Case Title: Hickman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 455, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICKY B. HICKMAN,  
 
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§ 
No. 455, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
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Appellant,  
 
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§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
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in and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0301005176 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
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Date Submitted: February 10, 2004 
Date Decided: March 24, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This 24th day of March 2004, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Ricky B Hickman, following a jury 
trial, appeals from his convictions of Delivery of Cocaine and Delivery of 
Cocaine within One Thousand Feet of a School.  In this appeal, Hickman 
argues that the Superior Court: (i) erred in ruling the photo identification 
process employed by police was not impermissibly suggestive; (ii) abused 
its discretion by admitting still photographs taken from a videotape because 
the jury was left to speculate about their significance; and (iii) abused its 
 
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discretion by granting the State’s motion to reopen its case after both parties 
had rested. 
 
(2) 
On October 7, 2002, two undercover detectives, Marvin Mailey 
and Jeffrey Matthews, attached to the Drug Enforcement Administration 
Drug Task Force in Georgetown, Delaware, drove an unmarked vehicle into 
the Georgetown Apartment Complex.  Their vehicle was equipped with a 
hidden surveillance camera and a listening device attached to the sun visor 
in the front of the car.  The detectives stopped in front of a building, and 
Hickman, whom they recognized from an earlier incident, approached the 
vehicle and asked the detectives what they wanted.  The detectives told 
Hickman they were looking for an “eight ball.”1 
 
(3) 
Hickman told the detectives he did not want to complete the 
deal on the street because of frequent police patrols, so Detective Mailey 
followed Hickman about 20 to 25 feet to the front of an apartment, where 
Hickman sold him 5 rocks of crack cocaine for one hundred dollars.  
Detective Matthews, still seated in the unmarked car, observed the 
transaction and described the subject into the hidden listening device.  After 
the transaction was completed, Detective Mailey returned to the vehicle and 
the two detectives left.  The crack cocaine weighed 1.99 grams. 
                                                 
1 An “eight ball” is the street name for approximately 3.5 grams of crack cocaine that is typically purchased 
for $150.00 to $200.00. 
 
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(4) 
Following the incident, Detective Matthews returned to the 
Georgetown Police Station where he was shown a single photograph of 
Hickman. Detective Matthews identified the man in the photograph as the 
person involved in the drug transaction. The following day, Detective 
Mailey also identified Hickman after being shown the same single 
photograph.  At trial, both Detective Mailey and Detective Matthews 
positively identified Hickman as the person who sold the drugs to Mailey on 
October 7, 2002. 
 
(5) 
On appeal, Hickman claims the Superior Court erred by ruling 
that the single photo identification process employed by the police was not 
impermissibly suggestive.  On the first morning of trial, the defense objected 
to the police’s use of the single photograph to identify Hickman.  Despite the 
untimely objection, the Trial Court held a suppression hearing and ruled that 
the photograph and in-court identifications were admissible.  After the 
conclusion of the suppression hearing, Hickman withdrew his objection.  On 
appeal, the State argues that the express withdrawal of Hickman’s objection 
renders this argument unreviewable except for plain error.  This Court 
agrees.2 
                                                 
2 MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 757 (Del. 2003). 
 
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(6) Even upon de novo review, however, Hickman’s appeal is without 
merit.  The fact that an identification process is suggestive, without more, 
does not create a due process violation.  An identification process is 
unconstitutional “where it is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”3  To determine 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
very 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
irreparable 
misidentification, a trial court must examine the totality of the 
circumstances, including:  
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of 
[the witness'] prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated [by the witness] at the confrontation, 
and the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation.4  
 
Despite finding the process inappropriate, the trial court found that the single 
photograph identification was not impermissibly suggestive in the 
circumstances of this case.  Additionally, the trial court found no likelihood 
of misidentification.  Before viewing the single photograph to identify 
Hickman, both detectives recognized the defendant from an earlier incident.  
Moreover both detectives had a reasonably long period to observe the 
defendant during the drug transaction.  Accordingly, there was a minimal 
                                                 
3 Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 550 (Del. 1985), quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)(internal quotation omitted). 
4 Richardson v. State, 673 A.2d 144 (Del. 1996), quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
 
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likelihood of misidentification by the detectives.  Hickman’s assertion of 
error is, therefore, rejected.  
 
(7) 
Hickman’s related argument, that the single photograph 
identification tainted the identifications made at trial, is also without merit.  
At trial, Hickman failed to object to the detectives’ in-court identification.  
Thus, Hickman’s claim is waived due to his failure to object at trial. 
Nonetheless, Hickman is unable to demonstrate plain error, because the 
detectives’ descriptions of Hickman before and after the drug transaction 
described a man with a missing front tooth, and the single-photo used for 
identification involved a closed mouth photo of Hickman.  The in-court 
identifications were corroborated by the admission of a different photograph 
at trial showing a gap in Hickman’s front teeth.  Accordingly, there is no 
plain error. 
 
(8)  
Hickman also contends that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting two still photographs which showed a suspect with a missing 
fingertip.  Specifically, Hickman argues that the trial court admitted the still 
photographs taken from the surveillance video of the detectives’ unmarked 
car without evaluating their relevancy, cumulativeness, and limitations 
during the trial.  
 
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(9) 
The record reveals, however, that the trial court properly 
analyzed the issue of admissibility and ruled that the still photographs were 
not cumulative or prejudicial.  Moreover, the court found that the still photos 
were freeze frames of the surveillance video that would allow the jury to 
focus on the suspect’s finger to determine whether Hickman was the alleged 
suspect seen in the video.  Finally, the court instructed the jury to examine 
the evidence and make independent conclusions about what the evidence did 
or did not show.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its broad 
discretion by admitting the two still photographs. 
(10) Lastly, Hickman contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing the prosecution to reopen its case after both parties 
had rested.  Hickman claims that he was prejudiced by the ruling because it 
precluded the possibility of a favorable ruling on a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.  The record, however, reveals Hickman failed to avail himself of 
the opportunity to move for a judgment of acquittal when the State rested its 
case the first time.  Only after the State rested its case for the second time 
did Hickman move for a judgment of acquittal.5  Furthermore, the trial court 
concluded that Hickman’s substantial rights would not be prejudiced if one 
of the State’s witnesses was called back to the witness stand to testify for the 
                                                 
5 Hickman’s Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal after the State rested their case for the second time was 
denied. 
 
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limited purpose of establishing Hickman’s age at the time of the offense.  In 
light of these circumstances, the trial court acted within its discretion by 
granting the State’s motion to reopen. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice