Case Title: In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases - Report 2019-01

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC19-419

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-419 
____________ 
 
 
IN RE:  STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—
REPORT 2019-01. 
 
December 19, 2019 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal 
Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to standard jury instructions 
3.6(f) and 3.6(g) and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard 
instructions for publication and use.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. 
Const. 
 
In In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2017-07, 257 
So. 3d 908 (Fla. 2018), we authorized for publication and use amendments to 
standard criminal jury instructions 3.6(f) (Justifiable Use of Deadly Force) and 
3.6(g) (Justifiable Use of Non-Deadly Force).  We also referred instruction 3.6(f) 
back to the Committee for consideration of whether the common law “castle 
doctrine” should be added to the instruction to cover the situation in which the 
 
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defendant is in his or her place of business and is engaged in criminal activity, see 
Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (adopting the rule 
that a defendant is under no duty to retreat prior to using deadly force in self-
defense when attacked in his or her place of employment while lawfully engaged 
in his occupation), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981); 
Frazier v. State, 681 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996) (agreeing with the 
Third District Court of Appeal that the “castle doctrine” applies to the workplace, 
citing Redondo), as suggested by the Florida Public Defender Association in its 
comment in that earlier case. 
The Committee, after having published its proposals in The Florida Bar 
News and having received one comment, filed its report with the Court proposing 
amendments to both instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g).  In its report, the Committee 
explains that 
[a] question arises as to whether this extension [of the “castle 
doctrine”] applies if the person were engaged in criminal activity.  
Notably, §§ 776.012(2) and 776.031(2), Fla. Stats., state: “A person 
who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this 
subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his 
or her ground if the person using or threatening to use deadly force is 
not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she 
has a right to be.  (emphasis added).  If the courts apply the plain 
language of these statutes, then a convicted felon, who unlawfully 
possesses a firearm while working in his place of business, has a duty 
to retreat before using deadly force because he is engaged in criminal 
activity.  However, if the Redondo and Frazier case law applies, 
despite the employee engaging in criminal activity, the convicted 
 
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felon, who was otherwise working at his job lawfully, would not have 
a duty to retreat before using deadly force. 
 
A majority of the Committee did not believe that the case law that extends the 
“castle doctrine” into a place of employment survives the Stand Your Ground 
statutes if the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.  Because this Court has 
not addressed this specific point of law, the Committee instead proposes amending 
instruction 3.6(f) to bring this issue to the attention of the courts and lawyers. 
We agree with the Committee that a standard jury instruction case is not the 
proper means in which to resolve a substantive issue of law.  Rather, absent 
clarification by the legislature, that matter must await this Court’s resolution in an 
actual case and controversy.  See, e.g., In re Std. Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases—
Report 2018-04, 257 So. 3d 370, 372 (Fla. 2018); In re Std. Jury Instrs. in 
Criminal Cases—Report No. 2015-08, 194 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 2016); In re Std. Jury 
Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Instruction 14.2, 140 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 2014); In re Std. 
Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2011-03, 95 So. 3d 868, 869 (Fla. 
2012); In re Std. Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Report 2011-04, 85 So. 3d 1090, 
1091 n.1 (Fla. 2012); In re Std. Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2007-5, 
982 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2008).  Accordingly, instruction 3.6(f) is amended to include 
two italicized notes alerting courts and litigants of the issue.  The first new 
paragraph is included in the section under section 776.013(1), and provides as 
follows: 
 
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Before the latest Chapter 776 statutes went into effect, case law such 
as De La Hoz v. State, 997 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) extended 
the Castle Doctrine to people in their place of employment while 
lawfully engaged in their occupations. If this extension of the Castle 
Doctrine is still valid, a person in his or her place of employment 
while lawfully engaged in his or her occupation has no duty to retreat 
before using or threatening to use deadly force, even if he or she was 
otherwise engaged in criminal activity. The paragraph below can be 
modified to include a person in his or her place of employment while 
lawfully engaged in his or her occupation. 
 
The second is added to the italicized note above the paragraph pertaining to 
danger, and provides “If the Castle Doctrine for a person in his or her place of 
employment still applies, the paragraph below should be modified to include a 
person in his or her place of employment while lawfully engaged in his or her 
occupation.” 
 
In addition to the above-described amendment to instruction 3.6(f), both 
instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) are amended to include the definition for “great 
bodily harm,” consistent with prior decisions to provide as follows:  “‘Great bodily 
harm’ means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, 
and as such does not include mere bruises.”  See, e.g., In re Std. Jury Instrs. in 
Criminal Cases—Report 2018-14, 267 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 2019) (authorizing 
instructions 3.3(d), 8.5(a), 16.5, 21.14, and 29.24 to include the definition); In re 
Std. Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Report 2018-09, 262 So. 3d 59, 67, 70 (Fla. 
2019) (authorizing instructions 7.9 and 16.12 to include the definition); In re Std. 
 
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Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Report 2018-06, 260 So.3d 941, 942 (Fla. 2018) 
(authorizing instructions 15.1, 15.2, and 15.3 to include the definition); In re Std. 
Instrs. in Criminal Cases—Report 2018-05, 257 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 2018) 
(authorizing instructions 13.1, 13.3, and 13.4 to include the definition).  We reject 
the Committee’s abbreviated definition proffered without explanation for the 
necessity to deviate from the previously authorized version. 
 
Having considered the Committee’s report, the comment, and the 
Committee’s response thereto, we authorize for publication and use amended 
instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) as modified and as set forth in the appendix to this 
opinion.1  New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is 
indicated by struck-through type.  In authorizing the publication and use of these 
instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested 
parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative 
instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions.  We further 
caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions 
                                          
 
 
1.  The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Criminal Jury 
Instructions as they appear on the Court’s website at www.floridasupremecourt.org 
/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml.  We recognize that there may be minor 
discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on the website and the 
published versions of the instructions.  Any discrepancies as to instructions 
authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be resolved by 
reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction. 
 
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reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the 
views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability.  The instructions as set 
forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in 
Criminal Cases 
 
Judge F. Rand Wallis, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Bart Schneider, Staff 
Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
 
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APPENDIX 
3.6(f) JUSTIFIABLE [USE] [OR] [THREATENED USE] OF DEADLY 
FORCE 
 
Because there are many statutes applicable to self-defense, give only those 
parts of the instructions that are required by the evidence. However, uUnless the 
evidence establishes the force or threat of force was deadly or non-deadly as a 
matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given. Mathis v. State, 863 So. 2d 464 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Only the discharge of a firearm, whether accidental or not, 
has been deemed to be the use of deadly force as a matter of law. Hosnedl v. State, 
126 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). 
 
§ 782.02, Fla. Stat., and many statutes within Chapter 776 address the 
justifiable use or threatened use of deadly force, however, § 782.02, Fla. Stat., 
does not address the concept of stand-your-ground/no duty to retreat. Additionally, 
§ 776.013(1), Fla. Stat., covers the situation where the defendant was in a dwelling 
and had the right to be there while §§ 776.012(1), and 776.031(2), Fla. Stats., 
cover other situations. Judges should use great caution in deciding which statutes 
apply and which parts of the instruction are required to be given.  
 
It is a defense to the crime[s] of (name[s] of relevant crime[s], including 
lesser-included offenses) if the actions of (defendant) constituted the justifiable 
[use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force. “Deadly force” means force likely 
to cause death or great bodily harm. “Great bodily harm” means great as 
distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does 
not include mere bruises.  
 
Section 782.02, Fla. Stat., and many statutes within Chapter 776 address the 
justifiable use of deadly force, however, § 782.02, Fla. Stat., does not address the 
concept of stand-your-ground/no duty to retreat. Additionally, § 776.013(1), Fla. 
Stat., covers the situation where the defendant was in a dwelling and had the right 
to be there while § 776.012(1), and §776.031(2), Fla. Stat., cover other situations. 
The Committee advises lawyers and judges to use great caution in deciding which 
statute or statutes apply. 
   
Give if applicable. § 782.02, Fla. Stat. 
 
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The use of deadly force is justifiable if (defendant) reasonably believed 
that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 
to [himself] [herself] while resisting: 
 
another’s attempt to murder [him] [her], or 
 
any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon [him] [her], or 
 
any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon or in any dwelling house 
in which [he] [she] was present. 
Give the elements of the applicable felony that defendant alleges victim 
attempted to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. 
State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). 
 
Give if applicable. §§ 776.012(2), 776.031(2), Fla. Stat. Defendant not in a 
dwelling or residence or defendant was in a dwelling or residence but had no right 
to be there. Where appropriate, the court should state or define the applicable 
criminal activity that the defendant may have been engaged in.  
(Defendant) was justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] deadly force 
if [he] [she] reasonably believed that such [force] [or] [threat of force] was 
necessary to prevent [imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] 
[herself] [or] [another] [or] [the imminent commission of (applicable forcible 
felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.) against [himself] [herself] [or another]]. If 
(defendant) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place 
[he] [she] had a right to be, then [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the 
right to stand [his] [her] ground. 
Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges 
victim was about to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo 
v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be 
modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a 
person. 
 
Give the paragraph below when there is evidence that the defendant was 
engaged in criminal activity or was not in a place where he or she had a right to 
be, which means there was a duty to retreat. Morgan v. State, 127 So. 3d 708 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2013). Where appropriate, the court should state or define the applicable 
criminal activity that the defendant may have been engaged in. 
If (defendant) was otherwise engaged in criminal activity or was not in a 
place [he] [she] had a right to be, then the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly 
force was not justified unless [he] [she] used every reasonable means within 
 
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[his] [her] power and consistent with [his] [her] own safety to avoid the danger 
before resorting to the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force. The fact 
that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify [his] [her] [use] [or] 
[threatened use] of deadly force, if, by retreating, [he] [she] could have 
avoided the need to [use] [or] [threaten to use] deadly force. However, if 
(defendant) was placed in a position of imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm and it would have increased [his] [her] own danger to retreat, 
then [his] [her] [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force was justifiable.  
Give if applicable. § 776.013(1), Fla. Stat. Defendant in a dwelling or 
residence and had a right to be there.  
Before the latest Chapter 776 statutes went into effect, case law such as De 
La Hoz v. State, 997 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) extended the Castle Doctrine 
to people in their place of employment while lawfully engaged in their occupations. 
If this extension of the Castle Doctrine is still valid, a person in his or her place of 
employment while lawfully engaged in his or her occupation has no duty to retreat 
before using or threatening to use deadly force, even if he or she was otherwise 
engaged in criminal activity. The paragraph below can be modified to include a 
person in his or her place of employment while lawfully engaged in his or her 
occupation.    
If (defendant) was in a [dwelling] [residence] in which [he] [she] had a 
right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] 
[her] ground and use [or] [threaten to use] force, including deadly force if [he] 
[she] reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [or] [another] [or] 
[the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. 
Stat.)] against [himself] [herself] [or] [another]. 
Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges 
victim was about to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo 
v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be 
modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a 
person. 
 
Force in resisting a law enforcement officer. § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. 
A person is not justified in [using force] [or] [threatening to use force] to 
resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement 
officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement 
officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, 
to be a law enforcement officer. 
 
 
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Give if applicable. 
However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a 
person is justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of reasonable force to 
defend [himself] [herself] (or another), but only to the extent [he] [she] 
reasonably believes such [force] [or] [threat of force] is necessary. See                   
§ 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); 
Jackson v. State, 463 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). 
 
Read in all cases. 
At the end of the last sentence of the paragraph below, there are two sets of 
brackets. The words within the first set of brackets should be read if the jury is 
instructed on either § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat., or § 776.031(2), Fla. Stat. The words 
within the second set of brackets should be read if the jury is instructed on             
§ 776.013(1), Fla. Stat. (If the Castle Doctrine for a person in his or her place of 
employment still applies, the paragraph below should be modified to include a 
person in his or her place of employment while lawfully engaged in his or her 
occupation.) 
If the evidence is in dispute about whether the defendant was in a dwelling 
or residence or whether the defendant had a right to be there or whether the 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the trial judge must craft a special 
instruction for the paragraph below.    
In deciding whether (defendant) was justified in the [use] [or] 
[threatened use] of deadly force, you must consider the circumstances by 
which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the [force] [or] [threat of force] 
was used. The danger need not have been actual; however, to justify the [use] 
[or] [threatened use] of deadly force, the appearance of danger must have 
been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same 
circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only 
through the use of that [force] [or] [threat of force]. Based upon appearances, 
(defendant) must have actually believed that the danger was real. However, the 
defendant had no duty to retreat if [he] [she] was [not otherwise engaged in 
criminal activity and was in a place where [he] [she] had a right to be] [was in 
a dwelling or residence in which [he] [she] had a right to be]. 
 
Presumption of fear (unlawful and forcible entry into dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013(2), Fla. Stat. 
(Defendant) is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent 
peril of death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] when 
[using] [or] [threatening to use] defensive force that was intended or likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm to another if: 
 
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a. 
The person against whom the defensive force was 
[used] [or] [threatened to be used] was in the process 
of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had 
unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, 
or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or 
was attempting to remove another against that 
person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle; and 
b. 
(Defendant) knew or had reason to believe that an 
unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible 
act was occurring or had occurred. 
Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. § 776.013(3)(a)-(3)(d), Fla. Stat. Give 
as applicable. 
The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily 
harm does not apply if: 
a. 
the person against whom the defensive force is [used] 
[or] [threatened to be used] has the right to be in [or 
is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] 
[vehicle], such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and 
there is not an injunction for protection from 
domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision 
order of no contact against that person; or 
b. 
the person or persons sought to be removed is a child 
or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or 
under the lawful guardianship of, the person against 
whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to 
be used]; or 
c. 
the person who [uses] [or] [threatens to use] defensive 
force is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the 
[dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further a 
criminal activity; or 
d. 
the person against whom the defensive force is [used] 
[or] [threatened to be used] is a law enforcement 
officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] 
[residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] 
official duties and the officer identified [himself] 
 
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[herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the 
person [using] [or] [threatening to use] the force knew 
or reasonably should have known that the person 
entering or attempting to enter was a law 
enforcement officer. 
If requested, give definition of “law enforcement officer” 
from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. 
 
§ 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. 
A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter 
another’s [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so 
with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. 
“Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any 
attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or 
permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, 
and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night. 
“Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either 
temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest. 
“Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, 
which is designed to transport people or property. 
Aggressor. § 776.041(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable and only in cases 
where the defendant is charged with either: a) an independent forcible felony, 
Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2008); or b) felony murder, if the 
underlying felony is an independent forcible felony, Cook v. State, 192 So. 3d 681 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016). 
However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force is not justified if 
you find that (defendant) was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping 
after the commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.). 
Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony but omit any reference to 
burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The 
instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is 
not a crime against a person. 
Aggressor. § 776.041(2), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. 
Gibbs v. State, 789 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force is not justified if 
you find that (defendant) used [force] [or] [the threat of force] to initially 
 
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provoke the [use] [or] [threatened use] of force against [himself] [herself], 
unless: 
1. 
the [force] [or] [threat of force] asserted toward the 
defendant was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed 
that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to 
escape the danger, other than [using] [or] [threatening to 
use] deadly force on (victim). 
[or] 
2. 
in good faith, (defendant) withdrew from physical contact 
with (victim) and clearly indicated to (victim) that [he] [she] 
wanted to withdraw and stop the [use] [or] [threatened use] 
of deadly force, but (victim) continued or resumed the [use] 
[or] [threatened use] of force. 
 
Prior threats. Give if applicable. 
If you find that (defendant), who because of threats or prior difficulties 
with (victim), had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger 
of death or great bodily harm at the hands of (victim), you may consider this 
fact in determining whether the actions of (defendant) were those of a 
reasonable person. 
Specific act of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable. 
If you find that at the time of the alleged (name[s] of relevant crime[s]), 
(defendant) knew that (victim) had committed an act [or acts] of violence, you 
may consider that fact in determining whether (defendant) reasonably believed 
it was necessary for [him] [her] to [use] [or] [threaten to use] deadly force. 
Reputation of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable. 
If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and 
dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to (defendant), 
you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of (defendant) 
were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that 
reputation. 
Reputation of victim not necessarily known by defendant (to show victim 
acted in conformity with victim’s character). Give if applicable. 
 
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If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and 
dangerous person, you may consider this fact in determining whether [he] 
[she] was the initial aggressor. 
Physical abilities. Read in all cases. 
In considering the issue of [self-defense] [defense of another], you may 
take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of (defendant) 
and (victim). 
Read in all cases. 
If in your consideration of the issue of [self-defense] [defense of another] 
you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether (defendant) was 
justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, you should find 
[him] [her] not guilty. 
However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that (defendant) was not justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of 
deadly force, you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of the 
charge have been proved. 
 
Comments 
 
This instruction should be used for crimes committed on or after July 1, 
2017. 
A defendant may have knowledge of a victim’s prior specific acts of 
violence because he or she was present during the occurrence of the specific acts or 
because the defendant heard of the specific acts prior to the date of the alleged act 
of self-defense. See Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So. 2d 
985], 1999 [732 So. 2d 1044], 2000 [789 So. 2d 954], 2006 [930 So. 2d 612], 2008 
[976 So. 2d 1081], 2010 [27 So. 3d 640], 2016 [191 So. 3d 411], and 2018 [257 
So. 3d 908], and 2019. 
 
 
 
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3.6(g) JUSTIFIABLE [USE] [OR] [THREATENED USE] OF NON-
DEADLY FORCE 
 
Because there are many statutes applicable to self-defensethe justifiable use 
or threatened use of force, give only those parts of the instructions that are 
required by the evidence. However, unless the evidence establishes the force used 
was deadly or non-deadly as a matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given. 
Mathis v. State, 863 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Only the discharge of a 
firearm, whether accidental or not, has been deemed to be the use of deadly force 
as a matter of law. Hosnedl v. State, 120 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). 
 
It is a defense to the crime[s] of (name[s] of relevant crime[s], including 
lesser-included offenses) if the actions of (defendant) constituted the justifiable 
[use] [or] [threatened] of non-deadly force. “Non-deadly” force means force 
not likely to cause death or great bodily harm. “Great bodily harm” means 
great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as 
such does not include mere bruises.  
 
In defense of person. §§ 776.012(1), 776.013(1), Fla. Stats. Give if 
applicable. 
(Defendant) was justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] non-deadly 
force against (victim) and had no duty to retreat if [he] [she] reasonably 
believed that such conduct was necessary to defend [himself] [herself] 
[another] against [(victim’s) imminent use of unlawful force] [or] the 
imminent commission of  (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.) 
against [himself] [herself] [or] [another]. 
Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges 
victim was about to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo 
v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be 
modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a 
person. 
 
In defense of property. § 776.031(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. 
(Defendant) was justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] non-deadly 
force against (victim) and had no duty to retreat if: 
 
1. 
(Victim) [was about to trespass] [or] [was trespassing] or 
[was about to wrongfully interfere] [or] [was wrongfully 
 
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interfering] with landreal property other than a dwelling or 
personal property; and 
 
2. 
The landreal property other than a dwelling or personal 
property was lawfully in (defendant’s) possession, or in the 
possession of a member of [his] [her] immediate family or 
household, or in the possession of some person whose 
property [he] [she] was under a legal duty to protect; and 
 
3. 
(Defendant) reasonably believed that [his] [her] [use] [or] 
[threatened use] of force was necessary to prevent or 
terminate (victim’s) wrongful behavior. 
 
Presumption of fear (unlawful and forcible entry into dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013(2), Fla. Stat. 
(Defendant) is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent 
peril of death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] when 
[using] [or] [threatening to use] defensive force if: 
 
a. 
The person against whom the defensive force was 
[used] [or] [threatened to be used] was in the process 
of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had 
unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, 
or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or 
was attempting to remove another against that 
person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle; and 
 
b. 
(Defendant) knew or had reason to believe that an 
unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible 
act was occurring or had occurred. 
 
Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. § 776.013(3)(a)-(3)(d), Fla. Stat. Give 
as applicable. 
The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily 
harm does not apply if: 
 
a. 
the person against whom the defensive force is [used] 
[or] [threatened to be used] has the right to be in [or 
is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] 
 
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[vehicle], such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and 
there is not an injunction for protection from 
domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision 
order of no contact against that person; or 
 
b. 
the person or persons sought to be removed is a child 
or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or 
under the lawful guardianship of, the person against 
whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to 
be used]; or 
 
c. 
the person who [uses] [or] [threatens to use] defensive 
force is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the 
[dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further a 
criminal activity; or 
 
d. 
the person against whom the defensive force is [used] 
[or] [threatened to be used] is a law enforcement 
officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] 
[residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] 
official duties and the officer identified [himself] 
[herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the 
person [using] [or] [threatening to use] the force knew 
or reasonably should have known that the person 
entering or attempting to enter was a law 
enforcement officer. 
If requested, give definition of “law enforcement officer” from 
§ 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. 
 
§§ 776.013(4), 776.013(5), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. 
A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter 
another’s [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so 
with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. 
 
“Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any 
attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or 
permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, 
and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night. 
 
 
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“Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either 
temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest. 
 
“Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, 
which is designed to transport people or property. 
 
Force in resisting a law enforcement officer. § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. 
A person is not justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] force to 
resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement 
officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement 
officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, 
to be a law enforcement officer. 
 
Give the following instruction if applicable. 
However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a 
person is justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of reasonable force to 
defend [himself] [herself] [another], but only to the extent [he] [she] 
reasonably believes such force is necessary. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. 
State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 463 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1985). 
 
Read in all cases. 
In deciding whether (defendant) was justified in the [use] [or] 
[threatened use] of non-deadly force, you must consider the circumstances by 
which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the [force] [or] [threat of force] 
was used. The danger need not have been actual; however, to justify the [use] 
[or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force, the appearance of danger must have 
been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same 
circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only 
through the use of that [force] [or] [threat of force], although as I have 
previously explained, the defendant had no duty to retreat. Based upon 
appearances, (defendant) must have actually believed that the danger was real. 
 
Aggressor. § 776.041(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable and only in cases 
where the defendant is charged with either: a) an independent forcible felony, 
Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2008); or b) felony murder, if the 
underlying felony is an independent forcible felony, Cook v. State, 192 So. 3d 681 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016). 
However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force is not 
justified if you find that (defendant) was attempting to commit, committing, or 
 
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escaping after the commission of a[n] (applicable forcible felony listed in 
§ 776.08, Fla. Stat.). 
Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony but omit any reference to 
burden of proof. Montijo v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The 
instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is 
not a crime against a person. 
 
Aggressor. § 776.041(2), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. 
Gibbs v. State, 789 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force is not 
justified if you find that (defendant) used [force] [or] [the threat of force] to 
initially provoke the [use] [or] [threatened use] of force against [himself] 
[herself], unless: 
 
1. 
the [force] [or] [threatened force] asserted toward 
(defendant) was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed 
that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to 
escape the danger, other than using non-deadly force on 
(victim). 
 
[or] 
 
2. 
in good faith, (defendant) withdrew from physical contact 
with (victim) and indicated clearly to (victim) that [he] [she] 
wanted to withdraw and stop the [use] [or] [threatened use] 
of non-deadly force, but (victim) continued or resumed the 
[use] [or] [threatened use] of force. 
 
Prior threats. Give if applicable.   
If you find that (defendant), who because of threats or prior difficulties 
with (victim), had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger 
of  imminent use of unlawful force at the hands of (victim), you may consider 
this fact in determining whether the actions of (defendant) were those of a 
reasonable person. 
 
Specific act of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable.  
If you find that at the time of the alleged (name[s] of relevant crime[s]), 
(defendant) knew that (victim) had committed an act [or acts] of violence, you 
may consider that fact in determining whether (defendant) reasonably believed 
 
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it was necessary for [him] [her] to [use] [or] [threaten to use] non-deadly 
force. 
 
Reputation of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable. 
If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and 
dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to (defendant), 
you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of (defendant) 
were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that 
reputation. 
 
Reputation of victim not necessarily known by defendant (to show victim 
acted in conformity with victim’s character). Give if applicable. 
If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and 
dangerous person, you may consider this fact in determining whether [he] 
[she] was the initial aggressor. 
 
Physical abilities. Read in all cases. 
In considering the issue of [self-defense] [defense of another] [defense of 
property], you may take into account the relative physical abilities and 
capacities of (defendant) and (victim). 
 
Read in all cases. 
If in your consideration of the issue of [self-defense] [defense of another] 
[defense of property] you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether 
(defendant) was justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force, 
you should find [him] [her] not guilty. 
 
However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that (defendant) was not justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of 
non-deadly force, then you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of 
the charge have been proved. 
 
Comments 
 
This instruction should be used for crimes committed on or after July 1, 
2017. 
A defendant may have knowledge of a victim’s prior specific acts of 
violence because he or she was present during the occurrence of the specific acts or 
 
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because the defendant heard of the specific acts prior to the date of the alleged act 
of self-defense. See Smith v. State, 606 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So. 2d 
985], 1992 [603 So. 2d 1175], 2006 [930 So. 2d 612], 2007 [947 So. 2d 1159], 
2008 [976 So. 2d 1081], 2010 [27 So. 3d 640], 2016 [191 So. 3d 411], and 2018 
[257 So. 3d 908], and 2019.