Case Title: Wilson v. Fallin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109652

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILSON v. FALLIN2011 OK 76Case Number: 109652Decided: 09/01/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

SENATOR JIM WILSON, Petitioner,v.MARY FALLIN, Governor 
of the State of Oklahoma, KRIS STEELE, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of 
Representatives, BRIAN BINGMAN, President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State 
Senate, PAUL ZIRIAX, Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board, 
Respondents.
PROCEEDING TO REVIEW SENATE REDISTRICTING ACT
¶0 Petitioner seeks review of the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011, 
pursuant to the section 11C, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner 
alleges the Act does not comply with the apportionment formula in section 9A, 
Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. This Court finds that the petitioner has 
failed to show that the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 does not comply 
with the provisions of section 9A.
STATE SENATE REDISTRICTING ACT OF 2011 COMPLIES WITHSECTION 
9A, ARTICLE V, OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.
Mark Hammons, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for petitioner Senator Jim 
Wilson.Neal Leader, Nancy Zerr, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents 
Governor Mary Fallin and Secretary Paul Ziriax.Robert McCambell, Lee Slater, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for respondent President Pro Tempore Brian 
Bingman.Andrew Lester, Edmond, Oklahoma, for respondent Speaker Kris 
Steele.
TAYLOR, C.J.
¶1 This is a proceeding to review the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 
(the Redistricting Act), Enrolled Senate Bill 821, sections 2 through 6, signed 
by the Governor on May 20, 2011. Two threshold first impression legal questions 
are presented: (1) What part, if any, of the apportionment formula in section 
9A, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution

¶2 Oklahoma State Senator Jim Wilson, a resident of Cherokee County, 
Oklahoma, filed a petition pursuant to section 11C for review of the 
Redistricting Act.

¶3 Senator Wilson alleges that the Redistricting Act does not comply with 
section 9A because it "fails to create Senate districts which as nearly as 
possible provide for compactness, political units, historical precedents, 
economic and political interests." Senator Wilson does not explicitly identify 
every district in the Redistricting Act that he contends is not in compliance 
with section 9A but claims that he has identified such districts by the maps 
provided in his appendix.

¶4 Senator Wilson points out what he considers the primary differences in the 
Redistricting Act and his proposed apportionment plan. He states that the 
largest district in the Redistricting Act has 78,943 persons and the largest 
district in his plan has 78,929 persons-a difference of fourteen persons-

¶5 Respondent Paul Ziriax, Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board, 
filed a preliminary statement, contending that the review of legislative 
apportionment provided in section 11C is limited in section 11D to a review for 
"compliance with the formula as set forth in this Article." Secretary Ziriax 
questions whether there is a manageable standard for adjudication of challenges 
brought under section 11C because a large part of section 9A was declared 
unconstitutional in Reynolds v. State Election Bd., 233 F. Supp. 323, 329 
(W.D.Okla. 1964), and then reinstated in an emasculated form in Ferrell v. 
State ex rel. Hall, 339 F. Supp. 73, 74 (W.D.Okla. 1972). Secretary Ziriax 
asks this Court to address whether this proceeding is a superficial contest 
between the Legislature's redistricting map and Senator Wilson's proposed 
redistricting map.

