Case Title: Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Studer, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Studer, Inc.1998 WY 160970 P.2d 389Case Number: 97-152Decided: 12/18/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Gretchen CAMPBELL, as personal representative for Thomas 
CAMPBELL, deceased; and the Estate of Thomas Campbell, deceased, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

STUDER, INC., a Wyoming 
corporation; Russell G. Sage, individually and as President of Studer, Inc.; 
Barbara L. Sage, individually and as Secretary of Studer, Inc.; NACCO Materials 
Handling Group, Inc., d/b/a Hyster Company, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Robert W. Horn 
and Vonde M. Smith of Robert W. Horn,. P.C., Jackson, WY. Argument presented by 
Ms. Smith, Representing Appellant.

Jeffrey C. 
Brinkerhoff and Keith M. Aurzada of Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, 
WY. Argument presented by Mr. Brinkerhoff, Representing 
Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ., and DONNELL, 
D.J.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

 

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Thomas Campbell 
was ejected from the seat of a road compactor, fell into its path, and later 
died from his injuries. Appellant Gretchen Campbell filed suit against 
appellees, the manufacturer and the distributor of the compactor, alleging 
defective design. She now appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of 
appellees, maintaining the district court erred in refusing to credit the 
testimony of her proposed expert that the compactor was unreasonably dangerous 
as designed. Finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to consider the expert's 
conclusions, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Campbell presents 
the following issues for review:

I. The trial 
court erroneously discounted the testimony of Plaintiff's expert testimony [sic] 
in its decision to dismiss Plaintiff's claims.

II. The trial 
court relied on improper evidence in each of its findings that Plaintiff failed 
to show that [the] product was unreasonably dangerous or that the manufacturer 
was negligent.

Appellees phrase 
the issues as:

1. Is qualified 
expert testimony necessary to withstand summary judgment in a strict products 
liability/negligent design case involving the design of a complex motorized 
piece of heavy construction equipment?

2. Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion when it found that Appellant's expert was not 
qualified to testify concerning the design and safety of a C530A, 12-ton, 
pneumatic-tired, diesel-powered, construction compactor when the "expert" has 
never designed any compactor, any similar vehicle, any motorized heavy 
equipment, any motor vehicle, or any component for a compactor and when he has 
not designed or tested for feasibility any of the components he 
recommends?

3. Did Appellant 
fail to present admissible evidence concerning her claims of a defective and 
unreasonably dangerous design, negligence, and causation?

FACTS

[¶3]      On August 26, 
1993, while operating a 12-ton Hyster C530A asphalt compactor, Thomas Campbell 
was apparently ejected from his seat when the compactor hit the rear end of his 
employer's truck. No one witnessed Mr. Campbell's fall, however a co-worker 
arrived to see the compactor, moving at full throttle in a counter-clockwise 
direction, run over Mr. Campbell. He died later that day from his 
injuries.

[¶4]      Mrs. Gretchen 
Campbell (Campbell) filed a wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of herself and the 
Campbells' two children and as representative of her late husband's estate, 
asserting claims for negligence and strict product liability. Campbell named as 
defendants Studer, Inc., the distributor that sold the compactor to Natrona 
County in 1971, and NACCO Materials Handling Group, the successor to Hyster Co., 
the manufacturer and designer of the compactor. Campbell claimed the design of 
the C530A was defective because it did not have safety equipment to keep the 
operator in the seat and it lacked an automatic shutoff device to stop the 
machine in case of operator ejection.

[¶5]      After extensive 
discovery, Studer and NACCO (collectively "appellees") moved for summary 
judgment. In support of this motion, appellees submitted the affidavit and 
deposition testimony of Mr. George Herbst, a mechanical engineer directly 
involved as the project engineer in the design, development and testing of the 
C530A. Mr. Herbst testified that the C530A was a self-propelled, pneumatic 
compactor, designed to compact asphalt or similar materials on smooth, flat, 
level surfaces such as highways, parking lots and airport runways. While 
compacting, the C530A is driven in a back and forth motion at speeds of three to 
five miles per hour. At top speed it can go approximately fifteen to seventeen 
miles an hour.

[¶6]      The design of the 
C530A introduced "articulated frame steering" and two side-mounted seats to 
enable the operator to move from seat to seat to more safely view the operations 
from either side while driving in forward or reverse. Prior to manufacture, the 
C530A prototype was tested for two years. Tilt, platform, and field tests 
demonstrated that the machine was stable and posed no risk of operator ejection 
or rollover during its intended use. Before the manufacture of the C530A, six 
years of field experience with a nearly identical model did not indicate 
additional safety devices were needed. In the thirty years that the C530A and 
other similar cockpit designs have been in use, there have been no problems with 
"fore and aft" ejections other than Mr. Campbell's 
accident.

[¶7]      Addressing 
specific safety devices, Mr. Herbst testified that an automatic shutoff device 
was not practical or appropriate for the C530A. The operation of the C530A, a 
back and forth movement requiring uniform speeds for extended periods, dictates 
against a device which requires constant operator pressure that would add to 
fatigue, divert the operator's attention, and restrict operator movement from 
seat to seat for optimum visibility and control. An automatic shutdown of the 
C530A without continuous operator pressure would take a relatively complex 
system, and no such system had been designed or tested at the time the C530A was 
manufactured. Moreover, unintended shutdown poses several potential safety 
problems, including operator ejection and loss of steering 
capability.

[¶8]      Mr. Herbst 
further testified that seat belts were not incorporated into the design because, 
without a rollover protective structure (ROPS), seat belts can trap an operator 
in a rollover situation. At the time this machine was manufactured, the design 
of ROPS was in its infancy. There was no ROPS design developed for a pneumatic 
tire compactor; no manufacturer provided one on similar machines; and no 
regulation or standard required a ROPS on pneumatic compactors such as the 
C530A. Safety and operational concerns were also inherent in the utilization of 
ROPS and a seat belt on this machine, such as reduced access and egress, reduced 
access to the steering wheel, and a reduction in maneuverability and 
clearance.

[¶9]      The C530A design, 
later adopted by other manufacturers, is still used today and complies with all 
applicable industry safety standards and regulations. On the basis of the 
foregoing, Mr. Herbst concluded that the C530A was not defective and was more 
than reasonably safe for a consumer utilizing the machine as 
intended.

[¶10]   In response, Campbell submitted the 
deposition testimony of her expert, Mr. Robert Hathaway. Mr. Hathaway received a 
bachelor of science in electrical engineering in 1956, and for six months 
thereafter worked for the Army Corps of Engineers teaching the operation and 
maintenance of road building equipment. He also sold Ford farm and industrial 
equipment, designed electrical systems components for aerospace projects, and 
later designed instrumentation for the mining industry. None of the equipment 
associated with this work history included a compactor similar to the 
C530A.

[¶11]   Between 1975 and 1985, Mr. Hathaway 
was a consultant on corporate acquisitions for a steel company, analyzing 
"liabilities or problems" that may exist with the "product performance" of a 
company being considered for purchase. His consulting was limited to products 
associated with the steel industry, and during this time he did not design any 
heavy construction equipment or an operator cockpit for any piece of 
equipment.

[¶12]   Between 1985 and the time of his 
deposition, Mr. Hathaway was employed as a litigation consultant, providing 
product analysis and expert opinions. His experience with the design of the 
safety devices at issue in this case was derived from on-the-job training during 
this period of time. At the time of Mr. Hathaway's deposition, he had no formal 
education in mechanical engineering; he had never participated in the overall 
design of operator-controlled heavy construction equipment; he had never 
designed a shutoff control for heavy motorized equipment; and he had never 
personally seen or driven the C530A. Hathaway further admitted that he had not 
attempted to design or test an actual application of the safety devices he 
recommended to the C530A.

On this record, the 
district court found:

Plaintiff's expert has 
not been involved in the design of a compactor nor in the designs of any of the 
safety features for compactors, including the features he recommends for this 
machine. He has not tested this machine or a similar one. He has not tested for 
feasibility of the changes he recommends. The expert witness for Defendants has 
done all of those things. Thus, Plaintiff's expert is not in a position to 
dispute the expert of Defendants, nor to raise issues of material 
fact.

The district 
court entered its order granting summary judgment for appellees, and Campbell 
timely filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶13]   Our recent statement pertaining to 
the standard for summary judgment review in negligence cases is appropriate to 
the facts of this case:

Summary judgment is 
considered a drastic remedy because it operates to deprive a litigant of the 
right to trial. As such, it should only be granted with caution and restraint. 
This is particularly true in negligence cases.

Appellate scrutiny of 
summary judgments necessitates a de novo review of the entire record, affording 
the opposing party the benefit of all favorable inferences to be drawn from that 
record. Thereafter, summary judgment shall not be affirmed unless no material 
fact remains in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Materiality is a function of a fact's capacity to establish or refute 
any essential element of a claim or defense thereto.

