Case Title: State Treasurer as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Witte

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92834

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TREASURER of the STATE OF MISSOURI-  
) 
CUSTODIAN of THE SECOND INJURY FUND, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No.  SC92834 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
) 
JAMES WITTE,  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.   
) 
consolidated with 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JOSEPH SALVICCIO, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,   
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
No.  SC92842 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
TREASURER of the STATE OF MISSOURI,    
 
) 
as CUSTODIAN of THE SECOND INJURY FUND, ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant.  
 
) 
consolidated with 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
WILLIAM DYSON, 
 
 
    
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,   
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
No.  SC92850 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
TREASURER of the STATE OF MISSOURI 
 
) 
as CUSTODIAN of SECOND INJURY FUND,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant.  
 
) 
consolidated with 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
ERIC BUHLINGER, 
 
 
    
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,   
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
No.  SC92867 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
) 
TREASURER OF MISSOURI as CUSTODIAN 
) 
of SECOND INJURY FUND, 
 
    
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant.  
 
) 
 
 
2 
 
                                             
APPEAL FROM THE MISSOURI LABOR AND 
 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
Opinion issued November 12, 2013 
The treasurer of the State of Missouri as custodian of the second injury fund (“the 
fund”) appeals four separate decisions of the labor and industrial relations commission 
that determined the fund was liable for compensation to injured claimants.  The fund 
claims that the commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law in those decisions by 
combining or “stacking” injuries to meet the statutory thresholds in section 287.220.11 
that trigger the fund’s liability and by considering injuries that did not meet the statutory 
thresholds to calculate the extent of its liability.  After opinions by the court of appeals, 
this Court granted transfer due to the general interest and importance of the issues 
involved.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.  Because the cases all require interpretation of 
section 287.220.1, they are consolidated for opinion.  This Court finds that the 
commission misapplied section 287.220.1 in triggering the fund’s liability by combining 
preexisting permanent partial disabilities to meet the statutory thresholds.  Nonetheless, 
Mr. Salviccio, Mr. Dyson, and Mr. Buhlinger each had a preexisting injury that met the 
thresholds, and this Court affirms the commission’s awards in those cases.  Mr. Witte did 
not have a preexisting disability that met the thresholds, and this Court reverses the 
commission’s award in his case.   
Factual and Procedural History 
 
The facts are undisputed in each case, and are as follows: 
 
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2012, unless otherwise indicated.   
Witte v. Treasurer 
 
In April 2007, James D. Witte slipped and fell while at work, breaking his right 
leg and hip.  He filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer, 
Show-Me Livestock Co-op., Inc., and the fund in July 2007.  Mr. Witte and Show-Me 
Livestock settled his claim by stipulating that he had a permanent partial disability of 20 
percent of the body as a whole, referable to the lumbar spine, and 30 percent of the right 
hip.  His claim against the fund, however, was disputed.  At a hearing before an 
administrative law judge, a medical expert testified that Mr. Witte had preexisting 
disabilities of diabetes, depression, anxiety, a spastic colon, back problems, a leg injury 
from a bike accident, and an eye condition that was surgically corrected. 
The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Mr. Witte “failed to sustain his 
burden of proof that he is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits” from the fund.  
The ALJ found that although Mr. Witte had multiple preexisting disabilities, none of 
them were significant enough to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to 
reach the thresholds set out in section 287.220.1. 
Mr. Witte filed an application for review with the commission, which found that 
Mr. Witte suffered preexisting permanent partial disabilities of 10 percent of the body as 
a whole, referable to diabetes; 10 percent of the body as a whole, referable to 
gastrointestinal issues; 10 percent of the body as a whole, referable to psychiatric 
problems; 5 percent of the body as a whole, referable to his lumbar spine; and 10 percent 
of his right leg.  The commission concluded that, instead of requiring each condition to 
meet the minimum thresholds set out in section 287.220.1, the ALJ should have 
4 
 
determined whether Mr. Witte’s “overall preexisting permanent partial disability” 
satisfied the 50-week minimum threshold.  After converting all of Mr. Witte’s preexisting 
disabilities into weeks of compensation, the commission combined them and determined 
his “overall preexisting permanent partial disability” to be 160.7 weeks, well above the 
50-week threshold.  It awarded Mr. Witte $8,478.55 of compensation from the fund. 
Salviccio v. Treasurer 
In November 2008, Joseph Salviccio injured his left knee while employed with 
Western Supplies Company.  Following surgery to repair his knee, he filed a workers’ 
compensation claim against Western Supplies and the fund.  Mr. Salviccio’s claim 
against Western Supplies was settled for 20 percent permanent partial disability of the 
left knee.  
An ALJ heard his case to determine the fund’s liability and made the following 
conclusions concerning his preexisting disabilities:  Mr. Salviccio’s little finger on his 
left hand was permanently injured in 1995 during a work-related accident; he suffered 
ventral hernias in 1999 and 2005; and he was diagnosed with diabetes in 1995.  Despite 
expert testimony of higher ratings, the ALJ found that the disability to Mr. Salviccio’s 
little finger did not rise to 15 percent permanent partial disability and that neither his 
diabetes nor his hernias warrant 50 weeks of compensation.  The AJL, therefore, 
determined that the fund was not liable for compensation because none of Mr. Salviccio’s 
preexisting permanent partial disabilities rose to the level necessary to satisfy the 
statutory thresholds outlined in section 287.220.1.   
5 
 
                                             
Upon Mr. Salviccio’s application for review, the commission concluded the ALJ’s 
ratings of Mr. Salviccio’s preexisting injuries were not supported by the evidence 
presented.  It determined the evidence supported preexisting permanent partial disabilities 
of 50 percent of the little finger; 12.5 percent of the body as a whole, referable to 
diabetes; 4 percent of the body as a whole, referable to the 1999 hernia; and 3.5 percent 
of the body as a whole, referable to the 2005 hernia.  Because Mr. Salviccio claimed 
multiple preexisting disabilities, the commission concluded that it was necessary to 
convert all of his preexisting disabilities to weeks of compensation and combine them to 
determine if they collectively met the statutory thresholds.  After combining all of his 
preexisting disabilities, it found that Mr. Salviccio had 91 weeks of compensation, 
surpassing the 50-week threshold, and determined that the fund was liable.  The 
commission awarded Mr. Salviccio $4,977.32 of compensation from the fund. 
Dyson v. Treasurer 
 
In June 2008, William Dyson injured his right shoulder while at work and filed a 
workers’ compensation claim against his employer, D & D Distributors, and the fund.  
He settled his claim with D & D Distributors for 25 percent permanent partial disability 
of the right shoulder.  Five months prior to his shoulder injury, Mr. Dyson suffered a 
work-related neck injury 2 and he also injured his right ankle in 2001. 
 
An ALJ determined that Mr. Dyson was entitled to workers’ compensation 
benefits from the fund after concluding that his neck injury, with a 15 percent permanent 
partial disability of the body as a whole, met the minimum thresholds set forth in section 
 
2 Mr. Dyson entered into a stipulation of compromise settlement with D & D Distributors 
regarding this prior injury for 15 percent permanent partial disability of the neck.   
6 
 
287.220.1.  The ALJ also found that Mr. Dyson’s disability due to his right ankle injury 
was not sufficient to meet the same thresholds.   
 
After Mr. Dyson applied for review, the commission determined that his 
preexisting ankle injury should have been included in determining the fund’s liability.  It 
found that the injury resulted in 7.5 percent permanent partial disability of that extremity, 
converted that percentage to its equivalent number of weeks, and added it to Mr. Dyson’s 
other injuries to determine that he met the thresholds for all of his injuries.  Accordingly, 
the commission held the fund liable for all of his injuries and awarded Mr. Dyson 
$5,041.96 of compensation from the fund.   
Buhlinger v. Treasurer 
 
In August 2008, Eric R. Buhlinger worked for Bryant Company as a laborer and a 
driver when the skid loader on which he was working “bucked,” causing him to hit his 
head on a crossbar and lose consciousness.  As a result of the accident, Mr. Buhlinger 
suffered a concussion and sustained injuries to his neck, back, and left elbow.  He filed a 
workers’ compensation claim against Bryant Company and the fund.  The claim against 
Bryant Company was settled for 27.5 percent of the body as a whole, referable to the 
neck; 5 percent of the body as a whole, referable to the concussion; and 5 percent of the 
left elbow.     
 
An ALJ heard Mr. Buhlinger’s case to determine the fund’s liability and found 
that, from his last injury, Mr. Buhlinger sustained permanent partial in the same amounts 
as the settlement.  During the hearing, there was testimony about Mr. Buhlinger’s prior 
work-related injury to his left foot and ankle that occurred in 1990 or 1991.  With regard 
7 
 
to the prior injury, the ALJ found that Mr. Buhlinger had a preexisting permanent partial 
disability of 17.5 percent of the left ankle.  The ALJ concluded the fund was liable 
because    Mr. Buhlinger’s permanent partial disabilities from the last injury, collectively, 
and preexisting permanent partial disability met the thresholds set forth in section 
287.220.1.  The ALJ awarded Mr. Buhlinger $6,782.10 of compensation from the fund. 
 
The fund filed an application for review of the ALJ’s award with the commission, 
arguing the ALJ erred in including Mr. Buhlinger’s concussion and left elbow injuries in 
its calculation of the fund’s liability because neither of those disabilities, standing alone, 
met the thresholds.  The commission accepted the ALJ’s award and decision.   
   
Standard of Review 
Section 287.495.1 determines this Court’s review of these cases:   
Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and, in the absence of 
fraud, the findings of fact made by the commission within its powers shall 
be conclusive and binding.  The court, on appeal, shall review only 
questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set 
aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other: (1) That 
the commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) That the award 
was procured by fraud; (3) That the facts found by the commission do not 
support the award; (4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in 
the record to warrant the making of the award.  
  
An appellate court will defer to the commission on issues of fact, the credibility of 
the witnesses, and the weight given to conflicting evidence.  Hornbeck v. Spectra 
Painting, Inc. 370 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Mo. banc 2012).  The Court reviews an issue of law 
de novo.  Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 595 (Mo. banc 
2008).  An issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law, not fact.  City of St. 
Joseph v. Village of Country Club, 163 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Mo. banc 2005). 
8 
 
Fund Liability Under Section 287.220 
The General Assembly enacted the statutes creating the fund and determining its 
liability in 1943.  1943 Mo. Laws 1068.  The purpose of the fund is “to encourage the 
employment of individuals who are already disabled from a preexisting injury, regardless 
of the type or cause of that injury.”  Pierson v. Treasurer of State, 126 S.W.3d 386, 389-
90 (Mo. banc 2004).  It encourages such employment by ensuring that an employer is 
only liable for the disability caused by the work injury.  Any disability attributable to the 
combination of the work injury with preexisting disabilities is compensated, if at all, by 
the fund.  See section 287.220.1. 
The fund appeals the commission’s decisions holding the fund liable for 
claimants’ injuries and awarding claimants compensation from the fund.  It claims the 
commission erred when it combined multiple preexisting permanent partial disabilities to 
meet the liability thresholds.  It also claims the commission erred when it considered 
preexisting disabilities and disabilities from the last injury that did not meet the 
thresholds in calculating the amount of compensation the fund owed.    
Resolution of these claims requires this Court to examine the language set out in 
section 287.220.1.  “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of 
the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to 
consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” State ex rel. Unnerstall v. 
Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. 
QuikTrip Corp., 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. banc 2004)).  If the language is unambiguous, 
this Court “must give effect to the legislature’s chosen language.”  State ex rel. Young v. 
9 
 
                                             
Wood, 254 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Mo. banc 2008).  Only where the language is ambiguous 
will the Court resort to other rules of statutory construction.  Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 
333 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Mo. banc 2011).  This Court must strictly construe the provisions 
of the workers’ compensation statutes.  Section 287.800. 
The fund’s liability for permanent partial disability benefits is determined by 
section 287.220.1,3 which states:  
All cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability 
shall be compensated as herein provided.  Compensation shall be computed 
on the basis of the average earnings at the time of the last injury.  If any 
employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from 
compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a 
hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the 
employee becomes unemployed, and the preexisting permanent partial 
disability, if a body as a whole injury, equals a minimum of fifty weeks of 
compensation or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of 
fifteen percent permanent partial disability, according to the medical 
standards that are used in determining such compensation, receives a 
subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial 
disability so that the degree or percentage of disability, in an amount equal 
to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if a body as a whole injury or, 
if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent 
permanent partial disability, caused by the combined disabilities is 
substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the last 
injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee is entitled to 
receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the 
employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or 
percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had 
there been no preexisting disability.  After the compensation liability of the 
employer for the last injury, considered alone, has been determined by an 
administrative law judge or the commission, the degree or percentage of 
employee’s disability that is attributable to all injuries or conditions 
 
3 In 2013, the General Assembly amended section 287.220 to change eligibility for 
benefits for injuries occurring after January 1, 2014.  2013 Mo. Laws S.B. 1 (to be 
codified at section 287.220).  Because the injuries in these cases occurred in 2007 and 
2008, section 287.220.1, RSMo. Supp. 2012, controls.  See Gervich v. Condaire, 370 
S.W.3d 617, 623 (Mo. banc 2012).  Further, the amended statute expressly acknowledges 
that the revisions do not affect injuries before its effective date.  2013 Mo. Laws S.B. 1.  
10 
 
                                             
existing at the time the last injury was sustained shall then be determined 
by that administrative law judge or by the commission and the degree or 
percentage of disability which existed prior to the last injury plus the 
disability resulting from the last injury, if any, considered alone, shall be 
deducted from the combined disability, and compensation for the balance, 
if any, shall be paid out of a special fund known as the second injury fund, 
hereinafter provided for.   
 
The fund’s claims relate to the third and fourth sentences of this subsection of section 
287.220.  This subsection includes multiple concepts and is best understood when those 
concepts are considered separately and applied to the fund’s claims.   
Thresholds Apply to Each Preexisting Disability or Injury 
The fund’s first claim is that multiple preexisting disabilities cannot be combined 
to meet the statutory thresholds, which implicates the third sentence of section 287.220.1.  
The third sentence prescribes the requirements for triggering the fund’s liability.  The 
first requirement to hold the fund liable is that the claimant must have “a preexisting 
permanent partial disability . . . of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or 
obstacle to employment.”  Id.  The preexisting disability also must, “if a body as a whole 
injury, equal[] a minimum of fifty weeks of compensation or, if a major extremity injury 
only, equal[] a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability.”  Id.  
Additionally, the preexisting disability and the disability from the last injury4 must 
combine in a way so that the degree of disability from the combined disabilities is “an 
amount equal to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if a body as a whole injury or, 
 
4 The statute uses the terms “last injury” and “subsequent injury” interchangeably.  See 
section 287.220.1.  Many cases also refer to the last injury as the “primary injury.”  E.g., 
Schussler v. Treasurer of State-Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 393 S.W.3d 90, 95 
(Mo. App. 2012); Carkeek v. Treasurer of Missouri-Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 
352 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Mo. App. 2011). 
11 
 
                                             
if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial 
disability.”  Finally, the combination of the preexisting disability and the disability from 
the last injury must be “substantially greater than that which would have resulted from 
the last injury, considered alone and of itself.”  Id.   
In other words, the third sentence of section 287.220.1 permits a claimant to obtain 
compensation from the fund when the claimant demonstrates that: (1) the claimant has a 
preexisting permanent partial disability of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or 
obstacle to employment; (2) the percentage of disability attributable to the preexisting 
disability equals a minimum of 50 weeks of compensation for a body as a whole injury or 
15 percent for a major extremity injury; (3) the combination of the preexisting disability 
and the disability resulting from the last injury equals a minimum of 50 weeks of 
compensation for a body as a whole injury or 15 percent for a major extremity injury; and 
(4) the combined disability is substantially greater than the disability that would have 
resulted from the last injury considered alone.5  When these requirements are met, the 
 
5 Some cases incorrectly state that section 287.220.1 requires the combined disability to 
be substantially greater than the sum of the preexisting disability and the disability from 
the last injury.  See Hutson v. Treasurer of Missouri, 365 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo. App. 
2012);  Cartwright v. Wells Fargo Armored Services, 921 S.W.2d 165, 167 n.3 (Mo. 
App. 1996); Fletcher v. Second Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo. App. 1996).  The 
“substantially greater” language in the third sentence of the statute, however, is a 
comparison between the combined disability and “that which would have resulted from 
the last injury, considered alone and of itself.”  Section 287.220.1.  The formula for 
determining the amount of the award, set out in the fourth sentence, requires the 
combined disability be greater than the sum of all of the preexisting disabilities and the 
disability from the last injury, but there is no requirement that the combined disability be 
substantially greater.  To the extent these cases misstate the requirements for triggering 
the fund’s liability, the cases are overruled. 
12 
 
employer at the time of the last injury is liable for only the degree of disability that would 
have resulted from the last injury if there was no preexisting disability.  Id. 
The first error claimed by the fund focuses on the second requirement of the third 
sentence, i.e., the percentage of disability attributable to the preexisting disability equal a 
minimum of 50 weeks of compensation, if a body as a whole injury, or 15 percent 
permanent partial disability, if a major extremity injury.  The fund claims the commission 
misapplied these statutory thresholds when it combined claimants’ preexisting disabilities 
to meet them.  It asserts that before a claimant is eligible for compensation from the fund, 
section 287.220.1 requires each preexisting disability to meet either the 50-week 
threshold, if an injury to the body as a whole, or the 15 percent permanent partial 
disability threshold, if an injury to a major extremity.   
The question of whether section 287.220.1 allows for combining, or “stacking,” of 
disabilities to meet the thresholds is answered by the statute’s plain and unambiguous 
language.  When defining the thresholds for the fund’s liability, section 287.220.1 refers 
to “any employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from 
compensable injury or otherwise” and allows for compensation when “the preexisting 
permanent partial disability, if a body as a whole injury, equals a minimum of fifty weeks 
of compensation or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent 
permanent partial disability.” (Emphasis added).  Further, a permanent partial disability is 
defined as “a disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree.”  Section 
287.190.6 (emphasis added).  Significantly, the statute repeatedly refers to “a disability” 
13 
 
                                             
and “the disability,” as opposed to “disabilities.”  The statute also uses the singular 
“injury” rather than the plural “injuries.”   
The legislature’s use of the singular form is shown to be intentional when the 
language of the third sentence is contrasted with the language governing permanent total 
disability in the fifth sentence.  The fifth sentence of section 287.220.1 discusses 
compensation for permanent total disability and provides that:  
If the previous disability or disabilities, whether from compensable injury 
or otherwise, and the last injury together result in total and permanent 
disability, the minimum standards under this subsection for a body as a 
whole injury or a major extremity injury shall not apply and the employer 
at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the disability resulting 
from the last injury considered alone and of itself . . . . 
 
(Emphasis added).  In the context of permanent total disability, the legislature used the 
language “previous disability or disabilities” to provide specifically for consideration of 
multiple disabilities.  Section 287.220.1.  The legislature’s use of different terminology 
for permanent partial disability and permanent total disabilities is presumed intentional 
and for a particular purpose.  See State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. banc 2010).  
Therefore, in the third sentence, it is presumed the legislature intended to require a single 
preexisting permanent partial disability, considered in isolation, to meet the thresholds 
before triggering the fund’s liability.  The commission’s method of combining several 
lesser injuries to meet the thresholds is a misapplication of section 287.220.1.6 
 
6 This interpretation is consistent with the commission’s treatment of multiple preexisting 
disabilities in Cardwell v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Mo. 
App. 2008) (discussing how the commission disregarded disabilities that did not 
individually meet the thresholds). 
14 
 
It is possible that multiple injuries can give rise to a single disability.  Such a 
situation is not contemplated by the statute’s language, however.  In setting the thresholds 
for a single preexisting disability, the statute refers to “a body as a whole injury” and “a 
major extremity injury.”  Section 287.220.1.  Accordingly, while the term “disability” 
could refer to multiple injuries, section 287.220.1 sets the thresholds for a preexisting 
disability based on a single injury.   
The error of the commission’s interpretation is also apparent from the 
commission’s difficulty in attempting to combine a major extremity injury with a body as 
a whole injury.  In Mr. Witte’s case, the commission stated: 
The legislature chose two different units of measurement to describe the 
thresholds: “fifty weeks of compensation” for preexisting disabilities of the 
body as a whole; and “fifteen percent permanent partial disability” for a 
preexisting disability to a major extremity only.  We believe the legislature 
rested on different units of measurement to foster arithmetic simplicity. 
. . . 
But where there is more than one preexisting disability, the simplicity 
described above cannot be achieved.  In that event, we need a method to 
combine the various disabilities to determine claimant’s overall preexisting 
disability as of the moment of the primary injury.  In order to combine the 
disabilities for comparison to the threshold, the disabilities must be 
converted to a common unit of measure.  The legislature selected weeks of 
compensation as the common unit of measure. 
 
Thus, to be able to combine disabilities from major extremity injuries with disabilities 
from body as a whole injuries, the commission found it necessary to convert all 
preexisting disabilities to a common unit of measurement – weeks.  This method of 
calculation is not supported by the language of section 287.220.1.  Interpreting the statute 
to allow the conversion of all preexisting disabilities to weeks of compensation compels 
the addition of concepts or language, which the commission cannot do.  See State ex rel. 
15 
 
                                             
Mills v. Allen, 128 S.W.2d 1040, 1046 (Mo. banc 1939).  The commission’s method of 
calculating the thresholds by combining injuries is not consistent with the language of 
section 287.220.1 and already has been rejected.  See Motton v. Outsource Int’l, 77 
S.W.3d 669, 674-75 (Mo. App. 2002). 
In Motton, the court of appeals held that the commission erred in considering 
whether a major extremity disability met the thresholds in terms of weeks, rather than in 
terms of percent of permanent partial disability.  Id.  According to the court, the language 
of the statute clearly requires a disability from major extremity injury to be measured in 
terms of the percentage of permanent partial disability.7  Id.  It determined that “[i]n 
setting the threshold for [the fund’s] liability, the legislature chose to define disability for 
the body as a whole in terms of ‘weeks,’ but for a major extremity in terms of a 
“percentage,” and it found “[h]ad the legislature intended to set the threshold for 
disability for a major extremity on a minimum number of ‘weeks’, rather than a 
minimum “percent” of disability, it could have done so as it did when it set the threshold 
for disability for the body as a whole.”  Id.  
As Motton demonstrates, the statute does not permit the conversion of a major 
extremity disability into weeks because it clearly requires that a major extremity 
disability be measured by the percentage of permanent partial disability.  Without 
converting all the injuries to a common unit of measurement, a major extremity disability 
 
7 The court rejected the notion that the 15 percent permanent partial disability threshold 
for a major-extremity injury is ambiguous for failing to specify a percentage of disability 
for different levels of a major extremity.  Id. at 674.  It found that the legislature set the 
threshold at 15 percent permanent partial disability for all major-extremity injuries, 
regardless of the level of the injury.  Id.   
16 
 
                                             
cannot be combined with a body as a whole disability.  Considering the legislature did 
not include a procedure for combining disabilities or define both types of disabilities in 
terms of weeks, it did not intend to allow for combining different types of disabilities.  
Instead, section 287.220.1 expresses the minimum thresholds only in terms of a singular 
injury to either the body as a whole or a major extremity.8 
Considering the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and the lack of a 
methodology for combining injuries, section 287.220.1 does not permit combining 
multiple permanent partial disabilities to meet the thresholds for the fund’s liability and, 
therefore, requires each disability be measured against the thresholds individually.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s purpose in enacting the thresholds. 
 
