Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 184 S.E.2d 875, 280 N.C. 132

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1971-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
184 S.E.2d 875 (1971)
280 N.C. 132
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Robert WILLIAMS, Jr.
No. 134.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
December 15, 1971.
*876 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Asst. Atty. Gen. Myron C. Banks for the State.
Winston, Coleman & Bernholz, by Barry T. Winston, Chapel Hill, for defendant.
BRANCH, Justice.
All of defendant's assignments of error are directed to the charge.
*877 Defendant contends that the court erred in instructing the jury as to second degree murder and manslaughter. In this connection, the trial judge instructed the jury:
The correct rule concerning the presumptions which arise in a homicide case are found in State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E.2d 560. There the Court stated:
Here the charge does not mention the intentional use of a deadly weapon. Nor are the presumptions which arise from the intentional use of a deadly weapon correctly stated. Further, nothing appears in this part of the charge which indicates that the presumption of malice might be rebutted. Thus, even a cursory examination of this portion of the charge reveals that it does not comply with the rule as correctly stated in State v. Propst, supra.
The court thereafter charged:
The court set out to charge on manslaughter, but proceeded to give a definition of murder in the second degree.
Again, in discussing distinctions in homicides, the record shows:
The chief purpose of a charge is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict. State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352; Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20, 47 S.E.2d 484.
Defendant further contends that the trial judge expressed opinions to the jury. In support of this contention defendant cites *878 portions of the record which show the following:
Defendant correctly contends that this portion of the charge amounted to a statement of opinion that, if the stabbing was done, an act of criminal negligence had been committed by defendant.
This part of the court's instructions omitted the single word "if". Undoubtedly this was an inadvertent omission. It resulted, however, in an expression of opinion by the court that the State had already shown that defendant's act was criminally negligent.
In the case of State v. Kea, 256 N.C. 492, 124 S.E.2d 174, the trial judge charged "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice . . . ." It was apparent that the trial judge intended to charge that "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." There the trial court in other places correctly charged as to this element of manslaughter; nevertheless, this Court held that such charge resulted in prejudicial error.
It is clear that some of the errors in this charge resulted from lapsus linguae on the part of the trial judge; however, in all fairness to this experienced trial judge, we feel compelled to observe that it is also apparent that many of the errors of omission and commission resulted from the taking and transcription of the record.
This Court, however, is bound by the record as certified and can judicially know only what appears of record. State v. Morgan, 225 N.C. 549, 35 S.E.2d 621; State v. Winford, 279 N.C. 58, 181 S.E.2d 423.
We seriously doubt that any part of the charge as challenged by any one assignment of error would constitute prejudicial error; however, without attempting to discuss all assignments of error, we conclude that the total charge failed to clarify the material issues so as to aid the jury in reaching a verdict.
For reasons stated, there must be a
New trial.