Case Title: State v. Roble-Baker

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51978

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: May 25, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DAWN ELLEN ROBLE-BAKER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 001743FE; CA A118722; SC S51978)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 22, 2005.
Jennelle Meeks Barton, Office of Public Defense Services,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on
review.  With her on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive
Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
David Amesbury, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Jackson County Circuit Court, Daniel Harris, Judge. 195 Or App 415, 99 P3d 1239 (2004).
** Chief Justice when case was argued.
*** Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
KISTLER, J.
The issue in this case is whether the police violated
defendant's state constitutional right against compelled self
incrimination when they failed to advise her of her Miranda
rights before she admitted to killing her husband. (1)  The
trial court concluded that the officers had not violated
defendant's rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without
opinion.  State v. Roble-Baker, 195 Or App 415, 99 P3d 1239
(2004).  We reach a different conclusion and accordingly reverse
the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court judgment.
We state the facts consistently with the trial court's
explicit and implicit factual findings.  Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or
485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968).  Skeletal remains were discovered
on March 12, 2000, in the back yard of defendant's former rental
home in Trail, Oregon.  Before the police had identified the
remains, defendant telephoned the police, claiming that her
family members had told her that her husband's wallet and
identification had been found near the remains and that police
might be looking for her.  Detective Newell returned defendant's
call and asked about her husband's whereabouts in the preceding
years.  Defendant told Newell that her husband had left her three
or four years earlier, that she believed he was living in
Portland, but that she did not know how to get in touch with him. 
Defendant gave Newell her home and work telephone numbers and
told him that he could contact her if he had any more questions.
The skeletal remains were positively identified as
being those of defendant's husband on April 4, 2000.  The next
day, Newell and Detective Wright went to defendant's place of
employment and asked her if they could interview her.  Defendant
agreed to talk with the detectives, but her supervisor asked that
the detectives conduct the interview elsewhere.  The detectives
suggested that they conduct the interview at the Oregon State
Police Headquarters, a 20- to 25-minute drive from defendant's
office.  They told defendant that they could drive her to the
police headquarters and that they would bring her back to her
office after the interview.  She agreed. 
Defendant and the two detectives arrived at police
headquarters at about 10:00 a.m.  They sat in the facility's
interview room and discussed defendant's relationship with her
husband and the circumstances of his disappearance.  Newell
explained:
"We were asking questions about the circumstances
of her marriage, her relationship with her husband, the
-- where they had lived, children, what was the -- the
relationship, the family life like?  When was the last
time she had seen him, the circumstances concerning the
fact that he had left her and where they were living at
the time he left her."
Newell described the atmosphere during the interview as
"relaxed," with defendant periodically taking breaks to use the
bathroom or smoke cigarettes outside the building. 
Throughout those initial discussions, defendant denied
having any knowledge about her husband's death.  Based upon that
denial, Newell suggested that defendant take a polygraph test. 
He explained:
"I mentioned to her that this was a serious
investigation.  I explained to her that the remains had
been identified and they were her husband's.  And she
offered some explanations for that.  
"I suggested a polygraph test, and she told me
that she would not take a polygraph test, that she
didn't believe they were reliable.  * * *. 
"So I explained to her that, you know, with --
with a polygraph test she could take, she could be
truthful and we could eliminate her from any further
concern."
Because defendant claimed to be concerned about the test's
reliability and was reluctant to take it, Wright suggested that
defendant discuss the test with Detective Phillips, a polygraph
examiner for the Oregon State Police.  Defendant agreed to do so
and met with Phillips at approximately 12:25 p.m., almost two and
one-half hours after she had first arrived at police
headquarters. 
According to Phillips, the purpose of his conversation
with defendant was to "clear up any questions that she had about
a polygraph exam."  He gave her an "overview of what the exam
[was] going to be like," and explained to her that, before the
examination, she would be given Miranda warnings and that any
participation on her part would be voluntary.  During the course
of the conversation, defendant agreed to take the test but asked
Phillips if she could do so the following day.  Phillips told her
that, although he did not believe she would come back the next
day, "she'd always been free to leave," and that "if she wanted
to take the test [the next day], that would be fine."  At 1:55
p.m., after talking with defendant for one and one-half hours,
Phillips told defendant that they would check with Newell and
Wright to see if they had any more questions for defendant and to
confirm an appointment for a polygraph test the next day. 
While Phillips was discussing the polygraph test with
defendant, two detectives had gone to interview defendant's son
at his elementary school to "get some background into the
investigation."  When Phillips and defendant returned to the
interview room and Phillips informed the detectives that
defendant wanted to go home, Wright told defendant that her son
was being interviewed.  Because school ended early that day, he
told her that the detectives would bring her son back to police
headquarters when they were done. 
Concerned that defendant would not return the next day,
Newell suggested that defendant listen to some additional facts
regarding their investigation of her husband's death.  He
described that conversation as follows: 
"I was sitting in the interview room and Detective
Phillips and [defendant] came into the room.
"* * * * *
"Detective Phillips stood in the doorway and he
said that they had talked about a possible -- or a --
talked about something and wanted to share it. 
Detective Phillips had said that he had talked to
[defendant] and she wanted to go home, she wanted to
think about things.  We had talked a lot, and that she
could come back the next day, take an interview and --
or to give an interview or to take a polygraph test. 
And Detective Phillips thought that was a good idea and
he was throwing it out for discussion.
"* * * * * 
"At that point, I -- I expressed my concern that
she wouldn't come back.  I thought that she could blow
us off, just -- just choose not to come back.  And I
told her that[,] 'Maybe you should hear some more
information,' you know, explain to her more of the
facts that we knew, and I began to explain those facts
to her."
After Newell explained those additional facts, defendant suddenly
stood up and said, "'Well, why don't you just take me out and
hang me?'" (2)  She then walked outside to the smoking area,
stating, "'I need a smoke.'" 
Newell followed defendant outside to the smoking area,
and Wright joined them shortly afterwards. (3)  As defendant
smoked her cigarette, Newell told her to tell him why she had
killed her husband.  He testified:  
"I told her that it was -- that it was real important
to tell us why she had killed her husband.  I said
there's a lot of reasons, you know, and it's important
to know why."
Although there were long periods during which defendant did not
respond to Newell, she told him that she would make a statement
after speaking with her son.  She said, "'I don't have any
friends to talk to and I don't know any attorneys.  I just want
to spend some time with [my son].'" 
Because defendant was emotional, Newell was concerned
that she would harm herself or her son.  He told her, "'I'm
afraid that you will hurt yourself and you could hurt yourself or
your son both because of this whole thing coming to light.'" 
Defendant did not respond.  He then suggested what he described
as "a compromise," stating to defendant, "'Why don't we end this
nightmare now, and then you can talk to your son * * *.'"  Newell
testified that the conversation was "taking place over some time"
because "she was smoking cigarettes and she was pretty
emotional."  He stated that "[t]here was times when she would
just be quiet, she wouldn't say anything."  Eventually, Newell
faced defendant and asked her, "'Did he deserve that?'"  She
responded "no," explaining that "'[w]e had some bad times, but he
was a good man.'"  At some time between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.,
approximately five to six hours after the detectives began
questioning her, defendant said, "'I hope I'm doing the right
thing,'" and then she confessed to killing her husband, claiming
she had done so in self defense. 
Newell ended the interview, and Wright told defendant
that her son was at police headquarters. (4)  As Newell and
defendant walked back into police headquarters, Newell told
defendant that she needed to make arrangements for her son. 
Shortly after 4:00 p.m., the detectives allowed defendant to
spend time alone with her son.  At about 6:00 p.m., after
speaking with her son and eating dinner with the detectives,
defendant agreed to give a taped interview.  At the beginning of
that interview, Newell read defendant her Miranda rights.  On
learning her rights, defendant invoked her right to an attorney,
and the detectives terminated the taped interview. 
The state charged defendant with murder.  Before trial,
defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements she made to
the detectives, arguing that the detectives should have given her
Miranda warnings before questioning her and that her statements
were involuntary. (5)  She maintained that admitting her
statements at trial would violate her rights against compelled
self-incrimination under both Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
The trial court rejected defendant's arguments in part,
suppressing only the statements that she had made after she had
admitted killing her husband.  The court reasoned that Miranda
warnings were required after that admission because only at that
point was she in police custody.  The statements that preceded
her arrest, the court concluded, were voluntary and therefore
admissible.
