Case Title: State v. Singleton

Citation: 2009-Ohio-6434

Docket Number: 20081255

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Singleton, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-6434.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-6434 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SINGLETON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Singleton, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-6434.] 
For criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court 
failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall conduct a 
de novo sentencing hearing in accordance with decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio — For criminal sentences imposed on and after July 11, 
2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control, 
trial courts shall apply the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. 
(No. 2008-1255 — Submitted June 3, 2009 — Decided December 22, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 90042, 2008-Ohio-2351. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  For criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court 
failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall conduct a 
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de novo sentencing hearing in accordance with decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio. 
2.  For criminal sentences imposed on and after July 11, 2006, in which a trial 
court failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall apply 
the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The question we confront in this case is whether the de novo 
sentencing procedures detailed in decisions of this court or the remedial 
procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191 (see Appendix for the text of R.C. 
2929.191), which became effective July 11, 2006, should be used by trial courts 
to properly sentence an offender when correcting a failure to properly impose 
postrelease control.  The answer to this question is that in the absence of a 
statutory remedy, our caselaw provides a constitutional remedial procedure for 
trial courts to follow in correcting a court’s failure to properly impose postrelease 
control prior to July 11, 2006; with the enactment of R.C. 2929.191, however, 
which became effective July 11, 2006, the legislature has promulgated a statutory 
remedy for trial courts to use to correct an error in imposing postrelease control.  
Accordingly, for sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court 
failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall conduct a de novo 
sentencing hearing in accordance with decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.  
However, for criminal sentences imposed on and after July 11, 2006, in which a 
trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall apply the 
procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. 
{¶ 2} In this case, the record reveals that the court sentenced Jason 
Singleton on December 21, 2000, prior to the effective date of R.C. 2929.191.  
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, which remanded this 
case for a de novo sentencing in accordance with our prior decisions. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} On February 22, 2000, Detective Dave Loeding of the North 
Royalton Police Department filed complaints in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile 
Court alleging 16-year-old Jason Singleton to be a delinquent child.  The juvenile 
court conducted an amenability hearing and transferred the case to the general 
division of the common pleas court, and subsequently a grand jury indicted 
Singleton for rape with a sexually violent predator specification, kidnapping with 
sexual motivation and sexually violent predator specifications, aggravated 
burglary, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault.  As a result of plea 
bargaining, Singleton pleaded guilty to rape without a sexually violent offender 
specification and to felonious assault, and the state nolled the remaining counts. 
{¶ 4} The court sentenced Singleton on December 21, 2000, to a term of 
imprisonment of ten years for rape consecutive with a term of seven years for 
felonious assault, and it notified Singleton of five years of postrelease control.  
However, at that sentencing hearing, the court failed to notify Singleton that for a 
violation of postrelease control, the parole board could impose a prison term as 
part of his sentence of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed 
on him.  And in its sentencing entry, the court referenced only the possibility of 
five years of postrelease control, and it did not specify that the parole board could 
impose an additional prison term of up to one-half of his prison sentence for a 
violation of postrelease control.  See R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (e). 
{¶ 5} The General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, Baldwin’s 
Ohio Legislative Service Annotated (Vol. 4, 2006) L-1911, L-1934 (“H.B. 137”), 
effective July 11, 2006, which amended R.C. 2929.14, 2929.19, and 2967.28 and 
created R.C. 2929.191.  Thus, the original sentencing hearing in Singleton’s case 
occurred before the effective date of H.B. 137. 
{¶ 6} On October 25, 2006, Singleton moved to vacate his guilty pleas, 
claiming that the court had failed to advise him of the mandatory period of 
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postrelease control and the consequences of a postrelease control violation.  The 
trial court denied the motion to vacate, and Singleton appealed.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate the plea, but vacated 
Singleton’s sentence because the judgment entry referenced “discretionary rather 
than mandatory postrelease control.”  State v. Singleton, Cuyahoga App. No. 
90042, 2008-Ohio-2351, ¶ 48.  The court of appeals remanded the cause for a de 
novo sentencing hearing in accordance with prior decisions of this court because 
it determined that R.C. 2929.191 did not specify whether a de novo or partial 
resentencing should be conducted.  Id. at ¶ 46. 
{¶ 7} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal and its sole 
proposition of law: prior to the expiration of a prison term, a trial court may 
correct a sentence lacking a mandatory term of postrelease control pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.191.  State v. Singleton, 120 Ohio St.3d 1415, 2008-Ohio-6166, 897 
N.E.2d 651. 
{¶ 8} The state advances two bases for its contention that the trial court 
does not need to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing to correct the failure to 
properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control.  First, it argues that the 
procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191 have supplanted our caselaw and permit the 
trial court to conduct a limited resentencing hearing to simply add the missing 
postrelease-control language.  Second, citing our holdings in State v. Saxon, 109 
Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, and State v. Evans, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 2007-Ohio-861, 863 N.E.2d 113, the state asserts that appellate courts 
must review sentences on a sanction-by-sanction basis and may vacate 
erroneously imposed sanctions without vacating other sanctions that the trial court 
validly imposed.  Thus, the state contends that we should remand the cause for a 
hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.191 to add the necessary postrelease-control 
language to Singleton’s sentence without conducting a de novo sentencing 
hearing. 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
{¶ 9} Singleton, on the other hand, argues that R.C. 2929.191 does not 
affect our decisions requiring a de novo sentencing hearing to correct the failure 
to properly impose mandatory postrelease control.  Maintaining that his original 
sentence is void, Singleton contends that a court may not merely add a term of 
postrelease control to remedy its failure to provide the statutorily mandated 
notices of postrelease control at the original sentencing hearing or to impose 
postrelease control in the original sentencing entry.  Further, according to 
Singleton, permitting the trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing limited 
solely to imposing postrelease control would violate double-jeopardy and due-
process protections. 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we are asked to address whether a trial court should 
apply the procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191 to add postrelease control to a 
criminal sentence entered prior to July 11, 2006, or whether it should adhere to 
the procedure authorized in decisions of this court requiring the trial court to 
conduct a de novo sentencing hearing. 
Law and Analysis 
Postrelease Control 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2967.28(B) (see Appendix for July 11, 2006, version of R.C. 
2967.28) requires a sentencing court imposing a prison term on a first- or second-
degree-felony offender or certain other offenders to include in the sentence a term 
of mandatory postrelease control to be imposed by the parole board on the 
offender’s release from prison.  In addition, R.C. 2929.19 mandates that a court, 
when imposing sentence, notify the offender at the hearing that he will be 
supervised pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that the parole board may impose a 
prison term of up to one-half of the prison term originally imposed on the 
offender if he violates supervision or a condition of postrelease control.  R.C. 
2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (e).  And the imposed postrelease-control sanctions are to 
be included in the judgment entry journalized by the court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Sentences Lacking Postrelease Control 
{¶ 12} This court has addressed the consequences of a trial court’s failure 
to adhere to the mandatory requirements of sentencing statutes on several 
occasions.  In State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 14 OBR 511, 471 N.E.2d 
774, we considered whether the court's failure to impose a mandated sentence and 
its subsequent correction of that sentence violated the defendant's constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy.  Id. at 75, 14 OBR 511, 471 N.E.2d 774.  We 
recognized that “[a]ny attempt by a court to disregard statutory requirements 
when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sentence a nullity or void.” Id.  
Because jeopardy does not attach to a void sentence, we held that the court’s 
subsequent correction of the void sentence did not violate principles of double 
jeopardy. Id. 
{¶ 13} In Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103, we 
addressed the constitutional significance of a trial court’s including postrelease 
control in its sentence, and stated that because the separation-of-powers doctrine 
precludes the executive branch of government from impeding the judiciary's 
imposition of a sentence, the Adult Parole Authority may impose postrelease-
control sanctions only if a trial court incorporates postrelease control into its 
original sentence. Id. at 512-513, 733 N.E.2d 1103. 
{¶ 14} In State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 
N.E.2d 864, this court considered the consequences of a trial court’s failure to 
advise an offender about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing.  Id. at ¶ 1.  
Applying Beasley, we held that “[b]ecause a trial court has a statutory duty to 
provide notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, any sentence 
imposed without such notification is contrary to law” and void and the cause must 
be remanded for resentencing.  Id. at ¶ 23, 27. 
{¶ 15} We again confronted a sentencing court’s failure to notify or 
incorporate postrelease control into its sentencing entry in Hernandez v. Kelly, 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301; however, in that case, 
discovery of the sentencing error did not occur until after the offender had been 
released from prison, placed on postrelease control by the parole board, and 
reimprisoned for violating the terms of postrelease control.  Id. at ¶ 4-7.  There, 
we granted a writ of habeas corpus in conformity with our decisions in Jordan 
and Woods, holding that the parole board lacked authority to impose postrelease 
control because the trial court had failed to notify the offender of postrelease 
control or to incorporate it into the sentencing entry and because Hernandez had 
completed serving that sentence when the error was discovered.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 16} After Hernandez, we denied a petition seeking a writ of prohibition 
to vacate a resentencing entry imposing a mandatory period of postrelease control.  
State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 
N.E.2d 263, ¶ 1.  Unlike Hernandez, the court discovered the sentencing error in 
Cruzado before the inmate had completed serving the sentence, and the court 
conducted a resentencing hearing and imposed a mandatory three-year period of 
postrelease control.  Id. at ¶ 9-11.  Citing Beasley and Jordan, and distinguishing 
Hernandez on the basis that Cruzado had not yet completed his sentence, we held 
that the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to correct 
the sentence.  Id. at ¶ 19-28, 32. 
{¶ 17} In State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 
961, we concluded that an offender is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing for 
the trial court to correct a sentence that omitted notice of postrelease control.  
While the enactment of H.B. 137 preceded our decision in Bezak, the parties did 
not raise, and we did not address, the potential application of R.C. 2929.191. 
Importantly, because Bezak had already completed his term of imprisonment, the 
trial court could not, consistent with our decision in Hernandez v. Kelley, 108 
Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 32, conduct a resentencing. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 18} In State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 
N.E.2d 568, we stated: “[I]n cases in which a defendant is convicted of, or pleads 
guilty to, an offense for which postrelease control is required but not properly 
included in the sentence, the sentence is void, and the state is entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing to have postrelease control imposed on the defendant unless 
the defendant has completed his sentence.”  Id. at ¶ 6.  Further, we recognized that 
conducting a new sentencing hearing would not offend double jeopardy or due 
process, because an offender could not have a legitimate expectation of finality in 
a void sentence.  Id. at ¶ 36-37. 
{¶ 19} In State v. Boswell,  121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 
N.E.2d 422, we held that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 
made by a defendant who has been given a void sentence must be considered as a 
presentence motion under Crim.R. 32.1.”  Id. at the syllabus.  Because the trial 
court failed to include postrelease control as mandated by statute, we vacated 
Boswell’s void sentence, remanded the case for the court to consider his motion to 
withdraw his plea under the proper standard, and ordered resentencing if the court 
ultimately denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 20} Most recently, in State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-
Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, we addressed constitutional challenges to R.C. 
2929.191 raised by three separate offenders in separate cases.  There, (1) we 
determined that offenders who had been sentenced and received de novo 
sentencing hearings before July 11, 2006, the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, 
lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, ¶ 31, (2) we 
rejected separation-of-powers and one-subject-rule challenges to R.C. 2929.191, ¶ 
45 and ¶ 56, and (3) we held that when a court fails to impose postrelease control 
before an offender completes the stated term of imprisonment, under either our 
caselaw or R.C. 2929.191, the offender must be discharged, ¶ 69-71. 
H.B. 137 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2929.191, enacted as part of H.B. 137, purports to apply 
retrospectively to offenders sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute.  
We recognize that all statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  
Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 510-511, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (a statute will be 
found unconstitutional only if the statute’s challenger succeeds in proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the legislation is not compatible with constitutional 
provisions).  R.C. 1.47 provides that “[i]n enacting a statute, it is presumed that * 
* * [c]ompliance with the constitutions of the state and of the United States is 
intended.”  Furthermore, the General Assembly is vested with broad authority 
pursuant to its police powers to enact laws defining criminal conduct and 
prescribing its punishment, and such statutes will not lightly be held invalid.  
State v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 926. 
{¶ 22} In 1996, the General Assembly imposed a duty on trial courts to 
notify an offender at the sentencing hearing of the imposition of postrelease 
control and of the authority of the parole board to impose a prison term for a 
violation; the General Assembly also required that a court include any 
postrelease-control sanctions in its sentencing entry.  See former R.C. 2929.14(F) 
and former R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(b) through (d) and (B)(4), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 
146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7470, 7486-7487.  However, prior to the 
enactment of R.C. 2929.191 in July of 2006, no statutory mechanism existed to 
correct a sentence which failed to comport with these statutory requirements.  We 
determined such sentencing judgments to be contrary to law, thereby rendering 
them subject to de novo sentencing.  See generally Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 
2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864; Cruzado, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-
5795, 856 N.E.2d 263; Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 
961. 
{¶ 23} But with the advent of R.C. 2929.191, the General Assembly has 
now provided a statutory remedy to correct a failure to properly impose 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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postrelease control.  Effective July 11, 2006, R.C. 2929.191 establishes a 
procedure to remedy a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of postrelease 
control.  It applies to offenders who have not yet been released from prison and 
who fall into at least one of three categories:  those who did not receive notice at 
the sentencing hearing that they would be subject to postrelease control, those 
who did not receive notice that the parole board could impose a prison term for a 
violation of postrelease control, or those who did not have both of these statutorily 
mandated notices incorporated into their sentencing entries.  R.C. 2929.191(A) 
and (B).  For such offenders, R.C. 2929.191 provides that trial courts may, after 
conducting a hearing with notice to the offender, the prosecuting attorney, and the 
department of rehabilitation and correction, correct an original judgment of 