When the party moving for 
summary judgment has established a prima facie case, the burden of production 
shifts to the opposing party who then is obliged to marshal admissible evidence, 
as opposed to general or conclusory allegations, establishing continuing 
viability of an issue of material fact. Such evidence must be competent and 
admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated 
by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful 
speculation.

Estate of 
Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co., 939 P.2d 233, 236 (Wyo. 1997) (citations 
omitted).

[¶14]   Campbell claims that summary 
judgment is dependent on the district court's refusal to accept the testimony of 
her expert as sufficient to establish a viable issue of material fact. A 
district court is vested with discretion to exclude expert testimony if it is 
deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the trier of the factual issues. Hatch v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 930 P.2d 382, 388-89 (Wyo. 1997); Lyden By 
and Through Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 455 (Wyo. 1996). Such a determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Wyo. 1996). "In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did." DJG v. MAP, 883 P.2d 946, 947 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Martinez 
v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)).

DISCUSSION

[¶15]   The "requirement of showing a 
defect is one element common to every products liability case." McLaughlin v. 
Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting W. KIMBLE & R. 
LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 53, at 69 (1979)). A defective product is a product 
which is "not reasonably safe," or is "unreasonably dangerous" to the user or 
consumer. Id.; Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 344 (Wyo. 1986). 
If a product is safe for normal handling and consumption, it is not defective. 
Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 835 (Wyo. 1974) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A(h) (1965)).1

[¶16]   The only testimony offered to 
refute appellees' evidence that the C530A was not defective is that of Mr. 
Hathaway. Expert testimony is the subject of W.R.E. 702, which 
provides:

If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise.

It is not the 
purpose of W.R.E. 702 to provide for blanket admissibility of expert testimony. 
Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 388; Lyden, 913 P.2d  at 455; Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific, 
859 P.2d 85, 87 (Wyo. 1993). Before ruling the testimony admissible, the trial 
court must determine that the witness has the "specialized knowledge" necessary 
to render an opinion on the subject, and that the opinion will assist the trier 
of fact. Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 389; Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & 
Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1189-90 (Wyo. 1992). "Whether 
the evidence assists the trier of fact is premised on the reliability of that 
evidence." Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 443 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Frenzel 
v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 750 (Wyo. 1993)).

[¶17]   In Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), the 
United States Supreme Court held that when scientific expert testimony is 
offered, the trial court must perform a gatekeeping function to ensure "that an 
expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the 
task at hand." Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 597, 113 S. Ct.  at 2799. Offering "general 
observations," the Court suggested that appropriate factors for the trial 
court's consideration may include "whether the scientific theory or technique: 
1) can or has been tested; 2) has been the subject of publication or peer 
review; and 3) has a 'known or potential error rate.' " Springfield, 860 P.2d  at 
443, (citing Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97). As we stated in 
Springfield, "If there is no proper foundation laid, then expert testimony does 
not 'assist' the jury in the search for the truth." Id. (quoting Ferris v. 
Myers, 625 P.2d 199, 204 (Wyo. 1981)).

[¶18]   The district court compared this 
case to our decision in Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 
(Wyo. 1974). There, the driver of a logging unit was injured when his trailer 
jackknifed, causing the tractor to roll. The driver filed suit, alleging the 
manufacturer and distributor of the tractor and trailer were liable under 
theories of negligence and strict product liability for failing to include a 
roll bar and padding in the design of the tractor, and failing to provide a 
device with which the driver could jettison the trailer in the event of an 
emergency. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
the jettison device claims because the driver failed to provide any evidence 
apart from his expert's conclusions, supported only by drawings and a small 
model, neither of which had been tested. We affirmed the district court on 
appeal, stating: "If categorical assertions of ultimate facts without supporting 
evidence could be used to defeat summary judgment, this procedure would have no 
viability." Id. at 834.

[¶19]   Like the district court, we can see 
no material distinction between the facts of this case and those of Maxted. Mr. 
Hathaway had no personal experience in the design or manufacture of the type of 
machinery at issue, and had no independent support for his conclusions based on 
"scientific principles." Although Mr. Hathaway asserted that the technology for 
an alternative design using seat belts was being incorporated into compactors 
for the Army Corps of Engineers prior to the manufacture of the C530A, he also 
testified that at the time the C530A was designed and manufactured, "the concept 
of ROPS was in its infancy" and "ROPS [were] not very practical because of the 
weight." When asked what he meant by that, Mr. Hathaway 
explained:

A. Well, the reason that 
ROPS were not included for a long time on compactors is simply because of the 
structure required to make it strong enough to withstand the weight of the 
compactor, so for a long time they didn't - ROPS were not considered practical 
and they have since with design techniques and test codes come up with a way to 
make it practical, but there is one of the considerations in the early days why 
they didn't put ROPS on machines, on compactors, even when they were putting 
them on other machines.

Q. And certainly - I 
think you've already testified that you certainly should not have seat belts on 
a compactor without ROPS?

A. That's 
right.

Mr. Hathaway 
also stated that in 1965, when the C530A was designed, there were design 
criteria for ROPS for compactors, but not for the C530A, which was intended to 
work on relatively level and improved surfaces. Mr. Hathaway offered no 
testimony to indicate operator ejection was a known safety problem for the 
intended use of the C530A.

[¶20]   As to Mr. Hathaway's testimony on 
the necessity and feasibility of an automatic shutoff, he admitted he did not 
attempt to design or test a "deadman control" for this machine, but he had a 
design "concept." After explaining his concept, which involved an entire system 
of shutoffs, Mr. Hathaway stated:

That's just - the only 
reason I throw that out - I haven't designed it, don't intend to present it as a 
design. It's a concept. * * * The reason I throw it out is to demonstrate the 
feasibility of a - what did I call it - deadman control.

We agree with 
the district court that Mr. Hathaway's "concept" is insufficient to refute Mr. 
Herbst's testimony or to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the lack of an automatic shutoff rendered the C530A defective. Not only was this 
"concept" untested in any way, Mr. Hathaway admitted he had made no effort to 
actually determine whether his "concept" could be designed, nor did he consider 
what other hazards may be created with the implementation of his 
concept.

[¶21]   In light of both the quality of Mr. 
Hathaway's experience with the subject matter at issue and the speculative 
nature of his testimony, his testimony lacked sufficient foundation to assist 
the jury. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
discounted Mr. Hathaway's expert opinion.

[¶22]   Campbell also claims that the 
district court ignored the OSHA accident report which stated the opinion of the 
investigators that an automatic shutoff would have prevented the injury. This 
evidence, however, does not establish that such a switch was or is feasible for 
the C530A. Both OSHA investigators testified they had no formal training or 
direct experience in mechanical or design engineering for a motor vehicle or 
piece of heavy equipment, and no personal knowledge whether a shutoff system had 
ever been designed for equipment such as the C530A. Both investigators, however, 
stated there were no violations in the maintenance or condition of the 
compactor, and no requirement that the machine be fitted with an automatic 
shutoff switch.

[¶23]   The mere fact that an injury 
occurred is insufficient, in and of itself, to show the existence of a product 
defect. West v. Deere & Co., 145 Ill. 2d 177, 164 Ill.Dec. 122, 582 N.E.2d 685, 686 (Ill. 1991); Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184, 1186 (10th 
Cir. 1970). "[A] party may not rely upon conclusions nor can they be employed in 
disposing of a motion for summary judgment." Maxted, 527 P.2d  at 834. The 
plaintiff must offer some admissible evidence that the product was not 
reasonably safe for its intended or foreseeable use. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Wyo. 1983); O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1985); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d 519, 525-26 
(Wyo. 1982). After careful review of the entire record, it is clear that 
Campbell's case rested entirely on unsupported speculation by Mr. Hathaway. 
Campbell presented no admissible evidence which would indicate that the C530A 
was not reasonably safe when designed and manufactured; and, therefore, the 
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
appellees.

CONCLUSION

[¶24]   Other than the unsupported 
conclusory statements of Campbell's expert, no evidence was presented which 
would establish, at the time of manufacture, the existence of a feasible, safer 
design for the C530A compactor. Further, Campbell failed to show that the 
absence of safety devices rendered the machine not reasonably safe for its 
foreseeable or intended use. Consequently, the district court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment to All Defendants is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 We note the 
recent RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS:

PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998) provides:

§ 
2. Categories of Product Defect

A 
product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:

* * 
*

(b) 
is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial 
chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe.

The 
requirement that plaintiff show the existence of a reasonable alternative design 
as an element of her claim has been the subject of extensive debate. Comments b 
and e to this section, however, suggest an alternative design may not be 
necessary in every design defect case. We need not enter the debate at this time 
because Campbell's allegations clearly rest on her contention that a feasible 
alternative design was available.