Case Title: Ex parte 2215 Northport OpCo LLC and 2215 Northport PropCo LLC PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Eric J. Anders, as personal representative of the Estate of Charlie G. Sansing, deceased v. 2215 Northport OpCo LLC and 2215 Northport PropCo LLC)(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court: CV-2022-900664) .

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: March 8, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0635 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte 2215 Northport OpCo LLC and 2215 Northport PropCo 
LLC 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: Eric J. Anders, as personal representative of the Estate of 
Charlie G. Sansing, deceased  
 
v.  
 
2215 Northport OpCo LLC and 2215 Northport PropCo LLC)  
 
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court: CV-2022-900664) 
 
 
SC-2023-0635 
2 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
Charlie G. Sansing died in Tuscaloosa County in 2020.  Nearly two 
years later, Tuscaloosa attorney Eric J. Anders petitioned the Tuscaloosa 
Probate Court to appoint him as the administrator ad colligendum of 
Sansing's estate -- a role that would authorize Anders to collect and 
manage Sansing's assets while they awaited distribution to his 
beneficiaries.  The probate court granted Anders's petition.  Anders then 
brought in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court a wrongful-death action against 
2215 Northport OpCo LLC d/b/a Forest Manor Health and Rehabilitation 
and 2215 Northport PropCo LLC (collectively referred to as "Northport") 
just one day before the two-year limitations period expired.  Northport 
moved to dismiss the action, arguing that Anders was not a proper 
plaintiff because the probate court had not appointed him as the personal 
representative of Sansing's estate and Alabama law does not permit 
anyone other than a personal representative to bring a wrongful-death 
action, see § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975.  And, Northport argued, because no 
properly appointed personal representative had brought a wrongful-
death action within the two-year limitations period, the cause of action 
was extinguished.   
SC-2023-0635 
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Despite the probate court's order appointing Anders to only the 
limited role of administrator ad colligendum, and despite our caselaw 
specifying that only executors and general administrators may serve as 
personal representatives in a wrongful-death action, the circuit court 
denied Northport's motion.  Northport petitions this Court for a writ of 
mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the case.  Because the 
materials clearly establish that Anders is not a proper party to bring suit, 
we grant Northport's petition. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Sansing died on August 2, 2020, in Tuscaloosa County.  In his will, 
he named Alphonso Duncan as the executor of his estate.  On July 22, 
2022 -- nearly two years after Sansing's death -- Duncan petitioned the 
Tuscaloosa Probate Court to probate Sansing's will and to appoint him 
as the personal representative of Sansing's estate.  The probate court did 
not act on Duncan's petition.     
One week later, on July 29, 2022, Anders filed an "Amended 
Petition for Letters of Administration ad Colligendum," asking the 
probate court to appoint him administrator ad colligendum "so that [he] 
may file a wrongful death lawsuit."  That same day, the probate court 
SC-2023-0635 
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granted Anders's petition and named him as the "special administrator" 
of Sansing's estate.  In its "Order Granting Letters of Administration ad 
Colligendum," the probate court authorized Anders "to collect and take 
into his possession the goods and chattels, monies, books, papers and 
evidence of debt of the deceased" until the probate court appointed a 
personal representative of the estate, at which time Anders's position 
would terminate. 
On August 1, 2022, Anders commenced a wrongful-death action 
against Northport in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.  In the complaint, 
Anders referred to himself as the "personal representative" of Sansing's 
estate and alleged that Sansing had died as a result of receiving 
substandard care while living in one of Northport's rehabilitation 
centers.   
On September 9, 2022, Northport moved to dismiss the action.  In 
its motion, Northport argued that because Anders had been appointed 
administrator ad colligendum -- not personal representative -- of 
Sansing's estate, he lacked authority under § 6-5-410 to bring a wrongful-
death action.  Because Anders lacked that authority, Northport argued, 
the circuit court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction and the 
SC-2023-0635 
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lawsuit was a nullity.  Further, Northport argued, since no properly 
appointed personal representative had initiated an action within the two-
year limitations period, the cause of action was extinguished.  The circuit 
court denied Northport's motion.   
 
Northport then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking this 
Court to direct the circuit court to dismiss the action. 
Standard of Review 
A writ of mandamus is appropriate if the petitioner can show "1) a 
clear legal right … to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the 
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of 
another adequate remedy; and 4) [the] properly invoked jurisdiction of 
the court."  Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 
1993).  This Court has consistently held that these requirements can be 
met in cases in which someone other than a personal representative 
commences a wrongful-death action.  See, e.g., Ex parte Bio-Medical 
Applications of Alabama, Inc., 216 So. 3d 420 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte 
Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So. 3d 1211 (2016).  In determining whether to 
grant mandamus relief, "this Court reviews issues of law de novo."  Ex 
parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 455, 457 (Ala. 2006).   
SC-2023-0635 
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Analysis 
Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, § 6-5-410, provides that only "[a] 
personal representative may commence an action" alleging wrongful 
death.  § 6-5-410(a).  The thrust of Northport's petition is that 
administrators ad colligendum are not "personal representatives." 
According to Northport, because Anders was appointed as an 
administrator ad colligendum, Anders could not bring the suit and the 
action was a nullity.  And, Northport further asserts, because no properly 
appointed personal representative brought suit within the two-year 
limitations period in § 6-5-410, the cause of action was extinguished.  See 
Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala. 1992).  We agree.   
A. An Administrator ad Colligendum Is Not a "Personal 
Representative" Within the Meaning of § 6-5-410(a) 
Section 6-5-410(a) provides that only a "personal representative" 
may bring a wrongful-death action, but it does not define who counts as 
one.  "[W]hen a term is not defined in a statute, the commonly accepted 
definition of that term should be applied."  Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. 
Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 855 So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 2003).  In accordance 
with that principle, this Court has interpreted "personal representative" 
to "only mean the executor or administrator."  Downtown Nursing Home, 
SC-2023-0635 
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Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 1979) (emphasis added); see also 
Hatas v. Partin, 175 So. 2d 759, 761 (Ala. 1965) (same); accord Black's 
Law Dictionary 1557 (11th ed. 2019) (explaining that "personal 
representative" is either "an executor … named in a will" or "an 
administrator … not named in a will"). 
Executors and administrators serve the same function -- managing 
the estate of a decedent -- but are appointed differently.  An executor can 
be appointed only by being named in the will of a decedent.  § 43-2-20, 
Ala. Code 1975.  On the other hand, the probate court can appoint an 
administrator when there is no will or the will does not name an executor.  
§ 43-2-40, Ala. Code 1975.  But a person cannot become an executor until 
the probate court issues letters testamentary; nor can a person become 
an administrator until the probate court issues letters of administration.  
Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Ala. 1993). 
The upshot is that only an executor or an administrator to whom 
the probate court has issued letters testamentary or letters of 
administration may commence a wrongful-death action, and he or she 
must do so within two years of the decedent's death.  Because an executor 
must be named in the decedent's will, and because Sansing did not name 
SC-2023-0635 
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Anders in his will, the only question here is whether Anders is an 
"administrator."  And to answer that question, we must determine 
whether an administrator ad colligendum is an "administrator" such that 
he or she could bring a wrongful-death action as a personal 
representative under § 6-5-410(a).   
An administrator ad colligendum is a "special administrator" whom 
a probate judge may appoint for "the specific purpose of collecting and 
preserving the assets of the estate when necessary."  Ex parte Baker, 183 
So. 3d 139, 143 (Ala. 2015).  Section 43-2-47(a), Ala. Code 1975, limits 
that role in duration -- it ends when "letters testamentary or of 
administration have been duly issued."  This Court has also interpreted 
that statute to limit the position's scope of authority, see Baker, 183 So. 
3d at 143 (noting than an administrator ad colligendum "may take no 
action with regard to any estate matters other than what is permitted by 
§ 43-2-47"). 
Consequently, 
unlike 
executors 
and 
administrators, 
an 
administrator ad colligendum cannot "initiate the general administration 
of [an] estate" or otherwise "deal with the duties and obligations of the 
administration of an estate."  Id.  Because of their "limited authority" as 
SC-2023-0635 
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mere officers of the probate court, administrators ad colligendum are 
neither "administrators" nor "executors" of a decedent's estate.  Id.    
Accordingly, they are not "personal representatives" under § 6-5-410.  
And because they are not personal representatives, administrators ad 
colligendum cannot bring suit under the Wrongful Death Act.   
Anders nonetheless argues that administrators ad colligendum 
should fall within the purview of Wrongful Death Act because this Court 
permitted an administrator ad litem, another type of special 
administrator, to prosecute a wrongful-death action in Affinity Hospital, 
L.L.C. v. Williford, 21 So. 3d 712 (Ala. 2009).  Since administrators ad 
colligendum are likewise special administrators, Anders says, it follows 
that they can also bring wrongful-death actions. 
Putting aside any relevant differences between the two types of 
special administrators, Anders's argument does not pass muster under 
the reasoning of Williford itself.  The Williford Court reached the 
conclusion that it did only because neither party provided any authority 
"indicating that an administrator ad litem lack[ed] the power of a 
'personal representative' for purposes of prosecuting a wrongful-death 
action."  Id. at 718.  And in the absence of any authority to the contrary, 
SC-2023-0635 
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the Court said it would not reverse the trial court's judgment on the issue.  
Id. But that reasoning has no relevance here, because Northport has 
pointed to authority -- both § 43-2-47 and our precedent -- indicating that 
administrators ad colligendum "lack[] the power of a 'personal 
representative.'"  See Baker, 183 So. 3d at 143; accord Ex parte 
Continental Motors, Inc., 270 So. 3d 1148, 1159 (Ala. 2018) (holding that 
an administrator ad litem does not have the authority to pursue a 
wrongful-death claim because the defendant "presented argument and 
authority"); Golden Gate Nat'l Senior Care, LLC v. Roser, 94 So. 3d 365, 
370 (Ala. 2012) (Bolin, J., concurring specially) (same).1  
Anders also argues that § 43-2-47 does expressly permit 
administrators ad colligendum to prosecute wrongful-death actions 
because subsection (b) says that an administrator ad colligendum "may 
maintain civil actions as administrator" and a wrongful-death action is a 
"civil action."  But in making this argument, Anders omits the 
 
1Justice Bolin visited the issue again in Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd, 
205 So. 3d 1188 (Ala. 2016), in which he wrote specially to emphasize 
that the Wrongful Death Act "grants to only a legally appointed personal 
representative, i.e., an administrator or an executor, the right to bring a 
wrongful-death action." 205 So. 3d at 1193 (Bolin, J., concurring 
specially). 
SC-2023-0635 
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immediately preceding phrase -- "for such purposes" -- which qualifies 
which "civil actions" an administrator ad colligendum "may maintain."  
The "purposes" to which the last clause refers are those laid out at the 
beginning of subsection (b): "collect[ing] the goods and chattels of the 
estate and debts of the deceased"; "giv[ing] receipts for moneys collected"; 
"satisfy[ing] liens and mortgages"; and "secur[ing] and preserv[ing] such 
goods and chattels."  Id.  In other words, an administrator ad colligendum 
may only maintain civil actions that further the execution of those 
particular duties. 
Prosecuting 
a wrongful-death 
action 
"is not 
an 
'act of 
administration.'"  Bio-Medical Applications, 216 So. 3d at 424; see also 
Hicks v. Barrett, 40 Ala. 291, 293 (1866) (noting that commencing a 
wrongful-death action is "altogether distinct from the administration" of 
an estate).  Rather than acting as an "agent of the probate court," Baker, 
183 So. 3d at 143, a personal representative "'acts as agent of legislative 
appointment'" and functions as a "'quasi-trustee'" of any damages 
recovered.  Bio-Medical Applications, 216 So. 3d at 424 (quoting United 
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Birmingham Oxygen Serv. Inc., 290 Ala. 149, 
155, 274 So. 2d 615, 621 (1973)).  Those damages are "'not subject to 
SC-2023-0635 
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administration'" because they "'do not become a part of the deceased's 
estate.'"  Id. 
In sum, a personal representative's function in a wrongful-death 
action does not approximate -- much less overlap with -- the 
administrator ad colligendum's stopgap role of "collecting and preserving 
the assets of the estate." Baker, 183 So. 3d at 143.   Maintaining a 
wrongful-death action simply does not fall within the ambit of § 43-2-
47(b).   
B. The Probate Court's References to Anders as "Personal 
Representative" and Anders's Intent to Commence a Wrongful-
Death Action Do Not Make Him a Personal Representative for 
Purposes of § 6-5-410(a) 
Anders argues that even if administrators ad colligendum are not 
ordinarily personal representatives, he is a personal representative here 
because the probate court referred to him as both an administrator ad 
colligendum and a "personal representative" in its order granting his 
petition.  Further, Anders says, because he made clear his intent to 
commence a wrongful-death action in his petition for letters of 
administration ad colligendum, the probate court's order implicitly 
granted him "broader powers," including the authority to commence a 
wrongful-death action.  Anders's answer at 4. 
SC-2023-0635 
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Section 43-2-47 limits the authority of not only administrators ad 
colligendum but also the probate court, which may appoint those 
administrators only "to collect and preserve the goods of the deceased, 
until some one [else] is clothed with authority to administer them."  Flora 
v. Mennice, 12 Ala. 836, 837 (1848); see also Little v. Gavin, 244 Ala. 156, 
12 So. 2d 549 (1943) (holding that a probate court cannot enlarge the 
duties of a special administrator); Erwin v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 14 
Ala. 307, 311 (1848) (same); Wolffe v. Eberlein, 74 Ala. 99, 107 (1883) 
(noting that the law, not the probate court, defines the duties of an 
administrator ad colligendum).  Because a probate court may appoint an 
administrator ad colligendum only for the purposes listed in § 43-2-47, 
Baker, 183 So. 3d at 143-44, it does not matter that Anders sought 
appointment as an administrator ad colligendum for the purpose of 
commencing a wrongful-death action.  Anders cannot somehow expand 
the scope of that position by premising his request on the desire to 
commence a wrongful-death action, and the probate court cannot grant 
him broader powers than what § 43-2-47 permits.  See Underhill v. 
Mobile Fire Dep't Ins. Co., 67 Ala. 45, 50 (1880) (holding that even though 
the administrator ad colligendum sought -- and the trial court granted -- 
SC-2023-0635 
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appointment to prosecute a conversion suit on behalf the decedent, "[t]he 
statute intervened" and limited the scope of the administrator ad 
colligendum's authority).  
Nor does the probate court's scattered references to Anders as a 
"personal representative" in the order appointing him administrator ad 
colligendum transform Anders into a "personal representative" under the 
Wrongful Death Act.  A "personal representative" as defined in the 
Probate Code, § 43-8-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, is not equivalent to a 
"personal representative" designated in the Wrongful Death Act.  In 
contrast to the Wrongful Death Act, the Probate Code does define 
"personal representative," and it does so broadly:  a "personal 
representative" can include an "executor, administrator, successor 
personal representative, special administrator" or any "persons who 
perform substantially the same function under the law governing their 
status."  § 43-8-1(24). 
In sum, what is sufficient to constitute a "personal representative" 
in probate court is not always sufficient to constitute a "personal 
representative" under the Wrongful Death Act; the two are not 
interchangeable.  See Golden Gate, 94 So. 3d at 368 (Bolin, J., concurring 
SC-2023-0635 
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specially) (noting that appointment as an administrator ad litem "is not 
sufficient to show compliance with the legislative mandate for a personal 
representative in § 6-5-410").  As a plurality of this Court has explained, 
"[o]ne who sues under [the Wrongful Death Act] without having been 
appointed executor or administrator does not qualify … as a personal 
representative."  Waters v. Hipp, 600 So. 2d 981, 982 (1992) (plurality 
opinion).  The probate court did not appoint Anders as either.  
Consequently, Anders could not bring a wrongful-death action.  And 
because Anders lacked authority to sue under § 6-5-410, his suit is a 
nullity.  See Hubbard Props., supra. 
C. The Relation-Back Doctrine Does Not Apply 
As a last resort, Anders insists that he is merely acting as the 
personal representative until Duncan, the executor named in Sansing's 
will, receives letters testamentary from the probate court that would 
make him a "successor personal representative."  Anders's answer at 12.  
To support his argument, Anders relies on the "relation-back" doctrine in 
§ 43-2-831, Ala. Code 1975.  That section provides that "[t]he powers of a 
personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person 
appointed which are beneficial to the estate occurring prior to 
SC-2023-0635 
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appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter."  On Anders's 
interpretation, § 43-2-831 preserves the right of a "future named 
administrator" of Sansing's estate to prosecute the wrongful-death action 
because Anders's appointment as administrator ad colligendum, and his 
commencement of the wrongful-death action, occurred before the two-
year limitations period in § 6-5-410 expired.  Anders's answer at 11.  If 
the probate court were to grant Duncan letters testamentary sometime 
in the future, Anders says, then Duncan would be able to prosecute the 
wrongful-death action because it would "relate back" to Anders's timely 
filed wrongful-death complaint, which was filed after Anders was 
appointed administrator ad colligendum.  See id. at 11-12. 
Anders's reliance on § 43-2-831 is misplaced.  As this Court recently 
explained, that rule "generally cannot be used to prevent a wrongful-
death claim from being time-barred where the personal representative is 
appointed after the two-year limitations period has expired."  Alvarado 
v. Estate of Kidd, 205 So. 3d 1188, 1192 (Ala. 2016).  That is because the 
plain language of § 43-2-831 limits the application of the rule to "acts by 
the person appointed which are beneficial to the estate."  (Emphasis 
added.)  A wrongful-death action, however, is not "beneficial to the 
SC-2023-0635 
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estate," id., because it is "not brought on behalf of the estate," Wood v. 
Wayman, 47 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (Ala. 2010), and "damages awarded in a 
wrongful-death action are not part of the decedent's estate,"  Alvarado, 
375 So. 3d at 1191.  For that reason, wrongful-death actions fall outside 
the scope of that doctrine.   
To the extent that our cases have recognized an exception and 
allowed a wrongful-death action to proceed under the relation-back 
doctrine, that exception does not apply here.  In Ogle v. Gordon, 706 So. 
2d 707 (Ala. 1997) -- the case on which Anders relies -- this Court 
permitted a plaintiff's wrongful-death action to "relate back" to the date 
he filed a wrongful-death complaint, which he filed while his petition for 
letters testamentary was still pending, even though the probate court did 
not actually appoint him as personal representative until after the 
limitations period had run.  Although the plaintiff had filed the petition 
just 4 months after his wife's death -- and had filed the wrongful-death 
complaint within the statutory limitations period -- the probate court 
waited over 27 months to appoint him personal representative, by which 
point the 2-year limitations period had expired.  Because of the probate 
SC-2023-0635 
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court's unexplained delay, the Court permitted Ogle's appointment to 
relate back to the date he filed his wrongful-death complaint.   
But our Court later explained that the Ogle "exception" only applied 
in those extreme cases in which the "dereliction" of the probate court 
causes the delay in the appointment of a personal representative.  Wood, 
47 So. 3d at 1217-19; see also Alvarado, 375 So. 3d at 1190-92.  Those 
circumstances are not present here, where Duncan did not file his 
petition requesting letters testamentary until 11 days before the 
limitations period in § 6-5-410 expired.  As in Alvarado -- where the 
executor named in the will filed a petition for letters testamentary six 
days before the two-year limitations period expired -- we cannot "rightly 
blame the probate court for 'inadvertence' or 'dereliction.'"  205 So. 3d at 
1192 (quoting Ogle, 706 So. 2d at 711).2  Consequently, the exception 
found in Ogle does not apply.   
 