conviction by placing on the journal of the court a nunc pro tunc entry that 
includes a statement that the offender will be supervised under R.C. 2967.28 after 
the offender leaves prison and that the parole board may impose a prison term of 
up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed if the offender violates 
postrelease control. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 2929.191(C) prescribes the type of hearing that must occur to 
make such a correction to a judgment entry “on and after the effective date of this 
section.”  The hearing contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(C) and the correction 
contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(A) and (B) pertain only to the flawed imposition 
of postrelease control.  R.C. 2929.191 does not address the remainder of an 
offender’s sentence. Thus, the General Assembly appears to have intended to 
leave undisturbed the sanctions imposed upon the offender which are unaffected 
by the court’s failure to properly impose postrelease control at the original 
sentencing. 
Retrospective Application of R.C. 2929.191 
{¶ 25} Before the enactment of R.C. 2929.191, no statutory remedy 
existed for the correction of a sentence that failed to properly impose postrelease 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
control.  In the absence of a statutory remedy, we recognized that a sentence that 
failed to properly impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control was 
contrary to law when imposed.  See Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 
817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23; Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 
961, ¶ 13.  When a sentence is a nullity, it is as though it never occurred.  Id., 
citing Romito v. Maxwell (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 266, 267, 39 O.O.2d 414, 227 
N.E.2d 223.  Accordingly, we directed trial courts to conduct a de novo 
sentencing. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 2929.191 purports to authorize application of the remedial 
procedure set forth therein to add postrelease control to sentences imposed before 
its effective date.  We recognize the General Assembly’s authority to alter our 
caselaw’s characterization of a sentence lacking postrelease control as a nullity 
and to provide a mechanism to correct the procedural defect by adding postrelease 
control at any time before the defendant is released from prison.  However, for 
sentences imposed prior to the effective date of the statute, there is no existing 
judgment for a sentencing court to correct.  H.B. 137 cannot retrospectively alter 
the character of sentencing entries issued prior to its effective date that were 
nullities at their inception, in order to render them valid judgments subject to 
correction.  Therefore, for criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in 
which a trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control, the de novo 
sentencing procedure detailed in decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio should 
be followed to properly sentence an offender. 
Prospective Application of R.C. 2929.191 
{¶ 27} Although our caselaw has previously characterized a sentence 
lacking postrelease control as a nullity, H.B. 137 demonstrates a legislative intent 
to apply the sentence-correction mechanism of R.C. 2929.191 to sentences 
imposed after the act’s effective date.  Specifically, in Section 5(B) of H.B. 137 at 
L-1971, the General Assembly declared that the “amendments made to sections 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2929.14, 2929.19, and 2967.28 and the enactment of section 2929.191 of the 
Revised Code * * * apply to all convicted offenders described in division (A) of 
this Section, regardless of whether they were sentenced prior to, or are sentenced 
on or after, the effective date of this act.” (Emphasis added.)  And, in Section 7 of 
H.B. 137, L-1971–L-1972, the General Assembly also declared the act to be “an 
emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 
health, and safety” and provided for it to go into immediate effect.  Section 7 
further states that “the amendments made in this act are crucially needed to clarify 
the law to protect the residents of this state from the consequences that might 
result if the state is forced to release without supervision offenders who have been 
convicted of serious offenses and imprisoned, solely because the offenders were 
not provided notice of the fact that the law always requires their supervision upon 
release from prison.” Id. 
{¶ 28} Additionally, R.C. 2929.191(C) provides that “on and after the 
effective date of this section,” a trial court “that wishes to” may “prepare and 
issue a correction to a judgment of conviction of a type described in division 
(A)(1) and (B)(1) of this section” after a hearing in accordance with division (C).  
This provision can be interpreted two ways. 
{¶ 29} If the “type” of judgment mentioned in R.C. 2929.191(C) is 
viewed generally as applicable to any situation in which postrelease control has 
not been properly imposed, including situations in which the initial sentencing 
occurred after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, then the statute has prospective 
application. 
{¶ 30} On the other hand, if the “type” of judgment referenced in R.C. 
2929.191(C) is viewed as also incorporating the phrases within R.C. 
2929.191(A)(1) and (B)(1) providing that the statute applies to sentences imposed 
“prior to the effective date of this section,” then the statute could be viewed as a 
gap-filler that was intended to apply only to those situations in which the initial 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
sentencing occurred prior to the effective date of R.C. 2929.191 and the corrective 
sentencing occurs after the statute’s effective date. 
{¶ 31} But this latter reading would fall short of meeting the stated 
legislative intent of correcting the problem of sentencing courts that fail to 
properly impose statutorily mandated terms of postrelease control because, as we 
have already stated, the statute cannot apply retrospectively.  Thus, the better 
view, given this express legislative purpose, is the former.  See Section 5(B) of 
H.B. 137 (declaring that the amended statutes and newly enacted R.C. 2929.191 
“apply to all convicted offenders described in division (A) of this Section, 
regardless of whether they were sentenced prior to, or are sentenced on or after, 
the effective date of this act”). 
{¶ 32} Interpreting R.C. 2929.191(C) to apply the corrective mechanism 
provided in R.C. 2929.191 prospectively gives the statute effect and furthers the 
General Assembly’s stated intent in passing H.B. 137.  It also preserves the 
constitutionality of H.B. 137 against a separation-of-powers challenge by 
requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing to add postrelease control to the 
offender’s existing sentence.  See Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512, 733 
N.E.2d 1103 (upholding Adult Parole Authority’s discretionary ability to impose 
postrelease-control sanctions when such sanctions are part of the original 
judicially imposed sentence).  Thus, prospective application of the corrective 
procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191 preserves both the judicial role of imposing 
punishment and the executive role of carrying out that punishment.  Bloomer, 122 
Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 71. 
{¶ 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not 
implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple 
punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings.  On or after the 
effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of 
finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court’s failure to properly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged 
with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 
2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.  See State v. Simpkins, 117 
Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 36,  citing Jones v. Thomas 
(1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (where Justice 
Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate 
expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that 
the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); 
see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United 
States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87  (“ ‘A defendant has a 
legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware 
at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased’ ” [emphasis added 
in Husein]). 
{¶ 34} In short, the General Assembly’s intention in H.B. 137 to require 
statutorily provided postrelease control to be included in every sentence to which 
it applies is manifest.  R.C. 2929.191 provides a correction mechanism to 
effectuate that intention.  Thus, effective July 11, 2006, the legislature has, for the 
first time, afforded a mechanism for trial courts to use in correcting sentences that 
lack proper imposition of postrelease control, and that mechanism has prospective 
application only. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 35} Based upon the foregoing, the de novo sentencing procedure 
detailed in the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court is the appropriate method to 
correct a criminal sentence imposed prior to July 11, 2006, that lacks proper 
notification and imposition of postrelease control.  However, because R.C. 
2929.191 applies prospectively to sentences entered on or after July 11, 2006, that 
lack proper imposition of postrelease control, a trial court may correct such 
sentences in accordance with the procedures set forth in that statute. 
January Term, 2009 
15 
 
