Case Title: In the Matter of Robert T. Stewart v. Chautauqua County Board of Elections

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 79  
In the Matter of Robert T. 
Stewart, &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Chautauqua County Board of 
Elections, et al.,
            Respondents,
Leon H. Beightol,
            Appellant.
---------------------------------
In the Matter of Leon H. 
Beightol, &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Chautauqua County Board of 
Elections, et al.,
            Respondents.
---------------------------------
In the Matter of Leon H. 
Beightol, &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Chautauqua County Board of 
Elections, et al.,
            Respondents.
Charles S. DeAngelo, for appellant Beightol.
Michael R. Cerrie, for appellant Green.
Andrew W. Goodell, for respondent Abram.
Michael J. Sullivan, for respondent Stewart.
PER CURIAM: 
I. 
These three related proceedings were commenced pursuant
to article 16 of the Election Law following the general election
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for the position of Chautauqua County Legislator for the Seventh
District.  Robert T. Stewart, the Republican and Independence
Party candidate, commenced the first proceeding challenging, as
relevant here, one affidavit ballot on the ground that the voter,
J.K., was not a resident of the voting district.  Stewart also
challenged two absentee ballots, on the ground that the "absentee
ballot applications submitted by [the two] voters were rejected
by the . . . Board of Elections [and c]orrections were not
received prior to sending the ballot or upon the return of the
ballot."  At that point, the two absentee ballot envelopes at
issue had not yet been opened.  Leon H. Beightol, the incumbent
Democratic and Working Families Party candidate, answered and
asserted counterclaims.  As relevant here, Beightol sought to
have Supreme Court validate the affidavit ballot of J.K. and
"open and count" the two absentee ballots.  
At a hearing on the first petition on November 30,
2009, Supreme Court directed the Board of Elections to open the
two absentee ballot envelopes to ascertain the contents of the
envelopes.  Each of the two envelopes contained one completed
absentee ballot application and one completed absentee ballot. 
To the parties' apparent surprise, both ballots were cast in
favor of Stewart.  Thereafter, Beightol commenced the second of
these three proceedings.  Altering the position he took in the
first proceeding, Beightol sought to have Supreme Court
invalidate the two absentee ballots on the ground that extrinsic
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material which could identify the voters, i.e., their absentee
voter applications, was included along with the voters' absentee
ballots in the ballot envelopes.  As relevant here, Beightol also
sought the invalidation of two optical scan ballots -- manually
counted by the Board of Elections on November 18, 2009 -- that he
claimed were "abandoned" at one polling site.  In his answer,
Stewart, also altering his original position, argued that the two
absentee ballots should be counted.  Stewart additionally argued
that the optical scan ballots were properly counted during the
hand count on December 8, 2009.       
Shortly thereafter, Beightol commenced the third
proceeding, challenging the optical scan ballots on the ground
that they were abandoned.  He also challenged whether chain of
custody controls were properly used with respect to the two
optical scan ballots.  
After a December 9, 2009 hearing, Supreme Court ordered
that J.K.'s affidavit ballot and the two absentee ballots be
counted and that the two optical scan ballots not be counted.  As
to the affidavit ballot, the court concluded that J.K. "properly
. . . cast her ballot in the location where she had significant
contacts . . . of a kind and nature which would have allowed her
to vote from that district on that date."  Addressing the two
absentee ballots, the court first noted that "[a]n absentee
ballot should not be mailed out [until] the [absentee ballot]
application is complete."  By sending the two absentee ballots,
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the court concluded that the Board of Elections had "deemed the 
. . . application to be complete."  The court further concluded
that the extrinsic materials included with the ballots in the
absentee ballot envelopes were the result of a ministerial error
by the Board of Elections.  Finally, with respect to the optical
scan ballots, the court concluded, without reaching Beightol's
chain of custody arguments, that the voters had abandoned their
ballots by leaving the polling place without ensuring their votes
had been counted.  Supreme Court's order resulted in a tie vote.  
As relevant here, Stewart appealed from so much of
Supreme Court's order as directed the Board of Elections to count
J.K.'s affidavit ballot.  Beightol cross-appealed from so much of
Supreme Court's order as directed the "opening and counting" of
the two absentee ballots and validated the Board of Election's
hand-count of the two optical scan ballots.  
The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting in
part, dismissed Beightol's cross appeal from Supreme Court's
order "insofar as it directed the opening of the two absentee
ballots," modified the order, on the law, by invalidating J.K.'s
affidavit ballot and validating the two optical scan ballots,
and, as modified, affirmed (see Matter of Stewart v Chautauqua
County Bd. Of Elections, __ AD3d __, 2010 NY Slip Op 00210, at *1
[4th Dept 1-12-10]).  The Appellate Division majority agreed with
Supreme Court's factual findings on the issue of J.K.'s residency
but held, as a matter of law, that J.K. resided at an address
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1  We denied Beightol's motion for leave to appeal as
unnecessary and granted his motion for a stay of enforcement of
the Appellate Division order (see __ NY3d __ [2-11-10]). 
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outside the voting district.  With respect to the optical scan
ballots, the court, relying on 9 NYCRR 6210.13 (A) (11),
concluded that the ballots were not "abandoned" within the
meaning of that regulation and were properly counted during the
Board of Elections' hand count.  
As to the two absentee ballots, the court first
characterized Beightol's cross appeal as "contend[ing] . . . that
[Supreme C]ourt erred in ordering that the two absentee ballots 
. . . be opened" (id. at *3).  Because the Appellate Division
determined that Beightol had previously sought to have the
absentee ballots opened, and Supreme Court had ordered the Board
to open the ballots, the Appellate Division concluded that
Beightol was not aggrieved by that part of Supreme Court's order. 
The court further determined that Beightol was judicially
estopped from taking the position in his two proceedings and on
appeal that the absentee ballots should not be counted because
that position was "contrary to his position in the proceeding
commenced by Stewart" (id.).  Finally, the court rejected
Beightol's argument that extrinsic materials included with the
absentee ballots invalidated those ballots.  After the Appellate
Division decision, Stewart led by three votes.   
Beightol appealed as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601
(a), from the Appellate Division order of modification,1 and we
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No. 79
2  Each of the three proceedings named as respondents, in
addition to the opposing candidate, the Board of Elections, Brian
Abram, the Republican member of the Board, and Norman Green, the
Democratic member of the Board.  At Supreme Court and on appeal,
the Republican member of the Board asserted arguments identical
to Stewart's position; the Democratic member of the Board
asserted arguments identical to Beightol's position.  Green
sought leave to appeal and appealed as of right from the
Appellate Division order.  Assuming without deciding that Green
has standing to appeal without Abram's permission (see Matter of
Graziano v County of Albany, 3 NY3d 475 [2004]), our holdings
with respect to Beightol's arguments apply equally to Green's
arguments.  
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now affirm.2 
II.
A.  J.K.'s Affidavit Ballot
Election Law § 1-104 (22) defines "residence" as "that
place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal
home and to which he [or she], wherever temporarily located,
always intends to return."  To be a resident of a place within
the meaning of the Election Law, we have held that "a person must
be physically present with the intent to remain for a time"
(People v O'Hara, 96 NY2d 378, 384 [2001], citing Matter of Palla
v Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 NY2d 36, 47 [1972]).  While
a voter may have more than one "bona fide residence," he or she
may not "create an address" merely to "circumvent[] residency
requirements" (id. at 384, 385 [citation omitted]).  In O'Hara,
we explained:  
"[A]n individual having two residences may
choose one to which she has 'legitimate,
significant and continuing attachments as
[his or] her residence for purposes of the
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Election Law.'  Generally, where there is no
reason to assume that a residence has been
asserted merely for the purposes of voting,
where no fraud or deception has been
practiced and where there is a history of the
residence employed, the courts have upheld a
fact-finder's determination of residency"
(O'Hara, 96 NY2d at 385, quoting Matter of Ferguson v McNab, 60
NY2d 598, 600 [1983]; see also Matter of Gallagher v Dinkins, 41
AD2d 946, 947 [2d Dept 1973], affd 32 NY2d 839 [1973]).
The record here establishes that J.K. did not have dual
residences in Chautauqua and Cattauragus Counties.  Although J.K.
testified that she stayed at the Chautauqua County house for
three consecutive summers and hoped to return for a fourth, she
further testified that she did not own the home, did not pay
rent, might not be permitted to return because her aunt could
decide to sell the property before the next summer, that the
electrical supply was shut off as of August 2009, and that the
house had no running water or heat source.  The record also
establishes that J.K. resided in the Cattaraugus County
apartment.  Notably, when asked how long she intended to reside
at the Cattaraugus County apartment, J.K. testified that she
hoped to stay there "permanent[ly]."  As a matter of law, J.K.'s
physical presence at her Cattaraugus County apartment, coupled
with her expressed intent to remain there permanently, sufficed
to establish that as her residence.  Moreover, J.K. lacked
"significant and continuing" attachments to the Chautauqua County
address sufficient to create a bona fide second residence for the
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purpose of voting.  Accordingly, we conclude, as a matter of law,
that J.K. was not a resident of the voting district and the
affidavit ballot must be invalidated.
B.  Optical Scan Ballots
Chautauqua County was one of several counties statewide
that used new optical scan voting machines for the first time in
the November 2009 general election in conformance with federal
mandates.  Under this system, the voter completes a paper ballot
in a privacy booth by using a pencil to fill in boxes identifying
the chosen candidates.  The voter then brings the ballot to an
optical scan machine and the ballot is fed into the device, which
"reads" the document and records the vote.  The technology is not
foolproof, however, and the machine is sometimes unable to record
the votes identified on the ballot for various reasons, including
deviation by the voter from the recommended manner of marking the
boxes on the form, causing some ballots to be rejected by the
machine as unreadable. 
In this case, at the end of the general election day,
there were two ballots at a polling place that had been completed
by voters but were rejected as unreadable by the optical scan
machine.  Testimony given by one election inspector from that
polling site established that one voter left immediately after
feeding his ballot into the machine, before learning of the
machine's rejection of the ballot.  The voter who filled out the
second ballot was aware that his ballot was not scanned by the
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machine but he declined to fill out a new ballot.  The election
inspector's testimony nonetheless made clear that the voter did
not intend to abandon his vote.  For both ballots, a bipartisan
team of inspectors attempted to rescan the ballot.  When the
attempt was unsuccessful, an election inspector then secured the
ballot in the emergency slot of the optical scan machine.  At the
end of the day, the ballots were delivered to the Board of
Elections in a specially designated envelope.   
We agree with the Appellate Division that the Board of
Elections properly hand-counted the two unscanned optical scan
ballots.  The applicable regulation, which "appl[ies] in
determining whether a ballot has been properly voted and whether
a vote should be counted," provides: "If a voter leaves the
voting machine or system without casting their ballot, a
bipartisan team of election inspectors shall cause the ballot to
be cast as the voter left it, without examining the ballot" (9
NYCRR 6210.13 [A] [11] [a]).  If the voter leaves a ballot "in a
privacy booth" without casting the ballot, the ballot is spoiled
(9 NYCRR 6210.13 [A] [11] [b]).  But, if a ballot is "non-machine
processable as submitted by the voter, [it] shall be manually
counted by a bipartisan team of election inspectors and such vote
totals shall be added to the canvass" (9 NYCRR 6210.13 [A] [8]).  
Here, no party contends that the ballots were left in a
"privacy booth."  Rather, the voters left their completed ballots
at the machines without ensuring that their ballots had been
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scanned.  Pursuant to the express language of the applicable
regulations, because the ballots were "non-machine processable as
submitted by the voter[s]," the votes were required to be
manually counted and added to the canvass.  The process utilized
by the election inspectors here, which ultimately culminated in a
manual count of the ballots by the Board of Elections, complied
with the provisions of the applicable regulations and was,
therefore, proper.
Beightol's argument that the optical scan ballots could
not be hand-counted because the voters' marks overran the squares
for designating a candidate lacks merit.  One ballot contained
check marks inserted within the squares instead of completely
penciled-in squares.  The other optical scan ballot contained
some marks that overran the squares.  However, the applicable
regulations specifically provide: 
"A vote for any candidate or ballot measure
shall not be rejected solely because the
voter failed to follow instructions for
marking the ballot . . . A mark is considered
valid when it is clear that it represents the
voter's choice and is the technique
consistently used by the voter to indicate
his or her selections.  Such marks may
include, but are not limited to, properly
filled in voting position targets, cross mark
'X,' a checkmark '[Checkmark],' circles,
completed open arrow '[Left Pointing Arrow],'
or any other clear indication of the voter's
choice" (9 NYCRR 6210.13 [A] [2], [3]).
Here, the ballots clearly indicate the voters' selections for
candidates and, therefore, should be counted. Accordingly, we
conclude that the two optical scan ballots were valid and should
be counted. 
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C. Absentee Ballots 
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Appellate
Division that Beightol was not aggrieved by so much of Supreme
Court's determination as directed the opening of the absentee
ballots envelopes.  In the first proceeding, Stewart sought a
determination that the two absentee ballot envelopes should not
be opened or the ballots counted.  In response, Beightol argued
that the ballot envelopes should be opened.  Given that Supreme
Court ordered the ballot envelopes opened, Beightol is not
aggrieved by that part of the determination.  He is aggrieved,
however, by so much of the order as directed that the ballots be
counted, and we therefore consider his objections to that ruling.
Beightol was not judicially estopped from adopting the
position that the absentee ballots were invalid.  We note that
Stewart, like Beightol, adopted a different position once the
absentee ballot envelopes were opened, in both the first
proceeding and in the subsequent proceedings; Stewart can hardly
assert that he was prejudiced when Beightol merely adopted
Stewart's original position (see generally Shepardson v Town of
Shodack, 195 AD2d 630, 632 [3d Dept 1994], affd 83 NY2d 894
[1993]).  Further, it is not clear on this record that Beightol
was successful in persuading Supreme Court to adopt his initial
position (see Zedner v United States, 547 US 489, 504 [2006]).  
Thus, we conclude that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is
inapplicable, and we turn to the merits of Beightol's argument
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that the two absentee ballots submitted by R.Y. and W.Y. are
invalid and should not be counted.
On the merits, Beightol first argues that the absentee
ballots should not be counted because the Board did not receive
completed absentee ballot applications prior to sending the
absentee ballots to these two voters.  Relying on Matter of Gross
v Albany County Bd. of Elections (3 NY3d 251 [2004]), Beightol
contends that the Board of Election's error was not merely
technical or ministerial, and its failure to adhere to the
provisions of the Election Law requires the invalidation of the
two absentee ballots.  We disagree.
The Election Law describes in detail the appropriate
procedure for the issuance of absentee ballots (see Election Law
§ 8-400; see also Gross, 3 NY3d at 256).  Before a voter may cast
an absentee ballot, he or she must complete an absentee ballot
application (see Election Law § 8-400 [2]).  The application must
include certain information; for example, the voter must specify
the reason for his or her absence from the voting district, the
duration of that absence, and that he or she is qualified and
registered to vote in the election district for which the
absentee ballot is sought (see id. § 8-400 [3] [b], [c]).  
Applications for absentee ballots "must be mailed to the board of
elections not later than the seventh day before the election for
which a ballot is first requested or delivered to such board not
later than the day before such election" (id. § 8-400 [2] [c]). 
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When a local board of elections receives an application for an
absentee ballot, the board determines "upon such inquiry as it
deems proper whether the applicant is qualified to vote and to
receive an absentee ballot" (id. § 8-402 [1], [2]), and, if it is
satisfied by its inquiry, the absentee ballot is then forwarded
to the voter (see Gross, 3 NY3d at 256). 
In Gross, we emphasized the need for compliance with
the framework specified in the absentee ballot provisions (see
id. at 258).  In that case, the Board of Elections, rather than
following the particularized requirements of the Election Law,
forwarded an absentee ballot for an April 2004 special general
election to any voter who had received one in the November 2003
general election without requiring an absentee ballot application
from each voter (see id. at 254).  We concluded that the Board's
mistake could not be "characterized as technical, ministerial or
inconsequential because it was central to the substantive process
by which voters are determined to be qualified to cast absentee
ballots" (id. at 258-259).  Specifically, we observed that the
Board's error resulted in an uneven application of the Election
Law, because some voters were required to comply with the
absentee voter application process, while others were not.  We
were also particularly concerned that the challenged absentee
votes were cast by voters who were never made to "articulate[]
why they were not able to vote at the polls" (id. at 259).  Thus,
because of the Board of Elections' failure to ascertain whether
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the voters were duly qualified to cast absentee ballots, we
concluded that the Board's mistake warranted the invalidation of
the challenged absentee ballots.
The concerns that motivated our holding in Gross are
not present here.  In this case, the record indicates that the
Board received applications for absentee ballots from both voters
within the applicable time period before the election.  However,
the applications did not contain necessary information;
specifically, the applications failed to state where the voters
would be at the time of the election and the dates of their
absence from the district.  The Board thereafter mailed absentee
ballots to both voters with instructions to return the completed
application together "with [the absentee] ballot or [the] ballot
will not be counted."  Both voters did, in fact, return their
completed absentee ballot applications with their absentee
ballots.  The applications were examined separately to ascertain
the qualification of each voter to cast an absentee ballot. 
Thus, the Board here, unlike the Board of Elections in Gross, did
have a basis upon which to determine that the two voters were
entitled to vote as absentee voters.  
The Board has conceded that the procedure it utilized
here was not the best method of complying with the requirements
of the Election Law and that it will not use these procedures
again in the future.  However, unlike the mistakes committed by
the Board of Elections in Gross, the slight deviation from the
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prescribed procedure utilized by the Board "can be viewed as
substantial compliance with statutory directives" (Gross, 3 NY3d
at 259).  The defect in the procedure was not a "substantive
deficiency implicating voter qualification" (id. at 259 n 3).
Finally, Beightol's argument that the absentee ballots
were void because the absentee ballot envelopes contained
extrinsic materials identifying the voters lacks merit.  We agree
with the Appellate Division that the absentee ballots were not
invalidated by the presence of the absentee ballot applications,
because no marks on the ballots themselves identified the voters
(see Election Law § 9-112 [1]; see also Matter of Altimari v
Meisser 15 NY2d 686, 687 [1965], modifying 22 AD2d 933 [2d Dept
1964], mot to amend remittitur granted, rearg denied 15 NY2d 847
[1965]).
III.
In sum, we hold that J.K.'s affidavit ballot was
invalid, the two optical scan ballots were valid and should be
counted, and the two absentee ballots were valid and should be
counted.  Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, without costs.  
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed, without costs.  Opinion Per Curiam.  Chief Judge
Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and
Jones concur.
Decided February 23, 2010