Case Title: Boss v. Town of Leverett

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12780

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12780 
 
SUSAN BOSS  vs.  TOWN OF LEVERETT. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     December 9, 2019. - April 23, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Public Employment, Retirement benefits.  Municipal Corporations, 
Insurance, Allocation of insurance premiums, Town meeting, 
Warrant for town meeting.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 28, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Mark D. Mason, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Crowley (Erin J. Meehan also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Ryan P. Dunn for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A retired town employee, Susan Boss, filed a 
complaint to obtain a declaration that the town of Leverett 
(town) was obligated to pay fifty percent of the full premium 
cost for health insurance for retired town employees and their 
2 
 
 
dependent spouses.  This is an appeal by the town from the grant 
of summary judgment in Boss's favor by a judge in the Superior 
Court.  The town also appeals from the corresponding denial of 
the town's cross motion for summary judgment.  We transferred 
this case sua sponte from the Appeals Court.  There are two 
issues presented here:  first, whether the town's adoption of 
G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, obligated it to contribute toward the 
premiums associated with retirees' dependents; and second, if 
G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, is interpreted to include these premiums, 
whether it effectively was adopted at the town meeting on April 
24, 2004. 
 
We hold that by adopting G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, the town was 
required to cover fifty percent of the premiums for both 
retirees and the retirees' dependents.  We further hold that the 
town successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town 
meeting held on April 24, 2004.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm. 
 
Background.  1.  Legislative proceedings of the local town 
meeting in 2004.  The town is a municipal corporation located in 
Franklin County that, pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, provides access 
to group health insurance coverage for current and retired 
employees of the Leverett public schools. 
 
On April 24, 2004, the town convened its annual town 
meeting, during which the town's citizens voted on proposed 
3 
 
 
bylaws and amendments.1  In accordance with G. L. c. 39, § 10, a 
warrant was posted before the town meeting to inform the town's 
citizens of the matters on which to be voted.2  Two of the 
articles contained in the warrant, articles 2 and 4, concerned 
retirement benefits.  Article 2 of the warrant proposed (1) the 
adoption of specific language regarding retiree health insurance 
premiums and (2) a budget appropriation for specified insurance 
premiums.  It aimed "to raise and appropriate the sum of $23,500 
to pay one-half the premium costs payable for life and medical 
insurances in [fiscal year] 2005 for retired [town] employees."3  
                     
 
1 The process for proposing a bylaw or subsequent amendment 
is detailed in chapter 11 of the town's code.  Code of Leverett, 
sections 11-1 to 11-9 (Apr. 2011).  See Code of Leverett, 
sections 1-2, 9-6.  Under section 11-5 of the code, any ten 
voters of the town may, through a written petition to the select 
board, include an article in the warrant of a scheduled annual 
town meeting.  Under section 11-6, articles must be submitted to 
the select board thirty days prior to the town meeting. 
 
 
2 The requirements for a warrant are subject to G. L. c. 39, 
§ 10.  Notice must be given at least seven days before the 
annual town meeting, and the warrant must state the time and 
place of the meeting and the subjects on which to be acted. 
 
 
3 The language adopted under article 2 was as follows: 
 
"The town will pay [fifty percent] of the cost of an 
individual health plan offered by the town for a retiree as 
long as the retiree notifies the town of his/her choice to 
enroll in a Leverett health insurance plan within [sixty] 
days of retirement from the town or a qualifying event; the 
individual was enrolled in a Leverett health insurance 
program at the time of retirement; the retiree is older 
than the eligible retirement age; and the retiree has a 
minimum of ten (10) years of credible service with the 
[town] in a beneficial position.  Employees eligible for 
4 
 
 
Article 4 was a ballot question that used the language mandated 
by G. L. c. 32B, § 9A:  "Shall the town pay one-half the premium 
costs payable by a retired employee for group life insurance and 
for group general or blanket hospital, surgical, medical, dental 
and other health insurance?"4 
 
At the town meeting, article 2 was moved for a vote as 
written.  The motion for the vote was then seconded and carried 
unanimously.  Because article 2's passage was contingent upon 
the affirmative vote of the ballot question presented in article 
4, the polls were opened for voting on article 4.  Attendees 
cast their ballot for article 4, which passed with 184 ballots 
in favor and twenty-one opposed.  Therefore, both articles 2 and 
4 passed. 
                     
Medicare shall be required to obtain such coverage and 
comply with [G. L. c. 32B, § 18]. 
 
"A retiree, who has not reached Medicare-eligible age, can 
apply [fifty percent] of the individual premium of his/her 
chosen health plan to the family or employee-plus one 
premium of the same health plan until the retiree reaches 
Medicare-eligible age." 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 32B, § 9A, provides in part:  "A town 
shall provide for the payment by vote of the town at a town 
meeting or if a majority of the votes cast in answer to the 
following question which shall be printed on the official ballot 
to be used at an election in said town is in the 
affirmative:  -- 'Shall the town pay one-half the premium costs 
payable by a retired employee for group life insurance and for 
group general or blanket hospital, surgical, medical, dental and 
other health insurance?'" 
5 
 
 
 
2.  Boss's employment history and health insurance 
coverage.  Boss worked as a teacher for Leverett public schools 
from 1990 until her retirement in 2015.  During her employment, 
she subscribed to health insurance coverage through a group 
plan.  The "1+1" or "Employee Plus One" family group plan was 
offered to all Leverett public school employees pursuant to 
G. L. c. 32B.  Before her retirement, the "1+1" plan covered 
Boss and her dependent spouse. 
 
Nearing her retirement, Boss was informed that after 
retirement she would be able to continue with her family plan 
but that the town would not pay fifty percent of her husband's 
premium coverage.  Boss consulted with the Leverett Education 
Association (association) about this issue.5  The association 
stressed to the town that the payments should be made for both 
the retiree and his or her dependents. 
 
Boss opted to continue participating in the group health 
insurance plan offered by the town.  However, since her 
retirement, the town has paid fifty percent of Boss's premium 
contribution based only on the premium cost for individual 
coverage.  Because the town has covered only fifty percent of 
her contribution, Boss has been responsible for covering the 
                     
 
5 The Leverett Education Association is the sole agent for 
the purposes of collective bargaining on behalf of the teachers 
in Leverett public schools. 
6 
 
 
balance for the "1+1" plan premium in order to continue coverage 
for her spouse.  In November 2017, Boss became Medicare 
eligible, and began to receive Medicare coverage, pursuant to 
article 2 guidelines,6 with the town contributing one-half of the 
premium cost of that coverage.  Since that time, Boss has 
continued to pay the full premium for her husband's individual 
plan. 
 
3.  Provisions of G. L. c. 32B previously adopted by the 
town.  The town previously adopted G. L. c. 32B, §§ 7A, 9D, and 
10, in 1968.  Code of Leverett, Appendix, chapter A232, 
section A (Apr. 2011).  According to G. L. c. 32B, § 10, once 
the local option or one of its sections is accepted, it cannot 
be rescinded or revoked.  Municipal employees will be covered 
automatically unless they give written notice "indicating that 
[they are] not to be insured for such coverages."  G. L. c. 32B, 
§ 4.  In addition, § 7A clarifies that once the local option is 
adopted, the municipal employee shall cover "fifty per cent of a 
premium for the insurance of the employee and his dependents and 
the government unit shall contribute the remaining fifty per 
cent of such premium."  G. L. c. 32B, § 7A (a).  This includes 
additional premiums for an employee's dependent child who is 
                     
 
6 Under article 2, adopted by the town, "[e]mployees 
eligible for Medicare shall be required to obtain such 
coverage." 
7 
 
 
nineteen years or older and is mentally or physically incapable 
of earning his or her own living.  Id.  Further, G. L. c. 32B, 
§ 9D, provides for the town's contribution of one-half of the 
premiums payable by the surviving spouse of an employee or 
retiree. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review a grant of 
summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Galenski v. Erving, 
471 Mass. 305, 307 (2015).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as 
amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  In addition, "[b]ecause this 
case involves questions of statutory interpretation, our review 
is de novo."  Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014). 
 
2.  Interpretation of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A.  We first address 
whether the adoption of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, requires that 
municipal employers pay fifty percent of the premiums for both 
retired employees and their dependents.  The town argues that 
the plain language of the statute does not include the word 
"dependents," and that therefore § 9A does not require it to 
contribute to the premium costs for a retired employee's 
dependents.  The town distinguishes § 9A from other sections in 
c. 32B that do expressly include the word "dependents."  See 
8 
 
 
G. L. c. 32B, §§ 7, 7A, 9E.7  Boss emphasizes that a town's § 9A 
contributions encompass fifty percent of the total premium costs 
of the retiree's insurance plan, not just an individual's 
premium costs.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the 
adoption of § 9A requires municipal employers to pay fifty 
percent of the health insurance premiums for both retired 
employees and their dependents. 
 
In Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001), we 
emphasized that "[a] fundamental tenet of statutory 
interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect 
consistent with its plain meaning."  If the language is clear 
and unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written.  See 
Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872 (1985).  We look at the 
statute in its entirety when determining how a single section 
should be construed.  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012).  In 
addition, when ambiguities are present, the principles of 
statutory construction require that we consider legislative 
                     
 
7 The town, in its memorandum in opposition to Boss's 
summary judgment motion, contends that "because [§] 9A makes no 
reference to payment of premiums on behalf of a retiree's spouse 
but [§] 9E explicitly does [make such a reference], the 
statutory maxim 'expressio[] unius est exclusio[] alterius,' 
meaning 'the expression of one thing in a statute is an implied 
exclusion of other things not included in the statute' applies.  
Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev. LLC, 473 Mass. 580, 
588 (2016), quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 
619 (2013)." 
9 
 
 
intent when interpreting a statute.  See Telesetsky, supra; 
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328 (1983).  See also 
Chin, supra. 
 
a.  Plain meaning.  We begin by examining the language of 
the statute.  General Laws c. 32B, § 9A, states in relevant 
part:  "[A town] may provide that it will pay one-half of the 
amount of the premium to be paid by a retired employee under the 
first sentence of [§] 9."8  The plain meaning of § 9A requires 
that once the town has adopted the section, it "pay one-half of 
the amount of the premium to be paid by a retired employee" 
(emphases added).  The phrase is clear:  the town must 
contribute fifty percent to that which the retired employee is 
required to pay.  The section does not address what type of 
insurance plan it will cover; rather, it focuses on payment.9  
                     
 
8 The first sentence of G. L. c. 32B, § 9, states in 
relevant part: 
 
"The policy or policies of insurance shall provide that 
upon retirement of an employee, . . . the retired employee 
shall make payment of the full premium cost, subject to the 
provisions of [§ 9A] or [9E], whichever may be applicable, 
of the average group premium as determined by the 
appropriate public authority for such insurance; and the 
group general or blanket insurance . . . shall be continued 
and the retired employee shall pay the full premium cost, 
subject to the provisions of [§ 9A] or [9E] whichever may 
be applicable of the average group premium as determined by 
the appropriate public authority . . . ." 
 
 
9 The town offers coverage for its employees through a 
select number of insurance plans.  All plans can be continued 
10 
 
 
Boss's premium payments are calculated based on her group family 
plan -- a plan she opted into prior to her retirement.  The fact 
that this plan includes her husband is irrelevant to the amount 
the town must contribute toward Boss's premium.  The town must 
cover fifty percent of the premium that Boss is to pay, not 
fifty percent of the cost to cover her individually.  It also is 
clear in § 9A that the word "premium" refers to the total 
premium an insured individual pays toward his or her selected 
plan -- regardless of whether the plan is for individual or 
family coverage -- and therefore, the town is required to pay 
fifty percent of that total premium. 
 
The town interprets the exclusion of the word "dependents" 
from § 9A as intentional silence and a deliberate omission by 
the Legislature.  Based on our previous interpretations of 
similar sections under chapter 32B, we disagree.  In Galenski, 
471 Mass. at 310-311, we invalidated the town of Erving's 
retirement policy that it had adopted to limit § 9E10 
contributions solely to retirees who worked for the town for a 
                     
upon retirement and will be subject to § 9A, so long as they are 
within the group offered by the town. 
 
 
10 Municipalities that choose to adopt § 9E agree to pay 
over fifty percent of a retiree's premium payments for his or 
her health insurance. 
11 
 
 
minimum of ten years.11  Before her retirement, the plaintiff had 
worked in the town of Erving for six years.12  Id. at 305.  
Because she did not meet the ten-year requirement, the 
retirement policy adopted by the town of Erving prevented her 
from receiving her seventy-nine percent premium coverage 
pursuant to § 9E.  Id. at 305-306, 307 n.4.  The court in 
Galenski held that the plain language of § 9E did not impose 
restrictions on which retirees could receive contributions, but 
rather the plain language of § 9E required municipal coverage of 
"employees retired from the service of the town."  Id. at 309, 
quoting G. L. c. 32B, § 9E.  Therefore, so long as Galenski met 
the c. 32B definition of a municipal employee, she was entitled 
to coverage pursuant to § 9E.13  Galenski, supra at 310.  The 
                     
 
11 In 2001, the town of Erving adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9E.  
The town's retirement policy was adopted in February 2006.  
Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 306-307 (2015). 
 
 
12 The plaintiff in Galenski had been a public school 
teacher for more than thirty years in Massachusetts.  She spent 
her last six years of service as a public school principal in 
the town of Erving.  She missed the ten-year teaching minimum, 
imposed by the town of Erving's retirement policy, by four 
years.  Galenski, 471 Mass. at 307. 
 
 
13 General Laws c. 32B defines an employee as 
 
"any person in the service of a governmental unit or whose 
services are divided between [two] or more governmental 
units or between a governmental unit and the commonwealth, 
and who receives compensation for any such service, whether 
such person is employed, appointed or elected by popular 
vote, and any employee of a free public library maintained 
in a city or town to the support of which that city or town 
12 
 
 
court determined that a tenure-based requirement was not 
explicitly stated in the statute.  Id. at 310-311.  By 
concluding that the policy limiting § 9E payments to employees 
who had worked for the town of Erving for ten years was 
inconsistent with § 9E and with the Legislature's purpose in 
enacting G. L. c. 32B, the court struck down the town of 
Erving's attempt to limit the statute after choosing to adopt 
it.  Id. at 311.  See G. L. c. 32B, § 9E. 
 
In the present case, the town's interpretation of the § 9A 
language of "premium costs payable by a retired employee" as 
distinguishing between individual and family coverage is at odds 
with the core of the holding in Galenski that a town may not 
limit its obligations in conflict with the language in c. 32B 
after adopting it.  In Galenski, the municipal policy was 
preempted by State law;14 the court concluded that a town could 
                     
annually contributes not less than one-half of the cost; 
provided, however, that the duties of such person require 
not less than [twenty] hours, regularly, in the service of 
the governmental unit during the regular work week of 
permanent or temporary employment." 
 
G. L. c. 32B, § 2. 
 
 
14 Under Massachusetts's Home Rule Amendment, municipal 
action is presumed valid unless preempted by State law.  Connors 
v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 35 (1999).  See art. 89, § 6, of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  This court, on 
multiple occasions, has reiterated that a municipality may not 
enact a policy that is inconsistent with State law.  See Cioch 
v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449 Mass. 690, 699 (2007) (citing to 
multiple cases in which local laws were invalidated as 
13 
 
 
not read coverage limitations into the statute where not 
explicitly stated.  Galenski, 471 Mass. at 312.  Similarly, here 
we cannot read a payment limitation into the statute when it is 
not explicitly mentioned in § 9A or in other sections of 
c. 32B.15 
 
Further, the court has held that when two or more statutes 
relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed 
together "so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with 
the legislative purpose."  Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 
319 (1997), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 
Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975).  The same principles of statutory 
interpretation apply here, where two or more sections within a 
statute relate to the same subject matter. 
 
The plain text of § 1 identifies c. 32B's purpose as that 
of providing health insurance16 for "certain persons in the 
                     
inconsistent with State law).  The court in Galenski concluded 
that the policy at issue was in direct conflict with §§ 9 and 
9E.  Galenski, 471 Mass. at 312 n.9. 
 
 
15 Boss raised in her brief an argument that article 2 of 
the warrant places an additional impermissible limitation on 
§ 9A.  The town did not respond.  Specifically, Boss argues that 
article 2 creates an impermissible ten-year minimum work 
requirement, similar to the one this court held was invalid in 
Galenski.  Actions limiting the provisions within a statute are 
preempted by State law.  Cioch, 449 Mass. at 698-699.  The 
article 2 limitations are inconsistent with the language in 
G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, and precluded by our holding in Galenski, 
471 Mass. at 310-311.  See G. L. c. 32B, § 9E. 
 
16 Chapter 32B encompasses hospital, surgical, medical, and 
dental insurance, as well as other health insurance coverage. 
14 
 
 
service of . . . towns and districts and their dependents" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 32B, § 1.  This language indicates 
an over-all intent to provide coverage for municipal employees 
and their dependents.  Section 9 merely extends these 
protections to retired employees and accounts for payment; it 
does not change the purpose of the chapter.  Section 9 states 
that "upon retirement of an employee . . . the group general or 
blanket insurance . . . shall be continued and the retired 
employee shall pay the full premium cost, subject to the 
provisions of [§ 9A] or [9E]" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 32B, 
§ 9.  The phrase "shall be continued" indicates that there is no 
change in an insured's plan coverage.  Therefore, a municipal 
employee's insurance plan continues after the insured retires; 
it is not altered or modified. 
 
In addition, § 9 offers a town three payment options.  A 
town can choose to have retirees pay their full premium 
coverage, to pay one-half of a retiree's premium coverage, or to 
pay more than one-half of a retiree's premium coverage.  See 
G. L. c. 32B, §§ 9, 9A, 9E.  However, once a town has adopted 
its payment plan, it "will pay" -- as §§ 9A and 9E both state -- 
the insured's chosen plan's premium cost.  G. L. c. 32B, §§ 9A, 
9E.  The town, by adopting § 9A, chose to cover fifty percent of 
retirees' premiums. 
15 
 
 
 
b.  Legislative history.  The legislative history of c. 32B 
also supports our conclusion that under § 9A the town is 
obligated to cover one-half of Boss's premium costs.  We 
interpret a statute 
"according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained 
from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved 
usage of the language, considered in connection with the 
cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end 
that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." 
 
Galenski, 471 Mass. at 309, quoting Worcester v. College Hill 
Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013).  To resolve whether 
there is an ambiguity regarding the use of the word "dependents" 
in §§ 9 and 9E, but not in § 9A, requires appropriate 
consideration of the relevant history and intent of the 
Legislature.  See Yeretsky, 424 Mass. at 319. 
 
General Laws c. 32B derives from a session law passed in 
1956.  St. 1956, c. 730, § 1.  From 1956 through 1965, § 9 of 
the statute stated that "the employee shall pay the entire 
average group premium . . . for the hospital, surgical and 
medical benefits for such employee or for such employee and his 
dependents."  Id.  In 1959, § 9A was added to give towns the 
option of covering fifty percent of retired municipal employees' 
premium payments.  St. 1959, c. 595.  The first paragraph of § 9 
was amended in 1966, and the phrase "for such employee and his 
dependents" was removed from the opening sentence of the 
16 
 
 
statute.17  St. 1965, c. 841, § 5.  However, when § 9A had been 
added to c. 32B in 1959, the language in § 9 still included 
"dependent," and §§ 9 and 9A remained in effect for six years 
before the 1965 amendments.  See St. 1956, c. 730, § 1; 
St. 1965, c. 841, § 5.  There is little doubt that, in those six 
years, any town that adopted § 9A would cover one-half of a 
retiree's premiums, including those of his or her dependents. 
 
