Case Title: Rogers v. Town of Newton

Citation: 121 N.H. 702

Docket Number: 

State: new-hampshire

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Date: 1981-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
121 N.H. 702 (1981) CHARLES F. ROGERS v. TOWN OF Newton & a. No. 80-117. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. August 10, 1981. *703 Craig, Wenners, Craig & McDowell, of Manchester (Vincent A. Wenners, Jr., on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff. Sulloway, Hollis & Soden, of Concord (John W. Mitchell on the brief and orally), for the defendants. BOIS, J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff-claimant, Charles F. Rogers, from the Superior Court's (Randall, J.) denial of workmen's compensation benefits under RSA ch. 281. The plaintiff claimed he was entitled to benefits because of disability resulting from a heart attack that he suffered on May 16, 1977, while on duty as a volunteer fireman for the defendant, the Town of Newton. After a hearing, the deputy labor commissioner denied the plaintiff's claim and found: Pursuant to RSA 281:37, the plaintiff appealed to the superior court, which, after a hearing, also denied his claim for benefits. We affirm. In April 1977, the plaintiff, a self-employed electronics engineer, joined the Town of Newton volunteer fire department. Prior to the May 16, 1977, incident, he had responded to five calls. On May 16, 1977, at approximately 11:30 p.m. the plaintiff received a "priority number 2 alarm," which indicated a fire that was a threat to life or property. He got out of bed, dressed, and drove to the fire station. Upon arrival, he discovered that the fire crew had already responded to the fire. The plaintiff remained at the station. While there he ran out some hose, but did not, according to his testimony, perform any "extraordinarily physically demanding" activities. He further testified that he felt a pain in the chest when he arrived at the station. He remained at the station, however, until the fire was brought under control and the crew returned to the station. Continuing to experience chest pains the following day, he went to the nearest hospital. The plaintiff was treated at the hospital by Dr. Robert H. Creech for two weeks. The doctor testified that the plaintiff had suffered a myocardial infarction while at the fire station on May 16, 1977. After his discharge on May 31, 1977, the plaintiff developed angina and was referred to a specialist for selective coronary angiography. The angiography indicated that the plaintiff required a vein bypass operation. Such an operation was performed in September of 1977. The court found that all of the doctors attending to the plaintiff had concluded that he was suffering from a severe condition of atherosclerosis, a condition that would take from five to fifteen years to develop. Furthermore, the doctors agreed that the plaintiff's family history included factors supportive of such a condition. Regarding the plaintiff's personal medical history prior to the May 16, 1977 heart attack, the court found that the plaintiff had been admitted to the Veteran's Administration Hospital in Manchester on three occasions in 1976 complaining of chest pains. There was *705 evidence that at least one of those admissions was because of a heart attack. The Court (Randall, J.) ultimately concluded that: [1] The plaintiff asserts that the only issue before us is the applicability to the facts at bar of the legal causation test enunciated in New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 119 N.H. 223, 400 A.2d 1163 (1979). He argues that the holding in Steinberg should apply only to heart attack cases involving chronic or long-term work-related stress, and should not extend to heart attack cases in which sudden, acute or traumatic stress or exertion is involved. Although Steinberg dealt with a heart attack allegedly caused by protracted work-related psychological stress, see New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 121 N.H. 506, 433 A.2d 1247 (1981), the test we enunciated in the first Steinberg decision was not expressly limited to one particular type of stress or exertion. Specifically, we stated that "the claimants had to prove both medical and legal causation." New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 119 N.H. at 230, 400 A.2d at 1168. [2-4] Regarding the test for legal causation, we stated in Steinberg: 119 N.H. at 231, 400 A.2d at 1168 (citations omitted). [5] In determining the "previous health of the employee," the *706 court in this case found that all of the medical evidence supported a finding that the claimant "was suffering from a severe condition of atherosclerosis." Having found the existence of a "previously weakened or diseased heart," the court then properly inquired into whether the claimant's employment duties on the night of May 16, 1977, contributed something substantial to the heart attack and concluded that they did not. New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 121 N.H. at 509, 433 A.2d at 1249. Accordingly, because the record supports the trial court's inability to find legal causation under the Steinberg test, we hold that the court properly denied benefits for the claimant. See Bothwick v. State, 119 N.H. 583, 587, 406 A.2d 462, 465 (1979). [6] The plaintiff also argues that even if the Steinberg ruling applies and the activities are not greater than those encountered in normal nonemployment life, the presumption established in RSA 281:2 V-a would constitute sufficient basis to "contribute something substantial" to the heart attack under Steinberg. RSA 281:2 V-a states in pertinent part: Because the record amply supports the conclusion that Rogers, a volunteer fireman, had a history of severe atherosclerosis at the time he became a fireman and at the time of the disabling attack, the statutory presumption set forth in RSA 281:2 V-a does not apply. [7] The court's finding that the May 16, 1977 heart attack "did not cause or contribute to the bypass operation in September, 1977" was proper, given the pre-existing infirmities of the claimant. Affirmed. BATCHELDER, J., did not sit; the others concurred.