the lay witness testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
revealed that Ponticelli had demonstrated the “lynchpin” evidence of it.23  Branch 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that in 1988 he would have been able to testify 
that Ponticelli was likely under a cocaine psychosis when he committed the 
homicides.  Post-1988 research has enabled Branch to testify to this with almost 
complete certainty.   
2.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law  
                                          
 
 
23.  For example, Branch pointed to the testimony of John Como, 
Ponticelli’s cousin, whose testimony at the evidentiary hearing described an 
incident in which Ponticelli had acted extremely paranoid after using cocaine.  
 
- 32 -
Ponticelli alleges his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the 
penalty phase of his trial because defense counsel failed to adequately investigate 
the penalty phase and also made a number of errors in its presentation.  “In order to 
prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused prejudice.”  
Suggs, 923 So. 2d at 429 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984)).  Deficiency requires a showing that “counsel’s representation ‘fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 
(2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688), and prejudice in regard to the penalty 
phase requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 
771 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).  “A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694.  Failure to establish either deficiency or prejudice results in the denial 
of the claim.  Ferrell v. State, 918 So. 2d 163, 172-73 (Fla. 2005).  Because the 
trial court denied these claims after an evidentiary hearing, this Court “review[s] 
the deficiency and prejudice prongs as ‘mixed questions of law and fact subject to 
a de novo review standard but . . . the trial court’s factual findings are to be given 
deference.’ ”  Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 32 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Sochor, 
 
- 33 -
883 So. 2d at 781).  Applying this standard to the case at hand, we deny these 
claims.   
3.  Analysis   
In its September 9, 2004, order, the trial court denied this ineffectiveness 
claim.  Regarding the lay witness testimony, the trial court found that Ponticelli 
“did not establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to offer [this] 
testimony.”  The court recognized that much of this testimony was cumulative to 
that presented at trial since “counsel incorporated the witnesses from the guilt 
phase into consideration in the penalty phase.”  Furthermore, to the extent the 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing differed from testimony at trial, it would have 
had a negative effect on Ponticelli’s case.  As the trial court explained:  
Instead of being a young man who naively experimented with drugs 
for a short period of time, the lay witnesses presented at the 
evidentiary hearing portray the Defendant as a man who escaped the 
ill effects of drugs for a substantial period of time in Florida and then 
returned to a habit he knew was evil. 
The trial court found that Ponticelli had not established that evidence available to 
counsel at the time of trial demonstrated Ponticelli had used cocaine at the time of 
the crime.  Furthermore, regarding the mental health expert testimony, the trial 
court summarized the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and found Dr. 
Conger’s testimony to be the most credible.  These findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence; therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this 
 
- 34 -
claim.  While we find that defense counsel’s investigation into mitigating evidence 
was inadequate and constituted deficient performance, Ponticelli has not 
established that this deficiency prejudiced him.    
a.  Deficient Performance   
 
Ponticelli has established that counsel’s penalty phase investigation and 
presentation were deficient.  “An attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable 
investigation for possible mitigating evidence.”  Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 
618 (Fla. 2003).  In determining whether counsel’s investigation was reasonable, a 
court must consider “not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, 
but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to 
investigate further.”  Ferrell, 918 So. 2d at 170 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527).    
Counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing and our review of the record 
reveal that counsel’s penalty phase investigation consisted of interviewing 
Ponticelli’s parents and asking Dr. Mills to testify.  Counsel apparently failed to 
contact the persons suggested by Ponticelli’s parents, made no effort to obtain any 
of Ponticelli’s school or medical records, and did not request that Dr. Mills 
evaluate Ponticelli again before testifying at the penalty phase.  While we 
recognize that a mental health evaluation is not required in every case, the record 
shows that Dr. Mills’ penalty phase testimony was based on the fifteen-minute 
evaluation he conducted on Ponticelli before the competency hearing and his 
 
- 35 -
review of the record.24   Cf. Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 34-35 (“A competency and 
sanity evaluation as superficial as the one [the mental health expert] performed . . . 
obviously cannot serve as a reliable substitute for a thorough mitigation 
evaluation.”); see also Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 772 (finding counsel deficient when 
counsel introduced the reports of three mental health experts who testified during 
the guilt phase but did not “specifically instruct [the experts] to examine and 
evaluate [the defendant] for the purpose of establishing mitigating evidence”).    
Counsel’s stated reason for not investigating this potential mitigation was 
that he did not know how to conduct a penalty phase.  Inexperience is not an 
excuse for deficient performance.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 573 (Fla. 
1996) (finding counsel deficient despite the fact that counsel’s poor handling of the 
case was due, in part, to his inexperience).  Furthermore, counsel’s failure to 
investigate cannot be justified simply because Ponticelli refused to cooperate.  
While we recognize that Ponticelli willfully chose not to speak with defense 
counsel, there is no indication that he asked counsel not to pursue an area of 
mitigation or otherwise precluded a proper investigation.  Cf.  State v. Riechmann, 
                                          
 
 
24.  The record also reveals that Dr. Mills’ competency evaluation lasted 
only fifteen minutes because Ponticelli refused to speak with him.  We do not find 
that Dr. Mills’ competency evaluation was inadequate, only that counsel should not 
have considered it “a reliable substitute for a thorough mitigation evaluation.”  
Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 34; cf. Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 922-23 (Fla. 2001) 
(recognizing that a defendant’s failure to speak with the mental health expert 
whom defense counsel sent to evaluate him was a significant factor in leading the 
court to deny an ineffectiveness claim).   
 
