Case Title: Stephen Joseph Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 71
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This order is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
 
 
Stephen Joseph Wright, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Jean-Luc Thiffeault, Somesh Jha, 
Joanne Kane, and Leah Dudley, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission; Don Millis, 
Robert F. Spindell, Jr., Mark L. Thomsen, Ann 
S. Jacobs, Marge Bostelmann, Joseph J. 
Czarnezki, in their official capacities as 
Members of the Wisconsin Elections Commission; 
and Meagan Wolfe, in her official capacity as 
Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 6, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court entered the following order on October 6, 2023: 
 
On August 4, 2023, petitioners Stephen Joseph Wright, et al., 
seven Wisconsin voters, filed a petition for leave to commence an 
original action under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.70, together with a 
supporting memorandum and an appendix.   
 
On August 22, 2023, the named respondents in this matter, the 
Wisconsin 
Elections 
Commission, 
its 
members, 
and 
its 
administrator, filed a response taking no position on the merits 
of the petition.     
 
On August 22, 2023, the Wisconsin Legislature filed a motion 
to intervene as a respondent.  On September 5, 2023, the 
petitioners in this case filed a letter response stating that they 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
2 
do not object to the intervention motion.  No other response or 
opposition to the motion to intervene has been filed.   
 
On August 22, 2023, the Wisconsin Legislature filed a motion 
for leave to file an amicus brief regarding the petition for 
original action.  No response or opposition to this motion to file 
an amicus brief has been filed. 
 
The court has considered the filings in this case.  
Accordingly, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a non-party 
brief, amici curiae, is granted, and the accompanying brief is 
accepted for filing; 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for leave to commence 
an original action is denied; and 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Wisconsin Legislature's motion 
to intervene is denied as moot.   
 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J.   (concurring).  This 
original action is nothing more than a motion for reconsideration 
of this court's decision in Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections 
Commission, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 ("Johnson 
III"), and appears to have been filed only because of a change in 
the court's membership.  Where does this cycle end?  Must this 
court also allow additional future parties to simply sit this 
litigation cycle out and come forward next court term—or after the 
next court election—and present already litigated claims again?  
What is to stop any party dissatisfied with the outcome here from 
carrying out challenges ad infinitum, each time from a slightly 
different angle, until their desired outcome is reached?  This 
litigation chips away at the public's faith in the judiciary as an 
independent, 
impartial 
institution, 
undermines 
foundational 
judicial principles such as stare decisis, and casts a hyper-
partisan shadow of judicial bias over the decisions of this court.   
Today, my colleagues grant one original action petition and 
deny another.  Specifically, four members of this court vote to 
grant Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2023AP1399-
OA, and deny Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 
2023AP1412-OA.  I concur in Wright and dissent in Clarke because 
we should not accept either of these cases.  Our court just decided 
redistricting last year in Johnson III.  Redistricting should not 
be an annual event.  Redistricting is a process that, under our 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
3 
state constitution, is only supposed to occur once every decade.1  
However, redistricting was required by this court nearly two years 
ago because the Governor vetoed the maps drawn by the Legislature, 
creating an impasse.  Absent court action, Wisconsin would have 
been in a constitutional crisis: Wisconsin would have had no maps 
in place to conduct state and federal elections.  Thus, the court, 
as the final arbiter, was required to act.  We clearly are not in 
that constitutional predicament today.  
The congressional map selected by the court was submitted by 
Democrats, specifically Governor Evers.  The state legislative 
maps ultimately selected by the court were submitted by 
Republicans, specifically the Wisconsin Legislature.  However, the 
selection of the current state legislative maps occurred only after 
the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed my colleagues' 
original selection of Governor Evers' state legislative maps 
because the Governor’s maps violated the Voting Rights Act.  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 
N.W.2d 402 ("Johnson II"), summarily rev'd sub. nom. Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) (per 
curiam).  The issues presented in these original actions have 
already been decided by this court.  The court, acting within its 
limited role to "answer legal questions," adopted maps that it 
decided were constitutional as a judicial remedy for an 
undisputedly unconstitutional situation (the previous district 
maps no longer matched the geographic distribution of Wisconsin's 
citizens).  This judicial remedy of court-adopted maps stands for 
the next ten years, absent the enactment of new constitutionally 
compliant maps by the Legislature and the Governor.  
I dissent to the order granting the original action petition 
filed in Clarke because it appears to be evidence of a partisan 
and political, rather than a reasoned and restrained, approach, 
and thus departs from the constitutional role of the judiciary.  
Some may prefer that other maps be drawn.  And now, it seems, there 
is a pre-ordained plan to accomplish that goal. However, I urge my 
colleagues to exercise judicial restraint here rather than give in 
to the temptation to exercise raw, political, partisan power. 
                                                 
1 "At its first session after each enumeration made by the 
authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion 
and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according 
to the number of inhabitants."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
4 
In granting Clarke, four of my colleagues accept only two of 
the five issues presented.2  Those same colleagues add two 
additional questions to the list of questions to be answered in 
briefing, two additional questions that are, at best, curious.3  
Why is this?  We do not know.  These orders are devoid of any 
stated rationale.  Hiding their rationale from the public is far 
from being transparent and accountable.  The Clarke petitioners 
presented these five issues: 
1. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court 
in 
[Johnson 
III], 
are 
extreme 
partisan 
gerrymanders that violate Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection 
under law; and whether this cause of action is 
justiciable in Wisconsin courts. 
2. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III are extreme partisan gerrymanders 
that retaliate against voters based on their viewpoint 
and exercise of free speech and abridge the ability of 
voters with disfavored political views to associate with 
                                                 
2 The petitioners in Clarke and in Wright raise almost 
precisely the same issues and ask for precisely the same relief.  
Why not accept both cases, consolidate them, or hold one in 
abeyance?  In certain respects, Wright has more complete pleadings. 
3 The court majority has added the following questions to be 
answered in briefing:  
If the court rules that Wisconsin's existing state 
legislative maps violate the Wisconsin Constitution for 
either or both of these reasons and the legislature and 
the governor then fail to adopt state legislative maps 
that comply with the Wisconsin Constitution, what 
standards should guide the court in imposing a remedy 
for the constitutional violation(s)?; and  
What fact-finding, if any, will be required if the 
court determines there is a constitutional violation 
based on the contiguity clauses and/or the separation of 
powers doctrine and the court is required to craft a 
remedy for the violation? If fact-finding will be 
required, what process should be used to resolve 
questions of fact? 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
5 
others to advance their political beliefs in violation 
of Article I, Sections 3 and 4 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and whether these causes of action are 
justiciable in Wisconsin courts. 
3. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III are extreme partisan gerrymanders 
that 
fail 
to 
"adhere[] 
to 
justice, 
moderation, 
temperance, 
frugality, 
and 
virtue, . . . [and] 
fundamental principles" in violation of Article I, 
Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and whether 
this cause of action is justiciable in Wisconsin courts. 
4. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III violate the requirement of Article 
IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution that 
legislators be elected from districts consisting of 
"contiguous territory." 
5. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III violate the separation-of-powers 
principle inherent in the Constitution’s division of 
legislative, executive, and judicial power by usurping 
the Governor’s core constitutional power to veto 
legislation and the Legislature’s core constitutional 
power to override such a veto. 
Four members of this court seemingly attempt to evade several 
fatal flaws by accepting only two of the five issues presented, 
namely, the issues relating to contiguity and separation of powers.  
I suspect the court's focus will be on contiguity even though that 
issue was already considered and decided in the Johnson litigation.  
Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶70 ("The Legislature has satisfied 
the remainder of Wisconsin's constitutional requirements.  The 
assembly districts are contiguous and sufficiently compact.").  
Accepting this case primarily, if not solely on contiguity, leads 
one to conclude that four of my colleagues may already know the 
result they wish to obtain.  Moreover, one of the issues added by 
the court has already been answered in the Johnson litigation with 
the court's unambiguous conclusion that the "least change" 
standard applies.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 
¶¶64-79, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 ("Johnson I").  The second 
added issue regarding fact-finding is not needed for the questions 
of law presented in the two accepted issues, but if fact-finding 
were somehow necessary, which is quite unclear, we are not a fact-
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
6 
finding court.  The decision to accept the original action petition 
in Clarke is a travesty which disregards our very recently decided 
Johnson litigation and completely ignores longstanding, sound 
legal principles and the precedent that binds the court. 
Do my colleagues refuse to accept the other issues or the 
petition in Wright because they know this court has already decided 
these matters?  Or is it because most of the petitioners in Wright 
were allowed to intervene in the Johnson litigation?  Typically, 
this court accepts all issues for review before determining which 
of those issues are necessary to resolve the case.  I suspect my 
four colleagues may have tried to narrow the issues at the outset 
to be able to better achieve the pre-determined outcome they 
desire.  But will the remedy they seek invoke the other issues not 
accepted for review, missing the benefit of briefing or argument?  
Petitioners appear to be raising the contiguity argument as a means 
to indirectly re-litigate the already litigated and decided issues 
of political fairness and political gerrymandering.  But, the four 
in the majority did not accept those issues so they are not before 
the court.  This court is asked to consider "partisan fairness" in 
overturning the current apportionment maps, as the parties claim 
that 
"the 
current 
legislative 
maps 
are 
extreme 
partisan 
gerrymanders."  But these issues are not before the court, and 
this court already addressed the issue of partisan fairness in 
Johnson I, determining that it was not the court's role to answer 
political questions such as claims of partisan fairness, but only 
to answer "legal" questions such as whether the proposed maps 
"satisfy all constitutional and statutory requirements".  Johnson 
I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶4.  As these issues have already been 
expressly decided, we should not be resolving them again here. 
Perhaps another answer why four members of this court would 
limit its selection of issues to contiguity and separation of 
powers could be an attempt to dodge appellate review.  When four 
members of the judicial branch decide they also serve as members 
of the legislative and executive branches, should they not at least 
subject themselves to further appellate scrutiny?  Yet, the limited 
issues the four justices accept seem to seek evasion of any such 
scrutiny. However, any remedy imposed might nonetheless be subject 
to review.  Typically, we take all the issues presented even if 
the court does not need to decide them because at its inception, 
we do not know the matter well enough.  We need extensive legal 
research, 
briefing 
and 
argument. 
This 
time 
around 
seems 
different:  it seems the four justices find that standard 
procedure unnecessary, as they already appear to know they do not 
need to fully research and hear all of the issues and arguments 
presented.  Instead, it seems the four justices only accept the 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
7 
two questions of law in order to avoid having the case proceed 
through traditional fact finding at the trial court.  
Notably, these justices vociferously dissented when the court 
decided Johnson III, a redistricting action, last year.  They 
primarily objected because there was no fact-finding.  Johnson 
III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶161 (Karofsky, J., dissenting).  This case, 
with all of its issues, could have proceeded and facts could have 
been fully developed in the courts below, but since it now appears 
that they have changed their view and abandoned their objection 
once they became a majority of the court, perhaps a thorough 
process is not what they now desire.  It is worth wondering whether 
this case would withstand a full vetting based upon developed facts 
and law.  Unlike the Johnson litigation, where the court was 
required to act within a short time frame and remedy a 
constitutional violation by adopting new maps, these original 
actions do not pose a situation where the state is without 
constitutionally compliant maps absent court action.  There is no 
urgency to act with such haste and without a thorough vetting.  It 
is also not urgent to act before the Legislature has decided 
whether they should proceed with implementing a plan which mirrors 
Iowa's.4  Why does the court wish to act with such haste when the 
Constitution clearly vests redistricting powers within the 
province of the Legislature and Governor?  This hastiness also 
portends that this case is decided almost before it has begun. 
All of this question-raising behavior seems to demonstrate 
not prudential judicial reasoning, but rather a sheer will to 
expedite a preconceived determination to ensure that all maps are 
favorable to a particular constituency.  When a court already knows 
the answer, the procedures in advance of that decision are nothing 
more than judicial window dressing.  This order seems to bear the 
hallmarks of just that. 
Far from being "judicial window-dressing," the court's 
reliance on foundational legal principles also supports the fact 
                                                 
4 Claire Reid, Robin Vos proposed 'Iowa-style' redistricting 
for Wisconsin. What does that mean? Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
(Sept. 
13, 
2023); 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/09/13/wisconsi
n-redistricting-what-is-iowa-style-model-proposed-by-
vos/70840624007/; Andrew Bahl, Is Iowa-style redistricting in 
Wisconsin's 
future? 
The 
Cap 
Times, 
(Sept. 
13, 
2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/is-iowa-style-redistricting-in-
wisconsin-s-future/article_49c8e042-526f-11ee-ad2f-
2fdd42d8bb17.html  
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
8 
that both petitions should be denied because the Johnson III 
decision is the law.  Under the doctrines of stare decisis,5 issue 
preclusion,6 claim preclusion,7 and the law of the case,8 the 
Johnson III decision stands.  Cases that have been decided with 
finality are not re-litigated.  During the Johnson litigation 
addressing this issue of redistricting maps, we liberally 
permitted any and all parties to intervene in the case.  We then 
                                                 
5 The doctrine of stare decisis bars parties from seeking to 
overrule recently decided cases such as Johnson III.  See State v. 
Alan Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 195, 990 N.W.2d 174 
("[W]e require a special justification in order to overturn our 
precedent."); Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶¶66-67, 
389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 ("Second, the doctrine of stare 
decisis militates against the precipitous change in the law that 
Dow seeks. Stare decisis is fundamental to the rule of law.  
Indeed, '[t]his court follows the doctrine of stare decisis 
scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule of law.'  
'Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will not be 
abandoned lightly. When existing law is open to revision in every 
case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise in judicial will, 
with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'  Accordingly, any 
departure from stare decisis requires ‘special justification.'" 
(citations and footnotes omitted)).  
6 The doctrine of issue preclusion clearly bars the parties 
from re-litigating what was already decided in the Johnson 
litigation.  See Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, ¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 
814 N.W.2d 433 ("The doctrine of issue preclusion . . . is 
designed to limit the re-litigation of issues that have been 
actually litigated in a previous action.")  
7 The doctrine of claim preclusion bars parties from bringing 
claims now which could have been brought in the Johnson litigation.  
See Dostal v. Strand, 2023 WI 6, ¶24, 405 Wis. 2d 572, 948 
N.W.2d 382 ("[C]laim preclusion . . . extends to all claims that 
either were or could have been asserted in the previous case.").  
8  The doctrine of law of the case, in the interest of there 
being finality in court decisions, binds the parties in any 
subsequent retrial or appeal involving the same case and 
substantially the same facts as was addressed in the Johnson 
litigation.  See State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, ¶18, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 
695 N.W.2d 783 (The law of the case doctrine is a "longstanding 
rule that a decision on a legal issue by an appellate court 
establishes the law of the case, which must be followed in all 
subsequent proceedings in the trial court or on later appeal."). 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
9 
"granted intervention to all parties that sought it."  Johnson II, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶2.  While the respondents were parties to the 
previous litigation, the Clarke petitioners apparently chose not 
to participate or at a minimum made no attempt to formally do so.9  
The law requires them to live with that decision.  Reframing 
arguments or attempting new fact-finding nonexistent in the 
previous litigation but involving the same maps should not be 
allowed to prevail.  Were that an acceptable tactic, there would 
be no finality in the law or litigation.  "If at first you don't 
succeed, try, try again" may be a good maxim for children, but 
that has never been the case for fully vetted, fully litigated and 
decided cases.  If these parties believed that these considerations 
were fundamental to map determinations, the time for participation 
was during the Johnson litigation.  That time has now passed. This 
                                                 
9 Notably, although the Clarke petitioners were not 
themselves 
parties in the Johnson litigation, they are represented in this 
case by many of the same law firms and lawyers who represented 
other parties in Johnson.  Specifically, Black Leaders Organizing 
for Communities, Voces de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, and Rebecca Alwin 
were parties in the Johnson litigation and were represented by Law 
Forward, Inc.; Stafford Rosenbaum LLP; and the Campaign Legal 
Center.  Those same law firms, with only the addition of a few 
additional out-of-state lawyers, now represent the petitioners in 
the Clarke case, creating the appearance that the lawyers have 
simply substituted a new group of parties to continue the 
redistricting litigation they could not resolve to their 
satisfaction in the Johnson litigation.   
In addition, the seven Wright petitioners include five 
individuals who already participated in the Johnson litigation as 
parties—a group referred to in the Johnson decisions as the 
"Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists":  Stephen Joseph Wright 
(Chair of the Department of Computer Sciences at the University 
Wisconsin-Madison); Gary Krenz (Professor Emeritus of Mathematical 
and Statistical Sciences and Adjunct Professor of Computer Science 
at Marquette University); Sarah J. Hamilton (Associate Professor 
of Mathematics at Marquette University and an Assistant Adjunct 
Professor at the Medical College of Wisconsin); Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault (Chair of the Department of Mathematics and a Professor 
of Applied Mathematics at the University Wisconsin-Madison); and 
Somesh Jha (Professor of Computer Sciences at the University 
Wisconsin-Madison).  The Wright petitioners are represented by the 
same attorneys who represented the Citizen Mathematicians and 
Scientists in the Johnson litigation.   
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
10 
court should not re-litigate the exact same maps one year later, 
with no intervening change in the law or facts presented.  At most, 
we see a motion for reconsideration; but in this case, such a 
motion is long since time barred. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.64 ("A 
party may seek reconsideration of the judgment or opinion of the 
supreme 
court 
by 
filing 
a 
motion 
under 
s. 
809.14 
for 
reconsideration within 20 days after the date of the decision of 
the supreme court.").  There is no other legal basis or procedural 
mechanism for this court to once again re-examine these maps. 
Moreover, the petitioners' claim that the court's decision in 
Johnson III violated separation of powers does not seem to warrant 
serious review.  In the Johnson litigation, there had to be new 
redistricting maps; the maps enacted following the 2010 census 
were undeniably unconstitutional following the 2020 United States 
Census.  The Legislature and the Governor, the branches 
constitutionally responsible for redistricting, exercised their 
constitutional authority in a way that resulted in an impasse.  
Since the impasse meant that there was a lack of constitutionally 
required maps in place prior to holding the next partisan election, 
the judicial branch was forced to intervene, albeit in a limited 
fashion.  We were forced to proceed with a judicial proceeding in 
the Johnson litigation to select constitutionally compliant maps 
as a remedy for the ongoing constitutional violation.  
It will be interesting to see how the separation-of-powers 
argument is presented. Seemingly, the argument is that by adopting 
legislative maps submitted by one party (i.e., the Legislature), 
this court violated the separation of powers because the Governor 
had previously vetoed those maps as part of the legislative 
process.  Would not the argument that the court violated the 
separation of powers by "judicially overriding" the Governor's 
veto of those maps also require finding that this court violated 
separation of powers by choosing the Governor's proposed 
congressional maps over the Legislature's proposed congressional 
maps?  Why does that scenario not also infringe on the 
Legislature's constitutional authority to enact new district maps?  
Indeed, the congressional maps proposed by the Governor and adopted 
by this court in Johnson II are still in effect.  If the 
petitioners' separation-of-powers claims have legal merit, should 
we also be reviewing the Governor's congressional maps to address 
that same violation? We shall see.  My guess is that the majority 
will not say much about separation of powers. 
The petitioners advance the proposition that Clarke raises 
issues no different than cases recently decided from other states.  
No other state in the nation is doing or has done what the 
petitioners ask this court to do.  None of those cases align with 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
11 
the procedural posture of the Johnson litigation and this new case.  
None of the other state cases the parties cited10 involve asking a 
state supreme court to reconsider maps that court adopted as 
constitutional just one year prior.  Moreover, Wisconsin, unlike 
the states upon which the parties rely, constitutionally vests 
both its legislature and its governor with the constitutional duty 
to determine redistricting.11  Wisconsin's unique procedural events 
                                                 
10 Szeliga v. Lamone, C-02-CV-21-001816, 2022 WL 2132194 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022); League of Women Voters of Utah v. Utah 
Legislature, No. 220901712 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. Nov. 22, 2022); 
Republican Party of New Mexico v. Oliver, No. S-1-SC-39481 (N.M. 
July 5, 2023); Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01CV2897, 2002 WL 1895406 
(D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2002); Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 
WL 36403750 (E.D. Tex. 2001).   
11 In the states the parties cited to, the individuals 
constitutionally responsible for redistricting are:  Maryland: the 
governor (M.D. Const. art. III, §V); Utah: Utah Legislative 
Redistricting Committee and the Utah Independent Redistricting 
Commission (Utah Const. art. IX, §1); New Mexico: the legislature 
(N.M. Const. art. VI, § 16); Colorado: independent commission as 
of 2018 (Colo. Const. art. V, §§ 44-48); and Texas:  the 
legislature, and if they fail to do so, the legislative 
redistricting board (Tex. Const. art. III, §28).  
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
12 
in the Johnson litigation have not been replicated in these other 
states.12   
All of these factors, when considered together, seem to lead 
to the reasonable conclusion that accepting this original action 
is a purely political action to achieve a desired outcome.  Despite 
this court having just declared that the existing maps are 
constitutional, four members of this court nonetheless accept the 
original action petition in Clarke.  At the same time, four members 
of this court attempt to evade judicial review by selecting only 
two of the five issues presented. These are questions of law, yet 
those justices nonetheless inquire about fact finding and also ask 
a question which telegraphs that they are poised to overturn the 
"least change" determination made in Johnson I.  399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶64-79.  Despite this evasive framing of the case, Caperton 
                                                 
12 In Maryland, the suit challenged a legislative-drawn map 
enacted over gubernatorial veto: the court ordered the legislature 
to adopt a revised map, which the legislature did, and which the 
governor then subsequently signed into law.  In Utah, the suit 
arose after the legislature adopted its own map over the three 
maps created and proposed by the Independent Redistricting 
Committee: the trial court declined to dismiss the plaintiff's 
partisan gerrymandering claims and the Utah State Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in July 2023. The New Mexico Supreme Court, 
unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, determined that partisan 
gerrymandering claims were in fact justiciable.  Whereas the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a map following a political impasse 
between its legislature and governor, in Colorado, the State 
District Court drew its own congressional map following the General 
Assembly's failure to pass a congressional redistricting plan in 
time for the 2002 elections. After the Republican-led legislature 
attempted to replace that court-drawn map, the Colorado Supreme 
Court ruled that the constitution allowed only one round of 
congressional redistricting after each 10-year census. And 
finally, in Texas, after the state failed to produce a 
congressional redistricting plan, the federal district court drew 
its 
own 
redistricting 
plan 
according 
to 
various 
neutral 
districting factors.  In none of these other states did their state 
supreme court draw the maps or overturn maps which they had adopted 
as a judicial remedy a year prior.  See supra n.10. 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
13 
nonetheless looms large and will remain a cloud over this outwardly 
handpicked, predetermined, and preordained litigation.13    
Finally, the Wisconsin Elections Commission does not seem to 
be a party that is taking a position. The petitioners' requested 
remedy affects 17 senators in odd-numbered districts.  These 
senators are named parties in Clarke.  But each Senate district 
has within it three Assembly seats, so there are potentially far-
reaching ramifications for seats in the Assembly.  Why not name 
those in the Assembly as well? If the result of the Johnson III 
maps being declared unconstitutional is that senators in odd-
numbered districts lack authority to hold their seats, then does 
the same lack of authority apply to members of the Assembly?  
Upon closer inspection, this original action appears to be 
nothing more than a thinly-veiled motion for reconsideration of 
this court's decision in Johnson III.  This court should not accept 
the petition in Clarke.  In granting the petition in Clarke, four 
members of this court have chosen to chip away at the public's 
faith in the judiciary as an independent impartial institution, 
undermine foundational judicial principles such as stare decisis, 
and cast a hyper-partisan shadow of judicial bias over the 
decisions of this court.  Such short-sighted behavior demonstrates 
the court majority's sheer will to expedite a preconceived outcome 
for a particular constituency. This abandonment of their judicial 
oath is disappointing.  I concur.    
I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The public's faith in the judiciary as an independent, 
impartial institution is upended when parties are allowed to 
"[pick] the judge in [their] own case."  Williams v. Pennsylvania, 
579 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2016).  Where parties are allowed to pick who 
presides over their cases, a specter of judicial bias violates 
parties' due process rights and invalidates the outcome.  Parties 
can give the impression that they have impermissibly "picked the 
judge in their own case" through donating overwhelmingly to the 
campaign of a judge they hope to have preside over their case.  
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
No.  2023AP1412-OA 
14