2Anders does not purport to rely on the relation-back doctrine under 
Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., which allows parties to file amended pleadings 
that "relate back" to their original pleading.  But even if he did, that 
relation-back rule would also not apply because Anders brought suit 
without having ever been appointed a personal representative within the 
meaning of § 6-5-410.  Because the suit was a "nullity" from its inception, 
there was no valid pleading to which to "relate back."  See Downtown 
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 1979) (holding that 
because the plaintiff "filed suit without having been appointed executor 
SC-2023-0635 
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Conclusion 
Because Anders sued under § 6-5-410 "without having been 
appointed executor or administrator," he is not a proper party under the 
statute and "the suit is a nullity."  Waters, 600 So. 2d at 982 (plurality 
opinion).  Northport has shown a clear legal right to the writ of 
mandamus.  We therefore grant Northport's petition and direct the 
circuit court to dismiss the complaint.     
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., 
concur. 
Shaw, J., concurs in the result. 
 
Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
 
 
or administrator," the wrongful-death suit was a "nullity" and the 
doctrine of relation back did not apply); Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 
205 So. 3d 1211, 1214 (Ala. 2016) (Shaw, J., concurring specially) (noting 
that because the wrongful-death "action was not properly commenced, 
the doctrine of relation back does not apply").   
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result). 
I concur in the result. Under current Alabama law, an 
administrator ad colligendum may not prosecute a wrongful-death 
action.   See § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975.  In Alabama, wrongful-death 
actions are purely statutory, and to pursue a wrongful-death action there 
must be, among other things, a personal representative duly appointed 
by a probate court, to whom letters testamentary or letters of 
administration have been issued.  Pollard v. H.C. P'ship, 309 So. 3d 1189, 
1201 (Ala. 2020) (Bolin, J., concurring specially).  In my opinion, where, 
as here, a party challenges a plaintiff's capacity to pursue a wrongful-
death action, this Court should look no further than to see whether  
letters testamentary or letters of administration were issued to the 
plaintiff to confirm his or her capacity. Letters testamentary and letters 
of administration are the unique legal documents vesting a personal 
representative with the authority to act on behalf of an estate. The status 
of personal representative can be bestowed by a probate court only 
through the granting of such letters. Absent the issuance of such letters, 
a wrongful-death action may not be maintained.