- 36 -
777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000) (finding counsel deficient for not investigating 
potential mitigation, in part, because although some of the defendant’s statements 
indicated he did not want counsel to pursue this line of mitigation, the defendant 
did “not instruct [counsel] or preclude him from investigating further or presenting 
mitigating evidence”).  Moreover, counsel’s decision to present positive character 
evidence during the guilt phase does not free him from the strict duty to conduct a 
reasonable investigation into the penalty phase of trial.  See Ragsdale v. State, 798 
So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 2001) (citing Reichmann, 777 So. 2d at 350, for the 
proposition that “[a]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable 
investigation of a defendant’s background for possible mitigating evidence”); see 
also Lewis, 838 So. 2d at 1113 (recognizing that “the obligation to investigate and 
prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated”).  Defense 
counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation resulted in a deficient 
penalty phase presentation.  He presented only one witness at the penalty phase 
and asked this witness to base his testimony on a hypothetical that was not entirely 
accurate.25  We agree with Ponticelli that counsel’s penalty phase investigation and 
presentation were deficient.     
                                          
 
 
25.  Ponticelli asked Dr. Mills to assume that Ponticelli had no history of 
cocaine abuse until Ponticelli returned from his visit to New York in October 1987.  
The unrefuted testimony at the evidentiary hearing revealed that Ponticelli was 
heavily abusing cocaine by the age of sixteen.   
 
 
- 37 -
b.  Prejudice   
 
Even though Ponticelli has established that defense counsel’s penalty phase 
performance was deficient, he has not established that this deficiency prejudiced 
him.  As in Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 35, Ponticelli has failed to present the “fairly 
strong evidence” of mitigation that would be required to overcome the significant 
aggravators and the overwhelming amount of evidence convicting Ponticelli of 
these homicides.  A number of witnesses testified at trial that Ponticelli first 
announced his plan to kill the Grandinettis; then, after following through on this 
plan, confessed that he did it and asked for help in covering it up.  Furthermore, 
two of the three aggravating factors found for Nick Grandinetti’s death, i.e., HAC 
and CCP, have been recognized as “two of the most serious aggravators set out in 
the statutory sentencing scheme.”  Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).26   
The lay witness testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing is certainly 
not sufficient to establish mitigators that outweigh these aggravators.  As the trial 
court recognized, the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was largely 
cumulative to that presented at trial and to which defense counsel referred in his 
closing statement during the penalty phase.  During the guilt phase, the jury heard 
a number of witnesses testify to Ponticelli’s positive character and the effect of 
                                          
 
 
26.  The CCP aggravator was established for Ralph Grandinetti’s murder 
alone, and the “committed for pecuniary gain” aggravator was established for both 
murders.   
 
- 38 -
cocaine on his life.  Ponticelli’s father testified that Ponticelli worked a part-time 
job during high school and was a “good kid.”  John Turner, Ponticelli’s close 
friend, testified that he was with Ponticelli every day after Ponticelli returned from 
his visit to New York and that Ponticelli used cocaine almost constantly during this 
time.  Turner and Ponticelli’s father also testified to Ponticelli’s paranoid behavior 
when he was under the effects of cocaine, and Brian Burgess testified at trial that 
Ponticelli was acting nervous on the night he appeared at Dotson’s.  At the penalty 
phase, which occurred nine days after the guilt phase ended, defense counsel 
specifically connected the testimony regarding Ponticelli’s paranoid behavior to his 
cocaine use.  Counsel led Dr. Mills to testify that this paranoia was indicative of 
the mental health mitigators.  On numerous occasions, this Court has denied 
ineffectiveness claims when the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was 
merely cumulative to that presented at trial.  See, e.g., Holland v. State, 916 So. 2d 
750, 757 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1790 (2006).27  This is true even 
when the mitigating evidence is presented during the guilt phase.  See Gorby v. 
State, 819 So. 2d 664, 675 (Fla. 2002) (denying ineffectiveness claim based on 
counsel’s failure to provide a witness to testify at the penalty phase when the 
                                          
 
 
27.  The only relevant piece of the lay witness testimony presented at the 
evidentiary hearing, but not at trial, was Ponticelli’s cocaine use as an adolescent. 
Given the fact that Dr. Mills had no difficulty testifying to the mental health 
mitigation without it, we find no reasonable probability that this additional 
evidence would have led the trial court to establish either mitigator or find that 
these mitigators outweighed the weighty aggravators in this case.        
 
- 39 -
witness’s testimony was largely cumulative to the testimony of a mental health 
expert presented during the guilt phase).  Therefore, Ponticelli has failed to 
establish that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase 
proceeding would have been different if defense counsel had conducted a 
reasonable investigation into the lay witness testimony.  See Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 
774 (deferring to the trial court’s factual finding that even if defense counsel had 
adequately investigated the penalty phase, he would not have been able to present 
evidence substantially different than that presented at the penalty phase).   
Ponticelli has also failed to establish prejudice in regard to the mental health 
testimony.  “In assessing prejudice, ‘it is important to focus on the nature of the 
mental health mitigation’ now presented.”  Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998)).  First, neither 
Dr. Crown’s nor Dr. Herkov’s testimony was sufficient to establish mental health 
mitigation which would, in all reasonable probability, have outweighed the 
significant aggravators in this case.  Neither testified that Ponticelli suffered from a 
major mental illness or was mentally retarded.28  See Suggs, 923 So. 2d at 435 
(finding defendant was not prejudiced by failure to obtain an additional 
psychological evaluation in preparation for the penalty phase when postconviction 
                                          
 
 
28.  Dr. Poettner, who evaluated Ponticelli in preparation for the evidentiary 
hearing, determined Ponticelli’s verbal IQ was 102.  This was not refuted at the 
evidentiary hearing.    
 
