Case Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Robert J. Hyndman

Citation: 2002 WI 6

Docket Number: 1988AP001616-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 6 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
88-1616-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Robert J. Hyndman, Attorney at Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
n/k/a Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
Robert J. Hyndman,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REINSTATEMENT OF HYNDMAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 23, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2002 WI 6 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  88-1616-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Robert J. Hyndman, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility, n/k/a Office of Lawyer  
Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert J. Hyndman,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 23, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
reinstatement 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
reinstated upon condition.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM   Effective 
June 
1, 1989, 
this 
court 
revoked Robert J. Hyndman's license to practice law in this 
state for professional misconduct consisting of his neglect of 
legal matters and his dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation to 
his clients, commingling of personal and client funds, failure 
to maintain complete records of client funds in his possession 
and promptly pay those funds to clients upon request, filing a 
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
2 
 
false 
certificate 
concerning 
his 
client 
trust 
account, 
misrepresentation of his practice as being a partnership, 
failure to promptly deliver client papers to successor counsel, 
and engaging in the practice of law in violation of this court's 
rules.  Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman, 149 Wis. 2d 
487, 439 N.W.2d 129 (1989).  At the time of that prior 
disciplinary proceeding, Attorney Hyndman had been charged but 
not then convicted of criminal acts.  In response to Hyndman's 
objection that this court in the context of the disciplinary 
case should not consider the then-pending criminal matter, this 
court agreed that it was unnecessary to address the pending 
criminal charge because the referee had recommended license 
revocation 
as 
discipline 
for 
Hyndman's 
other 
acts 
of 
professional misconduct and there was no more severe sanction 
available.  This court asserted, however, that it could, in the 
future if appropriate, consider the criminal matter if Hyndman 
were to seek reinstatement of his license to practice law.  Id. 
at 495-96.   
¶2 
Following this court's decision revoking his license 
to practice law, Hyndman was convicted on the criminal charge of 
solicitation to commit a felony, delivery of cocaine.  Hyndman 
received a 30-month sentence for that conviction.  That 
conviction was affirmed in State v. Hyndman, 170 Wis. 2d 198, 
488 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1992).  Hyndman served eight months of 
that sentence and was released on parole in September 1993.  
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
On February 9, 2000, Hyndman filed a petition seeking 
reinstatement of his license to practice law.1  A public hearing 
on Hyndman's petition for reinstatement was held and the 
District 2 Professional Responsibility Committee recommended 
that the petition for reinstatement be granted.  The director of 
OLR agreed that under the totality of the circumstances, 
                                                 
1 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process underwent a substantial restructuring.  
Under former SCR 21.11, when a petition for reinstatement was 
filed, the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility was 
required to conduct an investigation of the moral character of 
the person and report its findings and recommendations to this 
court.  Under the new attorney disciplinary procedures, the name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and the supreme court rules applicable 
to the lawyer regulation system, including reinstatement after 
revocation, were also revised.  In this case, because Hyndman's 
petition for reinstatement was filed before the effective date 
of the new rules, pursuant to former SCR 22.28(5), this petition 
for reinstatement was referred to the appropriate professional 
responsibility committee of the state bar created by former SCR 
21.08 for review and report.   
After 
a 
public 
hearing 
and 
recommendation 
from 
a 
subcommittee, 
that 
professional 
responsibility 
committee 
recommended that the petition be granted and Hyndman's license 
to practice law be reinstated.  That report was filed with the 
director of OLR on October 2, 2000.  Under the new provisions of 
SCR 22.30, a hearing on a petition for reinstatement is to be 
conducted by a referee.  Because this case arose under the old 
rules but the committee's report was filed under the new rules, 
the director of OLR filed a report and recommendation with this 
court agreeing with the district professional responsibility 
committee's recommendation that under the totality of the 
circumstances, Hyndman's petition for reinstatement should be 
granted.  The Board of Bar Examiners also filed a memorandum 
supporting that recommendation.  All further references to 
supreme court rules in this opinion will be to those in effect 
prior to October 1, 2000, unless specifically noted.   
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
4 
 
