Case Title: Robertson v. Lemmon

Citation: 189 Kan. 619, 371 P.2d 175

Docket Number: 42,664, 42,783

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1962-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
189 Kan. 619 (1962)
371 P.2d 175
JOHN J. ROBERTSON; E.A. SMITH; SHERMAN E. SMITH; MAX V. SCHRIER; EVERETT N. MITCHELL; CHARLES V. DARNALL; WALTER E. DARNALL; LEWIS WOODARD and MAY WOODARD, his wife; BEN J. FUNK and LORA B. FUNK, his wife, Appellees,
v.
MARGARET LEMMON; PAULINE JACK; WILLIAM F. JACK and LENA CLAIRE JACK, his wife, Appellants.
Nos. 42,664 and 42,783 (Consolidated)

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 5, 1962.
A.R. Lamb, of Coffeyville, argued the cause, and Paul A. Lamb, of Coffeyville, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
*620 Gerald Cauldwell, of Sedan, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellees, Ben J. Funk and Lora B. Funk.
John M. Wall, of Sedan, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellees, Lewis Woodard and Mary Woodard.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an action brought by the owners of an oil and gas lease to determine the owners of the mineral interests in certain real estate, and the ownership of the one-eighth royalty interest due and payable under the terms of such lease.
The petition alleged in substance that plaintiffs are the owners of an oil and gas lease on the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of the Southeast Quarter (SE 1/4) of Section Seven (7), Township Thirty-five (35) South, Range Twelve (12) East of the Sixth Principal Meridian, Chautauqua County, Kansas; that under the terms of the lease, plaintiffs are obligated to pay a royalty interest of an undivided one-eighth to the persons who are the owners of such royalty interest, but because of the conflicting claims between the owners plaintiffs do not know and are unable to ascertain the owners of such royalty interest. The petition asked that all the defendants be required to set up their purported claims, that the court determine their interests and bar all of the defendants from claiming any other right, title or interest therein.
The defendants, Ben J. and Lora B. Funk, answered alleging they had acquired the entire mineral interest by a sheriff's deed in a tax foreclosure action. The defendants, Lewis and May Woodard, answered alleging they are the owners of a one-half interest in the minerals which was conveyed to them by the Funk's. Any controversy heretofore existing between the Funks and the Woodards has been settled and they now appear in these appeals as appellees, having filed a joint counter-abstract and brief.
The defendants, Pauline Jack, William F. and Lena Claire Jack, husband and wife, and Margaret Lemmon, answered alleging that they owned an interest in the minerals, which was later stated by their counsel to be a total of three-tenths. They now appear as appellants in these appeals, claiming that, as they had no notice of the tax foreclosure proceedings and were not made parties, their interests could not be foreclosed.
The original plaintiffs have maintained an impartial attitude throughout all of the proceedings, including these appeals.
The facts alleged in the various pleadings are not disputed. A *621 brief review of such facts, as gleaned from the pleadings, may tend to simplify the issues.
W.F. Lemmon owned the mineral interest in the land in question. He died and, under the residuary clause in his will, the mineral interest passed to numerous persons including these appellants. His will was admitted to probate in Montgomery County, Kansas, on September 30, 1931, and the estate was finally settled on May 25, 1933. On May 6, 1933, the will was recorded in the probate court of Chautauqua County. The specific interests claimed by appellants were never made a matter of record nor listed for taxes as provided by G.S. 1949, 79-420 (now G.S. 1961 Supp., 79-420).
The appellants never paid any taxes, never exercised any control and, according to statements made in the briefs which are not denied, made no claim to such mineral interest until, or shortly before, the petition was filed in this action on June 8, 1960.
On May 25, 1936, three of the beneficiaries under the will of W.F. Lemmon conveyed a three-fourths interest in the minerals to C.R. Ross. On May 26, 1936, another beneficiary conveyed a one-fourth interest in the minerals to C.R. Ross. Ross exercised full ownership over the mineral rights, all of which were listed for taxation in his name, and paid all taxes thereon until the year 1944, when such taxes became delinquent.
On October 7, 1953, an action was filed in the name of the Board of County Commissioners for Chautauqua County, Kansas, for the foreclosure and sale of the mineral interests in question. The petition alleged that C.R. Ross was the owner of the mineral interests and that Ross Oil and Gas Company and Chautauqua County claimed some interest in them; that they were unpaid taxes, describing them, levied against such mineral interests for the years 1944, 1945, 1948, 1950, 1951 and 1952. Service was made by publication upon the above named defendants, naming them, and "all other persons who are or may be concerned." The publication described the mineral interest being foreclosed and gave the amount of delinquent taxes due upon it. On January 21, 1954, the district court of Chautauqua County entered its order finding that there was unpaid taxes upon the mineral interest; that the owners and claimants were as set out in the petition; foreclosed the lien for taxes, and ordered the property sold to satisfy the costs and lien. On February 8, 1954, an order of sale was issued to the Sheriff of Chautauqua *622 County. Following publication of the notice of sale, describing the mineral interest, naming C.R. Ross as the owner and the amount of taxes and costs due, such Sheriff proceeded to sell the mineral interest on March 16, 1954, to the appellee, Ben J. Funk. On May 13, 1954, the district court of Chautauqua County confirmed the sale and ordered the Sheriff to execute and deliver a deed to the purchaser at the tax sale. On May 15, 1954, a sheriff's deed was delivered to Ben J. Funk and Lora B. Funk.
The controversy was presented to the district court on pretrial conference, at which time it was agreed that the court should first determine the effect of the tax foreclosure action. On April 15, 1961, the court filed a memorandum opinion in which it stated:
Judgment was entered in accordance with the memorandum opinion and a separate appeal perfected therefrom was here docketed as Case No. 42,664. A subsequent appeal from the trial court's order overruling a motion for a new trial was here docketed as Case No. 42,783. Later the appeals were consolidated.
Appellants, conceding that their contentions constitute a collateral attack on the tax foreclosure judgment, present the following questions for appellate review.
We will first consider the statutes relating to the taxation of real estate and proceedings to collect such taxes.
G.S. 1949, 79-101, reads:
*623 G.S. 1949, 79-1804 [now G.S. 1961 Supp. 79-1804], provides:
G.S. 1949, 79-2301, et seq., contains provisions for the sale of real estate for taxes.
Proceedings to enforce a lien for unredeemed real estate bid in by the county by judicial foreclosure and sale are provided by G.S. 1949, 79-2801, which states in part as follows:
Appellants' contentions apply chiefly to the interpretation of G.S. 1949, 79-2804b, which, insofar as here material, provides:
The appellants contend that the provisions of the above statute do not apply to owners who were not made parties to the tax foreclosure action.
We cannot agree with appellants' contention. The language used in the statute is clear and requires no interpretation. The time limitation is a condition precedent to bringing the action. Every *624 action brought to set aside a tax foreclosure judgment must be brought within twelve months after the date the sale was confirmed by the court. The contention of the appellants might have been proper if addressed to the district court in a timely proceeding to vacate or set aside the tax foreclosure judgment.
The court, as early as 1880, in Pritchard v. Madren, 24 Kan. 486, held:
Later in Sheridan County Comm'rs v. Acre, 160 Kan. 278, 160 P.2d 250, we reached conclusions of law similar to those announced in the Pritchard case and, in doing so, said:
The question remains, does this strict application of the statute violate the due process clause of the Federal Constitution or Section 2 of our Bill of Rights?
We must answer this question in the negative. A tax levied on an interest in real property is levied against the property. It is not a personal charge against the owner. However, every owner knows, or if not by virtue of existing law is bound to know, that a tax will be levied against all real property; that if the tax is not paid it will become a lien against the property; that in due time the tax lien will be foreclosed; and that in due time the property will be sold and he will have but twelve months after the sale is confirmed to challenge the proceeding.
*625 The tax statutes, to which we have previously referred, give the owner of real property notice of the steps that will be taken in the levy and collection of taxes. If the owner sees fit to neglect the payment of the taxes he knows to be due, the duty is imposed upon him to watch the various tax proceedings and protect his interest. No other actual notice is required. (Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Skousen, 56 Ariz. 481, 109 P.2d 41, 132 A.L.R. 1040, 1045.)
An action to foreclose a tax lien is a proceeding in rem against the property. Here the property was properly described in the petition and in the publication notice.
The appellants rely chiefly on the case of Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112, 1 L. Ed. 2d 178, 77 S. Ct. 200. The case is not a precedent for the question now before us. There the court was dealing with a condemnation case. The owner had no reason to anticipate that his land was being condemned and proper notice was necessary.
The well-considered case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Moore, 179 Kan. 482, 297 P.2d 183, appears to be decisive of the question now under consideration. Therefore we quote at length from the opinion, which reads:
Based on what has been heretofore stated and held we conclude that neither the due process clause of the Federal Constitution nor Section 2 of the Kansas Bill of Rights was violated by the provisions of G.S. 1949, 79-2804b, limiting the time for challenging a tax foreclosure judgment to twelve months after the date the sale of the real estate was confirmed, even though the parties challenging the proceedings were not named in the petition or publication notice.
It follows the trial court did not err in rendering the judgment appealed from in Case No. 42,664 or in its order overruling the motion for a new trial in Case No. 42,783. Therefore the judgment and the order overruling the motion for a new trial must be affirmed.
It is so ordered.