Case Title: Joelson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-85

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joelson v. State1984 WY 1674 P.2d 229Case Number: 83-85Decided: 01/04/1984THOMAS A. JOELSON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
THOMAS A. JOELSON, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Robert J. O'Neil 
of Thomas, O'Neil & Padget, Gillette, for appellant. 

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen. and Margaret M. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant in this 
case was convicted in justice of the peace court of a violation of § 31-5-233, 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1983, driving while under the influence of intoxicants. He 
appealed to district court, where his conviction was upheld. Appellant then 
appealed to this court. We affirm.

[¶2.]     The issue on appeal, as 
worded by the appellant, is as follows:

"[W]hether the chemical 
analysis of the appellant's blood introduced at trial was erroneously admitted 
into evidence at the appellant's trial on an alleged violation of Wyoming 
Statute Section 31-5-233 as the State failed to comply with the foundational 
prerequisites of Wyoming Statute Section 31-6-105(b), said error requiring the 
reversal of the appellant's conviction."

[¶3.]     Two deputy sheriffs 
traveling south on Highway 59, in the dark of the night, noticed a vehicle in 
the northbound lane weaving back and forth rapidly with the headlights shining 
into the oncoming lane and then off to the right. The deputy sheriffs stopped 
the vehicle and asked the driver, the appellant, to step out. In attempting to 
get out of the car, the appellant almost fell out; in the words of one of the 
officers, "[i]t looked like he just forgot to bring his legs out of the vehicle 
when he tried to exit the vehicle." The appellant asked the officers why he had 
been stopped, and after the answer was given that he was driving poorly he asked 
the same question again. After observing that he had bloodshot eyes and smelled 
of alcohol, the officers then gave the appellant four field sobriety tests. The 
tests consisted of walking heel to toe four steps forward and six steps 
backward, of counting one-two-three-four and then back to one while touching his 
fingertips with his thumbs, of reciting the alphabet, and finally of standing on 
one leg for a few seconds. The appellant was unable to perform any of these 
tests correctly.

[¶4.]     At this point, the 
appellant was arrested and taken to the sheriff's office where he agreed to a 
blood test. However, after being taken to the hospital emergency room, he 
refused to sign the consent form for the test, and so was taken back to the 
sheriff's office whereupon he again changed his mind and agreed to the blood 
test. He was taken back to the hospital where the blood sample was taken. Tests 
determined his blood alcohol level to be at .20.

[¶5.]     The testimony at trial 
indicated that the appellant had gone from Gillette to Casper to see his son who 
was experiencing some kind of health problem. However, conflict between the 
appellant and his ex-wife apparently interfered with his ability to get in 
contact with his son, and he went to a friend's house where he consumed an 
undetermined amount of whiskey. Around 11:00 p.m., the appellant headed back to 
Gillette. Approximately an hour later he stopped at a guard station at the Naval 
Reserve Station. The guard there made a report of the incident and noted in the 
report that:

"* * * As Joelson 
appeared intoxicated and in no condition to drive a vehicle, I told Joelson to 
park his vehicle and I would get someone to give him a ride. * * * As there were 
no motel rooms * * * Joelson agreed to sleep in his vehicle until he sobered up. 
At approximately 0400 hours, Joelson woke up. * * *"

The appellant 
left the station around 4:00 a.m., and was subsequently arrested at 
approximately 5:30 a.m.

[¶6.]     The appellant argues 
that his conviction in the justice of the peace court was erroneous because of 
the introduction, over objection, of the results of the chemical analysis of his 
blood test. The argument is based on § 31-6-105(b), W.S. 1977, which reads as 
follows:

"(b) When a person shall 
submit to a blood test at the request of a law enforcement officer under the 
provisions of this act [§§ 31-6-101 to 31-6-106], only a physician, registered 
nurse, or a qualified clinical or laboratory technician may withdraw blood for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. This limitation shall 
not apply to the taking of breath specimens."

[¶7.]     The appellant's 
argument is that no evidence was introduced at trial that the blood sample was 
withdrawn by a "physician, registered nurse, or a qualified clinical or 
laboratory technician," and that without such evidence, the results of said 
blood sample are inadmissible for lack of reliability. The appellee relies, in 
opposition, on the facts that the appellant was taken to the emergency room at 
the Campbell County Memorial Hospital, and that on the form from the Blood/Urine 
Alcohol Collection Kit, a Theresa Hansen certified that she drew the blood 
samples from the appellant, and after her signature, in a box labeled "title," 
are written the initials RN. From these facts the State would have us infer that 
Theresa Hansen is a registered nurse, and thus one of the persons authorized by 
statute to "withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content 
therein." Thus, the State argues that there was no abuse of discretion at the 
lower court level in allowing the introduction of the appellant's blood alcohol 
level, which in turn raised a statutory presumption of intoxication. Section 
31-5-233(b), W.S. 1977.

[¶8.]     Appellant did not 
object to State's Exhibit No. 3, which is the form from the Blood/Urine Alcohol 
Collection Kit, and this exhibit was properly received into evidence, as a 
record of regularly conducted activity under Rule 803(6), W.R.E.1 After it was properly admitted into 
evidence, the material contained in the exhibit could be accepted as true or 
false by the trier of fact. The relevant portion of Exhibit No. 3 is as follows: 
"I hereby certify that I drew blood samples from the above person. Signed 
Theresa Hansen Title RN ."

[¶9.]     Appellant argues that 
there is no proof that Theresa Hansen meets the requirements of § 31-6-105(b), 
W.S. 1977. We disagree. The letters RN, placed in the space provided for 
"title," are defined as "1) registered nurse 2) Royal Navy," Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1979). We do not believe that 
Theresa Hansen was indicating that she was a member of the Royal 
Navy.

"It is a general habit 
and custom with officers to use parts of words or letters to indicate the 
official character in which they are acting, and this has become a matter of 
such general notoriety that judicial notice is taken of the meaning of such 
abbreviations. * * *" 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abbreviations, § 5.

"Abbreviations are 
recognized as part of the English language, and the courts will take judicial 
notice of all well-known and widely recognized and commonly used abbreviations 
as they are understood by the majority of the people under the same 
circumstances." 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 91.

[¶10.]  As Theresa Hansen was working in the 
emergency room of the CampbellCountyMemorialHospital, and as it is generally 
recognized by the majority of the people that the initials RN are an 
abbreviation for registered nurse, we hold that the trier of fact could believe 
from all the evidence that Theresa Hansen was a registered 
nurse.

[¶11.]  The State introduced evidence, Exhibit 
No. 3, that the blood was taken by a registered nurse, and the appellant 
introduced nothing to impeach or contradict this evidence. Taking the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and resolving all conflicts in 
the evidence for the appellee, Gray v. 
Fitzhugh, Wyo., 576 P.2d 88, 89 (1978), the trial court's ruling that the 
evidence was taken in compliance with § 31-6-105(b), supra, and its admission of 
the results of the blood test into evidence were proper.

[¶12.]  Even were we to hold otherwise, appellant 
has not made a showing that the admittance of his blood alcohol level was other 
than harmless error. As we have said before:

"* * * While a large 
portion of [appellant's] brief is devoted to the claimed error of admitting such 
evidence over appropriate objection, we remind counsel that in order to obtain a 
reversal here on such ground, even though his complaint might be well founded, 
he must go further and demonstrate that such claimed error prejudiced the 
substantial rights of plaintiff. Rule 72(g), W.R.C.P.; and Butcher v. McMichael, Wyo., 
370 P.2d 937, 939. On the record we conclude that this has not been 
accomplished." Willis v. Asbury Transportation Co., Wyo., 386 P.2d 934, 937 
(1963).

[¶13.]  As already noted, there is more than 
ample evidence in the record upon which to uphold the verdict of the trier of 
fact without reliance on the results of the blood test.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 803(6), W.R.E., 
provides:

"(6) Records of regularly 
conducted activity. - A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in 
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 
`business' as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit."