Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE INJURY TO EDWARD SHAPIRO, AN EMPLOYEE OF: JELCO, INC. EDWARD SHAPIRO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE INJURY TO EDWARD SHAPIRO, AN EMPLOYEE OF: JELCO, INC. EDWARD SHAPIRO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION1985 WY 96703 P.2d 1079Case Number: 84-276Decided: 07/24/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
INJURY TO EDWARD SHAPIRO, AN EMPLOYEE OF: JELCO, INC. EDWARD SHAPIRO, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX 
REL. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT), JELCO, INC., 
(RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
Stephen R. 
Johnson, Gillette, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from the granting of additional worker's compensation benefits under § 
27-12-405(d), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). Appellant Edward Shapiro 
applied for and received additional benefits from the district court, but did 
not agree with the computation method used by the court.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises a 
single issue:

"Is the proper date to 
measure entitlement for additional benefits pursuant to W.S. 27-12-405(d) for an 
employee with continued zero earning power the date of the original 
injury?"

[¶4.]     Appellant suffered a 
major heart attack on June 30, 1977, while in the employ of Jelco, Inc. He was 
awarded temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $806.09 per month 
from July 1, 1977, until October 14, 1977, when he received an award for 
permanent total disability in the amount of $30,000 to be paid at the rate of 
$537.42 per month. Additionally, his children were awarded a monthly stipend 
during their minority.

[¶5.]     On March 30, 1983, 
appellant was awarded additional benefits under § 27-12-405(d) in the amount of 
$500 per month for two years retroactive to July, 1982, the date the original 
benefits ran out. The court's order provided that these additional benefits 
would terminate in July, 1984.

[¶6.]     On July 20, 1984, 
appellant again filed a petition requesting additional benefits. On September 
25, 1984, the district court awarded additional benefits of $537.42 per month on 
a permanent basis, finding in part:

"5. That the employee 
currently has zero earning capacity, even though monthly expenses are 
substantial, and therefore the employee is entitled to additional 
benefits.

"6. That the appropriate 
date from which to measure entitlement is October [June], 1977, the date of the 
injury.

"7. That 2/3 of the 
state's average monthly wage in October [June], 1977 was 
$537.42.

"8. That the Court erred 
in its 1983 Order when computing additional benefits to be $500.00 and therefore 
the employee is entitled to a lump sum payment of $898.00 (37.42 X 
24).

"9. That the employee is 
entitled to receive additional compensation at a rate of $537.42 per month 
retroactive to July 1, 1984, during his lifetime and so long as his earning 
capacity remains impaired.

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 
that the employee, Edward Shapiro shall receive a lump sum payment of 
$898.00.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the employee shall receive $537.00 per month additional 
benefits."

[¶7.]     At the time of 
appellant's injury and the first time he was awarded additional benefits in 
March, 1983, § 27-12-405(d), W.S. 1977, provided in relevant 
part:

"(d) Upon the expiration 
of the period of time in which the amount awarded to the employee for permanent 
total disability would be paid in its entirety at the monthly rates fixed by 
law, the district court may award additional compensation to the injured 
employee for any continuing impairment of his earning power resulting from the 
original injury, subject to the following:

"(i) A claim for 
compensation must be filed by the employee, or by someone in his behalf, and a 
hearing held;

"(ii) The employee shall 
establish that his earning power has been and continues to be impaired by reason 
of the injury for which compensation was awarded;

"(iii) In determining 
whether there has been an impairment in the employee's earning power, the 
district court shall consider the amount which the employee is currently capable 
of earning in comparison with his earnings at the time of his 
injury;

"(iv) The maximum monthly 
amount of additional compensation shall not exceed two-thirds of the state's 
average monthly wage, less:

"(A) The employee's 
current monthly earning power, less taxes payable by the employee to the state 
or federal government on the earnings; and

"(B) The amount received 
monthly by the employee from any other state or governmental agency on account 
of disability resulting from the original injury."

[¶8.]     In 1983, the 
legislature repealed subsection (d)(iv)(B) of § 27-12-405 quoted above. This 
repeal was effective May 27, 1983, and provided for retrospective 
application:

"Any living employee 
awarded additional compensation for permanent total disability under W.S. 
27-12-405(d) before the effective date of this act shall be reimbursed for the 
total amount subtracted from his additional compensation pursuant to W.S. 
27-12-405(d)(iv)(B)." Ch. 
106, § 3, S.L. of Wyoming, 1983.

In calculating the 
maximum monthly amount of additional benefits to which appellant was entitled, 
the district court used the state's average monthly wage in effect at the time 
of appellant's injury under § 27-12-405(d)(iv) which provides, "The maximum 
monthly amount of additional compensation shall not exceed two-thirds of the 
state's average monthly wage." Appellant contends the district court erred when 
it used the state's average monthly wage in effect at the time of his injury. 
Conversely, appellant urges that the district court should have awarded 
additional benefits based on the current state's average monthly rate at the 
time of application.

[¶9.]     In reaching its 
decision to use the wage rate at the time of injury, the district court 
found:

"The additional benefits 
are 2/3 of the state's average monthly wage. The problem is to decide the date 
from which to measure. Mr. Shapiro claims entitlement at the current rate but 
that is not necessarily correct. The rate has varied substantially over the 
years, peaking at $1,255.06 in October, 1982. The rates at critical dates in 
this case are:

MONTHLY                  

DATE                                     
EVENT                       
AMOUNT

June, 1977                 
Date of injury              
            
$   
537.42

October, 1977           
Date of permanent 

award                         
            
$   
566.41

July, 1982                   
Date permanent award 

paid out                      
            
$1,237.77

March, 1983              
Date of order for 

additional benefits                
$1,011.22

July, 1984                   
Date of latest application 

for additional benefits 
          
$   
971.38

"I conclude the 
appropriate date from which to measure entitlement is the date of injury. 
Several considerations lead to that conclusion. First, the permanent award is 
calculated as of the injury date. W.S. § 27-12-405(b). Second, changes to the 
statutes do not apply to injuries completely apparent and compensable before the 
change. Bemis v. Texaco, 400 P.2d 529 (Wyo. 
1965); WyomingState Treasurer v. Schultz, 444 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1968). If the 
legislature intended retroactive application of increased rates it would have 
said so expressly as it did in requiring a refund of deductions. Third, it is 
unlikely the legislature intended to confer a bonus upon a person incapacitated 
beyond the payout period of the original permanent award. To compute Mr. 
Shapiro's additional discretionary benefits as of the expiration of his 
permanent award (July, 1982) would more than double his monthly entitlement and 
to use current rates would almost double it."

[¶10.]  We are in accord with the district 
court's reasoning here. We have not been cited to, nor have we found, any case 
where this issue has been previously addressed by this court. Therefore, resort 
must be made to rules of statutory construction. When we look at the provisions 
of § 27-12-405(d)(iv) in pari materia with other relevant provisions, as we 
must, we find the district court was correct in using the state's average 
monthly wage at the time of the injury. When making an award of permanent total 
disability under subsection (b) of the same statute, such award is based upon 
"two-thirds (2/3) of the state's average weekly wage at the time of the injury." (Emphasis 
added.) Section 27-12-405(b). Therefore, it seems logical to also use the 
average monthly wage in effect at the time of the injury when making an award of 
additional benefits under subsection (d) of the same statute, § 
27-12-405(d).

[¶11.]  It is true that the purpose and effect of 
worker's compensation statutes is to place the onus of industrial accidents upon 
industry and not the worker. To effectuate such purpose, worker's compensation 
statutes are to be liberally construed to protect employees who sustain injury 
while working. Bauer v. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048 (1985); and Matter of Johner, 
Wyo., 643 P.2d 932 (1982). But such statutes may not be so construed to cover situations 
clearly not within the intended ambit of such laws. Abas v. Worker's Compensation Division, 
701 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1985); Matter of Van 
Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 
(1983); Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982). An employee's claim 
is governed by the laws in effect at the time of injury. Wyoming Refining Company v. Bottjen, Wyo., 695 P.2d 647 (1985); and In the Matter of 
Barnes, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 214 (1978). In the absence of express statutory authority, we are not 
at liberty to apply a remedial statute retrospectively. Wyoming Refining 
Company v. Bottjen, supra; and Bemis 
v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 400 P.2d 529, reh. denied 401 P.2d 708 
(1965).

[¶12.]  In Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's 
Compensation Department v. Schultz, Wyo., 444 P.2d 313 (1968), an employee 
injured in 1962 filed an accident report some two and one-half years after 
injury seeking a permanent disability award. The district court awarded the 
employee permanent partial disability based on the maximum allowable 
compensation under the 1965 amendment to § 27-85, W.S. 1957. The state appealed, 
contending the district court erroneously applied such amendment 
retrospectively. This court reversed the district court's award, finding that 
the court could not apply the 1965 amendment retrospectively; rather, the 
district court was directed to award benefits to the employee based on the 
statute in effect at the time of the injury.

[¶13.]  In the present case, we find that the 
district court was correct in awarding appellant additional benefits based upon 
the state's average weekly wage at the time of the injury. When the legislature 
repealed subsection (d)(iv)(B) of § 27-12-405, it directed that such repeal be 
given retrospective effect. If the legislature had intended such effect be given 
subsection (d)(iv) of § 27-12-405, i.e., that additional benefits be awarded 
based upon the current state average weekly wage, it could have expressly 
directed so. Appellant would have us hold that the legislature intended 
additional benefits be awarded based upon the state's average weekly wage at the 
time of application and that such be recalculated each month to reflect the 
current wage. We cannot adhere to such a view and decline to do so, noting that 
such a construction would create a plethoric morass of administrative 
difficulties.1

[¶14.]  We find no error in the district court's 
award of additional worker's compensation benefits to 
appellant.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, 
C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, with whom ROSE, J., joined.

1 The dissent opines that 
there would be no conceived burden in recomputing the award each month to 
reflect the state's current average weekly wage. It is difficult to see how such 
a view can be supported given the current administrative workload in 
distributing worker's compensation benefits without having to additionally 
recompute the award each month.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶16.]  I must disagree with the result reached 
by the majority opinion and with the essential rationale for that decision. In 
light of our rule, recognized in the majority opinion, that the purpose and 
effect of the worker's compensation laws is to remove the burden of industrial 
accidents from the worker, and therefore these statutes should be liberally 
construed to protect the injured employee (Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048 (1985); Matter of Johner, Wyo., 643 P.2d 932 
(1982)), I cannot justify a construction of a statute specifically designed to 
protect an injured employee and his family based upon a long-term continued 
impairment of his earning power which affords him about half of the amount 
needed. It is clear from the table encompassed in the quotation from the 
district court's decision that inflation had a substantial impact upon average 
monthly wages during the period between 1977 and 1983.

[¶17.]  I cannot identify a retrospective 
application of a statute in this instance because the statutory language was 
identical at all relevant times. The only question to be decided is whether 
"two-thirds of the state's average monthly wage," used in § 27-12-405(d)(iv), 
W.S. 1977, means two-thirds of the average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
or two-thirds of the average weekly wage at the time of the additional 
award.

[¶18.]  It seems to me that there is as much 
logic and more policy justification for equating "two-thirds of the state's 
average monthly wage" with the phrase "the state's average weekly wage rate as 
determined quarterly" which appears in § 27-12-405(b), W.S. 1977, as there is to 
equating it with "two-thirds (2/3) of the state's average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury." The entire statutory plan must be read in pari materia to 
determine what the legislature intended. Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 551, 553-554 (1982), and the authorities 
there cited. This case demonstrates that the legislature knew how to use the 
qualifier "at the time of the injury" when it wished to so qualify the award, 
because it did so in § 27-12-405(b), W.S. 1977. When language appears in one 
section, but is absent from the other, this court ought not to transfer the 
language, and should not add words to a statute under the guise of 
interpretation. Wetering v. Eisele, 
Wyo., 682 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1984); Matter of Voss' Adoption, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 485 
(1976). The omission of words from a statute is to be considered 
intentional.

[¶19.]  While other justifications might abound, 
the foregoing simply demonstrates that the language governing the award of 
additional benefits need not be limited necessarily to two-thirds of the average 
salary at the time of the injury. This simply leaves the section without 
qualification, and in order to discover if there is any limitation on the 
additional award this court ought to look at the purpose of the statute in 
question. The court should identify the mischief the statute was intended to 
cure. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Holz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732 (1983); Saffels v. Bennett, Wyo., 630 P.2d 505 
(1981), overruled on other grounds, Wetering v. Eisele, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1055 
(1984); Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978).

[¶20.]  It is apparent to me that in adopting § 
27-12-405(b), the mischief the legislature intended to deal with was the 
economic plight of an injured worker whose disability continued beyond the 
period for which his initial award would support him and his family. The 
legislature wanted to avoid leaving this admittedly permanently disabled 
employee without sufficient support. A liberal construction of the statute would 
lead to providing adequate additional support benefits to the injured employee 
who still experiences difficulties beyond the initial five-year period of 
benefits provided for in § 27-12-405(b). In an inflationary economy, tying the 
additional benefits to the earlier average salary has the effect of defeating 
the purpose of the statute, which essentially vests the trial court with 
discretion to award a suitable amount.

[¶21.]  I recognize that the statute does not 
require the trial court to award the two-thirds of the average salary at the 
time of the hearing; although it does appear that in this instance the trial 
court intended to award what it perceived as the maximum benefits. The court 
still would have the discretion, however, to award some lesser amount because 
the statute simply provides that the district court may award additional 
compensation. I therefore would be disposed to reverse the district court and 
remand the case for a determination as to the amount of additional award which 
the district court deemed appropriate, bearing in mind that it could award as 
much as two-thirds of the average monthly wage at the time of the award. I do 
not conceive that this imposes a burden upon the system to recompute the award 
each month thereafter.