Case Title: TIMOTHY DANIEL MOORE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0276

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
TIMOTHY DANIEL MOORE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 108Case Number: S-08-0276Decided: 09/02/2009NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
TIMOTHY 
DANIEL MOORE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Timothy 
D. Moore, Pro se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and JAMES, 
D.J.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In 2002, Timothy 
Moore (Appellant) was convicted of four felonies.  Three of his felony sentences were 
ordered to be served concurrently with each other.  These three concurrent sentences were 
ordered to be served consecutively to the fourth felony sentence.  In 2004, the district court granted a 
sentence reduction.  It is 
Appellant's contention here that, as a result of the sentence reduction, all 
four sentences are now concurrent.  
The district court has repeatedly rejected Appellant's claims in this 
regard.  In this appeal, we will 
affirm the district court's Order 
Clarifying July 12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence 
Modification.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In his pro se brief, Appellant does not provide 
a statement of the issues presented for review, as required by W.R.A.P. 
7.01(d).  However, he makes these 
three arguments:

 
 

1.            
The 
March 12, 2004 Order required all of Appellant's sentences to run 
concurrently.

 
 

2.            
[The 
district court's] Order Clarifying July 12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence 
Modification rendered [the 2004] Order Granting Appellant's Motion for Sentence 
Modification an absurdity and without effect.

 
 

3.            
The 
language of the July 12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence Modification compelled 
Appellant to submit the Motion to Clarify and Complete the July 12, 2005 
Order.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2002, 
a Carbon County jury found Appellant guilty of two misdemeanors1 and the following four 
felonies:  aggravated burglary, 
blackmail, and two counts of kidnapping.  
The details of those crimes are set out in Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, 80 P.3d 191 
(Wyo. 2003).  The district court 
imposed the following felony sentences:

 
 
                        
Count I           
Aggravated burglary            
5-10 years

                        
Count IV        
Kidnapping                           
5-10 years

                        
Count V         
Kidnapping                           
5-10 years

                        
Count VI        
Blackmail                              
2-5 years

 
 
The 
district court ordered that the sentences for Counts IV, V, and VI be served 
concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence for Count 
I.  This Court affirmed the 
convictions in Moore, with mandate 
issuing on December 11, 2003.

 
 
[¶4]      On February 23, 
2004, Appellant filed a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
35(b).2  In that motion, Appellant requested that 
"his sentence be modified so that all of his sentences run concurrently."  On March 12, 2004, without holding a 
hearing, the district court entered its Order Granting Motion for Sentence 
Reduction.  That order 
provided:

 
 
IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Sentence 
Modification be, and is hereby granted;

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed in Counts I, IV and V of not less 
than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years be, and is hereby, reduced to a 
term of not less than five (5) years nor more than eight (8) 
years.

 
 
[¶5]      The meaning of 
this order has been the focus of subsequent litigation, including this 
appeal.  It is Appellant's 
contention that, when the district court granted the motion for sentence 
reduction, the district court granted the only relief requested thereinthat all 
sentences run concurrently.  
According to Appellant, the Wyoming Department of Corrections has treated 
the sentences as consecutive.

 
 
[¶6]      An added 
complication in this case arises from the retirement of Second Judicial District 
Court Judge Ken Stebner.  Judge 
Stebner presided over Appellant's original sentencing.  Judge Stebner also entered the Order Granting Motion for Sentence 
Reduction.  Judge Stebner later 
retired.  He was replaced by Judge 
Wade Waldrip, who presided over the following proceedings.  

 
 
[¶7]      In 2005, 
Appellant filed three letters with the district court.  In one of the letters, Appellant 
asserted that he had been advised by a records manager from the Wyoming 
Department of Corrections to "contact the sentencing court and ask for 
clarification concerning my sentence structure."  Appellant requested that the district 
court enter an order declaring that all of his sentences are concurrent.  On July 12, 2005, the district court 
entered its Order Denying Sentence 
Modification.  The order 
provides that the Order Granting Motion 
for Sentence Reduction "granted specific relief in response to Defendant's 
original Motion for Sentence Reduction, and only the specified relief.  The requests not granted were, 
necessarily, denied."