- 40 -
expert found defendant suffered from a significant neurological impairment in the 
executive functions of the brain but had an “average IQ [of 102]” and “did not 
suffer from any major psychiatric disorder”).  Furthermore, Herkov’s and Crown’s 
testimony that Ponticelli’s brain damage rose to the extent necessary to establish 
the mitigators was based on findings that were directly contradicted by Dr. Krop 
and Dr. Conger.  After weighing all the expert testimony, the trial court found Dr. 
Conger’s testimony most credible, and we defer to the trial court’s finding of fact 
when faced with conflicting expert testimony.  See Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 783.   
Second, our finding that Ponticelli has not established that counsel’s 
deficient investigation prejudiced him is supported by the fact that the mental 
health expert testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing is largely cumulative 
to Dr. Mills’ testimony presented at the penalty phase.  See Walls v. State, 926 So. 
2d 1157, 1170 (Fla. 2006) (denying claim that defense counsel was ineffective for 
not presenting an expert to testify to the effect of Ritalin on the defendant’s 
behavior and for not presenting a pharmacologist to testify to the effects of drug 
and alcohol abuse because this testimony was merely cumulative to that presented 
at trial).  Dr. Mills unequivocally testified at trial that both statutory mental health 
mitigators applied in Ponticelli’s case and that Ponticelli’s paranoid behavior was 
consistent with an extreme cocaine addiction.  While Dr. Crown and Dr. Herkov 
may have presented more compelling testimony at the evidentiary hearing, this is 
 
- 41 -
not dispositive.  See Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495, 504 (Fla. 2003) (citing Asay, 
769 So. 2d at 986, for the proposition that “counsel’s reasonable mental health 
investigation and presentation of evidence is not rendered incompetent ‘merely 
because the defendant has now secured the testimony of a more favorable mental 
health expert’ ”).  There is no reasonable probability that these experts would have 
led the trial court to find the mitigating factors at the time of trial.  The trial court 
did not find the mitigators from Dr. Mills’ testimony because there was no 
evidence Ponticelli had used cocaine on the day of the offenses, and none of the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing to refute this finding was available to 
counsel at the time of trial, even after a reasonable investigation.29   Therefore, we 
find that Ponticelli has not established that defense counsel’s deficient 
investigation and presentation at the penalty phase prejudiced him.  
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Guilt Phase  
Ponticelli also claims that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance 
during the pretrial and guilt phases of trial by: (1) failing to adequately investigate 
and present evidence that Ponticelli was incompetent at the time of trial; (2) taking 
                                          
 
 
29.  As we discussed in regard to Ponticelli’s Giglio and Brady claims, 
Ponticelli refused to speak with defense counsel regarding his cocaine use; counsel 
repeatedly asked Keesee if he had seen Ponticelli use cocaine, and Keesee denied 
it; and the West Virginia boys testified that they first met Ponticelli when he 
appeared at Dotson’s immediately before the crimes.  Turner’s deposition 
testimony does not indicate that he saw Ponticelli use cocaine immediately before 
the murders. 
 
 
- 42 -
inconsistent positions regarding Ponticelli’s guilt by arguing both voluntary 
intoxication/insanity and reasonable doubt, and then failing to present evidence of 
voluntary intoxication; (3) conceding the truthfulness of the West Virginia boys’ 
testimony, Freeman’s statements, and the state investigator’s credibility; (4) 
allowing the state investigator to be excluded from the rule prohibiting one witness 
from hearing another witness’s testimony; and (5) failing to object to improper 
prosecutorial comments, failing to object to the admission of inflammatory and 
prejudicial evidence, and failing to effectively cross-examine witnesses.30  Our 
analysis begins with the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing that is 
relevant to this claim.  Next, we provide the standard of review and applicable law; 
and finally, we apply this standard to each of Ponticelli’s claims.  For the reasons 
explained below, we deny each claim.   
  1.  Facts Presented at the Evidentiary Hearing 
The testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding this claim involved 
defense counsel’s strategy during the guilt phase and the issue of whether 
Ponticelli was competent to stand trial.       
                                          
 
 
30.  Ponticelli’s brief on appeal begins with nearly a full page of clauses 
alleging instances where defense counsel was ineffective. We address only those 
that were supported with a complete claim later in the brief.  See Whitfield v. 
State, 923 So. 2d 375, 378-79 (Fla. 2005) (summarily affirming the trial court’s 
denial of claims raised as conclusory statements in the appellant’s brief).   
 
 
- 43 -
On July 5, 1988, defense counsel filed a motion for a psychiatric evaluation 
after Ponticelli declared he would not discuss this case with defense counsel 
because he had “turned the case over to God.”  The trial court appointed three 
mental health experts who evaluated Ponticelli before trial and testified at an 
August 2, 1988, competency hearing.  Two of these experts, Dr. Harry Krop and 
Dr. Rodney Poettner, testified that they believed Ponticelli was competent.  As 
discussed earlier, Dr. Robin Mills testified that Ponticelli was not competent.31    
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Krop testified that for the first time in his 
professional career, he had changed his opinion regarding a defendant’s 
competency.  Dr. Krop testified that in 1988 Ponticelli presented a difficult case 
because he appeared candid, oriented, and coherent and did not exhibit any 
significant mental health issues or resentment toward the State or his defense 
counsel.32  Yet, Ponticelli adamantly refused to speak with counsel about his case.  
                                          
 
 
31.  As we recognized earlier, Dr. Mills’ report was based on a fifteen-
minute evaluation.  The report stated that it was “essentially impossible” to record 
Ponticelli’s testimony because there were breaks in it, and it did not make sense.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Krop testified that Ponticelli had intentionally 
refused to speak with Dr. Mills because a fellow inmate had advised against it.    
    