Hyndman's license to practice law in this state should be 
reinstated.   
¶4 
Although we agree with the recommendation from the 
district professional responsibility committee and the director 
that Hyndman's license be reinstated, we must note our grave 
concern about Hyndman's criminal activities and his felony drug 
conviction, factors that were expressly not considered by this 
court when we revoked his license to practice law in 1989.  In 
past cases we have examined the gravity of the underlying 
misconduct by the attorney and denied reinstatement.  See 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hersh, 108 Wis. 2d 450, 321 
N.W.2d 927 (1982).  We see nothing in our prior attorney 
disciplinary 
decisions 
implying 
that 
a 
petitioner 
for 
reinstatement enjoys a presumption of rehabilitation upon the 
expiration of a specified term of suspension——or in this case 
upon service of sentence imposed for a criminal conviction——
where no evidence of intervening or subsequent misconduct is 
present.  Under the former SCR rules, see SCR 22.28(6), as well 
as the new ones,2 a petitioner for reinstatement has the burden 
                                                 
2 In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Penn, 2002 WI 5, ___ 
Wis. 2d  ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, released today, we recognize that 
a petitioner seeking reinstatement has the burden at the hearing 
held before a referee to demonstrate by clear, satisfactory and 
convincing evidence that the petitioner has the moral character 
to practice law in Wisconsin and that his or her resumption of 
the 
practice 
of 
law 
would 
not 
be 
detrimental 
to 
the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public interest.  
To that end, we also recognize that the referee conducting the 
hearing on the petition for reinstatement may consider the 
petitioner's past, present, and predicted future conduct and may 
consider any relevant information presented.  See SCR 22.31(1) 
and (5) (effective October 1, 2000).   
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
5 
 
of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he or she 
possesses the requisite moral character to practice law in 
Wisconsin 
and 
that 
resumption 
of 
practice 
will 
not 
be 
detrimental to the integrity and standing or the bar of the 
administration of justice or be subversive of the public 
interest.  See Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hetzel, 118 Wis. 
2d 257, 268, 346 N.W.2d 782 (1984).  At the same time, however, 
we acknowledge that under former SCR 21.03(5), which was in 
effect at the time of Hyndman's revocation, it was expressly 
stated that the imposition of discipline for misconduct is not 
intended as a punishment for wrongdoing; rather, discipline is 
imposed to protect the public, the courts, and the legal 
profession.  Our review of the record in this matter now leads 
us to believe that the petitioner has met his burden and that he 
can now safely be reinstated to the practice of law in this 
state.  We think that Hyndman's reinstatement and resumption of 
the practice of law will not endanger the public, the courts, or 
the legal profession.  
¶5 
The report submitted by the District 2 Professional 
Responsibility Committee contained the following conclusions 
supporting its recommendation that Hyndman's license to practice 
law be reinstated: 
This Petitioner has waited eleven years to petition 
for reinstatement of his law license.  He has been 
sober for ten years and will be active in AA the rest 
of his life.  He has maintained steady employment, 
done laudable volunteer work, established a strong, 
loving family, reconnected with his family of origin 
and, generally, paid his debt to society.  Although he 
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
6 
 
served time in prison and found it necessary to 
declare bankruptcy, he has made all restitution and 
has the promise of a job with his brother if his 
license is reinstated.  The witnesses Petitioner 
presented at the reinstatement hearing were credible 
and convincing. . . . It is the committee's considered 
opinion that Robert Hyndman has made significant and 
lasting life-style changes coupled with an intense 
desire to resume the practice of law.   
¶6 
As noted, the OLR director agrees and recommends that 
Hyndman's petition for reinstatement be granted.   
¶7 
Other than noting our concern about the gravity of 
Hyndman's prior criminal activities as discussed above, we deem 
it necessary to discuss only one additional area of concern 
addressed by both the district responsibility committee and the 
OLR director in his report.  The question that was raised, and 
ultimately resolved in Hyndman's favor, focused on whether 
Hyndman had been practicing law while under revocation when he 
represented his employer in replevin actions in small claims 
court and made appearances at creditors' meetings in federal 
bankruptcy proceedings where he filed claims on behalf of his 
employer.  Both former and current SCR 22.26(2)3 proscribe 
practicing law while under revocation or suspension.  The 
subcommittee of the district responsibility committee which 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.26(2) provides: 
(2) An attorney whose license to practice law is suspended 
or revoked or who is suspended from the practice of law may not 
engage in this state in the practice of law or in any law work 
activity customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may engage in law 
related work in this state for a commercial employer itself not 
engaged in the practice of law.  (Effective October 1, 2000.)   
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
7 
 
