Case Title: State v. Marshall

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81680-8

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13–0739 
 
Filed June 30, 2016 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
JUSTIN ALEXANDER MARSHALL, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sean W. 
McPartland, Judge. 
 
 
The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 
reversing the defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree.  
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND 
CASE REMANDED. 
 
 
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant 
Attorney General, Janet Lyness, County Attorney, and Meredith Rich-
Chappel, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
APPEL, Justice. 
 
In this case, we consider whether the State violated Justin 
Marshall’s right to counsel through the acquisition of evidence from 
jailhouse informants.  The district court rejected the claim, and a jury 
convicted Marshall of first-degree murder.  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding the State had violated Marshall’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel by using a jailhouse informant to obtain incriminating 
information when Marshall was represented by counsel.  Finding the 
error was not harmless, the court of appeals reversed Marshall’s 
conviction. 
 
In light of the remand, the court of appeals also considered 
whether the trial court’s instructions on aiding and abetting and joint 
criminal conduct violated due process of law because the instructions 
were not supported by substantial evidence.  The court of appeals 
rejected Marshall’s due process claim. 
 
We granted further review.  We retain discretion to consider all 
issues raised in the original appeal or limit our opinion to selected 
issues.  Botsko v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm’n, 774 N.W.2d 841, 844 
(Iowa 2009).  In our discretion, we consider only Marshall’s right-to-
counsel challenge.  The court of appeals ruling on the due process 
challenge to jury instructions stands. 
 
For the reasons expressed below, we affirm in part and vacate in 
part the court of appeals decision, reverse the trial court ruling on the 
violation of the right-to-counsel issue, and remand the matter for a new 
trial. 
 
I.  Procedural and Factual Background. 
 
A.  Overview of the Crime.  John Versypt was the landlord of the 
Broadway Condominiums complex in Iowa City.  On October 8, 2009, 
3 
Versypt was shot while hanging a sign at the complex.  He suffered two 
gunshot wounds, one to his forehead and the other to his right hand, 
along with other injuries.  He was discovered by a tenant shortly after 
being shot.  On the ground near Versypt were a wallet, a gun, a few tools, 
and the sign.  Versypt died at the scene. 
 
Charles Thompson and Marshall were both staying at an 
apartment in the complex with Marshall’s aunt on the date of the 
murder.  In February 2010, the State originally charged Thompson1 with 
murder in connection with Versypt’s death.  Police, however, soon came 
to suspect Marshall in connection with the slaying.  On July 12, 2011, 
the lead detective on the case for the Iowa City police, Jennifer Clarahan, 
swore out a complaint against Marshall for the murder.  The complaint 
was filed in Johnson County District Court the following day. 
 
B.  Meetings with Confidential Informants Prior to and After 
Arrest of Marshall.  On July 12, Detective Clarahan and Detective 
Michael Smithey met with Carl Johnson, a federal prisoner, at the 
Muscatine County Jail.  They told Johnson they sought information on 
Charles Thompson, Courtney White, and Justin Marshall in connection 
with Versypt’s murder.  At the time of the meeting, Marshall was at large 
in Texas.  When Marshall was arrested in Texas and brought to Iowa, he 
was immediately sent to the Muscatine County Jail.  Marshall was 
charged with Versypt’s murder on August 1, 2011.  Iowa City police had 
subsequent contacts with Johnson and two other inmates—Earl 
Freeman and Antonio Martin—at the Muscatine County Jail.  All three 
1Thompson’s trial in connection with Versypt’s murder ended in a mistrial.  The 
State declined to retry Thompson. 
                                      
 
4 
inmates had obtained information about the crime from Marshall while 
he was incarcerated in Muscatine. 
 
C.  Disclosure of Relationship with Confidential Informants.  In 
March 2012, the State identified the inmates as additional witnesses in 
Marshall’s upcoming trial in a notice of additional testimony.  The State 
noted that Martin and Johnson were in “a cooperation agreement with 
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Iowa.”  The 
minutes, however, did not indicate any other relationship between the 
three inmates and the State. 
 
Marshall’s trial was scheduled to commence on January 22, 2013.  
On January 17, Marshall’s counsel received an email from the State with 
two letters from Freeman to Detectives Clarahan and Smithey dated 
September 21 and October 26, 2011.  In the September 21 letter from 
Freeman to Detective Clarahan, Freeman stated that he was in the 
cellblock with Marshall, that he could back up information the State had 
been provided on Marshall, and that if Marshall were kept in the block 
“we could get a lot more information.”  The October 26 letter from 
Freeman to Detectives Clarahan and Smithey asked, among other things, 
that Detectives Clarahan and Smithey advise federal prosecutors and 
Freeman’s attorney that “[Freeman] helped in [their] investigation and 
prosecution of Justin Marshall.” 
 
The trial began as scheduled.  Freeman was deposed a second time 
in the middle of the trial on the evening of January 31 to resolve an 
unrelated matter.  At this time, Marshall’s attorney received a letter 
dated January 26, 2013, from the Johnson County Attorney to Richard 
Westphal, a federal prosecutor in charge of handling Freeman’s pending 
federal drug prosecution.  In this letter, the county attorney explained in 
detail how Freeman cooperated first with the trial of Thompson and then 
5 
with the trial of Marshall for the death of Versypt.  The county attorney 
stressed that, while Freeman’s information had been helpful regarding 
the Thompson matter, it was also “extremely helpful” to the State in 
Marshall’s prosecution.  She closed by requesting that Freeman receive a 
reduction in his federal sentence because of his assistance in both the 
Thompson and Marshall cases. 
 
D.  Trial Testimony and Midtrial Motion to Suppress. 
 
1.  Opening trial testimony of Detective Smithey.  Detective Smithey 
was called as a witness at Marshall’s trial.  He described that pursuant 
to a cooperation agreement, a federal defendant could get a reduction in 
his or her sentence for providing information.  Such a reduction would be 
recommended by the United States Attorney and approved by a judge.  
Detective Smithey testified that at the time of the July 12 meeting with 
Johnson, Johnson had a cooperation agreement with the government.  
Johnson had already pled guilty and was awaiting sentencing.  Detective 
Smithey testified that when the police interview someone in connection 
with a cooperation agreement, they would not provide “specific 
information about how [the informant] should gather information.”  
Detective Smithey stated it was his understanding that providing specific 
instructions “would be bypassing . . . certain rights that people have who 
are incarcerated.” 
 
Detective Smithey testified he told Johnson at the July 12 meeting 
that the State was interested in information related to the Versypt 
murder and particularly interested in information about Charles 
Thompson, Justin Marshall, and Courtney White.  He made no promises 
regarding what Johnson would receive in exchange for the information, 
but Johnson was aware or was made aware that the United States 
Attorney would be advised of any information provided.  Detective 
6 
Smithey testified that, pursuant to the July 12 meeting, Johnson “was 
trying to provide information that would be used to determine what 
reduction [in sentence] he would receive.”  He testified it was probably 
reasonable to assume that Johnson would communicate the State’s 
interest in Marshall to other cooperating witnesses. 
 
2.  Marshall’s midtrial motion to suppress.  Marshall then made an 
oral, midtrial motion to suppress the testimony of Johnson, Martin, and 
Freeman.  At a hearing on the motion, Marshall offered into evidence the 
September 21, 2011, October 26, 2011, and January 26, 2013 letters.  
Marshall maintained that Freeman, Johnson, and Martin “were engaged 
in a pattern of seeking out Mr. Marshall [and] of working at the behest of 
the police or agents of the State while Mr. Marshall was represented by 
Counsel.”  Marshall asked the court to prohibit the State from calling 
Johnson, Martin, and Freeman to testify about Marshall’s conversations 
with them because it would be an “end run around Mr. Marshall’s right 
to have counsel present while agents of the State are questioning him.”  
While Marshall’s counsel stated that he was challenging the testimony of 
the three informants on grounds of Marshall’s right to counsel, he did 
not explicitly mention either the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution or article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. 
 
The district court took a recess, read the letters, and then 
reconvened the hearing to ask Marshall and the State for relevant 
authority.  After the brief recess, the State cited Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 
U.S. 436, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 92 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986), and Moore v. United 
States, 178 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1999), as standing for the proposition that 
an “informant becomes a government agent only when the informant has 
been instructed by the police to get information about the particular 
7 
defendant.”  Marshall’s attorney did not offer caselaw.  The State then 
called Detectives Smithey and Clarahan as witnesses. 
 
3.  Testimony of Detective Smithey at midtrial hearing on motion to 
suppress.  Detective Smithey testified that he first met with Johnson on 
things unrelated to the Versypt murder.  He explained that on July 12, 
2011, he had a meeting with Johnson, Johnson’s attorney, and Detective 
Clarahan at the Muscatine County Jail “to do a proffer agreement” with 
Johnson.  Detective Smithey stated that the purpose of the meeting was 
“[t]o find out if Carl Johnson had information about . . . the death of 
John Versypt.”  He stated that he did not request Johnson gather more 
information, but that he “only requested that [Johnson] contact [him] if 
he learned anything further.”  Detective Smithey further stated that he 
did not make any effort to have Marshall placed in a cell with anyone in 
particular. 
 
Detective Smithey testified that on September 12 Johnson’s 
attorney informed him that Johnson now had information about the 
Versypt murder.  As a result, Detective Smithey and Johnson met on 
September 15.  At the meeting, Detective Smithey said Johnson told him 
about statements made by Marshall while they were incarcerated in 
segregation together at the Muscatine County Jail in August of 2011.  
Detective Smithey repeated that he did not ask Johnson “to do anything 
to try to obtain more information or any information” from Marshall 
regarding Versypt’s death.  Detective Smithey testified he told Johnson 
“[o]nly to contact [him] if he learned anything.” 
 
Detective Smithey further testified that he met with Freeman on 
October 3 at the Muscatine County Jail to discuss what he had learned 
about Marshall’s involvement in the Versypt murder.  Detective Smithey 
said that he did not ask Freeman to do anything further in the 
8 
investigation, only “to contact [the detective] if there was additional 
information [Freeman] wished to relay.”  Detective Smithey testified that 
after speaking with Freeman he also met with Antonio Martin at the 
Muscatine County Jail on October 3.  According to Detective Smithey, he 
happened to see Martin after completing his session with Freeman.  
Detective Smithey stated he had previously done proffer interviews with 
Martin on other matters.  He further conceded that he “may have asked 
[Martin] if he had any knowledge” of the Versypt murder during one of 
the first proffers, but if so, it was a simple “do you know any information 
about this?”  Detective Smithey stated that he did nothing to put Martin 
or Freeman “in the same vicinity” of the Muscatine County Jail with 
Marshall.  He testified he did not ask Freeman, Martin, or Johnson “to do 
anything” to gather further information from Marshall. 
 
4.  Testimony of Detective Clarahan at midtrial hearing on motion to 
suppress.  Detective Clarahan also testified at the hearing on the motion 
to suppress.  Detective Clarahan said that she met with Johnson on 
July 12, 2011.  She stated she did not request Johnson to obtain 
information from Marshall, nor did she hear anyone make such a 
request.  She also said that she had not arranged for Johnson to be 
placed in the same cellblock as Marshall.  Detective Clarahan confirmed 
receipt of the two letters that Freeman had sent her.  She also stated she 
received a phone call from Freeman at home on October 1, 2011, during 
which Freeman stated he had information about Versypt’s murder.  
Detective Clarahan told the court she met with Freeman along with 
Detective Smithey on October 3, but had not joined Detective Smithey 
when he met with Martin.  Detective Clarahan said she did not ask 
Freeman to do anything on behalf of the State. 
9 
 
At the motion to suppress, no party presented the testimony of 
Freeman, Johnson, or Martin.  Further, Marshall did not testify.  As a 
result, no evidence was offered at the motion to suppress regarding the 
role or nature of the participation of each of the informants in the 
communications between Marshall and the informants about the crime. 
 
5.  Ruling on the motion to suppress.  After hearing the testimony of 
Detectives Smithey and Clarahan, the district court overruled the motion 
to suppress.  The court recognized and the State conceded that 
Marshall’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached.  The court 
ruled, however, that in order to violate the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, “[t]he defendant must demonstrate that the police and their 
informant took some action beyond merely listening that was designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.”  The court concluded that 
the case “presents just the sort of luck or happenstance that resulted in 
these gentlemen coming forward and providing information to the State.” 
 
6.  Freeman trial testimony.  After ruling on the motion to suppress, 
trial resumed.  The three informants then testified on behalf of the State.  
Freeman said that he first met Marshall when he was placed in the same 
cellblock in the Muscatine County Jail.  Freeman testified that Marshall 
approached him, stating that he was not satisfied with his attorney, and 
asked Freeman to help him draft a motion to appoint new counsel.  
According to Freeman, inmates Antonio Martin and Richard Sandifer 
sent Marshall to him.  Freeman testified that Sandifer told Marshall that 
Freeman had filed a motion for a different attorney and that the motion 
had been granted.  Freeman said that he did not know whether Johnson 
was involved in sending Marshall to him. 
 
Freeman stated that he wrote the motion for new counsel for 
Marshall, which Marshall filed with the court.  Freeman declared that 
10 
Marshall told him about Charles Thompson being tried for Versypt’s 
murder, that Thompson was “acquitted on a mistrial,” and that Marshall 
wanted to see if he could get his charge dropped from murder to 
manslaughter.  Freeman testified that he and Marshall went over a paper 
that contained a definition of manslaughter in Freeman’s cell.  According 
to Freeman, he told Marshall that Marshall would have to convince his 
own lawyer that Versypt’s death was an accident for manslaughter to 
work. 
 
Freeman testified Marshall told him he intended to rob Versypt, 
Versypt grabbed for the gun, the gun went off, and Versypt was shot in 
the hand and in the head.  Freeman recalled Marshall told him that 
Versypt fell and that he wiped off the gun with the front of his jacket and 
“took off.”  According to Freeman, Marshall wanted him and another 
inmate to go to their attorneys to “explain to them that Justin confessed 
. . . to the shooting, but that it was an accident.”  Freeman stated that he 
told Marshall if he wanted to do that, he would need to write it down “so 
all our stories would be the same.”  Freeman testified, “[W]e all talked 
about how he could try to convince his attorney that it was an accident.” 
 
The prosecutor asked Freeman whether he in any way tried to 
push Marshall to make admissions.  Freeman responded, 
I’d say yes.  After he started to—admitting to doing it, yeah, I 
would probably say, yeah, I did push him to tell me 
information. . . . Once I realized that I thought he actually 
did it, I was, you know, wanting to know what happened. 
Freeman testified that he was in prison on a federal charge of conspiracy 
to manufacture methamphetamine and that he had not been sentenced 
when he contacted the detectives about Marshall in October 2011.  
Freeman stated he did not have a cooperation agreement with the United 
States Attorney, but Freeman had hoped to get “cooperation time off” 
11 
from his sentence for his testimony about the Versypt murder.  Freeman 
testified that he did not receive any reduction in his sentence because of 
the information provided to the Iowa City police about Marshall.  When 
confronted with the January 26, 2013 letter from the Johnson County 
Attorney to federal authorities, Freeman agreed that the letter might help 
him get a reduction in his sentence in the future. 
 
7.  Johnson trial testimony.  Johnson stated he had been living at 
Broadway Condominiums when Versypt was murdered.  Johnson said he 
was acquainted with Marshall but they were not good friends.  Johnson 
testified he talked to Marshall about the murder once shortly after the 
event, and Marshall indicated that “folks,” apparently meaning 
Thompson, were responsible for the crime. 
 
In the summer of 2011, Johnson stated he was in jail after 
pleading guilty to a federal charge of distributing cocaine and had a 
proffer agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office to assist in 
other investigations.  Johnson said he had provided such assistance to 
police in about four other cases.  Johnson stated he had testified against 
his coconspirator.  As part of his cooperation agreement, Johnson 
testified that he met with Detective Smithey on July 12.  At the July 12 
meeting, Detective Smithey asked Johnson if he knew Marshall before 
Johnson had been arrested. 
 
Johnson testified that he was placed in segregation at the 
Muscatine County Jail because of jailhouse rule violations.  According to 
Johnson, Marshall was also in segregation at that time, and over a ten-
day period, they interacted during their hour-a-day reprieve from solitary 
confinement when they were permitted to leave their cells. 
 
Johnson stated, “I asked him what was he in there for.”  According 
to Johnson, Marshall responded, “[T]hey got me for that landlord.”  The 
12 
State asked Johnson a series of questions limited to information that 
Marshall told him about the crime.  In response to the series of 
questions, Johnson testified, 
[H]e told me, he say that they didn’t have no evidence on him 
and they didn’t have no witnesses.  The only witnesses they 
had was the police. . . .  He told me that he—he left Iowa 
City.  He went to Burlington because the police kept 
bothering him and other people was implicating his name in 
a murder. . . .  He said when the police came down there to 
Burlington, harassing him, threatening him he wasn’t going 
to see his family again if he didn’t tell them what happened, 
he told me that’s when he knew they didn’t really have 
evidence on him because they had previously before let him 
go, so that’s why they left and went to Burlington. 
. . . at first he said that they had nothing on him, and 
then he said all they had was a little gun powder on him. . . .  
He was looking at a lot of time. . . .  He told me that him, 
Weezy [Thompson], and Calvin was in the hallway, they was 
all in the hallway playing dice.  After a while Charles 
Thompson left and went inside his apartment.  That’s when 
he came up with the idea that he wanted to rob the 
landlord. . . .  He say he wanted to rob the landlord because 
he knows some people pay with money and some pay with 
cash. . . . 
He said, after Weezy went into the house, when he 
came up with the idea, the robbery went wrong. . . .  The 
landlord got shot. . . .  All he said was it was real—the shot 
was loud.  It was loud in the hallway, and that kind of froze 
him up, and after that he ran out the back to get away from 
the scene. . . .  When he came back in the building, he was 
knocking on the door, but he was whispering because he 
didn’t want no one to know he was in the hallway. . . .  
Charles Thompson’s trial was coming up, and he said he was 
supposed to testify at his trial, and if he do, he was going to 
say that he [Thompson] did it. . . .  To shift the weight off 
himself. 
Although Johnson thus testified extensively and in considerable detail 
about what Marshall said to him, the State did not ask, and Johnson did 
not volunteer, what Johnson said in response to Marshall’s statements 
or what his role was in the conversation after his initial inquiry.  
13 
Likewise, the defense did not ask about what Johnson said or did when 
Marshall provided him with the information. 
 
8.  Martin trial testimony.  Martin stated that he was serving a 
federal sentence and entered into a plea and cooperation agreement in 
February of 2011.  After entering into the cooperation agreement, Martin 
said that he had been interviewed twice regarding information he had 
about drug cases.  Martin said he testified against his cousin, a 
codefendant in his own case.  Martin claimed he did not know whether 
he would get any kind of reduction for his testimony.  After testifying 
against his cousin, however, Martin stated that his sentence was reduced 
from between twenty-seven and thirty-two years to twelve years and one 
month. 
 
Martin testified that he had not received a reduction for providing 
information in the Marshall case and that he received no promises in 
exchange for his testimony.  Martin admitted, however, that he did hope 
that he could receive a further reduction and that the United States 
Attorney’s Office would ask the judge for a reduction.   
Prior to his incarceration, Martin stated he lived in the Broadway 
Condominiums neighborhood and knew Marshall and Thompson.  
Martin testified his last communication with Marshall was around 
September 2009.   
After Marshall arrived at the Muscatine County Jail, Martin 
testified that he was moved from one housing pod to the pod where 
Marshall was incarcerated.  When in the same housing pod, Martin 
recalled that Marshall told him, “[T]hey got me on that BS, that 
Broadway case, that Broadway murder case.”  Martin further recalled 
that later on, probably in September, Marshall told him “he didn’t have 
nothing to do with it.”  Martin told Marshall that he—Martin—was 
14 
testifying against one of his codefendants.  Martin remembered that they 
had additional conversations about Marshall’s situation.  As with 
Johnson, the State asked Martin a series of questions about what 
Marshall said to him.  Martin testified Marshall told him that 
the person’s—victim’s fingerprints was on the gun, that the 
bullet went through his hand, through his face, and there 
was a drill, a wallet and something else next to the body or 
something that they found, and there was no money missing 
out of the wallet. . . [h]e was saying it’s a robbery . . . . 
 
Martin was next asked whether the two talked about Marshall 
writing something down.  Martin testified that they had discussions 
about a lesser charge and that Marshall might confess and tell his side of 
the story.  Marshall asked Martin to get legal information for him 
regarding the crimes of manslaughter and armed robbery.  Martin 
testified, 
And I told him, you know, you might have to tell your side of 
the story if you’re going to get a lesser charge.  So he went to 
write the story down, saying use me [Martin] as a jailhouse 
snitch and I can get your story out and it might help both of 
us.  So he went and wrote it down and gave me what was his 
version of what happened. 
Martin repeatedly emphasized that he told Marshall, “I said that you 
might have to tell—tell your side of the story, you know, your 
involvement in it, you know, because they—they say one thing.  You 
might got to tell the truth of what really happened.” 
 
Martin testified that Marshall told him information about the crime 
for which Marshall was charged.  According to Martin, 
[H]e was giving me one account and he was saying that he 
was going to take the gun to sell it to somebody and run 
downstairs.  Then . . . he started switching his story up, he 
started saying that he was at—at Junior’s house playing a 
game and got home.  He was going to go downstairs to get 
him something to eat, you know.  He was just like arranging 
his story.  That’s when I told him just write it down. 
15 
 
Martin stated that Marshall provided him further details about the 
crime: 
He said he went downstairs and somebody came up behind 
him saying something, coming, approaching him, and he got 
scared and he turned around and pulled the gun from his 
waistband. . . .  He said it all happened so quick, you know.  
The gun went off and he dropped it and picked it back up 
and wiped it off and dropped it again and ran. 
Martin testified that Marshall wrote down his story and that the plan was 
“for [Martin] to take it to [his] lawyer . . . to get [Marshall’s] story out.”  
Martin said that Marshall told him that he hoped that his story would get 
him a lesser charge.  Martin testified he began taking his own notes once 
Marshall told him details of the crime to provide to his attorney.  He then 
set up a telephone meeting with his attorney on October 3 in a room set 
up for prisoner conferences with attorneys.  Martin stated he had with 
him his notes about Marshall and Marshall’s notes about the crime.  
During the conversation with his attorney, Detective Smithey entered the 
room.  Martin then told Detective Smithey that he “had some information 
about the Broadway murder.”  He showed Detective Smithey the yellow 
legal pad with Marshall’s notes.  When Detective Smithey asked if he 
could take the yellow legal pad, Martin responded no because “[Marshall] 
didn’t know [he] was talking to [Detective Smithey] about that, and it 
wasn’t the plan to give it to [Detective Smithey] right then.”  Instead, 
Martin recalled, Detective Smithey made a copy and returned the yellow 
legal pad to Martin. 
 
Martin testified that he knew Johnson and Freeman.  Although he 
was housed with Johnson in the same pod for two or three weeks in 
August of 2011, Martin denied ever talking with Johnson.  Martin 
admitted, however, that he and Freeman discussed what Marshall 
should include in his written statement.   
16 
 
Through Martin, the State offered two exhibits purporting to be 
Marshall’s handwritten notes into evidence.  Along with other material in 
the notes, Marshall provided Martin with a written description of the 
events of October 8, 2011, in which Marshall claimed the shooting was 
an accident.  Marshall’s notes stated, “I gave up everything now you tell 
me do the descriptions fit.  I done told you the truth, now you telling me 
that isn’t it.”  The exhibit also contained a definition of ignorance or 
mistake of law in what appeared to be Marshall’s handwriting.  On cross-
examination, Martin admitted that Marshall sought information from 
him about the legal definition of manslaughter.  Martin repeated once 
more that he “told [Marshall] to tell his side of the story.”  Martin 
acknowledged that the Johnson County Attorney could write a letter to 
the United States Attorney and ask for a reduction in his sentence for 
testifying against Marshall. 
 
E.  Verdict and Posttrial Motions.  On February 7, 2013, the jury 
found Marshall guilty of murder in the first degree.  The verdict included 
special interrogatories.  No juror found Marshall guilty under the theory 
of premeditation, willfulness, and deliberation.  Seven jurors found 
Marshall guilty under the theory of felony murder.  Eleven jurors found 
Marshall guilty under the theory of aiding and abetting.  Two jurors 
found Marshall guilty on the theory of joint criminal conduct. 
 
On March 13, 2013, Marshall’s attorney filed a joint motion in 
arrest of judgment and for a new trial.  Marshall argued the prosecution 
engaged in prejudicial misconduct by withholding the two letters that 
Freeman sent to the detectives in September and October 2011, which 
the defense only obtained in January 2013.  This, the defense argued, 
prevented Marshall from making an effective suppression motion by 
requiring the suppression hearing to be conducted “ad-hoc, on the fly” 
17 
during trial.  The district court denied the motion. On the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the court stated the defense was aware of the 
testimony of the three jailhouse informants well in advance of trial.  The 
district court also found that the defense had not established a Massiah 
violation.  See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207, 84 S. Ct. 
1199, 1203, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246, 251 (1964).  According to the district 
court, 
[T]he . . . Defendant had not established the informants were 
government agents at the time the information was solicited, 
a necessary requirement. . . .  Rather, from the evidence in 
the record, it appear[ed] the inmates collected information 
prior to and without being approached by the police and 
later turned it over to the officers.   
Because the court concluded the inmates were not governmental agents 
at the time they solicited information from Marshall, the court found he 
was not entitled to a new trial. 
 
F.  Decision of Court of Appeals.  Marshall filed a timely notice of 
appeal, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals held that Johnson was acting as an agent of the State because 
Detective Smithey asked Johnson to get information about Marshall’s 
involvement in the Versypt murder on July 12, 2011, Johnson was being 
“paid” in reduced prison time for the information as part of his proffer 
agreement, and Detective Smithey “clearly . . . did not tell Johnson to be 
a passive listener, nor did he communicate anything close to that.”  
Therefore, the court held statements Marshall made to Johnson should 
have been suppressed as violating Marshall’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  However, the court of appeals did not find that Freeman or 
Martin were acting as agents of the State when they obtained information 
from 
Marshall, 
and 
the 
suggestion 
that 
Johnson 
must 
have 
18 
communicated with Freeman or Martin about Marshall was not sufficient 
to prove agency.   
 
The court of appeals, noting that the State had not raised the issue 
of harmless error, declined to engage in a sua sponte harmless-error 
review because the harmlessness of the error was debatable.  A 
concurrence emphasized that the placement of Marshall, Freeman, 
Johnson, and Martin in the Muscatine County Jail could hardly be 
considered a coincidence.  A dissent took a different approach.  The 
dissent focused on the question of deliberate elicitation.  The dissent 
found the defendant failed to provide proof on this issue.  As a result, the 
dissent argued that the trial court should be affirmed in all respects.   
 
The State applied for further review, which we granted. 
 
II.  Standard of Review. 
 
We review constitutional claims de novo.  State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 
757, 760 (Iowa 2010); State v. Wills, 696 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 2005). 
 
On a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights, the defendant generally has the burden 
of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Post, 
286 N.W.2d 195, 201–02 (Iowa 1979); accord United States v. Johnson, 
225 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1036 (N.D. Iowa 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 
352 F.3d 339, 344 (8th Cir. 2003).  While the burden may shift to the 
state in certain situations, when a defendant alleges that an agent of the 
state violated his right to counsel the defendant must show that the 
violation occurred.  United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 277, 100 S. Ct. 
2183, 2190, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115, 126 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“To 
demonstrate an infringement of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must 
show that the government engaged in conduct that, considering all of the 
circumstances, is the functional equivalent of interrogation.”).  But cf. 
19 
United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 841 (N.D. Iowa 2002), 
rev’d on other grounds, 338 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that the 
defendant conceded that she bore the burden of proof, but suggesting 
that there could be a distinction in who bears the burden of proof with 
respect to a Massiah violation on direct appeal rather than in a habeas 
action). 
 
III.  Preliminary Issue: Consideration of Trial Testimony on 
Merits of Motion to Suppress.   
As noted above, the informants did not testify at the midtrial 
motion to suppress hearing, but did testify at trial.  Evidence offered at 
trial may be considered in reviewing the merits of a previously 
determined motion to suppress.  State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 203–
04 (Iowa 2009). 
IV.  Claimed Invasion of Right to Counsel Through Use of 
Jailhouse Informant. 
A.  Introduction.  Ours is an accusatorial, not an inquisitorial, 
system of criminal justice.  Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541, 81 
S. Ct. 735, 739, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760, 766 (1961).  A defendant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel is critical to the fairness of the 
proceedings.  See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170–71, 106 S. Ct. 
477, 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492–93 (1985).  As noted in Henry, “[I]f the 
Sixth Amendment ‘is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and 
surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the 
jailhouse.’ ”  447 U.S. at 273, 100 S. Ct. at 2188, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 124 
(quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S. Ct. at 1203, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 
250). 
The use of jailhouse informants to obtain information from 
defendants represented by counsel is problematic for a number of 
20 
reasons.  As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the jailhouse is 
an unusual environment where a sense of camaraderie can mask real 
interests, where defendants may be particularly vulnerable, and where 
scheming and bravado are higher on the hierarchy of values than 
reporting the truth.  See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 303, 110 S. Ct. 
2394, 2400, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 255 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 274, 100 S. Ct. at 2188–89, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 124 
(“[T]he mere fact of custody imposes pressures on the accused; 
confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make [the 
defendant] 
particularly 
susceptible 
to 
the 
ploys 
of 
undercover 
Government agents.”). 
Further, the use of jailhouse informants who stand to benefit—
sometimes substantially—for providing evidence against a defendant 
raises substantial questions of reliability.  The Supreme Court noted over 
fifty years ago that “[t]he use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false 
friends, or any of the other betrayals which are ‘dirty business’ may raise 
serious questions of credibility.”  On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 
757, 72 S. Ct. 967, 973, 96 L. Ed. 1270, 1277 (1952).  On the question of 
jailhouse informers particularly, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit has observed that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater 
motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence.”  United 
States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).  More 
recently, the Fourth Circuit has observed that use of jailhouse 
informants is a “fertile field[] from which truth-bending or even perjury 
could grow.”  United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 
2002); see also United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 334 (9th 
Cir. 1993); Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315; United States v. 
Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980); Russell D. Covey, 
21 
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375, 
1380 (2014) [hereinafter Covey]. 
As the recent work of the Innocence Project demonstrates, 
jailhouse informants have played a significant role in convicting innocent 
persons.  According to one study of persons exonerated by DNA evidence, 
false informant testimony supported the wrongful conviction in twenty-
one percent of the cases.  See Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufield, & Barry 
Scheck, Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches 
from the Wrongly Convicted 246 (2000); see generally Covey, 49 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. at 1378.  The reliability problems associated with 
informants poses a particular problem as they are often utilized in cases 
where the state has little direct evidence.  Covey, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
at 1418. 
With respect to the potential lack of reliability of informants, the 
Supreme Court has responded by relying primarily on effective cross-
examination of informants.  Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311, 87 
S. Ct. 408, 418, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 387 (1966).  In order to provide the 
defendant with effective means of cross-examination, the state has a 
duty to disclose the fact that informants are working for the state.  See 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 
L. Ed. 2d 104, 108 (1972) (holding prosecutor had the duty to disclose to 
the defense a promise of leniency given to a key witness); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 
218 (1963) (holding suppressing evidence favorable to the defense 
violates due process). 
Finally, the use of jailhouse informants undercuts the role of 
counsel as serving as a medium between the defendant and the state.  
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 487, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496.  Many 
22 
defendants have undue confidence in their ability to game the system 
that would be tempered by effective counsel.  In addition, counsel can 
assist the defendant in developing an effective defense that may be 
impaired by ill-considered and imprecise statements made in the 
freewheeling jailhouse environment.  See generally James J. Tomkovicz, 
An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against Informants: 
Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 39–62 
(1988) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Adversary System]; James J. Tomkovicz, 
The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal 
Implications, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 751, 766–67 (1989). 
On the other hand, the state is not deprived of evidence because 
the defendant, acting on his own, has exercised poor judgment.  The law 
books are packed with occasions in which the defendant has been 
apprehended primarily because of his or her own mistakes that, in 
hindsight, are quite remarkable.  As noted in State v. Leopardi,  
it is no more unfair to use the evidence [the defendant] 
exposed through his lack of guile than it is to turn against 
[the defendant] clues at the scene of the crime that a 
brighter, better informed, or more gifted criminal would have 
hidden.   
701 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).  Where a defendant 
unwisely spills his guts in the presence of a third party who simply 
serves as a passive listener to a heartfelt confession, literally does 
nothing to elicit the statement, and was simply in the right place at the 
right time, there is very little rationale for suppressing the evidence on 
right to counsel grounds.  See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 
2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384–85.  The state should not be prohibited from 
using evidence it discovers “by luck or happenstance.”  Moulton, 474 U.S. 
at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 487, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496. 
23 
Finally, there are questions of proof.  As one authority has stated, 
“[i]n-custody confessions are often easy to allege and difficult, if not 
impossible, to disprove.”  Fred Kaufman, Report of the Kaufman 
Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin (Robert N. Moles, 
ed. Mar. 1998), http://netk.net.au/Canada/Morin22.asp; see also Fred 
Kaufman, The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin: 
Executive Summary 9–14 (1998), http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on. 
ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin_esumm.pdf; 
Covey, 
49 
Wake 
Forest L. Rev. at 1380.  The problem of proof, along with questions of 
reliability, have given rise to requiring some corroboration of jailhouse 
informant testimony to support a conviction in at least eighteen states.  
Covey, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 1416–20 (describing the various states’ 
corroboration requirements); see Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Criminal 
Justice, Report to the House of Delegates 1, 6–7 & n.16 (Feb. 2005) 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_ju
stice_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_my05108b.authcheckdam.pdf. 
B.  Positions of the Parties.  Marshall argues the record 
establishes that the State violated Massiah by employing informants to 
violate his right to counsel.  He stresses that Johnson was operating 
under a proffer agreement, that the State conceded Johnson was trying 
to provide information that would be used to determine what reduction 
in sentence he would receive, and that the State provided Johnson with a 
list of suspects.  Marshall notes that Johnson initiated the conversation 
about the crime when Johnson “asked him what was he in . . . for.”  
According to Marshall, Johnson was “deputized” to provide incriminating 
information on him.  
With respect to Martin and Freeman, Marshall recognizes that it is 
less clear that they were serving as agents of the State at the time they 
24 
received incriminating information from Marshall.  Marshall argues, 
however, that the State “must have known” that Johnson would pass on 
the State’s interest in him to Johnson’s coconspirator and coinformant, 
Martin, who was also incarcerated at the Muscatine County Jail and had 
provided information to Detective Smithey in the past under a 
cooperation agreement.  Marshall points out that Detective Smithey 
testified that it was probably reasonable to assume that Johnson was 
going to pass the information request on to Martin.  Marshall finds it an 
extraordinary coincidence that after Detective Smithey met with Johnson 
on October 3 he happened to run into Martin, who also happened to 
have extensive notes on a legal pad written by Marshall. 
Marshall asserts that Martin lied at trial by stating that he did not 
know Detective Smithey prior to providing information on Marshall when, 
in fact, Detective Smithey was well acquainted with Martin.  Detective 
Smithey testified that he had interviewed Martin in connection with 
Martin’s proffer agreement “on several occasions, two or more . . . prior 
to that date.”  Freeman, in turn, was enlisted by Martin.  Marshall notes 
that Freeman testified that Martin and another inmate named Sandifer 
sent Marshall to him.  Freeman and Martin then extensively infiltrated 
Marshall and his lawyer’s attorney–client relationship by providing what 
amounted to legal advice on how to prepare his defense and how to 
present it to Marshall’s lawyer. 
Marshall asserts that under Massiah and its progeny there is no 
requirement that Johnson be given specific instruction regarding how to 
obtain information.  He notes that in Henry, the informant was 
specifically told not to initiate any conversations.  See 447 U.S. at 266, 
100 S. Ct. at 2184–85, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 119.  Yet the Henry Court found a 
Massiah violation because the state “must have known” that the 
25 
informant would initiate conversations in light of the incentives to obtain 
the information.  Id. at 271, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  
Marshall claims these principles were reaffirmed in Moulton.  See 474 
U.S. at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 487, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496. 
Marshall then addresses the most recent United States Supreme 
Court case, Kuhlmann.  Marshall contends that in Kuhlmann, the 
Supreme Court “fudged” when it stated that the only remark made by the 
informant was that Kuhlmann’s position on the crimes “didn’t sound too 
good.”  477 U.S. at 460, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 385.  
Marshall points out that the informant in Kuhlmann in fact said that the 
defendant “better come up with a better story than that,” a fact noted in 
a footnote and then disregarded in Kuhlmann.  Id. at 440 n.1, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2619 n.1, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372 n.1.  Marshall cites Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in Kuhlmann, which stressed the failure of the majority to 
consider the full facts, including the statement cited by Marshall and the 
fact that the informant was placed in a jail cell with the defendant with a 
view of the scene of the crime.  Id. at 473, 106 S. Ct. at 2637, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 393–94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The bottom line for 
Marshall is that he was surrounded by a “tangled web” of informers and 
that the incriminating statements made to them should be suppressed 
under Massiah and its progeny. 
 
The State responds by asserting that the evidence in the case does 
not establish that the informants were acting as government agents and 
does not establish that they deliberately elicited the incriminating 
statements from Marshall.  On the question of agency, the State—citing 
Moore and other cases—asserts that there must be instructions to seek 
information about a “particular defendant.”  Moore, 178 F.3d at 999 
(quoting United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997)).  In 
26 
Henry, according to the State, the informant was acting on instructions 
from the police.  See 447 U.S. at 271, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 
122.  Since the record is devoid of such instruction, neither Johnson, 
Martin, nor Freeman, according to the State, were agents.  In addition, 
there was no promise of pay for successfully obtaining information.  
Therefore, according to the State, Johnson, Freeman, and Martin cannot 
be considered agents of the State. 
 
The State challenges Marshall’s argument that the State “must 
have known” that Johnson would tell others, including Freeman and 
Martin, about the State’s interest in information about the Versypt 
murder.  The State emphasizes that Johnson testified that he never 
talked with Martin about Marshall, and Freeman testified that he never 
spoke with Johnson about the Marshall matter.  The State also argued 
that Marshall failed to show “deliberate elicitation” under Kuhlmann.  
According to the State, the record shows that the informants were acting 
as “listening posts” under Kuhlmann.  477 U.S. at 456 & n.19, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2628 & n.19, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 382 & n.19 (majority opinion).  Noting 
that under Kuhlmann, the “primary concern of the Massiah line of 
decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the 
equivalent of direct police interrogation,” id. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 
91 L. Ed. 2d at 384, the State argues that the defendant has failed to 
show deliberate elicitation.   
 
In the alternative, the State argues that some of the interactions 
between the State and Johnson occurred before Johnson’s Sixth 
Amendment rights attached.  Yet the State acknowledges that in the 
proceedings below, the county attorney agreed with the district court 
that the right had attached prior to the time when the informants 
interacted with the defendants. 
27 
C.  United States Supreme Court’s Approach to the Use of 
Government 
Informants 
Against 
Defendants 
Represented 
by 
Counsel.  There are four important United States Supreme Court cases 
that establish a general framework for determining when the use of 
government informants violates the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  The first case is Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201, 84 S. Ct. at 1199, 
12 L. Ed. 2d at 246.  In Massiah, the Supreme Court considered a case 
where a government agent deliberately elicited information from a 
criminal defendant.  Id. at 203–04, 84 S. Ct. at 1201, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 
249.  A confederate of a defendant—who was on bail and had obtained 
legal representation—agreed to allow federal authorities to place a radio 
transmitter in the front seat of his car.  Id. at 202–03, 84 S. Ct. at 1201, 
12 L. Ed. 2d at 248.  Federal authorities sat in a car down the street and 
listened to the conversation between the confederate and the defendant.  
Id. at 203, 84 S. Ct. at 1201, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 248–49.  The defendant 
“made several incriminating statements during the course of the 
conversation.”  Id. at 203, 84 S. Ct. at 1201, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 249.  These 
incriminating conversations were introduced into evidence at trial.  Id. 
The Supreme Court held that the incriminating conversations were 
inadmissible.  Id. at 207, 84 S. Ct. at 1203, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 251.  
According to the Court, the defendant was denied the basic protections of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by use of his own incriminating 
words, “which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he 
had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”  Id. at 206, 84 
S. Ct. at 1203, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 250. 
After Massiah, the Supreme Court decided Henry, 447 U.S. at 264, 
100 S. Ct. at 2183, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 115.  In that case, the informant 
Nichols advised an FBI agent that he had been placed in the same 
28 
cellblock as the defendant Henry, who had been accused of participating 
in a bank robbery.  Id. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 2184, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 119.  
After Nichols was released from jail, Nichols told the FBI agent that “he 
and Henry had engaged in conversation and that Henry told him about 
the robbery.”  Id. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 2185, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 119. 
At trial, Nichols testified that he had “an opportunity to have some 
conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail” and that Henry 
had told him that he had participated in the robbery.  Id. at 267, 100 
S. Ct. at 2185, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 120.  After the evidence was admitted and 
the defendant convicted, an appellate court reversed and remanded for 
an evidentiary inquiry into “whether the witness . . . was acting as a 
government agent during his interviews with Henry.”  Id. at 268, 100 
S. Ct. at 2185, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 120.  At the subsequent evidentiary 
hearing, the FBI agent submitted an affidavit which stated, 
I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any 
statements made by these individuals [the federal prisoners] 
regarding the charges against them.  I specifically recall 
telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these 
individuals about the charges against them, however, if they 
engaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he 
was requested to pay attention to their statements. 
Id. at 268, 100 S. Ct. at 2186, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 121.  In addition, the FBI 
agent’s affidavit also stated that he never requested anyone to place 
Nichols in the same cell with Henry.  Id.  The district court affirmed 
Henry’s conviction.  Id.  The court of appeals reversed, indicating that “by 
general conversation . . . Nichols had developed a relationship of trust 
and confidence with Henry such that Henry revealed incriminating 
information.”  Id. at 269, 100 S. Ct. at 2186, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 121. 
Citing Massiah, the Court focused on the question of whether the 
government deliberately elicited incriminatory statements from the 
29 
defendant.  Id. at 270, 100 S. Ct. at 2186, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  In finding 
deliberate elicitation, the Henry Court cited three facts.  Id.  First, 
Nichols was acting under government instructions as a paid informant.  
Id. at 270, 100 S. Ct. at 2186–87, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  Second, Nichols 
appeared to be no more than a fellow inmate of Henry.  Id. at 270, 100 
S. Ct. at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  Third, “Henry was in custody and 
under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversations by 
Nichols.”  Id.  The Henry Court also noted that Nichols was operating on 
a contingency-fee arrangement.  Id.  The Court concluded, “Even if the 
agent’s statement that he did not intend that Nichols would take 
affirmative steps to secure incriminating information is accepted, he 
must have known that such propinquity likely would lead to that result.”  
Id. at 271, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  The Henry Court also 
rejected the government’s defense that the agents instructed Nichols not 
to question Henry about the robbery.  Id. at 271, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 122–23.  The Court noted, “Nichols was not a passive 
listener; rather, he had ‘some conversations with Mr. Henry’ while he was 
in jail and Henry’s incriminatory statements were ‘the product of this 
conversation.’ ”  Id. 
The Henry Court further noted that no inquiry was made in 
Massiah “as to whether Massiah or his codefendant first raised the 
subject of the crime under investigation.”  Id. at 271–72, 100 S. Ct. at 
2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 123.  The Court emphasized that conversations 
with a fellow inmate who is acting as a government informant “may elicit 
information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons 
known to be Government agents.”  Id. at 273, 100 S. Ct. at 2188, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 124.  What the police must not do, according to Henry, is 
engage in deliberate elicitation, which the Court defined as “intentionally 
30 
creating a situation likely to induce [a person] to make incriminating 
statements without the assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 274, 100 S. Ct. at 
2189, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 125 (emphasis added). 
The Court did not provide a precise formula for determining when 
“a situation” likely to induce a person to make incriminating statements 
without the assistance of counsel is present.  Henry, however, cited three 
factors: (1) the informant acted under instructions as a paid informant 
for the government, (2) the informant appeared to be just another 
inmate, and (3) the defendant was in custody and under indictment at 
the time the informant engaged him in conversation.  Id. at 270, 100 
S. Ct. at 2186–87, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  The Henry Court seemed to 
emphasize the fact that Nichols and Henry shared facilities and that 
Nichols had ingratiated himself through his “conduct and apparent 
status as a person sharing a common plight.”  Id. at 274, 100 S. Ct. at 
2189, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 124.  Yet the Court explicitly left open the question 
of whether there can be deliberate elicitation when the government 
informer, though planted, is wholly passive.  Id. at 271 n.9, 100 S. Ct. at 
2187 n.9, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 123 n.9. 
While five members joined the majority opinion, Justice Powell 
wrote a concurring opinion in Henry.  Justice Powell emphasized that 
Massiah requires deliberate elicitation.  Id. at 275, 100 S. Ct. at 2189, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 125 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Powell stressed that 
Massiah did not apply to passive listening devices that merely collect, but 
do not induce, incriminating statements.  Id. at 276, 100 S. Ct. at 2190, 
65 L. Ed. 2d at 126.  Justice Powell further stated that “the mere 
presence of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed to overhear 
conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conversations 
would not necessarily be unconstitutional.”  Id. 
31 
In 
Moulton, 
an 
informant 
met 
with 
the 
defendant—his 
accomplice—and repeatedly asked the defendant to remind him of the 
details of the crime and encouraged the defendant to describe his plan 
for killing witnesses.  474 U.S. at 165–66, 106 S. Ct. at 481–82, 88 
L. Ed. 2d at 489.  The Court explained that the informant engaging the 
defendant in active conversation about the upcoming trial was virtually 
certain to elicit incriminating statements.  Id. at 177 n.13, 106 S. Ct. at 
487 n.13, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496 n.13.  The Moulton Court emphasized 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative 
obligation to respect and preserve the accused’s choice to seek [the 
assistance of counsel].”  Id. at 171, 106 S. Ct. at 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 
492.  The Court also acknowledged that “[d]irect proof of the State’s 
knowledge will seldom be available to the accused.”  Id. at 176 n.12, 106 
S. Ct. at 487 n.12, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496 n.12. 
In Kuhlmann, the Supreme Court considered a second federal 
habeas corpus petition brought by a state prisoner who claimed a 
Massiah violation.  477 U.S. at 438, 441, 106 S. Ct. at 2619–20, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 371–73.  The defendant Wilson was accused of robbery and 
murder in connection with a robbery of a taxicab garage that led to the 
death of a night dispatcher.  Id. at 438–39, 106 S. Ct. at 2619, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 371.  After arraignment, Wilson was incarcerated in the 
Bronx House of Detention.  Id. at 439, 106 S. Ct. at 2619, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 
371.  Unbeknownst to Wilson, a detective had obtained an agreement 
from Lee, Wilson’s cellmate, to be an informant.  Id.  The government 
wanted to learn who participated in the crime with Wilson.  Id. at 439, 
106 S. Ct. at 2619, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 371–72.  The Kuhlmann Court noted 
that Lee was instructed simply to “keep his ears open” for the names of 
persons who participated in the crimes with Wilson.  Id. at 439, 106 
32 
S. Ct. at 2619, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372.  When Wilson observed that their cell 
had a view of the taxicab garage where the crimes occurred, he declared, 
“someone’s messing with me,” and narrated his version of events that he 
had already told police.  Lee responded that his explanation “didn’t 
sound too good.”  Id. at 439–40, 106 S. Ct. at 2619, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372.  
Later, Wilson changed his story, admitting that he and two others had 
committed the robbery and murdered the dispatcher.  Id. at 440, 106 
S. Ct. at 2619–20, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372. 
At a hearing in the original state court proceeding, the detective 
and Lee testified.  Id. at 440, 106 S. Ct. at 2620, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372.  
The detective testified that he had instructed Lee “to ask no questions” 
about the crime “but merely . . . listen” to what Wilson might say about 
the crime.  Id.  After hearing from Lee, the state trial court found, as a 
matter of fact, that Lee obeyed his instructions and only listened and 
made notes regarding what Wilson had to say.  Id.  The state trial court 
found respondent’s statements were spontaneous and unsolicited.  Id.  
After Wilson lost the appeal, he filed his first federal habeas corpus 
petition challenging the introduction of Lee’s testimony on Massiah 
grounds.  Id. at 441, 106 S. Ct. at 2620, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372–73.  The 
federal court denied relief and a divided court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 
441, 106 S. Ct. at 2620, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 373; see Wilson v. Henderson, 
584 F.2d 1185, 1192 (2d Cir. 1978). 
After the Supreme Court decided Henry, however, Wilson filed a 
motion to vacate his conviction in state court.  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 
442, 106 S. Ct. at 2620–21, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 373.  The state court denied 
relief on the ground that Henry was factually distinguishable and that 
under state law Henry was not retroactive.  Id. at 442, 106 S. Ct. at 
2621, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 373.  Wilson then filed his second federal habeas 
33 
corpus petition, arguing that Henry enunciated a new rule of law that 
should be retroactively applied to his case.  Id.  The federal district court 
again denied relief.  Id. at 442, 106 S. Ct. at 2621, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 373–
74.  The federal district court noted that the state trial court’s findings of 
fact were presumptively correct in a federal habeas corpus proceeding 
and were fully supported by the record.  Id. at 443, 106 S. Ct. at 2621, 
91 L. Ed. 2d at 374.  The federal court emphasized that under the facts 
as found by the state court, Lee made “no affirmative effort” of any kind 
“to elicit information” from the respondent.  Id. 
Wilson appealed and another divided panel of the Second Circuit 
reversed.  Id.; see Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1984).  
Among other things, the majority found that the facts of the case were 
indistinguishable from Henry and that Henry was fully applicable 
because it did not announce a new constitutional rule but merely applied 
settled principles to new facts.  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 443, 106 S. Ct. at 
2621, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 374 (citing Wilson, 742 F.2d at 746–47).  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id. at 444, 106 S. Ct. at 2621, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 374. 
In Kuhlmann, the majority concluded that there was no Massiah 
violation.  Id.  The Kuhlmann majority noted that in Henry the informant 
“developed a relationship of trust and confidence with [the defendant] 
such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating information.”  Id. at 
458, 106 S. Ct. at 2629, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 383–84 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. 
at 269, 100 S. Ct. at 2186, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 121).  The Kuhlmann Court 
further noted that in Henry the informant had stimulated conversations 
with the defendant in order to elicit incriminating information.  Id. at 
458, 106 S. Ct. at 2629, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384.  The Kuhlmann majority 
emphasized that the defendant must demonstrate that “police and their 
34 
informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.”  Id. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 
2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384–85. 
The Court also emphasized that “the primary concern of the 
Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory 
techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation.”  Id. at 
459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384–85.  Because in Kuhlmann 
the police deliberately placed the informant in the cell with the 
defendant, the Kuhlmann majority appeared to answer the question 
posed in a footnote in Henry—namely, whether mere placement of an 
informant alone in a cell with the defendant was enough to give rise to a 
Sixth Amendment violation.  Id. at 456, 106 S. Ct. at 2628, 91 L. Ed. 2d 
at 382–83. 
The Kuhlmann Court then considered whether there was deliberate 
elicitation under the circumstances of the case.  Id. at 460–61, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2630–31, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 385.  The Court found that the Second 
Circuit failed to give appropriate deference in the federal habeas corpus 
proceeding to the factual findings of the state court.  Id. at 459, 106 
S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 385.  The Court noted that the state court 
found the detective had instructed Lee “only to listen” to Wilson and that 
respondent’s comments were spontaneous and unsolicited.  Id. at 460, 
106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 385.  The Kuhlmann majority found 
that these state court findings were entitled to a presumption of 
correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Id. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 385.  The Court found that the Second Circuit had revised 
some of the trial court’s findings and that its conclusions were at odds 
with the factual findings of the state court.  Id. at 460, 106 S. Ct. at 
2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 385. 
35 
Justice Brennan, along with Justices Marshall and Stevens, 
dissented.  Id. at 461, 106 S. Ct. at 2631, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 386 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); id. at 476, 106 S. Ct. at 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 396 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Brennan, the Court in 
Henry found incriminating statements were deliberately elicited when a 
jailhouse informant followed instructions to obtain information without 
directly 
questioning 
Henry 
and 
without 
initiating 
conversations 
concerning the charges pending against Henry.  Id. at 474, 106 S. Ct. at 
2637–38, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan 
noted that in Henry, it was irrelevant that the informant asked pointed 
questions about the crime or “merely engage[d] in general conversation 
about it.”  Id. at 474, 106 S. Ct. at 2638, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 394 (quoting 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 272 n.10, 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.10, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 
123 n.10 (1980)). 
Justice Brennan emphasized that in Henry, the Court stressed the 
importance of three factors: (1) whether the informant was a paid 
informant, (2) whether the defendant was aware that there was an 
informant in his presence, and (3) whether the accused was in custody at 
the time of made incriminating statements.  Id. at 475, 106 S. Ct. at 
2638, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 394–95.  Justice Brennan found that all three of 
these factors were met in Kuhlmann.  Id. at 475–76, 106 S. Ct. at 2638–
39, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 395–96.  Justice Brennan also cited the fact that the 
jail cell had a visual view of the taxicab garage where the crime occurred 
and that the informant in essence gave the defendant advice to improve 
his story.  Id. at 476, 106 S. Ct. at 2638, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 395.  In his 
view, “[t]he State intentionally created a situation in which it was 
foreseeable that respondent would make incriminating statements 
without the assistance of counsel . . . .”  Id.  Justice Brennan argued that 
36 
the informant, “while avoiding direct questions, nonetheless developed a 
relationship 
of 
cellmate 
camaraderie 
with 
the 
respondent 
and 
encouraged him to talk about his crime.”  Id.  He found a sufficient 
nexus between the state’s actions and the admissions of guilt to 
constitute deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Henry.  Id. at 476, 
106 S. Ct. at 2638–39, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 395–96. 
After Kuhlmann, the question arose whether its language regarding 
what constituted deliberate elicitation should be interpreted as a 
limitation on the expansive view provided in Henry.  See, e.g., Craig 
Bradley, What’s Left of Massiah?, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 247, 260–61 
(2012); Tomkovicz, Adversary System, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 19–20.  
On the one hand, Henry was not expressly overruled in Kuhlmann.  
Further, many of the concepts of Henry were cited with approval in 
Kuhlmann.  See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 384 (majority opinion).  Additionally, Kuhlmann arose in the 
context of a federal habeas corpus challenge to a state court conviction.  
Because Kuhlmann essentially held for the state on procedural grounds 
unrelated to the Sixth Amendment, id. at 455, 106 S. Ct. at 2627–28, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 382, the subsequent discussion of Henry could be regarded 
as mere dicta. 
On the other hand, as pointed out by Justice Brennan, the facts of 
Kuhlmann seemed strikingly similar, if not indistinguishable, to Henry.  
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 473, 106 S. Ct. at 2637, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 394 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  One could argue that the only way the state 
could have violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment rights but not Wilson’s 
was if there was a modification of law in Kuhlmann.  See Bruce D. 
Lundstrom, Sixth Amendment—Right to Counsel: Limited Postindictment 
37 
Use of Jailhouse Informants Is Permissible, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
743, 764–65 (1986). 
Yet in reading the majority and dissenting opinions, they both 
appear to accept the deliberate-elicitation framework.  The facts, 
however, are viewed differently.  The majority considered the informant 
to be passive, while the dissent suggested that the informant took an 
active role by stimulating conversation about the crime and by 
suggesting that the defendant develop a more convincing story.  See April 
Leigh Ammeter, Kuhlmann v. Wilson: ‘Passive’ and ‘Active’ Government 
Informants: A Problematic Test, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1423, 1435 (1987) 
[hereinafter Ammeter].  As noted by one commentator, the debate 
between the majority in Kuhlmann and Justice Brennan’s dissent is “a 
demonstration of the morass into which the Court’s chosen path can 
lead a conscientious judge.”  H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind 
of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access 
and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1194 (1987). 
D.  Application of Massiah and Its Progeny in Lower Courts. 
1.  Introduction.  Applying the principles of Massiah and its 
progeny has been a challenge in the lower courts.  Courts frequently cite 
the conflicts in the cases and the lack in clarity of the applicable legal 
standards.  See, e.g., United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“[W]hile these legal premises are clear, their application to this 
case is less than straightforward.”); Leopardi, 701 A.2d at 956 (“[C]andor 
requires us to confess our difficulty in reconciling several of these 
decisions.”).  Many of the cases are not unanimous.  See, e.g., Johnson, 
338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI 
Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 905 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring) (finding 
Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); 
38 
Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Taylor, 
800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. 
Currington, 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (Swanstrom, J., 
dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (Pa. 
1998) (Castille, J., dissenting); Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 107 
(Tenn. 1995) (Reid, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Leadingham, 
438 S.E.2d 825, 839 (W. Va. 1993) (Workman, C.J., dissenting). 
2.  Requirement of informant agency. 
a.  Introduction.  For the activities of an informant to give rise to a 
Sixth Amendment violation, the informant must be acting as an agent for 
the government.  Henry, 447 U.S. at 270, 100 S. Ct. at 2186–87, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 122.  When the government and an informant have an 
express agreement, often reduced to writing, there may be little question 
that the informant should be regarded as an agent of the government for 
Sixth Amendment purposes.  But the question arises whether a jailhouse 
informant may be considered an agent for Sixth Amendment purposes in 
the absence of an express agreement.  Even if we accept a theory of 
implied agency, one may wonder where the line is to be drawn between 
an implied agency relationship and jailhouse “entrepreneurs” who seek 
to improve their prospects by offering information to the state in the 
“jailhouse marketplace” of informant testimony.  The cases have 
struggled to make this important distinction. 
Irrespective of the above, it seems clear from the cases that agency 
under Massiah does not rely too heavily on traditional principles of 
private contract or agency law, but instead seems closer to the doctrine 
of state action.  The question, for constitutional purposes, is whether the 
actions of an informant may be fairly attributed to the state.  
39 
Nonetheless, the cases suggest, “At a minimum . . . there must be some 
evidence that an agreement, express or implied, between the individual 
and a government official existed at the time the elicitation takes place.”  
Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 794 (11th Cir. 1991).  The test for 
agency is a multifactored one based on all the facts and circumstances 
and not subject to clear maxims or bright-line rules.  
b.  Express or implied agency.  There is some authority that seems 
to require a formal express agreement before an informant may be 
considered an agent of the state.  Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1020 
(majority opinion).  Most of the caselaw, however, has drifted away from 
such formalism.  There is ample authority for the proposition that the 
required agency may be express or implied.  See, e.g., Ayers v. Hudson, 
623 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2010); Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 
1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004); Matteo, 171 F.3d at 893 (majority opinion); 
United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994); Depree, 946 F.2d 
at 794; United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), 
overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 567 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1983). 
State courts have also embraced the notion of implied agency.  See, 
e.g., McBeath v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 22, 33 (Ky. 2007) (holding it 
is not necessary to have quid pro quo understanding in order to find 
agency); Commonwealth v. Foxworth, 40 N.E.3d 1003, 1012 (Mass. 2015) 
(requiring “evidence of a promise, express or implied” to find agency).  
Moulton advises that the state has an affirmative duty to ensure that the 
defendant’s right to counsel is honored.  474 U.S. at 171, 106 S. Ct. at 
484, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 492–93.  This affirmative duty cannot be met when 
the state enters into somewhat vague agreements with informants that 
predictably lead to interference with the right to counsel.  Thus, the real 
40 
question at issue in the better-reasoned cases is not whether agency may 
be implied, but rather what must be shown to establish implied agency. 
In addition, it is important to point out that the question of agency 
is a dynamic concept.  For instance, in Wesbrook v. State, an inmate 
reported conversations to state authorities in which the defendant 
expressed a desire to kill his ex-wife and her husband.  29 S.W.3d 103, 
116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  The inmate arranged a meeting with 
authorities, hoping to exploit the information for his benefit.  Id.  After 
receiving the information, the authorities then entered into an agreement 
with the inmate to elicit more information in exchange for a good word 
with the prosecution on the inmate’s pending charges.  Id.  The court 
allowed the testimony on information obtained prior to the first meeting 
with the authorities, but suppressed information gathered afterwards on 
Massiah grounds.  Id. at 119. 
c.  Requirement of express or implied instructions.  Moulton and 
Henry make clear that the existence of instructions not to ask questions 
of a defendant are not determinative on the issue of whether a Massiah 
violation has occurred.  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177 n.14, 106 S. Ct. at 488 
n.14, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 497 n.14; Henry, 447 U.S. at 271–72, 100 S. Ct. at 
2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122–23.  Such limitations are insufficient because 
failure to follow instructions is foreseeable in light of the strong 
incentives that motivate a jailhouse informant.  Henry, 447 U.S. at 270–
71 & n.7, 100 S. Ct. at 2187 & n.7, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122 & n.7.  
Nonetheless, 
the 
slightly 
different 
question 
of 
whether 
explicit 
instructions are required in order to establish agency, express or implied, 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment has sometimes reoccurred in the 
caselaw. 
41 
For instance, in Johnson, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
informant was not instructed, by express words or implication, to gather 
information about a defendant.  338 F.3d at 921 (majority opinion).  
Thus, according to the Johnson majority, there was no express or implied 
agency.  Id.  A dissent in Johnson disagreed, however, and concluded 
that agency should not be limited to cases where the government gives 
an informant direct, explicit oral or written instructions.  Id. at 925–26 
(Bye, J., dissenting).  According to the dissent, the record established 
that the informant did not need for the instructions to be spelled out.  Id.  
The dissent emphasized that the government did not obtain statements 
“by luck or happenstance” but as the result of a meeting purposefully 
arranged by the prosecutor to “circumvent[ ] the accused’s right to have 
counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state 
agent.”  Id. at 926 (quoting Robinson v. Clarke, 939 F.2d 573, 576 (8th 
Cir. 1991) (second quote)) (alteration in original). 
The formalism of the majority in Johnson seems inconsistent with 
the “likely to induce” standard in Henry and has been rejected by a 
number of courts.  447 U.S. at 274, 100 S. Ct. at 2189, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 
125.  As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, “There is, by necessity, no bright-
line rule for determining whether an individual is a government agent for 
purposes of the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to counsel.”  Depree, 946 F.2d 
at 793–94.  The Sixth Circuit has also rejected the Johnson approach, 
noting that if explicit instructions were required to establish agency for 
Sixth Amendment purposes, the state could accomplish “with a wink and 
a nod” what it cannot overtly do.  Ayers, 623 F.3d at 312.  The Third and 
Fourth Circuits have come to similar conclusions.  See Matteo, 171 F.3d 
at 893; Brink, 39 F.3d at 424; Cox, 708 F.2d at 136. 
42 
One state court case dramatically illustrates the shortcomings of a 
formalistic Johnson approach.  In Commonwealth v. Moose, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a case where the informant did 
not have specific instructions.  602 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Pa. 1992).  Yet the 
record demonstrated that the informant knew what to do.  Id.  Indeed, 
the informant was called “the monsignor” because so many inmates 
confessed to him.   Id.  Notwithstanding the lack of instructions, the 
informant was an agent of the state for Sixth Amendment purposes.  Id. 
at 1271. 
d.  Requirement of quid pro quo.  Some cases have considered 
whether an express or implicit quid pro quo is required to state a 
Massiah violation.  In McBeath, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated it is 
not necessary to have an express quid pro quo agreement.  244 S.W.3d 
at 33.  Similarly, the California Supreme Court has stated that an 
informant acts as a government agent if the informant acts “under the 
direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with 
the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage.”  People v. 
Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 83 (Cal. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting In re 
Neely, 864 P.2d 474, 481 (Cal. 1993)); see also Commonwealth v. 
Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 38, 40–41 (Mass. 2007); Rubalcado v. State, 424 
S.W.3d 560, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
In Brink, the court held that a lack of a specific promise was not 
determinative on the issue of agency for Sixth Amendment purposes.  39 
F.3d at 424.  Additionally, in Randolph, the court emphasized that it was 
enough that the state made a decision to obtain an informant’s 
cooperation and that the informant decided to provide it.  380 F.3d at 
1144.  Brink and Randolph are consistent with Henry, which emphasized 
that with respect to agency, it is the likely result of the government’s acts 
43 
that determines the issue.  447 U.S. at 271, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 122.  Given the long prison sentences that many informants 
face, the prospect that cooperation might be considered in reducing a 
sentence is a sufficient inducement to support a Massiah violation. 
e.  Distinction between informers and entrepreneurs.  Even if 
instructions are not necessarily required for express or implied agency, 
the cases generally draw a distinction between informants acting on 
behalf of the government and those who act without government 
involvement.  See Birbal, 113 F.3d at 346.  As stated in Cox, an inmate 
who volunteers information to authorities based on “an unencouraged 
hope to curry favor” does not offend Massiah.  708 F.2d at 136.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court offered a similar viewpoint, noting that the 
Sixth Amendment “does not protect a defendant against private 
individuals who wish to profit at his expense.”  Jackson v. State, 684 
A.2d 745, 752 (Del. 1996).  Such persons, in the parlance of courts 
grappling 
with 
Massiah 
issues, 
are 
commonly 
referred 
to 
as 
entrepreneurs.  See York, 933 F.2d at 1356. 
In some cases, it is undisputed that the informer has no agency 
relationship with the government.  For instance, in LaBare, one of the 
informants was “not even arguably a government agent” when he 
gathered incriminating statements.  191 F.3d at 66.  Whether an 
informant has crossed the line between agency and entrepreneurship, 
however, depends on the facts.  A number of cases have found, for 
instance, that what began as entrepreneurship may develop into an 
agency relationship.  See, e.g., Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 119.  Sometimes, 
however, an entrepreneur who becomes an agent may still not violate 
Massiah if, in his subsequent contact with the defendant, he does not 
engage in acts of deliberate elicitation.  See Birbal, 113 F.3d at 346. 
44 
f.  Requirement of specific target.  In some cases, courts have held 
that an informant becomes a government agent only when instructed by 
the government to get information about a particular defendant.  See 
LaBare, 191 F.3d at 65; Moore, 178 F.3d at 999; Birbal, 113 F.3d at 346; 
In re Benn, 952 P.2d 116, 138–39 (Wash. 1998).  Other courts, however, 
have come to a different conclusion and do not require targeting of 
specific individuals.  Brink, 39 F.3d at 423–24; York, 933 F.2d at 1356–
57; United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per 
curiam); Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 40; Moose, 602 A.2d at 1270. 
The problem with a requirement of a specific target is that it allows 
“informant[s] at large” to seek opportunities within the jailhouse at their 
discretion.  Sampol, 636 F.2d at 638.  The invasion of an incarcerated 
prisoner’s Sixth Amendment rights is not affected by whether the 
informant is operating at large or with a specific target.  As noted in 
Moose, “The vast majority of people in county jail are charged with crimes 
and awaiting trial . . . .”  Moose, 602 A.2d at 1270.  As a result, 
deliberately eliciting incriminating information from any of them violates 
Massiah.  Moose, 602 A.2d at 1270. 
As noted in York, the relationship between the state and its 
informers is often a symbiotic one.  933 F.2d at 1357.  According to the 
York court, it would be inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment to allow 
the government to send out informants on “a reconnaissance patrol . . . 
to gather evidence.”  Id. at 1356.  The court further noted “[w]hether the 
principal exercises its control strictly, by targeting specific individuals, or 
casually, by loosing an informant on the prison population at large, is 
irrelevant.”  Id. at 1357.  A state’s use of an at-large informant is at least 
somewhat inconsistent with the affirmative duty of prosecutors in 
45 
Moulton to avoid interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of 
defendants.  474 U.S. at 171, 106 S. Ct. at 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 492–93. 
g.  Infiltration of cell.  There is authority for the proposition that 
placement of a friend or acquaintance with a defendant in the jailhouse 
is at least some evidence of agency.  See Matteo, 171 F.3d at 894–95.  
Such action by the state “intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to 
induce [the accused] to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel” and is a significant factor to a finding of agency.  
Id. at 895 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 274, 100 S. Ct. at 2189, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 125); see also Brink, 39 F.3d at 424 (placing informant in 
cell with pretrial detainee could represent a deliberate effort to obtain 
incriminating evidence in violation of Sixth Amendment).  As noted in 
Kimball, if the state placed an informant back with the defendant after he 
expresses a willingness to cooperate, the state intentionally “creat[ed] a 
situation likely to induce” incriminating statements.  United States v. 
Kimball, 884 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989).  Under these 
circumstances, the government takes the risk that the informant will 
engage in deliberate elicitation.  See id. 
Yet there is authority for the proposition that mere placement of a 
person in a cell with a defendant, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
establish agency.  Taylor, 800 F.2d at 1016 (majority opinion).  Yet even 
in more cautious courts, the placement of an informant in a jail in 
proximity to a defendant, as in Henry, is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether the informant should be regarded as an agent of the 
state for Sixth Amendment purposes.  See, e.g., Henry, 447 U.S. at 274, 
100 S. Ct. at 2189, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 124; Brink, 39 F.3d at 424. 
h.  Summary.  No talismanic test, mechanical checklist, or 
mathematical formula exists for determining whether an informant is an 
46 
agent for Massiah purposes.  Instead, a court must determine—under all 
the facts and circumstances—whether the relationship between the state 
and an informant is such that the state has violated its affirmative duty 
under Moulton to protect the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants. 
3.  Approach to deliberate elicitation. 
a.  Introduction.  A second important issue in the federal caselaw is 
the meaning of the elusive phrase “deliberate elicitation.”  Before 
exploring the meaning of the term, we must first note that it is clear that 
deliberate elicitation is not the same as an interrogation.  Fellers v. 
United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524, 124 S. Ct. 1019, 1022–23, 157 
L. Ed. 2d 1016, 1022–23 (2004); see also Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399, 97 
S. Ct. at 1240, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 436–37 (stating that the detective “set out 
to elicit information from [the defendant] just as surely as—and perhaps 
more effectively than—if he had formally interrogated him”).  Yet 
Kuhlmann suggests that “the primary concern” of Massiah and its 
progeny is to protect defendants from “secret interrogation by 
investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of police interrogation.”  
477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384. 
In Henry, the Court seemed to embrace a three-part test to 
determine if the relationship between the government and the jailhouse 
informant was “likely” to elicit statements from a defendant in the 
absence of counsel.  447 U.S. at 270–71, 100 S. Ct. at 2186–87, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 122.  The three prongs of the test were the relationship 
between the state and the informant, the fact that the informant and the 
defendant were both incarcerated, and the fact that the informant was 
under indictment.  Id.  There is nothing in Henry that requires a 
defendant to show what actually happened at the jailhouse between the 
informant and the defendant.  Instead, the Court in Henry held the 
47 
creation of an environment likely to lead to elicitation was sufficient to 
establish the constitutional violation.  Id. at 271–72, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 
65 L. Ed. 2d at 123.  Yet in Henry it was clear that the informant 
engaged in some conversations with the defendant.  Id. at 271, 100 S. Ct. 
at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122–23. 
In Kuhlmann, however, the Supreme Court focused more 
extensively on the deliberate-elicitation test.  477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2629–30, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384–85.  There is language in Kuhlmann that 
seems to require that a defendant raising a Massiah challenge must 
specifically show that the jailhouse informant took active steps to elicit 
uncounseled statements by the defendant.  Id. (stating that the 
defendant must show that “the police and their informant took some 
action” (emphasis added)).  In short, under this theory of Kuhlmann, 
merely establishing that the state created an environment where 
elicitation of an uncounseled defendant was likely would not be 
sufficient.  Under this more expansive view of Kuhlmann, the defendant 
must show, as a matter of fact, that the jailhouse informant was more 
than a “passive listener.”  Accordingly, under this understanding, active 
participation of some kind by the informant is required.  An important 
issue under this reading of Kuhlmann is identifying what type of actions 
by a jailhouse informant are sufficient for a finding of deliberate 
elicitation and what actions may be regarded as merely incidental and 
constitutionally insignificant. 
b.  Pure “listening post” cases.  There are occasions, of course, 
where the jailhouse informant merely overhears incriminating statements 
but does not participate at all in an interaction directly with the 
defendant.  Where the evidence shows that the informant truly was a 
passive listening post—when he simply listened to conversations between 
48 
defendant and another inmate—courts do not find a Sixth Amendment 
violation.  For instance, in United States v. Mourad, the court found no 
deliberate elicitation when the government agents overheard the 
defendant make incriminating statements to his wife on the telephone.  
729 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1984).  This was a classic example of 
obtaining incriminating statements by luck or happenstance. 
But the boundary between listening-post cases and cases involving 
deliberate elicitation is fraught with border disputes.  For instance, 
consider two cases from Kentucky.  In Thurman v. Commonwealth, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the informant was, in fact, a 
passive listening post.  975 S.W.2d 888, 895–96 (Ky. 1998).  But in 
McBeath, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a claim that an 
informant—who recorded statements by a defendant—acted as a passive 
listening post when the informant engaged in conversations about the 
offense and discussed trial strategy with the defendant.  244 S.W.3d at 
29, 34. 
In fact, in many cases where courts found the informants to be 
acting as listening posts, the informant was not literally silent but 
instead engaged in some communication with the defendant.  The 
question in the caselaw is whether such communication was active or 
passive.  See Thomas, 708 F.2d at 136 n.5; Ammeter, 72 Iowa L. Rev. at 
1431–36. 
c.  Requirement that informant initiate discussion leading to 
incriminating statements.  It is sometimes claimed that an informant 
must initiate the conversation about the crime in order to violate 
Massiah and its progeny.  But Henry made clear a Massiah violation may 
occur even when the defendant initiates discussion of criminal conduct.  
Henry, 447 U.S. at 271–72, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 123; Bey 
49 
v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1997).  But deliberate elicitation is 
not a question of timing—it is a question of substance.  Faithfulness to 
Henry requires that there be no escape from honoring the defendant’s 
right to counsel simply because the informant initiates the discussion of 
the general subject matter of the crime.  The better view is that there is 
no requirement that the informant begin the conversation if he or she 
subsequently 
encourages 
the 
defendant 
to 
provide 
additional 
incriminating information by his or her responses. 
d.  Active vs. passive communication: responsive remarks.  Where 
informants literally do not take part in the conversation, but only listen, 
the cases are relatively easy.  More difficult are situations where the 
jailhouse informants are not completely silent bystanders but have some 
degree of direct interaction with the defendant.  The question then 
becomes, under the expansive view of Kuhlmann, whether the actions of 
the informant were active or passive.  Sometimes the courts distinguish 
casual 
remarks 
from 
statements 
designed 
to 
deliberately 
elicit 
incriminating statements.  In other cases, the courts distinguish 
responsive comments from more probing remarks. 
For instance, in McDonald v. Blackburn the defendant returned 
from a meeting with police to his jail cell and declared to the jailhouse 
informant that police had “the ring.”  806 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1986).  
When the informant asked “what ring?” the defendant answered that it 
was the ring taken from the murder victim.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit found 
this simple response was not an action designed to deliberately elicit 
incriminating remarks.  Id. at 622. 
But a different result occurred in Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 30.  In 
that case, the informant questioned the defendant about “what he did 
about his anger toward the victim.”  Id. at 44.  Plainly, unlike in 
50 
McDonald, this was not merely a response to the statement by the 
defendant, but was a question designed to enhance the substance of the 
communication between the defendant and the informant.  Id. at 44–45.  
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found this statement was 
sufficient deliberate elicitation to trigger a Massiah violation.  Id. at 46. 
e.  Active or passive communication: clarifying questions.  Matteo is 
a case considering the question of whether responding to a defendant’s 
statements by asking follow-up or clarifying questions amounts to 
deliberate elicitation under Massiah.  171 F.3d at 877.  In Matteo, the 
defendant called the informant and asked him to retrieve the murder 
weapon for him.  Id. at 881–82.  In the first conversation initiated by the 
defendant, the defendant revealed the gun’s general location.  Id. at 882.  
During this conversation, the informant said virtually nothing at all.  Id. 
at 882–83.  The police, however, could not find the gun based upon the 
information volunteered by the defendant in the first conversation.  Id. at 
883.  As a result, the police arranged for a second telephone 
conversation.  Id.  In the second conversation, the informant advised the 
defendant that he could not find the gun.  Id. at 883–84.  In the first 
conversation, the informant’s responses included seventy-three one-word 
expressions such as “okay” and “yeah.”  Id. at 896 n.3.  Nonetheless, 
during the second conversation, the informant asked some clarifying 
questions regarding the location of the gun: 
On the far side, on the side all the way closer to your home? 
. . .  [I]s it in the water? . . . So it’s not in the grass? . . . So 
it’s almost underneath the bridge? . . . Was the water frozen 
when you dropped it? 
Id. at 908 (McKee, J., concurring).  The majority found that the clarifying 
questions were directly responsive to statements made by the defendant.  
51 
Id. at 896 (majority opinion).  The court concluded there was no 
deliberate elicitation under Kuhlmann.  Id. at 897. 
Three judges, however, dissented on the issue of whether the Sixth 
Amendment was violated, but concurred in the result because of 
harmless error.  Id. at 905 (McKee, J., concurring).  According to these 
judges, the police directed the informant to obtain more information in 
the second conversation in order to find the gun.  Id. at 908.  The 
dissenters argued that the many monosyllabic answers did not transform 
the informant into a listening post when the very purpose of the second 
conversation was to find out more information about the location of the 
gun and the informant specifically asked questions designed to obtain 
greater details about its location.  Id. at 909. 
The issue of clarifying questions was also considered in United 
States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324, 330 (2d Cir. 2012).  Here, in one of the 
conversations, when the defendant stated that the actual killers had 
planted evidence, the informant asked, “[W]hat did they do?  What 
. . . kind of evidence?”  Id. at 330 n.2 (alteration in original).  Yet the 
court found no Sixth Amendment violation because the jailhouse 
informant was “entirely passive.”  Id. at 331–32.  According to the court, 
the few follow-up questions posed by the informant were not “of a 
probing nature.”  Id. at 332.  The court expressly reserved the question of 
whether limited follow-up questions could ever be found to stimulate 
discussion and thus be deliberate elicitation.  Id. 
A similar issue was confronted in York, 933 F.2d at 1343.  In York, 
the informant and York were engaged in daily conversations, “kind of 
digging in each other’s past.”  Id. at 1359.  York told the informant that 
his son testified against him in his first trial and thought that York had 
killed his mother.  Id.  When the informant observed, “You must have 
52 
been pretty mad at the bitch,” York declared, “Mad enough to put a 
bullet in the back of her head.”  Id.  The court found the statement of the 
informant not sufficient to rise to the level of deliberate elicitation.  Id.  
The court noted that informants are not required to reveal their status by 
not responding to subjects, to remove themselves from situations that 
might uncover incriminating information, or to abruptly change the 
subject when inmates unburden themselves.  Id. 
Other cases are more critical of follow-up questions.  For example, 
in Currington, an Idaho appellate court rejected claims that the informant 
was acting as a mere listening post when the informant asked some 
twenty questions to follow up on statements made by the defendant.  746 
P.2d at 1003–04 (majority opinion).  Similarly, in State v. Mattatall, the 
informant asked questions of the defendant and then pressed him for 
“clarification of his equivocal responses.”  525 A.2d 49, 52 (R.I. 1987).  In 
these cases, follow-up questions were sufficient to trigger a Massiah 
violation. 
f.  Active or passive communication: casual remarks.  Some cases 
seem to distinguish between casual remarks not designed to elicit 
incriminating statements and those that do.  An illustrative case is 
Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383 (Mass. 2005).  In Hilton, a court 
officer was escorting a murder and arson defendant in leg irons after 
arraignment into a holding area.  Id. at 391.  The charges for which she 
was being arraigned stemmed from a blaze that destroyed a residence.  
Id. at 388, 391.  The defendant stated that her son had warned her that 
leg irons were “no good.”  Id. at 391.  The court officer asked the 
defendant who her son was.  Id.  In response, the defendant made the 
incriminating statement, “I hope he forgives me . . . .  I could have killed 
my grandchildren.”  Id.  At that point, the court officer asked the 
53 
defendant a series of questions about whether she had lit the fire, why 
she had done so, and whether she knew about the other occupants of the 
house.  Id.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
court officer’s question regarding the identity of the defendant’s son was 
a causal remark not designed to elicit incriminating statements.  Id. at 
401.  But the court officer’s follow-up questions about the crime crossed 
the Massiah line and were properly suppressed.  Id. 
g.  Deliberate placement of informant with cellmate.  In Kuhlmann, 
the Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Amendment does not “forbid . . . 
admission in evidence of an accused’s statements to a jailhouse 
informant who was ‘placed in close proximity but [made] no effort to 
stimulate conversations about the crime charged.’ ”  477 U.S. at 456, 
106 S. Ct. at 2628, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 382 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 
n.9, 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.9, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 123 n.9) (alteration in 
original).  Nonetheless, cases stress the role of the state in placing the 
informant in the jailhouse in a fashion designed to provoke discussion 
and potential incriminating statements.  For instance, in Brink, the 
placement of an informant in close proximity to the defendant was a 
factor in determining agency.  39 F.3d at 424.  On the other hand, in 
Taylor, the Tenth Circuit came to the conclusion that the mere placement 
of an informant in a jail cell with a defendant is insufficient to establish 
agency.  800 F.2d at 1016.  But see Tomkovicz, Adversary System, 22 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 79–81 (asserting when the government 
surreptitiously enters defendant’s presence as a listener, it is not wholly 
passive and that Massiah should regulate passive reception). 
h.  Affirmative acts to cultivate trust.  A number of the cases 
emphasize that when the informant engages in acts designed to 
encourage the defendant to trust the informant, these acts may at least 
54 
be a factor in determining whether deliberate elicitation occurred.  For 
instance, in Murphy, the informant gained the trust of the defendant by 
helping him hide a shank.  862 N.E.2d at 44.  Such trust-building 
activity contributes to the likelihood of obtaining incrimination 
information. 
Yet in State v. Robinson, an informant prior to his arrest had 
worked with certain state agents.  448 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Neb. 1989).  
After the informant’s arrest, he was placed in a corrections center where 
the defendant was also incarcerated.  Id.  The officers with whom the 
informant had the relationship had no role in his placement.  Id.  In the 
cellblock, the informant asked the defendant why he was in prison, to 
which the defendant responded that it was none of his business.  Id.  
Later, the defendant asked the informant if there were some people he 
could contact to help raise bail money, which the informant said he 
would help with—an act designed to generate trust with the defendant.  
Id.  The trial court, however, found these facts insufficient to establish 
active elicitation.  The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. at 396. 
i.  Development of notes and written statements.  There are a 
handful of cases dealing with the development of written notes or 
documents by informants.  In United States v. Pannell, an informant 
received listening-post instructions from law enforcement.  510 
F. Supp. 2d 185, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  The informant, however, took 
detailed, handwritten notes of incriminating information supplied by the 
defendant.  Id.  The district court did not believe that the informant 
followed the listening-post instructions, in part because of the detailed 
nature of the notes.  Id. at 192.  The district court noted that the 
informant must have participated in active conversation with the 
55 
defendant in a deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating remarks.  Id. at 
193. 
A different result was reached in Frederick v. State, 755 N.E.2d 
1078 (Ind. 2001).  In that case, the informant’s taking of notes, even if at 
the request of the police, was held not to violate Sixth Amendment rights 
if the informant did not elicit the information.  Id. at 1082; see also 
Commonwealth v. Harmon, 573 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Mass. 1991) (finding 
the taking of notes about incriminating statements did not mean, under 
the facts and circumstances, that the note-taker was an agent of the 
state). 
E.  Application of Massiah in Iowa Cases.  In State v. Nelson, a 
defendant made incriminating statements to a jailhouse informant.  325 
N.W.2d 118, 119 (Iowa 1982).  The informant then told authorities about 
the statements.  Id.  The informant was returned to his cell, where 
further incriminating statements were obtained from the defendant.  Id.  
Citing the three-factor Henry test, we noted there was nothing to indicate 
that the state had “put him up to it.”  Id. at 119–20.  Specifically, there 
was nothing to indicate that Jackson had an agreement that he would be 
paid or would receive more favorable treatment for the information.  Id. 
at 120.  No promises were made to give anything to the informant in 
exchange for incriminating statements.  Id.  We thus found, as a matter 
of fact, that the informant was not acting as an agent of the state.  Id.  
We did not consider the question of deliberate elicitation. 
V.  Discussion of Right-to-Counsel Issue. 
A.  Attachment.  The State contends that the right to counsel did 
not attach because the arrest warrant was not issued at the time that the 
State’s officers met with Johnson on July 12.  The critical time is not 
when the State met with Johnson or any other informant.  The critical 
56 
time for purposes of attachment is when the informants obtained the 
incriminating information.  See Randolph, 380 F.3d at 1143 (“Once a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, the 
government is forbidden from ‘deliberately eliciting’ incriminating 
statements from the defendant.” (Emphasis added.)).  Here, there is no 
dispute that the right to counsel attached by then.  Therefore, we reject 
the State’s attachment argument. 
B.  Agency Relationship.  We next consider whether the State 
had an agency relationship with its informants sufficient to support a 
Massiah-type claim.  The court of appeals majority found such agency 
with respect to Johnson based on the totality of the circumstances and 
the dissent agreed.   
1.  Johnson.  We think the record establishes an agency  
relationship existed as to Johnson.  Whether a sufficient relationship 
exists between an informant and the state should not turn on formalistic 
analysis but on the more general proposition of whether an informant is 
seeking to provide information to the state in return for some kind of 
consideration.  Ayers, 623 F.3d at 311–12.  That was clearly the case 
here. 
We do not regard the State’s instructions, or lack of them, as 
preventing an agency relationship for Massiah purposes.  In Henry, the 
state explicitly instructed the informant not to engage in questioning, but 
the failure of the informant to follow instructions did not mean an agency 
relationship was not present.  447 U.S. at 271–72, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 122–23.  Also in Henry, the Court emphasized the jailhouse 
setting as a circumstance creating especial danger of a Sixth Amendment 
violation, a concern fully applicable here.  Id. at 273, 100 S. Ct. at 2188, 
65 L. Ed. 2d at 124.   
57 
Yet as in Henry, we think the incentives for Johnson were 
sufficiently substantial that the State should know that there was a 
likelihood that the informant would cross the line into deliberate 
elicitation.  Detective Smithey instructed Johnson to report back to him 
if he learned something.  Given the powerful incentives plus the 
invitation to report back to Detective Smithey, Johnson was encouraged 
by the State to become a criminal investigator.  If we took a contrary 
approach, we would promote a “wink and a nod” loophole to Massiah.  
Ayers, 623 F.3d at 312.  We further note that Johnson, an inmate at the 
Muscatine County Jail, met with Detectives Smithey and Clarahan a day 
prior to Marshall’s arrest.  Marshall was then incarcerated in the same 
jail.  The fact that Johnson obtained incriminating information from 
Marshall does not look like luck or happenstance. 
We also reject the State’s argument regarding the fact that the 
State officials asked for information about several persons of interest 
prevents us from finding an agency relationship between the State and 
Johnson.  Whether the State seeks information about one person as in 
Massiah and Kuhlmann or three persons as here, the incentives for the 
informant remain precisely the same and the risks to the accused are no 
different than if there was just one target.  We do not believe that the 
State can prevent the formation of an agency relationship by seeking 
information about multiple persons or by letting loose an informant at 
large in the jailhouse.  We find the discussion in York persuasive.  See 
933 F.2d at 1356–57.  We do not think the United States Supreme Court 
intended to allow the states to employ informants such as “the 
monsignor” to engage in wholesale violation of the right to counsel.  See 
Moose, 602 A.2d at 1270.  To do so would be contrary to the State’s 
affirmative obligation to ensure that it does not take action that violates 
58 
or interferes with the relationship between a defendant and his counsel.  
See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171, 106 S. Ct. at 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 492. 
2.  Freeman.  Marshall has not, however, established an agency 
relationship between the State and Freeman on the present record.  The 
record indicates that Freeman may have hoped to receive a benefit as a 
result from his testimony, but there is no evidence of a proffer agreement 
or any kind of meaningful relationship between Freeman and the State.  
See Cox, 708 F.2d at 136; Jackson, 684 A.2d at 752; Nelson, 325 N.W.2d 
at 120.  Freeman was the classic entrepreneur, seeking to market his 
information without any advance arrangement.  We reach this result as 
to Freeman even though he clearly deliberately elicited incriminating 
statements from Marshall.  Taylor, 800 F.2d at 1016 (holding if the 
informant was not a government agent, no Massiah violation occurred 
even if there was deliberate elicitation). 
3.  Martin.  Unlike Freeman, Detective Smithey testified that Martin 
had a proffer agreement.  The evidence showed that Martin had provided 
information under the proffer agreement on two other occasions and that 
he remained in the Muscatine County Jail for a lengthy period of time 
prior to sentencing.  Detective Smithey did not mention in direct 
examination that he met with Martin about the Versypt murder, but he 
conceded on cross-examination that he “may have asked him” if he had 
any information about the Versypt murder during one of his proffer 
interviews.  Further, Martin and Johnson were codefendants, and 
Detective Smithey conceded that Johnson would probably pass on to 
Martin that the State was interested in obtaining information about 
Marshall’s involvement in the Versypt murder.  In other words, it was 
likely that the State’s informant, Johnson, would pass the State’s 
interest in Marshall on to his codefendant, who also had a cooperation 
59 
agreement and had previously provided information to the State on at 
least two occasions.  After Marshall arrived at the Muscatine County Jail 
in August, Martin was moved into his cellpod.  Curiously, then, after 
Detective Smithey met with Johnson on October 3 at the Muscatine 
County Jail, Detective Smithey then saw Martin in a room off the library, 
who just happened to be talking to his lawyer and just happened to have 
with him his notes and Marshall’s notes about the Versypt murder.  
Notably, Martin had taken steps to document this information. 
Whatever else he is, Martin is not a classic jailhouse entrepreneur.  
He had a proffer agreement and had at least two interviews under his 
belt prior to providing information about Marshall.  Further, Detective 
Smithey’s admission that he may have asked him if he had information 
about the Versypt murder, that Johnson in any event would probably 
advise him of the State’s interest, Martin’s timely transfer into Marshall’s 
cellpod, and the remarkable coincidental meeting with Detective Smithey 
on 
October 3—where 
Martin 
presented 
Detective 
Smithey 
with 
documents—suggests more than luck or happenstance occurred here.  In 
any event, as pointed out above, the federal cases are divided on the 
question of whether deliberate elicitation by informants at large gives rise 
to a Massiah violation.  We think the better view, however, is that it does.  
York, 933 F.2d at 1357.  As a result, for purposes of this case, we 
conclude that Martin should be considered an agent of the State for 
Massiah purposes.  
C.  Deliberate Elicitation.  We next confront is the question of 
deliberate elicitation. 
1.  Johnson.  The evidence shows that Johnson asked Marshall 
“what was he in there for” when they were both together in segregation in 
the Muscatine County Jail.  The evidence also shows that Marshall 
60 
ultimately provided extensive information to Johnson about the 
underlying crime.  As noted above, the disclosures made by Marshall are 
extensive—they go on, and on, and on.  According to Johnson, the 
statements made to him by Marshall included the following comments:  
(1) there was no evidence or witnesses to the crime; (2) Marshall went to 
Burlington because police kept bothering him; (3) the police harassed 
him in Burlington and threatened him; (4) at first police said they had 
nothing on him and then they only had “a little gun powder;” (5) he was 
looking at a lot of time; (6) he, Calvin, and Weezy (Thompson’s nickname) 
were playing dice in the hallway; (7) he arrived at the idea to rob the 
landlord; (8) Weezy then went into the apartment; (9) the robbery went 
wrong; (10) the landlord got shot; (11) the shot was loud; (12) he froze in 
the hallway and then ran out the back; and (13) he reentered through 
the front door.  No direct evidence, however, was offered at the motion to 
suppress hearing or at trial about what Johnson specifically said to 
Marshall.  Surely it is unlikely that Marshall engaged in an extended 
Shakespearean soliloquy about the crime.  But the record does not 
provide an “I said, then he said, then I said” type of narrative. 
On the one hand, this situation could be regarded as a failure of 
proof.  It is, perhaps, conceivable that Johnson responded to Marshall’s 
statements with neutral “Oh’s” and “Uh’s,” other neutral filler comments, 
or solely with comments that did not encourage Marshall to elaborate.  
Recall that in Matteo a recorded telephone conversation revealed the 
informant had engaged in seventy-three one-word utterances in response 
to incriminating statements by a defendant.  171 F.3d at 896 n.3.  Such 
an argument, however, did not persuade the district court in Pannell, 
510 F. Supp. 2d at 192.  In Pannell, the informant claimed he did not ask 
the defendant any questions about his case and that the defendant 
61 
volunteered his incriminating comments during lengthy conversations 
about everyday matters.  Id.  The district court found the informant’s 
assertion incredible.  Id.  The district court noted that the informant “had 
great incentive to actively encourage [the defendant]” in light of his heavy 
sentence.  Id.  The district court concluded that there must have been 
some active encouragement from the informant and suppressed the 
statements.  Id. at 193. 
Yet on the record developed at trial, we think there has been a 
failure of proof.  It is conceivable that Johnson only responded to 
volunteered incriminating statements made by Marshall with “Ah’s” and 
“Oh’s” or other comments that did not encourage Marshall to continue 
with the narrative.  See Matteo, 171 F.3d at 896.  Under Kuhlmann and 
related cases, such neutral or responsive comments are not considered 
deliberate elicitation.  See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 460–61, 106 S. Ct. at 
2630–31, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 385.  It is remarkable, perhaps, that Marshall’s 
counsel—both at the motion to suppress and at trial—did not ask any 
questions of Johnson regarding his degree of participation in the 
communications with Marshall.  It is possible that Marshall’s counsel 
was not aware of the deliberate-elicitation requirement for finding a 
Massiah violation.  It is also possible, perhaps, that Marshall did provide 
a lengthy, unprompted confession to Johnson, and said as much to his 
attorney.  The record, however, is not adequate on this direct appeal to 
resolve any potential ineffectiveness claim based upon the failure of 
counsel to explore deliberate elicitation.  A different record, of course, 
might be developed on remand. 
2.  Martin.  As to Martin, there is no doubt that he deliberately 
elicited incriminating statements from Marshall.  At the outset, Martin 
got “legal stuff” for Marshall about manslaughter and armed robbery.  
62 
According to Martin, “I told him, you know, you might have to tell your 
side of the story if you’re going to get a lesser charge.  So he went to write 
the story down . . . .”  Martin’s suggestion that it was in Marshall’s 
interest to get out his side of the story is, of course, a classic police 
interrogation technique.  See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 645 P.2d 363, 365 
(Idaho 1982) (finding an interrogation when the police officer asked the 
defendant “if he would like to give his side of the story”); State v. Hebert, 
82 P.3d 470, 481 (Kan. 2004) (inviting suspect to “tell his side of the 
story” constitutes an interrogation); State v. Hannon, 636 N.W.2d 796, 
806 (Minn. 2001) (warning defendant that “his side of [the] story [would] 
never be known” after defendant invoked his right to counsel violated 
defendant’s rights); State v. Lynch, 477 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991) (asking “[w]hat’s your side of the story?” was an interrogation).  
Martin engaged in deliberate elicitation by any application of the 
Kuhlman standard.  See Calder v. State, 133 So. 3d 1025, 1030–31 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (reminding accused that this was his opportunity to 
present his side of the story and that doing so would benefit him is 
“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (quoting Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L. Ed. 2d 
297, 308 (1980))); State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2007) 
(characterizing statements to “get it out on the table” and “[t]ell us what 
really happened” as “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” 
(quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308 
(third quote))); Hebert, 82 P.3d at 483 (holding “[w]ould you like the 
opportunity to tell me your side of the story” elicited confession); see also 
Mark A. Godsey, Shining the Bright Light on Police Interrogation in 
America, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 711, 720–22 (2009). 
63 
Under the circumstances, Martin simply cannot be characterized 
as “a passive listener to a heartfelt confession.”  Franciscus, 710 A.2d at 
1120 (majority opinion). 
D.  Sua Sponte Harmless Error Under Blaise.  The State did not 
argue harmless error in its briefing in this case.  Yet in In re Detention of 
Blaise, we held that we could consider the issue of harmless error when 
it was not raised in the briefing in a narrow category of cases.  830 
N.W.2d 310, 319 (Iowa 2013).  Factors to be considered include “(1) the 
length and complexity of the record, (2) whether the harmlessness of the 
error or errors found is certain or debatable, and (3) whether a reversal 
will result in protracted, costly, and ultimately futile proceedings in the 
district court.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 
227 (7th Cir. 1991)).  The main factor, however, is “the extent to which 
the harmlessness of the error is open to question.”  Id. at 320. 
The first Blaise factor, length and complexity of the record, cuts 
against allowing a sua sponte harmless-error review.  The trial lasted 
thirteen days with over a hundred exhibits.  This was not a relatively 
short proceeding where the lack of harm is obvious from a cursory review 
of the record.  Further, we note that the State originally charged someone 
else, Charles Thompson, with Versypt’s murder.  This original 
prosecution ended in a mistrial.  This suggests that the question of who 
was responsible for the murder has been an open question and has 
shifted over time. 
We now turn to the other Blaise factors, considering whether 
reversal will lead to futile proceedings and especially the extent to 
whether the harmlessness of error is open to question. 
1.  Opening and closing statements as windows to sua sponte 
Blaise harmless error.  We look to the opening and closing statements of 
64 
the parties as a window into whether the demanding Blaise sua sponte 
harmless-error standard is met. 
In its opening statement, the first substantive line from the 
prosecution was, “This is a case about a robbery that went wrong.”  The 
prosecution outlined in detail uncontested facts related to the murder.  
The prosecution continued by stating that the evidence would show that 
Marshall observed Versypt as he approached the apartments on the day 
of the murder.  The prosecution noted that Charles Thompson, the 
previous defendant in the Versypt murder, would testify that Marshall 
took the clothes he was wearing on the day of the murder, placed them 
in a plastic bag, and threw them away.  The prosecution also stated that 
the testimony of its experts would show gunshot residue on articles of 
Marshall’s clothing. 
The State closed by outlining the expected testimony of its three 
informants.  The prosecution noted that these men were persons 
Marshall “thought that he could talk to and confide in.”  The prosecution 
summarized that Johnson would explain that Marshall told him that he, 
Charles Thompson, and another individual were playing dice and that 
Marshall and the other person decided to rob the landlord of rent money.  
The prosecution indicated that Martin was asked by Marshall “to help 
him write something that would make the shooting sound like an 
accident.”  The prosecution stated that Marshall asked Freeman for his 
help in stating that the shooting was an accident and asked Freeman to 
talk to his attorney about it. 
In its opening statement, the defense began by noting that many of 
the facts were not in dispute.  What was in dispute was “who did it.”  The 
prosecution noted that after a long and intensive investigation, the State 
charged Charles Thompson—and not Marshall—with the murder.  With 
65 
respect to the three informants, the defense emphasized that they needed 
to provide incriminating information to get reduction of their sentences.  
The defense emphasized the lack of DNA and fingerprints linking 
Marshall to the crime.  With respect to gunshot residue, the defense 
noted that gunshot residue was on the clothing of other occupants of the 
apartment where Marshall lived, including Charles Thompson.  In 
closing, the defense declared, “Mr. Freeman, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, 
those are witnesses that the State needs for their case.”  The defense 
again 
attacked 
their 
credibility 
and 
their 
incentive to 
provide 
incriminating statements. 
In the prosecution’s closing statement, it methodically summarized 
the testimony of trial witnesses.  As in the opening statement, the 
prosecution developed in depth the details of the John Versypt’s life, the 
investigation of the crime scene, and the autopsy.  The prosecution 
described in detail the testimony of Martin, Freeman, and Johnson.  The 
prosecution emphasized that Martin asked Marshall whether Marshall 
trusted him and that afterwards they developed a plan through which 
both would potentially benefit. 
The prosecution read verbatim the entire contents of Exhibit 105, 
the statement drawn up by Marshall at the request of Martin.  The 
prosecution emphasized to the jury, “[Y]ou’ll be able to take a look and 
read it for yourself.”  The prosecution further summarized the testimony 
of Freeman and Johnson.  All in all, the prosecution spent twelve 
consecutive pages of transcript discussing the testimony of the 
informants.  The prosecution emphasized that the jury will  “get to review 
[the written statement] where [Marshall] lays out and admits that he’s 
the one who shot John Versypt.”  The State recognized that there was a 
lack of scientific evidence linking Marshall to the crime, noting the trial 
66 
was “not a TV show, not everything is wrapped up.”  But the prosecution 
emphasized that “Justin Marshall did tell others what happened, and 
they did testify.” 
In the defense’s closing statement, the defense argued that the 
State “has almost no physical evidence against Justin Marshall,” no 
eyewitnesses, DNA, or fingerprints.  The defense noted that while 
gunshot residue, which has the capacity to migrate from one article of 
clothing to another, was found on Marshall’s clothing, it was also found 
on the clothing of Thompson and Courtney White, who from time to time 
occupied the same apartment as Marshall.  The defense noted testimony 
that the gun found at the crime scene belonged to Thompson, not to 
Marshall.  The defense pointed at Thompson as a potential perpetrator, 
noting that in September 2011 at Thompson’s trial the State identified 
him as the shooter. 
After citing the shortcomings of the State’s evidence, the defense 
declared, “[S]o what it comes down to, ladies and gentlemen, is what 
Justin Marshall said or supposedly said to the three convicted felons in 
the Muscatine County jail, Earl Freeman, Carl Johnson, and Antonio 
Martin.”  According to the defense, “[T]he State’s whole case comes down 
to three long-time career criminals who have done this before in order to 
get a reduction in their sentences . . . .”  In rebuttal, the prosecution 
focused immediately on the testimony of the three informants, noting 
that the prosecution had been “perfectly honest” about them.  The 
prosecution then briefly recanvased aspects of the trial, including 
inconsistencies in Marshall’s October 9 statement and testimony 
suggesting he disposed of his clothing after the murder.  In closing, the 
prosecution again returned to the subject of the informants.  The 
prosecution referred again to Exhibit 105, noting that “[t]his is not 
67 
something that was written by one of them.  This was something written 
by Justin Marshall.” 
2.  No sua sponte harmless error under Blaise.  On the record 
before us, we decline to find sua sponte that the error in admitting 
Martin’s testimony was harmless.  This was the second trial in 
connection with Versypt’s murder, with the first trial against a different 
defendant ending in a mistrial.  The State then charged Marshall and a 
thirteen-day trial ensued.  The evidence admitted through Martin—
especially incriminating written materials that virtually amounted to a 
confession—played a major role in the opening and closing statements of 
the parties.  The prosecution read the statement verbatim in closing 
argument and in rebuttal emphasized the written exhibit as proof of 
Marshall’s guilt.  While Freeman offered testimony in some ways similar 
to Martin’s, we do not think we can characterize Martin’s contribution as 
merely cumulative in a Blaise-type review for sua sponte harmless error. 
In addition, there was little direct scientific evidence linking 
Marshall to the crime, and Thompson was a good alternative suspect—
indeed, some of the jurors in Thompson’s trial were unwilling to acquit 
him of the charge.  Further, we note that the jury in this case asked a 
number of questions and ultimately were not unanimous on the theory of 
guilt.  We simply do not believe the narrow exception to our ordinary 
issue preservation rules found in Blaise has been met based on the 
record in this case. 
E.  Summary of Massiah Holdings.  Based on our analysis of the 
record, we conclude that Johnson and Martin were agents of the State.  
While Martin plainly deliberately elicited information from Marshall, we 
conclude that the evidence of deliberate elicitation is insufficient as to 
Johnson.  As a result, the motion to suppress should have been granted 
68 
as to Martin.  Because the State does not argue harmless error and we 
cannot say with certainty that the error was harmless under Blaise 
standards, we vacate Marshall’s conviction and remand the case for a 
new trial.  We decide this case based on the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, since this was the approach followed by the 
district court to decide the case.  While we reserve the right to interpret 
and apply the right to counsel provision in article I, section 10 of the 
Iowa Constitution in a fashion different than under its federal 
counterpart, see State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 280 (Iowa 2015) (“Our 
tradition of the right to counsel is simply broader than that represented 
by [the federal counterpart].”), we do not consider any questions in this 
case related to the right to counsel under this state constitutional 
provision.  
VI.  Conclusion. 
For the above reasons, we hold that the district court improperly 
overruled the motion to suppress as to Martin.  As a result, the decision 
of the court of appeals must be vacated and the judgment of the district 
court must be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND 
CASE REMANDED. 
All justices concur except Mansfield, Waterman, and Zager, JJ., 
who concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
 
69 
 
#13–0739, State v. Marshall 
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
This case can be resolved by common sense, precedent, and basic 
constitutional principles.  A defendant who volunteers incriminating 
statements to a fellow inmate is not deprived of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel just because the fellow inmate has a cooperation clause 
in his plea agreement and is cooperating with law enforcement.  Jail is 
not a pure, pristine environment.  Its occupants therefore run the risk 
that persons with whom they are sharing confidences may be, in 
common parlance, “snitches.”  The State does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment by taking advantage of this situation so long as the State 
does not circumvent the right to counsel by using jailhouse stand-ins to 
question inmates.  The Iowa City Police Department did not do that here 
or anything close to that.  I therefore respectfully dissent in part. 
 
In my view, the court goes well off the tracks in holding that 
Antonio Martin’s testimony should have been suppressed.  It appears the 
Iowa City police had not spoken to Martin at all about the Versypt killing 
before the defendant and Martin discussed it in jail; at most Martin had 
been asked one general question about it.  Furthermore, Martin disclosed 
to the defendant from the beginning that he was a snitch, and the 
defendant intentionally sought to use Martin as a snitch to tell his version 
of Versypt’s death.  As a practical matter, the majority finds a 
constitutional violation only because Martin gave the defendant advice 
that the defendant’s own counsel would not have given.  Unlike the 
court, I would not recognize this new constitutional claim of “ineffective 
assistance of fellow inmate.” 
 
The majority opinion, I fear, threatens to harm legitimate law 
enforcement in Iowa.  Under the majority’s approach, anyone who enters 
70 
into a cooperation agreement with the federal government as part of his 
or her guilty plea—a fairly common occurrence—becomes a roving agent 
“at large” of the State of Iowa.  If this person then interacts with another 
inmate, even if the interaction merely results in the inmate writing out 
what the inmate has already said, a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has occurred.  I am unaware of any court anywhere in 
the country that has adopted such an expansive view of Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964).2 
I believe the court’s conclusions are driven by a fundamentally 
wrong-headed view of the right to counsel.  Undoubtedly, the government 
has a constitutional obligation not to circumvent defendant’s legal 
counsel.  And that does happen in some cases, although it clearly didn’t 
happen here.  However, the majority’s position is that the State has to 
make the jail a sanitized environment where every inmate can trust that 
any fellow inmate who engages him in conversation isn’t cooperating with 
the government.  If the guarantee is violated, any statements can’t be 
used even if (as in the case of Martin) the defendant knew the fellow 
inmate was cooperating with the government. 
A further flaw in the court’s approach is that it is utterly 
unrealistic.  Offenders have snitched on one another ever since Adam 
blamed Eve for giving him the forbidden fruit.  This will continue to occur 
because the nature of plea bargaining and sentencing (especially federal 
sentencing) provides a strong incentive for it to occur.  The court’s 
opinion, however, provides a strong disincentive for the documentation of 
2I discuss below the cases that the court claims support its approach.  There is 
a Massachusetts case that adopts the majority’s view of agency but requires more by 
way of deliberate elicitation than the majority does today.  See Commonwealth v. 
Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 43–45 (Mass. 2007). 
                                      
 
71 
such arrangements.  Instead of formal cooperation agreements, which 
provide a clear basis for impeaching the informant while also providing a 
sanction if the informant doesn’t tell the truth, there will be vague and 
muddy informal arrangements. 
I.  Additional Factual Background. 
A fair understanding of this case needs to begin with more facts 
than the majority provides.  The majority’s quick “overview of the crime” 
does not adequately convey the strong evidence of Justin Marshall’s 
guilt.3  This evidence helps explain why Marshall was not so much a 
victim of jailhouse snitching as a willing participant, when he sought out 
others to tell his story in the hope that he would be convicted of a lesser 
charge than first-degree murder. 
Several witnesses placed Marshall in the location where Versypt 
was killed at the time he was killed.  Marshall was also tied to the 
murder weapon.  In addition, gunshot residue was found on Marshall’s 
jacket.  Marshall’s statements to police were highly inconsistent and 
revealed details about Versypt’s death not known to the public.  Marshall 
later told two fellow inmates—the admissibility of whose testimony is not 
questioned by the majority—that he had planned to rob Versypt, that 
Versypt went for the gun or otherwise startled him, that as a result 
Marshall shot Versypt, and that Marshall then wiped the gun off on his 
own jacket and ran. 
John Versypt’s death from a gunshot wound occurred around 
4 p.m. on October 8, 2009.  Officers found his body lying on the floor on 
3The district court found there was substantial evidence to support guilty 
verdicts on all of the theories presented to the jury, including that Marshall committed 
murder as a principal, that Marshall engaged in joint criminal conduct (i.e., he 
intentionally joined a robbery during the course of which Versypt was murdered), and 
that Marshall committed felony murder (the felony being robbery).  I agree. 
                                      
 
72 
the back landing of Building C of the Broadway Condominiums.  Versypt 
had been shot once, with the bullet passing at close range through one of 
his hands and his face.  Versypt passed away before the officers arrived.  
The officers retrieved a multicolored .38 caliber revolver that had been 
left near Versypt’s body. 
Shawnta Jackson lived in a third-floor apartment of Building C.  
While doing laundry downstairs that afternoon, she had noticed Marshall 
and another person (Courtney White) standing outside the back door of 
the building.  Later, when Jackson returned to get her laundry, she saw 
Versypt lying on the ground on the back landing. He was bleeding and 
gasping for air.  Jackson ran back up to her apartment. 
Andrew Shepard resided in the same third-floor apartment of 
Building C as his sister Jackson.  After Jackson ran into the apartment 
telling Shepard in shock what she had seen, Shepard hurried 
downstairs.  Versypt was still breathing heavily, and Shepard saw a gun 
on the ground.  Shepard called the police.  While Shepard was on the 
phone with the 911 operator, Versypt stopped breathing.  Shepard also 
saw a drill, a wallet, and signs on the floor.  The wallet was open. 
The next day, Shepard discussed with his brother what he had 
seen.  Marshall joined the pair and asked what kind of gun Shepard had 
observed near the body.  Shepard said it was a camouflage .38.  Marshall 
admitted to owning “a gun just like that one.”  Oddly, though, Marshall 
claimed to have been in Shepard’s apartment at the time of the shooting.  
Shepard disputed that, telling Marshall he had not been in Shepard’s 
apartment.  Marshall insisted he had been in Shepard’s apartment, and 
Shepard again disagreed. 
James Brown lived in Building C in an apartment next door to the 
apartment where Marshall and Charles Thompson resided.  On the night 
73 
before the shooting, Brown was visiting the other apartment and noticed 
a dark-colored gun that appeared to be a .38 lying on the bed in the back 
bedroom.  At that time Marshall and Thompson were present in the 
bedroom.  Brown later saw the actual gun that was retrieved from beside 
Versypt’s body.  He identified this as the same gun he had seen the night 
before the shooting. 
Brown’s account of the shooting generally aligned with Shepard’s.  
Brown heard a shot go off and heard the back door of the building “bust 
open real quick” but was unable to see anyone exit the building.  A few 
minutes later, Brown could hear Marshall knocking on the door of his 
own apartment, quietly asking his own aunt (who also resided in the 
apartment) to let him in.  When Brown opened the door and looked 
downstairs, he saw Versypt’s body lying on the landing.  Versypt was in 
the process of dying, and Shepard was on the phone with the 911 
operator. 
On the evening of the shooting, a surveillance camera caught 
Marshall and Thompson carrying garbage bags out of Building C, which 
they tossed into the dumpster.  However, a jacket that Marshall had been 
seen wearing during the afternoon of the shooting was later recovered by 
police.  It tested positive for gunshot residue. 
Marshall was interviewed by police and made numerous 
inconsistent statements.  His recorded interviews were subsequently 
played back for the jury.  Initially Marshall denied knowing anything 
about the shooting.  Later he tried to implicate Thompson, claiming he 
heard Thompson talking on the phone about “hitting a sweet lick 
[robbery]” around 2:30 p.m. on the day of the fatal shooting.  Police were 
unable to corroborate from phone records that this call had actually 
occurred. 
74 
Later still Marshall said that Thompson and someone else had 
planned to rob Versypt.  He claimed he overheard Thompson saying on 
the telephone afterward that “we hit a lick,” but the lick “went wrong.”  
Yet further into the interview, Marshall contradicted himself again and 
said that these alleged statements were made during a personal 
conversation he had with Thompson the night after the shooting. 
Marshall also told police that Versypt had been shot in the face.  
When asked how he knew this, Marshall became flustered and claimed 
the police had told him.  In fact, the police had deliberately withheld this 
factual detail. 
Thompson was originally charged with Versypt’s murder.  However, 
his trial ended in a mistrial when inadmissible evidence was 
inadvertently introduced.  Subsequently, he reached a deal with the 
State wherein he pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact. 
Thompson ultimately testified against Marshall at Marshall’s trial.  
According to Thompson’s testimony, right after the shooting, Marshall 
came into their apartment and said that someone had been shot in the 
hallway.  Later in the evening, Thompson saw Marshall putting the pants 
he had been wearing that day in a plastic sack.  Marshall then placed the 
sack in a larger garbage bag from the kitchen.  This was one of the bags 
the two men threw out that evening. 
II.  The Informants. 
On July 12, 2011, a criminal complaint was sworn out against 
Marshall.  Marshall was arrested in Texas several days later and 
transported back to Iowa.  On August 1, a trial information was filed 
charging Marshall with first-degree murder.  Marshall pled not guilty on 
August 2.  He was thereafter held in custody at the Muscatine County 
Jail. 
75 
Over the course of the Versypt murder investigation, Detective 
Michael Smithey interviewed several jailed individuals he thought might 
have information about the killing.  Detective Smithey stated that the 
focus of such interviews was “[t]o gather information that they have from 
while they were on the street or that they have gathered while 
incarcerated.”  Detective Smithey said that individuals who have been 
arrested for “federal-level drug crimes” can be particularly helpful in 
investigations because they are well known in their communities and can 
often “shed light on violent crimes, robberies, serious assaults, 
homicides, [and] other [crimes].”  He continued, “People in those 
situations are a wealth of knowledge about what is going on in the street 
and who is doing what.”  Detective Smithey denied giving any 
instructions to the persons he interviewed: 
[P]eople oftentimes ask, do you want us to find it?  No, we’re 
not telling you to do anything.  If you learn something, 
contact us, but there are no specific directions as to find 
something out about this person or ask them this or 
anything like that. 
Three of these informants ended up testifying against Marshall—
Carl Johnson, Earl Freeman, and Antonio Martin.  The majority 
concludes that error occurred only with respect to the admission of 
Martin’s testimony.  Let me therefore review the testimony of the other 
two informants before I get to Martin. 
A.  Johnson.  Johnson was being held in the Muscatine County 
Jail during the summer of 2011 following a federal conviction for 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  He had entered into a guilty plea that 
included a cooperation agreement.  Johnson had originally been 
sentenced to 240 months in prison, but after he testified against his 
codefendant, his sentence was reduced to 140 months. 
76 
On July 12, Johnson went through a proffer interview with 
Detective Smithey and Detective Jennifer Clarahan in the presence of 
Johnson’s attorney.  Detective Smithey subsequently testified regarding 
the interview as follows: 
Q.  Now, according to your report, the first thing you 
told him was we’re here for information about the death of 
John Versypt or words to that effect, correct?  A.  May I refer 
to my report? 
Q.  Yes. I’m looking at paragraph 2.  A.  Yes. 
Q.  Then, on the next page, he was asked to provide 
information about Charles Thompson, also known as Weezy.  
Do you see that there?  A.  Yes. 
Q.  Paragraph 4, he was asked to provide information 
about Justin Marshall.  Do you see that?  A.  Yes. 
Q.  And then paragraph 5, he was asked to provide 
information about Courtney White, also known as Mow-Mow. 
Do you see that?  A.  Yes. 
Q.  So, Officer, first you go into Mr. Johnson and you 
say, we’re here to talk about the killing of John Versypt. 
Then you give him the names of people you’re interested in, 
whether it’s [Charles Thompson], Justin Marshall, or 
Courtney White.  Do you recall doing that?  A.  Yes.  It’s in 
the report. 
Johnson said he had been a resident of the Broadway 
Condominiums at the time of the shooting, and he remembered 
discussing it with other residents when it occurred.  During the 
interview, Johnson told Detective Smithey that Marshall had said 
Thompson killed Versypt.  Detective Smithey did not ask Johnson to 
gather any more information from Marshall, Thompson, or White but did 
tell Johnson to “contact me if he learned anything further.” 
In September, Johnson’s attorney contacted Detective Smithey, 
indicating that Johnson might have additional information about the 
Versypt killing.  Detective Smithey accordingly reinterviewed Johnson at 
77 
the jail.  Johnson said he had learned more from Marshall after both 
men had been placed in a segregated area of the jail in August for 
separate rule violations.  According to Johnson’s trial testimony, their 
discussion went as follows: 
Q.  What did you discuss initially with Justin Marshall 
when you first started talking to him while you were in 
segregation?  A.  Well, when I first—I say to him then, I knew 
him so I asked him what was he in there for. 
Q.  And what did he tell you?  A.  He say, man, they 
got me for that landlord, and he cursed. 
Q.  Did he tell you more about what happened that led 
him to be charged or did he tell you more about the landlord 
being shot?  A.  Both. 
In further conversation, Marshall disclosed to Johnson that he 
(Marshall) came up with the idea to rob Versypt because “some [tenants] 
pay with cash.”  Marshall also told Johnson that “the robbery went 
wrong” in that “[t]he landlord got shot.”  According to Johnson, Marshall 
described the shooting in the following terms: 
All [Marshall] said was it was real—the shot was loud.  It was 
loud in the hallway, and that kind of like froze him up, and 
after that he ran out the back to get away from the scene.  
He came back around, knocking on the front door, but he 
was whispering a little bit because he didn’t want nobody to 
know he was in the hallway. 
The Iowa City police had made no effort to have either Johnson or 
Marshall placed in segregation.  Detective Smithey also denied asking 
Johnson to try to obtain more information or indeed any information 
from Marshall regarding the killing of Versypt.  Detective Clarahan 
likewise testified that she never asked Johnson to obtain information 
from Marshall, nor did she ever hear anyone else from the State ask 
Johnson to get information from Marshall. 
78 
B.  Freeman.  Freeman was also housed in the same cell block at 
the Muscatine County Jail as Marshall for a time period in 2011.  At one 
point, while Freeman was helping Marshall draft a motion for 
appointment of new counsel, Marshall spoke with Freeman about the 
reasons why he (Marshall) was in jail.  Marshall provided Freeman with 
this version of what had happened on October 8, 2009: 
[Marshall] went to rob him.  [Versypt] grabbed for the gun.  
The gun went off, shot him in the hand, shot him in the 
head.  He fell in the door or . . . on the ground in the 
doorway . . . and [Marshall] wiped the gun off the front of his 
jacket and he took off. 
Marshall told Freeman that no one else was involved in the attempted 
robbery and fatal shooting and that Thompson was “innocent.” 
Marshall also explained that he wanted to get his charges reduced 
from murder to manslaughter.  He thus discussed a scheme with 
Freeman under which Freeman would tell his attorney that Marshall had 
confessed to an accidental shooting.  Marshall wrote out on a yellow pad 
what he wanted Freeman and another inmate—Martin—to say. 
C.  Martin.  This brings us to Martin.  In November 2010, Martin 
was arrested on federal charges for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
a firearms violation.  He pled guilty, and his plea agreement included a 
cooperation agreement with the federal government in which he agreed to 
be interviewed by law enforcement and provide truthful information.  
Martin understood that if he provided substantial assistance in another 
criminal case to the government and the United States Attorney’s Office 
filed a motion, the federal district court could reduce his sentence.  In 
fact, when Martin was sentenced on his federal charges in March 2012, 
Martin received a large reduction in his sentence after testifying against 
his cousin, a codefendant in his case. 
79 
Although Martin had a cooperation agreement, his discussions 
with the Iowa City police before October 2011 related to other matters 
and not the Versypt killing.  On cross-examination, Detective Smithey 
conceded he “may have asked [Martin] if he had any knowledge of it . . . 
but it would have been just a simple, do you know any information about 
this?”  At this point, Martin’s answer obviously would have been no.4 
Between his arrest in November 2010 and his sentencing in March 
2012, Martin was also being held at the Muscatine County Jail.  Martin 
previously knew Marshall from the Broadway neighborhood, yet had not 
seen him since 2009.  In August 2011, Martin ran into Marshall when he 
was moved into Marshall’s sixteen-man pod.  There is no evidence that 
the State deliberately placed the men together or that Martin sought out 
Marshall’s pod. 
In their initial conversations, Marshall told Martin that he was in 
jail for the murder of Versypt but denied having anything to do with it.  
Martin in turn told Marshall what his federal charges were and that he 
was testifying against one of his codefendants.  In other words, Marshall 
knew that Martin was a “snitch.”  In fact, Marshall intended to use 
Martin for that purpose. 
As time passed, Marshall stopped claiming that he had nothing to 
do with Versypt’s death.  Instead, Marshall related to Martin a different 
story—that 
Versypt 
had 
startled 
Marshall, 
Marshall’s 
gun 
had 
accidentally gone off, and then Marshall had wiped the gun off and run 
away.  As Martin testified, 
4Martin himself did not recall ever meeting Detective Smithey prior to October 
2011.  Regardless, Detective Smithey’s testimony that he “may have” asked Martin in 
passing about the Versypt killing does not demonstrate that Detective Smithey asked 
Martin to gather information on that killing, let alone that Detective Smithey asked 
Martin to get information on Marshall. 
                                      
 
80 
Q.  [D]id he tell you what happened when he went out 
to sell the gun?  A.  He said he went downstairs and 
somebody came up behind him saying something, coming, 
approaching him, and he got scared and he turned around 
and pulled the gun from his waistband. 
Q.  Did he tell you what he did with the gun?  A.  He 
said it all happened so quick, you know.  The gun went off 
and he dropped it and picked it back up and wiped it off and 
dropped it again and ran. 
Marshall also told Martin he was trying to get his charge reduced 
to manslaughter and asked Martin for information on the legal definition 
of manslaughter as well as armed robbery.  At this point, Martin 
encouraged Marshall to write his story down, i.e., to “use [Martin] as a 
jailhouse snitch” so Martin could “get [Marshall’s] story out and it might 
help both of [them].”  Marshall did his writing on a legal pad provided by 
Marshall’s attorney.  Martin was not present when Marshall wrote out 
his account and never told Marshall what to write. 
In October 2011, Martin was telephoning with his own attorney at 
the Muscatine County Jail and took Marshall’s handwritten story with 
him.  It turned out that Detective Smithey was there that day as well on 
another matter.  Neither Martin nor Detective Smithey knew the other 
was going to be present.  When Detective Smithey came into the room, 
Martin showed him the legal pad and let him scan it but didn’t let him 
keep it.  Detective Smithey then obtained a search warrant for Marshall’s 
cell.  Marshall’s handwritten story, by then torn into pieces that had to 
be reassembled, was recovered from Marshall’s jail cell.  It was identified 
by both Freeman and Martin and used against Marshall at trial. 
The majority says it is a “remarkable coinciden[ce]” that Detective 
Smithey was at the jail the day that Martin was talking on the phone 
with his attorney.  I do not find this remarkable.  In 2011, Detective 
Smithey had been reassigned to the Johnson County Drug Task Force 
81 
and thus had numerous other reasons to be at the jail.  Here is Detective 
Smithey’s testimony that the majority finds unbelievable and that I do 
not: 
Q.  How did it come about that you interviewed him 
that day?  A.  I had just finished having a conversation with 
someone else there at the jail.  There are two areas where 
these conversations typically take place.  One is the library.  
It’s a fairly sizable room with law books, and I don’t know if 
it’s technically a law library there or not, but there’s fairly—
it’s where most of the meetings take place because there are 
multiple tables in it where five, six, ten people could 
probably sit.  And then there’s another room that is between 
the library and the door that is used to exit the secure area 
of the facility.  As I was leaving the library area, I saw 
Antonio Martin sitting alone inside that other much smaller 
room.  It’s a room that four people would be uncomfortable 
being in.  It’s tight.  He was alone in that room.  And I 
confirmed with jail staff that it was indeed Mr. Martin in the 
room. 
Q.  And what did you do when you saw Mr. Martin?  
A.  I asked the jail staff if they’d allow[] me in to speak with 
him, and they did.  I went into the room, and he was on the 
phone with his attorney at the time.  I identified myself to 
her.  I knew her from other cases that I was working, and 
they allowed me to sit in and ask a few questions of Mr. 
Martin. 
Q.  While you were sitting in with Mr. Martin, did Mr. 
Martin show you anything?  A.  He did. 
Q.  And could you just generally describe what he 
showed you.  A.  Mr. Martin showed me a yellow legal pad.  
That legal pad had—it wasn’t completely full.  It had four 
pages.  The first four pages had writing on them.  The others 
were blank. 
The district court found that Martin “collected information prior to 
and without being approached by the police.”  Unlike the majority, I 
would not disbelieve Detective Smithey but would rely on the trial judge’s 
evaluation of what happened here. 
82 
D.  The District Court’s Ruling.  The district court overruled 
Marshall’s motion to suppress the testimony of Freeman, Martin, and 
Johnson on the following grounds: 
I have had a chance to review the standard, and I’m going to 
overrule the motion to suppress and allow the witnesses to 
testify.  The case law suggests that an informant becomes a 
government agent for purposes of the test only when the 
informant has been instructed by the police to get 
information about a particular defendant.  The defendant 
must demonstrate that the police and their informant took 
some action beyond merely listening that was designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. 
 . . . .  
. . . The primary—the cases indicate that the primary 
concern of those decisions is secret interrogation by 
investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct 
police interrogation.  The Sixth Amendment is not violated, 
however, whenever, by luck or happenstance, the State 
obtains incriminating statements.  I think this case presents 
just the sort of luck or happenstance that resulted in these 
gentlemen coming forward and providing information to the 
State based upon what they alleged to have been statements 
made by Mr. Marshall. 
I think this analysis succinctly summarizes why there was no 
Sixth Amendment violation here. 
III.  Marshall’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Was Not 
Violated Because Martin Was Not a Government Agent When He 
Spoke to Marshall. 
In Massiah, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
defendant  
was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] 
when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his 
own 
incriminating 
words, 
which 
federal 
agents 
had 
deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and 
in the absence of his counsel.   
377 U.S. at 206, 84 S. Ct. at 1203, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 250.  Thus, a Massiah 
violation requires findings that the informant was a government “agent” 
and “had deliberately elicited” statements from the defendant.  Id.  Both 
83 
of those elements are simply absent here.  I will start with agency.  
Marshall bears the burden of proof in establishing agency.  See Moore v. 
United States, 178 F.3d 994, 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1999); Lightbourne v. 
Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1020 (11th Cir. 1987). 
I agree with the essence of the State’s position: Without some 
direction or instruction from the government, an informant does not 
become a government agent for Massiah purposes.  The most one can 
say here is that Martin had entered into a plea agreement on federal 
charges wherein he agreed to cooperate with the government in the hope 
of receiving a sentence reduction and that Martin and Marshall ended up 
in the same jail pod.  These routine circumstances fall well short of 
establishing agency. 
It is important to note what this case does not involve.  There is no 
evidence that Martin was asked to contact Marshall or engage him in 
conversation.  There is no evidence that any person with knowledge of 
Martin’s status placed him in the same unit with Marshall (or even knew 
they were going to be together).  There is also no evidence that Martin 
sought out Marshall.   
 
Since Massiah, three other Supreme Court decisions have 
specifically addressed the government use of informants to allegedly 
circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2628, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 
382–83 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484, 
88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492–93 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 
269, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2186, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115, 121 (1980). 
No one disputes that Henry is the high-water mark for the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of claims of Massiah violations.  In Henry, 
FBI agents reached out to Nichols, a paid informant, who was being held 
84 
in the same jail as Henry.  Henry, 447 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 2184, 
65 L. Ed. 2d at 119.  Henry had been indicted for armed robbery, and the 
facts were not clear whether the government contacted Nichols for 
information about the robbery more generally or asked for information 
specifically about Henry.  Id.  Nichols told the agents that he was on the 
same cellblock as several federal prisoners including Henry, and “[t]he 
agent told him to be alert to any statements made by the federal 
prisoners, but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry 
regarding the bank robbery.”  Id. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 2184–85, 65 L. Ed. 
2d at 119.  After Nichols’ release from jail, the same FBI agent contacted 
him, and Nichols gave the agent information that Henry had revealed to 
Nichols in conversation.  Id. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 2185, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 
119.  The government paid Nichols for the information.  Id.  Nichols 
testified at Henry’s trial, and Henry was convicted.  Id. at 267, 100 S. Ct. 
at 2185, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 120. 
Nichols had been a paid Government informant for more 
than a year; moreover, the FBI agent was aware that Nichols 
had access to Henry and would be able to engage him in 
conversations without arousing Henry’s suspicion.  The 
arrangement between Nichols and the agent was on a 
contingent-fee basis; Nichols was to be paid only if he 
produced useful information. 
Id. at 270, 100 S. Ct. at 2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122. 
In its opinion, the Court concluded, “By intentionally creating a 
situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements 
without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”  Id. at 274, 100 S. Ct. at 2189, 65 L. Ed. 
2d at 125.  The Court added, “Even if the agent’s statement that he did 
not intend that Nichols would take affirmative steps to secure 
incriminating information is accepted, he must have known that such 
85 
propinquity likely would lead to that result.”  Id. at 271, 100 S. Ct. at 
2187, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 122.  Otherwise stated, the Court found that 
Nichols was “acting by prearrangement as a Government agent.”  Id. at 
273, 100 S. Ct. at 2188, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 124. 
We applied Henry not long after it was decided in State v. Nelson, 
325 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1982).  In that case, Jackson, an informant, 
passed a note to a jailer stating that he had information regarding 
Nelson’s case that he wanted to discuss with law enforcement.  Id. at 
119.  The informant met with a deputy sheriff and passed along 
incriminating statements made by Nelson in jail.  Id.  The deputy sheriff 
told the informant that he would put him in touch with the officers 
investigating Nelson’s case.  Id.  The deputy “made no promise to 
Jackson in return for the information,” and “he did not direct Jackson to 
endeavor to gather any further information.”  Id.  Rather, “[h]e merely 
had Jackson return to his cell to continue in the same capacity as an 
inmate.”  Id.  The deputy “obviously knew further conversations were 
likely.”  Id.  Still we reasoned that “[t]he crux is that the State had not 
‘put him [the informant] up to it.’ ”  Id.  After this first meeting, Jackson 
later met with law enforcement again and agreed to work for the state on 
other cases.  Id. 
We affirmed the trial court’s ruling that only statements made by 
Nelson after Jackson’s second meeting with law enforcement should be 
suppressed whereas statements made after the first meeting were 
admissible.  Id. at 120.  With respect to the first meeting, we noted both 
that the state had not directed Jackson to gather more information and 
that Jackson had no agreement with the state that he would receive 
payment or other favorable treatment for providing the information.  Id. 
at 119–20.  “In summary we do not believe the statements which were 
86 
the subject of Jackson’s testimony were gathered by him at the time he 
was working for the State.”  Id. 
This case falls short of the circumstances warranting suppression 
that were described in either Henry or Nelson.  At most, prior to Martin’s 
encounter with Marshall, Detective Smithey might have asked Martin a 
simple question as to whether Martin had any information about the 
Versypt killing.  Again, there is no evidence the Iowa City Police 
Department knew Martin was going to be housed with Marshall, made 
arrangements for this to happen, told Martin to listen for statements by 
Marshall, or even expressed particular interest in the Versypt killing.5 
The majority places great weight, apparently dispositive weight, 
upon Martin’s federal cooperation agreement.  Although Martin’s plea 
bargain is not in the record, there is no indication that it included 
anything other than a typical, plain vanilla federal cooperation 
agreement.  Under such an agreement, the defendant agrees to meet with 
the government and provide truthful information about criminal activity 
of which he or she is aware, and the government agrees to move for a 
downward sentencing departure if the defendant ends up providing 
substantial assistance to the government.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 125 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Tejada, 
773 F. Supp. 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
5The majority points to testimony given by Detective Smithey on cross-
examination that it would “[p]robably” be “reasonable to assume” that after the July 
2011 meeting, Johnson was “going to tell other snitches” that the government wants to 
know about the Versypt killing and the people the government was interested in.  
However, Martin denied discussing Marshall with Johnson, and Johnson likewise 
denied discussing Marshall with Martin.  Moreover, the three individuals who were 
persons of interest in the Versypt killing—Marshall, Thompson, and White—were 
already widely known to the general public. 
                                      
 
87 
So, the question becomes, in effect, if an individual enters into a 
standard cooperation agreement, does that individual become a 
government agent with respect to any matters in which the government 
happens to have interest? 
A number of federal circuits would say no under their bright-line 
approach.  They hold that a cooperation agreement is not enough unless 
the informant is “instructed by the police to get information about the 
particular defendant.”  United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 193 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 
1997); see United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65–66 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Moore, 178 F.3d at 999.  Clearly that did not occur here. 
The majority is correct that many circuits do not follow the bright-
line approach.  But when one reviews the facts and holdings of these 
cases, none of them is helpful to Marshall. 
Thus, the Third Circuit has found that a combination of an 
informant’s “tacit agreement with the government” to receive potentially 
favorable sentencing treatment and the government’s deliberate placing 
of the informant in a cell with another inmate to obtain information from 
the inmate could amount to a Massiah violation.  United States v. Brink, 
39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994).  The Fourth Circuit requires that “the 
prosecutors have intentionally placed the informant in the jail cell with 
instructions to elicit a confession, or . . . there has been an agreement 
promising consideration for a confession from a particular defendant.”  
United States v. McFadden, 187 F. App’x 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2006).  The 
Fifth Circuit has approved a test for agency under which the informant 
must have “acted pursuant to instructions from the State, or otherwise 
submitted to the State’s control.”  Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 393 
(5th Cir. 1998).  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has refused to find a 
88 
Massiah violation when “[t]he evidence demonstrated no government 
control over [the informant’s] actions; most importantly, there was no 
control over [the informant’s] decision to arrange a meeting with [the 
defendant].”  United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995).  The 
Ninth Circuit has held that a Massiah violation can occur when the 
informant is intentionally “put back in the cell with [the defendant]” after 
meeting with law enforcement and indicating a “willingness to cooperate 
with the prosecution” even without a promise of leniency.  Randolph v. 
California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2004).  Meanwhile, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected a Sixth Amendment claim when the informant “was 
acting as an entrepreneur” and the government had not encouraged or 
instructed him to speak with the defendant in jail.  United States v. 
Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   
 
As can be seen, the nonbright-line circuits are not uniform in their 
approaches.  However, under any of these standards Marshall has failed 
to establish that Martin was acting as a government agent.  Martin had 
received no instructions from the State, and his encounters with 
Marshall in the same segregation unit of the jail were pure 
happenstance. 
The majority attempts to use United States v. York, to support its 
“informant at large” theory.  See York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991), 
overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 567 (7th 
Cir. 1999).  The case is easily distinguishable.  In that case, the 
informant had a longstanding relationship with the FBI and was 
reporting to the FBI on a weekly basis and making monitored phone calls 
on the FBI’s behalf.  Id. at 1357–58.  After giving the information to the 
FBI that was used against the defendant, he received $5000 from the 
FBI.  Id. at 1358.  Additionally, the FBI agent “told [the informant] the 
89 
type of information he was interested in receiving; that statement was 
tantamount to an invitation to [the informant] to go out and look for that 
type of information.”  Id.  In dicta, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an 
agency relationship existed between the FBI and the informant, although 
it ultimately found there had been no deliberate elicitation and therefore 
no Massiah violation.  Id. at 1358–60. 
The Seventh Circuit’s test for agency was based on traditional 
common law agency principles, and under the egregious facts of York the 
Seventh Circuit said that the informant served as an agent subject to the 
government’s control.  See id. at 1357–58.  However, it is noteworthy that 
the court today disclaims a common law agency test.  It is also 
noteworthy that more recently, the Seventh Circuit declined to find 
agency when the informant discussed with the government his plan to 
meet with the defendant, but there was no government control over the 
informant’s actions or his decision to arrange a meeting with the 
defendant.  See Li, 55 F.3d at 328. 
Another informant-at-large case, Commonwealth v. Moose, is also 
factually distinguishable from what occurred here.  See 602 A.2d 1265 
(Pa. 1992).  In that case, the informant had been intentionally “kept in 
the county jail for three years because he was supplying the district 
attorney’s office with information about various inmates.”  Id. at 1270.  
In fact, this informant “was called the ‘monsignor’ because so many 
inmates allegedly confessed to him.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court concluded that even though the informant “was not planted for the 
purpose of gaining information from a targeted defendant,” “[t]he fact 
that the Commonwealth intentionally left him there to harvest 
information from anyone charged with a crime and awaiting trial is the 
90 
villainy.”  Id.  Again, these extreme facts that supported a finding of 
agency bear no resemblance the record here. 
The majority also cites Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 312 (6th 
Cir. 2010), to support its view that “a wink and a nod” can establish 
agency.  The Sixth Circuit disavows the bright-line approach.  Id. at 311.  
(“We agree with those courts that do not limit agency in the Massiah 
context to cases where the State gave the informant instructions to 
obtain evidence from a defendant.”).  Yet once again, the facts of the case 
cited by the majority are quite different from here.  In Ayers, the 
defendant confessed to an informant sharing his jail pod that he had 
committed a murder.  Id. at 305.  The informant contacted the police and 
met with detectives to relay this information.  Id.  At that time, the 
informant could not provide the detectives with information about the 
murder weapon or money stolen from the victim.  Id.  The detectives’ 
report specifically noted this information was missing.  Id.  The detectives 
returned the informant to the jail pod and “within an hour or so” 
thereafter, the informant directly questioned the defendant regarding the 
murder weapon and the stolen money.  Id. at 305–06.  The Sixth Circuit 
suppressed the statements regarding the weapon and the money that the 
informant had obtained from the defendant within an hour after meeting 
with the detectives.  Id. at 310. 
By contrast, in the present case, the State did not intentionally 
place Martin in proximity to Marshall so he could procure additional 
information.  Moreover, the record in Ayers strongly suggested the 
informant had been given specific guidance by the police, considering 
that he immediately sought out the two pieces of information the 
detectives wanted.  See id. at 305.  No such guidance was given to 
Martin. 
91 
The only appellate decision I am aware of that might help Marshall 
establish agency under the facts of this case comes from the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
862 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 2007).  Murphy was found guilty of murder 
following a trial at which an informant testified to statements Murphy 
made in jail.  Id. at 34–35.  The informant had entered into a plea 
agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office and subsequently met 
Murphy in jail.  Id. at 34.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, “if the 
informant provided ‘substantial assistance’ to the government, in the 
discretion of the United States Attorney’s office,” the informant could 
potentially receive a lesser sentence.  Id. at 36.  The informant did not 
have any agreement with any Massachusetts authorities.  Id. at 35.  The 
informant did two favors for Murphy to lure him into a false sense of 
trust, before asking Murphy what he did about his anger toward the 
victim.  Id. at 44–45.  The court concluded that the informant had acted 
as a government agent and found a violation of both the Sixth 
Amendment and its counterpart in the Massachusetts Constitution.  Id. 
at 46.  The court explained, 
[W]here the government has entered into an “articulated 
agreement containing a specific benefit,” or promise thereof, 
the recipient inmate is a government agent for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights even if the 
inmate is not directed to target a specific individual. 
Id. at 33 (quoting Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 708 N.E.2d 658, 664 
(Mass. 1999)). 
I do not agree with this decision, which essentially holds that a 
generic cooperation agreement is enough to confer government agent 
status on an individual.  See Whitten, 610 F.3d at 193 (“More than a 
cooperation agreement is required to make an informant a government 
92 
agent with regard to a particular defendant.”).  Generally, of course, the 
mere existence of an agreement containing a quid pro quo does not make 
one party the agent of the other.  Contract law teaches us that all 
enforceable agreements have a quid pro quo, but that does not mean the 
parties become agents of each other.  See Restatement (Third) of Agency 
§ 1.01 cmt. c, at 19 (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (“Not all relationships in which 
one person provides services to another satisfy the definition of agency.”).  
There must be some element of control, based on an actual instruction to 
target a specific defendant, as several circuits hold, or some other form of 
supervision, such as intentionally placing the informant directly with the 
defendant in order to obtain information from the defendant.  Even 
foreseeability that the informant would engage with the defendant, which 
we do not have here, was not enough according to our Nelson decision.  
See Nelson, 325 N.W.2d at 119–20 (finding the informant was not 
“working for the State” because the State “had not ‘put him up to it’ ” 
even though the State “obviously knew further conversations were 
likely”).  Here there is simply no indication that Detective Smithey 
directed or controlled Martin’s activities. 
My colleagues do not approve of a direction-or-control requirement.  
But the law as established by the United States Supreme Court requires 
that the informant be a government “agent.”  See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 
206, 84 S. Ct. at 1203, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 250.  And to be an agent one 
must agree to act on a principal’s behalf and be subject to the principal’s 
control.  See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01, at 17.  So, a control 
element focuses the inquiry where it should be focused. 
By resorting to circular reasoning, the court leaves a hole in its 
analysis.  The majority states, “[A] court must determine—under all the 
facts and circumstances—whether the relationship between the state and 
93 
an informant is such that the state has violated its affirmative duty . . . 
to protect the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants.”  This circular 
standard is no standard at all.  Rather, it simply restates the ultimate 
issue—i.e., whether the Sixth Amendment has been violated.   
Given this circularity, we need to consider what as a practical 
matter the court relies on to find agency here.  As in Murphy, it is merely 
the existence of a generic cooperation agreement between Martin and the 
federal government. 
Given the nature of federal sentencing, federal defendants are often 
motivated to inform on other inmates with or without a cooperation 
agreement.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012) (“Upon motion of the 
Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence 
below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to 
reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense”).   
“Entrepreneurs and volunteers are not government agents.”  United 
States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 924 (8th Cir. 2003).  Marshall fell prey 
to the self-interest of other inmates, not government interference with his 
right to counsel.  This is clearly not a case where the government acted 
“to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel.”  Moulton, 474 U.S. 
at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 487, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496.  Because Martin was not 
acting as a government agent, Marshall’s Sixth Amendment rights were 
not violated. 
IV.  Martin Did Not Deliberately Elicit Statements from 
Marshall. 
Marshall’s Massiah claim also fails because Martin did not 
deliberately elicit statements from him.  The Supreme Court has 
explained the reasoning behind this prong of the inquiry: 
94 
[T]he primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is 
secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the 
equivalent of direct police interrogation.  Since “the Sixth 
Amendment 
is 
not 
violated 
whenever—by 
luck 
or 
happenstance—the State obtains incriminating statements 
from the accused after the right to counsel has attached,” a 
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply 
by showing that an informant, either through prior 
arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating 
statements to the police.  Rather, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the police and their informant took some 
action, 
beyond 
merely 
listening, 
that 
was 
designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. 
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384–85 
(quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 487, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 
496).  It should be noted that the burden of proving deliberate elicitation, 
like agency, rests with the defendant.  See id. (“[T]he defendant must 
demonstrate . . . .”). 
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Henry makes clear that “the Sixth 
Amendment is not violated when a passive listening device collects, but 
does not induce, incriminating comments” and that “the mere presence 
of 
jailhouse 
informant 
who 
had 
been 
instructed 
to 
overhear 
conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conversations 
would not necessarily be unconstitutional.”  Henry, 447 U.S. at 276, 100 
S. Ct. at 2190, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 126 (Powell, J., concurring).  It is Justice 
Powell’s concurrence that the Supreme Court cited and relied on in 
Kuhlmann and Moulton when it clarified the deliberate-elicitation 
element.  See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2629–30, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 384; Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 487, 88 L. Ed. 
2d at 496. 
Before I get to Martin, I would like to briefly comment on Johnson.  
The court concedes only grudgingly that Johnson did not deliberately 
elicit incriminating information from Marshall.  In fact, the only question 
95 
that Johnson asked Marshall was the classic icebreaker: What are you in 
for?  As Johnson testified, “I knew [Marshall] so I asked him what was he 
in there for.”  Kuhlmann makes clear that establishing deliberate 
elicitation requires more.  See 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2629–30, 91 
L. Ed. 2d at 384 (condemning techniques that are “the equivalent of 
direct police interrogation”).  Asking one question of such a generic 
nature does not amount to the functional equivalent of interrogation.  
See United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 330 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that a 
witness who ran into the defendant unexpectedly in jail and asked the 
defendant why he was there did not try to solicit information).  The trial 
testimony reveals that Marshall initiated the more detailed discussions 
about the shooting of Versypt.  As Johnson testified, 
Q.  . . . . And he just happened to start suddenly 
talking to you about his case?  A.  He didn’t just start talking 
to me over just a couple days.  He started talking to me, yes. 
 . . . . 
Q.  And only when you’re alone in segregation does he 
suddenly open up to you, correct?  A.  Yeah.  He told me 
about it a little bit, yeah. 
There is no evidence that Johnson asked Marshall any additional 
questions or even made suggestive comments when Marshall was 
describing to him the circumstances of Versypt’s death. 
This should end any need to discuss Johnson further, but the 
court goes on.  In particular, it indicates that Marshall’s trial counsel 
may have been ineffective, that counsel’s supposed failure to cross-
examine Johnson on the subject of elicitation was “remarkable,” and that 
counsel may not have been aware of the deliberate-elicitation 
requirement.  Although I agree with the court’s ultimate resolution of the 
Massiah claim regarding Johnson, these innuendoes are unfair.  The 
96 
questions and answers quoted above come from defense counsel’s cross-
examination of Johnson.  The deliberate-elicitation requirement had just 
been discussed at some length when the court ruled on the motion to 
suppress the previous afternoon.6 
Courts addressing Massiah claims with facts like these have found 
that no deliberate elicitation occurred.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Jacques, 684 F.3d 324, 330–32 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that no violation 
of the right to counsel occurred when a friend of the defendant 
cooperated with the FBI in speaking to the defendant through a series of 
monitored phone calls and the friend asked no more than a few 
questions that were not of “a probing nature”); Whitten, 610 F.3d at 192–
94 (denying Sixth Amendment claim when the defendant volunteered 
incriminating information during conversation that the defendant 
6Obviously, cross-examination is more an art than a science.  Defense lawyers 
need to weigh the downside of bringing out or reinforcing that which harms their clients 
against the upside of bringing out or reinforcing that which helps their clients.  We were 
not on the scene making these difficult decisions in real time. 
For related reasons, I do not see the relevance of United States v. Pannell, 510 F. 
Supp. 2d 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  In that case, the district court made a specific finding 
based on its own observations that the informant was not credible: 
Miller testified that he never asked Pannell any questions about 
his case and that Pannell volunteered the information during lengthy 
conversations about general, everyday matters.  Having carefully 
observed Miller, his testimony that Pannell volunteered detailed 
incriminating information—as memorialized in Miller’s notes—without 
any prompting or encouragement from Miller cannot be credited . . . .  
Miller was evasive and gave conclusory answers when questioned as to 
how Pannell had provided such painstakingly detailed information about 
his involvement in the post office robbery, repeatedly saying, “we 
conversated.”  Indeed, Miller would not acknowledge that, in the course 
of their conversations, even on everyday matters, he had ever asked 
Pannell a single question.  I therefore discredit Miller’s testimony that he 
never asked Pannell any questions about his case nor encouraged him to 
speak of it. 
Id. at 192.  In contrast, the district court here made no such finding.  And unlike the 
trial judge, we did not have the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. 
                                      
 
97 
initiated); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 895–96 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (finding no deliberate elicitation when the defendant had 
reached out to informant and the informant had largely just listened, 
asking only “a few clarifying questions”); Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1021 
(finding that alleged an Sixth Amendment violation was not supported by 
sufficient evidence where the informant “took no actions to stimulate the 
incriminating remarks”); Wallace v. Price, 265 F. Supp. 2d 545, 569 
(W.D. Pa. 2003) (noting there was “no evidence that [the informant] 
initiated 
the 
conversation 
with 
[the 
defendant]” 
and 
upholding 
magistrate’s ruling that the defendant had failed to direct the court to 
any evidence that the informant deliberately elicited statements).   
Turning to Martin, the court today says “there is no doubt that he 
deliberately elicited incriminating statements from Marshall.”  I disagree.  
Events happened in the following sequence.  First, Marshall denied 
involvement in the Versypt killing to Martin.  Then, over time, Marshall 
“started switching his story up,” according to Martin.  Marshall told 
Martin he had a gun with which he shot Versypt when Versypt startled 
him.  Marshall added that he had wiped off the gun and run away.  At 
that point, Marshall asked Martin for advice on manslaughter.  Martin 
researched manslaughter for Marshall and reported back.  Only then did 
Martin recommend that Marshall write down his “side of the story . . . to 
get a lesser charge.”  Marshall provided his written statement with the 
mutual understanding and plan that this statement would be passed 
along to law enforcement: 
Q.  When you were speaking with your attorney and to 
Officer Smithey, did you think that you were helping Justin 
Marshall?  A.  Yes. 
Q.  Did you believe that you were doing what Mr. 
Marshall had asked you to do?  A.  Yes. 
98 
Viewing the entire sequence of events, Martin did not engage in 
deliberate elicitation.  Marshall voluntarily told Martin what had 
happened and asked for Martin’s legal advice on getting a lesser charge.  
Thereupon Martin advised Marshall to write down his story so Martin 
could deliver it to Martin’s attorney and from there to law enforcement.  
This was poor advice, but it wasn’t deliberate elicitation.  This case to 
some extent resembles United States v. Booker, where the defendant 
“voluntarily approached Blickley and sought his assistance researching 
certain legal issues relating to this case.”  No. 05-313 (JBS), 2006 WL 
242509, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2006).  As the court described in that case: 
[T]he entire purpose of Booker’s request was to enlist 
Blickley’s help. . . . .  [T]hat task necessarily required Booker 
to furnish Blickley with details about his case.  Moreover, 
Blickley actually furnished advice to Booker, based on 
research, regarding suppression of evidence in this case and 
legal issues in other matters, and Blickley drafted a 
memorandum for Booker that led to the dismissal of 
unrelated bank robbery charges against Booker under the 
Speedy Trial Act, according to Blickley’s testimony.  It is 
understandable that a lot of talking transpired between 
Blickley and Booker in January given the range of legal 
assistance Booker was seeking from Blickley.  That Blickley 
may have asked certain clarifying questions of Booker during 
their many conversations, or that Blickley told Booker to be 
completely truthful, does not alter the voluntariness of 
Booker’s disclosures. 
Id. 
Moreover, in this case, Marshall knew Martin would be passing 
along his written statement to law enforcement.  Thus, concerns about 
an “undisclosed undercover informant” and “surreptitious interrogations” 
were simply absent here.  Henry, 447 U.S. at 273, 100 S. Ct. at 2188, 65 
L. Ed. 2d at 123–24; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S. Ct. at 1203, 88 
L. Ed. at 250.  Again, as the Supreme Court put it in Kuhlmann, “[T]he 
primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation 
99 
by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police 
interrogation.”  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 
2d at 384.  In Kuhlmann, an undisclosed informant commented to the 
defendant that his initial version of what happened “didn’t too sound too 
good”; a few days later, the defendant made incriminating statements.  
Id. at 439–40, 106 S. Ct. at 2619–20, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 372.  Yet, 
considering the entire “interaction,” the Court found that no deliberate 
elicitation had occurred.  Id. at 460, 106 S. Ct. at 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 
385.  Looking at the entire interaction here, I think this is an easier case 
than Kuhlmann: There was nothing “secret” here.  Martin was open about 
what he was doing and advised Marshall to write down his story only 
after Marshall had given Martin the same story orally and asked for 
Martin’s legal advice.   
V.  Conclusion. 
For the reasons stated, I would affirm Marshall’s conviction and 
the well-reasoned suppression ruling of the district court. 
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this concurrence in part and 
dissent in part.