Case Title: People v. Lopez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S073597

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 6/13/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S073597 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
JUAN MANUEL LOPEZ, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PA023649 
 
____________________________________) 
 
An information filed in February 1997 charged defendant Juan Manuel 
Lopez and his brother Ricardo Lopez with the April 1996 murder of Melinda 
Carmody (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and four other counts:  kidnapping (§ 207, 
subd. (a)), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and/or 
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), first degree residential burglary 
(§ 459), and second degree burglary of a vehicle (§ 459).  The information also 
alleged a special circumstance that the murder was committed for the purpose of 
preventing the victim‟s testimony in a criminal proceeding and that a principal was 
armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense.  (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10), 
former 12022, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 1995, ch. 377, § 8, p. 1948.)2 
                                              
1 
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
Defendant was jointly tried before a single jury with his brother Ricardo 
who was the actual shooter.  Ricardo was convicted of murder and the witness-
murder special circumstance was found true as to him.  Because Ricardo was 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
2 
A jury convicted defendant of murder and found true the special 
circumstance and weapon allegations.  The jury also convicted defendant of all 
charged crimes except the vehicle burglary count, as to which it was unable to 
reach a decision.  The jury then returned a verdict of death, which the trial court 
declined to modify.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
In 1995, defendant was the leader of the Parthenia Street gang.  In March 
1995, when she was 14 years old, Melinda “Mindy” Carmody was “jumped into” 
the Baby Locas — the female adjunct of defendant‟s gang.3  One of the girls who 
initiated her into the gang was the leader of the Baby Locas, Sandra Ramirez, who 
became Mindy‟s friend.  Mindy‟s gang moniker was “Crazy” and Ramirez‟s was 
“Shy Girl.”  Shortly after she joined the gang, Mindy began a relationship with 
defendant.  She eventually ran away from home and moved in with defendant‟s 
family.  In September 1995, Mindy returned home but continued her relationship 
with defendant.   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
under the age of 18 at the time of the crime, the prosecution did not seek the death 
penalty against him and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole.   
3  
To join a gang, the novice gang member is set upon by several members of 
the gang and has to fight them off; this is called being “jumped in.”  Mindy had to 
fight with three members of the Baby Locas in order to join the gang.   
 
3 
Mindy broke up with defendant in February 1996.  According to Mindy‟s 
preliminary hearing testimony, defendant called her at her mother‟s home on the 
morning of March 13, 1996, and asked if he could come by to pick up some 
papers.  Mindy said no, because she was afraid of defendant.  While they were still 
dating, defendant had told her that if she ever broke up with him, he would kill 
her.   
About an hour after he called, defendant entered Mindy‟s house through the 
garage.  He asked her if she wanted to leave with him.  When she said no, 
defendant approached her with a knife.  He stabbed her with the knife in the back 
of the neck and she fell onto the couch.  Defendant started choking her.  While he 
was choking her, he told her that if he “can‟t have [her], no one can.”  She fell off 
the couch and he released her, then he pulled her to her feet by her hair and forced 
her upstairs to her bedroom.  Defendant put Mindy in her closet and grabbed a bag 
and told her to get some clothes because they were leaving.  After packing the bag 
he pulled her downstairs.  Outside of the house, he placed her into the backseat of 
a waiting car.  Another man Mindy had never seen before was in the driver‟s seat.  
Before they left, defendant told her to change her shirt because there was blood on 
it.   
At the preliminary hearing Mindy testified further that they drove first to 
defendant‟s house where Mindy waited in the car while defendant went inside to 
retrieve a bag.  They then went to the house of defendant‟s aunt, Maria Hernandez, 
and defendant left her there.  Hernandez helped clean the back of Mindy‟s neck, 
which was bleeding, and she changed her shirt again.  Mindy remained at 
Hernandez‟s house for four hours but was unable to communicate with her 
because Hernandez spoke Spanish and Mindy did not.  Eventually, Hernandez 
drove Mindy home.   
 
4 
Later that same day, about 5:00 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Robert 
Denton responded to a call to Mindy‟s home.  According to the officer, Mindy was 
upset and nervous and started crying while he was talking to her.  He took her to 
the police station.  Photographs taken at the station showed fingerprint bruising 
and scratch marks around Mindy‟s throat and a wound to the back of her neck that 
had been oozing blood since Officer Denton first saw it.   
Police arrested defendant on the night of the incident when, responding to a 
report of a car break-in at a condominium complex near where Mindy lived, they 
found him in a dirt area beneath a balcony.  Defendant told the arresting officers 
that he “didn‟t do anything,” but “was in the area to see his girlfriend.”  He kept 
repeating that he “loved her too much.”   
Detective Morritt interrogated defendant.  After waiving his Miranda rights 
(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), defendant told Morritt that Mindy had 
given him permission to come to her house to pick up some papers.  Defendant 
said he took a bus to Mindy‟s house and, once there, they argued and he hit and 
choked her.  Nonetheless, according to defendant, Mindy voluntarily went with 
him to his house.  From there, a friend drove them to the home of defendant‟s 
aunt.   
Sometime after his arrest, defendant telephoned Sandra Ramirez, the leader 
of the Baby Locas, telling her that he had stabbed Mindy in the neck and 
kidnapped her.  He also told her that he wanted to take Mindy to Mexico to marry 
her.   
Mindy testified against defendant at the preliminary hearing on the 
kidnapping and assault charges on March 28, 1996.  According to Detective 
Morritt, Mindy appeared frightened and upset, and cried at times during her 
testimony.  At one point during Mindy‟s testimony, defendant sat forward in his 
chair and said, “I don‟t have to sit here and listen to this shit.”   
 
5 
Defendant called Ramirez on March 26 and March 27, 1996, from the cell 
area at the court where his preliminary hearing was held.  In the first call, he again 
admitted to Ramirez that he had stabbed and kidnapped Mindy.  He told Ramirez 
to tell Mindy not to go to court.  In the second call, he asked Ramirez to come to 
court and pick up a letter that he had written to Mindy and deliver it to her.   
Defendant was held to answer on the kidnapping and assault charges on 
March 28, 1996.  Defendant‟s sister, Patricia (Patty), told police that defendant 
called her during the first week of April and asked her to set up a three-way call 
with their brother, Ricardo, also known by his gang name “Diablo,” and Jorge 
Uribe, a gang member who was known as “Pelon.”  Patty set up the call but did 
not listen to the conversation.4 
On April 11, defendant again called Ramirez while she was talking to Alma 
Cruz, another member of the Baby Locas.  Ramirez, Cruz, and defendant all spoke 
together on a three-way call.  Defendant told them they had to go to a gang 
meeting that was scheduled for the following night to discuss paying dues to the 
Mexican Mafia.  They also talked about the girls‟ plan to jump in a new member, a 
girl called “Happy,” who was Mindy‟s friend.  The plan was to jump Happy in at a 
park outside the gang‟s territory.  Defendant insisted, however, that the girls jump 
her in at an alley claimed by the gang.  Defendant explained that if Happy was 
jumped in at the park she would not be from the gang-controlled neighborhood.  
Ramirez did not believe it mattered where the new gang member was jumped in, 
                                              
4  
After Ricardo was arrested he made a statement to police that was 
introduced into evidence against him at his joint trial with defendant after it had 
been redacted to omit any reference to defendant.  Ricardo told police he and 
Uribe discussed killing Mindy before the murder and that Uribe gave him the gun 
he used.   
 
6 
but because defendant was the gang leader she agreed.  According to Cruz, 
defendant asked her “if [she] could kill one of [her] homegirls.”  Cruz replied that 
it depended on whether “[the homegirl] would do something to me.”  Defendant 
said, “I already have someone doing it for me.”   
Records showed that on April 10, the day before defendant‟s conversation 
with Ramirez and Cruz, there were a number of phone calls from defendant‟s 
cellblock in the jail to the Lopez residence where his brother Ricardo lived with 
their parents.  On April 11, the same day defendant spoke to Ramirez and Cruz, 
calls were made from the superior court cell area at Van Nuys, where defendant 
was arraigned, again to the Lopez residence.  Three calls were also made the 
following day, April 12, the day Mindy was killed, from where defendant was 
being held in custody, to the Lopez residence.   
On Friday, April 12, 1996, Baby Locas leader Ramirez drove various 
members of the gang, including Mindy, to an alley off Schoenborn Street to attend 
the gang meeting and to initiate Happy into the Baby Locas.  When they arrived, 
the sole male gang members present were Ricardo and Uribe.  According to 
Ramirez, Mindy seemed frightened by Ricardo‟s presence, but Ramirez told her 
not to worry because he “wasn‟t going to do nothing.”  Ricardo was drinking beer, 
as were other gang members including Mindy and Ramirez.  Ricardo, Uribe, and 
other male gang members were on one side of the street and the females were on 
the opposite side.   
At some point, Ramirez went to talk to Ricardo, who was standing with 
Uribe.  Ricardo asked, “Why did you bring them?” and told her “[Y]ou know 
what‟s going to happen.”  According to Ramirez, she did not know what he meant 
by that, nor what he meant when he also told her that, “if anything happened, to 
say it was a drive by.”  Ricardo then took a gun out of his waistband, pointed it at 
 
7 
Ramirez and said he was going to shoot her.  Ricardo put the gun away and 
Ramirez walked away.   
Uribe crossed the street and told Mindy that Ricardo wanted to talk to her.  
Mindy made a face as if she did not want to speak to him, but she went.  Ramirez 
noticed that Mindy was talking to Ricardo.  She saw his gun at the side of his leg 
and then she heard Mindy scream, “Shy Girl, let‟s get out of here.”  She looked 
and saw Mindy coming toward her quickly with Ricardo following her.  He was 
pointing his gun at Mindy and then he started shooting.  Ramirez heard 
approximately five shots.  Mindy fell into the street.  Ricardo walked up to her and 
shot her while she was on the ground.  One of the girls present heard Ricardo say 
something about his brother.   
After Ricardo shot Mindy, he walked away with the gun to his own head.   
Ramirez and the other girls ran to Mindy and tried to move her, but 
ultimately left her at the scene because they were afraid to say anything to the 
police.  The girls got into Ramirez‟s car and drove to a convenience store where 
one of them called 911.   
Meanwhile, Leticia Corona, who lived on Schoenborn Street, was returning 
home around 9:00 p.m. when she saw Mindy lying in the street.  She and her sister 
got out of the car to help.  There was a pool of blood beneath Mindy‟s head but 
she was still alive.  Although her eyes remained closed, she tried to lift herself off 
the road.  Eventually, the paramedics arrived.  The next morning Corona returned 
to the scene and found a smashed-up bullet near the gutter.  She gave it to police 
who later matched it to a gun taken from the Lopez residence.   
A Los Angeles firefighter-paramedic transported Mindy to a nearby 
hospital.  He and the hospital chaplain testified that Mindy‟s pager had a message 
that read “187” and a phone number later identified as belonging to Mindy‟s 
 
8 
mother.  Mindy died at the hospital several hours after her arrival.  The cause of 
death was multiple gunshot wounds.   
On April 13, 1996, the day after the shooting, defendant called Sandra 
Ramirez and asked, “What happened?”  She told him that Ricardo had shot 
Mindy.  Defendant asked Ramirez if she knew where Ricardo was and hung up 
after she told him she did not.  Later that day, Ricardo called Ramirez and told her 
to say that Mindy‟s killing was a drive-by shooting.  Defendant then called 
Ramirez a second time and asked if she had spoken to police.  When she said no, 
he told her, “Don‟t say anything.”  Ricardo then called Ramirez again, this time 
telling her to tell the “girls” to attend a meeting that night so they would know 
what to say about the shooting.  According to Ramirez, when she told him she 
could not go, he told her that “if [she and other Baby Locas] didn‟t go [to the 
meeting], the same thing [as had happened to Mindy] was going to happen to us.”   
Phone and inmate locator records for that day show four calls were made to 
the Lopez residence from where defendant was being held in custody.   
Detective Oppelt interviewed defendant 12 days after the shooting.  
Defendant denied having anything to do with Mindy‟s death and said that he had 
learned of it only one week earlier when the lawyer representing him on the 
kidnapping and assault case mentioned it to him.  He said he was both mad and 
sad at things Mindy testified to at the preliminary hearing.  He also told the 
detective he was depressed about her death.  Defendant volunteered that Mindy 
told him that she had been receiving the number 187 on her pager and that he had 
assured her the message was not from anyone in his family.   
Defendant asserted that since his arrest on the assault and kidnapping 
charges he had not spoken to his brother Ricardo and he also denied having 
spoken to Jorge Uribe.  He also initially claimed not to have spoken to Sandra 
 
9 
Ramirez but then acknowledged that he had talked to her about jumping a girl into 
the gang.   
In January 1997, before the preliminary hearing in the present case, Sandra 
Ramirez‟s boyfriend received a letter from Ricardo sent from a jail facility.  The 
letter instructed him to tell Ramirez “not to go to court or else” Ricardo would 
“have the homeboys take care of her.”   
2.  Defense evidence 
Defendant presented the testimony of his mother, aunt, and his aunt‟s 
husband.  They each testified that they saw Mindy on the day she was allegedly 
kidnapped by defendant and that she did not appear to be frightened, nor was she 
injured.  Defendant‟s mother testified further that defendant and Mindy wanted to 
go to Mexico to get married.  His aunt testified that she talked them out of this 
plan.  Defendant‟s uncle testified that he, not his wife, drove defendant and Mindy 
from his house to Mindy‟s neighborhood.  He also testified that Mindy did not 
appear frightened or injured.   
In his defense, Ricardo introduced a portion of Ramon Ramos‟s 
preliminary hearing testimony after Ramos refused to testify.  Ramos, whose gang 
moniker was “Oso,” testified that Ricardo was drinking beer before he shot Mindy 
and that after he shot her, he put the gun to his own head and clicked it.  He also 
testified that after he took the gun from Ricardo, Ricardo said, “It‟s for my 
carnal,” meaning his brother, defendant.   
3.  Prosecution rebuttal evidence 
The prosecution presented Mindy‟s diary entry for the day of the assault in 
which she had written that “Bird [defendant] broke in and stabbed me and choked 
me and kidnapped me.  Went to Police station, went to Grandma‟s.”  She also told 
one of her schoolteachers about the incident.   
 
10 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence  
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant‟s violent acts while in 
custody.  Sheriff‟s Deputies Romo and Perez testified that defendant had been 
injured in a fight with another inmate.  After defendant had been treated in the jail 
infirmary, Perez prepared to use some handcuffs to transport him to the 
disciplinary building.  Defendant said, “Fuck you, I ain‟t going to the hole,” and 
tried to elbow and punch Perez in the face.  In the ensuing struggle, the deputy 
suffered scratches, swelling and bruising.  Several deputies eventually subdued 
defendant.   
The prosecution also presented victim impact testimony from Mindy‟s 
stepmother, her grandmother, and her mother.  Each testified that she had had a 
close relationship with Mindy and that Mindy‟s death had been devastating to her.   
2.  Defense evidence 
Defendant declined to present a penalty phase case.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection Issues 
1.  Limitation on voir dire 
The juror questionnaire in this case included four questions that touched on 
racial or ethnic bias — defendant is Hispanic and Mindy was Caucasian — 
including a question that asked prospective jurors whether they believed there was 
racial discrimination against Latinos in Southern California.  (Question No. 86.)  
Prior to voir dire, the court indicated it would not ask followup questions of those 
jurors who did not respond to this question.  Both defendants objected.  On appeal, 
defendant contends the court abused its discretion by failing to ask such followup 
questions.  We conclude otherwise.  
 
11 
a.  Background 
At the time of defendant‟s trial, the trial court alone conducted voir dire.  
(See Code Civ. Proc., former § 223, added by Prop. 115, § 7, approved by the 
electorate effective June 6, 1990 [voir dire from counsel permitted only for “good 
cause”].)  Nonetheless, prior to voir dire, the court and counsel collaborated on the 
juror questionnaire.   
Four questions on the questionnaire addressed the issue of racial or ethnic 
bias.  Question No. 86 stated:  “If you believe that there is racial discrimination 
against Latino/Mexican-Americans in Southern California, please describe the 
problem as you see it.”  Question No. 82 informed prospective jurors that they 
were to use “the same standards (which will be given to you by the court) to judge 
all witnesses‟ credibility regardless of their occupation, lifestyle, race, ethnic 
background, language, sex, or sexual orientation.  If you do not believe you can do 
this, or if you believe it would be difficult for you to do so, please set forth your 
thoughts about this.”  Question No. 87 asked prospective jurors:  “Have you ever 
been afraid of another person because of their race,” and, if so, “what was the 
circumstance?”  Question No. 88 asked:  “Are you a member of any private club, 
civic, professional or fraternal organization which limits its membership on the 
basis of race, ethnic origin, sex or religious convictions,” and, if so, “please 
identify the club(s) or organization(s).”   
Before the first group of prospective jurors entered the courtroom, the trial 
court made the following statement with respect to question No. 86:  “I noticed in 
reading the questionnaires, as I‟m confident you did as well, that a number of 
people did not respond to the question about racial prejudice.  I don‟t have any 
intention of following up on that question, ladies and gentlemen . . . .  In some of 
those responses, some showed a great sensitivity to the question, others showed 
less than great sensitivity to the question.  For other people it was apparently 
 
12 
something they had a ready answer to, and that suggests perhaps something about 
them one way or the other as any person would choose to infer; but inasmuch as 
the non-Hispanic who is part of the information before the court goes, that is, the 
alleged victim, she is the only non-Hispanic, I believe, with respect to the charges 
themselves, and there does not seem to have been any kind of discriminatory 
prosecution here.  I mean it‟s a simple and regular charging; and so if those people 
did not answer that, I do not intend to go over that subject matter.5”  Ricardo‟s 
counsel objected “on behalf of my client, reserving any possible appeal rights, 
both on federal and state constitutional grounds.”  Defendant‟s counsel joined “for 
the same purpose.”6   
b.  Discussion 
“At the time of trial in this matter, Code of Civil Procedure section 223, 
enacted by Proposition 115 (approved by the electorate effective June 6, 1990), 
provided for court-conducted examination of prospective jurors in a criminal case, 
                                              
5   
The trial court‟s comment about discriminatory prosecution is irrelevant to 
the issue of whether additional questions to question No. 86 were required to 
probe the issue of possible racial or ethnic bias on the part of the prospective 
jurors.  
6  
The Attorney General contends this objection was insufficient to preserve 
the present claim on appeal because defense counsel failed to specify the precise 
state and federal constitutional grounds that were the basis of his objection.  We 
disagree.  In contrast to People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, cited by the 
Attorney General, in which the defendant failed to request further questions 
regarding racial bias in addition to those on the questionnaire that defense counsel 
helped draft, defendant did object to the court‟s explicit decision not to ask 
followup racial bias questions.  Moreover, although unspecified, the objection was 
on constitutional grounds.  We conclude that the objection was sufficient to 
preserve the issue on appeal.  (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436-
437.) 
 
13 
including death penalty cases, in the presence of the other jurors.”  (People v. 
Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 534.)  “An appellate court applies the abuse of 
discretion standard of review to a trial court‟s conduct of the voir dire of 
prospective jurors.”  (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 88.) 
“Where the jury in its discretion is responsible for determining whether a 
defendant lives or dies, the need for juror impartiality is obviously most acute.”  
(People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1131, original italics.)  Given the 
gravity of the stakes in a capital case, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that “a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have 
prospective jurors . . . questioned on the issue of racial bias.”  (Turner v. Murray 
(1986) 476 U.S. 28, 36-37.)  Mindful of these admonitions, we nonetheless 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case by declining to 
question prospective jurors who left blank question No. 86 regarding potential 
racial bias. 
Unlike decisions cited by defendant, this is not a case in which prospective 
jurors were not questioned at all about potential racial bias.  (See, e.g., Turner v. 
Murray, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 36-37 [refusal of trial court to question prospective 
jurors about racial bias in capital case involving murder of Caucasian shopkeeper 
by African-American defendant]; Ham v. South Carolina (1973) 409 U.S. 524, 
526-527 [where defendant was a young African-American civil rights worker who 
asserted that his prosecution for drug possession was in retaliation for his civil 
rights activities, the trial court‟s refusal to ask questions about racial bias violated 
the 14th Amend.].)  Here, the juror questionnaire clearly addressed the issue of 
potential bias with four questions, including question No. 86. 
Defendant also cites People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, in support of his 
claim.  In Holt, we agreed that “adequate inquiry into possible racial bias is . . . 
essential in a case in which an African-American defendant is charged with 
 
14 
commission of a capital crime against a White victim.”  (Id. at p. 660.)  However, 
we went on to observe:  “Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the 
reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the 
manner in which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal.”  (Id. at p. 661.)  
We cannot so conclude in this case. 
Here, four questions on the jury questionnaire addressed the issue of the 
prospective jurors‟ possible ethnic or racial bias.  Question No. 86 inquired 
directly about the attitudes of prospective jurors on the issue of bias against 
Latinos in Southern California.  As the trial court observed, the responses showed 
various levels of sensitivity on that issue, which presumably were useful to the 
parties during the selection process.  Defendant claims, however, that the trial 
court should have questioned jurors who did not respond to that particular question 
because their silence may have masked bias against Hispanics.  We disagree.  
Question No. 86 was constructed as an “if/then” question.  Given that 
construction, a blank response indicated that the prospective juror did not believe 
that there existed racial discrimination against Latinos in Southern California.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to inquire about every blank 
response to ensure that this is what the prospective juror meant.  Further, to the 
extent a prospective juror responded to the question, as the trial court observed, 
the answer would stand for itself and give the parties relevant information.  
(Indeed, even a blank response was informative of a prospective juror‟s attitude on 
the issue.)  Thus, given that “the juror questionnaire gave the prospective jurors a 
clear opportunity to disclose views about racial bias that would warrant their 
excusal from the jury” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 609), the trial 
court‟s decision not to follow up on a question that did not require an answer and, 
as to which, any answer would speak for itself, fell within the appropriate exercise 
of its discretion.  
 
15 
Moreover, the remaining three questions that touched upon the issue of 
racial bias (questions Nos. 82, 87, and 88) were, unlike question No. 86, 
constructed in a manner that required a response from the prospective jurors.  
Thus, prospective jurors were required to answer whether they could apply the 
same standards of credibility to all witnesses despite, among other characteristics, 
their ethnic background; whether they had ever been afraid of a person of a 
different race and, if so, under what circumstances; and, whether they belonged to 
any organization that excluded people from membership for, among other reasons, 
their race or ethnic origin.  Therefore, whether or not prospective jurors answered 
question No. 86, their answers to these other questions would have provided the 
parties with some insight into their attitudes about race and ethnicity. 
Indeed, and notwithstanding its earlier pronouncement, the trial court asked 
three prospective jurors followup questions based on their answers to these 
questions.  At the request of Ricardo‟s attorney, the trial court asked Prospective 
Juror No. 1032 question No. 83 regarding witness credibility.  The trial court 
repeated question No. 87 to Prospective Juror No. 7502 regarding whether the 
juror had ever been afraid of another person because of race and posed a number 
of followup questions.  Among the questions the court asked was:  “Obviously the 
defendants who are before the court are Hispanic . . . .  Is there anything in the fact 
that they are Hispanic that would prejudice you against the defense before you 
know anything about the case at all?”  When the prospective juror seemed to 
hesitate, the court pressed, “You‟re confident of that?” and “Will you reflect on 
that and if it‟s problematic please let me know?”  In response to the court‟s 
inquiry, Prospective Juror No. 0886 indicated that the prospective juror‟s 
affirmative answer to question No. 88 was wrong.   
 
16 
Defendant suggests the court‟s questions were inadequate because “[v]ery 
few jurors would answer these questions in such a way that they would admit to 
racial prejudice.”  As we have seen, the record does not support this assertion. 
In People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, in which the defendant was 
African-American and his victims were not, the defendant claimed the trial court 
erred by failing to question prospective jurors about racial bias.  We rejected the 
claim, observing that “other than the bare fact of the difference between the races 
of defendant and the victims, nothing about the circumstances of this crime 
suggests race played any role.”  (Id. at p. 169.)  The same is true here.  (See also 
People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 695 [“This was not a case in which racial 
prejudice was an obvious issue”].)  In these circumstances, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court‟s decision not to question prospective jurors who left 
blank question No. 86.7   
Although we find no abuse of discretion here, we take this opportunity to 
remind trial courts in capital cases to “closely follow the language and formulae 
for voir dire recommended by the Judicial Council in the Standards [of Judicial 
Administration] to ensure that all appropriate areas of inquiry are covered in an 
                                              
7  
As noted, defendant‟s specific objection was to the trial court‟s decision not 
to ask further questions of prospective jurors who chose not to respond to question 
No. 86.  To the extent he is also arguing that all four questions on the juror 
questionnaire — which his counsel helped draft — were inadequate to assess 
racial bias, his argument is forfeited.  Defendant did not ask the court to pose 
followup questions with respect to questions Nos. 82, 87 or 88 nor did he 
generally argue that the questionnaire failed to adequately assess racial bias.  (See 
People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 607-608.)  Even were this claim not 
forfeited, we conclude that on the record before us, voir dire on this issue, both in 
the form of the questionnaire and the trial court‟s followup questions was 
“ „ “reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality.” ‟  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 737.) 
 
17 
appropriate manner.  Failure to use the recommended language may be a factor to 
be considered in determining whether a voir dire was adequate, but the entire voir 
dire must be considered in making that judgment.”  (People v. Holt, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 661.)8   
2.  Prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his claim under 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 that the prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges in an allegedly impermissibly discriminatory manner.9   
a.  Background 
After the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-
American juror — after having excused another African-American juror the day 
before — defense counsel lodged a Wheeler objection.  Defense counsel pointed 
out that, with the excusal of this prospective juror, “there appear to be . . . no other 
Blacks in the entire pool,” and maintained that the dismissed juror “seems 
otherwise qualified.  She has prior jury experience, including sitting on a jury on a 
                                              
8  
As relevant to this case, “Section 8.5(b)(18) [now redesignated as 
4.30(b)(20)] of the California Standards of Judicial Administration (West‟s Ann. 
Cal. Codes, Rules (Appen.) (1996 ed.) p. 663) (Standards), suggests this inquiry: 
„It may appear that one or more the parties, attorneys or witnesses come from a 
particular national, racial or religious group (or may have a life style different than 
your own).  Would this in any way affect your judgment or the weight and 
credibility you would give to their testimony?‟ ”  (People v. Holt, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 660, fn. 13.)  Unlike question No. 86 in this case, the standardized 
question requires prospective jurors to provide an answer. 
9  
Defendant also cites Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, which is 
essentially Wheeler‟s federal constitutional counterpart.  Notwithstanding his 
failure to cite Batson in the trial court, “the Wheeler objection preserves the 
Batson claims.”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1008, fn. 9.) 
 
18 
murder case [and] indicated in her questionnaire she could personally impose the 
death penalty if it was appropriate . . . .”   
The trial court rejected defendant‟s Wheeler claim, concluding that a prima 
facie case of discrimination had not been made with respect to the dismissed juror.  
The court found that the prospective juror “doesn‟t seem to be quite tuned in 
sometimes,” and noted that she worked “a swing shift at night so that she‟s in 
court all day and working during the night.  I noticed when she was sitting in the 
audience when we originally met her, [she] seemed to be behaving in a relatively 
unusual kind of way, leaning over her seat, not tuning in and paying attention to 
what we were doing.  She had to leave once during the proceedings, as you may 
recall, and I can‟t say that that‟s what the exercise [of the peremptory challenge] 
was based on, but it would certainly appear to me from what she said and from the 
information, that might explain her . . . relatively noticeable conduct in court, that 
perhaps added together, that was sufficient.”   
Although the court did not find a prima facie case, it invited the prosecutor 
to state his position for the record.  The prosecutor said, “I think there was quite 
enough evidence in the way — in the uncandid manner she answered particularly 
on her jury experience to justify my exercise of a peremptory.”  Ricardo‟s counsel, 
but not defendant‟s, objected to the sufficiency of the prosecutor‟s explanation for 
his exercise of his peremptory challenge.  Ricardo‟s counsel said she disagreed 
that any lack of candor by the prospective juror was sufficient to justify excusal.  
The court replied, “If it [were] for cause, I would certainly disagree as well, but 
it‟s not for cause.  It‟s peremptory and it is a sufficient reason.”   
b.  Discussion 
We recently summarized the law governing defendant‟s claim in People v. 
Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856.  “ „ “Under Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, „[a] 
 
19 
prosecutor‟s use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis 
of group bias — that is, bias against “members of an identifiable group 
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds” — violates the right 
of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section 
of the community under article I, section 16 of the state Constitution.  [Citations.]‟  
[Citation.]  „Such a practice also violates the defendant‟s right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  [Citations.]‟ ” ‟  (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 
Cal.4th 574, 611.)  [¶]  In ruling on a motion challenging the exercise of 
peremptory strikes, the trial court follows a three-step procedure.  „First, the 
defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”  [Citation.]  
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to 
the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-
neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, “[i]f a race-neutral 
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent 
of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.”  [Citation.]‟  (Johnson v. 
California [(2005)] 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted (Johnson).)  [¶]  Under 
Johnson, a defendant establishes a prima facie case „by producing evidence 
sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has 
occurred.‟  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170; see also People v. Taylor, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 614.) . . .  When, as here, it is unclear from the record whether the 
trial court employed [a former, now] disapproved-of standard, „ “we review the 
record independently to „apply the high court‟s standard and resolve the legal 
question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a 
juror‟ on a prohibited discriminatory basis.”  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Id. at 
pp. 903-904.) 
 
20 
Defendant contends the statistical disparity in the prosecutor‟s use of 
peremptory challenges in which half (two out of four) were directed at the only 
African-American prospective jurors raises an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.  In an analogous factual situation we rejected a similar claim.  “Bonilla 
relies principally on the fact that all African-Americans — two of two — were 
struck from the juror pool.  It is true that the prosecution used peremptories to 
challenge both African-Americans in the pool, but „the small absolute size of this 
sample makes drawing the inference of discrimination from this fact alone 
impossible.  “[E]ven the exclusion of a single prospective juror may be the product 
of an improper group bias.  As a practical matter, however, the challenge of one or 
two jurors can rarely suggest a pattern of impermissible exclusion.” ‟  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 342-343, fn. omitted.)  As in Bonilla, the 
size of the sample in this case does not lend itself to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.   
Defendant also contends that the trial court‟s reference to the dismissed 
juror‟s work schedule as the potential cause of her noticeable inattentiveness relied 
on knowledge not in the prosecutor‟s possession.  However, the issue is not 
whether the prosecutor knew the reason for the prospective juror‟s inattentiveness 
and, for purposes of our analysis, we do not consider the trial court‟s hypothesis 
regarding the reason for her inattention.  Our focus is solely on the trial court‟s 
observations regarding the prospective juror‟s lack of attention, which it referred 
to as “unusual” and “noticeable.”  These observations are relevant to the question 
whether the record supports an inference of discriminatory excusal because they 
suggest a race-neutral reason for excusing the prospective juror.  Defendant does 
not challenge the trial court‟s observations that the prospective juror was 
unusually and noticeably inattentive.  The existence of such an apparent race-
neutral reason further supports our conclusion that defendant has failed to raise the 
 
21 
inference that the prosecutor excused the prospective juror on the basis of her race.  
(See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 616 [no inference of discriminatory 
purpose where review of the record disclosed race-neutral reasons for excusing an 
Afrrican American prospective juror].)   
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court should not have credited the 
prosecutor‟s proffered explanation for excusing the prospective juror — her 
asserted lack of candor in responding to questions about her prior jury service — 
and suggests that a comparative analysis also undermines the prosecutor‟s 
explanation.  If, however, we determine that the trial court correctly found no 
prima facie case of discriminatory purpose in the prosecutor‟s exercise of his 
peremptory challenges, we need not address his proffered explanation or engage in 
comparative analysis.  “We have found it proper for trial courts to request and 
consider a prosecutor‟s stated reasons for excusing a prospective juror even when 
they find no prima facie case of discrimination; indeed, we have encouraged this 
practice.  [Citations.]  However, the trial court is not required to do this at the first 
stage of a Wheeler/Batson analysis, and the trial court‟s invitation [to have done so 
here] did „not convert [this] first-stage Wheeler/Batson case into a third-stage 
case.‟  [Citations.]  [¶]  Finally, because the trial court‟s request did not „convert 
[this] first-stage Wheeler/Batson case into a third-stage case‟ [citation], we also 
„decline defendant‟s invitation to engage in comparative juror analysis‟ [citation].”  
(People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617.) 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied defendant‟s 
Wheeler motion on the ground that he failed to make a prima facie showing that 
the prosecutor‟s use of his peremptory challenge was motivated by group bias. 
 
22 
3.  Defendant’s absence from in-chambers voir dire questioning 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his statutory rights under 
section 977 as well as his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and 
a trial by jury by conducting some voir dire questioning in chambers and outside 
his presence.10  His argument is without merit. 
During voir dire, the trial court said it wished to speak to some prospective 
jurors privately to determine if they were subject to excusal for cause.  The court 
indicated that it preferred to do so in chambers to avoid having to send the rest of 
the prospective jurors into the hallway.  The court told defense counsel:  “If your 
clients are willing, and if you are willing, I‟ll bring [the prospective jurors] in here 
one at a time, we‟ll do it on the record, and you can talk to your clients about 
anything you want to talk about with them in between, or whatever.  So we‟ll go 
back out [into open court], and I‟ll list who it is I want to talk to privately, and 
then I‟ll ask you if we can come back here or if we‟ll do it in the courtroom.”  
Both defense counsel agreed to this procedure.  The trial court returned to the 
courtroom, called the names of two prospective jurors, and obtained both sides‟ 
agreement that these prospective jurors could be questioned in chambers.  After 
questioning, the court excused one of the two prospective jurors for cause, over 
                                              
10  
To the extent defendant asserts constitutional claims on appeal not raised 
below, we entertain such claims only if “the new arguments do not invoke facts or 
legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but 
merely assert that the trial court‟s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons 
actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating 
the Constitution. . . .  [¶]  In [this] instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a 
claim that the trial court erred on the issue actually before that court necessarily 
leads to rejection of the newly applied constitutional „gloss‟ as well.  No separate 
constitutional discussion is required in such cases, and we therefore provide 
none.”  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17; see People v. Partida 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-439.) 
 
23 
defendant‟s objection.  The prosecution eventually exercised a peremptory 
challenge against the remaining prospective juror.   
The following day the court followed the same procedure with two other 
prospective jurors.  The parties stipulated to the excusal of one of these jurors 
because of his wife‟s medical condition.  Defendant eventually exercised a 
peremptory challenge against the other juror.   
The trial court also employed this procedure during the selection of 
alternate jurors, questioning five prospective jurors in chambers.  One of those 
questioned was excused for cause because of her language difficulties.   
“ „[A] criminal defendant has a right to be personally present at certain 
pretrial proceedings and at trial under various provisions of law, including the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, section 15 of article I of the California Constitution, and sections 977 
and 1043.  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]  The right is not absolute, however.  Under 
federal constitutional principles, a defendant is entitled to be present at a certain 
proceeding only if his or her appearance „is necessary to prevent “interference 
with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination” ‟ or if the proceeding 
represents a „ “stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome” and “his presence would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure.”  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]  Our state 
Constitution‟s right to personal presence is circumscribed in a similar manner, as 
are sections 977 and 1043, which codify that right.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 1003-1004, fn. omitted.)11  “This court has made it clear 
                                              
11 
Under section 977 a felony defendant must be personally present at certain 
specified portions of trial, such as arraignment and imposition of sentence, and “at 
all other proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
24 
that neither the state nor the federal Constitution, nor the statutory requirement 
that a defendant be present at „all . . . proceedings‟ (§ 977, subd (b)(1)), provides a 
criminal defendant with the right to be personally present in chambers or at bench 
discussions outside the jury‟s presence on questions of law or other matters as to 
which his presence bears no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to 
defend the charges against him.”  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1306, 
fn. omitted.) 
In circumstances analogous to this case, we have rejected the claim that a 
defendant‟s absence from sidebar or chambers conferences during which 
prospective jurors were questioned violated the defendant‟s right to be present.  
For instance, in People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, the trial court questioned 
two prospective jurors during sidebar conferences at which the defendant‟s 
counsel was present but the defendant was not.  We rejected his claim that his 
absence from these conferences deprived him of his right to be present at trial.  We 
observed:  “Defendant has not indicated any way in which his presence at the 
sidebar conferences bore a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to 
defend himself.  He admits the impossibility of knowing what sudden impressions 
and unaccountable prejudices he might have formed.  Because there must be a 
„reasonably substantial relation‟ to defendant‟s ability to defend himself, and not a 
mere „shadow‟ benefit, we must reject such claims based on undue speculation.  
[Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 433.)   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
court, a written waiver of his or her right to be personally present . . . .”  (§ 977, 
subd. (b)(1).)  Section 1043 requires that a felony defendant “be personally present 
at the trial.”  (§ 1043, subd. (a).)   
 
25 
In this case, defendant asserts that his exclusion from these conferences 
“made it impossible for [him] to assist his counsel when jurors were challenged 
and excused,” but he fails to offer any specific explanation how his absence 
inhibited his ability to defend himself.  Defendant also suggests that because he 
remained in the courtroom with the rest of the jury panel, the “prospective jurors 
were left with the impression that [defendant] was either too dangerous to 
participate in the proceedings in chambers or not interested in doing so.”  This 
assertion is unsupported by the record and, in any event, irrelevant to the claim he 
is making, which is that his exclusion from sidebar conferences made it impossible 
for him to have assisted defense counsel regarding juror selection.  We reject 
defendant‟s claim. 
B.  Evidentiary Claims 
1.  Admission of three-way call evidence 
Defendant contends that admission of evidence that he, his brother Ricardo, 
and another gang member were on a three-way telephone call before Mindy‟s 
murder violated a stipulation entered into by the parties to exclude reference to 
that call.  Alternately, he contends the evidence was either irrelevant or, if 
relevant, more prejudicial than probative.  We reject these claims.  
a.  Background 
After defendant‟s brother Ricardo was arrested he was interrogated by 
police.  During the interrogation, he revealed that he, defendant, and Jorge Uribe 
(also known as Pelon) had a three-way telephone conversation initiated by 
defendant, who was then in custody on the kidnapping and assault charges 
involving Mindy. Ricardo told police that in the course of that conversation, 
defendant made statements implicating himself in the plan to murder Mindy.   
 
26 
Defendant brought a pretrial motion to sever his case from Ricardo‟s based 
solely on his concern that introduction of Ricardo‟s statement to police would 
violate defendant‟s confrontation rights because neither Ricardo nor Uribe would 
be testifying at the joint trial.   
This type of motion is commonly known as an Aranda/Bruton motion after 
People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 
U.S. 123.  The Aranda/Bruton rule “declares that a nontestifying codefendant‟s 
extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is 
generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant‟s right 
of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.”  
(People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1120.)  As defendant acknowledged 
in his motion, as an alternative to severance, Ricardo‟s statement to police would 
be admissible against Ricardo if it was redacted to omit any portion that 
incriminated defendant.  For this proposition he cited Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 
481 U.S. 200 (Richardson).  In Richardson, the United States Supreme Court held 
“the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying 
codefendant‟s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the 
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant‟s name, but any 
reference to his or her existence.”  (Id. at p. 211.) 
At the hearing on defendant‟s motion, the prosecutor informed the court 
that to avoid severance he intended to confer with defense counsel to reach an 
agreement regarding Ricardo‟s statement.  At the next pretrial conference, the 
prosecutor read into the record the agreed-upon stipulation:  “[O]ur agreement is 
that any reference to [defendant], anything that he said, the fact that he was 
involved in any conversations with Mr. Ricardo Lopez, the fact that there were 
even three-way [telephone] conversations [between defendant, Ricardo and 
Uribe], which would indicate that this was a missing third party there, those will 
 
27 
be deleted.  Our agreement is, however, that any references to those conversations, 
since they were three-party conversations, will only include reference to the fact 
that this was a conversation between Ricardo Lopez and this person George [sic] 
Uribe, also known as Pelon, during which the murder of Miss Carmody was 
discussed, but there will not be any reference to the fact that this was a three-way 
conversation or that [defendant] was involved.  [¶]  I believe we‟ve looked this 
over.  We‟ve looked together.  We‟re aware of what the prevailing case law is in 
this area, and we believe that this is in conformance with Richardson v. Marsh.”12  
Defense counsel added:  “So stipulated, with the further proviso, so I understand 
that [the prosecutor] will instruct his investigating officers, if they testify to any 
portion of Ricardo Lopez‟s statement, that they will not inadvertently, or 
otherwise, refer to those passages that have been redacted.”  The prosecutor agreed 
to this condition and the court accepted the stipulation.   
In the prosecutor‟s opening statement, he told the jury that he would be 
calling Patty Lopez, defendant‟s sister, to testify that in the days before Mindy‟s 
killing Patty arranged a three-way call among defendant, Ricardo and Uribe.  
Defense counsel objected, arguing that evidence that Patty set up a three-way call 
violated the stipulation.  According to counsel, “The agreement was not only that 
the content of the conversation not be admissible, not be presented to the jury, but 
the very fact of a three-way conversation likewise [be] totally off limits.”  He 
requested a mistrial.   
                                              
12  
Although the stipulation refers to three-way conversations in the plural, the 
only conversation at issue here is the one to which Ricardo referred in his 
statement to the police during which he, defendant, and Uribe discussed killing 
Mindy.   
 
28 
The prosecutor maintained that the stipulation related solely to Ricardo‟s 
statement to the police and did not preclude other, independent testimony about 
the existence of the three-way call.  He stated that he had disclosed to defense 
counsel that he intended to call Patty Lopez.  The court found, however, that the 
prosecutor‟s opening statement “appeared to be violative of the spirit, if not the 
absolute language of the stipulation,” and took the mistrial motion under 
submission.   
The next day, there was further discussion of the matter.  The prosecutor 
insisted that the stipulation applied only to Ricardo‟s statement and that its sole 
purpose was to comply with Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. 200, and avoid 
severance.   
The following day, the court reviewed the stipulation on the record and 
agreed with the defense that it precluded “mention of a three-way conversation.”  
Again, however, the prosecutor argued that the stipulation covered only Ricardo‟s 
statement, adding “I would no way enter into any agreement limiting my ability to 
present other evidence in this case.  And I did not do that, and it was never my 
intention to do that.”  The prosecutor pointed out that Patty Lopez‟s testimony 
about setting up the three-way call impeached defendant‟s statement to police that 
he had not spoken to his brother in the days before the shooting.  He observed 
further that, unlike Ricardo, who did not plan to testify, Patty Lopez would testify 
and could be cross-examined, as could other witnesses who would be testifying 
regarding the phone records and what they showed.   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the mistrial motion.  
In the court‟s view there was “not a meeting of minds” with regard to the 
stipulation and it considered any agreement to be “limited as set forth by [the 
prosecutor].”  Defendant‟s counsel argued that if the content of the three-way 
conversation was inadmissible under the stipulation, the existence of any such call 
 
29 
would be irrelevant or lead to impermissible speculation about the content.  The 
court disagreed, observing that the existence of the call itself had some relevance.   
Defendant renewed his objection prior to Patty Lopez‟s testimony, making 
the further argument that, even if relevant, the testimony would be more 
prejudicial than probative.  The trial court again remarked that the stipulation was 
not clear and overruled the objection.   
When questioned about the call, Patty Lopez initially claimed a loss of 
memory, even when confronted with her statement to police admitting that she set 
up three-way calls before and after the shooting.  Ultimately, she admitted she had 
told police she had set up a three-way call among defendant, Ricardo, and Uribe 
the week before the shooting.  The prosecution later called Detective Michael 
Oppelt, who interviewed defendant after the shooting.  Oppelt explained that 
defendant told him the last time he had spoken to Ricardo was when defendant 
was initially arrested on the kidnapping and assault charges several weeks before 
the shooting.  According to the detective, defendant also said he had not spoken to 
Uribe after he was arrested.   
b.  Discussion 
Defendant contends that the admission of Patty Lopez‟s testimony violated 
the stipulation regarding the redaction of Ricardo‟s statement to police. 
As noted, the prosecutor argued — and the trial court ultimately agreed — 
that the stipulation was intended solely to avoid severance of defendant‟s trial 
from Ricardo‟s trial by redacting Ricardo‟s statement to eliminate any reference to 
defendant pursuant to Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. 200.  Defendant contends that 
the stipulation could be given effect only by interpreting it to exclude all 
references to the three-way phone conversation, including Patty Lopez‟s 
 
30 
testimony, and that the trial court erred by interpreting the stipulation to permit her 
testimony.   
The trial court initially agreed that the stipulation was at first blush broad 
enough to lend some support to defendant‟s interpretation of it.  After hearing the 
prosecutor‟s explanation, which evidently the court credited, the court concluded 
there had been no meeting of the minds between the parties.  It then construed the 
stipulation to limit it to Ricardo‟s statement to the police.  We conclude that the 
stipulation itself was broadly worded in parts and that the trial court‟s ultimate 
interpretation of it was reasonable in light of the circumstances that led the parties 
to agree to the stipulation and defense counsel‟s further proviso.  The record 
reveals that those concerns dealt exclusively with the admissibility of Ricardo‟s 
statement to police in such a way that would not require severance.  To achieve 
this goal, Richardson required the redaction of Ricardo‟s statement but not the 
preclusion of Patricia Lopez‟s testimony.  The trial court‟s interpretation of the 
stipulation gave the parties what they had bargained for. 
In the analogous case of People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 54 (Dyer), the 
defendant made a motion under People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 451-454, to 
exclude his three prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes should he 
testify in his defense.  The prosecutor orally agreed that he would not impeach 
defendant with those prior convictions.  Defense counsel asked whether the 
prosecutor also intended to refrain from asking character witnesses about the 
defendant‟s prior convictions.  The prosecutor replied, “ „It would apply to that,‟ ” 
and explained he would ask his witnesses not to volunteer any information about 
the defendant‟s prior convictions.  (Dyer, supra, at p. 55.)  He stated further, “ „we 
assent to [the defendant‟s] request not to bring out in any way before this jury in 
this [guilt] phase of the trial any evidence of any nature concerning any prior 
convictions suffered by the defendant in this phase of the trial.‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
31 
Later, defense counsel asked a defense witness about the defendant‟s 
reputation.  The trial court interrupted the witness‟s testimony to confer with 
counsel regarding the extent of the prosecutor‟s stipulation.  The question on 
which the court sought clarification was whether the prosecutor had intended by 
the stipulation to refrain from asking a witness who testified to the defendant‟s 
reputation for nonviolence about the prior convictions.  Defense counsel argued 
that the stipulation barred the prosecutor from asking about the prior convictions 
with respect to any character evidence.  The prosecutor rejected that interpretation, 
arguing it was never his intention to allow the defendant to present unchallenged 
reputation evidence “ „because then it would be basically asking me if I would let 
the jury hear false information about the defendant. . . .  So it was never clearly 
stated to me [by the defense] that there was an attempt to get me to be silent when 
the jury gets this false notion that this defendant has been nonviolent in his past.  
And I would not have acceded to those things, and I don‟t think the Court would 
require me to do that.‟ ”  (Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 55.) 
The trial court agreed.  It found that there had been no “ „meeting of the 
minds‟ ” regarding the stipulation.  (Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 56.)  It concluded 
further that the prosecutor‟s interpretation in the context in which the stipulation 
arose — the defendant‟s Beagle motion — was correct; that the prosecutor had 
intended to agree only that he would not raise the issue of the defendant‟s prior 
convictions through his own witnesses.  “The court observed that there was no 
reason for the prosecutor intentionally to forgo his right to impeach defendant‟s 
character witnesses, and defense counsel never indicated that he meant to obtain 
from the prosecutor a waiver of his right to impeach any witness on defendant‟s 
veracity or his lack of violent propensities.”  (Ibid.) 
We found the trial court‟s ruling to be proper.  We observed that a party 
may seek relief from the burdensome effect of a stipulation “ „by enforcement of 
 
32 
the stipulation in a reasonable and nonburdensome way.‟  [Citation.]  The court 
followed that procedure here; it did not purport to release the prosecutor from his 
stipulation, but merely interpreted it to reflect the probable intention of the 
parties.”  (Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 57.)  We noted that the “court could have 
simply released the prosecutor from the stipulation,” but, instead, “in effect found 
here that the stipulation, as interpreted by defense counsel, should not be binding.”  
(Ibid.) 
Although factually distinguishable, Dyer provides some guidance in the 
present case.  As in Dyer, the trial court in the present case found there was no 
meeting of the minds regarding the meaning and scope of the stipulation at issue.  
The defense argued the purpose of the stipulation was to prohibit any evidence of 
the existence of the three-way call.  The prosecutor argued the sole purpose of the 
stipulation was to comply with Richardson and to permit the admission of 
Ricardo‟s confession and avoid severance.  The trial court concluded the 
prosecutor‟s interpretation was the more reasonable one.  We agree. 
Defendant‟s severance motion specifically referred to redaction under 
Richardson as an alternative to severance.  The prosecutor‟s initial comments to 
the court indicated that he hoped to reach agreement with the defense to redact 
Ricardo‟s confession to avoid the need for severance.  Additionally, when the 
stipulation was entered into the record the prosecutor stated that it was “in 
conformance with Richardson v. Marsh.”  These circumstances support the trial 
court‟s conclusion that the prosecutor did not intend by the stipulation to preclude 
evidence about the existence of the three-way call other than by Ricardo‟s 
statement to the police. 
The trial court‟s ruling is consistent with Richardson itself.  Under 
Richardson, a defendant‟s confrontation clause rights are protected at a joint trial 
by the redaction of any reference to the defendant in his or her codefendant‟s 
 
33 
confession even if the redacted confession incriminates the defendant when linked 
to other evidence introduced at trial.  (People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 
1046-1047.)  In accordance with this principle, compliance with Richardson did 
not require the exclusion of Patty Lopez‟s testimony even if that testimony, when 
linked to Ricardo‟s redacted confession, might incriminate defendant.   
Defendant next contends that any ambiguity in the stipulation should be 
construed in his favor.  He provides no decisional support for such a rule.  As the 
stipulation was construed by the court, defendant received what he was entitled to 
receive under Richardson — the redaction of Ricardo‟s statement to eliminate any 
reference to him.  As noted, Richardson does not require the exclusion of other 
evidence that, when linked with the redacted statement, might incriminate 
defendant.  That evidence, moreover, had relevance beyond any possibly 
incriminatory effect when linked to Ricardo‟s redacted statement in that it 
impeached defendant‟s statement to police that he did not speak to Ricardo or 
Uribe in the days leading up to Mindy‟s killing. 
We also reject defendant‟s argument that any ambiguity should be 
construed in his favor because the prosecutor caused the uncertainty.  The record 
reveals that the stipulation was the fruit of negotiations between both parties.  
Defense counsel had an opportunity to speak up before accepting the stipulation 
and did, in fact, add to it his understanding that the prosecutor would instruct his 
police witnesses to refrain from referring to any portion of Ricardo‟s interview 
that had been redacted.  We see no reason to hold any ambiguity against the 
prosecution.  Nor are we persuaded by defendant‟s claim that he relied on the 
stipulation when he withdrew his severance motion because he believed it 
protected defendant‟s confrontation clause rights.  In line with the requirements of 
Richardson, the stipulation did protect his rights, even as ultimately construed by 
the trial court. 
 
34 
Defendant next argues that the evidence was either irrelevant or, if relevant, 
that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.)  “ „Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is 
admissible.‟  [Citations.]  „Evidence is relevant if it tends “ „logically, naturally, 
and by reasonable inference‟ to establish material facts . . . .” ‟ ”  (People v. Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 892.)  “[T]he trial court has broad discretion to determine 
the relevance of evidence.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 
727.)  Applying this standard, we conclude that Patty Lopez‟s testimony was 
clearly relevant both as tending to show defendant‟s participation in the planning 
of Mindy‟s killing and to impeach defendant‟s statement to police that he had not 
spoken to either Ricardo or Uribe after his initial arrest for the kidnapping and 
assault. 
Nor, contrary to defendant‟s claim, did the trial court abuse its discretion 
when it denied his motion to exclude the testimony as more prejudicial than 
probative under Evidence Code section 352.  Under this section, the court may 
exclude even relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  
We review the trial court‟s rulings under this section for abuse of discretion.  
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.)  “The prejudice which exclusion of 
evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the 
prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly 
probative evidence.‟ . . .  „The “prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 
352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against 
the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues.  In 
applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” ‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)  The evidence that 
 
35 
defendant participated in the three-way call with his brother and Uribe was 
undoubtedly damaging to him.  But it was not prejudicial under Evidence Code 
section 352, as articulated above. 
Defendant‟s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.  Defendant 
asserts that Patty Lopez‟s testimony was only minimally probative because 
defendant‟s denial that he had spoken to Ricardo or Uribe did not show a 
consciousness of guilt about anything related to the crime.  Patty Lopez testified 
that defendant spoke to the two men responsible for Mindy‟s murder in the days 
before the shooting.  Given this evidence, defendant‟s denial that he had spoken to 
Uribe or Ricardo in that time frame raised a strong inference of consciousness of 
guilt.  Defendant asserts furthermore that the testimony was prejudicial because 
the jury could have inferred that defendant‟s conversation with Ricardo and Uribe 
was in furtherance of the plan to kill.  Indeed, that was one of the purposes for 
which the evidence was introduced.  Although the evidence arguably “prejudiced” 
defendant in the same way that all evidence linking him to the crime was 
“prejudicial,” it did not prejudice him within the meaning of Evidence Code 
section 352.  (People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 638.)   
Defendant also argues that Patty Lopez‟s testimony was cumulative to other 
evidence that he called and spoke to a number of people while in custody.  But her 
testimony was the only direct evidence that defendant spoke to Ricardo and Uribe 
in the days before the murder.  The only other evidence was the Lopez family‟s 
phone records and records of defendant‟s location while in custody.  These records 
established that defendant called his family‟s residence from custody but did not 
establish to whom he spoke.  Patty Lopez‟s testimony was not cumulative of other 
evidence.  Moreover, to the extent her testimony was cumulative, it weakens 
defendant‟s claim that it was prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code 
section 352.  The inferences to be drawn from Patty Lopez‟s testimony that he 
 
36 
finds objectionable — that he planned the killing with Ricardo and Uribe — could 
also have been drawn from the documentary evidence cited above.   
The court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Patty Lopez‟s 
testimony. 
2. Ramon Ramos’s preliminary hearing testimony 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it admitted evidence against 
him of codefendant Ricardo‟s state of mind on the night of the murder.  We agree 
with defendant but conclude that the error was harmless. 
Ricardo presented the preliminary hearing testimony of Ramon Ramos in 
his defense after Ramos refused to testify at the trial and the trial court declared 
him unavailable.  (Evid. Code, § 240.)13  Ricardo‟s counsel requested that only 
certain portions of Ramos‟s prior testimony be read into evidence, including his 
statements that he and Ricardo were drinking on the night of the murder, that 
Ricardo and Mindy spoke to each other in loud voices, and that after Ricardo shot 
Mindy he put the gun to his own head.  The prosecutor requested that other 
portions of Ramos‟s testimony also be read, specifically his statement that when 
Ricardo pointed the gun to his head, he said, “It‟s for my carnal,” which meant, 
“It‟s for my brother.”  Defendant‟s counsel objected that the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay and improper rebuttal.  The prosecutor countered that the 
statement “was consistent with other testimony we received from the other 
witnesses, and that one of the witnesses testified that she heard the word „brother‟ 
                                              
13  
Under Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(6), a witness is 
unavailable if he or she is “[p]ersistent in refusing to testify concerning the subject 
matter of the declarant‟s statement despite having been found in contempt for 
refusal to testify.”  Ramos refused to testify despite being advised by the court that 
he had no right to do so.  This would appear to have been the basis of the finding 
of unavailability even though the court declined to sanction Ramos.   
 
37 
when [Ricardo] was doing it.”  The court overruled the defense objection, 
concluding that the phrase did not refer to any conversation between Ricardo and 
defendant, but only to Ricardo‟s state of mind at the time of the shooting.  After 
Ramos‟s testimony on this point was admitted, defendant‟s counsel renewed his 
objection and added an objection that the testimony “calls for a conclusion.”  The 
court overruled the objection.   
The parties agree that the trial court admitted the statement for the 
nonhearsay purpose of showing Ricardo‟s state of mind at the time of the 
shooting.  (Evid. Code, §§ 1250, 1251.)14  They disagree, however, as to whether 
the state of mind evidence was relevant.  (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
1189, 1204 [“[A]n out-of-court statement is not made admissible simply because 
its proponent states a theory of admissibility not related to the truth of the matter 
asserted. . . .  „The trial court must also find that the nonhearsay purpose is 
relevant to an issue in dispute.‟ ”].)  Defendant maintains that Ricardo‟s state of 
mind was irrelevant to any issue involving him.  He contends further that the 
evidence was improper rebuttal because he had not placed Ricardo‟s state of mind 
at issue.  The Attorney General argues that Ricardo‟s state of mind was relevant in 
that Ramos‟s prior testimony suggested that Ricardo‟s act of shooting Mindy was 
unplanned and unpremeditated. 
                                              
14  
As relevant here, Evidence Code section 1251 states:  “Subject to Section 
1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant‟s state of mind . . . at a time prior to 
the statement is not made inadmissible . . . if:  [¶]  (a) The declarant is unavailable 
as a witness; and  [¶]  (b) The evidence is offered to prove such prior state of 
mind, . . . and the evidence is not offered to prove any fact other than such state of 
mind . . . .”  Evidence Code section 1252 states:  “Evidence of a statement is 
inadmissible under this article if the statement was made under circumstances such 
as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” 
 
38 
There are two problems with the Attorney General‟s theory.  The first is 
that the statement “It‟s for my carnal,” is as consistent with an impulsive action as 
a planned one.  The second problem is that such evidence would tend to show 
premeditation only if it were admitted for its truth — that Ricardo shot Mindy on 
behalf of, or at the behest of, his brother.  We agree with defendant that the 
evidence was improper rebuttal because he had not placed Ricardo‟s state of mind 
at issue and to the extent the evidence was used against defendant, it was admitted 
in error.   
We disagree, however, with defendant‟s further assertion that the error was 
prejudicial.  This testimony was fleeting and — as we discuss more fully below 
(pt. II.C., post) in addressing defendant‟s sufficiency of the evidence claim — 
there was more than sufficient evidence that Ricardo committed the murder at 
defendant‟s behest.  Indeed, as the Attorney General points out, the prosecution 
had presented testimony in its case-in-chief that when Ricardo was shooting 
Mindy he said something to her about his brother.  On this record, we conclude 
that the error was harmless.  (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 820-821 
[in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendant‟s guilt, the erroneous 
admission under Evidence Code section 1250 of the victim‟s statement that she 
feared the defendant was harmless under either state or federal standards of 
assessing prejudice].)  
3.  The 187 evidence 
Over defendant‟s objection, the trial court admitted the testimony of two 
witnesses who indicated that they saw the number 187 — inferentially a reference 
to section 187, the murder statute — on the victim‟s pager after she was shot.  A 
paramedic saw the number 187 on the pager as he transported Mindy to the 
hospital.  The hospital chaplain also saw a series of 187‟s and a phone number 
 
39 
later identified as belonging to Mindy‟s mother.  The pager indicated the message 
had been received at 8:42 p.m.  The precise time of the shooting was not 
established, but a witness testified that it was about 9:00 p.m. when she found 
Mindy lying in the street, still alive.  When defendant spoke to police two weeks 
after the shooting, he spontaneously said that Mindy told him that she had been 
receiving the number 187 on her pager.  He assured her the message was not from 
anyone in his family.   
Defendant contends that the 187 evidence was irrelevant and speculative or, 
even if relevant, its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
We find no abuse of discretion.  Evidence that a shorthand reference to the 
Penal Code‟s murder statute appeared on the victim‟s pager near the time she was 
shot tended to support the prosecution‟s theory that the shooting was premeditated 
and not the result of Ricardo‟s impulsive action.  Defendant asserts that the 
evidence was speculative because the identity of the person who sent the message 
was not established.  Although no direct evidence proved the sender‟s identity, the 
existence and timing of the message tended to raise the reasonable inference that 
the page was sent by defendant or at his request.  Notably, during defendant‟s 
custodial interrogation, he spontaneously volunteered that Mindy had told him the 
number 187 had appeared on her pager.  The jury reasonably could have 
disbelieved defendant‟s claim that he had learned of this from the victim herself, 
particularly because there was no evidence that he had spoken with Mindy in the 
days before her murder.  Rather, the jury could have concluded that defendant 
offered this explanation to police preemptively before the police could confront 
him with the evidence that the number had been observed on her pager after she 
was shot.  The appearance of the number 187 on the victim‟s pager when coupled 
with defendant‟s spontaneous attempt to deflect any responsibility for it was 
indisputably relevant to the issue of defendant‟s involvement in the shooting.  Nor 
 
40 
was the probative value of the evidence outweighed by its prejudicial effect under 
Evidence Code section 352.   It was simply not the kind of evidence that 
“ „ “ „uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an 
individual and which has very little effect on the issues.‟ ” ‟ ”  (People v. Doolin 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439.)  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the pager evidence. 
4.  Limitations on cross-examination of Susan Carmody 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously sustained prosecution 
objections to three questions that his counsel asked during cross-examination of 
the victim‟s mother, Susan Carmody.  Specifically he asserts that the trial court 
erred when it prevented counsel from asking (1) how many times Mindy had run 
away from home before she moved in with defendant‟s family, (2) whether Mindy 
returned home of her own volition or because she was frightened, and (3) whether 
Carmody had once said that Mindy dressed “like a [W]hite girl” when she and 
Carmody were together but “like a chola” when they were not.  (Defendant 
explains that “chola” is a slang word for a Latina gang member.)   
The trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in sustaining the 
prosecutor‟s objections to these questions.  Carmody testified that Mindy had run 
away from home before she moved in with defendant‟s family and that at the time 
Mindy moved in with defendant, she was 14 or 15 years old.  Carmody testified 
further that she did not demand that Mindy return home because she felt Mindy 
was safe and being cared for at the home of defendant‟s family.   
Defendant contends that evidence regarding the number of times Mindy ran 
away from home was necessary because otherwise he might have been perceived 
as the person responsible for, or as having contributed to, the victim‟s problems 
with her mother.  This is not persuasive.  Testimony by a mother that her 14- or 
 
41 
15-year-old daughter had run away from home more than once before she moved 
in with her boyfriend‟s family was plainly indicative of a troubled family dynamic 
that predated defendant‟s relationship with Mindy.  Indeed, Carmody‟s further 
testimony that she allowed her daughter to remain with defendant‟s family 
because Mindy was safe and being cared for would have put defendant and his 
family in a positive light.  The exclusion of testimony regarding the number of 
times Mindy had run away from home was not an abuse of discretion. 
Nor did the court abuse its discretion when it sustained the prosecution‟s 
objection to defense counsel‟s question whether the police had frightened Mindy 
into returning home from defendant‟s house.  Carmody had already testified it was 
possible Mindy returned home because “some police officers scared her into doing 
so.”  She testified further that Mindy maintained her relationship with defendant 
even after she returned home.  Defendant asserts the court should have allowed 
him further examination of Carmody concerning the circumstances under which 
Mindy returned home to dispel any implication that Mindy did so because she had 
rejected defendant.  But the jury was aware that Mindy continued her relationship 
with defendant after she returned home and that her return home may have been 
the result of police intervention.  The court did not err in declining to allow further 
questioning on this minor and peripheral point. 
Finally, defendant asserts the trial court erred in prohibiting him from 
questioning Carmody regarding her reputed statement concerning Mindy‟s manner 
of dressing because it was relevant to explore Carmody‟s state of mind and her 
bias in this case as a result of her daughter‟s relationship with defendant.  Defense 
counsel had already elicited testimony from Carmody that she was upset about 
Mindy‟s relationship with defendant and that she had chosen to live with him.  
Moreover, Carmody‟s bias would have been unmistakable to the jury, given that 
defendant stood accused of arranging Mindy‟s killing.  The trial court did not 
 
42 
abuse its discretion in prohibiting a question the main point of which appeared to 
be to attempt to establish that Carmody was generally prejudiced against Latinos. 
5.  Evidence of the victim’s demeanor at the kidnapping preliminary 
hearing 
After the victim‟s preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record, 
the prosecutor questioned one of the detectives who had been present when Mindy 
testified, regarding Mindy‟s demeanor.  Defendant objected that the testimony was 
irrelevant and speculative.  The objection was overruled.  The detective testified 
briefly that Mindy was “frightened, upset and sometimes crying,” and, at one 
point, was given tissues by the trial judge, who asked her, “ „Would you like to go 
on?‟ ”   
Defendant renews his claim that testimony regarding the victim‟s demeanor 
at the preliminary hearing was irrelevant and may have led the jury to speculate 
that she was frightened to be giving testimony against defendant.  The Attorney 
General asserts the evidence was relevant to the jury‟s assessment of Mindy‟s 
demeanor for purposes of judging her credibility at the prior hearing.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 780.)  Defendant responds that such assessment must be made 
contemporaneously with the witness‟s testimony and not by secondhand evidence 
in the witness‟s absence. 
Evidence Code section 780 provides in pertinent part:  “Except as 
otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in determining the 
credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including but not limited 
to any of the following:  [¶]  (a) His demeanor while testifying and the manner in 
which he testifies.”  “[A] witness‟s „demeanor is always relevant to credibility.‟  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 493.)  The Attorney General 
argues that Evidence Code section 780 does not limit demeanor evidence to the 
 
43 
jury‟s firsthand observations of the witness as he or she is testifying before the 
jury but, when the witness is unavailable, such evidence may be supplied by other 
witnesses.  Defendant contends that permitting secondhand testimony regarding 
demeanor may violate the confrontation clause because the defendant is unable to 
effectively challenge such evidence. 
We need not decide whether admission of this testimony was error because 
any error would have been harmless under any standard of prejudice.  The 
testimony was brief and the prosecutor did not emphasize the officer‟s 
observations in his closing argument.  Furthermore, the jury reasonably could have 
found from Mindy‟s preliminary hearing testimony that she was frightened by 
defendant.  Mindy testified, for example, that she refused to allow defendant to 
come to her house because “I‟m scared of him,” and that she was frightened when 
defendant pushed her into his car.  We conclude any error in permitting the officer 
to testify regarding Mind‟s demeanor at the preliminary hearing was harmless. 
6.  Evidence of Mindy’s diary entry and her statements to one of her 
teachers 
During the defense case, defendant‟s mother, aunt and uncle testified that, 
on the day Mindy was allegedly kidnapped and assaulted, she appeared to them to 
have been uninjured and unafraid and that she was with defendant of her own 
volition.  In rebuttal, and over defendant‟s objection, the prosecution introduced a 
passage from Mindy‟s diary and a statement she made to one of her teachers that 
were consistent with her testimony at the preliminary hearing that defendant had 
assaulted and kidnapped her.  The diary entry read:  “[Defendant] broke in and 
stabbed me and choked me and kidnapped me.  Went to Police station, went to 
Grandma‟s.”  Mindy‟s teacher testified that Mindy told him defendant had broken 
into her house, threatened her, held a knife to her neck and taken her to his aunt‟s 
house.   
 
44 
On appeal, defendant argues the rebuttal evidence was improperly admitted 
because it did not constitute a prior consistent statement and it violated his 
confrontation and due process rights and his right to a reliable capital trial.  His 
argument is meritless. 
Defendant‟s confrontation clause claim is not preserved on appeal because 
he did not object to the admission of the rebuttal evidence on that ground.  (People 
v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 801 & fn. 21 (Riccardi).)  His claim, based on 
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, also is without merit.  In Crawford, 
the United States Supreme Court held that “ „[t]estimonial statements of witnesses 
absent from trial [can be] admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and 
only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.‟ ”  
(Williams v. Illinois (2012) ___ U.S ___ [132 S.Ct. 2221, 2232].)  But neither the 
diary entry nor Mindy‟s statement can be deemed testimonial within the meaning 
of Crawford.  Under the circumstances of this case, Mindy‟s recording of the 
day‟s events in her private diary and her disclosure of the incident to a trusted 
teacher, like other “informal statement[s] to a person not affiliated with law 
enforcement,” fall outside the scope of the confrontation clause, which is 
concerned with “formal and solemn accusatory statements . . . in the context of 
criminal investigations or inquiries.”  (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 987, 
italics omitted; see id. at pp. 986-991 [assault victim‟s statement to a hospital 
physician identifying the defendant as his assailant was nontestimonial].)  
Defendant‟s Crawford claim fails. 
We turn now to whether this evidence was properly admitted, over 
defendant‟s objection, under the exception to the rule against admitting hearsay to 
prove prior consistent statements.   
“To be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a prior consistent 
statement must be offered (1) after an inconsistent statement is admitted to attack 
 
45 
the testifying witness‟s credibility, where the consistent statement was made 
before the inconsistent statement or (2) where there is an express or implied 
charge that the witness‟s testimony recently was fabricated or influenced by bias 
or improper motive, and the statement was made prior to the fabrication, bias, or 
improper motive.  (Evid. Code, §§ 791, 1236.)”  (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 802.)  Here, as in Riccardi, we “are presented with the latter situation — an 
express or implied charge that [Mindy‟s] testimony recently had been fabricated or 
influenced by bias or improper motive — governed by subdivision (b) of Evidence 
Code section 791.”  (Ibid.) 
Defendant contends this second exception is inapplicable for two reasons.  
First, he argues there was no suggestion in the testimony of his witnesses that 
Mindy had fabricated her preliminary hearing testimony, thus opening the door to 
rehabilitating her testimony with the admission of her diary entry and the 
statement to her teacher.  We are not persuaded.  The statute itself speaks of an 
“express or implied charge” of fabrication.  (Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (b), italics 
added.)  “ „[R]ecent fabrication may be inferred when it is shown that a witness 
did not speak about an important matter at a time when it would have been natural 
for him to do so,‟ and in such a circumstance, „it is generally proper to permit 
rehabilitation by a prior consistent statement.‟  [Citations.]”  (Riccardi, supra, 54 
Cal.4th at p. 803; see also People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 143.)  In 
this case, defendant‟s mother and aunt were specifically asked whether Mindy told 
them she was being held against her will.  Both said no.  Additionally, defendant‟s 
aunt testified that Mindy did not complain of any injuries.  Plainly, the purpose of 
this testimony was to imply that Mindy‟s preliminary hearing testimony was of 
recent fabrication.   
Second, defendant argues that Mindy‟s diary entry and statement to the 
teacher do not qualify as prior consistent statements because they were made after 
 
46 
defendant‟s relatives had observed and spoken to her and after she had spoken to 
the police and accused defendant.  Defendant argues “[a]t that point, she had 
already spoke[n] to [defendant‟s] relatives and any motive to fabricate the 
evidence was already present.  Accordingly, Melinda‟s statements were 
inadmissible hearsay because they were not made before any other inconsistent 
statements or before she had a motive to fabricate [defendant‟s] guilt.”  We 
disagree. 
As noted, Mindy‟s statements fall under subdivision (b) of Evidence Code 
section 791 (section 791(b).)  Pursuant to section 791(b), a prior consistent 
statement is admissible to corroborate later testimony which is impliedly or 
expressly alleged to have been fabricated if the prior consistent statement was 
made before the motive for fabrication arose.  The specific timing question in this 
case, then, is whether Mindy‟s diary entry and her statement to her teacher were 
made before any motive to fabricate arose.  But defendant does not identify the 
moment at which a motive to fabricate arose before Mindy‟s diary entry or her 
statement to the teacher.  Rather, although he casts his argument as a timing claim, 
what he is actually asserting is that Mindy‟s silence could not provide the 
predicate for the admission of these statements to support her preliminary 
testimony because what was at issue was not her silence, “but her positive 
interactions with [defendant‟s] family and their observations about her physical 
and mental state.”  In other words, he is simply repeating his earlier claim that the 
testimony of his witnesses about their interactions with, and observations of, 
Mindy on the day of the kidnapping did not imply that her failure to tell them 
about the kidnapping was inconsistent with her later preliminary hearing 
testimony. 
As we have already explained, Mindy‟s silence was at issue.  The premise 
of the defense was that if, as Mindy testified at the preliminary hearing, she had 
 
47 
been assaulted and kidnapped by defendant, she would have said something to his 
mother, aunt, and uncle.  From the evidence she said nothing to them, the jury was 
invited to infer that her preliminary hearing testimony was fabricated.  The use of 
her silence by the defense for this purpose opened the door to admission of prior 
statements consistent with her preliminary hearing.  
It has long been recognized that when, as in this case, a witness‟s silence is 
presented as inconsistent with his or her later testimony, a statement made at the 
earliest opportunity after the silence that is consistent with the witness‟s later 
testimony may be admissible as a prior consistent statement under section 791(b).  
(People v. Gentry (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 462, 474 (Gentry).) 
In Gentry, the defendant presented evidence at trial that when the witness, 
Turner, was first questioned by police he failed to provide them with the damaging 
information about the defendant‟s involvement in the crime to which he later 
testified at trial.  To rebut the implication that Turner‟s trial testimony was 
fabricated, the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence of a second 
statement Turner made to the police the following day in which he did include the 
information to which he testified at trial.  The Court of Appeal held the trial court 
properly admitted the second statement.  As the court observed, at the time of 
Turner‟s initial interrogation by the police on the night of the crime he was 
“groggy and half asleep,” having gone to sleep drunk.  (Gentry, supra, 270 
Cal.App.2d at p. 474.)  But, “he made a full statement to the sheriff‟s officers of 
what he knew relevant to the case at the earliest opportunity after he had recovered 
his senses.  The explanation was corroborated by one of the officers to whom the 
statement had been made and by the statement reporter who recorded the 
statement.”  (Ibid.) 
Gentry‟s conclusion that Turner‟s later statement to the police was 
admissible as a prior consistent statement focuses on two factors; that at the time 
 
48 
of his initial silence he suffered from an incapacity that prevented him from 
speaking and that he made the prior consistent statement at the “earliest 
opportunity” after the incapacity was removed.  (Gentry, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at 
p. 747.)  In this case, Mindy‟s failure to report defendant‟s assault on her to his 
relatives can easily be explained by a concern for her safety; namely, she may not 
have been inclined to alert defendant‟s relatives to the kidnapping and assault for 
fear of repercussions from defendant.  Once she was no longer incapacitated by 
fear of defendant, she recorded the incident in her diary and told her teacher about 
it two days later.  This time frame falls within Gentry‟s “earliest opportunity” 
limitation.  (Ibid.)15 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted Mindy‟s 
diary entry and her statement to her teacher as prior consistent statements. 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Defendant’s Conviction of 
First Degree Murder 
The prosecution‟s theory of defendant‟s liability was that he orchestrated 
Mindy‟s murder while in custody on the assault and kidnapping case in retaliation 
for her preliminary hearing testimony in that case and to prevent her from 
testifying against him at the trial of those charges.  Because defendant was not the 
                                              
15  
Although Mindy was interviewed by the police before she made the diary 
entry, there was no evidence of what she told the police.  The officer who spoke to 
her did testify that she was upset and nervous and that she wept while he was at 
her residence.  She was then taken to the police station where her injuries were 
photographed.  From the officer‟s testimony, one can surmise that Mindy was still 
traumatized when she spoke to the police, that is, still to some degree 
incapacitated by the events.  Accordingly, we would not deem inadmissible her 
diary entry on the ground that her “earliest opportunity” to speak would have been 
when police interviewed her.  (People v. Gentry, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 474.)  
Rather, the officer‟s description of her emotional state and the photographs of her 
physical injuries corroborate her diary entry in the same way that the officer‟s 
testimony in Gentry corroborated Turner‟s statement.  (Ibid.)   
 
49 
shooter, the prosecution theorized that he was guilty of murder as an aider and 
abettor or a coconspirator and the jury was so instructed.  Defendant contends 
there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction of first degree murder as an 
aider and abettor.  We conclude that the evidence sufficed. 
As we have explained, “[w]hen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence,„ “[t]he court must review the whole record in the light most 
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 
evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — 
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  [Citation.]‟  [Citations.] . . .  „Substantial evidence includes 
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.  
[Citation.]‟  [Citation.]  We „ “ „presume in support of the judgment the existence 
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.‟ ”  [Citation.]‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 942-943.) 
“The elements of a charge of murder are an unlawful killing with malice 
aforethought.”  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.)  Murder perpetuated 
by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice 
aforethought, or that is immediately preceded by lying in wait is murder in the first 
degree.  (§ 189.)  Here, the jury was instructed with both these theories of first 
degree murder.  Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
prove first degree murder.  His concern is with his liability for that offense. 
A person may be liable for a criminal act as an aider and abettor.  Section 
31 defines “principals” in a crime to include persons who “aid and abet in its 
commission, or, . . . have advised and encouraged its commission.”  (§ 31.)  This 
court has interpreted section 31 to require that an aider and abettor must act with 
“knowledge of the direct perpetrator‟s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in 
achieving those unlawful ends, and . . . conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact 
 
50 
assists the achievement of the crime.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Perez (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that he was a principal 
under section 31 because there was no direct evidence that he instigated the 
murder or encouraged or advised its commission.  His contention fails.  
Preliminarily, the substantial evidence rule does not require that the evidence 
supporting defendant‟s conviction be direct evidence.  For purposes of the rule, 
substantial evidence encompasses circumstantial evidence and any reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from such evidence.  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 943.)   
There is no question that the evidence shows defendant had a strong motive 
for the murder:  to retaliate against Mindy for testifying against him at the 
preliminary hearing on the assault and kidnapping case and to prevent her from 
testifying at trial.  This was demonstrated by his call to Sandra Ramirez before the 
preliminary hearing in which he told Ramirez to tell Mindy not to go to court, 
followed by his second call to Ramirez in which he asked her to come to court and 
pick up a letter from him to Mindy; by the disturbance he caused at the 
preliminary hearing when, during Mindy‟s testimony, he said, “I don‟t have to sit 
here and listen to this shit”; and by his statement to police after the killing that he 
was angry about Mindy‟s testimony at the preliminary hearing.  The presence of 
motive is a circumstance that may establish guilt.  (People v. Estep (1996) 42 
Cal.App.4th 733, 738.) 
There was also strong evidence of defendant‟s active involvement in the 
murder even though he was in custody.  Defendant orchestrated Mindy‟s presence 
at the alley where she was murdered by insisting that Mindy‟s friend “Happy” be 
initiated into the girls‟ gang in the alley rather than in the park where the girls had 
originally planned to jump her into the gang.  Documentary evidence 
 
51 
demonstrated that one and two days before the shooting and on the day of the 
shooting calls were made from where defendant was being held in custody to his 
family‟s residence where his brother Ricardo lived.   
Moreover, Patty Lopez, the sister of defendant and Ricardo, told police she 
had arranged a three-way call between defendant and Uribe — who supplied the 
weapon — in the days before the killing.  The jury could reasonably have inferred 
from this evidence that the subject matter of defendant‟s conversation with 
Ricardo and Uribe was Mindy‟s murder.  The jury could reasonably also have 
concluded that defendant‟s insistence that Mindy be brought to the alley was part 
of the plot.  There also was defendant‟s question to gang member Alma Cruz the 
day before the shooting in which he asked her whether she could kill a “homegirl,” 
followed by his statement, “I already have someone doing it for me.”  The jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the “homegirl” in question was Mindy. 
Subsequent to the shooting, defendant acted and made statements in a 
manner from which the jury reasonably could have inferred consciousness of guilt 
that, in turn, provided additional evidence of his participation in the killing as a 
principal.  The day after the shooting, defendant called Sandra Ramirez and asked 
her, “What happened?”  When she told him Mindy had been killed, instead of 
professing shock or grief, he asked her if she knew where Ricardo was and hung 
up when she said she did not.  In a second call later that day, defendant asked her 
if she had spoken to police, and advised her not to say anything to them.  When 
interviewed by police approximately two weeks after the shooting, defendant lied 
when he was asked when he had learned about Mindy‟s killing.  He told Detective 
Oppelt he had learned about it only one week after it had happened.  Defendant 
also lied about not having spoken to either his brother or Uribe in the days before 
the shooting.  Defendant also initially lied to police about whether he had spoken 
to Ramirez, but then admitted he had talked to her about initiating a girl into the 
 
52 
gang.  This statement corroborated Ramirez‟s testimony that she and defendant 
had spoken about this matter.  Around the time Mindy was shot, the number 187 
was sent to her pager.  Defendant spontaneously volunteered to police that Mindy 
had complained to him about the number appearing on her pager and he said he 
had told her the message was not from his family.  From the fact that defendant 
admitted knowing about this incident and went out of his way to exculpate 
himself, the jury could have inferred the message originated from him or at his 
behest. 
Viewed in the light of the substantial evidence rule, the evidence was more 
than sufficient for the jury to have concluded that defendant instigated Mindy‟s 
killing, assisted in its planning, and advised and encouraged his brother to carry it 
out and was therefore guilty of first degree murder as a principal under an aiding 
and abetting theory. 
As noted, the prosecution alternatively argued that defendant could be 
convicted of Mindy‟s murder under a conspiracy theory.  Although defendant does 
not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support that theory, to 
the extent his argument may encompass such a claim, we reject it.  “One who 
conspires with others to commit a felony is guilty as a principal.  (§ 31.)  „ “Each 
member of the conspiracy is liable for the acts of any of the others in carrying out 
the common purpose, i.e., all acts within the reasonable and probable 
consequences of the common unlawful design.”  [Citations.]‟ ”  (In re Hardy 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 1025-1026.) 
The same evidence that supports defendant‟s conviction of first degree 
murder on an aiding and abetting theory also supports his conviction on a 
conspiracy theory of liability.  That evidence shows defendant conspired with his 
brother to kill Mindy and was personally responsible for luring Mindy to the alley 
where she was shot to death.  Additionally, defendant is liable for Mindy‟s murder 
 
53 
based on the acts taken by Ricardo to carry out the crime that was the object of the 
conspiracy. 
Defendant offers alternative and innocuous explanations of the evidence 
that supports his conviction.  Under the substantial evidence rule, however, “ „if 
the circumstances reasonably justify the jury‟s findings, the judgment may not be 
reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled 
with a contrary finding.‟  [Citation.]  Accordingly, we need not — and do not — 
address all of defendant[‟s] assertions of conflict[] in the evidence, or [his] 
alternative theories regarding the inference[] that should have been drawn from the 
evidence.”  (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 162.) 
We conclude that substantial evidence does establish that defendant was a 
principal to the crime and therefore supports his conviction of first degree murder. 
D.  Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Guilt Phase Closing 
Argument 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
argument by disparaging his attorney and by arguing facts not in evidence.  We 
reject his claim. 
“ „A prosecutor‟s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution when it “infects the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.”  [Citations.]  In other words, the 
misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
defendant‟s right to a fair trial.”  [Citation.]  A prosecutor‟s misconduct that does 
not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless violates California law if it 
involves “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.”  [Citations.]‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Clark, supra, 
52 Cal.4th at p. 960.)  “Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is 
preserved for appeal only if the defendant objects in the trial court and requests an 
 
54 
admonition, or if an admonition would not have cured the prejudice caused by the 
prosecutor‟s misconduct.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 
726, italics added.) 
Defendant‟s first claim of prosecutorial misconduct involves statements 
made by the prosecutor at two points during his closing argument, which he argues 
disparaged defense counsel.  “Personal attacks on opposing counsel are improper 
and irrelevant to the issues.”  (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 184.) 
Commenting on defense counsel‟s assertion that the prosecutor had invited 
the jury to base its verdict on speculation, the prosecutor suggested it was defense 
counsel who wanted the jury to speculate.  He added, “counsel has looked you in 
the eye unblinkingly and just said straight out, butter wouldn‟t melt in their 
mouths, and I want you to think about — .”  Ricardo‟s counsel immediately 
objected.  The court sustained the objection.  A few pages later in the transcript, 
responding to the defense argument that the prosecutor had asked the jury to 
speculate that it was defendant who broke into Margarite Pile‟s car, the prosecutor 
said:  “How do you know [defendant] was in the car?  Now, this is what I‟m 
talking about.  I thought [defendant‟s counsel] was in the courtroom during 
[Pile‟s] testimony —.”  Defense counsel objected to the “disparaging remark about 
counsel,” and the objection was sustained.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by 
attacking his attorney‟s integrity and implying that he was lying to the jury.  The 
Attorney General argues that defendant has forfeited his argument regarding the 
first allegedly disparaging remark because cocounsel, and not defendant‟s counsel, 
made the objection.  But the prosecutor‟s statement that “butter wouldn‟t melt in 
their mouths” appears to have been directed at both counsel.  Once cocounsel‟s 
objection was sustained, it would have served no purpose for defendant‟s attorney 
to independently object.  Under these circumstances, we find no forfeiture on the 
 
55 
ground that defendant‟s counsel failed to object.  However, as noted, to preserve 
the issue of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, the defendant must both object 
and request a curative admonition unless such admonition would have failed to 
cure to any prejudice.  (People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 726.)  
Defendant‟s failure to request a curative admonition as to either of the allegedly 
disparaging statements forfeits the claim.  (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
913, 942 [defense counsel‟s failure to request admonition after objecting to 
prosecutor‟s guilt phase rebuttal argument forfeits the claim on appeal]; People v. 
Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 914.)  In any event, the claim is meritless.  The 
remarks in question were fleeting and rather obscure.  Even if they constituted 
misconduct, they do not constitute the type of deceptive and reprehensible 
methods that require reversal.  (See People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 184 
[prosecutor‟s comments denigrating defense counsel were a small part of the 
prosecutor‟s argument and did not require reversal].)  Morever, the court sustained 
objections to the two comments that defendant claims constitute misconduct.  
(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845 [“[A]s to some of Morton‟s acts of 
misconduct, Blum objected and the trial court sustained the objection, thereby 
diminishing the prejudice flowing from that particular misconduct”].)   
Defendant‟s second allegation of prosecutorial misconduct asserts that the 
prosecutor argued facts not in evidence.  “The prosecutor should not, of course, 
argue facts not in evidence.”  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 698.) 
During defense counsel‟s own closing argument, he attacked the credibility 
of Mindy‟s fellow gang members, Sandra Ramirez and Alma Cruz, regarding their 
testimony that defendant had asked Cruz whether she would kill a “homegirl.”  In 
rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that, had Ramirez and Cruz wanted to falsely 
implicate defendant in the murder “why [didn‟t] they just come straight out and 
say it?  If they really wanted to get this guy, for God knows what reason, why 
 
56 
didn‟t they say [defendant] said, hey, I‟ve got Ricardo and [Uribe] working on it?”  
Defendant‟s counsel objected that the prosecutor was arguing facts not in 
evidence.  The objection was overruled.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s argument was improper because it 
assumed the two women knew that Ricardo and Uribe were both implicated in the 
crime when the only evidence implicating Uribe was Ricardo‟s statement, which 
was not admitted against defendant.  He claims that this amounted to arguing facts 
not in evidence.  We disagree.  The evidence showed that Uribe was with Ricardo 
when Ramirez, Cruz, and the other girls arrived in the alley where Mindy was 
shot.  Uribe also was present when Ricardo chastised Ramirez for bringing the 
other girls because “you know what‟s going to happen,” and when he told her that 
“if anything happened to say it was a drive by.”  Uribe was there when Ricardo 
removed the gun from his waistband, pointed it at Ramirez and said he was going 
to shoot her.  It was Uribe who went over to Mindy and told her that Ricardo 
wanted to talk to her.  The prosecutor could properly invite the jury to infer that 
Ramirez and Cruz surmised Uribe was part of the plan to kill the victim.  (People 
v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1052 [the prosecutor may argue his or her view 
of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence].)  Accordingly, the prosecutor‟s 
rehabilitation of the witnesses‟ credibility by pointing out that, had they wanted to 
implicate defendant, they could have done so more directly, was not misconduct.   
E.  Claims of Guilt Phase Instructional Error  
1.  Motive instruction 
Defendant contends the standard instruction on motive given in this case 
(CALJIC No. 2.51) improperly shifted the burden of proof.  The jury was 
instructed as follows:  “Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need 
not be shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a 
 
57 
circumstance in this case.  Presence of motive may tend to establish a defendant is 
guilty.  Absence of motive may tend to show that a defendant is not guilty.”  
“[T]he instruction did not shift the burden of proof.  It merely told the jury it may 
consider the presence or absence of motive.  [Citations.]  The motive instruction 
. . . did not undercut other instructions that correctly informed the jury that the 
prosecution had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People 
v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 750.)  We decline defendant‟s invitation to 
revisit these conclusions. 
2.  Consciousness of guilt instructions 
Defendant contends the consciousness of guilt instructions given in this 
case regarding false statements and suppression of evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.03 & 
2.06) were impermissibly argumentative and allowed the jury to convict him based 
on improper inferences.  As given here, CALJIC No. 2.03 provided:  “If you find 
before this trial a defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading 
statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may 
consider such statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of 
guilt.  However, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its 
weight and significance, if any, are matters for you to determine.”  CALJIC 
No. 2.06 essentially tracks CALJIC No. 2.03 with respect to the suppression of 
evidence “such as the intimidation of a witness and/or by concealing evidence.”  
As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly rejected the same argument in 
other cases.  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 555 [CALJIC No. 2.03 is 
neither argumentative nor does it “generate an irrational inference of 
consciousness of guilt”]; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142 [neither 
CALJIC No. 2.03 nor CALJIC No. 2.06 is argumentative or fundamentally 
 
58 
unfair].)  These conclusions apply with equal force to the case before us and 
defendant provides no persuasive reason for reconsidering the issue. 
F.  Penalty Phase Issues  
1.  Prosecutorial misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his 
closing argument in the penalty phase by (1) asserting that imposition of the death 
penalty on defendant was necessary to protect witnesses who had testified against 
him, (2) contending that the rule of law required imposition of the death penalty, 
and (3) contrasting defendant‟s life in prison with the victim‟s family‟s loss.  We 
find no misconduct. 
We previously have set forth the applicable legal standard in our review of 
defendant‟s claims of prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase.  (See ante, pt. 
II.D.)  The same standard applies to asserted misconduct at the penalty phase.  
(People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 464.) 
a.  Urging imposition of the death penalty to protect witnesses 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly argued that the death 
penalty was necessary in order to protect Mindy‟s fellow gang members, Sandra 
Ramirez and Alma Cruz.  Specifically, he cites the prosecutor‟s statements that 
defendant had subjected the witnesses to a continuing nightmare and that the jury 
must protect them.  Defendant contends that these remarks conveyed to the jury 
that the system had failed Mindy and the only way the jury could prevent 
defendant from posing a future danger to the witnesses was to return a death 
sentence.  We conclude the argument was not improper. 
In the prosecutor‟s discussion of the circumstances of the crime as a factor 
in aggravation, he referred to evidence that defendant had employed other people 
to carry out the murder.  For example, he pointed out that that defendant got his 
 
59 
“own younger brother” to do the shooting.  He continued,  “Who else did he leave 
in his wake here?  Look at the witnesses in this case.  [¶]  Look at Sandra Ramirez 
and Alma Cruz.  Look at what position they were put in.”  This remark drew a 
defense objection on the ground of “[i]mproper argument,” which was overruled.  
The prosecutor went on, “The circumstances surrounding this offense, he arranged 
through them, using them to get someone that was their friend in a position to be 
killed.  And during that conversation what is he talking about?  He‟s talking about 
the Mexican Mafia.  He‟s talking about dues.  He‟s talking about killing 
homegirls.  And then afterwards they‟re told not to say anything.  They still had 
enough courage to do the right thing, but it took a lot of courage.  [¶]  So when 
does their nightmare end?  When do they stop looking over their shoulders?”   
The prosecutor spoke again about witness killing when discussing the 
special circumstance that the victim was a witness to defendant‟s crimes and 
intentionally killed for that reason.  He argued:  “This is a horrible crime.  It goes 
to the very heart and soul of our system, the killing of a witness, not only that, a 
child.  Not only that, it is reached from beyond the walls of a custodial facility to 
the outside . . . .”  Continuing in this vein, the prosecutor explained that killing a 
witness was a special circumstance on par with “torture” and “multiple murders” 
warranting the “ultimate penalty” because “things like the murder of a witness, of 
a juror, of a judge . . . go right to the very core of our system, that system that we 
rely upon that allows the families and allows people to put trust in this system that 
says yes, we can approximate justice . . . .”   
The prosecutor returned to the theme of witness killing after a recess.  He 
pointed out that “[t]he system can‟t function if people are killed and cannot testify, 
or if they testify and then are killed and not able to answer the lies that are 
presented.  The system cannot function if people are too afraid to come to court 
and tell the truth and to do the right thing.”  Referring to Mindy, he noted, “She 
 
60 
said she was afraid of this man.  She still testified, and when she testified, what is 
she looking for?  The protection of this system.  And we didn‟t protect.  She‟s 
dead now.”  Referring to the witnesses in this case, including Sandra Ramirez, 
who “have courage to try and do the right thing,” the prosecutor asked the jury to 
“think about what trust these witnesses . . . place in us.”  He told the jury, “make 
sure that, through your search of justice and through your looking at what is the 
appropriate penalty, that that trust is not misplaced.”  The prosecutor continued:  
“You look at the defendant and you‟ll have to say to him, I know what you are, I 
know what you‟ve done.  And we will not, we cannot, if we‟re to survive as a 
society, tolerate this.  It cannot be done.  It cannot be accepted.  You have to say to 
him very clearly that this was way over the line.  And that if you have anything to 
say about it at all, he will never be put in a position where he will be able to do 
this again.”  At that point, defendant‟s counsel objected again, asserting the 
argument was improper.  The court indicated the objection was noted and the 
prosecutor resumed, asking the jury “to consider the courage of the witnesses that 
have come forward and talked about what has happened to them, what they have 
seen, what they have done . . . .  And if they had the courage to put their faith and 
their trust in this system, I‟m asking you to . . . look at your hearts and come back 
and say, justice demands this.  We know what justice demands, and justice 
demands nothing less than the ultimate penalty [for] this defendant.  Justice 
demands the death penalty.”   
We reject defendant‟s claim that these remarks constituted an emotional 
plea to the jury to assume personal responsibility for the safety of the 
prosecution‟s witnesses by returning a death verdict.  Rather, the point of the 
prosecutor‟s argument was that a system in which witnesses are killed or 
threatened with death cannot function and, therefore, the death penalty is required 
to deter people like defendant from killing witnesses and compromising the 
 
61 
integrity of the system.  A prosecutor is entitled to “assert that the community, 
acting on behalf of those injured, has the right to express its values by imposing 
the severest punishment for the most aggravated crimes,” so long as those 
comments are “not inflammatory,” do not “seek to invoke untethered passions,” 
and do not “form the principal basis of his argument.”  (People v. Zambrano 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1179.)  Moreover, to the extent the argument was a 
comment on defendant‟s future dangerousness, such argument was permissible.  
“ „[I]n closing argument a prosecutor may . . . comment on the possibility that if 
the defendant is not executed he or she will remain a danger to others. . . . [if] . . . 
such comments . . . are supported by the evidence.‟ ”  (People v. Michaels (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 486, 540-541.)  The argument was proper in this case based on the 
evidence that defendant had engineered Mindy‟s murder while he was in custody.  
We find no misconduct. 
b.  Preserving the rule of law 
We likewise reject defendant‟s related claim that the prosecutor‟s argument 
regarding the propriety of the death penalty for witness killing was necessary to 
preserve the rule of law.  Defendant asserts that the prosecutor‟s argument 
suggested to the jury that witness killing required the death penalty in every case 
notwithstanding the existence of the alternative of life without possibility of 
parole.  It is true the prosecutor argued that killing a witness warrants the death 
penalty because such an act strikes at the heart of the justice system.  That 
argument was not improper.  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1179.)  
The defense could and did offer a different view.  The jury was free to come to its 
own conclusion about which punishment was appropriate.  Nor do we agree with 
defendant that the argument improperly appealed to the jurors‟ emotions because 
it suggested the death penalty for witness killing was necessary for society‟s 
 
62 
survival.  “ „ “Unlike the guilt determination, where appeals to the jury‟s passions 
are inappropriate, in making the penalty decision, the jury must make a moral 
assessment of all the relevant facts as they reflect on its decision.  [Citations.]  
Emotions must not reign over reason and, on objection, courts should guard 
against prejudicially emotional argument.  [Citation.]  But emotion need not, 
indeed, cannot, be entirely excluded from the jury‟s moral assessment.”  
[Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 691.)  We conclude that 
the prosecutor‟s argument did not constitute prejudicially emotional argument and 
was not misconduct. 
c.  Comparing life without parole to the victim’s family’s 
permanent loss 
Defendant contends finally that the prosecutor committed misconduct when 
he contrasted the kind of life defendant might enjoy in prison with the impact of 
Mindy‟s death on her family, contending that the argument constituted an 
inflammatory call for vengeance and a misuse of victim impact testimony.  We 
conclude there was no misconduct.   
Over defense objection, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider the 
meaning of life without the possibility of parole, saying, “I want you to think 
about when you‟re a lifer and you‟re in prison, what are you doing [?]  What can 
you do?  Can you read?  Can you watch T.V.?  Can you work out?  Can you have 
friends?  It might be monastic, but do you have a life?  Do you continue to breathe 
the air that is on the earth?  Do you continue to think?  Do you continue to write to 
your friends and family?  Do you have visits?  Do you have a life? . . .  On 
holidays or whatever, can your family come and see you?  [¶]  If Mindy‟s family 
wants to visit her, they can‟t.  If they want to talk to — well, I take that back 
because they can go to the grave site, and what a bleak and lonely experience that 
must be, to see the — visit the grave of your child.  And when they talk to her, I 
 
63 
know that they hope and they pray that she‟s listening and hearing their words, but 
it‟s not the same as holding your child or holding your grandkids.”  The defense 
objected that the prosecutor‟s remarks constituted an improper appeal to the 
jurors‟ emotions and were also a call for vengeance.   
We observe initially that a prosecutor may properly argue that “the 
community, acting on behalf of those injured, has the right to express its values by 
imposing the severest punishment for the most aggravated crimes.”  (People v. 
Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1179, italics added.)  As we also observed in 
Zambrano, “[r]etribution on behalf of the community is an important purpose of 
all society‟s punishments, including the death penalty.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at 
p. 1078.)  Therefore, a prosecutor may argue for imposition of the death penalty as 
“a valid form of community retribution or vengeance,” (ibid.) so long as the 
argument does not seek to “invoke untethered passions, or to dissuade jurors from 
making individual decisions . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1179; accord, People v. Martinez 
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 966.) 
Moreover, with respect to the use of victim impact evidence, a prosecutor 
does not commit misconduct in closing argument when he or she refers to such 
evidence to “urge the jurors to rely on it in voting to impose the death penalty.”  
(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 400.)  In this case the prosecutor‟s 
allusions to the impact of Mindy‟s death on her family, including his reference to 
the family‟s graveside visits, were based on properly admitted victim impact 
evidence.   
In light of these principles, we conclude that the prosecutor did not commit 
misconduct when he called for imposition of the death penalty on defendant, 
rather than life in prison, because of the permanent loss his murder of Mindy had 
inflicted on her family.  Nor do we find that the prosecutor‟s argument sought to 
invoke the jury‟s “untethered passions” or “dissuade jurors from making 
 
64 
individual decisions.”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1179.)  The 
prosecutor did no more than argue from the evidence that justice in this case could 
be served only by imposition of the death penalty.  To do so was not misconduct. 
2.  Instruction on restraints 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing 
to instruct jurors in arriving at their verdict during the penalty phase to disregard 
the fact that defendant had been restrained in the courtroom.  We conclude there 
was no error or, if error, no prejudice. 
The record shows that at one point during the guilt phase trial, defendant 
and his brother created a ruckus in the courtroom outside the presence of the jury.  
As a result they were both placed in restraints and belted into their seats.  At the 
time the trial court ordered the restraints, it observed that the restraints would not 
be visible to the jury “unless the defendants make it so.”  During the penalty 
phase, Deputy Sheriff Perez, who had been involved in an altercation with 
defendant at the county jail, was asked to describe how she had handcuffed him on 
the day of that incident.  She testified:  “With the chains in my hand.  They‟re 
similar — I don’t know what he’s wearing now, but it‟s a handcuff on each end 
and it — it‟s got a chain, and I was holding him like this.”  There was no defense 
objection to this testimony. 
Defendant now contends that in light of the deputy sheriff‟s testimony, the 
trial court should have instructed the jury on its own motion to disregard the fact 
that defendant was in restraints.  In support of this claim he relies on People v. 
Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282 (Duran).  Under Duran, “[i]n those instances when 
visible restraints must be imposed the court shall instruct the jury sua sponte that 
such restraints should have no bearing on the determination of the defendant‟s 
guilt.  However, when the restraints are concealed from the jury‟s view, this 
 
65 
instruction should not be given unless requested by defendant since it might invite 
initial attention to the restraints and thus create prejudice which would otherwise 
be avoided.”  (Id. at pp. 291-292.)  Here, defendant points to nothing in the record 
suggesting that the restraints were visible to the jury.  In the absence of evidence 
the jury saw defendant‟s restraints, the court had no duty to instruct.  (People v. 
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 721.) 
Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a witness‟s fleeting 
and ambiguous reference to the possibility a defendant might be in restraints 
triggers the same duty to instruct.  Indeed, the Attorney General contends that 
“there is [sic] no indications that the restraints were visible to the jury.”  This 
assertion is supported by the trial court‟s observation when it ordered the restraints 
that unless the defendants “make it so,” the restraints would not be visible to the 
jury.  It is not even clear from the record whether Deputy Sheriff Perez actually 
saw defendant‟s restraints (and if she did, when she did) or whether she simply 
assumed he was restrained.  In these circumstances, an instruction may have 
achieved the opposite result than was intended by Duran by calling attention to 
defendant‟s restraints when, otherwise, the jury would have been unaware of them. 
Even were we to conclude that the witness‟s passing mention of restraints 
triggered the court‟s duty to instruct, any error was harmless.  The purpose of 
requiring the instruction is to prevent the jury from inferring that, because a 
defendant charged with a violent crime is restrained, he is “a violent person 
disposed to commit” the charged crime.  (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 290.)  
Where, however, as here, a defendant has been convicted of a special 
circumstance murder, the rationale requiring a sua sponte instruction is no longer 
applicable.  (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 898 [“the risk of substantial 
prejudice to a shackled defendant is diminished once his guilt has been 
determined”].)  As we observed in similar circumstances in People v. Slaughter 
 
66 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187:  “In the present case, the . . . penalty phase jury knew that 
defendant already had been found guilty of murdering two individuals during the 
commission of a robbery.  Under any standard, it does not appear that the jury‟s 
penalty phase verdict would have been affected even if the jurors . . . concluded 
[the defendant] was wearing a restraint.”  (Id. at p. 1214.)  For the same reasons, 
any error here was harmless. 
3.  Instruction regarding guilt phase instructions 
Defendant contends reversal is required because the trial court instructed 
the jury to disregard all guilt phase instructions in the penalty phase of the trial.  
(CALJIC No. 8.84.1.)  Defendant argues that because the court‟s penalty phase 
instructions did not include a definition of “reasonable doubt,” the jury would not 
know it was required to apply that standard of proof in deciding whether it could 
consider as a factor in aggravation the prosecution‟s evidence that defendant had 
committed a battery while in custody.  He further asserts that the instruction to 
disregard guilt phase instructions left the jury without standards by which to assess 
the credibility of witnesses or evaluate whether defendant‟s statements constituted 
confessions or admissions.  We conclude that the trial court‟s failure to define 
“reasonable doubt” and reinstruct on the assessment of witness credibility and 
confessions and admissions was error but that defendant was not prejudiced. 
The penalty phase trial lasted only one day.  Defendant elected not to 
present a case in mitigation.  The prosecution‟s case in aggravation consisted of 
victim impact testimony and the testimony of two sheriff‟s deputies regarding an 
incident in which defendant reacted violently when being moved from the jail 
infirmary to a disciplinary building. 
Notably, the jury was instructed that before it could consider the jail 
incident as a factor in aggravation it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
 
67 
defendant committed the act.  The court did not, however, provide a definition of 
“reasonable doubt.”  The court‟s failure to reiterate the definition of “reasonable 
doubt” at the penalty phase was error.  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 
494; People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 408.)  And yet “its failure to do so 
was harmless.  „Absent any suggestion to the contrary, the jury would likely have 
assumed the reasonable doubt the court referred to at the penalty phase had the 
same meaning as the term had during the guilt phase.  There is no reasonable 
likelihood [citation] the jury would have believed the reasonable doubt analysis it 
was required to engage in at the penalty phase was somehow different than the 
reasonable doubt analysis it had already engaged in at the guilt phase.  That the 
court would not have changed the meaning of such an important term without 
saying so is a “commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all 
that has taken place at the trial [that is] likely to prevail over technical 
hairsplitting.”  [Citation.]  Additionally, “the jury did not request a further 
explanation of the reasonable doubt standard, as it surely would have done had it 
been confused as to the meaning of reasonable doubt.”  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 745-746; accord, People v. Cowan, supra, 
at pp. 494-495; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 534-535.)  This analysis 
applies with equal force to the present case.  The trial court‟s failure to reinstruct 
the jury with the previously given definition of “reasonable doubt” was harmless. 
The court‟s failure to reinstruct the jury regarding how to assess witness 
credibility or how to determine whether defendant‟s statements were confessions 
or admissions is likewise error.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 37.)  In 
assessing prejudice from the omission of such instructions at the penalty phase, we 
evaluate “ „the nature of the evidence presented to determine whether it was likely 
the omitted instructions affected the jury‟s evaluation of the evidence,‟ ” and 
where we have found the “evidence presented by both the prosecutor and the 
 
68 
defendant at the penalty phase” to be “relatively straightforward,” we have 
concluded “defendant was not prejudiced by the omission of the instructions.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 134.) 
Here, the penalty phase evidence was relatively brief and quite 
straightforward.  The only evidence that the defense might have controverted, and 
as to which the credibility and admissions and confessions instructions might have 
applied, was the testimony of the two sheriff‟s deputies regarding defendant‟s in-
custody altercation.  Significantly, however, defense counsel‟s brief cross-
examination of these witnesses did not question whether the altercation had 
occurred as they described it.  Rather, counsel‟s approach was to minimize the 
incident.  For example, he asked one witness about the extent of her injuries and 
whether she had to take off any time from work.  Counsel pursued this strategy in 
his closing argument in which he referred briefly to the altercation and 
characterized it as a “relatively minor incident,” and suggested that it should be 
considered a factor in mitigation because it was the sole incident “in over a two-
year period that [defendant] has been incarcerated.”   
On this record, we conclude that the court‟s failure to redefine reasonable 
doubt and reinstruct on the evaluation of witness credibility and confessions and 
admissions by the defendant at the penalty phase did not prejudice defendant. 
G.  Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant advances a number of challenges to the death penalty statute and 
related procedures.  We have repeatedly rejected each in the past and we do so 
again, concluding: 
“California‟s automatic appeals procedure is not unconstitutional on the 
ground that it fails to provide for intercase proportionality review.”  (People v. 
Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1224.)   
 
69 
“The California death penalty scheme is not constitutionally defective 
because it fails to require jury unanimity on the existence of aggravating factors, 
or because it fails to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the 
appropriate penalty, that aggravating factors exist, or that aggravating factors 
outweigh mitigating factors.  [Citation.]  The United States Supreme Court‟s 
decisions interpreting the right to a jury trial under the federal Constitution (see 
Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584) 
do not change these conclusions.”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 835.)   
“We repeatedly have held that the standard version of CALJIC No. 8.88 
[defining aggravating and mitigating factors and the scope of the jury‟s sentencing 
discretion] is adequate and correct.  [Citations.]  We decline to reconsider that 
issue here.”  (People v. Souza, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 141.)  Specifically, we reject 
defendant‟s claims that CALJIC No. 8.88 is unconstitutional because (a) the 
instruction‟s use of the phrase “so substantial” is so vague as to violate the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution; (b) because the 
instruction unconstitutionally fails to require the jury to decide not only whether 
death is an authorized punishment, but also whether it is the appropriate 
punishment; (c) the instruction fails to inform the jury that if it determines that the 
factors in mitigation outweigh those in aggravation, it must return a sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole; and (d) the instruction fails to inform jurors 
that defendant does not have the burden of persuasion that death is not the 
appropriate penalty.  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 464-465; People v. 
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 661-662.)   
Moreover, “[s]ection 190.3, factor (a), does not violate the federal 
Constitution‟s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by its asserted 
application in a „ “wanton and freakish” ‟ manner that allows almost all features of 
 
70 
every murder, even features „ “at odds,” ‟ to be characterized as aggravating.”  
(People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007.)   
“ „The statutes are not invalid because they permit the jury to consider in 
aggravation, under section 190.3, factor (b), evidence of a defendant‟s 
unadjudicated offenses.  [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 
732.)  Moreover, the jury “need not make a unanimous finding on factor (b) 
evidence.”  (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402.)   
The trial court need not omit assertedly inapplicable sentencing factors.  
(People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 733.)  Neither does the inclusion of 
terms such as “ „ “ „extreme‟ ” ‟ ” and “ „ “ „substantial‟ ” ‟ ” in the list of potential 
mitigating factors read to the jury “ „ “impermissibly limit the mitigation evidence 
or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination.” ‟ ”  (Id. at 
p. 732.)  Nor is the statute invalid because the jury is not required to make written 
findings regarding the aggravating factors.  (Ibid.)  Finally, “ „ “[t]here is no 
violation of the equal protection of the laws as a result of the statutes‟ asserted 
failure to provide for capital defendants some procedural guarantees afforded to 
noncapital defendants.” ‟ ”  (Ibid.; accord, People v. Souza, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 142.)   
H.  International Law 
Defendant contends that his death sentence violates international law, 
covenants, treaties and norms that are binding on the United States.  “We reject the 
assertion.  „Because defendant has failed to establish prejudicial violations of state 
or federal constitutional law, we need not consider whether such violations would 
also violate international law.‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th 
at p. 1225.) 
 
71 
I.  Cumulative Effect of Asserted Errors  
Defendant maintains that the cumulative impact of the asserted errors at the 
guilt and penalty phases rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  We have found 
no error except as to defendant‟s claim that the trial court erroneously admitted 
evidence of Ricardo‟s state of mind during the guilt phase and the trial court‟s 
failure to reinstruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt and on witness 
credibility, confessions, and admissions during the penalty phase (see ante, pts. 
II.B.2., II.F.3).  In addition, we have assumed without deciding that the court erred 
by allowing testimony about Mindy‟s demeanor during her testimony at the 
preliminary hearing at the guilt phase and by failing to instruct the jury on 
restraints at the penalty phase.  (See ante, pts. II.B.5., II.F.2.)  Our findings of 
error and our assumptions of error were accompanied by findings that defendant 
was not prejudiced.  We also conclude defendant was not cumulatively prejudiced.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety.   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lopez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S073597 
Date Filed: June 13, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Meredith C. Taylor 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Arnold Erickson, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney, 
Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arnold Erickson 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Theresa A. Patterson 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 620-6004