Case Title: Mishr v. Poland Bd. of Zoning Appeals

Citation: 1996-Ohio-400

Docket Number: 19951616

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mishr, Appellee, v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Village of Poland, Appellant. 
[Cite as Mishr v. Poland Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1996), _______ Ohio St.3d 
____________.] 
Municipal corporation -- Ordinance changing zoning designation repealed 
-- Repealing ordinance does not specifically provide that property is 
to return to previous zoning designation as required by R.C. 731.19 
-- Property reverts to previous zoning classification. 
 
(No. 95-1616 -- Submitted June 4, 1996 -- Decided August 7, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 93 C.A. 234. 
 
The Council of the Village of Poland, Ohio, in 1978 adopted a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance for the entire village.  Plaintiff-appellee, Suman 
K. Mishr, applied to have the zoning of his property changed from the 
“Professional Office and Service District” designation into the “Village Center 
Commercial District” designation.  On May 15, 1990, the village council adopted 
Ordinance No. 846-90, and rezoned appellee’s property as requested by amending 
its zoning ordinance. 
 
On January 8, 1991, the village council adopted Ordinance No. 850-91, 
which repealed Ordinance No. 846-90.  The repealing ordinance did not 
specifically provide that the property was to return to the Professional Office and 
Service classification. 
 
 
 
 
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On August 27, 1992, appellee applied for a village zoning permit to build a 
professional and retail center on his property.  Appellee completed the blank space 
on the permit application pertaining to the zoning district of the property by 
stating that the property was located in an “Unzoned District.”  On August 31, 
1992, the village zoning administrator sent appellee a letter informing him that his 
zoning permit was denied, and stating that the property was not unzoned, but 
rather was zoned “Professional Office and Service District.” 
 
Appellee appealed to defendant-appellant, the Poland Board of Zoning 
Appeals, and explained his argument supporting his conclusion that the property 
was unzoned at a meeting of the board.  Appellee’s argument centered on R.C. 
731.19, which provides in part that “[n]o bylaw or ordinance, or section thereof, 
shall be revived or amended, unless the new bylaw or ordinance contains the entire 
bylaw, *** ordinance, or section revived or amended, and the bylaw, ordinance, or 
section so amended shall be repealed.”  Appellee contended that the failure of the 
repealing ordinance to contain, in the ordinance itself, the section of the previous 
ordinance establishing the Professional Office and Service designation meant that 
R.C. 731.19 was not satisfied, and that therefore the previous zoning on the 
 
 
 
 
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property was not revived.  Appellee further contended that the repealing ordinance 
had unequivocally removed the property from the Village Center Commercial 
designation, so that the property was not in that classification either.  Appellee 
reasoned that since the property was not in either classification, it must be 
unzoned.  The board rejected appellee’s argument, determined that the property 
was zoned Professional Office and Service, and denied the appeal. 
 
Appellee appealed the decision of the board to the Mahoning County 
Common Pleas Court.  The court overturned the decision of the board and found 
that appellee was entitled to the zoning permit.  The court ordered that the permit 
be issued due to the failure of the repealing ordinance (Ordinance No. 850-91) to 
comply with R.C. 731.19.  The Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, in a split 
decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
Paul E. Stevens, for appellee. 
 
Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld & Lodge and James E. Roberts; and Stuart J. 
Banks, for appellant. 
 
 
 
 
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Alice Robie Resnick, J.  The facts in this case are not disputed.  The issue 
presented is whether, based on those specific facts, R.C. 731.19 operates to yield a 
conclusion that appellee’s property is unzoned.  For the reasons which follow, we 
find that appellee’s property is not unzoned.  We reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
The court of appeals stated: 
 
“By the language of R.C. 731.19, it was incumbent upon the Village of 
Poland to specifically refer to and revive the 1978 Ordinance in order to return the 
zoning designation of the property in question to its pre-May 15, 1990 state.  The 
January 8, 1991 ordinance clearly does not contain any reference to the 1978 
ordinance, nor does it contain the mandatory reviving language.  Statutory 
procedures for enacting or amending zoning ordinances are mandatory upon 
villages that are not charter municipal corporations.  Evans v. Lakeview (1990), 67 
Ohio App.3d 117, 585 N.E.2d 1018. 
 
“The only way the property in question could have been returned to the 
designation it had under the 1978 ordinance would have been for the repealing 
ordinance to contain language sufficient to revive that designation.  As none 
 
 
 
 
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exists, the trial court was correct in finding that the property is currently unzoned 
and that the requested building permit be issued.” 
 
We do not agree with the conclusion reached by the court of appeals. 
 
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be 
interpreted to yield an absurd result.  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells 
(1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 18 OBR 437, 439, 481 N.E.2d 632, 634; Slater v. 
Cave (1853), 3 Ohio St. 80, 83-84 (“[W]here the literal construction of a statute 
would lead to gross absurdity, or where, out of several acts touching the same 
subject matter, there arise collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly 
contradictory to common reason, *** provisions leading to collateral 
consequences of great absurdity or injustice, may be rejected ***.”).  See, also, 
R.C. 1.47(C) (“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that *** [a] just and reasonable 
result is intended.”). 
 
We find that the court of appeals’ interpretation of R.C. 731.19 would yield 
an absurd result in this case.  A finding that appellee’s property is unzoned, when 
the village council clearly intended that it revert to the zoning that was in place 
before Ordinance No. 846-90 was adopted, would allow a legal technicality to 
 
 
 
 
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frustrate the very essence of the village’s comprehensive zoning plan.  In Union 
Oil Co. v. Worthington (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 263, 16 O.O.3d 315, 405 N.E.2d 
277, this court indicated that when a court invalidates the zoning of a particular 
property which is within an area covered by a comprehensive zoning plan, the 
courts should strive to avoid a determination that the property is unzoned. 
 
We are in accord with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Bd. 
of Commrs. of Henry Cty. v. Welch (1985), 253 Ga. 682, 324 S.E.2d 178, 
involving a situation similar to this one, in which a lower court had held that a 
parcel of property was unzoned because a county had repealed the zoning on the 
property without specifying a new zoning in its place.  The Supreme Court of 
Georgia found the lower court ruling, which operated “to denude certain areas of 
the county of any zoning classification, to be clearly unreasonable” and 
determined that the property remained in the previous zoning classification.  Id., 
253 Ga. at 684, 324 S.E.2d at 180. 
 
We acknowledge that zoning ordinances should be construed in favor of the 
property owner.  See In re Univ. Circle, Inc. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 180, 184, 10 
O.O.3d 346, 348, 383 N.E.2d 139, 141.  We further acknowledge that the village 
 
 
 
 
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council should have specifically revived the affected section of the 1978 ordinance 
by restating the language of that section when it adopted the repealing ordinance.  
However, the failure to do so is not fatal to appellant’s case, since no rule of 
construction can guide an inquiry when that rule of construction yields an absurd 
and unreasonable result. 
 
Appellee’s property is not unzoned.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  The decision of the board that appellee’s property is zoned Professional 
Office and Service is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals as 
recited in the majority opinion, therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.