Case Title: Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92838

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92838-Agenda 14-May 2002.
MARLIN UNZICKER et al., Appellants, v. KRAFT FOOD 
 								INGREDIENTS CORPORATION, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal are several questions regarding both the
interpretation and constitutionality of section 2-1117 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)), which
modified the common law rule of joint and several liability.
Pursuant to section 2-1117, any tortfeasor whose percentage of
fault for a plaintiff's injuries is found to be "less than 25% of the
total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the
plaintiff, and any third party defendant who could have been sued
by the plaintiff" is only severally liable for the plaintiff's
nonmedical damages. 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994). In this
case, plaintiffs, Marlin and Theresa Unzicker, argue that the trial
court erred in applying section 2-1117, which resulted in a
judgment that defendant Kraft Food Ingredients Corporation
(Kraft) was liable for only 1% of Marlin's nonmedical damages.
Plaintiffs assert that Marlin's employer, third-party defendant
Nogle & Black Mechanical, Inc. (Nogle), whom a jury found to be
99% responsible for Marlin's injuries, should not have been
included in the division of fault. Plaintiffs contend that an
employer who is protected from suit by the Workers'
Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2000)) is not a
party who "could have been sued" by the plaintiff. Additionally,
plaintiffs contend that section 2-1117 is unconstitutional and that
the trial court erred in failing to answer the jurors' questions and
to give a certain jury instruction.

BACKGROUND
	The essential facts are undisputed. Marlin was injured on July
20, 1991, while he was installing stainless steel piping at Kraft's
plant in Champaign. Marlin and another Nogle employee, Mike
Mills, were standing on a "manlift" and welding flanges to a pipe.
Marlin's foreman, Mike Law, attempted to deliver some
equipment to him by bringing it in the basket of a forklift that was
owned by Kraft and operated by another Nogle employee. The
forklift collided with the manlift, causing Marlin and Mills to fall.
	Marlin applied for and received workers' compensation
benefits. Additionally, Marlin and his wife, Theresa, sued Kraft,
alleging negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act (740
ILCS 150/0.01 through 9 (West 1992), repealed by Pub. Act 89-2,
§5, eff. February 14, 1995). Kraft filed a third-party complaint for
contribution against Nogle.
	The jury found against plaintiffs on the Structural Work Act
claim, but in their favor on the negligence counts. The jury
awarded plaintiffs $879,400 in total damages, $788,000 of which
were nonmedical and $91,400 of which were medical. The jury
apportioned 1% of the fault to Kraft and 99% to Nogle.
	The trial court applied section 2-1117, which modified the
common law rule of joint and several liability. At common law, a
plaintiff could recover compensation for the full amount of his
injury from any defendant responsible for the injury. Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 423 (1997). Section 2-1117
modified this rule as follows:
			"Except as provided in Section 2-1118, in actions on
account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to
property, based on negligence, or product liability based
on strict tort liability, all defendants found liable are
jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's past and future
medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant
whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than
25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the
defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party
defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall
be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant
whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or
greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the
defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party
defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff,
shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages."
735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994).(1)
The trial court's application of this section and the Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq.
(West 2000)) rendered the verdict somewhat of a loss for plaintiffs
because Kraft was severally liable for only 1% of the nonmedical
damages, and Nogle was liable only for contribution in an amount
equal to its workers' compensation liability (Kotecki v. Cyclops
Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155, 164-65 (1991)). Thus, the trial
court entered judgment on the jury's verdict as follows. Kraft and
Nogle were jointly and severally liable for Marlin's past and future
medical expenses of $91,400. Kraft was severally liable for 1% of
the nonmedical damages ($7,880). On Kraft's third-party
complaint, Nogle was liable to Kraft for $90,486 in contribution,
which represented 99% of the medical damages.
	Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion in which they argued that
the trial court erred in applying section 2-1117. Plaintiffs'
argument was based on the Fifth District of the Appellate Court's
opinion in Lilly v. Marcal Rope & Rigging, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d
1105 (1997), in which the court held that a plaintiff's employer
should not be included in an allocation of fault under section
2-1117 because an employer, who is immune from suit under the
Worker's Compensation Act, is not a "third party defendant who
could have been sued by the plaintiff."
	The trial court denied the post-trial motion and found that
plaintiffs had waived their argument that section 2-1117 should
not apply. Kraft had initially raised the application of section
2-1117 as an affirmative defense in an amendment to its answer
to the complaint. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs had waived
their argument about section 2-1117 by failing to move to strike
the answer. The trial court noted, however, that it would have been
bound to follow Lilly if the issue had not been waived.
	Plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth District affirmed. 325 Ill.
App. 3d 587. The Fourth District disagreed with the trial court's
conclusion that the section 2-1117 issue had been waived and held
that section 2-1117 does not have to be raised as an affirmative
defense. Rather, because that section operates to allocate damages
according to the jury's verdict, issues relating to it can be raised in
motions filed after the verdict's entry. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 592. On
the underlying issue, however, the Fourth District disagreed with
Lilly and held that an employer can be included within the phrase
"any third party defendant who could have been sued by the
plaintiff." The court relied on Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1
(1984), in which this court held that employers are subject to the
Contribution Act, which applies where "[two] or more persons are
subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury." See 740
ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2000). In Doyle, this court explained that the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
(820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)) is in the nature of an affirmative
defense that is waived if not asserted. Until the defense is asserted,
the employer is subject to liability in tort. Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d  at 10-11. Therefore, the Fourth District concluded, if the phrase "subject
to liability in tort" in the Contribution Act can include a plaintiff's
employer, the phrase "any third party defendant who could have
been sued by the plaintiff" in section 2-1117 can also include a
plaintiff's employer. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 593. We granted plaintiffs'
petition for leave to appeal to resolve this conflict in the appellate
court.

ANALYSIS
I. Motions to Strike
	Before discussing the merits of the appeal, we address two
motions that we ordered taken with the case. Kraft moved to strike
part of plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal and part of their
opening brief. Kraft objected to plaintiffs' raising issues that they
did not raise in the appellate court. In the appellate court, plaintiffs
raised only whether employers can be included in a section 2-1117
division of fault and whether the trial court erred in refusing to
answer the jury's questions. In Garza v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 383 (1996), we held that
issues that the appellant fails to raise in the appellate court are
waived for purposes of our review. See also Hammond v. North
American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 209-10 (1983).
	Here, however, we choose not to apply waiver. Waiver is a
limitation on the parties and not on the court. Committee for
Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1996). Moreover,
we may consider an issue not raised below if the issue is one of
law and is fully briefed and argued by the parties. Committee for
Educational Rights, 174 Ill. 2d  at 11. The issues plaintiffs raise
regarding section 2-1117 are purely legal questions that have been
fully briefed. We believe that the public interest favors considering
the issues now, and thus we will not apply waiver. See Committee
for Educational Rights, 174 Ill. 2d  at 12. Accordingly, the motions
to strike portions of the petition for leave to appeal and the
plaintiffs' brief are denied.

II. Interpretation of Section 2-1117
	Our first inquiry is one of statutory construction. Plaintiffs
argue that the appellate court erred in holding that a plaintiff's
employer can be considered a "third party defendant who could
have been sued by the plaintiff" in determining percentages of
fault under section 2-1117.
	The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's true intent. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). When determining legislative intent, our starting
point is the statute's language, which is the most reliable indicator
of the legislature's objectives in enacting the particular law.
Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). When a statute's language is clear and
unambiguous, courts may not read in exceptions, limitations, or
other conditions. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 419.  Only when the meaning
of the provision cannot be ascertained from its language may a
court look beyond the language and resort to aids for construction.
Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 533-34 (1997). Because
statutory interpretation presents a question of law, our review is de
novo. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 189 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (2000).
	Whether a plaintiff's employer can be considered in a section
2-1117 division of fault was first considered in Lilly. In that case,
the plaintiff obtained a judgment of $1,200,005 against the
defendant. The jury apportioned 90% of the fault to the plaintiff's
employer, who was a third-party defendant, and 10% to the
defendant. Accordingly, the defendant argued that it should be
responsible for only 10% of the plaintiff's nonmedical damages.
The trial court disagreed and refused to reduce the judgment
against the defendant. The Appellate Court, Fifth District,
affirmed. Lilly, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1105.
	The Fifth District noted that section 5(a) of the Workers'
Compensation Act provides that " '[n]o common law or statutory
right to recover damages from the employer *** for injury or death
sustained by any employee *** other than the compensation herein
provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the
provisions of this Act.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Lilly, 289 Ill. App.
3d at 1107, quoting 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 1996). Thus,
according to the Fifth District, a plaintiff's employer is not a party
who "could have been sued" by the plaintiff. The defendant in
Lilly argued that Doyle mandated the opposite result. In Doyle, this
court considered whether employers were liable for contribution
under the Contribution Act. The relevant portion of the
Contribution Act provided that "where 2 or more persons are
subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury *** there
is a right of contribution among them." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 70,
par. 302(a), now 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2000). The issue in
Doyle was whether employers, who are immune from suit under
the Workers' Compensation Act, are liable for contribution given
that the Contribution Act applies only to those who are "subject to
liability in tort." This court held that the Contribution Act does
apply to employers, reasoning as follows:
			"The language relied on by the employer is neither
unambiguous nor should it be construed in the way the
employer seeks to apply it. The Workers' Compensation
Act provides employers with a defense against any action
that may be asserted against them in tort, but that defense
is an affirmative one whose elements-the employment
relationship and the nexus between the employment and
the injury-must be established by the employer, and
which is waived if not asserted by him in the trial court.
[Citations.] Thus, the plaintiff may recover a tort
judgment against his employer for a work-related injury
if the employer fails to raise the defense the Workers'
Compensation Act gives him [citation], and on occasion
the employer may choose not to raise it in the hope that
the plaintiff will be unable to prove negligence to a jury's
satisfaction. The potential for tort liability exists until the
defense is established. As this court has recently decided
in interpreting the phrase of the Contribution Act at issue
here, ' "liability" is determined at the time of the injury
out of which the right to contribution arises, and not at the
time the action for contribution is brought' [citations]. At
the time of an injury for which an employer's negligence
is partly responsible, the employer is in fact 'subject to
liability in tort' to his employee, although that liability can
be defeated depending on the response he chooses to
make to his employee's claim in the event the employee
decides to sue in tort." Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d  at 10-11.
	Lilly distinguished Doyle by noting that in Doyle this court
was considering only whether employers were liable for
contribution. Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. The court also noted
that the legislature was aware of this court's decision in Doyle
when it enacted section 2-1117. Thus, according to Lilly, if the
legislature had intended for employers to be covered by section
2-1117, it would have used the phrase "subject to liability in tort"
because that phrase had already been construed to include
employers. Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1108. Further, Lilly held that
by using the phrase "could have been sued," the legislature did not
mean to include merely theoretical actions. According to Lilly,
such a construction could include a plaintiff's wife, his state, his
god, or his pet iguana, because a plaintiff could theoretically file
a piece of paper naming such persons, animals, or entities as
defendants. Lilly concluded that the legislature did not intend
"such a ridiculous result." Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1113.
	In the present case, the Fourth District rejected the Fifth
District's interpretation. The Fourth District relied on Doyle,
finding that the reasoning this court employed in determining that
employers are "subject to liability in tort" would apply equally to
a statute referring to "any third-party defendant who could have
been sued by the plaintiff." Further, the Fourth District concluded
that the clear legislative intent in section 2-1117 was that
minimally responsible defendants should not be responsible for
entire judgments and that it would make no sense in allocating
fault to ignore the tortfeasor 99% at fault. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 593.
	We agree with the Fourth District's interpretation. When the
legislature enacted section 2-1117, it was aware of our
construction of the phrase "subject to liability in tort" in the
Contribution Act. We held that employers, despite their immunity
provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, are still subject to
liability in tort because the protection of the Workers'
Compensation Act is in the nature of an affirmative defense that
must be raised in the trial court if the plaintiff brings a suit. Doyle,
101 Ill. 2d  at 10; see also Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
175 Ill. 2d 201, 207-08 (1997) (section 5(a) of the Workers'
Compensation Act is in the nature of an affirmative defense that
may be waived by the employer); Geise v. Phoenix Co. of
Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994) (same). In section
2-1117, the legislature referred to a division of fault among the
plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party
defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff. Under our
analyses in Doyle, Braye, and Geise, a plaintiff's employer who is
a third-party defendant is a party who "could have been sued by
the plaintiff."
	In coming to this conclusion, we must reject Lilly's somewhat
fanciful hypothesis of legislative intent. According to Lilly, if the
legislature had intended to include employers in the division of
fault, it would have used the phrase "subject to liability in tort"
because this court had already construed that phrase as including
employers. Thus, according to Lilly, the legislature must have
meant something different by using the phrase "could have been
sued by the plaintiff." If, however, the legislature intended to use
language that would exclude employers, we believe that it would
have simply put in language specifically excluding employers. If,
as Lilly contends, the legislature was considering Doyle when it
drafted section 2-1117 and wanted that section to mean something
different, it is difficult to believe that the legislature would have
chosen a phrase such as "who could have been sued by the
plaintiff" instead of excluding employers explicitly.
	Further, we disagree with Lilly's sarcastic conclusion that
including an employer who has statutory immunity from tort suits
in the division of fault would mean that a plaintiff's pet iguana
could also be included because a person could physically file a
paper naming his pet as a defendant in a suit. Such an analysis
ignores the first part of the relevant statutory phrase. Section
2-1117 does not include in the division of fault "anyone who
could have been sued by the plaintiff." Rather, it includes "any
third-party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff."
In other words, the party must already have been brought into the
case by a defendant for that party to be included in the division of
fault. Unless defendants in tort suits begin filing contribution
claims against the plaintiff's pets, Lilly's fears of iguana litigation
will never be realized.
	The clear legislative intent behind section 2-1117 is that
minimally responsible defendants should not have to pay entire
damage awards. The legislature set the line of minimal
responsibility at less than 25%. In order to apportion
responsibility, the legislature looked to those people in the suit: the
plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party
defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff. In our
opinion, the broad wording in the statute merely shows that the
legislature intended the division of responsibility to include those
people in the suit who might have been responsible for the
plaintiff's injuries. Here, ignoring the party found to be 99%
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and requiring the party found
1% responsible to pay all of the nonmedical damages would not be
in accord with the clear legislative intent that minimally
responsible defendants should not be liable for entire judgments.
The appellate court did not err in holding that Nogle was properly
considered in the division of fault.

III. Alleged Conflict with the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act
	Plaintiffs next argue that section 2-1117 irreconcilably
conflicts with sections 3 and 4 of the Contribution Act. These
sections provide as follows:
			"Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each
tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his
relative culpability. However, no person shall be required
to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount
greater than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one
or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that
event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid
portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance
with their pro rata liability.
			If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a
group shall constitute a single share." 740 ILCS 100/3
(West 2000).
			"Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. A plaintiff's right to
recover the full amount of his judgment from any one or
more defendants subject to liability in tort for the same
injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not
affected by the provisions of this Act." 740 ILCS 100/4
(West 1994).
	According to plaintiffs, these two sections-section 4 explicitly
and section 3 implicitly-recognize a plaintiff's right to recover all
of his or her damages from any responsible defendant. Section
2-1117, by contrast, eliminates a plaintiff's ability to recover the
full amount of his or her nonmedical damages from any defendant
found to be less than 25% responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
	Where there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, a
court has a duty to interpret those statutes in a manner that avoids
an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an
interpretation is reasonably possible. McNamee v. Federated
Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 427 (1998). Here, giving
such an interpretation is not difficult because the statutes simply
do not conflict. Section 4 of the Contribution Act merely clarifies
that nothing in the Contribution Act affects a plaintiff's right to
recover the full amount of damages from any one or more
defendants. Section 2-1117 is not in the Contribution Act, so its
modification of joint and several liability does not conflict with
Section 4. Section 3 explains how the amount of contribution is
determined and what happens when one or more of the tortfeasors
is insolvent. Likewise, this section simply does not conflict with
section 2-1117's modification of the rule of joint and several
liability for minimally culpable defendants. Section 2-1117 comes
into play before the Contribution Act and is applied to determine
liability. Any defendant who pays damages in an amount greater
than his or her proportionate share of fault can then seek
contribution under the Contribution Act.
	Plaintiffs rely on dicta from Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 424-26, in
which this court discussed a potential conflict between the
amended version of section 2-1117 and section 4 of the
Contribution Act. We noted that, as part of Public Act 89-7, the
legislature simultaneously amended section 4 to provide that, with
the exception of limited contribution against a plaintiff's
employer, nothing in the Contribution Act was intended to affect
a plaintiff's right to recover all of his or her damages from one or
more responsible tortfeasors. As part of the same public act, the
legislature passed amended section 2-1117 (735 ILCS 5/2-1117
(West 1996)), which abolished joint and several liability in favor
of complete proportional several liability. Thus, the legislature
passed legislation that abolished joint and several liability and at
the same time recognized its continuing existence. Best, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 425. Also, as part of Public Act 89-7, the legislature enacted
section 3.5 of the Contribution Act, which codified the Kotecki
decision and provided that an employer's contribution liability
would be capped at an amount equal to the employer's workers'
compensation liability. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 416. We recognized
a potential conflict with the simultaneous enactment of this section
and amended section 2-1117 because there would never be a
reason to seek contribution if defendants were only severally liable
for a plaintiff's damages. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 416-18. Ultimately,
however, this court never determined whether these conflicts could
be resolved because we held that section 3.5 of the Contribution
Act and amended section 2-1117 were both facially
invalid-section 3.5 because of internal inconsistencies and
amended section 2-1117 because it was passed in violation of the
special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 416-33.
	Defendant's reliance on Best is misplaced. The potential
conflicts we identified there are simply not present between
original section 2-1117 and the Contribution Act. Section 2-1117
retains full joint and several liability for all past and future medical
expenses. Further, the act retains full joint and several liability for
those whose percentage of fault for the plaintiff's injuries is 25%
or greater. Joint and several liability is abrogated in favor of
several liability only for those defendants whose percentage of
fault is less than 25%. Thus, the Contribution Act and section
2-1117 are not in conflict. That those defendants whose
percentage of fault is less than 25% will not need to avail
themselves of the Contribution Act does not mean that the statutes
conflict.

IV. Conflict with the Purpose of Joint and Several Liability
	Plaintiffs next contend that section 2-1117 conflicts with "the
purposes of joint and several liability." Plaintiffs' argument is
based on Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104 (1983),
and dicta from Best. Plaintiffs argue that in Coney and Best this
court recognized certain policies supporting the retention of joint
and several liability. Neither of these decisions, however, intimate
that the legislature cannot make a policy decision in favor of
modifying joint and several liability. In Coney, the issue was
whether our adoption of comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar,
85 Ill. 2d 1 (1981), required us to abandon joint and several
liability. We noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions that had
adopted comparative negligence have retained joint and several
liability. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d  at 120-21. We recognized certain policy
justifications for retaining joint and several liability and concluded
that our adoption of comparative negligence did not require us to
abandon joint and several liability. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d  at 121-24. In
Best, we discussed the purpose of joint and several liability and
quoted extensively from Coney. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 426-29. This
discussion arose in the context of considering whether the
defendants' justifications for the legislature's complete abolition
of joint and several liability in favor of proportional several
liability were at odds with our understanding of joint and several
liability. However, we never resolved this question because we
decided that amended section 2-1117 was passed in violation of
the Illinois Constitution's special legislation clause. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 429.
	Plaintiffs' argument on this point is not entirely clear. The
legislature's intent in passing the statute was to modify the
common law rule of joint and several liability. The legislature
maintained joint and several liability, but modified it with respect
to payment of nonmedical damages by those less than 25% at
fault. The plaintiffs' argument begs the question of whether the
legislature can modify joint and several liability. Plaintiffs have
cited no authority for the proposition that such a change is not the
legislature's prerogative. In both of the above decisions, we
recognized certain policies in favor of joint and several liability.
We did not hold that no policies supported modifying the rule or
that the legislature is powerless to act in this area. Accordingly, we
reject plaintiffs' argument that section 2-1117 is invalid on this
basis.

V. Arbitrary Elimination of a Common Law Remedy
	Plaintiffs next argue that section 2-1117 is unconstitutional
as an arbitrary abolition of an established common law remedy.
Plaintiffs rely on article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution,
which provides that "[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in
the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his
person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by
law, freely, completely, and promptly." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12.
However, we have held repeatedly that this constitutional
provision is merely an expression of philosophy and not a mandate
that a certain remedy be provided in any specific form. Segers v.
Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 435 (2000); DeLuna v. St.
Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57, 72 (1992); Sullivan v.
Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277 (1972).
	Further, any suggestion that Marlin has not found a certain
remedy in the law for all injuries and wrongs which he received to
his person is not well-taken. A jury found Nogle 99% responsible
for Marlin's work-related accident. Plaintiffs acknowledges that
Marlin applied for and received worker's compensation benefits.
In Kotecki, we noted that the central concept behind worker's
compensation is that " 'the employer and employee receive the
benefits of a guaranteed, fixed-schedule, nonfault recovery system,
which then constitutes the exclusive liability of the employer to his
employee.' " Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d  at 162-63, quoting Lambertson
v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 119-20, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684
(1977). Here, Marlin received the benefit of the no-fault workers'
compensation system when he applied for and received his
benefits. Additionally, a jury assessed his tort damages and found
that Kraft was 1% responsible. Kraft was jointly and severally
liable for Marlin's medical damages and severally liable for 1% of
his nonmedical damages. Thus, Marlin's "certain remedy" in this
case is that his employer paid his workers' compensation benefits,
all of his past and future medical expenses will be paid, and Kraft
will pay its proportionate share of the nonmedical damages.
Plaintiffs' argument suggests that anything less than full payment
of workers' compensation benefits and full payment of a tort
judgment by a 1% responsible defendant is not a "certain remedy"
for all injuries and wrongs suffered by Marlin. We cannot agree.
The legislature did not arbitrarily abolish a remedy in section
2-1117, as plaintiffs suggest. Rather, the legislature merely
determined how judgments would be paid and determined that
minimally responsible defendants should not be required to pay
entire judgments.

VI. Special Legislation and Equal Protection
	Plaintiffs next contend that section 2-1117 violates both the
special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13) and equal
protection (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2) clauses of the Illinois
Constitution. Plaintiffs claim that the legislature created an invalid
classification when it enacted sections 2-1117 and 2-1118 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
	As we noted, section 2-1117 preserves the common law rule
of joint and several liability for medical damages and for all other
damages for those found to be 25% or more at fault for a
plaintiff's injuries. The statute replaced joint and several liability
with several liability with respect to nonmedical damages for those
found less than 25% responsible for a plaintiff's injuries. Section
2-1118 exempts two classes of defendants from section 2-1117.
Defendants in medical malpractice cases and defendants in actions
in which the injury was caused by the "discharge into the
environment of any pollutant, including any waste, hazardous
substance, irritant or contaminant, including, but not limited to
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, asbestos, toxic or
corrosive chemicals, radioactive waste or mine tailings, and
including any such material intended to be recycled, reconditioned
or reclaimed." (Hereinafter referred to as toxic tort cases.) 735
ILCS 5/2-1118 (West 1994).(2)
	Plaintiffs contend that the legislature created an arbitrary and
invalid classification when it retained full joint and several
liability for bodily injury or property damage only in toxic tort and
medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs argue that they are directly
harmed by the classification because if Marlin's injury would have
been caused by a 1% responsible toxic tort or medical malpractice
defendant, plaintiffs could have recovered all of their damages
from that defendant. Because Kraft does not fall into one of those
classifications, plaintiffs can recover only 1% of their nonmedical
damages from Kraft.
	All statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality,
and the party challenging the statute bears the burden of clearly
rebutting this presumption. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57-58 (2001). The constitutionality of a statute is a purely legal
question; thus, our review is de novo. Burger v. Lutheran General
Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 31 (2001).
	The special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from
conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or
a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated.
Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 391. However, the legislature has broad
discretion in making statutory classifications, and the clause
prohibits only those which are arbitrary. In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510, 519 (2002). In other words, the clause prevents
legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select
group without a sound and reasonable basis. Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at
519. The special legislation clause supplements the equal
protection clause, which prohibits arbitrary discrimination against
a person or class. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1988). When a legislative classification neither affects
fundamental rights nor makes a suspect classification, the statute
is reviewed under the rational basis test. Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 520.
Under this test, the statute is constitutional if the classification is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Bilyk, 125 Ill. 2d  at 236. If the court can reasonably conceive of
circumstances that justify distinguishing the class that the statute
benefits from the class outside its scope, the classification is
constitutional. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995).
	Here, plaintiffs concede that the appropriate test is the rational
basis test. Plaintiffs argue that there is no conceivable rational
basis for treating plaintiffs in toxic tort and medical malpractice
cases differently than other plaintiffs.
	The reason for the classification is not apparent from the face
of the statute. Consequently, we have undertaken a comprehensive
review of the legislative history of Public Act 84-1431 (Pub. Act
84-1431, eff. November 25, 1986), which added sections 2-1117
and 2-1118 to the Code of Civil Procedure. These sections were
enacted as part of a larger bill that addressed a perceived insurance
crisis in the state. Public Act 84-1431 was entitled, "An act in
relation to the insurance crisis." Speaking in support of the
legislation, Representative Greiman explained that:
			"Early in this year and in the late days of last year, it
became apparent to people all across this country that
there was a problem in the accessibility of insurance in
some lines and the affordability of commercial lines
everywhere. *** And so, we came to this Legislature to
see if we could develop a balanced piece of legislation
that would make insurance affordable for Illinois
businesses, for Illinois people, and accessible to us, so
that some of the excesses of the civil justice system might
be addressed, so that customers of insurance companies
might have a fair and reasonable time after they have been
cancelled or nonrenewed, to go into the marketplace and
secure substituted insurance." 84th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 5-6 (statements of
Representative Greiman).
	Public Act 84-1431 made extensive amendments to the
Illinois Insurance Code. Additionally, the legislation amended the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2000)) to expand the scope
of immunities provided to local public entities. See Sylvester v.
Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 509 (1997) (explaining that
Public Act 84-1431 expanded immunities afforded to local public
entities in an effort to reduce the cost of their liability insurance).
Public Act 84-1431 also made several amendments to the Code of
Civil Procedure, including adding sections 2-1117 and 2-1118.
Section 2-1117 modified joint and several liability for those found
less than 25% responsible. Representative Greiman explained the
exceptions to the rule as follows:
		"We made three exceptions to that [25%] rule. We said
there should be no medically indigent in this state, and
that if you are ... and for medical bills, medical expenses,
defendants are jointly and severally liable. We said that
for environmental cases, because so often there are
hundreds of defendants that may, in fact, cause an
environmental danger, joint and several remains. And
finally, we said because the Medical Malpractice Act was
just passed last year, we should see how that works, and
we should not touch that. And so, we excluded the healing
arts from that." 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
June 30, 1986, at 9 (statements of Representative
Greiman).
	The above explanation is the only reference in the legislative
debates to the exemption for toxic tort cases. Nevertheless, we find
that statement sufficient to discern a rational basis for the
exception. The legislature apparently believed that the numbers of
defendants involved in toxic tort cases would make the abolition
of joint and several liability unduly burdensome on such plaintiffs.
Representative Greiman explained that hundreds of defendants can
contribute to an environmental injury. Apparently, the legislature
was concerned that with this many potentially responsible
defendants, the modification of joint and several liability would
mean that a plaintiff would have to file suit against scores of
defendants in order to have a chance at a complete recovery. This
explanation is a rational reason for treating toxic tort cases
differently, and plaintiffs have not argued that such a distinction
is invalid. Accordingly, we believe that the legislature had a
rational basis for exempting toxic tort cases from section 2-1117.
	Plaintiffs rely on Best in arguing that the exception for
medical malpractice cases is without a rational basis. In Best, we
considered a similar argument as it related to amended section
2-1117. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 429-33. The amended version of
2-1117 provided for complete proportional several liability.
However, subsection (b) of that section provided that:
			"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), in
any healing art malpractice action based on negligence or
wrongful death, any defendants found liable shall be
jointly and severally liable if the limitations on non-economic damages in Section 2-1115.1 of this Act are for
any reason deemed or found to be invalid." 735 ILCS
5/2-1117(b) (West 1996).
Earlier in the Best opinion, we had held that section 2-1115.1 (735
ILCS 5/2-1115.1 (West 1996)) was invalid. Thus, section
2-1117(b) was activated. We held that section 2-1117(b) violated
the special legislation clause because it arbitrarily benefitted only
medical malpractice plaintiffs. The defendants in that case had
failed to demonstrate a "discernable rational basis for treating
medical malpractice plaintiffs differently from other plaintiffs in
death, bodily injury and property damage cases." Best, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 432. We further concluded that section 2-1117(b) was directly
contrary to the stated purpose of Public Act 89-7, which stated in
its preamble that " 'it is the public policy of this State that a
defendant should not be liable for damages in excess of its
proportional share of fault.' " Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 432, quoting Pub.
Act 89-7, Preamble, eff. March 9, 1995.
	We disagree with plaintiffs' contention that Best is
controlling. Unlike with the amended version of section 2-1117,
we find that the legislature had a rational basis for excluding
medical malpractice cases from the 25% rule in the original
version of section 2-1117. As set forth above, Representative
Greiman explained that joint and several liability was preserved in
medical malpractice cases because the legislature had recently
passed medical malpractice legislation and wanted to see how the
legislation worked before making other changes. Representative
Greiman further explained this point in response to a question
from Representative Davis about the medical malpractice
exemption:
		"What we have said is, that last year we dealt with healing
arts and with the Liability of healing arts. The Supreme
Court of Illinois has suggested that that is a separate
classification. We thought it would be inappropriate to
interfere in what we did last year and to see how it's
working. We cannot ... part of it is predictability, Mr.
Davis, and if we change the law on them every year, then
we would destroy the essence of predictability." 84th Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 38-39
(statements of Representative Greiman).
	The legislation to which Representative Greiman referred was
Public Act 84-7 (Pub. Act 84-7, eff. August 15, 1985)), which
made several amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, all of
which were aimed at medical malpractice litigation. The purpose
of Public Act 84-7 was to respond to what was perceived to be a
crisis in the area of medical malpractice. Miller, 196 Ill. 2d  at 63;
Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 229 (1986). The legislature's
intent was to "reduce the burdens existing in the health professions
as a result of the perceived malpractice crisis." Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d 
at 252. Some of the changes the legislation made in the area of
healing art malpractice cases were (1) the establishment of review
panels, which would make determinations as to liability and
damages before a healing art malpractice plaintiff could go to trial
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1012 through 1020)(3); (2)
allowing periodic payment of certain damages (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1701 through 2-1719); (3) modification of
the collateral source rule to allow negligence judgments against
physicians or hospitals to be reduced by up to one-half for benefits
received from collateral sources (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par.
2-1205); (4) prohibiting punitive damage awards in healing art
malpractice cases (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1115); (5)
establishment of a sliding scale of the allowable fees that an
attorney may charge in representing a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1114); (6)
abolishing the special injury requirement in malicious prosecution
suits arising out of healing art malpractice suits (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 110, par. 2-114); and (7) requiring a plaintiff, prior to
filing a medical malpractice action, to obtain a certificate from a
qualified health professional certifying that there is a reasonable
and meritorious cause for filing the action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.
110, par. 2-622).
	Given all of the changes that the legislature made in the area
of medical malpractice litigation the previous year, we believe that
the legislature's decision to exempt medical malpractice
defendants from section 2-1117 was rational. The legislature was
not acting arbitrarily. Rather, the legislature's decision to see how
Public Act 84-7 was working in practice before making any
additional changes to this area of the law was reasonable. Also, it
is noteworthy that the changes made in Public Act 84-7 were
beneficial to medical malpractice defendants and detrimental to
medical malpractice plaintiffs. Thus, when the legislature
conferred a benefit on other defendants in section 2-1117, it was
rational for  it to exempt medical malpractice defendants, the one
class of defendants for whom the legislature had implemented
numerous favorable changes in the law the year before.
	In Bernier and Miller, this court upheld several sections of
Public Act 84-7 against special legislation challenges. In Bernier,
we rejected special legislation challenges to the provisions of
Public Act 84-7 that (1) permitted periodic payment of damage
settlements (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 238-39); (2) modified the
collateral source rule (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 242-43); (3) abolished
punitive damages (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 245-47); and (4)
provided for a sliding scale for contingent fee awards (Bernier,
113 Ill. 2d at 252-53). In Miller, we upheld the sections of Public
Act 84-7 that (1) eliminated the special injury requirement in
malicious prosecution suits by medical malpractice defendants
(Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 60-68); and (2) required a potential plaintiff
to get an affidavit from a qualified health professional certifying
the merits of the cause of action (Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 64-65). We
noted that the legislature was responding to a perceived crisis in
the area of medical malpractice litigation and had chosen rational
means to address the problem. Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 62-68;
Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d  at 234-53. If the legislature had a rational basis
for placing these additional burdens on medical malpractice
plaintiffs, we believe that it likewise had a rational basis for
exempting these plaintiffs from the additional burdens placed on
other plaintiffs in section 2-1117. Plaintiffs' suggestion that the
legislature arbitrarily conferred a benefit on medical malpractice
plaintiffs by exempting them from section 2-1117 is not well-taken. Rather, the legislature acted rationally in not further
burdening medical malpractice plaintiffs after passing extensive
legislation the previous year that burdened medical malpractice
plaintiffs but no others.
	Further, unlike in Best, we do not believe that the medical
malpractice exemption was diametrically opposed to the purposes
of the public act that implemented it. As stated, the purpose of
Public Act 84-1431 was to relieve a perceived insurance crisis in
the state and to attempt to reduce insurance premiums. Section
2-1117's modification of the joint and several liability rule was
part of the attempt to resolve this problem. However, having
recently taken steps to reduce medical malpractice premiums, it
was not arbitrary for the legislature to conclude that no further
action in that area was required. As Representative Greiman
explained, the legislature wished to see how the previous
legislation was working before making additional changes. This
was not arbitrary and was, indeed, entirely reasonable.
	Plaintiffs also suggest that section 2-1117 creates invalid
classifications because it applies only to "actions on account of
bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on
negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability."
Plaintiffs contend that there is no rational basis for modifying the
common law rule of joint and several liability only as to these
actions, and that defendants in other types of tort cases are still
jointly and severally liable. However, as noted above, the
legislature's intent in passing Public Act 84-1431 was to resolve
a perceived insurance crisis in the state, and the legislature was
trying to find ways to reduce insurance premiums. Generally,
liability insurance is purchased to provide coverage for claims of
bodily injury or property damage caused by the insured. Thus,
plaintiffs have not shown that the legislature acted arbitrarily in
limiting section 2-1117 to cases of bodily injury, death, or
property damage arising from negligence or product liability based
on strict tort liability.

VII. Separation of Powers
	Plaintiffs next contend, in a two-sentence argument, that
section 2-1117 is unconstitutional under the separation of powers
clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1)
because it amounts to a mandatory arbitrary legislative remittitur,
thus invading on the province of the judiciary to exercise its
discretionary powers of remittitur on a case-by-case basis.
Plaintiffs rely on Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 410-15, in which we held that
section 2-1115.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was an
unconstitutional legislative remittitur. That section placed a
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in actions seeking
damages for death, bodily injury, or property damage based on
negligence, or product liability based on any theory. We held that
the cap invaded the judiciary's prerogative of "determining
whether a jury's assessment of damages is excessive within the
meaning of the law." Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 414.
	Plaintiffs' argument is without merit. Section 2-1117 is
simply not a legislative remittitur. Unlike section 2-1115.1, which
set an arbitrary cap on noneconomic damages, section 2-1117
merely determines when a defendant can be held liable for the full
amount of a jury's verdict and when a defendant is liable only in
an amount equal to his or her percentage of fault. Section 2-1117
does not reduce the amount of the jury's verdict.

VIII. Vagueness
	Plaintiffs next contend that section 2-1117 violates the due
process guarantee of article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2) because it is so vague, indefinite, and
uncertain, that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess at its
meaning. A legislative act that is so vague, indefinite and
uncertain that the courts are unable, by accepted rules of
construction, to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty
what the legislature intended will be declared to be void. R.W.
Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 163
(1998). When faced with a vagueness challenge to a statute, a
court considers not only the language used, but also the legislative
objective and the evil the statute is designed to remedy. R.W.
Dunteman Co., 181 Ill. 2d  at 163.
	Plaintiffs base their vagueness challenge on two main points.
First, that courts have reached different conclusions as to how
section 2-1117 should be applied, and second, that its meaning
cannot be discerned when it is considered in conjunction with the
Contribution Act. We disagree on both points.
	When construing section 2-1117, it is not difficult to
determine "with any reasonable degree of certainty what the
legislature intended." R.W. Dunteman Co., 181 Ill. 2d  at 163. The
legislature intended to provide that minimally culpable defendants
should not be responsible for entire judgments and set forth clear
rules for how that policy would be implemented. That various
courts have interpreted section 2-1117 differently does not mean
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. If that were the test,
few statutes would remain on the books. Further, a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague merely because one can imagine
hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms might
be called into question. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers,
Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial
Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 425 (1997). Finally, we reject
plaintiffs' suggestion that section 2-1117 is vague because it
conflicts with the Contribution Act. We have already determined
above that there is no conflict. However, we note again that
plaintiffs are misreading section 4 of the Contribution Act.
Plaintiffs claim incorrectly that section 4 contains a "guarantee of
joint and several liability." As we set forth above, that section is
merely a clarification that nothing in the Contribution Act is
intended to affect a plaintiff's right to recover all of his or her
damages from any responsible defendant. This is neither a
"guarantee" of joint and several liability nor a statement that
nothing in the Illinois Compiled Statutes modifies joint and
several liability. We reject plaintiffs' vagueness challenge.

IX. Jury Instruction
	The final point raised by plaintiffs is that the trial court erred
in refusing to give Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No.
180.19 (1995) and in refusing to answer the jurors' questions.
Plaintiffs support these points with a six-sentence argument that
merely summarizes the contentions and then ends by saying,"As
the dissent below indicates, that failure constituted reversible
error." Plaintiffs did not attempt to develop an argument in support
of these points with citations to the record and supporting legal
authority. Their reliance on the reasoning of the appellate court
dissent is no help, as the dissent's only comment on this issue was,
"I do, however, believe the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury after the jury submitted questions. All questions should
have been answered. The trial court should also have given IPI
Civil  (1995) No. 180.19." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 598 (Myerscough,
J., dissenting). Plaintiffs' argument thus violates Rule 341(e)(7)
(188 Ill. 2d R.  341(e)(7)), which requires that the argument
contain "the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor,
with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied
on." Accordingly, we deem the argument waived.

CONCLUSION
	In sum, we hold that the appellate court properly determined
that Marlin's employer could be considered in the division of fault
under section 2-1117. Lilly v. Marcal Rope & Rigging, Inc., 289
Ill. App. 3d 1105 (1997), which held to the contrary, is overruled.
Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that section
2-1117 in unconstitutional. We thus affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.



Affirmed.
	 
	 
	JUSTICES GARMAN and RARICK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
	I agree with the court that, under the reasoning set forth in
Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 10-11 (1984), Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 175 Ill. 2d 201, 207-08 (1997), and Geise
v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994), a
plaintiff's employer who is a third-party defendant is a party who
"could have been sued by the plaintiff" under section 2-1117 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)).
Accordingly, I also agree with the court's conclusion that the
employer's fault must be included in the apportionment of fault
conducted pursuant to that provision.(4) I write separately to address
plaintiffs' contention that section 2-1117 is unconstitutional.
	"The common law doctrine of joint and several liability
provides, in general, that when two or more defendants tortiously
contribute to the same, indivisible injury, each defendant may be
held jointly and severally liable for the entire injury." Best v.
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 423 (1997). Section
2-1117 modifies the doctrine of joint and several liability by
providing, in general, that independent concurring tortfeasors will
be only proportionately liable for nonmedical damages when those
tortfeasors' percentage of comparative responsibility is less than
25%. Section 2-1117 states, in pertinent part:
			"[I]n actions on account of bodily injury or death or
physical damage to property, based on negligence, or
product liability based on strict tort liability, all
defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for
plaintiff's past and future medical and medically related
expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by
the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault
attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the
plaintiff and any third party defendant who could have
been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally liable for all
other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined
by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault
attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the
plaintiff, and any third party defendants who could have
been sued by the plaintiff, shall be jointly and severally
liable for all other damages." 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West
1994).
See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
§§17, D18 (2000) (listing jurisdictions which have adopted similar
"threshold" statutes).
	Section 2-1117 does not impinge upon a fundamental right or
involve a suspect classification. Accordingly, to satisfy the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2), the statute need only satisfy the
rational basis test. Under the rational basis test, we must determine
"whether the method or means employed in the statute to achieve
the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to
that goal." Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314,
323 (1996).
	A principal reason for modifying joint and several liability
that was discussed during the legislative debates on the bill which
resulted in section 2-1117 was that the doctrine of joint and
several liability unfairly requires civil defendants to pay for more
damages than they cause or for which they are responsible.
Representative Greiman, for example, described the functioning
of joint and several liability in terms which were repeated
throughout the debates:
		"[J]oint and several liability *** means that if you are one
percent negligent, you must pay the entire judgment ***.
*** We have changed that. We have heard from ***
people all across the state that we are concerned that we
are minimally liable, five, 10 percent liable, 15 percent
liable, and we're stuck for the whole thing. So we have
said that there should be a threshold. If you are 25 percent
liable, you are so much involved with causing that
accident *** that you should respond in damages for the
entire amount. But if you are less than 25 percent, then
you should pay only your share. *** The minimally liable
are no longer liable for any more than their share. Those
people only who have a significant part of the liability
will remain [jointly and severally] liable." (Emphasis
added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June
30, 1986, at 8-9 (statements of Representative Greiman).
See also, e.g., 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30,
1986, at 65-68 (statements of Representative Regan); see generally
R. Wright, Understanding Joint and Several Liability, 1 Shepard's
Ill. Tort Rep. 278 (1991) (discussing legislative history of section
2-1117).
	Mirroring the comments made during the legislative debates,
defendant Kraft maintains before this court that, under joint and
several liability, a civil defendant who is only "minimally
negligent" or "minimally culpable" with respect to a plaintiff's
injury is required to pay for the entirety of the plaintiff's damages.
Defendant maintains that this is inherently unfair and that the
modification of joint and several liability undertaken in section
2-1117 is a reasonable means of achieving the goal of eliminating
this unfairness.
	On several occasions, this court has explained that the
doctrine of joint and several liability does not, by itself, require a
civil defendant to pay for more damages than they cause or for
which they are responsible. For example, in Coney v. J.L.G.
Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104 (1983), this court discussed joint
and several liability as it related to the doctrine of comparative
negligence or fault. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d  at 110. The defendant in
Coney maintained that, having adopted comparative negligence,
this court should abandon the doctrine of joint and several
liability. According to the defendant, "[w]ith the adoption of
comparative negligence where damages are apportioned according
to each party's fault, *** it is no longer rational to hold a
defendant liable beyond his share of the total damages." Coney, 97 Ill. 2d  at 120. We rejected this argument and held that the adoption
of comparative negligence did not require the abolition of joint
and several liability. In so holding, we stated:
			"The feasibility of apportioning fault on a comparative
basis does not render an indivisible injury 'divisible' for
purposes of the joint and several liability rule. A
concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the whole of an
indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate
cause of that damage. *** The mere fact that it may be
possible to assign some percentage figure to the relative
culpability of one negligent defendant as compared to
another does not in any way suggest that each defendant's
negligence is not a proximate cause of the entire
indivisible injury." (Emphases added.) Coney, 97 Ill. 2d 
at 121-22.
	Subsequently, in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), we explained at length that tortfeasors who are held
jointly and severally liable are each fully responsible for the
entirety of the plaintiff's injury:
		" 'Joint and several liability only applies to injuries for
which the defendant herself is fully responsible. She is
responsible for the entirety of some injury only if her
tortious behavior was an actual and proximate cause of
the entire injury. *** She is not liable for injuries,
including separable portions of injuries, to which she did
not contribute. She is not liable unless the tortious aspect
of her conduct was an actual cause of the injury.
Moreover, even then, she is not liable if, for reasons of
policy or principle, her connection to the injury is
considered too remote or minimal to be "proximate."
			A defendant's individual full responsibility for an injury
that was an actual and proximate result of her tortious
behavior is not diminished if some other person's tortious
behavior also was an actual and proximate cause of the
injury. Rather each defendant whose tortious behavior
was an actual and proximate cause of the injury is
individually fully responsible for the entire injury. This is
most obvious when a defendant's tortious behavior was
either necessary or independently sufficient for the
occurrence of the injury, but it remains true whenever a
defendant's tortious behavior was an actual and proximate
cause of the injury.
* * *
			[There is a fundamental difference] between each
[joint] defendant's individual full responsibility for the
damages that she tortiously caused and the comparative
responsibility percentages that are obtained by comparing
the defendants' individual full responsibilities for the
injury. [In situations where two defendants are held jointly
and severally liable for negligently injuring a plaintiff]
[n]either defendant *** [is] merely "50% negligent" or
"50% responsible." Such statements make as much sense
as saying that someone is "50% pregnant." Nor did either
defendant's negligence cause or occasion only 50% of the
plaintiff's injury. Rather, each defendant was 100%
negligent, each defendant's negligence was an actual and
proximate cause of 100% of the injury, and each
defendant therefore is fully responsible for the entire
injury. Only when we compare their individual full
responsibilities, and assume that they were equally
negligent, does it make sense to say that each defendant,
when compared to the other, bears 50% of the total
comparative responsibility for the injury.' " (Emphases in
original.) Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 428-29, quoting R. Wright,
The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23
Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 45, 54-56 (1992).
	One year after Best, in Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512 (1998),
this court again observed that the doctrine of joint and several
liability does not require civil defendants to pay for more damages
than they cause or for which they are responsible:
			"In general, the common law doctrine of joint and
several liability provides that when two or more
individuals tortiously contribute to the same, indivisible
injury, each individual may be held jointly and severally
liable for the entire injury. See generally 3 F. Harper, F.
James & O. Gray, Torts §§10.1, 10.2 (2d ed. 1986); W.
Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §§47, 50 through 52
(5th ed. 1984); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 119-20 (1983). Under the common law, there are
several distinct circumstances in which a contributing
tortfeasor may be held jointly and severally liable. See 3
F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts §10.1 (2d ed. 1986)
(identifying four categories in which the courts have
historically imposed joint and several liability). In perhaps
the most frequently occurring situation, a tortfeasor who
acts independently and concurrently with other
individuals to produce an indivisible injury to a plaintiff
may be held jointly and severally liable for that injury,
even though the tortfeasor does not act in concert with the
other individuals, and shares no common purpose or duty
with them. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc.,
148 Ill. 2d 429, 438 (1992). Such an "independent
concurring tortfeasor" (3 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray,
Torts §10.1, at 7 (2d ed. 1986)) is not held liable for the
entirety of a plaintiff's injury because he or she is
responsible for the actions of the other individuals who
contribute to the plaintiff's injury. Rather, an independent,
concurring tortfeasor is held jointly and severally liable
because the plaintiff's injury cannot be divided into
separate portions, and because the tortfeasor fulfills the
standard elements of tort liability, i.e., his or her tortious
conduct was an actual and proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. See generally 3 F. Harper, F. James &
O. Gray, Torts §10.1, at 17-28 (2d ed. 1986); R. Wright,
Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes:
A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for
Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1141, 1141-68 (1988); R. Michael, Joint Liability: Should
It Be Reformed or Abolished?-The Illinois Experience, 27
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 867, 906-08 (1996). The fact that
another individual also tortiously contributes to the
plaintiff's injury does not alter the independent,
concurring tortfeasor's responsibility for the entirety of
the injury which he or she actually and proximately
caused. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §875,
Comment c, at 315 (1979); Coney, 97 Ill. 2d  at 121-22."
Woods, 181 Ill. 2d  at 518-19.
	If the only possible justification for the "threshold"
modification of joint and several liability set forth in section
2-1117 was that the modification is necessary in order to eliminate
unfairness created by the doctrine of joint and several liability
itself, then section 2-1117 could not be constitutionally sustained.
Ensuring that civil defendants do not pay for more damages than
they cause or for which they are responsible is a legitimate
legislative goal. However, the legislature's modification of joint
and several liability in section 2-1117 is not rationally related to
that goal because-as this court has explained repeatedly-joint and
several liability does not force civil defendants to pay for damages
which they do not cause or for which they are not responsible in
the first place. See Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 121-22; Best, 179 Ill. 2d at
426-29; Woods, 181 Ill. 2d at 518-19; see also A. Twerski, The
Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the
Critics, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1125, 1145 (1989) (the point that
joint and several liability does not, by itself, result in civil
defendants' paying for damages they did not cause or for which
they are not responsible "cannot be assailed").
	Although section 2-1117 cannot be sustained on the basis that
joint and several liability is an inherently unfair doctrine, this
conclusion does not end the constitutional inquiry. A statute may
be upheld under rational basis review "if any set of facts can
reasonably be conceived to justify" (Jacobson v. Department of
Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 324 (1996)) the statute. Accordingly,
the rationality of other possible justifications for the modification
of joint and several liability set forth in section 2-1117 must be
addressed.
	One justification that has been frequently advanced for
"threshold" statutes, such as section 2-1117, is that these statutes
help eliminate elements of unfairness found in the civil justice
system that are caused by factors other than joint and several
liability itself. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment of Liability §D18, Comment c, at 221 (2000) (the
threshold approach addresses unfairness caused by expansive
liability rules); 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1125. One problem in
particular that is said to be alleviated by threshold statutes is that
of "compromise verdicts." The problem of compromise verdicts
has been explained:
			"[A] ten percent finding of fault in a multi-defendant
case is not particularly difficult to obtain. Juries ***
parcel out small portions of liability without significant
evidence to support the verdict, and appellate courts are
close to impotent if they wish to reverse. The evidence
may be just enough to squeak by, and once the plaintiff
passes the most minimal of thresholds, the defendant
under common-law doctrine is liable for full damages."
22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 1139.
Moreover, "[g]iven a constitutional right to jury trial and severe
limitations on the judge's right to direct a verdict when legitimate
fact questions need to be decided, *** the mechanisms to thwart
improper jury verdicts are simply not operative." 22 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. at 1139. See also Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment of Liability § D18, Reporters' Note, Comment c,
at 226-27 (2000) (listing four frequently cited cases where
defendants assigned a very low percentage of comparative
responsibility were held fully liable for plaintiff's damages).
	Exactly why compromise verdicts arise is an issue that is not
fully discussed in the academic literature. It would appear that
such verdicts are the result of juror confusion in cases where a
third-party defendant is involved, the jury is instructed on the
principles of contribution, and the jury is asked to make
percentage allocations of fault. In these cases, the jury is typically
not instructed on the effect of joint and several liability and may
be unaware that a verdict rendered against the defendant means
that the defendant is fully responsible for the plaintiff's damages.
In addition, the jury may confuse its findings on the issue of
comparative fault for purposes of contribution with its finding of
liability to the plaintiff. In other words, the jury may mistakenly
believe that a finding that a defendant's comparative responsibility
is 10% for purposes of contribution is, in fact, a finding that the
defendant is only liable to the plaintiff for 10% of the damages. If
it is not so instructed, the jury may also be unaware that
contribution may not be available to the defendant if the third-party defendant is insolvent or immune. In these situations, some
or all of the members of the jury may compromise on the primary
question of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff, believing that
the defendant may then recover fully in contribution or that the
defendant will never be required to fully pay for the plaintiff's
damages in the first place.
	Notably, in the case at bar, Kraft describes the jury verdict
against it as a type of compromise verdict. According to Kraft, the
great disparity in percentages of fault assigned to it and to
plaintiff's employer Nogle & Black-1% versus 99%-means that
the jury "found the employer fully responsible for the injury" to
plaintiffs. The jury in this case was not instructed on the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability and was not instructed on
the effect of section 2-1117. Nor was the jury instructed on the
effect of Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155 (1991),
which holds that the amount in contribution that may be recovered
from a third-party defendant who is a plaintiff's employer is
limited to the amount of any worker's compensation damages.
Thus, according to Kraft, the jury in this case was expressing its
intent to find Nogle & Black fully responsible for plaintiffs'
injuries by finding Kraft 1% liable "and then pass[ing] the
resulting amount on to Nogle & Black." In other words, Kraft's
position in this appeal is that the jury compromised on the
question of Kraft's liability to plaintiffs because the jury believed
either that Kraft would be able to recover 99% of plaintiffs'
damages in contribution from the employer or that Kraft would not
be responsible for 99% of plaintiffs' damages in the first place.(5)
	Whether compromise verdicts are a pervasive problem in the
civil justice system has been seriously questioned. See, e.g., R.
Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23
Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 45, 63 n.49 (1992); M. Hager, What's
(Not!) In a Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability
Apportionment, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 77, 104-07 (2000). Furthermore,
if compromise verdicts are, in fact, a problem, the more direct way
to address that problem-rather than modifying joint and several
liability-would be to improve jury instructions or to more
vigilantly review jury verdicts. As one commentator has
explained:
			"Even if in a few cases juries have found deep-pocket
defendants liable in the absence of sufficient evidence of
tortious behavior or causation, the obvious and usual
remedy is policing of the juries' findings by trial and
appellate judges, rather than the elimination of joint and
several liability. In such cases, the real problem is not
joint and several liability, but rather any liability. Why
sacrifice injured plaintiffs in every case involving
multiple tortfeasors (by eliminating or limiting joint and
several liability) to correct problems that arise, at most, in
a very small percentage of cases that can and should be
handled by proper judicial supervision of juries?" 23
Memphis St. U. L. Rev. at 65.
	However, under rational basis review, the absence of
empirical evidence showing that compromise verdicts are, in fact,
a serious problem in the civil justice system cannot serve as a basis
for holding section 2-1117 constitutionally invalid. See Federal
Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211, 222, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102
(1993) (a legislative choice is generally "not subject to courtroom
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data"). Moreover, under rational basis
review, the wisdom of the solution to the problem of compromise
verdicts adopted in section 2-1117, i.e., imposing a threshold for
joint and several liability, is a question that must be left for the
legislature. See, e.g., Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 377 (under rational basis
review, the courts "should not and need not balance the advantages
and disadvantages of reform").
	Clearly, statutes such as section 2-1117 that establish a
threshold for joint and several liability are problematic in many
respects:
		"[A]ny threshold is an imperfect way to screen out
tangential tortfeasors, and often the threshold is set too
high (50 percent) to serve this function well. When there
are many tortfeasors, this [type of statute] does not
perform well, as it virtually guarantees that several
liability will be imposed, regardless of the role of any
given tortfeasor in the plaintiff's injuries. This threshold
series also imposes the risk of insolvency on an entirely
innocent plaintiff whenever all solvent defendants are
below the specified threshold. To the extent that the
justification for modifying joint and several liability is the
adoption of comparative responsibility, so that the
plaintiff may also be legally culpable, imposing the risk of
insolvency on an innocent plaintiff is unwarranted."
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
§17, Comment a, at 148-49 (2000).
Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
§§C18 through C21 (2000); Unif. Comp. Fault Act §2, 12 U.L.A.
39 (West Supp. 1990).
	Nevertheless, whatever the policy shortcomings of section
2-1117, the modification of joint and several liability undertaken
in the statute is rationally related to addressing the problem of
compromise verdicts. See Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment of Liability § D18, Reporters' Note, Comment c,
at 226 (2000) ( if low-fault-percentage jury verdicts "are perceived
to be a problem, a threshold for joint and several liability would be
the appropriate solution"); 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 1139-40; A.
Twerski, The Baby Swallowed the Bathwater: A Rejoinder to
Professor Wright, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1161, 1161-62 (1989).
On this ground, under the deferential standard of rational basis
review, the constitutionality of section 2-1117 may be sustained.
	For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment of the
court.
	The majority construes section 2-1117 to include plaintiff's
employer as a " 'third-party defendant who could have been sued
by the plaintiff' " within the meaning of that statute. Slip op. at 8.
As a result of this construction, a seriously injured plaintiff
entirely innocent of any fault can only recover 1% of his damages
from a defendant whose negligence was found by a jury to be a
direct and proximate cause of his injuries. A fair reading of the
statute does not require such a result. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
	The majority's analysis begins with a recital of several well-known rules of statutory construction (slip op. at 5), but omits an
equally important rule: "Statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed in favor of persons sought to be
subjected to their operation" (In re Illinois Bell Switching Station
Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 240 (1994)).
	This court has recognized that section 2-1117 is in derogation
of the common law. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 521 (1998). In
that case, despite the fact that the statute contains no exception for
tortfeasors who act in concert, the court held that there was no
indication, in either the operation or the language of section
2-1117, that the legislature intended to abolish the well-established common law principle that " '[p]arties who act in
concert, and co-operate in doing a negligent act which causes an
injury, are liable, either jointly or severally, to the person injured,
for the damage thereby occasioned.' " Woods, 181 Ill. 2d  at 521,
quoting Andrews v. Boedecker, 126 Ill. 605, 610 (1888).
	The majority discerns that the legislature, in enacting section
2-1117, clearly intended that minimally responsible defendants
should not have to pay entire damage awards. Slip op. at 9. No
explanation is offered for this conclusion, save the majority's
opinion that "the broad wording in the statute merely shows that
the legislature intended the division of responsibility to include
those people in the suit who might have been responsible for the
plaintiff's injuries." Slip op. at 9. The majority argues that
"ignoring the party found to be 99% responsible for the plaintiff's
injuries and requiring the party found 1% responsible to pay all of
the nonmedical damages would not be in accord with the clear
legislative intent that minimally responsible defendants should not
be liable for entire judgments." Slip op. at 9.
	The Lilly court's cogent analysis should have laid those fears
to rest. That court said:
			"Just as the Contribution Act does not come into play
until the plaintiff has collected more than a pro rata share
from a defendant, so, too, the joint liability law does not
come into play until a plaintiff has obtained a judgment
against a defendant. Therefore, in order to determine
whether 'any third party defendant who could have been
sued by the plaintiff' should include the plaintiff's
employer, the relevant inquiry is not whether there is a
theoretical or philosophical possibility of suing the
employer at the outset, but whether the plaintiff could
obtain a judgment against an employer. The judgment is
the relevant time of inquiry under the joint liability law.
Could a plaintiff obtain a judgment? If the employer did
not raise the exclusivity provisions of section 5(a),
presumably he could. If the plaintiff did obtain such a
judgment, then it would be fair to allow that judgment,
and the jury's assessment of the employer's culpability, to
be included in the section 2-1117 equation of allocation.
If, however, it was not the plaintiff but a third-party
plaintiff who obtained the judgment, as will universally be
the case in the real world, then the allocation provisions
of section 2-1117 should not include the plaintiff's
employer." (Emphasis in original.) Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d
at 1116.
	Reasoning further, the Lilly court said:
			"Turning to defendants who are immune from suit, such
as the plaintiff's employer, the State of Illinois, and
others, what is the practical effect of eliminating them
from the allocation equation? First, as we indicated
earlier, if for some unfathomable reason an immune
defendant does not raise its immunity and is subjected to
a judgment, then the allocation provisions of section
2-1117 would properly include that defendant's fault in
the equation. This result would be fair to all parties
because as the plaintiff is able to collect whatever portion
of the judgment was attributable to the immune
defendant, so also should that immune defendant's
conduct be considered under 2-1117's allocation of fault.
But if the immune defendant asserts its immunity, or if the
plaintiff does not file against the immune defendant
because he or she is obeying the dictates of the supreme
court rule which prohibits such unmeritorious filings (155
Ill. 2d R. 137), then the immune defendant will never be
subject to any collection procedure by the plaintiff and its
conduct should not play any part in the allocation
equation of section 2-1117." Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at
1117.
	Thus, it is apparent that a "minimally responsible" defendant
would not have to pay an entire judgment in the case before us.
Defendant can recoup 99% of the amount owing to plaintiff from
the third-party defendant employer, subject only to the employer's
right to limit the amount of its contribution to its worker's
compensation payments as defined by our holding in Kotecki v.
Cyclops Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155, 164-65 (1991).
	By the time relative fault was determined by the jury in the
case before us, plaintiff had long since elected his worker's
compensation remedy against his employer and had received
benefits. In the real world, any claim of common law fault by
plaintiff against his employer would certainly have been met with
the defense of immunity and, most probably, an application for
sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137).
	The majority has offered no authority and no rationale for its
assertion that the clear legislative intent mandates its holding. The
Lilly court, as the majority acknowledges (slip op. at 7), has
distinguished our holding in Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1 (1984).
I believe that well-reasoned distinction (Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at
1108-10) is correct. Without restating in full the rationale set forth
in Lilly, I contend that this court should have followed Lilly's
interpretation of section 2-1117.
	The majority's construction of section 2-1117 impairs the
plaintiff's right to recover against a tortfeasor found to have
proximately caused his injuries. Such a holding is contrary to the
long-standing rule of construction regarding statutes in derogation
of the common law recently restated in Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 240. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1This section was amended in 1995 by Public Act 89-7 to provide
for complete proportional several liability. However, this court declared
Public Act 89-7 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995) unconstitutional
in its entirety in Best, 179 Ill. 2d 367. The effect of Best was to leave the
law in force as it was before the adoption of the amendment. See People
v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1990).

2.      2This section was repealed as part of Public Act 89-7. As noted
previously, our decision in Best, which held that Public Act 89-7 was
unconstitutional in its entirety, had the effect of reinstating this section.
See Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d  at 390.

3.      3These sections were held unconstitutional in Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d  at
230-34.

4.      4This conclusion also finds support in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
§D19(a), Comment f, at 230 (2000).

5.      5Before this court, Kraft does not challenge the jury's finding of
negligence.