Case Title: Manners v. Manners

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-41

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Manners v. Manners1985 WY 144706 P.2d 671Case Number: 85-41Decided: 09/20/1985NORMAN R. MANNERS, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

SHARLET GAY MANNERS, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
NORMAN R. MANNERS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

SHARLET GAY MANNERS, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., and Kay Snider Coffman, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(defendant).

Rhonda Sigrist 
Woodard of Woodard, Hecox and Epps, Cheyenne, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and RODNEY M. GUTHRIE (Retired 
Justice).

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Five years after a 
divorce decree was entered, the trial court executed an order based on 
appellee's petition modifying the child support provision of the decree of 
divorce. Appellant raises the following issues:

"The trial court erred in 
finding that the child support ordered in the original decree of divorce was 
unreasonably low.

"The trial court erred in 
finding that there had been a change in circumstances warranting modification of 
the divorce decree.

"The trial court erred in 
finding that the appellant could pay increased child support and maintenance in 
light of its order in the case filed June 22, 1984, and 
otherwise."

[¶2.]     Appellee introduces 
another issue asking that appellant be ordered to pay her attorney's fees and 
damages incurred in defending this action.

[¶3.]     We will affirm the 
trial court in modifying the decree, and will assess appellant attorney's fees 
and damages.

[¶4.]     In September, 1979, 
appellant and appellee were divorced. At that time the parties had one child, 
Robert William, age 11. By agreement between the parties, appellant was ordered 
to pay $75 a month toward child support. At the time of the divorce it was known 
that Robert had a club foot and was mentally handicapped. Appellant did not pay 
any of the child support ordered by the court. In May, 1984, appellee filed a 
motion for an order to show cause why appellant should not be held in contempt 
of court and for a judgment for the arrearage in child support. On the same day, 
appellee petitioned for a modification of the 1979 decree of divorce. The two 
matters were heard and determined separately. In a judgment dated June 22, 1984, 
the court reduced the child support arrearages to judgment and provided for the 
judgment to be paid by installments. On November 16, 1984, appellee's petition 
to modify the divorce decree was heard. The court's order modifying the decree 
was filed December 28, 1984. 

[¶5.]     Although appellant only 
appeals the "Order Modifying Divorce Decree," he contends that both the judgment 
on arrearage and the order modifying divorce decree "are totally intertwined so 
as to call for consideration of both matters relative to this 
appeal."

[¶6.]     We will consider the 
arrearage judgment only insofar as it may affect appellant's ability to comply 
with the court's order modifying the divorce decree.

[¶7.]     In her petition for 
modification of the divorce decree, appellee alleges eight changes in 
circumstances since the divorce on September 17, 1979, and the date of her 
petition for modification, May 14, 1984. These alleged changes and circumstances 
are summarized as 1) the great increase in cost of supporting Robert; 2) 
diminished resources available to support the parties' son; and 3) appellant's 
increased ability to pay child support.

[¶8.]     In support of her 
change-of-circumstances allegations, appellee introduced evidence 
that:

(a) Robert, son of the 
parties, at the time of the hearing, was a little under 6'6" tall and required a 
size 16 shoe, required men's extra-large jeans, shirt and coat, and that items 
of clothing could not be purchased off the rack at a discount store as was the 
circumstance at the time of the divorce. There was evidence that at the time of 
the divorce, the average monthly expense for food, clothing and medical care for 
Robert was $146.25 a month. At the time of the modification hearing, the expense 
had increased to $329.17 a month.

(b) Robert, because of 
his club foot, had required surgery since the divorce; he will need further 
surgery and should now be wearing corrective shoes.

(c) Robert has been 
classified as "educable mentally retarded," has an IQ of 69, functions on a 
second and third grade level and is emotionally disturbed.

(d) Robert presently is 
unable to have any kind of a job and should not be left 
unattended.

[¶9.]     In connection with 
appellee's diminished ability to provide care for Robert, she produced evidence 
that a) medical insurance coverage available immediately after the divorce is no 
longer available; b) Robert requires more attention, thus reducing time 
available to earn other income; and c) help from charitable organizations and 
others available after the divorce, is no longer 
available.

[¶10.]  Appellant does not enjoy a large income; 
however, it increased almost $3,000 per year between 1980 and 1983. He has a 
small savings and an IRA account. He has enough income so that he can own a 
truck and two automobiles. He races one automobile in stock car 
races.

[¶11.]  The court modified the September 17, 
1979, divorce decree to provide that child support be "15% of [appellant's] 
gross income after deduction of the proper federal withholding tax, FICA and 
current life insurance payments. However, said child support shall not be less 
than $150 per month nor more than $200 per month." The order further requires 
appellant to pay one-half of all health, medical, dental, eye-glass and 
prescription drug expense incurred on behalf of Robert. Appellant was also 
ordered to maintain Robert as beneficiary of one-half of the proceeds of the 
life insurance which he currently has on his life.

[¶12.]  We will consider the issues appellant 
raises on appeal together. Whether or not to modify a divorce decree rests in 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's determination will not 
be disturbed except for a grave abuse of that discretion or violation of some 
legal principle. Harrington v. Harrington, Wyo., 660 P.2d 356 (1983); and Beard v. Beard, 
Wyo., 368 P.2d 953 (1962). As a general rule, a divorce decree is res judicata on all issues 
decided. Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); and Heyl v. Heyl, 
Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 (1974). The principle of res judicata 
is necessary to end litigation at some point. Otherwise, the legal system would 
become unmanageable. However, in certain circumstances modification of divorce 
decrees is necessary. Before a modification is warranted, it must be shown that 
there has been a material or substantial change in circumstances which outweighs 
society's interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata. The burden of proof 
lies with the party seeking modification. Mentock v. Mentock, 
supra.

[¶13.]  In determining an appropriate support 
order, the requirements of the child are factors to be considered along with 
what a parent can reasonably be expected to pay. The income of the parents must 
be taken into consideration in determining whether there has been a change in 
circumstances which warrants a modification of the divorce decree. The fact that 
a change in circumstances was foreseeable is not fatal to a petition to modify a 
decree of divorce. Mentock v. Mentock, 
supra.

[¶14.]  We cannot say that the court abused its 
discretion in modifying the divorce decree to provide for a minimum of $150 per 
month child support and provide for certain medical payments and insurance 
benefits. Robert, son of the parties, is an unusually large boy with many 
physical and mental infirmities, and as indicated above, requires special 
treatment. The resources available to take care of Robert have diminished since 
the divorce in 1979. Appellant's income has increased slightly the last few 
years. Considering the numerous changes in circumstances, we cannot disagree 
with the trial judge in his determination "that there had been a substantial 
change in the circumstances of the minor child and the parties * * * since the 
divorce decree was entered which justifies an increase in child support and 
payments of other obligations." The fact that these changes could, in a measure, 
be foreseen is immaterial. Mentock v. 
Mentock, supra.

[¶15.]  Appellant complains that he cannot pay 
the increased child support and also pay the arrearages ordered by the court in 
its order dated June 22, 1984. The court was very lenient with appellant. The 
arrearage payments were spread over many years. In determining the arrearage, 
the court did not add interest, nor does the judgment bear interest so long as 
appellant pays according to schedule. The court considered the burden of paying 
the arrearage and gave appellant a long, interest-free 
ride.

[¶16.]  A duty to pay child support is not 
satisfied merely by showing limited income. One obligated to support his child 
has a duty to make a good faith effort to generate enough income to discharge 
that obligation. Appellant really does not know if he can pay the child support 
ordered by the court. Until the order of modification, he had never paid any. 
Perhaps if appellant secured a part-time job instead of racing stock cars, he 
would improve his financial condition.

[¶17.]  In his first issue on appeal, appellant 
complains that the court found "that the amount of child support ordered in the 
divorce decree is unreasonably low." We do not attach any particular 
significance to this gratuitous finding. The court did not modify the divorce 
decree retroactively nor did it modify the decree an additional amount in order 
to make up for a low child support provision contained in the original decree. 
The amount appellant was ordered to pay initially under the modified order is 
still less than half the cost of supporting appellant's 
son.

[¶18.]  Appellee asks that appellant be ordered 
to pay attorney's fees and damages for requiring her to defend this appeal. Rule 
10.05, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides:

"When, in a civil case, 
the judgment or final order is affirmed, appellee shall recover the cost for 
typewriting and reproducing his brief, such cost to be computed at the rate 
allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence. Unless the court 
certifies that there was reasonable cause 
for the appeal, there shall also be taxed as part of the costs in the case, a 
reasonable fee, to be fixed by the court, not less than one hundred dollars 
($100.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), to the counsel of the 
appellee, and to the appellee damages in such sum as may be reasonable, not 
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), unless the judgment or final order 
directs the payment of money, and execution thereof was stayed, when in lieu of 
such penalty, it shall bear additional interest at a rate not exceeding five 
percent (5%) per annum, for the time for which it was stayed, to be ascertained 
and awarded by the court." (Emphasis added.)

[¶19.]  Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P. requires that we 
assess attorney fees and damages against appellant unless we certify "that there 
was reasonable cause for appeal." We cannot make this certification. This appeal 
is without merit. Appellee not only incurred the expense of proceedings in the 
district court, but additional expense in this court, all because of appellant's 
dereliction. Accordingly, we will add a reasonable attorney's fee and damages as 
costs.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.