Case Title: State v. Payne

Citation: 2007-Ohio-4642

Docket Number: 20061245 and 20061383

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. PAYNE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642.] 
Criminal law — Sentencing — When sentencing occurs after Blakely v. 
Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, failure 
to object to the sentence as violating Blakely forfeits the issue on appeal. 
(Nos. 2006-1245 and 2006-1383—Submitted May 22, 2007—Decided  
September 26, 2007.) 
CERTIFIED by and APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-517, 2006-Ohio-2552. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal comes to us in the wake of our decision in State v. 
Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470.  Foster, following 
Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, 
held that statutes that required “judicial fact-finding before imposition of a 
sentence greater than the maximum term authorized by a jury verdict or admission 
of the defendant” violated a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Foster, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  The issue confronting us now is whether, when sentencing occurred 
after Blakely, failure to object at trial to a sentence that violates Blakely forfeits 
the issue on appeal.  For the reasons that follow, we answer the question in the 
affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} On August 11, 2003, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 
Grand Jury returned a seven-count indictment against appellant, Ronald Payne, 
charging him with one count each of aggravated burglary and kidnapping, both 
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felonies of the first degree; four counts of rape, felonies of the first degree; and 
one count of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree.  The aggravated-
burglary and kidnapping charges included three-year firearm specifications. 
{¶ 3} Between Payne’s indictment and trial, the Supreme Court of the 
United States released Blakely. 
{¶ 4} Payne’s case went to trial in 2005, but one day into the trial, Payne 
withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. 
Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, to aggravated burglary, 
kidnapping, rape, and felonious assault.  The court nolled the gun specifications. 
{¶ 5} At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of two 
years for the felonious assault, eight years for the kidnapping, and five years for 
each count of rape, for an aggregate sentence of 35 years. Payne never voiced an 
objection with the trial court regarding the sentence.  However, claiming that the 
sentence violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment and Blakely, Payne 
appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals.  The state maintained that Payne 
had never raised this objection with the trial court and that therefore, the appellate 
court should review the error under plain-error analysis. 
{¶ 6} In 2006, we held that those portions of Ohio’s sentencing scheme 
requiring judicial fact-finding were unconstitutional.  Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraphs one, three, and five of the syllabus.  
We severed the unconstitutional sections from the constitutional sections.  Id., 
paragraphs two, four, and six of the syllabus. 
{¶ 7} The appellate court initially reversed and remanded Payne’s 
sentence on the authority of Foster.  State v. Payne (Mar. 31, 2006), 05AP-517.  
The state then successfully moved the court of appeals for reconsideration of its 
judgment.  State v. Payne, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-517, 2006-Ohio-2552, ¶ 1.  Upon 
reconsideration, the court of appeals held that Payne “was sentenced after the 
[United States] Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, and thus, he could have 
January Term, 2007 
3 
objected to his sentencing based on Blakely and the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
sentencing scheme.  [Payne], however, did not raise such a constitutional 
challenge * * *in the trial court, and therefore [he] waived his Blakely argument 
on appeal.”  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals certified a conflict between its decision and 
the Second District Court of Appeals decision in State v. Miller, 2d Dist. No. 
21054, 2006-Ohio-1138.  We determined that a conflict exists, case No. 2006-
1383, and having accepted discretionary jurisdiction over Payne’s appeal in case 
No. 2006-1245, we consolidated the cases. 
II. Analysis 
A 
{¶ 9} In Foster and similar appellate cases,1 we remanded a large 
number of cases already in the appellate phase for resentencing hearings without 
any mention of forfeiture.  Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 
470, ¶ 3-7.  The remand orders were silent as to the issue currently confronting us. 
{¶ 10} We recognize that this court remanded for resentencing some cases 
in which the initial sentencing by the trial court had occurred after Blakely was 
decided, but where the defendant had seemingly failed to object on Blakely 
grounds to the sentence imposed.  See, e.g., State v. Kendrick, 2d Dist. No. 20965, 
2006-Ohio-311, judgment reversed by In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes 
Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 411, 2006-Ohio-2394, 848 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 19.  However, 
                                          