The legislature added the numerical thresholds for triggering the fund’s liability to 
the statute in 1993.  Before then, it lacked any numerical thresholds.  Compare section 
287.220.1, RSMo Supp. 1992, with section 287.220, RSMo 2000.  Consequently, 
Missouri courts required parties to demonstrate an “industrial disability” in order “to 
insure that [section] 287.220 would be used only for those who had previously suffered a 
bona fide work-related disability.”  Leutzinger v. Treasurer of the State, 895 S.W.2d 591, 
592 (Mo. App. 1995).  See Wilhite v. Hurd, 411 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo. 1967), overruled on 
 
8 Claimants rely on the court of appeals decision in Shipp v. Treasurer of State for 
combining injuries to meet the thresholds.  99 S.W.3d 44 (Mo. App. 2003) overruled on 
separate grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 
2003).  In Shipp, the court held that when “a claimant has multiple injuries to a major 
extremity at various levels, it may be appropriate, depending on the facts and 
circumstances, to rate the percentage of disability to the entire major extremity.”  Id. at 
53.  None of the claims at issue here involve multiple preexisting injuries at various 
levels of a major extremity.  Because these cases do not present the same issue, this Court 
does not address whether injuries to the same major extremity require a different 
application of section 287.220.1. 
17 
 
separate grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 
2003).  By amending the statute, the legislature replaced the judicially created standard 
with the current, more precise thresholds.  See section 287.220.1.   
 
The statutory thresholds serve to make clear which preexisting conditions are 
considered sufficiently serious to trigger the fund’s liability.  Hedrick v. Chrysler Corp., 
900 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Mo. App. 1995).  Accordingly, the minimum thresholds exclude 
de minimus injuries from triggering liability.  Combining injuries to meet statutory 
thresholds not only would allow de minimus injuries to trigger the fund’s liability but also 
would encourage it – contrary to the purpose of the 1993 amendment.   
 
In Mr. Buhlinger’s case, the fund claims the commission erred in combining 
multiple disabilities resulting from his last injury to meet the thresholds.  Unlike with 
preexisting permanent partial disabilities, however, section 287.220.1 does not require 
permanent partial disabilities from the last injury to meet a numerical threshold.  In 
referring to the last injury, section 287.220.1 states:   
If any employee . . . receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in 
additional permanent partial disability so that the degree or percentage of 
disability, in an amount equal to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if 
a body as a whole injury or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a 
minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability, caused by the 
combined disabilities is substantially greater . . . . 
 
That language imposes the 50-week or 15 percent permanent partial disability thresholds 
on the combined disability, not a disability resulting from the last injury.  When the 
threshold language is removed, it is more apparent that the threshold language refers to 
“the degree or percentage of disability . . . caused by the combined disabilities.”  Section 
287.220.1. 
18 
 
 
The legislature perhaps included this requirement to reinforce its intent that the 
preexisting disabilities be of sufficient seriousness to meet the thresholds.  Although the 
purpose is not clear, the statute’s language is clear in that “the degree or percentage of 
disability . . . caused by the combined disabilities” must equal at least 50 weeks of 
compensation, if a body as a whole injury, or 15 percent permanent partial disability, if a 
major extremity injury.  See id.  This Court must interpret statutes by their plain and 
ordinary language, and “[w]here there is no ambiguity, [it] cannot look to any other rule 
of construction.”  Bosworth v. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. banc 1996).  By its 
plain and ordinary language, section 287.220.1 does not require a disability from the last 
injury to meet a numerical threshold to trigger liability.  Consequently, this Court 
overrules any case to the extent that it states disabilities from the last injury must meet the 
thresholds.  Huston v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 365 
S.W.3d 269 (Mo. App. 2012); Palazzolo v. Joe’s Delivery Serv., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 654 
(Mo. App. 2003); Reese v. Gary & Roger Link, Inc., 5 S.W.3d 522 (Mo. App. 1999); 
Conley v. Treasurer of Missouri, 999 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. App. 1999); Fletcher v. Second 
Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. 1996); Smart v. Missouri State Treasurer, 916 
S.W.2d 367 (Mo. App. 1996). 
Every Injury is Considered When Calculating the Amount of Compensation 
Once the fund’s liability has been triggered by meeting the requirements in the 
third sentence, the fourth sentence of section 287.220.1 provides the mechanics for 
determining the amount of compensation for which the fund is liable.  “After the 
compensation liability of the employer for the last injury, considered alone, has been 
19 
 
determined . . . , the degree or percentage of employee’s disability that is attributable to 
all injuries or conditions existing at the time the last injury was sustained shall then be 
determined.”  Id.  Next, “the degree or percentage of disability which existed prior to the 
last injury plus the disability resulting from the last injury, . . . considered alone, shall be 
deducted from the combined disability,” and the fund must pay the balance.  Id.  Simply 
put, the fund is liable only for the degree of the combined disability that exceeds the 
numerical sum of the preexisting disabilities and the disability from the last injury.  This 
excess for which the fund is liable is referred to as the synergistic effect of the combined 
disabilities.  See Pierson, 126 S.W.3d at 389. 
In the cases at issue, the commission considered all of claimants’ preexisting 
permanent partial disabilities in calculating the amount of the award after combining 
them to meet the thresholds.  The fund claims that the commission erred in including 
below-threshold preexisting disabilities in its calculation of the awards.  Claimants 
counter that section 287.220.1 requires an ALJ to use all of a claimant’s injuries, 
including those that did not satisfy the thresholds, when determining the amount of 
compensation.  Therefore, claimants argue that even if the commission impermissibly 
used below-threshold injuries to trigger liability, it correctly determined the amount of 
compensation to which they are entitled. 
 