conducted the public hearing on Hyndman's reinstatement petition 
considered in detail Hyndman's activities on behalf of his 
employer.  One of the members of that committee requested a 
research memo from an employee of his firm, discussing whether 
Hyndman's appearances on behalf of his employer in replevin 
actions in small claims court and at creditors' meetings where 
Hyndman filed claims on behalf of his employer in bankruptcy 
proceedings, constituted practicing law within the proscription 
of the rule.  The research memo suggested that Hyndman's 
activities did, in fact, constitute the practice of law.   
¶8 
The committee, however, rejected that conclusion and 
instead determined that because the actions Hyndman took on 
behalf of his employer could be——and frequently were——performed 
by non-lawyers, his activities fell within the exception in the 
rule permitting a suspended or revoked attorney to perform "law 
related work for a commercial employer."  Thus, Hyndman had not 
violated SCR 22.26(2). 
¶9 
We agree.  First we note that Wis. Stat. § 799.06 
(1999-2000)4 permits non-lawyers, if an authorized and full-time 
employee, to appear on behalf of another "person" in small 
claims actions.  In Jadair Inc. v. United States First Ins. Co., 
209 Wis. 2d 187, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997), this court pointed out 
that this statute, which permits an authorized full-time 
employee to appear in small claims actions on behalf of an 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
8 
 
employer, is an exception to the general proscription against 
practicing law without a license set out in Wis. Stat. § 757.30.  
The Jadair court noted the fiction in Wis. Stat. § 799.06(2) 
that in a small claims action, the non-lawyer appearing for his 
or her employer is considered to be the "party" to the action.  
Id. at 198 n.10.  See also Holz v. Busy Bees Contracting, Inc., 
223 Wis. 2d 598, 589 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1998), where the court 
of appeals held that a non-lawyer president of a corporation 
could file a notice of appeal in a small claims action on behalf 
of the corporation.   
¶10 The writer of the research memo submitted to the 
district committee in this case reasoned that although the 
activities 
permitted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 799.06(2) 
may 
not 
constitute practicing law under Wis. Stat. § 757.30, that does 
not mean that those same activities should not be considered 
"practicing law" within the prohibition of SCR 22.26(2).  In 
other words, the writer of the research memo took the position 
that even though a non-lawyer may represent his or her employer 
in a small claims action under Wis. Stat. §  799.06(2) without 
violating Wis. Stat. § 757.30, if that non-lawyer is a suspended 
or revoked attorney, those same acts on behalf of his or her 
employer 
would 
violate 
SCR 
22.26(2). 
 
The 
memo-writer's 
underlying premise was that actions that may be permissible for 
non-lawyers, are not permissible for suspended or revoked 
attorneys because the latter were once licensed to practice law 
and, consequently, must be held to higher standards. 
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
9 
 
¶11 Likewise, the writer of the research memo concluded 
that Hyndman's activities on behalf of his employer in the 
bankruptcy proceedings——even though Hyndman did not appear 
before a judge and even though those same activities were also 
regularly 
performed 
by 
non-lawyers——constituted 
appearances 
before a governmental body in an effort to determine the rights 
of individuals, something this court in Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eisenberg, 96 Wis. 2d 342, 344, 291 N.W.2d 565 (1980), 
held constituted the practice of law within the prohibition of 
SCR 22.26(2).  See also, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kells, 
172 Wis. 2d 613, 627, 493 N.W.2d 723 (1993), where this court 
held that a suspended attorney who had drafted legal documents 
for his wife in her federal bankruptcy proceedings had been 
practicing law in violation of SCR 22.26(2).  In Kells, this 
court noted the sophisticated nature of the legal documents that 
had been prepared, as well as the extent of the suspended 
lawyer's actions on behalf of his wife and viewed them as 
exceeding the kind of participation a pro se debtor's spouse 
would normally be permitted to undertake.5 
¶12 We agree with the district professional responsibility 
committee's conclusion that Hyndman's activities on behalf of 
                                                 
