Case Title: Ouellette v. Saco River Corridor Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022 ME 42

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2022 ME 42 
Docket: 
Yor-21-344 
Argued: 
June 6, 2022 
Decided: 
July 26, 2022 
 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
RICHARD OUELLETTE 
 
v. 
 
SACO RIVER CORRIDOR COMMISSION 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Richard Ouellette appeals from a decision of the Superior Court 
(York County, Douglas, J.) affirming the decision of the Saco River Corridor 
Commission denying Ouellette’s application to build a privacy fence along a 
portion of his property because such a fence would unreasonably despoil the 
scenic, rural, and open space character of the Saco River Corridor.  Because the 
Commission’s “scenic view” rule, 94-412 C.M.R. ch. 103, § 2(G)(3) (effective 
Jan. 30, 2006), neither conflicts with the Saco River Corridor Act, 38 M.R.S. 
§§ 951-969 (2022), nor is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, and because 
the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, we affirm. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the Commission’s findings, 
which are supported by competent record evidence.  See Sultan Corp. v. Dep’t of 
Env’t Prot., 2022 ME 21, ¶ 2, 272 A.3d 296.  Richard Ouellette owns property on 
the Saco River on Pool Street in Biddeford.  The property is located within the 
Limited Residential District of the Saco River Corridor as defined by 38 M.R.S. 
§ 957-B.  The property abuts 11 and 13 Marblehead Lane.  If there are no 
obstructions, the Saco River is visible from the Marblehead Lane properties 
when looking over the Pool Street property during certain seasons.   
 
[¶3]  In June 2020, it came to the Commission’s attention that Ouellette 
had replaced an existing 264-foot-long, 5-foot-tall, vinyl post-and-rail fence 
with a 6- to 7-foot-tall privacy fence, without obtaining a permit from the 
Commission.  Ouellette installed this fence to block his view of his neighbor’s 
backyard.  After the Commission contacted Ouellette about the fence, he applied 
for an after-the-fact permit for the project.  This initial application proposed 
keeping the entire fence intact.  The neighbors at 11 and 13 Marblehead Lane 
submitted comments that their views of the Saco River were obstructed by the 
new fence in a way that they were not by the previous fence and submitted 
photographic evidence supporting the comments.  Commission staff visited the 
 
 
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site on August 14, 2020, and two commissioners visited the site on August 24, 
2020.  The Commission considered the application at their August 26, 2020, 
meeting.  By a vote of 7-3, the Commission denied the application, determining 
that, under the standards set forth in 94-412 C.M.R. ch. 103, § 2(G), the fence 
unreasonably obstructed the views of the river from abutting properties.  The 
Commission issued a written decision on September 2, 2020.   
[¶4]  Ouellette initially appealed this decision but withdrew his appeal 
after he reapplied for the permit on September 16, 2020.  The new application 
proposed replacing the six solid panels nearest to the river with the original 
split-rail fence.  On September 30, 2020, commissioners visited the site again.  
The abutting landowners again submitted comments in opposition to the 
application.  During its October 28, 2020, meeting, the Commission denied the 
application by a vote of 10-3 and found that the proposed privacy fence “would 
unreasonably involve factors enumerated in Section 959-A.1.A. through K of the 
Act INCLUDING: G. Despoliation of the scenic, rural, and open space character 
of the corridor” by unreasonably obstructing the views of the river from 
abutting properties.  The Commission issued its written decision, with findings, 
on November 4, 2020.   
 
 
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[¶5]  On November 27, 2020, Ouellette requested that the Commission 
reconsider the application, pursuant to 94-412 C.M.R. ch. 101, § 5 (effective 
Jan. 30, 2006).  The neighbors, as they did with the application, filed documents 
opposing the request for reconsideration.  The Commission heard the request 
for reconsideration at its January 4, 2021, meeting.  By a vote of 8-6 the 
Commission rejected the request.  A commissioner then proposed replacing ten 
panels with the original split-rail fence, but this proposal failed to carry because 
the Commission voted 7-7.  The Commission issued its decision with findings 
on January 13, 2021.  On February 3, 2021, Ouellette timely appealed from the 
Commission’s decision to the Superior Court.1  See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(b); 5 M.R.S. 
§ 11002(3) (2022). 
[¶6]  Following argument on August 17, 2021, the Superior Court 
affirmed the Commission’s decision on October 15, 2021.  Ouellette timely 
appeals.  See 5 M.R.S. § 11008(1) (2022). 
 
1  Although 38 M.R.S. § 968 (2022) provides that appeals from decisions of the Commission be 
taken pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, the statute was enacted in 1979, prior to the adoption of M.R. 
Civ. P. 80C in 1983.  See Palesky v. Sec’y of State, 1998 ME 103, ¶ 7 n.2, 711 A.2d 129 (“Prior to the 
adoption of M.R. Civ. P. 80C, both governmental and agency actions were reviewed according to M.R. 
Civ. P. 80B . . . .”).  Because the Commission is an administrative agency, see 5 M.R.S. § 8002(2) (2022), 
this appeal was properly brought under M.R. Civ. P. 80C, which “applies to appeals from state 
administrative action,” Dubois v. Town of Arundel, 2019 ME 21, ¶ 5, 202 A.3d 524.  See also M.R. 
Civ. P. 80B Advisory Committee’s Notes to February 15, 1983 Order Amending Rule 80B (“[M.R. 
Civ. P. 80B and 80C] now provide separate procedural paths for judicial review of local government 
agencies and for review of state administrative agencies subject to the Maine Administrative 
Procedure Act.”).  
 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  On appeal, Ouellette contends that the Commission’s “scenic view” 
rule conflicts with the Saco River Corridor Act, that the rule is 
unconstitutionally vague, and that the Commission’s decision to deny the 
permit was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.   
A. 
The “Scenic View” Rule 
 
1. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶8]  “In an appeal from a Superior Court judgment on a Rule 80C petition, 
we review the underlying administrative agency decision directly for abuse of 
discretion, errors of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
record.”  Maquoit Bay, LLC v. Dep’t of Marine Res., 2022 ME 19, ¶ 5, 271 A.3d 
1183.  We review a trial court’s interpretation of statute de novo.  SAD 3 Educ. 
Ass’n v. RSU 3 Bd. of Dirs., 2018 ME 29, ¶ 14, 180 A.3d 125.  When a statute’s 
language is unambiguous, “we interpret the provisions according to their 
unambiguous meaning unless the result is illogical or absurd,” and only if a 
statute is ambiguous do we “consider the statute’s meaning in light of its 
legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
 
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2. 
The Saco River Corridor Act 
[¶9]  The Saco River Corridor Act establishes the Saco River Corridor and 
the Commission.  The Legislature found “that [the Saco, Ossipee, and Little 
Ossipee Rivers] and their adjacent lands possess outstanding scenic and 
aesthetic qualities.”  38 M.R.S. § 951.  The purpose of the Act includes preserving 
the “scenic, rural and unspoiled character of the lands adjacent to these rivers.”  
Id.  The Act separates the corridor into three districts—the Resource Protection 
District, the Limited Residential District, and the General Development District.  
Id. § 957.  Ouellette’s property is in the Limited Residential District, which is 
defined as “lands within the corridor which may be suitable for development, 
but which are not necessary for the growth of areas of intensive development.”  
Id. § 957-B(1).  Uses that are allowed by permit include single-family residences 
and accessory structures.  Id. § 957-B(3)(E).  “Fences” are included in the Act’s 
definition of “structure.”  Id. § 952(16). 
[¶10]  To receive a permit to construct a structure in the Limited 
Residential District, an applicant must show that a proposed use will not 
unreasonably 
cause 
any 
of 
eleven 
enumerated 
conditions. 
 
Id. 
§ 959-A(1)(A)-(K).  Paragraph (G) requires the applicant to prove that the 
proposed use will not involve an unreasonable “[d]espoliation of the scenic, 
 
 
7 
rural and open space character of the corridor.”  The Commission, which is 
authorized to adopt additional standards for permitted uses, id. § 954-C(1), has 
promulgated rules that expand upon section 959-A(1)(G).  One of these rules, 
the “scenic view” rule, requires applicants to show “[t]he proposed use will not 
unreasonably obstruct scenic views from neighboring properties or public 
roads.”  94-412 C.M.R. ch. 103, § 2(G)(3). 
[¶11]  Ouellette argues that the “scenic view” rule conflicts with the Act 
because the Commission cannot deny a permit based on a proposed use’s effect 
on an abutting landowner, categorically bans all fences in the corridor, and 
empowers the Commission to create de facto view easements.   
a. 
Effect on Abutting Landowners 
[¶12]  The plain language of section 959-A(1)(G) of the act requires the 
Commission to determine whether a proposed use will involve “any 
unreasonable . . . despoliation of the scenic, rural and open space character of 
the corridor.”  This requirement clearly extends to the lands adjacent to the 
river.  See id. § 951 (“[I]t is the purpose of this chapter . . . to preserve the scenic 
rural and unspoiled character of the lands adjacent to [the rivers constituting 
the corridor] . . . .”); id. § 953 (“The [Saco River Corridor] includes the lands 
adjacent to these rivers to a distance of 500 feet.”).  The rule promulgated in 
 
 
8 
accordance with the statute provides that a use must not unreasonably obstruct 
scenic views from the road and neighboring properties or be highly visible from 
the water.  94-412 C.M.R. ch. 103, § 2(G)(3)-(4).  The unambiguous language in 
section 2(G) does not conflict with the statute but instead provides the 
Commission with a consistent means of examining whether the use will involve 
an “unreasonable [d]espoliation of the scenic, rural and open space character 
of the corridor,” 38 M.R.S. § 959-A(1)(G).  
b. 
The Act Does Not Ban Fences 
[¶13]  Ouellette argues that the Commission’s “scenic view” rule conflicts 
with the Act because it categorically bans the use of fences, a permitted use 
under the Act.  See 38 M.R.S. §§ 952(2), (16), 957-B.  However, the rule does not 
ban all fences, just those that unreasonably obstruct scenic views, 94-412 
C.M.R. ch. 103, § 2(G)(3), which aligns with the statute.  See 38 M.R.S. 
§ 959-A(1)(G) (barring uses that unreasonably cause “[d]espoliation of the 
scenic . . . character of the corridor”).  “[W]hether a proposed activity will 
unreasonably interfere with an existing scenic or aesthetic use will necessarily 
depend on the specific circumstances of a given case.”  Uliano v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 
2009 ME 89, ¶ 23, 977 A.2d 400.  Ultimately, neither the statute nor the rules 
ban the use of all fences, and whether any given fence unreasonably interferes 
 
 
9 
with the scenic view is a fact-specific determination within the Commission’s 
role as fact finder.   
 
c. 
View Easements 
[¶14]  Ouellette also argues that the “scenic view” rule conflicts with the 
Act because the rule empowers the Commission to “create and give away de 
facto view easements to adjacent landowners,” a power the Act does not 
bestow.  A view easement requires “the owner of the servient estate [to] not 
undertake any activities, such as the construction of a building, that would 
impede the view of the owner of the dominant estate.”  Patterson v. Paul, 
863 N.E.2d 527, 533 (Mass. 2007).  However, Ouellette points to no authority 
that would differentiate the “scenic view” rule from other rules that consider 
the scenic effect on neighbors and that have been upheld.  See, e.g., Uliano, 2009 
ME 89, ¶ 31, 977 A.2d 400 (“[P]rotection of scenic and aesthetic uses serves a 
significant governmental interest and is a valid exercise of the police power.”).  
Further, the rule does not block all obstructions, only “unreasonable” ones.  
38 M.R.S. § 959-A(1)(G).  We therefore reject this argument. 
B. 
Void for Vagueness 
[¶15]  Ouellette contends that the “scenic view” rule is unconstitutionally 
void for vagueness.  “A person challenging the constitutionality of a legislative 
 
 
10 
enactment ‘bears a heavy burden of proving unconstitutionality[,] since all acts 
of the Legislature are presumed constitutional,’” Jones v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 
113, ¶ 18, 238 A.3d 982 (quoting Goggin v. State Tax Assessor, 2018 ME 111, 
¶ 20, 191 A.3d 341).  This burden also applies to regulations.  Davis v. Sec’y of 
State, 577 A.2d 338, 341 (Me. 1990) (“The party challenging the regulation 
bears the heavy burden of overcoming its presumption of constitutionality.”).  
In a void-for-vagueness challenge, the challenging party “must demonstrate 
that the statute has no valid application or logical construction.”  Stewart Title 
Guar. Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 2009 ME 8, ¶ 40, 963 A.2d 169.  A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague “when its language either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must guess 
at its meaning, or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”  Uliano, 2009 ME 89, ¶ 15, 977 A.2d 400 (quotation marks 
omitted).  In a land use context, standards that are “wholly subjective” and 
“permit[] municipal employees or board members to make ‘legislative-type 
decisions based on any factor they independently deem[] appropriate” are void 
for vagueness.  Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 
¶ 16, 752 A.2d 183).2  However, “[o]bjective quantification, mathematical 
 
2  Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown addresses an improper delegation of legislative authority and 
does not address a void-for-vagueness challenge.  2000 ME 106, ¶ 1, 752 A.2d 183.  However, we 
 
 
11 
certainty, and absolute precision are not required by either the United States 
Constitution or Maine Constitution.”  Friends of Me.’s Mountains v. Bd. of Env’t 
Prot., 2013 ME 25, ¶ 21, 61 A.3d 689 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
[¶16]  We have held that a standard that required that a proposed activity 
“not unreasonably interfere with existing scenic, aesthetic, recreational or 
navigational uses,” 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(1) (2022), was sufficiently definite to not 
be void for vagueness or unconstitutionally delegate legislative power.  Uliano, 
2009 ME 89, ¶¶ 14, 29-32, 977 A.2d 400.  In Uliano, addressing the lack of 
quantitative standards, we emphasized the difference between the limited 
requirement in the statute at issue there—that the decision maker determine 
whether a proposed activity unreasonably interfered with an existing scenic or 
aesthetic use—and Kosalka’s “amorphous command . . . requiring an applicant 
to prove that a project will ‘conserve natural beauty.’”  Id. ¶ 25.  Further, 
because the statute in Uliano was administered by an executive agency (the 
Board of Environmental Protection) subject to the Maine Administrative 
Procedure Act, the parties were provided with greater due process protections.  
 
have stated that “both vagueness and unlawful delegation challenges are concerned with the issue of 
definiteness” and that both have been “properly treated as a single inquiry.”  Uliano v. Bd. of Env’t 
Prot., 2009 ME 89, ¶ 15, 977 A.2d 400.  We look to our analysis in Kosalka for limited guidance on the 
specificity required to meet constitutional requirements.  See id. ¶¶ 24-28. 
 
 
12 
Id. ¶¶ 26-28.  Ultimately, we determined that the phrase ‘scenic and aesthetic 
uses’ was sufficiently definite and offered “an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.”  Id. ¶¶ 29-30 (quoting 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)). 
 
[¶17]  However, the analysis as to whether a view is actually scenic, and 
therefore whether an application could potentially be denied under the rule, is 
more complicated.  Ouellette argues that not every view of the corridor is scenic 
and that there is no definition that determines what views are scenic.  However, 
the statute supports an interpretation that all views of the river are considered 
scenic.  The Legislature found that “[the rivers making up the corridor] and 
their adjacent lands possess outstanding scenic and aesthetic qualities.”  
38 M.R.S. § 951.  Although the Act specifies that there are areas of “exceptional 
scenic value” or “exceptional scenic importance,” see id. §§ 951, 957-A(F), these 
areas are the subject of special statutes and rules, id. § 957-A(F); 94-412 C.M.R. 
ch. 103, § 2(G)(5), implying that the other rules would apply to all views of the 
corridor.  Looking to “the context of the whole statutory scheme of which the 
section at issue forms a part to achieve a consistent and harmonious result,” 
Fortin v. Titcomb, 2013 ME 14, ¶ 7, 60 A.3d 765 (quotation marks omitted), we 
reject Ouellette’s argument.   
 
 
13 
 
[¶18]  The statute further provides greater due process protections to 
Ouellette, thereby weakening his vagueness argument.  The Saco River Corridor 
Commission was established by the Legislature and is subject to Title 5.  See 
5 M.R.S. § 12004-G(13) (2022); 38 M.R.S. §§ 954, 954-C.  This provides 
“adequate procedural safeguards to protect against an abuse of discretion” 
when, like here, “the statutory enactment of detailed specific standards is 
impossible.”  Uliano, 2009 ME 89, ¶ 26, 977 A.2d 400 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Ultimately, we conclude that the rule is not unconstitutionally void 
for vagueness. 
C. 
Substantial Evidence 
[¶19]  Ouellette contends that the Commission’s determinations that the 
fence unreasonably obstructed the views of the river from abutting properties 
and that those views were scenic were unsupported by substantial evidence.   
[¶20]  “In an appeal from a Superior Court judgment on a Rule 80C 
petition, we review the underlying administrative decision directly for 
. . . findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Maquoit Bay, 
LLC, 2022 ME 19, ¶ 5, 271 A.3d 1183.  We will “not substitute our judgment for 
that of the agency and will affirm findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.”  AngleZ Behav. Health Servs. v. Dep’t of 
 
 
14 
Health & Hum. Servs., 2020 ME 26, ¶ 12, 226 A.3d 762 (quotation marks 
omitted).  “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind would rely on 
that evidence as sufficient support for a conclusion.”  Doane v. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs., 2021 ME 28, ¶ 38, 250 A.3d 1101 (quotation marks omitted).  We 
“examine the entire record to determine whether, on the basis of all the 
testimony and exhibits before it, the agency could fairly and reasonably find the 
facts as it did.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  However, the 
substantial-evidence standard of review “does not involve any weighing of the 
merits of evidence; instead, we will vacate an agency’s factual findings only if 
there is no competent evidence in the record to support the findings.”  AngleZ 
Behav. Health Servs., 2020 ME 26, ¶ 12, 226 A.3d 762 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, we will affirm the agency’s findings “even if the record 
contains inconsistent evidence or evidence contrary to the result reached by 
the agency.”  Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 2010 ME 18, ¶ 13, 989 
A.2d 1128. 
[¶21]  With respect to the unreasonable obstruction of a scenic view, the 
Commission found as follows: 
The prior existing split-rail fence allowed views to the river from 
abutting properties and Marblehead Lane.  The Commission finds 
the proposed changes to the fence would continue to unreasonably 
obstruct views of the river from abutting properties including 
 
 
15 
11 and 13 Marblehead Lane.  Before the privacy fence was 
constructed[,] expansive views of the river and tidal marsh were 
visible from 11 and 13 Marblehead Lane.  Views of the river and 
marsh vary based on the season, and in the late fall, winter, and 
early spring there was high visibility of the river before the fence 
was erected.  This determination is based on photographs taken by 
Commission staff and provided by abutters and interested parties 
that show the prior existing view of the river from different 
abutting properties.  Commissioners present for the site visit 
provided assessments of the site [that were] also considered in the 
determination of this application.  Based on the facts, the 
Commission finds the proposed design is not within the meaning of 
the Act. 
 
[¶22]  The Commission reviewed evidence that included photographs of 
the views from the properties at 11 and 13 Marblehead Lane, from both before 
and after the fence was installed.  Commission staff and some of the 
commissioners made several visits to the property to examine the views and 
the fence.  The commissioners considered comments from several neighbors 
that described the views that existed before the fence was installed.  Because 
the Commission had competent evidence upon which to determine that the 
views were scenic, to both neighbors and the public, and that those views were 
unreasonably obstructed by Ouellette’s fence, the Commission’s decision was 
supported by substantial evidence. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tyler J. Smith, Esq. (orally), Libby O’Brien Kingsley & 
Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellant Richard Ouellette 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, Caleb E. Elwell, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), and 
Margaret A. Bensinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, 
for appellee Saco River Corridor Commission 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2021-02 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY