Case Title: Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Public Health

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12622

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12622 
 
BOSTON GLOBE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2019. - June 17, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Public Records.  Department of Public Health.  Privacy.  
Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 30, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Karen F. Green, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jonathan M. Albano for the plaintiff. 
 
William W. Porter, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Bruce D. Brown, Katie Townsend, & Caitlin Vogus, of the 
District of Columbia, Andrew F. Sellars, & Julissa Milligan, for 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In this public records case, Boston Globe Media 
Partners, LLC (Globe), appeals from an order of the Superior 
2 
 
 
Court granting the Department of Public Health's (DPH) motion 
for summary judgment and denying the Globe's motion for summary 
judgment.  The Globe asked the judge to declare that electronic 
indices of publicly available birth and marriage data constitute 
public records and to order DPH to produce them.  DPH argued 
that it could withhold the requested indices pursuant to G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a) (exemption [a]), which exempts from 
the definition of public records "materials or data" that are 
"specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
disclosure by statute."  DPH also argued that it could withhold 
the requested indices pursuant to G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth 
(c) (exemption [c]), which exempts from the definition of public 
records "personnel and medical files or information [and] any 
other materials or data relating to a specifically named 
individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."  The judge concluded 
DPH could withhold the indices pursuant to exemption (c), but 
not pursuant to exemption (a). 
 
We remand for further proceedings on both exemptions.  The 
Globe's request necessitates an approach to exemption (a) that 
takes into account future requests for the indices.  The 
application of exemption (c) involves a privacy issue we have 
yet to address in the public records context, namely, whether 
there is a greater privacy interest in a compilation of personal 
3 
 
 
information than in the discrete information that a compilation 
summarizes.1  We conclude that, in certain circumstances, there 
is. 
 
With respect to exemption (a), the judge on remand should 
make factual findings about the extent to which the indices 
requested here could be compared against later-requested indices 
to reveal information protected from public disclosure by 
statute.  The judge should then determine whether the risk of 
revealing such information brings the requested indices within 
the scope of exemption (a). 
 
With respect to exemption (c), which protects personal 
privacy, the judge on remand should first decide the extent to 
which the indices requested here could be compared against 
later-requested indices to reveal medical information absolutely 
exempt from the public records law.  If necessary, the judge 
should then decide whether there is a privacy interest in the 
requested indices.  To do so, the judge should make further 
findings on (1) the extent to which multiple indices could be 
compared to reveal private information; (2) whether the 
requested compilation is already available in the aggregate form 
                     
 
1 In this opinion, a "compilation" refers to a record that 
combines individual pieces of information.  Each of these 
individual pieces of information is "discrete."  For example, a 
telephone book is a compilation.  Each telephone number, 
address, and name in the telephone book is discrete information. 
4 
 
 
requested or, if not, the ease with which it can be assembled 
from public information; (3) whether DPH has shown that 
releasing the indices could pose a risk of identity theft or 
fraud; and (4) the extent to which the indices could facilitate 
unwanted intrusions. 
 
If there is a privacy interest in the requested indices, 
then the judge should decide whether the public interest in 
disclosure substantially outweighs that interest.  People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. 
Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 291-292 (2017) (PETA).  Because we 
have yet to precisely define the contours of this public 
interest analysis, we clarify that the public interest is not 
limited to the interest in learning about government operations.  
To fully analyze the public interest here, the judge should make 
further findings on (1) whether the Globe could use the indices 
to learn about government by scrutinizing whether DPH is 
properly recording births and marriages, and (2) whether 
releasing the indices could serve public interests other than 
the interest in learning about government.2 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, the editorial staff of The 
Tech, Metro Corp., New England Center for Investigative 
Reporting, New England First Amendment Coalition, New England 
Newspaper and Press Association, The New York Times Company, 
North of Boston Media Group, and the editorial staff of The Free 
Press. 
5 
 
 
 
Background.  The following background is taken from the 
parties' stipulated facts and exhibits.  A Globe reporter 
submitted a public records request to DPH for electronic indices 
of the publicly available birth, marriage, divorce, and death 
records maintained by DPH's Registry of Vital Records and 
Statistics (registry).  The Globe later clarified that it was 
requesting only "an electronic copy of the most up-to-date 
[indices] made available to the public on computer terminals in 
the [r]egistry's research room."  The request did not include 
indices from the nonpublic Vitals Information Partnership (VIP) 
centralized database, which contains birth data. 
 
The registry maintains a research room that is open eleven 
hours per week.  The research room includes searchable databases 
publicly accessible on computers for nine dollars per hour.  The 
computers do not have a print function, although there are no 
restrictions on transcribing information found on the computers.  
At the time the stipulated facts were filed in the Superior 
Court, the databases included information about births occurring 
in Massachusetts from 1953 through approximately January 2011 
and marriages occurring since 1983.  Births occurring after 
approximately January 2011 were recorded only in the VIP 
database, which was not accessible through the public computers.3  
                     
 
3 It appears that the public computer databases now include 
information about more recent births.  If the judge on remand 
6 
 
 
Each entry in the marriage database included last name, first 
name, date of marriage, spouse, place where the license was 
filed, certificate number, and the location of the paper record 
in the registry's vault.  Although not entirely clear from the 
stipulated facts, entries in the birth database seem to have 
included last name, first name, middle name, date of birth, 
place of birth, gender, names of parents, and the location of 
the record in the vault.4 
 
Birth and marriage information is available other than 
through the registry's public computer databases.  For example, 
                     
decides that the Globe is entitled to the requested indices, 
then DPH should provide the Globe with "the most up-to-date" 
information available on its public computers as determined by 
the judge, pursuant to the Globe's request. 
 
 
4 It seems that some of this information was available only 
for births from 1953 to 1986, the information for which was kept 
in a separate database (WebTop database) when the stipulated 
facts were filed.  The stipulated facts specify that the middle 
name is available only for births in this period.  And gender is 
mentioned as a search criterion only for 1953-1986 birth 
records.  In other respects, the scope of the 1953-1986 records 
is unclear.  From the stipulated facts, there seem to be two 
levels of detail in the WebTop database:  a preliminary data set 
appears first, then "[a] user can click on the item . . . and 
. . . see the full birth certificate with more detailed 
information."  However, DPH has "dispute[d] any implication that 
the public can inspect or obtain copies of birth or marriage 
certificates from the public" computers.  Further complicating 
matters is the recent upgrade of the databases, see note 3, 
supra, which resulted in the 1953-1986 birth records being 
merged with more recent records into a single database.  As 
discussed infra, the precise information being requested is 
important to the application of exemption (a) and exemption (c).  
The parties should clarify on remand which birth and marriage 
information would be included in the requested indices. 
7 
 
 
the public may inspect, but may not photocopy, printed birth and 
marriage indices in the registry's research room.  The public 
also may request individual birth and marriage certificates from 
the registry or from the relevant city or town. 
 
After DPH did not respond to the Globe's request, the Globe 
appealed to the supervisor of records (supervisor) in the 
Secretary of State's office.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (a).  The 
supervisor ordered DPH to disclose the records.  DPH provided 
the Globe with responsive death and divorce information, but 
declined to release the requested birth and marriage indices.  
The Globe appealed, and the supervisor again ordered DPH to 
disclose the requested information.  However, in response to 
DPH's request for reconsideration, the supervisor decided that 
DPH could withhold the birth and marriage indices pursuant to 
exemption (a).  The supervisor did not rule on DPH's exemption 
(c) claim, stating only that DPH made "a compelling argument" 
that the indices could also be withheld under exemption (c). 
 
The Globe then commenced an action against DPH in Superior 
Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the 
public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10, and the declaratory 
judgment act, G. L. c. 231A, § 1.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (c).  
In granting DPH's motion for summary judgment based on the 
parties' stipulated facts and exhibits, the judge concluded that 
DPH could withhold the indices pursuant to exemption (c), but 
8 
 
 
not pursuant to exemption (a).  The Globe appealed.  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
For the reasons discussed below, we remand for further 
proceedings with respect to exemptions (a) and (c). 
 
Discussion.  We review "a grant of summary judgment de novo 
. . . to determine 'whether . . . all material facts have been 
established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law'" (citation omitted).  District Attorney for the 
Northern Dist. v. School Comm. of Wayland, 455 Mass. 561, 566 
(2009), quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 
117, 120 (1991). 
 
The public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a), requires the 
government to release upon request materials that fall under the 
definition of "[p]ublic records," G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  
There is a statutory presumption of disclosure of such records.  
G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv) ("a presumption shall exist that 
each record sought is public and the burden shall be on the 
defendant agency or municipality to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that such record or portion of the record may be 
withheld in accordance with [S]tate or [F]ederal law").5  
                     
 
5 The presumption of disclosure language in the public 
records law was rewritten between the time of the records 
request and the decision on the motions for summary judgment.  
See St. 2016, c. 121, § 10, inserting G. L. c. 66, § 10A.  Prior 
to 2016, the presumption was set forth in G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c), 
as amended through St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 58-59 ("there shall be a 
9 
 
 
Therefore, "the statutory exemptions [from the definition of 
public records] must be strictly and narrowly construed."  Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 439 
Mass. 374, 380 (2003) (District Attorney for the Middle Dist.), 
quoting General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 
429 Mass. 798, 801-802 (1999), overruled on other grounds by 
DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015). 
 
1.  Exemption (a).6  DPH argues that the requested indices 
are exempt from the definition of public records by G. L. c. 4, 
                     
presumption that the record sought is public, and the burden 
shall be upon the custodian to prove with specificity the 
exemption which applies").  The motion judge applied the statute 
as it existed at the time of the records request.  However, 
applying the amended statute makes sense because if an appellate 
court holds under an old version of the public records law that 
requested information may be withheld, then the requester may 
simply refile a request under the amended law.  Cf. 
Massachusetts Outdoor Advertising Council v. Outdoor Advertising 
Bd., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 775, 777 (1980) ("it is a function of 
declaratory proceedings to guide the future conduct of 
parties").  Therefore, we apply the current version of the 
public records law and of all other statutes relevant to our 
decision. 
 
 
6 The Globe is requesting only information that DPH has 
already made available on its public computers.  Under the 
Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), an agency's 
disclosure of information will under certain circumstances 
prevent the agency from later withholding that information in 
response to a public records request.  See, e.g., American Civ. 
Liberties Union v. United States Dep't of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 
620-621 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and cases cited.  This waiver doctrine 
seems to have received only brief mention in our case law.  See 
General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 
798, 806-807 (1999), overruled on other grounds by DaRosa v. New 
Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police 
Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 861 n.11, 863 (1995).  Because 
10 
 
 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (a), which encompasses "materials or data" 
that are "specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
disclosure by statute."  DPH points to five statutes that 
purportedly exempt the requested indices from disclosure:  the 
statute establishing the VIP database, two statutes that 
expressly remove certain birth data from the public records law, 
a statute that impounds certain vital records, and a statute 
                     
the parties have not briefed the waiver issue, we decline to 
apply it here.  The parties may address it on remand. 
 
 
Another relevant point not raised by the parties is the 
impact of a statute that expanded the definition of "[p]ublic 
records," set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, but also 
restricted its application by adding exemptions, including 
exemptions (a) and (c).  See St. 1973, c. 1050, § 1.  See also 
Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 152-153 
(1979) (describing how 1973 amendments changed definition of 
public records).  According to the 1973 act, the amendments 
"shall not be construed to exempt any record which was a public 
record on the effective date of this act," which was July 1, 
1974.  St. 1973, c. 1050, §§ 6, 7.  Thus, if a record existed on 
or before July 1, 1974, and if it was a public record as that 
term was then defined, then it remains a public record even if 
it falls within an exemption added by St. 1973, c. 1050, § 1.  
It is not the case, despite what the Appeals Court has 
suggested, that all records that would have been considered 
public under the pre-1974 definition, including those created 
after July 1, 1974, are still public records now even if they 
fall within an exemption.  See Doe v. Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 419 & n.9 (1988).  Therefore, 
if a record was made after July 1, 1974, then a court should not 
consider whether it would have been public under the pre-1974 
definition.  Here, we need not decide whether the requested 
indices would have been considered public records under the 
earlier definition because the registry's public databases were 
not created until the 1980s or later. 
 
11 
 
 
that addresses the amendment of vital records.7  We conclude that 
the statute establishing the VIP database pertains to 
information the Globe is not requesting and, therefore, does not 
exempt the requested indices from disclosure.  The same can 
likely be said for the statutes removing certain birth data from 
the public records law.  However, we remand for further findings 
about the extent to which the indices requested here could be 
compared against later-requested indices to reveal information 
protected from public disclosure by the statutes addressing the 
impoundment and amendment of vital records. 
 
a.  VIP database statute.  General Laws c. 46, § 33, first 
par., mandates that the Registry establish a "centralized, 
automated database for the system of vital records and 
statistics."  The registry implements § 33 through the VIP 
database.  Because the VIP database is not available on the 
registry's public computers, the Globe is not requesting data 
from it.  Therefore, § 33 does not prohibit disclosure of the 
requested indices.  DPH argues that § 33 "reflects a policy 
against bulk dissemination of birth and marriage information, 
                     
 
7 Although DPH contends otherwise, statutory restrictions on 
certified copies of vital records are irrelevant here.  See 
G. L. c. 46, §§ 16, 18, 19, 19A, 19C, 32, 33, 34.  These 
restrictions seem to demonstrate the Legislature's concern with 
fraudulent birth and marriage certificates, not with birth and 
marriage information released in a format that does not emulate 
a certified copy. 
12 
 
 
regardless of where a discrete record happens to be registered 
at a particular time."  We disagree.  Even if the VIP database 
may not be accessed through the public records law, an issue we 
do not decide, information in the database that is not otherwise 
exempt from disclosure may still constitute a public record if 
stored in a repository that is subject to a public records 
request.  Cf. Hastings & Sons Publ. Co. v. City Treas. of Lynn, 
374 Mass. 812, 820 n.10 (1978) (where tax returns are 
confidential by statute and "information contained in 
[requested] payroll records can also be found in tax returns," 
payroll records may still be disclosed). 
 
b.  Statutes expressly removing certain birth data from 
public records law.  DPH suggests that two statutes, G. L. 
c. 111, § 24B, and G. L. c. 46, § 4A, that expressly remove from 
the public records law certain birth information, also remove 
from the publics records law the birth data in the requested 
indices.  Because the birth data in the indices does not appear 
to be governed by either § 24B or § 4A, we disagree. 
 
Birth data sent to the Commissioner of Public Health 
(commissioner) is exempt from the public records law.  G. L. 
c. 111, § 24B.8  By contrast, birth data is transmitted to the 
                     
 
8 "Upon the birth of any child, the . . . person in charge 
of a hospital, or any other person responsible for reporting a 
birth . . . shall forward to the commissioner [of public health 
(commissioner)] any information . . . as required by the 
13 
 
 
registry, either directly or through local clerks, pursuant to 
statutes that do not implicate the public records law.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 46, § 3A ("person in charge of a hospital" must 
file birth reports "with the town clerk of the city or town 
wherein the birth occurred" and, "[i]f the hospital . . . 
delivers more than [ninety-nine] births per year, [the birth] 
report shall be prepared on an electronic system of birth 
registration . . . and transmitted to the [S]tate registrar [of 
vital records and statistics]"); G. L. c. 46, § 17 ("clerk of 
each town and of each city shall . . . transmit to the [S]tate 
registrar [of vital records and statistics] . . . the original 
records of . . . births").  These latter statutes seem to apply 
to the registry birth information from which the requested 
indices are derived.9 
                     
commissioner for administrative, research and statistical 
purposes . . . .  Such data that is included in the certificate 
of birth shall be transmitted within ten days of the birth of 
the child and shall not constitute a public record and shall not 
be available except for the foregoing purposes" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 111, § 24B. 
 
 
9 Our reasoning with respect to G. L. c. 111, § 24B, may be 
complicated by DPH regulations not addressed by the parties.  
See 105 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 305.000 (2007).  Those regulations 
suggest that (1) birth data sent to the Commissioner pursuant to 
§ 24B go through the Registry, see 105 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 305.020; and (2) § 24B does not contemplate the sort of 
information requested here, see 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 305.004 
(defining "[c]onfidential [b]irth [i]nformation").  The parties 
may address these regulations on remand. 
14 
 
 
 
The same reasoning applies to G. L. c. 46, § 4A, which 
removes from the public records law birth lists sent from town 
clerks to local boards of health.10  Unlike these lists, birth 
information transmitted from town clerks to the registry is 
governed by statutes that do not mention public records.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 46, § 17. 
 
Because G. L. c. 111, § 24B, and G. L. c. 46, § 4A, do not 
appear to govern the transfer of birth information to the 
Registry, they likely do not preclude the disclosure of indices 
derived from Registry databases.  As discussed supra, 
information in repositories exempt from the public records law 
may still be public if located in a repository that is not 
exempt.  And by removing from the public records law birth 
information transmitted to the commissioner and to local boards 
of health, but not removing from the public records law birth 
information transmitted to the registry, the Legislature 
demonstrated an intent not to exempt the latter information.11 
                     
 
10 "Upon request of the chair[] of the local board of 
health, [each] town clerk shall file daily with the local board 
of health a list of all births reported to [the clerk], showing 
as to each, the date of birth, sex, name of the child, names of 
the parents, their residence and the name of the physician or 
officer in charge.  Such list shall not be a public record" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 46, § 4A, second par. 
 
 
11 The Legislature also has added certain birth and marriage 
information to the public records law.  See St. 1983, c. 374, 
§ 2 ("copies [maintained by the Secretary of State] and all 
original records of birth, marriage and death on file in the 
15 
 
 
 
c.  Statutes addressing impoundment and amendment of vital 
records.  Absent a court order, G. L. c. 46, § 2A, permits only 
specified individuals to examine particular vital records, 
including those of children born to unmarried parents.12  Unlike 
the statutes we have already addressed, § 2A restricts access to 
particular records regardless of where those records are 
deposited or how they are transmitted.  Cf. District Attorney 
for the Middle Dist., 439 Mass. at 383 (under criminal offender 
record information [CORI] statute, "court record's status as a 
public record does not depend on the identity of the custodian 
from whom that public record is sought").  Although § 2A does 
not address the public records law, it exempts certain records 
                     
office of the city and town clerks . . . for [1841-1890], 
inclusive, shall be maintained as public records in accordance 
with [G. L. c. 66]").  We do not interpret such language as 
demonstrating an intent to exclude from the public records law 
other birth and marriage information.  The statutory definition 
of public records includes specified government documents unless 
an exemption applies.  See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. 
 
 
12 "Examination of records and returns of children born out 
of wedlock or abnormal sex births, or fetal deaths, . . . or of 
copies of such records in the department of public health, shall 
not be permitted except upon proper judicial order, or upon 
request of a person seeking his own birth or marriage record, or 
his attorney, parent, guardian, or conservator, or a person 
whose official duties, in the opinion of the town clerk or the 
commissioner . . . , . . . entitle him to the information 
contained therein, nor shall certified copies thereof be 
furnished except upon such order, or the request of such 
person."  G. L. c. 46, § 2A. 
16 
 
 
from disclosure by impounding them.13  Cf. District Attorney for 
the Middle Dist., supra at 381, 383, quoting G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (a) (where criminal offender record information may 
be disseminated only to particular individuals and entities 
under CORI statute, that statute "operates as an exception to 
the definition of '[p]ublic records'"). 
 
General Laws c. 46, § 13 (h), requires local clerks or the 
registry to amend vital records.  Other subsections of G. L. 
c. 46, § 13, set forth the specific changes that warrant 
amendment:  a change in status from having been born to 
unmarried parents to having been born to married parents, which 
may occur if certain procedures are followed after parents 
marry, G. L. c. 46, § 13 (c); acknowledgment or judgment of 
paternity, G. L. c. 46, § 13 (d); medical intervention for sex 
reassignment, G. L. c. 46, § 13 (e); withdrawal of 
acknowledgment of paternity or judgment of nonpaternity, G. L. 
c. 46, § 13 (f); and adoption, G. L. c. 46, § 13 (g).  Absent 
court order, § 13 (h) allows only particular individuals to 
examine the original versions of amended records.  As with the 
                     
 
13 The restricted records may be examined "upon proper 
judicial order." G. L. c. 46, § 2A.  We do not read this 
language to include a judicial order enforcing a public records 
request.  Such an interpretation would contravene § 2A's purpose 
of protecting certain records from public inspection.  Cf. Globe 
Newspaper Company, Inc., petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 123 (2011) 
(creating rule "necessary to fulfil the legislative purpose in 
. . . statutory impoundment"). 
17 
 
 
records protected by G. L. c. 46, § 2A, the original records are 
exempt from disclosure because there is a statutory restriction 
on who can view them. 
 
According to the stipulated facts, the registry's public 
computers are updated nightly to remove records protected by 
G. L. c. 46, § 2A; add records no longer protected by § 2A; and 
amend records changed pursuant to G. L. c. 46, § 13 (h).  
Because the records protected by § 2A are not available on the 
registry's public computers, the Globe is not requesting them.  
And because pre-amendment information is not available on the 
public computers, the Globe is not requesting information 
protected by § 13 (h). 
 
However, protected information could be gleaned through 
comparison if the Globe or another requester were to obtain in 
the future an updated version of the same indices requested 
here.14  A side-by-side comparison of the same person's data at 
different points in time might reveal, for example, the 
biological parents' names of an individual who has since been 
adopted, the name of a putative father whose nonpaternity has 
since been established, and the previous name and sex of an 
individual who has since completed sex reassignment surgery. 
                     
 
14 A comparison also could occur without a second index.  
Someone could search for a particular individual's information 
in the registry's public database and compare the results 
against an earlier index. 
18 
 
 
 
The motion judge concluded that the question whether such a 
comparison would disclose statutorily protected information was 
not presented because the Globe requested a single index from a 
single moment in time.  She therefore "expressly limited" her 
conclusion that exemption (a) does not prohibit disclosure to 
the request at issue, and clarified that her reasoning did "not 
extend to any future request that may be made."  This approach 
fails to recognize that we are confronted with a situation in 
which the requested records evolve daily to protect information 
impounded by statute.  The indices are, as the parties observe 
in their stipulated facts, "dynamic."  Today's current 
information may be tomorrow's record protected from public view 
by G. L. c. 46, § 13 (h), because of an amendment, or tomorrow's 
indication that an entry has been removed pursuant to G. L. 
c. 46, § 2A.  To examine the Globe's request in a vacuum is to 
ignore that an index from the present is entwined with indices 
from the future. 
 
The judge on remand should make factual findings about the 
extent to which the indices requested here could be compared 
against later-requested indices to reveal information protected 
from public disclosure by statute.  The judge should then 
19 
 
 
determine whether the risk of revealing such information brings 
the requested indices within the scope of exemption (a).15 
 
We turn now to DPH's argument that the records may be 
withheld pursuant to exemption (c). 
 
2.  Exemption (c).  DPH also contends the requested 
materials are exempt from the definition of public records by 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), which encompasses "personnel 
and medical files or information" and "any other materials or 
data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure 
of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy."  On remand, the judge should make further findings 
with respect to this exemption.  First, the judge should decide 
the extent to which the indices requested here could be compared 
against later-requested indices to reveal medical information 
absolutely exempt from the public records law.  If necessary, 
the judge should then decide whether there is a privacy interest 
in the requested indices and, if there is, whether the public 
interest in disclosure substantially outweighs that interest. 
 
Exemption (c) includes two categories of records.  The 
first category, "personnel and medical files or information," 
                     
 
15 DPH has provided information suggesting that an 
examination of who is absent from an index would not necessarily 
reveal information protected by G. L. c. 46, § 2A, because there 
are other reasons why someone's name might be missing.  The 
parties should address this issue on remand. 
20 
 
 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), is "absolutely exempt from 
mandatory disclosure where the files or information are of a 
personal nature and relate to a particular individual."  Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 
(1983) (Boston Retirement Bd.).  See Wakefield Teachers Ass'n v. 
School Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 799-800 (2000).  DPH 
argued below that the requested records constitute "medical 
files or information." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c).  DPH 
contended that because DPH updates the vital records of someone 
who "has completed medical intervention for the purpose of 
permanent sex reassignment," G. L. c. 46, § 13 (e), the birth 
index could be used to identify people who have completed such 
medical intervention.  That someone "has completed medical 
intervention for the purpose of permanent sex reassignment" is, 
by its terms, "medical . . . information," G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (c).  The judge nevertheless rejected DPH's 
argument because the requested index will not itself reveal that 
someone has completed medical intervention for permanent sex 
reassignment.  Because we decline to view the Globe's request in 
isolation, on remand the judge should decide the extent to which 
the indices requested here could be compared against later-
requested indices to reveal medical information absolutely 
exempt from the public records law. 
21 
 
 
 
The second category of records under exemption (c), "any 
other materials or data relating to a specifically named 
individual," is exempt only if disclosure "may constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (c).  See Wakefield Teachers Ass'n, 431 Mass. at 
796-797.  DPH contends that the requested indices fall within 
this second category.  Where the second category under exemption 
(c) is implicated, a court should first determine whether there 
is a privacy interest in the requested records.  If there is 
not, then the requested material does not fall under exemption 
(c).  If there is a privacy interest, then "[e]xemption (c) 
requires a balancing test:  where the public interest in 
obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the 
seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in 
preventing disclosure must yield."  PETA, 477 Mass. at 291-292.  
Compare Pottle v. School Comm. of Braintree, 395 Mass. 861, 866 
& n.6 (1985) (unnecessary to balance public and private 
interests where disclosure would not "invade the privacy" of 
specified individuals), with PETA, supra at 292 n.14 ("if the 
judge on remand finds some privacy interest does exist in the 
redacted information, [requester] must be afforded an 
opportunity to articulate a public interest on the other side of 
the balancing test"). 
22 
 
 
 
a.  Privacy interest.  In deciding whether there is a 
privacy interest in requested records and the weight to be 
accorded any such interest, "we have looked to three 
factors . . . :  (1) whether disclosure would result in personal 
embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) 
whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a 
highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is 
available from other sources" (footnote omitted).  PETA, 477 
Mass. at 292, citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of 
Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 858 (1995) (Police Comm'r of Boston).  
"'[O]ther case-specific relevant factors' may [also] influence 
the calculus."  PETA, supra, quoting Police Comm'r of Boston, 
supra. 
 
The Globe asserts, contrary to PETA, 477 Mass. at 292, that 
whether the requested materials contain intimate details of a 
highly personal nature is dispositive.  There are cases 
interpreting exemption (c) that support this argument.  See, 
e.g., Cape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable County, 443 Mass. 
587, 594-595 (2005); Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 
Mass. 151, 157 (1979) (Collector of Lynn). 
 
Other cases, like PETA, supra, suggest that whether the 
requested records include intimate details of a highly personal 
nature is but one factor to consider.  See Champa v. Weston Pub. 
Schs., 473 Mass. 86, 96 (2015); Doe v. Registrar of Motor 
23 
 
 
Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 425 (1988) (Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles).  Additionally, some decisions that claim to equate 
invasion of privacy with requests for intimate and highly 
personal information consider other factors as well, such as 
public employees' "diminished expectations of privacy," Pottle, 
395 Mass. at 866, and the requested information's availability 
from other sources, see Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 157.  
These cases suggest, and we conclude, that whether the requested 
information is intimate and highly personal is one of many 
possible factors to consider when evaluating the privacy 
interest in nondisclosure. 
 
One case-specific factor here is the aggregate nature of 
the requested indices, which combine discrete information about 
millions of individuals.  We have yet to address in the public 
records context whether there is a greater privacy interest in a 
compilation of personal information than in the discrete 
information that a compilation summarizes.  We now recognize, as 
have the United States Supreme Court and the Appeals Court, that 
in certain circumstances there is.  See United States Dep't of 
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 764, 765 (1989) (Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press) 
(addressing "whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain 
information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure 
of that information," and describing congressional "recognition 
24 
 
 
of the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that 
outstrips the combined power of the bits of information 
contained within"); Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 425 ("aggregate effect on the privacy of the total number 
of people whose data are disseminated weighs against 
disclosure"). 
 
By way of comparison, in the context of construing the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we have said 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's physical 
location is a function of how much location data the government 
seeks.  See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 253 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015), and 472 Mass. 448 (2015) ("a 
number of courts -- including this court -- have determined that 
it is only when [vehicle location] tracking takes place over 
extended periods of time that the cumulative nature of the 
information collected implicates a privacy interest"); id. at 
254 ("it is likely that the duration of the period for which 
historical [location information] is sought will be a relevant 
consideration in the reasonable expectation of privacy 
calculus").  Likewise, the privacy interest in a public records 
request may increase if the requested record is a compilation.  
Cf. New Bedford Standard-Times Publ. Co. v. Clerk of the Third 
Dist. Court of Bristol, 377 Mass. 404, 415 (1979) (where records 
"aggregate information concerning the criminal history of an 
25 
 
 
individual," they "threaten the privacy interests" protected by 
CORI statute). 
 
The Globe contends there is a greater privacy interest in 
"vertical compilations" that "aggregate information about 
specific individuals," such as an individual's criminal record, 
than in "horizontal compilations" that "provide a limited amount 
of information about many people," such as a telephone book.  We 
agree that a minimal amount of nonintrusive data does not become 
private merely because it relates to millions of people.  But 
where requested records include a fair amount of personal 
information, it matters how many individuals the records 
implicate:  the more people affected by disclosure, the greater 
the privacy concerns. 
 
The requested indices here compile enough personal data for 
the number of people affected to influence the privacy analysis.  
The marriage index entries would likely include name, date of 
marriage, spouse, place where the license was filed, and 
certificate number.  And at least some of the birth index 
entries would likely include name, date of birth, place of 
birth, gender, and parents' names. 
 
The Globe points out that "the birthdate and marriage 
information is not conjoined with any other information, . . . 
such as medical or criminal histories, [S]ocial [S]ecurity 
numbers[,] or financial data."  If the indices included this 
26 
 
 
type of other information, then there would be a greater privacy 
interest in preventing their disclosure.  That does not mean the 
aggregate nature of the indices as they exist has no impact on 
the privacy analysis.  The requested indices combine personal 
details about millions of individuals.  Their composite nature 
weighs in favor of a conclusion that there is a privacy interest 
in them. 
 
Other factors weigh in favor of the same conclusion.  The 
requested information concerns private citizens rather than 
public employees or, where a public employee is included in the 
index, data neither related to nor collected in the course of 
employment.  See PETA, 477 Mass. at 293-294 ("exemption [c] 
balancing test . . . should account for the different privacy 
interests . . . held by a public employee versus a private 
one").  See also National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 
541 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (Favish), quoting Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 780 ("where the subject of the 
documents 'is a private citizen,' 'the privacy interest . . . is 
at its apex'").  And the people identified in the indices had no 
choice in the submission of their personal information to the 
registry.  See Georgiou v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. 
Accs., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 436, 437 (2006) (where requested 
information, amongst other characteristics, was "not information 
that [affected employees] had any part in forwarding to" agency, 
27 
 
 
disclosure would implicate privacy interests).16  Nor does the 
Registrar have the information of people identified in the 
indices "because of any failure on [their] part to comply with 
legal obligations."  Id. at 436.  Cf. Collector of Lynn, 377 
Mass. at 157, 158 (requiring disclosure of "lists of real estate 
tax delinquents" because, amongst other reasons, "an owner of 
property . . . does not have the same expectation of privacy 
concerning [a] legal obligation as he [or she] has in . . . 
private financial affairs"). 
 
Although these factors suggest there is a privacy interest 
in the requested indices, the record is insufficient to measure 
other relevant factors adequately.  We therefore remand for 
additional findings on the following four issues:  (1) the 
extent to which multiple indices could be compared to reveal 
private information, (2) the availability from other sources of 
the information in the requested indices, (3) the risk from 
disclosure of identity theft or fraud, and (4) the extent to 
which disclosure could result in unwanted intrusions. 
 
i.  Comparing multiple indices.  Earlier in this opinion, 
we stated that on remand the judge should make factual findings 
about the extent to which the indices requested here could be 
                     
 
16 Town clerks must collect birth and marriage information, 
G. L. c. 46, § 1, and provide that information to the registry, 
G. L. c. 46, §§ 17 (births), 17A (marriages). 
28 
 
 
compared against later-requested indices to reveal information 
protected from public disclosure by statute or medical 
information absolutely exempt from the public records law.  The 
judge also should make factual findings about the extent to 
which comparing indices could reveal private information, 
including "intimate details of a highly personal nature."  PETA, 
477 Mass. at 292.17 
 
ii.  Availability from other sources.  Because the Globe's 
request by its terms includes only information that is available 
on the registry's public computers, the Globe contends that any 
privacy interest in the indices is significantly reduced.  
"[T]he gravity of any putative invasion of privacy resulting 
from disclosure . . . may be reduced if 'substantially the same 
information is available from other sources.'"  PETA, 477 Mass. 
at 294, quoting Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 157.  Whether 
                     
 
17 We agree with the judge that "[i]t is a close[] question 
whether the information" on the face of the indices is highly 
personal and intimate.  Compare People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 
280, 292 n.13 (2017), quoting Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r 
of the Real Prop. Dep't of Boston, 380 Mass. 623, 626 n.2 (1980) 
("'intimate details' may include 'marital status, legitimacy of 
children, identity of fathers of children, medical condition, 
welfare payments, alcohol consumption, family fights, [and] 
reputation'"), with United States Dep't of State v. Washington 
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982) ("Information such as place 
of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment history, 
and comparable data is not normally regarded as highly 
personal").  We do not resolve this issue where the judge may 
find on remand that comparing indices reveals information that 
is plainly intimate and highly personal. 
29 
 
 
"substantially the same information is available" becomes a 
difficult inquiry where, as here, the requested records compile 
discrete information.  If each piece of information is publicly 
available but the data are not available in the aggregate, is 
the privacy interest in the compilation significantly reduced? 
 
In the past, we have avoided answering this question by 
focusing on the availability of requested information regardless 
of how it was packaged and how easily it could be obtained.  See 
Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 158  ("anyone may for a fee 
obtain a certificate itemizing all amounts payable on account of 
tax liens on a piece of property. . . .  The public availability 
of this information reduces the owner's expectation of privacy 
in nondisclosure of the list of tax delinquents" [citation 
omitted; emphasis added]).  We also have recognized, however, 
that public information may be considered private for purposes 
of the public records law.  Police Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 
at 860 ("otherwise private information does not necessarily lose 
that character by having been at one time placed in the public 
domain").  And in deciding that individuals have "a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest" in information 
disclosed pursuant to the sex offender act, we have cited cases 
that discuss the Federal Freedom of Information Act for the 
proposition that, "[i]n certain instances, the aggregation and 
dissemination of publicly available information has triggered a 
30 
 
 
right to privacy."  Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 143 
(1997), citing United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor 
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994), and Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 762-764. 
 
It follows from these cases, and from our recognition today 
that there may be a greater privacy interest in a compilation of 
personal information than in the discrete information that a 
compilation summarizes, that the availability of a requested 
compilation itself, not merely the availability of information 
that makes up the compilation, will significantly reduce the 
privacy interest in that compilation.  The more difficult it is 
to create a requested compilation using public sources, the 
greater the privacy interest in the compilation.  See Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 764 (discussing 
"distinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered 
disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet 
and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole"); Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 427 (where "obtain[ing] the 
[requested] data would require inquiry of many sources, a far 
more cumbersome procedure, . . . disclosure may still be viewed 
as a significant invasion"). 
 
Here, the Globe is requesting indices that compile in one 
place all the information on the registry's public databases.  
Thus, although the individual data points being requested are 
31 
 
 
publicly available, it is unclear to what extent the aggregate 
data also is available. 
 
The requested indices are not accessible on the registry's 
public computers, which require searching for individual 
entries.  And using the databases to manually compile the 
requested indices would involve extensive and costly research.18  
Because using the databases "to obtain the data would require 
. . . a far more cumbersome procedure" than examining the 
requested indices, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 427, the availability of individual data points on the 
public computers does not significantly reduce the privacy 
                     
 
18 When the stipulated facts were filed in the Superior 
Court, a researcher could obtain short lists by typing letters 
into the databases' search field.  For instance, "by typing in 
the letters 'AA' . . . one [was] able to view and scroll through 
a list of names" beginning with those letters.  It would be 
insuperable using this method to obtain the information for 
everyone in the databases, especially because "[u]sers cannot 
print the results of their search queries" and because the 
databases are available only eleven hours per week.  
Additionally, in a letter to the court, DPH represented that it 
is now even harder to collect data on multiple individuals using 
the databases:  "The system no longer permits 'wild card' 
searches, wherein a user could input only the first few letters 
of a last name, and obtain results for multiple names that begin 
with those few letters."  The Globe has not addressed this new 
search system, and our decision does not rest upon it.  Both 
systems present fragmented information that may well be 
impossible to aggregate manually.  Considering the amount of 
entries in the databases, our conclusion is not affected by the 
Globe reporter's statement in his declaration that he was able 
to "create[] two spreadsheets with the first few dozen entries 
in the marriage and birth ind[ic]es in about fifteen to twenty 
minutes, respectively." 
32 
 
 
interest in the indices.  The same reasoning applies to the 
availability of individual birth and marriage certificates, 
which the public may request from the registry or from the 
relevant city or town; and to hard copy birth and marriage 
indices, which the public may inspect in the registry's research 
room but which may not be photocopied. 
 
However, we cannot determine based on the undisputed facts 
the impact on the privacy analysis of birth and marriage 
information allegedly available from other government agencies 
and commercial sources.  The parties dispute the extent of this 
public information.  On remand, the parties should address in 
particular the availability, from other sources, of private 
information that a comparison of indices may reveal. 
 
We also cannot determine the impact on the privacy analysis 
of DPH's two annual reports and the "aggregate marriage data" 
that DPH makes "available by request."  It is unclear from the 
record whether the reports and aggregate marriage data contain 
identifying information, such as names or other details that can 
be linked to individuals.19  Cf. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 
at 438 ("release of the [requested records], even without other 
                     
 
19 According to the stipulated facts, the annual birth 
report "presents detailed data on the number and characteristics 
of Massachusetts births recorded in the [r]egistry," and the 
vital statistics annual report "includes marriage and divorce 
counts." 
33 
 
 
particular identifying details, creates a grave risk of indirect 
identification").  If the reports and aggregate data do not 
include identifying information, then their existence does not 
reduce the privacy interest in the requested indices.  If they 
do include identifying information, and if they include much or 
all of the data requested here, then the privacy interest in the 
requested indices will be significantly reduced.  See Police 
Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. at 860 ("considerable amount of 
prior disclosure . . . seriously compromised any privacy 
interests").  Cf. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 
164, 176 (1991) ("Although disclosure of . . . personal 
information constitutes only a de minimis invasion of privacy 
when the identities . . . are unknown, the invasion of privacy 
becomes significant when the personal information is linked to 
particular [individuals]").  The parties should clarify on 
remand the scope of the reports and the aggregate marriage data. 
 
iii.  Risk of identity theft and fraud.  DPH contends, and 
the judge decided, that disclosing the requested information 
would pose a risk of identity theft and fraud.  This risk is a 
proper case-specific factor in the privacy analysis.  Cf. PETA, 
477 Mass. at 295 ("personal safety" may be considered in privacy 
analysis).  Cf. also Sherman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 
244 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2001) ("we are comfortable measuring 
the scope of the privacy interest in a [Social Security number] 
34 
 
 
in terms of the dire consequences of identity theft and other 
forms of fraud").  However, the record does not support the 
judge's decision.  Cf. Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 1 
Mass. L. Rep. 156, 158 (1993) ("Plaintiff introduced expert 
testimony regarding the potential privacy concerns of making 
universal identifiers such as birth date publicly available").  
The judge, not unreasonably, seems to have used mainly common 
sense to reach her conclusion.  But we decline to take judicial 
notice of an issue as technologically complex as identity theft 
and fraud. 
 
This is especially so because the risk of identity theft 
may factor into the privacy analysis only if DPH "can identify 
specific information demonstrating that a significant risk [of 
such theft] . . . is posed by the disclosure."  PETA, 477 Mass. 
at 295 (discussing "significant risk to an individual's personal 
safety").  A fact-intensive inquiry such as this should be 
resolved through an adversarial proceeding before a fact finder.  
Moreover, the Globe suggests there is evidence that the 
Legislature and this court, in our capacity as a rulemaking 
body, do not perceive the requested information as posing a 
threat of fraud. 
 
General Laws c. 93H, concerning security breaches, defines 
"[p]ersonal information" as "a resident's first name and last 
name or first initial and last name in combination with any 
35 
 
 
[one] or more of the following data elements that relate to such 
resident:  (a) Social Security number; (b) driver's license 
number or [S]tate-issued identification card number; or (c) 
financial account number, or credit or debit card number."  
G. L. c. 93H, § 1.  The requested indices include first and last 
names, but they do not include any of the other information 
listed in the statute. 
 
The Globe points also to S.J.C. Rule 1:24 (2016).  "This 
rule is intended to prevent the unnecessary inclusion of certain 
personally identifying information in publicly accessible 
[court] documents . . . to reduce the possibility of," amongst 
other things, "identity theft."  SJC Rule 1:24, § 1.  "Personal 
identifying information" is defined as "a [S]ocial [S]ecurity 
number, taxpayer identification number, driver's license number, 
[S]tate-issued identification card number, . . . passport 
number, a parent's birth surname if identified as such, a 
financial account number, or a credit or debit card number."  
SJC Rule 1:24, § 2.  Of all these options, the requested indices 
might reveal only a parent's surname.  Although G. L. c. 93H and 
SJC Rule 1:24 are not dispositive, they provide another reason 
to avoid resolving the fraud inquiry without a firm factual 
record. 
 
iv.  Unwanted intrusions.  As DPH contends, it may be that 
the requested indices could result in "unwanted solicitations 
36 
 
 
and intrusions" when combined with street addresses and 
telephone numbers readily available from telephone books.  Cf. 
Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. United States 
Dep't of the Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994) 
("invasion of privacy . . . can result from release of a list of 
names and addresses coupled with a characteristic susceptible to 
commercial exploitation").  DPH points out that disclosing the 
indices could result in "unwanted solicitations based on age, 
such as schemes that target senior citizens."  See Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 426 (where individual's 
street address, make and year of automobile, and age are 
disclosed, "such a person, particularly one of advanced years, 
may become the target of those who would like to share in his or 
her wealth").  "Similarly, parents . . . could be targeted for 
[children's] products . . . [,] and married couples solicited on 
their wedding anniversaries."  However, the extent to which 
information in the indices could lead to unwanted solicitations 
is not apparent from the record, and we decline to take judicial 
notice of the complexities of commercial advertising.  The 
parties may produce further evidence on this point on remand. 
 
When addressing on remand the issues of identity theft and 
unwanted intrusions, the judge should keep in mind that courts 
and agencies do not consider the requester's intent when ruling 
on public records requests.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d) (viii) 
37 
 
 
("records access officer may not require the requester to 
specify the purpose for a request, except to determine whether 
the records are requested for a commercial purpose or whether to 
grant a request for a fee waiver").  See also Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Commissioner of Educ., 439 Mass. 124, 133 n.13 (2003) 
("there is no requirement in the statute that a reason or 
justification is necessary or must be given to access public 
records[,] and we do not perceive any other basis for such a 
requirement" [alteration omitted]).  Even if the Globe asserts 
that it will neither publish the requested indices nor use them 
for commercial or malicious ends, a different requester might 
use the information differently.  If the requested indices are 
available as a matter of law to the Globe, then they must be 
available to everyone. 
 
b.  Public interest in disclosure.  If the judge concludes 
on remand that there is a privacy interest in the requested 
indices, then the judge must weigh the privacy interest in 
nondisclosure against any public interest in disclosure that the 
Globe articulates.  PETA, 477 Mass. at 291-292.  Because our 
cases do not precisely define public interest, we take the 
opportunity to do so here.  On remand, the judge should apply 
that definition and make further factual findings where 
appropriate. 
38 
 
 
 
The judge, quoting Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 158, and 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 425, stated 
that "[t]he public's interest is usually limited to its interest 
'in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their 
duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner.' . . .  In the 
circumstances of this case, however, the public's interest in 
disclosure also includes [the ']negative public interest' in 
making the compiled personal data of so many individuals 
available electronically for public scrutiny."  Although the 
judge's definition of public interest has ample support in the 
case law, we think it is both too narrow and too broad. 
 
We already have observed in this opinion that the privacy 
interest in a requested record may increase if the record 
implicates many individuals.  To allow the existence of a large 
number of potentially affected individuals to reduce the public 
interest in disclosure would give that factor undue weight.  
Therefore, we decline to consider on the public interest side of 
the scale any "negative public interest in placing the private 
affairs of . . . many individuals" into the public domain.  
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 425. 
 
We also disagree with the judge that the only other 
relevant public interest is the interest "in knowing whether 
public servants are carrying out their duties in an efficient 
39 
 
 
and law-abiding manner."  Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 158.  
As the Globe argues, other public interests may be considered. 
 
Although nothing in the plain language of exemption (c) 
requires that the public interest be limited to the interest in 
government operations,20 our jurisprudence has often limited the 
public interest in this manner.  See PETA, 477 Mass. at 292 
("public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public 
servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and 
efficient manner"); Hastings & Sons Publ. Co., 374 Mass. at 818-
819 ("paramount right of the public to know what its public 
servants are paid must prevail. . . .  Such knowledge could 
significantly add to the citizen's understanding of the 
government's operations" [citation omitted]); Antell v. Attorney 
                     
 
20 Admittedly, the public records statute itself equates 
public interest with learning about government.  The statute 
allows for fee waiver or reduction where "disclosure of a 
requested record is in the public interest because it is likely 
to contribute significantly to public understanding of the 
operations or activities of the government and is not primarily 
in the commercial interest of the requester" (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d) (v).  The United States Supreme Court 
cited a nearly identical FOIA provision to support its 
conclusion that the only relevant public interest is in learning 
about the government.  United States Dep't of Justice v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 775 
(1989).  But the Court also acknowledged that "such a provision 
. . . implies that there will be requests that do not meet such 
a 'public interest' standard."  Id.  Moreover, the statute's use 
of the word "because" suggests there are public interests other 
than the one described.  A different provision in the same 
statute identifies another such interest, namely, "the public 
interest served by limiting the cost of public access to the 
records."  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d) (iv) (1). 
40 
 
 
Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 247 (2001) ("public interest in 
disclosing allegations of official misconduct"). 
 
However, the parties have not pointed to, and we have not 
found, any published Massachusetts case that expressly limits 
the public interest analysis.  In fact, Massachusetts courts 
have considered public interests other than the interest in 
government operations.  See Matter of a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
445 Mass. 685, 689 (2006) ("public's interest in disclosing the 
videotaped interviews of the plaintiffs to their attorneys"); 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 418 n.7 
("public purpose in providing injured members of the public with 
accurate information as to the owners and operators of 
automobiles and in making such data readily available"); 
Cunningham v. Health Officer of Chelsea, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 861, 
862 (1979) ("matters of public concern" include "quality of 
residential housing"). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has said, with regard to a 
FOIA balancing test similar to the one required by exemption 
(c), that the public interest must relate to government 
operations.  See Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 
355, 355-356 (1997) (per curiam), quoting Federal Labor 
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 497 ("the only relevant public 
interest in the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which 
disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an 
41 
 
 
agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let 
citizens know what their government is up to" [quotations and 
alteration omitted]).  The Court has so held because "the core 
purpose of the FOIA . . . is contributing significantly to 
public understanding of the operations or activities of the 
government" (quotations, alteration, and emphasis omitted).  
Federal Labor Relations Auth., supra at 495, quoting Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 775.  Similarly, we 
have recognized that our public records law "expresses the 
Legislature's considered judgment that '[t]he public has an 
interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out 
their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner.'"  Suffolk 
Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 
453 (2007), quoting Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 158. 
 
But public records laws serve an important purpose in 
addition to shining sunlight on government operations.  Indeed, 
we have articulated a wide-ranging "dominant purpose" for our 
own law:  "to afford the public broad access to governmental 
records."  Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. at 436.  See Harvard 
Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  Contrast Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press, 489 U.S. at 772, quoting Environmental Protection 
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) ("In our leading case on 
the FOIA, we declared that the Act was designed to create a 
42 
 
 
broad right of access to 'official information'").21  This 
purpose is served by the statutory presumption "that each record 
sought is public."  G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv). 
 
Information is the bread and butter of democracy, and the 
government is in a unique position to collect and aggregate 
information from which the public may benefit.  As the request 
in this case demonstrates, reporters, scholars, and others seek 
to use this information to learn and teach.  See Statement on 
World Press Freedom Day, 1 Pub. Papers of the Presidents 607 
(2010) (then President Barack H. Obama recalling "the words of 
Thomas Jefferson:  'The basis of our governments being the 
opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep 
                     
 
21 To a certain extent, the Legislative history of the 
modern version of the public records law suggests that the 
statute's purpose is to learn about government.  See Collector 
of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 152-153 (describing shift in orientation 
of public records law from limited disclosure to modern scheme 
of presumed disclosure).  A legislative proposal not enacted 
contained a statement of findings that emphasized discovering 
what the government is up to:  the General Court "declare[d] 
that it is a fundamental right of a citizen to know what his 
government is doing and thus, to have free and open access to 
most of the official papers and records of his government.  It 
is . . . the purpose of this act to clarify, and to provide 
effective remedies for, this right."  1973 House Doc. No. 1127.  
This language does not change our analysis.  It was not included 
in later proposals or in the law that was enacted, 1973 House 
Doc. No. 7310; St. 1973, c. 1050, and, as discussed in the text, 
we previously have acknowledged a broader purpose for the 
statute.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 452 Mass. 97, 100-101 
(2008), S.C., Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 1001 (2009) 
(declining to rely on findings in statute's preamble where 
"plain language of the statute enacted sweeps more broadly"). 
43 
 
 
that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should 
have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a 
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the 
latter'"). 
 
To ensure that the public-private balancing test reflects 
the various uses to which government information may be put, we 
conclude that where a requester articulates with specificity a 
public interest, even one unrelated to government operations,  
"that non-dispositive factor can add weight to whatever [public] 
interest exists on that side of the balancing test."  PETA, 477 
Mass. at 295.  In applying this rule, judges should remember 
that, when analyzing the public interest in disclosure, we do 
not consider who is framing that public interest.  See Pottle, 
395 Mass. at 866 n.6.  Cf. Cameranesi v. United States Dep't of 
Defense, 856 F.3d 626, 639-640 (9th Cir. 2017) ("In considering 
whether the public interest is significant, . . . [w]e do not 
give weight to the FOIA requester's personal interest in 
obtaining information"). 
 
On remand, the judge should consider all the Globe's 
arguments for why disclosure would be in the public interest.  
For instance, the Globe argues in its brief that disclosure 
"would assist in identifying individuals in news reports, 
ferreting out voter fraud, and studying birth and marriage 
trends."  The judge also should make further findings with 
44 
 
 
respect to the public interest argument already considered in 
the Superior Court, namely, the Globe's "contention that access 
[to the requested indices] would provide a check on whether the 
registry is properly recording births and marriages." 
 
Where the government withholds a record pursuant to 
exemption (c), a requester may not simply proffer a public 
interest in general terms.  "First, the citizen must show that 
the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, 
an interest more specific than having the information for its 
own sake.  Second, the citizen must show the information is 
likely to advance that interest."  Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.  
Where "the public interest being asserted is to show that 
responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly 
in the performance of their duties, the requester must establish 
more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.  
Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a 
belief by a reasonable person that the alleged [g]overnment 
impropriety might have occurred."  Id. at 174. 
 
The Globe articulated a specific public interest, namely, 
"whether the [r]egistry is properly recording" vital records.  
It also produced evidence that the registry might not be doing 
its job correctly:  the parties agreed in the Superior Court 
that, according to a 2010 State audit, the registry "lacked 
certain controls for its computer databases."  However, the 
45 
 
 
parties dispute whether the requested indices could reveal 
errors in the registry databases.  The Globe argued below that 
"[b]y analyzing the database, [it] could calculate the number of 
certificates recorded each year and in each town and compare 
that with [c]ensus data and other records to search for any 
discrepancies."  DPH disagreed, arguing that because "the 
ind[ic]es would not include restricted information, . . . there 
will be a discrepancy between the [c]ensus data and the number 
of listings in the ind[ic]es."  The judge did not reach the 
issue whether the Globe could use the census or other data as a 
comparison for the requested indices.22  This issue should be 
addressed on remand. 
 
Conclusion.  With respect to exemption (a), on remand the 
judge should make factual findings about the extent to which the 
                     
 
22 Instead, the judge emphasized that "the Globe . . . could 
conduct its research using other available means," namely, two 
annual reports published by DPH and "aggregate marriage data 
available by request."  However, in Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 
at 158 n.6, we rejected an argument that "the public interest in 
disclosure [of lists of tax delinquents] is minimal because a 
collector is required by statute eventually to publish his 
delinquent accounts."  We concluded that "the public has an 
interest in knowing whether the collector complies with the 
spirit and letter of these statutory requirements."  Id.  Here, 
even if the publications mentioned by the judge provide the same 
information as the requested indices, cf. Hastings & Sons Publ. 
Co. v. City Treas. of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 819 (1978) ("General 
salary schedules, obtainable from publication of the collective 
bargaining agreement, would not provide the details sought by 
the plaintiff"), there is a public interest in knowing whether 
the data DPH publishes and compiles upon request is accurate. 
46 
 
 
indices requested here could be compared against later-requested 
indices to reveal information protected from public disclosure 
by statute.  The judge should then determine whether the risk of 
revealing such information brings the requested indices within 
the scope of exemption (a). 
 
With respect to exemption (c), on remand the judge should 
first decide the extent to which the indices requested here 
could be compared against later-requested indices to reveal 
medical information absolutely exempt from the public records 
law.  If necessary, the judge should then decide whether there 
is a privacy interest in the requested indices.  To do so, the 
judge should make further findings on (1) the extent to which 
multiple indices could be compared to reveal private 
information; (2) whether the requested compilation is already 
available in the aggregate form requested or, if not, the ease 
with which it can be assembled from public information; (3) 
whether DPH has shown that releasing the indices could pose a 
risk of identity theft or fraud; and (4) the extent to which the 
indices could facilitate unwanted intrusions. 
 
If there is a privacy interest in the requested indices, 
then the judge should decide whether the public interest in 
disclosure substantially outweighs the privacy interest.  To do 
so, the judge should make further findings on (1) whether the 
Globe could use the indices to learn about government by 
47 
 
 
scrutinizing whether DPH is properly recording births and 
marriages, and (2) whether releasing the indices could serve 
public interests other than the interest in learning about 
government. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment is vacated, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.