32.  Dr. Krop interviewed Ponticelli’s parents before issuing his report in 
1988, and Ponticelli’s parents confirmed this diagnosis.  They told Dr. Krop that 
Ponticelli had not exhibited any significant medical problems or difficulties at 
birth.  Dr. Krop’s report indicated that Ponticelli appeared well-nourished, did not 
exhibit loose associations, tangentiality, thought block, poor concentration, or poor 
attention span, and, according to Dr. Poettner’s findings, had a verbal IQ of 102.  
While Ponticelli admitted he had used crack cocaine in Florida, he did not discuss 
 
- 44 -
On September 9, 1999, Dr. Krop evaluated Ponticelli a second time, and based on 
a  report prepared in 1997 by the agency responsible for Ponticelli’s adoption and 
the testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding Ponticelli’s significant cocaine 
use at the time of the crimes, Dr. Krop testified that there was sufficient evidence 
to find Ponticelli incompetent at the time of trial.  Dr. Krop testified that he 
believed Ponticelli’s religious convictions rose to the level of a delusion that 
prevented Ponticelli from communicating with counsel at the time of trial.  Dr. 
Krop did not believe his original evaluation was inadequate, but rather that the new 
information helped sway a difficult case.   
Dr. Michael Herkov and Dr. Barry Crown each agreed with Dr. Krop’s 
findings at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Herkov testified that Ponticelli’s refusal to 
speak with defense counsel was due to a religious psychosis or delusion of 
reference that went above and beyond a jailhouse conversion and was likely 
spurred by the initial stress of being incarcerated.33  Dr. Barry Crown testified that 
                                                                                                                                        
the extent of the cocaine use.  Dr. Krop’s initial report contradicted both Dr. Mills’ 
report and Dr. Herkov’s findings, and Dr. Herkov recognized that Dr. Krop’s 
report was based on an evaluation that occurred sixteen days before trial.  
 
33.  Dr. Herkov defined a delusion as a fixed, false belief that is not rational.  
Dr. Herkov based this diagnosis on Ponticelli’s statements that he believed God 
spoke to him by making his arm tingle and Ponticelli’s reports of euphoria (i.e., a 
burst of incredible energy that leads one to sleep and eat very little).  Dr. Herkov 
also testified that Ponticelli’s willingness to cooperate with postconviction counsel 
was evidence that his delusion was waning now that the initial stress of 
incarceration had worn off.       
 
- 45 -
Ponticelli suffered from moderate brain damage, most likely caused by the 
deprivation of oxygen at birth and exacerbated by Ponticelli’s cocaine use, which 
rose to the level of “cocaine kindling.”34  On cross-examination, Dr. Herkov 
testified that he could not render a specific diagnosis twelve years after the fact, 
and he believed Ponticelli understood the adversarial process and the charges 
against him.  Dr. Crown admitted that he did not interview other witnesses or 
consider Ponticelli’s behavior at the time of the homicides when he made this 
diagnosis.  
The State’s expert, Dr. Thomas Conger, disagreed with the other mental 
health experts.  In Dr. Conger’s opinion, Ponticelli exhibited unusual religious 
beliefs, but these beliefs did not constitute a delusion.  Dr. Conger pointed to 
portions of the record that indicated Ponticelli had the ability to communicate with 
counsel.  For example, Ponticelli stated, “That’s false right there” to defense 
counsel when Dr. Krop made a statement at the competency hearing that Ponticelli 
disagreed with, and defense counsel’s notes indicated that Ponticelli had called 
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
34. Dr. Crown testified that “cocaine kindling” is a disorder in which the 
brain’s neurotransmitters are altered in such a way as to allow the cocaine to have a 
greater effect in a shorter period of time.  This is very prevalent in chronic cocaine 
users, especially those who had some brain damage before using cocaine and who 
began using cocaine during adolescence.  Crown testified that his report was 
supported by Ponticelli’s reports that he suffered headaches immediately following 
his incarceration.   
 
- 46 -
counsel from jail and provided him with the name of two potential mitigating 
witnesses.    
Three former cellmates also testified to Ponticelli’s strange behavior at the 
time of trial.  They testified that they often saw Ponticelli pacing in his cell, at 
times with a cloth over his head, and constantly reading his Bible and praying.  An 
inventory of his jail cell at the time of trial revealed eight Bibles; several friends 
and family members testified that Ponticelli wrote them long letters from jail that 
were fragmented and uncharacteristically religious; and defense counsel testified 
that Ponticelli’s bizarre behavior continued throughout trial.  Ponticelli’s sister 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that Ponticelli’s father was fundamental in his 
religious beliefs, but she had never known Ponticelli to be.  
There was also testimony regarding defense counsel’s strategy in this case 
and whether counsel was ineffective for not further investigating Ponticelli’s 
mental health at the time of the crimes.35  Counsel testified that he had two theories 
in regard to Ponticelli’s defense: (1) an acquittal based on insanity or cocaine 
psychosis; and (2) second-degree murder based on the voluntary intoxication 
defense.   At the time of trial, counsel truly believed he had all the evidence 
                                          
 
 
35.  Much of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding 
Ponticelli’s mental health is summarized in the discussion of the facts surrounding 
Ponticelli’s ability to establish ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase.     
  