Legislative history also shows that on May 18, 1959, the 
Senate committee on bills in the third reading introduced 1959 
Senate Doc. No. 635, which detailed a new draft of § 9A.18  The 
Senate considered for a title, "An Act providing that certain 
governmental units having contributory group general or blanket 
insurance for persons in the service thereof and their 
dependents contribute one half the premium for said insurance 
for persons retired from service."  Although the title of an act 
does not control the language in the act, it provides some 
guidance regarding the intent of the Legislature at the time.  
                     
 
17 The lower court judge found that this likely occurred 
because the language "for such employee and his dependents" was 
redundant.  Further, the 1965 amendment removed both the words 
"employee" and "dependent."  This does not signify a purposeful 
omission.  Clearly, the Legislature did not intend to stop 
coverage for employees, it being the very purpose of the 
statute. 
 
 
18 The substance of the draft is similar to the version that 
is in effect today.  Compare 1959 Senate Doc. No. 635 to G. L. 
c. 32B, § 9A, as amended through St. 2003, c. 46, § 13. 
17 
 
 
Hemman v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 
70, 73 (1984), superseded on another ground by St. 1989, c. 653, 
§ 37.  See United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818).  
In drafting the sections of c. 32B, the Legislature intended to 
provide access to insurance for dependents, and as reflected in 
§ 9A, this access included partial payments of premiums. 
 
c.  Conclusion.  After considering the plain language of 
the statute and the legislative history, we conclude that the 
total premium costs would include those of a retiree and his or 
her dependents if they were previously covered under the plan 
while the retiree was employed.  Section 9A requires the town to 
contribute fifty percent of the total premium for whatever 
continued coverage the retiree has adopted.  If the retiree has 
continued with a family group plan, town contributions would 
cover the premium for the retiree and his or her dependents. 
 
3.  The validity of the town meeting vote on April 24, 
2004.  We next address the accompanying issue whether the town 
successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, when it took a vote on 
articles 2 and 4 presented at the town meeting on April 24, 
2004.  The town argues that the warrant for the April 24 town 
meeting was defective and misleading and that therefore the town 
never validly adopted § 9A.  Boss contends that not only did the 
town validly adopt § 9A, but the town also is barred from 
raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised in the 
18 
 
 
court below.  We hold that the town did not sufficiently raise 
the issue below and is therefore barred from raising it on 
appeal.  We further hold that even if the issue were not waived, 
the town successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town 
meeting. 
 
a.  The town is barred from raising the issue.  This court, 
on numerous occasions, has held that issues not raised below 
cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.  See e.g., Carey 
v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006); M.H. 
Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 386 
Mass. 64, 67 (1982); Henchey v. Cox, 348 Mass. 742, 747 (1965).  
"The reason for this fundamental rule of appellate practice is 
well established:  it is important that an appellate court have 
before it an adequate record and findings concerning a claim to 
permit it to resolve that claim properly."  R.W. Granger & Sons, 
Inc. v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 435 Mass. 66, 74 (2001). 
 
The inquiry into whether an issue has been raised is fact 
specific.  See M.H. Gordon & Son, Inc., 386 Mass. at 67 (looking 
at record to determine whether issue had been raised for first 
time on appeal).  See also R.W. Granger & Sons, 435 Mass. at 74 
(finding issue was raised for first time on appeal where party 
did not introduce any evidence on issue or raise it during any 
argument at bench trial or in any of its posttrial motions).  
While the town does not dispute that a vote was taken on April 
19 
 
 
24, 2004, it argues that the vote was invalid due to the 
fundamentally misleading nature of the warrant articles.  Boss 
argues that the issue was not raised below and is therefore 
waived.  The town offers two examples as evidence that the 
argument was raised sufficiently:  its cross motion for summary 
judgment and the ruling by the motion judge.  The only mention 
that the cross motion for summary judgment and the lower court 
judge made regarding this issue was in relation to the town's 
statutory interpretation argument.19  Further, the motion judge 
never mentioned the warrant requirement statute, and his 
statement, standing alone, would not be enough.  See M.H. Gordon 
& Son, Inc., supra (considering judge's statement as factor in 
deeming issue raised below, but noting that this statement 
absent other evidence would not be enough). 
 
The town's limited references to the warrant issue were 
never addressed in the context of the warrant actually being 
void, but rather in furtherance of the town's statutory 
interpretation of § 9A.  We therefore determine that the town's 
argument is insufficient and hold that the issue was not 
properly raised in the lower court. 
                     
 
19 References to article 4 potentially containing misleading 
language were only offered as part of the town's statutory 
interpretation argument.  They were offered to explain how 
voters could only interpret § 9A in one way -- as not including 
payment coverage for dependents. 
20 
 
 
 
b.  The town validly adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, during the 
town meeting on April 24, 2004.  Because G. L. c. 32B is a local 
option statute, and a similar situation may arise at a future 
town meeting, we next address whether, even if the issue of the 
town's adoption of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, were not waived, the town 
successfully adopted it at the April 24, 2004, town meeting.  
Under G. L. c. 39, § 10, "[t]he warrant for all town meetings 
shall state the time and place of holding the meeting and the 
subjects to be acted upon thereat."  This court previously has 
stated that "[t]his means only that the subjects to be acted 
upon must be sufficiently stated in the warrant to apprise 
voters of the nature of the matters with which the meeting is 
authorized to deal."  Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 219, 
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945).  Only in limited 
circumstances can a town invalidate a vote.  A town may find a 
vote invalid if the language in the warrant is misleading, if 
the language included or excluded in the warrant substantially 
alters the article's meaning, or if the warrant fails to 
sufficiently state the nature of the matter.  See id. at 218-
219; Coffin v. Lawrence, 143 Mass. 110, 112 (1886); Coonamessett 
Inn v. Chief of Falmouth Fire Dep't, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634-
635 (1983).  However, once a section is validly adopted through 
a town meeting vote, c. 32B does not permit the section to be 
rescinded or revoked.  G. L. c. 32B, § 10. 
21 
 
 
 
The town rests its argument on the allegedly misleading 
language of article 2.  It contends that because the adoption of 
article 2 was contingent upon the passage of the article 4 
ballot question, the voters were misled into thinking that the 
meaning of both articles was connected.  Article 2 states in 
relevant part, "[t]he town will pay [fifty percent] of the cost 
of an individual health plan offered" (emphasis added).  The 
town argues that this language misled voters into thinking that 
the article 4 ballot question adopting § 9A only included 
coverage for individual health plans.  Such a discrepancy, they 
argue, is sufficient to invalidate the warrant.  Nevertheless, 
the town provides no evidence that the voters were confused by 
the language in the warrant when they voted on April 24, 2004.  
Cf. Wolf v. Mansfield, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 58-59 (2006) ("The 
plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that confusion 
over a town meeting vote empowers a judge to order that a new 
vote be conducted . . . [and] the record fails to support the 
plaintiffs' claim that voters were confused.  On the face of the 
town meeting transcript, the residents understood [what] they 
were being asked to vote on").  In fact, the minutes from the 
town meeting demonstrate that the voters decisively adopted 
article 4, which had the exact language required under G. L. 
c. 32B, § 9A -- language we have held already, supra, includes 
coverage of family plans.  The warrant included all of the 
22 
 
 
required elements:  it specified the time, date, and location of 
the town meeting, and it provided a copy of the language of all 
relevant articles.  G. L. c. 39, § 10.  See Coffin, 143 Mass. at 
112 ("Warrants are held sufficient if they indicate with 
substantial certainty the nature of the business to be acted 
on").  Absent evidence to the contrary, there is no reason for 
us to conclude that the town voters did not clearly understand 
the language in the warrant when they adopted it.  See 
Burlington, 318 Mass. at 219 ("[G. L. c. 39, § 10,] does not 
require that the warrant contain an accurate forecast of the 
precise action which the meeting will take upon [announced] 
subjects").  Therefore, we hold that the town successfully 
adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town meeting on April 24, 
2004. 
 
Conclusion.  By adopting G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, the town was 
required to cover fifty percent of the premiums for both 
retirees and the retirees' dependents.  Furthermore, the town 
successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town meeting 
held on April 24, 2004.  We affirm the order granting summary 
judgment for Boss and denying the town's cross motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.