Claimants’ interpretation of section 287.220.1 is supported by the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the statute’s language.  The statute directs the ALJ to determine the 
degree or percentage of disability attributable to “all injuries or conditions existing at the 
time the last injury was sustained.”  Section 287.220.1.  The plain and ordinary meaning 
20 
 
of this language is that all preexisting injuries, without the threshold limitation, are to be 
considered in calculating the amount of compensation.  The legislature added a numerical 
threshold to the third sentence in section 287.220.1 for determining when the fund’s 
liability is triggered.  It could have added similar language to the fourth sentence to limit 
what can be used in computing a claimant’s award, but it did not do so.  Rather, it 
expressly requires all injuries or conditions existing at the time of the last injury to be 
considered. 
 
The fund asserts that the thresholds are rendered ineffective by interpreting section 
287.220.1 in a way to permit considering below-threshold injuries in determining the 
amount of compensation.  The language plainly requires consideration of “all” injuries, 
which is contrary to an interpretation that “all” means all injuries that meet the 
thresholds.  A court is not at liberty to “add words or requirements by implication where 
the statute is not ambiguous.”  Sherf v. Koster, 371 S.W.3d 903, 907 (Mo. App. 2012).  
Additionally, the fund’s argument that such an interpretation affects the purpose of the 
thresholds is not valid.  By implementing the thresholds, the legislature provided a more 
precise standard and excluded de minimus injuries from triggering liability.  Merely 
because all of a claimant’s preexisting injuries will be considered when computing the 
amount of compensation does not mean all claimants will receive compensation – there 
still must be an injury of sufficient seriousness to meet the thresholds before the fund can 
be liable. 
 
This Court finds there must be a single preexisting permanent partial disability that 
meets the thresholds to trigger the fund’s liability and there is no threshold requirement 
21 
 
                                             
for the last injury.  Additionally, all preexisting injuries must be considered in calculating 
the amount of compensation for which the fund is liable.  These holdings must be applied 
to the fund’s claims in each case. 
Witte v. Treasurer 
The fund claims the commission erred in considering all of Mr. Witte’s 
preexisting permanent partial disabilities when determining the fund’s liability because 
none of them individually meet the statutory thresholds.  The commission found that    
Mr. Witte suffered from preexisting permanent partial disabilities of 10 percent of the 
body as a whole, diabetes; 10 percent of the body as a whole, gastrointestinal issues; 10 
percent of the body as a whole, psychiatric problems; 5 percent of the body as a whole, 
lumbar spine; and 10 percent of his right leg.  Mr. Witte’s body-as-a-whole disabilities 
due to his diabetes, gastrointestinal issues and psychiatric problems each entitle him to 40 
weeks of compensation, while the disability due to his lumbar spine entitles him to 20 
weeks.9     
The fund is only liable when there is a preexisting permanent partial disability that 
meets either the 50-week threshold for a body as a whole injury or the 15 percent 
threshold for a major extremity injury.  Because none of Mr. Witte’s preexisting injuries, 
when considered alone, meets the thresholds, he is not eligible for compensation from the 
fund.  The commission erred in awarding him compensation. 
 
9 While section 287.220.1 does not allow converting a major extremity injury to weeks, 
the legislature provided a method for converting a body as a whole injury to weeks.  See 
section 287.190.3.  To determine the number of weeks of compensation for a body as a 
whole injury, the percentage of permanent partial disability is multiplied by 400 weeks.  
Id. 
22 
 
                                             
Salviccio v. Treasurer 
The fund claims the commission erred in considering Mr. Salviccio’s preexisting 
permanent partial disabilities resulting from his hernias and to his little finger when 
determining the fund’s liability because none of the disabilities individually meets the 
statutory thresholds.  The commission determined that Mr. Salviccio had preexisting 
permanent partial disabilities of 12.5 percent of the body as a whole, referable to 
diabetes; 4 percent of the body as a whole, referable to the 1999 hernia; 3.5 percent of the 
body as a whole, referable to the 2005 hernia; and 50 percent of the little finger.  Mr. 
Salviccio’s disabilities due to his body as a whole injuries entitle him to the following 
number of weeks of compensation: 50 weeks for his diabetes; 16 weeks for his 1999 
hernia; and 14 weeks for his 2005 hernia.  See section 287.290. 
Mr. Salviccio’s disability due to his diabetes meets the 50-week threshold to 
trigger the fund’s liability.10  Once the threshold is met, all of Mr. Salviccio’s disabilities 
should be considered in calculating the extent of the fund’s liability.  While the 
commission erred in combining all of Mr. Salviccio’s injuries to meet the thresholds, it 
did not err in finding the fund liable or in using all of his injuries in calculating the 
amount of the award. 
 