 
 
[¶8]      In October of 
2005, Appellant filed a Petition for Nunc 
Pro Tunc Judgment and Sentence.  
In that petition, Appellant averred that the March 12, 2004 Order Granting Motion for Sentence 
Reduction "does not specify that terms are to be consecutive.  The sentence remained concurrent 
according to law."  The district 
court denied that petition as well, on October 13, 2005.

 
 
[¶9]      The present 
action began on August 14, 2008, when Appellant filed a Motion to Clarify and Complete the July 12, 
2005 Order.  On September 18, 
2008, the district court entered its Order Clarifying July 12, 2005 Order Denying 
Sentence Modification.  In 
clarifying its prior order, the district court concluded that "[i]n actual 
application, [Appellant] is essentially sentenced to serve two (2) 
consecutive sentences, each 5 years to 8 years in length."  (Emphasis in original.)  This timely appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Appellant argues that the March 12, 
2004 Order Granting Motion for Sentence 
Reduction made all of his sentences concurrent.  He submits that, when the district court 
granted his motion for sentence reduction, it granted the only relief requested 
in the motionthat all sentences run concurrently.  He claims that the reduction in the 
maximum term (from 10 to 8 years) was a grant of additional relief.  He also asserts that the July 12, 2005 
Order Denying Sentence Modification 
was so confusing that he was compelled to seek clarification of it.  The State, in addition to addressing the 
merits of Appellant's arguments, contends that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Appellant's motions and, alternatively, that Appellant's 
present claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

 
 
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶11]   We first examine the State's 
contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter both (1) the 
July 12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence 
Modification and (2) the September 18, 2008 Order Clarifying July 12, 2005 Order Denying 
Sentence Modification.  With 
regard to post-conviction relief matters, we follow the rule that, "[O]nce the 
defendant's conviction has become final because of the exercise or forfeiture of 
his right to appeal from his conviction, the district court has no continuing 
authority to act in the case unless permitted by express statute or rule."  Taylor v. State, 2003 WY 97, ¶ 8, 
74 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, 
¶¶ 11-13, 51 P.3d 851, 854 (Wyo. 2002)).  This authority issue presents a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction, and "[t]he subject matter jurisdiction of a 
court is a question of law that is reviewed de novo."  Brown v. State, 2008 WY 9, ¶ 12, 
175 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶12]   With respect to the 2005 order, the 
State is making a collateral attack on the order's validity.  Joyner v. State, 2002 WY 174, ¶ 14, 
58 P.3d 331, 336 (Wyo. 2002) ("Collateral attack principles apply where a party 
is seeking to attack or undo' a prior court order.")  As a general rule, collateral attacks on 
judgments are not allowed.  Id. at ¶ 12, 58 P.3d 335-36.  However, a "judgment rendered by a court 
without jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral attack."  Rogers v. City of Cheyenne, 747 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Wyo. 1987); Joyner, 
¶ 12, 58 P.3d  at 335-36.  Thus, 
we will permit the State's jurisdictional challenge to the 2005 order.  With respect to the 2008 order, the 
jurisdictional challenge is clearly appropriate.  Joyner, ¶ 13, 58 P.3d  at 336.  However, we reject both 
challenges.

 
 
[¶13]   The State contends that Appellant's 
2005 and 2008 requests for sentence modification were not timely under W.R.Cr.P. 
35(b), leaving the district court without jurisdiction to consider the 
motions.  Stewart v. State, 654 P.2d 727, 727 
(Wyo. 1982).  First, we note that 
Appellant's initial Motion for Sentence 
Modification, which he filed on February 23, 2004, was clearly timely, 
because the motion was filed within one year of this Court's affirmance of 
Appellant's convictions.  W.R.Cr.P. 
35(b); Tomlin v. State, 2001 WY 121, 
35 P.3d 1255 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶14]   Turning to Appellant's 2005 
pleadings, we first note that the "motion" was actually a series of 
letters.  In the letters, Appellant 
requested, among other things, that the district court clarify the Order Granting Motion for Sentence 
Reduction.  Clearly, this was 
not a request for sentence reduction under W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), which would have 
been untimely.  Instead, Appellant 
was requesting clarification/correction of the Order Granting Motion for Sentence 
Reduction.  Thus, Appellant's 
"motion" was not a motion filed pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
35(b).

 
 
[¶15]   We find authority for Appellant's 
"motion" in W.R.Cr.P. 36, which provides:

 
 

W.R.Cr.P. 
36.  Clerical 
mistakes.

 
 
Clerical 
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.

 
 
The 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure contain a nearly identical provision in 
W.R.C.P. 60(a).3  In Kearns v. State, 2002 WY 97, ¶ 27, 
48 P.3d 1090, 1098 n.1 (Wyo. 2002), we used interpretations of Rule 60 to aid us 
in interpreting and applying W.R.Cr.P. 36.  
We find it appropriate to do the same here.

 
 
[¶16]   In interpreting Rule 60(a), this 
Court has written:

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
60(a) is intended to correct clerical, not judicial, errors.  A clerical error is a mistake or 
omission of a mechanical nature apparent on the face of the record that prevents 
the judgment as entered from accurately reflecting the judgment that was 
rendered.  In addition, W.R.C.P. 60(a) is designed to 
clarify, as well as to correct, and is properly invoked to dispel either patent 
or latent ambiguities in a judgment.

 
 

Elsasser 
v. Elsasser, 
989 P.2d 106, 108 (Wyo. 1999) (internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied); 
Wyland v. Wyland, 2006 WY 93, 
¶¶ 8-9, 138 P.3d 1165, 1167-68 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶17]   In addition, in a slightly 
different context, we have emphasized that the judicial branch has an obligation 
to clearly define sentencing structure.  
In Jones v. State, 2003 WY 
154, ¶ 8, 79 P.3d 1021, 1024 (Wyo. 2003), we quoted our own order, entered 
upon a petition for writ of review, which order directed the district court to 
clarify Jones' sentence structure:

 
 
The 
Court further finds that, due to the district court's refusal, at the time of 
sentencing, to designate [Jones's] 1993 aggravated robbery sentences as either 
concurrent or consecutive to his parole sentence, it would not be appropriate or 
just in this instance for the courts to stand silent and allow the Board of 
Parole to rely on the presumption of consecutive sentencing found in Loper v. Shillinger, 772 P.2d 552, 553 
(Wyo. 1989) and Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83, 85 (Wyo. 1995).  Therefore, 
pursuant to its supervisory power, this Court finds that the district court 
should be directed to correct the 1993 judgment and sentence to include a 
designation regarding whether the 1993 sentences are to be served concurrently 
or consecutively to [Jones's] parole sentence.  The Court also notes that, despite the 
fact that this matter may technically be res judicata due to the district court's 
repeated denials of [Jones's] various motions to correct an illegal sentence, 
its decision is made in the interests of justice as well as in the interest of 
requiring the judicial branch to discharge its duties.  See also W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(2)(C).

 
 
[¶18]   Here, there is a lack of clarity in 
the district court's 2004 Order Granting 
Motion for Sentence Reduction.  
As this litigation indicates, it is not clear if the district court 
intended that all of Appellant's sentences be concurrent.  Thus, we find that, although the 
district court denominated Appellant's letters as a motion for sentence 
modification, the letters were a proper motion to correct clerical error, 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 36.  Thus, we 
conclude that the district court had jurisdiction, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 36, to 
enter its July 12, 2005 Order Denying 
Sentence Modification.  In 
addition, we find that the district court's action, in addressing Appellant's 
filings on the merits, is entirely consistent with what we said in Jones.

 
 
[¶19]   We turn next to Appellant's 
August 2008 Motion to Clarify and 
Complete the July 12, 2005 Order.  
We again conclude that this motion was a proper motion to correct a 
clerical error under W.R.Cr.P. 36, inasmuch as the motion also sought 
clarification.  We also again 
conclude that the district court's actions were consistent with Jones.  The July 12, 2005 order provided that 
the 2004 Order Granting Sentence 
Reduction "granted specific relief in response to Defendant's original 
Motion for Sentence Reduction, and only the specified relief.  The requests not granted were, 
necessarily, denied."  This 
statement begs the question:  what 
specific relief was granted?  Thus, 
the July 12, 2005 order also suffered from a lack of clarity, although that lack 
of clarity was arguably less significant than the lack of clarity in the 2004 Order Granting Sentence Reduction.  In any event, given the rules and 
precedent detailed above, we conclude that the district court acted 
appropriately in treating Appellant's motion as jurisdictionally proper. 
 Nevertheless, even though 
Appellant's motions were jurisdictionally proper, we must still determine 
whether res judicata bars any of 
Appellant's present claims.