 
1.  See, e.g., In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 110 Ohio St.3d 264, 2006-Ohio-
4475, 853 N.E.2d 274, ¶ 2-3; In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 110 Ohio St.3d 156, 
2006-Ohio-4086, 852 N.E.2d 156, ¶ 3-7; In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-3663, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 2-10; In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes 
Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 518, 2006-Ohio-3254, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 2-9; In re Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 509, 2006-Ohio-2721, 849 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 2-10; In re 
Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 411, 2006-Ohio-2394, 848 N.E.2d 809, 
¶ 2-19; In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 313, 2006-Ohio-2109, 847 
N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 2-252. 
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this court did not then definitively resolve the issue presented by this case; thus, it 
is appropriate to do so now. 
{¶ 11} Both Payne and the majority of Ohio’s appellate districts have 
construed our silence as to remands as settling this issue.  In doing so, they have 
overlooked our holding that “[a] reported decision, although a case where the 
question might have been raised, is entitled to no consideration whatever as 
settling * * *a question not passed upon or raised at the time of the adjudication.”  
State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes (1952), 158 Ohio St. 129, 48 O.O. 64, 107 N.E.2d 
206, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 12} Thus, we are not bound by any perceived implications that may 
have been inferred from Foster.  Cf. Lopez v. Monterey Cty. (1999), 525 U.S. 266, 
281, 119 S.Ct. 693, 142 L.Ed.2d 728; see, also, State ex rel. United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 
108 Ohio St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 46. 
{¶ 13} We are guided by United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 
125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  Booker, like Foster, applied to every case that 
was in the appellate stage.  Id at 268, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  The 
United States Supreme Court, however, noted that not every case would be 
entitled to a resentencing hearing.  Instead, Booker instructed courts “to apply 
ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was 
raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”  Id. 
{¶ 14} In heeding the dictates of Booker, we will address for the first time 
whether Blakely error can be forfeited. 
B 
{¶ 15} Typically, if a party forfeits an objection in the trial court, 
reviewing courts may notice only “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial 
rights.”  Crim.R. 52(B).  Inherent in the rule are three limits placed on reviewing 
courts for correcting plain error. 
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5 
{¶ 16} “First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from the legal rule.  
* * * Second, the error must be plain.  To be ‘plain’ within the meaning of 
Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings.  * * * 
Third, the error must have affected ‘substantial rights.’  We have interpreted this 
aspect of the rule to mean that the trial court’s error must have affected the 
outcome of the trial.”  State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 
1240.  Courts are to notice plain error “only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.”  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 17} The burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.  
See, e.g., State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 150, 512 N.E.2d 962.  A 
reversal is warranted if the party can prove that the outcome “would have been 
different absent the error.”  State v. Hill (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 203, 749 
N.E.2d 274. 
{¶ 18} There also exist those classes of errors that need not be analyzed 
using the above “limits” and are “[s]ubject to automatic reversal, ‘only in a very 
limited class of cases.’ ” State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 
N.E.2d 643, ¶ 18, quoting Johnson v. United States, (1997) 520 U.S. 461, 468, 
117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718.  These errors are considered structural errors 
because they permeate the entire “ ‘framework within which the trial proceeds.’ ”  
State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 9, quoting 
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 
L.Ed.2d 302.  Although all structural errors are by nature constitutional errors, not 
all constitutional errors are structural.  Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 
18, 22-23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.  As a result, some constitutional errors 
can be deemed nonprejudicial so long as the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 24. 
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{¶ 19} Applying these doctrines, we first determine whether the trial 
court’s error in sentencing Payne pursuant to the pre-Foster version of the 
sentencing statute is structural.  If it is, our inquiry is at an end. 
{¶ 20} Controlling our disposition on this issue is the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Washington v. Recuenco (2006), __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 
165 L.Ed.2d 466.  In Recuenco, the court held that Blakely error is not structural.  
Id. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2553, 165 L.Ed.2d 466.  The court reasoned that the failure 
to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is akin to failure to submit an element of 
an offense to the jury.  Id.  As the latter omission previously was determined not 
to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair, Neder v. United States (1999), 527 
U.S. 1, 19-20, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, it stands to reason that a Blakely 
violation should be treated identically because sentencing factors and elements of 
an offense are treated the same under the Sixth Amendment.  Recuenco, __ U.S. 
__, 126 S.Ct. at 2552, 165 L.Ed.2d 466.  Accordingly, we follow Recuenco and 
hold that the constitutional error involved in this kind of case is not structural and 
should ordinarily be analyzed pursuant to Crim.R. 52 analysis. 
C 
{¶ 21} Because Blakely was announced prior to Payne’s plea and 
sentence, and because we conclude that the error is not structural, in failing to 
make a Blakely objection, Payne forfeited the issue for appellate purposes. 
{¶ 22} At this point, we note that this case involves forfeiture rather than 
waiver.2  The distinction between these two terms is critical. 
{¶ 23} Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a right, 
and waiver of a right “cannot form the basis of any claimed error under Crim.R. 
                                          
 
2.   The court of appeals in this case mistakenly, yet perhaps understandably, conflated waiver 
with forfeiture.  Cf. Freytag v. Commr. of Internal Revenue (1991), 501 U.S. 868, 894, 111 S.Ct. 
2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764, fn. 2 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court uses the term ‘waive’ instead of 
‘forfeit’ * * *. The two are really not the same, although our cases have so often used them 
interchangeably * * *”). 
   
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52(B).”  State v. McKee (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 299, 744 N.E.2d 737, fn. 3 
(Cook, J., dissenting); see, also, United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 733, 
113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508.  On the other hand, forfeiture is a failure to 
preserve an objection, and because Payne failed to timely assert his rights under 
Blakely, his failure to preserve the objection must be treated as a forfeiture.  Id. at 
733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508.  “[A] mere forfeiture does not extinguish a 
claim of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B).”  McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d at 299, 744 
N.E.2d 737, fn. 3 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 24} Thus, if Payne had knowingly waived his rights, barring a finding 
that the error is structural, we would conclude our analysis.  Because the record is 
devoid of any evidence that there was a waiver of the Blakely objection, we must 
apply the plain-error analysis set forth in Section B, supra, to Payne’s forfeiture. 
{¶ 25} No plain error occurred.  Payne cannot establish that but for the 
Blakely error, he would have received a more lenient sentence.  See Crim.R. 
52(B).  Indeed, Foster represents a Pyrrhic victory for Payne and other defendants 
affected by its holding.  Although defendants were successful in arguing the 
unconstitutionality of the sections of the statutes that required judicial findings for 
the imposition of higher than minimum sanctions, we did not adopt their proposed 
remedy of mandatory minimum sentences.  Since Foster, trial courts no longer 
must navigate a series of criteria that dictate the sentence and ignore judicial 
discretion. 
{¶ 26} Payne, therefore, has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by 
the judicial fact-finding requirements.  If Payne were to be resentenced, nothing in 
the record would hinder the trial court from considering the same factors it 
previously had been required to consider and imposing the same sentence or even 
a more stringent one. 
{¶ 27} Payne mistakenly contends that our use of “void” in Foster, 109 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 103, creates an exception to this 
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analysis.  In reality, void and voidable sentences are distinguishable.  A void 
sentence is one that a court imposes despite lacking subject-matter jurisdiction or 
the authority to act.  State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 
196.  Conversely, a voidable sentence is one that a court has jurisdiction to 
impose, but was imposed irregularly or erroneously.  State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, in those cases in which a trial court has jurisdiction but 
“ ‘ “erroneous[ly] exercise[s] * * * jurisdiction, * * * the [sentence] * * * is not 
void,” ’ ” and the sentence can be set aside only if successfully challenged on 
direct appeal.  Id. at 240, 714 N.E.2d 867, quoting In re Waite (1991), 188 
Mich.App. 189, 200, 468 N.W.2d 912, quoting Jackson City Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Fredrick (1935), 271 Mich. 538, 544-546, 260 N.W. 908. 
{¶ 29} Applying these principles, we conclude that Foster addressed a 
situation in which the trial courts had both subject-matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  Courts prior to Foster had jurisdiction to 
impose a sentence within the statutory range after conducting the judicial fact-
finding previously required by the statute.  Our holding portions of R.C. 2929.14 
unconstitutional rendered some pre-Foster sentences erroneous exercises of trial 
court jurisdiction.  Thus, pre-Foster sentences imposed after judicial fact-finding 
and falling within the statutory range are voidable.3    
{¶ 30} Therefore, defendants with a voidable sentence are entitled to 
resentencing only upon a successful challenge on direct appeal.  Because Payne 
forfeited the Blakely error, his appeal fails to establish that he should be 
resentenced pursuant to Foster. 
III. Conclusion 
                                          