 
- 47 -
available to him, and he argued the alternative theories of cocaine psychosis and 
reasonable doubt during his opening statement because he had no evidence 
Ponticelli was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the offense.  He 
testified that he would not have conceded that Ponticelli met the West Virginia 
boys four hours before the homicide if he had known the testimony presented at 
the evidentiary hearing.  He also testified that he would not have made statements 
allegedly vouching for the state investigator’s credibility if he had known the state 
investigator had withheld evidence.36  Counsel also admitted that he did not follow 
                                          
 
 
36.  The appellant’s brief alleges that trial counsel vouched for the state 
investigator’s credibility many times at trial, but it fails to provide a specific 
citation.  Because the trial court’s November 1, 2002, order cites to the following 
two statements, we will address this part of Ponticelli’s claim.   
The first statement came in the context of a situation in which defense 
counsel objected to the State’s motion to introduce an exhibit during the state 
investigator’s testimony.  Defense counsel stated:   
 
Judge I think it’s pretty clear the [exhibit] has not been tied to the 
defendant by anything or anybody else . . . .  I’m certain [the state 
investigator] found it out there where he says he found it, but that 
particular [exhibit] has not been tied to the defendant in this charge.  
It’s immaterial, it’s irrelevant, and at this point hasn’t been shown to 
be either material or relevant.   
 
The second cited statement came during defense counsel’s cross-
examination of the state investigator when defense counsel stated:  
 
You probably couldn’t remember Investigator . . . .  This thing is 135 
pages long, so I’m not surprised that you don’t remember.  Let me see 
if I can refresh your memory a little bit.   
 
 
- 48 -
up on Dr. Branch’s suggestion to obtain a clinical mental health expert to testify at 
trial, even though Dr. Poettner gave him the name of an expert before trial.   
 2.  Standard of Review and Applicable Law  
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pretrial and guilt 
phases are reviewed under Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.  To establish this claim, a 
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness,”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688), and that “counsel’s errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687.  Failure to establish either deficiency or prejudice results in a 
denial of the claim.  Ferrell, 918 So. 2d at 172-73.  Because the trial court denied 
these claims after an evidentiary hearing, this Court “review[s] the deficiency and 
prejudice prongs as ‘mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review 
standard but . . . the trial court’s factual findings are to be given deference.’ ”   
Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 32 (quoting Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 781).   
 3.  Analysis   
For the reasons explained below, we find that none of the five allegations 
Ponticelli raises here constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland.   
Ponticelli’s first claim alleges that counsel was ineffective for waiting until a 
month before trial to file his motion for psychiatric evaluation and for failing to 
 
- 49 -
obtain jail records and to interview cellmates who would have provided additional 
information regarding Ponticelli’s strange behavior.  This claim is without merit. 
Ponticelli has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel’s representation was reasonable.  See State v. Duncan, 
894 So. 2d 817, 823 (Fla. 2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, and 
recognizing that “[t]he defendant alone carries the burden to overcome the 
presumption of effective assistance”).  He has provided no evidence that it was 
unreasonable for defense counsel to file his motion for a psychiatric evaluation a 
month before trial; in fact, counsel testified that he filed this motion as soon as he 
noticed Ponticelli consistently refusing to speak with him about the case.  
Furthermore, Ponticelli has provided no evidence that the mental health 
evaluations were inadequate because of lack of time or inadequate information.  
While the mental health experts who testified at the evidentiary hearing disputed 
one or two of the tests conducted or the results obtained in some of the 1988 
mental health evaluations, none testified that all of the evaluations were 
inadequate.  In fact, the 1988 evaluations took a similar amount of time and relied 
on similar tests as those conducted in preparation for the evidentiary hearing.  Even 
Dr. Krop, who changed his opinion at the evidentiary hearing based on information 
largely not available to defense counsel at the time of trial, testified that his initial 
evaluation was adequate.  Furthermore, there is no evidence Ponticelli’s former 
 
- 50 -
cellmates revealed anything significant that the experts did not know when they 
evaluated Ponticelli.  The cellmates’ testimony was not a factor Dr. Krop pointed 
to when he decided to change his opinion.  Having established neither deficiency 
nor prejudice, Ponticelli has not established counsel was ineffective in regard to 
this claim.   
 
Ponticelli’s second claim alleges that counsel was ineffective for taking 
inconsistent positions during opening argument without adequately investigating 
and supporting his voluntary intoxication defense.  Ponticelli claims this action 
was per se ineffective because, in essence, counsel conceded Ponticelli’s guilt.   
In its November 3, 1998, order, the trial court found that defense counsel did 
not concede that Ponticelli committed the homicides, but the trial court permitted 
Ponticelli to question defense counsel about making a potentially inconsistent 
argument at the evidentiary hearing.  Defense counsel testified that he presented 
alternative positions in his opening argument because he planned to present both 
defenses but was unable to do so when Dr. Branch’s testimony was excluded 
because Ponticelli refused to discuss his cocaine use around the time of the crimes.  
The trial court ultimately denied this claim, finding counsel’s approach was 
reasonable strategy and that Ponticelli’s refusal to speak about his drug use 
prevented counsel from establishing the voluntary intoxication defense.  This 
finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence; therefore, we affirm the 
 