¶6 Respondent Brian Bingman, President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State 
Senate, in his recommendations to this Court, also advances threshold issues: 
what is the proper standard or test for determining whether apportionment 
legislation complies with Article V as required by section 11D; whether and to 
what extent section 9A is viable after being declared unconstitutional in 
Reynolds v. State Election Bd. and then declared partially constitutional 
in Ferrell v. State ex rel. Hall; whether population is the only 
mandatory criterion in section 9A; which issues presented herein are 
justiciable; and what is the Court's role in this review proceeding. The 
President Pro Tempore also suggests a procedure for taking evidence in this 
proceeding, if needed. Respondent Kris Steele, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of 
Representatives, filed a report adopting the procedure suggested by the 
President Pro Tempore.
¶7 Responding to the respondents' suggestions, Senator Wilson admits that he 
is not asserting a claim under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, et 
seq.; states there is no need for a briefing schedule in this proceeding; 
and opposes any order issued by this Court that would allow the Election Board 
to prepare for the 2012 election under the Redistricting Act. The President Pro 
Tempore asks to file a brief on issues relevant to the 2012 election in reply to 
Senator Wilson.
¶8 We agree with the respondents that we must address, for the first time, 
the application of sections 9A, 11C, and 11D of the apportionment provisions in 
Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Sections 9A, 10A, and 11A through 11E 
were added to Article V by State Question 416, Referendum Petition No. 142, 
adopted at a special election held May 26, 1964. The 1963 Legislature proposed 
State Question 416 in Senate Joint Resolution No. 4, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws, p. 
736, to establish constitutional reapportionment formulas for both houses. In 
the joint resolution, the Legislature resolved that county-based apportionment, 
with consideration given to "the federal analogy, history, economics, custom, 
territory, and similar and related factors," was a proper method of providing 
adequate and fair representation of groups with like political, social, and 
economic interests and of avoiding divesting segments of the population of their 
representation.
¶9 Section 9A provides for forty-eight state senate districts to be based on 
the most recent federal decennial census. It provides that each of the nineteen 
most populous counties constitutes a senate district and the fifty-eight less 
populous counties be joined into twenty-nine two-county districts. It further 
provides that population, compactness, area, political units, historical 
precedents, economic and political interests, contiguous territory, and other 
factors are to be considered to the extent feasible in apportioning the state 
senate. Section 9A fixes the term of the senate office as four years with 
one-half of the senators elected at each general election.
¶10 Section 11C authorizes any qualified voter to petition the Supreme Court 
for review of any apportionment by the Legislature or the Apportionment 
Commission

¶11 When the county-based apportionment formula in section 9A was submitted 
to a vote of the people, many states' legislative districts were based on units 
of local government and rural/urban distinctions. Several states, including 
Oklahoma, had failed to reapportion and redistrict for decades. Many states were 
involved in litigation challenging the legislative apportionment. The state 
courts had declined to resolve apportionment complaints, considering them to be 
nonjusticiable political matters, and many state apportionment schemes were 
challenged in federal court. Then the United States Supreme Court handed down 
its opinion in Baker v. Carr, 
¶12 Two years after Baker v. Carr, the opinion in Reynolds v. 
Sims, 
¶13 Oklahoma had been involved in apportionment litigation before a 
three-judge panel in the federal district court for several years when the 
United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Reynolds v. Sims. 
In light of Reynolds v. Sims, the three-judge panel ruled that the 
legislative apportionment provisions in section 9A are null and void. 
Reynolds v. State Election Bd., 233 F. Supp. 323 (1964). The three-judge 
panel specifically left standing only the provision in section 9A that 
established the forty-eight senatorial offices with the four-year terms and the 
provision that one-half of the senatorial offices will be elected every two 
years. 233 F.Supp at 329. The three-judge panel further ruled that the 
provisions in sections 11A through11E, establishing the Apportionment Commission 
and providing for Supreme Court review and exercise of original jurisdiction, do 
not conflict with the federal constitution and are valid. Id. In 1972, 
another three-judge panel in Ferrell v. State of Oklahoma, 339 F. Supp. 73, 76 (1972), reconsidered the validity of the provisions in section 9A and 
ruled that it is permissible, but not mandatory, for the Legislature to consider 
the factors of compactness, area, political units, historical precedents, 
economic and political interests, and contiguous territory set out in section 9A 
in apportioning legislative districts. As will be discussed, we reach a 
conclusion that is similar in several respects to the conclusions reached in 
Reynolds v. State Election Bd. and Ferrell v. State of Oklahoma. 

¶14 Although we have discussed the apportionment provisions of Article V in 
deciding a challenge to congressional redistricting, Alexander v. Taylor, 

¶15 As to section 9A, it is clear that the county-based apportionment formula 
is rendered a nullity by the basic constitutional standard that state 
legislative districts must be based on equality in the total population under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Reynolds v. 
Sims, 
¶16 The presumption that legislation is constitutional and should be 
sustained against challenge where it is possible to do so applies to 
constitutional provisions. Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. 
Keating, 
¶17 The invalid language defining the county-based apportionment formula is 
presumed to be severable, In re Application of Okla. Dept. of Transp., at 
¶31, and no party argues otherwise. Accordingly, we find the language defining 
the county-based apportionment formula in section 9A to be severable without the 
necessity of a severability analysis.
¶18 The remaining language in section 9A provides a population appropriation 
formula for apportioning senate districts. A population apportionment formula 
necessarily requires equality in the state's total population so that the 
forty-eight senate districts have only minimal deviation from the ideal district 
population determined by the most recent Federal Decennial Census. However, we 
recognize that local interest factors such as compactness, political units, and 
economic and political interests are considered under the totality of the 
circumstances principle in racially-motivated gerrymander and minority-vote 
dilution claims under the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973,et 
seq., which are not presented herein.
¶19 The opinions in Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny do not affect 
sections 11C and 11D. Notwithstanding, we consider sections 11C and 11D because 
they control this proceeding. Section 11C reads:
Any qualified elector may seek a review of any apportionment order of the 
Commission, or apportionment law of the legislature, within sixty days from the 
filing thereof, by filing in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma a petition which must 
set forth a proposed apportionment more nearly in accordance with this Article. 
Any apportionment of either the Senate or the House of Representatives, as 
ordered by the Commission, or apportionment law of the legislature, from which 
review is not sought within such time, shall become final. The court shall give 
all cases involving apportionment precedence over all other cases and 
proceedings; and if said court be not in session, it shall convene promptly for 
the disposal of the same.
Section 11D reads:
Upon review, the Supreme Court shall determine whether or not the 
apportionment order of the Commission or act of the legislature is in compliance 
with the formula as set forth in this Article and, if so, it shall require the 
same to be filed or refiled as the case may be with the Secretary of State 
forthwith, and such apportionment shall become final on the date of said writ. 
In the event the Supreme Court shall determine that the apportionment order of 
said Commission or legislative act is not in compliance with the formula for 
either the Senate or the House of Representatives as set forth in this Article, 
it will remand the matter to the Commission with directions to modify its order 
to achieve conformity with the provisions of this Article.
¶20 Reading section 11C in conjunction with section 11D,

¶21 In his initial filings, Senator Wilson asked for evidentiary and briefing 
schedules, asserting that no deference may be given to the senate districts in 
the Redistricting Act and that the respondents must bring forth evidentiary 
support for the districts. This assertion is incorrect. Every statute is 
presumed constitutional. Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. 
Keating, 
¶22 Turning to the challenge to the Redistricting Act, Senator Wilson 
effectively agrees that the apportionment therein is based on population, but he 
complains that it was drawn with little or no regard for compactness and local 
political and economic interests. Senator Wilson admits that the district with 
the most population (78,943) in the challenged act includes only fourteen more 
people than his most populous district with 78,929. He also admits that the 
least populous district in both the challenged act and his proposed plan has 
77,350 people. Senator Wilson makes no showing that the challenged act does not 
comply with the population formula in section 9A.
¶23 We conclude that the population apportionment formula set out in section 
9A, Article V, Oklahoma Constitution, remains in effect. We also conclude that a 
review proceeding authorized by section 11C, Article V, Oklahoma Constitution, 
is limited by section 11D, Article V, Oklahoma Constitution, to a review for 
compliance with the population apportionment formula set out in section 9A, 
Article V, Oklahoma Constitution, as a matter of law. We find the petitioner has 
failed to clearly demonstrate that the presumed constitutional State Senate 
Redistricting Act of 2011 does not comply with section 9A, Article V of the 
Oklahoma Constitution. We determine and hold that the State Senate Redistricting 
Act of 2011 complies with the population apportionment formula set out in 
section 9A, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
STATE SENATE REDISTRICTING ACT OF 2011 COMPLIES WITHSECTION 
9A, ARTICLE V, OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.
Taylor, C.J., Colbert, V.C.J., (by separate writing), and Kauger, Watt, 
Winchester, Edmondson, Reif, Combs, and Gurich, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES

1 All section references 
are to Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution unless otherwise stated. 

2 Senator Wilson initiated this proceeding as a qualified 
elector, not in his official capacity as a state senator. Section 11C, Article V 
of the Oklahoma Constitution authorizes any qualified elector to petition the 
Supreme Court for a review of apportionment legislation. 