5 In contrast, Hyndman's activities in small claims court 
and in the creditors' meetings in the federal bankruptcy 
proceedings could be, and frequently were, performed by non-
lawyers.  Furthermore, with respect to the small claims replevin 
actions, Hyndman's actions on behalf of his employer were 
specifically excluded from what would otherwise be considered 
the unauthorized practice of law under Wis. Stat. § 757.30.   
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
10 
 
his employer while he was under revocation did not constitute 
the practice of law within the proscription of SCR 22.26(2).  
First, Hyndman's acts in both the small claims court as well as 
in the federal bankruptcy proceedings were acts that could be 
and, in fact, frequently were performed by non-lawyers.  If 
those acts would not constitute practicing law for a non-lawyer, 
then those same acts would not constitute practicing law for a 
person, like Hyndman, whose license to practice law had 
previously been revoked or suspended.   
¶13 Furthermore, as noted, the small claims procedure 
itself specifically permits non-lawyers to do what Hyndman did 
on behalf of his employer in small claims replevin actions.  
Wis. Stat. § 799.06(2).  Similarly, we conclude that Hyndman's 
activities 
on 
behalf 
of 
his 
employer 
in 
the 
bankruptcy 
proceedings did not constitute the practice of law because these 
activities could be and frequently were, performed by non-
lawyers.  The testimony before the committee at the public 
hearing established that Hyndman did not hold himself out to be 
an attorney when performing those acts; rather he took pains to 
note that he was acting as a layperson.  We agree that Hyndman's 
activities did not constitute practicing law. 
¶14 Moreover, we observe that Hyndman's activities could 
be viewed as simply being "law related work for a commercial 
employer not itself engaged in the practice of law"——an 
exception recognized within SCR 22.26(2) itself.  Hyndman's 
employer was a commercial enterprise in the business of leasing 
household items; it was not engaged in the practice of law.  We 
No. 
88-1616-D   
 
11 
 
determine that Hyndman's activities on behalf of his employer 
fell within this exception in SCR 22.26(2). 
¶15 In sum, although we are greatly troubled by the 
seriousness of Hyndman's criminal activities leading to his 
felony conviction and prison sentence, we conclude that he has 
met his burden of demonstrating by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence that he has the moral character to practice 
law in this state, that his resumption of the practice of law 
will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or 
subversive of the public interest, and that he has complied 
fully with all the terms of the order of revocation and with the 
requirements of SCR 22.26.  We further conclude that Hyndman's 
activities on behalf of his employer in the 11 years since the 
revocation of his license, did not constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law within the proscription of SCR 22.26(2). 
Accordingly, 
¶16 IT IS ORDERED the petition for the reinstatement of 
the license of Robert J. Hyndman to practice law in Wisconsin is 
granted and his license is reinstated effective the date of this 
order upon the condition that he comply with the current CLE 
requirements.6 
                                                 
6 The Board of Bar Examiners recommended that this petition 
for reinstatement be granted having determined that Hyndman is 
in compliance with the applicable continuing legal education 
requirements.   
No.  88-1616-D.jpw 
 
 
 
1
¶17 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I am concerned that 
the timing of this petition for reinstatement——that it arose 
during the transition between the old and the new lawyer 
regulation systems——has not allowed us to make an adequate 
consideration of the facts in this case.  Most notably, I think 
there has been an insufficient inquiry into the circumstances of 
Hyndman's felony conviction.  Without more information, the 
court's decision to reinstate Hyndman's license to practice law 
could set an inappropriate precedent for future cases.  Under 
the circumstances of this particular case, I would find it more 
appropriate to assign the case to a referee for further 
investigation.  For that reason, I dissent. 
¶18 As the court points out, the timing of this petition 
was unusual.  Per curiam op. at ¶3 n.1.  The initial public 
hearing was held before a subcommittee of the District 2 
Professional 
Responsibility 
Committee 
("the 
Committee") 
on 
August 2, 2000.  The report of the Committee was received by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) on October 2, 2000.  Changes 
in the lawyer regulation system had dissolved the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) on October 1, 2000.  
Because there had already been a public hearing, the case was 
not assigned to a referee, as would have been required under the 
present rules.  See SCR 21.08 (2000).  Instead, the case was 
sent to the OLR, and the director submitted to this court a 
report, which recommended reinstatement of Hyndman's license.  
However, because no referee was appointed, I think that some 
No.  88-1616-D.jpw 
 
 
 