Following the trial court's ruling, defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter in the
first degree, with leave to appeal the trial court's ruling on
her motion to suppress.  See ORS 135.335(3) (authorizing
defendants to enter conditional guilty pleas reserving right, in
writing, to appeal adverse pretrial rulings).  She appealed, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without
opinion.  Roble-Baker, 195 Or App at 415.  We allowed review to
consider whether the detectives obtained defendant's statements
in violation of her rights under either the state or the federal
constitution.  We begin with defendant's argument that Article I,
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution required the detectives to
give defendant Miranda warnings before she admitted killing her
husband.  See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123
(1981) (stating ordinary sequence of analysis).
Article I, section 12, provides in part that "[n]o
person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to
testify against himself."  To protect a person's right against
compelled self-incrimination under that section, this court has
held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings
to a person who is in "full custody" or in circumstances that
"create a setting which judges would and officers should
recognize to be 'compelling.'"  State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7, 791
P2d 836 (1990) (quoting State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265, 744 P2d
250 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On review, defendant argues that, at three distinct
points during her conversations with the police, the
circumstances became "compelling," triggering the requirement
that the police give her Miranda warnings.  First, she contends
that the circumstances became compelling when Newell suggested
that she take a polygraph test.  In the alternative, she asserts
that the circumstances became compelling after she expressed to
Phillips her desire to leave police headquarters.  Finally, she
argues that the circumstances became compelling when Newell
suggested "a compromise," stating to defendant, "'Why don't we
end this nightmare now, and then you can talk to your son * *
*.'"  Accordingly, defendant maintains that the trial court erred
when it failed to suppress her statements following those
distinct points that she now identifies.   
Before considering whether the detectives placed
defendant in compelling circumstances, we first address the
state's contention that defendant failed to preserve that issue
for this court's review.  The state maintains that, before the
Court of Appeals, defendant sought suppression of all her
statements, failing to identify -- as she does on review -- the
specific points at which the circumstances became compelling. 
Because defendant seeks to suppress fewer statements on review
than she attempted to suppress on appeal, the state contends that
defendant failed to preserve her claim that the detectives placed
her in compelling circumstances.  As explained below, we conclude
that defendant preserved her Miranda claim.
As a general rule, this court will not consider an
issue that the appellant did not preserve.  See State v. King,
307 Or 332, 338, 768 P2d 391 (1989) (declining to consider issues
that were not presented to the Court of Appeals).  Two purposes
of that rule are to promote judicial efficiency and to ensure
that "parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied
opportunities to meet an argument."  Davis v. O'Brien, 320 Or
729, 737, 891 P2d 1307 (1995).  In determining whether a party's
argument is properly preserved for this court's review, "we view
the record in light of the purposes of fairness and efficiency
that underlie the preservation requirement."  Northwest Natural
Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 328 Or 487, 499-500, 982 P2d 1117
(1999).
Defendant first raised the legal issue relevant to this
case -- i.e., whether she was in compelling circumstances when
she made unwarned statements to police -- before the trial court
in her motion to suppress.  After defendant filed that motion, it
was the state's burden to show that defendant's unwarned
statements were made before the circumstances became compelling. 
See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 137, 806 P2d 92 (1991) (holding
that the state must prove the voluntariness of a defendant's
statements under Article I, section 12, by a preponderance of the
evidence).  The trial court denied defendant's motion, and she
raised the issue again on appeal.  Although defendant now
identifies three alternative points at which she contends the
circumstances became compelling, neither the state's obligation
nor the reviewing court's inquiry has changed.  The state still
must show that defendant's unwarned statements were not made
while she was in compelling circumstances, and the reviewing
court must determine the point at which, if ever, the
circumstances became compelling.  We conclude that the state has
not been taken by surprise, misled, or denied the opportunity to
meet defendant's arguments.  Accordingly, we conclude that
defendant properly preserved her Miranda claim and that we may
consider it on review. (6)
We now turn to defendant's argument that her encounter
with the detectives evolved into "a setting which judges would
and officers should recognize to be 'compelling.'"  Magee, 304 Or
at 265.  In deciding whether a defendant's encounter with police
officers has so evolved, this court has considered a host of
factors, including:  (1) the location of the encounter, Smith,
310 Or at 7 (concluding that circumstances were not compelling,
in part, because detective met with defendant in noncustodial
facility "in surroundings relatively familiar to defendant"); (2)
the length of the encounter, State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 495,
930 P2d 221 (1997) (concluding that circumstances were not
compelling, in part, because "[t]he stop as a whole, and the
questions, were brief"); (3) the amount of pressure exerted on
the defendant, State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 205, 808 P2d 1002
(1991) (concluding that circumstances were not compelling, in
part, because there was no evidence that "police coerced or
pressured defendant to answer questions"); and (4) the
defendant's ability to terminate the encounter, Magee, 304 Or at
265.
Those factors are neither the exclusive factors that
this court will consider, nor are they to be applied
mechanically.  Rather, in determining whether the police placed a
defendant in compelling circumstances, this court will consider
all the circumstances, and its overarching inquiry is whether the
officers created the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that
Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.  See Magee, 304 Or
at 264-65 (recognizing that state Miranda requirement protects
same interests as federal requirement); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
US 436, 455-57, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966) (explaining
that warnings are necessary to ensure that a person's statement
is truly the product of free choice when that person is placed in
an "incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere").   
In arguing that the circumstances here were not
compelling, the state relies primarily on the fact that defendant
was free to leave.  It notes that defendant was "neither told
that she could not leave, nor prevented from leaving, until after
she was told she was under arrest."  Therefore, it maintains, the
detectives did not place her in compelling circumstances until
after she had confessed to killing her husband and the detectives
had told her she was under arrest. 
As the state's argument recognizes, in determining
whether the detectives placed defendant in compelling
circumstances, an important consideration is whether they
prevented her from leaving and thereby ending the encounter. 
Forced detention can become tantamount to an arrest, which will
trigger the need for Miranda warnings.  Consistently with that
principle, this court has held that compelling circumstances
exist when a police officer tells a defendant that he or she is
not free to leave the police station and terminate the encounter. 
See Magee, 304 Or at 266 (holding that Miranda warnings were
required before questioning when police officer told defendant he
could not leave police station).  Conversely, when a police
officer tells a defendant that he or she may terminate the
encounter -- and then allows that defendant to do so -- the
officer has not placed the defendant in compelling circumstances. 
See State v. Johnson, 340 Or 319, 332, 131 P3d 173 (2006)
(holding that defendant was not in compelling circumstances, in
part, because "when he asked the investigators to terminate the
interview and return him to his home, they did so"). 
Here, the detectives never explicitly told defendant
that she could not leave police headquarters and, during
Phillips' discussion with defendant, he told her that "she'd
always been free to leave."  However, as explained below, the
detectives' actions undercut the force of Phillips' statement.
After defendant told Phillips that she wanted to go
home, Phillips relayed that conversation to the other detectives. 
In response, Newell "expressed [his] concern that she wouldn't
come back" and told her that "[m]aybe [she] should hear some more
information."  Although the detectives did not explicitly tell
defendant that she could not leave, as was the case in Magee,
they also did not honor her request and terminate the interview,
as was the case in Johnson.  
Additionally, and more importantly, the detectives
created a situation in which defendant was required, for all
practical purposes, to remain at the police headquarters. 
Because the detectives had driven defendant to the police
headquarters -- a 20- to 25-minute drive from her work --
defendant was dependent upon them for leaving; she was not free
to leave unless and until they agreed to take her back to work. 
Beyond that, the detectives had told defendant that police
officers were interviewing her son at his elementary school and
that they would bring him to police headquarters when they were
finished.
Assuming that, with greater persistence, defendant
could have terminated the interview and secured a ride back to
work, she could have done so only if she decided not to wait for
her son.  As a practical matter, defendant could not leave until
her son arrived.  By failing to terminate the interview upon
defendant's request and by creating a situation that required
defendant to remain at police headquarters, the detectives
undermined their earlier representation that she was "free to
leave."    