3 The Honorable Mary Fallin, Governor of the State of 
Oklahoma, moved to be dismissed. The Governor's motion to dismiss is rendered 
moot by our resolution of this proceeding. 

4 Senator Wilson explicitly identifies his senate 
district 3 as a redrawn district in the Redistricting Act that does not comply 
with section 9A. Senator Wilson alleges that the Redistricting Act unnecessarily 
divided three counties in drawing district 3 and removed the heart of the 
Cherokee Nation from district 3. 

5 Based on the 2010 United States census, Oklahoma has a 
population of 3,751,351 persons. United States Census 2010, 2010 Census Data, 
hppt://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2011). Dividing the 
state's total population by the total senate districts, the ideal senate 
district would contain 78,153 persons. 

6 Secretary Ziriax also asks this Court to address 
whether tribal boundary lines are a proper consideration, particularly since the 
Cherokee Nation's Indian country is a patchwork quilt collection of trust land 
and restricted allotments scattered throughout fourteen counties. Because in 
this special review proceeding before this Court, pursuant to § 11C, art. V, 
Okla. Const., we conclude that the constitutional apportionment formula must be 
based on population and that the Redistricting Act complies with the 
population-based formula, we need not address whether tribal areas or historic 
precedents should be considered in apportionment. 

7 Section 11A establishes the Apportionment Commission 
and provides for it to act whenever the Legislature refuses to make the 
apportionment within ninety legislative days after convening the first regular 
session of the Legislature following the Federal Decennial Census. Amended in 
2010, a seven member Bipartisan Commission on Legislative Apportionment replaced 
the Apportionment Commission. State Question 748, Legislative Referendum 349, 
adopted November 2, 2010. 

8 In addition to Reynolds, in 1964, the Supreme 
Court struck down the legislative apportionment of several other states, such as 
Maryland in Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 
377 U.S. 656, 84 S. Ct. 1429, 12 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1964); Virginia in Davis v. Mann, 
377 U.S. 678, 84 S. Ct. 1441, 12 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1964); and Colorado in Lucas v. 
Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S. Ct. 1459, 12 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1964), for failing to be population-based contrary to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, the Reynolds opinion 
noted that suits had been instituted challenging the apportionments in 
thirty-four states, 84 S. Ct.  at 1378-1379, n. 30, and that it had remanded 
several cases to the courts below for reconsideration in light of Baker v. 
Carr, listing Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429, 82 S. Ct. 910, 8 L. Ed. 2d 1 (challenging a Michigan apportionment), and WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 
370 U.S. 190, 82 S. Ct. 1234, 8 L. Ed. 2d 430 (challenging a New York apportionment). 

9 We note that the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized some flexibility in drawing state legislative districts based on 
equality in the total population. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 
91 S. Ct. 1904, 29 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1971). In doing so, the Court rejected 
application of local interests to justify deviations from population for 
apportionment of state legislative districts. The Court recognized that 
"deviations from population equality must be justified by legitimate state 
interests" and that "state interests offered to justify deviations from 
population equality" must be carefully scrutinized. 403 U.S.  at 
185, 
91 S. Ct.  at 1906-1907. 

10 General rules of statutory construction are used in 
construing the constitution such as the rule that provisions in pari 
materia should be construed together. Cowart V. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
1983 OK 66, ¶4, 665 P.2d 315, 317. 

11 We hereby deny Senator Wilson's motion for a briefing 
schedule and evidentiary hearing, even though after filing the motion, he 
admitted there was no need for a briefing schedule.

COLBERT, V.C.J., with whom Watt, Combs, and Gurich, JJ. join, concurring
¶1 By an election held May 26, 1964, the people of Oklahoma added a formula 
for redistricting in Section 9A of Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. The 
formula provided for nineteen Senate districts with one Senator from each of the 
most populous counties along with twenty-nine two-county districts from the 
fifty-eight less populous counties. It also listed several social, geographic, 
and political factors to be considered by providing that "[i]n apportioning the 
State Senate, consideration shall be given to population, compactness, area, 
political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests, 
contiguous territory, and other major factors, to the extent feasible." Okla. 
Const. Art. V, § 9A.
¶2 Less than one month after that election, the United States Supreme Court 
handed down Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which established 
that in order to pass constitutional muster, population rather than location 
must be the predominate consideration in the apportionment of electoral 
districts. Reynolds specifically rejected an approach in which population 
is the only factor, noting that "[m]athmatical exactness or precision is 
hardly a workable constitutional requirement." 377 U.S.  at 
577. 
The Reynolds Court acknowledged the legitimate function of such factors 
as compactness, area, political units, historical precedents, and economic and 
political interests when it stated:

A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various 
political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts 
of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid 
considerations may underlie such aims. Indiscriminate districting, without any 
regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be 
little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering. . . . Whatever 
the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be substantial 
equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any 
citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the 
State.
Id. at 578-579.
¶3 By today's decision, this Court strikes only the county-based aspect of 
the Section 9A formula to meet the requirement of Reynolds that 
population be the controlling criterion in evaluating a redistricting plan. The 
remaining "population apportionment formula" includes the Section 9A factors of 
"compactness, area, political units, historical precedents, economic and 
political interests, contiguous territory, and other major factors."
¶4 Today's decision recognizes that factors other than population can be the 
tool for achieving voter equality as well as the tool for its circumvention. The 
problem is not in the tool. Rather it is in its application. That is why those 
factors continue to be utilized by states in their constitutional and statutory 
redistricting schemes1 and by state and federal courts in evaluating whether a 
redistricting plan unconstitutionally furthers invidious discrimination. 
See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 
(1993)(applying several of the factors listed in Section 9A to a claim of racial 
gerrymandering). The proper focus of redistricting and judicial review of 
redistricting plans is voter equality rather than mathematical uniformity of 
population among the districts because "the achieving of fair and effective 
representation for all citizens is . . . the basic aim of legislative 
apportionment." Reynolds, 377 U.S.  at 565-566.

¶5 In this matter, no claim of gerrymandering based on race or economic 
status has been asserted. The claim is that political gerrymandering was 
involved in the redistricting. In 2004, the United States Supreme Court in 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, held all claims of political 
gerrymandering to be nonjusticiable in federal court because no judicially 
discernable and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims exist. The 
clear implication of Vieth is that if a state court has judicially 
discernable and manageable standards, it is justified in adjudicating claims of 
political gerrymandering. Those standards, however, are derived from a states 
statutory and/or constitutional scheme for redistricting. By contrast, claims of 
racial or economic gerrymandering are subject to strict scrutiny under the 14th 
Amendment.

¶6 In this political gerrymandering claim, the problem is that the fact 
specific factors listed in Section 9A are not sufficient to provide discernable 
and manageable standards by which this Court may adjudicate a claim of political 
gerrymandering in an Article V, Section 11C review proceeding. However, the 
factors are sufficient to guide the District Court in making the fact 
determinations necessary to determine whether political gerrymandering has 
occurred or whether some form of voter discrimination has been perpetrated in 
contravention of the 14th Amendment or the Voting Rights 
Act.
FOOTNOTES

1 New Jersey, for example, 
has a special commission to establish Congressional redistricting. N.J. Const. 
Art.II, § 2. Iowa has very specific protections against gerrymandering. Iowa's 
redistricting standards mandate the use of a set of factors that include 
population, compactness, area, political units, political interests, and 
contiguous territory. Iowa Code § 42.4.