 
 
10 The court of appeals held that a little finger is not a major extremity and, therefore, a 
disability to a little finger could not meet the 15 percent major extremity threshold no 
matter how serious the disability.  Because Mr. Salviccio already has an additional 
disability of sufficient seriousness to meet the thresholds, this Court does not need to 
consider that issue. 
23 
 
Dyson v. Treasurer 
The fund claims the commission erred in considering Mr. Dyson’s preexisting 
permanent partial disability to his right ankle when determining its liability because it 
does not, by itself, meet the 15 percent threshold required for a major extremity injury.  
The fund additionally claims the commission erred in considering the ankle injury 
because the commission failed to make a finding, and there was no evidence, that the 
injury constituted a hindrance or obstacle to his employment.   
 Despite the fund’s claim, there was evidence showing Mr. Dyson’s ankle injury 
constituted a hindrance or obstacle to his employment.  Mr. Dyson’s medical expert,    
Dr. Volarich, testified that the injury caused “ongoing pain, particularly with prolonged 
weightbearing [sic] and deep squatting activities.”  Mr. Dyson testified that his ankle hurt 
at certain times when he got into his work truck.  He also testified that he has to wear 
boots to work year-round to provide support for his ankle and that he still experiences 
discomfort.  Further, the commission made a finding that the ankle injury constituted a 
hindrance or obstacle to employment when it expressly credited testimony from             
Dr. Volarich that both preexisting injuries amounted to a hindrance or obstacle to 
employment at the time of the last injury.  Because the commission expressly found the 
ankle injury amounted to a hindrance or obstacle to employment and this finding is 
supported by testimony in the record, the fund’s claim that the commission erred in 
considering the ankle injury because it was not a hindrance or obstacle fails. 
As to the fund’s claim regarding the statutory thresholds, the commission found 
that Mr. Dyson had preexisting permanent partial disabilities of 15 percent of the body as 
24 
 
a whole, referable to the neck injury and 7.5 percent of his right ankle.  The disability due 
to his neck injury entitles Mr. Dyson to 60 weeks of compensation.  See section 287.190.  
While Mr. Dyson’s disability to his ankle was insufficient to meet the thresholds, his 
disability to the body as a whole, referable to his neck, meets the 50-week threshold to 
trigger the fund’s liability.  In determining the extent of the fund’s liability, all of          
Mr. Dyson’s disabilities must be considered.  While the commission erred in combining 
both of Mr. Dyson’s preexisting permanent partial disabilities to meet the thresholds, it 
did not err in using both disabilities to calculate the amount of his award. 
Buhlinger v. Treasurer 
 
In Mr. Buhlinger’s case, the fund claims the commission erred in combining the 
permanent partial disabilities from his last injury to meet the thresholds.  The commission 
found Mr. Buhlinger had permanent partial disabilities from his last injury of 27.5 
percent of the body as a whole, referable to the neck, 5 percent of the body as a whole, 
referable to the concussion, and 5 percent of the left elbow.  As previously discussed, 
section 287.220.1 does not impose a numerical threshold for disabilities from the last 
injury. 
 
Accordingly, the commission did not err in combining the permanent partial 
disabilities from Mr. Buhlinger’s last injury in meeting the thresholds because they did 
not need to meet the thresholds.  The commission found Mr. Buhlinger had a preexisting 
permanent partial disability of 17.5 percent of his left ankle, meeting the 15 percent major 
extremity threshold to trigger the fund’s liability.  The commission properly considered 
all of his injuries in calculating the amount of his award. 
25 
 
Conclusion 
The commission misapplied section 287.220.1 in combining preexisting 
permanent partial disabilities to meet the thresholds for triggering the fund’s liability.  
Disabilities from the last injury do not need to meet a certain threshold to trigger the 
fund’s liability, but the statute does require that an individual preexisting permanent 
partial disability meets the thresholds.  Nonetheless, Mr. Salviccio, Mr. Dyson and         
Mr. Buhlinger each had an individual preexisting permanent partial disability that met the 
statutory thresholds to trigger the fund’s liability.  Therefore, the commission did not err 
in finding they were entitled to compensation and awarding an amount based on the 
combined disability of all of their preexisting injuries and the last injury.  This Court 
affirms the commission’s awards in those cases.  Mr. Witte did not have a preexisting 
permanent partial disability that met the thresholds and, therefore, the commission erred 
in awarding any compensation from the fund to him.  This court reverses the 
commission’s award in Mr. Witte’s case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Stith, 
Draper and Teitelman, JJ., concur. 
Wilson, J., not participating.