Other evidence combined with that restriction to make
the circumstances compelling.  After Newell had given defendant
additional "information," she rose, exclaimed "why don't you take
me out and hang me[,]" left the interview room, and walked
outside to the smoking area.  Newell followed her to the smoking
area, and Wright soon joined him, thus continuing the interview
and preventing her from suspending it by leaving the room. (7) 
Once in the smoking area, Newell heightened the intensity of the
inquiry by putting questions to defendant that assumed her
guilt. (8)  He told her that "it was real important to tell
[the detectives] why she had killed her husband."  Defendant
again expressed a desire, albeit obliquely, to discontinue the
interview, stating, "I don't have any friends to talk to and I
don't know any attorneys.  I just want to spend time with [my
son]."  Again, her request was not granted.  Newell told her that
he was worried that she would hurt herself or her son "because of
this whole thing coming to light," and suggested a "compromise,"
stating, "Why don't we end this nightmare now, and then you can
talk to your son."  Instead of suspending the interview after
defendant's request, Newell pressed her once again to admit her
guilt by asking, "Did he deserve that?" 
By that time, defendant had spent five to six hours at
police headquarters.  She had asked to suspend the interview
twice, both times without success.  For all practical purposes
she could not leave police headquarters, both detectives had
followed her as she sought to leave the interview room for a
break, and Newell had continued to press defendant by asking
questions that assumed her guilt.  Considering all the above, we
conclude that, at the point Newell asked defendant, "Did he
deserve that," the detectives had created the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to
counteract.  Because the circumstances then became compelling and
because the detectives failed to advise defendant of her Miranda
rights, all defendant's statements after Newell asked her, "Did
he deserve that," should have been suppressed.  The trial court
and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. (9)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
1. Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution is an
independent source for warnings similar to those required under
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L
Ed 2d 694 (1966).  See State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265-66, 744
P2d 250 (1987) (so stating).  For ease of reference, we refer to
those warnings as Miranda rights or Miranda warnings.
2. The evidence at the suppression hearing does not
disclose what Newell told defendant.  Apparently relying on a
police report that was not admitted into evidence, the trial
court found that Newell had told defendant that he was concerned
about her safety and that it was reasonable to consider her a
suspect.  There is no evidence in the record, however, from which
the trial court could have made that finding.
3. Before Wright joined defendant and Newell in the
smoking area, he learned that defendant's son had arrived at
police headquarters. 
4. Newell did not know that defendant's son had arrived at
police headquarters until Wright told defendant. 
5. Defendant also argued that her statements should be
suppressed because they were the product of an illegal seizure of
her person in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution.  She has abandoned that argument on review.   
6. The state bases its contrary argument on the rule that
a general objection to the admission of evidence is insufficient
to preserve that issue for appellate review if any part of the
evidence is admissible.  See State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 359, 800
P2d 259 (1990) (stating rule).  That rule, however, applies to
the admission of evidence at trial and requires the parties to
put the trial court on notice of the specific problems that a
party perceives regarding the proffered evidence.  In this case,
the question presented by defendant's pretrial suppression motion
was the point, if any, at which the circumstances became
sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.  As
explained above, defendant's pretrial motion and her brief in the
Court of Appeals put both the state and the courts on notice of
that issue.
7. In Smith, this court concluded that a defendant was not
"in custody" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, in part, because the defendant could
have terminated his interview with police by leaving the room. 
310 Or at 9.  We also deem that consideration relevant to the
inquiry here -- that is, whether defendant's circumstances were
compelling for the purposes of Article I, section 12.  
8. See Miranda, 384 US at 455 (noting that "[t]he aura of
confidence in [a defendant's] guilt undermines his [or her] will
to resist").
9. As noted above, defendant advances other arguments on
review to suppress her statements at an earlier point.  She
argues that the detectives failed to give her Miranda warnings,
as required under the federal constitution.  The federal
constitution, however, did not require Miranda warnings at an
earlier point.  See Miranda, 384 US at 444 (requiring Miranda
warnings before questioning when person has been "taken into
custody").  She also argues that her statements to the detectives
were involuntary, in violation of ORS 136.425(1) (providing that
a statement is involuntary if "made under the influence of fear
produced by threats"); the Oregon Constitution, see State v.
Stevens, 311 Or 119, 132 n 9, 806 P2d 92 (1991) (stating that a
confession is involuntary if it is "procured by any threat or
promise, direct or implied"); and the United States Constitution,
see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 225-26, 93 S Ct 2041,
36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973) (stating that a confession is involuntary
if the defendant's "will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired").  Defendant's claim that
her statements were involuntary has no merit.