- 51 -
trial court’s holding that Ponticelli has failed to establish deficiency.  See Brown v. 
State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1125 (Fla. 2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 
1001 (Fla. 2000), for the proposition that “this Court will not second-guess 
counsel’s strategic decisions on collateral attack”); see also Brown v. State, 894 
So. 2d 137, 146 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 
2000), for the proposition that “the reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be 
determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or 
actions”).   
We also affirm the trial court’s finding that even if defense counsel was 
deficient, Ponticelli has not established prejudice.  Neither Dr. Krop, Dr. Crown, 
nor Dr. Herkov, who had all the evidence Ponticelli claims defense counsel was 
deficient for not obtaining, testified at the evidentiary hearing that Ponticelli was 
insane at the time of the murders.  Moreover, because Dr. Branch was not qualified 
to testify to cocaine psychosis even if counsel could have provided him with the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding Ponticelli’s significant 
drug history, he would not have been able to testify to this at trial.  The fact that the 
jury did not hear his testimony does not undermine our confidence in the verdict.  
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.  
Ponticelli’s third claim alleges that counsel was ineffective for conceding the 
truthfulness of the West Virginia boys’ testimony, the state investigator’s 
 
- 52 -
credibility, and the truth of Freeman’s statements.  Ponticelli claims this action, in 
effect, entered a guilty plea without Ponticelli’s consent and was per se ineffective.  
The trial court denied Ponticelli’s claim regarding the West Virginia boys’ 
testimony because even if counsel vouched for their credibility, there is no 
indication this was unreasonable because counsel did not know their statements 
were untruthful.  The trial court also denied Ponticelli’s claim regarding the state 
investigator because defense counsel did not vouch for the state investigator’s 
credibility, and even if he did, Ponticelli has not established that this was 
unreasonable or resulted in prejudice.  The trial court’s findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.   
Counsel was not aware that Brown and Burgess testified falsely, as both men 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that they never told defense counsel about the 
cocaine party.  Furthermore, defense counsel’s statements to and about the state 
investigator during trial do not indicate that defense counsel was vouching for the 
investigator’s credibility, and Ponticelli has not established that the investigator 
was not credible.   
Finally, in regard to Freeman’s statements, the trial court did not address this 
claim, but we find it without merit.  As we explained in regard to Ponticelli’s 
Brady and Giglio claims, Freeman’s credibility and capacity for truthfulness were 
significantly impeached by defense counsel at trial.  Moreover, his testimony was 
 
- 53 -
corroborated by the evidence presented at trial.  We do not find counsel’s conduct 
deficient given the context of these statements and the circumstances at trial.  
Therefore, we deny this claim.   
Ponticelli’s fourth claim alleges that counsel was ineffective for allowing the 
state investigator to be excluded from the rule of witness sequestration.  In its 
November 1, 2002, order, the trial court determined that defense counsel had made 
a strategic decision not to object to the state investigator’s presence in the 
courtroom because defense counsel had no basis to object.  Ponticelli has not 
established that this strategy was unreasonable.  The trial court has great discretion 
regarding the rule of sequestration, and this Court has more than once upheld the 
trial court’s decision to permit a state detective to sit through trial.  See, e.g.,  
Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 430 (Fla. 1998) (finding trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting State’s motion to allow a detective to remain in the 
courtroom when investigator was a fact witness); see also Randolph v. State, 463 
So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984) (recognizing that the “rule of witness sequestration is 
not an absolute rule,” and that trial court did not abuse its “sound judicial 
discretion” in allowing the state investigator to remain in the courtroom because 
the investigator was not “a principal actor in the crime,” or a witness whose 
testimony “was actually suggested by what he heard in the courtroom”).   
 
- 54 -
Furthermore, even if counsel should have objected, Ponticelli has not 
established that the presence of the state investigator prejudiced him.  While 
Turner testified at the evidentiary hearing that he felt intimidated by the state 
investigator’s presence, there is no evidence the investigator did anything at trial 
that affected Turner’s testimony.  In fact, the state investigator’s presence did not 
prevent Turner from testifying to Ponticelli’s significant cocaine use in the weeks 
immediately preceding the homicides.  Ponticelli has not established that the state 
investigator would have been excluded upon defense counsel’s objection or that a 
reasonable probability exists that this exclusion “led to an improper conviction.”  
Randolph, 463 So. 2d at 192 (“We cannot say that the presence of [the detective] in 
the courtroom led to an improper conviction.”).  Therefore, his claim was properly 
denied.   
Ponticelli’s fifth claim alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
improper prosecutorial comments and the admission of inflammatory and 
prejudicial evidence lacking in relevance and for failing to competently cross-
examine witnesses.   These claims are legally insufficient because Ponticelli has 
not alleged how he was prejudiced by each of these deficiencies.  See Waterhouse 
v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1181 n.10 (Fla. 2001) (finding procedurally barred 
claims couched as conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were 
 
- 55 -
facially insufficient where the defendant did not allege how he was prejudiced by 
the failure to object).   
D.  Denial of Competent Mental Health Assistance  
Ponticelli claims he was denied the assistance of a competent mental health 
expert at the time of trial.  This claim is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate 
the trial court’s determination that Ponticelli was competent to stand trial.  
Therefore, it is procedurally barred because it was raised and denied on direct 
appeal.  Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 487.  Second, even if this were a valid Ake37 
claim, it remains procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct 
appeal.  See Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 375, 379 (Fla. 2005).  Third, if it could 
be read as a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide Ponticelli with 
                                          
 
37.  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  Even if this claim were not 
procedurally barred, the record conclusively establishes that it is without merit.  In 
Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that “where an indigent defendant 
demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a 
significant factor at trial, the state must ‘assure the defendant access to a competent 
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, 
preparation, and presentation of the defense.’ ”  Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 
353 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).  There is no evidence that the State 
failed in its obligation because the trial court appointed three mental health experts 
to evaluate Ponticelli in preparation for the August 2, 1988, competency hearing, 
and the State appointed a fourth expert to evaluate Ponticelli after the competency 
hearing but before trial.  Even if this claim were not procedurally barred, Ponticelli 
has not established that the State failed in its obligation under Ake.  See id. at 353 
(denying Ake claim where the defendant had “access to multiple mental health 
experts prior to trial, and the experts performed all of the essential tasks required 
by Ake”).  
 
 
- 56 -
a competent mental health expert, it is without merit.  See Correll v. Dugger, 558 
So. 2d 422, 426 (Fla. 1990) (finding that testimony at evidentiary hearing that 
defendant likely suffered brain damage from his significant drug use did not justify 
a finding that defendant was denied the assistance of a competent mental health 
professional because original experts knew of defendant’s drug use).  Therefore, 
we deny this claim.      
E.  Inappropriate Summary Denial of Claims 
 
As stated earlier, the trial court summarily denied all but nine of the forty-
two claims Ponticelli raised in his fifth amended motion for postconviction relief.  
On appeal, Ponticelli asserts the summary denial was inappropriate in regard to a 
number of allegations of trial court error, including the trial court’s decision to (1) 
find him competent, (2) deny his motion to exclude Freeman’s testimony, and (3) 
improperly instruct the jury on the aggravators and its role in the sentencing 
process.  Because each of these claims is either procedurally barred or facially 
insufficient, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of them.   
“To uphold the trial court’s summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 
motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the 
record.  Further, where no evidentiary hearing is held below, we must accept the 
defendant’s factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record.”  
Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999) (citation omitted) (citing Fla. R. 
 
- 57 -
Crim. P. 3.850(d) and Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989)).  
Each of the claims at issue here meets this standard.  Ponticelli’s first and third 
claims, i.e., that he was incompetent to proceed and that the trial court issued 
improper jury instructions, were considered and denied by this Court on direct 
appeal.  See Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 487; Ponticelli, 618 So 2d. at 154-55.  
Therefore, these claims are procedurally barred.  See Johnson v. State, 522 So. 2d 
356, 357 (Fla. 1988) (finding claim raised in a 3.850 motion procedurally barred 
because the claim was raised and rejected on direct appeal).  Furthermore, 
Ponticelli’s second claim that the trial court erred in denying counsel’s motion to 
exclude Freeman’s testimony is also procedurally barred because it could and 
should have been raised on direct appeal.  See Bruno v. State, 807 So. 2d 55, 63 
(Fla. 2001) (“A claim of trial court error generally can be raised on direct appeal 
but not in a rule 3.850 motion . . . .”).   Ponticelli’s second claim is also facially 
insufficient since Ponticelli presented no evidence at the evidentiary hearing that 
Freeman was a state agent, and defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that Ponticelli’s refusal to testify in support of this motion at trial prevented 
counsel from presenting a potentially valid motion.  We therefore affirm the trial 
court’s summary denial of each of these claims.     
II.  
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus  
 
- 58 -
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Ponticelli claims that Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), that Ponticelli’s death sentence was unconstitutional, and that appellate 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  As explained below, we deny all of these 
claims.   
A.  Florida’s Capital Sentencing Procedure is Unconstitutional 
Ponticelli claims Florida’s capital sentencing procedure is unconstitutional in 
light of Ring, 536 U.S. 584.  This claim is without merit.  Ponticelli’s convictions 
and sentences became final in 1993, nearly nine years before the United States 
Supreme Court decided Ring.  Both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Florida Supreme Court have held that Ring does not apply retroactively.  Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 408-09 
(Fla. 2005).  Therefore, this claim is without merit. 
 
B.  Ponticelli’s Conviction and Sentence are Unconstitutional  
Ponticelli claims his convictions and sentences are unconstitutional because 
the aggravating circumstances were not charged in the indictment as is required by 
Ring, 536 U.S. 584, and by Florida law mandating that every element of the 
offense be alleged in the information or indictment.  This claim is without merit.  
As explained above, Ring does not apply retroactively to Ponticelli’s case.  
 
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Moreover, we have repeatedly rejected similar claims.  See Orme v. State, 896 So. 
2d 725, 736-37 (Fla. 2005). 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel  
In his third and final claim, Ponticelli alleges that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions on direct appeal, failing to challenge the prosecutor’s knowing 
presentation of false evidence, and failing to correct prosecutorial misconduct on 
direct appeal.  We find these claims to be without merit.   
When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this 
Court applies a standard similar to that enunciated in Strickland.  “The ‘[p]etitioner 
must show (1) specific errors or omissions which show that appellate counsel’s 
performance deviated from the norm or fell outside the range of professionally 
acceptable performance and (2) the deficiency of that performance compromised 
the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness 
and correctness of the appellate result.’ ”  Smith, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S163  
(quoting Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Ordinarily, 
counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise issues that are 
procedurally barred because they were not properly raised by trial counsel or that 
are without merit.  Id. (citing Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 
2000).  As explained below, none of Ponticelli’s claims have merit.   
 
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Ponticelli’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.  This Court reviewed the 
record on direct appeal and found “that the verdicts are supported by competent 
and substantial evidence of guilt.”  Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 489.  As in past cases, 
“[w]e decline to re-address an issue that has already been considered and resolved 
on the direct appeal.”  Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 377 (Fla. 2004).  
Furthermore, since our independent review revealed that Ponticelli’s claim was 
without merit, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise it 
on appeal.  See Smith, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S163.   
Ponticelli’s second claim is also procedurally barred and without merit.  This 
claim rests largely on Ponticelli’s allegation that the prosecutor suppressed 
evidence or presented false testimony, and the claim is procedurally barred because 
it is litigated in his motion for postconviction relief.  See Randolph v. State, 853 
So. 2d 1051, 1068 (Fla. 2003) (denying habeas claim that was a claim from 3.850 
appeal couched as ineffectiveness of appellate counsel argument).  Moreover, even 
if this claim were not procedurally barred, Ponticelli has not established that 
counsel objected to the prosecutor’s statements at trial.  Consequently, appellate 
counsel cannot be found ineffective for not raising them on appeal because 
Ponticelli has not established that the prosecutor’s statements constituted 
 
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fundamental error.  See Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1261 (Fla. 2006).  
Therefore, we deny this claim. 
 
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 
Ponticelli’s motion for postconviction relief and deny Ponticelli’s petition for writ 
of habeas corpus.   
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
Those searching for a poster child for the evils of cocaine addiction need 
search no further.  While there appears to be little doubt that Anthony Ponticelli is 
guilty of the homicides at issue, there is also little doubt that his only chance for 
life rested in the hands of counsel that was ineffective in failing to competently 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the crime and Ponticelli’s background of 
cocaine addiction, including Ponticelli’s heavy consumption of cocaine in the time 
immediately preceding the killings of the two drug-dealer victims.  Hence, 
 
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Ponticelli’s only genuine case for a life sentence was never fully developed and 
presented to the jury.  As noted by the majority, the only mitigation found by the 
trial court was Ponticelli’s age of twenty and his lack of a significant history of 
criminal activity.  Critically, the trial court expressly refused to find the two 
important statutory mental mitigators because of the lack of evidence of 
Ponticelli’s drug consumption in the immediate time period before the killings.  
For the same reason, the trial court refused to allow into evidence the testimony of 
a defense expert that Ponticelli was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the 
killings.   
 
In addition to counsel’s failures, it is apparent that the State allowed false 
testimony to be presented by its witnesses on this key issue.  The State 
acknowledged at the postconviction hearing that Ponticelli’s drug use in the period 
immediately preceding the killings was a critical issue at trial.  Nevertheless, the 
State permitted false testimony to be presented on this issue that the State’s 
investigator knew to be false.  The State’s investigator was told by witness Tim 
Keesee, who resided with the victims, that he witnessed Ponticelli consume 
cocaine at the victims’ residence shortly before the killings occurred.  Keesee also 
testified that he gave this same information to the prosecutor.  Nevertheless, the 
State allowed Keesee to testify falsely that he witnessed no cocaine use by 
Ponticelli before the killings.  In addition, the State’s investigator was told by the 
 
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jailhouse informant, Dennis Freeman, that the West Virginia boys had gone with 
Ponticelli to purchase cocaine from the victims the day of the killings.  Again, 
however, the State stood by while the West Virginia boys provided false testimony 
as to their knowledge of Ponticelli and his drug consumption with them in the 
hours preceding the killings.   
 
In its order denying postconviction relief the court made factual findings 
supporting the defendant’s Giglio claim: 
 
Upon consideration of the evidence presented at hearing, this 
Court finds the following facts in relation to this claim: 
1)  Investigator Munster’s December 1987 Supplemental Report 
mentioned “cocaine usage” at the Grandinetti’s trailer on the day of 
the murders.  This report was supplied to Trial Counsel; however, he 
had no way of knowing that the reference meant that Defendant was 
using cocaine at the trailer the night of the murders. 
 
2)  Investigator Munster’s field notes, which were not disclosed to the 
defense until 1997, provide further evidence of cocaine use at the 
Grandinetti’s trailer on the night of the murder.  The State simply 
overlooked this information.  There is no way of knowing whether 
Trial Counsel would have gathered from those field notes that 
Defendant was using cocaine at the trailer on the night of the murders. 
 
3)  Investigator Munster testified that Tim Kesee told him about 
cocaine use at the Grandinetti’s trailer the night of the murders.  This 
information was not turned over to the defense. 
 
4)  Prosecutor Balius’ interview notes with Tim Kesee may indicate 
that Defendant was using cocaine at the Grandinetti’s trailer on the 
night of the murder.  These notes were not turned over to the defense.  
Again, it appears that the State simply overlooked this information.  
There is no way of knowing whether Trial Counsel would have 
 
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gathered from those interview notes that Defendant was using cocaine 
at the Grandinetti’s trailer on the night of the murders. 
 
5)  Investigator Munster’s field notes indicate that Defendant went to 
the Grandinetti’s trailer on the night of November 26, 1987 with “two 
boys from West Virginia,” presumably to purchase cocaine.  These 
field notes were not turned over to the defense until 1997. 
 
Trial court order at 17-18.  The trial court ultimately rejected all of these claims by 
alluding to Ponticelli’s refusal to fully disclose all of this information to his lawyer.   
 
It cannot be denied that Ponticelli should be held accountable, both for the 
killings and for his refusal to aid in his defense afterwards.  However, the State 
cannot get off so easily.  Ponticelli’s lack of cooperation is immaterial to an 
analysis of the State’s obligation under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972), and the constitutional guarantee of due process.  As Giglio and its progeny 
make clear, the State’s obligation to see that a fair trial is conducted obligates it to 
speak up when it knows the facts are different than the testimony its witnesses 
present.  See id. at 153-54.  This obligation is obviously heightened when the State 
acknowledges the importance of the issue in question, Ponticelli’s drug ingestion 
immediately preceding the killings. 
 
I agree with the majority that Ponticelli is not entitled to relief from his 
convictions.  I cannot agree, however, that he is not entitled to a new penalty phase 
when it is so apparent that a completely false picture was presented to the jury of 
Ponticelli’s drug usage at the time of the crime. 
 
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Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County,  
Victor J. Musleh, Chief Judge - Case No. 87-2719-CF-A-W 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Kenneth S. 
Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
 
 
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