2
significant factors regarding Hyndman's fitness to practice law 
have not been adequately considered. 
¶19 Most serious among these factors is Hyndman's felony 
conviction for solicitation to commit a felony, delivery of 
cocaine.  The incident that gave rise to the conviction occurred 
in 1988 while Hyndman was a licensed attorney and involved a 
conspiracy to purchase approximately $17,000 worth of cocaine 
through one of his own clients.  Hyndman was charged in 1988, 
but a judgment of conviction was not entered until March 26, 
1991.  Because the conviction was not yet final at the time of 
Hyndman's original disciplinary hearing, the charge, rightly, 
was not considered for the purposes of discipline.  However, 
this court explicitly stated that the conviction could be 
considered at future disciplinary proceedings or when Hyndman 
sought reinstatement.  Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman, 
149 Wis. 2d 487, 495-96, 439, N.W.2d 129 (1989). 
¶20 Now that Hyndman has applied for reinstatement, it 
seems that our consideration of his felony conviction has 
slipped through the cracks.  In the OLR Director's report, the 
only mention made of the conviction is that "Petitioner showed 
sincere remorse for the totality of his behavior which led to 
his revocation and the subsequent criminal conviction" and that 
"Petitioner's . . . criminal behavior prior to his revocation 
was reprehensible.  However Petitioner has demonstrated that he 
has addressed the problems (primarily alcoholism) that were 
present in his life at that time . . . ."  The court, in my 
view, gives equally short shrift to the issue.  In its opinion, 
No.  88-1616-D.jpw 
 
 
 
3
the court notes its "grave concern about Hyndman's criminal 
activities and his felony drug conviction" and that a petitioner 
for 
reinstatement 
does 
not 
enjoy 
a 
"presumption 
of 
rehabilitation."  Per curiam op. at ¶4.  However, the court says 
no more about the conviction and goes on to conclude that 
Hyndman is a suitable candidate for reinstatement. 
¶21 Nowhere does the court address the concerns raised by 
Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney Jack Stoiber in his 
letter to the Committee.  Specifically, Mr. Stoiber noted that 
because Hyndman's criminal activity involved a client, Hyndman 
may have violated his duty to avoid conflicts of interest under 
SCR 20:1.7, violated his duty to refrain from inappropriate 
business relationships with clients under SCR 20:1.8, and 
engaged in conduct that reflected poorly on his honesty, 
trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer under SCR 20:8.4.  I 
have similar concerns about these potential violations, and I 
think that a full inquiry into the issues is necessary before we 
issue a decision on whether or not to reinstate Hyndman's 
license.  Thus, I would find that further investigation of the 
matters is warranted. 
¶22 With that said, I recognize that Hyndman has made 
great strides in his personal life.  He has paid all of his 
restitution, maintained productive employment, reestablished 
ties with his family and his community, and brought his 
substance abuse problems under control.  When we have dealt with 
lawyers impaired by substance abuse problems in the past, we 
No.  88-1616-D.jpw 
 
 
 
4
have recognized that substance abuse is a treatable problem 
that, with diligence and help, can be controlled. 
¶23 My concern with this case, however, goes deeper than 
mere impairment.  The crime that the court glosses over is not a 
minor one.  Such a felony drug conviction would prevent Hyndman 
from joining the Armed Forces,7 from becoming a police officer or 
a sheriff's deputy,8 from owning a firearm,9 and even from 
becoming a notary public.10  The fact that the crime involved one 
of Hyndman's own clients adds to the seriousness of the offense.  
Still, the court holds today that he is fit to practice law and 
serve as an officer of the court.  Without more to justify this 
court's lack of consideration of Hyndman's felony conviction, I 
am concerned that the court is setting a troubling precedent.  
                                                 
7 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1994); Dep't of Defense Directive 
1304.26, § E1.2.7.2 (Mar. 4, 1994). 
8 See, e.g., Dane County Sheriff's Recruiting Announcement 
(2002), at http://www.co.dane.wi.us/shrf/recruit.html; Milwaukee 
Police 
Officer 
Guide: 
Qualifications 
(Jan. 
2002), 
at 
http://www.ci.mil.wi.us/citygov/fpc/poguide.htm#se. 
9 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 & Supp. 2000); Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1)(a) (1999-2000). 
10 63 Op. Atty. Gen. Wis. 74, 75 (1974). 
No.  88-1616-D.jpw 
 
 
 
5
For this reason, I think a further investigation is warranted, 
and that this petition should be assigned to a referee for 
careful consideration in accordance with the present rules. 
¶24 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶25 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins in this dissent. 
 
No.  88-1616-D.jpw 
 
 
 
1