 
3.  It is axiomatic that imposing a sentence outside the statutory range, contrary to the statute, is 
outside a court’s jurisdiction, thereby rendering the sentence void ab initio. 
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{¶ 31} Our ruling today adheres to the Supreme Court’s growing line of 
jurisprudence in this area of law.  In prior cases, we have applied Blakely and 
Booker in holding portions of Ohio’s sentencing statutes unconstitutional and in 
subsequently providing a remedy for those statutory provisions deemed violative 
of the Sixth Amendment.  Using Booker and Recuenco as our constitutional 
guideposts in addressing the issue of forfeiture is consistent with the recent 
developments of jurisprudence pertaining to Ohio’s sentencing scheme.  For the 
foregoing reasons, we hold that a lack of an objection in the trial court forfeits the 
Blakely issue for purposes of appeal when the sentencing occurred after the 
announcement of Blakely. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and CUPP, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 32} I fully concur with the majority opinion but write to emphasize the 
importance of our clarification of the terms “void” and “voidable” in the 
sentencing context. 
{¶ 33} These distinct terms have distinct consequences, as a void 
judgment is “a judgment that has no legal force or effect, the invalidity of which 
may be asserted by any party whose rights are affected at any time and any place, 
whether directly or collaterally,”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 861, and 
a voidable judgment is “[v]alid until annulled,” id. at 1605. 
{¶ 34} In State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 
470, ¶ 103, we cited State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 
N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23, and stated, “When a sentence is deemed void, the ordinary 
course is to vacate that sentence and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing 
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hearing.”  (Emphasis added.)  Instead, in referring to a sentence that could be 
annulled for improper exercise of the trial court’s authority, we should have more 
clearly stated that a voidable sentence is, on appeal, subject to being vacated and 
remanded for resentencing.  Sentences that are “void ab initio,” meaning imposed 
without subject-matter jurisdiction, may be attacked on direct appeal or 
collaterally by means of habeas corpus.  State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 
44, 652 N.E.2d 196; Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 
N.E.2d 1282.  In a successful challenge to a void sentence, “a court lacks the 
authority to do anything but announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.” Pratts 
v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 35} Cases appealed on grounds of Foster involve voidable, rather than 
void, sentences, and I agree that Payne forfeited the Blakely issue in not 
registering his objection to a nonstructural error. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 36} I welcome and approve today’s needed clarification of when a 
sentence is void and when it is merely voidable, and the legal consequences of 
each.  I concur in that portion of the decision. 
{¶ 37} The main issue to be resolved, however, is whether this court’s 
sweeping resentencing mandate in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-
856, 845 N.E.2d 470, should be modified by applying the traditional principles of 
waiver or forfeiture or whether this court should, for purposes of consistency, 
adhere to the Foster resentencing mandate now that, presumably, most defendants 
subject to the requirement have already been resentenced.  I would adhere to the 
resentencing directive of Foster for the purpose of consistency, and I therefore 
respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s decision. 
{¶ 38} In Foster, after holding various provisions of Ohio’s sentencing 
statutes unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 
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11 
S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, this court adopted several remedies similar to those 
adopted in United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
L.Ed.2d 621.  However, one of the remedies in Foster differed from the remedies 
in Booker in a significant way. 
{¶ 39} Consistent with Booker, Foster first adopted a severance remedy.  
That is, the court severed the provisions of the sentencing statutes that violated the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution from the remainder of the 
sentencing statutes.  Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 
93-102.  Second, the court applied its holding to all cases pending on direct 
review, a remedy also consistent with Booker.  Id. at ¶ 104.  Third, this court 
ordered all cases pending on direct review “remanded to trial courts for new 
sentencing hearings.”  Id.  It is the apparent scope of this third remedy that differs 
from Booker’s remedial outline. 
{¶ 40} Although Booker applied its holding to “all cases on direct 
review,” Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, it did not order 
new sentencing hearings.  Rather, the United States Supreme Court directed that 
federal courts, in deciding whether resentencing is necessary, “apply ordinary 
prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised 
below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”  Id.  Foster did not include this 
directive. 
{¶ 41} This distinction is a significant one and bears upon our decision in 
the instant case.  The majority herein reasons that because Foster adopted 
remedies fashioned after those in Booker, the Booker language regarding waiver, 
plain error, and harmless error are also applicable here.  That may be.  However, 
the language of this court’s decision in Foster ostensibly made Foster broader 
than Booker by its specific order to resentence. 
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{¶ 42} Resentencing has already been conducted in hundreds of criminal 
cases around the state based on the Foster directive.4  Consistency in this matter, 
as in all criminal sentencing, is desirable.  The majority’s decision in this case, 
however, will result in some defendants having been granted a resentencing 
hearing whether or not they objected in the trial court to their initial sentence on 
Blakely grounds, while other defendants are being denied similar treatment.  This 
lack of consistency is troubling. 
{¶ 43} The resentencing ordered in Foster of all cases on direct review, 
without the Booker qualification, appeared to be a clear directive to trial and 
appellate courts. These courts have responded by undertaking or ordering new 
sentencing hearings.  As a result, continued application of the resentencing 
requirement is the most consistent way of resolving the matter at hand.  It is likely 
the most efficient way, too, considering the related claims that are sure to flow 
from today’s decision. 
{¶ 44} Because I do not find Booker to be controlling in light of the 
particular language used in Foster, I would not at this late date depart from the 
resentencing directive, whether overbroad or not.  For these reasons, I dissent 
from that part of the majority’s decision. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Paul Skendelas, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________ 
                                          
 
4.  As the majority notes, this court remanded a large number of cases for resentencing in the 
months following the Foster decision.  See majority opinion at ¶ 9 and footnote 1.