 
 
Res 
judicata

 
 
[¶20]   "Application of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law that 
we review de novo."  Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2008 
WY 46, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d 94, 99 (Wyo. 2008).  This Court has made clear 
that

 
 
[t]he 
concept of res judicata applies in 
criminal cases as well as in civil cases.  
Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157 
¶ 14, 151 P.3d 261, 266 (Wyo. 2006).  
Under res judicata, "[i]t is a 
longstanding rule that issues which could have been raised in an earlier 
proceeding are foreclosed from subsequent consideration."  Gould, ¶ 15, 151 P.3d  at 266 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Lacey v. 
State, 2003 WY 148, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 493, 495 
(Wyo.2003)).

 
 

Meyers 
v. State, 
2007 WY 118, ¶ 12, 164 P.3d 544, 547 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
In 
determining whether the doctrine of res 
judicata applies, we examine four factors:  (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in 
subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; 
and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the 
subject matter and the issues between them.

 
 

Lacey 
v. State, 
2003 WY 148, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003).  In this case, the parties, the subject 
matter, and the capacities of the parties have been the same in the 
post-conviction motions filed in this matter.  Therefore, our analysis of the res judicata question will focus on 
whether Appellant raised, or had the opportunity to raise, the same issue 
presently before us in this appeal in any previous proceeding.  Martinez v. State, 2007 WY 164, 
¶ 11, 169 P.3d 89, 91 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶21]   
The district court, in its July 12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence Modification 
clarified the March 2004 Order Granting 
Motion for Sentence Reduction.  
The 2005 order clearly denied Appellant's requests for relief regarding 
the interpretation of the 2004 order, including Appellant's argument that the 
2004 order made all his sentences concurrent.  Indeed, it is clear that the district 
court did not grant Appellant any relief in its 2005 order.  Appellant did not appeal from the 2005 
order.  Thus, any claims denied by 
that order, including Appellant's claim that the sentences are concurrent, are 
res judicata.  Therefore, Appellant's claims, with 
respect to the meaning of the 2004 order, are barred by res judicata, because those claims were 
clearly raised, and clearly denied, in 2005.

 
 
[¶22]   Given the foregoing analysis, 
Appellant's challenges to the order that is the subject of this appeal (the 
September 18, 2008 Order Clarifying July 
12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence Modification) must be limited to whether the 
district court's interpretation and clarification of the July 12, 2005 order was 
proper.  As noted above, it is clear 
that the district court did not grant Appellant any relief in its July 12, 2005 
order.  It denied the 
requested relief.  Just as 
importantly, it granted no affirmative relief.  While the July 12, 2005 order may have 
suffered from a lack of clarity in some respects, it clearly did not grant 
Appellant any relief, including the relief he requestedthat the sentences be 
declared concurrent.  The district 
court's September 18, 2008 order, although more specific in clarifying 
Appellant's sentence structure, is entirely consistent with the July 12, 2005 
order.  We conclude that the 
district court's September 18, 2008 clarification of the July 12, 2005 order is 
entirely consistent with the 2005 order itself.  Therefore, the district court's 
September 18, 2008 Order Clarifying July 
12, 2005 Order Denying Sentence Modification is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellant's misdemeanor sentences are not at issue 
here.

 
 

2W.R.Cr.P. 
35.  Correction or reduction of 
sentence.

            
. . . .

            
(b)  Reduction.A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or 
the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the 
sentence is imposed or probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by 
the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of 
the appeal, or within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the 
Wyoming Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a 
judgment of conviction or probation revocation.  The court shall determine the motion 
within a reasonable time.  Changing 
a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall 
constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision.  The court may determine the motion with 
or without a hearing.

 
 

3W.R.C.P. 
60.  Relief from judgment or 
order.

 
 
            
(a)  Clerical 
Mistakes.Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders.