Case Title: In re Stowe Club Highlands

Citation: 166 Vt. 33, 687 A.2d 102

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Stowe Club Highlands  (95-341); 166 Vt. 33; 687 A.2d 102

[Filed 08-Nov-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 22-Nov-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 95-341

In re Stowe Club Highlands                        Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
                                                  Environmental Board

                                                  March Term, 1996

John T. Ewing, Chair

Harold B. Stevens, Stowe, for appellant

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and John H. Hasen, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for amicus curiae State of Vermont

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  Stowe Club Highlands (SCH) appeals a decision of the
  Environmental Board denying SCH's application for a permit to develop a
  twenty-two acre Meadow Lot within the Stowe Club development.  Both the
  District Commission and the Board concluded that the proposed development
  violated the original permit governing the Stowe Club project, and denied
  the permit modification under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  We
  reject the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel under these
  circumstances, but conclude that the Board properly denied the permit
  amendment in light of the reliance of the purchasers of lots adjacent to
  the Meadow Lot.  Accordingly, we affirm the Board's decision.

       This case began in 1985, when SCH's predecessor, Stowe Club
  Associates, sought and received an Act 250 permit to develop the 250-acre
  tract of land now known as Stowe Club. The original permit authorized
  construction of a 100-unit hotel, a 10,000-square-foot conference center,
  fifty-five three-bedroom townhouses and a twenty-three lot subdivision. 
  Condition 13 of the original permit states that: "The 40 acre meadow on the
  project tract shall be retained for

 

  agricultural uses for a period of time at least equal to the life of this
  land use permit."(FN1)  In addition, the District Commission at the time made
  findings under 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(8) & (9)(B) (Criteria 8 and 9(B)), based
  on statements in the permit application, that the Meadow Lot would remain
  open and would be reserved for agricultural uses.  Condition 1 of the
  original permit explicitly incorporates the findings and conclusions of the
  Commission.

       Some changes have occurred in the Stowe Club development since the
  original permit was issued.  Stowe Club Associates and an adjacent farmer,
  Paul Percy, had entered into an agreement for the sale of the Meadow Lot;
  that sale did not occur.  A 1986 permit amendment allowed construction of
  community waste disposal fields in the Meadow Lot.  Also, the planned
  100-unit hotel was replaced with a smaller, 21-unit facility.

       In 1990, Stowe Club Associates conveyed the project tract to the
  Chittenden Bank in lieu of foreclosure.  The Bank sold a number of
  single-family house lots adjacent to the Meadow Lot, and in 1992, sold the
  remaining portion of the tract to Robinson Springs Partnership, which had
  knowledge of the land use restrictions in the original permit.  Appellant
  SCH is the direct successor in interest of Robinson Springs Partnership.

       The Board also found that Leighton Detora, the owner of a lot adjacent
  to the Meadow Lot and a party below, relied on the fact that the Meadow Lot
  would remain undeveloped when he purchased his lot and built his residence. 
  Specifically, the Board found that Detora enjoys the agricultural character
  of the neighborhood, the cows in the nearby pasture, and the lack of light
  at night from the barn.

                                I.

       We begin with SCH's threshold argument, that replacing the barn with a
  smaller residence and stable does not violate the permit condition
  requiring that the Meadow Lot be retained for agricultural uses.  SCH
  maintains that the smaller residence and stable will increase

 

  the amount of open space and not threaten the agricultural potential of the
  soil.  Following this reasoning, the application to develop the Meadow Lot
  should have been considered independently, and not as an attempt to modify
  the original permit.

       We agree with the Board, however, that building a single-family home
  on the  Meadow Lot is not consistent with preserving the lot for
  agricultural uses.  Merely attaching a stable to a house does not convert a
  residential development to an agricultural use.  In the zoning context, for
  example, courts have held that ordinances authorizing the use of certain
  land as a farm do not permit the stabling and training of riding horses. 
  See Demarest v. Heck,