{¶ 36} Here, the state does not dispute that the trial court failed to 
properly impose postrelease control at Singleton’s original sentencing hearing, 
which occurred prior to July 11, 2006.  For the reasons stated above, R.C. 
2929.191 does not apply to Singleton’s sentence.  Therefore, this court’s caselaw 
describes the procedure to be followed to correct this sentence.  Accordingly, 
because the appellate court properly remanded the case for a de novo sentencing 
hearing pursuant to decisions of this court, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.1   
Judgment affirmed. 
CUPP, J., concurs. 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and O'CONNOR, JJ., concur in the judgment, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, and the portion of the opinion addressing the 
retrospective application of R.C. 2929.191 but dissent as to paragraph two of the 
syllabus and the portion of the opinion addressing the prospective application of 
R.C. 2929.191. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in paragraph two of the 
syllabus but dissent from the judgment and paragraph one of the syllabus and 
would instead reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that R.C. 
2929.191 also applies retrospectively. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 37} I concur in the judgment of the majority and in the first syllabus 
paragraph regarding the retroactive application of R.C. 2929.191.  I dissent from 
                                                 
1.  This opinion should not be interpreted to require further judicial action in cases where, prior to 
the release of this opinion, a trial court has conducted a de novo sentencing hearing in conformity 
with the caselaw of this court to remedy a sentence lacking postrelease control entered on or after 
July 11, 2006.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
the second syllabus paragraph and the portion of the opinion regarding the 
prospective application of R.C. 2929.191, for three reasons: 
{¶ 38} First, the issue of the prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 is 
not before us.  Jason Singleton is the only defendant in this case.  His sentencing 
hearing occurred on December 21, 2000, long before the enactment of R.C. 
2929.191.  Thus, the majority opinion’s second syllabus paragraph and its related 
discussion of R.C. 2929.191’s effect on sentences imposed after the statute’s 
effective date are entirely dicta.  That portion of the opinion runs contrary to “our 
well-settled precedent that we will not indulge in advisory opinions.” State ex rel. 
Keyes v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 123 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-4052, 
913 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 29.  Not only is the portion of the majority decision regarding 
the prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 advisory, no party sought this 
court’s advice on that issue.  The majority answers a question that is of no 
relevance to the instant case and places that answer in the syllabus. 
{¶ 39} Second, by its own terms, R.C. 2929.191 limits its application to 
sentences imposed prior to the statute’s effective date.  R.C. 2929.191 provides: 
{¶ 40} “(A)(1) If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court 
imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division 
(B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code and failed to notify the offender 
pursuant to that division that the offender will be supervised under section 
2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison * * * the court may 
prepare and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in the 
judgment of conviction the statement that the offender will be supervised under 
section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison. 
{¶ 41} “If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court imposed a 
sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(3)(d) of 
section 2929.19 of the Revised Code and failed to notify the offender pursuant to 
that division that the offender may be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 
January Term, 2009 
17 
 
Revised Code after the offender leaves prison * * * the court may prepare and 
issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in the judgment of 
conviction the statement that the offender may be supervised under section 
2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison. 
{¶ 42} “* * *  
{¶ 43} “(B)(1) If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court 
imposed a sentence including a prison term and failed to notify the offender 
pursuant to division (B)(3)(e) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding 
the possibility of the parole board imposing a prison term for a violation of 
supervision or a condition of post-release control * * *, the court may prepare and 
issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in the judgment of 
conviction the statement that if a period of supervision is imposed following the 
offender's release from prison, * * *, and if the offender violates that supervision 
* * * the parole board may impose as part of the sentence a prison term of up to 
one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon the offender.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 44} R.C. 2929.191(C) makes clear that the statute apples only to “a 
judgment of conviction of a type described in division (A)(1) or (B)(1) of this 
section,” that is, sentences imposed prior to the effective date of the statute. 
{¶ 45} The General Assembly passed an unambiguous statute.  It is 
inappropriate for the majority to employ uncodified statements of legislative 
intent to change the meaning of R.C. 2929.191.  When a statute is unambiguous, a 
court construing the statute need look only to the language contained in the 
statute: 
{¶ 46} “ ‘The object of judicial investigation in the construction of a 
statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law-making body which 
enacted it.’ Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph 
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one of the syllabus. This court may engage in statutory interpretation when the 
statute under review is ambiguous. Id. 
{¶ 47} “ ‘But the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the 
language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and 
express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is 
no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. The question is not what 
did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it 
did enact. That body should be held to mean what it has plainly expressed, and 
hence no room is left for construction.’ Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.” State 
v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11-12. 
{¶ 48} No statements of legislative intent are necessary to interpret R.C. 
2929.191.  It is crystal clear by its own terms.  The majority attempts to breathe 
life into R.C. 2929.191 by claiming that since it has no legal effect for sentences 
imposed prior to its enactment, it must certainly apply prospectively.  But R.C. 
2929.191 was enacted to fix sentencing mistakes of the past – mistakes that 
gained practical relevance only after this court’s decisions in State v. Jordan, 104 
Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, and Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 
Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, which established the 
consequences of a trial court’s failure to appropriately set forth postrelease-
control sanctions in sentencing a defendant. 
{¶ 49} Amendments made to other statutes amended by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
137, Baldwin’s Ohio Legislative Service Annotated (Vol. 4, 2006) L-1911 (“H.B. 
137”), make it clear that R.C. 2929.191 was intended to address past mistakes.  
The intent of H.B. 137 was to make prospective postrelease-control sentencing 
errors basically irrelevant.  For example, R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) was amended by 
H.B. 137 to include this language: 
{¶ 50} “If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type 
described in this division on or after the effective date of this amendment, the 
January Term, 2009 
19 
 
failure of a court to include a post-release control requirement in the sentence 
pursuant to this division does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory 
period of post-release control that is required for the offender under division (B) 
of section 2967.28 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 51} The amendment to R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) then adds that R.C. 
2929.191 applies to sentences imposed prior to the effective date of the act: 
{¶ 52} “Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to the 
effective date of this amendment, a court imposed a sentence including a prison 
term of a type described in this division and failed to include in the sentence 
pursuant to this division a statement regarding post-release control.”  H.B. 137, L-
1929. 
{¶ 53} H.B. 137 similarly amended R.C. 2929.19(B) and 2967.28(B).  All 
of these amendments attempt to make prospective mistakes nonproblematic and 
employ R.C. 2929.191 to address past errors.  For the General Assembly, the 
prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 was never a consideration. 
{¶ 54} The third reason for my dissent is simple: void is void.  There is 
nothing to add to a nullity. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 55} I concur in the majority opinion solely to the extent that it holds 
R.C. 2929.191 to be applicable to sentences imposed after July 11, 2006.  
Otherwise, I dissent from the opinion and would reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals on grounds that the statute also applies retroactively. 
I. The Problem of Void Sentences 
{¶ 56} The majority holds that a series of decisions, in which sentences 
with postrelease control errors are declared to be void, still specifies the procedure 
for correcting the error for sentences imposed before July 11, 2006.  I have 
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repeatedly asserted my position that these sentences should not be deemed void, 
meaning that a court has acted without jurisdiction, but rather should be treated as 
voidable, meaning correctable on appeal.  See, e.g., State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, ¶ 17-18 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 57} The majority holds that R.C. 2929.191 cannot be applied 
retroactively, because the original sentencing entry omitting postrelease control is 
a void judgment, and thus is a nullity incapable of being corrected.  The recent 
decisions of this court illustrate the inconsistencies that arise from characterizing 
as void those sentences based on sentencing entries with incomplete notification 
of postrelease control.  A sentence cannot be void initially and then later become 
valid after it is served.  If a sentence is void, meaning that it is one “that a court 
imposes despite lacking subject-matter jurisdiction or the authority to act,” State 
v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 27, then it is 
invalid, both during the period of incarceration specified in the void sentence and 
after the void sentence is completed.  It is absurd to call a sentence void from its 
inception, but only until the time that it has been fully served, when it 
metamorphizes from a void sentence into a valid sentence. 
{¶ 58} If sentences lacking postrelease-control notification are truly void, 
then the sentences are a nullity and no valid sentence is being served.  Calling 
these sentences void, however, belies the understanding of those incarcerated, 
who undoubtedly view their sentences as final.  Regardless of whether the 
sentence contains a mistake, everyone who leaves the courtroom after a 
sentencing hearing under R.C. 2929.19 has an expectation and understanding that 
a final decision has been made, one that can be appealed (by either party) within 
30 days and corrected, if necessary, by the court of appeals. 
{¶ 59} The majority continues to apply flawed precedent to sentences 
imposed before the effective date of R.C. 2929.191 in spite of the General 
Assembly’s intent.  Section 5(B) of H.B. 137 plainly states that the new 
January Term, 2009 
21 
 
enactment, which abrogates those decisions and provides a method of correction 
for all sentences, is intended to “apply to all convicted offenders * * * regardless 
of whether they were sentenced prior to, or are sentenced on or after, the effective 
date of this act.” 
II. Retroactive Application of R.C. 2929.191 Does Not  
Implicate Double Jeopardy 
{¶ 60} All statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a statute will not 
be invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 
926.  Although Singleton argues that retroactive application of R.C. 2929.191 
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the new 
statutory correction process neither imposes additional punishment nor disturbs an 
offender’s legitimate expectation of finality in the original judgment entry.  
Postrelease control, a substitute for probation, is a sanction that must be imposed 
when a defendant is sentenced for certain offenses.  The court has no discretion 
over whether to impose a sentence containing a mandatory monitoring period.  
With R.C. 2929.191, the General Assembly has created a procedure for a court to 
use when it has mistakenly failed to clarify that mandatory postrelease control is 
part of the sentence. 
{¶ 61} It is important to distinguish between mandatory and discretionary 
portions of sentences.  When postrelease control is mandatory, it must be included 
in the sentence.  The General Assembly has now adopted the position that 
sentences that lack mandatory postrelease control are not void, because this 
mistake results from a court’s error in exercising jurisdiction, rather than from a 
lack of its authority to sentence.  These sentences thus are correctable on appeal.  
And R.C. 2929.191 now provides an additional means by which sentences lacking 
mandatory postrelease control can be corrected—not by imposing a new sentence 
or by subjecting the convicted offender to additional discretionary punishment, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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but by fixing what amounts to a clerical error that omitted a mandatory portion of 
the sentence. 
{¶ 62} Any concerns with finality are misplaced.  Because of the 
mandatory nature of postrelease control for specified offenses, both defendants 
and prosecutors were given clear notice before the effective date of R.C. 2929.191 
that a specified period of postrelease control would be included in the offender’s 
sentence.  When a court follows the procedure outlined in R.C. 2929.191, it does 
not use its discretion to add extra punishment to the existing sentence.  Instead, it 
corrects the sentence to include proper notation of the period of postrelease 
control according to its mandatory duty that has been imposed by statute. 
{¶ 63} When an offender is sentenced for an offense that also requires 
mandatory postrelease control to be imposed , the General Assembly intended that 
the parole board would automatically monitor the offender for a specific period of 
time after the offender’s release from prison.  Allowing a trial judge to correct the 
sentence without first vacating it is in keeping with the purpose of postrelease 
control sanctions, which we have stated are “ ‘sanctions aimed at behavior 
modification in the attempt to reintegrate the offender safely into the community, 
not mere punishment for an additional crime.’ ”  State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 
398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, at ¶ 16, quoting Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 504, 512, 733 N.E.2d 1103.  This correction of the sentence to 
conform to the statute as written does not raise double jeopardy concerns.  I 
would thus hold that retroactive application of R.C. 2929.191 does not violate 
double jeopardy. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 64} For sentences occurring before July 11, 2006, the majority 
continues to use the term “void” to apply to sentences more properly termed 
“voidable.”  This leaves every criminal sentence open to the possibility of being 
deemed to be “void,” thus subjecting the offender to undergoing sentencing as if 
January Term, 2009 
23 
 
for the first time, at least until the offender is released from prison.  Of course, 
once the prison term has been completed, the sentence served magically becomes 
“not void.”  Under this reasoning, each sentence in Ohio has the potential to be 
considered a nullity or “not final” at any time until it has been completely served.  
I cannot subscribe to this reasoning. 
{¶ 65} In enacting R.C. 2929.191, the General Assembly sought to 
supersede this court’s decisions requiring full resentencing and instead to provide 
a simple means by which trial courts might correct judgments that lacked a 
mandatory term of postrelease control.  The legislature’s intention is also evident 
in its amendments to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), which now provides, “If a court 
imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division 
(B)(3)(c) of this section * * *, the failure of a court to notify the offender pursuant 
to division (B)(3)(c) of this section that the offender will be supervised under 
section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison or to include 
in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal a statement to that effect does 
not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of supervision that is 
required for the offender under division (B) of section 2967.28 of the Revised 
Code.”  I believe that the amendments to R.C. 2929.19 and the enactment of R.C. 
2929.191 represent an attempt to return logic and order to this area of the law and 
that R.C. 2929.191 should be applied both retroactively and prospectively. 
{¶ 66} For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s holding that the 
procedures of R.C. 2929.191 must be used to correct error in the imposition of 
postrelease control for sentences occurring on and after the effective date of the 
statute, but I dissent from the majority’s holding that the statute does not apply 
retroactively. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 
Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
__________________ 
Appendix 
R.C. 2929.191 
{¶ 67} (A)(1) If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court imposed 
a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(3)(c) of 
section 2929.19 of the Revised Code and failed to notify the offender pursuant to 
that division that the offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 
Revised Code after the offender leaves prison or to include a statement to that 
effect in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence 
pursuant to division (F)(1) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, at any time 
before the offender is released from imprisonment under that term and at a 
hearing conducted in accordance with division (C) of this section, the court may 
prepare and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in the 
judgment of conviction the statement that the offender will be supervised under 
section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison. 
{¶ 68} If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court imposed a 
sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(3)(d) of 
section 2929.19 of the Revised Code and failed to notify the offender pursuant to 
that division that the offender may be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 
Revised Code after the offender leaves prison or to include a statement to that 
effect in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence 
pursuant to division (F)(2) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, at any time 
before the offender is released from imprisonment under that term and at a 
hearing conducted in accordance with division (C) of this section, the court may 
prepare and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in the 
January Term, 2009 
25 
 
judgment of conviction the statement that the offender may be supervised under 
section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison. 
{¶ 69} (2) If a court prepares and issues a correction to a judgment of 
conviction as described in division (A)(1) of this section before the offender is 
released from imprisonment under the prison term the court imposed prior to the 
effective date of this section, the court shall place upon the journal of the court an 
entry nunc pro tunc to record the correction to the judgment of conviction and 
shall provide a copy of the entry to the offender or, if the offender is not 
physically present at the hearing, shall send a copy of the entry to the department 
of rehabilitation and correction for delivery to the offender. If the court sends a 
copy of the entry to the department, the department promptly shall deliver a copy 
of the entry to the offender. The court's placement upon the journal of the entry 
nunc pro tunc before the offender is released from imprisonment under the term 
shall be considered, and shall have the same effect, as if the court at the time of 
original sentencing had included the statement in the sentence and the judgment 
of conviction entered on the journal and had notified the offender that the 
offender will be so supervised regarding a sentence including a prison term of a 
type described in division (B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code or 
that the offender may be so supervised regarding a sentence including a prison 
term of a type described in division (B)(3)(d) of that section. 
{¶ 70} (B)(1) If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court imposed 
a sentence including a prison term and failed to notify the offender pursuant to 
division (B)(3)(e) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding the 
possibility of the parole board imposing a prison term for a violation of 
supervision or a condition of post-release control or to include in the judgment of 
conviction entered on the journal a statement to that effect, at any time before the 
offender is released from imprisonment under that term and at a hearing 
conducted in accordance with division (C) of this section, the court may prepare 
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and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in the judgment 
of conviction the statement that if a period of supervision is imposed following 
the offender's release from prison, as described in division (B)(3)(c) or (d) of 
section 2929.19 of the Revised Code, and if the offender violates that supervision 
or a condition of post-release control imposed under division (B) of section 
2967.131 of the Revised Code the parole board may impose as part of the 
sentence a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally 
imposed upon the offender. 
{¶ 71} (2) If the court prepares and issues a correction to a judgment of 
conviction as described in division (B)(1) of this section before the offender is 
released from imprisonment under the term, the court shall place upon the journal 
of the court an entry nunc pro tunc to record the correction to the judgment of 
conviction and shall provide a copy of the entry to the offender or, if the offender 
is not physically present at the hearing, shall send a copy of the entry to the 
department of rehabilitation and correction for delivery to the offender. If the 
court sends a copy of the entry to the department, the department promptly shall 
deliver a copy of the entry to the offender. The court's placement upon the journal 
of the entry nunc pro tunc before the offender is released from imprisonment 
under the term shall be considered, and shall have the same effect, as if the court 
at the time of original sentencing had included the statement in the judgment of 
conviction entered on the journal and had notified the offender pursuant to 
division (B)(3)(e) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding the 
possibility of the parole board imposing a prison term for a violation of 
supervision or a condition of post-release control. 
{¶ 72} (C) On and after the effective date of this section, a court that 
wishes to prepare and issue a correction to a judgment of conviction of a type 
described in division (A)(1) or (B)(1) of this section shall not issue the correction 
until after the court has conducted a hearing in accordance with this division. 
January Term, 2009 
27 
 
Before a court holds a hearing pursuant to this division, the court shall provide 
notice of the date, time, place, and purpose of the hearing to the offender who is 
the subject of the hearing, the prosecuting attorney of the county, and the 
department of rehabilitation and correction. The offender has the right to be 
physically present at the hearing, except that, upon the court's own motion or the 
motion of the offender or the prosecuting attorney, the court may permit the 
offender to appear at the hearing by video conferencing equipment if available 
and compatible. An appearance by video conferencing equipment pursuant to this 
division has the same force and effect as if the offender were physically present at 
the hearing. At the hearing, the offender and the prosecuting attorney may make a 
statement as to whether the court should issue a correction to the judgment of 
conviction. 
R.C. 2967.28 
{¶ 73} (A) As used in this section: 
{¶ 74} (1) "Monitored time" means the monitored time sanction specified 
in section 2929.17 of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 75} (2) "Deadly weapon" and "dangerous ordnance" have the same 
meanings as in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 76} (3) "Felony sex offense" means a violation of a section contained 
in Chapter 2907. of the Revised Code that is a felony. 
{¶ 77} (B) Each sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree, 
for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the 
third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the 
offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person shall include a 
requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control 
imposed by the parole board after the offender's release from imprisonment. If a 
court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this 
division on or after the effective date of this amendment, the failure of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sentencing court to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(3)(c) of section 
2929.19 of the Revised Code of this requirement or to include in the judgment of 
conviction entered on the journal a statement that the offender's sentence includes 
this requirement does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period 
of supervision that is required for the offender under this division. Section 
2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to the effective date of this 
amendment, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type 
described in this division and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division 
(B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding post-release control or 
to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence 
pursuant to division (F)(1) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement 
regarding post-release control. Unless reduced by the parole board pursuant to 
division (D) of this section when authorized under that division, a period of post-
release control required by this division for an offender shall be of one of the 
following periods: 
{¶ 78} (1) For a felony of the first degree or for a felony sex offense, five 
years; 
{¶ 79} (2) For a felony of the second degree that is not a felony sex 
offense, three years; 
{¶ 80} (3) For a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense 
and in the commission of which the offender caused or threatened physical harm 
to a person, three years. 
{¶ 81} (C) Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, 
or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(1) or (3) of this section shall 
include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release 
control of up to three years after the offender's release from imprisonment, if the 
parole board, in accordance with division (D) of this section, determines that a 
period of post-release control is necessary for that offender. Section 2929.191 of 
January Term, 2009 
29 
 
the Revised Code applies if, prior to the effective date of this amendment, a court 
imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division 
and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(3)(d) of section 2929.19 
of the Revised Code regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment 
of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence pursuant to division (F)(2) 
of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement regarding post-release 
control. 
{¶ 82} (D)(1) Before the prisoner is released from imprisonment, the 
parole board shall impose upon a prisoner described in division (B) of this 
section, may impose upon a prisoner described in division (C) of this section, and 
shall impose upon a prisoner described in division (B)(2)(b) of section 5120.031 
or in division (B)(1) of section 5120.032 of the Revised Code, one or more post-
release control sanctions to apply during the prisoner's period of post-release 
control. Whenever the board imposes one or more post-release control sanctions 
upon a prisoner, the board, in addition to imposing the sanctions, also shall 
include as a condition of the post-release control that the individual or felon not 
leave the state without permission of the court or the individual's or felon's parole 
or probation officer and that the individual or felon abide by the law. The board 
may impose any other conditions of release under a post-release control sanction 
that the board considers appropriate, and the conditions of release may include 
any community residential sanction, community nonresidential sanction, or 
financial sanction that the sentencing court was authorized to impose pursuant to 
sections 2929.16, 2929.17, and 2929.18 of the Revised Code. Prior to the release 
of a prisoner for whom it will impose one or more post-release control sanctions 
under this division, the parole board shall review the prisoner's criminal history, 
all juvenile court adjudications finding the prisoner, while a juvenile, to be a 
delinquent child, and the record of the prisoner's conduct while imprisoned. The 
parole board shall consider any recommendation regarding post-release control 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sanctions for the prisoner made by the office of victims' services. After 
considering those materials, the board shall determine, for a prisoner described in 
division (B) of this section, division (B)(2)(b) of section 5120.031, or division 
(B)(1) of section 5120.032 of the Revised Code, which post-release control 
sanction or combination of post-release control sanctions is reasonable under the 
circumstances or, for a prisoner described in division (C) of this section, whether 
a post-release control sanction is necessary and, if so, which post-release control 
sanction or combination of post-release control sanctions is reasonable under the 
circumstances. In the case of a prisoner convicted of a felony of the fourth or fifth 
degree other than a felony sex offense, the board shall presume that monitored 
time is the appropriate post-release control sanction unless the board determines 
that a more restrictive sanction is warranted. A post-release control sanction 
imposed under this division takes effect upon the prisoner's release from 
imprisonment. 
{¶ 83} Regardless of whether the prisoner was sentenced to the prison 
term prior to, on, or after the effective date of this amendment, prior to the release 
of a prisoner for whom it will impose one or more post-release control sanctions 
under this division, the parole board shall notify the prisoner that, if the prisoner 
violates any sanction so imposed or any condition of post-release control 
described in division (B) of section 2967.131 of the Revised Code that is imposed 
on the prisoner, the parole board may impose a prison term of up to one-half of 
the stated prison term originally imposed upon the prisoner. 
{¶ 84} (2) At any time after a prisoner is released from imprisonment and 
during the period of post-release control applicable to the releasee, the adult 
parole authority may review the releasee's behavior under the post-release control 
sanctions imposed upon the releasee under this section. The authority may 
determine, based upon the review and in accordance with the standards 
established under division (E) of this section, that a more restrictive or a less 
January Term, 2009 
31 
 
restrictive sanction is appropriate and may impose a different sanction. Unless the 
period of post-release control was imposed for an offense described in division 
(B)(1) of this section, the authority also may recommend that the parole board 
reduce the duration of the period of post-release control imposed by the court. If 
the authority recommends that the board reduce the duration of control for an 
offense described in division (B)(2), (B)(3), or (C) of this section, the board shall 
review the releasee's behavior and may reduce the duration of the period of 
control imposed by the court. In no case shall the board reduce the duration of the 
period of control imposed by the court for an offense described in division (B)(1) 
of this section, and in no case shall the board permit the releasee to leave the state 
without permission of the court or the releasee's parole or probation officer. 
{¶ 85} (E) The department of rehabilitation and correction, in accordance 
with Chapter 119. of the Revised Code, shall adopt rules that do all of the 
following: 
{¶ 86} (1) Establish standards for the imposition by the parole board of 
post-release control sanctions under this section that are consistent with the 
overriding purposes and sentencing principles set forth in section 2929.11 of the 
Revised Code and that are appropriate to the needs of releasees; 
{¶ 87} (2) Establish standards by which the parole board can determine 
which prisoners described in division (C) of this section should be placed under a 
period of post-release control; 
{¶ 88} (3) Establish standards to be used by the parole board in reducing 
the duration of the period of post-release control imposed by the court when 
authorized under division (D) of this section, in imposing a more restrictive post-
release control sanction than monitored time upon a prisoner convicted of a felony 
of the fourth or fifth degree other than a felony sex offense, or in imposing a less 
restrictive control sanction upon a releasee based on the releasee's activities 
including, but not limited to, remaining free from criminal activity and from the 
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abuse of alcohol or other drugs, successfully participating in approved 
rehabilitation programs, maintaining employment, and paying restitution to the 
victim or meeting the terms of other financial sanctions; 
{¶ 89} (4) Establish standards to be used by the adult parole authority in 
modifying a releasee's post-release control sanctions pursuant to division (D)(2) 
of this section; 
{¶ 90} (5) Establish standards to be used by the adult parole authority or 
parole board in imposing further sanctions under division (F) of this section on 
releasees who violate post-release control sanctions, including standards that do 
the following: 
{¶ 91} (a) Classify violations according to the degree of seriousness; 
{¶ 92} (b) Define the circumstances under which formal action by the 
parole board is warranted; 
{¶ 93} (c) Govern the use of evidence at violation hearings; 
{¶ 94} (d) Ensure procedural due process to an alleged violator; 
{¶ 95} (e) Prescribe nonresidential community control sanctions for most 
misdemeanor and technical violations; 
{¶ 96} (f) Provide procedures for the return of a releasee to imprisonment 
for violations of post-release control. 
{¶ 97} (F)(1) Whenever the parole board imposes one or more post-
release control sanctions upon an offender under this section, the offender upon 
release from imprisonment shall be under the general jurisdiction of the adult 
parole authority and generally shall be supervised by the field services section 
through its staff of parole and field officers as described in section 5149.04 of the 
Revised Code, as if the offender had been placed on parole. If the offender upon 
release from imprisonment violates the post-release control sanction or any 
conditions described in division (A) of section 2967.131 of the Revised Code that 
are imposed on the offender, the public or private person or entity that operates or 
January Term, 2009 
33 
 
administers the sanction or the program or activity that comprises the sanction 
shall report the violation directly to the adult parole authority or to the officer of 
the authority who supervises the offender. The authority's officers may treat the 
offender as if the offender were on parole and in violation of the parole, and 
otherwise shall comply with this section. 
{¶ 98} (2) If the adult parole authority determines that a releasee has 
violated a post-release control sanction or any conditions described in division 
(A) of section 2967.131 of the Revised Code imposed upon the releasee and that a 
more restrictive sanction is appropriate, the authority may impose a more 
restrictive sanction upon the releasee, in accordance with the standards 
established under division (E) of this section, or may report the violation to the 
parole board for a hearing pursuant to division (F)(3) of this section. The authority 
may not, pursuant to this division, increase the duration of the releasee's post-
release control or impose as a post-release control sanction a residential sanction 
that includes a prison term, but the authority may impose on the releasee any 
other residential sanction, nonresidential sanction, or financial sanction that the 
sentencing court was authorized to impose pursuant to sections 2929.16, 2929.17, 
and 2929.18 of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 99} (3) The parole board may hold a hearing on any alleged violation 
by a releasee of a post-release control sanction or any conditions described in 
division (A) of section 2967.131 of the Revised Code that are imposed upon the 
releasee. If after the hearing the board finds that the releasee violated the sanction 
or condition, the board may increase the duration of the releasee's post-release 
control up to the maximum duration authorized by division (B) or (C) of this 
section or impose a more restrictive post-release control sanction. When 
appropriate, the board may impose as a post-release control sanction a residential 
sanction that includes a prison term. The board shall consider a prison term as a 
post-release control sanction imposed for a violation of post-release control when 
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the violation involves a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, physical harm or 
attempted serious physical harm to a person, or sexual misconduct, or when the 
releasee committed repeated violations of post-release control sanctions. The 
period of a prison term that is imposed as a post-release control sanction under 
this division shall not exceed nine months, and the maximum cumulative prison 
term for all violations under this division shall not exceed one-half of the stated 
prison term originally imposed upon the offender as part of this sentence. The 
period of a prison term that is imposed as a post-release control sanction under 
this division shall not count as, or be credited toward, the remaining period of 
post-release control. 
{¶ 100} If an offender is imprisoned for a felony committed while under 
post-release control supervision and is again released on post-release control for a 
period of time determined by division (F)(4)(d) of this section, the maximum 
cumulative prison term for all violations under this division shall not exceed one-
half of the total stated prison terms of the earlier felony, reduced by any prison 
term administratively imposed by the parole board, plus one-half of the total 
stated prison term of the new felony. 
{¶ 101} (4) Any period of post-release control shall commence upon an 
offender's actual release from prison. If an offender is serving an indefinite prison 
term or a life sentence in addition to a stated prison term, the offender shall serve 
the period of post-release control in the following manner: 
{¶ 102} (a) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the 
offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under a life 
sentence or an indefinite sentence, and if the period of post-release control ends 
prior to the period of parole, the offender shall be supervised on parole. The 
offender shall receive credit for post-release control supervision during the period 
of parole. The offender is not eligible for final release under section 2967.16 of 
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35 
 
the Revised Code until the post-release control period otherwise would have 
ended. 
{¶ 103} (b) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the 
offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under an 
indefinite sentence, and if the period of parole ends prior to the period of post-
release control, the offender shall be supervised on post-release control. The 
requirements of parole supervision shall be satisfied during the post-release 
control period. 
{¶ 104} (c) If an offender is subject to more than one period of post-
release control, the period of post-release control for all of the sentences shall be 
the period of post-release control that expires last, as determined by the parole 
board. Periods of post-release control shall be served concurrently and shall not 
be imposed consecutively to each other. 
{¶ 105} (d) The period of post-release control for a releasee who commits 
a felony while under post-release control for an earlier felony shall be the longer 
of the period of post-release control specified for the new felony under division 
(B) or (C) of this section or the time remaining under the period of post-release 
control imposed for the earlier felony as determined by the parole board. 
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